RAFEQ (A.K.)

Ph.D. (History)

1963
THE PROVINCE OF DAMASCUS FROM 1723 TO 1733

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 'AZM PASHAS

by

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Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the University of London

June 1963
ABSTRACT

The period under study was characterized by two main features: the appointment of members of the local ‘Azm family as governors and the trend towards lengthening the tenure of governors. An investigation of the causes which brought about these developments shows that the decline of the Ottoman central administration facilitated the emergence of local power groups. The transfer of the command of the Pilgrimage, previously mainly held by local notables, to the governors of Damascus was a major factor behind the lengthening of their tenure. The object of this study is to show how these developments came about and how the history of Damascus was shaped as a result.

The principal sources include Arabic manuscripts and archival material. These are surveyed in the first chapter. The second chapter deals with the limits of the province of Damascus, analyses the importance of the period under study and examines various aspects of the administration and the religious institutions.

The local political developments which immediately preceded the appointment of the first ‘Azm governor, Isma‘il Pasha, to Damascus are discussed, together with the origin of the ‘Azm, in the first half of Chapter 3. The remaining part of the chapter deals with his governorship and with the causes behind the downfall of the ‘Azm governors in 1730.

The period between 1730 and 1741 which is discussed in Chapter 4, saw five governors appointed to Damascus, one of whom was a ‘Azm. The causes behind the rehabilitation of the ‘Azm are discussed here. Chapter 5 is devoted to the third phase of ‘Azm rule in Damascus in the period between 1741 and 1757. After it their power was weakened. It was not till 1771 that a
‘Azm was again appointed to Damascus.

The period between 1757 and 1760, which is discussed in Chapter 6, saw the governors seriously challenged by local forces inside and outside Damascus. They held the field for the time being, however. After 1760 the forces in Damascus were quiescent, but the outside dangers were increasing. A large part of Chapter 7 is devoted, therefore, to an analysis of these dangers, which culminated with the occupation of Damascus by the Mamluks of Egypt in 1771. The final chapter discusses the difficulties which the ‘Azm governor, Muhammad Pasha, encountered in his attempt to restore the hegemony of Damascus. His death in 1783 marks the decline of ‘Azm power and the transfer of the political initiative in southern Syria to the governor of Sidon, Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am greatly indebted to Dr. P. M. Holt for his kind attention and guidance throughout the preparation of this work. I am very grateful to Professor Bernard Lewis for his invaluable advice.
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<td>BJRL</td>
<td>Bulletin of the John Rylands Library.</td>
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<td>EHR</td>
<td>Economic History Review.</td>
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<td>JA</td>
<td>Journal Asiatique.</td>
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<td>JPOS</td>
<td>Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society.</td>
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<td>JRAS</td>
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<td>Middle East Forum.</td>
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<td>RAAD</td>
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Chapter 2

A SURVEY OF THE SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF DAMASCUS IN THE

18TH CENTURY.

A. ARABIC SOURCES

I. Chronicles.

a) Chronicles which deal with the internal history of Damascus.

1. Ibn Kinān, al-Ḥawādith al-yawmiyya, 2 vols. in manuscript form. Vol. I deals with the period between 1111/1699-1700 and 1134/1721-2, and Vol. II with the period between 1135/1722-3 and 1153/1740-1. The author was born in Damascus in 1074/1663-4 and died in it in 1153/1740-1. He figured among the ʿawān of Murādī and, like his father, was affiliated with the Ḥalwatiyya ʿariqa. He devoted a large part of his chronicle to information about the ʿUlāma in Damascus. Details concerning the arrival and departure of pilgrims are abundant in his work. Struggles among the power groups in Damascus are amply described as well. Murādī had access to a copy of this work and utilized parts of it in the writing of his Silk al-durar. There are many additions in the margins, particularly in the second volume, probably by the author's son Muḥammad Saʿīd (1153/1740-1 - 1189/1775-6), who assembled its loose leaves in 1187/1773-4. In this task he was not wholly successful, as he himself confessed. However, the dates mentioned in the text and on the margins, together with the names of governors and other officials, minimize this disadvantage.

1 Full bibliographical details of these works are given in the Bibliography, see pp. 412-425.


4 Ibn Kinān, I, f. 2a. 5 Ibid., II, f. 189a. 6 Ibid.
2. Within the period covered by the second volume of the work of Ibn Kinān, there is a very good account on the years between roughly 1724 and 1727. It covers fols. 55-60 in an MS in the Berlin Collection entitled \textit{Kitāb majūf fīhi...}. This narrative, attributed to ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mawṣūlī, is of special importance because it deals in detail with the period when the first ‘Aẓm governor was appointed to Damascus. The factional struggles, the extortions practised on the Damascenes and the fluctuations in the prices of foodstuffs are well described. Other sources substantiate this account.

3. Budayrī’s \textit{Hawādith Dimashq al-iyāmiyya} starts with the events of 1154/1741, the year at which Ibn Kinān stopped, and ends with the year 1176/1762-3. This work, of which there exist in the Zahirīyya Library in Damascus two MSS, which were utilized for this study, and a third in the library of Ḥusayn Iskandar al-Ma’lūf, was edited by Dr. Aḥmad ‘Izzat ‘Abd al-Karīm and published in Cairo in 1959.

There is no biography of Budayrī in Murādī’s \textit{Silk al-durar}, apparently because he did not rank among the \textit{a’yan} he selected. The little that is known about him is taken from his MS. As a barber he had occasion to meet many people, and this seems to have enabled him to keep in touch with what was happening in Damascus and to listen to various points of view. He described the political and social developments in Damascus and elaborated particularly on the fluctuations in the prices of foodstuffs. The fact that Budayrī was not well off made him more sensitive to the changes in prices which weighed heavily on the poor. As a devoted Muslim, he ascribed the nat-

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1 If this is true either this person was not the same ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mawṣūlī whose death Murādī reported in 1118/1706-7, see II, 259-66, or Murādī was mistaken in dating his death.


3 Budayrī, \textit{ff.} 4a, 53b. (\textit{MS. Zāhirīyya} \textit{fī 3937 is used for reference}).
ural calamities that befell Damascus to the mischiefs that prevailed in it.

Unfortunately the MS of Budayrī did not reach us in its original form. Al-Shaykh Muḥammad Saʿīd al-Qāsimī (1259/1843 - 1317/1900) acquired the original copy, which was written by Budayrī in the colloquial language, and which, he alleged, contained many unnecessary asides, trimmed it and then put it in grammatical Arabic, deficient though this remains. There is no reason to believe that al-Qāsimī might have altered what Budayrī had stated. Apart from his religious upbringing and his appointment as Imām of the Sināniyya Mosque in Damascus, al-Qāsimī was a learned person who had written several books; chief among them was his work on the crafts in Damascus. These aspects of his career incline us to take his word that he had not damaged the account of Budayrī. True, there was a gap between the social status of al-Qāsimī, who ranked among the aʿyān of Damascus, and that of Budayrī, who was a barber, which could have affected their selection of events had they been writing on the same period. But there is nothing to suggest that al-Qāsimī had suppressed any information by Budayrī which was prejudicial, for example, to other members of his class. The statement in which Budayrī accused the Muftī Ḥamid Efendi al-ʿImādī of profiteering is not suppressed.

Budayrī's account of the last five years of his chronicle, 1172-1176, is unusually brief, with the exception of the year 1173, during which Damascus was hit by a series of earthquakes; the immense damage necessitated ample description. Contrary to Budayrī's claim in the title of his MS, that it cov-

1Budayrī, ff. 14b, 15a, 21a.
2For his biography see: Muḥammad Jamīl al-Shatṭī, Tarājim aʿyān Dimashq, Damascus, 1948; see also: Qamus al-ḵānāʾī al-Shamiyya, 1, 8-10.
3Budayrī, f. 1b.
4It is entitled Qamus al-ḵānāʾī al-Shamiyya, see Bibliography.
5Budayrī, f. 29b.
ered the period between 1154 and 1176 A.H., the last year mentioned in the
text by al-Qasimi is 1175. In a concluding statement al-Qasimi accused Bud-
ayri of having inserted an extra year in the title. By examining the con-
tents of these last years we find that al-Qasimi failed to notice that the
events of the year 1173 were mistakenly grouped with those of 1172, and that
1173 took the place of 1174 with a resultant difference of one year. It is
difficult to ascertain who was responsible for this mistake. But it is
clear from the contents that two Muḥarrams were mentioned under the year 1172,
and that the deposition of 'Abd Allāh Pasha al-Ghataji which took place in
1173 is wrongly mentioned under 1172. In fact the year 1173 should be placed
before the second Muḥarram (under 1172) in f. 25a, and the following years
increased by one. Thus, the events would be placed in their correct histori-
cal sequence, and the original date of 1176 given by Budayri would then be
justified.

Dr. Ahmad 'Izzat ‘Abd al-Karīm erroneously agrees with al-Qasimi (p. 236
n. 1 of his edition) that the chronicle should end in 1175 and not in 1176,
although he himself seemed puzzled (p. 230 n. 2) that Ahmad b. Siwar's death,
reported in the chronicle under 1172 (erroneously of course), is mentioned
by Murādī as having taken place in 1173. This did not, however, excite in
the editor an urge to compare the subsequent events in the chronicle with
other sources, not even to question the allegation by al-Qasimi. By com-
paring this edition with the Zahirīyya MSS, one of which in fact the editor
unfortunately used, we find mistakes in the edited text and worse ones in
the annotation. The introduction, in which he dealt inadequately with cer-
tain political and administrative aspects of Ottoman Syria, contains many
misleading statements. It is more profitable to use the Zahirīyya MSS.
4. On the history of the eventful years 1184-5/1770-1, when the troops of 'Ali Bey invaded Syria, there is a very detailed and reliable account in an MS in the Berlin Collection entitled Gharāʾīb al-badāʾiʿ by Ibn al-Ṣiddiq. Nothing is known about the author except what can be deduced from his chronicle. Apparently he is a Damascene, and he wrote in the colloquial language, more precisely in the Damascene dialect which makes it difficult for a person not acquainted with it to understand all the vocabulary he uses. From the particulars he mentions of the movement of troops, especially those of Damascus, it seems that he was a member of a military corps, possibly the Yerliyya, some of whose high ranking members he enumerates in an introductory list. One forms the idea, moreover, from the expressions which Ibn al-Ṣiddiq uses and the warmth of his chronicle, that it was probably read before a gathering of people, possibly in one of the coffee-houses where story tellers related stories of adventure.

5. Mikha'īl Barīk, a Damascene Greek Orthodox priest, witnessed the events he described in his chronicle, Taʾrīkh al-Shām, 1720-82, ed. by Qustantīn al-Bastānī. He gave three reasons for starting his history from 1720: firstly, because he then became conscious of what was happening; secondly, because this year marked the beginning of 'Aǰm rule; and thirdly, because Catholicism began to spread rapidly at the time.

That the start of 'Aǰm rule should be a determining factor is of significance. Barīk, as a Christian Arab, considered the 'Aǰms as the first group of awlād al-ʿArab who became governors in 'our country' (bīlādīnā), as he put it.  

1Mikha'īl al-Dimaghqī, another Damascene chronicler, took up the account in his work, Taʾrīkh Hawādith al-Shām wa-Lubnān, from the point where Barīk stopped, that is 1782, and ended with the year 1841.

2p. 2.

3p. 36; see below p. 35 n. 1.
His awareness of the importance of this change became sharper after the election of a person of local origin as Orthodox patriarch in 1720. Barīk then commented that this patriarch was the first to be ordained from awlād al-ʿarabiyyīn in contrast with the former patriarchs, who were of Greek origin. Again, as a Christian whose interests were not bounded by the limits of the Muslim world, Barīk, alone among his contemporary Damascene chroniclers, reported events which took place in non-Ottoman and non-Muslim countries, mainly in Europe.

Barīk devoted a large part of his chronicle to the squabbles which took place in Damascus between the Catholics and the Greek Orthodox. He was rather naive in believing everything of a miraculous nature. But his description of the political events in Damascus, although lacking in detail, is on the whole sound, and other sources substantiate his account. His dating, largely based on the Christian calendar, was not always exact. Of special importance in this work is an appendix inserted, with others, by the editor, on the deposition of the *Asm governors in 1730. It was written by the priest Tūmā al-Labbūdī for the information of his superior in Rome.

6. The chronicles of Ibn Jun'ā and al-Ǧarī, edited by S. Munajjīd in Wulāt Dimashq, jointly cover the history of Damascus in the 18th century. Ibn Jun'ā, an 18th century Damascene chronicler, was an artisan who did not figure among the aṭyān of Murādī. He seems to have written a long history of 74 chapters, of which this chronicle is chapter 74, and about which nothing else is known. His information, brief on the whole, is varied and reliable.

1p. 3.

2This is apparent in the title of the chronicle, and also referred to by the chronicler, see Wulāt Dimashq, 28.
There are two MSS in the Berlin Collection of this chronicle of Ibn Jum’a. The MS edited by Munajjid is the same one translated and edited later by H. Laoust in Les gouverneurs de Damas, and is referred to in the Berlin Cat. 9785, Spr. 188. The other MS, which neither editor used, is referred to in the Berlin Cat. 9785, We (II), 418. It is composed of 32 fols., whereas the former is of 26 fols. It is also more complete than the former and does not contain similar gaps. Neither MS mentions the date of copying. Most of the information inserted in the margins of the MS edited by Munajjid is neglected by him. Laoust, more wisely, reproduced them in parenthesis. This marginal information is included in the text of the other MS. Munajjid dropped also several sentences and phrases from the MS he used, and failed to read correctly several words in the text. When the edition by Munajjid agrees with both MSS, it is then cited in this study for reference; when otherwise, the relevant MS or MSS will be referred to.

Al-Qarī was a sharif of a well-known Damascene family and seems to have written his chronicle in the first half of the 19th century. The information he provides is reliable, although less detailed than that of Ibn Jum’a.

b) The Chronicles which deal with other parts of geographical Syria.

These chronicles deal mainly with the history of Mount Lebanon and its relation with the governors of Sidon and Damascus. The main Lebanese chroniclers are:

1Wulat Dimashq, pp. 37, 49, 50.

2For more particulars see, Ibid., pp. 9, 10.

Hayder Ahmad Shihāb, Tannūs al-Shidiyaq, and Hanāniyya al-Munayyir.

1. Haydar Ahmad Shihāb (1761-1835) was a member of the ruling Shihāb family which was the main theme of his historical work. His major chronicle, the title of which is given in several variations, seems to have been called al-Ghurar al-jiṣan fī akhbar abnā‘ al-zaman. This work, composed of three parts which start with the year 622, was published by N. Mughabghab, Cairo, 1900-1. The last two parts, which start with the transfer of the paramountcy in Mount Lebanon to the Shihābs in 1697, were published by A. Rustum and F. A. al-Bustānī under the title Lubnān fī 'ahd al-Umara’ al-Shihabiyyīn, Beirut 1933.

By comparing the corresponding accounts in the two editions, we find that neither the phraseology nor the sequence of events is identical. Furthermore, different versions of certain events are given in both editions.

Taking for granted that Haydar was the author of this chronicle, he was helped, nevertheless, by prominent writers such as Nagīf al-Yazījī and Niqūlā al-Turk in the preparation of his history. As a result, several copies of his work existed, sometimes in abridged form, and with various titles. Some copies were anonymously published; hence, the confusion in knowing which work belonged to which author.

2. Tannūs al-Shidiyaq (1805-61), in his Akhbar al-A‘yan fī Jabal Lubnān, departed from the common practice of classifying events according to years. Instead, he dealt basically with the families of Mount Lebanon as feudal units.

1 See Hourani, 'Historians of Lebanon', p. 232.

and, within this framework, he traced their history chronologically. He reveals in his account with whom real power rested in Mount Lebanon. By profession a clerk who was attached to the service of the Shihāba, Shidyāq was in a good position to acquire essential information.1

3. Ḥanāniyya al-Munayyir (1756-1832?) deals in his chronicle, al-Durr al-margūf (or al-mawsuf) fi tārīkh al-Shuf, with the history of Mount Lebanon between 1109/1697 and 1222/1807. According to his introductory statement, his work was not to be restricted to the history of bilād al-Shuf, but was to extend it to events in neighbouring regions; he devoted, therefore, more attention to the internal history of Damascus than did Ǧaydar or Shidyāq. On several occasions he is more precise in his account than either. However, he omits the events of many years.

An MS in the Berlin Collection entitled Hadha tārīkh Jabal al-Duruz by an anonymous author, and covering the period between 1109/1697 and 1223/1809, seems to be another copy of al-Durr al-margūf. By contrasting these accounts we find that, except for slight variations, they agree with each other, very often word for word. The date of 1244/1828–9 mentioned in this MS shows that it is probably older than the copy edited by A. Sarkīs in al-Mashriq.

It might be generally stated in conclusion that all of the above Lebanese chroniclers present confused information on names, dates and events relating to the history of Damascus and particularly the ‘Aqums. More detailed comment is made in the relevant contexts. They are important, however, because they provide an essential background for writing the history of Mount Lebanon, without which the history of Damascus remains unintelligible.

1See Hourani, 'Historians of Lebanon', 233; Salibi, 'Traditional Historiography', pp. 223–5.
II. Biographies.

a) Damascene biographies.

The value of biographies, in general, depends on the period on which the author is writing and the quantity and quality of the chronicles available about it. Murādī's *Silk al-durar* is of special importance to this study because it provides missing links on different aspects, substantiates other accounts and throws light on the social background of many prominent persons who played active roles in the history of Damascus in the 18th century. It follows the same pattern as the centennial dictionaries of Ghazzī and Muhīdī.

The great-grandfather of Muhammad Khalīl al-Murādī migrated to Damascus from Samarqand in the second half of the 17th century. Muhammad Khalīl was the third member of this family to become the Hanafi mufti of Damascus. He held this office between 1192/1777 and his death in 1206/1791.

Three factors prompted Murādī to write his dictionary: an inner urge, an awareness of the importance of history, and the absence of a biographical dictionary for the a‘yān of Damascus in the 18th century. He depended on personal information and corresponded with Ulama outside Damascus for this purpose. One of these was Ḫasan b. 'Abd al-Latif of Jerusalem, who mentioned, in his work on the biographies of the eminent Ulama and Shaykhīs who lived in Jerusalem in the 12th century A.H. (BM. MS. Or. 3047), that he had compiled it at the request of Murādī. Another, more interesting figure, with whom Murādī communicated was the Cairene Muhammad Murtaḍa al-Zābīdī who asked his pupil 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Jabartī to collect relevant material.
Murādī also used the works of contemporary or near-contemporary Damascene authors such as Nābulsī, Ibn Kinān and Sa‘īd al-Sammān. He quoted at length from a lost work by the last, whose flowery style, devoid of any substantial meaning, contrasts glaringly with his own prosaic style. He also quoted at some length from Muḥibbī. He utilized the chronicle of the 18th century Aleppine chronicler Ibn Mīro but, oddly enough, Murādī did not write a biography of him.¹

Murādī’s *Silk* includes about 1000 biographies of Damascenes and others. Religious prominence was not the sole condition for a person to rank among his *`ayn*. Some governors of Damascus figure among them but they are a very small percentage of the total number. Strangely enough, of all the *`Azm* governors, four of whom were appointed six times to Damascus between 1725 and 1783, only Muḥammad Pasha al-*`Azm* has a biography in *Silk al-durar*. While *Silk al-durar* might be excused for not writing the biographies of all non-*`Azm* governors who were appointed to Damascus in the 12th century A.H., probably because in his opinion not all of them were worthy to rank among his *`ayn* or perhaps because it was difficult for him to trace their origins and whereabouts, the absence from his list of the *`Azm* governors but one is remarkable. Murādī did not lack information about the *`Azm*, because the chronicle of Ibn Mīro which he used contained adequate biographies of several *`Azm* governors.² It was not difficult either for Murādī to draw on local anthologies which contained information on the *`Azm*, because he quoted amply from them on other occasions. Furthermore, the *`Azm* built in Damascus several buildings to which Murādī referred in various parts of his work. It might be that Murādī

found it difficult to reconcile the humble origin of the 'Aṣm as peasants (fellāhīn) in Ma'arra with the dignity they acquired later, at a time when there was a prevailing contempt among the townspeople towards the fallāhīn,\(^1\) of which Murādī was aware.\(^2\) Muḥammad Pasha al-'Aṣm ruled too late to be directly associated with this origin. In fact Murādī did not refer to the origin of his family in his biography. Furthermore, Murādī became mufti\(^3\) during his governorship and seems to have been on good terms with him. It might be also that Murādī found many inconsistencies in the conduct of the other 'Aṣm governors who combined exploitation with religious appeasement; hence, as a mufti, he had either to accept their behaviour as a whole or to discard it as a whole. As for Muḥammad Pasha, there was a sort of unanimity among the chroniclers concerning his good administration in Damascus.

Another biographical work by Murādī, in manuscript form, is Ṣafma al-wājid. It is divided into five chapters and deals mainly with the biography of his father. It contains important information on various administrative matters in Damascus. Of particular importance are its remarks on the transfer of the command of the pilgrimage to Damascus towards the end of the 17th century.

There are two other biographical works on the a'īvan of Damascus in the 12th century A.H., both of which are extant in manuscript form in the Ẓahirīyya Library. They were written by two Damascenes: Ḥasibī and Ayyūbī, who lived in the 13th century A.H. Both of them copied heavily from Murādī, very often word for word. But they included biographies not found in Murādī. Ḥasibī's language is ungrammatical, but it is correct in so far as he copies

\(^1\)Cf. Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 86b; Russell, The Natural History of Aleppo, I,405.
\(^2\)Cf. Murādī, III, 276.
from Murādī. His biographies, like those of Ayyūbī, are not alphabetically arranged. Biographies of governors do not appear in his work, which is almost completely restricted to biographies of religious persons from Damascus and, to a lesser extent, from Iraq and Egypt; there are hardly any from Istanbul. This applies also to Ayyūbī's work. In general, both works do not substantially add to that of Murādī, except in so far as they provide information on the 13th century A.H. On one occasion, Ḥasībī criticized Murādī for having underrated Saʿīd al-Kunānī in his biography.¹

'Umar al-Wakīl wrote a biographical work on the governor of Damascus, 'Abd Allāh Pasha Chataji, entitled, Tarwīh al-qalb al-shajī, MS. Vienna. The author was attached to the service of Chataji and seems to have been a Damascene as is suggested by the language and also by the ending of his chronicle before the deposition of 'Abd Allāh Pasha from Damascus. He was very generous in showering praise on Chataji, to the extent of considering him a sharīf, which dignity Murādī did not mention in his biography of Chataji. The work contains several poems written by well-known Damascenes in praise of Chataji. The historical narrative it contains is valuable.

b) Other biographies.

The main biographical works which deal with the history of Zāhir al-'Umar at some length, although with varying reliability, are those of Mikḥā'īl al-Ṣabbāgh, Taʾrīkh al-Shaykh Zāhir, ed. by Q. al-Bašā, and of 'Abbūd al-Ṣabbāgh, al-Raws al-Zāhir, MS. Bibliothèque Nationale. Both biographers were Christians from Acre and relations of the famous man of affairs of Zāhir, Ibrāhīm al-Ṣabbāgh. Mikḥā'īl was attached to the French expedition

¹ f. 41b.
of Napoleon in Egypt and wrote his work in France; whereas 'Abbūd wrote his work in Egypt. Since the Ṣabbāgh family reached the zenith of its fame under Ẓahir, the role it played could only be assessed against the background of Ẓahir's history. This is one reason why these authors wrote biographies of Ẓahir. Another seems to have been their desire to absolve Ibrāhīm al-Ṣabbāgh of any responsibility for the failure of Ẓahir. In fact the authors produced a brilliant portrait of Ibrāhīm and extolled his many virtues.

Of the two accounts, the more reliable and straightforward is that of 'Abbūd although it is shorter and hardly mentions any dates, thus differing from Mikha’īl's. Other sources, Damascene and otherwise, substantiate the account of 'Abbūd. Mikha’īl, on the other hand, is very confused, highly misleading in certain parts, and not reliable about dates.

A biography of Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzār, attributed to Ḥaydar ʿAlmad Shīhāb, and entitled Taʾrīkh Ahmad Bāshā al-Jazzār, ed. by Chibli and Khalife, is useful to this study. However, within the limited period where it coincides with this study, it does not add much more to what is found in Gḥūrār al--liṣān by Ḥaydar Shīhāb.

III Miscellaneous Arabic Sources.

a) Lists of governors and religious officials.

There are several lists which give the dates of appointment and deposition of governors, judges and muftīs, which help to confirm data provided by other sources or to fill lacunae. The one MS available which gives the

1See the introduction by al-Bašā.

names of all three groups of officials from the Ottoman conquest till 1240/1824-5 is by an anonymous author and entitled Risāla fī man tawalla. Other anonymous MSS deal with one group or more of these officials.

b) Divāns (anthologies)

Several diwāns by 18th century Damascene poets such as Ahmad al-Kaywâni and Sa‘īd al-Sammān, contain poems dedicated to governors or prominent persons in Damascus on various occasions. These sources implicitly reveal also the identity of the groups whose support the person concerned had solicited.

c) Travel accounts.

Several accounts by Arab travellers who were contemporary or near-contemporary to the period under study are available, mainly in manuscript form. ‘Abd al-Qanîn al-Nabulsi (1050/1641-1143/1731), a Damascene ‘ālim, described his travels in several works, most of them still in manuscript form. The largest of his travel accounts is Kitāb al-haqîqa wa’il-majâz. Of special importance in this work is Nabulsi’s description of the Pilgrimage route between Medina and Damascus in 1105-6 A.H. Several other descriptions of the Pilgrimage route made at various times help, when collated, to make a comprehensive study of the halting places along this route.

Two other useful travel accounts, still in manuscript form, are those of Kashf al-râda by Muṣṭafâ al-Siddîqî, in which he described his journey from Istanbul on 3 Muharram 1139/31 August 1726, during which he visited Baghdad, Aleppo and Damascus; and Mawāniq al-uns by Muṣṭafâ al-Luqaymî, in which he described his journey from Damietta, in Egypt, in 1143/1730-1 and his visit to Sidon and Damascus.

B. EUROPEAN SOURCES.

I. Archives

These fall into two main groups: French and British. The French archives

1 For a list of the diwāns utilized in this study see Bibliography.

2 See Bibliography.
are the most important for the simple reason that French commercial interests were deeply committed in southern Syria. The English, represented by the Levant Company, were more concentrated in the region of Aleppo. However, because of their commercial contacts with southern Syria, albeit on a small scale, the English kept vice-consuls, for short periods in the 18th century, in some ports in the south.

a) The French Archives.

In his article, 'Les Correspondances des Consuls de France comme source de l'histoire de Proche-Orient', M.N. Sworonos 1 underscores the important role which the French Archives would fill in the writing of the local history of the Near East since the beginning of the 18th century. During this period the French had a consulate in Sidon, another in Tripoli, and vice-consulates in Acre, Jaffa, and Ramle, and later on in other places. But they had none in Damascus. Although they had many commercial interests there, the French authorities remained reluctant to establish a consulate, fearing lest extortions be practised on their officials, and also because they were apprehensive of political upheavals in it which might jeopardize their interests. The resident missionaries in Damascus - Jesuits, Capuchins and Terre-Sainte - provided an ominous example. They were under the protection of the local French authorities, who were very often put in embarrassing situations with the local authorities as a result of the complaints of these missionaries against maltreatment. This, on the other hand, enriched the archival correspondence with much valuable information about the local authorities with whom these missionaries were embroiled. Appeals by the French consuls to their ambassadors at Istanbul to seek redress by exerting pressure on the governors

concerned through their Istanbul agents, enrich our knowledge with much im-
portant information about less known figures who backed the authority of these
governors.

The bulk of the political information contained in these archives comes
from the dispatches of the consuls and vice-consuls. The consuls corresponded
sometimes with the French ambassadors in Istanbul, but mostly with the author-
ities in France.¹ The correspondence of the consuls before 1793, that is be-
fore the Convention attached the consulates to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
is kept in the Archives Nationales under the title Sous-Série B,¹ Correspond-
ance Consulaire, and those after this date are kept in the Quai d'Orsay. Other
documents of various contents, mainly commercial, are preserved in Sous-Série
III and Marine B in the Archives Nationales. Sous-Série B¹ is relatively
better kept, and all are on the whole readable.

The information obtained from these archives, particularly from Sous-
Série B¹, are extremely valuable for this study. Although the main concern
of the French officials was commercial, they described the political situation
because it affected their interests. Very often the French consuls in Syria
sent dispatches to Istanbul bearing on the local political situation. Such
dispatches do not seem to have been transmitted by the consuls to France be-
cause no record is kept of them in the archives of their consulates. But the
ambassador in his correspondence with France reveals the nature of these dis-
patches.

b) The Levant Company Archives.

The bulk of these archives is kept in the Public Record Office in London
Since the main centre of the Levant Company in Syria was in Aleppo, dis-
patches were sent from this place to the headquarters of the company in Lon-
¹For the identity of these authorities see: Charles-Roux, Les Échelles,
pp.12-17.
of all these archives series S.P.110 is the most useful for this study. Apart from scanty information on major political events, the main interests of these dispatches are commercial. As such, they enable us to study the factors that contributed to the decline of the English trade in Aleppo, which partly caused the commercial revival of southern Syria.

The dispatches of the English ambassadors at Istanbul reveal that they used to receive reports on the political situation in Syria from their consuls and vice-consuls there. No record exists of these reports except what is quoted in the dispatches of the ambassadors to London.

c) Other archives.

The important archives include the Radcliffe papers, about 1500 items, kept in the Guildhall Library, London. They contain letters, reports and other documents largely sent from Aleppo and Smyrna by English merchants to their superiors, the Radcliffes, in London. The correspondence covers the period between 1702 and 1768, and analyses in detail the causes behind the decline of the English trade in Aleppo and those behind the flourishing of the French trade. I am grateful to Dr. M. E. Yapp from whom I first heard about these documents.

Another archival source consists of the letters from Missions. Of all the letters of the foreign missionaries, Terre-Sainte, Capuchins and Jesuits, who resided in Damascus, those of the Jesuits are the best known. A good book which deals with the history and writings of the Jesuits in Syria is *La Première Mission de la Compagnie de Jésus en Syrie* by George Levenq.

The political information contained in the published letters of the Jesuits is small if compared with the religious information. However, the propor-
tion of political information in their writings varies from one country to another, and from one missionary to the other. It might be that more letters may come to light containing information on the political conditions in Syria, because not all the letters of the Jesuits are yet published.

II. Travellers' accounts.

We may classify the 18th century European travellers who visited Syria according to the motives that made them undertake their journey. Some were sent by their governments to report on the countries of the East, such as the Frenchman Paul Lucas in 1714. Others were either moved by curiosity, like the Frenchman Volney in the early 'eighties, or by scientific interests like the Swede Hasselquist around the 'fifties, or by religious motives - visiting the Holy Land - like the Italian Abbé G. Mariti in the mid-'sixties.

Not all the travellers who visited Syria came to Damascus. Those who travelled from Istanbul, or through it, to Basra or Persia via Aleppo, were largely officials or merchants such as the Frenchman Otter in the late 'thirties, the Englishman J. Carmichael in 1751, and others mentioned by D. Carruthers in *The Desert route to India*. These travellers do not contribute much to this study. The travellers who went from Istanbul to Egypt or vice-versa, and those who travelled directly from Europe to the Holy Land, usually visited Damascus. Such are G. Perry in the mid-'thirties, R. Pococke in 1738, and Hasselquist.

Most of the travellers who visited Damascus and Aleppo gave more detailed description of the latter. This might be explained by the fact that in Aleppo the travellers could meet English as well as French merchants, who would give them information on various local aspects. In Damascus only foreign mission-

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aries were found; but they lived in seclusion and hardly mixed with the local Muslim people. Much of what the travellers wrote about Syria lacks precision. The value of their accounts is limited to the factual observations they made.

The best-known yet the most controversial of these travellers is Constantine-Francois Chasseboeuf, better known under the pseudonym Volney. He toured Egypt and Syria in the period between 1783 and 1785. His book, *Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie*, was first published in French in two volumes, in 1787. It was translated later into five languages, including Arabic. A recent French edition in one volume by J. Gaulmier appeared in Paris in 1959.

Volney was about twenty-five years old when he made his journey. A sudden access of fortune and a personal interest in the past and present history of the countries he visited set him on his tour. The one year or so he spent in Egypt at the beginning of his voyage and the route he followed in touring Syria — he started from the north rather than from the south — seem to have provided him with adequate familiarity with the country before he came to southern Syria. This may explain why he wrote at length about it. The duration of his stay in Syria and the contacts he made with the local inhabitants were surely very advantageous. The danger with these, however, was that they provided him with much oral information — most of it faulty. If to this is added his reliance on works by earlier travellers whose accounts were not always reliable, then the reasons behind his many errors, particularly on past events, can well be appreciated. Had Volney concentrated, with his penetrating mind, on describing the prevailing conditions rather than on digging into past history, he would have produced a more useful work.
Chapter 2.

INTRODUCTION

I. The Component Parts of the Province of Damascus.

According to 'Ayn-i 'Alī's account in 1609, the province of Damascus consisted of ten ganjaqs or liwās (administrative divisions), namely: Damascus, the administrative centre of the province, Jerusalem, Gaza, Safad, Nablus, Ajlūn, Lajjūn, Tadmor (Palmyra), Sidon and Beirut, and Karak and Shawbak. Most, if not all, of these ganjaqs seem to have been created by the Ottomans after the suppression on 26 Safar 927/5 February 1521 of the revolt of the governor of Damascus, Janbirdī al-Ghazālī, which he started on 17 Dhu‘l-Qa‘da 926/24 October 1520. Several of these ganjaqs had been administrative centres under the Mamluk Sultanate, and their governors were usually subordinate to those of Damascus. The reason for the creation of these several administrative divisions could be partly explained by the existence of various religious, feudal and tribal groups in these regions, who, helped by the geography of the country which largely made their existence possible, had been able to preserve their power, in varying degrees, and to enjoy a semi-autonomous rule. The establishment of these centres could help


2 For some sources which tend to confirm this view see R. Mantran and J. Sauvaget, Reglement Fiscaux Ottoman, Les Provinces Syriennes, Damascus, 1951, pp. 35, 43, 47, 53, 55, 56; B. Lewis, 'The Ottoman Archives as a source for the history of the Arab lands', JRAS (1951), pp. 153-5. For an account of the revolt see Muhammad b. Tulūn: l' Islam al-wara, translated into French and edited, by H. Laoust in Les Gouverneurs de Damas sous les Mamluks, Damascus, 1952, pp. 154-8; Muhammad b. Tulūn, Das Tübinger Fragment der chronik des Ibn Tulūn, ed. and trans. into German by R. Hartmann, Berlin, 1926, p. 117. Ma'arra is to the north of Hamah, on the main road to Aleppo. Arish was dependent on the governor of Egypt.
therefore in keeping a closer watch over these groups, in ensuring the safety of the lines of communication with Egypt, and in safeguarding the passage of the Pilgrimage.

When Sultan Selim I appointed al-Ghazāli as governor of Damascus in 924/1518 he placed under his control the territory extending between Ma‘arra in the north and ‘Arīsh in the south. It is not known if this administrative arrangement continued until his revolt. However, there is evidence that the province of Tripoli was in existence in 926/1519-20 and probably a year earlier. In 924/1518 there existed regulations for the liwa of Aleppo, probably as a component part of the province of Aleppo. It seems that further administrative arrangements had been made shortly after the suppression of al-Ghazāli’s revolt which may have affected the limits and the administrative divisions of each province rather than the existence of the provinces themselves.

In the 17th century the province of Sidon was carved out from the province of Damascus. In a firman dated 28 Muḥarram 1023/10 March 1614 the Sultan ordered the formation of the province of Sidon from the sanjaqs of Sidon and Beirut, and Ṣafad, which had been until then under the jurisdiction of the governor of Damascus. A beylerbeysi was then appointed to govern it. Although there is ample evidence of the continued existence of the province of Sidon from 1660 onwards, it is not known how long it remained in existence after its first formation in 1614. It seems, however, that it was abolished after its first formation in 1614. It seems, however, that it was abolished.

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1 Ibn Tulun, ed. Lacoste, 151; Ibn Tulun, ed. Hartmann, 120.
2 Mantran and Sauvaget, 77.
3 B. Lewis, ‘Ottoman Archives’, 151.
4 Ibid., 150

in 1615. The abolition of a province after its formation, particularly if it was carved out of another province, was not an unfamiliar practice as concerns the province of Damascus itself.

In 1660, during the vigorous administration of the Grand Vezir Muhammad Pasha Köprüü, the province of Sidon was created once more, apparently in its earlier limits, and the conqueror of the Damascene janissaries ʻAlī Agha al-Daftardār was appointed its governor. The Ma‘ns did not then present a serious military challenge to the Ottoman authorities; because after the death of Fakhr al-Dīn in 1635 factionalism was seething among the ranks of the Druzes. The creation of the province of Sidon, it is true, might provide a better safeguard for maintaining Ottoman authority. But there were other reasons which brought about this event. After the complicity of the governor of Damascus with the revolutionary governor of Aleppo, Hasan Pasha in 1667/1656-7, the Porte seems to have deemed it necessary to contain the ambitions of future governors of Damascus by limiting their resources. Furthermore, the upsurge of the insubordinate soldiery in Damascus during this period necessitated that its governor should devote more attention to internal security. Perhaps another reason was to find a suitable recompense for ʻAlī Agha al-Daftardār. After all a precedent had already been set when in 1614 the province of Sidon was first created.

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1 See Shidyaq, 319-21, cf. 360, 389. 2 See below p. 264. 3 See below p. 64.


5 See below p. 86, 166. 6 See below p. 63.
During the period under study there was much fluctuation in the administrative regulations pertaining to the territory under the jurisdiction of the governors of Damascus. The tax-farm (iltizām) of Haifa, for example, was, for a long period in the 18th century, attached to that of Acre which was under the jurisdiction of the governor of Sidon. Hamah and Hims, mentioned by ‘Ayn-i ‘Alī as liwās in the province of Tripoli, became in the 18th century māli-kānes attached to the governors of Damascus in their capacity as Commanders of the Pilgrimage. It may be safely stated, however, that the ganjaqs mentioned by ‘Ayn-i ‘Alī, with the exception of those that constituted the province of Sidon, were still included in the province of Damascus during the 18th century.

II The political importance of the period under study.

In glaring contrast to the 16th and 17th centuries with their excessively frequent change of governors, Damascus witnessed in the 18th century a lesser number of governors with longer tenure of office. Striking as this change might seem, it derives all the more significance from the coming to power of the local ‘Azm family. The controversial origins of the ‘Azm family will be discussed elsewhere, but what concerns us here is that members of this family governed Damascus at intermittent periods for about 38 years between 1725 and 1783, with a sequel in the last decade of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th. Some of these governors together with other members of the same family frequently governed the provinces of Sidon and Tripoli as well, either concurrently or at different times.

1 See below p. 275.
2 A system of tax-farms granted for life introduced by the Ottoman administration towards the beginning of the 18th century.
3 See below p. 102.
4 This is based on fragmentary information provided by 18th century Damascene chroniclers.
5 See below p. 118.
Such a rule of a local and lengthy nature was not peculiar to Damascus in the 18th century. Parallel examples can be found in the Jalîlî governors of Mosul, in the Mamluk governors of Baghdad and, in a different way, in the derebeys (Valley-Lords) of Anatolia. But why was it that such a trend appeared at this time, and why in these particular places? The answer could be found in the conditions of the Ottoman Empire as a whole as well as in the regions concerned.

Since the failure of the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683, which was followed later on by the humiliating treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, Ottoman power in Europe was on the defensive. Such military setbacks did not only impair the prestige of the Sultan, which was already debased by corruption within the palace, but also brought its decline more into the open. The vigorous effort of the Köprülü Grand Vezirs in the second half of the 17th century to rejuvenate the Empire had spent itself by the beginning of the 18th century. The existing intrigues in the Court were more exposed and were now aggravated by the lack of military glories, in the grand style, to overshadow them or at least to tone down their excesses. Gone were the days when illuminations were ordered in the Empire to celebrate astounding military victories. Many were still ordered but mainly to celebrate the birth of royal babies, and many they were.

The loss of initiative by the Sultans brought into the open, and in fact


2 For some illuminating reflections on the decline of the Ottoman power see the dispatches by the British ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Everard Fawkener, PRO, S.P. 97/28: Istanbul, 18.5.36, Istanbul, 7.8.36. (This form is used throughout this study to denote the date of dispatch.)
aggravated, the rivalry between the Grand Vezirs and the Kizlar Aghas, each party trying to fill the power vacuum left at the centre. Around these two poles revolved the destiny of the provincial governors whose agents, Kapu Kâhyaeesi, triumphed or lost according to the party they relied on. But this struggle in the capital, important though it was in deciding the confirmation, deposition, or reinstatement of the governors, was only one end of the clue to the situation. The other was in the local conditions that existed in the regions concerned.

The local causes for the lengthy rule of the Jaliliis in Mosul and of Hasan Pasha and his son Ahmad Pasha, who were followed by Mamluk governors, differed in many ways from those which made the lengthy rule of the 'Azms possible. Mosul and Baghdad were frontier provinces, subject to attacks by the rulers of Persia. Hence, there was a military necessity to tolerate the rule of strong governors. However, many attempts were made by the Sultan to depose Hasan Pasha and Ahmad Pasha and their successors, but their gallantry and their stand before the Persians proved the futility of the Sultan's attempts to depose them by force. On the contrary, he was compelled to condone their governorships, even in spite of the suspect loyalty and alleged complicity with the Persians of at least Hasan Pasha and Ahmad Pasha. In Mosul the Jaliliis proved to be useful governors to the Ottomans against the Persians although not as militant nor as dangerous as those in Baghdad.

Southern Syria had known several local ruling families during the Otto-

1 It was a common practice for provincial governors as well as for senior officials and notables to have agents at the Porte to look after their interests.


man period, such as the Banū Ḥarfūsh, the Banū Sayfā, the Ma'ns, the Shihābs and the Ziyādīnī. But the basis of their power had been mainly feudal and tribal. The regions in which they figured were traditionally and geographically suited for their emergence. The ‘Aţms differed from these families in two main respects. Firstly, whatever their origin, the ‘Aţms developed their power as administrative officials. Secondly, the main centres where the ‘Aţms distinguished themselves as administrators, namely Damascus, Sidon and Tripoli, had been traditional centres of administration over which the central authorities had had relatively firm control.

That the ‘Aţms should gain such ascendancy and rule for such a long time and be tolerated by the Sultan must be due to peculiar reasons. It was partly through a protector at Istanbul, the use of much money in bribes, and, certainly, skill in manoeuvring that the ‘Aţms attained their power. But such means, useful at times, were risky at others because not based on military power, which in the course of their rule they neither developed nor exploited to their benefit. The ‘Aţms fell victims to these very factors which helped them attain power. The fact that they used money, not always successfully, to buy support at Istanbul made the Sultan more anxious to obtain it through confiscation. The way in which the ‘Aţms were deposed, reinstated, or even executed was not unfamiliar in the Ottoman Empire. In 1730, for example, after the revolt in Istanbul, the ‘Aţm governors were hurriedly deposed and imprisoned and their property confiscated. However, shortly afterwards they returned to power. They were tolerated not so much because of a lack of alternatives as because of their wealth and the security they achieved in the territories they governed. There was something in the nature of these territories which made their lengthy rule possible.
Unlike Mosul and Baghdad, Damascus at this time was not a frontier province against an external enemy. Nevertheless, it had frontier problems. The province of Damascus is the borderland of the desert and as such its governors had many problems arising from Beduin insubordination. Foremost among their responsibilities was the ensuring of the safety of the Pilgrimage along the desert route to the Hijaz. It is no mere coincidence that the tendency towards lengthening the rule of the governors of Damascus started simultaneously with their consistent appointment as commanders of the Pilgrimage, roughly in the first quarter of the 18th century. On the other hand, the extension of the province of Damascus over a large area interspersed with many tribal chieftains and powerful local notables created problems of security and placed several handicaps on the collection of revenue. This situation was certainly not new. But with the decline of the central authority the local chiefs had better opportunities to figure. The semi-autonomous communities in Mount Lebanon were thorns in the side of the governor of Damascus, not only because their territory bordered on his but also because he very often usurped or shouldered the responsibilities of the governor of Sidon, particularly when he was a relative of his. These problems, together with the increase in factionalism and insubordination among the various

The terms used by the local chroniclers for Beduin were ‘Arab, A'rab, and Urban, roughly meaning pastoral nomads. The Arabic term awlad al-'Arab (Turkish, evlad-i 'Arab) had a different meaning. It mainly denoted local chieftains who may or may not have been of Beduin (i.e. nomadic) origin, cf. Heyd, pp. 48, 50, 75. al-Khuri Mikha'il Barik, Ta'rikh al-Sham, 1720-82, ed. by Q. al-Basha, Harisa, 1930, p. 36 referred to the ‘Ams as well as to Huseyn Pasha b. Makri as awlad al-‘Arab meaning local people, irrespective of their origin. For Beduin he used the terms ‘Arab, A'rab or Urban. Mikha'il al-Sabbagh, Ta'rith al-Shaykh Zahir al-'Umar, ed. by Q. al-Basha, Harisa, 1935, p. 174, stated that the term awlad al-'Arab meant local people. Duwahli, 359, used the term in the same sense. So did Shab (ed. Mughabghab, 732). That this term was also used in the same sense in Ottoman documents is apparent in a firman which referred to the native deputy-judges as evlad-i ‘Arab (Heyd, 55 n.6). Heyd's grouping of evlad-i
troops in Damascus, provided a serious challenge to the governors. This situation partly explains why the governors of Damascus in the 18th century were no longer asked, after being entrusted with the command of the Pilgrimage to relieve the Sultan with troops in his wars outside Syria.¹

In fact, the most important occupation of the governors of Damascus was to ensure the safety of the Pilgrimage. This the 'Aznas did fairly efficiently and must have satisfied both the Sultan and the religious public. That such duty helped them, when efficiently and safely carried out, to maintain their position at a time when many governors were deposed for their failure to do so, is quite evident. Paradoxically, this function was also responsible when safely discharged for several years, for arousing the fears of the Sultan lest the governors concerned should deepen their local roots and gain prestige as a result. Such an apprehension may be valid in an efficient central administration but, in the conditions of the prevailing decline, the distrust, the conspiracies and, above all, the need for confiscation had the priority. This was probably the main reason why we find many governors breaking the 'Azn succession. A yearly tenure for the governor could be more financially advantageous to the Sultan. It would also satisfy the pressing demands of many candidates for governorships, particularly because the office of the governor of Damascus had immensely increased in prestige and

¹The term Syria did not have an administrative significance under the Ottomans. It is used here, however, as meaning geographical Syria, that is the area extending between the Taurus Mountains in the north and 'Arîjî in the south, and between the Mediterranean in the West and the Euphrates in the east.

(cont.) 'Arîb with 'Arîb, A'râb and 'Urban all meaning in his opinion Beduin (p. 48 n. 2) is therefore erroneous. He was nearer to the truth, in another statement of his (p. 55 n. 6), when he doubted the suitability of the term Beduin for referring to şulad-i 'Arîb. To avoid using the various terms of 'Arîb, A'râb and 'Urban, the standard term Beduin is henceforth used in this study.

²See below p. 92.
profit after the command of the Pilgrimage was attached to it. But such a yearly tenure was far from practicable in the conditions of 18th century Damascus. Because of the increased insubordination of various groups both inside and outside Damascus, a governor with a longer tenure and, certainly, of adequate ability, was more likely to assess the situation and restrain the insurgents. A long tenure of the governor, it could be argued, might be more beneficial for the inhabitants who need not submit to the hurried exactions of a governor trying to make the most of his short tenure. This applies in some cases; but it is equally true moreover that a governor with a long tenure tends to be more familiar with the local conditions, and hence with the best ways of enforcing exactations, as we shall have many instances to note in the course of this study.

The 'Aẓms did not work for an autonomous, let alone independent, rule. They were interested merely in their own welfare and prestige within the 'Establishment'. There was no danger as such that their growing local image might dwarf that of the Sultan. No matter how much the central administration had decayed, the religious ties between the Sultan and the Muslim people of his Empire were strong. However, it is to the credit of the 'Aẓms that they had introduced the tendency of local rule in Syria which strengthened local self-assertion in many ways.

If the 'Aẓms were unable or unwilling to challenge the authority of the central administration even when their basic interests were at stake, other local rulers, less regular in position but, partly because of this, more powerful, were able to do so. Almost simultaneously with the emergence of 'Aẓm rule in the first quarter of the 18th century, the Ziyādina, allegedly of tribal origin, started groping for power in the region of Ṣafad, which was
under the jurisdiction of the governors of Sidon. Their prominent chief, Shaykh Zahir al-‘Umar, who was basically a multazim (tax-farmer) in the regions of Safad and Acre, was able to expand his authority and the territory he controlled, largely within the limits of the province of Sidon, to a degree that made the Ottoman authorities consider him a rebel because of his many provocations.

At the time of his emergence, the semi-autonomous amīras of Mount Lebanon were weak, largely because of internal factionalism and also because of the close watch kept on them by the governors of Sidon. The Shi‘ī Matāwila of Jabal ‘Amil, interposed between Zahir and the Druzes, were also weak. They were being used, as very often, by one party against the other. Their co-religionists in the Biqa‘, the Banī Harfūsh, had almost spent their power by the 18th century. Zahir therefore met no strong local rivals either among the tribal chieftains whose support he sought at the beginning, or among the local families of notables. His alliance with ‘Alī Bey of Egypt and the Russians in the early ‘seventies became intolerable to the Sultan. After his war with Russia had ended, the Sultan dispatched a naval force against Zahir, who was finally liquidated in 1775.

In terms of power politics Zahir eclipsed the ‘Aţms. Although the parties differed in the bases of their authority, yet it is true that the ‘Aţm governors had tried several times to subdue Zahir but failed. If the ‘Aţms had introduced or rather shared in a new phenomenon in provincial administration, Zahir had resuscitated a local tradition of insubordination.

The power vacuum left by the death of Zahir and the decline in the power of the governor of Sidon of the governors of Damascus was filled by Aḥmad Pāsha al-Jazzār. Like the ‘Aţms, Jazzār developed his power within the 'Establishment', and ruled for
several years. He exploited all the resources of the territory he governed, most of them developed under Zahir, to consolidate his authority. Unlike the 'Azmis, however, Jazzar maintained his position by force in the style of Zahir. As a mamluk depending on mamluk troops, Jazzar had many similarities with the Mamluk governors of Baghdad. Like them, for example, he was tolerated by the Sultan because of his power and of his ability to restrain the insubordinate local groups. The acquisition by Jazzar of the governorship of the province of Damascus in 1785 started a new phase in its history.

III Some aspects of the administration of Damascus.

1. The Governor.

The governors of Damascus usually held the rank of wasir. This was generally the case during the period under study. If a governor on his appointment to Damascus was not of the rank of wasir, he would then be promoted to it. Because this rank had become largely honorary, the number of candidates for governorships was much increased. However, in Damascus the governors could make up for whatever debasement the rank of wasir had suffered by invoking their other title of Commander of the Pilgrimage.

The Arabic terms used by the local chroniclers to express the term 'governor' of Damascus underwent a change with the lapse of time. In the 16th and 17th centuries the term nakib al-Sham was very often used. This was a continuation of Mamluk terminology and is best seen in the writings of Muhammad b. Tulun who lived under both the Mamluk and the Ottoman regimes. Not until early in the 18th century was the use of this term almost dropped by the Damascene chroniclers. In the writings of Muhibbi and Muradi appear the terms hakim and kafil, both meaning governor. Ibn Tulun used the terms kafil and
kafāla (governorship) in the same sense as naʿīb and nīyāba. The term wālī (governor) was also used by the Damascene chroniclers, particularly in the 18th century.

Although the governors of Damascus were not excessively changed in the 18th century they were, nevertheless, yearly confirmed in office. The threat to their continuation in office is thus still maintained, but, on the other hand, they had enough means at their disposal, given the decay of Ottoman administration, if not to reverse their deposition, at least to avoid it as long as possible. However, the real significance of this confirmation lies in its bearing on the relations between the governor and the power groups inside Damascus.

The governor exploited the occasion of the arrival of the firman of confirmation for propaganda purposes and the furtherance of his prestige. Guns were fired and celebrations staged to mark the occasion. It is not clear whether the confirmation was made after the lapse of one year on the date of the appointment or of the previous confirmation of the governor, or whether, irrespective of this, it was made on a specific regular date. Whichever the case, it is apparent from the comments of the governors on certain occasions that the firman of confirmation sometimes used to arrive late. This may have been due to several reasons such as the manoeuvres of candidates at Istanbul, the degree of efficiency of the governor's agent at the Porte, travel difficulties and bureaucratic corruption.

1The term power groups inside Damascus is used in this study to denote the following, who exercised power: the various military groups, the Ashraf, the artisans, as well as the 'Ulama and the notables, who included a cross section of several groups. On other occasions reference will be made to the power groups outside Damascus which means the various tribal chieftains and families of notables who exercised power.

2Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 38b, 93b, 125a; Budayrī, ff. 35a, 35b; A.N.B 1023; Sidon, 4.1.73, Bl. 1027; Sidon 28.10.49.
The headquarters of the governor in Damascus was known in the writings of the local chroniclers as saraya, sometimes as sarayat al-hukm. It was located near Suq al-Darwishiyya, in the vicinity of the citadel.

2. The Mutasallim.

During the period under study the term mutasallim was applied, in the province of Damascus, to two types of officials, both of whom deputized for the governor in one capacity or another. The governors of sanjaqs or of smaller administrative divisions who were dependent on the governor of Damascus, were sometimes called mutasallims. The term mutasarrif was used as an alternative of mutasallim, in this capacity. Also, the person who deputized for the governor in Damascus during his absence was called mutasallim.

The role of the mutasallim in Damascus is of paramount importance to this study. In the interregnum between the deposition of a governor and the arrival of a successor, a mutasallim took control of the government. In this capacity he seems to have been known as mutasallim mā-bayn, which means intermediate governor. When the governor temporarily left Damascus on a certain commission such as going on the daūra or on the Pilgrimage, a mutasallim deputized for him.


2 The term was also rendered musallim sometimes by the local chroniclers but almost always in both the English and the French dispatches of the time which gave further variations of it as well.

3 This restrictive phrase is inserted for fear of generalization because the meaning of the term varied in other places though not in the other Syrian provinces, see S. J. Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798, Princeton 1962, p. 196 (henceforth referred to as Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798).

4 See, Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 38a, 78a, 79b, 81a; Mawsili, f. 58a; Muradī, Matmah, f. 115a; A.N.B. 38; Aleppo, 28.1.60.

5 Muradī, II, 32.
The mutasallim of Damascus was usually appointed by the governor and very often chosen from among his retinue. On one occasion Fathi, the daftar-dar of Damascus, was appointed mutasallim. On others, the agha of either the Yerliyya or the Kapi Kulus, or the alaybeyi (commander) of the feudal forces was appointed as mutasallim. On certain occasions the Sultan appointed the mutasallim. This took place mainly in cases when the governor was not yet nominated by the Sultan and also when the governor-designate was not in a position to nominate his mutasallim. In emergencies the notables of Damascus sometimes appointed the mutasallim. On one occasion, the mutasallim entered Damascus, but his governor was deposed before he assumed office. The succeeding governor sent another mutasallim.

There was no continuity in the office of the mutasallim in Damascus. The mutasallim deputized for the governor only during his absence. In the presence of the governor he no longer had de jure authority as such. The mutasallim who deputized for the governor in the period between his nomination and his arrival in Damascus was not necessarily the same one who deputized for the governor during his absence later on.

(cont.)

The term qa'im ma'am was sometimes used by the Damascene chroniclers in place of that of mutasallim, see Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 22a, 24a, 67b, 69b, 110a. The mutasallim of Damascus in 1731 referred to himself, in a letter to the French consul in Sidon, as 'caimacam' (sic), see A.N.B. 1023: (Sidon, 17.2.31).

7Ibn Jun'a, 59; the Arabic term ma-bayn means what is between. 
8See below p. 50.

1See Ahmad al-Muwaqqi, al-Barq al-lamI, f. 250b; Mawgil, ff. 55b, 58a; Ibn Kinan, II, f. 80a; Budayri, ff. 2a, 7a; Risala, f. 14b.

2Risala, f. 14b; Muwaqqi, f. 250b; see below p. 176.

3The Turkish form of the term is Kapi Kullari (sing. Kapı Kulu). The term Kapi Kulus is used in this study as the plural of the Turkish singular because it is near to the Arabic form given by the chroniclers as gabiqi.

4cf. Ibn Jun'a, 45; Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 84b.

5Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 60a; cf. Budayri, f. 7a.

6Muwaqqi, f. 250b.
3. The Daftardär.

The financial accounts of the province of Damascus were kept by the daftardär who held his office directly from Istanbul. He was the treasurer who dealt with money matters including the receipt and expenditure of cash. The finance office headed by the daftardär was referred to in various terms by the Damascene chroniclers. Sometimes the term used was derived from the Turkish one ḥāzīna-i āmire, rendered in Arabic al-khāzinā al-āmīra. Very often it was referred to as al-khāzinā al-dimashqiyya, or al-khāzinā al-mirīyya al-sūltāniyya, or al-khāzinā al-mirīyya, or simply al-khāzinā. The daftardär was sometimes referred to as daftardär Dimashq, or daftardär al-Shām, or daftardär Dimashq al-Shām. Very often he was referred to simply as daftardär or daftari. The arabicization of the term is apparent in the nisba-ending (i) which replaced the Persian dār. Sometimes one of the titles efendi and, less frequently, chelebi were added to the name of the daftardär.

1H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, 1 volume in two parts, London, 1951, 1957, i.i.201.
2Murādī, I. 163. Murādī, Matmah, f. 225b.
3Murādī, III. 148. Mirīyya is derived from mirī. According to S.J. Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798, p. 64 n. 165, 'in colloquial usage, the term mirī was applied indiscriminately, as both noun and adjective, to all possessions and revenues of the Imperial treasury. However, it was more frequently used for the Imperial lands and the land tax revenues of the Treasury'. Henceforth, the term mirī will be used in this study to refer to the land tax revenue of the Treasury.
6Ibīd., 95, 100; Ibn Jumʿa, 27.
7Ibn Jumʿa, 59.
8Efendi was a title generally applied to 'Ulama'. It was also given to (cont.)
It seems that until roughly 975/1568 the province of Damascus and other Asian provinces were, as concerns fiscal matters, under the authority of the daftardār of Aleppo whose title was deftərdār-i 'Arab wa-'Ajam. Around this date this office was abolished and separate treasuries were set up in each of those provinces. The financial authority of the daftardār of Aleppo over the province of Damascus during this period does not mean that there was no local treasurer in Damascus, albeit subordinate to the daftardār of Aleppo. In fact such an official existed and bore the title daftardār. It is stated that Sultan Selīm I created a deftərdārlık in Damascus. The Damascene chronicler Ibn Tulūn mentioned the existence of a daftardār in Damascus in Ramaḍān 922/Sept.-Oct. 1516, after the conquest of Sultan Selīm I. Later on, the Damascene biographer, Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, also mentioned the existence of a daftardār in Damascus around 944/1537-8. It is not clear, however, if these daftardārs in Damascus were subordinate to the daftardār of Aleppo, or were directly responsible to Istanbul, as later on in the century.

(cont.) government secretaries, mainly those connected with the finance department, who were considered, together with the 'Ulama', as 'men of the pen', see Gibb and Bowen, I.i.120 n.5. The term is still in use in Arabic as a dignified title for various groups of people.

1Chelebi was a title applied to men of the upper classes in Turkey, primarily poets, men of letters and also princes, between the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 18th century. It was also applied to shaykhs of türāq (sing. tarīqa which means brotherhood of mystics) until the 20th century. In its secular meaning the term has been replaced by əfendī in the Ottoman Empire since ca. 1700, see W. Barthold /B. Spuler/, E.I., new ed. s.v. Çelebi.

1Heyd, 42, 69 n.3(31); cf. B. Lewis, E.I., new ed. s.v. Daftardar.
2Gibb and Bowen, I.i.129, n.5 quoting 'Atā I, 96.
3Ibn Tulūn, ed. Hartmann, 128, 129, 131.
From roughly 975/1568 the existence of separate daftardars in Damascus can easily be traced. A few remarks may be made here concerning them. Firstly, some daftardars were of local origin, such as Fatḥ al-Daftarī. This was not due to the decline of the central administration, nor was it a trend initiated at a certain period, as was the case with the ‘Āṣm governors. Secondly, the length of the tenure of the daftardar was fixed neither by regulation nor by practice. In one case a daftardar remained in office for two years, in another for thirty years, both examples being from the 12th century A.H. Thirdly, in some cases the daftardars were entrusted with other duties. In 1041/1631-2, for example, the daftardar of Damascus was appointed commander of the Pilgrimage. On more than one occasion the daftardar acted as mutasallim in Damascus. However, during the Mamluk intervention in Syria in the early seventies, the Sultan appointed a special daftardar to take charge of the financial affairs of the Ottoman army assembled in Damascus.

During the period under study four daftardars assumed office in Damascus. Although it is difficult to tell if this was an improvement or otherwise over other periods in terms of length of office, the political importance which the office of daftardar had acquired, particularly under Fatḥ al-Daftarī, is of significance. The daftardar of Damascus in the period between 1129/1716 and 1148/1736, with a minor interruption, was ‘Alī al-Daftarī who was born in Hamah but graduated from Istanbul. His father had earlier occupied the office of daftardar in Damascus in 1101/1689-90 and 1102/1691.

1 Murādī, II, 31, 32. 2 Ibid., III, 209-12.
4 Murādī, IV, 7; see below p. 176. 5 Murādī, IV, 7.
6 Murādī, II, 31, 32.
In 1129/1716-7 the Grand Vezir banished many officials, among whom was ‘Ali. He was appointed daftardar of Damascus to keep him away from Istanbul. Although this was a paternal banishment it may illustrate the low esteem in which this office was held at the Porte. The successor of ‘Ali was Fâjîh al-Daftârî, who occupied the office between 1148/1736-6 and his death in 1159/1746. After him the office of daftardar passed into political insignificance. The term of his successor, Muhammad b. Rajab, known as ibn Farrûkh, erroneously linked with the 17th century Farrûkh family of notables because he resided in the house they built on the outskirts of Damascus known as dar Banî Farrûkh, extended over a period of thirty years and marked the subsequent political eclipse of the office of the daftardar. His Rûm origin was perhaps not a determined attempt on the part of the Sultan


Originally the term Rûm was applied by the Muslims in its political and geographical aspects to the Byzantine territory lying across the Taurus and the Euphrates. Muslim chroniclers later on called the Seljuqs who were established in Asia Minor Salâjigat al-Rûm, in the geographical sense only; whereas they still called the Byzantine Emperor malik al-Rûm, using the term here in a political sense. When the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid acquired the title Sultan al-Rûm from the Abbasid Caliph in Cairo in 797/1394 both aspects of the term, the geographical and the political, were thus combined; see the detailed study by P. Wittke, 4Le Sultan de Rûm", Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves, Mélanges Emile Boisacq Vol. VI (1938), pp. 361-390. When the Ottomans occupied Syria, the terms Rûm and Rûmî, long used by the Muslims for the country and the people beyond the Taurus and the Euphrates, kept being used by the local chroniclers, and indeed by the Ottoman administration, in the same meaning. In a firman dated 4 Jumada I 985 (20 July 1577) addressed to the governor of Damascus, the Sultan referred to the vacant places in the janissary corps in Damascus which were given to natives (yerlûd) and foreigners (tât) in contradiction to his orders to give them to young men from Rûm. According to Heyd, 65 n. 6, cf. 152, the term Rûm here seems to refer to the old Ottoman provinces in Anatolia and Rumelia. The 16th century Damascene chronicler ibn Thûlûn alternatively used the terms Sulêman al-Rûm (ed. Hartmann, 147, 150), malik al-Rûm (ibid. 131, 132), and al-Sulîman al-'Uthmânî (ibid. 122) in referring to the Ottoman Sultan. He referred to the Ottomans in Damascus as Rûm and Arvân, sing. Rûmî (ibid. 112, 128) as well as Türk (ibid. 131, 145, 150, 154). Najm al-Dîn al-Ghazzi III, 150, referred to them as Rûm, which term he used also for the Ottoman territory beyond the Taurus and the Euphrates
against local people, i.e. Fathi al-Daftarî and his relatives, because this change was in the tradition of the office. But his change of residence from what seems to have been the traditional centre of al-Qaymariyya (inside the town) to a place on the outskirts of Damascus, was more representative of a break-away from the past upheavals that were associated with the office and its occupant Fathi al-Daftarî. Under his successor Fayd Allah al-Akhsakhawi, a Rumi, who assumed office in 1189/1775-6, the office again made political news, partly because of the complacency of the then governor, Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm.  

Alongside the state financial officials there existed private household officials employed by prominent rich persons, such as the governor, the daf­ tardar and some notables, to take care of their private financial affairs. Fathi al-Daftarî, for example, had two khazinedars (treasurers).  

Salayman Pasha al-'Azm had a khazinedar as well as an influential vakîl al-kharj (cont.) (III, 50). Muḥibbi in the 17th century used the term Rum in the same sense (II, 242). So did Murādī in the 18th century (III, 227, IV, 7, 38, 82, 130, Matmâh, ff. 6a, 26a, 72b), but he differentiated between al-bilâd al- 'Arabiyâ and al-bilâd al-Rumiyâ (I, 41). Murādī also used the term Atrak (I, 220). He referred to Istanbul as Qustantîniyyat al-Rum (I, 274, II, 13, Matmâh, f. 5b) and sometimes used instead the strictly Muslim term İslambûl, meaning the city of Islam (I, 41, III, 287, IV, 115, 219). İslambûl first occurs regularly on the coins of Sultan Ahmâd III (1703-30), Gibb and Bowen, I, II, 218 n.1. Most of the Damascus chroniclers used the term İslambûl. Ibn Kinâ' described the pilgrims coming from beyond the Taurus as al-Hajj al- Rumî (II, ff. 31a, 71a, 92a, 165b, 171b). At the start of almost every year in his chronicle, Ibn Kinâ' gave the title of the Ottoman Sultan as Sultan al-mamlâkî (sometimes al-mamlâka) al-Rumîyya wa-bad (sometimes wa-aktbar) al-'Arabiyâ webad al-'Ajamîyya (II, ff. 28b, 37a, 69b, 80b, 85b, 119a). All the other Muslim Damascene chroniclers used the term Rum in the same sense. The local Christian chroniclers used it in a different sense. Barîk, for example, used the term Rum as meaning the Greek Orthodox community, local and otherwise, in the same sense as the Muslims had previously used it for the Byzantines, (see pp. 14, 19, 61, 64, 65, 85). He referred to the Ottomans as 'Uthmanîî (pp. 62, 92). On one occasion, however, he seems to have used the term al-bilâd al-Rumîyya (pp. 29) to refer to Rumelia, that is the European parts of the Ottoman Empire.

2 Murâdī, IV, 38.

3 Budayrî, f. 18b.
(superintendent of expenditure) who had previously served in this capacity under Ismā'īl Pasha and Asʿad Pasha, the ‘Aẓm. Because the influence of these private officials depended on the influence of the person to whom they were attached, we rarely hear of other similar officials unless there was something spectacular in their career or in the career of their employers. The above persons for example were mentioned on the occasion of the confiscation of the property of their masters.

While dealing with financial affairs, it is necessary to examine the role of the Jews and Christians in this respect. It is difficult to know the exact role which these two communities had played in the financial bureaucracy in Damascus. The Ottoman authorities of Damascus relied more on Jews than on Christians as far as fiscal matters were concerned. The Christians took more to commerce either on their own or as agents for the French and English merchants. Sometimes they acted as commercial agents for the daf-tardar as well as for the governor. The Christians had the advantage also of being employed as dragomans and as secretaries. Of the latter category we may mention Ibrāhīm al-Ṣabbāgh who was employed by Zāhir and Ilyās al-Yāziqī al-Ḥimsī employed by Saʿd al-Dīn Pasha al-‘Āzm.

After the Ottoman conquest of Damascus a Jew called Ṣadaqa was mentioned as muʿallim dar al-‘arb (chief official at the mint) in Damascus. Probably he was the same Muʿallim Ṣadaqa mentioned shortly afterwards as a money-

1 Budayrī, ff. 10a, 12a, 18a, 18b.
2 See for example, A.N. 1023: Sidon, 27.3.53, and 30.3.53, Sidon, 313.53.
3 See for example, PRO, S.P. 110/35: Aleppo, 17.3.61.
4 A.N. 1023: Sidon, (?), 12.31.
5Cf. Barlik, 24, 25; on the role of the Christians and Jews see A. Hourani, A vision of History, pp. 50-53; Gibb and Bowen, I.i.308-11.
6 Ibn Tulun, ed. Hartmann, p. 136.
lender. 1 In the second half of the 16th century many attempts were made to dismiss the Samaritans, officially considered as Jews, from the offices they occupied in the financial administration in Damascus. 2 Thévenot, who visited Damascus in the late fifties of the 17th century, saw a place near the citadel 'où l'on bat la monnaie, dans lequel les Juifs travaillent'. 3 At the beginning of the period under study, a Jewish sayrafi (banker) who was attached to the governor of Damascus, 'Uthman Pasha Abu Tawq, suffered among others in the revolt staged by the Damascenes against the mutasallim and his entourage. 4 Later on, in the early seventies of the 18th century, a Jew called Sheidy (sic) was mentioned as garraf (banker), sometimes referred to as garraf bashi (chief banker) of the governor of Damascus. In a financial dispute between this garraf and the English consul at Aleppo the latter admitted that 'Sheidy's interest at Damascus seems very powerful and will be strengthened on the Basha's arrival from Mecca'. 5 The registers of the mîrî in Damascus were kept by Jewish sarrafs. 6

Owing to their financial skill the Jews played an important role in commerce as well. According to Saint-Maure, who visited Damascus in 1721, 'rien ne se négocie dans cette ville que par l'entremise des Juifs qui y sont presque les maîtres du négocie'. 7 In Aleppo the English merchants em-

1 B. Lewis, 'A Jewish source on Damascus just after the Ottoman conquest', ESOAS, X, 1 (1939), p. 182.
2 Heyd, 164, 172, 173 n.9.
4 See below p. 112.
5 PRO, S.P. 110/42: Aleppo, 26.4.73, see also S.P. 110/40: Aleppo, 19.1.70, S.P. 110/42: Aleppo, 9.12.72, Aleppo, 11.3.73.
6 Cribb and Bowen, I.ii. 47.n.4.
7 C. de Saint-Maure, Nouveau Voyage de Grèce d'Egypte, de Palestine... Fait en 1721, 1722 et 1723, The Hague 1724, p. 172; on the speculation of the sarrafs of the governors of Damascus in trade, see A.N.BI 1030: Sido.
ployed Jews as commercial agents.¹

As for the currency of Damascus in the 18th century, there is no adequate information in the sources available to permit a comprehensive study of it. However, it is known that there was a mint in Damascus which struck coins.² But it is not clear what type of coins were struck in it, nor for how long this mint was permitted to function. Budayrī stated that the fulūs (the word may have been used to denote a specific coin or coins in general) which were struck in Damascus lost their value towards the end of ḫu' l-Ḥijja 1157/early February 1745.³ Because of several factors, mainly economic and political, such as the repeated devaluation of the currency, the striking of coins locally, counterfeiting, and the exactions of several governors, there developed a difference in the value of the currency from one place to another.

4. The Dawra

Before the command of the Pilgrimage was entrusted to the governors of Damascus, roughly in the first quarter of the 18th century, it was very often given to local chieftains and notables who were appointed governors of ṣanjaqs in the province of Damascus. Being tax-farmers of the regions they governed, these local governors used part of the revenue they collected to finance the Pilgrimage.⁵ When the governors of Damascus became commanders of the Pilgrimage, it was their direct responsibility to provide for its expenses, largely from the revenue of their province. For this purpose the

² Thevenot, II, 683; Budayrī, f. 14a. ³ Budayrī, f. 14a.
⁴ Cf. A.N.B. 1030: Sidon, 1.7.53; PRO, S.P. 110/38: Aleppo, 17.7.66, Aleppo, 27.5.67; Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 117a, 171b; Mawṣili, f. 59b; Budayrī, ff. 24b, 35a, 41a.
⁵ See below p. 101.
governors of Damascus, in their capacity as muhâqilîs (farmers-in-chief), made yearly tours of their province to collect the revenue from the local tax-farmers. This tour was called in Arabic al-dawra.

The regions normally toured by the governors on the dawra were those of Nablus, 'Ajlûn, Lajjûn, Gaza and Jerusalem. On one occasion the region of al-Shûf was included. Such tours can be traced almost yearly ever since the governors of Damascus became commanders of the Pilgrimage. The only obvious exception during the period under study was in 1185/1771-2, when the governor of Damascus was unable to go on the dawra because of the invasion of his province by the troops of 'Alî Bey of Egypt.

That the governors of Damascus toured their province almost regularly after they were entrusted with the command of the Pilgrimage does not mean that they did not tour it before. In fact they did so very often, mainly to collect arrears in the mirf dues or for military purposes. But there is no evidence that they made a dawra every year at a more or less fixed time before they assumed the command of the Pilgrimage. This could be explained by the fact that there was then no pressing financial need for the governors.

1 In the French dispatches of the time the dawra was referred to as la tournée, see for example A.N.B 1031: Sidon, 28.7.56; R. Pococke, A Description of the East and some other countries, 2 vols., London, 1743-5, II, i, 54 referred to the dawra as the circuit.


3 Ibn Kinân, II, f. 162a. This region was under the jurisdiction of the governor of Sidon. That it was toured on the dawra seems to have been an exceptional case because at the time the governor of Sidon was the son of Abû Ṭawq, the governor of Damascus. It could be that Abû Ṭawq was directly involved in some financial problems with the amīr of al-Shûf, who was in effect the amīr of Mount Lebanon, or that his action was simply an expression of power politics.

4 See below p. 97. On another occasion in 1169/1755-6 the Sultan issued a firman appointing Ḥusayn Pašha b. Makkî governor of Jerusalem and authoriz-

(cont.)
to go on the dawra every year, so long as others conducted the Pilgrimage and provided for it. Furthermore, they were very often entrusted with military duties outside the confines of their province, largely on the battlefields of Europe and on the border with Persia; hence they had no time to conduct the dawra regularly. Since they had been appointed commanders of the Pilgrimage, they were no longer asked to go on such campaigns outside Syria.

By the beginning of the 18th century the local families of chieftains and notables of the 16th and 17th centuries were either extinguished or weakened. Others, however, were coming to the fore, such as Zahir. The dawra, although primarily intended to collect the revenue, came to assume, by necessity, the aspect of a military expedition to discipline the rebellious chiefs. This is apparent, to give one example, in the campaigns of Sulayman Pasha al-‘Azm against Zahir, which took place at the time of the dawra. Such calculated attacks against a strong enemy tended to increase the length of the dawra. On one occasion it lasted from 3 Rajab 1155/3 September 1742 until 5 Shawwal 1155/3 December 1742. Normally the dawra lasted for about a month. It usually started sometime between the beginning of Jumada II and early Shawal. Its duration depended on the problems the governor had to deal with, both inside and outside Damascus. While the starting date was left to the discretion of the governor, that of return was timed with, sometimes dictated by, the date for the departure of the Pilgrimage. This obligation caused on many occasions the curtailment of the dawra. However, the days most often

(cont.) ing him to collect the revenue of the dawra. But it is not known if Husayn Pasha did in fact go on the dawra, in other words if the governor of Damascus was unable to go on the dawra that year, see below p. 264.

1Budayri, f. 4a. 2Ibid., f. 5b. 3See ibid., ff. 40a, 43a, 44b, 53b. 4Ibid., f. 6a; ‘Abd al-Šabban, al-Rawd al-zahir fi akhbar Dahir, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS. F.A. 4610, f. 8a.
reported for the return of the governor from the dawra were in Ramadān. ¹

It seems that on the occasion of the dawra the governors of Damascus used to impose a special tax known as dawriyya on, at least, the foreign missionaries residing in Jerusalem. This is suggested by a statement in a command by the Sultan to ‘Uthmān Pagha al-Kurjī, governor of Damascus (1760-71) which reads: 'Votre Boyourdi t'obligerait de ne plus exiger d'eux (meaning the missionaries of Jerusalem) pour Devrie ou pour Sandjakié rien en sur des 7000 p. qu'ils sont depuis un temps immémorial dans l'usage de donner aux gouverneurs de Damas'. ²

5. The Dīwān. ³

We may differentiate between two types of dīwān in Damascus:

a) The administrative dīwān. This was a general term given to the headquarters of the administration in Damascus. The dīwān as such was an integral part of the sarāva, the seat of the governor; hence, it was known as dīwān sarāyat al-hukm. ⁴ It was composed largely of clerks who dealt with government registers. We may mention here the office of katib al-dīwān,⁵ the office of katib al-‘Arabī ⁶ and the office of the dīwān Efendi ⁷ (sometimes referred to by local chroniclers as dīwān Efendisi). ⁸ The last two offices were im-

¹See Budayrī, ff. 35a, 40b, 41b, 47b, 51b; Ibn Kinān, II, f. 162a.
²A.N.B ¹ 439; Istanbul: 18.8.64 (Traduction d'un commandement du Grand Seigneur adressé à Osman Pacha).
³Some say that the term is of Persian origin and others that it is of Arabic origin, see E.I., new ed. s.v. Dīwān.
⁷Budayrī, f. 39b; for the dīwān Efendi of Sidon see, A.N.B ¹ 1031: Sidon, 28.7.56, B¹ 1033: Sidon, 23.12.66.
⁸Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 74b, 110b.
portant in the provincial administration. The katib al-‘Arabī, in charge of Arabic correspondence, as the name suggests, was an influential person because, as an 18th century French source put it, all governors 's'adressent à lui pour en savoir les usages du pays'.\(^1\) He was also described as 'celui qui approche de plus près les différents gouverneurs qui ne font presque jamais rien que par son entremise et sur ses conseils'.\(^2\) The diwan Efendi was a sort of a secretary to the governor.\(^3\) On one occasion, in an assembly of the consultative diwan, the governor asked the diwan Efendi to read the text of certain firmans which he had received from the Sultan.\(^4\)

There were other officials attached to the diwan, such as certain sipahis who were either given timars or more probably retained their timars for their service in the diwan.\(^5\) There were also cha‘ūshas attached to the diwan who were low-ranking military officials under the command of a bashi entrusted with ensuring public security.\(^6\)

b) The consultative diwan was an assembly of officials who included the aghas of the military corps, the daftardār, the judge, the muftī, the naqīb al-‘Ashraf, and of notables, generally referred to by the local chroniclers as akābir, a‘wan and afandiyya.\(^7\) To speak about a diwan in Damascus as always being composed of specified persons and meeting at more or less regular intervals is misleading. No such institution existed in Damascus, at least until the end of the period under study. The consultative diwan was

\(^1\)A.N.B\(^1\) 1028: Sidon, 27.2.50.  
\(^2\)A.N.B\(^1\) 1028: Sidon, 25.3.50.  
\(^3\)Gibb and Bowen, I.I.120, 152.  
\(^4\)Ibn al-‘Ṣiddīq, ff. 110a, 110b.  
\(^5\)Murādī, IV. 16.  
\(^7\)Cf. Budayrī, ff. 4a, 11b; Ibn al-‘Ṣiddīq, f. 18a; Ibn Kinān, II, f. 83a.
summoned by the governor or the mutasallim or the notables, depending on the kind of occasion that warranted its convocation. Its decisions were not generally to restrict the authority of the governor but to facilitate the implementation of his decisions or those of the Sultan. It was also intended to commit those attending it to its decisions, which very often affected their interests.

6. The military forces.

Three main types of troops existed in Damascus during the period under study: feudal forces, janissaries, and private or mercenary troops.

a) The feudal forces. It is only possible to draw here a general picture of the decline in numbers and military importance of the feudal forces in the province of Damascus, based on very scanty and fragmentary information. According to the figures given by Ayn-i Ali in 1609, which probably were twenty to thirty years older if not more, the feudal forces in the province of Damascus numbered 3,197 out of a total of 120,535 for the whole Ottoman Empire. The number of fief-holders was 1006. The number of 3,606 given by Marsigli in the early 18th century for the feudal forces in the province of Damascus seems to have been true of the period prior to 1660 because the sanjaqs which composed the province of Sidon at this date were included by him in the province of Damascus. M. de Girardin mentioned in 1687 that Damascus provided 700 timar cavalry (probably Sipahis only excluding the Zu'ama). He gave the number of fiefs (d'épée) as 1200. In 1193/1779 there

1 A.N. Poliak, Feudalism in Egypt, Syria., pp. 43-4.
5 According to Heyd, 67 n.2, in many Ottoman documents the term Sipahi does not refer to all fief-holders 'but means timar-holders as opposed to (cont.)
were 128 zi'ametts and 368 timars in the province of Damascus. 1

During the 16th century and probably up till the third quarter of the 17th century, when the janissaries of Damascus were replaced as garrison by the Kapi Kulus, 2 it seems that the main duty of the feudal troops was to garrison the fortresses along the Pilgrimage route and to provide necessary protection for the Pilgrimage. 3 With the decline of the feudal system many fief-holders managed to be exempted from military service through the payment of money known as badal. 4 However, many of them still performed military duties in the 18th century. On 8 Jumādā I 1160/18 May 1747, the governor of Damascus, As'ad Pasha al-'Azm, ordered the janissaries, the Zu'amā and the Sipahis to march against the Druzes. On 16 Jumādā I/26 May, they paraded before him in the Marja square in Damascus. 5 It seems that the Zu'amā and the Sipahīs, in contrast to the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus, had no fixed military duties in the 18th century. 6 They were resorted to mainly in emergencies, and very often it was their religious sentiment that was appealed to.

The feudal troops were commanded by an alaybevi who was a holder of a Zi'amet. 8 It seems that there was one alaybevi in every ṣanjāq of the province, at least in the heyday of the feudal system.

(cont.) Zi'amet-holders. In fact this is apparent also in a statement by Budayri, f. 21a, when he referred to the troops of As'ad Pasha al-'Azm. A Zi'amet was a fief which yielded between 20,000 and 99,000 aspres a year; a timar yielded a revenue of up to 19,999 aspres a year, see Heyd, 66.

6Belin, 290.

1Muhammad Adīb, Itinéraire de Constantinople à la Mecque, ed. by M. Bianchi, Paris, 1825, p.34.
2See below p. 64.
3Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, III, 157; Heyd, 76.
5Budayrī, f. 21a. 6Cf. Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 28b.
7Cf. Muradi, Matmah, f. 39a; Budayrī, f. 7a. 8Gibb and Bowen, I, i.51, 146.
b) The Janissaries. There were two janissary corps in Damascus: the Yerliyya (local janissaries) and the Kapi Kulüs (Imperial janissaries), both of whom played an important political role during the period under study. Almost always they were opposed to each other and the Yerliyya very often were in the ascendant. To understand the background to this rivalry it is important to know how these two corps came to exist in Damascus. We may consider the date 1070/1659-60 as a dividing mark between two phases in the history of the janissary corps in Damascus.

1. From the Ottoman conquest until roughly 1070/1659-60, there was one janissary corps in Damascus under the command of an ağa appointed directly from Istanbul. Rûmis, presumably janissaries of Rûmi origin, were stationed in the citadel of Damascus after its conquest by Sultan Selîm I.¹ The revolt of Janbirdî al-Ghazâlî, shortly afterwards, was suppressed by Rûmi janissaries and as a result the garrison of Damascus was strengthened.² The primary duties of the janissaries as garrison were to guard the citadel and the gates of the city, and to act as local police.³ However, during the 16th and 17th centuries members of the janissaries accompanied the governors of Damascus on their military expeditions both inside and outside their province.

The changing character of the Janissary Corps in Damascus.

When the Ottomans occupied Syria the Janissary Corps was well established in the Ottoman Empire, but symptoms of decay were already apparent in it.⁵ Like their fellow members, the janissaries of Damascus lived outside

¹ Ibîn Jum’a, cf. Ibîn Kinân, II, f. 159a. ² Ibîn Jum’a, 4.
³ Cf. Muḥibbî, IV, 310.
⁴ See Ibîn Jum’a, 36, 44; Muḥibbî, II, 124, 125; Heyd, 72.
⁵ On their decay see Gibb and Bowen, I. i. 179 ff.
their barracks, joined the crafts and became merchants and money-lenders. Such mixing on the part of the janissaries with the local population was not one-sided because many artisans, merchants and other influential persons joined the janissary corps to benefit from its many privileges. Means of avoiding any irritating duties resulting from this membership were not lacking. It came about therefore that many natives (Yerli) and foreigners (tat), that is, non-Turkish subjects of the Sultan like the Kurds, penetrated the janissary corps. In a firman dated 4 Jumāda I 985/20 July 1575 addressed to the governor of Damascus, the Sultan ordered him to confer the places that have fallen vacant in the janissary corps on young men from Rum and not on rich and wealthy natives and foreigners as was happening. The orders of the Sultan do not seem to have been heeded, and the process of natives and foreigners joining the janissary corps continued unabated.

Until roughly 1070/1669-60 the influential members of the janissary corps in Damascus were not natives. It is true that many of them, whether of Rum or foreign origin, had become Damascenized, but they still composed distinct groups. Members of the family of Ḥasan al-Turkomānī, a prominent janissary, together with their subordinates, composed about one quarter of the total number of the janissaries of Damascus in the first half of the 17th century. ‘Alī b. al-Arnaṭ, of Albanian origin, was a prominent member in this corps early in the 17th century. After his death in 1035/1625-6 his sons, Khudāwardī and ‘Alī, distinguished themselves in it. By far the most influential group during this period was that of Kaywān who had been

1 Cf. Heyd, 69, n.3 (20). 2 Ibid., 68, n.2. 3 Ibid., 68, 69. 4 Muḥībī, III, 427; Murādī, II, 63. 5 Muḥībī, III, 156.
a mamlūk of Rūqān of Gaza.¹ He wielded such power and prestige in the janissary corps in Damascus that when a person was attached to him he became known as Ḥbn Kaywān.² Other members of Kūnī origin held influential positions in this corps.³ Many of them originally came to Damascus in the service of a governor⁴ or with their fathers who were officials in it⁵, or for some other reason.

