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School of Oriental and African Studies

" History of the Afghāns in India, 1545 - 1631, A. D.,
with especial reference to their relations
with the Mughals."

Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph. D.

by Muhammad 'Abdur Rahim

June, 1954.

"History of the Afghāns in India, 1545 - 1631 A.
with especial reference to their relations
with the Mughals."

A B S T R A C T

TITLE : " History of the Afghāns in India, 1545-1631 A. D., with
especial reference to their relations with the Mughals

In this thesis, an attempt has been made to study the history of the Afghāns in India from 1545 to 1631 ; especial stress has been laid on their relations with the Mughals as, either as rulers or as vanquished, they had far-reaching contact with the latter.

Chapter I discusses the origin of the Afghāns, the settlement in India and their rise to the saltanate.

Chapter II examines the nature of the Afghān monarchy, revealing its tribal character, the ascendancy of the chiefs and the conflict of two opposite political forces, the tribal independence and strong monarchy, in the saltanate.

Chapter III discusses Islām Shāh's kingship and administration comparing them with Sher Shāh's and emphasising Islām Shāh's success.

Chapter IV studies the reaction and the re-appearance of the conflict culminating in Afghān loss of Northern India.

Chapters V-VI deal with the Afghān saltanate in Eastern India and its relations with the Mughals.

Chapters VII-IX study the Afghān attitude towards their conquerors and the Afghān policy of the Mughal emperors, revealing Bābur and Humāyūn's conciliation, Akbar's distrust and Jahāngīr's clemency and favours to the Afghāns and also the rise of Afghān influence at the Mughal court. Chapter IX shows the decline of the Afghān position at Shāh Jahān's court on account of Khān Jahān Lūdi's rebellion and the Afghān abortive attempt to recover their sovereignty.

Chapter X concludes the Afghān history in India by assessing the significance of Afghān rule and the place of the Afghān people in the general history of this country.

The Bibliography contains an appreciation of the materials used in the thesis.

P R E F A C E

The Afghāns occupy a peculiarly significant position in the history of Muslim rule in India. A distinct people from either their predecessors, the Turks, or their successors, the Mughals, they introduced a new element in the political institutions of this country. The Sūr Afghān rulers in particular made a substantial contribution to the development of the political and social institutions of India. Moreover, unlike other conquered peoples, the Afghāns maintained their identity throughout the period of Mughal rule in India, and hence they had a history as a political community even after they had lost their saltanate to the Mughals.

Indeed the history of ~~the~~ Muslim rule in India remains incomplete without a fuller treatment of the history of the Afghāns in this country. Practically no work has been done on them particularly after Sher Shāh. Even Dr. K. R. Qanungo's monograph on Sher Shāh requires revision in the light of modern researches. Cambridge History of India, vol. IV, which has devoted a few pages for the successors of Sher Shāh, is entirely a military chronicle and hence inadequate. Written with pre-conceived ideas and based on meagre materials, chiefly on Elliot and Dowson's translations in the History of India as told by its Historians, vols. IV and V, it is full of

inaccuracies and ill-founded assumptions and hence is without the merit of a history.

The present thesis has aimed at filling this blank in the history of Muslim rule in India by giving a complete picture of the Afghāns in this country to 1631 and also assigning them the place they deserve in the history of India. An honest attempt has been made to exploit and utilise all kinds of materials, Persian, Bengali, Hindi, Sanskrit, Arabic and the accounts of foreigners, towards the fulfilment of that aim within a comparatively limited sphere. The scope and nature of the work have been discussed in the abstract.

It is my pleasant duty to express my very sincere and deep gratitude to my supervisor Professor C. H. Philips for the encouragement and guidance I received in the preparation of this thesis. I am very grateful to Dr. P. Hardy for his ungrudging and constant help without which, I am afraid, the thesis would have hardly seen the light. I thank Mr. J. B. Harrison for his day to day help in the initial work of this thesis. I also thank Dr. A. L. Basham for his reading with me some Sanskrit books. My thanks are also due to Dr. R. P. Tripathi, Vice-chancellor, Sagar University, for giving me his valuable time, during his stay in London last summer, in discussing some of the problems of the thesis. Indeed he illuminated the subject and immensely benefited me.

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbās	Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī of Abbās Khān Sarwānī.
Āmal	Āmal Sālīh of Muhammad Sālīh Kambū.
A. N.	Akbarnāma of Abūl Fazl.
Ā'in	Ā'in-i-Akbarī of Abūl Fazl.
B.	Badāunī's Muntakhab-i-Tawārīkh.
BM.	British Museum manuscript.
Biyāt	Bāyazīd Biyāt's Tārīkh-i-Humāyūn.
B. N.	Bāburnāma translated by A. S. Beveridge.
BPP.	Bengal Past and Present (Journal).
Baharistān	Bahāristān-i-Ghayebī of Mīrzā Nathan.
Barānī	Tārīkh-i-Fīrūz Shāhī of Ziyāuddīn Barānī.
Blochmann	Blochmann's translation of Ā'in-i-Akbarī.
D.	Tārīkh-i-Dāudi of Abdullā
Dorn	Dorn's translation of Makḥzan-i-Afghāna.
E.	Elliot and Dowson.
F.	Firishta's Tārīkh.
Idem	The same as previously mentioned.
Iqbāl-nāma	Iqbāl-nāma-i-Jahāngīrī of Muṭamid Khān.
IO.	India Office manuscript.
Jauhar	Tazkirat ul Waqīat of Jauhar Aftabchī.
JASB.	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.
Khāfī K.	Muntakhab ul Lubāb of Muhammad Hāshim Khāfī
JOBS.	Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society.

M.	Makhzan-i-Afghāna of Ni'matullā.
Ma'āsir	Ma'āsir ul 'Umara.
Mir'āt A.	Mir'āt-i-Ahmadi of 'Alī Muhammad Khān.
Mir'āt S.	Mir'āt-i-Sikandari of Sikandar Manjhū.
Op. Cit.	The same as previously quoted or mentioned.
Rahimī	Ma'āsir-i-Rahimī of 'Abdul Bāqī Nihāvandī.
R. T.	Rauzat ut Tahirin of Tahir Muhammad.
R.	Rogers' translation of Tūzuk-i-Jahāngirī.
Riyāz	Riyāz us Salātin of Ghulām Husain Salīm.
Shāhī	Tārikh-i-Shāhī or Salātin-i-Afghāna of Ahmad Yadgar.
School	Oriental School manuscript.
T.	Tabaqat-i-Akbari of Nizāmuddīn Ahmad Bakhshī.
Tuz.	Tūzuk-i-Jahāngirī.
W. M.	Wāqī'at-i-Mustaqi of Rizqullā Mustaqī.

Transliteration

In transliteration, the system of F. Steingass (Persian - English Dictionary, London, 1930) has been followed.

ا - a	ط - t
ب - b	ظ - z
پ - p	ع - 'e
ت - t	غ - gh
ث - s	ف - f
ج - j	ق - q
چ - ch	ک - k
ح - h	گ - g
خ - kh	ل - l
د - d	م - m
ذ - z	ن preceded by ع - m
ر - r	ن - n
ز - z	و - v and w
ژ - zh	ح - h
س - s	ع - 'e
ش - sh	ی - y
ص - s	
ض - z	

Vowel signs (short vowels) - a, i, u,

long vowels - ā, ī, ū, e and o.

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Enclosures

Maps of Northern India and Eastern India
in the sixteenth century
My article: Chittagong under the Pathan Rule
in Bengal.

CHAPTER I

The origin of the Afghāns and their rise to the Saltānate of Delhi

In writing of the Afghāns in India, one is naturally interested in the questions, who were they, when did they come and settle in India and how did they rise to the saltānate of Delhi. Indeed the establishment of the Afghān saltānate in Northern India in 1451 A. D. cannot be treated as a sudden and unconnected event in history. Hence, an investigation into the earlier history of the Afghāns forms an essential introduction to the present thesis.

The Afghāns claim to be descended from Jewish stock regarding Afghāna, a grandson of king Saul and commander-in-chief of the famous king Solomon, as their traditional ancestor. If this pretension is accepted, then the Afghāns must be considered a people of the great Semitic race.

The theory of the Jewish origin of the Afghāns propounded by the Afghān chronicler Nīmatullā¹ in the seventeenth century has been propagated by all the subsequent Afghān historians and chroniclers.² According to this theory, the descendants of Afghāna, living in Palestine, were taken captive first by the Assyrian king Sargon II (722 B. C.) and

1. M., 3b-9b.

2. Khulāṣat ul Ansāb, 15a and 29a-b ; Akhbār-i-Mahabbat, 3a and 6a.

then by the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar (586 B. C.). After the fall of the Babylonian empire, the captive jews came to Kuhistan, the mountainous region in Afghanistan, and settled there. ¹

This theory has appealed to some modern scholars. Bellew Sir William Jones and others have lent their support to it on the following grounds. First, they find a striking resemblance to the Jews in the Afghāns tall and well built body, fair complexion, blue eyes, brown head and especially the long nose slightly curved. Secondly, the common names, Ibrāhīm, Mūsa, 'Isa, Dāud, Yusuf, Sulaimān, etc., the common title of Malik, and particularly the existence of the Sulaiman mountain in their territory, have been adduced as proof of this origin by the upholders of the theory. Moreover, there are the similar customs and usages found among the Jews and Afghāns, for example, the sprinkling of the blood of an animal over the doorposts of a house where a sick person resides, placing of the sins of the people upon a heifer in the same manner as the Biblical scapegoat, the offering up of sacrifices and the stoning to death of blasphemers. Lastly, their tribal spirit and clannish temperament are considered to strengthen the theory of the Jewish origin of the Afghāns. ²

The theory of the Semitic origin of the Afghāns does

1. M., 22a-b.

2. Davies - The problem of the North West frontier, 42-3 ;
Raverty - Notes on Afghanistan, JASB., 1875.

not, however, stand the test of serious analysis. The resemblance in features cannot be considered as providing a scientific criterion for grouping different peoples into one race. The Sumerians resemble the Aryans in features, though they are not considered to have any affiliations with the Aryan people. The portrait of the Kusana kings found in their coins has the same type of features. But they are certainly neither Afghāns nor Semites.¹

Dr. C. C. Davies has rightly pointed out that the use of Biblical names and customs is common to all Muslims and the Prophet himself adopted them from the Jews around him.² The title of Malik was in general use among the Turkish nobles of India. The tribal spirit and clannish temperament are, in fact, the general characteristics of every mountainous or Beduin people of the world.

Other evidence also suggests the implausibility of the theory. It seems unlikely that, after their captivity, the Jews should come to mountainous Afghanistan instead of returning to their native land Palestine. What fascination did barren Afghanistan exercise to induce them to leave behind the fertile lands of Iraq and Iran ? Again, why should the Persian empire allow these people to enter and cross its territories ?

Judged by language, which is a most useful criterion for

1. Davies, 42 ; Encyclopaedia of Islam, I, 149.

2. Ibid, 43.

deciding the race of a people, the Afghāns cannot be said to have any affiliation with the Semites. According to Grierson, the eminent linguist, Pashtu, the language of the Afghāns, is a subgroup of the Eastern group of Iranian languages.¹ In his analysis of the Pashtu language, another oriental linguist, Dr. Muhammad Shahidullā, has shown that there is not a single word of the Semitic languages in Pashtu.² Professors Raverty and Dowson also have found no trace of Hebrew in the language of the Afghāns and it seems incredible that the whole race has, in course of time, completely changed their language without trace. Pashtu is an admixture of Sanskrit and Persian and this suggests the Indo-Iranian origin of the Afghāns.

According to Firishta, the Afghāns were descended from certain nobles of the court of Pharaohs of Egypt and, ~~refusing~~ refusing to accept the faith of Moses, they left Egypt and came to Kuhistan.⁴ This contradicts the original theory and weakens its force.

If the accounts of the origin of the Afghāns show a strange diversity, so do accounts of the name Pathan, which is also applied to the Afghāns. Ni'matullā has advanced a fantastic

1. Grierson - Linguistic Survey of India, I, 493 and X, 9.

2. A paper read in a seminar of the Pakistan Asiatic Society,
June, 1952.

3. Raverty - Notes on Afghanistan, JASB., 1875.

4. F., I, 29.

story that a descendant of Afghāna, 'Abdur Rashīd Kais, obtained the conferment of the title ' Pathan ', meaning the wood used as a keel of the ship, from the Prophet in recognition of his gallantry. Being the descendants of 'Abdur Rashīd Kais Pathan, the Afghāns are called Pathans.¹ Firishta, on the otherhand, says that the people called the Afghāns, living in Patna, as Patans. Percy Sykes, however, maintains that the Pathan is a speaker of Pashtu.³ It is a reasonable explanation that the name Pathan is a linguistic term and has been derived from Pashtun or Pakhtun, the plural forms of Pashtu. Pashtun or Pakhtun is used to denote all Pashtu-speaking Afghān people.⁴ Hence, linguistically an Afghān is a Pathan.

The name Afghān first occurs as ' Avagāna ' in Bhrita Sanhita in the middle of the sixth century.⁵ The name Pathan, on the otherhand, came to be used in the sixteenth century by Firishta and other historians.⁶

The home country of the Afghāns was known to the Indian historians as Rūh (a Pashtu word meaning mountain), which extended in length from Swat and Bijaur in North West Province to the district of Bukkur in Sind and in breadth from

1. M., 39a.

2. F., I, 29.

3. Sykes - History of Afghanistan, I, 13.

4. Encyclopaedia of Islam, I, 149.

5. Kern, H. - Varaha Mihir's Bhrita Sanhita, verse, 11.61 and

6. Briggs - Firishta, I, 552 ; F., I, 29 ; 16.38.

Encyclopaedia of Islam, I, 149.

Hasan Abdal in North West Frontier Province to Kabul. Qandahar and Sulaiman mountains lay within the confines of Rūh.¹

The mountainous nature of the country, with its small widely separated areas of cultivable land, fostered in the Afghāns a tribal and individualistic spirit. This spirit characterises them ~~em~~ even in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. So, Dr. C. C. Davies writes, " The Pathan is intensely democratic and refuses to obey even his tribal chiefs or maliks, unless they are great warriors or blood-thirsty, fearless desperadoes." ²

The poverty of the soil made the Afghāns ready to leave their homes. Thus we read in the history of Firishṭa and others that, in about 766 A. D., they occupied Peshawar and other place belonging to Raja Jayapala , the ruler of the Panjab and Kashmir. After a fruitless struggle of some months, Jayapala, who had also to face the rising Ghaznavid power, made peace with the Afghāns by allowing them to settle in some places of Lamaghan. The Afghāns then erected a fort in the mountains off Peshawar which they called Khaibar.³

Later Subuktagin realised the importance of the fighting material in the Afghāns and, enrolling them in his army, he favoured them in every possible way. They continued to be

1. 'Abbās, IO., 5a ; T., II, 140 ; F., I, 30 ; M., 40b.

2. Davies, 47.

3. F., I, 29 ; Grierson, X, 7.

appointed as mercenaries in the army of Sultān Maḥmūd Ghaznavī. Muḥammad Ghurī and Qutbuddīn engaged them as hirelings in the conquest of India.² It is known from the contemporary historian Minhaj us Sirāj that Sultān Nāṣiruddīn Maḥmūd's noble Ulugh Khān employed in 1260 A. D. 3000 Afghāns in subduing the ~~xxx~~ hill tribes of Mewat.³

The Afghāns came into prominence in the reign of Sultān Balban, who employed them as garrisons with assignments of lands for their maintenance to secure Delhi against the turbulent Mewatis.⁴ These Afghān colonies, in the south-west vicinity of Delhi, came to be known as Afghanpur.⁵ Balban also settled the Afghāns in Bhojpur, Kampil and Patiali, three principal centres of disaffection, disturbance and robbery.⁶ The fact that 'Alāuddīn Khiljī had an Afghān amir whom Barānī calls Ikhtiyāruddīn Mal Afghān⁷ shows that the Khiljī sultāns continued to employ the Afghāns.

The employment of the Afghāns in large numbers in the army of the Turkish saltanate of Delhi and the elevation of some of them to the amirate of the court must have brought

1. Utbi - Tarikh-i-Yamini, Aligarh Elliot, II, 24 and 32 ;
Grierson, X, 7.

2. M., 39b.

3. Tabaqat-i-Nāsiri, 381.

4. Barānī, 57.

5. Ibid, 452.

6. Ibid, 57-8. The places are in modern Farrukhabad district, ~~xx~~
in U. P.

7. Ibid, 241.

fresh streams of Afghāns into India. By the time of Muhammad Tughluq, they became a fairly powerful community in the empire and this is reflected in their rebellions against the sultān in Multan, Guzrat and Daulatabad.

Malik Shāhū Afghān killed the governor of Multan and seized the power of the province. Muhammad Tughluq's approach, however, made him flee with his followers to Afghanistan.¹ The rebellion of Shāhū brought severe restrictions on the Afghāns, who thereupon rose in Daulatabad against the authority of the sultān and made Ismail Makh Afghān their king.² Although at the approach of the sultān they fled, yet they came back after his return to the north. This ultimately resulted in the establishment of the Bahmani kingdom. The Afghāns rebelled in Guzrat also.³ This indicates the political importance of the Afghāns in the period of the Tughluq saltanate in India.

Firūz Tughluq seems to have greatly favoured the Afghāns.⁴ He gave the fief of Bihar to Malik Bīr Afghān and also appointed Malik Khitāb Afghān to the government of Sambal and Katehar (in Ruhilkhand).⁵

stream Amīr Timur's invasion of India in 1398 brought a fresh
^ of the Afghāns into this country and he gave them for settlement

1. Barānī, 482 ; Yahya - Mubārak Shāhī, 106-7.

2. Ibid, 258 ; 111-2.

3. Mubārak Shāhī, K. K. Basu's translation, 115-6 ;

Mahdi Hasan - Muhammad Tughluq, 180-2.

4. M., 41a.

5. Yahya - Mubārak Shāhī, 133 and 135.

Duāb in the Panjab. Timur's autobiography refers to some Afghān chiefs in his train and the appointment of Mustafa Kābulī to the government of Dipalpur.¹

Thus, by the end of the fourteenth century, the Afghāns had developed into a politically important community settled in the nerve ~~xxx~~ centre of Northern India. The people, who had hitherto served as hirelings, now found political supremacy within their grasp. In the later Tughluq period, the Afghāns under their leader Daulat Khān Lūdī, a faujdār of the Duāb,² became the real masters of the saltanate. In 1416, Daulat Khān Lūdī held Delhi against Khizr Khān and became a king in fact though not in name, for a few months (1416-17). After a heroic resistance, he had finally to surrender himself to Khizr Khān, the first Saiyid sultān of Delhi. He died in confinement in Hisar Fīruza.³ Daulat Khān is to be regarded as a precursor of the Afghān monarchy in India.

The Afghān influence rose even higher in the Saiyid saltanate of Delhi. Sultān Shāh Lūdī, entitled Islām Khān, was appointed as governor of Sarhind by Mubārak Shāh.⁴ He was succeeded in that office by his nephew and son-in-law Bahlul Lūdī, who soon rose to be the most influential figure at the

1. Malfuzat-i-Timurī, E., III, 420 ; M., 41b ; Grierson, X, 8.

2. Yahya - Mubārak Shāhī, 175 ; T., I, 260, Briggs - F. I, 505.

3. Ibid, 181 ; 264-5 ; F., I, 292-3.

4. Ibid, 195 ; F., I, 317.

Saiyid court and received the title of Khān Khānān from the sultān. The incompetence of 'Alāuddīn 'Ālam Shāh, the factious spirit of the amīrs and the consequent confusion in the country offered Bahlūl an opportunity to organise the Afghāns under his leadership and to make a bid for the throne of Delhi. United under a good organiser, the Afghāns succeeded in 1451 in obtaining the sovereignty of Northern India. They made Bahlūl their king and realised the dream of establishing their rule in this country.

CHAPTER II

The Nature of the Afghān Monarchy and the position of the Afghān chiefs

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Afghāns of India remained essentially a tribal people in their nature, behaviour, social institutions, associations and political ideas. So, the monarchy they established in this country represented their tribal peculiarities. Their quarrel-some nature, rough and unruly behaviour, their great attachment to their own tribes and tribal chiefs and their love of tribal independence determined the character of the monarchy.

The Afghān chiefs, secure in the allegiance of their respective tribes, enjoyed great power and position either as jagirdārs or as courtiers of the Afghān kings. They looked upon the king as a comrade and only as a first among equals. Some of the Afghān kings, Ibrāhim Lūdī, Islām Shāh and 'Ādil Shāh, however, tried to curb their power and increase the power and position of the king for the sake of establishing an efficient centralised administration in the saltānate. This brought in severe conflicts between two opposing forces - the idea of tribal independence held by the chiefs and the idea of strong monarchy and centralised government adopted by the kings.

A tribal people in nature :

According to their own historian Ni'matullā, the Afghāns formed 345 tribes. 1 A few of them, the Lūdīs, Lūhānīs, Sūrs, Farmūlīs, Sarwānīs, Niyā'azīs, Kākars, Karrānīs and others rose to political importance in India.

Although the Afghāns acquired supreme power in Northern India, yet, like all other tribal peoples, they were very quarrel-some . The Afghān historian Abbās says that quarrelling, disputing and fighting were the chief characteristics of the Afghāns in the sixteenth century. 2 His evidence is corroborated by Sher Shāh's remark that it was customary with one Afghān tribe to destroy the other if the former ~~was~~ had four men more than the latter. 3 Sher Shāh often lamented over the factious nature of his people and repeatedly emphasised that they lost the saltānate to the Mughals only because of their internal discords. 4 We accept the evidence of Sher Shāh not because he was an Afghān but because an examination of the causes of the fall of the Afghān saltānate in 1526 shows that their quarrel-some nature prepared conditions for their great misfortune. The Afghāns were so quarrel-some and unruly that

1. M., 205b.

2. Abbās, IO., 121a; BM., 79b.

3. Ibid, 33b-34a;

23b ; M., 96b.

4. Ibid, 29b ;

20b- 21a.

بر قبايل افغنہ مقرر است کہ ہر کہ ۲۳b ; M., 96b.
 غراز دیگری زیادہ دارد در ہلا کہ دیگری میکوشندہ

they even fought bloody disputes in the court of Sultān Muḥammad 'Adil. I That they retained this nature even in the eighteenth century is seen from an answer given to Elphinstone by an Afghān. " We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood, but we can never be content with a master."

The quarrel-some nature of the Afghāns was largely due to their revengeful spirit. An Afghān must take his revenge on wrong-doers. This would cause blood feuds between one tribe and another for generations. Even in the reign of Sher Shāh, such a blood feud was on the point of breaking out between the Sūrs and the Niyāzīs over the death of Mubārak Khān Sūr. The prudence of Sher Shāh and the timely action of A'zam Humāyūn Niyāzī, however, saved the situation. 3

Some small incidents show how the Afghāns nourished their spirit of revenge. In the reign of Islām Shāh, Shujā'at Khān, the governor of Malwa, cut off the hands of an Afghān named 'Usmān for his misdemeanours. On his complaint, Islām Shāh said to him, "You are an Afghān ; go and revenge yourself on him." 4 In fact 'Usmān had his revenge on Shujā'at Khān by wounding him in an attempt on his life. In 1545 after seizing Jalāl Khān Jallū and

1. T., II, 120-1 ; B., I, 419-20 ; M., 163a-b ; F., I, 439.

2. Dorn, Preface, vi.

3. 'Abbās, 10., 116b-119a ; BM., 77a-8b.

4. D., BM., 108b ; T., II, 113 ; Rahīmī, I, 193.

his brother Khudādād, Islām Shāh made them over to an Afghān, who had blood feud with them, and they eventually killed them. 1

The revengeful spirit ~~characterised~~ characterised the Afghāns even in the nineteenth century. Briggs tells us that Afghān revenge became proverbial in India and it was said that a man was never safe from the revenge of an elephant, a snake or an Afghān. " 2 The Writings of Dr. C. C. Davies reveal the prevalence of blood feud among them even in the twentieth century. He says, " The tribes are perpetually at feud, tribe with tribe, clan with clan, and family with family. There is hardly a Pathan whose hand is not stained with the blood of his hereditary enemy. The fury of the Pathan vendetta finds its European counterpart in the modern Albanian blood feud. " 3

A tribal people in behaviour and culture :

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Afghāns, in their manners and behaviour as well as culture, did not very much surpass the tribal stage of life. Bābur wanted to conciliate them on political grounds. 4 He, however, greatly disliked their uncouth behaviour and referred to them as a rustic people. 5 The Mughals felt themselves uncomfortable at Afghān court. Mīrzā

1. Briggs ~~xxxx~~ Firishta, B., B., I, 378 ; T., II, III.

2. Briggs - Firishta, I, 547.

3. Davies - The North West Frontier, 49.

4. See Chapter ~~xx~~ VII, p. 185-8

5. Wāqī'at-i-Bāburī, MS., 466 ; B. N., II, 341

Afsaruddīn, a rebellious noble, fled from the court of Akbar and took shelter with the Afghān chief Mūsa Khān Fūlādī at Patan in Guzrat. He, however, left the Fūlādī court on account of the rough behaviour of the Afghāns and joined Chengīz Khān, another chief of Guzrat. I

It might be argued that Bābur and Sikandar, who wrote at the time of the Mughals, could not be fair to the Afghāns, the enemies of the Mughals. But evidence gathered from other sources also conveys the same idea regarding their behaviour. When we remember that , in spite of his long association with the refined court of Khān Khānān 'Abdur Raḥīm, Daulat Khān Lūdī, an Afghān noble in Mughal service, behaved very discourteously to 'Abūl Faẓl and Prince Dāniyāl,² we are led to the belief that the Afghāns remained unpolished in their manners and were inferior to the Mughals in refinement. Comparison of the behaviour of the Afghāns and of the Mughals confirms our belief.

Two similar incidents illustrate the above contention. Being dispossessed of Kabul by his brother Humāyūn, Kāmran came to take shelter in the court of Islām Shāh. As he did not perform the customary salutation to their king, the Afghān chamberlain violently seized his neck and forced him bow down. ^{AA2}3 This is really a contrast to the descent behaviour of Bābur to the

1. Mir'āt S., 338a ; Fazlulla - Mir'āt S., 293.

2. Ma'āṣir, II, 7-8.

3. B., I, 389-90 ; T., II, 79 ; A. N., I, 325.

Afghān chief Biban, who, in violation of the court etiquette, sat in his presence. Bābur, however, did not impose his court ~~ceremonial~~ ceremonial on the rustic Afghān chief. I

On account of their quarrel-some spirit and uncouth behaviour, the Afghāns, in spite of their long association with the Indians remained a strange people to them. The incident that occurred in the Jam-i- Mosque of Delhi a few days after Bahlūl Lūdī's accession illustrates it. While reading the khutba Mullā Fāzīl observed that they had an extraordinary tribe of rulers and he did not know if they were followers of the arch-fiend or arch-fiends themselves. 2 The Afghān historian 'Abdullā has narrated this incident to show the goodness of Bahlūl that he did not punish the preacher. We, however, see in the remark of Fāzīl an indication of the Indian Muslims' attitude towards their new masters. In their eyes, the Afghāns were a strange people and inferior to them in culture.

Being a strange people to the Indians, the Afghāns could not enlist their sympathy and support. So, we see that some persons of Delhi and Agra informed Humāyūn of the death of Islām Shāh and of the discord of the Afghāns and invited him to India. 3

I. Waqī'at-i-Bāburī, MS., 466 ; B. N., II, 466.

2. D., BM., 9a ; School, Io-II. میران پریش رو
میران الله عجب قومى پیدا شدند
بال اند یا دجال در ایشان باشد

3. F., I, 456 ; A. N., I, 336.

A tribal people in social institutions :

The social institutions of the Afghāns particularly marriage shows tribal basis of their society in the fifteenth and sixteenth ~~sixteenth~~ century India. They usually married within the tribe and disfavoured marriage outside the tribe. Numerous instances may be cited to show the prevalence of tribal marriage among the Afghāns. We shall, however, illustrate the point by a few typical examples.

Bahlūl's father Malik Kālā and Bahlūl himself married their own cousins. 1 As the marriage of the Lūdī Afghāns took place within their tribe, so also other Afghāns used to marry within their own tribes. Islām Shāh Sūr,² Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr³ and Sikandar Khān Sūr⁴ married the daughters of Nizām Khān Sūr the younger brother of Sher Shāh. Sulaimān Karranī's daughter married her cousin Hansū Karranī.⁵ 'Usmān Lūhānī's daughter was married to his nephew Dāud, a son of Sulaimān Lūhānī.⁶ Walī Lūhānī married a daughter of Walī Mandukhail Lūhānī.⁷

There are instances which show that the Afghāns disliked marriage outside the tribe. Mubārak Khān Sūr, a nephew

1. F., I, * 317.

2. B., I, 416

3. Ibid, 421 ; M., 164a.

4. T., II, 172.

5. D., School, 162.

6. Bahāristān, I, 173.

7. Ibid.

of Sher Shāh, being enamoured of a beautiful daughter of Allahdād Khān Niyāzī, proposed to marry her. The Niyāzī chief, ~~however~~ who considered his tribe to be more aristocratic in blood, refused the proposal of a member of the reigning Sūr family. Disappointed Mubārak, however, tried to force him ; but this resulted in a bloody dispute and the death of Mubārak. I

The Afghāns detested marriage with non-Afghāns. In 1561 on his way to Makkah, Bairām Khān halted at Patan and arranged the betrothal of his son 'Abdur Rahīm with a daughter of Islām Shāh. The news of this betrothal displeased the Afghāns and they killed him. 2 Other factors, such as Afghān hatred towards the Mughals and the desire of Mubārak Khān Lūhānī to avenge the death of his father in the battle of Macchiwara, also contributed to the assassination of Bairām Khān. But, considering that the Afghān chief Sher Khān Fūlādī received the fallen Mughal vakīl and a pilgrim as his guest and he afterwards connived at the murder, we are led to believe that the betrothal was the cause of his ~~connivance~~ connivance.

Intermarriage would in exceptional cases take place. The Afghāns, however, denied the children of such marriages the status of a pure born Afghān. Islām Khān Lūdī preferred his nephew Bahlūl to his son Quṭb Khān to be his successor as the latter was born of

1. Abbās, 10, 116b-9b ; BM., 77a-8b.

2. B., 11, 45 ; A. N., 11, 131 ; Mir' āt A., 1, 93.

a non-Afghān mother and would not have been acceptable to the Afghāns.¹

According to Elphinstone, tribal marriage prevailed among the Afghāns even in the early part of the nineteenth century.²

Allegiance to tribal chiefs and settlement on tribal lines :

The Afghāns attached themselves to their respective tribal chiefs and settled on tribal lines so as to form different tribal zones in India. Islām Khān Lūdī, the governor of Sarhind under the Saiyid sultāns of Delhi, had in his service 12,000 Afghāns of his own tribe.³ Sher Shāh's grandfather Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr joined the service of Maḥābat Khān Sūr and settled in Bajwara in the Panjab with his family and followers.⁴ Most of the Sarwānīs attached themselves to their chief A'zam Humāyūn Sarwānī the jagirdār of Cawnpur, and they were settled in that area.⁵ We also learn that Ḥaṣan Khān Sūr, the father of Sher Shāh, attached to himself his relations and kindred as his followers.⁶ The Niyāzī Afghāns are also found attached to their chiefs.⁷ In a similar way, the Farmūlī, Lūhānī, Karranī, Kākar and other Afghāns lived under their respective chiefs in the areas, which they held in jagir.

1. F., I, 317 ; Afsān-i-Shāhan, 14b.

2. Elphinstone - An Account of the kingdom of Cabul, I, 237.

3. F., I, 317.

4. Abbās, 10., 5a ; BM., 4b.

5. Ibid, 21a ; 15b.

6. T., ~~xxx~~, II, 87.

7. T. II. ~~xxx~~ 102

A picture of the Afghān settlement on tribal lines and of their tribal zones in India in the Lūdī period (1451-1526) may be obtained from the accounts of Rizqullā, whose father Sa'dullā served Miyān Zainuddīn and his sons at Agra fifty five years. His accounts are corroborated by those of Bābur, Abbās and other Mughal historians. In this period, the Shāhūkhail Lūdīs of the family of Bahlūl were generally settled in Delhi, Agra, Kalpi, Chandwar and Lucknow. 1 Other branches of the Lūdīs, such as the Yusufkhails and the Sarangkhānīs settled in Lahur ² and Jaunpur ³ respectively. Saran, Champaran, Oudh, Shahabad, Thanesvar and Kanauj formed the zones of the Farmulī Afghāns. ⁴ The Lūhānīs colonised Ghazipur and Bihar. ⁵ Cawnpur, Kara and Etawa were the areas of the Sarwānī Afghāns. ⁶ The Sūrs were settled in the parganas of Chaund, Sahsaram and Khwaspur Tanda in South Bihar. ⁷

The battle of Panipat in 1526 caused some Afghāns to settle outside the Mughal territories. Bābur, however, did not disturb the zones of those Afghāns, who submitted to his rule. He left Oudh, ⁸ Saran, ⁹ and other places in the possession of the Farmulīs

1 and 2. W. M., 67b.

3. Ibid, 35a. ‡

4. Ibid, 65a ; Abbās, IO., 51a-b ; BM., 35b.

5. B. N., II, 523 and 527 ; Abbās, BM., 15 6a and 17a ; T., I, 351

6. W. M., 34b ; Abbās, BM., 15b ; B. N., II, 523.

7. Abbās, BM., 6a and 17a ; T., II, 89 and 86.

8. Ibid, 34b ; IO., 51a.

9. B. N. II, 675.

The Sarwānīs retained Kara.¹ Bābur also allowed the Lūhānīs² and the Sūrs³ to hold their respective areas as they promised to be loyal to the Mughal throne.

In the Sūr Afghān period (1540-1556) also we see that the Afghāns settled on tribal lines. The Sūrs lived in Delhi, Chunar and Gwalior.⁵ The Sarwānīs settled in Lucknow, Kant, Gola and Tilhar.⁶ Oudh and Kanauj continued to be the zone of the Farmulī. The Niyāzīs settled in the Panjab under their chief A'zam Humāyūn Haibat Khān.⁸ The Karranīs got their home in Khwaspur Tanda and other parganas in South Bihar.⁹ The Kākars colonised Milwat, Nagarkot, Jwala and Dihdawal near the Jammu hills.¹⁰ As the Lūdīs had sank in political importance we do not get any reference to their settlement in the contemporary records.

Even in the eighteenth century, the Afghāns settled in Ruhilkhand on tribal lines. The Afghān historian Maḥabat Khān writes that they belonged to 52 different tribes and each tribe had a separate mahalla (quarter) in the city of Shahjahanpur, the early seat of their power in Ruhilkhand.¹¹

I. B.N., II, 537 ; A.N., I, 104.

2 and 3. Ibid, 659, 669, 676 ; 652 and 649.

4. Sher Shāh kept his treasures at Chunar. Adil made it capital.

5. Islām Shāh made Gwalior his capital.

6. Abbās, IO., 107a-b ; BM., 70a and 57b. The places mentioned are in the modern district of Shahjahanpur, U. P.

7. B., 419-20 ; T., II, 120.

8. Abbās, BM., 70a ; T., II, III-2 ; B., I, 380.

9. B., I, 420 ; T., II, 121-2.

10. Abbās, IO., 107a ; BM., 70a. The places referred to were in the territories between Lahur and Kangra.

11. Maḥabat Khān - Akhbar-i-Maḥabbat, 65b ;

District Gazetteer, Shahjahanpur, ~~XVIII~~ XVII, 136.

The settlement of the Afghāns on tribal lines and their attachment to their respective tribal chiefs suggest that the latter, secure in the support of their own tribal peoples, could exercise great authority over the ~~xx~~ areas, which they received as jagirs from the king.

Position of the chiefs as jagirdārs :

Bahlūl Lūdī (1451- 87), the founder of the Afghān saltanate in Northern India, parcelled out the kingdom among the Afghān chiefs, who had joined him in the conquest of the country and helped him against his enemies. When Delhi was attacked by the Sharqī sultān Mahmūd of Jaunpur, he invited the Afghāns of ^{RUK} ~~RUK~~ saying, " God has given the kingdom of Delhi to the Afghāns, but the other kings wish to expel them. Come to this country. The name of ~~saxersinkyxwikxxremamix~~ sovereignty will remain with me, but the territories we have acquired and may conquer will be shared among us as brothers. " ¹ True to this word, Bahlūl gave a jagir to every Afghān chief, who helped him. ² As the powerful Farmulī and Lūhānī chiefs came in large numbers and joined him in the conquest, he gave them one half of the kingdom in jagirs and assigned the other half to other Afghān tribes. ³

Having acquired jagirs, the Afghān chiefs settled there on tribal lines. They considered the jagirs as theirs by right and not a favour from the king and they held possession of them in hereditary succession. We are informed that Oudh, which was the jagir of Miyān Kālā Pahār Farmulī in the reign of Bahlūl Lūdī, passed in hereditary right to his daughter Fath Malika and her husband Mustafa Farmulī at the time of Ibrāhīm Lūdī. ⁴

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1. Abbās, 10., 3a-b ; BM., 3b. سپهسالار توالی سلطنت ملک دہلی بافتان عنایت نموده است
2. Ibid, 4b ; 4b.
3. W.M., 67b.
4. Abbās, 10., 51a-b ; BM., 34b.

The Lūhānīs held their jagir in Bihar for three generations, ¹ and in the chieftainship Dariyā Khān was succeeded by his son Bihar Khān and then his grandson Jalāl Khān. Farīd enjoyed his father's jagir in Sahsaram in hereditary succession. The family of Daulat Khān Lūdi Yusufkhail held their jagir in the Panjab for thirty years. ² The other Afghāns also maintained the same hereditary right in their jagirs.

The jagirdārs enjoyed great authority over the area of their jagirs. Within them, they were practically supreme. Farīd, as the deputy of his father, made new arrangements with the soldiers, the zamīndārs and the subjects. ³ The jagirdār could also portion his jagir among his sons. We see that Ḥasan Khān Sūr, in his life time, assigned separate jagirs to his sons. ⁴ Shujā'at Khān also divided his jagir in Malwa among his sons. ⁵

The jagirdārs kept troops of their own to maintain local peace and to help the king in times of need. During the period of the Lūdi saltanate, Jamāl Khān Lūdi Sarangkhānī and his son Ahmad, the jagirdārs of Jaunpur, maintained 20,000 horse. ⁶ Tātār Khān Lūdi Yusufkhail, who had a jagir in the Panjab, commanded 15,000 cavalry. ⁷ Muhammad Khān Sūr, the jagirdār of

1. M., 96b.

2. Shāhī, 89 ; B.N., I, 439-40.

3. M., 86a.

4. Abbās, 10., 23a ; BM., 16b.

5. T., III 421 ; Rahīmī, I, 196.

6. W. M., 35a ; Abbās (BM., 6a) says that Ahmad maintained 12,000 horse.

7. D., School, 27.

Chaund, and Ḥaṣan Khān Sūr, the jagirdār of Sahsaram, kept 1,500 ~~fixxxx~~ and 500 horses respectively. ¹ The powerful Sarwānī chief A'zam Humāyūn maintained 45,000 cavalry and 700 elephant in Kara.

The big jagirdārs could delegate their military authority to a number of subordinate chiefs with assignment of jagirs and thus create their respective groups of loyal lieutenants. In the reign of Sikandar Lūdī (1487-1517), A'zam Humāyūn Sarwānī made Saif Khān, Daulat Khān, 'Alī Khān and Fīrūz Khān his subordinate chiefs by conferring on them the command of 6,000, 4,000, and 6,000 respectively. ³ Jamāl Khān Lūdī also gave Ḥaṣan Sūr the command of 500 and a jagir in Sahsaram. ⁴

The soldiers of the jagirdārs were the men of their tribes. They were also paid by them in fiefs. ⁵ Being the men of their tribes and paid by them, the soldiers were naturally attached to the chiefs and the jagirdārs.

Jagirdārs in the Sūr period :

In the Sūr Afghān period (1540-56) also, the jagir system and the ideas of the time of the Lūdīs regarding the jagir prevailed. Sher Shāh restored the Afghān saltānate in India with the help of the Afghān chiefs and as such he had to

1. Abbās, BM., 6a and 17a : T., II, 86 and 89.

2. W. M., 34b.

3. Ibid, 35a.

4. Abbās, IO., 6b ; BM., 6a.

5. Ibid, Iob ; 8b ; T., I, 335 ; D., School, 31

satisfy them by the grant of jagirs. The evidence that may be gathered from the contemporary sources show that he gave them jagirs.

In the reign of Sher Shāh (1540-45), Shujā'at Khān held Malwa in jagir. ¹ We know that at first Sher Shāh assigned the parganas of Kant, Gola and Tilhar as a jagir to 'Isa Khān ~~Sarwa~~ Sarwānī and later on the sarkar of Sambal was added to his area. ² The Karranīs received Khwaspur Tanda and the Gangetic parganas in South Bihar as their jagir. ³ In 1542 after Khizr Khān's rebellion, Sher Shāh divided Bengal in jagirs among some tribal chiefs. ⁴

The Niyāzīs had their jagirs in the Panjab and Multan. The area under them was a fairly big one. They were at the same time, however, a turbulent and ambitious people. Abbās says that Sher Shāh intended to remove them from the Panjab, but before he could do this he died. ⁵ We, however, see that it was not ~~the~~ his death but rather the dictates of prudence and ~~military necessity~~ military necessity which prevented Sher Shāh from removing the Niyāzīs. The powerful Niyāzī chief A'zam Humāyūn, who had distinguished himself in many a campaign of Sher Shāh and in the conquest of Multan, ranked as one of the pillars of the restored

1. Abbās, IO., ~~II, 121-2~~ BM., ~~II, 121-2~~ 75a 114-6b ; BM., 71a and 75a

2. Ibid, 107b ; 70a.

3. B., I, 420 ; T., II, 121-2.

4. Ibid, 365 ; F., I, 425 ; Abbās, IO., 87b ; D., School, 92a
Abbās says that Sher Shāh established ملوک طوائف in Bengal.

5. Abbās, IO., 120a ; BM., 79a-b.

saltanate. Prudence forbade him from alienating ~~at~~ such a powerful chief. Moreover, the defence of the north-west frontier against expelled Humāyūn demanded that the Panjab was to be in the hands of a powerful chief and in a tranquil state.

The jagirdārs of the Sūr period also kept their own troops. A'zam Humāyūn Niyāzī commanded 30,000 horse ¹ and Shujā'at Khān 12,000 horse. ² We are informed that, while conferring Sambal on 'Isa Khān Sarwānī, Sher Shāh asked him to keep an additional cavalry force of 5,000 to maintain peace in the troublesome Sambal area. ³ The jagirdārs also paid their soldiers in fiefs. ⁴

The idea that the jagir was a family property of the chief prevailed until the end of the Sur rule in Northern India. In 1553, Muhammad 'Adil Shāh held a darbār at Gwalior to carry out a scheme of the redistribution of jagirs. In the darbār he proposed the transfer of Kanauj from the Farmulīs to the Sarbanīs. Sikandar Khān Farmulī protested against the interference of the sultān in their jagir, which they held from the time of Sher Shāh. This affair resulted in a bloody dispute in the darbār and the loss of several lives. ⁵ This incident illustrates how the Afghān chiefs throughout the entire period of Afghān rule in India maintained that they held their jagirs by right and not by royal favour.

1. Abbās, IO., II6b ; ~~BM~~ BM., 77a.

2. Ibid, Ioob 65b.

3. Ibid, Io7b 70a.

4. Ibid, Io7b and II4a ; 70a and 75a.

5. T., II, I20-I ; B., I, 4I9-20 ; F., I, 439 ; D., BM., ~~24~~ I20a.

The hold of the Afghān chiefs on their tribes and their great power over their jagirs naturally limited the authority of the Afghān king in their localities. Indeed, it may be said that the chiefs established semi-independent political units within the kingdom.

The role of the Afghān chiefs in the royal succession :

The Afghān chiefs exercised great influence in the political questions of their saltanate. The significant role they played in the affairs of succession to the throne suggests that the Afghān king was really chosen by them. The reigning king might nominate his successor. He would, however, nominate such a person, who would be acceptable to the chiefs. Even then, the chiefs could accept or reject him and place some other relation of the deceased king on the throne.

Islām Khān Lūdī, who for the first time united the Afghāns under his leadership, nominated his nephew Bahlūl Lūdī rather than his son Quṭb Khān to be his successor as the latter would not have been accepted by his people.¹ This shows that the Afghān leader had respect for the opinion of his brethren. In spite of this, the Afghāns were not unanimous in the acceptance of Bahlūl.² By his tact and personality, Bahlūl, however, made himself acceptable to them. Even when he became the acknowledged ~~leader~~ leader and ~~monarch~~ monarch of the Afghāns, he behaved with them in

1. F., I, 317 ; Afsān-i-Shāhan, 14b.

2. Ibid.

such a way as to show that he had been a choice of his people and that he held the high office at their pleasure. ¹

The accession of Sikandar Lūdī is an instance which illustrates that the Afghān chiefs had their choice in succession. When Bahlūl Lūdī died they sat in assembly to decide whom they should place on the throne. At that time the elder prince Bārbik was at Jaunpur and the third Sikandar was in Delhi. A few of the chiefs favoured the succession of Bārbik, while others wanted to place A'zam Humāyūn, the son of the eldest prince Bāyazīd, who had died, on the throne. Nobody made any mention of Sikandar, who is said to have been nominated successor by Bahlūl. ² Seeing that her son's case was going by default, Sikandar's mother spoke, from behind the curtain, about the qualities of her son and presented his case to the assembled chiefs. 'Isa Khān Lūdī retorted that the throne was not for the son of a goldsmith's daughter. ³ Khān Khānān Farmulī, one of the influential chiefs, objected to such harsh language towards the wife of the late king. This caused a quarrel between the two ~~kh~~ chiefs. Khān Khānān Farmulī swore that he would support the succession of Sikandar. As he commanded the respect of the majority of the chiefs, they chose Sikandar for the throne and invited him accordingly. Sikandar came in haste to Jalāli and ascended

1. See p. 22.

2. F., I, 329 ; D., School, 27.

3. Ibid. Sikandar's mother was a goldsmith's daughter. F., I, 329.

~~4. Ibid ; T., I, 314.~~

the throne. ¹

In 1517 after the death of Sikandar, the majority of the chiefs favoured the succession of Ibrāhīm Lūdī, who was noted for his intelligence, bravery and other praiseworthy qualities. ² Accordingly Ibrāhīm succ^eeded to the throne. A few of the chiefs, however, placed his younger brother Jalāl on the throne at Jaunpur. It was after much fight ~~km~~ that Jalāl was eliminated and Ibrāhīm became undisputed.

In the Sūr period :

In the Sūr Afghān monarchy also we see the great ~~influen~~ influence of the Afghān chiefs in succession. It was by championing the Afghān national cause against the Mughals that Sher Shāh became the leader of the Afghāns. ³ In 1539, he defeated Humāyūn at Chausa. This made him supreme in Bengal, Bihar and territories up to the Kanauj and placed him well on the road to Agra and Delhi. In recognition of the quality of his leadership and his great service to the cause of the Afghāns, 'Isa Khān Sarwānī proposed in an assembly of the Afghān chiefs to make him their king. Miyān Babin Lūdī and other chiefs unanimously consented and Sher Shāh accepted the offer saying, " The kingship is an exalted office and is not devoid of trouble but since the noble minds of my friends have decided to make me king, I agree. " ⁴ This shows that the Afghān chiefs chose

1. F., I, 329 ; T., I, 314.

2. T., I, ~~341~~ 341-2.

3. Abbās, IO., 52b ; BM., 35b.

4. Ibid, 73a-b ; 48a.

Sher Shāh to be their king.

In 1545, the installation of Islām Shāh, the second son of Sher Shāh, in preference to his eldest son and nominated successor Ādil Khān, is another instance showing the great influence of the Afghān chiefs in succession in the Sūr Afghān saltānate.¹ The assassination of Islām Shāh's son and successor Fīrūz on the third day of his accession in 1553 and the raising of Muhammad Ādil on the throne by the chiefs² confirms our belief that the Afghān king was really the choice of the Afghān chiefs.

Later instances also show the great position of the Afghān chiefs in the monarchy. Sikandar Khān Sūr, after being elevated to the throne in 1554, addressed the chiefs in the following words : " I regard myself as one of you ; I claim no superiority over you. If you think me incapable of rule let an abler head and a stronger arm be elected from among you that I may also swear allegiance to him. " ³ This indicates that, even down to the end of the Sūr rule, the Afghān chiefs controlled the succession to the throne and that the idea that the king was an equal of the chiefs held sway.

1. See Chapter II, pp. 40-2

2. See Chapter IV, pp. 92-3

3. F., I, 343-4 ; Khāfī Khān, I, 113.

گفت من یکی شما یم و مرا بر شما تفوقی نیست .. و اگر مرا شایسته این امر جلیل القدر
نمیدانید از میان خود هر کس را که لائق این منصب عظیم الشان دایند بر تخت نشایند

Relations between the king and the chiefs :

The position of the Afghān chiefs as leader of the tribes and as jagirdārs and their significant role in the important political question, such as succession to the throne, suggest that the Afghān monarchy in India was really an oligarchy of the chiefs presided over by the monarch. The chiefs used to look upon the king as one of their equals and they would accord him the honours of a leader in war rather than of a master in peace. So, Dr. Tripathy remarks that the Afghān monarchy was a sort of confederation of the tribes presided over by the king.¹ Even in the eighteenth century, the state of Ruhilkhand established by 'Alī Muḥammad Khān Rūhīla was based on jagirs and was really a confederacy of the Afghān chiefs with the Nawāb as their leader.² A study of the relation between Bahlūl Lūdi and the chiefs will show that the founder of the first Afghān monarchy in India gave the chiefs equal status with the king.

At the time of the establishment of the Afghān kingdom in Northern India, Bahlūl promised to share the conquered territories among the chiefs as brothers.³ The jagirs that he ~~granted~~ gave them show that he kept his promise. He even divided the royal treasure among them.⁴ Bahlūl also behaved himself with the

1. Tripathi - Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, 83.

2. Rahman - The rise and fall of Ruhila Power, 13.

3. Abbās, 10., 3a-b ; BM., 3b . Bābur (Wāqī'at-i-i-Bāburī, 389) says that six or seven chiefs including Tātār Khān Lūdi occupied Hindustan and made Bahlūl their king. Tātār Khān obtained the territories of the Panjab.

4. F., I, 328.

chiefs as friends and never gave an air of superiority over them. Either in public or private audiences he did not sit on a throne and sat on a carpet along with the chiefs. He addressed them as Masnad-i-Āli, i.e., Your Excellencies and never issued to them a farman savouring of command. If anyone of them was displeased with him he would go to his house and placing his sword and turban before him, he would say, " If you think me unworthy of the office, choose someone else and give me some other office. " ¹ Bahlul would eat in their company and would not ride a horse better than those of the chiefs. He never paraded of his royalty. ² Such was the founder of the Afghān monarchy in India and his relationship with the chiefs. In fact, Bahlul, being the first, became the traditional model of a sultān to the Afghāns in India.

We wonder why Bahlul established such a monarchy in which the position of the chiefs was enhanced beyond measure and the dignity of the king was greatly lowered. Indeed he had difficulties in establishing an absolutism of the monarch. The ~~sakfwiklad~~ self-willed Afghān chiefs, who valued their tribal independence more than anything else, would not have favoured an institution, which would have made them servants of the king. Secondly, the Afghān kingdom established with the help of the Afghān chiefs depended on their co-operation with the king.

میگفت اگر مرا لائق نمیداشتند این کار دیگر اختیار نکنم و مرا کاری دیگر نرسانید
1. D., BM., 8b ; School, Io ; W. M., 76 ; F., I, 328
2. F., I, 328.

Bahlūl's kingdom was essentially an Afghān kingdom in which the non-Afghān section of the people had neither any concern nor any interest. In view of this fact, Bahlūl had to fashion his monarchy in such a way that it might insure him the whole-hearted support of the chiefs at all times. Besides, as the Afghāns in India numbered only a few laks^I he could not have afforded to create divisions among them by forcing on them the institution of absolute monarchy. Lastly, Bahlūl himself was an Afghān born and bred and would not be expected to revolt against his own instiⁿct and upbringing.

It cannot, however, be denied that, in his desire to please the Afghān chiefs, Bahlūl lowered the position of the king more than was ~~ness~~ necessary. He could ~~net~~ have kept on good terms with them without raising them up as equals. By such conduct as sitting ~~on~~ on a carpet with them, addressing them as Masnad-i-Ālī and asking their forgiveness by putting off the turban, Bahlūl unnecessarily humiliated the monarchy. As the first Afghān king he could have given kingship more dignity and have handed on a better tradition for his successors. His actions towards the chiefs reveal him as an average tribal chief devoid of any ~~p~~ political knowledge and ideas. His conduct created a dangerous precedent for his successors.

I. According to Afsān-i-Shāhan (150b), in the reign of Islām Shāh Sūr, the Afghāns in India numbered only nine laks.

~~Sikandar~~
Sikandar Lūdī (1489- 1517) perceived that the great power of the chiefs was an obstacle in the way of an efficient administration and the stability of the kingdom. So, he wanted to check their power and improve the position of the king. He, however, proceeded very cautiously. Sikandar would not sit on the throne in the presence of the great chiefs.¹ He would also alight from his horse to receive them.² At the same time, he took steps to introduce a mild control over them. He provided for inspecting and auditing the revenue ~~accounts~~ accounts of the chiefs.³ But he did not push this too far. 'Abdullā says that Sikandar allowed them to settle their accounts with the finance department in a manner most convenient to themselves.⁴ Still they clamoured against this interference of the king in their affairs. Sikandar's tact^{and} ability, however, silenced their opposition.

The conflict of ideas that originated at the time of Sikandar came to a head in the reign of his son and successor Ibrāhīm Lūdī (1517-26). In his reign, the great power of the Afghān chiefs became a positive danger to the Afghān monarchy. They challenged his authority by installing his younger brother Jalāl as a rival king in Jaunpur. They even ignored his orders. Ibrāhīm appointed Miyān Makhan to the chief command in place of

I. F., I, 329. بطریق پدر با افغانان سلوک هموار و برادرانه پیش گرفت و در حضور اکابر قوم بر تخت نشست

2. Ibid, 331.

3. Ibid, 334-35 ; Briggs - Firishta, I, 574.

4. D., BM., 24a.

Miyān Husain Farmulī in the campaign against Rana Sanga of Mewar. Miyān Husain, however, could not tolerate it. He joined the Rana and helped him in defeating the forces of Miyān Makhan.

