RAHIM (M.A.)
Ph.D.
1954
(Mediaeval Indian History)
University of London (Faculty of Arts)

School of Oriental and African Studies

"History of the Afghans in India, 1545 - 1631 A.D., with especial reference to their relations with the Mughals."

Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph. D.

by Muhammad Abdur Rahim

June, 1954.
"History of the Afghans in India, 1545 - 1631 A.D.,
with especial reference to their relations
with the Mughals."
TITLE: "History of the Afghans in India, 1545-1631 A. D., with especial reference to their relations with the Mughals.

In this thesis, an attempt has been made to study the history of the Afghans in India from 1545 to 1631; especial stress has been laid on their relations with the Mughals as, either as rulers or as vanquished, they had far-reaching contact with the latter.

Chapter I discusses the origin of the Afghans, their settlement in India and their rise to the saltanate.

Chapter II examines the nature of the Afghan monarchy, revealing its tribal character, the ascendancy of the chiefs and the conflict of two opposite political forces, the tribal independence and strong monarchy, in the saltanate.

Chapter III discusses Islam Shāh's kingship and administration comparing them with Sher Shāh's and emphasising Islam Shāh's success.

Chapter IV studies the reaction and the re-appearances of the conflict culminating in Afghan loss of Northern India.

Chapters V-VI deal with the Afghan saltanate in Eastern India and its relations with the Mughals.
Chapters VII-IX study the Afghān attitude towards their conquerors and the Afghān policy of the Mughal emperors, revealing Bābur and Humāyūn's conciliation, Akbar's distrust and Jāhāngīr's clemency and favours to the Afghāns and also the rise of Afghān influence at the Mughal court. Chapter IX shows the decline of the Afghān position at Shāh Jahan's court on account of Khān Jahan Lūdī's rebellion and the Afghān abortive attempt to recover their sovereignty.

Chapter X concludes the Afghān history in India by assessing the significance of Afghān rule and the place of the Afghān people in the general history of this country.

The Bibliography contains an appreciation of the materials used in the thesis.
The Afghans occupy a peculiarly significant position in the history of Muslim rule in India. A distinct people from either their predecessors, the Turks, or their successors, the Mughals, they introduced a new element in the political institutions of this country. The Sür Afghân rulers in particular made a substantial contribution to the development of the political and social institutions of India. Moreover, unlike other conquered peoples, the Afghans maintained their identity throughout the period of Mughal rule in India and hence they had a history as a political community even after they had lost their saltanate to the Mughals.

Indeed the history of Muslim rule in India remains incomplete without a fuller treatment of the history of the Afghans in this country. Practically no work has been done on them particularly after Sher Shâh. Even Dr. K. R. Qanungo's monograph on Sher Shâh requires revision in the light of modern researches. Cambridge History of India, vol. IV, which has devoted a few pages for the successors of Sher Shâh, is entirely a military chronicle and hence inadequate. Written with pre-conceived ideas and based on meagre materials, chiefly on Elliot and Dowson's translations in the History of India as told by its Historians, vol. IV and V, it is full of
inaccuracies and ill-founded assumptions and hence is without the merit of a history.

The present thesis has aimed at filling this blank in the history of Muslim rule in India by giving a complete picture of the Afghans in this country to 1631 and also assigning them the place they deserve in the history of India. An honest attempt has been made to exploit and utilise all kinds of materials, Persian, Bengali, Hindi, Sanskrit, Arabic and the accounts of foreigners, towards the fulfilment of that aim within a comparatively limited sphere. The scope and nature of the work have been discussed in the abstract.

It is my pleasant duty to express my very sincere and deep gratitude to my supervisor Professor C. H. Philips for the encouragement and guidance I received in the preparation of this thesis. I am very grateful to Dr. P. Hardy for his ungrudging and constant help without which, I am afraid, the thesis would have hardly seen the light. I thank Mr. J. B. Harrison for his day to day help in the initial work of this thesis. I also thank Dr. A. L. Basham for his reading with me some Sanskrit books. My thanks are also due to Dr. R. P. Tripathi, Vice-chancellor, Sagar University, for giving me his valuable time, during his stay in London last summer, in discussing some of the problems of the thesis. Indeed he illuminated the subject and immensely benefited me.
ABBREVIATIONS

Abbās

Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī of ʿAbbās Khān Sarwānī.

Āmal

ʿĀmal ʿṢāliḥ of Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Kambū.

A. N.

Aḵbarnāma of Abūl Ḥasan.

Aʿīn

Aʿīn-i-Ākbarī of Abūl Ḥasan.

B.

Badāuni's Muntakhab-i-Tawārīkh.

Bk.

British Museum manuscript.

Biyāt

Bāyazīd Biyāt's Tārīkh-i-Humāyūn.

B. N.

Bābūrnāma translated by A. S. Beveridge.

BPP.

Bengal Past and Present (Journal).

Baharistān

Baharistān-i-Chayebī of Mirzā Nathan.

Barānī

Tārīkh-i-Shāhī of Ẓiyāuddīn Barānī.

Blochmann

Blochmann's translation of Aʿīn-i-Ākbarī.

D.

Tārīkh-i-Dāndī or Abdullāh Dorn's translation of Makhzan-i-Afghānā.

Dorn

Elliot and Dowson.

F.

Fīrishta's Tārīkh.

Idem

The same as previously mentioned.

Iqbāl-nāma

Iqbālnāma-i-Jahāngīrī of Muṭamid Khān.

IO.

India Office manuscript.

Jauhar

Tazkīrat ul Waqīʿat of Jauhar Aftabchī.

JASB.

Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

Khāfī K.

Muntakhab ul Lubāb of Muḥammad Ḥāshim Khāfī.

JOBRS.

Makhzan-i-Afghāna of Ni‘matullāh.
Ma‘āsir ul ‘Umara.
Mir‘at-i-Ahmadi of Ali Muhammad Khān.
Mir‘at-i-Sikandari of Sikandar Manjhu.
The same as previously quoted or mentioned.
Ma‘āsir-i-Rahimi of ‘Abdul Bāqī Nihāvandi.
Rauzat ut Tahirin of Tahir Muḥammad.
Rogers’ translation of Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī.
Riyāz us Salātīn of Ghulām Husain Salīm.
Tārikh-i-Shāhī or Salātīn-i-Afghāna of Ahmad Yadgar.
Oriental School manuscript.
Tabaqat-i-Akbari of Nizāmuddin Ahmad Bakhshī.
Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī.
Wāqi‘at-i-Mustaqi of Rizqullāh Mustaqi.
Transliteration

In transliteration, the system of F. Steingass (Persian-English Dictionary, London, 1930) has been followed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persian</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ی</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>١</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>٢</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>٣</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>٤</td>
<td>s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>٥</td>
<td>j</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>٦</td>
<td>ch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>٧</td>
<td>h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>٨</td>
<td>kh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>٩</td>
<td>d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>١٠</td>
<td>z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>١١</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>١٢</td>
<td>z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>١٣</td>
<td>zh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>١٤</td>
<td>s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>١٥</td>
<td>sh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>١٦</td>
<td>s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>١٧</td>
<td>z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Vowel signs (short vowels) - a, i, u,

long vowels - ā, ī, ū, e and o.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I</td>
<td>The Origin of the Afghāns and their rise to the Saltanate of Delhi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II</td>
<td>The Nature of the Afghān Monarchy and the position of the Afghān chiefs</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III</td>
<td>Islām Shāh and his strong Monarchy</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV</td>
<td>Muḥammad ʿAdil Shāh and the Afghān loss of Northern India</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V</td>
<td>The Afghān Saltanate in Eastern India and its relations with the Mughals</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VI</td>
<td>Dāud Karranī: his relations with Akbar and the fall of the Afghan Saltanate in Eastern India</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII</td>
<td>The position of the Afghāns under the Mughals down to the end of the reign of Akbar</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VIII</td>
<td>Jahāngīr's policy to the Afghāns and their position in his court</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IX</td>
<td>The fall of Khān Jahān and the decline of Afghān influence</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter X</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>Evaluation of the sources</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Enclosures**

- Maps of Northern India and Eastern India in the Sixteenth Century
- My article: Chittagong under the Pathan Rule in Bengal.
CHAPTER I
The origin of the Afghans and their rise to the Saltanate of Delhi

In writing of the Afghans in India, one is naturally interested in the questions, who were they, when did they come and settle in India and how did they rise to the saltanate of Delhi. Indeed the establishment of the Afghan saltanate in Northern India in 1451 A.D. cannot be treated as a sudden and unconnected event in history. Hence, an investigation into the earlier history of the Afghans forms an essential introduction to the present thesis.

The Afghans claim to be descended from Jewish stock regarding Afghana, a grandson of king Saul and commander-in-chief of the famous king Solomon, as their traditional ancestor. If this pretension is accepted, then the Afghans must be considered a people of the great Semitic race.

The theory of the Jewish origin of the Afghans propounded by the Afghan chronicler Nimatullah in the seventeenth century has been propagated by all the subsequent Afghan historians and chroniclers. According to this theory, the descendants of Afghana, living in Palestine, were taken captive first by the Assyrian king Sargon II (722 B.C.) and

1. M., 3b-9b.
2. Khulāṣat ul Ansāb, 15a and 29a-b; Akhbār-i-Maḥabbat, 3a and 6a.
then by the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar (586 B.C.). After the fall of the Babylonian empire, the captive Jews came to Kuhistan, the mountainous region in Afghanistan, and settled there. ¹

This theory has appealed to some modern scholars. Belles Sir William Jones and others have lent their support to it on the following grounds. First, they find a striking resemblance to the Jews in the Afghāns tall and well built body, fair complexion, blue eyes, brown head and especially the long nose slightly curved. Secondly, the common names, ʿIbrāhīm, Mūsa, ʿIsa, Dāud, Yusuf, Sulaimān, etc., the common title of Malik, and particularly the existence of the Sulaiman mountain in their territory, have been adduced as proof of this origin by the upholders of the theory. Moreover, there are the similar customs and usages found among the Jews and Afghāns, for example, the sprinkling of the blood of an animal over the doorposts of a house where a sick person resides, placing of the sins of the people upon a heifer in the same manner as the Biblical scapegoat, the offering up of sacrifices and the stoning to death of blasphemers. Lastly, their tribal spirit and clannish temperament are considered to strengthen the theory of the Jewish origin of the Afghāns. ²

The theory of the Semitic origin of the Afghāns does

¹ M., 22a-b.
² Davies - The problem of the North West frontier, 42-3; Raverty - Notes on Afghanistan, JASB., 1875.
not, however, stand the test of serious analysis. The resemblance in features cannot be considered as providing a scientific criterion for grouping different peoples into one race. The Sumerians resemble the Aryans in features, though they are not considered to have any affiliations with the Aryan people. The portrait of the Kusana kings found in their coins has the same type of features. But they are certainly neither Afghans nor Semites.¹

Dr. C. C. Davies has rightly pointed out that the use of Biblical names and customs is common to all Muslims and the Prophet himself adopted them from the Jews around him.² The title of Malik was in general use among the Turkish nobles of India. The tribal spirit and clannish temperament are, in fact, the general characteristics of every mountainous or Beduin people of the world.

Other evidence also suggests the implausibility of the theory. It seems unlikely that, after their captivity, the Jews should come to mountainous Afghanistan instead of returning to their native land Palestine. What fascination did barren Afghanistan exercise to induce them to leave behind the fertile lands of Iraq and Iran? Again, why should the Persian empire allow these people to enter and cross its territories?

Judged by language, which is a most useful criterion for

---

1. Davies, 42; Encyclopaedia of Islam, I, 149.
2. Ibid, 43.
deciding the race of a people, the Afghāns cannot be said to have any affiliation with the Semites. According to Grierson, the eminent linguist, Pashtu, the language of the Afghāns, is a subgroup of the Eastern group of Iranian languages. In his analysis of the Pashtu language, another oriental linguist, Dr. Muhammad Shahīdullā, has shown that there is not a single word of the Semitic languages in Pashtu. Professors Raverty and Dowson also have found no trace of Hebrew in the language of the Afghan and it seems incredible that the whole race has, in course of time, completely changed their language without trace. Pashtu is an admixture of Sanskrit and Persian and this suggests the Indo-Iranian origin of the Afghāns.

According to Pirishta, the Afghāns were descended from certain nobles of the court of Pharaohs of Egypt and, refusing to accept the faith of Moses, they left Egypt and came to Kuhistan. This contradicts the original theory and weakens its force.

If the accounts of the origin of the Afghāns show a strange diversity, so do accounts of the name Pathan, which is also applied to the Afghāns. Ni‘matullā has advanced a fantastic

4. F., I, 29.
story that a descendant of 'Afghānā, 'Abdur Rashīd Kais, obtained the conferment of the title 'Pathan', meaning the wood used as a keel of the ship, from the Prophet in recognition of his gallantry. Being the descendants of 'Abdur Rashīd Kais Pathan, the Afghāns are called Pathans. \(^1\) Firishta, on the other hand, says that the people called the Afghāns, living in Patna, as Patans. \(^2\) Percy Sykes, however, maintains that the Pathan is a speaker of Pashtu. \(^3\) It is a reasonable explanation that the name Pathan is a linguistic term and has been derived from Pashtun or Pakhtun, the plural forms of Pashtu. Pashtun or Pakhtun is used to denote all Pashtu-speaking Afghān people. \(^4\) Hence, linguistically an Afghan is a Pathan.

The name Afghān first occurs as 'Avarāna' in Bhrita Sanhita in the middle of the sixth century. \(^5\) The name Pathan, on the other hand, came to be used in the sixteenth century by Firishta and other historians. \(^6\)

The home country of the Afghāns was known to the Indian historians as Rūh (a Pashtu word meaning mountain), which extended in length from Swat and Bijaur in North West Province to the district of Bukkur in Sind and in breadth from

\(^1\) M., 39a.
\(^2\) F., I, 29.
\(^3\) Sykes - History of Afghanistan, I, 13.
\(^4\) Encyclopaedia of Islam, I, 149.
\(^5\) Kern, H., Varaha Mihir's Bhrita Sanhita, verse, 11,61 and 16,38.
\(^6\) Briggs - Firishta, I, 552; F., I, 29; Encyclopaedia of Islam, I, 149.
Hasan Abdal in North West Frontier Province to Kabul, Qandahar and Sulaiman mountains lay within the confines of Kuh. ¹

The mountainous nature of the country, with its small widely separated areas of cultivable land, fostered in the Afghāns a tribal and individualistic spirit. This spirit characterises them even in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. So, Dr. C. C. Davies writes, "The Pathan is intensely democratic and refuses to obey even his tribal chiefs or maliks, unless they are great warriors or blood-thirsty, fearless desperadoes." ²

The poverty of the soil made the Afghāns ready to leave their homes. Thus we read in the history of Firishśta and others that, in about 766 A. D., they occupied Peshawar and other places belonging to Raja Jayapala, the ruler of the Panjab and Kashmir. After a fruitless struggle of some months, Jayapala, who had also to face the rising Ghaznavid power, made peace with the Afghāns by allowing them to settle in some places of Lamaghan. The Afghāns then erected a fort in the mountains off Peshawar which they called Khaibar. ³

Later Subuktagin realised the importance of the fighting material in the Afghāns and, enrolling them in his army, he favoured them in every possible way. They continued to be

¹ ‘Abbās, 10., 5a; T., II, 140; F., I, 30; M., 40b.
² Davies, 47.
³ F., I, 29; Grierson, X, 7.
appointed as mercenaries in the army of Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi. Muhammad Ghuri and Qutbuddin engaged them as hirelings in the conquest of India. It is known from the contemporary historian Minhaj us Siraj that Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud's noble Ulugh Khan employed in 1260 A.D. 3000 Afghans in subduing the hill tribes of Mewat.

The Afghans came into prominence in the reign of Sultan Balban, who employed them as garrisons with assignments of lands for their maintenance to secure Delhi against the turbuler Mewatis. These Afghan colonies, in the south-west vicinity of Delhi, came to be known as Afghanpur. Balban also settled the Afghans in Bhojpur, Kampil and Patiali, three principal centres of disaffection, disturbance and robbery. The fact that Alauddin Khilji had an Afghan amir whom Barani calls Ikhtiyaruddin Mal Afghan shows that the Khilji sultans continued to employ the Afghans.

The employment of the Afghans in large numbers in the army of the Turkish sultanate of Delhi and the elevation of some of them to the amirate of the court must have brought

1. Utbi - Tarikh-i-Yamini, Aligarh Elliot, II, 24 and 32; Grierson, X, 7.
2. M., 39b.
3. Tabaqat-i-Nasiri, 381.
5. Ibid, 452.
6. Ibid, 57-8. The places are in modern Farrukhabad district, in U. P.
fresh streams of Afghāns into India. By the time of Muḥammad Tughluq, they became a fairly powerful community in the empire and this is reflected in their rebellions against the sultān in Multan, Guzrat and Daulatabad.

Malik Shāhū Afghan killed the governor of Multan and seized the power of the province. Muḥammad Tughluq's approach, however, made him flee with his followers to Afghanistan.¹ The rebellion of Shāhū brought severe restrictions on the Afghāns, who thereupon rose in Daulatabad against the authority of the sultān and made Ismail Makh Afghān their king.² Although at the approach of the sultān they fled, yet they came back after his return to the north. This ultimately resulted in the establishment of the Bahmani kingdom. The Afghāns rebelled in Guzrat also.³ This indicates the political importance of the Afghāns in the period of the Tughluq sultanate in India.

Firūz Tughluq seems to have greatly favoured the Afghāns.⁴ He gave the fief of Bihar to Malik Bir Afghān and also appointed Malik Khitāb Afghān to the government of Sambal and Katehar (in Ruhilkhand).⁵

Amīr Timur's invasion of India in 1398 brought a fresh stream of the Afghāns into this country and he gave them for settlement.

---

¹ Barānī, 482; Yahya - Mubarak Shāhī, 106-7.
² Ibid, 258; 111-2.
⁴ N., 41a.
⁵ Yahya - Mubarak Shāhī, 133 and 135.
Duāb in the Panjab, Timur's autobiography refers to some Afghān chiefs in his train and the appointment of Mustafa Kābulī to the government of Dipalpur. 1

Thus, by the end of the fourteenth century, the Afghāns had developed into a politically important community settled in the nerve centre of Northern India. The people, who had hitherto served as hirelings, now found political supremacy within their grasp. In the later Tughluq period, the Afghāns under their leader Daulat Khān Lūdi, a faujdār of the Duāb, 2 became the real masters of the saltanate. In 1416, Daulat Khān Lūdi held Delhi against Khizr Khān and became a king in fact though not in name, for a few months (1416-17). After a heroic resistance, he had finally to surrender himself to Khizr Khān, the first Saiyid sultan of Delhi. He died in confinement in Hisar Fīruza. 3 Daulat Khān is to be regarded as a precursor of the Afghān monarchy in India.

The Afghān influence rose even higher in the Saiyid saltanate of Delhi. Sultan Shāh Lūdi, entitled Islām Khān, was appointed as governor of Sarhind by Mubārak Shāh. 4 He was succeeded in that office by his nephew and son-in-law Bahlūl Lūdi, who soon rose to be the most influential figure at the

1. Malfuzat-i-Timuri, E., 111, 420; M., 41b; Grierson, X, 8.
2. Yahya—Mubārak Shāhī, 175; T., I, 260; Briggs—F.I, 505.
3. Ibid., 181; 264-5; F., I, 292-3.
4. Ibid., 195; F., I, 317.
Saiyid court and received the title of Khān Khānān from the sultan. The incompetence of ʿAlauddīn ʿAlām Shāh, the factious spirit of the amīrs and the consequent confusion in the country offered Bahlūl an opportunity to organise the Afghāns under his leadership and to make a bid for the throne of Delhi. United under a good organiser, the Afghāns succeeded in 1451 in obtaining the sovereignty of Northern India. They made Bahlūl their king and realised the dream of establishing their rule in this country.
CHAPTER II
The Nature of the Afghan Monarchy and
the position of the Afghan chiefs

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Afghāns of
India remained essentially a tribal people in their nature,
behaviour, social institutions, associations and political ideas. So, the monarchy they established in this country represented
their tribal peculiarities. Their quarrel-some nature, rough
and unruly behaviour, their great attachment to their own tribes
and tribal chiefs and their love of tribal independence
determined the character of the monarchy.

The Afghan chiefs, secure in the allegiance of their
respective tribes, enjoyed great power and position either as
jagirdārs or as courtiers of the Afghan kings. They looked upon
the king as a comrade and only as a first among equals. Some
of the Afghan kings, Ibrāhīm Lūdī, ʿĪsām Shāh and ʿĀdīl Shāh,
however, tried to curb their power and increase the power and
position of the king for the sake of establishing an efficient
centralised administration in the salṭanate. This brought in
severe conflicts between two opposing forces - the idea of
tribal independence held by the chiefs and the idea of strong
monarchy and centralised government adopted by the kings.
A tribal people in nature:

According to their own historian Ni‘matullā, the Afghāns formed 345 tribes. A few of them, the Lūdīs, Lūhānīs, Sūrs, Farmūlīs, Sarwānīs, Niya‘āzīs, Kākars, Karrānīs and others rose to political importance in India.

Although the Afghāns acquired supreme power in Northern India, yet, like all other tribal peoples, they were very quarrelsome. The Afghān historian Abbās says that quarrelling, disputing and fighting were the chief characteristic of the Afghāns in the sixteenth century. His evidence is corroborated by Sher Shāh's remark that it was customary with one Afghān tribe to destroy the other if the former had four men more than the latter. Sher Shāh often lamented over the factious nature of his people and repeatedly emphasised that they lost the saltanate to the Mughals only because of their internal discords. We accept the evidence of Sher Shāh not because he was an Afghān but because an examination of the causes of the fall of the Afghān saltanate in 1526 shows that their quarrelsome nature prepared conditions for their great misfortune. The Afghāns were so quarrelsome and unruly that

I. M., 205b.
2. Abbās, 10., 121a; BM., 79b.
3. Ibid, 33b-34a; 23b; M., 96b.
4. Ibid, 29b; 20b-21a.
they even fought bloody disputes in the court of Sultan Muhammad Adil. I That they retained this nature even in the eighteenth century is seen from an answer given to Elphinstone by an Afghan: "We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood, but we can never be content with a master."

The quarrel-some nature of the Afghans was largely due to their revengeful spirit. An Afghan must take his revenge on wrong-doers. This would cause blood feuds between one tribe and another for generations. Even in the reign of Sher Shāh, such a blood feud was on the point of breaking out between the Sūrs and the Niyāzīs over the death of Mubārak Khan Sūr. The prudence of Sher Shāh and the timely action of Aʿẓam Humāyūn Niyāzī, however, saved the situation. 3

Some small incidents show how the Afghans nourished their spirit of revenge. In the reign of Islām Shāh, Shujaʿat Khān, the governor of Malwa, cut off the hands of an Afghan named 'Usmān for his misdemeanours. On his complaint, Islām Shāh said to him, "You are an Afghan; go and revenge yourself on him." 4 In fact 'Usmān had his revenge on Shujaʿat Khān by wounding him in an attempt on his life. In 1545 after seizing Jalāl Khān Jallū and

1. T., II, 120-1; B., I, 419-20; M., I63a-b; F., I, 439.
2. Dorn, Preface, vi.
3. 'Abbās, IO., II6b-II9a; BM., 77a-8b.
4. D., EM., I08b; T., II, II3; Rahīmī, I, I93.
his brother Khudādād, Islām Shāh made them over to an Afghān, who had a blood feud with them, and they eventually killed them. The revengeful spirit characterized the Afghāns even in the nineteenth century. Briggs tells us that Afghān revenge became proverbial in India and it was said that a man was never safe from the revenge of an elephant, a snake or an Afghān. 2 The *Writings of Dr. C.C. Davies reveals the prevalence of blood feud among them even in the twentieth century. He says, "The tribes are perpetually at feud, tribe with tribe, clan with clan, and family with family. There is hardly a Pathan whose hand is not stained with the blood of his hereditary enemy. The fury of the Pathan vendetta finds its European counterpart in the modern Albanian blood feud." 3 A tribal people in behaviour and culture:

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Afghāns, in their manners and behaviour as well as culture, did not very much surpass the tribal stage of life. Bābur wanted to conciliate them on political grounds. 4 He, however, greatly disliked their uncouth behaviour and referred to them as a rustic people. 5 The Mughals felt themselves uncomfortable at Afghān court. Mīrzā

1. Briggs - Firishta, B., I, 378 ; T., II, III.
2. Briggs - Firishta, I, 547.
3. Davies - The North West Frontier, 49.
5. Wāqi'at-i-Bābūrī, MS., 466 ; B. N., II, 341.
Afsaruddin, a rebellious noble, fled from the court of Akbar and took shelter with the Afghān chief Mūsā Khān Fūlādī at Patan in Guzrat. He, however, left the Fūlādī court on account of the rough behaviour of the Afghāns and joined Chingiz Khān, another chief of Guzrat. 1

It might be argued that Bābur and Sikandar, who wrote at the time of the Mughals, could not be fair to the Afghāns, the enemies of the Mughals. But evidence gathered from other sources also conveys the same idea regarding their behaviour. When we remember that, in spite of his long association with the refined court of Khān Khānān ʿAbdūr Raḥīm, Daulat Khān Lūdī, an Afghān noble in Mughal service, behaved very discourteously to ʿAbūl Fāżl and Prince Dāniyāl, 2 we are led to the belief that the Afghāns remained unpolished in their manners and were inferior to the Mughals in refinement. Comparison of the behaviour of the Afghāns and of the Mughals confirms our belief.

Two similar incidents illustrate the above contention. Being dispossessed of Kabul by his brother Humāyūn, Kāmrān came to take shelter in the court of Islām Shāh. As he did not perform the customary salutation to their king, the Afghān chamberlain violently seized his neck and forced him bow down. 3 This is really a contrast to the descent behaviour of Bābur to the

I. Mirʿāt S., 338a; Fazlulla - Mirʿāt S., 293.
Afghan chief Biban, who, in violation of the court etiquette, sa' in his presence, Bābur, however, did not impose his court ceremonial on the rustic Afghan chief. I

On account of their quarrel—some spirit and uncouth behaviour, the Afghāns, in spite of their long association with the Indians, remained a strange people to them. The incident that occurred in the Jam-i-Mosque of Delhi a few days after Bahlūl Lūdi's accession illustrates it. While reading the khutba Mulla Fāzil observed that they had an extraordinary tribe of rulers and he did not know if they were followers of the arch-fiend or arch-fiends themselves. 2 The Afghan historian Abdullā has narrated this incident to show the goodness of Bahlūl that he did not punish the preacher. We, however, see in the remark of Fāzil an indication of the Indian Muslims' attitude towards their new masters. In their eyes, the Afghāns were a strange people and inferior to them in culture.

Being a strange people to the Indians, the Afghāns could not enlist their sympathy and support. So, we see that some persons of Delhi and Agra informed Humāyūn of the death of Islām Shāh and of the discord of the Afghāns and invited him to India. 3

I. Waqīyat-i-Bāburi, MS., 466; B. N., II, 466.
2. D., BM., 9a; School, Io-II.
A tribal people in social institutions:

The social institutions of the Afghāns particularly marriage shows tribal basis of their society in the fifteenth and sixteenth century India. They usually married within the tribe and disfavoured marriage outside the tribe. Numerous instances may be cited to show the prevalence of tribal marriage among the Afghāns. We shall, however, illustrate the point by a few typical examples.

Bahlūl's father Malik Kālā and Bahlūl himself married their own cousins. As the marriage of the Lūdī Afghāns took place within their tribe, so also other Afghāns used to marry within their own tribes. Islām Shāh Sūr, Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr and Sikandar Khān Sūr married the daughters of Nizām Khān Sūr the younger brother of Sher Shāh. Sulaimān Karrānī's daughter married her cousin Hansū Karrānī. 'Usmān Lūhānī's daughter was married to his nephew Dāud, a son of Sulaimān Lūhānī. Wālī Lūhānī married a daughter of Wālī Mandukhāil Lūhānī.

There are instances which show that the Afghāns disliked marriage outside the tribe. Mubārak Khān Sūr, a nephew

2. B., I, 416
3. Ibid, 421 ; M., I64a.
5. D., School, I62.
7. Ibid.
of Sher Shāh, being enamoured of a beautiful daughter of Allahadād Khān Niyāzi, proposed to marry her. The Niyāzi chief, who considered his tribe to be more aristocratic in blood, refused the proposal of a member of the reigning Sūr family. Disappointed Mubāarak, however, tried to force him; but this resulted in a bloody dispute and the death of Mubāarak. I

The Afghāns detested marriage with non-Afghāns. In 1561 on his way to Makkah, Bairām Khān halted at Patan and arranged the betrothal of his son ʿAbdūr Rahīm with a daughter of Islām Shāh. The news of this betrothal displeased the Afghāns and they killed him. 2 Other factors, such as Afghan hatred towards the Mughals and the desire of Mubāarak Khān Lūḥānī to avenge the death of his father in the battle of Macchiwara, also contributed to the assassination of Bairām Khān. But, considering that the Afghan chief Sher Khān Pūlādī received the fallen Mughal vakīl and a pilgrim as his guest and he afterwards connived at the murder, we are led to believe that the betrothal was the cause of his connivance.

Intermarriage would in exceptional cases take place. The Afghāns, however, denied the children of such marriages the status of a pure born Afghān. Islām Khān Lūdī preferred his nephew Bahlūl to his son Qutb Khān to be his successor as the latter was born of

I. ʿAbbās, IO, II6b-9b; BM., 77a-8b.
a non-Afghan mother and would not have been acceptable to the Afghans.\footnote{1}

According to Elphinstone, tribal marriage prevailed among the Afghans even in the early part of the nineteenth century. \footnote{2}

**Allegiance to tribal chiefs and settlement on tribal lines:**

The Afghans attached themselves to their respective tribal chiefs and settled on tribal lines so as to form different tribal zones in India. Islām Khān Lūdī, the governor of Sarhind under the Saiyid sultāns of Delhi, had in his service 12,000 Afghans of his own tribe. \footnote{3} Sher Shāh's grandfather Ibrāhīm Khār Sur joined the service of Mahābat Khān Sūr and settled in Bajwars in the Panjab with his family and followers. \footnote{4} Most of the Sarwānis attached themselves to their chief Aʿzam Humāyūn Sarwānī the jagirdār of Cawnpur, and they were settled in that area. \footnote{5} We also learn that Ḥasan Khān Sūr, the father of Sher Shāh, attached to himself his relations and kindred as his followers. \footnote{6} The Niyāzī Afghans are also found attached to their chiefs. \footnote{7}

In a similar way, the Fārmūlī, Lūhānī, Karrānī, Kākar and other Afghans lived under their respective chiefs in the areas, which they held in jagir.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{1} F., I, 317; Afsān-i-Shāhān, I4b.
  \item \footnote{2} Elphinstone - An Account of the kingdom of Cabul, I, 237.
  \item \footnote{3} F., I, 317.
  \item \footnote{4} Abbās, IO., 5a; BM., 4b.
  \item \footnote{5} Ibid, 21a; I5b.
  \item \footnote{6} T., XII, II, 87.
  \item \footnote{7} T. II, K2, I02.
\end{itemize}
A picture of the Afghan settlement on tribal lines and of their tribal zones in India in the Ludi period (1451-1526) may be obtained from the accounts of Rizqulla, whose father Sa‘dullah served Miyân Zainuddîn and his sons at Agra fifty five years. His accounts are corroborated by those of Bābur, Abbās and other Mughal historians. In this period, the Shāhukhail Lūdis of the family of Bahlûl were generally settled in Delhi, Agra, Kalpi, Chandwar and Lucknow. Other branches of the Lūdis, such as the Yusufkhails and the Sarangkhānis settled in Lahur and Jaunpur respectively. Saran, Champâran, Oudh, Shahabad, Thanesvar and Kanauj formed the zones of the Farmulî Afghāns. The Lūhānis colonised Ghazipur and Bihar. Cawnpur, Kara and Etawa were the areas of the Sarwānī Afghāns. The Sūrs were settled in the parganas of Chaund, Sahsaram and Khwaspur Tanda in South Bihar.

The battle of Panipat in 1526 caused some Afghāns to settle outside the Mughal territories. Bābur, however, did not disturb the zones of those Afghāns, who submitted to his rule. He left Oudh, Saran, and other places in the possession of the Farmulis.

1 and 2. W. M., 67b.
3. Ibid, 35a.
4. Ibid, 65a; Abbās, IO., 51a-b; BM., 35b.
5. B. N., II, 523 and 527; Abbās, BM., 6a and 17a; T., I, 351.
6. W. M., 34b; Abbās, BM., 15b; B. N., II, 523.
7. Abbās, BM., 6a and 17a; T., II, 89 and 86.
8. Ibid, 34b; IO., 51a.
The Sarwānis retained Kara. Babur also allowed the Lūhānis and the Sūrs to hold their respective areas as they promised to be loyal to the Mughal throne.