When a person first enrolled in the janissary corps he was described by the Damascene chroniclers as having become min ʿābd al-jund al-Shāmī, that is a soldier, nafar, (pi. nafīr).⁶ Provided he did not lack influence and initiative, the higher ranks of the corps were open to him as well. The aghā of this corps was frequently referred to by the Damascene chroniclers during the 16th and 17th centuries as ḍabīṭ al-jund al-Shāmī.⁷ His influence in the corps was very much diminished, partly because of the growing insubordination of the members of this corps.⁸ Below the aghā ranked the kāhya (ketkhuda) of al-jund al-Shāmī.⁹ A very influential rank in the janissary corps was that of yaya bashi¹¹ which seems to have been immediately below

²Muḥibbī, I, 30. ³cf. Ibid., II, 417.
⁴See for example, ibid., II, 157. ⁵See for example, ibid. II, 417.
⁶Ibid., II, 111; III, 156, 428. ⁷Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 110b.
⁸Muḥibbī, II, 242. ⁹Cf. Ibid. ¹⁰Ibid., II, 220; III, 156, 427; Murādī, II, 64.
¹¹Muḥibbī, I, 30; II, 417; III, 428; the Yaya Bashi (chief infantryman) was a commander of a unit (būlūk) of janissaries whose size differed according to time and place, see Gibb and Bowen, I, i.54, n.2; I.H. Uzunçarşılı, E.I., new ed., s.v. Būlūk, Būlūk-Bashi, and Būlūk-Bashi; cf. Venture de Paradis, Algèr au XVIIIᵉ siècle, ed. by E. Fagnan, Algiers 1898, pp. 70, 118.
that of kāhya. The rank of būluk bashi seems to have been lower than that of yaya bashi. The rank of chorbaji hardly figures in the writings of Muḥibbi. However, Maḥasin mentioned in the second half of the 17th century the chorbajis of the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus corps. In the 18th century the yaya bashis and the chorbajis of the Yerliyya corps played influential roles in Damascus. In this century the term ikhtiyariyyat al-ʾajāq (from the Arabic term ikhtiyar meaning choice) very often occurs in the writings of the Damascene chroniclers, meaning the chosen and influential elders of the corps.

Alongside these official titles, the Damascene chroniclers bestowed social titles on the influential members of the janissary corps. Such members were described as kubaraʿ al-jund al-Sham (the elders of the Damascene janissaries), or min ʾayn al-Sham (from the notables of Damascus), or min ʾayn al-jund biʾl-Sham (from the notables of the Damascene janissaries). Muḥibbi referred to Ibn al-Arnaut, for example, as ʾulāʾ kubaraʿ jund al-Sham (one of the elders of the Damascene janissaries). Ibn Jumʿa referred to the same person as min ʾayn Dimashq (from the notables of Damascus).

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1 Muḥibbi, III, 428; Kurd ʿAlī, II, 249. The būluk bashi was mounted and commanded certain būlūks known as būlūks of the aghā, see I. H. Uzunçarşılı, E.I., new ed., s.v. Būluk-Bashi.


3 pp. 119, 95 respectively. 4 See Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, (back of front cover and f.1b)

5 Cf. Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 20a, 23b, 53b, 54a; Budayrī, f. 47b.

6 Muḥibbi, II, 129, III, 299. For the translation of jund al-Sham as the Damascene janissaries see below p. 61.

7 Muḥibbi, I, 30; Ibn Jumʿa, 33. 8 Muḥibbi, II, 417.

9 Ibid., III, 156. 10 p. 33.
When there was one janissary corps in Damascus before 1070/1659-60, the Damascene chroniclers used to refer to it in various terms. Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzi, for example, used the term yankājariyya when referring to it. Muḥibbi used this term but he also referred to the janissaries as al-jund al-Shām. Ibn Jumʿa, who wrote in the 18th century, used the terms inkishār-riyya and yankājariyya when he referred to the janissaries of this and of the following period. Sometimes, he simply referred to them as ḥaq al-Shām or ʿaskar Dimashq.

Besides the term jund al-Shām, usually used by the chroniclers to refer to the janissary corps of Damascus before 1070/1659-60, there existed another term ʿaskar al-Shām or ʿaskar Dimashq which, although occasionally used in the same sense as jund al-Shām, was very often used to refer to a large ensemble of soldiers who accompanied the governors of Damascus on expeditions inside and outside their province. Since these soldiers were composed of janissaries, feudal forces and private troops, in various proportions, a comprehensive designation, that of ʿaskar al-Shām or Dimashq, was used by the chroniclers in referring to them. Non-Damascene chroniclers like Shidyaq, for example, referred to the troops which accompanied the governors of Damascus on their expeditions during this period as ʿaskar Dimashq. Although this term might have been envisaged by these chroniclers in the same comprehensive sense as that envisaged by the Damascene chroniclers, its geographical con-

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1 See for example, III, 50, 202.
5 pp. 36, 37.
6 Muḥibbi, I, 388, II, 125, III, 137; Ṭaḥṣīnī, 97, 102, 105, 121.
7 Muḥibbi, I, 388, II, 125, III, 137; Ibn Jumʿa, 36; Budayrī, f. 21a.
text is inherently emphasized in this case. After 1070/1659-60, Damascene as well as non-Damascene chroniclers tended to refer to each corps by a special name.

The Suppression of the Janissaries.

As early as the latter part of the 16th century the janissaries of Damascus extended their zone of influence and exploitation outside the limits of this province. The janissaries who figured in these practices during this period were Khada Wardī, Aq Yanaq, Qara Yanaq and Ḥamza al-Kurdī,¹ whose names suggest that they were not natives of Damascus. With corruption seething in their ranks the janissaries of Damascus became less effective in war.² The humiliations they suffered at the hands of Fakhr al-Dīn II not only demonstrated their military inadequacy but made them more determined to avenge their wounded pride in the field by intensifying their exploitation of the people.³

Under Sultan Murād IV (1623-40) the Ottoman central administration exhibited some vigour. Fakhr al-Dīn was finally defeated in 1635 and several militant chieftains in the province of Damascus were tamed as well. Thus the governors of Damascus retained the military initiative over their vassals. This triumph coincided with the upsurge in the power of the janissaries. Partly as a result of their growing self-assertion and partly also because of the weakening of the local chieftains who had provided commanders for the Pilgrimage for a long time, members of the janissaries were appointed to this office.⁴ However, because of the increase in the insubordination of the

²See Muḥibbi, III, 137; Ibn Jum'a, 28; Shidyq, 54, 359.
³Muḥibbi, III, 439.
⁴See below p. 37.
janissaries and the corresponding increase in the authority of the governors of Damascus, the latter started taking action against them.¹ This marked the beginning of the struggle for political power in Damascus.

Towards the middle of the 17th century relations between the governors and the janissaries of Damascus became strained. Several clashes occurred between them.² In 1061/1650-1, a plague spread in Damascus and caused the death of five hundred janissaries, among others. The governor used the occasion to impose a tax of five hundred piastres on every vacant position (mahlūl) in the janissary corps. Far from being resigned to their fate, the janissaries became more conscious of their interests, and they clashed in the same year with the governor.³ In 1063/1652-3, they were described as being the de facto rulers of Damascus, and in a clash with the governor that year, they caused him to flee the city.⁴ These frequent clashes culminated in a big crisis a few years later. The crisis started in 1067/1656-7 when the janissaries prevented the governor, Murtağa Pasha, an old enemy of theirs, from entering the city, although the Sultan was backing him.⁵ At the time, Muḥammad Pasha Köprülī, the Grand Vezir (1656-61) was infusing vigour into Ottoman authority. Moved by fear and envy the governor of Aleppo, Ḥasan Pasha, revolted in 1067/1656-7 against the administration of Muḥammad Pasha Köprülī, the Grand Vezir, and was supported by the governor of Damascus, Muḥammad Pasha b. al-Ṭayyār. The revolt of Ḥasan Pasha, referred to by Ibn

²Ibn Jum’a, 36, 37, MS. Berlin Cat. 9785, We (II) 418, ff. 13b, 14a.
³Ibn Jum’a, MS. Berlin Cat. 9785, We (II) 418, f. 14a.
⁴Ibid., ff. 14a, 14b.
⁵Muḥibbī, II, 418.
at the Jum'a as the Hasanlıyya affair, occurred a time when he was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the troops ordered by the Sultan to support him against the rebels in Anatolia. The janissaries of Damascus who were placed under his command took part in the revolt. After Hasan Pasha and Ibn al-Ṭayyār were eliminated by loyal troops,¹ the janissaries of Damascus paid next for their disloyalty and insubordination. In 1069/1658-9 several hundred Kapi Kulus were dispatched from Istanbul to Damascus. They took control of the citadel, the gates and other public services in the city which had been until then in the hands of the janissaries. Many prominent janissaries were put to death at the orders of the Sultan. Among those killed from the janissaries were 'Abd al-Salām al-Mar‘aghl and Mūhammad al-Turkomānī² whose names suggest that they were not natives of Damascus. Since many Damascenes had already penetrated the corps they shared as well in the casualties.⁴ The elimination of many high ranking non-Damascene janissaries increased the chances for the Damascenes to penetrate into the corps and to rise to its high ranks. Later evidence shows that this process was in fact accelerated as a result. Another important development at the time was the appointment of 'All Agha al-Daftardār, the conqueror of the Damascene janissaries, as governor of the newly-created province of Sidon.⁵ The janissaries

¹The Sultan was afraid lest the Persians join forces with the rebel governors see P. Ricaut (also Rycaut), Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, trans. from English, 6 vols., The Hague 1709, Vol. II, 260-265; Hammer, XI, 55ff.

²Muhībbī, IV, 310 gave their number as 300; whereas ¹bn Jum'a, MS Berlin Cat. 9785, We (II) 418, f. 15b gave it as two thousand. The troops which were sent to Damascus seem to have been part of the fresh troops raised by Sultan Murād IV after he suspended the devshirme, cf. Gibb and Bowen, I, 181. On the state of the Kapi Kulus in the Ottoman Empire and their division into infantry and cavalry, see, Marsigli, 32 ff.

³Ibn Jum'a, MS. Berlin Cat. 9785, We (II) 418, ff. 14b-15b; Muhībbī, II, 417, 418, IV, 309, 310; Hammer, XI, 73; cf. Ibn Kinan, II, f. 159a.

⁴Muhībbī, III, 448; Murādī, I, 256. ⁵See above p. 30.
seem to have been entrusted, after this event, with guarding the fortresses along the Pilgrimage route. However, most of them stayed in Damascus.

2. From 1070/1659-60 onwards two janissary corps existed in Damascus: the Kapi Kulus and the local janissaries who came to be known as the Yerliyya. Each corps had its own agha who was appointed from Istanbul. Before the Kapi Kulus were sent to Damascus, the local janissaries were sometimes referred to by the local chroniclers as al-qul, that is the slaves of the Sultan. Although both the local and the Imperial janissaries were considered as slaves of the Sultan, the term qul or al-qul or qabiqul came now to be almost exclusively used by the local chroniclers in referring to the Imperial janissaries. Since the Kapi Kulus as garrison were based on the citadel, they were occasionally referred to as dawlat al-qal'a (roughly masters of the citadel). On the same fashion, but demonstrating their local identification, the local janissaries were sometimes referred to as dawlat Dimashq (roughly

1Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 29a, 110b; cf. Nabulsî, al-Ḫaqîqa waʾl-majâz, MS. Camb. Qq. 300, ff. 381a, 381b, 384a; cf. 'Uthman, A description of the Pilgrimage route in 1156 A.H., MS. Berlin Cat. 6147, Fm (I), 105, ff. 276a, 276b; İbrahîm al-Khiyari, Tuhfat al-Udabâ', MS. Berlin Cat. 6135, WE (I), 125, ff. 7b, 15a; Mūrâdî, III, 12.

Earlier the feudal troops figured as guards in these fortresses, see Najm al-Dîn al-Ghazzî, III, 157.


3Ibn Jun'â, MS. Berlin Cat. 9785, We (II), 418, f. 14b.


5Ibid., f. 160a.
masters of Damascus). However, the various chroniclers used various terms in referring to the local janissaries. Ibn Jum’α, for example, alternately used the terms ṭaqq al-Shām and Ḥiṣāriyya in referring to the local janissaries. Although Budayri sometimes used the term ṭaqq al-Shām, he very often used the term Ḥiṣāriyya. Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, on the other hand, frequently used the term yankājariyya, sometimes alternately with Yerliyya. Muradī almost always used the term Yerliyya either on its own or, less frequently, together with other terms such as al-Yankājariyya al-Yerliyya.

The term Yerliyya is used in this study to refer to the local janissaries.

After the purge of the insubordinate janissary chiefs, the Yerliyya corps became more docile. The presence of the Kapi Kulus introduced a new factor which neutralized the power of the Yerliyya. However, the highhanded policy displayed by Ḥamza Paşa, governor of Damascus in 1093/1683-4, decided the Yerliyya to resist and in their desperation they revolted against him. But they were violently suppressed. It is interesting to note here the change in the composition of the Yerliyya as revealed in the terms which were applied to it. Ibn Jum’a called those who revolted abnā Dimashq, (the sons of Damascus). Muḥibbi, on the other hand, referred to them as al-jund al-Shami. While it is possible that the Yerliyya were helped by some militant Damascenes (which frequently occurred later on because of the common

1 pp. 43, 46. 2 pp. 64, 68. 3 See for example f. 21b.
4 ff. 4a, 9b, 15a, 21b. 5 ff. 23b, 59a, 110b. 6 f. 63a.
7 See II, 215, III, 286. 8 III, 90, IV, 14.
9 Ibn Jum’a, 46, 48; Kurd ‘Alī, II, 383; Muḥibbi, IV, 331, 333.
10 Ibn Jum’a, 46, 48. 11 Muḥibbi, IV, 331, 333.
interests they shared) it seems that both chroniclers were primarily referring to the Yerliyya corps which was becoming identified with the Damascenes.

The death in 1100/1688-9 of Salih b. Sadaqa, a prominent janissary, at the hands of the Kapi Kulug inaugurated the second phase in the liquidation of the Yerliyya chiefs. This also marked the beginning of a bitter hostility between the corps. In 1103/1692 the campaign of repression against the Yerliyya was stepped up. Nine of their prominent members, most of whom were Damascenes, were put to death by the governor of Damascus at the orders of the Sultan. Because these persons were prominent in the Yerliyya corps as well as in Damascus the chroniclers referred to them as aghawāt al-wijaq, a'yan Dimashq and akābir Dimashq.

The Yerliyya corps was weakened after the elimination of several of its prominent members. The Damascenes suffered also as a result because, with the removal of these personages who used to defend their interests, it became easier for the governors to enforce arbitrary measures. However, if the Yerliyya corps was weakened at the moment, another force, the Ulama, came to the fore to fill the vacuum and defend the Damascenes.

Around the middle of the 17th century the Ulama of Damascus were weakened as a result of the suspension of certain stipends which they used to receive from the Sultan. This coincided with the growing prominence of the


2Ibn Kinan, I, ff. 14b-16a; Sulaymān al-Zahir, p. 448; Kurd ‘Alī, II, 283, 284; Ibn Jum’a, 47, 48.

3Sulaymān al-Zahir, 443; Kurd ‘Alī, II, 283, 284; Ibn Jum’a, 47, 48.

4Cf. Ibn Jum’a, 46, 48.

5Muhibbi, I, 402, 403.
janissaries, whose effective influence overshadowed that of the Ulama. However, towards the end of this century the Ulama were able to assert their power, largely because of the weakening of the Yerliyya which thrust responsibility on them. In 1107/1695-6 some Ulama including Abd al-Karim b. Hamza, Nadiib al-Ashraf, Sulayman b. Mahasin, Khatib al-Jami' al-Umayy, and al-Shaykh 'Uthman al-Qattan opposed the zulum (injustice) of the governor and they were exiled as a result to Qalat al-Qasr, between Hims and Hamah, on the orders of the Sultan. In 1118/1706-7 another group of Ulama were exiled to Sidon, also on the orders of the Sultan, because they opposed the governor who tried to exact money from the Damascenes. The exile of the Ulama who stood for an apparently good cause gained them much popularity and sympathy in Damascus. When the Sultan revoked the orders for their banishment shortly afterwards, their prestige became established and the validity of the cause they fought for was implicitly endorsed. More daring roles awaited them in the future. So long as the Yerliyya were relegated to the background, the Ulama had the opportunity to step forward.

The major force that was locally sustaining the power of the governor vis-a-vis the Yerliyya was the Kapi Kulus. In 1118/1706-7 the Kapi Kulus were strengthened by the arrival of a number of odas from al-Rum. Many of

1. Ibn Jum'a, 49; Sulayman al-Zahir, 448, 449; Muradi, III, 167; for the identity of these persons see, Muradi, III, 66; Hasibi, f. 38b; Ayyubi, ff. 79, 107, 173.
2. Ibn Kinan, I, f. 67a; Sulayman al-Zahir, 449; Muradi, I, 224; cf. Hasibi, f. 36a.
3. See below p. 112.
4. Ibn Jum'a, 46. 52.
5. Ibn Jum'a, 52 gave the number of these odas as four. Ibn Kinan, I, f. 67b gave it as eight. Oda means orta. In Istanbul as well as in the provinces, each orta was housed in an oda (a room which means here barracks) and this is why the terms were sometimes alternately used, see Gibb and Bowen, I.I, 62, n.6. The number of persons constituting each orta varied according to time, place and occasion. It was estimated in the late 18th century (cont.)
the Kapi Kulus were of Mawsili and Baghdadi origin. This made the Yerliyya consider them as aliens. Enmity between these corps was sharpened later, particularly because of the clash in their economic interests after the Kapi Kulus started penetrating the various fields claimed by the Yerliyya as their spheres of influence.

c) The private or mercenary troops. By private troops is meant here the cavalry and infantry forces that were employed by the governors of Damascus to help them discharge their duties. Being mainly of non-Syrian origin and seeking to sell their services for money, such troops may well be called mercenaries. In Damascus they were composed of Dalatiyya and Lawand, both of them cavalry, and Tufengjis and Maghariya who were infantry. Reliance on such varied troops increased during the 18th century for various reasons. The feudal forces had enormously declined by then. The Yerliyya, although theoretically entrusted with guarding the fortresses along the pilgrimage route, became more interested in safeguarding their interests in Damascus against any intruder, not excluding the governor. The Kapi Kulus kept watch as a garrison in the citadel and served as a balance to the Yerliyya. Tension between the corps very often resulted in outbursts of violence. To enforce their own authority the governors of Damascus relied on private troops. This was all the more necessary because of their obligations to go on the dawra and, more important, to ensure the safety of the pilgrimage. But as one group of private troops became insubordinate the governors had to rely on

(cont.) that an orta stationed in the provinces amounted to 300 persons in peace time and to 500 when it was sent on a campaign, see Gibb and Bowen, I:i.61, n.5. In 1769 a foreign source in Istanbul estimated the number of janissaries who constituted an orta at about 106 persons, who ranged in age between children of eight to old men of seventy, PRO. S.P. 97/45; Istanbul, 4.4.69.

1 Budayrī, f. 4a.
another group to neutralize it. This increased the numbers and kinds of the
private troops and led to much tension and confusion in Damascus.

In studying the various types of these troops two aspects may be empha­
sized here. Firstly, their origin and recruitment and, secondly, their main
functions.

The Dalātiyya

The term Dalātiyya (sing. Dalātī) seems to have been a corruption of the
Turkish adjective deli, which means mad or wild. They were so called because
of their bravery and recklessness. Originally they were employed by the
governor of Rumelia around the beginning of the 10th/16th century. Later on,
other governors employed them. By the 18th century the Dalātiyya had become
disorganized and corrupt. They were mainly recruited from Anatolian Turks,
Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. Their commander was known as deli bashī,¹ but
it is not clear how many troops were under his command.

Like the Lewand and the Naghariba, the Dalātiyya were lodged in a special
khan in Damascus known after them.² On one occasion, in 1161/1748, a group
of them, under the command of a certain ‘Abd Allāh al-Turk, were brought by
the governor of Damascus from Sidon to serve under his mutasallim in Damascus³.
Very often the Dalātiyya accompanied the governors of Damascus on expeditions
as well as on the Pilgrimage.⁴ In Damascus they were used by the governor to
establish his authority against rival military groups such as the Yerliyya.⁵

¹I. H. Uzunçarşılı, E.I., new ed. s.v. Deli; Gibb and Bowen, I.i,193,n.3; ⁵Ibn Jum'a, 58.
P. Ricaut, VI, 89 (Tableau de l'Empire Ottoman); cf. Ibn al-Siddīq, f. 17b; ⁶Cf. Budayrī, f. 15a.
Budayrī, f. 9b.
²Ibn al-Siddīq, f. 43b. ³Budayrī, f. 27a, cf. ff. 6b, 19b; Mawsīlī, f.56a
⁴Budayrī, ff. 4b, 21b, 22b. ⁵Ibn Jum'a, 58.
The Dalātiyya were not always reliable in fighting. Sometimes they were dismissed because of their insubordination. On many occasions they terrorized the local inhabitants. They were also associated with moral corruption in Damascus.

The date on which the Dalātiyya, and probably other private troops, were paid was called waqt al-diyūn, and their pay was called 'ala 'ir.

The Lawand

The word is a corruption of the term Levantine which the Venetians used to refer to easterners who were employed in their fleet. The Ottoman navy inherited the word and used it for its crews, who were recruited from among the same native people who had earlier supplied the Venetians with their crews. Towards the end of the 16th century, the Lawand were disbanded from the navy and replaced by other Turkish recruits. Many of those disbanded turned to brigandage, while others became employed as private troops. By the end of the 17th century the Ottoman administration tried to eliminate the Lawand, particularly from Asia Minor where most of them lived, because of their insubordination. In spite of frequent attempts to get rid of them towards the middle of the 18th century, the Lawand remained in existence in certain parts of the Empire till at least the last quarter of the 18th century.

It seems that in the course of time the term lawand had lost its early association with a special type of recruits and came to be used rather loosely
as an adjective meaning cavalry and, sometimes, vagabond. In 18th-century Damascus the term Lawand was very often associated with Kurds, hence Lawand al-Akrad. The Lawand troops in Damascus seem to have been composed mainly of Kurds, probably recruited from the regions of Killis and 'Aintab. It is not strange, owing to the long use of the term Lawand and the many groups that adopted it, that the Damascene chroniclers should thus have identified its bearers. However, on several occasions the term Lawand was mentioned by the Damascene chroniclers without reference to the Kurds. This 'shortened' form was very often used by Ibn al-Ṣiddīq who wrote in the last quarter of the 18th century. It seems that the identification of Lawand with Kurds had become so well established by then that it was no longer necessary to mention the latter term.

The Lawand in Damascus were under the command of an agha. They were housed in a separate khan known as khan al-Lawand. On one occasion Lawand troops were brought from Tripoli to serve in Damascus. In one of the final attempts made by the Ottoman authorities to eliminate the Lawand from bilād al-Rum, in the second half of the 18th century, a group of them managed to escape and were employed by Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm, the governor of Damascus, and by Jazzār, the governor of Sidon. Like other private troops, the Lawand took part in the expeditions of the governors of Damascus. They very often clashed with rival military groups such as the Dalāṭiyya.

1Heyd, 161, n.1 (107). 2See Budayrī, ff. 6b, 47a.
3Bf. Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 9b. 4Ibid., ff. 9b, 10b, 25b; cf. Budayrī, f.50a.
5Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 10b. 6Ibid., f. 43b. 7Ibid., f. 25b.
8Shihāb, Lubānan, I, 118. 9Budayrī, f. 6b.
the Maghariba and the Yerliyya, and security in Damascus was endangered as a result.

The Maghariba

These troops were largely infantry, but some of them were cavalry as well. They were recruited mainly from Algeria and Tunisia, the countries constituting the bulk of the area referred to in English writings of the 18th century as Barbary (Fr. Barbarie); hence, these troops were known in European writings as Barbareques. Obviously, the Arabic term Maghariba is derived from the word al-Maghrib which in Arabic writings usually referred to Tripolitania, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

Maghariba troops were employed in Syria long before its conquest by the Ottomans. In 802/1399-1400 a Faviya for the Maghariba was built in Damascus, which shows that a community of them was living in Damascus, as was the case in Jerusalem and Tripoli. However, the large number of Maghariba troops employed in Damascus, and in the neighbouring regions, in the 18th century, in contrast with the two previous centuries, is significant. The increasing reliance of the governors on private troops in this century created an increase

1 Budayrī, f. 47a.  2 Ibn al-Siddīq, f. 17b.
4 Ibn al-Siddīq, f. 10b.
5 Pococke, II. i, 124. The famous Dinkizli, who commanded a group of Maghariba troops and was employed by Zahir al-‘Umar, claimed to be a native of Tahert in Algeria, see Munayyir, al-Durr al-Marguf, 50 (1956), p. 196.
8 Munajjīd, Wuṭat Dimashq, p. 10 n. 4; cf. Ibn Tulūn, ed. Hartmann, 155, 156; Ibn Tulūn, ed. Laoust, 51; Ibn Jum‘a, 10.
9 B. Lewis, ‘Studies — I’, BSOAS, XVI, 3 (1954), 479, 480; Nabulsī who visited Jerusalem in Rabī‘I 1105/ Oct.- Nov. 1693 mentioned his visit in it to
in the demand for these troops. The consistent influx of *Maghariba* troops during the 18th century is unparalleled among the other private troops. But how and why did these *Maghariba* troops come to be employed in Syria?

There were many opportunities for the *Maghariba* to come to Syria. They could come for example apparently as *mujawirs* (persons living close to a religious shrine) or disguised as pilgrims or with the pilgrims of the Maghrib who joined the Pilgrimage of Cairo. It would then be easy for them to come to Damascus, either directly or with the Damascene Pilgrimage from the Hijāz. But the continuous influx of *Maghariba* troops to Damascus, largely through Sidon, suggests that they came by another more expedient route. From the information available it seems that the majority of these troops came by sea to the Syrian coast and from there went into the interior in search of employment and fortune. It is significant that the governors who were appointed to Damascus and proceeded to it from the north, that is from bilād al-Rūm, usually brought with them *Dalātiyya*, *Lavand* and also Albanian troops, but not *Maghariba*. This might be explained by the fact that the places from which these governors came were far from the regions usually frequented by the *Maghariba*, namely the southern Syrian coast and Egypt. The arrival of *Maghariba* by sea is consistent with their reputation as seafarers. The pirates of the Maghrib enjoyed a wide influence in the Mediterranean for centuries. In 1032/1622, for example, three ships manned by

(cont.) to the mosque of the *Maghariba*, see *al-Naqīqa*, f. 94a.


1 The Egyptian commander of the Pilgrimage employed some *Maghariba* pilgrims as soldiers, see: S. J. Shaw, *Ottoman Egypt in the 18th century*, Harvard, 1962, p. 42.

2 Cf. A. N. B 1027: Sidon, 27.7.48.
Maghariba fought with European ships in Acre. In 1748 French vessels were accused of transporting Maghariba between the Syrian ports. On his return from the dawra in 1160/1747-8, the governor of Damascus, As'ad Pasha, was accompanied by many Maghariba who, as the statement of the chronicler suggests, were not with him when he left Damascus. Since the regions toured by the governors on such occasions included coastal regions, it is very probable that he recruited the Maghariba in or near the Syrian ports where they disembarked. On one occasion in 1131/1718-9 when the Maghariba troops were temporarily expelled from Damascus, they went in the direction of the coast to take to the sea.

It is not known if all the Maghariba troops employed in Syria were of Maghribi origin. Many sailors and passengers of various nationalities were kidnapped by the pirates of the Maghrib. Some of these captives may have been used by a Maghribi leader alongside his kinsmen to sell their services to the faction-split Syrian and Egyptian provinces.

Every group of Maghariba employed as private troops in Syria was usually commanded by a bash agha. In Damascus these troops were housed in a special khan known as khan al-Maghariba. Among other duties, they accompanied the governors on military expeditions and on the Pilgrimage. They were very often involved in military clashes with other troops in Damascus, as well as

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1Shihāb, ed. Mughābghab, 631.
2A. N. B. 1027: Sidon, 27.7.48.
3Budayrī, f. 24a.
4Ibn Kinān, I, 163b.
For a study on the Algerian pirates in the 18th century see Venture de Paradis, Algér, 38-56.
For the existence of surplus man-power in Algeria see ibid., 57-96; T. Shaw, Travels or Observations relating to several parts of Barbary and the Levant, Oxford, 1738, pp. 312-24; of Pro, S.P. 97/34: Istanbul, 21.11.49.
7Ibn al-Siddīq, ff. 10b, 21a; A. N. B. 1033: (Sidon), Ramle 28.10.67.
8Ibn al-Siddīq, f. 47a.
9Budayrī, f. 21b; Ibn al-Siddīq, f. 10b.
10Budayrī, f. 41a; Ibn al-Siddīq, f. 25a; Ibn Kinān, I, f. 32b.
11See Budayrī, f. 47a; Ibn al-Siddīq, ff. 20b, 21a.
with the Damascenes. Their pay, like that of the other private troops, was known as *alā’if.*

The **Tüfenqis**.

This is a Turkish term which means musketeers or fusiliers, and its bearers were infantry. The commander of the **Tüfenqis** was called **tüfenqji bashi.**

There is mention of a **bayraqdar** (a standard-bearer) for this corps. It is not clear from which regions the **Tüfenqis** were recruited. Under As'ad Pasha the **tüfenqji bashi** was a Baghdādi. On one occasion the **Tüfenqis** sided with the Baghdādis and Mawṣilīs in Damascus in their struggle with the Lawand. Such cooperation, in addition to the fact that the **tüfenqji bashi** was a Baghdādi, suggests a common origin.

The **Tüfenqis** seem to have been mainly responsible for ensuring security in Damascus. At times of emergency they were alerted alongside the other troops, and were entrusted with military duties outside Damascus. In general the **Tüfenqis** were more law-abiding and less inclined to insubordination than the other troops.

IV **The Religious institutions of Damascus.**

1. **The Judge**

Because of the official status, the almost continuous Ṛumān origin of the Ḥanafi judges and the comparative ease in tracing them—many lists of their names are available—it is only natural that more information is available on them than on the judges of the other madhhabss.

a) The importance of the office of the **Hanafi** judge of Damascus. In the reorganization of the order of *mollas* (chief judges) in the 18th century, the judge of Damascus, who was considered a *molla* and was sometimes referred to as *qādī al-qudat,* ranked after the two main *qādī-*`askars.

1Budayrī, f. 47a; see below, p. 160.
2Ibn al-Siddīq, f. 30b; M.al-Sabbagh,158; Munayyir, al-Mashriq,50 (1956),196.
3Budayrī, f.30a; Barīk, 14, 15; A.N.B.1 1033: (Sidon) Ramle, 28,10,67; cf. Gibb and Bowen, I.4, 193, n.3.
4Budayrī, f.34b. 5Barīk, 14, 15. 6Budayrī, f.35a. 7Ibid.,f.19b;Barīk,66.
8Ibn al-Siddīq, f.19b. 9Ibid., f.23b. 10Cf. Barīk,15. 11Gibb and Bowen, I,4, 88.
12Muhībī, III, 137; Murādī, Matmam, f.18a; Maḥasinī, 94, 120,137.
the judge of Istanbul, the judges of the two Holy Cities and the judges of the former capitals of the Ottoman Empire, Brusa and Adrianople. Although he was put in the same grade as the judge of Egypt, he ranked higher than him because of the religious importance of Damascus. In 1193/1779 the office of the judge of Damascus was described as 'un mollalik ou office de cinq cents aspers. It is not clear if this was the salary of the judge or a lump sum paid by a candidate, probably to the mufti (shaykh al-İslam) of Istanbul, for obtaining this office. However, it is known that the office of the judge of Damascus was farmed out for a certain sum of money.4

b) The appointment, term of office and identity of the Hanafi judge of Damascus. The mufti of Istanbul usually appointed the mollas. Judges of lesser degree were nominated by the qa'di 'askar of Anatolia. It is stated that by 1677 the tenure of mollas, including the one in Damascus, was fixed at one year. By surveying the list of the judges of Damascus from the Ottoman conquest until the end of the period under study, we notice two phases as regards their tenure. The year 1114/1702-3 may be taken as the dividing date. In the period before this date the general tendency is for the judges of Damascus to occupy their office for about one year. However, several judges remained in office for more than one year and some indeed for four continuous years. Others held the office for more than one year at intermittent periods. It is not known if these cases the judge

1Gibb and Bowen, I,ii.89.  
2Murad, I, 32, IV, 219.  
3Muhammad Adib, 33.  
4Gibb and Bowen, I,ii,123.  
5Ibid., 98, 106 n.5, 122.  
6Ibid., 106 n.5.  
7Ibn Jum’a, 1, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 43; Risala, ff. 18b, 19a, 19b.  
8See Ibn Jum’a, 9, 10, 11, 12.  
9Ibid., 5, 9, 14, 19.
needed to be confirmed in office every year. After 1093/1682, the judges of Damascus usually held office for one year only. The trend towards the recurrent appointment of the same judge became less frequent. It was in conformity with the general ruling of the Ottoman authorities at the time to fix at one year the term of judges appointed by shaykh al-Islām, such as the one of Damascus.

From 1114/1702-3 until the end of the period under study the judges of Damascus held their office on a yearly basis and were no longer reappointed to it. The reason behind this yearly change of judges seems to have been that it served to check the judges from exploiting the benefits of their long stay in office and, at the same time, to appease a long list of waiting candidates. It is a paradox in the conditions of 18th century Damascus that whereas many governors remained in office for several years, contrary to previous practice, the judges, as a rule, were changed yearly although this departure from previous practice was less striking than in the case of the governors.

Sometimes a newly-appointed judge entered Damascus while his predecessor was still in it because his term had not yet expired. But the newcomer was unable to discharge his duties until the term of his predecessor had expired to the day. If a judge died or was exiled while in office, it seems that as a rule his deputy acted in his place until the end of the judge's term. This emphasizes the fact that the one-year limit was adhered to. It is difficult to know if there was a specific date on which the judges

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1Gibb and Bowen, I.ii, 122 n.2.  2Budayrî, f. 4a.
3Anon, Dhikr asma' man tawallā qada Dimagh, MS. Zahiriyya, 4419, ff. 120b, 121a, 121b.
were usually deposed or appointed.

When the Ottomans occupied Syria they retained some of the Mamluk administrators, such as al-Ghazalī, who showed apparent zeal in their service. The judges were no exception and the Ottomans appointed as judges of Damascus Ibn al-Farfūr and Ibn Muflīḥ, both descended from families which produced judges under the Mamluks, after they had adopted, as it seems, the Ḥanafī madhhab. 1 Within ten years of the suppression of the revolt of al-Ghazalī, the judges of Damascus were being recruited almost wholly from among ṭūmīs. However, a sprinkling of local names still appeared in their lists. In 958/1551 the Damascene Ja'far Efendi al-Imādī was appointed judge of Damascus. 2 In 1104/1692-3 Ahmad Efendi al-Bakrī al-Ṣiddīqī became judge of Damascus. 3 Although these examples do not exhaust the list of the judges of Damascus who were of local origin, it is true to say that the great majority of the judges were of ṭūmī origin.

2. The Muftī.

In the Syrian provinces, as indeed elsewhere in the Ottoman provinces, 4 the muftī officially ranked after the judge and was considered the fourth important official in the province after the governor, the mutasallim and the judge. 5 Like the Ḥanafī judge, the official muftī was Ḥanafī appointed by the shaykh al-Islām of Istanbul, and only his fatwas (legal opinions) were admitted in the law courts. 6 But while the Ḥanafī judges were almost always

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1 Ibn Jum'a, 1; cf. Ibn Tulun, ed. Hartmann, 120.
2 Ibn Jum'a, 14; Risāla, f. 19a.
3 Ibn Jum'a, 48; Risāla, f. 19a; Muṣīrādī, I, 149.
4 Gibb and Bowen, I, ii. 135.
of Rūmi origin and usually held office for one year, the Ḥanafī muftīs were mainly of local origin, particularly from the 17th century onwards, and remained in office for long periods, sometimes for life.

If we study the list of the Ḥanafī muftīs of Damascus in the period between 922/1516 and 1240/1824-5 two main features emerge. Firstly, about half of the muftīs of Damascus in the 16th century were of Rūmi origin, the rest were of local origin. In the 17th century only two were Rūmis out of a total of thirteen muftīs. All the muftīs of the 18th century were of local origin. Secondly, in the period between roughly the middle of the 17th century and the first quarter of the 19th century, two families, the ʿImadīs and the Murādīs, produced several muftīs. Until roughly the middle of the 18th century about one-third of the total number of muftīs were from the ʿImadī family.¹ Later on the muftīs were drawn more frequently from the Murādī family.

Very often the ʿUlamaʾ of Damascus nominated the Ḥanafī muftī and forwarded his name for the approval of the shaykh al-Islām at Istanbul. On some occasions the shaykh al-Islām did not agree to the nominations. In 1188/1774-5, for example, he appointed a muftī other than the one nominated by the governor, the judge and several notables of Damascus.² On another occasion he endorsed the demand of the Damascenes to have Ḥusayn al-Murādī appointed muftī.³


Officially naqīb al-Ashraf ranked after the muftī, but in practice his

² Ibid., I, 243, Matmah, ff. 101b, 102a; Ḥasibī, ff. 44a, 44b.
³ Murādī, Matmah, f. 32b.
power depended on his own authority and that of the Ashraf whose leader he was. The shifts in the balance of power among the various groups in Damascus in the 18th century contributed to many vicissitudes in his political position and that of the Ashraf.

A sharif may be defined as a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and her husband 'Ali. This could be either through the eldest son, Hasan, or the second, Husayn. For a person to be considered a sharif he needed a genealogical table to establish his descent and witnesses to attest to it. Descent could be valid on the maternal, as well as on the paternal side. If a person was a sharif on both sides so much the better. Probably because of many attempts to forge genealogical documents, the authenticity of the genealogy was emphasized as something important.

The distinguishing mark of the Ashraf was the green turban, which colour they adopted towards the end of the 16th century. They also held the title of sayyid. The Ashraf were not identified with a special section of the society but rather cut across all levels of Muslim society. In Aleppo, where the Ashraf were strong, they were tried before special courts presided over by the naqib al-Ashraf in cases entailing imprisonment or corporal punishment. They also enjoyed special privileges such as exemption from certain taxes. The same may have been true of the Ashraf of Damascus.

1Gibb and Bowen, I.ii.93, n.1. 2Muhibbi, I, 153.
3Muradi, I, 10, 223, 241; Ayyubi, f. 96; Hasibi, ff. 38b, 52a, 53b.
4Muradi, I, 58 described such a person as ha'iz al-sharafayn.
5Muhibbi, III, 437; d'Ohsson, IV, 556-7.
8Cf. Gibb and Bowen, I.ii.93.
In Damascus, as elsewhere, the naqīb al-Ashraf controlled the affairs of the Ashraf. He was appointed on a yearly basis by naqīb al-Ashraf of Istanbul. But his term could be renewed and in practice he held his office for several years. On one occasion al-Sayyid ‘Alī al-‘Ajlan monopolized this office 'istabaddabiha' - in the words of Murādī, from 1172/1758-9 to 1183/1769-70. The naqībs in Damascus were of local origin and the office changed hands between the second half of the 17th century and the end of the period under study among three families: the ‘Ajlānis, the Ḥamzas and the Kaylanis. Members of one family succeeded each other very often. What is significant is that the naqībs were drawn from Shāfi‘is as well as from Ḥanafīs. Among the Ḥamzas there were Shāfi‘i naqībs as well as Ḥanafī ones. The same was true with the ‘Ajlānis.

Contrary to Aleppo, perhaps the only place in the Ottoman Empire where the Ashraf played a major political role for reasons peculiar to the locality, in Damascus the Ashraf were comparative late-comers on the active political scene. When they entered the struggle for political power in Damascus as a separate group, around the middle of the 18th century, they did not prove successful. This failure was largely due to their lack of political experience as well as to the presence of the Xerliyya, which corps served as an alternative power-concentration for the Damascenes. It was only

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1Gibb and Bowen, I.ii.100; Russell, I.321; Ḥasībī, f. 34b.
4Ibid., III, 208; Ayyūbī, f. 79; Budayrī, f. 6a. 5Muḥibbī, III, 439.
6Murādī, III, 67. 7Ibid., III, 206; Muḥibbī, III, 436, 439.
8Cf. A.N.B 194: Aleppo, 16.4.77 (Mémoire).
9See Budayrī, ff. 24b, 25a, 49a.
when the Yerliyya were enfeebled that the Ashraf emerged, mainly to balance the alien Kapi Kulüs. How far the Ashraf were successful will be discussed in the course of this study.

V. Some Aspects of the Damascene Pilgrimage.

The transfer of the command of the Pilgrimage to the governors of Damascus roughly in the first quarter of the 13th century was an event of capital importance because it affected the development of events both inside and outside Damascus thereafter. The absence of the governor from Damascus for about four months every year while conducting the Pilgrimage, and for an additional period on the dawra to provide for its finance, and the occupation of the bulk of his private troops on those commissions, created a sort of power-vacuum in the centre of the province no matter how efficient the mutasallim had been. This state of affairs encouraged the emergence and the consolidation of the power of various local forces. Furthermore, Damascus suffered from the presence of a growing number of mercenary troops needed to guard the Pilgrimage. Since the transfer of the command to the governors of Damascus was the result of political developments that took place within the province of Damascus during the 16th and 17th centuries, its investigation here not only puts this event in its historical perspective but provides as well a picture of the political developments which preceded the period under study and shaped to a very large extent the course of its events.

A. An historical outline of the changes in the command of the Pilgrimage.

With the fall of the Mamluk Sultanate Damascus acquired a special religious importance in the Ottoman Empire. Pilgrims from the vast Ottoman
territories to the north of it swarmed into this city on the occasion of the Pilgrimage. Others from outside the boundaries of the Empire, notably from Persia, did so as well.  

The pilgrims assembled in Damascus were, for reasons of security, organized as a caravan usually referred to by the Damascene chroniclers in the first two centuries of Ottoman rule as al-rākīb al-Shāmī, and more frequently later as al-Hājj al-Shāmī, by way of distinction from the only other organized and official pilgrimage in the Ottoman Empire: namely al-rākīb al-Mīsīrī or al-Hājj al-Mīsīrī. Each of these pilgrimages had a commander known as amīr al-rākīb or amīr al-Hājj.

In tracing the history of the command of the pilgrimage from the Ottoman conquest of Syria until the beginning of the period under study, four stages may be noted.

1. Until the year 979/1571-2 nothing substantial is known about the identity of the commander of the Pilgrimage. After the Ottoman conquest of Damascus special care was taken by the Ottoman authorities to ensure the safety of the Pilgrimage. With the revolt of al-Ghazālī, the Ottoman hold over the countryside was weakened. In need of supporters, al-Ghazālī deposed

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2. Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzālī, III, 150, 201, IV, 434; Muḥibbī, I, 30, IV, 434; cf. Muradī, I, 258; Ibn Jum'a, 35, 45, 48. According to S.J. Shaw, Ottoman Egypt 1517-1798, p. 240 n.2, the term amīr rākīb al-Māmīl was a Mamluk one, see also S.J. Shaw, Ottoman Egypt in the 18th century, p. 2 n.1.
3. The term al-Hājj al-Shāmī signifies, in a comprehensive sense, the ensemble of pilgrims who left Damascus for the pilgrimage under the command of amīr al-Hājj. This ensemble of pilgrims is referred to in this study as the Damascene Pilgrimage or simply the Pilgrimage. The term al-Hājj al-Shāmī was also used in a limited geographical sense to denote the pilgrims of Damascus and its environs, see, Ibn Kinān, II, f. 80a.
4. Referred to in this study as commander of the Pilgrimage.
5. Ibn Tulūn ed. Hartmann, 128; Ibn Tulūn, ed. Laoust, 145, 148, 152, 153;
Amīr Sinān al-Rumī, governor of the Biqā', and appointed, in his place, a member of the militant, but by then suppressed, Ḥanash family. This gave a new impetus to the ambitions of other local chieftains and dealt a blow to the Ottoman reputation among the Beduin. Perhaps it was more than mere coincidence that the Pilgrimage was attacked in al-‘Ula at this time.2

Al-Ghazzālī was suppressed and Damascus regained by the Ottomans, but it was difficult for them to exercise direct supremacy over the countryside. On 16 Jumāda II 927/24 May 1521 Iyās Pasha, the governor of Damascus, bought off the Beduin whom he could not subdue so as to secure a safe passage for the Pilgrimage.3 This was the first weakening and many vicissitudes were to follow.

2. In the period between 980/1572-3 and the elimination of Fakhr al-Dīn Ma‘n II in 1045/1635 there is evidence that the commanders of the Pilgrimage were appointed from the local chieftains and families of notables. The person chosen was always a governor of one or more of the following ganjaqs: Gaza, ‘Ajlūn, Lajjun, Nablus, Jerusalem and Karak.4 If he was not a governor then on his appointment as commander he would be made governor. That such governors were appointed commanders of the Pilgrimage may be explained by certain reasons. Strategically, these governors were in a good position to ward off the attacks of the Beduin on the Pilgrimage. Being familiar with


1Ibn Tulūn, ed. Laoust, 154; Ibn Tulūn, ed. Hartmann, 117.

2Ibn Jum'a, 2. 3Ibn Tulūn, ed. Laoust, 159.

the local conditions and strong enough to be chosen for this task, they were able to manage the Beduin who might threaten the Pilgrimage. Financially, such appointments would persuade these governors to contribute to the expenses of the Pilgrimage, either from the revenue of the regions they controlled and whose *muqata'ajījīs* (tax-farmers) they were, or from a special tax known as *mal al-Hajj* which these territories were under obligation to pay. Another reason was one of power politics, which explains why such chieftains were appointed at all as governors and commanders of the Pilgrimage. Once they were established and the Ottoman authorities were unable to subdue them except at a great risk, the latter had to tolerate their presence and regularize their position. Probably their own threat to the Pilgrimage would then be averted.

The elimination of Fakhr al-Dīn in 1045/1635 at the hands of the governor of Damascus gave the latter an undisputed supremacy in his province. Not until the emergence of Zahir al-'Umar in the 18th century did the governors of Damascus encounter a powerful vassal. Fakhr al-Dīn's successors were unable to fill the power vacuum which he had left, particularly because the Yemenī Bruzes, the 'Ālam al-Dīns, backed by the governors of Damascus, stepped into the political scene as rivals to the Qaysī Ma'īns. Most of the local chieftains and notables, who were dealt with harshly under Fakhr al-Dīn and were played off against each other by the contending parties, were losing influence. Other types of officials were appointed as commanders.

A new phase in the history of the command of the Pilgrimage, indeed in the

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2 See below p.101.
history of the province of Damascus, had started.

3. Between 1046/1636 and 1082/1671-2 there was a tendency towards appointing the commanders of the Pilgrimage from persons resident in Damascus, largely from the janissaries. The local families of notables did not cease to provide commanders, but they did so now less frequently than before.\(^1\)

The fact that several janissaries were appointed commanders of the Pilgrimage demonstrates the weakening in the position of the local families of notables and attests as well the growing influence of the janissaries of Damascus at the time.\(^2\) Viewed in a wider context, more exactly in the geographical context, the appointment of the janissaries as commanders provides a further proof that Damascus was taking the initiative, if not as yet as the centre of government for the commanders, at least as the place from which the commanders were increasingly recruited. This distinction between the centre of government and the place of recruitment of the commanders of the Pilgrimage becomes very important at this stage. When a janissary or any other Ottoman official was appointed as commander, during this period, he was given on the occasion the governorship of one or more of the sanjaqs of Gaza, Nablus, ‘Ajlūn, Lajjūn, Jerusalem and Karak. The reason for this practice was not so much the difficulty of departing from an established tradition as it was to enable the commanders of the Pilgrimage to collect the revenue of the regions which they were to govern, so as to defray part of the expenses of the Pilgrimage. The appointment of the commanders as

\(^1\)See Muḥibbi, II, 219-20, III, 56, 428, IV, 434; Murādi, II, 63, Natmah, f. 191b; Ibn Jam‘a, MS. Berlin Cat. 9785; We (II) 418, f. 14a; Ibn Jam‘a, 40.

\(^2\)See, Nabulsi, al-Haqiqa, f. 7a; Muḥibbi, I, 442, II, 88, IV, 110; Maḥasini, 80; Khiyari, ff. 4a, 4b.

\(^3\)See above p. 62.
local governors was also intended to fill part of the power vacuum, which
was created after the weakening of the local families of notables.

The appointment of Janissaries as commanders of the Pilgrimage seems to
have caused a dislocation in the relations between this new type of command­
ers and the Beduin, who were more used to commanders appointed from local
families of notables. Nor were the janissaries after 1660 as strong as they
had been earlier because they were subjected to repression by the governors
of Damascus.1 The disastrous attack by Ibn Rashīd on the Pilgrimage which
was commanded by the janissary Mūsā al-Turkomānī in 1081/1671, in as near
a place as Hawrān, seems to have decided the Ottoman authorities to appoint
strong officials, such as governors of provinces, to this important office.
After all this was the age of the efficient Köprülü Grand Vezirs at Istanbul.
4. The period between 1083/1672 and 1102/1691 saw a number of Ottoman offi­
cials of Rumi origin appointed commanders of the Pilgrimage.2 Among these
officials were some governors of Damascus. But janissaries and members of
the local families of notables were still appointed as commanders, though
not frequently.3 The small number of commanders provided by these two
groups during this period illustrates the latter's growing loss of influence.

After the attack on the Pilgrimage by Ibn Rashīd, its security was dis­
turbed for some years. This seems to have been partly due to the increasing
appointment of Ottoman officials who decreased the customary yearly payment
(sarr)4 made to the Beduin and hence exposed the Pilgrimage to danger.5 In

1See above p. 68.
2See, Muḥibbī, I, 244, 448, II, 124; Maḥāsinī, 97, 98, 102, 135; Ibn Jum’a,
41, 45.
3See, Muḥibbī, II, 133-4; Mūradī, III, 248; Ibn Jum’a, 43.
4See below p. 103.      5Cf. Maḥāsinī, 97, 98.
an attempt to restore the security of the Pilgrimage the Ottoman authorities appointed Khalil b. Kaywan, a prominent janissary in Damascus and a descendant of Kaywan, the mamlik of Riqwan al-Chazzawi, as commander in 1088/1678.

He held this office for four consecutive years. On his fourth pilgrimage, in 1091-2, he died.¹

Three main features are apparent in this period. Firstly, behind this diversity in the identity of the commanders of the Pilgrimage lies the change in the balance of power among the governors of Damascus, the janissaries and the local families of notables. The governors of Damascus were gaining the upper hand. Secondly, the governors of Damascus were appointed commanders but not yet regularly. The Sultan needed their assistance in his wars, particularly in Europe.² Furthermore, he seems to have been reluctant, at this stage, to augment their prestige by appointing them to such a dignified office. However, their occasional appointment as commanders, during this period, was a precedent for their regular appointment later on. Thirdly, not all of the Ottoman officials appointed commanders were given local governorships. Hence, many of them stayed in Damascus with their troops, and, as a result, insecurity and lawlessness increased in Damascus. When a commander was governor of, say, Gaza, it was not necessary for him to come with his troops to Damascus to conduct the Pilgrimage. He seems to have assumed the actual command of the Pilgrimage at a certain point outside Damascus, as happened on one occasion when the governor of Damascus conducted the Pil-

¹Mahiibbi, II, 133, 134; Muradi, III, 248; Ibn Juma, 43.
²Cf. Ibn Juma, 44, 45, 46.
grimage to a place called Qubbat al-Hajj, on the outskirts of Damascus, where the appointed commander then took over. That the Damascenes were spared on such occasions the rapacity of the troops of the commanders of the Pilgrimage is confirmed in a statement by Murādī. Around 1102/1690-1, when the commanders of the Pilgrimage were no longer regularly appointed local governors but frequently stayed in Damascus with their troops, Murād al-Murādī, the great grandfather of the biographer Murādī, appealed to the Sultan to remove the command of the Pilgrimage from Damascus and to return it to the governors of Jerusalem, 'Ajlūn and the neighbouring regions, as had previously been the case, because, according to Murādī, Damascus had suffered so much from the rapacity of the troops who assembled in it. The Sultan responded positively and removed the command from Damascus, where it had been for several years, and appointed to this office, in 1102/1690-1, al-Sharif Yahya, who was given the governorship of Jerusalem at the same time. Murādī states that Damascus was then relieved of the injustice of troops and of the oppression and the crimes which took place at the time of the Pilgrimage.

Al-Sharif Yahya did not prove fit for the task entrusted to him. Owing to his neglect the Beduin attacked the Pilgrimage which was under his command. After this calamity al-Sharif Yahya was deposed and the command of the pil-

1 It was the point at which the notables of Damascus awaited the return of the Pilgrimage, see Ibn Kinān, II, p. 161b. It is situated to the south of the Qubaybat quarter, outside Bab or Bawwabat Allāh (the gate of God), so called because it led both to Jerusalem and Mecca. See Murādī, Matmah, f. 37b; Pococke, II, i, 118.

2 Cf. Mahasini, 102.

3 He was the son of Barakat III, Sharīf of Mecca between 1082/1672 and 1093/1682. Al-Sharif Yahya fled to Syria with his son Barakat IV, towards the end of the 17th century, under the pressure of his rival, al-Sharif Dhawū Zayd, see G. Rentz, E.J., new ed., s.v. Barakat; cf. Ibn Kinān, I, f. 159b; see below p. 115, 131.

4 Murādī, Matmah, f. 26b; cf. Ibn Jum'a, 47.
grimage was returned to Damascus, where it remained until at least the time when Murādī was writing, roughly the end of the 17th century.  

5. In the period between 1103/1692 and 1119/1708, no janissaries or members of local families of notables seem to have been appointed commanders of the Pilgrimage. Mainly Ottoman officials of Rumī origin were appointed to this office. Out of fifteen known commanders during this period, eight were governors of Damascus. The statement by a Damascene chronicler on the occasion of the appointment of the governor of Damascus in 1115/1703 as commander of the Pilgrimage, which reads: tawallā al-ḥukm wa-l-imara, was very often used later on such occasions. The inefficiency of some of these commanders and the greed of others were mainly responsible for the Bedouin's attacks on the Pilgrimage. Moreover, the yearly change of commanders did not contribute towards a better understanding of the problem of the Bedouin. It was only through force or exact payment that the security of the Pilgrimage was ensured. The application of the first of these means was largely responsible for the prolongation of the tenure of Naṣūh Pasha who remained governor of Damascus and commander of the Pilgrimage from 1120/1703 to 1126/1714-5, thus inaugurating the trend of long governorships in the 18th century. Implicit in this example, which came after sustained attacks on the Pilgrimage, is

1Murādī, Matmah, f. 27a (wa-u'idat imarat al-Ḥajj ila Dimashq kama kanat wa-l-hiya ila'l-ān.)

2See Ibn Kinan, I, ff. 8a, 16b, 21a-24b, 29a, 32a, 45b, 47a, 47b, 49b, 54a, 54b, 57b, 59a, 64b, 68b, 71a, 72b; Ibn Jun'a 48, 49, 51, 52; Ibn Jun'a, MS. Berlin Cat. 97B5, We (II) 418, ff. 22a-23a; Muradī, Matmah, f. 26a; Nabulsī, al-Naqīqa, ff. 353a, 373b; Mafasini, 90; Hammer, Vol. XIII, 52, 53, 55, 56, 100.

3Dhikr man tawallā, al-Wizara, f. 114a.

4See Ibn Kinan, I, ff. 77a, 80a, 82b, 83a, 88a, 97a, 99b, 104b, 110a, 110b, 114a; Ibn Jun'a, 52, 54.
the fact that the Sultan was willing to prolong the tenure of those governors who ensured the safety of the Pilgrimage. The Sultan, in his capacity as Guardian of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, was ultimately responsible for the safety of the Pilgrimage. That the 'Ām governors remained in office for a long time is partly explained by their ability to ensure the safety of the Pilgrimage.

From 1120/1708-9 till at least the end of the period under study, the governors of Damascus were continuously appointed as commanders of the Pilgrimage. For this purpose they were exempted henceforth from going with their troops to the aid of the Sultan in his wars outside Syria as had formerly been their duty. A new phase in the history of Damascus had thus begun.

Apart from the religious prestige which the governors of Damascus acquired as commanders of the Pilgrimage, they benefited financially from this new office. They used to inherit from all those who died on the Pilgrimage. The rate of mortality was usually high among the pilgrims, partly because of the advanced age of many of them, partly because of the fatal attacks by the Beduin on the Pilgrimage, and partly also because of natural calamities, such as floods, thirst and excessive heat.

B. The composition, departure and return of the Pilgrimage.

The composition of the Pilgrimage: The fact that Damascus was the meeting point of the pilgrims coming from the north had contributed to the shap-

\[\text{PRO, S.P. 97/31: Istanbul, 30.1.41; Volney, 315.}\]

\[\text{Budayr}^\text{f. 44b; cf. Murādī, II, 218, 219; Matmah, f. 33b.}\]
ing of its history. The pilgrims used to come to Damascus in groups, very often defined geographically. The main groups were the Rumī pilgrims (al-Ḥajj al-Rumī),¹ the Aleppine pilgrims (al-Ḥajj al-Ḥalabī)² and the Persian pilgrims (al-Ḥajj al-ʿAjamī).³ These divisions were not strictly territorial because many pilgrims from other parts, sometimes outside the Empire, joined one group or the other.

There is very scanty information as to the number of pilgrims who composed the Damascene Pilgrimage. Most of the estimates available do not seem to be accurate because they were mainly made on the occasion of attacks on the Pilgrimage, and the tendency among the chroniclers in such cases was to base their estimates either on conjecture or on hearsay. In the disastrous attack on the Damascene Pilgrimage in 1757,⁴ the number of pilgrims, as given by Volney,⁵ was sixty thousand. Another source in Istanbul⁶ puts it between seventy and one hundred thousand. It is not without significance that Volney wrote about a quarter of a century later, at a time when this calamity had lost its painfulness and passed into the realm of legend. The other estimate, although contemporary, emanated from Istanbul and was probably based on the reports of agents in Syria who were not necessarily on the spot. On another occasion Volney estimated the number of pilgrims as being, in normal years, between thirty and fifty thousand.⁷ A missionary in

¹Ibn Ḥumāna, 2; Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 71a, 147a, 162a, 171b.
²Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 78a, 80a, 86b; Budayrī, f. 26b; it was also called al-rakb al-Ḥalabī, see M. b. ʿAlwan, MS. Berlin Cat. 6137. We(II), 1860, f. 102b.
³Ibn Kinān, f. 125b; Ibn Ḥumāna 53; Budayrī, ff. 2a, 38a, 40b.
⁴See below p. 277. ⁵p. 253.
⁷Volney, 322.
Damascus estimated the number of pilgrims in 1739 as between fifteen and twenty thousand. This number, moderate in comparison with the previous ones, seems to have been a fair estimate because on some occasions when the number of pilgrims soared for various reasons, it usually rose up to forty thousand. Since many persons went on the Pilgrimage for commercial purposes, the vicissitudes in the trade with the far east through Mecca affected their number and hence the total number of the Pilgrimage.

The departure of the Pilgrimage: Some pilgrims arrived in Damascus four or five months before the departure of the Pilgrimage. However, the majority usually arrived in the month of Ramadān. Late-comers arrived within a few days of the departure of the commander with the Mahmil and the bulk of the pilgrims.

The departure of the Pilgrimage from Damascus was marked by a magnificent procession in which the governor, accompanied by the Mahmil and the holy standard (ganjaq), took part, together with the elite of his troops. The date of his departure from Damascus was usually between the 12th and the 20th of Shawwal. However, this was not necessarily always the case, nor was it timed to coincide with a special day, say, a Friday. Other obligations, mainly financial, such as the dawra, or other military exigencies might warrant a further delay or an early start.

7Ibn Kinān, f. 125b; Budayrī, ff. 2b, 35a.
The commander of the Pilgrimage, accompanied by the Mahmil, the ganjaq and the troops, halted for a short time in Qubbat al-Ḥajj, on the outskirts of Damascus, awaiting the pilgrims to follow. The latter were usually late in leaving Damascus because they were interested in watching the procession of the Mahmil. They had also to complete their preparations and to bid farewell to any of their relatives who stayed in Damascus; not to all, because many accompanied the pilgrims to Muzayrib. As a result, the Pilgrimage proceeded from Damascus to Muzayrib in a rather loose manner, accompanied by relatives as well as by pedlars.

Within about a week of the departure of the governor with the Mahmil, the last of the pilgrims must have left Damascus, including any who had arrived late or who had been waiting for Ottoman officials on their way to Mecca. In Muzayrib the pilgrims halted for about a week to wait for the late arrivals, to complete their preparations and, for some of them, to deposit their valuables in its fortress. The Pilgrimage then made a fresh start as a more compact whole. The majority of those who had accompanied the pilgrims to Muzayrib would then return to Damascus. As such they were known as al-Muzayribatiyya. However, a few persons accompanied the pilgrims a little further.

(cont.)

8 See Ibn Kinān, II, f. 39a, 86b; Budayrī, ff. 38a, 38b, 42a, 43b, 47b; Mawṣili, f. 58a; Maḥasini, 135; Suwaydī, f. 114a.
1 Ibn Kinān, I, ff. 156b, 175a; II, ff. 165b, 171b.
2 Muzayrib, sometimes mentioned Mazarib, see Murādī I, 258, is a large village about 103 km. to the south west of Damascus, cf. R. Dussaud, Topographie Historiques, Paris, 1927, p. 340; Tresse, 69.
3 Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 27a, 39a, 87a; Budayrī, ff. 11b, 31a.
4 Budayrī, f. 35a. 5 Ibid. f. 2b.
6 Ibid., f. 6b; Muḥammad Adīb, 39; Suwaydī, f. 114b.
7 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 30a, 31a. 8 Budayrī, f. 6b; Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 125b, 169b.
On the arrival of the Pilgrimage at al-'Ula, the pilgrims sent letters to their relatives and friends concerning their safety and affairs. A special messenger known as kattab carried these letters to Damascus. He usually arrived sometime in the month of Dhu 'l-Hijja.  

The journey from Damascus to Mecca usually took about thirty-five days. The return journey lasted for about the same time. One pilgrim estimated that it took 490 hours of travel to reach Mecca from Damascus. Another estimated the return journey at 450 hours.  

The Return of the Pilgrimage to Damascus. During the 18th century the return of the Pilgrimage usually took place in the first half of Safar. On certain occasions, however, the Pilgrimage diverted its route, either to avoid an impending threat or to salvage what remained after an attack by the Beduin, and this entailed a late return.  

The return of the Pilgrimage was usually heralded by the arrival in Damascus of various messengers entrusted with special commissions, mainly to do with the condition of the pilgrims. The jawqadar al-Haji, who was a special emissary dispatched by the commander of the Pilgrimage, usually from Ma‘an, to inform the Damascenes of the safety of the pilgrims on their way back.  

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1 See Appendix II, p. 411.  
2 Ibn Kinān, I, ff. 73b, 113b, 153a, II, ff. 141a, 164a, 165b; M. b ‘Alwān, f. 106a; Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 33a, 164a; Mawṣili, f. 59a.  
3 Cf. Suwaydi, ff. 114a, 129a; Muḥammad Adīb, 39, 86; Volney, 322, put it at forty days.  
4 Cf. Nābulṣi, al-Haqīqa, ff. 344b, 373b, 385a; Muḥammad Adīb, 77.  
5 Uthman, MS. Berlin Cat. 6147. Fm. (II) 105, f. 284b.  
6 The term is from the Persian jawqadar, meaning an officer on patrol for watch duties, see R. Dozy, Supplément aux Dictionnaires Arabes, I, p. 230. The emissary of the commander of the Pilgrimage was sometimes referred to by the Damascene chroniclers as majāb, (Ibn Kinān, ff. 11a, 57b, 167a), an Arabic term which means a mounted courier.  
7 Cf. Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 1b, 120b; Budayrī, f. 3b.  
8 Munajjīd, Wulāt Dimashq, 109.
back, usually arrived in Damascus in the latter half of Muḥarram, roughly between the 20th and the 30th and very often between the 25th and the 30th.\(^1\)

Within a week of the arrival of the jawādār, kattāb, usually referred to as kattāb al-Hajj, entered Damascus carrying letters from the pilgrims.\(^2\) It seems that the letters addressed to the Damascenes were distributed in the Darwāshīyya market\(^3\) – a central place in the city.

Within a week of the arrival of kattāb al-Hajj at Damascus, the first of the pilgrims entered Damascus.\(^4\) The order in which the pilgrims entered Damascus was the opposite to that in which they left. More anxious now to be home, they made their entry before the Māhmīl and the commander.\(^5\)

C. The Military protection of the Pilgrimage.

Apart from the troops that accompanied the commander of the Pilgrimage and the garrisons in several fortresses along the Pilgrimage route, other troops were needed to protect the provisions carried to the returning Pilgrimage, and to escort it as well. This escort was known as the jarda. It seems that the primary purpose of the jarda was to carry provisions to the returning Pilgrimage. Because of threats along the route the jarda was well armed. This military feature, in the conditions of the time, became its dominant aspect.\(^6\)

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1 Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 1b, 8a, 120; Budayrī, ff. 3b, 7b, 28b, 35b, 38b, 41a, 44b, 45b.
2 Maḥāsinī, 80, 81, 95, 99, 103, 135, 136; Ibn Kinān, ff. 69b, 80b, 110a, 114a.
5 Cf. Ibid., II, ff. 8a, 92a; Budayrī, ff. 2a, 2b.
6 Cf. Budayrī, f. 54a; Suwaydī, f. 134b; A.N.B. 1116: Tripoli, 25.5.31; A.N.B. 1120: Tripoli, 1.10.63 (Bulletin); A.N.B. 83: Aleppo, 28.8.58.
7 Budayrī, f. 2b n.; Shihāb, ed. Mughābghāb, 679, 727.
The commander of the jarda was referred to by the chroniclers by various terms such as Ṕashat al-jarda, jardal, amr al-mulagat, and very often amr al-jarda. The group from which he was recruited changed with the times, as was the case with the commander of the Pilgrimage. The period of uncertainty about his identity after the Ottoman occupation of Syria, is longer than that connected with the commander of the Pilgrimage. In the 17th century the commanders of the jarda were chosen from the local families of notables and from the janissaries of Damascus, as were the commanders of the Pilgrimage. Similarly, also, the commanders of the jarda were recruited from Ottoman officials towards the end of the century. It seems that when an official entrusted with this office did not have enough troops to enable him to discharge his duties, extra troops were put under his command. Some of those appointed commanders of the jarda were governors, or were appointed on the occasion as governors, of sanjaqs in the province of Damascus, such as Jerusalem and Nablus. Before the command of the Pilgrimage was continuously entrusted to the governors of Damascus, some of these governors were appointed commanders of the jarda. Later on, during the larger part of the 18th century, the governors of either Sidon, Tripoli, or, less frequently,
Aleppo, were almost always appointed commanders of the jarda. The choice of these governors was made for various reasons, such as the nearness of their governorships to Damascus, which would ensure a speedy movement, and the fact that these provinces contributed to the jarda. However, the choice of the commander of the jarda was influenced by the type of rule that existed at the time when members of one family were frequently appointed as governors of more than one of the Syrian provinces. When a 'Azm, for example, was governor of Damascus and a member of the same family was governor of Aleppo and not of either Sidon or Tripoli, the one in Aleppo was appointed commander of the jarda.

Like the commander of the Pilgrimage, the commander of the jarda was appointed by the Sultan. But it seems that the governors of Damascus, before they were regularly appointed commanders of the Pilgrimage, sometimes appointed, perhaps merely nominated, the commanders of the jarda as well as of the Pilgrimage.

Within a month after the departure of the Pilgrimage, the commander of the jarda usually arrived in Damascus, if he was not resident in it. His departure from Damascus to escort the Pilgrimage depended on the date of his arrival in it, the completion of his preparations and how urgently the Pilgrimage needed help. Usually he left Damascus in the month of Dhu 'l-Qa'da or in early Dhu 'l-Hijja. As in the case of the Pilgrimage, many

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1 See Murādī, IV, 237; Budayrī, ff. 2b, 38a. 2 See below p. 102.
3 Murādī, IV, 237; Budayrī, ff. 6b, 42a, cf. f. 38a; Kurd 'Alī, II, 289.
4 Mushibbī, I, 18; Shīhāb, ed. Mughabghab, 683, 684, 728.
5 Budayrī, f. 6b; Ibn Kinān, II, f. 105a; Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 27b.
6 Budayrī, ff. 2b, 42a, 44b; Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 80b, 87b; cf. Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 35a.
people accompanied the jarda to Muzayrīb, and they were called Muzayrīb
Batīyyat al-jarda.

When the commander of the jarda arrived in Damascus, his troops usually
stayed there with him. In the disturbed security conditions that prevailed
in Damascus at the time, his troops added to political instability. In
1173/1760 the Damascene chronicler expressed his relief when the commander
of the jarda stayed with his troops in a village outside Damascus. 2

The point at which the jarda met the pilgrimage was not fixed as a rule.
It depended on the date on which the jarda left Damascus, the threats to
the pilgrimage and to the jarda itself, and the efficiency and dedication
of the commander of the jarda. In the late 17th century Nabulsi mentioned
Tabuk as the usual place where the jarda met the pilgrimage. 3 In the 18th
century the point of encounter seems to have been very often in Mada'in
Ṣāliḥ. 4 However, the threat of the Beduin to the pilgrimage as well as to
the jarda made the meeting point rather unstable. 5

In 1166/1752-3 two pashas, in this case ‘Azm brothers, were jointly
appointed as commanders of the jarda. 6 This was illustrative of the in­
fluence of the ‘Aznas and was a further precaution after the attack on the
Pilgrimage the year before. In emergencies a second jarda was necessary. 7

1 Ibn Kinān, I, f. 68b, II, ff. 141a, 141b. 2 Budayrī, f. 54a.
3 al-Haqīqa, f. 382 b; cf. Khayrī, f. 8a; Muḥibbī, I, 18, II, 18;
4 Budayrī, f. 2b n.
5 See ‘Umar al-Wakīl, Tarwīḥ al-qalb al-shajī, MS. Vienna, f. 57b; Budayrī,
f. 54a.
6 Budayrī, f. 42a. 7 Ibid., ff. 48b, 49a; al-Qārī, 80.
Appeals for volunteers to go on the jarda always met with enthusiastic response from the people.  

D. The financing of the Pilgrimage.

The resources of the Pilgrimage: In spite of their varied nature, these resources were drawn largely from the amīr revenue in one form or another. We may distinguish between resources allotted to the Pilgrimage and others allotted to the jarda. Within this framework the year 1120/1708–9 will be taken as a point of departure.

Before 1120/1708–9 the commanders of the Pilgrimage and of the jarda were usually governors of one or more sanjaqs in the province of Damascus. As such, they were the tax-farmers of the regions they governed. It seems that they used part of the revenue to finance the jarda. This partly explains why the governors of Damascus used during this period to appoint the commanders of the Pilgrimage and of the jarda as mubassils (farmers-in-chief) of their province they were entitled to appoint tax-farmers. Other regions, not administered by the governors who were appointed as commanders of the Pilgrimage and of the jarda, were under an obligation to contribute to the expenses of the Pilgrimage and the jarda. The money which the governors of these regions offered for this purpose was known as mal al-Hajj and mal mulaqat al-Hajj respectively. The nature of this financial obligation seems to have helped to sanctify it at a time when a large part of the local

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1 See Budayrī, f. 8a; Ibn al-Siddīq, ff. 22b, 109b.
4 Shīhāb, ed. Mughabghab, 677–9, 683.
revenue was appropriated by strong local chieftains. 1

When, after 1120/1708-9, the governors of Damascus were regularly appointed commanders of the pilgrimage, they assumed immediate responsibility for its finance. For this purpose they went on the dawra every year. The fact that the revenue of the province of Damascus was largely used to defray the expenses of the pilgrimage explains the meagre tribute which it sent to Istanbul and which did not exceed forty-five purses, according to Volney. 2

The provinces of Sidon, Tripoli and Aleppo were also under an obligation to contribute to the expenses of the pilgrimage and the jarda 3 irrespective of whose governor was appointed commander of the jarda.

In some cases impositions in kind were levied from merchants so as to supply the pilgrimage with provisions. 4 Since the commander of the jarda usually halted in Damascus before he resumed his journey, this place contributed towards his expenses. 5

With the decline of the feudal forces and the State's increasing need of cash, the holders of timars and zi'amets used to pay money in lieu of military service. This money, called by the Damascene biographer māl al-badal, was assigned by the Sultan to finance the pilgrimage. 6 Another source of revenue in the 18th century was the income of certain mālikanes, such as Hims, Hamah and Ma'arra, which were given to the governors of Damascus in their capacity as commanders of the pilgrimage. 7

3Volney, 281, 287; A.N.B 1036; Sidon, 28.2.74; cf. B 1025; Sidon, 6.2.41, Sidon, 10.11.41; A.N.B 1032; Sidon, 14.3.60.
4PRO. S.P. 110/47; Aleppo, 27.6.83.
5See Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 25a, 25b, 27b, 91a; Budayrī, f. 49a.
6Murādī, Majnūn, ff. 42a, 42b; see H. Bowen, E.I., new ed. s.v.Badal.
7Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 92a, 95a, 103b, 105a; Murādī, II, 32, III, 47.
Expenditure on the Pilgrimage: Part of the revenue assigned to the Pilgrimage seems to have been allotted for the pay of the troops that escorted it, the majority of whom, in the 18th century, were mercenaries. It is true that a large part of these troops were ordinarily in the service, and hence the pay, of the governor. But the occasion of the Pilgrimage necessitated the keeping, and at times the immediate recruitment, of extra troops, and this entailed further expenses. The pay of the troops that guarded the fortresses along the Pilgrimage route, whether Ṣinābīs or janissaries, was accounted for from other resources. The Ṣinābīs had fiefs to provide for their upkeep and the janissaries had certificates of pay (esami).

Another expense of a more fluctuating nature, yet very essential, was the payment to the Beduin along the Pilgrimage route. Such a payment was usually referred to as garr and less frequently as surra. Not all tribes along the Pilgrimage route received such a payment; only the militant ones that could cause trouble and obstruct the passage of the Pilgrimage were on the pay-roll of the commanders of the Pilgrimage. The sums paid to these tribes were intended mainly to procure a safe passage for the Pilgrimage in the regions they dominated. This also implied that the Beduin acted as guides to the Pilgrimage along the desert route.

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2 Ibid., IV, 215; Nābuṣī, al-Haqīqa, ff. 38a, 38b; cf. Mūradī, III, 12.
3 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 29a, 110b; cf. Mūradī, III, 22.
4 Both are Arabic terms which roughly mean a purse. Although the term garr was usually used by the chroniclers to denote the sum paid to the Beduin, some of these chroniclers used the term surra in the same sense. 'Umar al-Wakīl, Tarwīh, for example, used both terms alternately, ff. 44a, 46a, 46b, cf. Māḥasinī, 97, 98. A differentiation between the terms is essential, because the term surra usually referred to the sum annually sent by the Sultan to the Holy Cities; see below p. 105.
5 See M. V. J. Seetzen, "Mémoire pour arriver à la connaissance des tribus" (cont.)
Several of the commanders of the Pilgrimage during the 18th century tried, with varying degrees of success, to withhold part of the sum allotted to the Beduin. The latter retaliated by attacking the Pilgrimage. Usually the attacks on the Pilgrimage took place on the way back. Probably the large amount of merchandise which then accompanied the Pilgrimage tempted the attackers. Furthermore, this was the last chance for a year for the Beduin to obtain their full pay from the commander of the Pilgrimage. For, according to Mariti, payment to the Beduin was made in two instalments, half on the way to Mecca and half on the way back. Some of the commanders of the Pilgrimage were reluctant to hand the Beduin their exact sum on the way back because their hopes of getting through without payment were then high.

Apart from the garr, some tribes received further pay for carrying the pilgrims and their luggage to the Ḥijāz. Since a large number of camels were needed for the journey, the help of the Beduin was essential. In 1110/1698-9, for example, the ‘Anaza⁴ and the Ṣakhir⁵ Beduin carried the pilgrims (cont.)

(3) See, Hammer, XIII, 52, 53; Ibn Jun'a, MS. Berlin Cat. 9785. We (II) 418, f. 22a; Ibn Kinan, f. 16b, 21a-24b; Mawṣili, f. 60a.
(4) III, 117.
(5) See, Mawṣili, f. 60a.

Around the end of the 17th century the ‘Anaza started a new migration from the Arabian peninsula towards Syria, in the direction of the Euphrates. Nabuṣi (al-Haqqāq, f. 380a) who was on his way back from the Ḥijāz in Muḥarram 1106/Aug.-Sept. 1694, mentions that the ‘Anaza had spread in the region between Medina and al-‘Uṯā and that they were a great menace to the pilgrims. The vacuum created in northern Syria as a result of the waning power of the Mawṣili tribe since the end of the 17th century, besides other factors, attracted the northward push of the ‘Anaza (see E. Graft, E.I., new ed., s.v. ‘Anaza Bedouins). In the spring and summer the ‘Anaza spread in a region extending between Hadiyya in the south and the confines of Aleppo. In the autumn and winter they retreated into the interior, in the direction of Wadi Sarḥan and Baghdad (see Seetzen, 282).
for a fixed sum of money. Obviously the militant tribes were the ones who took part in carrying the pilgrims. It seems that the envy of other tribes was aroused as a result. It may well have been that a tribe attacked the Pilgrimage not so much to plunder it as to show its dissatisfaction at its neglect.

Apart from these resources assigned to the Pilgrimage, the Sultan made an annual contribution, referred to as *surra*, to the *Ashraf*, the *Ulama* and the poor of the Holy Cities. He contributed also to the decoration of the Ka'ba. The Holy Cities in this respect usually meant Mecca and Medina. However, on occasions Jerusalem was included among them and some of its inhabitants received payment from the *surra*. But there is no consistent evidence that Jerusalem regularly shared in the *surra* all through the Ottoman period.

The contributions made by the Sultan to Mecca and Medina were sent through the Egyptian as well as the Damascene Pilgrimages. The money carried by the Egyptian Pilgrimage for this purpose was also known as *surra*. But whereas in the case of Egypt the *surra* was sent to the Hijaz in the care of the Egyptian commander of the Pilgrimage, in the case of Damascus the *surra* was entrusted to a special official referred to as *amir al-surra* and more often as *surra emini*, who usually carried it, except for some intervals.

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1 Kurt 'Ali, II, 286; cf. Budayrī, f. 6b; Ibn al-Siddiq, f. ll4a, Volney, 322
3 Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798, p. 261.
5 Ibid., pp. 260-1.
all the way through from Istanbul to the Hijāz via Damascus, where he joined its Pilgrimage.¹

E. The Commercial Importance of the Pilgrimage.

The occasion of the Pilgrimage provided a relatively safe means, in comparison with other alternatives, for the movement of goods. It also provided a favourable market for the sale and barter of goods in Damascus.

The goods carried with the Pilgrimage to Damascus and elsewhere² were varied in nature and origin. They usually consisted of spices, textiles, precious stones and coffee.³ The coffee came mostly from the Yemen; the bulk of the other goods came from Surat in India to the Red Sea port of Jedda⁴ and were then transported to Mecca.⁵ There is no adequate information on the types of goods which were carried with the Pilgrimage to the Hijāz.

Although the trade carried with the Pilgrimage benefited many regions, its impact on Damascus was very important. On one occasion, in 1164/1750-1, the Damascene chronicler commented that the arrival of the Persian pilgrims with a variety of goods in Damascus stimulated commercial activity there.⁶

¹See, Hammer XIV, 183, cf. XIII, 53; d'Ohsson, III, 262; Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 6a, 147a, 165b, 171b; Budayrī, ff. 5a, 11a, 34b, 38a, 40b; Ibn al-Siddīq, f. 11a.

²See, Mantran and Sauvaget, 9; Shīhāb, ed. Mughābghāb, 737; Budayrī, ff. 7b, 8a; PRO, S.P. 97/39: Istanbul, 23.12.57.

³PRO, S.P. 110/25, Pt. II: Aleppo, 27.9.26; Aleppo, 19.10.26; Radcliffe papers, 6645/2: Aleppo, 12.2.15; Volney, 323; Russell, I, 199.


⁵A.N.B ¹ 1040: Sidon, 11.10.83; Pococke, II.i.125; Russell, I, 199.

⁶Budayrī, f. 38a.
Chapter 3.

THE FIRST PHASE OF "AZM RULE IN DAMASCUS

The pre-"AZM period in Damascus, 1723-5.

Damascus witnessed in the period that preceded the appointment of the first "AZM governor a revolt which in one way benefited the "AZMs. The revolt flared up against the arbitrary rule of "Uthman Pasha Abu Tawq, a Rumi by origin and formerly a qapudan pasha (Lord High Admiral) and a qa'im macam (probably a deputy of either the agha of the janissaries or of the Grand Vezir) in Istanbul. One source added that he was married to the sister of the Sultan. He was appointed twice to Damascus and it was towards the end of his second governorship (19 Rabi' II 1135/27 January 1723 - Jumada I 1137/January 1725) that the revolt took place.

Abu Tawq enjoyed the support of the Grand Vezir at Istanbul and his credit at the Porte was in the ascendant. This culminated in the marriage of his son, governor of Sidon at the time, to the Sultan's daughter. He counted, moreover, on his military power which held the people in awe not only in Damascus but also in the component parts of this province as well.

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1 Ibn Kinan, II, f. 6b; A.N.B 1021: Sidon, 19.5.21.
2 A.N.B 232: Tripoli, 22.10.18 (mission de Maillet).
3 His first governorship in Damascus lasted from 23 Jumada I 1131/13 April 1719 to 18 Jumada I 1133/13 March 1721. The MS. of Ibn Jum'a used by Munajjid, pp. 57, 59, erroneously stated that this was his second governorship in Damascus and the one after his third, but it failed to mention his first. The other MS. of Ibn Jum'a's work, Berlin Cat. 9785, We. (II) 418 f. 27a, described the last governorship of Abu Tawq in Damascus as his second, which is true, but erroneously described his first one as his second, f. 26a. All other chroniclers agree that Abu Tawq was twice appointed to Damascus.
4 Ibn Jum'a, 59.
5 A.N.B 1021: Sidon, 25.1.25.
as in the province of Sidon where his son was governor. Besides, Abu Tawq had the reputation of being a learned governor and this seems to have lulled the 'Ulama in Damascus for some time but could not avert their final clash with him.

It seems that the preoccupation of Abu Tawq with the province of Sidon and his long absences on the _dawra_ and on the Pilgrimage, made him rely on his subordinates in controlling the affairs of Damascus. Chief among these was his _Mutasallim Lukmush_ who cooperated with a group which included Šalih b. Sulayman Shaykh al-Ārd, the _shaykh_ of the Qubaybat quarter and the _subashi_ of the Šalihiyya quarter. Together with their

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2 Ibn Kinan, I, f. 162a; Barik, 3; Muradī, Matmah, f. 10b.
4 Mawsīlī, f. 55a.
5 It is not known if the term _shaykh al-ārd_ was an administrative title or a surname probably acquired after an office occupied by one of his ancestors. In either case the nature of this office is not known.
6 Each quarter had a chief, called _shaykh_, whose position was recognized by the authorities and whose functions were of a police nature, see Gibb and Bowen, I. i. 279. The Qubaybat quarter was originally a village on the southern outskirts of Damascus. It was so called because its inhabitants, largely composed of gardeners and peasants, used to live in small cupola-like houses. With the expansion of the Maydan quarter towards the south it absorbed this village. Although it retained its name later on as a quarter, it was sometimes known as the lower Maydan (al-Maydan al-Tah-tanā'). To the south of al-Qubaybat was Bab Allah, see J. Sauvaget, 'Esquisse d'une Histoire de la Ville de Damas', NF, 1934, p. 471; cf. Budayrī, ff. 11b, 12a; see attached town-plan, p. 486.
7 A police officer, see Gibb and Bowen, I. i, 51, 119, 154, 155, 279.
8 Al-Šalihiyya, called after Shaykh Abu Šalih founder of the first of its (cont.)
assistants they formed a class of extortioners known as al-‘awaniyya.  

Exactions made by the ‘awaniyya loomed over many Damascenes, and in Sha‘ban 1136/April-May 1724, in the absence of the governor, a revolt started in the Salihyya and soon spread to other quarters. The shops closed and the mob stoned the law-court and injured the judge, Isma‘îl Efendi Ta‘bîrî-Zade, whom they held responsible for not enforcing the Shari‘a, in other words for not combatting the ‘awaniyya. This shows the ineffective authority of the judge and the populace’s fear of reckoning directly with the mutasallim. It was only after the demands of the revolutionaries were conceded and the impositions revoked that the uprising subsided. In the meantime the parties concerned began preparing for their second move.  

(cont.)

An Arabic term derived from the root ‘awana. According to E.W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, Bk. I. 5 (London 1874) p. 2203, ‘awaniyya is an appellation applied to a ‘awan (armed attendant or guard), who accompanied a Sultan, without pay or allowance. Dozy, II. 121, 122 translated the term ‘awaniyy as ‘mouchard, denonciateur, delateur’, roughly meaning informer. He gave the plural as ‘awaniyya. According to him also the terms ‘awania or ‘awan mean ‘tort fait de gaieté de coeur’.

Muhîbbî, I, 403 and Ibn Jum‘a, 32 used the terms ‘awana(t) and a‘wan respectively in referring to those who helped others, usually influential persons, in causing mischief. ‘Awaniyya was used in the same sense, see Ibn Jum‘a, 60, 61. The exactions made by the ‘awaniyya were called ‘awan, (cont.)
On the return of Abu Tawq from the dawra he brought to account those accused of starting the revolt and reported to the Sultan that they had stoned the law-court. Those arrested by him included a manufacturer of jars, a grocer and three members of the Taghlib family, ‘Abd al-Qadir b. ‘Umar b. Taghlib, Ḥasan al-Taghlibī and Rasīlān al-Taghlibī. The Taghlib family was of importance in Damascus because several of its members were prominent Ḥanbālī ʿUlama, Sufis, and, most important, propagators of the Shaybanī Ṭarīqa. On Thursday 21 Shawwal 1136/13 July 1724, Abu Tawq put to death the arrested Taghlibī members together with other persons from the Ṣaliḥiya, after he had procured a Khattī Sharīf to this effect through his son, who was in Istanbul at the time. Those who were not executed were sent to Istanbul, but they were shipwrecked near Tripoli and eventually saved by its governor.

(cont.)

Russell, I, 316, n.4 states that the term avania, used in English writings at the time for exactions (its French equivalent was avanie), was of Italian origin meaning literally an undeserved injury. According to him it was universally used in the Levant and applied to all oppressive or unjust exactions under false pretences. In fact the term still means in Italian ill-treatment or insult. It is probable that the Venetians used this term to refer to such exactions in the Orient. There is reason to believe that other European writers used this Italian term because had they been transliterating Arabic terms a mosaic of spellings would have appeared in their writing as was the case for example with the spelling of the term mutasallim. It does not seem probable, moreover, that any of the above Arabic terms was a corruption of the Italian one because they were used in earlier Arabic texts. It may well be that the opposite is true.