Ibrāhīm felt that the kingdom could neither be made stable nor be efficiently governed if the Afghān chiefs were allowed to have unchecked power. He also came to the throne with his own ideas of raising the power and dignity of the king and of placing him as an impartial head of the kingdom. Hence we find him proclaiming that the king had no friend ~~or~~ or relations and that all were servants of royalty. Firishta has introduced the above statement to show the arrogance of Ibrāhīm Lūdī, who departed from the manners and practices of ~~his~~ his father and grandfather.² We, however, find in it the spirit of a dutiful king, who wanted to be the king of all the people of the kingdom irrespective of race and to give them the benefits of an orderly and efficient government.

The ideas of Ibrāhīm Lūdī naturally brought him into conflict with the ideas of the chiefs, who would not readily consent to part with their power and privileges. His ideas made them his bitter enemies. Ibrāhīm, however, was not daunted ; he proceeded boldly to crush the opposition. He nearly succeeded. The defeated and humiliated chiefs, however, in their rage,

1. D., BM., 56a ; Shāhī, 78-9.

2. F., I, 347.

بر خلدن جد و پدر قواعد و آداب سلوک با خویشان و افغانان را تفسیر داده گفت یادشاهان را
نوعیش و قوم نباشد همه نوکر تفسیر کرده اند و باید شرط خدمت بجای آرند

forgot their common interests as Afghāns^{and} by inviting Bābur to India, they caused the destruction of the Afghān monarchy at the battle of Panipat in 1526.

Ibrāhīm Lūdī was, no doubt, intelligent and able and was inspired by a sound idea of introducing an efficient administration in the kingdom. There were, however, defects in his method of attaining that object. He was uncompromising in principle and hasty in action. He did not allow for the ~~prejudices~~ prejudices of the Afghān chiefs. The chiefs were also ~~uncompromising~~ uncompromising in their ideas. So, the inevitable result of the conflict of two uncompromising ideas was to confound them both. In Sher Shāh's reign ;

In Sher Shāh Sūr's Afghān saltānate also, we see that the tribal associations of the Afghāns, their ideas regarding the jagirs and the great position of the chiefs as jagirdārs and courtiers continued to exist.¹ Being favoured by circumstances, Sher Shāh, however, established a comparatively strong monarchy to that of Bahlūl Lūdī.

Sher Shāh's was a restored Afghān saltānate. After fifteen years of misfortune, his leadership restored sovereignty² of Northern India to the Afghāns. Naturally they looked upon him as their great saviour and reposed confidence in his intelligence and wisdom.² His love and care for them endeared him all the more to them. Badāunī says that Sher Shāh would not give the

1. See, p., 24-6.

2. Abbās, 10., 72b ; BM., 48a.

head of a soldier even for a kingdom. ¹ So when in the battle of Jodhpur a few Afghān soldiers were killed Sher Shāh said, I have ~~xxx~~ sold the empire of the whole of Hindustan for a handful of bajra (a kind of grain). " ² Abbās writes that Sher Shāh gave the Afghāns jagirs or stipends in such a scale that everyone of them whether in India or Rūh became a man of substance. ³

Moreover, the brilliant victories and conquests of Sher Shāh held the Afghāns spell-bound and they brought fresh fortune to them. The conquests also diverted their attention from the internal affairs to the theatres of war and the wealth of new territories. Being thus diverted, the Afghāns did not realise how much power was being quietly engrossed by the monarchy.

Favourable circumstances as well as his prudence and sagacity enabled Sher Shāh (in) establishing a stronger monarchy than that of Bahlūl. This is seen in some of his measures. A few of his coins mention him as Khalīfatuzzamān, ⁴ i.e., ~~khawakiph~~ the caliph of the age, showing that Sher Shāh did not own even theoretical allegiance to the caliph of Islām. In view of the fall of the caliphate in 1517 at the hands of the Ottoman sultān

1. B., I, 368.

2. Abbās, 10., 100a ; M., 140b.

3. Ibid, 113b 74b.

4. Wright - The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultans of Delhi, II, 109. Coins AE. 1257- 1281.

Salīm, the institution of caliphate had lost its significance. ~~So~~ So, the assumption of the title of caliph by Sher Shāh did not mean much from the point of view of the relationship of a Muslim king with the caliphate. It, however, contained some implications regarding his relations with his people. The assumption of the title of Khālīfatuzzamān meant that Sher Shāh wanted to be more than an Afghān king ~~as~~ in the tradition of Bahlūl Lūdī.

We notice in Sher Shāh's scheme of dividing the empire into sarkars and in the introduction of revenue reforms and branding regulations a tendency towards centralised administration under the direct control of the king. Sher Shāh, however, acted very cautiously and made concessions where necessary. He granted jagirs to the chiefs and allowed them to maintain forces. He left A'zam Humāyūn Niyāzī in the Panjab and Multan though he would have liked to remove him from such a big area.¹ Sher Shāh also exempted Ismail Khān from the ~~brand~~ branding system as the latter did not like that his horses should be branded.²

This shows that Sher Shāh did not push far his idea of centralisation and he made allowance for the sentiments and prejudices of the Afghān chiefs. So, there was no occasion for his conflict ~~with~~ with them. His son and successor Islām Shāh, however, carried his ideas of centralisation too far and hence his reign witnessed a bitter conflict of the two opposing forces.

1. See p., 25.

2. Ahbās, 10., 84b ; BM., 55b.

CHAPTER III

Islām Shāh Sūr and his Monarchy

952 H./ 1545 A.D. - 960 H./ 1553 A.D.

The reign of Islām Shāh Sūr is a remarkably momentous period of Afghān rule in India. It saw an astounding victory of the monarch over the chiefs and the realisation of the ideas of Ibrahim Ludi as well as the perfection of the principles and the institutions of Sher Shāh. It inaugurated in the Afghān saltānate a monarchy that was reminiscent of the absolutism of the great Turkish sultāns, 'Alāuddīn Khiljī and Muḥammad bin Tughluq, and the precursor of the splendid¹ royalty and an efficient administrative system of the illustrious Mughal Emperor Akbar. Indeed, in the history of ideas and institutions of Muslim rule, Islām Shāh, the successor of the Afghān king Sher Shāh, stands as a k connecting link between the Turks and the Mughals in India.

Accession and fratricidal war :

On May 23, 1545, Sher Shah died in the camp at Kalinjar, leaving behind him two sons and both of them were absent. The elder 'Adil Khān was at Ranthambhor and the younger Jalāl Khān was at Rewa, 200 miles and 50 miles away respectively from Kalinjar. Succession to the throne was imperative. Before his death, Sher Shah had nominated 'Adil Khān as his successor. ^I The Afghān chiefs, however, attached little importance to their great leader's will and wanted to make their own choice.

I. T., II, 107 ; F., I, 430 ; M., 137b ; D., BM., 102b.

'Isa Khān Hujjāb, Jamāl Khān, Sheikh Muhammad Gukbar and other chiefs present sat in council to decide who should succeed. Ni'matullā gives a detailed account of their discussions. The accounts of Nizamuddin, Badāuni, Firishta and 'Abdullā substantially agree with that of Ni'matullā.¹ 'Isa Khān Hujjāb, who held the important post of Tambūldār of Sher Shāh and was in great confidence of that monarch,² championed the cause of Jalāl. At first he made the other chiefs agree that they should not take away the throne from the family of Sher Shāh. Then this shrewd partisan of Jalāl made a comparative estimate of the two princes showing the incompetence of the elder and the competence of the younger as an administrator and soldier.

According to 'Isa Khān, Sher Shāh often lamented that none of his sons was fit for the throne ; the elder was given to luxury and amusements and the younger was impetuous and vindictive. He, however, appreciated the war like qualities of Jalāl. This judgement of Sher Shāh quoted by one of his chief supporters could not fail to weaken the cause of 'Adil.

Secondly, 'Isa Khān pointed to the respective careers of the two princes in the reign of their father. 'Adil had no distinguished service to his credit. Being ease-loving and lazy, he would prove himself a failure as a ruler. Jalāl had

1. M., I37b-8b ; T., II, 107 ; F., 430 ; D., BM., 102b.

2. Ni'matullā (I40b) says that the office of the Tambūldār or the betel leaf bearer was the highest in the Afghān saltānate

distinguished himself as a soldier and he had excellently managed every business entrusted to him by the late king. * By this illustration 'Isa Khān wanted to convince that Jalāl would be a better choice for the throne. Thirdly, he emphasised that the vacant throne should immediately be filled so that the peace and integrity of the empire could be maintained. 'Adil was far off, Jalāl near. Fourthly, 'Isa Khān produced a precedent to show that only those present could qualify for the throne. After the death of Bahlūl, his son Sikandar was chosen for the throne by the chiefs in preference to his elder brother Bārbik because he was near at hand. Lastly, he made the assembled chiefs understand that Jalāl, a man of passionate temper, would never be reconciled to the succession of his brother and that, if 'Adil was given the throne, serious troubles might follow. So the peace and welfare of the empire demanded that Jalāl should be placed on the throne.

* Jalāl distinguished himself in his father's conquest of Bengal. ('Abbās, BM., 38b ; E., IV, 359-60). He also successfully checked the advance of Humāyūn at Garhi and captured some camels and horses of the Mughals in an engagement. This enabled Sher Shāh to remove the treasures of Gaur to Rohtas. ('Abbās, ~~IO., 76b ; BM., 42b ; IO., 64a-b~~ BM., 42b ; IO., 64a-b). Jalāl also commanded the Afghān right in the battle of Kanauj in 1540. ('Abbās, IO., 76b ; BM., 50b). Ni'matullā (I40a) says that the early name of Jalāl was 'Abdur Rashīd. His services and exploits under his father earned him the name of Jalīl.

These eloquent arguments decided the Afghān chiefs in favour of Jalāl. Ni'matullā mentions that they ~~gave~~ gave a letter to Mahmūd to carry to his father Ādil informing him of the death of Sher Shāh and asking him to come to Kalinjar. The letter was, however, a contrivance of the chiefs to remove the son of Ādil from the camp. They sent another letter by courier to Jalāl informing him of the death of his father and of their decision to place him on the throne. ¹ Jalāl hastened to Kalinjar and, although he was secretly glad at the offer of the throne, he insincerely hesitated saying that his father had ^{na}nomi^{na}ted his elder brother. 'Isa Khān and other chiefs, however, emphasised that they had unanimously decided for his succession and that the interest of the empire demanded his acceptance. Being thus ~~re-assured, Jalāl the offer and, assuming the name of Islām Shāh~~ re-assured, Jalāl accepted the offer and, on May 28, 1545 (15 Rabi' I, 952), assuming the name of Islām Shāh, he ascended the throne of the saltanate in the fort of Kalinjar. ²

After his accession Islām Shāh wanted to secure his ~~position~~ position against his elder brother by creating a group of strong supporters of his throne. He rewarded 'Isa Khān Hujjāb with the

1. M., I38b-9a ; Dorn, I44 ; F., I, 430 ; D., BM., I02b.

2. Ibid, I40a ; I45 ; 430 ; B., I, 375 ; T., II, I07.

Most of the contemporary histories mention Islām Shāh as Salīm Shāh or Islem Shāh. His coins (Wright - The Coins and the Metrology of the Sultans of Delhi, 326-7), however, bear the title of Jalāl ud duniā wa dīn Abūl Muzaffar Islām Shāh.

important and confidential office of Tambūldār and raised his brother and son to higher posts in the saltānate.¹ Islām Shāh promoted 6,000 soldiers, who followed him when he was a prince, making privates officers and officers nobles.² He also satisfied the army by a grant of one month's pay as present and one month's pay in advance.³

The installation of Islām Shāh on the throne bewildered Khwās Khān, 'Isa Khān Niyāzī and other supporters of 'Adil who had been away at the time. Considering that his accession had become a fait accompli and that he had strengthened his position, they, however, thought it wise to accept him as their king. Khwās Khān came from Mewat and met Islām Shāh at Kara on his way to Agra. When Islām Shāh received the allegiance of Khwās Khān, he exclaimed that he had become king from the time Khwās Khān had joined him.⁴ In fact, the adhesion of Khwās Khān, the most distinguished general of Sher Shāh and previously a strong supporter of 'Adil, secured the position of Islam Shah on the throne.

Even after Khwās Khān had accepted him as king, Islām Shāh felt himself insecure on the throne, thinking that his brother might at any time create troubles for him. So, he determined to get rid of him. He wanted to attain his object by means of

1. M., I40b ; Dorn, I46.

2. D., BM., I03b.

3. Ibid, I02b-3a ; W. M., 57a.

4. T., II, I07 ; B., I, 375 ; M., I41b.

dissimulation. After his ~~x~~ access^{io} in he feigned loyalty to his brother and wrote to him from Kalinjar that he had accepted the responsibility of government and ~~army~~ military command so that troubles might not arise. He invited his brother to come and assume the reins of government. On his arrival at Agra, Islām Shāh sent him another letter assuring him of safety. Ādil, however, referred the question of his coming to Khwās Khān, Īsa Khān Niyāzī, Qutb Khān Naib and Jalāl Khān Jallū. Islām Shāh sent these four chiefs to re-assure him of safety by a solemn compact. Acting on their advice, Ādil came from Ranthambhor to Sikri. To receive his brother Islām Shāh left Agra and the two brothers met at Shingarpur.¹

Islām Shāh received Ādil with every mark of cordiality. The two brothers mourned their father's death together and then they set out for Agra. But while outwardly pretending cordiality, Islām Shāh planned to kill his brother. He had given secret orders to his followers not to allow more than two or three of his brother's attendants to enter the fort.² Ādil's men, five to six thousand in number, however, forced their way in. Finding that his plan had failed, Islām Shāh treated his brother with outward deference. He said to him that he had so long taken care of the leaderless Afghāns and now he made them over to him. He

1. B., I, 375 ; T., II, 107 ; D., BM., 104a ; Shāhī, 297.

2. Ibid, 375-6 ; 108 ; D., School, 135 ; 297 ;

F., I, 430.

placed his brother on the throne and showed himself submissive to him. ¹ Even in these proceedings Islām Shāh planned the death of Ādil. He had previously placed some brave and trustworthy young men behind the throne so that they might in an opportune moment kill him. ² Ādil, however, feeling that his brother was not sincere in the profession of loyalty to him, rose from the throne and placing Jalāl on it, saluted him and swore allegiance to him. Islām Shāh gave Biyana in jagir to him. Leaving his son Mahmūd at court, Ādil accompanied Khwās Khān and Īsa Khān Niyāzī to his jagir. ³

After Ādil had recognised him king, Islām Shāh had ~~apparent~~ apparently no cause for fear on his brother's account. He, however, could not feel himself secure on the throne so long his brother lived. ⁴ Ni'matullā says that Islām Shah feared that Ādil would never~~xxxx~~ fail to seize an opportunity to make a bid for the throne and, in view of the unruly character and rebellious spirit of the Afghans, there would be ample occasion for such an opportunity. He thought that, while his brother lived, he would not be able to set his hand to any important affair of the saltanate. Islām Shāh intended on introducing administrative measures, which would go against the interests of the Afghān chiefs. In such a case, Ādil might rally them against his throne.

1. B., I, 375-6 ; T., II, 108 : F., I, 430 ; D., School, 135 ;
Shāhī, 297.

2. M., 145a ; Dorn, 151.

3. As in foot note 1 above.

4. M., 145b ; Dorn, 152.

Besides, the frontier problems, particularly the defence of the north-west of the saltanate against Humāyūn, would call forth his vigilance. While he was thus engaged, his brother might create serious trouble ~~h~~ for him. The affair of Humāyūn and Kāmran was a warning. Kāmran had caused the defeat and expulsion of his brother from India by fostering revolt. Adil must therefore be removed. ^I

Adil and his supporters had sworn allegiance to Islām Shāh and had given him no cause to suspect their loyalty. But, it cannot be said that Adil, who was the elder and was nominated successor by his father and had the support of some great chiefs, would reconcile himself to the rule of his younger brother and would not have made an attempt to assert his rights in an opportune moment. The previous history of the Afghāns produced instances of this nature. Bārbik gave enormous trouble to Sikandar Lūdī, although the latter was the nominated successor of his father and was ~~chosen~~ chosen for the throne by the Afghān chiefs. So, we cannot brush aside the putative political necessity, which impelled Islām Shāh to remove his brother from his side. He saw the ^{possible} ~~political~~ danger from his brother and thought it prudent to eliminate it before it was ripe.

Morally, Islām Shāh's conduct towards his elder brother is indefensible. It revealed him as an unscrupulous man, who felt no qualm of conscience at breaking a solemn compact in order to

achieve his ends. It also frightened the Afghān chiefs and, in its immediate effect, convulsed the saltanate in a fratricidal war.

Only two months after the compact, Islām Shāh sent one of his confidential agents, Ghāzi Khān Mahallī, to bring his brother in chains to Agra. Being frightened, 'Adil fled to the protection of Khwās Khān in Mewat. Khwās Khān was enraged at the breach of the agreement. He arrested Ghāzi Khān and incited Isa Khān Niyāzi Qutb Khān, Jalāl Khān Jallū and other chiefs against Islām Shāh. They assured him of fighting in favour of 'Adil. Qutb Khān Naib wrote him to come with 'Adil and their forces near Agra a little before day-break so that, without shame or loss of reputation, he and other chiefs might desert Islām Shāh and join 'Adil. ¹

With a large army, 'Adil, Khwās Khān and 'Isa Khān Niyāzi marched towards Agra. But, as in the night of Shab-i-barat Khwās Khān said his prayers in the company of Sheikh Salīm Chishtī at Sikri, they, however, reached the outskirts of Agra at break-fast time. So, Qutb Khān and his associates could not desert Islām Shāh. ² Still, Par Khān Lūhānī, 'Ālam Khān Miyānā, Barmazid Gur and a few others went over to the side of 'Adil. ³

Apprehending desertion by his forces on the battle-field, Islām Shāh was very perturbed. 'Isa Khān, however, infused

1. T., II, 108-9 ; B., I, 376-7 ; D., BM., 104b ; M., 145b.

The Afghāns consider desertion at night as honourable. In 1525 when 'Ālam Khān Lūdi came to fight his nephew, Ibrāhīm Lūdi, the Afghān chiefs assured him of deserting the king if he

approached Delhi before day-break. T., II, 5.

2. T., II, 109 ; B., I, 376-7 ; D., BM., 105a.

3. M., 150b.

4. Ibid., 148b ; F., I, 431 ; T., II, 110.

confidence in him by saying that his devoted band of followers, the Farmulīs and the Niyāzīs, would remain loyal to him and that, in his face, no Afghān would desert him on the battle-field.¹ Thus encouraged, Islām Shāh prepared for battle. On October 23, 1545 (Sha'bān 15, 952), a fierce fight took place near Agra. Ādil's forces were defeated and routed. Ādil fled to Patna and no reference of him is found afterwards.

Khawās Khān and Īsa Khān Niyāzī fled towards Mewat. Islām Shāh's forces defeated them again at Firuzpur and drove them to the shelter of the Raja of the Kumaun hills. Islām Shāh appointed Qutb Khān Nāib to fight them. Posting himself in the outskirts of the Kumaun hills, Qutb Khān constantly raided, plundered and devastated the country.²

Extermination of the Afghān chiefs :

The victory over his brother made Islām Shāh an uncontested ruler. Next, he devoted himself to the overthrow of the powerful Afghān chiefs. Ābduḷlā says that Islām Shāh became suspicious of his father's chiefs and took measures to remove them.³ Badāunī also writes that Islām Shāh set himself to exterminate the adherents of Ādil and he swept them off one by one from the board of the world like so many chess pieces.⁴

The contemporary evidences show that Islām Shāh followed

1. F. I, 431 ; T., II, 110 ; M., 148b.

2. T., II, 110 ; B., I, 378 ; D., BM., 105b ; Shāhī, 240-I.

3. D., BM., 105b.

4. B., I, 378.

a policy of ruthlessly exterminating the Afghān chiefs. We might well ask, what were the reasons which made him deal with them so severely. It was not merely because a few of them were favourably disposed to Adil that Islām Shāh suspected them and exterminated them. In the battle with his brother, some of the chiefs deserted him and a few of them, though they did not desert, were guilty of conspiring against him. Hence, it was not unnatural for him to suspect them. Moreover, Islām Shāh, who cherished the idea of establishing a strong centralised monarchy in the saltānate and of raising the dignity of the king, found a serious obstacle in the great chiefs of his father's time. So, his method of dealing with the opposition was -- extermination.

Islām Shāh's first victim was Jalāl Khān Jallū, one of the chief* conspirators and supporters of Adil, and his brother Khudādād. By inviting them one day to his camp at Kara Khatampur, he arrested them and made them over to an Afghān, who had blood feud with them and eventually killed them. ¹ The fate of Jalāl Khān frightened Qutb Khān, another chief conspirator, and he fled to the protection of A'zam Humāyūn Haibat Khān in the Panjab. The Niyāzī chief, however, delivered him in chains to Islām Shāh. Islām Shāh imprisoned him with 14 others, including Shāhbāz Khān Niyāzī ~~LUHANI~~ ^{XXXXXX} Luhānī, Adil's son Mahmūd, Shams Khān Niyāzī, Zain Khān Niyāzī and Barmazid Gur in a cell at Gwalior. ² According

1. T., II, III ; B., I, 378 ; M., I55b-6a .

2. Ibid, 378-9 I56a ; D., BM., I05b-6a ;

Shāhī, 241-2.

to contemporary evidence, the Gwalior prisoners were afterwards burnt to death with gunpowder. As Kamāl Khān covered himself with some wet quilts supplied by his wife, he escaped death.¹

Islām Shāh thought of exterminating Shujā'at Khān Sūr and ~~xxx~~ A'zam Humāyūn Niyāzī, the powerful chiefs who governed Malwa, and the Panjab respectively. He summoned them to Gwalior. The former came, but the latter made excuses. As Islām Shāh wanted to seize them simultaneously, he allowed Shujā'at Khān to return to Malwa.² He then marched to punish A'zam Humāyūn and when he reached Agra Shujā'at Khān again came and paid his respects to him.³ Concealing his real intentions, Islām Shāh treated him with favour and allowed him to go back to his jagir.

Again in 1547 (954 H.), Shujā'at Khān came to visit the king at Gwalior. Partly because of his submission and partly because of his favourite companion Daulat Khān Ujjiyālā, the adopted son of Shujā'at Khan, Islām Shāh could not openly destroy him. He, however, instigated an Afghān named 'Uṣmān, whose hands had been cut off by Shujā'at Khān for his misdemeanour, to take revenge. One day 'Uṣmān made an attempt on him and wounded him. Suspecting Islām Shāh, Shujā'at fled to Malwa and, as Islām Shāh pursued him, he took shelter in Banswara. Islām Shāh posted 'Isa Khān Sūr with a large force at Ujjain and then returned.⁴

1. D., BM., II4b ; B., I, 379.

2. Ibid, Io6b.

3. Ibid, ; B., I, 379-80 ; T., II, III.

4. Ibid, IIoa ; 383-4 ; II3 ; W. M., 75b.

NE Ni'matullā (M., I58a) says 'Isa Khān Hujjāb.

Later on Daulat Khān's intercession obtained pardon for Shujā and he received the charge of Sarangpur and Raisin.¹ Thus Islām Shāh broke his power, though he did not exterminate him.

Islām Shāh could not tolerate the powerful Niyāzī chief, A'zam Humāyūn, in the possession of the Panjab and ~~Mulx~~ Multan, a fairly big area and an important part of his saltanate. Sher Shāh had also wanted to remove him ; but he was cautious in giving effect to his idea and he died before he could set his hands to it.² Islām Shāh, however, was bold in the execution of his ideas. So, when he felt that the Niyāzīs stood as a great obstacle on the way of his administrative ideal he proceeded boldly to remove them. A'zam Humāyūn had disobeyed his summons. His brother Sa'id Khan Niyāzī also fled from his court. If Badāūnī is to be believed, then it can be said that the Niyāzīs even defied the authority of Islām Shāh in the Panjab by reading the khutba in A'zam Humāyūn's name.³ All these furnished Islām Shāh with a good cassus belli (for a strong measure against them.)

In 1546 Islām Shāh marched against the Niyāzīs . A'zam Humāyūn made an alliance with Khwās Khān and 'Isa Khān Niyāzī and their combined forces faced Islām Shāh near the town of Ambala. On the night preceding the battle, the alliance, however, broke down on the question of succession to the throne. Devoted to the

1. A. N., II, 89 and III, 420 ; D., BM., IIoa ; M., I67a.

2. ~~Idem~~ Idem, 25-6.

3. B. I, 379-80 ; Shāhī, 242.

family of Sher Shāh, Khwās Khān wanted the saltanate for 'Adil ; but the Niyāzis declared that they were fighting to have the throne for themselves. ¹ Khwās Khān thought of desertion. The Afghān historians write that he secretly informed Islām Shāh that, though he had joined the Niyāzis, he would not fight against the family of his great benefactor Sher Shāh. ² However, ~~Iskandar~~ Shāh in December, 1546, Islām Shāh engaged the rebels near Ambala. At the time of the battle, Khwās Khān and 'Isa Khān Niyāzi left the field. The Niyāzis, however, fought courageously, but they were defeated and routed. ³

Islām Shāh pursued the Niyāzis as far as the fort of Rohtas and they fled to Dinkot near Rūh. His general Rai Husain Jilwānī defeated Khwās Khān and 'Isa Khān Niyāzi and they took shelter in the Kumaun hills. ~~Leaving~~ Leaving Shams Khān Lūhānī as governor of Lahur and Khwāja Wais Sarwānī in charge of Rohtas and to fight the Niyāzis, Islām Shāh returned to his capital Gwalior. ⁴ In an engagement, the Niyāzis, however, defeated Wais Sarwānī and advanced to Sarhind. On the approach of a larger army, they retreated and, in 1548, they were again defeated in Mauja Sambla near Mankot. Leaving a number of women and children captive, the Niyāzis fled to the Ghakkar country near Kashmir. ⁵

1. B., I, 380-1 ; T., II, III ; Shāhi, 243-4.

2. D., BM., 107a ; Shāhi, 243-4.

3. B., I, 381-2 ; T., II, II2 ; Shāhi, 243-4.

4. Ibid, II3 ; D., BM., IIob ; F., I, 434.

Dinkot is in N.W.F. Province.

5. Ibid, 385-6 ; II3 ; IIob ; 434.

Badāuni and Ni'matullā say that, once a week two years, Islām Shāh exposed the Niyāzī females in the Common Hall of Audience and the heralds and the chamberlains proclaimed aloud ~~xxxxxx~~ the names of the Niyāzī chiefs as rebels.¹ This shows the vindictiveness and ruthlessness of Islām Shāh in dealing with the opposition. Badāuni informs us that this conduct of Islām Shāh annoyed many Afghāns.² He, however, cared very little for their sentiments. He wanted them to learn that a similar fate would befall other rebels.

The Niyāzīs, however, in alliance with the Gakkars, whose chief Sultān Adam Gakkār was friendly to Humāyūn, created such serious trouble in the borders of the Panjab that, in 1549, Islām Shāh advanced in person to deal with them and he succeeded in driving them from their territories and obtaining the submission of the zamīndārs of the Siwalik hills.³ About this time Islām Shāh constructed five forts in Mankot as a great defensive measure against the Gakkars and Humāyūn.⁴

The Niyāzīs had a tragic end. Being pursued, they entered the hills of Kashmir and sought the protection of its king Mīrzā Haidar. 'Abdullā writes that some Kashmiri chiefs wanted to ~~xxxxxx~~ utilise them in expelling their king and, having failed to

1. B., I, 386 ; M., 158a.

2. Ibid.

3. W.M., 75b ; B., I, 386-7 ; D., BM., IIoa-IIa.

4. ~~Idem~~, See p. 57.

have their help in their design, they informed him that the Niyāzīs intended on the occupation of Kashmir. Being enraged, Mīrzā Haidar ordered his forces to attack them. The Niyāzīs and their women, however, fought bravely and died. Mīrzā Haidar sent the heads of A'zam Humāyūn and other Niyāzī chiefs to Islām Shāh at Ban.¹ The Mughal historians say that, being friendly to Islām Shāh, Mīrzā Haidar treacherously attacked the Niyāzīs and killed them.² It might be that Mīrzā Haidar, who was previously a noble of Humāyūn and had left him in 1540 in his bad days after the battle of Kanauj, feared Humāyūn's invasion of Kashmir and hence wanted to be on friendly terms with his enemy. It was, however, a great gain to Islām Shāh. The turbulent Niyāzī tribe was destroyed and he was saved from the trouble of an ambitious people in the ~~frontiers~~ ^{frontiers} of his saltanate.

Relations with Kāmran and frontier policy :

When in 1551, Islām Shāh was fighting against the Niyāzīs Mīrzā Kāmran, being dispossessed of Kabul by his brother Humāyūn, came to seek his help. Islām Shāh sent his confidential agent Hemu to escort him to his court at Mankot. The contemporary historians state that Islām Shāh treated Kāmran very discourteously. Badāunī says that Islām Shāh gave orders to his Master of the Ceremonies, Sarmast Khān, to direct Kāmran to

1. D., BM., II2b-3a.

2. T., II, II3 ; B., 388.

perform salutations like an ordinary servant. As Kāmran made an ordinary salutation by slightly bending down his head (kūrnish), Sarmast Khān seized him by ~~the~~ ~~the~~ the neck and made him bow down. Besides, Islām Shāh ignored Kāmran and placed him under surveillance in the camp. Kāmran, however, managed to escape and he took shelter with the Ghakkar chief Sultān Adam.¹

‘Abdullā says that, though Islām Shāh did not want to help Kāmran, yet he treated him with honour ; the latter, however, fled from the court.² This evidence seems unacceptable. If Islām Shāh behaved courteously towards Kāmran, then why should he flee from his court and take shelter with the Gakkar chief whom he knew to be friendly with Humāyūn ?

It might be argued that Islām Shāh blundered in not helping Kāmran against his brother. By utilising Kāmran he could have dispossessed Humāyūn of Kabul and averted the catastrophe, which fell to his dynasty after his death. Islām Shāh ought to have realised that Humāyūn would never be reconciled to the loss of his empire and would sooner or latter make an attempt for the recovery of his throne. There was little possibility of his attempting a restoration during the time of Sher Shāh when Humāyūn was a wanderer and a refugee in Persia. The possibility of such an attempt arose from the moment Humāyūn obtained a foothold in Kabul, which gave ~~Humāyūn~~ the exiled Mughal king a

1. B., I, 389-90 ; T, II, 79 and II4 ; A.N. I, 325 ; M., 159a.

2. D., BM., II3a-b.

recruiting ground and a rallying centre. By helping Kāmran Islām Shāh could have destroyed this foothold of Humāyūn. He could either occupy Kabul or place Kāmran there as his protege. This would have removed a great danger to Afghān rule in India.

It was, however, difficult for Islām Shāh to prosecute a warlike policy against Humāyūn. Such a policy might have drawn against him the Shāh of Persia as the latter had been friendly to Humāyūn and had helped him in conquering Kabul from Kāmran. Besides, in view of the internal troubles in the empire, Islām Shāh could not have taken the risk of a distant expedition. Moreover, the Gakkars, whose territory he had recently devastated, being friendly to Humāyūn, would certainly have created ~~farxhinx~~ troubles for him in the event of a war against the Mughals in Kabul. So, the expedition might have ended in disaster.

Considering the relations of Kāmran with his brother, Islām Shāh could not also have relied on him. Kāmran's rebellions against Humāyūn, in spite of his favours, his desertion of his brother in the battle of Kanauj and his subsequent hostility towards him revealed him as a man treacherous and ambitious. ^I

Islām Shāh thought that, by following a vigorous defensive policy in the north-west frontier area, he would be in a better position to ward off the possibility of Humāyūn's invasion. So, he completed the building of the fort of Rohtas

which was begun by his father. He also built in Mankot five ~~strong~~ strong fortresses, which were named Shergarh, Islāmgarh, ~~Firuzgarh~~ Firūzgarh, ~~Rah~~ Rashīdgarh and Mangarh.¹ Rizqullā and 'Abdullā say that the building of those forts astonished those who saw them. They compared Islām Shāh's performances with the work done by genii by the order of the Prophet Solomon.²

Islām Shāh garrisoned the frontier forts. He also built opposite Humāyūn's Dīn Panāh and on the bank of the Jumna a strong fort known as Islāmgarh.³ As a part of his defensive measures, Islām Shāh posted 20,000 cavalry in the sarkar of Sambal and 5,000 horse in every important sarkar of Northern India.⁴

The defence of the north-west frontier area was one of the factors which made Islām Shāh remove the turbulent Niyāzīs from the Panjab. His idea was to clear the frontier territories of all disturbing elements and to keep it in a proper defensive condition. He also kept his army and arms and amunitions always in a state of preparedness and himself kept a vigilant eye on the frontier.

Thus Islām Shāh succeeded in warding off any possibility ~~possibi~~ of Humāyūn's invasion during his own reign. In 1552 Humāyūn advanced from Kabul to conquer Kashmir. Having crossed

1. W.M., 75b ; D., BM., IIIa ; B., I, 386-7.

2. Ibid.

3. Shāhī, 252 ; Manucci - Storia, I, 184 and 306.

4. B., I, 384.

the Indus, he arrived at Bhanbar, on the Sutlej, near the Kashmir border. Only a few days back, Islām Shāh had gone from the Panjab to Delhi and was suffering from a sore in his throat. ~~Notwith~~ Notwithstanding, at the news of Humāyūn's approach, he hastened to the frontier. This frightened Humāyūn's nobles into ~~xxxx~~ retreating towards Kabul. ¹⁶ After this Humāyūn did not dare approach the Indian frontier so long as Islām Shāh lived. ¹⁷ The success of Islām Shāh in checking Humāyūn justifies his Kabul policy.

On the eastern frontier of the saltanate also Islām Shāh kept his vigilant watch. During his reign, the kings of Arakan and Tripura who had always struggled for the possession of Chittagong area with the rulers of Bengal kept their hands from it. He had, however, to face a dangerous rebellion of a pretender named Sulaimān Khān in Eastern Bengal about 1546-48 A.D.

A ~~xx~~ ~~ABais~~ Rajput named Kalidas entered the service of Mahmūd III, the last ~~Saiyid~~ Saiyid sultān of Bengal, and soon rose to the position of his diwān. For his munificence to the Brahmins, Kalidas earned the name of Gazdāni. Afterwards he became a Muslim and was named Sulaimān Khān. Sulaimān Khān married a daughter of Mahmūd III. In 1538, the fall of the Saiyid saltanate obliged him to retreat to Bhati, i.e., the

1. B., i, 412-3 ; T., II, 79 and 129 ; D., BM., II3b-II4a.

2. A. N., III, 432 ; N.K. Bhattasali - Isa Khan, B.P.P.,

territory comprising eastern Sylhet and Tippera and western Dacca and Mymensingh districts.

When Islām Shāh was fighting the Niyāzis, Sulaimān rebelled in Eastern Bengal with the object of restoring the Saiyid saltanate. Islām Shāh sent an army under Tāj Khān Karrani and Dariyā Khān. In two battles Sulaimān was defeated and in the last he was killed. His sons 'Isa and Mūsa were captured and sold as slaves to the merchants of Turan.^I The fall of Sulaimān saved the saltanate of Islām Shah from a very serious ~~danger~~ in the east from a very serious danger.

I. A. N., III, 432 ; N.K. Bhattasali - Isa Khan, B.P.P.,

Islām Shāh's Administration :

Islām Shāh inherited from his father a large empire extending from the Panjab and Sind to Chittagong and Sylhet in Bengal.¹ He did not make any new territorial acquisitions. His activities show that he was more interested in the introduction of an efficient centralised administration than in the expansion of the empire. It was the desire of Islām Shāh to make his mark as an administrator rather than as a conqueror. He aimed at giving stability to the saltanate and raising the dignity of the king. His works prove that he succeeded in realising his aim.

General policy :

On the evidence of Rizqullā and 'Abdullā, who wrote that Islām Shāh reversed some of the measures and regulations of his father,² modern historians have stigmatised him as a narrow-minded ruler, devoid of the imperial outlook and the great political qualities of his father.³ In ~~fact~~ fact, the Persian historians, who wrote long after Islām Shāh's reign, failed to see his works and measures in perspective. A dispassionate study, however, reveals Islām Shāh as one of the great kings of medieval India who struggled throughout his reign for the

1. My Paper - Chittagong under the Pathan Rule in Bengal,

JASB., 1952, pp. 24-5.

2. W. M., 74b ;; D., BM., 102b.

3. Cambridge History of India, IV, 63.

realisation of his administrative ideals and who worked with untiring energy for the good of the empire and the people. He sincerely followed his father and even went further than could be expected in promoting those institutions which worked for the interest of the empire and the people.

In one of his speeches after accession, Islām Shāh declared that he intended to conserve his father's institutions and promote the public welfare.¹ We shall see that he was as good as his word. He changed only those policies and institutions of Sher Shāh which could not contribute any real benefit to the empire. Abdullā, on whose evidence the modern historians have denounced Islām Shāh, says that, after accession, he, inquiring into the ordinances of his father, left some as they were and changed others to suit his own ideas.²

It was only in his father's policy of expanding the empire that Islām Shāh made a conspicuous change. Sher Shāh could not subjugate the whole of Rajputana. He also wanted to conquer the Shi'ite saltanates of the Deccan.³ But death cut short his career. Master of an efficient army and himself a good warrior, Islam Shah could have followed his father in the conquest of new territories. He, however, departed from his father's policy in this respect. Islām Shāh stopped campaigns against the Rajputs

1. M., I40a ; Dorn, I45.

2. D., BM., I02b.

3. Abbās, I0., 98a.

در جمیع ضابطها پدر نظر انداخته بعضی را بمال خود داشت و در بعضی با تفسیر داده ضابطها از خود بهم رسانیده =

and other wars of conquest. His idea was to place the existing empire on a sound footing and he devoted his whole energy to attain that object.

Islām Shāh adopted his father's policy of advancing the Indian element, particularly the Hindus, in government service. His idea was to place them as a counterpoise to the Afghān element at court. His policy regarding the Hindus was a definite improvement on that of ~~Shah Shāh~~ his father. In the reign of Sher Shāh, though there were two Hindus, Barmazid Gur, a Hindu of unknown origin, and Todar Mal in government service,¹ they did not have any place of importance at court. In the reign of Islām Shāh, however, we see the rise of Hindu influence in the person of Hemu, who, commencing his career as an overseer of the market, rose to the position of his ~~name~~ confidential agent.² Indeed, Hemu's elevation to the supreme position of commander-in-chief and vazir in the reign of Muhammad 'Adil Shāh was due to the policy of Islām Shāh. Islām Shāh retained the services of Todar Mal. His revenue department was manned by the Hindus. So, one day, Shāh Muhammad Farmulī, an intimate friend and noble of Islām Shāh, spoke to him in jest that he saw in a dream that dust fell upon the head of the Afghān soldiers, the gold went to the houses of the Hindu clerks and the papers remained in the royal treasury.³

1. M., I29a.

2. B., I, 389.

3. Ibid, 387. که سه خریطه از آسمان فرود آمد در یکی خاک و در یکی زر و در یکی کاغذ از آن جمله خاک بر سر سپاهی افتاد و زر بخانه هندوان دفتر رفت و کاغذ بخریدۀ پادشاهی ماند

The general policy of Islām Shāh towards the Hindus was more liberal than that of his father. From the appointment of two Hindus in government service and some arrangement for food and temporary residence for the Hindus in sarais Dr. Qanungo has concluded that Sher Shāh followed a liberal policy towards the Hindus. But, in his enthusiasm for his hero, he seems to have ignored some historical facts. Sher Shāh's wars on Maldeo of Jodhpur and other Rajput states were dictated by his desire to launch a crusade against the non-Muslims. 'Abbās writes that his chiefs advised him to lead an expedition against the Shī'ite saltanates of the Deccan and to root out schism of that country. Sher Shāh appreciated their advise and said that he would first cleanse the country of Jodhpur, Nagor and Ajmir from the ~~xxx~~ contamination of the unbelievers and then he would go to the Deccan.¹ He killed Puran Mal, the Raja of Raisin, his family and adherents and 4,000 Rajputs of note, though he had given them the promise of safety, in the belief that one can break his pledge to an unbeliever and kill him.² These show that Sher Shāh was not so liberal towards the Hindus as he is supposed.

The reign of Islām Shāh is not marred by any religious animosity towards the Hindus. He did not undertake any war

1. 'Abbās, 10., 98a-b ; B., I, 367.

2. Ibid, 96b 366 ; T., II, 104 ; Rahīmī, I, 628.

against them to earn religious merit. Islām Shāh executed Kirat Singh and 70 of his companions after his accession¹ not because they were Hindus but because they caused the death of his father. He also imprisoned Barmazid Gur ~~xxx~~ because the latter had deserted him in the battle with his brother and rejoined him after his victory.²

Like 'Alāuddīn Khiljī, Islām Shāh took the bold step of liberating the state from the influence of the 'ulema. Though Sher Shāh is claimed to be a liberal monarch, he was under the influence of the 'ulema and theologians who used to accompany him even in the battle-field.³ On a fatwa (religious verdict) of the 'ulema, he broke his promise to Puran Mal and killed him and his men.⁴ It was at their advice that he waged Jihād (religious war) against Maldeo.⁵ In the war against Kirat Singh of Kalinjar, one of the 'ulema, Sheikh Nizām, advised Sher Shāh, " There is nothing equal to a Jihād against the infidels. If you are slain you become a Shahīd (martyr) ; if you live you become a Ghāzī (religious warrior)." Inspired by this advice, Sher Shāh rushed into the battle.⁶ An explosion of the gunpowder seriously wounded him and he died in the camp. Sher Shah had a

1. D., BM., 103a.

2. M., 151a.

3. Abbās, 10., 96b ; T., II, 105-6.

4. Ibid, 96b ; 104 ; B., I, 366.

5. Ibid, 97b-8b.

Ibid,

6. Ibid, 101a-b.

so much respect for a theologian, Sheikh Badh, that he always assisted him in putting on his shoes by placing them before him.¹ This shows how great was the influence of the 'ulema over this great Afghan king.

Islām Shāh associated with the 'ulema. But they had little influence over him. Several times he ignored the advice of Makhdum ul Mulk Mullā 'Abdullā Sultānpūrī and other theologians who gave fatwa that the Mahdavi teacher Sheikh 'Alai was a heretic and should be executed. It was only when he found that the Mahdavi teachers were going against the interest of his state that he ordered them to be stripped.² Islām Shāh was so bold in his defiance of the theologians that he issued general regulations political, civil and religious caring little whether they were contrary to religion or not.³ His only concern was the good of the state and he issued regulations accordingly.

Centralisation :

Islām Shāh adopted his father's ideal of establishing an efficient centralised administration in the saltanate. The only difference between the father and the son in this respect was that the former acted slowly and cautiously making allowance for the prejudices of the Afghan chiefs while the latter worked openly and boldly. The father made concessions where necessary.

1. D., BM., II5b.

2. Idem, See pp. 82-4.

3. B., I, 384-5. خواه موافق شریعت باشد خواه نه و هیچ احتیاج نبود که دران باب رجوع بقاضی و مفتی باید کرد

To the son, however, there was no compromise to the ideal and no half-heartedness in the execution of a policy.

The king stood for centralising the administration and ~~opposed~~ opposed to him were the great Afghan ~~chiefs~~ chiefs, who wanted to keep their tribal independence. They would not readily consent to part with their powers and privileges and submit themselves entirely to him. In such a case, the conflict between the two opposing forces was bound to be a severe one. It, however, goes to the credit of Islām Shāh that he fought fearlessly against this strong opposition and succeeded in overthrowing it. The only objection that can be raised against him is that he was often unscrupulous in his methods. He perfidiously removed many of his opponents and ruthlessly exterminated those whom he considered dangerous to the state.

The bold and ruthless policy of Islām Shāh prepared the ground for the reception of a centralised administration. The hitherto undaunted and turbulent Afghan chiefs began to fear and obey him. He could then introduce various measures which brought them down from the position of equals to that of servants of the king.

Islām Shāh resumed the jagirs of the Afghan chiefs and made them stipendiaries. According to Badāuni and Abdullā, he abolished all the jagirs in the provinces and brought the entire country under the direct control of the royal exchequer.¹ It

seems that our historians speak of the ideal which Islām Shāh wanted to attain. We, however, see that the Farmulīs and the Karranīs held Kanauj and South Bihar respectively in jagir down to the end of the Sūr rule.¹ Though we cannot agree with Badaūnī and Abdullā in their general statement, still it suggests that Islām Shāh abolished many of the jagirs and, as he ruled only 8 years, he could not bring the entire country under the exchequer. In fact, no system could be perfected in a ~~single~~ single reign, particularly if a short ~~reign~~ one. ~~In~~ In spite of his great popularity and other advantages, Sher Shāh did not set his hand to the abolition of jagirs, while his son, with all his disadvantages, took a substantial step in the abolition of this pernicious system. This proves that Islām Shāh made a more definite advance than Sher Shāh in attaining the ideal of centralised administration in the sultanate.

Islām Shāh broke the power of the chiefs by taking away many of their privileges. He seized their elephants leaving them only wretched female ones for carrying baggage.² He forbade them the use of the red tent which he reserved as a royal privilege.³ Badaūnī says that Islām Shāh did not even allow the chiefs to keep dancing girls in the Akhrās forcing them to part with them.⁴ In this regulation of Islām Shāh, we see the

I. T., II, 120.

² - 4. B., ~~IX~~ I, 384

پاتران را از امرائی که اکهاره داشتند و آن در هند مشهور است همه گرفتند و فیلان نیز هم چنان کشیده گرفت و غیر از ماده فیلان زیور لایق بازگشتی با هیچ کسی نگذاشت و حکم نموده که سر پرده سرخ خاصه او را باشد

spirit of 'Alāuddīn Khiljī, who restricted the social gatherings and convivial parties of the nobles so that they might not easily be tempted to conspire together against him. Islām Shāh probably thought that the Akharas, the meeting place of the Afghān chiefs, served as centres of conspiracy against him, and therefore ~~closed~~ closed them. His desire to cleanse the Afghān social life of corruption might also have actuated him to close the Akharas. Islām Shāh had an eye to the morals of society. The fact that ~~that~~ he wanted to appoint the great Mahdavi teacher Sheikh 'Alāi as muhtasib (censor of the morals) of the empire¹ suggests it.

Islām Shāh kept the pay of the chiefs and soldiers in arrears.² ~~His~~ ^{His} idea in doing this was to lessen the wealth of the Afghāns so that they might be entirely subservient to him.

The Afghān chiefs could not reconcile themselves to the loss of their power and privileges. But they dared not openly rebel against ~~him~~ Islām Shāh. They, however, plotted to murder him and place his cousin and brother-in-law, Mubārīz, on the throne. They engaged men for this purpose and in 1551³ and 1552⁴ made several attempts on his life. Their attempts, however, failed and the plots were discovered.⁵ These conspiracies made Islām Shāh more ruthless in his policy towards the chiefs. He wanted to execute Mubārīz. The entreaties of his

1. ~~Ibid.~~ See pp. 82-3.

2. W. M., 75b ; B., I, 412 ; D., BM., IIIa.

3. Ibid, 74b-6b ; D., BM., IIIa-2b ; B., I, 410.

4. D., BM., II4a-b ; B., I, 413 ; T., II, II4-5.

wife Bībī Bāī, however, saved the life of her brother.¹

As a legislator Islām Shāh was not inferior to his father. His regulations withdrawing the privileges of the Afghān chiefs, abolishing the jagir system and organising the army and his enactments regulating the conduct of the local officers in relation to the state and the people show that he was one of the great legislators of the medieval Indian history. In his legislative work, Islām Shāh was actuated by the idea of developing an orderly centralised state, which was to work for the good of the people.

The Hukmnāmas, which Islām Shāh issued to all the sarkars of his empire speak for him as a great legislator. They contained comprehensive instructions on all important affairs religious, political and civil in 80 sheets of paper. They were intended to regulate the life of the soldiers, the subjects, the merchants and other classes of people. The Hukmnāmas were a sort of manual of instructions to be followed by the local officers in their dealings with the people. The officers read them in the public meeting and thus gave them adequate publicity in the localities.² Indeed in the Hukmnāmas of Islām Shāh, we see his desire to systematise, codify and rationalise the local laws and at the same time to provide the

1. D., BM., II4a-b ; B., I, 4I3 ; T., II, II4-5.

2. B., I, 384-5. حکمنامہا در اطراف ولایت بہر سرکار نوشت کہ شامل جمیع معاملات و مہمات دینی و ملکی و مالی باشد و تفسیر و قطع میر ضروری و برہستہائی کہ سیاہی و رعیت و سوداگر و طوائف مختلفہ بکار آید و حکام را سلوک باید کرد دران مندرج بود دہیری ان حکم نامہ را کہ بمقدار ہشتاد ہند کاغذ بود کہما بیش محبوب و مفصل مہم خواند و ہر مسئلہ کہ اشکال میداشت بجمیع شقوق و انواع دران ہیچ می یافتند و بعمل درمی آوردند .

local officers with a manual of instructions regulating their conduct in relation to the state and the people.

Islām Shāh was keenly alive to the necessity of an efficient army as an indispensable instrument of a centralised administration. So, he greatly improved the military organisation he inherited from his father. His experiences under his father helped him in organising his army into a disciplined force under his direct control. Islām Shāh divided his army into several ~~divisions~~ divisions beginning from 50 to 12,000 and introduced the system of manṣab in the army.¹ He placed each division under a noble, who was paid, according to his manṣab, in stipend from the royal treasury instead of in jagir. This made the Afghān chiefs stipendiaries and official nobles of ~~the~~ the king.² Islām Shāh also ~~introduced~~ introduced the system of paying the soldiers in cash³ and strictly enforced the branding regulations.⁴

In order to keep watch over the conduct of the sardārs and the nobles, Islām Shāh, like his father, appointed one Persian news-writer and one Hindi news-writer to accompany every force of 5,000 troops. He also attached three eunuchs to ~~the~~ every division of the army. The news-writers and eunuchs were to report ~~every~~ to the king everything about the army to which they were attached.⁵ Islām Shāh also appointed one Persian munṣif

1. W. M., 74b ; D., BM., 103a.

2. D., BM., 103a.

3. B., I, 384. سپاهیانرا از نقد میدادند

4. Ibid, 384.

5. W. M., 74b ; D., BM., 103a.

and one Hindustani munsif to each division. As in the days of Sher Shāh, they examined the brands in the army.¹ Islām Shāh gave particular attention to providing the army with arms and amunitions. He maintained an efficient artillery. His guns were so big that they had to be pulled by two thousand men.² A staff of engineers accompanied every division of the army. 'Abdullā says thaat when Islām Shāh was proceeding against Humāyūn he had 150,000 wood-cutters and 150,000 dig men to dig ditches.³ This might have been an exaggerated number ; but it gives an idea that the engineering department of Islām Shāh was well manned.

It was due to his efficient army organisation that Islām Shāh could maintain the solidarity of his empire in the face of the opposition of the turbulent Afghan chiefs and ~~imxixix~~ also frighten Humāyūn back to Kabul when in 1552 he advanced towards Kashmir.

~~ixkax~~ For the sake of local administrative efficiency, Islām Shāh retained the former pargana divisions as well as the ~~saxkax~~ sarkar divisions introduced by his father in the saltanate.⁴ He, however, made the local officers more responsible for the maintenance of local peace. In the time of Sher Shāh, the muqaddam (the village head man) was held responsible for any crime in the

1. W. M., 49a.

2. D., BM., II4a.

3. Ibid.


4. A. N., I, 196. Abūl Fazl says that Sher Shāh divided India into 47 divisions.

locality and he was to produce the culprit to the shiqdār. Islām Shāh, on the otherhand, made the shiqdār accountable for crime in his jurisdiction and he was to make good the loss on account of theft or robbery. The author of Afsān-i-Shāhan says that a horse ~~was~~ of a man was stolen and he lodged a complaint to the shiqdār. On shiqdār's failure to find out the thief, the man complained to Islām Shāh. Islām Shāh ordered the shiqdār to pay the price of the horse to the man. In holding the shiqdār liable for the crime, Islām Shāh was guided by the idea that the people paid bāj (tax) to the government and hence they were entitled to have peace and protection.¹ Such an idea made the government officers more active, vigilant and dutiful than before.

Islām Shāh maintained extensive governorships in the empire. He found provincial divisions useful for an efficient centralised administration. Sher Shāh's ideal was to govern in smaller units like the sarkars. So he divided Behgal into a few parts and gave them as jagirs to the tribal chiefs.² He appointed Qāzī Fazilat as an amīn or trusty to act as an umpire in the conflict of the chiefs. Islām Shāh, however, reversed this arrangement and appointed a governor in Bengal.³ Sher Shāh wanted to divide the panjab into smaller units ; but as he could not remove the Niyazīs he left it undisturbed. Islām Shāh removed the

1. Afsān-i-Shāhan, 151b.

2. Abbās, 10., 108b ; BM., 57a ; T., II, 102.

Sher Shāh introduced
Sher Shāh introduced  in Bengal.

3. B., I, 432 ; T., II 124 ; Riyāz, 148.

Niyāzīs and then he could have carried out his father's intention. He, however, appointed Shams Khān as governor of the province.¹ Similarly we find that he appointed 'Isa Khān Sūr as governor of Malwa.² This shows that Islām Shāh favoured the idea of administration in larger units than did his father. ~~Indeed~~ Indeed Islam Shah was more practical than his father. It is ~~possi~~ possible for the king to have direct control over the governor rather than on numerous chiefs of a province. They could best be controlled through the governor. Experiences showed the soundness of Islām Shāh's idea. So, later we find that Emperor Akbar favoured the idea of administration in provincial units.