In the Sūr Afghan period (1540-1556) also we see that the Afghāns settled on tribal lines. The Sūrs lived in Delhi, Chunar and Gwalior. The Sarwānis settled in Lucknow, Kant, Gola and Tilhar. Oudh and Kanauj continued to be the zone of the Fārmūlī. The Niyāzīs settled in the Panjāb under their chief Aʿzam Humayūn Haibat Khān. The Kāranīs got their home in Khwaspur Tanda and other parganas in South Bihar. The Kākars colonised Milwat, Nagarkot, Jwala and Dihdawal near the Jammu hills. As the Lūdīs had sank in political importance we do not get any reference to their settlement in the contemporary records.

Even in the eighteenth century, the Afghāns settled in Ruhilkhand on tribal lines. The Afghān historian Mahabat Khān writes that they belonged to 52 different tribes and each tribe had a separate mahalla (quarter) in the city of Shahjahanpur, the early seat of their power in Ruhilkhand.

2 and 3. Ibid, 659, 669, 676; 652 and 649.
4. Sher Shāh kept his treasures at Chunar. Ādil made it capital.
5. Islām Shāh made Gwalior his capital.
6. Ābās, IO., 107a-b; BM., 70a and 57b. The places mentioned are in the modern district of Shahjahanpur, U. P.
7. B., 419-20; T., II, 120.
8. Ābās, BM., 70a; T., II, III-2; B., I, 380.
10. Ābās, IO., 107a; BM., 70a. The places referred to were in the territories between Lahur and Kangra.

II. Mahabat Khan - Akhbar-i-Mahabbat, 65b;
District Gazetteer, Shahjahanpur, XVIII, XVII, 136.
The settlement of the Afghans on tribal lines and their attachment to their respective tribal chiefs suggest that the latter, secure in the support of their own tribal peoples, could exercise great authority over the areas, which they received as jagirs from the king.

Position of the chiefs as jagirdars:

Bahlūl Lūdī (1451-87), the founder of the Afghan saltanate in Northern India, parcelled out the kingdom among the Afghan chiefs, who had joined him in the conquest of the country and helped him against his enemies. When Delhi was attacked by the Sharqī sultān Mahmūd of Jaunpur, he invited the Afghāns of Rūh saying, *God has given the kingdom of Delhi to the Afghāns, but the other kings wish to expel them. Come to this country. The sovereignty will remain with me, but the territories we have acquired and may conquer will be shared among us as brothers.* True to this word, Bahlūl gave a jagir to every Afghan chief, who helped him. As the powerful Farmulī and Lūhānī chiefs came in large numbers and joined him in the conquest, he gave them one half of the kingdom in jagirs and assigned the other half to other Afghan tribes.

Having acquired jagirs, the Afghan chiefs settled there on tribal lines. They considered the jagirs as theirs by right and not a favour from the king and they held possession of them in hereditary succession. We are informed that Oudh, which was the jagir of Miyan Kālā Pahār Farmulī in the reign of Bahlūl Lūdī, passed in hereditary right to his daughter Fath Malika and her husband Mustafa Farmulī at the time of Ibrāhīm Lūdī.

1. Abbās, 10., 5a-b ; BM., 3b.
2. Ibid., 4b ; 4b.
4. Abbās, 10., 51a-b ; BM., 34b.
The Luhánis held their jagir in Bihar for three generations, and in the chieftainship Dariyā Khān was succeeded by his son Bihar Khān and then his grandson Jalāl Khān. Farīd enjoyed his father's jagir in Sahsaram in hereditary succession. The family of Daulat Khān Lūdī Yusufkhāil held their jagir in the Panjab for thirty years. The other Afghāns also maintained the same hereditary right in their jagirs.

The jagirdārs enjoyed great authority over the area of their jagirs. Within them, they were practically supreme. Farīd, as the deputy of his father, made new arrangements with the soldiers, the zamindārs and the subjects. The jagirdār could also portion his jagir among his sons. We see that Hasan Khān Sūr, in his life time, assigned separate jagirs to his sons. Shujā'at Khān also divided his jagir in Malwa among his sons.

The jagirdārs kept troops of their own to maintain local peace and to help the king in times of need. During the period of the Lūdī saltanate, Jamāl Khān Lūdī Sarangkhānī and his son Ahmad, the jagirdārs of Jaunpur, maintained 20,000 horse. Tātār Khān Lūdī Yusufkhāil, who had a jagir in the Panjab, commanded 15,000 cavalry. Muhammad Khān Sūr, the jagirdār of

1. M., 96b.
4. Abbās, 10., 23a; BM., I6b.
5. T., III 421; Rahimi\(^{12}\), I, 196.
6. W. M., 35a; Abbās (BM., 6a) says that Ahmad maintained 12,000 horse.
7. D., School, 27.
Chaund, and Hasan Khan Sur, the jagirdar of Sahsaram, kept 1,500 and 500 horses respectively. The powerful Sarwani chief, A'zam Humayun maintained 45,000 cavalry and 700 elephant in Kara.

The big jagirdars could delegate their military authority to a number of subordinate chiefs with assignment of jagirs and thus create their respective groups of loyal lieutenants. In the reign of Sikandar Ludi (1487-1517), A'zam Humayun Sarwani made Saif Khan, Daulat Khan, Ali Khan and Firuz Khan his subordinate chiefs by conferring on them the command of 6,000, 4,000, and 6,000 respectively. Jamal Khan Ludi also gave Hasan Sur the command of 500 and a jagir in Sahsaram.

The soldiers of the jagirdars were the men of their tribes. They were also paid by them in fiefs. Being the men of their tribes and paid by them, the soldiers were naturally attached to the chiefs and the jagirdars.

Jagirdars in the Sur period:

In the Sur Afghan period (1540-56) also, the jagir system and the ideas of the time of the Ludis regarding the jagir prevailed. Sher Shah restored the Afghan saltanate in India with the help of the Afghan chiefs and as such he had to

I. Abbâs, BM., 6a and 17a; T., II, 86 and 89.
2. W. M., 34b.
3. Ibid, 35a.
4. Abbâs, IO., 6b; BM., 6a.
5. Ibid, Iob; 8b; T., I, 335; D., School, 31
satisfy them by the grant of jagirs. The evidence that may be
gathered from the contemporary sources show that he gave them
jagirs.

In the reign of Sher Shāh (1540-45), Shujāʿat Khān
held Malwa in jagir. 1 We know that at first Sher Shāh assigned
the parganas of Kant, Gola and Tilhar as a jagir to ʿIsa Khān
Sarwānī and later on the sarkar of Sambal was added to his
area. 2 The Karranīs received Khwaspur Tanda and the Gangetic
parganas in South Bihar as their jagir. 3 In 1542 after Khīzr
Khān's rebellion, Sher Shāh divided Bengal in jagirs among some
tribal chiefs. 4

The Niyāzīs had their jagirs in the Panjab and Multan.
The area under them was a fairly big one. They were at the same
time, however, a turbulent and ambitious people. Abbās says that
Sher Shāh intended to remove them from the Panjab, but before he
could do this he died. 5 We, however, see that it was not the
his death but rather the dictates of prudence and military necessity which prevented Sher Shāh from removing the
Niyāzīs. The powerful Niyāzī chief Aʿẓam Humāyūn, who had
distinguished himself in many a campaign of Sher Shāh and in the
conquest of Multan, ranked as one of the pillars of the restored

I. Abbās, 10., ii3ta«feX3la4-6b ; BM., 71a and 75a.
2. Ibid, 107b ; 70a.
4. Ibid, 365 ; F., I, 425 ; Abbās, 10., 87b ; D., School, 92a.
Abbās says that Sher Shāh established ملوك طويل in Bengal.
5. Abbās, 10., 120a ; BM., 79a-b.
saltanate. Prudence forbade him from alienating such a powerful chief. Moreover, the defence of the north-west frontier against expelled Humayun demanded that the Panjab was to be in the hands of a powerful chief and in a tranquil state.

The jagirdars of the Sur period also kept their own troops. A'zam Humayun Niyazi commanded 30,000 horse and Shuja Khan 12,000 horse. We are informed that, while conferring Sambal on 'Isa Khan Sarwani, Sher Shah asked him to keep an additional cavalry force of 5,000 to maintain peace in the troublesome Sambal area. The jagirdars also paid their soldiers in fiefs.

The idea that the jagir was a family property of the chief prevailed until the end of the Sur rule in Northern India. In 1553, Muhammad Adil Shah held a darbar at Gwalior to carry out a scheme of the redistribution of jagirs. In the darbar he proposed the transfer of Kanauj from the Barmulis to the Sarbanis. Sikandar Khan Barmuli protested against the interference of the sultan in their jagir, which they held from the time of Sher Shah. This affair resulted in a bloody dispute in the darbar and the loss of several lives. This incident illustrates how the Afghan chiefs throughout the entire period of Afghan rule in India maintained that they held their jagirs by right and not by royal favour.

1. Abbâs, I0., II6b ; BM, BM, 77a.
2. Ibid, I00b 65b.
3. Ibid, I07b 70a.
4. Ibid, I07b and II4a ; 70a and 75a.
5. T., II, I2o-I ; B., I, 419-20 ; F., I, 439 ; D., BM, I2oA.
The hold of the Afghān chiefs on their tribes and their great power over their jagirs naturally limited the authority of the Afghān king in their localities. Indeed, it may be said that the chiefs established semi-independent political units within the kingdom.

The role of the Afghān chiefs in the royal succession:

The Afghān chiefs exercised great influence in the political questions of their saltanate. The significant role they played in the affairs of succession to the throne suggests that the Afghān king was really chosen by them. The reigning king might nominate his successor. He would, however, nominate such a person, who would be acceptable to the chiefs. Even then, the chiefs could accept or reject him and place some other relation of the deceased king on the throne.

-Islām Khān Lūdī, who for the first time united the Afghāns under his leadership, nominated his nephew Bahlūl Lūdī rather than his son Qūṭb Khān to be his successor as the latter would not have been accepted by his people. This shows that the Afghān leader had respect for the opinion of his brethren. In spite of this, the Afghāns were not unanimous in the acceptance of Bahlūl. By his tact and personality, Bahlūl, however, made himself acceptable to them. Even when he became the acknowledged leader and monarch of the Afghāns, he behaved with them in

I. F. I, 317; Afsān-i-Shāhan, I4b.
2. Ibid.
such a way as to show that he had been a choice of his people and that he held the high office at their pleasure. 1

The accession of Sikandar Lūdī is an instance which illustrates that the Afghan chiefs had their choice in succession. When Bahlūl Lūdī died they sat in assembly to decide whom they should place on the throne. At that time the elder prince Bārbik was at Jaunpur and the third Sikandar was in Delhi. A few of the chiefs favoured the succession of Bārbik, while others wanted to place Aʿzām Humāyūn, the son of the eldest prince Bāyazīd, who had died, on the throne. Nobody made any mention of Sikandar, who is said to have been nominated successor by Bahlūl. 2 Seeing that her son's case was going by default, Sikandar's mother spoke, from behind the curtain, about the qualities of her son and presented his case to the assembled chiefs. 'Isa Khān Lūdī retorted that the throne was not for the son of a goldsmith's daughter. 3 Khān Khānān Farūlī, one of the influential chiefs, objected to such harsh language towards the wife of the late king. This caused a quarrel between the two khān chiefs. Khān Khānān Farūlī swore that he would support the succession of Sikandar. As he commanded the respect of the majority of the chiefs, they chose Sikandar for the throne and invited him accordingly. Sikandar came in haste to Jalālī and ascended

1. See p. 32.
2. F., I, 329; D., School, 27.
3. Ibid. Sikandar's mother was a goldsmith's daughter. F., I, 329.
In 1517 after the death of Sikandar, the majority of the chiefs favoured the succession of Ibrahim Ludi, who was noted for his intelligence, bravery and other praiseworthy qualities. Accordingly Ibrahim succeeded to the throne. A few of the chiefs, however, placed his younger brother Jalal on the throne at Jaunpur. It was after much fight that Jalal was eliminated and Ibrahim became undisputed.

In the Sûr period:

In the Sûr Afghan monarchy also we see the great influence of the Afghan chiefs in succession. It was by championing the Afghan national cause against the Mughals that Sher Shah became the leader of the Afghans. In 1539, he defeated Humayun at Chausa. This made him supreme in Bengal, Bihar and territories up to the Kanauj and placed him well on the road to Agra and Delhi. In recognition of the quality of his leadership and his great service to the cause of the Afghans, 'Isa Khân Sarwâni proposed in an assembly of the Afghan chiefs to make him their king. Miyan Babin Ludi and other chiefs unanimously consented and Sher Shâh accepted the offer saying, "The kingship is an exalted office and is not devoid of trouble but since the noble minds of my friends have decided to make me king, I agree." This shows that the Afghan chiefs chose

---

1. F., I, 329; T., I, 314.
3. Abbâs, 10, 52b; BM., 35b.
4. Ibid, 73a-b; 48a.
Sher Shâh to be their king.

In 1545, the installation of Islam Shâh, the second son of Sher Shâh, in preference to his eldest son and nominated successor Ādîl Khân, is another instance showing the great influence of the Afghan chiefs in succession in the Sûr Afghan sultanate. The assassination of Islam Shâh's son and successor Firûz on the third day of his accession in 1553 and the raising of Muhammad Ādîl on the throne by the chiefs confirms our belief that the Afghan king was really the choice of the Afghan chiefs.

Later instances also show the great position of the Afghan chiefs in the monarchy. Sikandar Khân Sûr, after being elevated to the throne in 1554, addressed the chiefs in the following words: "I regard myself as one of you; I claim no superiority over you. If you think me incapable of rule let an abler head and a stronger arm be elected from among you that I may also swear allegiance to him." This indicates that, even down to the end of the Sûr rule, the Afghan chiefs controlled the succession to the throne and that the idea that the king was an equal of the chiefs held sway.

---

1. See Chapter II], p. 40-2
2. See Chapter I N, p. 92-3
Relations between the king and the chiefs:

The position of the Afghan chiefs as leader of the tribes and as jagirdars and their significant role in the important political question, such as succession to the throne, suggest that the Afghan monarchy in India was really an oligarchy of the chiefs presided over by the monarch. The chiefs used to look upon the king as one of their equals and they would accord him the honours of a leader in war rather than of a master in peace. So, Dr. Tripathi remarks that the Afghan monarchy was a sort of confederation of the tribes presided over by the king. 1

Even in the eighteenth century, the state of Ruhilkhand established by Āli Muḥammad Khān Rūhīla was based on jagirs and was really a confederacy of the Afghan chiefs with the Nawāb as their leader. 2 A study of the relation between Bahlūl Lūdī and the chiefs will show that the founder of the first Afghan monarchy in India gave the chiefs equal status with the king.

At the time of the establishment of the Afghan kingdom in Northern India, Bahlūl promised to share the conquered territories among the chiefs as brothers. 3 The jagirs that he granted gave them show that he kept his promise. He even divided the royal treasure among them. 4 Bahlūl also behaved himself with the

1. Tripathi - Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, 83.
2. Rahman - The rise and fall of Ruhila Power, 13.
3. Abbās, 10., 3a-b ; BM., 3b. Babur ( Wāqiʿat-i-Bābur, 389 ) says that six or seven chiefs including Tātār Khān Lūdī occupied Hindustan and made Bahlūl their king. Tātār Khān obtained the territories of the Panjab.
4. F., I, 328.
chiefs as friends and never gave an air of superiority over them. Either in public or private audiences he did not sit on a throne and sat on a carpet along with the chiefs. He addressed them as Masnad-i-Āli, i.e., Your Excellencies and never issued to them a farman savouring of command. If anyone of them was displeased with him he would go to his house and placing his sword and turban before him, he would say, "If you think me unworthy of the office, choose someone else and give me some other office." Bahlūl would eat in their company and would not ride a horse better than those of the chiefs. He never paraded of his royalty. Such was the founder of the Afghān monarchy in India and his relationship with the chiefs. In fact, Bahlūl, being the first, became the traditional model of a sultan to the Afghāns in India.

We wonder why Bahlūl established such a monarchy in which the position of the chiefs was enhanced beyond measure and the dignity of the king was greatly lowered. Indeed he had difficulties in establishing an absolutism of the monarch. The self-willed Afghan chiefs, who valued their tribal independence more than anything else, would not have favoured an institution, which would have made them servants of the king. Secondly, the Afghan kingdom established with the help of the Afghan chiefs depended on their co-operation with the king.
Bahlūl's kingdom was essentially an Afghān kingdom in which the non-Afghan section of the people had neither any concern nor any interest. In view of this fact, Bahlūl had to fashion his monarchy in such a way that it might insure him the whole-hearted support of the chiefs at all times. Besides, as the Afghāns in India numbered only a few laks I he could not have afforded to create divisions among them by forcing on them the institution of absolute monarchy. Lastly, Bahlūl himself was an Afghān born and bred and would not be expected to revolt against his own instinct and upbringing.

It cannot, however, be denied that, in his desire to please the Afghan chiefs, Bahlūl lowered the position of the king more than was necessary. He could not have kept on good terms with them without raising them up as equals. By such conduct as sitting on a carpet with them, addressing them as Masnad-i-Ālī and asking their forgiveness by putting off the turban, Bahlūl unnecessarily humiliated the monarchy. As the first Afghan king he could have given kingship more dignity and have handed on a better tradition for his successors. His actions towards the chiefs reveal him as an average tribal chief devoid of any political knowledge and ideas. His conduct created a dangerous precedent for his successors.

I. According to Afsān-i-Shāhan (I5ob), in the reign of Islām Shāh Sūr, the Afghāns in India numbered only nine laks.
Sikandar Lūdī (1489-1517) perceived that the great power of the chiefs was an obstacle in the way of an efficient administration and the stability of the kingdom. So, he wanted to check their power and improve the position of the king. He, however, proceeded very cautiously. Sikandar would not sit on the throne in the presence of the great chiefs. He would also alight from his horse to receive them. At the same time, he took steps to introduce a mild control over them. He provided for inspecting and auditing the revenue accounts of the chiefs. But he did not push this too far. ‘Abdullā says that Sikandar allowed them to settle their accounts with the finance department in a manner most convenient to themselves. Still they clamoured against this interference of the king in their affairs. Sikandar's tactility, however, silenced their opposition.

The conflict of ideas that originated at the time of Sikandar came to a head in the reign of his son and successor Ibrāhīm Lūdī (1517-26). In his reign, the great power of the Afghan chiefs became a positive danger to the Afghan monarchy. They challenged his authority by installing his younger brother Jalāl as a rival king in Jaunpur. They even ignored his orders. Ibrāhīm appointed Miyān Makhan to the chief command in place of

1. F. I., 1, 329.
2. Ibid, 331.
3. Ibid, 334-35; Briggs - Firishta, I, 574.
Miyan Husain Farmulī in the campaign against Rana Sanga of Mewar. Miyan Husain, however, could not tolerate it. He joined the Rana and helped him in defeating the forces of Miyan Makhan.

Ibrāhīm felt that the kingdom could neither be made stable nor be efficiently governed if the Afghān chiefs were allowed to have unchecked power. He also came to the throne with his own ideas of raising the power and dignity of the king and of placing him as an impartial head of the kingdom. Hence we find him proclaiming that the king had no friend or relations and that all were servants of royalty. Firishta has introduced the above statement to show the arrogance of Ibrāhīm Lūdī, who departed from the manners and practices of his father and grandfather. 2 We, however, find in it the spirit of a dutiful king, who wanted to be the king of all the people of the kingdom irrespective of race and to give them the benefits of an orderly and efficient government.

The ideas of Ibrāhīm Lūdī naturally brought him into conflict with the ideas of the chiefs, who would not readily consent to part with their power and privileges. His ideas made them his bitter enemies. Ibrāhīm, however, was not daunted; he proceeded boldly to crush the opposition. He nearly succeeded. The defeated and humiliated chiefs, however, in their rage,

I. D., Bm., 56a; Shāhī, 78-9.
2. F., I, 347.
forgot their common interests as Afghans by inviting Bābur to India, they caused the destruction of the Afghan monarchy at the battle of Panipat in 1526.

Ibrāhīm Ludi was, no doubt, intelligent and able and was inspired by a sound idea of introducing an efficient administration in the kingdom. There were, however, defects in his method of attaining that object. He was uncompromising in principle and hasty in action. He did not allow for the prejudices of the Afghan chiefs. The chiefs were also uncompromising in their ideas. So, the inevitable result of the conflict of two uncompromising ideas was to confound them both.

In Sher Shāh’s reign;

In Sher Shāh Sūr’s Afghan saltanate also, we see that the tribal associations of the Afghans, their ideas regarding the jagirs and the great position of the chiefs as jagirdārs and courtiers continued to exist. Being favoured by circumstances, Sher Shāh, however, established a comparatively strong monarchy to that of Bahlūl Lūdī.

Sher Shāh’s was a restored Afghan saltanate. After fifteen years of misfortune, his leadership restored sovereignty of Northern India to the Afghans. Naturally they looked upon him as their great saviour and reposed confidence in his intelligence and wisdom. His love and care for them endeared him all the more to them. Bādāuni says that Sher Shāh would not give the

1. See, p., 24-6.
2. Abbās, IO., 72b ; BM., 48a.
head of a soldier even for a kingdom. 1 So when in the battle of Jodhpur a few Afghan soldiers were killed Sher Shāh said, I have sold the empire of the whole of Hindustan for a handful of bajra (a kind of grain). 2 Abbās writes that Sher Shāh gave the Afghāns jagirs or stipends in such a scale that everyone of them whether in India or Rūh became a man of substance. 3

Moreover, the brilliant victories and conquests of Sher Shāh held the Afghāns spell-bound and they brought fresh fortune to them. The conquests also diverted their attention from the internal affairs to the theatres of war and the wealth of new territories. Being thus diverted, the Afghāns did not realise how much power was being quietly engrossed by the monarchy.

Favourable circumstances as well as his prudence and sagacity enabled Sher Shāh in establishing a stronger monarchy than that of Bahlūl. This is seen in some of his measures. A few of his coins mention him as Khalīfatuzzamān, 4 i.e., khwāshīf the caliph of the age, showing that Sher Shāh did not own even theoretical allegiance to the caliph of Islām. In view of the fall of the caliphate in 1517 at the hands of the Ottoman sultan

---

1. B., I, 368.
2. Abbās, 10., I00a ; M., I40b.
3. Ibid., II3b 74b.
Salīm, the institution of caliphate had lost its significance. So, the assumption of the title of caliph by Sher Shāh did not mean much from the point of view of the relationship of a Muslim king with the caliphate. It, however, contained some implications regarding his relations with his people. The assumption of the title of Khalīfatuzzaman meant that Sher Shāh wanted to be more than an Afghan king in the tradition of Bahlūl Lūdī.

We notice in Sher Shāh's scheme of dividing the empire into sarkars and in the introduction of revenue reforms and branding regulations a tendency towards centralised administration under the direct control of the king. Sher Shāh, however, acted very cautiously and made concessions where necessary. He granted jagirs to the chiefs and allowed them to maintain forces. He left Aʿzam Humayūn Niyāzī in the Panjab and Multan though he would have liked to remove him from such a big area. Sher Shāh also exempted Ismail Khān from the branding system as the latter did not like that his horses should be branded.

This shows that Sher Shāh did not push far his idea of centralisation and he made allowance for the sentiments and prejudices of the Afghan chiefs. So there was no occasion for his conflict with them. His son and successor Islām Shāh, however, carried his ideas of centralisation too far and hence his reign witnessed a bitter conflict of the two opposing forces.

---

2. Abbās, Io., 84b; BM., 55b.
CHAPTER III
Islam Shah Sûr and his Monarchy
952 H./1545 A.D. - 960 H./1555 A.D.

The reign of Islam Shah Sûr is a remarkably momentous period of Afghan rule in India. It saw an astounding victory of the monarch over the chiefs and the realisation of the ideas of Ibrahim Ludi as well as the perfection of the principles and the institutions of Sher Shâh. It inaugurated in the Afghan saltanate a monarchy that was reminiscent of the absolutism of the great Turkish sultâns, Alâuddin Khilji and Muhammad bin Tughluq, and the precursor of the splendid royalty and an efficient administrative system of the illustrious Mughal Emperor Akbar. Indeed, in the history of ideas and institutions of Muslim rule, Islam Shâh, the successor of the Afghan king Sher Shâh, stands as a connecting link between the Turks and the Mughals in India.

Accession and fratricidal war:

On May 23, 1545, Sher Shah died in the camp at Kalinjar, leaving behind him two sons and both of them were absent. The elder Adil Khan was at Ranthambhor and the younger Jalâl Khan was at Rewa, 200 miles and 50 miles away respectively from Kalinjar. Succession to the throne was imperative. Before his death, Sher Shah had nominated Adil Khan as his successor. The Afghan chiefs, however, attached little importance to their great leader's will and wanted to make their own choice.
and other chiefs present sat in council to decide who should succeed. Ni'matullā gives a detailed account of their discussions. The accounts of Nizamuddīn, Badāuni, Firishta and 'Abdullā substantially agree with that of Ni'matullā. 'Isa Khan Hujjab, who held the important post of Tambūldār of Sher Shāh and was in great confidence of that monarch, championed the cause of Jalāl. At first he made the other chiefs agree that they should not take away the throne from the family of Sher Shāh. Then this shrewd partisan of Jalāl made a comparative estimate of the two princes showing the incompetence of the elder and the competence of the younger as an administrator and soldier.

According to 'Isa Khan, Sher Shāh often lamented that none of his sons was fit for the throne; the elder was given to luxury and amusements and the younger was impetuous and vindictive. He, however, appreciated the war-like qualities of Jalāl. This judgement of Sher Shāh quoted by one of his chief supporters could not fail to weaken the cause of 'Adil.

Secondly, 'Isa Khan pointed to the respective careers of the two princes in the reign of their father. 'Adil had no distinguished service to his credit. Being ease-loving and lazy, he would prove himself a failure as a ruler. Jalāl had

I. M., 137b-8b ; T., II, 107 ; F., 430 ; D., BM., 102b.
2. Ni'matullā (140b) says that the office of the Tambūldār or the betel leaf bearer was the highest in the Afghan saltanate.
distinguished himself as a soldier and he had excellently
managed every business entrusted to him by the late king. By
this illustration Ḫasan wanted to convince that Jalāl would be
a better choice for the throne. Thirdly, he emphasised that the
vacant throne should immediately be filled so that the peace and
integrity of the empire could be maintained. Ḫādīl was far off,
Jalāl near. Fourthly, Ḫasan produced a precedent to show that
only those present could qualify for the throne. After the death
of Bahlūl, his son Sikandar was chosen for the throne by the
chiefs in preference to his elder brother Bārbik because he was
near at hand. Lastly, he made the assembled chiefs understand
that Jalāl, a man of passionate temper, would never be reconciled
to the succession of his brother and that, if Ḫādīl was given the
throne, serious troubles might follow. So the peace and welfare
of the empire demanded that Jalāl should be placed on the throne.

* Jalāl distinguished himself in his father's conquest of
Bengal. ( Ḳāsim, BM., 38b; E., IV, 359-60 ). He also
successfully checked the advance of Humāyūn at Garhi and
captured some camels and horses of the Mughals in an engagement.
This enabled Sher Shah to remove the treasures of Gaur to Rohtas.
( Ḳāsim, IO, 16b; BM., 42b; IO, 64a-b ). Jalāl also
commanded the Afghān right in the battle of Kanauj in 1540.
( Ḳāsim, IO, 76b; BM., 50b ). Ni'matullā ( I4oa ) says that the
early name of Jalāl was ʿAbdur Rashīd. His services and exploits
under his father earned him the name of Jalīl.

I M., 138b; Ḳāsim, Dorn, 143-4.
These eloquent arguments decided the Afghan chiefs in favour of Jalāl. Niʿmatullā mentions that they gave a letter to Māhmūd to carry to his father Ādil informing him of the death of Sher Shāh and asking him to come to Kalinjar. The letter was, however, a contrivance of the chiefs to remove the son of Ādil from the camp. They sent another letter by courier to Jalāl informing him of the death of his father and of their decision to place him on the throne. Jalāl hastened to Kalinjar and, although he was secretly glad at the offer of the throne, he insincerely hesitated saying that his father had nominated his elder brother. 'Isa Khan and other chiefs, however, emphasised that they had unanimously decided for his succession and that the interest of the empire demanded his acceptance. Being thus reassured, Jalāl accepted the offer and, on May 28, 1545 (15 Rabiʿ I, 952), assuming the name of Islam Shah, he ascended the throne of the sarṭanate in the fort of Kalinjar.

After his accession Islam Shah wanted to secure his position against his elder brother by creating a group of strong supporters of his throne. He rewarded 'Isa Khan Ḥujjāb with the

---

1. M., 133b-9a; Dorn., I44 ; F., I, 430 ; D., BM., I02b.
2. Ibid., I40a ; I45 ; 430 ; B., I, 375 ; T., II, I07.

Most of the contemporary histories mention Islam Shāh as Salīm Shāh or Islem Shāh. His coins (Wright - The Coins and the Metrology of the Sultans of Delhi, 326-7), however, bear the title of Jalāl ud duniā wa dīn 'Abūl Muẓaffar Islam Shāh.
important and confidential office of Tambūldār and raised his brother and son to higher posts in the saltānate. Islam Shāh promoted 6,000 soldiers, who followed him when he was a prince, making privates officers and officers nobles. He also satisfied the army by a grant of one month's pay as present and one month's pay in advance.

The installation of Islam Shāh on the throne bewildered Khwās Khān, Isa Khān Niyāzī and other supporters of Ādil who had been away at the time. Considering that his accession had become a fait accompli and that he had strengthened his position, they, however, thought it wise to accept him as their king. Khwās Khān came from Mewat and met Islam Shāh at Kara on his way to Agra. When Islam Shāh received the allegiance of Khwās Khān, he exclaimed that he had become king from the time Khwās Khān had joined him. In fact, the adhesion of Khwās Khān, the most distinguished general of Sher Shāh and previously a strong supporter of Ādil, secured the position of Islam Shah on the throne.

Even after Khwās Khān had accepted him as king, Islam Shāh felt himself insecure on the throne, thinking that his brother might at any time create troubles for him. So, he determined to get rid of him. He wanted to attain his object by means of

1. M., I4ob; Dorn, I46.
2. D., BM., I03b.
3. Ibid, I02b-3a; W. M., 57a.
4. T., II, I07; B., I, 375; M., I4L.
dissimulation. After his access, he feigned loyalty to his brother and wrote to him from Kalinjar that he had accepted the responsibility of government and military command so that troubles might not arise. He invited his brother to come and assume the reins of government. On his arrival at Agra, Islam Shah sent him another letter assuring him of safety. Adil, however, referred the question of his coming to Khwās Khān, Isa Khan Niyāzī, Qutb Khan Naib and Jalāl Khan Jallū. Islam Shah sent these four chiefs to re-assure him of safety by a solemn compact. Acting on their advice, Adil came from Ranthambhor to Sikri. To receive his brother Islam Shah left Agra and the two brothers met at Shingarpur.1

Islam Shah received Adil with every mark of cordiality. The two brothers mourned their father's death together and then they set out for Agra. But while outwardly pretending cordiality, Islam Shah planned to kill his brother. He had given secret orders to his followers not to allow more than two or three of his brother's attendants to enter the fort. 2 Adil's men, five to six thousand in number, however, forced their way in. Finding that his plan had failed, Islam Shah treated his brother with outward deference. He said to him that he had so long taken care of the leaderless Afghāns and now he made them over to him. He

1. B., I, 375; T., II, 107; D., BM., 104a; Shāhī, 297.
2. Ibid, 375-6; 108; D., School, 135; 297; F., I, 430.
placed his brother on the throne and showed himself submissive to him. 1 Even in these proceedings ʻIsām Shāh planned the death of ʻAdil. He had previously placed some brave and trustworthy young men behind the throne so that they might in an opportune moment kill him. 2 ʻAdil, however, feeling that his brother was not sincere in the profession of loyalty to him, rose from the throne and placing Jalāl on it, saluted him and swore allegiance to him. ʻIsām Shāh gave Biyana in jagir to him. Leaving his son Ṡāmūd at court, ʻAdil accompanied Khwās Khān and ʻIsa Khān Niyāzī to his jagir. 3

After ʻAdil had recognised him king, ʻIsām Shāh had apparently no cause for fear on his brother's account. He, however, could not feel himself secure on the throne so long as his brother lived. 4 Ni'matullā says that ʻIsām Shāh feared that ʻAdil would never fail to seize an opportunity to make a bid for the throne and, in view of the unruly character and rebellious spirit of the Afghans, there would be ample occasion for such an opportunity. He thought that, while his brother lived, he would not be able to set his hand to any important affair of the saltanate. ʻIsām Shāh intended introducing administrative measures, which would go against the interests of the Afghan chiefs. In such a case, ʻAdil might rally them against his throne.