Ibn Jum’a, 60; Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 162a, 164a referred to him as Ismā‘īl Efendī Ma’bar-Zade; Risāla, f. 24a gave his name as Mufassar Ismā‘īl Efendī

Ibn Kinān, II, f. 162a; Mawṣilī, f. 55a.

1 Probably a namesake of the one mentioned by Murādī, III, 58, 59 and Ḥasibī, f. 35a as having died a year earlier.

2 Ibn Kinān, II, f. 162b.

(cont.)
The Judge left Damascus for Istanbul by the end of Shawwal 1136/ middle of July 1724 to present his case and that of the Damascenes to its authorities. He advised the Damascenes, moreover, to appeal in turn to the Sultan explaining their grievances. Accordingly, a deputation was sent from Damascus to Istanbul to plead against Abu Tawq and his mutasallim. It consisted of 'Abd Allah Agha for the Yerliyya, a cheribashi for the Zu'ama, Abu 'l-Safa al-Istawi for the Ulama', and others representing the crafts, the quarters and the villages. Strong and fully representative though this deputation was, the Sultan turned down its case. This indicates the strong backing which Abu Tawq had in Istanbul. His son, who was present at the meeting held for this purpose at the Porte, was shown the plea of the Damascenes, and although he could not refute the charge he tried to exonerate his father and laid the responsibility upon Lukmush, his mutasallim. Strange and perhaps characteristically enough, the members of the deputation fled to save their necks. The Sultan seems to have had second thoughts later on about this affair. It seems also that the agent of Isma'il Pasha al-'Azm had exploited the occasion to advance the cause of his candidate for the government of Damascus.

(cont.)

3Hasib, ff. 35a, 42b, 43a; Ayyubi, f. 141. The Shaybanī Tariqa was referred to also as al-Tariqa al-Yunusiyya after the 'Christian' name of its founder Yusuf al-Shaybanī, L. Massignon, E.L. 'Est. Ed. s.v. Tariqa, described it as a wandering Syrian order.

4Ibn Kinan, II, f. 162b; Mawsili, f. 55b.

1Ibn Kinan, II, f. 162a; Mawsili, f. 55a.

2A feudal official who ranked after the aylybi and was chosen from among the Zu'ama, see Gibb and Bowen, I, i. 51.

3Mawsili, f. 55b.
In the second half of Rabī‘ II 1137/first half of January 1725 Abū Tawq withdrew to Sidon, which was governed by his son, apparently for relaxation, and there he received the news of his deposition. Things were warming up in Damascus in the meantime and rumours were rife about his deposition. Although this was not yet officially confirmed in Damascus, the assembling of the notables of the city in the presence of the new judge in Jumāda I of the same year, to deliberate on the situation, sparked off a revolt against his mutasallim and the ‘awāniyya. It was led by the Ḥanafi Muftī Muḥammad Khalīl al-Bakrī al-Ṣiddiqī. Lukmush, the mutasallim, and a few others of his supporters fled to Sidon and the erupting mob killed the rest of the ‘awāniyya and mutilated their bodies. The house of the Jewish ṣārraf of Abū Tawq, a certain Ibn Jubān-Oghlu, was demolished by the mob who sacked also the house of a Christian for his co-operation with the ‘awāniyya against his fellow believers. In early Jumāda II it was formally announced in Damascus that Abū Tawq was deposed, and on the 23rd/9th March 1725, Ismā‘īl Pasha al-‘Azm entered Damascus as governor.

It is remarkable that the revolt was led by the muftī and not by a member of the military organizations, which had been represented on the


2 Ibn Kinān, II, f. 164b.

3 Ibn Jum‘a, 61; Mawṣīla, f. 55a; Murādī, II, 84; Ayyūbī, f. 230. The Ṣiddiqī family of Damascus was a branch of the Ṣiddiqī family of Egypt. The first member of the latter family to settle in Damascus was Muḥammad Badr al-Dīn, see Murādī, I, 149-152; cf. N. al-Ghazzī III, 67; see also the genealogical table given by Muṣṭafā b. Kamāl al-Dīn al-Ṣiddiqī in his: al-Khamra al-ḥasīyya fī‘l-riḥla al-Qudsīyya, MS. Berlin Cat. 6149, Mq. 460, f. 2b. For a biographical work on the Ṣiddiqī family in Egypt see: Muḥammad Tawfīq al-Bakrī, Bayt al-Ṣiddiq, Cairo, 1323 A.H.

4 Mawṣīla, f. 55a; Ibn Kinān, II, f. 165a; Barīk, 5.
delegation to the Sultan. The Zu'ama and the other feudal forces in Damascus were insignificant politically and indeed militarily, as was generally the case in the Ottoman Empire.\(^1\) As for the Ye'liyya, they were not yet in a position to stage a revolt, partly because of the successive campaigns of repression to which they had been subjected in the past.\(^2\) Nothing is more indicative of the decrease in the revolutionary vigour which they had exhibited earlier than their being represented on a peaceful delegation to put the case of the Damascenes before the Sultan, rather than resorting to force. Only recently, in 1129/1717-8, the governor of Damascus had threatened the Ye'liyya that he would appeal to the Sultan to remove their corps from Damascus because of a fight in which they took part.\(^3\) This and other recent clashes between them and the Kapı Kulus demonstrate, however, the ability of the Ye'liyya to respond positively to challenge as well as attest to their growing strength. On the other hand, the Ye'liyya corps was undergoing a change in structure at the time. More Damascenes were admitted to its ranks but they seem to have been mainly influential persons whose interests were not encroached on by the šawāniyya. The rank and file of the Damascenes who suffered most from exactions do not seem to have started to penetrate the corps, and even if they did they were not influential in it as yet. It was not insurmountable barriers that hindered them from penetrating it in strength, but it was a matter of time before the corps swelled its ranks with them. Furthermore, the ağa of the corps was not yet chosen from among the Damascenes. At the time the ağa was a certain

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\(^1\) See above p. 55.  
\(^2\) See above pp. 64-7.  
\(^3\) Ibn Kinān, I, f. 148b.
'Abd Allāh al-Jākasi, a graduate of the Sultan's sarāyā. He was appointed to this office in 1113/1702-3 and remained in it till his death in 1140/1727-8. But the Ottoman authority which he represented was undergoing a change, and on two occasions he was deposed by members of his own corps. This could be a result of the transition the corps was undergoing when it became increasingly identified with the Damascenes. He himself, reflecting this change in his career, represented the Yerliyya on the delegation.

Because of the inability of both the feudal forces and the Yerliyya to take the initiative in staging a revolt at the time, responsibility was thrust on the 'Ulama'. The Muftī al-Siddīqī was not the first alim, nor indeed the last one, to defend the rights of the Damascenes during the 18th century. Others had preceded him shortly before. But his example was certainly the most daring, and as such unique, among his class during the period under study. His action could be explained by various reasons. If we consider those who were arrested and eventually put to death by Abu Tawq as the ringleaders in the revolt, then it might be said that the revolt was led by small business men, mainly shop-keepers who suffered the most from exactions. Among them figured also some important and popular persons like the Taghlibī members who as Sufis seem to have enjoyed much backing. These persons were in a good position to revolt, largely because of the suburban nature of their quarter, the Salīhiyya. Furthermore, the solidarity of the quarter was an important factor, and when the revolt/sparked off others joined it as a mob usually functions. The suppression of these re-

1Murādī, III, 90.
2See above p. 68.
volutionaries at the hands of Abu Tawq seems to have gained them the symp-
athy and support of the muftī. His action in giving them a lead, so long
as it was justified, was not against religious teachings. Indeed much
praise was showered on him from religious people. The religious credit
of Abu Tawq was already debased in Damascus as a result of the ill-treatment
which he and his mutasallim had given al-Sharif Yahya in utter disregard of
his religious eminence and his past career as Sharif of Mecca, Commander
of the Pilgrimage and governor of Jerusalem. This caused dismay in Damas-
cus. Moreover, those who were led in revolt by the muftī had nothing to
fear, at least religiously, and as things developed they were not even
punished by the Sultan because the action of the muftī could be considered
as a practical fatwā, although a rather forceful one.

The apparent powerlessness of the judge threw the responsibility on
the muftī who was in a better position to act, given his local links and
the origin of his power. Al-Siddiqī could draw much confidence from the
prestige which his family enjoyed in Damascus, Egypt and Istanbul.

Perhaps al-Siddiqī wanted also by this act to heal some of the damage
which his popularity had suffered earlier when he worked to dislodge the
popular Muftī ‘Abd al-Sharīf al-Nabulsī, who was installed muftī on the initia-
tive of the Damascenes in 1135/1722-3. Through the Shaykh al-Islām in
Istanbul, al-Siddiqī reversed this decision and had himself appointed muftī
to the disappointment of many—an act which he himself regretted, later on:

1 See Ibn Jum’a, 61, 62; Murādī, III, 90.
2 See above p. 90; see also Ibn Kinān, I, ff. 159b, 179a, 179b, 183b.
3 Murādī, f. 56b; Ibn Kinān, II, f. 168b.
4 Murādī, II, 83, 84; Ayyubī, f. 229; Ḥāfīzī, ff. 40b, 41a.
The bearing of this revolt on the appointment of the first 'Azm governor to Damascus was great. The revolt contributed to the removal from Damascus of 'Uthman Pasha Abu Tawq, who was a potential political rival to Isma'il Pasha al-'Azm, particularly because of his strong links with the Sultan. Furthermore, Abu Tawq was known for his preference for the governorship of Damascus to any other. But the Sultan could no longer disregard the growing opposition of the Damascenes to Abu Tawq. More serious things were occupying the attention of the Sultan at the time. Persia was torn by internal disorder and the Russians were taking advantage of it. The rebel Ashraf advocated Sunnism in Persia and this posed a challenge to the religious authority of the Sultan. In Baghdad, too, the authority of the Sultan was challenged. After the death of Hasan Pasha, governor of Baghdad, in 1724, the Sultan reluctantly appointed his son Ahmad as his successor. Things had to be settled peacefully in Damascus to avoid the eruption of another crisis which might threaten the safety of the Pilgrimage and obstruct the passage of the relief troops which were sent from Cairo to the Persian front through Damascus.

Although Abu Tawq became governor of Sidon after his deposition from Damascus, he still exercised wide influence in several dependencies of Damascus. One of his sons was governor of Jerusalem at the time.

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6 A.N.B. 978: Acre, 25.4.25, Acre, 30.4.25, Acre, 12.10.25. 7 Ibid. Acre, 10.2.25, Acre, 15.2.25, Acre, 23.2.25, Acre, 27.3.25, Acre, 14.4.25.
Tawq also tried to restore his credit in Istanbul. Had he lived longer he would have been a great impediment to the expansion of Azm rule. His death on 17 Rabi‘ II 1139/12 Dec. 1726 coincided with the upsurge in the power of the Azms who filled the power vacuum he left. But the sons of Abū Tawq did not relinquish their efforts to be appointed to the governorship of Damascus and Sidon. No sooner were the Azm governors deposed as a whole in 1730 than a son of Abū Tawq was appointed governor of Sidon. This appointment shows the interest which the family of Abū Tawq still had in this region and further illustrates the importance to the Azms of the revolt of the Damascenes against Abū Tawq.

The revolt had further bearing on the relations between Ismā‘īl Pasha al-Azm and the Damascenes, and between the succeeding governors and the Damascenes. Ismā‘īl Pasha, while governor of Damascus, ordered his brother Sulaymān Pasha, governor of Tripoli, to give asylum to the shipwrecked Damascene prisoners who were sent by Abū Tawq to Istanbul. By this act he was smoothing the way to cultivate the friendship of the Damascenes to whom he was already familiar as Commander of the jarda.

1Ibid. Acre, 23.4.25; A.N.B. 1021: Sidon (?).3.25.
2A.N.B. 1021: Sidon, 24.4.27; Ibn Kinaṭ, II, 9. 74b; al-Qazwī, p.77, reports his death in 1138/1725-6. The statement by Murādī IV, 15, that Abū Tawq was appointed governor of Basra around 1150/1737-8, appears erroneous. In fact Abū Tawq was appointed governor of Basra but that was around 1126/1715 before his first appointment to Damascus, see Shidyāq, 70, 417; Shihāb, Šubnān, I, 16; Nasha, MS. Paris, f. 35b; cf. ‘Abbas al-Azzawi, Ta‘rikh al-Iraq bayn ihtilalayn, 8 vols., Baghdad, V, 187-8.
3See below p.152.
4Mawṣūlī, f. 55b.
The fact that the Damascenes revolted and killed several of the 'awāniyya without being punished was of great significance for the future. Their attitude towards their governors was deeply affected, all the more so because the Sultan complied with their demands when he deposed Abu Ṭawq. A revolutionary tradition was thus established which was to inspire further revolts of greater magnitude and far-reaching results.

The Origin of the 'Azms and their rise to power.

There has been much speculation about the origin of the 'Azm family. The most controversial attempt to trace their origin was made by 'Isa Iskandar al-Ma'luf, a versatile Lebanese author who wrote in the first half of the 20th century. Several later writers quoted Ma'luf and the sources he used, but hardly added anything substantial to his arguments in this respect. The most recent of these writers is 'Abd al-Qadir al-'Azm whose account appears in his book entitled al-Usra al-'Azmiyya. The two major pronouncements by Ma'luf on the subject appeared in al-Mashriq, in the form of an introduction to his description of the palace of As'ad Pasha al-'Azm in Damascus, and in RAAD while writing about one of their contemporary members.

Ma'luf began his article in al-Mashriq by mentioning a variety of sources he referred to. But these seem to have been of no great help to him in tracing the origins of the 'Azm family, because the majority of them dealt with

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1 Published in Damascus, 1960.
2 Qasr, As'ad Basha al-'Azm, al-Mashriq, 24 (1926), 5-6.
3 'Al-Marhum Jamil Bek al-'Azm, RAAD, 14 (1936), 56.
the Azms while in office. He stated that they were of the Banī 'Azīm
tribe in Balqā. Sultan Selīm I, according to him, made its chief an agha
in the Syrian countryside and took with him seven of his sons to Anatolia
as hostages, to assure that other members of his family who were wāzīrs would
not revolt. He then adds that al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Fāsī al-Maghribī
states in his history, written in Egypt after 1100 A.H., that the title 'Azīm
was given to them by the state but in origin they were 'Urbān from Bādiyat
al-Shām. Their being Arabs, he continued, is confirmed by the fact that there
was no trace of them in Konya and among the Turkish tribes which did not
even know them. But in another passage he states that two brothers of this
family, Qāsim Bey al-'Azīm, known as Abī Katif, who died with no heir, and
Ibrāhīm Bey, ancestor of the contemporary 'Azīms, were brought up in Konya.
Ma'lūf then adds that according to some sources the 'Azīms were Turks from
Anatolia, and only God knows the truth!

In his later account in RAAD, Ma'lūf appears more inclined to believe
that the 'Azīms originated in Turkey. The prominence he gave earlier to the
probability that they were of Arab origin is abandoned now. He mentions
that the Azīms were from the tribes of Konya in Turkey and that some histor-
ians (i.e. 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Fāsī, whom he still quotes but, now, signifi-
cantly in a footnote) said they were descended from the Banī 'Azīm Arabs in
Hawmān and its vicinity. Qāsim Bey al-'Azīm, known as Abī Katif, who left
no heir, and Ibrāhīm Bey, father of Ismā'īl Pasha, distinguished themselves
in Konya. Ibrāhīm moved to Baghdad in the reign of Sultan Murād IV and
there Ismā'īl Pasha and Sulaymān Pasha were born to him and they were the
first to come to Damascus. He then adds that some Turkish papers men-
tioned that the title al-‘Azm was given to them because of the big stature of their ancestor, Abī Katif, known in Turkish as kamikli.

In these two accounts irreconcilable statements appear in the first, while the second inexplicably adopts a different view of the origin of the ‘Azm family. Perhaps in his brief errata note in an earlier work Ma‘lūf was nearer to the truth when he stated that Ibrāhīm Pasha, ancestor of the ‘Azm family in Syria, came from Konya to Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man, which was within the province of Aleppo. Other sources confirm that the ‘Azm family first started their political career in Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man. But whether they were tribes and whether they were of Turkish or Arab origin is difficult to ascertain. What is certain is that they were an established family in and around Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man in the first quarter of the 18th century. This view is supported by various sources.

1. The Damascene chronicler Sayyid Rasīlān al-Qārī, who wrote in the 19th century, after the ‘Azm hegemony was eclipsed, mentioned that 'Imām Pasha al-‘Azm was a fāllāh (peasant) from Ma‘arra. This term may have been essentially used by al-Qārī to describe the original occupation of 'Imām Pasha in Ma‘arra. But if we consider the social standing of al-Qārī as a sharīf and a member of a wealthy Damascene family, then his term might imply contempt as well which was characteristic in the attitude of the urban people.

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1 Dawānī al-qutūf fī tārīkh Bani al-Ma‘lūf, Lebanon, 1907-8, p. 705.

2 See Ayā-i ‘Alī, 276; Otter, Voyage en Turquie et en Perse, 2 vols., Paris, 1748, I, 91. In the 18th century Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man as given as malikānē to the governors of Damascus, see below p. 767.

3 p. 77. This term, used alternately with that of Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man, is a shortened form of the latter.

4 Munajjīd, Wulāt Dimashq, p. 9.
towards the rural people at the time, all the more so in this case because a person of peasant origin became a governor. What supports this view is another statement made by Fāghib Pasha, who was nominated to succeed As‘ad Pasha as governor of Damascus in 1757 and later became Grand Vezir. Infuriated at the rejection by As‘ad Pasha of a proposal he put to him to buy some of the belongings of As‘ad Pasha which were necessary to him in his future office of Commander of the Pilgrimage, Fāghib Pasha denounced him as fallāh ibn fallāh (peasant son of a peasant). Although Fāghib Pasha used the term here in a contemptuous sense which reflected the low esteem in which the peasants were held, he was invoking, at the same time, the fact that the ‘Azm family had been peasants. But for a peasant like Ismā‘īl Pasha al-Azm to be appointed governor of a province, he must have been a rather influential peasant, in other words a rural notable.

2. The Aleppine chronicler ‘Abd Allāh b. Miro, who was contemporary with the ‘Azm family, mentioned that the father of Ismā‘īl Pasha was a jundī (soldier) who settled in Ma‘arrat probably around the middle of the 17th century. According to this chronicler As‘ad Pasha al-‘Azm, son of Ismā‘īl Pasha, was born in Ma‘arrat in 1117/1705-6, and his brother Sa‘d al-Dīn was born in the same place sometime after 1130/1717-8. This shows that the ‘Azm family were

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1 See for example Murādī, III, 276; Russell, I, 405; Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 64a, 72b, 86b.
2 Russell, I, 405; see below, p. 266.
3 See Muḥammad Fāghib al-Ṭabbakh, I‘lam al-nubalā’ bi-ta‘rīkh Halab al-Shahba‘, 7 vols. Aleppo, 1922-6; vi, 481; Kurd ‘Allī, II, 289. Ibn Mīro who died in 1184/1770-1 (see Tābbakh, I, 55) left a work which apparently had no title and whose whereabouts are not known at the present time. Passages from this work are quoted in extenso by Tābbakh and, to a lesser extent, by Kurd ‘Allī.
4 The term jundī (pl. jund) was used by the Damascene chroniclers to refer
resident in Ma'arra in the first quarter of the 18th century.

3. The Damascene chronicler Ibn Kinān, who was also contemporary with the 'Āżms, referred to Isma'il Pasha as 'known as Ibn al-'Āżm al-Nu'mānī', that is from Ma'arrat al-Nu'mān. When Sulaymān Pasha al-'Āżm was deposed from his first governorship of Damascus in Rabi' II 1151/July-August 1738, he left Damascus in Jumādā I with his family and went to bilādīhi (his country), as this chronicler put it. 'His country' according to Ibn Kinān was Ḥamāh where Sulaymān Pasha had a sarayā (palace). It seems that the 'Āżms with the rise in their power moved their main residence to Ḥamāh which they were given at intermittent periods, together with Ma'arra', as malikānī. 4

4. Surpassing the previous accounts in identifying the 'Āżms, al-Khūrī Mikha'il Barīk, an 18th century Damascene chronicler, stated that Husayn Pasha b. Makī, a native of Gaza and governor of Damascus in 1170/1757, 'was from the second group of awlād al-'Arab who became wāzīrs in our country. The first group was Bayt al-'Āżm whose origin is from ... Ma'arrat Ḥalab, awlād 'Arab'. It is not clear if Barīk meant that the 'Āżms were of Arab and not of 'Uthmanī' origin, as he preferred to call the Rūmās. But most certainly he meant that they were of local origin. Barīk, Moreover, considered the rise of the 'Āżms to power as an historical event which among

(cont.) to the janissaries of Damascus in the 17th century, see above p. 61.

5 Tabbakh, III, 334. 6 Ibid., 329.

1 Ibn Kinān, II, f. 163b. 2 Ibid., ff. 84b, 85a.

3 Ibid., f. 105a. 4 See for example Tabbakh, III, 335.

5 This is a local pronunciation of the word 'Āżm, cf. Lammens, La Syrie, II, 99

6 p. 36. 7 pp. 62, 93. 8 See above p. 35 n.1.
had other things prompted him to begin his history from 1720 by which time they had become governors. 1 As an Orthodox Christian Arab he emphasized the fact that the 'Azms were awlād 'Arab and prided himself, on one occasion, on their tolerant rule towards the Christians in Damascus. 2 His 'arabism' cut across his religious allegiances when he described Patriarch Cyrillus, a native by origin, as the first to be ordained from awlād al-'Arab instead of from the Greeks. 3 Other evidence shows that the 'Azms were considered Arabs by their contemporaries.

5. The French Consul at Sidon referred to Sulaymān Pasha al-'Azm when he was governor of Sidon in 1729 as, 'Il est et a toujours été élevé à la campagne où il est s'est accoutumé a se obeir absolument'. 4 When the 'Azms were deposed and their wealth confiscated in 1730, the French Vice-Consul in Acre commented, 'ils seraient encore heureux s'il se voyaient reduits à leur premier état de simples particuliers de campagne'. 5 On other occasions the French dispatches referred to the 'Azms as Arabs. On the appointment of Sa'd al-Dīn Pasha al-'Azm to the government of Tripoli in 1746, the French Consul referred to him as 'un autre pasha arabe de nation'. 6 In 1763 Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm, governor of Sidon at the time, was described in a dispatch as being 'de la famille arabe nommée Beit El admir'. 7

1 See Barīk, p.2.  
2 Ibid., 62.  
3 Ibid., 3; it is significant also that Barīk identified the area extending between Antioch in the north and 'Arish in the south as al-bilād al-'Arabiyya, pp. 35, 68, 69.  
4 A.N.B1 1022: Sidon, 20.9.29.  
6 A.N.B1 1118: Tripoli, 10.10.46.  
7 A.N.B1 1033: Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin)
In the first two statements the French officials revealed the accepted fact that the ‘Aţms started their career in the Syrian countryside. By 1730 members of this family governed a wide region which extended from the boundaries of ‘Arîsh ‘Miṣr to the boundaries of Aleppo', and this shows, as what concerns us here, an entrenched family power which must have taken the ‘Aţms some years to build up. Furthermore, the ‘Aţms do not seem to have been graduates of the Sultan’s saraya and were not transferred, at the beginning of their rule, from a non-Syrian province to a Syrian one, but held office at first in the region where they built up their power.

The other statements in the French dispatches which referred to the ‘Aţms as Arabs were based on a first hand knowledge by French observers on the spot who communicated with the ‘Aţm governors. These observers were reflecting in their statements an established belief that the ‘Aţms were Arabs most certainly, meaning local people. If this does not go back to the remote past, at least it shows they were considered so at the time.

That the ‘Aţms lived in Ma‘arra before they started their administrative career in the first quarter of the 18th century is already established. But how were they able to attain such power?

According to Ibn Mîro Ibrâhîm, the father of Ismâ‘îl Fagha al-‘Aţm, came as a jundî to Ma‘arrah. In the fighting that broke out between the people of Ma‘arrah and the Turkomans who frequented its vicinity, Ibrâhîm was killed.

1 The garrison of ‘Arîsh was composed at the time of Mutafarriga troops, see, M. al-Kurdî, f. 60b.
2 Barîk, 124.
3 See above p. 59.
4 The Turkomans usually settled in the vicinity of urban centres, see: Nabulsi, Hillat al-shahab al-‘Arabî, MS. BM. OR. 3622, f. 5b; Sauvaget, Alep, 230; Pococke, II. 1. 118.
One of his sons, Isma'īl, born in Ma'arra shortly before 1070/1659-60, was able, later, to become governor of his birth-place as well as of Hamah.\(^1\)

That İbrahim came to Ma'arra as a jundi, probably around the middle of the 17th century, fits into a common practice at the time. We have already seen that the janissaries of Damascus known in the 17th century as jund Dimashq extended their zone of influence as far as Aleppo early in this century and took control particularly of revenue collection in the countryside.\(^2\) True, the janissaries of Damascus were able to exercise such an influence partly because of their growing power. But on the other hand the conditions in the countryside were certainly favourable for this expansion in their influence. With such a practice established and the conditions inviting as they were, it is no wonder that other jundis or perhaps mere adventurers should have flocked into this territory on the fringes of the province of Aleppo. It may well have been also that İbrahim al-‘Azm was appointed by the Ottoman authorities to guard Ma'arra against the threatening Turkomāns. But the place from which İbrahim came is an enigma which does not admit of a solution at the moment.

How far is Ibn Miro reliable and how far were the conditions in Ma'arra at the time helpful for the 'Azm to build up such a career? 'Abd Allāh Ibn Miro was descended from a family of notables\(^3\) known in the history of Aleppo in the 18th and 19th centuries for its trading activities. The commercial relations of the Miro family, particularly 'Abd Allāh, outside Aleppo\(^4\) seem

\(^1\)Tabbākh, VI, 481.
\(^2\)See above p. 62.
\(^3\)See Sunayaṭ̣', ff. 40b, 78a.
\(^4\)PRO, S.P.110/40: Aleppo, 11.8.69; Radcliffe papers, 6645/5: Aleppo, 15.10.48; Aleppo, 20.2.49.
to have enabled him to obtain information on the inhabitants of the countryside for his history. Moreover, his contemporary, the Biographer Murādi, copied at length from his history which suggests its reliability.

The location of Ma‘arra on the borderline with the desert was advantageous because it served as a centre for trade with the Beduin. But on the other hand its position made it vulnerable to their attacks. Furthermore, Ma‘arra was located on the main road between Aleppo and Damascus and this enhanced its commercial importance, as well as enabled its authorities to control the traffic of passengers and goods. Thévenot described Ma‘arra in 1658 as "une méchante ville commandée par un Sangiac", and noted the ruins that surrounded it. In 1105/1693 Nebulsī saw numerous Beduin roaming the region between Hims and Hamāh. Pococke who visited Ma‘arra in the thirties of the 18th century described the poverty of the town and the independance of its agha who levied contributions on travellers.

Given the loose security that prevailed at the time, particularly in the countryside, it does not seem to have been difficult for a person like Ibrāhīm al-‘Azm, who was a soldier by occupation, to build up a career in this region and for the Ottoman authorities to condone his rule because apparently he helped to restore order. His death in the fighting with the Turkomans was a challenge to which his family was able to measure up. It

1 Tabbākh, I, 36, 37.
3 Cf. Mantran and Sauvaget, 119.
4 Voyages, II, 703, Suite de Voyage, III, 97, 98.
5 al-Ḥaqīqa, ff. 37a, 37b.
6 II, i. 145, 146.
seems that during the counter-attack which the Ottoman authorities launched against the nomads who ravaged the countryside in the province of Aleppo in the first quarter of the 18th century, 1 Isma'il Pasha al-'Agm was recognised as governor of Ma'arra and Hamah. For, once he was able to assert his authority, it was only natural for the Porte to regularize his position by appointing him to a government post with all this entailed of ease in deposition and confiscation. Through the good offices of the governor of Aleppo, 'Arifî Ahmed Pasha, Isma'il Pasha was made governor of the two 'uqays and appointed to the governorship of Tripoli in the early twenties. In this capacity he was appointed commander of the jarda as well. In addition, he was given, together with his brother Sulayman, Hims, Hamah and Ma'arra as malikanes. The next step was his appointment to the governorship of Damascus in 1725. 2

Once the 'Agms were initiated into the process of obtaining a governorship, they devoted all their resources and skill to this purpose. Two essential conditions at the time to acquire a governorship were enough money to buy the way through, and the offices of an influential person in Istanbul to insure that this was done. The 'Agms did not lack either. Money was forthcoming from their malikanes and other interests. They counted, moreover, on the resources of the province of Tripoli to which Isma'il Pasha was appointed.

The Syrian littoral, between 'Arîsh and Latakia, was undergoing, at the time, a change in its economic fortune. Since the first quarter of the 18th century Aleppo had started losing the initiative in trade which it had retained all through the previous century. The Russian attack on Persia in 1721-2 and the consequent occupation of its silk producing regions cut off the

1 Kamîl al-Ghazzi, III, 295.

2 Ibid., III, 295, 296; Tabbâkh, III, 316, IV, 481.
flow of Persian silk to Aleppo. The resumption of hostilities between the Ottomans and Persia impeded the traffic in goods between Ispahan, the Persian Gulf and Aleppo. The deterioration in the commercial position of Aleppo partly resulted in, and indeed coincided with, an expansion in the commercial activity of southern Syria. This expansion was partly due also to the rising interest of the French in the commerce of the Levant particularly after 1715. The treaty of Utrecht in 1713 brought peace to France, and its Mediterranean communications were no longer hampered. The economic policy of Colbert geared the whole effort of the state towards this expansion. The English traders, centred on Aleppo, soon found dangerous rivals in the French traders who established themselves in southern Syria. The increasing demand for tobacco and silk produced in the province of Tripoli brought heavy rewards to its governor. Its ash which was exported to Europe for the use of the soap and glass industries provided an additional profit. Nothing is more illustrative of the desire of the 'Aznas for amassing money and indeed of their ability to do so than the vast wealth confiscated from them in 1730.

The 'Aznas relied on influential persons in their drive for power, such as the governor of Aleppo 'Abbâx Ahmad Pasha. Like other governors they kept an

1PRO, S.P. 97/24, Pt. IV: Istanbul, 12.3.23; H. Shire, 90-5; Wood, 145.
6A kind of soda supplied largely by the Beduin and produced from the burning of certain alkaline herb, see A.N.B.' 322: Sidon, 28.1.36; B111 45: Marseille, 6.8.28; Volney, 347. The French dispatches referred to this material as 'cendres'.
8See below p. 149.
agent at the Porte to look after their interests. Their agent at this time was a certain Khalîl Efendi¹ who was attached to the kâhya² of the Grand Vezir.³ In 1725, when Isma‘îl Pasha al-‘Azm and his brother, Sulaymân Pasha, were appointed to Damascus and Tripoli respectively, they sent money to Khalîl Efendi in the form of bills of exchange⁴ drawn through the English factors at Aleppo.⁵ It is not clear precisely for what these sums were paid. They may have been part of the müri³ revenue sent by the ‘Azm governors to the Imperial treasury at Istanbul.⁶ They may well have been sent also to Khalîl Efendi in payment for his services to the ‘Azm or to buy favour. The fact remains, however, that this agent was taking care of their affairs in Istanbul.

The First ‘Azm Governor of Damascus.

Isma‘îl Pasha al-‘Azm governed Damascus in the period between 23 Jumâdâ II 1137/9 March 1725 and the first half of Jumâdâ I 1143/Nov. 1730.⁷ The mutasallim whom he sent to take control of its affairs was Sayyid ‘Abd al-Fattâh Agha⁸ whose daughter Isma‘îl Pasha married.⁹

The policy of Isma‘îl Pasha in Damascus:

The main feature of Isma‘îl Pasha’s governorship in Damascus was the monopolistic policy he adopted particularly as concerns the sale of meat.

¹A.N.B¹ 1022: Sidon, 22.11.29.
²He actually controlled all the internal administration of the Empire, see Hammer, XIV, 218, 219; Cf. PRO, S.P. 97/35: Istanbul, 2.12.52. Hammer, XV, 98, XVII, 43 referred also to this official as Minister of the Interior.
⁶Cf. Gibb and Bowen, 11.46 n.5. ⁷Ibn Jum’a, 64; Risâla, f. 14a; Muyaqi', f. 250b.
⁸Risâla, f. 14a; Muyaqi', f. 250b. ⁹Mawgilli, f. 55b.
Ten butchers' shops and two slaughter houses were allowed to function. The next step was that he made himself the sole supplier of sheep. Stringent measures were taken against the inhabitants of the nearby villages who sheltered herdsmen without his approval. Thousands of sheep were brought from his property, probably his ṭalikanes of Ḥims, Ḥamāh and Maʿāra, and supplies were released by him for sale at intervals. The price of mutton rose by more than half and on some occasions it was doubled. This stringent policy encouraged smuggling and profiteering. The prices of other foodstuffs followed suit and the people pronounced against the governor. This situation, which lasted all through his governorship, was aggravated during his third year of office by a bad harvest and the price of wheat soared that year. True, there were some outside factors which contributed to the rise in prices such as the passage of Damascus in 1727 of troops coming from Egypt on their way to the Persian front which seems to have diminished the available supplies and made them dearer. But this was for a limited period and was by no means responsible for the persistence of the high prices during the whole governorship of Ismaʿīl Pasha. Rather, Ismaʿīl Pasha seems to have exploited the orders of the Sultan to provide supplies to the troops on the Persian front to enrich himself. Whenever he left the city prices and supplies returned to normal.

1Mawsili, f. 56a; cf. Ibn Kinān, II, f. 74a; al-Qādiri, 77.
2Mawsili, f. 58a. 3Ibid. 4Ibid., f. 57b. 5Ibid.
6Ibn Jumā, 63. 7Barīk, 2.
8Ibn Kinān, II, f. 171b; A.N.B1 1116; Tripoli, 19.4.27; A.N.B1 80; Aleppo, 24.7.27 estimated the number of these troops at 3600.
9Cf. A.N.B1 1116: Tripoli, 14.2.27.
10Ibn Kinān, II, f. 75a; cf. A.N.B1 1116: Tripoli, 14.2.27.
11Mawsili, f. 58b.
The transport animals which he confiscated on the orders of the Sultan, to be sent to the Persian front, were used by him instead to carry Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem for a special charge. It is significant that the šāhbandar (the head of the merchants) was put to death in the citadel of Damascus shortly after the appointment of Ismā'īl Pasha. The reason is not known, but this seems to have facilitated the execution of his policy.

How was Ismā'īl Pasha able to maintain his hold in spite of this injurious policy, and what were the reactions of the Damascenes, who had only recently revolted against the exactions of Abū Ṭawq? Ismā'īl Pasha was strong enough to command obedience. He depended on his own bodyguard composed mainly of Maghāriba. On his appointment to Damascus heavy troops accompanied him. Diplomacy was not lacking, moreover, and at the start of his governorship he posed as the champion of the Damascenes' rights, particularly of those of them implicated in the revolt against Abū Ṭawq. When the latter sent some of those accused to Istanbul and they were shipwrecked near Tripoli, its governor Sulaymān Pasha rescued them on the instructions of his brother Ismā'īl Pasha who refused to hand them over to Abū Ṭawq in spite of a Khatti Sherīf to have them killed. Another act of religious significance and wider appeal was soon to follow. The exiled Sharīf Yaḥya who was formerly persecuted by Abū Ṭawq in Damascus, to the annoyance of many of its inhabitants, was

1 Mawṣili, f. 58b.  2 Gibb and Bowen, 1.i.303.
3 Ibn Kinān, II, f. 165a.  4 Barīk, 7.
5 Ibn Kinān, II, f. 165a.  6 Mawṣili, f. 55b.
7 See above p. 90 n. 3.  8 See above p. 115.
welcomed as a settler in Damascus by Isma'īl Pasha, where he remained until his death in Jumāda I 1138/January-February 1726.¹

Fitting into the classical tradition of Muslim governors and satisfying at the same time religious public opinion, Isma'īl Pasha built a madrasa (school) in Suq al-Khayyātīn near Mahlamat al-bab. Apart from its use for religious instruction,² it provided accommodation for some Ulama³ and was utilized by the Sufis for dhikr (a Sufi practice).⁴ He built a bath in the same suq,⁵ and another in the Kharāb quarter.⁶ He also built a coffee-house and shops in the region known as taht al-qal'a (below the citadel).⁷

The coffee-houses, where, according to Pococke, the idle people, strangers and others who were not of the first rank assembled and passed their leisure time, were places of amusement in some of which music was played and Arabian stories told at fixed hours.⁸ An extra coffee-house may satisfy more people, but it could also be used as a rallying place where dissatisfaction may be disseminated.

Another achievement by Isma'īl Pasha, which was of particular importance to the Sultan, was the comparative safety which he ensured to the Pilgrimage during his six years' term of office. It suffered no serious attacks under his strong command and the escort of his brother Sulaymān Pasha, except for

¹Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 167b, 168a, 168b; cf. Mawṣilī, f. 58b; Sulaymān al-Zaḥīr, Salṭa, RAAD, 17 (1942), 449.
⁴Cf. Ibid., II, 53; Murāḍī, Maktab, f. 194a.
⁵Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 74b, 172b.
⁶Ibid., f. 118a. Many Shi'is inhabited the Kharāb quarter at the time, see Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 53a.
⁷Mustāfa al-Ṭarazi, Diwan, MS. Berlin Cat. 8034, Pet (I) 287, f. 4b.
⁸Pococke, II, i. 122; Cf. Russell, I, 146-8.
the last year when he clashed with the Ḥarb Beduin in Ḥijāz. The only other calamities it suffered were natural, such as excessive heat. Isma’il Pasha relied on military strength as well as on diplomacy in his relations with the Beduin along the Pilgrimage route. His credit as a result was augmented in religious public opinion in Damascus. His assurance of the safety of the Pilgrimage must have contributed in no small measure to his long duration in office.

This double-sided policy of profiteering and appeasement apparently neutralized the Damascenes, but the situation was always liable to explode. The deposition, shortly after Isma’il Pasha’s appointment to Damascus, of the Muftī Khalīl al-Bakrī al-Ṣiddīqī who had led the discontented Damascenes in revolt against the awāniyya of Abū Ṭawq, had removed a potential leader who could rally the Damascenes once more. His replacement by Ḥamid Efendi al-‘Imādī restored the old traditional and peaceful line. Whether Isma’il Pasha had a hand in the deposition of al-Ṣiddīqī is difficult to tell. It seems that the change of Shaykh al-Islām at Istanbul to whom al-Ṣiddīqī was attached had contributed to his removal. Probably this news was received with relief by Isma’il Pasha because he had no more to fear the past record of the Muftī.

Despite all these conciliatory and helpful acts by the governor, signs of unrest became apparent. A šarīf, significantly one of the discontented

1 A.N.B. 978: Acre, 18.10.30; Ṭabbākh, VI, 481.
2 Ibn Jum’a, 62, 63; Mawsīli, f. 56a; A.N.B. 1116: Tripoli, 8.10.25, Tripoli, 20.11.25.
3 Ibn Kinān, II, f. 165b. 4 Ibid., f. 75a; Mawsīli, f. 55b.
5 For poems said in his praise see Ta’rāzī, ff. 4b, 73a. No matter how flattering these poets may have been they still represented and reflected the opinion of influential sections of the Damascenes.
6 Ibn Kinān, II, f. 165b; Mawsīli, f. 55b. 7 Murādī, II, 84.
butchers, was implicated in an affair connected with the confiscation of transport animals and was subjected to the bastinado by the kahya of the governor. Some persons from the Safiyya, the already oppressed and revolting quarter, suffered also in this affair. The 'Ulama', it seems, were not enthusiastic about a revolt probably because they were lulled by the religious works of Ismail Pasha and also because they seem to have lacked a Bakr. Leadership, therefore, was thrust on the Yerliyya who were becoming more identified with the Damascenes, and hence more sensitive to their ills. Some members of the Yerliyya started a revolt against the kahya of the governor and soon the mob was formed. The shops closed and the law-court sittings were suspended. This took place while the governor was on the dawra, sometime between Rajab and Ramadân 1138/March and May 1726. It was only after the mutasallim ordered the release of those arrested and the suspension of all penalties that things returned to normal.

Once a revolt was started and the ruler compromised, the discontented were merely bought off and, as a result, similar conditions could inspire other revolts. Towards the end of the same year two incidents occurred with grave consequences. Both took place in the absence of the governor on the Pilgrimage. On 20 Dhu'l-Qa'da 1133/20 July 1726, the mutasallim, who was the son of Ismail Pasha, ordered the raising of thirty purses from the crafts, the villagers, the Turkomans and the nomads of al-Biqā', to be given as a khidma (recompense or wage), to the qapili dispatched by the

1Mawṣilī, ff. 58a, 58b.

2The purse was an Ottoman unit of account introduced during the 17th century. Its value differed according to the time and place where it was used, see S. J. Shaw, Ottoman Egypt in the 18th century, p. 10 n. 4. The Syrian purse, in the early eighties of the 18th century, was of 500 piastres; see Gibb and Bowen, I.i.45 n.2.

3A member of a corps employed by the Sultan for various functions, one of which was to execute special commissions in the provinces, see Gibb and Bowen, I.i.83n.5, 347.
Sultan to announce the revaluation of the gold coins. The shops closed, the call to prayer and the Friday prayer were suspended and the populace rose in revolt in protest. It is not known why the mob's anger was directed against the Safarjalānī family whose members were described as having the upper hand in Damascus. It may have been that members of this family who were prominent merchants in Damascus had either used their influence to be exempted from this imposition with the result that the envy of the extorted classes was aroused against them, or that they cooperated with the governor in the execution of his monopolistic policy. It is significant that members of the Safarjalānī family suffered later in the wake of As'ad Pasha's death, which suggests that this family had been cooperating with the 'Aẓm governors.

The agha of the Kānī Kulūs, at the head of about two hundred soldiers, interfered to relieve the mutasallim, and several persons were injured in the fighting. The affair was settled only after the judge, the muftī and the ṭāqīb al-Āṣrāf had issued a joint appeal to the Damascenes and excused them from payment. When preparations for the jārda became due at the end of Dhu'l-Qa'da, the mutasallim had the opportunity to take revenge on these religious leaders and he threatened that he would not prepare for the jārda unless the sum of ten purses, which he had already paid to the qaāšī, were refunded. Anxious for the safety of the Pilgrimage, the religious leaders levied the amount from the crafts and the villages.

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1. Ḥasibī, f. 52a; cf. Murādī, I, 15-6; III, 187; Budayrī, f. 32a.
3. Cf. Ibíd., IV, 210; see below p. 288 n. 7.
4. Ḥasibī, f. 59b referred to him as aqāt al-Yankashāry. It seems that this chronicler who referred to the Yerliyya and the Kānī Kulūs by the same term, mostly inkishariyya, probably meant here the Kānī Kulūs who were usually on the side of the governor against the Yerliyya. This may have aroused the hostility of some of the Yerliyya who later revolted against the mutasallim.
5. Mawṣūlī, ff. 59a, 59b.
The relations between the mutasallim and Yerliyya deteriorated still further, each trying to discredit the other. On 18 Dhu 'l-Hijja 1138/18 July 1726, the mutasallim sent the gubashi accompanied by Tufenqisi to enquire into alleged immoral acts committed in the house of 'Abd Allah b. Sadaqa, a member of the Yerliyya. Opposite the latter's house in Qasr al-Hajjaj street, the Mawgili family was celebrating the marriage of one of its members in the house of 'Umar Agha al-Nashif, also from the Yerliyya. Those attending included an assortment of 'Ulama', Ashraf, Yerliyya and others who seized on this occasion and denounced the gubashi as having unlawfully intruded on the privacy of the harim of Ibn Sadaqa. Although such an incident calls for alarm, the hostile reaction of the Yerliyya and their associates (al-'awan) could not be justified solely by this act. They killed the gubashi and threw his corpse in the law-court as a further act of defiance. The mufti and the judge then intervened and demanded that both parties should appear before the law. This assertion of political power by the Yerliyya was further demonstrated in the middle of Muharram 1139/September 1726 in a struggle between them and the Kapi Kulus during which the shops closed for three days and many casualties occurred.

The significance of these disturbances could be summed up as follows:

1. The role which the 'Ulama' had assumed in defending the Damascenes against impositions and injustices in the first quarter of the 18th century was changing in character. The religious officials such as the judge and particularly the mufti and the naqib al-Ashraf were adopting the conciliatory
role of a go-between and were satisfied with enforcing the rules of the Shari'a on the contestants. This middle role was possible because the Yerliyya began to assert their power vis-à-vis the governor and to balance the Kapi Kulug.

2. These events reveal a change in the position of the Yerliyya. The Damascenes became more widely and effectively represented in the Yerliyya Corps. This is apparent in the attitude of this corps in defending the interests of the Damascenes, and in the co-operation of the latter with its members. This was one reason why the Yerliyya were able to rally the mob behind them. Some 'Ulama', as we have already seen, concerted action with the Yerliyya because of the several interests they shared. In the religious atmosphere that prevailed in Damascus in the 18th century - one has only to look at the long list of 'Ulama' from other places who resided in it and at the growing number of the adherents of the türüq - the term 'alim was very loosely applied. With the widening in the recruitment of Damascenes to the Yerliyya Corps, many of those considered 'Ulama' penetrated the corps and many of those already in it identified themselves with the 'Ulama' because it was rewarding both ways. The common denominator now between the Yerliyya and what we may call the militant 'Ulama' was a unity of interest based on the merging in their recruitment. This new outlet, in the Yerliyya Corps, for those Damascenes who considered themselves as 'Ulama', and who in the absence of this corps or in the closing of its ranks to them could have strengthened the religious class by a militant element, brought about this new relationship. As a result of the penetration by the Damascenes into the Yerliyya Corps its members mirrored the various social levels existing in Damascus. Among the
members of the Yerliyya Corps there were those who were considered (notables) and those who were considered (rabble).\(^1\)

3. The Kapi Kulus appeared as restorers of order, and as such they were on the side of the governor at this stage at least. But they were not immune to corruption and to penetration by the Damascenes as we shall see later. However, they were bitterly opposed to the Yerliyya as a rule.

4. A kind of balance was emerging between the forces supporting the governor and those representing the Damascenes. The security of the governor in Damascus depended either on mastering a superior military force or on keeping a balance among these groups.

5. As for the attitude of the Sultan towards these disturbances in Damascus, it may be said that there was nothing very spectacular about them to warrant his direct interference. No Judges were implicated nor was the law-court stoned as happened under Abū Tawq. Then a deputation was sent to Istanbul to plead against his injustices, but now the Yerliyya became powerful enough to look after their own interests. However, some complaints were made by the Damascenes to the Sultan against Ismā‘īl Pasha. Similar complaints were made at the same time by certain persons in the provinces of Sidon and Tripoli against their ‘Aṣm governors. But the Sultan, seeing no urgency to act, seems to have brushed aside these complaints\(^2\), partly as it seems, because of the manoeuvres of the ‘Aṣm agents in Istanbul\(^3\) and partly perhaps because of the Sultan's occupation at the time with the more serious problems of Persia.\(^4\)

\(^1\) See \textit{Murādī III}, 90; see below p. 292.
\(^2\) A.N.B\(^1\) 978: Acre, 20.1.31. \(^3\) A.N.B\(^1\) 400: Istanbul, 8.12.29.
\(^4\) PRO, S.P. 97/25: Istanbul, 8.2.26, Istanbul, 24.1.27.
The policy of Isma‘il Pasha outside Damascus:

Unlike his apparently conciliatory, although basically extortionate, policy in Damascus, Isma‘il Pasha exhibited a forceful policy blended with diplomacy towards the rural people in his province. The main lines of this policy were to take whatever measures were necessary to enforce the restrictions he applied on the sale of mutton in Damascus and to maintain his authority vis-à-vis the Beduin.

In the immediate neighbourhood of Damascus, in the villages of Jarmana, ‘AQRaBa, Bayt SAlm and of ARd Al-Wad (valley of Barada), the strong hand of Isma‘il Pasha loomed over the inhabitants. On one occasion he held them collectively responsible for allowing unauthorized herdsmen to frequent their lands, which was detrimental to his monopolistic policy in Damascus, and inflicted penalties on them. On another, forced contributions were levied upon the villagers to pay the messenger of the Sultan.

In the Hawrān and in the region between the upper Jordan valley, and Safad and Nablus, Isma‘il Pasha introduced certain political adjustments among the local power groups. At first he acknowledged the authority of two Beduin chiefs, Jabr in the Hawrān and Rashid al-Nu‘aym in the region to the south west. This arrangement was designed to prevent Jabr from extending his authority towards Safad and Nablus. Eventually it failed. Jabr exhibited power and influence to an extent that threatened to disrupt the

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1 Mawṣili, p. 58a.  
2 Ibid., ff. 59a, 59b.

3 It seems that he is the one whom M. al-Sabbagh, p. 25, referred to as Rashid al-Jabr, Amir mashayikh ‘Arab Safad.

4 Towards the end of the 18th century this tribe numbered about 10,000 persons and roamed the region between Damascus and Hims, Seetzen, 291.
balance of power which Isma'il Pasha tried to establish, because the local chiefs in the regions of Safad, Nablus and Jabal 'Amil rallied around Jabr. Isma'il Pasha therefore expelled him and his tribe to the Hebron district, where, although removed from an important region, he was more free to act, and recognized as chief in his place Tahir (also referred to as Zahir, sometimes Dahir) b. Kulayb.

The southern regions of the province of Damascus were frequented, in parts indeed settled, by various tribes. When there were strong local chiefs in these regions, as was the case with the Ghazzawis, the Furaykhs, Fakhr al-Din Ma'n II and the Farrukhs in the 17th century, these tribes were dealt with by such strong local rulers who usually either allied themselves with them or subdued them. In such cases the governors of Damascus were relieved from direct responsibility, so to speak, towards these tribes, but then the risk of managing these powerful local rulers would be greater. During the first quarter of the 18th century there was no strong local chief in these regions to assume some sort of responsibility towards these tribes. Zahir al-Umar, who figured shortly afterwards as paramount chief in the region of Safad, was still groping for power at the time. Direct responsibility was therefore in the hands of the governors of Damascus. Nasser Pasha, governor of Damascus between 1120/1708-9 and 1126/1714-5, adopted a forceful policy towards the Beduin. He killed the then militant Beduin chief, Kulayb, Shaykh of the Sardiyya, who held the titles of Shaykh 'Arab bilād al-Sham and Shaykh al-bilād al-Hawrāniyya. Under the weak succeeding governors,

1 On the relations between Zahir al-Umar and Jabr see below p. 173.
2 Ibn Kinan, I, f. 99a.
3 M. al-Kurdi, f. 31a.
4 Mawsil, f. 58b, cf. ff. 55b, 56b.
the Beduins resumed their insubordination on a wide scale.¹

Ṭāhir b. Kulayb did not prove as militant as his father, and his authority was challenged by other tribes. The fact that his tribe belonged to the Yemeni faction caused him trouble from the Qaysi faction.² Isma‘īl Pasha tried to support some local notables so as to balance the power of the Beduin chiefs.³ He appointed a member of the Tawqān family, probably Ibrāhīm b. Ṣalih, as governor of Nablus where this family was prominent.⁴ In Jerusalem he appointed for governor a certain Qara Mutasallim who had served under ʿAbd al-Tawq in Damascus.⁵

Such arrangements, introduced by Isma‘īl Pasha, designed to ensure order by guarding against any suspect groupings among the local chiefs and by installing reliable rulers, did not altogether stand the strain of the Beduin inherent insubordination and the repulsion of the local people towards his exactions. He failed to eradicate the danger of the Beduin who attacked places as near to Damascus as al-Ghūta and al-Marj and devastated the crops without being punished.⁶ However, the administrative measures taken by Isma‘īl Pasha helped him to enforce his monetary demands on the dawra rather easily. On one occasion he collected from the regions of

¹ See Ibn Kinān, I, ff. 32b, 47a, 99a, 110b; M. al-Kurdi, ff. 8a-38b; Ibn Juma‘, MS. Berlin Kat. 9785. We(II) 418, f. 23a; Ibn Jun’a, 52-55; Hammer XIII, 189, 258, cf. 101.
² Cf. M. al-Kurdi, ff. 27b, 38a, 38b; for the Qaysi-Yemeni rivalry among the Druzes, see below p. 166; for the division of the population in the region between Jerusalem and Tripoli into these two factions see, Heyd, 86 n.l.
⁴ Mawsīlī, f. 58a; cf. Muradi, I, 113; Ḥasībī, f. 52a. ⁵ Mawsīlī, ff. 57a, 57b, 58a. ⁶ Ibid., f. 60a.
Nablus, Jerusalem and Gaza more than the specified amounts 'copying the example of Abū Ṭawq and even transcending him', in the words of his contemporary chronicler. Such exactions were met sometimes with forceful defiance on the part of the oppressed. In 1729 Ismai'īl Pasha was besieged by peasants supported by Beduin forces in the region of Jerusalem because of the extortions he practised on them. His brother Sulaymān Pasha of Sidon came to his rescue and was recompensed by the Sultan, it is alleged, with the title of wazīr.

The Fortunes of the 'Azm family during the governorship of Ismai'īl Pasha in Damascus.

When Ismai'īl Pasha al-'Azm was governing Damascus, other members of the 'Azm family were appointed governors of the provinces of Sidon and Tripoli. This demonstrates the upsurge of their political power in a relatively short time.

Sulaymān Pasha al-'Azm succeeded his brother Ismai'īl Pasha in Tripoli as soon as the latter was appointed to Damascus in 1725. In this capacity Sulaymān Pasha was appointed Commander of the jarda. On 14 February 1727 he was deposed from Tripoli and appointed to the province of Urfa. Far from being a move against the 'Azm family or against one of their members, which in a way it was if judged by their preference for local governorship, this appointment was intended by the Sultan to strengthen his defences against

1 Mawṣili, f. 58b.  
3 Mawṣili, f. 55b.  
5 A.N.B 1 116: Tripoli, 14.2.27; Ibn Kinān, II, f. 75a mentions Erzerum instead.
the Persians. 1 'Abd Allah Pasha Koprülü of Urfa, whom Sulayman Pasha re­
placed, was disgraced in the fighting against the Persians and was transfer­
red to the governorship of Sidon which happened to be vacant after the death of Abu Ṭawq. 2 As a successor to Sulayman Pasha in Tripoli, another member of the 'Azm family, Ibrahim Pasha, son of Isma‘īl Pasha, was ap­
pointed. 3 Latakia which was dependent on the governor of Tripoli 4 was gov­
erned by Yasım Bey, 5 son of Ibrahim Pasha al-'Azm. With the temporary cessa­
tion of hostilities between the Ottomans and the rulers of Persia and the conclusion of peace on 13 October, 1727, it seems that Sulayman Pasha was in a position to use his influence at the Porte to acquire the governorship of Sidon. This he obtained in 1728. 7 Thus the 'Azm family concurrently governed the three provinces of Damascus, Sidon and Tripoli. As‘ad Bey al-'Azm, son of Isma‘īl Pasha, was appointed mutasallim for his father in both Hamah and Ma‘arra. 8 In 1730, a few months before his deposition and arrest, Sulayman Pasha, as we have already seen, was raised to the rank of vazîr. 9 Khalîl Efendi, the agent of the 'Azm family, was still efficient at Istanbul. 10

1A.N.B. 1 1116: Tripoli, 124.27.
2A.N.B. 1 1022: Sidon, 24.4.27, Sidon, 25.5.27.
3A.N.B. 1 1116: Tripoli 11.3.27; Ibn Kinân, II, f. 75a gives his name as Sa‘îd. Ibn Kinân, II, f.126, seems to have corrected his statement when he mentioned Ibrahim Pasha, son of Isma‘īl Pasha, as governor of Tripoli.
4A.N.B. 1111 45: Marseille, 6.8.28.
5Barîk, 123; A.N.B. 1 1116: Tripoli, 26.10.30 (Relation de la révolte arrivée à Tripoly de Sirie), gives his name as Muṣṭafa.
6M. Shay, 125; A.N.B. 1 1116: Tripoli, 28.2.28; for the text of the treaty see Hikmat, 183, 184.
7A.N.B. 1 1022: Sidon, 1.11.28, Sidon, 24.12.28.
8Barîk, 124; Tabbâkh, III, 334, IV, 48; cf. Ibn Kinân, II, f. 111b. (cont.)
used money also to extricate themselves from any dilemma there. By the end of 1730 members of the ‘Azm family, together with their dependents, ruled an area which extended from ‘Arish Miṣr to the boundaries of Aleppo. But things were changing in Istanbul and with them the fortunes of the ‘Azm family.

The revolt in Istanbul and the deposition of the ‘Azm family.

On Thursday 15 Rabī‘ I 1143/28 September 1730 seventeen janissaries with Patrona Khalil at their head started a revolt in Istanbul. The Sultan, Aḥmad III, panicked and lost the initiative against the rebels while they were still in a minority and undecided about the next step. He strangled the Grand Vezir, the latter’s kāhya and the capudan paşa, whose death the rebels had asked for. This was the first weakening on the part of the Sultan, and was followed the next day by his deposition at the request of the rebels and the installation of his nephew Sultan Maḥmūd I.

The ‘Azm family suffered as a result of this revolt. Their agent at Istanbul, Khalil Efendi, who was attached to the kāhya of the Grand Vezir, lost his patron and with him his influence. Hardly had two months elapsed when officials were dispatched from Istanbul with orders to depose, imprison and confiscate the property of the ‘Azm governors of Damascus, Sidon, Tripoli, etc. Other references:

1See above p. 142.
3A.N.B1 1022: Sidon, 20.9.29.
4Barīk, 124.
7A.N.B1 400: Istanbul, 8.12.29; Istanbul, 16.1.30 referred to this agent as secretary of the kāhya; A.N.B1 1022: Sidon, 22.11.29.
8Ibn Jum‘a, 64.
9A.N.B1 1023: Sidon, 4.1.31; A.N.B1 1978: Acre, 20.8.31; al-Luqaymi. (cont.)
as well as of other members of this family who were sub-governors. Although similar but less severe orders were issued against other governors - the governor of Aleppo, who was a nephew of the late Grand Vezir, was deposed yet the deposition of the ‘Azm governors as a group, their imprisonment, as well as the confiscation of their property, exceeded what would normally be expected after such an administrative change at Istanbul. The reaction of the people who were governed by the ‘Azm is significant in this respect.

Within about three weeks of the start of the revolt at Istanbul, news of it was carried to the provinces of Aleppo, Tripoli, Sidon and Damascus by special messengers dispatched by the Sultan to announce his accession and the deposition of his predecessor. In some regions in Syria, the populace seized on this occasion and revolted against their governors. In Aleppo, a local squabble developed into a demand for the reduction of the price of bread. The villagers around Aleppo rose against the local judges whom they held responsible for not checking vexations. But by far the worst revolts took place in Latakia and Tripoli against the ‘Azm governors. To relieve his son the governor of Latakia, against whom the people of the city and its hinterland revolted, Ibrahim Pasha al-‘Azm, governor of Tripoli, tried to send him janissary troops. But janissaries revolted on 27 October 1730, perhaps encouraged by the revolt of their namesakes in Istanbul, and certainly taking advantage

(cont.) Mawāniḥ al-‘Uns, ff. 140a, 140b.

8 A.N.B 1 1116: Tripoli, 26.10.30 (Relation de la révoltes arrivées à Tripoly de Syrie contre Ibrahim Pasha, gouverneur de cette ville); cf. Charles-Rouac.

1 Barīk, 124.

2 A.N.B 1 81; Aleppo, 14.10.30.

3 A.N.B 1 81; Aleppo, 2.1.31; A.N.B 1 403; Istanbul, 25.1.31.


5 A.N.B 1 81; Aleppo, 10.11.30.
of this opportunity to settle accounts with Ibrahim Pasha. Some of the inhabitants of Tripoli joined them in their revolt. The real causes, however, were the extortions of the ‘awāniyya who were protected by the governor, and the latter's monopoly of foodstuffs counselled, it is alleged, by his Jewish sarrāf. Like his father, the governor of Damascus, Ibrahim Pasha exploited the orders of the Sultan to send supplies to the Persian front to enrich himself. The rebels demanded a reduction in the price of meat, bread and other necessities. Several casualties occurred and the judge, as was very often the case elsewhere, was held responsible, and his house was sacked. The headquarters of the governor was stoned and he himself needed the protection of some of the inhabitants.

In Sidon the situation stopped short of a revolt, as it seems, perhaps because there was no outside pressure as happened in the case of Latakia and Tripoli, and probably because the policy of Sulayman Pasha in Sidon was less economically oppressive than was the case with either his brother or nephew. If Sulayman Pasha had spared the inhabitants of Sidon heavy exactions it was largely because he had other resources to count on. In the flourishing economic conditions in southern Syria at the time, the rural regions in the province of Sidon produced large quantities of cotton, silk and ash which were demanded for export. Sidon benefited from this commercial activity and this explains why the French Consulate there was very active. Sulayman Pasha

1 A.N.B 1116: Tripoli, 16.7.27.
2 A.N.B 1116: Tripoli, 26.10.30 (Relation de la révolte); Charles-Roux, 59, Barīk, 123, 124.
found it more profitable to concentrate on the countryside to enrich himself, and for this purpose he speculated in trade, practised extortions, and oppressed his vassals.\footnote{1} He also exacted money from the foreign merchants and from the missionaries established in his province.\footnote{2} In his attempt to dominate the countryside by force, Sulaymān Pasha besieged in 1730 the rebellious inhabitants of Tiberias and used large guns in reducing them. In these efforts he concerted action with his brother Ismā‘īl Pasha of Damascus.\footnote{3} The subjugation of Tiberias is of great importance because it was farmed by Zāhir al-‘Umar at the time.\footnote{4} This marked the beginning of a bitter struggle between Sulaymān Pasha and Zāhir which ended by the death of Sulaymān Pasha in 1743 while attempting to subdue Zāhir.\footnote{5}

Precise information on the attitude of the Damascenes towards their governor after learning of the revolt in Istanbul is lacking. The news started, however, a series of clashes between the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus. This seems to have served as a diversion for whatever ill-feelings may have existed towards Ismā‘īl Pasha. During the fighting the shops closed for four days, the Friday prayer was suspended, and several casualties occurred.\footnote{6} This was basically a struggle for political power. But the clash in economic interests between both corps after the Kapi Kulus joined the drafts\footnote{7} gave this

\footnote{1}{A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 978: Acre, 15.4.30; Acre, 3.5.30; Acre, 13.10.30; A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 1023: Sidon, 19.3.31.}
\footnote{2}{A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 1022: Sidon, 15.10.30; A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 978: Acre, 20.8.31.}
\footnote{3}{A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 978: Acre, 15.4.30, Acre, 3.5.30.}
\footnote{4}{See below p. 172.}
\footnote{5}{See below p. 210.}
\footnote{6}{Ibn Jum‘a, 64.}
\footnote{7}{See \textit{ibid.}, 68.}
struggle a sharp twist. It was apparent, however, that the Yerliyya were
gaining the upper hand. 1

It seems that the change of administration in Istanbul and the removal
of the 'Aẓms' agent from the centre of power had revived the appeals already
made by the Damascenes and others to the late Sultan against the exactions of
the 'Aẓm' governors. It may well be that the new administration had invoked
them to justify its action against the 'Aẓms. There were other reasons,
however, which had discredited Isma'īl Pasha, the senior governor among the
'Aẓms, if only by virtue of his appointment to Damascus, at the Porte. On
his sixth and last Pilgrimage Isma'īl Pasha clashed with the militant Ḥarb
tribe between Mecca and Medina and, as a result, he changed his course and
avoided passing through Medina on his way back. 2 This aroused the indignation
of the Sharīf of Medina and its inhabitants and, according to Ibn Mīrā, had
caused Isma'īl Pasha's deposition. 3 Seen in the context of the deposition of
the 'Aẓm governors as a whole, it seems an exaggeration to attribute the de­
position of Isma'īl Pasha solely to this cause. Religious indignation there
certainly was, and particularly a new Sultan could not leave such an offence
unpunished or unexploited. Appeal to religious opinion both in the provinces
and at Istanbul was very much needed by him at this early stage of his reign.
Ostensibly, to allay the alarmed religious opinion at what happened near
Medina, he appointed the powerful 'Abd Allāh Pasha Muḥsin-Zade as governor
of Damascus - an office which he did not occupy in practice. The Sultan may

1 cf. A.N.B 1023: Damascus, 4.2.31.
3 Ṭabbākh, VI, 281.
have used the appointment of this powerful person as commander of the Pilgrimage to lull religious opinion at a critical time. That he played up this issue for other reasons mainly to camouflage the summoning of his strong supporters to Istanbul against whom the rebels protested, is clear. 'Abd Allah Pasha helped the Sultan in putting to death several of the chiefs of the rebels on 14 Jumada I 1143/25 November 1730, and was consequently appointed agha of the janissaries in Istanbul rather than governor of Damascus and Commander of the Pilgrimage.\(^1\)

It is obvious that the 'Azm governors, not unlike several other governors, tried to exploit their position to enrich themselves. The extortions they practised and the immense wealth confiscated from them\(^2\) partly attest to this fact. The reaction of the inhabitants manifested itself sometimes in appeals to the Sultan, sometimes in protests and strikes, and finally in revolts in some places. One should not underestimate the impact of the revolt at Istanbul in igniting these local revolts. But, on the other hand, these revolts were only possible because a revolutionary situation did exist. These revolts may not have been the immediate cause for the deposition and imprisonment of the 'Azm governors since they started in the second half of October and the 'Azm governors were deposed in early November\(^3\), and this makes a report to the Sultan, a decision for deposition, and an order to that effect hardly credible in so short a time.\(^4\) The revolts, however, may have confirmed the new

\(^1\) A.N.B\(^1\) 402: Istanbul, 30.11.30; Hammer, XIV, 243-5; cf. Ibn Jum'ā, 64.

\(^2\) For a detailed description see Barīk, 124, 125.

\(^3\) A.N.B\(^1\) 1116: Tripoli, 26.10.30 (Relation de la révolte); Barīk, 124; Ibn Jum'ā, 64; cf. Risāla, f. 14a; Muwaqqī, f. 250b.

\(^4\) On one occasion, in 1740, it took an express messenger from Istanbul to reach Sidon about forty-five days, see A.N.B\(^1\) 1025: Sidon, 16.3.40.
administration in Istanbul in its suspicions of the 'Ażm governors and possibly
in the wisdom of its action against them. The radical changes in the
administration at Istanbul with all that they entailed seem to have been the
main reason for the deposition of the 'Ażm governors. The confiscation of their
wealth would bring the Sultan much needed money for his Persian War. At
the same time, the deposition would enable the new officials at Istanbul to
provide governorships for their candidates. These various factors contributed
to the temporary eclipse of the 'Ażm governors as a group. It took them,
however, a relatively short time to regain their prestige and to return to
the administration.

\[1\] Barīk 127.
Chapter A

THE PROVINCE OF DAMASCUS BETWEEN

1143/1730 AND 1154/1741

The Governorship of ‘Abd Allah Pasha Aydînî

‘Abd Allah Pasha Muḥsin-Zâde, the successor-designate to Ismâ’îl Pasha al-‘Aṣm, assumed other duties in Istanbul and never occupied the governorship of Damascus. He was replaced by the Sultan’s brother-in-law, ‘Abd Allah Pasha Aydînî, whose surname seems to have been conferred on him by the local chroniclers after the name of the province of Aydîn which he had governed before his appointment to Damascus. ‘Uthman Agha, the mutasallim of ‘Abd Allah Pasha Muḥsin-Zâde, who entered Damascus on 12 Jumâda I 1143/23 Nov. 1730, was replaced on 15 Jumâda II 1143/26 December 1730 by Qara Sulaymân Agha, the mutasallim of ‘Abd Allah Pasha Aydînî. The latter arrived in Damascus on 21 Ramadan 1143/30 March 1731. At the outset the appointment of ‘Abd Allah Pasha to Damascus was part of a wider scheme to break ‘Aṣm rule. In Tripoli the imprisoned ‘Aṣm governor, Ibrâhîm Pasha, was succeeded by ‘Uthman Pasha who was a muhâssid in Aleppo. Ahmad Pasha, the

1 Cf. A.N.B. 408; Istanbul, 7.11.33; PRO, S.P. 97/27; Pera of Istanbul, 3.5.35
2 Dhikr man tawallâ al-Ḥizârâ, f. 114b; Risâla, f. 14a; Muwaqqi‘, f. 250b.
3 Muwaqqi‘, f. 250b, cf. Ibn Jum‘a, 64; A.N.B. 1023; Sidon, 8.2.31, Sidon, 19.3.31, Damascus, (?)(?) 31; Radcliffe papers, 6645/4: Aleppo, 2.2.31.
4 Ibn Jum‘a, 64; A.N.B. 1023; Sidon, 28.3.31 states that he entered Damascus on 22 March 1731.
5 A.N.B. 31: Aleppo, 2.1.31; A.N.B. 1116: Tripoli, 15.1.31; Baruk, 125; ‘Uthman Pasha was a native of Aleppo, Radcliffe papers, 6645/7: Aleppo, 24.8.38.
son of 'Uthman Pasha Abū Ṭawq and son-in-law of the late Sultan, was appointed governor of Sidon after the deposition and arrest of Sulayman Pasha al-'Azm.

Under 'Abd Allah Pasha order was restored to Damascus. Already before his arrival, his mutasallim seems to have been able during his three months' rule to re-establish tranquillity after the clashes that took place between the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus. 'Abd Allah Pasha entered Damascus with a show of strength, and four thousand soldiers accompanied him. He was, moreover, known in the Ottoman Empire for his valour and for the bravery through of his private troops. The passage Damascus in Dhu 'l-Qa'da 1145/April-May 1733 of troops coming from Egypt to the amount of six thousand on their way to the Persian front, seems to have impressed the Damascenes, particularly the Yerliyya, and implicitly strengthened the authority of the governor. The fact that the Kapi Kulus received these troops, seems to have inspired confidence in the former and contributed to the docility of the Yerliyya, if not to the lessening of their hatred of the Kapi Kulus. News of the attack of Tahmasp-Kuli Khan of Persia on Iraq and the encampment of his

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1 A.N.B. 1023: Sidon, 4.1.31, Sidon, 18.2.31; Barīk, 125.
2 Barīk, 8.
3 A.N.B. 1023: Sidon, 28.3.31.
4 Cf. PRO, S.P. 97/27: Pera of Istanbul, 3.5.35.
5 PRO, S.P. 97/26: Pera of Istanbul, 5.6.33; Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 33a, 36b.
6 Ibn Kinān, II, f. 36b.
7 On entering the service of Shah Tahmasp II the future Nadir Shāh became known as Tahmasp-Kuli Khan. After his coronation on 27 January 1736, his original name was changed to Nadir and he became known by it, see Suwaydī, f. 10a; V. Minorsky, E.I. 1st ed. s.v. Nadir Shāh, pp. 810, 811.
troops between Mosul and Baghdad and the consequent siege of the latter, brought the danger home.

In spite of a big increase in prices of food, especially of bread, in the last year of his governorship, 1146/1733-4, no disturbances occurred in Damascus. 'Abd Allāh Pasha, it is true, did not make exactions. Perhaps his wealth - he was known as one of the richest governors in Turkey - made him more interested in the prestige of his office as commander of the Pilgrimage than in enriching himself deliberately as Ismā'īl Pasha had done before. The increase in prices was caused by various factors. The orders of the sultan to the provinces to send much needed supplies to the Persian front seem to have caused a shortage and hence a rise in prices. The passage is:

Damascus of numerous troops coming from Egypt must have increased the demand for food. The lack of water from which the pilgrims had suffered on their way back that year may have affected certain regions on whose supply Damascus had depended. Plague spread also in Damascus as well as in the adjoining regions in 1144/1731-2 and lingered on until the beginning of 1145/1732, causing heavy mortality. Apart from the falling-off it must have caused in the energies of the people, its impact in occupying the Damascenes with a serious immediate danger limited the chances of giving vent to insubordination.

1 PRO, S.P. 97/26: Pera of Istanbul, 1.3.33; M. Shay, 142, 145.
3 Barīk, 8; Ibn Jum'a, 65; Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 28b, 93b.
4 PRO, S.P. 97/27: Pera of Istanbul, 3.5.35.
5 PRO, S.P. 97/26: Pera of Istanbul, 21.5.33. 6 Ibn Jum'a, 65.
6 A.N.B. 1117: Tripoli, 21.2.32, Tripoli, 25.4.32; Russell, II, 336 n.2.
7 Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 28b, 30b. 9 Ibid., Ibn Jum'a, 65.
Paradoxically, the governorship of 'Abd Allāh Pasha witnessed a commercial activity from which the Damascenes benefited.\(^1\) This was probably responsible for lessening the impact of the rise in prices. The safety of the Pilgrimage under 'Abd Allāh Pasha encouraged more merchants to accompany it, thus increasing the mobility and purchase of goods. But by far the greatest factor was the development of trade relations between Damascus and the neighbouring ports, particularly Sidon. The silk and cotton manufactures as well as ash were in increasing demand by the French. The defterār of Damascus speculated in the trade in ash through Christian agents.\(^2\)

'Abd Allāh Pasha's main contributions while governor of Damascus were connected with the Pilgrimage. He ensured its safety during the three times he commanded it, and this gained him much credit locally, particularly among the 'Ulama' for whom he had a special affection.\(^3\) Two of their members who committed a minor theft in Muzayrib were put to death by him.\(^4\) On his second Pilgrimage the Beduin attacked him while on his way back. Together with the commander of the jarda he defended the Pilgrimage and inflicted heavy casualties on the Beduin.\(^5\) It is remarkable that the information about this event came from sources in Tripoli and not from the Damascene chroniclers as usual. This was because the commander of the jarda was the governor of Tripoli Sulaymān Pasha al-'Azm who communicated the news to his mutasallim, his nephew As'ad Pasha. The latter ordered three days' celebration in the

\(^1\) Barīk, 8.  
\(^2\) A.N.B\(^1\) 1023: Sidon (?).11.31.  
\(^3\) al-Qārī, 78.  
\(^4\) Barīk, 7, 8.  
\(^5\) A.N.B\(^1\) 1117: Tripoli, 30.7.32.
citadel to mark this victory. It seems that a normal skirmish with the Beduin which did not excite the anxiety of the Damascene chroniclers was exploited by the 'Azm governor in Tripoli for propaganda purposes. The 'Azm governors were very much in need of such publicity to repair some of the damage which their popularity had suffered earlier, and to consolidate their position at Istanbul.

Apart from his successful protection of the Pilgrimage, 'Abd Allah Pasha built two embankments on the Pilgrimage route between Šanamayn and Muzayrîb. This facilitated the journey of the pilgrims and of those who used to accompany them to the latter point. He also paved the road leading from Damascus to Qunayṭra, which seems to have been partly used by the pilgrims at the start of their journey. The local inhabitants certainly benefited as well from these works. He reconstructed some fortresses along the Pilgrimage route as well as the bridge of al-Hasa. He built a fortress in al-Mudawarra and founded two water reservoirs in it. He contributed to the religious edifices in Mecca, decorated the Mahmîl and ornamented some of the famous tombs in Damascus with relics brought from Mecca.²

Early in Sha'ban 1146/January 1734, 'Abd Allah Pasha Ayîfîlî was deposed from Damascus, and Sulayman Pasha al-'Azm was appointed to it.

The second phase of 'Azm rule in Damascus.

I. The rehabilitation of the 'Azm governors.

Hardly had a year elapsed after the arrest of the 'Azm governors and

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¹ For this and other places along the Pilgrimage route see below Appendix II, 411.
² al-Qarî, 77, 78.
the confiscation of their property when they were released from prison and some of them offered new appointments. Ismâ‘îl Pasha was released from his prison in the citadel of Damascus, in the month of Jumâ‘âh I 1144/November 1731 and appointed governor of Canea in Crete where he died in 1145/1732-3. His son İbrahim Pasha was imprisoned in Tripoli was discharged on 10 Jumâ‘âh I of the same year and ordered to accompany his father. As‘ad Pasha was also ordered to go with his father but was later excused for reasons of health. Sulayman Pasha was the only ‘Azm who was appointed to a local governorship. After his release from the citadel of Sidon on 15 Rabî‘ II 1144/17 October 1731, he was immediately appointed governor of Tripoli.

The appointment of Ismâ‘îl Pasha to a distant governorship in Crete which was very often used by the Ottomans for exile, and the orders to his sons to accompany him, amounted to virtual banishment when compared with the appointment of Sulayman Pasha to Tripoli. Such a contrast suggests that either Sulayman Pasha was working separately and that he was more influential at Istanbul or that his past record was less odious than that of his brother, Ismâ‘îl Pasha, and of his sons. However, it is apparent that there was a change for the better in the attitude of the administration at Istanbul towards the ‘Azm and particularly Sulayman Pasha. An investigation of developments which occurred both in Istanbul and in Tripoli helps to clarify this point.
In Istanbul the prominent leaders of the September revolt were massacred by the Sultan on 25 November 1730. Some of their fellow revolutionaries who remained at large took advantage of the discontent resulting from the rise in prices to stage another revolt on 15 Ramadan 1143/24 March 1731, but their attempt was crushed. Although the revolutionary leaders were eliminated, the feelings of distrust and intrigue which the revolts had created were not easy to suppress. The spy system which was strengthened as a result helped the Sultan early in September 1731 to foil another attempted revolt. These disorders in Istanbul are important to this study in two respects. On the one hand, the power of the Grand Vezirs was weakened as a result of the change in the attitude of the new Sultan. He was advised not to be blindly governed by his Grand Vezirs, but to change them frequently. What is remarkable is that the Kizlar Āgha, who was alleged to be behind this advice, emerged now to fill the power vacuum created. Rivalry then developed between the Kizlar Āghas on the one hand, and the Grand Vezirs on the other, each group trying to have the upper hand. This situation had repercussions on the provincial governors who gained or lost according to the party to which their agents were attached. To anticipate we may mention the future defiance by Fathī, the Daftardār of Damascus, of the ‘Azm governors because he was backed


1 PRO, S.P.97/26: Pera of Istanbul, 4/15.4.31; A.N.B 403: Istanbul, 28.3.31; Istanbul, 2.4.31; Hammer, XIV, 247, 248; M. Shay, 31.32; C. Perry, 112,113.


3 PRO, S.P.97/26: Pera of Istanbul, 27.9.30; Porter, Observations, 83, 84; M. Shay, 30,31.
by the Kislar Agha and they by the Grand Vezirs, and the execution of 
As'ad Pasha which was partly caused by the enmity of the Kislar Agha towards 
him. Of more immediate importance, on the other hand, was the reconcili-
ation between the 'Azm governors and the new administration in Istanbul. Khalil 
Efendi, who protected the interests of the 'Azm governors before their de-
position, was able to regain some power. In his efforts for the rehabilita-
tion of the 'Azm, he relied on the Khan of the Crimea who helped the Sul-
tan in eliminating the chiefs of the September revolt. The limited re-
instatement of the 'Azm illustrates, however, the difficulties they still 
encountered in Istanbul.

There were other reasons which helped the appointment of Sulayman Pasha 
al-'Azm to Tripoli. The governor of Tripoli, 'Uthman Pasha al-Mu'assil, 
was unable to restrain the revolutionaries who had revolted against his 
predecessor, Ibrahim Pasha al-'Azm, all the more so because they considered 
the deposition of the 'Azm as an endorsement of their point of view. On 
4 April 1731 the janissaries of Tripoli revolted against 'Uthman Pasha. He was ordered by the Sultan to suppress them, but his departure on the 
jarda before he could put these orders into effect encouraged other places 
to revolt. Some persons in Ma'arra, Hamah and Latakia seized on the oc-
casion and revolted as well. Against whom and for what cause these revolts 
were staged is not known. Of special importance, however, are the revolts in

1 See below pp. 266, 281.
2 A.N.B 402: Istanbul, 30.11.30; A.N.B 1116: Tripoli, 15.1.31: Hammer, 
XIV, 242.
4 A.N.B 1116: Tripoli, 25.5.31. 5 Ibid., Tripoli, 14.8.31.
Ma‘arra and Ḥamāh, the 'homeland' of the ‘Aẓm, and their former mālikānes. Alarmed at these disorders which ‘Uthmān Pasha was apparently unable to cope with, and pressed by the growing influence of the agent of the ‘Aẓm in Istanbul, the Sultan appointed Sulaymān Pasha to Tripoli which he entered on 1 December 1731. Tripoli was then reported as calm. This might be expected after a mere change of governors, but with a member of the ‘Aẓm family it is significant. Sulaymān Pasha was already a familiar figure to the people of Tripoli. His first governorship in Tripoli (1725-7) did not leave the same bitter memories as that of his successor, Ibrāhīm Pasha al-‘Aẓm. When Sulaymān Pasha was arrested in 1730, no revolt seems to have taken place against him in Sidon because of his relatively mild rule there. He could appeal once more to the people of Tripoli as their good old governor whom they might distinguish from the line of Ismā‘īl Pasha. This past record of Sulaymān Pasha may have decided the Sultan to appoint him to Tripoli to quieten the situation. However, the rebels in Tripoli were temporarily quiet. Before they could marshal their forces and 'au moment qu'ils y pensaient le moins', Sulaymān Pasha surprised them. An enforced tranquillity was then established. Sulaymān Pasha was executing the orders of the Sultan when he acted against them and, at the same time, he was taking vengeance on the same leaders who had revolted against his nephew, Ibrāhīm Pasha.

After his restoration of order in Tripoli came his much publicised action of protecting the Pilgrimage in his capacity as commander of the jarda.

His affairs, and indeed those of the ‘Aẓms in general, seem now to have been

1 A.N.Bł 1116: Tripoli, 17.12.31; cf. A.N.Bł 81: Aleppo, 18.3.32.
2 A.N.Bł 1116: Tripoli, 25.11.31.
3 A.N.Bł 1117: Tripoli, 25.4.32, Tripoli, 9.3.32.
4 Ibid., Tripoli, 9.3.32 (Relation de la punitiion des rebelles de Tripoli).
5 See above p. 154.
going smoothly in Istanbul. After his transfer to Sidon, Sulayman Pasha was appointed governor of Damascus. His brother Isma‘il Pasha, together with his son Ibrahīm Pasha, were recalled by the Sultan from Crete. Isma‘il Pasha was to have replaced Sulayman Pasha in Tripoli, but he died before he left Crete. Thus the ‘Azm family was back in favour. But apart from Sulayman Pasha it had no prominent member at the time. The promising members of the second generation of ‘Azm governors such as As‘ad Pasha and his brother Sa‘d al-Dīn Pasha were comparatively young. As‘ad Pasha was in his middle twenties at the time and Sa‘d al-Dīn Pasha was still younger. Until his death in 1156/1743 Sulayman Pasha was the most prominent governor among the ‘Azm.

II The first governorship of Sulayman Pasha al-‘Azm in Damascus.

Preceded by the mutasallim, his kāhya, Mūsā Agha, Sulayman Pasha entered Damascus on Thursday, 8 Sha‘bān 1146/14 January 1734. This appointment realized a long standing desire by Sulayman Pasha which once made him consult an astrologer as to whether and when it would come true. In fact, rumours had been rife in Tripoli ever since 5 Rabi‘ I 1145/26 August 1732 that he would be appointed to Damascus. The appointment of ‘Abd Allāh Pasha Aydınlī to a military post on the Persian front served the interests of Sulayman Pasha.

1A.N.B 1117: Tripoli, 26.8.32.  
2See above p. 156.  
3Tabbakh, III, 334.  
4Ibid., 329.  
5Ibn Kinān, II, f. 39a; Risāla, f. 14a; Muwag̥i‘, f. 250b; Ibn Jum‘a, 65 gave the date of the entry of Sulayman Pasha to Damascus as 9 Sha‘ban which seems erroneous because he as well as the other chroniclers agreed on the day of entry as Thursday which is 8 Sha‘ban.  
6Murādi, 9, 52a.  
7A.N.B 1117: Tripoli, 26.8.32.  
Sulayman Pasha's internal policy.

From the outset, Sulayman Pasha was confronted with a delicate economic situation. Prices of foodstuffs were high, and some Damascenes attacked what seem to have been the private granaries of Sulayman Pasha and took possession of the wheat they found in them. Sulayman Pasha retaliated by hanging four persons, and this caused the estrangement of many Damascenes. The Damascenes were already familiar with the extortionate policy of his brother, Isma'il Pasha, and seemed to suspect the intentions of the newcomer. After all, they knew Sulayman Pasha only as commander of the jarda during his brother's governorship and that of Aydanli, and his success in this task could serve as a good start. But still the past record of Isma'il Pasha was ominous. Such a state of affairs, at the beginning of his rule, made both sides, the Damascenes and the governor, reconsider their positions.

The insubordinate elements among the Damascenes gauged the power of Sulayman Pasha and were violently suppressed. What attitudes would he and they adopt next?

On returning from his first pilgrimage Sulayman Pasha held celebrations on the occasion of the circumcision of his sons. Such an event, usually exploited by the governors as well as by other dignitaries to impress their prestige particularly on the poor, heralded a policy of reconciliation between Sulayman Pasha and the Damascenes. It was based as much on his past

(cont.) PRO, S.P. 97/27: Pera of Istanbul, 3.5.35; M. Shay, 145,146.

1 Ibn Juw' a, 65.  
2 al-Qari, 78.

3 A.N.B 1116: Tripoli, 5.9.25, Tripoli, 8.10.25, Tripoli, 10.11.26.
4 A.N.B 1117: Tripoli, 30.7.32; Ibn Kinan, II, f. 28b.
5 al-Qari, 78.
experience as on the realities of the political situation in Damascus. Its main lines were to relieve the Damascenes from certain impositions, to ally himself with the *Ulama*, and with their help or rather acquiescence, to strike against the insubordinate elements, and control the military corps.

Sulayman Pasha started by removing certain unjust practices (*mazālim*) from which the Damascenes and particularly the artisans had suffered. The support of the artisans was important because they were the breeding ground for revolts by virtue of their organization and their links with the military corps. It seems that partly as a result of this reform and partly because of a good harvest the prices of wheat and barley decreased remarkably in 1147/1734 to the popular satisfaction. Sulayman Pasha then embarked on ensuring security. A certain Ibn Maghmūr from the Shaghūr quarter, who blocked the roads and robbed the people in the region between Bab al-Saghīr and Bab Kaysān, was put to death on 1 Rabī‘ II 1148/21 August 1735. This shows the insecurity that had prevailed near such important gates of the city. The fact that Bab al-Saghīr bordered on the Maydān quarter, the economic artery through which Damascus was provided with the wheat of Hawrān, means that such supplies could proceed now unhindered. On 3 Rabī‘ II 1148, Sulayman Pasha convoked a dīwān which was attended by the Muftī Hamid Efendi al-Imādī. This was probably to make the dignitaries share in the responsibility of his acts, and certainly to win them to his side.

