A HISTORY OF ADDIS ABBABA
FROM
ITS FOUNDATION IN 1886 TO 1910

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This thesis traces aspects of the political, economic and religious history of Addis Ababa from 1886 to 1910. It is based largely on documentary material, both Ethiopian and European, but also depends on oral information. As a city it was unique in Africa because of the absence of an imposed European direction of its development and as a result it grew ad hoc, influenced by both Ethiopian and foreign concepts of an urban community.

From the beginnings Emperor Menilek completely dominated the political and administrative machinery of the capital, but during his illnesses many of his responsibilities were, perforce, delegated to his closest associates who exercised their powers largely through the organisation of the Imperial Palace. The bureaucracy became increasingly civilian in its personnel, rather than military, especially after the Battle of Adwa. Furthermore, since Addis Ababa was also the capital of the empire, the city and its administrators played not only a local but also an imperial role.

The economic influence of the capital was even more pronounced, where again the Emperor was more important than any other individual in the land and under his watchful eye foreigners dominated the import and export trade, while Christians wrested the overall control of trade in the Empire from the Muslims. Yet evangelically, the church was rarely very energetic in the capital although its influence was pervasive.

While many historians have seen Menilek's reign as a period of significant innovation and modernisation, this thesis regards that as an exaggerated claim. For, when closely examined, the modernisation of even the capital was never very impressive, although
it was the acknowledged centre of foreign influence. Nonetheless, the capital did show itself to be the main point for the diffusion of the few modernisations that were introduced into the country from the 1880s to 1910.
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Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my family.
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Abbreviations

A/A Addis Ababa (this is used only in the footnotes).
AP:CR Accounts and Papers. Commercial Reports.
British Parliamentary Papers.
ASMAI Archivio Storico del Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, Rome.
BSGI Bollettino della Società Geografica Italiana.
B. T. Board of Trade, London.
D. D. Documenti Diplomatici, Libri Verdi, Rome.
E. C. Ethiopian calendar date.
Encl. Enclosure.
G. C. Gregorian calendar date.
HSLU Haile Sellassie I University, Addis Ababa.
I. E. S. Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa.
MAB Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome.
M & D Memoires et Documents, Quai d'Orsay, Paris.
MTD Maria Theresa Dollar.
No. Number.
N. S. Eth. - Nouvelle Serie, Ethiopie, Quai d'Orsay, Paris.
O. I. Oral Informant.
SGI Società Geografica Italiana, Rome.
W. D. WargenMh Diary, Addis Ababa.
Note on Transcription

The following method has been used to transcribe:

1) Vowels - first order \\
   second " u \\
   third " i \\
   fourth " a \\
   fifth " é \\
   sixth " e \\
   seventh " o 

2) Consonants - the following have been used for the 5 explosives:
   q the explosive form of "k" Ø \\
   t " " " " " " " t " m \\
   p " " " " " " p " å \\
   s " " " " " " s " q \\
   ch " " " " " " ch " m \\

   Also ch has been used for: ŋ " n " " " ñ \\
   j " " " " ŋ \\

   No attempt has been made to render or employ plurals in Amharic. Guidi1 and Gankin2 were in the main used for reference, while Conti Rossini3 was consulted for plac names as were Crummey4 and Tadesse Tamrat5. When doubt still remained or there were lacunae, transcriptions directly from the oral interviews were sometimes employed. In quotations as well as footnotes, the vagaries of the sources have been adhered to. No attempt has been made to employ a separate transcription system for Oromo names and they appear as they would in Ethiopic script.

1 Guidi, Vocabolario Americano-Italiano (Rome, 1953).
2 E. Gankin, Amaregngna Mskobengngna Mzsäbb Qalat (Moscow, 1969).
When this thesis was started there were many topics that might have been tackled but the nature of the sources available have precluded investigation of many of them. A portrait of Addis Ababa, for instance, on the model of an urban history of London\(^1\) or Paris\(^2\) was impossible. Nor was a straight institutional study possible, or even very rewarding, again because of the lack of a substantial body of documentation of the relevant institutions. The lack of municipal archival material in particular prevented a detailed chronological analysis of factors like population density, land policy or housing.

This history of an urban complex, then, is unusual in many ways because of the very nature of the sources available to the researcher. Urbanization in Ethiopia is such that many of the kinds of institutions one might expect in other parts of Africa or the Middle East, for example, simply do not exist and thus the sources the historian has to work with are of an entirely different order. Ethiopia of Emperor Yohannes and Emperor Menilek (1872-1889 and 1889-1913) had no identifiable concept of a town in the European sense of the term and this is, naturally, reflected in the type of documentation that have been left behind. The nearest equivalents today are a limited number of the early land


charters and to gain access even to these is extremely difficult. No early municipal correspondence seems to have survived. The municipality was set up just before 1910 and only had authority over a minute proportion of the political and economic activities of Addis Ababa. The activities of the imperial household and its documentation became a more significant consideration, but they are closed to the researcher and rumoured to be meagre.

Therefore, I have been forced to rely on the dense archival sources in London, Paris and Rome, as well as private papers within Ethiopia for the bulk of my documentation. The greatest difficulty was the degree to which the material relevant to the actual history of the city was hidden in the mass of correspondence dealing with Ethiopia as a whole. At no time was a large coherent mass of material dealing solely with the city and its affairs found in any of these sources and the account has had to be pieced together from short descriptions and brief references. Even in the area of maps it was found that they were few and far between and of such varying scales and reliability that they never proved to be of any great assistance.

Oral material, too, proved to be something of a disappointment. Informants were very suspicious of the political implications of what they had to say. Thus many of them are not mentioned by name, although any scholar is free to have access to my notes and obtain the names and addresses of those who said they were willing to talk. Still one must be extremely careful with the material gathered about the early Menilek period. Oral information was never used without checking it against written material when this was possible. The oral material was never as reliable as might have been wished.

Despite all the difficulties of working in Ethiopia and the inaccessibility of so much of the material, however, I was able to
gain access to a great deal of material hitherto untouched by historians. The most important of these finds was the diary of Azzaj Wärqenäh, often referred to outside Ethiopia as Dr. Charles Martin. He kept a detailed day-by-day diary from 1899 to 1949. For the purpose of the thesis the most important sections were in the first ten years, for he was deeply involved in the politics of the capital as well as in its early economic growth. It was of prime importance to the thesis. Secondly, I was the only historian to gain access to the archives of the municipality which include the early series of land charters of the city when it was divided into abiyä or parishes. However, I was stopped from working in these archives after I had only just begun. Furthermore, I had access to some of the private papers of the Ilg family in Zürich and to those of several different families in Addis Abäba.

The bulk of the thesis is based on careful and extended work on the diplomatic archives of England, France, and Italy. Here in the weekly despatches, each of the three main diplomatic establishments in the capital provided a continuous and detailed chronicle of the daily events of the empire and the capital. Furthermore, their reliability was enhanced by the fact that each was partisan. The British were hostile to the French and the Italians to the French and vice-versa, one acting as a check on the other with, of course, Ethiopian sources checking on all three. These latter sources in most cases were not so easily dateable and it was upon the foreign sources that the basic chronology had in the end to depend. Both were supplemented by the use of oral material gathered from a wide range of informants both inside and outside the household, as well as by a wide range of published and unpublished works in Amharic.
Methodology

The paradigms of urban centres in the rest of Africa, the Middle East, or even the rest of the world when contrasted to Addis Ababa, or urbanization in Ethiopia as a whole, are not very helpful. The vast majority of the towns in Africa were the creation of colonial powers and those that were not were greatly modified when the town in question was taken over by the metropolitan power. This generally entailed a degree of planning and nearly always resulted in the division of a town into various districts like the "native quarter" and a separate area for the colonizing power.

Addis Ababa on the other hand was an ad hoc creation. It was unique in the Ethiopian let alone the African context. There was no plan to its growth or even foundation, although it is often maintained that Menilek planned and consciously carried through the modernization of the Empire and the centralization of the government and bureaucracy starting from the capital. But it seems clear that the city, like Topsy, "just grew". There was a certain amount of rhetoric concerning modernization, but whether this can be called a policy is something quite different. As I show in the thesis, the little modernization that took place was carried out in fits and starts, always heavily tempered by the needs of the Emperor to strengthen his own personal hold and placate conservative opposition to his rule. Furthermore, the bulk of the modernization that had taken place in the country was concentrated in the capital but then even Menilek planned to break with all these and move to Addis Ababa.¹ Addis Ababa had grown without his willing it to, and when

¹See below, pp. 97-102, 135-144.
he attempted to stop its growth by moving the administrative centre of the empire to the newly founded Addis Alam, he ran into such entrenched opposition he had to abandon his plans. Vested interests were too stubborn in their refusal to move. Here Menilek was willing to abandon the few developments he had undertaken in Addis Ababa ostensibly to start from scratch elsewhere.

Thus the main difficulty of this thesis has been following the ad hoc growth of the city, that is, working up the very chronology from disparate sources and then trying to define the uniqueness of Addis Ababa. First the European archival sources provide the bare bones and then the indigenous, largely Amharic sources make up the flesh and provide a great deal of the insight into the city's history. The oral material in particular, although never entirely reliable on its own, helps the historian to ask new and more challenging questions of his material. Throughout, one had to be extremely careful of the extent to which hindsight might have informed the oral sources used. In the context of Addis Ababa this is particular pertinent because the court of Menilek (from the 1880s to 1913) is so often confused with the more recent one of the Empress Zawditu (1916-1930). The two will not be separated in my opinion until the court of the Empress and the functions of all its various offices have been very carefully studied first. Then having separated that out, the more meagre, hidden material on Menilek could be rigorously tackled. To investigate the two reigns through oral material the other way round leaves one open to attack and

1This might, perhaps, especially be seen in the inability to confirm H.R. Marcus's information in: "The Organisation of Menilek's Palace and Imperial Hospitality (after 1896)", in Rural Africana, No. 11 (Spring, 1970), pp. 57-63.
prone to misinterpretation.

A thematic approach to the thesis was intentional. Only the political, economic and religious aspects independently tackled could be dealt with in depth because these were the most significant and most heavily documented of the city's history. Furthermore, each of these themes looked at separately leads to a clearer and better understanding of the growth of the city and its basic structure. In so many ways the economic life of the capital had a life of its own, unstructured and rarely closely controlled by the Emperor or his advisers. Thus the only way to understand this theme is to see it independently. The same might be said of the religious life of the city but to a lesser extent. The political aspects, if only because of the sheer mass of material, also deserve to be dealt with on their own. Within each chapter a chronological approach has basically been followed to bring out the important causal relationships. Finally, I have attempted at the beginning in the introduction to integrate the three major themes and reinterpret them chronologically.
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Addis Ababa was founded in what turned out to be the centre of the Empire. It was on the southern border of the expansion of Amharic speakers, and to the south, east and west lie the areas conquered by Menilek in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹ The Entoto range of hills, dominating the capital to the north, provides the watershed between two of the great river systems of Ethiopia, the Abbay (or Blue Nile) and the Awash rivers. A fair distance to the south and west is the watershed for the Omo, the most important river system in the southwest. Furthermore, Addis Ababa lies on the dividing line between two of Ethiopia's climatic categories, the daga and the ወንኔ ዕገ ይ which are fundamentally based on altitude. This means that Addis Ababa lies as a natural local trading centre between two areas, each of which grows different varieties of crops. The capital could then sell both of them. Finally, it is at Addis Ababa that one finds the gentlest upward incline on which to scale the highland plateau of Ethiopia.

Yet, in the final analysis, all these geographical factors, even when they are taken in conjunction, were never as significant

in the growth of the city as, say, the Thames was to the growth of London, the Hudson to New York or the Seine to Paris. Addis Ababa's foundation was fundamentally due to other less prominent factors which are, perhaps, best brought out in a chronological survey of her history from the 1880s to 1910.

Addis Ababa was founded in 1886, but the nature of urbenization of Shāwa was such that it was by no means sure that it would for long remain the military, political and administrative centre. It was at its inception not by any stretch of the imagination the economic centre of the province of Shāwa, let alone that of the empire. However, events before and after its foundation point towards a city at Addis Ababa or in its immediate vicinity becoming the capital of the empire. With hindsight the early 1880s proved to be crucial for the Addis Ababa/Enjottò area. For it was then that Menilek was victorious at the battle of Embabo, in the most western part of his kingdom. Here his rival Ṭklä Haymanot of Gojam was defeated. This was the first indication that both the rich lands and the trade of the south and west of present-day Ethiopia were going to redound to the benefit of Shāwa and not remain in the hands of Gojam and neighbouring lands to the north. The sacking of Gondàr by Abu Anja some years later, in 1888, may well have put the seal on the decline of Gojam. For Menilek from

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1 See p. 32+ 36-37.
2 See p. 40.
3 Ibid.
4 See p. 149-150.
1882 onwards seems to have increasingly taken over control of the trade of the south and west, forced it to pass through Addis Abāba and used the tax revenues to benefit his own treasury.1

Also in 1882 Matewos the new Abun or bishop of Shāwa arrived. The significance of this lay in the fact that Menilek, in conferring upon him the right to appoint the Liqā Kabenat, gave him a much greater degree of control over the taxes of the Shāwa church than fellow Abun in their respective provinces of Ethiopia had over theirs. In turn this must have led to a greater degree of centralization of the church which became significant for Addis Abāba when Matewos settled there permanently.2

Like the Battle of Embabo the conquest of Harār in 1887 played a large role in the future growth of Addis Abāba. For Harār was the biggest trading emporium in the Horn of Africa and once under Shāwa control provided a reliable outlet for her exports and a gathering point for imports.3 As Addis Abāba increased in importance after 1887 as an economic centre, Gondār in the North declined, as did many of the smaller regional markets surrounding Addis Abāba, much further south like Rogé and Buliyorké.4

Yet the economic factors in the history of Addis Abāba should not be overemphasized in the pre-Adwa period. Military exigencies

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1See, pp. 145, 149–150.
2See pp. 34–36.
4See pp. 245ff.
still played a large role, particularly in 1888 when Shāwa was in imminent danger of being invaded by the armies of Emperor Yohannes, and Menilek, using Addis Abāba as a gathering point and strategic centre, tried to guard Shāwa and the capital from Yohannes's large army. Failing in his attempts to cross the Abbay or Blue Nile,1 Yohannes turned north and was killed at the battle of Mātāmma while fighting the Mahdiyya and eight months later Menilek was crowned as the next King of Kings, Negusā Nāğāst, of Ethiopia.2 The coronation took place at the church of Eñotō Maryam slightly north of Addis Abāba and symbolized the southward shift of the centre of power in the Empire. Formerly it had rested in the north during the reign of Emperor Yohannes (1872-1889), but now as Emperor Menilek, the former Negus or King of Shāwa, ruled from the centre and capital of his own province.3 As a result Addis Abāba was to become first the political, administrative and religious hub of the Empire and later its economic centre as well. Soon after the coronation both the heads of the church, Abuna Matēwos and Abuna Pēetros began to reside in the Addis Abāba/Eñotō area, thus confirming its importance as a religious centre.4

It was not solely the leaders and officials of the empire who established themselves in the capital but also a growing population; during the years 1889-1892 the worst famine of the century

1 See p. 41–42.
2 See pp. 424.
3 See p. 44.
4 See p. 343 ff.
hit Shawa and caused many from the countryside to flock to the capital, and some other cities, where Menilek gave out food as alms.\(^1\) This he obtained from granaries set up throughout the country which were stocked with grain obtained by a compulsory tax. The famine and its after effects also led to other modifications of the traditional land tenure of Shawa.\(^2\) Certain sections of Menilek's army, often referred to as the Gondaré, had in the 1870s and 1880s been settled in the Oromo areas around Addis Ababa and Entoto, each Oromo household having to support a certain number of the troops.\(^3\) During the famine this became an impossible burden for them and so Menilek was forced to initiate a regular tax based on the number of oxen a man possessed and the revenue from this and other taxes was used to support the troops.\(^4\) Thus it can hardly be said that Menilek intentionally created a salaried army as a modernizing and centralizing step, rather the measure was forced on him by circumstances.

Another action Menilek took to alleviate the famine in Shawa was to carry out extensive raids, especially in Wálamo, so that the troops in Shawa and particularly around the capital would not be a further burden on him. Essential cattle and slaves were also obtained from the raids; the first to replenish stock after the ravages of rinderpest and the second to restock the imperial household.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) See pp. 330-333, 346f.

\(^2\) See p. 346f.

\(^3\) See p. 348. ASMAI 36/4, Antonelli to MAE, Entotto, 18.9.87.

\(^4\) Ibid.

\(^5\) See p. 45ff.
After 1893, the establishment of another form of land tenure based on the *gebzenna* church land charters was carried out. These not only assured the Churches of Addis Ababa and surrounding areas of more stable revenues but also provided nobles resident in the capital with a more dependable source of daily supplies and, more importantly, one that did not unduly strain imperial reserves. ¹

Before 1896 and the Battle of Adwa important developments also took place to make Addis Ababa more of an economic centre of the empire. In 1890 the first mention of a *Nëggadras* having been appointed in Addis Ababa appeared. ² Two years later a coffee monopoly was established by Waldä Giyorgis and Täsämma over all the exports from Käfa and the south and west. Coffee and other exports were to be sent through Addis Ababa and taxed there to the detriment of the route through Gojam and Gondär to the north.³

To increase the efficiency of the newer trade route and to ensure its year-round use a metal bridge was built over the large Awash river.⁴ At the same time, because of the break with Italy following the Treaty of Wechale, imports of guns and other materials were stopped by the Italians through Asäb, the Italian port on the Red Sea.⁵ Ethiopia's foreign trade was now almost wholly in the hands of the French, especially the armaments trade through the port of Jibuti.⁶ Furthermore, it was becoming increasingly clear that

¹See pp. 746 ff.
²See p. 315.
³See p. 146 ff.
⁴See p. 248.
⁵See p. 150 ff. + 163 ff.
⁶See p. 245 ff., 152 ff., + 171.
Ethiopia's internal trade was largely if not wholly dominated by Christians, not by Muslims as had earlier been the case. The Christian traders' hold on Addis Ababa had, perhaps, been strengthened by the transfer of certain important Christian families from Gondar to Addis Ababa.¹

Yet all of these developments might well have been ephemeral had it not been for Menilek's great victory at Adwa. Only victory as final as Adwa could have confirmed and cemented his hold over many of the more recalcitrant of his subjects. Now he could afford to dictate to his provincial nobles and insist that they come to Addis Ababa, the seat of his power and pay homage to him there. They could no longer drive such a hard bargain with him and ask that he come to them or that they should meet at a spot halfway between their two "capitals". Isolating the nobles from their provincial bases by bringing them to the capital for extended periods was one of the most effective techniques Menilek had at his command to reduce their power and strengthen his own position at the centre. The crucial role of the battle of Adwa can hardly be overemphasized in this respect. But these were not the only contributions of the battle to the life of that city; it can be seen as a watershed in many other ways.

Some of the more immediate results were a renewed campaign of church building to give thanks for the victory - the new church of St. George was perhaps the most prominent example.² The campaign

¹See pp. 149-250 & 267ff.
²See pp. 353-354.
to the north had been most costly in terms of men, for leaders like Fitawrari Gēbāyōḥu and及びまんch Bēshah lost their lives and were in turn replaced by the promotion of men like Fitawrari Habtā Giyorgis and及びまんch Balcha. Replacements like Balcha were drawn largely from the imperial household which played such an important role in the governing of the city.¹

But as the months passed Ethiopia's improved standing with the outside world became more and more apparent. Menilek's legitimacy was enhanced by this recognition and sometimes special missions were sent to Ethiopia by France, Italy, Great Britain, Russia, Germany and others.² However, a corollary to this was increased anti-foreign feeling in Ethiopia against the new influx of foreigners which came after 1896.³ Part of this had also been inspired, perhaps, by a scramble for monopolies that had been set off by Adwa. Once Ethiopia's independence had been established many foreigners thought they would be able to take advantage of the underdeveloped market, get a monopoly and make a quick profit.⁴ Thus monopolies were given out largely to foreigners, most of whom were Christians as were the imperial officials who gave the monopolies out in Menilek's name. Christian domination of trade was thus reinforced.⁵

Adwa, in establishing Šāwa, predominance in Ethiopia, also encouraged foreign capitalization of the railway Menilek had long

¹See pp. 27 of the reference.
²See pp. 17 of the reference.
³See p. 23 of the reference.
⁴See p. 25 of the reference.
⁵Ibid.
planned from Jibuti on the coast inland to Shëwa and Addis Abëba.\(^1\) The trade routes that had previously been encouraged to lead from the south and west through Addis Abëba and then to Harër and emerge on the coast were further stabilized and their future protected.\(^2\) Slowly too, after 1896 another trend became apparent; French domination of the import/export trade began to be replaced by the more efficient and widespread trading network being built up by the Indians in Ethiopia.\(^3\) Traders were also assisted by the beginnings of a telegraph and telephone network that spread slowly throughout the country, the first stage from Jibuti to Harër and on to Addis Abëba being completed in 1899.\(^4\) But the main effect of this change was not economic but political. For now the Emperor could exercise a far greater degree of control over his farflung lieutenants because he could always be in swifter and closer contact with them. The basic point here was that Menilek did not adopt the technology of the European world because, necessarily, he wanted to modernize the state, although this may have been part of his rhetoric; rather he saw in some of them a means whereby he could exercise a greater degree of control over the whole of the Empire. Therefore he particularly encouraged the development of innovations like the telegraph.

One year later, in 1900, the first Nëggadras of the capital, Aggedëw, died and was replaced by his capable assistant Haylë Giyorgis. He was to have a vital role in the later history of the city and the country and was foremost among those Ethiopians who advocated westernization, in such forms as a new kind of land tenure

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\(^{1}\) See pp. 25-26.
\(^{2}\) See pp. 24ff., 35ff.
\(^{3}\) See p. 271-273.
\(^{4}\) See p. 296ff.
in the capital, a more efficient police force, etc.¹ Meanwhile, Menilek was trying to push through a scheme whereby the capital would be moved some forty kilometers to the west of Addis Ababa to Addis Alam where there was more wood for fuel and building purposes. However, the opposition was so great that by 1902 he had decided to turn the newly built palace into a church and instead construct a road from the forests near Addis Alam to the "old" capital Addis Ababa.²

Menilek intended the new church in Addis Alam, Maryam, to become a rival of the much older Ethiopian religious centres in the north, especially Aksum. Thus he gave the title of Neburq Ed to the head of his new church; previously the title had only been held by the head of the church of St. Mary in Aksum.³ Furthermore, he tried to reduce the prestige of Aksum by appointing a secular official to this post, Ḥājazmach Gābārā Sellāṣé, a very unusual appointment and doubtless very unpopular in the north.

On the economic front progress on the railway was approaching a crisis. After Ilg had signed a new concession in 1896 construction made steady progress towards the half-way point to be created at Deré Dawa. In 1901/1902 the financial control of the railway company underwent at least two important changes; first, British financiers slowly gained a dominant financial interest⁵ and then in 1902 the French tried to replace them.⁶ Menilek objected strenuously

¹See p. 315 ff.
²See p. 359 ff.
³See p. 369 ff.
⁴C.I. No. XIII.
⁵See pp. 319 ff., 335 ff.
⁶Ibid. for this and following.
to the latter initiative, largely because the French government, without informing him and going against several articles of the railway concession, acted as if they were going to reduce the Emperor's influence in the railway and increase their own. Thus he refused to go to the opening ceremonies at Deré Dawa in 1902 marking the completion of the first half of the railway and forbade any further construction to take place towards Addis Ababa. The railway was not to reach Aqaqi, south of Addis Ababa, until 1914. Thus the effect of the railway on the capital before 1910 was only indirect. A new commercial centre perforce grew up at the railhead in Deré Dawa, and it competed strongly with Harar to the east which had been a centre for caravan routes in the Horn of Africa. Yet because of the very high rates charged by the railway, the caravans were still competitive and a trade war as well as traders's protests over monopolies developed between the two cities. Meanwhile, the capital slowly grew in importance as a distributive centre and was, some years later, to overtake all her rivals and become more economically important than any other centre in the Empire.¹

Addis Ababa was also given a boost by a new building programme initiated in the capital after its final stabilization in the wake of the abortive scheme to move to Addis Alem. A new mint was begun in 1903,² new bridges financed in 1904 and ¹905,³ and the concession for a cartridge factory and associated buildings was given in ¹905.⁴

¹See also pp. 147 ff.
²See p. 236 ff.
³See p. 236. Also p. 361 ff.
⁴See p. 302.
Furthermore, another large church building and rebuilding programme was undertaken and the whole of the central ġábiyya or market reorganized during the same period. At the same time, the whole method of imposing customs seems to have been changed so as to make it more efficient and lucrative. One further significant financial measure was the granting of a concession to the National Bank of Egypt and thus the British for the creation of the Bank of Abyssinia. Menilek felt so confident of the future of the Bank and its ability to raise capital that he threatened the French-financed railway company by saying that if they did not give in to his demands to have greater control over the further construction of the railway, he would use the bank to raise his own capital and build the railway from Deré Dawa to Addis Abëba himself. Nothing much came of the Emperor's initiative and by the middle of 1905 he had become disillusioned with the bank. Its role in the history of the Empire and the city was to be much smaller than might have been expected. However, the long awaited Addis Abëba to Metewwa telegraph was finished in May of 1905 and the capital could be called a communications centre, if not of railways, then at least of telephones and telegraphs.

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1 See pp. 361 ff.
2 See pp. 256.
3 See p. 89.
4 See p. 286 ff.
5 See pp. 336 and 386 ff. for this and following.
6 See pp. 31 ff. and 316 ff.
Two further innovations were introduced in the following year, 1906; traction engines on the route from Dere Dawa to Addis Ababa\(^1\) and a school in the capital.\(^2\) The first proved a limited success until the railway reached Aqaqi, while the second, since it consisted almost wholly of the sons of the nobility, never had a widespread impact.\(^3\)

Much more important for the history of the capital was a thorough restructuring of the city's system of land tenure in 1907.\(^4\) Land holdings in the city now had to be measured and title deeds made out with the area, boundaries, number of buildings and tax assessment included. Security of tenure was greatly enhanced. A national Council of Ministers was also created\(^5\) but this seems to have been a step largely for foreign consumption and made little practical difference to the running of the empire or city. However, it does reveal the extent to which the clergy played a crucial role in government\(^6\) and also brought into greater prominence a man who played a very large role in the city's administration, Naggadraes Hayla Giyorgis.

Economically the most important event of 1907 and 1908, however, was the shift of the distributive centre of the empire from Harār to Addis Ababa.\(^7\) This was the culmination of a long process that had begun with the conquest of the city of Harār by Shēwa in 1887 but

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\(^1\)See p. 263ff.

\(^2\)See pp. 363ff.

\(^3\)Ibid. See also 366ff.

\(^4\)See p. 326ff. for this and following.

\(^5\)See p. 321ff.

\(^6\)See p. 372.

\(^7\)See p. 250ff. for this and following.
several factors from 1906 to 1908 seem to have speeded up the change-
over. First came the death of Ras Makonnen in 1906\(^1\) and then
further political instability in the province of Harär as the Ras's
eldest son Yelma succeeded but then died after a tenure of somewhat
more than a year. He was in turn replaced by Däjazmach Balcha
whose excessive taxation and high-handed ways had a bad influence
on trade. Symptomatic of the economic difficulties prevalent
during this period were the monopoly controversies and crises of
1906 and 1908.\(^2\) Added to all of these difficulties and uncertainties
were the continually unsuccessful or only partially successful
negotiations over the railway.\(^3\)

Nationally there were also alarming developments in the
capital. Menilek's favourite and unofficial heir, Däjazmach Wsän
Säggäd died while still relatively young\(^4\) and Menilek himself
suffered a serious stroke,\(^5\) one of a series which were to reveal
themselves as the irreversible results of tertiary syphilis. The
immediate after effects of his heir's death and his own ill-health
were a proclamation increasing the security of tenure for Ethiopians
and foreigners because of the fears which arose after his seizure\(^6\)
and the appointment of Täsämma as regent\(^7\) and the reorganization

\(^{1}\) See p. S 2 ff.
\(^{2}\) See pp. S 7 ff.
\(^{3}\) See pp. S 2 ff.
\(^{4}\) See p. S 6 ff.
\(^{5}\) See p. S 6 ff.
\(^{6}\) See p. S 6 ff.
\(^{7}\) Ibid.
of the Addis Ababa police force to guard against the danger of
looting in the city during any period of unrest. As Menilek's
health and hold on the affairs of state declined, the Empress
Taytu's powers proportionately grew as did the responsibilities
of the various cabinet ministers who had been appointed in 1907.
Haylä Giyorgis was in the vanguard of these men and by 1909 had
added several provinces to his personal domains.

In November of 1908 Menilek visited Däbrä Libanos in order
to get away from the capital and relax from the cares of state. However, on his return to the capital in February 1909 he suffered
another severe seizure but again gradually improved. Nonetheless,
the new heir to the throne, Lej Iyasu was put directly under the
care of Thäームma, the police in the city were again strengthened
and the foreign legations in the capital made more strenuous efforts
to fortify their residences. In May, 1909 Iyasu was publicly
proclaimed heir to the throne, though not by name, and in August
Thäームma was given the prestigious title of Ras Bitwäddäd. But
Taytu's power in the land was also increasing so that she was able
to found a new bank in June and in September organize enough opposition
to Haylä Giyorgis so that he was removed from his Ministry of Commerce.

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1 See p. 879+883.
2 Ibid and pp. 320-322.
3 See p. 326.
4 Ibid.
5 See pp. 879+89.
6 See p. 89.
7 See p. 61.
8 See p. 283.
In October 1909 Menilek suffered another serious relapse and fears for his life were so great that Lej Iyasu was proclaimed by name as his successor in a public proclamation. Again severe security measures were taken to try and avert panic among the Armenian and Greek small traders and the powerful Le'ul Saggâd was appointed to run the palace. Finally in 1910 Taytu was ousted from power, a crisis during which Ras Täsämma, Fitawrari Habtä Giyorgis and Abunä Matewos all resident in the capital played the most critical roles. One of the many results of the fall of Taytu was the reappointment of Haylä Giyorgis to his ministry and thus a central role in the administration of the city. He was to have a much larger role in further reforms of the capital's land charters and westernization of its bureaucracy. Shâwa had effectively dealt with Taytu's challenge in favour of a greater role for the north in the empire's affairs, and Addis Abâba as the centre of Shâwa could remain assured of her supremacy throughout the empire.

1See p. 62ff. for this and following.
CHAPTER II: POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION

I. A. INTRODUCTION

Many themes run through the political history of Addis Ababa from the 1880s to 1910, but three seem to take precedence. First, one must see the original foundation and continued growth and stability of the capital as being due to a combination of political military and economic factors. Soon after its foundation, and particularly after Menilek’s coronation in 1889, the capital increasingly lost its predominately military character and, although the military function remained, other considerations became more important. One way of looking at the growth of the city could be traced the slow development away from a military towards a civilian-oriented organisation. Although Addis Ababa started as a military encampment, by 1910 its government was firmly in the hands of the bureaucracy of the imperial household.

Closely reflecting this shift in the nature of the city was a change in the nature of the offices and institutions which ran it, that is, in the organisation of the Imperial Palace. In the context of the growing city, old offices took on new forms and new functions, but a decisive role was played, all too often, by the personality of the holder of each of the individual offices. Symbolic of the kind of changes that were taking place was the replacement of men like Azzaj Gezaw and Azzaj Wäldä Sadeq by men like Näggadras Haylälä Giryogis and Näggadras Yeğazu. The latter were more flexible in the face of the new methods needed to rule the city. Yet even some

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1This section, from pp. 30 to 65, is an introduction to and a summary of the history of Ethiopia as a whole emphasising its political and administrative history as it relates to the history of the capital. A certain amount of duplication as regards the overall introduction has proved unavoidable but the political and administrative history of the period is so complex that it seemed absolutely necessary.
of the most traditional of offices, the imperial Fitawrari and the Ak' Negus, were performing duties, especially for foreigners and Ethiopian minority groups, that would have been barely recognisable by their grandfathers who had served in the years before the Battle of Adwa of 1896. However, the shift away from the military nature of the capital was not the only pressure that speeded up changes in offices and institutions; an important practical consideration was the deteriorating health of the Emperor, which forced a certain amount of devolution of power. This was further exacerbated when the prime inheritor of political power, his wife, Empress Taytu, overestimated her support and was replaced by a coalition of Shāwa nobles. Some of them were members of the newly formed ministry of 1907 and 1908.

The very fact that the capital remained in one place and did not move to another despite many threats to the contrary, inevitably led to changes in traditional forms of land tenure. In the process, the capital underwent a shift from largely military rule to a greater degree of civilian participation in the political life and administration of the city. Within the city spokesmen arose from various population groups rather than being appointed from the top. Also there was increased pressure from all population groups, but particularly the foreigners and traders, for a greater degree of personal security in the city, something that never seems to have quite been achieved. However, some of these points might be more clearly revealed if a short, overall chronological summary of the political and administrative history of the city and empire was given as background.
Addis Ababa up to 1886. Three main political centres existed in Shawa in the late nineteenth century: Ankobär up to 1865, then Leche, and from 1878 Däbrä Berhan. The latter was then replaced by Entotto soon after, and it in turn by Addis Ababa in 1886. The distribution of dates and places from which Menilek sent letters to foreigners supports this. However, it must be made clear that there was no direct move from one centre to the other. Menilek would often return to a former capital and hold court in his gebi, or palace. He would even send official letters from them, but always less frequently than from capitals like Entotto or Addis Ababa. The picture is further complicated by military campaigns which would take the court from one urban centre to another at various times. Even after the naming of Addis Ababa it was unclear until 1902 whether Menilek was planning to move again to Addis Alhâm forty kilometers to the west of Addis Ababa. There was the vague suspicion at times that Menilek enjoyed keeping his courtiers and foreign representatives in Addis Ababa unsure as to his next move.

The concept of a capital is itself a difficult one to handle in the context of Ethiopia, especially in Shawa. Even in Amharic there is no truly distinct word for capital, only kätäma or city as opposed to wanna kätäma or a main city. It is true, however, that the Emperor and provincial rulers usually had places where they would spend the winter. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

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1 I collected a list of these in the F.O. files, the ASMAI in Rome and in the Memoires et Documents for the years 1865 to 1896.

2 See Glossary.

they would return regularly, for example, to Gondär. But the situation was far more complicated in Shāwa than has been realised so far. Not only were there temporary "winter" residences but also military fortresses some of which later developed into urban centres. Entoto was one example (for it was the immediate predecessor of Addis Ababa) and Fecho provides an even better example. These and other fortresses, it seems clear, often had two military functions. The first was to provide Menilek with a strong point in the event of an attack from the north during the early years of his reign; secondly, they could be a base from which campaigns might be mounted to keep a newly conquered part of the empire subjugated. Although the original reason for the foundation of a town may have been military, its continued existence in times of peace or increased stability was due first to political and then to economic factors. Däbrä Berhan for example was deserted for many years before being rebuilt by Menilek, mostly it

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1 James Bruce, *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile, 1867-1773* (London, 1790), Vol. III, pp. 37 and 94. These are only two examples.


5 G. Massaja, *I Miei Trentacinque Anni di Missione nell'alta Etiopia* (Rome, 1889-95), Vol. 10, p. 11. The threat was mainly from Emperor Yohannes. (Henceforth, Massaja).

seems for political reasons.¹

Furthermore, the original reason for establishing the fortress of Enţöttő was a military one. It was a centre for the campaigns against the Oromo.² The immediate reasons for the move down from Enţöttő hills to the flatter plain below were pressing practical ones. Borelli details these saying that the Enţöttő summit was cold, damp and windy. Supplying wood, fuel and food was also inconvenient, because of the steep slope of the hill.³ On the lower reaches of the hill, the present site of Addis Abăba, the climate was much more congenial and the 10 Weha hot springs were, and still are, reputed to have great curative powers.⁴

Only slightly to the south is Finfinni. An hour's ride from there, according to Arnoux, there was extensive, though rudimentary, mining for iron. Arnoux had a tendency to exaggerate the natural resources of Shēwa in his efforts to arouse European interest and investment, so his descriptions must be accepted cum grano salis. There is, however, a long letter on the galleries which were dug, the utensils used, and the various furnaces and their capacities. Finally, he comments on the deforestation which took place in the surrounding area in order to obtain the charcoal necessary to fuel the furnaces.⁵ Arnoux actually saw these mines in operation and it is strange that later references are largely lacking. Nonetheless, these factors and the population gathered in the area to


²The Amhara call the people surrounding Addis Abăba the "Galla", who themselves prefer to be known as Oromo, unless they consider themselves to have been absorbed in Shēwa society when they prefer to be referred to as "Amhara". I shall henceforth refer to the former as the Oromo.

³J. Borelli,  Ethiopie Meridionale  (Paris, 1890), pp. 100-101 (Henceforth, Borelli)

⁴V. Maschov, "Il Secondo Viaggio in Abissinia del Maschov, 1891-2", translated from the Russian by O. Cerotti, extract from Bolletino
work the mines may have influenced Menilek's final choice
to settle in the Addis Ababa area, although there is no direct
proof to this effect.

Somewhat east of the present site of Addis Ababa was the
trading centre of Rogé. Massaja describes it as one of the three
main slave-trade centres in Ethiopia. With the rise of Addis Ababa,
Rogé declined into a predominantly local centre and the Addis Ababa
gībēya or market absorbed its extensive transit trade which came
from the coast and led to the Oromo lands to the west and south-
west. Addis Ababa, then, arose in an area where there was a
fortress slightly to the north (Enọţọ), a major market to the
east (Rogé) and the ruins of an older settlement, called "Antotto
vecchia" on Italian maps, slightly to the south west of Addis Ababa. Massaja's subordinate, Father Taurin, was sent in December 1868 to
found a Roman Catholic Mission at Finfinni, then called Bērbīsa.
Massaja never actually visited it but there are some descriptive
letters about it from Father Taurin and an extensive diary by
his assistant Père Ferdinand.

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(Henceforth, Masschov).


2See pp. 146.

3See map in F.0.925/625 maps. It is near the site of the church
of Wēchacho Maryam.


5Journal of Père Ferdinand. A photocopy is at the Institute of
Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa (Henceforth, Ferdinand Diary),
passim.
Foundation of Addis Ababa. It is difficult to say that Addis Ababa was at any particular point in time "founded". Rather, because of its holy and curative hot springs, it was a natural resting place for Menilek and Taytu, was later named by her and only still later boasted a permanent residence, churches and a market.

There are numerous references to Menilek having stopped off at Finfinni or Fel Weha during his campaigns to the south or simply when he happened to be in the area. Menilek first built a strong point near the present site of Entoto in 1877. In 1878-9 he made it his headquarters when on campaign in the south and west and the final site was only chosen in 1881 after the ruins of Emperor Dawit's town were found. Later the gebi was built up further and two churches erected. But Menilek and more especially his wife Taytu, increasingly spent their time at the hot springs lower down the hill. Gébré Sellassé goes into a long and colourful description of Taytu's role in the founding of Addis Ababa. Pankhurst wrongly says the only contemporary account is by Borelli.

The first written reference to Addis Ababa occurs on November 26th 1886 in a private letter from Taytu to her husband who was engaged on the military conquest of Harhar. Menilek's former wife

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1 See above, p. 34.

2 See, for instance, Borelli, 22,10,86 (p.155); Ferdinand Diary. For instance: 30,3,68, 27,6,68, 15,10,69, 15,7,70 and 9,12,81. Also Mangeste Lémma (ed.), Mihafu Tezeta ZAÁlusa Lémmay Haylu, Wilia Tarik (Addis Ababa, 1959 E.C.), p.131. (Henceforth, Afsona Lémma.)


4 A careful reading of Borelli's entries for 22,10,86, 6,3,87, 22,6,87 and 12,10,87 and ff. (see also Ferdinand Diary, op.cit.) shows that Menilek was continuously moving in and out of Fel Weha and a specific date can hardly be gleaned from Borelli for the "foundation" of the city. Rather the only firm date that the historian can rely on is Taytu's letter (see following footnote).

5 Oral Interview, Number 42. The letter was mentioned in an interview
had already settled some retainers in the area and may have even had some rights over the land. So when Menilek, having gathered his troops on the plains of Fel Weha, left his campaign, refusing to take Taytu along, she in turn refused to follow the advice of the mïkwanent or nobles that Menilek had left behind. She insisted on remaining on the plain below the capital of Entoto. The mïkwanent were then forced to gather the wood necessary to build her a house in which to sleep and later also a kitchen. The person responsible for all this would almost certainly have been Ras Gobëna who at this time was Këthma Tëbbagi (protector of the city) for Menilek during his absence. Concern for Taytu's safety might also have been a vital issue at this time; fully armed soldiers who had deserted Dëjazmach Wëlda Gëbre'ël were streaming back to the capital of Entoto demanding redress for maltreatment by their leader and, according to Borelli, quite impervious to reason.

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1 Borelli, 29.7.86, p.110.
2 See Ferdinand Diary, 19.3.81, 15.6.81, 2.12.81.
3 See Alëga Lämma, p.132 for a particularly picturesque account.
4 Ibid.
6 Borelli, 9.12.86, p.179. They had originally been seen by Menilek as the first stage in his campaign to conquer Harår.
At least two waves of these deserters seem to have descended on the Addis Ababa-Enkoto area. Borelli on 9.12.86 saw three or four hundred soldiers\(^1\) and 1,200, according to Capucci, were present somewhat later.\(^2\) Taytu seems to have handled the whole incident rather adroitly, inviting them all to a royal feast and calmly having them disarmed, as custom demanded, before they entered the imperial Addarash, or banquet tent.\(^3\) The pro-Taytu chronicle said that they were then enchained at her command but this is not corroborated by other contemporary accounts.\(^4\) The chronicle goes on to say that some one month later when Ras Gobena was seriously injured in a fall from his horse, the Oromo peoples in the areas surrounding Addis Ababa became restless and thought of revolt. Menilek was far away in Harar and the Katama Tabbagi incapacitated. So she settled in Finfini and began building Addis Ababa to demonstrate to one and all her faith in the impossibility of any revolt being successful. Thus, the chronicle continues, the Oromo became calm and a city was founded. Here, as upon other occasions, the chronicle betrays itself as an official history

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\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)ASMAI 36/4/39, R. Commissariato Civile to MAE, Assab, 27.3.87, Encl. Antonelli to R. Commissario, Ankobar, 19.1.87.

\(^3\)ASMAI 36/4/39, op. cit.

\(^4\)De Coppet, pp. 239-40.
of the reign. No other contemporary account, European or Ethiopian, mentions the Oromo as being anything but peaceful during this period and it seems that Taytu's move may well have been prompted by the rebellious troops of Ḍajazmach Wälīdā Ḍēbre'ēl and the possibility that they might incite a local Oromo revolt. The Oromo in the Addis Abāba area had been brutally crushed some ten years earlier, many had been transferred to Arusi and were in no real position to revolt for a second time.  

Thus two factors worked to persuade Taytu to choose the more salubrious Addis Abāba for her residence; the reluctance to return to Entōtto after her husband left on campaign, be it because of the climate or, perhaps, to emphasize her independence from Menilek's generals and, the need to impress one and all, be they restive Oromo or unruly soldiers, of the stability and strength of Menilek's base of operations in the Addis Abāba/Entōtto area.

However, it was not until Menilek returned from his Harār campaign (6.3.87) that a real building program was undertaken in Addis Abāba and this did not even include a church foundation, until several years later.

Aside from these personal and local factors there were wider political and military considerations of the empire which influenced the exact timing and siting of the new capital.

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1 De Coppet, p.241.
2 See Ferdinand Diary 1870-1880, passim; O.I. No. 29 and No. 30, passim.
3 Agné, Vol. II, p.54; De Coppet, p.249.
Overall Political and Military Considerations in the Growth of Addis Ababa (1886-1896). 1

Overall political and military considerations were closely interwoven in determining the timing and exact position of the new capital. During this period, the death of Emperor Yohannes and the accession of Emperor Menilek saw an extremely significant shift of power from Tegré to Shāwa domination in Ethiopia. The very fact that the coronation took place in Entoto, and not in Gondār or Aksum in the north, is a clear indication that Menilek was not entirely confident of his power-base there and preferred to have the ceremony where he was more sure of his ground. Only one year before the coronation, the future capital had been directly threatened by Emperor Yohannes who, only at the last minute, decided its defences along the Abbay river were too strong and then went to fight the Mahdiyya instead, at the fatal Battle of Matamba.

Ever since the battle of Embabo in 1882 Menilek's position in southern Shāwa and in his conquests to the south and southwest had been relatively secure from the intervention of the Emperor. However, in 1888 Yohannes carried out a ruthless invasion of Gojam whose Negus, or King, Tékli Haymanot had rebelled. 2 Menilek and many contemporaries thought he had lost his senses, driven mad by

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the death of his son and only legitimate heir, Ras Araya. Menilek having received refugees from Gojam, including the King of Gojam's eldest son Dijazmach Bēlāw, fully expected Yohannes to invade Shāwa next and cross the Abbey (or Blue Nile). Traversi even compared Yohannes to Emperor Tewodros in this context. Menilek desperately sought arms and began fortifying the approaches to Entoto, Fale and Wēyzōro Amba. Generals were ordered to gather in the area, ditches were dug, water supplies made secure and cannon put in place. Contingency plans were made in case of defeat whereby delaying actions were to be fought in Menjar, at Assabot and finally if necessary Harār. All of Menilek's armies, estimated at 130,000, were ordered to gather at Entoto on December 17th, except those on guard on the borders. The tension in Shāwa reached panic proportions when Yohannes's peace settlement with Negus Tāklih Haymanot of Gojam (Menilek's former ally) was announced. With the whole of Gojam once more directly under Yohannes's control, another potential invasion route was open to Yohannes in Gādru, to the south of Shāwa. Therefore, Menilek had to divide his army and send two trusted generals, Ras Gobāna and Dijazmach Bāshah to Gādru to meet this new threat.

1 ASMAl 36/5/50, Traversi to Antonelli, 27.10.88, "pazzo" is Traversi's term here.

2 ASMAl 36/5/50, Traversi to Antonelli, 27.10.88; ASMAl 36/5/49, Antonelli to MAE, 28.10.88; ASMAl 36/5/50, Antonelli to MAE, 30.10.88.

3 Ibid.

4 ASMAl 36/5/50, Antonelli to MAE, 30.10.88, pp. 676-677.

5 ASMAl 36/5/50, Traversi to Antonelli, 16.12.88; De Coppel, p. 256.

6 ASMAl 36/5/50, Traversi to Antonelli, 16.12.88.

7 Ibid.
The Abun interceded as a mediator but to no avail. In January Yohannes probed Menilek's defences and even sent his advance guard across the Abbey, but found the fortifications too strong. By February 20th, Yohannes had decided not to invade Shāwa and so, as a gesture of reconciliation, returned Ḫiwditu the wife of his late son and daughter of Menilek.\(^1\) The latter promptly set off for Willo to occupy Shāwa's northern marches and to protect the country from a possible invasion in that quarter and occupy areas left unprotected by Yohannes's troops who were on their way to Mätāmma.

Yohannes's death on the field of battle completely upset the balance of power within Ethiopia. Tegre was never to recover from the blow delivered to the northern armies at Mätāmma, but several contingents, especially those of Ras Ḳika'el and Ḥabab, remained whole\(^2\) and a serious challenge to an immediate Shāwa take-over.\(^3\)

Yohannes's death took place on March 10th, 1889 and yet Menilek's coronation did not occur until November 3rd. Longer gaps between reigns have occurred in Ethiopian history and far bloodier struggles for power, yet the question of the timing and location of the ceremony remain. Immediately after Yohannes' death Menilek may very well have intended to march directly north and have himself crowned at Gondār or at Aksum, thus giving them a claim

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\(^1\) ASMAI 36/6/53, Ministero della Guerra to Crispi, 30.3.89; Annesso, Antonelli to Crispi, 20.2.89; De Coppet, p.257; See Caulk, pp. 273 ff, and 277-278. For the arguments in Yohannes's camp see Zewde, pp. 542 ff and Erlich, pp. 231 ff.

\(^2\) See Erlich, pp. 238 ff.

\(^3\) ASMAI 36/6/53, Cecchi to MAE, Aden 10.5.89. Annesso, Antonelli to Crispi, "Debekeic (Ghedem)", 25.3.89.

\(^4\) ASMAI 36/6/54, Nerazzini to Salimbeni, 29.6.89. Annesso, Antonelli to Nerazzini, 14.5.89; ASMAI 56/6/54, Antonelli to MAE, 2.7.89.
to be the true capital. But many factors militated against
his taking this course of action. By May 25th Menilek had reached
Labibâla, his farthest point north, and realized that if he went
further he would have to spend kerämt (the rainy season) in hostile
territory north of his kingdom of Shäwa. But many of
his men had been on campaign since September and did not relish the
thought of several more months in enemy territory. Most were
intent on going back home to tend their crops and cattle. Thus,
Menilek decided to spend the rains in Boru Meda on the northern
fringe of Shäwa controlled territory, but then with the death of
Ras Gobäna on July 4th was forced to return to Entôffo. The
settling of the northern question was postponed until September,
after the rains had finished.

Once back home, the Shäwa clergy could exercise a greater
degree of influence over him. The coronation had to be performed
by the head of the Ethiopian Orthodox church, the Abun. The ruling
prelate, Pëtrôs had been very close to Yohannes and supported a
rival theological position to that of Shäwa and its Archbishop Matëwos. Permission had to be obtained from Alexandria before Matëwos would
be able to crown Menilek instead of Pëtrôs, a situation, with the two prelates both in Ethiopia, fighting over the question of a coronation was an entirely new one and to have held the cere-
mony in the north surrounded by hostile clergy would have been most
difficult. The official chronicle sums all this up by saying that

1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.; Caulk, pp. 291-302, emphasises foreign policy considerations
for Menilek's actions and movements.
3 Ibid.
4 See Belletu Mengestu, "A Short Biography of Abune Matëwos (1881-
1926)", 4th year student paper, History Department, HSIU (1972),
(Henceforth, Belletu Mengestu.) See also, pp. 34-74.
it was the advice of monks that persuaded Menilek to have the
coronation in Entoto.¹

The coronation then followed on the 3rd November amidst
great pomp. Ras Mika'el attended and Negus Têkläh Haymanot was
only prevented from doing so by the high waters of the Abbay
river. These were two of the most powerful men in the land.²

The coronation was held at Entoto and not in Addis Abāba not
only because two churches had already been established there but
also because the Entotto hills contained the ruins of the palaces
of earlier kings which could be used as justification when doubts
were cast on the validity of a coronation outside Gondār or Aksum.³

Shortly after the coronation, Menilek and his courtiers, trying to
recover from an inordinate amount of drinking, moved down to
the more salubrious Addis Abāba plains and settled there.⁴

The buildings which made up the Addis Abāba palace at this
time and shortly before the coronation, were to be destroyed in the
fire of 1892; this was when Addis Abāba was transformed from a
military camp, periodically in danger of threats from the north
and west, into a growing political and commercial centre.

Furthermore, from 1889-1892 there was a catastrophic epidemic
of rinderpest and a famine which forced Menilek to take steps to
improve the source of food for those visiting or residing in the

¹It should be added that Menilek had been extremely generous to
Matéwos, more so than Têkläh Haymanot had been to Luqos, and
Yohannes to Pètròs. Thus Matéwos was almost entirely beholden to
him for his prestige and power in Shāwa. See De Coppet, p.265.

²De Coppet, p.266; ASMAI 36/6/36, Cecchi to MAE, Aden, 24.12.89.
Amnesso, Ragazzi to MAE, 16.11.89 or D.D. [Libre Verde] Etiopia
2a, Doc. no. 69, p.52, Ragazzi to MAE, 16.11.89.


⁴De Coppet, pp. 278-280.
capital. Action had also been essential because of the increased population and importance of the capital after the coronation.

In taking these steps Menilek had followed a pragmatic approach adopting some of the measures put forward by the powerful clerical advisers in his court. However, this took place in a larger context since the modifications of the land tenure around the capital were but one part of the reorganisation being undertaken in the areas Menilek had recently conquered during expansion to the south, east and west. By this decree, one-third of all the land was to be returned to the original owners who had held the land before the Amhara expansion.

Meanwhile, the city itself was beginning to take on an air of permanency as it slowly developed away from being solely a military encampment. What immediately struck most observers was the spaciousness of the city. Travellers and sportsmen constantly commented on its looking like a "vast camp", or "a collection of villages" rather than what we understand by a town. People were spread out among the low hills and hours were needed to get from one part of the town to the other on horseback or mule, especially during the rains. No attempt was made to build a town wall until after 1906. Although certain other aspects of its structure may

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1 See pp. 344-353, for the above and the following. These pages go into detail on the related problems of a stable capital, famine, land tenure and Menilek's campaigns to the south, east and west.

2 De Coppet, pp. 301-2 and pp. 359-60. Also, Blattengétz, Nahtümä Sellase Wiläb Mäqul, Zekrä Nágäär (A/A, 1962 E.C.) Second edition, p.70. The date of the proclamation was 23 Ter, 1883 E.C. (Henceforth, Zekrä Nágäär). See also pp. 103-104 below.


be similar to that of Yoruba towns, I have yet to find a parallel
to this spaciousness elsewhere in Africa. By 1897 Gleichen's map show clearly that Addis Ababa was expanding largely westwards
from the original centre of the Emperor's gebi. Pankhurst attributes this westward move to the completion of the church of St.
George (1897), but perhaps the presence of the gābōya or market
in this area attracted merchants and raised land values as well.

Furthermore, since the Emperor spent a large part of the
year in Addis Ababa, it became, by virtue of his presence, the poli-
tical hub of Shāwa. All the major figures within Ethiopia had by
this time been assigned particular sāfār, or quarters in the
capital. The original land charters of the city, however, identi-

See endpiece (Henceforth Gleichen.) So. map. 2
Pankhurst, Economic History, p. 702.
4 Addis Abāba Kāḥōma Gezat, YēHezb Quterenna Ṣunēta (A/A, n.d.),
pp. 10-11.
5 See A/A Municipality land charters series I. Also end map in
Gleichen.
6 Gleichen, op.cit.
comment so frequently on its spaciousness.\(^1\)

Throughout this period up to 1896, the military role of the capital had been particularly apparent. For by the early 1890s Addis Ababa had ceased to be on a vulnerable frontier, and became more of a gathering and supply area for campaigns distant from the city. For instance Menilek's campaigns to the south in 1893-4 to Lake Zway\(^2\) and in 1894-5 to Wälamo were organised in Addis Ababa.\(^3\) However, from the time of the Battle of Adwa onwards the military was to play a smaller and smaller, although still significant role, while civilians exercised an ever increasing influence, especially in the bureaucracy and administration of the city.

**Political Background (1896-1908)**

Menilek's triumphal entry into Addis Ababa on May 22nd, 1896 heralded a period when changes in the capital were to proceed much more rapidly than ever before.\(^4\) Some of the dynamic for change was generated internally in Ethiopia, but it was Menilek's desire to regularise his relations with the outside world that created the biggest excitement immediately after the Battle of Adwa. The initial, and most striking evidence of Ethiopia's relations with foreign powers

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1. See footnotes from above.
3. De Coppet, pp. 361 and 364; see also Sähafé Te'ezzæz, Gëbrä Sellasé, Tarikä Zähmän ZëDegmawi Menilek Negusä Negast Zältæyywa (A/A, 1959 E.C.), pp. 219 and 221. This is an Amharic version of which De Coppet is a translation (Henceforth, Gëbra Sellasé). Also ASMAI 36/17/169, Capucci to Traversi, 17.10.94.
was the presence of large numbers of Italian prisoners from
the campaign in the north\(^1\) and a large contingent of Russians
who formed part of a Red Cross mission sent to Addis Ababa by
the Russian Government.\(^2\) They were soon followed by fully
accredited diplomatic representatives to Menilek's court.\(^3\) Of
greater significance to Ethiopia's overall diplomatic stance in
world affairs were the conventions and treaties negotiated with
Italy,\(^4\) France\(^5\) and Great Britain,\(^6\) and their personal representatives
in Addis Ababa.

The first diplomatic agreement was the Convention of Addis
Ababa (20.10.96) between Ethiopia and Italy which finally released
the Italian prisoners taken during the Adwa campaign.\(^7\) There
followed, within a year, a commercial Treaty (24.6.97) which gave
Italy much the same privileges that France and Great Britain had
already obtained, a remarkable proof of Menilek's desire not to
exact revenge for the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. At the same
time, however, more delicate and subtle negotiations were taking
place between Menilek on one hand and the French and British on

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\(^1\) See pp. 234-235.

\(^2\) P. J. Rollins, "Russia's Ethiopian Adventure, 1888-1905", Unpublished
Ph.D., Syracuse University, 1967, pp. 183-191. (Henceforth, Rollins).
See, De Coppet, p. 154; Gëbrä Sellaé, p. 271. See also, pp. 74-77.

\(^3\) ASMAI 38/1/4, Ciccodicola to M.E., A/A, 10.12.98. F.C.1/37/No.11,
Harrington to F.O., A/A, 24.2.1900. N.S.Eth. 10, Brice to Pichon,
A/A, 6.3.10, p. 92.

\(^4\) C. Rossetti, Storia Diplomatica della Etiopia durante il regno di
Menilik II (Turin, 1910), pp. 200 and 235-8 (Henceforth, Rossetti).

\(^5\) Ibid., pp. 221-25.

\(^6\) Ibid., pp. 225-235.

\(^7\) Rossetti, p. 200.

\(^8\) Ibid., pp. 235-238.
the other. Sometimes overlooked in the fascinating complexity of
of the Fashoda incident, however, was the role played by Somaliland
and the eastern borders of Ethiopia. British concessions here in
particular with regard to trade and the all important Ethiopian
trade routes to the coast, may well have played a larger role than
has hitherto been realized. The freedom of trade through Zeyla looms
especially large.

Despite the world-wide implications of the Fashoda incident
and the amount of time Menilek doubtless spent in placating the
British, French and the Mahdiyya, the internal implications of the
Adwa campaign were to have a far greater impact on the city and its
development. Many of Menilek's generals were killed at the Battle
of Adwa, like D'Jazmach Bashah and Fitawrari Gəbəyyəhū, and some of
the appointments that were to replace them came from the imperial
household. The prime example of this was Balcha, who had been a
Bajerond but Haptö Giyorgis was also made a Fitawrari, to take
Gəbəyyəhū's place. The former appointment at least, signalled the
departure from the central bureaucracy of an increasingly conserva-

1The relevant treaties, of course, were only the bare bones of an
extremely complicated diplomatic wrangle over the Sudan between
the two great powers, the ramifications of which are quite beyond
the scope of this thesis. A few of the many sources are: Rossetti,
pp. 221-225 (for the French treaty) and pp. 225-235 (for the
British treaty). G.N.Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper Nile,
1882-1899 (Edinburgh, 1965); R. Robinson and J.Gallagher, Africa


3Marcus, pp. 50-51. Also, A.M.Brockett, "The British Somaliland

4Le Temps, 25,3,98. See also pp. 133-143, 148-151.
became much more pronounced and the import-export trade through the capital increased.¹ Supporters of this trend, men like Azzaj
Gezaw and Naggadras Haylê Giyorgis, gained in power and prestige as Menilek's interlocutors with the foreign communities and later became his close advisers.²

Two important foreign innovations were initiated during the years immediately after Adwa, the railway³ and the beginnings of an empire-wide network of telephones and telegraphs.⁴ Both aided Menilek's efforts to centralise the government and administration of the country, although they met a certain amount of opposition.⁵ The main opposition to his rule was concentrated in the north and troops were sent to Tegré in November 1898 and 1899 under Ras Makonnen to counter the threat.⁶ In Shawa itself, just at the turn of the century, Menilek was consolidating his military might in the capital and went on to build an arsenal for many of his newly imported weapons at Sülame in Bulga.⁷

¹See pp. 180f.
²See pp. 11f.
³Rossetti, pp. 135-141.
⁴F.O. 1/34/No.7, Harrington to F.O., A/A, 7.5.98. F.O. 1/49/telegram 12, Harrington to F.O., A/A, 18.5.04. See also pp. 191-192.
⁶N.S. Eth. 7, Ministère des Colonies to Minister, Paris, 18.11.98. S.F.Petrides, Les Héros d'Adua (Paris, 1963), pp. 211-213 and p.217. However, this is not the most reliable of books and its dating is often suspect.
⁷Azzaj Wärgénäs Diary. In the private possession of the family. Entries for 26.12.99 to 2.1.00, 23.1.00 to 10.3.00 and 15.5.00 (Henceforth, W.D.).
year the death of Näggadras Aggedaw in 1900, signalled a significant change in the actual administration of the city. For Aggedaw's main assistant HaylM Giyorgis, who had already taken over most of the perrogatives of the office, now assumed the title of Näggadras itself.1

But Menilek's foundation of a new capital in Addis Alâm, 40 kilometers west of Addis Abûba, dwarfed all other events of 1899-1901 in the history of Addis Abûba. However, he soon found2 that there was too much opposition to his schemes and the natural resources of the area were not sufficient for a large urban area. Menilek seems still to have had little conception of the administrative complexity that a large urban area entailed and continued to think in terms of a traditional military encampment. Addis Abûba was no longer a military encampment but was one of the major commercial centres of the empire, and could no longer be moved at the Emperor's whim.3 By May 1902 Menilek had decided against using Addis Alâm as a new capital and only as a winter residence; Addis Abûba's future was assured.4 At about the same time he decided to build a metalled road between the two towns so as to assure Addis Abûba sufficient supplies of wood.5 The Addis

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1Ibid., 3.4.00. See also pp. 124-136.
2See pp. 91-103.
3See pp. 103-114, 296-301.
4ASMAI 38/3/18, Martini to MAE, Asmara, 10.6.02, Annesso, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 23.5.02. Djibouti: Journal Franco-Ethiopien, 1.11.20, 15.11.02 (Henceforth Djibouti); W.D. 20.11.00, N.S.Eth.19, Lagarde to Delcasse, Addis tiéna, 29.12.00, p.129.
5Ibid. and Alâga Lämma, pp. 173-4.
Alam road was the biggest "public works" project successfully undertaken by Menilek during this period and yet aroused complaint and disobedience from a large segment of the work force Menilek raised for the task.

While these internal, basically Ethiopian, events were taking place, foreign affairs and the interests of foreigners resident in the capital increasingly impinged on the city's affairs. Anti-foreign incidents which had been common immediately after the Battle of Adwa, recurred in 1900 and 1901 causing concern in many of the legations in the capital. The cumulative effect of these and other incidents was to saddle Ethiopia with a modified form of capitulations which were to endure through the 1930s. Also in July, 1901 a new railway company, the International Ethiopian Railway, Trust and Construction Co., was formed marking the beginning of British domination of capital investment in the railway, which had formerly been largely French. But within a year the French by the Bonhôte/Chefneux Convention were attempting to regain control. French arrogance during the negotiations infuriated

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1Dr. L. De Castro, Nella terra dei Negus (Milan, 1915) (Henceforth De Castro), Vol. I, p.239.
2Djibouti, 25.7.03. ASMAI 38/3/23, Colli to MAE, A/A, 15.6.03. ASMAI 38/4/23, Colli to MAE, A/A, 10.7.03.
3Fariset, pp. 61 and 128.
4ASMAI 38/1/1, Ciccodicola to MAE, 16.9.00. N.S.Eth. 19, Lagarde to Delcasse, Entatto, 9.2.01, p.121. See pp. 668 for a more complete treatment of this whole problem.
5Rossetti, pp. 139-151. Also Marcus, pp. 53-56. See also P.P. Garretson, "Some Aspects of Communications in Ethiopia during the Reign of Menilek", African History Seminar, SOAS, 13.6.75. (Henceforth, Garretson, Communications.) For the detailed development of the railway, the best archival sources so far available are: N.S.Eth., 22-51, and ASMAI 41/1, fasc. 1-9, covering the years 1894-1911.
6Ibid.
Menilek, he feared that the French would no longer allow him to have sufficient control over the further construction and running of the railway. Thus when construction finally reached Dèrè Dawa in December, 1902, he refused to attend the opening ceremonies, blocked any further construction towards Addis Abäba, and stripped the railway company of some of its special trading privileges, making any significant profits on the existing line impossible.\(^1\) After three years of fruitless negotiations concerning extension of the line to Addis Abäba Menilek threatened to continue construction on his own, without French or British assistance.\(^2\) The recent foundation of the Bank of Abyssinia bolstered his claims.\(^3\) Furthermore, preparations were under way to make Ethiopia independent in the manufacture of ammunition with a factory in the capital and the Addis Abäba to Metewwa telegraph line was completed in May 1905 so that Ethiopia was no longer solely dependent on the line through French Somaliland.\(^4\) Towards the end of the next year, Menilek began to discover the full implications for the independence of Ethiopia of the Tripartite Agreement between Great Britain, Italy and France.\(^5\) Although all its clauses were never to be fully enforced, because of the inability

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\(^{1}\) Marcus, pp. 53-58.

\(^{2}\) Garretson, Communications.

\(^{3}\) See pp. 187ff, Rossetti, pp. 297-305.

\(^{4}\) See pp. 146ff.

\(^{5}\) Rossetti, pp. 319-368.
of the powers to act in concert, nonetheless its threats to Ethiopia's sovereignty at the time appeared to Menilek to be most sinister. 1

Internally, the city experienced an overall reorganisation of its central market 2 and a major campaign to rebuild the city's churches. 3 Associated with the former was a change regarding land; now Ethiopians or foreigners could purchase it more easily with cash. 4 Security of tenure was an endemic problem in the capital particularly because of the insecurity and disorder that was brought about by the death of prominent Ethiopians like Ras Makonnen. 5 This caused merchants, mostly foreign, to make bitter complaints to the Ethiopian government and the legation officials. 6 Added to this was increased concern over Menilek's health because of a series of real and rumoured heart seizures after 1906. 7 His death, it was thought, would have led to complete chaos within Ethiopia and the collapse of its government. 8 As

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1 Ibid.
2 Ilg Papers KB 13/page 138, Compte de Travaux, signed by Ilg, A/A, 10.5.05; also ibid., Castagna to Ilg, 1.11.04 and 25.11.04.
3 Ilg Papers, KB 13/page 138, op. cit. See also pp. 361 ff.
5 F.0, 371/3/18102/1987/No.17, Harrington to F.0., 7.6.06. ASMAI 3/20/169, Martini to MAE, A/A, 7/1906, O.I.No.17, p.16. Disorders like this occurred because Ethiopians had a tendency towards breaking out in paroxisms of grief on the death of an important person, especially if he happened to be their feudal lord. Crowd control became a serious problem. This was a recurrent problem in the early history of the city and never seems to have been wholly resolved.
6 Ibid.
7 N.S.Eth.1, Lagarde to Minister, Entoto, 21.5.06, pp. 85-7.
8 See F.0. 371/3/file 18102 has much relevant correspondence from Harrington and Nicolson concerning these fears. See also pp. 87 ff.
early as that same year there was proof that Menilek had contemplated the creation of a Council of Ministers upon whom he would devolve some of his many responsibilities. But it was only on the 26th October, 1907 that he actually appointed a "cabinet". As Menilek's health deteriorated and Lej Iyasu became the only serious claimant to his throne, more and more power was to rest upon the shoulders of those men he had appointed.

More important, practically, for the history of the capital was a basic change in the form of land tenure in the city. Influenced by the Code Napoléon and drawn up under Naggadra Haylë Giyorgis's supervision, it established the stability of tenure for which the merchant community had long been looking. However, the degree to which it was enforced is not clear. Nonetheless, it inaugurated for the first time land charters in the city on a European model.

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1 See p. 153-156.


3 See below, pp. 108ff.
After the death of his previous heir Wasián Saggád and his own heart seizure, Menilek announced to the various foreign legations and others his next choice of an heir, Lej Iyasu, although he did not immediately proclaim him publicly. Most people knew nothing of this, but concern grew as the months passed and the Emperor himself made no public appearances. The police force of the capital was tightened up by Haylã Giyorgis with French advice and the Germans took over protection of Ottoman subjects in Ethiopia. Menilek finally showed himself to the public at the Mäsqäl, or Ethiopian New Year, celebrations, which led to great rejoicing. But the unfortunate business with Doctor Moussali Bey, and the incident of sorcerers and a black cat, both led to increased anti-foreign feeling. Moussali Bey was an Egyptian with doubtful medical qualifications who caught Menilek's fancy and tried to alleviate the sufferings of the Emperor's tertiary syphilis with the then fashionable electric shock treatment.

Unfortunately in the course of them, Menilek suffered a relapse.

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2. N.S.Eth.1, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 24.8.08, pp. 247-8. This was particularly revealed in oral interviews, C.I. No. 1 and No. 20, passim, especially.

3. N.S.Eth.1, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 8.8.08, p.234;

4. N.S.Eth.62, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 8.6.08, p.164.

5. N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 1.9.08, plus annexes, pp. 2-19.

6. N.S.Eth.1, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 2.8.08, pp. 232-3. Also P. Merab, Impressions d'Ethiopie (Paris, 1921-1929), Vol. III, p.260. His 1907 date is incorrect. He is on the whole a difficult source to use since his dating is suspect and he was, for instance, so totally deceived as to think that Menilek had died in 1910. However, his background on people and events is so detailed as to be invaluable, when cross checked.
and Bey soon found himself bundled out of Ethiopia.\(^1\) The other unconnected incident involved the finding of a dead and mutilated black cat, a particularly potent weapon of a sorcerer’s arsenal it seems, in Menilek’s private bedchamber. An Ethiopian offender was said to have been identified but Menilek had to announce public-\(^2\)

The repercussions of these events were partially counteracted by a proclamation concerning inheritance which strengthened security of tenure and introduced a new and more foreign influenced form of land charters. Both were received with cries of ”Long live the Emperor!”\(^3\) However, other incidents occurred\(^4\) and, eventually, for this and other reasons, a Regent, Ras Täsämma Nadâw was appointed.\(^5\) Shortly afterwards, Menilek went on his trip to Dabrâ Libanos taking with him nearly all the important figures resident in the capital, with a retinue of some 8,000 people and 30,000 animals. The powerful Habtâ Giyorgis was left to keep order in the city, taking over from the recently deceased Afâ Negus, another example of Menilek’s devolution of power.\(^6\) In mid-February he too left Addis Abâba to join the Emperor who, it seems, had suffered another relapse.\(^7\)

\(^1\) N.S. Eth.2, op.cit.

\(^2\) N.S.Eth.1, op.cit., and Merab, op.cit. See also O.I. No. 1, pp. lff.

\(^3\) N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 4.10.08, p.142. See pp. 108-114 on land tenure.

\(^4\) N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 22.10.08, pp. 51-2. AP/GFS/31 dossier 9, Governor of Somalis Française to Ministère des Colonies, Annexe, Official Journal of Eritrea, 24.10.08.

\(^5\) ASMAI 54/34/141, Miniscaldi to MAE, A/A, 19.11.08.

\(^6\) N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 2.12.08, p.68.

\(^7\) ASMAI 54/34/141, subsection file for 1909, Colli to MAE, A/A, 8.4.09.
inefficient Minister of Interior, Kätäma, was left to keep the peace in the capital, but had the aid of the capable Kántiba Gābru who had just been appointed to the Ministry. But Menilek's health improved and a certain degree of calm was restored when he finally returned to the capital. On the 25th February the heir to the throne, Lej Iyasu, was put under the care of the regent, Tāsämma, and removed from the imperial palace. In April the police force was reorganized, receiving new uniforms and regulations. Yet these measures were not as impressive as they sound and were to a large degree superficial. The foreign residents of the capital recognised this and continued to go to the legations in greater numbers to put themselves under their protection and yet only two of the legations had completely finished their fortresslike premises (the Germans and the Russians) while the French, Italians and British had still only completed the foundations. At the same

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1 Ibid.
2 W.D.12.1.09 and N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 28.1.09, p.84.
3 ASMAI 54/34/141 (1909), Colli to MAE, A/A, 8.4.09.
4 N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 25.3.09, p.111.
5 Alāqa Kenfé, p.22, 4 Miyazya, 1901.
6 N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 8.2.09, p.94; N.S.Eth.62, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 22.12.08, pp. 199-201.
7 F.0.371/595/3946/21100, Hervey to Grey, 14.5.09.
time the recently created Minister of Public Works, a man known for his traditional approach, was replaced by the more flexible Azzaj Gezaw.1

In April of 1909 Lej Iyasu married the last daughter of Ras Mängasha,2 but this was not announced until the 16th May.3 Then two days later, an heir to the throne was public proclaimed for the first time.4 The wording of the proclamation led to uncertainty among the population of the city and some said that the Emperor had already died.5 The problem of security in the capital was compounded by the fact that the troops of so many nobles had come to witness and pay homage to the new heir.6 The British saw a long-term increase in the incidence of theft7 while the French put the blame more squarely on unruly soldiers in the capital.8 An April security edict which registered and reorganized the city's Zäbängna or guards9 was strengthened by other edicts or

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1 See pp. 114
2 ASMAI 54/34/141 for (1909) Colli to MAE, A/A, 8.4.09.
3 N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 20.5.09, p.128.
4 Ibid. p.129. Also ASMAI 54/34/141 (file for 1909), Colli to Gov. Asmara, A/A, 18.5.09, but also see Colli's despatch to the MAE, A/A, 28.5.09, in the same file for a different Italian version. See also W.D.18.5.09. The British archival information is so much after the event as to be less reliable. F.O.371/597/12284/27439, Hervey to Grey, 26.6.09.
5 Ibid. [footnote 5 and 6 inclusive].
6 Ibid. and probably De Coppet, pp. 537-8; Gãbrã Sellasõ, 340-1.
7 F.O.371/594/415/16406, Hervey to Grey, 10.4.09.
8 N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 7.5.09, p.124.
9 See pp. 1311. Sch.18-153.
away on the 7th\(^1\) and 22nd of May. \(^2\) Zäbäängnas or guards were to be given more distinctive uniform hats so that they might be recognized as officials and were to circulate through the town in groups. The second decree concentrated on those soldiers who were without masters and were causing the greatest threat to the peace in the capital. They were to go directly to the Emperor for justice. The decree ended by reminding the nobles of their responsibilities and the soldiers of their duty. Disputes between nobles like that between Täsämma and Habtä Giyorgis about jurisdiction over troops in the capital, and soldiers complaints about the better conditions available under one leader as opposed to another, all led to many misunderstandings and even clashes.\(^3\)

Meanwhile, national political events centred on the capital moved swiftly. Menilek's doctor, Steinkühler, and his foreign affairs adviser Zintgraff, both of German nationality, brought charges against Menilek, and implicitly against Empress Taytu, for attempting to poison the Emperor. Zintgraff, blocked and prevented from any meaningful influence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, may have imagined he could increase his stature by getting Taytu discredited. However, the two Germans acted hastily and greatly misjudged the situation. Both were forced to leave the country.\(^4\)

\(^1\) N.S.Eth.22, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 7.5.09, p.124. See also Semeur V, 593.

\(^2\) Ibid., 26.5.09, pp. 132-3.

\(^3\) N.S.Eth.5, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 7.6.09, pp. 132-3. See also N.S. Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, 26.5.09, pp. 132-3.

\(^4\) Good summaries can be found in N.S.Eth.9, pp. 220-236; in W.D. 9.7.09-30.10.09 and Le Docteur Nouvellement Venu (Dire Dawa, 1909); The latter is also in N.S.Eth.10, pp. 40-53.
Of great importance for the city was the fact that Nagтрадаs Haylå Giyorgis violently opposed Taytu at this time. He was to suffer for it later.

The Legations felt increasingly concerned about security and had been very anxious at what appeared to be strong German influence at the gebi. They were relieved at the firing of the two German officials. But two other actions of the Ethiopian government gave the legations cause for alarm. Some Ethiopian officials entered the Italian legation grounds in order to arrest a legation official (without permission). This led to a joint legation statement seeking to clarify extraterritoriality and diplomatic privilege. They thought Ethiopian activity around the fort dominating the legations potentially dangerous to them, but this was dismissed in the end as not being a serious threat.

More intrinsically important was the administrative disarray into which Taytu seemed to be leading the country.