---

1. B., I, 375-6; T., II, 1o8: F., I, 43o; D., School, I35; ʻIsām Shāhī, 297.
2. M., I45a; Dorn, I51.
3. As in foot note 1 above.
4. M., I45b; Dorn, I52.
Besides, the frontier problems, particularly the defence of the north-west of the sultanate against Humayun, would call forth his vigilance. While he was thus engaged, his brother might create serious trouble for him. The affair of Humayun and Kāmrān was a warning. Kāmrān had caused the defeat and expulsion of his brother from India by fostering revolt. 'Adil must therefore be removed. I

'Adil and his supporters had sworn allegiance to Islām Shāh and had given him no cause to suspect their loyalty. But, it cannot be said that 'Adil, who was the elder and was nominated successor by his father and had the support of some great chiefs, would reconcile himself to the rule of his younger brother and would not have made an attempt to assert his rights in an opportune moment. The previous history of the Afghāns produced instances of this nature. Bārbik gave enormous trouble to Sikandar Lūdī, although the latter was the nominated successor of his father and was chosen for the throne by the Afghān chiefs. So, we cannot brush aside the putative political necessity, which impelled Islām Shāh to remove his brother from his side. He saw the possible danger from his brother and thought it prudent to eliminate it before it was ripe.

Morally, Islām Shāh's conduct towards his elder brother is indefensible. It revealed him as an unscrupulous man, who felt no quailm of conscience at breaking a solemn compact in order to

I. M.; I45b; Dorn, I52.
achieve his ends. It also frightened the Afghan chiefs and, in its immediate effect, convulsed the saltanate in a fratricidal war.

Only two months after the compact, Islam Shah sent one of his confidential agents, Ghazi Khan Mahalli, to bring his brother in chains to Agra. Being frightened, Adil fled to the protection of Khwas Khan in Mewat. Khwas Khan was enraged at the breach of the agreement. He arrested Ghazi Khan and incited Isa Khan Niyazi Qutb Khan, Jalal Khan Jallu and other chiefs against Islam Shah. They assured him of fighting in favour of Adil. Qutb Khan Naib wrote him to come with Adil and their forces near Agra a little before day-break so that, without shame or loss of reputation, he and other chiefs might desert Islam Shah and join Adil.

With a large army, Adil, Khwas Khan and Isa Khan Niyazi marched towards Agra. But, as in the night of Shab-i-barat Khwas Khan said his prayers in the company of Sheikh Salim Chisti at Sikri, they, however, reached the outskirts of Agra at break-fast time. So, Qutb Khan and his associates could not desert Islam Shah. Still, Par Khan Luhani, Alam Khan Miyana, Barmazid Gur and a few others went over to the side of Adil.

Apprehending desertion by his forces on the battle-field, Islam Shah was very perturbed. Isa Khan, however, infused

1. T., II, 108-9; B., I, 376-7; D., BM., 104b; M., 145b.
2. T., II, 109; B., II, 376-7; D., BM., 105a.
4. Ibid., 148b; F., I, 431; T., II, 110.

The Afghans consider desertion at night as honourable. In 1525 when Alam Khan Ludi came to fight his nephew, Ibrahim Ludi, the Afghan chiefs assured him of deserting the king if he approached Delhi before day-break. T., II, 5.
confidence in him by saying that his devoted band of followers, the Fardulis and the Niyāzīs, would remain loyal to him and that, in his face, no Afghan would desert him on the battle-field. Thus encouraged, Islam Shāh prepared for battle. On October 23, 1545 (Sha' bān 15, 952), a fierce fight took place near Agra. Ādil's forces were defeated and routed. Ādil fled to Patna and no reference of him is found afterwards.

Khwās Khān and 'Isa Khān Niyāzī fled towards Mewat. Islam Shāh's forces defeated them again at Fīruzpur and drove them to the shelter of the Raja of the Kumaun hills. Islam Shāh appointed Qutb Khān Nāib to fight them. Posting himself in the outskirts of the Kumaun hills, Qutb Khān constantly raided, plundered and devastated the country.

Extermination of the Afghan chiefs:

The victory over his brother made Islam Shāh an uncontested ruler. Next, he devoted himself to the overthrow of the powerful Afghan chiefs. 'Abdullā says that Islam Shāh became suspicious of his father's chiefs and took measures to remove them. Bādāunī also writes that Islam Shāh set himself to exterminate the adherents of Ādil and he swept them from the board of the world like so many chess pieces.

The contemporary evidences show that Islam Shāh followed

I. F. I, 431; T., II, 110; M., 148b.
2. T., II, 110; B., I, 378; D., BM., Io5b; Shāhī, 240-I.
a policy of ruthlessly exterminating the Afghan chiefs. We might
well ask, what were the reasons which made him deal with them so
severely. It was not merely because a few of them were favourably
disposed to Ādil that Īslām Shāh suspected them and exterminated
them. In the battle with his brother, some of the chiefs deserted
him and a few of them, though they did not desert, were guilty of
conspiring against him. Hence, it was not unnatural for him to
suspect them. Moreover, Īslām Shāh, who cherished the idea of
establishing a strong centralised monarchy in the saltanate and
of raising the dignity of the king, found a serious obstacle in
the great chiefs of his father's time. So, his method of dealing
with the opposition was -- extermination.

Īslām Shāh's first victim was Jalāl Khān Jallū, one of
the chief conspirators and supporters of Ādil, and his brother
Khudādād. By inviting them one day to his camp at Kara Khatampur,
he arrested them and made them over to an Afghan, who had blood
with them and eventually killed them. The fate of Jalāl Khān
frightened Qutb Khān, another chief conspirator, and he fled to
the protection of Āzām Humāyūn Haibat Khān in the Panjab. The
Niyāzi chief, however, delivered him in chains to Īslām Shāh.
Īslām Shāh imprisoned him with 14 others, including Shāhbāz Khān
Niyāzi Lūhānī, Ādil's son Mahmūd, Shams Khān Niyāzi, Zain
Khān Niyāzi and Barmazīd Gur in a cell at Gwalior. 2

1. T., II, III; B., I, 378; M., I55b-6a.
2. Ibid., 378-9; D., BM., I56a-6a; Shāhī, 241-2.
to contemporary evidence, the Gwalior prisoners were afterwards burnt to death with gunpowder. As Kamāl Khān covered himself with some wet quilts supplied by his wife, he escaped death.  

Iṣlām Shāh thought of exterminating Shujāʿat Khān Sūr and Aʿzām Humāyūn Niyāzī, the powerful chiefs who governed Malwa, and the Panjāb respectively. He summoned them to Gwalior. The former came, but the latter made excuses. As Iṣlām Shāh wanted to seize them simultaneously, he allowed Shujāʿat Khān to return to Malwa.  

He then marched to punish Aʿzām Humāyūn and when he reached Agra Shujāʿat Khān again came and paid his respects to him. Concealing his real intentions, Iṣlām Shāh treated him with favour and allowed him to go back to his jagir.  

Again in 1547 (954 H.), Shujāʿat Khān came to visit the king at Gwalior. Partly because of his submission and partly because of his favourite companion Daulat Khān Ujiyālā, the adopted son of Shujāʿat Khan, Iṣlām Shāh could not openly destroy him. He, however, instigated an Afghān named ʿUṣmān, whose hands had been cut off by Shujāʿat Khān for his misdemeanour, to take revenge. One day ʿUṣmān made an attempt on him and wounded him. Suspecting Iṣlām Shāh, Shujā fled to Malwa and, as Iṣlām Shāh pursued him, he took shelter in Banswara. Iṣlām Shāh posted Iṣa Khān Sūr with a large force at Ujjain and then returned.
Later on Daulat Khān’s intercession obtained pardon for Shuja and he received the charge of Sarangpur and Raisin. Thus Islām Shāh broke his power, though he did not exterminate him.

Islām Shāh could not tolerate the powerful Niyāzī chief, Aʿzam Humāyūn, in the possession of the Panjab and Multan, a fairly big area and an important part of his saltanate. Sher Shāh had also wanted to remove him; but he was cautious in giving effect to his idea and he died before he could set his hands to it. Islām Shāh, however, was bold in the execution of his ideas. So, when he felt that the Niyāzīs stood as a great obstacle on the way of his administrative ideal he proceeded boldly to remove them. Aʿzam Humāyūn had disobeyed his summons. His brother Saʿīd Khan Niyāzī also fled from his court. If Bādāuni is to be believed, then it can be said that the Niyāzīs even defied the authority of Islām Shāh in the Panjab by reading the khutba in Aʿzam Humāyūn’s name. All these furnished Islām Shāh with a good casus belli for a strong measure against them.

In 1546 Islām Shāh marched against the Niyāzīs. Aʿzam Humāyūn made an alliance with Khwās Khān and ʿIsa Khān Niyāzī and their combined forces faced Islām Shāh near the town of Ambala. On the night preceding the battle, the alliance, however, broke down on the question of succession to the throne. Devoted to the

I. A. N., II, 89 and III, 420; D., BM., IIoa; M., I67a.
family of Sher Shāh, Khwās Khān wanted the saltanate for ʿĀdil; but the Niyāzīs declared that they were fighting to have the throne for themselves. Khwās Khān thought of desertion. The Afghan historians write that he secretly informed Islām Shāh that, though he had joined the Niyāzīs, he would not fight against the family of his great benefactor Sher Shāh. However, Islām Shāh in December, 1546, Islām Shāh engaged the rebels near Ambala. At the time of the battle, Khwās Khān and ʿIsa Khān Niyāżī left the field. The Niyāzīs, however, fought courageously, but they were defeated and routed.

Islām Shāh pursued the Niyāzīs as far as the fort of Rohtas and they fled to Dinkot near Rūh. His general Rai Ḥusain Jilwānī defeated Khwās Khān and ʿIsa Khān Niyāżī and they took shelter in the Kumaun hills. Islām Shāh left Shams Khān Lūhānī as governor of Lahur and Khwāja Wais Sarwānī in charge of Rohtas and to fight the Niyāzīs, Islām Shāh returned to his capital Gwalior. In an engagement, the Niyāzīs, however, defeated Wais Sarwānī and advanced to Sarhind. On the approach of a larger army, they retreated and, in 1548, they were again defeated in Mauja Sambla near Mankot. Leaving a number of women and children captive, the Niyāzīs fled to the Ghakkar country near Kashmir.

1. B., I, 380-1; T., II, III; Shahī, 243-4.
2. D., BM., I07a; Shahī, 243-4.
3. B., I, 381-2; T., II, I12; Shahī, 243-4.
4. Ibid, I13; D., BM., I10b; F., I, 434. Dinkot is in N.W.F. Province.
5. Ibid, 385-6; I13; I10b; 434.
Badāuni and Ni'matullā say that, once a week two years, Islām Shāh exposed the Niyāzī females in the Common Hall of Audience and the heralds and the chamberlains proclaimed aloud the names of the Niyāzī chiefs as rebels. This shows the vindictiveness and ruthlessness of Islām Shāh in dealing with the opposition. Badāuni informs us that this conduct of Islām Shāh annoyed many Afghāns. He, however, cared very little for their sentiments. He wanted them to learn that a similar fate would befall other rebels.

The Niyāzīs, however, in alliance with the Gakkars, whose chief Sultān Adam Gakkāi was friendly to Hūmāyūn, created such serious trouble in the borders of the Panjab that, in 1549, Islām Shāh advanced in person to deal with them and he succeeded in driving them from their territories and obtaining the submission of the zamīndārs of the Siwalik hills. About this time Islām Shāh constructed five forts in Mankot as a great defensive measure against the Gakkars and Hūmāyūn.

The Niyāzīs had a tragic end. Being pursued, they entered the hills of Kashmir and sought the protection of its king Mīrza Haidar. Abdullā writes that some Kashmiri chiefs wanted to utilise them in expelling their king and, having failed to

---

1. B., I, 386; M., I58a.
2. Ibid.
3. W.M., 75b; B., I, 386-7; D., BM., IIoa-IIa.
4. Ibid., see p. 57.
have their help in their design, they informed him that the
Niyāzis intended on the occupation of Kashmir. Being enraged,
Mirzā Haidar ordered his forces to attack them. The Niyāzīs and
their women, however, fought bravely and died. Mirzā Haidar sent
the heads of Ā'zam Humāyūn and other Niyāzī chiefs to Islām Shāh
at Ban. The Mughal historians say that, being friendly to
Islām Shāh, Mirzā Haidar treacherously attacked the Niyāzīs and
killed them. It might be that Mirzā Haidar, who was previously a
noble of Humāyūn and had left him in 1540 in his bad days after
the battle of Kanauj, feared Humāyūn's invasion of Kashmir and
hence wanted to be on friendly terms with his enemy. It was,
however, a great gain to Islām Shāh. The turbulent Niyāzī tribe
was destroyed and he was saved from the trouble of an ambitious
people in the frontiers of his Salṭanate.

Relations with Kāmrān and frontier policy

When in 1551, Islām Shāh was fighting against the Niyāzīs,
Mirzā Kāmrān, being dispossessed of Kabul by his brother
Humāyūn, came to seek his help. Islām Shāh sent his confidential
agent Hemu to escort him to his court at Mankot. The contemporary
historians state that Islām Shāh treated Kāmrān very
discourteously. Badāunī says that Islām Shāh gave orders to his
Master of the Ceremonies, Sarmast Khān, to direct Kāmrān to

1. D., EM., II2b-3a.
2. T., II, I13 ; B., 388.
perform salutations like an ordinary servant. As Kāmrān made an ordinary salutation by slightly bending down his head (kūrnish), Sarmast Khān seized him by kārāxān the neck and made him bow down. Besides, Islām Shāh ignored Kāmrān and placed him under surveillance in the camp. Kāmrān, however, managed to escape and he took shelter with the Ghakkar chief Sultan Adam.1

‘Abdullā says that, though Islām Shāh did not want to help Kāmrān, yet he treated him with honour; the latter, however, fled from the court.2 This evidence seems unacceptable. If Islām Shāh behaved courteously towards Kāmrān, then why should he flee from his court and take shelter with the Gakkar chief whom he knew to be friendly with Humāyūn?

It might be argued that Islām Shāh blundered in not helping Kāmrān against his brother. By utilising Kāmrān he could have dispossessed Humāyūn of Kabul and averted the catastrophe, which fell to his dynasty after his death. Islām Shāh ought to have realised that Humāyūn would never be reconciled to the loss of his empire and would sooner or later make an attempt for the recovery of his throne. There was little possibility of his attempting a restoration during the time of Sher Shāh when Humāyūn was a wanderer and a refugee in Persia. The possibility of such an attempt arose from the moment Humāyūn obtained a foothold in Kabul, which gave Humāyūn the exiled Mughal king a

---

2. D., BM., II3a-b.
recruiting ground and a rallying centre. By helping Kāmrān Islam Shāh could have destroyed this foothold of Humāyūn. He could either occupy Kabul or place Kāmrān there as his protege. This would have removed a great danger to Afghan rule in India.

It was, however, difficult for Islam Shāh to prosecute a warlike policy against Humāyūn. Such a policy might have drawn against him the Shāh of Persia as the latter had been friendly to Humāyūn and had helped him in conquering Kabul from Kāmrān. Besides, in view of the internal troubles in the empire, Islam Shāh could not have taken the risk of a distant expedition. Moreover, the Gakkars, whose territory he had recently devastated, being friendly to Humāyūn, would certainly have created troubles for him in the event of a war against the Mughals in Kabul. So, the expedition might have ended in disaster.

Considering the relations of Kāmrān with his brother, Islam Shāh could not also have relied on him. Kāmrān’s rebellions against Humāyūn, in spite of his favours, his desertion of his brother in the battle of Kanauj and his subsequent hostility towards him revealed him as a man treacherous and ambitious. I

Islam Shāh thought that, by following a vigorous defensive policy in the north-west frontier area, he would be in a better position to ward off the possibility of Humāyūn’s invasion. So, he completed the building of the fort of Rohtas

I. Banerjee - Humayun, I, 224.
which was begun by his father. He also built in Mankot five strong fortresses, which were named Shergarh, Islāmgarh, Firūzgarh, Rashīdgarh and Mangarh. I. Rizqullā and 'Abdullā say that the building of those fortresses astonished those who saw them. They compared Islām Shāh's performances with the work done by genii by the order of the Prophet Solomon. 

Islām Shāh garrisoned the frontier forts. He also built opposite Humāyūn's Dīn Panāh and on the bank of the Jumna a strong fort known as Islāmgarh. As a part of his defensive measures, Islām Shāh posted 20,000 cavalry in the sarkar of Sambal and 5,000 horse in every important sarkar of Northern India. 

The defence of the north-west frontier area was one of the factors which made Islām Shāh remove the turbulent Niyāzīs from the Panjab. His idea was to clear the frontier territories of all disturbing elements and to keep it in a proper defensive condition. He also kept his army and arms and ammunitions always in a state of preparedness and himself kept a vigilant eye on the frontier.

Thus Islām Shāh succeeded in warding off any possibility of Humāyūn's invasion during his own reign. In 1552 Humāyūn advanced from Kabul to conquer Kashmir. Having crossed

---

I. W.M.; 75b; D., BM., IIIa; B., I, 386-7.
2. Ibid.
3. Shāhī, 252; Manucci - Storia, I, 184 and 306.
4. B., I, 384.
the Indus, he arrived at Bhanbar, on the Sutlej, near the Kashmir border. Only a few days back, Islām Shāh had gone from the Panjab to Delhi and was suffering from a sore in his throat. Notwithstanding, at the news of Humāyūn’s approach, he hastened to the frontier. This frightened Humāyūn’s nobles into retreating towards Kabul. After this Humāyūn did not dare approach the Indian frontier so long as Islām Shāh lived. The success of Islām Shāh in checking Humāyūn justifies his Kabul policy.

On the eastern frontier of the saltanate also Islām Shāh kept his vigilant watch. During his reign, the kings of Arakan and Tripura who had always struggled for the possession of Chittagong area with the rulers of Bengal kept their hands from it. He had, however, to face a dangerous rebellion of a pretender named Sulaimān Khān in Eastern Bengal about 1546-48 A.D.

A Rājput named Kalidas entered the service of Mahmūd III, the last Sāyid sultan of Bengal, and soon rose to the position of his diwan. For his munificence to the Brahmins, Kalidas earned the name of Gazdānī. Afterwards he became a Muslim and was named Sulaimān Khān. Sulaimān Khān married a daughter of Mahmūd III. In 1538, the fall of the Sāyid saltanate obliged him to retreat to Bhati, i.e., the

I. B., i, 412-3; T., II, 79 and 129; D., BM., II3b-II4a.
2. A. N., III, 432; N.K.-Bhattasali - Isa Khan, B.P.P., July-December, 1929.
territory comprising eastern Sylhet and Tippera and western Dacca and Mymensingh districts.

When Islām Shāh was fighting the Niyāzīs, Sulaimān rebelled in Eastern Bengal with the object of restoring the Sayyid sultanate. Islām Shāh sent an army under Tāj Khān Karrānī and Dariyā Khān. In two battles Sulaimān was defeated and in the last he was killed. His sons 'Iṣā and Mūsā were captured and sold as slaves to the merchants of Turan. The fall of Sulaimān saved the sultanate of Islām Shāh from a very serious danger in the east from a very serious danger.

I. A. N., III, 432; N.K. Bhattasali - Isa Khan, B.P.P., July-December, 1929.
Islam Shah's Administration:

Islam Shah inherited from his father a large empire extending from the Panjab and Sind to Chittagong and Sylhet in Bengal. He did not make any new territorial acquisitions. His activities show that he was more interested in the introduction of an efficient centralised administration than in the expansion of the empire. It was the desire of Islam Shah to make his mark as an administrator rather than as a conqueror. He aimed at giving stability to the sultanate and raising the dignity of the king. His works prove that he succeeded in realising his aim.

General policy:

On the evidence of Rizqulla and 'Abdulla, who wrote that Islam Shah reversed some of the measures and regulations of his father, modern historians have stigmatised him as a narrow-minded ruler, devoid of the imperial outlook and the great political qualities of his father. In fact, the Persian historians, who wrote long after Islam Shah's reign, failed to see his works and measures in perspective. A dispassionate study, however, reveals Islam Shah as one of the great kings of medieval India who struggled throughout his reign for the

2. W. M., 74b ; D., EM., IO2b.
3. Cambridge History of India, IV, 63.
realisation of his administrative ideals and who worked with untiring energy for the good of the empire and the people. He sincerely followed his father and even went further than could he expected in promoting those institutions which worked for the interest of the empire and the people.

In one of his speeches after accession, Islam Shah declared that he intended to conserve his father's institutions and promote the public welfare. We shall see that he was as good as his word. He changed only those policies and institutions of Sher Shah which could not contribute any real benefit to the empire. Abdullā, on whose evidence the modern historians have denounced Islam Shah, says that, after accession, he, inquiring into the ordinances of his father, left some as they were and changed others to suit his own ideas.

It was only in his father's policy of expanding the empire that Islam Shah made a conspicuous change. Sher Shah could not subjugate the whole of Rajputana. He also wanted to conquer the Shi'ite saltanates of the Deccan. But death cut short his career. Master of an efficient army and himself a good warrior, Islam Shah could have followed his father in the conquest of new territories. He, however, departed from his father's policy in this respect. Islam Shah stopped campaigns against the Rajputs.

---

1. M., I4oa; Dorn, I45.
2. D., BM., Io2b.
3. 'Abbās, IO., 98a.
and other wars of conquest. His idea was to place the existing empire on a sound footing and he devoted his whole energy to attain that object.

Iṣṭām Shāh adopted his father’s policy of advancing the Indian element, particularly the Hindus, in government service. His idea was to place them as a counterpoise to the Afghan element at court. His policy regarding the Hindus was a definite improvement on that of Shāh Shāh his father. In the reign of Sher Shāh, though there were two Hindus, Barmazid Gur, a Hindu of unknown origin, and Todar Mal in government service, they did not have any place of importance at court. In the reign of Iṣṭām Shāh, however, we see the rise of Hindu influence in the person of Hemu, who, commencing his career as an overseer of the market, rose to the position of his confidential agent. Indeed, Hemu’s elevation to the supreme position of commander-in-chief and vazir in the reign of Muhammad ‘Adil Shāh was due to the policy of Iṣṭām Shāh. Iṣṭām Shāh retained the services of Todar Mal. His revenue department was manned by the Hindus. So, one day, Shāh Muhammad Farmuli, an intimate friend and noble of Iṣṭām Shāh, spoke to him in jest that he saw in a dream that dust fell upon the head of the Afghan soldiers, the gold went to the houses of the Hindu clerks and the papers remained in the royal treasury.  

I. M., I29a.
2. B., I, 389.
3. Ibid, 387.
The general policy of Islām Shāh towards the Hindus was more liberal than that of his father. From the appointment of two Hindus in government service and some arrangement for food and temporary residence for the Hindus in sarais Dr. Qanungo has concluded that Sher Shāh followed a liberal policy towards the Hindus. But, in his enthusiasm for his hero, he seems to have ignored some historical facts. Sher Shāh's wars on Maldeo of Jodhpur and other Rajput states were dictated by his desire to launch a crusade against the non-Muslims. ‘Abbās writes that his chiefs advised him to lead an expedition against the Shi‘ite saltanat of the Deccan and to root out schism of that country. Sher Shāh appreciated their advice and said that he would first cleanse the country of Jodhpur, Nagor and Ajmir from the contamination of the unbelievers and then he would go to the Deccan. He killed Puran Mal, the Raja of Raisin, his family and adherents and 4,000 Rajputs of note, though he had given them the promise of safety, in the belief that one can break his pledge to an unbeliever and kill him. These show that Sher Shāh was not so liberal towards the Hindus as he is supposed.

The reign of Islām Shāh is not marred by any religious animosity towards the Hindus. He did not undertake any war

---

1. ‘Abbās, 10., 98a-b; B., I, 367.
2. Ibid, 96b 366; T., II, I04; Rahīmī, I, 628.
against them to earn religious merit. Islam Shah executed Kirat Singh and 7o of his companions after his accession not because they were Hindus but because they caused the death of his father. He also imprisoned Barmaid Gur because the latter had deserted him in the battle with his brother and rejoined him after his victory.

Like Alauddin Khilji, Islam Shah took the bold step of liberating the state from the influence of the 'ulema. Though Sher Shah is claimed to be a liberal monarch, he was under the influence of the 'ulema and theologians who used to accompany him even in the battle-field. On a fatwa (religious verdict) of the 'ulema, he broke his promise to Puran Mal and killed him and his men. It was at their advice that he waged Jihād (religious war) against Maldeo. In the war against Kirat Singh of Kalinjar, one of the 'ulema, Sheikh Nizām, advised Sher Shah, "There is nothing equal to a Jihād against the infidels. If you are slain you become a Shahid (martyr); if you live you become a Ghāzi (religious warrior)." Inspired by this advice, Sher Shah rushed into the battle. An explosion of the gunpowder seriously wounded him and he died in the camp. Sher Shah had

1. D., BM., Io3a.
2. M., I5Ia.
3. Abbas, IO., 96b; T., II, Io5-6.
4. Ibid., 96b; B., I, 366.
5. Ibid., 97b-8b.
6. Ibid., IoIa-b.
so much respect for a theologian, Sheikh Badh, that he always assisted him in putting on his shoes by placing them before him. This shows how great was the influence of the 'ulema over this great Afghan king.

Islam Shah associated with the 'ulema. But they had little influence over him. Several times he ignored the advice of Makhduum ul Mulk Mulla 'Abdulla Sultanpuri and other theologians who gave fatwa that the Mahdavi teacher Sheikh 'Alai was a heretic and should be executed. It was only when he found that the Mahdavi teachers were going against the interest of his state that he ordered them to be stripped. Islam Shah was so bold in his defiance of the theologians that he issued general regulations political, civil and religious caring little whether they were contrary to religion or not. His only concern was the good of the state and he issued regulations accordingly.

Centralisation:

Islam Shah adopted his father's ideal of establishing an efficient centralised administration in the saltanate. The only difference between the father and the son in this respect was that the former acted slowly and cautiously making allowance for the prejudices of the Afghan chiefs while the latter worked openly and boldly. The father made concessions where necessary.

I. D., BM., II5b.
2. Idem., Sec. Fr. 82-4.
3. B., I, 384-5.
To the son, however, there was no compromise to the ideal and no half-heartedness in the execution of a policy.

The king stood for centralising the administration and opposed to him were the great Afghan chiefs, who wanted to keep their tribal independence. They would not readily consent to part with their powers and privileges and submit themselves entirely to him. In such a case, the conflict between the two opposing forces was bound to be a severe one. It, however, goes to the credit of Islam Shah that he fought fearlessly against this strong opposition and succeeded in overthrowing it. The only objection that can be raised against him is that he was often unscrupulous in his methods. He perfidiously removed many of his opponents and ruthlessly exterminated those whom he considered dangerous to the state.

The bold and ruthless policy of Islam Shah prepared the ground for the reception of a centralised administration. The hitherto undaunted and turbulent Afghan chiefs began to fear and obey him. He could then introduce various measures which brought them down from the position of equals to that of servants of the king.

Islam Shah resumed the jagirs of the Afghan chiefs and made them stipendiaries. According to Badauni and Abdulla, he abolished all the jagirs in the provinces and brought the entire country under the direct control of the royal exchequer.\textsuperscript{1} It

\textsuperscript{1} I. B., I, 384; D., BM., Io3a.
seems that our historians speak of the ideal which Islam Shah wanted to attain. We, however, see that the Farmulīs and the Karranīs held Kanauj and South Bihar respectively in jagir down to the end of the Sur rule. Though we cannot agree with Badauni and Abdulla in their general statement, still it suggests that Islam Shah abolished many of the jagirs and, as he ruled only 8 years, he could not bring the entire country under the exchequer. In fact, no system could be perfected in a single reign, particularly if a short reign one. In spite of his great popularity and other advantages, Sher Shah did not set his hand to the abolition of jagirs, while his son, with all his disadvantages, took a substantial step in the abolition of this pernicious system. This proves that Islam Shah made a more definite advance than Sher Shah in attaining the ideal of centralised administration in the sultanate.

Islam Shah broke the power of the chiefs by taking away many of their privileges. He seized their elephants leaving them only wretched female ones for carrying baggage. He forbade them the use of the red tent which he reserved as a royal privilege. Badauni says that Islam Shah did not even allow the chiefs to keep dancing girls in the Akhras forcing them to part with them. In this regulation of Islam Shah, we see the

I. T., II, 120.

I. T., II, 120.
spirit of 'Alāuddīn Khīljb, who restricted the social gatherings and convivial parties of the nobles so that they might not easily be tempted to conspire together against him. Islām Shāh probably thought that the Akharas, the meeting place of the Afghān chiefs, served as centres of conspiracy against him, and therefore closed them. His desire to cleanse the Afghān social life of corruption might also have actuated him to close the Akharas. Islām Shāh had an eye to the morals of society. The fact that he wanted to appoint the great Mahdavī teacher Sheikh 'Alāi as muṭtasib (censor of the morals) of the empire suggests it.

Islām Shāh kept the pay of the chiefs and soldiers in arrears. His idea in doing this was to lessen the wealth of the Afghāns so that they might be entirely subservient to him.

The Afghan chiefs could not reconcile themselves to the loss of their power and privileges. But they dared not openly rebel against him Islām Shāh. They, however, plotted to murder him and place his cousin and brother-in-law, Mubāriz, on the throne. They engaged men for this purpose and in 1551 and 1552 made several attempts on his life. Their attempts, however, failed and the plots were discovered. These conspiracies made Islām Shāh more ruthless in his policy towards the chiefs. He wanted to execute Mubāriz. The entreaties of his

I. See p. 32-3.
2. W. M., 75b; B., 1, 412; D., BM., IIIa.
3. Ibid, 74b-6b; D., BM., IIIa-2b; B., 1, 410.
4. D., BM., IIa4-b; B., 1, 413; T., II, IIa4-5.
wife Bibi Bai, however, saved the life of her brother.  

As a legislator Islam Shah was not inferior to his father. His regulations withdrawing the privileges of the Afghan chiefs, abolishing the jagir system and organising the army and his enactments regulating the conduct of the local officers in relation to the state and the people show that he was one of the great legislators of medieval Indian history. In his legislative work, Islam Shah was actuated by the idea of developing an orderly centralised state, which was to work for the good of the people.

The Hukmnāmas, which Islam Shah issued to all the sarkars of his empire speak for him as a great legislator. They contained comprehensive instructions on all important affairs religious, political and civil in 80 sheets of paper. They were intended to regulate the life of the soldiers, the subjects, the merchants and other classes of people. The Hukmnāmas were a sort of manual of instructions to be followed by the local officers in their dealings with the people. The officers read them in the public meeting and thus gave them adequate publicity in the localities. Indeed in the Hukmnāmas of Islam Shah, we see his desire to systematise, codify and rationalise the local laws and at the same time to provide the

I. D., BM., II4a-b ; B., I, 413 ; T., II, II4-5.
local officers with a manual of instructions regulating their conduct in relation to the state and the people.

İslam Shah was keenly alive to the necessity of an efficient army as an indispensable instrument of a centralised administration. So, he greatly improved the military organisation he inherited from his father. His experiences under his father helped him in organising his army into a disciplined force under his direct control. Islam Shah divided his army into several divisions beginning from 50 to 2,000 and introduced the system of mansab in the army. He placed each division under a noble, who was paid, according to his mansab, in stipend from the royal treasury instead of in jagir. This made the Afghan chiefs stipendiaries and official nobles of the king. Islam Shah also introduced the system of paying the soldiers in cash and strictly enforced the branding regulations.

In order to keep watch over the conduct of the sadars and the nobles, Islam Shah, like his father, appointed one Persian news-writer and one Hindi news-writer to accompany every force of 5,000 troops. He also attached three eunuchs to every division of the army. The news-writers and eunuchs were to report to the king everything about the army to which they were attached. Islam Shah also appointed one Persian munṣif

---
1. W. M., 74b; D., BM., Io3a.
2. D., BM., Io3a.
3. B., I., 384.
4. Ibid., 384.
5. W. M., 74b; D., BM., Io3a.
and one Hindustani munsif to each division. As in the days of Sher Shāh, they examined the brands in the army. I Islām Shāh gave particular attention to providing the army with arms and ammunitions. He maintained an efficient artillery. His guns were so big that they had to be pulled by two thousand men. 2 A staff of engineers accompanied every division of the army. Abdullā says that when Islām Shāh was proceeding against Humāyūn he had 150,000 woodcutters and 150,000 dig men to dig ditches. 3 This might have been an exaggerated number; but it gives an idea that the engineering department of Islām Shāh was well manned.

It was due to his efficient army organisation that Islām Shāh could maintain the solidarity of his empire in the face of the opposition of the turbulent Afghan chiefs and also frighten Humāyūn back to Kabul when in 1552 he advanced towards Kashmir.