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1This is a rather general term on which no details could be provided in this particular case. These may have been the same, or of the type of, *mazālim* referred to by Budayrī, f. 102a, on another occasion, see below p. 145.

2al-Qarafi, 78; Bārik, 8, 9.

3Ibn Kinān, II, f. 129a.

4See attached plan p. 426.

5Ibn Kinān, II, f. 83a.

6Ibid.
In 1148/1735-6 members of the Kapi Kulus rose against their agha and killed him. It seems that this was not a purely internal affair because it developed into a state of disorder throughout Damascus. Sulayman Pasha stepped in and put to death twelve persons. In the same year he arrested eight prominent members of the Yerliyya corps for an unknown reason. The authority of Sulayman Pasha was very much enhanced as a result.

The safety which he ensured for the Pilgrimage during his term of office helped to make the Damascenes satisfied with his rule. He also strengthened his religious and material ties with them. He built a madrasa near his house in Zuqaq al-Barid as well as two baths, one near al-Haramiya and the other in the Kharab quarter, where many Shi'is lived. He also built a qaysariyya in Suq al-`Ubdi.

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1 Ibn Jun'a, 66. The term qul which he used is a shortened form of Kapi Kulus (in Arabic Qafaiqul), cf. pp. 46, 53, 56; cf. Ibn Kinan, II, f. 73a; see above p. 65. Barik, 9 was probably referring to the same incident when he mentioned that the agha of the inkishariyya was killed.

2 Barik, 9.
4 Ibn Kinan, II, f. 84b; Murad, I, 3, II, 215; Suwaydi, f. 101b.
5 Ibn Kinan, II, f. 84b. It seems that this bath was located to the west of qaysariyyat Bahram near al-Suq al-Jadid, cf. Ibid, f. 69b.
6 See above p. 132n.6.
7 A qaysariyya is made up of an enclosed space, partly paved, surrounded by rooms to house merchants and strangers, and stores for the keeping of goods see Russell, I, 36; Dozy, II, 432. The last says that the term is derived from the Latin Caesaria. Very often the arabicized Persian term Khan is used in place of qaysariyya, see Lane, I, 826. M. Ecochard 'Le palais Azem de Damas', Gazette Des Beaux-Arts, XIII, Paris 1935, p. 232, fig.3, referred to the khan of Sulayman Pasha which was in effect his qaysariyya. According to Muhibbi, IV, 356, 357 the term wakala, that is khan, was used in Egypt for the building referred to by the Damascenes as qaysariyya.
8 Ibn Kinan, II, f. 84b.
At this time Sulaymān Pasha bought numerous houses and gardens in Damascus. Such a step of converting cash into real estate seems to have been unwise because his wealth was always liable to confiscation. He seems, however, to have been intent on making Damascus a residence for his family. To have vested interests in it would enable the ‘Aţms to figure among the notables of Damascus and to penetrate the Yerliyya corps, as in fact happened later.\(^1\) This would help the ‘Aţms, when in power, to have solid support from below, and would give them, when not, more chance for manoeuvring against other governors from within. One possible disadvantage of this policy was that the ‘Aţms would then incur the rivalry of local families of notables such as that of Fāṭī al-Dafārī.\(^2\)

If Sulaymān Pasha abstained from practising extortions on the Damascenes, it was because he had other resources at his disposal. Besides what was usually allotted to his office from revenue by regulation, practice and expediency, he had an additional income from his mālikāne of Hāmah and its dependencies which he was granted for the second time when he was governor of Tripoli in 1731-2, as equal partner with his nephew, As‘ad Pasha, who resided in Hāmah and took care of its affairs.\(^3\)

The flourishing trade of Damascus played also into the hands of Sulaymān Pasha. In 1737 he gave the monopoly of the trade in ash to a single French merchant through the intercession of Sulaymān Pasha’s nephew, Ibrāhīm

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1 See below p. 401.

2 See below pp. 198, 211, 213.

3 Tabbākh, III, 335.
Pasha, who was then governor of Sidon. The centre of the Damascenes' trade with the French merchants shifted now from Sidon to Damascus. This commercial activity from which Sulayman Pasha benefited seems to have been largely responsible for the building of his qaysariyya in Damascus. After his deposition, Fathi al-Daftari took over the protection of the French merchant who monopolized the ash trade, on the recommendation of Sulayman Pasha himself. It is interesting to note here that Fathi, who became daftardar of Damascus in 1148/1735-6, seems to have been, at the time, on good terms with Sulayman Pasha. His protection of the French merchant was the first sign of his attempt to build up his economic and political power which he would use later on, against the 'Azms themselves.

But by far the largest sphere for Sulayman Pasha's exploitation was outside Damascus. Such a policy of relieving the townspeople at the expense of the rural people was Sulayman Pasha's habitual policy. It appeased the urban malcontents, while the rural population would suffer extortion, sometimes with the Sultan's acquiescence, under the pretext of checking their insubordination. The recurrent expeditions of the governor into the countryside were also intended to maintain a balance of power in the region, and implicitly served as a safety valve for the insubordinate troops employed by him.

The policy of Sulayman Pasha outside Damascus.

Sulayman Pasha was very much helped in this policy by the confused

1 A.N.B. 1024: Sidon, 27.7.39 (Mémoire présenté à M. Arasy).
2 A.N.B. 1022: Sidon, 19.7.28 (Mémoire pour le commerce de Seyde); A.N.B. 1024: Sidon, 29.7.39.
3 A.N.B. 1024: Sidon, 27.7.39. (Mémoire présenté à M. Arasy).
4 Muradî, III, 211.
state of affairs in Mount Lebanon and the adjoining regions of Jabal ‘Amil and Safad. From being formidable enemies to the governors of Damascus in the first half of the 17th century, the amīrs of Mount Lebanon had become occupied with internal factional strife since the second half of it. The governors of Damascus exploited this struggle and encouraged one faction against the other. This seething faction-manoeuvring, besides other factors, undermined the authority of the amīrs over the inhabitants of the Mount, and their former dependencies on the periphery such as Jabal ‘Amil and the region of Safad moved away from their control. To understand what was really happening in these regions at the time, and to study the background for the emergence of Ẓahir al-ʿUmar, a survey of the developments that took place is necessary.

After the elimination of Fakhr al-Dīn Maʿn II in 1635, his Maʿn successors were unable to fill his place as paramount chiefs. True, the establishment of the province of Sidon was intended to keep a close watch over Mount Lebanon. But there were other internal causes which weakened the power of the Maʿn amīrs and their successors the Shībābs. Foremost among these causes was the internal factional strife between Qaysis and Yemenis which resurfaced in this period of weakness, and in fact contributed to it, and

1Mount Lebanon was sometimes referred to as Jabal al-Ṣūf, see Munayyir, al-Maghrib, 48 (1954) p. 672; it was known also as Jabal al-Duruz; this is apparent in the title of a work devoted to the history of Mount Lebanon between 1695 and 1805, Anon., Tārīkh Jabal al-Duruz, M.S. Berlin Cat. 9790, We. (II) 377, which is probably another copy of Munayyir's al-Durr, see above p. 16; ‘Abbūd al-Ṣabbagh, al-rāwḍ al-Ẓahir fī akhbar Dahir, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS arabe 4610, f. 20.

2On the origin of the Qaysi-Yemeni factionalism see, F.N. Haddad, "Political parties in Syria and Palestine (Qaisi and Yemeni); JPOS, Vol. I, Oct. 1920, No. 4, pp. 209-214; on the Qaysi-Yemeni factionalism among Bedouin and villagers in the southern regions of the province of Damascus in the first quarter of the 18th century see M. al-Kurdi, Tahdhib, ff. 27b-38b, see above p. 141.
which cut across religious barriers. The Ma‘ns who were installed as amīrs of Mount Lebanon by Sultan Selīm I, superseding the pro-Mamluk Buḥturids, were of the Qaysi faction. Opposed to them were the 'Alam al-Dīns, related but opposed to the Buḥturids, who headed the Yemeni faction. The other families of notables adhered to one faction or the other, but the Qaysis were in the majority and had the upper hand under the Ma‘ns. The Yemenis remained potential enemies and caused trouble whenever the occasion arose.¹

This factional rivalry reached a high pitch after the execution of Fakhr al-Dīn II because the ‘Alam al-Dīns allied themselves with the governors of Damascus against the Qaysi Ma‘ns.²

The death of the last Ma‘n ruling amīr in 1697 and the election of the first Shībāb amīr had two major consequences. Firstly, whereas the first Ma‘n amīr of Mount Lebanon was appointed directly by the Sultan, the first Shībāb amīr was elected by an assembly of notables. No matter how 'democratic' this procedure was, the fact that the notables assembled themselves and elected the amīr showed and indeed crystallized their consciousness of their strength, and this worked to undermine his authority. Secondly, the issue around which these notables grouped themselves was the upholding of the Qaysi solidarity and hegemony against the Yemenis. This crystallization in rivalry made each faction determined to destroy the other. In the battle of 'Ayn Dāra in 1711, the ‘Alam al-Dīns were finally liquidated. The defeated faction was not only Yemeni, but contained a strong Druze element. As a result...

¹Shidyāq, 323; Lammens, II, 89; ‘ʿAdel Ismāʿīl, I, 32, n.5.
²Shidyāq, 54-6, 132-6, 380, 387, 388; ‘ʿAdel Ismāʿīl, I, 32, n.5; Dibs, VII, 209.
Druze hegemony was weakened, all the more so because the *Shihāb amīr* was a Sunni. After the battle the *Shihāb amīr* recompensed his supporters by raising their chiefs to the rank of *shaykh* (tax-farmer). He addressed them as 'brothers' and appointed each as tax-farmer of a certain district. The Abu 'l-Lam's alone were raised to the rank of *amīrs.* Thus the position of these *shaykh* was further strengthened, and they would serve as a check on the power of the *amīr*.

We may distinguish in the first quarter of the 18th century three feudal groups, defined geographically and answerable to the governor of Sidon:

1. Mount Lebanon was under the control of a *Shihāb amīr* whose residence was in Dayr al-Qamar, and who farmed his territory from the governor of Sidon. It was divided into seven districts (*muqāṭa‘at*), namely: al-Shuf, al-'Arqub, al-Jurd, al-Shahhar, al-Gharb, al-Matn and Kasrawān. These districts, and others created or merged later on, were administered by *shaykhs* of leading families, who farmed them in turn from the *Shihāb amīr*.

2. Jabal 'Āmil was divided into three districts: Bilād Bīghara, the two

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3Shidyāq, 409.

4Munayyir, al-Maghrib, 48 (1954) 672, 674; Haydar Ahmad Shihāb, Nuzhat al-Zaman fī hāwādith Arabistan, MS. Cambridge, Or 63 (9), ff. 1b, 2a; Ta'rikh Jabal al-Duruz, f. 13a.

5Shidyāq, 21-33; Poliak, 57.

6Referred to also as *muqāṭa‘a jīs*, see Poliak, 58.

7Salibi, 'Lebanon', 20.
regions of al-Shammar and al-Tuffah, and al-Shaqif. Their inhabitants were largely Matawila Shi'is and their local chiefs, the Banū al-Saghir in the first, the Banū Munkir in the second, and the Banū Sa'b in the third, were of the Yemeni faction. These chiefs usually farmed their districts directly from the governor of Sidon, but in 1700 these districts were put temporarily under the control of the Shihâb amîr who became responsible for them to the governor of Sidon. The fluctuation in the direct dependence of these districts on the Shihâb amîrs or the governors of Sidon continued later on. Several battles were fought between the Shihâb amîr and the Matawila, at this time, partly as a result of the antagonism between the first who was a Qaysi Sunnî, and the second who were Yemeni Shi'is. In addition, the Shihâb amîr was in need of an easy conquest to bolster up his prestige. His economic position would also improve if he could lay his hands on the tobacco-producing lands in Jabal 'Amil. The danger of the Ziyadînî to the south was not yet sufficiently strong to decide the Shihâb amîr to avoid becoming their immediate neighbour. Nevertheless, the occupation of the Matawila lands would safeguard his country from the south if only from their incursions.

3. The sanjaq of Safad was under the jurisdiction of the governor of Sidon. Its history in the first quarter of the 18th century is rather controversial particularly as concerns the rise of Zahir al-'Umar. According to the accounts of the Lebanese chroniclers, Shihâb and Shidyaq, the Shihâb amîr was given in 1700 wilâyat Safad (probably meaning the sanjaq of Safad) by the governor of Sidon to acquire his co-operation in suppressing the

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1Shihâb, Lubnân, I, 5.  
2Ibid., I, 8.  
3Ibid., I, 5, 6.  
4Ibid., 8, 9; Nuzha MS, Paris, f. 33a; Shidyaq, 409-11.
Matawali Yemeni rebel of Bilad Bishara, Mushrif al-Saghir. Amir Bashir appointed his cousin, Amir Mansur, governor over Safad. 'Umar al-Zaydanî, father of Zahir, became tax-farmer, with the rank of shaykh, over the dependent parts of Safad because he was a Qaysi. With the death of Amir Mansur in 1702, 'Umar al-Zaydanî became governor of Safad. Later, in 1706, after the death of Amir Bashir and the accession of Amir Haydar and as a result of the change of the governor of Sidon, wilayat Safad, as well as the districts of Jabal 'Amil, were taken away from the Shihab amir and came under the direct supervision of the governor of Sidon. The latter appointed Zahir al-'Umar as governor over Safad and its dependencies (diyariba) and Acre and its dependencies.

From the above statements it is clear that 'Umar al-Zaydanî was already established in the region of Safad, and on this basis, besides being a Qaysi, he was appointed, or perhaps merely confirmed, by Amir Bashir in 1700 as tax-farmer in wilayat Safad. In fact, 'Ali, the father of 'Umar and head of the Ziyadina family, was recognized before 1700 as tax-farmer of Tiberias by the governor of Sidon through the amir of Mount Lebanon. Muradi confirmed the prominence of the Ziyadina at this period when he stated that Zahir's father, grandfather and uncles were governors in Safad and in Acre. The appointment of 'Umar al-Zaydanî by Amir Bashir was, therefore, a re-

1 Shidyaq, 409, 410; Shihab, Lubnan, I, 5; Nuzha MS, Paris, f. 32a.
2 Shidyaq, 410; Shihab, Lubnan, I, 6, 76; Nuzha MS, Paris, f. 32a.
3 Shidyaq, 411; Shihab, Lubnan, I, 7.
5 A. al-Sabbagh, f. 2a.
6 Muradi III, 184.
umption of an old practice in the family. Between 1700 and 1706 'Umar was
more attached to Amir Bashir because wilayat Safad was given to the latter,
but, still, the supreme authority was with the governor of Sidon. If we are
to believe the account of Muradi that Zahir was born in 1106, at the lat­
est 1694, then his age in 1706 was twelve years. The statement by Shihab
and Shidyaq that Zahir had become, by this time, the governor of Safad and
Acre with their dependencies needs further explanation.

Acre at the time was not an important place. It was almost in ruins
and its commercial activity had not yet begun. Neither 'A. al-Sabbagh nor
M. al-Sabbagh, who devoted their works to the history of Zahir, mentioned
that Acre was governed by Zahir at this time. 'A. al-Sabbagh mentioned, how­
ever, that al-Damun, in the vicinity of Acre, was nominally farmed by Zahir.
Probably some of Zahir's relations extended their authority over Acre at the
time. But this does not mean that Zahir held it by virtue of his own power
ever since. It was not till 1746 that he gained possession of it. The
emphasis on Acre in the writings of Shihab and Shidyaq and those who copied
them seems to reflect the important position it acquired later, of which
they were witnesses.

Zahir at this early age was not really the effective ruler of the dis­

1 Muradi, III, 184. This age is somewhat corroborated by 'A. al-Sabbagh,
who mentioned that Zahir was fourteen years old when he was re­
ocognized nominally as chief tax-farmer. It is understood from M. al-
Sabbagh, p. 17 that Zahir was born in 1689, and from Volney, p. 250, that
he was born around 1686. Since the account of Muradi is supported by the
careful chronicler 'A. al-Sabbagh, then we shall take it as being nearer
to the truth.

2 Nabulisi, al-Haqiq, f. 79b; Masson, 512; Volney, 250; according to T.Shaw,
Travels, 331. 'Tyre was no better and its port was choked up with sand
and rubbish.'
asked the governor of Sidon to issue the tax-farm in his name so that they, the effective tax-farmers, could take cover behind the young Ẓahîr in case of any arrears in the mīlī tax. His authority, therefore, was only nominal. Munayyir was nearer to the truth when he mentioned in the events of 1706 that the government of Acre and Ẓafad was in the hands of al-Mashāyikh awlād Dānī Zaydān. It was not, however, till the early thirties of the 18th century that Ẓahîr started asserting his military power and expanding outside his stronghold of Tiberias.

During the governorships of ‘Uthmān Pasha Abū Ṭawq in Damascus and Sidon, his military power loomed heavily over the mountain of Lebanon. Ismā‘īl Pasha al-‘Aẓm made political arrangements to neutralize the feudal and tribal forces within his province. No clashes were reported between ‘Abd Allāh Pasha Aydīnli and any of the Shiḥāb amīrā or Ẓahîr al-‘Umar, probably because as a Rūmi appointed for the first time to a Syrian province he was not acquainted with the local power groups, and also because there was no immediate threat against the dependencies of Damascus. With the appointment of Sulaymān Pasha al-‘Aẓm to Damascus, the picture became quite different. His past experience, his enmity against the Shiḥābs, and the dangerously growing power of Ẓahîr al-‘Umar brought him into military conflict with both of them. Sulaymān Pasha picked the issue of the Lebanese raids on the Biqa‘ which was largely under his jurisdiction, to open

1. A. al-Ṣabbagh, f. 2b.  
3. A. al-Ṣabbagh, ff. 6b, 7a; M. al-Ṣabbagh, pp. 27-8, 31-6.  
4. Cf. Ibn Kinān, I, ff. 43a, 153b; Shiḥāb, Lubnān, I, 123; Evliya Efendi, Narrative of Travels in Europe, Asia, ..., tr. from Turkish by Hammer, I vol.; London, 1834-46. The author visited Damascus around the middle of the 17th century and mentioned, I.i. 93, that al-Biqa‘ is a junjaq in the province of Damascus.
hostilities with the Shihāb Amīr Mulhim. The raids took place after a victory obtained by Amīr Mulhim over the Bani al-Ṣaghīr of Bilād Bīghara. 1 Sulaymān Pasha exploited the incident to avenge an old quarrel with the father of Amīr Mulhim. He obtained the approval of the Porte to lead an expedition against him, and orders were issued also to the governors of Sidon and Tripoli to join him. The joint expedition marched late in 1736, but discord broke out between the governors of Damascus and Sidon and a compromise was reached with the Shihāb amīr through the French Consul at Sidon before serious fighting started. Sulaymān Pasha was to receive 150 thousand piastres from Amīr Mulhim for calling off the expedition, and the latter was to put his brother and a son of each of the two principal shaykhs of Kasrawān - it is not known why these two were chosen - as hostages with the French Consul to serve as security for the payment. 2 The expedition benefited Sulaymān Pasha economically and bolstered up his prestige politically. Encouraged by this success, he directed his attention towards Zahir al-ʿUmar who was a more dangerous enemy by virtue of his position and prospects for expansion than the somewhat isolated and weakened Shihāb amīr.

In his attempts to establish his power and extend his territory in the early thirties, Zahir allied himself with the principal local chiefs. After having acquired the iltizām of the regions he controlled from the governor of Sidon directly and not through the Shihāb amīr as previously - an act suggestive of his growing prestige - Zahir tried to trim the wings of his strong but dangerous allies. In Hebron, the Beduin chief Jabr resumed

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1 Shidyaq, 418, 419; Nuzha, MS. Paris, f. 36a; Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 30; Shihāb, Nuzha, MS. Camb, f. 16a.

2 For a detailed account see A.N.B 1024: Sidon, 4.2.37; Sidon, 17.7.37; A.N.Bill: (?), 225.37; Charles-Roux, 65.

3 See above p. 139.
his schemes for expansion. He allied himself with the Saqr Beduin\(^1\) and became amir of the Beduin shaykhs of Safad.\(^2\) To guard against Ibn Madi, a militant notable in the region of Nablus, who was cooperating with the governor of Sidon, Jabr sought the alliance of Zahir. The latter welcomed this alliance and used it to destroy his enemies.\(^3\) But having pledged himself to the governor of Sidon and to the inhabitants of the districts he had acquired to ensure the security of his territory, Zahir was bound to clash with his insubordinate allies, particularly the Saqr.\(^4\) His attempt to eradicate their insubordination alienated them, and they shifted to his enemies, Ibn Madi and Ibn Jarrar, the paramount chiefs in the region of Nablus. Both of these chiefs were answerable to the governor of Damascus, and when Zahir encroached on their territory, Sulayman Pasha came to their help.\(^5\)

Aware of the dangers he would encounter, Zahir started to reinforce the defences of his stronghold, Tiberias.\(^6\) Sulayman Pasha led an expedition against him in 1737 and was joined by the Saqr. The skirmishes that took place resulted in the capture of Zahir's brother, Salih, who was put to death in Damascus.\(^7\) The subsequent deposition of Sulayman Pasha in 1738 brought a short respite to Zahir, but hostilities were to be resumed on a wider and more forceful scale during his second governorship in Damascus.

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\(^1\) In the first quarter of the 19th century the Saqr were centred on the sanjaqs of Lajjun and Safad, see M. al-Kurdi, Tahdid\(^1\), ff. 24b, 25b.

\(^2\) M. al-Sabbagh, 25.

\(^3\) Ibid., 31-5.

\(^4\) Ibid., 35, 36.

\(^5\) Ibid., 46-52.


\(^7\) Pococke, II, i. 68, 69; Barak, 9; A. al-Sabbagh, f. 7a; Muradi, III, 184. The latter mentioned Mustafa in place of Salih. No such name appears in the list of Zahir's brothers which was given by A. al-Sabbagh, f. 2b.
The last expedition by Sulayman Pasha before his deposition was directed, according to Barik, against the Beduin of Balqa'. It is not known whether these Beduin were being punished for threatening the safety of the Pilgrimage or for supporting Zahir. Since at the end of the century they were reported as paying tribute to the governors of Damascus, Sulayman Pasha may have been enforcing this obligation.

On Saturday 1 Rajab II 1151/19 July 1738, Sulayman Pasha was deposed from Damascus. On Thursday 3 Jumada I 1151/19 August 1738, he left for Hamah. He spent a lot of money at Istanbul to retain the governorship of Damascus, but in vain. In the meantime, he was not offered any governorship, and he was still in Hamah in Dhu l-Qa‘da 1151/February-March 1739 awaiting a new appointment. In 1152/1739-40, he was appointed governor of Egypt.

During the governorship of Sulayman Pasha in Damascus, an agent 'qui est le creature du Kiaya du Grand Vizir', was taking care of his interests at the Porte. It seems that with the deposition of the kāhya of the Grand Vizir in January 1738, the agent of Sulayman Pasha lost his influence. It is significant that Husayn Pasha, who succeeded him in Damascus, was pro-

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1 For the activity of these Beduin in the first quarter of the 18th century see M. al-Iwurdi, ff. 27b, 31a. Towards the end of the 18th century the Beduin of Balqa' numbered between 40 and 60 thousand, see Seetzen, 296, 297.

2 Seetzen, 296, 297. 4 Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 84a, 183b.

3 Seetzen, 296, 297. 5 Ibid., f. 85a.

6 Ibid., f. 84b.

7 Ibid., f. 105a. 8 Jabarti, I, 150.


tected by the Grand Vezir himself. This may have been one of the reasons for the deposition of Sulayman Pasha. During his governorship in Damascus, there was apparently nothing in his record to discredit him, nor did the Damascenes complain to the Sultan of any injustices. Furthermore, his wealth was not confiscated after his deposition. That he was still in favour is demonstrated by his subsequent appointment to the governorship of Egypt.

Political Changes among the Power Groups in Damascus.

Between 2 Rabi' II 1151/20 July 1738 and about the end of Rabi' II 1154/the first half of July 1741, three governors succeeded each other in Damascus. Such a rapid change of governors in so short a period is reminiscent of the old practice which persisted until the first quarter of the 18th century, and contrasts with the lengthy tenure of the 'Aṣms. Events during this period were of paramount importance for the relations between the Damascenes and their governors, and the fortunes of the power groups in Damascus.

A. The revolt against Husayn Pasha al-Bustanjī.

Before his entry to Damascus on 14 Jumādā I 1151/30 August 1738, Husayn Pasha al-Bustanjī, a Rūmī by origin, appointed as his mutasallim on 2 Rabi' II Fathī, the daftardar of Damascus, During his previous governorship of Tripoli, Husayn Pasha had commanded the jarda and was a familiar

2Risālā, f. 14a; Muwaqqi, f. 250b; Dhikr man tawallā al Wizāra, f. 114b; cf. A.N.B. 1024; Sīdon, 27.7.39. Ibn Kinān, II, f. 85b gives the date of his entry as 15 Jumādā I.
3Ibn Kinān II, f. 183a; A.N.B. 1117: Tripoli, 10.5.38.
figure to the Damascenes. His appointment of Fathi was a proof of this acquaintance and of the latter's growing prominence. This familiarity might have enabled Husayn Pasha to formulate a tentative policy to apply in Damascus should he be appointed to it. But, it seems that he misjudged the situation, was over-confident in his private troops and underestimated the strength of the Damascenes.

At the start of his governorship, Husayn Pasha hanged two persons and left them on the poles for some time. ¹ Whatever their crimes, this was intended to impress the people with his power and to create a feeling of terror. He then started amassing money, which he obtained, as it seems, through fraud.² The amount he collected during his first month in office was estimated at 900 purses.³ He abolished certain Sufi practices known as tahliila.⁴ Although the chronicler Ibn Jun'a expressed relief and satisfaction at this ban, such a measure seems to have alienated the followers of the turuq who had much influence in Damascus. This issue, added to the extortions of the governor, provoked the populace to revolt. They were exhorted to do so by the religious shaykhs who suspended the Friday prayer and urged the wor-

¹ IbnJun'a, 66. The term he used for hanging, galaba (crucified), does not seem really to denote an operation of crucifixion. The context of the term could be seen in another example. When the Mamluk Sultan Tuman Bay was killed one chronicler stated that after this was done, Sultan Selim I, Salabahu (i.e. fixed him to a pole) in Bab Zawila, see Anon., Dhikr nab'ba fi zal-dawla al-Rumiyya wa saltana al-Uthmaniyya, MS. Berlin cat. 9728. No 463, f.3a

² Ibn Jun'a, 66.

³ Lettres édifiantes, XXVI (1743), 437.

shippers to avenge the honour of the Prophet, in reference to the abolition of the *tahlīla*, and to demand the enforcement of the *Shārī‘a*.¹

Husayn Pasha, in his high-handed policy, alienated all the power groups in Damascus and relied solely on his private troops, composed mainly of Maghārib and Dālātiyya.² On Friday 12 Jumādā II 1151/27 September 1738, less than a month after his entry to Damascus, *awlād al-Sham*, a common name designating the *Yerliyya* who had become Damascenes in uniform, and other discontented Damascenes,³ revolted against the governor, and many casualties occurred in the fighting. The *Kapi Kulus* were becoming acclimatized and they fraternized with the Damascenes to guard their own interests. They threatened the governor by directing the guns of the citadel on his headquarters.⁴ The governor tried to gain time by negotiating with the aghas of the *Yerliyya* and the *Kapi Kulus*.⁵ When his preparations were complete, he retaliated by attacking, at the head of 4,000 troops, the Maydan quarter and its vicinity the Qubaybat, around the middle of Jumādā II. These places were the strongholds of the *Yerliyya*, and by subduing them not only could the ringleaders be suppressed, but he could control the flow of the supplies

¹Lettres edifiantes, XXVI (1743), 434; cf. Ibn Jum‘a, 66.
³That *awlād al-Sham* or *Dimashq* meant in effect the *Yerliyya* and other Damascenes, excluding the *Kapi Kulus*, is apparent in the first round of the fighting in which the *Kapi Kulus* did not take active part, see Ibn Jum‘a, 67; Barīk, 9. When the *Kapi Kulus* took part in the fighting later, Barīk, 9, mentioned *awlād Dimashq* alongside the *Kapi Kulus*. Al-Qarī, 73 used the common designation, ‘*askar al-Sham*, to denote the various troops which fought against the governor. For an earlier use of the term ‘*askar al-Sham* in the same sense, see above p. 61.
⁴Ibn Jum‘a, 67; Lettres edifiantes XXVI (1743), 435; A. N. B. 1024: Sidon, 11.10.38.
⁵Lettres edifiantes, XXVI (1743), 436.
coming from Hawran to Damascus. The fact that these quarters were outside the walls of the city, made them more vulnerable and facilitated, at the same time, the mobility of the governor's troops. Devastation, pillage and casualties were reported in the fighting.

With the time for the departure of the Pilgrimage getting nearer, the governor gave up the fighting and went on the dawra to collect the revenue. In the meantime, the Damascenes were taking precautionary measures. They reconstructed the walls and the gates of the city to oppose the governor on his return. They pleaded, also, to the Sultan, but the protector of Husayn Pasha, who was the Grand Vezir, brushed aside their appeals.

On his return from the dawra, Husayn Pasha freed the Damascenes whom he had imprisoned and disbanded some of his troops to appease the Damascenes. Shortly afterwards, he employed them once more to guard the Pilgrimage. The safety he ensured to the Pilgrimage, did not allay the enmity of the Damascenes, or overcome their objection to the return of his troops.

From being mere sympathizers, the Kapi Kulus participated now in active fighting against the governor, and used the citadel to fire on his headquarters. The major obstacle that had hindered them from doing so previously was removed when some of their members arrested the agha of this corps whom they suspected of communicating secretly with Husayn Pasha. The

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1. Lettres édifiantes, XXVI (1743), 437, 438; see a detailed description by Husayn b. Tu'ma al-Baytimani, Diwan, MS. B.M. Or. 3175, ff. 17a, 17b.
2. Lettres édifiantes, XXVI (1743), 440; A.N.B 1024: Sidon, 27.2.39.
3. Lettres édifiantes, XXVI (1743), 441; Baytimānī, f. 17b; Ibn Kinān, II, f. 17b.
4. Lettres édifiantes, XXVI (1743), 442. 5Ibid.
The governor was driven out of the city and took refuge in the countryside. The villages of al-Mu‘adamiyya, Marīn and Quṭayfa suffered from the ravages of his troops, and some of their inhabitants came to Damascus to join in protest. Faced with this widespread resistance, the muftī of Damascus, who refrained, at the beginning, from sanctioning the revolt of the Damascenes, rallied, now, to their support and condoned their action.

In the meantime, Husayn Pasha appealed to the Sultan for support. The Sultan sent orders to the Damascenes to receive their governor, but they were adamant in their opposition to his entry unless he disbanded his troops of Magharība and Dalṭiyya. They went further in expressing their enmity to his troops, expelling and even killing some of the remaining Magharība who were the backbone of his power. It seems also that the resident Magharība were considered a potential enemy and were expelled as well and their Zawīya, which had existed for centuries, was destroyed.

Husayn Pasha was determined to subdue the Damascenes. But before his plans for attacking them could be put into effect, the Sultan responded to the persistent appeals of the Damascenes and had him deposed on Saturday 1 Jumādā II 1152/5 September 1739. The news of his deposition was received

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1 Lettres édifiantes, XXVI (1743), 446; Baytimānī, f. 17b; Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 11b, 13a; al-Qarī, 78; A.N.B 1024: Sidon, 29.7.39 (dispatch No. 2 under this date), Sidon, 2.9.39 (dispatch No. 1 under this date).


3 Lettres édifiantes, XXVI (1743), 434, 435. Ibid., 447.

4 Ibid., 447.

5 A.N.B 1024: Sidon, 2.9.39 (dispatch No. 1 under this date).

6 Baytimānī, f. 17b; Barīk, 9.

7 See above p. 173.

8 Barīk, 10; Ibn Kinān, II, f. 13a; Baytimānī, f. 17b; Ibn Jum‘a, 67.
with joy in Damascus, and celebrations were staged there.¹

The significance of this revolt lies in the following points:

1. The Damascenes asserted themselves and revolted against their Rumi governor. This does not necessarily mean that they would not have done so against a governor of local origin if he committed the same acts. But the fact that Ḫusayn Pasha was a Rumi and was opposed by the various groups in Damascus, for which he was principally to blame, must have brought forth in the minds of the Damascenes a comparison with the tolerant rule of his predecessor, Sulaymān Pasha al-‘Azm. The Damascenes might not have been politically conscious of a distinction between governors of Rumi or local origin, because both were Muslims and were appointed by the Sultan, but their different methods as administrators might well be a subject of comparison. The mere fact that the Muslim chroniclers started now, that is after the appointment of the ‘Azm governors, using more frequently the adjective Rumi for governors of non-local origin implies that they at least were becoming more conscious of the distinction between the two types of origins. The Christian Barīk went far ahead in describing the ‘Azm as awlād ‘Arab.

The Damascenes had revolted several times previously but, by now, their revolts had become of a wider magnitude. The revolutionary tradition was becoming more legitimate particularly because the Sultan implicitly endorsed their action by deposing Ḫusayn Pasha. The Sultan went even further in courting the favour of the Damascenes. About the middle of Jumāda II, a few days after the deposition of Ḫusayn Pasha, he sent instructions that, as

¹Ibn Kinān, II, f. 13a.
Damascus was his malikane, nobody must injure it, and justice must be upheld.\(^1\)

The term malikane here, does not necessarily imply the strict sense of the word, but seems to have been used by the Sultan to allay the Damascenes' fears of further extortions by emphasizing his direct responsibility and patronage. Although such a concern was natural on the part of the Sultan, it must have strengthened the position of the Damascenes vis-à-vis their governors. The Sultan followed this by abrogating the practice that the governor of Damascus should keep an agent in Istanbul, guaranteeing instead to send him the news, good and bad, of what happened there.\(^2\) This suggests that the agent of Husayn Pasha had distorted the facts in his favour. However, the abrogation was not maintained.

2. The Yerliyya took advantage of their alliance with the Kapi Kulus, and expelled the Maghariba who were often used by the governors in subduing them. The expulsion of the Maghariba, albeit temporarily, encouraged the Yerliyya and the Damascenes to demand, later on, the expulsion of the Kapi Kulus. The issue developed into a struggle (between Damascenes and aliens) and was given a sharp twist by the clash of their interests. As a result of the success achieved by the Yerliyya, insubordination increased among their ranks to the extent that many members went out of control. These members were referred to by the chroniclers as zorab or zorbawat (sing. zorba)\(^3\) or simply as ashqiya' al-Jund.\(^4\)

\(^1\) Ibn Kinān, II, f. 13b.  
\(^2\) Ibid.  
\(^3\) Zorba is a term of Turkish origin which means, both in Arabic and Turkish, insolent or rebel. See Redhouses' Turkish Dictionary, London 1880, p. 589; Dozy II, 584.  
\(^4\) Murādī, IV, 178.
3. The walls and gates of the city were reconstructed and barricades could now be erected very easily. The narrowness of the streets was also of great help for this purpose. The Damascenes could draw confidence from the strength of their defenses, and despotic governors would think twice, with this proof in sight, before they alienated them. The governors might, however, have learnt a lesson from Husayn Pasha's unsuccessful policy in depending solely on private troops to the exclusion of the local groups.

4. Fathî al-Daftarî, who was appointed mutasallim by Husayn Pasha at the start of his governorship, does not seem to have suffered any major setback as a result of his association with Husayn Pasha. His appointment as mutasallim did not necessarily mean that he deputized for the governor during the whole of his governorship. It is stated that Husayn Pasha did not appoint any person to govern in his absence when he went on the Pilgrimage. Fathî, at this time, was still groping for power and watching how events were developing. It is probable that the early association of his name with Husayn Pasha had later caused him some discredit even though he had not supported him. It seems that because of this, and also as a result of the growing influence of the Yerliyya, Fathî associated himself with them. This means, besides others, enabled him, later, to assert his authority against the 'Azm governors.

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1 Pococke, II, i.118; cf. Maundrell, 100.
2 Lettres Edifiantes, XXVI (1743), 443.
3 Murâdî, III, 286; his statement that Fathî was muntamiyyan ila wîjâq al-Yerliyya is equivocal and does not necessarily mean that he became a member of this corps.
4 See below pp. 198, 211, 213.
5. The revolt had disruptive effects on the economic life of Damascus. The ravaging of the countryside by the troops of the governor, decisive though it was in bringing the peasants into the struggle, was of a temporary nature. Of more importance was the confirmation of the French authorities in their conviction of the risk in sending their merchants to trade in Damascus, or of maintaining a consul in it. The French had already encountered difficulty in trading with the Damascenes. Once the French goods reached the city, the Damascenes enforced the prices they wanted; whereas, if they came to Sidon to buy them, better prices would be obtained. On the other hand, when the French merchants went to Damascus to buy ash, they were left at the mercy of the muleteers who carried it to Sidon, because they abused their opportunity. Such complaints were sharpened by the implications of the revolt. The French King, acting on the recommendation of the authorities concerned, prohibited the French merchants from sending their goods and buying any commodity in Damascus. This prohibition did not ban the trade with the Damascenes, but transferred its centre to Sidon. Since Damascus was a principal market for the French goods, the Damascenes lost several advantages as a result. As late as 1783 the French authorities were still reluctant to permit their merchants to establish themselves in Damascus for fear of exactions and disorders.

1 A.N.B 1 1024: Sidon, 29.7.39 (dispatch No. 2 under this date); cf. Rabbath, II, 571-2.
2 A.N.B 1 1024: Sidon, 29.7.39 (dispatch No. 5 under this date); cf. PRO, S.P. 110/38, Aleppo, (?):7.67.
3 A.N.B 1 1024: Sidon, 10.2.40.
5 A.N.B 1 979: Acre, 6.7.83 (Memoire sur le commerce).
B. The Dismissal of the Kapi Kulus from Damascus under 'Uthman Pasha al-Muhassil.

On Monday 3 Jumada II 1152/7 September 1739, two days after the deposition of Husayn Pasha, the mutasallim of 'Uthman Pasha al-Muhassil entered Damascus.\(^1\) The governor followed him on 17 Jumada II 1152/21 September 1739.\(^2\)

'Uthman Pasha was born and brought up in Aleppo where he became a muhassil (chief tax-farmer).\(^3\) He was no stranger to Damascus because as early as 1731, when he was governor of Tripoli, he had been Commander of the jarda.\(^4\) His inability to suppress the revolt which took place in Tripoli and its dependent parts, was partly responsible for his deposition from Tripoli, at the time.\(^5\) He commanded the jarda once more during his first governorship of Aleppo\(^6\) (from 4 Sha'ban 1150/27 November 1737 until his appointment to Damascus).\(^7\)

'Uthman Pasha was faced with the further consequences of the recent revolt. Hardly had seven months elapsed since it took place, when a split developed among the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus corps. In Muharram 1153/March-April 1740, during the absence of 'Uthman Pasha on the Pilgrimage,

\(^1\)Ibn Kinān, II, f. 13b.

\(^2\)Ibn Jum'a, 67; al-Qarī, 78 gives the date of his entry as 9 Jumada II 1152/13 Sept. 1739. The above date was preferred because it allows reasonable time for the journey of 'Uthman Pasha who was reported as still in Aleppo on 7 September preparing for his departure to Damascus, 'il doit partir peu de jours', see A.N.B 83: Aleppo, 7.9.39.

\(^3\)Muradī, III, 151; A.N.B 81: Aleppo, 2.1.31; Radcliffe papers, 6645/6: Aleppo, 23.8.38; cf. Ibn Kinān, II, f. 14lb.

\(^4\)Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 36b, 105a; A.N.B 1116: Tripoli, 25.5.31.

\(^5\)See above p. 158.

\(^6\)Ibn Kinān, II, ff. 105a, 14lb.

\(^7\)A. Mingana, 'List of the Turkish governors and High Judges of Aleppo from (cont.)
fighting started between the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus.¹

It seems that the combination of both groups against Husayn Pasha and the endorsement by the Sultan of their point of view, had contributed to the assertion of their power and to the creation of a more conscious factional animosity once the common enemy was removed. The Kapi Kulus were more isolated compared with the Yerliyya who had broad local support. This made the Kapi Kulus more anxious to maintain their superiority and the privileges they had obtained after they joined the crafts.² The Yerliyya were equally determined to secure the upper hand. Previously, they had taken part in the Expulsion of the Maghariba from Damascus, and if they could drive out the Kapi Kulus, their military superiority and economic interests would be unchallenged by alien troops. Since their first installation in Damascus in 1069/1658-9, the Kapi Kulus had controlled, among other things, the citadel and the gates of the city, which were previously in the hands of the Janissaries.³ In 1737 they were still reported as holding these key positions⁴ during the revolt against Husayn Pasha, the gates of the city were reinforced, and this served to strengthen the hand of the Kapi Kulus. The Yerliyya, strong as they had become, could not tolerate the presence of such potential

(contr.) the Ottoman conquest to A.D.1747¹. Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, vol. 10, No. 2, July, 1926, p.5; Dhikr man tawallaha, f. 114b; Risala, f. 14a; Radcliffe papers 6645/6; Aleppo, 24.8.38; Muradi, III, 159, erroneously states that 'Uthman Pasha was appointed to Damascus before his first appointment to Aleppo, that is before 4 Sha’ban 1150.

¹Ibn Jum’a, 68; Ibn Kinān, II, f. 159a. ²Ibn Jum’a, 68.
³Muhībbī, IV, 310; Ibn Kinān, II, f. 159a.
⁴Pococke, II.i.124.
rivals in these strategic points. The clash with the Kapi Kulus seems to have confirmed them in their suspicions, because the Kapi Kulus immediately made barricades in the quarters where they were living with their families, and closed the gates of the city over which they had control. This was detrimental to the Yerliyya because the majority of them lived in the suburban quarters of al-Maydān and Suq Saruja, outside the gates.

Amid this struggle two fresh odas of Kapi Kulus arrived in Damascus from Istanbul. Their subsequent penetration of the crafts shows that this was already an established practice. The Yerliyya regarded the reinforcement of their enemy as prejudicial to their interests and superiority. The 'Ulama' and notables, joined by 'Uthman Pasha, protested against the corruption and the misdeeds of the Kapi Kulus. The Sultan, impressed by this unanimity and anxious, as it seems, not to alienate the Damascenes, sent a firman authorizing the expulsion of the Kapi Kulus from Damascus. This took place around the middle of Rabi' II 1153/the first half of July 1740. Some of the Kapi Kulus were killed and the majority were expelled. Those of them who had families and exhibited good conduct by proving that they were not zorab, as judged by the notables of the city who reviewed each at the door of his house, were permitted to stay, provided they gave up

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1 Ibn Jum'a, 68.  
2 See above p. 187.  
3 Ibn Jum'a, 68; A.N.B.1 1025: Sidon, 19.8.40.  
4 A chief of a quarter (shaykh qara) is mentioned as having enrolled in the Kapi Kulus corps, see Ibn Kinān, II, f. 73a.  
5 Ibn Jum'a, 68.  
6 Barīk, 10; al-Qari, 78.  
7 Ibn Kinān, II, f. 188b.
their uniforms and other privileges and became ordinary inhabitants. Some of those expelled took refuge with the Druzes, probably in Mount Lebanon. The Druzes were in a relatively safe country and were traditionally the declared enemies of the governors of Damascus. It is perhaps significant that the chronicler who mentioned that the expelled Kapi Kulus were dispersed in different places was satisfied with identifying one place only, namely the Druze country. The Druzes were more compact as a community and easy to identify geographically. Of more importance was the religious hostility of the Damascenes to them, which would further discredit the Kapi Kulus if their name was associated with the Druzes. However, such a refuge seems to have been in the tradition of the Kapi Kulus because, as early as 10 Safar 1105/11 October 1693, Nābulṣī visited some prominent members of this corps who sought asylum with Amīr Ahmad Ma‘n, after their clash with the Yerliyya of Damascus.

It is interesting to note here the role played by Fathī al-Daftarī in this affair. In his bid for power, Fathī, as we have already seen, associated himself with the Yerliyya so as to ensure a better guarantee for the success of his plans. He seized on the present struggle and collaborated with the interested parties for the expulsion of the Kapi Kulus. Such an

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1Budayrī, f. 1b; Barīk, 10; Ibn Jum‘a, 68; Ibn Kinān, II, f. 188b; al-Qārī, 78.
2Ibn Kinān, II, f. 188b.
3For this religious antagonism see for example, Nābulṣī, al-Haqīqa, f. 69b; Ibn Jum‘a, 6, 7.
4Nābulṣī, al-Haqīqa, ff. 69a, 69b.
5Barīk, p. 10.
opportune move by Fatḥū'ī gained him an easy personal success and further established his prestige.

The Governorship of ‘Alī Pasha.

‘Uthmān Pasha al-Muḥāṣṣil was deposed roughly in the first half of Sha‘bān 1153/second half of October 1740. He was succeeded by ‘Alī Pasha, known as Abū Qilī, who was until then governor of Belgrade, and who held the rank of wāzīr like his father, ‘Abdī Pasha. He entered Damascus on 23 Sha‘bān 1153/13 November 1740, and was deposed towards the end of Ṣā‘īd II 1154/first half of July 1741. Calm and security prevailed in Damascus during his rule. This was partly due to the expulsion of the Kābi Kūlūs who had caused a lot of trouble previously. With their dismissal the Yerliyya emerged victorious and became the strongest single group in Damascus. But this victory gave further impetus to insubordination in the ranks of the Yerliyya. The full scope of this insubordination did not become apparent during the short tenure of ‘Alī Pasha. On the other hand, the dismissed Kābi Kūlūs who remained in Damascus had not yet recovered from the blow they were dealt, and hence had no chance to provoke the Yerliyya in the meantime. This was probably one reason for the calm and security during ‘Alī Pasha’s governorship. Another was his re-

1Cf. Ibn Jum‘a, 68; al-Qārī, 78.

2No information is available about his mutasallim.

3al-Qārī, 78; cf. Muwaqqi‘, f. 251a.

4Dhikr man tawallā, f. 114b; Risāla, f. 14a; cf. Ibn Jum‘a, 68.

5Ibn Jum‘a, 68; cf. al-Qārī, 78.

6Ibn Jum‘a, 68.

7Budayrī, f. 2b.
putedly just administration. He was also praised for generosity and tolerance, particularly towards the Christians, which made Barîk feel sorry for his deposition.¹ Perhaps his previous lack of acquaintance with the politics of Damascus and its dependent parts, and his short duration in it, especially if we take into account his departure on the dawra and with the Pilgrimage, explain the absence of any clashes between him and either the Druzes or Zahir al-‘Umar. Zahir benefited from this relative quiet which helped him to maintain his authority - a fact which enabled him, a year later, to defy Sulaymân Pasha al-‘Azm. However, the only incident during the governorship of ‘Alî Pasha was his clash with the Ḥarb Beduin in wâdî al-‘Aqîq,² while he was commanding the Pilgrimage. But he emerged victorious.³

The deposition of ‘Alî Pasha, after being in office for less than a year, was apparently due to the fact that his services were needed against Nadir Shâh. He proceeded to Erzerum where he was appointed Sarî ‘askar (commander-in-chief).⁴ His deposition cleared the way for the appointment of Sulaymân Pasha al-‘Azm who was deposed, the year before, from the governorship of Egypt.⁵

¹ pp. 10, 11; cf. al-‘ârî, 78.
² It is about half an hour's walk to the west of Međîna, see ‘Umar R. Kahhâla, Jughrâfiyyat shibh jazîrat al-‘Arab, Damascus, 1944, pp. 141, 142.
³ Ibn Jum’a, 68; Budayrî, f. 2b.
⁴ PRO, S.P. 97/31; Istanbul, 8.5.41.
⁵ Jabartî, I, 151; cf. Murâdî, I, 38, III, 47.
The Second Governorship of Sulaymān Pasha al-‘Azm in Damascus.

Ibrahim Agha, the mutasallim of Sulaymān Pasha al-‘Azm, entered Damascus around the end of Rabī‘ II 1154/first half of July 1741. On 12 Jumāda 2/25 August, Sulaymān Pasha made his entry into Damascus. This was his second governorship of Damascus, and there was nothing very new about such a recurrent appointment if judged by other examples - the nearest was that of Abu Ṭawq. But with the ‘Azm family there was something particular about it. As they were a local family which distinguished itself by acquiring mainly local governorships, their aim was always to stick to these governorships and to prefer that of Damascus to any other. Whenever the Sultan tried to appoint or to transfer them to governorships outside Syria it was very reluctantly that they accepted their new appointments. A second appointment of Sulaymān Pasha to Damascus was, therefore, quite an achievement for himself and for the ‘Azm family.

The Policy of Sulaymān Pasha in Damascus.

The past policy of Sulaymān Pasha of appeasing the Damascenes and tightening his grip on the rural people was maintained. But the political

1Dhikr man tawallā, ff. 114b, 115a; Risāla, f. 14b. These sources describe Ibrahim Agha as the khazinedar of Sulaymān Pasha. Budayrī, f. 2b, states that he was his silāḥdar, a position which he seems to have acquired after his previous one, or in addition to it. If he was the same Ibrahim who was killed later by the Beduin while acting as mutasallim for Sulaymān Pasha, see Budayrī, ff. 7a, 7b, then he was his mamluk as well.

2Budayrī, f. 2b; Ibn Jum’a, 69.
situation in Damascus had undergone by now a deep change which necessitated an equivalent change of policy to keep in step with what was happening. The new thing in Damascus during his present governorship was that the previous balance between the Kapi Kulus and the Yerliyya was destroyed with the dismissal of the former. The Yerliyya corps had emerged victorious after a series of clashes with Husayn Pasha, the Maghariba and then the Kapi Kulus. This encouraged its insubordinate members, the zorab, to assert themselves and to defy the governor publicly.

Three days after his entry to Damascus, Sulayman Pasha put to death 
three insubordinate Beduin. No matter if they had committed crimes inside or outside Damascus, this act might have helped to impress the Damascenes and emphasize his authority. But it failed to drive the lesson a little deeper, partly, as it seems, because they were Beduin and not Damascenes. Nor was it followed by a further move in the same direction within Damascus. In the words of his contemporary chronicler, Sulayman Pasha 'left everything as it was'. This encouraged the insubordinate elements to make headway. Taking advantage of the delay in the arrival of the firman confirming Sulayman Pasha in his governorship, they exhibited much lawlessness until it arrived on 4 Jumada II 1155/6 August 1742. This was a challenge to his authority because nothing was changed in his de facto status, and it was quite natural, after his confirmation, to take action against them. But the way he reacted was remarkable. On 22 Jumada II 1155/24 August 1742 he convoked

1Budayri, 2b; the term he used is salaba (crucified) probably meaning fixed them to poles, see above p. 171 n.1.

2Ibid.

3Ibid., f. 4a.
the religious officials and other dignitaries in a dīwan and produced a Khatti sherīf for the punishment of the zorab. Sixteen of them from the Maydan quarter were struck off the rolls and the Damascenes were exhorted to kill them. To make the dignitaries and the religious officials share with him the responsibility for such an important decision was politically expedient, and consistent, at the same time, with his previous policy of attaching himself to these influential persons. The crucial point, however, is that he did not follow this apparently daring but rather showy decision by a personal initiative to implement it. On the contrary, the decision against the zorab was reversed, also in a dīwan which he convoked before his departure on the pilgrimage in Shawwāl of the same year, in spite of a Khatti Sherīf to have them killed. Whether he was unable to punish them, which is very probable, particularly because such a reversal happened about four months after the first decision, or whether it was intended as a gesture of good will on the eve of his departure which could help also to quieten things in his absence, the important thing was that he temporized and the zorab were appeased.

His further action in expelling from Damascus the remaining members of the dismissed Kapi Kulus, composed mainly of Mawṣils and Bağdādis, who were accused of making trouble, is a proof of the resurgence of the Kapi Kulus which was partly the result of his loose control. Their expulsion must have pleased the Yerliyya because it eliminated a latent enemy of theirs. However, if the insubordinate Yerliyya remained relatively quiescent after that it was because they had other outlets as we shall see.

1Budayrī, f. 4a.  
2Ibid., f. 6b.  
3Ibid., f. 4a.
Such a policy of reconciliation and appeasement by Sulayman Pasha had immediate and future consequences. Because of his leniency and probable acquiescence, speculation in the prices of essential commodities was stepped up. The prices of foodstuffs soared, attaining their maximum in the month of Ramadān, although there was no shortage in supplies.¹ The usual high demand and profiteering in such a month could have been partly responsible for this rise, but not to the degree which astonished the chronicler of the time. However, the rise in prices persisted during his governorship.²

Judged by previous examples such an economic situation provided material for a revolt. But against whom would it be directed and who would lead, or stage, it? Sulayman Pasha was not overtly marked out as responsible because he did not adopt a monopolistic policy. It is not known whether his immense wealth, which was confiscated after his death,³ was, at least, partly collected by illegal dealings. It is incredible that it should not have been so, if only because he had tolerated the high prices to sell his own products. Moreover, his contemporary chronicler implicitly implicated him, in his general statement that the rulers (al-hukkam) were hoarding and the Damascenes were copying their example.⁵ He was also to blame for not taking action against the speculators. His mamluk Ibrāhīm, who acted as his mutasallim, exercised an arbitrary policy and exploited the Damascenes. If he could not, for instance, bring a guilty person to account, he would use the occasion to hold

¹Budayrī, f. 5b.  
²Ibid., ff. 7b, 8a.  
³See below p. 215.  
⁴As‘ad Pasha had recourse to such a practice later, see below p. 233.  
⁵Budayrī, ff. 5a, 7b, 8a.
his relatives as collectively responsible and exact money from them. Although Sulayman Pasha was indirectly responsible for his acts, particularly because he was his mamlik as well, he was not affected. He had other means at his disposal to make up for whatever blame he might have incurred.

Sulayman Pasha ensured the safety of the Pilgrimage from the Beduin. On one occasion it suffered heavily from the floods it encountered. But his action in rescuing the goods of the merchants who accompanied it from the threat of the Beduin earned him much praise. He could still draw credit from his pious works in Damascus and from his abolition of many injustices during his first governorship. Nor had he now deviated from his policy of satisfying the Damascenes. In Jumada I 1156/June–July 1743, he reconstructed the banks of the Qanawa river in Damascus and regularized the rationing of its water among the people concerned – an act which was very much acclaimed.

The organized craftsmen and artisans who would be easier to rally in a revolt were appeased by Sulayman Pasha. He abrogated certain impositions known as shashiyya and mashyakha, probably connected with promotions inside the crafts, as the terms suggest, which were enforced on them, presumably respectively, once or twice a year. The quarters were also relieved of a certain tax known as 'ard which was levied once or twice a year. The militant solidarity of the quarter which had proved decisive in the past must

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1 Budayrī, f. 7a.  
2 Ibid., ff. 76, 80.  
3 See above p. 162.  
4 Budayrī, ff. 8b, 9a.  
5 It seems that the term shashiyya was used in a different sense on other occasions. According to Shihāb, Lubnan, I, 134, a tax of two piastres imposed by Amir Yusuf al-Shihābī in 1197/1782–3 on every adolescent male, was called shashiyya.  
6 Budayrī, f. 10a. It is assumed that the impositions mentioned by the chroni-
have been mitigated by the new measure. We have already seen that Sulayman Pasha associated himself with the religious officials and other dignitaries by convoking them in **divans**. That they were strong and active was apparent when they assembled themselves in a **diwan**, took over **de facto** authority in the city and appointed a deputy for Sulayman Pasha after his **mutasallim**, Ibrahim Agha, was killed by the Beduin.¹

On the occasion of the circumcision of his son, Ahmad, in early Rabī' I 1156/late April 1743², Sulayman Pasha exploited the event to the full and staged public rejoicings which lasted for a fortnight. Damascus was decorated and its streets illuminated. Religious officials, Yerliyya chiefs, and other notables were among the guests he entertained. The poor were particularly favoured also. Sons of some poor families were circumcised on the occasion and were offered clothes, food, and money. Such an act was not the first of its kind. The new thing, however, was the publicity and lavishness exhibited. Perhaps Sulayman Pasha intended to divert the attention of the Damascenes, particularly the poor among them, who suffered most from the high prices.³ Certainly he wanted also to impress the people by emphasizing his growing prestige.

Responsibility for the high prices rested not with a single person but with a wide cross-section of Damascenes who were tolerated and encouraged [cont.,] cler are in the same order and relationship with the organizations affected.

¹Budayrī, ff. 7b, 8a; cf. Murādī, III, 141.
²Ibid., f. 8a; Murādī, I, 166.
³Budayrī, ff. 8a, 8b.
by the inactivity and, probably, the example of the governor. Those who dealt with foodstuffs, such as wheat merchants, millers, bakers and shopkeepers, took advantage of the loose control of the governor and enforced the prices they liked. Some prominent members among the 

Yerliyya benefited from the situation. Several millers were members of the Yerliyya corps. So long as their interests were safe they had no reason to complain, and seem to have restrained the insubordinate members of their corps from causing trouble which could jeopardize their interests.

Only the poor, who suffered most from the high prices, were restless. Their dissatisfaction, if adequately exploited by organized militant groups, could be effective. But such groups were either appeased by the governor or were benefiting from the situation. Hardly had two months elapsed after the previous celebrations staged by Sulayman Pasha, in which the poor were generously favoured when they revolted in protest against the high prices. They attacked the law-court, expelled the judge and looted the bakeries. Although the judge was responsible for inspection and the enforcement of the Sharī'a, he was devoid, at the time, of any practical authority. To revolt against him was in line with previous practice and was illustrative of the spontaneous action of those who revolted and their inability to reckon with more responsible and implicated persons. Sulayman Pasha intervened and ordered the bakers to provide food at reasonable prices. But this was a temporary remedy.

1Budayrī, f. 9a.  
2cf. Ibid., f. 14b.  
3Ibn Kinān, II, f. 117a.  
4Budayrī, f. 9a.
This policy of compromise and appeasement pursued by Sulayman Pasha in Damascus was expedient as far as its short term results were concerned, mainly in keeping things going without major upheavals. In the long run it proved disastrous because the insubordinate elements had been lulled rather than suppressed. The situation played into the hands of Fatih al-Daftari, who profited from the mild rule of Sulayman Pasha. He rallied the dissatisfied and the insubordinate persons to his side, and through their support he asserted his authority in Damascus. Had it not been for the skill of As'ad Pasha in eliminating Fatih later, he could have gained further prestige in Damascus.

The Prominence of Fatih al-Daftari.

The grandfather of Fatih Efendi al-Falaqinsi migrated to Damascus from Falaqins, a village near Hims in central Syria. He stayed in the Qaymariyya quarter and took up the trade of weaving. Members of this family distinguished themselves as officials in the state treasury in Damascus long before Fatih was appointed daftardar. According to Ibn Kinan, Muhammad al-Falaqinsi became daftardar in Damascus sometime in the first quarter of the 18th century. Muhammad's brother, 'Abd al-Mu'ti, was appointed to the office of accountant in the state treasury, and assumed other fiscal duties connected with waqf. He acquired high prestige particularly with the 'Ulama', and in 1112/1701-2 built al-Dahabhiyya bath near the Umayyad Mosque. Thus the stage was set for Fatih, and he mobilized all his efforts and the credit of his family.

1 Muradi, I, 167; Ayyubi, f.5. The branch of trade in which he was engaged was called alalaja, which was an expensive striped Damascene cloth, see Qasimi, I, 39; cf. Gibb and Bowen, I.1. 296 n.3.
to acquire prominence in Damascus.

In 1148/1735-6 Fathi was appointed daftardar of Damascus, and in 1151/1738- he was chosen by Husayn Pasha as his mutasallim. The fact that he was a sharīf seems to have helped in initiating him to the religious public and in gaining him at the beginning the support of the Ashraf who played an important, although not very distinguished, role in Damascus. He exploited this asset to the full and strengthened it by different works. In 1150/1737-8, Fathi reconstructed the two minarets of the Sulaymaniyya Mosque—an act considered by the chronicler Budayrī as the most important of his achievements. In the same year he built a qa'a, probably a hall in his house which he had built in 1141/1728-9. He paved the road leading to Sālihiyya in 1155/1742-3, and this must have won him special religious credit because of the predominantly Sufi aspect of this quarter. He followed this in 1156/1743-4 by reconstruction work in the Umayyad Mosque. In this same year, he built a madrasa in the Qaymariyya quarter, and assigned to it

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1See above p. 165. 2See above p. 176; cf. Ibn Kinan, II, f.80a.
3Most sources mention this. Baytimanī, Diwan, f. 52a, addressed Fathi in one of his poems as, Ya nasl al-nabi (0, descendant of the Prophet).
4Murādī, III, 280; Ayyūbī, f. 245; Sa'īd al-Samman, Diwan, MS. Berlin Cat. 8040, Spr. 1124, f. 34b; Budayrī, f. 18a.
5Samman, f. 41b.
6Aṣmad al-Manīnī, Diwan, MS. Berlin Cat. 8039. We/158, ff. 67a, 103b.
7Budayrī, ff. 4a, 18a. 8See above p.108n.8.
9A. al-Kaywānī, Diwan, Damascus 1301/1883-4, pp. 182, 183, Diwan, MS. Berlin Cat. 8041, 8163, We. (II) 202, f. 66a.
10Murādī, II, 143, III, 280; Ayyūbī, ff. 45, 245; Nasībī, f. 58b.
certain waqfs to provide, inter alia, for the upkeep of students and other residents. He was also in charge of several waqfs. Such works undertaken by Fathī were usually performed by governors. Hardly any daftardar of Damascus did anything comparable. This partly explains the interest and admiration which many Damascenes showed towards Fathī's works. Poets of religious standing dedicated many poems in his praise. The names of Ahmad al-Baytīmānī,5 Ahmad al-Manīnī,6 Abd al-Rahmān al-Bahlūl,7 and Muṣṭafā al-'Alwānī8 are but few examples. By far the most outspoken and devoted among them was Saʿīd al-Samman who was particularly favoured by Fathī. He chose him to act as ʿimām (leader in prayer) and khatīb (orator) in his madrasa. In gratitude Samman compiled the biographies of the literary men, Damascenes and others, who praised Fathī, in a book entitled: al-Rāwḍ al-nafīḥ fīma warada 'alā 'l-Fath min al-mada'īn.9

1Budayrī, f. 18a. 
2Muradī, II, 240. 
3Ibid., III, 280. 
4Ibid. 
5See his dīwān, MS. Berlin Cat. 8039. We (II) 158, ff. 67a, 103b. 
6He was a prominent member of the Yerliyya corps, see Muradī, I, 97-107, Maṭmānī, ff. 72b-73b. 
7Muradī, II, 310, 314. 
8Ibid., IV, 142, 152. 
9See the biography of Saʿīd al-Samman in Muradī, II, 141-149; Ayyūbī, ff. 44, 45; Ḥasibī, f. 58b; see also, Muradī, III, 280; Ayyūbī, f. 245. In the Berlin Collection there exists a shortened MS of this book entitled Mukhtasar al-Rāwḍ al-nafīḥ fīma warada 'alā 'l-Fath al-Falāqīnī min al-mada'īn MS. Berlin Cat. 8027. We (II) 1771 ff. 50-76.
The relation between Fāṭīh and the militant Yerliyya was very strong at the time. The conciliatory policy of Sulaymān Pasha towards the zorab confirmed them in their self-confidence, and they found a powerful protector in Fāṭīh; each serving the interests of the other. It seems that as an expression of this fraternization between Fāṭīh and the Yerliyya, particularly the zorab, the majority of whom lived in the Maydān quarter, he built in 1153/1745-46 a bath in the Mawṣili street in the Maydān which is still extant. He also built a coffee-house in the same quarter.

The prestige which Fāṭīh had acquired made his contemporary chronicler describe him as being 'the Sultan in Damascus'. Probably as a result of this wide popularity, what seems to have been the original form of his name: Fath Allah, sometimes 'Abd al-Fattah, was shortened into Fāṭīh which was easier to handle, particularly in poems, and also as a sign of favouritism. The form al-daftar, from daftardār, does not have special significance because it had already been in use.

Having satisfied the essential power groups among the Damascenes, Fāṭīh seized on the occasion of the marriage of his daughter to his nephew to assert his prestige publicly. Was it a pure coincidence that this event

1Murādī, III, 286, 287.
2See above p. 193; see below p. 219.
3Murādī, III, 280; Budayrī, f. 18a.
5Budayrī, f. 18a.
6Murādī, III, 280.
7Budayrī, f. 10b.
8Murādī, II, 143, 314; Kayânī, Dīwān, MS. Berlin, f. 66a, Dīwān, Damascus, p. 182; Hasībī, f. 58b; Ayyubī, f. 45.
9Baytimâni, f. 52a.
took place in the month of Rabī‘ I 1156, a few days after the celebrations staged by Sulaymān Pasha to mark the circumcision of his son. The timing was remarkable and of no less significance was the lavishness exhibited by Fathī and the programme he arranged. He preceded his celebrations by a talhīla (a Sufi practice) to which he invited the shaykhs of the various turuq. Probably he wanted by this act to dismiss any ill-feeling that might have arisen towards him among members of the tūruq as a result of the association of his name with Husayn Pasha who had earlier banned the talhīla.*

But the immediate aim behind his action was more important. Nearly every aлим in Damascus belonged to one ṭariqa or more, and every one of the latter had a sheikh (head) of its own. It was not necessary that only the shaykhs of the tūruq were invited; but other ṭuğus who were also called shaykhs* might have been entertained as well. The close link between the tūruq and the crafts* must have been very much in the mind of Fathī also.

He followed this by seven days' rejoicings, every day of which was assigned to a group of people. Among those invited, besides the 'Ulama',

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1See above p. 177.

2See for example, Murādī, I, 5; Ayyūbī, f. 86; Ibn Jum‘a, 59.

3Cf. Suwaydī, f. 94b.

4Cf. Budayrī, ff. 7b, 8b, 22a, 39b; Muḥibbī, IV, 145; Suwaydī, ff. 93a, 93b; E. Qudsi, 'Notice sur les corporations de Damas' (in Arabic), published by Carlo Landberg in Actes du VIe Congrès des Orientalistes, Pt. II, Leiden, 1885, pp. 10-14.
the military chiefs and the merchants, were the governor, Sulayman Pasha, Christians and Jews, peasants and, on the last day, prostitutes. Each group was entertained on a separate day. It is no wonder that Sulayman Pasha should have been entertained on the first day. But the remarkable thing is that, by his attendance, he was promoting the standing of Fathi before the people and endorsing his growing prestige. Members of the Christian and Jewish communities seem to have been useful to Fathi as financial and commercial agents. After all, Sulayman Pasha, himself, had invited them before. That the peasants should have been invited, at all, shows the popular aspect of the rejoicings, and perhaps the economic relations between them and Fathi, in spite of the prevailing contempt for them which even he had observed by entertaining them on the penultimate day of the rejoicings. The invitation of prostitutes, strange as it seems, illustrates their growing numbers, and was probably intended to add colour to the occasion. Indeed their presence betrays the character of Fathi. Of more importance, however, was the close link that existed between the prostitutes and the insubordinate persons who were protected by Fathi, and who, one would suppose, were in their company.

Such a close succession of events and the wider cross-section of groups entertained by Fathi if compared with those invited by Sulayman Pasha

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2 Budayri, f. 8a. 3 See above p. 120. 4 See below p. 243.
5 See Muradi, III, 286, 287.
suggest outwardly the growing prominence of Fathi and inwardly his determination to rival the 'Azn. If relations between both were up till now amicable on the surface, it was because they were more apparent than real. Four months later, Fathi publicly asserted his enmity to the 'Azn after Sulayman Pasha's death.

The Policy of Sulayman Pasha outside Damascus.

Sulayman Pasha resumed his policy of strength outside Damascus and exhibited much vigour and determination particularly against Zahir al-‘Umar. However, his campaigns against the latter reached no clear-cut success and eventually ended by his death.

After his appointment to Damascus it took Sulayman Pasha two months to enter the city. During this period he made preparations in the Biqa' to attack the Druzes of Mount Lebanon. Before serious fighting started a compromise was reached between the parties according to which Sulayman Pasha received a large sum of money. Sulayman Pasha might have been responding to an appeal made by his nephew, Ibrahim Pasha, the governor of Sidon at the time, to help him obtain the taxes due from the Druzes. But he was particularly infuriated at the Druzes' attack on the Biqa'. Probably he was

1 See above p. 191.

2 Budayri, f. 2a. The amount is not specified but, according to this chronicler, it was a large sum (mal 'azIm).

3 For a similar appeal by Ibrahim Pasha to Sulayman Pasha see A.N.B 1 1025: Sidon, 10.11.41.

4 The governors of Sidon showed weakness, at the time, in dealing with their vassals, see, A.N.B 1 1025: Sidon, 11.4.40, Sidon, 19.3.40.

5 The Lebanese chronicles are extremely confused as regards the dates and the names of the governors of Damascus. Shidyak, p. 419 mentioned a skirmish between the governor of Damascus and the Shihab amir which corresponds to the (cont.)
encouraged also by a precedent, from his first governorship, when he prepared for an attack against the Druzes and then called it off after he received a considerable amount of money. The analogy between the events is relevant, and so were the similar subsequent steps. As before, the next expedition by Sulayman Pasha was directed against Zahir al-`Umar. This was a resumption of the hostilities that had started earlier, at the end of his first governorship in Damascus. But now the struggle assumed wider dimensions and a more forceful aspect.

Zahir was arousing the anxiety of Sulayman Pasha on two major issues. Firstly, he had become the most militant multazim in the Safad region and was well fortified in the fortress of Tiberias. His brother Sa'd was guarding the second important fortress of Dayr Hanan. Apart from the concern with which Sulayman Pasha had viewed the growing power of Zahir on the periphery of his province, the latter's encroachment on the district of Nablus, which was under the jurisdiction of the governor of Damascus, was a casus belli. Such an act if passed unpunished by Sulayman Pasha would impair his prestige in the dependent parts of his province and help to reinforce the power of Zahir. Also, any toleration of Zahir's aggrandizement would subject the miri revenue to dangerous dislocations, the more so should he occupy further territories in the province of Damascus. Secondly, Zahir was principally answerable to the governor of Sidon by virtue of the territory he held. His

(cont.) right date, 1741, but the name of the governor of Damascus which he gave is erroneous, and the particulars he mentioned are not precise.

1 See above p. 173.  
2 See above p. 174.

3 Budayri, f. 4b; cf. A.N.B 978: Acre, 30.1.49.
4 A. al-Sabbagh, f. 7b; M. al-Sabbagh, 51, 52.
delay in paying the mīrād dues was the responsibility of the latter except in so far as the territory of the province of Damascus was concerned. Moreover, Sulayman Pasha was interested in the affairs of Zahir on two further points. The governor of Sidon in 1741 was Ibrahim Pasha al-‘Azm who was succeeded in the same year by As‘ad Pasha al-‘Azm, both nephews of Sulayman Pasha. In 1742 a certain Ya‘qūb Pasha was appointed to Sidon for the second time, as successor to As‘ad Pasha. But it seems that his term in office did not last long, and he was replaced by Ibrahim Pasha al-‘Azm, who was deposed in 1744. The family link between Sulayman Pasha and his nephews, the governors of Sidon, encouraged them to ask for his help in their struggles with the tax-farmers in their province. The matter was not only a family collaboration. The mīrād revenue collected by the Governor of Sidon was needed to finance the Pilgrimage and the jarda. On this issue the Sultan could not help standing aloof, particularly at this time. The persistent demands by Nadir Shah to have a separate Persian Pilgrimage as a matter of prestige and allegedly to ensure the security of the Persian pilgrims, were still great obstacles in the negotiations that were going on, at the time, between him and the Sultan. The Sultan, himself pressed for money for his military

1 A.N.B 1 1025: Sidon, 10.11.41.
3 Murādi, IV, 237, did not mention this second governorship of Ya‘qūb Pasha (his first was in 1739, cf. A.N.B 1 1026: Sidon) probably because of its short duration.
4 A.N.B 1 1026: Sidon, 25.5.44.
5 A.N.B 1 1025: Sidon, 10.11.41.
6 Ibid.; A.N.B 1 1025: Sidon, 6.2.41.
preparations on the Persian front, \(^1\) could not tolerate any diminution in the local resources of the Pilgrimage, \(^2\) and hence any risks in its operation which might play into the hands of Nadir Shah and further strengthen his cause. Moreover, Zahir was considered a rebel at Istanbul, \(^3\) and a rather dangerous one, near the Pilgrimage route. This prompted the Sultan to issue orders to Sulayman Pasha to suppress him. \(^4\)

On 3 Rajab 1155/3 Sept. 1742, Sulayman Pasha left Damascus at the head of a large army composed mainly of Dalatiyya to attack Zahir al-'Umar in Tiberias. Gunners and sappers dispatched from Istanbul, accompanied him. \(^5\) This was a further proof that the campaign was premeditated and ordered by Istanbul. Sulayman Pasha was helped in the siege of Tiberias by the Druzes \(^6\) because Amir Mulhim was on good terms with the 'Azims at the time. On 30 Nov. 1741 Amir Mulhim paid a friendly visit to As'ad Pasha who was governor of Sidon. \(^7\) The inhabitants of Nablus also helped Sulayman Pasha because they were subjected to the encroachments of Zahir. The deputy-governor (na'ib) of Jerusalem, Khalil Agba, came to the help of Sulayman Pasha. So did the Sakhr and the Saqr Beduin who were on bad terms with Zahir. \(^8\) Such an assortment of forces might look impressive but they lacked cohesion and discipline. The mercenary troops of Sulayman Pasha devastated the neighbouring villages, and this alienated the inhabitants. \(^9\) The commercial activities were inter-

\(^1\) PRO, S.P. 97/31: Istanbul, 8.5.41.  
\(^2\) Cf. A.N.B 1026: Sidon, 19.9.42.  
\(^3\) A.N.B 420: Istanbul, 1.5.43.  
\(^4\) A.N.B 1026: Sidon, 19.9.42.  
\(^5\) Budayri, ff. 4a, 4b.  
\(^6\) Ibid.  
\(^7\) A.N.B 1026: Sidon, 30.1.42, Sidon, 22.12.41 (Extrait des Registres).  
\(^8\) Budayri, ff. 4a, 4b.  
\(^9\) A.N.B 1026: Sidon, 19.9.42.
rupted as a result of these ravages and of the insecurity of the roads.\(^1\) In spite of the fierce attack on Tiberias and its siege on all sides, including that on the lake by boats carried on camels' backs, Zahir offered a staunch resistance and was able to receive smuggled supplies.\(^2\) The siege lasted for about three months, the time of the dawra, after which both sides were interested in bringing it to an end. Sulayman Pasha was due to command the Pilgrimage and Zahir's power was almost exhausted. A compromise was reached between the parties.\(^3\)

On 4 Shawwal/2 Dec. of the same year, the day before Sulayman Pasha arrived in Damascus, he officially announced to the Damascenes the conquest of Tiberias, and celebrations were staged.\(^4\) It was rumoured in Damascus that Zahir's son was taken as hostage.\(^5\)

To say that he had conquered Tiberias was a sheer piece of propaganda to hide his military failure. It is true that Zahir's strength was strained almost to the extreme, but it was to Sulayman Pasha's peace delegation rather than to his armies that Zahir opened the gates of Tiberias.\(^6\) Had Sulayman Pasha really subdued Zahir militarily he would have, at least, dismantled his fortifications, of which action there is no proof. All other sources agree that he did not conquer Zahir militarily.\(^7\) Even Budayri doubted the.

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\(^1\) A.N.B\(^1\) 1026: Sidon, 19.9.42, Sidon, 29.9.42, Sidon, 12.11.42 (dispatch No. 4 under this date), Sidon, 15.3.43.

\(^2\) A.N.B\(^1\) 1026: Sidon, 19.9.42; Budayri, f. 4b.

\(^3\) Budayri, f. 5b.

\(^4\) Ibid.

\(^5\) Ibid., f. 6a.

\(^6\) Ibid., ff. 5b, 6a.

\(^7\) A.N.B\(^1\) 1026: Sidon, 5.1.43; Barik, 11; 'A. al-Sabbagh, f. 8a; cf. Ibn Jum’a, 69; Hasselquist, 158, mentions, perhaps by mistake, the name of the governor of Sidon in place of that of Damascus.
authenticity of the account he gave. Moreover, Sulaymān Pasha had to lead a second expedition, about a year later, to try to subdue Zahir.

In the meantime, Zahir was strengthening himself militarily, and politically. His relations with the local French merchants and officials had been on a purely personal basis until now because generally they were not yet sure of his ability to maintain his position. The trading and religious concerns of the French were at stake. Their relations with the amīr of Mount Lebanon, for example, were amicable and they gave him every assistance possible because they knew that his office was more stable than that of Zahir, and because he was safeguarding their religious and commercial interests. To back Zahir without being sure of his intentions or ability to survive would alienate Sulaymān Pasha who represented established authority and was personally more amenable. During the previous expedition, the French Consul made overtures to Sulaymān Pasha to extend his protection to the French merchants at Acre, and to the Terre-Sainte convents at Nazareth and Mount Carmel. This was accordingly granted by Sulaymān Pasha. The welfare of the religious orders in Damascus necessitated also that the French should be on good terms with the Governor of Damascus. The French, however, were anxious to acquire Zahir's friendship to safeguard their commercial interests. In his search for supporters Zahir approached the French Consul in Sidon who wrote to ask the French ambassador at the Porte to accord Zahir his protection and to obtain for him a firman which would confirm him in his position, and prevent Sulaymān Pasha from attacking him. The ambassador reasoned that the friendship of Sulaymān Pasha was more beneficial for the protection of the religious orders.

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1Budayr, f. 6a.  
2Cf. 'A. al-Qabbāgh, f. 8b.  
3A.N.B1 1026: Sidon, 30.1.42, Sidon, 22.11.42 (Extrait des Registres).  
4Ibid.: Sidon, 19.9.42, Sidon, 26.5.43.  
5Ibid.: Sidon, 12.11.42.
Besides, he could not talk the matter over with the Ottoman officials because of their declared enmity to Zahir and also because certain French merchants were accused of having supplied Zahir with powder and bullets. He counselled, however, that Zahir should keep an agent at the Porte to take care of his interests, and he would help him secretly.

At the start of his second expedition against Zahir, Sulayman Pasha took precautionary measures to safeguard the villages, of Hawran, probably because he was afraid of a possible reprisal by the Zabid Beduin. Apart from the 300 Yerliyya troops whom he asked to join him, he requested the Yerliyya chiefs to deploy what remained of their forces in Hawran to ensure its protection. He also ordered that every village around Damascus should choose ten of its inhabitants, apparently to keep watch with the Yerliyya and probably to guard against their insubordination. This would also serve as an outlet to the Yerliyya and could be regarded as a further precaution against their possible insubordination in Damascus in his absence.

The second expedition against Zahir differed from the first both in scope and tactics. The governors of Sidon and Tripoli and the deputy-governors of Jerusalem, Gaza, Ramle and Irbid were ordered by the Sultan to join Sulayman Pasha. He set out to conquer the fortress of Dayr Hanna which was defended by Zahir's brother, Sa'd. Such a plan of attacking the less important strongholds of the Ziyadina, if successfully carried out, would cut off the supplies of Tiberias, and exert a psychological pressure, as well, on its defenders. However, the sudden death of Sulayman Pasha in the village of Lubia, near Tiberias, around 4 Rajab 1156/25 August 1743, though its causes remain, brought relief to Zahir.

1 A.N.B 420; Istanbul, 1.5.43. 2 Budayri, f. 9b; 7a. 3 Ibid., ff. 9a, 9b. 4 Ibn Jum’a, 69; A. al-Sabbagh, f. 9a; cf. al-Qari, 78. 5 Budayri, f. 10a; Muradi, III, 134; M. al-Sabbagh, 62, 63; Barak, 11.
The events that ensued in Damascus after the death of Sulayman Pasha confirmed the weakness of his policy of appeasement and portended the difficulties which his successor would encounter. Shortly after his death the Yerliyya arose and killed some members of the Dalātiyya. The situation played also into the hands of Fathi al-Daftari al-Daftari. He assumed de facto authority, sequestrated the property of Sulayman Pasha and arrested his sulhādār (sword-bearer), his khazīnedār (treasurer) who was his cousin, and his wakīl al-kharj (superintendent of expenditure), together with their retinue, pending the arrival of an order from the Sultan who was duly informed by Fathi. The fact that Fathî acted "authoritatively" on his own initiative illustrates his latent enmity to Sulayman Pasha and his bid for political power. If he was expecting to be appointed governor, then he was twice disappointed, firstly, because another governor was appointed and, secondly, because this governor was a nephew of the late Sulayman Pasha. In spite of this, Fathi spared no time and efforts to make the most he could of the new situation.

The Governorship of As'ad Pasha al-‘Azm.

On 14 Sha‘ban 1156/3 Oct. 1743, it was learned in Damascus that As'ad Pasha was appointed as governor. 2 ‘Ali Agha, the mutasallim of his predecessor, acted for him in the meantime. 3 On Sunday 24 Sha‘ban, As'ad Pasha entered Damascus. 4

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1 Budayrī, f. 10a.
2 Ibid., erroneously gave the name of the month as Ramadān.
3 Ibid; Dhikr mān tawallā, f. 115a; Risāla, f. 14b.
4 Ibn Jum'ā, 69. This date was preferred to that given by Budayrī, f. 10b, as Saturday 25 Sha‘ban because Sunday coincides with 24 Sha‘ban.
As'ad Pasha was thirty nine years old at the time. He started his administrative career as mutasallim for his father, Isma'il Pasha, in Ma'arra and Hamah. Towards the end of 1741 he succeeded his brother, Ibrāhīm Pasha, in Sidon, and remained in this office until about the beginning of March 1742, during which time his rule was generally acclaimed. Shortly afterwards, he was appointed governor of Hamah. Through money and the help of Bakr Pasha, ex-governor of Jedda, he was granted the malikan of Hamah as his own. It seems that partly through the intercession of this very influential person who was a son-in-law of the Sultan, As'ad Pasha was appointed to Damascus.

There was nothing at the time to discredit the 'Azm governors at Istanbul. There was also no radical change in the administration in Istanbul such as happened after the revolution of 1730 and as a result of which the 'Azm were eclipsed albeit temporarily. As'ad Pasha disposed of the principal means of obtaining governorship, namely, money and strong backing. Furthermore, he had experience in the affairs of the Pilgrimage having commanded the jarda in 1153/1740-1. Given the safety which his uncle had ensured for the Pilgrimage and his own experience, As'ad Pasha would then be expected to maintain a similar record.

The appointment of As'ad Pasha to Damascus was the only instance of two 'Azm governors succeeding each other in Damascus. Such an event had previously occurred in Tripoli and Sidon. But it acquired an added importance, in this case, because As'ad Pasha's rule lasted, without interruption, for about fourteen years - a unique example in the history of Ottoman Damascus.

We may note three phases in the governorship of As'ad Pasha:

1 Tabbakh, III, 334.  2 A.N.B 1025: Sidon, 10.11.41; cf. Tabbakh, III, 334.
3 A.N.B 1026: Sidon, 7.3.42.  4 Tabbakh, III, 334.  5 Hammer, XV, 10.
6 Tabbakh, III, 335.  7 See the list of the Ottoman Governors of Damascus in Wulat Dimashq.
1. The dominance of the Yerliyya and Fatḥū al-Daftārī, 1156-8/1743-5.

Asʿad Pasha's attitude in Damascus during this period was characterized by passivism and inactivity. In fact he could not do otherwise at this stage because the forces he encountered were strong and also because he had other more urgent duties, at the time. On 5 Ṯаmādīn/23 October, ten days after his entry to Damascus, he left for the dawra. Far from resuming the past policy of Sulaymān Pasha in bringing Zāhir to heel, Asʿad Pasha reached an accommodation with him through the intercession of Fatḥū al-Daftārī. This was the first sign of his future policy of 'peaceful co-existence' with Zāhir. His determination to secure his position in Damascus, during these trying days, might have worked towards this reconciliation, but it does not follow that when his former aim was achieved his attitude towards Zāhir was reversed.¹

Already before his entry to Damascus, the Yerliyya exhibited much insubordination and clashed with the Dalātiyya. The absence of Asʿad Pasha on the dawra played into their hands. Under Fatḥū's protection and perhaps encouragement, their lawlessness surged unabated.² The intolerable state of insecurity which resulted and the intimidation caused by certain followers of Fatḥū to some highly respected 'Ulama', urged the plaintiffs to act.

In the second half of Ramadān 1156/first half of Nov. 1743, a certain Laʾfāga, attached to Fatḥū, insulted 'Alī Efendi al-'Ajlānī, Naqīb al-Āshraf,³ and Sayyid 'Alī Efendi al-Murādī, father of the biographer Khalīl al-Murādī and a prominent person in Damascus (raʾīs),⁴ and threatened them with a firearm.⁵ On 25 Ramadān/12 Nov., the Ashraf demonstrated against Fatḥū and the shops closed. The notables assembled themselves in a dīwān and issued a

¹See below p. 255.  
²Murādī, III, 230, 236.  
³Ibid., III, 207.  
⁴Ibid.  
⁵Budayrī, f. 11a.
fatwa authorizing the killing of La‘faṣa who took refuge in the house of Muṣṭafā Agha b. Khudāri, a chorbajī in the Yerliyya corps, in the Maydān. Undeterred, La‘faṣa finally fired on ‘Allī Efendi al-Murādī. This daring act prompted the notables to reckon directly with Fathī who protected La‘faṣa. Together with certain Ottoman officials such as the qurra emīnī and the Baltajīa who were in Damascus at the time, they assembled in the law-court in the presence of the judge and drafted an appeal to the Sultan against Fathī and his followers. Although they changed their minds the next day, the mere fact that they assembled in protest against Fathī was remarkable. By this act, they were able to pin the responsibility overtly on Fathī and his proteges. A sharp line was thus drawn between the insubordinate elements, Yerliyya and otherwise, with Fathī at their head, and the notables of Damascus. As‘ad Pasha was still not directly implicated because these things happened in his absence. It was to his disadvantage that attitudes should thus have crystallized.