An attempt to restore order to the capital was made by naming Täsämna, Ras Bitulação, and later Bálumulu Seltan or Regent Plenipotentiary. This highly unusual step, involving the creation

1N.S.Eth.9, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 23.7.09, p.222.
2ASMAI 54/34/141 (for 1909), Colli to MAE, A/A, 4.8.09. The Italian view here was slightly different but overall similar to the French and British attitudes.
5See pp. 84.
6N.S.Eth.5, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 29.7.09, pp. 142-3.
9Ibid. See also 0.1.24 (16.5.72).
of a title that had not previously been bestowed on Ethiopians was taken largely in the interests of the capital\(^1\) and may have been influenced by the decreasing influence of Hayle Giyorgis, the Naggrades of the city.\(^2\) The steps do not seem to have been very successful,\(^3\) although Thsamma did provide a very powerful force in the city to whom appeal might be made.\(^4\)

Then on the 27th of October Menilek, who had been gradually recovering, had a serious relapse after departing from the strict diet on which he had been put by Dr. Wargenah.\(^5\) Two days later \(\text{Lej Iyasu was publicly and unequivocally proclaimed by name.}\)

Nearly everyone of influence had urged this including Habt\(\text{\u0128}^\text{6}\) Giyorgis and the Abun.\(^6\) At the same time, swift security steps were taken in the capital. Immediately after the Emperor's relapse the market was militarily occupied\(^7\) and the Liq\(\text{\u0128}^\text{\u0102}\) M\(\text{\u0128}^\text{\u0102}\) Makwas ordered that the market be held outside the city on the plains of Fel Weha.\(^8\)

Predictably, the Armenians and Greeks, with their market shops in danger of being destroyed, were particularly apprehensive,\(^9\) but

\(^{1}\)N.S. \textit{ibid.}

\(^{2}\)See pp. 133\textit{a} and N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 2.10.09, pp.157-8.

\(^{3}\)F.O.371/595/3946/34940, Wingate to F.O. 16.9.09, contains extracts from an Armbruster letter.

\(^{4}\)N.S.Eth.58, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 9.9.09, p.148.

\(^{5}\)W.D.27.10.09. N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 1.11.09, p.182.


\(^{7}\)N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 1.11.09, p.182.


\(^{9}\)N.S.Eth.10, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 14.11.09, pp. 59-60.
Lord Hervey was optimistic:

"The authorities in Adis Ababa [sic] now seem fully prepared for any ordinary emergency which may arise; and I do not anticipate any grave danger either to the foreign merchants or the legations, unless a state of chaos ensues at a later stage should any of the great chiefs revolt."1

A fascinating overall interpretation and explanation for the security problem in the capital now emerges from Italian accounts upon the occasion of further measures against masterless soldiers. The awaj ordered all such men to goto Ligaba Wëldë Gabré'él and put themselves under his direction.2 Colli, the Italian diplomatic representative, stated that the unrest of the period was primarily due to economic reasons. The campaigns of Menilek's youth were over and the soldiers could no longer count on the loot of war. They were now expected to get used to the lesser rewards of peace and were having some difficulty in so doing.3 The civilian rather than military character of the capital was finally being recognized.

Another step towards stabilisation was the appointment in mid-December of Dëjazmach Le'ul Sëgad to be in overall control of the imperial palace.4 He was a particularly strong personality and imposed, perhaps, a degree of organisation that had not previously existed. Furthermore, Ras Tëshëmma was hoping to prepare

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1 F.0.371/595/3946/43343, Hervey to Grey, 5.11.09.
3 ASMAI 54/34/141 (file for 1909), Colli to MAE, A/A, 10.12.09.
4 See pp. 151-156.
for all eventualities by ringing the capital's various strategic heights with batteries of artillery\(^1\) and generally improving the defences and strong points of the city.\(^2\) However, even a relatively minor fire which occurred at the time seemed to cause panic among the inhabitants of the city.\(^3\) But the French legation was more satisfied than it had been earlier with the development of the system of consular law.\(^4\) The British were preparing to get rid of their biggest nuisance in this area, their representation of the Greeks,\(^5\) while most of the new fortified Legations seemed to have been near enough to completion to withstand any attack the troubled times seemed to promise foreign residents.\(^6\)

At the same time, of course, the power struggle between Taytu and her adherents on the one hand, and a group of basically Shawa nobles, led by Ras Täsämma and Fītarē Fītwre Fāhītā Gīyorgis on the other was taking place.\(^7\) One of the most important results

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\(^1\)N.S.Eth.20, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 12.1.10. Annexe compte rendu... entre... Tessaama... et Brice, p.94.

\(^2\)AP/CFS/121 Dossier 2, Ministère des Colonies to M. le Gouverneur des Somalis Françaises, 8.3.10.

\(^3\)N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 12.3.10, p.264.

\(^4\)N.S.Eth.62, Traité d'Amitié et de Commerce entre la France et l'Ethiopie, pp. 147-48. See also ASMAI 49/1/5, Guglielmo Ciamarra to MAE, file for 1913-4. An historical resume of consular jurisdiction in Ethiopia.

\(^5\)F.O.371/822/8581/8581, Thesiger to Grey, 16.2.10.


\(^7\)The details of the dispute are so voluminous and complex that they will not be gone into in any great detail since it was of primarily national rather than of local importance to the history of Addis Abāba. In the French archives the best source is to be found in...
of this crisis, as far as the future of Addis Ababa was concerned, was Haylé Giyorgis's return to power as both Minister of Commerce and Foreign Affairs after the 1910 crisis. In the years after 1910 he was to gain the confidence of the ruler, Lej Iyasu and have almost complete power in the internal administration of the city, as well as becoming for a short time the most powerful man in the land. He, perhaps, more than any other individual had extensive and constant contact with Europeans. One of his, and his predecessor's, main tasks was to assure the security of those foreigners temporarily or permanently in the capital.

N.S.Eth.2; in the Italian in ASMAI 54/34/141 in the files for 1909 and 1910; in the British in F.O. 371/321-823 and 594-597. W.D. for 1909-1910 is the best non-diplomatic account and the U.S. Dept. of State 884.00/9866/45 has only a few despatches. See also pp. 133-136, 143-144, 145-151 for individuals and officers of city-wide importance involved in the crisis.

1 See pp. 133-136.
I. Part B. Topics: The Problem of Security in the Capital; the Addis Alam Road and Land Tenure

Introduction. One of the themes that runs consistently through the early history of the city is that of the security of the individual, especially that of foreigners, and the influence of the foreign diplomatic community on this and other aspects of the development of the capital. Before the Battle of Adwa there were no permanent foreign diplomatic representatives in the capital and security was maintained by Menilek's Azza or during Menilek's absence by an Endarase, usually an old and trusted confidant of the Emperor. However, the Battle of Adwa was, in many ways, a watershed. Anti-foreign feeling increased as a result of it, while many more foreigners came to the capital to try to take advantage of the country's vast resources. Meanwhile the Ethiopian population of the city increased, just at the time that the city was shifting from a largely military to a basically civilian city. Foreign diplomats all too often complained of the lack of personal security and the threat to trade that this posed, an indication that the government was having difficulty solving the problems of crowd control and the basic necessity of continuous policing of the city.

But the foreign diplomatic community did more than just register diplomatic protests, they organized "personal escorts", built bridges and roads and organized a modified system of capitulations, provided medical services and advised the Emperor on various municipal affairs. Much of this was in their own self-interest,

1 Closely tied to this, of course, was the state of Menilek's health, for every change for the worse led to new fears of mob violence in the city. More on this, however, will be found in the section immediately preceding this one. See pp. 30-65.
but it cannot be denied that many of these services would not have been otherwise provided.¹

Foreign Influences and the Problems of Security until 1896. The problems of security in the capital before the Battle of Adwa were very different to those afterwards up to 1910. Before 1896 the fears of the Shāwa were mainly military, of the invasion of Shāwa from Gojam or the north and the possibilities of revolt in the south. Thus during his absences from the capital, Menilek appointed a reliable confidant, usually a powerful military figure to rule from the capital in his stead with full powers civil and judicial, as Endārāsé.² Later, as larger numbers of Europeans began to settle in the capital, special arrangements, especially legal ones, had to be instituted to care for them as an independent community.³

Menilek was at the pinnacle of the civil and military administration; when he left the capital for any extended period he had to delegate his power in the Addis Abāba area to a subordinate and usually he would leave a great provincial lord to rule as his Endārāsé. However, whenever he was himself present the core of the city was ruled by civil authorities within the royal household.

¹Three other themes will be dealt with in this section (p. 66-114) before taking a close look at the organisation of the imperial palace, that is, the moving of the capital (p. 91 to p. 47), the Addis Alem road (p. 47 to p. 103) and land tenure in Addis Ababa (p. 103 to p. 114).

²Translated literally it means 'like myself'.

³In the period before 1896 there seem to have been no serious fears as to Menilek's health, so during the early period fears of his death did not arise to create security problems.
Most prominent among these officials were the Azzaï, and the Nëggadras. The Nëggadras had jurisdiction over the market, known as the gâbâya or arada,\(^1\) while the royal Azzaï held power over the whole of the vast imperial household. Every major military ruler within Shâwa had, in miniature, a similar household to that of Menilek, each with his own Azzaï and other officials. They in turn had jurisdiction over the different sections of rif of the city that were assigned to them, just as the royal Azzaï only had jurisdiction over the royal rif. Before going into this in detail, however, it might be helpful to establish who the Endärasë were, and what exactly was the nature of their powers since this throws light on Menilek's role as a civil and military administrator in Entoto and Addis Ababa. One of the most important reasons a prominent noble seems to have been appointed was because he would have a large number of retainers who could act as the army and garrison while the Emperor's army was absent. Sometimes Menilek might leave part of his own army with the Endärasë, the Gondârë troops being one case in point.\(^2\)

Thus when Menilek campaign to Harâr (12.11.86 to 6.3.87)\(^3\) he left Ras Gobâna as Ḫikātâma Tābbaqi or protector of the town of Entoto.\(^4\) Later when he went on his extended campaign to the north (28.12.87 to 29.6.88)\(^5\) he again left Ras Gobâna to

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\(^1\)See pp. 114.

\(^2\)See pp. 348 ff.


\(^5\)De Coppet, pp. 250-253. While ASMAI 36/4/42, Antonelli to MAE, A/A, 16.11.87 says he left on the 12th.
govern in his stead. Ras Gobana was Menilek's most powerful military leader and when Menilek grew concerned with his growing power, he fell into disfavour. This, probably, was reflected by his lack of importance in the chronicle. When Menilek again went north on campaign (7.3.89 to 16.7.89), Gobana was appointed over the city for a third time and was given custody of his widowed daughter Wëyzëro Zäwditu and Asfa Wäsän. In a history of Gobana's life there is a very good description of him as an Endärase during this period.

"Ate Menilek had a son named Asfa Wäsän. He left his son with Ras Gobana telling him to accord to him the respect he was accustomed to give him in case he did not come back. He ordered him to keep the country and the town, order his soldiers and settle them nearby and to cut off the arms and legs of those whom he found misbehaving and betraying him. Ras Gobana settled in Enjoffo town. He made his soldiers of Wälläga and elsewhere settle in places nearby. There are not many who have as many soldiers as Ras Gobana. Dëijach Gärmané, too, was guarding Addis Abäba. He used to come everyday to Ras Gobana for counsel.

One day they discussed and decided to cut off the arms of those who stayed away from campaigning. That same day 16 persons' hands were cut off... Ras Gobana was very sorry for the blood of these people that was shed at the gate of his house. After that all men who had stayed in forests and in their homes went on campaign."

1 Borelli, pp. 262 and 401.
3 De Coppet, pp. 258 and 263.
4 ASMAI 36/6/53, Cecchi to MAE, 11.5.89. Ammesso, Antonelli to Crispì, 26.3.89.
5 Ato Nëggädë, "YëGobana Tarik", Ms. copy in the possession of Shähay Berhan Sellëse at I.E.S. (Henceforth, Nëggädë).
The Endarase, then, basically had three functions. First, the position was essentially military, one of its duties being to organise the layout of the town by assigning certain areas to certain soldiers, as indicated in the quote above. Secondly, there were wide judicial implications to maintain the security of the capital, for the man who was clearly the Emperor's personal representative in the area. Finally, Ras Gobana as Endarase had been named a guardian of both the heir to the throne and the town of Entoto.

When Ras Gobana suddenly died on July 4th 1889,\(^1\) Menilek rushed southwards to make sure all was well in his capital. When Menilek again left for the north (Dec. 1889 to June 1890)\(^2\) he appointed his most trusted and powerful relation Ras Dargé, an uncle, to be Endarase.\(^3\) However, Menilek wanted Ras Mikonnen who was returning from a mission to Italy to replace Dargé at Entoto so the latter could come and assist him in the north.\(^4\) Mikonnen arrived in June 1890\(^5\) and Menilek's next northern campaign (Dec. 1891 to April 1892)\(^6\) saw him work as Endarase,\(^7\) as did Menilek's expedition to Lake Zway (Dec. 1893 to Jan. 1894).\(^8\) And finally when on the 12th

\(^1\) Neggadi, p.16.

\(^2\) De Coppet, p.283, says Menilek left, 18.12.89. However, ASMAI 36/6/56, Cassato to Ministero della Guerra, 30.12.89. Annesso, Ragazzi to Cassato, 28.11.89, says he left at the beginning of November. But he probably left the 17th, see ASMAI 36/11/88, Antonelli to MAE, 24.1.90.

\(^3\) De Coppet, pp. 283 and 295. ASMAI 36/11/93, Traversi to MAE, 16.3.90.

\(^4\) ASMAI 36/11/88, Salimbeni to MAE, 6.1.90; ASMAI 36/9/71, Salimbeni to MAE, 6.1.90; ASMAI 36/11/93, Traversi to MAE, 16.3.90. Also 36/11/88, Cecchi to MAE, 13.1.90. Annesso, Menilek to Antonelli, 14.12.89.

\(^5\) ASMAI 36/11/95, Traversi to MAE. The telegram was placed between others dated June 11 and June 28, 1890.

\(^6\) De Coppet, pp. 313, 316 and 319; BSGI Serie 3, Vol. 6 (1894), p.867.

\(^7\) AP/CFS/131 dossier 1892, Lagarde to Ministère des Colonies, 6.1.92
of October Menilek set off for Adwa, Ras Darge was left as Endärase while Mëkonnen participated in the Adwa campaign.

The pattern was for an ageing and fully trusted confidant to be left in charge of the capital and the kingdom of Shawa whenever Menilek left its confines. He took over the day to day administrative duties of the Emperor, while the imperial court set off with Menilek. While administering the area the Endärase would normally use his own household personnel, and this may well be the reason why so many men who had spent their youth in Ras Darge or Ras Mëkonnen's employ ended up, years later, in the municipality. But it is clear that the emphasis in the beginning was military and the personnel of the early administration of the capital was largely old advisers close to the Emperor. This was possible because before Adwa Addis Ababa's commercial importance had yet to become predominant and the role of foreigners was still small. However, one celebrated instance of a European being tried by Menilek rather than by an Endärase occurred in the case of the spy Capucci. He was found guilty of spying in Shawa and revealing to the Italians secrets concerning Ethiopia's military preparedness. Doubtless his light sentence and swift escape embittered Ethiopian relations with Europeans in the capital and may have contributed

and Ministère des Colonies to Ministère, 5.3.92. Annexe Lagarde to M. des Colonies, 9.2.92. M & D 138/p.295, 9.2.92 and ASMAI 36/16/147, Traversi to MAE, 6.2.92.


1 De Coppet, p.395; Gëbrä Sellassé, p.230.

2 Ibid., pp. 375 and 226.

3 See pp. 128-136.
to anti-foreign feelings there. Precedents may also have been set for future cases involving consular jurisdiction.¹

**Security in the Capital. Menilek's Health and Foreign Diplomatic Influence (1896-1910).** Immediately after the Battle of Adwa there was a marked anti-foreign feeling noticeable in the capital but it subsided after several months.² Long-term residents seem to have been less adversely affected,³ but there was a constant stream of incidents of individuals and diplomatic representatives being attacked or insulted in the capital. After 1900 the Boxer rebellion and its implications for Ethiopia preyed on foreigners' minds, especially the possibility of a rampaging mob getting out of control during the frenzy which often seemed to follow the death of a prominent noble. Yet, despite all the fears, the situation never really got out of control in Addis Ababa, although rumours did, and led to many precautions being taken. For example, the French representative, Lagarde, speaks often of his powerful escort,⁶ and was concerned about the degree to which his legation

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¹See ASMAI 3/7/47 which contains much of Capucci's letters from 1894-1897. Copies are also in ASMAI 36/17/159 and 36/18/173 to 186 covering the same period.

²Pariset, pp. 61 and 128.

³Ibid.

⁴See pp. 64-69, 114-114.?.

⁵See Djibouti, 31/8/01, p.3. Also see pp. 4-5.

⁶For instance, N.S.Eth.19, Lagarde to Delcassé, Entoto, 9.2.01, p.120.
could have been defended against mob attack, and even advocated building a vast European structure in the region of Harār near the proposed railway to which Europeans might escape. The Russian, Italian, and British representatives also had large personal escorts revealing the same concern about security.

In September 1900 Greeks, Somalis, Arabs and some Indians showed their concern for their safety by persuading the British government to put them under British protection. Formerly they had been under Menilek's direct control and this transfer seems to have marked not only a lack of confidence in him, but also a curtailment of his sovereignty. As early as 1901 concern was being voiced about the chaos that might follow Menilek's death; his personal supervision was said to be slipping and incidents of pillaging were increasing. A permanent fortified British legation was asked for by Harrington but the move to Addis Abāba caused delay. For the British government was unwilling to go to great expense building a legation in Addis Abāba if it were to prove necessary to build another one in Addis Abāba. Some, however, said all this concern was greatly exaggerated and the events were nothing in

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1 N.S.Eth.19, Lagarde to Delcassé, Addisababa, 29.12.00, p.127.
2 Ibid.
3 H. Vivian, Abyssinia: Through the Lionland to the Court of the Lion of Judah (London, 1901), p.86 (Henceforth, Vivian).
4 Ibid., p.182.
5 F.O.371/396/2371, British Representative in A/A to F.O., A/A, 8.7.07.
6 N.S.Eth.6, Bonhoure to Decrais, Djibouti, 20.7.01, p.171; Powell-Cotton, p.75.
7 ASMAI 38/1/1, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 16.9.00.
8 N.S.Eth.19, Lagarde to Delcassé, Entoto, 9.2.01, p.121.
9 Ibid., pp. 122 and F.O. 1/39, Harrington to T.Sanderson, A/A, 12.5.01.
comparison with the "Boxer rebellion". ¹

It is significant to note that all this panic came at the same time as Menilek was reported to have had a slight heart attack in August of 1901. ² However, the celebrations in connection with the seventh anniversary of the Battle of Adwa when some 200,000 men gathered in the capital, seems to have passed off without any untoward incidents. ³

The Russian Presence until 1904 - In the first eight years after the battle of Adwa, up to the Addis Alàm episode (1899-1904), ⁴ it was the Russians who had the biggest impact on the life of the capital. ⁵ Their influence came from two different sources, one was the official Russian Red Cross and diplomatic missions, and the second was the ephemeral but more colourful doings of Count Leontieff, a Russian adventurer. ⁶

Leontieff had been to Ethiopia several times but never in any official capacity. ⁷ In 1897 he gave forty musical instruments to the Emperor for a band ⁸ and two years later arrived in the capital with 10,000 head of cattle after raiding in the provinces which he

¹Djibouti, 31.8.01, p.3.
²N.S.Eth.1, Lagarde to Dalcassé, Entotto, 20.12.04. Also Djibouti, 2.11.01, p.4. Indicate Menilek was having some difficulties with his eyes.
³Djibouti, 30.5.03 and 25.7.03; De Castro, I., 176-7, 215; De Coppet, pp. 500-507, including footnotes; Gébrä Sellase, pp. 306-312.
⁴See pp. 71 ff.
⁶Rollins, pp. 188 ff.
⁷Ibid.
⁸T.0.1/32/No.19, Rodd to Salisbury, A/A, 10.5.97.
had been given north of Lake Rudolf. In 1901 he became involved in a legal wrangle with a Frenchman, and had enough influence in the court of Menilek to have the case shifted from the French consular court to that of the Aff Negus. Leontieff eventually won the case. Although it does not seem to have been cited by Ethiopians as a precedent in later cases, it nonetheless carried on and strengthened the pre-Adwa method of dealing with foreigners.

The effect of the official Russian overtures was a much more solid affair. In order to treat the casualties of the Battle of Adwa, Russia sent its first Red Cross mission, which arrived in Addis Ababa in July 1896. Sixty-one men arrived in Addis Ababa as part of the mission. Between 1896 and 1906, 65,056 people were treated in the capital and the hospital cost £7,000 to run per year.

In 1898 a new mission was sent out including about 42 men with three doctors, two doctor's assistants, and a pharmacist. While the

1Djibouti, 18.11.99, p.3.
2See pp. 146. This was the Kahn case. See also: N.S.Eth.60, Le Français, "Chez Menélék" by Gaston Stieglit, 22.3.02 and 26.2.02, pp. 22 and 27 respectively. Also, N.S.Eth. 62, Lagarde to Delcassé, Paris, 15.12.01, p.27. N.S.Eth.60, Lagarde to Delcassé, A/A, 16.4.02, pp.40-41.
3See pp. 146.
4De Coppet, p.454; Ghbré Sellasé, p.271. Also, N.K.Schvedov, Ruskii Krasnyikrost v. Ablissinii v. 1895 godu (St. Petersburg, 1897), pp. 24-40. Quoted in Pankhurst, Economic History, p.644. (Henceforth, Schvedov with the Pankhurst page reference). All figures quoted should be treated with caution since the book has proved to be rife with misquotes and typographical errors.
5C.Zeghi, I Russi in Etiopia (Naples, 1973), Vol. II, p.248. (Henceforth, Zeghi, I Russi). However, according to Pariset 43 (p.62) and 31 according to Schvedov, p.644.
6Schvedov, pp. 644-5. See Le Temps, 2.11.96 for a good contemporary description.
7Powell-Cotton, pp. 88-89.
8Fonds Anciens: Somalis 17, Hanotaux to Lebon, Paris 7.4.98. Annexe, extract from Lagarde, Entoto, 20.2.98.
earlier mission had been ostensibly connected to the Russian Red Cross this one was diplomatic.¹ By May Menilek had given them land on which to build a Legation and work on it had begun;² by December ground had been obtained for a hospital and permanent buildings began to replace the tents the doctors had formerly used.³ By 1904 a pharmacy and store house had been added.⁴ Menilek himself used the Russian doctors for his various ailments during the 1896-1906 period.⁵ But Russian influence was not by any means solely medical during these first years. They became deeply involved with Ethiopian clerics and the possibilities of closer relationships between the two Orthodox churches; further they were supposed to have distributed some 60,000 guns by 1898.⁶ By 1900 the Russians were spending £8,000-10,000 on their hospital and diplomatic establishment⁷ and this was probably raised when the mission was upgraded to a legation in 1902.⁸ Nonetheless,

They live together in some wretched looking tuculs and tents, in a very untidy compound, some little distance beyond the Russian Embassy. Among the Europeans they have not a very high reputation for medical

¹ Schvedov, p. 644.
² ASMAI, 38/1/4, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 23.5.98. W.D., 1.1.10.
³ ASMAI 38/1/4, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 10.12.98.
⁴ Schvedov, p. 645.
⁵ See p. 97. From 1896 to 1898 they seem to have been the only doctors in A/A. N.S.Eth.10, Brice to Pichon /Based on information from Dr. Vitalien/, A/A, 15.10, 09, p. 34.
⁶ ASMAI 38/1/4, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 10.12.98.
⁷ F.O. 1/37/No.11, Harrington to F.O., A/A, 24.2.1900.
⁸ N.S.Eth.10, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 6.3.10, p. 92.
skill, but they have done much useful surgical work for the natives, especially those wounded in the late war with Italy. ¹

As Skinner says the Russian was 'the most considerable of all foreign undertakings ... The influence obtained by Russian diplomacy operating along medical lines is necessarily immense'.²

This vast expense, comparable only with Italian expenditure, is all the more surprising when one considers that the Russians had no significant trade with Ethiopia nor any colonial borders with Ethiopia as did Italy, France and Great Britain.³

The Italians until 1904 - The next most active diplomatic community after the Russian in the early years of the city, was probably the Italian, Ciccodicola, the Italian representative to the court of Menilek, was given the immensely difficult task of rebuilding Ethiopian Italian relations after the Battle of Adwa. The Italians had two common borders with Ethiopia, in Eritrea in the north and Somaliland in the south and east; neither had been delineated. Furthermore, in both areas there were periodic raids across the borders, while Italian Somaliland had the additional diplomatic problem posed by the activities of Mohammad Abdille Hassan.⁴ One of Ciccodicola's most successful methods of winning over the Ethiopians in the capital

¹Powell-Cotton, p.89.
²Skinner, p.89.
³Ibid., p.129. For trade see pp.241-255. The Russians became deeply involved in Shawa and Ethiopia during the period, when they sent a Red Cross Mission to the capital to care for the wounded after the Battle of Adwa (1896). Before and after this, they sent large amounts of arms to Ethiopia. Ethiopia's Orthodox Christians were regarded by the Russians as another of the many orthodox in the Middle East to be given support against the non-orthodox, in this case the French Roman Catholics. Furthermore, they may have had hopes of obtaining a coaling port on the Red Sea. (See Rollins, op.cit. See also Zaghi, I Russia, for Russian involvement in Ethiopia in the pre-Adwa period). For religious implications, see pp.358-359.
was by assisting in the construction of two major public works, the Addis Alam road\(^1\) and the empire-wide telegraph network.\(^2\)

The Italian residence was in the centre of the city and Ciccodicola was fortunate enough in persuading the powerful Fitawrari Habit\(^3\) Giyorgis,\(^3\) to guarantee to watch over it for him. To further enhance Italy's prestige he had

"far and away the best, I had almost written only, house there [In Addis Ababa], and is empowered to spend secret service money lavishly in a country where money is particularly potent... To them [the Ethiopians] the palatial Legation, with its succession of luxurious saloons, filled with costly ornaments, pictures, divans, stuffed polar bears, and other marvels, is ever eloquent... He [Ciccodicola] is also very ingenious in his maintenance of semi-regal state."\(^4\)

The monthly cost of the upkeep of the establishment was estimated to be 1,050 MTD in 1898.\(^5\) The Italians also had a medical establishment, but not on so large a scale as that of the Russians. It was a clinic and gave 59,695 consultations between 1901 and 1911.\(^6\)

The French until 1904 - Potentially the most influential of the foreign diplomatic communities in the capital was the French, for it was they who had given Menilek the greatest support before the

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\(^1\)See pp. 976.
\(^2\)See pp. 1798.
\(^3\)See p. 149.
\(^4\)Vivian, pp. 182-3. See also Powell-Cotton, pp. 76-7 and W.D.3,1,00.
\(^5\)F.O. 1/34/No.18, Harrington to F.O., London, 28.7.98. See Appendix I for the Ethiopian equivalent for this amount.
Battle of Adwa and allowed a large number of guns to be imported.

During most of the period the major public works project built in Ethiopia was the railway, under the control of French capital.\(^1\)

Furthermore, French traders began the period in a position of pre-

dominance in Ethiopia's import/export trade\(^2\) and many Frenchmen were in advisory positions at various levels of the Ethiopian govern-

mental structure.\(^3\) But France soon lost her position of strength in Ethiopian trade\(^4\) and her high-handed methods during the Fashoda incident and at certain stages of the railway negotiations hurt her relationship with the central government.\(^5\)

During the first few years that the French representative, Lagarde, was in Ethiopia his standing with Menilek was very high. He was given a title\(^6\) and a vast tract of land for a legation.\(^7\) The French too had a physician attached to their medical staff, L'Herminier, and also a visiting medical mission under Wurtz.\(^8\)

After 1904, however, their influence in the medical field was to be much more pervasive.

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\(^1\) Rossetti, pp. 135-181 and 370-389. Also pp. 352f.

\(^2\) See pp. 142-356.

\(^3\) Djibouti, 30.5.03. See also pp. 140-356, 371f.

\(^4\) See pp. 171f.

\(^5\) See pp. 47ff.

\(^6\) A/CFS/142 dossier on the Bonchamps mission. Ministère des Colonies to Minister, Paris, 2.3.98. Annexe, Lagarde to Ministère des Colonies, Entoto, 8.2.98.

\(^7\) ASMAI 38/3/23, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 20.5.03. Also pp. 105-106.

\(^8\) R. Wurtz, "Hygiène publique et privée en Abyssinie", La Semaine Médicale (7.12.98). The French and the English resented the free medical attention given by the Italians and Russians.
The British until 1904 - The role of the British diplomatic community is, perhaps, the most difficult to gauge. They had the longest borders with Ethiopia, including British East Africa, Somaliland and the Sudan and difficulties were encountered both in defining the borders and coping with cross border raids. Their big coup in the early years, of course, was the establishment of the Bank of Abyssinia.¹ Like the French and the Russians, they were given eight acres of land² by the Emperor, in 1898, a tract next to the Russian one.³ They too had a doctor, Wakeman, attached to the legation⁴ and later he was to be specially recognized by the Emperor and Empress for his services in attending on Menilek during his illness.⁵

They too tried to impress the Ethiopians by the munificence of their legation as shown by the cost of the first buildings on the new land.⁶ By 1906 the total yearly cost of the establishment was 2,500 to 2,600 pounds a year all inclusive.⁷ The most important influence of the British, however, was in the sphere of trade. The Indian, Greek, Somali and Arab traders looked to the British consular courts for the impartial settling of their commercial and

¹See pp. 186-995.
²F.O. 1/34/No.18, Harrington to F.O., London, 28.7.98. W.D.1.1.00.
³Vivian, p.170.
⁴Powell-Cotton, p.75.
⁵F.O. 371/396/44554, Harrington to F.O., 6.12.08.
⁶F.O.1/34/No.18, Harrington to F.O., London, 28.7.98, they cost some 12,000 MTD.
⁷F.O.371/190/444/444, Harrington to F.O., 4.12.06.
Although the French, Italians, and Russians had a fair number of cases the British had by far the most. The issue of consular jurisdiction was closely tied to the problem of safety and personal security in the capital which in turn was closely related to the crises in Menilek's health.

The New Legations - The period from the decision against moving to Addis Ababa in 1904 and Menilek's very serious seizure of May 11, 1908 saw all the major powers in the city build new permanent residences in stone, while some got new grants of land so that all the legations were for the first time concentrated in the northeastern part of the city. All of them were now vying with each other to impress the Ethiopians with the power and prestige of their respective governments.

Previously the various diplomats had expressed concern over their personal security and also the decision had been made not to move to Addis Ababa but instead to build a road there. Menilek then suggested in October, 1903 that the legations in the capital should get together and begin to build roads and bridges within the capital, linking themselves with the imperial palace. The Russians had by that time already begun construction on a new

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1ASMAI 38/1/1, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 16.9.00.
2Ibid. Eventually the ever growing number of cases led to a special legal code called "The Abyssinian Order in Council".
3See pp. 97ff.
4N.S.Eth.1, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 12.5.08.
5ASMAI 38/3/25, Martini to MAE, Asmara, 7.11.03, Annesso, Ciccodicola to Martini, A/A, 24.10.03.
legation, their government having given them a credit of about £6,000 for the job.¹ The French seem at this time to have rebuilt parts of their legation in Addis Tena with Cheyneux supervising construction.²

Several roads and bridges were built with Greek and Italian labour.³

Following the Russians, the Germans seem to have made the most progress in building their new legation, in the same area as the British and Russians.⁴ The new Italian legation was only in the planning stages at that point, but plans were being made jointly with the Germans to build a bridge across the Qäbbäna river to join the two legations with the imperial palace.⁵ The estimated future cost of the legation itself and the bridge was put at 100,000 MTD in 1907, without the cost of wood which was to be supplied free by the Emperor. The bridge on its own was to cost 5,000 MTD.⁶ On top of these expenses Ciccodicola recommended the

¹Ibid. and F.0.1/55/Harrington to F.0., A/A, 30.9.04.
²ASMAI, 38/3/25, op.cit.
⁴F.0.371/190/2471/37790, Enclosure I, German Embassy London to F.0., 13.11.07. See also, N.S.Eth.64, Roux to Pichon, A/A, 8.3.07, pp.35-6; N.S.Eth.9, Lagarde to Minister, A/A, 5.6.06, p.30. The German role in Ethiopia was very much smaller than that of the other powers mentioned, but see pp.60-64 for their role in the Doctor controversy and pp.36-41 for their role in education.
⁵F.0.371/190/271/37790, op.cit. ASMAI 37/2/11, Colli to MAE, A/A, 21.5.07.
⁶ASMAI 37/2/11, op.cit. The "Palazzina" was to cost 36,400; chancellory (11,090); Doctor's home (11,050); stables (6,000); servants' quarters (2,500); a road around the legation (2,000); a wall (5,000); the bridge (5,000); the water system (2,500); interpreter's house (500) and other constructions (2,000). Prices were rather astronomical. See also ASMAI 37/2/10, Colli to MAE, A/A, 21.5.07.
expansion of the Italian dispensary so that it might compete more effectively with the Russian hospital. 50,000 Lire a year was suggested and 100,000 Lire for building new quarters for the hospital. The Italians thought it imperative that they move to the new legation section of the city because of their exposed position in the centre of the market. It seems also to have been directly connected with the savage pillaging that occurred after the death of Ras Makonnen. The whole project seems to have been speeded up by the visit of Martini, the governor of Eritrea who was received in style by the Emperor and 60,000 men.

The British, although they had obtained grudging permission in October 1905 from His Majesty's Office of Works were still only in the planning stages of their fortress-like legation in July, 1907. Cooperation between the legations on the security issue seems to have been quite close. In October 1906 the Russians initiated discussions concerning a common meeting ground for mutual defence should the situation get completely out of control in the capital.

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1. ASMAI 38/4/33, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 3.8.06. This was despite the fact that Menilek and Taytu were still using Russian doctors. ASMAI 38/4/32, Cicco to MAE, 29.4.06.


4. ASMAI 3/20/169, op. cit.

5. F.O. 1/55/H.M. Office of Works, 26.10.05. Also J. Boyes, My Abyssinian Journey (Nairobi, n.d.), p.16 (Henceforth, Boyes).


The Russians were particularly concerned because they had no permanent water supply and were especially eager to have an understanding with their nearest neighbour, the British.

Another cause for common concern was the alleged Ethiopian attempt to build a "blockhouse" dominating the Russian, British, Italian and even the German legations. The Italian minister at the time directly, and almost certainly correctly, contradicted British fears by pointing out that Menilek had first gone up to the top of the hill trying to escape from a cholera epidemic and then in his fashion had suddenly decided to build a residence for himself there.

The French were the last to build their permanent legation. After the special envoy Klobukowski had helped to negotiate a new railway agreement in 1907 the French were given an especially large plot of land somewhat removed from the rest of the legations in recognition of France's privileged position. By April of the next year construction was well under way.

1904-1908 - The period 1904 to 1908 was much more important than the earlier eight years in the sense that Menilek's deteriorating health, the death of one of his heirs and the increasing power of

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1 Ibid.
2 F.0.371/190/2471/37790, Incl. I, German Embassy, London to F.0., 13.11.07.
3 F.0.371/190/2471/18080, Clerk to Grey, A/A, 8.8.07. "The Emperor Menilek has recently begun to build a fort which is situated on the summit of the hill [behind the legation], and it is his intention to park his mountain batteries there, so that in the event of an organized attack the legations would be subject to direct plunging fire from above, which would hardly render them tenable."
4 ASMAI 37/2/10, Colli to MAE, A/A, 4.9.07. British isolation from reliable sources of information at this time was probably due to the fact that there was no one of rank in the legation due to diplomatic difficulties concerning the return to Ethiopia of the earlier ambassador, Harrington. See the Foreign Office Lists
his wife forced many to think of how power was to be delegated
during his illness and what was to be done should he die. In
this increasingly fluid situation a seemingly innocuous clause in
a Franco-Ethiopian treaty set precedents that engendered endless
conflicts in later years, especially in the Regency period (1916-30).
An important spur to foreign involvement in these changes came
from the state of security in the capital. Diplomats, eager to
ensure their personal safety, tried to support the most powerful
factions favourable to their cause.

There were quite a number of cases in the period after the
battle of Adwa involving mixed Ethiopian and foreign jurisdiction.
Besides the Kahn case of 1901,¹ there were the long, complicated
case of Jules Forgeron, the son of an important A/A merchant,² and
shortly afterwards an incident at the telegraph office.³ Unlike
the earlier Kahn case these two seem to have provoked an attempt
by the legations to get Menilek to recognize "un statut Personnel."⁴

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¹See pp. 141-147. N.S.Eth.62, Lagarde to Delcassé, Paris, 5.12.01,
p.27.
²N.S.Eth.62, Lagarde to Delcassé, Entotto, 18.8.05, pp. 47-9.
³ASMAI 38/3/28, No. 69, Castani to MAE, A/A, 27.5.05.
⁴ASMAI 38/4/28, Martini to MAE, Asmara, 29.8.05. Annesso,
Ciccodicola to Martini, A/A, 21.8.05.
⁵F.O. 371/193/33059/33149, Hohler to Louis, 7.9.07.
⁶F.O. 371/395/3219/10271, Grey to Count Bengkendorf, 24.4.08.
or a system similar to capitulations, for foreigners resident in Ethiopia. This Menilek refused to do since he felt it would be a grave blow to the independence of the Emperor and to the integrity of the Empire. At the same time, the British were trying to get rid of one of the most onerous groups which they had under their protection, described as a "class of Greeks... of the lowest description." "The legation was obliged to refer them to the local authorities, who, it is to be feared show little inclination to give them attention."  

A crisis of major proportions now intervened to put more pressure on Menilek to take active measures - the death of Ras Makonnen and widespread pillaging which followed in the capital. Ras Makonnen died while travelling from Har’ar to Addis Ababa on March 23rd, 1906 and the Addis Ababa market was looted when the news became widespread in the capital. Menilek had started travelling on his way to meet the governor of Eritrea, but returned to the capital. On the fourth of April when Makonnen’s death was announced, Menilek ordered the market to be suspended as a sign of mourning. People in the market were even forced to have their

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1 ASMAI 49/1/1, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 24.1.06. The Europeans objected to the savagery and long delays of the Ethiopian legal system. Cases taking several years were not unknown and offences for theft might be punished by the amputation of a limb. See pp. 143-147.  

2 N.S.Eth.62, op. cit.  

3 F.O.372/1/13037, Harrington to Grey, A/A, 18.3.06.  

4 Al‘Haa Kenfe, pp. 10-11, 13 Mäggabit 1898.  

5 Ibid. and F.O.371/3/18102/19876/No.17, Harrington to F.O. 7.6.06. ASMAI 3/20/169, Martini to MAE, A/A, 7/1906.  

6 ASMAI 38/4/32, Martini to MAE, Asmara, 25.3.06. See also F.Martini, Diario Eritreo (Firenze, nd.) who stresses other factors, pp. 271-2 (Henceforth, F.Martini).  

7 Ibid.
hair shorn as a further indication of respect.\(^1\) Those who attempted to continue carrying on business had their goods confiscated. In the process of enforcing this, looting resulted from the influx of troops brought in to carry out Menilek's orders.\(^2\) Not only the soldiers were involved in the looting, for the poor could not buy even basic supplies and some of them may have resorted to pillaging as well.\(^3\) The Indian commercial houses seem to have fared better since they were prepared to resist attacks by force of arms. Furthermore, their businesses were much like "factories" and therefore easily defensible. When Menilek found out all that had occurred he was very angry, made about 500 arrests, carried out extensive floggings and distributed money to those who had suffered.\(^4\) Needless to say there was a diplomatic protest concerning the excesses.\(^5\)

Before the furore had died down, Menilek suffered an "apoplectic attack", having fainted during a walk with Taytu near Raguel church.\(^6\) This was a very much more serious matter. The British especially seem to have worked out contingency plans in case of unrest. An unnamed "chief", probably DJajamach Abbat,\(^7\) was sought out to

\(^{1}\) Q.I. No. 17 (16.3.72), p.16.
\(^{2}\) ASMAI 38/4/32, op.cit.
\(^{3}\) Q.I. No. 17, op.cit.
\(^{4}\) ASMAI 38/4/32, op.cit.
\(^{5}\) Ibid. and ASMAI 3/20/196, Martini to NAE, A/A, 7/1906.
\(^{6}\) N.S. Eth.1, Lagarde to Minister, Entoto, 21.5.06, pp. 85-7. This is the most reliable source since Vitalien was in charge of taking care of Menilek. However, it was the Russian doctor Kohanowski who was on the spot to revive the Emperor. Regrettably Russian records are unavailable for scrutiny.
\(^{7}\) See pp. 154 ff.
provide protection and plans were laid for common action with other legations and the creation of a refuge for the commercial community. Diplomats were particularly fearful of what might happen should the Emperor suddenly die.

At least two other lootings occurred in the Addis Ababa market within the next year, both in connection with the death and memorial service for one of Taytu's nieces. In December 1906 Menilek seems to have had another attack leading to partial paralysis. Public disquiet was further increased by earth tremors in November of that year. Furthermore, there were several incidents involving foreigners which renewed pressure to establish an international court of justice in the capital. Incidents in August 1906 involved a dispute among Greeks in which two were killed, and the guilty parties were deported. Another case, in

\footnote{F.O.371/3/18106/19676 No. 17, Harrington to F.O., 7.6.06.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{F.O.371/3/18102/31426 No. 8, Harrington to F.O., 20.8.06. F.O. 371/3/18103/34983 No. 28, Harrington to Grey, 12.10.06. F.O. 371/3/18102/36336 No. 713, Nicolson to Grey, 24.10.06.}
\footnote{N.S.Eth. 1, Roux to Pichon, A/A, 5.3.07, pp. 116-118.}
\footnote{N.S.Eth. 1, Lagarde to Pichon, 12/06.}
\footnote{N.S.Eth. 1, Lagarde to Pichon, Entoto, 12.11.06, pp. 106-7.}
\footnote{N.S.Eth. 62, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 10.9.07, p.82.}
\footnote{Alaga Kenfe, p.14, 19 Nährase 1898. ASMAI 49/1/1, Ciccodicola to NAE, A/A, 7-9.06. F.O. 371/192/24282/27724, Hohler to Grey, 24.7.07.}
which servants of Europeans were summarily executed, intensified concern.\(^1\) Basically, among the legations responsible for the largest number of foreigners there was a split as to the manner in which mixed Ethiopian and foreign cases should be dealt with.\(^2\) The Italians and the British were in favour of an international court of justice\(^3\) and the nomination of a sole European judge freely chosen by the Emperor and having jurisdiction in the first and last instance over all European litigation.\(^4\) However, it was Klobukowski's opinion, probably correct, that Manilek would never agree to this infringement of his sovereignty. Even the Af\(\bar{H}\) Negus's judgements were often subject to appeal to the Emperor.\(^5\) Menilek even went so far as to say that he saw the international court of justice as a potential "war machine directed against his country's independence".\(^6\) The French view was that change could only come slowly and that consular jurisdiction would provide a model for the future.\(^7\) They also pressed for a more efficient local police force, limits on their ability to search and arrest Europeans, and

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\(^1\) F.0.371/193/36153, Hohler to Grey, A/A, 8.10.07.

\(^2\) The foreign legations agreed that the eternal disputes between Greeks would be better dealt with by the Ethiopians but they were not keen to take on this responsibility. See F.0.371/192/24282/36963, Hohler to Grey, 10.10.07.

\(^3\) N.S.Eth.62, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 10.9.07, pp. 82-5. However, it was not prominently pointed out in Clerk's report of 1906, F.0.371/192/6031, pp. 245-255.

\(^4\) Ibid., 11.10.07, p.105.

\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) N.S.Eth.62, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 10.9.07, p.83.

\(^7\) N.S.Eth.62, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 10.9.07, pp. 84-5.
the need for a separate prison for European prisoners. All in all Klobukowski argued that Ethiopia was a "special case" and that they should not insist upon any hard and fast rules.¹ Nonetheless, article 7 in the treaty of 10.1.08 negotiated with the Emperor established precedents other legations were to lean on.² Klobukowski, who was at one time an important official in Indo-China, completely rejected Harrington's fear of a "bloodbath of Boxer rebellion stature" in Ethiopia as exaggerated.³

The announcement of the council of Ministers and the appointment of an energetic secretary in the Ministry of Interior were seen as helpful steps.⁴

Two events which according to Europeans' point of view again threatened security in the capital, were the death of one of Menilek's heirs, Dëjazmach Wëssëh Sëgäd,⁵ and a cerebral haemorrhage suffered by the Emperor on May 11th, 1908.⁶ These events led to alarm in European circles especially among Greeks and Italians who began to make preparations to defend their homes and shops.⁷

¹ N.S.Eth.66, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 19.1.08, pp. 22-3.
² Rossetti, p.397.
³ N.S.Eth.9, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 16.10.07, p.89.
⁴ See pp. 151-153. W.D.12.1.08; N.S.Eth.1, Brice to Pichon, Djibouti, 1.2.08, p.184; N.S.Eth.20, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 5.3.08.
⁵ N.S.Eth.1, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 1.4.08, p.190. His funeral was on 29.3.08. See also, De Coppet, p.540, fn. 3 and ASMAI 54/34/141 (subfile for 1908), Colli to MAE, A/A, 8.6.08.
⁶ N.S.Eth.1, Brice to Pichon, 12.5.08. This was probably the most serious of Menilek's attacks and was to leave him paralysed on the right side for quite some time, making his speech unclear. One of the reasons he sought the assistance of the Egyptian, Bey, and the German Doctor Steinküller was to find relief from these symptoms.
⁷ ASMAI 54/34/141, subfile for 1908, Colli to MAE, A/A, 8.6.08.
For the overall developments in the capital see pp. 47-66.
Menilek's Residences other than Addis Abëba (1896-1904) - At different times between 1896 and 1904 Menilek contemplated moving his capital to a site other than Addis Abëba. Addis Alüm was the site most seriously considered but others were mentioned as possible sites. The motives for the move are tangled but lack of wood and the prestige associated with founding many cities coupled with the desire of an ageing monarch to create a more congenial residence for the long kerëmt or rainy season, appear to be the most persuasive ones.

This wanderlust, leading to the foundation of several towns (Korëmash, Addis Alüm, Gännät and Holäta) is inextricably linked with the growing pains of Addis Abëba. In its role as the commercial hub of Ethiopia Addis Abëba could never have been transferred to Addis Alüm; there were just insufficient resources in the area to support a large urban complex. Menilek could toy with the idea of establishing a residence there, but the majority of the important yearly festivals were held in Addis Abëba, and once the Addis Alüm to Addis Abëba road was decided upon in May 1902 the continued existence of Addis Abëba as Ethiopia's major commercial city was assured. Proof of Ethiopian and foreign confidence in its stability came with the steadily increasing number of permanent buildings and the modification of land tenure that subsequently took place. Addis Abëba's political ascendancy over Ethiopia took somewhat

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1 See pp. 296-309, 329f.

2 W. D., 20.11.00, N. S., Eth. 19, Lagarde to Delcassé, "Addis tiêna", 29.12.00, p. 129.

3 See pp. 97f.
longer to establish and rumours of an imminent departure continued.

Menilek's series of seizures and the necessity of constant medical supervision from a stream of doctors eventually led to a final settling-down in Addis Ababa after 1906. Here he was close to the hospital he had established and the doctors upon whose assistance he depended.

During the period 1893-1897 Menilek was busy dealing with the campaign leading up to and the diplomatic repercussions of the Battle of Adwa. This not only entailed negotiation of a treaty with the Italians and settling with them and the Vatican concerning the Italian prisoners of war but also receiving various diplomatic missions from the Russians, the French, and the English. As if this was not enough to keep him busy, elaborate arrangements had to be made for the receptions in Addis Ababa of Ras Mängäsha, the campaigns to the north in 1898 and various campaigns to the south and in the same period. However, after all this the foundation
of towns and churches took the place of zámacha or military expeditions.¹ As the number of his military expeditions decreased, he became more sedentary and preoccupied with the city and its land tenure.² By September 1900 several disadvantages in the Addis Abõba site of the capital had become apparent and Menilek made extended trips to Addis Alám.³ As early as 1897 he was beginning to get very tired of so many visitors coming to see him, sportsmen, travellers and missions (official and unofficial (especially the French ones). He was said to have acidly commented that his foreign friends had not been nearly so numerous before the Battle of Adwa.⁴

Menilek's first foray outside of Addis Abõba to do major construction was in Bulga, a day's journey to the east of Addis Abõba,⁵ where he had spent five months.⁶ He was "building a temporary sort of residence for himself and a magazine for his arms and ammunitions in a very inaccessible place."⁷ It was close enough to Addis Abõba so that he could quickly return to the city in an emergency.⁸ Large

¹Guidi, p.610 and see chapter on religion, p. 354ff., 361ff.
²See pp. 103-114.
³ASMAI 38/1/11, Ciccodiloca to MAE, Aden, 20.10.00 (A/A, 25.9.00).
⁴N.S.Eth.? Billol to Hanotaux, Rome, 7.7.97, Encl. Tribuna, 6.7.97 (Harar, 9.6.97). The information is attributed to Mondoir.
⁵W.D. 2.2.00 and 3.2.00.
⁶W.D. 26.12.99-2.1.00, 21.1.00-10.8.00 and 15.5.00.
⁷W.D. 9.2.00. See also Djibouti, 10.3.00.
⁸Djibouti, 10.3.00.
amounts of Menilek's surplus arms and ammunition were in the process of being taken to the new arsenal. However, there never seems to have been any serious attempt to move the capital to the site.

First of all, Menilek personally supervised the construction of all the buildings there, but the land itself belonged to Taytu, and her Azzaj, Zamanu'el, was her representative in the area. Secondly, the Bulga imperial residence (sometimes called Salangé, or Korëmash) does not figure as prominently in the British, French or Italian diplomatic complaints as Addis Alam when another site for a capital was being considered. Furthermore, it was essentially an inconvenient military site at a time when defence was no longer a primary consideration.

By this time defence was no longer of major importance in the foundation of a city in Shawa but the shortage of wood was, and there is a particularly large mass of references to shortages in Addis Ababa. Furthermore, Bulga does not seem to have had large numbers of trees at this time. In 1899 eucalyptus trees had been planted in the palace by the Emperor, some of the nobles, and residents of the city. Other sources say Mondon was responsible for the first

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1 F.O.1/37/page 121, Harrington to Sir Thomas Sanderson, A/A, 1.5.00.
2 W.D.13/2/00.
3 Ibid., 3.2.00.
4 W.D. 3.2.00.
5 O.I.No. 39 (23.5.72), p.2.
7 Henri d'Orleans, p.11. W.D.26.12.99. London Times, 8.7.97 (A/A, 30.4.97); this includes special despatches from a member of the official mission. M.S.Wellby, 'Twixt Siradar and Menilek (London, 1901), pp. 99-100. (Henceforth, Wellby). These are but a few of the references.
eucalyptuses being planted\textsuperscript{1} and that Menilek grew many himself, ordering priests and soldiers to plant and water six trees each. They took root and soon many others began to plant them.\textsuperscript{2} The poor were not allowed to cut the trees down\textsuperscript{3} and the saplings were guarded by \textit{zabärnena} or guards.\textsuperscript{4} Still, many people were forced to use animal dung as fuel instead of wood because the landscape around Addis Abäba for a twenty kilometer circumference had already been denuded.\textsuperscript{5} Part of this was due to extremely inefficient gathering methods (such as burning trees down) which led to only 25\% of the trees felled actually reaching the market.\textsuperscript{6} The Addis Alam road was being constructed in 1903-4 to try to increase the wood supply of the capital.\textsuperscript{7}

To alleviate some of these problems Menilek planned to build a new capital to the west of Addis Abäba in Addis Alam as soon as the rains were over.\textsuperscript{8} By the beginning of November 1900, Menilek began building his new residence\textsuperscript{9} and at least two Ethiopian sources

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Alläga Lämma, p.124.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Ibid., pp. 174-5.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Ibid. and O.I. No. 39 (23.5.72), p.7.
\item \textsuperscript{4} Op.cit., O.I. No. 39.
\item \textsuperscript{5} N.S.Eth.19, Lagarde to Delcassé, "Addis tiéna", 29.12.00.
\item \textsuperscript{6} Powell-Cotton, pp. 158-9.
\item \textsuperscript{7} See below, pp. 97\&.
\item \textsuperscript{8} ASMAI 38/1/11, Ciccodicola to MAE, Aden, 20.10.00 (A/A, 25.9.00).
\item \textsuperscript{9} W.D. 10.11.1900.
\end{itemize}
say that the city was founded in this month. Many foreigners believed the capital would be immediately moved to the new site but that eventuality was improbable. There was no real possibility that Addis Ålm would become the new capital and hub of the Empire in the same sense that Addis Abäba had been. For there simply was not enough water in the area to support a large population all the year round. In the beginning it was merely a winter residence during the rainy season when water was plentiful and wood for fuel (at the time of the year when it was most needed) more closely at hand. What was possible was that there would be an ever widening search for winter capitals farther and farther from Addis Abäba in search of sufficient fuel to satisfy the needs of the Emperor's numerous retainers and followers during the cold winter months. This became unnecessary because of two interrelated projects: the building of a road from Addis Abäba to Addis Ålm, which relieved the immediate and pressing need for fuel, and the success of eucalyptus plantations in Addis Abäba which solved the long term problem of wood shortages.

1Aläga Kenfe, Hedar, 1893, p.5. De Coppet, pp. 485-6; Gâbrä Sellasâ, p.293.
3W.D. 20.11.00. N.S.Eth,19; Lagarde to Delcassé, Addis Tiéna, 29.12.00, p.129.
5Ibid. W.D. 20,11.00.
In May 1902 Menilek finally decided to build the Addis Alam to Addis Ababa road and construction began after the rains. After the road was begun there is no evidence suggesting that Menilek travelled for any extended period outside Addis Ababa. Thus he spent the rainy seasons of 1901 and 1902 in Addis Alam and later in 1908 for a shorter period went for a cure to Dabră Libanos. Otherwise, he stayed in Addis Ababa.

The Addis Alam Road - The Addis Ababa to Addis Alam road, some 40 kilometres long, was the biggest "public works" project undertaken by Menilek in this period. At one point at least 50,000 people were labouring on it under Menilek's orders, yet it took three years to build. Even before the final plans for the road were laid, concession hunters swarmed round Menilek to extract their dubious privileges. A Frenchman even got a concession to build an electric or steam tramway along the side of the road and eventually the road was built in such a way that a tramway might be added later. Firm plans for the road, however, were only decided upon between Menilek and the Italian diplomatic representative in May, 1902...

1ASMAI 38/3/18, Martini to MAE, Asmara, 10.6.02. Annesso, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 23.5.02.
2Djibouti, 11.11.02, 15.11.02.
3Djibouti, 6.4.01, 13.7.01, 12.7.02 and 28.8.02.
4W.D. 1.12.08, 22.12.08. This trip was taken as a cure and for religious reasons.
5ASMAI 38/3/18, Martini to MAE, Asmara, 10.6.02. Annesso, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 23.5.02.
6De Castro, Vol. I, p.239.
7Djibouti, 25.7.03. ASMAI 38/3/23, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 20.5.03.
8O.I. No. 39 (23.5.72), p.5.
9W.D. 15.2.01; Djibouti, 22.6.01.
10Djibouti, 9.8.02.
11ASMAI, op.cit., N.S.Eth.4, Mathieu to Minister, A/A, 16.9.02.
It was to be about forty kilometers long, cost 100,000 Lire and Ciccodicola was to find workers of "good character" to supervise the work. Empress Taytu took an active role in the negotiations and agreed to help pay for part of it and provide labour. Ciccodicola took advantage of the presence of an Italian crew building the Addis Ababa to Addis Alîm telegraph to have the whole route carefully surveyed and pegged out on the ground by its officer, Lieutenant Adelmo Bardi. The day to day supervisor of construction was to be Castagna, an Italian engineer whose stay in Addis Ababa was to be a long one.

Further surveying was done in October and November 1902 under Menilek's and Taytu's personal supervision. The plans were still not complete in December although five or six Italians had arrived to work on the road and the telegraph had been completed. Since this was at the height of a monopoly crisis,
another bogus concession, never actualized, involved a Greek gulled into signing a contract to build another railway.¹ Much more significant were the effects of an imperial ḍwaj or proclamation which led to a great influx of labour from all over the Empire to work on all sections of the road at once.² Menilek sent out orders to his governors to send about 1,000 men each³ and in January 1903 there was an "enormous" increase in the populations of Addis Ababa and Addis Alam, as the men summoned by the imperial ḍwaj arrived.⁴ Menilek assigned each important man one section of the road to build.⁵ Ras Makonnen had responsibility for the first section from the ġebi⁶ and the Qubbāna river⁷ which included the original Ras Makonnen bridge.⁷ He sent 20,000 men to work on this one small section of the road⁸ - an index of the overall numbers involved.⁹ However, he had more experience in such matters since he had already built the Harār to Deré Dawa road.¹⁰

¹ ASMAI 38/3/22, Ciccodicola to MAE, Addis Alem, 4.12.02. He was also given a "concession" to build two kilometres of the road at his own expense. See, ASMAI 38/3/22, Ciccodicola to MAE, Addis Alem, 25.2.03.
² Djibouti, 10.1.03.
³ De Castro, Vol. I, p.239.
⁴ Djibouti, 10.1.03 (telegram dated 3.1.03).
⁵ O.I, No. I (27.10.71), p.5. ASMAI 38/3/22, Ciccodicola to MAE, Addis Alem, 25.2.03, (for just two examples of many).
⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Djibouti, 30.5.03.
¹⁰ Djibouti, 15.11.02.
Soldiers complained bitterly about having to perform these menial
tasks unsanctioned by tradition. 1 But matters went farther than
merely complaint when a majority of Ras Wâlê's troops disobeyed
orders and refused to follow him so that they would not have to
take part in the road building. 2 These were soldiers bridling at
the prospect of doing manual work now that the era of Amhara
expansion to the south and west was ending. 3 Local labour levies
showed no such rebellion, 4 even when they were not paid or given
any recompense. 5 Subservient labour was also imported from
Wôlâmô and Guragé speaking areas which owed labour directly to
the Emperor. 6

However, despite all the trials and tribulations the road
was finished, opening up a virgin forest for Addis Ababa's fuel
and construction needs. But a cheaper and more readily accessible
source of wood was needed and this was supplied by eucalyptus trees
planted in the city. 7

While the Addis Abâm road was being built a big effort was
made at reafforestation of the city. Menilek instituted a "festa

1 Djibouti 25.7.03. ASMAI 38/3/23, Colli to MAE, A/A, 15.6.03.
2 ASMAI 38/3/23, Colli to MAE, A/A, 15.6.03. ASMAI 38/4/23, Colli
to MAE, A/A, 10.7.03. I could not, however, find traces of this
from my informants.
3 ASMAI 54/34/141 (1909), Colli to MAE, A/A, 10.12.09.
4 ASMAI 38/4/23, Colli to MAE, A/A, 10.9.03.
7 See pp. 101 A.
degli alberi" and in 1904 issued an awaj encouraging it, and many small trees appeared on slopes in the city. Then in 1905 he granted a concession to Mr. Didier, a representative of the International Ethiopian Railway Company for the free planting of trees over twenty gashsha of land. The Ethiopian government was to get ten percent of the timber marketed, either in wood or cash.

Other developments took place while the road was being built. First the decision to turn Addis Alam into an important imperial religious centre was taken and then the Imperial residence was moved from Addis Alam to Gānnāt. The first decision seems to have been made in June or July of 1902. Once the imperial elfegn was allocated to become the church of Maryam, a new imperial residence, removed from the pressures of Addis Abāba, was deemed to be necessary. At first it was Holēta and then Ayn Alam and finally Gānnāt. Menilek was to use these residences as an

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3 F.O.915/4/6598, Memo on the Forestry Concession. In this area a gashsha equalled approximately 90 acres. Thus the area involved is a massive 1,800 acres.
4 See pp. 35ff. for the religious aspects of the new foundation.
6 ALāqa Lāmma, pp. 176-77.
7 Djibouti, 10.1.03.
9 Ibid. and ALāqa Kenfe, 7-10 Tex, 1895.
escape and relaxation from the bustle of Addis Abība as late as
October, 1909. ¹ In retrospect it is difficult to take seriously
the possibility that the capital might have been transferred from
Addis Abība, but many steps were taken at the time in Addis Alēm
to ensure permanency. The components for a water system were
imported² and a temporary Russian hospital set up.³ The Italians⁴
and the Russians⁵ set up Embassies there and Menilek divided the
city up into sāfār allocated to various nobles⁶ and appointed Haylā
Giyorgis as Nāggadras.⁷

Yet from the very beginning there was a great amount of
opposition from all sectors of the population of Addis Abība to
the shift to Addis Alēm so it is not surprising that Menilek's so-
journ there was so short-lived. Most bitter, perhaps, were the
large established merchants, owners of extensive permanent buildings
in the capital.⁸ Taytu was not enthusiastic about any change⁹ except
for the foundation of the church.¹⁰ The nobles and clergy too were

¹ W. D. 18, 10. 09.
² Djibouti, 24, 8. 01, p. 4.
³ Djibouti, 12, 7. 02, p. 4.
"Addistiena", 29, 12. 00.
⁵ N. S. Eth. 19, op. cit.
⁷ O. I. No. 33 (30. 5. 72), p. 22. The Sāfār are still pointed out today.
¹⁰ De Coppet, p. 497; Gēbrä Sellassé, p. 303.
eager only at the latter development and may have actually opposed the project of moving the capital from the beginning.

Needless to say, the foreign diplomatic representatives were opposed to the increased expenditure needed for new quarters and extra travel.

Land in Addis Ababa - The type of land tenure in the capital went through several stages often influenced by the stability and permanence of the capital. In the beginning when the city was first founded, Shāwa ruled the local Oromo balabbat through mālkāngma or representatives of the central Shāwa monarchy. As the city grew and more and more Shāwa and other Ethiopian nobles were given land by Menilek, the local Oromo land holders were dispossessed. However, the nobles were also to have little permanency of tenure in the years that followed, and could be removed at imperial whim.

After the Battle of Adwa when permanent diplomatic missions came from Europe Menilek tried to treat them and the traders who came in their wake in the same traditional manner. But they protested loudly and one of their arguments carried a fair amount of weight. This was the fact that although the land itself had no great value, the buildings or trees on it did. Those who lived in the centre of the capital, especially the merchants, wanted title deeds for the plots on which their stores stood. This led to a great change in the

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1 Alēkā Lāmma, pp. 176-7.
2 De Castro, op.cit.
3 T.0.1/37/p.249, Harrington to Maxwell, 25.11.00.
whole land tenure system in the capital which in the years to come was to effect large areas of the country. Title deeds, based on French models, were introduced and a large bureaucracy established to administer the new system.\footnote{A basic lack of reliable sources especially in the early period makes this topic particularly hard to document. There were also great restrictions on using the A/A, land charters archives (see Bibliography). Thus the brevity of this section. For changes in land tenure systems before Adwa see pp. 34 \& W.}

Some of the original Oromo landowners, it seems, were dispossessed before the Battle of Adwa, but the pace increased after the battle.\footnote{O.I. No. 29 (12.5.72) in Arusi. O.I. No. 30 (30.5.72) in Arusi, p.7.} Most of them were settled in the province of Arusi on land that was to come under the sway of Ras Berru.\footnote{Ibid.} At the time of the founding of Addis Alam the fate of the local Oromo was all too similar.\footnote{Ibid. and O.I. No. 33 (30.5.72), p.20. W.D.20.11.00.} According to Azzaj Wèrqañhā, "the galla Oromof farmers were kicked out to give place to their conquerors. To compensate the Gallas they have been given land elsewhere."\footnote{W.D.20.11.00. To estimate the number of people dispossessed has proved to be impossible and oral informants were not of great assistance. It seems unlikely that the numbers were large, for judging from}

Those who replaced the Oromo, mainly followers and vassals of Menilek, may not have had full security of tenure but their insecurity was not nearly so great as that of their predecessors. If they were powerful in their own right or high in Menilek's favour, they could influence any decision he might make. It was basically a problem of finding them a place to live near the palace and not like the Oromo sending them to a distant province like Arusi so that they should not remain near the city as an unstable and potentially rebellious element of the population.
However, exactly where people lived in Addis Ababa depended on the wishes of Menilek. At first there seems to have been no form of permanent land tenure. For instance, when the Russian medical mission arrived they were housed on Savouré's land and Stevénin had to move off land originally given him by Menilek.¹ He was then given land which had originally belonged to Ras Andargachchaw and Ras Mokriya. Ciccodicola, the Italian representative, lived in Ras Täsamma's house when he first came to Addis Ababa, and later moved to Savouré's² house having been given the land by Menilek and having bought the houses for 5,000 MTD.³ The initial British mission to Addis Ababa, that of Rodd, lived in another noble's house⁴ and later Menilek gave the legation land on the outskirts of the city.⁵ However, the French representative, Lagarde, received preferential treatment and was treated more as if he was part of the Ethiopian nobility.⁶ His house was built

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¹Pariset, p. 62. See also C.F. Rey, In the Country of the Blue Nile (London, 1927), pp. 183-6 (Henceforth Rey).
²ASMAI 38/4/39, Malvano to Governor of Asmara, Rome, 16.7.07, Annesso, promemoria for Agnessa.
³Ibid.
⁴See Gleichen, the map at the end. See map 2 p. 476.
⁵See pp. 80-81.
⁶ASMAI 38/4/39, op. cit.
for him by Menilek\(^1\) and he was given the meaningless non-
 Ethiopian title of "Duc d'Entotto".\(^2\) Neither the title nor the
 property were given in perpetuity.\(^3\) The other French missions
 which came in connection with the Marchand expedition were
temporarily housed in the empty residences of nobles.\(^4\) By
1900 the Russians had been given land for an embassy and a hospital\(^5\)
while the British had obtained land next door,\(^6\) where Menilek had
provided workers to build a series of mud houses.\(^7\) The majority
of the foreign representatives remained in these Addis Ababa
residences and the ones who later moved did so voluntarily after
the Addis Alâm interlude, largely for security reasons.\(^8\) Nor did
Ethiopian nobles have security of tenure for the lands that were
assigned to them by Menilek. For instance, Menilek got Abbata to
move from his original site between present Arat and Seddest
Kilo to a site beyond the Gabbuna river to make way for Abuna
Matewos's residence.\(^9\)

\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^2\) AP/GFS/132 dossier de Bonchamps misc. Ministère des Colonies to
Minister, Paris, 2.3.98. Since there is no such title in Ethiopia
one feels this was given by Menilek as a harmless attempt to
placate Lagarde's vanity.
\(^3\) ASMAI 38/1/4, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 10.12.98.
\(^4\) Ibid. and Djibouti, 20.5.99, p.2.
\(^5\) W.D.1.1.00 and ASMAI 38/1/4, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 10.12.98.
\(^6\) Ibid.
\(^7\) Ibid. and F.O. 1/34, Harrington to T. Sanderson, A/A, 16.11.98.
\(^8\) See pp. 72 ff.
Furthermore, after Menilek moved to Gannät and abandoned
the palace of Addis Alam he parcelled
out the land in the traditional manner to Addis Alam priests just
as he had previously given šaffār out to nobles. However,
at the same time land tenure in Addis Abäba was undergoing a signi-
ificant change. Thus immediately after the Battle of Adwa security
of tenure was dependent on the Emperor's favour. If a man was close
to the Emperor there was little to fear. Should a man be asked
to move, he would be given compensation in land elsewhere.
The resident European diplomats had been treated like powerful
Ethiopian nobles. Land and labour had been given to Italy's dip-
losmatic corps but they had also to pay the French trader Savouré
5,000 MTD as compensation for buildings already on the site of
which he had been dispossessed by the Ethiopian government.

Here then was the vital point destined to reappear again
and again when the city's land tenure was in question - the value
of the building extent or planned, necessitating long-range security
of tenure. The land itself in the early days had no great value.
The foreign representatives and influential Ethiopian nobles were
not overly concerned that their land in the city might be taken
from them. Their independent power bases and influence with the
Emperor were the best possible security. It was the merchants and
less influential men who were most concerned and took out the vast

3 ASMAI 38/4/39, Malvano to the Governor in Asmara, Rome, 16.7.07.
Annesso, Promemoria per Agnessa.
majority of the early land charters.  

In 1904 a turning point of sorts seems to have been reached when Captain England, representative of the International Ethiopian Railway Trust, paid about 2,000 MTD for some land and insisted on a deed. However, in reply, Menilek insisted that since Capt. England planned to build a fair amount, then an uninhabited region or addēbabay surrounding the region must be agreed upon. This was a fascinating and very unusual instance of attempted segregation in the capital. In this instance it was unsuccessful because the company had little capital with which to trade let alone build in the capital. Thus by 1904 when there was no longer a threat of a move to Addis Abām, England's and other's willingness to pay led to much speculation and many disputes. One dispute finally ended up in the court of the Afā Negus and Menilek passed final judgement saying: "Why do you fârânji /Foreigners/ quarrel about my land. Take your building material and leave. None of you shall have the land. The land is mine and, I will sell it afterwards to somebody if I want to."  

1See Addis Abāba Municipality Archives, Charters, Series I (No. 85-1228). The security of the French representative's land for instance can be clearly seen in ASMAI 38/1/4, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 23.5.98; ASMAI 38/3/28, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 20.5.03.  

2Missions-Tiding, Vol. 75, p.123. This was the first time land with a deed seems to have been paid for. An earlier example of this kind of transaction might be seen in the case of Let Marāfiya, the "resting place" of the Società Geografica Italiana. However, no deed was ever given only the permission to construct buildings. Unlike the later deeds, rest was not mentioned. See L. Traversi, Let-Marafia (Rome, 1941), pp. 51ff; also see the plate opposite p.96 for the text of Menilek's concession in Amharic.  


4See pp. 141-147.  

5Missions-Tiding, op. cit. I am very grateful to Mrs. Heßler for translating this passage and the others used and unused in this thesis from Missions-Tiding.
Thus in February 1907 it was prohibited to buy and sell land, a very unpopular decision with Europeans. To get land in the city one had to give a "present" to the Emperor and get in return the land as a personal gift.\(^1\) Nothing would be in writing. This decision, it should be remembered, would have particularly affected merchants, especially Arabs, Indians, Greeks and Armenians who had lent out money and/or liquor to Ethiopian residents, got mortgages in return and eventually foreclosed, taking over the land.\(^2\)

However, in October, 1907, a complete reversal took place. On October 27th an awaj of thirty-two clauses was promulgated dealing with the "Buying of Ereṣṭ in the City of Addis Abēba".\(^3\) It is, however, by no means sure how rigorously the law was to be applied. The price of the land, according to the decree, was to be established by the owner\(^4\) who could sell it at will.\(^5\) Then, the buyer would have to consult the government (māngest) over the measuring and mapping of the land.\(^6\) The Government would then register the land, include it in an overall cadastre /kadoser/ of the capital,\(^7\) and give the new owner a title deed establishing the land as rest

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. This is a document in my possession (Henceforth, The Buying of Ereṣṭ). The person who gave it to me asked that his name not be revealed. Corroboration as to its authenticity is given in: N.S.2th.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 18,8,08 and also in Biscese, pp. 67 ff. Because of its importance it deserves to be summarised in some detail.
4. The Buying of Ereṣṭ, articles I and II.
5. Ibid., article III.
6. Ibid., articles IV, V and VII.
7. Ibid., article VI.
The price of the land could in certain instances be paid gradually. However, the deed had to contain: the registry number, the names of the seller and buyer, the extent of the land, the structures on it, the borders, the names of the neighbours, the price of the land and the date on which it was sold. Furthermore, the government's seal had to be on the deed (at a cost of ten MTD) and 1/4 of the total worth of the land had to be paid in tax to the government. Article sixteen is particularly interesting and deserves to be quoted:

"Foreigners and foreign companies are forbidden to buy more than ten hectares. However, if the government wishes, it can permit them to buy land." Just as significant, if not more so, was article twenty establishing security of tenure:

"When the full price of the land is paid and the paper is done according to law, the owner can do as he wishes with the land. He can pass it, as a whole or half of it, on to his descendants; he can sell it or he can have it held as a guarantee to borrow money." Also, provision was made for government expropriation

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1 Ibid., article XI.  
2 Ibid., article IX.  
3 Ibid., article XI.  
4 Ibid., article XII. Each time the land was sold this process had to be repeated, see articles XIII and XIV. Articles XV, XVII, IX, XXI, XXII and XIII deal with fines, punishments and technicalities.  
5 Engedoch, literally "guests".  
6 Rey, pp. 183-184 has rather badly misrepresented this clause.  
7 Ibid., article XX.
and compensation for health\(^1\) and other reasons.\(^2\)

Inheritance played a large role in the law providing articles for a 2\(^0\)/o tax to be paid each time land was inherited.\(^3\)

Furthermore, rest would be reserved by the government for only thirty years in order to wait for descendants to present themselves; after this stipulated period the land would revert to the government.\(^4\)

Finally, perhaps the most revealing of all the articles (No. XXI) demonstrated the extent to which this awaj was indebted to French law. "If a dispute arises over rest, it shall be judged in accordance with the law of Ethiopia.\(^7\) If the law is not sufficient \(\text{i.e., if the case is very complex}\), the judge can ask for the Code Napoleon (XiiNapoliwonen Heg).\(^9\)

By August 1908, Brice was asking his superiors if the deeds stemming from the land charters were valid and whether they should be registered at the embassy. Each had the seal of Naggadrae Haylœ Giyorgis\(^6\) although their actual registration and daily administration was probably by then in the hands of Andarge Habtā Maryam.\(^7\) Nonetheless, Haylœ Giyorgis seems to have been the driving force

\(^1\)Ibid., article XX.

\(^2\)Ibid., articles XXV-XXVII.

\(^3\)Ibid., article XXIV.

\(^4\)Ibid., article XXIX and XXX. Foreigners were given more privileged treatment in article XXVIII.

\(^5\)N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 18.8.08.

\(^6\)Ibid. and see Addis Abāba Municipality Archives.

\(^7\)Ms. of the Dictionary of National Biography. Entry by Bairu Tafla.
behind the reforms. The largest number of charters were issued in the Arada or commercial district of the capital and were popular among foreigners and the commercial community. They had wanted the land tenure system changed so that they could have the security for it to be worthwhile to build permanent stone buildings. This, in effect, was a response to their demands. From 1905 the foreign Legations had begun building in stone and this must have provided a spur.

The Addis Ababa law of October 1907 was followed by another dealing this time with the whole empire. Slightly less than a year later it incorporated several elements from its predecessor and thus said that Addis Ababa's land laws had an influence far beyond its own limits. Its laws played not only a local but even an imperial role in Menilek's dominions. In all of this he seems to have had the advice of elders and foreigners, like Jacob Mar, Chefneux and Jaume.