For the sake of local administrative efficiency, Islām Shāh retained the former pargāna divisions as well as the sarkar divisions introduced by his father in the saltanate. He, however, made the local officers more responsible for the maintenance of local peace. In the time of Shar Shāh, the muqaddam (the village head man) was held responsible for any crime in the

I. W. M., 49a.
2. D., BM., II4a.
3. Ibid.
4. A. N., I, 196. Abul Fazl says that Sher Shāh divided India into 47 divisions.
locality and he was to produce the culprit to the shiqdār. Islām Shāh, on the otherhand, made the shiqdār accountable for crime in his jurisdiction and he was to make good the loss on account of theft or robbery. The author of Afsān-i-Shāhan says that a horse of a man was stolen and he lodged a complaint to the shiqdār. On shiqdār's failure to find out the thief, the man complained to Islām Shāh. Islām Shāh ordered the shiqdār to pay the price of the horse to the man. In holding the shiqdār liable for the crime, Islām Shāh was guided by the idea that the people paid bāj (tax) to the government and hence they were entitled to have peace and protection. Such an idea made the government officers more active, vigilant and dutiful than before.

Islām Shāh maintained extensive governorships in the empire. He found provincial divisions useful for an efficient centralised administration. Shar Shāh's ideal was to govern in smaller units like the sarkars. So he divided Bengal into a few parts and gave them as jagirs to the tribal chiefs. He appointed Qāżi Fazīlat as an amin or trusty to act as an umpire in the conflict of the chiefs. Islām Shāh, however, reversed this arrangement and appointed a governor in Bengal. Sher Shāh wanted to divide the Panjab into smaller units; but as he could not remove the Niyāzīs he left it undisturbed. Islām Shāh removed the

I. Afsān-i-Shāhan, 151b.
2. Abbās, 10., 108b; BM. 57a; T., II, 102.
3. B., I, 432; T., II 124; Riyāz, 148.
Niyāzīs and then he could have carried out his father's intention. He, however, appointed Shams Khān as governor of the province. Similarly we find that he appointed 'Īsa Khān Sūr as governor of Malwa. This shows that Islām Shāh favoured the idea of administration in larger units than did his father. Indeed Islām Shāh was more practical than his father. It is possible for the king to have direct control over the governor rather than on numerous chiefs of a province. They could best be controlled through the governor. Experiences showed the soundness of Islām Shāh's idea. So, later we find that Emperor Akbar favoured the idea of administration in provincial units.

To have direct control over the various localities of the empire and to keep himself informed of the conduct of the nobles and officers, Islām Shāh extended the espionage and the dāk chaukī (postal system) of his father's time. He improved both these centralising institutions. Ni'matullā says that, in order to ensure regularity of despatch, the dāk chaukī establishment delivered everyday a turban of Sonargaon and a handful of fresh rice from Bengal to Islām Shāh wherever he might be. Two horsemen and some footmen were posted in every sarai; they carried the despatch from one sarai to another till it reached the king.

---

2. W. M., 75b; D., BM., IIoa; T., II, II3.
4. Tarikh-i-Khān-i-Jahānī, IO., Io2a.
5. D., BM., Io3a.
Islam Shah's Royalty:

By breaking the power of the Afghan chiefs, Islam Shah made himself absolute in the empire. He also gave a spectacular form to the royalty. His idea behind this was certainly to raise kingship to a position of dignity and honour and also to impress the Afghans with the might and majesty of the great office. Indeed in his royalty, we see the reappearance of the days of the great Turkish sultans whose pomp and magnificence inspired so great an awe that ambassadors and tributaries were known to faint when ushered into the august presence of the sultan.

Following his father, Islam Shah took the title of Khalifat ul Adil as his coins evidence. The assumption of this title did not mean much from the point of view of a Muslim king in relation to the Caliphate in view of the fact that the real Caliphate had ceased to exist from 1517 if not from 1258. The title, however, is significant in analysing Islam Shah's relations to the Afghans. It indicates that he meant to be more than an Afghan king in the tradition of Bahlul Lodi.

Islam Shah made his court splendid by surrounding himself with dignitaries and great ceremonial. A Tambuldar would always wait on him with betel leaves. He was a great noble and always enjoyed the status of a vazir. According to Mixmatu'll:

1. Barani, 30-2. The Sultan referred to was Balban.
2. Wright - The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultanate of Delhi, coins AE 1428-31.
Ni‘matullā, the office of Tambūldār obtained from the time of Sher Shāh and it was considered to be one of g great confidence and importance in the empire. 1 ‘Isa Khān Ḥujjāb held this office to both Sher Shāh and Islām Shāh.

Another great place at the court of Islām Shāh was that of Bārbik or the Master of Ceremonies. The Bārbik, also known as amīr-i-ḥājib at the time of the Turkish sultanate, acted as a court usher. Sarmast Khān held this office. 2 There were also ḥājibs or ma‘rufs (chamberlains) in Islam Shah’s court. Under the general direction of the Bārbik, these chamberlains supervised all the great functions of the court and the palace. They introduced visitors to the king. 3 There were naqībs or heralds at court who would announce the names of persons, who came to visit the king. 4

These court officials and court ceremonies greatly raised the prestige of kingship. The Afghan chiefs, who looked upon their king as their equal, felt at the time of Islām Shāh that they had a master to be respected and obeyed. We obtain an idea of their respect and obedience to him from the writings of Badauni. Badauni gives an account, how the Afghan nobles of 5,000, 10,000, and 20,000 received the Hukmāmas of Islām Shāh. On Friday, they would pitch a lofty tent supported by 8 poles in their sarkārs and place the slippers of Islām Shāh

1. M., I4ob ; B., I, 400.
2. B., I, 389.
3. Ibid., 386.
4. Ibid.
together with a quiver in front of the throne. The sardar, the
munṣifā and the amin followed by others in order of rank and all
with bowed heads and marks of respect would take their seats.
The dabīr would then come and read aloud the Ḥukmīnāmas in the
assembly. If anyone contravened them, the dabīr (secretary)
would report to the king and he was punished together with his
family and relations. \(^1\)

The above incident appears **im** incredible. Badāuni, however,
says that in 1548 he himself witnessed such an incident
at Bajwara in the sarkar of Biana where he accompanied his
maternal grandfather. In such a case, we cannot ignore his
evidence. It might be that he exaggerated in saying that the
nobles placed the slippers of Islām Shāh as 
**aww** as a symbol of his
authority and paid their respects to them. His evidence, however,
gives an idea of the character of Islām Shāh's rule. It shows
that, in his reign, the authority of the king over the chiefs
became a real force and the Afghān chiefs learnt to respect and
obey him. Indeed in it, we see the reminiscence of the saltanate
of Muḥammad bin Tughluq when, in the absence of the sultan, the
vazīrs and others saluted the throne on entering the Hall of
Audience with so deep an obeisance that the head almost reached
the ground and the backs of their fingers touched the ground. \(^2\)

---

2. Ibn Batuta - Ṭuḥfat un nuzẓār, II, 96.

---
The success of Islām Shāh in establishing an efficient centralised administration and raising the dignity of the king proves that, as a ruler, he was not inferior to his illustrious father, rather, in some respects, he was superior to him. Indeed he possessed ideas and also the requisite qualities for translating them into practice. His boldness, untiring energy and supreme self-confidence accounted for his success in his great administrative enterprise. Even Abūl Fazl, who brands him as a tyrant, appreciates his qualities saying that had he been a servant of Emperor Akbar and entrusted with the work of guarding the frontiers of the empire he would have earned great renown. In fact, the way he crushed the turbulent Afghan chiefs and tamed them to respect his throne and he guarded the frontiers and preserved the integrity of his vast empire illustrates the qualities of his character. So Abūl Fazl could say that Islām Shāh surpassed even his father in wickedness.

---

1. W. M. 76b; D., BM., II6b.
2. A. N., I, 337.
3. Ibid, 339.
4. Ibid, I96.
Mahdavism and Islam Shah:

Islam Shah's reign witnessed a religious movement known as Mahdavism. Although primarily a religious movement, Mahdavism had also great political, social and cultural significance in the history of sixteenth century India. Islam Shah's relations with it throw some light on his administrative policy as well as his attitude towards the new social forces and hence it forms an important part of the study of his reign. However, it will be useful to have an idea of Mahdavism before we enter into a discussion of Islam Shah's relations with it.

Mahdi means a divinely guided one. Mahdism is connected with the Shi'ite idea of the reappearance of the hidden Imam for the establishment of an ideal state of affairs in the world. It is the equivalent in Islam of the Christian conception of the coming of a messiah. In India the Shi'ite idea was influenced by the Aryan conception of the appearance of a deliverer after a cycle of one thousand years. In course of time, the Shi'ite and Aryan ideas mingled together to form a common belief of the Indian Muslims that the Mahdi would come to the world after a thousand years to restore the wilting faith of Islam to its pristine freshness. According to a saying of the Prophet Muhammad, the latter days of Islam would be marked by a general decadence in political power and in morals which, on reaching its climax, 

I. Encyclopaedia of Islam, III, III.
would be followed by the appearance of Mahdi, the lord of the times. Christ would also appear and after all men had been led through him to Islam, the day of judgement would commence.¹

Towards the close of the first millennium of Islam, the Mahdavite ideas assumed peculiar importance and the learned everywhere contemplated the question till at last the movement assumed a definite form through the teaching of Mīr Saiyid Muḥammad (1443-1504), a son of Mīr Saiyid Khān of Jaunpur. A descendant of the Prophet and a great saint of the time, Mīr Saiyid Muḥammad, who saw in the fall of Jaunpur a decadence of political power, claimed to be a Mahdī.² He gained many adherents, but the persecution of the ‘ulema forced him to flee from Jaunpur to Mūr Guzrat and thence to make a pilgrimage to Makkah. He, however, died at Farrah in Beluchistan on his way back to India.³ According to Mir‘at-i-Sikandari, Saiyid Muḥammad was killed by the enemies of his ideas.⁴

Saiyid Muḥammad, the Mahdī, died, but his ideas survived in his disciple Miyan Ābdullā, a Niyāzī Afghan, and Sheikh ‘Ālā‘ī, a son of a Bengali holy man Sheikh Ḥasan, resident of Biana. Their learning and ‘Alā‘ī’s persuasive eloquence in particular, attracted many persons to their ideas. Abandoning their homes,

2. Jarret and Sarkar - A‘īn, III, 415 ; B, I, 319 ;
   Blochmann - A‘īn, I, iii-iv.
4. Mir‘at S, IIIa-2b ; Fazlullā - Mir‘at, 90-1.
they gave themselves entirely to devotion and prayer. They held daily *zmug* religious meetings and said the five times prayers in congregation. They also divided among themselves equally food or anything they received from others. Wherever they went they appeared armed to the teeth. The Mahdavis interfered in local affairs inspecting the bazârs and removing forcibly all articles forbidden in religion. They would warn anyone whom they found doing anything contrary to the Holy law. If they found him doing the same thing again they would punish him and even kill him. The local officers, many of them being Mahdavis, connived at or those who did not approve of their conduct were afraid of them.

Mahdavism was essentially a revivalist movement in Islam and the Mahdavis were much more than reformers as they wanted to bring back the ideal days of the Prophet and the Pious Caliphs. They enjoined strict observance of the rites of religion and the injunctions of the Qurân and of the Prophet. According to their doctrine, a man is to be judged a Muslim by his deeds - prayer five times a day in congregation, fasting, observance of lawful and avoidance of prohibited things. A man, who was not punctilious in the performance of the formal rites of the faith, was to be punished, even by death. Khwâs Khân became a disciple of Sheikh 'Alâi. But when he was asked to prohibit all forbidden things he gave up his association with Mahdavism.

I. T., II, II5-6 : B., I, 400 ; F., I, 436.
2. Ibid, II6 401 436.
3. Ibid ; D.m, BM., II5a.
The Mahdavī teachers assumed to themselves the authority to issue authoritative orders and prohibitions controlling the Muslim society. The persons disobeying their orders and prohibitions could be put to death by them without any reference to the ordinary court of law. The Mahdavis also took to themselves the work of the censor of the morals and the power of the qāzī, as we see from their activities in the localities.

The Mahdavis believed in community of property and did not favour the idea of private property. They maintained as their ideal the life of Abū Bakr and ʿUmar who did not possess any private property. The community of property was, however, a new idea in Islām and a departure from the teaching of the prophet, who allowed private property.

The most striking feature of the Mahdavī movement was its militancy. The Mahdavis went armed and enforced their ideas on the people caring little for the existing government.

The orthodox ʿulema denounced the Mahdavis as heretics. First, the Mahdi idea originated in Shiʿite faith which the Sunnis abhorred. Secondly, by putting too much stress on the performance of the formal rites, the Mahdavis rejected the works and teachings of the Four Imāms. Thirdly, they departed from the teaching of the Prophet by their belief in community of property. Lastly, they challenged the position of the orthodox ʿulema in

I. B., I, 67.
Muslim society and at court. They arrogated to themselves the authority to issue authoritative decrees and to control the religious, moral and social life of Muslims. The orthodox ‘ulema had hitherto enjoyed this authority. Hence in the rise of the Mahdavis, they saw a great threat to their pretensions not only as the religious leaders of society but also as the confidants of kings. It was, therefore, partly to preserve Sunnî Islam and partly to maintain their position in Muslim society and at the royal courts that the ‘ulema were determined on exterminating the Mahdavis. Makhdum ul Mulk Mullâ Abdullâ Sultanpûrî, the sadr-i-sudûr in the Sûr court, led the opposition against them.

Islam Shah seems to have sympathy for the revivalist Mahdavi movement. He too wanted to reform society and in particular to remove the influence of the ‘ulema from the Muslim community and from the ruling circles. In common opposition to the ascendancy of the ‘ulema, Islam Shah and the Mahdavis met on common ground.

The activities of the Mahdavis were brought to the notice of Islam Shah after his accession and he summoned the Mahdavi teacher Sheikh Ālāî to Agra. In audience, Shâikh Ālāî made only the ordinary salutation permitted by the Islamic rules and this offended Islam Shah. The ‘ulema led by Mullâ Abdullâ Sultanpûrî gave a fatwa declaring Ālāî as a heretic and condemning him to death. Islam Shah, however, ignored the fatwa and offered Ālāî
the office of muḥtasib (the censor of morals) of the empire.¹

This shows that, notwithstanding ʿAlāʾi's offensive behaviour, he appreciated his reforming zeal and wanted to make him an ally to his own idea of reform. ʿAlāʾi, however, could not be tempted by the offer of an official position.²

When the appeal of the orthodox 'ulema had failed on religious, they switched their arguments to political grounds alleging the danger to the empire from ʿAlāʾi's messianic claims. About this time Bihar Khān Sarwānī, the governor of Hindīa, accepted Mahdāvī doctrine with all his men. Mullā ʿAbdullā Sultānpūrī reported the incident to Islām Shāh emphasising that the Mahdāvīs would create disturbance in the empire and that, by claiming to be a Mahdī, ʿAlāʾi in effect desired to rule the world.³ This time also Islām Shāh ignored the advice of the 'ulema.

One incident, however, favoured the orthodox 'ulema against the Mahdāvīs. In 1559, Islām Shāh was proceeding to suppress the rebel Niyāzūs of the Panjab. When he arrived in the neighbourhood of Bīana, Mullā ʿAbdullā Sultānpūrī drew his attention to Sheikh ʿAbdullā Niyāzī, who roamed about in the hills of Bīana with three to four hundred men and was known to have influence over the Nīyāzūs.⁴

---

¹ and ² T., II, II7; F., I, 437; B., I, 402; D., BM., II5a
³ Ibid, 403
⁴ Ibid, Blochmann - Āʾīn, I, viii; B., III, 45-6.
The activities of the Mahdavis, such as their going armed everywhere and their defiance of local officers, had made Islam Shah suspect them as an enemy to the state. Still he tolerated them with the idea that they met him on a common ground, i.e., the overthrow of the orthodox ulema. But when he perceived the association of the militant Mahdavis with the rebel Niyazis, he was convinced that the Mahdavis were a threat to his empire. So, he ordered the Mahdavi teacher Abdulla Niyazi to be whipped. Though Abdulla Niyazi was whipped mercilessly, he survived death and recanting Mahdavism he lived like a holy man in Sarhind. Sheikh Alai was similarly whipped. He, however, died at the third lash (I550).

Badâunî holds the orthodox Mulla Abdulla Sultanpuri to be responsible for the death of Sheikh Alai. And indeed this Mulla, to insures his position at court and society, had impressed upon Islam Shah the necessity of executing Sheikh Alai. When his appeal failed on religious, he switched his argument to political grounds. Once Islam Shah perceived the association of the Mahdavis with the rebel Niyazis, he was convinced and, for reasons of state, he ordered the Mahdavi teachers to be punished.

The death of Alai was a triumph for the orthodox ulema in the country. They hunted and persecuted the Mahdavis. This continued some years even after Akbar's accession. So bitter was

1. T., II, 117; D., BM., II5b; B., III, 45-6; Blochmann -
2. Ibid, II8; II6a; F., I, 437.
3. B., I, 408.
'their persecution that Abul Fazl's father, Sheikh Mubarak, had had to flee from place to place as he was suspected to be a Mahdi on account of his association with Sheikh Alai.\textsuperscript{1}

The intolerance of the 'ulema, however, reacted against themselves. Emperor Akbar began to hate them. By his superior learning, Abul Fazl also beat them in religious debates and helped the Emperor in overthrowing their ascendancy at court. Thus, the intellectual legacy left by the Mahdavis, who were vastly learned men of the time, led to the fall of orthodoxy at court and ushered in a period of rationalism and liberalism in the history of Akbar's reign in India.

The revivalist movement of Mahdavisim did not die out even after bitter persecution. It revived again towards the close of Akbar's reign in the person of Saiyid Ahmad of Sarhind who is known as the Mujaddid-i-Alfi Sanī or the revivalist of a thousand years. Indeed the Mahdi tradition lingered in the nineteenth century when it was revived by Saiyid Ahmad of Bareilly.

\textsuperscript{1}I. B., III, 72; Blochmann - A'īn, I, viii-x.
Islam Shah's benevolent works and his patronage to learning:

Islam Shah maintained the benevolent institutions of his father. Sher Shah built sarais at a distance of two kos; Islam Shah, however, built between every two another sarai and provided them with every comfort necessary for travellers both Muslims and Hindus. Every sarai had a dwelling place, wells, a battery and kitchens containing cooked and uncooked food. A mosque was attached to every sarai and an imam, a muazzin and a servant were appointed to it. Sher Shah had built 1,700 sarais; in the reign of Islam Shah, the number rose to 3,400. Islam Shah also arranged for the distribution of alms for the poor from every sarai instead of from the royal camp which was the practice in his father's time. He also provided that indigent travellers and mendicants should be supplied with all their needs from the sarais.

Islam Shah maintained the charitable institutions, the grants to religious and educational foundations as well as the gardens of his father's time. Abul Fazl's accusation that Islam Shah and his father made lavish grants of lands confirms it.

In his patronage to learning, Islam Shah surpassed his father. And indeed this gave a great stimulus to literary activities and the development of the Persian language and poetry in particular. Sher Shah read a little Persian taught to the

---

1. W. M., 74a-b; B., I, 384; F., I, 435; T., II, 115.
2. D., BM., Io3a.
beginners in the Persian schools in India. Although he associated with some 'ulema and theologians, this cannot entitle him to be regarded as a patron of learning. Islam Shah was a good poet, who competed with great poets of the time in composing elegant verses and was highly esteemed by the learned. The poets and the learned were his constant companions. Badāuni says that Mir Saiyid Nīma known by his poetical name as Rusūlī, who was an incomparable learned man of the age, was his constant companion. Sheikh 'Abdul Hai, a vastly learned man and a poet, and Shah Muḥammad Farmūlī, a man renowned for his wit and humour, were the favourite companions of Islam Shah.

Islam Shah took great interest in discussions with the learned and the poets. Near his own residence, he provided beautifully furnished pavilions, where the learned and the poets like Mir Saiyid Nīma, Shah Muḥammad Farmūlī, Haiti, Saifi and Sur Das met and recited poetry and debated literary and philosophical questions. Islam Shah would often join them in their discussions. He pleaded that they should not rise to greet him when he entered.

One incident illustrates Islam Shah's love and respect for learning and the learned. The author of Afsān-i-Shāhan, Kabīr, says that Islam Shah and Mulla Ābdullā Sultanpuri were once

---

1. B., I, 416.
2. Ibid, 415.
3. Ibid, 410.
4. Ibid, 387.
5. Ibid, 416; Afsān-i-Shāhan, I54a-b.
passing through a defile when they saw an enraged elephant rushing towards them. ʿAbdullā wanted to proceed, but Islām Shāh would not let him. He said, "O' Emperor let me step forward, for if you are killed, the whole empire will fall into disorder." Islām Shāh said, "Master, you do not realise that there are nine laks of Afghāns to replace me; but if you perish, another like you may not be born in India for ages." 

Badāuni also says that Islām Shāh had great respect for the learning of Mullā ʿAbdullā Sultaṅpūrī, though he knew that the Mullā was not sincerely devoted to him and favoured the restoration of Humāyūn. One day Islām Shāh said to his nobles that Bābur had five sons and all had left India except one and that was Mullā ʿAbdullā Sultaṅpūrī. On being asked why he kept the Mullā at court, he replied that he could not find a better one than him. ² And indeed this Mullā was one of the vastly learned men of the time and unrivalled especially in the knowledge of the Qurān, Ḥadīṣ, scholastic theology and all those branches of learning which depend on memory. He was the author of Ismat-i-ʿAmbiyaʾ and Shamaʿī nabi, the best two of his compositions. Humāyūn gave him the title of Makhdum ul Mulk and Sheikh ul Islām. ³

Under the patronage of Islām Shāh, Hindi literature also

I. Afsān-i-Shāhan, I5ob.
2. B., I, 416.
3. B., III, 70.
made a considerable progress. The stimulus it received from Malik Muhammad Jaisī, a great Hindi poet of the time of Sher Shāh, continued throughout the reign of Islām Shāh. The well-known Hindi poet and musician Sur Dās, who later on became the court musician of Akbar, flourished under the patronage of Islām Shāh. Shāh Muhammad Barmuli was also a gifted poet in Hindi. Mīrzā Kāmrān said that he could gain international fame if he wrote in Persian. Islām Shāh as a man:

As a man Islām Shāh was imperious, vindictive and ruthless. He could brook no opposition to his will and ruthlessly crushed his opponents. His extermination of the Afgān nobles proves it. His dealings with his brother 'Adil Khān and his adherents reveal him as a man perfidious, cruel and unscrupulous. Islām Shāh broke the solemn compact he made with his brother and ruined him. In 1552, he also gave a promise of safety to Khwās Khān and had him treacherously put to death by Tāj Khān Karranī.

Although he was a terror to the Afghāns, Islām Shāh was not without the finer sentiments of a man. He had but one wife Bībī Bāī and he was devoted to her. She seems to have some influence on him as we find in the case of Mubāriz Khān. Islām Shāh felt the necessity of executing him as he considered him a danger to the throne of his son and heir Firūz. He, however,

2. Blochmann - Ā'īn, I, 612.
3. Afsān-i-Shāhan, I46a-b.
could not execute him as Bibi Bai did not consent to it.

According to orthodox Badāuni, Islām Shāh was a good Muslim, who never missed his prayers or touched any intoxicants.

Islam Shāh's place in history:

Islam Shāh occupies a very significant position in medieval Indian history. In him we see the fruition of the ideas of Sher Shāh and also of the initiation of many of the institutions and principles which passed as a precious legacy to his Mughal successors.

Islam Shāh made a definite contribution to the system of strong monarchy and centralised administration. By assuming the title of Khalīfat ul-Ādil and surrounding himself with dignitaries and great ceremonials, he gave spectacular form to royalty and greatly raised the dignity and majesty of kingship. Indeed his work encouraged Akbar to propound the theory of 'divine right of kingship' revealed in the writings of Abūl Faẓl, who says, "Royalty is a light emanating from God and a ray from the sun."

2 In connection with the pardon of Dāud, Akbar said, "By virtue of our being the shadow of God, we receive little and give much. Our forgiveness has no relish for vengeance." Following Islām Shāh Akbar took the title of Khalīfat ul-Ilahi and elevated royalty to an unique position.

1. B., I, 416.
His reduction of the dignity of the Mughal chiefs to a position of official nobility was but a continuation of the policy and work of Islām Shāh.

In Islām Shāh’s system of administration in bigger units, we find the beginning of Akbar’s sūbah administration. To him is also due the credit for the introduction of the mansābdārī system which received systematic shape in Akbar’s reign. Indeed Islām Shāh’s was the first attempt at the codification of the local laws regulating the lives of the individuals and officers. His Ḥukmnāmas are the precursor of the ‘dastūr-i-‘amāl’ (the manuals of instruction) of Mughal times.

In the introduction of liberal ideas in Islām, Islām Shāh took a remarkable step in liberating the state from the influence of the orthodox ‘ulema and in tolerating the heretical Mahdavi ideas. Indeed his activities in this respect prepared the way for the rationalism of Akbar’s reign. Also Islām Shāh’s liberal policy towards the non-Muslim elements of India’s population encouraged his great Mughal successor to advance further in promoting the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity.

In Islām Shāh’s patronage to the learned and his interest in philosophical discussions with them, we see the dawn of the intellectual renaissance that took place in the reign of Akbar.
CHAPTER XV

Muhammad Ādil Shāh and
the Afgān loss of Northern India

The death of energetic Islām Shāh and the minority of his successor Firūz gave the Afgān chiefs an opportunity to reassert their position in the sultānate. The attempt of weak Ādil Shāh's maternal uncle to follow Islām Shāh, however, revived the conflict between the king and the chiefs culminating in the dissolution of the sultānate and the Afgān loss of sovereignty in Northern India.

Murder of Firūz:

On October 30, 1553, on the death of Islām Shāh, his son Firūz, a boy of twelve, was placed on the throne at Gwalior by the supporters of the late king. Tāj Khān Karrānī, to whom the dying king had entrusted the guardianship of his minor son, became his vazīr. But the disaffection, which Islām Shāh's strong monarchy and centralised government had created among the Afgān chiefs, proved too strong for the boy king and his guardian minister and on the third day of his accession, Firūz was killed by his maternal uncle Mubāriz Khān Sūr, the son of Sher Shāh's younger brother Nizām Khān Sūr, who had the support of Pahār Khān Sarwānī.

2. B., I, 416; T., II, 318; F., I, 438.

All the contemporary historians, except Ahmad Yadgar, say that Firūz was killed within a few days of his accession, the general statement being 3 days.
Ibrahim Khan Sur, Shamshir Khan, the younger brother of Khwās Khan, and other disaffected Afghān chiefs.

In his life time Islām Shāh had foreseen that such a calamity might happen to his successor and he wanted to ensure his safety by executing Mubāriz, who formed the centre of the conspiracy of the Afghān chiefs against him. His wife Bībī Bāī, however, prevented him from executing her brother, saying that he was given to music and pleasures and was not interested in the throne. Islām Shāh was disgusted and remarked that she would live to see the consequences of her folly. Bāūnī writes that the prophecy of Islām Shāh came true and, in spite of all her entreaties, Mubāriz murdered her son in her very presence. 2 With the consent of the chiefs, Mubāriz then ascended the throne and assumed the title of Sultan Muhammad ʿĀdil. 3

ʿĀdil's accession, a triumph for the chiefs:

The murder of Firūz and the accession of ʿĀdil to the throne was a victory for the Afghān chiefs and a defeat for the idea of strong monarchy and centralised government. It was the reassertion of their former power and position in the saltanate. Islām Shāh's strong monarchy and centralised administration had taken away from them their powers and privileges and had made them subservient to the throne. The self-willed Afghān chiefs could

1. W. M., 76b.
2. B., I, 416.
3. Ibid., 417; F., I, 438; T., II, II9; M., 162a; Wright - The coins and metrology of the Sultans of Delhi, 366.
not submit themselves to such a humiliating position. They plotted and conspired against Islam Shah, but they failed; the iron hand of the autocrat was too strong for them. In the death of Islam Shah, however, they obtained an opportunity to recover their former power and position.

Even though Firuz was a boy, the Afghan chiefs could not accept his accession, because they thought that, being the son of an autocratic ruler, he would carry on the ideas and traditions of his father. Bent on uprooting the idea of strong monarchy, they supported Adil in murdering Firuz. Thinking that, as he was given to music and pleasures, Adil would not be inclined towards the establishment of a strong monarchy, the Afghan chiefs chose him for the throne. Moreover, Firuz was nominated for the throne by his father. The chiefs, who had always their choice in the affairs of succession, could not accept the enthronement of Firuz, as it meant their surrender of an important privilege to the king. So, they supported Adil in obtaining the throne.

Sultan Muhammad Adil began his reign by conferring favours and important offices on his supporters. He appointed Shamshir Khan and Daulat Khan, a new Muslim and a protege of the Luhans, as vazir and vakil respectively. He also gave high position to Pahar Khan Sarwani and Ibrahim Khan Sur. He restored Shuja'at Khan, who had been in the bad graces of Islam Shah,

to Malwa. Hemu became his trusted confidant and supervisor of his important affairs, civil and military.¹

\[\text{Adil wanted to gain popularity by the lavish grant of money. Following the example of Muhammad Tughluq for whom he had a great admiration, he opened the royal treasure for the people and scattered money among them.}\]

\[\text{Adil deceives the chiefs:}\]

The Afghan chiefs had raised Adil to the throne thinking that, being accustomed to a life of singing and dancing and of the pleasures of the harem, he would care very little for administration and that this would ensure their ascendancy in the saltanate. Indeed Adil was a musician and a great master of the art of music in that age. Miyan Tansen, the great musician of Akbar's court, and Baz Bahadur, the king of Malwa and a gifted musician, were his disciples.³ Adil's musical performances took the musicians of the time by surprise. He was such a master musician that he could play with Pakhwaz, a kind of musical drum of the size of a man, both with hand and foot.⁴ Under his instruction, a Bhagat boy, who was named Mujahid Khan, became an excellent musician of the time.⁵ Indeed Adil gave a great stimulus to the medieval Indian music.

---

¹ W. M., 77a; B., I, 389 and 418; M., I62b.
² T., II, 119; B., I, 418; F., I, 439; Shāhī, 272.
³ B., I, 416.
⁴-⁵ Ibid, 435; Ranking, I, 557, Bhagat is a religious mendicant, a worshipper of Vishnu (Wilson — A glossary of terms of British India, 74).
The musician king, however, soon deceived the Afghan chiefs. As soon as he felt himself secure on the throne he adopted Islam Shah's policy of strengthening the monarchy and ruining them. He followed his autocrat predecessor in enlisting the support of the Indian section of the people. 'Adil raised Hemu to the vazirate and made him his uncontrolled agent in all the affairs of administration. He also appointed the Bhagat boy Mujahid Khan as a commander of 10,000. 'Adil's idea was to curb the power of the Afghan chiefs with the help of this new group of official supporters.

'Adil followed Islam Shah's policy of strengthening the monarchy, but he did not possess the competence of that monarch. Badauni rightly says that 'Adil was by no means fitted for the conduct of important affairs of civil and military administration. Indeed there are instances which prove his incompetence. His cowardly flight from his darbar at Gwalior to the harem for fear of an Afghan chief shows how incompetent he was for carrying through his idea of a strong monarchy. His pathetic appeal to Hemu for help in 1555 when Muhammad Khan Sur of Bengal faced him in the battle of Chapparghata reveals his lack of energy and fighting quality which were so essential for an Afghan king.

1. W. M., 78a ; B., I, 427 ; M., I62b.
2. B., I, 435.
3. Ibid, 413.
4. Ibid, 420 ; T., II, 121 ; F., I, 439 ; M., I63b.
5. Ibid, see P. 103.
On account of his incompetence, 'Adil proved himself quite incapable of following the policy of energetic Ḩasan Islām Shāh. By his policy he raised the forces of fierce opposition and rebellion, but he failed to suppress them. This caused the dissolution of the Afghān sultanate and paved the way for the loss of Afghān sovereignty in Northern India.

Rebellions of the chiefs:

'Adil had scarcely reigned a month when the Afghān chiefs rebelled in different parts of the sultanate and there arose a number of rival claimants for the throne. Most of the contemporary historians are of opinion that 'Adil's murder of Firūz and usurpation of the throne, his elevation of low-born Hindu Hemu to the supreme position in the sultanate, the repugnance of the Afghān chiefs to obey a Hindu and Hemu's insolent behaviour towards the Afghāns caused the rebellion of the chiefs against 'Adil.

Indeed Firūz's murder enraged the partisans of the family of Islām Shāh. The raising of Hemu to the supreme position could not have failed to cause dissatisfaction among the proud Afghān chiefs. But the evidence that Hemu behaved insolently towards the Afghāns is not borne out by facts. Our historians seem to have expressed a common idea of the Muslims of the time regarding the elevation of a Hindu to the supreme position.

---

1. T., II, II9; B., I, 4I8.
2. W. M., 78a; B., I, 4I8; F., I, 439; M., 162b.
in a Muslim saltanate. In fact, Hemu took much care of the Afghans; He would often invite the Afghans soldiers to dine at his table and ask them to eat to their satisfaction.