On 7 Shawwāl 1156/24 Nov. 1743, three days after his return from the dawra, As‘ad Pasha convoked the notables in a diwan and fixed the prices of wheat and bread. Although this proved to be a temporary and an ineffective solution, it gained him much credit in Damascus. On 15 Shawwāl he left for the Pilgrimage. In his absence two developments occurred in Damascus. The price of wheat went up again and this sharpened the complaint of the populace.

1See above p. 60.
2See above p. 105.
3Budayrī, f. 11a.
4Ibid., f. 11b.
Stricken by plague, at the same time, the exacerbated poor arose and stoned the law-court. On 23 Shawwal, a week after the departure of As'ad Pasha, a salakht (courier) arrived from Istanbul with orders to confiscate the property of Sulayman Pasha al-‘Azm. By threat and imprisonment, the places where the money was hoarded were known. Immense amounts of money, valuables and wheat were confiscated, not to mention what had already been expropriated by Fatih. The Damascenes who had suffered from high prices under Sulayman Pasha, came to know now, rightly or wrongly, where their money had finally gone. The Sultan sent further orders to tighten the measures taken against the family of Sulayman Pasha and against his retinue. More wealth was confiscated and a lot of injustices were committed in the operation.

On the return of As'ad Pasha, he convoked a diwan which was attended by the Sultan's official who carried out the confiscation. The latter produced the firman by which he was authorized to do so, and As'ad Pasha did nothing. After his purpose was served, the Sultan pardoned those implicated. What remained of the estate of Sulayman Pasha was sold to As'ad Pasha.

The confiscation of Sulayman Pasha's property would cause no surprise, even if there were nothing in his record to necessitate or justify it. This

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1 Ibid., ff. 11b, 12b. The plague which spread in Damascus appeared also in the Syrian coast and in Aleppo, see, A.N.B 1026: Sidon, 25.5.44; Radcliffe papers, 6645/5: Aleppo, 16.4.43, Aleppo, 24.5.43, 6645/3: Aleppo, 2.4.44. It was also reported in Istanbul at the same time, see PRO, S.F. 97/32: Istanbul, 12.8.44.

2 This is a corruption of the Turkish term Silihun, see Gibb and Bowen, I.i. 87 n.5.

3 Budayri, ff. 12a, 12b.

4 Ibid., ff. 13a, 13b.

5 Ibid., f. 13b.
was a well-known practice in the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan was hard
pressed for money to provide for his wars with Persia and for his other
expenses. In Istanbul he was confiscating at random. Wealth and old age
in a candidate for an office were welcomed. But the impact of this confis-
cation on the Damascenes who saw in it an insult to As‘ad Pasha was far-
reaching.

The Ottoman official left Damascus for Istanbul unmolested by As‘ad
Pasha to the surprise of the Damascenes. Nor did As‘ad Pasha make any move
against Fathi, who was considered to be behind this affair. At the end of
Jumada II 1157/9 August 1749 Fathi was ordered by the Sultan to leave for
Istanbul. His absence provided an opportunity for the notables of Damascus
to make a second appeal against him. But its outcome was no better than the
first. This was probably because some of the notables either panicked or
were attached to Fathi; one such was the well-known Sa‘id al-Sammān, who,
with his friends, might have sabotaged the resolution from within. How­
ever, those who were staunch opponents of Fathi did send a protest against
him. The Sultan, it is alleged, wanted to kill Fathi because of his mis­
deeds in Damascus. In fact, he thought he had killed him when he put to
death another man who was introduced to him as Fathi. If this story is un­
true, it still reflects the importance attached to Fathi in Damascus where
it was rife. If it is true, as is probable, it shows an expedient policy of

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1 PRO, S.P. 97/32: Istanbul, 12.8.43, Istanbul, 7.9.43, Istanbul, 27.12.43,
2 Hammer, XV, 75, 76. 3 Budayrī, ff. 13b, 14a.
6 Budayrī, f. 14a.
dispensing with a person after he had served his purpose or at least a considerable part of it. Of more importance, however, were the means through which Fathi had extricated himself. Apart from the use of money, his attachment to the powerful Kizlar Agha, Bashir, enabled him to return safely to Damascus.  

The victorious return of Fathi gave an impetus to lawlessness. He started by taking vengeance on those who pleaded against him. His proteges were openly insubordinate. They used, for instance, to go to the prison and set free whom they liked without being molested. Although this was in utter disregard of As'ad Pasha's authority, they went even further by intimidating him personally. The Damascenes were alarmed at the indifference of As'ad Pasha, whose attitude encouraged the zarab, and they nicknamed him Sa'diyva kadin.  

So far As'ad Pasha did not interfere effectively because the powers he encountered were not easy to curb. His prestige was greatly diminished not for what he had done but for what he was unable to do. The hate towards Fathi and his lawless followers was a potential asset if he tried to exploit it. Many notables had openly declared their enmity to Fathi, though they lacked decisiveness and unanimity. The Damascene poor who were the hard core of the mob were restless at the increase in prices. Their discontent if

1 Muradi, III, 287; see above p. 157.  
2 Muradi, III, 287; Budayri, f. 14a.  
3 Muradi, III, 287.  
4 For this state of affairs, see ibid; Budayri, ff. 14a, 16a; kadin is a Turkish term which means woman. The change of As'ad's name into the feminine form, Sa'diyva, is a further insult.
they could be adequately recruited and an enemy marked for them, might well be decisive.

If non-interference by As'ad Pasha was dictated so far by necessity, he seems to have changed it now into a useful policy. He needed, should he decide to act, to whip up the hate of the mob not so much directly against Fathi, who was still strong, as to create through them a feeling of crisis which would facilitate the implementation of his pending plans. He permitted tension to heighten and worked to discredit any other possible saviour except himself. When the demonstrators came to him protesting against the increase in food prices, he sent them to the judge. The latter, taught by experience to guard against such recurrent events, ordered his guards to fire at the demonstrators. Many casualties occurred on both sides and the judge fled. Later on, he was recompensed by the notables and reinstated in the law-court. His successor entered Damascus escorted by armed followers - 'an unprecedented act' in the words of his contemporary chronicler. The rising proved abortive and the prices were still high. The exacerbation of the populace reached a high pitch and they had no other to pin their hopes on but As'ad Pasha. It was then that he decided to put his plans into action.

2. The Victory of As'ad Pasha over his opponents, 1159/1746.

As'ad Pasha started first with the suppression of the zorab who dominated the Yerliyya corps and were the backbone of Fathi's power. Orders to this effect were obtained from Istanbul. Through his private troops, the

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1 Budayri, f. 15a.  
2 Ibid., f. 14b.  
3 Muradi, III, 287.
Dalatiyya, numbering about four hundred, he occupied the citadel, which was in the hands of the Yerliyya, on 22 Safar 1159/17 March 1746. Their main power, however, was centered in the two quarters of Suq Saruja and the Maydan, which were outside the gates of the city. The Yerliyya alerted their forces and assembled in Bab al Jabiya which leads to the Maydan. As'ad Pasha deceived them by attacking the other less important and, now, less guarded quarter of Suq Saruja. His artillery stormed it, burning its houses and opening them to the ravages of his troops. Ahmad al-Qaltaqji and 'Abd Allah b. Hamza, the prominent Yerliyya chiefs of this quarter, managed to escape. After pacifying it, the troops of As'ad Pasha prepared to attack the second and more important stronghold, the Maydan quarter. There, Mustafa Agha b. Khudari, with the rank of chorbaji, was the leader of the zorab. He went to the extent of calling himself Sultan al-Sham. Other prominent chiefs of the zorab were Ahmad Agha and Khalil Agha described as awlad al-Durzi. The successful attack on Suq Saruja shocked the Yerliyya as much as it encouraged As'ad Pasha. When he ordered that the guns be directed against the Maydan, its chiefs fled without putting up any resistance. The troops then destroyed and looted about five hundred houses.

Having pacified the strongholds of the Yerliyya, As'ad Pasha started the suppression of the insubordinate enclaves in other quarters. He threatened the shaykhs and imams of these quarters with financial penalties if they failed to co-operate in the arrest of these persons. Through their help many were seized and put to death. Their mutilated bodies were exhibited in

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1 Budayri, f. 15b. They might have been Druzes because Budayri on another occasion, f. 24a, used the expression, awlad al-Durzi, in referring to the Druzes.

2 Budayri, f. 15b; al-Qari, 79.
front of the governor's headquarters. ¹

Five members of the house of Ḥasan al-Turkomānī were killed - 'the worst calamity to hit a single family'. ² This also marked the military eclipse of this family whose members, relatives, and dependents comprised, at one time, about one fourth of the Yerliyya corps. ³ Those who fled took refuge with the neighbouring rulers and used their territories as bases for the attack on Damascus. Awlād al-Durzī, Ahmad Agha and Khalīl Agha, with their followers took refuge with the Kulayb Beduin. ⁴ 'Abd Allāh b. Ḥamza and his followers went to Zahir al-‘Umar, and Ahmad al-Qalṭaqī and his followers sought asylum with the Druzes of Mount Lebanon. ⁵ Because the Yerliyya lived in quarters and had family connections, many innocent persons were killed or suffered in one way or another as a result. This did not, however, detract from the satisfaction and relief felt by the majority of the Damascenes at the restoration of order. ⁶ As‘ad Pasha exploited this victory to the full. The city was illuminated and the guns kept firing twice daily for two months as a sign of joy. ⁷ The Sultan bestowed on As‘ad Pasha much honour. ⁸ His brother Sa‘d al-Dīn Pasha was raised to the rank of wazīr at this time, ⁹ and was appointed shortly afterwards governor of Tripoli. ¹⁰

¹ For more details about these events see: Budayrī, ff. 15a-16a; al-Qārī, ⁷⁹; cf. Murādī, II, 63, III, 287, IV, 178.
² Budayrī, f. 16a. ³ Murādī, II, 63.
⁴ See above p. ⁴⁰. ⁵ Budayrī, f. 17a.
⁶ Ibid., f. 16b; Kaywānī, Dīnār, Damascus, 1301/1883-4, pp. 172-3.
⁷ Budayrī, f. 16a. ⁸ Ibid., ff. 16a, 16b.
⁹ Ibid., f. 16b; cf. Tābbākh, III, 392.
¹⁰ Budayrī, f. 19a; A.N.B. ¹ⅡⅫ8: Tripoli, 10.10.46; see below p. ⁶Ⅱ.
To guard against any resurgence of the insubordinate Yerliyya and perhaps also as a gesture of loyalty to the Sultan, As'ad Pasha asked for and was granted the dispatch of an orta of Kapi Kulus. Thus these troops were reinstated in Damascus after they had been dismissed from it during the governorship of 'Uthman Pasha al-Muhassil.  

So far Fathi al-Daftari had weathered many attempts aimed at dislodging him. On 15 Jumada II, 1159/5 July, 1746, he was finally put to death by As'ad Pasha. The suppression of the zorab crippled his local support in Damascus. At the same time he lost his strong protector at Istanbul, the Kizlar Agha, Bashir. The latter's death on 1 Jumada I, 1159/22 May, 1746 and the struggle of the Grand Vezir to regain his power made it difficult for Fathi to accommodate himself to this change in so short a time. Furthermore, he found a personal enemy in the Grand Vezir Hasan Pasha, a relative of whose, Ahmad Agha, had been appointed agha of the Yerliyya in Damascus and had eventually been expelled through the efforts of Fathi. Hasan Pasha confirmed the Sultan in his suspicions already aroused by As'ad Pasha against Fathi. With the collaboration of Khalil al-Bakri al-Siddiqi and other notables, As'ad Pasha informed the Sultan of the injustices committed by Fathi. The role played by Khalil al-Bakri al-Siddiqi who was appointed judge of Jerusalem in 1158/1745-46 and happened to be in Damascus at the time, is remarkable. It is in line with his previous attitude when, as mufti of Damascus, he

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1 See above p.68n.5  
2 See above p.187.  
3 Muradi, III, 287; Budayri, f. 14a.  
5 Muradi, III, 287.  
6 Ibid, II, 84.
led the Damascenes against the 'awāniyya of Abu Tawī. The Sultan seems also to have been tempted by the pledge of As'ad Pasha who guaranteed to pay him one thousand purses from the fortune of Fathi should he be killed. Fathi's body was mutilated and dragged in the streets for three days. Members of his family were humiliated and their wealth was confiscated. His retinue were either killed or managed to escape.

After the elimination of Fathi, the office of daftardar lapsed into political insignificance. His successor Muḥammad Efendi b. Raja, known as Ibn Farrūkh, remained daftardar of Damascus for thirty successive years. His long term in office could be partly explained by his abstention from active politics.

3. The Aftermath of Victory 1159-1170/1746-1757.

This phase of As'ad Pasha's governorship was characterized by major developments both within Damascus and in the neighbouring regions. The power vacuum created after the suppression of the gorab and the execution of Fathi was partly filled by the reinstated Kapi Kulus, partly by the increasing number of private troops, and above all by the much enhanced authority of As'ad Pasha. Such a situation, in which many power groups existed, necessitated a political ability in the governor to keep things under control. As'ad Pasha did not lack such a quality and was able to keep a balance among these

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1. See above p. 112.
3. Ibid., I, 163; II, 220, 221; Ayyūbī, ff. 199, 200.
5. Murādi, IV, 38; cf. Budayrī, f. 19a; see above p. 46.
groups. Having destroyed the local checks on his power, he enforced an economic policy aimed mainly at augmenting his own wealth. Since the military initiative was taken from the hands of the Damascene Yerliyya no matter how insubordinate some of their members had been, the Damascenes were subjected now to the insubordination of alien troops. The social conditions and the security of Damascus were deeply affected as a result.

The new shape of the power groups in Damascus.

Far from being resigned to their fate, the fugitive zorab were making plans to infiltrate into Damascus and take revenge on their enemies. To avert this danger at a time when many troops were occupied outside Damascus with the Pilgrimage, Mūsā Kāhā, the mutasallim, re-employed at the end of 1159/1746 the dismissed 'Abd Allāh al-Turk, an agha of the Dalātiyya, and increased his troops. Being cavalry,¹ the Dalātiyya were entrusted with keeping watch around the city to forestall any attack by the zorab. The Filfengu­jīs (musketeers) with Māḥmūd Agha al-Baghdādī as their chief patrolled the suburbs of Damascus.² It seems that some Yerliyya in Damascus were either encouraged by the manoeuvres of their expelled colleagues and tried to assert their power, or that they were considered potential enemies whose presence could not be tolerated. On his return from the Pilgrimage Asʿad Pasha put to death two of their members, 'Alī b. al-Ḥaddād (or al-Ḥadīd) and 'Alī 'Anbar.³

The Dalātiyya who were called on to preserve the law against the zorab

¹ See above p. 70.
² Budayrī, f. 19b; cf. Barīk, 15.
³ Budayrī, f. 20a.
proved no less insubordinate. They devastated the villages and committed many atrocities which made the people protest to As'ad Pasha against them. Although he was authorized by Istanbul to have them annihilated, all he did was to fix a three-days' time limit for their corrupt members to leave Damascus. By not specifying these members but merely asking them for a self-imposed scrutiny of behaviour which might well end with their death, As'ad Pasha seems to have been not so much interested in suppressing the Dalatiyya as in placating the plaintiffs by a threat which he was unable and perhaps unwilling to implement. A few days later the Dalatiyya publicly appeared unmolested. However, an outlet for their insubordination was provided by As'ad Pasha's campaigns against the Druzes. The inefficiency they exhibited in the fighting and the inability of As'ad Pasha to get rid of them peacefully, made him resort to the employment of the Maghariba to balance them. Thus, As'ad Pasha reinstated the Maghariba in Damascus after they had been expelled by the Damascenes during the governorship of Husayn Pasha. The reaction of the Damascenes towards the re-employment of the Maghariba was one of indifference, partly perhaps because they felt that their presence would neutralize that of the Dalatiyya who were getting out of control, and partly also because the chief opponents of the Maghariba, the Yerliyya, were tamed.

After the purge that took place in the ranks of the Yerliyya, they became more docile as a whole and the governor relied on them in his campaigns. In his expedition against the Druzes in Jumada I, 1160/May-June

1Budayri, f. 20a.
2See below pp. 247ff.
3Budayri, ff. 21b, 24a.
4See above p. 180.
1747, they accompanied As‘ad Pasha together with other recruits such as the Sipahis and some levies from the villages. The presence of the Yerliyya on the expedition is remarkable. Theoretically their duty was to guard the fortresses along the Pilgrimage route. It seems that with the increase in their insubordination they became reluctant to take part in the expeditions of the governors as they used to in emergencies. As‘ad Pasha rightly described them when they accompanied him on the expedition as volunteers. He praised their dedication and gallantry in the fighting, in contrast to the Dalātiyya and in spite of what they had suffered at his hands.

The authority of the agha of the Yerliyya was enhanced as a result of the suppression of the zorab and it seems that it contributed also to the docility of this corps. In 1157/1744-5 Darwish b. ‘Abd Allah was appointed agha of the Yerliyya. He was on good terms with As‘ad Pasha and the notables of Damascus, particularly al-Sayyid ‘Ali Efendi al-Murādī, whose wife was his niece. The fact that Darwish Agha had survived the suppression of the zorab shows that he had approved of it. No matter how much say he had in the affairs of the corps after this event, his self-assertion was only temporary.

The return of the Kapi Kulus was by far the greatest single factor that kept the Yerliyya in check. Their presence, on the other hand, and the challenge they offered to the Yerliyya, crystallized the latter’s enmity towards them and accelerated their revival. The Kapi Kulus reoccupied the strategic positions in Damascus, i.e. the citadel and the gates. Their agha was in-

1 See below p. 248.  
3 Budyarī, f. 21b.  
4 Murādī, II, 107, 108, 111.
structed by As'ad Pasha not to permit any Damascene to enrol in his corps. By keeping the Kapi Kulus immune from such penetration, they would remain a distinct alien group, more effective in balancing the Damascene Yerliyya, provided they did not join the crafts as their predecessors had done. This, however, would make rivalry between the Kapi Kulus and the Damascenes more acute. The ban on the Damascenes joining them seems to have been strictly adhered to by the Kapi Kulus themselves who did not want local recruits to share with them their privileges. On one occasion they revolted because a person, presumably a Damascene, enrolled in their corps, and it was only after he was dismissed and the responsible oda bashi deposed that they calmed down.

If the presence of the Kapi Kulus was intended to balance the Yerliyya, they went further than ensuring this. They became the dominant party and their power was still in the ascendant. But they were not unchallenged. Naturally enough, the inefficient challenge they encountered from less powerful groups enhanced their prestige still further.

The Ashraf came now to assume part of the role of the Yerliyya in antagonizing the Kapi Kulus, incapable though they proved to be. When the Yerliyya were trying to assert their supremacy during the first quarter of the 18th century, they concerted action with the Ashraf. With the dominance of the Yerliyya later, the Ashraf were no more needed as supporters. However, the Ashraf did not become inactive, but were merely overshadowed. While there was no sharp dividing line between the Yerliyya and the Ashraf, in the sense that they were Damascenes and many members of each group appertained to the other, a distinct organization existed, however, for each group. The Ashraf

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1Budayrī, f. 16b.  
2cf. Ibid. f. 29a.  
3Chief of the barrack-room, see Gibb & Bowen, I.i.319.  
4Budayrī, f. 42a.  
5See above p. 136.
had a Ṽaqīb, special privileges and certain other distinctive features.¹
Certainly their organization was looser than that of the Yerliyya but it
nevertheless existed. Disturbed security encouraged local groupings of var-
ious kinds and degrees, such as quarters, crafts, military corps and religious
organizations, each of them defending the rights of its members. Because of
the common denominator most of these groups shared, i.e. local origin and in-
terests, they very often concerted action, as happened in the fight against Ḥusayn Pasha.²

When the Yerliyya corps became dominated by its insubordinate members,
particularly at the time of Fathī al-Daftari, the Ashraf rose as a group
against the zorab who insulted some of their members; but their action
proved abortive.³ With the disciplining of the Yerliyya under Asʿad Pasha,
the Ashraf came to the fore. So far their military power was untried in-
dependently. When they assumed responsibility to oppose the Kapi Kulus,
they proved a poor substitute for the Yerliyya.

At the end of Jumāda II 1161/26 June 1748 the first in a series of
clashes took place between the Ashraf and the Kapi Kulus. A šarīf was test-
ing a firearm which he had bought from another šarīf in al-khandaq, probably
the moat of the citadel,⁴ at a spot near enough to awaken the ağa of the
Kapi Kulus from his sleep. Both were arrested, beaten and intimidated, which
upset Ṽaqīb al-Ashraf. The next day the Ashraf assembled and attacked the
Kapi Kulus. In the fighting three Ṽarīf were killed and many injured. The

¹ See above p. 80. ² See above p. 178.
³ See above p. 213.
⁴ Cf. J. Sauvaget, 'La Citadelle de Damas', Syria, XI (1930), pp. 59-90, 216-241, see p. 64. Around the walls of the city there was also a moat, see, J. Sauvaget, 'Esquisse', p. 471.
shops closed and As'ad Pasha called for a dīwan which decreed the payment of an indemnity by the Kapi Kulus. For the agha of the Yerliyya to punish the two ashrāf might be explained by his alarm at the violation of order. But to do so because he was awakened shows his growing self-assertion and contempt even of these respected persons. The forceful retaliation of the Ashraf, as a whole, to avenge their fellow-members instead of appealing to the governor to take action, is illustrative of their self-confidence and determination to take things into their own hands. The fact that they were forcefully rebuffed demonstrates their inability to stand up to the Kapi Kulus. This was a victory for the latter and led to further trouble in the future. A shārif who took part in the previous fighting, Sayyid Muhammad b. al-Dahbān, was killed, later, by the Kapi Kulus. Having been worsted in the previous battle the Ashraf appealed to As'ad Pasha to take action. He asked for witnesses but no one dared to turn up because of the fear of antagonizing 'some 5,000 malicious persons'. This figure, given by the chronicler, might not represent the real number of the Kapi Kulus because it was used in the context of justifying the reluctance of the witnesses to testify against these strong troops. But the point of comparison was certainly relevant in that the Kapi Kulus were having the upper hand.

The attitude of As'ad Pasha during these events was one of reconciliation, aimed chiefly at appeasing the Kapi Kulus. In fact he went to the extent of making the 'Ulama and other notables acknowledge their superiority in a dīwan which he convoked for this purpose. Further events worked also

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1Budayrī, ff. 24b, 25a.
2Ibid., f. 25a.
3Ibid., ff. 25a, 25b.
in favour of the Kapi Kulus. Around the end of Shawwal 1161/second half of October 1748, the expelled zorab infiltrated into the Maydan seeking vengeance on their enemies. At their head was Ahmed al-Qal'aqji, and they were accompanied by a group of Druzes estimated at 60 persons from the Talh"uqs. The Talh"uqs gave asylum to some of the fugitive zorab and were interested in the fighting because some Druzes, captured by As'ad Pasha during an expedition against them, were still under arrest in Damascus. The mutasallim, Musa Kahya, led a force composed of Kapi Kulus, Dalatiyya and Tifengjis to combat them. He ordered the religious officials to declare them khawarij (schismatics), and to call for volunteers to support him. For three days the zorab and the Druzes had the upper hand, and the troops of the mutasallim suffered many casualties. It was only after he brought reinforcements from the villages and the Sakhr Beduin that he was able to defeat them. Some of the invaders were killed and the majority managed to escape. The inhabitants of the Maydan and its southern extremity, the Qubaybat, of Bab Mugalla and Suwayqa, which were outside the gates, suffered heavily in the fighting, particularly from the ravages of the mutasallim's troops. Fearing further disorders, these inhabitants moved inside the gates. Although the Kapi Kulus and the other private troops were unable at the beginning to stand up to the challenge, they emerged victorious in the end. On the testimony of the Kapi Kulus, many persons accused of aiding the invaders were put to death. The occasion was used by the mutasallim to purge suspected persons and by the Damascenes to settle personal enmities. It was apparent, nevertheless, that the zorab enjoyed a strong support particularly among their fellow-members in the Maydan.

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1 See below p. 250.
government officials, such as Isma‘īl Agha b. al-Shawīgh who was a sabashi in certain villages around Damascus, were accused of helping them and consequently imprisoned. This was the first and last attempt by the expelled zarab to cause serious trouble in Damascus during the governorship of As‘ad Pasha. Their members were either arrested and later put to death by the governor, or were pardoned by him. Some were killed by Zahir al-‘Umar who was anxious at the time to improve his relations with the Ottoman authorities. He sent their severed heads to the Governor of Sidon who in turn forwarded them to Istanbul with a request that the territory of Tiberias, which was under the control of Zahir, be excluded from the da‘ura.

The crimes which the Kapi Kulus continued to commit in Damascus passed unpunished or punished according to circumstances. Their antagonism to the Ashraf was by no means mitigated, and the Kapi Kulus went on molesting, even killing the Ashraf. At the end of Jumada II 1164/25 May 1751, the Kapi Kulus were reinforced by the arrival of an orta, at the demand of As‘ad Pasha. Fellow members, Dalatiyya and Tufenqis went out to welcome the new-comers. They entered in a magnificent procession which surpassed that of the Pilgrimage. The absence of the Yerliyya from this ceremony was in line with

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1 For a detailed account of the fighting see, Budayrī, ff. 26b-28a.
2 Ibid., ff 29a, 29b, 31b.
3 Ibid., ff. 30a, 35b.
4 Ibid., f. 30a; it is not known if Tiberias, which was a component part of the sanjaq of Safad and, as such, under the jurisdiction of the governor of Sidon, was at the time under the jurisdiction of the governor of Damascus, Cf. A.N.B 428: Istanbul, 16.10.49 (translation of a letter sent by the Grand Vezir to As‘ad Pasha). It might be that Zahir was referring to those territories in the province of Damascus which were near Tiberias and under his control.
5 Budayrī, f. 29a.
6 Ibid., ff. 32a, 36b.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., f. 37b.
their enmity to the Kāpi Kulus, and further illustrates their isolation.

The Ashraf became less self-assertive after the reinforcement of their enemies. As'ad Pasha put to death Sayyid Ḥasan who was shaykh šabāb (chief youth) of Bāb Muṣallā, for an unknown reason, without any retaliation on the part of the Ashraf. The authority of As'ad Pasha was so well established by then that he could act against any dissident member belonging to any group without being affected.

The Profiteering Policy of As'ad Pasha.

With the consolidation of his power, As'ad Pasha embarked on a policy aimed chiefly at enriching himself. The attitude of the Damascenes towards profiteering by the governors differed according to the methods used by these governors in enforcing such policies. Some governors, such as Abu Tawq and Ḥusayn Pasha, alienated the effective power groups, were revolted against and eventually deposed. Others, like Isma'īl Pasha al-'Azm, tried to win certain groups to their side and through their help or acquiescence carried out their extortions. The policy of As'ad Pasha in this respect differed from the monopolistic policy of his father in that it was less obvious and more flexible. It was at the same time more enterprising and daring than that of his uncle Sulaymān Pasha. The political situation in Damascus, which was mainly shaped and controlled by As'ad Pasha, facilitated the implementation of his policy.

The rise in prices between 1156/1743-4 and 1159/1746-7, the period in which As'ad Pasha was not the actual master of the situation, could be blamed on the continuation of former practices. That such a state of affairs subsisted after 1159 A.H. Budayrī, f. 41a.
when As‘ad Pasha was the effective ruler was to a large extent his immediate responsibility.

Except for the excessive spread of locusts in the Damascus region including Ḥawrān between Jumādā I 1159/May–June 1747 and Jumādā II 1160/June–July 1748 no natural calamity took place to account for the constant increase in prices. Two attempts were made to suppress the locusts. The first was of a superstitious nature sponsored by the Ṣūfīs, and its only effects were to increase the excitement of the people and encourage complacency among them. An old belief subsisted that if a certain kind of water was brought from a spring, between Iṣfahān and Shīrāz, it would attract a special kind of bird called Samarmār which would devour the locusts. On 12 Rajab 1159/31 July 1747 this water was brought to Damascus amid the rejoicings of the ṭūrūq followers, and was fixed in as high places as the minarets of mosques to attract the samarmār. Other Ṣūfī practices such as the dawsa (a Ṣūfī shaykh riding a horse and treading over the bodies of Ṣūfīs who believed they would thus obtain his blessing) and visits to shrines were no more effective. The only measure that was practical and had some chance of success, if judged by the standards of the time, was the enforcement by As‘ad Pasha on every village of a special quota of locusts to be collected by its inhabitants.

1Budayrī, f. 16b. 2Ibid., f. 21a.

3Murādī, III, 214; cf. A.N.B. Aleppo, 21.5.29, this source gives the place of the water as near Ankara in Anatolia. On the superstitious aspects of the Samarmār water, its ineffectiveness and its exploitation later by the Bektashī darwishes to exact money see, K. al-Ṣhadī, III, 261, 262.

4Budayrī, f. 18b. 5Ibid., ff. 20b, 21a.
The amounts gathered and buried in the ground were immense but could hardly eliminate all the existing locusts.\(^1\)

The danger caused by the locusts was of a passing nature and does not seem to have been very grave.\(^2\) The real and permanent causes behind the increasing rise in prices were due to the neglect of what the chronicler called the rulers, (al hukkam)\(^3\), who benefited economically from the situation in cooperation with other speculators. As'ad Pasha tolerated the high prices in order to sell his abundant supplies of wheat accruing from his malikene of Hamah.\(^4\) He allied himself with the chief of the millers (shaykh al-tahhâna), and enforced prices that were beneficial to both.\(^5\) On one occasion, in Jumâda II 1162/May-June 1749, As'ad Pasha personally intervened to prevent a reduction in the price of bread after the harvest, which was demanded by the populace.\(^6\) As'ad Pasha and his entourage were openly accused by the Damascenes of profiteering.\(^7\) Those who exploited the situation to enrich themselves included merchants and other prominent persons such as the muftî, Hamid Efendi al-'Imâdî, who was accused of hoarding wheat to benefit from the rise in prices.\(^8\) Other notables, who were not implicated, kept silent about what was happening.\(^9\)

\(^1\) Budayrî, ff. 20a, 20b. \(^2\) Ibid., f. 16b.

\(^3\) Ibid., f. 13b, cf. f. 22a. \(^4\) See above p. 212.

\(^5\) Budayrî, f. 22a. For the practice of hoarding wheat by the millers which resulted in an increase in prices see, Ibn Kinan, II, f. 117a.

\(^6\) Budayrî, ff. 29b, 30a. \(^7\) Ibid., f. 44a.

\(^8\) Ibid., f. 36a. \(^9\) Ibid., f. 29b.

\(^10\) Ibid., ff. 38b, 40a.
The poor tried to revolt but were violently suppressed. Those who revolted were tortured, and some were put to death.\textsuperscript{1} Certain measures were taken, however, to mitigate the harsh effects of the high prices. One of these was the debasement of the currency.\textsuperscript{2} Such a measure seems to have created temporary relief,\textsuperscript{3} but its effects in the long run were disastrous because the prices, in the absence of any effective check, tended to rise as a result.

A more beneficial, though less durable,\textsuperscript{4} measure for combatting speculation was to fix the prices of commodities. About two months after his appointment to Damascus, As'ad Pasha summoned a dīwān which fixed the prices of wheat and bread.\textsuperscript{5} This was at a time when he needed to appease and impress the inhabitants while establishing his position. But he was not consistent in enforcing this price control because it was not in his economic interest to do so, and also because this would alienate the merchants and other vested interests with whom he cooperated. On another occasion, in Shawwal 1165/August-September 1752, his mutasallim, Ahmad Agha, applied this means once more. Some merchants whose interests were damaged as a result resorted to hoarding. Charcoal disappeared from the market and only the strong such as the Kapīj-Kulūs and the Dalāṭiyya had access to it.\textsuperscript{6}

The flourishing trade of Damascus during this period helped in relieving the general economic situation of the Damascenes, although it played into

\textsuperscript{1}Budayrī, f. 22a.  
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., cf. ff. 24b, 35a, 41a.  
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., f. 41a.  
\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., f. 11b.  
\textsuperscript{5}Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., f. 40b.
the hands largely of merchants and business men. The Pilgrimage was a great factor in promoting commercial activity in Damascus, and a wide cross-section of its inhabitants usually benefited from it. Of more importance were the growing trade relations of Damascus both with the French merchants in the province of Sidon, and to a lesser extent with Baghdad.

The French merchants, as we have already seen, were forbidden by their authorities to reside in Damascus. Fear of political upheavals and reprisals against the French for acts for which they had no responsibility was still a major impediment. The absence of French merchants and of a consul from Damascus did not affect, however, the continuity of commercial relations between the French and the Damascenes.

The growth in the silk and cotton manufactures of Damascus caused heavy demand for the spun cotton of Sidon and its dependent parts to an extent that decreased the French supplies. From Beirut, Damascus was provisioned with the silk of Mount Lebanon, particularly al-Shuf. On the other hand, Damascus was the principal centre for the consumption of French goods. These were sold in it either directly on behalf of the French merchants, through their local agents, or by the native merchants.

The continuous decline of English trade in Aleppo played into the hands of the French and benefited Damascus as well. The recurrent Ottoman-Persian

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1Budayri, f. 38a.  
2See above p. 184.  
3A. N. B. 1 978: Acre, 30.1.49; A. N. B. 1 1026: Sidon, 2.1.45; A. N. B. 1 1031 (Sidon) Jaffa, 3.4.56, Sidon, 11.5.56, Sidon, 2.7.56, Sidon, 9.8.56; Masson, 517,518.  
4A. N. B. 1 1026: Sidon, 12.11.42.  
5A. N. B. 1 432: Istanbul, 15.11.53; cf. A. N. B. 1 1030: Sidon, 13.4.53; Masson, 519.  
6A. N. B. 1 1029: Sidon, 6.12.52; A. N. B. 1 978: Acre, 30.1.49.  
7See letters written to Hanna Marun, French agent in Damascus, A. N. B. 1 1030: Sidon, 27.3.53, Sidon, 30.3.53, Sidon, 31.3.53.  
8A. N. B. 1 1029: Sidon, 6.12.52.  
9Pro. S. P. 97/34: Istanbul, 22.2.49.
wars blocked the way of English commerce to the markets of Persia. Even after
the declaration of peace between the Ottomans and Nadir Shah in late 1746, English trade still suffered from other impediments. The internal anarchy in Persia after the death of Nadir Shah in 1747 hindered trade relations. Insecurity of roads between Aleppo and its port, Alexandretta, arbitrary measures exercised by the powerful governors of Baghdad against English trade, chronic lack of cash, and the growing rivalry of the native merchants who traded with Baghdad and Basra, besides the usual competition of French cloth in quality and design, were major obstacles.

French trade, on the other hand, endured the strain caused by the English blockade to its ships during the war of the Austrian succession (1740-8). This did not, however, seriously affect trade in southern Syria. After the treaty of peace, French commercial activity was in full sway once more.

Damascus benefited from this activity and by implication from the decline of Aleppo. Caravans carrying local and French goods from Damascus to Baghdad and bringing back mainly Indian products continued their progress undeterred by the attacks of the Bedouin along the desert route. Chief among these were the Ḍanāz Bedouin who were roaming in the Syrian desert and threatening the safety of the Pilgrimage. The French planned also to send their trade to Aleppo via Damascus.

1 Radcliffe papers, 6645/6: Aleppo, 25.8.43, 6645/5: Aleppo, 17.11.43, Aleppo, 20.1.44.
4 A.N.B 84: Aleppo, 14.2.43; A.N.B 85: Aleppo, 24.5.47, Aleppo, 19.11.48; Masson, 522; Charles-Roux, 70-3.
5 Radcliffe papers, 6645/3: Aleppo, 21.4.44, 6645/5: Aleppo, 3.11.42, Aleppo, 25.6.39, Aleppo, 1.11.49, Aleppo, 17.1.50, Aleppo, 6.7.51, Aleppo, 16.5.53; Masson, 521.
6 Radcliffe papers, 6645/5: Aleppo, 8.6.44, Aleppo, 24.8.44, Aleppo, 18.3.45, Aleppo, 1.11.48; Charles-Roux, 57, 58.
7 Radcliffe papers, 6645/5: Aleppo, 17.1.50, Aleppo, 24.3.50.
8 A.N.B 1030: Sidon, 24.6.53; M. Niebuhr, II, 179; The desert route to India, ed. by Douglas Carruthers, London, 1929, p. 34; Budayrī, f. 9b.
9 Niebuhr, II, 179.
10 A.N.B 1030: Sidon, 1.7.53.
This growing commercial activity in Damascus was probably responsible for the establishment by As'ad Pasha in 1166/1752-3 of his famous khan\(^1\) in the Bzūriyya place near his residence. It took him one year to build,\(^2\) and by its fine architecture it stands unique among its kind in Damascus.\(^3\)

The wealth of As'ad Pasha swelled enormously after the penal confiscations he enacted against his enemies both inside and outside Damascus, and also as a result of his speculation in the market. Immediately after the suppression of the zorab, and the elimination of Fathī al-Daftarī, As'ad Pasha transformed most of his property into waqf\(^4\) to the benefit of his children and grand-children. The waqf act was properly registered in the law-court on 21 Rajab 1159/9 August 1746.\(^5\) The confiscation by the Sultan of his uncle's property, at the start of his governorship, seems to have served as an ominous example to As'ad Pasha. The step he had taken was certainly the best means to ensure that his property would remain in his family.

At intervals, later, As'ad Pasha gave further proof of his accumulating wealth. In 1162/1748-9 he bought houses, orchards and wheat mills.\(^6\) The acquisition of the mills seems to have enabled him to tighten his control over the prices of bread, and this explains, among other things, his cooperation with the chief of the millers.\(^7\)

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\(^1\)See above p. 163n.8.

\(^2\)Budayrī, ff. 41b, 42b.

\(^3\)Ibid.; Barīk 18; N. al-Qasatī, al-Rawda al-ghana' fī Dimashq al-fay'a, Beirut 1879, p. 110.

\(^4\)It means family foundation and is different from al-waqf al-khayrī which is a foundation for public benefit.

\(^5\)Budayrī, ff. 18b, 19a.

\(^6\)Ibid., f. 29b.

\(^7\)Ibid., f. 22a.
In 1163/1749-50, As'ad Pasha started building his famous palace. The site he chose was in the traditional centre of Damascus near the Umayyad Mosque. On the same spot once stood part of the temple of Jupiter, and, after, a palace which seems to have been dār al-dhahab, built by the Mamluk governor, Tenkiz. It was alleged also that the palace of the Umayyad Caliph, Mu'āwiya, was built on the same site. The palace was built in two stages. During the first stage, the haramlik (family residence) was completed in one year. The second stage, begun in 1164/1750-1 and probably finished in the same year, was described as an enlargement on the first, and seems to have been concerned with the building of the section reserved for public life, known as the salamlik. As'ad Pasha mobilized all the useful resources and skills available in Damascus and elsewhere for this purpose. Architecturally the palace embodied the various features of Damascene art at the time. During the French mandate it was bought by the French who made it the centre of the Institut Français d'Archéologie et d'Art Musulmans. It has been made recently a museum.

The poetical verses inscribed on various parts of the palace contained

1The local chroniclers called it dār, bayt, both meaning house, or a sarāyā (officially the headquarters of the governor), probably in the sense that it was as large and esteemed as the headquarters of a governor. The building was commonly known, later, by Orientalists and local writers alike as a qaṣr (palace), although it does not fit into the western concept of the term.


3Budayri, f. 32b; cf. Maḥibbī, IV, 172.

4Budayri, f. 35a; cf. Murādī, Matmah, f. 151b. 5Budayri, f. 37b.

6For a detailed description of its building see: Budayri, ff. 32b-34a, 37b.


8Sauvaget and de Laurey, 447.

9Ibid., p. 444; Maʾlūf, 'Qaṣr As'ad Bāshā', al-Mashriq, 24 (1926), pp. 15-6.
many a wish for the continued rule of As'ad Pasha. The degree of its splendour was certainly out of all proportion to any other family residence of any governor in Ottoman Syria, except perhaps for the residence of Amīr Baghār II in Bteiddin, Lebanon, which was anyway in a different category. It represented the zenith at which As'ad Pasha's prestige had arrived.

It seems that the cost of this building - the wages of the workers alone are estimated at 400 purses - did not greatly reduce the wealth of As'ad Pasha. The same year in which he enlarged his palace, he bought more property consisting of orchards in the suburbs, and of a whole suq (market) in the centre of Damascus for the building of his khan, already referred to. In 1162/1748-9 As'ad Pasha reconstructed the upper rooms in the school which was built by his father, Isma'īl Pasha, in Suq al-Khayyātīn, regularized the reading of the Qur'an in it, arranged for its expenses, and built a mosque to the south of it. On 11 Shawwal 1165/22 August 1752, he made a waqf act by which he dedicated several works, dealing with jurisprudence, hadith and other related subjects to the use of the school. In 1163/1749-50, As'ad Pasha showed interest in the well-being of the Umayyad Mosque and gave instructions for its decoration. The year 1165/1751-2 witnessed an unusual building activity by As'ad Pasha, mainly of a religious nature. He ordered the repair of the road leading to the Maydān, between Bāb Muğalla and Bāb Allāh, which was used by the pilgrims on their way to the Holy Cities. This would also facilitate the dispatch of troops to the Maydān, the subdued stronghold of the Yerliyya, should any disorders warrant their presence. Furthermore, food supplies and other commodities from Jawrān and the south

1See above p. 172.  
2Budayrī, f. 31a.  
3Kitāb waqf As'ad Bāghā al-'Agm, ed. by S. Munajjid, Damascus, 1953, p. 25.  
4Budayrī, f. 34a.  
5Ibid., f. 39b.
be more easily carried to Damascus. As‘ad Pasha built also a large edifice around the shrine of Sayyida Zaynab – an act which was very much acclaimed particularly by members of the ṭurūq who used to visit the place on various occasions. In the same year, he enlarged the bridge of al-Kiswa, a suburban village. Two years later, in 1167/1753-4, he reconstructed a mosque opposite to the Ḥuzayzātiyya coffee-house. The year after, he redecorated the Umayyad Mosque and assigned waqfīs for its upkeep. At the same time he ordered a wealthy man from his entourage to pay for the repairs of the Yaghūshiyā Mosque in Damascus.

The public works of As‘ad Pasha were not confined to Damascus. When he was governor of Ḥamāh he built there a large khan. A government residence in it was attributed to him, as well as other khans in Ma‘arra and Khan Shaykhūn both on the main road between Aleppo and Ḥamāh. This building activity by As‘ad Pasha was a salient feature of his rule. It was, however, in line with similar activities performed by other governors, ‘Azm and otherwise. But the long duration of his rule – about fourteen years – enabled him to contribute more than the others, and the refinement of his establishments focused attention on his works.

It is significant that most of As‘ad Pasha’s public works in Damascus took place after the building of his palace. This seems to have been more than a mere coincidence and remains insufficiently explained in the general

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1Budayrī, f. 40a.  
2Ibid., f. 20b.  
4Budayrī, f. 43a.  
5Ibid., f. 44a.  
6Ibid., f. 45a.  
7Suwaydī, f. 80a.  
8Na‘īlūf, ‘Qasr As‘ad Pasha al-‘Azm’, p. 7; Suwaydī, f. 79a, mentions that (cont.)
context of a building activity by As'ad Pasha during this period. Certainly his wealth had very much increased by then, and it enabled him to provide for these various projects, religious and otherwise. After seven years rule, rarely achieved before, he seems to have felt a comforting security in office which made him build his palace and what followed it. The large amount of money he spent on the building of his palace, the many requisitions and confiscations he made, and the damage caused to many inhabitants as a result, brought him much discredit. Also, such a tangible proof of wealth confirmed the poor in their suspicion that As'ad Pasha was really benefiting from the rise in prices. Perhaps to erase any such ill-feeling and to balance his private establishments by others of a more public nature, As'ad Pasha started his pious works immediately after his palace was finished. This by no means implies that had he not built his palace, these works would not have been constructed. Other governors, particularly 'Azsms, constructed similar works. But the timing and sequence of the works of As'ad Pasha suggest that he was primarily interested in emphasizing his prestige and appeasing the Damascenes. In fact his pious works won him much support particularly among the 'Ulama'.

With regard to the Pilgrimage As'ad Pasha could also claim much credit. He commanded it fourteen times, and it suffered no major attacks except in 1165-6/1752-3. The only other dangers it encountered were caused by natural factors such as excessive heat, floods, or lack of water. For its further

(cont.) the khan he saw in Ma'arra on 15 Ramadan 1157/22 October 1744 was built by Murad Chelebi, according to an inscription on the door. It might be that As'ad Pasha built a khan in it, later.

1 Budayrī, f. 41a.  
2 Ibid., f. 45b.  
3 Ibid., ff. 24b, 35b.  
4 Ibid., f. 44b.
safeguard and the convenience of the pilgrims, he built a fortress in al-
Mada'in on the Pilgrimage route, where none existed before. Even his sup-
pression of the zorab won him religious credit. As'ad Pasha was, furthermore, on good terms with the religious dignitaries. Nothing is more illus-
trative of this than the attitude of Khalīl al-Bakrī al-Ṣiddīqī, who was
appointed to the office of judge in Damascus in 1165/1751-2. Although he
had formerly championed the cause of the Damascenes against exploitation,
he did not now make any effort to stop exploitation and profiteering, prob-
ably because of the big names and vested interests involved. His attitude
ran contrary to the expectations of many Damascenes who were delighted at
his appointment thinking it would bring strict inspection and cause many
changes. Others, probably benefiting from the prevailing situation, were
upset, lest he would live up to his past career in dismantling corruption.
It may be said in general that As'ad Pasha encountered no strong opposition
to his policy of profiteering thanks to the power he displayed, the policy
of religious appeasement he practised, and the commercial activity from
which the Damascenes benefited.

Social Conditions and Public Security in Damascus.
The strengthening of the alien troops enabled As'ad Pasha to keep the
Damascene power groups in check and to enforce a policy aimed at enriching
himself. So far as these objectives are concerned he was successful. But

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1 al-Qari, 79; see below Appendix II, p.411.
2 Budayrī, f. 16b.
3 Cf. Ibid., ff. 34a, 39a.
4 Murādī, II, 84.
5 See above pp. 112, 221.
6 Budayrī, ff. 38b, 39a.
the danger of this policy was that these troops, in the absence of effective restraints, became insubordinate.¹

There was a very close relation between the increase in disorderly behaviour, and the growing dominance of the troops in Damascus. When the zorab had the upper hand prostitutes increased in number and began to appear publicly. One of them went to the extent of insulting the judge, on one occasion. This drove the judge to act against them, and in Muharram 1157/ Feb.-March 1744 he concerted action with the mufti and others, and forced the prostitutes either to flee the city or to go into hiding. The one who insulted him was put to death.² Such a measure drove them underground and failed to eradicate the deeper evils on which prostitution prospered, namely the insubordinate soldiery. Shortly afterwards they appeared openly. 'Abd Allah al-Suwaydī, who stayed in Damascus between 22 Sha'ban and 20 Shawwal 1157/30 Sept. and 26 Nov. 1744, was extremely surprised at the large number and bold attitude of the prostitutes who appeared in the company of lawless persons and broke the rules of Ramadān. During this time the prostitutes used to assemble near the Qonliyya Mosque.³

With the suppression of the zorab, the Dalātiyya figured in the company of the prostitutes.⁴ The latter went to the extent of organizing a public ceremony on one occasion without being molested by the authorities.⁵ When As'ad Pasha was approached by the notables of Damascus to put an end to the problem of the prostitutes either through restricting their residence

¹Budayrī, ff. 19b, 20a, 26a, 37b, 43a. ²Ibid., ff. 12b, 13a. ³Suwaydī, f. 94b. ⁴Budayrī, f. 21a. ⁵Ibid., f. 25b.
or having them deported, he replied rather piously that he would not do anything of the sort lest they curse him. While his proclaimed reason is difficult to believe, it seems that he was rather anxious not to antagonize his troops who enjoyed their company. Another reason was apparent in the attitude of his mutasallim who instead of implementing a decision he had taken for their expulsion, found it more profitable and expedient to tolerate their presence and tax them.

If widespread lawlessness caused concern on the part of many Damascenes, others more directly involved either committed suicide because they were frustrated, or killed the violaters, or were killed while defending their honour. Although such an abnormal upsurge in moral corruption was very remarkable, refined pleasures, on the other hand, were not lacking. A Jewish musical band came from Aleppo to Damascus and played in the coffee-houses. The coffee-houses seem to have been much in demand and, in one year only, 1169/1755-56, three such places were opened.

Thefts and murders, even suicides, were as much the result of the fluid security conditions as of the deteriorating economic situation of the lower classes. Mosques and religious shrines were not spared by thieves, and many valuables were stolen from them. Other persons pressed by rising debts preferred to commit suicide rather than resort to these unlawful means.

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1 Budayri, f. 29b.  
2 Ibid., f. 31a.  
3 Ibid., f. 11b.  
4 Ibid., f. 36a.  
5 Ibid., f. 34b.  
6 Ibid., f. 21b; see above p. 132.  
7 Ibid., f. 45a.  
8 Cf. Ibid., ff. 11b, 31a.  
9 Ibid., ff. 40a, 41b.
The growing number of prostitutes may also be ascribed to economic need, among other things. The fact that the majority of these crimes and thefts passed unpunished helped to increase their number and encouraged many persons to settle accounts with their enemies. Between 21 and 25 Ramadān 1161/14 and 18 Sept. 1748, for example, three persons were murdered in different places in Damascus, and in one case only was the murderer arrested.²

The attitude of the governor was to act when he deemed it necessary or profitable to do so. When the Kābi Kulus were newly reinstated, As‘ād Pasha was in need of their support, and he therefore tried not to alienate them.³ Later, when his authority was well established he was no longer compelled to ignore the crimes of the Kābi Kulus, particularly against the Ashraf.⁴ If the culprits did not belong to a powerful group, and the governor deemed it necessary or profitable to have them put to death, he did so, although their crimes, mainly thefts, were not comparable to others he let pass unpunished.⁵ When the alien troops quarrelled with each other, As‘ād Pasha kept aloof, probably because these struggles would weaken his political enemies and eventually enhance his authority, or for fear of being embroiled in them, which would gain him the enmity of at least one party.⁶

The role played by Mūsā Kāḥya⁷ who acted as mutasallim for As‘ād Pasha

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1. Budayrī, ff. 25b, 39a, 40a, 42a, 43b, 44a.
2. Ibid., f. 26b, cf. f. 42a.
3. Cf. Ibid., f. 25a.
4. Ibid., ff. 32a, 32b.
5. Ibid., f. 31b.
6. Ibid., f. 44a, cf. ff. 34b, 35a.
7. Because of the ambiguity in the account by Budayrī on the identity of Mūsā Kāḥya, a few remarks need to be made here. It seems that there did exist two persons, who worked for As‘ād Pasha and other ‘Azm governors before him, each of whom was called Mūsā Kāḥya. The one who died in 1164/1751 (Budayrī, f. 37a) was buried in the cemetery of Bāb al-Šaghrīr, and there is no evidence that he died after a fight. The one who died in 1170/1757, and with whom we are concerned here, was buried in the cemetery of Sīdī Khammar, Budayrī, f. 45b; Murādi, II, 61. The statement by al-Qārī, 80, that this Mūsā was buried in Bāb al-Šaghrīr seems to have been due to a
deserves special mention here because of the stringent measures he took to ensure security. Until 1159/1746-7, by which time As‘ad Pasha had suppressed the zorab, Müsä Kayha did not play a prominent role, partly perhaps because As‘ad Pasha’s fortune was at stake and the initiative was his. When As‘ad Pasha established his authority, Müsä Kahya had more say in the affairs of Damascus. During the periods when he deputized for the governor, Müsä Kahya exhibited much vigour in suppressing the lawless persons. In 1163/1750, he imposed a night curfew in Damascus and made inspection tours in the city — an unprecedented measure — in the words of his contemporary chronicler. When As‘ad Pasha was on the Pilgrimage in 1160-1/1747-8, Müsä Kahya released certain Druze prisoners on the orders of the Sultan after As‘ad Pasha had defied more than once similar orders. In all these measures Müsä Kahya proved to be more radical than As‘ad Pasha. But like him, he made no effort to check profiteering. Indeed he encouraged it. On one occasion he raised the prices of foodstuffs after they had decreased because he was bribed by those interested in keeping prices high.

The measures which Müsä Kahya took reveal the seriousness of the deteriorating security, as well as illustrate his ability to respond to it effectively. The volume of his actions was out of all proportion to the short duration and temporary nature of his rule. No other mutasallim during the period under study attained such a stature.

The policy of As‘ad Pasha outside Damascus.

There were three power groups with which As‘ad Pasha had to deal outside Damascus. These were: the amirs of Mount Lebanon, Zahir al-‘Umar, and the Beduin in the Hawran and along the Pilgrimage route.

(cont.) mistake arising from the similarity in their names, which confused al Qari writing about a century late. The violent death of the second Musa is confirmed by various sources, see below p. 277.

1 Budayri, ff. 31a, 31b, 34b; see above p. 277.  2 Budayri, f. 34b.
3 Ibid., f. 24a.  4 Ibid., f. 22a.
In the period between 1156 and 1159 A.H, when As'ad Pasha was busy consolidating his power within Damascus, these power groups were free from his military intervention. On one occasion only, in 1158/1745, he was ordered by the Sultan, together with the governor of Tripoli, to join 'Uthman al-Muhasil, governor of Sidon, in an expedition against Amīr Mulhim, who was accused of arrears in the miri dues. After a brief raid on the Druze country, a settlement was reached whereby the arrears were to be paid. Some sons of certain Druze notables seem to have been taken by As'ad Pasha to Damascus as security for the payment. It seems also that this settlement brought about a change in the government of Ba'libak which was under the jurisdiction of the governor of Damascus. Amīr Mulhim was in charge of its tax-farm, and he appointed his brothers, Amīr Ahmad and Amīr Mansur, to govern it jointly. During the campaign, As'ad Pasha dismissed the amirs from Ba'libak and appointed Amīr Haydar al-Parfush, a member of the old dominant Matawila family of the region, who sided with him, as its governor. Amīr Mulhim was able, later, in the absence of As'ad Pasha on the Pilgrimage, to dismiss Amīr Haydar and to appoint the latter's brother, Amīr Husayn, who was on his side, as governor of Ba'libak.

The powerful position which As'ad Pasha acquired in Damascus after 1159/1746-7 enabled him to devote more attention to external problems. The

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1 A certain 'Ali Pasha was appointed to Sidon around May 1744, see A.N.B 1026: Sidon, 25.5.44. Around July 1745 'Uthman Pasha, most probably al-Muhasil (cf. Shihab, Lubnan, I, 39 and Muradi, III, 159) was appointed to Sidon, see A.N.B 1026: Sidon, 24.7.45.

2 A.N.B 1026: Sidon, 22.10.45.

3 Budayra, f. 22b.

4 Shidyaq, 421.422; Shihab, Lubnan, I, 34, 35; Nuzha, MS. Paris, ff. 37a, 37b; Shihab, Nuzha, MS. Camb. ff. 18b, 19a. The Lebanese chroniclers are very confused and misleading in their accounts as regards the course of events, the dates and particularly the names of the 'Azn governors. Nevertheless, some information may be accepted after comparison with other accounts.
initiative in the previous expedition was apparently not his, but the course of the fighting enabled him to gauge the power of the Druzes, and the prospects of victory were encouraging. Moreover, the expedition created further complications which embroiled him with the Druzes. His first action after the suppression of the zorab was to dispatch a strong contingent of troops to Baalbek, at the end of Rabì‘ II 1159/May 1746, to kill Amīr Ḫusayn al-Ḥarfūsh. The latter managed to escape but other persons were brought to account. It seems that the Druzes retaliated against this attack and the previous one by attacking certain regions in the Bīqa‘ which were under the jurisdiction of the governor of Damascus. The refuge of some of the fugitive zorab into the Druze country and their continued threats to Damascus, which eventually ended in its invasion with the help of the Druzes, further worsened the relations between the parties. It is no wonder, therefore, that the bulk of As‘ad Pasha’s military operations were directed against the Druzes.

On 16 Jumāḍā I 1160/26 May 1747 As‘ad Pasha left Damascus to attack the Druzes. Although the declared reason for the campaign was the Druze raids in the Bīqa‘, its occurrence at the time of harvest seems to have been more than a mere coincidence. Militarily it is advantageous to destroy the supplies of the enemy. But if we link the timing of the expedition with the sending of wheat and other products confiscated from the Druzes to Damascus and their sale at high prices, it may be concluded that the time of the campaign was not so much accidental as it was calculated for profiteering purposes. Muḥammad Pasha, governor of Sidon, tried to mediate and counselled As‘ad Pasha to spare the villages from the ravages of his troops, but in vain.

1 Budayrī, f. 16a.  
2 Ibid., f. 22b.  
3 Ibid., ff. 19a, 19b.
4 See above p. 229.  
5 Budayrī, ff. 21a-23a.
Pasha dealt a heavy blow to the Druzes. But far from subduing them, the ravages and devastations of his troops brought about a counter attack by the Druzes.

The mediation rather than the assistance of the governor of Sidon gave As'ad Pasha the opportunity to ask the Sultan to appoint a brother of his, Mustafa Pasha al-'Azm, as governor of Tripoli. As'ad Pasha's pretext was that this appointment would enable him to tighten his grip over the Druzes. But his demand was not granted.

Shortly afterwards, in Rajab 1160/July-August 1747 the Druzes retaliated by attacking and ravaging a number of villages in the Bīqa'. Ba'labak which seems to have had as governor Amir Jaydar al-Harfūsh, who was on the side of As'ad Pasha, was besieged by the Druzes. On 7 Shawwal/14 August of this year As'ad Pasha ordered his troops to march against the Druzes. Again, the Druzes were defeated and several of them were taken prisoners.

Around the end of 1160/Nov.-Dec. 1747, Musa Kāhya, the mutasallim, released the Druze prisoners by the order of the Sultan. It seems that this gesture had the adverse effect of being considered by the Druzes as a victory. Around the middle of 1161/1748 they attacked and looted the important village of al-Zabadānī which was near Damascus. This was a mere rehearsal for the next direct attack by some Druzes, in alliance with the zorab, on Damascus itself. There is no reason to believe that all these attacks by the Druzes were engineered by the Amir of Mount Lebanon, or that they had the approval of the whole community. In the last attack, for example, only the Talḥūqs who gave refuge to some zorab joined them in the fighting.

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1Budayrī, f. 23a.  
2Ibid., ff. 23a, 23b.  
3Ibid., ff. 23b, 24a, 26a.  
4See above p. 229.  
5Budayrī, f. 26b.
attackers alleged that their aim was to secure the release of certain imprisoned Druzes\(^1\) who were either captured in the previous attack on al-Zabadānī or were not released previously with their colleagues. This might be true of the Talḫūqs, but the zorab had other accounts to settle. Furthermore the Talḫūqs might have been prompted to cooperate with the zorab in accordance with tribal tradition because they were their hosts. It could be also that the territory of the Talḫūqs, the Upper Gharb, suffered most from the incursions of the Damascene troops in the previous campaigns.

The Lebanese chroniclers report a rift between Amir Mulḥim and the Talḫūqs and 'Abd al-Maliks\(^2\) because they protected some of the zorab like Ahmad al-Qalṭaqjī and his friends, and concerted action with them in the attack on Damascus. On the demand of the governor of Damascus, Amir Mulḥim ordered these two families to expel the zorab and, on their refusal, he attacked their villages and drove them out altogether.\(^3\) If this was true it shows that Amir Mulḥim did not back the Druze attack on Damascus. That the governor of Damascus asked Amir Mulḥim to expel the zorab rather than attack them himself, and that Amir Mulḥim went further than that by expelling their hosts as well, may show the desire of both sides for cooperation,

\(^1\) Budayrī, f. 27a.

\(^2\) It is to be noted that the district of al-Jurd which was governed by the 'Abd al-Maliks bordered on the Upper Gharb, the district of the Talḫūqs, and this may have contributed, among other things, to their joint action in protecting the zorab, see Shidyāq, 27, 28, 206. Moreover, the two families belonged to the Yazbaki faction (for this faction see below p. 254), Shidyāq, 18 and 183. In fact some Lebanese chroniclers mention that the zorab took refuge with the Yazbakiyya, see Munayyir, al-Mashriq, 48 (1954), 679.

\(^3\) Shidyāq, 203, 423; Nuzha, MS. Paris, ff. 37b, 38a; Shibāb Nuzha, MS. Camb. ff. 19b, 20a; Tā‘rīkh Jabal al-Durūz, MS. Berlin, ff. 7b, 8a; Dibs, VII, 375.
or at least for the cessation of hostilities. The opposite may be true, moreover, in that the governor of Damascus had made his demand to Amīr Mulḥīm to embarrass him and to use that as a pretext for an all-out attack on him. But the fact remains that Amīr Mulḥīm tried to be on good terms with Asʿad Pasha.

Until the end of the governorship of Asʿad Pasha no major clashes took place between him and the Shihābs. Several factors contributed to this relative calm. It is true that the affairs of Baʿḻbak, which embroiled the in struggles earlier, had remained unsettled, but they developed now into squabbles of local nature between ins and outs of the Ḩarfūsh family. 1 Asʿad Pasha had demonstrated his strength against the Druze and they against him in different proportions but with no clear-cut victory for either. After 1163/1749-50, he became more interested in augmenting his prestige in Damascus and in building his various establishments. The Beduin in Hawrān and the neighbouring regions were becoming more insubordinate, and Asʿad Pasha had to send punitive expeditions against them. His desire to have his brother Muṣṭafā - another brother, Saʿad al-Dīn, was governor of Tripoli - appointed to Sidon in order to tighten his grip on the Druzes, was not realized until 1755, a short time before his deposition. 2 In the meantime, a certain Muṣṭafā Pasha, who governed Sidon between 1750 and 1752, was on good terms with Amīr Mulḥīm. 3 This was militarily disadvantageous to Asʿad Pasha.

1 Budayrī, ff. 37a, 38a, 44b.
2 See below p. 258ff.
3 A.N.B 1030: Sidon, 10.4.55, Sidon, 11.4.55; cf. Budayrī, ff. 42a, 44a.
4 A.N.B 1028: Sidon, 4.4.50, B 1029: Sidon, 30.3.52. Probably he was one mentioned by the Lebanese chroniclers as Muṣṭafā Pasha al-ʿAwwāq, Shidyāq, 424, Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 42.
Amīr Mulḥim, on his part, was occupied with other problems, such as the acquisition of Beirut, struggles with the Matāwila and, more important, the split within his ranks.

Several factors contributed to the acquisition by Amīr Mulḥim of the iltizām of Beirut, and, in effect, its governorship. There was at first the need by Amīr Mulḥim for new resources. The expeditions by Asʿad Pasha against him were apparently caused by his failure to pay the taxes in full. Such a disturbed situation, however, was not new in the relations among the amīrs of Mount Lebanon and the governors of Sidon and Damascus. But whereas the predecessors of Amīr Mulḥim managed to keep things going either by exact payment of taxes, usually made by force, or by compromise, mainly after an unsuccessful disciplinary expedition against them, or by acquiring the iltizām of Jabal ʿAmil and Ṣafad, which increased their resources, Amīr Mulḥim was at a disadvantage. Zahir monopolized the iltizām of Ṣafad, the Matāwila grew stronger and, worst of all, Amīr Mulḥim's authority among his people was becoming undermined. The only way to meet his financial obligations, when hard pressed, was to resort to additional taxation. But the local chiefs in Mount Lebanon, growing more self-assertive, opposed such a thing. The acquisition of the iltizām of Beirut could bring him, therefore, new resources, particularly at this time when it was taking the initiative in commerce from Sidon. Beirut was the usual market for the silk produced in Mount Lebanon and for which there was a high demand in Damascus and Egypt, and which was bought a

1 Shibāb, Lubnān, I, 41.
2 A. N. B. 1029: Sidon, 23.2.53 (Extrait des Registres), Sidon, 7.8.53; Masso.
well by the English and French merchants. By acquiring its ʿiltizām Amir Mulḥim could control this trade, enforce the prices beneficial to him, and maintain his prestige vis-à-vis his countrymen, Ṣāhir al-ʿUmar, the Maṭāwila and the neighbouring governors. Ṣāhir had acquired the ʿiltizām of Acre in 1746 so why should Amir Mulḥim not do a similar thing? In 1749 Amir Mulḥim managed to acquire the ʿiltizām of Beirut from the governor of Sidon. This acquisition later embroiled Amir Mulḥim’s successors in grave struggles with the governor of Sidon, Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzār, because of their inability to defend Beirut.

In 1163/1749-50 Amir Mulḥim was embroiled in a dispute with the Maṭāwila. As a sign of the future changes in the local power groupings, some of Ṣāhir’s sons, probably with the acquiescence of their father, helped the Maṭāwila in the fighting.

Amir Mulḥim had to impose extra taxes on the people to meet his financial obligations. But they were reluctant to pay, and their chiefs assembled in a diwan and repudiated his monetary demands, which he eventually withdrew. So long as he was unable to uphold an unchallenged authority he had recourse to the expedient but risky policy of ‘divide and rule’. Such a policy warrants a special strength and experience in the ruler who has recourse to it. Any weakening on his part makes him its victim rather than its master. When

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1 A.N.B 1 1030; Sidon, 13.3.53; A.N.B 1 432: Istanbul, 15.11.53; PRO, S.P.37/34: Istanbul, 22.2.53; Masson, 519.

2 Masson, 518.  

3 See below p. 254.

4 Shidyaq, 423; Dibs, VII, 379; Shibāb, Lubnān, I, 40. The date of 1163 A.H. given by the last tallies, to a certain extent, with that given by Shidyaq and Dibs. Shibab’s other statement (p. 37) in which he gave the date as 1161 A.H. seems an erroneous anticipation; Cf. A.N.B 1 1030: Sidon, 13.3.53.


6 Shibāb, Lubnān, I, 41; Nuzha, MS. Paris, f. 38a; Budayrī, f. 35a.

7 Shibāb, Lubnān, I, 41; Nuzha, MS. Camb., f. 20b.
Amīr Mulḥim fell ill in 1754, the occasion was exploited by the local chiefs to assert their power. They encouraged two brothers of his, Amīr Mansūr and Amīr Aḥmad, to rule jointly in his place. Unable to resist them, Amīr Mulḥim abdicated in their favour and retired to Beirut. His later manoeuvres to dislodge them with support from Istanbul proved abortive, and he died in 1761. The Amirate, weakened and divided as it had become, mirrored a corresponding division among the notables of Mount Lebanon and, in turn, served as a focus to the new groupings that were beginning to emerge. Two major factions were taking shape at the time. The Janbalātī faction headed by ‘Alī Janbalāt, and the Yazbakī faction headed by ‘Abd al-Salām al-‘Imād and so called after his ancestor Yazbak. The old Qaysi-Yemeni factionalism was almost dead after the elimination of the ‘Alām al-Dīn in ‘Āyn Dārā. Partly as a result of this the Qaysis began to split and they polarized around these two factions. This internal split among the Qaysis undermined the authority of the amīrs of Mount Lebanon and had deep repercussions on the balance of power in the region.

After Zahir had survived the attacks of Sulayman Pasha his prestige soared. The increasing demand by the French and other merchants for the products (chiefly cotton) of the regions which Zahir dominated, encouraged such trade and, more important, played into his hands.

In 1746 the governor/gave the iltizām of Acre to Zahir. Acre had re-

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1 Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 43, 44, 49; Shidyāq, 425-7; Nuzha, MS. Paris, ff. 38b, 39a.
2 Shidyāq, 182, 183, 427; Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 49; Nuzha, MS. Paris, f. 39a.
5 A.N.B. 1027: Sidon, 12.11.46. A.N.B. 978: Acre, 18.11.46 (Mémoire); cf. ‘A al-Ṣabbagh, f. 9b and M. al-Ṣabbagh, 41-3. The statement by Volney, 250 (cont.)
vived as a result of the growing commercial activity and, as a sign of this, the French had a vice-consul in it. The French fears of the consequences of this action were confirmed when Zahir practised extortion on the French merchants who resided in Acre. They appealed to their ambassador at Istanbul to use his influence to remedy their injustices. The English vice-consul in Acre, Mr. Usgate, who was the only English merchant in this place, and who took care at the same time of the interests of Holland and Venice - an example of the small volume of trade of these nations - suffered from similar extortions and appealed, in turn, to his ambassador at Istanbul. The combined efforts of these ambassadors failed to bring other than unheeded recommendations by the Grand Vezir to Zahir and to the local governors.

The attitude of As'ad Pasha towards the growing power of Zahir was apparently one of indifference. It is true that As'ad Pasha was, at the beginning of his governorship, occupied with the internal situation in Damascus but his passive attitude towards Zahir, later on, freed the latter's hands. As'ad Pasha commanded and sent more than one expedition against the Druzes, but nothing similar against Zahir. Several factors prompted him to attack the Druzes, as we have already seen, not the least among them the relative military ease of doing so. The Druzes were a community living in

(cont.) that Zahir took hold of Acre 'vers' 1749, which was copied by later writers, is contradicted by this evidence.

1 A.N.B 1027: Sidon, 4.11.49, Sidon, 19.7.49, Sidon, 28.10.49.

2 Ibid.: Sidon, 11.9.49; PRO, S.P. 97/34: Istanbul, 24.10.49 (dispatch No.2 under this date); cf. Charles-Roux, 82.

3 Cf. A.N.B 1028: Sidon, 4.3.50, (Sidon) Istanbul, 15.7.50, Sidon, 25.9.50 (Extrait des Registres); "A. al-Šabbagh, f. 9b.

4 Cf. A.N.B 1030: Sidon, 1.5.54 (Arabic text of a letter by Zahir to the French Minister of State dated 8 Rajab 1167), Budayrī, f. 39b.
a comparatively large area. To attack a village inhabited by Druzes or to devastate their countryside was considered a campaign against the Druzes no matter whether it encountered resistance or not. But in the case of Zahir the military situation was quite different. The Ziyadina were not a community like the Druzes, but were a family, members of which had distinguished themselves rather recently, and whose military power depended largely on fortresses. To lead an expedition against Zahir it must necessarily be directed against his stronghold of Tiberias or the less important one of Dayr Hanna. Both, and particularly Tiberias,\(^1\) were very much strengthened after the attacks of Sulayman Pasha. It seems that As'ad Pasha was afraid of a military failure which might damage his prestige and perhaps affect his administrative career. Of more importance, however, was the change in the attitude of Istanbul towards Zahir.

As a result of the representations made by the French and English ambassadors to the Porte and because of the inability or rather unwillingness of the governor of Sidon to remedy their injustices,\(^2\) the Grand Vezir requested the governor of Damascus to intercede on their behalf.\(^3\) As'ad Pasha did not take any military action, pretending that he wanted stronger orders from Istanbul. Indeed he did not receive a firman from the Sultan to combat Zahir but merely recommendations in the form of friendly letters from the Grand Vezir.\(^4\) After all, it was the infidels who were suffering extortion. Be-

\(^1\) Hasselquist, 158; cf. Fococke, II.1.68.

\(^2\) A.N.B.¹ 1027: Sidon, 19.7.49; Sidon, 11.9.49; cf. A.N.B.¹ 1028: Sidon, 25.4.50.

\(^3\) A.N.B.¹ 428: Istanbul, 16.10.49 (translation of a letter written by the Grand Vezir to As'ad Pasha); PRO, S.P. 97/34: Istanbul, 24.10.49.

\(^4\) A.N.B.¹ 428: Istanbul, 16.10.49.
sides, Ḥāhir was keen at this stage not to make any arrears in his financial obligations to the state so as not to incur the anger of the Porte. He pretended also to be law-abiding and in 1162/1748-9 he killed some of the zorā who were expelled from Damascus. It might be true from the probing which the French ambassador had made at Istanbul that the authorities there were unable to send an expedition against Ḥāhir because of the expenses it would entail and also because of their occupation with other more pressing problems.

The French felt, at last, that Ḥāhir was strong and that it was in their interest to be reconciled with him. In 1753 they reached an accommodation with him concerning trade. The change of heart on the part of Ḥāhir towards the French was caused to a large extent by his anxiety to safeguard his commercial interests, and also by the obliging letters which he had received from the Grand Vezir, the daftādar of Istanbul, and the Reis Efendi. Thus the rebel's favour was courted by top officials at Istanbul.

In a letter to the French Minister of State for the Marine dated 8 Rajab 1167/1 May 1754, Ḥāhir revealed that Jaffa, which was under the jurisdiction of the governor of Damascus, was 'sous mon pouvoir'. One source states that its īltizām was given to him by As'ad Pasha. Ḥāhir was also able to obtain

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1. A. al-Ṣabbāgh, f. 9b. 2. Budayrī, f. 30a; see above p. 230.
3. A.N.B 1028; (Sidon) Istanbul, 15.7.50, Sidon, 23.9.50.
4. A.N.B 1030: Sidon, 12.7.53 (Articles d'accommodement entre M. de Verrayon, Consul de France à Seyde et le Chek Daher el Omar Commandant d'Acre).
5. A.N.B 432; Istanbul, 6.10.53.
6. A.N.B 1030: Sidon, 1.5.54 (the Arabic text of the letter carries the date of 8 Rajab 1167, and the name of Ḥāhir is given at the end; the French version carries his signature and titles in Arabic, which suggests that it was written or perhaps translated by one of his secretaries who knew French).
the iltizām of other regions which were under the jurisdiction of the governor of Damascus. These included certain villages in the region of Nablus, in bilād Ṭarītha (Mount Carmel and the adjacent territories to the south)\(^1\) and in Jabal ‘Ajlūn.\(^2\) His most important acquisition, however, was Acre, where he resided. But responsibility for its defence was great.\(^3\) Its importance to Zahir is apparent in the titles he assumed, such as ḍābit ‘Akka wa-bilādībā\(^4\) or ḍābit ‘Akka wa-bilād al-Jālīl.\(^5\)

The third group with which As‘ad Pasha had to deal were the Beduin. In the province of Damascus, particularly in bilād Ḥawrān and along the Jordan valley in the direction of Nablus, there existed several tribes, some of whom received ṣarūr from the governor of Damascus for facilitating the passage of the Pilgrimage,\(^6\) while others paid dues to him.\(^7\) The governor of Damascus had to deal also with other tribes outside the confines of his province, along the Pilgrimage route.

The attitude of As‘ad Pasha towards the Beduin was interesting. While he tried to be on good terms with the big tribes such as ‘Anaza and Ḥarb, he tightened his hold over the small and less militant ones. The danger of this policy was that while the big tribes were appeased, the small ones were infuriated at their humiliation and, very often, retaliated by counter attacks.

Immediately after his triumph over the zorab, As‘ad Pasha sent troops

\(^{1}\)Cf. Poliak, 59.  
\(^{2}\)A. al-Ṣabbāḥ, ff. 9b, 10a; M. al-Ṣabbāḥ, 46.  
\(^{3}\)See Hasselquist, 151.  
\(^{4}\)E. Rossi, 'Due Lettere Di Ṣābih, Signor Di S. Giovanni D'Acri Al Gran Maestro Di Malta (1752)', Rivista Degli Studi Orientali, XIV, (1934), 62.  
\(^{5}\)A.N.B 1030; Sidon, 1.5.54; A.N.B 1029; Sidon 8.10.53 (the text of a letter sent by Zahir to the French Minister of State for the Marine, dated 15 Dhu 'l-Hijja 1166).  
\(^{6}\)See above p. 103.  
\(^{7}\)Cf. Seetzen, 289.
against unidentified Beduin in the vicinity of Damascus. Their property was
looted and the heads of several Beduin were brought to Damascus. Other ex-
peditions were sent against unidentified Beduin in the vicinity of Damascus.
On 2 Rajab 1166/5 May 1753 As'ad Pasha led an expedition against the Beduin
of Balqūjā', whose prominent chief was Ibn 'Adwān, and defeated them. In
1167/1753-4 As'ad Pasha sent troops against the Beduin of al-Jabal, probably
Jabal Ḥawrān, and inflicted heavy casualties on them. In Rajab 1168/April-
May 1755 he sent an expedition against the Fāqīl Beduin of Ḥawrān who were
also worsted in the fighting.

These campaigns against comparatively small tribes might have been nec-
essary to discipline them. Indeed they occupied territories which affected
the supplies of Damascus and the safety of the Pilgrimage. In such campaigns
looting on both sides was not an unusual practice. But if we notice that the
Beduin were almost always defeated and that their sheep were sometimes sold
by As'ad Pasha at high prices, one wonders if the aim of profiteering was
not a strong factor behind these expeditions.

In 1160/1747 news arrived in Damascus of a big fight which took place
between the 'Anaza and certain Beduin called Rasha. Both suffered heavy
casualties but the latter were worsted and their property looted. It was
rumoured that As'ad Pasha helped 'the Beduin', most probably the 'Anaza
1Budayrī, f.16a. 2See for example, ibid., f.29a. 3Cf. Seetzen, 296,297.
4Cf. Seetzen, 296, 297; Budayrī, f. 41b. 5Cf. Muhammad Adīb, 43.
6Budayrī, f. 43a. 7Ibid., ff. 44a, 44b. 8Cf. ibid., ff. 26a, 29.
9Ibid., f. 26a.

10Budayrī, f. 20a. It seems that the word Rasha was a corruption of Shrasha,
with the first letter dropped from the Arabic pronunciation. If this is
true then they seem to have represented that section of the Ṣakhr who were
led by Shaykh al-Shresha; the remaining Ṣakhr were led by Ibn Fā'iz, cf.
Seetzen, p. 287. The subsequent fight between the Ṣakhr and the 'Anaza
lends truth to this explanation.
because they were victorious and also because the looted sheep were sold in Damascus.¹ In Rajab/July-August of the same year, the ‘Anaza came to blows with the Sakhr Beduin in bilad Hawrân.² The summer season during which this fight took place coincided with the yearly expansion of the ‘Anaza towards the cultivated regions where the Sakhr predominated. Since the ‘Anaza were masters of the Syrian desert it was desirable for the governor of Damascus to be on good terms with them to safeguard the Pilgrimage and the trade caravans that crossed the desert between Damascus and Baghdad.³

Another strong tribe with which As‘ad Pasha compromised was the Ḥarb. The territory controlled by this tribe extended between Mecca and Medina. Since the Pilgrimage passed through this territory, the governors of Damascus had necessarily to deal with the Ḥarb.⁴ In 1169/1755-56 the Ḥarb quarrelled with the authorities of Medina and besieged it. The Sultan, alarmed at this threatening state of affairs in such an important place, sent order to As‘ad Pasha and to his brothers, Muṣṭafa Pasha and Sa‘ad al-Dīn Pasha, to march against them, and appointed the last governor of Jedda apparently to tighten the grip on the Ḥarb.⁵ Instead of fighting them, in compliance with the Sultan’s orders, As‘ad Pasha paid a hundred purses to this tribe and brought about a reconciliation between them and the authorities of Medina.⁶ This was an expedient measure, but the peace it brought about was of

a temporary nature because the Harb were bought off rather than subdued. Shortly afterwards they resumed their insubordination and the governor of Damascus, ‘Abd Allāh Pasha al-Chataji, subdued them by force.¹ So long as As‘ad Pasha was governor he was able to manage these various tribes. But the policy he adopted towards them had disastrous repercussions under his successors.

The Vicissitudes of the ‘Azm Governors.

With the death of Sulaymān Pasha, the second generation of ‘Azm governors, all of them sons of his brother, Ismā‘īl Pasha, came to the fore. One of them, Ibrāhīm Pasha, fell into oblivion after his deposition from Sidon in 1744,² and eventually died in Ḫamāh in 1159/1746-7 without acquiring the rank of wazīr.³ His brother Sa‘d al-Dīn Pasha, who stayed in Damascus with his brother As‘ad Pasha, was promoted in 1159/1746 to the rank of wazīr.⁴ the same year he was appointed governor of Tripoli.⁵ Apart from the usual procedures for obtaining governorships, it seems that the satisfaction of the Sultan at the actions of As‘ad Pasha, who suppressed the insubordinate persons in Damascus and reinstated the Kapi Kulus, contributed much to this appointment of Sa‘d al-Dīn Pasha. While governor of Tripoli Sa‘d al-Dīn commanded the jarda for four successive years between 1160 and 1164 A.H.⁶ In 1164/1750-1 he was appointed governor of Aleppo.⁷ In his new governorship,

¹See below p. 298. ²A.N.B¹ 1026: Sidon, 25.5.44.
³Tabbākh, VI, 481. ⁴Budayrī, f. 16b.
⁵Ibid., f. 19a; A.N.B¹ 1118: Tripoli, 10.10.46.
⁶Budayrī, ff. 24b, 31b, 36a.
Sa‘d al-Dīn Pasha exploited his appointment as commander of the jarda to practice extortions. The Aleppines revolted, the Friday prayer was suspended, and many casualties occurred. The Aleppines appealed also to the Sultan against his injustices. However, he commanded the jarda that year and was subsequently deposed, to their relief. It seems that he was appointed to Sidon in 1752, and in 1753 he was transferred to Tripoli, where he seems to have stayed as governor until April 1756. In 1166/1752-3 Muṣṭafā was granted two tugās, apparently without being appointed to a governorship, and was asked to cooperate with his brother Sa‘d al-Dīn Pasha in commanding the jarda. In the middle of Jumāda I 1168/around the end of February 1755, Muṣṭafā Pasha was appointed governor of Sidon. Thus, the three governorships of Damascus, Tripoli and Sidon were in ‘Aẓm hands as in 1730. This was certainly a great honour to the ‘Aẓm family and particularly to As‘ad Pasha who towered high over his brothers and sponsored their appointments. But this situation did not last long. Around Jumāda II 1169/March 1756 the three ‘Aẓm governors were ordered by the Sultan to proceed to Medina and relieve it from the Ḥarb Beduin who besieged it. Sa‘d al-Dīn Pasha was appointed governor of Jedda on the occasion. This appointment did not materialize, however, and Sa‘d al-Dīn Pasha was appointed governor of Sidon.

1 Budayrī, f. 38a; A.N.B. 86: Aleppo, 20.9.51. 2 Budayrī, f. 38b.
5 A.N.B. 1030: Sidon, 7.5.53.
6 A.N.B. 1119: Tripoli, 5.4.56, Tripoli, 4.5.56; Budayrī, f. 45a.
7 Budayrī, f. 42a, cf. f. 42b.
8 Ibid., f. 44a; A.N.B. 1030: Sidon, 10.4.55, Sidon, 11.4.55.
9 See above p. 143. 10 See above p. 260.
in place of his brother Mustafa Pasha who was deposed by the end of 1169/Sept. 1756 and was appointed to Adana. 1

On 27 Safar 1168/13 Dec. 1754 Sultan Mahmud I died in Istanbul and his brother, 'Uthman III, was proclaimed Sultan. 2 This event entailed large changes in the administration both at Istanbul and in the provinces. As'ad Pasha became anxious when the firman of his confirmation did not arrive by mid-Jumada I of that year, the date on which his brother Mustafa was appointed to Sidon, 3 and the usual time for its arrival. Although the appointment of his brother was comforting and he himself received his confirmation in mid-Rajab, a rather late date in his case, 4 As'ad Pasha had reason to feel as he did because of his unusually long tenure in office and, more important, because of certain manoeuvrings against him in Istanbul of which he seems to have been aware.

After the death in 1746 of the Kizlar Agha Bashir, who wielded great authority in Istanbul, 5 his successors struggled, not always successfully, 6 to maintain the same authority as the Kizlar Agha Bashir had exercised. Shortly after the accession of Sultan 'Uthman III, the prestige of the office of the Kizlar Agha revived. Its occupant, Ahmad Aboulcouf 7 (sic) worked to discredit As'ad Pasha. It was alleged that this Kizlar Agha, while on his way to Mecca in 1754, was not given due

(cont.)

1PRO, S.P. 97/38: Istanbul, 13.12.54; A.N.B 1 433: Istanbul, 16.9.54;
Hammer, XV, 276, 278; Budayri, f. 43b.
2Budayri, ff. 45a, 45b.
3Budayri, f. 44a.  4Cf. Ibid., ff. 24b, 42b, 44b.  5See above p. 221.
6Hammer, XV, 106, 111; PRO, S.P. 97/33: Istanbul, 29.8.47; S.P.97/34:
Istanbul, 21.11.49; S.P. 97/35: Istanbul, 23.7.51, Istanbul, 24.10.51,
8Hammer, XVI, 14, gave his name in this form; cf. PRO, S.P.97/39: Istanbul, 25.4.51.
honour by As‘ad Pasha - a contrast with the friendly attitude of Ḥusayn Bey b. Makki, the governor of Gaza, towards him. Through the support of the Kizlar Agha, Ḥusayn Bey was granted two tuges and appointed, around Rabī‘ II 1169/January 1756, governor of the province of Jerusalem which was carved out of that of Damascus. He was authorized to collect the revenue of the dawra.

The limits of this province caused a controversy in the French Consulate in Sidon. If it was restricted to Jerusalem then the present the French would offer to Ḥusayn Pasha would be less than if Ramle, which was important to French trade, were added to it. It turned out, however, that the new province of Jerusalem included, besides the nahiya districts attached to it, Gaza and Ramle as well. The point to be stressed here is that the prestige and the resources of As‘ad Pasha suffered as a result of this dismemberment of his province. More important were the factors that brought about this change in Istanbul.

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3. Budayrī, f. 44b; A.N.B 1031, Sidon, 16.1.56 (Extrait des Registres); Volney, 316-7. The statement by Murādī, II, 61, that As‘ad Pasha made Ḥusayn Bey his deputy-governor in Jerusalem in which position he stayed until 1169 A.H., might have been true, see S. Lusignan, Letters, II, 226. But at this date he was appointed by the Sultan governor of the province of Jerusalem, as Murādī (II, 61) himself, asserts.
4. A.N.B 1031, Sidon, 16.1.56 (Extrait des Registres).
5. Ibid., Sidon, 4.2.56.
Husayn Pasha remained governor of Jerusalem for nine months after which he was deposed. He returned to his former governorship of the *sanjaq* of Gaza. Jerusalem then reverted to the jurisdiction of As'ad Pasha, and its governor was once more known as his *mutasallim*. Apparently this was a setback to the Kizlar Agha and his protégé Husayn Pasha. It was also a challenge to which the Kizlar Agha responded successfully by procuring, shortly afterwards, the governorship of Damascus for Husayn Pasha.