To have direct control over the various localities of the empire and to keep himself informed of the conduct of the nobles and officers, Islām Shāh extended the espionage and the dāk chaukī (postal system) of his father's time.³ He improved both these centralising institutions. Ni'matullā says that, in order to ensure regularity of despatch, the dāk chaukī establishment delivered everyday a turban of Sonargaon and a handful of fresh rice from Bengal to Islām Shāh wherever he might be.⁴ Two horsemen and some footmen were posted in every sarāi ; they carried the despatch from one sarāi to another till it reached the king.⁵

1. B., I, 383 ; T., II, II2-3.

2. W. M., 75b ; D., BM., IIoa ; T., II, II3.

3. Shāhi, 250.

4. Tarikh-i-Khān-i-Jahānī, IO., Io2a.

5. D., BM., Io3a.

Islām Shāh's Royalty :

By breaking the power of the Afghān chiefs, Islām Shāh made himself absolute in the empire. He also gave a spectacular form to the royalty. His idea behind this was certainly to raise kingship to a position of dignity and honour and also to impress the Afghāns with the might and majesty of the great office. Indeed in his royalty, we see the reappearance of the days of the great Turkish sultāns whose pomp and magnificence inspired so great awe that ambassadors and tributaries were known to faint when ushered into the august ~~presence~~ presence of the sultān.^I

Following his ~~father~~ father, Islām Shāh took the title of Khalīfat ul 'Adil as his coins evidence.² The assumption of this title did not mean much from the point of view of a Muslim king in relation to the Caliphate in view of the fact that the real Caliphate had ceased to exist from 1517 if not from 1258. The title, however, is significant in analysing Islām Shāh's relations to the Afghāns. It indicates that he meant to be more than an Afghān king in the tradition of Bahlūl Lūdī.

Islām Shāh made his court splendid by surrounding himself with dignitaries and great ceremonial. A Tambūldār would always wait on him with betel leaves. He was a great noble and always enjoyed the status of a vazīr. According to ~~Nixmatullah~~

1. Barānī, 30-2. The sultān referred to was Balban.

2. Wright - The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultanate of Delhi, coins ~~no~~ AE 1428- 31.

Ni'matullā, the office of Tambūldār obtained from the time of Sher Shāh and it was considered to be one of ~~g gra~~ great confidence and importance in the empire.¹ 'Isa Khān Hujjāb held this office to both Sher Shāh and Islām Shāh.

Another great place at the court of Islām Shāh was that of Bārbik or the Master of Ceremonies. The Bārbik, also known as amīr-i-hājib at the time of the Turkish saltānate, acted as a court usher. Sarmast Khān held this office.² There were also hājibs or ma'rufs (chamberlains) in Islam Shah's court. Under the general direction of the Bārbik, these chamberlains supervised all the great functions of the court and the palace. They introduced visitors to the king.³ There were naqībs or heralds at court who would announce the names of persons, who came to visit the king.⁴

These court officials and court ceremonies greatly raised the prestige of kingship. The Afghān chiefs, who looked upon their king as their equal, felt at the time of Islām Shāh that they had a master to be respected and obeyed. We obtain an idea of their respect and obedience to him from the writings of Badāuni. Badāuni gives an account, how the Afghān nobles of 5,000, 10,000, and 20,000 received the Hukmnāmas of Islām Shāh. On Friday, they would pitch a lofty tent supported by ~~2 spokes~~ 8 poles in their sarkārs and place the slippers of Islām Shāh

1. M., 140b ; B., I, 400.

2. B., I, 389.

3. Ibid, 386.

4. Ibid.

together with a quiver in front of the throne. The sardār, the munṣif and the amin followed by others in order of rank and all with bowed heads and marks of respect would take their seats. The dabir would then come and read aloud the Hukmnāmas in the assembly. If anyone contravened them, the dabir (secretary) would report to the king and he was punished together with his family and relations.¹

The above incident appears ~~im~~ incredible. Badāunī, however, says that in 1548 he himself witnessed such an incident at Bajwara in the sarkar of Biana where he accompanied his maternal grandfather. In such a case, we cannot ignore his evidence. It might be that he exaggerated in saying that the nobles placed the slippers of Islām Shāh ~~xxx~~ as a symbol of his authority and paid their respects to them. His evidence, however, gives an idea of the character of Islām Shāh's rule. It shows that, in his reign, the authority of the king over the chiefs became a real force and the Afghān chiefs learnt to respect and obey him. Indeed in it, we see the reminiscence of the saltānate of Muḥammad bin Tughluq when, in the absence of the sultān, the vazīrs and others saluted the throne on entering the Hall of Audience with so deep an obeisance that the head almost reached the ground and the backs of their fingers touched the ground.²

کفتن سلیم شاه را با ترکشی که بستر داران داده بود بر سر کرسی میزدند و نه تنها از همه سرداران بلکه بعد از آن منصف که عبارت از امین باشد و دیگران بشرفیاب سر فرود آورده باده.
1. Badāunī, I, 384-5. تمام هر کدام به پایگاه معین من نشستند.

2. Ibn Batuta - Tuhfat un nuzzār, II, 90.

The success of Islām Shāh in establishing an efficient centralised administration and raising the dignity of the king proves that, as a ruler, he was not inferior to his illustrious father, rather, in some respects, he was superior to him. Indeed he possessed ~~idm~~ ideas and also the requisite qualities for translating them ~~inm~~ into practice. His boldness, untiring energy and supreme self-confidence¹ accounted for ~~hm~~ his success in his great administrative enterprise. Even Abūl Fazl, who brands him as a tyrant,² appreciates his qualities saying that had he been a servant of Emperor Akbar and entrusted with the ~~wm~~ work of guarding the frontiers of the empire he would have earned great renown.³ In fact, the way he crushed the turbulent Afghān chiefs and tamed them to respect his throne and he guarded the frontiers and preseved the integrity of his vast empire illustrates the qualities of his character. So Abūl Fazl could say that Islām Shāh surpassed even his father in ~~wiksdm~~ wickedness.⁴

1. W. M. 76b ; D., BM., II6b.

2. A. N., I, 337.

3. Ibid, 339.

4. Ibid, I96.

Mahdaviism and Islām Shāh :

~~Mahdaviism~~

Islām Shāh's reign witnessed a religious movement known as Mahdaviism. Although primarily a religious movement, Mahdaviism had also great political, social and cultural significance in the history of sixteenth century India. Islām Shāh's relations with it throw some light on his administrative policy as well as his attitude towards the new social forces and hence it forms an important part of the study of his reign. However, it will be useful to have an idea of Mahdaviism before we enter into a discussion of Islām Shāh's relations with it.

Mahdī means a divinely guided one.^I Mahdīism is connected with the Shi'ite idea of the reappearance of the hidden Imām for the establishment of an ideal state of affairs in the world. It is the equivalent in Islam of the Christian conception of the coming of a messiah. In India the Shi'ite idea was influenced by the Aryan conception of the appearance of a deliverer after a cycle of one thousand years. In course of time, the Shi'ite and Aryan ideas mingled together to form a common belief of the Indian Muslims that the Mahdī would come to the world after a thousand years to restore the wilting faith of Islam to its pristine freshness. According to a saying of the Prophet Muhammad, the latter days of Islām would be marked by a general decadence in political power and in morals which, on reaching its climax,

I. Encyclopaedia of Islam, III, III.

would be followed by the appearance of Mahdī, the lord of the times. Christ would also appear and after all men had been led through him to Islām, the day of judgement would commence.¹

Towards the close of the first millennium of Islām, the Mahdavite ideas assumed peculiar importance and the learned everywhere contemplated the question till at last the movement assumed a definite form through the teaching of Mīr Saiyid Muhammad (1443-1504), a son of Mīr Saiyid Khān of Jaunpur. A descendant of the Prophet and a great saint of the time, Mīr Saiyid Muhammad, who saw in the fall of Jaunpur a decadence of political power, claimed to be a Mahdī.² He gained many adherents, but the persecution of the 'ulema forced him to flee from Jaunpur to ~~Gur~~ Guzrat and thence to make a pilgrimage to Makkah. He, however, died at Farrah in Beluchistan on his way back to India.³ According to Mir'at-i-Sikandari, Saiyid Muhammad was killed by the enemies of his ideas.⁴

Saiyid Muhammad, the Mahdī, died, but his ideas survived in his disciple Miyān 'Abdullā, a Niyāzī Afghān, and Sheikh 'Alāi, a son of a Bengali holy man Sheikh Hasan, resident of Biana. Their learning and 'Alāi's persuasive eloquence in particular, attracted many persons to their ideas. Abandoning their homes,

1. Blochmann - A'in, I, iii ; Titus - Indian Islam, 106-7.

2. Jarret and Sarkar - A'in, III, 415 ; B., I, 319 ;
Blochmann - A'in, I, iii-iv.

3. B., I, 319.

4. Mir'at S., IIIa-2b ; Fazlullā - Mir'at, 90-1.

they gave themselves entirely to devotion and prayer. They held daily ~~religious~~ religious meetings and said the five times prayers in congregation. They also divided among themselves equally food or anything they received from others. Wherever they went they appeared armed to the teeth.¹ The Mahdavis interfered in local affairs inspecting the bazārs and removing forcibly all articles forbidden in religion. They would warn anyone whom they found doing anything contrary to the Holy law. If they found him doing the same thing again they would punish him and even kill him. The local officers, many of them being Mahdavis, connived at or those who did not approve of their conduct were afraid of them.²

Mahdavisism was essentially a revivalist movement in Islām and the Mahdavis were much more than reformers as they wanted to bring back the ideal days of the Prophet and the Pious Caliphs. They enjoined strict observance of the rites of religion and the injunctions of the Qurān and of the Prophet. According to their doctrine, a man is to be judged a Muslim by his deeds - prayer five times a day in congregation, fasting, observance of lawful and avoidance of prohibited things. A man, who was not punctilious in the performance of the formal rites of the faith, was to be punished, even by death. Khwās Khān became a ~~disciple~~ disciple of Sheikh 'Alāi. But when he was asked to prohibit all forbidden things he gave up his association with Mahdavisism.³

1. T., II, II5-6 : B., I, 400 ; F., I, 436.

2. Ibid, II6 401 436.

3. Ibid ; D.M., BM., II5a.

The Mahdavi teachers assumed to themselves the authority to issue authoritative orders and prohibitions controlling the Muslim society.¹ The persons disobeying their orders and prohibitions could be put to death by them without any ~~refer~~ reference to the ordinary court of law. The Mahdavis also took to themselves the work of the ~~ex~~ censor of the morals and the power of the qāzī, as we ~~a~~ see from their activities in the localities.

The Mahdavis believed in community of property and did not favour the idea of private property. They maintained as their ideal the life of Abū Bakr and 'Umar who did not possess any private property. The community of property was, however, a new idea in Islām and a departure from the teaching of the prophet, who allowed private property.

The most striking feature of the Mahdavi movement was its militancy. The Mahdavis went armed and enforced their ideas on the people caring little for the existing government.

The orthodox 'ulema denounced the Mahdavis as heretics. First, the Mahdī idea originated in Shī'ite faith which the ~~Sunnīs~~ Sunnīs abhorred. Secondly, by putting too much stress on the performance of the formal rites, the Mahdavis rejected the works and teachings of the Four Imāms. Thirdly, they departed from the teaching of the Prophet by their belief in community of property. Lastly, they challenged the position of the orthodox 'ulema in

Muslim society and at court. They arrogated to themselves the authority to issue authoritative decrees and to control the religious, moral and social life of Muslims. The orthodox 'ulema had hitherto enjoyed this authority. Hence in the rise of the Mahdavis, they saw a great threat to their pretensions not only as the religious leaders of society but also as the confidants of kings. It was, therefore, partly to preserve Sunni Islām and partly to maintain their position in Muslim society and at the royal courts that the 'ulema were determined on exterminating the Mahdavis. Makhdum ul Mulk Mullā 'Abdullā Sultānpūrī, the ~~xxxx~~ ~~sadr-i-sudūr~~ in the Sūr court, led the opposition against them.

Islām Shāh seems to have sympathy for the revivalist Mahdavi movement. He too wanted to reform society and in ~~particular~~ particular to remove the influence of the 'ulema from the Muslim community and from the ruling circles. In common opposition to the ascendancy ~~of~~ of the 'ulema, Islām Shāh and the Mahdavis met on common ground.

The activities of the Mahdavis were brought to the notice of Islām Shāh after his accession and he summoned the Mahdavi teacher Sheikh 'Alāi to Agra. In audience, Sheikh 'Alāi made only the ordinary salutation permitted by the Islāmic rules and this offended Islām Shāh. The 'ulema led by Mullā 'Abdullā Sultānpūrī gave a fatwa declaring 'Alāi as a heretic and condemning him to death. Islām Shāh, however, ignored the fatwa and offered 'Alāi

the office of muhtasib (the censor of morals) of the empire.¹ This shows that, notwithstanding 'Alāi's offensive behaviour, he appreciated his reforming zeal and wanted to make him an ally to his own idea of reform. 'Alāi, however, could not be tempted by the offer of an official position.²

When the appeal of the orthodox 'ulema had failed on religious, they ~~switched~~ switched their arguments to political grounds alleging the danger to the empire from 'Alāi's messianic claims. About this time Bihar Khān Sarwānī, the governor of Hindia, accepted Mahdavi doctrine with all his men. Mullā 'Abdullā Sultānpūrī reported the incident to Islām Shāh emphasising that the Mahdavis would create disturbance in the empire and that, by claiming to be a Mahdī, 'Alāi in effect desired to rule the ~~wp~~ world.³ This time also Islām Shāh ignored the advice ~~at the~~ of the 'ulema.

One incident, however, favoured the orthodox 'ulema against the Mahdavis. In 1559, Islām Shāh was proceeding to suppress the rebel Niyāzīs of the Panjab. When he arrived in the neighbourhood of Biana, Mullā 'Abdullā Sultānpūrī drew his attention to Sheikh ~~Abd~~ 'Abdullā Niyāzī, who roamed about in the hills of Biana with three to four hundred men and was known to have influence ~~on~~ over the ~~xx~~ Niyāzīs.⁴

¹ I and 2. T., II, 117 ; F., I, 437 ; B., I, 402 ; D., BM., II5a

³ Ibid,

403

II5b.

⁴ Ibid, ; Blochmann - 'Ā'in, I, viii ; B., III, 45-6.

The activities of the Mahdavis, such as their going armed everywhere and their defiance of local officers, had made Islām Shāh suspect them as an enemy to the state. Still he tolerated them with the idea that they met him on a common ground, i.e., the overthrow of the orthodox 'ulema. But when he perceived the association of the militant Mahdavis with the rebel Niyāzis, he was convinced that the Mahdavis were a threat to his empire. So, he ordered the Mahdavi teacher 'Abdullā ~~NI~~ Niyāzi to be whipped. Though 'Abdullā Niyāzi was whipped mercilessly, he survived death and recanting Mahdavisism he lived ~~like~~ like a holy man in Sarhind.¹ Sheikh 'Alāi was similarly whipped. He, however, died at the third ~~lash~~ lash (1550).²

Badauni holds the orthodox Mullā 'Abdullā Sultānpūrī to be responsible for the death of Sheikh 'Alāi.³ And indeed this Mullā, to insure his position at court and society, had impressed upon Islām Shāh the necessity of executing Sheikh 'Alāi. When his appeal failed on religious, he switched his argument to political grounds. Once Islām Shāh perceived the association of the Mahdavis with the rebel Niyāzis, he was convinced and, for reasons of state, he ordered the Mahdavi teachers to be punished.

The death of 'Alāi was a triumph for the orthodox 'ulema in the country. They hunted and persecuted the Mahdavis. This continued some years even after Akbar's accession. So bitter was

1. T., II, 117 ; D., BM., 115b ; B., III, 45-6 ; Blochmann -

2. Ibid, 118 ; 116a ; F., I, 437.

3. B., I, 408.

Ā'in, I, viii.

their persecution that Abul~~as~~ Fazl's father, Sheikh Mubārak, had had to flee from place to place as he was suspected to be a Mahdī on account of his association with Sheikh Alāi.^I

The intolerance of the 'ulema, however, reacted against themselves. Emperor Akbar began to hate them. By his superior learning, Abūl Fazl also beat them in religious debates and helped the Emperor in overthrowing their ascendancy at court. Thus, the intellectual legacy left by the Mahdavis, who were vastly learned men of the time, led to the fall of orthodoxy at court and ushered in a period of rationalism and liberalism in the history of Akbar's reign in India.

The revivalist movement of Mahdāvism did not die out even after bitter persecution. It revived again towards the close of Akbar's reign in the person of Saiyid Ahmad of Sarhind who is known as the Mujaddid-i-Alfi Sanī or the revivalist of a thousand years. Indeed the Mahdī tradition lingered in the nineteenth century when it was revived by Saiyid Ahmad of Bareilly.

I. B., III, 72 ; Blochmann - Ā'in, I, viii-x.

Islām Shāh's benevolent works and his patronage to learning :

Islām Shāh maintained the benevolent institutions of his father. Sher Shāh built sarāis at a distance of two kos ; Islām Shāh, however, built between every two another sarāi and provided them with every comfort necessary for travellers both Muslims and Hindus. Every sarāi had a dwelling place, wells, ~~a battery~~ and kitchens containing cooked ~~me~~ and uncooked food. A mosque was attached to every sarai and an imām, a muazzin and a servant were appointed to it. Sher Shah had built 1,700 sarāis ; in the reign of Islām Shāh, the number rose to 3,400.¹ Islām Shāh also arranged for the distribution of alms for the poor from every sarāi instead of from the royal camp which was the practice in his father's time. He also provided that indigent travellers and mendicants should be supplied with all their needs from the sarāis.²

Islām Shāh maintained the charitable institutions, the grants to religious and educational foundations as well as the gardens of his father's time.³ Abūl Fazl's accusation that Islām Shāh and his father made lavish grants of lands confirms it.⁴

In his patronage to learning, Islām Shāh surpassed his father. And indeed this gave a great stimulus to literary activities and the development of the Persian language and poetry in particular. Sher Shāh read a little Persian taught to the

1. W. M., 74a-b ; B., I, 384 ; F., I, 435 ; T., II, 115.

2. D., BM., 103a.

3. B., I, 384.

4. Ā'in. I. 296.

beginners in the Persian schools in India. Although he ~~was associated~~ associated with some 'ulema and theologians, this cannot entitle him to be regarded as a patron of learning. Islām Shāh was a good poet, who competed with great poets of the time in composing elegant verses and was highly esteemed by the learned.¹ The poets and the learned were his constant companions. Badāunī says that Mīr Saiyid Ni'ma known by his poetical name as Rusūlī, who was an incomparable learned man of the age, was his constant companion.² Sheikh 'Abdul Hai, a vastly learned man and a poet,³ and Shāh Muhammad Farmulī, a man renowned for his wit and humour, were the favourite companions of Islām Shāh.⁴

Islām Shāh took great interest in discussions with the learned and the poets. Near his own residence, he provided beautifully furnished pavilions, where the learned and the poets like Mīr Saiyid Ni'ma, Shāh Muhammad Farmulī, Haiti, Saifi and Sur Das met and recited poetry and debated literary and ~~philosophical~~ philosophical questions. Islām Shāh would often join them in their discussions. He pleaded that they should not rise to greet him when he entered.⁵

One incident illustrates Islām Shāh's love and respect for learning and the learned. The author of Afsān-i-Shāhan, Kabīr, says that Islam Shah and Mullā 'Abdullā Sultānpūrī were once

1. B., I, 416.

2. Ibid, 415.

3. Ibid, 410.

4. Ibid, 387.

5. Ibid, 416 ; Afsān-i-Shāhan, 154a-b.

passing through a defile when they saw an enraged elephant rushing towards them. 'Abdullā wanted to proceed, but Islām Shāh would not let him. He said, " O' Emperor let me step forward, for if you are killed, the whole empire will fall into disorder. " Islām Shāh said, M " Master, you do not realise that there are nine laks of Afghāns to replace me ; but if you perish, another like you may not be born in India for ages. " I

Badaūnī also says that Islām Shāh had great respect for the learning of Mullā 'Abdullā Sultānpūrī, though he knew that the Mullā was not sincerely devoted to him and favoured the restoration of Humāyūn. One day Islām Shāh said to his nobles that Bābur had five sons and all had left India except one and that was Mullā 'Abdullā Sultānpūrī. On being asked why he kept the Mullā at court, he replied that he could not find a better one than him. ² And indeed this Mullā was one of the vastly learned men of the time and unrivalled especially in the ~~knowled~~ ~~kw~~ knowledge of the Qur'ān, Hadīṣ, scholastic theology and all those branches of learning which depend on memory. He was the author of Ismat-i-Ambiyā' and Shama'īi nabī, the best two of his compositions. Humāyūn gave him the title of Makhdum ul Mulk and Sheikh ul Islām. ³

Under the patronage of Islām Shāh, Hindi literature also

1. Afsān-i-Shāhan, 150b.

2. B., I, 416.

3. B., III, 70.

made a considerable progress. The stimulus it received from Malik Muhammad Jaisī, a great Hindi poet of the time of Sher Shāh,¹ continued throughout the reign of Islām Shāh. The well-known Hindi poet and musician Sur Das, who later on became the court musician of Akbar,² flourished under the patronage of Islām Shāh. Shāh Muhammad Fārmulī was also a gifted poet in Hindi. Mirzā Kāmran said that he could gain international fame if he wrote in Persian.³

Islām Shāh as a man :

As a man Islām Shāh was imperious, vindictive and ruthless. He could brook no opposition to his will and ruthlessly crushed his opponents. His extermination of the Afghān nobles proves it. His dealings with his brother Adil Khān and his adherents reveal him as a man perfidious, cruel and unscrupulous. Islām Shāh broke the solemn compact he made with his brother and ruined him. In 1552, he also gave a promise of safety to Khwās Khān and had him treacherously put to death by Tāj Khān Karranī.⁴

Although he was a terror to the Afghāns, Islām Shāh was not without the finer sentiments of a man. He had but one wife Bibi Bāi and he was devoted to her. She seems to have some influence on him as we find in the case of Mubārīz Khān. Islām Shāh felt the necessity of executing him as he considered him a danger to the throne of his son and heir Fīrūz. He, however,

1. Shirref - Malik Muhammad Jaisi's Padmavati, 9-14.

2. Blochmann - Ā'in, I, 612.

3. Afsān-i-Shāhan, 146a-b.

4. B., I, 409-10 ; F., I, 435 ; Shāhi, 250-4.

could not execute him as Bibi Bai did not consent to it.

According to orthodox Badauni, Islām Shāh was a good Muslim, who never missed his prayers or touched any intoxicants.¹

Islām Shāh's place in history :

Islām Shāh occupies a very significant position in medieval Indian history. In him we see the fruition of the ideas of Sher Shāh and also of the initiation^{ti} of many of the institutions and principles which passed as a precious legacy to his Mughal successors.

Islām Shāh made a definite contribution to the system of strong monarchy and centralised administration. By assuming the title of Khalīfat ul 'Adil and surrounding himself with dignitaries and great ceremonials, he gave spectacular form to royalty and greatly raised the dignity and majesty of kingship. Indeed his work encouraged Akbar to propound the theory of 'divine right of kingship' revealed in the writings of Abūl Fazl, who says, "Royalty is a light emanating from God and a ray from the sun."² In connection with the pardon of Dāud, Akbar said, "By virtue of our being the shadow of God, we receive little and give much. Our forgiveness has no relish for vengeance."³ Following Islām Shāh Akbar took the title of Khalīfat ul Ilahī and elevated royalty to an unique position.

1. B., I, 416.

2. Blochmann - A'in, I, iii ; Ibn Hasan, 59.

3. A. N., III, 97.

His reduction of the dignity of the Mughal chiefs to a position of official nobility was but a continuation of the policy and work of Islām Shāh.

In Islām Shāh's system of administration in bigger units, we find the beginning of Akbar's sūbah administration. To him is also due the credit for the introduction of the mansabdārī system which received systematic shape in Akbar's reign. Indeed Islām Shāh's was the first attempt at the codification of the local laws regulating the lives of the individuals and officers. His Hukmnāmas are the precursor of the 'dastūr-i-'amal' (the manuals of instruction) of Mughal times.

In the introduction of liberal ideas in Islām, Islām Shāh took a remarkable step in liberating the state from the influence of the orthodox 'ulema and in tolerating the heretical Mahdavi ideas. Indeed his activities in this respect prepared the way for the rationalism of ~~Akbar's~~ Akbar's reign. Also Islām Shāh's liberal policy towards the non-Muslim elements of India's population encouraged his great Mughal successor to advance further in promoting the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity.

In Islām Shāh's patronage to the learned and his interest in philosophical discussions with them, we see the dawn of the intellectual renaissance that took place in the reign of Akbar.

CHAPTER IV

Muhammad Ādil Shāh and the Afghān loss of Northern India

The death of energetic Islām Shāh and the minority of his successor Firūz gave the Afghān chiefs an opportunity to reassert their position in the saltanate. The attempt of weak Ādil Shāh ~~to~~ to follow Islām Shāh, however, revived the conflict between the king and the chiefs culminating in the dissolution of the saltanate and the Afghān loss of sovereignty in Northern India.

Murder of Firūz :

On October 30, 1553, on the death of Islām Shāh, his son Firūz, a boy of twelve, was placed on the throne at Gwalior by the supporters of the late king. Tāj Khān Karrānī, to whom the dying king had entrusted the guardianship of his minor son, became his vazir.¹ But the disaffection, which Islām Shāh's strong monarchy and centralised government had created among the Afghān chiefs, proved too strong for the boy king and his guardian minister and on the third day of his accession,² Firūz was killed by his maternal uncle Mubāriz Khān Sūr, the son of Sher Shāh's younger brother Nizām Khān Sūr, who had the support of Pahār Khān Sarwānī,

1. Shāhī, 272-4.

2. B., I, 416 ; T., II, 118 ; F., I, 438.

All the contemporary historians, execept Ahmad Yadgar, say that Firūz was killed within a few days of his accession, the general statement being 3 days.

Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr, Shamshir Khān, the younger brother of Khwās Khān, and other disaffected Afghān chiefs. ^I

In his life time Islām Shāh had foreseen that such a ~~calamity~~ calamity might happen to his successor and he wanted to ensure his ~~saf~~ safety by executing Mubārīz, who formed the centre of the conspiracy of the Afghān chiefs against him. His wife Bibī Bāi, however, prevented him from executing her brother, saying that he was given to music and pleasures and was not interested in the throne. Islām Shāh was disgusted and remarked that she would live to see the consequences of her folly. Badāuni writes that the prophecy of Islām Shāh came true and, in spite of all her ~~entreaties~~ entreaties, Mubārīz murdered her son in her very presence. ² With the consent of the chiefs, Mubārīz then ascended the throne and assumed the title of Sultān Muhammad 'Adil. ³

'Adil's accession, a triumph for the chiefs :

The murder of Fīrūz and the accession of 'Adil to the throne was a victory for the Afghān chiefs and a defeat for the idea of strong monarchy and centralised government. It was the reassertion of their former power and position in the saltānate. Islām Shāh's strong monarchy and centralised administration had taken away from them their powers and privileges and had made them subservient to the throne. The self-willed Afghān chiefs could

I. W. M., 76b.

2. B., I, 416.

3. Ibid, 417 ; F., I, 438 ; T., II, 119 ; M., 162a ;

Wright - The coins and metrology of the Sultans of Delhi, 366.

not submit themselves to such a humiliating position. They plotted and ~~conspired~~ conspired against Islām Shāh, but they failed ; the iron hand of the autocrat was too strong for them. In the death of Islam Shah, however, they obtained an opportunity to recover their former power and position.

Even though Firūz was a boy, the Afghān chiefs could not accept his accession, because they thought that, being the son of an autocratic ruler, he would carry on the ideas and traditions of his father. Bent on uprooting the idea of strong monarchy, they supported 'Adil in murdering Firūz. Thinking that, as he was given to music and pleasures, 'Adil would not be inclined towards the establishment of a strong monarchy, the Afghān chiefs chose him for the throne. Moreover, Firūz was nominated for the throne by his father. The chiefs, who had always their choice ~~in~~ in the affairs of succession, could not accept the enthronement of Firūz, as it meant their surrender of an important privilege to the king. So, they supported 'Adil in obtaining the throne.

Sultān Muhammad 'Adil began his reign by conferring favours and important offices on his supporters. He appointed M Shamsir Khān and Daulat Khān, a new Muslim and a protege' of the Lūhānis, as vazīr and vakīl respectively. He also gave high position to Pahār Khān Sarwānī and Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr.^I He restored Shujā'at Khān, who had been in the bad graces of Islām Shāh,

to Malwa. Hemu became his trusted confidant and supervisor of his important affairs, civil and military.¹

Adil wanted to gain popularity by the lavish grant of money. Following the example of Muhammad Tughluq for whom he had a great admiration, he opened the royal treasure for the people and scattered money among them.²

Adil deceives the chiefs :

The Afghān chiefs had raised Adil to the throne thinking that, being accustomed to a life of singing and dancing and of the pleasures of the harem, he would care very little for administration and that this would ensure their ascendancy in the saltanate. Indeed Adil was a musician and a great master of the art of music in that age. Miyān Tansen, the great musician of Akbar's court, and Bāz Bahādur, the king of Malwa and a gifted musician, were his disciples.³ Adil's musical performances took the musicians of the time by surprise. He was such a master musician that he could play with Pakhwaz, a kind of musical drum of the size of a man, both with hand and foot.⁴ Under his instruction, a Bhagat boy, who was named Mujāhid Khān, became an excellent musician of the time.⁵ Indeed Adil gave a great stimulus to the medieval Indian music.

1. W. M., 77a ; B., I, 389 and 418 ; M., I62b.

2. T., II, 119 ; B., I, 418 ; F., I, 439 ; Shāhi, 272.

3. B., I, 416.

4-5. Ibid, 435 ; Ranking, I, 557, Bhagat is a religious mendicant, a worshipper of Vishnu (Wilson - A Glossary of terms of British India, 74).

The musician king, however, soon deceived the Afghān chiefs. As soon as he felt himself secure on the throne he adopted Islām Shāh's policy of strengthening the monarchy and ruining them. He followed his autocrat/predecessor in enlisting the support of the Indian section of the people. Ādil raised Hemu to the vazīrate and made him his uncontrolled agent in all the affairs of administration.¹ He also appointed the Bhagat boy Mujāhid Khān as a commander of 10,000.² Ādil's idea was to curb the power of the Afghān chiefs with the help of this new group of official supporters.

Ādil followed Islām Shāh's policy of strengthening the monarchy, but he did not possess the competence of that monarch. Badāuni rightly says that Ādil was by no means fitted for the conduct of important affairs of civil and military administration.³ Indeed there are instances which prove his incompetence. His cowardly flight from his darbār at Gwalior to the harem for fear of an Afghān chief shows how incompetent he was for carrying through his idea of a strong monarchy.⁴ His pathetic appeal to Hemu for help in 1555 when Muḥammad Khān Sūr of Bengal faced him in the battle of Chapparghata⁵ ~~reveals~~ reveals his lack of energy and fighting quality which were so essential for an Afghān king.

1. W. M., 78a ; B., I, 427 ; M., I62b.

2. B., I, 435.

3. Ibid, 418.

4. Ibid, 420 ; T., II, 121 ; F., I, 439 ; M., I63b.

5. Idem, See P. 103

On account of his incompetence, Ādil proved himself quite incapable of following the policy of energetic ~~the~~ Islām Shāh. By his policy he raised the forces of fierce opposition and rebellion, but he failed to suppress them. This caused the dissolution of the Afghān saltanate and paved the way for the loss of Afghān sovereignty in Northern India.

Rebellions of the chiefs :

Ādil had scarcely reigned a month when the Afghān chiefs rebelled in ~~diff~~ different parts of the saltanate and there arose a number of rival claimants for the throne.¹ Most of the ~~xxxxxx~~ contemporary historians are of opinion that Ādil's murder of Firūz and usurpation of the throne, his elevation of low-born Hindu Hemu to the supreme position in the saltanate, the repugnance of the Afghān chiefs to obey a Hindu and Hemu's insolent behaviour towards the Afghāns caused the rebellion of the chiefs against Ādil.²

Indeed Firūz's murder enraged the partisans of the family of Islām Shāh. The raising of Hemu to the supreme position could not have failed to cause dissatisfaction among the proud Afghān chiefs. But the evidence that Hemu behaved insolently towards the Afghāns is not borne out by facts. Our historians seem to have expressed a common idea of the Muslims of the time regarding the elevation of a Hindu to the ~~supreme~~ ^{supreme} ~~xxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxx~~ position

1. T., II, 119 ; B., I, 418.

2. W. M., 78a ; B., I, 418 ; F., I, 439 ; M., 162b.

in a Muslim saltanate. In fact, Hemu took much care of the Afghāns. He would often invite the Afghāns soldiers to dine at his table and ask them to eat to their satisfaction.¹

Adil's policy of establishing a ~~str~~ strong monarchy and ruining the chiefs was the principal cause of the rebellions in the saltanate. The rebellions were really the signs of the reappearance of the conflict of two opposite forces - the idea of strong monarchy and the idea of tribal independence of the Afghāns.

Aiming at an extention of royal authority, Adil wanted to redistribute the jagirs of the saltanate. In a darbār at Gwalior, he gave an order transferring the sarkar of Kanauj, a jagir of Muhammad Khān Farmulī, to Sarmast Khān Sarbanī. Muhammad's son Sikandar Khān Farmulī, however, protested against the interference of the king in their jagir. This led to a quarrel in the darbār and it ended in a bloody dispute in which several lives were lost and a few were wounded. The contemporary historians say that, in the midst of the bloody scene, "Adil got up and ran to the harem. Sikandar rushed after him, but Adil bolted the door from inside and with great difficulty escaped. This affair went on for an hour or two. "² The courage of Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr and the death of Sikandar Khān Farmulī, however, saved Adil's position at that time.

1. W.M., 78a ; B., I, 413-4 ; M., II6a.

2. T., II, 120-1 ; B., I, 419-20 ; F., I, 439 ; M., I63a-b.

The above incident reflects the nature of the Afghān monarchy and the idea of the Afghān chiefs regarding their jagirs. They considered the jagirs as theirs by right and disfavoured king's interference in their affairs. In trying to interfere in their jurisdiction, Ādil alienated them from his rule.

Like Islām Shāh, Ādil wanted to destroy the Afghān chiefs. He put to death Daulat Khān Niyāzī and Firūz Khān Kākar and imprisoned Nasib Khān Sarwānī, Ismail Khān, Allahdād Khān Miyāna and Nizām Khān Shāhukhail.¹ Ādil's design on Tāj Khān Karranī failed as that clever chief escaped from Gwalior on the eve of the Gwalior darbar.² He also intended to ruin his sister's husband Ibrahim Khān Sūr, who, however, managed to flee to his father Ghāzī Khān Sūr, governor of Biana and Hindaun.³

Dissolution of Afghān saltanate and civil wars :

Dissatisfied with Ādil's activities, the self-willed Afghān chiefs rose against his authority. Ni'matullā and Ābdu'llā give us an idea of the state of affairs saying, " From country to country, from town to town, all was in a state of rebellion."⁴ Tāj Khān Karranī rebelled and established himself in South Bihar. Muhammad Khān Sūr, the governor of Bengal, declared independence and prepared to make a bid for the sovereignty of Northern India. Ibrahim Khān Sūr and Ahmad Khān Sūr, a nephew of Sher Shāh,

1. Shāhi, 291.

2. T., II, 121-2 ; B., I, 419-20 ; M., 163b-4a ; F., I, 440.

3. Shāhi, 291 ; T., II 122 ; B., I, 421 ; M., 164a-b.

4. M., 162b ; D., BM., 120b.

rebelled and stood forth as rival claimants for the Afghān throne. The Afghān chiefs joined those sides which suited their interests best. In 1555 when Ādil was fighting the rebels and pretenders, Bāz Bahādur, the son of Shujā'at Khān Sūr, succeeded his father and installed himself as a sovereign in Malwa.¹

By nature and temperament, Ādil was incapable of dealing with saltanate-wide rebellions. He, however, found in Hemu a competent general. Even Abūl Fazl expresses high appreciation for the courage and capability of Hemu. On account of bodily deformity Hemu could not ride a horse and he was always carried about in ~~an~~ a haudah (sindūq-i-fīl).² His valour and daring, however, won great victories and he performed great things.³ De Laet also says that Hemu was an energetic soldier.⁴ Indeed it was Hemu's generalship that saved the saltanate of Ādil from a collapse ; Ādil's cause against rebels and rivals and ~~an~~ even against the Mughals prospered as long as this competent general lived.

At first, Ādil defeated Tāj Khān Karranī at Chappramau, 40 kos from Agra and 30 kos from Kanauj. The defeated Karranī chief, however, joined by his brothers and other Afghāns, established himself in South Bihar.⁵ Ādil and Hemu confronted them on the bank of the Ganges. One day Hemu proposed to his

1. T., III, 421-2 ; F., II, 537-8 ; M., I67a-b.

2. A. N. , I, 340.

3. Ibid, 338.

4. De Laet, I40-I.

5. T., II, I21-2 ; F., I, 440 ; M., I63b-4a.

master that if he would give him a halqa of elephants (one hundred elephants), he would cross the river and destroy the Karranī rebels. Ādil complied with his request. Crossing the river, Hemu fought a desperate battle and dispersed the Karranīs.¹ As Ādil required his services in dealing with troubles in northern part of the saltanate, Hemu could not crush the power of the Karranīs in South Bihar.

About this time, the pretender Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr had defeated Ādil's general 'Isa Khān Niyāzī in a battle near Kalpi² and occupied Delhi, Agra and the neighbouring territories. Leaving the Karranīs, Ādil and Hemu hastened to the Jumna. Finding a vast army with Ādil, Ibrāhīm played a trick on him. He sent an envoy to Ādil proposing that if he would send to him Rai Husain Jilwānī, Bihar Khān Sarwānī and some other Afghān chiefs upon whose assurances of protection he could depend, he would come personally to make his submission to him. Ādil sent his great nobles to him. Ibrāhīm, however, won them all over to his side and prepared to fight. This defection of the chiefs greatly weakened Ādil and he returned in a helpless state to Chunar, which he had made his capital. Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr assumed the title of Ibrāhīm Shāh and had his name entered in the khutba and on coins.³

1. T., II, 121-2 ; F., I, 440 ; M., 163b-4a.

2. Ibid, 121 ; B., I, 421-2 ; 164a-b.

3. Ibid, 122 ; Wright - The coins and metrology of the Sultans of Delhi, 378.

Another pretender Ahmad Khān Sūr had declared himself as ~~an~~ an independent ruler in the Panjab. He assumed the title of Sikandar Shāh and entertaining hopes of still further increase of power, he advanced towards Delhi and Agra. ¹

The rival pretenders competed with one another in winning over the Afghān chiefs. Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr gave velvet tents, standards and kettle-drums to 200 Afghān chiefs. ² He gave everyone, who came with ten or fifteen horsemen, a banner and a jagir. Badauni says that Ibrāhīm showed great favour to Hājī Khān Sultānī, the powerful chief of Alwar. He bestowed on him a lofty spacious tent covered on the outside with saqirlat (siqlat ; silken stuff brocaded with gold) of Portugal and on the inside with a Frankish velvet. Besides, he lavished upon Hājī Khān magnificent carpets and vessels of gold and silver and all other requirements. ³ In this way, Ibrāhīm raised an army of 80,000 men. He then advanced to meet the forces of Sikandar Khān Sūr.

The two armies met at Farrah, 10 kos from Agra. ⁴ The army of Sikandar numbered only 10,000. Frightened at the great superiority of the enemy, he made overtures ~~of~~ for peace in the following terms : " The country from Delhi to the east should belong to Ibrāhīm ; the panjab, Multan and other north-western

1. T., II, 122-3 ; B., I, 421-2 ; F., I, 441 ; M., 164b ; ~~Shahih~~ Shāhi, 300-1 ; Wright - The coins and metrology of the Sultans of Delhi, 379 ; coins dated, 962H.

2. T., II, 123 ; B., I, 423.

3. B., I, 423.

4. Ibid, 422 ; T., II 123.

territories were to be under Sikandar. " It was also stipulated that if Ibrāhīm took possession of 'Adil's treasury, he should give a share of the same to Sikandar and his chiefs. ¹

Proud of his great army, Ibrāhīm turned down Sikandar's peace proposals and arranged his forces in battle array. In the latter part of 1554, a fierce battle took place at Farrah and, in spite of numerical inferiority, Sikandar obtained a decisive victory over his rival. He occupied Agra and Delhi and pursued Ibrāhīm from Sambal to Etawa. About this time, he received the news of Humayūn's occupation of Lahur. ²

Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr collected a fresh army and advanced towards Kalpi. About this time, 'Adil sent his vazir and commander-in-chief Hemu from Chunar with a large army and 500 elephants to recover Delhi and Agra. When Hemu reached Kalpi he resolved first to dispose of Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr. In a battle he ~~and~~ defeated Ibrāhīm and pursued him to Biana. Again in a battle in the outskirts of Biana, Hemu defeated him. As Ibrāhīm took shelter in the fort of Biana, he besieged it and the siege continued three months. ³

When Hemu was in Biana, Muhammad Khān Sūr of Bengal captured Jaunpur and made for Kalpi and Agra. Frightened at the sight of vast enemy forces, 'Adil sent an urgent summons to Hemu, " At all costs come to me at once as I am confronted by a powerful enemy. " ⁴ Hemu abandoned the siege of Biana. As he proceeded

1. B., I, 423-4.

² Ibid. Ibid, 427 ; T., II, 124.

3. Ibid, 430 ;

I23 ; F., I, 441-2.

* 4. Ibid, 430-1

I24 ; M., 165b.

towards Kalpi, Ibrāhīm followed him and at Mandagar, 6 kos from Agra, attacked his rear. Hemu, however, defeated him and drove him away. Ibrāhīm fled to the shelter of Hājī Khān of Alwar ; but being refused by him, he took the road to Patna. ¹

After his victory over Ibrāhīm, Hemu resumed his march and joined Ādil at Chapparghata, 15 kos from Kalpi and 15 from Agra. ² Here Ādil and Muhammad Khān Sūr were facing one another with the Jumna between them. Hemu's arrival, however, turned the scale. In a battle in December, 1555, Hemu defeated and killed Muhammad Khān Sūr. ³

Humāyūn's restoration :

When Ādil was engaged in dealing with Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr and Muhammad Khān Sūr, Humāyūn occupied Delhi and Agra. ⁴ After 1552, ⁵ Humāyūn dared not invade India as long as Islām Shāh lived. The news of the death of that energetic Afghān king, the feeble rule of Ādil and the internal discord among the Afghāns encouraged him to make an attempt for the recovery of his throne. Abūl Fazl, Firishta and De Laet write that Humāyūn received from some persons of Delhi and Agra letters informing him of the death of Islām Shāh and the civil wars of the Afghāns. ⁶

1. T., II, 124 : B., I, 430-I ; M., 165b.

2. Ibid., 432 ; F., I, 442.

3. Ibid.

4. F., I, 443-2.

5. Idem, 57-8.

6. A. N., I, 336 ; F., I, 456 ; De laet, 139.

On November 12, 1554, Humāyūn marched from Kabul to invade India. Engrossed in civil wars, the Afghāns had neglected the defence of the north-west frontier. So, Humāyūn crossed the Indus unopposed and made a swift attack on the fort of Rohtas. Tātār Khān Kāsi, Sikandar Khān Sūr's governor of the Panjab, fled without any resistance. On February 24, 1555, after a little fight, the Afghāns left Lahur to the Mughals.¹ From Dipalpur also the Afghān generals, Shāhbāz Khān and Nasir Khān, took to flight in great panic and confusion.²

When Sikandar Khān Sūr was pursuing Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr in Etawa, he heard of Humāyūn's occupation of the Panjab.³ He sent 30,000 cavalry under Tātār Khān Kāsi, Haibat Khān and Nasir Khān against the Mughals. On May 12, 1555, they fought at Machiwara a battle against Humāyūn's general Bairām Khān.⁴ Badauni says that being harassed by the Mughal fire, the Afghāns took shelter at night in a neighbouring village. A fire broke out in the village and the Afghāns were clearly seen by the Mughal soldiers, whereas they could not see the Mughals. Nizāmuddīn writes, "In the glare of the fire, the enemy presented a fine target for Mughal shafts and being unable to endure them longer, they took to flight."⁵

1 and 2. F., I, 457 ; T., II, 80-1 ; Banerji - Humayun, II, 232.

3. B., I, 460 ; T., II, 81.

4. ~~Stewart's~~ Stewart's Jauhar, II4 ; F., I, 457 ; Banerji, 232
Humayun, II, 235.

5. B., I, 460 ; T., II, 82 ; F., I, 457. Firishta says that says that it winter night and Afghāns kindled the fire. But being the month of May, it cannot be a winter season.

At the news of the Machiwara disaster, Sikandar Khān Sūr advanced to the Panjab with a force of 80,000 cavalry and a strong force of artillery and elephants. On June 22, 1555 (Sha'bān 2, 962), he fought a fierce battle with the Mughals near Sarhind.¹ Although the Afghāns were four times as numerous as the Mughals, yet they were completely defeated. Badāunī says that they behaved with due bravery and valour, but they could not contend against their fate. Defeated Sikandar fled to the Siwalik hills.² On July 20, 1555 (Ramzān I, 962), after fifteen years of exile, Humāyūn re-entered his capital Delhi.³ He then occupied Agra and the adjoining territories. His general Haidar Muhammad Khān Atka invested Biana. Being in a straitened condition, Ibrāhīm Khān ~~Sūr's~~ Sūr's father Ghāzi Khān Sūr surrendered. He was, however, executed by the Mughal general.⁴

Humāyūn did not long survive his restoration. He died on January 28, 1556 (15 Rabi' I, 963). On February 14, 1556 (2 Rabi' II, 963), Akbar, who was in the Panjab with his guardian Bairām Khān, was crowned at Kalanur.⁵

Hemu recovers Agra and Delhi :

After his victory over Muhammad Khān Sūr at Chapparghata in December, 1555, Adil intended to send Hemu to repel the Mughals.⁶

1. T., II, 88 and 82 ; B., I, 460 ; Banerji - Humayun, II, 233-4.

2. B., I, 461 ; T., II, 82.

3. T., II, 83.

4. B., I, 462-3.

5. T., II, 83 and 85 ; Banerji - Humayun, II, 256 and 259.

6. B., I, 433.

He came to Chunar to raise a strong force capable of fighting the formidable ~~an~~ enemy. He was soon informed of the death of Humāyūn. The news of Humāyūn's death and the accession of a boy on the throne induced Adil to send Hemu with a force of 50,000 horse and 500 elephants towards Agra and Delhi. But he himself could not leave Chunar on account of the factions which prevailed among his people.¹

It seems that ~~Adil~~ Adil could not send Hemu against the Mughals immediately after the death of Humāyūn. The flight of the Mughal generals and governors from Agra and other places at the approach of Hemu and his consequent speedy conquest of Mughal possessions suggest that Hemu's march from Chunar to Delhi could at most have taken two months. According to Abul Fazl, Hemu fought and defeated Tardī Beg and also occupied Delhi on the same day, i. e., October 7th, 1556 (Zilhaj 2, 963).² Had Hemu advanced immediately after the death of Humāyūn, he would have occupied Delhi six to seven months earlier than he actually did.

Moreover, at his accession Akbar inherited all the territories recovered by his father, for even after his ~~coronation~~ coronation at Kalanur, he stayed several months in the Panjab fighting against Sikandar Khān Sūr. Had Hemu occupied any Mughal territory Akbar and Bairām Khān would not have neglected to come to the capital Delhi.

1. Shāhi, 348-50 ; M., I65b ; F., I, 442-3 ; De laet, I40-I.

2. A. N., II, 29.

Furthermore, in view of his greatly reduced forces on account of constant warfare against the rebels and also of the ~~xxamgh~~ strength of the enemy, who had defeated Sikandar in several battles, Adil could not have sent his army immediately after Humāyūn's death. The raising and equipping of an army must have taken him some months.

Badāuni and Nizāmuddīn's writings also reveal the rapid march of Hemu to Delhi. These Mughal historians say that when Hemu approached Agra, Sikandar Khān Uzbek, the governor of Agra and Kalpi, fled towards Delhi.¹ Abdullā Khān Uzbek, Haidar Khān Muhammad and others left Etawa, Biana and other places and hastened to Delhi.² Alī Qulī Khān Zamān, who had been in Sambal, received letters from Agra, Etawa and other places informing him of the approach of Hemu and asking him to proceed to Delhi.³

As Hemu drew near to Delhi, Tardī Beg, Abdullā Khān Uzbek, Sikandar Khān Uzbek and other Mughal generals arranged their forces outside Delhi. On October 7, 1556 (Zilhaj 2, 963), Hemu engaged them near Tughluqabād in the environs of Delhi. The sight of the large force under the distinguished general Hemu seems to have damped down the fighting spirit of the Mughals. So, Abūl Fazl writes, " Many of the brave men from motives of prudence and some out of cowardice were not willing to fight. Some brave

1. T., II, 129 ; B., II, 13.

2. Ibid., 129.

3. B., II 13.

men were, however, determined to fight and die. "¹

In the first phase of the battle, Hemu's left fell back before the ~~xxxx~~ fierce attack of the Mughal right. Hemu, however, made a violent attack with his elephants on the Mughal centre whose commander Tardī Beg, being unable to stand, took to flight. Nizāmuddīn says that, by his artifice and tactics, Hemu prevailed over Tardī Beg and made him flee.² Victorious Hemu obtained enormous booty, 1,000 horses and 160 elephants and occupied Delhi.³

Some modern historians think that, after his occupation of Delhi, Hemu made no pretence of restoring his ~~mad~~ master. He took upon himself sover^eign power by assuming the title of Raja Bikramjit (a Persian form of Bikramaditya ; Bikramaditya was an illustrious king of ancient India. [†] and striking coins bearing his title.⁴ These historians have based their view on the evidence of the contemporary Persian historians. The Mughal historians say that, vaunting too much of his ~~xxxx~~ achievements, Hemu assumed the title of Raja Bikramjit and asked the Afghāns to salute him as Hemu Shāh.⁵ Ahmad Yadgar writes, " Having obtained possession of so many things appertaining to royalty, Hemu began to entertain ~~an~~ ambitious ideas. He distributed all the spoils, ~~xx~~ with the exception of elephants, among the Afghāns and won them over to

1. A. N., II, 129-30.

2. T., II, 129-31.

3. Shāhī, 151-3.

4. Cambridge History of India, IV, 72 ;

Advanced History of India, 446.

5. T., II, 131 ; B., II, 15 ; F., I, 464 ; ~~Don~~ Dorn, 176.

himself. With their concurrence, he ~~raised~~ raised the imperial canopy over himself and ordered coin to be struck in his name.¹

We cannot accept the evidence of the contemporary ~~Persian~~ Persian historians, because we have not found any numismatic evidence showing Hemu's assumption of the insignia of sovereign power. Besides, the title Bikramjit, which is considered to have been assumed by Hemu, was, in ~~reality~~ fact, conferred on him by Adil in 1553. We know on the evidence of Abdullā that Adil gave Hemu this title after the latter had obtained a brilliant victory over the Karranī rebels.²

Moreover, we cannot believe that the proud and self-willed Afghān chiefs would have consented to Hemu's assumption of sovereignty and to saluting him as Hemu Shāh. Had Hemu assumed sovereign power, he would not have been able to command a large army of the Afghāns in the battle of Panipat. Even Ahmad Yadgar's statement shows that Hemu remained loyal to Adil. This Afghān historian has quoted Hemu's letter to Adil after his occupation of Delhi to illustrate the deceitfulness of the former to the latter. But in fact, this letter ~~expresses~~ expresses Hemu's loyalty and subservience to Adil. Ahmad Yadgar says that, in order to console Adil, Hemu wrote to him, " Your slave by the royal fortune routed the Mughal army, which was as firm as the iron wall. I hear that Humayūn's son commands a numerous force and is advancing against

1. Shāhi, 352-3.

2. D., BM., 121b.

Delhi. For this reason, I have kept the horses and elephants to fight the formidable enemy. "I Adil was comforted by these deceitful assertions."²

Battle of Panipat :

On the news of Hemu's occupation of Delhi, Akbar and Bairām Khān left Gulbadan's husband Khwāja Khizr to deal with Sikandar Khān Sūr and they hurried from Jalandar towards Delhi. At Sarhind the defeated Tardī Beg and other Mughal nobles presented themselves before Akbar. Here Bairām Khān, who had the general direction of affairs, executed Tardī Beg. Ostensibly, Tardī Beg was executed for what Bairām Khān considered as his flight in a cowardly fashion from Delhi. This step was taken as a warning to cowardly generals. Firishta is of opinion that such an action was a necessity. He writes, " I understood from the best informed men of the times that had Tardī Beg not been executed by way of example, such was the condition of the Mughal army and the general feeling of those foreigners that the old scene of Sher Shāh would have been acted again. " ³

But the real cause of the execution of Tardī Beg by Bairām Khān was the power and the influence of the former, who became almost a rival to the latter. There was also a long-standing quarrel between the two. This was aggravated by the sectarian bitterness between Sunnī Tardī Beg and Shī'a Bairām.


I and 2. Shāhi, 352-3.

3. F., I, 464.

The flight of Tardī Beg from Delhi gave Bairām Khān simply a pretext to remove his rival in the name of imperial necessity.

After the execution of Tardī Beg, Bairām Khān made preparations for the recovery of Delhi and Agra. He sent in advance 'Alī Qulī Khān & Zamān with a force of 10,000 and himself and his royal ward with the rest of the army followed them.

Hemu prepared to meet the Mughals. To check the advance of the enemy he sent in advance his park of artillery. In an engagement with the Mughal advance guard, it was defeated and dispersed.¹ The news of this disaster distressed Hemu and disheartened his men. Hemu, however, encouraged them by giving an elephant to every chief and promising increased pay as well as rewards to the officers and soldiers.² With 30,000 cavalry and more than 1,500 elephants, he then came to Panipat and met the Mughal advance guard,³ which according to Abūl Fazl, numbered 1,000 souls of whom only 5,000 were men of battle.⁴ On Thursday, November 5, 1556 (Muharram 2, 964), the contending forces advanced to fight in the following battle array.⁵



1. A. N., II, 35-6 ; T., II, 131 ; F., I, 463.

2. Ibid., 35-6.

3. Ibid., 50 ; B., II, 16 ; F., I, 465

next page

A Mughal assault shook Hemu's wings and his commander of the right, Shāhī Khān Kākar, fell in the field. With his fierce war elephants, Hemu, however, made a desperate charge and shook the Mughal left. He then fell on the centre under 'Alī Qulī Khān Zaman. The Mughals, however, received Hemu with showers of arrows. An arrow pierced his eye and came out at the back of his head. Seeing Hemu thus mortally wounded, his men dispersed in panic.

As Hemu's elephant was making off towards the jungle, a Mughal officer, Shāh Qulī Khān, fell in with the elephant and discovered Hemu lying wounded in the haudah.¹ He then drove the elephant to Akbar and Bairām Khān who had just arrived at Panipat and received the news of victory.² Abūl Fazl says that Bairām Khān asked Akbar to slay Hemu and earn the merit of a ' Ghāzī ' (religious warrior). As Akbar did not care to kill a fallen enemy, Bairām himself slew Hemu.³

Continued from page, 112.