Adil's policy of establishing a strong monarchy and ruining the chiefs was the principal cause of the rebellions in the saltanate. The rebellions were really the signs of the reappearance of the conflict of two opposite forces — the idea of strong monarchy and the idea of tribal independence of the Afghans.

Aiming at an extension of royal authority, Adil wanted to redistribute the jagirs of the saltanate. In a darbar at Gwalior, he gave an order transferring the sarkar of Kanauj, a jagir of Muhammad Khan Farmuli, to Sarmast Khan Sarban. Muhammad's son Sikandar Khan Farmuli, however, protested against the interference of the king in their jagir. This led to a quarrel in the darbar and it ended in a bloody dispute in which several lives were lost and a few were wounded. The contemporary historians say that, in the midst of the bloody scene, "Adil got up and ran to the harem. Sikandar rushed after him, but Adil bolted the door from inside and with great difficulty escaped. This affair went on for an hour or two. " The courage of Ibrahim Khan Sur and the death of Sikandar Khan Farmuli, however, saved Adil's position at that time.

I. W.M., 78a ; B., I, 413-4 ; M., II6a.
2. T., II, 120-1 ; B., I, 419-20 ; F., I, 439 ; M., I63a-b.
The above incident reflects the nature of the Afghan monarchy and the idea of the Afghan chiefs regarding their jagirs. They considered the jagirs as theirs by right and disfavoured king's interference in their affairs. In trying to interfere in their jurisdiction, Adil alienated them from his rule.

Like Islam Shah, Adil wanted to destroy the Afghan chiefs. He put to death Daulat Khan Niyazî and Firuz Khan Kâkar and imprisoned Nasîb Khan Sarwâni, Ismail Khan, Allahdad Khan Miyâna and Nizâm Khan Shahûkhail. Adil's design on Taj Khan Karrâni failed as that clever chief escaped from Gwalior on the eve of the Gwalior darbâr. He also intended to ruin his sister's husband Ibrahim Khan Sur, who, however, managed to flee to his father Ghâzi Khan Sur, governor of Biana and Hindaun.

Dissolution of Afghan saltanate and civil wars:

Dissatisfied with Adil's activities, the self-willed Afghan chiefs rose against his authority. Ni'matûlâ and 'Abdûllâ give us an idea of the state of affairs saying, "From country to country, from town to town, all was in a state of rebellion." Taj Khan Karrâni rebelled and established himself in South Bihar. Muhammad Khan Sur, the governor of Bengal, declared independence and prepared to make a bid for the sovereignty of Northern India. Ibrahim Khan Sur and Ahmad Khan Sur, a nephew of Sher Shah, 

1. Shâhi, 291.
2. T., II, I21-2; B., I, 419-20; M., I63b-4a; F., I, 440.
3. Shâhi, 291; T., II I22; B., I, 421; M., I64a-b.
rebelled and stood forth as rival claimants for the Afghan throne. The Afghan chiefs joined those sides which suited their interests best. In 1555 when Ādīl was fighting the rebels and pretenders, Bāz Bahādur, the son of Shujāʿat Khān Sūr, succeeded his father and installed himself as a sovereign in Malwa.¹

By nature and temperament, Ādīl was incapable of dealing with saltanate-wide rebellions. He, however, found in Hemu a competent general. Even Abūl Fazl expresses high appreciation for the courage and capability of Hemu. On account of bodily deformity Hemu could not ride a horse and he was always carried about in a haudah (sindūq-i-fīl).² His valour and daring, however, won great victories and he performed great things.³ De Laet also says that Hemu was an energetic soldier.⁴ Indeed it was Hemu's generalship that saved the saltanate of Ādīl from a collapse; Ādīl's cause against rebels and rivals and even against the Mughals prospered as long as this competent general lived.

At first, Ādīl defeated Taj Khān Karrānī at Chapramau, 40 kos from Agra and 30 kos from Kanauj. The defeated Karrānī chief, however, joined by his brothers and other Afghāns, established himself in South Bihar.⁵ Ādīl and Hemu confronted them on the bank of the Ganges. One day Hemu proposed to his

---

1. T., III, 421-2; F., II, 537-8; M., I67a-b.
2. A. N., I, 340.
4. De Laet, I40-I.
5. T., II, I2I-2; F., I, 440; M., I63b-4a.
master that if he would give him a halqa of elephants (one hundred elephants), he would cross the river and destroy the Karrani rebels. ‘Adil complied with his request. Crossing the river, Hemu fought a desperate battle and dispersed the Karranis. As ‘Adil required his services in dealing with troubles in the northern part of the saltanate, Hemu could not crush the power of the Karranis in South Bihar.

About this time, the pretender Ibrahīm Khān Sūr had defeated ‘Adil’s general ‘Isa Khān Niyāzī in a battle near Kalpi and occupied Delhi, Agra and the neighbouring territories.

Leaving the Karranis, ‘Adil and Hemu hastened to the Jumna. Finding a vast army with ‘Adil, Ibrahīm played a trick on him. He sent an envoy to ‘Adil proposing that if he would send to him Rai Husain Jilwānī, Bihar Khān Sarwānī and some other Afghān chiefs upon whose assurances of protection he could depend, he would come personally to make his submission to him. ‘Adil sent his great nobles to him. Ibrahīm, however, won them all over to his side and prepared to fight. This defection of the chiefs greatly weakened ‘Adil and he returned in a helpless state to Chunar, which he had made his capital. Ibrahīm Khān Sūr assumed the title of Ibrahīm Shāh and had his name entered in the khutba and on coins.

1. T., II, 121-2; F., I, 440; M., 163b-4a.
2. Ibid, 121; B., I, 421-2; 164a-b.
3. Ibid, 122; Wright - The coins and metrology of the Sultans of Delhi, 378.
Another pretender Ahmad Khan Sur had declared himself as an independent ruler in the Panjab. He assumed the title of Sikandar Shāh and entertaining hopes of still further increase of power, he advanced towards Delhi and Agra.  

The rival pretenders competed with one another in winning over the Afghān chiefs. Ibrāhīm Khān Sur gave velvet tents, standards and kettle-drums to 200 Afghān chiefs. He gave everyone, who came with ten or fifteen horsemen, a banner and a jagir. Badaunī says that Ibrāhīm showed great favour to Hājī Khān Sultānī, the powerful chief of Alwar. He bestowed on him a lofty spacious tent covered on the outside with saqirlat (siqlat; silken stuff brocaded with gold) of Portugal and on the inside with a Frankish velvet. Besides, he lavished upon Hājī Khān magnificent carpets and vessels of gold and silver and all other requirements. In this way, Ibrāhīm raised an army of 80,000 men. He then advanced to meet the forces of Sikandar Khān Sur.

The two armies met at Farrah, 100 kos from Agra. The army of Sikandar numbered only 10,000. Frightened at the great superiority of the enemy, he made overtures for peace in the following terms: "The country from Delhi to the east should belong to Ibrāhīm; the Panjab, Multan and other north-western..."

---

1. T., II, 122-3; B., I, 421-2; F., I, 441; M., I64b; Shahī Shāhī, 300-I; Wright - The coins and metrology of the Sultans of Delhi, 379; coins dated, 962H.
2. T., II, 123; B., I, 423.
4. Ibid., 422; T., II, 123.
territories were to be under Sikandar. It was also stipulated that if Ibrāhīm took possession of 'Ādil's treasury, he should give a share of the same to Sikandar and his chiefs.

Proud of his great army, Ibrāhīm turned down Sikandar's peace proposals and arranged his forces in battle array. In the latter part of 1554, a fierce battle took place at Farrah and, in spite of numerical inferiority, Sikandar obtained a decisive victory over his rival. He occupied Agra and Delhi and pursued Ibrāhīm from Sambal to Etawa. About this time, he received the news of Humāyūn's occupation of Lahur.

Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr collected a fresh army and advanced towards Kalpi. About this time, 'Ādil sent his vazīr and commander-in-chief Hemu from Chunuar with a large army and 500 elephants to recover Delhi and Agra. When Hemu reached Kalpi he resolved first to dispose of Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr. In a battle he defeated Ibrāhīm and pursued him to Biana. Again in a battle in the outskirts of Biana, Hemu defeated him. As Ibrāhīm took shelter in the fort of Biana, he besieged it and the siege continued three months.

When Hemu was in Biana, Muhammad Khān Sūr of Bengal captured Jaunpur and made for Kalpi and Agra. Frightened at the sight of vast enemy forces, 'Ādil sent an urgent summons to Hemu, "At all costs come to me at once as I am confronted by a powerful enemy." Hemu abandoned the siege of Biana. As he proceeded

---

2. Ibid., 427; T., II, 124.  
3. Ibid., 430; 123; F., I, 441-2.  
4. Ibid., 430-1; 124; M., 165b.
towards Kalpi, İbrahim followed him and at Mandagar, 6 kos from Agra, attacked his rear. Hemu, however, defeated him and drove him away. İbrahim fled to the shelter of Häjî Khân of Alwar; but being refused by him, he took the road to Patna. 1

After his victory over İbrahim, Hemu resumed his march and joined Ādil at Chapparghata, 15 kos from Kalpi and 15 from Agra. 2 Here Ādil and Muhammed Khân Sûr were facing one another with the Jumma between them. Hemu's arrival, however, turned the scale. In a battle in December, 1555, Hemu defeated and killed Muhammed Khân Sûr. 3

Humâyûn's restoration:

When Ādil was engaged in dealing with İbrahim Khân Sûr and Muhammed Khân Sûr, Humâyûn occupied Delhi and Agra. 4 After 1552, 5 Humâyûn dared not invade India as long as Islâm Shah lived. The news of the death of that energetic Afghân king, the feeble rule of Ādil and the internal discord among the Afghâns encouraged him to make an attempt for the recovery of his throne. Abûl Fâzîl, Firishta and De Laet write that Humâyûn received from some persons of Delhi and Agra letters informing him of the death of Islâm Shah and the civil wars of the Afghâns. 6

1. T., II, 124 ; B., I, 430-1 ; M., I65b.
2. Ibid, 432 ; F., I, 442.
3. Ibid.
6. A. N., I, 336 ; F., I, 456 ; De laet, 139.
On November 12, 1554, Humayun marched from Kabul to invade India. Engrossed in civil wars, the Afghans had neglected the defence of the north-west frontier. So, Humayun crossed the Indus unopposed and made a swift attack on the fort of Rohtas. Tatar Khan Kasi, Sikandar Khan Sur's governor of the Panjab, fled without any resistance. On February 24, 1555, after a little fight, the Afghans left Lahur to the Mughals. From Dipalpur also the Afghan generals, Shahbaz Khan and Nasir Khan, took to flight in great panic and confusion.

When Sikandar Khan Sur was pursuing Ibrahîm Khan Sur in Etawa, he heard of Humayun's occupation of the Panjab. He sent 30,000 cavalry under Tatar Khan Kasi, Haibat Khan and Nasir Khan against the Mughals. On May 12, 1555, they fought at Machiwara a battle against Humayun's general Bairam Khan. Badauni says that being harassed by the Mughal fire, the Afghans took shelter at night in a neighbouring village. A fire broke out in the village and the Afghans were clearly seen by the Mughal soldiers, whereas they could not see the Mughals. Nizamuddin writes, "In the glare of the fire, the enemy presented a fine target for Mughal shafts and being unable to endure them longer, they took to flight."

---

1 and 2. F., I, 457; T., II, 80-1; Banerji - Humayun, II, 232.
3. B., I, 460; T., II, 81.
4. Stewart's Jauhar, II4; F., I, 457; Banerji, Humayun, II, 235.
5. B., I, 460; T., II, 82; F., I, 457. Firishta says that says that it winter night and Afghans kindled the fire. But being the month of May, it cannot be a winter season.
At the news of the Machiwara disaster, Sikandar Khan Sūr advanced to the Panjab with a force of 80,000 cavalry and a strong force of artillery and elephants. On June 22, 1555 (Sha‘bān 2, 962), he fought a fierce battle with the Mughals near Sarhind. Although the Afghāns were four times as numerous as the Mughals, yet they were completely defeated. Badauni says that they behaved with due bravery and valour, but they could not contend against their fate. Defeated Sikandar fled to the Siwalik hills. On July 20, 1555 (Ramzān 1, 962), after fifteen years of exile, Humāyūn re-entered his capital Delhi. He then occupied Agra and the adjoining territories. His general Haidar Muhammed Khān Atka invested Biana. Being in a straitened condition, Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr’s father Ghāzi Khān Sūr surrendered. He was, however, executed by the Mughal general.

Humāyūn did not long survive his restoration. He died on January 28, 1556 (15 Rabī‘ I, 963). On February 14, 1556 (2 Rabī‘ II, 963), Akbar, who was in the Panjab with his guardian Bairām Khān, was crowned at Kalanur.

Hemu recovers Agra and Delhi:

After his victory over Muhammed Khān Sūr at Chapparghata in December, 1555, Ḍil intended to send Hemu to repel the Mughals.
He came to Chunar to raise a strong force capable of fighting the formidable enemy. He was soon informed of the death of Humāyūn. The news of Humāyūn's death and the accession of a boy on the throne induced Ādil to send Hemu with a force of 50,000 horse and 500 elephants towards Agra and Delhi. But he himself could not leave Chunar on account of the factions which prevailed among his people.

It seems that Ādil could not send Hemu against the Mughals immediately after the death of Humāyūn. The flight of the Mughal generals and governors from Agra and other places at the approach of Hemu and his consequent speedy conquest of Mughal possessions suggest that Hemu's march from Chunar to Delhi could at most have taken two months. According to Abūl Fazl, Hemu fought and defeated Tartā Beg and also occupied Delhi on the same day, i.e., October 7th, 1556 (Zilhāj 2, 963). Had Hemu advanced immediately after the death of Humāyūn, he would have occupied Delhi six to seven months earlier than he actually did.

Moreover, at his accession Akbar inherited all the territories recovered by his father; for even after his coronation at Kalanur, he stayed several months in the Punjab fighting against Sikandar Khān Sūr. Had Hemu occupied any Mughal territory Akbar and Bairam Khān would not have neglected to come to the capital Delhi.

I. Shāhī, 348-50 ; M., I65b ; F., I, 442-3 ; De laet, I40-I.
2. A. N., II, 29.
Furthermore, in view of his greatly reduced forces on account of constant warfare against the rebels and also of the strength of the enemy, who had defeated Sikandar in several battles, Adil could not have sent his army immediately after Humāyūn's death. The raising and equipping of an army must have taken him some months.

Badauni and Nizamuddin's writings also reveal the rapid march of Hemu to Delhi. These Mughal historians say that when Hemu approached Agra, Sikandar Khān Uzbeg, the governor of Agra and Kalpi, fled towards Delhi. 1 'Abdullā Khān Uzbeg, Haidar Khān Muhammad and others left Etawa, Biana and other places and hastened to Delhi. 2 'Ali Quli Khān Zamān, who had been in Sambal, received letters from Agra, Etawa and other places informing him of the approach of Hemu and asking him to proceed to Delhi. 3

As Hemu drew near to Delhi, Tardi Beg, Abdullā Khān Uzbeg, Sikandar Khān Uzbeg and other Mughal generals arranged their forces outside Delhi. On October 7, 1556 (Zilhāj 2, 963), Hemu engaged them near Tughluqabād in the environs of Delhi. The sight of the large force under the distinguished general Hemu seems to have damped down the fighting spirit of the Mughals. So, Abūl Fażl writes, "Many of the brave men from motives of prudence and some out of cowardice were not willing to fight. Some brave

2. Ibid., 129.
men were, however, determined to fight and die. "1

In the first phase of the battle, Hemu's left fell back before the fierce attack of the Mughal right. Hemu, however, made a violent attack with his elephants on the Mughal centre whose commander Tārdī Beg, being unable to stand, took to flight. Nizāmuddīn says that, by his artifice and tactics, Hemu prevailed over Tārdī Beg and made him flee. 2 Victorious Hemu obtained enormous booty, 1,000 horses and 160 elephants and occupied Delhi. 3

Some modern historians think that, after his occupation of Delhi, Hemu made no pretence of restoring his master. He took upon himself sovereign power by assuming the title of Raja Bikramjit (a Persian form of Bikramaditya; Bikramaditya was an illustrious king of ancient India. 4) and striking coins bearing his title. 5 These historians have based their view on the evidence of the contemporary Persian historians. The Mughal historians say that, vaunting too much of his achievements, Hemu assumed the title of Raja Bikramjit and asked the Afghāns to salute him as Hemu Shāh. 6 Ahmad Yadgar writes, "Having obtained possession of so many things appertaining to royalty, Hemu began to entertain ambitious ideas. He distributed all the spoils, except the elephants, among the Afghāns and won them over to

4. Cambridge History of India, IV, 72; Advanced History of India, 446.
5. T., II, 131; B., II, 15; F., I, 464; Bān Dorn, 176.
himself. With their concurrence, he raised the imperial canopy over himself and ordered coin to be struck in his name.

We cannot accept the evidence of the contemporary Persian historians, because we have not found any numismatic evidence showing Hemu's assumption of the insignia of sovereign power. Besides, the title Bikramjit, which is considered to have been assumed by Hemu, was, in reality, conferred on him by Ādil in 1553. We know on the evidence of Abdullā that Ādil gave Hemu this title after the latter had obtained a brilliant victory over the Karrani rebels.  

Moreover, we cannot believe that the proud and self-willed Afghan chiefs would have consented to Hemu's assumption of sovereignty and to saluting him as Hemu Shāh. Had Hemu assumed sovereign power, he would not have been able to command a large army of the Afghāns in the battle of Panipat. Even Ahmad Yadgar's statement shows that Hemu remained loyal to Ādil. This Afghan historian has quoted Hemu's letter to Ādil after his occupation of Delhi to illustrate the deceitfulness of the former to the latter. But in fact, this letter expresses Hemu's loyalty and subservience to Ādil. Ahmad Yadgar says that, in order to console Ādil, Hemu wrote to him, "Your slave by the royal fortune routed the Mughal army, which was as firm as the iron wall. I hear that Humāyūn's son commands a numerous force and is advancing against

2. D., BM., I2Ib.
Delhi. For this reason, I have kept the horses and elephants to fight the formidable enemy. "I 'Adil was comforted by these deceitful assertions."

Battle of Panipat:

On the news of Hemu's occupation of Delhi, Akbar and Bairam Khan left Gulbadan's husband Khwaja Khizr to deal with Sikandar Khan Sur and they hurried from Jalandar towards Delhi. At Sarhind the defeated Tardi Beg and other Mughal nobles presented themselves before Akbar. Here Bairam Khan, who had the general direction of affairs, executed Tardi Beg. Ostensibly, Tardi Beg was executed for what Bairam Khan considered as his flight in a cowardly fashion from Delhi. This step was taken as a warning to cowardly generals. Firishta is of opinion that such an action was a necessity. He writes: "I understood from the best informed men of the times that had Tardi Beg not been executed by way of example, such was the condition of the Mughal army and the general feeling of those foreigners that the old scene of Sher Shâh would have been acted again.

But the real cause of the execution of Tardi Beg by Bairam Khan was the power and the influence of the former, who became almost a rival to the latter. There was also a long-standing quarrel between the two. This was aggravated by the sectarian bitterness between Sunnî Tardi Beg and Shi'a Bairam.
The flight of Tardi Beg from Delhi gave Bairam Khan simply a pretext to remove his rival in the name of imperial necessity.

After the execution of Tardi Beg, Bairam Khan made preparations for the recovery of Delhi and Agra. He sent in advance Ali Quli Khan \( \times \) Zamân with a force of 10,000 and himself and his royal ward with the rest of the army followed them.

Hemu prepared to meet the Mughals. To check the advance of the enemy he sent in advance his park of artillery. In an engagement with the Mughal advance guard, it was defeated and dispersed. The news of this disaster distressed Hemu and disheartened his men. Hemu, however, encouraged them by giving an elephant to every chief and promising increased pay as well as rewards to the officers and soldiers. With 30,000 cavalry and more than 1,500 elephants, he then came to Panipat and met the Mughal advance guard, which according to Abûl Fazl, numbered 1,000 souls of whom only 5,000 were men of battle. On Thursday, November 5, 1556 (Muhaarram 2, 964), the contending forces advanced to fight in the following battle array.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Centre</th>
<th>Left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shadi Khan</td>
<td>Hemu</td>
<td>Ramya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left centre</th>
<th>Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdulla Khan</td>
<td>Sikandar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>Uzbek</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. A. N., II, 35-6; T., II, 131; F., I, 463.
2. Ibid, 35-6.
3. Ibid, 50-50; B., II, 16; F., 1, 465.
A Mughal assault shook Hemu's wings and his commander of the right, Shâdî Khân Kâkar, fell in the field. With his fierce war elephants, Hemu, however, made a desperate charge and shook the Mughal left. He then fell on the centre under 'Âlî Quli Khân Zaman. The Mughals, however, received Hemu with showers of arrows. An arrow pierced his eye and came out at the back of his head. Seeing Hemu thus mortally wounded, his men dispersed in panic.

As Hemu's elephant was making off towards the jungle, a Mughal officer, Shâh Quli Khân, fell in with the elephant and discovered Hemu lying wounded in the haudah. He then drove the elephant to Akbar and Bairâm Khân who had just arrived at Panipat and received the news of victory. Abûl Fâzîl says that Bairâm Khân asked Akbar to slay Hemu and earn the merit of a 'Ghâzi' (religious warrior). As Akbar did not care to kill a fallen enemy, Bairâm himself slew Hemu.  

Continued from page II2.


1. T., II, 131-2; A. N., II, 49; F., I, 465. Abûl Fâzîl and Firishta say that Hemu's own driver, for fear of his life, betrayed his master to Shâh Quli Khân.
2. A. N., II, 39.
3. Ibid., 41-2; T., II, 132. Jahângrî writes (Rogers - Tûzuk-i-Jahângrî, I, 40) that Akbar said that, in his boyhood, he had drawn and killed the picture of Hemu and hence he declined to kill a killed man.
Abūl Fazl greatly appreciates the genius of Hemū and regrets that Bairām Khaṇ had unwisely killed him. He says that Hemū was a most excellent servant possessed of a lofty spirit and if he could be induced to serve Emperor Akbar, he would have performed great things.¹

The death of Hemū was a great calamity to Mūsūrī Adil. It was Hemū's energy and generalship which had so long preserved his position against his enemies. In Hemū's death, the musician king lost his strength and spirit and became as helpless as a boy without a guardian.

The Afghān loss of Northern India:

The battle of Panipat had dispossessed the Afghāns of the territories from the Panjab to Agra; but still they held a large part of India. The Siwalik hills of the Panjab remained under Sikandar Khaṇ Sūr. Rukn Khaṇ Lūhānī, an amīr of Ṣad Ṣalīh, held Sambal.² Ḥājī Khaṇ governed Alwar and Mewat.³ Ṣalīh retained control of the territories from Lucknow to Gwalior to the borders of Bengal. Bāz Bahādur and Bahādur Khaṇ Sūr ruled Malwa and Bengal respectively. Thus the territories under the Afghāns were twice as extensive as the empire of Akbar and the united action of the Afghāns might have retrieved the situation even after the disaster of Panipat.

¹ A. N., II, 42.
² Ibid., 56.
³ Ibid.
But on account of their factions, the Afghans could not see the long-term interest of the Indian Afghans. They continued to fight one another and thus they prepared their own grave. A few Afghan chiefs fought individually against the Mughals and fell, while others remained passive spectators expecting to profit by the fall of the chiefs of their own race.

When Adil's general Hemu was fighting at Panipat Bahadur Khān Sūr of Bengal seized the opportunity to stab him in the back. He occupied Bihar and advanced to revenge the death of his father. In April, 1557, Adil fought against him at Fatehpur, 4 miles west of Surajgarh, and Khirat was killed. It was Akbar's good fortune that his Afghan enemies were fighting and killing themselves and thus paving the way for his supremacy in Northern India. So Abūl Faẓl writes, "I admire the wonderous fortune which occured to the empire from the mutual contention of the enemies. They fought one another and showed themselves auxiliaries of eternal dominion." 2

Sikandar Khān Sūr fought against the Mughals in the Siwalik hills of the Panjab and in March, 1557, he obtained a victory over Khwājā Khizr. At this news, Akbar and Bairam Khān advanced to deal with him. 3 Sikandar retreated to his stronghold in the Siwalik hills, which Abūl Faẓl mentions as a refuge of the disaffected and headstrong spirits of India. As Akbar won over the

---

1. B., I, 433; F., I, 443; Dacca university History of Bengal, II, 180.
2. A. N., II, 58.
local zamindars, Sikandar was obliged to take shelter in the impregnable fortress of Mankot built by Islam Shāh. The Mughals closely besieged the fort and prevented egress and ingress to it. Shortage of provisions forced Sikandar to open negotiations for peace and on July 25, 1557 (Ramžān 27, 964), he surrendered to Akbar’s promise of a jagir to him in Bengal. As a surety for his loyalty to the Emperor, he gave his son Abdur Rahmān Sūr and confidential agent Ghāzī Khān Tanūri to the service of the Mughal empire.

Hājī Khān, who joined Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr in the battle of Farrah and deserted him after his defeat, joined Hemu in the battle of Panipat. After the battle, he retired to Alwar. With his men and goods, the father of Hemu took shelter with him. Akbar sent an army under Pir Muḥammad Khān Sarwānī to Alwar. Hājī Khān fled to Ajmir and Alwar including Mewat fell into the hands of the Mughals. Hemu’s father fell a captive to them. Hājī Khān fought the Raja of Ajmir and occupied his territory. At the approach of the Mughals, he, however, fled to Guzrat and joined the Afghān chiefs of that country.

In 1557, Khān Zamān defeated and drove away Rukan Khān Lūhani from Sambal. Another Afghān chief Jalāl Khān Sūr, in

---

1. T., II, 133; B., II, 18; A. N., II, 47-51.
2. A. N., II, 58.
3. Ibid., 59; T., II, 134-5; F., I, 466.
4. Ibid., 45-6.
5. B., II, 32 and 45; Mir’at A., I, 90-I.
6. A. N. II, 56; De Laet, I42.
alliance with Hasan Khan Bachoti, one of the great zamindars of India, fought against Khan Zaman near Lucknow. He was, however, beaten by the Mughal general. As a result of these defeats, the Afghans lost to the Mughals the territories from Sambal to Lucknow.

Ibrahim Khan Sur, who had issued from his refuge in Patna after the death of Adil, took possession of Jaunpur. In 1558, Khan Zaman advanced to conquer Jaunpur. Being unable to stand the assault of the Mughal general, Ibrahim Khan Sur fled to Orissa. Khan Zaman occupied Jaunpur. In the same year, Bahadur Khan of Bengal advanced towards Jaunpur with 30 to 40 thousand horse to drive the Mughals from Northern India. Khan Zaman, however, drove him back to Bengal.

The Afghan chiefs continued their isolated efforts to recover Northern India. The partisans of Adil placed his son Sher Khan (called Sher Shāh II) on the throne at Chunar and in 1561, with a large force of 20,000 cavalry, 50,000 infantry and 500 elephants, they proceeded to recover Jaunpur. In an engagement near Jaunpur, the Afghans defeated Khan Zaman’s forces. Thinking that they had won the victory, the Afghan soldiery turned to plunder. Khan Zaman took the opportunity to make a swift attack on them. This unexpected attack made the Afghans flee in great confusion and panic. Thus the Afghans, through their cupidity and

1. A. N., II, 56; B., II, 25; De laét, 142.
2. Ibid., 82.
3. B., II, 48; De Laet, 142.
indiscipline, lost a victory.\footnote{1} After this defeat, Sher Shāh II took to the life of a recluse.\footnote{2}

Feeling that the Afghan fortune was irretrievably ruined and it was impossible for him to continue possession of Chunar, Fattū Khān Masnad-i-'Alī, a noble of 'Ādil, willingly surrendered the fort to the Mughal general Āṣaf Khān and entered the service of Akbar.\footnote{3}

When the nobles of 'Ādil had placed his son Sher Shāh II on the throne at Chunar, the supporters of the family of Islām Shāh chose his son Awāz Khān as their king at Rohtas. They took advantage of Khān Zāmān's preoccupation with Sher Shāh II to seize some Mughal territories. Then in 1561, after Sher Shāh II's defeat, they advanced towards Jaunpur with a large army. In an engagement at Andhiari, the Afghāns beat a detachment of Khān Zāmān and then they gave themselves to plunder. Abūl Fāzī says that an accident saved the position of the Mughals. An unruly elephant of Khān Zāmān's brother Bahādur Khān fell into the hands of the Afghāns. Some Afghān soldiers unchained the elephant and tried to ride it. The elephant became violent and created confusion among them. The Afghāns, who were busy in plunder, mistook the confusion to be their defeat and took to their heels.\footnote{4} With a small force, Khān Zāmān obtained a

\footnote{1} B. II, 48; A. N., II, 138-9; T., II, 154; D., BM., I26a.
\footnote{2} A. N., II, 49; D., BM., I26a.
\footnote{3} Ibid, I49-50; B., II, 63; T., II, I70.
\footnote{4} Ibid, 220.
Idecisive victory over them.

Awāz Khān's was the last attempt of the Afghāns to recover their lost territories. After this, they ceased to launch any systematic offensive against the Mughals and they gave their attention mainly to preserving what they still held in India. Akbar, however, was not inclined to allow them to retain possession of their territories. His conquest of Malwa illustrates this fact.

The Afghān loss of Malwa:

Bāz Bahādur, the king of Malwa, had given no immediate cause for offense to Akbar. When his fellow chiefs were fighting the Mughals, he remained unconcerned at the fate of his race. If he rejoiced at the downfall of his Afghān rivals or hoped by standing aloof to avoid their fate, he was disillusioned, because Akbar would never tolerate the existence of an Afghān kingdom by the side of his empire. Indeed Akbar invaded Malwa in 1560.

According to the contemporary Persian historians, the misgovernment of Bāz Bahādur was the cause of Akbar's invasion of Malwa. They say that Bāz Bahādur was so much immersed in pleasure music and women that he could not distinguish between day and night. Indeed Bāz Bahādur was a great musician. He gathered round himself nine hundred singers, musicians, songstresses and dancing girls of whom Rupamati excelled others in beauty and wit.

1. B., II, 24-5.
2. A. N., II, 1346; T., II, 151; M., 168a; Ma'āsir, I, 388.
He was adept in various kinds of Hindi tunes and in the composition of Hindi love songs. During his reign, music reached its perfection. Being thus given music, Bāz Bahādur neglected the government of the country. His indifference to government caused suffering to his people and Akbar thought it his duty to deliver them from the evils of misgovernment.

It may, however, be pointed out that the misgovernment of Bāz Bahādur did not in any way injure the interests of the Mughal empire. So, the question of misgovernment was simply an excuse to justify the conquest of the country. The fact is that Akbar could not reconcile himself to leaving the Afghāns in the possession of the fertile country of Malwa, which enjoyed great strategic importance for subjecting Rajputana, Guzrat, Gondwana and also for an expansion in the Deccan.

Akbar's first preparations for an attack upon Malwa, made in 1559, were abortive for the rebellion of Bairām Khān made it necessary to recall the army under Bahādur Khān, the brother of Khān Zāmān. In 1561 after Bairām's fall, Akbar renewed his attempt, sending a large army under Adham Khān and Pīr Muḥammad Sarwānī. Bāz Bahādur was so given to pleasure that he did not act until the Mughals had arrived within three miles of his capital.

I. M., I68a-b ; F., II, 538.
2. Ibid, I68a ; A. N., II, 134-6 ; T., II, 151 ; Maʾāṣir, I, 388.
Sarangpur. Nīmatullā says that it was only then, yielding to urgency, that he left the room of his beauties and took the field. The Mughals, however, defeated him and occupied Malwa. ¹

Bāz Bahādur wandered in the jungles of Malwa and Khandesh. Pīr Muhammad Khān Shirwānī again defeated him at Awan in Bijagār.² Bāz Bahādur took shelter with Mirāk Mubārak Shāh, the ruler of Khandesh. In 1562, he advanced towards Malwa with a large army of Khandesh and in an engagement on the bank of the Narbada, he defeated Pīr Muhammad, who, in his flight, was drowned in the river.³ At his approach, Qiyā Khān and other Mughal generals left Malwa. Bāz Bahādur recovered his ḍama throne.⁴

Bāz Bahādur had scarcely time to draw breath before Akbar sent Abdullā Khān Ūzbek to Malwa. As resistance to the mighty Mughal force was beyond his power, Bāz Bahādur left the country without a fight.⁵

Bāz Bahādur first took shelter with Baharji, the zamīndār of Baglana, and thence he went to Guzrat seeking help of the Fūlādī Afghan chiefs of Patān.⁶ Being disappointed, he went to Ahmadnagar. As he failed to obtain help of the Nizām ul Mulk, he went to Rana Pratap Singh of Mewar.⁷

---

2. A. N., II, I66 ; Ma'āṣir, I, 390.
3. Badāunī (II, 51) says "He went by water to fire."⁸
4. A N., II, I67-8 ; Ma'āṣir, i, 390 ; F., I, 541.
5. Ibid.
Abūl Fazl says that Akbar felt pity for the musician ex-king of Malwa and in 1571 induced him to come to the court with a promise of favour. He made him a court musician and gave him a mansab of 1,000 which was later on raised to 2,000.