As'ad Pasha managed to retain Jerusalem partly, it seems, through the manoeuvres of his agent in Istanbul. On 13 Rabi' I 1170/5 January 1757, about two months before his deposition, As'ad Pasha was honoured by a gift from the Sultan. This was apparently an expression of satisfaction at

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1 Budayrī, f. 44b; A.N.B 1031: Sidon, 1.9.56 (Extrait des Registres), Sidon, 20.9.56 (Extrait des Registres); Murādī, II, 61. The statement by the last that Husayn Pasha was deposed by As'ad Pasha is not to be taken literally because As'ad Pasha did not appoint Husayn Pasha to Jerusalem and also because Budayrī made it clear that Husayn Pasha was deposed by the Sultan. It might mean, however, that this was done at the demand of As'ad Pasha.

2 A.N.B 1031: Sidon, 17.8.56 (Traduction d'une lettre écrite par Assad Pacha gouverneur de Damas à Monsieur Bourguignon Proconsul de France à Seyde, datée 13 Shawal, 1167/16 July 1756); cf. A.N.B 1031: Sidon, 4.6.56, Sidon, 10.6.56, Sidon, 12.6.56.

3 Murādī's statement in II, 62, that Husayn Pasha was appointed governor of Sidon before his appointment to Damascus is not substantiated by any other source.

4 A.N.B 87: Aleppo, 22.3.57.

5 Budayrī, f. 45b.
his achievement of a reconciliation between the Ḫarb Beduin and the authorities of Medina. Asʿad Pasha still enjoyed much credit at Istanbul. Would this credit stand the test? At the end of Rabīʿ/1170/21 January 1757, Asʿad Pasha was deposed from Damascus and appointed to Aleppo. This was attributed to the successful manoeuvres of the Kizlar Ağa, Aboukouf, who was anxious to promote his protégé, Ḥusayn Pasha b. Makkī. Rāghib Pasha of Aleppo, who was appointed to Damascus, was made Grand Vezir before he assumed his new governorship.

On Friday 15 Jumāda I 1170/5 February 1757 Asʿad Pasha received the firmanent which appointed him to Aleppo, and he left Damascus three days later for his new governorship.

In Aleppo, Asʿad Pasha's suspicions of the intentions behind his deposition from Damascus began to be confirmed. Opposition to him in Istanbul was gaining momentum because he incurred also the enmity of the new Grand Vezir, Rāghib Pasha, who had denounced him as 'fallāh ibn fallāh' (peasant son of a peasant) in the wake of a deal that failed between them.

Asʿad Pasha started his rule by lowering the price of grain and by supplying the city from his own granaries - an act which won him the admiration of the Aleppines. Although he still benefited by selling his

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1Budayrī, f. 45b; see above p. 260. 2Budayrī, f. 46a.
4Budayrī, f. 46a; Hammer, XV, 304; PRO, S.P. 97/38: Istanbul, 15.1.56; Russell, I, 404-5 n.30; Radcliffe papers, 6645/5: Aleppo, 24.1.57.
5Budayrī, ff. 46a, 46b.
6Russell, I, 404-5 n.30; see above p. 121. 7Russell, I, 405.
grain, the reduction in prices was a glaring departure from his policy in Damascus. Such a gesture seems to have served several purposes. The exactions made by his brother, Sa'd al-Din Pasha, a few years earlier, had provoked the Aleppines to revolt against him.\footnote{1} As'ad Pasha might have been anxious to allay their fears. As a new governor who was exploring the situation in Aleppo, and who was still suspicious of the intentions of Istanbul, such a paternal approach could win him needful popular support.

On 26 February 1757 As'ad Pasha was appointed governor of Egypt.\footnote{2} The shops in Aleppo were closed in protest, and the Aleppines demonstrated in the streets expressing their desire not to part with As'ad Pasha. They appealed also to the Sultan to keep him in Aleppo.\footnote{3} Was this a spontaneous move on the part of the Aleppines or was it arranged by As'ad Pasha? On his deposition from Damascus no such demonstration took place in his favour. In spite of his extortionate policy there which had alienated a large section of the Damascene poor, he could still have arranged a demonstration had he wanted because many vested interests were on his side. That he had commanded the Pilgrimage fourteen times provided him with powerful religious and political assets. In Aleppo, however, the situation was different. Probably he thought he might settle there for a similar long period, and perhaps ultimately return to Damascus. For the Aleppines to forget so easily their hard time under his brother and to be whipped up to such a frenzy in

\footnote{1}{See above p. 262.} \footnote{2}{A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 87: Aleppo, 10.3.57.} \footnote{3}{A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 87: Aleppo: 22.3.57, Aleppo, 26.3.57; A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 435: Istanbul, 30.4.57; Budayri, f. 47a.}
so limited a period makes it incredible that their action was simply spontaneous. Certainly the religious prestige of As'ad Pasha counted for much. But it seems also that the reduction in prices which he introduced was deliberately planned with the collaboration of certain merchants in the city. The merchants, who could count on, if not be sure of, a future reversal of this policy when the time was ripe, seem to have incited the demonstrations. After As'ad Pasha's death they were arrested and fined. Nor was As'ad Pasha resigned to his fate. He approached the foreign consuls in Aleppo to write to their ambassadors in Istanbul on his behalf, and particularly requested the French Consul to do so in order that the French ambassador might concert action with As'ad's agent at the Porte to ward off his deposition. In the meantime, As'ad Pasha was alarmed lest the attitude of the populace should harm his case. He pretended to comply with the order for his deposition, but did nothing to quieten the people. On the 9th of May he was confirmed in Aleppo.

That As'ad Pasha weathered the storm, and his successor-designate was appointed to another province after the Aleppoites had turned away his mutasallim, was an example of the weakness of the government in Istanbul. The forceful demonstrations of the Aleppoites were a further proof of the

1 A.N.B 88: Aleppo, 4.11.58.
2 A.N.B 87: Aleppo, 22.3.57; Aleppo, 26.3.57.
3 A.N.B 87: Aleppo, 14.5.57.
4 PRO, S.P. 97/39: Istanbul, 2.5.57.
loosening control of the central administration over the provinces. For a time it appeared as if the 'Azims were still in favour. Sa'd al-Dīn Pasha was appointed to Mar'ash and his brother Muṣṭafā to Mosul.

On 25 Sept. 1757, As'ad Pasha was deposed once more and appointed to Siwās. The Aleppines rose again in protest. During this time sums of money were sent by As'ad Pasha to Istanbul. Although it is not known whether this money was part of the revenue to the Imperial treasury or was sent to his agent to work him up, the fact that it was made at all at this time is remarkable. Contrary to the advice of his supporters and of his brother Sa'd al-Dīn Pasha to send large sums to Istanbul to buy off his deposition, or to augment his forces and to put up resistance, or to purchase his retirement, As'ad Pasha chose to submit, and he left Aleppo after a long delay during which every pretext for staying was exhausted.

In trying to ascertain why As'ad Pasha failed to put up military resistance when the Aleppines were apparently supporting him, a survey of his administrative career is useful. During his fourteen years' tenure in Damascus, As'ad Pasha was forced by events to adopt a clear attitude towards the power groups there. His strengthening of the alien troops, particularly

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1 In 1748, for example, the Sultan was forced to appoint Sulaymān Pasha, Kahya of Ahmad Pasha of Baghdad, as governor of this province after his nominee was driven out, see PRO, S.P. 97/33: Istanbul, 28.3.48; Istanbul, 24.10.49.

2 Budayrī, f. 47a; Tabbākh, III, 329; cf. A.N.B 87: Aleppo, 30.8.57.

3 Tabbākh, III, 335; A.N.B 87: Aleppo, 7.10.57.

4 A.N.B 87: Aleppo, 7.10.57.

5 PRO, S.P. 110/34: Aleppo, 5.10.57.

his reinstatement of the *Kapi Kulüs*, was primarily intended to put an end to the growing prominence and insubordination of the *Yerliyya*. But it seems that the reinstatement of the *Kapi Kulüs*, at the demand of As'ad Pasha and certainly to the satisfaction of the Sultan, was played up in Istanbul in As'ad Pasha's favour and contributed, among other things, to the prolongation of his tenure.

As'ad Pasha was a typical example of the governor who was interested in the furtherance of his prestige and his fortune within the 'Establishment'. During his rule in Damascus he did not try to exploit military power to retain his post in defiance of the Sultan's orders. In Aleppo, however, he became conscious of the intrigues directed against him in Istanbul but could do nothing to halt them. He remained true to his past career of governing with the Sultan's acquiescence. His background and the origins of his power had shaped his decision. The Aleppines had demonstrated in his favour, but could such a popular upsurge of a momentary nature help to sustain his authority for a longer period and in defiance of the Sultan's orders? Aleppo was within easy reach of the Sultan's troops. Furthermore, any trouble there would not be tolerated by the Sultan especially because it would endanger his military position on the Persian front. When As'ad Pasha accepted his deposition he did not know that he was moving towards his doom. Around the beginning of *Şafar* 1171/second half of October 1757, the Pilgrimage was almost annihilated by the Beduin. Towards the end of *Sha'bā* 1171/beginning of May 1758, news of the decapitation of As'ad Pasha arrived in Syria, and soon after followed the confiscation of his property. The relation between these events will be discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter 6

THE PROVINCE OF DAMASCUS BETWEEN 1170/1757 AND 1174/1760.

I. Internal disorders and the attack on the Pilgrimage under Ḫusayn Pasha b. Makkī.

Ḫusayn Pasha entered Damascus as governor on 5 Jumāda II 1170/25 February 1757. His grandfather was a native of Gaza and one of its merchants. This local identification made Barīk describe Ḫusayn Pasha as of the second group of awlād al-ʿArab who became wazīrs in our country (bilādīnā), as he put it. Ḫusayn's father, Muḥammad, acted, at one time, as kāḥva for Asʿad Pasha, and in 1155/1742-3, he was given bilād Gaza (probably the sānjaq of Gaza) as wālikānī.6

On the entry of Ḫusayn Pasha to Damascus, amid the customary procession in which the notables of the city figured, a crowd assembled and shouted against the tyranny of the notables and against the high prices. A more daring event occurred the next day, when the religious officials and the notables came to the sarāva to greet him. A crowd intercepted them, labelled them with disgraceful titles such as murāfīqīn (hypocrites) who helped the rulers in their oppression of the poor, and went even to the extent of stoning them.7 Such a tangible complaint at the start of his rule prompted Ḫusayn Pasha to tighten inspection measures, and bread prices were reduced by about one half. But this was of temporary duration and prices went up shortly afterwards.8

The change of the governor played into the hands of the Yerliyya who were trying to restore their prominence. Before his departure from Damascus Asʿad Pasha counselled the members of the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus to

1 Budayrī, f. 46b. 2 Barīk, 36. 3 Murādī, II, 60.
4 Barīk, 36. The first group, according to this chronicler, were the 'Azms, see ibid.
5 Ibid.; Murādī, II, 60, 61; cf. Baytimānī, Diwan, ff. 48a, 49b.
6 Murādī, II, 60, 61. 7 Budayrī, ff. 46b, 47a; Murādī, II, 61.
8 Budayrī, f. 47a.
come to terms. He also released many prisoners, some of whom had been in prison for about ten years. This seems to have increased excitement in the city. Immediately after his departure signs of unrest became apparent. Insubordinate members of the Xerliyya from the Maydan quarter began to assert themselves, but they were temporarily restrained by their superiors. The Kapi Kulus, apprehending reprisals by the Xerliyya, vacated their houses in the quarters and took refuge in the citadel. Many shop-keepers moved their goods to safer places. Rumours were rife in Damascus, at the time, of an impending invasion by the expelled zorb. In fact, the latter after their abortive attack on Damascus in 1161/1748 were either killed, or pardoned, or had lost interest or sympathy after a period of twelve years. Their surviving chief, Ahmad al-Qaltaqji, was on good terms with Husayn Pasha, and instead of attacking Damascus as it was rumoured he would, he offered to mediate in the dispute between the Xerliyya and the Kapi Kulus. In such a disturbed state of affairs and among such fear-stricken inhabitants, every rumour of a violent nature gathered momentum very easily. It was only after the mutasallim of Husayn Pasha put to death an insubordinate person from the Suwayqa quarter that the anxiety of the people somewhat subsided.

Between 5 Jumādā II 1170/25 February 1757, the date on which Husayn Pasha entered Damascus, and 1 Sha‘bān/21 April of the same year, when he went on the dawra, direct clashes between the Xerliyya and the Kapi Kulus had not yet started. But public security was disturbed by the insubordination of the

1 Budayrī, f. 46b. 2 Ibid. 3 See above p. 230.
4 Budayrī, f. 49b. 5 Ibid., f. 46b.
Maghāriba, who had enjoyed a privileged position under As‘ād Pasha. On 20 Rajab 1170/10 April 1757 they attacked the governor and fired on a crowd, killing about ten persons and burning many places. In the same month they clashed with the Kurdish Lawand. About fifteen persons were killed on both sides. As a further sign of the general deterioration in security, six persons were found murdered in various places in Damascus in this same month of Rajab - an unusual thing, according to the chronicler. On the 27th of it/17 April Ḥusayn Pasha put to death a murderer from the Maydān.¹

Before leaving for the dawra Ḥusayn Pasha appointed as mutasallim Ḥusayn Agha, the alaybevi of the Sipahi.² This seems to have been an expedient choice because this corps did not take part as such in any of the previous troubles, and also because any person appointed to this office from the Yerliyya would alienate the Kapi Kulus and vice-versa. But his choice of Mustafa Agha, a prominent Kapi Kulu, to act as Tufengji bashi (roughly chief of police) after he had guaranteed to maintain order,³ seems to have alienated the Yerliyya who were not given any similar influential office and who would be coerced as a result.

On 18 Ramadan 1170/6 June 1757, in the absence of Ḥusayn Pasha, the first in a series of clashes took place between the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus. The rise, at the time, in the prices of foodstuffs created further complication. The price of bread, for example, rose from three misriyyas for the rotle in Rajab, when the governor enforced inspection,⁴ to twelve

¹Budayrī, f. 47a. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., f. 47b. ⁴Ibid., f. 47a.
migriyyas for the rolte in Ramadān of the same year without any apparent change in the value of the currency. This situation brought the poor into the scene, and they fought on the side of the Yerliyya because of the common interests they had with them. The Kapi Kulus marshalled all the non-Damascene troops to their side, such as the Dalātiyya, the Ākrād, the Maṣṣilīs and the Baghdādis. A sharp division was thus drawn between Damascene and non-Damascene forces. In the fighting many casualties occurred on both sides, and it was at the intercession of Naqīb al-Aghrāf, Sayyid Ḥamza, and other dignitaries that the hostilities were brought to a halt. On his return from the dawra on 20 Ramadān/8 June, Husayn Pasha showed no concern at what had happened.

In the first half of Shawwal 1170/second half of June 1757, Muṣṭafā Agha al-Ḥamawy was appointed agha of the Yerliyya. His predecessor, Darwīsh Agha, who had occupied this office since 1157/1744-5, was on good terms with Asʿad Pasha and the notables of Damascus. With the deposition of Asʿad Pasha and the growing insubordination of the Yerliyya, Darwīsh Agha was afraid of being attacked by the lawless members of his own corps. He therefore appealed to Husayn Pasha to relieve him of his office and to write to Istanbul to this effect. His wish was finally conceded. Muṣṭafā Agha was no stranger to Damascus. His father ʿAlī, a native of Ḥamāh, was daftardar of Damascus between 1129/1716-7 and 1148/1735-6. He was also a sharif on the mater-

1Budayrī, f. 47b.  2Ibid.; Murādī, II, 61.  3Cf. Murādī, III, 207.
4Budayrī, f. 47b; Barīk, 44; Cf. Murādī, Maṭmah, f. 39b.
5Budayrī, f. 47b.  6See above p. 225.  7Murādī, II, 107-112.
8See above p. 45.
nal side. ¹ Although the agha of the Yerliyya was still appointed from Istanbul, he was chosen by then from among Damascene or Damascenized persons. This tended to make the corps more homogeneous but failed to make the leadership more effective.

The Yerliyya were determined on a decisive clash with the Kapi Kulus. On the surface the struggle was for military supremacy, but behind it lurked the economic rivalry between Damascenes and non-Damascenes because the latter were indulging in business activities. Moreover, the non-Damascene troops and in particular the mercenaries, were creating much disorder and practising extortion, which infuriated the Damascenes.

Before the departure of Ḥusayn Pasha on the Pilgrimage on 19 Shawwal 1170/7 July 1757, the Damascenes arose as one ² demanding the expulsion of the ghurabā' (aliens) from the city. The governor issued orders to this effect, and some aliens left.³ Literally the 'aliens' should have included the Kapi Kulus alongside the mercenary troops. But the order of Ḥusayn Pasha seems to have affected the mercenary troops only, the majority of whom kept living in Damascus after they had been dismissed from service, and continued causing trouble. It should be recalled here that many aliens who came to Damascus on the occasion of the Pilgrimage stayed in it for one reason or another.⁴ Ḥusayn Pasha tried to reconcile the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus before his departure, and a hujja (written ruling) was promulgated in the

¹ Murādī, II, 111, III, 209.
² Budayrī, f. 48a (qāmat ahl al-Shām bi-gawrūt wahid).
³ Ibid., f. 48a, cf. f. 47b. ⁴ See Murādī, Matna, f. 43a.
presence of the judge and other dignitaries which decreed heavy penalties on any who violated its terms.\(^1\)

Such conciliatory measures postponed the clash but could not prevent it. The atmosphere was so tense that the least pretext would disturb it. On 13 Dhu 'l-Hijja 1170/29 August 1757, in the absence of Husayn Pasha, a Kurd, who had been in the service of As'ad Pasha, arrived in Damascus. His past record in terrorising the Damascenes made them demand his expulsion. But the Kapi Kulus gave him asylum in the citadel, and this resulted in the resumption of hostilities between them and the Yerliyya. Some unidentified Druzes came to the help of the Yerliyya.\(^2\) This action on the part of the Druzes causes no surprise because earlier the Druze Talhuqs gave asylum to some fugitive zorab, and took part with them in the invasion of Damascus.\(^3\) The shops of Damascus closed, and the 'Amara quarter, near the citadel, where many Kapi Kulus lived, was sacked by the Yerliyya,\(^4\) in reprisal for an attack on their Darwishiyya quarter.\(^5\) A diwan was summoned by the notables which decreed the expulsion of the Kurd, together with other aliens, from the city. Those who were expelled committed many atrocities in the countryside.\(^6\)

In spite of a series of earth tremors in Damascus, which started on 22 Dhu 'l-Hijja 1170/7 September 1757,\(^7\) and of the appalling news about the disastrous attack on the jardé and the Pilgrimage, fighting between the Yer-

\(^1\)Budayrî, ff. 47b, 48a.

\(^2\)Ibid., f. 48a; cf. Shibâb, Lubnân, I, 45; Munayyir, al-Mashriq, 48 (1954) p. 683 described these Druzes as 'min ahali jabal al-shûf'.

\(^3\)See above p. 229.\(^4\)Barîk, 45.\(^5\)Budayrî, f. 48a.

\(^6\)Ibid., f. 48b.\(^7\)Ibid., f. 48a; Murâdî, III, 61.
liyya and the Kapi Kulus continued intermittently. The Kapi Kulus living outside the citadel were forced to take refuge in it, and the Yerliyya dominated the rest of the city.

The attack on the jarda and the Pilgrimage.

On 27 Dhu 'l-Hijja 1170/12 September 1757 news arrived in Damascus of an attack on the jarda by the Sakhr Beduin, on 20 Dhu 'l-Hijja, in a place between Qa'irana and Ma'aran. The commander of the jarda, Musa Kahya, governor of Sidon, was badly injured, and died a week later. A second jarda was dispatched from Damascus but its commander panicked at the news of an impending attack by the Beduin, and did not proceed further than Balqa'. On the arrival of the Pilgrimage at Tabuk, its commander, Husayn Pasha, learned of the intention of the Sakhr's chief Qa'dan al-Fa'iz to attack it. He tried to buy him off but failed. Pressed by hunger and frustration at the absence of the jarda, the Pilgrimage moved on and was consequently attacked in force by the Sakhr in a place between Tabuk and Dhat Hajj. Muhammed Adib gave the name of this place as manzal Qa'al Basit or al-Sakhir. Many pilgrims were killed and many more died later as a result of the misery that befell them. Among the dead was a sister of the Sultan.

Estimates of the size of the Pilgrimage and of the number of casualties and of attackers varied considerably. But there is no mistaking the volume

1 Barîk, 45, 49; Budayrî, ff. 49a, 50a; al-Qarî, 80.
2 Barîk, 45; Budayrî, f. 48b; al-Qarî, 79.
3 Budayrî, ff. 48b, 49a; al-Qarî, 80; A.N.B1 1033: Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin).
4 Muhammed Adib, 49, 50; see Appendix II, P. 44.
5 Budayrî, f. 50a; Murâdî, III, 132-3; A.N.B1 87: Aleppo, 24.12.57.
6 See above p. 93.
of this calamity and the consternation it caused, particularly in Damascus
and Istanbul which were as much indignant as aggrieved. As soon as the news
of the attack on the Pilgrimage reached Damascus on 17 Safar 1171/31 October
1757, a crowd started stoning the headquarters of the governor because the
mutasallim, Husayn Agha, did not go to the rescue in time. However, a re-

* relief party, which included the mutasallim, left Damascus on 21 Safar to sal-
vage what remained of the Pilgrimage. Husayn Pasha managed to escape to
Gaza, and he never returned to Damascus as governor. The Mahmil, which was
taken by the Beduin, was later ransomed and brought to Damascus in a shabby
condition.

An investigation of the causes of the attack.

It was not unusual for the Beduin to attack the Pilgrimage. But this
attack was carefully planned because the Beduin isolated the Pilgrimage by
first attacking the jarda. The Sakhr were designated as the authors of this
act. Other tribes such as the Sardiyya, the Banū Kullayb and the Banū 'Aqīl,

1 For further details on the attack see, Budayrī, ff. 48b-50a; Barīk, 45-7;
al-Qarī, 79-81; Murādī II, 61, 62; PFO, S.P. 97/39: Istanbul, 3.12.57, Istan-
bul, 23.12.57; A.N.B 435: Istanbul, 26.11.57; Porter, Observations, 25-9;
Volney, 316-7; Mariti, III, 117-120; Hammer, XVI, 15-7. The statement by th
last that the attackers were the Ḥarb Beduin is erroneous. Apart from the
fact that no other source agreed with him, he himself refuted this statement
when he mentioned on p. 33 that the Sakhr with their chief Qa‘dān al-Fā’is
were responsible for the attack. It is significant that not all the Leban-
ese chroniclers who were near-contemporary to the event mentioned the attack
on the Pilgrimage. Munayyir, al-Maghriq, 48 (1954), 682 seems to have been
the only exception. Again, of the two gabbaghs, only M. al-Sabbagh, the
less reliable, mentioned this event, see pp. 75-80, in which Zahir was im-
plicated.
who seem to have been related to the Şakhr, were alleged to have taken part in the attack. Ostensibly, the reason for the attack was the reluctance of Husayn Pasha to make the customary payment (garr) to the Şakhr and probably to those of their allies who used to receive it regularly. When he foresaw that the danger of being attacked was imminent, he tried unsuccessfully, at the last moment, to buy them off. It is stated that the Şakhr were determined to attack in revenge for their supersession as conductors of the Pilgrimage. Apart from the prestige of this function, it was a source of income as well. With the advance of the Anaza into Syria early in the 18th century, they took part in the transport of the Pilgrimage, and thus became rivals to the Şakhr. As‘ad Pasha, as already pointed out, had tightened his hold over the small tribes while he compromised with the strong ones. This made the small tribes await the right opportunity to react. They may also have been influenced by the belligerent attitude of the Ḥarb who the year before had besieged Medina, and had been bought off by As‘ad Pasha.

The Beduin along the Pilgrimage route had suffered from natural calamities in the year which preceded the attack. The excessive heat towards the end of 1169/August 1756, particularly in the region of Abar al-Ghanam,

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1Kahhala, II, 509, III, 493; cf. Seetzen, 237, 288; Budayrī, ff. 16a, 41b.
2M. al-Ṣabbagh, 78, 79; cf. Barīk, 45-6; al-Qārī, 80.
3M. al-Ṣabbagh, 75-8; PRO, S.P. 97/39; Istanbul, 3.12.57; cf. Seetzen, 288; see above p. 103.
4Barīk, 46; al-Qārī, 80. 
6See above p. 104. 
7Cf. Suwaydī, f. 114b; see above p. 104. 
8See above p. 258.
9See above p. 260. 
10 See Appendix, II, p. 411.
caused several casualties among them and a decrease in the number of camels.\footnote{\cit{Budayri}, f. 45b.} A severe frost in the winter of 1170/1756-7 affected the flocks and caused mortality among the Beduin.\footnote{\cit{Ibid.}, f. 46a.} These calamities may not have directly affected the Sakhr, but their impact on other neighbouring tribes must have caused a dislocation in the economy of the desert. The Pilgrimage was on its way back carrying goods which seem to have made the attack more tempting. In fact all the goods were plundered.\footnote{\cit{Ibid.}, f. 49a; Barîk, 46; al-Qari, 80; M. al-Šabbâgh, 73.} Furthermore, the fact that the attack took place in autumn, in which season the powerful Anaza usually withdrew from their advanced penetration in the direction of a region extending between Aleppo and Hadiyya into the interior is important.\footnote{\cit{Cf. Seetzen, 282.} \cit{Murâdî, II, 61.}} This not only offered more breathing space to the smaller semi-settled tribes on the periphery of the cultivated regions such as the Sakhr, but enabled them as well to manoeuvre more freely.

The administrative career of the commander of the Pilgrimage, Husayn Pasha b. Makkî, should be taken into account. Save for a short period when he became governor of the province of Jerusalem, Husayn Pasha was a deputy-governor of Gaza and Ramle, and, as such, subordinate to the governor of Damascus. In 1169/1755-6 he was granted two tûgs on the occasion of his appointment to the province of Jerusalem,\footnote{\cit{PRO, S.P. 97/39; Istanbul, 3.12.57; see above p. 265.}} and about a year later he was promoted to the rank of wazîr and appointed to Damascus.\footnote{\cit{Cf. Murâdî, II, 61.}} But he proved incapable of discharging the duties of this office.\footnote{\cit{Cf. Murâdî, II, 61.}} The fact that the regions...
he had governed before his appointment to Damascus were within the range of
the Şakhr seem to have made him acquainted with the Şakhr long before the
attack on the Pilgrimage. Nothing is more illustrative of the ill-feelings
that existed between him and his neighbours than his expressed determination,
after his appointment to Damascus, to resume possession of the regions whose
iltizam was usurped by Zahir al-‘Umar. This being the case Zahir might, as
has been alleged, have encouraged the Beduin to attack the Pilgrimage. In
fact, the Beduin sold almost all their booty to Zahir. The allegation can,
however, be neither substantiated nor rejected.

The connection between As‘ad Pasha’s death and the attack
on the Pilgrimage.

It has been alleged that As‘ad Pasha encouraged the Beduin to attack
the Pilgrimage, and that he was put to death and his property confiscated as
a result of his complicity. A recapitulation of events is illuminating at
this stage. Between roughly 20 Dhu ’l-Ḥijja 1170/5 September 1757 and 10
Ṣafar 1171/24 October 1757, the jarda and the Pilgrimage were attacked. Around
11 Muharrum 1171/25 September 1757, it was known in Aleppo that As‘ad Pasha
was deposed from its governorship for the second time. Around the middle
of October 1757 As‘ad Pasha left Aleppo for his new governorship of Siwas.

1 A. al-Şabbagh, ff. 10a, 10b. 2 M. al-Şabbagh, 79, 80.
3 Ibid.; Yanni, 322.
4 Barīk, 59; Tabbākh, III, 335; A.N.B 1 1032: Sidon, 19.10.58; Hammer, XVI,
17; Volney, 317, besides others who copied them.
5 A. N. B 1 87: Aleppo, 7.10.57; Tabbākh, III, 335.
In the second half of March 1758 orders were sent to Siwas for his arrest and exile to Crete on charges of complicity in the attack on the pilgrimage. On 5 Sha'bân 1171/14 April 1758 he was killed while on his way to exile, and his head was sent to Istanbul. News of his death spread in Syria towards the end of April 1758, and immediately followed the confiscation of his property.

Of the two contemporary Damascene chroniclers, Barîk mentioned that the execution of As'ad Pasha was the result of his complicity with the Beduin. Budayrî, on the other hand, mentioned no accusation; he may have heard and tacitly rejected it. Barîk simply related what was reported. Barîk always drew ethical conclusions, and in this case the accusation provided the missing link for interpreting the calamity that befell As'ad Pasha. Outside Damascus the contemporary Aleppine chronicler Ibn Mîro mentioned the accusation.

The jarda was attacked on 20 Dhu 'l-Hijja 1170/5 September 1757, before As'ad Pasha received the news of his second deposition from Aleppo. It could be argued that he might have learned of his deposition long before news of it reached Aleppo, probably before the attack on the jarda took place, and that he incited the Beduin well in time. While this is mere conjecture, it would not have been easy for As'ad Pasha to incite the Beduin at such

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1 Ṭabbâkh, III, 335; PRO, S.P. 97/40: Istanbul, 17.4.58.
2 Ṭabbâkh, III, 335, gave the place of his death as Ankara; A.N.B 88: Aleppo, 1.5.58, states that he was killed near Smyrna.
3 PRO, S.P. 97/40: Istanbul, 3.5.58.
4 A.N.B 88: Aleppo, 1.5.58, Aleppo, 31.5.58; Budayrî, f. 51b; Barîk, 59.
5 Barîk, 59.
6 Kurd ‘Alî, II, 292.
short notice. Furthermore, what purpose would this incitement serve? If As'ad Pasha had thought of exerting pressure at Istanbul to retain Aleppo, it would have been beneficial for him to resort to more immediate means such as buying off his deposition or fomenting a revolt in Aleppo, as he was advised by his friends to do. Furthermore, during his governorship of Damascus As'ad Pasha was not on friendly terms with the Sakhr and other small tribes, and he suspended the customary payment made to them on the occasion of the Pilgrimage. Also, to incite the Beduin to attack the Pilgrimage was incompatible with As'ad Pasha's administrative career. After his second deposition from Aleppo, he had not opposed the orders of the Sultan at a time when he could have offered more than a token resistance. Certainly the calamity that befell the Pilgrimage was as much a setback to Husayn Pasha as it was indirectly beneficial to As'ad Pasha. For fourteen years, before this attack, As'ad Pasha had almost always ensured the security of the Pilgrimage by force, money and diplomacy. This stands in glaring contrast to its unfortunate lot under his successor and focuses admiration more sharply on the past record of As'ad Pasha. But it is doubtful if this could have materialized to his benefit in Istanbul. The authorities there reacted otherwise and condemned As'ad Pasha to death.

There were, rather, other causes which brought about the death of As'ad Pasha. On 16 Safar 1171/30 October 1757 the death of Sultan 'Uthman III was announced, and his brother, Mustafa III, was proclaimed Sultan.  

1 Porter, Observations, 26; see above p. 254.  

2 Radcliffe papers, 66/5/3: Aleppo, 31.3.56.  

The accession of the new Sultan entailed great changes among officials both in Istanbul and in the provinces. On 24 Safar 1171/7 November 1757, only eight days after the accession of Sultan Muṣṭafā III, the powerful Kizlar Ağa, Ahmed Aboukouf, was exiled to Rhodes. Of no less importance was the confirmation of the Grand Vezir Rāghib Pasha who had assumed his office about six months before the death of Sultan ‘Uthmān III and held it until he died in 1763. The power of the Kizlar Ağa was already in decline, and the initiative was taken now by Rāghib Pasha, who was described by Hammer as the last Grand Vezir of the Ottoman Empire (of course until the end of the period on which he wrote, that is the beginning of the last quarter of the 18th century) to merit the title of 'Grand'.

News of the attack on the Pilgrimage reached Istanbul shortly after the accession of Muṣṭafā III. The people there were already restless at the rise in the price of bread and the rarity of meat and other necessities. The lack of security in the Anatolian countryside and the rapacity of the provincial governors, besides other reasons, caused thousands of Anatolians to swarm into Istanbul. Here they contributed to the heightening of social

2 Hammer, XVI, 163.
3 XVI, 88-90. 4 Cf. Ibid., XVI, 163-187.

It seems that the news of the attack reached Istanbul not earlier than the latter part of Nov. 1757, cf. A.N.B. 435: Istanbul 26.11.57; PRO, S.P. 97/39: Istanbul, 3.12.57; Hammer, XVI, 15, 16 mentions that news of the attack on the Pilgrimage reached Istanbul one month before the death of Sultan ‘Uthmān III. This is erroneous because the latter died on 30 Oct. 1756/16 Safar 1171, according to Hammer himself, and the attack on the Pilgrimage took place about a week before. Damascus itself knew of the attack on 17 Safar/31 Oct. It is possible, however, that the news of the attack on the jarda and not the Pilgrimage reached Istanbul one month before his death because this attack occurred on 20 Dhu ‘l-Hijja 1170/5 Sept. 1757, and this allows reasonable time, about 25 days, for the news to reach Istanbul.
tension.¹ There was nothing particularly new about such a situation except perhaps the rising crescendo of public dissatisfaction and the equally high expectations of the people after the accession of the new Sultan. On top of this came the disquieting news of the attack on the Pilgrimage. Many goods carried by the Pilgrimage and destined for Istanbul were lost.² Of more importance was the religious implication of the attack and the arrival of its news at an awkward time. Certain sacred relics awaited from Mecca, to be displayed on the occasion of the mawlid (the Prophet's nativity) on 12 Rabi' II/24 December, did not arrive, and this aroused the frenzy of the populace. The new Sultan could not disregard the growing discontent. The people had to be appeased. Many changes of officials were made, and continuous diwans and consultations were held.³ The Sultan ordered an amnesty for the persons imprisoned on account of debt.⁴ However, the Kizlar Agha, Aboukouf, was the first to pay for the disaster that befell the Pilgrimage. On 15 Rabi' I 1171/27 November 1757 he was killed and his head was exhibited to the people in front of the seraglio (the Sultan's residence) with an inscription asserting that he was the cause of the ruin of the Pilgrimage. He was accused of having caused, through venality, the deposition of the strong governor of Damascus, As'ad Pasha, and the appointment of his protégé Ḥusayn Pasha who was an obscure man neither loved nor feared by the Beduin. The sentence was legitimized by a fatwa issued in a diwan specially summoned by the Sultan to discuss the affairs of the Pilgrimage.⁵

It seems rather surprising that Ḥusayn Pasha b. Makkī, whose death was expected by foreign observers in Istanbul for his failure to ensure the security of the Pilgrimage, should remain at large, and indeed be offered other governorships later, while the Kizlar Agha paid with his head. By the standards of the time such an attitude in the authorities of Istanbul was not surprising because expediency and vengeance were dominant. The Kizlar Agha had been deposed on 24 Ṣafar/7 November, most probably before the news of the attack on the Pilgrimage had reached Istanbul, and anyway his deposition came primarily as a result of the changes that took place after the accession of the Sultan. Ṭaghib Pasha, the Grand Vezir, was determined on a bid for power. The deposition of his strong rival, the Kizlar Agha, thus becomes understandable. There were rumours at the time, that the Kizlar Agha was arrested after large amounts of money had been found with him. It should be emphasized here that his deposition was followed by his exile, while his arrest followed later, when the authorities intended to confiscate his property. This took place before the affair of the Pilgrimage was seriously discussed. The accusation of having been responsible for the disaster of the Pilgrimage was a convenient way if not of justifying his death to the public, at least of finding a scapegoat.

Asʿad Pasha did not profit from the fall of the Kizlar Agha. Ṭaghib Pasha, who was a declared enemy of his, had his authority very much enhanced at the time. To state in the accusation against the Kizlar Agha that through

2 See below p. 289.  
3 PRO, S.P. 97/39: Istanbul, 17.11.57.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Radcliffe papers, 6645/3: Aleppo, 31.3.58; see above p. 266.
his venality As'ad Pasha was removed from Damascus, suggests that the de-
position of As'ad Pasha was regretted. The accusation, however, was no
more than a pretext to get rid of the Kizlar Agha, and does not necessarily
imply that As'ad Pasha was at all favoured at Istanbul. The demonstrations
which the Aleppines had staged in protest against the first deposition of
As'ad Pasha from Aleppo could not be viewed with indifference, particularly
by Râghib Pasha. A second and successful attempt to denounce him was made
three months later. Thus the enemies of As'ad Pasha had their own way.
Six years after the attack on the Pilgrimage a French source in Sidon stated
that 'le détroussement de cette caravane importante et venerable à tous les
turcs, donna occasion aux ennemies d'Essad Pacha de l'accuser d'en être
la cause'.

Disposing of a person to obtain his money was not an unusual practice
in the Ottoman Empire. A newly-appointed Sultan particularly needed money.
On the occasion of his accession, Mustafa III doubled the pay of the janis-
saries. In spite of the economizing measures taken by Râghib Pasha, such
as reducing the expenses of the Sultan's household and diverting the money
to public services - a move which further weakened the influence of the
Kizlar Agha - there was in 1758 a great scarcity of provisions in Istanbul
as in other parts of the Empire. The populace in Istanbul stormed the bak-
ers' shops and became almost mutinous. Any source of money was therefore

1A.N.B. 1033: Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin).
2PRO, S.P. 97/39: Istanbul, 17.11.57.
3PRO, S.P. 97/40: Istanbul, 4.1.58.
4Ibid., Istanbul, 16.2.58, Istanbul, 17.3.58, Istanbul, 3.5.58, Istanbul, 17.5.58.
welcome to the Sultan, and more important, any further whipping up of the latent memory of the unfortunate Pilgrimage would be immediately rewarding, in the sense that the Sultan would appear as still concerned about this affair.

The desire to confiscate As'ad Pasha's property was attested by a foreign observer in Istanbul. In fact, before As'ad Pasha's death on 5 Sha'ban/14 April, an envoy of the Sultan left Aleppo on 1 April 1758 on his way to Hamah to arrest the agent of As'ad Pasha there and confiscate his property. The wealth of As'ad Pasha which was confiscated from Hamah and Damascus prompted the Sultan, among other things, to revalue the currency.

The occasion of the death of As'ad Pasha was also utilized by the Sultan to confiscate the property of some merchants, with whom As'ad Pasha had relations, at Aleppo and possibly at Damascus. But there is no suggestion that those merchants were in collusion with the Beduin.

It is significant that the 'Azm governors were not held collectively responsible. Of the two brothers of As'ad Pasha, Sa'ed al-Din Pasha and

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1 PRO, S.P. 97/40: Istanbul, 17.4.58.
2 A.N.B 88: Aleppo, 1.5.58. 
3 Ibid.
4 Budayri, f. 51b; Barik, 59, 60. The total amount of cash confiscated was estimated by one source (PRO, S.P. 97/40: Istanbul, 16.3.58) as above 80,000 purses. Another source (A.N.B 88: Aleppo, 31.5.58) put it at 70,000 purses, and still another (Barik, 60) at 100,000 purses. When this wealth was transferred to Istanbul, every governor along the way was instructed to ensure its safety within the limits of his province, see A.N.B 88: Aleppo, 11.12.58.
6 A.N.B 88: Aleppo 4.11.58.
7 See Mura'd, IV, 209, 210 for the arrest of Abd al-Karim al-Safa jalani. Members of this family were noted merchants in Damascus, see above p.135.
Muṣṭafā Pasha, only the last was discredited and deprived of his tuğs at the time, although it is not clear that he was accused of complicity, and, besides, there is no evidence that his wealth was confiscated.\(^1\) Saʻd al-Dīn Pasha, who was governor of Sidon at the time, was not disgraced,\(^2\) but he took precautionary measures to ensure his security.\(^3\)

As for Ḥusayn Pasha, he was back in favour four years later, and in 1762 he was appointed governor of Marʻash.\(^4\) He remained in this office for about one year,\(^5\) after which he returned to his native place, Gaza. Eventually he was killed in a fight with the Ṣakhir and the Wāḥidāt Beduin on 25 Rabī‘ I 1197/30 March 1783.\(^6\)

### II Restoration of Order by ‘Abd Allāh Pasha Chataji

In the assembly convoked by Sultan Muṣṭafā III to deliberate on the affairs of the Pilgrimage, ‘Abd Allāh Pasha Chataji was appointed governor of Damascus.\(^8\) He assumed his governorship on 27 Rabī‘ II 1171/8 January 1758.

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1\(^{A.N.B}^1\) 1033: Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin).
2\(^{A.N.B}^2\) 1032: Sidon, 8.4.58.
3\(^{A.N.B}^3\) 1033: Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin).
4\(\text{i.bid.}; A.N.B^1\) 88: Aleppo, 3.9.62; Muradi, II, 62.
5\(\text{i.bid.}; A.N.B^1\) 89: Aleppo, 17.1.64; Muradi, II, 62. 6Muradi, II, 62.
7Given sometimes as ‘Abdī (al-Qari, 81, 83) which seems to have been a shortened form of ‘Abd Allāh.
8Hammer, XVI, 16, 17.
9The date on which he arrived varied among the chroniclers. Two agreed on the above one (al-Qari, 81, and Barīk, 49) although the last wrongly gave the date of 27.12.57 as equivalent. Budayrī, f. 50a, gave the date as 28 Rabī‘ II. Two other sources, Dhikr man tawallā, f. 115a, and Risala, f. 15a, gave it as 18 Rabī‘ II.
'Abd Allāh Pasha b. Ibrāhīm was born in the city of Jarmak (written also Jarmaka), in the province of Dīyār Bakr, in 1115/1703-4. He distinguished himself in the Ottoman army in the wars against Nadir Shāh and elsewhere, and acquired the title of Chataji (leader of the vanguard) for his bravery. He was appointed to various governorships, and before his appointment to Damascus he was governor of Aleppo. His appointment to Damascus was due largely to his ability to restore order and ensure the safety of the Pilgrimage. 'Abd Allāh Pasha lived up to this expectation. His entry into Damascus was impressive militarily. Forty bayraqs of Dalātīyya, fifty bayraqs of Lawand and twenty bayraqs of Amnūṭ (Albanians) accompanied him. Soon he was confronted with two immediate tasks: the elimination of the disorderly troops in Damascus and the pacification of the Pilgrimage route.

1 al-Wakīl, Taḥrīr, f. 5b; Murādī, III, 81.
2 al-Wakīl, ff. 59-13a; Volney, 317-9 substantiates this general picture, but the particulars he gave are doubtful.
3 Hammer, XVI, 16, translated the term as 'general des tirailleurs'; al-Wakīl, f. 10b, explained the term chataji as mighwar (he who raids).
4 al-Wakīl, f. 12a; Murādī, III, 81, mentions that he was appointed to Aleppo in Muharram 1172/Sept.-Oct. 1758 before his appointment to Damascus. Taḥbakh, III, 337 and K. al-Ghazzī, III, 301 copied him. This date is erroneous because 'Abd Allāh Pasha succeeded As'ad Pasha in Aleppo. On 10 Rabi' II 1171/22 December 1757 'Abd Allah Pasha left Aleppo for Damascus, see A. N. B1 87: Aleppo, 24.12.57.
5 al-Wakīl, ff. 14a-14b, 15b, 16a; Murādī, Matmakh, f. 39b.
6 Literally bayraq means standard. According to Ibn Kinān, I, f. 72b, writing in the first half of the 18th century, the bayraq consisted of about fifty persons. On this basis, the total number of the troops that accompanied 'Abd Allāh Pasha amounted to about 6500. This is somewhat substantiated by another source. After the deposition of 'Abdallah Pasha from Damascus he was reported, on his arrival to Aleppo, to have with him from seven to eight thousand troops, see A. N. B1 88: Aleppo, 1.3.60. Volney, writing in the last quarter of the 18th century, states, however, that the bayraq (drapeau) consisted of ten men. His estimate seems to have been true of his time because it is substantiated by a contemporary French source, see (cont.)
In the interregnum between the flight of Ḥusayn Pasha to Gaza and the arrival of ‘Abd Allāh Pasha, the Kapi Kulus clashed anew with the Yerliyya on 5 Rabī‘ II 1171/17 December 1757, undeterred by the surrounding misery and grief that resulted from the attack on the Pilgrimage.1 ‘Abd Allāh Pasha tried to purge the ranks of the Yerliyya of the insubordinate members. Aware of this impending danger, the Yerliyya began to marshal their forces and defy the governor.2 He asked to meet a group of them, and on their refusal, he ordered the inhabitants of the quarters where they lived to vacate their houses. He then summoned a diwan, probably to make the notables share in the responsibility for his action. At the head of his troops, ‘Abd Allāh Pasha marched against the Yerliyya who gathered in the Maydan. The Yerliyya suffered heavy casualties, and many were captured. Those of them who fled into the countryside were chased by his troops. Although ‘Abd Allāh Pasha prevented looting, many atrocities were committed. The contemporary chronicler, perhaps using a cliché, considered the event the worst since that of Timūr.3

This was the second suppression of the Yerliyya in a relatively short time.4 It is true that there were many zorab among their ranks, but it is important to notice that very often the disciplining of the zorab was used as a pretext for disciplining the whole corps. This created a

(cont.) A.N.B1 1036: Sidon, 28.2.74 (Bulletin) which mentions ‘un secours de 150 bannières (environ 1500 hommes)’. Volney may have based his information on this French source.

1Budayrī, f. 50a; Barīk, 49. 2Budsyrī, f. 50b. 3Ibid., ff. 50b, 51a; Barīk, 50, 51; Muradī, Matmah, f. 33b; cf. Kurd ʿAll II, 296-7; Shihab, Lubbān, I, 45; Shihab, Nuzha, MS. Camb. f. 24a; Munayyir, al-Mashriq, 48 (1954), 682. 4See above pp. 218 ff.
feeling of solidarity among its members. Much depends, however, on know-
ing why a yerli was regarded as a zorba, and by whom he was so regarded. 
Very often the Damascene power groups, notably the Yerliyya, the Ashraf 
and the ‘Ulama’, concerted action against a common enemy such as an offen-
sive governor, a mercenary, or a regular alien military group. Given the 
self-assertion that developed among the Damascenes and particularly the 
Yerliyya, it was not unusual for some of the latter to be corrupted and to 
get out of control. However, if one looks at the actions of the zorab and 
the Yerliyya in general from the point of view of the Damascenes, it becomes 
apparent that the Yerliyya were defending the interests of the Damascenes 
against alien groups. Seen from the point of view of the Ottoman authori-
ties, the Yerliyya were considered unruly and insubordinate. It is true 
that their excesses affected, not unnaturally, some Damascenes. But the vol-
ume of their danger to the Damascenes was in no way comparable to the dan-
ger of the mercenary troops. It is significant in this respect that the 
term zorba was borrowed by the Arab chroniclers from Turkish. Murādī re-
ferred to the zorab as ru‘ā‘ (rabble)\(^1\) - a designation which cut across 
military and civilians alike.\(^2\) However, the terms zorab and ru‘ā‘ were 
usually dropped in the writings of the Damascene chroniclers when referring 
to a joint Damascene action against an alien group. Instead, these chroni-
clers/used the term abna‘ al-Shām or Dimashq. The suppression of the Yer-
liyya implied, therefore, a weakening of the Damascenes' self-assertion and 

\(^1\) Silk, II, 61, Matmah, ff. 38b, 39b; cf. al-Wakīl, ff. 14b, 15a. 
\(^2\) See above p. 138.
consequently of their ability to guard against extortion. It is no wonder
that the contemporary Damascene chronicler had referred to ‘Abd Allah on the
occasion of his recompense by the Sultan for having suppressed the Yerliyya as
having conquered (fatah) Damascus. The Arabic connotation of the term is
stronger than its English translation because it conveys the meaning of a fresh
Ottoman conquest, in other words the re-establishment of Ottoman authority
against Damascene predominance.

After the Yerliyya were subdued, the Damascenes were subjected to a ser­
ies of molestations. Some of the governor’s troops practised extortions on
them both when they were on service and after they were discharged. The vil­
lages in the vicinity of Damascus suffered most from the insubordination of
these troops. On more than one occasion ‘Abd Allah Pasha and his entourage
levied money from the Damascenes. Yet he tried to relieve them by forcefully
curbing the lawlessness of his troops. Furthermore, he paid his troops with
a certain kind of coin received from Istanbul, which was not at that time cur­
rent in Damascus. To avoid being compelled to accept it, the Damascenes closed
their shops until ‘Abd Allah Pasha went on the dawra. A shortage of food sup­
plies affected Damascus at the time, and prices went up. Crowds gathered out­
side the bakers’ shops and beggars increased considerably. The shortage seems
to have been due largely to a widespread bad harvest which caused famine in

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1Barîk, 52. 2Budayrî, f. 51a.
3Ibid.; Barîk, 52. 4Budayrî, f. 51a.
5Barîk, 52, 53.
6Ibid., 52, 53, 58; Budayrî (ff. 51a, 51b) described the miserable state of
the crowd outside the bakers’ shops in these words, tasma lahun bukâ wahâlîb yuqâṭṭi al-qulûb wa’l-akbad.
such places as Mosul, Diyar Bakr and as far as Istanbul. The disastrous blow dealt to the Pilgrimage a few months earlier, apart from causing the loss of many goods, discouraged many persons from going on the Pilgrimage the following year, and this affected the economy of Damascus. On the other hand, the trade of Sidon, to which the trade of Damascus was linked in many ways, was suffering a relapse partly because of the extortions of the governor, Sa‘d al-Dîn Pasha al-‘Azm, partly because of the interruption of French trade in the Mediterranean owing to the Seven years’ War (1756–63) and partly also because of a decrease in the price of local commodities in Marseille.

With the Yerliyya suppressed and the economic situation looming over them, the Damascenes could do nothing to check the excesses of ‘Abd Allâh Pasha and his troops. They tried on one occasion to ward off by force the evils of his troops but failed. The Damascenes lacked a leader. The ‘Ulama were unable to give them a lead because they were not spared the molestation of ‘Abd Allâh Pasha and many were arrested by him. He exiled Naqîb al-‘Aghrâ: Humza Efendi, for an unknown reason, and had him succeeded by ‘Ali Efendi al-‘Ajlûnî. On the other hand, ‘Abd Allâh Pasha was not without admirers among the ‘Ulama’. He was a man of letters and enjoyed the company of many literate persons. 

1PRO, S.P. 97/40: Istanbul, 16.2.58; Barîk, 58, 59.
2A.N.B1 58: Aleppo, 1.5.58. 3A.N.B1 1032: Sidon, 18.1.59.
4Ibid., Sidon, 10.3.59.
5Radcliffe papers, 6645/7: Aleppo, 2.2.59; Masson, 512, 513, 518, 519.
6Budayrî, f. 51a. 7Murâdî, Matmah, f. 38b. 8Budayrî, f. 51a.
9Murâdî, III, 206–8.
10He composed a work entitled Anbâr al-Jinan fi ay al-Qur’ân, Murâdî, I, 98; Hammer, XVI, 57.
ary figures in Damascus, some of whom dedicated many poems in his praise.  
The safety he ensured for the Pilgrimage raised his credit with the religious people. His policy of not alienating all the Damascenes made him lend his ear to the advice of 'Ali al-Muradī who was most outspoken in reprimanding him for his injustice and that of his soldiery.

'Abd Allāh Pasha had a mandate from the Sultan to do what he pleased. Stringent security measures were taken by him to keep things under control. The Tufenqjis kept a close watch in Damascus during the night, and 'Abd Allāh Pasha frequently made inspection tours incognito. There was also much spying on the people. The judge acted as muhtasib and toured the market, punishing those whose weights were defective, and recompensing the honest. Such measures helped to stamp out corruption. But, with the Damascenes subdued, a favoured group, known as the 'awaniyya, gathered around the governor and practised mischief blatantly, as in the governorship of 'Uthman Pasha Abū Ṭauq.

Towards the end of his governorship, Damascus suffered from a series of earthquakes. Already on 14 Dhu 'l-Hijja 1170/30 August 1757, severe tremors had shaken the city. But these were in no way comparable to the later

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1 See Murādī, I, 98; Matmah, f. 73b; al-Makīl, ff. 59a, 62b, 64a.
2 See below p. 298.
3 Murādī, Matmah, ff. 33b, 39b, 40a, cf. ffs. 35b-31b; Budayri, f. 51a.
4 Barīk, 66; cf. Budayri, f. 52a; Muwaqqī, al-Barq, f. 251a.
5 Budayri, f. 52a.
6 Ibid.
7 See above p. 101 n.1.
8 Barīk, 61.
9 See above p. 101
10 Budayri, f. 43a.
earthquake which occurred on Tuesday 8 Rabî‘ I 1173/30 October, 1759. It was followed by another severe earthquake on Sunday night 5-6 Rabî‘ II/26-27 November, of the same year. The resulting damage was startling. Several casualties occurred, and many buildings collapsed. The Umayyad Mosque was badly damaged. The calamity was not restricted to Damascus. The whole region extending between Aleppo and Antioch in the north and ‘Arîsh in the south, suffered in varying degrees. Damascus, however, seems to have been most affected.1 ‘Abd Allāh Pasha dealt severely with the malefactors who took advantage of the situation.2

‘Abd Allāh Pasha's forceful policy outside Damascus.

After pacifying Damascus, ‘Abd Allāh Pasha left for the dawra. He tried to make his tour look as impressive militarily as his entry to Damascus had been. Two big guns which had, for many years, flanked the gate of the citadel3 were taken with him. Guns of another kind, known as shawāḥî which provided more flexibility in firing by turning to the sides, were adjusted to camels' backs.4 While on the dawra, ‘Abd Allāh Pasha occupied the fortress of al-Karak and fortified it.5 Al-Karak, like the nearby al-Shawbak, was

1For detailed accounts on these earthquakes see: 'Zilzal sanat 1173 A.H.', al-Maṣḥūrī, 42 (1948) pp. 333-47, edited by Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Dār Ḥamān; see also Budayrī, ff. 52b-53a; Barīk, 68; al-Qarī, 82, 83; A.N.B 1032; (Des Jardins de Seyde), 22.12.59, 28.12.59, 4.1.60; 27.3.60 (as is apparent the consul took shelter outside Sidon); A.N.B 1120: Tripoli, 4.2.60, Tripoli, 12.8.60; A.N.B 88: Aleppo, 11.12.59, Aleppo, 24.12.59, Aleppo, 14.1.60; PRO, S.P. 110/36: Aleppo, 22.12.59; A.N.B 436: Istanbul, 29.12.59; Hammer, XVI, 49, 50.

2Barīk, 70.  
3Cf. Egmont and Heyman, II, 253.

4Budayrī, ff. 51a, 51b; al-Qarī, 82.

5al-Qarī, 82.
under the jurisdiction of the governor of Damascus. The fortress of al-Karak was, at the time, in a dilapidated condition and used by the Beduin for shelter. Since it was about three hours walk from Qa‘rana, near the place where the jarda and the Pilgrimage were attacked the year before, its fortification was of strategic importance. Furthermore, it was in the region frequented by the Sakhr Beduin. By asserting his authority over it and manning it with Yerliyya, ‘Abd Allāh Pasha was taking precautionary measures to ward off any future attack on the Pilgrimage by the Sakhr. By sending the Yerliyya to keep watch in it, he was reminding them of their official duty, and this in turn served as a safety valve for their possible resurgence and insubordination in Damascus.

It seems that the show of force which ‘Abd Allāh Pasha exhibited on the dawra eliminated any chances of possible resistance. No clashes were reported between him and the Druzes or Ẓahir al-‘Umar, possibly also because of the internal preoccupation of the latter. Besides, ‘Abd Allāh Pasha was not of local origin nor had he occupied any of the local governorships of Damascus, Sidon or Tripoli; hence he was not entangled in local rivalries or prejudices.

While he was on the dawra, the mutasallim in Damascus, presumably Sulaymān Agha, resumed the policy of force initiated by ‘Abd Allāh Pasha. He hanged one person, for an unknown reason, and put to death a sharīf who was

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1 Muhammad Adīb, 45; ‘Ayn-i Ali, 274.
2 al-Wakīl, f. 44a; cf. Muhammad Adīb, 45.
3 Muhammad Adīb, 45. 4 al-Qārī, 82; cf. al-Wakīl, f. 44a.
5 Ibn al-Siddīq, f. 29a; see above p. 65. 6 See below p. 65.
7 cf. Budayrī, f. 52a.
accused of having fought on the side of the Yerliyya. If the accusation was untrue, it is illustrative, nevertheless, of the common interests between the Yerliyya and the Ashraf vis-à-vis the governor.

The second and major task of 'Abd Allah Pasha was to ensure the safety of the Pilgrimage. On 24 Ramaqr 1171/12 May 1758, he returned from the dawra, and on 17 Shawwal/24 June, he left with the Pilgrimage accompanied by a large number of soldiers.\(^1\) Shortly before, possibly when he was on the dawra, 'Abd Allah Pasha dispatched troops against the Sakhr, who were worsted in the fighting that took place.\(^2\) This seems to have made them more amenable to reason. They were satisfied, at the moment, to present 'Abd Allah Pasha with a petition asking for their customary garr. But 'Abd Allah Pasha ignored their demand.\(^3\) On his arrival at Medina, the Harb asked also for their garr, threatening, otherwise, to block his way to Mecca. Using this as a pretext to discipline them, 'Abd Allah Pasha attacked the Harb and inflicted a heavy defeat on them. Among the dead was 'Id, the belligerent chief of this tribe. 'Abd Allah Pasha then, with the help of the Sharif of Mecca, installed the uncle of 'Id, Khuzā' b. Maḍīān as shaykh of the Harb. Khuzā' was more dedicated to peace and undertook to ensure the safety of the Pilgrimage provided the usual garr were paid. This was granted by 'Abd Allah Pasha.\(^4\) The triumph of 'Abd Allah Pasha caused much relief. The Medinese scholar Ja'far al-Barzanji\(^5\) wrote a treatise entitled al-Nafṣ al-farajī.

\(^1\) Budayrī, f. 51b; Barīk, 59; al-Wakil, f. 44a.
\(^2\) al-Wakil, ff. 43b, 44a.
\(^3\) Ibid., f. 44b.
\(^4\) Ibid., ff. 45b-50b; al-Garī, 82; Budayrī, f. 52a; Murādī, III, 81; Hammer, XVI, 32; cf. A.N.B.88: Aleppo, 26.10.58.
\(^5\) For his biography see Murādī, II, 9.
fī 'l-fāth al-Jatājī, to commemorate this victory. The Sultan also gained in prestige locally. The assembled muftīs of the four Sunni schools in Mecca decreed that the title of Ghāzi should be added henceforth to the Sultan's other titles in the Friday prayer.

The Ṣāḥib who had been rebuffed by 'Abd Allāh Pasha tried to take vengeance on the jardā. This was conducted by 'Abd al-Raḥmān Pasha, governor of Tripoli, who also refused to pay them the ṣarr, and eventually came to blows with them in the plain of Tabout-Kourousi (another name for al-Hasa).

'Abd Allāh Pasha concerted action with 'Abd al-Raḥmān Pasha and defeated the Ṣāḥib. Hammer alone mentions the capture and decapitation by 'Abd Allāh Pasha of the chiefs of the three tribes of Ṣāḥib, 'Anaza and Nabhān.

Damascus celebrated the triumph of 'Abd Allāh Pasha over the Beduin. Its prominent Ulama' such as 'Āḥmad al-Maninī, 'Abd al-Ḡadīr al-Kaylānī and Sa'īd al-Samman, dedicated many poems to 'Abd Allāh Pasha on the occasion. In addition to ensuring the safety of the Pilgrimage, 'Abd Allāh Pasha decorated the Mahmil, which was shabby after having been captured. This also earned him credit, particularly among the pious in Damascus.

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1 Murādī, III, 82. 2 Hammer, XVI, 32, 33.
3 cf. al-Qārī, 82.
5 Ibn Kinānī referred to it as Tabut Qaṣāṣī.
6 PRO, S.P. 97/40: Istanbul, 4.11.58.
7 XVI, 33.
8 Barīk, 59.
10 al-Wakīl, ff. 65a, 65b.
On 16 Shawwal 1172/12 June 1755, ‘Abd Allah Pasha commanded the Pilgrimage for the second year running. Sa’d al-Dīn Pasha al-Azm, who had been deposed from Sidon in early March of the same year, accompanied the Pilgrimage to his new governorship of Jedda. The combined forces of the two governors deterred the suppressed Beduin from any intended retaliation. ‘Abd Allah Pasha, acting on the orders of the Porte, deposed the Sharīf of Mecca, Musa’id b. Sa’īd, and appointed his brother, Ja’far, in his place.  

‘Abd Allah Pasha’s deposition was attributed to his deposition of the Sharīf of Mecca, Musa’id b. Sa’īd. This Sharīf had many supporters in Mecca, among whom were the muftīs. After the departure of ‘Abd Allah Pasha with the Pilgrimage, Sharīf Musa’id regained power and appealed to Istanbul against his deposition. Two assemblies were held at the Porte, which confirmed him in power and deposed ‘Abd Allah Pasha. It is ironical that this should have been the main reason for the deposition of ‘Abd Allah Pasha because he was acting on the instructions of the Porte when he deposed Sharīf Musa’id. Apparently, the deposition of ‘Abd Allah Pasha served to save the face of the Porte. But the fact that ‘Abd Allah Pasha had won many victories both in Damascus and outside it, and that his personal prestige had grown...


2 Ibid., Sidon, 26.9.59; Budayrī, f. 52a; Tabbakh, III, 329.

3 Hammer, XVI, 47, 48; Murādī, III, 81; Budayrī, f. 52a, note the discrepancy in the dating at this juncture, see above p. 10; al-Qārī, 82, the sequence of his events at this point is erroneous.

4 Murādī, III, 81.

5 Hammer, XVI, 47, 48.

6 Ibid.

7 His protection of the Pilgrimage was particularly acclaimed, cf. Hammer, XVI, 57.
seem to have been further considerations which brought about his deposition. His subsequent appointment to the governorship of Diyar Bakr seems to have been welcome to ‘Abd Allāh Pasha in the sense that it was his native land, and as far as the Sultan was concerned, he might again be of use in the regions which bordered on Persia, where he built up his military career. While governor of Diyar Bakr, ‘Abd Allāh Pasha died, probably in the month of Rābī’ II 1174/Nov.-Dec. 1760.  

The Governorship of Muḥammad Pasha Chāliq.

Before his entry into Damascus on Monday, 1 Rajab 1173/18 February 1760, Muḥammad Pasha appointed, on 15 Jumāda II/3 February, Mustafa, Agha of the Kapi Kulus, as mutasallim. Muḥammad Pasha was governor of Tripoli before his appointment to Damascus, and in this capacity he commanded the jarda in the second Pilgrimage of ‘Abd Allāh Pasha Chataji.

The Yerliyya did not cause any trouble after the deposition of ‘Abd Allāh Pasha partly because they had not yet recovered from the blow which they were dealt by the latter, and partly also because of the disastrous impact of the earthquakes. By contrast, the Kapi Kulus, not having as many vested interests as the Yerliyya, seem to have been less affected by the earthquakes; hence probably their ability to maintain their dominance. It is no wonder, therefore, that Muḥammad Pasha appointed the agha of the Kapi Kulus as mutasallim.

1Hammer, XVI, 57; cf. A.N.B1 88: Aleppo, 28.1.60, Aleppo, 1.3.60; Muradī's statement, II, 81, that ‘Abd Allāh Pasha died in Jumada (?) 1174, at the earliest, 9th December 1760 is erroneous because news of his death reached Aleppo on 4 Dec. 1760, cf. A.N.B1 88: Aleppo, 18.12.60. It could be, however, that the news reached Damascus in Jumada.

2Budayrī, f. 53a; al-Qārī, 83. 3Risāla, f. 15a; Dhikr man tawallā, f. 115a.

4A.N.B1 1120p Tripoli, 4.2.60; A.N.B1 88: Aleppo, 28.1.60; Hammer, XVI, 47, 48.
The plague which followed the earthquakes confronted the new governor on his arrival. The first symptoms of the disease in Damascus became apparent in Jumāda II 1173/Jan.-Feb. 1760. It seems that the plague started in Safad, controversial though this remains, and, with the dispersion of its inhabitants by the earthquakes, spread to other places. The next city to be attacked was Acre, and from there it spread to Sidon. From the region of Acre it penetrated Damascus. Within a short period it engulfed a region extending between Antioch and Smyrna, in the north, and Gaza, in the south. The earthquakes made conditions favourable to its spread. The degree of havoc caused by the plague differed from one place to the other, and it seems that Aleppo was slightly affected. Damascus was the worst hit and, according to various accounts, about one thousand persons died there every day, probably at the peak of the epidemic which seems to have lasted about a week, around the end of Ramadān 1173/middle of May 1760. The plague lasted for about six months, two thirds of the term of Muhammad Pasha. Further sporadic outbreaks occurred in the following year, but were not as serious.

1 PRO, S.P. 97/41: Istanbul, 18.6.60.
2 A.N.B 1032: (Des Jardins de Seyde), 22.12.59.
3 Ibid. (Des Jardins de Seyde), 28.12.59.
4 Ibid. (Des Jardins de Seyde), 4.1.60. 5 Barīk, 70.
6 Ibid.; A.N.B 1032: (Des Jardins de Seyde), 27.3.60; A.N.B 1120: Tripoli, 4.2.60; PRO, S.P. 97/41: Istanbul, 18.6.60, Istanbul, 4.7.60; Mariti, I, 283-94.
7 PRO, S.P. 110/36: Aleppo, 26.4.60.
8 al-Qaṭī, 83; Budayrī's statement, f. 53b, which implies that about 1000 funerals came out from every gate of the city is incredible and seems rather to mean the sum total, cf. Ibn Jum'a, 40; see also, PRO, S.P. 110/36: Aleppo, 13.6.60. A notorious figure who died in the plague was the zorba, Ahmad al-Qalṭaqī, Budayrī, f. 53b.

(cont.)
plague, a severe frost affected the crops, and prices of foodstuffs increased considerably.\(^1\)

The Sultan showed much concern about what happened, particularly about the damage that befell the Umayyad Mosque and the citadel.\(^2\) On 22 Rajab 1173/16 March 1760, a deputation, headed by Muṣṭafā Sabānīkh-Zāde and including a chief architect arrived in Damascus to start reconstruction.\(^3\) The Sultan contributed a large sum of money for this purpose,\(^4\) Other sums were assigned in the wills of deceased persons, the majority of whom seem to have been victims of the plague, for reconstruction.\(^5\) Work continued until the second year of the governorship of Ḫūdān Pasha.\(^6\)

After one dawra, and one Pilgrimage, both of which went fairly smoothly, Muḥammad Pasha was deposed from Damascus on 27 Rabi‘ I 1174/6 November 1760,\(^7\) to the relief of the Damascenes. Apart from his arbitrary rule,\(^8\) the people considered his governorship an omen of bad luck.\(^9\)

\(^{cont.}\)

\(^{9}\)Barīk, 70; A.N.B\(^{1}\) 1032: Sidon, 16.9.60; PRO, S.P. 110/36: Aleppo, 30.6.60, Aleppo, 10.7.60; al-Qārī, 83 states that the plague stayed in Damascus for four months.

\(^{10}\)Budayrī, f. 54b, cf. Murādī, III, 87.

\(^{1}\)Budayrī, f. 53b. \(^{2}\)al-Qārī, 83.

\(^{3}\)Budayrī, f. 53b; Murādī, Matmāh, f. 67b; Hammer, XVI, 50.

\(^{4}\)Hammer, XVI, 50. \(^{5}\)Murādī, III, 82.

\(^{6}\)Budayrī, f. 54a; cf. Murādī, Matmāh, f. 67b.

\(^{7}\)Budayrī, f. 54a. \(^{8}\)Barīk, 71; al-Qārī, 83.

\(^{9}\)al-Qārī, 83.
Chapter 7

THE GOVERNORSHIP OF 'UTHMĀN PASHA AL-KURJĪ, 1760-71.

The background of 'Uthmān Pasha and his connection with the 'Aẓms.

'Uthmān Pasha was appointed to Damascus on 27 Rabī' II 1174/6 November 1760. Before he entered it on 3 Jumādā I 1174/11 December 1760, he appointed a certain Sulaymān Bey as mutasallim.

Nothing is known about the early life of 'Uthmān Pasha b. 'Abd Allāh except that he was of Georgian origin, and a mamlūk of As'ad Pasha al-'Aẓm. The term mamlūk does not imply here a member of an established power group, as was the case in Egypt and in Baghdad at the time. It rather signified a master-slave relationship. 'Uthmān Pasha was not the only mamlūk of As'ad Pasha. Other mamlūks are known to have been in the service of the latter. Again, As'ad Pasha was not the only 'Aẓm to have mamlūks in his service. Sulaymān Pasha al-'Aẓm, for example, had at least one mamlūk. Nor were the 'Aẓms the only family to have mamlūks during this period. The Maydānīs who

1Budayrī, f. 54a.  
2Murādī, III, 161; cf. al-Qārī, 83.
3Risāla, f. 15a; Dhikr man tawallā, f. 115a.
4The ambiguous name 'Abd Allāh (slave of God) was usually used by devshirme recruits and Caucasian tribute-children, see P.M. Holt, 'The exalted lineage of Ridwān Bey', BSOAS, XXII, 3, 1959, 225. It was very often used to identify mamlūks whose fathers were not known or perhaps whose names were embarrassingly non-Muslim, particularly after they had acquired a high position which necessitated their being known with a matching, albeit ambiguous, Muslim name; cf. Murādī, IV, 245; cf. Muḥibbī, III, 299.
5Barīk, 71, referred to him as 'Uthmān Pasha al-Kurjī.
6See the list of Yerliwa officers on the back of the front cover and in f. 1b of the MS. of Ibn al-Šiddīq.
7Budayrī, f. 7a.  
were merchants in Damascus had mamlûks of their own. A certain Ḥasan Efendi al-Daftarî (killed in Ḥamāh in 1106/1694-5) is stated to have had forty mamlûks.  

The relationship that existed between such mamlûks and their masters did not present insurmountable barriers in the face of the prominence of these mamlûks. Yusuf b. 'Abd Allāh, for example, who was originally a mamlûk of the Maydânîs, figured among the aʿrân of Murādî. Sometimes, a mamlûk might be entrusted with administrative work, depending of course on the status of his master. 'Uthmān Pasha, for one, acted as mutasallîm for Asʿad Pasha in Ḥamāh, presumably during the period when the latter was governor of Damascus, because Ḥamāh was given to him as mālikân. Such mamlûks were admitted also into the Yerliya corps and some of them held high ranks in it. For, once they were initiated into public life, it was easy for them to continue on their own. Former mamlûks of Asʿad Pasha figured in the Yerliya corps around 1185/1771-2. It should be noted however that not every governor of Damascus had mamlûks because these were not so much necessitated by his office as they were basically dependent on his economic and social status. No mention has been made of a Damascene governor, at least during the period under study, who raised mamlûks for military purposes. The private or mercenary troops were quite different in recruitment, organisation and status.

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1 Murādî, IV, 245, 246.  
2 Ibid., II, 31-33.  
3 Ibid., IV, 245, 246.  
4 Ibid., III, 161; Barîk, 71; A.N.B 88: Aleppo, 28.6.60.  
5 Tabbâkh, III, 335.  
6 See back of front cover and f. 1b of the MS of Ibn al-Ṣiddîq.
from the Mamlük troops.

A decisive turn in 'Uthmân Pasha's administrative career came about after As'ad Pasha's death and the confiscation of his property. On 22 Rajab 1171/1 April 1758, about a fortnight before the death of As'ad Pasha, the Sultan's emissaries left Aleppo for Hamah to arrest As'ad Pasha's agent there and to confiscate his property. It seems that this agent was 'Uthmân Pasha who, in spite of rumours about his escape, was arrested and taken to Istanbul. He was later sent to Damascus with the rank of vazîr. According to Murâdî providence helped 'Uthmân Pasha to extricate himself, and he was appointed governor of Damascus with the rank of vazîr. The latter statement is erroneous because 'Uthmân Pasha was appointed first to Tripoli and not to Damascus.

'Uthmân Pasha was said to have divulged information to the Sultan about the places where As'ad Pasha hid his money, and for this reason he acquired the surname of al-Ṣâdíq (the Truthful). It seems that this cooperation on the part of 'Uthmân Pasha brought him a promise of an administrative office and, in early 1760, he was appointed Governor of Tripoli. A rumour was current in Aleppo where he was at the time of his appointment to Tripoli, that the Sultan had elevated him to this office so as to be able eventually to confiscate the wealth he was suspected of having retained.

Between the arrest of 'Uthmân Pasha and his appointment to Tripoli in

1 A.N.B 188: Aleppo, 1.5.58.  2 Ibid.
3 Murâdî, III, 161.  4 Ibid.
5 Muwaqqi', f. 25lb.
6 A.N.B 188: Aleppo, 28.1.60; A.N.B 1120: Tripoli, 4.2.60, Tripoli, 17.4.60.
7 A.N.B 188: Aleppo, 19.2.60.
Jumādā I 1173/January 1760, nothing is known about his whereabouts except that he was in Aleppo at the above date. On 16 February he left for Tripoli amid a superb procession which surprised the Aleppines. In Tripoli he succeeded Muḥammad Pasha Ghāliq who was appointed to Damascus. While governor of Tripoli, 'Uthmān Pasha commanded the jarda in Dhu 'l-Ḥijja 1173/July-August 1760. He showed much zeal in this commission and awaited the Pilgrimage in Hadiyya, a long way towards Mecca, which no commander known to Budayrī had done before. Furthermore, he performed many acts of charity, and, according to the previous source, news of this reached Istanbul and as a result he was appointed to Damascus, probably with the rank of wāzīr as well. His son, Muḥammad Pasha, replaced him as governor of Tripoli. For, once 'Uthmān Pasha was initiated into government service it was not difficult for him to learn 'the rules of the game' and to reach higher ranks.

The appointment of 'Uthmān Pasha to Damascus does not represent a continuation of 'Aẓm rule. Rather, it continued the break that began with the fall of As'ad Pasha. It was through the 'Aẓms that 'Uthmān Pasha was introduced into the administration as mutasallim. It was largely because of his cooperation with the Sultan against the 'Aẓms that he later acquired the

1A.N.B 88: Aleppo, 28.1.60.  2Ibid., Aleppo, 19.2.60.
3Ibid., Aleppo, 28.1.60; A.N.B 1120: Tripoli, 4.2.60.
4See Appendix, f. 411.  5Budayrī, f. 54a.
7Cf. Murādī, III, 161. When he was appointed to Tripoli he held the rank of beylerbevi, see A.N.B 1120: Tripoli, 4.2.60, cf. Tripoli, 12.1.60.
8A.N.B 1120: Tripoli, 12.1.61.
9It has been suggested, see Gibb and Bowen, I.1.221, that with his appointment the 'Aẓm régime was restored.
governorship of Tripoli. The mutasallim he appointed before his entry to Damascus was Sulaymān Bey, who seems to have been the same person who acted for him later as kāhya, and who was originally a mamlūk of Sulaymān Pasha al-‘Azm. This indicates that those who were dependent on the ‘Azm family now to assume their place. But it is erroneous to conclude that ‘Uthmān Pasha represents the ‘Azm family, let alone that he was a ‘Azm. Jabarti refers to ‘Uthmān Pasha on the occasion of the Mamlūk intervention in Syria as ‘Uthmān Bayk ibn al-‘Azm, wāli al-Shām. Jabarti may have been reiterating here a common belief arising from the early association of ‘Uthmān Pasha with the ‘Azm family. As a former mamlūk of this family it was not unusual for ‘Uthmān Pasha to be identified with his famous masters. But the ‘Azm did not consider ‘Uthmān Pasha as their representative nor did they try to rule through him. On the contrary, the appointment of one of their mamlūks to Damascus was a challenge to them and it increased their efforts to have one of their members appointed to Damascus or another Syrian province. In fact this was all the more challenging because the ‘Azm family was by now well established

1 Budayrī, f. 55a.

2 Jabarti, I, 309. Earlier Jabarti referred to Sulaymān Pasha al-‘Azm on his appointment as governor of Egypt as Sulaymān Pasha al-Shāmi al-shahir bi-ibn al-‘Azm, see I, 150, see above p. 175. Jabarti’s other statement, I, 351 that fighting took place in Syria between the Mamlūk troops and muqallam al-Shām wa-awlad al-‘Azm, is misleading. He did not explain whom he meant by awlad al-‘Azm and, furthermore, there is no evidence that a ‘Azm governor clashed with the Mamlūk troops. On another occasion, I, 418, he referred to a certain Muṣṭafā Pasha al-Nabulṣī as min awlad al-‘Azm (probably ‘Azm) and as being appointed governor of Egypt. Again, there is no evidence that a ‘Azm was appointed governor of Egypt at this time, nor does the term ‘Nabulṣī’ fit with that of ‘Azm.

3 Muḥibbī mentions a certain Ibrahīm b. ‘Uthmān, one of the a’yan of Damascus as being known as ibn Kaywān because of the association of his father with the famous Kaywān, see I, 30, cf. III, 299.
in Damascus. Rumours were rife in Aleppo in late 1760 that Saʿd al-Dīn Pasha al-ʿAẓm had been appointed to Damascus. This was not so, but it indicates the efforts made by the ʿAẓms and the popular expectations. Furthermore, because of the jealousy with which the ʿAẓms regarded their former mam-lūk, ʿUthmān Pasha, the latter tried to discredit their only governor, Muḥammad Pasha of Sidon, by fomenting trouble in territories under his jurisdiction. Muḥammad Pasha considered the governorship of Damascus as an appanage of his family.

The prestige of the ʿAẓm family was dealt a heavy blow with the death of Asʿad Pasha. His brother, Muṣṭafā Pasha, died sometime between 1757 and 1763. Another brother, Saʿd al-Dīn Pasha, died of plague on 11 Dhu ʿl-Qaʿda 1175/3 June 1762. With the disappearance of the second generation of ʿAẓm governors, a third one came to the fore. Its representative was Muḥammad Pasha al-ʿAẓm. From the outset he was at a disadvantage. Apart from the humiliating end of Asʿad Pasha, he was relatively young at the time when ʿUthmān Pasha was appointed to Damascus and had not yet entered an administrative career. The ʿAẓms worked hard to acquire the governorship of Damascus for him, but he was appointed to Sidon around March 1763. It was not

till 1185/1771 that he was appointed to Damascus. The governorship of Sidon cost him 4000 purses, in addition to the recommendation made in his favour by the mufti of Damascus and the effective help he was given by a certain Jānim Agha, who was an influential person in Istanbul. Another favourable gesture on the part of the Sultan was the restitution to Muḥammad Pasha of a good part of the property of Asʿad Pasha, and Saʿd al-Dīn Pasha. Murādī states that the death of Saʿd al-Dīn Pasha had gained Muḥammad Pasha the sympathy of the Sultan. But by the time Muḥammad Pasha was appointed to Sidon, Ḫūṭmān Pasha had become established.

It is clear, therefore, that the ‘Aṯms did not consider Ḫūṭmān Pasha as their representative. In fact, his former connection with the ‘Aṯms contributed to the increase in hostility between them. It remains to be seen, however, in what respects developments begun under the ‘Aṯms continued during the governorship of Ḫūṭmān Pasha, in other words, how his administration contrasts with that of the ‘Aṯms.

It is possible to detect certain resemblances between the rule of Ḫūṭmān Pasha and that of the ‘Aṯms. His lengthy tenure of about eleven years ranks second after that of Asʿad Pasha in the history of Ottoman Damascus. The reasons behind this and other similarities become apparent during the study of Ḫūṭmān Pasha's policy inside and outside Damascus.

The Policy of Ḫūṭmān Pasha in Damascus.

There was a marked contrast between the policy of conciliation and

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1See below p. 369.  
2A.N.B 1 1033: Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin).  
3Murādī, IV, 98.  
4A.N.B 1 1033: Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin).  
5Murādī, IV, 98.
appeasement pursued by ‘Uthman Pasha in Damascus and his high handed policy outside it, particularly against Zahir al-‘Umar and the rural population. His policy, in this respect, was more similar to that of Sulayman Pasha al-‘Azm than to the policies of Isma‘il Pasha and As‘ad Pasha, the ‘Azmis. ‘Uthman Pasha seems to have been conscious of his humble origin and of the importance of the governorship he was occupying. Already before his appointment, when he commanded the jardu, his acts of charity as concerns the pilgrims were largely intended to gain credit in Damascus and in Istanbul. This was further illustrated after his appointment to Damascus when he immediately lowered the prices of bread and other essential commodities. On the occasion of the birth of a prince to the Sultan on 24 Dec. 1761 orders were dispatched to Damascus, as to other places, to celebrate the event for seven days. ‘Uthman Pasha took great care to excel in the festivities and he exploited them to the full to acquire prestige. The artisans paraded in the streets with their colourful costumes and then visited the saraya and received gifts and money from ‘Uthan Pasha. The chroniclers of the time were agreed that this was a most splendid occasion. What seems to have puzzled them, however, was not the reason behind the celebration, nor the frequency of similar events. It was rather the fervour which ‘Uthman Pasha showed and the type of people he particularly favoured. The artisans could be strong supporters. Further-

1 al-Qari, 83. Budayrī, f. 54b took no notice of this reduction. He rather considered the prices of some foodstuffs as still high. But the unusual absence of the price of bread from his list probably indicates a reduction.


3 Budayrī, f. 54b; al-Qari, 83, Muradi, III, 161. The statement by the last which suggests that the celebrations as well as the birth took place in 1174 is erroneous and should be in 1175.

4 The statement by Budayrī, f. 54b, suggests that the artisans were armed.
more, being the first ceremony after the recent calamities that befell Damascus, its impact on the Damascenes was great.

No serious clashes seem to have taken place between the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus during the governorship of 'Uthman Pasha. This does not necessarily mean that they were reconciled. The Yerliyya had been twice suppressed within a relatively short period, and they do not seem yet to have recovered their strength. The Kapi Kulus maintained their ascendancy. As for the mercenary troops, they found outlets for their insubordination in the campaigns of 'Uthman Pasha outside Damascus, the first of which was directed against Zahir al-'Umar hardly three months after the appointment of 'Uthman Pasha to Damascus.¹

The absence of serious troubles in Damascus was an important factor which contributed to the lengthy rule of 'Uthman Pasha. While it enabled him to direct his attention outside Damascus, this did not prevent him from courting the favour of the Damascenes. He cooperated with the Mufti 'Ali al-Murādi in abolishing certain arbitrary regulations imposed on the Damascenes. Former governors of Damascus used to levy a tax in kind on barley, flocks and certain commodities, which was enforced on merchants as well as on the poor in Damascus.² On the initiative of 'Ali al-Murādi and with the collaboration of 'Uthman Pasha, a firman was obtained from Istanbul and duly registered in the law-court which ended this practice. Another firman,

¹Budayrī, f. 54b.

²Murādī, Matmāh, f. 42a, his statement reads, rafa' al-tarb min al-sha'ir wa'l-mawashī wa-ghayr dhālik al-ladhi kana yutrah 'ala 'l-tujjar wa'l-fuqara bi-Dimasqo min jihhat al-ḥukkam.
also obtained at the initiative of the mufti and with the collaboration of 'Uthman Pasha, decreased the percentage of a tax known as mal al-badal which was collected in lieu of service from the holders of zi‘amets and timars.

In 1133/1769-70, 'Uthman Pasha built a pool in the court of the Ummayad Mosque and water was supplied to it from the Qanawat river. Much money was spent on this project but no less credit was gained. His works in Damascus are significant if compared with those of the 'Azm governors. The latter were much interested in promoting the prestige of their family in Damascus. However, 'Uthman Pasha showed more interest in the welfare of the Pilgrimage route. He built and reconstructed several fortresses and reservoirs along this route. He also decorated the Mahmil improving on the decoration made earlier by 'Abd Allah Pasha Chataji. Furthermore, he ensured the safety of the Pilgrimage all through his governorship.

The policy of 'Uthman Pasha outside Damascus.

In the period between the death of Sulayman Pasha al-'Azm and the appointment of 'Uthman Pasha to Damascus, no governor of this province made any serious attempt to subdue Zahir. The governors of Sidon were also losing control over the mulkazims in their province. Nothing is more illustrative of this than Sa'd al-Din Pasha's unfulfilled threats to send punitive expeditions against Zahir and the Matawila. Their only effect, however, was that Zahir strengthened the fortifications of Acre, and the Matawila looked for allies. The governors of Sidon could theoretically still exert press-

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1 Murādī, Matmah f. 42b; see above p. 102.
2 Murādī, III, 161; al-Qārī, 83.
3 Murādī, III, 161, Matmah, f. 62a; al-Qārī, 83. For particulars see, Muhammad Adib, 51, 54, 57, 58.
4 al-Qārī, 83.
5 A.N.B 1032: Sidon, 8.4.58, Sidon, 19.10.58.
sure on their multazims by obstructing or withholding the renewal of their iltizām, but this had become by now a mere ceremonially act. Partly because of the impotence of the governors of Sidon and partly also because of Zahir’s encroachment on certain territories in the province of Damascus, actual responsibility towards Zahir was thrust on the governors of Damascus.

‘Uthman Pasha assumed the governorship of Damascus at a critical time. The earthquakes and the ensuing plague had caused much dislocation in the economic life of the country. This, in turn, affected the political behaviour of the rulers. Zahir tightened his grip over the French merchants at Acre to make up for what he had lost. His simultaneous encroachment on territories under the jurisdiction of the governors of Damascus constituted a political as well as an economic threat which ‘Uthman Pasha did not tolerate. About two months after his appointment to Damascus ‘Uthman Pasha left for the dawra. He conquered the fortress of Tartūra which was under the control of Zahir. Although Tartūra belonged to Damascus, the immediate reason for this occupation was the incursion by Zahir’s sons on the territory of the province of Damascus in an attempt, as it seems, to gauge the power and reaction of ‘Uthman Pasha. However, Zahir reoccupied Tartūra after ‘Uthman Pasha withdrew. In the following year, 1175/1761-2, ‘Uthman Pasha conquered the fortress of Sahyún, probably from Zahir. A more daring act

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1 With regard to Zahir see, A.N.B. 1032: Sidon, 8.4.58; with regard to the Matawila, see ibid., Sidon, 9.3.59.
2 A.N.B. 1032: (Des Jardins de Seyde), 22.12.59, according to this dispatch Safad was ‘entièremment detruit’, (Des Jardins de Seyde), 27.3.60; PRO, S.P. 27.3.60; PRO. S.F. 110/36: Aleppo, 22.12.59, Aleppo, 2.4.60; Mariti, II,172.
3 A.N.B. 1032: (Des Jardins de Seyde), 22.12.59.
4 For its location see attached maps. 5 A.N.B. 1032: Sidon, 6.6.61; Budayrī, f. 54b.
6 Budayrī, f. 54b. 7 Ibid.
on the part of 'Uthman Pasha was his attempt to take control of Haifa which was basically under his jurisdiction but held by Zahir in iltizam. By virtue of a firman obtained from Istanbul by 'Uthman Pasha, Abu Tawq and 'Ali Agha Hammud some forty or forty-two years earlier, the iltizam of Haifa had been attached to that of Acre ever since. With the growing commercial importance of Acre, Haifa benefited as well because it was more suitable for anchorage than the former. After 'Uthman Pasha had obtained from the Sultan a firman ordering the separation of the iltizam of Haifa from that of Acre, he dispatched a force of Mughariba to capture its fortress. The force left Beirut by sea on 20 May 1761 as passengers on board a French vessel which was on its way to Jaffa. On its arrival at Haifa on 24 May, it was defeated by Zahir's forces. In addition to this success by Zahir, the collusion of the Governor of Sidon with him, and the efforts of Zahir's agents at Istanbul, Zahir had another project: he approached the French Consul in Sidon as well as Mr. Usgate, the English vice-Consul in Acre, to write to their ambassadors at the Porte to help him reverse the firman which authorized the separation of the iltizam of Haifa from that of Acre. While attempts for a reconciliation between Zahir and 'Uthman Pasha were under way, the latter dispatched another force which occupied the fortress of Haifa in late 1761. To counterbalance this move Zahir conceived a scheme.