4. A. N., II, 37.

5. Ibid, ; T., II, 131 ; F., I, 465 ; B., II, 16.

1. T., II, 131-2 ; A. N., II, 49 ; F., I, 465. Abūl Fazl and Firishta say that Hemu's own driver, for fear of his life, betrayed his master to Shāh Qulī Khān.

2. A. N., II, 39.

3. Ibid, 41-2 ; T., II, 132. Jahāngīr writes (Rogers - Tūzūk-i-Jahāngīrī, I, 40) that Akbar said that, in his boyhood, he had drawn and killed the picture of Hemu and hence he declined to kill a killed man.

Abūl Fazl greatly appreciates the genius of Hemu and regrets that Bairām Khān had unwisely killed him. He says that Hemu was ~~an~~ a most ~~xxx~~ excellent servant possessed of a lofty spirit and if he could be induced to serve Emperor Akbar, he would have performed great things.¹

The death of Hemu was a great calamity to ~~Hemu~~ Adil. It was Hemu's energy and generalship which had so long ~~preserved~~ preserved his position against his enemies. In Hemu's death, the musician king lost his strength and spirit and became as helpless as a boy without a guardian.

The Afghān loss of Northern India :

The battle of Panipat had dispossessed the Afghāns of the territories from the Panjab to Agra ; but still they held a large part of India. The Siwalik hills of the Panjab remained under Sikandar Khān Sūr. Rukn Khān Lūhānī, an amīr of ~~Adil~~ Adil, held Sambal.² Hājī Khān governed Alwar and Mewat.³ Adil retained control of the territories from Lucknow ~~to~~ and Gwalior to the borders of Bengal. Bāz Bahādur and Bahādur Khān Sūr ruled Malwa and Bengal respectively. Thus the territories under the Afghāns were twice as extensive as the empire of Akbar and the united action of the Afghāns might have retrieved the situation even after the disaster of Panipat.

1. A. N., II, 42.

2. Ibid, 56.

3. Ibid.

But on account of their factions, the Afghāns could not see the long-term interest of the Indian Afghāns. They continued to fight one another and thus they prepared their own grave. A few Afghān chiefs fought individually against the Mughals and fell, while others remained passive spectators expecting to profit by the fall of the chiefs of their own race.

When Ādil's general Hemu was fighting at Panipat Bahādur Khān Sūr of Bengal seized the opportunity to stab him in the back. He occupied Bihar and advanced to revenge the death of his father. In April, 1557, Ādil fought against him at Fathpur, 4 miles west of Surajgarh, and ~~kikkat~~ was killed.¹ It was Akbar's good fortune that his Afghān enemies were fighting and killing themselves and thus paving the way for his supremacy in Northern India. So Abūl Fazl writes, "I admire the wonderous fortune which occurred to the empire from the mutual contention of the enemies. They fought one another and showed themselves auxiliaries of eternal dominion."²

Sikandar Khān Sūr fought against the Mughals in the Siwalik hills of the Panjab and in March, 1557, he obtained a victory over Khwājā Khizr. At this news, Akbar and Bairām Khān advanced to deal with him.³ Sikandar retreated to his stronghold in the Siwalik hills, which Abūl Fazl mentions as a refuge of the disaffected and headstrong spirits of India. As Akbar won over the

1. B., I, 433 ; F., I, 443 ; Dacca university History of Bengal, II, 180.

2. A. N., II, 58.

3. T., II, 133 ; B., II, 18.

local zamindars, Sikandar was obliged to take shelter in the impregnable fortress ~~at Mankat~~ of Mankot built by Islām Shāh.¹ The Mughals closely besieged the fort and prevented egress and ingress to it.² Shortage of provisions forced Sikandar to open negotiations for peace and on July 25, 1557 (Ramzān 27, 964), he surrendered on Akbar's promise of a jagir to him in Bengal. As a surety for his loyalty to the Emperor, he gave his son 'Abdur Rahmān Sūr and confidential agent Ghāzī Khān Tanūrī to the service of the Mughal empire.³

Hājī Khān, who joined Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr in the battle of Farrah and deserted him after his defeat, joined Hemu in the battle of Panipat. After the battle, he retired to Alwar. With his men and goods, the father of Hemu took shelter with him. Akbar sent an army under Pir Muhammad Khān Sarwānī to Alwar. Hājī Khān fled to Ajmir and Alwar including Mewat fell into the hands of the Mughals. Hemu's father fell a captive to them. Hājī Khān fought the Raja of Ajmir and occupied his ~~ix~~ territory.⁴ At the approach of the Mughals, he, however, fled to Guzrat and joined the Afghān chiefs of that country.⁵

In 1557, Khān Zamān defeated and drove away Rukn Khān Lūhānī from Sambal.⁶ Another Afghān chief Jalāl Khān Sūr, in

1. T., II, 133 ; B., II, 18 ; A. N., II, 47-51.

2. A. N., II, 58.

3. Ibid, 59 ; T., II, 134-5 ; F., I, 466.

4. Ibid, 45-6.

5. B., II, 32 and 45 ; Mir'āt A., I, 90-1.

6. A. N. II, 56 ; De Laet, 142.

alliance with Hasan Khān ~~Sur~~ Bachoti, one of the great zamīndārs of India, fought against Khān Zamān near Lucknow. He was, however, beaten by the Mughal general.¹ As a result of these defeats, the Afghāns lost to the Mughals the territories from Sambal to Lucknow.

Ibrāhīm Khān Sur, who had issued from his refuge in Patna after the death of Ādil, took possession of Jaunpur.² In 1558, Khān Zamān advanced to conquer Jaunpur. Being unable to stand the assault of the Mughal general, Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr fled to ~~Orx~~ Orissa. Khān Zamān occupied Jaunpur. In the same year, Bahādur Khān of Bengal advanced towards Jaunpur with 30 to 40 thousand horse to drive the Mughals from Northern India. Khān Zamān, ~~however~~ however, drove him back to Bengal.³

The Afghān chiefs continued their isolated efforts to recover Northern India. The partisans of Ādil placed his son Sher Khān (called Sher Shāh II) on the throne at Chunar and in 1561, with a large force of 20,000 cavalry, 50,000 infantry and 500 elephants, they proceeded to recover Jaunpur. In an engagement near Jaunpur, the Afghāns defeated Khān Zamān's forces. ~~Thik~~ Thinking that they had won the victory, the Afghān soldiers turned to plunder. Khān Zamān took the opportunity to make a swift attack ~~on~~ on them. This unexpected attack made the Afghāns flee in great confusion and panic. Thus the Afghāns, through their cupidity and

1. A. N., II, 56 ; B., II, 25 ; De laet^e, 142.

2. Ibid, 82.

3. B., II, 48 ; De Laet, 142.

indiscipline, lost a victory.¹ After this defeat, Sher Shāh II took to the life of a recluse.²

Feeling that the Afghān fortune was irretrievably ~~ruined~~ and it was impossible for him to continue possession of Chunar, Fattū Khān Masnad-i-ʿAlī, a noble of ʿAdil, willingly surrendered the fort to the Mughal general Asaf Khān and entered the service of Akbar.³

When the nobles of ʿAdil had placed his son Sher Shāh II on the throne at Chunar, the supporters of the family of Islām Shāh chose his son Awāz Khān as their king at Rohtas. They took advantage of Khān Zamān's preoccupation with Sher Shāh II to seize some Mughal territories. Then in 1561, after Sher Shāh II's defeat, they advanced towards Jaunpur with a large army. In an engagement at Andhiari, the Afghāns beat a detachment of Khān Zamān and then they ~~gave~~ gave themselves to plunder. Abūl Fazl says that an accident saved the position of the Mughals. An unruly elephant of Khān Zamān's brother Bahādur Khān fell into the hands of the Afghāns. Some Afghān soldiers unchained the elephant and tried to ride it. The elephant ~~he~~ became violent and created confusion among them. The Afghāns, who were busy in plunder, mistook the confusion ~~amongst them~~ to be their defeat and took to their heels.⁴ With a small force, Khān Zamān obtained a

1. B., II, 48 ; A. N., II, 138-9 ; T., II, 154 ; D., BM., 126a.

2. A. N., II, 49 ; D., Bm., 126a.

3. Ibid, 149-50 ; B., II, 63 ; T., II, 170.

4. Ibid, 220.

decisive victory over them.¹

Awāz Khān's was the last attempt of the Afghāns to recover ~~the~~ their lost territories. After this, they ceased to launch any systematic offensive against the Mughals and they gave their attention mainly to preserving what they still held in India. Akbar, however, was not inclined to allow them retain possession of their territories. His conquest of Malwa illustrates this fact.

The Afghān loss of Malwa :

Bāz Bahādur, the king of Malwa, had given no immediate cause for offense to Akbar. When his fellow chiefs were fighting the Mughals, he remained unconcerned at the fate of his race. If he rejoiced at the downfall of his Afghān rivals or hoped by standing aloof to avoid their fate, he was disillusioned, because Akbar would never tolerate the existence of an Afghān kingdom by the side of his empire. Indeed ~~Akbar~~ Akbar invaded Malwa in 1560.

According to the contemporary Persian historians, the misgovernment of Bāz Bahādur was the cause of Akbar's invasion of Malwa. They say that Bāz Bahādur was so much immersed in pleasure, music and women ² that he could not distinguish between day and night. Indeed Bāz Bahādur was a great musician. He gathered round himself nine hundred singers, musicians, songstresses and dancing girls of whom Rupamati excelled others in beauty and wit.

1. B., II, 24-5.

2. A. N., II, 1346-6 ; T., II, 151 ; M., 168a ; Ma' āsir, I, 388.

He was ~~adept~~ adept in various kinds of Hindi tunes and in the composition of Hindi love songs. During his reign, music reached its perfection.¹ Being thus given (in) music, Bāz Bahādur neglected the ~~gove~~government of the country. ~~His~~ His indifference to government caused suffering to his people and Akbar thought it his duty to deliver them from the evils of ~~misgover~~ misgovernment.²

It may, however, be pointed out that the misgovernment of Bāz Bahādur did not in any way injure the interests of the Mughal empire. So, the question of misgovernment was simply an excuse to justify the conquest of the country. The fact is that Akbar could not reconcile himself to leaving the Afghāns in the possession of the fertile country of Malwa, which enjoyed great strategic importance for subjecting Rajputana, Guzrat, Gondwana and also for an expansion in the Deccan.

Akbar's first preparations for an attack upon Malwa, made in 1559, were abortive for the rebellion of Bairām Khān made it necessary to recall the army under Bahādur Khān, the brother of Khān Zamān.³ In 1561 after Bairām's fall, Akbar renewed his ~~attemp~~ attempt, sending a large army under Adham Khān and Pīr Muḥammad Sārwanī.⁴ Bāz Bahādur was so given to pleasure that he did not act untill the Mughals had arrived within three miles of his capital

1. M., I68a-b ; F., II, 538.

2. Ibid, I68a ; A. N., II, 134-6 ; T., II, 151 ; Ma' āsir, I, 388.

3. A. N., II, 90 ; B., II, 29.

4. Ibid, 135 ; M., I68a.

Sarangpur. Ni'matullā says that it was only then, yielding to urgency, that he left the room of his beauties and took the field. The Mughals, however, defeated him and occupied Malwa.¹

Bāz Bahādur wandered in the jungles of Malwa and Khandesh. Pīr Muhammad Khān Shirwānī again defeated him at Awan in Bijagarh.² Bāz Bahādur took shelter with Mirāk Mubārak Shāh, the ruler of Khandesh. In 1562, he advanced towards Malwa with a large army of Khandesh and in an engagement on the bank of the Narbada, he defeated Pīr Muhammad, who, in his flight, was drowned in the river.³ At his approach, Qiyā Khān and other Mughal generals left Malwa. Bāz Bahādur recovered his ~~the~~ throne.⁴

Bāz Bahādur had scarcely time to draw breath before Akbar sent Abdullā Khān Uzbek to Malwa. As resistance to the mighty Mughal force was beyond his power, Bāz Bahādur left the country without a fight.⁵

Bāz Bahādur first took shelter with Baharji, the zamīndār of Baglana, and thence he went to Guzrat seeking help of the Fūlādī Afghān chiefs of Patan.⁶ Being disappointed, he went to Ahmadnagar. As he failed to obtain help of the Nizām ul Mulk, he went to Rana Pratap Singh of Mewar.⁷

1. M., 168a ; A. N., II, 136 ; F., II, 538.

2. A. N., II, 166 ; Ma'āsir, I, 390.

3. Badāunī (II, 51) says " He went by water to fire. "

4. A. N., II, 167-8 ; Ma'āsir, i, 390 ; F., I, 541.

5. Ibid.

6. Mir'āt S., 333a and 345b ; Fazlulla - Mir'āt S., 295, 299.

7. A. N., II, 358 ; T., III, 423-4.

Abūl Fazl says that Akbar felt pity for the musician ex-king of Malwa and in 1571 induced him to come to the court with a promise of favour. He made him a court musician and gave him a mansab of 1,000 which was later on raised to 2,000. ¹

Causes of the Afghān loss of Northern India :

It is surprising that the Afghāns, who had ~~been~~ long been settled in India and had the vast resources of the country at their disposal, should have suffered defeat after defeat and lost the sovereignty to ~~a foreign people like~~ the Mughals. What were the causes of such an unexpected event ?

Sher Shāh would often say to his people, " The Afghāns are not inferior to the Mughals in valour and courage ; but they lost the sovereignty of Hindustan on account of their discord and dissension. " ² Of course, Sher Shāh's statement refers to the loss of Afghān sovereignty in 1526. This analysis of the cause, however, applies equally well to the loss of sovereignty in 1556. The primary cause of the national disaster on both the occasions remained the same, the factious spirit, discord and dissension of the Afghāns. In translating Firishta, Alexander Dow maintains the same view. ³ On the eve of both the occasions, there had been factious fight and civil war among the Afghāns and this prevented them from presenting an united front to the enemy.

1. A. N., II, 358 ; T., III, 423-4 ; M., 168a-b ; Ma' āsir, I, 390-I.

2. Abbās, BM., 20b.

3. Dow - Firishta, II, II3.

Faction was inherent in the nature of the Afghāns and their loss of sovereignty in 1526 and ~~1556~~ again in 1556, owing to that spirit, proves that the empire was not for such a tribal people.

It is generally believed that Islām Shāh's autocracy engendered faction of the Afghāns and prepared conditions for the fall of the Afghān saltanate. In fact, Islām Shāh wanted to ~~destroy~~ destroy the idea of the tribal independence of the Afghāns and consolidate the saltanate. Had he lived longer and been succeeded by a strong and energetic ruler like himself, the Afghān saltanate would have emerged consolidated and stronger. But he had a very short reign and was succeeded first by a minor and then by a weakling. It was really the incapacity of ~~Adil~~ Adil that frustrated the labours of Islām Shāh and caused the fall of the Afghān ~~saltanate~~ saltanate in Northern India.

The Afghān army, which was the pride of Sher Shāh and the prop of Islām Shāh, lost its morale at the time of Adil. They behaved like a mob on the field of battle and caring more for spoils, they would often give ~~themselves~~ themselves to plunder before they had actually won the victory. On several occasions, the Afghāns failed to clinch their victory on account of this sort of behaviour in the battle.¹ Though Badāunī says that ten Mughals could meet thousand of the Afghāns,² we consider that the Mughals won victory not because of their superiority in courage,

1. Idem, II7-8.

2. B., I, 459.

but because of the indiscipline of the Afghāns.

According to the contemporary historians, Hemu's elevation to supreme position in the saltanate and his usurpation of sovereign power were responsible for the fall of the Afghān saltanate. Badāunī and Ni'matullā say that the Afghāns were so much dissatisfied with Hemu that they prayed for his fall and even welcomed a vicissitude against themselves in the battle of Panipat.¹ We have discussed before that Hemu was neither insolent towards the Afghāns nor did he usurp the sovereign power.² ~~We have discussed before that Hemu was neither insolent towards the Afghāns.~~ The raising of a Hindu to supreme position in the saltanate was itself enough to dissatisfy the Afghāns. Hemu, however, sought to satisfy them by his care for them.³ He also gave them rewards.⁴ The success of Hemu in various campaigns against the rebels and Mughals shows that, in spite of his being a Hindu, he inspired the confidence of the Afghān soldiers. The ~~fact~~ fact that he was able to command 30,000 horsemen in the battle of Panipat bears out that he still had the confidence of the Afghāns.

The defeat of the Afghāns at Panipat was not due to the dissatisfaction of the Afghāns with Hemu's leadership. It was rather the absence of his leadership which dispirited them. As an

1. B., II, 15 ; M., I66a.

2. Idem, Io9-Io.

3. Idem, 97-8.

4. Idem, II2.

arrow disabled him, the leaderless Afghans dispersed in panic from the battle-field.

In spite of their long association with India, the Afghāns failed to ^{enlist the} support and the sympathy of the subject people. The fact that several inhabitants of Delhi and Agra informed Humāyūn of Islām Shāh's death and of the dissension of the Afghāns and invited him to India¹ expresses the feeling of dissatisfaction of the subject people towards the ruling Afghāns and their admiration for the expelled Mughals. It shows that ^{to} the Indian section of the population, they remained a strange people in the middle of the sixteenth century ~~at~~ as they had been in the beginning of the reign of Bahlūl Lūdī.²

The civil wars of the Afghāns did great harm to the people at large. From 1553 to 1556, there was continuous fighting from the Panjab to Bengal. This must have caused great injury to agriculture, trade and industry. Badāuni says that in 1555 a great famine raged in the territories from Delhi to Agra and Biana. People died in their thousands and men ate man.³ The damage to corn-fields and famine could not have failed to aggravate the discontent of the people against the Afghān regime. In the circumstances, they did everything in their power to undermine such a rule.

1. A. N., I, 336 : F., I, 456 ; De Laet, 139.

2. Idem, 16.

3. B., I, 430.

As the two important regions, Kabul-Panjab and Bengal, remained outside, the Afghān saltanate of Northern India lost the sources of its strength. The province of Kabul and the north-west frontier area were the recruiting ground of the Afghāns. As Kabul was in the hands of Humāyūn and the Gakkars in the frontier were friendly to him, the Afghān chiefs experienced great difficulty in recruiting fresh soldiers. Humāyūn's conquest of the Panjab in 1555 completely severed the Afghān-land from the Afghāns of India.

Bengal was another source of strength to the Afghān saltanate. Its wealth and resources helped the establishment of the Sūr Afghān saltanane. So, Sher Shāh and Islām Shāh maintained their strong hold on Bengal. With Ādil's accession, however, it became independent under Muhammad Khān Sūr. Though it remained under an Afghān chief, it proved a source of trouble and weakness to the saltanate of Northern India, because Muhammad Khān Sūr and his successor Bahādur Khān Sūr contested the sovereignty of Northern India with Ādil. This also lessened the strength of the Afghāns and paved the way for the loss of their hegemony in Northern India.

CHAPTER V

The Afghān Saltanate in Eastern India and its relations with the Mughals

Even after the loss of Northern India, the Afghāns possessed Eastern India, which, in his great political wisdom, Sher Shāh had made his early seat of power and the stronghold of the Afghāns. Akbar was, however, determined on expelling them from it. But he could not do so until the powerful Afghān ruler Sulaimān Karranī had died in 1572.

The infiltration of the Afghāns into Bengal began in the fifteenth century when they came as mercenaries of its independent sultāns. The Ḥabshī sultān Muẓaffar Shāh (1491-94) had a few thousand Afghān soldiers in his army.¹ There were some Afghān officers² and a body of Afghān soldiers³ in the service of 'Alāuddīn Husain Shāh (1498-1517), the founder of the Saiyid dynasty in Bengal. The battle of Panipat in 1526 made a few Afghāns, including Ibrāhīm Lūdī's brother Mahmūd Lūdī and some members of his family, flee to Bengal. The Saiyid Sultān Saiyid sultān Nasrat Shāh (1517-32) gave parganas and towns for their maintenance and married a daughter of Ibrāhīm Lūdī.⁴ Thus the Afghāns obtained shelter in Bengal, which was destined to be their seat of power and home from 1539 to 1576. The

1. Riyāz, 128.

2. Ibid, 133.

3. Ibid, 134.

4. Shāhī, 99 ; F., II, 587.

conciliatory policy of Bābur and Humāyūn left the Lūhānī and Sūr Afghāns undisturbed in Bihar.¹

Sher Shāh's saltanate in Eastern India :

A wise and a far-sighted politician, Sher Shāh saw the importance of Bengal ~~and~~ and decided to make it, with its ~~pro~~ proverbial wealth as a support and equally proverbial bad climate as a barrier, the citadel of the last Afghān power in India. Indeed Bengal was fabulously rich. Ibn Batuta, who visited Bengal in 1346, spoke in glowing terms of the general prosperity of the country.² In his Memoirs, Bābur also wrote, " To amass treasure, the Bengalis regard as a glorious distinction and it is considered as a disgraceful fault in a ruler to spend and consume the treasure of his predecessors. " ³ The writings of the Mughal historians also disclose that in the sixteenth century , Bengal possessed enormous riches.⁴

Besides its wealth, Bengal also possessed a notoriously bad climate on account of its swamps and marshes. Hence, Ibn Batuta says, the men coming from Khurasan called it ' dūzak^h-i-purni^hmat ' or the hell of all good things. ⁵ Owing to its bad climate, the Mughal officers did not want to serve in Bengal. In 1538, Humāyūn wanted to appoint one of his nobles, Zahīd Beg, as

1. ~~Idem~~, See pp. 184-92.

2. Ibn Batūta - Tuḥfah-i-Nuẓẓār, II, 179.

Translated in N. K. Bhattasali's Coins and Chronology of the independent sultans of Bengal, 135.

3. M. M Waqī'at-i-Bāburī, 483-4 ; B. N., II, 483.

4. B., II, 269.

5. Same as in 2.

its governor. Zahid Beg said, " What! could Your Majesty find no other place to kill me than in Bengal. " ¹ Even the Mughal soldiers grumbled at going to Bengal. So, Akbar increased by 100 p. c. and 50 p. c. respectively the pay of the soldiers serving in Bengal and Bihar . ²

The bad climate together with the hundreds of streams, which glide over the water-logged soil, not only discouraged the soldiers of Northern India from coming to Bengal but also ~~afforded~~ afforded a great ~~defence~~ defence to the country. They had always helped Bengal in throwing off the yoke of the saltanate of Delhi and asserting its independence. Hence, Barānī writes ~~that~~ that shrewd and well-informed men gave Bengal the name of Bulghakpūr, i.e., the city of strife. ³ Abūl Fazl also expresses the same idea regarding Bengal. He writes, " The country of Bengal is a land where, owing to the climate's favouring the base, the dust of dissension is always rising. So, in old writings it was called Bulghak Khāna k or the house of strife. " ⁴

Realising the importance of Bengal for its wealth and its climate, Sher Shāh, from the beginning of his career, made repeated attempts to conquer it and in 1538 succeeded in ~~occupy~~ occupying its capital Gaur. The vast wealth he obtained in Gaur greatly strengthened his position against Humāyūn and enabled

1. Jauhar, 30 and A. N., I, 157. زاهد بیگ در میان مجلس عرض کرد که جای دیگر نبود که بر کشتن میوه دهد
در بنگله نمایند

2. A. N., III, 293.

3. Barānī, 82. دانیان و تجربه یافتگان لکهنوتی را بلفاکیپیر خواندند

4. A. N. III, 183. که انرا از قدیم بلفاک خانه گویند =

him in 1539 to defeat the Mughals at Chausa. Ni'matullā says that, for want of adequate transport, Sher Shāh could not carry the ~~xxx~~ treasures of Gaur to Rohtas until Jalāl Khān ~~x~~ sent him the elephants, horses and camels which he had captured from the Mughals by a surprise attack on them at Garhi. ¹

That Sher Shāh was keenly alive to the importance of Bengal is proved by the fact that in 1538 when Humāyūn advanced towards Bihar, he offered to surrender Bihar and pay him ten lak of rupees as tribute if he was left in possession of Bengal. ² Humāyūn wanted to give him some places in Bihar and Jaunpur. But on no account did Sher Shāh consent to part with Bengal. ³

Even after he had occupied the throne of Delhi, ~~Sher~~ Sher Shāh attached the same importance to Bengal and maintained his hold tight on that country. In 1542 when Khizr Khān Turk ~~xxx~~ showed signs of rebellion by marrying a daughter of the last Saiyid sultān Mahmūd III and sitting on the Takṭūkī (raised platform) in the manner of the kings, he left his urgent work of completing the contruction of the fort of Rohtas in the Panjab and hastened towards Bengal. He imprisoned the rebelliously inclined governor and divided Bengal into several parts giving them to tribal chiefs as jagirs. To exercise a general ~~supervision~~ supervision over the chiefs and to settle the disputes that

1. M. II4a.

2. Abbās, IO., 59a ; Dorn, III.

3. Jauhar, 25-6. گفت که من پنج و شش سال محنت کشیده بنگاله را بضرر شمشیر گرفته ام و اکثر لشکر من کشته شده پس ملک بنگاله کسی نمیدهم.

might arise between them, Sher Shāh appointed Qāzī Fazīlat, a man well-known for his learning and honesty, as the amīn (trusty) of the country. ¹ Indeed Sher Shāh's vigilance maintained his hold on the whole of Bengal extending to the hills of Assam in the north-east and Chittagong in the south-east. ²

Islām Shāh also attached ~~the~~ great importance to the possession of Bengal. In following the policy of centralising the saltanate, he appointed one of his relations and a very capable man, Muhammad Khān Sūr, as governor of the province. ³ In 1546-48, Islām Shāh took prompt action in suppressing Sulaimān Khān, who aimed at the restoration of the Saiyid saltanate in Bengal. ⁴

Independent Sūr saltanate in Eastern India :

In 1553, on the murder of Islām Shāh's son and successor Fīrūz and the accession of 'Adil, Muhammad Khān Sūr, who was the supporter of the ousted family, declared himself as a sovereign ruler of Bengal and, assuming the title of Shāhsuddin Muhammad Shāh Ghāzī, he struck coins in his own name. ⁵ Seated on the throne, Muhammad Shāh turned his eyes ~~on~~ to Northern India and prepared to make a bid for the saltanate of Delhi.

With his eyes riveted to the north, Muhammad Shah neglected the east and in 1553 the Arakanese king Meng Beng

1. 'Abbās, 10., 87b ; BM., 57a ; T., II, 102.

2. My Article - Chittagong under the Pathan Rule in Bengal, ~~xxx~~ JASB., 1952, 23-5.

3. B., I, 432 ; T., II, 124 ; Riyāz, 148.

4. Idem, 58-9.

5. B., I, 430 ; T., II, 124 ; Riyāz, 148 ; Wright - Catalogue of the coins of the Indian Museum, II, 180.

seized the opportunity to occupy Chittagong.¹ ~~This~~ This renewed, after the lapse of a century and a half, the tripartite struggle among the rulers of Bengal, Tripura and Arakan for the possession of Chittagong.² Meng Beng could not long retain his hold on the port. In 1554 ~~Riya~~ Bijoymanikya, the powerful king of Tripura (1540-71), dispossessed him of it. Tripura's hold on Chittagong, however, lasted only a few months. Rajmala, the family chronicle of the kings of Tripura, records its capture by the Afghān general Mubārak Khān.³ The Arakan coin of Muhammad Khān Sūr also shows that in 1554 he not only recovered Chittagong but also occupied Arakan.⁴ The forces of Bijoymanikya fought eight months without success to recapture Chittagong. Digging holes under the walls of the fort at night, they, however, entered the fort and defeated the Afghāns in a surprise attack. They occupied ~~Chittagong~~ Chittagong and, taking the Afghān general Mubārak Khān a captive to Rangamati, they slaughtered him as a sacrifice to their fourteen gods.⁵ Engaged with Adil in the north, Muhammad Khān Sūr could not arrange for the recovery of Chittagong.

Aiming at the throne of Delhi, Muhammad Khān Sūr had entered into a sharp rivalry with Adil. In 1555 he occupied Bihar and Jaunpur and then advanced towards Agra. In December

1. Phyaire - History of Burma, 79-80.

2. My Article - Chittagong under the Pathan Rule in Bengal, JASB., 1952, 25-7.

3. Rajmala, II, 46-7.

4. Lanepoole - Catalogue of the Indian coins, 56 ;

Wright - Catalogue of the coins of the Indian Museum, II, 180

5. Rajmala, II, 47.

he fought a battle with 'Adil's general Hemu at Chapparghata, 15 kos from Agra, but was defeated and killed.¹

The chiefs of Muhammad Khān Sūr retreated to a village named Jhusi, opposite to Allahabad, and raised his son Khizr Khān to the throne. Khizr Khān assumed the title of Ghiyāsuddīn Bahādūr Shāh.² He then proceeded to recover Bengal, which was in the meantime occupied by 'Adil. Bahādūr Shāh fought a battle with 'Adil's governor of Bengal, Shāhbāz Khān, near Gaur. He defeated and killed him and entered his capital Gaur.³

Bahādūr Shāh raised a large army and in 1557 advanced to revenge the death of his father. The rebel Tāj Khān Karranī and his brothers joined him.⁴ In April, 1557 in a battle at Fathpur, # four miles west of Surajgarh, their combined forces defeated and killed 'Adil.⁵ As a result of this victory, the whole of Bihar passed into the hands of Bahādūr Shāh. Leaving Tāj Khān Karranī in charge of Bihar, he returned to Gaur.⁶

Master of Bengal and Bihar, Bahādūr Shāh resolved to expel the Mughals from Northern India and to recover the lost sovereignty of the Afghāns. In 1558 he advanced towards # Jaunpur with 30,000 horse. In an engagement near Jaunpur, he routed ~~the~~ an

1. Idem, 104

2. B., I, 433 ; Riyāz, 149; Wright - Catalogue of the coins of the Indian Museum, II, 181.

3. Riyāz, 150.

4. R. T., 697a.

5. B., I, 433 ; R. T., 697a.

6. R. T., 697a.

army of Khān Zamān, the Mughal viceroy of the eastern provinces. Thinking that they had won the victory, the Afghān soldiers gave themselves to plunder. While they were thus engaged, Khān Zamān made a surprise attack on them and dispersed them. Many of the Afghāns were killed and captured and their baggage fell into the hands of the Mughals.¹

This defeat made Bahādur Shāh wiser. He understood that the Mughals had consolidated their position in Northern India and it was sheer waste of energy and ~~resources~~ resources to try to drive ~~them~~ them from it. Henceforth Bahādur Shāh kept himself within his own territorial limits and maintained good relations with the Mughal viceroy at Jaunpur.

Bahādur Shāh died in 1560 and was succeeded by his brother Jalāluddīn Sūr, who assumed the title of Ghiyāsuddīn Abūl Muzaffar Jalāl Shāh.² It appears from a Mosque inscription near Sherpur Murcha in Bogra district³ that in 1553 in the reign of his father, Jalāl installed himself as an independent ruler in eastern Bengal. He, however, submitted to his father and was nominated second in succession.

Jalāl Shāh followed a very pacific foreign policy. In his relations with the Mughals, he avoided provoking them. So, he remained a passive spectator of the campaigns of the Afghāns of Chunar and Rohtas for the recovery of Northern India.

1. B., II, 25.

2. Riyāz, 150 ; Wright - Catalogue of coins in Indian Museum, II,

3. JASB., 1875, 275. Inscription is dated 960 H.

Jalāl Shāh died in 1563¹ and was succeeded by his son, whose name, however, has not been mentioned by the contemporary historians. After a reign of seven months and nine days, he fell a victim to a usurper, who assumed the title of Ghiyāsuddīn. Ghiyāsuddīn reigned one year and eleven days. In 1564 he was killed by Tāj Khān, the founder of the Karranī saltanate in Bengal.²

The Karranī saltanate in Eastern India

Tāj Khān Karranī, the founder :

The Karranī Afghāns, who had remained obscure in the Lūdi saltanate, rose to great political importance in the period of the Sūr rule under their chiefs Tāj Khān Karranī and Sulaimān Khān Karranī. Tāj Khān's father Jamāl Khān played no significant role in the history of the Afghāns, because we do not find any reference to him except in an inscription which mentions him as his son.³ Worthy sons of an obscure father, Tāj Khān and Sulaimān Khān, were, however, destined to political greatness.

We first see Tāj Khān and Sulaimān Khān in 1540 fighting as generals of Sher Shāh at the battle of Kanauj.⁴ In recognition of their services, Sher Shāh gave them jagirs in Khwaspur Tanda and other places on the bank of the Ganges in South Bihar.⁵ ~~He~~ He especially favoured Tāj Khān for his intelligence and ~~courage~~ courage

1. Wright - Catalogue of coins in Indian Museum, II, 181.
The coin is dated 970 H.

2. Riyāz, 152.

3. JBORS., IV, 188 ; Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica, 1933-4, 7-8.

4. Abbās, E. IV, 381 ; A. N., 164.

5. Riyāz, 153 ; Stewart Stewart, - History of Bengal, 147.

and made him a ~~son~~ constant companion of his son Jalāl,¹ who, after his death in 1545, ascended the throne under the title of Islām Shāh.

In the reign of Islām Shāh, Tāj Khān became one of his principal nobles and confidential agents. He rendered very valuable and loyal service to his royal master. In 1548, Tāj Khān defeated and killed the dangerous pretender Sulaimān Khān of Bhati and thus saved the eastern part of Islām Shāh's saltanate.² He also got Islām Shāh rid of Khwās Khān by treacherously murdering him. The contemporary historians condemn Tāj Khān for his base ingratitude to his benefactor Khwās Khān, because he owed his preferment to that great general of Sher Shāh.³ In fact, Tāj Khān took to unscrupulous methods in order to please Islām Shāh.

At the time of his death, Islām Shāh left his minor son Fīrūz to the care of Tāj Khān⁴ and when Fīrūz ascended the throne Tāj Khān became his vazīr and the absolute authority in the saltanate. The jealousy of the other Afghān chiefs, however, caused the dismissal of Tāj Khān from that high office. After his dismissal, it was easy for ~~shik~~ Adil to kill the boy king Fīrūz and to obtain the saltanate.⁵

On account of Tāj Khān's ~~attack~~ attachment to the

1. R. T., 696b.

2. Idem, 58-9.

3. H. x 499 & F., I, 435; B., I, 409.

4. R. T., 696b; Shāhi, 272-4.

5. Ibid.

family of Islām Shāh, 'Ādil could not trust him and wanted to ruin him. One day someone made an attempt on Tāj Khān's life at Gwalior. Tāj Khān suspected that the attempt on his life had been made at the instigation of 'Ādil. He also saw the rise of the factions among the Afghān chiefs of 'Ādil. So, he thought it wise to retire from his court, which he termed as the house of strife. In 1553 on the eve of 'Ādil's Gwalior darbar, Tāj Khān escaped from Gwalior and took the road to Bengal.¹

On the news of Tāj Khān's flight, 'Ādil detached a large force in pursuit of him and himself followed it. At Chappramau, forty kos from Agra and thirty kos from Kanauj, Tāj Khān fought against the forces of 'Ādil. Defeated, he fled towards Ghunar. On the way, he won over a few revenue collectors of crown lands and seized the treasure and 100 elephants belonging to the king. He then joined his brothers Sulaimān, Iliyās and 'Imād in South Bihar.² A large number of Afghāns entered his service and he became absolute in South Bihar.³

'Ādil and Hemu advanced to suppress the Karranī rebels. In 1554 in a battle near the Ganges, Hemu defeated them.⁴ As 'Ādil had to divert his energies to suppress the pretender Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr, the Karranīs, however, remained master of South Bihar.

Tāj Khān had also to fight against Muhammad Khān Sūr,

1 and 2. T., II, 121-2 ; B., I, 420 ; M., 168b.

3. M., 168b.

4. R. T., 697a.

the ruler of Bengal, who could not tolerate the independent existence of the Karranīs in South Bihar. Being placed between two powerful enemies, Ādil in the north and Muḥammad Khān Sūr in the east, he felt himself insecure in his possessions. So, he made peace with the new saltānate in Bengal ¹ and helped it against Ādil. In 1557, the Karranīs joined Bahādur Shāh in the battle of Surajgarh, in which Ādil was ~~2~~ defeated and killed. After the battle, Bahādur Shāh left Tāj Khān in charge of the newly acquired province of Bihar. ² An inscription dated 1559 refers to Bahādur Shāh as the overlord of Tāj Khān. It also mentions Tāj Khān bearing the title of Masnad-i-Āli. ³ ~~Exigx~~ It suggests that Tāj Khān received the title from Bahādur Shāh and recognised his vassalage at least upto the year 1559.

Towards the close of Bahādur Shāh's reign, Tāj Khān showed signs of insubordination and hence he was recalled to Gaur. The Karranī chief, however, ignored the summons of his overlord and, contracting friendship with the Mughal viceroy Khān Zamān, strengthened his position and sent his brother Sulaimān Karranī with an army to invade Bengal. Bahādur Shāh raised a large force to fight the Karranīs. He, however, fell ill and died. ⁴ His

1. A. N., II, 325. Abūl Fazl says that Tāj Khān and his brothers were sometimes at strife and sometimes ~~am~~ on friendly relations with the Sūr sultāns of Bengal.

2. R. T., 697a.

3. JBORS., IV, 188 ; Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica, 1933-4, 7-8.

4. R. T., 697a.

brother Jalāl Shāh averted the Karranī invasion and maintained friendly relations with Tāj Khān Karranī.¹

The civil strife that began after the death of Jalāl Shāh in 1563 and the troubles caused by the usurpation of Ghiyāsuddīn III gave Tāj Khān an opportunity to make a bid for the throne of Bengal. In 1564, he defeated and killed Ghiyāsuddīn and occupied Gaur.² This introduced the Karranī saltanate in Bengal and Bihar.

Tāj Khān's relations with the Mughals :

Tāj Khān Karranī maintained friendly relations with Khān Zamān, the Mughal viceroy at Jaunpur. Indeed he was a shrewd politician. He realised that if he was to maintain his position in Bihar and conquer Bengal, he must have good relations with the Mughal power. Akbar was bent on conquering Bihar and Bengal. Bahādur Shāh also was not inclined to tolerate the independent attitude of Tāj Khān in Bihar. So, Tāj Khān was between two fires and it stands to his credit that, by his diplomacy, he not only preserved his position but also acquired the throne of Bengal.

Considering an alliance with the Karranīs of Bihar to be useful to him, Khān Zamān, who thought of rebelling against the Emperor, responded to Tāj Khān's gesture of friendship. As a mark of his friendship, Tāj Khān made occasional presents to the viceroy.³

1. A. N., II, 325.

2. R. T., 697a.

3. A. N., II, 325 ; Biyāt, 100a.

In 1559, he sent Khān Zamān the present of some elephants and pieces of some muslin (Bengali fine cloth).¹

In 1562 when Akbar reappointed Khān Zamān to the viceroyalty of Jaunpur, in a farman he promised to assign to him the country of Bengal if the latter could conquer it from the Afghāns. Bāyazīd Biyāt says that Khān Zamān could easily conquer Bengal and really he conquered it, but he gave it to Tāj Khān.² In fact, in view of the enmity between the Sūr Afghāns and the Karranī Afghāns and the civil strife at Gaur, it would not have been difficult for the veteran Mughal general Khān Zamān to conquer Bihar and Bengal. But he did not wish for the expansion of Akbar's empire. He was planning to rebel against the Emperor and to establish an independent kingdom at in Jaunpur. In his contemplated scheme, Khān Zamān counted on the Karranīs and hence he strengthened his friendship with Tāj Khān. So it is probable that he helped Tāj Khān in conquering Bengal from the Sūr Afghāns.

Tāj Khān Karranī could not long enjoy his newly-acquired position in Bengal. In 1565 a few months after his conquest of Bengal, he died.³ All the contemporary historians have appreciated his ability, learning and wisdom.⁴ Badāunī⁵ mentions him as the wisest and the most learned man of the Afghāns.

1. Biyāt, loca.

2. Ibid,

3. A. N., II, 325 ; R. T., 697a.

4. R. T., 696b.

5. B., I, 409.

او بنگالہ لا باسان تہیں وجہی میگزنت بلکہ او گرفتہ بتاج خان دادہ بود۔

Sulaimān Karranī :

In 1565 after the death of Tāj Khān, his brother Sulaimān Karranī succeeded to the saltanate of Bengal and Bihar.¹ The accession of Sulaimān Karranī ushered in a brilliant period of Karranī rule in Bengal and Bihar. An able, tactful and wise ruler, Sulaimān gave vigour to the Afghān saltanate and made it a strong power in Eastern India. Indeed it was the strength of his saltanate, which, at least for a generation, saved the position of the Afghāns in the face of the opposition of Akbar and also made a new home in Orissa.

Time and circumstance favoured Sulaimān in building a powerful saltanate. This was a time when the various branches of the Sūr family which had fought each other and made unsuccessful attempts for the recovery of Northern India had died down. The extinction of the Sūr family had left Sulaimān without a rival for the leadership of the Afghāns. The dispossessed and bewildered Afghāns flocked to his refuge and leadership² and strengthened his position in Eastern India. So, Abūl Fazl says that the brainless Afghāns gathered round Sulaimān and he acquired strange power.³ He also possessed a large army and immense riches.⁴ He had a force of 3,600 elephants

1. A. N., 11, 325 ; R. T., 697a.

2. D., BM., 126a ; School, 162.

3. A. A. N., 11, 325.

4. Ibid.

40,000 cavalry, 14,000 infantry and 20,000 pieces of cannon and several hundred war-boats.¹ The writings of De Laet also expresses that Sulaimān was a very powerful ruler of Eastern India.²

Sulaimān Karranī was a just and pious ruler. A Mosque inscription found in the town of Bihar calls him a second Solomon in justice and piety.³ The contemporary historians also praise him for these qualities. They say that he strictly observed the rules of Islām in his personal and public life.⁴ Sulaimān used to say his prayers every night in the company of 150 sheikhs and 'ulema and he discussed with them religious matters till morning when, after performing the morning prayer, he would attend to state affairs. Badaunī says that the news of Sulaimān's association with the sheikhs and 'ulema inspired Emperor Akbar to build an 'Ibādatkhāna (house of worship) for the discussion of religious and philosophical matters with the learned.⁵

Though an orthodox Muslim, Sulaimān Karranī followed the previous sultāns of Bengal in their liberal policy towards the Hindus. In order to win over the Hindus, he appointed them to higher posts in the government. In his reign, ~~Ramanda x Guha x and x~~

1. Stewart - History of Bengal, 152.

2. De Laet, 14.

3. Blochmann - History and Geography of Bengal, JASB., 1875, 303.

4. R. T., 697a ; M., 170b ; B., 11, 200-1.

5. B., 11, 200-1.

Ramananda Guha and his sons Bhabananda, Gunananda and Sibananda held important offices in the government.¹ Bhabananda and Gunananda rose even to the position of his ministers and Sibananda to that of the headship of the revenue department.² Bhabananda's son Srihari became the most intimate companion of Sulaimān Karranī's son Dāud. In the reign of Dāud, Srihari rose to the vazīrate and obtained the lofty title of Bikramaditya.³

Conquest of Orissa :

The conquest of Orissa is one of the important events of Sulaimān Karranī's rule. Sulaimān was induced to undertake a military expedition against Orissa because its king Mukunda Harichandana maintained a hostile attitude towards him. The Raja had given shelter to Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr and Sulaimān feared that he might create trouble for him.⁴ In fact, Akbar wanted to ~~xxxx~~ utilise Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr to destroy Sulaimān's power in Eastern India. He drew the Raja into an alliance and induced him to undertake a military expedition to Bengal, if Sulaimān Karranī helped the rebel viceroy Khān Zamān.⁵ In view of Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr's presence in Orissa and the alliance of the Raja with the Emperor, Sulaimān Karranī could not feel himself secure in his possessions so long Orissa remained outside his dominions. So,

1. ~~Pratap~~ Pratapaditya Charitra, 4-9.

2. S. C. Mitra - Jessore-Khulner Itihasha, 11, 13.

3. Pratapaditya Charitra, 4-9.

4. A. N., II, 354-5.

5. Ibid, 258.

to secure his position in Eastern India, he thought it necessary to remove a source of danger by the conquest of Orissa. Sulaimān also felt that, in view of the wealth and resources of Orissa, its acquisition would greatly strengthen him against Akbar.

Sulaimān chose a very suitable time to invade Orissa. In 1567 when Akbar was busy in the conquest of Chitor, he sent an army to Orissa under his son Bāyazīd, Sikandar Uzbeg, a deserter from the court of Akbar, and Kālā Pahār, a converted Muslim.¹ After a fierce fight, the Afghāns occupied the whole of Orissa including Puri. Enormous spoil including gold came into their possession. Ni'matullā says that every Afghān, who took part in the campaign, obtained as booty one or two gold images. Kālā Pahār destroyed the temple of Jagannath in Puri which contained 700 idols made of gold, the biggest of which weighed 30 mans.² Sulaimān appointed his vazīr Lūdī and Qatlū Lūhānī as governors of Orissa and Puri respectively.³

Relations with Koch Bihar :

Immediately after the conquest of Orissa, Sulaimān had to fight a defensive battle with the neighbouring kingdom of Koch Bihar. Proud of his conquest of Kantapur, in 1568 Raja Biswa Singh invaded Bengal. Sulaimān, however, defeated the Koch

1. A. N., III, 610. Kālā Pahār's early name was Raju (A. N., III, 610, 23.).

2. M., 170a.

3. B., II, 174.

army and captured its general Prince Sukladhwaja.

In retaliation, Sulaimān sent his general Kālā Pahār to invade Koch Bihar. The Afghān army overran the country as far as Tezpur upto the Brahmaputra. They demolished the temples of Kamakhya, Hajo and other places and returned. Sulaimān Karranī's idea was to vindicate his strength. So, he did not annex the Koch territories. Moreover, as a gesture of friendship to the Koch king he released the Koch Prince from captivity.¹ In this friendly move towards Koch Bihar, Sulaimān Karranī was actuated by his desire to secure the northern frontier of his territory in the event of a Mughal invasion of Bihar and Bengal.

Sulaimān's relations with Akbar :

In his relations with the Mughal empire, Sulaimān Karranī showed great political wisdom and sagacity. In this field, his policy had threefold features. In order to placate the powerful Mughal Emperor Akbar, he made an outward show of submission to him by making occasional presents and having his name entered in the khutba and coins.² Secondly, Sulaimān followed the footsteps of his elder brother in maintaining friendly relations with the Mughal viceroy of the eastern provinces.

1. Gait - History of Assam, 54. Salīm (Riyāz, 153) says that the Afghān army besieged Koch capital, but the news of the rebellion in Orissa made Sulaimān withdraw the siege. Abūl Fazl (A. N. III, 717) says that the Koch king did not pay his respects to the ruler of Bengal. So, Sulaimān made war upon him, but he returned after failure.

2. A. N., III, 19-20 and 69 , B., II, 173-4 ; T., II, 281 ; R.T., 697a

Indeed the maintenance of friendship with the Mughal viceroy on the border of Bihar formed the cardinal principle in the foreign policy of the Karranī ruler. Lastly, while maintaining a position of outward submission to Emperor Akbar, Sulaimān Karranī also pursued a policy of watchful opportunism in seizing every opportunity to cause embarrassment to the Emperor.

The contemporary historians say that Sulaimān Karranī made presents to Akbar and read the khutba and struck coins in Emperor's name. ¹ The Afghān historians Ni'matullā and 'Abdullā, however, say that Sulaimān Karranī established sovereign power in Bengal and Bihar. ² We cannot accept the view of the Afghān historians because Sulaimān Karranī did not issue any coins. The right of coinage was regarded as an essential insignia of ~~sovereign~~ sovereign power. Though Sulaimān Karranī ruled for eight years (1565-72), we have not yet found any of his coins, while we have a good number of coins of his son Dāud, who ruled only four years.

Besides, Sulaimān did not assume the title of Shāh or Sultān as Dāud did after him. He took upon himself the title of ' Hazrat-i-'Alī ' or His Exalted Highness. Both the Mughal and the Afghān historians agree on this point. ³ The title of Hazrat-i-'Alī does not indicate that Sulaimān claimed sovereign power. This was a title first assumed by Sher Shāh in 1535 when,

1. A. N., III, 19-20 and 69 ; R. T., 697a ; B., II, 173-4 ;
T., II, 281.

2. M., 170a ; D., BM., 126a.

3. Ibid, ; B., II, 163.

after his victory over the combined forces of the Bengali sultān Mahmūd III and the Lūhānī ruler Jalāl Khān at Surajgarh, he became the master of Bihar.¹ Though he became supreme in Bihar and assumed the title of Hazrat-i-Ālī, Sher Shāh did not have his name entered in the khutba and coins and he continued to recognise the de jure sovereignty of Humāyūn. It was only in 1539 after the battle of Chausa that he assumed the title of Shāh and claimed for himself sovereign power by striking coins and reading the khutba in his own name. Sulaimān Karranī's assumption of Hazrat-i-Ālī title suggests that he was a de facto ruler of Bengal just as Sher Shāh had been in the period, 1535-1539.

Moreover, the Afghān historians wrote long after Sulaimān Karranī had died. Being of the same race, they were carried away by their sentiment for their ruler and wrote that he rose to sovereign power. Also there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the contemporary Mughal historians, particularly of Badāunī, who had nothing but praise for Sulaimān Karranī. We see that the Mughal historians have informed us that Bāyazīd and Dāud assumed the insignia of royalty. Had their father Sulaimān Karranī assumed sovereign power they would have mentioned it.

There are other considerations which favour the evidence of the Mughal historians. Sulaimān was a shrewd and

1. Ābbās, IO., 726; BM., 47a.

prudent ruler. He aimed at preserving and strengthening his position without giving offence to the powerful Mughal Emperor. His assumption of de jure sovereignty would have thrown a direct challenge to him. Akbar, who already greatly distrusted the Afghāns and who also aimed at installing himself as paramount ruler over the whole of India, could not have tolerated Sulaimān's open assumption of royalty. So, Sulaimān had to be very cautious in his relations with the Mughal empire. Though he was de facto ruler in Bengal and Bihar, he wanted to placate the Emperor by owning lip homage to him. Abūl Fazl saw through the policy of Sulaimān and called him a hypocrite, who, to secure his position, made an outward show of submission.¹ In fact, Sulaimān's hypocrisy was his statesmanship. It saved his position as well as the home of the Afghāns in Bengal and Bihar. It also enabled him to acquire Orissa and to strengthen his position.

Besides, it would have been difficult for Sulaimān Karranī to maintain friendship with the Mughal viceroys Khān Zamān and Khān Khānān, if he had assumed the insignia of sovereign power. Akbar could not have allowed his viceroys to contract friendship with his open enemies.

Forced to accept some practical limitations to his own power, Akbar had to be satisfied for the time being with

1. A. N., III, 19-20 and 69.

Sulaimān Karranī's show of submission. Indeed, from the very beginning of his reign, he wanted to expel the Afghāns from Bihar and Bengal. In 1557 when Sikandar Khān Sūr surrendered Mankot, Akbar resolved to clear Bengal of the Afghāns.¹ Again, in 1563 when he reappointed Khān Zamān to the viceroyalty of Jaunpur, he assured him in a farman that he would confer on him the government of Bengal if he could conquer it.² But Khān Zamān never showed any eagerness to conquer Bihar and Bengal from his friendly Afghān rulers. Besides, to the great embarrassment of Akbar, the viceroy showed signs of rebellion and in 1565 he actually rose against the Emperor. In 1567, Mīrzā Hakīm, Akbar's brother, also rebelled against the Emperor in Kabul adding to his difficulties and inability to grapple with the Bengal problem.

Moreover, Sulaimān Karranī was a powerful ruler. He had a large army and immense riches.³ With his other troubles in the empire, Akbar could not have risked an expedition against him. So, he had to be satisfied with Sulaimān's lip service.

Himself a wise and prudent man, Sulaimān obtained the devoted services of a very wise vazīr whom Abūl Fazl calls as the rational spirit of the Afghāns.⁴ Lūdī had served Tāj Khān as his vazīr ; Sulaimān retained the services of this

1. B., II, 18-9.

2. Biyāt, 100a.

3. Idem, 141-2.

4. A. N., II, 326 and III, 20.

distinguished minister. Under the advice of Lūdī, Sulaimān always maintained good relations with the Mughal viceroy on the western border of his territory by means of friendly communications and rich presents. ¹ It served Sulaimān twofold purposes. First, it secured his position against the impending Mughal invasion and afforded him an opportunity to conquer Orissa. Also it gave him an opportunity to cause embarrassment to Akbar.

In 1565, Khān Zamān rebelled in Jaunpur much to Akbar's embarrassment. The Emperor feared that as Sulaimān was friendly with the powerful viceroy, he might help him in his rebellion. ¹ To prevent Sulaimān from helping Khan Zaman, he sent Hājī Muhammad Sistānī as an envoy to him. The Afghāns, however, seized him near the fort of Rohtas and sent him to Khān Zamān. ² Akbar also sent another diplomatic mission led by Hasan Khān Khazanchī and Mahapattar, a man unrivalled in the art of Indian music and poetry, to the Raja of Orissa to persuade him that if Sulaimān helped the rebel viceroy, he was to invade Bihar and Bengal. The Raja received the envoys with honour and formed an alliance with the Emperor. He agreed to put forth Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr, who was a refugee at his court, as a rival claimant for the throne of Bengal and Bihar and to fight for

1. A. N., II, 253.

2. Ibid., 253-4 ; T., II, 183-4 ; B., II, 76.

him against Sulaimān.¹

Sulaimān Karranī, however, helped Khān Zamān by sending him an army under his generals Kālā Pahār and Sulaimān Mānkālī.² He also took advantage of Akbar's embarrassing situation to make an attempt to conquer the fort of Rohtas³ from the Afghān chief Fath Khān Batnī, who had seized it in 1561. Akbar, who had come to Jaunpur to deal with Khān Zamān, sent a force under Qulīj Khān towards Rohtas. At this Sulaimān withdrew from the siege. Being relieved of the danger, Hasan Khān Batnī, however, forgot his promise to surrender the fort to the Emperor and he made preparations for its defence. So, the Mughal general had to return disappointed.⁴

Sulaimān continued to give help to Khān Zamān. Through the efforts of Khān Khānān Munīm Khān, Khān Zamān was reconciled to the Emperor. Again in 1567, Khān Zamān rebelled in favour of Mīrzā Hakīm and at Jaunpur he read the Khutba in his name. In an engagement with the imperial forces, he was, however, killed.