Causes of the Afghan loss of Northern India:

It is surprising that the Afghans, who had been long settled in India and had the vast resources of the country at their disposal, should have suffered defeat after defeat and lost the sovereignty to a foreign people like the Mughals. What were the causes of such an unexpected event?

Sher Shāh would often say to his people, "The Afghans are not inferior to the Mughals in valour and courage; but they lost the sovereignty of Hindustan on account of their discord and dissension." 2 Of course, Sher Shāh's statement refers to the loss of Afghan sovereignty in 1526. This analysis of the cause, however, applies equally well to the loss of sovereignty in 1556. The primary cause of the national disaster on both the occasions remained the same, the factious spirit, discord and dissension of the Afghans. In translating Fīrishta, Alexander Dow maintains the same view. 3 On the eve of both the occasions, there had been factious fight and civil war among the Afghans and this prevented them from presenting an united front to the enemy.

1. A. N., II, 358; T., III, 423-4; M., I68a-b; Ma'āṣir, I, 390-I.
2. Abbas, BM., 2ob.
Faction was inherent in the nature of the Afghans and their loss of sovereignty in 1526 and again in 1556, owing to that spirit, proves that the empire was not for such a tribal people.

It is generally believed that Islam Shah's autocracy engendered faction of the Afghans and prepared conditions for the fall of the Afghan sultanate. In fact, Islam Shah wanted to destroy the idea of the tribal independence of the Afghans and consolidate the sultanate. Had he lived longer and been succeeded by a strong and energetic ruler like himself, the Afghan sultanate would have emerged consolidated and stronger. But he had a very short reign and was succeeded first by a minor and then by a weakling. It was really the incapacity of Adil that frustrated the labours of Islam Shah and caused the fall of the Afghan sultanate in Northern India.

The Afghan army, which was the pride of Sher Shah and the prop of Islam Shah, lost its morale at the time of Adil. They behaved like a mob on the field of battle and caring more for spoils, they would often give themselves to plunder before they had actually won the victory. On several occasions, the Afghans failed to clinch their victory on account of this sort of behaviour in the battle. Though Badami says that ten Mughals could meet thousand of the Afghans, we consider that the Mughals won victory not because of their superiority in courage,
but because of the indiscipline of the Afghāns.

According to the contemporary historians, Hemu's elevation to supreme position in the saltanate and his usurpation of sovereign power were responsible for the fall of the Afghān saltanate. Bādāunī and Niʿmatullā say that the Afghāns were so much dissatisfied with Hemu that they prayed for his fall and even welcomed a vicissitude against themselves in the battle of Panipat. We have discussed before that Hemu was neither insolent towards the Afghāns nor did he usurp the sovereign power. We have discussed before that Hemu was neither insolent towards the Afghāns. The raising of a Hindu to supreme position in the saltanate was itself enough to dissatisfy the Afghāns. Hemu, however, sought to satisfy them by his care for them. He also gave them rewards. The success of Hemu in various campaigns against the rebels and Mughals shows that, in spite of his being a Hindu, he inspired the confidence of the Afghān soldiers. The fact that he was able to command 30,000 horsemen in the battle of Panipat bears out that he still had the confidence of the Afghāns.

The defeat of the Afghāns at Panipat was not due to the dissatisfaction of the Afghāns with Hemu's leadership. It was rather the absence of his leadership which dispirited them. As an

1. B., II, 15; M., 166a.
arrow disabled him, the leaderless Afghans dispersed in panic from the battle-field.

In spite of their long association with India, the Afghans failed to enlist the support and the sympathy of the subject people. The fact that several inhabitants of Delhi and Agra informed Humayun of Islam Shah's death and of the dissension of the Afghans and invited him to India expresses the feeling of dissatisfaction of the subject people towards the ruling Afghans and their admiration for the expelled Mughals. It shows that the Indian section of the population, they remained a strange people in the middle of the sixteenth century as they had been in the beginning of the reign of Bahlul Ludi.

The civil wars of the Afghans did great harm to the people at large. From 1553 to 1556, there was continuous fighting from the Panjab to Bengal. This must have caused great injury to agriculture, trade and industry. Badāuni says that in 1555 a great famine raged in the territories from Delhi to Agra and Biana. People died in their thousands and men ate man. The damage to corn-fields and famine could not have failed to aggravate the discontent of the people against the Afghan regime. In the circumstances, they did everything in their power to undermine such a rule.

1. A. N., I, 336; F., I, 456; De Last, I39.
3. B., I, 430.
As the two important regions, Kabul-Panjab and Bengal, remained outside, the Afghan saltanate of Northern India lost the sources of its strength. The province of Kabul and the north-west frontier area were the recruiting ground of the Afghāns. As Kabul was in the hands of Humayūn and the Gakkars in the frontier were friendly to him, the Afghan chiefs experienced great difficulty in recruiting fresh soldiers. Humayūn's conquest of the Panjab in 1555 completely severed the Afghan-land from the Afghāns of India.

Bengal was another source of strength to the Afghan saltanate. Its wealth and resources helped the establishment of the Sūr Afghan saltanate. So, Sher Shāh and Islām Shāh maintained their strong hold on Bengal. With Ḍilī's accession, however, it became independent under Muḥammad Khān Sūr. Though it remained under an Afghan chief, it proved a source of trouble and weakness to the saltanate of Northern India, because Muḥammad Khān Sūr and his successor Bahādūr Khān Sūr contested the sovereignty of Northern India with Ḍilī. This also lessened the strength of the Afghāns and paved the way for the loss of their hegemony in Northern India.
CHAPTER V

The Afghan Sultanate in Eastern India
and its relations with the Mughals

Even after the loss of Northern India, the Afghans possessed Eastern India, which, in his great political wisdom, Sher Shah made had made his early seat of power and the stronghold of the Afghans. Akbar was, however, determined on expelling them from it. But he could not do so until the powerful Afghan ruler Sulaiman Karrani had died in 1572.

The infiltration of the Afghans into Bengal began in the fifteenth century when they came as mercenaries of its independent sultans. The Habshi sultan Muzaffar Shah (1491-94) had a few thousand Afghan soldiers in his army. There were some Afghan officers and a body of Afghan soldiers in the service of Alauddin Husain Shah (1498-1517), the founder of the Saiyid dynasty in Bengal. The battle of Panipat in 1526 made a few Afghans, including Ibrahim Ludi, his brother Mahmud Ludi and some members of his family, flee to Bengal. The Saiyid sultan Nasrat Shah (1517-32) gave parganas and towns for their maintenance and married a daughter of Ibrahim Ludi. Thus the Afghans obtained shelter in Bengal, which was destined to be their seat of power and home from 1539 to 1576.

I. Riyāz, I28.
2. Ibid, I33.
3. Ibid, I34.
conciliatory policy of Babur and Humayun left the Luhani and Sur Afghans undisturbed in Bihar.

Sher Shah's sultanate in Eastern India:

A wise and a far-sighted politician, Sher Shah saw the importance of Bengal and decided to make it, with its proverbial wealth as a support and equally proverbial bad climate as a barrier, the citadel of the last Afghan power in India. Indeed Bengal was fabulously rich. Ibn Batuta, who visited Bengal in 1346, spoke in glowing terms of the general prosperity of the country. In his Memoirs, Babur also wrote, "To amass treasure, the Bengalis regard as a glorious distinction and it is considered as a disgraceful fault in a ruler to spend and consume the treasure of his predecessors." The writings of the Mughal historians also disclose that in the sixteenth century, Bengal possessed enormous riches.

Besides its wealth, Bengal also possessed a notoriously bad climate on account of its swamps and marshes. Hence, Ibn Batuta says; the men coming from Khurasan called it 'dúzakh-i-purnimát' or the hell of all good things. Owing to its bad climate, the Mughal officers did not want to serve in Bengal. In 1538, Humayun wanted to appoint one of his nobles, Zahid Beg, as

---

1. Ibid., See pp. 184-92.
5. Same as in 2.
its governor, Zahid Beg said, "What! could Your Majesty find no other place to kill me than in Bengal." Even the Mughal soldiers grumbled at going to Bengal. So, Akbar increased by 100 p. c. and 50 p. c. respectively the pay of the soldiers serving in Bengal and Bihar. 2

The bad climate together with the hundreds of streams, which glide over the water-logged soil, not only discouraged the soldiers of Northern India from coming to Bengal but also afforded a great defence to the country. They had always helped Bengal in throwing off the yoke of the saltanate of Delhi and asserting its independence. Hence, Baranī writes that shrewd and well-informed men gave Bengal the name of Bulghakpur, i.e., the city of strife. 3 Abul Fazl also expresses the same idea regarding Bengal. He writes, "The country of Bengal is a land where, owing to the climate's favouring the base, the dust of dissension is always rising. So, in old writings it was called Bulghak Khāna or the house of strife." 4

Realising the importance of Bengal for its wealth and climate, Sher Shah, from the beginning of his career, made repeated attempts to conquer it and in 1538 succeeded in occupying its capital Gaur. The vast wealth he obtained in Gaur greatly strengthened his position against Humāyūn and enabled

---

2. A. N., III, 293.
3. Baranī, 82.
him in 1539 to defeat the Mughals at Chausa. Ni'matulla says that, for want of adequate transport, Sher Shah could not carry the treasures of Gaur to Rohtas until Jalāl Khān sent him the elephants, horses and camels which he had captured from the Mughals by a surprise attack on them at Garhi. 1

That Sher Shah was keenly alive to the importance of Bengal is proved by the fact that in 1538 when Humāyūn advanced towards Bihar, he offered to surrender Bihar and pay him ten lak of rupees as tribute if he was left in possession of Bengal. 2 Humāyūn wanted to give him some places in Bihar and Jaunpur. But on no account did Sher Shah consent to part with Bengal. 3

Even after he had occupied the throne of Delhi, Sher Shah attached the same importance to Bengal and maintained his hold tight on that country. In 1542 when Khizr Khān Turs showed signs of rebellion by marrying a daughter of the last Saiyid sultan Mahmūd III and sitting on the TukTukī (raised platform) in the manner of the kings, he left his urgent work of completing the construction of the fort of Rohtas in the Panjab and hastened towards Bengal. He imprisoned the rebelliously inclined governor and divided Bengal into several parts giving them to tribal chiefs as jagirs. To exercise a general supervision over the chiefs and to settle the disputes that

1. M. II4a.
2. 'Abbās, II, 59a; Dorn, III.
might arise between them, Sher Shāh appointed Qāżī Fazīlat, a man well-known for his learning and honesty, as the amin (trusty) of the country. Indeed Sher Shāh's vigilance maintained his hold on the whole of Bengal extending to the hills of Assam in the north-east and Chittagong in the south-east.  

Islam Shāh also attached great importance to the possession of Bengal. In following the policy of centralising the saltanate, he appointed one of his relations and a very capable man, Muḥammad Khān Sūr, as governor of the province. In 1546-48, Islam Shāh took prompt action in suppressing Sulaimān Khān, who aimed at the restoration of the Saiyid saltanate in Bengal.

Independent Sūr saltanate in Eastern India:

In 1553, on the murder of Islam Shāh's son and successor Firūz and the accession of 'Adil, Muḥammad Khān Sūr, who was the supporter of the ousted family, declared himself as a sovereign ruler of Bengal and, assuming the title of Shaḥsuddin Muḥammad Shāh Ghāzī, he struck coins in his own name. Seated on the throne, Muḥammad Shāh turned his eyes to Northern India and prepared to make a bid for the saltanate of Delhi.

With his eyes riveted to the north, Muḥammad Shāh neglected the east and in 1553 the Arakanese king Meng Beng

References:
1. 'Abbās, IO., 87b; BM., 57a; T., II, Io2.
3. B., I, 432; T., II, 124; Riyāż, 148.
seized the opportunity to occupy Chittagong. This renewed, after the lapse of a century and a half, the tripartite struggle among the rulers of Bengal, Tripura and Arakan for the possession of Chittagong. Meng Beng could not long retain his hold on the port. In 1554 Bijoymanikya, the powerful king of Tripura (1540-71), dispossessed him of it. Tripura's hold on Chittagong, however, lasted only a few months. Rajmala, the family chronicle of the kings of Tripura, records its capture by the Afghan general Mubarak Khan. The Arakan coin of Muhammad Khan Sur also shows that in 1554 he not only recovered Chittagong but also occupied Arakan. The forces of Bijoymanikya fought eight months without success to recapture Chittagong. Digging holes under the walls of the fort at night, they, however, entered the fort and defeated the Afghans in a surprise attack. They occupied Chittagong and, taking the Afghan general Mubarak Khan a captive to Rangamati, they slaughtered him as a sacrifice to their fourteen gods. Engaged with Adil in the north, Muhammad Khan Sur could not arrange for the recovery of Chittagong.

Aiming at the throne of Delhi, Muhammad Khan Sur had entered into a sharp rivalry with Adil. In 1555 he occupied Bihar and Jaunpur and then advanced towards Agra. In December

4. Langpole - Catalogue of the Indian coins, 56 ;
Wright - Catalogue of the coins of the Indian Museum, II, 180
5. Rajmala, II, 47.
he fought a battle with 'Adil's general Hemu at Chapparghata, 15 kos from Agra, but was defeated and killed.¹

The chiefs of Muhammad Khan Sur retreated to a village named Jhusi, opposite to Allahabad, and raised his son Khizr Khan to the throne. Khizr Khan assumed the title of Ghiyāsuddīn Bahādūr Shāh.² He then proceeded to recover Bengal, which was in the meantime occupied by 'Adil. Bahādūr Shāh fought a battle with 'Adil's governor of Bengal, Shāhbāz Khan, near Gaur. He defeated and killed him and entered his capital Gaur.³

Bahādūr Shāh raised a large army and in 1557 advanced to revenge the death of his father. The rebel Tāj Khan Karrani and his brothers joined him.⁴ In April, 1557 in a battle at Fathpur, four miles west of Surajgarh, their combined forces defeated and killed 'Adil.⁵ As a result of this victory, the whole of Bihar passed into the hands of Bahādūr Shāh. Leaving Tāj Khan Karrani in charge of Bihar, he returned to Gaur.⁶

Master of Bengal and Bihar, Bahādūr Shāh resolved to expel the Mughals from Northern India and to recover the lost sovereignty of the Afghāns. In 1558 he advanced towards Jaunpur with 30,000 horse. In an engagement near Jaunpur, he routed the an

¹. Idem, 104
². B., I., 433; Riyāz, 149; Wright - Catalogue of the coins of the Indian Museum, II, 181.
³. Riyāz, 150.
⁴. R. T., 697a.
⁵. B., I., 433; R. T., 697a.
⁶. R. T., 697a.
army of Khān Zamān, the Mughal viceroy of the eastern provinces. Thinking that they had won the victory, the Afghan soldiers gave themselves to plunder. While they were thus engaged, Khān Zamān made a surprise attack on them and dispersed them. Many of the Afghāns were killed and captured and their baggage fell into the hands of the Mughals. 

This defeat made Bahādur Shāh wiser. He understood that the Mughals had consolidated their position in Northern India and it was sheer waste of energy and resources to try to drive them from it. Henceforth Bahādur Shāh kept himself within his own territorial limits and maintained good relations with the Mughal viceroy at Jaunpur.

Bahādur Shāh died in 1560 and was succeeded by his brother Jalāluddīn Sūr, who assumed the title of Ghīyāsuddīn Abūl Muzaffar Jalāl Shāh. It appears from a Mosque inscription near Sherpur Murcha in Bogra district that in 1553 in the reign of his father, Jalāl installed himself as an independent ruler in eastern Bengal. He, however, submitted to his father and was nominated second in succession.

Jalāl Shāh followed a very pacific foreign policy. In his relations with the Mughals, he avoided provoking them. So, he remained a passive spectator of the campaigns of the Afghāns of Chunar and Rohtas for the recovery of Northern India.

---

1. B., II, 25.
2. Riyaż, 150; Wright - Catalogue of coins in Indian Museum, II, 1875, 275. Inscription is dated 960 H.
Jalāl Shāh died in 1563 and was succeeded by his son, whose name, however, has not been mentioned by the contemporary historians. After a reign of seven months and nine days, he fell a victim to a usurper, who assumed the title of Ghiyāsuddīn. Ghiyāsuddīn reigned one year and eleven days. In 1564 he was killed by Tāj Khān, the founder of the Karrānī saltanate in Bengal.

The Karrānī saltanate in Eastern India

Tāj Khān Karrānī, the founder

The Karrānī Afghāns, who had remained obscure in the Lūdī saltanate, rose to great political importance in the period of the Sūr rule under their chiefs Tāj Khān Karrānī and Sulaimān Khān Karrānī. Tāj Khān's father Jamāl Khān played no significant role in the history of the Afghāns, because we do not find any reference to him except in an inscription which mentions him as his son. Worthy sons of an obscure father, Tāj Khān and Sulaimān Khān, were, however, destined to political greatness.

We first see Tāj Khān and Sulaimān Khān in 1540 fighting as generals of Sher Shāh at the battle of Kanauj. In recognition of their services, Sher Shāh gave them jagirs in Khwaspur Tanda and other places on the bank of the Ganges in South Bihar. He especially favoured Tāj Khān for his intelligence and courage.

I. Wright - Catalogue of coins in Indian Museum, II, 181. The coin is dated 970 H.

2. Riyāz, 152.
3. JBOBS., IV, 188; Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica, 1933-4, 7-8.
5. Riyāz, 153; Hiram Stewart, - History of Bengal, 147.
and made him a constant companion of his son Jalāl, who, after his death in 1545, ascended the throne under the title of Islām Shāh.

In the reign of Islām Shāh, Tāj Khān became one of his principal nobles and confidential agents. He rendered very valuable and loyal service to his royal master. In 1548, Tāj Khān defeated and killed the dangerous pretender Sulaimān Khān of Bhati and thus saved the eastern part of Islām Shāh's saltanate. He also got Islām Shāh rid of Khwās Khān by treacherously murdering him. The contemporary historians condemn Tāj Khān for his base ingratitude to his benefactor Khwās Khān, because he owed his preferment to that great general of Sher Shāh. In fact, Tāj Khān took to unscrupulous methods in order to please Islām Shāh.

At the time of his death, Islām Shāh left his minor son Fīrūz to the care of Tāj Khān and when Fīrūz ascended the throne Tāj Khān became his vazīr and the absolute authority in the saltanate. The jealousy of the other Afghan chiefs, however, caused the dismissal of Tāj Khān from that high office. After his dismissal, it was easy for Adil to kill the boy king Fīrūz and to obtain the saltanate.

On account of Tāj Khān's attachment to the

1. R. T., 696b.
4. R. T., 696b; Shāhī, 272-4.
5. Ibid.
family of Islam Shāh, Ṣālṭah could not trust him and wanted to ruin him. One day someone made an attempt on Tāj Khān’s life at Gwalior. Tāj Khān suspected that the attempt on his life had been made at the instigation of Ṣālṭah. He also saw the rise of the factions among the Afghān chiefs of Ṣālṭah. So, he thought it wise to retire from his court, which he termed as the house of strife.

In 1553 on the eve of Ṣālṭah’s Gwalior darbar, Tāj Khān escaped from Gwalior and took the road to Bengal.¹

On the news of Tāj Khān’s flight, Ṣālṭah detached a large force in pursuit of him and himself followed it. At Chappramau, forty kos from Agra and thirty kos from Kanauj, Tāj Khān fought against the forces of Ṣālṭah. Defeated, he fled towards Chunar. On the way, he won over a few revenue collectors of crown lands and seized the treasure and 100 elephants belonging to the king. He then joined his brothers Sulaimān, Iliyās and Imād in South Bihar.² A large number of Afghāns entered his service and he became absolute in South Bihar.³

Ṣālṭah and Hemu advanced to suppress the Karrani rebels. In 1554 in a battle near the Ganges, Hemu defeated them.⁴ As Ṣālṭah had to divert his energies to suppress the pretender Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr, the Karranīs, however, remained master of South Bihar.

Tāj Khān had also to fight against Muhammad Khān Sūr.

¹ and 2. T., II, 121–2; B., I, 420; M., 168b.
³. M., 168b.
⁴. R. T., 697a.
the ruler of Bengal, who could not tolerate the independent existence of the Karranis in South Bihar. Being placed between two powerful enemies, Adil in the north and Muhammad Khan Sur in the east, he felt himself insecure in his possessions. So, he made peace with the new sultanate in Bengal and helped it against Adil. In 1557, the Karranis joined Bahadur Shah in the battle of Surajgarh, in which Adil was defeated and killed. After the battle, Bahadur Shah left Taj Khan in charge of the newly acquired province of Bihar. An inscription dated 1559 refers to Bahadur Shah as the overlord of Taj Khan. It also mentions Taj Khan bearing the title of Masnad-i-Ali. It suggests that Taj Khan received the title from Bahadur Shah and recognised his vassalage at least up to the year 1559.

Towards the close of Bahadur Shah’s reign, Taj Khan showed signs of insubordination and hence he was recalled to Gaur. The Karrani chief, however, ignored the summons of his overlord and, contracting friendship with the Mughal viceroy Khan Zaman, strengthened his position and sent his brother Sulaiman Karrani with an army to invade Bengal. Bahadur Shah raised a large force to fight the Karranis. He, however, fell ill and died. His

1. A. N., II, 325. Abul Fazl says that Taj Khan and his brothers were sometimes at strife and sometimes in friendly relations with the Sur sultans of Bengal.
2. R. T., 697a.
3. JBOBS., IV, 188; Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica, 1933-4, 7-8.
4. R. T., 697a.
brother Jalāl Shāh averted the Karrani invasion and maintained friendly relations with Taj Khan Karrani.¹

The civil strife that began after the death of Jalāl Shāh in 1563 and the troubles caused by the usurpation of Ghiyāṣuddīn III gave Taj Khan an opportunity to make a bid for the throne of Bengal. In 1564, he defeated and killed Ghiyāṣuddīn and occupied Gaur.² This introduced the Karrani saltanate in Bengal and Bihar.

Taj Khan's relations relations with the Mughals:

Taj Khan Karrani maintained friendly relations with Khan Zaman, the Mughal viceroy at Jaunpur. Indeed he was a shrewd politician. He realised that if he was to maintain his position in Bihar and conquer Bengal, he must have good relations with the Mughal power. Akbar was bent on conquering Bihar and Bengal. Bahādur Shāh also was not inclined to tolerate the independent attitude of Taj Khan in Bihar. So, Taj Khan was between two fires and it stands to his credit that, by his diplomacy, he not only preserved his position but also acquired the throne of Bengal.

Considering an alliance with the Karranīs of Bihar to be useful to him, Khan Zaman, who thought of rebelling against the Emperor, responded to Taj Khan's gesture of friendship. As a mark of his friendship, Taj Khan made occasional presents to the viceroy.

I. A. N., II, 325.
2. R. T., 697a.
3. A. N., II, 325 ; Biyāt, Iooa.
In 1559, he sent Khan Zaman the present of some elephants and pieces of some muslin (Bengali fine cloth). 1

In 1562 when Akbar reappointed Khan Zaman to the viceroyalty of Jaunpur, in a farman he promised to assign to him the country of Bengal if the latter could conquer it from the Afghans. Bayazid Biyāt says that Khan Zaman could easily conquer Bengal and really he conquered it, but he gave it to Taj Khan. 2

In fact, in view of the enmity between the Sūr Afghāns and the Karrānī Afghāns and the civil strife at Gaur, it would not have been difficult for the veteran Mughal general Khan Zaman to conquer Bihar and Bengal. But he did not wish for the expansion of Akbar’s empire. He was planning to rebel against the Emperor and to establish an independent kingdom at in Jaunpur. In his contemplated scheme, Khan Zaman counted on the Karrānīs and hence he strengthened his friendship with Taj Khan. So it is probable that he helped Taj Khan in conquering Bengal from the Sūr Afghāns.

Taj Khan Karrānī could not long enjoy his newly-acquired position in Bengal. In 1565 a few months after his conquest of Bengal, he died. 3 All the contemporary historians have appreciated his ability, learning and wisdom. 4 Badauni mentions him as the wisest and the most learned man of the Afghāns. 5

1. Biyāt, 100a.
2. Ibid.
4. R. T., 696b.
5. B., I, 409.
Sulaimān Karrānī:

In 1565 after the death of Tāj Khān, his brother Sulaimān Karrānī succeeded to the saltanate of Bengal and Bihar.¹ The accession of Sulaimān Karrānī ushered in a brilliant period of Karrānī rule in Bengal and Bihar. An able, tactful and wise ruler, Sulaimān gave vigour to the Afghān saltanate and made it a strong power in Eastern India. Indeed it was the strength of his saltanate, which, at least for a generation, saved the position of the Afghāns in the face of the opposition of Akbar and also made a new home in Orissa.

Time and circumstance favoured Sulaimān in building a powerful saltanate. This was a time when the various branches of the Sūr family which had fought each other and made unsuccessful attempts for the recovery of Northern India had died down. The extinction of the Sūr family had left Sulaimān without a rival for the leadership of the Afghāns. The dispossessed and bewildered Afghāns flocked to his refuge and leadership ² and strengthened his position in Eastern India. So, Abūl Fazl says that the brainless Afghāns gathered round Sulaimān and he acquired strange power.³ He also possessed a large army and immense riches.⁴ He had a force of 3,600 elephants.

1. A. N., II, 325; R. T., 697a.
2. D., B.M., 126a; School, 162.
A. A. N., II, 325.
4. Ibid.
40,000 cavalry, 14,000 infantry and 20,000 pieces of cannon and several hundred war-boats. The writings of De Laet also expresses that Sulaimān was a very powerful ruler of Eastern India.

Sulaimān Karrani was a just and pious ruler. A Mosque inscription found in the town of Bihar calls him a second Solomon in justice and piety. The contemporary historians also praise him for these qualities. They say that he strictly observed the rules of Islām in his personal and public life. Sulaimān used to say his prayers every night in the company of 150 sheikhs and 'ulema and he discussed with them religious matters till morning when, after performing the morning prayer, he would attend to state affairs. Bādāuni says that the news of Sulaimān's association with the sheikhs and 'ulema inspired Emperor Akbar to build an 'Ībādatkhāna (house of worship) for the discussion of religious and philosophical matters with the learned.

Though an orthodox Muslim, Sulaimān Karrani followed the previous sultāns of Bengal in their liberal policy towards the Hindus. In order to win over the Hindus, he appointed them to higher posts in the government. In his reign,

1. Stewart - History of Bengal, 152.
3. Blochmann - History and Geography of Bengal, JASB., 1875, 305.
4. R. T., 697a ; M., 170b ; B., 11, 200-1.
5. B., 11, 200-1.
Ramananda Guha and his sons Bhabananda, Gunananda and Sibananda held important offices in the government.² Bhabananda and Gunananda rose even to the position of his ministers and Sibananda to that of the headship of the revenue department.² Bhabananda's son Srihari became the most intimate companion of Sulaiman Karrani's son Daud. In the reign of Daud, Srihari rose to the vazirate and obtained the lofty title of Bikramaditya.³

Conquest of Orissa:

The conquest of Orissa is one of the important events of Sulaiman Karrani's rule. Sulaiman was induced to undertake a military expedition against Orissa because its king Mukunda Harichandana maintained a hostile attitude towards him. The Raja had given shelter to Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr and Sulaiman feared that he might create trouble for him.⁴ In fact, Akbar wanted to utilise Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr to destroy Sulaiman's power in Eastern India. He drew the Raja into an alliance and induced him to undertake a military expedition to Bengal, if Sulaiman Karrani helped the rebel viceroy Khān Zamān.⁵ In view of Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr's presence in Orissa and the alliance of the Raja with the Emperor, Sulaiman Karrani could not feel himself secure in his possessions so long Orissa remained outside his dominions. So,

1. Pratapaditya Charitra, 4-9.
3. Pratapaditya Charitra, 4-9.
5. Ibid, 258.
to secure his position in Eastern India, he thought it necessary to remove a source of danger by the conquest of Orissa. Sulaimān also felt that, in view of the wealth and resources of Orissa, its acquisition would greatly strengthen him against Akbar.

Sulaimān chose a very suitable time to invade Orissa. In 1567 when Akbar was busy in the conquest of Chitor, he sent an army to Orissa under his son Bāyazīd, Sikandar Uzbek, a deserter from the court of Akbar, and Kālā Pahār, a converted Muslim. After a fierce fight, the Afghāns occupied the whole of Orissa including Puri. Enormous spoil including gold came into their possession. Ni’matullā says that every Afghān, who took part in the campaign, obtained as booty one or two gold images. Kālā Pahār destroyed the temple of Jagannath in Puri which contained 700 idols made of gold, the biggest of which weighed 30 mans. Sulaimān appointed his vazir Lūdī and Qatlū Lūhānī as governors of Orissa and Puri respectively.

Relations with Koch Bihar:

Immediately after the conquest of Orissa, Sulaimān had to fight a defensive battle with the neighbouring kingdom of Koch Bihar. Proud of his conquest of Kamtapur, in 1568 Raja Biswa Singh invaded Bengal. Sulaimān, however, defeated the Koch.

---

1. A. N., III, 610. Kālā Pahār's early name was Raju (A. N., III, 610).
army and captured its general Prince Sukladhwaja.

In retaliation, Sulaimān sent his general Kālā Pahār to invade Koch Bihar. The Afghan army overran the country as far as Tezpur up to the Brahmaputra. They demolished the temples of Kamakhya, Hajo and other places and returned. Sulaimān Karrānī's idea was to vindicate his strength. So, he did not annex the Koch territories. Moreover, as a gesture of friendship to the Koch king he released the Koch Prince from captivity.¹ In this friendly move towards Koch Bihar, Sulaimān Karrānī was actuated by his desire to secure the northern frontier of his territory in the event of a Mughal invasion of Bihar and Bengal.

Sulaimān's relations with Akbar:

In his relations with the Mughal empire, Sulaimān Karrānī showed great political wisdom and sagacity. In this field, his policy had threefold features. In order to placate the powerful Mughal Emperor Akbar, he made an outward show of submission to him by making occasional presents and having his name entered in the khutba and coins.² Secondly, Sulaimān followed the footsteps of his elder brother in maintaining friendly relations with the Mughal viceroy of the eastern provinces.

¹. Gait - History of Assam, 54. Salīm (Riyāḍ, 153) says that the Afghan army besieged Koch capital, but the news of the rebellion in Orissa made Sulaimān withdraw the siege. Abūl Fazl (A. N. III, 717) says that the Koch king did not pay his respects to the ruler of Bengal. So, Sulaimān made war upon him, but he returned after failure.

². A. N., III, 19-20 and 69, B., II, 173-4; T., II, 281; R. T., 697a
Indeed the maintenance of friendship with the Mughal viceroy on the border of Bihar formed the cardinal principle in the foreign policy of the Karranī ruler. Lastly, while maintaining a position of outward submission to Emperor Akbar, Sulaimān Karranī also pursued a policy of watchful opportunism in seizing every opportunity to cause embarrassment to the Emperor.

The contemporary historians say that Sulaimān Karranī made presents to Akbar and read the khutba and struck coins in Emperor's name. The Afghan historians Ni‘matullā and ʿAbdullā, however, say that Sulaimān Karranī established sovereign power in Bengal and Bihar. We cannot accept the view of the Afghan historians because Sulaimān Karranī did not issue any coins. The right of coinage was regarded as an essential insignia of sovereign power. Though Sulaimān Karranī ruled for eight years (1565-72), we have not yet found any of his coins, while we have a good number of coins of his son Dāud, who ruled only four years.

Besides, Sulaimān did not assume the title of Shāh or Sultān as Dāud did after him. He took upon himself the title of Ḥazrat-i-ʿAlī or His Exalted Highness. Both the Mughal and the Afghan historians agree on this point. The title of Ḥazrat-i-ʿAlī does not indicate that Sulaimān claimed sovereign power. This was a title first assumed by Sher Shāh in 1535 when,

1. A. N., III, 19-20 and 69; R. T., 697a; B., II, 173-4; T., II, 281.
2. M., 170a; D., BM., 126a.
3. Ibid; B., II, 163.
after his victory over the combined forces of the Bengali sultan Mahmūd III and the Lūhānī ruler Jalāl Khān at Surajgarh, he became the master of Bihar. Though he became supreme in Bihar and assumed the title of Ḥāẓrat-i-Ālī, Sher Shāh did not have his name entered in the khutba and coins and he continued to recognise the de jure sovereignty of Ḥumāyūn. It was only in 1539 after the battle of Chausa that he assumed the title of Shāh and claimed for himself sovereign power by striking coins and reading the khutba in his own name. Sulaimān Karrānī's assumption of Ḥāẓrat-i-Ālī title suggests that he was a de facto ruler of Bengal just as Sher Shāh had been in the period, 1535-1539.