However, by March 1909 the newly created system of land tenure was to be put in jeopardy by Taytu's "extravagant actions" in trying to gain political predominance. Nonetheless, the system continued

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1See pp. 132 ff.
2See pp. 316 ff.
3See Briscese, pp. 67 ff.
4Zekrä Negär, p. 71.
5Briscese, p. 66.
6Ibid., p. 68.
to function and a description of its mechanics shows how traditional and foreign personnel and procedures overlap.\textsuperscript{1} If an Ethiopian was given the land he could neither sell it nor give it away.\textsuperscript{2} First the Ligaba showed it\textsuperscript{3} and then a Greek Employee of the Azzaj measured it.\textsuperscript{4} An engineer, in this case an Armenian, then gave a certificate to the effect that the work was well and truly done,\textsuperscript{5} and then the deed of gift was duly entered by the assistant to the Sähafé Te'ezaz, Afâ Wârq.\textsuperscript{6} However, the Bäjerond had a right to question the proceedings.\textsuperscript{7}

Still the Addis Abâba law of 1907 was perhaps the most important in the capital's history. It not only gave Ethiopian and foreign landowners a great deal more security of tenure than they had ever had before,\textsuperscript{8} but it also clearly distinguished the city from the surrounding countryside in a way that had not been done ever before. A unique form of urban land tenure was established for the first time in Shäwa. The man most responsible for the law, Nâggadras Haylä Giyorgis, achieved a neat balance between traditional forms of land tenure (including the concept of rest) while leaning heavily

\textsuperscript{1}For this and the following see W.D.14.8.09-11.11.09.
\textsuperscript{2}W.D.14.8.09.
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{4}W.D.19.8.09, 24.8.09.
\textsuperscript{5}W.D.27.8.09.
\textsuperscript{6}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{7}Ibid. and 11.10.09. For explanation of all these offices see pp. 116-128, 135-142, 147-148, 151f.
on European precedents, in particular the Code Napoléon. It is true that Haylă Giyorgis fell from power soon after the law was promulgated and was not able to fully implement it. But after 1910 when he returned to power, his law was to have an influence not only in the capital but throughout the Empire.
II THE ORGANIZATION OF THE IMPERIAL PALACE AND ITS RELATION TO ADDIS ABABA

Introduction

The gebi or Imperial Palace was the centre of the imperial Ethiopian political and administrative system and was far more complex than can be revealed here. Only those offices which had a demonstrable influence and effect upon the capital are dwelt upon in detail, that is, the Azzaj, Naggadras and Bëjerond.

The creation of Menilek's cabinet in October 1907 had an influence more apparent than real. It is a convenient point from which to focus upon the institutions of the palace because most foreign and contemporary observers thought it a development of significance and used it as an occasion to describe the governmental system and the personalities involved. Later, Ethiopian commentators stressed its importance as a symbol of the westernization of the bureaucracy. However, no revolutionary change seems to have taken place then, although in the years following its establishment, certain offices gained more power and sophistication in the city. It simply marked one stage in the continuing changes of personnel and function of some of the offices described below, particularly in relation to the declining role of the many military figures in the capital's administration.

However, other themes recur in analysing the different offices of the imperial household: the importance of an office holder's dynastic ties and personal friendships; his personality and flexibility in dealing with endless court intrigues; the important role played by Menilek's sickness in deciding the way in which his responsibilities would be devolved and finally, the political miscalculation of Taytu in 1909-1910 and the shake-up this caused. Also Menilek was
able in the years before and during his illness to keep many important provincial appointments, like Haylä Giyorgis, near him and prevent them from building up an independent provincial power base. Thus the function of Addis Abäba might in some ways be compared to that of Versailles.

But other more general themes can also be discerned: the increasing pressure of the variegated population groups settling in the city and the different means by which they were governed and assimilated; the role of spokesmen in the household representing minorities in the capital and the role played by changes in land tenure.

The first group of offices that are dealt with were of largely local importance to the urban history of the capital (that is, the Azzoj, Näggadraeg, Käntiba, Bäjerond and some lesser officials). The second group (the Afä Negus, Sähaf'Tes'egez, Fitawrari, Ligi Mākwas and the advisers) are more commonly known for their imperial functions but they too played a large role in the capital's administration.

**Azzoj**

**Introduction** - The Azzoj was an old established post in Shäwa, and every important noble had one, or sometimes several. Basically, they were the officials who as the noble's representative administered by means of the household.¹ With enough initiative Menilek's Azzoj could become very powerful not only in the traditional context,

¹W.D.26.3.10 and 2.4.10.
as the actual administrators of Menilek's vast estates, but also as his personal representatives in the capital, especially when the Emperor was absent. Menilek's Azzaj quite neatly divide themselves into the traditional ones like Wältä Sadeq, who exercised customary prerogatives like dergo (hospitality) or lébashey (thief-catching); or men like Azzaj Gezaw who adapted themselves more completely to the changing circumstances of a growing city. They got more fully involved in public works projects in the capital, took over greater responsibility in dealing with foreigners and became responsible for a growing system of paying certain officials regular salaries in lieu of the traditional method of rewarding loyal followers with land. This practice, it should be emphasized, was very much in its infancy. Yet after Gezaw's fall in 1906, his new powers were inherited not by another Azzaj but also by a Maggadras, Hayla Giyorgis, an even more flexible bureaucrat than Gezaw. The implications of this change were to be very significant for the reform of land tenure and security precautions in the city. Yet many traditional functions of the office of Azzaj, dergo and lébashey continued under other Azzaj who carried on the office's traditional prerogatives. They were the symbol of civilian rather than military rule of the city, for none of them had ever been known for their military prowess.

Azzaj Wältä Sadeq and Azzaj Zämanuel - Wältä Sadeq's position as a traditional Azzaj was unique. After the Battle of Adwa he was probably no longer in constant attendance upon Menilek, on the contrary his appearance in Addis Abéba was an occasion of note. ¹ This is not

¹Djibouti, 23.12.99, p.3.
to say that he was out of favour, but the ageing Azzaj of Ifat
was entrusted with the task of bringing up Menilek's two surviving
male grandchildren, Wäsän Säggäd\(^1\) and Lej Iyasu.\(^2\) Both were to be
brought to Addis Abëba later and put directly under Menilek and Taytu's
care.\(^3\) But Wäldä Šadeq's links with Addis Abëba were more extensive
than this for not only did he rule Wälamo at a stage when its
labour was crucial to Addis Abëba,\(^4\) but also from 1906 he ruled
Gäja Shfä, south of the capital, where seasonal Gurage workers
stopped on their way to giving their required labour in the
capital.\(^5\) Already in 1905\(^6\) he was asking to be relieved of some
of his many activities, especially the guarding of political prisoners
and, then, in late February, 1909 he died\(^7\) and was replaced by
Nääggadrae Yegäzu who was only to retain the office for a short
time.\(^8\) However, it is Wäldä Šadeq who remains the archetype of
the Azzaj in oral tradition.\(^9\)

\(^1\)Djibouti, 25.7.03. Since "the child" was said to be 21 the reference
could hardly refer to anyone else.

\(^2\)De Castro, I, p.179. See also Journal of Ethiopian Studies, VI,
No. 1, for Bairu Tafia's biography of Wäldä Šadeq, pp. 123-25.
(Henceforth J.E.S., VI, No.1)

\(^3\)Ibid. and ASMAI 3/20/169, Martini to MAE, A/A, 7/1906.

\(^4\)ASMAI 38/4/33, Ciccodicolà to MAE, A/A, 24.8.06.

\(^5\)O.I.No. 8, p.4; O.I.No. 9 (26.11.71), p.9. One source corroborates
the other.

\(^6\)See Bairu Tafia, op. cit.

\(^7\)Semeur, V, p.545 (2/1909). (Henceforth Semeur).

\(^8\)Semeur, V, p.545 (2/1909); W.D. 2.4.09. N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon,
A/A, 3.3.09.

\(^9\)O.I.No. 17 (16.3.72), pp. 7-8. I was unable to get any further
clarification of the female symbolism surrounding the office.
"Azza)i Walda Sadeq ... was Azza)i of Ankobar. In
former times when Azza)i were appointed they used to
wear pantalons for women, a golden amulet and golden
ring worn on the leg... They (the clothes) were
those of women. Azza)i means leader (Alka) of women.
When an Azza)i supervised a gebêr then he dressed and
acted as a woman."

Exercised the Azza)i's traditional duties not only in
Ankobar but also in the Addis Ababa area. Another Azza)i of
traditional kwa was the official in charge of Taytu's household,
Azza)i Zamausel. 1 Twice he plays a role in Addis Ababa's history,
first when he was in charge of the construction of a new royal
residence at Bulga 2 and secondly when the important political
prisoner Dëjaszmach Abreha was imprisoned in his Addis Ababa home
after the battle of Korkum. 3 Otherwise, he was important only in
so far as the Queen's household assisted Menilek's in the adminis-
tration of the city. His influence was basically in Bulga but
because of his talents and the fact that he was highly trusted
he was given extra duties to perform in the Addis Ababa area, as
had been the case with Azza)i Walda Sadeq.

The Azza)i in Addis Ababa (1880-1910) - In contrast to these two
traditional Azza)i are the younger men who surrounded the Emperor
and later performed the functions previously exercised by their elders.
In the 1880s Azza)i Habte directed the royal household with a certain
"Ayeto Senkê" as his assistant. 4 However, Habte fell from power in

1W. D.3.2.00.
2W. D.3.2.00. See also pp. 91-94.
October 1886, and was soon replaced by Senké whose assistant was Habtā Maryam. Borelli having had unfortunate business contacts with Senké, thought he was "le type accompli d'un 'gentleman'" Shonais: doucereux dans les paroles, trahir et vindictif dans ses actes." Brought up by the Catholics, he was a former slave and when the Catholics were expelled from Ethiopia, was found to be of the Ethiopian Orthodox persuasion and was very close to Menilik. By 1891 there was another Azzaj, Bezzabbeh, and the flexibility of household is partially revealed by noting that Bezzabbeh rose from being head of the mad beṭ to the position of Azzaj. Before the Battle of Adwa, he seems to have been the most powerful Azzaj in constant attendance upon the imperial court and was influential for some time after the battle. However,

1Ibid., p.144 (4.10.86).
3Borelli, p.402 (17.6.88).
4Borelli, p.108 (24.7.86).
5BSGI Serie 3, Vol. 6 (1894), p.862.
6Or kitchen house, see glossary.
7Borelli, p.108 (23.7.86).
8Henri d'Orleans, p.197. Djibouti, 31.5.02 indicates a certain "Azage Betsabè" was given Gojam by Menilek. This would fit fairly well with the rise of his successor Gezaw but may well only be a reference to the son of Negus Täkl Haymanot. Whether these two personalities are actually one and the same person I have been unable to establish and would rather tend to doubt. See also, De Coppet, p.504, footnote 5. His name does not seem to have survived in oral tradition.
Bezzabbeh's successor, Azzaj Gezaw was nothing like the shadowy presence of his predecessor. Mondon was surely referring to him when he said:

"Les abyssins... prétendent que les azzaj ne sont jamais maigres ... les abyssins intendent par là que c'est leur bourse qui s'engraisse quand leur corps s'y refuse ... Je dois constater que j'ai permis mes amis des azzaj dont la complaisance laisse encore à désirer."¹

His position in the city was legendary² and during this period he was the most important figure in the administration of the city after the Emperor and, perhaps, Négradræ Haylæ Giyorgis. Whenever the Emperor moved from one place to another in the period 1899-1906³ it was Azzaj Gezaw who was "Kêtma Tábbaq" or protector of the city.⁴ Heruy, writing in the 1920s, even goes so far as to say that Gezaw was like a Kantiba.⁵

Already, soon after the battle of Adwa foreigners referred to him as "governor" of Addis Ababa and expected him to take charge of the Italian prisoners billeted there. He refused to have anything to do with them.⁶ One of his most troublesome tasks seems to have been the finding of housing, on behalf of Menilek, for visitors, especially important people staying temporarily or permanently in

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¹Le Temps, 25.3.98.
³In March 1899 Dégazmach Haylæ Maryam died who had previously exercised this function (Djibouti, 1.4.99). And in 1906 Gezaw fell from favour (N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 9.4.09).
⁵Heruy Yäleywät Tarik, p.96. See below, pp. 134-137.
⁶Fariset, pp. 61-2.
the capital. He was in charge of pay negotiations for people working for the Emperor, and even got "wroth" at Azzaj Warqenäh for "settling with the Emperor during his Gezaw's absence". He was responsible for Ras Darge's tomb, and also as a ruler of Gëja Sëfër, the source of much of the seasonal Guragé labour of the city.

In short this man, some forty years, was a classic example of the importance of the individual, a personality in Ethiopian political life, rather than an office or the functions of that office. Because he was trusted and favoured by the Emperor he was given different administrative responsibilities. Thus when he fell from favour in early 1906, his responsibilities were divided up among a number of different Azzaj (Mëttäfariya, Abba Tëmsas and Haylé) and also Näggadra Haylë Giyorgis. None of the Azzaj were to rise quite to the heights he had attained. Ironically, only a Näggadra was to do so. Despite his fall, however, two years later Azzaj Gezaw, after being governor of the important province of Tëgulët, was to return to a position of responsibility in the Imperial Palace and in April 1909 was appointed Minister of Public Works.

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1Ibid. and pp. 62-3. W.D.19.2.00, 9.2.01 and 9.8.09.
2W.D.12.5.00. It concerned payment of a salary.
3W.D.6.5.00.
4O.I.No. 8, p.4.
5W.D.27.1.00.
6N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 9.4.09. Heruy, YëHeywät Tarik, p.96. The former source indicates that he had fallen three years earlier.
7See pp. 128-136.
Of those who replaced him in 1906 Mattafäriya seems to have been the most important. Like Azzaj Gezaw he was honoured by being included among the biographies of important Ethiopian personalities\(^1\), but unlike Gezaw is named in Gëbrä Sellasé's history\(^2\) as well. He started off relatively humbly, it seems, as a shambël\(^3\) for Sëhafé Te'ez az Gëbrä Sellasé, and was fortunate enough to be chosen by Menilek as baldáräba\(^4\) for Lagarde. This in turn led to his becoming Balamwal\(^5\) and Tëjj Asallafi.\(^6\) Finally, in 1906 he was made Yëgebi Menister.\(^7\) All these titles revealed a steadily increasing influence in the palace. In the long run he, more than any other Azzaj in Menilek's court, can be said to have taken Azzaj Gezaw's place, although in February 1908 he was still referred to as an Asallafi.\(^8\) Shortly after, with his official acceptance into the Council of Ministers,\(^9\) he was given the

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\(^1\) Heruy, YëHeywät Tarik, p. 7, for this and the following.

\(^2\) De Coppet, pp. 528 and 621.

\(^3\) See Guidi, 423—thus probably a cavalry office.

\(^4\) Guidi, 316, "procuratore". This was, surely, a post from which a man could expect to rise to higher things since it involved acting, especially in the case of a foreigner, essentially as the intermediary in all the foreigner's dealings with the imperial court. Thus, a man like Mattafäriya would have become thoroughly acquainted with all the major personalities of the court in carrying out Lagarde's business as representative for the French government.

\(^5\) Guidi, 312.

\(^6\) Guidi, 417 and 830.

\(^7\) Heruy, YëHeywät Tarik, p. 7. for this and above.

\(^8\) Semeur, IV, p. 355 (2/1908).

\(^9\) Ibid. and De Coppet, p. 621.
more prestigious title of Azza.i. The "Doctor Controversy" of 1909 made quite clear the extent to which Mättafáriya had to be considered one of the members of Empress Taytu's faction. Dr. Steinkühler's memo of 31.7.09, in an attack on the Empress, names both him and Bäjerond Mulugêta, as does the semi-official publication of the correspondence of the affair by Taytu. Despite the exoneration of the Ethiopians concerned in this affair (at least in Ethiopian eyes) Mättafáriya's and thus Taytu's hold on Menilek's household was loosened. In October or November 1909 Mättafáriya was given the Ministry of Public Works and Bäjerond Gälé was made Azza.i of the gebbi under Bitwaddad Le'ul Süggud. Mättafáriya as a result took a much more active role in administering Addis Abába's roads and water supply.

Other Azza.i of note in Menilek's household at this time besides Gezaw, Mättafáriya and Gälé were Azza.i Abba Tënasas and Azza.i Haylé. They seem, after the fall of Gezaw, to have taken over the administration of dergo.

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1 N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 2.12.08.
2 See pp. 56 4.
3 N.S.Eth.9, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 3.8.09. Encl. 8, Scheller to Brice, Steinkühler Memo, A/A, 31.7.09.
4 Le Docteur Nouvellement Venu (Dire Dawa, 1909).
5 W.D.25.11.09. I have taken this as being a more reliable source than the cabinet list in the French Archives (N.S.Eth.55, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 4.1.10. Annexe note.) For although Mättafáriya is called "Intendant du Palais", Námibú is named as Afî Negus despite having died several years previously. See also Merab, Vol. II, p.87.
6 W.D.10.2.10 and Heruy, YHHeywHêt Tarik, p.?
7 ASMAI 3/20/170, Martini to MAE, Rome, 4/1907; ASMAI 3/20/170, Ciccodicola to MAE, Rome, 9/1907.
Dergo - One of the most important traditional functions of the Azzaj was the distribution of dergo, an institutionalized form of hospitality. Basically it was a manifestation of the ruler's generosity to visiting dignitaries and soldiers, be they Ethiopian or foreign.¹ These supplies were generally given once a week, but during the famine Menilek was hard put to supply even his few European visitors the amount of produce they had hitherto received.² It was the pressure of supplying dergo during the severe famine shortages of 1889-1892 that may well have forced Menilek into his land reforms and the Ghibzenna charters of June 1894.³ Dergo was administered at first by the Azzaj of Ankobur Waldi Sadeq.⁴ However, in 1891, Menilek's Azzaj in Addis Ababa, Azzaj Bezzabbeh, was carrying out this function.⁵ After the Battle of Adwa in February, 1900, Azzaj Gezaw was in charge of its distribution,⁶ but by at least 1907 he had been replaced by Abba Tamsas and Haylé.⁷ But dergo after Adwa had to be expanded

¹Maschov, p. 862. See also Guidi, 661 and Borelli, p. 105 (21.7.86) and p. 108 (21.7.86).
²Ibid. Salimbeni Diary, p. 103 (9.2.90) and p. 106 (22.7.90). Also C. Zeghi, "Pietro Antonelli e l'ambiente sciocco del diario inedito di Luigi Cicognani", in Nuovi Problemi (1935) entry for 11.6.86. (Henceforth, Zeghi, Antonelli and Cicognani Diary).
³See J.E.S., X, No. 1, pp. 67-70 for the text of the charters. See also below, pp. 146 ff.
⁴Zeghi, Antonelli and Cicognani Diary, 10.7.89.
⁵See pp. 120-121.
⁶W.D.16.2.00.
⁷ASMAI 3/20/170, Ciccodicola to MAE, Rome, 9/1907.
because of all the foreign missions which came to the capital and they put a great deal more pressure on Menilek's resources.\footnote{See pp. 479, 739.} One result of these pressures was that a hotel was built to accommodate foreigners.\footnote{See pp. 206-207.} An example of what was involved in the distribution of dergo was given by Skinner, head of the American Mission to Menilek, "ten steers and fifty sheep and goats" were sent to maintain him and his followers.\footnote{Skinner, pp. 57-9.} This was on top of the dergo required by most of the palace workers\footnote{Mérab, Vol. II, p.19. O.I.No. 1, (5.12.72), pp. 5-9.} in time of sickness and in health as well as provisions for funeral rites.\footnote{O.I.No. 1, op.cit.}

**Lébashay** - Another traditional institution under the jurisdiction of the Azzaï was that of the lébashay. This was a Shawa of an investigative procedure for discovering robbers and thieves.\footnote{N.S.Eth.62, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 14.12.08. O.I.No. 14 (5.3.72), p.4. O.I.No. 18 (17.3.72), p.18.} It was equivalent to an early police force\footnote{N.S.Eth.60, Le Francais "Chez Menilek" by Gaston Stiegler, 22.3.02.} and the privilege of running the system under the supervision of the palace and probably the Azzaï was invested in a certain number of families who passed it on from generation to generation.\footnote{Ibid. and O.I.No. 21 (11.4.72), p.25.} Europeans living in Addis Ababa were not only violently opposed to it but were also horrified
by it and several diplomatic incidents concerning it occurred both before\(^1\) and after\(^2\) they protested against it.\(^3\) Claims were periodically made that the institution had been extinguished\(^4\) but Amharas had a fondness for it and believed that it was fully effective.\(^5\) It does not seem to have been suppressed in Addis Ababa until the Italian Occupation.\(^6\) But minority groups were often victimized or taken advantage of by lôbeshay, especially the Gurage,\(^7\) Oromo,\(^8\) and Catholics.\(^9\) The institution was centred on Addis Ababa and directed from there\(^10\) and spread throughout many provinces including: the Ankôber area,\(^11\) Wîllo,\(^12\) Shàwa west of Addis Ababa,\(^13\) Gojam,\(^14\) Begêmdar,\(^15\) Wîllàga,\(^16\) Wîllamo, Sidamo and Haràrgà.\(^17\) The institution of the lôbeshay, then, was significant

\(^{1}\) N.S.Eth. 60, op. cit.
\(^{3}\) Governor Côtes Français des Somalis to Minister, 2.8.08.
\(^{4}\) N.S.Eth. 65, Ministère de Commerce to Minister, Paris, 16.6.06.
\(^{5}\) Annexe Trouillet to Ministère de Commerce, A/A, 3.5.06. Annexe,
Pétition with 81 signatures, n.d., p.67.
\(^{7}\) F.O. 371/192, op. cit.
\(^{9}\) O.I. No. 22 (17.4.72), p.22. O.I. No. 10 (4.2.72), p.15.
\(^{10}\) O.I. No. 8, p.2.
\(^{11}\) O.I. No. 14 (5.3.72), p.4.
\(^{12}\) Pariset, pp. 79-80.
\(^{14}\) O.I. No. 40, op. cit.
\(^{15}\) O.I. No. 3, op. cit.
\(^{16}\) O.I. No. 14, op. cit.
\(^{17}\) O.I. No. 10, op. cit.
\(^{18}\) Ibid.
\(^{19}\) O.I. No. 16 (16.3.72), p.6.
in that it seems to have been almost a government within a government. Appointments of the lébashay alğa who administered this system of "thief catching" throughout the various provinces mentioned above were made from the capital by a man directly under Menilek. These alğa throughout the capital and the provinces would have had to know about all the local intrigues and all the likely thieves in order for the lébashay to be an effective and believable institution. Thus, potentially, they must have been an extremely valuable intelligence network throughout the empire.

One further function of the gebi in Addis Ababa and probably under the jurisdiction of the Azzaj was to reserve for lost animals. The law was very strict and a payment in salt and sometimes in MTD was required. It was effective not only for various animals but also for slaves, both in the capital and in the areas surrounding the city.

Näggadras

The Näggadras's functions have been described as being threefold: chief merchant (after the Emperor), civil magistrate and head of the local customs. For, like the Azzaj, he represented civilian rather than military rule. Yet all this misses a significant

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2 W.D.30.1.00.
3 Mérab, op. cit. s. a. l. q. 12 4 4.
4 Zekra Nágür, p.6. The Azzaj is dated 20 Mákabit, 1900 E.C.
5 T.0.371/192/19257, Clerk's General Report of 1906, 11.6.07. For his economic role see pp.113-114 and for his role in the judiciary see pp.310-329.
role of the most important Năggadras of Ethiopia, Haylă Giyorgis.\(^1\)
In the end his power and influence in the city were dependent upon
his political standing and more especially on how much he could count
on the Emperor's favour. Traditionally the Năggadras was part of
the Imperial household but the degree to which he held the Emperor's
trust put him in a privileged position. Within the city he had
special jurisdiction over the Arada or market and controlled it as
a noble controlled a Shfær assigned to him by the Emperor.\(^2\) Should
labour be required by the Emperor in any part of the city he might
be ordered to obtain it from people in the market.\(^3\)

While the Năggadras was quite clearly predominant in the economic
sphere,\(^4\) the growth in his political power was slower and, besides
being dependent upon the favour of the Emperor, was linked with the
varying fortunes of the Azzaj of the gebi, particularly Azzaj Gezaw\(^5\)
and with the increasing complexity of the administration of the
capital. After Gezaw's fall Haylă Giyorgis gained more and more power,
especially as Menilek declined in health and could no longer personally
follow all the details of the city's administration. However, in
theory the Năggadras was still a subordinate of the Azzaj, especially
with regard to the administration of the police.\(^6\) However, unlike

\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^2\) O. I. No. 17 (16.3.72), p.33.
\(^3\) De Castro, Vol. I, p.236.
\(^4\) See pp. 310-329 for his role in the economic life of the capital.
\(^5\) See pp. 124-127 for the role of Azzaj Gezaw.
the other officials of the palace, he more than anyone else grew in power with the growth of the city.

After Haylâ Giyorgis had become Nâgadraz Aggedâw's assistant about 1890, he took over the administration of the Addis Abîba customs in about 1894. Yet he does not seem to have become a personage of any great importance until after the death of Aggedâw in about August 1900. Aggedâw's power rested largely on the fact that he came from an important and prestigious trading family of Gondâr a very important centre in the north. Many of his family and other merchants from Gondâr settled in a single area of the city, called Gondârâ Sâfar and Haylâ Giyorgis as the succeeding Nâgadraz inherited control over the area, adding to his political power in the city. By 1902 he was considered to be powerful enough to be given one of the more substantial of the bribes, 600 Lire, handed out by the Italian diplomatic representative who was attempting to restore the prestige and power the Italians had lost at Adwa. At about the same time Menilek was busy building a new short-lived capital, whose oldest inhabitants still remember Haylâ Giyorgis as being one of the most important

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1 Mérab, vol. II, p.82. According to this source he was the son of a döbtâra.
2 N. S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 27.10.09. See pp. 34û-341 for his role in collecting customs revenue.
3 W. D. 3.4.00, Azza, Wärqêlah last saw him in hospital. O. I. No. 25 (19.5.72) said he died in August/September of that year.
4 W. D. 29-30.3.1900, 3.4.00, 4.10.00. O. I. No. 25 (19.5.72).
5 Ibid. and O. I. No. 27 (17.5.72).
6 ASMAI 38/2/17, no signature, or date, but was between files marked 29.1.02 and 27.1.02.
figures in that city's affairs. Shortly afterwards he was contributing towards the cost of buildings, bridges and churches in the capital, the bulk of the cost being borne by the Emperor. Thus from 1900 until 1905, Haylaz Giyorgis's influence in the political sphere was slowly growing but his basic source of power was still economic. In 1906 two unrelated developments advanced his political prospects and brought him much closer to Menilek. First of all, Azzaj Gezaw, previously Menilek's right hand man in the city, fell from favour and was exiled to the provinces. From this point onwards Haylaz Giyorgis's dealings with foreigners increased dramatically and soon afterwards a new land charter system was instituted for the city. Among the many western educated Ethiopians who may have become one of Haylaz Giyorgis's assistants at this time was Andarge.

Haylaz Giyorgis was also charged to restore order in the capital after the death of Ras Makonnen. For during the frenzy of the mourning for this important figure, the Addis Ababa market was pillaged and Haylaz Giyorgis was put in charge of restoring order, which he did both quickly and efficiently. In the future his loyal

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1. O.I.No. 33 (30.5.72), p.22. He also seems to have maintained control over the city afterwards, ibid.
2. Ilg Papers KB 13/p.138, Compte de Travaux, signed by Ilg, A/A, 10.5.05.
7. See Dictionary of National Biography, Ms. entry by Bairu Tafka for Andarge. This Ms. is at the I.E.S. A/A.
retainers, the Arada Žibigaına, were to play an increasingly large role in the maintenance of security, not only in the market but also in various other parts of the city. Furthermore, Menilek increasingly entrusted him with difficult legal cases, especially those involving foreigners. Thus when the Italians were handing out various medals on the occasion of Martini's visit to the capital in April 1907 he was included in the second rank of important figures, preceded only by the most important nobles of the land and the head of the Church.

In October 1907 he was appointed to Menilek's cabinet as Minister of Commerce and Foreign Affairs. The British and the Italians objected strenuously to his appointment calling him "corrupt" and an "intriguer". They wanted to deal directly with the Emperor but this was to prove impossible after the illness which increasingly incapacitated him. Haylä Giyorgis's power was such that he was to be influential in trying to prevent the return of the British representative, Harrington, to Ethiopia. In 1906 he is described

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1Ibid. and p. 84A.
3ASMAI 3/20/170, Martini to MAE, Rome, 4/1907.
4ASMAI 38/4/38, Colli to MAE, Amesso, A/A, 30.10.07.
5N.S. Eth. 1, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 27.10.07, p. 174. F.0.371/193/35571/36988, Hohler to Grey, 30.10.07.
F.0.371/op. cit.
7ASMAI 38/4/38, Colli to MAE, A/A, 30.10.07.
8See pp. 474, 72A.
9F.0.371/193/38783, Hohler to Grey, A/A, 30.10.07. There seems to be no proof of the British charge that Haylä Giyorgis was in the pay of the French, at least in the volumes I covered in the Quai d'Orsay. For former, see F.0.371/193/35571/36988, Hohler to Grey, 30.10.07; for latter, see Bibliography, pp. 480 n.
as being the "principal merchant, Civil Magistrate, chief of the Customs, and, ... head of the police" as well as being high in Menilek's favour, although it was thought that he could not last long in power.¹

Soon after the first cabinet meeting of July, 1907² the degree by which some power was delegated to the cabinet after Menilek's heart attack,³ became clearer. First of all, Haylå Giyorgis replaced Dâjazmach Joti in some western provinces because of the latter's maladministration.⁴ However, Haylå Giyorgis never seems to have gone out to any of these provinces for an extended period; on the contrary, he spent the greater portion of his time in Addis Abåba. Thus he could not build up an independent power base in the provinces. While in the capital, the Nâggadras took French advice on the reform of the police force⁵ and the division of ministerial responsibility between his ministry (that of Commerce and Foreign Affairs) and the ministries of Finance, and Agriculture, on problems concerning monopolies,⁶ and power of the purse strings.⁷

³Ibid.
⁴N.S.Eth.1, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 30.7.08, Incl. Edit Impérial, 25.7.08.
⁵N.S.Eth.1, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 8.8.08, p.234.
⁶N.S.Eth.1, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 8.8.08, p.234.
⁷N.S.Eth.1, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 26.8.08, p.251.
Again with French advice but this time also with the assistance of some of Menilek's old advisers,¹ Haylā Giyorgis reformed the method of registering and making deeds for land in the city, reversing the previous policy.² It seems clear that foreign influence was greatest in the two areas in which Haylā Giyorgis was most involved, commerce and the running of the city.

By now Haylā Giyorgis had reached a high point in his career and his power began to clash with that of the Empress. By October rumours were circulating that he would soon lose his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs³ but in December he was still actively discharging his duties as a judge in legal tangles in the city and also functioning as Foreign Minister.⁴

But during the early months of 1909 the Nāggadras accompanied the Emperor on his pilgrimage to Dābrā Libanos,⁵ continuing actively as Minister⁶ and adding two new provinces to his personal domains.⁷ Upon the court's return, to reassure the capital's population, fearful of instability during the Emperor's absence, a proclamation was promulgated in April, 1909 reorganizing the zabāngna (guards) or the police force of the city:

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¹ Heruy, Yāḥeywat Tarik, p.42.
² See pp. 108 R. N.S.Bth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 18.8.08.
³ Municipality archives, Series I.
⁴ Ibid.
⁶ N.S.Bth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 2.12.08.
"Formerly everyone claimed to be a zabrängna. Henceforth I [Menilek] will give the zabrängna who are guarding the city night and day registration numbers, a flag, and a cap with emblems. You are now bound by that law."1

But his position was becoming increasingly precarious. By February his rival Nàggadras Yegazu had been given the prestigious title of Azzãj of Anbãbür2 and in the same month Haylā Giyôrgis had to reverse his policy towards the French regarding the railway because of the increasing pressure of Empress Taytu's faction.3 Opposition to him gained momentum4 until in September 1909 he was replaced in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Habtâ Giyôrgis, the Minister of War.5 Taytu was now reaping revenge for his attacks on her during the "Doctors controversy" and Taytu's niece whom he had only just recently married, hastened to abandon him.6 Furthermore, all his "shady" financial dealings were to be investigated by his archenemy the Minister of Finance, Bëjerond Mulugêta, a person close to Taytu.7

Then on December 24, 1909 he was put in chains and deprived of the Ministry of Commerce.8 The next day "there was a great

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1 Kenfe Diary, p. 22, 4 Miyazya, 1901 E.C.
3 N.S.Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 10.3.09.
4 ASMAI 54/34/141 (1909), Colli to MAE, A/A, 8.4.09. N.S.Eth. 9, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 23.7.09, pp. 220-222, and 3.8.09, pp. 227 and 236. N.S.Eth. 10, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 2.9.09, p. 3.
5 N.S.Eth. 2, Telegram No. 66, Brice to Minister, Djibouti, 21.9.09, p. 254.
6 N.S.Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 2.10.09, pp. 157-8.
7 Ibid. and F.O. 371/597/38230, Hervey to Grey, 24.9.09.
demonstration and joy at the release of Haile Gorgis. All the merchants ... became guarantee for him. But he had been replaced at the Ministry of Commerce by Yegäsu. The Empress wanted to get at the money lent to Haylä Giyorgis by her husband and get an account of the monies that he had acquired because of his position as head of the Addis Abēba customs.

However, Haylä Giyorgis was restored to power in the Ministry of Commerce as soon as Taytu's power was broken on March 21, 1909. Thus the hiatus was brief, lasting only from December 24, 1909 to March 28, 1910. He then rose to new heights and greater influence during the rule of Ras Tāḥāmma and Lej Ḫiyāsu. During the latter's reign he became one of the most powerful men in the realm.

Kāntiba

Nebulous as many of the early offices of the city were, the role of Kāntiba in the early history of the city may well surpass all the others in its obscurity. The first Kāntiba or mayor of Addis Abēba was Wālād Ṣādeq who was appointed by Menilek soon after the death of his master Ras Ḥārē at the end of March 1900. He was at this time appointed Kāntiba of both Addis Abēba and Gondār, succeeding Kāntiba Gābru in the latter post. His activities and the functions of the office of Kāntiba in Addis Abēba remained obscure.

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1 W.D.24 and 25.12.09.

2 See section on the Ṣaḥīḥa al-Qādirah and his economic functions, pp. 80-334. Also pp. 318. for this and following.

3 Merab II, p.89. (He is not to be confused with Azzai Wālād Ṣādeq.) Heruy, Ṭāḥāmra Ṭarik, p.74.

4 W.D.23 and 25.3.00. The Ras died between these two days.

5 Heruy, Ṭāḥāmra Ṭarik, p.74.

until his appointment to Menilek's cabinet as Minister of Agriculture in 1907.\(^1\) Earlier accounts also indicated that he was also to take responsibility for public works.\(^2\) The only evidence of his having taken an active role in the construction of any public works were his efforts directed towards the completion of the Veterinary Institute in Gulêlê in February 1909.\(^3\) His role as Minister of Agriculture, somewhat of a misnomer, seems to have been more active. For as "a respectable, honest and intelligent man, and one who has had a considerable amount of intercourse with Europeans"\(^4\) and as a man responsible for mining and forest concessions\(^5\) he would have been kept very busy by the many concession hunters frequenting Menilek's court. However, he never seems to have acquired the amount of power that came the way of Haylâ Giyorgis in this area and his influence here remained small.\(^6\)

Kêntibâ Wêldû Şâdeq and the offices he held were largely of a traditional cast. He married into Ras Darge's family,\(^7\) had some responsibility in the bestowing of dergo\(^8\) and when the Emperor made

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\(^{2}\)ASMAI 38/4/38, Colli to MAE, A/A, 30.10.07.

\(^{3}\)N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 5.2.02.


\(^{5}\)Merab, II, p.89.

\(^{6}\)F.O.371/193, op.cit.

\(^{7}\)Heruy, YâHâywât Târik, p.74.

\(^{8}\)Semeur III, pp. 274-5. See also pp. 139^k^.
his pilgrimage to Débré Libanos, faithfully accompanied him.  

One can only conclude by saying that before 1910 the Kantiba of Addis Ababa in no way rivalled the role of the Azzaj or Nëggadras in the running of the city. Rather he was a minor official who had been rewarded for faithful service to the Emperor's uncle, Ras Darge, and showed neither great initiative nor gross ineptitude. It was only after 1916, during the Regency of the future Emperor Haylă Sellasé that the office of Kantiba became a powerful one in the administration of Addis Ababa.  

Bäjerond  

Within the palace, the Bäjerond were, perhaps, the third most important officials after the Azzaj and the Ñäggadras. His functions were more varied than those of the Ñäggadras and depended more on the personality of the holder of the office. Originally, the Bäjerond acted largely as the treasurer but his functions rapidly broadened in the context of the growth of Addis Ababa, so that by 1906 he was being described as "Menilek's Confidential Attendant and Treasurer". Usually there were two of them, but the individuals holding the office, their connections and personalities, generally determined which would be the most influential and how the power of this office would stand in comparison to the Azzaj and Ñäggadras. Like them, the Bäjerond adapted to some of the needs of the growing urban complex, especially in the

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1 N.S., Eth., 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 2.12.08.  
2 Kantiba Nïsibu Zëmanu'él was particularly well regarded. See the Ms. of a biography in the I.E.S. Gullelat, "YädHjazmach Nïsibu Zëmanu'él Tarik".  
3 T.0.371/192/19257, Clerk's General report of 1906.
area of the administration of the city's land charters, but in the end the Bäjerond did not have as big an impact as the Azzai and Næssa'ras on the growth of the city.

Balcha who had held the office of Bäjerond before the Battle of Adwa continued to hold it until at least 1898, at which time he had already begun to administer provinces from afar. One year before Balcha had made himself very unpopular with the merchant community by asking for some money back from one of Addis Ababa's foremost merchants, M. Savouré. He would not pay, was evicted from his land and only at Menilek's personal intervention were things ironed out at Balcha's expense. He remained in Menilek's favour but his usefulness as Menilek's intermediary in monetary affairs with the merchant community must have been greatly weakened. By 1900 he was governor of Sidamo and resident in the province.

An eight year gap follows until a Bäjerond is again mentioned in the sources. At that time a certain Mulugèta was awarded an Italian medal, something that would not have happened had he not been a man of standing. During this interim period an official

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2. Le Temps, 25.3.1898, dispatch by Mondon.
4. N.S.Eth., Billol to Hanotaux, Rome, 7.7.97, Annexe, La Tribuna, 6.7.97.
5. Le Temps, 25.3.98.
7. ASMAI 3/20/170, Martini to MAE, Rome, 4/1907.
8. Ibid.
who may have shared with Mulugéta some of the duties performed by
Balcha was Shalkca, later Kitawrari Bisa. However, Mulugéta,
a man of good family, seems to have been particularly close to
Menilek and was one of only a few people who had complete freedom
of access to him. Thus in 1906 he is described as being
"Menelik’s Confidential Attendant and Treasurer", a position which
he used to his own financial advantage to assist foreigners to
get "favours and concessions". On the 23rd of October he was
appointed to the new cabinet appointed by Menilek with his old
title of Bajerond. Soon thereafter he was being called Minister
of Finance by the resident French minister and later יִוואלנצב
Ministär or "Minister of money" by Ethiopians.

After Menilek’s stroke in 1908 Mulugéta’s influence increased
another notch when he became the constant personal attendant upon
the king during his illness, for proximity to the Emperor meant
power. This led to Mulugéta’s successfully challenging the Minister
of Finance’s right to enquire into the financial transactions of
the Minister of Commerce, ለገgunakan ከይላ ጽጝርጌስ, a right which

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1 W.D.221.00. See also Merab, Vol. II, pp. 89-90, who says he was
Menilek’s treasurer.
2 Heruy, Yawiyyat Tarik, p.11.
4 F.O.371/192/19257, Clerk’s General Report of 1906. See also
W.D.16.8.09 for a soap monopoly. For a rubber concession see
F.O.371/594/147/44989, Hervey to Grey, 17.11.09.
5 N.S.,Eth.1, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 27.10.07. Encl. Menilek to
Klobukowski, A/A, 23.10.07. For the French text. ASMAI 38/4/38,
Colli to MAE, Anneso, A/A, 30.10.07. For Amharic text.
6 N.S.,Eth.1, Klobukowski to Pichon, NAE, A/A, 27.10.07, p.174.
7 De Coppet, p.528; Gabru Sellasé, p.334. The degree to which the
traditional concepts of the office of Bajerond survived and the
degree to which it changed when foreigners expected the Minister of
Finance to exercise certain other duties is a fascinating problem
outside, perhaps, the scope of this thesis.
8 N.S.,Eth.1, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 28.8.08. Encl. 1, Vitalien to Brice,
27.8.08.
had never existed before. All of which led the French diplomatic representative to be sanguine about the possibilities of Ministries along western lines in Ethiopia.¹ Soon afterwards he was challenging the position of the powerful Minister of War, Habté Giyorgis, and holding up payment from the palace for armaments.² By this time it was becoming increasingly clear that Bajéroud Mulugéta was in charge of running the only hospital in Addis Ababa³ and also of European workers in the Imperial Palace, especially those involved in the traction engine concession.⁴ Furthermore, he was in the thick of negotiations over who was to be Menilek's doctor.⁵ A further boost to his power was his close relationship to Empress Taytu and his involvement in what came to be known as the German Doctor Affair. Mulugéta along with Azzaj Mëttäfāriya⁶ was accused of attempting to poison Menilek.⁷ However, he successfully survived this crisis⁸ largely because Menilek strongly

¹N.S.Eth.1, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 26.8.08. N.S.Eth.5, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 3.1.09.
²N.S.Eth.5, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 12.11.08.
⁴W.D. 17.5.09.
⁵W.D. 6.7.09.
⁶See above, pp. 123ff.
⁷N.S.Eth. 9, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 3.8.09.
defended him and was not in serious trouble again until the fall of Taytu. Of all the important adherents of Taytu he seems to have been the most important one to survive her fall from power.

Another Bäjerond of the same period was Bäjerond Gälé who seems to have been involved in the administration of the land charter system in the city. In November 1909 he was made an Azzaj of the Gebi under Le'ul Süggūd.

Afa Negus

The Afa Negus, or the equivalent of a chief justice, in comparison with the three major offices so far discussed (the Azzaj, Naggadras and Bäjerond) seems to have changed and evolved least in relation to the growth of Addis Abāba. Much of this must have been due to the eminence of the two men who held the office for most of the period under consideration Afa Negus Nāsībū, and Fitawrārī Habtā Giyorgis. The 1907 creation of judicial districts in Addis Abāba was a significant development, but judicial procedure and the close links of the office with the Emperor remained unchanged and this traditional office seems, curiously enough, to have had nothing whatever to do with the reform of the city's land tenure and the coming of the new land charters. The traditional judicial system operating in the city seems to have remained largely unchanged throughout the period, 1886 to 1910.

1W.D. 2.3.10.
2U.S. Dept. of State 884.80/9866/44, Love to Dept. of State, A/A, 30.3.10.
3W.D. 11.10.09.
4W.D. 25.11.09. What his role and influence was are unclear, but he may have been the Bäjerond more concerned with the daily administration of the palace while Mulugeta was in overall command and dealt more with foreigners.
After the Battle of Adwa, and more likely than not before it, the Afâ Negus was "by comparison with his predecessors... looked upon by the Abyssinians as a most upright judge." But this is not to say that he did not inspire fear and have a reputation for being cruel and displaying a tendency to accept bribes.

The judicial hierarchy in the city was clearly delineated, but since a reorganization was to take place upon Mâsibu's death the system existing before his demise will be gone into here.

"In general all disputes are settled as far as possible on the spot. This sense of the inconveniences of the law's delays is so strong that in any question which may suddenly arise the disputants can call on the first passerby to settle their quarrel; moreover, the latter can not refuse to hear the case, and his decision is recognized as binding. If he considers the case as beyond his competence, he must accompany the litigants to some official who can decide it."^4

The next level in the city was "the local judge or judges of the Quarter (in the case of civilians) or by the respective chiefs in the case of soldiers."^5 No records were kept, but there was a "miserable" government jail where the prisoners had to depend on family and friends for food. If the case was commercial in nature or occurred in the market the relevant official was the Mëggadras. A case could then be appealed to the Afâ Negus and

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3O.I.No. 4, op.cit. ASMAI 38/2/17. There was no signature but it was a paper after a file marked 2/1.02 and before one marked 29.1.02. The equivalent of 1,200 Lire was given to the wives of four important Ethiopian nobles including that of the Afâ Negus.
4F.0.371/192/19257, Clerk's General Report of 1906, 11.6.07. Also W.D. 23.2.01.
5W.D.23.2.01.
6Ibid.
7See pp. 131-136.
on to the Emperor if necessary. 1

Towards the end of 1907 there was a reform of areas of the
city's judicial system, part of a nationwide judicial reform.
The reform was to do away with mutilation, the cutting off of
arms or legs for theft, and, instead a system of flogging,
public exhibition, and enforced servitude was instituted. "The
effect... had been very satisfactory, as half the male factors in
the town had hastened already to leave it, and to seek safety in
more distant regions of the Kingdom." 2 More important were the
measures dividing the nation into twelve sectors each with its
own judge. The city was similarly officially divided up and
Menilek appointed the judges. Furthermore, judgements were to be
copied and the duplicates to be sent to the newly created Ministry
of Justice. 3 That these measures seem never to have been fully
carried out may have been due to the sudden death 4 of the powerful
Mäsimu and the seizures of the Emperor. When Mäsimu was appointed
to the first Ministry, only he and the Minister of War, Fitawari
Habth Giyorgis, were important in their own right by virtue of
the provinces they ruled. 5 For the short period from his appoint-
ment in October 1907 until his death in July 1908, 6 Mäsimu acted

1 F.O.1/52/No.10 Enclosure 1, Harrington, A/A, 6.10.05. F.O.372/
192/9257, Clerk's 1906 Report, op.cit., p.10. This latter reference
has a very good description of the exact role which the Afä Negus
plays. It was really rather more complicated than a straight appeals
procedure.


3 N.S.Eth.62, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 21.3.08. See Zekrä Nägär,
pp. 68-71; De Coppet, pp. 528-30 and Heruy, YäHeywät Tarik, p.59.
4 YäHeywät Tarik
5 Heruy, p.45.
as president of the Council of Ministers. In the interim after
the death of the AfK Negus, Fitawrari HabtM Giyorgis performed his
duties until AlMsa Estifanos was appointed to succeed Nisibu. This
appointment clearly indicates the power of the clergy at this
time since Estifanos had formerly been the Baladruba for the clergy and a key man in the changing of Addis AlMn into a religious centre.
Another point very much in Estifanos's favour was the strong sup-
port he received from Empress Taytu. However, before he had be-
come securely ensconced in his office, several important steps
had been taken in the administration of justice in the capital.
Thus the Council of Ministers attempted to intervene in the imposi-
tion of the death penalty. Formerly only the Emperor or the
AfK Negus could impose it and now the council wanted their advice
to be sought in future cases. Furthermore, the system of monetary
payment for justice was drastically changed. Payment, in reality
a system of betting, had been abused and cost a great deal. An

1 ASMAI 5/34/141 (1909), Colli to MAE, A/A, 8.4.09.
2 F.O.371/595/2957, Annual General Report of 1907-8 by Lord Hervey,
A/A, 31.12.08.
4 See pp. 383.
5 Semeur, V, 3/1909 and Heruy, Yehoywet Tarik, p.59. See also Merab,
6 O.I.No. 33 (30.5.72), pp. 6-7.
7 N.S.Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 3.3.09, p.106.
8 N.S.Eth.2, Brice, to Pichon, A/A, 14.12.08, p.73.
9 This was a very complicated method of adjudication which would
take a good deal of space to explain. However, the main points were
that it favoured the wealthy and had stirred up a good deal of
opposition before Menilek reformed it.
upper limit was put on these. Payment to the judge was regularized and the confiscation of rest land by the government limited. The system of inheritance was also modified.¹

Before the coup against Taytu certain of Menilek's reforms particularly in connection with the punishment of criminals were done away with,² since ከፋፋኝ እስቃፈስ was probably so dependent on her support for holding his office.³

One aspect of justice that sometimes fell within the jurisdiction of the ከፋፋኝ but more often than not was appealed directly to the Emperor was the matter of cases in which foreigners were involved, particularly Europeans. Until the Klobukowski treaty and for some time after it there was no question of extra-territoriality.⁴ At least four major incidents occurred between 1896-1910 involving Europeans and each seems to have been dealt with on an ad hoc basis. In each instance the Emperor seems to have reviewed the case as presented to the ከፋፋኝ and on every occasion approved of his judgement.⁵

¹De Coppet, pp. 528-9; ጥንቁ ዓይኡና, pp. 334-5. See also ዓይኡ ከገር, pp. 68-71.
³N.S.Eth.9, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 23.7.09, p.221. See also Heruy, የስዩወልት ሰርጅ ሐጭወ ሁሮ, p.59.
⁴See above, pp. 66-97.
⁵For Kahn case, see N.S.Eth.62, Lagarde to Delcassé, 5.12.01, p.27. N.S.Eth.60, Le Français, 26.3.02, pp. 22-27. For Forgeron, N.S. Eth.62, Lagarde to Delcassé, Entotto, 18.8.05, pp. 47-8. ASMAI 38/3/28, No. 69, Caetani to MAE, A/A, 27.5.05. Incident at the Telegraph, ASMAI 38/4/29, Martini to MAE, 29.8.05. Encl. Ciccodicola to Martini, A/A, 21.8.05. A Greek case, F.O. 371/192/24282/27724, Hohler to Grey, 24.7.07.
The Sahafe Te'ezaz did not play as large a role in the affairs of the city as other members of Menilek's 1907 cabinet, and yet his importance was by no means minimal, especially in the religious sphere. Again this was a reflection of Gebre Sellasse's personal qualities and his close relationship with the Emperor. Mondon goes so far as to say that he was the busiest man in the Empire, constantly engaged in the diplomatic and internal correspondence of the Emperor, while at the same time composing an official history of his reign. Yet this man of humble origin is rarely mentioned in published sources. Much of his energy seems to have gone into religious activities and at various times he was Ali of both Däbrä Säyon of Addis Aläm and Raguel of Entoto, not to mention being Njoum Ed of Addis Aläm. He was also a man of importance to the Dorze community, largely involved in weaving. Many of them in the early years lived on his land in the city and on occasion he acted as their spokesman with the Emperor when a dispute arose. However, Fitawmari Habtä Giyorgis performed this function more often than he did.

After his appointment to the Cabinet in 1907, Gebre Sellasse increasingly delegated day to day administration to his capable

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1. Le Temps, 25.3.98.
4. O.I.No. 22 (17.4.72), pp. 2-19. O.I.No. 28 (16.5.72), pp. 6 and 9.
assistant Afä Wärq. Two important functions that the latter performed were to register land charters of Addis Abāba given out by the Emperor and also to exercise control over the imperial printing press. In December 1908 he was active enough to follow the Emperor on his pilgrimage to Dābrū Libanos.

Fitawrari

Fitawrari Habtā Giyorgis was the most important military figure of Ethiopian the post-Adwa period. He distinguished himself during the Battle of Adwa and was subsequently appointed to replace the former imperial Fitawrari Gābāyāhu, who had been killed on the field of battle. Habtā Giyorgis was unique among all the office holders listed in that during the period 1896-1910 he was never replaced. He, throughout that time, was the only imperial Fitawrari and there were only minor and very unsuccessful attempts to unseat him. He alone seems to have defined the role of the Fitawrari in Addis Abāba. He always stood high in Mənilek's favour and is another example, like Nəggadres Haylā Giyorgis and others, of the importance of the individual rather than the office in Ethiopian history. Thus after Afä Negus Nāsibu's death we find Habtā Giyorgis performing his duties although he never seems to have actually been appointed to the office itself. His increased power was partly

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1 W.D. 27.8.09 and 18.8.09. Mērab, II, 89.
2 W.D. 27.8.09.
3 W.D. 18.8.09.
4 N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 2.12.08, p.68.
5 See pp. 142-144.
due to Menilek's trust in him during his illness and partly to the
independent power base he had built up in the provinces to the
south of the capital. However, as he was almost constantly resident
in Addis Ababa and had control over the largest army in the immediate
vicinity of the capital, he played a very significant role in the
city's affairs.

Habtä Giyorgis was appointed the royal Fitawrari, in effect
the man directly under Menilek in charge of the imperial army, soon
after the Battle of Adwa. However, until soon after the turn of
the century he was involved in campaigns to the south and especially
to the Boran and since for several years he did not spend the
majority of his time in the capital, was not deeply involved in
the city's affairs. But by 1906, when Governor of Eritrea
Martini came to visit the capital, Habtä Giyorgis, in return for
a handsome payment, was already willing to guarantee the safety
of the Italian Legation with his 30,000 troops, several thousand
of whom were a trained bodyguard of Shänqäla. Habtä Giyorgis
was thought to be stronger than anyone else in Addis Ababa. At
the time of the appointment of the ministers he and the Áfrä Negus
were thought to be the "only men of weight in the new ministry".

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1 See Bairu Tafila's biography in J.E.S., VI, No. 1, pp. 125-130.
2 Shähay Berhan Sellasé, pp. 49ff.
3 ASMAI 3/20/170, Martini to MAE, A/A, 7/1906.
4 ASMAI 37/2/10, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 4.1.07.
5 For Amharic text, see ASMAI 38/4/38, Colli to MAE, Annesso, A/A,
30.10.07.
Only he and the Afä Negus of all the Ministers were entitled to give independent feasts on the occasion of their new rank of minister.¹

Six months later his standing with the Emperor and his popularity among the soldiers in Addis Ababa were revealed when he gave a tremendous banquet for all soldiers, priests and paupers in the Addis Ababa area. The Emperor himself attended, a highly unusual occurrence and a special mark of honour.²

By October of the following year Habtäh Giyorgis was taking increasing responsibility for police duties in the capital and an Agaj or proclamation was issued in his name in connection with an incident involving some Italians at the Bank of Abyssinia and at the telegraph office.³ Shortly thereafter Habtäh Giyorgis was given sweeping powers in the city to maintain order and act directly in Menilek's name but only at the very critical time when his master went on a pilgrimage to Debër Libanos.⁴

Meanwhile until the appointment of the new Afä Negus,⁵ Habtäh Giyorgis acted in Nasibu's place and was even mentioned as being his successor.⁶ This involved an extra, heavy load of legal cases.⁷

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²N.S.Eth. 1, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 8.5.08.
³AP/CFS/81 dossier 9, Governor Côtes Françaises des Somalis to Ministère des Colonies, 10.11.08. Annexe, Official Journal of Eritrea, 24.10.08.
⁴N.S.Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 2.12.08, pp. 68-69. ASMAI 54/34/141 (1908), Miniscaldi to MAE, A/A, 9.12.08.
⁵See pp. 141-144.
⁶ASMAI 54/34/141 (1909), Colli to MAE, A/A, 8.4.09.
In February the extent of Habtā Giyorgis's influence was underlined when he left the capital and went to join the Emperor at Dēbrē Libanos. This led to great uncertainty in the capital and protests from the diplomatic communities.¹ In recognition of his power and prestige he was appointed to two new positions, in June, 1909 to be Ras Wērg² and in September to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³ But Habtā Giyorgis's position was threatened by the Empress's growing power and he became one of the most influential of those involved in her downfall.⁴

**Liqā Makwas**

From 1886 to 1910 no personality, important to the history of Addis Abāba, held the essentially military position of Liqā Makwas and thus this previously important office had relatively little impact on the history of the city. This is perhaps a reflection of the decline of the importance of the military in the running of the city's affairs.

The Liqā Makwas seems to have had relatively little to do with the running of the city, until in October, 1907 one of the lesser known Liqā Makwas appointed by Menilek, Kātēma, was made a Minister. "Likamaquas Katama ... is also head of the King's Rifle Brigade. He is appointed Minister of the Interior. He is a man of no weight or importance."⁵ Although this judgement might

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¹ F.0.371/595/3946/9624, Hervey to Grey, 19.2.09. ASMAI 54/34/141 (1909), Colli to MAE, A/A, 8.4.09, pp. 4-14.
² Semeur V, 6/1909, p. 603. With this title few people could be said to outrank him in the Empire. Of those of influence and in semi-permanent residence in the capital, only the Emperor and perhaps, Ras Tāsimma.
⁴ N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 16.7.09, pp. 136-7. F.0.371/595/3946/ 2833, Hervey to Grey, 16.7.09. N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A,
be somewhat harsh, Kätäma does not again appear prominently in the
city’s affairs until February 1909 when Fitawrrāri Ḥaabīḥ Giyorgis
leaves Addis Abëba to join Menilek in Dëbrä Libanos and Kätäma
is appointed in his stead to keep order in the capital. The Italian
representative described him as being "insignificant, indolent
and lacking in any authority". Yet he had risen in the ranks of
Menilek’s bodyguard from the common soldiery to Ṭāwattaddär AlKaa
and eventually Liqā Mākwās and a Ḏējzmach. Furthermore, in
November 1909 he proved himself to be energetic and capable in
promulgating an awaj, temporarily changing the site of the market
and energetically enforcing order in the city when it seems to
have badly needed it. He may well have been greatly assisted in
these police actions by his western educated assistant, AlKaa or
Kăntiba Gübru (sometimes Goba or Gubao) who was his secretary for
a time in the Ministry of the Interior.

18/2/10, p.249. U.S. Dept. of State, 884.00/9866/44, Love to
Dept. of State, A/A, 30.3.10.

5 Except if his role as leader of part of Menilek’s troops is taken
into account (see Heruy, YēHeywēt Tarik, pp. 61-2). Kätäma
was not by any means the only Liqā Mākwās, but seems to have been
the only one active in Addis Abëba.

For Amharic text of the appointment, see ASMAI 38/4/38, Colli to
MAE, Annesso, A/A, 30.10.07.

1ASMAI 54/34/141 (1909), Colli to MAE, A/A, 8.4.09. See pp. 66-91.
for further information on the maintenance of security in the capital.

2Heruy, YēHeywēt Tarik, pp. 61-62.

3N.S.Eth.2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 23.11.09, p.199 and also Annexe I,
Orde du Likamakouaz /sic/, Katama, n.d.

4W.D. 12.1.09 and N.S.Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 28.1.09, p.84.
Advisers to the Emperor

Just as important as the traditional hierarchy of the court and the new appointments in the Cabinet, were two groups of people partly outside this framework: the old trusted advisers of the Emperor, like Māshāsha Wārqé, Le'ul Sāggād, Tāmmāma and Habtā Giyorgis, and secondly new men deemed to be promising by Menilek, like Abbātā, Zāllāqā and Bāyyānā.¹ Some with military backgrounds already ruled important and others not so important provinces but both groups spent most of their time in the capital. They could be called upon by Menilek at whim to do important, special or even mundane tasks, usurping temporarily and/or replacing palace officials. These men of both groups were almost completely loyal to Menilek and may be said to have formed a kind of "kitchen cabinet", men in whom he could have complete confidence. Some of them acted as spokesmen for the peoples of the provinces they ruled, but as Menilek became more and more debilitated he seems to have relied increasingly on some of them, as well as his new cabinet, and because of his trust in them they were accorded special respect by Menilek's subjects.

Among the first group of older established advisers who played a large role in the history of the capital in the days after Adwa were Ra'a Dargé and Dājjazmach Haylā Maryam.² Both briefly acted, respectively, as regent and governor of Addis Abēba during Menilek's absences from the capital. This, however, was a very specialized

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¹The eight previously mentioned offices (Azzaj, Nāggadras, Kāntiba, Būjīrond, Afā Negus, Gāhāf Te'ezza, Fitawri and Līqā Mākwas) were all included in the 1907 cabinet and thus given special recognition and have a certain claim to be looked at separately and individually.

²See above pp. 67ff. Le Temps (contribution by Mondon) 11.5.96.
role and was to be repeated by Azzaj Gezaw and Fitawrari Habtä Giyorgis.\(^1\) More important to the daily life and running of the city were men like Dfäjazmäch Mhähäsäa Wärğä who lived largely in the capital and ruled over the nearby land of Ad'a.\(^2\)

Dfäjazmäch Le'ul Sëggähd, who had formerly been a Ligabä,\(^3\) became a very important figure in the palace,\(^4\) after having ruled the important province of Arusi.\(^5\) He was the cousin of Ras Täsämä another important adviser to Menilek whose influence was more important in national rather than in city terms.\(^6\)

Among the Emperor's younger advisers and favourites were Ras Abbata, Lejj Bäyyänä and Lejj Zälläqä. Ras Abbata was one of Menilek's particular favourites and resided almost permanently at the capital.\(^7\) While Habtä Giyorgis accepted responsibility for the protection of the Italian Legation in Addis Abäba,\(^8\) Abbata did the same for the British Legation.\(^9\) Abbata was also

\(^{1}\)See pp. 121, 149 ff.
\(^{2}\)ASMAI 54/34/141 (1908), Miniscaldi to MAE, A/A, 9.12.08.
\(^{3}\)F.0. 371/192/6031/page 254. Heruy, YHäeywät Tarik, p.7.
\(^{4}\)See pp. 156 ff.
\(^{5}\)ASMAI 54/34/141 (1909), Colli to MAE, A/A, 10.12.09.
\(^{6}\)Heruy, YHäeywät Tarik, p.5, and Mërub, II, pp. 77-8.
\(^{7}\)F.0.371/192/6031/page 253.
\(^{8}\)F.0.371/192/6031/p.254. Heruy, YHäeywät Tarik, p.50.
\(^{9}\)See p. 449.
\(^{10}\)ASMAI 38/4/33, Il Direttore Centrale degli Affari Coloniali to S.E. Ministro - Memo, Roma, 5.8.06.
deeply involved in the negotiations concerning the Bank of Abyssinia,\(^1\) as well as being considered something of a reformer by his British friends.\(^2\)

Another example of a young favourite and adviser to the Emperor might be found in Lej Bäyyäna who was Director of Posts and Telegraphs, a position that was later raised to the rank of minister.\(^3\) He played an important role in the commercial life of the city\(^4\) and was deeply involved in such things as the negotiations concerning the Cartridge factory, giving final approval for its purchase in England.\(^5\) He was also one of the prime targets of Taytu's attempts to recover monies loaned out by Menilek. It has been said that he owed 500,000 MTD at that time.\(^6\) One final example can be found in Lej ZällHgM, the son of Néggradras Aggedaw. He was sent to the Menilek school by the Emperor and was later put in charge of the Hotel set up by Taytu.\(^7\)

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\(^1\)See pp. 1874.

\(^2\)F.O. 371/192/6031/p.254.


\(^4\)F.O. 371/192, ibid.

\(^5\)ASMAI 38/3/28, Caetani to MAE, A/A, 27.5.05.

\(^6\)N.S.Eth.56, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 25.2.10, p.110.

\(^7\)Heruy, YaHeywät Tarik, p.77. See also pp. 367 for his role in the hotel. These, of course, are only a few examples of advisers and favourites close to Menilek. It must be realized that there were many more involved in various different activities, throughout the city and the Empire, and that this has been an attempt only to look at the ones who seem to have been somewhat more important in the running of the city.
The Aggafari, Ligaba and the Imperial Guard

With the Azza in the hierarchy of the gebi or palace were the Aggafari and the Ligaba. Many men who were later to become very important provincial rulers began at some time or another as Aggafari or Ligaba; Ras Le'ul Saggiad and Dijazmach Waldä Gäbre'el are but two examples among many. An Aggafari seems to have been a position below that of the Ligaba and his functions have been described as follows:

"They led people in and out, and informed the Emperor that a guest had arrived and asked his permission to allow him to enter. They also informed him that the guest had come with ... horse, honey and beef oxen. He Menilek would then ask him who he was and let him enter. The guest having entered carried on his business and gave the beef oxen.

The Aggafari was not only one of the men responsible for the daily running of dergo on behalf of the Azza, but also might be asked by Menilek to take charge of a caravan to the coast to get arms or other things that might be needed in the capital.

The Ligaba on the other hand has been called the "grand chamberlain" and the commander of the imperial guard.

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1 See pp. 114 - 118.
2 Guidi, 787.
3 Baetman, 994.
4 O.I.No. 17 (16.3.72), pp. 23-4.
6 O.I. No. 2, op.cit.
7 See pp. 125 - 126.
10 ASMAI 3/20/170, Ciccodicola to MAE, Rome, 9/1907. Whether the Ligaba is above the Aggafari or not is somewhat unclear. Many sources tend to say he is, but some say the opposite (for instance O.I.No. 17 (16.3.72), p.35).
Walda Gêbre'êl is mentioned more often than the other Ligaba in connection with the city. In 1907 he was named as the head of the imperial guard\(^1\) while in 1909 is said to have read one of the succession edicts.\(^2\) In November of the same year he was named in an imperial awaj or edict. All men who had no master were to go to him and put themselves under his orders.\(^3\) Informants remember him as the main or chief Ligaba.\(^4\)

There were at least three separate hierarchies of soldiers guarding the imperial palace and directly under the control of the Emperor: the gebi zäbägnä, the elfen zäbägnä and the Färäzäbägnä.\(^5\) The gebi zäbägnä were responsible for guarding the outer perimeter of the palace that is to say the outermost of the three concentric circular enclosures.\(^6\) They were under the command of Shaläqä and each month a new Shaläqä arrived with a fresh contingent of soldiers.\(^7\) Some received land, others who were considered to be less favoured were paid in cash or in kind.\(^8\) Payment might be 3, 4 or even 10 Maria Theresa dollars depending on the rank of

\(^1\)ASMAI 3/20/170, Ciccodicola to MAE, Rome, 9/1907. Before this he had been a soldier, Däj Aeggafari and then Ligaba. Heruy, Yäneywät Tarik, p.70.

\(^2\)ASMAI 54/34/141 (1909), Colli to MAE, A/A, 28.5.09.


\(^4\)O.I.No. 41 (9.7.72), pp. 17-18. O.I.No. 17 (16.3.72), p.35. However, this may very well be influenced by his high position during the reign of Empress Zawditu.


\(^7\)O.I.No. 22, op.cit.

\(^8\)Ibid.
the soldier and one to three Dawella of grain would be given a month.\(^1\) Once or twice a year they might be required to do stone work for the government and if they had been given land they were required to give a tithe.\(^2\) Furthermore, they had the right to attend the supper or feast held every Sunday, no small thing since food and especially meat which could last ten days might be taken away by the soldiers.\(^3\)

The elfegn zāḇāṅgna were organized along the same lines as the gebi zāḇāṅgna but were more of an elite since they guarded the innermost of the enclosures in the palace and the Emperor's private chambers.\(^4\) Their most famous leader towards the end of the period was Fitawrari Gibrā Maryan\(^5\). Henri D'Orleans was probably referring to these men when he spoke of the "garde du roi" composed of men who had been under fire and had killed at least 40 men.\(^6\) Otherwise, these footsoldiers had the same privileges as the gebi zāḇāṅgna, although because of their elitist position they might tend to have had more land.\(^7\)

The Firds zāḇāṅgna, as their name implies,\(^8\) were mounted troops and unlike the gebi and elfegn zāḇāṅgna they were not

\(^{1}\text{T}ibid.\text{ and }\text{O.I. No. 2 (11.12.71), p.10.}\)
\(^{2}\text{O.I.No. 18, op.cit.}\)
\(^{3}\text{O.I.No. 22, op.cit.}\)
\(^{4}\text{T}ibid.\text{ and }\text{O.I.No. 41 (9.7.72), p.16.}\)
\(^{5}\text{O.I.No. 5 (20.1.72), p.32. O.I.No. 41, op.cit.}\)
\(^{6}\text{Henry d'Orleans, 8.5.97.}\)
\(^{7}\text{O.I.No. 22, op.cit., p.32.}\)
\(^{8}\text{Guidi, 873, literally horse guards.}\)
quartered inside the gebi enclosures, but just outside near Gābre'el church. Three of the more famous leaders of the Fārās Zābāgnana were Abābē Tufa, Abba Koran, and Chāngārē Sokilé.

It was to these kinds of relatively minor offices that talented or malleable leaders of Ethiopian and even foreign population groups might aspire. They might be elected by their peers as a leader and then have their qualities recognized by Menilek by means of a title, or one of his nobles who would then raise him to one of these posts. But then the process could be reversed and the appointment might come directly from above and Menilek would expect his subordinate, if necessary, to impose his authority on his particular population group.

Conclusion

Overall two themes of particular importance stand out in the political and administrative history of the capital, the economic element and the importance of personality rather than office. It must never be forgotten that the city grew ad hoc. It developed into an urban centre without any active decision to do so and without any profound realisation of what was actually taking place. However, one exception must be made here for the merchants in the capital, particularly foreign ones, who had preconceived notions

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1 One can still see the old buildings and they were quite definitely outside the enclosures, as pointed out to me by informant Emmama Semägn.

2 Ibid. and O.I.No. 22, op.cit.

3 O.I.No. 1, op.cit., p. 7.


5 Ibid.
as to the nature of an urban centre and seem to have tried to make Addis Ababa conform to them. Their role was, perhaps, most clearly revealed during the attempt to transfer the capital to Addis Alam. This incident plays a disproportionate role in the growth of the city since it galvanised not only the economic and commercial elements in Addis Ababa but other Ethiopian settled elements into taking steps to avert their economic ruin. But it was not just the foreign and indigenous community that were important to the economic growth of the city but also the role of the nobility and the growing bureaucracy. The central importance of the Nëggadras as the tax collector of the city is the most important example, but he was by no means the only one. Most of the officers and nobility permanently or semi-permanently resident in the city were concerned with trade and taxation and thus had a stake in the economic growth of the capital, albeit unwillingly in many cases.

The pragmatic approach played as large a role in the administrative development of the city as it did in economic development. The significance of the city was crucial in the growth of the Empire's bureaucracy. It was in the capital that foreign and western elements had their most impressive impact, particularly on officials like Nëggadras Haylë Giyorgis in the spheres of land tenure and commerce. Yet neither an organised project of centralisation or of modernisation can really be discerned. There was a certain amount of rhetoric but in every case it was the personality of an official rather than the office he held that was of the greatest importance. This concept has a very long history in Ethiopia and can hardly be overemphasized.
However, one final theme, that of the military, must not be totally forgotten. Many if not all of the officials that rose to prominence under Menilek were essentially soldiers and regarded themselves as such. Fitawrari Habtä Giyorgis is the best example. Despite his imperial role as leader of the Emperor's army, he was deeply involved in the politics and administration of the Ethiopian population groups in the capital and in his military capacity did much to integrate them peacefully into the life of the capital. Yet the military role of the capital declined after the Battle of Adwa and the role of civilians increased thereafter, again with the personal influence of important courtiers more significant than their actual offices.
There are several common themes running through the relations between the Imperial Palace and the various population groups in the capital. However, an initial distinction must be made between the relations with foreigners resident in the capital and the relations with Ethiopian population groups in the city. The kinds of legal restraints and the type of independence foreigners were allowed in the city were basically different, although similarities can often be discerned. Similarities can most clearly be seen in the kind of spokesmen representing the various population groups, foreign or Ethiopian, and in the nature and independence of the communities making up the capital. An attempt might be made to put the degree of independence of each of the minority groups on a continuum to show the relation of one to the other. At one end would be a community, foreign or internal, which would be regarded as completely independent of the imperial fiat. This community would have an internally chosen spokesman who would represent the community at the Imperial Palace. The best examples of this would have been the Indian community represented by Mohammad Aly, the Legation communities as represented by their ministers, or the Tegre represented by one of the descendants of Emperor Yohannes. At the other end of the continuum you would have found mainly minority groups from those areas recently conquered in the south and west of Ethiopia. They were represented in the high councils of the Imperial Palace by spokesmen approved of by Menilek as an adjunct to his military rule of these newly conquered areas. The best example of this would have been the Wâlamo or the Dorzo.

Before going any further, however, it should be pointed out
that this is a gross over simplification and the situation was really far more complex than it might appear. No one community could remain static for very long and the fluidity of the relationships was marked. One of the reasons Addis Ababa's growth as an urban centre was remarkable was the fact that Menilek and his advisers were flexible enough to be able to adapt and incorporate so many different minorities into the city and yet contain the violence that seemed to break out so often. The main method through which this seems to have been performed was through various officials of the court, mainly relatively minor ones, many appointed by Menilek from among leaders chosen by the population groups themselves.
Part A: Foreign Minorities

Introduction - In the years immediately after the Battle of Adwa, Menilek tried to act towards the foreign minorities in much the same way as he did towards certain Ethiopian population groups in the capital. Their degree of independence depended partly upon the kind of work they engaged in and the personal qualities of their spokesmen but in the case of foreign minorities an extra and especially potent factor intervenes, the problem of consular jurisdiction and protection. British, French, and Italian citizens rarely seem to have encountered this problem but Menilek had a running battle over these powers' attempts to extend their protection over Greeks, Armenians, Indians or Arabs. The varying degree of success that Menilek had in directly controlling these various minorities fairly closely reflects the amount of respect that Ethiopians had for the various groups of foreigners. Nearly all the minorities experienced population influxes in 1905, 1907 or 1909, a reflection of unemployment and the stoppage of contracts on the railroad.

The Greeks

The Greeks as a foreign community in Addis Ababa were in some ways unique since they fell halfway between the foreign and Ethiopian communities in their internal organization and in the way they were treated by the Ethiopian government. For in June 1907 the Greeks did away with British consular protection and formed themselves into a short-lived Greek "community" which dealt directly with the Ethiopian government, in a way similar to certain Ethiopian population groups in the capital. Like other foreigners, however, they came

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1 The order followed in this chapter of the various groups is in descending order of the size of their Addis Ababa population. One need hardly add that documentation of the foreign minorities is much greater than that encountered for the various Ethiopian groups.

2 See pp. (45-49) for Ethiopian population groups. Also F.O.371/192/2482/2482, Hohler to Grey, A/A, 28.6.07.
under the modified form of capitulations in force in Ethiopia, causing special difficulties for Menilek. Unlike the Armenians they engaged in less prestigious, more manual work, and unlike the French and Italians, they were not so consistently under the protection of any one legation. Finally, they seem to have made up the largest proportion of the "poor white" influxes of 1905 and 1907 coming largely through Jibuti where many had worked on the French railway. Others trickled in through Egypt, the Sudan or Eritrea. Basically, they can be seen as but one small element of the great diaspora centred mainly in Egypt and the Sudan, who happened to merge more effectively into Ethiopian culture largely because they too were Orthodox Christians.

Until September 1900 the Greeks in Ethiopia had been treated much as if they were any other servant or worker in the capital. They seem to have been accorded none of the privileges of foreigners, particularly that of separate consular courts.¹ Eventually the British gave in to pressure from the King of Greece² and letters in the Egyptian press from Greeks under British protection there³ and then unilaterally decided to take Greeks in Ethiopia under their protection without consulting Menilek.⁴ The Emperor was angry with what he regarded as British interference in his relations with the Greeks in his domains⁵ and asked the Italian⁶ and French⁷ diplomatic

¹ASMAI 38/1/1, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 16.9.00.
²ASMAI 38/1/10, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 28.7.00. Also N.S.Eth. 19, French Ambassador in Cairo to Delcassé, Cairo, 23.6.00.
⁴Ibid.
⁵Ibid.
⁶ASMAI 38/1/11, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 16.9.00. Also ASMAI 38/1/10, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 28.7.00.
⁷Ibid.
⁸N.S.Eth. 19, Lagarde to Delcassé, Addis Tiéna, 29.12.00, p.155.
representatives in the capital for advice. As the French and Italians pointed out, Ethiopian acceptance of British protection of the Greeks was a significant diminution of the Emperor's sovereignty. But Menilek accepted the British fait accompli. The situation remained fairly stable until the Greek population increased significantly with the completion of the railway to Dere Dawa.

During the years before 1902 the Greek community seems to have been a prosperous and influential one in the capital. They had influential men like Sourvis, who by September 1900 was an official interpreter for Menilek, and in 1909 played an important role in the foundation of the "Banque Nationale d'Agriculture et pour le Développement du Commerce". Men like Sourvis, Balambaras Giyorgis, or Greek merchants in Addis Ababa could easily have acted as intermediaries with the Emperor concerning any disputes in which their countrymen might have been involved. But once the railway had arrived in Dere Dawa the Ethiopian and British attitudes towards the Greeks began to change. Different kinds of Greeks were beginning to arrive, men willing to work with their hands, in road work and building bridges, houses and churches.

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1 It should be pointed out but that there were many precedents among Ethiopian population groups of a powerful noble acting as a judge, intercessor and spokesman for those under his control. See below, pp. 183-185.

2 F.O. 371/1/13037, Harrington to Grey, A/A, 18.3.06. Here for instance they are complaining of the large number of cases they had to deal with.

3 W.D. 11.9.00. Formerly he had been very close to Ras Makonnen, and after Grosmarch Yosef's death took over as official interpreter. See Djanbouli, 24.8.01, p.3. See also Skinner, pp. 78 and 85. The spelling of his name is unclear; Attanesius, M.Athanase Sourvis are also used, among others.