1 A.N.B 1032: Sidon, 30.5.61 (Copie d'une lettre écrite par les négociants d'Acre à N. de Clairambault Consul de Seyde); cf. A.N.B 978: Acre, 12.10.25

2 Charles-Roux, 6.

3 A.N.B 1032: (Sidon), 24.5.61, Sidon, 30.5.61, Sidon, 1.6.61 (Extrait des Registres); cf. Charles-Roux, 69.

4 A.N.B 1032: Sidon, 6.6.61.

5 A. al-Šabbagh, ff. 10b, 11a.

6 For the letters sent by Zahir to the French Consul in Sidon, see, A.N.B 1032: Sidon, 30.5.61.
for enlarging the harbour of Acre. He also besieged the fortress of Haifa and threatened its garrison with starvation until it finally surrendered.

The various attempts by 'Uthman Pasha to subdue Zahir had failed. Several factors contributed to this failure. 'Uthman Pasha was at a disadvantage militarily because Haifa was far from his centre of power and near Zahir's. The territory through which he had to send his reinforcements was interspersed with local chiefs who were not all loyal to him. Furthermore, the governor of Sidon, Nu'man Pasha (1760-3), did not provide 'Uthman Pasha with any effective help against Zahir, in spite of the instructions by the Sultan, but rather communicated to Zahir the plans of 'Uthman Pasha. Nu'man Pasha was anxious not to alienate Zahir who could jeopardize his task as governor by withholding the payment of the miri dues already in gross arrears. Nu'man Pasha was also known for his jealousy towards 'Uthman Pasha.

The relations of 'Uthman Pasha with the amir of Mount Lebanon were friendly at the start, partly because of internal struggles among the Druses and partly also because Zahir's belligerence dominated the scene. This, however, did not prevent 'Uthman Pasha from attacking in 1761 Amir Isma'il, the Shihab governor of Hašbayya, which was under the jurisdiction of Damascus, and destroying the Banyas fortress which he had reconstructed. This action by 'Uthman Pasha was necessary to safeguard his lines of communication.

Between roughly 1762 and 1770 the various power groups in the provinces of Damascus and Sidon were more concerned with internal struggles. The

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1. A.N.B 1032: Sidon, 25.5.62.
2. A.N.B 1033: Sidon, 7.3.63; cf. A.N.B 1032: Sidon, 15.9.60.
5. Ibid., Sidon, 6.6.61.
6. The districts of Hašbayya and Rashayya were jointly known under the name of Wadi Taym, see Lammens, II, 97. Their Shihab amirs were kin of those ruling Mount Lebanon. Amir Isma'il was cousin and son-in-law of Amir Mansur, A.N.B 1033: Sidon, 11.11.66 (Extrait des Registres).
7. Barik, 72; Shihab, Lubnan, I, 53, 54; cf. A.N.B 1033: Sidon, 23.4.67, Sidon, 11.11.66.
Splits that occurred in the ranks of the Druzes, of the Matawila and of the Ziyadina brought about new alliances which cut across religious and traditional barriers. For his part, 'Uthman Pasha was also occupied with troubles in the rural parts of his province. His intervention, however, in the internal struggles of these power groups further complicated the political picture.

The abdication of Amir Mulhim and the accession of his two brothers, Amir Mansur and Amir Ahmad, to the paramountcy in 1754, brought into the open the discord within the ruling Shihab family and the Druze community in general. After his abdication, Amir Mulhim manoeuvred against the two ruling amirs by encouraging his nephew, Amir Qasim b. Umar, to contest their rule. With the death of Amir Mulhim in 1761, Amir Qasim lost support and eventually failed to attain the paramountcy.

The removal of the enmity of Amir Qasim encouraged dissension between the two ruling amirs. For it was apparent ever since the accession of Amir Mansur and Amir Ahmad that their appointment reflected a split among the communities of Mount Lebanon. Any struggle between the Janbalatiyya and the Yazzbakiyya, each of which was attached to, indeed represented by, one amir or the other, was bound therefore to affect the relations of these amirs. In 1177/1763, for example, discord broke out between Shaykh 'Abd al-Salam al-'Imad, head of the Yazzbakî faction, and Shaykh 'Ali Janbalâti, head of the Janbalâti faction, and this in turn embroiled the two ruling amirs.

\[1\] See above p. 254.  
\[2\] Shidyq, 427; Lammens, II, 100.  
\[3\] Shihab, Lubnan, I, 43, 44, 50-2; Shidyq, 426, 428-9; Munayyir, al-Mashriq, 48 (1954), pp. 683, 686.
each of whom tried to rule independently. Amir Mansūr had been communicating with the Porte, through the governor of Sidon, Nu'man Pasha, to acquire the paramountcy for himself. It was on the orders of the Porte that the then governor of Sidon, Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm, came to the help of Amir Mansūr against Amir Ahmad. The latter’s main supporters panicked before the swollen power of Amir Mansūr, and eventually changed sides. Amir Ahmad then gave up the struggle and his share in the government, and Amir Mansūr became sole ruler, after about nine years of dual rule (1754-63). Taking advantage of his reliance on Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm, governor of Sidon, Amir Mansūr antagonized the chiefs of his country. The removal of Amir Ahmad did not do away with factionalism. This had deeper roots. It is true that his removal had caused a dislocation in the grouping of the two factions, but another focus was soon to be found in a claimant to the paramountcy, Amir Yusuf, nephew of Amir Mansūr and son of Amir Mulhim. Amir Yusuf was supported by the Janbalāṭī faction and by the spiritual chief of the Druzes, Shaykh Ismā'il Ḥamza.

These political developments in Mount Lebanon had important repercussions on the balance of power in the provinces of Damascus and Sidon. While Amir Mansūr invoked the help of Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm, Amir Yusuf relied on 'Uthman Pasha in his groping for power. Such a choice of allies set a
pattern to which both amīrs adhered. In fact the attitude of Amīr Maṃṣūr towards his opponents was determined to a very large extent by the support he had from Muḥammad Pāshā. The enmity which existed between Muḥammad Pāshā and ‘Uṭmān Pāshā widened the gulf between the two amīrs. Any radical change in the fortune of these governors was bound, therefore, to have repercussions on their fortune. When the son of ‘Uṭmān Pāshā was appointed governor of Sidon in 1770 the consequences for Amīr Maṃṣūr were serious.

The occupation of the Druses with their factional struggle provided a relative respite for their traditional enemies the Matāwila of Jabal ‘Āmil. But this relaxation in the pressure of the Druses encouraged an internal split among the Matāwila. The paramount Shaykh Naṣīf al-Naṣīr (of the Ǧaghir family) was opposed by his uncle, Shaykh Qabīlān, whose party was in the minority. The Matāwila benefited from the commercial revival of southern Syria, particularly after they had acquired in 1759 the iltizām of Tyre. Their economic prosperity during this period lent much strength to their internal rivalry. The upsurge in Zahir's power, in contrast to that of the Shihābs, attracted the Matāwila into the orbit of his influence.

1 On the cooperation between Amīr Maṃṣūr and Muḥammad Pāshā see, A.N.B1 1120: Tripoli, 10.5.64 (Bulletin); A.N.B1 1033: Sidon, 15.5.66, Sidon, 31.5.66. On the cooperation between Amīr Yusūf and ‘Uṭmān Pāshā see, A.N.B1 1120: Tripoli, 10.5.64 (Bulletin); Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 63; Shidyāq, 432; Munayyir, al-Mashriq, 48 (1954), 689.

2 Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 64; Shidyāq, 433; Munayyir, al-Mashriq, 48 (1954), 689.

3 A.N.B1 1033: Sidon, 12.10.67. 4See below, p. 322.

5 A.N.B1 1032: Sidon, 9.3.59; Charles-Roux, 66; Masson, 289.

6 Mariti, II, 207, 208, 211; cf. A.N.B1 1032: Sidon, 9.3.59, Sidon, 26.9.59; A.N.B1 1033: Sidon, 23.4.67; cf. A.N.B1 1036: Sidon, 30.11.73 (Appendix No. 13 attached to this dispatch); M. al-Sabbagh, 39.

7 cf. A.N.B1 1032: Sidon, 25.3.62.
In the meantime Zahir was threatened with fresh attempts at revolt by some of his sons. Several factors contributed to this situation. The absence of effective military action by the Ottoman Governors against Zahir had caused a relaxation in solidarity among the Ziyadina. After 'Uthman Pasha's failure to bring Zahir to heel, he concentrated, instead, on fomenting discord between Zahir and his sons. The latter had been appointed local governors by Zahir, but far from being appeased, they aspired for more power. Zahir's policy of marrying his sons into local families of notables and Beduin chieftains to win their support, wise enough provided other conditions obtained, had the adverse effects of fragmenting loyalty towards Zahir in favour of his sons. Furthermore, the territory acquired by Zahir had expanded to an extent that encouraged his sons to covet its rule. Rivalry and jealousy among Zahir's sons, very often caused by their descent from one wife of Zahir or the other, or by Zahir's

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1 For an account of these revolts in the 'sixties see. A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 1032: Sidon, 22.9.61; Sidon, 25.3.62; A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 1033: Sidon, 15.5.66 (Bulletin, Sidon, 10.5.66), Sidon, 23.4.67, Sidon, 25.10.67 (Bulletin, Sidon, 25.10.67), M. al-Sabbagh, 87-9.

2 A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 1032: Sidon, 22.9.61, Sidon, 25.3.62; M. al-Sabbagh, 87-9.

3 A. al-Sabbagh, f. 10a; M. al-Sabbagh, 51; A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 1036: Sidon, 30.11.73 (Appendix No.13 attached to this dispatch); Yanni, 321.

4 M. al-Sabbagh, 53, Yanni, 321.

5 A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 1032: Sidon, 25.3.62.
support of a particular son, \(^1\) complicated the struggle. The corresponding split in the ranks of the Druzes and the Matawila made one faction or the other among these groups rally to the support of either Zahir or his sons, depending on the interest of each group.\(^2\)

Towards the end of 1767 there was a relaxation of tension between Zahir and his sons. Zahir was also reconciled with Shaykh Naṣif and was on good terms with Amir Mansūr. This reconciliation among the three groups continued for several years, and with Zahir and Shaykh Naṣif it developed into an alliance. But tension between Zahir and ‘Uthmān Pasha was gathering momentum at the time. ‘Uthmān Pasha was contemplating an attack on Zahir to wrest from him those parts of his territory which he had usurped.\(^3\) Two main reasons were holding ‘Uthmān Pasha from launching his attack. Firstly, no authorization was given to him by Istanbul to make this attack. It was alleged that the point of view at the Porte was that Zahir had become redoubtable and any attempt to antagonize him would cause further difficulty to the state which was engaged, at the time, in a disastrous war with Russia.\(^4\) Secondly, the appointment of ‘Uthmān Pasha’s son to the governorship of Sidon to enable him to tighten his grip on Zahir, was not realized until 1770.

In the meantime, ‘Uthmān Pasha was faced with a series of revolts in the rural regions of his province. In contrast to his conciliatory policy in Damascus, ‘Uthmān Pasha tightened his hold on the rural population and exacted

\(^1\) A.N.B\(^1\) 1032: Sidon, 25.3.62; ‘A. al-Šabbagh, f. 10a; M. al-Šabbagh, 51.
\(^2\) A.N.B\(^1\) 1032: Sidon, 25.3.62; A.N.B\(^1\) 1033: Sidon, 15.5.66 (Bulletin, Sidon, 10.5.66), Sidon, 23.4.67, Sidon, 29.9.67 (Bulletin, Sidon, 20.9.67); Sidon, 22.12.67.
\(^3\) A.N.B\(^1\) 1033: Sidon, 12.10.67.
\(^4\) ‘A. al-Šabbagh, ff. 11a-14a.
money from them. Exacerbated by his exactions and those of his deputies and
their 'awāniyya, the inhabitants of Ramle - described by 'Uthmān Pasha as
his malikānā - and of Jaffa revolted in 1767. Other revolts had preceded
and succeeded this one in these as well as in other places. A statement by
the French merchants in Ramle tends to confirm that 'Uthmān Pasha practised
vexations in all 'Palestine', hence one would assume that the revolts were
not restricted to these places. The atrocities of 'Uthmān Pasha, particular­
ly against the 'Ulama' of Gaza were later referred to by 'Ali Bey in his
manifesto to the Damascenes. 'Uthmān Pasha subdued the insurgents by force,
and, on one occasion, he invoked the help of the 'Ariaza Beduin. It is sig­
ificant that the leaders of the revolt in Ramle, the mārtī, the judge and a
certain Māhmūd Agha, should have sought asylum in Acre. Zahir had sent a
considerable amount of gun-powder to the insurgents of Ramle so as to dis­
credit 'Uthmān Pasha. The influence of these revolts on the attitude of
the rural inhabitants in the coming struggle between 'Ali Bey and 'Uthmān
Pasha was decisive.

Around the end of September 1770, Darwīsh Pasha, the son of 'Uthmān
Pasha, was appointed governor of Sidon, in place of Muhammad Pasha al-‘Azm.

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1 A.N.B.1 1033: Ramle, 28.10.67 (attached to the dispatch from Sidon, 21.12.67).
2 For further details see A.N.B.1 1033: Jaffa, 6.6.67 (attached to the dispatch
from Sidon, 30.6.67), Sidon, 30.6.67, Jaffa, 18.10.67, Jaffa, 19.10.67 (the
last two are attached to the dispatch from Sidon, 26.10.67), Sidon, 26.10.67
Masson, 290; cf. Barīk, 90.
3 A.N.B. 1034: Ramle, 9.11.70 (attached to the dispatch from Sidon, 15.11.70);
cf. Murādī, III, 134.
4 See below p. 322. 5 A.N.B.1 1033: Sidon, 26.10.67. 6 Ibid.
7 See below p. 328.
8 A.N.B.1 1034: Sidon, 6.8.70, Sidon, 4.9.70, Sidon, 15.11.70; A.N.B.1 1121:
Tripoli, 29.10.70.
This was a great success for 'Uthman Pasha, partly because of his enmity to Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm and particularly because his other son, Muhammad Pasha was governor of Tripoli. 1 The appointment of Darwish Pasha cost 'Uthman Pasha much money at Istanbul. 2 'Uthman Pasha could claim now a prestige comparable to that of the 'Azm when they concurrently governed all three provinces. But the price of responsibility was high. Immediately after the appointment of Darwish Pasha, 'Uthman Pasha wrote an insulting letter to Zahir stating that he would pass by Acre, after he finished the dawra in the region of Nablus, on his way to Sidon to take care of its affairs. 3 It was quite natural that Zahir's anxiety should be heightened and that he should take military precautions on the mere appointment of Darwish Pasha because it was apparent that 'Uthman Pasha would dispose the affairs of his son. 4 Zahir had already started making new fortifications in Acre, and he mobilized its inhabitants. 5 In October 1770 it was believed by observers that a clash between 'Uthman Pasha and Zahir was imminent. 6 In November the threat subsided because 'Uthman Pasha had returned to Damascus after the failure of his military operation against a principal shaykh in the region of Nablus. Nevertheless Zahir continued his military preparations and his sons rallied to his support. Darwish Pasha had not yet arrived at Sidon and was still in Damascus. At this time rumours were rife in Sidon that 'Ali Bey

1 See above p. 207.
2 A. al-Šabbag, f. 14b; PRO, S.P. 110/40: Aleppo, 17.11.69.
3 A. al-Šabbag, f. 14b; A.N.B 1121: Tripoli, 29.10.70.
4 A.N.B 1034: Sidon, 15.11.70. 5 Ibid., Sidon, 4.9.70.
6 Ibid., Sidon, 18.10.70.
of Egypt was preparing troops to take hold of Gaza, which was under the jurisdiction of Damascus. The rumours continued, and on 28 November 1770 news reached Sidon that the troops of ‘Ali Bey were advancing on Gaza. On 4 December it was known in Sidon that Gaza and Ramle were occupied. Shortly afterwards the troops of Zahir joined those of ‘Ali Bey.

The Mamluk intervention in Syria.

The Causes: The military intervention by ‘Ali Bey of Egypt in Syria weakened the position of Uthman Pasha and eventually brought about his deposition. It also revealed the weakness of Ottoman administration as well as caused a radical change in the balance of power in the provinces of Damascus and Sidon which prepared the way for the emergence of Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar. Various factors brought about this intervention. A mamluk of Circassian origin, ‘Ali Bey acquired prominence in Egypt, and in 1764 he commanded the Egyptian Pilgrimage to the Hijaz. There, he was embroiled in a dispute with the commander of the Damascene Pilgrimage, Uthman Pasha. The latter exhorted the opponents of ‘Ali Bey in Egypt to expel him. In his

1 A.N.B. 1034: Sidon, 15.11.70.
2 Ibid., Sidon, 24.11.70.
3 Ibid., Sidon, 28.11.70.
4 Ibid., Sidon, 4.12.70.
5 Ibid., Sidon, 20.12.70.


8 Ibn al-Šiddīq, f. 2b.
struggle with his opponents, 'Alī Bey was forced to flee to Gaza around the end of Ramaḍān 1179/first half of March 1766. ι 'Uṯmān Pasha ordered his mutasallim in Gaza, Ibrāhīm Agha, to expel 'Alī Bey who, on learning of this, fled back to Egypt. 2 Between 1767 and 1769, 'Alī Bey overpowered all his enemies in Egypt and became shaykh al-balad (premier amīr) and qa'im marām (acting governor). His name was mentioned in the khutba (the bidding prayer recited in the Friday congregational devotions) and inscribed on the coinage, both of which were prerogatives of a Muslim sovereign. In Shawāl 1182/February 1769, 'Alī Bey complained to the Sultan against 'Uṯmān Pasha whom he accused of giving asylum to fugitive Egyptians, and asked for his deposition. 3 This may have been a genuine complaint or a mere pretext, but there were other more important reasons which made 'Alī Bey invade Ṣyriā.

It is to be recalled here that the revival of Mamluk power in Egypt which reached its peak under 'Alī Bey was not something accidental. It had been building up ever since the Ottoman conquest. 4 Having secured a dominant position in Egypt, 'Alī Bey looked abroad for expansion. 5 The outbreak of war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1768, which lasted until 1774, provided 'Alī Bey with a favourable occasion of whose value he was aware. 6 It is stated, furthermore, that 'Alī Bey concluded a treaty with Comte Orloff, the Russian Commander in the Mediterranean, in the last quarter of 1770, whereby the latter would offer 'Alī Bey military assistance. 7

1Jabarti, I, 255; Hammer, XV, 158. 2Ibn al-Ṣiddiq, f. 2b.
6Bruce, I, 110, 111. (cont.)
But there was no conclusive evidence that such an assistance was offered to 'Ali Bey until May-June 1772. An opportunity for 'Ali Bey's expansion arose when the Sultan asked him, allegedly, to settle a dispute between two contenders for the post of Sharīf of Mecca. 'Ali Bey could win from this intervention religious prestige as well as economic resources, by taking control of the Porte of Jedda. After his successful campaign in the Hijāz, whose objectives, nevertheless, had not been maintained, 'Ali Bey started his invasion of Syria in alliance with Zāhir. The appointment of Uṯmān Pasha's son, Darwīsh Pasha, to the governorship of Sidon in September 1770, had aroused the apprehension of Zāhir and seems to have determined him to throw his lot with 'Ali Bey. But there is evidence of earlier cooperation between 'Ali Bey and Zāhir. In early 1770, 'Ali Bey supplied Zāhir with money to raise troops for him.

In his self-imposed task, expounded in his manifesto to the Damascenes, 'Ali Bey declared that his intention was to purge Syria from the tyranny of Uṯmān Pasha. 'Ali Bey was acquainted, no doubt, with the injustices committed by Uṯmān Pasha and his deputies against the rural population, possibly through his short refuge in Gaza, and also through the appeals allegedly made to him by the inhabitants of Gaza. It is not unusual for an invader to set himself the disinterested task of relieving the inhabitants


1 See below p. 378.

2 Holt, 'The Cloud-catcher', 55, 56; Jabartī, I, 350, 351; Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 6b-7b, 19a, 19b; Volney, 81. The Sharīf installed by the troops of 'Ali Bey was 'Abd Allah, the last governor of Dhawu Barakat, see, G. Renz, E.T., new ed., s.v. Barakat.

(cont.)
so as to camouflage his real aim. 'Ali Bey intended to restore the old Mamluk Sultanate composed of Egypt and Syria. When the Mamluk commander, Abu'l-Dhabab, later took the declared pledges of 'Ali Bey at their face value to justify his withdrawal from Damascus, maintaining that he had accomplished his task by expelling Uthman Pasha, 'Ali Bey was deeply disturbed because his grand scheme had misfired. The suggestion by some contemporary foreign sources, that 'Ali Bey aimed from his intervention in Syria to make Zahir its master and to grant independence to the Druzes and the Matawila so as to interpose a barrier which would safeguard his rule in Egypt from an Ottoman attack by land, does not seem to have been foremost in the mind of 'Ali Bey.²

The military operations in Syria by Isma'il Bey and Zahir.

In mid-Rajab 1184/early November 1770, 'Ali Bey started his intervention in Syria by dispatching a force to eliminate the rebel chief of the Gaza Beduin, the Salî'î, which was achieved.³ This seems to have been a precautionary measure to safeguard his lines of communication. In the second half of Rajab, an expedition commanded by Isma'il Bey left Cairo for Syria. Another left Damietta by sea at about the same time.⁴ The number of troops, probably those sent by land, was estimated at between fifteen and twenty thousand.⁵

(cont.)

²A.N.B 1034: Sidon, 2.3.70 (containing copies of four letters), Sidon, 6.3.70, Sidon, 20.3.70.
³Jabarti, I, 381; 'A. al-Šabbagh, f. 15b. Shihab, Lubnan, I, 89.
⁴See below p. 332.
⁵Murādi, I, 54.
⁶A.N.B 440: (1779) Compte rendu de la mission secrète du Baron de Tott, 118 pages, pp. 52-3.
⁷Ibid.
⁸Ibn al-Šiddīq, f. 3b.
The first target, Gaza, capitulated without resistance. The inhabitants of Gaza, long oppressed by the vexations of 'Uthmān Pasha, welcomed the invaders and their mutasallim fled.² By Nov. 30 Ramle was occupied as well without any resistance. The newly-appointed Mamluk governors of Gaza and Ramle² announced the abolition of the mīrī tax, until then collected by the governor of Damascus, for the period of four years.³ Such a benevolent move designed for propaganda purposes did not fail to encourage other places to defect. In fact, many villages, alienated by the extortions of 'Uthmān Pasha, declared for 'All Bey.⁴

So far, the troops of Zahir did not link up with those of Ismā'īl Bey. 'Uthmān Pasha was notified of the invasion, after the occupation of Gaza, by Ibn Jarrār,⁵ the paramount chief in the region of Nablus, who held the fortress of Sannūr.⁶ He hurriedly collected whatever troops he could muster and marched towards Jaffa, which was not yet occupied by Ismā'īl Bey, but which was not loyal to 'Uthmān Pasha either. Its inhabitants were more disposed towards 'Ali Bey,⁷ and 'Uthmān Pasha had to enter the city on 12 Shābān/1 Dec. by force.⁸ Ismā'īl Bey was at the time in Ramle awaiting the troops of Zahir. An exploratory force which he sent to meet them was surprised by the troops of 'Uthmān Pasha and almost annihilated. Although this victory was obtained in a surprise attack, it provoked Ismā'īl

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¹Ibn al-Šiddīq, ff. 8b, 9a.
²See A.N.B¹ 1035: Sidon, 4.2.71 (Extrait des Registres, Sidon, 30.1.71).
³A.N.B¹ 1034: Sidon, 4.12.70. It is understood from PRO, S.P. 97/47: Istanbul 4.3.71 that this applied to all 'Palestine'.
⁴Ibn al-Šiddīq, ff. 11a, 11b, 17a.
⁵About his origin and power see, Ihsān al-Nimr, Tā'rikh Jabal Nablus, pp. 123, 130, 131; also, Poliak, 59; M. al-Šabbagh, 49, 50; al-Šabbagh, 50.
⁶Ibn al-Šiddīq, f. 9a.
⁷Ibid., f. 10b.
⁸Ibid., f. 12a; A.N.B¹ 1034: Sidon, 20.11.70; A.N.B¹ 441: Istanbul, 4.3.71 (attached to a dispatch from Sidon, 20.11.70).
Bey rather than frightened him. Uthman Pasha exploited this victory to
the full, particularly for his credit with the Sultan, to whom he dispatched
the severed heads of the victims. The momentary confidence which this
victory instilled in the troops of Uthman Pasha was dissipated after the
arrival of Zahir and his troops at the camp of Ismail. Zahir made it clear
to the emissary of Uthman Pasha who came to enquire and threaten that he
was acting on the orders of Ali Bey and that war was inevitable.

Uthman Pasha decided to withdraw to Damascus to make further prepara-
tions. He decamped on 20 Shawwal/9 December and arrived in Damascus nine
days later and twenty days after he left it. After his withdrawal Jaffa
was occupied by the joint troops of Ismail Bey and Zahir. Its occupation
was of great importance because reinforcements sent by sea from Damietta
were disembarked in it as well as in Acre.

Between 29 Shawwal/18 December, the date on which Uthman Pasha returned
to Damascus, and mid-Shawwal/end of January 1771, when the Pilgrimage was
threatened by Ismail Bey and his allies near Muzayrib, no direct clashes
occurred. This lull in the fighting could be attributed to several reasons.
On 26 Shawwal/15 December Zahir returned ill to Acre. However, some of his sons and troops remained with Ismail Bey. It

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1 Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 12b, 13a, 14a; A.N.B. 441: Istanbul, 4.3.71
(associated to a dispatch from Sidon, 20.11.70).
2 Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 14a, 14b; A. al-Sabbagh, ff. 16b, 17b.
3 Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 16a, 16b, 17a, 17b, 18a; A. al-Sabbagh, ff. 17b,
18a; PRO, S.P. 97/47: Istanbul, 4.3.71.
4 A.N.B. 1034: Sidon, 20.11.70; A.N.B. 441, Istanbul, 4.3.71.
5 A.N.B. 441: Istanbul, 4.3.71.
seems that the latter was afraid lest Zahir might die, and consequently his support be withdrawn. On the other hand, Zahir was determined to have the upper hand in the conduct of the campaign and it seems that Isma'Il Bey was discouraged from advancing without him. This might explain why Isma'Il Bey remained quiescent from about 15 Dec. to 27 Jan., during which period Zahir was ill.\(^1\) It is true that there was much hatred among the rural population towards 'Uthman Pasha, and this would surely be a great asset to Isma'Il Bey should he decide to continue his advance. But there were other considerations which seem to have withheld him from doing so. The professed aim of Isma'Il Bey to which he clung till the very end, was to eliminate 'Uthman Pasha, thus taking the words of 'Ali Bey to this effect at their face value. So far, Isma'Il Bey had gained a foothold in the southern extremity of the province of Damascus which ensured his lines of communication with 'Ali Bey and Zahir and cut a large part of the revenue from 'Uthman Pasha. He also acquired the prestige of having caused 'Uthman Pasha to retreat. It seems that he was not interested at the time in spending energy conquering adjoining territories and concentrating on towns and fortresses like Jerusalem and Samnür which were loyal to 'Uthman Pasha, because this might present frustrating obstacles and consequently risk failure in his major aim of toppling 'Uthman Pasha. Strategically, these conquests were not so necessary nor urgent because these places were more defensive than offensive, and did not necessarily obstruct his way. Furthermore, any such expansion, even if successfully achieved, would strain his man-power because he had to garrison the conquered places. It is true that if he extended his

\(^1\) A. al-Šabbāgh, ff. 18a, 18b.
occupation, he would deprive 'Uthmān Pasha of a large part of revenue. But 'Uthmān Pasha was unable, anyway, to collect the revenue at the time. Ismā'īl Bey was also waiting for the effect of the manifesto addressed by 'Alī Bey to the Damascenes, who received it in December. Contrary to what is stated by the Lebanese Chroniclers and those who copied them, that this manifesto was later sent to the Damascenes by Abu 'l-Dhahab when he was in the vicinity of Damascus, rather, it seems certain that it was sent at this time after the occupation of Gaza and Ramle.

See, Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 83-5; Shihāb, Ta'rīkh Ahmad Pāshā al-Jazzār, ed. by Shibli and Khalīfa, Beirut, 1955, pp. 41-4; Shihāb, Nuẓha, MS. Camb., ff. 44a-45b; Nuẓha, MS. Paris, ff. 43b-45a; Munayyir, al-Naḥṣirīq 49 (1955), 261-262. These works give the text of the manifesto: Among other works which refer to the manifesto on this occasion, but do not give its text, are those of Ta'rīkh Jabal al-Durūz, MS. Berlin, f. 11b and Shidyag, 434, 435. With the exception of Shidyag, who mentioned the manifesto under the year 1768, all the other works place it under 1184/1770 which is true. But neither the occasion on which they mention it nor the date of the attack of Abu 'l-Dhahab on Damascus fall in this year. Contemporary Damascene chroniclers such as Barīk, Muwaqqi', Murādī and Ibn al-Siddīq, did not mention such a manifesto. The last two, however, did mention, I, 54; ff. 18a, 18b, respectively, the arrival of a letter (maktūb or khitab) from 'Alī Bey addressed to the notables of Damascus and handed to the Muftī 'Alī al-Murādī on 4 Ramaḍān 1184/22 December 1770. That not all the Damascene chroniclers referred to this letter, which probably was the manifesto in question, may be explained by the efforts of the governor or the muftī not to publicize it so as not to arouse the Damascenes against the governor. The biographers of Ṣakhir, 'A. al-Ṣabbāgh and M. al-Ṣabbāgh, did not refer to such a manifesto. Jabarti did not mention it either. The text of the manifesto and a French translation of it are attached to dispatch A.N.B 91:1Aleppo, 6.7.71. A French translation is also attached to dispatch A.N.B 1121: Tripoli, 12.6.71.

This is clear from the date and title of the manifesto. The Arabic and French titles in A.N.B 91:1Aleppo, 6.7.70, read: 'Sirat faraman al-ladlS arsalahu 'Alī Bayk ila ahālī al-Sham, 1184,' 'Commandement d’Aly Bey Caim macam de l’Égypte, adressé au peuple de Damas, après la prise de Gaza et de Rame, donné dans le mois de cheval 1184.' The title of the French translation of it are attached to dispatch A.N.B 1121: Tripoli, 12.6.71, is Traduction d’une lettre d’Aly Bey aux grands de Damas.' In 'Relation de ce qui passe en Syrie', attached to the last dispatch, a statement reads: 'Osman Pacha gouverneur de Damas ayant été chassé de la Palestine en Decembre dernier par un corps de troupes (cont.)
In his manifesto, 'Ali Bey presented himself to the Damascenes first as a former commander of the Pilgrimage and then as qa'im maqam in Egypt. Although this shows that he had not revoked the sovereignty of the Sultan, his reference to his title of Commander of the Pilgrimage was opportune, particularly because he expressed his intention, in the manifesto, of appointing a commander for the Damascene Pilgrimage. He also justified his military intervention by his desire to put an end to the injustices of 'Uthman Pasha, and he quoted from the Qur'an to legalize his self-imposed task. 'Ali Bey referred to 'Uthman Pasha's mal-treatment of the Pilgrims and the merchants, which shows, irrespective of whether the accusation was true or not, his awareness of the importance of these two groups in Damascus. To frighten the 'Ulama' of Damascus away from 'Uthman Pasha, 'Ali Bey mentioned his atrocities against the 'Ulama' of Gaza. After referring to the endorsement by the four Sunni schools of his use of force against 'Uthman Pasha, which may or may not have been true but was certainly advantageous, 'Ali Bey asked the Damascenes to co-operate with him and to expel 'Uthman Pasha. The terms he used contained implicit threats, and he made it known that his troops were proceeding against 'Uthman Pasha anyway.

The manifesto created a sensation among the officials in Damascus. The Mufti 'Ali al-Muradî, to whose it was handed, conferred with 'Uthman Pasha in (cont.) d'Ali Bey joint à celle du chef Daher d'Acre, il ne s'est rien passé de conséquence jusqu'au départ de la caravane de la Mecque. Nous avons attribué cette tranquillité apparente au peu d'effet qui paraissait avoir produit la lettre qu'il a écrite aux grands de Damas', cf. Volney, 81. It is apparent also that the manifesto was sent to Damascus before the departure of 'Uthman Pasha with the Pilgrimage. Otherwise, the statement by 'Ali Bey in his manifesto that he would appoint the commander of the Pilgrimage, and the consequent interception of the Pilgrimage by Isma'il Bey, would be unjustified. Furthermore, the date on which the letter arrived in Damascus, as given by Muradî and Ibn al-Siddîq, was 4 Ramaḍān 1184/22 Dec. 1770. Ibn al-Siddîq states that 'Ali Bey requested the Damascenes in his letter not to send the Pilgrimage with 'Uthman Pasha, because he ('Ali Bey) had appointed Isma'il Bey as its commander.

1 Cf. Muradî, III, 134.
an assembly which was attended by the judge and other notables. It was decided to inform the Sultan of ‘Alī Bey’s intentions,² and this was duly done.

On 8 Shawwāl 1184/25 January 1771 ‘Uthmān Pasha left Damascus with the pilgrimage,³ after appointing Muṣṭafā Agha of the Kāni Kulus as his mutassallim.⁴ Rumours about an impending attack on the Pilgrimage were rife in Damascus, and precautions were accordingly taken.⁵ However, the attack did not take place. Ismā‘īl Bey opposed Zāhir’s plan to attack ‘Uthmān Pasha because this would involve the pilgrims and consequently provoke the wrath of God.⁶

That Ismā‘īl Bey was reluctant to attack ‘Uthmān Pasha for fear of injuring the pilgrims, was not incompatible with what amounted to his treason to ‘Alī Bey later when he worked on Abu ‘l-Dhahab to give up the conquest of Damascus.⁷ The divergence in views between Zāhir and Ismā‘īl Bey did not develop into a rupture in their relations. It indicates, however, that Zāhir failed to take the initiative in the conduct of the campaign. He reported the unyielding attitude of Ismā‘īl Bey to ‘Alī Bey who prepared for the dispatch of fresh troops. In fact, preparation of troops had not ceased in

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¹Cf. Ibn al-Siddīq, ff. 18b, 19a. ²Ibid., ff. 27a, 27b.
³Ibid., ff. 21a, 21b. ⁴Ibid., f. 22a.
⁵Ibid., ff. 21b-24b.
⁶A.M.B. 1035: Sidon, 4.2.71; Ibn al-Siddīq, ff. 24b, 26a, 29b, 30a; Barīk, 94, cf. Muradi, Monument, ff. 39a, 39b; Shibib, Lubnan, I, 80.
⁷See below p. 352.
⁸Shibib, Lubnan, I, 80; Munayyir, 49 (1955), 259-60.
Egypt ever since the first expedition was sent and particularly after the surprise attack by the troops of ‘Uthmān Pasha on the forces of Ismā‘īl Bey in the vicinity of Jaffa. 1 On learning of this attack and of the losses which his forces had sustained, ‘Allī Bey dispatched in the middle of Dhu ’l-Qa‘da 1184/beginning of March 1771, another expedition composed of 4000 troops to occupy Muzayrib and take control of the Pilgrimage, presumably on its return, by force. 2 This explains why Ismā‘īl Bey and his allies occupied Muzayrib after the departure of the Pilgrimage for the Hijāz. 3

In the meantime, Zahir tried to take hold of the revenue of Qunayṭra and to occupy Irbid, 4 both of which were under the jurisdiction of the governor of Damascus. His troops looted the Nu‘aym Beduin in the region of Hawrān. 5 At the same time, Zahir was embroiled in a struggle with the Ṣaqr Beduin, 6 who were providing help to ‘Uthmān Pasha. 7 The Sardiyya Beduin seem to have been hostile to Zahir as well. 8

On 18 Dhu ’l-Qa‘da 1184/5 March 1771, the governor of Tripoli, Muḥammad Pasha, son of ‘Uthmān Pasha, arrived in Damascus, accompanied by about 1800 soldiers, 10 to command the jarda. Rumours of an impending attack on the

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1 See above p. 328.
3 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 31a-33a, 35b; A.N.B 1 1035: Sidon, 2.5.71.
6 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 23a. 7 A. al-Ṣabbāgh, ff. 16b-17b.
8 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 30a. 9 Ibid., f. 27b.
10 A.N.B 1 1121: Tripoli 12.6.71 (Relation de ce qui passe en Syrie).
by Isma'īl Bey and his allies were rife in Damascus, and Muḥammad Pasha tried to increase his forces. The Yerliyya whom he approached to accompany him refused to do so; on the pretext that they were not required by regulations to do so. The Kapi Kulus made their departure conditional on receiving orders from the Sultan or from their agha (presumably the agha of the janissaries in Istanbul). The Zu'ama made it known to their alaybeyi that they would go only if the other two corps agreed to go - a stipulation characteristic of their lack of initiative. As the time for the departure of the jarda was overdue, Muḥammad Pasha, after much procrastination, left Damascus with no conspicuous forces. Through the help of the shaykh of the Sardiyya Beduin he was able to avoid the usual passage through Muzayrīb and followed instead the route of al-Liwa, in the region of Bogrā, which eventually linked him with the main Pilgrimage route in al-Zarqa'.

Of the three wazīrs dispatched by the Sultan only those of Aleppo and Killis arrived in Damascus. Nu'mān Pasha the Governor of Urfa, who was appointed governor of Egypt and Ṣarī askar (commander-in-chief), was still preparing to leave for Damascus. The arrival of these troops in Damascus had a great effect in frightening away Isma'īl Bey and his allies. Already, there had been divergence in views between Isma'īl Bey and ʿAḥir over attacking

1 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 28a, 28b.  
2 Ibid., ff. 28b-29b.  
3 Ibid., ff. 35a-36a.  
4 Ibid., f. 36a; A.N.B 1121; Tripoli, 12.6.71 (Relation de ce qui passe en Syrie); A.N.B 1035; Sidon, 2.5.72. For the location of al-Zarqā' on the Pilgrimage route see Appendix, II, P. 411.  
5 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 33a, 36a-37a; cf. A.N.B 91; Aleppo, 12.4.72, Aleppo, 29.4.71, A.N.B 1035; Sidon, 2.5.72, PRO.S.F. 110/39, Pt. I; Aleppo, 13.4.71.
'Uthmān Pasha with or without the pilgrims. Although Zahir's plan for attacking him irrespective of any consideration had failed when the Pilgrimage was on its way to Mecca, it seems that he had his own way, later, when his troops took the initiative in occupying Muzayrib. But the jarda managed to pass safely. To keep holding Muzayrib, awaiting the return of 'Uthmān Pasha with the Pilgrimage, would possibly renew the controversy between Ismā'īl Bey and Zahir about the implications of attacking it or not and would also endanger their chances of victory after the arrival of the relief troops to Damascus. Consequently, Ismā'īl Bey and his allies withdrew from Muzayrib. The Matawila went to their country, Zahir returned to the region of Safad, and Ismā'īl Bey went to the region of Nablus to besiege Ibn Jarrār. This does not mean that the 'allies' had split; they had simply dispersed because no joint action was expected at the time. It was apparent, however, that the political initiative slipped away from Zahir's hands. If it is true that he had reported the unyielding attitude of Ismā'īl Bey to 'Alī Bey, who consequently sent more troops, then it is ironical that Zahir's supremacy should have been overshadowed as a result.

The campaign of Abu 'l-Dhabab and the occupation of Damascus.

On 4 Muharram 1185/19 April 1771, Abu 'l-Dhabab left Cairo for Syria at the head of a large army. Guns were carried on camels, and other pro-

1 A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 2.5.71.
2 Ibid., about Ismā'īl Bey's occupation of the village of Qabā'iyah and the submission of certain shaykhs to him in the region of Nablus with the exception of Ibn Jarrār, see A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 3.5.71; Ibn al-Siddīq, ff. 37b, 38a.
3 A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 2.5.71, cf. B 1034: Sidon, 15.11.70; Shiḥāb, Lubnān, I, 81.
4 Ibn al-Siddīq, f. 38b.
5 Estimates on the size of his army ranged between 12 and 40 thousand, see ibid.; 'A. al-Sabbagh, f. 18b; PROSP 97/47: Istanbul, 3.6.71; A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 31.5.71; A.N.B 1121: Tripoli, 12.6.71.
visions were sent by sea to Damietta. For the latter purpose 'Ali Bey laid an embargo on vessels.² On 2 Safar 1185/17 May 1771 Abu 'l-Dhabab arrived in Ramle.³ This was a decisive event, which affected Zahir’s ascendancy but not his committed policy towards 'Ali Bey. Zahir did not go in person to meet Abu 'l-Dhabab but was satisfied to send the eldest of his sons. In the words of a contemporary source, Zahir 'n'a pas voulu aller se présenter au devant du général d'Egipète'. This was in glaring contrast to his personal welcome to Isma'il Bey. Zahir was busy at the time strengthening the fortifications of Acre.⁵ He had reason to fear an Ottoman disciplinary attack, particularly because the arrival of Abu 'l-Dhabab would give the struggle a sharper turn. Such a threat had always been imminent but the Sultan was still busy in his war with Russia. Moreover, the strengthening of an ally should have been comforting to Zahir. In spite of that it appeared 'qu'il est dans quelques craintes'.⁶ It seems that Zahir began to be apprehensive of the increasing power of the troops of 'Ali Bey. However, Zahir’s forces, commanded by his sons, and not, significantly, by himself as previously, fought alongside those of Abu 'l-Dhabab.

Shaykh Naṣīf presented his allegiance personally to Abu 'l-Dhabab.⁷ His reasons for doing so are understandable; not the least among them was the fact that his leadership among the Matāwila was still challenged by Shaykh

³A.N.B¹ 1035: Sidon, 31.5.71; Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 14a.
⁴A.N.B¹ 1035: Sidon, 31.5.71. ⁵Ibid.
⁶Ibid. ⁷Ibid.
Qablān, who was secretly communicating with Darwīsh Pasha in Sidon. The immediate objectives of Shaykh Naṣīf were to assure his supremacy among the Matawila and to acquire the governorship of Sidon.¹

‘Uthmān Pasha managed to conduct the Pilgrimage safely that year and he returned to Damascus on 8 Ṣafar/23 May.² The occasion was celebrated with rejoicings in Damascus,³ as well as in Tripoli and Sidon.⁴

The advance of Abu ‘l-Dhahab on Damascus put the military power of ‘Uthmān Pasha, and indeed of all the troops sent by the Sultan, to the test. Joined by Isma‘īl Bey and the troops of Zahir and the Matawila,⁵ Abu ‘l-Dhahab reached Sa‘sa‘,⁶ a village on the outskirts of Damascus,⁷ on 18 Ṣafar 1185/2 June 1771, without encountering any resistance.⁸ Before discussing the military confrontation that took place, an examination of the power potential of both sides is useful at this stage.

The number of troops defending Damascus amounted to about 13,000.⁹ They seemed invincible to the Damascenes, and as such disastrously encouraged complacency even in ‘Uthmān Pasha. The troops were composed of several

¹A.N.B¹ 1035: Sidon, 31.5.71.
²Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 40a; A.N.B¹ 91: Aleppo, 1.6.71.
³Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 40b; A.N.B¹ 1121: Tripoli, 12.6.71.
⁴A.N.B¹ 1035: Sidon, 31.5.71; Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 42a.
⁵A.N.B¹ 1035: 1035: Sidon, 31.5.71; Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 42a. In 929/1521 Sa‘sa‘ was described in the Ottoman documents as an isolated halting-place near Damascus, on the road to Jerusalem. In that year it was made a village at the suggestion of a former judge of Damascus, see Heyd, 101.
⁶Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 42a. Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 42a. In 939/1531 Sa‘sa‘ was described in the Ottoman documents as an isolated halting-place near Damascus, on the road to Jerusalem. In that year it was made a village at the suggestion of a former judge of Damascus, see Heyd, 101.
⁷Muradī, II, 128. A.N.B¹ 1035: Sidon, 1.6.71.
⁸This is based on information given by Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 28b, 36a, 37a, 41a, 41b, 42a, 110b; A.N.B¹ 1121: Tripoli, 12.6.71 (Relation de ce qui passe en Syrie); A.N.B¹ 91: Aleppo, 23.5.71.
¹⁰Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 41b, cf. ff. 36b, 37a.
corps which were conscious of their separate identities and more apt to take to rivalry than to cooperation. The Yerliyya, long used to factional struggle and very rarely to punitive expeditions against neighbouring forces, were subjected now to an external pressure of which they had no experience. If the number of esamīs (certificates of pay) coincided with the actual membership of the Yerliyya corps, then there were 1950 Yerlis at the time of the attack. But not all of them were fit for fighting, nor were all even theoretically available, because their primary task was to garrison the fortresses along the Pilgrimage route. Furthermore, the agha of the Yerliyya, Yūsuf b. Jabrī, was suspected of secret communication with the Mamluks.

In 1184/1770-1 the Kapi Kulus numbered no less than two thousand. But their duty was to guard the citadel and other strategic points in Damascus; hence, they were not of much help on the battle-field. As for the feudal forces, Zu‘ama and Timariots, they were, like the Yerliyya, concerned with safeguarding their local interests. Militarily they were not of much value. The private or mercenary troops were aliens having no substantial local interests to safeguard; their chief impetus for fighting was pay and booty. Even these inducements were not enough at times of imminent danger. During the attack of Abu ʿl-Dhahab on Damascus, the Lawand and the Dalāṭiyya were driven out from their lodgings into the battle-field with sticks. On learning, earlier, that Abu ʿl-Dhahab had reached Gaza, the Lawand exploited the situation to practise extortions on the villagers. Partly as a result of

1 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 110b. 2 Ibid., ff. 16b, 17a, 110b.
3 Ibid., ff. 29b, 35a, 35b, 40a, 40b; see below p. 346. 4 Ibid., f. 28b.
5 Ibid., ff. 25a, 25b, 30b. 6 Ibid., f. 43b.
this and partly also as a result of the impending threat of Abu 'l-Dhahab, the majority of the inhabitants of Wadi al-'Ajam (a region in the vicinity of Damascus) took refuge in Damascus. The swarming of the inhabitants of several villages to Damascus increased tension in it. Undeterred by the danger of the troops of 'Ali Bey, the Dalāṭiyya quarrelled with the Yerliyya.

The arrival of the relief troops in Damascus, although comforting, was disquieting to many Damascenes because they had to provide for their upkeep. However, when news of the arrival of Abu 'l-Dhahab in Gaza reached Damascus, many of the janissaries from Aleppo, Killis, Aintāb and Antioch fled.

Apart from their lack of homogeneity and discipline, the troops in Damascus lacked a unified command. The commander-in-chief, Mu'āmmar Pasha, had not yet arrived. Of more importance was the fact that their allegiance was at variance. Since they were not fighting an infidel, there was no feeling of Islamic solidarity and of jihād. The enemy here was Muslim, and although the Matawila were Ši'is this did not account much because of their small number vis-à-vis their Sunnī allies, and also because they were quite familiar to the Damascenes. Furthermore, 'Ali Bey had not revoked the sovereignty of the Sultan. His proclaimed aim of relieving the inhabitants of the injustice of 'Uthman Pasha, in accordance with the precepts of the Qur'ān,

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1 Ibn al-Šiddīq, f. 41a.  
2 Mu'āddī, I, 55.  
3 Ibn al-Šiddīq, f. 17b.  
4 Ibid., f. 41a.  
could not fail to lull the Damascenes, as it had the rural population.

Against this background of confusion the attack of Abu '1-Dhahab took place. The forces he commanded were in a better position than their opposite numbers. The troops that accompanied him from Egypt were numerically larger than those gathered in Damascus. He had at his disposition also a large number of guns, which proved decisive in the fighting. Abu '1-Dhahab was the commander-in-chief of all the troops of 'Ali Bey and of his allies. Moreover, the hard core of his troops was composed of Mamluks who were so far loyal to 'Ali Bey. No matter how faction-divided were the Mamluks, the fact that they were in alien land could help to keep them together. Besides the Mamluks, there were other types of troops on the expeditions dispatched by 'Ali Bey such as Maghāribi, Turks, Indians and others who seem to have been mercenary troops like their opposite numbers in Damascus. But unlike them, they were less insubordinate, apparently because they did not have the upper hand. Rather, they gravitated around the hard core of Mamluks, the like of whom did not exist in Damascus. Obviously, the troops of 'Ali Bey had the advantage also of having been successful when put to the test in their campaign in the Hijāz, significantly under the command of Abu '1-Dhahab, and this must have gained him and them much experience as well as confidence.

1The number of troops that accompanied Abu '1-Dhahab was estimated by Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 38b, at 30,000, and by another source, A.N.B. 1035: Sidon, 31.5.71, at 40,000. Muradi, I, 54 estimated the total number of troops under his command at 40,000.


3Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 43a; A.N.B. 334: Cairo, 24.6.71 (Bulletin).

4Cf. Jabarti, I, 364.

5Jabarti, I, 365.

6Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 47b, 48a.
On the other hand, the troops of Zahir, largely cavalry, were more acquainted with the geography of the country than their Mamluk allies who were anyway no worse in this respect than the bulk of their adversaries, notably the relief troops. Zahir had scores to settle with ‘Uthman Pasha, and as this was apparently the immediate objective of ‘Alî Bey, alliance between them was still maintained. Zahir's sons were no less dedicated to the fighting because it served both as an outlet to their pent-up forces and ipso facto as a realization of their schemes for expansion.

The Matawila were also acquainted with local fighting. After a long period of intimidation, largely at the hands of the Druzes they were anxious to score a resounding victory. Their participation on the side of Zahir and Abu 'l-Dhabab might gain them Sidon from Darwish Pasha who was, more irritatingly, backed by their enemy, Amir Yusuf.

On 17 Safar/1 June, a letter in the form of an ultimatum from Abu 'l-Dhabab was received by 'Uthman Pasha. Abu 'l-Dhabab stated in it that 'Alî Bey had appointed him governor of Damascus and that he (‘Uthman Pasha) should leave immediately to spare the inhabitants any injury. This was the first indication of the real expansionist policy of 'Alî Bey which transcended his avowed claim of merely eliminating ‘Uthman Pasha. On receiving the letter ‘Uthman Pasha sent it to Nu'man Pasha as a strong reminder urging him to come to Damascus. In the meantime, ‘Uthman Pasha began mobilizing his forces. Assured that Abu 'l-Dhabab had camped in Sa'sa', he ordered 'Abd al-Rahman Pasha and Deli Khalil Pasha to march out with their troops and take positions in Darayya. Apart from the many advantages which Abu 'l-Dhabab enjoyed, he proved to be well versed in military tactics as shown in the de-

\[1\] Ibn al-Šiddiq, f. 41b.
ployment of his troops for the battle. Provoked according to a fixed plan by the vanguard of the army of Abu 'l-Dhahab, the troops coming out from Damascus were defeated before their preparations were completed. The date was Monday 19 Safar 1185/3 June 1771.¹

It is interesting to note that 'Uthman Pasha, whom one would expect to lead this conglomeration of troops, remained behind in Damascus.² The fugitive soldiers tried to return to Damascus through the Maydan quarter but its inhabitants, together with those of the Qubaybat quarter, fearing their plunder and ravages, closed the gates in their faces and frightened them away by firing at them. The troops of Urfa fled in the direction of the suburban Ṣaliḥiyya quarter, plundering wherever they went. The inhabitants of this quarter exhibited much vigour in restraining them.³ Nearly all the relief troops had fled.⁴ Deli Khalīl Pasha left for Killis on 20 Safar/4 June,⁵ and 'Abd al-Rahmān Pasha followed him the next day,⁶ arriving in Aleppo on 26 Safar/10 June.⁷

The battle now centered on Damascus proper and the Damascenes took the

¹ For a detailed account of the battle see Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 42b-44a; another, reliable, and in some parts rather detailed, account is given in A.N.B¹ 33; Cairo, 24.6.71 (Bulletin); see also A.N.B¹ 91: Aleppo, 11.6.71; Barīk, 94, 95; al-Qārī, 84.

² Murādī's statement, I, 54, that all four governors went out to combat him is ambiguous and not substantiated by any other source, not even his other statements.

³ Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 44a-45a, A.N.B¹ 91: Aleppo, 11.6.71.

⁴ Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 45a; cf. Murādī, I, 54; A.N.B¹ 1121: Tripoli, 12.6.71 (Relation).

⁵ A.N.B¹ 33; Cairo, 24.6.71 (Bulletin); cf. Murādī, I, 54. 55.

⁶ A.N.B¹ 33; Cairo, 24.7.61 (Bulletin).

⁷ A.N.B¹ 91: Aleppo, 11.6.71; cf. A.N.B¹ 1121: Tripoli, 12.6.71 (Relation).
initiative in defending their city. Once more awlād al-Shām came to the fore. The vanguard of Abu 'l-Dhahab, composed of Ṣafadiyya, Matāwila and Maghāriba, converged on the Maydān quarter on Tuesday 20 Ṣafar /4 June. Through the help of some deserters from the troops of 'Uthmān Pasha, they penetrated into the Qubaybat and the Maydān by al-Qā'a street where defence seems to have been neglected. A house-to-house battle was then fought. Between Tuesday 20 Ṣafar/4 June and Thursday 22 Ṣafar attacks and counter-attacks took place, with the troops of Abu 'l-Dhahab penetrating to Bāb al-Jābiya, only to be pushed back by the Damascenes. The Maydān quarter was badly affected as a result. Two facts emerge from this confused situation. Firstly, Abu 'l-Dhahab did not launch so far an all-out attack on Damascus. Secondly, rumours were rife in Damascus of a revolt being planned against 'Uthmān Pasha. Seeing that the situation was getting worse and fearing lest the Damascenes turn against him if only in a bid to disarm Abu 'l-Dhahab of his avowed aim to eliminate him, 'Uthmān Pasha fled from Damascus on Thursday evening, 22 Ṣafar, and made for Hims. Contrary to the expectations of the Damascenes, Abu 'l-Dhahab did not attack on Friday. This might be a calculated plan on his part designed to lull religious opinion on this special day, as indeed his act was interpreted in Damascus. It seems also that Abu 'l-Dhahab wanted to provide a breathing space for the conciliatory elements in Damascus to approach him

1 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 41a, 41b.  
2 Ibid., ff. 45a-48b.
3 Ibid., f. 46b.  
4 Ibid., ff. 48a, 48b; cf. A.N.B 1334: Cairo, 24.6.71 (Bulletin). Murādī, I, 55, is somewhat confused in his dates.
5 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 48b.
because he was aware of the flight of ‘Uthmân Pasha. In fact the notables sent him a letter on Friday morning querying him on three points: if he desired to occupy Damascus then he should make it known to them; if he wanted to get hold of ‘Uthmân Pasha then they were to inform him that he had fled to an unknown destination; and, finally, it was for him to decide if he merely wanted to pillage Damascus. It is important to note here that in their letter the notables still retained the initiative as to their final decision.

In his reply Abu ʿl-Dhahab assured them and the Damascenes of safe-conduct and asked to receive a deputation from them. A three-man delegation, composed of ‘Alî Efendi al-Ṭâghistanî, Asʿad Efendi al-Bakrî and Muhammad Efendi al-ʿAnî, went to see him in his headquarters in al-ʿAssalî, outside Bâb Allāh. Their task was difficult because they feared to alienate the Sultan and ‘Uthmân Pasha. They were also worried lest the city be plundered. On hearing from Abu ʿl-Dhahab that he was obedient to God and to the Sultan and that he had no intention of plundering Damascus, the delegation demanded safe-conduct in writing for all the Damascenes, who would then deliberate on the attitude they would take. The conciliatory words of Abu ʿl-Dhahab were not complimentary but they really marked a change of heart on his part.

During the consultations held in Damascus the Yerliyva and the Kapi Kulus asserted their determination to resist. However, the agha of the Yerliyva,

1 Ibn al-Ṣiddîq, f. 50b.
2 Ibid., ff. 49b, 49a.
3 Ibid., ff. 49a, 49b; cf. Murâdî, I, 55.
5 Ibid., ff. 49b-51b.
6 Ibid., ff. 51a, 51b.
Yusuf b. Jabri, who agreed to resist, apparently under duress, changed his mind later, and left Damascus on Friday night. Did he panic or was he bought over by Abu 'l-Dhahab as many Damascenes suggested? When pressed to give his reasons for leaving, Ibn Jabri bluntly stated that the situation was hopeless and that he wanted to save his own skin. Although it is difficult to accuse him with certainty of being bought over by the Mamluks, his attitude, nevertheless, remains questionable. Muradi on one occasion denied that Ibn Jabri had betrayed the Sultan or was bought over by Abu 'l-Dhahab, but on another he accused him of doing so. It seems that Ibn Jabri was trying through any means to be appointed governor of Damascus. The Sultan divulged later that Ibn Jabri had approached him to be appointed governor and that he was granted three tugs for a fixed sum of money. But there was no promise or any indication that he was to attain the governorship of Damascus. It seems also that 'Uthman Pasha was aware of the attempt made to this end at Istanbul by Ibn Jabri and this explains why 'Uthman Pasha tried to have him killed. It is probable that Ibn Jabri, after seeing that the Sultan did not seriously consider granting him the governorship of Damascus, had turned to the Mamluks to achieve his aim. But Abu 'l-Dhahab does not seem to have been well disposed towards him, and this may explain why Ibn Jabri did not go to him after his flight from Damascus. He went to the Druzes instead, probably to

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1Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 51b, 52a.  
2II, 164.  
3I, 56.  
4Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 95b; see above p. 104.  
5Muradi, Matmah, f. 37b.  
6See his comment on Ibn Jabri in Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 50a.
await the result of the struggle. Whatever his motives, it is apparent that Ibn Jabrī and ‘Uthmān Pasha were at loggerheads and that each of them worked to eliminate the other.

The flight of Ibn Jabrī encouraged others to follow suit. The muftī, the naqīb al-Ashraf, As‘ad Efendi al-Bakrī, and other notables panicked and fled on the same night. On learning on Saturday morning 24 Safar/8 June that many of the notables had fled, the determination of the Damascenes to resist petered out and chaos swept in. The bakeries, the barometer of public unrest, closed, and the poor and hungry, with their numbers swollen by the uprooted refugees from the villages, strained the situation still further. The Kāpi Kulūs withdrew to the citadel to put up resistance there. Under these circumstances, the remaining notables decided to surrender to Abu ‘l-Dhahab the city with the exception of the citadel over which they had no authority. A second delegation composed of Alī Efendi al-Taḥghistānī, the Shafi‘I Muftī Muḥammad al-Ghazzī, the orator of the Umayyad Mosque Sulaymān al-Majāsinī, and the scholar Khalīl al-‘Amīlī, informed Abu ‘l-Dhahab of this decision on Saturday 24 Safar/8 June. A decree of safe-conduct granted by Abu ‘l-Dhahab to the Damascenes was publicized by a crier in the city, and shops, wheat-mills and bakeries were ordered to resume business as usual. The troops of Abu ‘l-Dhahab swarmed into the city, and, abiding by his strict orders, no encroachment on their part nor any reprisals on the part of the Damascenes took place. Their presence, in fact, revived commercial activity in Damascus.

1 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 52b; Murādī, I, 55; A.N.B 1 334: Cairo, 24.6.71 (Bulletin); A.N.B 1 1035: Sidon, 28.6.71; PRO, S.P. 97/47: Istanbul, 3.7.71; A.N.B 1 1121: Tripoli, 12.6.71 (Relation) gave the date as 7 June.

2 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 52b, 53a, 56b, 58b, 59a; Murādī, I, 55; Barīk, 95.
As concerns the administration, Abu 'l-Dhahab was satisfied to appoint as deputy muftī, Ibrāhīm al-Ghazzāwī, and as agha for the Yerliyya a member from their ranks, Amīn Agha. He retained the deputy judge Shākir Efendi. This took place before an assembly of notables whose suggestions as to who should be appointed were taken into consideration by Abu 'l-Dhahab. The important facts which emerge from these appointments are that the opinion of the notables had prevailed and that Abu 'l-Dhahab was anxious not to violate the Shari'ā. If this attitude in Abu 'l-Dhahab is linked with other episodes to follow, then his change of heart towards 'Alī Bey becomes more apparent.

No punitive measures were taken by Abu 'l-Dhahab against any of the Damascenes. He confiscated, however, the belongings of the fugitive vazīrs. He ordered 'Uthmān al-Falāqīnsī, the accountant in the Treasury, to render an account on the fiscal affairs of Damascus. Although the sarāyā resumed its functions, Abu 'l-Dhahab does not seem to have made it his headquarters, probably because he did not intend to remain in Damascus and probably also for fear of the neighbouring citadel. The refusal of the Kapı Kulüs to surrender the citadel was a major obstacle to Abu 'l-Dhahab. Muṣṭafā Agha,

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1 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 53b-55a; Murādī, I, 56 was not precise when he mentioned that a muftī and a judge were appointed because, although this was contrary to the Shari'ā, as the notables argued before Abu 'l-Dhahab, the names of these persons do not appear in the standard lists of the muftīs and judges of Damascus, see Risāla, ff. 26a, 32a.


3 Murādī, III, 149.

4 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 56b.

5 Cf. Ibid., f. 57b; Yanni, 377 states that Abu 'l-Dhahab stayed in dār al-wizara.
commander of its garrison, made it known to Abu 'l-Dhabab that he received
his orders from the Sultan only. The resistance of the citadel disquieted
the Damascenes as much as it decided Abu 'l-Dhabab to reduce it by force. 1
He ordered his gunners to bombard it after warning the neighbouring inhabit­
ants to evacuate their houses. Out of 29 balls (gānābir) fired on the cita­
del, according to one account, only three hit it directly. Most of the rest
strayed into the neighbouring houses and two of them hit the Umayyad Mosque.
Partly because of the display of the gānjaq (the holy standard) by the be­
sieged Kābi Kūlūs, partly because of the representations made by the 'Ulama*
who were particularly infuriated at the damage done to the Umayyad Mosque,
and partly also because the bombarding did not achieve positive results,
Abu 'l-Dhabab gave orders to his gunners to stop bombarding it. 2

The occupation of Damascus brought jubilation to Cairo and confusion
to the other Syrian provinces, and above all to Istanbul. 'Alī Bey received
the news of the victory of his army in Darayya on 11 June, and of the surren­
der of Damascus on the 15th. Celebrations were ordered in Cairo as
well as in other cities of Egypt for three consecutive days starting with
17 June. 3 More troops were prepared for dispatch to Syria. 4

In Sidon the repercussions were of a different nature. While its gov­
ernor Darwīsh Pasha was preparing to defend it against the threats of Shaykh
Naṣīf and Ẓahir, news of the surrender of Damascus and the flight of its

1 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 57a.
2 Ibid., ff. 58a, 58b; cf. Murādī, I, 55, 56; al-Qārī, 84; Barīk, 95.
governor decided him to flee instead. Zahir and the Matawila then took control of Sidon. This endangered the position of Amir Yusuf who was actually the dominant figure in Mount Lebanon although he did not yet acquire the paramountcy. He therefore expelled the representatives of Zahir and the Matawila from Sidon, and his supporters took control of it pending the arrival of a governor for the Sultan. It seems that Zahir and the Matawila were not in a position to hold out in Sidon, probably because the bulk of their forces were still with Abu 'l-Dhahab. Of more importance, however, was the unexpected retreat of Abu 'l-Dhahab from Damascus on 18 June which frustrated Zahir.

In Tripoli, the janissaries immediately took up arms and became mutinous. Brigands made headway and a rebellion seemed imminent. The notables, in the absence of the governor, Muhammad Pasha, assembled in a diwan to deliberate on the situation and were able to foil the attempted revolt. News of the surrender of Damascus was announced from the saraya in Aleppo in the evening of 11 June, one day after the return of 'Abd al-Rahman Pasha. In spite of many fugitive troops which passed through Aleppo, everything seemed quiet. This might be partly explained by the fact that the Aleppines were used to the sight and behaviour of similar troops which on many occasions passed through Aleppo to and from the Persian front. But once the Aleppines recovered from the shock, a great fear dawned on them because they knew, not without historical sense, that the second major target

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2. A.N.Bl 1121: Tripoli, 12.6.71 (Relation); cf. Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 60b.
of ‘Ali Bey would be Aleppo. Several contemporary sources conceded that this could happen. In fact ‘Ali Bey had ordered Abu ’1-Dhahab to carry his conquests ‘as far as he liked’. Furthermore, Aleppo was an integral part of the old Mamluk Sultanate which ‘Ali Bey was trying to resurrect. Troops and munition were being prepared in Cairo for this purpose. No wonder, therefore, that Aleppo should start now taking precautions for defence. The governor held several councils for this purpose.

A lot of confusion reigned in Istanbul at the time, as a result of the war with Russia. The occupation of Damascus aggravated the situation. The Reis Efendi was reported to have confessed that his head was so much confused after the occupation of Damascus that he could not read his memorials. Further reinforcements were ordered by the Sultan to proceed to Syria.

The withdrawal of Abu ’1-Dhahab.

At a time when the prospects for a further advance by Abu ’1-Dhahab were bright, he sounded, instead, the retreat. On Tuesday 5 Rabî‘ I 1185/18 June 1771, ten days after the surrender of Damascus, Abu ’1-Dhahab withdrew. Nothing was more unexpected to his allies, adversaries and superiors.

Various explanations were given for his retreat and there seems to be some truth in all of them. It was stated that because Abu ’1-Dhahab was unable to conquer the citadel he gave up and retreated. Indeed his with-

5Ibn al-Siddîq, f. 59a; Barîk, 96, 97; Murâdî, I, 56; A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 28,6,71; PRO, S.P. 97/47: Istanbul, 17.8.71.
drawal came after a futile attempt to storm the citadel, but this does not mean that he would really be unable to conquer it in the long run. The ten days' period during which he was in Damascus is too short a time for us to judge his determined military potential. Although the majority of the balls strayed outside the citadel, the aim could be adjusted later on. Furthermore, it was on the representation of the notables that the bombardment was stopped. Some say that this was done after the besieged displayed the holy standard.

It is true that an unsubdued citadel was a thorn in the side of Abu 'l-Dhahab and might serve as a central point for festering wider opposition, but such a danger did not seem imminent at the time when he withdrew.

Another explanation, given mainly by Lebanese chroniclers, states that Isma'īl Bey insinuated to Abu 'l-Dhahab the folly of his actions by threatening him with the Sultan's retaliation after he had terminated his war with Russia, and by pointing out to him that the action of 'Ali Bey, and by implication his own, was a breach of the Muslim religion, partly because 'Ali Bey had been a follower (probably meaning an ally) of the Empress of Russia, who was the enemy of the Muslim faith, and, as such, it was permissible for every Muslim to fight him. This explanation states also that Isma'īl Bey drew the attention of Abu 'l-Dhahab to the unyielding and treacherous attitude of Zahir and his sons, exemplified by the little respect which 'Ali Zahir showed towards him. Taking advantage of the presence of the surra eminī in Damascus, both Abu 'l-Dhahab and Isma'īl Bey intimated to him that they came contrary to their wish and that they were decided to withdraw. He promised to use his

1 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 58b.  
2 Shīhāb, Lubnān, I, 85.  
3 For his function see above p. 105.
good offices at the Porte in their favour.  

Such advice by Isma'îl Bey to Abu 'l-Dhahab was not incompatible with the past attitude of Isma'îl Bey when he rejected Zahir's plan to attack 'Uthman Pasha for fear of molesting the pilgrims. There is further evidence which confirms that Abu 'l-Dhahab did really meet the surra emîni besides other Ottoman officials. Volney states that an agent sent by 'Uthman Pasha worked on Abu 'l-Dhahab and alienated him from 'Alî Bey. M. al-Šabbagh states that 'Uthman Pasha presented to Abu 'l-Dhahab a Khattî Sharîf from the Sultan promising to appoint him in the place of 'Alî Bey.

There might be some truth also in the explanation given by Jabarti, that Abu 'l-Dhahab was tired of wars and that this feeling was reciprocated by the Mamluk amîrs who were with him. The expedition into Syria followed so soon after the one into the Hijaz.

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1 Shihâb, Lubnân, I, 86, 87; Shibab, Ta'rikh al-Jazzar, 45; Munayyir, al-Mashriq, 49 (1955), 263; Ta'rikh Jabal al-Durûz, MS. Berlin, f. 12a; Nuzha, MS. Paris, f. 45b. With regard to the fact that the account in Nuzha coincided, very often word for word, with that of Shihâb in Lubnân, I, it is interesting to note here the divergence in the accounts of both works. Nuzha f. 45b, did not refer to the emphasis of Isma'îl Bey in his advice to Abu 'l-Dhahab on the treacherous attitude of Zahir's sons nor to the statement that 'Alî Bey, by allying himself with the Empress of Russia, was committing a religious offence, both of which points appear in Shihâb's Lubnân. It is thus difficult to know which is the trustworthy account. But it seems, from other sources which support the account of Shihâb in Lubnân, that the account in Nuzha was probably deliberately presented in this form probably because its author or perhaps copyist was sympathetic towards Zahir and Russia.

2 See above p. 333.

3 Ibn al-Siddîq, f. 56a.

4 p. 84.

5 pp. 108-111.

6 Jabarti, I. 365.
These explanations dwell on one main theme, namely that different external pressures worked on Abu 'l-Dhabab and decided him to give up the campaign. That he responded to them positively implies a certain readiness in him to accept them. After knowing how he reacted, it remains to examine his real intention for doing so. Part of the answer lies in the later career of Abu 'l-Dhabab. But enough was known while he was still in Damascus to reveal the reasons for his change of heart. Either on the day of his departure, which is more probable, or on the day before, Abu 'l-Dhabab addressed a letter to the Damascenes in which he declared that the aim of his expedition was to expel 'Uthmana Pasha and that since this was done, his mission was over. He pretended that had 'Uthman Pasha come out to fight him (implying of course his liquidation) he would not have occupied Damascus. He alleged also that he had given up occupying the citadel after he was sure that 'Uthman Pasha was not in it. For, according to him, Damascus and its citadel belonged to the Sultan. If the contents of the letter were truly reported then Abu 'l-Dhabab was using contradictory terms because he knew beforehand that 'Uthman Pasha had fled from Damascus before it surrendered to him. His giving up the attack on the citadel was due apparently to other reasons, not the least among them was his determination to withdraw. Did Abu 'l-Dhabab really believe that the successive expeditions sent by 'Ali Bey were merely meant to get rid of a governor who was by no means irreplaceable?

1 Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 59a, 59b.
2 Muradi, I, 56. It is unlikely that Abu 'l-Dhabab, who was in a hostile territory, would have given an early notice of his withdrawal for fear of attack on his troops.
3 Muradi, I, 56; Yanni, 377.
4 Muradi, I, 56.
If we survey the attitude of Abu '1-Dhahab before his withdrawal, a rather satisfactory answer explaining his retreat can be arrived at. When he marched on Damascus, Abu '1-Dhahab enjoyed a military reputation which perhaps surpassed that of his master, 'Alī Bey. It was under his command that the rivals of 'Alī Bey in Cairo were eliminated, that the redoubtable Beduin Shaykh Humām was defeated, and that the Hijaz was conquered. Yet he was subordinate to 'Alī Bey. Even before these glories Abu '1-Dhahab seems to have been conscious of his prestige, because on being emancipated and made a bey in 1764, two years after 'Alī Bey bought him as mamluk, he made the hardly precedenteded gesture of distributing a largess of gold on the occasion. Given the immense prestige which Abu '1-Dhahab had enjoyed in so short a time, he might be seen as a potential rival to 'Alī Bey, as events eventually proved him to be. The campaigns into Syria were meant to serve, in a way, as an outlet to the military prowess of Abu '1-Dhahab who could be dangerous if left comparatively idle, so to speak, in Cairo. But as things turned out these campaigns marked the beginning of a split between him and 'Alī Bey.

The advance of Abu '1-Dhahab on Damascus, unhampered by any resistance, and his subsequent military victory in Darayya enhanced still further his consciousness of this strength. In Damascus he felt free to do what he liked. The stages which marked the change in his attitude could best be illustrated by the changes in the tone of his letters to the Damascenes and others. In a letter addressed to 'Uthman Pasha, which arrived in Damascus on 17 Safar/1 June, Abu '1-Dhahab stated that 'Alī Bey had appointed him governor of Damascus. One day before Damascus surrendered, Abu '1-Dhahab

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1 See Holt, 'The Cloud-catcher', 54, 56. 2 Ibid., 52; Jabarti, I, 417. 3 Ibn al-Siddīq, f. 41b.
told a delegation of notables that he did not come to devastate and plunder but he was obedient to God and to the Sultan. It is significant that he made no reference here to 'Ali Bey. After the surrender of Damascus, a crier referred to Abu 'l-Dhahab as Muhammad Bayk Sultan al-Barr. No matter if this title was really assumed by Abu 'l-Dhahab or bestowed on him by the crier, it was evident, by then, that 'Ali Bey's name was no more officially referred to by Abu 'l-Dhahab. Later, Abu 'l-Dhahab made it known to the surre-emini and other Ottoman officials, that he had appealed to the Sultan to appoint him as governor of Damascus promising that he would pay 3000 purses for it. He maintained, however, that if the Sultan did not agree to appoint him, then he should send another governor in place of 'Uthman Pasha. Naturally enough, Abu 'l-Dhahab was opposed to the return of 'Uthman Pasha, if only to justify his own actions. On 1 Rabī' I/14 June, Abu 'l-Dhahab ordered another crier to assure the Damascenes of safety in accordance with the decrees of the holy law, of Muhammad Bayk, Wāli al-Sham, and of Sultan Mustafa.

In a letter to the agha of the citadel, Abu 'l-Dhahab made it known, once more, that he had asked the Sultan to appoint him governor of Damascus, and if this was granted he would stay; otherwise he would leave. If Abu 'l-Dhahab had really made such a demand could he have received an answer from Istanbul by 5 Rabī' I, the date on which he withdrew? It is improbable that his request should have been made earlier than 20 Safar, the date on which he defeated the main army of 'Uthman Pasha. For, to make such a request Abu 'l-Dhahab needed to impress the Sultan from a position of strength. Before the battle of Darayya Abu 'l-Dhahab was potentially strong but from the point of view of Istanbul the forces assembled in Damascus might have been thought enough to defeat such a rebel.

1 Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 50b; Murādi, I, 55.
2 Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 53a. The term sultan al-barr was used earlier by Fakhr al-Dīn Ma'n II, see 'A. Isma'il, Le Liban, I, 58.
3 Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 56a.
4 Ibid., ff. 56a, 56b.
5 Ibid., f. 57a.
This fact and the probability that the Sultan was infuriated rather than impressed by Abu '1-Dhahab's occupation of Damascus, explain why he did not appoint him its governor. Moreover, it is incredible that a request by Abu '1-Dhahab to Istanbul and an answer could have been possible in such a short time. Other factors seem to have decided Abu '1-Dhahab to withdraw.

That Abu '1-Dhahab became conscious partly through fear and partly through personal interest, of his allegiance to the Sultan and consequently disowned the expansionist policy of 'Alī Bey, is almost certain. But it seems that he did not seriously believe that he would be given the governorship of Damascus. His withdrawal came only a few days after his interview with the Ottoman officials and it is not improbable that their talks centred on his future role in Egypt rather than in Syria. 'A. al-Šabbāgh asserted that the reason for his withdrawal was treachery, in collusion with Ismā'īl Bey, to 'Alī Bey, with the aim of installing himself in his place. Naturally enough, the primary field for the ambition of Abu '1-Dhahab was Egypt, where he gained prominence and where it was not unusual, in accordance with the prevailing Mamlūk tradition of factionalism, to hope for a paramount position. In Syria, Abu '1-Dhahab was uprooted, as were indeed the mamlūks who accompanied him. He is alleged to have stated in his compte rendu to 'Alī Bey, that he and the rest of the mamlūks were in an alien country. The dream of reviving the old Mamluk Sultanate does not seem yet to have captured his imagination, given his subordinate position. Better, at first, be governor in Egypt with the Sultan's acquiescence, rather than a commander

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1f. 19a. 


3Ibid.; Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 89.
or a governor in Syria under a fellow-mamlûk. Rivalry among the Mamlûks was in its heyday at the time.

Another factor which seems to have decided Abu 'l-Dhabab to withdraw was his fear of further military clashes, especially because 'Uthmân Pasha was not resigned to his fate and also because fresh troops, ordered by the Sultan, were moving to combat him.\(^1\) When he later justified his withdrawal before 'Alî Bey, Abu 'l-Dhabab gave as one reason the nearness of enemy reinforcements.\(^2\) It was true that Abu 'l-Dhabab should have been able to count on further reinforcements from 'Alî Bey, and these were really in preparation, but they had not left Cairo by the time when he withdrew.\(^3\) In an interview with the muftî of Jerusalem, Muḥammad al-Tâlîḥi,\(^4\) in Ramle, Abu 'l-Dhabab, who was on his way to Egypt, purported to him that he was forced (implying by 'Alî Bey) to make the attack, and criticised the folly of 'Alî Bey, the cowardice of 'Uthmân Pasha and the deceit of Žahir.\(^5\)

The withdrawal of Abu 'l-Dhabab from Syria had far-reaching repercussions there and particularly in Egypt. The balance of power in southern Syria was disrupted, and chaos prevailed for several years. In his attempt to re-assert his authority outside Damascus, 'Uthmân Pasha failed and was eventually deposed.

'Uthmân Pasha returned to Damascus on 13 Rabî' I/26 June, accompanied by some fugitive notables.\(^6\) Three days later fresh Ottoman troops started to

\(^{1}\) Ibn al-Ṣiddîq, ff. 61a, 61b; cf. Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 87, 88.

\(^{2}\) Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 89.

\(^{3}\) PRO, S. P. 97/47: Istanbul, 17.9.71.

\(^{4}\) See Murādī, IV, 102-3.

\(^{5}\) Ibn al-Ṣiddîq, ff. 101a, 101b, 102a.

\(^{6}\) Ibid., f. 61b; Murādī, I, 56, gave the date as Thursday 16 Rabî' I, which seems erroneous because the 16th was not a Thursday.
arrive in Damascus. On 8 Rabi' II/21 July a Khattī Sherīf was received in Damascus in which the Sultan thanked awlād al-Sham and particularly the muftī for the role they played. It is not known if 'Uṯmān Pasha was praised or reprimanded by the Sultan, but it is significant that he was not deposed at the time. The fact that he felt safe augmented his self-confidence.

Shortly after his return 'Uṯmān Pasha killed Yusuf b. Jabrī, the agha of the Yerliyya. He nominated in his place Sulaymān Agha, Kāhva of the Yerliyya. The event was well-timed because 'Uṯmān Pasha needed to reassert his authority in Damascus. He also needed the money of Ibn Jabrī. He confiscated 300 purses, largely drawn from the revenue of his property, estimated at 3000 purses, and then asked the Sultan to authorize its confiscation. 'Uṯmān Pasha did not remain in office long enough to receive the orders of the Sultan to this effect, and it was under his successor, Muhammad Pasha al-'Āṣm, that this took place. The reaction of the Damascenes was generally favourable because of the lofty attitude of Ibn Jabrī. The Yerliyya did not show any sign of insubordination, probably because they were convinced of the guilt of Ibn Jabrī. The fact that Ibn Jabrī was a peasant by origin - a fact contemptuously invoked after his death - might also explain the lack of sympathy for him among the townspeople.

1 Ibn al-Siddīq, f. 61b; cf. A.N.B1 91: Aleppo, 6.7.71.
2 This seems rather over-complimentary because the Muftī Husayn al-Murādī fled from Damascus and did not play a prominent role.
3 Ibn al-Siddīq, f. 62a.
5 Ibn al-Siddīq, ff. 63a-65a.
6 Ibid., ff. 64a, 65a, cf. f. 65b; Murādī, II, 163, 164, Matmāh, f. 124b.
The amounts confiscated from Ibn Jabrî mitigated the excesses in the extortions already started by 'Uthmân Pasha in Damascus, to finance his military preparations and to regain part of the wealth he had forfeited. Nevertheless, 'Uthmân Pasha stepped up his extortionate measures in Damascus, shortly afterwards, to an extent that alienated its inhabitants.

'Uthmân Pasha's self-confidence increased to a degree that bordered on overweening arrogance and eventually endangered his balance of judgment. On 19 Rabi' II/1 August a Khatti Sherîf arrived from the Sultan, confirming 'Uthmân Pasha in his governorship, decorating him with a robe of honour and thanking him for his bravery against the invaders. Officials and other notables were decorated as well. It was not lost on the Damascenes that 'Uthmân Pasha had distorted the facts in his reports to the Sultan and had portrayed his defeatism as bravery. Yet, 'Uthmân Pasha was confirmed, his defeatism decorated and, more important, his dangerous haughtiness encouraged.

Instead of reaching an accommodation with Deli Khalîl Pasha over the pay of his troops, 'Uthmân Pasha expelled him and his troops from Damascus at a time when the danger had by no means subsided. For, on 2 Jumāda 1/13 Aug. Ibn Jarrār, who had been besieged in the fortress of Sannûr for about a year, appealed to 'Uthmân Pasha for help against an imminent attack

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2 Ibn al-Šiddîq, f. 65a.
3 Cf. Ibid.
4 Ibn al-Šiddîq, f. 66a. His son Muḥammad Pasha was confirmed at about the same time in the governorship of Tripoli, A.N.B 1 1121: Tripoli, 26.6.71 (Extrait des Registres). His other son, Darwîsh Pasha of Sidon seems also to have been confirmed because he was not deposed
5 Ibn al-Šiddîq, f. 66a, cf. f. 102a.
6 Ibid., ff. 65a, 65b; Deli Khalîl Pasha was appointed to the governorship of Urfa in place of Nu'man Pasha, see A.N.B 1 91: Aleppo, 27.9.71.
by Zahir and the Matawila. Again, the military unpreparedness or rather the over-confidence of ‘Uthman Pasha were largely responsible for his subsequent defeat at the hands of Zahir.

‘Uthman Pasha tried to fill the power vacuum created after the withdrawal of Abu ’l-Dhabab. Although he appointed governors to the Biqa‘ and Qunaytra, his authority was by no means restored over all the remaining parts of his province. It is true that Zahir was politically and militarily embarrassed after the withdrawal of Abu ’l-Dhabab, but he was in communication with ‘Ali Bey who, acquainted with the betrayal of Abu ’l-Dhabab, promised to dispatch fresh troops to Syria. The ease with which the conquest of Damascus had been achieved was certainly encouraging to ‘Ali Bey.

The response of ‘Ali Bey was heartening to Zahir who consequently sent troops to take possession of Jaffa, so as to receive the promised troops of ‘Ali Bey. In the wake of Abu ’l-Dhabab’s withdrawal, Gaza, Ramle and Jaffa were left without governors. Their inhabitants were apprehensive of the return of ‘Uthman Pasha and the resumption of the old practices of exploitation. The Bedouin in their vicinity ran loose, communications were threatened and a severe blow was dealt to commerce. With ‘Uthman Pasha determined to restore his authority over all parts of his province and Zahir encouraged by ‘Ali Bey to stand firm, a clash between them became imminent. While Jaffa

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1Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 64a.
2A.N.B 1 1035: Sidon, 28.6.71; Volney, 84; ‘A. al-Sabbagh, f. 19a.
4A.N.B 1 1035: Sidon, 10.7.71.
was under the control of Zahir, the governorships of Gaza and Ramle changed from his control to that of 'Uthman Pasha. In the meantime, Zahir was trying to subdue his enemy Ibn Jarraḥ. It seems that Zahir was apprehensive of the rise of Amīr Yusuf to the paramountcy in Mount Lebanon in place of Amīr Manṣūr, who had been on his side. By subduing Ibn Jarraḥ, Zahir certainly hoped to deprive 'Uthman Pasha of a powerful ally. He needed also to impress 'Ali Bey with the continued invincibility of his military power so as to encourage him to dispatch troops. Furthermore, military action might keep his ranks closed and divert the attention of his sons from inter-rivalry. The danger of Zahir's action was that it aroused 'Uthman Pasha, who responded to the call for help of his protegé Ibn Jarraḥ. It is true that 'Uthman Pasha was planning to attack Zahir any way and that a clash was likely to occur when 'Uthman Pasha went on the dawra because Zahir had taken control of several regions in the province. But this incident hastened the clash. On Monday 22 Jumādā I 1185/2 September 1771 a battle took place between 'Uthman Pasha and Zahir near Lake Ḫūla. The army of 'Uthman Pasha was worsted, the majority were drowned in the river Jordan while trying to escape, and 'Uthman Pasha was lucky enough to be saved. He returned to Damascus on 6 September.

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1 ANB 1035: Sidon, 20.8.71 (attached to it a dispatch from Ramle, 20.7.71).


3 ANB 1035: Sidon, 28.6.71, Sidon, 20.8.71; Shibāb, Lubnān, I, 88; Nuzha, MS. Paris, ff. 46a, 46b; Shidyāq, 435–7; Munayyir, al-Maghriq, 49 (1955), 263.

4 For an account of the battle see, Ibn al-Siddīq, ff. 69b–74b; ANB 1035: Sidon, 21.9.71; ANB 91: Aleppo, 27.9.71 (attached to it a dispatch from Sidon); PRO, S.P. 97/47: Istanbul, 4.11.71; ‘A. al-Ṣabbāḥ, ff. 19b–20b; (cont.)
After his return to Damascus, ‘Uthman Pasha was confronted with the urgent problem of preparing money and troops to conduct the Pilgrimage. He started by confiscating the property of the persons who were killed in the battle of Hula, and by making exactions. He also curtailed the pay to the Lawand and the Dalatiyya because they were unreliable in fighting, and promised to raise other troops. In the divan, which he convoked to deliberate on the situation and to advise on how to report to the Sultan, ‘Uthman Pasha was urged by those assembled to relate the truth; otherwise they would not endorse his appeal. Accordingly, ‘Uthman Pasha informed the Sultan, without extolling his own bravery, of the unreliability of his troops and of his need for money and troops.