Moreover, the Afghān historians wrote long after Sulaimān Karrānī had died. Being of the same race, they were carried away by their sentiment for their ruler and wrote that he rose to sovereign power. Also there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the contemporary Mughal historians, particularly of Badaūnī, who had nothing but praise for Sulaimān Karrānī. We see that the Mughal historians have informed us that Bāyazīd and Dāud assumed the insignia of royalty. Had their father Sulaimān Karrānī assumed sovereign power they would have mentioned it.

There are other considerations which favour the evidence of the Mughal historians. Sulaimān was a shrewd and

1. ʿAbbās, IO., 72a; BM., 47a.
prudent ruler. He aimed at preserving and strengthening his position without giving offence to the powerful Mughal Emperor. His assumption of de jure sovereignty would have thrown a direct challenge to him. Akbar, who already greatly distrusted the Afghans and who also aimed at installing himself as paramount ruler over the whole of India, could not have tolerated Sulaiman's open assumption of royalty. So, Sulaiman had to be very cautious in his relations with the Mughal empire. Though he was de facto ruler in Bengal and Bihar, he wanted to placate the Emperor by owning lip homage to him. Abul Fazl saw through the policy of Sulaiman and called him a hypocrite, who, to secure his position, made an outward show of submission. 1 In fact, Sulaiman's hypocrisy was his statesmanship. It saved his position as well as the home of the Afghans in Bengal and Bihar. It also enabled him to acquire Orissa and to strengthen his position.

Besides, it would have been difficult for Sulaiman Karrani to maintain friendship with the Mughal viceroys Khan Zaman and Khan Khanan, if he had assumed the insignia of sovereign power. Akbar could not have allowed his viceroys to contract friendship with his open enemies.

Forced to accept some practical limitations to his own power, Akbar had to be satisfied for the time being with

1. A. N., III, 19-20 and 69.
Sulaimān Karranī's show of submission. Indeed, from the very beginning of his reign, he wanted to expel the Afghāns from Bihar and Bengal. In 1557 when Sikandar Khān Sūr surrendered Mankot, Akbar resolved to clear Bengal of the Afghāns. Again, in 1563 when he reappointed Khān Zāmān to the viceroyalty of Jaunpur, he assured him in a farman that he would confer on him the government of Bengal if he could conquer it. But Khān Zāmān never showed any eagerness to conquer Bihar and Bengal from his friendly Afghān rulers. Besides, to the great embarrassment of Akbar, the viceroy showed signs of rebellion and in 1565 he actually rose against the Emperor. In 1567, Mīrza Ḥakīm, Akbar's brother, also rebelled against the Emperor in Kabul adding to his difficulties and inability to grapple with the Bengal problem.

Moreover, Sulaimān Karranī was a powerful ruler. He had a large army and immense riches. With his other troubles in the empire, Akbar could not have risked an expedition against him. So, he had to be satisfied with Sulaimān's lip service.

Himself a wise and prudent man, Sulaimān obtained the devoted services of a very wise vazīr whom Abūl Faẓl calls as the rational spirit of the Afghāns. Lūdī had served Tāj Khān as his vazīr; Sulaimān retained the services of this

---

2. Biyāt, loca.
distinguished minister. Under the advice of Lūdī, Sulaimān always maintained good relations with the Mughal viceroy on the western border of his territory by means of friendly communications and rich presents. It served Sulaimān twofold purposes. First, it secured his position against the impending Mughal invasion and afforded him an opportunity to conquer Orissa. Also it gave him an opportunity to cause embarrassment to Akbar.

In 1565, Khān Zāmān rebelled in Jaunpur much to Akbar's embarrassment. The Emperor feared that as Sulaimān was friendly with the powerful viceroy, he might help him in his rebellion. To prevent Sulaimān from helping Khan Zaman, he sent Hājī Muḥammad Sistānī as an envoy to him. The Afghāns, however, seized him near the fort of Rohtas and sent him to Khān Zāmān. Akbar also sent another diplomatic mission led by Hasan Khān Khazanchī and Mahapattar, a man unrivalled in the art of Indian music and poetry, to the Raja of Orissa to persuade him that if Sulaimān helped the rebel viceroy, he was to invade Bihar and Bengal. The Raja received the envoys with honour and formed an alliance with the Emperor. He agreed to put forth Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr, who was a refuge at his court, as a rival claimant for the throne of Bengal and Bihar and to fight for

2. Ibid., 253-4; T., II, 183-4; B., II, 76.
him against Sulaimān. ¹

Sulaimān Karranī, however, helped Khān Zaman by sending him an army under his generals Kālā Pahār and Sulaimān Mankalī. ² He also took advantage of Akbar’s embarrassing situation to make an attempt to conquer the fort of Rohtas ³ from the Afghan chief Fath Khān Batnī, who had seized it in 1561. Akbar, who had come to Jaunpur to deal with Khān Zaman, sent a force under Qulīj Khān towards Rohtas. At this Sulaimān withdrew from the siege. Being relieved of the danger, Hasan Khān Batnī, however, forgot his promise to surrender the fort to the Emperor and he made preparations for its defence. So, the Mughal general had to return disappointed. ⁴

Sulaimān continued to give help to Khān Zaman. Through the efforts of Khān Khānān Munīm Khān, Khān Zaman was reconciled to the Emperor. Again in 1567, Khān Zaman rebelled in favour of Mīrzā Hakīm and at Jaunpur he read the Khutba in his name. In an engagement with the imperial forces, he was, however, killed.

Khān Zaman had built a fort named Zamaniya near Benares. At the time of his death, one of his followers named Asadullā held the fort. Feeling that he would not be able to

2. A. N., II, 258.
3. Ibid., 253 ; B., II, 77-8. Abūl Fazl says that the fort of Rohtas, one of the strongest forts in India, was more than 5 kos in length and breadth and one kos in height and it had cultivable land and water inside.
maintain his hold on it, Asadulla proposed to surrender Zamaniya to Sulaiman Karrani. Being aware of this, Khan Khanan Mun'im Khan, who succeeded Khan Zaman to the viceroyalty of the eastern provinces, conciliated him. As the fort passed into the hands of the imperial officers, Sulaiman's army had to retreat from before the fort. 1

At the death of Khan Zaman, Sulaiman Karrani lost a very valuable friend in the Mughal empire. At the advice of Ludi, he, however, decided to make friends with Khan Khanan Mun'im Khan. In 1567 Sulaiman sent presents and friendly messages to him. Mun'im Khan responded to this gesture of friendship. To cement their friendship, Ludi arranged for a meeting between Sulaiman and Mun'im Khan. With his followers and officers, Mun'im Khan set off for Patna. Ludi and Bayazid came to receive him. When Mun'im Khan was 5 or 6 kos from AgVa Patna, Sulaiman himself came to receive him and embraced him. First Mun'im Khan gave a feast to Sulaiman in his camp. Next day Sulaiman gave him a feast. He made suitable presents to him and to the Emperor. Sulaiman also entered the name of the Emperor in the khutba and coins. 2

A few Afghans suggested to Sulaiman the seizure of Mun'im Khan. They argued that it would cause confusion among the

1. A. N., II, 325; Biyat, 90b.
2. Ibid, 325-6.
Mughals and enable them to occupy Mughal territories. Sulaimān and Lūdī, however, did not accept their suggestion. Fearing that the unruly Afghāns might injure Mun'īm Khān, they arranged for his safe return to his place. ¹

Secure in the friendship of Mun'īm Khān, Sulaimān Karrānī seized the opportunity created by Akbar's preoccupation in the conquest of Chitor to invade Orissa and in 1566 he conquered it. ² Sulaimān maintained the friendship with Mun'īm Khān as long as he lived.

Thus Sulaimān Karrānī's prudence and sagacity saved for the Afghāns their home in Eastern India which Sher Shāh's far-sighted political wisdom had built for them. Much against his inclination, Akbar had to be satisfied with his outward show of submission. Sulaimān's method of kindly treating the self-willed Afghān chiefs kept the solidarity of the Afghāns ³ and the Mughal Emperor found no scope to realise his imperialistic designs on Bengal and Bihar.

Indeed the Afghān dominion in Eastern India prospered and preserved its integrity as long as Sulaimān Karrānī lived. His death in 1572 was, however, a calamity for the Afghāns, because his mantle fell into the hands of his imprudent sons.

¹ A. N., II, 326-7.
² Ibid, 324 and 326.
³ A. N., III, 20 ; D., School, 162 ; BM., 126a.
who, discarding the prudent and sound policy of their father, introduced dissension among the Afghans and caused the ruin of the Afghan saltanate in Eastern India.
CHAPTER VI

Dāud Karranī and his relations with Akbar: the fall of the Afghan Saltanate in Eastern India

In 1572 after the death of Sulaimān Karranī, his eldest son Bāyazīd Karranī succeeded him in his possessions in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. An ambitious youth, Bāyazīd departed from his father's policy of an outward submission to Akbar and introduced the khutba in his own name. He also discarded his father's wise method of treating the Afghan chiefs and tried his best to ruin them. Naturally the Afghan chiefs were disgusted with his behaviour and plotted against him. Under the leadership of Qatlu Lūhanī, the Lūhanī Afghanān espoused the cause of Hansū, Sulaimān Karranī's brother, Imād Karranī's son and his son-in-law, and within a few days of his accession, they put Bāyazīd to death.

Dāud and Lūdī:

The murder of Bāyazīd ushered in a period of bitter factious fight among the Afghanāns; the interested chiefs set up three rival candidates for the throne. The Lūhanīs had raised Hansū and Lūdī, who held the supreme authority in the state, installed Sulaimān Karranī's youngest son Dāud Karranī on the

1. A. N., III, 20; D., School. 162; EM., 126a.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid and M., 170b; B., II, 174; Briggs - Firishta, V, 355.
throne. In Bihar, Gujar Karrani placed a son of Bayazid as a rival for the saltanate.  

Daud and Ludi fought against Hansu and killed him. Being hard pressed, the Luhânîs submitted to Daud. Then Ludi proceeded from the capital Tanda to deal with Gujar Karrani in Bihar. About this time, under the instruction of Akbar, Kân Kânân Mun'îm Khân advanced from Chunar to invade the Afghan territories. At the approach of a large army under Ludi, Gujar Karrani became frightened and he negotiated with Mun'îm Khân to surrender Bihar and enter the Mughal service, if the Emperor would grant him Gorakpur, Hajipur and Bihar for a year and a fief in Bengal next year. Mun'îm Khân accepted Gujar Karrani's proposal. Seeing in this transaction the ruin of the Afghans, Ludi, however, exerted himself to reconcile Gujar to the rule of Daud and, after prolonged negotiations, he succeeded in winning him over. Ludi and Gujar then marched together to check the advance of the Mughals.  

Thus Ludi's ability and wisdom secured Daud's position. Abûl Fazl regrets that Mun'îm Khân lost a good opportunity of creating discord among the Afghans and of enlisting Gujar Karrani's services for striking a decisive blow at them in Eastern India.  

1. A. N., III, 20; B., II, 174; T., II, 293; D., School, 162; EM., 126b.  
2. Ibid.  
Under Lūdī's direction, Dāud's cause was prospering even against the Mughals, because he had successfully checked Mun'īm Khān's invading forces and was also advancing for the conquest of Jaunpur. It was at this time that, listening to the evil counsels of Qatlu, Srihari and Gujār, who were envious of the ascendancy of Lūdī, Dāud distrusted him and worked for his own ruin. His evil counsellors made him understand that Lūdī, who had been an old servant of Tāj Khān Karranī and had also affianced his daughter to his son Yusuf, would soon set him aside in favour of his son-in-law. Believing their allegations, Dāud put Yusuf to death and planned to destroy Lūdī. Goaded to despair, Lūdī stopped fighting against the Mughals and made peace with Mun'īm Khān sending suitable presents to the Emperor.

Lūdī then turned towards Dāud, who, in great panic, retreated from Munghyr to Bengal. In order to keep the Afghāns by his side, Dāud distributed his father's treasures among them. About this time, Kālā Pahār and Jalāl Khān Sadhuri left Lūdī. This obliged Lūdī to retreat to the fort of Rohtas. Dāud came to Hajipur and sent a force against him. Declaring himself as a servant of the Emperor, Lūdī sought the help of Mun'īm Khān. Mun'īm Khān sent an army to help him and, expecting easily to conquer Bengal and Bihar, he himself moved forward.

---

1. A. N., III, 22-3; B., II, 174; D., BM., 127a.
2. Ibid.; T., II, 282.
When Dāud saw that Lūdī had contracted an alliance with the Mughals, under the advice of Qatlı, Srijhari and Gujjar, he had recourse to wiles. He sent a message to Lūdī saying, "You are in the place of my father; if, on account of your love for his family, you have been offended with me, you have done your duty and I am not displeased with you. In every undertaking, I seek your assistance. At this time when the imperial forces have come against me, I wish that you, who have always shown excellent goodwill, would be prepared to fight the enemy. I make over to you the army, the park of artillery and the treasure."

Patriotic Lūdī, to whom the cause of the Afghāns was perhaps dearer than his life, was reconciled to Dāud. He then marched against the Mughals and effectively checked Mun'īm Khān's forces on the bank of the Son. To avert any further invasion of the Mughals, Lūdī proposed peace to Mun'īm Khān agreeing to pay to the Emperor a tribute of two lāks of rupees in cash and one lāk of rupees in stuffs. In recollection of the old friendship with Sulaimān Karrānī and Lūdī, Mun'īm Khān made peace with the Afghāns and turned back.

Although Lūdī's vigour and wisdom had averted the Mughal danger to his saltanate, Dāud could not appreciate his services.

1. A. N., III, 71-2; T., II, 282; D., BM., 127a.
2. A. N., III, 70.
3. Ibid, 72.
At the instigation of his evil counsellors, however, he planned to ruin him. On the pretext of consulting him on an urgent matter of state, Daud sent for Ludi and when he came, he imprisoned him and handed him over to Srihari. Ludi felt certain that he would be executed. Still he gave his last advice to the misguided young ruler. Ludi advised him not to rely too much on the peace he had made with the Mughals, but to launch a vigorous campaign against them, because they would never let an opportunity of conquering Bengal and Bihar slip by. Under the tuition of Qatlu and Srihari, whom he appointed to the office of vakil and vazir respectively in place of Ludi, Daud, however, ignored the advice and caused Ludi to be put to death.

By putting Ludi to death, Daud had committed a great political blunder. The Afghan historian Abdulla says that Ludi was the pillar of Daud's saltanate and by executing him, Daud destroyed his saltanate with his own hands. Baduni also writes that, by this senseless action, Daud struck his own foot with his own axe and uprooted the plant of his prosperity. Even Abul Fazl appreciates Ludi's wisdom, sound judgement and his devotion and services to the cause of his people. He says, "Ludi was far-seeing in stratagems and had a vigorous mind for..."
plans. He was the rational spirit of the eastern provinces and was devoted in promoting the cause of the Afghāns. 1

Indeed it was Lūdī's wisdom and ability that had maintained the solidarity of the Afghāns and saved the Afghān saltanate in Eastern India against the Mughals. His death, however, removed a great obstacle on the way to the Mughal conquest of Bihar and Bengal. Hence Abūl Fāzīl exults in saying that it was the good fortune of the Emperor that his enemies themselves accomplished a work, which the imperial servants could not themselves effect in spite of their best efforts. 2

Lūdī's execution produced a great dissension among the Afghāns. 3 It also induced Mun'im Khān to advance instantly for the conquest of Bihar and Bengal. 4

Dāūd's relations with Akbar:

Master of a large dominion consisting of Bengal (including Chittagong), 5 Bihar and Orissa, of a numerous army and vast wealth, 6 Dāūd did not think himself in any way inferior to Emperor Akbar. He assumed the title of Bādshāh and read the khutba and struck coins in his own name. 7 Dāūd even vied

---

1. A. N., III, 70.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 73; D., BM., 127b.
4. B., II, 175; T., II, 283.
7. T., II, 281-2; M., 171a; D., BM., 126a; (continued)
with the Mughal Emperor in majesties. He conferred the title of Khan Khanan on Ismail Silahdar and Khan Jahann on another Afghan chief, who was governor of Orissa and was known by his title. He gave Srihari and Janakiballav the title of Bikramaditya and Basanta Rai respectively. Gujar Karrani received from him the title of Rukn ud daula or the pillar of the state. 1

The Mughal historians inform us that Daud's departure from the policy of his father and his open assumption of sovereign rights enraged Emperor Akbar and caused the Mughal invasion of the Karrani dominion in 1572. 2 Evidences, however, show that Akbar's invasion of Bihar and Bengal was entirely an act of aggression and Daud's assumption of sovereignty was simply a pretext for war.

The writings of Abul Fazl best illustrate the imperialistic idea of his royal master. He writes, "According to the ascetic sages and politicians, the peace of the mortals is bound with one rule, one ruler, one guide, one aim and one thought." 3 Abul Fazl also explains Akbar's motive for the conquest of Bihar and Bengal saying, "Justice-loving rulers should not be satisfied with the countries they are in possession.

(continuation of the previous page)

7. Catalogue of the Provincial coin Cabinet, Assam, 177.

---

but should set his hearts in conquering other countries and regard this as a choice form of worship. Hence the Emperor is continually engaged in the conquest of other countries.  

The above statements of the court historian reveal that Akbar was determined upon the conquest of Bihar and Bengal in order to realise his ideal of establishing one rule throughout the whole of India.

From the very beginning of his reign, Akbar was bent on the conquest of Bihar and Bengal in order to destroy the stronghold of the Afghāns, whom he greatly distrusted. In view of the strength and resources of Sulaimān Karrānī and also his own troubles in the empire, he, however, could not realise his object. But that he was anxious to do so is revealed in the writings of the contemporary Mughal historians. Even in 1557 when Sikandar Khān Sūr surrendered Mankot, Akbar issued a farman giving him a temporary chief in Jaunpur and promising him a jagir in Bengal as soon as Khān Zamān would conquer it from the Afghāns. 2 Again in 1563 when appointing Khān Zamān a second time to the viceroyalty of Jaunpur, Akbar promised him Bengal if he could conquer that country from the Afghāns. 3

Indeed Akbar waited for a favourable opportunity to destroy the Afghān power in Eastern India. The death of the
powerful ruler Sulaimān Karranī gave him the much looked for opportunity and the writings of Abūl Fāzīl disclose this important fact. This court historian gives Akbar's reaction at the news of Sulaimān Karranī's death. He says that when the Emperor was proceeding to the Guzrat campaign, the news of Sulaimān Karranī's death reached him and a few of the officers suggested to him the postponement of Guzrat campaign and an advance to the conquest of Bihar and Bengal. The Emperor, however, said that it was good that the news of Sulaimān's death had come during his march to Guzrat, for had it come while he was in the capital he would certainly have addressed himself to the conquest of Bengal. However, feeling certain that, as Sulaimān Karranī was dead, the imperial servants would easily conquer the Afghān territories, he sent a farman to Mun‘im Khān ordering him to advance immediately to conquer Bihar and Bengal.

The above facts show that Akbar only waited for an opportunity to conquer Bihar and Bengal from the Afghāns and he would have invaded Eastern India after the death of Sulaimān Karranī even if Dāud had not assumed the insignia of royalty.

So, in 1572 after the death of Sulaimān Karranī, Mun‘im Khān advanced to invade Bihar. About this time, Dāud and

2. Ibid ; B., II, 174.
Lūdī were proceeding against Gujar Karrānī. We have discussed before how Lūdī reconciled Gujar to Dāud and their combined forces marched to check the Mughal advance. Lūdī, however, thought it wise to ward off the Mughal invasion by peaceful means. He offered two lakhs of rupees and other valuables as a present to the Mughal viceroy. Friendship with Sulaimān and Lūdī, troubles of a campaign in an old age and valuable presents induced Mun‘īm Khān to make peace with the Afghāns and to return to Jaunpur.

Lūdī understood that, though Mun‘īm Khān had made peace with the Afghāns, Emperor Akbar would never be satisfied until Bihar and Bengal had been annexed to his empire. So, he tried to strengthen the Afghān position and create troubles for the Mughals. About this time, Mun‘īm Khān was busy in dealing with the rebellion of Sulaimān’s son Yusuf Muhammad in Gorakhpur. Lūdī seized the opportunity to advance towards Jaunpur and occupy the fort of Zamaniya. After defeating Yusuf Muhammad, Mun‘īm Khān proceeded to meet Lūdī. Yusuf Muhammad joined Lūdī and, being re-inforced by a contingent of the Afghān army, he advanced across the Ganges against the imperial forces. Hasan Khān, Raja Gajpati and other Mughal generals, however, defeated him.

1. Idem., 156.
3. Ibid, 21-2 ; T., II, 281-2 ; D., BM., School, 162 ; Biyat, 90b.
Lūdī and Munʿim Khān confronted each other near Ghazipur. Lūdī's strategy placed the Mughal forces in a very precarious position and this is revealed in the writings of Abūl Fazl, who says, "The generals were in a strange position; to fight was not advisable and it was difficult to retreat." In despair, Munʿim Khān made proposals for peace. Lūdī, however, did not agree. It was at this time when Dāud's cause was prospering against the Mughals that he planned to destroy Lūdī and forced him to the shelter of the Mughals. Thus his senseless action spoiled the sure chance of a victory over the Mughals. So, Abūl Fazl writes that Munʿim Khān escaped from a great danger.

We have seen that the wiles of Dāud reconciled Lūdī to him and Lūdī successfully checked the Mughal advance on the bank of the Son. He then concluded a peace with the Mughal viceroy in order to ward off any further Mughal invasion. Shortly after this, Dāud, however, put him to death.

Loss of Bihar and Bengal:

Lūdī's death induced Munʿim Khān to invade Bihar. Crossing the Son, he advanced within the striking distance of Patna. Though Dāud had a large army, yet he retreated to Patna and shut himself up in the fort. In early November, 1573,

1. A. N., III, 22.
2. Ibid, 70.
3. Idem, 159.
4. T., II, 284; B., II, 175; A. N., III, 82; D., BM., 164 127b.
Mun‘im Khan besieged Patna and sent Majnūn Khan Qaqshāl and other Mughal officers to break the dam of the Punpun river which falls into the Ganges ten miles east of Patna. Sulaimān Mānkālī and Bābūi Mānkālī, the Afghan chiefs who guarded the dam, were su surprised in a night attack and being ashamed of their negligence, they went off to Ghoraghat in Bengal. 1

The siege of Patna, however, did not make much progress. Well guarded by the Ganges, the fort defied the Mughal forces until August, 1574 when Akbar's presence entirely changed the situation. The Emperor discerned that the fort depended for its provisions on the town of Hajipur and that the capture of that town was an essential preliminary to the conquest of Patna. Accordingly he sent an well equipped force supported by war-boats to capture Hajipur. 2 After a fierce resistance, the Mughal general Khān Ālam occupied the town. 3

The fall of Hajipur broke the spirit of Afghan resistance to the Mughals. The Afghan chiefs, particularly Qatlu Lūhānī, advised the evacuation of Patna. As Dāūd could not be persuaded to leave the fort, at night on August 10, 1574, Qatlu administered a narcotic to him and carried him senseless by a boat to the capital Tanda. 4 Dāūd's favourite minister Srihari

1. A. N., III, 83.
2. Ibid., 82-3 and 96 ; T., II, 29o-ł.
3. Ibid, 100 ; 291-2 ; B., II, 181 ; M., 171a-b.
4. M., 171a-b ; Dāūdī, BM., 127a ; B., II, 181.
placed his master's treasures in a boat and followed him to Bengal. 1 Gujar Karrani evacuated the fort with the army and elephants. The night was very dark. The rivers were swollen and the country around was flooded. Niẓāmuddin compares it with the Resurrection night. Daud's army suffered terribly in the evacuation. A large number of them were drowned in the ditch round the fort. A few were trampled to death by the frightened elephants. The Punpun bridge gave way under the weight of the flying multitudes and a large number of soldiers and elephants were drowned in the river. 2

Easily occupying the evacuated fort of Patna, the Mughals pursued the Afghanis. Being overtaken, Gujar fled leaving behind a large number of elephants, which fell into the hands of the Mughals. Thinking that Mun'im Khān and other generals would without difficulty occupy the rest of Bihar and Bengal, on August 24, 1574 Akbar left for the capital. By the September of the same year, the Mughals captured from the Afghanis Surajgarh, Munghyr, Bhagalpur, Colgong and other places practically without any opposition. 3

Daud, however, decided to check the Mughal advance into Bengal at the narrow pass of Teliagarhi, which was one of

2. Ibid., 293; A. N., III, 100-1; B., II, 181-2.
the three thoroughfares from Northern India to Bengal. ¹

Starting from Patna, the Teliagarhi route passes via Bhagalpur, Colgong and along the southern bank of the Ganges having in the south steep hills extending southwards for about eighty miles up to the northern boundary of the Birbhum district. Between the vast expanse of the Ganges in the north and the steep hills and rugged regions to the south, the route narrows down at Teliagarhi. From the earliest times, Teliagarhi was known as the ' Gateway to Bengal ' and a fort was constructed in the place completely blocking the route.² It was in this strategic position that Daud wanted to check the Mughals. He, however, made no adequate arrangement for the defence of the pass. He only left a small detachment of his army under the command of his Khan Khanān Ismail Silahdār.³

Mun'im Khān found it very difficult to advance by the pass of Teliagarhi. He, however, won over some local zamīndārs, who showed him a secret path by which a division of the Mughal army advanced to make a surprise attack on the Afghan rear. The plan succeeded well and, being attacked simultaneously in front and rear, Ismail Silahdār found it impossible to fight against

¹. Jharkhand route, Tirhut route and Teliagarhi route.
². A. N., III, 108.
³. Ibid ; T.; II, 297.
the enemy with his small forces and retreated. The Mughals occupied Teliagarhi without a fight. So, Abūl Fazl exults in saying that by Divine aid the imperial army took possession of a place that could hardly have been occupied by fighting. ¹

The fall of Teliagarhi left Bengal open to the Mughals. In great panic, Dāūd left his capital Tanda ² and went to Satgaon. On September 21, 1574, Mun'īm Khān took possession of Tanda ² and sent several detachment of his forces against the Afghāns in different places of Bengal. One division under Muḥammad Qulī Khān Barlās pursued Dāūd to Satgaon and another under Majnūn Khān Qaqshāl and Bābā Khān Qaqshāl advanced to Ghoraghat, ³ where Kālā Pahār, Bābui Mānkalā and Sulaimān Mānkalā had taken shelter. A third division under Murād Khān was sent to occupy Fathabad and Bakla and a fourth under Iṣtimād Khān to acquire Sonargaon. ⁴

---

¹ A. N., III, 108 ; T., II, 297.
² Ibid., 298.
³ Ghoraghat stands on the west bank of the Karatoya and on the western boundary of the Rangpur district and is included in the Dinajpur district. It is 28 miles north of Bogra town and 18 miles east of Hijli, an E. B. R. station. According to Buchanan, in the days of its prosperity Ghoraghat town extended 10 miles in length and 2 miles in breadth. In 1808, he found the ruins of some mosques and the dargah of Ismail Ghazi, a captain of Barbik Shah. Martin - Eastern India, II, 679-82 ; Damont, G. H. - Notes on Ismail Ghazi, JASB., 1874 ; Bhattasali, N. K. - Bengal chiefs' struggle, BPP., 1928.
⁴ A. N., III, 118-9 ; T., II, 298.
In Ghoraghat, Kalâ Pahâr and the Mânkalîs fought a sharp engagement with Majnûn Khan Qaqshâl and were defeated. Sulaimân Mânkalî died in the fight and Kalâ Pahâr and Babui Mânkalî fled towards Koch Bihar leaving their dependants and families prisoners in the hands of the Mughals. Majnûn Khan Qaqshâl occupied Ghoraghat and married his son to the daughter of Sulaimân Mânkalî. ¹

At the approach of the Mughal general Muḥammad Qulî Khan Barlâs, Dâud retreated from Satgaon to Orissa. About this time, his minister Srihari escaped to Jessore with his treasures. ² Dâud entrenched himself at Debra Kesai (15 miles east of the Midnapur town), to fight the Mughals. But when Muḥammad Qulî Khan Barlâs re-inforced by Todar Mal advanced from Mandaran to Kulia (23 miles north-east of Midnapur town), he fell back on Garh Haripur (11 miles south-east of Danton station on the B. N. R.). ³

In the meantime, Dâud's cousin Junaid Karrânî, a son of 'Imâd Karrânî, was causing great trouble to the Mughals. At the time of Sulaimân Karrânî, Junaid fled from his uncle and took shelter in the court of Akbar. Though Akbar favoured him with a fief in Hindauñ, he later on left the imperial service and, joining his fellow Afghans in Guzrat, he fought against the

¹ A. N., III, 119; T., II, 302-3.
² Ibid, 120.
³ Ibid, 121; 304; Sarkar, J. N., - Battle of Tukaroi, BPP., 1935; Rennel - Bengal Atlas, sheet, 7.
Mughals. After the Mughal conquest of Guzrat in 1573, Junaid, however, went to Jharkhand and with a band of warriors he plundered the Mughal possessions in Bihar.  

Junaid also wanted to join Daud at Din Kesai. As Daud could not trust his adventurous and ambitious cousin, they could not unite their forces against the Mughals. Junaid, however, continued his plundering and devastating incursions against the Mughals with success. It was not the advance of a superior army under Todar Mal that he retreated to the jungles of Jharkhand. But he remained a menace to the Mughals in Bihar.  

In 1575, Munim Khan and Raja Todar Mal took up the plan of a vigorous campaign against Daud. Todar Mal advanced from Mandaran and Munim Khan joined him at Cheto. Leaving his family at Katak, Daud encamped himself at Garh Haripur. He fortified his camp by digging trenches and throwing breastworks. He also barricaded at strategic points the regular road from Midnapur to Garh Haripur. Munim Khan found it very difficult to advance. With the help of the local people, he, however, discovered an obscure circuitous route and by it arrived at Najaura (11 miles east of the Danton railway station). Daud advanced to check them and on March 3, 1575, confronted

2. Ibid. III, 119-20; T., II, 303-4.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 121-2; T., II, 304.
the enemy on the plains of Tukaroi (9 miles east of Danton and 3 miles west of Najura). The contending parties arranged their respective forces in the following battle array.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R.</th>
<th>C.</th>
<th>L.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sikandar</td>
<td>Daud</td>
<td>Ismail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujar</td>
<td>Van</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alam Khan</td>
<td>Van</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qiys Khan</td>
<td>Iltimsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.</td>
<td>Todar Mal</td>
<td>Mun'im Khan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Daud placed a line of huge tuskers in front of his forces and, covering them with hide and hanging a number of Yaktailes from their heads and tusks, he made them terrible to behold. As according to the astrologers, who accompanied the army, the planets were not favourable, Mun'im Khan did not want to fight on that day. The Afghan van under Gujar, however, precipitated the battle with a furious charge of his elephants. He threw the Mughal van into confusion and killed its leader 'Alam Khan. He even swept away the Mughal Iltimsh and the centre. In spite of his best efforts, Mun'im Khan failed to keep his soldiers in the field. The Afghan tide swept him also five miles.

1. A. N., III, 121-2; T., II, 304-5;
   Sarkar, J. N. - Battle of Tukaroi, BPP., 1935.
away from the front. Pursuing him half a mile, the Afghan van turned to plunder his camp and pack of animals.¹

The Afghan love for plunder before the battle was actually won ruined their victory as it had done in other battles. When the Afghan van was engaged in picking up the spoils, Qiyā Khan and other Mughal generals reformed their broken ranks and fell on them. Pierced in the brain by an arrow, Gujar fell dead. The death of their general caused confusion in the Afghan van and, in great panic, they dispersed.