4 W.D. 20.1.00. Powell-Cotton, pp. 117-8. The use of the Ethiopian title Balambaras is significant, revealing the degree to which even foreigners were being accepted into the hierarchy of the
Especially in 1905 there seems to have been a great influx of Greek manual labourers.\(^1\)

By 1906 the British consular officials in the capital found that "trivial" and "vexatious" disputes between Greeks had become so numerous that they could no longer handle them and they were referred to the Ethiopian courts.\(^2\) But cases in August and November of that year involved murder, forcing the Ethiopian authorities to resort to deportation.\(^3\) However, it must be pointed out that most of these offences were committed by newcomers to the Greek community, referred to as a "class ... of the lowest description"\(^4\) who were "on the worst terms with ... their Abyssinian neighbors".\(^5\) The most probable reason for this animosity was their position in semi-competition with Ethiopians engaged in similar work and businesses.\(^6\)

Most revealing is one of their own comments in a semi-literate

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Shâwa' court.

\(^5\)Ibid. and also, W.D.18.11.00 and Michel, p.523.


\(^1\)F.0.371/395/1495/1495, Hohler to Grey, A/A, 21.12.07.

\(^2\)F.0.371/1/13037, Harrington to Grey, A/A, 18.3.06.

\(^3\)F.0.371/192/24282, Hohler to Grey, 24.7.07.

\(^4\)F.0. 371/192, op.cit.

\(^5\)F.0.371/190/2471/27722, Hohler to Grey, 21.7.07.

\(^6\)F.0.371/192/24282/24282, Private letter, Hohler to Louis, 28.6.07.
petition complaining that they were being "sneered at by Gourakis
\[sic, Gureg\],\(^1\) a minority group which often, at that time,
performed the most menial of tasks. It was this element of the
Greek community, the most lawless and boisterous, that brought
the longer established Greek residents into disrepute.

Thus when the Greeks as a whole formed a community to regulate
their own affairs, the British and Menilek naturally welcomed the
development.\(^2\) "Practically all" the Greeks in the capital and those
living in the immediate area joined the community and signed its
statutes, which provided for a President, officers and a council
elected by public vote, in something that sounds today very much
like a tribal association. \(2,000\ MTD\) was collected at the first
meeting for the community, to hire and keep up a house, in charity,
for the maintenance of penniless workmen and for "improving the
general standing and morale of the community". Menilek hoped it
would introduce better order and discipline into the Greek colony.
He was especially angry at a number of Greeks who had been employed
to build churches and had then broken their contracts and he had
only been deterred from expelling all Greeks in Ethiopia because
they were building so many houses in the capital.\(^3\) By this step
in forming an organized community the Greeks had in effect returned
to the kind of relationship that had existed between Greeks and the
Ethiopians during Johannes's reign,\(^4\) although in 1905 it was on a

\(^1\)Ibid. Hohler to Grey, A/A, 28.6.07. Enclosure V - the Petition had
124 signatures and a Deputation led by Phocas Mirialis, Orpahvides,
and Kavadin. See pp. 198-203.

\(^2\)Ibid. See also, Hohler to Grey and Hohler to Louis, same file,
same date.

\(^3\)F.0.371/192/24282/24282, Hohler to Grey, A/A, 28.6.07. See also
Ilg Papers KB 13 (p.138), Compte de Travaux, signed by Ilg, A/A, 10.5.05.

\(^4\)Djibouti, 21.12.01, p.2.
much more highly organized basis. This relationship, with the President of the Greek community acting as a spokesman for the minority group of Greeks, was much the same kind of relationship that existed between indigenous minority groups like the Wälamo, Dorzé and Guragé with their Amhara overlords,¹ and provides the best documentation for the establishment of the system. Other foreigners, Armenians, Italians, French, Indians or Arabs, had the French, Italian and British governments to exercise jurisdiction over them.²

At the end of 1907 there was another large influx of Greeks which necessitated a system of passes at the railway terminal at Deré Dawa to avoid having large numbers of Greeks "of an undesirable or useless character" flooding the capital again. The Greek Community in Addis Ababa recommended that individuals not be allowed past Deré Dawa unless: 1) they were acquainted with a trade or 2) they possessed at least 100 MTD beyond the sum necessary for the journey. For there was no need in the capital for unskilled labour who expected such high standards of living and salary.³ Essentially this might be seen as the Greeks themselves establishing an immigration policy to avoid difficulties with Menilek and the Ethiopian authorities.

The pressure of these new duties and internal dissensions among the members of the Greek Community soon reached such an acute stage that its governing committee resigned and was unable to reconstitute itself.

²See pp. 66-99 and 110-119.
Once again the British had to extend their protection over the Greeks. In Athens the Greek Ministry of Interior, although it had been willing to confirm the status of the Community, did not send a diplomatic representative. Only in January 1909 did their government decide to send an exploratory representative to Addis Ababa, M. Fontana. By that time the number of Greeks in the capital was estimated at 334. Because of the large number of Greeks involved, the heavy load of cases for consular officials, and the unpopularity accruing to the British government due to her protection of the Greeks, Harrington and then Thesiger, decided to put a time limit on their commitments and were to cease their protection at the end of March 1911. Perhaps more than any other minority the Greeks felt greater insecurity in the capital because of their poor relationship with Ethiopians and thus clamoured more for the protection of one of the foreign Legations.

The Greeks seem to have been involved in a wide spectrum of jobs including: work in stone quarries, the liquor trade, shoemaking, 

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1 F.O.371/393/1495/30246, Harrington to Grey, 7.8.08. In the Ethiopian context it was as if a noble was reasserting his control over a population group that had grown overly independent under its own spokesmen.

2 F.O.371/395/1495/5556 Encl. I, Royal Decree (Greece), 22.1.08 or 4.2.08.

3 F.O.371/595/1055/3628 Elliott to F.O., 22.1.09.


9 Ibid.
in the Telegraph office,\(^1\) as architects, masons, in grocery stores, cafes, restaurants, as carpenters, hairdressers, tailors or gardeners. In short it was due to them and the Armenians that rudimentary European facilities were available for foreigners in the capital.\(^2\) But this does not detract from the basic fact that Menilek often found the Greeks to be a source of constant bother. He even said to Salimbeni that he wanted to keep European workers to a minimum because they caused problems asking constantly for too many privileges.\(^3\) It was largely, then, Greeks and some Armenians who fell into the category of what might be described as "poor whites" about which Menilek was so concerned.\(^4\) Greek relations with Menilek were the most subtle of all the foreign minorities and thus, perhaps, the most interesting. While much controversy surrounds their status under the modified form of capitulations, it can be fairly said that they were assimilated, as a minority group, to a far greater degree than any other group of foreigners.

**Arabs**

The role of the Arab minority in the early history of the capital is obscure. Though large in number (227) in 1909,\(^5\) they

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\(^1\) AP/CFS/81 dossier 9, Gov. Somalis française to Ministère des Colonies, Annexe, Officiel Journal d’Eritrea, 24.10.08.


\(^3\) Zaghi, Salimbeni diary, p.107 (13.7.90). See also Pariset, pp. 29 and 33. De Coppet, pp. 275 and 276.

\(^4\) ASMAI 36/11/95, Traversi to Antonelli, 15.4.90. ASMAI 36/16/147, Illma (Traversi’s servant) to MAE, Let Marefià, 30.1.92.

\(^5\) Merab, Vol. II, pp. 103-4. I found it impossible during my stay in Ethiopia to gain sufficiently the confidence of any Arab informants so as to get any really reliable information. Thus to venture any firm statements as to the status of their spokesmen, and their particular standing on the question of consular jurisdiction might be a bit rash.
often are confused in oral and written sources with the Indian population of the capital. They had a long tradition of participation in economic life, but their dominant position seems to have slipped with the influx of other foreign communities. However, they carried on their traditional roles as exporters of incense, as camel drivers, sellers and readers of the Koran, cooks and small merchants, especially in coffee.

**Indians**

More than any of the other foreign minority groups the Indian community had a strict hierarchical organization and the bulk of them used one of the major Indian merchants, usually Mohammad Aly, as their spokesmen in the court of Menilek. They were a close knit group in some ways like the Armenians, but even less open, very different from the Greeks. For while the Armenians in the early years went to Ethiopian Orthodox churches, the Indians were largely Muslim and kept themselves separate even from Ethiopian Muslims already resident in the area. They too, like the Greeks and Armenians, had a long tradition of contact with Ethiopia, and experienced an influx of their fellow countrymen after the Battle of Adwa. But this influx included several rich merchants who rigorously controlled the arrival and behaviour of most of their kinsmen. The merchants' trading ties were with Bombay and they originally entered Ethiopia through the Red Sea ports.

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1 For instance, see, O.I. No. 32 (25.5.72). The two main reasons, perhaps, for the confusion concerning the Arabs and the Indians during this period were: first that both were Muslims and secondly, many of the Indians that came to Ethiopia did so after first going through the Red Sea ports.


3 See pp. 164-65.


from Aden after they had expanded first to the Horn of Africa
in Zäyla and Bärbärä in present day Somalia and then, during the
Egyptian occupation period, to Harär.¹

The older sections of the Indian community in Addis Abäba seem
to have been made up of men like Haji Kivas² and Wâli Mohammed³
who undertook to build various churches and houses in and around
the capital.⁴ But soon after the Battle of Adwa they were to be
out numbered by Indians who had been encouraged to come to Ethiopia
by the British Agency set up in the capital. Thus, in December 1899
when the whole British protected community turned out to greet
Harrington, the older residents were surprised to see all at once
the number of Indians who had settled in the capital since 1896.⁵

But Menilek through Mohammad Aly and others seems to have
kept strict control over the immigration of Indians into Ethiopia,⁶
and even up to 1902 was strenuously arguing with Harrington that
he should have ultimate control over "his servants", the Indians in
the capital, and that Great Britain had no right to put them under

¹See Brockett, passim but esp. pp. 27, 54, 111 and 201 ff.
²W.D.1.10.00.
³O.I. No. 32 (25.5.72), p.1. I was unfortunately unable to tape
or take notes of any of my conversations with old Indians.
⁴W.D.1.10.00 for Haji Kivas building Entotto Ragu'el. See Gleichjen,
pp. 248-9 for his work on Gâbre'el. See also De Coppet, pp. 465-6;
Gäbrä Sellase, p.278. W.D. 26.12.99 for role of Indians in
building the palace, and 9.1.09 for Mehtab Din a "King's carpenter".
Also O.I.No. 32, op.cit., and De Castro, Vol. 1, p.244 for the
Indian role in the building of Addis Alâm.
⁵Djibouti, 20.1.00. Harrington as the British diplomatic representative
exercised control over the British protected Indian community.
⁶See W.D.26.12.99, where it is pointed out that Indians could go
no further than Harâr without getting permission by telephone
from Addis Abäba.
her protection. Harrington argued that some Indians' contracts had expired and Menilek was keeping the Indians against their will.\(^1\)

In March 1903 the "questions regarding Indians were discussed and arranged"\(^2\) according to Harrington, but in exactly what way is not clear, probably in much the same way as with the Greek group, that is, with Britain taking them under her protection.\(^3\) However, British relations with the Indians were much more cordial than those with the Greeks, for the former seem rarely to have caused difficulty or engaged in the endless litigation to which the Greeks were prone. Moreover, British responsibility for the Indians was much more clear-cut, being a direct imperial one, while responsibility for Greeks was a confused and dubious inheritance from the Anglo-Egyptian involvement.

The British even imported contract workers directly from India to build their new Legation, since semi-skilled labour in the capital was so undependable.\(^4\) There were also Indian artisans, tailors, hairdressers, gold and silver smiths, most of whom were quite poor.\(^5\) All in all there were some 149 Indians in the capital in 1909.\(^6\) The two or three large merchants, particularly Mohammad

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\(^1\) F.O.1/40, Private letter from Harrington to Boyle, 3.5.02.
\(^2\) Ibid., 12.3.03.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) W.D.2.3.09.
\(^6\) Ibid., pp. 103-4.
Aly and Jiwaje maintained control over their employees by means of a kind of corporation or co-operative, while the rest of the Indian community outside this system were generally very poor and struggled hard to make ends meet. Yet Indians smuggled themselves into the country illegally, so they must have thought that there was a profit to be made somewhere. This caused a certain amount of ill feeling among Ethiopians as did the fact that they were Muslims and would not even contribute to a local mosque since they were of a different, Shi'ite sect.

Armenians

The Armenian community in Addis Ababa was more tightly knit and influential than the Greek; the history of its contact was long and their spokesmen like Terzian and Decrens, had had a close relationship with Menilek. Their options as to where they might live in the world were more narrow since there was little possibility of returning home to lands in which they were being persecuted by the Russians and the Turks. More than any other foreign group they set up families in the capital bringing wives of their own nationality and setting up permanent homes. Also they had many men involved in working on gold, in the liquor trade, in manufacturing and small business. Overall, they were less associated with manual labour than

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1 See pp. 189ff. for the role of Indians in trade.
2 Ibid. See also W.D.9.1.09 and Merab, pp. 110-11.
3 O.I.No. 21 (11.4.72), p.16.
4 Ibid. In a later period after 1910, Mohammed Aly virtually acted as an independent noble in the Ethiopian manner settling legal cases and punishing Indians so convicted. See F.0.915 for the Addis Ababa consular records after 1913.
the Greeks and Italians in the capital, but like these two latter groups the two periods of their greatest influx into the capital seem to have occurred in 1905 and 1907.

Unlike many of the other foreigners in Ethiopia, the Armenians seem to have had a long tradition of living in Ethiopia, as families and communities. Before the Battle of Adwa there were several families established in the capital and they seem to have formed a nucleus attracting other Armenians fleeing persecution in their homelands. One of the worst massacres took place in 1895 and brought many Armenians by various routes to Ethiopia, mainly to Addis Ababa and Harar. The most influential individual leader of the Armenian community was one of its foremost traders, Sarkis Terzian, but others were employed in the palace as gardeners and cooks, or were jewellers and small traders in the market.

The next big influx did not occur until 1905 when new massacres took place, this time in Russian Armenia, and the Jibuti to Deré Dawa

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1 ASMAI 36/11/45, Traversi to Antonelli, 15.4.90. For this and following, see also Guiseppe Martucci, La Comunità Armea d'Etiopia (Rome, 1940).
3 Ibid. See also D.M.Lang, Armenia... (London, 1970), p.287.
4 O.I.No. II, op.cit.
5 W.D.26/12/99; Powell-Cotton, p.97; Henri d'Orleans, p.200.
6 W.D.27.1.00; Powell-Cotton, pp. 117-8; Michel, p.523.
7 Lang, p.287 and N.S.Eth.62, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 17.9.08, p.190.
railway also facilitated immigration. Like the Syrians but unlike the Greeks, there seems to have been no real difficulty in absorbing the Armenian newcomers, largely because they came as families with the express intention of settling down as a community.

As the years passed the Armenians generally prospered and their businesses expanded, but some of them seem to have suffered from competition with the Indians in the capital. However, they came to supply the foreign population of the capital with fresh vegetables, grapes, wine and many of the water mills of the capital. More intense activity took place in their domination of the liquor trade and its distribution in the capital, and it was this aspect of their early years that made the strongest impression in the minds of Ethiopian informants. Although the liquor recalled here was the imported variety, the locally manufactured spirits that they made almost certainly constituted the majority of their turnover. They first administered the liquor monopoly in Addis Ababa and

1 N.S.Eth.62, op.cit.
2 Ibid.
3 See pp. 164-171.
4 Méraf, Vol. II, p.106, also O.I.No. II, op.cit. Unlike the Greeks, for instance, there never seems to have been any question of controlling their influx at Dére Dawá. Rather this was done by the larger families like the Terzians vouching for any Armenians that came and looking after them when they arrived. See O.I.No. I. & No. II, and section on Greeks, pp. 164-171.
5 N.S.Eth.62, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 17.9.08, pp.190-193.
7 Decaux, pp. 179-180.
8 O.I.No. III (23.11.71), pp. 4-5. Also O.I.No. II (9.11.71), p.3.
9 For instance, O.I.No. 17 (16.3.72), p.33.
10 N.S.Eth.65, Roux to Pichon, A/A, 18.3.07, pp. 144-5.
11 N.S.Eth.65, Lagarde to Bourgeois, Antato, 17.4.06, pp. 59-60, and 28.9.06. N.S.Eth.65, Roux to Pichon, A/A, 18.3.07, pp. 144-5; also 2.4.07, pp. 146-7 and 15.4.07, p.151.
other smaller ones of a similar nature. More importantly, however, it becomes clear during this period that the Armenians played a larger role than any other group of foreigners in training Ethiopians in the capital. In the palace many of them worked as engineers, clock makers and repairers, forgers, mechanics, and weavers. They trained slaves in the palace to weave large rugs and do other tasks, besides training servants in western ways of preparing food and doing domestic chores. They were also in the vanguard in trying to abolish the lébashay, a system of thief catching.

Furthermore, they were in the forefront of importing goods, especially made for the Ethiopian market. Significant, too, was the ire the Armenians raised in British diplomatic circles because of their influence as intimate advisers to Menilek. Armenians today are proud of the fact that they were independent of the various political colonial powers established in the capital and their ability to go against the wishes of the legation. But many

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1 N.S.Eth.21, Roux to Pichon, A/A, 12.3.07, pp. 80-81.
2 N.S.Eth.62, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 17.9.08, p.192.
3 N.S.Eth.55, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 4.1.10, pp. 183-4.
4 O.I.No. III (23.11.71), p.5.
5 N.S.Eth.63, Dépêche Colonial, 10.6.06, p.252. They made up 4 of the 14 signatures.
6 See pp. 136 -138.
7 See O.I.No. II (9.11.71), p.3.
8 F.O.371/190/1149/1970, Clerk to Grey, 15.5.07.
of them, 87 in Addis Ababa alone, were protected by the French
Legation to whom they sent a yearly delegation to present their
homage and good wishes. 1 So in June 1908 it came as a shock to
the Armenians when it was announced that the German government
had notified the Ethiopians that it had accepted under its pro-
tection Ottoman subjects within Ethiopia. 2 The Armenians preferred
French protection, especially considering German involvement in
the massacres of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 3 but eventually
many of them reluctantly signed the German registers. 4 The
main reason for agreeing to the change was the widespread feeling
of insecurity that was felt concerning Menilek's health during
Taytu's bid for power in 1909 to 1910. 5 They even asked the German
consulate to keep an inventory of their merchandise so that they
might attempt to get compensation should looting occur. 6

At this time the Armenians in Addis Ababa numbered about 146, 7
a substantial increase since 1901, 8 and had a doctor 9 but no priest.10

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2 N.S.Eth.62, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 8.6.08, p.164. See also N.S.
   Eth. 62, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 17.9.08, pp. 30-3.
3 Lang, p. 287.
4 N.S.62, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 22.12.08 and 10.2.09, p.201.
5 See pp. 661. Also N.S.Eth.10, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 14.11.09,
6 N.S.Eth.10, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 14.11.09, p.61. Encl. Une Délé-
   gation Arménienne à l'Allemande, 14.11.09.
8 W.D.28.11.08.
9 W.D.3.12.08.
The population group next in size after the Armenian was the Italian.¹

**Italians**

The Italians in the capital deserve somewhat more extensive treatment than the British or French because unlike them they formed a larger proportion of the population, mixed more with the Ethiopians, and participated to a much greater degree in the development of the capital. For within the Italian community there were not only metropolitan Italians but indigenous Eritreans who also attempted to reap the benefits of Italian protection. Their relationship with Menilek is also very revealing in the light thrown on the system of spokesmen. For the Italians, like the French, British, the Germans and Russians, depended on their diplomatic representative to be their spokesman in the Imperial Court and the Ethiopians readily understood their functions as being similar to that of the spokesmen of, say, the Tegré.

As with all the other foreign minorities in the capital, the first great influx of Italians occurred after the completion of the railway. In May of 1902 Menilek asked Ciccodicola to recruit for him men "of good character" to help build the road to Addis Abîm.² By December they had been collected and acted somewhat as a pump primer, encouraging many impoverished and unskilled foreign workers, mainly Greek and Italian put out of work by the suspension of the railway construction, to come to the capital to seek work.³ Those originally recruited worked under Castagna, who later employed them on many other construction projects in the capital in the succeeding years.⁴ It was this random influx of men that must have led to

¹Ibid.
²ASMAI 38/3/18, Martini to MAE, Asmara, 10.6.02. Annesso, Ciccodicola
the controls imposed on other groups, especially the Greeks who wanted
to come to the capital. The number of Italians was carefully con-
trolled by their embassy and by 1909 there were 42 Italians in
the capital.1 This influx of Italians became so pronounced by 1907
that Count Colli asked that a consular official be added to his
staff so that he might be able to cope with the increasing number
of court cases.2 Part of this was due not only to the increase in
cases involving metropolitan Italians, but also an increase in the
number of Italian protected Eritreans settling in the capital. They
included not only translators at the Italian Legation, but servants
of Italians and Italian diplomats.3 One particular case of Ḩebashay
revealed Shawa animosity against one of the Eritreans.4 But the
metropolitan Italians themselves were not respected as highly as
other foreign minorities and were treated much like the Greeks.5
Nonetheless, Ciccodicola often intervened with Menilek, as did
Harrington and Lagarde, in cases involving Ethiopians and their
citizens to make sure "justice was done".6 Like British, French
and German protected citizens the Italian protected citizens had
a distinct advantage over many Ethiopian minority groups because
the whole might of their respective metropolitan governments was

3 ASMAI 38/3/22, Ciccodicola to MAE, Addis Alem, 12.12.02.
4 De Castro, Vol. I, 224 and 239. ASMAI 37/2/10, Colli to MAE,
    A/A, 21.3.07.
2 ASMAI 38/4/37, Colli to MAE, A/A, 28.8.07.
3 ASMAI 38/3/25, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 12.9.03. ASMAI 38/4/39,
    Malvano to Governatore Asmara, Rome 26.7.07. Annesso pro-Memoria
    per Agnesa, F.0.1/34/No.18, London, 28.7.98.
5 AF/CFS/81 dossier 9, Governor Somalis Française to Ministère des
deemed to be behind them. Overall, the Italians had an impact on the capital far beyond what their relatively few members would have seemed to warrant.

Other European minorities

Of the other minorities in Addis Ababa, the French were the most numerous and had a great influence in the sense that they established French as the most widely spoken foreign language in the capital. But they were an extremely fragmented community with various factions constantly bickering among themselves.

The British, although their nationals were fewer in number, had many more under their protection and more individuals than the French involved in manual labour, although nowhere near the extent of the Greeks or Italians.

The influence of the 20 Germans in the capital was greatly exaggerated at the time especially in political and economic

Colonies, 10.11.08. Annexe, Official Journal of Eritrea, 24.10.08.

1 See pp. 66-91.

1 Merab, Vol. II, pp. 103-4 says 63 while the official Chancery records for the same year say 56, see N.S.Eth.62, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 31.3.09. They also had 10 protected citizens.

2 N.S.Eth.9, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 17.6.07, p.54.

3 N.S.Eth.8, Lagarde to Delcassé, A/A, 22.11.02, pp. 204-210.


5 Djibouti, 20.1.00, p.4.

6 F.O.371/192/19257,1906, General Report by Clerk, 11.6.07. Also W.D.28.11.08, 17.5.09, 29.11.08.


8 See especially N.S.Eth.9, pp. 30-48 and ff.
terms. Most of them only came towards the end of the period. The influence of the Russians was great at the time of Adwa and immediately afterwards, especially in the medical field, but their influence slackened after 1906.

But more importantly what all these minorities had in common was the high regard in which their diplomatic representatives were held, a direct reflection of Menilek's and the Ethiopian government's recognition of the strength of these world powers. Thus their citizens and protected citizens shared certain privileges of accessibility to and the protection of the Emperor, giving their residents in the capital a status that only can be compared with the closest retainers of the most powerful nobles in the land.

Conclusion

In general most of the foreign minorities were treated very much as if they were one of the Ethiopian population groups of the old highland core of the Empire, that is, like the followers of some important noble from Tegré (for instance, Ras Mängäsha or Dəjazmach Gəbrä Sellasē) or Gojam (Negua Täklä Haymanot). For, the major foreign powers like Italy, France or Great Britain were recognized as having a great deal of power and prestige and their nationals had to be treated accordingly. Other foreign minorities (like the Armenians or Greeks) were dealt with according to the strength of the consular court that happened to be representing them in the

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1 Ibid., and p. 60.
2 See pp. 73. Also Rollins, passim.
capital at the time. However, the personality and dependability of their spokesman in Menilek's court determined, to a large extent, the strength or weakness of their position. Thus the Indians, enjoying unvarying British protection, had a large degree of independence and the Armenians with spokesmen like Sarkis Terzian were also highly regarded. The Greeks on the other hand suffered from being shuttled from one protecting power to another and, like the Arabs, had a difficult time when they attempted to stand on their own as a community without the external protection of some great power.

Economically, the foreign minorities played a disproportionate role in the conduct of the import and export trade, but there is little or no proof that they established a colour bar to segregate themselves from the Ethiopians. The diplomatic community attempted to build their legations all in one quarter but Italy and France at first insisted on living closer to the centre of the capital. Those in commerce never followed the legations' lead. Had the widespread foreign desire for greater segregation been more successful, the level of violence in the city might well have been higher, since the Ethiopian population groups would have been very likely to object.
Part B: Ethiopian Population Groups

Introduction - Far more important than the foreign minorities in the capital were the Ethiopian population groups.\(^1\) They made up the vast bulk of the city's population and only as the period advances does a coherent central government policy for all the different Ethiopian population groups become clear, as well as their reactions to these policies. Their status in the capital depended on at least two main factors, first, the power and independence experienced by the political leaders of their homelands and the personal qualities of their spokesmen in the capital. However, another factor must not be overlooked but given equal emphasis, namely, the basic changeover in society from an actively expanding polity to one trying increasingly to come to terms with a relatively ordered administration of conquered areas, particularly those in the south, east and west.

Thus, the Ethiopian population of the city was divided into many different groups, each presided over and controlled to a greater or lesser extent by the rulers of Shāwa. Traditionally independent minorities from the North, like the Tegré, Gondārē and Wāllo had a far greater degree of independence than the recently conquered peoples from the south like the Dorzē, Wālamo or Guragē, and this was reflected in the way they were represented in Menilek's court. The former did not have Shāwa acting as spokesmen in cases of conflict or disagreement while the latter almost always did and yet the latter seemed to have members of their own community, sometimes recognised and decorated by the Shāwa who would solve minor

\(^1\)"Groups" is used here instead of "minorities" because the Oromo, making up a majority of the city's population, could hardly be referred to as a minority.
internal disputes and sometimes appeal important internal or
mixed disputes through various stages higher up in the hierarchy.
Outside of this basically civilian organization one finds a
parallel military hierarchy, much more highly centralized around
important and extremely loyal Menilek appointments. This seems to
have been a survival of the older form of control of minority
groups, upset by the totally new conditions posited by the Addis
Abäba urban complex. Here the military rulers were in many cases
playing the traditional role of acting as spokesmen for the
peoples in the regions they had conquered, but now this was
taking place in a new and quite different context, the city of
Addis Abäba, changing the traditional role significantly. Nothing
similar to this seems to have happened in the case of foreign
minorities. Again separate from these civilian and military groups
was the much smaller group of Ethiopians dependent on foreigners,
whose status was unsure, mainly because they acted as a bridge
between the Ethiopians and the foreigners.¹

The Oromo

The Oromo were so widespread and were ruled in so many different
ways, it is very difficult to fit them in as a group into the various
themes binding together the Ethiopian population groups in the capital.
To begin with they were probably a majority, or at least a plurality
of the city's population.² and completely surrounded the capital.³

¹Basically this section on Ethiopian population groups is organized
by the size of each community in descending order of magnitude, except
for the latter sections. The Shêmans are excluded. In this section
I deal only with those Ethiopian population groups on which I was
able to collect oral material and mainly look at them from the
point of view of how they fit politically, into the way the city
was run.

(25.1.08).

³Ibid.
Many Oromo clans in the empire were under direct military rule and thus would be represented in Menilek's court by the appropriate military spokesmen whenever a grievance arose or a difficult problem had to be solved. Yet in areas more completely assimilated by their Shawa rulers, they had spokesmen who were chosen from their own community or clan. Some of these latter Oromo spokesmen were among the most assimilated of all Ethiopian population groups into Amhara or rather Shawa culture largely because of the inter-marriage and conversion to Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity that had been going on for centuries. Yet many, if not most, of these groups tended to use Oromo rather than Amharic among themselves. Not merely were there nobles of Shawa/Oromo descent high in the hierarchy of the palace, or, even provincial rulers, but there were also local Oromo leaders who had allied themselves to their Amhara overlords. Many of them like Abābē Tufa, Abba Koran and Abba Mojjo were part of the Färē Ṭēčāngā or imperial cavalry, others were in the Ṣega Bet. Oromo merchants, on the other hand, would probably have turned to the most prominent members of the market to gain redress of their grievances.

The Oromo originally inhabited the whole area surrounding Addis Abāba and constituted at least 20,000 out of a total population of 60,000, but also generally made up the bulk of weekly and seasonal

\[\text{References}\]

3. Missions-Tiding, Vol. 75 (1909), p. 43, 23.1.08, N.S.Eth. 1, Roux to Pichon, A/A., 53.1.07, pp. 117-8. N.S.Eth. 64, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 4.11.08, passim. I found it difficult to gain any oral material on this aspect because informants, especially merchants in the city, were loath to admit to being Oromo and when they claimed to be Amhara said the Oromo played little or no role in trade.
The Addis Ababa market as it became more of an imperial rather than a local market, attracted more and more Oromo from ever increasing distances. The Addis Ababa area had also been a religious centre for the Oromo and after the Amhara had taken over must have retained much of its earlier prestige. More important, perhaps, was the long history of contact, of collaboration and resistance, between the Amhara and the Oromo of the area. Strong ties with certain factions and descent groups within the Tulama Oromo probably led to speedier assimilation, while many of those who resisted were packed off to other parts of the empire. Contemporary written sources only say that Oromo from the Addis Ababa and Addis Alam areas were moved, with little or no compensation in land or money, to other areas of the empire, but oral informants while confirming this, fill in some vital details. There are two major local Oromo clans in the Addis Ababa area, the Gulalle and the Gellan, the former generally collaborated with the Amhara, while the latter resisted. The Gulalle received

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1 See Merab, Vol. II, p.116. Also Missions-Tidings, Vol. 75 (1909), p.43, in a letter dated 23.1.08. Population estimates are very difficult since many people only came in from the countryside on big festivals or market days.

2 Ibid. See also Ferdinand Diary, paseim and pp. 222-224, 231.

3 See p. 341 - 375.

4 This goes back at least as far as the campaigns of Wäsän Säggäid and of Sahélä Sellasse in the first half of the 19th century, in the area of Addis Ababa (see Darkwah, pp. 40 and 58-59; see also W.C. Harris, The Highlands of Ethiopia... (London, 1844), Vol. III, p.37) and continued right through to the foundation of Addis Ababa.

5 To go into great detail distinguishing the resisters versus the collaborators is quite beyond the scope of the thesis. The best sources are Ferdinand's diary, E. Haberland's Galla Sud-Äthiopiens (Stuttgart, 1963) (Henceforth, Haberland) and above all local elders.

6 W.D. 20.11.00, Missions-Tidings, Vol. 75 (1909), p.43, 23.1.08.

7 See for instance the Ferdinand Diary, 11.12.68, 9.1.69, 28.1.69 and 20.2.72. Also Haberland, especially, pp. 522-32. The situation was very involved, but this is not, perhaps, the time to go into the history of their relations.
lands in the province of Arusi, in areas called Boru\(^1\) and, perhaps, Chelalo,\(^2\) while the G\(\text{\textumlaut{}n}\) received no compensation.\(^3\) Other Oromo clans, the Abechu and Me\(\text{\textumlaut{}a}\) were given land in Q\(\text{\textumlaut{}rsa}\) in Arusi\(^4\) and the Ad\(\text{\textumlaut{}a}\) in Chelalo in Arusi.\(^5\)

When Menilek decided to establish a capital at Addis Al\(\text{\textumlaut{}m}\),\(^6\) much the same happened to the Oromo inhabitants there as had happened, and continued to happen,\(^7\) to the Oromo in the Addis Ab\(\text{\textumlaut{}ba}\) area.\(^8\) Oromo in the Addis Al\(\text{\textumlaut{}m}\) area were also sent off to Arusi.\(^9\)

However, the scale and effects of this migration must not be overemphasized. The numbers involved among these semi-nomadic peoples could not have been very large and many would have perforce moved simply because the increased Amhara settlement ruined the cycle of their pastoral life and in some cases settled agricultural life. It seems clear that a majority of the Oromo, 20,000,\(^10\) remained in

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\(^1\)O.I. No. 34 (6.6.72), pp. 13-14. O.I. No. 29 (12.5.72).
\(^3\)O.I. No. 34, \textit{op.cit.} and O.I. No. 29, \textit{op.cit.} My informants were unwilling to comment any further but the conclusions are there to be drawn.
\(^4\)\textit{Tbid.}
\(^5\)O.I. No. 19, \textit{op.cit.}
\(^6\)See pp. 97ff.
\(^7\)Missions-Tiding, Vol. 73 (1909), p.43, 23.1.08.
\(^8\)W.D. 20.11.00. O.I. No. 19 (19.3.72), p.7.
\(^9\)O.I. No. 19, \textit{op.cit.}
the Addis Ababa area rather than migrate. The Amhara continued throughout the period to fear that the more numerous Oromo would revolt against them despite any real indication that they were likely to do so.\(^1\) It was these pastoralists and settled agriculturists who supplied the food for the capital and cultivated the lands of the Emperor and Amhara nobles.\(^2\) They were also expected to give a certain number of days in labour per week or month according to the type of superimposed Shawa land tenure involved.\(^3\) The most widely remembered task to which the Oromo were put was the building of the Addis Ababa road. Taking three years to complete while many labourers died of exhaustion, it involved one of the very few examples where a large scale revolt occurred.\(^4\) Other tasks to which the Oromo were put involved, for example, splitting stones for building and working in the stone quarries,\(^5\) herding the royal cattle,\(^6\) or working as servants for foreign or Ethiopian masters.\(^7\)

Religiously,\(^8\) the Oromo were either Ethiopian Orthodox Christians,

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\(^1\) N. S. Eth. 19, Lagarde to Delcassé, Addisbaba, 29.12.00, pp. 126-7.


\(^3\) See also above, pp. 103–114.

\(^4\) ASMAI 38/4/23, Colli to MAE, A/A, 10.7.03, Also I. O. No. 39 (23.5.72), p. 5.

\(^5\) W.D. 3.2.09. Several Oromo were killed by a dynamite explosion at the site.


\(^7\) Missions-Tiding, Vol. 75 (1909), pp. 122 and 44. One more extensive category might be added here, that of slaves. However, there seems to be little firm evidence to suggest that Oromo of the immediate Addis Ababa area were enslaved and thus this will be dealt with below. See pp. 334–339.

\(^8\) When dealing with religion and language in the context of the Oromo the same problems of their wanting to identify with the Amhara, that is, with the Amharic language and the Christian Church, are encountered. Oromo is widely spoken throughout Addis Ababa and almost exclusively in the surrounding countryside. As to the situation at the turn of the century there seems to be little reliable information.
Muslims, Catholics or animists.  

Ethiopian Orthodox churches were early on founded in the Addis Ababa area on sites previously sacred to the Oromo, while the Catholic Finfinni mission was established there by Menilek. Ethiopian priests remained and continued to minister to converts in the area.

The Oromo seem not to have engaged in the institutions of Mahbär or Edder but did suffer from adverse discrimination when the Amhara institution of lebashay was administered in their areas. For they had their own institution of afersata which they considered to be less corrupt and more democratic.

The Oromo who remained in the immediate Addis Ababa area seem to have been one of the Ethiopian population groups most swiftly and effectively assimilated into Sháwa culture. Thus it was very difficult to distinguish the one from the other. Those who retained a degree of independence came largely from areas progressively far away from the capital and, as has been mentioned, had spokesmen of varying importance, involved mostly in the sectors of the household dealing with horses and the cavalry, whom they generally used as their spokesmen.

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2 See pp. 34 ff.
3 Ferdinand Diary, 26, 10, 68.
4 Ferdinand Diary, see esp. 1879-1885. AlHaa Kenfe, 19 Hamle E.C. (27, 8, 07). Semeur IV, facing page 484. The only indication of the numbers is Merab’s reference (Vol. II, p. 115) to 2,000 "Abyssins, Gallas, Gouragues" who were Catholics.
5 O. I, No. 14, No. 19, No. 29 and No. 30, passim. Also see the glossary. They were different types of voluntary organisations. The Oromo were unlike the Gurage who seem to have had both institutions, see below pp. 198-199.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
The Dorzé were the best example in the city of a minority group almost totally associated with one type of seasonal employment, weaving. Moreover, they were a very good example of the way minority groups were represented by spokesmen in the Amhara political system. The Dorzé had four kinds of spokesmen: at first, there seem to have been elders who decided together what was to be done; later, a local member of the community was elected for a one year term; thirdly, a perhaps more eminent member of the community who had been recognized by the Amhara and given a title was appointed as their leader and finally a highly placed figure in the imperial household, often a noble, was appointed over them who would intercede in Menilek's court for the Dorzé and, if necessary, take a case all the way up to the Emperor.

The two main spokesmen appointed by Menilek from his household were Sahafé Te'ez'az Gibrë Sellasé and Fitawrarì Habtä Giyorgis, but the Dorzé generally turned to the latter. Significantly enough, most Dorzé lived on land that belonged to one or the other

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1 Here they were similar to the Gurage (see pp. 198-303) both in the matter of spokesmen and in the seasonal nature of the labour they performed in the capital.

2 O.I. No. 22 (17.4.72), pp. 9-15. It has been especially difficult to be sure of the chronology with the Dorzé, for the oldest informant seemed only to be able to remember back to the end of the period in question. However, he and others assured me that much the same situation existed after the Battle of Adwa. Checking his material against more scattered references from other informants gave the bulk of his assurances a good deal of weight. See O.I. No. 28; O.I. No. 40; O.I. No. 31 and O.I. No. 3.

3 O.I. No. 22, p.12.
of these two important but non-Dorze figures. However, before they went so far as to appeal to them, problems would first be taken to their own Alaga, or leader, who was annually elected, men like Alaga Bilego, Chalogo, Ejoge, and Ato Molla who were considered to be wise men of the community in the capital. According to Ato Qito Gayto the elders (or shemagelle) were more important in the very early days for settling internal disputes, men like Wademé, Anko, Kobe, Daqa, Hoza and Hassa, all from the Dorze homelands. Some of each of the Alaga and Shemagelle groups were later given Shawa titles by Fitawrari Habtā Giyorgis to give them greater prestige within the Dorze community or to recognize the degree of influence they had already achieved.

In 1910 the Dorze community in Addis Ababa was fairly sizeable, probably including about 3,000 Dorze who were largely living in the northern part of the city. A European source for the period indicates that the traditional "home industry" of weaving was falling off at this time (1909) because of foreign imports. From the first Dorze who came to Addis Ababa early in Menilek's reign, a group of about fifty were selected to go to Ankobār to be educated in the traditional Shawa methods of weaving. In fact the term Dorze

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2 Ibid. He was unable to put them into any chronological order. See also O.I. No. 28, p. 9.
5 J.T.Craig, "Abyssinia", Cairo Scientific Journal, Vol. II, 9/08. Unfortunately oral material was unable to throw any further light on this point.
6 O.I. No. 12, p. 18.
at present is almost synonymous with weaving throughout the capital.¹
And yet at the turn of the century hints are given in the interviews
that the Dorze were not always weavers in Addis Ababa. One of my
best informants told how before he settled in the capital and became
a full-time weaver he had been one of Fitawrari Habtä Giyorgis's
soldiers.² Other informants when speaking of the organization of
the palace insisted that Dorze participated in areas and functions
of the palace organization other than just weaving. Thus some worked
in the sega béét or the house where meat was prepared, as butchers
for the inhabitants and visitors to the palace.³

There seem to have been two major reasons for the Dorze to
come to the capital: first, in order to carry on litigation brought
on appeal from local courts to the capital and to pay labour taxes
demanded of them by Shāwa.⁴ Sometimes the elected elders in their
lands of origin, largely around Arba Mench,⁵ would "assign" certain
people including children to go to the capital and fulfill the labour
obligations (lēgeber) of the whole community.⁶ Generally, the Dorze

¹ This was true in virtually every interview in which I enquired about
the Dorze. See especially, O.I. No. 28 and O.I. No. 22, O.I. No.
40, O.I. No. 31 and O.I. No. 3, passim.
² O.I. No. 22, p. 2.
⁴ O.I. No. 28, pp. 4 and 10-11. See also No. 22, passim.
⁵ O.I. No. 22, pp. 12-17.
⁶ Ibid.
would return to their homelands and to their wives who never came
to the capital.\footnote{1}{O.I. No. 22, p.11.} at the Ethiopian new year, in September, after the
tracks had dried out sufficiently to travel.\footnote{2}{O.I. No. 28, p.4. O.I. No. 3 (14,12,71), pp. 8-9.}

Where they worked and lived in the capital depended on their
employer. If they worked for the government they tended to live
on the plots allotted to them by the Šhafé Te’esaz, or Minister
of the Pen, or if they worked for the market (1eq̱ḇaya), they lived
near there on the lands of Fitawrari Habtā Giyorgis or on the
lands of the noble from whose province they had originally come.\footnote{3}{O.I. No. 22, pp. 4, 2 and 15. O.I. No. 3, pp. 8-9.}

The degree to which the Dorzé had been affected by the Shawa
in the capital is difficult to establish. They continued to speak
their native tongue among themselves at home and the few who knew
Amharic communicated for the whole community with the Shawa.\footnote{4}{O.I. No. 22, p.11. They did not know Oromo. Also O.I. No. 28, confirms this.}

Although all my Dorzé informants insisted that they had been
Christians before the Amhara had conquered their lands,\footnote{5}{O.I. No. 22, pp. 11-12. O.I. No. 28, p.5.} this
was not confirmed by knowledgeable Amhara priests.\footnote{6}{O.I. No. 33 (30,5,72), p.20.} They also
claimed that they had not been victimized as other minority groups
by Amhara institutions like the Šbashay.\footnote{7}{O.I. No.22, Ato Qito Gāyto, pp. 21-22.} Nor did they adopt
typical Addis Abāba institutions like the Mahbār and Edder until
after the Italian Occupation of 1935-41, although they may have had a Tewa ኤብብር, similar to the Amhara one from the very earliest times.¹

All of which would seem to indicate that the Dorze were, perhaps, one of the least integrated of the minorities under Amhara control in the capital. Their special status as weavers would have made them suspect by other groups as possessors of the buda or evil eye, thus they were largely regarded as a separate caste and would not be so readily absorbed and assimilated as some Gurage speaking peoples or other population groups.² But more importantly, the independent and dominant position as spokesmen of እብ्रሮ ሰላሰ and, more especially, ሳብ ዳይሬር, made the Dorze extremely dependent on these two men for any cases they might want settled in their community or for intercession should any harsh measures be imposed upon them by the central government, especially those dealing with taxation and labour.

The Wälamo

It is not clear who the Shawa spokesmen for the Wälamo were in Addis Ababa in the period up to 1910, but probably their masters and the rulers of Wälamo, ደሶንጆ and later የስጫ ኃ nga,³ while the only local Wälamo leader in the area where many of them lived, Wälamo የ 있어서,⁴ was perhaps, Abdisa Amaru.⁵ However, Tona, who had been their ruler in Wälamo, seems to have acted as their spokesman when

¹Ibid., pp. 13-14.
²For a further discussion of this point, see pp. 124 ff.
³See Bairu Tufia's biography in Ms. of the Dictionary of National Biography.
⁴See ገርጋ, Vol. II, p. 34. Also Colli di Felližano, "Nei paesi galla
he was resident in Addis Ababa.¹

The Walamo had been a source of slaves for quite some time but especially after the expeditions of 1893 and 1894,² so that by 1909 there were about 5,000 Walamo in the capital.³ In the imperial household they filled a variety of occupations in the Sega Bet (meat house)⁴ as Mentaf Sāratāgngna (rug workers)⁵ Yēhenētha Ashkār (guards at the gates)⁶ and as workers for the church.⁷ Many Walamo were also settled in Addis Alēm by Menilek but who their leader there was, if he was different from the ones in Addis Ababa, is unclear.⁸ Claims were made as with the Dorzé that the Walamo were Christians before the Amhara came, and even more doubtfully that they spoke not only the language of Walamo, but also Oromo, the language of the Dorzé, and Amharic.⁹

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¹ *Sud dello Scioa*, B.S.G.I., 1905. O.I. No. 31, *passim.*


² See pp. 41-49. The separation between the Walamo and the Dorzé is basically arbitrary, except in the sense that the majority of the Dorzé had a skill, weaving, and oral sources differentiate between them and the Walamo although they may have at times come from the same geographical area.


⁴ O.I. No. 31 (29.5.72), pp. 4-14 and O.I. No. 40 (30.4.72) pp. 12-13.


⁷ O.I. No. 33 (27.5.72), *passim.*

⁸ O.I. No. 5 (20.1.72), p. 16 and O.I. No. 33 and No. 31, *passim.*

⁹ O.I. No. 31 (29.5.72), p. 9. As with the case of the Dorzé I would tend to doubt both claims, the first because of the account of the take
Nothing is terribly clear so far as the history of the Wàlamo in Addis Abàba are concerned. Yet it seems that the system of spokesmen for their community was comparable to the Dorzé and Guragé model, although the Wàlamo may have been more tightly controlled by the Shàwà.

The Guragé

The Guragé had fewer kinds of spokesmen than the Dorzé, just elders, leaders of their community with Shàwà titles, or highly placed members of Menilek's court who might intercede on the Guragé's behalf to mitigate measures to be enforced in their community or carry local grievances to the Imperial Court. Unlike other minorities to the south of the Awash river, they had had long and continuous contact with the Amhara and had a sizeable Christian population before the Amhara take-over, as well as a fairly widespread trading community. Thus the assimilation process with certain sections of the Guragé was very much more swift and thorough-going than with many other minorities. However, other sections of the Guragé speaking peoples, were more akin to peoples like the Dorzé than their fellow Guragé, in the degree to which they were integrated into the Shàwà capital. These are the Guragé which will be concentrated on. Like the Dorzé or some Wàlamo the labour they performed in the capital was largely seasonal.

oyer of Wàlamo (see J.G. Vanderheym, "Une Expedition avec le Negous Menélïk...", Le Tour du Monde, Vol. 2 (1896), pp. 97-144 (Henceforth Vanderheym) and the second because his Amharic was almost unintelligible.

1The differences between the various sections and groups of the Guragé will not be gone into in detail since they are beyond the scope of this thesis. But for the background and history of one of these groups see Bahru Zewde, "The Aymàllàl Gurage in the Nineteenth Century: A Political History", Transafrican Journal of History, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 55-68.
The most widely mentioned spokesmen for the Gurage were Fitawrari Habt Giyorgis, Ra' Le'ul Shaggad and Djazmach Balcha, all highly placed in Menilek's court. Representatives elected from among the community were not mentioned by my informants, and the contrast with the situation among the Dorze is striking. Yet unlike the condition of any other Ethiopian population group from the newly conquered parts of Menilek's empire, some early Gurage inhabitants of Addis Ababa acquired rest or inheritable land in or near the city. Perforce, these Menilek land grants automatically gave these men entree to the imperial court and made them elders to be reckoned with in an Amhara culture so centred on the land and its owners.

Before the battle of Adwa, the Gurage concentrated south of Addis Ababa are said, nonetheless, to have been quite widespread throughout Ethiopia as small traders who depended on family ties for their trading networks. Certainly by the turn of the century they were well established in small scale trade in the capital and acted as middlemen for the Shawa coming into the capital to sell their goods. Most of these merchants may have been Muslims.

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1 O. I. No. 8, p.1 and O. I. No. 9, p.3.
2 O. I. No. 8, p.2; O. I. No. 9, p.4. See also pp. 103-114.
3 A. Hoben, Land Tenure Among the Amhara of Ethiopia (Chicago, 1973), passim.
4 Personal communication from Faqadu Gadamu.
7 O. I. No. 20 (11.4.72), p.15.
but other Gurage seem to have preceded these men into the presence of the Imperial Court and not only as the wives and concubines of important nobles. One informant even intimated that when Menilek raided Gādābānan he captured its woman leader,

"Wayzār Wālātā Sellāsē. He made her his concubine (qubat) ... She was authorised or given power by the king to organise certain sections of the imperial palace. Then all Gurage started to flow into Addis Ābāba claiming they were her relatives ... Some of them became household servants; some baked enjēra (the Amhara staple, a kind of bread ... some worked in the kitchens and then they surpassed in number the Amharas in these areas."

It was probably people such as these, the relatives of the Gurage wives of the Shāwa that were the ones to be most quickly absorbed into the Shāwa hierarchy.

But there was another and much more numerous group of Gurage who were at the opposite end of the social scale and kept at arm's length by their Shāwa overlords. These men comprised the bulk of the work force of the capital and two of their most often mentioned tasks were breaking stones to build houses and roads and the planting of eucalyptus trees. They contributed a great deal of labour to the building of the Addis Ālām road. Merab was probably referring only to these men when he said there were 2,000 Gurage in the capital c. 1909.


2O.I. No. 3, pp. 9-10.


To provide this labour the Gurage did not necessarily migrate each year from their homelands all the way to the capital, but would often stay for a short period and later live in Gaja Sifar south of Addis Ababa. They hoped to obtain rest (inheritable land) in the capital by doing their work well. Some of those who did were: Gudana Gabi (a worker, sarratagnna in the Palace), Damboba Róe, Abba Mammo, Gabi Turamo, Gabi Räfäté, and Bādada Wägäto. Some of the reasons given for this movement north were the effects of the famine, and the need to pay the land taxes expected of them by their Shawa overlords. The required tax was one day of labour out of eight and generally men came and worked for a month as well in order to pay the land tax. Later some settled in Addis Ababa itself, in the southern part of the city on the lands of Fitawari Habta Giyorgis where many of them grew vegetables. Again as with the Dorze a minority's

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1 O.I. No. 8, pp. 1-5. O.I. No. 9, pp. 3-4.
2 O.I. No. 8, p.2. This might be achieved by being, for instance, an especially skilled leatherworker for the Emperor or a noble.
3 Ibid.
4 O.I. No. 9, p.4.
5 O.I. No. 8, p.3.
6 Ibid. Also O.I. No. V, p.4.
7 O.I. No. 8, pp. 2 and 4 and O.I. No. 9, pp. 9-10. Whether there was any actual settlement of Gurage in Addis Ababa before 1910 can not be fully established. But since Ras TäaMmä was the noble who tried to take some of their land away from them, according to Basha Bobas, and the Ras died in 1911 it seems fairly clear that some settlement must have taken place some years before that date.
8 See pp. 193 ff.
spokesman was also their landlord. A not altogether felicitous relationship one would have thought.

However, the case in which Habtš Giyorgis’s intervention was most prominent came when Ras TseMma, shortly before his death, succeeded in taking away the land the Gurage had been given after the battle of Adwa. After TseMma’s death (in April 1911) the land was restored through Habtš Giyorgis’s good offices.¹

Many more Gurage than Dorze seem to have known Amharic, especially the Soddo or Aymillal Gurage.² Furthermore, the Gurage were, like the Oromo and Tigré, divided into those who were Christian, Muslim and believers in animist cults,³ and suffered more than any other minority group from the oppressiveness of the Shewa institution of the Lébáshay.⁴ This type of harassment may have contributed to the fact that they were the first minority group to organize the edder or self-help, voluntary organizations in the capital.⁵

In their earliest days the edder were almost entirely restricted to organizing a decent funeral for its members and other functions of the organization do not seem to have been added until after the Italian occupation.⁶

¹ O.I. No. 8, p.1. See also O.I. No. 9, pp. 3-4.
² See O.I. Nos. 8 and 9 passim. Knowledge of Amharic among Gurage from other areas was perhaps less common.
⁴ O.I. No. 8, p.2.
⁵ O.I. No. 9, p.6. O.I. No. 31; and O.I. No. 3, pp. 1-2.
⁶ O.I. No. 9, passim.
The position of the Tegre, Amhara and Gondar minorities in Addis Ababa was very different from that of say the Gurage or Dorze, largely because the relationship of their provinces to the Shawa monarchy was of a wholly different order. While the lands of the Gurage and most of the Dorze were under the military rule of Menilek's great general, Fitawrari Habta Giyorgis, Tegre and Begemder (the province of the Gondar) had a very much greater degree of independence and, significantly, were nearly always ruled by an indigenous noble family. Thus when grievances arose within the local Tegre or Gondar community in the capital, they would in many cases be brought before the Emperor by the governor of their home province. In effect it would be looked upon by the imperial household as more of a diplomatic rather than an administrative problem, similar to dealings with a member of the French, British or Italian protected communities in the capital, rather than the Dorze or Gurage case already described.

However, the situation was more complicated than that because of the economic factor. Merchants did not necessarily work through their provincial rulers but through their own representatives, generally the foremost of their merchants. In turn they dealt with the Haggadas, a member of the household, who in the early days of the capital was a merchant who had originally come from Gondar.

The Tegre and Gondar had a long history of contact with Shawa

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1 See pp. 128-136.

2 See below, pp. 128-136 Also pp. 316-329.

3 I mean by this term Tegre and Tegrigagna speakers, that is to say those from Eritrea and the province of Tegre proper.
not only as merchants but as specialised workers and as churchmen. Tegré merchants in Shawa were both Christian and Muslim, but the latter, the WaTarj, outnumbered the former. Also in the market were Tegré jewellers who specialised in gold and silver filigree work, two of the most renowned seemed to have been Ato Buhlto and Bäjerond Wäldh Giyorgis. A reliable informant placed the number of these two groups of Tegré merchants and craftsmen at 11 in about 1905.

After the Battle of Adwa, Tegré immigrants came not only from the province of Tegré but also from Eritrea. In 1907 the Italian legation at the capital complained that too many people were coming from Eritrea without sufficient documentation and it was difficult to stretch the category of protected citizens to include them. By 1909 the Tegré numbered about 1,000 and Shawa resentment over the large influx of Tegré into the capital due to Empress Taytu's appointments of relatives and friends from the north to administrative positions during the course of her unsuccessful attempt to increase

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1 See p. 344.
2 O.I. No. 21 (11.4.72), pp. 11-12 and 17-18. See also pp. 367 ff.
3 Vivian pp. 190-191. Also Powell-Cotton, p. 110.
4 O.I. No. 2, pp. 3-4 and O.I. No. 3, p. 11.
5 O.I. No. 21, p. 4.
6 ASMAI 38/3/25, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 12.9.03. ASMAI 38/4/39, Malvano to Governor at Asmara, Rome, 26.7.07, Annesso pro-Memoria per Agessa.
her power. These appointees in turn would almost certainly have
brought large numbers of retainers to the capital. Many of the
spokesmen for the Tegré community were almost certainly these newly
appointed men, if not the Queen herself, while the merchant community
seems to have depended on men like Abreham Hagos, Ato Iyasu and
Shyed Badra.

The most important long term impact of the Gondäré on Addis
Ababa was almost certainly in trade. Under the leadership of
Næggadras Aggeddaw both Muslim and Christian merchants and their
families settled largely in one particular area of the city, Næggadé
SRfhM, and played a large role in the increasing commercial importance
of the capital. Another longstanding Gondäré community in
the capital was an elite corps of the "Gondäré" who had been settled
in the area before the capital was named. They were still present
through 1910 but most of them had been given extensive lands around
the capital and in the provinces for their services to the Emperor.
Then in 1908 to 1910 there was a new infusion of Amhara into the
capital in the form of Empress Taytu's relatives and hangers on.

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1 N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, 30.4.09, p.119. O.I. No. V (14.12.71),
p.4. See also pp. 8-14.
2 O.I. No. 20, pp. 11-12.
3 See pp. 31-34.
4 Ibid. & W.D. 28-30.3.00, 4.10.00 and 6.10.00, O.I. No. 21 (11.4.72),
pp. 17-18. O.I. No. 27 (17.5.72), p.I. However, unlike Tegré
and as one would expect from a declining centre of skilled labour,
there seem to have been few if any gold or silver smiths from Gondär
5 Ferdinand Diary, 8.11.71.
6 O.I. No. 18 (17.3.72), pp. 6-7.
7 N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 30.4.09, p.119.
so that their population reached some 3,000 and part of this was almost certainly from the present province of Wollo.

In the years after the Battle of Adwa, there were not very many traders from Wollo in Addis Ababa but their numbers increased in the years that followed. More numerous were the soldiers in the capital mainly under the control of Ras Mika'el. When he was resident he would have at least three or four hundred followers who would live around his house situated now near the present Jan Meda, many of whom would remain in Addis Ababa to represent him when he returned to his province. This in effect reflected Menilek's court in miniature. As with those from Gondar or Gojam, the vast majority of the men from Wollo spoke Amharic while very few spoke Oromo; they were both Muslim and Christian, few believing in animism.

A very reliable informant's comment on this was most revealing: "Our countrymen were easily converted from one religion to another." Most of the people of Wollo changed their religion if they found meat.

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2. O.I. No. 21 (11.4.72), p.18. Mérab does not mention them as a separate group and they would probably be included among the figure for Amhara, i.e. 3,000, see p.116.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. O.I. No. 21, p.4.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. They seem not to have been harassed by institutions like lëbashaw.
In language and religion of course the Gondaré were close to the Shàwa, although the effects of theological differences were not insignificant. Nonetheless, many priests of the Addis Abàba churches were educated in Gondar or even came from there. The Gondaré too, seem to have been on equal terms with the Shàwa in institutions like the Mahbàr.

The Tegré, Gondaré and Amhara, especially the Christians, had a privileged position in the capital compared with other minorities, for they could lean on the support of their provincial rulers. Yet this is not to say that they did not upon occasion arouse the active animosity of the Shàwa. Empress Taytu's bid for power in 1909-1910 being but one case in point.

Other Minority Groups—Many other minority groups had a lesser impact on the capital and thus are not dealt with at length, particularly the Adâre, Gojame, Jemraa and Wllaga. The impact of the Adâre on the capital was very small particularly in the area of trade where one might have thought their influence would have been greater.

Conclusion

One of the most striking phenomena affecting all the different Ethiopian population groups living in the capital was the very low level of violence among these various groups. Violence, fear of robbery

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1 Heruy, NhåHeywät Tarik, for instance, p. 63.
2 W.D. 2,10.00, 1,11.00.
3 On many of these and other groups I was unable to gather sufficient material to go into them at any length. Nor was I able to gather enough on their spokesmen.
4 On them I could find little information as a separate group, although they would probably have been very similar to the Gondaré in their involvement in the church and to the Wlllo in being closely tied to their ruler, in their case Negus Tâklâ Haymanot. Merâb estimates that there were 1,000 in the capital in 1909 (see pp. 116-16).  
5 O.I.No. 3, p.11. O.I.No. 21, p.18. Harâr had long played an important
and pillage, were very much a part of the lives of foreign minorities in the capital but not to such a great extent it appears among Ethiopians in the city. Many means were used to control violence but the following seem to have been the most important. The military nature of the structure of the city and the noble households that made up most of the capital was one and another was the savage nature of the punishment for even minor criminal offences. But more important, perhaps, was the role of xenophobia and anti-foreign feeling in the capital. It seems clear that this had a profound effect upon the social history of all the population groups of the capital. For it may well explain why in a city with so many soldiers and constantly fluctuating population that violence, especially between Ethiopian population groups, was successfully kept at such a low level. Whether this outlet was created intentionally or not, especially in the immediate post-Adwa period, can not be wholly established, however, there is little evidence it was intentional. Nonetheless, xenophobia did provide an outlet for pressures that existed within the rapidly expanding capital; pressures and animosities that might otherwise have been inwardly directed were instead dissipated by being aimed at Europeans and foreigners.

But a more general point also needs to be made, Addis Ababa was a rarity, if not unique in Ethiopian history as a plural society. Here was a mixture of a wide variety of ethnic groups held together not because they were an army but because they formed an urban complex,

role in the trade of the Horn of Africa (see pp. 342–350) and yet it was the Amhara rulers of Harār, in particular ṭaṣ ṭaṣṣonnen and ṭissadras ṭaḥabtē, who exercised control over trade through their own traders.
the nodal point of the Empire. The importance of each of the population groups in the capital can be seen by the extent to which officers in Menilek's army, men like HabtÌ Giyorgis and nobility like Ras TnsÌmma or Ras Dargé tried to capture or gain the support of various immigrant constituencies for local power purposes. Furthermore, the various ethnic groups seem not to have resisted these efforts or those of Menilek's expanding urban administration and acquiesced in what must be regarded as innovations in Ethiopian methods of administration. However, one must hasten to add that these 'innovations' were always within the traditional framework and rarely strayed very far from the traditional forms of Ethiopian political behaviour.
Part C. Interpreters, Soldiers, Salaried Workers, Artisans and Slaves in the Capital.

Introduction - In this section an attempt will be made to look at the population of the city not from the point of view of the ethnic origin of its various components, but rather with an eye to distinguish, in a very broad and selective way, some of the kinds of labourers there were in the capital up to 1910, and some of the ways such groups of people were represented at and communicated with the Imperial Court and household. One of the basic problems of such an attempt must necessarily be trying to understand the status of what the European literature refers to as a "slave" and discovering the relevance of the term "caste" in this context. Much of the labour of the imperial palace, as well as that of the noble households was stocked by means of slaves, from the ranks of interpreters down to those of the lowly metal worker. Yet a discussion of the term "caste" really only seems to apply to the latter category.1 Overall, most of the workers dealt with in this section were permanently resident in the capital, unlike the semi-permanent Gurage or Dorze who migrated to the capital to give labour required of their provinces or to earn money.

Interpreters

Interpreters played an influential and powerful role in the imperial court and in the development of the city because of their position as mediators between the traditional and the foreign. Menilek's and the Legations' top-flight interpreters were, with a few exceptions, Ethiopians and many of them had been captives and

1Discussion of this point will be reserved until pp. 124 ff.
often slaves, while others were educated by missionaries in Ethiopia. Despite their humble beginnings their regular and free access to the Emperor\(^1\) assured them a degree of influence that might not normally be assumed for such a lowly position. Some became influential in banks, others favourites of the king and still others, substantial landowners, at least as a partial result of their position near the centre of power.\(^2\) It is interesting to speculate on how symbolic or representative they might be as an example of those westernized Ethiopians resident in the capital. They were, however, not a cohesive group, each one being in an eminent position to be his own spokesman.

Gerazmach Yosef, the famous translator of the Treaty Wechale\(^3\), seems to have performed as Menilek's main interpreter in the immediate post-Adwa period until his death some time between 1899 and August 1901.\(^4\) He was then replaced by a Greek, Attanasius Sourvis,\(^5\) but Menilek also had at least one other interpreter, "Gabriel W. Gobano.\(^6\) Both had been befriended and educated by the Catholic mission and one had probably been a slave. Sourvis remained as Menilek's main interpreter until at least December 1903\(^7\) and probably much later since he was appointed to an important position in the Taytu backed bank in

\(^1\)N.S. Eth. 9, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 18.3.09, pp. 185-6.

\(^2\)See below, p. 213.

\(^3\)Djibouti, 24.8.01, p.3.

\(^4\)Djibouti, 24.8.01, p.3.

\(^5\)F.O. 1/36/No. 18 Incl. 3, A/A, 26.5.99. See also mention of an interpreter of Menilek's "a Galla from Limmu", in AlHosken's, Ter 1893 E.C. Jan./Feb. 1901/.

\(^6\)See Skinner, pp. 78 and 85, also W.D. 11.9.00.
By October, 1907 Ato Haylä Maryam had become an important interpreter and more so as time passed.

The various Legations all had their interpreters and exists as to their standards of living and personal backgrounds. During the period 1896-1910 the British had two regular interpreters Mika'el Berru and McKelvie with the former performing the bulk of the work. In 1898 the first interpreter received £90 per annum while the second interpreter got £60, but by 1900 their salaries were raised to £100 and £80 respectively. Mika'el was the son of Lord Napier's interpreter and had himself interpreted for the Hewett and Harrison Smith missions. Swedes, and Jesuits undertook his mission education and he was also at Mr. Waldmeier's school in Beirut before he became an official interpreter for the British at their Agency in Aden. However, the British never had "full confidence" in him, although they considered him "the best interpreter in Addis Ababa". Since McKelvie was by 1907 getting more decrepit and infirm

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1 N.S. Eth. 56, Lagarde to Delcassé, A/A, 1.7.09, p.41. Curiously enough, however, his name does not appear in the description of the association in Zeka' Māqār, pp. 321ff.

2 Semeur, Vol. III, pp. 274-5, October 1907. N.S. Eth. 10, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 2.9.09. Incl. ... Séance ... le Mardi 17.8.09, par ordre de S.M. le Negus, p.3. Héréy, Yā'āyāyī Māt Tārik, p.40. He was sent abroad by Menilek to study foreign languages. See also Mērāb, Vol. II, p.273.

3 F.O. 1/34/No. 18, Harrington of F.O., London, 28.7.98. F.O. 371/190/4009/20858/Hohler to Grey, A/A, 31.5.07. See also W.D. 26/12/99 for "McKelvy".

4 F.O. 1/35, Treasury to F.O., 10.9.98.

5 F.O. 1/36/No. 63, Copy of the estimate sent to Audit Office, 30.11.1900, Incl. 2.

6 F.O. 1/40/page 206, Memo by Harrington, 8.8.02.

7 F.O. 1/34/No. 18, Harrington to F.O., 28.7.98.

8 F.O. 371/190/4009/20858, Hohler to Grey, A/A, 31.5.07.
Hohler had 12 Ethiopians sent to Gordon College in Khartoum to learn English in order to become interpreters.¹ Mika'él by that time was independent of his Legation salary with six or seven farms in various parts of Ethiopia.² The British were worried that there were so few people acquainted with English and Amharic in the capital, and that they had to depend so much on the unpredictable Mika'él.³ One of the few freelance interpreters was called Wūldā Haymanot who was paid for services given to various travellers visiting the country and once even translated for the Abun.⁴

The Italians seem to have been somewhat better placed than the British since they could depend on a fairly regular supply of translators from Eritrea. They, like the British, had two salaried interpreters,⁵ and their first interpreter "Ato Ghezagu" was from Eritrea⁶ but died suddenly in 1903 causing a minor crisis.⁷ He had been an extremely devoted man⁸ and his successors never quite seem to have come up to his mark. The Foreign Ministry finally, though reluctantly, decided that it would be too expensive to employ a European⁹ and there were two unsuccessful replacements, first a

¹Ibid.
²W.D. 30.11.08.
³F.O. 1/42/No. 5, Harrington to F.O., A/A, 2.5.03.
⁴W.D. 7.8.1.00.
⁵F.O. 1/34/18, Harrington to F.O., London, 28.7.98.
⁷ASMAI 38/3/25, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 12.9.03.
⁸ASMAI 38/3/25, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 12.9.03.
⁹Ibid. and ASMAI 38/4/39, op. cit.
Shawa, and then an Eritrean. Ciccodicola stressed how important the interpreter was for the legation as the head of the Italian intelligence gathering service and the vital necessity that he be able to conduct diplomacy efficiently on equal terms with the Amhara social elite.

The French perhaps had the best and most widely respected interpreters in the capital. Instead of a staff of two, like the other Legations, they had four interpreters in 1898, and their first interpreter Ato Zawga was a Balkewal or favourite of the Emperor and thus had constant access to the inner sanctums of the palace. In February 1903 when Taytu severely restricted the number of people who might see the Emperor, an exception was made especially for Zawga. Again, emphasis is put on the importance of the interpreter in a court where people write but rarely and communicate largely by word of mouth.

Soldiers in the capital

Throughout the period the large population of soldiers in the capital played an extremely important role in its development. Immediately after the battle of Adwa there were still several massive
campaigns to conquer areas to the east, south and west of Addis Ababa but by 1910 the process had been completed and soldiers had to adjust themselves to a different existence. Many of the soldiers, particularly those who were members of armies from the south or west had joined the victorious Shâwa armies after their own had been defeated in battle. In many cases it seems, it was that or the captive being sent off as a slave to another household or for export as a slave.\(^1\) Soldiers of course, when they were in the capital were represented by their commanding officers who would be responsible for intervening on their behalf in the imperial court to obtain justice.\(^2\)

As the period advanced wages were less and less regularly paid and it was difficult for soldiers to settle down on lands given as a reward for loyal service. Soldiers could only expect a small amount of grain and staple per month\(^3\) and perhaps a sheep on a feast day from the Emperor.\(^4\) Also they might get some material every year for clothing.\(^5\) But more important to most of them were three other things: the money (3-15 MTD per annum)\(^6\)

and continuous period of time, especially in Shâwa and Harâr which gave them a vast source of linguistic talent on which they might draw. There is very much less information for the interpreters for the Germans, Russians and Americans. The former used Kântiba Gâbru for a while (see F.O. 1/40/page 205, Harrington memo, 8.2.02) and the Russians used a certain Ato "Uanno" (see N. S. Eth. 9, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 20.6.09).

\(^1\) J. G. Vanderhey, pp. 97-144, passim.

\(^2\) W. D. 23.2.01.

\(^3\) Gleichen, p. 191; C. Keller, Alfred Ille (Frauenfeld 1912) (Henceforth Keller), p. 45. O. I. Nos. 17 and 20.

\(^4\) Keller, p. 45, and O. I. No. 5 and No. 7.


the geber or weekly feast at the palace\(^1\) and most importantly
a grant of land.\(^2\) The weekly feast they could depend on and there
is much evidence to prove that it went a long way towards assuring
the common soldier's family sufficient food to survive on.\(^3\) All
the other benefits that the soldier might expect to receive from
his master were all too often given with alarming irregularity,\(^4\)
especially in the years of Menilek's illness. Nonetheless, the
most dependable of masters, because after all he was the most
wealthy, was the Emperor. Furthermore, there was a greater chance
of getting a land grant from the Emperor than there was from any
other noble.\(^5\) This was the ultimate aim of every soldier, for
this was the ultimate security, that is a piece of land that was
unalienable, rest.

The Gondàrè,\(^6\) who might be said to have formed a kind of im-
perial guard, were the earliest example among Menilek's troops actually
to obtain land in the Addis Abàba area. Later land would be given
at increased distances from the capital. These troops, however,
were the most loyal to the regime and formed Menilek's immediate
guard, changing in rotation three times a year.\(^7\) Generally, it was

\(^1\)0.I. No. 3.
\(^2\)Michel, pp. 468-9. Also, O.I. No. 4, No. 6, No. 17, No. 21 and
No. 41. But this was a common view among most informants.
\(^3\)O.I. Nos. 1-5 and also No. 51.
\(^4\)Gleichen, p.191. F.O. 403/313, Hansbury-Tracey to F.O. 6.11.01.
\(^5\)O.I. Nos. 1-5 and also No. 21.
\(^6\)See p. 3484.
\(^7\)O.I. No.7 and No. 41. See also above, pp. 1564.
not Menilek's but the nobles' troops in the capital that caused
the greatest trouble. They were more irregularly supplied and had less
of a chance of getting land grants near the capital and would resent
being so far from their homes.

Overall estimates of the total number of troops in Addis Ababa
on special occasions in the post-Adwa period range from 60,000\(^1\)
to 250,000\(^2\) but it must be remembered that any important noble had
only one to three hundred immediate retainers who actually accompanied
him inside the city while the rest of his troops camped outside the
city on the surrounding fields.\(^3\) All his troops were only allowed
into the capital on rare holidays and victory celebrations. These
figures give an idea of the scale a revolt could achieve should rest-
less or rebellious troops get out of hand.

The first indication of widespread rebelliousness among troops
in Addis Ababa came to light in 1903, when some several thousand
troops of Haile Wale refused to follow their provincial governor.\(^4\)
At this time there were some 200,000 men in the capital in connection
with the anniversary of the battle of Adwa and the building of the
Addis Ababa road,\(^5\) but the restless mood does not seem to have spread.

The second important period of unrest within military ranks
took place during the politically unstable years of 1909 to 1910.
Forewarnings of troubles came with a tide of petty larceny and theft

\(^{1}\) ASMAI 3/20/169, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 16.6.06.

\(^{2}\) N.S. Eth. 7, Lagarde to Minister, Entotto, 24.12.98, p.133. See
also De Coppet, pp. 502-505 and Gëbrä Sellase, pp. 308-11.

\(^{3}\) See Bairu Tafila's notes of collected oral material: interviews
with "Kantiba Dasta", 22.10.65, p.2, and 2.12.65. Also with
"Blatta Begu Eshet" on 28.8.65 and Mr. Goetz, 16.11.65.

\(^{4}\) ASMAI 38/3/23, Colli to MAE, A/A, 15.6.03 and 10.7.03.

\(^{5}\) Djibouti, 25.7.03, and extract from Quizaine Coloniale, 10.5.03.
See also pp.91-95.
beginning in the early months of 1909. While the causes of the difficulties in 1903 were relatively simple and based on opposition to working on the Addis Alam road, the 1909 disturbance was a much more complex and interesting phenomenon involving many major interlocking factors. The first and most important was Menilek's illness which caused a constant stream of anxious nobles to come to the capital to pay their respects and get the latest information on his illness. The sheer presence of thousands upon thousands of soldiers with engrained looting instincts honed to a fine edge over many years of experience made for an unstable situation. More importantly, perhaps, these men were unused to town life and only time could eradicate the originally military character of the capital. But this was aggravated by the fact that many of them were not regularly paid and some had to resort to selling their horses, animals and guns. This was why the presence of a strong man like Fitawrari HabtM Giyorgis was so essential. A third factor was an intense rivalry between the soldiers of various nobles, especially those of Ras TisSumma and Fitawrari HabtM Giyorgis. A proclamation had been promulgated shortly before in May, enjoining

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3 N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 26.5.09, pp. 132-3.
4 Ibid.
6 N.S. Eth. 5, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 7.6.09, p. 132.
soldiers to be loyal to their lords and lords to be just to their men, but Tshenna's men, nonetheless, appealed to Habta Giyorgis for more pay, he absorbed them into his army and the case went all the way to the Emperor. Menilek had originally assigned separate hilltops to each different noble, so that the troops of different nobles were in close and explosive proximity. Menilek's personal guard was, of course, an elite and looked down on all other troops, but there were complicated jealousies and rivalries between the troops of all the other variously graded nobles in the hierarchy.

The fourth factor for unrest and instability among the soldiers of the capital was the necessary economic readjustment from the campaigning years of Menilek's early years with its loot and excitement to the more settled and sedentary times of Menilek's post-Adwa years of consolidation. The most dangerous of post-Adwa efforts for Addis Ababa was Wagshum Abbat's attempt to quell Djazmach Abreha's revolt in the north in 1909. On the 22nd of May a proclamation enjoined his troops to follow their leader on the campaign to Tegre. Many, fearing a hard fought battle (and rightly so for that is what Abbat encountered), deserted in droves. By August at least 2,000 had flooded back to Addis Ababa. One

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1Tbid.
2O.1. No. 1 (27,10.71), p.4.
3Henri d'Orleans, 8.5.97. O. I. No. 2, pp. 31-32.
4Tbid.
5ASMAI 54/34/141 (1909), Colli to MAE, A/A, 10,12,09.
6ASMAI 54/34/141 (1909), Colli to Governatore Asmara, A/A, 10,8,09. N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 26,5,09, p.133.
final factor that aggravated all the above was the arbitrary promotions and demotions carried out in 1909-10 by Empress Taytu. This led to a widespread attempt by soldiers to switch from those with falling political fortunes to those with rising ones.  

**European Trained or Employed Labour**

It was prestigious to be the servant of a European, but not quite as prestigious as being one of the Emperor's soldiers. Servants could be drawn from many sources but it is clear some of them at least had formerly been slaves. They also had a greater degree of independence because of their willingness, at times, to adopt the methods of foreigners to increase their wages. But the government had other and more cogent reasons to follow a firm policy towards servants and workers under European or foreign masters. For instance, in May of 1907 a number of manual workers mainly masons, called a strike asking for larger and more regularly paid salaries, almost certainly the first strike to have occurred in Ethiopia. This was followed by an even more serious strike in April 1909, again in the building trade. After was replaced as Minister of Public Works for certain irregularities in his accounts and further malpractices came to light in connection with the granting of building contracts to Castagna. Workers for the Ethiopian government made written complaints against Castagna,

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2 O.I. No. 1 (15.12.71) and No. 6 (16.12.71).