Khān Zamān had built a fort named Zamaniya near Benares. At the time of his death, one of his followers named Asadullā held the fort. Feeling that he would not be able to

1. T., II, 183 ; A. N., II, 253-4.

2. A. N., II, 258.

3. Ibid, 253 ; B., II, 77-8. Abūl Fazl says that the fort of Rohtas, one of the strongest forts in India, was more than 5 kos in length and breadth and one kos in height and it had cultivable land and water inside.

4. T., II, 185 ; A. N., II, 253 ; B., II, 77-8.

maintain his hold on it, Asadullā proposed to surrender Zamaniya to Sulaimān Karranī. Being aware of this, Khān Khānān Mun'im Khān, who succeeded Khān Zamān to the viceroyalty of the eastern provinces, conciliated him. As the fort passed into the hands of the imperial officers, Sulaimān's army had to retreat from before the fort. ¹

At the death of Khān Zamān, Sulaimān Karranī lost a very valuable friend in the Mughal empire. At the advice of Lūdi, he, however, decided to make friends with Khān Khānān Mun'im Khān. In 1567 Sulaimān sent presents and friendly messages to him. Mun'im Khān responded to this gesture of friendship. To cement their friendship, Lūdi arranged for a meeting between Sulaimān and Mun'im Khān. With his followers and officers, Mun'im Khān set off for Patna. Lūdi and Bāyazīd came to receive him. When Mun'im Khān was 5 or 6 kos from ~~Aggra~~ Patna, Sulaimān himself came to receive him and embraced him. First Mun'im Khān gave a feast to Sulaimān in his camp. Next day Sulaimān gave him a feast. He made suitable presents to him and to the Emperor. Sulaimān also entered the name of the Emperor in the khutba and coins. ²

A few Afghāns suggested to Sulaimān the seizure of Mun'im Khān. They argued that it would cause confusion among the

1. A. N., II, 325 ; Biyāt, 9ob.

2. Ibid, 325-6.

Mughals and enable them to occupy Mughal territories. Sulaimān and Lūdī, however, did not accept their suggestion. Fearing that the unruly Afghāns might injure Mun'im Khān, they arranged for his safe return to his place.¹

Secure in the friendship of Mun'im Khān, Sulaimān Karranī seized the opportunity created by Akbar's preoccupation in the conquest of Chitor to invade Orissa and in 1568 he conquered it.² Sulaimān maintained the friendship with Mun'im Khān as long as he lived.

Thus Sulaimān Karranī's prudence and sagacity saved for the Afghāns their home in Eastern India which Sher Shāh's far-sighted political wisdom had built for them. Much against his inclination, Akbar had to be satisfied with his outward show of submission. Sulaimān's method of kindly treating the self-willed Afghān chiefs kept the solidarity of the Afghāns³ and the Mughal Emperor found no scope to realise his imperialistic designs on Bengal and Bihar.

Indeed the Afghān dominion in Eastern India prospered and preserved its integrity as long as Sulaimān Karranī lived. His death in 1572 was, however, a calamity for the Afghāns, because his mantle fell into the hands of his imprudent sons,

1. A. N., II, 326-7.

2. Ibid, 324 and 326.

3. A. N., III, 20 ; D., School, 162 ; BM., 126a.

who, discarding the prudent and sound policy of their father, introduced dissension among the Afghāns and caused the ruin of the Afghān saltanate in Eastern India.

CHAPTER VI

Dāud Karranī and his relations with Akbar :

the fall of the Afghān Saltanate in Eastern India

In 1572 after the death of Sulaimān Karranī, his eldest son Bāyazīd Karranī succeeded him in his possessions in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. An ambitious youth, Bāyazīd departed from his father's policy of an outward submission to Akbar and introduced the khutba in his own name.¹ He also discarded his father's wise method of treating the Afghān chiefs and tried his best to ruin them.² Naturally the Afghān chiefs were disgusted with his behaviour and plotted against him. Under the leadership of Qatlū Lūhānī, the Lūhānī Afghāns espoused the cause of Hansū, Sulaimān Karranī's brother 'Imād Karranī's son and his son-in-law, and within a few days of his accession, they put Bāyazīd to death.³

Dāud and Lūdi :

The murder of Bāyazīd ushered in a period of bitter factious fight among the Afghāns ; the interested chiefs set up three rival candidates for the throne. The Lūhānīs had raised Hansū and Lūdi, who held the supreme authority in the state, installed Sulaimān Karranī's youngest son Dāud Karranī on the

1. A. N., III, 20 ; D., School 162 ; BM., 126a.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid and M., 170b ; B., II, 174 ; Briggs - Firishta, V, 355.

throne. In Bihar, Gujar Karranī placed a son of Bāyazīd as a rival for the saltanate.¹

Dāud and Lūdī fought against Hansū and killed him. Being hard pressed, the Lūhānīs submitted to Dāud. Then Lūdī proceeded from the capital Tanda to deal with Gujar Karranī in Bihar. About this time, under the instruction of Akbar, Khān Khānān Mun'im Khān advanced from Chunar to invade the Afghān territories. At the approach of a large army under Lūdī, Gujar Karranī became frightened and he negotiated with Mun'im Khān to surrender Bihar and enter the Mughal service, if the Emperor would grant him Gorakpur, Hajipur and Bihar for a year and a fief in Bengal next year. Mun'im Khān accepted Gujar Karranī's proposal. Seeing in this transaction the ruin of the Afghāns, Lūdī, however, exerted himself to reconcile Gujar to the rule of Dāud and, after prolonged negotiations, he succeeded in winning him over. Lūdī and Gujar then marched together to check the advance of the Mughals.²

Thus Lūdī's ability and wisdom secured Dāud's position. Abūl Fazl regrets that Mun'im Khān lost a good opportunity of creating discord among the Afghāns and of enlisting Gujar Karranī's services for striking a decisive blow at them in Eastern India.³

1. A. N., III, 20 ; B., II, 174 ; T., II, 293 ; D., School, 162 ; BM., 126b.

2. Ibid.

3. A. N., III, 21.

Under Lūdī's direction, Dāud's cause was prospering even against the Mughals, because he had successfully checked Mun'im Khān's invading forces and was also advancing for the conquest of Jaunpur. It was at this time that, listening to the evil counsels of Qatlū, Srihari and Gujar, who were envious of the ascendancy of Lūdī, Dāud distrusted him and worked for his own ruin. His evil counsellors made him understand that Lūdī, who had been an old servant of Tāj Khān Karranī and had also affianced his daughter to his son Yusuf, would soon set him aside in favour of his son-in-law. Believing their allegations, Dāud put Yusuf to death and planned to destroy Lūdī. Goaded to despair, Lūdī stopped fighting against the Mughals and made peace with Mun'im Khān sending suitable presents to the Emperor. ¹

Lūdī then turned towards Dāud, who, in great panic, retreated from Munghyr to Bengal. In order to keep the Afghāns by his side, Dāud distributed his father's treasures among them. About this time, Kalā Pahār and Jalāl Khān Sadhurī left Lūdī. This obliged Lūdī to retreat to the fort of Rohtas. Dāud came to Hajipur and sent a force against him. Declaring himself as a servant of the Emperor, Lūdī sought the help of Mun'im Khān. ² Mun'im Khān sent an army to help him and, expecting easily to conquer Bengal and Bihar, he himself moved forward. ³

1. A. N., III, 22-3 ; B., II, 174 ; D., BM., 127a.

2. Ibid, ; T., II, 282.

3. A. N., III, 70-1.

When Dāud saw that Lūdī had contracted an alliance with the Mughals, under the advice of Qatlū, Srihari and Gujar, he had recourse to wiles. He sent a message to Lūdī saying, " You are in the place of my father ; if, on account of your love for his family, you have been offended with me, you have done your duty and I am not displeased with you. In every undertaking, I seek your assistance. At this time when the imperial forces have come against me, I wish that you, who have always shown excellent goodwill, would be prepared to fight the enemy. I make over to you the army, the park of artillery and the treasure."²¹

Patriotic Lūdī, to whom the cause of the Afghāns was perhaps dearer than his life,² was reconciled to Dāud. He then marched against the Mughals and effectively checked Mun'im Khān's forces on the bank of the Son.³ To avert any further invasion of the Mughals, Lūdī proposed peace to Mun'im Khān agreeing to pay to the Emperor a tribute of two lakhs of rupees in cash and one lak of rupees in stuffs. In recollection of the old friendship with Sulaimān Karranī and Lūdī, Mun'im Khān made peace with the Afghāns and turned back.⁴

Although Lūdī's vigour and wisdom had averted the Mughal danger to his saltanate, Dāud could not appreciate his services.

1. A. N., III, 71-2 ; T., II, 282 ; D., BM., 127a.

2. A. N., III, 70.

3. Ibid, 72.

4. T., II, 282 ; B., II, 174-5.

At the instigation of his evil counsellors, he, however, planned to ruin him. On the pretext of consulting him on an urgent matter of state, Dāud sent for Lūdī and when he came, he imprisoned him and handed him over to Srihari.¹ Lūdī felt certain that he would be executed. Still he gave his last advice to the misguided young ruler. Lūdī advised him not to rely too much on the peace he had made with the Mughals, but to launch a vigorous campaign against them, because they would never let an opportunity of conquering Bengal and Bihar slip by.² Under the tuition of Qatlū and Srihari, whom he appointed to the office of vakīl and vazīr respectively in place of Lūdī, Dāud, however, ignored the advice and caused Lūdī to be put to death.³

By putting Lūdī to death, Dāud had committed a great political blunder. The Afghān historian 'Abdullā says that Lūdī was the pillar of Dāud's saltānate and by executing him, Dāud destroyed his saltānate with his own hands.⁴ Badāunī also writes that, by this senseless action, Dāud struck his own foot with his own axe and uprooted the plant of his prosperity.⁵ Even Abūl Fazl appreciates Lūdī's wisdom, sound judgement and his ~~am~~ ~~devotion~~ devotion and services to the cause of his people. He says, " Lūdī was far-seeing in stratagems and had a vigorous mind for

1 and 2. T., II, 282 ; B., II, 174-5 and 181 ; D., BM., 127b.

3. T., 283 ; D., BM., 127b.

4. D., BM., 127b.

5. B., II, 175. لودی نیک خواه را بقتل رسانید و تیشه برپای خود زد و نهال دولتش را از همان زمان بکنای نیکبت از بیخ برانداخت

plans. He was the rational spirit of the eastern provinces and was devoted in promoting the cause of the Afghāns. " ¹

Indeed it was Lūdi's wisdom and ability that had maintained the solidarity of the Afghāns and saved the Afghān saltanate in Eastern India against the Mughals. His death, however, removed a great obstacle on the way to the Mughal conquest of Bihar and Bengal. Hence Abūl Fazl exults in saying that it was the good fortune of the Emperor that his enemies themselves accomplished a work, which the imperial servants could not themselves effect in spite of their best efforts. ²

Lūdi's execution produced a great dissension among the Afghāns. ³ It also induced Mun'im Khān to advance instantly for the conquest of Bihar and Bengal. ⁴

Dāud's relations with Akbar :

Master of a large dominion consisting of Bengal (including Chittagong), ⁵ Bihar and Orissa, of a numerous army and vast wealth, ⁶ Dāud did not think himself in any way inferior to Emperor Akbar. He assumed the title of Bādshāh and read the khutba and struck coins in his own name. ⁷ Dāud even vied

او در گریز دست دراز داشت و در تدبیر دل قوی و نفس ناطقه دیار شرقیه
شده برآمدگار طوائف افغانان را طلبکار بود

1. A. N., III, 70.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 73 ; D., BM., 127b.

4. B., II, 175 ; T., II, 283.

5. My Article - Chittagong under the Pathan Rule in Bengal,

JASB., 1952, 28-30.

6. Idem, 141-2.

7. T., II, 281-2 ; M., 171a ; D., BM., 126a ; (continued)

with the Mughal Emperor in majesties. He conferred the title of Khān Khānān on Ismail Silahdar and Khān Jahān on another Afghan chief, who was governor of Orissa and was known by his title. He gave Srihari and Janakiballav the title of Bikramaditya and Basanta Rai respectively. Gujar Karrani received from him the title of Rukn ud daula or the pillar of the state.¹

The Mughal historians inform us that Dāud's departure from the policy of his father and his open assumption of sovereign rights enraged Emperor Akbar and caused the Mughal invasion of the Karrani dominion in 1572.² Evidences, however, show that Akbar's invasion of Bihar and Bengal was entirely an act of aggression and Dāud's assumption of sovereignty was simply a pretext for war.

The writings of Abūl Fazl best illustrate the imperialistic idea of his royal master. He writes, "According to the ascetic sages and politicians, the peace of the mortals is bound with one rule, one ruler, one guide, one aim and one thought."³ Abūl Fazl also explains Akbar's motive for the conquest of Bihar and Bengal saying, "Justice-loving rulers should not be satisfied with the countries they are in possession,

(continuation of the previous page)

7. Catalogue of the Provincial coin Cabinet, Assam, 177.

Coins AR 1-2.

1. A. N., III, 108 ; B., II, 181 and 195 ; T., II, 292-3 and 305.

2. T., II, 281-2.

3. A. N., III, 4.

اصفیای تجدد و ادبیای تعلق نظر بر آسایش جوانیان که وابسته بیک مکتبی بیک حاکمی
و یک راهی و یک جهتی و یک اندیشی است

but should set his hearts ^{upon} ~~in~~ conquering other countries and regard this as a choice form of worship. Hence the Emperor is continually engaged in the conquest of other countries. " ¹
The above statements of the court historian reveal that Akbar was determined upon the conquest of Bihar and Bengal in order to realise his ideal of establishing one rule throughout the whole of India.

From the very beginning of his reign, Akbar was bent on the conquest of Bihar and Bengal in order to destroy the stronghold of the Afghāns, whom he greatly distrusted. In view of the strength and resources of Sulaimān Karranī and also his own troubles in the empire, he, however, could not realise his object. But that he was anxious to do so is revealed in the writings of the contemporary Mughal historians. Even in 1557 when Sikandar Khān Sūr surrendered Mankot, Akbar issued a farman giving him a temporary ^{Jagir} ~~fief~~ in Jaunpur and promising him a ^{Permanent} ~~jagir~~ in Bengal as soon as Khān Zamān would conquer it from the Afghāns. ² Again in 1563 when appointing Khān Zamān a second time to the viceroyalty of Jaunpur, Akbar promised him Bengal if he could conquer that country from the Afghāns. ³

Indeed Akbar waited for a favourable opportunity to destroy the Afghān power in Eastern India. The death of the

1. A. N., III, 86-7. دل در تسخير ملك ديگر بسنن را از عبادات گزيده شمارند.

2. B., II, 18-9.

3. Biyāt, 100a.

powerful ruler Sulaimān Karranī gave him the much looked for opportunity and the writings of Abūl Fazl disclose this important fact. This court historian gives Akbar's reaction at the news of Sulaimān Karranī's death. He says that when the Emperor was proceeding to the Guzrat campaign, the news of Sulaimān Karranī's death reached him and a few of the officers suggested to him the postponement of Guzrat campaign and an advance to the conquest of Bihar and Bengal. The Emperor, however, said that it was good that the news of Sulaimān's death had come during his march to Guzrat, for had it come while he was in the capital he would certainly have addressed himself to the conquest of Bengal.¹ However, feeling certain that, as Sulaimān Karranī was dead, the imperial servants would easily conquer the Afghān territories, he sent a farman to Mun'im Khān ordering him to advance immediately to conquer Bihar and Bengal.²

The above facts show that Akbar only waited for an opportunity to conquer Bihar and Bengal from the Afghāns and he would have invaded Eastern India after the death of Sulaimān Karranī even if Dāud had not assumed the insignia of royalty.

So, in 1572 after the death of Sulaimān Karranī, Mun'im Khān advanced to invade Bihar. About this time, Dāud and

1. A. N., III, 4.

2. Ibid ; B., II, 174.

Lūdi were proceeding against Gujar Karrani. We have discussed before how Lūdi reconciled Gujar to Dāud and their combined forces marched to check the Mughal advance.¹ Lūdi, however, thought it wise to ward off the Mughal invasion by peaceful means. He offered two laks of rupees and other valuables as a present to the Mughal viceroy. Friendship with Sulaimān and Lūdi, troubles of a campaign in an old age and valuable presents induced Mun'im Khān to make peace with the Afghāns and to return to Jaunpur.²

Lūdi understood that, though Mun'im Khān had made peace with the Afghāns, Emperor Akbar would never be satisfied until Bihar and Bengal had been annexed to his empire. So, he tried to strengthen the Afghān position and create troubles for the Mughals. About this time, Mun'im Khān was busy in dealing with the rebellion of Sulaimān's son Yusuf Muhammad in Gorakhpur. Lūdi seized the opportunity to advance towards Jaunpur and occupy the fort of Zamaniya.³ After ~~defeating~~ defeating Yusuf Muhammad, Mun'im Khān proceeded to meet Lūdi. Yusuf Muhammad joined Lūdi and, being re-inforced by a contingent of the Afghān army, he advanced across the Ganges against the imperial forces. Hasan Khān, Raja Gajpati and other Mughal generals, however, defeated him.⁴

1. Idem, 156.

2. A. N., III, 20.

3. Ibid, 21-2 ; T., II, 281-2 ; D., BM., School, 162 ; Biyāt, 9ob.

4. A. N., III, 22.

Lūdi and Mun'im Khān confronted each other near Ghazipur. Lūdi's strategy placed the Mughal forces in a very precarious position and this is revealed in the writings of Abūl Fazl, who says, " The generals were in a strange position ; to fight was not advisable and it was difficult to retreat. " In despair, Mun'im Khān made proposals for peace. Lūdi, however, did not agree.¹ It was at this time when Dāud's cause was prospering against the Mughals that he planned to destroy Lūdi and forced him to the shelter of the Mughals. Thus his senseless action spoiled the sure chance of a victory over the Mughals. So, Abūl Fazl writes that Mun'im Khān escaped from a great danger.²

We have seen that the wiles of Dāud reconciled Lūdi to him and Lūdi successfully checked the Mughal advance on the bank of the Son. He then concluded a peace with the Mughal viceroy in order to ward off any further Mughal invasion. Shortly after this, Dāud, however, put him to death.³

Loss of Bihar and Bengal :

Lūdi's death induced Mun'im Khān to invade Bihar. Crossing the Son, he advanced within the striking distance of Patna. Though Dāud had a large army, yet he retreated to Patna and shut himself up in the fort.⁴ In early November, 1573,

1. A. N., III, 22.

2. Ibid, 70.

3. Idem, 159.

4. T., II, 284 ; B., II, 175 ; A. N., III, 82 ; D., BM., 164 127b.

Mun'im Khān besieged Patna and sent Majnūn Khān Qaqshāl and other Mughal officers to break the dam of the Punpun river, which falls into the Ganges ten miles east of Patna. Sulaimān Mānkālī and Bābui Mānkālī, the Afghān chiefs who guarded the dam, were surprised in a night attack and being ashamed of their negligence, they went off to Ghoraghat in Bengal. ¹

The siege of Patna, however, did not make much progress. Well guarded by the Ganges, the fort defied the Mughal forces until August, 1574 when Akbar's presence entirely changed the situation. The Emperor discerned that the fort depended for its provisions on the town of Hajipur and that the capture of that town was an essential preliminary to the conquest of Patna. Accordingly he sent an well equipped force supported by war-boats to capture Hajipur. ² After a fierce resistance, the Mughal general Khān 'Ālam occupied the town. ³

The fall of Hajipur broke the spirit of Afghān resistance to the Mughals. The Afghān chiefs, particularly Qatlū Lūhānī, advised the evacuation of Patna. As Dāud could not be persuaded to leave the fort, at night on August 10, 1574, Qatlū administered a narcotic to him and carried him senseless by a boat to the capital Tanda. ⁴ Dāud's favourite minister Srihari

1. A. N., III, 83.

2. Ibid, 82-3 and 96 ; T., II, 290-1.

3. Ibid, 100 ; 291-2 ; B., II, 181 ; M., 171a-b.

4. M., 171a-b ; Dāudī, BM., ~~127a~~ 127a ; B., II, 181.

placed his master's treasures in a boat and followed him to Bengal.¹ Gujar Karranī evacuated the fort with the army and elephants. The night was very dark. The rivers were swollen and the country around was flooded. Nizāmuddīn compares it with to the ^{Resurrection} ~~Domesday~~ night. Dāud's army suffered terribly in the evacuation. A large number of them were drowned in the ditch round the fort. A few were trampled to death by the frightened elephants. The Punpun bridge gave way under the weight of the flying multitudes and a large number of soldiers and elephants were drowned in the river.²

Easily occupying the evacuated fort of Patna, the Mughals pursued the Afghāns. Being overtaken, Gujar fled leaving behind a large number of elephants, which fell into the hands of the Mughals. Thinking that Mun'im Khān and other generals would without difficulty occupy the rest of Bihar and Bengal, on August 24, 1574 Akbar left for the capital. By the September of the same year, the Mughals captured from the Afghāns Surajgarh, Munghyr, Bhagalpur, Colgong and other places practically without any opposition.³

Dāud, however, decided to check the Mughal advance into Bengal at the narrow pass of Teliagarhi, which was one of

1. T., II, 292-3.

2. Ibid, 293 ; A. N., III, 100-1 ; B., II, 181-2.

3. A. N., III, 101-3 and 107-8 ; B., II, 182.

the three thoroughfares from Northern India to Bengal.¹ Starting from Patna, the Teliagarhi route passes via Bhagalpur, Colgong and along the southern bank of the Ganges having in the south steep hills extending southwards for about eighty miles up to the northern boundary of the Birbhum district. Between the vast expanse of the Ganges in the north and the steep hills and rugged regions to the south, the route narrows down at Teliagarhi. From the earliest times, Teliagarhi was known as the ' Gateway to Bengal ' and a fort was constructed in the place completely blocking the route.² It was in this strategic position that Dāud wanted to check the Mughals. He, however, made no adequate arrangement for the defence of the pass. He only left a small detachment of his army under the command of his Khān Khānān Ismail Silahdār.³

Mun'im Khān found it very difficult to advance by the pass of Teliagarhi. He, however, won over some local zamīndārs, who showed him a secret path by which a division of the Mughal army advanced to make a surprise attack on the Afghān rear. The plan succeeded well and, being attacked simultaneously in front and rear, Ismail Silahdār found it impossible to fight against

1. Jharkhand route, Tirhut route and Teliagarhi route.

Bhatiasali - Bengal chiefs' struggle, BPP., 1928.

2. A. N., III, 108.

3. Ibid ; T., II, 297.

the enemy with his small forces and retreated. The Mughals occupied Teliagarhi without a fight. So, Abūl Fazl exults in saying that by Divine aid the imperial army took possession of a place that could hardly have been occupied by fighting. ¹

The fall of Teliagarhi left Bengal open to the Mughals. In great panic, Dāud left his capital Tanda ² and went to Satgaon. On September 21, 1574, Mun'im Khān took possession of Tanda ² and sent several detachment of his forces against the Afghāns in different places of Bengal. One division under Muhammad Qulī Khān Barlās pursued Dāud to Satgaon and another under Majnūn Khān Qaqshāl and Bābā Khān Qaqshāl advanced to Ghoraghat, ³ where Kālā Pahār, Bābui Mānkālī and Sulaimān Mānkālī had taken shelter. A third division under Murād Khān was sent to occupy Fathabad and Bakla and a fourth under I'timad Khān to acquire Sonargaon. ⁴

1. A. N., III, 108 ; T., II, 297.

2. Ibid, 298.

3. Ghoraghat stands on the west bank of the Karatoya and on the western boundary of the Rangpur district and is included in the Dinajpur district. It is 28 miles north of Bogra town and 18 miles east of Hijli, an E. B. R. station. According to Buchanan, in the days of its prosperity Ghoraghat town extended 10 miles in length and 2 miles in breadth. In 1808, he found the ruins of some mosques and the dargah of Ismail Ghazi, a captain of Barbik Shah.

Martin - Eastern India, II, 679-82 ;

Dumont, G. H. - Notes on Ismail Ghazi, JASB., 1874 ;

Bhattachali, N. K. - Bengal chiefs' struggle, BPP., 1928.

4. A. N., III, 118-9 ; T., II, 298.

In Ghoraghat, Kālā Pahār and the Mānkalis fought a sharp engagement with Majnūn Khān Qaqshāl and were defeated. Sulaimān Mānkali died in the fight and Kālā Pahār and Bābui Mānkali fled towards Koch Bihar leaving their dependants and families prisoners in the hands of the Mughals. Majnūn Khān Qaqshāl occupied Ghoraghat and married his son to the daughter of Sulaimān Mānkali.¹

At the approach of the Mughal general Muhammad Qulī Khān Barlās, Dāud retreated from Satgaon to Orissa. About this time, his minister Srihari escaped to Jessore with his treasures.² Dāud entrenched himself at Debra Kesai (15 miles east of the Midnapur town), to fight the Mughals. But when Muhammad Qulī Khān Barlās re-inforced by Todar Mal advanced from Mandaran to Kulia (23 miles north-east of Midnapur town), he fell back on Garh Haripur (11 miles south-east of Danton station on the B. N. R.).³

In the meantime, Dāud's cousin Junaid Karranī, a son of Imād Karranī, was causing great trouble to the Mughals. At the time of Sulaimān Karranī, Junaid fled from his uncle and took shelter in the court of Akbar. Though Akbar favoured him with a fief in Hindaun, he later on left the imperial service and, joining his fellow Afghāns in Guzrat, he fought against the

1. A. N., III, 119 ; T., II, 302-3.

2. Ibid, 120.

3. Ibid, 121 ; 304; Sarkar, J. N., - Battle of Tukaroi, BPP., 1935 ; Rennel - Bengal Atlas, sheet, 7.

Mughals.¹ After the Mughal conquest of Guzrat in 1573, Junaid, however, went to Jharkhand and with a band of warriors he plundered the Mughal possessions in Bihar.²

Junaid also wanted to join Dāud at Din Kesai. As Dāud could not trust his adventurous and ambitious cousin, they could not unite their forces against the Mughals. Junaid, however, continued his plundering and devastating incursions against the Mughals with success. It was on the advance of a superior army under Todar Mal that he retreated to the jungles of Jharkhand. But he remained a menace to the Mughals in Bihar.³

In 1575, Mun'im Khān and Raja Todar Mal took up the plan of a vigorous campaign against Dāud. Todar Mal advanced from Mandaran and Mun'im Khān joined him at Cheto.⁴ Leaving his family at Katak, Dāud encamped himself at Garh Haripur. He fortified his camp by digging trenches and throwing breastplates. He also barricaded at strategic points the regular road from Midnapur to Garh Haripur. Mun'im Khān found it very difficult to advance. With the help of the local people, he, however, discovered an obscure circuitous route and by it arrived at Najaura (11 miles east of the Danton railway station). Dāud advanced to check them and on ~~March 3~~ March 3, 1575, confronted


1. A. N., II, 284 and III, 119 ; B., I, 193.

2. Ibid III, 119-20 ; T., II, 303-4.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid, 121-2 ; T., II, 304.

the enemy on the plains of Tukaroi (9 miles east of Danton and 3 miles west of Najura). The contending parties arranged their respective forces in the following battle array. ¹



Dāud placed a line of huge tuskers in front of his forces and, covering them with hide and hanging a number of Yaktails from their heads and tusks, he made them terrible to behold. As according to the astrologers, who accompanied the army, the planets were not favourable, Mun'im Khān did not want to fight on that day. The Afghān van under Gujar, however, ~~precipitated~~ precipitated the battle with a furious charge of his elephants. He threw the Mughal van into confusion and killed its leader Alam Khān. He even swept away the Mughal Iltimsh and the centre. In spite of his best efforts, Mun'im Khān failed to keep his soldiers in the field. The Afghān tide swept him also five miles

1. A. N., III, 121-2 ; T., II, 304-5 ;

Sarkar, J. N. - Battle of Tukaroi, B.P.P., 1935.

away from the front. Pursuing him half a mile, the Afghān van turned to plunder his camp and pack of animals.¹

The Afghān love for plunder before the battle was actually won ruined their victory as it had done in other battles. When the Afghān van was engaged in picking up the spoils, Qiyā Khān and other Mughal generals reformed their broken ranks and fell on them. Pierced in the brain by an arrow, Gujar fell dead. The death of their general caused confusion in the Afghān van and, in great panic, they dispersed.

When Gujar and his van were pushing forward, the other three Afghān divisions remained spectators. The Afghān right under Orissa's governor Khān Jahān's brother Sikandar advanced to meet the Mughal left, but it fled without coming to blows. When Dāud's centre confronted the Mughal left, the news of Gujar's death reached it and the dispersed Mughal divisions returned to the field. About this time, the Mughal right drove away the Afghān left. All these unnerved Dāud's centre and the Afghāns fled in utter confusion. The Mughals pursued and slaughtered the Afghāns and captured a large number of them. Next day Mun'im Khān vented his wrath by making eighty minarets reaching to the skies, with the heads of the Afghān prisoners.²

1 and 2. A. N. III, 123-7 ; T., II, 305-6 ; B., II, 193-6 ;
Sarkar, J. N. - Battle of Tukaroi, BPP., 1935.

Being defeated in the battle of Tukaroi, Dāud fled to the fort of Katak. Khān Jahān encouraged him to fight the Mughals again. Accordingly he prepared for another contest. But the Mughal generals were determined not to allow him any breathing space and, following their victory, they advanced to besiege the fort of Katak. As the preparations for a battle were not complete, Dāud thought it wise to make proposals for peace. In view of the strong position of the Afghāns in the fort, the war-worn octogenarian Mughal general Mun'im Khān and other Mughal officers, with the exception of Todar Mal, considered settlement as an advantage. After an exchange of messages, an interview was arranged between Dāud and Mun'im Khān in the Mughal camp. On April 12, 1575, accompanied by his chiefs, Dāud went to the camp of Mun'im Khān.¹

Mun'im Khān received Dāud with due honour and cordiality and entertained him and his chiefs in a distinguished manner. Amidst festivities a treaty was concluded. Dāud was to hold Orissa as a vassal of Emperor Akhar. He made presents of noted elephants and valuable articles to the court. Abūl Fazl says that, as a mark of his submission to the Emperor, Dāud turned his face towards the Mughal capital and prostrated himself. As a surety for his allegiance, he made over his brother's son Sheikh Muhammad

1. A. N. III, 129-30 ; T., II, 308-9 ; B., II, 195-6.

to the court. On behalf of the Emperor, Mun'im Khān conferred on Dāud a splendid khil'at, a sword and a jewelled belt.¹

The battle of Tukeroi and the treaty of Katak registered the transfer of the sovereignty of Bengal and Bihar from the Afghāns to the Mughals. The Afghāns in general, however, did not accept the treaty and loss of territories. They continued to resist the Mughals in different places of Bihar and Bengal. The Afghān chiefs maintained their hold on Rohtas, Chaund and Sahsaram. From his stronghold in Jharkhand, Junaid Karrani raided South Bihar. Kalā Pahar, Bābui Mānkali and Jalāluddīn Sūr drove away Majnūn Khān Qaqshal from Ghoraghat.² They also expelled the Mughals from Gaur and recovered the whole of North Bengal. They even pursued the Mughals to Tanda. The timely arrival of Mun'im Khān, however, saved the situation and the capital. Relieving Tanda, he hastened to Gaur and recaptured it. He then sent Majnūn Khān ~~to~~ with a large army to Ghoraghat. After a fierce fight, Majnūn Khān recovered Ghoraghat. The Afghāns, however, continued to give trouble to the Mughals in North Bengal as well as in South Bihar.³

Thinking that ~~the~~ residence in Gaur would enable him to deal effectively with the Afghān disturbances in North Bengal and also, being attracted by the magnificent buildings

1 and 2. A. N., III, 130-1 ; B., II, 195-7 ; T., II, 309-10.

3. Ibid, 131 ; 216-8 ; 317.

of the old capital of Bengal, in August, 1575, Mun'im Khān shifted his headquarters from Tanda to Gaur. The transfer of capital, however, proved a blunder. It was on account of its notoriously bad climate that only a few years ago Sulaimān Karranī had shifted the capital from Gaur to Tanda. Mun'im Khān ignored this fact and suffered terribly, because within a month a great plague broke out in the city. In his Memoirs, Bāyazīd Biyāt, an attendant of Mun'im Khān, has left us an graphic account of this plague. People died in such large numbers that cremation or burial became impossible. It was only when twelve of his distinguished generals had died that Mun'im Khān ordered his men back to Tanda. But he could not enter Tanda. In the outskirts of Tanda, he was taken ill and on October 23, 1575 at the age of over eighty, he died.¹

Fall of Dāud :

Mun'im Khān's death encouraged Dāud to make a bid for the recovery of Bengal and Bihar. He swiftly fell on the Mughal general Nazr Bahādur, defeated and killed him and occupied Bhadrak. At his approach, the Mughals fled away from Jaleswar and Tanda. Dāud ~~re-entered~~ re-entered his capital and easily recovered Teliagarhi from the panic-stricken Mughals. 'Isa Khān, the zamindār of Bhati, drove away the Mughals from Eastern Bengal.

1. A. N., III, 160-1 ; B., II, 216-8 ; Biyāt, 147a.

Panic and confusion prevailed among the Mughals everywhere and leaving Bengal, they proceeded towards Northern India.¹

Akbar sent Bairām Khān's sister's son Husain Qulī Khān entitled Khān Jahān as governor of Bengal and Raja Todar Mal as his assistant in command. On November 15, 1575, they ~~met~~ left Agra and near Bhagalpur they met the Mughal officers and soldiers fleeing from Bengal to Northern India. With great difficulty, Khān Jahān and Todar Mal persuaded them to turn towards Bengal. At Teliagarhi their advance was opposed by 3,000 Afghāns under Ayāz Khāskhail. In a fierce engagement, the Afghāns were, however, beaten and Teliagarhi again passed into the hands of the Mughals.² Khān Jahān advanced towards Tanda. Dāud, however, blocked his passage at a narrow place, situated between the Ganges on the north-west and the hills on the south-east, in Rajmahal.³ In this Rajmahal pass, he had fortified his position and held up the Mughals from December 1575 to June 1576.⁴

In spite of his best efforts, Khān Jahān could not make his way through the pass, though in a skirmish ~~he~~ he

1. A. N., III, 161-2 ; B., II, 218 ; T. , II, 319-20.

2. Ibid, 162 ; 227 ; 321.

3. Rajmahal was previously called Akmahal or advance place, because while proceeding to Bihar, the sultāns of Gaur used it as an advance station. Man Singh named it Akbarmahal and later on it came to be known as Rajmahal.

Bhattasali, N. K. - Bengal chiefs' struggle, BPP., 1928.

4. A. N., III, 162-3 ; and 179 ; T., II, 321.

killed Dāud's Khān Khānān Ismail Silāhdār.¹ On the otherhand, his position became daily weaker. The rains, the interception of the supply of his provisions by the Afghāns in Bihar and the difficulties of the place unnerved the Mughal soldiers. Besides, the Sunni Mughals did not like to fight under a Persian Shī'a, Khān Jahān. Moreover, the Afghāns were daily increasing in number and Dāud had diplomatically caused the desertion from Mughal service of Raja Gajpati, the zamīndār of Patna and Hajipur, and induced him to create trouble for the Mughals in Bihar and Ghazipur.²

Being in a precarious position, Khān Jahān sent urgent representations to the Emperor for food and re-inforcements. Akbar despatched boat-loads of food from Agra and ordered Muẓaffar Khān to advance ~~xxxx~~ immediately from Bihar to the assistance of Khān Jahān. On July 10, 1576, (~~xx15xRabi'II,x984x~~),~~xx~~ Muẓaffar Khān joined the Mughal forces at Rajmahal.³ Khān Jahān arranged his forces in battle array and, on July 12, 1576 (15 Rabi' II, 984), a fierce battle took place between the Mughals ~~am~~ and Afghāns in the field of Rajmahal.⁴

Badaūnī says that, in his great presumption and pride, Dāud left his hiding place and offered battle to the Mughals.⁵


1. A. N., III, 162-3 ; 168 and 176 ; T., II, 321-2.

2. Ibid, 169-9 and 178-9 ; B., II, 237.

3. Ibid, ~~xxx~~ 180 ~~xxx~~ ; 238 ; T., II, 324.

4. Ibid.

5. B., II, 238.



TAKEN FROM
BENGAL PAST AND PRESENT, 1929.

THE PASS OF RAJMAHAL WHERE DAUD KARRANI S.
HELD UP THE MUGHALS IN 1575-76 A.D.

It is surprising that Dāud should have left his strategically strong position in the narrow pass, where he had held up the Mughals for seven months, and come down into the plain to fight an open battle with the enemy. The Mughal historians write that Junaid's joining with Dāud emboldened him to leave his fortified position.¹ In his Pratapaditya Charitra, ~~Ramram Basu, however,~~ Ramram Basu, however, mentions that the treachery of Dāud's favourite minister Srihari Bikramaditya was the cause of his leaving the narrow pass and fighting a battle in the plain.

Ramram Basu writes that Srihari Bikramaditya and his brother Basanta Rai gave the state papers and other secrets to the Mughal generals, who assured them of their possession in Jessore. The news of the defection of Srihari greatly upset Dāud and he left his hiding place in the hills to meet the Mughals on the plains.²

Although written in a fanciful style and more than two centuries after the event had taken place, the account of Pratapaditya Charitra seems to have contained facts. Its evidence of Dāud's favour to Srihari and Basanta Rai and their flight to Jessore with the treasures of their master³ is corroborated from the writings of the contemporary historians.⁴

1. B., II, 238 ; T., II, 324.

2. Ramram Basu - Pratapaditya Charitra, 32-8.

3. Ibid, 12 and 32-4.

4. Idem, 159, 166-7 and 170.

Moreover, Badauni's writings also substantially agree with Ramram Basu's account.¹ Furthermore, the fact that, after the conquest of Bengal, the Mughals, though they occupied the territories of Fathabad and Bakla, spared Srihari's Jessore shows that he must have rendered valuable services to them. Indeed the defection and faithlessness of his confidant Srihari greatly weakened Dāud and he suspected that some other of his chiefs might play the same game with him. So, he considered it prudent to risk an open engagement with the Mughals rather than allowing his strength to be dwindled by defection.

Dāud, however, arranged his forces in battle array. In the field of Rajmahal, the Afghans and Mughals confronted each other in the following battle array.²

R.	[-----] [Kālā Pahār] [-----]	C.	[-----] [Dāud] [-----]	L.	[+++++] [Junaid] [-----]
			[-----] [Batlu and [Khān Jahān] [-----]		

[-----] [Shāham Khān] [-----]	Van
[-----] [Ismail and [Qiyā Khān] [-----]	Iltimsh

L.	[-----] [Todar Māl] [-----]	C.	[-----] [Khān Jahān] [-----]	R.	[-----] [Muzaffar Khān] [-----]
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1. Idem, 178.

2. A. N., III, 180 ; B., II, 238 ; T., II, 324.

Unfortunately for Dāud his best general Junaid Karrani had had his knee smashed as a result of the fall of a Mughal cannon in the previous night when he was sleeping on a charpai.¹ This disheartened the Afghāns. Junaid, however, led his forces in the battle. In the first encounter, the Afghān right shook the Mughal left. The Mughal fire, however, wounded Kālā Pahār and he fled from the field. His flight and the pressure of the Mughal left caused confusion in the Afghān right. In a fierce engagement with the Mughal right, Junaid was killed and the Afghān left was routed from the field. An attack of the Mughal van and Iltimsh killed Khān Jahān and the Afghān van dispersed. After this, the Afghān centre gave way without a fight. Dāud fled for his life. His horse, however, got entangled in a marsh and he was brought a captive before the Mughal commander Khān Jahān.²

Khān Jahān rebuked Dāud for having broken the treaty of Katak. Dāud replied with composure that the treaty was with Mun'im Khān and that the time had come for the conclusion of a new one. Badaūnī writes that, ~~pier~~ parched with thirst, Dāud asked for water and some wicked soldiers, filling his slipper with water, offered it to him. Khān Jahān, however, offered him a drink from his own private canteen. He also wanted to spare the life of a young and handsome prince, Dāud, but all the Mughal

1. A. N., III, 181 ; B., II, 238 ; T., II, 324.

2. Ibid, 181-2 ; 238 ; 325.

officers advised for his execution. To sever Dāud's head from his body they took two strokes at the neck, but they failed. At the third stroke, however, they succeeded. Khān Jahān sent Dāud's head to the Emperor by the hands of Saiyid 'Abdullā Khān.¹ The battle of Rajmahal closed the last chapter of Afghān rule in Eastern India.

Ni'matullā says that the Afghāns lost their saltanate in Eastern India on account of Qatlū Lūhānī's baseness.² According to this Afghān historian, on the eve of the battle of Rajmahal Qatlū formed a treasonable connection with Khān Jahān. On condition that some parganas of Orissa were given to him, he promised to take such a position in the battle as to render Dāud's defeat unavoidable.³

The Mughal historians inform us that in the battle of Rajmahal Qatlū Lūhānī and Dāud's Khān Jahān commanded the Afghān van. They mention that Khān Jahān was killed and the Afghān van dispersed ; but they do not refer to the activities of Qatlū in the battle. The silence of the Mughal historians in a way agrees with the evidence of Ni'matullā that Qatlū deserted Dāud in the battle-field. Moreover, Ni'matullā says that, as a reward for his treachery, Qatlū received from Khān Jahān the territory of Orissa.⁴ Indeed, after the battle of Rajmahal, Qatlū is found in possession

1. A. N., III, 182 ; B., II, 238 ; T., II, 325.

2. M., 172a.

3. Ibid, 172b.

4. Ibid.

of Orissa. How could he have possessed it, if he did not receive it as a reward for his defection ? Had it not been conferred on him for his valuable services, Emperor Akbar could not have consented to leave Orissa in the possession of the turbulent Afghāns.

Again, after the battle of Rajmahal, the Mughals occupied the Afghān possessions in Bengal and Bihar. What did *prevent* them from occupying Orissa ? Even for some years after 1576, Orissa remained undisturbed by the Mughals. It was only in 1583 when, at the time of the Bihar-Bengal rebellion of the Mughal officers, Qatlū proved disloyal to the Emperor that a force was sent against him.¹

Thus, on account of Akbar's determination to expel the turbulent Afghāns from their stronghold in Eastern India, Dāud's foolishness in killing his wise and able minister Lūdī, the desertion of his favourite minister Srihari Bikramaditya and the treachery of his counsellor Qatlū Lūhānī, the Afghāns lost their home and saltanate in Bengal and Bihar which was built by the genius of Sher Shāh and preserved by the wisdom and ability of Sulaimān Karranī.

1 See Chapter VII, P. 197.

CHAPTER VII

The position of the Afghāns under the Mughals down to the end of the reign of Akbar

In the sixteenth century, the general attitude of the Afghāns towards the Mughals was one of hostility. This was because the self-willed Afghān chiefs, fresh from the enjoyment of privileges and accustomed to a life of turbulence and feud, could neither reconcile themselves to the loss of sovereignty nor submit easily as a peaceful population of the Mughal empire. Babur and Humāyūn sought to win them over by following a conciliatory policy. This policy contributed, however, to the expulsion of the Mughals from India in 1540.

In the reign of Akbar (1556-1605), the relation between the Afghāns and Mughals may be summed up as one of hostility and distrust. With a few exceptions, the Afghāns as a body remained hostile to Akbar until they lost Bihar and Bengal in 1576. After that, with the exception of a few, they reconciled themselves to Mughal rule. Akbar, however, could not forget their past conduct to his father and to himself and, throughout his reign, he followed a policy of distrust towards them, though many of them served him with loyalty and gave their toil and blood for his empire.

Bābur and the Afghans :

Under Bābur (1526-30) and Humāyūn (1530-40), the Mughals lived to win over the Afghāns to acceptance of their rule in Northern India. In his Memoirs, Bābur claims that he showed the Afghān nobles greater kindness and favour than they could claim by right.¹ Abūl Fazl's Akbarnāma supports Bābur's contention. He says, after the conquest of India, Bābur treated everyone great or small with kindness and even the mother, children, dependents and relations of Ibrāhīm Lūdī received his favours in the form of jagirs, allowances and pensions.² Badāuni's view also agrees with that of Bābur and Abūl Fazl.³

We shall see that Bābur did really follow a conciliatory policy towards the Afghāns. In this policy, he was indeed guided by the need to stabilise his newly acquired empire. But whatever might have been his motive, it has to be said that, considering the standards of the time and the treatment normally meted out by the victor to the vanquished, Bābur was remarkably humane and generous to the Afghāns.

The first step in Bābur's policy, taken even before his conquest of India, was his marriage with an Afghān lady named Bibī Mubārīka, the daughter of an Yusufzai chief Malik

1. Wāqī'at-i-Bāburī, 527 ; B. N., II, 527.

2. A. N., II, 98-9.

3. B., I, 337.

Shāh Mansūr.¹ In 1526 after the conquest of the Panjab, he appointed 'Alāuddīn 'Ālam Khān Lūdī, the uncle of Ibrāhīm Lūdī, and Dilāwar Khān Lūdī, a son of Daulat Khān Lūdī, as governors of Dipalpur and Sultanpur respectively.² He even helped the former in his attempt to obtain the throne of Delhi.³ It was only when 'Ālam Khān had proved his utter incompetence as an organiser and general, that Babur decided to fight for the throne of Delhi for himself. Bābur especially favoured Dilāwar Khān Lūdī whom, in 1526 after the battle of Panipat, he honoured with the title of Khān Khānān, the highest title in the Indian Muslim court.⁴

Among the examples of Bābur's favours to the Afghāns was the conferment upon the mother of Ibrāhīm Lūdī of a pargana worth seven laks of double dams⁵ equivalent to rupees thirtyfive thousands a year. He also favoured the Afghān chiefs, who submitted to his rule, with jagirs, money and suitable posts in the imperial service. Fīrūz Khān Sarangkhānī received a jagir in Jaunpur and one crore fortysix laks and five thousands rupees.⁶ Bāyazīd Farmulī⁷ obtained the ~~government~~ government of Oudh and

1. Wāqī'at-i-Bāburī, 379 ; B. N., I, 375.

2. B. N., I, 442-3 ; Cambridge History of India, III, 11.

3. B. N., I, 444.

4. Wāqī'at-i-Bāburī, 572 ; B. N., II, 567 ; Tūz., 42.

5. Ibid, 478 478 19 ; A.N., I, 98

6. Ibid, 527 527 ; T., II, 19.

7. Bāyazīd was brother of Mustafa Farmulī, the husband of Fath Malika, the daughter of Miyān Muhammad Farmulī called Kālā Pahār, a noble of the Lūdī sultāns.

Abbās, IO., 51a-b ; BM., 34b.

a crore of rupees. Bābur also gave Mahmūd Khān Lūhānī the government of Ghazipur and ninety thousand rupees.¹ He appointed Shāh Muḥammad Farmulī as governor of Saran.²

Bābur favoured Fath Khān Sarwānī with Kara, the title of Khān Jahān and one crore sixty lak rupees.³ Biban Shāhūkhail,⁴ Malikdād Karranī⁵ and Yahyā Lūhānī⁶ were admitted into the imperial service. Nizām Khān Miyāna and his brother Ālam Khān, Tātār Khān Sarangkhānī of Gwalior, Muḥammad Zaitūn and other chiefs received royal favours.⁷ Bābur had also been generous to the Lūhānī and Sūr Afghāns. The Lūhānī chief Jalāl Khān was left undisturbed in Bihar on his promise to be loyal to the Mughal throne and pay tribute to the imperial treasury.⁸ Sher Khān Sūr also retained his possessions in Sahsaram.⁹ Bābur admitted about eight thousand Lūhānīs to the imperial service.¹⁰

Furthermore, Bābur was lenient towards rebel Afghāns. He did not treat harshly Ibrāhīm Lūdī's mother, who, in spite of

1. Wāqī'at-i-Bāburī, 527, 530 and 550 ; B. N., II, 527, 530 and 544 ; A.N. II, 102 and 104.

2. B. N., II, 675.

3. Wāqī'at-i-Bāburī, 537 ; B. N., 537.

4. Ibid, 446 ; 464 and 466.

5. Ibid, 478 ; 540.

6. Ibid, 682-3 ; 676.

7. B. N., II, 539-40 ; A. N., I, 104-5.

8. Wāqī'at-i-Bāburī, 682-3 ; B. N., II, 676.

9. Ibid, 658-9 ; 652 ; Abbās, IO, 28a ; BM., 196.

10. Ibid, 683 ; 676.

his favours, made an attempt on his life by having a cook poison his food.¹ Biban Shāhūkhail broke the court etiquette by sitting in the royal presence while all the great nobles Mīr Khalīfa, Sultān Junaid Barlās, 'Alāuddīn 'Ālam Khān Lūdī, Dilāwar Khān Lūdī and others used to stand in the presence of the Emperor. Although disgusted, Bābur did not enforce his court etiquette on the rustic Afghān chief.² This shows his eagerness to conciliate the Afghāns.

Badāunī writes, " The amīrs of India, notwithstanding his (Bābur's) conciliating behaviour and efforts to improve their fortunes, did not yield obedience to him and behaved like unruly savages. " ³ We might not agree with Badāunī that Bābur wanted to improve the fortunes of the Afghān chiefs, but it cannot be denied that Bābur accorded them generous treatment. The Afghān chiefs, who had tasted the privileges of power, could not, however, remain content with the favours bestowed on them by the Mughal Emperor. They yearned for the full privileges of sovereignty and deserted Mughal service.

Biban,⁴ Bāyazīd⁵ and Fath Khān Sarwānī⁶ deserted

1. Wāqī'at-i-Bāburī, 542 ; B. N., II, 542 ; A. N., I, 104.

2. Ibid, 466 ; 466.

3. B., I, 337.

4. Wāqī'at-i-Bāburī, 528 ; B. N., II, 468.

5 and 6. Ibid, 658-9 ; 652 and 589.

Fath Khān Sarwānī deserted because Bābur did not confer on him his father's title of A'zam Humāyūn. As the name of Bābur's son was Humāyūn he could not make Fath Khān greater Humāyūn.

B. N., II, 537.

Bābur's from ~~Baur's~~ service. Biban and Bāyazīd formed a confederacy with Maḥmūd Lūdī, the brother of Ibrāhīm Ludi, with the intention of driving out the Mughals from India. On March 12, 1528, they fought an unsuccessful battle against Bābur near the Ghogra.¹ Sher Khān Sūr was also obliged to join them in this battle.²

A few of the Afghān chiefs had gone to Bengal and they incited the Bengali king ~~Nasir~~ Nuṣrat Shāh against Bābur.³ The Afghāns also joined Rana Sanga of Mewar and fought against the Mughals in the battle of Khanwa.⁴

Humāyūn and the Afghāns :

Humāyūn faithfully followed the Afghān policy of his father. In his reign, Dilāwar Khān Khān Khānān rose to the ~~position~~ position of a minister. Of all the Afghān chiefs it was Dilāwar Khān, who remained sincerely attached to Humāyūn and even advised him not to trust too much his fellow Afghān chiefs. In 1536, he said to Humāyūn, " It is not wise to neglect Sher Khān Sūr, for he is rebelliously inclined and well understands all matters pertaining to government. " ⁵ Humāyūn, however, neglected Sher Khān and marched against him only when he had gained strength and besieged Gaur. Though Dilāwar Khān advised him to advance

1. Waqī'at-i-Bāburī, 658-9 ; B. N., II, 652.

2. Ibid.

3. F., II, 587 ; Shāhī, 99.

4. Waqī'at-i-Bāburī, 569 ; B. N., 562 ; A. N., I, 106 ;
Abbās, E., IV, 346-7

5. Abbās, IO., 53b ; BM., 36a-b.

immediately to Gaur, ¹ he wasted in the siege and occupation of Chunar six months and thus gave time to Sher Khan to capture Gaur and strengthen his power with the wealth of Bengal.

On his return march from Gaur in 1539, Humāyūn sent in advance Dilāwar Khān to Munghyr. Sher Khān's general Khwās Khān made a surprise attack on him at Munghyr and took him prisoner. ² Sher Khān allotted his captive a daily allowance of half a ser of unground barley and executed him after the battle of Chausa. ³

The Lūhānīs and Sūrs of Bihar received generous treatment from Humāyūn. Humāyūn could have exterminated Sher Khān, a petty chief of Sahsaram in 1532, and thus have averted the greatest calamity of his life. He, however, left him in undisturbed possession of his estates as he promised to be loyal to his throne and also sent as a security his third son Qutb Khān and his vakīl 'Isa Khān with 500 retainers to his service. ⁴ It was a great political blunder by Humāyūn that he trusted the ambitious Afghān chief Sher Khān, who, only a few days previously had joined the confederacy of Biban, Bāyazīd and Mahmūd Lūdi and fought against him in the battle of Dauroh in 1531. ⁵

1. 'Abbās, IO., 54b-55a ; BM., 37a.

2. Ibid, BM., 42b ; Jauhar, 31 ; Tuz., 42.

3. Ibid, 49a-b ; IO., 75a.

4. Ibid, 34a ; Jauhar, 6 ; A. N., I, 123-4. Abūl Fazl mentions the name of Qutb Khān as 'Abdur Rashīd.

5. 'Abbās, BM., 32b ; E. IV, 348-9.

Humāyūn was deceived by the show of allegiance by the crafty Afghān chief. In 1535 when Humāyūn was fighting against Bahādur Shāh of Guzrat, Qutb Khān fled from his service. ¹

A few of the Afghān chiefs who had deserted Mughal service joined Bahādur Shāh of Guzrat and incited him against Humāyūn. Bahādur Shāh sent Tātār Khān Lūdi, the son of 'Alāuddīn 'Alam Khān Lūdi, ² with 40,000 horse to fight the Mughals. Tātār Khān captured Biana. Humāyūn's brothers, Hindal and Askari, however, recovered it and defeated and killed him in a battle at Mandrael near Biana in 1534. ³ 'Alāuddīn 'Alam Khān and his Afghān followers also fought for Bahādur Shāh against the Mughals. Humāyūn defeated them and captured 'Alam Khān along with others in the fort of Mandu in June, 1535. He was, however, hamstrung and released. ⁴

1. 'Abbās, IO., 75a ; BM., 49b ; A. N., I, 123-4. After the battle of Chausa, Sher Shāh sent Qutb Khān to Chanderi to create disturbances for Humāyūn. In an engagement at Mandrael, Qutb Khān was, however, killed.

2. Considering 'Alam Khān dangerous due to his pretensions, Bābur confined him in Qila Zafar in Badakhshan. 'Alam Khān, however, escaped with the help of some Afghān traders and came to the court of Bahādur Shah. A. N., I, 129 ; Erskine - History of India
XXX II, 41.