In the meantime security had reached a low ebb both in Damascus and in the rural regions. Some Maghariba blocked the highways and Beduin in the immediate vicinity of Damascus ran loose. The indecisiveness and loss of control of ‘Uthman Pasha encouraged this state of affairs. However, the expected arrival of Nu‘mân Pasha evoked a feeling of security among the Damascenes. But their anxiety was soon aroused on hearing how he was exploiting the inhabitants on his way.

While ‘Uthman Pasha had enough problems on his hands to cope with, news that his son Darwish Pasha was besieged in Sidon was received in Damascus on 11 Rajab/20 Oct. and caused much consternation and embarrassment. After his victory over ‘Uthman Pasha, Zahir returned to Acre on 5 September and communicated to ‘Ali Bey the news of his victory over ‘Uthman Pasha. He then turned his attention to Sidon. On 13 Oct. Zahir sent an ultimatum to Darwish Pasha (cont.) M. al-Šabbagh, 100-1; Barik, 97; Shihab, Lubnan, I, 89; Munayyir, al-Nashriq, 49 (1955), 262, 263.

2Ibn al-Siddîq, ff. 74a-75a. 3Ibid., ff. 75a-76a.
4Ibid., ff. 78a, 78b, 81a. 5Ibid., f. 81a.
6N.B:91; Aleppo, 27.9.71; A.N.B.1035; Sidon, 21.9.71; cf. S.P.97/47.
asking him to quit Sidon, which he did on the following day. Amir Yusuf, fearing isolation and a possible threat to Beirut by Zahir, persuaded Darwish Pasha to return to Sidon under the protection of his troops. Thus Amir Yusuf committed himself militarily against Zahir and the Matawila. Several factors decided Amir Yusuf to act so quickly and decisively. His position in Mount Lebanon was by no means unchallenged. His retired uncle, Amir Mansur, was manoeuvring to discredit him. Since Amir Mansur had previously taken the side of Zahir, it was to the latter's advantage that he should be reinstated. The Matawila also began to create trouble for Amir Yusuf by attacking territories under his jurisdiction. Furthermore, Amir Yusuf was very much in need of a resounding victory, after he was raised to the paramountcy, to establish his prestige. On the other hand, 'Uthman Pasha exempted him from paying the miri tax for two years, in accordance with a Khatti Sherif, and exhorted him to fight the Matawila. In the battle that ensued in Nabatiyya on 20 October, between Amir Yusuf on the one hand, and the Matawila backed by Zahir, on the other, Amir Yusuf was defeated. On 23 October Sidon was occupied by the joint forces of Zahir and the Matawila, which converged on it by land, and

1A.N.B1 1035: Sidon 9.11.71; A.N.B1 91: Aleppo, 17.11.71 (Relation de la prise de Seyde); A.N.B1 1035: Marseille, 29.1.72 (attached to it a dispatch from Sidon, 30.10.71); Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 81b, 82a, 87a, 87b.


4Shibab, Lubnan, I, 91; Shidyq, 437; Nuzha, MS. Paris, f. 47a.

5Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 32b. Shibab, Lubnan, I, 90 and Shidyq, 439 mention that Amir Yusuf was exempted from the miri tax for one year so as to guard Sidon. A.N.B1 1035: Sidon, 9.11.71, merely referred to a monetary arrangement between 'Uthman Pasha and Amir Yusuf based on a Khatti Sherif. According to 'A. al-Šabbagh, f. 20b 'Uthman Pasha drew the attention of Amir Yusuf to the fact that he had already been exempted from paying the miri tax for three years.

6Shibab, Lubnan, I, 90-2; Shidyq, 438; Munayyir, al-Mashriq 49 (1955), 264; Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 87a-89b; Barik, 97; 'A. al-Šabbagh, f. 21a.
those of ‘Ali Bey, which descended on it from the sea. Other troops of
‘Ali Bey occupied Gaza, Jaffa and Ramle. An apparent calm prevailed in
Cairo at the time, and hostilities did not break out between ‘Ali Bey and
Abu ‘l-Dhahab until early Shawwal 1185/January 1772. This enabled ‘Ali Bey
to send troops to Syria.

The Deposition of ‘Uthman Pasha.

Amid this political turmoil ‘Uthman Pasha and his sons were deposed from
their governorships of Damascus, Sidon and Tripoli. News to this effect
reached Damascus on 13 Rajab/22 Oct. through ‘Uthman Pasha’s agent in Istanbul. The Damascenes were doubly glad, firstly, because the recent calamities
were associated with ‘Uthman Pasha, and, secondly, because a member of the
‘Azm family succeeded him. The contemporary Damascene chronicler, Ibn al-
Siddiq, referred, on the occasion, to the humble origin ‘Uthman Pasha
(calil al-asl) in contrast to the dignified origin of Muhammad Pasha al-‘Azm
who became governor.

1See A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 9.11.71, Sidon, 30.4.72 (Bulletin); A.N.B 91:
Aleppo, 17.11.71 (Relation de la prise de Seyde); PRO, S.P. 97/47: Istanbul,
17.12.71.

2A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 9.11.71, Sidon, 23.11.71, Sidon, 10.2.72; A.N.B 1
S.P. 97/47: Istanbul, 3.12.71. Jabarti, I, 365, dismissed the events of
Rajab, Sha‘ban and Ramadan of this year in a few words, and mentioned noth-
ing on the departure of these troops. The Lebanese chroniclers give con-
fused information. cf. Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 79b, 80a, 85b.

3Jabarti, I, 365.

4Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 83b.

5Ibid.
Until his defeat near Lake Ḥula, 'Uthman Pasha had been able to retain his governorship. Various factors helped him do so. Apart from the usual practice of keeping an agent at Istanbul, 'Uthman Pasha adopted an expedient administrative policy. He refrained from practising extortions in Damascus until his hand was forced after the attack by Abu'l-Dhabab. There is no evidence that the Damascenes tried to revolt against him before this incident. In fact 'Uthman Pasha was very cooperative with the Damascenes. The rural population, it is true, had suffered from his exactions, but they expressed their discontent in another way, by declaring for 'Ali Bey. He also ensured the safety of the Pilgrimage: all through his governorship and this gained him much credit. Even after the occupation of Damascus by Abu'l-Dhabab, 'Uthman Pasha had been able to weather the storm. The Sultan, occupied in the war with Russia, was not duly informed about the real political situation in Syria. Nothing is more illustrative of this than the demand made on one occasion by the Reis Efendi to the dragoman of the English ambassador at Istanbul to supply him with the information which the latter had received from the English Consul at Aleppo concerning the affairs of Syria.

A major factor which seems to have decided the Sultan not to depose 'Uthman Pasha while the troops of 'Ali Bey were still in Syria was connected with the Sultan's prestige. It was publicly made known by 'Ali Bey and his

commanders that their aim was to purge Syria from the injustice of 'Uthman Pasha. The Sultan had been informed by the Damascenes of this claim as early as Ramadan 1184/December-January 1770-1. An appeal had also been made to the Sultan by 'Ali Bey and Zahir asking him to depose 'Uthman Pasha. For the Sultan to depose 'Uthman Pasha while the troops of 'Ali Bey were still in Syria, even if he was convinced of the validity of the accusations made by 'Ali Bey against him, would be interpreted as giving way to the demands of 'Ali Bey, and this would augment the latter's prestige. After the withdrawal of the Mamluk troops the Sultan was more free to act. The subsequent defeat of 'Uthman Pasha near Lake Ḫula, and his appeal to the Sultan for troops and money increased the embarrassment of the Sultan because he was still embroiled in war with Russia. The Sultan may also have become aware of the deceit of 'Uthman Pasha who was mainly interested in extolling his own courage. One wonders also if the deposition of 'Uthman Pasha was not implicitly intended help by the Sultan to ward off another attack by 'Ali Bey, or at least to appease Abu 'l-Dhabab who had insisted on it before his withdrawal. The Ottoman officials who conversed with Abu 'l-Dhabab in Damascus may also have alienated the Sultan from 'Uthman Pasha. However, 'Uthman Pasha was not completely discredited. He was appointed governor of Konya in place of Muḥammad Pasha al-'Aṣm, and his son Muḥammad Pasha was appointed to Mosul. He was also deprived of the mālikānes of Ḥamāh, Ḥims, Ma‘arra and al-Ḥisn, which were given to Muḥammad Pasha al-'Aṣm in his capacity as commander of the Pilgrimage.

1 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 18a-19a.  
Chapter 8.

THE FOURTH PHASE OF 'AZM RULE IN DAMASCUS.

Between 1771 and 1783 the governors of Damascus gradually lost the initiative in the bid for political power vis-à-vis the neighbouring power groups. The dominant role which the governors of Damascus had played ever since the elimination of Fakhr al-Dīn II in 1635, in varying degrees from one period to the other, was completely reversed under 'Uthmān Pasha. The expedition of 'Alī Bey exposed not only the weakness of Ottoman authority but, what most concerns us here, the inability of the governors of Damascus to stand up to this challenge and, more important, to regain their strength after this setback. Theirs was a supremacy adjusted to the local balance of power. Once it was shaken by the Mamluk intervention, they relapsed into military insignificance until Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār assumed the governorship of Damascus. Jazzār was essentially based on the province of Sidon and his acquisition of the governorship of Damascus was something subsidiary, although very much desired for its prestige. Under him the Damascenes were much humiliated and the hegemony of Damascus was surrendered to Sidon or rather to Acre.

This chapter deals therefore with the sequel of Abu 'l-Dhahab's withdrawal and the inability of the governors of Damascus to adjust themselves to the changes that followed. Damascus witnessed three governorships during this period of twelve years, two of which were assumed by Muḥammad Pasha al-'Azām, who governed in all about eleven years. He was appointed to Damascus at a time when it was undergoing a crisis in the struggle for supremacy,
and he was unable to salvage it. Jazzār was moving on his track and, before he overtook him, Muḥammad Pasha died.

To trace the vicissitudes of Damascus during this fourth phase of ‘Aẓm rule, the year 1775 is taken as a point of departure in the development of political powers. Concerns the relations of the governors of Damascus with their neighbours; this affected to some extent their policies inside Damascus.

I. The Province of Damascus between 1771 and 1775.

The First Governorship of Muḥammad Pasha al-‘Aẓm.

On 13 Rajab 1185/22 Oct., 1771, the day on which ‘Uthmān Pasha al-Kurjā was informed of his deposition, a messenger dispatched by Muḥammad Pasha al-‘Aẓm arrived in Damascus and officially announced his appointment and that of Muḥtārā Agha of the Kapī Kulus, as mutasallim. On 26 Rajab/4 November, Muḥammad Pasha al-‘Aẓm entered Damascus.

Muḥammad Pasha represents the third generation of ‘Aẓm governors who were appointed to Damascus. He was the son of Muḥtārā b. Fāris b. Ibrāhīm al-‘Aẓm and his grandfather on the maternal side was Isma’il Pasha al-‘Aẓm.

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1 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 83a, 83b.  2 Ibid., 84b; cf. Risāla, f. 15a.
3 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 86a, 93b; cf. Risāla, f. 15a.
4 Murādī, IV, 97; cf. Mika‘īl al-Dimashqī, Tarīkh hadādith al-Shām wa-Lubnān, 1782-1841, Beirut, 1912; p.7; see the genealogical table of ‘Aẓm governors, Appendix 1. The statement by Gibb and Bowen, I.i.221, that Muḥammad Pasha was descended from the ‘Aẓm family on the maternal side is misleading because it seems to have been based on a statement by Murādī, IV, 97, that the grandfather of Muḥammad Pasha on the maternal side was the famous Wazīr Ismā‘īl Pasha al-‘Aẓm. This seems to have been intended by Murādī to link Muḥammad Pasha with this famous governor who was known to the Damascenes. Ismā‘īl Pasha was certainly more famous than any relative on the paternal side of Muḥammad Pasha. The statement by Murādī does not bear any implication that Muḥammad Pasha was not descended from the ‘Aẓms on the paternal side also.
Since his first appointment to Sidon in 1763 Muḥammad Pasha had been appointed to other provinces. But for the larger part of the period between 1763 and 1771 he held the governorship of Sidon intermittently. Before he assumed the governorship of Konya to which he was posted, Muḥammad Pasha was appointed to Damascus. This appointment realized a long-standing desire by the ‘Aṣms to have one of their members appointed to Damascus in place of the former manṣūk of Asʿad Pasha.

Uppermost among the difficulties that confronted Muḥammad Pasha was the need to obtain enough money to finance the Pilgrimage. The methods he used, however, and the resources he tapped helped him to overcome this obstacle. Rather than enforce levies in cash and in kind indiscriminately on the Damascenes he marked certain groups which were small in number and rich enough to contribute, such as the merchants and other wealthy dignitaries, and excused the mass of the people, who could be easily alienated and who were able to cause trouble. It might be argued that this would sharpen the protests of the non-exempted groups who had the means to create trouble. But it seems that care was also taken not to include among them the militant groups, such as the Yerliyya, who could carry their complaints into open revolt. Through his intercession, ‘Uthmān Aḥa b. Shābīb was appointed aḥa of the Yerliyya in place of Sulaymān Aḥa, who was a puppet of the deposed ‘Uthmān Pasha. Before his departure for the Pilgrimage, Muḥammad Pasha received a firman in which the Sultan granted 120 esāmī to the Yerliyya corps, which swelled their number to 2070. The aim behind this increase was to guard the fort-

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1See Murādī, IV, 98-101. 2Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 91b, 92a; cf. Murādī, IV, 101. 3See above p. 308. 4Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 94b. 5Ibid., ff. 110a, 110b.
resses along the Pilgrimage route. Muḥammad Pasha handed the ǧībān to the agha of the Yerliyya and ordered him to confer them on able persons and not on boys or elderly people.1 Such an increase in the ǧībān could not fail to win Muḥammad Pasha much support among the Yerliyya, particularly because the person who was authorized to distribute the ǧībān was ‘Uṭmān Aḥḥa b. Ṣaḥ₃ib. Muḥammad Pasha was also on good terms with the agha of the Kani Kulus, and he appointed him for the second time, on the occasion of his departure with the Pilgrimage, as his mutasallim. Furthermore, a sense of religious responsibility prevailed, as the fate of the Pilgrimage was at stake. Another source of revenue which partly helped in relieving the Damascenes was the Sultan’s authorization to the confiscation of part of the revenue of the malikanes of Ḥamah, Ḥims, Maʿarrat and al-Jişn from ‘Uṭmān Pasha.2 ‘Uṭmān Pasha was also ordered to surrender the money he had confiscated from Ibn Jābrī, and to hand the sums he owed to some Damascenes to Muḥammad Pasha. Most of this was done.3 What remained of the property of Ibn Jābrī in Damascus was sold by the order of the Sultan.4

What aggravated Muḥammad Pasha’s need for money was his inability to go on the dawra. According to Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, Muḥammad Pasha ascribed his inability to go on the dawra to the lack of time before the Pilgrimage. Instead, he sent orders on 25 Shaʿbān/16 December to the inhabitants of the region of Nablus urging them to pay the mīrā duēs to Muṣṭafā Bey Ṭawqān whom he appointed mutasallim of Nablus. This appointment alienated the Jarrār shaykhs, Ḥamān, Yūṣuf and Khālīl, because they felt that they had been more

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1 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 110a, 116b.
2 Ibid., f. 105a, cf. ff. 102b, 103a.
3 Ibid., ff. 103b-105b.
4 Ibid., ff. 95b-97a.
loyal to the governor of Damascus than the refractory Muṣṭafa Bey Tawqān. Muhammad Pasha tried to appease them by appointing them governors of the rural region of Nablus. But this did not satisfy them, and Shaykh Ḥamdān and Shaykh Yusuf went over to the side of Zāhir. Apart from its military drawbacks, their defection was, in economic terms, a further financial loss to Muhammad Pasha, and partly explains why he asked Muṣṭafa Bey to collect the mīrī dues for him.

To suggest, as Muhammad Pasha did, that he was prevented from going on the dawra by the lack of time, is not very satisfactory nor indeed representative of the real situation. Muhammad Pasha entered Damascus on 26 Rajab/4 November and, judged by precedent, he had enough time to go on the dawra and be back to lead the Pilgrimage in due time. Asād Pasha al-ʿAẓm, for example, entered Damascus, after his appointment, on 25 Shaʿbān 1156/1 October 1743, left for the dawra on 5 Ramadān/23 Oct. and was back in time to command the Pilgrimage. There were probably other reasons which prevented Muhammad Pasha from going on the dawra, as indicated by the limitation of his orders to the inhabitants of Nablus. At the time, many parts of the province of Damascus were either occupied by Mamluk troops or were under the control of rebel chiefs over whom Muhammad Pasha had no effective authority. Mamluk troops, as we have already seen, were in control of Gaza, Ramle and Jaffa. Zāhir dominated other regions. ʿAlī Zāhir was usurping the revenue of other parts of the province of Damascus. News of his occupation of the fortress of Jibrīn (between Ramle and Hebron) reached Damascus on 22 Shaʿ

1 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 91b, 98a-99b, 100b, 101a, 107b-108a.
2 Budayrī, f. 10b. See above p. 214.
Shortly afterwards, 'Ali Zahir pushed his attacks into territories in the immediate neighbourhood of Damascus and tried to collect the mira dues from their inhabitants. It was difficult, therefore, for Muhammad Pasha to tour these places as usual without provoking a struggle that might well be disastrous for him. In fact, he approached Zahir to sound him on his attitude if he went on the dawra. According to one source, Zahir made it known, rather politely, that it was not necessary for Muhammad Pasha to leave Damascus for this sole purpose and that, instead, he would dispatch the revenue of these regions to him. Barik, on the other hand, put it more bluntly when he stated that Zahir prevented Muhammad Pasha from going on the dawra. Still more humiliating, Zahir was reported to have permitted Muhammad Pasha to go on the Pilgrimage. This not only demonstrates the extent of Zahir's power and the fact that Muhammad Pasha betrayed signs of weakness from the outset, but it also throws much light on the loss of initiative that Muhammad Pasha exhibited during his tenure in Damascus which partly made possible the submergence of the hegemony of Damascus.

With the date for the departure of the Pilgrimage getting nearer, Muhammad Pasha felt pressed to raise the necessary money by a loan from the Dam-

\[1\] Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 98b, 99a.
\[2\] Ibid., A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 10.2.72, Sidon, 18.3.72.
\[3\] A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 23.11.71.
\[4\] p. 98
\[5\] A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 23.11.71.
ascenes which amounted to 600 purses. On 15 Ramaḍān/22 December, the surra arrived in Damascus, and on 15 Shawwāl/1 January Muḥammad Pasha left with the Pilgrimage.

The Pilgrimage suffered no attacks on its way to and from the Hijāz. This was probably due to two main factors. Firstly, the militant ‘Anāzā and Ṣakhir Beduin who used to threaten it were appeased by Muḥammad Pasha. Rather than depend on one tribe to the detriment, and very often to the outrage, of the other, he hired transport animals from both of them as well as from other lesser tribes. Secondly, there was no imminent Mamluk threat, as there was to the previous Pilgrimage, because the Mamluks and Zahir had other more urgent problems on their hands. In spite of the threats of ‘Alī Zahir to Muzayrib and its adjoining regions, after the departure of the Pilgrimage, Muḥammad Pasha managed to conduct it safely, and it returned to Damascus on 8 Ṣafar 1186/11 May 1772.

Calls for help against the attacks of ‘Alī Zahir were made to the authorities in Damascus but no substantial relief materialized. True, Muḥammad Pasha was on the Pilgrimage at the time, but he had a mutasallīm in Damascus where also there was Nu‘mān Pasha. However, not all the troops that were assigned to the command of Nu‘mān Pasha had arrived. On 14 Ramaḍān/21 December, Nu‘mān Pasha was deprived of his functions and a certain ‘Uthmān Ağa was given the rank of wazīr and appoint-

\[1\] Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 108a, 109b; Barīk, 98. \[2\] Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 106b. \[3\] Ibid., ff. 111a, 111b; A. N. B\[1\] 1035: Sidon, 10.2.72. \[4\] Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 114a. \[5\] Ibid., ff. 114a-125a; Barīk, 98. \[6\] A. N. B\[1\] 1035: Sidon, 21.5.72 (Bulletin including a letter from Dayr al- Qamar; 12.5.72).
ed commander-in-chief and governor of Egypt in his place. On 8 Shawwāl/
14 January 1772, Nu'mān Pasha left Damascus for Sīwās to which he was posted.

The new commander-in-chief, ʿUthmān Pasha, had previously served as wakīl (deputy) of the Kizlar Agha in Egypt in his capacity as controller of the pious foundation whose revenue, referred to as mal al-Karamayn, was assigned to the Two Holy Sanctuaries. During his bid for power ʿAlī Bey expelled ʿUthmān Agha from Egypt and confiscated ten thousand purses from him. He resided temporarily in Medina and shortly afterwards, before the deposition of ʿUthmān Pasha al-Kurjī from Damascus, the Sultan ordered him to go to Damascus with a view to appointing him as commander-in-chief and governor of Egypt because of his popularity there. Nothing materialized in the meantime, and he resided in the Qanawat quarter of Damascus until he was chosen as successor to Nu'mān Pasha. When ʿAlī Bey learned of this appointment he tried to kill the deputy whom ʿUthmān Pasha left behind in Egypt.

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1 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 106a; A.N.B1 92: Aleppo, 29.1.72; A.N.B1 1035: Sidon, 10.2.72.

2 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 108b.

3 It seems that this was the origin of the title of al-Wakīl with which he was later known, cf. PRO, S.P. 97/34: Istanbul, 25.8.49. ʿA. al-Ṣabbagh, f. 29a, states that ʿUthmān Pasha, in one of his letters to Zahir, mentioned that he was wakīl al-Sultan in Ḥarābistān (according to Heyd, 66 n. 6, this term signifies either the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire or the regions inhabited by Beduin, cf. ibid. 74); cf. Barīk, 99.


5 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 105b. It seems that Jabarti, I, 334, referred to this ʿUthman Agha when he mentioned that ʿAlī Bey expelled in Muḥarram 1183/ May–June, 1769 ʿUthman Agha al-Wakīl, see also PRO, S.P. 97/34: Istanbul, 25.8.49.

6 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, ff. 105b, 106a. 7 Ibid., f. 123b.
of his association with Egypt 'Uthman Pasha earned the surname al-Migri which appears alternately, sometimes side by side, with the title al-Wakil in the writings of local chronicles and European writers. It should be made quite clear here with regard to the misleading statements by various writers,¹ that 'Uthman Pasha al-Migri or al-Wakil was never appointed governor of Damascus.² The confusion seems to have arisen partly from his stay in Damascus³ and partly from the role he played while there in his capacity as commander-in-chief, which indeed overshadowed that of the governor of Damascus, particularly in external affairs. On his appointment as successor to Nu'man Pasha he made his headquarters in the saraya probably because Muhammad Pasha was on the Pilgrimage at the time.⁴ This might have occurred during other Pilgrimages and probably this practice became established.

The military potential of Damascus at the time was no better than before. It is true that there was a commander-in-chief there besides the governor, but both of them lacked money and, more ominously, the first lacked troops as well.⁵ Even the citadel lacked munitions for self-defence and an appeal was made to the Sultan by the Kapi Kulus and the dignitaries of the city to

¹Shidyaq, 439, 440, states that 'Uthman Pasha al-Migri al-Wakil was appointed governor of Damascus after the death of 'Uthman Pasha (al-Kurji), which is doubly wrong. Similar errors appear in Shihab, Tarikh al-Jazzar, 48, ‘A. al-Sabbagh, f. 23a, Gibb and Bowen, I.1.221.

²Cf. Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 105b-126a; Bariki, 99, states that the Sultan sent a garibão command to Damascus (Wazir mulhir li'l-Sham) called 'Uthman Pasha al-Migri. His protection of Damascus was part of his duty, and does not necessarily mean that he was sent to govern it. Muradi and al-Qari mention nothing about his appointment as governor of Damascus. Nor did 'Uthman Pasha al-Migri figure in the lists of the governors who were appointed to Damascus.

³This was probably the reason why one dispatch from Istanbul referred to him as 'Uthman Pasha of Damascus and commander-in-chief, see PRO, S.P. 97/48: Istanbul, 3.6.72.

⁴Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 112a.

⁵Ibid., ff. 106a, 106b, cf. ff. 112a, 112b; cf. A.N.B 92: Aleppo, 29.1.72.
this effect. The Sultan promised to send what they had asked for by sea.1 With the authority of the governor of Damascus very much diminished outside Damascus, and with promises of help rather than actual military strength displayed in it, both Muhammad Pasha and 'Uthman Pasha tried to negotiate with Zahir, partly under the pressure of the Damascenes, who thought that if an accommodation could be reached they would be relieved economically. Such negotiations would also gain the authorities of Damascus time during which they would work to undermine Zahir's power by encouraging the dissidence of his sons. Zahir showed apparent readiness to negotiate, partly because he was biding his time to see the result of the struggle between Abu '1-Dhahab and 'Ali Bey in Egypt. He was also once more threatened with attempts made by some of his sons to revolt against him.2

‘Ali Bey was driven out of Egypt on 25 Muqarram 1186/28 April 1772.4 On 8 May he arrived in Gaza5 and on the 15th Zahir met him in Ramle.6 ‘Ali Bey was interested primarily in restoring his authority in Egypt and in seeing Zahir well established on his side so as to shield him from the Ottoman forces.

With the lack of efficient leadership on the part of either Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm or 'Uthman Pasha al-Miṣrī, petty chiefs in the province of Damascus took the initiative into their own hands. A certain Muhammad, probably

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1 Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 99b.  
2 Ibid., ff. 97b, 113a-113b.  
3 A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 10.2.72, Sidon, 30.4.72 (Bulletin); PRO. S.P. 97/48; Istanbul, 3.6.72; Ibn al-Ṣiddīq, f. 124a.  
4 Jabartiī, I, 365-6, 371; 'A. al-Šabbāgh, f.22a; A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 18.3.72, Sidon, 30.4.72 (Bulletin); PRO, S.P. 97/48; Istanbul, 3.7.72.  
6 A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 2.6.72 (Bulletin).  
7 Ibid., Sidon, 21.5.72.
the brother of Mustafa Bey Tawqan, with about seven to eight hundred peasants from the region of Nablus, took Jaffa from the Mamluks with the help of its inhabitants. After 'Ali Bey left Gaza to meet Zahir, Abu Maraq, a former governor of this place, managed to occupy it with the help of the Salih Beduin, who had been suppressed earlier by 'Ali Bey, and Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm confirmed him as its governor. Deli Khalil Pasha who reappeared in Damascus with relief troops was at this time in the Druze territory preparing to attack Sidon.

At this juncture a new factor intervened to turn the scales temporarily in favour of Zahir rather than 'Ali Bey. In the afternoon of 1 June 1772, Russian vessels approached Haifa to succour Zahir and 'Ali Bey. Although this help did not radically change the situation, its significance was enormous because Muslims called on infidels for help against fellow Muslims.

On the demand of 'Ali Bey and Zahir, the Russian vessels proceeded to bombard Beirut on 18 June. The aim was to destroy certain Ottoman vessels

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2 Ibid., Sidon, 21.5.72 (Bulletin, Ramle, 13.5.72).
3 Ibid., Sidon, 2.6.72 (Bulletin, Ramle, 22.5.72); cf. above p. 327.
4 A.N.B 1 1035: Sidon, 30.4.72 (Bulletin); PRO. S.P. 97/48: Istanbul, 17.7.72.
5 A.N.B 1 1035: Sidon, 2.6.72 (Bulletin); 'A. al-Sabbagh, f. 22a; Shihab, Lubnan, I, 92.
6 It is interesting to note that the governor of Damascus, thinking that the Russian vessels were either Maltese or 'Franks', put pressure on the foreign missionaries in Damascus to urge the French Consul in Sidon to make them leave. The latter made it known to him that the troops in these vessels were Greeks and that the Russians gave them their flag and employed them, see A.N.B 1 1035: Sidon, 28.6.72 (a letter from the French Consul to the Governor of Damascus). The Consul referred to these vessels in his dispatches as 'vaisseaux Russes Grecs'. Sometimes he referred to them simply as 'les batiments Grecs', see for example A.N.B 1 1035: Sidon, 26.9.72 (Bulletin).
gathered there and, more important, to divert the attention of the Druzes who, together with some troops from Damascus, were preparing to attack Sidon. Russian troops landed in Beirut but they soon re-embarked on 23 June, after Amir Yusuf had bought them off. ¹

While the Russians were moving towards Beirut to bombard it, the Druzes and Deli Khalil Pasha were defeated by Zahir and his Mamluk and Matawila allies near Sidon on 11 June.² Fearing lest Zahir, with the help of his allies, might extend his control over Beirut and encourage the retired Amir Mansur, who was biding his time, to take his place, Amir Yusuf appealed to ‘Uthman Pasha al-Miğri to send troops to reinforce the defences of Beirut. ‘Uthman Pasha dispatched Ahmad Bey al-Jazzar with a group of Maghāriba and entrusted him with this task.³

Although the victory of Zahir and his allies was heartening to them, it did not gain them a clear-cut superiority. Much confusion and indecisiveness reigned at the time. Ali Bey was preparing to return to Egypt. Accordingly, the Mamluk governor of Sidon withdrew, and Sidon remained in the hands of Zahir. The land route to Egypt was not secure for Ali Bey. Furthermore, Zahir and Ali Bey were still besieging Jaffa.⁴

Muhammad Pasha al-Aṣm and ‘Uthman Pasha al-Miğri did not interfere effectively because they still lacked adequate troops and money.⁵ Their main resource was to levy forced loans on the inhabitants over whom they had direct control, and these were exacerbated as a result.⁶ The commercial activity in Damascus was almost at a standstill.⁷ This was partly due to

¹A.N.B¹ 1035: Sidon, 15.6.72 (Bulletin), Sidon, 19.6.72, Sidon, 28.6.72; A.N.B² 92: Aleppo, 17.7.72; PRO, S.P. 97/48: Istanbul, 2.8.72; Auriant, 212-216; Anderson, 298; ‘A. al-Sabbagh, f.22b; Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 94; Shidyaq, 441-442.

²For an account of the battle see, Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 93; ‘A. al-Sabbagh, f. 22b; Volney, 85, 86; Hammer, XVI, 352, 353; PRO, S.P. 97/48: Istanbul, 3.8.72.


⁴For a detailed account, see A.N.B¹ 1035: Sidon, 31.7.72 (Bulletin), ‘A.al-Sabbagh, f. 23b.

⁵A.N.B¹ 1035: Sidon, 16.8.72. ²Ibid., Sidon, 29.6.72.

⁶Barak, 93.
the effect of exactions, and partly to the disruption of commercial trans-
actions and communications in the coastal regions because of political up-
heavals.\textsuperscript{1} The unstable value of the currency which 'Ali Bey had issued
earlier in Egypt further aggravated the financial situation. After the ex-
pulsion of 'Ali Bey from Egypt, this currency was declared null by Abu 'l-
Dhahab.\textsuperscript{2} Nevertheless, it was still in use in the territory which Zahir
controlled, but it was reduced to half its original value.\textsuperscript{3} Zahir tried to
persuade the French merchants not to refuse it. This encouraged speculation
eighty
and on one occasion, \textsuperscript{4} thousand piastres were smuggled into Acre from Egypt.

Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm tried once more to detach Zahir from 'Ali Bey.
Two attempts were made in this direction. At first Muhammad Pasha sent a
messenger to Zahir, but he had no success. Then the agha of the Yerliyya
in Damascus, probably acting on behalf of its governor, sent two other mess-
engers to Zahir to intimate to him his readiness to act as mediator between
him and the Sultan. Their lot was no better than that of their predecessor.\textsuperscript{5}
In fact nothing substantial came of these approaches at the time, probably
because Zahir did not yet feel militarily pressed to seek an accommodation,
all the more so because 'Ali Bey was preparing to return to Egypt to regain
his supremacy, and probably because he suspected that the authorities of
Damascus were merely trying to gain time.

\textsuperscript{1}Barîk, 98; A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 1035: Sidon, 2.15.72, Sidon, 31.7.72.

\textsuperscript{2}Jabarti, I, 371.

\textsuperscript{3}A.N.B\textsuperscript{1} 1035: Sidon, 20.7.72 (Bulletin).

\textsuperscript{4}Ibid.: Sidon, 16.8.72.

\textsuperscript{5}Ibid.: Sidon, 20.7.72 (Bulletin).
At a time when the discontent of the Damascenes had soared as a result of the extortions and forced loans Muḥammad Pasha al-‘Aẓm was deposed in Rabi‘ I 1186/June-July 1772. This short term of ‘Aẓm rule in Damascus, of less than a year, has no precedent among members of this family who governed Damascus. Its nearest non-‘Aẓm parallel was the governorship of Ghāliq. It seems that the complacent role of Muḥammad Pasha in reacting to events rather than in successfully shaping them had infuriated the Sultan who was still busy in the war with Russia. The French Consul in Aleppo remarked at the time that Muḥammad Pasha ‘parait disgracie de la Porte’, and that as a sign of this, he was appointed to Konya which was normally given to a governor with twoTEGR.A. The British ambassador in Istanbul commented that ‘the news from Syria has alarmed the Porte so much that I fancy it will facilitate the peace’, (meaning with Russia). His speculation came to be true as an armistice was concluded between the Sultan and Russia on 10 June 1772. The Sultan took advantage of this occasion to try to put an end to the revolt of Ẓahīr and ‘Alī Bey. He ordered a naval force to prepare for this objective. News of this move by the Sultan was communicated by the Russian Naval commander, Orlov, to ‘Alī Bey and was followed up with an undertaking made by the latter to block the way of the Sultan’s force. Neither action took

place after all, because the war with Russia was soon resumed. It was not
till after the peace treaty in 1774 that such a force was really dispatched.

It seems that the deposition of Muhammad Pasha was part of the Sultan's
plans to accomplish a tour de force against Zahir and Ali Bey by sending
a former commander-in-chief to govern Damascus in place of Muhammad Pasha.
If this was the Sultan's intention then the new governor, Mustafa Pasha,
disappointed him in turn. However, Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm was not resigned
to his fate and he exerted much pressure in Istanbul to reverse his deposi­
tion. On 22 December 1772 he was still waiting in Syria for the result of
his manoeuvres. About a year after his deposition, he was re-appointed to
Damascus.

The Governorship of Mustafa Pasha Sabayekji.2

Before his appointment to Damascus Mustafa Pasha was governor of Erze­
rum3 and commander-in-chief, probably at the same time, of the Ottoman army
in Georgia.4 When he entered Aleppo on 15 Oct. on his way to Damascus,
about six thousand troops were accompanying him.5 This show of force sug-

1 A.N.B1 1035: Sidon, 18.11.72 (Bulletin, Damascus, 7.11.72); A.N.B1 92:
Aleppo, 24.11.72 (Diverses Nouvelles, Aleppo, 22.11.72).

2 The spelling of this word is based on the terms given by al-Qari, 84, and
Muwaqqi4, f. 251b. Risala, f. 15a gives it as Ispantjji. The French dis­
patches referred to him as Spanky or as Spanatgy.

3 A.N.B1 1035: Sidon, 24.4.73 (Bulletin, Damascus, 17.4.73); another source
mentions him as governor of Kars, see A.N.B1 92: Aleppo, 23.10.72; cf.
Risala, f. 15a.

4 A.N.B1 92: Aleppo, 23.10.72.

5 Ibid.
gests that the Sultan was determined to put an end to the fluid and disturbing military situation in Syria. On 5 November, about three months after the deposition of Muḥammad Pasha, Muṣṭafā Pasha entered Damascus amid a superb procession. In this interval the Sultan appointed the agha of the Kāpi Kūlus as mutasallim. It seems that the presence of Ḫūṭmān Pasha al-Miṣrī in Damascus made the governor's presence less necessary.

During his governorship which lasted for about one year, nothing spectacular was achieved by Muṣṭafā Pasha. Barīk mentioned his name only twice, first on his appointment, and then on his deposition, when referring to a building which Muṣṭafā Pasha built near the place of al-Asṣālī in the vicinity of Damascus. Al-Qārī states that he was a just and a rich governor who contributed from his wealth to the expenses of the Pilgrimage.

The little information given on Muṣṭafā Pasha causes no surprise because the scene of events during his governorship was the province of Sidon and the southern districts of the province of Damascus, where Muṣṭafā Pasha played no major part. It is not that he was completely unacquainted with this part of the Ottoman Empire. In 1770 he had visited Damascus on a special commission to look into the vexations of Ḫūṭmān Pasha al-Kūrji and make reparations. It is rather because he was confronted with a situation which he could not control. Nothing is more representative of the

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1 A.N.B: 1036: Sidon, 24.4.73 (Bulletin, Damascus, 17.4.73).
3 p. 99.
4 Ibid., 100.
5 p. 84.
6 A.N.B: 1036: Sidon, 18.2.73 (French translation of a letter by Muṣṭafā Pasha to the French Consul in Sidon, dated 29.12.72).
frustration of Muṣṭafā Pasha than the letter which he wrote to the French Consul in Sidon on the occasion of his preparations for the Pilgrimage. In it he solicited his advice on how to collect the miri duties of the province of Sidon, which he was authorized by the Sultan to obtain so as to finance the Pilgrimage. It is strange that Muṣṭafā Pasha should have referred to the Consul who, no matter how versed he was in the methods of collecting the miri dues, could not offer him any substantial help, if only for fear of alienating the de facto master of Sidon, Zahir. It could be that Muṣṭafā Pasha, by making known to the Consul his need for money, might have hoped to use this as a preliminary step to asking him for a loan, or perhaps for his intercession with Zahir to acquire the money. The significance of this demand by Muṣṭafā Pasha was not lost on the Consul, who commented, "qu’un homme tel que lui, qui occupe une des premiers places dans l’empire Ottoman, et qui doit vraisemblablement être parfaitement instruit du fond et de tous les détails des troubles de la Syrie, s’adresse à moi pour savoir comment il doit s’y prendre pour percevoir le miriy." If Muṣṭafā Pasha was really determined enough and strong enough to obtain what he needed and what he was ordered by the Sultan to obtain, then the only immediate means was to resort to force. In this he proved hopeless. In spite of a rumour that he had left Damascus at the head of an army to relieve Jaffa, which was besieged by the troops of Zahir and ‘Alī Bey, nothing was achieved in this direction.

1 A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 3.12.72 (attached to this dispatch a French translation of the letter of Muṣṭafā Pasha).

2 Ibid., Sidon, 3.12.72.

3 Ibid., Sidon, 3.12.72 (Bulletin).
On 16 Shawāl 1186/10 January 1773 Muṣṭafā Pasha left Damascus with the Pilgrimage. The number of pilgrims was estimated at more than 100,000 persons. According to a contemporary source, the magnitude of this Pilgrimage is almost unique. The large number of pilgrims was attributed to the excitement that stirred the devotion of the Muslims as a result of the troubles that befell Syria and the Ottoman Empire in general. It might be also that the short-lived armistice with Russia shortly before had deserved some sort of religious acknowledgment. Economically, the large number of pilgrims was very beneficial to the Damascenes.

On 16 February 1773 Jaffa surrendered to the troops of Ẓāhir and Ṭāhir, after about eight months of siege. As a result, Ṭāhir felt free to return to Egypt. Without adequate preparation, he made for Egypt at the beginning of March 1773, accompanied by some of Ṭāhir's troops. In a battle with Abu ʾl-Dhahab at Ṣāliḥiyā on 5 Ṣafar 1187/28 April 1773, Ṭāhir was defeated and captured. On 15 Ṣafar/8 May he died.

1 A.N.B1 1036: Sidon, 12.1.73 (Bulletin).

2 Ibid.

3 Cf. A.N.B1 1036: Sidon, 18.3.73 (attached to it a dispatch from Sidon, 5.3.73).


5 Jabartī, I, 376, 377; Hammer, XVI, 353, 354; A.N.B1 1036: Sidon, 22.4.73 (Bulletin, Gaza, 20.4.73, Sidon, 24.4.73), Sidon, 14.6.73; PRO, S.P. 97/49: Istanbul, 3.6.73, Istanbul, 17.6.73; Auriant, 219. 220.
The death of ‘Ali Bey had far-reaching repercussions. Although militarily he was not very important at the time of his death, he was still the rallying point of his allies. Furthermore, he symbolised the Mamluk defiance to Ottoman authority in Egypt, and carried it into Syria. Zahir was politically and militarily embarrassed as a result, in spite of the fact that the weakened ‘Ali Bey had become more of a problem to him than an asset.

Neither the governor of Damascus, Muṣṭafā Pasha, who returned safely with the Pilgrimage on 5 Ṣafar/28 April, nor the commander-in-chief, ‘Uthmān Pasha al-Miṣrī, exploited the death of ‘Ali Bey to threaten, let alone to fight Zahir. They were satisfied to reinforce the garrison of Beirut under Jazzār. The latter started to fortify this city and refused to quit it when Amir Yusuf, whose suspicions were aroused at this ally’s show of force, asked him to do so. The appeals to this effect which Amir Yusuf made to the authorities of Damascus were of no avail. Beirut was essential to the Ottoman authorities of Damascus, not only because it provided them with a strategic position should they decide to tighten their grip on Zahir, but more essentially because it gave them a link with Istanbul. Beirut, it is to be recalled, was the only port under Ottoman authority along the coast between Egypt and Tripoli.

1 A.N.B. 1036: Sidon, 4.5.73.
2 Ibid.: Sidon, 22.4.73 (Bulletin).
Against the threat of Jazzār the Shīhābs resolved their differences and prepared to regain Beirut by force. In a bid to strengthen themselves they made an accommodation with Ẓāhir and the Matawila on 9 June 1773. Amīr Manṣūr was behind this orientation of policy. Ẓāhir's positive reaction is illustrative of his need, as much as that of Amīr Yusuf, for allies. The absence of ‘Alī Bey from the scene had isolated him and put him face to face with a new threatening enemy in Egypt. The grip was being tightened around him, and a governor nominated by the Sultan to Sidon had already arrived in Damascus. 1

In the meantime, Muṣṭafā Pasha of Damascus was authorized by the Sultan to reach an accommodation with Ẓāhir. It seems that the Sultan was afraid lest the Russians exploit the situation in Syria and interfere still further in its affairs, or lest Abu ʾl-Dhabab might find a pretext to interfere, apparently on the Sultan's behalf, and eventually to dominate in the style of ‘Alī Bey. This does not mean, however, that the Sultan would ultimately reconcile himself with Ẓāhir; rather, he was in need of time until his war with Russia should come to an end. Negotiations between Ẓāhir and Muṣṭafā Pasha were conducted by the latter's bazarganbashi (chief purveyor), 2 a certain Philip, through the good offices of the French Consul at Sidon. After declaring that he was not a rebel against the Sultan but only defending

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1 See A.N.B. 1036: Sidon, 24.4.73, Sidon, 14.6.73; PRO, S.P. 97/49: Istanbul, 3.9.73; Shīhāb, Lubnān, I, 97, 98; Shīhāb, Taʾrikh al-Jazzār, 52; 'A. al-Sabbagh, ff. 25a, 25b; Shidyāq, 443, 444; Munayyir, al-Masārīq, 49 (1955), 268; Volney, 235, 236.

2 A.N.B. 1036: Sidon, 14.6.73.

3 Translated in the French dispatch, ibid., as 'premier marchand'.
the rights of the people, Zahir demanded that the governor of Damascus ensure his continued possession (probably in the form of malikâne) of the territories he occupied at the time, and he undertook that he would pay the mirî dues punctually, together with all arrears. Zahir made it known also that he did not desire to have the two jugs which were usually conferred on the governor of Sidon and that he would provide for the jarâda. However, these negotiations were abandoned, probably under the stress of the ensuing events.

Zahir, as the ally of Amir Yusuf, became embroiled in the struggle with Jazzîr over Beirut. The Russian vessels which Zahir and 'Ali Bey had asked for previously, arrived at this time and were entrusted by Zahir with the task of attacking Jazzîr in Beirut. Accompanied by Dînkizlî, this force appeared before Beirut on 6 July 1773 and started bombarding it. In the meantime Zahir was threatened with a revolt by his sons 'Ali and Sa'îd. Their differences were patched up, however, because of the impending dangers. For, on 27 August 1773, a messenger arrived in Acre from Abu 'l-Dhahab, asking Zahir to forward to him the possessions which 'Ali Bey had left with him and to vacate Nablus, Ramle, Gaza and Jaffa, which the Sultan, as Abu 'l-Dhahab alleged, had given him for his services.

1Shihâb, Lubnân, I, 100.

2A.N.B. 1036: Sidon, 14.6.73 (translation of two letters, dated 9 May 1773 and 2 June 1773, addressed by the governor of Damascus to the French Consul in Sidon), Sidon, 3.7.73, Sidon, 7.7.73 (translation of a letter from Jaffa, dated July 1773, addressed by Zahir to the governor of Damascus), Sidon, 16.8.73; cf. Shihâb, Lubnân, I, 99, 100.

3A.N.B. 1036: Sidon, 7.7.73; Anderson, 302.

4There is no evidence that Zahir occupied Nablus. Probably Abu 'l-Dhahab was referring to Jabal Nablus (cf. Shihâb, Lubnân, I, 108), which was nevertheless (cont.)
The bombardment of Beirut by the Russians gave rise to demonstrations in Damascus at the inactivity of the governor and the commander-in-chief, all the more so because the attackers were Christians. The tension was aggravated by the scarcity of bread. Unable, as it seems, to control the revolts that took place in Damascus, Mustafa Pasha withdrew from the city and encamped in its vicinity. In late August 1773/around the middle of Jumada II, 1187 he was deposed. He was succeeded by Muhammad Pasha al-‘Azm who appointed as mutasallim a certain Ahmad Agha. In mid-Rajab 1187/beginning of October 1773, Muhammad Pasha entered Damascus.

The Second Governorship of Muhammad Pasha al-‘Azm in Damascus.

Ever since his deposition from Damascus, and indeed ever since he was appointed governor, Muhammad Pasha had always worked to obtain the governorship of Damascus. Previously, he had ensured the safety of the Pilgrimage. In spite of his levying loans from the Damascenes, he did not alienate them. Furthermore, his past experience as governor had trained him in the techniques of obtaining appointments.

Shortly after his second appointment to Damascus, Muhammad Pasha’s son, Yusuf Pasha, was appointed governor of Tripoli. This was surely a further success to Muhammad Pasha and explains the strong support he had, or rather the efficacy of his manoeuvres, at Istanbul. A few months later, Muhammad Pasha was not displaced by the death of Sultan Mustafa III on 9 Shawal 1187/24 December 1773 and the accession of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II, even though this entailed, as usual, changes among officials.
The development of events outside Damascus, particularly during the first two years of the second governorship of Muḥammad Pasha, was of major importance not only in shaping the position of the governor of Damascus vis-à-vis the neighbouring power groups but also, and as a result, in affecting his policies inside Damascus.

Between 1773 and 1775 the chief rebels were eliminated one after another. At times Muḥammad Pasha took part in the operations against them, but his role was neither decisive nor consistent. In the interval between the deposition of Muṣṭafā Pasha and the arrival of Muḥammad Pasha, major developments occurred in Beirut. In August 1773, Amīr Yusuf and the Russian vessels besieged Jazzār in Beirut by land and sea. Zahir was unable to send reinforcements to Amīr Yusuf because he was confronted with the impending attack of Abu ‘l-Dhahab. The punitive expedition led by ‘Uthmān Pasha al-Miṣrī against the Druzes for the attacks by some of their members on the trade caravans of Damascus in al-Biqā‘ was defeated by Amīr Yusuf, who was helped by Shaykh Naṣīf and ‘Alī Zahir, in al-Biqā‘ on 13 Rajab 1187/30 Sept. 1773. It seems that this event took place after Jazzār was overwhelmed in Beirut, and besieged in its citadel. Eventually Jazzār surrendered, and took refuge with Zahir.

Unable to subdue Zahir and his allies after they gained the prestige of having chased him and salvaged Beirut from Jazzār, ‘Uthmān Pasha al-Miṣrī

1A.N.B 1036: Sidon, 2.9.73.
2A. al-Ṣabbāgh, ff. 25b, 26a; PRO, S.P. 97/49: Istanbul, 3.12.73; Volney, 260; Shihāb, Lubnan, I, 103; Shihāb, Ta’rikh al-Jazzār, 59; Shidyaq, 443-5.
3PRO, S.P. 97/49: Istanbul, 3.9.73. The Lebanese chroniclers as well as Volney placed the expedition of ‘Uthmān Pasha after the surrender of Beirut. This does not seem to be true.
started negotiating with Zahir. 'Uthman Pasha was acting under various pressures. After the death of Sultan Mustafa III he was anxious lest he be deposed if he did not contribute to resolving the situation. Militarily, he proved unable so far to achieve victory. The new Sultan seems not to have been averse to a reconciliation, perhaps a temporary one, because he was still embroiled in war with Russia and was in need of money, part of which could be acquired from Zahir. An all-out attack on Zahir would necessitate the dispatch of more troops and entail further expenditure. Furthermore, Jazzar had defected to Zahir, and Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm commanded the Pilgrimage on 13 Shawwal/28 December. It might be also that 'Uthman Pasha wanted to anticipate the arrival of Abu 'l-Dhabab and indeed to avert his expedition by coming to terms with Zahir. Overtures for peace were, therefore, beneficial for the time being at least, for both 'Uthman Pasha and the Sultan.²

Agreement was reached between 'Uthman Pasha, in his capacity as commander-in-chief, and Zahir and the Matawila, through the intercession of Shaykh Qablan and a certain official called Husayn Efendi. According to a buyuruldu issued by 'Uthman Pasha on 27 Dhu'l-Qa'da 1187/9 Feb. 1774, Zahir would be granted the province of Sidon (probably what he then occupied) as malikane on condition that he paid 1000 purses to cover the arrears in the niri dues until Muharram 1188/March 1774, and then an annual sum of 450 purses from this date onwards. In addition Zahir would forward provisions for the jarda which the governor of Sidon used to provide.³ It is to be

¹Hammer, XVI, 375. ²A.N.B. ¹ 1036: Sidon, 31.1.74 (Bulletin, Tyre, 31.1.74). ³Ibid., Sidon, 31.1.74 (Bulletin, translation of a letter addressed by the mufti of Damascus to a Turk in Sidon, dated 7 Dhu'l-Qa'da 1187, also a dispatch from Acre, 3.2.74), Sidon, 28.2.74 (Bulletin, translation of the (cont.)
noted here that these terms offered by 'Uthman Pasha were not confirmed by the Sultan, in spite of a promise to Zahir that a 
Khātti Shīrīf would be
issued to this effect. All that the Sultan sent to Zahir was a safe-conduct but nothing about a 
mašīkānā or other appointments. In Nov. 1774 Zahir requested the Sultan to give him Sidon, Jaffa, Ramle and Gaza as 
mašīkānās. That he did not ask to be granted the whole of the province of Sidon as mašīkānā, as already suggested by 'Uthman Pasha, was probably to avoid being em-
broiled in struggles with Amīr Yūsuf. Also, Zahir preferred to be given the
places he suggested as mašīkānās rather than be appointed governor of the
province of Sidon because, apart from the complications which might then
arise with the Druzes and the Matāwila, he would be subject to the usual vicis-
situdes of Ottoman governors including deposition and confiscation of property.

Events were moving fast and the Ottoman authorities proved to be neither
serious nor sincere in their promises to Zahir. Around July 1774 'Uthman
Pasha al-Miṣrī was posted to another office. Muhammad Pasha al-‘Azm was later
appointed as commander-in-chief. Militarily, 'Uthman Pasha had proved hope-

less, particularly after his defeat by the Druzes. His main task - to proceed to Egypt, discipline 'Ali Bey and instal himself as governor in Cairo - became irrelevant after the death of 'Ali Bey and Abu 'l-Dhabab's declaration of allegiance to the Sultan. Furthermore, another governor was appointed to Egypt and was received by Abu 'l-Dhabab. In fact, as early as March 1773, 'Uthman Pasha was appointed governor of Aleppo. He remained in Damascus as commander-in-chief, however, and appointed a mutasallim to Aleppo. Although this shows the extent of his prestige and the efficacy of his manoeuvres, it also reveals that his appointment as governor of Egypt was not taken seriously.

Ostensibly, the deposition of 'Uthman Pasha bolstered the prestige of Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm because he could focus more attention on himself. But this involved more responsibility as well. Muhammad Pasha was not, as a result, in a better position to suppress Zahir nor, in fact, did Zahir become more apprehensive of this particular change. Indeed Zahir was alarmed at the time, but owing to other factors which were as serious to him as they were eventually to Muhammad Pasha. After Jazzar took refuge with Zahir he defected while helping his men to collect the miri revenue, in the region of Jerusalem, and made for Damascus around the end of Nov. 1773. On the other hand, ever since his accommodation with the Shihabs and the apparently conciliatory attitude of the Ottoman authorities towards him, Zahir's immediate tensions relaxed. This encouraged some of his sons to resume their

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1Jabarti, I, 377.  
2A.N.B 92: Aleppo, 31.3.73.  
3Ibid., Aleppo, 8.7.74.  
4A.N.B 1036: Sidon, 31.1.74 (Bulletin, Acre, 31.1.74); PRO, S.P. 97/50: Istanbul, 17.2.74; 'A. al-Šabbagh, ff. 27a-29a; Shihab, Lubnan, I, 115.
dissidence against him. One of them, Ahmad, occupied Jabal 'Ajlūn, a district under the jurisdiction of the governor of Damascus, who eventually recognised his rule over it, partly because he was unable at the moment to wrest it from him, being about to command the Pilgrimage, and perhaps partly because he would confirm Ahmad's position and consequently deepen the rift between him and his father. However, the most serious of these familial revolts was that of 'Alī, which occurred on the eve of Abu l-Dhahab's invasion.

Around the beginning of Muḥarram 1189/beginning of March 1775, Abu l-Dhahab left Cairo at the head of an army to combat Zāhir, allegedly with the approval of the Sultan. On 29 Muḥarram/1 April Gaza capitulated to Abu l-Dhahab. Ramle followed suit and, after a long siege, Jaffa surrendered and many of its inhabitants were massacred. There was no mention of the local inhabitants declaring in advance for the invader, probably because they had become tired of the change of governors. Here the significance of the revolt by Zāhir's son, 'Alī, becomes apparent because he conspired with Abu l-Dhahab against his father. Stunned at the successful advance of Abu l-Dhahab, Zāhir fled from Acre and it surrendered to Abu l-Dhahab. Sidon also capitulated to the latter's naval forces. News of these conquests was celebrated in Cairo in early Rabi' II 1189/early June 1775. But before these celebrations were over, the Mamluk army was thrown into confusion at the death of Abu l-Dhahab in Acre on 10 Rabi' II/10 June. Controversial though

1 A.N.B. 1036: Sidon, 28.8.73, Sidon, 31.7.83, Sidon, 15.10.74; Volney, 260, 265
2 A.N.B. 1036: 31.1.74 (Bulletin, Acre, 31.1.74).
3 Jabarti, I, 413; Shibāb, Lubnān, I, 110; Shibāb, Tārīkh al-Jazzār, 63-4; M. al-Ṣabbagh, 130.
4 A.N.B 1037: Sidon (Bulletin, Acre, 10.4.75).
5 A.N.B. 1037: 25.6.75; Jabarti, I, 414 mentions that he died on 8 Rabi' II/8 June.
the causes of his death remain, the fact remains that his army immediately withdrew back to Egypt, giving up all its conquests. ¹

The death of Abu 'l-Dhahab seems to have relieved the Sultan of a potential rebel, and the governor of Damascus of an impending threat. No matter how much Abu 'l-Dhahab alleged that he was executing the orders of the Sultan, it was almost certain, in the light of the evidence available, that he would eventually tear off the mask and follow the example of 'Ali Bey. ² Abu 'l-Dhahab was determined to govern at least what he had conquered of Syria. On the very day of his death, he made it known to his troops that they were to govern what they had conquered. ³ Had Abu 'l-Dhahab lived longer, conditions for the expansion of his power were not unfavourable. For, no sooner was the Sultan relieved of the war with Russia by the signature of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarja on 12 Jumāda II 1188/21 July 1774, than a new threat on the part of Karīm Khān of Persia became manifest. ⁴ The hostilities that ensued seriously occupied the Sultan for several years.

Apparently grateful for the services of Abu 'l-Dhahab, the Sultan, according to foreign sources in Istanbul, conferred on him the rank of wazīr and appointed him governor of Cairo (probably Egypt), which dignity made him eligible for removal to other governorships. ⁵ According to Jabarti, the Sultan agreed to the demand by Abu 'l-Dhahab and appointed him governor of

¹For these developments see, A.N.B¹ 1037: Sidon, 7.4.75 (Bulletin, Acre, 10.4.75), Sidon, 17.5.75, Sidon, 5.6.75, Sidon, 25.6.75; PRO, S.P. 79/51: Istanbul, 3.7.75; PRO, S.P. 110/43: Aleppo, 17.6.75, Aleppo, 24.6.75; A.N.B 442: Istanbul, 3.7.75, Rabbath, I, 622-4; A. al-Sabbagh, ff. 30a-33a; M. al-Sabbagh, 130-7, 169-70, 172; Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 110, 111; Shihāb, Taʾrīkh al-Jazzār, 64-7; Jabarti, I, 413, 414; Volney, 261, 262; Barīk, 102, 103.

²Rabbath, I, 622.

³Jabarti, I, 414.


⁵PRO, S.P. 97/51: Istanbul, 3.7.75; A.N.B¹ 442: Istanbul, 3.7.75.
Egypt and al-Sham (probably southern Syria including Damascus). News to this effect reached Abu 'l-Dhahab shortly before his death. However, the Sultan dispatched the qapudan, Hasan Pasha, at the head of a naval force, apparently to suppress Zahir and probably also to see that Abu 'l-Dhahab did not get out of control. Some sources suggest that Hasan Pasha was dispatched after the death of Abu 'l-Dhahab to prevent possible confusion and the exploitation of the situation by Zahir.

During the attack of Abu 'l-Dhahab, Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm did no more than await the result of the struggle, which was bound to affect him, no matter who the victor was. The Mamluk governor of Sidon, who was determined to withdraw after the death of Abu 'l-Dhahab, appealed to Muhammad Pasha and to his son, the governor of Tripoli, to send forces and occupy the city in the name of the Sultan. Accordingly, Muhammad Pasha sent his kahya who entered Sidon on 22 June 1775 and took control of it until further instructions from the Sultan. On 10 August a certain Melek Muhammad Pasha arrived in Sidon as governor. Although Zahir reoccupied Acre, and probably Jaffa and Gaza as well, after the withdrawal of Abu 'l-Dhahab, the loss of Sidon was the beginning of his end. Muhammad Pasha made his appearance on the scene not through the force of arms, but only to fill a power vacuum, albeit temporarily. This in no way attests his military supremacy. Many opportunities still

1 Jabarti, I, 413, 414. 2 A. al-Sabbagh, f. 33a.
3 A.N.B 1 442: Istanbul, 3.7.75; Rabbath, I, 623.
4 A.N.B 1 1037: Sidon, 25.6.75 (Bulletin); Rabbath, I, 623.
5 A.N.B 1 1037: Sidon, 30.8.75; A. al-Sabbagh, f. 39b.
lay ahead to demonstrate his initiative. While Hasan Pasha was proceeding towards Acre, Muhammad Pasha was appointed commander-in-chief, probably over the local Ottoman forces. Apart from its prestige, this office carried heavy responsibility and it remained to be seen if he was worthy of it.

Hasan Pasha arrived in the proximity of Haifa on 7 August 1775, and the garrison of Maghribā surrendered the city to him. Zahir made his headquarters in Acre, and on 21 August Hasan Pasha appeared before its walls. Negotiations about the payment of the mirār dues failed because, it was alleged, they were sabotaged by the counsellors of Zahir, Ibrāhīm al-Ṣabbāgh and Dinkizlī. It seems also that Hasan Pasha was not interested in their success. Partly through the treachery of Dinkizlī and the Maghribā, Zahir was forced to flee and was killed not far from the gates of the city by his own Maghribā. His property was confiscated and his famous man of affairs, Ibrāhīm al-Ṣabbāgh, was arrested and taken to Istanbul. Dinkizlī was later killed, around April 1776, by Hasan Pasha. But not all the sons of Zahir were eliminated or arrested because they took to the countryside.

In his capacity as commander-in-chief, Muhammad Pasha al-ʿĀzm hastened to take part in the struggle against Zahir. He arrived in the vicinity of Acre on 26 August, rather late to take part in the battle. His late arrival

1 A.N.B 1037: Sidon, 2.9.75 (Bulletin, Sidon, 30.8.75); 'A. al-Ṣabbāgh, ff. 33a, 39a.
2 A.N.B 1037: Sidon, 2.9.75 (Bulletin); A.N.B 93: Aleppo, 6.10.75 (Nouvelles, No. 15, Acre, 13.9.75), also (Précis des revolutions d'Acre depuis le 20 du mois de May jusqu'au 15 Juin 1775); PRO, S.P. 97/51: Istanbul, 4.9.75; Rabbath, I, 623-4; Volney, 262-5; 'A. al-Ṣabbāgh, ff. 33b-39b; M. al-Ṣabbāgh, 143-9, 172-4; Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 112, 113; Shihāb, Taʿrīkh al-Jazzār, 67-70.
3 A.N.B 1037: Sidon, 30.4.76; Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 117; Mumayyīr, al-Maṣhrīq, 50 (1956), 196.
may not have been deliberate but it was typical of his lack of initiative
and portended his future minor position in the struggle for political power.
Hasan Pasha accused him of treachery for this. The governor of Sidon did not
take part in this battle, because he also arrived late. Both of them re-
turned to the centres of their governorships without laurels and spoil and,
more important, without taking part in the political solutions that were im-
posed.

With the elimination of Zahir, the Matawila and the Shibabs lost their
rallying point. The balance of power in southern Syria adjusted by the pres-
ence of Zahir was thus disrupted. The power vacuum created invited an
adventurer. Such a man was found in Jazzar, who reappeared on the scene and
was appointed by the Sultan as muhafiz of Acre. On 18
December 1775 Melek Muhammad Pasha was deposed from the governorship of Sidon,
Jazzar immediately sent a mutasallim to govern it in his name. On 11 March
1776 Jazzar himself entered Sidon after the Sultan had appointed him its gov-
ernor with the rank of wazir. A new phase in the history of the provinces
of Sidon and Damascus, identified with Jazzar, was initiated. In the period
between 1776 and 1783 a new balance of power began taking shape.

1 A. al-Sabbagh, f. 93a. 2 A.N.B 1037: Sidon, 2.9.75; A. al-Sabbagh, f. 39.
3 A.N.B 1037: Sidon, 3.10.75 (Bulletin).
4 A.N.B 1037: Sidon, 2.9.75; A. al-Sabbagh, f. 39b; M. al-Sabbagh, 145 n.l
175. According to Hammer, XV, 155, a commander on the frontier or in a
fortress was called muhafiz.
5 A.N.B 1037: Sidon, 18.2.75; cf. A.N.B 93: Tripoli, 2.12.75 (Nouvelles
No. 26/7).
6 A.N.B 1037: Sidon, 12.3.76; cf. Shibah, Lubnan, 116; Shibah, Tarikh al-
Jazzar, 71.
II  The Province of Damascus between 1776 and 1783.

With the elimination of the main rebels in the coastal regions by the end of 1775, the economic prospect for Damascus looked brighter because the roads between it and these regions would be more secure. Also, the governor of Damascus would be able to retain his hold over those regions of his province which Zahir had usurped, and this would relieve him and the Damascenes economically.

Free of major military entanglements, Muhammad Pasha undertook construction work inside Damascus both of a private and public nature. He built a residence near the market which was associated with his name. It is interesting to note here that every 'Azm governor built his own house, partly as a matter of prestige and partly also because the 'Azm family was established in Damascus and so there was no chance of occupying the house of a former 'Azm governor. One of his major works was his enlargement in Jumādā I 1195/April-May 1781 of the market which extended from the gate of Sūq al-Arwām to the citadel. Later on, this market was burnt down and in its place today stands Sūq al-Ḥamādiyya, called after Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamīd II, in whose reign it seems to have been rebuilt. Between the end of this market and his house he installed a public fountain. He carried out reconstruction work on certain administrative buildings such as the sarāyā, the treasury, and the main law-court (mahkamat al-bab). He reconstructed many of the tombs of holy men, such as the famous Sufī Ibn al-ʿArabi. The

1Murādī, IV, 101; al-Qārī, 85; Ḥasībi, f. 49b.
2Barīk, 113; Murādī, IV, 101; al-Qārī, 85.  
3Murādī, IV, 110.
4Ḥasībi, f. 49a gave the date of this work as 1196/1781-2.
5Murādī, IV, 102.
6Murādī, IV, 101.
Sufis were of much importance in Damascus, and their satisfaction would gain Muhammad Pasha credit of political value. His chief contribution to the Pilgrimage route was his rebuilding of the fortress and water reservoir in Bi‘r al-Zumurrud.¹

These works, together with many others, mainly of a charitable nature, won Muhammad Pasha much praise in Damascus, particularly from poets whom he patronized.² It is no wonder, therefore, that of all the ‘Aznas, governors and otherwise, Muhammad Pasha was the only one who had a biography in Murādī’s Silk al-Durar.³

The political situation in Damascus remained quiet during the whole governorship of Muhammad Pasha. Murādī states that seditions subsided during his rule.⁴ This was partly due to the just rule of Muhammad Pasha.⁵ However, he did not lack decisiveness when the situation warranted it. Immediately after his second appointment to Damascus, he put to death the agha of the Yerliyya, ‘Uthmān b. Shabīb, whom he accused of insolence and injustice.⁶ It is to be recalled here that ‘Uthmān Agha was appointed to this office at the intercession of Muhammad Pasha himself during his first governorship.⁷ However, this action against ‘Uthmān Agha did not necessarily alienate the Yerliyya corps, since the agha did not focus the real loyalties of its members. It shows, nevertheless, the high-handed policy of Muhammad

¹ Murādī, IV, 101; al-Qarī, 84; Muhammad Adīb, 56. From the last source it is learned that Muhammad Pasha contributed this work before 1193/1779. For the location of this place see Appendix, p. 411.
² Murādī, IV, 101, 102.
³ See above p. 18.
⁴ Murādī, IV, 101.
⁵ Muwaqqī‘, f. 251b.
⁶ Barīk, 100.
⁷ See above p. 310.
Pasha, particularly at the beginning of his rule, to give an impression of forcefulness. Muḥammad Pasha seems to have been helped by the fact that the Yerliyya corps was already purged (under Ghataji) of the bulk of its dissident members, after which it became more amenable. Also, many of the top ranks of this corps were staffed, at the time, by ‘Aẓm members or by dependants of this family as well as by other influential groups whose favour Muhammad Pasha had courted.²

Muḥammad Pasha did not play a major role in the events outside Damascus because he was confronted with a strong rival, Jazẓār. The immediate task of Jazẓār after his appointment as governor of Sidon was to eliminate Zāhir's sons and to establish his authority over the amīrs of Mount Lebanon and the Matāwila. This he did fairly easily. The redoubtable ‘Alī Zāhir was finally killed around October 1776 through the efforts of the governor of Damascus.³ It seems that around 1776 Amīr Yusuf forfeited Beirut to Jazẓār.⁴ In September 1781 Jazẓār subdued the Matāwila, killed Shaykh Naṣīr, and took away Tyre from them.⁵

Local opposition to Amīr Yusuf became conspicuous and it found a focus in two of his brothers, Amīr Afandi and Amīr Sayyid Ahmad, who contested his office. The struggle did not take a strictly Yazbaki-Janbalatī character as there had been much confusion and change of sides. However, this struggle brought Muḥammad Pasha al-‘Aẓm into

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¹See the list of names of some members of the Yerliyya corps on the back of the front cover of the work of Ibn al-Siddiq.

²Cf. al-Ṭaʾrīq, 84; Barīk, 111.

³A.N.B 1037f Sidon, 31.10.76, cf. 20.8.76 (Bulletin); PRO, S.P. 97/52: Istanbul, 18.11.76; Mūrādī, IV, 101; Barīk, 105, 106; Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 118; Munayyir, al-Maṣhīrīq, 50 (1956), 200.

⁴Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 120, Taʾrīkh al-Jazzār, 72-4.

⁵A.N.B 1039f Sidon, 2.10.81; Barīk, 112.
the scene. Muhammad Pasha al-‘Azm was not so much averse to interfering in the affairs of Mount Lebanon as he was afraid of being embroiled in a struggle which would bring him face to face with Jazzār. In 1773 Amīr Yūsuf gave up his office under the pressure of his brothers, who were supported by Jazzār. However, Amīr Yūsuf was not resigned to his fate, and he sought the help of Muhammad Pasha. When Amīr Yūsuf demonstrated his superiority in the struggle with his brothers, Jazzār, shrewd enough to pick the winning card, backed him, and he consequently regained his office. In 1781 Amīr Yūsuf murdered Amīr Afandi. Amīr Sayyid Ahmad then turned to Muhammad Pasha al-‘Azm for support. But he was defeated together with his supporter by Amīr Yūsuf, who was backed by the troops of Jazzār, in a battle in the Biqa’ in June 1781.

While Jazzār was playing hot and cold with Amīr Yūsuf until he finally brought about his deposition in 1788, Muhammad Pasha played a minor role and his aid was usually sought by the weak party. The help he gave to the contestants for the paramount office in Mount Lebanon brought him discredit and did not benefit the party that sought it. Apart from his participation in the murder of ‘Alī Zahir, which was after all achieved through intrigue, the only successful military action by Muhammad Pasha was a punitive expedition against the Beduin chief, Ibn ‘Adwān, who held the fortress of al-Salt.2

Alarmed at the growing power of Jazzār, the Sultan tried to depose him, but without success. His messengers, as well as the governor he appointed to Sidon, were intimidated and turned away by Jazzār.3 The latter had established his power while the Sultan was busy in a lengthy war with Karīm Khan of

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1 Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 122-3; Shihāb, Ta’rikh al-Jazzār, 77-82; Shidyāq, 453-9; Munayyir, al-Mashriq, 50 (1956), 202-7; A.N.B 1038 (Sidon, 16.4.79); A.N.B 1039t (Acre), 11.4.81; Sidon, 11.5.81, Sidon, 11.9.81 (Des événements arrivaient à la montagne).

2 Barīk, 111, 112; Murādī, IV, 101.

3 A.N.B 1037; Sidon, 1.1.77.
Persia, which dragged on from 1774 to 1779, during which time Basra was occupied by the troops of Karīm Khān and then evacuated. Amid the disorders caused by rebels, Beduin and highwaymen, particularly in the region between Aleppo and Alexandretta, Jazzār could still be regarded by the Sultan, no matter how arbitrary he was in his rule and reluctant to accept his deposition, as a factor of stability. The Sultan was satisfied at Jazzār's rigorous suppression of the schismatic and rebellious communities in his province. Nevertheless, Jazzār was always on the alert to counter any possible attack which the Sultan might order against him, and he strengthened the fortifications of Acre where he largely resided.

While the hegemony of Damascus was overshadowed by Jazzār, Damascus was better off economically than any other place in Syria during the governorship of Muḥammad Ḥāfa al-ʿAzm. It is true that, as the market of the hinterland, it had suffered as a result of the political upheavals that fell the coastal regions. But the damage it sustained was less than that


2 PRO, S.P. 97/5: Istanbul, 3.2.75.

3 PRO, F.O. 78/3: Istanbul, 8.2.82, Istanbul, 11.2.82, Istanbul, 25.2.82, Istanbul, 19.3.82, Istanbul, 11.4.82, Istanbul, 1.5.82, Istanbul, 10.6.82, Istanbul, 25.9.82.

4 A.N.B. 1039: Sidon, 22.6.82. 5 A.N.B. 1038: Sidon, 3.6.80.

6 A.N.B. 1037: Sidon, 31.5.77; Shihāb, Taʾrīkh al-Jazzār, 79.


9 Cf. A.N.B. 979: Acre, 6.7.82 (Mémoire sur le commerce).
sustained by the latter regions. Sidon had begun to decline commercially ever since Ḍẖir made Acre the centre of his power. Acre, in turn, suffered from the attack of Abu ‘l-Dḥahab and from the disorders that preceded and succeeded the elimination of Ḍẖir. The extortions practised by Jazzār on the French merchants were no less damaging than the devastation of the countryside by his troops. Jaffa suffered immensely from the vengeance of Abu‘l-Dḥahab, and, together with Gaza and the region in between, particularly suffered from the decline in the trade of ash on which they had prospered.

Beirut was subjected to two Russian attacks and a blockade by the Druzes which disrupted its commercial activity. The continuous depopulation of the rural regions, largely caused by the political upheavals and perpetuated by the tyranny of Jazzār, dealt a heavy blow to commerce. Jazzār resorted to corvée in fortifying Acre, and the villagers were called on to offer their services. A shortage of labour resulted in the cultivated areas and large tracts of land remaining unexploited. Natural calamities such as draught, occasional threats of plague, and the spread of locusts caused further damage.

Damascus was better off because it could still count on the commerce connected with the Pilgrimage. It also attracted the little that remained of

1 A.N.B 1037: Sidon, 31.10.76; cf. A.N.B 1037: Acre, 24.9.77, Sidon, 30.4.76, B 1038: Sidon 7/13.10.80 (Observations sur le mémoire).
2 Shibāb, Taʾrīkh al-Jazzār, 74, 76.
3 A.N.B 1037: Sidon, 28.9.78, Sidon 7/13.10.80 (Observations sur le mémoire); A.N.B 7 433 (Marine): Sidon (?).(?).73 (Description topographique des lieux).
4 A.N.B 1036: Sidon, 17.11.77. 5 Shibāb, Taʾrīkh al-Jazzār, 79.
6 A.N.B 1037: Acre, 24.9.77, Sidon, 17.12.77; Volney 290-313.
7 A.N.B 1037: Sidon, 2.10.76. 8 A.N.B 1037: Sidon, 17.12.77; Barīk, 109.
the foreign trade by this very factor. It benefited from trading with Baghdad, either directly or as a centre for transit trade. In spite of the Bedunin threat along this route, this branch of commerce was still a going concern. The relative prosperity of Damascus was a great asset for Muhammad Pasha. It partly enabled him to finance his public works, already mentioned, and seems to have satisfied the inhabitants with his rule.

However, the general decline of commerce in southern Syria was not balanced by a corresponding revival in northern Syria, in the region of Aleppo, where the English merchants of the Levant Company were based. English trade there continued in a 'most languishing' state. The French merchants in Aleppo were not in a better position. One cause for this decline in Aleppo was the lack of safety on the roads as a result of the ravages by Turkmans, Kurds and Bedunin. Other causes were the requisitioning of men and animals for the war with Russia, and, later on, with Persia, the closing of the latter's markets, the dislocation caused in the markets of Baghdad and Basra as a result of the Persian invasion, the competition by the East India Company with the Levant Company, and the extortions practised by oppressive governors. Lurking below these causes, and certainly perpetuated by them, was a steady decline which had continued from the first quarter of the 18th century.

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1 A.N.B 1039: Sidon, 11.4.81, Sidon, 1.9.81 (Mémoire sur le commerce, Sidon, 30.4.81); A.N.B 1040: Sidon, 11.10.83, A.N.B111 233: Sidon, 9.12.76 (Inspection des Échelles du Levant par Baron de Tott, No. 3); A.N.B 979: Acre 6.7.83 (Mémoire sur le commerce).

2 PRO, F.O. 261/4: Pera of Istanbul, 27.2.81.

3 PRO, F.O. 261/4, Pera of Istanbul, 27.2.81; A.N.B 1040: Sidon, 11.10.83. According to the last dispatch two or three trade caravans left Damascus for Baghdad each year.

4 Cf. Wood, 163.
This general decline of commerce in Syria marked the end of a phase in the commercial activities of the English and French merchants and had deep repercussions on the economic life of the country. The Levant Company was doomed. Emphasis shifted now to the Red Sea route where both English and French merchants, largely based on India, sought to arrange the passage of their Indian goods through Suez. The Levant Company opposed this scheme by the East India Company because it was damaging to its interests.1

On 13 Jumādā I 1197/16 April 1783 Muḥammad Pasha al-ʿAzm died in Damascus and was buried in the cemetery of Bab al-Ṣaghrīr.2 With his death a phase of ʿAzm rule and a generation of ʿAzm governors came to an end in Damascus. In terms of length of tenure he ranks with Asʿad Pasha and ʿUthmān Pasha al-Kurji in the history of Ottoman Damascus. Several factors contributed to the lengthy rule of Muḥammad Pasha. He was not entangled in a major crisis, either inside or outside Damascus, which might weaken his position in Istanbul. The accusation of treachery by the gapudan Pasha does not seem to have borne fruit at Istanbul. Muḥammad Pasha ensured the safety of the Pilgrimage all through his governorship. The credit was largely his, by managing the Beduin through the exact payment of their qarr. (cont.)

5PRO, S.P. 110/39, Pt. II: Aleppo, 12.5.80, see also, Aleppo, 16.5.80, Aleppo, 18.9.80.

6A.N.B 94: Aleppo, 16.4.77 (Mémorie donnant connaissance de l’Échelle d’Aleppo).

7Ibid.; Wood, 162-3.  

8See above p.127.


2Murādī, IV, 102; al-Qāri, 85; Risāla, f. 15a; A.N.B 979: Acre, 15.5.83 gives the date of his death as 15 April.
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as it seems, and force when necessary. A belief existed at the time that the Sultan was forced to appoint the ‘Ażms as governors so as to ensure the safety of the Pilgrimage and the jarda, because they were on good terms with the Beduin. The implication underlying this belief was that, being Arabs, the ‘Ażms could manage the Arab (the Beduin). While this has some truth in it in the sense that the ‘Ażms were a local family, several members of which assumed local governorships and, as such, were acquainted with the Beduin and vice-versa, the fact remains that every governor, ‘Ażm or otherwise, dealt with the situation according to his own ability and according to the prevailing conditions. Muḥammad Pasha did not find much difficulty in financing the Pilgrimage — an important factor towards ensuring its safety — because, particularly after the elimination of Zahir, there were no political upheavals in his province of a nature that would hinder his going on the daʿra, as happened during his first governorship. Then, he had to raise loans from the Damascenes rather than suspend the garr for the Beduin. Nor were there defiant rebels in his province who might withhold the payment of the mīrā dues. Even Jazzār, with his greed for money, did not dare curtail his contribution to the jarda, probably for fear of alienating Muslim opinion. Furthermore, Muḥammad Pasha did not have trouble in finding a reliable commander for the jarda. This command was assumed during most of his governorship by his sons Yūsuf Pasha and ‘Abd Allāh Pasha in their capacity as governors of Tripoli. Their appointment to Tripoli and to the

1PRO, F.O. 78/3: Istanbul, 26.3.82.  
2A.N.B. 1123: Tripoli, 24.6.82.  
3Cf. PRO, S.P. 110/47: Aleppo, 27.6.83.  
4A.N.B. 1037: Sidon, 17.2.77.  
5A.N.B. 1036: Sidon, 30.11.73; A.N.B. 1122: Tripoli, 16.11.73, Tripoli, 16.2.74, Tripoli, 28.4.75, Tripoli, 7.10.76, cf. B. 1123: Tripoli, 25.3.82.
Iarda is a further proof of the ability of Muḥammad Pasha to manoeuvre successfully at Istanbul and partly explains why they held their governorships for so long a period.

It may be said that the death of Muḥammad Pasha came at the right time and he was spared a possible humiliation by the Sultan, if only the confiscation of his wealth, and a more certain forceful confrontation with Jazzār. Two days after learning of the death of Muḥammad Pasha, the Sultan dispatched on 1 May 1783, an official to Damascus with orders to confiscate the property of Muḥammad Pasha. At about the same time, his son 'Abd Allāh Pasha was deposed from Tripoli and arrested, and his property was confiscated. Later, at the turn of the century, 'Abd Allāh Pasha was three times appointed to the governorship of Damascus. He was the last member of the 'Aṣms to govern this province, and during his governorship he was confronted with the bitter rivalry of Jazzār.

Jazzār was in Acre when he learned, on the morning of 17 April 1783, of the death of Muḥammad Pasha. He immediately dispatched a messenger to Istanbul asking for the governorship of Damascus. An eye witness in Acre described how Jazzār then behaved as if he had already become the governor of Damascus and how he received congratulations to this effect from various persons on the very day on which he learned of the death of Muḥammad Pasha. However, the Sultan appointed Muḥammad Pasha, son of 'Uthman Pasha al-Kurji.

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1 PRO, F.O. 78/4; Istanbul, 10.5.83.
3 al-Qari, 90; Risāla, ff. 16b-17b; Mikhaʾīl al-Dimashqī, Taʾrīkh havadith al-Sham wa-Lubnān, 1197-1257 A.H., ed. by L. Maʿluf, Beirut, 1912, p.9.
4 See the list of the governors of Damascus in Munajjid, Wulāt Dimashq, 90-5.
as governor of Damascus. Jazzār seems to have been anxious not to alienate the Sultan by any show of force and desirous, at the same time, to keep the governorship of Sidon within his grasp by having his kāhya, Selīm Agha, appointed to it should he be given the governorship of Damascus.  

On 9 Sha‘ban 1197/10 July 1783, the newly appointed governor of Damascus, Muhammad Pasha, died after less than a month in office. Jazzār was so optimistic that he would be given the governorship of Damascus that he started making preparations to conduct the Pilgrimage. He even nominated mutasallims for the various regions of his present and future governorships. On 7 August he learned that Darwīsh Pasha, another son of ‘Uthman Pasha al-Kurjī, was appointed governor of Damascus.

After the deposition of Darwīsh Pasha on 18 Ṭābi‘ 1199/28 February 1785, Jazzār was at last appointed to Damascus. This was the first of four times in which he was appointed to Damascus between 1785 and his death in 1804. Sidon remained virtually under his control because his mamlūk Selīm succeeded him in the governorship. Another mamlūk of his, Sulayman, was appointed governor of Tripoli at the same time. A new phase in the history of the province of Damascus, and indeed in the history of Syria, had begun.

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1 A.N.B. 979: Acre, 15.5.83. 
2 al-Qarī, 85; M. al-Dimashqī, 2. 
3 A.N.B. 979: Acre, 12.8.83; cf. PRO,F.0.78/4: Istanbul, 24.7.83; al-Qarī, 85. 
4 A.N.B. 979: Acre, 20.3.85; al-Qarī, 85. S.J. Shaw in Ottoman Egypt in the eighteenth century - the Nizamname-i Mihr of Cezzar Ahmad Pasha, Harvard 1962, p. 9 n.4, erroneously implies that Jazzār was governor of Damascus in 1775. His other statement that Jazzār was governor of Syria, pp. 6, 7 n.1, lacks precision because no such office then existed. Furthermore, a statement in the text pp. 2, 10 suggests that this report by Jazzār was written before the death of Ṣāhir in 1775, which, if true, renders the date which the editor gave for the report as 1199/1785 erroneous, see Ibid., p. 7. 
5 See al-Qarī, 85, 88, 90; Risāla, ff. 15b-17b; cf. Shihāb, Tārikh al-Jazzār, 87, 101, 166. 
6 A.N.B. 1041: Sidon, 23.3.85; Shihāb, Tārikh al-Jazzār, 87. 
7 Shihāb, Lubnān, I, 141.
APPENDIX I

A genealogical table of the 'Azm governors during the period under study

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\begin{align*}
\text{Ibrahîm} & \\
\text{Musa} & \text{Isma'îl (c.1659-1733)} & \text{Sulayman (?)-1743)} & \text{Muhammad Faris} \\
\text{Ibrahîm} & \text{Sa'd al-Dîn} & \text{Muṣṭafa As'ad (1705-6-1758)} & \text{daughter} \text{Muṣṭafa} \\
\text{Yaṣîn} & \text{Naṣṣûh} & \text{daughter} \text{Muhammad (1731-1783)} \\
\text{Yusuf} & \text{'Abd Allah} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Note: Governors of Damascus are underlined.

Tabbâkh, VI, 481 does not mention Faris among the sons of Ibrahîm. However, he states, later on the same page, that Isma'îl married his daughter to his nephew, Muṣṭafa b. Faris. That Faris was the son of Ibrahîm is further supported by a statement by Muradî, IV, 97, who mentions that Muhammad was the son of Muṣṭafa b. Faris b. Ibrahîm; see also Kamîl al-Ghazzi, III, 303, and 'Abd al-Qâdir al-'Azm, p. 25.
APPENDIX II

The halting places (manazil) along the Pilgrimage route (al-tarīq al-sultani) between Damascus and Mecca:


This is based on the descriptions given by: Ibn ‘Alīyan, Khiyārī, Muḥammad Adīb, Nābulṣī, al-Ḥaqīqa, Suwaydī and ‘Uthmān. Some variations of names are given in brackets. The list by no means exhausts the names of all the small places where the pilgrims halted. Moreover, it was not necessary for the pilgrims to stop at every place mentioned above. In emergencies the Pilgrimage diverted its route.
I. General Works of Reference.

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II. Works in Arabic.

(A) Manuscripts

Anon. Dhikr asma‘ man tawalla qada‘ Dimashq al-Sham min sanat 1100 A.H. MS. Zahiriyia (Damascus), am, 4419.
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Dhikr man tawalla Dimashq min al-baklabakiyya al-izam fi dawlat bani ‘Uthman. MS. Zahiriyia, am, 4681.
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Dhikr man tawalla al-wizara wa-imarat al-Hajj al-sharif min al-Muzara‘ al-fikham bi-Dimashq al-Sham min sanat 1100 A.H. MS. Zahiriyia, am, 4419.
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Dhikr nabdha fi’il - dawla al-Humiyya wa’il-saltana al-‘Uthmaniyya, Berlin Cat. 9728. Mq. 461.1
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Histoire de la famille de Baschir7, MS. Bibliothèque Nationale, F.A. 2111.

1 The Berlin MSS are found today in Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen.
Anon.  
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Damas au milieu du xixe siècle.
CARTE DE LA PHOENICIE ET DES ENVIRONS DE DAMAS

PAR LE SIEUR MOLLER, Directeur Géographique du Roy, des Académies Romaines des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, et des Sciences, etc. de Ptolémée de Ptolemaeus, Inventeur de 100 M. de Paris, 1750.

Dessin en 1740.
Publié en 1749.

ÉCUBELLES
Milles Romains, équivalant à 800 Toises.

[Map of Phoenicia and the environs of Damascus with place names and distances.]