4 ASMAI 38/4/36, Colli to MAE, A/A, 7.5.07.
paraded to the gates of the palace carrying the Ethiopian flag and sent an emissary in the traditional manner to the Emperor asking him to dispense justice. The workers, carrying written proofs of Castagna's incapacity and petty exactions charged that he misappropriated part of their pay and demanded that he be dismissed. All of this was taken before the council of Ministers who were to examine the evidence and make a decision. The events may seem to be minor and the results even more so, but events such as these were truly extraordinary in the Ethiopian context. Most workers trained by foreigners seem to have been much more docile. Those working in the palace and trained to do jobs such as weaving carpets or fixing guns seem to have been largely content with their lot, or at least subdued.

It is impossible to estimate the number of the servants and slaves working for Ethiopians but an attempt can be made for those working for Europeans in the capital. Judging from the amounts allocated for paying them in the Legation estimates the number must have been substantial, approaching 500 to 1,000. For servants were not only employed by the Legations but most of the other Europeans

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1 The only account of this fascinating affair is contained in: N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 9, 4, 09, pp. 115-6. I was unable to gather any oral material concerning it, nor could I find anything further as to the eventual decision of the Council of Ministers.


3 Mounted escorts and messengers cost £250 for the British in 1898 (see F.O. 1/35, Treasury to F.O., 10, 9, 98): £650 in 1900 (F.O. 1/36/53, Copy of Estimate sent to Audit Office, Excl. 2, 30, 11, 1900) and £350 in 1906 (F.O. 371/190/444/444, Harrington to F.O., 4, 12, 06). In 1898 the Italians had 24 "native infantry", 4 orderlies, one door keeper, ten house servants and 6 women servants"a total of 45 and the French had 50 "native infantry", 12 mounted Somalis, 16 women servants,
in the capital. Their pay was high and comparable to that of
Menilek's troops in the 1880s.\textsuperscript{1} As a whole, servants of Europeans
were very unpopular and even hated because they tried to cloak them-
selves with the supposed superiority of their masters.\textsuperscript{2} Harrington
even had servants brought in from India.\textsuperscript{3} A typical case involving the ser-
vant of a European occurred in 1907 when an Ethiopian in a Belgian's
employ knocked down an Ethiopian in the market. Unfortunately, the
man later died and the servant pleading not guilty was tried by
the Af\textsuperscript{2} Negus, already a recognition of special status since the
court of first instance was in effect the highest in the land. "The
court ... resolved that he should die, for they said, these servants
of the Afrangis [\textit{Sic.}, foreigners\textsuperscript{7}] need a lesson, and he was handed
over to a file of soldiers who shot him then and there."\textsuperscript{4}

A fascinating side-light were the roles played by the Ethiopian
mistresses of Europeans, a wide-spread phenomenon of the times.
Their positions, like those of the interpreters, were of great in-
fluence although documentation is difficult to come by. Diplomats
claimed that it was they who obtained most important introductions
and an entrée to many important Ethiopian figures.\textsuperscript{5}

Some of the Bét within the Gebi

Workers within Menilek's palace, those most extensively docu-
mented, were similar in many ways to the soldiers in the capital.

\begin{itemize}
\item 10 camel sowars, 20 couriers and "a large number of men servants",
a total of much more than 108. (See F.O., 1/34/No. 18, Harrington to
F.O., 28.7.98).
\item Borelli, pp. 90, 91 and 148.
\item F.O. 371/193/36153, Hohler to Grey, A/A, 8.10.07.
\item F.O. 1/36/No. 39, Harrington of F.O., A/A, 26.5.99.
\item F.O. 371/193/36153, Hohler to Grey, A/A, 8.10.07.
\item ASMAI 38/4/39, Malvano to Governatore Asmara, Rome 16.7.07. Annesso,
\end{itemize}
Indeed, they were on occasion required to go out and fight as groups according to the organized sector of the palace to which they belonged. Thus they had an AlMa within the palace organization who on the field of battle became their military leader.¹ Each of these men, with varying titles, was in charge of a bêt or house in the gebi. But the imperial palace was not alone in having bêt for the various noble households seem to have each had workers within their gebi organized along much the same lines. None of them, however, had as many workers as the Emperor; but all had varying numbers according to the noble's power and station.

The three most important bêt in the gebi were often made up originally of slaves, that is, the sega bêt, the tejj bêt and the mad bêt. The sega bêt, or meat house, was more than just a place where meat was prepared for the imperial table, for the whole contingent might at any time be called out to go on a campaign.⁴ There were probably about 700⁵ to 800⁶ men and were then organized in groups of forty to eighty men.⁷ Meat was provided for feasts, weddings, tázkar (mourning remembrances) and the regular Sunday

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¹ Pro Memoria per Agnesa. See also ASMAI 36/15/135, Salimbeni to Ilg, Antoto, 10.2.91, for an earlier example.
² 0. I. Nos. 4 and 6.
³ 0. I. No. 31, p.14.
⁴ 0. I. No. 41, p.12.
⁵ 0. I. No. 40 (30.4.72), p.12.
⁷ 0. I. No. 31, p. 14; 0. I. No. 41, p. 12.
geber feasts. Some were slaves from all over the Empire and others were recruited from among the royal cattle herders, the wërëgäñana and were put under Amhara leadership.

The people in the mad bé or kitchen were organized along much the same lines but were more numerous and included women as well as men. Much the same can be said of the Tëjbé.

Slaves

Slaves were a traditional ShSidean method of recruiting the labour needed in the gebi or royal household. On a smaller scale slaves were employed in every noble household to do tasks that were considered too demeaning for others. Yet it should be remembered that slavery in Ethiopia was in no way comparable to the plantation slavery of the American South, but rather was a generally benign version of domestic slavery. In small households especially, slaves could rise to positions of great trust and power, but this was also true even of the greatest, as can so often be seen in Menilek's household. The main source of slaves within Ethiopia seems to have been military campaigns, and much of the future of a slave depended on where he was sent after the division of booty after a battle. Some became soldiers and could rise high in the ranks on merit, others might be drafted into less prestigious areas of the household and perform duties of varying difficulty. But even here, as indicated before, there were opportunities of advancement, since many of these

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1Ibid.
3O.I. No. 41 (9.7.72), p.16.
4Darkwah, pp. 279-281, 284ff, and 321ff. Also, H.R. Marcus "The Organization of Menilek's Palace and Imperial Hospitality (after 1896)", Rural Africana, No. 11 (Spring, 1970), pp. 57-63
5See pp. 316 - 318, 339ff, 144ff.
men might also be ordered on a military campaign on short notice. However, as the anti-slave trading decrees indicate, there was also the possibility that a slave might be added to a caravan and sent to another noble or for export to other lands, perhaps the worst fate of all. Yet within this framework, one must take into account those slaves that ended up as skilled artisans, weavers, potters or tanners. Here only, one can begin to talk of caste, for they were almost always endogamous and generally regarded as wizards, sorcerers, possessed of the buda and generally experts in the supernatural.

At the very bottom of the hierarchy of a household, then, were slaves who were being transported from one part of the country to another or those who had escaped and then had been recaptured. The many proclamations against the slave trade were mainly for European consumption but reveal the chronic nature of the problem.

There were two major proclamations in the capital concerning slavery that have survived, one in August, 1903 and the other in October, 1909. The first was a prohibition against slave-trading, a measure that was ineffective. Clerk, the British representative, goes into detail on the ways such regulations were by-passed.

"The demand for slaves in Adis Ababa is principally met in the following way. A soldier from Kaffa or Wallamo ... gets leave to go to Addis Ababa with two or three servants. On arrival at the capital he soon finds how he can best dispose of them. He then offers them as a gift to the would-be owner; the latter

1F.O. 1/42/No. 38, Clerk to F.O., A/A, 7.9.03. The text of 20.8.03 proclamation is included in translation only: "Regarding the Galla slave question; before now I wrote letters to all the districts; proclaimed proclamations and excommunicated but you still persist in stealing Gallas and selling them for slaves. But hereafter whoever I shall find selling Gallas, I shall not only punish him with his property but shall also give him a bodily punishment."
accepts them and in return presses a gift of so many dollars on his 'friend'. These preliminaries are kept secret. A day or two later, the soldier pays a visit to the purchaser, accompanied by his servants and some witnesses. He then explains that he had been suddenly recalled to his post, that his servants will delay him and that therefore he will be very grateful if his friend will keep them in his house until he returns to claim them, an event which never happens. There is no scrutiny over soldiers going back to duty and consequently his return to his garrison without servants causes no official comment.¹

Other examples of the subtle exchange of slaves as servants, and gifts abound.² No attempt seems to have been made locally to reform slave-owning. Only slave-trading was attacked and even then only the abuses of it.

By October 1909 the situation was the same. This time the proclamation was aimed at making penalties against harbourers of runaway slaves more severe.³ Tribute was still paid in slaves and great suffering undergone in transporting slaves from one area to another and although slave markets did not exist publicly, the slave trade was carried out clandestinely and it was easy enough to procure them.⁴ One of the most notorious campaigns carried out by Menilek to obtain slaves was in Wàllamo in 1893 and 1894. The brutality of the soldiers and the fate of hundreds of thousands

¹Ibid.
³N. S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 11. 10. 09, and Annexe Aouadj Imperial ..., 2. 10. 09, pp. 163-7. Again Menilek's actual proclamation is included in translation: "A diverses réprises, ces temps derniers, j'ai fait savoir que le peuple devait restituer les esclaves qui avaient quitté leurs maîtres. A raison de la saison des pluies qui rend tout déplacement difficile, il n'a pas été tenu un compte suffisant de mes avis répétés. Aujourd'hui que les routes sont praticables, j'engage mes sujets par le présent édit à ramener, dans un délai de 8 jours, les esclaves qui se sont enfuis. En cas de contrevention à cet édit, seront punis les riches de leur fortune, les propriétaires de leurs propriétés et ceux qui ne sont possèdent ni fortune ni propriété, de leurs mains qui seront coupées."
⁴Ibid. p. 163. Again the clauses concerning confiscation of land seem to have never been enforced.
of inhabitants is very sobering indeed. Estimates of the number of slaves in the capital vary, but Mérab was probably fairly accurate when he said that there were 15,000 in the capital in 1909.

**Metal Workers, Weavers, Potters and Tanners**

Finally, only partly distinguished from slaves, in fact including many slaves among their number, were certain specialized sectors of the palace, namely potters, weavers, metal workers and tanners, who were considered to be possessed of the buda or had magical powers. They can not really be described as a 'caste' for there was a degree of upward social mobility especially among the lébassay, and the Emperor made special efforts, even to the extent of promulgating a proclamation to lift the stigma associated with these workers. Yet they were still regarded by most as a group set apart in death and marriage. Furthermore, most of them were specialized, as mentioned above, into definite crafts and these seem to have often but not always been handed down from father to son.

The most numerous of the workers were those working in iron. They were divided into two groups, the fitters and the more numerous forgers. The former were the most skillful, could repair the parts of a rifle, make iron lances, bits, chains and sabres. Menilek

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1. Vanderheym, pp. 97-144. ASMAI 36/17/169, Capucci to MAE, A/A, 18.1.95. ASMAI 3/7/49, Capucci to MAE, A/A, 16.11.94.
3. Only a quick overall view will be given of these workers, as it was impossible to gain oral information from all or even more than a few of the various groups. The whole question of caste versus slavery is by no means clear and further research would be needed before any confident assertions can be made.
5. Menilek.
attempted to counterbalance the fear and disrepute in which these men were held by giving special rewards to the best among them. The iron ore seems to have been mined locally.

Weavers were also a numerous group working for the palace. Some wove traditional cloths, like the shamma, others were set to the task of imitating those from abroad. The first were probably the most numerous and perhaps 1,300 were in the city, although all of them did not work for the Emperor. Many of them had started out as soldiers and when they became older or were injured had settled down in the capital to work as weavers. They came largely from Guragé and Dorzé speaking areas.

The second group of weavers, numbering about 470, worked largely on carpets, some of which took six months to complete. Originally they were trained by Europeans. As a group these men and women were ostracised by most of the rest of the palace workers despite all Menilek's efforts to the contrary. They included:

1. Heruy, YHHeywat Tarik, pp. 3-4, 28. However, I found it impossible to find any of these men willing to talk of these times.


6. Ibid.


8. Ibid.


10. Heruy, YHHeywat Tarik, pp. 3-4 and 28. Also Zekeňa Năgăşăns, pp. 421-422. See also the text of Menilek's proclamation of 1908 on pp. 17ff. See also pp. 214-217.
potters, blacksmiths, silversmiths, carpenters, carpet makers, weavers, and menders of guns and swords. Considered very significant was the fact that when these people died they were buried by the government outside the churches.

The uncertain link between slavery and the caste-like character of artisans and various other workers in the imperial and noble households can be emphasized by the example of the lebashay or thief catchers. The small boys who were used were, more often than not, slaves, but because of the nature of the semi-magical work they performed and the spells which were put on them they, like the weavers and tanners, were regarded as buda while they were under the influence of the drugs they had been given.

Conclusion

In conclusion it should be pointed out that alongside the plural society of the various population groups there had grown up a degree of job specialization that was quite novel. For although artisans, interpreters and so on had existed in Shawa and Ethiopia for a very long time, they had not for a very considerable period been permanently gathered together in one place in such great numbers. Nor did they completely identify themselves with foreign minorities in the capital; rather they were able to retain many of their links with their past. All of which had many administrative

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ramifications for the growing bureaucracy of the city.

For it seems that Menilek's hold over the various population groups in the capital grew as the period advanced, until his illnesses may have slowed the process down. Before Adwa, during his many absences from the capital, power remained largely in the hands of his Endārāse. Yet increasingly after Adwa, spokesmen came to his court and were appointed with his agreement and through his influence, even in the case of some foreign minorities. Thus a process of centralisation within the capital slowly developed. Significantly, parallel to this process within the capital, was a similar tendency throughout the empire. Men like Ras Mihkonn and Ras Abbat² were sent to rule the north while areas like Wulamo were put directly under the administration of the Imperial Palace. Both were attempts to centralise further the imperial administration.

The foreign and Ethiopian population groups, then, were similar in the way they were treated by Menilek's court and the ways in which they were represented there, politically and administratively. Yet economically the differences between the groups were much larger. Foreigners dominated the import and export trade, while internal and local trade had a significant degree of Ethiopian participation. Here, too, Menilek exercised a great degree of control but in very different ways, most importantly through the Nēggadras and through the loans he made to both Ethiopians and foreigners involved in trade.
CHAPTER III: ECONOMIC

Introduction

Five main themes dominate the economic history of Ethiopia and the growth of its capital in the period 1880 to 1910. First are two general points of significance for the entire Empire which were greatly influenced by Addis Abāba's unique role as capital. Menilek, in his capacity, first as King of Shawa, and then after 1889 as Emperor, had almost complete control of all the trade passing through his expanding dominions. He personally inspected the bulk of imports and he and his wife, as two of the richest people in the Empire, loaned vast sums of money to all the prominent merchants of the land. Secondly, the Emperor, through a network of Nāggadras, appointed throughout the land, taxed and carried on a very large portion of the internal trade of the land, largely through monopolies. Their overall titular head, under the Emperor, was the Nāggadras of Addis Abāba, Aggedāw, until 1900, and then Haylā Hiyorgis.

One of the more immediate effects of the increasingly efficient administration of the Nāggadras was the notable dominance of Christians over Muslims in the ordering of the import-export trade. This was partly revealed by the fourth theme of the gradual decline of Harār as the main distributive centre in Ethiopia and the eventual predominance of Addis Abāba after the turn of the century in that role. Finally, a strong case can be made for the economic factors determining the central site of the capital so that it would be in a more advantageous position to dominate and tax the trade of the new conquests to the south and west.
It seems clear that Menilek's role in trade and in the economic life of the capital was very much larger than had previously been thought to have been the case. Extensive proof of this comes to light in Empress Taytu's 1909/1910 attempt to gain power when she tried to gather in many of Menilek's outstanding loans in order to take control of the Ethiopian government during his illness. These loans were the most striking example of the degree to which Menilek dominated the economic life of the capital and (indeed) the country. However, the traditional powers in the economic sphere of the rulers of Shawa were still in effect, those over monopolies, tribute, and the traditional redistributive system of the court. Yet each of these three areas was significantly expanded during the period and new functions added to each. There were especially notable changes in the administration of monopolies and trade which the Emperor increasingly delegated to his Naggadras.

Overall, however, one must stress that Menilek's role in controlling a large portion, even the majority, of the liquid capital of the country may well have been one of the key factors in his political centralization of the country. Although one must be careful in ascribing to Ethiopia the kind of feudalism that existed in Europe, a similar but by no means identical, relationship between the land, the land holder and the tenant existed in certain

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parts of Amhara and Shawa. Before the reign of Menilek money rarely entered into the picture and exchange was conducted almost entirely in kind. During Menilek's reign, with the increased importance of trade and partly through the system of Weggadras, money in the form of Maria Theresa Dollars (MTD) first entered the scene on a significant scale. Menilek loaned substantial amounts of money to various feudal lords not only to build large and expensive houses in Addis Ababa but also, perhaps, to enable them to carry on trade if they felt so inclined. Seen through the eyes of contemporary Ethiopians it would not have been regarded as a major departure from traditional practice. After all, the Emperor customarily loaned guns and cartridges to favourites as a mark of his favour and cartridges were regarded as currency throughout the Empire. It was only a short step to loan money instead of cartridges. However, this step seen from the perspective of similar developments in the history of feudalism in Europe, places this change in quite a different light. Later, loans of money as opposed to cartridges had played a vital role during Taytu's attempt to gain power, and may have done so later in 1911 and 1916.

1See A.Hoben, Land Tenure Among the Amhara of Ethiopia: The Dynamics of Cognatic Descent (London, 1973), passim, but especially pp. 1 ff (henceforth Hoben).

2Here one might see a parallel with the period of "bastard feudalism" of Europe. See Berhanou Abbebe, Évolution de la Propriété Foncière au Choa (Éthiopie) du Règne de Menelik à la Constitution de 1931 (Paris, 1971), passim. (henceforth Berhanou Abbebe). This has a contrasting viewpoint to Hoben and myself.

3It is most interesting to speculate what effect these substantial loans may have had on the crisis of 1916. Ostensibly Lej Iyasu would have inherited not only Menilek's and Taytu's claims to rest lands but also to outstanding loans.
But earlier on in 1896 Menilek and Addis Abëba were to have completely different kinds of "loans", the labour of the Italian prisoners taken at Adwa.

They are a fascinating example of the relationship between the traditional and the modern and found themselves in Addis Abëba while the peace agreement was being negotiated. Having been brought down from Adwa by Abbata at Menilek's express orders, they were at first under the jurisdiction of the Azzaj of the royal gebi. Azzaj Gezaw, but were later put under the care of the different nobles resident in Addis Abëba as well as important foreign merchants. Traditionally, important prisoners captured in war were farmed out by the Emperor for safekeeping and to lessen the cost of upkeep, were entrusted to subjects without the royal dominions, but they were still essentially dependent upon him. Prisoners were treated by their captors according to their social status, ranging from that of virtual slavery to that of an honoured guest, who, unfortunately, one could not allow to leave. The Italian prisoners fell slightly below the latter definition of the mereko status as defined by


4 ASMAI 36/5/43, Antonelli to MAE A/A, 23.11.87, Annesso, "Zemecchia, ossia spedizione dell'esercito sciocano."

5 Ibid.
Antonelli. ¹ How well they were treated and whether they were ex-
pected to do any demanding labour depended wholly upon those who
had charge over them. Some under Azzaï Gezaw were not well treated,
while those under Stevënin and Europeans in Addis Abëba seem to
have had little cause for complaint. ² The amount of work they
actually did in construction in Addis Abëba seems to have been
minimal, but they built some stone structures in the enclosures of
the Europeans to whom they had been assigned. ³ Thus these European
prisoners were fitted into the traditional pattern in the way they
were treated, but also assisted the European residents of Addis Abëba
in constructing needed facilities and in carrying on their trading
activities. ⁴

The Italian prisoners it should be remembered were only a
very small fraction of the Addis Abëba labour force over which
Menilek and Taytu had control. Vast numbers of slaves, paid workers
and those giving service in labour were directly under the supervision
of the Imperial household or gebi. ⁵ It was from these sources of
labour, rather than the Italian prisoners, that the bulk of the con-
struction work was done in Addis Abëba, ⁶ directly under the eye of

¹Ibid. See also Gëbrë Sellasë, p.271.
²Pariset, pp. 61-2, 56, 65; O.I.No. I (27,10,71), p.5; Henri
d'Orleans, Une Visite à l'empereur Menelick (Paris, 1898), pp. 142
and 165 (henceforth Henri d'Orleans).
³Pariset, pp. 63-65. Stevënin had 11 prisoners working for him at
one time, See also O.I. No. I (27,10,71), p.5.
⁴Ibid.
⁵These will be dealt with at greater length in the political chapter
of the thesis where they fit more easily into the overall hierarchical
organization of the palace. So too will the effect of tribute, local
and national, in the form of labour and in kind. See pp. 323-324, 333ff.
⁶The best example of how roads were built is the one to Addis Alëm,
see pp. 97-103. For buildings, see De Coppet, p.466, and Gëbrë
Sellasë, p.268, for Menilek's Addarash or banquet hall.
the Emperor. Before Adwa the pattern was for an Indian or European to supervise the construction of a particular building and be directly responsible only to Menilek. In the case of the new bridges built after 1904 Ilg was Menilek's direct subordinate in charge and imported some Italian and Greek construction workers. Europeans or Indians also built churches and the houses of the nobility. Later, after becoming increasingly incapacitated, Menilek delegated his power to various assistants but not necessarily always the Minister of Works. But even after Ilg's departure Europeans, men like Castagna and Haertel, often supervised construction.

In the minting of his new coinage Menilek carried out all the initiatives but again depended on Europeans to execute his orders. At first, from 1896-1903, the majority of the coins were struck in Paris and then shipped to Ethiopia, but only in the capital were they fully accepted as currency. In 1903 machinery for a mint arrived

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2 See pp. 354, 361.

3 Henri d'Orleans, p.193; Ilg Papers, KB 13, Panagiotou, Panagioli di Mariallis and Nilus to Ilg, 5.7.04. Also, p.138, Compte de Travaux, signed Ilg, A/A, 10.6.05.

4 For further details on churches see pp. 354, 361.

5 Ilg Papers, op.cit., mentioned in particular are Asallafi Abbéyye (Abbyy?), Maiaza Yelma and Walda Gabre'el.

6 See political section, pp.56. Also, Warrqenah Diary, February tenth, 1910 (henceforth W.D.). Mitafäriya in this case was in charge of Addis Ababa roads and water.

7 ASMAI 37/2/10, Colli to MAE, A/A, 21.3.07.

in Addis Ababa and was under the direct supervision of two Armenians, Baghdassarian and Topjan, who were directly paid by Menilek.\footnote{Djibuti: Journal Franco-Ethiopian, 13.6.03, 20.6.03, 25.7.03, 29.8.03 (henceforth Djibuti); Pariset, p.136.}

A Swiss, M. Faller, was architect of the building in the gebi.\footnote{Djibouti, 18.03; De Coppet, pp. 508-9, and Gabr'Ä Sellase, p.312.}

It took a long time for the new coinage to be accepted by Ethiopians in the capital and it never really was in the provinces. This was especially true of the Menilek dollar which was supposed to replace the Maria Theresa dollar.\footnote{F.0.1/33, Rodd to F.O., A/A, 15.5.97, pp. 33-4; Accounts and Papers: Commercial Reports (1907), vol. 89, Report number 3747, Trade of Abyssinia for 1905-1906, pp. 3-4 (henceforth, AP:CR(1907) vol. 89, No. 3747; Abyssinia, 1905/6, pp.3-4). N.S., Eth., 56, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 10.1.09.}

The smaller denominations seem to have had an easier time being accepted although never very far outside the capital.\footnote{Ibid., and Powell-Cotton, p.139.}

Menilek promulgated many proclamations or \\textit{Awaj} naming it the only currency and prohibiting the use of salt or cartridges as currency in order to promote the popularity and stability of the new coinage. More ingenious was the creation of bars for drink or \\textit{Bëjj bet} where prices were lower than in the rest of the city and only Menilek currency accepted.\footnote{De Coppet, p.456; Henri d'Orleans, p.194, for 1897 and N.S.,Eth. 56, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 10.1.09, for 1909.}

Active attempts to institute the new currency stretch from 1893 to 1909 and after. It was only Menilek's constant interest and prodding that assured the
wide diffusion of the coinage within the capital. Otherwise, it would never have achieved even its limited distribution.

More impressive proof of Menilek's domination of the life of the city is to be found in the sphere of Menilek's absolute control over monopolies and, closely related to this, his domination of the major traders by means of loans and the method of payment for imported goods. As will be shown later, Menilek carefully controlled the export of certain goods traditionally monopolized by the rulers of Shewa, like gold and ivory and increasingly after 1896 gave monopolies in other exported goods and imposed monopolies on a wide range of imports. These were given mostly to Indians, Arabs, Greeks and Armenians, many of whom he had a hold over because they were in debt to him or other Ethiopians. Thus he had freedom to manoeuvre and did not need to worry about any single important foreign government or its protected merchants obtaining a dominant role in Ethiopian trade.

Menilek, "il solo e vero commerciante in Etiopia", was the principal buyer of goods in the empire. He would loan money to Ethiopians, Indians and Europeans at varying rates of interest and

1See pp. 350-386.
2F.0.1/33, p.29, Rodd to Salisbury, A/A, 15.5.97; Powell-Cotton, p.117.
4Ibid., and see below, pp. 350-386.
5Ibid.
6ASMAI 38/3.23, Ciccodicola to MAB, A/A, 28.7.02, p.13.
7Ibid. H. Decaux, Chasses en Abyssinie (Paris, 1905), pp. 185-6 (henceforth Decaux).
differing stipulations. Azzaj Wärqenäh was offered $2,000 to trade with as an inducement to stay in Ethiopia and no interest seems to have been expected\(^1\) and Mohammad Aly seems to have had very advantageous terms towards the end of the period.\(^2\) Others seem not to have been so favoured, especially French traders once Menilek discovered that Indian traders had larger profit margins, part of which they could pass on to him.\(^3\) Another method with which Menilek maintained a hold over Addis Abëba traders was by lightening or completely lifting the necessity to pay customs as a mark of his favour.\(^4\) Furthermore, he would commission particular traders to organize caravans going from Addis Abëba to Jibuti, or the return trip, composed largely of his own goods. Payment would not be given until the goods arrived or more usually until after kerämt (the rainy season) when Menilek had been given his tribute. But in the interim only extremely favourable rates of interest on the capital involved would be required.\(^5\)

This close imperial supervision of trade began to break down in the period 1908-1910 as Menilek suffered his repeated seizures. No references to close and continuous supervision occur during this period.

\(^1\)W.O. 26.12.1899, 7.5.1900 and 11.11.1900.

\(^2\)W.O. 106/232, Sudan Intelligence Reports, 6/1909.

\(^3\)Decaux, pp. 185-6; ASMAI, 38/3.23, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 28.7.02.

\(^4\)F.O. 1/33, Rodd to F.O., A/A, 15.5.97, p.35.

\(^5\)F.O. 1/34, p.130, "Harrar Correspondent", 19.8.98 for but one example. Djibouti, 11.11.99. Written by Trouillet (an important merchant), 16.10.99, 8.9.00. Commerce of Ethiopia, 1899 by Savouré. See also pp. 733-34.
period; on the contrary the degree to which the monies of the imperial treasury had filtered down to Menilek's subordinates becomes clear when Taytu, just before she was eased from the political scene, demanded that Menilek's debts be repaid.  

That Menilek's control of the merchants had been slipping was clear by November 1908 in the handling of the rubber monopoly. Further references in March 1909 and December 1909 firmly underline this tendency. However, this loosening of control in his later years is in sharp and direct contrast with the tight hold he maintained upon commercial affairs in the years before 1908. Little escaped his supervision or indirect control particularly in the sphere of import/export trade. Here was where the biggest profits were to be had, but a description of the various trade centres and their influences is necessary first as an introduction.

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1 The above references, at a glance, will show all are before this period.

2 See section on the Bank of Abyssinia, pp. 286-288.

3 F.O. 371/396/12469/44260, Hervey to F.O., 25.11.08.

Part A. Long Distance Trade Routes (1880-1910)

The long distance trade routes through Ethiopia need to be dealt with in two separate periods, first, as they existed before the Battle of Adwa and then from 1896-1910. Only after the battle were the routes really stabilized, and a process in which the slow construction of the railway, begun in 1896, played a part. The role of these trade routes was crucial to the foundation and growth of the capital for many reasons. Before the 1880s and Shāwa's expansion to the south, Addis Abāba did not exist as a town, although an important market, Rogé, existed some miles to the east. During the 1880s and early 1890s but not really until 1896, the bulk of the vital trade of the south and west (the only areas of Ethiopia to consistently produce exportable items) was transferred from its route northwards to the east so that it passed through the new capital of Addis Abāba and out through Harār and its neighbouring Red Sea ports. As they passed through Addis Abāba the goods were fairly efficiently taxed and this laid a foundation of financial stability for the expanding Christian as opposed to Muslim traders. Addis Abāba became the first important cash nexus in a largely feudal land and gradually overtook even Harār as the trading emporium of the Empire. As the Addis Abāba to Harār and later Addis Abāba to Deré Dawa route gained, all other routes shrank in importance. In the process Addis Abāba grew to be by far the most important urban area in the Empire, overshadowing any possible rival. Its economic expansion, based on its domination of trade routes, was essential to this growth.
a)  **Long Distance Trade Routes (1880s-1896)**

There were four major import/export routes through Shāwa that were of importance from 1886-1896: first, was the route through Awsa coming out to the sea at the Italian port of Asāb; secondly, the route through Gojam to Gondār leading out either through the Sudan or Meṭewa; thirdly, the route through Wēllo and up north to Meṭewa and finally, the most important route, starting at Ankobār or Addis Aβaba coming down part of the Awash river, sometimes through the city of Harār, and eventually reaching the coast at Jibuti, Zāyla, Bārbāra or some other smaller port on the coast.

Asāb was a creation of the Italians and its fortunes waned with theirs. The route was pioneered by Antonelli and its growth was a cherished Italian goal. However, the track was too long, very rocky and only at certain seasons of the year was there enough food and forage for beasts of burden. The vast majority of the 35,390 guns officially imported by the Italians into Shāwa from 1882 to 1893 was brought in from Asāb and through Awsa. The route's main advantage was political, for its presence meant that Menilek was not solely dependent on the French and English at respectively

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1 A fifth, the route down the Baro/Sobat rivers need not concern us during this period since the Amhara conquests had not consolidated themselves in that area yet, and the Mahdiyya prevented any substantial trade going down the Nile anyway.

2 ASMAI 36/16/108, Traversi to MAE, Rome, 2.6.91.

3 M. and D. 105/p.329, Report by the merchant Armand Savoure, Sept., 1887. See following footnote.

4 ASMAI 36/18/184, being a summary of arms delivered to Shāwa until 8.2.1896, by M.G., 24.5.55.
Obock/Jibuti and Zëyla. Commercially Asāb could never become important and, as an official Italian source points out, it was really only of use for "undercover arms shipments". Its importance was largely a figment of the Italian imagination.

However, as late as June 1890, the Italians still had hopes for the expansion of trade through Asāb, but Menilek, Ras Mākonnen, and Azzaj Wāldā Sadeq were encouraging trade to flow through Harār. Most merchants used the routes through Harār but some still used Asāb. Six months later Menilek had gone a step further actually discouraging the Asāb trade, and within another six months Traversi had given up thoughts of using the route for anything but undercover arms shipments. Two years later Capucci said the route had been totally abandoned and all trade had shifted to Jibuti and Zëyla. Lagarde, the governor of Jibuti, confirmed this in 1895. Had Asāb ever really developed into a major trade route the growth of Addis Abāba into a major commercial centre would have been greatly retarded. However, Menilek's renunciation of the treaty of Wechale in 1893, the Tegré policy, the Mārūb treaty and the war with Italy in the north were the death-knell of Shāwa trade with the north through Asāb. For

1 ASMAI 36/13/108, Traversi to MAE, Rome, 2.6.91.
2 ASMAI 36/11/95, Traversi to MAE, Let Marefià, 11.6.90.
3 ASMAI 36/12/101, Traversi to MAE, Assab, 18.12.90.
4 ASMAI 36/13/108, Traversi to MAE, Rome, 2.6.91.
5 ASMAI 36/16/152, Traversi to MAE, A/A, 19.6.93. Annesso, Capucci to Traversi, A/A, 17.6.93.
this final break with Italy led to an embargo and almost complete stoppage of trade across the border between Ethiopia and Italian Eritrea.

Another main port to the north of Shawa, Mețewwa, was equally, if not more, affected by the hostile Italian presence in Eritrea both on the Wëllo and Gojam routes that converged on the port. Even as early as 1887, one of the major foreign traders of Shawa was saying that the Mețewwa route was closed by the Italian expedition. At this time Savouré was advising the French to encourage the rerouting of the Gojam trade to come out at the Gulf of Tajura rather than through Mețewwa. Formerly, some of it went through the Sudan and down the Nile but this languished with the rise of the Mahdists. The Italians, too, were ready to admit that their activities in the north were adversely affecting northern trade even before the Adwa build-up of the middle 1890s. The salt trade from Endârta was particularly hard hit, so much so that only four Amolé or salt bars could be bought for one MTD. But the Greeks do not seem to have totally abandoned the northern route, for a certain Cesare Giorgi, a Greek despite his name, managed to obtain a safe conduct and get at least as far as Dëse, although no other traders seem to have been lucky enough to succeed.

Although foreign traders had the greatest difficulty getting through, one has further hints that even the local salt trade was

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2 Ibid.

3 ASMAI 36/11/95, Traversi to Antonelli, Let Marefia, 15.4.90; ASMAI 36/11/95, Antonelli to MAE, Massaua, 22.6.90; ASMAI 36/13/108, Traversi to MAE, Rome, 2.6.91.

4 ASMAI 36/11/95, Traversi to Commissario, Lago Mai, 4.5.90.
deteriorating. Not only the Italians but local nobles like 
Wagshum Berru forced the redirection of trade by means of heavy
taxation. Furthermore, by 1894 the bulk of the trade of Gojam
had switched from Metewa to a more southerly route through Addis
Abāba. For security was so much greater in Shāwa and merchants
preferred that route although the way was somewhat longer.

The last and by far the most important trade route from Shāwa
was the one centred on the city of Harār. The written sources con­
centrate on the relationship between the three ports of Jibuti
(French), Zayla and Bērbēra (English) with the entrepôt of Harār
(conquered by Shāwa in 1887) and with Shāwa itself. Before the
conquest of Harār, trade was more diversified using the other three
routes. Furthermore, the Shāwa export/import trade was centred
at Ankobēr with slaves at Abd-el-Rasul and everything else a few
miles away at Alyu Amba, halfway down the escarpment. Tax revenue
was collected when goods were shifted from camels to donkeys or
males, the former for the wastes of the Awash valley, and the latter
for the steep climb up the escarpment. However, once Menelik was
firmly established in the Addis Abāba and Entopo area in the middle
1880s and once he had conquered all of the tribes on the route to
Harār and then Harār itself, the costs of transport could be

1 ASMAI 36/17/161, Cecchi to MAE, n.d. Annesso, Capucci to Cecchi,
A/A, 30.1.94.

2 AP/CFS/131 dossier 1894, Savoure to Ministère des Colonies,
Paris, 20.9.94.

3 See Richard Caulk, "The Occupation of Harar: January, 1887", J.E.S.

(Henceforth, Cecchi).

significantly lowered. Camels could be used on the whole route and tribute was no longer levied by every minor tribe along the route. However, realization of all these possibilities came slowly and external factors like the famine were also to interfere and slow the process down.

From 1886 to 1888 there were still descriptions of thriving local markets, which were within a decade to be absorbed almost completely by Addis Ababa. The two biggest were Alyu Amba (two days by mule northeast of Addis Ababa) and Rogé (several hours east of Addis Ababa). The former with its nearby slaving centre of Abd-el-Rasul was still ceded to Mohammed Abubakar of Zayla, in exchange for a yearly tribute (this was never the case with Addis Ababa). Rogé was equal in size to Alyu Amba but specialized in slavery. It was dominated by Muslims but was more closely controlled by Menilek through a personal representative there, Toro Wariyo. He was referred to as a Naggadras and is a clear example of Menilek's administrative efforts to consolidate his hold on a newly incorporated area economically by appointing a powerful Naggadras over it. It too, had a neighbouring centre which was not as specialized in its merchandise - Dhlhti. Just south of Addis Ababa it was controlled by Jemma, the most important trading country to the south of Shawa which had already very profitably

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1See p. 2514.

2 J. Borrelli, Ethiope Meridionale... (Paris, 1890), p. 127 (19.8.86) and p. 140 (24.9.86) (Henceforth, Borrelli).

3 BSGI, Serie 2, Vol. 12 (1887), Traversi to Società Geografica Italiana, Antoto, 4.1.86. O.1. No. 15 (2.3.72).

4 O.1., No. 15, op. cit.

allied itself with Shāwa, in lieu of resisting her conquests in the
south and west. One other market remains, that of Buliyorké -
just to the west of Ankobār. It specialized in mules, horses,
skins and saddlery.¹

Harūr's importance on the other hand, was to outlast that of
other regional centres, retaining her importance until after the
coming of the railway and past the creation of Deré Dawa in 1902.
The bulk of the trade to Jibuti, Žayla and Bārbāra passed through
it. Although a temporary decline in its overall trade set in before
the Shāwa conquest, in 1887² and the famine hit it more severely
than it did Shāwa,³ it was still in 1891-2 the most important market
in the Horn of Africa with a revenue of 300,000 MTD per annum from
customs, a staggering figure in the context of Shāwa finances. This
great increase in trade can partly be explained by the increased
stability engendered by the British occupation of the coast and their
efforts to encourage and expand trade in the area⁵ as well as Harūr's
growing importance as a centre of the arm 's trade.⁶

These revenues were so great largely because Harūr was the
gathering point for most of the major ports on the Red Sea east of

¹Borelli, p.141 (26 and 28.9.86).
²ASMAI 36/17/167, Traversi to MAE, 19.11.94; Gaulk, Harar, op.cit.,
pp. 18-19. For the earlier decline of its trade in 1885 caused by
the Ittu Oromo, see P.Paulitschke, "Relazione sulle condizioni
dell Harar nel Gennaio 1885", BSGI 23 (1886), pp. 397-9.
Italiana, Let Marefìa, 4.1.92.
⁴BSGI Serie 3, Vol. 6 (1894), Mashkov, "Il Secondo Viaggio Aбиссино-
in del Mashkov (1891-92)", p.847.
⁵See Andrew M.Brockett, "The British Somaliland Protectorate to 1905",
Unpublished D.Phil, Oxford, 1969 (Henceforth,
Brocket).
Asāb: Obok and later Jibuti, Žayla, Bārbāra and other ports all sent their goods to Harār. In 1887 the Obok/Jibuti route, that is the route based on the Gulf of Tajura, was described as being better than the Asāb route but not as easy on pack animals as the Žayla route.¹ The advantages of the port of Žayla were that the routes to it were very flat with plenty of water and grass and there were only two clans on the track who would demand payment for use of their pack animals.² Bārbāra, however, was much further away, rocky and had many clans who demanded tribute.³

Menilek's concern that Harār's trade should increase has already been shown by the measures he took to control the trade to Asāb. Furthermore, in 1893 he had the first metal bridge built across the Awash river to assure year round use of the route.⁴ Formerly, he had had the wooden bridges rebuilt nearly every year.⁵ This was aimed, perhaps, at stabilizing the all camel route pioneered by Rimbaud in 1887-8 and opened up by Menilek in 1890.⁶ This route, by-passing Ankobar and Alyu Amba laid the foundations for the future commercial prosperity of Addis Abāba. Along it went the all important goods from the south and west increasing the prosperity of Addis Abāba, Harār, Žayla and Jibuti. Addis Abāba had many advantages

¹M. & D. 105/p.329, A.Savoure, Sept., 1887, op.cit.
²Ibid.
³Ibid.
⁴Paris, p.27.
⁵ASMAI 36/11/95, Traversi to MAE, Let Marefià, 11.6.90.
⁶ASMAI 36/11/95, Antonelli to MAE, Massaua, 22.6.90; Paris, p.48.
over Ankobâr and Alyu Amba: it was somewhat more centrally placed, the route from the coast up the escarpment was not quite so precipitous and climatically it was more salubrious for the ageing Emperor and his court.

Thus by the end of the period it was only the Addis Abâba to Harâr route that mattered commercially. The link up of this route to the coast with the opening up of the vast markets of civet and more especially coffee in the south and west meant not only a great increase in the amount of trade but a new and vital role for Addis Abâba. Formerly, Gondâr had played the role as the great centre for the trade of southern and western Ethiopia. But first Tewodros's sackings of the 1860s followed by those of Abu Anja in 1887 and 1888 which were much more destructive, left Gondâr depopulated and no longer a major commercial centre. Addis Abâba, through Menilek's efforts, began by 1893 to play the role of a transhipment and taxing centre under the leadership of some of the transplanted traders of Gondâr. Furthermore, the trade in arms tended to use Addis Abâba.

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1See p. 260A.
2See pp. 260A.
4G. Lejean, Théodore II : Le Nouvel Empire d'Abyssinie et les intérêts français dans le sud de la Mer Rouge (Paris, 1865), pp. 176-7 and 193 (Henceforth, Lejean); G. Rohls, Meine Mission nach Abessinien (Leipzig, 1883), pp. 256-7 (Henceforth, Rohls); H.A. Stern, The Captive Missionary... (London, 1868), pp. 179-180 (Henceforth, Stern).
7See pp. 316.
as its main point of distribution, increasing its importance and stability.

b) **Long Distance Trade Routes (1896-1910)**

It is during this period that trade routes began to be firmly stabilized. The construction of the railway to the foot-hills of Harār at Derē Dawa established Jibuti as Ethiopia’s major outlet and at the same time created Derē Dawa as an economic rival for the traditional trading centre of Harār. Once the railway reached Derē Dawa, the ports of Zäyla and Bārbāra played a very much less important role than they once did but their decline was less swift than might have been imagined. Meanwhile, the collapse of the Mahdist state and Britain’s opening up of the various Nile confluents saw an expansion of western Ethiopian outlets. To the north internal stability and the re-establishment of cordial relations with the Italians in Eritrea led to increased trade to the north and Metewwa although not to Asāb.²

Addis Abāba found herself in a very central position as regards all these changes. Increasingly, goods were brought to the capital, especially imported ones,³ inspected by the Emperor and distributed as was needed. He, of course, was in a position to manipulate them to his own advantage, not only farming out monopolies but also, doubtless, taking advantage of his place at the centre of trade to play on the fluctuations of the market.

¹See pp. 93ff.

²In this section only European dominated long distance trade is being dealt with while on pp. 340-346 the question of Ethiopian traders will be more carefully gone into. The overall pattern as will be explained is European domination of imports and exports, while Ethiopians gather goods at the two main southern Ethiopian distribution points of Harār and Addis Abāba.

³See below, pp. 363-367.
The destruction wrought by the Mahdists, the troubles with the Italians in the North and the consolidation of Menilek's conquests in the south and west ensured that the vast bulk of exports was channelled through Addis Ababa and then to the coast.

**Eastern Outlets**

Ethiopia's outlets to the east dominated her trade. The Anglo-French rivalry of 1886-96 to dominate Ethiopia's major trade-route continued, especially with regard to financial domination of the railway. The Italians meanwhile had been squeezed out and no longer played a significant role in the east. However, the growth of the eastern outlets effected Addis Ababa closely in three ways. Progress on the railway was tremendously slowed down, for it did not reach the capital for more than twenty years. Secondly, this prolonged the commercial importance of Harar. But it was overtaken by Addis Ababa as a transfer centre by 1907 and by 1908 Addis Ababa enjoyed a commanding lead of 60% of Ethiopia's trade.

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1. See p. 244 where this was pointed out for the 1896 period.
4. The Italian role in Metewawi is dealt with in the next section, pp. 253ff.
6. Djibouti, 22.12.00, p. 2 and 15.11.02.
In 1908 Harar began to decline sharply in importance for two further reasons. The renegotiation of the railway concession by Klobukowski led to the Vitalien concession of 30th January 1908 and resumption of construction. This in turn meant that local stations on the Dere Dawa to Addis Ababa section of the railway cut off Harar from many of her local western markets since it was more profitable to ship directly to Dere Dawa or Jibuti. Thus traders increasingly would move to Dere Dawa or pick up and go to Addis Ababa. Secondly, Majazmach Balcha was appointed to rule Hararge in 1907 and his exactions "despoiled" the country to the great detriment of local and long distance trade. Furthermore, it meant that major commercial houses like Mohamad Aly were not forced to move their head offices for Ethiopia from Harar to Addis Ababa until 1908-9. Lastly, Anglo-French rivalry led to the British encouraging Indian traders who eventually drove out the established pre-Adwa French traders from control of all but the luxury trade, such as liquor and perfume.

However, individual Frenchmen retained the Emperor's favour and continued to advise him and organise imperial caravans, although

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2 AP:CR, ibid.


6 See Monopoly Section, pp. 38-386.
fewer and fewer held important monopolies.\textsuperscript{1} To go any deeper into the intricacies of Anglo-French rivalry and the Jibuti versus the Zayla port's competition would be to stray into the realm of diplomatic history, but a look at the alternative methods of transport used during railway construction and their effects on trade routes gives important insights into the supplying of Ethiopian capital with foreign goods.\textsuperscript{2}

**Northern Outlets**

While Italian hopes for a share of trade in Shawa and Harar dwindled,\textsuperscript{3} relations improved after Adwa and the consolidation of Eritrea under the direction of the first civilian governor, Martini.\textsuperscript{4} Martini from the north and Ciccodicola from Addis Ababa were trying to encourage Ethiopian trade, especially the use of the port of Metewwa instead of Jibuti,\textsuperscript{5} even to the extent of trying to persuade Menilek to assist in an Adwa-Metewwa road. Needless to say Menilek refused this point-blank, fearing new Italian encroachment so soon after Adwa.\textsuperscript{6}

In 1896\textsuperscript{7} there were two major trade routes north, one through Wollo and the other through Gojam, leading to Metewwa. With the defeat of the Mahdists the age-old outlet down the Nile from Matamma could again be extensively used by Ethiopia, although the British

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Ibid. See ASMAI 38/1/8, Telegram 97, Ciccodicola to MAE, Aden, 13.1.1900; and Addis Ababa 23.12.99; Djibouti, 20.1.1900, p.3, and 27.1.1900, p.4.
\item \textsuperscript{2}See p. 3\textsuperscript{toll}.
\item \textsuperscript{3}See above, pp.143-145 ASMAI 138/3/23, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 11.5.03.
\item \textsuperscript{4}F. Martini, Diario Eritrea (Florence, 1946), vol.s 1-IV, passim. (See index for references to Martini) (Henceforth F. Martini).
\item \textsuperscript{5}ASMAI 38/14, Martini to MAE, Asmara, 11.11.98.
\item \textsuperscript{6}ASMAI 38/1/9, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 15.2.00.
\item \textsuperscript{7}See pp. 143-250.
\end{itemize}
tended to exaggerate its importance and the speed with which it would grow.\(^1\) Statistics for the Matamma outlet in this area are particularly difficult to obtain. However, statistics for Mețewwa are relatively plentiful and it seems clear that there was no significant growth in trade until after 1908-9.\(^2\) Part of this can be ascribed to the border not being delineated until 10th July 1900,\(^3\) due partly to the political upheavals and revolts in the north,\(^4\) but mostly one feels because much of the trade from the south-west which used to flow north was diverted through Addis Ababa to Jibuti and later down the Baro.\(^5\) Menilek, it seems, did not try to impose in the north the trading policy he used in the south and south west. Here priority was put on forcing trade to flow through Addis Ababa and out through eastern outlets to increase the central government's customs revenue. Although attempts were made to do this early on\(^6\) in drawing Gomjam trade into Shawa, they seem not to have been as vigorously pursued as they were further to the south. An attempt at abolishing kella or customs collection points and encouraging all trade was made instead.\(^7\)

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\(^1\)Manchester Guardian, article by Wylde, 24.6.97. F.O.1/50/No. 1, enclosure 3 No. 6, Cromer to Sanderson, 14.1.04 and A/A, 6.12.03. See p.25 of AP:CR.

\(^2\)See p.257, 2. AC:CR ref. especially (1907), vol. 88, No. 3737, Abyssinia 1905-6, p.11, and (1911), vol. 90, Abyssinia 1910, p.3.

\(^3\)Rossetti, pp. 247-8.

\(^4\)F.O.1/36/1, Enclosure 2, A/A, 4.1.1899. But see also Manchester Guardian, 24.6.97, where it is pointed out that trade was really but little affected by these revolts. However, is should be remembered Wylde was trying to promote trade.

\(^5\)See pp. 256-316, 316-312, 313-314.

\(^6\)F.O. 1/50, No. 1, Enclosure 3, No. 6, Cromer to Sanderson, 14.1.04, A/A, 26.10.03.

\(^7\)Ibid. F.O. 371/3/F 31427, Harrington to Grey, A/A, 12.8.06. W.D., 29.10.00.
The trade to the south and south west provides a contrast with the situation in the north. It is from these areas that the bulk of the trade transhipped through Addis Ababa came, the same trade that established her pre-eminence in the Empire. Although in 1898 the British entertained great hopes for the expansion of Sudanese trade with Ethiopia this was not to be the case to any significant degree until the very end of the period and then only in Gambela.\(^1\) Besides the difficulties of facilities and navigation\(^2\) there was Menilek's policy of routing exports through Addis Ababa for the lucrative customs revenue.\(^3\) While formerly the emphasis was on coffee, gold, beeswax and ivory, rubber, very lucrative until the world price drop, was added to the list in 1909.\(^4\)

Trade directly to the south and east with British East Africa\(^5\) and with Italian Somaliland was too insignificant to have any effect on Addis Ababa customs revenue.

But one feels it was the southern and western conquests up through the turn of the century that really increased the flow of trade and goods through the capital. Each of the more important nobles would organize caravans from their provinces which would pass through Addis Ababa, present tribute, be taxed and head for the coast.\(^6\)

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\(^1\)See AP:CR reference above, p. 234, fn. 2. Especially reports for 1910, pp. 5 and 6.

\(^2\)See AP:CR (1907), vol. 88, No. 3743, pp. 11 and 12.

\(^3\)See below, pp. 296 - 310 Also F.O. 371/594/146/146, Hervey to Grey, A/A, 12.12.09.


\(^6\)Djibouti, 11.11.99. See also Trouillet to Alavail, A/A, 16.10.99.
The conquests themselves involved the gathering of vast amounts
of booty, much of which would pass through the capital and out
of the main eastern outlets.

Part B. Monopolies and their effects (1880s-1910)

The main question concerning monopolies and concessions in
Ethiopia was the degree to which they were going to be allowed
to dominate trade and the length of time they would survive. Before
the battle of Adwa a relatively restricted number of goods
was subject to monopoly and individual foreigners ran the import/
export trade on a small scale. There was no vociferous opposition
and it seems to have been only a slightly modified continuation of
the traditional system. The years 1896-1910, however, witnessed
a rash of protests, the major ones in 1902, 1906 and 1908 and one
is confronted with the problem of adequately explaining them.
Initially, as will be shown, they were sparked off by the wholesale
granting of new monopolies or by the government's attempts to
tighten up customs changes in trying to increase revenue. Other
more important factors can also be discerned behind the scenes:
Indian versus French domination of trade, the shift from Harär
to Addis Abēba of the commercial centre of the empire, big organized
import/export companies taking over from individuals working on a

1 Sīhay Berhan Sellase, "Menilek II: Conquest and Consolidation
of the Southern Provinces", HSIU, 4th Year Paper, History Dept.,

2 ASMAI 38/3/23, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 28.7.02. An interesting
case study of one of these, the Bank of Abyssinia, will be dealt with
in detail in a following section. See pp. 286-286.

3 See below, pp. 386 et.

4 See below, pp. 357 et.
smaller scale and, finally, Menilek's and later Taytu's need for immediate cash. The last may very well lie behind all these financial shifts. Recently, the change from French to Indian domination of the import/export trade had been emphasized, but the other factors were just as important. A review from the 1880s to 1910 reveals these and other factors more clearly. But throughout this discussion it must be borne in mind that monopolies were the traditional Shawa method of dealing with trade and the post-Adwa foreign and Harar's protests against them were a new and unsettling development for Menilek.

The Export Monopolies of Long Distance Trade (1880-1894)

Traditionally the ruler of Shawa had a monopoly for the export of at least two luxury goods: ivory and gold. During this period these monopolies, and others newly created, were farmed out to Europeans, largely because of Menilek's constant shortage of cash. This was an entirely new development, for formerly such trade, if we are to believe Abir, was in the hands of Muslim traders. Most of the ivory and gold was brought as tribute by regional rulers, yearly or irregularly when they paid submission to Menilek. Many more of them did this at the time of the coronation than had previously been the case. In 1892 and 1893, 600,000 Francs' worth of ivory from Shawa was exported from Jibuti and Zayla. It sold for 70-80 MTD.

1 See Pankhurst, pp. 398-9.
3 Abir, pp. 70-2.
4 See pp. 333 ff.
per farrasulla (or 15\(\frac{1}{3}\) kilos) in Shāwa, and for 110 to 115 MTD at the coast. The overall ivory trade in Aden declined from 1893-97 but whether this was due to a decline within Shāwa is not clear. This lucrative monopoly was in the hands of Ilg and Chefneux for a three year period up to at least 18.5.1892 and then was granted to Savouré up to 1896 whose last caravan included 300 camels.

While ivory fits neatly into the traditional mould of a state monopoly there was a move towards changing the whole basis of the gold and salt monopolies that was to have a profound influence on the way monopolies were run and how trade as a whole was regarded. The tentative changes of 1886 to 1896 led to a restructuring of trade from 1896 to 1910. The alluvial gold was gathered mostly in Wāllāga and Kūfa and was sold in the form of rings. The amount seems not to have been great but Europeans eagerly sought a monopoly or a concession. Alfred Ilg, probably the most influential European of the period, tried very hard to get it and only succeeded after the battle of Adwa. Potentially more lucrative, perhaps, was the salt monopoly. By the beginning of 1890 there were already reports that Chefneux had succeeded in obtaining it. He was to extract it from Lake Assal paying a yearly tribute of 1,500 MTD and exporting it to India.

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1. M&D Afrique, 138/p.328. Note sur le commerce avec l'Abyssinie, Obock, 12/1893. ASMAI 36/12/100. Antonelli to MAE, Zaila, 20.11.90. This has essentially the same figures. Gankin says it is now equal to 20 k.


3. ASMAI 36/12/100, Antonelli to MAE, Zaila, 20.11.90. ASMAI 36/14/128, Capucci to Salimbene, Ankorbe, 18.5.92. Pariset, p.48.


5. ASMAI 36/11/95, Traversi to Antonelli, 15.4.90. It must be emphasized that this involved only a very small proportion of the overall salt
But it was only in 1893 that an engineer was sent and in 1896
the Italians were saying that they had succeeded in blocking any
exports of the salt.\(^1\)

The essential difference between the ivory and the salt/
gold monopolies was that the former was originally gathered and
exploited by Ethiopians before the export monopoly was granted
to a foreigner, while in the case of the salt and gold monopolies
middle men were excluded and the whole process was in the hands
of only one person or company.

Several other monopolies were rumoured especially in coffee
which would have had a tremendous influence on trade.\(^2\) But only
one, the export of mules, actually got off the ground before 1896.
A twenty year transport concession for ox-carts connecting the rail-
way terminus with the capital had an effect only after construction
had begun in 1896.\(^3\) Menilek was so short of money and arms that
he even agreed to export mules which must have been desperately needed
for transport in the approaching Adwa campaign. In 1895, 2,000 mules
were exported to Madagascar, Menilek requisitioning them by force
(paying only 25 MTD per head), while Chefneux paid him 40 MTD per
head. This was given partly in arms and 30,000 MTD in the form of
the first issue of Menilek dollars lately minted in Paris and pro-
viding Ethiopia, but really only Addis Ababa, with her first .

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consumption of Shāwa. The bulk came from the north and was unaffected
by this monopoly.

\(^1\)Ibid. and ASMAI 36/13/111, Traversi to MAE, 26.10.91, ASMAI 36/16/157,
Salimbeni to MAE, 9.3.93.

\(^2\)Ibid. and ASMAI 3/7/49, Capucci to MAE, Roma, 22.4.97, Annesso Capucci
to Governatore, Eritrea, 18.3.97, p.31. The report was written earlier,
probably in 1896.

\(^3\)ASMAI 36/17/170, Traversi to MAE, A/A, 5.12.93.
indigenous currency.¹

Before Adwa foreigners who came to Ethiopia seeking concessions and monopolies were relatively few. But after the great victory over the Italians, their numbers increasingly grew. Worthless monopolies and the bribery needed to obtain them grew apace and finally at the turn of the century there was a crisis over the monopolies affecting the government and the whole business community. The groundwork for that crisis was laid in the less complicated and easy-going days of the pre-Adwa period. In order to fully understand these developments in monopolized exports, the parallel non-monopolized exports and imports in the pre-1896 period must be explored.

Non-monopolized Exports (1896-1896)

The main non-monopolized exports were coffee, skins and almost certainly slaves taking up at least one half of overall exports. However, the full extent of the slave trade is very difficult indeed to pin down and there is virtually no mention of its extent in the Addis Ababa area from 1886 to 1896. One can only speculate that its routes were shifted so as to be invisible to foreigners and Ethiopian sources are loath to dwell on such a sensitive subject. That it should have disappeared is inconceivable and exports to Arabia must have continued. It certainly was strongly established in Dalati, Rogé and Abd-el-Rasul from 1886 to 1888.² It was absolutely vital to the functioning of Menilek's household and this was but one of the reasons why it could

¹ASMAI 3/7/49, Capucci to Felter, A/A, 31.3.95, and Capucci to MAE, Rome, 15.4.97; also Pariset, pp. 37 and 88.
²Borelli, 14.11.86, 21.6.86. See also Cecchi, Vol. I, pp. 490-491.
BSGI, Serie 2, Vol. 12 (1887), Traversi to SGI, Antoto, 4.1.86.
The coffee trade, on the other hand, is more fully documented and seems after 1892-3 to have grown quite rapidly. While the 1893 French report, cited above, says this was not a regular trade, Menilek in December 1893 was talking of making it a monopoly along with ivory and gold indicating quite clearly that it was either lucrative at the time or potentially lucrative. Formerly, there were three centres of the coffee trade in the south and west of Ethiopia, in the Lake Tana region and in Harār. However, Gondār had suffered irreparable damage with the sackings of the Mahdists and it seems clear that Menilek with the active assistance of his provincial governors made a concerted effort to redirect the coffee of the south and west away from the route north through Gojam, to the Addis Abāba/Harār route. Thus in 1894 instead of creating a monopoly for some foreign trader, he made a pact with Ras Wāldā Giyorgis and Dējazmach Tāshāma Nadāw that they would send to Addis Abāba the coffee given as tribute and collected privately from their newly conquered provinces of Kāfa and Iłlababor. Having taxed it, Menilek would in turn send it on to Harār, once Mākonnen had procured enough camels by raiding in the Wēgadān.

1 See pp. 334-8.
2 M&D Vol. 138, Note sur le commerce avec Abyssinie, Paris 1893, p. 328. ASMAI 36/17/168, Capucci to MAE, 15.12.94. It should be pointed out that this thesis deals only with the coffee of the south and west of Ethiopia which flowed through A/A and not with the coffee from Harār which went directly to the coast.
3 ASMAI 36/17/160, Traversi to MAE, 5.12.93.
4 Abir, pp. 51-2 and 86.
5 See p. 149-150.
6 ASMAI 36/17/168, Capucci to MAE, 15.12.94. ASMAI 36/17/170, Capucci to MAE, 10.2.95.
Traders who had already bought stocks of coffee in south west Ethiopia were hard hit by the drop in prices caused by Täsämma and Wäldä Giyorgis wanting to buy coffee at the cheapest possible price. But Menilek prevented Täsämma from controlling all the exports from Illubabor so the smaller traders were able to export the stocks they had on hand and were thus not immediately ruined. One gets a clearer idea of the trading practices of these middlemen small traders from transactions noted in Azzaj Wärqenêh's diary.

Three less important exports must still be dealt with: skins, civet and wax. After the rinderpest epidemic there was temporarily a significant rise in skin exports mostly going out through Jibuti. Civet was next on the list and was often used by Menilek to pay traders when he ran short of MTD. Finally, wax was not as fully exploited as it might have been, for although it was produced throughout the country, since honey was an essential ingredient of the national beverage, Täj, the wax was a natural by-product.

This change in trade routes was significant for the growth of Addis Abäba, since it meant a tremendous increase in the volume of trade moving through the city, in taxes and in the incentive for Gondär merchants to settle and or have permanent contacts there.

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1Ibid.
2W. D. 11.11.00, 9.1.01, 16.1.01 and 6.2.01. See also pp. 337-246.
4Ibid. and Morelli, 9.11.86.
5M&D, op.cit.
6See p. 313.
Non-monopolized Imports (1882 - 1896)

Monopoly goods and concessions had no great effect on imports before 1896, and only had a real impact immediately after Adwa. The three most important imports were armaments, salt and cotton sheeting. To isolate Shawa from the rest of Ethiopia for arms imports is fairly easy, but it is much more difficult to get any reliable statistics for the other two items and the wide range of luxury goods that accompanied them. Most of the statistics deal with imports or exports from ports and thus do not necessarily concern Shawa per se but would in some cases include northern trade or that affecting only the hinterland of the port.

Imports (1882 - 1896)

However, the Italians were extremely interested in the Ethiopian arms trade and in particular its scope in Shawa. The big change in the trade came in 1892-3, when Italian imports of Wetterlis and Remington rifles almost completely ceased, and Gras rifles began to be imported on a large scale since the French army was carrying out its switch from Gras to Lebel Rifles from July 1893. Prices of muskets and guns using cartridges dropped steadily from 20 MTD in 1880 to 12 or 14 MTD in 1885, to 5 MTD in 1890. At first the Gras rifles sold at 14 MTD but then the French government offered them from Jibuti at 7 MTD and then in September 1894 at 6 MTD. However,

1See ASMAI 3/7/49 and 36/18/184 especially. The French material is somewhat more scattered, but the Italian documentation is much more substantial.

2ASMAI 3/7/49, Capucci to MAE, 22/4/97. Annesso, Capucci to Governatore Eritrea, 18.3.97. ASMAI 36/18/184, Mario Gazzini's compilation from ASMAI.


4Ibid.

5AP/CFS/131, dossier 1894, Savoure to Ministère des Colonies, 20.9.94.
this was largely a political and not an economic measure, aimed at solidifying support for France in Shāwa. In 1885 it was estimated that Shāwa had only several thousand guns of all kinds, but by 1894 the estimate was "circa 100,000" of these at least 35,390 were supplied by the Italians along the Asāb route and the rest would have been imported by men like Savouè or Ilg from the Gulf of Tajura. Basically, from 1890 onward this was the only area where arms could be imported because of the English and Italian arms embargo. But more important than the French domination of arms trade was the influence this massive importation had on domestic trade within Ethiopia. First of all, a one MTD tax had to be paid to the Emperor for each gun imported and secondly, the Emperor had first option as to whether to buy, be it for his own army, parts of his army assigned to his lieutenants or as a gift to one of their regional armies. Otherwise they could be sold by the European traders to private individuals but not to Cromo of

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2 ASMAI 3/7/49, Capucci to MAE, 22/4/97, Annesso, Capucci to Governatore Eritrea, 18.3.97, pp. 2-3.

3 ASMAI 36/18/184, M. Gazzini.

4 ASMAI 3/7/49, Capucci to MAE, 22/4/97, Annesso Capucci to Governatore Eritrea, 18.3.97, p. 10. ASMAI 36/17/164, Traversi to MAE, 17.9.94, Annesso Capucci to Traversi, A/A, 29.8.94. AP/CFS/131 dossier 1894; Savouè to Ministère des Colonies, 20.9.94. M&D, 138, Note sur le Commerce, 12/93; Zaghi (ed) Crispi e Menelick nel Diario del Conte Augusto Salimbenc (Turin, 1956), 19.7.90, p. 121. (Henceforth, Zaghi, Salimbenc Diary). There is also some oral proof to the effect that large numbers of guns were illicitly imported by-passing all ports. Avedis Terzian said his father Sarkis Terzian imported guns by dropping them in sealed containers off coastal ships in the gulf of Tajura at high tide. They were then gathered at low tide by waiting relatives who then transported them to Addis Ababa by camel. His estimates, however, in the millions are greatly exaggerated. O.I. No. II (27.10.71), pp. 2-4.
Muslim minorities.¹ Menilek before the battle of Adwa already had sufficient arms for his own soldiers and was thinking of arming Amhara residents in Bulga in the east of Addis Ababa who were threatened by the Adal.² Thus small Amhara traders had access to a substantial number of arms and could travel where they wanted selling two or three guns at a time.³ These transfers would, in the first instance, have taken place in the capital where Menilek had large numbers of troops and could keep his eye on all guns that were imported. The trade in arms became so important and widespread that cartridges became a means of exchange alongside salt. An estimated four million cartridges were put in store for the battle of Adwa and the glut was so great that in May 1895 twenty to twenty-five could be obtained for only one MTD.⁴

The second major commodity imported into Shāwa was salt and this trade underwent no substantive changes from the earlier period up to 1886. Shortages were experienced in 1890 because of interference with the trade routes and lack of draught animals due to rinderpest.⁵ More extended shortages in the years before Adwa may have been due to the military campaigns in the north against

¹ASMAI 3/7/49, Capucci to MAE, 22.4.97, Annesso Capucci to Governatore Eritrea, 8.3.97, p.4.
²Ibid., p.5.
³Ibid., p.4.
⁴Ibid., pp. 4-5.
⁵ASMAI 36/11/95, Traversi to Antonelli, 15.4.90.
the Italians or local rulers like Wagshum Berru to levying high taxes on salt caravans during times of unrest. This may have led to Menilek's exploring the possibility of Chefneux's monopoly on extracting salt from Lake Assal.

After guns the most important foreign import was cotton sheeting. India, or really Bombay, supplied the material for the indigenous clothing called the shāmma, while America supplied it for trousers. France supplied textiles of finer quality, velvets, silks and coloured threads. Shāwa already had a thriving local cotton industry and the vast majority of Ethiopian garments were spun and woven locally. However, the 1891-2 cholera epidemic hit the people of the cotton-growing lowlands particularly hard. What is interesting to note here is that the combination of famine and cholera practically destroyed the indigenous cotton production of the time as well as the weaving industry. One wonders, with very little proof at hand, whether this may have influenced the growth of cotton sheeting imports revealed in the post-'Adwa period and thus the increased use of Addis Abāba as a central distribution point.

Finally, odds and ends, mostly European manufactured goods, were imported in small quantities: hardware, locks, steel, copper, lead, wire, tin, mercury, medicines, liquor, perfumes, etc. More important than most of these, were grind stones for flour mills run

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1 ASMAI 36/17/161, Cecchi to MAE, n.d. Annesso, Capucci to Cecchi, 30.1.94.
2 See p. 258-259.
4 As I shall show later in dealing with the economic impact of the famine, see pp. 39-44.
5 ASMAI 36/17/167, Traversi and Piano to MAE, 19.11.94, p.29.
by water or wind and religious objects for the Orthodox Church; bells, pictures and statuettes. This demand for these last imports was largely supplied by the foreign communities resident in Ethiopia, increasingly in the Addis Ababa area, those who largely administered both the monopolies and long distance trade in the period surrounding the Battle of Adwa.

Peoples Involved in Long Distance Trade (1880s-1890s)

As we have seen, the bulk of Shawa's trade passed through Harar and was exported from Jibuti/Obok or Zayla. French and Italian documentation would have one believe that theirs was the only important rivalry in the struggle to control the trade of the interior but it seems fairly clear that the Shawa were increasingly involving themselves deeply in trade. Abir's thesis as to the non-involvement of Christians in trade for an earlier period would not seem to hold true. The caravans in the south and west may well have been organized by Muslims, largely from Jemma and perhaps from Tegré and Wallo as was the case after the battle of Adwa. But when it was brought to Alyu Amba and later Addis Ababa, taxes were levied by Christian Amhara Naggardas, and the goods were largely sold to French, Greek, Italian, Armenian or Arab merchant houses or individuals. The Muslim role in trade was declining swiftly, so swiftly as to cause one to wonder how important it had actually been originally. Internally the Christian Naggardas dominated trade.

1 Ibid. and M&D 138, Note sur le commerce avec Abyssinie, 12/1893.
2 Abir, pp. 70-2.
while the import/export/trade was presided over by foreigners.

During this period French was the most widely spoken European language and they had five major and six minor merchant houses with branches in Shawa, while the Italians had only two. The Italians worked through Bienenfield in Aden and Viscardi in Shawa while Chefneux (who on 9.3.94 was awarded the railway concession) also had a base in Aden as well as one in Obok. Most of the Frenchmen were, however, based in Obok/Jibuti: Brémond, Savouré, Pino, and Dubois. Savouré was the most important trader, the only one with branches in both Harār and Shawa. After the French the most important European involvement in the trade of Shawa was Greek; twenty firms were established in Jibuti and had links with the interior. Only two are mentioned by name, "Cesare Georgi" and "Giorgio X.P.Fotis". Traversi went so far as to say the Greeks and Armenians were beginning to "infest the country". Larger numbers were to come into the country after the 1896 massacres in the Armenian homelands and before the battle of Adwa there were at least 8 Armenian traders, including "Estephanos" and "Dacran".

References:
4. Ibid. and ASMAI 36/11/95, Traversi to Antonelli, 15.4.90.
5. M&D 138/p.140, Annexe to Savouré, 6.12.89. ASMAI 36/12/95, Antonelli to MAE, 22.6.90.
7. ASMAI 36/11/95, Traversi to Antonelli, 15.4.90.
The Greeks and the Armenians were not nearly as prosperous as the French and Italians and were the first examples of a "poor white" element, if one can use the phrase, to appear in Ethiopia.\(^1\)

The railway was to bring many more. There were no German or English houses, yet and only scattered Swiss and English individuals.\(^2\)

One wonders whether Menilek was consciously trying to replace Muslims by foreigners, especially Greeks or Armenians, in order to break the former's grip on trade and bring in others who were more directly dependent on his patronage.\(^3\)

Besides the Europeans two other groups had their fingers in the Shawa pie, Yemeni Arabs and the Abubakar family from Zäyla. Savouré says there were several large Arab merchants and five or six members of "Abubakar's family;\(^4\) other evidence is largely lacking. Judging from the role that Zäyla played as an outlet for Shawa's goods, the Abubakar role in her trade might have been large but evidence is scanty while that for the European role is large. There is also some oral proof to the effect that some long distance trade which stretched across Shawa and even into Gojam and Wollo was in the hands of Guragé families.\(^5\)

Two further points remain to be made in an attempt to redress the balance of a predominance of European sources for commerce during this period. That Ethiopia's commerce should have been so dominated

\(^1\) ASMAI 36/16/147, Illma to MAE, 30.1.92.

\(^2\) ASMAI 36/15/135, Salimbeni to Ilg, 10.2.91. M&D 138/p.140, Annex to Savouré, 6.12.89.

\(^3\) This of course is true only if one assumes that Abir's assertions concerning Muslim trade are valid for the earlier period.


\(^5\) Personal communication from Fiqadu Gádamu. Whether they were Muslim or Christian I have been unable to establish, but they seem to have been relatively recent development and after Shawa's conquests in the area would have been dependent upon Menilek.
by non-Amharas is so striking as to arouse suspicion. In the post-Adwa period, there is some evidence\(^1\) to suggest that many traders, especially those from Gondär, had been forced by the sackings in 1864/5 and in 1887 to leave the former capital and dominant commercial centre.\(^2\) Many of them, including Wärqenäh's family, and more especially his uncle, who was the first Nëggadras of Addis Abäba, settled in the new capital in Gondärë'sëfär.\(^3\) They were involved in trading skins, civet and coffee and organized small caravans not only from the south and southwest to Addis Abäba but also from Addis Abäba to Harär.\(^4\) The Nëggadras, very definitely a Christian, was entitled to 10\(^{\circ}/\)o in kind or in money of everything that flowed through the market and perforce on behalf of the Emperor would become one of the most important traders in the land.

It is very difficult to square this view of trade with that presented by Abir, of long distance trade being dominated by Muslims. Perhaps the shift from Muslim to Christian traders took place in the shift from the centres of Gondär to Addis Abäba though this would seem to be a rather sudden development. More likely in the absence of any firm data except the Christian/Gondär data of the diary is the hypothesis that both carried on trade simultaneously, the Muslims increasingly hampered first by Tewodros's decrees against Islam and then those of Yohannes. Then with Shëwa's southern and western conquests the Muslims would have been furthered hampered by a Shëwa

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\(^1\) See below, pp. 341-41 and W., D. 11.11.00, 9.1.01, 10.1.01 and 6.2.01.

\(^2\) See pp. 144ff., 334 above.

\(^3\) W., D. 29-30.3.1900, O., D. No. 25 (19.5.72).

\(^4\) Ibid.
takeover of the trade routes and Menilek's domination of the personnel appointed to supervise it.\textsuperscript{1} Thus, while the internal trade of the Empire was increasingly in the hands of Christian Ethiopians, the import/export trade had by the time of the Battle of Adwa passed from the hands of Muslim merchants into those of foreigners, at first largely Frenchmen.

**Monopolies from 1896-1910.**

Immediately after the battle of Adwa individual French traders dominated commerce in Addis Ababa\textsuperscript{2} while in Harar there was more of a mixture of Indians, Greeks and Armenians.\textsuperscript{3} The main French traders in Addis Ababa at this time were Chefneux, Savouret,\textsuperscript{4} Trouillet\textsuperscript{5} and Stevénin.\textsuperscript{6} Menilek's monopolies were then only actively enforced on gold and ivory.\textsuperscript{7} Already by 1898 Indian merchants had begun to move to Addis Ababa attracted by Harrington's

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\textsuperscript{1} Later after 1910 Islamic domination of the Import/Export trade may well have been restored during the years of the success of Mohamad Aly's Company.

\textsuperscript{2} F.O. 1/33/No.19, Rodd to Salisbury, A/A, 10.5.97; F.O. 1/33/p.51, Rodd to Salisbury, Zeyla, 14.6.97.

\textsuperscript{3} F.O. 1/33/p.8, Rodd to Salisbury, Harrar, 6.4.97.

\textsuperscript{4} N.S.Eth.7, Billol to Hanotaux, Rome, 7.7.97, Incl. La Tribuna, 6.7.97. F.O. 1/32/No. 19, Rodd to Salisbury, A/A, 10.5.97.

\textsuperscript{5} Djibouti, 11.11.99, p.2.

\textsuperscript{6} Pariset, passim. The work is basically a biography of Stevénin. Another important merchant at that time probably was Benin.

\textsuperscript{7} F.O. 1/33/p.29, Rodd to Salisbury, A/A, 15.5.97.
first mission there, but it was not until December 1899 that the French community in Addis Ababa began to realize the large number of Indians established in the capital. Furthermore, Savouré and the two associated French traders Trouillet and Stevénin had had their businesses seriously affected when one of their yearly caravans was looted. More than a year passed before any indemnity was given them. Had they not been such long-time residents of the country they would have been unlikely to have received even this payment, for Menilek gave such privileges only to a favoured few. Many foreigners came clamouring for free monopolies and concessions after Menilek had impressed the world with his strength and independence at Adwa. The vast majority became discouraged and left. One of the largest and perhaps most profitable imports, arms, was rapidly falling off in importance, due to a glut on the Ethiopian market. For, immediately before and after the Battle of Adwa, Ethiopians imported a massive number of arms (mainly through French-held territory on the Gulf of Tajura) to face Italian and foreign threats. After Adwa, France

3Djibouti, 27.1.00.
4F.O. 1/33/p.35, Rodd to Salisbury, A/A, 15.5.07.
5Djibouti, 6.5.99; Powell-Cotton, p.117.
6F.O. 1/37/No. 17, Harrington to F.O., A/A, 7.4.1900.
and Russia in effect gave her further arms, or sold them at very reduced prices. Finally, Menilek had to build an arsenal in Bulga to house all the excess arms.\(^1\) For this time there also exists a listing of all the important traders in Addis Ababa and their nationalities.\(^2\) During the previous two years the two big Indian traders, Mohammed Aly and Jiwajee,\(^3\) and one of the biggest Armenian traders, Terzian,\(^4\) had moved from Harar to Addis Ababa. Of the three or more major French traders of 1897 only one is regarded as being in the first class. The decline of the French as big traders is obvious.