3. T., III, 267-8 ; Abū Turāb - Tārīkh-i-Guzrat, 5.

4. A. N., I, 134 ; Abu Turab, 19. In the reign of Mahmūd Shāh III (1538-53), 'Alam Khān became for a time the vazīr and an absolut authority in Guzrat. (T., III, 237-8 ; Abū Turāb, 43). His absolutism disgusted the sultān and the amirs Saiyid Mubārak Khān and Itimad K., the Habshī chief, Their combined forces made him leave Guzrat and take shelter in Malwa, where Sher Shāh gave him a jagir in 1542. After Sher Shāh's death, he had to leave Malwa and come back to Guzrat. Saiyid Mubārak gave him a jagir in Champanir. 'Alam K. plotted against his benefactor and, being defeated, joined the Fūlādī Afghāns at Patan. They occupied Kari a possession of Itimad K., who, however, later on defeated them and Killed 'Alam K. T. III, 237-8 ; Mir'āt S., 271, 275-6, 279 ;

In 1537 after the death of Bahādur Shāh , some of the Afghān chiefs went from Guzrat to Bihar and joined Sher Khān.¹ Strengthened by their adhesion, Sher Khān could indulge in his vision of the restoration of Afghān sovereignty in India. In 1540 his vision was realised at the battle of Kanauj ; Humāyūn was expelled from India and Afghān rule was restored in the country.

The restoration of Afghān sovereignty in India was made possible by the conciliatory policy of Bābur and Humāyūn towards the Afghāns. This policy saved them from being ruined and homeless. It also gave them an opportunity to regain strength and resources. Indeed the Afghāns under Sher Shāh could conquer Gaur and strengthen themselves with the wealth of Bengal only because Bābur and Humāyūn had left them in the possession of Bihar. Had they been dispossessed of Bihar it would have been extremely difficult for these homeless people to obtain a foothold and a rallying centre in order to make a bid for the restoration of their lost sovereignty in India.

Akbar and the Afghāns ;

The Afghāns lost the sovereignty of India to Humāyūn in 1555 and finally to Akbar in 1556. Prudence required their acceptance of Mughal rule. The proud Afghān chiefs, however, instead of submitting peacefully to the Mughal rule, remained at bottom hostile and created troubles throughout the reign of Akbar (1556-1605).

1. Abbās, IO., 50b ; BM., 34b.

In the period from 1556 to 1561, the Afghāns made several attempts to recover their sovereignty. In 1558, the Afghān ex-pretender Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr came out of his refuge in Orissa and advanced to occupy Jaunpur.¹ The Mughal commander Ālī Qulī Khān Zamān, however, forced him to retire to Orissa. Bahādur Shāh of Bengal also fought against Khān Zamān near Jaunpur, but he was beaten back to his own country.² In 1561, the Afghāns under Sher Shāh II, the son of sultān Ādil, made another attempt to recover their territories, but they failed due to their own indiscipline and the superior generalship of Khān Zamān.³ The last attempt at a systematic campaign of the Afghāns under Awāz Khān, a son of Islām Shāh, in 1561 for the recovery of their lost position also failed at Andhiabari on the bank of the Son.⁴

After these failures, the Afghāns seem to have realised that the recovery of their power was an impossible task and they retreated to their possessions in Bihar and Bengal. A few adventurous chiefs went to Guzrat and joined their fellow chiefs at Patan. The retreat of the Afghāns from the Mughal occupied territories did not, however, mean the end of their hostility towards the Mughals. Of course they did not launch any more systematic campaigns against the Mughals, but they did not cease

1. A. N., II, 82.

2. B. N., II, 25.

3. Ibid, 48 ; A. N., II, 138-9 ; T., II, 154 ; D., BM., 126a.

4. A. N., II, 220 ; B., II, 24-5.

to make trouble for Emperor Akbar whenever they saw the opportunity. Indeed any enemy of the Mughal Emperor was a friend of the Afghāns.

In 1564 when Khān Zamān rebelled in Jaunpur, the Afghāns helped him. Awāz Khān joined him and only deserted to the Mughal forces in 1565 when he found the position of Khān Zamān hopeless in the extreme.¹ Sulaimān Karranī, the ruler of Begnal and Bihar, contracted a friendship with the rebel Mughal viceroy and helped him by sending an army under his generals Hasan Khān Batnī, Sulaimān Mānkālī and Kālā Pahār.²

The Afghāns also joined Rana Pratap of Mewar, the bitterest enemy of Akbar, and fought against the Mughal forces in the battle of Haldighat in 1576. Our historian Badāuni himself was a soldier in this battle and his evidence that the Afghāns fought in the side of the Rajputs cannot be disbelieved. He says that an Afghān chief named Hakīm Khān Sūr led a division of Pratap's army at Haldighat.³

Hājī Khān⁴ and other Afghān chiefs, who, after the

1. A. N., II, 266.

2. Op. Cit., 151 and A. N., II, 2 258.

3. B., II, 231 and 233.

4. Hājī K. at first joined Itimad K. of Guzrat who gave him jagir in Kari. In a battle between Itimad K. and Sher K. Fūlādī, he with his forces stood aside out of sympathy for his fellow Afghāns. Being defeated, Itimad K. wanted to seize Hājī K., who however, fled and joined the Fūlādī Afghāns, in 1561.

Mir'at A., I, 90-1 ; Mir'at S., 279-80, 286, 291 ; T., III, 246-7

loss of sovereignty in Northern India, took shelter in Guzrat remained the uncompromising enemy of the Mughals. So great was their hatred of the Mughals that they killed Bairām Khān, the fallen minister of Akbar, who had halted awhile at Patan on his way to Makkah in 1561. ¹ It was the Afghāns under the leadership of Sher Khān Fūlādī, who had installed himself as the virtual ruler of Guzrat having the puppet sultān Muẓaffar Shāh III in his control, ² who in practice resisted Akbar's conquest of Guzrat in 1572 when Iʿtimad Khān and other Guzrati nobles had submitted to the Mughals. ³

After Akbar's conquest of Guzrat, the Afghāns did not submit to him. They ~~went~~ left the country. Sher Khān Fūlādī took shelter in Surat and his son Muḥammad Khān in the mountains of Idar. In January, 1573 when the Emperor was dealing with the rebellious Mirzās at Surat Sher Khān Fūlādī, Junaid Karranī, another Afghān adventurous warrior who fled from Mughal service, ~~xxx~~ and other Afghāns came out of their refuge and created serious disturbance in Patan. Then with a large army they advanced to capture the fort of Patan. They reduced the Mughal commandant of the fort to great straits. The timely arrival of the Mughal general Khān Aʿzam Mirzā ʿAzīz Koka from Ahmadabad and of the Emperor from Surat saved the situation. The Afghāns

1. A. N., ii, 131 ; B., II, 45 ; Mir at A., I, 93.

2. T., III, 258-9 ; Mirʾat S., 303-4. Sikandar was present at the time of the Guzrat campaign.

3. A. N., III, 5-7 ; Abū Turāb. Abu Turab acted as the envoy of Iʿtimad Khān to Akbar. (54-56).

were defeated. Sher Khān fled to Junagarh and his son with other Afghāns to Idar. ¹ Akbar returned to capital.

No sooner had Akbar returned to Fathpur Sikri than the Afghāns came back to Guzrat and, in collaboration with the Mīrzās, captured some places and besieged Ahmadabad. Badaūnī says that Sher Khān Fūlādī and the Mīrzās made a plan that some of them would go to Northern India to incite rebellion against the Emperor and Sher Khān Fūlādī would besiege Patan. ² The execution of the plan depended on their capture of Ahmadabad. Their vigorous attack placed the Mughals in a straitened condition. In despair, Khān A'zam prayed for the help of the Emperor. ³ Akbar, however, personally marched to Guzrat and arrived near Ahmadabad in nine days covering a distance of six hundred miles. The enemy was surprised and beaten in a battle near Ahmadabad on September 2, 1573. ⁴

After this defeat, the Afghāns were dispersed and Guzrat seemed to be free from any further Afghān trouble. Trouble, however, arose in 1582 when Muzaffar Shāh managed to escape from the custody of the Mughal officers. He collected an army. With his Afghān followers, Sher Khān Fūlādī came out of the obscure corners where he had been spending his days in misfortune and

1. A. N., III, 26.

2. B., II, 147-8.

3. A. N., III, 41 ; B., II, 164-5 ; Abū Turāb, 59.

4. Ibid, 53 and 57 ; B., II, 167-8.

assumed command of an army. He advanced to take possession of Patan from the Mughal officers.¹ Our historian Nizāmuddīn, who served under Mīrzā ‘Abdur Raḥīm, the Mughal governor of Guzrat, routed Sher Khān Fūlādī and sent him flying back to Ahmadabad.² Mīrzā ‘Abdur Raḥīm defeated the rebels in a hotly contested battle at Sakrej, three kos from Ahmadabad, on December 31, 1583. Sher Khān Fūlādī and his Afghāns fled towards Baglana and thence to the Deccan, while Muẓaffar Šāh took shelter in Kathiawar.³ Thus the Afghāns of Guzrat fought against the Mughals to the last and left the country instead of submitting themselves to their rule.

In 1576 at the battle of Rajmahal, the Afghāns lost their strongholds in Bihar and Bengal. Even after this, a section of them remained the uncompromising foes of Akbar. They retreated to Orissa and frequently raided the Mughal territories in Bengal and Bihar. At the time of the Bihar-Bengal rebellion and the rebellion of Akbar's brother Mīrzā Ḥakīm⁴ in 1579-1581, the Afghāns under the leadership of Qatlū Lūḥānī took the opportunity to fish in troubled waters and seize some Mughal territories in Bihar and Bengal.⁵ The rebellion was, however, suppressed by

1. T., II, 373 ; A. N., III, 412-3 ; B., II, 329.

2. Ibid, 373-4.

3. Ibid, 375-6 ; A. N., III, 424. Nizāmuddīn fought in the battle of Sarkej.

4. The Afghāns of Afghanistan supported Ḥakīm as he championed the cause of orthodox Islām against Akbar whom they considered heretical. A. N., III, 335-7, 360.

5. A. N., III, 320- 1 and 398-9.

the Mughal generals and the Afghāns had to fall back on their strongholds in Orissa.

The Afghāns could not long hold Orissa ; in 1592, it fell into the hands of the Mughal general Raja Man Singh. ~~Even then~~ The loss of Orissa made the Afghāns homeless wanderers. Even then, a large number of them did not accept Mughal rule but dispersed themselves in Bengal. They took service under the Bara Bhuyāns (twelve great zamīndars), who had installed themselves as independent rulers in their respective territories after the fall of the Karranī saltanate in 1576.

Qatlū Lūhānī's son Sulaimān Khān Lūhānī and his followers entered the service of Raja Kedar Rai of Bhusna. In 1596, he died fighting Raja Man Singh. ¹ Khwajā Kamāl and Khwāja Jamāl, two brothers of Sulaimān Khān Lūhānī, joined the service of Raja Pratapaditya of Jessore. ² and ~~strengthened~~ strengthened his position against the Mughals. 'Isa Khān Masnad-i-'Alī, the powerful zamīndār of Bhati and the leader of the Bara Bhuyāns in their struggle against Akbar, made Khwāja 'Usmān, another brother of Sulaimān Lūhānī, his ally by the grant of territories in Bukainagar ³ in ~~eastern Mymensing~~ eastern Mymensingh and western Sylhet districts. 'Usmān and his Afghāns, in alliance with 'Isa Khān, and, after his death , with his sons Mūsa and Dāūd challenged the authority of

1. A. N., III, 711.

2. Baharistān, I, 126-7 , 130 and 135-6.

3. A. N., III, 632 ; Baharistān, I, 110.

Akbar in Eastern Bengal. ¹ In spite of his best efforts, Akbar failed to subdue them and Bengal, though it was ~~namikk~~ nominally conquered in 1576, remained in fact unconquered until his death in 1605.

Akbar's distrust of the Afghāns :

Akbar thoroughly disliked the Afghāns as a body. In view of their past conduct to Babur and Humāyūn and their hostility towards his own rule, his distrust of them was but natural. Akbar could not certainly forget that ~~the~~ the Afghāns had deserted Humāyūn and caused his expulsion from India.

Moreover, Akbar had seen from ~~past~~ personal experience that the turbulent Afghān chiefs did not feel comfortable at the Mughal court, because a few of them who, being forced by circumstances, joined his service, proved ~~deserts~~ ^{ver} after a few days. 'Abdur Rahmān Khān Sūr, the son of Sikandar Khān Sūr, and Ghāzī Khān Tanurī entered Mughal service at the time of the surrender of Mankot by Sikandar Khān Sūr in July, 1557. ² In 1560 when Bairām Khān rebelled, they left service and created trouble in Sambal. Suffering defeat in an engagement, they fled and took shelter with Raja Ram Chand of Panna. The Mughal general Asaf Khān, however, defeated them in a fight and killed many of the Afghāns including Ghāzī Khān Tanurī. ³

1. A. N., III, 809 ; Baharistān, I, 141-2.

~~Ibid~~ 2. A. N., II, 59 ; T., II, 134-5 ; Briggs - F., II, 190.

3. Ibid, 98, 148 and 183.

Junaid Karranī, the son of Sulaimān Karranī's brother 'Imād Karranī, was another deserter from Mughal service. In 1566, he fled from his uncle's court and took refuge with Akbar. According to Abūl Fazl, the Emperor bestowed princely favours on him and granted him a jagir in Hindaun ; but Junaid deserted the Mughal service and went to Guzrat.¹ In view of Akbar's distrust of the Afghāns, Abūl Fazl might be exaggerating when he said that Junaid received princely favours from the Emperor ; but undoubtedly he was admitted to the imperial service and he deserted it only after a few days. Junaid joined his fellow Afghāns in Guzrat and, in 1572-3, fought against the Mughals invaders. After Akbar's occupation of Guzrat, he went to Bihar and caused enormous trouble for the Mughals.² Junaid afterwards joined his cousin Dāud Karranī and was killed in the battle of Rajmahal in 1576.³

Mahmūd Khān Sūr,⁴ a son of Sikandar Khān Sūr, and Husain,⁵ a son of 'Adil Shāh, also left the service of Akbar in 1572 and 1574 respectively. The desertion of these Afghān chiefs, in spite of his favours, naturally caused Akbar's distrust of the Afghāns.

1. A. N., II, 284 . Abūl Fazl says that Junaid fled owing to a groundless apprehension.

2. A. N., III, 119 ; B., I, 193 ; T., II, 304 ; Mir'āt S. 339a and 341a.

3. Op. Cit., 170-1 and A. N.,^Q 181-2.

4. Ibid., 181 and A. N., III, 16.

5. A. N., III, 102. Husain was later on captured and executed by Mun'im Khān.

This distrust is revealed in Akbar's conduct towards some of the Afghān chiefs. In 1557 when Sikandar Khān Sūr surrendered the fort of Mankot, he was promised Jaunpur in jagir, though the territory was yet to be conquered.¹ In 1558, Jaunpur was, however, conquered ; but it was conferred on Khān Zamān and the Afghān chief was sent with a small force to conquer Bengal from his fellow Afghāns and to obtain his jagir there.² Badāunī says that in Bengal many accidents befell Sikandar Khān Sūr and that such a position was created that he attached himself again to his friends and died shortly afterwards.³

Bāz Bahādur, the ex-king of Malwa, who was induced to join the Mughal court, also did not receive any better treatment. Although nominally he was given a manṣab of 1,000, raised later on to 2,000, yet actually he was confined in the fort of Agra until his death.⁴ The Mughal historians, except Badāunī, are silent about Bāz Bahādur's fate after he was admitted to court. They simply mention him as a talented musician and a manṣabdār of 2,000 and do not refer to his confinement. It is probable that Abūl Fazl and Nizāmuddīn did not refer to Bāz Bahādur's

1. Op. Cit., 116 and B., II, 18-9.

2 and 3. ~~Op. Cit.~~ Ibid.

4. Op. Cit., 122 and B., II, 51-2. Badāunī says that Bāz Bahādur obtained release from confinement, but he could not escape his death.

confinement as it would have injured the reputation of their master. Writing his book in secret, Badāunī, however, stated what he saw with his own eyes.

The reaction of Akbar to the news of the death of a petty Afghān officer, Daulat Khān Lūdī at Ahmadnagar in 1601, expresses his distrust of the Afghāns. The Emperor is said to have remarked, " This day Sher Khān Sūr has departed from the world. " ¹ This indicates the distrust with which Akbar still regarded the Afghāns even at a time when his empire had reached the zenith of its prosperity and they had ceased to be a political factor in India.

Certain economic measures of Akbar show his distrust of the Afghāns. Badāunī says that, as the Sadar-i-Sudūr (Minister in charge of Ecclesiastical affairs and Endowments) of the Emperor from 1556 to 1561 A. D., Sheikh Gadāī cancelled madād-i-ma'āsh lands and took away the legacy of the Khānzādas. ² Evidently by the Khānzādas, Badāunī meant the Afghāns, because in his history we find him often mentioning them as Khāns or Khānzādas and the Mughals as Mīrzās, Chaghtais and Qizilbāshis. Moreover, the Afghāns had preceded Akbar and also Abūl Fazl accused Sher Shāh and Islām Shāh for their lavish grant of lands. ³ So, it is reasonable to conclude that this land measure of Akbar

1. Maṣ Ma'āṣir, II, 6.

2. ~~Akbar-nāma~~ B., II, 29.

3. Ā'in, I, 296.

امروز شیرخان سور از عالم رفت =

او قلم نسخ بر اراضی مودمهاش و اوقات
خانزادهای قدیم کشید =

affected the Afghāns living in his empire.

Further evidence from Ā'in-i-Akbarī not only clears whatever doubt we might have had about our conclusion from Badāunī's statement, but also proves that Akbar was determined to ruin the well-to-do Afghān families of his empire. Abūl Fazl writes that, in 1562-63 (971 H.), Emperor Akbar appointed Sheikh 'Abdun Nahī as the Sadar-i-Sudūr of the empire. He then took away all the land grants (suyūrghāl) from the Afghāns and chaudhurīes and referred the case of the others to the Sheikh, who inquired into and certified their grants.¹ Indeed this incident reveals Akbar's distrust of the Afghāns. He resumed outright the lands of the Afghāns, while he gave the other classes of landholders the benefit of inquiry and confirmation. The motive which actuated Akbar in the resumption of all Afghān lands was certainly to ~~weaken them~~ break their economic affluence and to weaken them so that they might not create any trouble in the empire.

Another incident, though small in itself, expresses Akbar's distrust towards the Afghāns. In 1579, some Afghāns came from their country and settled in the Panjab. On a report that they oppressed the people of the locality, Akbar ordered Sa'id Khān, the sūbadār of the Panjab, to have them settled in batches

1. Ā'in, 1, 198.

سیورغال افغانان و چودریان خالصه شد و دیگر مردم را
بتصدیق و تصحیح او گذاشتند :

in different places so that they might neither be able to oppress the people nor become vagabonds.¹ The idea in thus scattering the Afghāns over the province was, no doubt, to prevent them from causing any mischief locally.

Akbar's distrust of the Afghāns is reflected in the writings of his secretary and court historian Abūl Fazl, who often mentioned them with the epithets of "black fated", "black faced", "brainless", "turbulent", "vagabonds", and "wicked".² In making such remarks, Abūl Fazl, who recorded the deeds and thoughts of his royal master, simply gave expression to the feeling of Akbar towards the Afghāns.

A large number of Afghāns entered the Mughal army, particularly after the loss of Bengal and Bihar in 1576. Although they served with devotion and valour, Akbar did not entrust them with any important post in his government. Malik Mustafa,³ a brother of Bāz Bahādur, Fath Khān Masnad-i-Ālī, Hasan Khān Batnī, Hājī Khān,⁴ the brother of Khwās Khān, Salīm Khān Kākar,⁵ Bābui Mānkālī, Saiyid Khān Karrānī,⁶ Shāhbāz Khān Niyāzī, Ibrāhīm Khān Kākar, Ibrāhīm Khān Miyāna,⁷ Muḥammad Khān Niyāzī,⁸ Habībullā,⁹ Fath Khān Sūr, Daulat Khān Lūdī,

1. A. N., III, 247.

2. Ibid, II, 253, 325 and III, 4.

3. T., III, 420.

4. A. N. III, 24.

5. Ibid, 14 ; T., II, 448.

6 and 7. Ibid, 427 and 623.

8. Ibid, 608-9 ; T., II, 452.

9. M., - E., V, 67. He was the father of historian Ni'matullā.

Fath Khān Lūdī, ¹ Bahādur Khān Qurdār, Salīm Khān Lūhānī, Isa Khān Maswānī, Sultān Sūr, Allahadād Khān Lūhānī, Ulugh Khān Lūhānī, Naṣīr Khān Miyāna, Manu Khān Lūhānī, Tāj Khān Lūhānī, Sher Khān and others ² joined Akbar's army and rendered him good service in different campaigns of the empire. None of them, however, attained any post of dignity and honour in the imperial service.

While Akbar was very free in his appointments of the Turks, Persians and even Hindus to responsible posts, he seems to have behaved very differently towards the Afghāns. There were 7 vakīls (Principal Ministers), 10 vazīrs (Ministers of Finance), 15 bakhshīs (Paymasters of the Army) and 8 ṣadars (Ministers in charge of Ecclesiastical affairs and Endowments) in the reign of Akbar, ³ but not one of them was an Afghān. The Afghāns were not appointed to governorship or to any other subordinate office in the provincial administration. Although they took part in many of Akbar's campaigns and distinguished themselves, yet they were never entrusted with a major army command.

Moreover, Akbar did not give any of the larger manṣabs to the Afghāns. A study of the list of the manṣabdārs given in the ~~As~~ Ā'in reveals this fact. ⁴

1. A. N., III, 807.

2. Ibid, 650.

3. Ā'in, I, 232 ; Blochmann, I, 527-8.

4. Ibid, 223-32 ; 535-8.

<u>Manṣab</u>	<u>Total No. of Manṣabdārs</u>	<u>No. of Afghān Manṣabdārs</u>
5,000	30 (excepting the princes)	None
4,500	2	None
4,000	9	None
3,500	2	None
3,000	17	None
2,500	8	None
2,000	27	2
1,500	7	None
1,250	1	None
1000	31	4
900	38	None
800	2	None
700	25	None
600	4	None
500	46	None
350	19	
400	18	1
350	19	None
300	33	1
250	12	None
200	81	1
	-----	-----
	412	9

The table shows that of the total number of 412 mansabdars only 9 Afghans received mansabs, and those too but lowly ones. Bāz Bahādūr, the musician and the ex-king of Malwa, ~~was~~ ^{was} the receipient of the mansab of 2,000. ¹ Another Afghān named Daulat Khān Lūdi received this rank. ² Fattū Khān Masnad-i-‘Alī, ³ Hasan Khān Batnī, ⁴ Bābui Mānkālī, ⁵ and Salīm Khān Kākar, ⁶ were mansabdars of 1,000. Raḥmat Khān and Shāh Muḥammad, the sons of Fattū Khān, ⁷ and Bahādūr Khān Qurdār ⁸ obtained the mansab of 300, 250 and 400 respectively. Hasan Khān Miyāna, the father of Bahlūl Khān Miyāna, who rose to the mansab of 1,500 in the reign of Jahāngīr, has been mentioned as a mansabdar, but his actual command has not been given in the A'in. ⁹

Most of the above mentioned Afghān chiefs, hōwever, rendered distinguished service to Akbar's empire. Fattū Khān Masnad-i-‘Alī, a noble of sultān ‘Adil Shāh, joined Mughal service in 1561 after the failure of Sher Shāh II's attempt to recover the lost sovereignty, surrendering the fort of Chunar to Akbar. ¹⁰

1. A'in, I, 225.

2. A. N., III, 785 ; T., II, 388-90.

3. Badāunī (II, 77) mentions him as a mansabdār of 2,000, but Nizāmuddīn (II, 440) says that Fattū died a mansabdār of 1,000. The evidence of Nizāmuddīn, who was a bakhshi, seems more reliable.

4. Blochmann - A'in, I, 476.

5. A'in, I, 227 ; Blochmann, I, 473 ; T., II, 440.

6. Ibid, 225 ; T., II, 448.

7. ~~and see~~ Ibid, 229 ; Blochmann, I, 528.

8. Ibid, 228 ; T., II, 456.

9. Blochmann - A'in, I, 569.

10. A. N., II, 149-50 ; T., II, 170 ; B., II, 63.

A valient soldier, Fattū Khān fought the enemies of the Emperor in many a campaign. He took part in suppressing the rebel viceroy Khān Zamān in 1565 ¹ and the disturbances in the Panjab caused by the advance of ambitious Mīrzā Hākīm from Kabul. ²

Hasan Khān Batnī, one of the Afghān chiefs of Sulaimān Karranī, left the service of Dāud Karranī before the fall of Hajipur to Akbar in 1574. The capture of Hajipur and Patna from Dāud was mostly due to his valuable suggestion. When the Mughals had failed to capture the strong fort of Patna, Hasan Khān Batnī suggested the destruction of the Punpun bridge and the siege of Hajipur, the supply centre to Patna, as the necessary preliminary. ³ Following his suggestions, the Mughals captured Hajipur and the fall of the town broke the resistance of the Afghāns of Dāud. They evacuated Patna and the Emperor easily occupied the fort.

Bābui Mānkālī was another noble of Dāud Karranī who entered the service of Akbar after the fall of the Karranī saltanate in 1576. He took a good part part in the suppression of the Bihar-Bengal rebellion and in subduing the chiefs of Bengal. ⁴

Daulat Khān Lūdī was another Afghān, who served

1. A. N., II, 257.

2. Ibid, 370 ; III, 167 ; B., II, 156.

~~3. Ibid, 370 ; III, 167 ; B., II, 156.~~

3. Ibid, 325 ; III, 82-3.

4. A. N., III, 314 and 400-1.

valiently the cause of Mughal expansion. His ancestors, the relations of Daulat Khān Lūdī and Dilāwar Khān Khān Khānān, served the Lūdī and Sūr sultāns and his father ^{Umar} ~~Usman~~ Khān Lūdī, after the battle of Panipat in 1556, fled to Guzrat and took service under Sher Khān Fūlādī at Patan. ¹ Umar Khān fought against the Mughals in Guzrat in 1572-73 and was killed and his son Daulat Khān Lūdī ~~fkxf with~~ fled along with other Afghāns to Surat. Abū Turāb, the author of Tārīkh-i-Guzrat, invited him to Ahmadabad and introduced him to the Mughal sūbadār, Khān A'zam Mīrzā 'Azīz Koka, who appointed the brave young Afghān in his army in 1575. ²

Khān A'zam greatly appreciated the courage and fighting qualities of Daulat Khān Lūdī and made a present of him to Mīrzā 'Abdur Rahīm, the son of Bairām Khān, at the time of his (Khān A'zam) sister's marriage with him. At that time, he said to 'Abdur Rahīm that if he wished to rise high and to obtain his father's title of Khān Khānān, he should keep Daulat Khān with him and rear him. ³

Mīrzā 'Abdur Rahīm had a great admiration for Daulat Khān Lūdī and chose him for his companion. In his Memoirs, Jahāngīr says that 'Abdur Rahīm regarded Daulat Khān as his own brother or even hundred times more than his brother. ⁴ Daulat

1. Tūz., 42-3 ; Imamuddin - Khan Jahan's Ancestors,

Islamic Culture, XXXIII, No. 3.

2. Ibid and Ma'āsir, II, 5.

3. Ibid.

4. Tūz., 43.

Khān had so much influence with his master that Badāuni has mentioned him as his vakīl (deputy).¹

Indeed most of the victories of 'Abdur Rahīm were due to Daulat Khān's valour and manliness.² In 1583, 'Abdur Rahīm, then governor of Guzrat, was faced with the formidable rebellion of the renegade Guzrati sultān Muzaffar Shāh III, who had collected 40,000 horse against Mughal force numbering ~~xxxxx~~ only 10,000. The Emperor had sent instructions to him not to engage the rebels until the re-inforcements from Guzrat had arrived. Daulat Khān, however, said to 'Abdur Rahīm at that time, " Then you will have ~~partner~~ partners ; if you want to be Khān Khānān, you must win victory alone. ³ It is better to be killed than to live with an obscure name. " ³ Thus encouraged, 'Abdur Rahīm instantly engaged the enemy at Sarkej, 3 kos from Ahmadabad. Daulat Khān fought with undaunted courage and defeated the rebels. This victory won 'Abdur Rahīm from Akbar the title of Khān Khānān and the mansab of 5,000.⁴

Daulat Khān also played a heroic part in 'Abdur Rahīm's conquest of Thatta in 1593.⁵ His part in the conquest of Ahmadnagar in 1600 was no less distinguished. In recognition of

1. B., II, 367.

2. Tūz., 43 ; Rahīmī, III, 1628.

3. Ma'āsir, I, 694-5.

4. T., II, 376 ; B., II, 336.

5. Ma'āsir, II, 5 ; Rahīmī, III, 1628.

his courage and service, 'Abdur Rahīm gave him the rank of 1,000 in his own contingent.¹

Prince Dāniyāl had great admiration for Daulat Khān for his valour and courage. At his request, 'Abdur Rahīm, who was his (Prince's) father-in-law, transferred the service of Daulat Khān to the Prince in 1600. Dāniyāl gave him the rank of 2000. Daulat Khān, however, did not live long to enjoy his new mansab, for in 1601 he died of colic in Ahmadnagar.²

The authors of Rahīmī and Ma'āsir mention Daulat Khān as one of the bravest men of the age.³ Indeed the victory of Sarkej and the conquest of Thatta and Ahmadnagar were largely due to his valour. Still Akbar distrusted him as an Afghān, and this is reflected in the remark he made when he received the news of his death.⁴

Daulat Khān Lūdī left several sons behind him of whom Pīr Khān was destined to be the most influential noble in the court of Jahāngīr, with the title and name of Khān Jahān Lūdī.

1. Ma'āsir, II, 5 ; Rahīmī, III, 1628.

2. A. N., III, 785 ; Ma'āsir, II, 5-6.

3. Rahīmī, III, 1628-9 ; Ma'āsir, II, 6.

4. Op. Cit., 202.

CHAPTER VIII

Jahāngīr's policy to the Afghāns and their position in his court (1605-27)

The relationship between the Afghāns and Akbar was one of hostility and distrust. Jahāngīr, however, followed a conciliatory policy towards the Afghāns and favoured them with suitable posts in the imperial service and an honoured position at court. The Afghāns responded to this treatment with loyalty and devotion on the battle-field and in the council-chamber. Thus there dawned a new phase in Afghān-Mughal relations in India.

The Afghān historian Ni'matullā's writings reveal this important fact. He says, " In the year 1021 H. (1612 A. D.), the Afghāns lost their rule in India ¹ and Emperor Jahāngīr, pardoning them their previous faults, attached them to himself by the bonds of bounty. He gave so much attention to them that they gave up their hostile attitude and bound themselves in submission and attachment to him even at the sacrifice of their lives. By their distinguished service, they raised themselves to the rank of great nobles and became worthy of being admitted to the Emperor's company. They aspired after imperial favour and exalted rank and they were exalted by the conferment of illustrious titles. " ²

1. The Afghāns had lost their rule in Northern India in 1556 and in Eastern India in 1576. It was only in Sylhet that a few Afghāns under Usman Lūhāni resisted Mughal rule till 1612.

2. M., 1720b 172b.

New Afghān policy with Jahāngīr's accession :

In fact, however, the new phase in Afghān-Mughal relations began, not in 1612 as Ni‘matullā alleged, but in 1605, at the very beginning of the reign of Jahāngīr. In this respect, in 1612 the Afghān chief ‘Usmān Lūhānī died fighting the battles of a bygone period. Jahāngīr had already been willing to make peace with ‘Usmān Lūhānī by offering him a command of 5,000.¹

Jahāngīr sought the support of the Afghāns from the very beginning of his reign just because he could not rely on many of the nobles of his father's time and felt the need of having a strong body of his supporters. Khān A‘zam Mīrzā ‘Azīz Kūka, at the head of a section of Mughal nobles, and Raja Man Singh, the chief of the Rajput nobles, had, in the last days of Emperor Akbar, tried to push aside his succession and place his son Khusrāu on the throne. Their intrigues made him feel so insecure that he dared not visit his dying father. The support of the Barhā Saiyids led by Saiyid Khān Barhā and Murtaza Khān, however, foiled their intrigues and Jahāngīr succeeded his father without further hindrance from them. But Jahāngīr's faith in many of the nobles of his father's time was weakened naturally weakened and he felt the need of creating a group of nobles on whom he could confidently rely. For this he began to look towards the Afghāns.

1. Bahārīstān, I, 174-5.

Besides, born in the freer atmosphere of his father's court, Jahāngīr felt able to go further than his father in conciliating ill-wisher and the vanquished foes of his empire. He conciliated the Rajputs of Udaipur whom Akbar failed to conquer. The favour he showed to Rana Amar Singh and his Karan Singh, after the conquest of his country in 1614, speaks of his conciliatory policy towards the vanquished.

When Karan Singh accompanied Prince Khurrām to court, Jahāngīr honoured him by giving him a place in front of the right hand of the circle as well as a robe of honour and a jewelled sword. In his Memoirs, Jahāngīr writes, " As it was necessary to win the heart of Karan, I everyday showed him some fresh favour. On the second day of his attendance, I gave him a ~~jakk~~ jewelled dagger and on the next a special Iraqi horse with a jewelled saddle. . . . Nūrbahān Begam gave him a rich dress of honour, a jewelled sword, a horse, a saddle and an elephant. After this I presented him with a rosary of pearls of great value. " ¹ The same spirit of conciliation governed Jahāngīr's policy towards the Afghāns.

Moreover, Jahāngīr realised that the Afghāns were a race of good fighters and if they could be won over, they might render valuable service in his account. Already while he was a prince, a number of Afghāns served him with distinction. An

1. Tūz., 135-6 ; R., II, 17.

Afghān chief named Ruknuddīn ~~san~~ earned from him the name of Sher Khān for his valour.¹ Another Afghān chief named Ibrāhīm Khān Kākar performed meritorious service, a few days after the accession of Jahāngīr, in dealing with some rebelliously inclined Rajputs. Abhay Ram, Bijoy Ram and Shyam Ram, the grandsons of Bhagwan Das, the paternal uncle and adopted father of Raja Man Singh, tried to flee from Agra so that they might join the Rana of Udaipur. They were, however, placed in the custody of Ibrāhīm Khān Kākar and Hātīm Mānkālī, the son of Bābui Mānkālī. When Ibrāhīm and Hātīm wanted to disarm these Rajputs they attacked them and wounded Ibrāhīm. Ibrāhīm, however, managed to kill them. Impressed Jahāngīr rewarded heroic Ibrāhīm with the title of Dilāwar Khān and gave him advancement in the imperial service.²

A comparison of the position of the Afghāns in the court of Akbar and of Jahāngīr in the ~~period~~ period, 1605-12, shows that Jahāngīr, from the very beginning of his reign, followed a conciliatory policy towards the Afghāns.³

1. Tūz., 7 ; R., I, 17.

2. Ibid, 12-3 ; Ma' āsir, II, 9.

3. *See*, 205-7 and 216.

In the reign of Jahāngīr
(1605 - 12)

In the reign of Akbar
(1556 - 1605)

Sūbadārs 2

None

Faujdārs 2

None

Independent campaign
commanders 2

None

Manṣabdārs :

5,000 1

None

3,500 1

None

2,000 1

2 (but one of them
Bāz Bahādur of Malwa was
in prison)

1,000 1

4

There was also a good number of Afghān officers in the army whose manṣab cannot be ascertained. Their mention in Jahāngīr's Memoirs and other contemporary works, however, suggest¹ suggests that they held suitable manṣabs in the army. Hātīm,¹ the son of Bābui Mānkali, Bāyazīd Mānkali,² 'Alī Khān Niyāzi,³ Shāhbāz Khān Lūdī,⁴ Bāyazīd Khān Panī, Jahān Khān Panī and Sher Khān Tarīn⁵ were some of the Afghān officers whose actual rank as manṣabdār has not been mentioned in the contemporary histories.

1. Tūz., 12 ; R., I, 29.

2. Ibid, 80 ; 166.

3. Ibid, 88 ;

4. Ibid, 147 ; Iqbāl-nāma, 104.

5. Bahārīstān, I, 74-5.

In the year of his accession, Jahāngīr appointed Dilāwar Khān Kākar as governor of Lahur and raised his manṣab to 1,500 horse.¹ He promoted Sher Khān to the manṣab of 3,560² and gave him the charge of Peshawar and Khaibar Pass.³ In 1610, Jahāngīr elevated Ghaznīn Khān Jālūrī to the rank of 2,000 personal and 700 horse.⁴ Manglī Khān held the manṣab of 1,500 personal and 800 horse in the early years of the reign of Jahāngīr.⁵ In 1607, Jahāngīr appointed Mubārak Khān Sarwānī to the Faujdārship of Hisar and two years after he increased his manṣab to 1000 ~~personal~~ personal and 300 horse.⁶ Tāj Khān Afghān, whose manṣab is not known, served the empire of Jahāngīr as governor of Thatta.⁷

Moreover, Jahāngīr showed special favour to Pīr Khān Lūdī, the son of Daulat Khān Lūdī. In 1606, he gave him the rank of 3,000 personal and 1,500 horse and conferred on him the title of Salābat Khān. He also presented him with a standard and drums and called him farzand (son).⁸ Jahāngīr always referred to him as " my son " and looked upon him as no less than his own sons. In 1607, he gave him the title of Khān Jahān and ordered that, in all the farmāns and ~~correspondence~~ correspondences, his name should be written by the new title.

دلاور خان افغان را به حکومت لاهور سرتیور ساخته بلا تصویب رفعتی فرمودند

1. Tūz., 23 and 27 ; Iqbāl-nāma, 7 ; Ma'āsīr, II, 9.

2. Ibid, 7.

3. Ibid, 49 and 60.

4. Ibid, 85.

5. Ibid, 146.

6. Ibid, 55 and 76.

7. Ibid, 131.

8. Ibid, 42 and Iqbāl-nāma, 19.

About this time, Khān Jahān Lūdī received the rank of 5,000 personal and 5,000 horse and a special khil'at and a jewelled sword.¹

By 1608 Khān Jahān Lūdī became one of the intimate and influential nobles at court. In his Memoirs, Jahāngīr writes, " I promoted him (Khān Jahān) beyond his fellows and equals."² The Emperor also says, " Today there is in my government none of greater influence than Khān Jahān, so much so that, on his representation, I pass over faults, which are not pardoned at the intercession of any other servant of the court. " ³ In fact, Jahāngīr pardoned the offences of the nobles and officers at the intercession of Khān Jahān Lūdī. Dulip Rai, the son of Rai Rai Singh, committed an offence, which Jahāngīr, in his Memoirs, does not speak, and took shelter with Khān Jahān. For the sake of Khān Jahān, Jahāngīr passed over the matter. ⁴

The author of Ma'āṣir says that Jahāngīr favoured Khān Jahān so much that he wished him to marry in the Mughal royal family. He also wanted to give him the title of sultān and to offer him a seat in the Ghusalkhāna (Royal Bath). Khān Jahān, however, refused representing that these were two

1. Tūz., 61.

2. Ibid, 42 .

3. Ibid, 43.

4. Ibid, 70.

4. Ibid, 70.

او بخطاب والای فرزندى از امثال و اقربان در گذرانیدم =
امروز در دولت من از صاحب نسبت تری نیست چنانکه گناهان عظیم که
بشفاعت هیچک از بندهای درگاه بعفو مقرون نگردد بالتماس او میگذرانیم =
چون پناه بفرزند خانجهان اورد گناهان او بعفو مقرون گشت =

privileges reserved for the princes.¹ We donot know if the above statement of Ma'āsir is a fact. But, considering Jahāngir's intimacy with and strong affection for Khān Jahān, we can say that such offers were not improbable.

When in 1610, Khān Jahān offered to go ~~to~~ ^{on} the Deccan campaign, Jahāngir writes in his Memoirs, " I had never contemplated separation from him ; but, as the affair was an important one, I necessarily gave him permission and ordered him that, as soon as matters had been arranged, he should return without delay and that he should not stay in that region more than a year."² The Emperor gave him presents of many things and appointed faithful nobles and officers to accompany him to the Deccan.³ At the time of Khān Jahān's departure, Jahāngir descended from the Jharokha (the place wherefrom the Emperor used to give audience to the people) and placed his own turban on his head. He then took Khān Jahān's hand and helped him to mount the horse. The Emperor granted him the special privilege of beating his drums as he went from his presence. The author of Ma'āsir writes that both Jahāngir and Khān Jahān wept at the time of the separation.⁴ The above incident shows the position of the Afghān noble Khān Jahān in the court of Jahāngir.

1. Ma'āsir, I, 717.

2. Tūz., 77.

3. Ibid, 77.

4. Ma'āsir, I, 718. وقت رخصت پادشاه خود از جهر و کت خاص و عام فرود آمده دستار خود را بر سرش گذاشته دست او گرفته بر اسب سوار کردند و حکم شد که از حضور نقاره نواخته روان شود ازین طرف پادشاه و ازان سو خانبهان بیه اختیار گریه می کردند

Noteworthy also as a proof of the new Mughal Emperor's attitude towards the Afghāns is his entrusting them with responsible posts and important commands. Jahāngīr gave them the charge of such strategically important places as the Panjab, Peshawar and the Khaibar Pass.¹ In 1610, he vested the supreme command of the Deccan campaign to Khān Jahān Lūdī.²

This new attitude produced the desired effect. From this time we find the Afghāns fighting in right earnest for the cause of the Mughal empire. Jahāngīr himself appreciated the service of his Afghān officers. Of Sher Khān he says that he did his duty of guarding the Khaibar Pass well.³ As the governor of Lahur, Dilāwar Khān also rendered valuable service to the empire of Jahāngīr. When the renegade and rebel Prince Khusrau advanced towards Lahur in 1606 and many of the Mughal officers had joined his standard, Dilāwar Khān remained loyal to the Emperor. He could have joined Khusrau along with other Afghāns of the Panjab. But, Dilāwar Khān did not do that. He prepared the defence of Lahur and stubbornly resisted the siege of the rebel Prince.⁴ Indeed it was his resistance which enabled Jahāngīr to defeat and capture Khusrau and to avert a civil war in the empire.

Many Afghān officers fought in the war against Udaipur

1. Op. Cit., 217.

2. Tūz., 86 ; Ma'aṣir, I, 719 ; Iqbāl-nāma, 45.

3. Ibid, 60 ; R., I, 102. در حفظ و مراقبت راه تقصیر نکرده بوده است

4. Ibid, 27 and 29 ; Iqbāl-nāma, 10-1 ; De Laet, 174.

and Jahāngīr appreciated their services. He says that Ghaznīn Khān Jālūrī showed the greatest zeal of all in fighting against the Rana.¹ Bāyazīd Mānkālī and his brothers fought bravely against the rebels in Uch.²

Khān Jahān Lūdī and many other Afghāns took part in the campaign against Ahmadnagar. At first Khān Jahān went to assist the supreme commander Khān Khānān ‘Abdur Rahīm in the campaign. But, he found the commander lukewarm in his duty. So, he sent a representation to the Emperor accusing ‘Abdur Rahīm and suggesting that if he was appointed to the chief command, he would conquer Ahmadnagar and Bijapur in two years.³ Jahāngīr fell in with his proposals. He also appointed Khān A‘zam to assist the new commander. Although Khān Jahān exerted himself with great zeal and ability, his campaign against Ahmadnagar did not fare better than that of ‘Abdur Rahīm. The guerrilla tactics of the Deccanis and the genius of their commander Malik ‘Ambar foiled his efforts. The absence of a concerted plan of campaign on account of the differences of the Mughal generals also contributed to the failure of Khān Jahān. But whatever the reason for the result of the campaign, it illustrates the earnestness of an Afghān chief in fighting for the expansion of Jahāngīr's empire.

چون از همه بیشتر اظهار خدمتگاری و کار طلبی غزنین خان جالوری نموده بود. 85. Tūz., 85.

2. Ibid., 82.

3. Ibid., 86 ; R., I, 179-80.

In 1611, a great offensive against Ahmadnagar was planned. Khān Jahān, Man Singh and Khān A'zam were to advance from the side of Berar and Khandesh. ʿAbdullā Khān was to advance from Guzrat in the direction of Nasik and Trimbak. He was to keep in touch with the main division of the army¹ so that they might make a simultaneous attack on Ahmadnagar. ʿAbdullā Khān's vanity and his selfish passion for glory, however, spoiled the plan. He did not co-operate with Khān Jahān and made a dash towards Daulatabad. The guerrilla tactics of the Deccanis and their blockade of his supply routes greatly reduced his army. Realising his folly, ʿAbdullā Khān retreated to Baglana and thence to Guzrat.

In his Memoirs, Jahāngīr writes that the great offensive under Khān Jahān Lūdī failed because of the pride of ʿAbdullā Khān, the disagreement of the generals and the carelessness of Khān A'zam.¹ We, however, think that the disagreement of the Mughal generals and the carelessness of Khān A'zam might have been due to the vesting of the supreme command in Khān Jahān. The proud Mughal nobles and generals probably could not reconcile themselves to the idea of being subordinates to an Afghān and a new-comer to the imperial service.

Jahāngīr's policy won over many Afghān chiefs to his service. Pīr Khān Lūdī and his brothers joined the army of

1. Tūz., 107 ; R., I, 219-20.

Islām Khān, the governor of Bengal.¹ In 1611 after the battle of Salka, Jamāl Khān Lūhānī left the service of Raja Pratapaditya of Jessore and entered Jahāngīr's Bengal army.² Naṣīr Khān Panī, Dariyā Khān Panī and their followers left 'Usmān Lūhānī and joined the imperial army.³ Mīrzā Nathan, the author of Bahāristān-i-Ghayebī and a petty officer in the Mughal army, had 250 Afghāns under him.⁴ In the campaign of Islām Khān against the zamīndārs of Bengal and 'Usmān Lūhānī, we ~~see~~ see that Bāyazīd Khān Panī, Jahān Khān Panī, Sher Khān Tarīn, Muḥammad Khān Panī and other Afghān officers and soldiers fought in the Mughal army.⁵

Notwithstanding the conciliatory policy of Jahāngīr towards the Afghāns in general and his fair offers to 'Usmān Lūhānī in particular, a section of the Afghāns under 'Usmān Lūhānī and Bāyazīd Karranī remained hostile to him. In alliance with Mūsa Khān, the son of 'Isa Khān, the leader of the Barabhuyāns of Bengal, they resisted Mughal authority in Eastern Bengal. Even after the submission of the zamīndārs in 1611, these Afghāns defied Jahāngīr's authority in Sylhet. In the battle of Daulambapur in 1612, they fought against the vast forces of the Mughals with only 10,000 infantry, 5,200 cavalry

1. Bahāristān, I, 54.

2. Ibid, 110.

3. Ibid, 100.

4. Ibid, 87.

5. Ibid, 74-6 and 78.

and 140 elephants.¹ 'Usmān fell in the fight and many of his men were killed. The death of the leader dispirited the Afghāns² and they surrendered themselves to the Mughal general Shujā'at Khān.

Afghan position after 1612 :

'Usmān and his men^{had} given the Mughals much trouble. The battle of Daulambapur had destroyed the last refuge of the Afghāns. They could obtain neither shelter nor service in Bengal as the power of the zamīndārs had been crushed and the whole country had passed into the hands of the Mughals. They could not also pass to Afghanistan ⁶ or to Southern India through the Mughal territories. So, after the battle of Daulambapur, the Afghāns were either to surrender or to move as homeless wanderers in the hills of Assam or Tripura.

In the circumstances, Jahāngīr might have remained indifferent to the Afghāns. He, however, forgot their past conduct and favoured them. When the Afghāns surrendered after the battle, Shujā'at Khān and other Mughal officers received them honourably. The sons and brothers of 'Usmān Lūhānī received robes of honour and 400 Afghān chiefs obtained the present of a pair of shawls each.³ On their arrival at Dacca, sūbadār

1. Bahāristān, I, 173.

2. Tūz., 104. Jahangir writes that he could not at first believe that 'Usmān, the great warrior, who had for years defied the Mughals, was dead at Daulambapur.

3. Bahāristān, I, 196-7 ; Iqbāl-nāma, 64.

Islām Khān also presented them with robes of honour.¹ Bāyazīd Karranī and his brothers who had also submitted received the same generous treatment from Jahāngīr.²

Jahāngīr admitted the Afghāns of 'Usmān and Bāyazīd into the imperial army. This made a great impression on their minds and they fought loyally and heroically in the Mughal conquest of Koch Bihar, Kamrup and Kachar. The subjugation of these countries of the north-east frontier of the Mughal empire was largely due to this.³

The subjugation of the Afghāns of Sylhet in 1612 and Jahāngīr's clemency to them brought about a complete change in Afghān-Mughal relations in India. It dissipated the atmosphere of hostility and distrust that had existed between the Afghāns and Mughals since the time of Bābur. Jahāngīr trusted the Afghāns unreservedly with responsible posts in the imperial service and honoured them with titles, presents and khil'ats. The Afghāns, on their part, reconciled themselves to the loss of their sovereignty and independence and exerted themselves to better their fortune within the imperial service and to obtain an honoured position at the Mughal court. Thus the Afghāns rose rapidly in the imperial service and though they ceased to be an independent political force in India, they succeeded in

1. Bahārīstān, I, 205.

2. Ibid, 195-6 and 208.

3. Ibid, 222-3, 230-2, 316, 371 and 410.

establishing their influence within the court of Jahāngir. A study of their position in the period, 1613-1627, will bear out this statement.

Afghāns in Mughal imperial service (1613- 27) :

Sūbadārs 4

Dilāwar Khān Kākar	Kashmir
Tāj Khān Afghān	Thatta
Jalāl Khān Kākar	Kashmir
Khān Jahān Lūdī	Multan, Guzrat and the Deccan

Independent campaign commanders 3

Atālīq 1

Sipāhsalār 1

Faujdārs 3

Mubārak Khān Sarwānī

Mubārīz Khān ¹

Sher Khān Afghān ²

Manṣabdārs :

7,000	7,000	Khān Jahān Lūdī ³
4,000	3,000	Dilāwar Khān Kākar ⁴
4,000	3,000	Bahlūl Khān Miyāna ⁵ (Sarbuland Khān)

1. Tūz., 203 ; R., I, 409.

2. Iqbāl-nāma, 222.

3. Lāhūrī, I, 182.

4. Tūz., 303 ; Iqbāl-nāma, 146.

5. Lāhūrī, I, 182.

4,000		Kamāluddīn Rūhīla ¹
3,000	3,000	Mubārīz Khān Rūhīla ²
3,000	2,500	Sardār Khān Afghān ³
		Sher Khān (Nahr Khān) ⁴
3,000	2,000	Sherū Rūhīla ⁵
1,500	1,000	Allahadād Khān Rūhīla ⁶
3,000	500	Shāhbāz Khān Dutānī ⁷
2,500	1,200	Bābui Khān Karrānī ⁸
2,000	1,500	Aḥmad Khān Niyāzī ⁹
2,000	1,000	Aṣālat Khān Lūdī ¹⁰
		Shāhbāz Khān Lūdī ¹¹
2,000	700	Ghaznīn Khān Jālūrī
1,500	1,200	Nannū Khān Afghān ¹²
1,500	1,000	Manglī Khān ¹³
1,000	700	Mubārak Khān Niyāzī ¹⁴
1,000	600	Jalāl Khān Kākar ¹⁵
1,000	300	Mubārak Khān Sarwānī
700	500	Kamāluddīn Khān (son of Sher Khān Afghān) ¹⁶

1. Lāhūrī, I, 311.

2. Ibid, I, 182 and 214.

3. Tūz., 344.

4. Ma'āṣir, II, 652 ; Lāhūrī, I, 78.

5. Ibid, 650-1.

6. Tūz., 184.

7 and 8. Lāhūrī, I, 183 and 121.

9. Ma'āṣir, I, 185.

10-13. Tūz., 352, 147, 366 and 146.

14. Lāhūrī, I, 307.

15-16. Tūz., 312 and 146.

Besides those listed above, there were in the army of Jahāngīr other Afghān mansabdārs whose actual rank as mansabdār is not known. Shāh Muḥammad Kākar, Muḥammad Khān Niyāzī and others ¹ have been mentioned as officers in the imperial army fighting against Koch Bihar and Kamrup in 1612-13. We, however, do not find any reference to the number of horse they commanded. Jahāngīr writes that, in 1617 after the death of Ḥasan Khān Miyāna, he granted mansabs to his sons.² In 1620 when Dilāwar Khān died, Jahāngīr also favoured his sons and sardārs with mansabs.³ Jamāl Khān and Rustam Khān have been mentioned as Afghān officers in the Mughal army fighting the rebels of Kangra in 1620.⁴ As they were officers having Afghān followers under them, it may be said that they held some mansab in the imperial army.

To illustrate Jahāngīr's new policy towards the Afghāns and their loyal service to him it will be useful to examine in some detail the careers of Dilāwar Khān Kākar and Khān Jahān Lūdi. We have seen that Dilāwar Khān Kākar saved the empire of Jahāngīr in 1606 from a civil war by resisting the rebel Prince Khusrāu at Lahur and by helping the Emperor to capture him. In 1614, along with Sher Khān and other Afghān officers,

1. Bahāristān, I, 318, 336, 371 and 410.

2. Tūz., 200-1 ; R., I, 405-6.

3. Ibid, 311 ; II, 167.

4. Ibid, 311-2 ; II, 166-7.

he joined Prince Khurrām in the conquest of Udaipur and performed distinguished service.¹ In 1618, Jahāngīr appointed Dilāwar Khān as governor of Kashmir and the latter promised to the Emperor that he would in the course of two years conquer Kishtwar, a mountainous country in South Kashmir.²

In 1619, accompanied by his adventurous sons Jalāl, Jamāl and Hasan, Dilāwar Khān marched with an army of 10,000 foot for the conquest of Kishtwar. As the country was full of mountains, defiles, jungles, rivers and fords, they had to face great difficulties in the campaign. They, however, overcame all obstacles and, by the beginning of 1620, they completed the conquest of Kishtwar.³ Jahāngīr highly appreciated Dilāwar Khān's service. He honoured him and his sons with khil'at and an increase in manṣab and granted him the revenue of the conquered territory which amounted to 100,000 rupees a year.⁴ In his Memoirs, Jahāngīr wrote about him, " Among the nobles of high rank Dilāwar Khān was one who combined valour with leadership and knowledge of affairs. He always established his superiority in my service and worked with perfect sincerity."⁵ The Emperor patronised his sons, after Dilāwar Khān's death in 1620, and appointed his eldest son Jalāl as governor of Kashmir.