Another trend can just be seen in the listing; the beginnings of a gap between the small traders (with a total of 12) and the large ones (total 6). The medium or second class number only five. This division is quite clear among the Arabs, Armenians, Greeks and Indians and became so increasingly among the French. Thus the beginnings of the concentration of the import/export business in the hands of the two Armenian firms, the two Indians, Jiwajee, Mohammed Aly, and the Jew, Benin,\(^5\) quite clearly has begun to take

\(^1\)See pp. 91-97.

\(^2\)Djibouti, 17.8.01, p.3. Also AP:CR (1900), vol. 92, No. 2531, p.13.

\(^3\)See references, p. 371-372.


\(^5\)An area of the city is known by his name, as the oldest and largest Jewish trader in the city. O.I. No. I (5.12.71). His origins are unclear but this name may well have been a contraction of the name of the well-known Bienenfield, the trader at Aden, See pp. 367 ff.
place. For by October 1900 the bulk of commerce was completely monopolized by Indians and Armenians. The Indians were so successful in taking over trade from the French because they were not only willing to cut down profit margins through spending less on their overheads and living expenses, but also by employing more efficient trading methods. "Instead of sending cash to the coast they laid it out in ivory, civet and gold, and so secure a double profit." As their agents expanded into the various provinces they became more efficient in gathering raw materials and in further dominating the import/export trade. While the Indians expanded to the west and south, an Armenian, Sarkis Terzian, seems to have done much the same in the east in the province of Hararge. It is significant to note that these large trading concerns were based on family and ethnic solidarity which could hold together the farflung posts as well as a close relationship with Menilek from whom they obtained much of their capital. But the Indians had one further advantage which none of their competitors could share: a very significant amount of Ethiopia's exports ended up in India in the years immediately

1 ASMAI 38/1/11, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 10.10.1900.
3 Powell-Cotton, op.cit.
4 See below, pp. 273-274.
7 W.D., 27.1.00.
after Adwa. In 1897 five exports (gold, ivory, civet, coffee and wax) went to India in large quantities.\(^1\) Thus with a base in Bombay, an efficient network was set up. Furthermore, German and Italian goods were transhipped to Ethiopia through Bombay.\(^2\)

In April 1901 the first tentative protest against monopolies took place.\(^3\) This almost certainly reveals an attempt by established small traders and new foreigners attracted by the construction of the railway to get a share of the trade previously monopolised by foreigners close to Menilek. At the same time the two French traders, Trouillet and Stevénin, were already beginning to diversify, moving from the import/export trade more and more into light industrial work and setting up flour-mills, a soap factory and a tannery in the Addis Ababa area.\(^4\) By May 1902 the buying and selling of monopolies was in full swing. The coffee monopoly was sold to Mohammad Aly for 65,000 MTD and the wax and salt monopolies farmed out, while the skin monopoly was renewed for five years.\(^5\) Oral information adds candles, petroleum and sugar to this list.\(^6\) Ilg at this time was heatedly against the monopolies, saying that Menilek would lose rather than gain money, for the laws against contraband could never be effectively enforced in Ethiopia.\(^7\) He was symbolic of the small traders being pushed

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\(^1\)AP:CR (1897), vol. 89, No. 1978, Abyssinia 1897, p.4. Coffee also went to India, see Djibouti, 22.9.00, pp. 1-2.

\(^2\)ASM AI 38/11/1, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 6.11.00.

\(^3\)Djibouti, 12.7.02, O.I. No. II (9.11.71), p.4 and (23.11.71), p.1.

\(^4\)Djibouti, 16.3.01 and 6.4.01, p.3. See also pp. 396 - 370.

\(^5\)Djibouti, 5.7.02.

\(^6\)Djibouti, 31.5.02.

\(^7\)O.I. No. II (9.11.71), p.4.

\(^8\)Djibouti, 21.6.02, passim.
out by the bigger and more highly organised traders like Terzian and Mohammad Aly. The greatest competition for monopolies, however, revolved around the most lucrative of imports, Abi'adid or cotton sheeting.\(^1\) It lay at the base of most of the competition and was the biggest plum, as will be seen later. Protests against the monopolies built up until November 1902. The newspaper *Djibouti: Journal Franco-Ethiopien* with its strong French pro-railway and newcomer bias was in the forefront.\(^2\) It even went so far as to publish the full text of the July 1902 protest.\(^3\) This protest was signed solely by Harar merchants - mostly Arabs and Muslims and centred on the coffee monopoly which had hitherto been the most profitable item of trade in Harar. Contraband routes were being organized everywhere; the railway suffered as a result, and local Oromo farmers refused to trade in it any more because there was too little profit. All in all it was quite a blow to Harar's economic position in the country and perhaps even more to the Muslims who had formerly controlled her trade. In November 1902 M. Euripides Yohannides left Harar for Addis Ababa to try to cancel his skin monopoly. This was the first monopoly to be a victim of the new protests, for contraband trade in skins had made it impossible for him to make a reasonable profit.\(^5\) Within a month Menilek was reviewing his whole attitude to the monopoly

\(^1\)ASMAI 38/3/19, Martini to MAE, Asmara, 20.7.02; ASMAI 38/3/23, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 28.7.02, p.14; Djibouti, 12.7.02, p.4.

\(^2\)Djibouti, 5.7.02, 12.7.02.

\(^3\)Ibid. and Djibouti, 5.7.02.

\(^4\)ASMAI 38/3/19, Ciccodicola to MAE, Addis Alam, 15.8.02; Djibouti, 12.7.02.

\(^5\)Djibouti, 6.9.02.
problem and thinking of abolishing them all. However, in November 1902 he granted a tobacco monopoly and flirted with the idea of granting the Abujadid monopoly in return for an Addis Ababa to Addis Alam electric tramway in a complicated deal involving money and exclusive use of mineral resources.

The lines of battle on the abolition of the monopolies were now drawn. In favour of abolition were: Italy, small traders and the Armenians; against were big traders, many of them English protected Indian subjects while the French legation, to the great dismay of Djibouti: Journal Franco-Ethiopien and French traders, remained neutral. Finally, in April, 1903 Menilek said he would abolish all the monopolies after Easter. This, the Italian minister says, was due to his own efforts but a different version of the same incident was given to me by the son of an Armenian trader.

"Menilek was most concerned lest he should lose any revenue. Sarkis Terzian advised him to break the monopolies and in consequence the case was opened. Sarkis said he could collect two million Maria Theresa Dollars from the merchants of Harar to pay for the monopolies and was able to do so ... This was the greatest event of his life."

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1 N.S.Eth., 65, Lagarde to Delcassé, A/A, 19.11.02; ASMAI 38/3/20, Ciccodicola to MAE, Addis Alam, 26.10.02 and 6.11.02.
2 N.S.Eth., 65, op.cit., Annexe 1 proclamation by Menilek, 19.11.02. This was a dead letter since the conditions were never entirely fulfilled.
3 ASMAI 38/3/22, Ciccodicola to MAE, Addis Alam, 4.12.02.
4 ASMAI 38/3/22, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 25.4.03.
5 Djibouti, 26.7.02.
6 O.I. No. II (9.11.71).
7 ASMAI 38/3/22, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 25.4.03.
8 Djibouti, 31.5.02.
9 ASMAI 38/3/22, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 25.4.03; ASMAI 38/3/24, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 21.7.03.
10 O.I. No. II (9.11.71), p.4.
Avedis Terzian may well have exaggerated the role his father played and the amount of money involved, but somehow the story has a truthful ring, although it has proved impossible to substantiate it directly from written sources.

Monopolies provide a consistent bribery and scandal prone theme throughout Ethiopian economic history, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As Ciccodicola pointed out in July 1903, as long as Menilek held the degree of power he did over capital in Ethiopia there was "no guarantee monopolies won't begin again."

There were no further organized protests until halfway through 1906. This seems to have been sparked off by two measures which immediately affected the day to day commercial transactions of Addis Ababa and Harar traders. Before this, however, several limited monopolies were given out in 1905-6. The most important was a monopoly for the making of cartridges in Ethiopia given to Sarkis Terzian. Since cartridges were still widely accepted as currency the concession was very important, especially since arms imports had considerably slackened. Sarkis bought the machinery in England in May 1905 but his concession was taken over by an English firm in January 1906. The reasons for this were complicated and obscure. Terzian had momentarily fallen from favour while Humphreys was cashing

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1 ASMAI 38/3/24, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 21.7.03.
2 ASMAI 38/3/28, Caetani to MAE, A/A, 20.5.05.
3 AP:CR (1907), vol. 88, No. 3747, Abyssinia 1905/6, p.3.
4 See above, pp. 33-34.
5 ASMAI 38/3/28, Caetani to MAE, A/A, 27.5.05.
6 F.O. 371/2/file 2685/2885, Greenwood and Batley, Ltd. to F.O., 20.1.06; N.S.Eth. 21, Lagarde to Bourgeois, Entoto, 8.4.06; O.I. No. II (9.11.71), p.2.
in on the rising British prestige occasioned by the newly chartered Egyptian dominated Bank of Abyssinia. A Tobacco monopoly was given to some Russians and one in alcohol to Armenians in April 1906. At about the same time Alfred Ilg, a longtime small trader and advisor to Menilek, left the country for good. All these minor shifts by the smaller traders, and others not mentioned, seem again to point to the continuing process of their being squeezed out by the larger traders and the Indians especially gaining over their competitors in trying to control the large scale import/export trade.

Unlike 1902, the 1906 protest had both Harar and Addis Ababa signatures. Thus the 1902 protest was Harar based while in 1906 Addis Ababa was the centre of unrest. Urgent reform of four points was called for: 1) the financial organisation of MTD imports; 2) the organisation of customs; 3) communications, especially the Abubakar caravan monopoly and 4) the administration of justice for Europeans. The first point was so important it was the subject of a separate written protest and garnered 55 Addis Ababa signatures and 27 from Harar and Dere Dawa. After the creation of the Bank of Abyssinia Menilek imposed a 10% tax on the importation of MTD, the most widespread currency of the time. According to the bank's charter, however, it was not bound to pay it and was thus in a very

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1 See pp. 286-295.
2 N.S.Eth. 65, Lagarde to Bourgeois, Entoto, 17.4.06, pp. 58-60.
3 ASMAI 38/4/31, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 18.2.06. It should be added that his commercial vicissitudes were only one of many factors influencing his departure.
4 R.P. Skinner, Abyssinia of Today (London, 1906), p. 96 (Henceforth Skinner); Decaux, pp. 179-80. The first was in 1903, the second in 1905.
5 N.S.Eth. 63, Dépêche Coloniale, 10.6.06, pp. 252-3.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p. 252.
favourable position vis-à-vis all the merchants who had to pay it.\footnote{Ibid.}

The second point, "arbitrary and vexatious" customs duties, is an eternal theme in Ethiopian trade and the Abubākār caravan monopoly hit Addis Abēba merchants particularly hard.\footnote{Ibid. p. 252. Transport from Derē Dawa to Addis Abēba went from 28 to 30 MTD per camel load to 50 MTD per camel.} The final point was directed against the Ḳābashāy (a local method of thief catching) under which several merchants and foreigners had suffered.\footnote{See \cite[p. 185-6]{Decaux}.}

It seems clear that the 1906 protests do not fit as neatly into the overall theme presented in the introduction but, nonetheless, if a merchant's relations with the Emperor were good and if he was rich enough to bribe efficiently he could more easily deal with the customs and Abubākār than the smaller merchants whose means were more limited.\footnote{Decaux, pp. 185-6.} Thus the 1906 and 1908 crises were similar in that protests were concentrated in Addis Abēba while the 1902 crisis was a more localised Ḳārēr phenomenon. All of which tends to again point out the non-Shāwa bent of the protests to which Menilek had to yield in order to increase his liquid capital.

The rainproof monopoly or as it was sometimes called the rubber monopoly was a good example of the shady dealings, so profitable to Menilek. The concession was given to the Kardofan Trading Company at the end of 1905\footnote{F. O. 371/2/817/817, Kardofan to F. O., 3.1.06.} and from the beginning a certain Yālibi played an important role in the English company which had rights to grow plantations for rubber on the Baro river.\footnote{F. O. 371/190/2494/4020, Harrington to F. O., London, 3.2.07.} He worked closely with
Nagadras Haylä Giyorgis and the two were destined to scale the ladder of power in Ethiopia together. Harrington went so far as to say "My opinion is that it [the rubber monopoly] is a joint swindle between the Nagadras [sic] and Ydlibi."

The company wanted to "dispense" with Ydlibi's managerial services but could not afford to do so because of his influence with Menilek. Furthermore, there was an increasing possibility that the concession would be withdrawn from the company because the Ethiopian government claimed it had not fulfilled the stipulations of the original contract and listed five different points in dispute. Only Ydlibi was thought to be able to prevent a revocation of the original charter.

After June of 1908 Menilek was seriously ill and could not carry out the business of state and dealing with foreigners fell increasingly to his newly created Minister of Commerce and Foreign Affairs Nagadras Haylä Giyorgis. A German, Zintgraff, was appointed arbitrator and a decision favour to Haylä Giyorgis and Ydlibi was duly reached. The concession was withdrawn and then worked by the Ethiopian government "as a Regie" with Ydlibi in charge. Formerly exports of coffee, hides, rubber and other commodities had gone out through Gambela but now were conveniently re-routed through Addis Abäba and Jibouti and, needless to say, through Haylä Giyorgis's Addis Abäba customshouses.

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1 Ibid. See also W.D., 12.12.08.
2 F.O. 371/396/12469/12469 passim, 21.3.08.
3 F.O. 371/396/12469/29890, Ethiopian Rubber Co. to F.O., 27.8.08.
4 See political section, p. 564.
5 Ibid.
6 ASMAI 54/2/141(1909), Colli to MAE, 28.8.09. Zintgraff was already deeply involved with Ydlibi and Haylä Giyorgis before the case.
7 F.O. 371/396/12469/44260, Hervey to F.O., 25.11.08. There were stone
At about the same time Ydlibi was appointed by Hayll Giyorgis to improve government customs receipts. "The choice was not a happy one" and led to immediate protests.\(^1\) In January 1909, despite the protests he was put in direct control of the Addis Ababa customs.\(^2\) But already the Addis Ababa merchants had made four public complaints, three of which were directed against the administration of customs levies.\(^3\) First they said that customs employees must be sworn in and given an oath. Secondly, there were further complaints about the Abubakar caravan monopoly from which merchants still suffered. The third clause was the most interesting and registers the foreigners' antipathy to indigenous traders. They alleged that "indigenous" traders avoided the main customs points, especially Addis Ababa, by taking lesser known routes and thus had to pay less duty on exportable items. The Europeans wanted an overall tax on all goods destined for export.\(^4\) This was quite unrealistic considering the state of Ethiopian administration and communications at the time.

The final complaint was against customs officials who were themselves involved in trade because they didn't tax themselves and thus "paralyzed" the operations of other traders. Again it was unrealistic to suppose this might be done since the whole system of taxation was administered by a Naggadras, like Hayll Giyorgis, who as their very title implies were appointed because they were the most important of warehouses where imports and exports had to be stored until they were taxed and before they left the capital.

\(^1\) N.S.Eth. 64, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 4.11.08.

\(^2\) Ibid., A/A, 2.1.09.

\(^3\) N.S.Eth 64, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 4.11.08. Annexe 2, Pétition des Commerçants d'Addis Ababa pour protester les nouvelles exigences d'administration des Douanes.

\(^4\) Ibid.
the local merchants. The only action that seems to have been taken by the Ethiopian government was to create an official tribunal, which had hitherto been unofficial. "Le Negus a institué un tribunal de commerce précisé par le Naggadras; celui-ci récut autour de lui les commerçants notables européens de la place et les prie d'examiner les plaintes des parties en cause." The Naggadras would make most decisions himself and for the very important ones the Emperor provided the final court of appeal.

By the beginning of the next year, the state of Menilek's health being what it was, his former "acts" were being "questioned" and "no concessions granted by, and no contracts made with the Emperor, is now safe". The situation was extremely fluid while the power struggle between Taytu and the Shawa nobles was taking place. In 1909 she created the Banque Nationale d'Agriculture et pour de Developpement de Commerce to compete with the Bank of Abyssinia, a final attempt, perhaps, by Harar to break Addis Ababa's financial domination of trade and monopolies. Then, in September 1909, she felt strong enough to remove Naggadras HayI Giyorgis from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and appoint a representative of the Treasury to check all his dealings in the Ministry of Commerce. One of the many shady

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1 Guidi, Vocabolario Amarico Italiano (Rome, 1953), 400. See section on the Naggadras below, pp. 138-139, 310ff.
3 F.O. 371/594/147/14365, Harvey to Grey, A/A, 20.3.09.
4 See political section, pp. 76ff.
5 See above, pp. 249-356.
involvements brought to light was the Ydlibi/Haylā Giyorgis rubber affair.¹ Bägerond Mulugēta, the Minister of Finance (and close confidant of Empress Ṭaytu) and Fitawrari Ḥabtā Giyorgis (the powerful Minister of War), came out in favour of the case being reviewed should Menilek agree to do so. Eventually, it was decided to wait until he was well enough to make a decision.² Before this occurred other factors, partly political, led to the Naggads being arrested and put in chains.³ The next day he was "released but is removed from his position as Minister of Commerce..." There was a great demonstration and joy at the release of Haila Giyorgis.⁴ All the merchants ... became guarantee for him.⁵ Many of the most important merchants of the capital were ordered by Ṭaytu to pay their outstanding loans. Her failure to collect these led to the legitimizing of the position of the monopolies and traders whom she had previously attacked and a re-establishment of the commercial status quo.⁶ For, having failed to collect Haylā Giyorgis's loans she had found it much more difficult to collect them from others. In making an overall assessment of Ṭaytu's influence on trade one is left with the almost inescapable conclusion that her influence was far less than it might have been. Unlike Menilek, she obviously did not understand the central role that loans played in

¹ F.O. 371/594/147/44989, Hervey to Grey, A/A, 17.11.09.
² Ibid.
³ W.D., 24.12.09.
⁴ W.D., 25.12.09.
⁵ See below, pp. 185 ff.
the empire's trade, for when she had the power in her hands she
did not take advantage of the opportunity. The loans and the money
from them remained in the hands of men like Haylê Giyorgis, giving
them vast profits in the years to come.

Thus Ydlibi's position was legitimized and the position of
other monopolies strengthened, especially those of the Indian traders.
After the Ydlibi rubber monopoly, the next most important national
monopoly as far as Addis Abêba was concerned was the cartridge
monopoly. Its transfer to an English firm was mentioned above,¹
but in 1909-10 negotiations were in full swing as to who would get
the contract to buy the machinery and administer the factory once
it was set up. Humphreys was to get it eventually after 1910 because
of his good contacts at the centre of power.²

A less important monopoly was that in tobacco. It was taken
over by Kevorkoff in 1907 after Menilek ordered a thorough examination
of the records of the earlier corrupt concession holders. Kevorkoff
reorganized it completely, retained good relations with Ethiopians
and kept the monopoly profitably going until the Italian Occupation.³

Finally, the development of the Indian domination of Ethiopian
trade must be further explored. By 1909-10 they were firmly established
as Ethiopia's most prosperous import/exporters⁴ with Mohammad Aly the
most important and Jiwajee close behind.⁵ Their capital came largely

¹See pp. 280ff.
²W.D. 26.2.09; F.O. 371/597/41605, Hervey to Grey, 23.10.09. Humphreys
was an unscrupulous adventurer with connections in the Palace who was
trying to gain as much influence and money as possible.
³N.S.Eth. 56, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 20.10.09; O.I. No. II (23.11.71),
p.1.
Sudan Intelligence Report, 6/1909; F.O. 371/595/1957, Hervey Annual
Report, 31.12.09, p.11; C. Citerni, Ai Confini Meridionale dell'
Etiope (Milan', 1913), p.49 (Henceforth Citerni).
⁵W.O., op. cit.; W.D. 25.12.08.
from Menilek and was once estimated at £2,000,000 in the case
of Mohammad Aly, albeit somewhat unreliably.¹ But not all Indian
traders were necessarily prosperous; Mullah Akbarali and his Harār
associate Mullah Faizullahboy were small scale traders who were
forced into bankruptcy by the large debts incurred by their unprofit¬
able branch in Harār. But once the two larger firms had weathered
the crisis of Taytu's coup their stability seemed to be assured.
The small and medium sized Addis Abēba French traders too seemed to
have undergone little change from 1908-1909.² But overall it remains
clear that in the long run it was the largest traders with the closest
contacts with Menilek that were faring best, making the largest profits
and expanding most swiftly.

The Bank of Abyssinia - an Example of a Monopoly

Like many other concessions Menilek gave, but especially the
railway, the Bank of Abyssinia was one that he later often regretted.
The pattern set by the railway was repeated in the Bank and the im¬
mediate stimulus for the Bank was the financial crisis of the rail¬
way. Menilek never had complete faith in the Bank. He was ever
fearful of British financial domination, and State monies were never
wholly entrusted to it. Thus its impact on Ethiopia as a whole was
very small, although its influence on Addis Abēba or her traders
was more significant. At the end of the period under review here a
completely unsuccessful rival to the Bank of Abyssinia was put for¬
ward by Empress Taytu. This crisis clearly revealed the degree to
which Imperial financial affairs were carried on independently of the

¹ W.O., op.cit.
² N.S.Eth. 66, Note pour M. le Rapporteur, Paris, 27.08, p.65; N.S.
Eth. 62, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 31.3.09; N.S.Eth. 62, Brice to
Corarel, A/A, 8.8.09; AP/CFS/81, dossier 1; Encl. Abyssinie Traité
de Commerce, Encl. No. 2061, Chambre des Députés, procès verbal, 22.10.08.
earlier Bank of Abyssinia. The bank’s influence was never as large as foreign diplomats imagined or hoped but it did, at times, assist in raising capital for the construction of permanent buildings and for the purchase of centrally located building sites.

There had been several trial kites flown for a bank in Ethiopia prior to the 10th of March, 1905, Bank of Abyssinia concession. 1899 saw unsuccessful enquiries by a M. Delhorbe, a friend of Chefneux, while Ilg and Chefneux later in the same year were given a concession to study the possibilities of a bank with European financial backing. Nothing came of these initiatives but it was typical of Menilek to explore the possibilities of such a sensitive venture not through the representatives of foreign powers in Addis Ababa (Lagarde, Harrington or Ciccodicola) but through trusted personal friends, independent of official government ties.

It is interesting to note that these initiatives came when Ilg and Chefneux’s railway company was experiencing increasing financial strains and before his animosity against French government involvement in the railway affair became pronounced. For five years there was an unruffled silence, so far as the records indicate, on the bank question.

At the beginning of 1905 both Germany and England (the latter through the National Bank of Egypt) offered Menilek aid in breaking the stalemate which had arisen in the finances of the railway. France

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1 N.S. Eth. 57, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Memo, Paris, 22.11.98.
2 N.S. Eth. 57, Telegram, Lagarde to Minister, Djibouti, 26.12.98.
3 Ibid.
4 See F.O. 403/299, Harrington to F.O., 30.5.00. Willi Leoppe’s Ph.D. thesis on Ilg and the railway up to 1909 is eagerly awaited to clear up the endlessly complicated diplomatic moves surrounding the early growth of the railway.
5 F.O. 401/8, Harrington to F.O., 28.7.05.
in the heat of an election campaign took up the issue of British involvement in the originally French dominated railway and in the process French parliamentarians let loose some especially jingoistic statements about Ethiopia. These were sped to Menilek's ear by the recently completed Italian telegraph and the Emperor turned to Britain in the person of Harrington and a British supported bank so that he could raise money independently of France to continue construction of the railway now halted at Deré Dawa. The concession was formally granted by Menilek on the 10th of March 1905 and decreed by Egypt on 30th of that month. The immediate stimulus for the bank was Menilek's desire to raise sufficient money both in Ethiopia and outside it so that he could, if necessary, carry on railway construction on his own.

The full text of the concession is readily available in Rossetti, the main points being: in Article one that the Bank of Egypt was to have a 50 year concession. The capital of the Bank was to start at £100,000, with a head office at Addis Ababa. In Article two, "8 privileges are granted exclusively": the establishment of no other bank, sole right to issue bank notes and mint coins, all government funds were to be deposited there and preference given to the bank for government loans; the bank was to get a free grant of land in Addis Ababa and could build warehouses where merchants could deposit goods in guarantee for loans; finally, specie, that is largely Maria Theresa dollars, could be brought into the country by rail under the

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2 Rossetti, op.cit. For progress of the telegraph see elsewhere in this chapter, pp. 34-5 N.S.Eth. 57, Telegram, Lagarde to Minister, Entoto, 7,3,05 and 11,3,05; N.S.Eth. 57, Lagarde to Delcassé, Entoto, 18,3,05. F.O. 1/52, Revelstokes to Lansdowne, 10,11,05, Command Papers 3747, Trade of Abyssinia 1905-6, pp. 3-4.

same very favourable conditions as those allowed to the government.

Although international in name, the bank was dominated by British interests, the President was from the Bank of Egypt and the Vice-President was nominated by him.\(^1\) By far the largest share of the stock, 39,000 out of 100,000, was owned by British subjects and only 6,180 by Ethiopians.\(^2\) Furthermore, the Ethiopians to be represented on the council counted for little. Their names are not mentioned in Foreign Office or Quai d'Orsay correspondence until May 1907 and Ras Mäkonnen, an original member, was not replaced until two years after his death.\(^4\)

Menilek's disillusion with the bank began early, scarcely three months after granting the concession.\(^5\) At that time, Palmer was proclaimed President of the bank instead of Menilek. It was, perhaps, at this time that Menilek decided not to entrust the full amount of his royal treasury or gemjabet monies to the bank.\(^6\) Thus a significant proportion of Imperial finances remained in the hands of the Bäjerond of the Imperial Court, at this time probably Mulugeta, later to be named Minister of Finance in 1907.\(^7\) However, Menilek came to have increasing faith in the Governor of the Bank of Abyssinia, McGillivray, who was resident in Addis Abäba and in 1906 he was urging Menilek to build the railway on his own.\(^8\) Though

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\(^1\)Rossetti, p.300.
\(^2\)Rossetti, p.302.
\(^3\)N.S.Eth. 58, M. Chevandier de Valdrome to Pichon, Cairo, 6.5.07.
\(^4\)N.S.Eth. 58, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 11.7.08. It seems clear that although at the time of the concession in 1905 it was understood that two Ethiopian directors were to be included, the Bank of Egypt was opposed to this. See Rossetti, pp. 297, 303, and F.O. 371/1/18473, Cromer to Grey, Cairo, 29.5.06.
\(^5\)N.S.Eth. 57, Lagarde to Rouvier, Entoto, 17.8.05.
\(^6\)Ibid., and Guidi, 719.
\(^7\)See Section on Politics, pp. 138–142.
\(^8\)F.O. 371/1/10214, No. 34, Cromer to Grey, Cairo, 16.3.06.
\(^9\)F.O. 371/1/6964, No. 71, Telegram, Cromer to Grey, Cairo, 19.3.06.
supported by the British Legation in Addis Ababa, McGillivray's action raised the ire of the Bank of Abyssinia's Egyptian management who insisted on his recall. This led to Menilek's increased pressure to renegotiate the original concession giving Ethiopia more control over the Bank's functioning in the form of two Ethiopian representatives. By March 1907 Menilek seemed satisfied with the progress in the negotiations and the changes to which the British had consented. Thus in July 1908 Menilek nominated Ras Təšəhhu to join Ras Wəldā Giyorgis as an administrator of the bank after considering several trusted Europeans for the post. The Bank of Egypt appointments were Mr. Goldie and as his assistant Mr. Brodie, who supervised the day to day activities of the bank. However, by the beginning of 1909, serious questions were again being raised with a view to renegotiating the original 1905 concession. This time Djazmach Abbāt, a brilliant military leader not known for his tact or financial acumen, was put in charge of the negotiations.

1 F.O. 371/1/11040, No. 39, Enclosure I, Harrington to Cromer, A/A, 23.3.06.
2 F.O. 371/1/18473, Telegram No. 180, Cromer to Grey, Cairo, 29.5.06. N.S. Eth. 57, Telegram, Lagarde to Minister, Entoto, 5.7.06. F.O. 371/190/F.2050, Cromer to Clark, 12.1.07.
3 N.S. Eth. 58, Roux to Pichon, A/A, 7.3.07. Enclosure, Gábrũ Sellasė to Rowlatt. It is made clear here and in Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 25.9.07, that Menilek was handing over all his correspondence with Britain to the French and thus there is, paradoxically, more information in N.S. concerning the Bank of Abyssinia than in the F.O. 371. It has been impossible to track down the correspondence of the Bank of Abyssinia itself or that of the National Bank of Egypt. Throughout the period 1905-10 there was constant jockeying between the British and French over the position and powers of the Bank of Abyssinia.
4 N.S. Eth. 58, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 11.7.08. N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 15.9.08. Vitalien and Ilg's names are mentioned.
5 W.D., 28.11.08 and F.O. 371/3/F.28238/31070, Corbett to Harrington, 17.9.06; F.O. 371/190/F.2080/32626, Hohler to Graham, 29.8.07.
6 F.O. 371/597/10663/10663, Hervey to Grey, 27.2.09.
One wonders, considering Menilek's serious illness of June 1908, how close Menilek's supervision could have been of relatively independent negotiations such as this and whether an ambitious man such as Abbata tried to take advantage of such an opportunity. Men such as Abbata (and Haylu Giyorgis) seem to have energetically pursued issues of Ethiopian sovereignty to enhance their own standing in Ethiopia after the Emperor's death. An attack on Ild and British interests, moreover, would have dispelled damaging rumours that either was in the pay of foreign powers.

Again the Bank of Egypt intervened fearing the increasing Ethiopian sympathies of the Bank saying that Goldie was "disloyal" to the Bank directors, should "keep clear of politics" and that his "knowledge and experience as a banker are not sufficient". The Foreign Office was more realistic, saying it was naive to think Goldie would not have to get politically involved. It was not until July that Goldie's replacement, Mr. Miles Backhouse, was confirmed. But by this time a rival bank was being contemplated by Empress Taytu. Although it was to exist only eight months before becoming bankrupt, Taytu's bank was to have a marvellous proliferation of names:

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1 See Political section, pp. 86.

2 N.S. Eth. 58, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 1.3.09.


6 Ibid. and N.S. Eth. 86, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 25.2.10.
"Banque Nationale d'Agriculture et pour le Dévelopement du Commerce", ¹
"Yañeggedänna Yaershah Microy Bank" or "Société Populaire de Credit", ²
"Société Générale Ethiopienne de Credit", ³ and the final name of
"Yañahabêsha Bank" or, translated literally, Bank of Abyssinia. ⁴ The
inauguration took place in September 1909 with great pomp, many nobles
being present and the Abun threatening excommunication to anyone
"going against the occasion and custom which started on this day". ⁵
Although on the surface it might appear that the bank was created
after a complete breakdown in the negotiations with the Bank of Egypt,
such does not seem to have been the case. The reasons were largely
internal, the rivalry between Addis Ababa and Harar and Taytu's
attempt to get into her own hands Menilek's financial domination
of Ethiopia. The attempt to create a new Ethiopian based bank failed
because Taytu's 1909-10 bid for power failed rather than for any
other reason. For she was very rich in her own right and considered
to be the second richest person in Ethiopia after Menilek. ⁶

The Harar/Addis Ababa aspect of the problem comes out clearly when
Taytu puts forward Nëggadraa Bahabtê as its head. ⁷ He had been

¹N.S. Eth. 56, Legarde to Delcassé, A/A, 1.7.09.
³N.S. Eth. 56, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 10.9.09.
⁴Alâqa Kenfe Diary, 27 Nähâse 1901 E.C. (or G.C.3/9/09). A typed
 copy of the diary is in the private possession of Aleme Eshete at the J.E.S.
⁵Ibid. Also N.S. Eth. 56, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 10.9.09.
⁶P. Merab, Impressions d'Ethiopie, II, p. 49 (Henceforth Merab). See
 also Political chapter, pp. 56-8.
⁷N.S. Eth. 56, telegram No. 53, Brice to Minister, Djibuti, 18.6.09.
Naggdras of Harār since Menilek's takeover of the city in 1887 and his son Azzaj Yegāzu, within three to four months was to take over from Hayλ Giyorgis as Minister of Commerce and Naggdras of Addis Abēba and as quickly disappear when Taytu's bid for power failed. The new bank was even installed in Hayλ Giyorgis's house after he had been unceremoniously removed.

Taytu's attempt to fill the treasuries of her new bank with the outstanding loans of the all too generous Menilek was probably one of the most important reasons that the Shāwa nobles united to overthrow her. Brice, the French Minister, in one of his most graceful dispatches, had a far clearer grasp of this aspect of the crises than either his Italian or British contemporaries. Basically she was attempting to get back all the money loaned out by Menilek, be it to a foreigner or an Ethiopian. Since the majority of merchants in the capital had Imperial loans at 12-15% interest per month such a policy, if successful, would have had a catastrophic effect on the commercial life of the capital. A commission was set up to administer the policy under Bējerond Mulugeta and the ubiquitous Naggdras Yegāzu. The biggest outstanding debts were those of Lej Bayyānah (500,000 MTD), Naggdras Hayλ Giyorgis (75,000 MTD) and Naggdras Abubēkēr (32,000 MTD). Armenians and Greeks were particularly affected by Taytu's attempt to create a war chest to pursue her political aims should Menilek suddenly die. The Shāwa nobles seem to have been so concerned that part of the money in the Treasury of Gwada was spirited.

1 O.I. No. 17 (16.3.72), pp. 18-20. He was a personal retainer of Dējazmach Yelma in Harār. N.S. Eth. 2, Telegram No. 20, Brice to Minister, Djibouti, 29.3.10. Ibid., N.S. Eth. 56, Lagarde to Delcassé, A/A, 17.7.09. N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 27,10.09 and 3,1.10.

2 N.S. Eth. 56, Lagarde to Delcassé, A/A, 17.7.09.

3 N.S. Eth. 56, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 25,2,10 for that which follows.
away to the islands in Lake Zway. The overall sum aimed at seems to have been 400,000 MTD largely held by the two great Bombay based commercial networks of Jiwaje and Mohamad Aly. At another time 240,000 MTD was demanded from Haylą Giyorgis. These were tremendous amounts in the Ethiopian context. Not only large and important personalities were affected, but Taytu also put the "squeeze" on lesser traders.3

In the absence of the records of the Bank of Abyssinia it is rather difficult to establish how it was actually organized and run, when it ran a profit or a loss, its policies as regards loans to traders, Ethiopian or foreign, and the personnel below the Egyptian appointed staff at the top. Detailed records in the archives as to profit and loss only appear after 1908. Both English and French archives agree there was a loss that year. The Quai d'Orsay shows: 1908 loss of £8,425; 1909 loss of £3,605 and 1910 profit £150,4 while the Foreign Office says: 1908 loss of £2,864 and 1909 profit of £4,819.5 One of the biggest expenses in the early years was the need to build a permanent, easily defensible headquarters for the bank in Addis Ababa.6 While much of the profits came from the ability originally given in the concession to import MTD at the cheap government

1Ibid.
2N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 3110.
3W.D., 9210, Ato Mogas, a relation, was required to pay £10,000 MTD and Bāyyānā, a friend, £5,000 MTD.
4N.S. Eth. 58, pp. 140-43, 163-6, 184-7.
rate. Speculation in them could be most rewarding. For the
value of MTD in Ethiopia was relatively stable and there was a
long time lag before its value would reflect fluctuations in the
world silver market. Thus when the world price of silver was high
it would be lucrative to export MTD in Ethiopia and vice versa,
it was profitable to import MTD into Ethiopia when the world price
of silver was low.

Financial risks were not often taken in speculations like the
Addis Ababa cartridge factory or the rubber monopoly, but small
loans were given to reputable traders. The Bank's personnel seems
to have been made up of a wide range of people: an important trader
from Wello, Ibrahim Wello, and French and Italians of diverse origin.
According to Mérab it had seven Italian, two French and three Greek
employees.

It is all too easy to exaggerate the importance of the Bank
of Abyssinia in the economic life of the country but its role in the
capital was much more significant, especially as regards regularization
of land tenure in the city. Later, after the end of the period under
consideration, the creation of branches in the provinces gave the bank
a larger national role, but during this period its most significant
effect was local.

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1Ibid. N.S. Eth. 57, Lagarde to Pichon, A/A, 29.11.06. Encl.
Trouillet to M. Directeur d'Office, A/A, 1.12.06.

2N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 8.11.09. See section in this
chapter on Monopolies, pp. 156-164.

3W.D., 28.11.08 and 10.1.09.

4O.I., No. 21 (11.4.72). Although not confirmed elsewhere this was
my most reliable informant and he repeated his name and details
concerning him several times in different contexts.

5W.D., 10.1.09. F.O. 371/3/F28238/31070, Corbett to Harrington,
17.9.06.

6Mérab, p.124.

7AP:CR (1913), vol. 69, No. 5163, Abyssinia 1911-12, pp. 8-9. W.D.
Part C. Addis Ababa as a Commercial Centre

Mainly after Adwa Addis Ababa underwent great expansion as a transportation and communications centre but only in comparison with the almost complete vacuum that existed before. Menilek encouraged change and innovation not for the sake of "modernization", as is sometimes put forward, but only insofar as new methods or machines would buttress his power and prestige or because mechanical gadgets just happened to amuse his interest and curiosity. Into the first category came pre-eminently the railway and bank but also the cartridge factory, telephones, telegraph, mills, the traction engines and others. In the second category came cinemas, cars, and a vast number of lesser items barely worth mentioning. Nearly everything new started in the capital where Menilek could keep an eye on them and also protect their growth for there was a good deal of opposition to them, especially from the clergy. Optimistic hopes for swift "development" were all too common among Europeans and in their written sources. Yet if one looks closely at the facts it becomes clear that all too many enterprises folded before making a profit, or took inordinately long to get started and even then were rarely a great success. For instance, the railway concession was given in 1894 and

passim 1908-1913. He was involved in many land deals, most negotiated through the bank.

1 See p. 474ff.

3 A distinction might be made here between modernization and innovation. It can hardly be said that Menilek modernized Ethiopia, quite the contrary, he only introduced a limited number of innovations.
yet the track did not reach Aqaqi near Addis Ababa until 1915, a period of twenty-one years. The cartridge factory monopoly was given in 1905, machinery bought in 1906 and yet no cartridge was commercially sold until 1914. These are perhaps the most extreme examples but since Menilek has so often been labelled a "modernizer", the actual "modernizations" within Addis Ababa where his power was greatest were relatively few. Only to the most conservative of Ethiopians could Menilek be seen as a moderniser. Everything was tailored to advance at the speed set by him and his advisers. Any hint of strong opposition would cause endless delays. Guns were readily introduced and portable flour mills for carrying on campaigns. But the telephone and water mills were delayed many years because of clerical opposition. The clergy saw the mills and telephones as being unnatural, works of the devil, and many among the older nobility feared anything that might radically change the way of life to which they were accustomed. Thus even Menilek's limited economic innovations encountered the kind of opposition which confined any further changes largely to the capital, preventing them from having any significant impact outside of it.

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1 See Pankhurst, p. 334.
2 Cartridges were never in Ethiopia sold in significant quantities. O.I., No. XIV (3.9.73).
3 N.S. Eth. 55, Price to Pichon, A/A, 4.1.10; Annexe 2 Note, Etude generale sur l'Abyssinie.
4 See below.
5 See p. 508.
6 See pp. 508.
One of Menilek's great successes and one of his most powerful modernising tools for centralisation was the nation-wide network of telegraph and telephone lines centred on Addis Ababa. The first major telephone line to be completed was between Addis Ababa and Harar some time after June 1894 and before February 1899. Initial experiments with telephones imported into Addis Ababa in the early '90s had encountered stiff opposition from priests but finally they had been pacified after Adwa. Furthermore, the original lines were prone to break down because of storms and lightning, until lightning rods were affixed every ten or fifteen yards. Menilek used the line to keep in close touch with the provincial governors and was fully and swiftly informed of all that went on in all the provinces.

For a tidy profit the foreign embassies were charged for their use of it. By May 1898 an Italian Ethiopian convention had been signed to build the longer and in many ways more important Metewa to Addis Ababa telegraph line. It took six years to complete but for the first time in May 1904 Addis Ababa was closely linked with provincial

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1See Bertolani, Linee telegrafiche e telefoniche in Etiopia (Ministero delle Colonie, 1913) for the best overall map of the system. See also P.P. Garretson "Some Aspects of Communications in Ethiopia during the Reign of Menilek", a Seminar Paper AH/1972 on 13.6.73 at SOAS. (Henceforth Garretson, Communications.)

2F.O. 1/33, Hodd to F.O., Zeila, 14.6.97.

3Djibouti, op.cit., 18.2.99, Harrar, 8.2.99.


5Ibid., p.154.

6ASMAI 38/1/11, Ciccodicola to MAE, Addis, 10.10.00 and A/A, 25.9.00. W.D., 26.12.99.

7F.O. 1/36, No. 63, copy to Audit Office, Encl. 2, 30.11.1900, £150 for 10 months was charged to the British and similar charges must have been made to the other diplomatic communities.

8F.O. 1/34/No. 7, Harrington to F.O., A/A, 7.5.98.
centres to the North. In the period 1904-1906 a central bureau was set up in Addis Ababa and lines had been built to Addis Alam (December 1902); Kefa (1907 and its ruler Ras Wulde Giyorgis) and Gore (1907 with its ruler Ras Tashema). The whole telegraph/telephone system was considered to be so important that one of Menilek's closest confidants Lej Bayyana was made superintendent of Ethiopian telegraphs. Shortly thereafter Ethiopia entered the Postal Union (1.11.08) and as a result the service improved, especially with Harar where French employees replaced Swiss ones. This revealed the extent to which the French had increased their influence in Ethiopia after the railway concession.

The postal service was not nearly as important a centralising influence as the telephone or telegraph. It was used largely by the European legations, missionaries and foreign traders. Significant improvements came in 1897, 1899 and 1908.

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1 F.O. 1/4 9/telegram 12, Harrington to F.O., A/A, 18.5.04. See also Bertolani, op.cit. Swift communication was especially significant in Ethiopia in that it seems to have more swiftly isolated a rebel against the Emperor and given the centre a close hold on the periphery.

2 ASMAI 38/4/39, Malvano to Governor Asmara, Rome, 16.7.07, Annesso, Pro-memoria Agnese.

3 Djibouti, 13.12.02.


7 De Coppet, pp. 472-3, ftn. 7 for relatively good overall account. Semeur, 2/08.

8 Djibouti, 27.5.99.

9 F.O. 371/316/15373/30243, Harrington to Grey, A/A, 31.7.08. See also Garretson, Communications, p.2.
Another communications innovation of Menilek's period was the improvement of transport between Addis Abāba and Deré Dawa after 1902. When railway construction reached Deré Dawa in 1902, it soon became clear that it was going to be stalled indefinitely. In the interim before construction began again in 1909 after the Vitalien concession, Sarkis Terzian, having obtained a monopoly from Menilek, organized two-wheeled ox cart services to Addis Abāba. The ox carts brought bulky goods too heavy for traditional means of transport, like camels and mules. Its eight to ten oxen could pull a one ton load on its special steel wheels while camels could only manage 200 kilos and mules 80-100 kilos. It was the ox wagons that brought the heavy corrugated iron for roofing, the machinery for the cartridge factory, heavy machinery for flour mills and even a great bell sent from Russia. These two methods of transport thus facilitated the steady growth of bulky imports.

Later this Armenian concession came into competition with another Addis Abāba based means of transport, traction engines. By 1906 some traction engines had reached the capital and were mainly engaged in road construction. But by 1907 they were grinding their way back and forth to Addis Abāba, and were under the care of British

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1 Rossetti, pp. 140-141, 150-57, 369-77. See also Garretson, Communications, pp. 4-5.
2 Pariset, 141; O.I. No. II (9,11,71), p.2. See also ASMAI 36/17/163, Traversi to MAE, A/A, 20.4.94. Annesso, Menelik to Savoure, A/A, 11.4.94.
4 See p.354, footnote 2 for continuing references to increased trade in such items.
5 N.S. Eth. 64, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 20.8.07.
mechanics based in the palace workshops. Greenwood and Walker were the mechanics and received the handsome salary of £60 a month and worked directly under the Bäjerond. The whole concession must have been moderately lucrative because Wärqenäh was offered it in lieu of £1,000 per month pay. In 1908 Terzian sold 40% of the concession to a German, Holtz, a wise move he may have thought since the railway concession had been given to Vitalien in January of that year and track construction to Addis Abāba was soon to begin. Holtz imported several cars and trucks but although his concession was confirmed by Ras Tāshāmma in 1910 his financial position remained extremely precarious and the commercial prospects dim.

Overall the only really successful "innovations" in transport were on a small scale, the ox carts and traction engines, while the early importance of the motor car has been highly overrated.

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2 W.D., 28.11.08.
3 W.D., 18.7.1909.
4 N.S. Eth. 64, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 13.5.08, p.123 and 3.7.08, p.128.
5 Rossetti, pp. 370-375.
7 N.S. Eth 64, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 1.1.10, p.17.
8 N.S. Eth. 64, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 29.3.10, p.176 and 29.7.10, p.180.
9 Pankhurst, p.712. Also N.S.Eth. 64, pp. 127-80 for over-reaction in Europe to Holtz's and Halle's initiatives. See also A. Holtz, Im Auto zu Kaiser Menelik (Berlin, 1908) and C. Halle, To Menelik in a Motor Car (London, 1913), passim.
The vast bulk of trade was still carried on camels and mules in the traditional manner and was effectively monopolised by Naggadras Abubakar who vigorously opposed competing forms of transport. 1

Another so-called innovation whose early importance was exaggerated by contemporary observers and later historians was the cartridge factory. As pointed out, the concession was granted in 1905 and yet the first guns and cartridges were not produced until 1914. 2 However, powder had, since before the period treated here, been produced locally throughout the country. 3 Originally given in May 1895 to Sarkis Terzian 4 the concession was renegotiated in 1906 after it was taken over by a British firm. 5 But Terzian tried for years to regain control of the concession and intrigue clouds its actual status until the end of 1910. 6 In an official Ethiopian account of the cartridge factory these early years are completely ignored and the tale only begins with the actual arrival of the machinery from Europe in 1910-11 and the tax levied to install the machinery and build the necessary buildings. 7 It is interesting to

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See also, AP: CR (1907), vol. 88, No. 3747, Abyssinia 1905/6, pp. 8-11 (1909), vol. 92, No. 4357, Abyssinia 1907/8, p. 7.
2 See above, pp. 35-36 and Herab, II, p. 204.
3 F.O. 368/165/24394/31880, Harrington to F.O., 21.8.08.
4 N.S. Eth. 21, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 2.8.07.
5 N.S. Eth. 21, Lagarde to Bourgeois, Entoto, 21.5.06. The reasons for this takeover are not terribly clear. Sarkis seems to have temporarily fallen from favour and Humphreys, an Englishman and old style adventurer, acquired close ties in the Palace.
6 W.D., 26.7.09, 7.8.09, 5.9.09, 11.10.09, 0.1. No. II (9.11.71), p. 2. N.S. Eth. 21, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 25.3.10 and 22.5.10.
7 Zekra Nagar, pp. 225-7. The factory never produced cartridges in significant amounts. O.I. No. XIV (3.9.73).
note that the main reason given for building the factory was Menilek's "burning desire" that the guns already imported should have sufficient ammunition and not be dependent on foreign imports. This point had been driven home by the 1906 Brussels pact concerning arms imports to Africa.

While the cartridge factory was the biggest and most prestigious of foreign innovations planned for the capital (excepting, of course, the railway) the various mills built in the city and its immediate vicinity had a greater immediate impact. Before the battle of Adwa several powder and corn grinding mills had short lives in the Ankobār and Addis Abāba areas. As pointed out these encountered a great deal of opposition from priests and other conservative elements. Although finally overcome it must have hampered early efforts at being accepted by local inhabitants. These, however, could only be run by water power. In 1901 Stevenin brought from France three easily portable mills which could be powered by hand, steam, or water, to add to the mill already established by Savouër. Menilek had ordered the former specially from Italy so that they could be used on ወስматериал or military campaigns, thus improving the health of

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3. See above, Chapter II, pp. 36ff., 67ff.
4. Djibouti, 6.4.01, p.3; Pariset, p.129.
5. Djibouti, 31.3.00.
his troops and the mobility of the columns.¹ In 1903-4 bigger and more permanent flour mills with machinery imported from France were set up on the outskirts of Addis Abāba on the Aqaqi river. Ethiopian women increasingly brought grain to be ground at the mill and according to Terzian were relieved of the drudgery of doing it themselves.² However, the main use of the mills was to provide sufficient flour for the massive feasts held in the Emperor’s and Ras’s palaces. Ten to twelve thousand would be fed on some Sundays and there were not enough slave women to provide sufficient ground grain. One quarter of an MTD would be paid for a dawlla³ of grain.⁴

Once accepted in Addis Abāba the turbines were copied and made locally and thousands were eventually set up throughout the country.⁵ The success of these water driven flour mills encouraged the setting up of other small scale factories run by water. Again Harār was to lose out in these "developments" since, unlike Addis Abāba, she lacked swift flowing streams.⁶ Machinery for a sawmill⁷ a soap factory, a tannery and a vegetable oil extraction plant were all imported by 1906.⁸ Since the first tannery was unsuccessful a certain M. Bailet tried again and, after getting a concession in April 1907, managed after a few years to make a profit on his goat,

¹Ibid., also Djibouti, 16.3.01, p.4.
³Guidi,685, 1 dawla = 93.8 liters (in Gondār).
⁵See footnote 2 above.
⁶O.I. No. III (23.11.71), pp. 4-5.
⁸Djibouti, 16.3.01, p.4; 6.4.01, p.3.
sheep and cattle skins. By 1908 a gunpowder factory, tobacco monopoly, a mirror factory and bakery had been set up in Addis Ababa. Needless to say these were all on an extremely small scale, many observers failed even to notice them, and their importance is all too easily exaggerated. Together they had a total capital of only slightly over 300,000 francs in business. The basically French/Armenian monopoly was broken in October 1908-9 when Walker set up a flour mill in the Aqaqi. Other English enterprises included several eucalyptus plantations in the Addis Ababa area which were started to meet the growing demand for firewood, but never made a profit for the British company, because the plantations were illegally appropriated by their local representative, Humphreys.

By 1910 all these factories were still functioning and the soap monopoly was considered especially profitable, Trouillet having

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1 N.S. Eth. 65 Roux to Pichon, A/A, 18.4.07. AP/CFS/81, dos. 1, Encl. Abyssinie, Traité de Commerce, Encl. No. 2061, Chambre des Députés, procès verbal, 22.10.08. N.S. Eth. 31, Brice to Pichon, 8.5.09.


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Rozis, p.485.

6 AP/CFS/81, dossier 1, quoted in footnote 1 above.

7 FO 371/396/37737/37737, passim in the file, 29.10.08. FO 371/596/8263/8263, Encl. 1, R. Greenwood to Robinson & Sons, Ltd., 29.1.09.


10 N.S. Eth. 55, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 4.1.10, p.184.
it extended for five years. A further mill was built by an Italian, Vaudetto so that one observer exaggeratedly said that Aqaqi was well on its way to becoming an industrial area. Meanwhile, near Addis Alâm (60-90 kilometres from Addis Abëba) two sawmills were flourishing near the almost inexhaustible virgin forests of Mânnagâsha and Jâmjâm. The first was established by the Frenchman, Dubois, and taken over by the Swiss, Evalet and a second one was built by an Armenian. Both the mills are still recalled by local residents as having been under Menilek's protection and being very prosperous.

Four relatively successful Addis Abëba small scale enterprises remain, two were departures from tradition and one came halfway between the old and the new. The hotels of Addis Abëba fit quite snugly into the latter category. The most widely known is the still extant Etegé or Imperial Hotel inaugurated 19th November 1907. It was built and designed by Armenians at a cost of about 50,000 MTD, which was

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2 Citerni, p.56.
3 Mérab II, p.203. This observer, however, must always be taken with a grain of salt, such comments tending to be on the flowery side.
4 AP:CR (1909), vol. 92, No. 4357, Abyssinia 1907-8, p.86.
5 F.O. 1/32/No. 19, Rodd to Salisbury, A/A, 10.5.97, p.166.
6 Ibid. and Mérab,II, pp. 103 and 208.
7 Ibid.
8 0.I. No. 33 (30.5.72), p.19; 0.I. No. 14 (5.3.72), p.1.
9 Allek Kenfê diary, p.19; Mérab, II, p.123.
10 0.I. No. V (14.12.71), pp. 4-5.
11 Mérab II, p.122.
paid by the Empress so that she could act as a hostess in the traditional manner and yet provide foreigners with the strange amenities to which they seemed to be addicted. Before, Europeans had been sent to the vacant house of a Ras. At first it was unsuccessfully run by an Ethiopian, Zāhāq Aggedāw, then by Mrs. and Miss Hall, and finally by a Greek, Bollolakos. It was much frequented by Europeans and rich Ethiopians and those in limbo halfway between the two worlds. In 1904 the "Cercle de l'union" club was founded there.

The second hotel, older in name if not in edifice, was "Hotel de la Terrasse" or "Hotel de France", owned at first by Terrasse and Trouillet.

The tobacco monopoly, which has already been mentioned, had apparently never been successfully given as a monopoly before. It got free land for growing tobacco, would own the only factories processing tobacco and got preferential tax customs concessions. It was, over the years, a modestly successful enterprise making its Russian

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2. W. D., 1.12.08.
3. Ibid., 11.12.08.
5. W. D., passim.
6. Néраб II, p. 122. See some of its early Ms. at I.E.S. The Cercle seems to have been housed elsewhere before being moved to the Etégé.
9. N.S. Eth. 65, Lagarde to Delcassé, A/A, 19.11.02, Annexe Menilek Proclamation, 19.11.02.
10. N.S. Eth. 56, Annexe, Menilek proclamation, 22.2.09, p. 65. See clauses I-XIII.
Armenian owner, Maliq Kevorkoff, a prosperous and successful business man.¹

Finally a word should be said about two other monopolies, those in liquor and the Fel Weha baths. An actual liquor monopoly seems to have existed in Addis Ababa only for short periods in 1906 and 1907² at the height of the monopoly protests. The people mentioned in connection with them were the Armenians Ebeyan and Baghdassarian.³ The Armenians were not the only ones involved but Greeks were as well.⁴

The monopolies dealt not only with imports but with the constant local production of spirits⁵ the Ethiopians' taste for European hard liquor instead of traditional drinks grew rapidly. Supplying it became increasingly lucrative.⁶

Less lucrative but somewhat more respectable was the Fel Weha or Hot Springs concession. The ubiquitous Sarkis Terzian obtained it in 1907 and up to 1911, when it was transferred to an Ethiopian, earned about 2,000 MTD.⁷

²N.S. Eth. 65, Lagarde to Bourgeois, Entoto, 17.4.06, pp. 59-60; 28.9.06, pp. 101-2. N.S. Eth. 65, Roux to Pichon, A/A, 18.3.07, pp. 144-5; 2.4.07, pp. 146-7 and 15.4.07, p.151. Also see pp. 156-231.
³N.S. Eth. 65, Roux to Pichon, A/A, 15.4.07, p.151.
⁵See above, footnote No. 2.
⁶O.I. No. 17 (16.3.72), p.35.
⁷N.S. Eth. 21, Roux to Pichon, A/A, 12.3.07, pp. 80-1. Mérel II, p.151.
Other Addis Ababa innovations of lesser significance except insofar as they reveal Menilek's curiosity in this direction were early electrical installations in the Palace\(^1\) and the sporadic introduction of cinemas in the capital.\(^2\)

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\(^1\)Pariset, p.155; W.D. 1.3.09; N.S. Eth. 21, Ministère des Colonies to Minister, Paris, 19.6.08. Encl. Menilek to Ilg, Djibouti, 21.5.08. ASMAI 38/4/29, Cicco to MAE, A/A, 13.7.05.

\(^2\)Merab, II, p.123.
IV ETHIOPIAN DOMINATED AND INTERNAL TRADE

Part A. Role of the Naggadras

a) Long range trade

A clear distinction must be made early on between the import/export trade and internal trade. The first was almost wholly in the hands of foreigners, the second almost totally controlled by Ethiopians. The Naggadras played an increasingly important role as the link between the Emperor and the foreign economic community and between the Emperor and the Ethiopian economic community. The whole economic life of the city was by no means completely controlled by him but his was the vital role. As Menilek became incapacitated by illness and perforce had to delegate authority, Haylā Giyorgis, the Naggadras of Addis Ababa, because he was one of Menilek's most trusted subordinates, gained a degree of power nationally completely out of proportion to the relatively minor office he at first held.

Through his hands passed both the national Ethiopian and local Addis Ababa customs revenues. Their rise and fall reflected and were reflected in the increase and decrease of the salt, coffee, and cattle/slave trade of the nation. Furthermore, as a Christian and leader of the Christian traders who left Gondār and settled in Addis Ababa he stood as a symbol of the Christian Shāwa attempt to wrest overall control of Ethiopia's trade, long in the hands of Muslims.

For the import/export see pp. 201-2. In this section there is a concentration on the latter aspect of trade.

Naggadras Haylā Giyorgis's influence over economic affairs depended largely on the amount of political influence he had in Menilek's court. His various offices were bestowed upon him as a mark of the Emperor's favour which in turn was partly dependent upon the amount of profit he handed on to his master. See Political chapter, pp. 158-159 and pp. 264 ff. and 373 ff.
It was largely through him and his subordinates that the trade of the recent Shawa conquests were controlled.

The Revenue of the Naggadras

To outline the structure of Addis Ababa's trade a close look must be taken at Haylə Giyorgis' income as Naggadras of Addis Ababa. Clerk's General Report of 1906 attributes the Naggadras with three functions: 

1. "(1) Chief or principal merchant in the province ... 
(2) Magistrate and judge in all local civil and commercial cases. 
(3) Head of the local customs." Significantly, each of these functions reveals an important source of revenue or patronage. However, Haylə Giyorgis as Menilek's personal Naggadras adds a national element to Clerk's definition of a provincial office. Thus Haylə Giyorgis did not receive revenue simply as Naggadras of Addis Ababa and Naggadras of Shawa, but also as Naggadras of various domains personally ruled by Menilek and later those given personally to him by Menilek. A parallel might be drawn here with Habtə Giyorgis and the office of imperial Fitawrari. The latter was normally a relatively minor post as leader of the vanguard of an army, but the very fact that he was in charge of the Emperor's vanguard and as such the most powerful official within his personal army meant that he was one of the most powerful men in the land. During this period he was one of Haylə Giyorgis's close rivals.

Haylə Giyorgis' power was based on money and his standing in

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1 F.O. 371/192/19237, Clerk to F.O., A/A, 11.6.07 (date received at F.O.). This is perhaps the most perceptive, although very biased, single general report on Ethiopia in my period by any of the foreign diplomatic representatives in Addis Ababa.

2 Guidi, 882. It should perhaps be pointed out that Haylə Giyorgis and Habtə Giyorgis were not related in any way.

3 F.O. 371/192/19237, Clerk to F.O., 11.6.07.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.
the merchant community, just as Habtā Giyorgis's was based on soldiers and his power over Menilek's army.¹ Five overall sources of revenue for the Naggadras can be distinguished: (1) revenue by virtue of his close relationship with Menilek, (2) customs dues from the national import/export trade, (3) revenue, monetary and in kind, from Addis Abāba and local Shāwa markets, (4) judicial fees and prerogatives, both local and national, and (5) revenue from trade carried out by him as an individual.

Menilek, of course, was the most powerful man in Addis Abāba,² and he often involved himself in even the most minute administrative details³ yet in economic affairs involving trade and the Arada (the commercial area of Addis Abāba) he came to rely increasingly upon Haylā Giyorgis, who took a large cut of the revenue but passed on the bulk to his master.

As Menilek trusted him more and more he was given an ever larger role in the granting of monopolies. Thus in 1905 he renewed Trouillet's soap monopoly for five years,⁴ not a large monopoly but he was to rise to bigger and better things with the marvellously named "Ethiopian Rainproof monopoly". Incorporated in 1906,⁵ this company marked the beginning of a long and lucrative arrangement between the Naggadras and

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¹Ibid., Blatta Heruy Whīdā Sellāsē, Yāḥeywät Tarik (Biographie) Bēhwala Zāmēn... (Addis Abāba, 1915 E.C.) (Henceforth Heruy, Yāḥeywät Tarik).
²See above, pp. 330-341.
³See above, p. 235 ff.
⁴Heruy, Yāḥeywät Tarik, p. 42.
⁵W.D., 16.8.09. He says Trouillet had already had the monopoly 4 years.
⁶Board of Trade 31/11640/file 89966, passim (Henceforth B.T. etc.).
a certain Ydlibi, the local manager, in control of the company on the spot. Harrington and Clerk's descriptions of their relationship bears repeating to give an idea of what a monopoly entails in Ethiopia:

"Hayla Giyorgis is absolutely the biggest scoundrel in the country and hand in glove with Ydlibi, who has been bribing him, whether the monopoly has been given or not he has always denied it... My own opinion is that it is a joint swindle between the Nagadras and Ydlibi."  

"He knows Menilek thoroughly and can divine the exact moment... when it is a good time to ask for and obtain a concession for some European, a concession probably worthless in itself but for which he receives a good price from the European, and which the latter sells to confiding investors in Europe!"  

It was estimated that up to 1909 £80,000 worth of rubber was exported by the rubber company while the two were controlling it. How much stuck to their fingers will perhaps never be established but that the greater part did there can be little doubt. Their relationship remained very close since Baldissare, Hayla Giyorgis's secretary, was Ydlibi's brother-in-law.

To trace the development of each monopoly described earlier would be impossible, there being a lack of reliable documentation on such ephemera. In the case of the other large monopolies, traction engines, camels, the cartridge factory and so on, there is very

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W.D., 14.2.1910.  
2 F.O., op.cit.  
3 Ibid.  
4 W.D., 26.2.09.  
5 W.D., 26.12.08.  
6 F.O. 371/396/12469/29890, Encl. 3, Ethiopian Rubber Co., draft of 1908.  
7 See pp. 246 - 246.
little information as to how much Haylă Giyorgis may have made in his dealings with them. What we can be sure of is that:

"He is directly concerned in every commercial transaction of the slightest importance which takes place, and draws profit impartially from all concerned." ¹

But the income from monopolies, most blatant in the case of rubber, was supplemented by the guresha, or small monetary payments, necessary often simply to get an audience with an official or the Emperor. ² Other more permanent arrangements seem to have been made, for instance in the railway negotiations whereby 45,000 MTD was given as a down payment and 5,000 MTD were given per month to the Nêggadras so that one or another of the European factions in the negotiations might feel they could "depend" on him. ³ All of this was possible because of his position close to Menilek. ⁴ Furthermore, when Menilek became "seriously ill" in June 1908 ⁵ and his most trusted judge, Afä Negus Nêsibu, died in July 1908, Haylă Giyorgis's power in the control of monopolies rose even higher. ⁶ All this, of course, was to be brought into question by Taytu's attempt to gain power in 1909-10. ⁷

³ N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 2.10.09.
⁴ Hervey, Ṭāfewāt Tarik, pp. 42-5.
⁵ See pp. §6a.
⁷ See pp. §6a.
Besides direct monetary payments Haylā Giyorgis's position of trust gave him extensive opportunities for patronage within the city and in lands given him by Menilek. Furthermore, he had charge over the loaning out of a significant proportion of Menilek's monies, some of which Taytu tried and failed to get returned. The odd mention in diaries and archives add up to 240,000 MTD, a large figure for ivory exports, the biggest money earner in the country. Nor is it by any means sure that this was anywhere near the actual figure, it was almost certainly a good deal more.

Inextricably linked with the power and degree of Menilek's influence he possessed was the role Haylā Giyorgis could expect to play nationally in the collection of customs revenue. As he was trusted by Menilek so he would increase his hold in various provinces. Fortunately there is enough material to be able to trace this development rather closely.

It was only as Menilek was preparing for the battle of Adwa that Addis Abāba's market or Abūṣa had any claim as a national market. At first there was competition with Entoppo, and at least up to 1890 the Naggadras who was in charge of the market was resident there. This is the first reference we have to a Naggadras in the Addis Ababa

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1 F.O. 371/597/11624/Encl. 3, Report on South West Abyssinia, 10.2.09.
2 W.D., 7.2.10, for 210,000 MTD loan, N.S. Eth. 56, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 25.2.10, for 275,000 MTD. N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 10.1.10, for 2160,000 MTD.
4 Borelli, p.123 (14.8.86) and p.135 (18.9.86).
5 Zaghi, Salimbeni Diary, p.122 (20.7.90).
area and is very important since it indicates he had by that time moved from Alyu 'Amba or had been appointed as a competitor to this older market, already in decline.

The Naggadras at this time was almost certainly Aggedàw, an important merchant from Gondùr\(^1\) whose family was deeply involved in the coffee trade. He had already gathered around himself a group of able assistants including Haylë Giyorgis, the son of an Imperial Secretary, Debtëra Wëldë Mika'ël. Before the battle of Adwa he was second in command and was to succeed his master, Aggedàw, upon the latter's death in 1900.\(^2\) About the time of the battle of Adwa or slightly before, Haylë Giyorgis was made the Wanna Yăcumaruk Shafari, or main customs secretary of Addis Abëba, responsible to the founder of the Addis Abëba customs, Naggadras Aggedàw.\(^3\) Trade had begun to increase significantly only while he was Naggadras and he was the first one to set up check points around the market (Aëbëyaw bërru) under government supervision.\(^4\) The traditional system of taxation established by Aggedàw before Adwa was probably continued up to the year of his death, at any rate it was in effect in 1897 as described in Rodd's reports of that year.\(^5\) His is one of the best descriptions of Addis Abëba's trade up to 1897. Every mule load was taxed 2 MTD and every camel load 5 MTD as they entered the market. When they left they were charged 2 Amolë or bars of salt. But these

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\(^1\)W.D., 29-30.3.1900, 3-4.1900 and 10.1900. Heruy, YëHeywät Tarik, (A/A, 1922), pp. 42 and 45.

\(^2\)Ibid. and N.S. Eth., Brice to Pichon, A/A, 30.7.08.

\(^3\)Heruy, YëHeywät Tarik, pp. 42 and 55; N.S.Eth., 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 27.10.09.

\(^4\)Heruy, YëHeywät Tarik, p. 55.

rates fluctuated wildly and were largely dependent upon one's relationship with the Emperor and/or the Nëggadras. This was in striking contrast to Haräär with its Egyptian-inherited ad valorem tax. Rodd incorrectly says this latter system was "about" to be adopted in Addis Abäba. Haräär's system does not seem to have been incorporated in the capital until much later, and even then only partially, till Hayliä Giyorgis took over from Aggedäw during the latter's protracted illness of 1900. Already there were two different customs houses, one under the Nëggadras at the market and the other under Azzaj Bezzabbeh in the palace but directly under the supervision of Shaläka Yäbäzza. After all the goods, especially foreign imports, had undergone Menilek's careful examination in his customs or store houses, kwada, they were transferred to the market customs house and taxed. Furthermore, revenue at Addis Abäba was increased by forcing merchants on the Haräär to Addis Abäba route to go all the way to Addis Abäba and pay their customs dues before they were allowed to return and trade at any of the intermediate markets.

1 F.O., 1/33, Rodd to F.O., A/A, 13.5.97, p.35.
2 F.O., 1/32, Rodd to Salisbury, Suez, 22.6.97, p.391.
3 W.D., 29-30,3.1900, 3.4.1900, 4.10.1900.
4 Wellby, p.94.
5 Henri d'Orleans, 30.5.97, p.197.
6 W.D., 20.1.00.
7 Ibid. and Djibouti, Trouillet to Alavaill, A/A, 10.9.99 in issue 14,10.99, AP:OR (1907), vol. 88, No. 3747, p.10.
By 1900 some of Haylũ Giyorgis's reforms of customs administration, so admired by Menilek, began to take hold.¹ Instead of the old salt and MID taxes, ad valorem taxes were instituted on the Harār model. Official ad valorem Addis Abāba export duties were 5°/o on all goods from the provinces, 5°/o on all export goods going to Harār and 10°/o on all goods going directly to the coast. Import duties were 10°/o. Ostensibly, with Addis Abāba's imports at 2,977,000 MID the customs revenue should have been 297,700 MID. But this must be taken as being most tentative since, as pointed out above,³ many traders had special privileges, especially the established French traders who were Menilek's advisors.⁴ A more likely figure would be about half, or 150,000, the percentage that seems to have been collected according to Brice's 1907-8 estimate.⁵ Other traders at the turn of the century preferred Harār as an import centre because its ad valorem tax was 2°/o lower than that of Addis Abāba.⁶ But the handwriting was on the wall for Ethiopian merchants were beginning to shun Harār because for them customs dues were less heavy at Addis Abāba.⁷ Nonetheless, the situation did not change

¹See Heruy, YEHMLUṬ Tarik, p.42. AP:CR (1900), vol. 92, No. 2531, Abyssinia 1899-1900, p.10.
²See pp. 356 - 384.
³See pp. 156 - 158.
⁵Heruy, YEHMLUṬ Tarik, p.42.
⁶N.S. Eth. 64, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 4.11.08.
⁷Ibid., p.25.
significantly because overall administration was so poor. One glaring example is the amount of customs revenue that ended up in Ras Mëkonnen's hands in Harër, little being forwarded to Menilek.\(^1\)

The story is much the same with exports. A rough estimate of the customs revenue would be 60,000 MTD but this figure is even more sketchy than that for imports since there is no breakdown for goods going directly to the coast and those transhipped through Harër. Adding the two tentative figures together gives an annual estimate of 210,000 MTD, a figure that does not seem too far out of line in the light of later estimates.\(^2\)

The next reorganisation of customs does not seem to have taken place until 1905-6, again to the disadvantage of Harër. As pointed out above,\(^3\) Harër's trade had already been severely affected by the creation in 1902 of the nearby railway terminus of Deré-Dawa.

Furthermore, Ras Mëkonnen, the powerful ruler of the province, died in 1906 to be succeeded by his son Majazmach Yelma, a very much less powerful figure. Thus it was easier for Menilek and his Nëggadras to enforce regulations more favourable to Addis Abëba than to Harër.\(^4\)

Basically the old 10\(^{\circ}\) ad valorem tax was on imports and exports but with complex clauses about paying further duties at Harër and clauses covering transport to the coast.\(^5\) These changes and the greater efficiency with which the taxes were collected led to prompt

\(^1\)ASMAI 38/4/23, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 10.7.03. Towards the end of his life Mëkonnen's degree of independence at Harër grew as did his control over trade. The two were quite obviously closely linked and the whole Nëggadras system is amenable to close political analysis.

\(^2\)See below, pp. 330-333.

\(^3\)See pp. 376ff.-308ff.

\(^4\)AP:CR (1907), vol. 88, No. 3947, pp. 10-17.

\(^5\)Ibid.
merchant protests but also approval from Menilek. He made Haylā Giyorgis a favourite, a 
ballānwāl, for administering capably, 
appointing very good men and causing a great deal of money to enter 
the imperial treasury. The changes instituted are described as 
being instituted after questioning foreigners, probably mostly French-
men, and Ethiopian elders, shemageloch.

By June 1907 it seems clear that Menilek had direct control 
over the appointment of the Harār Nāggradras and Haylā Giyorgis 
as Menilek's main Nāggradras had at least some influence over the 
other Nāggradras appointed by Menilek.

In 1907-8 references to Haylā Giyorgis increase rapidly, 
partly because of his appointment as Minister of Commerce and Foreign 
Affairs in Menilek's cabinet, but also because he was beginning to 
change from being a figure of purely local Addis Abāba significance 
into a personality of national importance. This was based largely 
on his Addis Abāba customs revenues. "The Naggradras also takes his 
toll from all the merchants, native and foreign ... and is probably 
the richest man in ready-money in Abyssinia."

Brice estimated the 1907 Addis Abāba customs revenue at 
700,000 MTD and then goes on to say that for the Ethiopian authorities

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1 N.S. Eth. 63, Dépêche Coloniale, 10.6.06.
2 Heruy, YHäwät Tarik, p. 42.
3 Ibid.
5 0.I. No. 1 (5.12.71). I have been unable to substantiate elsewhere her claim that Haylā Giyorgis appointed Menilek's other Nāggradras.
6 ASMAI 38/4/38, Colli to MAE, A/A, 30.10.07.
7 F.O. 371/192/19257, Clerk General Report 1906, 11.6.07. This reference, significantly, is before his cabinet appointment.
8 N.S. Eth. 64, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 4.11.09, p. 149.
how great the scope for increased revenue was when the first railway statistics were published showing an annual turnover of 20-25 million dollars which, with a 10% duty, would realise 2 to 2.5 million dollars revenue. Ydlibi was appointed under Haylā Giyorgis to try to achieve these goals through improved taxing techniques.1 This appointment and the methods employed may have sparked off the 1908 protests.2 For the first time receipts were employed.3 The prominent part played by French traders in the Addis Abāba protest and the amount which Brice wrote about an incident almost unmentioned in British and Italian correspondence, leads to the suspicion that the established French traders were finally beginning to lose their privileged position of being able to avoid taxes in their import/export dealings.

Although Ydlibi's efforts may have raised the efficiency of import/export tax gathering methods complaints were common that taxes fluctuated from 10-30%.4 An English report blames this on the fact that "customs houses do not accept invoice valuations but appraise the goods themselves."5

At this time several steps were taken which led to increased customs revenues, the extent of which is difficult to establish. Firstly, Menilek again attempted to re-route more efficiently the trade of the south and west so that it passed through Addis Abāba.

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1Ibid. See also 2.1.09, p.156.
2See above, pp. 354 - 396.
3N.S. Eth. 64, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 4.11.08.
5Ibid.
and increased his customs revenue. Secondly, Hayläh Giyorgis was given
direct power over the Naggadras of "Dejaz, Kumsa, Joti and the Arab
countries". Tribute from these areas would have gone to him personally
as premier Naggadras of Ethiopia. To this must be added his position
controlling gold exports from Wällaga. Thirdly, he was appointed
"chief of the elephant killers", a post of national significance that
led to his having 300,000 francs worth of ivory in his store houses.
Three million MTD was Brice's estimate of his fortune at the time
of the Taytu bid for power and his fall from grace.

b) The Naggadras's Local Revenues

The Naggadras of Addis Abäba's local revenues were the normal
ones any Naggadras would receive from the markets in the territory
over which he had been appointed by his overlord. In the case of
Aggedaw and Hayläh Giyorgis their territory was Shäwa. The main market,
naturally, was Addis Abäba and there is some proof that revenue was
also received from Addis Alam, Ankobä and Røge.

The Naggadras was entitled to ten per cent of all goods that
passed through the market, at first in kind and gradually in currency.

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1 FO. 371/146/146, Hervey to Grey, A/A, 12.12.08; FO. 371/
377/11624, Encl. 3, Report on South West Abyssinia, 10.2.09.