1. Tūz., 27-9 and 127 ; Ma'āṣir, II, 10.

2. Ibid, 225 ; R., II, 6.

3. Ibid, 294-5 ; Iqbāl-nāma, 141-6.

4. Ibid, 288 ; 146.

5. Ibid, 311 ; R., II, 167.

Jalāl and his men fought bravely in subduing the zamīndārs and chiefs who still defied Mughal authority in Kishtwar.¹

Afghān influence at Mughal court :

The career of Khān Jahān Lūdī best illustrates the new policy of Jahāngīr. It also shows the rise of Afghān influence in the Mughal empire. Even after Khān Jahān's failure in the Deccan in 1611, Jahāngīr treated him with favour. He gave him a jagir in Thaneshvar. In 1612, Jahāngīr summoned him to court because as he says in his Memoirs, " As I had a great desire to see my farzand Khān Jahān and wanted to inquire into the important affairs connected with the Deccan, I sent for him. "² About this time at his request, the Emperor raised the manṣab of Shāhbāz Khān Lūdī to 2,000 personal and 1,000 horse.³

In 1616, Khān Jahān accompanied Prince Shāh Jahān to the Deccan. In 1617, Jahāngīr elevated him to the manṣab of 6,000 personal and 6,000 horse - a rank, which no other noble except the princes of the blood enjoyed at that time. He also honoured Khān Jahān with the present of an Iraqi horse from his private stable.⁴ In the same year, Khān Jahān returned from the Deccan along with Prince Shāh Jahān, Mahābat Khān and others and Jahāngīr

1. Tūz., 312 ; R., II, 171.

2. Ibid, 145 ; Ma'āsir, I, 719.

3. Ibid, 147 ; 719.

4. Ibi, 184 ; R., I, 372.

gave precedence to him over other nobles. Shāh Jahān had the honour of audience with the Emperor in the Jharokha. After this, Jahāngīr ordered the bakhshīs to arrange the nobles according to their rank. In his Memoirs, he writes, " The first, who had the honour of audience, was Khān Jahān. Sending for him above (to the Jharokha), I selected him for the honour of kissing my feet. "¹ After this 'Abdullā Khān, Mahābat Khān and others were introduced before the Emperor.² This precedence of Khān Jahān over others shows that by 1617 he rose to be the premier noble at court.

Jahāngīr had greater trust in Khān Jahān than in any other noble of his court. Even Empress Nūrbahān's brother Asaf Khān did not enjoy so much of the Emperor's confidence. An incident relating to the imprisoned Prince Khusrāu reveals that. Mahābat Khān, Khān Jahān Lūdī and other nobles suggested the release of the Prince to the Emperor. Jahāngīr, however, feared that Khusrāu might again create trouble for him. He agreed to release him if he could be placed in the custody of a trustworthy noble. The choice of Jahāngīr fell on Khān Jahān. Khusrāu was set free and made over to his care.³

In 1620, Jahāngīr took Khān Jahān with him to Kashmir for a change of air. About this time, the Emperor granted him a

1. Tūz., 195 ; R., I, 394 .

2. Ibid, 195 ; 394.

3. Wahab - Intikhab-i-Jahāngīr Shāhī, E., VI, 452.

اول خانجوهان بسفادت ملازمت سرفرازی یافت اورا بالا
طلبیده بدولت قدمبوس امتیاز بخشیدم =

very charming village named Inch near Srinagar which had been given by Akbar to Ramdas Kachwaha.¹

In 1621 when Jahāngīr was in Kashmir, he received news that the Persians were threatening Qandahar. Thereupon he appointed Khān Jahān as governor of Multan so that he might keep watch in that quarter. He sent him to his charge with the present of a khil'at, a jewelled sword, a horse and an elephant.² In 1621, Jahāngīr sent him the present of a special elephant named Gaj Ratan³ and raised the mansab of his son Aṣālat Khān.⁴

In 1622, the Persian ruler Shāh 'Abbās II besieged Qandahar with a large army and the Mughal commandant 'Abdul 'Azīz was shut up in the fort with a force of 300 soldiers. Khān Jahān communicated the news to Jahāngīr and sought his permission to proceed to the relief of the beleaguered fort. Under the influence of Nūrjahān, who wanted to send Shāh Jahān to Qandahar in order to humiliate and ruin him, Jahāngīr, however, refused him saying that kings should be opposed by kings or princes.

A little later Jahāngīr sent a farmān to Khān Jahān summoning him to court. The opponents of Khān Jahān interpreted this sudden call as a sign that the Emperor would humiliate him. But to their disappointment and surprise, the Emperor received

1. Tūz., 312-3 ; R., II, 172.

2. Ibid, 323 ; 191 ; Iqbāl-nāma, 176-7.

3. Ibid, 332 ; 209.

4. Ibid, 337 ; 219.

him with his usual favour and presented him with a khil'at, an elephant, a special horse, a jewelled sword and a dagger. In fact, the Emperor required the ~~px~~ presence of Khān Jahān at court so that he might discuss Qandahar affairs with him. It was settled that until Shāh Jahān came from the Deccan to command the army to Qandahar, Khān Jahān was to wait at Multan and make all necessary preparations. ¹

Shāh Jahān, however, understood Nūrjahān's motives and he did not leave the Deccan on one excuse or another. In the meantime after a siege of 45 days, the fort of Qandahar fell into the hands of Shāh 'Abbās II. ²

When in 1622 Shāh Jahān rebelled, Jahāngīr summoned Khān Jahān to court. As he did not come in spite of repeated orders, Jahāngīr wrote to him, " If at this time Sher Khān Sūr were living, he would, notwithstanding his enmity, come to us and yet you have not come." ³ It happened that Khān Jahān had fallen ill at that time. When after 13 days he recovered, he hastened to court. Jahāngīr treated him with with favour and ordered him to guard the fort of Agra and its treasures and to take up his abode at Fathpur Sikri. ⁴

In 1623 on the death of Khān A'zam Mīrzā 'Azīz Kūka, Jahāngīr appointed Khān Jahān as governor of Guzrat. In the

1. Tūz., 345 ; Iqbāl-nāma, 192 and 196 ; Ma'aṣir, I, 719-20.

2. Lāhūrī, II, 26.

3. Ma'aṣir, I, 720.

4. Tūz., 360, 373 and 380 ; Iqbāl-nāma, 216 ; Ma'aṣir, I, 720.

following year, he appointed him atālīq to Prince Parvez and viceroy of the Deccan in place of Mahābat Khān, who had fallen into the bad graces of the Emperor. In 1625, Parvez died and Khān Jahān obtained the sole management of the Deccan affairs.¹ By this time, Shāh Jahān was in full rebellion. Khān Jahān's position as a premier noble in the empire was definitely established when Shāh Jahān rebelled and Mahābat Khān lost his position with Prince Parvez. He had the favour and the confidence of the Emperor and he wielded considerable influence at court. So, when after a fruitless rebellion Shāh Jahān presented his petition of submission, the Emperor pardoned him at the intercession of Khān Jahān.² De Laet also writes that in 1626 Khān Jahān was the most influential noble in the Mughal empire.³

As a viceroy of the Deccan, Khān Jahān tarnished his good name by succumbing to the temptation of the Deccani gold. Instead of prosecuting the war against Ahmadnagar, in 1626 he made a treaty with the Nizām ul Mulk and his Abyssinian minister Hamīd Khān. By this treaty, he sold to them for an annual tribute of three lak of Huns the whole territory of Balaghat. The annual revenue of the territory was 55 crores of Huns. Khān Jahān sent orders to the Mughal officers to make over the territory to the Nizām ul Mulk's officers. All obeyed except Sipāhdār Khān, the

1. Ma'āṣir, I, 721.

2. Iqbāl-nāma, 248.

3. De Laet, 23.

commandant of the fort of Ahmadnagar, who refused to surrender his charge without a farmān from the Emperor.¹

The court historian Mu'tamid Khān has condemned Khān Jahān as a faithless Afghān for his sale of Balaghat.² The author of Ma'āṣir says that by this treaty Khān Jahān made friends with the Nizām ul Mulk so that he might find refuge at his court in the event of a change of fortune.³ In view of the illness of Jahāngīr, Mahābat Khān's coup and the rival parties at court on the issue of succession, Khān Jahān probably felt that he might fall on evil days after the death of the Emperor. So, to provide against future misfortune, he made friends with the Nizam ul Mulk. But, whatever might have been his motive, the sale transaction revealed his faithlessness and ingratitude to the Emperor and his patron.

Khān Jahān's sale of Balaghat displeased Jahāngīr. In spite of this, Jahāngīr conferred on him a few days later the title of sipāhsalār.⁴ It seems strange that, instead of humiliating the faithless Afghān, Jahāngīr favoured him with the highest military title of the empire. It was not, however, the strong affection of the Emperor for him rather the policy of Empress Nūrbahān, who was the de facto ruler of the empire

1. Iqbāl-nāma, 283-4 ; Lāhūrī, I, 271-2 ; Ma'āṣir, I, 721.

2. Ibid.

3. Ma'āṣir, I, 721.

4. Iqbāl-nāma, 289 ; Ma'āṣir, I, 721.

at the time, which accounted for this. Nūrbahān wanted the succession for her son-in-law Prince Shāhriyār and for this reason she had disgraced Shāh Jahān and Mahābat Khān. The rebel Mahābat Khān joined Shāh Jahān¹ and their alliance threatened the ascendancy of Nūrbahān. Besides, Nūrbahān could not rely on her brother Asaf Khān, the father-in-law of Shāh Jahān. She had to rely all the more on Khān Jahān, the powerful viceroy of the Deccan. Hence, Khān Jahān received the favour of the court and he continued to enjoy his great position in the empire till the death of Emperor Jahāngīr in 1627.

A favourite companion of Emperor Jahāngīr, an atālīq to a prince, a powerful viceroy of a great and coveteable province and the sipāhsalār of the empire, Khān Jahān had a unique position at the Mughal court. His intercession obtained for ~~nobles~~ nobles and princes pardons from the Emperor for their offences.² The author of Ma'āṣir says that, in point of intimacy and influence of words, Khān Jahān had no rival at court.³ The Emperor looked upon him as his son and offered him a seat in the Ghusalkhāna. He also wanted him to marry a princess of the blood. He helped him to mount the ~~horse~~ ~~and~~ ~~then~~ horse and even wept at his separation from him. The writings of

1. Iqbāl-nāma, 289 ; Ma'āṣir, I, 721.

2. Op. Cit., 218 and 234.

3. Ma'āṣir, I, 717.

the European travellers also reveal the affections of Jahāngīr for Khān Jahān. Edward Terry, who came to the Mughal court in 1616, says that the Emperor Jahāngīr gave Khān Jahān the title of " the Lord of my Heart " ¹

Indeed Khān Jahān held an enviable position at the court of Jahāngīr. The Emperor granted him many special privileges. Khān Jahān enjoyed the privilege of beating his drums in the royal presence. He had also the privilege of public and private reception.² The author of Ma'aṣir says that all the nobles had to receive Khān Jahān when he came to court.³ One day Shāh Jahān said to Saiyid Khān Jahān Barhā, " This title (Khān Jahān) is of a man from whom we and all the princes desire to receive attention ; but, out of contempt, he says nothing to anybody. " ⁴ This illustrates the position and influence of Khān Jahān at the court of Jahāngīr. Indeed in Khān Jahān we find the culmination of the Afghān political influence in the Mughal empire.

1. Purchas His Pilgrimes, IX, 48.

2. Ma'aṣir, I, 723.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid, 730-1. ^{رجوع خاص و عام} این خطاب شخصی است که ما در جمیع شاهزاده ها آرزو مند نگاه او بودیم و او با استفنا تا کسر حدف نمیداد =

CHAPTER IX

The fall of Khān Jahān and the decline of Afghān influence

In the reign of Jahāngīr, the Afghān influence at the court of the Mughals rose to its zenith in the person of Khān Jahān Lūdi. In the reign of Shāh Jahān (1627-58), however, there came a steady decline in Afghān influence and position in the Mughal empire. The hostile attitude of Khān Jahān to the succession of Shāh Jahān, his subsequent rebellion against him and consequent distrust of the new Emperor towards the Afghāns accounted for this.

Khān Jahān and Shāh Jahān's succession :

Jahāngīr died in 1627 and there came an eclipse in the fortunes of Khān Jahān. Shāh Jahān, who was at Junair in the Deccan, proclaimed himself emperor at the news of his father's death and, desiring to win over the powerful viceroy of the Deccan to his cause against his rival claimants to the throne, he sent his confidential agent, Jān Nishār Khān, to him with a farmān confirming him his viceroyalty. Khān Jahān, however, refused to support Shāh Jahān. The court historians say that Khān Jahān, who had great authority in the Deccan, aimed at sovereign power after the death of Jahāngīr. ¹

1. Iqbāl-nāma, 299 ; Lāhūrī, I, 270-1.

This view of the Mughal historians seems to have been based on their prejudice against Khān Jahān and the Afghāns. In fact, Khān Jahān did not aim at sovereign power, though many of his friends and followers, particularly Sikandar Dutānī and Dariyā Khān Rūhīla, formerly an officer of Prince Shāh Jahān, incited him to seize the opportunity for the recovery of the Afghān sovereignty in India.¹

Khān Jahān, however, wanted to be neutral in the succession dispute that occurred after the death of Jahāngīr. He saw that Empress Nūrbahān supported the cause of her son-in-law Prince Shāhriyār and the latter had proclaimed himself as emperor at Lahur. Aṣaf Khān and the army officers who had been with the dying Emperor Jahāngīr in the camp in Kashmir had installed Dāwar Bakhsh, a son of Prince Khusrāu, on the throne. While there were three candidates for the throne, Aqā Afzal, the diwān of the Deccan whose brother was a diwān of Shāhriyār, advised Khān Jahān to remain neutral in the succession dispute and to join the service of whoever became emperor.²

Besides, Khān Jahān was displeased with Shāh Jahān because he conferred on Mahābat Khān the title of sipāhsalār.³ He feared that if Shāh Jahān became emperor, he would promote Mahābat Khān and as such his own great position and influence

1. Iqbāl-nāma, 299 ; Ma'āṣir, I, 722 and 727.

2. Ma'āṣir, I, 722.

3. Ibid.

at court would be gone. It wounded the feelings of Khān Jahān that ^{because} Shāh Jahān, in spite of his former intimacy with him, should favour his rival Mahābat Khān, who had joined him only recently.¹ So, Khān Jahān did not wish to support the cause of Shāh Jahān. Moreover, he thought that, in view of Empress Nūrbahān's support of Shāhriyār and the installation of Dāwar Bakhsh by Aṣaf Khān and the army, Shāh Jahān had little chance of obtaining the throne.

Khān Jahān's hostile attitude towards Shāh Jahān's succession incensed the latter and he sent Mahābat Khān with an army to Mandu, where Khān Jahān had left his family and men. At this, Khān Jahān renewed friendly relations with the Nizām ul Mulk and, leaving his sons and Sikandar Dutānī in charge of Burhanpur, he moved towards Mandu and occupied Malwa from its governor Muzaffar Khān Ma'murī, who was inclined to Shāh Jahān.²

But, although Khān Jahān did not support Shāh Jahān, in the end it was the latter who won the war of succession. Empress Nūrbahān's nominee Shāhriyār was defeated and captured and the proclamation of Dāwar Bakhsh proved to be a ruse invented by Aṣaf Khān in favour of his son-in-law. Khān Jahān realised his grave miscalculation. So, after Shāh Jahān's accession, he sent a vakīl to court with suitable presents.³ Emperor Shāh Jahān forgave him and reappointed him to the government of the Deccan.⁴

1. Ma'āṣir, I, 1722.

2. Iqbāl-nāma, 300 ; Lāhūrī, I, 272 ; Ma'āṣir, I, 723.

3. Ibid.

4. Lāhūrī, I, 273 ; Āmal, I, 348.

Shāh Jahān's Afghān Policy (1627-31) :

At the beginning of his reign (1627-31), Emperor Shāh Jahān followed his father's policy of conciliating the Afghāns. The fact that he forgave Khān Jahān and reappointed him to the government of the Deccan illustrates this. He also confirmed Khān Jahān's rank of 7,000 zāt and 7,000 sawār.¹ Shāh Jahān even pardoned Dariyā Khān Rūhīla, who had deserted from his service and joined Khān Jahān. The Emperor also gave him a manṣab of 4,000 zāt and 3,000 sawār which, in 1628, was raised to 4,000 and 4,000.²

Besides, Shāh Jahān appointed Sher Khān as governor of Guzrat and conferred on him the rank of 5,000 and 5,000.³ He also confirmed and raised the manṣab of a few other Afghān officers, such as Bahlūl Khān Miyāna, Mubārīz Khān Afghān, Shāhbāz Dutānī⁴ and Jalāl Khān Kākar.⁵ Moreover, he created a few manṣabdārs from among the Afghāns, such as Bahādur Khān Rūhīla, the son of Dariyā Khān Rūhīla,⁶ Jahān Khān Kākar⁷ and others. The following table will give an idea of the position of the Afghāns in the early years (1627-31) of Shāh Jahān's reign.

1. Lāhūrī, I, 182.

2. Ibid, 202-3 and 297.

3. Ibid, 77-8 ; Ma'aṣir, II, 652-3.

4. Ibid, 182-3.

5. Ibid, 184.

6. Ibid, 117.

7. Ibid, 119.

Afghān manṣabdārs (1631-A. D.) :

7,000	7,000	Khān Jahān Lūdī
5,000	5,000	Sher Khān
4,000	4,000	Dariyā Khān Rūhila
4,000	3,000	Bahlūl Khān Miyāna
4,000	2,000	Bahādur Khān Rūhila
3,000	3,000	Aṣalat Khān Lūdī ¹
		Mubārīz Khān Rūhila
3,000	2,000	Sherū Rūhila ²
3,000	500	Shāhbāz Dutānī
2,500	2,000	Allahdād Khān Rūhila
2,000	1,500	Bābui Khān Karranī ³
1,500	1,000	Mubārak Khān Niyāzī ⁴
1,500	700	Jalāl Khān Kākar
1,500	500	Aḥmad Khān Niyāzī ⁵
1,000	800	Pīr Khān Miyāna ⁶
1,000	400	Jahān Khān Kākar
		Bahādur Khān Lūdī ⁷

1. Ma'aṣir, I, 732.

2. Lāhūrī, I, 204.

3. Ibid, I, ii, 302.

4. Ibid, I, 307.

5. Ibid, 296.

6. Ibid, I, ii, 308.

7. Ibid, I, 276.

Although the Afghāns continued to enjoy an honourable place in the Mughal army, yet their political influence, which they had wielded in the empire through the great position of Khān Jahān Lūdī, disappeared in Shāh Jahān's reign. On account of his sale of Balaghat and his hostile attitude to the succession of Shāh Jahān, Khān Jahān lost his position at his court. On the otherhand, Aṣaf Khān and Mahābat Khān who had helped the new Emperor in the war of succession became the premier nobles in the empire and they obtained the titles of Yamīn ud daula (the Pillar of the State) and Khān Khānān respectively.

The rise of Mahābat Khān, his rival, in particular, meant the loss of Khān Jahān's great position in the empire. So, the author of Ma'āṣir rightly says that men, who had not been admitted to the presence of Emperor Jahāngīr, claimed to be the equals of Khān Jahān and they even raised their heads above him.¹

It seems that Shāh Jahān appointed Khān Jahān as governor of the Deccan with the idea that he was to recover Balaghat from his friend the Nizām ul Mulk. But as the latter could not do so, in 1628 the Emperor transferred him to Malwa and gave Mahābat Khān the charge of the Deccan.² Khān Jahān took

1. Ma'āṣir, I, 730-1.

2. Āmal, I, 348 ; Lāhūrī, I, 199 and 273.

part in the suppression of Jujhar Singh Bundela's rebellion. After that, he came to court on a summons from the Emperor.¹

Khān Jahān's rebellion :

The court historians say that Khān Jahān remained ~~a~~ eight months at court and, although the Emperor did not rebuke him, he continued to be moody and disconcerted and was ready to listen to trouble-makers..² We, however think that Khān Jahān had reason to feel uneasy at the court of Shah Jahan. He found that his former position ~~was~~ ^{had} gone and his inferiors had been made his superiors. Besides, Shāh Jahān received him only with cold and formal politeness.³ This neglect wounded the feelings of Khān Jahān. Moreover, Shāh Jahān significantly referred to the strong contingent he had brought to court. He also transferred some parganas of Khān Jahān's jagirs to others.⁴ These made Khān Jahān suspect that Shāh Jahān would humiliate and ruin him.⁴

The rumour that he would soon be imprisoned added to Khān Jahān's suspicions. One day Mukhlis Khān's son Mīrzā Laskarī mischievously told a son of Khān Jahān that his father would soon be imprisoned. The son informed the father. Khān Jahān feared for his safety and remained shut up in his house. Shāh Jahān sent him an amānnāma assuring him of safety.

1. Lahūrī, I, 255 ; 'Amal, I, 348.

2. Ibid, 273.

3. Ma'āṣir, I, 723.

4. Ibid, 723-4.

Aṣaf Khān re-assured him. Khān Jahān, however, could not rely on the amānnāma and, in the night of October 5, 1629 (Safar 26, 1039), he fled from Agra with his family and followers.¹

Shāh Jahān sent Khwājā Abūl Ḥasan Turbatī to the pursuit of Khān Jahān. At Dhulpur, 18 kos from Agra, Muẓaffar Khān Barhā and other Mughal generals encountered him. In the fight, Khān Jahān's sons Husain and Ajmal and his son-in-law Shams Khān Lūdī together with his brothers Muḥammad and Mahmūd, the grandsons of 'Ālam Khān Lūdī, and many other Afghāns were killed.² Khān Jahān crossed the Chambal and passing through Bundelkhand, the country of Jujhar Singh Bundela, and seeking in vain shelter in Gondwana, he came via Berar to Ahmadnagar.

Bahlūl Khān Miyāna , the jagirdār of Balapur, and Sikandar Dutānī of Jalnapur left the Mughal service and joined Khān Jahān.³ A little later Dariyā Khān Rūhila fled from Burhanpur and joined him at Ahmadnagar.⁴ Several other Afghān officers deserted Shāh Jahān's service and swelled the ranks of the rebels. Considering Khān Jahān's coming as a great gain against the Mughal empire, the Nizām ul Mulk received him cordially and gave him and his companions money and fiefs.⁵

In alliance with the Nizām ul Mulk, Khān Jahān raided

1. Lāhurī, I, 274-5 ; Āmal, I, 348-9 ; Ma'āṣir, I, 724-5.

2. Ibid, 276-8 ; 725.

3. Ibid, 289 ; 356 ; 726.

4. Ibid, 300 ; 371.

5. Ma'āṣir, I, 726.

and plundered the Mughal territories in the Deccan. Shāh Jahān came personally to deal with him and from Burhanpur he directed the campaign, sending three forces against Ahmadnagar. Khān Jahān could not stand before the imperialists and in 1630, being defeated in a battle at Bir, on the road east of Ahmadnagar, he retreated to Daulatabad.¹

In the meantime, differences and distrust arose between the Nizām ul Mulk and Khān Jahān.² It was in the hope of getting some benefit against the Mughal empire that the Nizām ul Mulk had given shelter and help to Khān Jahān and his men. He, however, found that the Afghāns were a liability rather than an asset to him as in the event they failed to acquire any part of the Mughal territory for him. Moreover, the territories of the Nizām ul Mulk suffered severely from the inroads of the Mughal forces, which were in pursuit of Khān Jahān.³ Khān Jahān also was disgusted with the interested "friendship" of the Nizām ul Mulk.⁴ He thought it advisable to leave his territory.

Attempt for the recovery of Afghān rule :

On the advice of Dariyā Khān Rūhīla, Aimāl Khān Tarīn, Sardār Khān Rūhīla and his chief adherents, Khān Jahān resolved to go to the ~~Ran~~ Panjab so that he might obtain the help of

1. Lāhūrī, I, 324-6 and 328.

2. Ibid, 334-5.

3. Ibid, 334-5 ; Āmal, I, 398.

4. Ma'āṣir, I, 728.

the Afghāns there.¹ This resolution changed the objective of Khān Jahān's rebellion. A rebel turned a champion of Afghān national cause. Khān Jahān now determined upon rallying the Afghāns for the recovery of the Afghān rule in India.

According to the author of Ma'āsir, Khān Jahān originally rebelled in defence of his honour ; but before the end, he was actuated by the desire to re-establish the Afghān rule in India.² An analysis of his activities will indeed confirm Shāh Nawāz's verdict.

In spite of the advice of Dariyā Khān Rūhīlā, Sikandar Dutānī and others to make an attempt for the recovery of Afghān sovereignty, Khān Jahān at first recognised Shāh Jahān as Emperor, after he ascended the throne.³ Not until the third year of Shāh Jahān's reign did he rebel as protest against what he considered his disgrace at court.⁴ But he could not have certainly improved his position in Shāh Jahān's empire by means of rebellion. What was his object then ? It seems that Khān Jahān was not clear in his aims. His sense of prestige had forced him to rebel and to ally with the Mughal enemy, the Nizām ul Mulk.

Indeed Bahlūl Khān Miyāna, Sikandar Dutānī, Dariyā

1. Lāhūrī, I, 335 : Āmal, I, 399 : Ma'āsir, I, 728.

2. Ma'āsir, I, 730-1.

3. Op. Cit., 240.

4. Op. Cit., 244.

Khān Rūhīla and other Afghān deserters from Mughal service joined Khān Jahān with the hope of making a bid for the ~~restoration~~ restoration of Afghān rule under his leadership.¹ At Daulatabad they wanted him to sit on the throne. But Khān Jahān did not consent and he said, " Fifty years of my life have gone ; I do not know if after me my sons will be fit for the throne. Every Mughal will expel the Afghāns with ignominy from every town and village and then the maid-servants will execrate me. " ² This disappointed his supporters and Bahlūl Khān Miyāna, Sikandar Dutānī and many other Afghāns left him.³

Desertions and reverses in the Deccan made Khān Jahān ~~and~~ feel that he had no chance of success unless he could rally the Afghāns under his banner by holding before them the ambition of reviving the Afghān rule in India. So, he resolved to go to the Panjab so that he might enlist the support of the Afghāns there. Khān Jahān also wrote to Kamāluddīn Rūhīla, a deserter from Mughal service, who led the various Afghān tribes of the north-west frontier area against the Mughal empire.⁴ Kamāluddīn and his confederates wanted to capture Peshawar. But the Mughal generals Sa'id Khān, Laskar Khān, Qulīj Khān and others frustrated their plan.⁵

1. Ma'āṣir, I, 727-8.

2. Ibid, 728.

3. Ibid.

4. Lahūrī, I, 335 311 ; Āmal, I, 378 ; Ma'āṣir-i-Jahāngīrī, 63a.

5. Ibid, 311-4 ; 378-81.

Khān Jahān wanted to go to the Panjab via Malwa. Anticipating such a move, Shāh Jahān sent 'Abdullā Khān to close the roads to that country.¹ Finding all roads closed, Khān Jahān, in despair, entered Bundelkhand intending to push on to Kalpi. Jujhar Singh Bundela's son Bikramjit pursued him and attacked his rear. In an engagement on January 21, 1631 (~~Jama~~ 17 Jamadi II, 1040), he killed Dariyā Khān Rūhīla, his son and many other Afghāns. Khān Jahān narrowly escaped with his followers.²

Dariyā Khān's death greatly distressed Khān Jahān and weakened his strength. The imperialists followed him at his heels. Again on February 2, 1631 (29 Jamadi II, 1040), Muzaffar Khān Barhā defeated him at Bhandar, north-east of Jhasi. In the fight, Khān Jahān lost his son Mahmud and many of his followers and he himself was wounded. ~~His son Hasan was taken captive~~ Being hard-pressed, he fled to Kalinjar. Saiyid Ahmad, the commandant of the fort, attacked him and killed a large number of the Afghāns. Khān Jahān's son Hasan was taken captive. The unfortunate Afghān chief fled to Sahindra, 20 kos north of Kalinjar. Muzaffar Khān Barhā and 'Abdullā Khān, however, hotly pursued him.³

Being surrounded by the imperialists on all sides,

1. Lāhūrī, I, 335.

2. Ibid, 338-9.

3. Ibid, 348-50.

Khān Jahān found no hope of escape. Disappointment and misfortune made him desperate and he resolved to die fighting with his greatly reduced army. On February 17, 1631 (Rajab 15, 1040), Khān Jahān engaged at Sahindra the Mughal advance-guard under Madhu Singh. Khān Jahān and his men fought desperately. Madhu Singh, however, fatally wounded him with an arrow and killed his sons 'Aziz and Aimal. Before 'Abdullā Khān and Muzaffar Khān arrived in the field, he had defeated the Afghāns and cut off the heads of Khān Jahān and his sons. The Mughal generals sent our historian Khwāja Kamgar to Shāh Jahān to Burhanpur with their heads. Khān Jahān's head was fixed for some days on the gate of the fort of Burhanpur and afterwards buried in the vault of Daulat Khān Lūdi, the father of Khān Jahān.¹

With the death of Khān Jahān died in its embryo the last attempt at the restoration of Afghān rule in India.

Fall of Afghān influence :

The rebellion and fall of Khān Jahān ended Afghān influence in the Mughal empire. No other Afghān noble after him had such a great position at court. Besides, his rebellion caused lasting injury to the Afghān position in the Mughal imperial service. A few of the Afghān officers, such as Dariyā Khān Rūhīla, Bahlūl Khān Miyāna, Sikandar Dutānī and others

1. Lāhūrī, I, 350-1 ; Ma'āṣir-i-Jahāngīrī, 63a ; Ma'āṣir, I, 729.

with their followers had deserted from service and joined him. Moreover, they had made an attempt for the recovery of the Afghān rule in Indīa. These naturally shook Shāh Jahān's faith in them and he could not trust them with responsible posts in the empire.

No amount of loyal service of the Afghāns could win back the confidence of Shāh Jahān and their position in the imperial service. Many of the Afghāns, such as Sher Khān Tunūr, Bahādur Khān Rūhīla, Ahmād Khān Niyāzī, Khān Jahān Kākar, Mubārīz Khān Rūhīla and others remained steadfastly loyal at the time of Khān Jahān's rebellion and even fought to suppress him.¹ They also fought heroically in the Deccan, Qandahar and Balkh-Badakhshan campaigns of Shāh Jahān. Notwithstanding their distinguished services, however, they could win back neither the favour of the Emperor nor their rightful place in the army. A short summary of the subsequent careers of Bahādur Khān Rūhīla, Jalāl Khān Kākar and Ahmād Khān Niyāzī illustrates this.

From the time Shāh Jahān was a prince, Bahādur Khān Rūhīla, a son of Dariyā Khān Rūhīla, served him with sincere devotion and loyalty. After his father had deserted from service and joined Khān Jahān, he attached himself more firmly to the Emperor. At the time of his accession, Shāh Jahān, in appreciation

1. Lahūrī, I, 301, 294, 296 and 298 ; Amal, I, 368 ;

Ma'āsir, II, 653.

appreciation of his service, had promoted him to the rank of 4,000 zāt and 2,000 sawār and had given him a fief in Kalpi.¹ Bahādur Khān Rūhīla fought against his father and Khān Jahān and in the campaigns against Ahmadnagar and Bijapur.²

In 1647 in Prince Murād's campaign against Balkh, Bahādur Khān distinguished himself for his courage.³ But although he had made great exertions in the Balkh and Uzbek campaigns, he fell into the bad graces of the Emperor. Certain malicious persons informed Shāh Jahān that Bahādur Khān Rūhīla had neglected to pursue Nazr Muḥammad, the ruler of Balkh and that his supineness was responsible for the defeat of Sa'id Khān in the Uzbek war. Shāh Jahān, who had already lost his faith in the Afghāns, believed the report and punished Bahādur Khān by depriving him of his jagir.⁴ This made Bahādur Khān grieved at heart. He died in 1649 in the Qandahar campaign of Prince Aurangzib.⁵

Jalāl Khān Kākar, a son of Dilāwar Khān Kākar, did good service in assisting Sa'id Khān against an attempt of the Afghāns under Kamāluddīn Rūhīla to take Peshawar in 1630.⁶ He also served in the Balkh and Qandahar campaigns with

1. Lāhūrī, I, 117 and 191 ; Ma'āṣir, I, 416.

2. Ibid, 380-1 ; 416-7.

3. Ibid, II, 513 ; 420-1.

4. Ibid, 553-4, 666 and 691-2; 423 ; Khāfī K., I, 662-3.

5. Ma'āṣir, I, 423-4.

6. Lāhūrī, I, 311 ; Ma'āṣir, I, 530.

distinction. But his rank did not exceed 2,000 zāt and 1,500 sawār.

Ahmad Khān Niyāzī was another Afghān who performed meritorious service in the reign of Shāh Jahān. In the Deccan campaign, his courage forced a large combined forces of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar to retreat. He also played a distinguished part in Mahābat Khān's capture of Amarkot, an outer fort of Daulatabad. His manṣab, however, was only 3,000 zāt and 3,000 sawār.¹

After Khān Jahān's rebellion, Shāh Jahān did not appoint any Afghāns as provincial governors. In the suppression of Khān Jahān's rebellion and the conquest of the Nizām Shāhī territories, Sher Khān Tunūr greatly helped the Emperor. He, however, retained his post as governor in the reign of Shāh Jahān of Guzrat until his death in 1631.² After that we do not see any Afghān as provincial governor in the reign of Shāh Jahān. Also he did not entrust any Afghān with an independent army command. The Afghāns were attached as assistants to other Mughal generals.

A study of the manṣab of the Afghāns at the end of Shāh Jahān's reign indicates a marked decline of their position in the Mughal empire.

1. Ma'āṣir, I, 719 ; Āmal, III, 454.

2. Ibid, II, 653 ; Lāhūrī, I, ii, 294.

Mansabdārs (excepting the princes)

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Total No.</u>	<u>No. of Afghāns</u>
9 Hazārī	1 Aṣaf Khān	None
7 -	8	None
6 -	7	None
5 -	31	1 Bahādur Khān Rūhīla ¹
4 -	29	1 Mubāriz Khān Rūhīla ²
3 -	57	2 Aḥmad Khān Niyāzī ³ Shāhbāz Khān Rūhīla
2½ -	24	None
2 -	66	4 Dilīr Khān Rūhīla ⁴ Mubāriz Khān Niyāzī Jalāl Khān Kākar Kākar Khān
1½ -	72	2 Yasīn Khān ⁵ Jamāl Khān Lūhānī
1 -	138	2 Sher Khān Miyāna ⁶ 'Usmān Khān Rūhīla
9 Sadī	31	1 Ail Khān ⁷
8 -	81	2 Jamāl Khān Kākar ⁸ Bahar Lūhānī

1. 'Amal, III, 451

2. Ibid, 452.

3. Ibid, 454.

4. Ibid, 457-8.

5. Ibid, 462.

6 - 8. Ibid, 465 ; 471 ; 472-3.

7	Sadī	77	1	Nik <u>Khān</u> (son of Bahādur <u>Khān</u> Rūhīla)	1
6	-	57	2	Baghe (son of Sher <u>Khān</u> Tunūr) Kaka Kākar	2
5	-	180	4	Shihab (son of Mubāarak <u>Khān</u> Sarwānī) Shāhbāz Afghān Yusuf (son of Bahādur <u>Khān</u> Rūhīla) Arjumand (nephew of Jalāl <u>Khān</u> Kākar)	3

The above discussion shows that Khān Jahān's rebellion caused a revival of the Mughal Emperor's distrust of the Afghāns and that no amount of loyal service could win them back the confidence of Shāh Jahān. One incident illustrates how Shāh Jahān's mind reacted against them. In 1640, as 'Abdullā Khān Fīrūz Jang had failed to suppress the rebel Bundela chief Champat, the Emperor appointed the distinguished Afghān general Bahādur Khān Rūhīla in his place and gave him the fief of Islamabad in Bundelkhand. Immediately after the appointment, Shāh Jahān thought that he had acted unwisely in sending Bahādur Khān to Bundelkhand and he feared that he might convert Bundelkhand into Ruhilkhand. So, he recalled him. ⁴

1. 'Amal, III, 476.

2. Ibid, 479-80.

3. Ibid, 481, 483 and 485.

4. Ma'āṣir, I, 420.

بندیل کو تدارک رو میل کھند کردن صلاح ملکی نیست

This distrust of the Mughals towards the Afghāns continued even down to the reign of Aurangzib ; indeed it was so very marked that foreigners even noticed it . The Venetian Niccolao Manucci, who came to Agra towards the close of the reign of Shāh Jahān (1656) and lived in ~~Dak~~ Delhi for many years in the reign of Aurangzib (1659-1707), wrote, " It is a rule in the Mughal empire not to trust the race of the Pathans." ¹

But through the complicated political conditions of his reign, the rise of Shivaji and the Marathas in the Deccan, wars against the Deccani saltanates, the alienation of the Rajputs and the rebellion of the Jats and the Satnamis, Aurangzib in fact had to depend more on the arms of the Afghāns. The Afghān general Dilīr Khān Rūhīla distinguished himself in many a campaign in his reign. Still Aurangzib never entrusted him with an independent army command. In 1683, Dilīr Khān was ~~fight~~ fighting against the Bijapuris as second in command ~~in command~~ to Prince Shāh Ālam. Shāh Ālam intended to rebel against his father and seize the throne. He tried to induce Dilīr Khān to join him. Failing to win him over, the Prince secretly poisoned him.² Manucci says that Aurangzib was grieved at the death of so faithful a general, for whom he had considerable affection, in spite of his being a Pathan.³

1. Storia, II, 257.

2. Ibid ; Ma'āsir, II, 55-6.

3. Ibid.

Manucci's writings further reveal the distrust of the Mughals for the Afghāns. He says, " Upon birthdays, days of festival and New Year day, the emperor and the princes are weighed. On those days, the chief ladies of the court are obliged to attend at the palace to make their compliments to the queens and princesses. From this ceremony the wives of the Pathan captains are exempted." ¹ To pay compliments to the queens and princesses on festive occasions was an honour for the ladies of the court and the exclusion of the Afghān ladies from such an honour shows that, although the Mughals continued to enlist the services of the Afghāns, yet they would not rely on them even in the reign of Aurangzib. The writings of the French traveller Bernier, who lived in India from 1658 to 1667 and was intimately connected with the Mughal court, express the same spirit of distrust of the Mughals towards the Afghāns. They confirm that it was military necessity only which compelled the Mughal ~~emperor~~ emperor to engage the Afghāns in his service. ²

1. Storia, II, 345.

2. Bernier, 210-1.

CHAPTER X

Conclusion

Although politically the rise of the Afghān saltānate was not an unexpected event, yet from the point of view of institutional development, particularly the institution of the monarchy, it came as a break in the political tradition of India, even in the tradition of Muslim India. The typical form of government in India was absolute monarchy. The Turks only developed this tradition further, indeed to an extent undreamt of even by the imperial Guptas.

Racially and culturally, the Turks and the Mughals of India had an affinity and Bābur was the lineal descendant of both Timur, the Turk and Chengīz, the Mughal. Hence, he considered himself as a rightful claimant to the empire of Hindustan. The Afghāns, however, had affinity with neither their predecessors, the Turks, nor with their successors, the Mughals. Mughal rule in India saw the perfection of the Turkish institution of absolute monarchy. At the time of the Afghāns, however, we see the introduction of a monarchy different from the Turks and the Mughals and hence their saltānate caused a breach in the history of absolute monarchy in India.

In the period of the Afghān saltānate, India underwent the experiment of a monarchy based on tribal lines and it is

this fact which gives especial significance to the history of Afghān rule in this country. Absolute monarchy was alien to the nature and temperament of the Afghān people. On account of their excessive attachment to their own tribes and tribal chiefs as well as their love for tribal independence, the Afghāns converted the monarchy to a sort of confederacy of the tribal chiefs presided over by the king. The chiefs accorded him the honours of a leader of equals rather than of a master.

The experiment of this new type of monarchy, however, could have been an interesting deviation from the monotonous history of absolutism, if the Afghāns could have shown more aptitude for compromise in their ideas and actions. The Afghān chiefs were the accredited leaders of their own tribes and this gave them a representative character. Had they been balanced and judicious in their ideas of freedom and their respect for law and authority, they could have easily constituted themselves as the parliament and cabinet of the saltanate. This would have introduced the experiment of a constitutional monarchy in the fifteenth and sixteenth century India and this would have entitled the Afghāns to a dignified position as the greatest benefactor and contributor to the history of this country. This would have given permanence to their rule in India and also saved the country much trouble. But their ignorance,

uncompromising nature and individualistic spirit prevented the Afghāns from appreciating the value of constitutional government. So great was their individualistic spirit that even foreigners noticed it. Bernier, who visited India in the middle of the seventeenth century, wrote that even the menials and water-carriers of the Afghāns thought themselves worthy of the throne of Delhi.¹ Indeed this spirit of the Afghān chiefs accounted for their failure to introduce constitutional monarchy in their saltānate. So, Muslim monarchy in India lost a good chance of a change for the better.

On account of their tribal nature and ideas, the Afghāns, however, introduced in India a period of bitter conflict. The Afghān chiefs fanatically maintained tribal independence and vehemently resisted all attempts of the king to establish a strong monarchy. So, in the Afghān saltānate, we see the conflict between the principle of kingship and the idea of tribal independence and this was primarily responsible for the loss of their saltānate in 1526 and 1556.

If the Afghāns failed to give constitutional form to their monarchy, then the only alternative form for them was a strong monarchy or an absolute monarchy of the type of the Turkish saltānate. The Afghān saltānate as such represented misgovernment and the attitude of the Indians towards them

1. Bernier, 207.

reflected it. They began their rule as strangers to India and ended as strangers to India.¹

Islām Shāh felt the need for a strong centralised monarchy in the saltanate. Bold in his ideas as well as in his actions, he ruthlessly suppressed tribal independence and returned to an absolutism reminiscent of the days of Balban, 'Alāuddīn Khiljī and Muhammad bin Tughluq. He also introduced and developed ideas and institutions which provided a worthy legacy for the absolute rule and imperial system of Akbar, the Great Mughal. Thus, Islām Shāh healed the breach in the history of the institutional development in India and linked together the Turks and the Mughals in this country, in one common political tradition.

Intellectually and culturally, the period of Afghān rule in India presaged the intellectual renaissance of the time of the Mughal Emperor Akbar. It saw a great development of Persian, Hindi and Bengali languages and literatures as well as of poetry and music. Makhdum ul Mulk Sheikh 'Abdullā Sultānpūrī and Sheikh 'Alāī whom the contemporary historians regarded as most proficient in all the sciences of the time flourished at the time of the Sūr saltanate. The period was particularly rich in Persian poetry. Great poets like Mir Saiyid Ni ~~ama~~ Ni'ama, Sheikh 'Abdul Hai, Haiti and Saifi belonged to the

1. Op. Cit., 16 and 125.

court of Islām Shāh. The king and the nobles also vied with one another in the composition of verses in Persian.

The Sūr sultāns patronised Hindi. Their coins bear Hindi names. Islām Shāh's noble Shāh Muhammad was a good Hindi poet and Mīrzā Kāmran remarked that if he wrote in Persian, he would have ~~can~~ earned international fame. The great Hindi poet and musician Surdas adorned the court of Islām Shāh.

The Afghān period produced the greatest musicians of medieval Indian history. Sultān Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh was a master musician who counted among his disciples Miyān Tansen and Bāz Bahādur who afterwards became the most illustrious musicians of the court of Akbar. Bāz Bahādur, the Afghān ruler of Malwa, maintained 900 songtresses and dancing girls and made his court the most illuminating centre of music of the middle age in India. They composed songs both in Persian and Hindi. The love-songs, which Bāz Bahādur and his favourite Rupamati composed pouring their hearts for one another, are a valuable piece of Hindi literature~~and~~ ~~as~~ and music and still popular in India.¹

Islām Shāh and Sulaimān Karranī took a great interest in literary and philosophical discussions. Poets and scholars assembled in the court and debated questions of literature,

1. Op. Cit., 119-20.

poetry and philosophy. Indeed these literary and philosophical discussions in the court of the Afghāns encouraged Akbar later to hold such meetings in his court. This led to the building of the 'Ibādatkhāna and brought in the great intellectual awakening of his reign.

The period of the Afghān saltanate also witnessed the rise of the Mahdavi movement whose ideas had considerable significance in introducing rationalism and also liberating Islām from the influence of the orthodox 'ulema in the reign of Akbar. It also saw a marvellous development of Sūfism in the person of Sheikh Salīm Chishtī of Fathpur Sikri.

The period of Afghān rule also saw a brilliant development of the Bengali language. The great stimulus to Bengali literature under the patronage of the Iliyās Shāhī sultāns and Saiyid sultāns continued in the period of the Afghān rule in Eastern India. After the loss of Northern India, the Afghāns adopted Bengal as their home and patronised Bengali intellect. The rise of Srihari Bikramaditya and Janakiballava Basanta Rai illustrates this.

The period is particularly rich in Chaitanya Kavyas and Manasamangal Kavyas. The poets, Ramchandra Khan, Dviya Raghunath, Isannagar, Bansidas, Brindaban Das Das, Lochan Das, Krishnadas Kaviraj, Daulat Wazir Bahram, Bijaya Gupta, Muktaram Sen, Raghunath Pandit, Madhabacharya, Saiyid Sultān and Manik

Ganguli flourished in this period.¹ Mukundaram Chakravarti, called Kavikankan Chandi, the Crabbe of Bengali literature and the Chaucer of Indian story-tellers,² was also a product of this period.

Another significant event of the period was the Satyapir movement which aimed at a synthesis of the Hindu and Muslim creeds. The Bhakti movement also received a great impetus due to the great development of the Vaishnava literatures of the time.

One especially significant fact of the history of the Afghāns in India was their relations with their conquerors, the Mughals. Unlike other conquered peoples, the Afghāns would not tamely submit themselves to the Mughal rule and the Mughals also could not trust them. So, their relations with the Mughals passed through the various phases of distrust, conciliation and suspicion. Nevertheless, through military necessity, the Mughal emperors had to appoint them in the army and it is indeed a paradox of history that Shāh Jahān's reign, which saw the revival of the Mughal distrust of the Afghāns, also laid the basis of the Afghān revival in India.

On account of his distinguished services and particularly for his suppression of the turbulent Hindu chiefs

1. Sen, S. K. - Bangla Sahityer Itihasa, I, 66-503 ;
Prachin Puthir Bibaran, I, ii, 1320 B. S. ; Advanced History of India, 407-8.
2. Dasgupta, J. N. - Bengal in the Sixteenth Century, 57.

of Katehr, Shāh Jahān granted Dilīr Khān Rūhila, a son of the deserter Dariyā Khān Rūhila and brother of Bahādur Khān Rūhila, some villages in the sarkar of Kanauj. Dilīr Khān colonised them with the Afghāns and built there a city, which he named Shahjahanpur.¹ These Afghān colonies naturally attracted more Afghāns to India, particularly in the later days of Aurangjib's reign, and they formed the nucleus for the establishment of the Afghān states in Farrukhabad and Ruhilkhand. The first was established in 1712 by Muḥammad Khān Bangash known as the Nawāb of Bangash and the second in 1737 by 'Alī Muḥammad Khān Rūhila.²

Settled near Delhi, the Afghāns could also exercise great political influence in the Mughal court in the days of its decline. An Afghān jagirdār of Ruhilkhand, Najib Khān, ~~indeed~~ became so influential that in 1757 he ~~became~~ a protector made himself a protector of Emperor Aḥmad Shāh.³

Thus, although it seems contradictory, yet it is a fact that ^{at this time} the unruly nature and fighting spirit of the Afghāns brought them once more in the lime-light of history as ^{previously} these qualities had also, on several occasions, paved the way for their great national misfortune.

1. Khāfī Khān, I, 662-3 ; Ma'āṣir, I, 423 ; Akhbar-i-Mahabbat, 64b-5b ; District Gazetteer, Shahjahanpur, XVII, 136.

2. K. Rahman - The Rise and Fall of the Rūhila Afghāns, 8 and 48.

3. Ibid, 122-5 and 133.

Bibliography

Evaluation of the Sources :

This thesis is entirely based on origin sources. The contemporary Persian histories form the main source. A few Sanskrit, Arabic, Hindi and Bengali works have been consulted. The Bengali works in particular have supplied a good deal of useful information about the Afghān rule in Bengal and the Afghān-Mughal relations in Eastern India. The accounts of the foreign travellers, particularly of the Europeans, have been very profitably utilised. They have thrown interesting side-lights on the Afghān-Mughal relations in India. Their accounts have supplemented and substantiated the evidence gathered from the contemporary Persian sources and have in a few cases added valuable facts to the subject under study. The coins and inscriptions of the period have also been consulted. The varieties of sources have, however, ~~help~~ helped me greatly in weighing the statement of one by that of the others and in making correct estimate of facts.

The contemporary Persian historians who wrote about the Afghāns and the Afghān-Mughal relations in India fall according to nationality into three classes : (A) Afghān, (B) Mughal and (C) Provincial.

The Afghan historians are naturally inclined to idealise their Afghān kings. On the otherhand, the Mughal historians are generally hostile to the Afghāns, the great enemy of the Mughals. The two sources, however, enable us to obtain an idea of the Afghān and Mughal view-points. The third class of historians, who were neither Afghāns nor Mughals and whom we might for the sake of convenience give the name of Provincial, also volunteer their evidence in many cases. Their evidence has, however, been helpful in arriving at many conclusions.

Although these historians have been divided into three classes, it should not be thought that all the Afghān historians were pro-Afghān and anti-Mughal, all the Mughal historians were pro-Mughal and anti-Afghān and the Provincial historians were impartial narrators of facts. In fact, the merit of the histories of these three classes of historians depends on many factors, particularly the circumstances under which they wrote, their personal likes and dislikes of a particular people or a person and their qualities as an honest narrator of events they saw or heard.

All the Afghān historians wrote during the time of the Mughals and some of them directly or indirectly compiled their works under the supervision of the Mughals. Thus Abbās Khān Sarwānī wrote his work Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī at the order of Emperor Akbar. Ni'matullā compiled his Makhzan-i-Afghāna at the

time of Jahāngīr and under the patronage of the Emperor's favourite Afghān noble Khān Jahān Lūdī. The Tārīkh-i-Shāhī and Tārīkh-i-Dāudī were also compiled in the reign of Jahāngīr, though not under any direct or indirect supervision. Under these circumstances, the Afghān historians would have found it difficult to have idealised their kings at the expense of the Mughals.

We also cannot brand the Mughal historians as necessarily hostile to the Afghāns. Even Abūl Fazl, Akbar's court historian, has highly appreciated the qualities of Sher Shāh, Islām Shāh, Hemu and Lūdī. He might have been a great adorer of his royal master in whom he saw no wrong whatsoever, but as regards others he has largely given facts if they did not go against the reputation of his master and patron. Nizāmuddīn Ahmad Bakhshī has been recognised as a most celebrated historian of medieval India. In many instances, he gives us facts ; but in some instances, where the question of the prestige of his master, Emperor Akbar, was concerned, he has remained silent.

Although a Mughal historian, Mullā 'Abdul Qadīr Badāunī is favourably disposed towards the Afghāns. He wrote his history in secret and it was not made public until some years after his death. Being an orthodox Mullā, Badāunī was bitterly

hostile to the religious innovations of Akbar as the pages of his history show. But in matters not affecting his religious convictions, he was fair to the Emperor. Considering the circumstances under which Badaūnī compiled his history and his fairness to the Afghāns as well ^{as} to the Emperor, his work is a very valuable source of information for the period in which he lived.

The Provincial historians were not necessarily impartial as between Mughals and Afghāns in their statements. Firishta was neither an Afghān ^{nor a Mughal} historian but wrote in the court of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh of Bijapur. Sometimes, however, he is more Mughal than even the Mughals. The same outlook is found in Rizqullā, the author of Wāqī'at-i-Mustaqī and in Tahir Muhammad, the writer of Rauzat ut Tahirin.

In view of these factors, the ~~convenient~~ convenient classification of the Persian materials into Afghān, Mughal and Provincial must not be pushed too far. Individual examination of each history's source will illuminate this and confirm the need for caution.

A. Contemporary Afghān historians :

(Arranged alphabetically)

Abbās Khān Sarwānī - Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī also known as
Tuḥfah-i-Akbar Shāhī.

Abbās held the post of wāqī'anavis in the court of Akbar and wrote the history of the Afghān rulers at the Emperor's order. His work begins with Bahlūl and ends with Sher Shāh. It was completed in 1587 (995 H.). Abbās claims to have been related to the family of Sher Shāh and obtained information from his father, grandfather and other elderly Afghāns.

Though he was engaged by Akbar to write the history of the Afghāns, Abbās has idealised Sher Shāh by crediting him with the introduction of many political institutions. This shows that, in the composition of the history, he had full freedom to narrate facts. Himself an Afghān, Abbās has exposed the tribal nature of his people. Indeed his work is useful in acquiring an insight into the nature of the Afghān people and the character of their government.

India office MS., 218

British Museum Ms., Or. 164.

Abdullā - Tārīkh-i-Dāudī.

This is a complete history of the Afghāns from Bahlūl to Dāud (1481-1576). There is no date of compilation in the work ; the occasional reference in it to Emperor

Jahāngīr, however, suggests that 'Abdullā wrote his history at the time of Jahāngīr (1605-27), though without any supervision from the Mughals.

Although deficient in dates and chronology, Dāudī gives us detailed information on the Sūr period, particularly of the successors of Sher Shāh. 'Abdullā has taken much of his materials from the works of 'Abbās and Rizqullā. As the portion of 'Abbās' work dealing with the successors of Sher Shāh is not available, Dāudī has, however, preserved for us the original information about them. But, its evidence in many cases, particularly in the cases of Afghān-Mughal relations, needs corroboration, because it represents purely an Afghān view-point.

Dāudī is, however, very useful for the administration of Islām Shāh. Although without a sense of perspective, 'Abdullā has branded Islām Shāh as a tyrant and an ambitious man who reversed many of his father's measures to earn a name for himself, yet we find in his evidence the nature and ideals of Islām Shāh's monarchy and administration.

British Museum MS., Or. 197

Oriental School MS., 46451.

Ahmad Yadgar - Tārikh-i-Shāhi also called Tārikh-i-Salatīn-i-Afghāna.

Ahmad Yadgar says that he was engaged ~~by the~~ to compile the history of the Afghāns by Dāud Karranī, the last

Afghān ruler of Bengal. The fact that he often quoted *Tabaqat-i-Akbarī* shows that he compiled his work after 1595, the date of the compilation of *Tabaqat*.

‘Abdullā wrote his history beginning from Bahlūl to the fall of Dāud Karranī in 1576. *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī* is full of mistakes in dates and events and very deficient in chronology. The author very often indulged in fantastic stories and seems very unreliable. His evidence cannot ^{be} entertained unless it is corroborated by that of the others.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1939.

Hāfiz Rahmat Khān - Khulāṣat ul Ansāb.

Hāfiz Rahmat, the dīwān of the Rūhīla Afghān state of Ruhilkhand, compiled his work in 1771. The only utility of his work is that it shows how the Afghāns even in the eighteenth century clung to the theory that they came from Semitic stock.

British Museum MS., Egerton 1104.

Mahabat Khān - Akhbār-i-Mahabbat.

In 1850 Mahabat Khān, a grandson of Shāh Jahān's great general Dilīr Khān Rūhīla, wrote this general history of India with particular reference to his ancestors. His work is useful in so far we obtain some information about the Rūhīla Afghāns in the reign of Shāh Jahān and his successors.

British Museum MS., Or. 1714.

Muhammad Kabir - Afsan-i-Shahan.

Kabir, a daughter's son of Sheikh Khalilullah Haqqani, who died in the reign of Akbar, compiled his work sometime in the eighteenth century. In his work, he has given us a series of anecdotes of the Afghan kings of India. Although his work has little historical value, yet it gives us an insight into the spirit of the rule of some of the Afghan kings and particularly their intellectual interests.

British Museum MS., Add. ~~21,911~~. 24,409.

Nimatullah - Makhzan-i-Afghana. BM. MS., Add. 21,911.

- Tarikh-i-Khan Jahān Ludi. IO., MS., 2649.

Nimatullah's two works are almost the same except that the latter has devoted two additional chapters for Khan Jahān Ludi's ancestry. Nimatullah served in the Khalṣa department of Akbar for 30 years and in 1595 as the librarian of Khan Khanān 'Abdur Raḥīm. In Jahāngir's reign, he was wāqī'anavis and after dismissal in 1608, he was engaged by Khan Jahān Ludi. On February 13, 1612, under Khan Jahān's patronage, he commenced writing the history of the Afghans.

Nimatullah first wrote about the Semitic origin of the Afghans. With the exception of the legendary portion, his genealogy of the Afghans, showing their tribal divisions, is useful. Although he derived much of his materials from Tabaqat, yet his work has introduced additional information revealing Jahāngir's conciliatory policy to the Afghans and Qatlū Lūhānī's treachery in the battle of Rajmahal which is not found in any other contemporary work. Makhzan-i-Afghana has been translated by Bernhard Dorn. London. 1820

B.

Contemporary Mughal historians :

Abūl Fazl 'Allamī - Akbarnāma and 'Ā'in-i-Akbarī.

Abūl Fazl, the court historian of Akbar, compiled his two monumental works before he was killed at the instigation of Prince Salīm in 1603 (1011 H.). His work was, however, completed to the close of the reign of Akbar by 'Inayetullā.

Abūl Fazl had the fullest facilities in obtaining ~~information~~ information in the compilation of his works. The author himself says that the Emperor made all possible arrangements for his materials. The state papers of the Afghāns as well ~~as~~ as of the Emperor were before him. He obtained information from the old members of the ruling family. He examined both prudent and veracious old men and active-minded and virtuous youngmen. Royal commands were issued to the provinces that those who remembered with any certainty the events of the past should copy out their notes and submit to the court. ¹

As a result, Abūl Fazl's Akbarnāma is fuller and more detailed in its information than any other contemporary history. Although a court historian and naturally hostile towards his master's enemies, the Afghāns, whom he mentions with the epithet of " Black faced ", " Black fated ", Wicked ", etc., yet Abūl Fazl has never distorted facts. He refers to Sher Shāh as a wicked man and Islām Shāh as a person who surpassed even his

1 A. N., I, 9.

father in wickedness, but he also appreciates their merit when he says that, if they had been in the service of a master like Emperor Akbar, they would have earned renown. Even his mention of them as wicked shows that they were shrewd men. Abūl Fazl also appreciates the genius of Hemu and regrets that Bairām Khān killed him; if he could be induced to serve the Emperor, he would have done great things for the empire.

Abūl Fazl's work, particularly the portion dealing with the Afghāns in Eastern India, is very useful. He has justified Akbar's conquests by saying that the peace of mortals is connected with one ruler, one rule, etc. ; but this gives us an insight into the aggressive policy of Akbar on the Afghāns in Eastern India.

In short, although Abūl Fazl eulogises his master fulsomely and tries to justify his actions, yet he has never concealed or distorted any fact.

Text - Akbarnāma, Bibliotheca Indica, 1878-86.

H. Beveridge's translation, Bibliotheca Indica, 1939.

Text - Ā'in-i-Akbarī, Bibliotheca Indica, 1877 ;

H. Blochmann, Jarret and J. N. Sarkar's translation,
Bibliotheca Indica, 1927.

Abdul Qadīr Muluk Shāh of Badāun called Badāunī -

Muntakhab ut Tawārikh.

Badāunī was born in 1540 (947 H.). In early life, he entered the service of Akbar. He died in 1596 (1004 H.). Being

an orthodox Mullā, Badaūnī was bitterly hostile to the religious innovations of Akbar and expresses that hostility in his book. He wrote his work in secret and it did not become public until some years after the accession of Jahāngīr. Excepting the religious ^{aspect,} Badaūnī's narration of the events of Akbar's reign deserves credence.

Although a Mughal, Badaūnī is favourably disposed towards the Afghāns and deplores their bad luck. He even thinks himself fortunate that he was born in the reign of so just a king as Sher Shāh. Considering that he was not prejudiced against the Afghāns and that he wrote his history in secret, his evidence cannot be ignored on the score of his being a Mughal. Badaūnī had been eye-witness of many of the events affecting the Afghāns and the Mughals. In this respect, he supplements others and adds new materials.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1868 ;

George S. A. Ranking and Sir Woolsey Haig's translation,
Bibliotheca Indica, 1898 and 1925.

Abdul Bāqī Nihāvandī - Ma'āṣir-i-Rahīmī.

This work was compiled in 1691 (1103 H.) under the patronage of Khān Khānān 'Abdur Raḥīm. Chiefly it supplements other contemporary ~~historians~~ histories.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1924-31.

Abdul Hamīd Lāhūrī - Bādshāhnāma.

Lāhūrī was a court historian of Shāh Jahān. He died in 1654. Bādshāhnāma is a history of Mughal rule in India up to the

twentieth year of the reign of Shāh Jahān. Lāhūrī gives very detailed information of the events of Shāh Jahān's reign. For the rebellion of Khān Jahān Lūdī and the position of the Afghāns in Shāh Jahān's court his work is a good source of information. But, he is not fair to the Afghāns.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1867-68.

Abdul Wahab - Intikhab-i-Jahāngīr Shāhī.

Abdul Wahab was a companion of Jahāngīr and died in 1622-3 (1032 H.). Being close to the court, he gives some valuable information of the reign of Jahāngīr. No manuscript of his work is available. A few extracts of the work have been translated in Elliot, vol. VI.

Bābur - Waqī'at-i-Bāburī or Bāburnāma.

Bābur wrote his autobiography in Turki. It was rendered into Persian at the time of Akbar by Khān Khānān 'Abdur Rahīm. In his Memoirs, Bābur, with his characteristic frankness, has recorded all the events of his life. He has not concealed his even his own failures and weaknesses. Bābur claims, " In this history, I have held firmly to it that truth should be reached in every matter and every act should be recorded precisely as it occurred. From this it follows of necessity that I have set down of good or bad whatever is known concerning of father and elder brother, kinsmen and strangers." ^IIndeed in

Indeed in ~~Bāburnāma~~ Bābur's Memoirs, we find a faithful picture of all his activities, policies and campaigns

and his likes and dislikes of persons and things. Bābur abhors the rustic behaviour of the Afghāns, but he was generous enough to arrange a ceremonial funeral for his enemy Ibrāhīm Lūdi. His Memoirs really reveals his policy of conciliation towards the vanquished Afghāns.

Oriental School MS. 46627;

A. S. Beveridge's translation from original Turki, London, 1921
Bāyazīd Biyāt - Tārīkh-i-Humāyūn.

An attendant companion of Khān Khānān Mun'im Khān, Bāyazīd Biyāt compiled his work at the command of Akbar in 1591-2 (1000 H.). His ~~his~~ history deals with the period from 1542 to 1591. Being an attendant of Mun'im Khān, the viceroy of the eastern provinces of the Mughal empire, Bāyazīd Biyāt supplies us with some useful and first hand information of that quarter.

India Office MS. 216 ;

B. P. Saksena's translation, Allahabad Studies, 1939.

Gulbadan Begum - Humāyūnnāma.

Gulbadan, the eldest daughter of Bābur, compiled the history of her brother's reign in 1587 (995 H.). In some respects, her work supplements other Mughal histories.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1902.

Jahāngīr - Tūzūk-i-Jahāngīrī.

Like his great grandfather, Jahāngīr wrote his autobiography with characteristic frankness and concealed nothing except his marriage episode with Nūrbahān. He wrote himself up to

the nineteenth year of his reign and, as he later on became incapable of writing on account of bodily infirmity, the Memoirs were completed by Muhammad Hādī in 1624.

Tūzuk-i-Jahāngirī is the best source of information about Jahāngir's relation with the Afghāns. It shows that he sincerely followed a conciliatory policy towards the Afghāns by elevating them to positions of honour and dignity at court and won them over to the service of his empire.

Text - edited by Saiyid Ahmad Khān, Aligarh, 1864 ;
Alexander Rogers' translation, Bibliotheca Indica, 1909 and 1914.
Jauhar Aftābchī - Tazkirat ul Wāḥiāt.

Humāyūn's cup bearer Jauhar wrote the events of his master's reign at the command of Akbar in 1587 (995 H.). As an eye-witness of the events of Humāyūn's reign, Jauhar supplies valuable information which we do not obtain in any other contemporary work.

Oriental School MS. 46451.

Khawāja Kamgar Khān - Ma'āsir-i-Jahāngirī.

Kamgar Khān wrote his history of the last years of the reign of Jahāngir and early years of the reign of Shāh Jahān in 1631. He fought in the imperial ~~arm~~ army against Khān Jahān Lūdi and brought his head to Shāh Jahān to Burhanpur.

British Museum MS. , Add. 26,220.

Mirzā Nathan - Bahāristān-i-Ghayebī.

A junior officer in the Mughal army in Bengal, Mirzā Nathan wrote his work before 1641 (1051 H.). As an eye-witness of the Mughal-Afghān relations in Bengal in his period, he gives us many valuable information.

This work has been translated by M. I. Borah, the Professor of Persian in the Dacca University in 1936.

Muhammad Ṣālih Kambū - 'Āmal Ṣālih.

A manṣabdār of 500 in the reign of Shāh Jahān, Kambū wrote the history of the Emperor from his birth to death in 1665 (1065H.). Except that his work gives a list of the nobles and manṣabdārs of Shāh Jahān's reign, it is a repetition of Lāhūrī's Bādshāhnāma.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1923-39.

Muhammad Hāshim Khāfī Khān - Muntakhab ul Lubāb.

Khāfī Khān compiled his work in the reign of Emperor Muhammad Shāh, who died in 1748. He is a judicious writer. His work supplements the other Persian histories.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1869.

Mutamid Khān - Iqbāl-nāma-i-Jahāngīrī.

Mutamid Khān was a court historian of Jahāngīr. He completed his work in 1627-1628. His work is simply a repetition of the Tūzūk-i-Jahāngīrī.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1865.

Mustaid Khān - Ma'āṣir-i-Jahāngīrī ; written in 1707-10.

J. N. Sarkar's ~~text~~ translation, Bibliotheca Indica, 1947.

Nizāmuddīn Ahmad Bakhshī - Tabaqat-i-Akbari.

Nizāmuddīn was a Bakhshī in the reign of Akbar. He died in 1595 (1003 H.). His Tabaqat is considered as one of the most celebrated histories of India. Even the irascible Badāunī has greatly appreciated his work. Firishta and the author of Ma'āṣir ul 'Umara had high praise for Nizāmuddīn and they freely utilised his history in the compilation of their works.

Nizāmuddīn fought against the Afghāns in Guzrat and hence had direct information about the Afghān-Mughal relations in that country. As a very reliable man, he supplies valuable materials for history ; but he also sometimes conceals facts which might injure the prestige of the Emperor. For example, he gives some

detailed information about Bāz Bahādur, but does not mention his imprisonment which Badaūnī does.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1927 and 1935 ;

B. Dey's translation, Bibliotheca, 1937 and 1939

C. Provincial historians :

Abū Turāb 'Alī - Tārīkh-i-Guzrat.

Abū Turāb was in the service of Itimād Khān, one of the chiefs of Guzrat and, after the conquest of Guzrat by Akbar, he joined imperial service. His work deals with the history of Guzrat and gives some first-hand information about the Afghāns of that country in his time. Abū Turāb died in 1594.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1907.

'Alī Muḥammad Khān - Mir'āt-i-Ahmadi.

A history of Guzrat up to the defeat of the Marathas by Ahmad Shāh 'Abdalī in 1761. The author was a dīwān of Guzrat in the reign of Muḥammad Shāh.

Text - Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1835 ;

James Bird's translation, London, 1855.

Ghulām Husain Salīm - Riyāz us Salāṭīn.

Salīm wrote his history in 1786-7 under the patronage of George ~~Went~~ Udney, the commercial resident of the East India Company at Malda. Though not a contemporary historian, he collected materials from many older works which are not available now. His evidence in many respects corroborates others. He also supplies some data not found elsewhere.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1890.

Mullā Muhammad Qāsim Hindū Shāh Firishta - Gulshān-i-Ibrāhīmī or
Tārīkh-i-Firishta.

Firishta compiled his work in 1612 A. D. at the court of Sultān Ibrāhīm Ādil Shāh of Bijapur.

Mostly he has copied verbatim the Tabaqat-i-Akbarī and Akbarnāma and is sometimes led away by his sentiment for the Mughals. He, however, gives a detailed information about the Afghān activities in Guzrat. But the part of his work dealing with the Afghāns in Eastern India is based on hearsay. The chief utility of his work is that it corroborates in many cases the evidence of the Afghān and Mughal historians.

Edited by Major General John Briggs, Bombay, 1831;
translated by Briggs, London, 1829 and
Alexander Dow, London, 1783.

Rizqullā Mustaqī - Wāqī'at-i-Mustaqī ; compiled in 1581 - 989 H.

Rizqullā was a contemporary of Ābbās Sarwānī. His work gives a comprehensive history of Afghāna rule in Northern India. His father was in the service of the Afghāns from the time of Sikandar Lūdī and so he had great facility in obtaining information.

Wāqī'at-i-Mustaqī is valuable because it reveals the tribal character of the Afghān saltānate and the ascendancy of the Afghān chiefs. From it also we obtain contemporary information on the administrative measures of Islām Shāh. Like Badāunī, Rizqullā was an orthodox Mullā and strongly denounces Hemu.

British Museum MS., Add. 11,633.

Shāh Nawāz Khān - Ma'āsir ul 'Umara.

Nawāb Samsamud dowlā Shāh Nawāz Khān belonged to the Saiyid family of Khwaf in Khurasan. His great great grandfather Mīr Kamāluddīn came to India in the reign of Akbar. Shāh Nawāz was a minister of Nawāb Salābat Khān of Hyderabad. He began writing his biography of the Mughal nobility in 1769. Before he could complete the work, he died. His son 'Abdul Hayy, however, finished the work of his father. in 1780.

In his Ma'āsir, Shah Nawaz says, " From the beginning of the years of my understanding and discretion, I had a love for investigating biographies and chronicles." Indeed the volume and quality of his work prove that he was a genuine student of history. He consulted a good number of contemporary works, many of which have perished since then.

The portions of Ma'āsir dealing with the Afghāns nobles in the court of the Mughals are very valuable for us.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1888-91 ;

H. Beveridge and B. Dey's translation, Bibliotheca Indica,
1941 and 1953.

Sikandar Manjhū - Mir'at-i-Sikandari.

A guzrati and a companion of Jahāngir, Sikandar compiled the history of his country in 1613 (1020 H.). He also served under Khān A'zam, the Mughal viceroy of Guzrat, and witnessed the Mughal-Afghān struggle in that part of India.

Oriental School MS. 46422 ;

Fazlulla Lutfulla Faridi's translation, Dharampur, 1889.

Tāhir Muḥammad - Rauzat ut Tāhirīn.

This is a general history compiled in 1607.

The portion of this work dealing with the Karranī Afghāns of Bengal is a useful contribution to later Afghān history.

British Museum MS., Or. 168.

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Minḥājuddīn - Tabaqat-i-Nāsirī.

The work was compiled in 1261 A. D.

From this work some information about the Afghāns in the period of the Turkish saltanate is found.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1864.

Utbi - Tārīkh-i-Yamīnī.

This work has been compiled in 1026 (411 H.).

Tārīkh-i-Yamīnī is useful in so far as it speaks of the Afghāns of the time of Sultān Maḥmūd Ghaznavī.

Aligarh translation of Elliot, vol. II, 1953.

Yahya Sarhindī - Tārīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī ; compiled in 1434.

This work shows the position of the Afghāns under the Saiyid sultāns of Delhi.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1931 ;

K. K. Basu's translation, Baroda Oriental Institute, 1932.

Ziyāuddīn Barānī - Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhī ; compiled in 1357 x 5
(758 H.).

Barānī's history helps us in ascertaining the position of the Afghāns under the Turkish saltanate of Delhi.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1862.

Amir Timūr - Malfuzat-i-Timūrī.

~~Timūr - Malfuzat-i-Timūrī~~

This is an autobiography of Timūr.

The extracts of the work has been translated in Elliot, vol. II
III.

~~Arabic work~~ : Arabic work :

Muhammad ibn Abdullā ibn Batūta - Tuhfah-i-nuzzār fil Gharāyeb
ul Amṣār ; written in 1354 A. D.

This work enables us in making a comparative study of the court etiquette of the Turkish sultāns and of the Afghān sultāns and also supplies us some information about Bengal at the time he visited it (1346). Edited by Saiyid 'Umar Husain al Khushk
Text published in Cairo, 1901 (1322 H.).

Sanskrit work :

Baraha Mihir - BH Bhrita Sanhita.

Written in the early half of the sixth century, this work shows the existence of the Afghāns in that period.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1865.

Hindi work :

Malik Muhammad Jaisī - Padmavati.

A great Hindi poet, Jaisī composed his work in the reign of Sher Shāh. The work shows the development of Hindi in the Sūr Afghān period.

Padmavati has been translated into English by A. G. Shirref and published in Bibliotheca Indica, 1944.

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Rajmala - A family chronicle of the kings of Tripura compiled at the time of ~~Amarmann~~ Amarmannikya about 1586.

The work is useful as it shows the Afghān relations with Tripura and Arakan.

Ramram Basu - Pratapaditya Charitra.

This is the first Bengali prose work published at Serampur in 1802.

Essentially a biography of Pratapaditya, the son of Dāud Karrani's minister Srihari Bikramaditya, it gives some ~~ixxx~~ rare information - Srihari's treachery to Dāud. Though a later work and written in a fantastic way, some of its evidence is substantiated by the evidence of the contemporary historians and also by circumstances.

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European works :

Bernier, Francois - Travels in the Mughal Empire.

A highly educated Frenchman, Bernier visited India at the time of Shāh Jahān. During his stay of twelve ~~xx~~ years , 1658-67, in India, he travelled extensively in the Mughal empire and had been a physician of the Emperor for some years. In 1670 after his return to France, he compiled this accounts of his

travels. As an eye-witness to some of the events of the reign of Shāh Jahān, Bernier gives us some useful information. His remarks on the Afghāns are particularly valuable. His description of social conditions is also very useful.

Bernier's work was written in French. It was translated into English by Archibald Constance, London, 1891.

Laet, Joanner - De Imperio Magni Mogolis .

Laet was a Director of the Dutch East India Company. Though he did not visit India, he gathered materials for his work from European travellers, missionaries, envoys, etc. His work gives a good deal of information of the reign of Akbar and Jahāngīr and is a good supplement to the contemporary Persian histories.

The work was translated from Dutch into English by J. S. Hoyland and was published in Bombay in 1928.

Manucci, Nicholas - Storia De Mogor.

A Venetian, Manucci came to India in 1656 and served Prince Dara and then Jai Singh. He also served as a physician to Prince Shāh 'Ālam from 1678 to 1682. Afterwards he went to Surat, married a Catholic widow and settled there. He died in 1707.

A voluminous writer, Manucci recorded much that he heard and saw in the Mughal empire. His work gives a good idea of social conditions of the people of India at that time. Manucci

also throws light on their Afghān-Mughal relations in the empire.

The work has been translated into English by
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Roe came as an ambassador from James I of England to
Emperor Jahāngir in 1615 and stayed in India until 1619. He has
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
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CHITTAGONG UNDER THE PATHAN RULE IN BENGAL

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The present essay aims at a discussion of the history of Chittagong in the period of Pathan rule in Bengal (1539–1576 A.D.). A proper understanding of the period requires a brief survey of the history of Chittagong in the pre-Pathan period.

An emporium of foreign trade and a gateway to Bengal from the south-east, Chittagong had been a bone of contention among the rival kingdoms of Arakan, Tripura and Bengal. A tripartite war seems to have been going on among the three kingdoms over the possession of Chittagong, throughout the medieval period of its history. According to an Arakanese tradition, an Arakanese king occupied Chittagong, in the ninth century and built a pillar in the town. The town is said to have derived its name from a remark made by the Arakanese king, who conquered it.¹ The duration of Arakanese rule over Chittagong is not known. A copper plate inscription, dated 1165 Saka/1243 A.D., found in a village named Nasirabad, indicates the possession of Chittagong by Damodaradeva, a king of East Bengal, in the middle of the thirteenth century.²

The first Muslim ruler to conquer Chittagong was Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah of Sonargaon, about 1338 A.D.³ Shihabuddin Talish says that Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah connected Chittagong with Chandpur on the Meghna by a raised cause-way and built there mosques and tombs. If Dr. N. K. Bhattasali's identification of Ibn Batuta's Sadkawan,⁴ is taken to be correct, it will be an additional evidence of the possession of Chittagong by Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah, about 1345-46 A.D. From 1338 to 1459 A.D., Chittagong remained under the rule of the kings of Bengal. The Chinese accounts⁵ regarding the visits of the Chinese embassies to the court of Gaur, in 1409, 1412-13 and 1415, the Chatigrama

¹ Eastern Bengal District Gazetteers, Chittagong—O'Malley. The Arakanese king remarked 'Tsit-ta-gung', i.e. to make war is improper. According to Buddhist tradition, Chittagong is a corruption of Chaityagram (land of the Chaityas or Buddhist monuments). Another version is that its Hindu name Chattal was changed by the Muslims into Chatigaon (Chati means earthen lamp and gaon means place). Bernouilli, in the 'Description of historique de l' Inde' (1786), derives the name from Arabic Shat (delta) and Ganga, meaning the city at the mouth of the Ganges. O'Malley considers that the name Chatigaon was probably derived from Chaturgrama or four villages.

² Inscription of Bengal, Vol. III, pp. 158–163.

³ Sarkar's 'Studies in Mughal India', p. 122.

⁴ Ibn Batuta mentioned Sadkawan as the name of the Great Port he visited. History of Bengal, Vol. II (p. 100) has identified Sadwakan with Satgaon on the Hughli. Dr. N. K. Bhattasali (Coins and Chronology of the Early Independent Sultans of Bengal, p. 145) makes Sadkawan identical with Chittagong.

⁵ Dr. P. C. Bagchi—'Political Relation between Bengal and China' (Visva-Bharati Annals).

'The Chinese missions disembarked at Chati-kiang (Chittagong) where they were received by the officers of the Bengal king. Thence by small boat they came to Sonargaon and from Sonargaon they reached Pandua by overland route.'

coin of Danujamardandeva, dated 1395/1417 A.D. and the Chatgaon coins of Jalaluddin Muhammad Shah, dated 823 H./1419 A.D.,¹ are evidences of the sway of the Bengal kings over Chittagong in the early years of the fifteenth century. The fact that a dethroned Arakanese king, named Meng-tsaumum, recovered his throne, in 1430 A.D., with the help of the Gaur king (Jalaluddin Muhammad Shah) and recognized his vassalage² goes to show the hold of Gaur court on Chittagong about the time. Meng Khri (1434-59), successor of Meng-tsaumum, continued to be a vassal of the king of Gaur. He adopted Muslim title 'Ali Shah' and inscribed the 'Kalima' and the Arabic legend in his coins. The assumption of Muslim titles and the use of Arabic legend in the coins became a tradition with the successors of Meng Khri Ali Shah.³ But, this does not prove that the subordination of Arakan to Gaur was continued for an indefinite period. Towards the close of his reign, Meng Khri Ali Shah repudiated the vassalage and occupied Ramu.⁴ His successor Basaupya Kalima Shah conquered the town of Chittagong, in 1459 A.D.⁵

Arakan's hold on Chittagong seems to have been very short-lived. The inscription of Rasti Khan⁶ found in the tomb of Alaul, dated 1473-74 A.D., indicates the recovery of the town by the king of Gaur (Ruknuddin Barbak Shah, 1459-1474 A.D.). The sway of Gaur over Chittagong continued till 1512 A.D., when the town fell into the hands of Dhanyamanikya, king of Tripura.⁷ Tripura's authority over Chittagong was brought to a speedy termination by the Arakanese. The Arakanese also lost the town to Alauddin Husain Shah (1493-1519 A.D.) of Bengal, about 1517 A.D. 'The evidence gathered from the writings of the poets Kavindra Parameswar and Srikanan Nandi as well as the local Muslim traditions of Chittagong proves beyond doubt that the Arakanese were driven out of the Chittagong area by Prince Nusrat (son of Husain Shah). The statement of De Barros that when Joao de Silveira landed at Chittagong, in 1517, the port belonged to the king of Bengal and Arakan was a vassal of the Bengal king, may refer to the result of Nusrat's campaigns.'⁸ Prince Nusrat commemorated the conquest of Chittagong by renaming it Fathabad, i.e. place of victory.⁹ That Chittagong had the name of Fathabad is also known from a poet named Daulat Wazir Bahram, who says:—

নগর ফতেয়াবাদ, দেখিতে পুরয়ে সাধ,

চাউগ্রাম সুনাম প্রকাশ ।

মনোহর মনোরম, অমর নগর সম

শতে শতে অনেক নিবাস ॥

কর্ণফুলী নদীতট

শুভপূরী অতি দিব্যমান ।¹⁰

¹ N. K. Bhattasali—Coins and Chronology of the Early Independent Sultans, of Bengal, pp. 119-126.

² Phayre—History of Burma, p. 76 and Dr. A. B. M. Habibullah—'Arakan', etc., J.A.S.B., 1945.

³ Dr. A. B. M. Habibullah—Arakan.... J.A.S.B., 1945.

⁴ Dr. Habibullah—Arakan.... J.A.S.B., 1945.

Das Gupta (Bengal in the 16th century, p. 142) identifies Ramu with a village called Ramu, which is in the southern part of the Chittagong district; it is now a police station.

⁵ Phayre—History of Burma, p. 171.

⁶ Dr. Habibullah—Arakan.... J.A.S.B., 1945.

⁷ K. P. Sen—Rajmala, Pt. II, p. 22.

⁸ Dr. Habibullah—Arakan.... J.A.S.B., 1945.

⁹ Ahadisul Khawanim (Hamidullah)—Blochmann, J.A.S.B., 1871 and 1872.

¹⁰ A. Karim—Prachin Puthir Bibaran, Pt. I, 1320 B.S.

A study of the Portuguese accounts reveals the fact that the Husain Shahi dynasty had uninterrupted sway over Chittagong from 1517 to 1538 A.D.¹ The year 1538 A.D. saw a revolution at Gaur. The Pathan Chief Sher Khan captured Gaur (6th April, 1538) and the ousted king Ghiyasuddin Mahmud Shah, the last king of the Husain Shahi dynasty, died at Kahlgaon. Humayun came to Gaur and occupied it. After a short stay at Gaur (Jannatabad), he moved towards Agra. Sher Khan intercepted Humayun at Chausa and defeated him. The victorious Pathan Chief came to Gaur and reconquered it from Humayun's governor Jahangir Quli, in October, 1539.² Sher Shah installed himself as an independent ruler at Gaur. With the vast resources of Bengal at his command, he now prepared to make a bid for the throne of Hindustan.

Sher Shah inaugurated the Pathan rule in Bengal and it continued down to the year 1576 A.D. The history of Chittagong during this period is rather obscure. In the History of Bengal, Vol. II, published by the Dacca University, practically no reference has been made about the fate of Chittagong in this period. In some places, there are vague statements, which amount to an expression of doubt, regarding the hold of the mighty Pathan rulers Sher Shah and Islam Shah on Chittagong.³ But, the materials prove beyond doubt that Sher Shah and Islam Shah had jurisdiction over the place.

On the evidence of the Portuguese accounts, it can be said that Sher Shah conquered Chittagong. Even before his final occupation of Gaur (Oct., 1539), he sent his generals to occupy the outlying districts of Bengal. When he was invading Gaur in 1538, he sent one 'Nogazil' to occupy Chittagong.⁴ Sher Shah was conscious of the strategic importance of Chittagong. Besides, he felt the necessity of preventing the Portuguese from coming to the aid of Ghiyasuddin Mahmud Shah, who was a friend of the Portuguese of Chittagong at the time. The expedition of Nogazil had the desired result. The Portuguese could not come to the help of Ghiyasuddin Mahmud Shah at Gaur and Nogazil easily took possession of Chittagong. The quarrel between Khudabaksh Khan and Amirza Khan, the officers of Ghiyasuddin Mahmud Shah at Chittagong, made the task easy for Nogazil. Due to divided opinion, the Portuguese could not take advantage of the troubled condition of Chittagong. Of course, the Portuguese made an attempt to establish their hold over Chittagong. But, it was too late; Sher Shah's authority over Chittagong had already been established on a firm footing. Hence, Castanheda remarks, 'Through the folly and indiscretion of Sampayo (Portuguese captain), the king of Portugal lost Chittagong which could easily have been taken possession of, considering that Sher Shah was busily engaged on the other side of Bengal.'⁵ Dr. Qanungo says that after the victory of Chausa, Sher Shah became the *de facto* ruler of the vast territories bounded on the west by the bend of the Ganges from Kanauj to Chunar, on the south by the hills of Jharkhand (Rohtas to Birbhum) and the Bay of Bengal, on the east by the hills of Assam and Chittagong and on the north by the

¹ Campos—History of the Portuguese in Bengal, pp. 30–40.

² History of Bengal, II, D.U., p. 173.

³ History of Bengal, II, p. 378 says—'A Burmese king of Arakan had wrested the Chatgaon district from the independent Sultans of Bengal in 1459. In Jahangir's reign, the Mughals had recovered the country up to the Feni river....' This statement gives an idea that, after 1459 A.D., the rulers of Bengal had no hold on Chittagong till its conquest by the Mughals.

⁴ Qanungo—Sher Shah, p. 138 and Campos—History of the Portuguese in Bengal, pp. 36–38.

⁵ Campos—History of the Portuguese in Bengal, p. 43.

Himalayas.¹ Dr. Habibullah also has incidentally referred to the occupation of Chittagong by Sher Shah and his hold over it till his death in 1545 A.D.²

A Bengali poem named 'Laila-Majnu', written by Daulat Wazir Bahram, speaks of the Sur rule over Chittagong. The poem, at first, makes mention of the conquest of Chittagong in the reign of Husain Shah and then says that, after some generations, Nizam Shah Sur became the ruler of Chittagong.

অনুক্ৰমে বংশ কত, গঞিলেক এই মত,
গৌড়ের কুদিন হৈল দূর।
চাটিগ্রাম অধিপতি, নানা মত মহাপতি
নৃপতি নেজাম সাহা স্বর।³

According to Dr. Shahidullah, Daulat Wazir Bahram was a contemporary of Sher Shah and Nizam Shah Sur, mentioned by him, was brother of Sher Shah.⁴ It is rather difficult to believe that Sher Shah had appointed his brother merely as a district officer, when he appointed Khizr Khan, a man who was not related to his family or race, as the governor of Bengal. Granted that Nizam Khan Sur was appointed to the government of Chittagong, why should he assume the title of Shah? The title Shah was a privilege enjoyed by the independent rulers and Sher Shah or Islam Shah could not have tolerated the assumption of the 'Shah' title by Nizam Khan Sur. Besides, no mention of Nizam Khan Sur is found in any contemporary Persian history after the capture of Rohtas by Sher Shah, in March, 1538.⁵ This might be interpreted in two ways: Nizam Khan Sur had either died after the capture of Rohtas or had played no significant rôle in the subsequent history of his great brother.

There is also another side of the picture. It might be that Sher Shah was alive to the great importance of Chittagong and to the danger from the Portuguese and the Arakanese. To secure the distant south-eastern frontier against the imperialistic Portuguese and the Arakanese, Sher Shah appointed his loyal brother to the government of Chittagong. It is not unlikely that poet Daulat Wazir Bahram had, either through carelessness or in his enthusiasm for the lord of Chittagong, called Nizam Khan Sur as Nizam Shah Sur. The Portuguese accounts have referred to one Nogazil whom Sher Shah sent to occupy Chittagong. Can this Nogazil and Nizam Khan Sur or Nizam be identical? The Portuguese have generally corrupted Muslim names. They have called Sher Khan Sur as Xercansur, Khudabaksh Khan as Cadavascas and Amirza Khan as Amarzacas.⁶ They might have corrupted Nizam into Nogazil.

Whatever might be the relation of Nizam Shah Sur with Nizam Khan Sur or with Nogazil, the poem of Daulat Wazir Bahram bears testimony to the fact that Chittagong enjoyed Sur rule after the fall of the Husain Shahi dynasty. That the Sur rule over Chittagong continued throughout the reigns of Sher Shah and Islam Shah is evident from the Portuguese records. De Barros, writing in 1552 A.D., says, 'Chatigaon is the most famous and wealthy city of the kingdom of Bengal, by reason of its port, at which meets the traffic of all that eastern region'.⁷ Chittagong had been

¹ Qanungo—Sher Shah, p. 200.

² Dr. Habibullah—Arakan . . . J.A.S.B., 1945.

³ A. Karim—Prachin Puthir Bibaran, Pt. I, 1320 B.S.

⁴ Dr. Shahidullah—Bangla Sahitye Musalman—Mahe Nao, June 1951.

⁵ Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi—Elliot and Dowson, Vol. IV, p. 357.

⁶ Campos—Hist. of the Portuguese in Bengal, p. 43.

⁷ Eastern Bengal District Gazetteers, Chittagong—O'Malley.

an integral part of Bengal in the medieval period, though it sometimes passed into the hands of the Arakanese and the kings of Tripura. The records of the foreigners prove this fact. Ralph Fitch, who visited Chittagong, in 1585, says, 'From Chatigaon in Bengala, I came to Bacola'.¹ Whenever foreigners had referred to the kingdom of Bengal, they had generally meant the kingdom or the territory of Bengal which commenced from the borders of Patna (Bihar) and Orissa. Barbosa, a Portuguese who visited Bengal about 1514 A.D., remarks, 'On the other side of this river (the Ganges) commences the kingdom of Bengala'.² This undoubtedly refers to the territory whose seat of power was at Gaur. That De Barros, by his kingdom of Bengal, has also meant the same territory with its seat of power at Gaur, is clear from his statement on another occasion. He says that when Joao de Silviera landed at Chittagong, in 1517, the port belonged to the 'King of Bengal and Arakan was a vassal of the Bengal king'.³ The Chinese records also, in referring to the kingdom of Bengal, mean the same territory with Gaur or Pandua as Capital.⁴

It is evident, therefore, that Chittagong, in 1552 A.D., was a part of the Gaur kingdom and was under the rule of the Sur Emperor Islam Shah.

An Arakanese tradition claims that Chittagong was conquered by the Arakanese king Meng Beng (1531-53 A.D.). He minted a coin at Chittagong. The coin bears his name and title of 'Sultan'.⁵ Perhaps the coin was issued to commemorate his conquest of Chittagong. But, due to the absence of date in the coin, it is difficult to say when the coin was minted. The Sur Pathans retained their hold on Chittagong up to 1552 A.D. The conquest of Chittagong by Meng Beng might have taken place in 1553 A.D. This is borne out by the following facts. Islam Shah Sur died in 1553 A.D.⁶ and his death was an occasion for succession disputes among the Pathans. The boy Sultan Firoz was killed, on the third day of his accession, by his maternal uncle Mubariz Khan, who ascended the throne under the title Sultan Muhammad Adil. This usurpation bred discontent and also ambitions in the Pathan nobility. Several pretenders arose and they came to contest the sovereignty of Hindustan with Sultan Muhammad Adil. Muhammad Khan Sur, the governor of Bengal, did not sit idle. He assumed the title of Sultan Muhammad Shah Ghazi and declared himself as an independent sovereign of Bengal and prepared to contest the throne with Sultan Muhammad Adil. With his eyes riveted to the north, Muhammad Khan Sur might have neglected the defence of Chittagong. Meng Beng might have seized the opportunity and conquered Chittagong towards the close of 1553 A.D.

Relying on an Arakanese tradition, Phayre maintains that Meng Beng (1531-53 A.D.) conquered Chittagong from the possession of Tripura.⁷ But, this is not borne out by facts. It has been proved that the

¹ Cited in Das Gupta's 'Bengal in the Sixteenth century', p. 144.

² Ibid., p. 113.

³ Campos—History of the Portuguese in Bengal, p. 28; Dr. Habibullah—Arakan ... J.A.S.B., 1945.

⁴ Mahuan's account cited in N. K. Bhattasali's 'Coins and Chronology of the Independent Sultans of Bengal', p. 169; Mahuan says, 'The kingdom of Pang-ko-la (Bengala) is reached by ship... the vessel arrives first at Cheh-ti-gan (Chittagong)'.

⁵ Phayre—History of Burma, p. 72.

⁶ As to the date of the death of Islam Shah, there are different views. Dr. N. K. Bhattasali (Bengal Past and Present, July-Dec., 1929) dates 1552 and Majumdar (Advanced History of India) dates Nov., 1554; N. B. Ray (Successors of Sher Shah) has placed the death of Islam Shah on 30th October, 1553. History of Bengal II, D.U. agrees with N. B. Ray.

⁷ Phayre—History of Burma, p. 72.

Sur rulers had hold on Chittagong up to 1552 A.D. and Meng Beng conquered the town after the death of Islam Shah, i.e. towards the close of the year 1553 A.D. Rajmala¹ and the Arakan coin of Muhammad Shah Ghazi² (Muhammad Khan Sur) speak of the conquest of Chittagong by the king of Gaur, in 1554 A.D. from Bijoymanikya (1540-71 A.D.), the king of Tripura. From this, it is clear that Bijoymanikya captured the town from the Arakanese, in the early part of 1554 A.D.

Bijoymanikya enjoyed a few months' authority over the great port. Rajmala records its capture by the Pathans of Gaur. The mutiny of the Pathan horsemen³ in the army of Bijoymanikya and its ruthless suppression⁴ by him enraged the Pathan ruler of Gaur. He sent an army under Mamarak Khan (Mubarak Khan) to Chittagong.

এই সব বৃত্তান্ত তাতে পাঠান শুনিল ।

ক্রোধে গোড়ের বহু সৈন্ত দিল রণে ॥

* * * *

মমারক খাঁ সৈন্ত সমে চাটিগ্রামে গেল ।

ভঙ্গ দিল ত্রিপুর সৈন্ত মগলে জিনিল ॥⁵

The Pathan general Mubarak Khan captured Chittagong from the forces of Bijoymanikya.⁶ Who was this ruler of Gaur who sent Mubarak Khan? There are reasons to believe that the Gaur ruler referred to in Rajmala was Muhammad Khan Sur. Muhammad Khan raided Arrakan⁷ (Arakan). Raid on Arakan is impossible without the conquest and occupation of Chittagong area.

A coin of Ghiyasuddin Muhammad Shah Ghazi (Muhammad Khan Sur), dated 962 H./1554 A.D., bears Arakan as mint place.⁸ The coin was perhaps issued to commemorate the conquest of Arakan by Muhammad Khan Sur. This coin testifies to the conquest of Chittagong by Muhammad Khan Sur, in 1554 A.D. That Muhammad Khan Sur conquered the place from Bijoymanikya, in 1554, is also proved by the subsequent events.

After the occupation of Chittagong by the Pathan general Mubarak Khan, Bijoymanikya sent fresh forces to Chittagong. The Tripura forces fought for eight months with the Pathans, but they failed to recover the town.

অটমাস যুদ্ধ করে পাঠানের সনে ।

লইতে না পারে গড় চাটিগ্রাম স্থানে ॥⁹

¹ K. P. Sen—Rajmala, Part II, p. 44.

² Lanepoole—Catalogue of Indian Coins, p. 56. The Arakan coin speaks of the conquest of Arakan by Muhammad Shah Ghazi (Muhammad Khan Sur). The conquest of Arakan must have been preceded by the occupation of Chittagong.

³ Rajmala (K. P. Sen), Pt. II, p. 46:—

তথা চাটিগ্রামে সেই পাঠান বর্বর ।

রাজারে মারিতে যুক্তি করেন অপর ॥

⁴ Ibid. The Pathan soldiers were taken prisoners and sacrificed before the Fourteen gods.

⁵ and ⁶ Ibid., pp. 46-47.

⁷ History of Bengal, II, D.U., p. 179.

⁸ S. Lanepoole—Catalogue of Indian Coins, p. 56.

Dr. Habibullah (J.A.S.B., 1945) says that the name of mint-town has been incorrectly read; the correct reading would be Rikab. But, Rikab was not an important town and had never been a mint-town. The reading 'Arakan' seems correct.

⁹ K. P. Sen—Rajmala, II, p. 47.

Bijoymanikya sent his veteran commander Kala Nazir; Kala Nazir fell in a fight with the Pathans. At night-fall, the victorious Pathans returned to the fort of Chittagong. The Tripura forces dug holes beneath the walls of the fort and made a surprise attack on the Musalmans. The Pathans fell fighting and Mubarak Khan was taken prisoner to Rangamati, capital of Tripura. Mubarak Khan was slaughtered as sacrifice before the Fourteen Gods. Chittagong passed into the hands of Bijoymanikya.¹

'Tripur Bansabali Puthi'² and Rajmala record a daring raid of Bijoymanikya in Eastern Bengal after the recovery of Chittagong from the Pathans. Bijoymanikya came up to the Brahmaputra, the Lakhya and the Padma. He bathed in these rivers and minted coins to commemorate the events.³ A Lakhya coin, dated 1481 Saka/1559 A.D., has been discovered. The legend on the obverse of the coin records: *ত্রিভীলক্ষ্যাবধী* *বিজয়মানিক্য দেব* = The doubly illustrious Bijoymanikya who bathed in the Lakhya.⁴

The daring Eastern Bengal raid of Bijoymanikya, in 1559 A.D., was an event subsequent to his recovery of Chittagong. On the evidence of the 'Arakan coin' of Muhammad Khan Sur, it can be said that Muhammad Khan Sur had hold on Chittagong, in 1554 A.D. Hence, the recovery of Chittagong by Bijoymanikya must have taken place sometime in the period from 1554 to 1559 A.D.⁵ This period saw the most disastrous internecine wars among the Pathans and their consequent weakness and loss of sovereignty and territory. Humayan had recovered the throne of Hindustan, in 1555 A.D. The internecine wars had also disastrous results on the kingdom of Bengal. Ambitious Muhammad Khan Sur had been defeated and slain at Chhapar-ghat, in December 1555, by Himu, Muhammad Adil's general. Bahadur Shah (Muhammad Khan Sur's son) had to recover the throne by fighting Adil's governor Shahbaz Khan (1556).⁶ He had to avenge his father's death. He fought Adil at Surajgarh and defeated and killed him (April, 1557).⁷ Bahadur Shah had, then, to consolidate his position on the throne of Bengal. These troubles of the rulers of Gaur helped Bijoymanikya to recover Chittagong and encouraged him to undertake a daring raid in Eastern Bengal.

In 1554 A.D., Chittagong was in the hands of Muhammad Khan Sur. The Tripura forces fought for eight months to capture the town, but failed. Kala Nazir, who was afterwards sent by Bijoymanikya, fell in a fight with the Pathans. Then the Tripura forces planned a night attack by digging holes beneath the walls of the fort and, by this, they succeeded in capturing the town. From the above discussions, it may be concluded that the Tripura forces captured the town, in 1556 A.D. It was a time when Muhammad Khan Sur had died and his son Bahadur Shah had been fighting with Shahbaz Khan to recover the throne of Gaur. Hence, no reinforcement came to the Pathan army which had been fighting against the fresh streams of Tripura forces.

¹ Ibid., and Rev. Long—Analysis of Rajmala, J.A.S.B., 1850.

² Cited in K. P. Sen's Rajmala, II, p. 54.

³ K. P. Sen—Rajmala, II, p. 54; Rev. Long—Analysis of Rajmala, J.A.S.B., 1850.

⁴ N. K. B.—Bengal Chiefs' Struggle, B.P.P., July-Dec., 1929.

⁵ N. K. Bhattasali (Bengal Chiefs' struggle—B.P.P., July-Dec., 1929) maintains that Bijoymanikya's conquest of Chittagong and his daring Eastern Bengal raid had taken place in the period from 1543 to 1559 A.D. when the authority of the Pathan rulers over Bengal was weak. But, as a matter of fact, the Pathan authority over Bengal was not weak in the reigns of Sher Shah and Islam Shah (1539–1553 A.D.). The authority became weak after the death of Islam Shah.

⁶ History of Bengal, II, D.U., p. 179.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 179–80.

The Sur rulers of Gaur had lost Chittagong in 1556 A.D. and, for some years, the place enjoyed the rule of Bijoymanikya. Bijoymanikya was a powerful ruler. Abul Fazl says, 'He has a force of two hundred thousand footmen and a thousand elephants'.¹ It seems that Bijoymanikya maintained his hold on Chittagong till his death, in 1571 A.D.² His successor Anantamanikya (1571-72)³ was assassinated by the commander of his army Udaymanikya (1572-74),⁴ who usurped the throne. Udaymanikya shifted the capital from Rangamati to Udaypur. The death of the powerful king Bijoymanikya and the usurpation of the throne by a person, who did not belong to the royal family, encouraged the king of Gaur to send an army to conquer Chittagong. Who was this king of Gaur

গৌড়েশ্বর শুনে বিজয়মাণিক্য মরণ ।

চৌদ্দ শ চৌরানব্বই শকে উদয় রাজন ॥

রাজবংশ নাহি কেহ অগ্র হৈল রাজা ।

চাউগ্রামে পাঠাইল সৈন্ত মহাতেজা ॥ ⁵

who sent the expedition to Chittagong? Bijoymanikya died of smallpox.⁶ Generally smallpox breaks out in March and April. It might be that Bijoymanikya died in April, 1571. His son Anantamanikya reigned for a year and a half.⁷ Hence, Udaymanikya might have come to the throne about October, 1572 and this was the time when Sulaiman Karrani had also died.⁸ Sulaiman Karrani's successor Bayazid Karrani had a very short and disturbed reign and, as such, he could not have sent any expedition to a distant place like Chittagong. Daud Karrani (1573-76),⁹ who was very ambitious, might have sent the Chittagong expedition and perhaps it was sent in the early part of 1573 A.D.¹⁰

As the Pathan troops were marching to Chittagong, a Tripura army of 52,000 soldiers and 3,000 generals advanced to intercept them. Ignoring the unfavourable omens of the flapping of the vulture's wings, falling of fire from the sky and the barking of foxes, the Tripura army attacked the Pathans at Khandal.¹¹ The Tripura troops were routed with a loss of 40,000 soldiers; the Pathans lost only 4,000 men.¹² The victorious Pathans entered Chittagong. The king of Gaur (Daud Karrani) became very glad at the news of the victory and sent a fresh army under Piroj (Firoz) Khan Anni and Jamal Khan Panni. They were helped by the 'Twelve Chiefs of Bengal'.

রণে ভঙ্গ ত্রিপুর সেনা রাজ্যে ত তৎপর ।

চট্টলের গড়ে গেল পাঠান সত্তর ॥

গৌড়েশ্বর শুনিলেক এসব বৃত্তান্ত ।

হরষিতে বহু সৈন্ত পাঠায় সামন্ত ॥

¹ Jarret—Ain, Vol. II, p. 130 (1949 Ed.)

² N. K. B.—Bengal Chiefs' struggle (B.P.P., July-Dec., 1929) quoted from the preface of Blochmann in Ain, Vol. I.

³ and ⁴ Ibid.

⁵ K. P. Sen—Rajmala, II, p. 69.

⁶ and ⁷ Rev. Long—Analysis of Rajmala, J.A.S.B., 1850.

⁸ History of Bengal, II, D.U., p. 185.

⁹ Jarret—Ain, II, p. 27.

¹⁰ Rajmala says that the king of Gaur sent an army to conquer Chittagong on hearing the news of Udaymanikya's usurpation of the throne of Tripura.

¹¹ Kandal is a place on the road to Chittagong; formerly it was in the district of Tippera and now it forms part of the district of Noakhali (K. P. Sen's identification—Rajmala, II).

¹² Analysis of Rajmala (Rev. Long, J.A.S.B., 1850) and K. P. Sen—Rajmala, II, p. 71.

পিরোজ খাঁ আমি আর জামাল খাঁ পনি ।
 চট্টলে পাঠাইল গৌড়ে তারা যোদ্ধা জানি ॥
 দ্বাদশ বাদশা দিল তাঁহার সহিত ।
 মেহারকুল গড়ে যুদ্ধ হয়ে বিপরীত ॥ ¹

The Pathans under the command of Firoz Khan Anni and Jamal Khan Panni invaded Tripura and defeated the army of Udaymanikya at Meharkul.² Udaymanikya fought with the Pathans for five years.³ The war proved a great calamity to Tripura; it brought starvation and epidemics in the country.⁴

On the evidence of Rajmala, it may be said that Daud Karrani recovered, in 1573, the town of Chittagong, which had been lost by the Sur Pathans, about 1556 A.D. Rajmala is a fairly contemporary work of the Pathan period in Bengal.⁵ It is a family history of the kings of Tripura. Since, it admits the defeat of a king of that family and the loss of Chittagong, there is no reason to disbelieve it. The conquest of Chittagong by Daud Karrani may be accepted as a fact.

There are indirect evidences which go to prove that the Karrani rulers might have had a hold on Chittagong. In the Rent Roll introduced by Todar Mal, in 1582 A.D., one Mahal of Sarkar Chittagong has been mentioned as Sulaimanpur.⁶ Names generally reflect the ideas of the time and the places are named after the names of important persons. Sarkars and Mahals have been generally named Husainshahi, Husainpur, Nusrat Shahi, Mahmud Shahi, Sher Shahi, Sulaimanabad, Sulaimanshahi, Sulaimanpur, Daud Shahi, etc. after the names of the rulers and princes.

A Mahal or Pargana of Sarkar Chittagong could not have been named Sulaimanpur, unless Sulaiman or anyone of his dynasty had ruled over the place. The name could not have been introduced at the time of the Sur rule, when Sulaiman Karrani was a governor in south Bihar and was not connected with Bengal.

The name could not have been introduced by the kings of Arakan or Tripura. Of course, the Buddhist kings of Arakan adopted Muslim names. But, we do not know of any Arakanese king, flourishing before 1582, who adopted Sulaiman as his title.

Again, the Mahal Sulaimanpur must have existed in Sarkar Chittagong before Todar Mal's entry in the Rent Roll of 1582 A.D., with its estimated revenue of 11,424,310 dams.⁷ The Mughals could not conquer Chittagong before 1666 A.D. Shihabuddin Talish admits that 'when Bengal was annexed to the Mughal Empire, Chatgaon was entered in the papers of Bengal as one of the defaulting and unsettled districts. When the Mutasaddis did not really wish to pay any man whose salary was due, they gave him an assignment on the revenue of Chatgaon'.⁸ Chittagong was not conquered at the time of Akbar; still it is entered as a Sarkar with all its Mahals in the Rent Roll. From this, it may be

¹ See footnote 12, p. 28.

² Meharkul is situated near Comilla.

³ K. P. Sen—Rajmala, II, p. 71, "পঞ্চ বৎসর যুদ্ধ ছিল জামাল পনি সনে।"

⁴ Ibid, p. 72, and Rev. Long—Analysis of Rajmala, J.A.S.B., 1850.

⁵ Rajmala, II, is said to have been written at the time of Amarmanikya (1577-86). K. P. Sen—Rajmala, II, pp. 4-5.

⁶ Ain, Vol. II, p. 152—Jarret, 1949 Edition.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Eastern Bengal Gazetteers, Chittagong—O'Malley; and Sarkar's Studies in Mughal India, p. 122.

concluded that Abul Fazl had copied them from the records of the previous rulers, who had authority over Chittagong. The existence of the name of Sulaimanpur Mahal in the records, from which Abul Fazl copied, suggests that the records belonged to the Karrani Sultans, who preceded the Mughals, in Bengal. It is likely that Daud Karrani, after the conquest of Chittagong, had named a Mahal of his newly-acquired territory after the name of his father.

Chittagong might have come into the possession of Daud Karrani about 1573 A.D. Udaymanikya fought with Jamal Khan Panni, general of Daud, for five years and failed to recover Chittagong. This indicates that Daud Karrani retained his hold on Chittagong till his death, in 1576 A.D. It is difficult to say what became of the great port after the death of Daud Karrani. It might be that independent Pathan chiefs ruled for some time until it fell into the hands of the Arakanese. Ralph Fitch, who visited Chittagong, in 1585, wrote, 'From Satagam, I travelled to the country of Tippera or Porto Grande (Chittagong), with whom the Mogores or Mogen have almost continual warres. The Mogen which be of the kingdom of Recon and Rame, be stronger than the kingdom of Tippera, so that Chatigaon or Porto Grande is often times under the king of Recon'.¹ Rajmala also records the conquest of Chittagong by Amarmanikya from the Arakanese.² Arakanese accounts claim that the Arakanese king Meng Phalaung Sikardar conquered it from Tripura, in 1586.³ From 1586 A.D., Chittagong remained under the Arakanese till its conquest by the Mughal general Shayesta Khan, in 1666.⁴

¹ Cited in Dasgupta's 'Bengal in the 16th century', p. 141.

² N.K.B.—B.P.P., July-Dec., 1929.

³ Ibid.

⁴ History of Bengal, II, p. 377 (D.U. Publication).