2 FO. 371/11624, op.cit., p.21.

3 N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 27.10.09, p.177.

4 N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 27.10.09, p.177.

5 Ibid.

6 See p. 864.


8 O.I. No. 33, (30.5.72), p.22. Also footnote 9 below.

9 O.I. No. 2 (11.12.71), pp. 4-5.

10 O.I. No. 15 (2.3.72), pp. 10-11.

11 O.Cerotti, "Il Secondo Viaggio in Abissinia del Maschov, 1891-2",
BSGI (1894), p. 866 (Henceforth, Cerotti). O.I. No. 1, passim; O.I. No. 21
passim.
The tax was stored in the imperial enclosure and the Naggadras was considered as part of the imperial household. In 1894 the market place was moved closer to the imperial residence so that it could be more easily controlled. This had also taken place for similar reasons in Eniottuin 1886. From his position above the market on a temporary platform the Naggadras acted as a judge in any disputes which arose while trading went on. Whether he also had jurisdiction over smaller markets that existed throughout the city on days other than the main Saturday market is not clear for the pre-Adwa period. Nonetheless, to obtain his position he had to be the most substantial merchant of the town and the ten per cent tax levy could only add to his claim to be the dominant merchant of Shāwa. His presence in Addis Abāba is indicative of its increasing importance as a commercial centre and the increasing prominence of the institution of the Naggadras as the overseers of not only local Addis Abāba trade but the overall trade of the Empire. Two general types of taxes were collected on all trade, those in kind and, increasingly towards the end of the period, monetary payments.

**Tax in kind** - These taxes were collected at customs gates or Kella by Gārach ortaxers. There seem to have been at least five of these check-points on the outskirts of the city, one on each major road:

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1. BSGI, Serie 3, Vol. 6 (1894), from Journal des Debats, August, 1894, p. 929.
2. O.I. No. XIII (15.8.73).
(1) Shola (on the road to Harär and Dase and the one most frequented by travellers); (2) on the Willaga road; (3) Jambare for the Gojam road; (4) Abba Jifar Säfär for the Jemma road and finally (5), one on the Sidamo road. At each of these customs gates any man with goods would be stopped and the required percentage of goods taken. This might be done by one of Hayla Giyorgis’s immediate assistants or Abba Jifar, Näggadras Dëgosé, Näggadras Chärqos or Ato Amda Nhäsqil or a lesser man. Two descriptions give a better idea of what was involved:

"The taxes were simply collected at customs gates. There was no customs house. The taxes /In kind/ were piled in rich men’s verandas /Bäranda/. The Arabs used to buy coffee and hides from such verandas."  

"Let Him /God/ give great health to Hayla Sellase. He saved us. In the market he /the tax collector/ would take everything out of our bags and would take /as much as he wanted/ ... it was taken in the customs house /Jämrekt/."  

Firewood was the most heavily taxed individual item coming into Addis Abëba, half of the wood carried by the old women was taken from them. Often it came from Gafarsa, Addis Alam or even

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1Deaux, p.164; W.D., 27.11.08; O.1. No. I (11.12.71); O.1. No. 20 (11.4.72), p.11; O.1. No. I (4.11.71).  
2O.1. No. I (11.12.71); O.1. No. 20 (11.4.72), p.11.  
3Ibid. and O.1. No. I (4.11.71).  
4O.1. No. 20 (11.4.72), p.11.  
5Ibid. and O.1. No. I (4.11.71).  
6O.1. No. 21 (11.4.72), p.23; O.1. No. 18 (12.3.72), p.16.  
7O.1. No. 17 (16.3.72), p.18.  
8O.1. No. 20 (11.4.72), p.23.  
11Ibid. and Vivian, pp. 227-8; Deaux, p.179.
Ad'a, that is, up to 40 or 45 kilometers away. On most other commodities 10°/o was levied; Coffee, salt, grain, sheep, ivory, gold, honey, incense, hides and cotton goods, that is everything brought into the main Addis Ababa market or Arada for sale.

To give any overall accurate approximation of the amount of revenue obtained from this taxation would be impossible. Much of it would be used to feed and clothe the Naggadras's many retainers and any attempt to elicit a precise figure from oral informants got responses like "the goods were piled so high they reached to the sky".

Monetary payments - There seem to have been at least five different kinds of monetary payments: those for yábado qurach or ground tax for a plot of ground in the market; hadar or a tax on large shipments of goods; a tax on weavers; taxes on shops and finally a land tax for any land in the city.

In the beginning nothing but the yábado qurach existed in the city. This was a tax of one-quarter of a dollar or twenty-five cents for the use of a small area or stand in the market on market day. Also the Naggadras may have charged merchants for the privilege of staying in Naggade Sāñ'ār in GuHlē, an area over which he had jurisdiction.

4 See Supplement, Guidi.
5 O.I. No.17 (16.3.72), pp. 32-3.
The second (hadar) was a tax paid on various transactions in
the market and was about one-fiftieth of the total or sometimes the
flat rate 1.25 MTD.\(^1\) It was collected in the customs house on such
goods as coffee, skins and wax.\(^2\)

Thirdly, there was a tax on weavers who worked for the market.\(^3\)
Once they had fulfilled the quota necessary to pay the land taxes in
their provinces they could either work for the government and have
their food and lodging paid for or they could "work for the market"
to sell their woven goods independently.\(^4\) Of the 3-4,000 who came
from the southern and western provinces 1,200-1,400 decided on the
latter course.\(^5\)

Finally there were taxes on shops and land.\(^6\) Gradually the
original yahota qurach developed into a system of paying not by the
day or the week but by the month or year for a specific plot of land.\(^7\)
Then after it became clear that Menilek was not going to move the
capital to Addis Ababa permanent shops and buildings were built and
taxes levied on these.\(^8\) In 1904 a thorough reorganisation and
systemization of the market was begun when Ilg, Castagna and the
Neggadras worked on it together.\(^9\) This does not seem to have really

\(^1\) W.D., 9.1.01, 16.1.03, 6.2.01. Craig (see p. 325 fn. 6, above) is
wrong in saying this was not paid as the Wärqenäh diary quoted proves
him wrong many times.

\(^2\) Ibid. and O.I. No. 39 (23.5.72), p. 6.

\(^3\) O.I. No. 22 (17.4.72), pp. 3-4.

\(^4\) Ibid. O.I. No. 28 (16.5.72).

\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) Addis Ababa Municipality Archives. See samples of original city
land charters from 1900 E.C. (1907/8 G.C.). (Henceforth A/A

\(^7\) O.I. No. 25 (19.5.72).

\(^8\) O.I. No. 17 (16.3.72), p. 35.

\(^9\) Ilg Papers KB 131, Castagna to Ilg, 1.11.04 and 25.11.04.
borne fruit until about October 1907 when the first series of Addis Ababa land charters were introduced. The charters I was able to see stretched from Number 85 (3.10.07) to Number 1228 (14.5.08), the average tax of which was 4.50 MTD. Series II was instituted in December 1910, so if they were issued at the same rate up to that date 22,994 MTD would have been realized by the Naggadras solely from the registry fee. Unlike Series II, Series I does not indicate the amount of yearly tax or sale price.

The Naggadras's revenue from dispensing justice

Besides the revenues accruing to the Naggadras as a favourite of Menilek, a national administrator of customs or as a regional one, his revenues as a magistrate would have been by no means minimal, although extremely difficult to pin down. According to Clerk, the Naggadras was "magistrate and judge in all local civil and commercial cases". This role is confirmed in many sources but specific instances are hard to come by before the G.B. Consular Court began recording cases in 1913 when they abound. One assumes that after the reorganisation of the judicial system in 1908 and then the death of the Afa Negus or chief justice, combined with Menilek's failing health, Haylë Giyorgis's duties in the judicial field would have

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1 A/A Municipality Archives, Series I, No. 85-1228. The earliest of these land charters that I saw was No. 85 dated 3.10.1907. They are to be distinguished from Series II in that a) they are no longer valid, b) they have no map, c) are far less detailed. See also Berhanod Abbebe, pp. 97-100.


3 A/A Archives, Series I and II, passim. That all of this would have been collected is by no means sure.


6 See F.O. 915 from 1913-1916. Especially Vol. 3, case 23; Vol. 4, cases
substantially increased - so too would his revenue, as there was a standard fee for a judge for each case he decided. One must remember that all the commercial and civil cases adjudicated by the Naggadras could be appealed to the Afä Negus and then on to the Emperor.

The most interesting individual case of which a description has survived where the Naggadras is involved deals with the seizure of the effects of a Russian, Leontieff, a swashbuckling Cossack adventurer, who had all his effects in Ethiopia seized by Hayla Giyorgis on behalf of Menilek and various nobles, after it was discovered that his European-based company had gone bankrupt. As to the amount involved in this and other cases, nothing seems to have survived. However, there must have been other seizures of other traders and companies gone bankrupt (a not uncommon occurrence in Ethiopia) and this may have made up a significant proportion of Hayla Giyorgis's personal fortune of three million MTD in 1909.

In conclusion, it is difficult to put the local revenues of the Naggadras into perspective as a proportion of the overall revenues he got from other sources. The land tax revenues, which were to play

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1, 2, 5; Vol. 11, case 18.

7 See Zekrä Négäär, pp. 68-9.

Ibid., p. 70.


3 F. O. 1/40/Harrington to Boyle, A/A, 27.3.1902; E.T. 31/9429/20059, passim in file.

4 N.S. Eth 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 27.10.09.
a very important role after 1910 were still relatively insignificant in comparison with the Chota Qursch. These must have been the most significant monetary taxes. Yet these two were probably overshadowed in importance by the taxes in kind collected at the Kellas into the city, a large proportion of which, as the descriptions above shows, could have been exported by the Nëggadras.

Part B. Addis Abëba as Distribution Centre

Long range trade

There were, of course, other economic activities taking place in the capital not touched upon in this chapter. Many were not under the direct jurisdiction of the Emperor or the Nëggadras but were supervised by other officials of the Imperial Palace. Contra-band trade existed, of course, but its extent is impossible to estimate. It is mostly mentioned in connection with the monopoly controversies and was carried on largely by Ethiopians.

Other spheres of economic activity must, however, be mentioned, especially those of the Imperial Palace, and those under the jurisdiction of important Ethiopian personalities, each respectively run by an Azzaj or in some cases a Dëjerond or Sëhafé Wezzaz.

Five short topics remain: (1) The effects of famine and fire; (2) The role of tribute and imperial hospitality in the capital; (3) Tracing in more detail the role of indigenous traders in specific important long distance trade commodities; (4) Looking at the role of independent Oromo and Gurage traders in the local Addis Abëba

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1 This will be dealt with in Chap. pp. 162-164.
2 For instance, Djibouti, 17.2.02; ASMAI 38/3/24, Cicco to MAE, 21.7.03.
3 These has been dealt with in the political section as these offices are more oriented in that direction than the Nëggadras. See below, pp. 116-118, 118-119, 147-149.
market and (5) Exploring the status of Christian versus Islamic traders during the period.

**Famine and Fire.** No economic treatment of Ethiopia including the 1890s can avoid dealing with the series of disasters that struck the Empire following Menilek's coronation. The most catastrophic was the plague, famine and cholera epidemics of 1889-92. The first concrete evidence we have of its effects is the Awał of July 27th, 1889.¹ In it Menilek upbraids the people saying he had warned them to pray, they had not, and now the wrath of the Lord was upon them; not only was there an epidemic among the animals of the land but vermin had attacked the crops and men fell from disease. Even today men old enough to remember or recalling their fathers' words would refer to it as "i'ākefu zāmān", "the bad time" not to be compared with later and lesser famines or epidemics.² The rinderpest at first hit the heavy draught animals, especially the oxen, hardest. Since they were habitually used in plowing, this was very serious and contributed greatly to the crop failure after the meagre "bālg" or small rains of the spring of 1890.³ Many people came to the King and then Emperor's Entoppo and Addis Abāba residence looking for food, some from as far away as Gojam.⁴ In order to feed this growing urban population Menilek had to raid neighbouring Oromo lands which were rich in crops and herds.⁵ Cattle were sent by Ras Makonnen

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¹BSGI Serie 3, Vol. 3 (1889), Ragazzi to SGI, 14.8.89 for text.
²O.I. Nos. 1-45, passim.
³Ibid. De Coppet, pp. 296-8. ASMAI 36/9/93, Traversi to MAE, 16.3.90; ASMAI 36/9/73, Salimbeni to MAE, 18.6.90 and 9.7.90.
⁴Asme Gygorgis, Yealla Tarik, a photocopy of the Ms. exists at HSIU's Kennedy Library. The original is at the Bibliothèque National, Manuscrits Ethiopiens, No. 302., p.60. De Coppet, p.296.
⁵ASMAI 36/7/93, Salimbeni to MAE, 9.7.90. ASMAI 36/9/74, Salimbeni to Governatore, Massaua, 20.11.90.
all the way from Harar after he had raided the Wagadén in 1892.\(^1\) Even individual farmers travelled long distances to get cattle in lands to the south and southwest and bring them to the northern areas that had been hardest hit.\(^2\)

Ethiopian sources tended to greatly exaggerate the effect of the famine saying that "all the people of the lowlands died" or that "the people are beginning to be destroyed".\(^3\) Foreign observers are somewhat more reliable, although the estimates are still rather staggering. Capucci said only one tenth of the lowlanders (people of the \textit{qolla}) survived and one fourth from the highlands,\(^4\) while Mashkov said a half of the highlanders in the Ankobār area survived.\(^5\) Ilg's estimate was higher with two-thirds of Ethiopia's population supposedly surviving.\(^6\) Ilg as a spokesman for the Ethiopian government and Capucci as an Italian spy, both had a tendency to exaggerate their opposing cases, while Mashkov, a Russian not in any official capacity, seems to be the most dependable observer. Whatever the exact amount of the decrease was, it is clear that depopulation was greater in the lowlands than in the highlands, that is, in the \textit{qolla} rather than the \textit{dega} and \textit{wāyna dega}. Alyu Amba was particularly hard hit.\(^7\) Here then is another indication

\(^1\)ASMAI 36/14/18, Wěldž Amanu'ēl to Salimbeni, Nov./Dec. 1892.
\(^2\)Ibid.
\(^3\)Ibid. 0.1. \textit{passim} Nos. 1-45. BSGI Serie 3, Vol. 3 (1889), Ragazzi to SGI, 14.8.89. ASMAI 36/13/104, Gerazmach "Jusief al mio Amato", 15.11.90.
\(^4\)ASMAI 36/14/128, Capucci to Salimbeni, 4.8.92.
\(^5\)BSGI Serie 3, Vol. 6 (1894), pp. 870.
\(^6\)Intelligenzblatt und Berner Stadtblatt, 26.3.92.
\(^7\)See fn. 5 and 6 above.
of the decline of this regional market at the expense of Addis
Abäba and Ento which, being at a higher altitude, were less severely
affected.

One can, however, be a bit more concrete as to price changes
during this period to give an idea of scale. Mashkov’s estimates
are the most complete but Traversi, who was in Ethiopia for a longer
period, indicates that the change was not as great as the traveller
Mashkov makes out. The best indication comes with the price of salt.
Before the famine Mashkov says 8-12 pieces of salt could be bought
for one MTD while Traversi says 9-11. After the famine Mashkov
says 2-2 1/2 and Traversi concurs. As for cattle intended for food,
Traversi says 2 MTD would be sufficient for one before the famine,
while Mashkov says 1-1 1/2 and after the famine 30-60 MTD. Thus,
with salt a basic unit of exchange, basic food prices must have in­
creased at least fivefold and a luxury like beef at least fifteen fold.

Needless to say the impact on the economy must have been shattering.

The harvest at the end of 1892 marked the end of the famine
and people were no longer dying of hunger. One MTD now bought
three qunna of Téf and six qunna of barley. The next crop too was
good but it would be a long time before the country completely recovered
from its effects. At the end of 1892 Menilek was particularly short
of money and the shortage was aggravated by the fire which burned

1 BSGI Serie 3, Vol. 6 (1894), Mashkov 2nd Viaggio, p. 871.
3 BSGI (1892), op. cit.
4 ASMAI 36/13/108, Traversi to MAE, 2.6.91.
5 Mashkov, op. cit.
6 ASMAI 36/14/18, Wälāh Amanu'āl to Salimbeni, Nov./Dec. 1892.
ASMAI 36/16/157, Salimbeni to MAE, 26.1.93. Annesso, Capucci to
Salimbeni, 20.1.93.
7 M&D 138, Lagarde to MAE, 12.3.93.
8 ASMAI 36/14/128, Capucci to Salimbeni, 11.11.92.
the bulk of Addis Ababa's buildings to the ground except for one chapel or se'el bêt.\(^1\) An autobiography goes so far as to say that all of Menilek's cannon and guns, stored in his treasure house, were also destroyed.\(^2\) Thus at the time when Addis Ababa was first beginning to grow an unusually large number of 'acts of God' hindered her speedy development, like the fire, while others like the famine indirectly contributed to her growth as a centre for the distribution of food.

**Tribute.** The prime example of Addis Ababa as a parasite can be seen in the institution of the tribute provincial rulers had to bring to the capital when making their submission to the Emperor. Another example is found in the extensive celebrations and feasting necessary at the inauguration of churches in the area, and more especially at the time of the coronation.\(^3\) Figures are available for the number of cattle needed for one of the former (the feast for the church of Entoppo Maryam) when Dəjazmach Wälde carried out a special raid into Gurage for the necessary 3,000 cattle.\(^4\) A much larger number would have been necessary for the bigger feast at the time of the coronation, leaving aside the regular banquets or geber given every Sunday except during fasts. It was in this manner that Menilek fed his standing army in Addis Ababa and also the Imperial Court approximately 2,300 strong at this time.\(^5\) Parallel to this was the court's tremendous

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\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) See pp. 406, 347 ff.

\(^4\) Borelli, p. 254 (29.9.87).

\(^5\) Ilg's article in Intelligenzblatt und Berner Stadsblatt, 28.3.92.
appetite for slaves, many of whom came in the form of tribute and others by right of conquest. The most conspicuous example of the latter can be found in the Wâlamo campaign when Menilek kept several thousand and gave many way as gifts to provincial lords.¹

Specific Goods and Addis Abâba as a distributive centre

We have already seen how Menilek, his Ras, and foreigners dominated the import/export trade from their bases in Harâr and Addis Abâba.² What follows is an attempt, despite limited sources, to look at the indigenous traders who gathered raw materials and brought them to the capital for export.

"Foreign merchants do not trade directly with the provinces. Goods are bought in Addis Abâba by Abyssinians, who distribute them throughout the country districts, and return thence with wax, coffee, civet and ivory which is sold for export to foreign merchants in the capital."³

By this time regional markets like Rogé, Alyu Amba or Dâlâtî, which had been important before Adwa, were no longer significant except as very local markets.⁴

A majority of the traders at the beginning of the period seem to have been Islamic but trade was by no means dominated by them in this period, as some have implied.⁵ One of the few foreign observers to comment on this point said the merchants in the market were mainly Mohammedans.⁶ This is corroborated by oral informants.⁷

¹De Coppet, p.363; GHbM Sellase, p.220; ASMAI 36/16/152, Traversi to MAE, A/A, 25.7.93; ASMAI 3/7/49, Capucci to MAE, Rome, 15.9.97.
⁴W.D., 9.3.01; O.I. No. 21 (11.4.72), pp. 1-1, O.I. No. 15, (2.3.72), p.11.
⁵Caplan, p.19. Abir, pp. 70-2. The degree to which Christians are
Many were from Tegré, were called Wärj (Harj or Wärjih) and had originally used Rogé. But others came from Marrita, Mahdāra Maryam (near Gondār) and fewer still from Gojam and Wello. But Christians were also deeply involved in trade and not just as providers of capital. Both Christians and Muslims point this out. Many were from Tegré, too, like Abreham Hagos, or from Shāwa, but the bulk seems to have left Gondār and settled in Addis Abāba. Many came before Adwa and most were well established at the latest by the turn of the century. The biggest and most important family seems to have been that of Nāggadāras Aggedāw. Both Muslims and Christians were mixed together in the market and there was no separation between them as there had been at Gondār. Certainly the head of the merchants,

involved in trade, as this chapter I hope shows, casts some doubt on Abir's categorical statement.

6 Michel, p. 106.

0.1. No. 20 (11.4.72), pp. 15-18; 0.1. No. 39 (23.5.72), p. 6.

0.1. No. 15 (2.3.72); 0.1. No. 20 (11.4.72), pp. 17-18.

Ibid.

3 0.1. No. 20 (11.4.72), pp. 11-12; 0.1. No. 27 (17.5.72); 0.1. No. IX (9.10.71).

4 0.1. No. 20 (11.4.72), pp. 11-12. By cross checking this informant it seems clear Abreham was a pre-1910 trader.

5 0.1. No. 39 (23.5.72), p. 6.

6 See pp. 141-180, 953 K.

7 W.D., 28-30.3.1900; 0.1. No. IX (9.10.71); 0.1. No. 27 (17.5.72).

8 Ibid.

9 0.1. No. 20 (11.4.72), p. 18.
the Näggadras of Addis Abāba, was always a Christian\(^1\) and the extent to which Menilek and important nobles dominated the capitalisation of trade has already been pointed out.\(^2\) Whether Menilek was intentionally attempting to break the Islamic domination of trade described by Abir\(^3\) has been impossible to establish. It is doubtful that there was any systematic, organized effort to do this.\(^4\) Nonetheless, the tools to do so were there and subtle, unobtrusive means (some of them not so subtle) may have been used: favouritism in the collection of customs revenue,\(^5\) leniency in collection or extension of loans,\(^6\) ease in extension of letters of credit to various provinces,\(^7\) lower rates on loans,\(^8\) and so on. Certainly the joy with which Haylā Giyorgis was received by Christians and Muslims alike when released from Taytu's imprisonment indicates that rancour between the two communities was not very high.\(^9\)

\(^1\)O.I. No. 27 (17.5.72).
\(^2\)See pp. 333-334.
\(^3\)Abir, pp. 70-72.
\(^4\)There were no intimations from informants that this might have occurred, despite persistent questioning, O.I. No. 20 (11.4.72), and II (14.4.72); O.I. No. 35 (23.5.72); O.I. No. 39 (23.5.72).
\(^5\)F.O. 1/33/p.33, Rood to F.O., A/A, 15.5.97; O.I. No. 39 (23.5.72), p. 6.
\(^6\)W.D., 6.2.01.
\(^7\)W.D., 6.2.01.
\(^8\)Djibouti, 8.9.00.
\(^9\)W.D., 24.12.09.
When dealing with commodities in Ethiopia where they are largely in the hands of indigenous traders, it is even more difficult to get hard data than with those in the hands of foreigners. This is especially true of gold, ivory, slaves and salt. The first can be passed over because, being the means of paying tribute throughout the land, it does not seem to have been taxed as other commodities were. In the appended chart some figures have been gathered but they are highly unreliable.

In the case of ivory, figures are more plentiful but whether these amounts actually passed through Addis Ababa is not fully established. Furthermore, as elephants were slowly exterminated the tusks came from widely scattered areas of the Empire. This would account for ivory exports remaining relatively steady in amount despite constant warnings of extinction. They are often described as being stacked next to customs houses and were in high demand as an easily transportable export.

For salt and slaves no reliable statistics exist. Salt was used as currency throughout the period and the method of trade changed but little from Abir's description. The slave trade though, had significantly changed. The imperial proclamations of 20th August

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1 See pp. 335-340.
2 See Chart I, p. 340
3 Ibid.
5 For instance, Wellby, p. 94.
6 Pankhurst, p. 460.

7 See Abir, pp. 44-9, 62. Addis Ababa would of course replace the regional centres mentioned. I have been unable to discover what effect Lake Assal salt had on overall trade.
1903\(^1\) and 9th October 1909\(^2\) do not seem to have caused any significant change for both Clerk and Brice point out that Ethiopians admit that as a deterrent the proclamations were useless.\(^3\) All important Ethiopian families had domestic slaves, the only change was that they were no longer sold publicly.\(^4\) Mostly they were brought to the capital by soldiers from Käfa or Wäiamo as servants, slaves and money would be exchanged as "gifts" and the soldiers would return south "temporarily" leaving the slave but taking the money.\(^5\) By 1909 rates were: 50-70 MTD (men or women aged 20-35); 60-90 MTD (boys 9-20) and 70-100 MTD (girls 7 to 20).\(^6\) Domestic slavery then was established in Addis Abëba.\(^7\) But the bulk of the long-distance slave trade almost certainly by-passed the capital for there are no documentary mentions of it.

The most interesting commodity by far was coffee. Two outlets are found in Ethiopia, one in Harër, the other in the south and west. Only the latter concerns us because it was the only one to be exported through Addis Abëba.\(^8\) As Chart I shows, exports slowly dropped from 1899 to 1910, already in 1900 merchants were switching

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1 F.O. 1/48, No. 8, Encl. 1, Clerk to F.O., 7.9.03, Translation of the proclamation annexed.
2 N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 11.10.09, Translation of the proclamation annexed.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
from dealing in civet and coffee exports to wax and skins. But Azza Wurgenah's family still found it to be a profitable enterprise and in 1909 Menilek thought it significant enough to stop exports through Gambela. Both Christians and Muslims were deeply involved. One wonders, particularly in this case, how much figures were distorted by contraband trade aimed at avoiding customs Kellas.

The last important, well documented export is wax (see Chart I), except for the French 1907-8 from a rather unreliable source, wax shows a steady growth as an export. Most of it came from Gojam but it is a common by-product throughout Ethiopia in the production of the national drink Taji (or mead). It too was on the 1909 list of products in the south west to be diverted from Gambela through Addis Ababa.

Finally, a quick look must be given to local trade in the Addis Ababa area and the people involved in it. The market seems to have been made up of about one-half Oromo and one-half Gurage speaking peoples. In the case of the local incense and soap trade, the respective myrtle and endos was brought to Addis Ababa, sometimes

2W.D., 11,11,00, 9,1,01, 16,1,01, 6,2,01.
3F.O. 371/597/11624, Encl. 3, Report on South West, Abyssinia, 10,2,09.
4W.D., op.cit., O.I. No. 20 (11,4,72), pp. 6, 11-12.
5Djibuti, 22.9,00, p.1.
6F.O. 371, op.cit. Other important exports basic to long distance trade in Ethiopia, like honey, civet, skins and hides, are passed over because of the lack of information.
7Merab II, p.149; O.I. No. 9 (16,12,71); O.I. No. 18 (17,3,72), p.14.
8Guidi, p.471.
from many days' journey away. It was sold to retailers, generally Guragés, in the open market. They in turn would sell it to Amharas or in neighbouring areas.\(^1\) With the money they bought locally made metal farming implements, presents for their wives and sometimes clothes.\(^2\) Much the same was true for other goods, like wood,\(^3\) grain,\(^4\) and probably others like chickens, sheep and drink, of which neighbouring farmers had a surplus.

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\(^{1}\) O.I. No. 18 (17.3.72), p.14; Mérab II, p.149.

\(^{2}\) O.I. No. 18, op.cit.


\(^{4}\) O.I. No. 15 (2.3.72), pp. 10-11.
Conclusion

Several themes dominate the early economic history of the capital. The most striking being the almost complete domination of the economic life of the capital by the Emperor. The bulk of all the import/export trade seems to have passed through his hands in Addis Ababa for personal inspection and selection, or through those of his Naggadras. The import/export trade was further controlled by him and his assistants by means of monopolies, loans, concessions and other means that were meted out principally to foreigners who manipulated most of the actual trade. More importantly, the internal trade of the country was taxed and partly controlled by an empire-wide network of Naggadras, many of whom were appointed by the Emperor. Furthermore, Menilek, while in the capital, kept a close watch on any foreign "innovations" imported into the country, encouraging those which enhanced and strengthened him and neglecting or discouraging others. Another theme important to the economic life of Addis Ababa was the shift from Muslim to Christian domination of trade in this period. Virtually all the Empire's trade routes were brought under Menilek's and Shawa control and Christians seem to have been appointed and encouraged by him. That this was conscious policy can not be conclusively determined on the evidence available. Finally, the economic factors that led to the location and stabilisation of the capital in its present site should not be under-emphasised. Although both political and economic factors played a role, it was the economic ones that proved to be decisive. Religious factors, although present, played a relatively minor role.
CHAPTER IV: RELIGION

Introduction

The influence of the Orthodox Church of Ethiopia from 1880-1910 in Addis Abëba falls into two distinct periods. During the earlier period (1880-1896) it played a much more active role, taking the lead in modifying traditional forms of land tenure and founding a large number of churches, while in the later one (1896-1910) its influence was more conservative, especially regarding toleration of other creeds, and the process of assimilation of the new arrivals flocking to the capital.

The role of religion from 1880-1896 goes beyond the bounds one normally assigns to it in the Ethiopian context, especially because of the great significance of the religious shift of power signalled by Yohannes's death and the role played by clerics in the modified forms of land tenure and taxation. But the true function of clerics in government and the extent of their influence, will never be fully unravelled, for the private confessor or nafs abbat, often a monarch's and his subordinate's closest advisor, was sworn to secrecy. The church in this period probably played a larger role in the history of the city than it was ever to do again. This was further due to the role of the new Abun, Matëwos, to whom Menilek gave control of the Liqå Kahenat, thus centralizing the church around him and the city of Addis Abëba.

During the years 1896 to 1910 concern for land tenure schemes passed into other hands and there was no national catastrophe on the scale of the 1889 famine in which the church might take such an active role. Nonetheless, its influence was pervasive as a conservative force attempting to slow the pace of change, although in at least one instance, with the setting up of the Menilek II school, Egyptian Coptic teachers were imported to give the elite an education very
different from the traditional one provided by the church. But even this small step was taken in reaction to German educational initiatives and was sponsored by the head of the church, the Abun, in opposition to much of the hierarchy. In marked contrast to this there were sporadic outbursts of religious persecution against Catholics and Protestants, coupled with a remarkable degree of tolerance for Islam. At the end of this period Menilek's serious heart seizure of May, 1908, and the attempts to settle the succession dispute led to a widening of the old split between Abunā Pē'tros and Abunā Matēwos.

Evangelically, the church seems to have made no energetic efforts to convert or assimilate Muslims or animists. Shayk Zākariyas, a convert to Christianity from Islam, was the only Ethiopian who seems to have strenuously attempted to convert Muslims. Yet his formative experience of Christianity came from foreign missionaries, not from the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church's assimilation of non-Christians seems to have followed a typically Ethiopian pragmatic, unmethodical course. Churches were haphazardly founded by the Emperor or his nobles on hills in the capital and then the capital was divided into abbiya or parishes with a church at the centre of each. The church and the grounds surrounding them served, especially on Sundays, as a gathering point for the city's inhabitants. In order to keep abreast of the latest political developments (particularly land cases), one had consistently to attend not only the nobles' courts but also the formal services and more importantly the informal Sunday meeting held in the church on the sabbath after regular services. Many a new convert and nominal Christian must have taken his initial steps towards the Orthodox Church of Ethiopia or..
made overtures for a son or a daughter to do so, so as not to miss out on just such apparently casual gatherings.

All in all the church by increasing the number of foundations in the capital showed that it could expand with the growing city. Yet one feels it was inflexible, bound to its traditional approach to heresy and "paganism" and only unwillingly adapting to the special problems of an urban centre. It was the power and prestige of Menilek that pointed the way and deep difficulties were to grow out of his sickness and ill health.

Religion in Addis Ababa (1880s-1896)

Before 1886, the Addis Ababa area already had three churches, two royal foundations and one founded by Menilek's uncle Ras Darge, called Ura'el.1 One of the former, Entotto Maryam, had been inaugurated with great pomp and expense and within three years was to become the site of the imperial coronation of Menilek II.2 By 1882 Abuna Matewos had already been given control over the appointment of the Liqä Khenenat and thus over clerical taxation in Shwa, a privilege none of the other bishops sent to Ethiopia from Egypt had achieved. This gave him a degree of power within Shwa that the other bishops could not match inside or outside their own provinces.3

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1M. de Coppet, Chronique du Régne de Menélïk (Paris, 1930-2), Vol. I, p. 218, footnote 3. Volumes I and II are consecutively numbered; Sähäs Te'ez az Gäbrä Selläsé, Tarikä Zäšän ZäDägmai Menilek Neqäš Nägäät Za'Myopä (Addis Abäba, 1959 E.C.). The former is a translation of the latter and henceforth will be referred to respectively as De Coppet and Gäbrä Selläsé. This was the only written reference I could find for this fact.

2In De Coppet, pp. 264-272, and Gäbrä Selläsé, pp. 156-163 there is a very colourful description. The only European diplomat present was Ragazzi, ASMAI 36/6/56, Cecchi to MAE, Aden, 24/12/89, Incl. Ragazzi to MAE, Antoto, 16/11/89, for dating of the coronation.

3See Adugna Amanu, "The Ethiopian Church Becomes Autocephalous", History Department HSIU, Fourth Year Paper (1969), pp. 9-10. This paper is particularly valuable because the author had access to Ms. ?4 of the National Library in A/A, a Mass which has become unavailable. (Henceforth Adugna.)
In 1889 when Abuna Matéwos placed the crown of the King of Kings of Ethiopia on Menilek's head in the crowded church at Entoto it symbolized not only a dramatic political shift in power but also a parallel shift in religious power. For Abuna Pétrros, the head of the church during the previous Emperor's reign, was not mentioned in the official account of the coronation and does not even seem to have been present. The religious dignitaries who attended were largely from the churches of Gojam and Sháwa and none seem to have represented the traditional coronation sites of Gondár and Aksum. Some three months later the Empire was divided into new religious districts to the disadvantage of Pétrros, the former head of the church, and within a year he had been brought to the capital where a closer watch could be kept on him.

Less significant was the investiture of the Echáże, for the importance of the office during the Menilek period has generally been exaggerated. For the power of appointment which he had had during Yohannes's reign over the Lígá Kahanat, was taken away from him by Menilek and given to the Abun, Matéwos. However, within a

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1Ibid. The degree to which theological disputes between the north and the south were involved is not clear. Menilek seems to have been wary of the power of the soait ledít faction but appointments were not made on these grounds alone. Sahel Séllásé's establishment of soait ledít in Sháwa had been divisive and Menilek was probably glad when Yohannes officiated over a settlement at Boru Méda in 1887. (I would like to thank Donald Crummey for pointing this out to me.) As for Abuná Pétrros, he does not seem to have arrived in Sháwa until 1890 and was at that time in Ankobár. See O. Cerrotti, "Il Secondo Viaggio in Abissinia di Maschov, 1891-1892", BSGI (1894) Serie III, Vol. VII, p. 872. (Henceforth Cerotti)

2De Coppet, p. 268; Gábrál Séllásé, p. 159.

3De Coppet, p. 284.

4De Coppet, p. 299.

5See, for example, D. Mathew, Ethiopia the Study of a Polity, 1540-1935 (London, 1947), pp. 172-174. However, this was the highest post an Ethiopian could hold within the church. See glossary, I. Guidi, Vocabolario Amarico-Italiano (Rome, 1901), 511, and A. Cécchi,
year the Echägi had also taken up residence in the capital next to the imperial palace. ¹

Until the tenure of Ysäb, which ended at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Abun and Echägi were permanently resident in Gondär. Then, during the reigns of emperors Tewodros (1855-1868), Täklä Giyorgis (1869-1872) and Yohannes (1872-1889), they were in attendance upon the imperial court. They also maintained during this period several residences on their various gult, notably in Dömbeya for the Abun and Azäzo for the Echägi. It was only after Menilek's 1889 coronation that both were to have again permanent residences, this time in the Entọtto and Addis Abäba areas. ² Matéwos was also given Männagäsha Marqos, within half a day's ride of the centre of the capital to use as an alternative residence and source from which to supply his needs and those of his court in the capital. ³

In April 1891 Menilek began work on a new church near his palace in Addis Abäba, bringing wood from the nearby forests of Männagäsha. But the tabo did not enter it till the thirteenth of July. ⁴ According to Aşmé, Menilek established this, the first royal foundation in

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¹ ASMAI 36/9/75, "Gabriel W. Gobana" to Salimbeni, in file marked "end of 1889-1890".


³ Adugna, p. 9.

⁴ See glossary.

Addis Ababa, to atone for the famine which by the beginning of 1891 was proving to be one of the worst that Ethiopia had ever experienced.¹

The cattle plague, famine and cholera epidemic following one upon the other affected all aspects of life, not the least of which was religion. Soon after the cattle epidemic appeared, Menilek blamed its advent on the fact that the people had not strictly kept the round of prayers that he had ordered. The plague was God's retribution.²

But as the famine and epidemics persisted, Menilek, Ṭaytu and Abunä Matéwos gave alms every day.³ This was one of the factors that contributed to an influx of people into the towns of Shäwa.⁴

This influx of common people and the increasing number of nobles who resided in the capital after the imperial coronation forced Menilek into modifying traditional forms of land tenure and taxation so as to support the growing population of the capital. Some of these policies of the 1890s were initiated by men inside the church and partly administered by them. Overall there were six pressures that led Menilek towards these modifications of the 1890s.

First and most important were the famine, drought and epidemics of rinderpest and cholera. Food shortages were widespread in Shäwa and the high death rate among the ploughing oxen meant that fewer fields were ploughed and sown than normal, which in turn helped protract the famine. The imperial soldiers who had been billeted on

¹Agmé Giyorgis, YeGalla Tarik, p. 61. The original is at the Bibliothèque Nationale, Ms. Ethiopiens, No. 302 and a photocopy at Haile Selassie I University’s Kennedy Library (Henceforth Agmé). See also Cerotti, pp. 862-927.


³De Coppet, p. 258.

⁴See pp. 3309.
the land surrounding Addis Ababa became an almost intolerable burden, for there was not even enough food for the peasants who were tilling the land. Secondly, many of Menilek's reserves almost certainly had been consumed during the extended coronation ceremonies described at such length in his chronicle. Furthermore, during and following the coronation, የኔትግሃንንት or nobles came to pay homage to Menilek and expected to be feasted in a manner befitting their high station. Much of this occurred during the height of the famine of 1889-1892.

Fourthly, now that Menilek was King of Kings, many more nobles and clerics, seekers of favour and important rulers under "house-arrest", began to live permanently or semi-permanently at his court. All needed food and supplies. There was also the need to distribute the lands of Menilek's most famous general, የሆዝ ገብና who had ruled vast stretches of land in the immediate vicinity of Addis Ababa and had died just before the coronation. Then, in early 1892, a fire burnt down everything in the royal enclosure, except for the chapel. Not only food supplies were lost, but guns, money and the presents that had been stored up for the Emperor to give those who came

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1 ASMAI 36/14/128, Capucci to Salimbeni, Antoto, 15,10,92 and De Coppet, p.324. The soldiers, most of them Gondaré mercenaries from the north seem to have been settled in the Addis Ababa area to consolidate Menilek's control of this Oromo area because many of them had refused to fight Yohannes. See ASMAI 36/4, Antonelli to MAE, Antoto, 15.9.87.

2 De Coppet, pp. 264-272; Gëbräi Sellase', pp. 156-163.

3 For instance, for Abba Jifar and Tähäl Haymanot and his sons see, De Coppet, pp. 220, 266, and 339-344. See also Bairu Tafila, "Two of the Last Provincial Kings of Ethiopia", Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. XI, No. 1, p.42 and passim. For Abba Jifar, see Le Temps, 28.7.93.

4 Ato NëggäHå, "YHobëHa Tarik", copy of the Ms. in the personal possession of Tähay Berhan Sellase', at the Institute of Ethiopian Studies. See pp. 2, 3, 10, 12,14 and 16. Henceforth, NëggäHå.
to pay homage and to those he had to honour and promote. This was a
serious loss to the treasury.¹

A final cause of pressure may have been the ever increasing
number of troops dependent upon Menilek who could not be fed because
Menilek did not have enough wealth and land to accommodate them
all. This may have influenced the timing of his campaigns to Walamo.
There he could amass more lands for the troops, loot the grain,
cattle and slaves of a country relatively untouched by the ravages
of the famine.²

In reacting to these pressures Menilek used a balanced policy
alternatively emphasising modifications of the land tenure system
and then, more desperately, imposing harsh measures of taxation.
First in 1890 he modified the land tenure system in the Addis Ababa
area by changing gasha márét into rest land.³ To understand the
full significance of this change a slight digression, I fear, into
Ethiopian land tenure is necessary. Essentially, gasha márét was
a form of gult, that is, a type of tenure whereby the possessor was
allowed in one way or another to tax the tillers of the soil, usually
in kind, in return for military service to his ruler.⁴ This was a

¹De Coppet, p. 319. Mângestu Lâmma (editor), Mîshafî Tezzeta ZñAl îga
This is probably a description of this event and took place in
February or March.

²Sâhîy Berhan Sellassé, "Menilek II: Conquest and Consolidation of the
Southern Provinces", HSIU, Department of History, unpublished fourth
year paper, 1969, pp. 32-37. (Henceforth Sâhîy Berhan Sellassé.)

³De Coppet, pp. 301-302; Gûbru Sellassé, p.179. Also see, Blattângéta
Mahtéma Sellassé Wîldâ Mîsaqîl, Zekrû Nîdèr (Addis Ababa, 1962,

⁴See Berhanou Abbeebe, Evoluțion de la Propriété Foncière au Choa
temporary grant and could be revoked at the Emperor's pleasure. In 1890, then, Menilek improved the lot of the soldiers by changing the gaasha mare' into rest so that the land became theirs for ever and could be inherited by their descendants. In other words, it was inalienable. Now the soldiers had full rights over the land, not only to tax it but also to the usufruct. The effect of this measure during the time of famine was to renew the loyalty of the troops who owned the land and to settle them permanently around the capital and to assure it of its security.

Secondly, on the thirteenth of October 1892, Menilek proclaimed an Awaj instituting a ten per cent tithe and ordered all the royal troops billeted around Addis Ababa to leave the households that they had been occupying for the last three years and in the future draw rations from granaries set up to hold the grain gathered by the tithe (or asrat). The royal chronicle emphasizes the joy with which the latter half of the measure was received,¹ while an account by a longtime European resident points out the unpopularity of the first half of the Awaj.² The two, of course, were intimately linked, for the tithe or asrat was imposed as an emergency measure to support the large numbers of troops stationed in the capital mainly because of the shortages caused by the famine.

It is only in Capucci's account that the full details and the involvement of the church in the proclamation come to light. According

¹De Coppet, p. 324.
²ASMAI 36/14/128, Capucci to Salimbeni, Antoto, 15.10.92. See also Bairu Tafia, "Some Aspects of Land Tenure and Taxation in Säläle under Ras Darge, 1871-1900", Paper Presented at the Historical Society of Ethiopia, May 28-29, 1973 in Addis Ababa. The asrat was really a very heavy tax, in the Shäwa context, and the soldiers, especially the Gondäré, had a reputation throughout the province for their rapacity.
to him, it was Aläga Admasu\(^1\) who advised Menilek to institute the tax, getting inspiration from the Bible and sanctioning it with extensive quotes. He was very close to Menilek and one of the foremost clerics in the court, as Aläga Bitweddä\(^2\), despite the ups and downs of a somewhat stormy career. Menilek had instituted earlier taxes of a similar nature, to pay tribute demanded by Yohannes, to buy arms or to repay the Italian loan of the Treaty of Wachale\(^3\). All were born of one emergency or another.

Within six months Aläga Admasu experienced another of his sudden falls from power, being tried for an attempted coup and treason against the state.\(^4\) Modification of the traditional forms of land tenure, however, went on apace and does not seem to have been affected by his fall from favour. Menilek's next move was to have a direct impact on the swiftly growing new capital, instituting the first widespread use of gebzenna land charters in Shäwa.

When Menilek visited Däbrä Libanos, the most holy religious site in Shäwa, for Admasu's conspiracy trial from the 21st to the 26th of May he ordered, at the same time, the reorganization of the

\(^1\)Aläga Admasu (according to Blatta Heruy Wäldä Sellase', YäHeywät Tarik (Biographie),... (A/A, 1915 E.C.), p.55 (henceforth Heruy, YäHeywät Tarik) and O.I. No. 32 and 33, passim), was a very important figure in the church and does not seem to have been merely a religious man influential in it. He later became Ninbury Ed during Iyasu's reign. One of the difficulties of the historiography of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church at present is that there is no satisfactory model to which to refer in problems like this, the corporate identity of the church.

\(^2\)Ibid. On the analogy with the secular office, it would make him the third or fourth most important cleric in the land, a constant visitor and advisor to the court. See Guidi, 311.

\(^3\)ASMAI 36/17/169, Capucci to Traversi, Addis Ababa, 28.8.1894.

\(^4\)Le Temps, 28.7.93, but written in Addis Ababa in March, 1893.
finances of the whole monastery, to make it richer and more prosperous. Thus the revenues from the nearby market of Gurûni were given to it, and more interestingly the "YÄGebzenna Gwalt Ali Dor" were given to Ras Dargé as rest to maintain the traditional level of observance at the monastery.¹ This is the first mention of a gebzenna charter in the modern history of Shāwa.² Within a year fifteen such charters had been registered. These land charters deal exclusively with central Shāwa and were registered for safe keeping in the famous church of Dābrā Berhan Sellasé on the second folio of a revered patristic collection, Haymânot Abâw. Part of the many lands granted seem to have been Ras Gobūna's old holdings mentioned in the chronicle as being between the Chacha and Sibelu rivers.³ These were some of the lands closest to Addis Abâba. Ostensibly five churches in the Addis Abâba area were being given support: Maryam, Ragú'el, Ura'él, Sellasé and Giyorgis. What is far more interesting is the list of who were the respective gâbâz of these and other neighbouring churches: Etëgé Taytu, Dâjazmach Tâshâmâ Nadâw, Azzaj Wâldâ-Ṣadak, Dâjazmach Wâsh-Ṣaggâd, Alhâsa Estifanos, the army of the Liqaba, Shhâfè Te'ez'az Gâbrā Sellasé, Blatta Pavlos, Azzaj Zâmanu'él, Ras Mika'él, Dâjazmach Wâldâ Giyorgis, Mâyyâro Zâwdit, and Ras Mâkonnen.⁴

¹ De Coppet, pp. 331-3; Gâbrā Sellasé, p. 200.
³ O.I. No. 43 (22/10/73). There is a possibility that gebzenna charters were instituted so that nobles could avoid the asrat but no proof for this has come to light.
⁴ J.E.S., op.cit., pp. 67-69.
Here is a concise list of some of the most important personalities resident in the new capital. The majority of the ten churches registered in the charter were very old and well established in the heartland of Shawa.

After the Dəbrə Libanos grants were made, Menilek as his third measure announced an entirely new tax based on monetary payments as opposed to the taxes in kind of former times.\(^1\) It was to cover the whole land except for Tegré. One Maria Theresa dollar was to be paid for every pair of oxen, asses or horses used in plowing; 2 MTD for every property that did not have oxen, 1 MTD for every four workers and 4 MTD for every ምፋፋጪጭ ምጪ or gult.\(^2\) The tax was payable in the new year (September). Very soon, however, it became clear that it was only to be enforced in the lands surrounding Addis Ababa.\(^3\)

These three measures laid the foundation for the permanent residence in the capital of the religious and secular hierarchies of Menilek’s Imperial court. Supplies in kind were made permanent, for the church by the gebzenna charters and for Menilek and his nobles by the first aerat of 1892.\(^4\) Finally, a short term financial deficit was made good by the 1894 MTD aerat. More specifically, not only were newly endowed churches like Sellasé, Giyorgis and Mika‘el given powerful supporters and fixed incomes by their new ገብረץ,\(^5\) but the

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\(^1\) ASMAI 3/7/49, "Ing. L. Capucci - Informazioni... 6/1894-5/1895. Roma, 16/4/96."

\(^2\) ASMAI 36/17/169, Capucci to Traversi, A/A, 28.8.94.

\(^3\) Ibid., A/A, 4.11.94.


\(^5\) Gebzenna is the adjective for the charter, while the ገብረৎ is the one who administers the land so entitled. See Guidi, 746.
gəbäś themselves, in many cases far from their power bases and source of supplies (like Taytu, Täsämma Nadāw, Mika'el, Wīldā Giyorgis and Makonnen), were given a permanent source of supply necessary to support them and their large military and civil retinues when they were in attendance upon Menilek.

Thus the ostensibly religious form of gebzenna land tenure was expanded to cover the secular needs of nobles. Little of the however, asrat was used to assist the church. Menilek paid his newly enlarged standing army, from the revenue of the asrat so that the increasingly unpopular billeting of soldiers could be discontinued. On the eve of the battle of Adwa at the beginning of 1895, Menilek had amassed 760,000 MTD from this tax, a staggering sum in the Shāwa context.

But Menilek's court clergy did not confine themselves simply to helpful advice, on the contrary they often expressed support or violent opposition to military expeditions in the presence of the Emperor or other members of the court. Sometimes these took the form of prophesies. Throughout the period immediately before the Battle of Adwa church building went on space in the capital and during the last kerämt or rains before the campaign the rebuilding of Giyorgis and Ura'el was begun in Addis Abubba.

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1 See op. cit., J.E.S. to MAE
2 ASMAI 3/7/49, Capucci, 18.3.97, p.15.
3 Ibid. For the continuation of Menilek's policy towards land tenure, see pp. 103-114.
4 ASMAI 36/11/88, Commando Superiore to MAE, 12.1.90, Amnesso, Ragazzi to MAE, 20.12.99 is but one example.
5 ASMAI 36/17/168, Capucci to Traversi, A/A, 25.10.94.
6 De Coppet, p. 372; Gëbrä Sellasé, p. 224.
Religion (1896-1910)

After the Battle of Adwa Menilek fulfilled the pledge he had made before going to battle and founded a new church in the palace grounds, the church of Găbre'él. However, his piety went further than this and he promulgated a sweeping proclamation dealing not only with Addis Abăba but the whole country. He promised that he and his zăbăngna would build and renovate churches and encouraged officials, land owners, soldiers, carpenters, masons and common people to do the same. Thus the church building efforts of the pre-Adwa period were to be surpassed by those after the battle.

When the Emperor triumphantly returned from the Adwa campaign he was met by the clergy of the five churches of Addis Abăba: Maryam, Ragu'él (the two churches on the Enţoppo range), Ura'él, Sellase and Giyorgis (all three in Addis Abăba). From the time of the foundation of the churches until Menilek's incapacitation and Iyasu's proclamation as heir, Menilek encouraged renowned clerics to preside over and teach in the new churches of his capital. Many of them came from the north and were educated there, especially in Tegré, Gondăr and Gojam and it seems that they came in increasing numbers after

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1 De Coppet, Vol. II, p465; Găbră Sellaşă, p. 278.

2 Zekră Năgar, p.526. The full text of the proclamation is translated to convey something of its spirit. See Appendix III. Also, it is interesting to note that many of the carpenters and masons, and most prominently Haji Kiwas, who worked on the churches, were Indians in Menilek's pay. See De Coppet, p. 465; Găbră Sellaşă, p.278.

3 De Coppet, p. 454; Găbră Sellaşă, p. 271. See also below, pp. 364 ff.

4 See Heruy, YHieywät Tarik, pp. 63, 67, 72, 73, 90-91 and also the page facing page 90. This is a clear reflection of an ancient pattern established by Tăklă Haymanot and bishop Ya'eqob. See Taddesse Tamrat, Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527 (Oxford, 1972), pp. 160-174, and also 174 ff. (Henceforth Taddesse Tamrat).
the coronation and also after the battle of Adwa. Many clerics in the various churches had close ties with Taytu and Menilek\textsuperscript{1} or had high and responsible secular positions.\textsuperscript{2} For Adwa, in a very real way, was a confirmation of Menilek's 1889 coronation. Only now was he the undisputed Emperor of the whole land and Addis Abēba the undisputed centre of the Empire, its political and religious capital.

After the battle of Adwa, Abūnā Matéwos\textsuperscript{3}(the head of the church), the Echēge\textsuperscript{4}(a very powerful church official) and Abūnā Pētros\textsuperscript{5}(the former head of the church) were all resident in the capital. The Nābura Ed of Aksum also seems to have spent a considerable time in the capital.\textsuperscript{6} Whether he was a permanent resident at the time is not clear. It also seems that during this period the rivalry between Abūnā Matéwos and Pētros was still keen, although Matéwos, his position doubtless strengthened by Menilek's and Shēwa's commanding position in the empire, was in by far the more powerful position.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{1}The best example here, perhaps, is Mēzmur Kasa who had access to Taytu's Elfēgn or private chambers. Heruy, YēHeywēt Tarik, p.63.

\textsuperscript{2}For example Gābrā Sellaṣē, the Shēhaf Te'ez az (see pp. 147-148) was also YēGābrā Alēṣa of Entōṭto Negu'el. Heruy, YēHeywēt Tarik, p. 91.

\textsuperscript{3}The Times, special dispatch of 30.4.97 from A/A. W.D. 30.9.00, 7.1.00.

\textsuperscript{4}De Coppet, p. 458; Gābrā Sellaṣē, p. 272. Also W.D. 20.9.00.

\textsuperscript{5}The Times, special dispatch of 30.4.97 from A/A. W.D. 30.9.00, 7.1.00.

\textsuperscript{6}See ASMAI 38/1/4, Ciccodicola to MAE, A/A, 30.4.98. De Coppet, p.459; Gābrā Sellaṣē, p.275.

\textsuperscript{7}See above, pp. 474, 1434.
Wirkénih concisely describes the situation. "There are two Abunas in Addis Ababa at present. Abuna Mathos [sic] who is the Abuna of Shoa and Petros who is the Abuna of Gondar and Tigre. The Emperor is keeping the latter here to prevent Gondar and Tigre from revolting and getting their nominee consecrated as king."¹ In effect Abuna Petros’s stay in Addis Ababa was an enforced exile. Matewos was shown to be more in the Emperor’s favour when he was given a prime site for his town house, forcing one of Menilek’s favourites, Abbath, to vacate the site,² and he was also given extensive lands to govern near the capital, at Mānnagāsha.³ Furthermore, he had a retinue of some 700 people to support while he was resident in the capital.⁴ While Matewos was often accused of being too interested in money,⁵ Abuna Petros on the other hand seems not to have been subjected to such criticism. Unlike Matewos he did not have a large house on his plot of land, which adjoined that of his closest ally, Ras Mikael.⁶

In 1901/2 Matewos’s power reached a peak. His position vis-à-vis Petros was very strong, his power within the Shāwan hierarchy was well established,⁷ and he had the favour of both Menilek and Taytu.⁸

¹W.D., 7.1.00.
³W.D., 19.11.00.
⁵Ibid., pp. 51 and 56 ff.
⁶W.D., 21.6.09.
⁷See above, pp. 34 ff.
⁸N.S. Eth. 61, Lagarde to Delcassé, Antoto, 8.2.01, pp. 37-8.
Symbolically in 1901 he presided over the festivities held on the anniversary of the battle of Adwa.\textsuperscript{1} One way in which he seems to have exercised his power was in refusing to allow foreigners and especially French Catholics to be baptised in the capital. Lagarde even goes so far as to say that it was impossible for Menilek to enforce the kind of religious toleration he might wish since he feared dethronement and even being poisoned.\textsuperscript{2} He had, however, several years earlier received a Lazarist in the capital as he had promised Lagarde,\textsuperscript{3} and Lagarde admits to having used his diplomatic privileges to provide refuge in the French legation grounds for Catholics who were being persecuted.\textsuperscript{4} At about the same time an educated Ethiopian Protestant, Këntiba Gëbru, was imprisoned in Ankobär after having returned from a mission to the Khalifa, but was released in 1900.\textsuperscript{5} While in 1895, if we are to believe a somewhat unreliable source, a number of Roman Catholic priests including several Ethiopians and a European, were brought to Addis Abëba, bound hand and foot. It was only through the intervention of a well-known French merchant that the case was brought to Menilek's attention and the priests freed.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{1}Djibouti: Journal Franco-Ethiopien 6.4.01, p.1. (Henceforth Djibouti).
\textsuperscript{2}N.S. Eth. 61, Lagarde to Delcassé, Entoto, 8.2.01, p.38.
\textsuperscript{3}N.S. Eth. 7, Lagarde to Minister, Entotto, 12.2.98, p. 179.
\textsuperscript{4}N.S. Eth. 61, Lagarde to Delcassé, Entoto, 8.2.01, p.39, and French Ambassador [Signature illegible] to Quai D'Orsay, Rome, 30.4.01, p.62.
\textsuperscript{5}W.D., 12.9.00.
\textsuperscript{6}Pariset, Al Tempo di Menelik (Milan, 1947), pp. 94-95.
All of this might be construed as a campaign against non-members of the Ethiopian Orthodox church, but it seems more likely that these were relatively isolated incidents. Nonetheless, Matéwos's role was most unclear.¹

In 1901, the Russians staged a minor diplomatic coup when they persuaded Menilek to allow Abuna Matéwos to leave Ethiopia and make a trip to Egypt, Jerusalem and Moscow.² This was the first time that the head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church had left Ethiopia and the priests of the church were very much opposed to this attempt at a rapprochement between the Ethiopian and Russian Orthodox churches. More important was the fact that the absence of Matéwos allowed those who opposed him to strengthen their position within the church and gave them an occasion to attack him. For while he had been in Jerusalem he was thought to have betrayed the Ethiopian Orthodox Church by giving over Ethiopia's rights to Dayr-as-Sultan to the Egyptian Copts.³ Equally important was the support given to the Abun's critics by Taytu. Together they felt powerful enough to reveal their deep seated discontent with the way the church had been run by stepping up of persecutions in the capital.

¹See W.D. 12.9.00 and F.O. 1/40, p.205, Harrington memo, 8.8.02.
²A better case for a more organised campaign can be made out for 1908-10 under the direction of Empress Taytu. See pp. 374-375.
Petros's role during Matéwos's absence is obscure and he may have hoped to undermine Matéwos while his rival was abroad, but there is no convincing evidence that his position was significantly strengthened. For it was quite natural for him to preside at the 1902 festivities celebrating the Battle of Adwa.

However, there was a renewal of persecution against the Roman Catholics in the capital which seems to have been intensified by three other factors: Russian intrigues against the Roman Catholics, an abortive and over zealous mission by Jarousseau to Käfa, and the visit to the capital of the Governor of Käfa himself, Ras Wäldä Giyorgis.

Addis Alam

In June 1902 Menilek, saying that the kingdom of heaven was more important than that of the earth, ordered that the palace he

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1 ASMAI 38/2/17, MAE to Manzoni, op. cit.
2 Djibouti, 17.4.02, p.2.
3 N.S. Eth. 61, Père André to Delcassé, A/A, 27.3.03, p.28.
4 F.O. 1/41/No. 11, Clerk to F.O. A/A, 23.12.03.
5 Nazrét Archives, Amharc Ms. No. I, Wäsneh to Endreyas, 22 Mäskäräm, 1897 E.C. (or 5.10.04 G.C.). Jarousseau's mission to Käfa had antagonized its governor Ras Wäldä Giyorgis who was more narrow-mindedly determined than Menilek was to keep out Roman Catholics and protect the Ethiopian Orthodox faith. (See Wäsneh, op. cit., and P. Méarab, Impressions d'Ethiopie (Paris, 1922), Vol. II, p.70. (Henceforth Méarab.) It should also be remembered that Ras Wäldä Giyorgis had a real problem on his hands in the form of the Ethiopian Catholics in Käfa. They swore allegiance to another church in competition with the Ethiopian Orthodox church and were a legacy of Masaia's mission in that area. (I would like to thank Donald Crummey for pointing this out to me.) For the whole Russian involvement pre-Adwa, see C. Zaghi, I Russi in Etiopia (Naples, 1973), passim.
had built at Addis Alam be changed into . Such is one version of the official account.\(^1\) Another says that the responsibility was Taytu's.\(^2\) Still another version says Menilek was unsure what to do with his palace once he had decided to return to Addis Ababa and his balämwal, or favourites, suggested that he turn it into a church.\(^3\) All of the versions are equally plausible, but were one favour the thesis that Menilek was consciously trying to create a religious centre in Shawa to rival those in the north\(^4\) the first version would be more congenial. The very existence of the others, however, throws doubt on it. Nonetheless, the new church seems to have fitted in as part of Menilek's overall church building scheme,\(^5\) famous clerics were gathered there,\(^6\) and its head was appointed Nebura Ed, a title that formerly belonged only to the main sanctuary at Aksum, the traditional centre of the empire.\(^7\)

In 1902/3 Menilek ordered the nobles to move back to Addis Ababa and settled many newly acquired slaves there.\(^8\) This new centre in

\(^1\)De Coppet, p. 496; Gêbrä Sellasë, p. 301.

\(^2\)De Coppet, p. 497; Gêbrä Sellasë, p. 303.

\(^3\)Alhâqa Lämma, pp. 176-177.

\(^4\)L. De Castro, Nella Terra dei Negus (Milan, 1915); Vol. I, p. 244 (Henceforth De Castro).

\(^5\)See above, p. 343 and below, pp. 341 ff.

\(^6\)Heruy, Yähéywat Tarik, pp. 62 and 91; O.I. No. 33, (30/5/72), he was one of the original priests, pp. 1-7.

De Coppet, p. 545; Gêbrä Sellasë, p. 349; De Castro, Vol. I, p. 244.

\(^7\)Alhâqa Lämma, p. 177; Heruy, Yähéywat Tarik, p. 62; O.I. No. 33, op.cit., pp. 7 and 17-18; O.I. No. 5 (20/1/72), pp. 15-16.
Shawa, with its untraditional architecture\(^1\) was finished at the end of January, 1905,\(^2\) largely through the efforts of Indians and Arabs working under Wāli Mohammēd.\(^3\)

However, the main problem remains, to what extent was Menilek intending to create in Shawa a religious centre to rival those in the north, particularly Aksum? The worrying point here is the relative dearth of contemporary evidence that this was Menilek's intention and the gap of several years, before a Neburā Ed was actually appointed. Yet the importance of the tabot of Maryam of Sayon and the later undoubted prestige of the Neburā Ed must not be forgotten. Thus it would seem that the full significance of the foundation of Addis Alēm and its churches were not immediately significant to Menilek or his contemporaries, but, as with so much in Ethiopia, only with the passage of time did the actuality catch up with the rhetoric.

**Church Building, Schools and Medicine**

But the church in Addis Alēm was only a small part of a much larger scheme. For during the years 1905-1906 Menilek helped rebuild four of the five churches in the Addis Abēba area and two more were founded. An unusually big effort seems to have been invested in building Giyorgis, whose architect was an Italian named Castagna.\(^4\) At least 2,496 MTD and part of the 6,166 MTD building costs were paid...

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\(^1\)De Castro, Vol. I, p. 244.

\(^2\)Alēma Kenē, Addisu. Ms. in the private possession of Dr. Aleme Eshete at the Institute of Ethiopian Studies. See entry for 21 Terr 1897.


by Menilek and Néggadras Haylē Giyorgis. Ilg seems to have tried to maintain overall supervision of the various building projects in the capital and the churches were but one small part of them.

Menilek and Taytu at this time seem to have been more personally involved in rebuilding Entoto Maryam and for this specially brought artisans from Europe. Their personal motives behind the church building campaign are difficult to guess. These projects were, perhaps, an attempt to replace the military campaigns of conquest to the south, east and west and have the flavour of an imperial tradition. The extent to which it was based on the personal piety of Menilek and Taytu has been impossible to establish. Entoto Maryam's reconstruction began in September 1905 and was finished in February 1906. In September 1905 Sellase church was officially opened by Menilek although it was not to be finished completely until February of the next year. The last church to be rebuilt was Gābre'el, which was moved to a more convenient site probably some time in 1906.

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1 Ilg Papers, op. cit.
3 ASMAI 38/4/30, Ciccodicola to MAE, Agordat, 6.12.05; De Coppet, p. 520; Gābrē Sellase, p. 323. The workers were probably the Greeks (Mērāb, Vol. II, p. 105) who had been brought to work on the Addis Alēm road and later complained to Ilg about non-payment of salary, see pp. 166-167.
4 De Coppet, p. 521; Gābrē Sellase, p. 324. The roof was, however, still up in the air!
5 Alēqa Kenfē, 10 Mēskārām, 1898 E.C., 20.9.05. This includes a very colourful description of the whole opening.
6 De Coppet, p. 523; Gābrē Sellase, p. 326.
7 De Coppet, p. 524; Gābrē Sellase, p. 333.
The two new foundations were Aqaqi Mädähané Aläm, built with money raised by Aggafari Wälda Gbrë'él (who was more commonly known as Ligaba) with land and workers furnished by Menilek1 at the beginning of 1906, and Rufa'ël whose tabot was consecrated on the 20th of July 1906 and whose architect was Castagna.2 These two churches were on the outskirts of the city and perhaps indicate the tendency of Addis Abäba to grow towards the north and the west. Also it shows that the church building campaign was not a monopoly of Menilek and Täytu but was also pursued by some of the Emperor's ageing generals. However, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was not only engaged in founding new churches in Addis Abäba but also was involved in education.

Shortly after the foundation of the two churches a group of Germans who had close connections with Empress Täytu arrived in the capital. One of this group of forty or so, Jacob Hall, opened a primary school for the young nobles in attendance at the court.3 This German intrusion very much disquieted Abuna Matewos for now it seemed that Ethiopian Aläha and Mämmer were about to lose the monopoly they had had on education in Ethiopia.4 The two traditional

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1De Coppet, p. 524; Gbrä Sellase, p. 325; O.I. No. IV, p.7.
2Aläha Kenfe, 12 Hamle, 1898 E.C.; 20.7.06 G.C. "However, he [Menilek] did not announce publicly the foundation of the church." What this means exactly is obscure.
3N.S. Eth. 9, Roux to Pichon, A/A, 27.3.07, pp. 45-46; N.S. Eth. 9, Lagarde to Bourgeois, Entoto, 25.10.06, p.39; N.S. Eth. 9, Lagarde to Minister, A/A, 5.6.06, p.30. Among the students were two future emperors, Lej. Iyasu and Däjazmach Täfari, as he then was, both of whom were being taught German. Of the latter it was even said "Le jeune Tafari oublie de plus en plus le français."
4N.S. Eth.9, Roux to Pichon, A/A, 27.3.07, p.46. See also Alaka Imbakom Kalewold, Traditional Ethiopian Church Education (New York, 1970) for a fairly extended description by an Ethiopian. See F.O. 371/192/6031, pp. 12-3 for a typical contemporary view critical of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. See also, Bairu Tafi, "Education of the Ethiopian Máxwanten in the Nineteenth Century". Paper for the Interdisciplinary seminar, HSIU, 17.6.72.
teachers (with the most to lose) in Addis Ababa with the most students at this time seem to have been Liqä Täbbäbt Haylū and Mämmere Wëldä Giyorgis at Ençoţto Ragu'él. As a result of the German mission Abunä Matéwos decided to try to obtain Coptic priests from Alexandria to open a school to compete with the Germans. Eight Egyptians arrived by May 1907. It is interesting to note that the Abun had promised Wärqenäh almost 7 years earlier to start a western school, although Wärqenäh found him decidedly unenthusiastic about the whole project. But it took the direct threat of the German intrusion to spur on the church to even this small, tentative step. The German experiment itself was not very successful. Most of the German schoolmasters soon returned home; the next year Menilek sent for some more but they only gave Lej Iyasu a few lessons before they in turn were put aside on the pretext that their lessons were "unprofitable" since they were not in Amharic.

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1 Heruy, YëHeywät Tarik, p. 73. He had some 200 students.
2 Ibid., p. 441. It was under the patronage of Ras Mika'él.
3 N.S. Eth. 9, Roux to Pichon, A/A, 27.3.02, p. 46. S. Eth. 9, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 17.6.07. W.D. 29.9.00.
4 ASMAI 38/4/36, Colli to MAE, A/A, 7.5.07.
5 N.S. Eth. 9, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 17.6.07.
6 ASMAI 54/4/14 (Subfile for 1908), Miniscaldi to the Governor of Asmara, 23.7.08.
7 N.S. Eth. 9, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 23.7.09, p. 219.
The Coptic school, soon to be named the "Royal School" and later known as Menilek II School, fared very much better. There was some difficulty with payment, in dividing the costs between the Patriarchate in Alexandria and the Church and Emperor in Ethiopia, but eventually Menilek agreed to pay 1,000 MTD per month and the Patriarch agreed to give 50 pounds sterling to each individual teacher. Two of the teachers stayed in Harar while the others settled in Addis Ababa in Ras Mika'el's house (he was the father of Lej Iyasu, the school's most illustrious student). The curriculum included French, English, Arabic and some history, geography, literature and science. In September, 1909, Ilg's former house was taken from him (when he had already returned to stay in Europe) and the school was housed there. Its teachers were then accorded the honour of attending official functions. Menilek went so far as to proclaim an Awaj which deserves to be quoted in full:

"Up until now anyone with handicraft skills was called names. Therefore, there was no one who toiled to learn and become westernised (sellefané). If we continue to live under these degrading conditions churches will be closed and, moreover, Christianity will cease to exist..."

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1 N.S. Eth. 9, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/S, 17.6.07, p.47.
2 Ibid.
3 N.S. Eth. 9, Roux to Pichon, A/A, 27.3.07, pp. 46-7.
4 N.S. Eth. 9, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 17.6.07, p. 54.
5 Ibid. See also, De Coppet, pp. 529-530; Gëbrä Sellasê, p.336.
6 ASMAI 38/4/38, Salazar to MAE, Asmara, 3.10.07; Annesso, Colli, A/A, 30.9.07.
Therefore, from today onwards, in the future all boys and girls should go to school after the age of six. As for those households (bethäbb) who do not strive to have their children educated, when their parents die, their wealth will not become their children's, but will be transferred to the government. It is my government which will prepare schools and teachers.\(^1\)

The proclamation was not successful: no girl seems ever to have gone to school, a year later there were only 100 students,\(^2\) and if the inheritance clauses were ever enforced (which is doubtful) they were revoked a few years later.

Basically, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church's attitude to any form of western education was an almost instinctive reaction against it, born perhaps of the sixteenth century struggle against the Portuguese Jesuits, and of a more general and universal cultural conservatism. Only the arrival of the German mission in 1906 and the threat of their monopolizing the education of the elite\(^4\) gave Menilek the leverage to get Egyptian Coptic teachers into the capital. Yet the new school was firmly under the control of the head of the church, Matěwos, and was to remain so for quite some time. The proclamation quoted in Zekř Ńägű\(^5\) makes it quite clear that the church regarded the new school largely as a glorified training ground for translators, a role which conflicted with the noble upbringing of many of its first students. Overall, however, several questions remain. Was Menilek trying to lever Matěwos into action on the education issue

\(^1\)See Zekř Ŗägū for an undated text, pp. 600-1. However, there is a partial translation of it in N.S. Eth. I, Klobůkowski to Pichon, A/A, 8.10.07, p.165, allowing fairly secure dating.

\(^2\)See J. Feitlovtch, Quer durch Äbessinien (Berlin, 1910), pp. 120-1.

\(^3\)D. Crummey, Priests and Eliticians... (London, 1973), pp. 15-23 (henceforth Crummey).

\(^4\)See above, pp. 363-364.

\(^5\)Zekř Ŗägū, ibid.
and what exactly was Taytu's role in encouraging the Germans and opposing Matéwos?

The Orthodox Church of Ethiopia's attitude to western medicine was much less ambivalent than its attitude towards western education. Their leaders accepted the treatment of western doctors and do not seem to have opposed the coming of the Russian Red Cross Mission or the setting up of a western-style hospital in the capital. The attitude strikes one as being similar to the incongruity of Muslim Arabs building Christian churches in the capital, or the presence of foreign legations. The Sháwa court had had a long tradition of being treated by foreign doctors and so the presence of them in the capital was by no means a revolutionary step. Perhaps the debtāras and other practitioners of traditional medicine had slowly come to realize that the new and strange methods practised by the Russian Red Cross and later by others like Wärqenäh, Merab and De Castro, to name but a few, were not a direct threat to their livelihood. Both the new and old worlds seem to have coexisted amicably and Ethiopian patients periodically switched from one to the other.

**Addis Abába's Religious Minorities**

During the years up to 1908 significant developments were to take place for the main religious minorities of the city: the Muslims,

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1 W. D., 1.1.00, 23-25.3.1900 and passim.
2 W. D., 1.1.00. See also, Pankhurst, pp. 644-645.
3 See above, pp. 354, 361.
4 See pp. 66 ff.
5 For Alfieri, Ragazzi and Traversi's role as doctors, for instance, see L. Traversi, Let Marefià (Rome, 1941). See also De Castro, especially Vol. I, p. 361.
6 W. D., passim.
Animists, Roman Catholics and Protestants. Sporadic persecution seems to have been largely limited to the latter two, while Islam seems to have benefited from a long standing modus vivendi with its orthodox Christian rulers. In 1909 there were about 50,000 members of the Ethiopian Orthodox church, 5,000 Muslims, 3,000 Animists, 2,000 Roman Catholics, 100 Protestants and 100 Falasha (in Addis Ababa).

Most of the merchants in Addis Ababa were Muslims, mostly from Tegré, although some of them were from Gojam, Wollo and Gondar. Many of the Gurage merchants were Muslim and there were also a number of Junidis working in a separate religious group as carpenters for the Emperor. There were only a few Adaré and Somali.

Before the mosque was built Muslim holidays were celebrated on the meadow of Felweha, on the southern fringe of the city. The mosque itself may have been begun before 1910; Sayed Hamid certainly began fund-raising before then and land was eventually bought from Benin, a Jewish merchant. Also at times the Amhara in the city were quite concerned as to the effect Mohammad Abdillé Hassan (commonly but pejoratively referred to as "the Mad Mullah") might have upon the Muslims subject to Menilek in and around the capital.

1. This term is used reluctantly and only because alternatives are so cumbersome.
2. Merab, Vol. II, p.115. These minorities will be dealt with in descending order of the number of their members.
3. See glossary.
However, these fears might have been exaggerated by European observers for in 1906 and 1908 on at least two occasions Muslim groups presented themselves, voluntarily it seems, before Menilek’s court to ask him to give judgment in a dispute between Abba Jifar of Jimma and Shaykh Zakaryas concerning the Shaykh’s right to continue proselytising. The latter won the case.¹ A telling comment on the overall position of the Muslim Oromo in Ethiopia at this time was made by Clerk: "The Gallas i.e., the Oromo... are mostly Mahommedans. They are, however, not fanatical, and most of them who rise to any eminence in Abyssinia, become professing Christians."² This comment may well apply to many, if not all Oromo groups in Ethiopia, but it is certainly true of those groups resident in the capital.

In the same report he goes on to make an observation about Roman Catholics:

"Among the Abyssinians themselves there are a few Roman Catholics, ... in Kaffa or the French Mission in Harrar, which latter still exists, but is not allowed to proselytize. These Roman Catholics are looked on with great suspicion, and every effort is made by Menelek to prevent their gaining any converts."³

However, unknown to many residents of the capital there were indigenous Catholics permanently living there. The oldest member of the community seems to have been "Waqa Wajdin" who had been the devoted guardian of the small Catholic mission on the outskirts of the city in Kataba for 30 years. He had been baptised out of slavery by


³Ibid.
Taurin in 1868 and died September 30, 1908. Another group of Roman Catholics lived near Ur'a'l, and when the Qābbāna river flooded, all the people and their homes were swept away.

In October 1907 a Catholic mission under the leadership of Basile was invited to the capital and received at the court. Partly as a result of this Marie-Bernard was allowed to reside in the capital and construct new buildings. Early the next year Basile was given permission to teach but within strictly defined limits. If these were exceeded, the privileges would be revoked. Religious instruction was definitely out of the question. Six months later Jarousseau, the Catholic bishop at Harār pressed to have another Frenchman added to the Addis Abāba mission. The French diplomatic representative thought this most unwise for there was too much xenophobia in the capital and an increase in the priesthood at that time meant risking the closing down of the whole mission. During the one year absence of the Abun, Menilek had already allowed a chapel and a church to be built in the capital.

A Protestant mission seems to have started at about the same time, on a smaller scale, under the leadership of a Swede, Cederqvist.

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1Semeur, Vol. IV., obituary facing p. 484.

2Alēna Kené, 19 Hamlé 1897 E.C. /27.8.05 G, C, F. The diary goes on to say "Since they [the dead people] had been Catholics, the people of Addis Ababa gossiped that such a catastrophe befell them because of their different faith."


4N.S. Eth. 61, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 16.12.07, p. 235.

5Ibid., 26.2.08, pp. 236-7.

6N.S. Eth. 20, Klobukowski to Pichon, A/A, 20.2.08, p. 23; Annex, Menelik to Klobukowski, A/A, 25.2.08.

7The Abun had gone on a trip to Egypt, Jerusalem, Constantinople and Russia. It was the first time the head of the Ethiopian church had left Ethiopian soil.

8N.S. Eth. 61, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 12.8.08, pp. 244-5.
However, he seems to have had a great deal more difficulty than the Roman Catholics in setting up his mission and beginning to teach.\(^1\) Another indication of the easing of suspicion concerning Protestants may have been the appointment of Alkaa Gëbru, who was considered to be a Protestant, to the Ministry of Interior in January 1909.\(^2\) These problems were especially reflected in the small number of converts in Addis Ababa.\(^3\)

Treatment of convicted blasphemers within the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was far more straightforward. In June 1907, a man was found guilty on three points:\(^4\) 1) that he had blasphemed and denied the existence of the Trinity, 2) that he had attempted to cast a magic spell on the Emperor and 3) that he had resorted to impious practices in the exercise of the healing art. The case was appealed all the way to the Emperor, and under pressure from the clergy he was forced to condemn the man to death by lapidation.\(^4\)

It is conceivable, however, that something deeper lay behind this incident. During Zär'a Ya'eqob's reign (1434-1468), several attempted coup or threats to the Emperor's throne were concealed by accusing the main offender or offenders of witchcraft. Thus the incident's political nature was hidden by a religious facade.\(^5\) However, the

\(^{1}\) Missions-Tiding med Bilagen Sjömansvänner utgifven Evangeliska Fosterlands-Stiftelsen (Stockholm), Vol. 75, p. 122. See also, Dr. Fride Hylander, "Karl Cederqvist: To the 30th Anniversary of his Death." Xerox of the typescript in my possession. Also above, p. 364.

\(^{2}\) W.D. 12.1.09.

\(^{3}\) Merab, Vol. II, p.115. He says there were only one hundred Protestants in the capital.

\(^{4}\) F.0, 371/192/23937, Hohler to F.0., A/A, 20.6.07. See also, N.S. Eth. 62, Klobubkowski to Pichon, A/A, 18.6.07, p.79.

\(^{5}\) See Taddesse Tamrat, pp. 283-285. I would like to thank Donald Crummey for bringing this reference to my attention.
conservative bent of the church was very pronounced indeed, as incidents of lapidation reveal, and the greatest protection religious minorities in the capital had was the power, prestige and favour of Emperor Menilek. But the general weakness of the organisation of the church, as well as its traditional tolerance, were also to the advantage of the minorities and the few incidents of persecution one comes across do not seem to have been empire-wide nor particularly thoroughgoing.

**Imperial Religious Developments: 1907-10**

Before Menilek's very serious cerebral hemorrhage in May of 1908, his ministerial appointments of October 1907 included at least one cleric (Alēqa Gēbrā Selloṣ) and one son of a cleric (Haylā Giyorgis) while the remaining ministers almost certainly had at least a church education. Significantly, when the Afā Negus or Minister of Justice died in 1908 he was replaced by another cleric Alēqa Estifanos. The consequences of Menilek's decreased domination of government after his cerebral hemorrhage were much the same in the religious sphere as they had been in the political and economic. Parallel to the judicial reform at the end of 1908 was a reorganization of the church's control of land

1 See pp. 85-8.
3 See above pp. 85-8. and for a list of the Ministers: N.S. Eth. 1, Klobovskak to Pichon, A/A, 27.10.07. p.174, or ASMAI 38/438, Colli to NAE, A/A, 30.10.07 for the Amharic text.
5 De Coppet, pp. 528-29; Gēbrā Selloṣ, p. 334.
and the income she was to receive from it. Teachers and students seem to have particularly benefited from the favourable regularization of the church's finances.¹

By November Menilek had had one of his recurrent recoveries and as a result of the pressure of his European doctor, and the concurrence of Ethiopian religious figures and his wife, he set off from Addis Ababa on the 28th of November for the most sacred religious centre in Shàwa, Dàbrà Libanos, hoping its priests might perform a miraculous cure of his illness.² A great concourse of people accompanied him, including most of the nobles of the land. He returned to Addis Ababa on 13.2.08 feeling somewhat better.³

Soon after Menilek left for Dàbrà Libanos Abunà Pètròs, Abunà Matèwos's great rival, started his trip to the north where he would be under the protection of the powerful Ras Mika'el.⁴ By 1908 he had a residence at Adi Abuna and thus was only four hours away from the traditional centre of the church and able to take part in its prestigious ceremonies.⁵ His house and lands in Addis Ababa were sold after his departure so he was hardly expected to return.⁶ The departure is perhaps symbolic of the continuing theological and provincial divisions of the church. The basis of these divisions

¹See Zekrû NNkhr., p. 547. The proclamation is dated 16 Shàne 1900 E.C. (24.6.08 G.C.)
²W.D. 28.11.08, 11.12.08, and 13.2.09. Also De Coppet, pp. 536-7; \['aburà Sellase, p. 340.
³N.S.Eth., 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 2.12.08, p. 68; ASMAI 54/34/141 (1909), Colli to MAE, A/A, 8.4.09, pp. 4-14.
⁴W.D. 1.12.08. The reasons and immediate pressures that led to this significant change in the balance of power within the church are not clear. Presumably it meant an increase in Pètròs’s influence at the expense of Matèwos.
seems largely to have been the political differences between the Shawa nobles and the supporters of Ras Mika'el. The degree to which theological differences were brought in to buttress the political split are unclear.

The second and far more important result of Menilek's incapacitation was the increase of the power of the Empress. Her influence seems to have been particularly pronounced in religious matters. It was she who was the instigator of the proclamation of 6.3.09 attacking laxity of religion in the capital.\(^1\) Sundays were to be as strictly kept as Holy Days, and the indissolubility of marriages maintained, on threat of imprisonment and the confiscation of goods to the profit of those who pointed a finger of accusation. Furthermore, the police were ordered to be more vigilant in enforcing the laws of the land, particularly the workers in the palace who were considered especially lax.\(^2\) This proclamation was linked with another involving more savage punishments for criminal offences.\(^3\)

Taytu is sometimes also accused of having been behind the persecution of some of the Roman Catholics,\(^4\) Coptic teachers,\(^5\) and Protestant translators in the capital.\(^6\) At the same time she was extremely charitable in the traditional manner, giving vast sums for the poor of the capital, for the building of churches and even to the French.

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\(^{1}\) N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 9.3.09, p.107; see also W.D. 6.3.09.

\(^{2}\) Ibid.

\(^{3}\) N.S. Eth. 62, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 20.6.09, p. 223.

\(^{4}\) W.D. 25.10.09.

\(^{5}\) W.D. 22-24.1.10.

\(^{6}\) N.S. Eth. 10, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 2.9.09, pp. 1-2.
During this same period, while Taytu's power was growing, Abuna Matewos was taking a more and more prominent role in the political crises of the capital, despite, or perhaps, as a result of his increasing estrangement from the Queen, a process which had begun with his trip to Russia and the complicated negotiations over the Ethiopian rights in the Holy Lands. The probable growth in influence of his rival in Willo and Tegré, Abuna Petros would also account for Abuna Matewos's increased political involvement after 1908.

1 N.S. Eth. 20, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 12.10.09, pp. 86-7. See also p. 85 for an article on this subject from Liberte.

2 See especially F.O. 371/192/19257, the 1906 General Report by Clerk, 11.6.07, pp. 19-20; De Coppet, p. 540; Gābrā Sellāsē, p. 343; W.D. 30.10.09 and 21-24.3.10; N.S. Eth. 9, Brice to Pichon, A/A, 22.9.08, p. 250; Annexe, Ras bit. Tseṣsema to Brice, A/A, 6.8.09; N.S. Eth. 2, Brice to Minister, A/A, 24.3.10.
CONCLUSION

The history of Addis Ababa from 1890 to 1910 is more than a microcosm of the history of Ethiopia during that period. The centralization of Ethiopia around its new capital at the geographical center of the new Empire dominates all else in the history of Menilek's reign. The Kingdom of Shewa had come increasingly, after 1886, to look upon Addis Ababa as its center, but it was only after the Battle of Adwa in 1896 that the Empire of Ethiopia began to look upon Addis Ababa as its capital. True, Addis Ababa's importance may be regarded as a function of the growing dominance of Shewa in the Empire, but, nonetheless, no other city since Gondar's predominance in the eighteenth and, perhaps, the nineteenth century, had played such a significant part in the folding and unfolding of Ethiopia's history.

In this period Addis Ababa not only became the political, economic and religious center of the Empire but also manipulated the diplomatic missions and received and controlled the release of the foreign influences within Ethiopia. By the turn of the century, the vast majority of the foreigners resided permanently in Addis Ababa. The capital replaced Harar as the pre-eminent distributive center for almost all economic activity. The import and export trade was concentrated and taxed in Addis Ababa. The first small scale industries introduced into the Empire were located in Addis Ababa. Virtually all foreign "innovation" made its debut in Addis Ababa under the watchful eye of the Emperor. The new and foreign
entered the Empire through a city that was already integrating many Ethiopian population groups and elements around the Shewa core that Menilek had so firmly implanted in the city.

The administration of the capital city as it shifted from a military to a civilian organisation in this period reflected some of the most significant of Menilek's political structures and processes for organising and running his Empire. The Imperial Household evolved relations within Addis Ababa, with the resident nobles, military leaders, the Ethiopian and foreign population groups that paralleled and revealed imperial policy in the provinces and with the foreign powers. The relative independence enjoyed by the provinces in the north, in particular, Tegre and Gojam, reflected in the honoured treatment they received at the Imperial Court, is to be seen in contrast to the almost complete dependence and domination of Shewa over a province like Wilmamo which was directly administered for a time by a section of the gebi or palace. All the other population groups in the city fell into varying degrees of standing and treatment between the older and newer areas of the Empire. Even the way the separate communities in the capital, administered by their spokesmen, reflected the position of the provinces from which they came. The same principles generally applied to the way in which foreign groups in the capital were treated.

The role of the capital in the political centralisation of the Empire may also be measured against the growth of the power of the kingdom of Shewa. Politically the Battle of Mitamma marked an important stage in the decline of the north, while the Battle of Adwa
confirmed Menilek's and Shewa's supremacy in the Empire. Addis Ababa symbolised this shift of the center of the Empire from Tigré in the north to Shewa in the south. Economically, the shift meant not only the decline of the trade routes to the north and the northern ports but also, somewhat later, resulted in the relative decline of Harer and the aggrandisement of Addis Ababa as Ethiopia's trading emporium. At the same time, Addis Ababa was made the center of Menilek's increasingly efficient and, one might say, rapacious, Moggadras who administered customs and transit trade revenues throughout Ethiopia.

Furthermore, Menilek's monopoly of the trade of the south and west secured to him and his appointees the goods and products to barter and the gold to buy, a greatly increased supply of consumer goods, luxuries and light mechanical and industrial equipment from abroad. But it was the foreign and largely Christian merchants who profited most, despite all their protestations to the contrary. But it must not be forgotten that a fair proportion of the revenue was spent on arms to prepare for any sequel to Adwa, and that a considerable amount of the profit stuck to the fingers of the most important nobles in the court and particularly the Moggadras throughout the Empire. Some, but not very much, seems to have percolated down to the foreign educated, the servants of foreigners, traders, soldiers and those close to the elite but very much less to the mass of the city's population. Similarly, the traditional attitudes towards the land and land holding were applied to the areas occupied in the latter half of the nineteenth century and thereby assured that the
same elite obtained a disproportionate share of the capital's land in spite of the limited measures of land reform in the capital in the form of the Emperor's first land charters. Furthermore, land plots in the market area or Arada were concentrated largely in the hands of foreigners or rich local traders, once their value began to rise.

Increased centralisation of the Empire was also clearly reflected in the religious sphere when the southward shift of power is again evident. Menilek's foundation of the church of Mary in Addis Ababa intentionally created a rival to the traditional center of Aksum in the north. So also, the head of the church in Shewa, Abune Matéwos, replaced the former Abunäm of all Ethiopia, Petros, and soon centralised around himself to a greater extent than any of his recent predecessors the administration of the church and especially its finances in the body of the Liqät Kahenät.

The church's establishment in the capital, however, did not alter its conservative religious influence prevalent throughout the land, nor change the negative attitude towards evangelization. In fact, the religious, in marked contrast to the commercial, political and administrative structures of the city, adapted least to the radically new challenge of urban life in Ethiopia that Addis Ababa presented.

The role of Menilek's health in the process of centralization and unification should not, however, be forgotten. During his last years and particularly after 1908, he became increasingly incapacitated, and he had more and more to depend on his close associates to carry on the administration of the Empire and the capital. His recurring weakness, paradoxically, strengthened the growing bureaucracy of the Imperial Household. The transfer of much of that bureaucracy into the urban administration of Addis Ababa
as the city shifted from a military to a civilian structure, was a political process of seminal importance.

The expanding polity of the early years of Menilek's reign slowly reached its limits as Ethiopia's borders were defined. After Adwa his reign shifted from aggressive military expansion towards a more ordered administration. Power tended to pass to a more civilian oriented administration and, as far as the capital was concerned, was less and less exercised by a bureaucracy of purely military figures and their retainers. Yet the power of the military in the Menilek period, one is tempted to say in any period of Ethiopian history, should never be underestimated. The question from the 1880's to 1910 was the degree of military influence in the capital and this seems to have declined. However, after 1910 and through 1916, the constant shifts of power and the decline in the influence of some of Menilek's closest advisors at the center led to a decentralisation and a resurgence in the influence of provincial rulers and their feudal levies. The most important prize, indeed the vital object, in all of these struggles was the control of the capital. Such it was and such it remains. The shifts in the internal politics and economics of Addis Ababa increasingly became the measure of those taking place in the Empire at large.

However, Addis Ababa measured the Empire of Ethiopia in other more undefinable ways. From her beginnings her growth was unplanned and unmethodical; the approach of her rulers pragmatic. The unfortunate results are clear in the sprawling, scattered nature of the city today, but there were advantages as well. The most striking, perhaps, is the absence of any thoroughgoing attempt at segregating the city into European, Ethiopian, industrial, commercial,
residential, Ethiopian population areas or even into separate quarters for the rich or powerful and for the poor. The absence of such a policy or even tendency along such lines made, and continued to make, Addis Ababa unique among the major cities of the Middle East or Africa.

Furthermore, contrast between Addis Ababa and other urban centers in the rest of Africa is particularly sharp when one considers the level of violence in Ethiopia's capital. In many urban centers in the rest of Africa, regional animosities and rivalries were heightened in the atmosphere of a large urban center. Yet in Addis Ababa traditional political structures seemed to have controlled these pressures to a remarkable degree. Even with those population groups from the south and west (those areas of Ethiopia that would seem to have the greatest affinities with the rest of Africa) this has been the case. To what degree this containment of violence in the city was the result of inherent social and psychological differences of the Ethiopian ethnic groups or to the very nature of Addis Ababa and its political structure, is difficult to say. That it was a fact is undeniable.

Thus, in the period 1880-1910, Addis Ababa could be seen as both a mirror and microcosm of the Empire. But it was also very much more than this. For, in the final analysis, the capital was unique, a "new flower" both within and without Ethiopia.
GLOSSARY

This glossary contains only words used in the thesis, although some, such as the months of the year, are omitted.

Abba - "Father", Reverend, title of ecclesiastics but also a term of respect for an elder.

Abujadid - Imported lengths of cotton sheeting.

Abun or Abunä - Title of the head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church; during the Menilek period he was from Egypt.

Addæbabay - A square, an open and free space in a city.

Addarash - A banquet tent or hall.

Afm Negus - "Mouth of the King", equivalent of the Chief Justice in the American system of government. Head of the judicial system but answerable to the Emperor.

Afmarsata - A kind of investigation. When a crime has been committed the inhabitants must remain gathered in place until the guilty party is discovered.

Aggafari - A kind of master of ceremonies who shows those coming to a feast or meal to their places, attends to their wants, gives orders to the servants, etc.

Alæga - Chief, leader; superior of a monastery.

Amhara - Used generally in the thesis to indicate the Semetic speaking inhabitants of the highland core of Ethiopia.

Amolé - A rectangular shaped piece of salt used as money.

Arada - The central market area of a city.

Asallaфи - A civil title of intermediate importance in the palace. He would serve food at a feast.

Ashkær - Might be described as a servant but follower is a better term. It was used by informants to imply various members of the trusted circle of friends and military men surrounding the Emperor or an important leader.

Asrat - A tithe.

Atbiya - Parish.

Ato - It is now the equivalent of Mr., but during Menilek's reign, and especially in Shawa, was equivalent to Sir, a title of respect. It was generally reserved for members of the royal family or important officials of the court.
Awaj - Proclamation or edict.

Azzaq - The superintendent of the servants, head of the household, either of a noble or the Emperor.

Bajerond - Treasurer. He was in charge of the Qemjabat and Gwada (see entry below). A second meaning is a worker in metals.

Balabbat - A person of good family, nobleman; sometimes used by informants more generally as a large land owner.

Balambaras - Military title of intermediate seniority. See entry under Bitwaddad for hierarchy.

Balumulu Seltan - "Full master of authority", plenipotentiary.

Balumwal - Favorite. In the imperial court it meant freedom of access to Menilek's chambers.

Balumwaba - The official introducer at the side of the Emperor or an important courtier.

Bilg - The dry season, i.e., from approximately March to June. It is between Meja and Keram.

Bâr - Gate.

Bitwaddad - One of the most senior titles of the Ethiopian realm. The order of seniority during the Menilek period seems to have been: 1) Negus, 2) Ras Bitwaddad, 3) Ras, 4) Bitwaddad, 5) Mijazmach, 6) Mawrari, 7) Mengnazmach, 8) Cerazmach, and 9) Balambaras.

Blatta - Abbreviation of BLATTENGETA. Now generally an honorary title for the learned. Originally he was a kind of Prime Minister in the royal court or that of a Ras. During Menilek's reign a civil rather than a military title.

Bota Qurach - (see yâbota Qurach).

Buda - An evil spirit, evil "eye", associated with slaves and menial tasks.

Gëntcha Askär - "Stone servant", a group of workers of the palace one of whose tasks was the breaking of stones for building purposes. They also went on campaign.

Mibtara - Cantor, men associated with the church, considered to be men of letters, astute and crafty.

Mega - Highlands, above c. 2,400 meters. Opposite to Qolla. Much of the best pasturages are here.

Maj - Door or gate.
Dilizmach - "Commander of the door", a senior court official. See entry under Bitwëddädd for hierarchy.

Dergo - Pension in kind, not just for an important person and foreign visitors but also for his whole entourage. Also given by the rich and noble to the poor.

Dawella - Measure of grain equal to 20 Qumma (93.8 liters in Gondär c. 1900).

Echâge - He had supreme authority over the monks and monasteries of Ethiopia and was also Prior of Dëbrä Libanos. The highest post to which an Ethiopian born cleric could aspire.

Edder - "Custom", a self-help voluntary organisation, originally for funeral purposes.

Elfeğn - Private chambers, where one does not entertain strangers. Opposite of Addarash.

Endärase - "As myself", a representative, regent.

Engeda - Stranger, guest, visitor.

Enjära - Ethiopian bread.

Etégé - Queen, Empress.

Färänj - A European or white foreigner.

Färäs Zëbängana - "Horse guard". One of the most prestigious elite of the troops guarding the Emperor. Generally made up from the sons of noble families.

Fitawrari - "Commander of the Spearhead", generally a title of intermediate seniority but in the case of the imperial Fitawrari, he was equivalent to a Ras. See entry under Bitwëddädd for hierarchy.

Färäsula - Measure equivalent to approximately 17 kilos or 37 lbs. Generally used for coffee, ivory or skins.

Gëbbaya - Market, the central and most important commercial area of Addis Abëba. Also referred to as the Arada.

Gëbäs - A head of a church. Generally a layman and the person in charge of the financial and land affairs of the parish.

Galla - Oromo is used in this thesis instead of this term. For many Oromo speakers consider Galla to be pejorative.

Gashsha - Literally it means shield, but it is also an abbreviation of Gashsha märät which is a form of land tenure (see
Berhanou Abbebe, pp. 52-57). It also refers to a specific area of land which varies in extent in accordance with the fertility of the soil.

Geber - Meal, feast. More specifically during Menilek's reign it refers to the weekly and holiday feasts he gave in the Addarash in the capital.

Gebi - The precinct of the royal palace, which included the Efegen, Addarash, Gwada, Gemjabet, etc.

Gebzena - Type of land charter referring to areas ostensibly under the control of the church.

Gemjabet - "Silk house", storehouse or treasury in the gebi. It refers to the area and building in the palace where precious objects were kept.

Gerazmach - "Commander of the left". A military title of intermediate seniority. See Bitwedd for entry.

Condare - An inhabitant of Condar. However, during the Menilek period it referred to an elite corps of riflemen, largely mercenaries from the north.

Gult - Fief, feudal benefice. See Ullendorff, p. 188, also Hoen.

Gursha - "Mouthful", also an unsolicited gift.

Gwada - Area and building in the palace where goods and provisions were stored. Also a place where precious objects were kept.

Hedar - A tax on merchandise.

Junids - Moslem workers, carpenters.

Kántiba - Mayor of Condar and of Addis Ababa, but during the Menilek period it was largely honorific.

Kátáma - City, originally a semi-permanent or permanent camp.

Kátáma Tábbaqi - See entry under Tábbaqi.

Kífila - Customs post. Originally an Oromo term for the kingdoms of southwest Ethiopia.

Kérramt - Rainy season (c. June to September).

Lébashay - Thief-catcher. A boy who, under the influence of a special potion, searches for and points out a thief. Can refer to the boy, his master or the person to be caught.
Lej - Title of a young nobleman in the court.

Ligaba - Master of ceremonies at the court. A very important civilian court official. (Baetman, 994, and Gallina and Cerulli, 17, disagree as to the derivation of the word.)

Liq&W Kahanat - "Chief of priests", in Menilek's period seems to refer to the assembly of priests (see Adugna.).

Liq&W Nākwas - Intermediate title of the court. The official who dressed the Emperor for battle and also dressed as he did to distract the enemy.

Liq&W Ṭabbābt - An intermediate clerical title.

Mad bét - The royal kitchen. It also refers to all the people who worked in it.

Mahbār - Society or vestry of a church. More especially a society which meets periodically (generally once a month) to hold a feast, the cost of which is paid by each member in turn. One's standing in court might be reflected by the eminence of the mahbār to which one belonged.

Mākwanent - Nobleman, officer, dignitary.

Mākλγngannēt - Type of territorial fief.

Māmmer or Māmher - Superior of a monastery, teacher.

Māngest - Government, kingdom.

Mēsqēl - Feast of the cross in the month of Mēskāwēm (c. 27th of September). It is the occasion after the ending of the rains when provincial nobles were expected to come to the capital and pay homage to the Emperor. If they did not, then they could, technically, be deemed in revolt.

Mazzēgāja bét - Municipality. Literally, the word means house which serves for preparation.

Mēzmur - A title of a cantor.

Mentaf Sārratāngna - "Rug worker". Those in the palace workshops who made rugs.

Merekō - Prisoner of war. The most well treated of captives taken in battle.

Mēβurā Bēd - Originally the very prestigious religious title. Menilek used the same title for the head of the newly constructed church of Mary at Addis Abīm.
Näfs abbat - "Soul father", father confessor.

Näggadé - Merchant, trader.

Näggadras - "Head of merchants", originally seems to have been the man in charge of a caravan. Later he became the head of customs. In Addis Ababa, at least until 1916, he was the equivalent of mayor.

Negus - King, the most senior of Ethiopian titles after the Negus Nëgëst. See entry under Negus Nëgëst.

Oromo - The term used in this thesis for Oromo or Galla speaking people. See entry under Galla.

Qëngnazmach - "Commander of the right", a military title of intermediate seniority. See entry under Bitwëddëd for the hierarchy.

Qërah - Customs officer and duty.

Qeddus - Holy, indicates that a church has been consecrated.

Qolla - Lowlands, less than 1,800 meters. Considered by the Amhara to be 'hot' and disease-ridden. Opposite to Wëga. Most of the cotton is grown here.

Qubat - Concubine.

Qunna - Measure of grain. 20 Qunna one dawella (c. 4.5 liters in Gondar in 1900). Weekly ration per person for derég was given in quuna.

Ras - One of the most senior of Ethiopian titles (comparable to "Duke"). See entry under Hëtwëddëd.

Rest - Hereditary land rights (cf. Ullendorff, p. 188, also Ebben).

Sëffar - An area of a city, originally a camp or encampment.

Sëhiff Te'egzaz - "Writer of orders", Minister of Pen, a very senior Ethiopian civilian title.

Sërratëngna - "Worker", applied to the various houses (or bêt) within the palace.

Sega bêt - "Meat house", the place where meat was prepared for palace meals, also the people involved. Included were those who took care of the flocks and herds.

Sel bêt - "Picture house", the private chapel of the Emperor, a king or some nobles.
Shalâqa - "Leader of a thousand", a military title of intermediate seniority (comparable to a "captain"). Rarely did such a man actually lead a thousand men into battle, generally somewhere between four and eight hundred.

Shambal - A military title of intermediate seniority, similar to but perhaps lower, than the Shalâqa. He was in charge of c. three hundred Zâhâmâna.

Shâmme - Togalike Ethiopian national dress.

Shâwâ - Term used to include the present geographic boundaries of said province.

Shemagallâ - Elder or notable.

Sost leddâ - "Three births", one of many theological persuasions. It was centred in Shâwâ and Mâhâl Libanos. See Crumney.

(Kâtûma) Tâbbâqi - "Guard of the city". Term used for a trusted officer left in charge of the capital when the Emperor was away. Similar to Endârasâ.

Tabot - Ark of the Covenant, tablets of the law. The central and most sacred section of the church is called Mâgadas and this is where the tabot is kept.

Tâjj Bêt - "Mead house", the place where mead was prepared and also the people associated with the process.

Tâzkar - A funeral banquet in remembrance of someone deceased. It can be held, depending on the wealth of relatives and friends, on the seventh day, the twelfth day, the thirtieth day, the fortieth day, the sixth month, the first anniversary and the seventh anniversary. However, it is most commonly associated with the fortieth day.

Têf - The staple crop of highland Ethiopia (poa abissinica). A kind of millet.

Wagshum - "Chief of Wag". The traditional title for the ruler of the province of Wag.

Wanna kâtûma - "Main city", capital.

Wârdqât - Paper. Colloquially it means permission.

Wârj - A name for Muslims in Ethiopia and is, perhaps, pejorative. It is often associated with Muslims active in trade, in particular, slave trade.

Wâttaddâr - Soldier.

Wâynâ dàlga - The intermediate highlands, between c. 1,800 and c. 2,400 meters. This is where the bulk of têf is grown.
Wäyzåro - Now Mrs.; however during Menilek's reign a title equivalent to Lady. The development of the term was similar to that of Ato.

YàBota Qurach - "The tax of a place", refers to the payment due for having a plot of land from which to sell produce in the market on market day.

YàFerd Ministär - "Minister of Justice." Title first used in the 1907 cabinet. See Af Negus entry.

YàGënzåb Ministär - "Minister of Money", i. e., Minister of Finance, a title first used in the 1907 cabinet. See Bëjerond entry.

YàGëzat Ministär - "Rule of the Country Minister", i. e., Minister of the Interior. Title first used in the 1907 cabinet. No earlier equivalent.

YàKefu zamm - "Time of evil", informants used this term in connection with the 1889-1892 famine, drought and pestilence.

YàMesekker wàragat - "Paper of witness", a term used for a deed.

YàNegd Ministär - "Minister of Trade", title first used in 1907 cabinet. See Mëggdrams.

YàRasha Ministär - "Minister of the land", i. e., Minister of Agriculture. Title first used in the 1907 cabinet. No previous equivalent.

YàSefit Ministär - "Minister of Documents", i. e., Minister of the Pen. Term first used in the 1907 cabinet. For previous equivalent see Shafè Téexàz.

YàTor Ministär - "Minister of War". The title first used for the 1907 cabinet. For previous equivalent see Tiawrari.

YàWech Guday Ministär - "Minister of External Affairs", i. e. Minister of Foreign Affairs. Title first used in 1907 cabinet.

Zäbbëgnagna - Guard, watchman.

Zämmæcha - Military operation, raid or campaign.
### APPENDIX I

**Table I**

**Amount of Exports passing through Addis Ababa in MTD**

(1899-1910)

**Selected commodities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>gold</th>
<th>coffee</th>
<th>ivory</th>
<th>wax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899/00</td>
<td>856,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905/6</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>260,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907/8</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>119,820</td>
<td>860,240</td>
<td>302,410</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>61,920</td>
<td>638,380</td>
<td>367,120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>34,080</td>
<td>927,640</td>
<td>435,920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>15,680</td>
<td>672,060</td>
<td>475,080</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1908-10 MTD average £1 = 10 MTD = 1 MTD = 3/-
1899-1910 average 1 MTD = 2.50 fr.

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2. AP:CR (1900), vol. 92, No. 2531, Abyssinia 1899/1900.
4. N.S. Eth. 66, "Note pour M. le rapporteur de la commission de juges", Paris 2.7.08.
### Table II

**Basic Commodities**

*(in MTD)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 dawella grain</th>
<th>1 cow</th>
<th>1 horse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2½ bushels)</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>20-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880s</td>
<td>1/10³</td>
<td>1½-2²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-92</td>
<td>10³</td>
<td>30-60²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897-98</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20-30²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899-1900</td>
<td>1½ 8</td>
<td>15-25³</td>
<td>40³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10-50³</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table III

**Modes of Exchange**

*(quantity equal to one MTD)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Salt (Amolé)</th>
<th>Cartridges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880s</td>
<td>9-9 1/2³</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889-90</td>
<td>2²</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-92</td>
<td>8-11²</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897-98</td>
<td>5-6 4</td>
<td>16²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899-1900</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>12 10</td>
<td>12 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-06</td>
<td>4-6 10</td>
<td>12 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. Cecchi, p.305.
2. See above, p.337.
7. Vivian, p.239.
11. Decaux, p.177.
APPENDIX III

"A Proclamation Issued by Menilek II.

Hear ye, Hear ye, my countrymen!

Our Lord, our power and our help, Jesus Christ, enabled us to live and rule up to this day, having given to our country and our government peace and tranquility. And We, having thought over all this, deem it right to help. I myself with the zäbänu (guards) of my city will build and renovate the churches which are in disrepair in the city. Officials and cult-owners, as a specific type of land tenure, build the sanctuaries (mágäs) which are in every parish (ätäviya) and the tabots (the central and most sacred part of the church) in areas where churches have been destroyed. You who have strength, soldiers and peasants, give help. Carpenters and masons help and build churches wherever you are.

The basis of the faith and the symbol of Christianity is the building of churches. You who are idle, frugal with your strength and money and unwilling to build churches, you will be condemned in heaven and will be deprived of your position and money on earth. [Proclaimed in the year] 1889 E. C. [This is equal to 1896 to 1897 G. C.]"
In the bibliography which appears below I have used the following organisation:

I. Unpublished Documentary Sources:
   A) Ethiopian
   B) Italian
   C) French
   D) British
   E) Miscellaneous

II. Published Documentary Sources

III. Unpublished Typescripts and Theses

IV. Newspapers and Periodicals

V. Published Sources in Amharic

VI. Published Sources in European Languages

VII. Oral Information

I. A) Unpublished Documentary Sources in Ethiopia

Unpublished sources in Ethiopia are relatively rich, although official and governmental archives remain almost totally inaccessible. Overall, the unpublished material falls into one of two categories, either it is in private hands or in scattered archives, religious or governmental, both largely inaccessible. Some of the governmental material has been published in Zekri

Naghr, to which frequent mention is made in the thesis. Otherwise, as listed below, sources under private or semi-private control have been consulted. The range of these is broad and varies in quality and dependability, but when used in conjunction with other material they proved invaluable.

1. For a fuller account of this and other points concerning Ethiopian sources see my forthcoming article "A Preliminary Survey of Sources for Modern Ethiopian History, 1889-1935" in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.
1. Addis Ababa Municipal Archives

Series I (No. 85-1228): These were the first land charters to have been made in the city under Nāggādā Haylā Giyorgis. The latest charter I saw was issued in 1907. They are no longer valid and access to them is relatively easy, but there is no index.

Series II: These began with the 1909 reform and are still in effect. They are far more detailed and each has an attached map. Access to them is difficult and restricted.

2. The Institute of Ethiopian Studies

a) The Dictionary of National Biography. This is in the process of being published, although the volumes covering modern history can not be expected for some time. However, Ms. copies are, at present, at the Institute.

b) The Journal of Père Ferdinand (his name occasionally appears in Amharic as Abba Atatéwos). The Institute only has a photocopy (sometimes illegible), while the original, I believe, is in the care of the Nazaret archives. It is an extremely detailed work stretching, with some gaps, from 1867 to 1884 and the best written source so far available for the Addis Ababa area during that period. It even contains copies in Amharic of correspondence Ferdinand carried out with various members of court and local land lords.

c) Gullalat. "YaDa'ajzmach Nasibu Žamanu'éľ Tarik." This is a biography of one of Addis Ababa's foremost mayors who held office during the 1920s.

d) Qaggamazmach Haylè Zallaq, "YaDa'ajzmach Gårmané Tarik." Gårmané like Gobâna was one of Menilek's foremost generals, but I found Haylè Zallaq's biography less helpful than Nāggādā's.
e) "YMGobMna Tarik. An Ms. copy is in the possession of Sähay Berhan Sellase at the Institute. This is a biography of Menilek's foremost general by one of the Ras's former retainers.

f) Yaddis Ababa Kätama Gezat Y'hēzs Guterenna Hunēta Se/Bét (A/a, 1943 E.C.). This is a stenciled Ms. which gives a semi-official historical and statistical survey of the population of the capital. Not very reliable, but nonetheless interesting.

3. Haile Sellassie I University History Department

The following list of references do not do justice to the broad range and high quality of some of the many topics pursued by the students in their final year of the course. Only those of direct relevance to the thesis are given here.


4. Haile Sellassie I University Library

Asmé Giyorgis. "YaGalla Tarik". HSIIU has a photōopy of the original at the Bibliothèque Nationale, Ms. Ethiopiens, No. 302.
5. The Nazarét Archives

They contain the original of the Ferdinand diary (see I.A.2.b. above) as well as two large files of letters in Amharic, which are labeled I and II. These miscellaneous letters cover the period from the 1890s through to 1910. Nazarét is the collection point for much of the Roman Catholic Capucin missions material that remained in Ethiopia when the sections of greatest interest were transferred to Toulouse.


It was largely a disappointing depository of material because much that was expected to be of interest had been removed. However, the rare and very useful newspaper Djibouti: Journal Franco-Ethiopien is to be found there.

7. Private Papers

a) Anonymous. A person who preferred to remain anonymous allowed me to see a document entitled "The Buying of Erast in the City of Addis Ababa". I have been able, by internal evidence, to date the document to October, 1907. This was the only copy that I could obtain of a basic reform of Addis Ababa's land tenure.

b) Bairu Tafla kindly allowed me to take notes from oral material that he collected in the 1960s, mostly from oral informants in the Addis Ababa area. I would like to thank him for allowing me to see his very useful interviews.

c) Aläga Kenfé Addisu. A copy of the Ms. is in the private possession of Dr. Aleme Eshete at I.E.S. and I would like to thank him for allowing me access to it. Aläga Kenfé was a Roman Catholic priest and kept a diary from the late 1890s through to 1910. It does not contain daily entries but usually a periodic summary of events every several months. Whether the diary was corrected or changed after its original composition is not clear.
d) Azza\j Wärgenäh Diary. Azza\j Wärgenäh began his diary in 1899 upon his arrival in Ethiopia after a most eventful youth. He became Menilek's personal physician in 1908 as well as a doctor in the Menilek hospital and shortly thereafter was the equivalent of the Minister of Public Works. Although he was a qualified physician with a degree from Edinburgh, he showed a keen interest in both the political and economic life of the capital.

e) D\ņjaamach Zewdie Gabre-Sellassie Papers - He kindly allowed me to see correspondence between his father D\ņjaamach G\bbnr Sellassé and Bitw\ddhd Hayl\ Hayorgis which throws light on the latter's life.

B) Unpublished Documentary Sources in Italy

Italy has substantially the most wide-ranging European archival sources dealing with Sh
wa and Ethiopian history in the period 1870-1910. Within Italy the single most useful and complete of the archives are those found in the Foreign Ministry (ASMAI) at the Foro Italico. Overall, the Italian representatives in Addis Ab\ba compared favourably with those of Britain and France and the despatches of Federico Cioccodicola (1897-1907) and Giuseppe Colli di Felizzano (1906-1912) provide the best single archival source so far accessible for the period, 1896-1910. The archives, of course, are also extremely rich for the period before 1896 and the correspondence of Antinori, Cecchi, Antonelli, Ragazzi, Salimbeni, Traversi, Felter, Capucci and Nerazzini are but a few of the men who provide unrivalled documentary coverage in volume and scope of the events in Ethiopia from the point of view of Sh\wa in the period 1870-1910.
1. Archivio Storico del Ministero dell'Africa Italiana

a) **ASMAI - Eritrea**

Posiz. 3/7/ fasc. 47. - This file contains copies of the letters Capucci sent from ShMwa from 1894-1897.

3/20 - This covers the period 1902-1913 and includes a description of the visit of the Governor of Eritrea, Ferdinando Martini to Addis Ababa and ShMwa during 1906 and 1907.

b) **ASMAI - Ethiopia**

Relations with the Negus and the Ras

36/1/ 1-10 covers the period 1857-1885
36/2/ 11-21bis (1882-1907)
36/3/ 22-31 (1885-1907)
36/4/ 32-42 (1886-1889)
36/5/ 43-50 (1887-1888)
36/6/ 51-56 (1888-1895)
36/9/ 70-76 (1889-1893)
36/10/ 77-87 (1889-1899)
36/11/ 88-93 (1890)
36/12/ 94-102 (1890-1892)
36/13/ 102-114 (1891)
36/14/ 115-132 (1888-1894)
36/15/ 135-145 (1891-1895)
36/17/ 159-172 (1893-1895)
36/18/ 173-186 (1894-1905)

Salimbeni in ShMwa.
The Ethiopian debt with Italy.
Treaty of Wechalé.
Article 17, Salimbeni and Antonelli despatches.
Break off of negotiations.
Salimbeni, Traversi and Capucci letters.
largely Salimbeni correspondence
Traversi and Capucci correspondence. Piano mission.
Traversi and Capucci correspondence. Foreign powers in ShMwa and the Italian Red Cross mission.
**Internal Ethiopian Questions:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume/Issue</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37/1/1-9</td>
<td>1897-1906</td>
<td>Nerazzini and Ciccodicola missions to Addis Ababa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37/2/10-16</td>
<td>1906-1912</td>
<td>Defense of the legation. Also meeting of Martini and Menilek.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37/3/17-26</td>
<td>1908-1909</td>
<td>Ciccodicola on succession to the throne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37/4/27-37</td>
<td>1909-1913</td>
<td>Ciccodicola on internal situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37/5/38-54</td>
<td>1912-1916</td>
<td></td>
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**Ciccodicola Mission:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume/Issue</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38/1/1-12</td>
<td>1897-1901</td>
<td>Ciccodicola despatches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38/2/13-18</td>
<td>1901-1902</td>
<td>Ciccodicola on the Addis Ababa road.</td>
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<tr>
<td>38/3/19-28</td>
<td>1902-1905</td>
<td>Ciccodicola on Martini visit, railway and commerce.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Miscellaneous:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume/Issue</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40/1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Let Marefiá and commerce.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40/4/12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Addis Ababa and commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40/5/47</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ostini report on Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49/1/1-6</td>
<td>1905-1915</td>
<td>Consular representation in Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50/1/1-9</td>
<td>1903-1922</td>
<td>Banking and the circulation of money.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54/30/119</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Bank of Abyssinia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54/34/141</td>
<td>1902-1910</td>
<td>Internal Politics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179/6/47</td>
<td></td>
<td>Salimbeni material.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Società Geografica Italiana

Their historical archives are largely either published in the B.S.G.I. or in ASMAI. However, some interesting material can be found in:

Documenti del Primo Gruppo VI - Spedizione nell' Africa Equatoriale - Let Marefià.

A & B - recount the organization of the expedition.
C - (1873-1883) includes letters of Antinori, Cecchi, Chiarini and Martini. Also extracts of Antinori's diary (29/7/76 - 6/2/79).

3. Istituto Italiano per l'Africa

Most of the material concerning Antonelli and Nerazzini (mentioned in Richard Caulk's thesis bibliography) seems to have been transferred to the Ministero degli Affari Esteri, but I was unable to locate all of it.

4. Propaganda Fide

The material only goes up to 1892 and I was unable to find much of relevance about the Addis Ababa area. The Roman Catholics were expelled from the area by Emperor Yohannes before the capital was founded.

C) Unpublished Documentary Sources in France

The French archives, although not as comprehensive as the Italian, are more efficiently catalogued, at least at the Quai d'Orsay, and, with the Nouvelle Serie and Guerre series, carefully bound and organized according to topic. Like the Italian archives, however, hours of access are restricted. L. Lagarde (the French representative from 1896-1906) was an extremely idiosyncratic
observer, but his replacement, Brice, was perhaps the most reliable individual diplomat of all in the capital. This is probably, however, a reflection on the great ability of his translator and dragoman Ato Zawga.

1. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères

a) Memoires et Documents, Afrique. Short reference [M. & D]

Tome 62 covering the years 1867-1883 is titled Abyssinie
" 63 " " " 1839-1880 " " Mer Rouge
" 64 " " " 1881-1882 " " Mer Rouge
" 65 " " " 1883-1884 " " Mer Rouge
" 66 " " " 1885 " " Mer Rouge
" 105 " " " 1884-1887 " " Abyssinie
" 106 " " " 1886 " " Mer Rouge
" 107 " " " 1887 " " Mer Rouge
" 135 " " " 1887-1888 " " Mer Rouge
" 136 " " " 1889-1891 " " Mer Rouge
" 137 " " " 1892-1895 " " Mer Rouge
" 138 " " " 1887-1895 " " Abyssinie

b) Correspondance Politique des Consuls.
Short reference [Correspondance Politique]

Egypte - Tome 4 (1875-1885) Massaouah
- Tome 5 (1886-1888) Massaouah

Angleterre - Tome 113 (1885-1895) Aden

c) Correspondance Consulaire et Commercial
Short reference [Correspondance Consulaire]

Massaouah - Tome 2 (1860-1885)
Aden - Tome 1 (1858-1889)
Tome 2 (1890-1901)
Addis Abéba- 1898-1901
d) **Nouvelle Série. Short reference [N.S. Eth.]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tome</th>
<th>Sujet</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Politiques Intérieures</td>
<td>(1898-1908)</td>
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<td>(1908-1910)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>(1910-1914)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Défense Nationale - armée - armement</td>
<td>(1896-1907)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Politique Étrangères</td>
<td>(1894-1897)</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>(1897-1898)</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>(1899-1904)</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>(1905-1909)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
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<td>(1909-1914)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Relations avec France</td>
<td>(1896-1897)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
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<td>(1898-1903)</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
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<td>(1904-1913)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Agriculture, Industrie, Travaux-Publiques</td>
<td>(1904-1913)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>(1899-1913)</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Finances, dossier Général</td>
<td>(1903-1914)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Banque d'Abyssinie</td>
<td>(1898-1899 &amp; 1905-1906)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Finances - Affaires Leontieff</td>
<td>(1907-1913)</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Finances Privées</td>
<td>(1902-1909)</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Missions Catholiques</td>
<td>(1896-1913)</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Questions Judiciaires</td>
<td>(1900-1914)</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Affaires Commerciales - général</td>
<td>(1897-1906)</td>
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<td>Affaires Commerciales - relations avec France</td>
<td>(1895-1907)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1908-1914)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e) **Guerre.**

Tomes 1617 to 1636 deal with the years 1914-1918.

2. **Ministère d'Outre Mer**

a) **Fonds Anciens Somalis. Short Reference [Fonds Anciens]**

The relevant cartons are 1 - 20 which deal with the period 1884 - 1907. The most interesting information concerns Ethiopian commerce transhipped through the Gulf of Tajura.
b) **Affaires Politiques Côtes Françaises des Somalis**

Position 36, cartons 121 - 144. These cartons contain dossiers of loose correspondence, all too often in sad disarray. The period covered stretches from 1884 to the 1920s. Much, but not all is duplicated at the Quai d'Orsay.

Position 48, cartons 186-188bis. This contains odd bits of information from 1885-1920.

3. **Bibliothèque Nationale**

Besides containing books, especially travel accounts, unavailable elsewhere, I made use of Asmè Giyorgis' "YèGalla Tarik" (Ms. Ethiopiens, No. 302).

D) **Unpublished Documentary Sources in Britain**

The British Foreign Office files are in many ways disappointing in comparison with ASMAI and the Quai d'Orsay. Although Harrington's reports compare favourably with those of Lagarde and Ciccodicola, his replacements and successors were in Ethiopia for relatively short periods of time and this was adversely reflected in the accuracy and depth of perception revealed in their reports. However, the F.O. is indispensible for any economic study of the period and is much stronger in this field than the Quai d'Orsay and even ASMAI.
1. Foreign Office

a) F.O. 1, Political

Volumes

30 for the years 1880-1884 concerning the Hewett mission

1884-1885 - Harrison Smith's mission

1897 - Rodd mission

1897 - " "

1898 - Harrington despatches

1897-1898 - " "

1899 - Harrington and Baird despatches

1900 - " " " " "

1900 - various

1901 - Harrington, various.

1902 - various Harrington and Baird despatches

1900-1902 - Railway

1903 - Harrington and Clerk despatches

1903 - Railway

1899-1900 - Boundaries.

1901 - " "

1902 - " "

1903 - " "

1903 - " "

1904 - Clerk and Harrington - various despatches.

1904 - Railway

1898-1904 - Concessions and Leontieff in Ethiopia

1905 - Harrington various

1905 - Railway

1904-1905 - Boundaries

1900-1905 - Legation buildings

1903-1905 - Tripartite Agreement
b) F.O. 368, Commercial, Abyssinia: Volumes: 1, 85, 165, 266, 379, 506, 921, 1200, 1478, 1688, 1875 and 2049. These volumes deal with commercial matters in Ethiopia during the years 1906-1919 but contain very little information indeed.

c) F.O. 369, Consular, Abyssinia: Volumes: 60, 120, 193, 272, 349, 438, 542, and 658. These volumes deal with consular matters in Ethiopia during the years 1907-1914 but contain little beyond the names of the consular officers and the dates of their appointment.

d) F.O. 371, Political, Abyssinia.
Volumes 1 to 3 - These deal with the year of 1906
190 to 193 - " " " " " " 1907
394 to 396 - " " " " " " 1908
594 to 597 - " " " " " " 1909
821 to 823 - " " " " " " 1910
1042 to 1044 - " " " " " " 1911
The above volumes contain a wealth of material about the economic and political history of Ethiopia from 1906 to 1911, and are by far the richest source in Britain for the period.

e) F.O. 372, Treaty, Abyssinia: Volumes: 1, 44, 95, 145, 195, 267, 339, and 416. These volumes deal with treaty matters in Ethiopia, of which there seems to have been remarkably little judging by this correspondence, during the years 1906-1913.

f) F.O. 401, Confidential Print, Abyssinia, 1908-1910. These almost always reprint the original correspondence from the F.O. 371 series and I have with few exceptions referred to the latter.
g) F.O. 403, Confidential Print, Abyssinia, East Africa, 1911-1913. See comment for F.O. 401.

h) F.O. 915, Consular, Addis Ababa. These files begin only after 1910 but give an idea of the heavy load of cases consular officers had to decide in the capital.

i) F.O. 925, Maps.

2. War Office \[W.O./\]

W.O. 157 and W.O. 106. These series contain some of the Sudan intelligence reports. However, I found them not to be either rich or very reliable on the internal affairs of the city or even on the national situation in Ethiopia.

3. India Office

a) Political and Secret Records \[I.P \& S/9\]. Volumes: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. These volumes deal with the years 1874 to 1911 but had little of relevance to internal Ethiopian history.

b) Confidential Branch material from Aden \[I.O. R 20 A/A/C\]. Volumes 2 to 52 deal with the years 1887 to 1905 but contained little of relevance to internal Ethiopian history.
E) Miscellaneous Unpublished Documentary Sources

1. Ilg Papers.

These are in the private possession of the family in Zürich. Herr W. Logpf who is working on them was kind enough to let me see some of his notes of the material bearing directly on the capital. Most were listed under KB 13.

2. United States, Department of State /U.S. Dept. of State/. The microfilms of these archives at the I.E.S. were used. There were only a few despatches from Mr. Love in 1909 and 1910 relevant to the thesis and they are listed under 884.00/9866/45.

II Published Documentary Sources

A. Accounts and Papers: Commercial Reports (contained in British Parliamentary Papers), (1897), vol. 89, No. 1978; (1900), vol. 92, No. 2531; (1907), vol. 88, No. 3747; (1909), vol. 88, No. 4357; (1911), vol. 90, No. 4759.

/Short reference: AP:CR/. These stretch from 1896 to 1911 Many of the actual reports are missing from the F.O. 1, F.O. 368 and F.O. 371 files and often this was the only place one could find the full text of the commercial reports.

B. Addis Yemättut Hakimoch: Le Docteur Nouvellement Venu (Direz Dawa, 1909). A fascinating pamphlet which gives us the first concrete example of a press in Ethiopia being used as an instrument of propaganda on behalf of the government in power.
It reprints a series of documents in Amharic and French justifying Empress Taytu's actions from 1908 to 1910 when she was unjustly accused by a German doctor of having poisoned her husband. It is a very difficult pamphlet to get hold of but can be found in N.S.Eth., Vol. 10, pp. 43-52 (as an Enclosure).

C. Documents Diplomatiques Francais (1871-1914), Premier Série (Paris, 1929 ff). In every case the more complete documentation from Nouvelle & Guerre series are cited.


E. Libri Verdi (E.D.J. Etiopia, (1890), Atti Parlamentari XVI Legislatura, quarta sessione 1889-1890 (Crispi), seduta del 17 dicembre 1889, No. XV.
Avveniamenti d'Africa (Gennaio 1895 - Marzo 1896) Atti Parlamentari XIX Legislatura, prima sessione 1895-1896 (Rudini-Caetani-Ricotti-Blanc), comunicati il 27 Aprile 1896, No. XXIII. Also No. XXIIIbis and No. XXIiter.
Trattato di Pace tra l'Italia e l'Etiopia e Convenzione per la Restituzione dei Prigionieri di Guerra del 26 Ottobre, 1896. Atti Parlamentari, Legislatura XXI, seconda sessione, 1897 (Visconti - Venosta), seduta del 24/5/1897, No. X.
In almost every case the more complete documentation in ASMAI is cited.
F. Mahatmà Sellase Wàldà Mabsàl, Blaténgeta. Zekra Nagàr
F. Mahatmà Sellase Wàldà Mabsàl, Blaténgeta. Zekra Nagàr
(A/A, 1962 E.C.). This the second edition has been used
instead of the first edition (A/A, 1942 E.C.) largely because
of the improved index. As a source it must be treated with
extreme caution, one of its main aims being to extoll the
achievements of Menilek's and especially Haylé Sellasé's
reigns and pointing out how numerous the modernizations and
improvements of these reigns were. Documents are often undated
or mistated, especially those of Menilek's era and errors of
the earlier edition have not necessarily been corrected.

III Unpublished Typescripts and Theses

Akalou Wolde-Mikael. "Urban Development in Ethiopia in Time and Space

Bairu Tafia. "Some Aspects of Land Tenure and Taxation in Sàlalà
under Ras Dárgè, 1871-1900". Paper presented at the Historical
Society of Ethiopia, May 28-29, 1973 in Addis Abàba,

Brockett, Andrew M. "The British Somaliland Protectorate to 1905".


Caulk, Richard Alan. "The Origins and Development of the Foreign
Policy of Menelik II, 1865-1896". Unpublished Ph.D., SOAS, University
of London, 1966. [Short ref. Caulk].

Christopher, John B. "Ethiopia, the Jibuti railway and the powers,

Darkwah, Rexford Henry Kofi. "The Rise of the Kingdom of Shoa,
1813-1889". Unpublished Ph.D., SOAS, University of London, 1966
[Short ref. Darkwah].

Erlich].


----------. "Some Aspects of Communications in Ethiopia during the Reign of Menilek". SOAS Seminar paper for the African History Seminar, 13/6/73. /"Short ref. Garretson, Communications/.  


Hylander, Dr. Fride. "Karl Cederqvist: To the 30th Anniversary (i.e. 1949) of his Death". Unpublished Typescript. Xerox in my possession.  


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IV. Newspapers and Periodicals  

Addis Zamen. Post World War II Amharic newspaper with occasional articles and obituaries of interest.  

Bollettino della Società Geografica Italiana /short reference BSGI/. Most of the correspondence of importance in the Società Geografica Italiana archives was published here verbatim as well as a wide range of articles. It is a veritable mine of information.  

Djibouti: Journal Franco-Ethiopien /"Short ref. Djibouti/. This was a very useful local European source for the turn of the century and was particularly helpful in dating commercial matters. It was published during the years 1899-1902.  

Intelligenzblatt und Berner Stadtblatt. Ilg published several interesting articles here.  

Manchester Guardian. In particular it contains a series of special articles by Wylde in 1897.
Missions-Tiding med Bilagan Sjonsvannen utgifven Evangeliska 
Fosterlands-Stiftelsen (Stockholm), Vol. 73-76 for the years 
1906-1909. Of greatest assistance were the letters written by 
Cederqvist during those three years. I would like to thank 
Mrs Hühler for translating these for me.

Semeur d’Ethiopie. /"short ref. Semeur/>. Printed in Harar, it has 
much of interest from the point of view of the Catholic missionaries.

Le Temps. Mondon's articles were periodically printed both before 
and after Adwa.

Times of London. Of particular interest were the special 
despachtes sent at the time of the Rodd mission.

Le Tribune. Of all the Italian newspapers, perhaps, it had the best 
coverage of Ethiopia.

YaZareyitu Ityopya. Post World War II Amharic and French newspaper 
with occasional articles and obituaries of interest.

V. Published Sources in Amharic and Dictionaries

of Ethiopia (Addis Ababa, 1942). In both English and Amharic. 
It is superficial but has a few interesting details.

/"For translation see entry below under Afeworq Gebre Iyasus/
This eulogistic work is of little use and its dependence on 
unacknowledged European sources makes it especially troublesome.

Baetman, J. Dictionnaire Amarigna-Français (Diré Daoua, 1929).
/Short ref. Baetman/

Bogala Walalu. YaWalamo Hebr Tarik Baremëtem Endët Tawaggada 
(Addis Ababa, 1956). A disappointingly superficial history of 
Walamo and its slavery. Although elders are said to have been 
consulted, this is hardly evident and the approach of the author 
has not been rigorous.

D bästa Täklä Wälä. Addis Yamaregnina Wağbä Qalat. BäKahenatenna 
GabrH Heywat Baykádagn. "Ate Menilekenna Ityopya", Berhan Yehun, 1912. (See ref. under Fussella below for the translation)

Mängestenna YëNeab Astädadär (Addis Abba, 1916) A very interesting contemporary critique of Menilek's reign, but one can not be sure of the provenance of its statistical material.

GabrH Sellase, Yëhafë Te'esaz. Tarikä Zëmän ZëDagmawi Menilek, Negusë Negast ZëItyopya (Addis Abba, 1959 E.C.). (Short ref. GabrH Sellase). This is one of the most essential Amharic sources for the period and has been rather inadequately translated (see entry below for De Coppet), although usefully edited. Although frustrating in its chronology and aspects of the period not dealt with, it is basic reading for any understanding of Menilek's reign.

Gankin, Dr. E. Amaregenna Mäskobegenna Wäsgäbbu Qalat (Moscow, 1969). (Short ref. Gankin).


Haylë Selläsé, Qadamawi, Negusë Negast ZëItyopya. Andägenna Wësehab. YMHeywätëenna Ylìtyopya Ermejja. EngliMD, Bâth 1929. (Addis ABBa 1965) E.C.). This, the first installment of the Emperor's autobiography deals only briefly with the period up to 1910.

Heruy Wältë Selläsé, Blatta. YMHeywät Tarik (Biographic) BEhwala Zëmän.... (Addis ABBa, 1915 E.C.). This is a very valuable, though sometimes unclear source—full of gaps. Its dating is unreliable and many figures of importance are left out. Nonetheless, its frequent use of titles is helpful.

Mahtamë Selläsë Wältë Wësgä. Che BMlw (Addis Abba, 1961). It is also printed in J.E.S., Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 199-303. Basically a series of biographies it is a useful supplement to Heruy's work mentioned above since some of the earlier figures' later lives are described.

Blättnëgëtsä. ZebrH Wësgä (See entry under in Printed Documentary sources).
Mikonnen Endalkachew, Ras Bitweldi. Mikam Beteboch (?Asmara, 1949 E.C.). The former Prime Minister's autobiography gives the flavour of the times like few other works. The role of the family, the beteboch, comes out particularly strongly.

Mengestu Lemma (ed.). Meksher Tezeta Zhaliqa Lemma Haylu, Whalum Tarik (Addis Ababa, 1959 E.C.). This is an absolutely fascinating source, being the edited tape recordings of a cleric who lived from the time of Tewodros. The flavour of Menilek's time comes through as in no other source. Particularly good on religious life.


VI. Published Sources in European Languages


Annaratone, Carlo. In Abissinia (Rome, 1914.)


"Two Ethiopian Biographies", J.E.S. Vol. VI, No. 1, Pp. 123-130. [Short ref., JES. VI, No. 1].


Bertolani. Linee telegrafiche e telefoniche in Etiopia (Ministero delle Colonie, 1913).


Superficial.
Borelli, Jules. *Éthiopie Méridionale: Journal de mon voyage au pays Amhara, Oromo et Sidama*. September 1885 to November 1886. Paris, 1890. [Short ref.: Borelli]. He was extremely observant and this is one of the best travel accounts of the period.

Bourg de Bozais, Vicompte. *De la Mer Rouge à l'Atlantique* (Paris 1906).

Boyce, J. *My Abyssinian Journey* (Nairobi, n.d.).

Briscese, A. "L'Unica catasastro in Etiopia: istituto da Menelik II nel 1909", Atti del Terzo Congresso di Studi Coloniali (Rome, 1937) [Short ref.: Briscese]. One of the very few articles directly on the subject. He was able to interview some of those directly involved in setting up the 1909 reform.

Bruce, James. *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile in the Years 1768, 1769, 1770, 1771, 1772 and 1773*. (London, 1790).

Castro, Lincoln de and Oddone, E. "La Città e il clima di Addis Ababa", BSGI. Vol. X, 1909. Although the article deals mostly with climate it has a marvellous map.

Castro, Dr. Lincoln de. *Nella terra dei Negus*. 2 vol. (Milan, 1915). [Short ref.: De Castro]. Although factually more dependable than Merab, it was not used as extensively because one could not be sure its observations pertained to the pre-1910 period.


Cora, Q; Àwà. *Il Commercio d'importazione e di esportazione dell'Etiopia nell'1911* (Ministero dell Colonie, 1915). It deals almost exclusively with the north.


Eadie, J.I. An Amharic Reader (Cambridge, 1924). ["Short ref., Eadie "].

Mixed selection of texts which were collected in the Addis Ababa area about 1913. It is of interest to the historian because some Awaj and petitions were included.

Faitlovitch, Jacques. Quer durch Abessinien, Meine zweite Reise zu den Falashas... (Berlin, 1910).


Fusella, L. "Menilik e l'Etiopia in un testo Amareio del Baykadan", Annali dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli (1952) Vol. IV. ["See GBbr & Heywitt Baykaddagn for the Amharic original "].


Gilmour, T.L. Abyssinia: The Ethiopian Railway and the Powers (London, 1906). ["Short ref., Gilmour "].
Gleichen, Count Albert, Edward, Wilfred. With the Mission to Menelik, 1897... (London, 1898). [Short ref., Gleichen].


Halle, Clifford. To Menelik in a Motor Car (London, 1913)


Hersbruch, K. Abessinien (Munich, 1925).


[Short ref., Holt].

Holts, A. Im Auto zu Kaiser Menelik (Berlin, 1908).


Keller, Conrad. Alfred Ilg: sein Leben und sein Wirken als schweizerischer Kulturbote in Abessinien ... (Frauenfeld, 1918). [Short ref., Keller]. The chronology in the book is frustrating, and one is not sure what is based on Ilg's correspondence and what on the Rosen mission.

Kulmer, F. Im Reiche Kaiser Meneliks (Leipzig, 1910).


Lejean, G. Théodore II: Le nouvel empire d'Abbyssnie et les intérêts français dans le sud de la Mer Rouge (Paris, 1865). [Short ref., Lejean].


Levine, Donald. Wax and Gold (Chicago, 1965).


———. The Modern History of Ethiopia: A Select and Annotated Bibliography (Stanford, 1972). This deals only with geographical journals in the Library of Congress.


"Short ref., F. Martini." An extremely valuable source for northern Ethiopia, although somewhat disappointing for the south. However, entries are lengthy for nearly every day he was governor of Eritrea from 1897 to 1907. Texts of letters and telegrams received and sent are often included.


Mashcov, V. "Il Secondo viaggio in Abissinia del Maschov (1891-1892)", extract from BSGI (1894) Serie III, Vol. VII.

"Short ref., Mashcov.


"Short ref., Merab." A rambling but invaluable source. His dating is hazy, although the background on people and events often is essentially correct. However, as with the interpretation of Menilek's last years, he was very wide of the mark. His population figures have proved to be relatively reliable, but still he must be used with great caution.


Pankhurst, R. K. P. *Economic History of Ethiopia, 1800–1935* (Addis Ababa, 1968). [Short ref., Pankhurst, Economic History]. Typographical errors and insufficient editing make this very unreliable. However, the vast majority of previously widely scattered articles are at least gathered together in one place.

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Pariset, D. *Al tempo di Menelik* (Milan, 1947). A fascinating account based, it seems, on Stevénin's papers which are now unavailable. [Short ref., Pariset].


Rait, M. B. "Russian Red Cross Expedition to Ethiopia", in U.S.S.R., Africa Institute, Russia and Africa (Moscow, 1966). Zaghi's book and Rollin's thesis are more dependable.


Rey, C.P. *In the Country of the Blue Nile* (London, 1927). [Short ref., Rey].


Rodd, Lord Rennell. *Social and Diplomatic Memoires* (London, 1922) [Short ref., Rodd].


Sabelli, Luca dei. Storia d'Abissinia (Rome, 1936).

Salimbeni, Augusto. C. Zaghi (ed.). Crispi e Menelick nel Diario inedito del Conte Augusto Salimbeni (Turin, 1956). [Short ref., Zaghi, Salimbeni diary]. A rich source, by an extremely observant aristocrat who had spent a long time in Ethiopia and knew some Amharic. Much of his diary remains unpublished in the ASMAI files.


Stern, H. A. The Captive Missionary... (London, 1868). [Short ref., Stern].


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Wurtz, R. "Hygiène publique et privée en Abyssinie", La Semaine Médicale, 7/12/98.


VII. Oral Interviews

The following is by no means an exhaustive list of all the oral interviews conducted, but merely those which have been used in this thesis, or were influential in helping me to find other informants. An attempt was made to make as broad and representative a selection as possible by office and ethnic group, but this was not always possible because of the suspicion and practical difficulties encountered. The vast majority of the interviews were taped and I have transcribed and translated those. Other informants did not wish me to use a tape recorder and so I was only able to take notes. The majority were in Amharic, although some were in Oromo, English or French. I would particularly like to thank my assistants Hussein Ahmad and Getachew Tesfa for their assistance in the Amharic interviews and Teshoma in the Oromo ones.

0.I. No. 1(5/12/71); No. 2(5/12/71); No. 3(14/12/71); No. 4(15/12/71) and No. 5(20/1/72).

Name: Wayzara Emmama Semaga Age: circa 80
(She claims to be 100)

Location: Addis Ababa Language: Amharic

She claims to have worked in the household of Emperor Menilek and to have been on several campaigns to the south and the north and to have come to Addis Ababa after the Battle of Adwa. Her information contained some internal inconsistencies. However, when describing events at length her information had greater consistency and reliability.
O.I. No. 6 and No. 7. Dates: (9/12/71) and (16/12/71)
Name: This informant asked me not to reveal his name.
Age: circa 80
A reliable informant. His mother was tutor to one of Menilek's sons who died early. The informant then became a soldier and fought in the battle of Kordm (1907).

O.I. No. 8.
Name: Bagha Bobas Mughta. Age: Over 80
He was a very good informant but I was unable to actually interview him and used the notes of Bahru Zewde. (See Bahru Zewde, "The Ayméli Gura in the Nineteenth Century: A Political History." Transafrican Journal of History, Vol. II, No. 2, Pp. 55-68, but especially p. 65, footnote 9.)

O.I. No. 9. Date: (10/1/72).
Name: Ato Habte Borgane. Age: circa 45 (now deceased)
Not a very reliable informant, but as leader of one of the oldest edder in Addis Ababa had access to a good deal of information unavailable otherwise.

O.I. No. 10. Date: (4/2/72)
Name: Ato KebtiH Yemr. Age: circa 80
Location: Ankobbr. Language: Amharic.
He is one of the keepers of the old palace at Ankobbr, but has not lived there all his life. He knew a good deal about the palace and the prisoners who were kept there but much of his information dealt with the 1935-41 war, in which he seemed to be more interested.
O.I. No. 11  
Name: Dmhtura Habta Giyorgis  
Age: circa 80  
Location: MqGllos, a village about 3 hours walk south-west of Dmbrk Berhan  

He was a servant of Whyzuro Baffna ZHllMile, one of Menilek's wives or mistresses before his marriage to Empress Taytu. He was knowledgeable about local history and contacts with Addis Ababa.

O.I. No. 12.  
Name: Ato JhmanMh WhldM Giyorgis  
Age: circa 70  
Location: MqGllos (See 11 above)  
Language: Amharic  

He is a farmer but knows a good deal about the history of the area and took part in the Battle of Shglle in 1916.

O.I. No. 13.  
Name: Demetrio Mikalides  
Age: circa 75  
Location: Qera Sufur in Addis Ababa  
Language: Amharic  

He came to Addis Ababa before World War I and started working with members of his family as a small Greek trader. Informed on topics of local trade in the city and the life of foreign minorities.

O.I. No. 14 and No. 19.  
Date: (5/3/72) and (20/3/72)  
Name: Ato Ayyano Guddata  
Age: circa 65  
Location: WqCchacha mountains west of Addis Ababa.  
Language: Amharic and Oromo  

He is a small land owner descended from an important Oromo family of the area. He is knowledgeable about Oromo traditions of the WqCchacha area.

O.I. No. 15.  
Date: (2/3/72)  
Name: The gathered elders (shHmagel6) of the market of Rogé.  
Ages: 40 – 80  
Location: The weekly Thursday market of Rogé, east of Addis Ababa and south of Dqgaladi.  
Languages: Amharic and Oromo  

They knew about the history of the market and the surrounding area. When contradictions arose a consensus could usually be arrived at.
O.I. No. 16.  
Name: Ato Gugsa  
Location: Addis Ababa  
Language: Amharic  
Date: (16/3/72)  
Age: circa 70

A follower of Bitwelded Mikonnen Dmensaaw and a resident of the capital, he was brought up in the capital. He did not prove to be the most reliable of informants.

O.I. No. 17.  
Name: Ato Tamachu  
Location: Addis Ababa, QAbbana Shfor  
Language: Amharic  
Date: (16/3/73)  
Age: circa 75

He was an ashkär of BMjazmaoh Yelma (the present Emperor's elder brother) and spent much of his life in Addis Ababa. His mind was particularly clear and precise. He was one of my best informants.

O.I. No. 18.  
Name: Ato Seshah Mëhli  
Location: Addis Ababa, he is a resident of Addis Ababa but comes from Jerru in DMbrā Berhan Awraja.  
Language: Amharic  
Date: (17/3/72)  
Age: circa 75

A local trader, he involuntarily fought in the Battle of SMgule. His memory, particularly of ŋalë was very clear.

O.I. No. 20 and No. 21  
Name: This informant asked me not to reveal his name  
Location: Addis Ababa  
Language: Amharic  
Date: (11/4/72) and (14/4/72)  
Age: circa 95

He was one of my very best informants. His mind was very clear and his information had few internal inconsistencies. He had been an ashkär of Lej Iyasu and was a trader.
O.I. No. 22
Name: Ato Qito Qayto
Age: circa 80
Location: Addis Ababa, Qubr Sellassié Shifa
Language: Amharic
He is a Dorze, a weaver in Addis Ababa, and has been resident in the capital since Taytu's attempted 'coup.' He is the most knowledgeable man on the history of the Dorze in the capital.

O.I. No. 23.
Name: Ato Anasimos.
Age: circa 85
Location: Addis Ababa
Language: Amharic
I was unable to see him personally and only used the notes of Belletu Mengestu (see "A Short Biography of Abumä Matewos, 1881-1926", a fourth year student paper of the History Department at HSIU, 1972). He was one of Abumä Matewos' ashkär.

O.I. No. 24 and No. 25.  
Name: Blatta Dmresa Amanté
Location: Addis Ababa
Language: Amharic
Descended from an old Wällëga family, he was resident in the capital after the turn of the century. He is an extremely reliable source.

O.I. No. 26 and No. IX.
Names: Elizabeth and Yelma Deressa
Location: Addis Ababa
Language: English
She is the daughter of Azzaj Wärqenäh and her of Blatta Deressa and both were of great assistance to me while I was in Ethiopia.

O.I. No. 27.
Names: Wängnanzmach Wängasha Kefla and Wäyatro Qämil Tullu
Location: Shola, on the eastern outskirts of Addis Ababa
Language: Amharic and English
Wäyatro Qämil is a descendent of Ras Gobïna's brother and was married to Azzaj Wärqenäh. Wängnanzmach Wängasha was one of Azzaj Wärqenäh's first students.
O.I. No. 28
Name: This informant asked me not to reveal his name.
Date: (16/5/72)
Age: circa 70
Location: Addis Ababa
Language: Amharic.

Not quite as well informed as Ato Qito Ghyto, he is also a weaver and a Dorze. He corroborated most of what the former said but arrived in the capital somewhat later.

O.I. No. 29.
Name: Ato Dëbbërë Robi.
Date: (15/5/72)
Age: circa 60
Location: Asella, Arusi at Boru market
Languages: Oromo and Amharic.

His family of the Gullële Oromo was moved from the Addis Ababa area to Arusi and he gave a persuasive description of the whole process.

O.I. No. 30
Name: Ato Ayyano Guddata
Date: (18/5/72)
Age: circa 70
(No relation to O.I. No. 14)
Location: Asella, Arusi at the Boru market
Language: Oromo and Amharic

His family, also of the Gullële Oromo, was moved from the Addis Ababa area, somewhat earlier than Ato Dëbbërë’s family (see O.I. No. 29). He too, was a fairly reliable informant.

O.I. No. 31.
Name: (This informant asked me not to reveal his name)
Date: (29/5/72)
Age: circa 90
(But he claims to be 100)
Location: Addis Ababa, but he was originally from Gâmu Gofa
Language: Amharic

He came to Addis Ababa during Menilek’s reign on "legal matters". However his interview had many internal inconsistencies and he was not the most reliable of informants.
O.I. No. 32 and No. 33

Date: (30/5/72) (27/5/72)

Name: Mümmeré Dünbēru Wūldē Mika'él
Age: circa 80

Location: Addis AlEm
Language: Amharic

He is one of the original priests to have been given land at Addis AlEm by Menilek. His mind is extremely clear and he is a very good informant on the history of Addis AlEm.

O.I. No. 34

Date: (6/6/72)

Name: This informant asked me not to reveal his name
Age: circa 70

Location: Addis Abēba
Language: Oromo and Amharic

He is from a Gūlēlē Oromo family which remained in Addis Abēba.
Very well informed in local Oromo history, he is particularly bitter at the treatment the Gūlēlē received.

O.I. No. 35A

Date: (10/6/72)

Name: Elders at Wūchacha Maryam Church
Age: c.65-c.80

Location: Wūchacha Maryam Church south west of Addis Abēba
Language: Oromo and Amharic

They told stories of their church's history and of Menilek's military encampment nearby before 1886.

O.I. No. 35B

Date: (10/6/72)

Name: Qēsš Gūbēq Gezaw

Location: Wūchacha Maryam Church south west of Addis Abēba
Languages: Amharic and French

He is the Qēsš Gūbēq of Wūchacha Maryam and although he arrived relatively recently, knows of its history and that of the area.
O.I. No. 36.  
Date: (16/6/72)
Name: This informant asked me not to reveal his name
Location: Addis Ababa
Languages: Amharic and French

A Roman Catholic priest, he was knowledgeable about the early history of the capital and the Roman Catholic Church's role in its growth.

O.I. No. 37.  
Date: (25/6/72)
Name: The gathered elders of Ragu'él church
Ages: c.50 - c.90
Location: The Entoto hills just north and overlooking Addis Ababa
Language: Amharic

They knew about the history of the church and of the area. One man's facts might be contradicted by another but a consensus view would generally emerge.

O.I. No. 38.  
Date: (29/5/72)
Name: WEyzErE WRIEtE HeywEt HabtR Maryam
Ages: circa 85
Location: Addis Ababa. However she was born near Gambéla and was raised in Bulga
Language: Amharic

She was not a good informant although she corroborated others' evidence. She had been a worker in the palace.

O.I. No. 39.  
Date: (23/5/72)
Name: Abba BaggAl Mâkuriya
Ages: circa 80
Location: Addis Ababa, but he is from the Ankobâr area
Language: Amharic

He had a church education in Addis Ababa at the turn of the century and is well informed about the history of the church and of the capital for 1900 to 1920.
O.I. No. 40
Date: (30/4/72)
Name: Ato Haylu Sellasé Habtä Maryam
Age: 80
Location: Addis Abäba (near Urseél church)
Language: Amharic

Both he and his father were workers in Menilek's sega bêt.

O.I. No. 41
Date: (9/7/72)
Name: Ato Gärbrä Sadaq
Age: circa 95
Location: Entotto, but he was originally from Gärnu.
Language: Amharic

He was an ashkär of Ras Gobäna and came to Entotto c. 1890. His mind was clear and his information reliable.

O.I. No. 42
Date: (27/6/72)
Name: Blättegêta Mahtäm Sellasé Mešqstär
Location: at his home on the outskirts of Addis Abäba
Language: English and Amharic

One hardly needs to comment on the author of Zekrë Negër and former minister. His father was Sährä Te'ezzaz for Empress Zäwditū.

O.I. No. I,II,III, IV, AND V.
Dates: (27/10/71)
(9/11/71)
(23/11/71)
(30/11/71)
(14/12/71)

Name: Avedis Terzian
Age: circa 55
Location: Addis Abäba
Language: English

He is the son of Sarkis Terzian and a leader of the Armenian community in Addis Abäba, much of his extensive knowledge about Addis Abäba and the Armenians in Ethiopia is based on his father's papers.
Name: Mr. F. Abel  
Location: Addis Ababa  
Language: English

He came to Addis Ababa shortly before World War I and started working as an import/export trader while being closely associated with the members of the German Embassy.

Name: Whysbro Smgé Whlâh Ru'fa'el  
Location: Addis Ababa  
Language: Amharic

She is a grand-daughter of Ras Gobêna, wife of Ras Emru, and very well informed on the history of Addis Ababa and Menilek's court.

Name: Brigadier Lush  
Age: 78  
Location: Mullu farm, north of Addis Ababa and London  
Language: English

He was military attaché in Addis Ababa in 1919 and had close contacts with Ethiopia before and since that date.

Names: Wilfred Thesiger and Christine Sandford  
Location: Mullu farm  
Language: English

Thesiger was born in Ethiopia and has had close contacts with it ever since. Mrs. Sandford arrived there after World War I and has lived in the capital most of her life since then.
O.I. No. XIII

Date: off and on from 1969-1973

Name: Dejazmach Zewde Gabra Sellasie
Locaton: London and Ethiopia

An historian of note, his knowledge of Ethiopian history from oral and written sources is unrivalled.