When Gujar and his van were pushing forward, the other three Afghan divisions remained spectators. The Afghan right under Orissa’s governor Khan Jahān’s brother Sikandar advanced to meet the Mughal left, but it fled without coming to blows. When Dāud’s centre confronted the Mughal left, the news of Gujar’s death reached it and the dispersed Mughal divisions returned to the field. About this time, the Mughal right drove away the Afghan left. All these unmoved Dāud’s centre and the Afghāns fled in utter confusion. The Mughals pursued and slaughtered the Afghāns and captured a large number of them. Next day Mun’im Khan vented his wrath by making eighty minarets reaching to the skies, with the heads of the Afghan prisoners. ²

¹ and ² A. N. III, 123-7; T., II, 305-6; B., II, 193-6; Sarkar, J. N. - Battle of Tukaroi, BPP., 1935.
Being defeated in the battle of Tukaroi, Dāud fled to the fort of Kātak. Khān Jahan encouraged him to fight the Mughals again. Accordingly he prepared for another contest. But the Mughal generals were determined not to allow him any breathing space and, following their victory, they advanced to besiege the fort of Kātak. As the preparations for a battle were not complete, Dāud thought it wise to make proposals for peace. In view of the strong position of the Afghans in the fort, the war-worn octogenarian Mughal general Mun‘im Khān and other Mughal officers, with the exception of Todar Mal, considered settlement as an advantage. After an exchange of messages, an interview was arranged between Dāud and Mun‘im Khān in the Mughal camp. On April 12, 1575, accompanied by his chiefs, Dāud went to the camp of Mun‘im Khān. ¹

Mun‘im Khān received Dāud with due honour and cordiality and entertained him and his chiefs in a distinguished manner. Amidst festivities a treaty was concluded. Dāud was to hold Orissa as a vassal of Emperor Akbar. He made presents of noted elephants and valuable articles to the court. Abūl Fazl says that, as a mark of his submission to the Emperor, Dāud turned his face towards the Mughal capital and prostrated himself. As a surety for his allegiance, he made over his brother’s son Sheikh Muhammad

¹ A. N. III, 129-30; T., II, 308-9; B., II, 195-6.
to the court. On behalf of the Emperor, Mun‘im Khān conferred on Dāud a splendid khil‘at, a sword and a jewelled belt. ¹

The battle of Tukaroi and the treaty of Katak registered the transfer of the sovereignty of Bengal and Bihar from the Afghāns to the Mughals. The Afghāns in general, however, did not accept the treaty and loss of territories. They continued to resist the Mughals in different places of Bihar and Bengal. The Afghān chiefs maintained their hold on Rohtas, Chaund and Sahsaram. From his stronghold in Jharkhand, Junaid Karrānī raided South Bihar, Kālā Pahār, Bābui Mānkālī and Jalāluddīn Sūr drove away Majnūn Khān Qaqshāl from Ghoraghat. ² They also expelled the Mughals from Gaur and recovered the whole of North Bengal. They even pursued the Mughals to Tanda. The timely arrival of Mun‘im Khān, however, saved the situation and the capital. Relieving Tanda, he hastened to Gaur and recaptured it. He then sent Majnūn Khān tū with a large army to Ghoraghat. After a fierce fight, Majnūn Khān recovered Ghoraghat. The Afghāns, however, continued to give trouble to the Mughals in North Bengal as well as in South Bihar. ³

Thinking that the residence in Gaur would enable him to deal effectively with the Afghān disturbances in North Bengal and also, being attracted by the magnificent buildings...

¹ and ² A. N., III, 130-1; B., II, 195-6; T., II, 309-10.
³ Ibid., 131; 216-8; 317.
of the old capital of Bengal, in August, 1575, Mun'im Khān shifted his headquarters from Tanda to Gaur. The transfer of capital, however, proved a blunder. It was on account of its notoriously bad climate that only a few years ago Sulaimān Karranī had shifted the capital from Gaur to Tanda. Mun'im Khān ignored this fact and suffered terribly, because within a month a great plague broke out in the city. In his Memoirs, Bāyāzīd Biyat, an attendant of Mun'im Khān, has left us a graphic account of this plague. People died in such large numbers that cremation or burial became impossible. It was only when twelve of his distinguished generals had died that Mun'im Khān ordered his men back to Tanda. But he could not enter Tanda. In the outskirts of Tanda, he was taken ill and on October 23, 1575 at the age of over eighty, he died. 1

Fall of Dāud:

Mun'im Khān's death encouraged Dāud to make a bid for the recovery of Bengal and Bihar. He swiftly fell on the Mughal general Nāzīr Bahādur, defeated and killed him and occupied Bhadrak. At his approach, the Mughals fled away from Jaleswar and Tanda. Dāud re-entered re-entered his capital and easily recovered Teliagarhī from the panic-striken Mughals. 'Isa Khān, the zamīndār of Bhati, drove away the Mughals from Eastern Bengal.

1. A. N., III, 160-1 ; B., II, 216-8 ; Biyat, 147a.
Panic and confusion prevailed among the Mughals everywhere and leaving Bengal, they proceeded towards Northern India. 1

Akbar sent Bairam Khan's sister's son Husain Quli Khan entitled Khan Jahan as governor of Bengal and Raja Todar Mal as his assistant in command. On November 15, 1575, they left Agra and near Bhagalpur they met the Mughal officers and soldiers fleeing from Bengal to Northern India. With great difficulty, Khan Jahan and Todar Mal persuaded them to turn towards Bengal. At Teliagarhi their advance was opposed by 3,000 Afghans under Ayaz Khaskhail. In a fierce engagement, the Afghans were, however, beaten and Teliagarhi again passed into the hands of the Mughals. 2 Khan Jahan advanced towards Tanda. Daud, however, blocked his passage at a narrow place, situated between the Ganges on the north-west and the hills on the south-east, in Rajmahal. 3 In this Rajmahal pass, he had fortified his position and held up the Mughals from December 1575 to June 1576. 4

In spite of his best efforts, Khan Jahan could not make his way through the pass, though in a skirmish he

2. Ibid, 162 ; 227 ; 321.
3. Rajmahal was previously called Akmahal or advance place, because while proceeding to Bihar, the sultans of Gaur used it as an advance station. Man Singh named it Akbarmahal and later on it came to be known as Rajmahal.
4. A. N., III, 162-3 ; and 179 ; T., II, 321.
killed Dāud’s Khān Khānān Ismail Silāhdār. On the other hand, his position became daily weaker. The rains, the interception of the supply of his provisions by the Afghāns in Bihar and the difficulties of the place unnerved the Mughal soldiers. Besides, the Sunnī Mughals did not like to fight under a Persian Shīa, Khān Jahān. Moreover, the Afghāns were daily increasing in number and Dāud had diplomatically caused the desertion from Mughal service of Raja Gajpati, the zamīndār of Patna and Hajipur, and induced him to create trouble for the Mughals in Bihar and Ghazipur. 

Being in a precarious position, Khān Jahān sent urgent representations to the Emperor for food and re-inforcements. Akbār despatched boat-loads of food from Agra and ordered Muzaffar Khān to advance immediately from Bihar to the assistance of Khān Jahān. On July 10, 1576 (15 Rabi‘ II, 984), Muzaffar Khān joined the Mughal forces at Rajmahal. Khān Jahān arranged his forces in battle array and, on July 12, 1576 (15 Rabi‘ II, 984), a fierce battle took place between the Mughals and Afghāns in the field of Rajmahal. Badāuni says that, in his great presumption and pride, Dāud left his hiding place and offered battle to the Mughals.

2. Ibid, 169-9 and 178-9; B., II, 237.
3. Ibid, t8r 180 188; 238; T., II, 324.
4. Ibid.
5. B., II, 238.
It is surprising that Dāud should have left his strategically strong position in the narrow pass, where he had held up the Mughals for seven months, and come down into the plain to fight an open battle with the enemy. The Mughal historians write that Junaid's joining with Dāud emboldened him to leave his fortified position. 1 In his Pratapaditya Charitra, 2 Ramram Basu, however, mentions that the treachery of Dāud's favourite minister Srihari Bikramaditya was the cause of his leaving the narrow pass and fighting a battle in the plain.

Ramram Basu writes that Srihari Bikramaditya and his brother Basanta Rai gave the state papers and other secrets to the Mughal generals, who assured them of their possession in Jessore. The news of the defection of Srihari greatly upset Dāud and he left his hiding place in the hills to meet the Mughals on the plains. 2

Although written in a fanciful style and more than two centuries after the event had taken place, the account of Pratapaditya Charitra seems to have contained facts. Its evidence of Dāud's favour to Srihari and Basanta Rai and their flight to Jessore with the treasures of their master 3 is corroborated from the writings of the contemporary historians. 4

1. B., II, 238; T., II, 324.
3. Ibid., 12 and 32-4.
4. Ibid., 159, 165-7 and 170.
Moreover, Bādāuni's writings also substantially agree with Ramram Basu's account. Furthermore, the fact that, after the conquest of Bengal, the Mughals, though they occupied the territories of Fathabad and Bakla, spared Srihari's Jessore shows that he must have rendered valuable services to them. Indeed the defection and faithlessness of his confidant Srihari greatly weakened Dāud and he suspected that some other of his chiefs might play the same game with him. So, he considered it prudent to risk an open engagement with the Mughals rather than allowing his strength to be dwindled by defection.

Dāud, however, arranged his forces in battle array. In the field of Rajmahal, the Afghans and Mughals confronted each other in the following battle array.

```
  R.  |  Kalā Pahār  |  C.  |  Dāud  |  L.  |  Junaid  |
      +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
      |  Qailū and      |  |  |  |
      |  Khān Jāhān    |  |
      +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+

  L.  |  Todar Māl  |  C.  |  Khān Jāhān  |  R.  |  Muzaffar Khān  |
      +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
      |  |  |  |  Shāham Khān  |  Van  |
      |  |  |  |  |  Ismail and  |
      |  |  |  |  |  Qiyā Khān  |
      +-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------+
      |  |  |  |  Iltimsh  |
      |  |  |  |
```

1. Idem, 178.
2. A. N., III, 180; B., II, 238; T., II, 324.
Unfortunately for Dāud his best general Junaid Karrani had had his knee smashed as a result of the fall of a Mughal cannon in the previous night when he was sleeping on a charpai. This disheartened the Afghāns. Junaid, however, led his forces in the battle. In the first encounter, the Afghān right shook the Mughal left. The Mughal fire, however, wounded Kālā Pahār and he fled from the field. His flight and the pressure of the Mughal left caused confusion in the Afghān right. In a fierce engagement with the Mughal right, Junaid was killed and the Afghān left was routed from the field. An attack of the Mughal van and Iltimsh killed Khan Jahan and the Afghān van dispersed. After this, the Afghān centre gave way without a fight. Dāud fled for his life. His horse, however, got entangled in a marsh and he was brought a captive before the Mughal commander Khan Jahan.  

Khan Jahan rebuked Dāud for having broken the treaty of Katak. Dāud replied with composure that the treaty was with Mun'īm Khan and that the time had come for the conclusion of a new one. Badaunī writes that, parched with thirst, Dāud asked for water and some wicked soldiers, filling his slipper with water, offered it to him. Khan Jahan, however, offered him a drink from his own private canteen. He also wanted to spare the life of a young and handsome prince, Dāud, but all the Mughal...

1. A. N., III, 181 ; B., II, 238 ; T., II, 324.
2. Ibid., 181-2 ; 238 ; 325.
officers advised for his execution. To sever Daud's head from his body they took two strokes at the neck, but they failed. At the third stroke, however, they succeeded. Khan Jahān sent Daud's head to the Emperor by the hands of Saiyid 'Abdullā Khān.¹ The battle of Rajmahal closed the last chapter of Afghān rule in Eastern India.

Ni'matullā says that the Afghāns lost their saltanate in Eastern India on account of Qatlu Lūhani's baseness.² According to this Afghān historian, on the eve of the battle of Rajmahal Qatlu formed a treasonable connection with Khan Jahān. On condition that some parganas of Orissa were given to him, he promised to take such a position in the battle as to render Daud's defeat unavoidable.³

The Mughal historians inform us that in the battle of Rajmahal Qatlu Lūhani and Daud's Khan Jahān commanded the Afghān van. They mention that Khan Jahān was killed and the Afghān van dispersed; but they do not refer to the activities of Qatlu in the battle. The silence of the Mughal historians in a way agrees with the evidence of Ni'matullā that Qatlu deserted Daud in the battle-field. Moreover, Ni'matullā says that, as a reward for his treachery, Qatlu received from Khan Jahān the territory of Orissa. Indeed, after the battle of Rajmahal, Qatlu is found in possession

¹ A. N., III, 182; B., II, 238; T., II, 325.
² M., 172a.
³ Ibid., 172b.
⁴ Ibid.
of Orissa. How could he have possessed it, if he did not receive it as a reward for his defection? Had it not been conferred on him for his valuable services, Emperor Akbar could not have consented to leave Orissa in the possession of the turbulent Afghāns.

Again, after the battle of Rajmahal, the Mughals occupied the Afghan possessions in Bengal and Bihar. What did refrain them from occupying Orissa? Even for some years after 1576, Orissa remained undisturbed by the Mughals. It was only in 1583 when, at the time of the Bihar-Bengal rebellion of the Mughal officers, Qatlu proved disloyal to the Emperor that a force was sent against him. 1

Thus, on account of Akbar's determination to expel the turbulent Afghāns from their stronghold in Eastern India, Dāud's foolishness in killing his wise and able minister Lūdī, the desertion of his favourite minister Srihari Bikramaditya and the treachery of his counsellor Qatlu Luhānī, the Afghāns lost their home and saltanate in Bengal and Bihar which was built by the genius of Sher Shāh and preserved by the wisdom and ability of Sulaimān Karranī.

1 See Chapter VII, P. 197.
CHAPTER VII

The position of the Afghans under the Mughals down to the end of the reign of Akbar

In the sixteenth century, the general attitude of the Afghans towards the Mughals was one of hostility. This was because the self-willed Afghan chiefs, fresh from the enjoyment of privileges and accustomed to a life of turbulence and feud, could neither reconcile themselves to the loss of sovereignty nor submit easily as a peaceful population of the Mughal empire. Babur and Humayun sought to win them over by following a conciliatory policy. This policy contributed, however, to the expulsion of the Mughals from India in 1540.

In the reign of Akbar (1556-1605), the relation between the Afghans and Mughals may be summed up as one of hostility and distrust. With a few exceptions, the Afghans as a body remained hostile to Akbar until they lost Bihar and Bengal in 1576. After that, with the exception of a few, they reconciled themselves to Mughal rule. Akbar, however, could not forget their past conduct to his father and to himself and, throughout his reign, he followed a policy of distrust towards them, though many of them served him with loyalty and gave their toil and blood for his empire.
Bābur and the Afghans:

Under Bābur (1526-30) and Humāyūn (1530-40), the Mughals lived to win over the Afghāns to acceptance of their rule in Northern India. In his Memoirs, Bābur claims that he showed the Afghān nobles greater kindness and favour than they could claim by right. 1 Abūl Faţl’s Akbarnāma supports Bābur’s contention. He says, after the conquest of India, Bābur treated everyone great or small with kindness and even the mother, children, dependents and relations of Ibrāhīm Lūdī received his favours in the form of jagirs, allowances and pensions. 2 Badāuni’s view also agrees with that of Bābur and Abūl Faţl. 3

We shall see that Bābur did really follow a conciliatory policy towards the Afghāns. In this policy, he was indeed guided by the need to stabilise his newly acquired empire. But whatever might have been his motive, it has to be said that, considering the standards of the time and the treatment normally meted out by the victor to the vanquished, Bābur was remarkably humane and generous to the Afghāns.

The first step in Bābur’s policy, taken even before his conquest of India, was his marriage with an Afghān lady named Bībī Mubārika, the daughter of an Yusufzai chief Malik

1. Waqī‘at-i-Baburi, 527; B. N., II, 527.
3. B., I, 337.
Shāh Mansūr. 1 In 1526 after the conquest of the Panjab, he appointed ʿAlāʾūddīn ʿĀlām Khān Lūdī, the uncle of Ibrahīm Lūdī, and Dilāwar Khān Lūdī, a son of Daulat Khān Lūdī, as governors of Dipalpur and Sultanpur respectively. 2 He even helped the former in his attempt to obtain the throne of Delhi. 3 It was only when ʿĀlām Khān had proved his utter incompetence as an organiser and general, that Babur decided to fight for the throne of Delhi for himself. Babur especially favoured Dilāwar Khān Lūdī whom, in 1526 after the battle of Panipat, he honoured with the title of Khān Khānānān, the highest title in the Indian Muslim court. 4

Among the examples of Babur's favours to the Afghāns was the conferment upon the mother of Ibrahīm Lūdī of a pargana worth seven laks of double dams 5 equivalent to rupees thirtyfive thousands a year. He also favoured the Afghān chiefs, who submitted to his rule, with jagirs, money and suitable posts in the imperial service. Fīrūz Khān Sarangkhānī received a jagir in Jaunpur and one crore fortysix laks and five thousands rupees. 6 Bayazīd Farmūlī 7 obtained the government of Oudh and

1. Waqīʿat-i-Bāburī, 379 ; B. N., I, 375.
2. B. N., I, 442-3 ; Cambridge History of India, III, 11.
4. Waqīʿat-i-Bāburī, 572 ; B. N., II, 567 ; Tūz., 42.
5. Ibid. 478 478 19 ; A.N., I, 98
6. Ibid. 527 527 ; T., II, 19.
7. Bayazīd was brother of Mustafa Farmūlī, the husband of Fath Malika, the daughter of Miyan Muḥammad Farmūlī called Kālā Pahār, a noble of the Lūdī sultāns. Abbās, IO., 51a-b ; BM., 34b.
a crore of rupees. Bābur also gave Mahmūd Khān Lūhānī the
government of Ghazipur and ninety thousand rupees. 1  He appointed
Shāh Muḥammad Farmūlī as governor of Saran. 2

Bābur favoured Fath Khān Sarwānī with Kara, the title
of Khān Jāhān and one crore sixty lak rupees. 3 Biban Shāhūkhāl, Malikdād Karrānī 5 and Yahyā Lūhānī 6 were admitted into the
imperial service. Nizām Khān Miyāna and his brother Ālam Khān,
Tātār Khān Sarangkhānī of Gwalior, Muḥammad Zaitūn and other
chiefs received royal favours. 7 Bābur had also been generous to
the Lūhānī and Sūr Afghāns. The Lūhānī chief Jalāl Khān was left
undisturbed in Bihar on his promise to be loyal to the Mughal
throne and pay tribute to the imperial treasury. 8 Sher Khān Sūr
also retained his possessions in Sahsaram. 9 Bābur admitted about
eight thousand Lūhānīs to the imperial service. 10

Furthermore, Bābur was lenient towards rebel Afghāns.

He did not treat harshly Ibrāhīm Lūdī's mother, who, in spite of

1. Waqīʿat-i-Bāburī, 527, 530 and 550 ; B. N., II, 527, 530 and
544 ; A. N., II, 102 and 104.
2. B. N., II, 675.
3. Waqīʿat-i-Bāburī, 537 ; B. N., 537.
4. Ibid, 446 ; 464 and 466.
5. Ibid, 478 ; 540.
6. Ibid, 682-3 ; 676.
8. Waqīʿat-i-Bāburī, 682-3 ; B. N., II, 676.
9. Ibid, 658-9 ; 652 ; Abbās, BM, 28a ; 19b.
10. Ibid, 683 ; 676.
his favours, made an attempt on his life by having a cook poison his food.\(^1\) Biban Shāhūkhail broke the court etiquette by sitting in the royal presence while all the great nobles Mir Khalīfa, Sultān Junaid Barlās, Alāuddīn Ālam Khān Lūdī, Dilāwar Khān Lūdī and others used to stand in the presence of the Emperor. Although disgusted, Babur did not enforce his court etiquette on the rustic Afghan chief. \(^2\) This shows his eagerness to conciliate the Afghāns.

Badāunī writes, "The amīrs of India, notwithstanding his (Bābur's) conciliating behaviour and efforts to improve their fortunes, did not yield obedience to him and behaved like unruly savages." \(^3\) We might not agree with Badāunī that Bābur wanted to improve the fortunes of the Afghan chiefs, but it cannot be denied that Bābur accorded them generous treatment. The Afghan chiefs, who had tasted the privileges of power, could not, however, remain content with the favours bestowed on them by the Mughal Emperor. They yearned for the full privileges of sovereignty and deserted Mughal service.

Biban, \(^4\) Bayazīd \(^5\) and Fath Khān Sarwānī \(^6\) deserted

---

2. Ibid. 466.
3. B., I, 337.
5 and 6. Ibid. 658-9; 652 and 589.

Fath Khān Sarwānī deserted because Bābur did not confer on him his father's title of Ā'lam Humayūn. As the name of Bābur's son was Humayūn he could not make Fath Khān greater Humayūn. 

B.N., II, 537.
Bābur's from Bābur's service. Biban and Bāyāzīd formed a confederacy with Maḥmūd Lūdī, the brother of Ibrāhīm Lūdī, with the intention of driving out the Mughals from India. On March 12, 1528, they fought an unsuccessful battle against Bābur near the Ghogra. 1 Sher Khān Sūr was also obliged to join them in this battle. 2

A few of the Afghān chiefs had gone to Bengal and they incited the Bengali king Nāṣrūt Shāh against Bābur. 3 The Afghāns also joined Rana Sanga of Mewar and fought against the Mughals in the battle of Khanwa. 4

Humāyūn and the Afghāns:

Humāyūn faithfully followed the Afghān policy of his father. In his reign, Dilāwar Khān Khān Khānān rose to the position of a minister. Of all the Afghān chiefs it was Dilāwar Khān, who remained sincerely attached to Humāyūn and even advised him not to trust too much his fellow Afghān chiefs. In 1536, he said to Humāyūn, "It is not wise to neglect Sher Khān Sūr, for he is rebelliously inclined and well understands all matters pertaining to government." 5 Humāyūn, however, neglected Sher Khān and marched against him only when he had gained strength and besieged Gaur. Though Dilāwar Khān advised him to advance

2. Ibid.
3. F., II, 587; Shāhī, 99.
5. Abbās, IO., 53b; BM., 36a-b.
immediately to Gaur, he wasted in the siege and occupation of Chunar six months and thus gave time to Sher Khan to capture Gaur and strengthen his power with the wealth of Bengal.

On his return march from Gaur in 1539, Humayun sent in advance Dilawar Khan to Munghyr. Sher Khan's general Khwaas Khan made a surprise attack on him at Munghyr and took him prisoner. Sher Khan allotted his captive a daily allowance of half a ser of unground barley and executed him after the battle of Chausa.

The Luhani and Surs of Bihar received generous treatment from Humayun. Humayun could have exterminated Sher Khan, a petty chief of Sahsaram in 1532, and thus have averted the greatest calamity of his life. He, however, left him in undisturbed possession of his estates as he promised to be loyal to his throne and also sent as a security his third son Qutb Khan and his vakil 'Isa Khan with 500 retainers to his service.

It was a great political blunder by Humayun that he trusted the ambitious Afghan chief Sher Khan, who, only a few days previously had joined the confederacy of Biban, Bayazid and Mahmud Ludi and fought against him in the battle of Dauroh in 1531.

1. 'Abbas, IO., 54b-55a; BM., 37a.
2. Ibid, BM., 42b; Jauhar, 31; Tuz., 42.
3. Ibid, 49a-b; IO., 75a.
4. Ibid, 34a; Jauhar, 6; A. N., I, 123-4. Abul Fazl mentions the name of Quutb Khan as Abdur Rashid.
5. 'Abbas, BM., 32b; E. IV, 348-9.
Humayun was deceived by the show of allegiance by the crafty Afghan chief. In 1535 when Humayun was fighting against Bahadur Shah of Guzrat, Qutb Khan fled from his service. 

A few of the Afghan chiefs who had deserted Mughal service joined Bahadur Shah of Guzrat and incited him against Humayun. Bahadur Shah sent Tatar Khan Ludi, the son of Alauddin Alam Khan Ludi, with 40,000 horse to fight the Mughals. Tatar Khan captured Biana. Humayun's brothers, Hindal and Askari, however, recovered it and defeated and killed him in a battle at Mandrael near Biana in 1534. Alauddin Alam Khan and his Afghan followers also fought for Bahadur Shah against the Mughals. Humayun defeated them and captured Alam Khan along with others in the fort of Mandu in June, 1535. He was, however, hamstrung and released.

1. Abbas, IO., 75a ; BM., 49b ; A. N., I, 123-4. After the battle of Chausa, Sher Shah sent Qutb Khan to Chanderi to create disturbances for Humayun. In an engagement at Mandrael, Qutb Khan was, however, killed.

2. Considering Alam Khan dangerous due to his pretensions, Babur confined him in Qila Zafar in Badakhshan. Alam Khan, however, escaped with the help of some Afghan traders and came to the court of Bahadur Shah. A. N., I, 129 ; Erskine - History of India, III, 41.

3. A. N., I, 134 ; Abu Turab, 19. In the reign of Mahmud Shah III (1538-53), Alam Khan became for a time the vazir and an absolut authority in Guzrat. (T., III, 237-8 ; Abu Turab, 43). His absolutism disgusted the sultan and the amirs Saiyid Mubarak Khan and Itimad K., the Habshi chief. Their combined forces made him leave Guzrat and take shelter in Malwa, where Sher Shah gave him a jagir in 1542. After Sher Shah's death, he had to leave Malwa and come back to Guzrat. Saiyid Mubarak gave him a jagir in Champanir. Alam K. plotted against his benefactor and, being defeated, joined the Fuladi Afghans at Patan. They occupied Kari a possession of Itimad K., who, however, later on defeated them and killed Alam K. T. III, 237-8 ; Mir'at S., 271, 275-6, 279 ; Mir'at A., 139.
In 1537 after the death of Bahādur Shāh, some of the Afghan chiefs went from Guzrat to Bihar and joined Sher Khān. Strengthened by their adhesion, Sher Khān could indulge in his vision of the restoration of Afghan sovereignty in India. In 1540 his vision was realised at the battle of Kanauj; Humāyūn was expelled from India and Afghan rule was restored in the country.

The restoration of Afghan sovereignty in India was made possible by the conciliatory policy of Bābur and Humāyūn towards the Afghāns. This policy saved them from being ruined and homeless. It also gave them an opportunity to regain strength and resources. Indeed the Afghāns under Sher Shāh could conquer Gaur and strengthen themselves with the wealth of Bengal only because Bābur and Humāyūn had left them in the possession of Bihar. Had they been dispossessed of Bihar it would have been extremely difficult for these homeless people to obtain a foothold and a rallying centre in order to make a bid for the restoration of their lost sovereignty in India.

**Akbar and the Afghāns**

The Afghāns lost the sovereignty of India to Humāyūn in 1555 and finally to Akbar in 1556. Prudence required their acceptance of Mughal rule. The proud Afghan chiefs, however, instead of submitting peacefully to the Mughal rule, remained at bottom hostile and created troubles throughout the reign of Akbar (1556-1605).

1. Abbās, IO., 5ob; BM., 34b.
In the period from 1556 to 1561, the Afghāns made several attempts to recover their sovereignty. In 1558, the Afghān ex-pretender Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr came out of his refuge in Orissa and advanced to occupy Jaunpur. 1 The Mughal commander Ālī Quli Khān Zamān, however, forced him to retire to Orissa. Bahādur Shāh of Bengal also fought against Khān Zamān near Jaunpur, but he was beaten back to his own country. 2 In 1561, the Afghāns under Sher Shāh II, the son of sultan ʿAdil, made another attempt to recover their territories, but they failed due to their own indiscipline and the superior generalship of Khān Zamān. 3 The last attempt at a systematic campaign of the Afghāns under Awāz Khān, a son of Islām Shāh, in 1561 for the recovery of their lost position also failed at Andhiabari on the bank of the Son. 4

After these failures, the Afghāns seem to have realised that the recovery of their power was an impossible task and they retreated to their possessions in Bihar and Bengal. A few adventurous chiefs went to Guzrat and joined their fellow chiefs at Patan. The retreat of the Afghāns from the Mughal occupied territories did not, however, mean the end of their hostility towards the Mughals. Of course they did not launch any more systematic campaigns against the Mughals, but they did not cease

1. A. N., II, 82.
2. B., II, 25.
to make trouble for Emperor Akbar whenever they saw the opportunity. Indeed any enemy of the Mughal Emperor was a friend of the Afghans.

In 1564 when Khan Zaman rebelled in Jaunpur, the Afghans helped him. Awaz Khan joined him and only deserted to the Mughal forces in 1565 when he found the position of Khan Zaman hopeless in the extreme. Sulaiman Karrani, the ruler of Begnala and Bihar, contracted a friendship with the rebel Mughal viceroy and helped him by sending an army under his generals Hasan Khan Batni, Sulaiman Mankali and Kala Pahar.

The Afghans also joined Rana Pratap of Mewar, the bitterest enemy of Akbar, and fought against the Mughal forces in the battle of Haldighat in 1576. Our historian Badauni himself was a soldier in this battle and his evidence that the Afghans fought in the side of the Rajputs cannot be disbelieved. He says that an Afghan chief named Hakim Khan Suri led a division of Pratap’s army at Haldighat.

Haji Khan and other Afghan chiefs, who, after the

1. A. N., II, 266.
4. Haji K. at first joined Itimad K. of Guzrat who gave him jagir in Kari. In a battle between Itimad K. and Sher K. Fuladi, he with his forces stood aside out of sympathy for his fellow Afghans. Being defeated, Itimad K. wanted to seize Haji K., who however, fled and joined the Fuladi Afghans, in 1561.

Mir’at A., I, 90-1; Mir’at S., 279-80, 286, 291; T., III, 246-7
loss of sovereignty in Northern India, took shelter in Guzrat remained the uncompromising enemy of the Mughals. So great was their hatred of the Mughals that they killed Bairam Khan, the fallen minister of Akbar, who had halted awhile at Patan on his way to Makkah in 1561. It was the Afghans under the leadership of Sher Khan Fuladi, who had installed himself as the virtual ruler of Guzrat having the puppet sultan Muzaffar Shah III in his control, who in practice resisted Akbar's conquest of Guzrat in 1572 when I'timad Khan and other Guzrati nobles had submitted to the Mughals.

After Akbar's conquest of Guzrat, the Afghans did not submit to him. They left the country. Sher Khan Fuladi took shelter in Surat and his son Muhammad Khan in the mountains of Idar. In January, 1573 when the Emperor was dealing with the rebellious Mirzas at Surat Sher Khan Fuladi, Junaid Karrani, another Afghan adventurous warrior who fled from Mughal service, and other Afghans came out of their refuge and created serious disturbance in Patan. Then with a large army they advanced to capture the fort of Patan. They reduced the Mughal commandant of the fort to great straits. The timely arrival of the Mughal general Khan Azam Mirza Aziz Koka from Ahmadabad and of the Emperor from Surat saved the situation. The Afghans

1. A. N., ii, 131; B., II, 45; Mir at A., I, 93.
2. T., III, 258-9; Mir'at S., 303-4. Sikandar was present at the time of the Guzrat campaign.
3. A. N., III, 5-7; Abu Turab. Abu Turab acted as the envoy of I'timad Khan to Akbar. (54-56).
were defeated. Sher Khan fled to Junagarh and his son with other Afghāns to Idrā. 1 Akbar returned to capital.

No sooner had Akbar returned to Fathpur Sikri than the Afghāns came back to Guzrat and, in collaboration with the Mīrzsās, captured some places and besieged Ahmadābad. Badāuni says that Sher Khān Fūlādī and the Mīrzsās made a plan that some of them would go to Northern India to incite rebellion against the Emperor and Sher Khān Fūlādī would besiege Patan. 2 The execution of the plan depended on their capture of Ahmadābad. Their vigorous attack placed the Mughals in a strained condition. In despair, Khān Aʿẓam prayed for the help of the Emperor. 3 Akbār, however, personally marched to Guzrat and arrived near Ahmadābad in nine days covering a distance of six hundred miles. The enemy was surprised and beaten in a battle near Ahmadābad on September 2, 1573. 4

After this defeat, the Afghāns were dispersed and Guzrat seemed to be free from any further Afghān trouble. Trouble, however, arose in 1582 when Muzaffar Shāh managed to escape from the custody of the Mughal officers. He collected an army. With his Afghān followers, Sher Khān Fūlādī came out of the obscure corners where he had been spending his days in misfortune and

assumed command of an army. He advanced to take possession of Patan from the Mughal officers. ¹ Our historian Nizāmuddin, who served under Mīrzā ʿAbdur Rahīm, the Mughal governor of Guzrat, routed Sher Khān Fūlādī and sent him flying back to Ahmadabad. ² Mīrzā ʿAbdur Rahīm defeated the rebels in a hotly contested battle at Sakrej, three kos from Ahmadabad, on December 31, 1583. Sher Khān Fūlādī and his Afghāns fled towards Baglana and thence to the Deccan, while Muẓaffar K Šāh took shelter in Kathiawar. ³ Thus the Afghāns of Guzrat fought against the Mughals to the last and left the country instead of submitting themselves to their rule.

In 1576 at the battle of Rajmahal, the Afghāns lost their strongholds in Bihar and Bengal. Even after this, a section of them remained the uncompromising foes of Akbar. They retreated to Orissa and frequently raided the Mughal territories in Bengal and Bihar. At the time of the Bihar-Bengal rebellion and the rebellion of Akbar's brother Mīrzā Ḥakīm ⁴ in 1579-1581, the Afghāns under the leadership of Qatɩ Luḥānī took the opportunity to fish in troubled waters and seize some Mughal territories in Bihar and Bengal. ⁵ The rebellion was, however, suppressed by

¹. T. , II, 373 ; A. N. , III, 412-3 ; B. , II, 329.
². Ibid, 373-4.
⁴. The Afghāns of Afghanistan supported Ḥakīm as he championed the cause of orthodox of Islam against Akbar whom they considered heretical. A. N. , III, 335-7, 360.
the Mughal generals and the Afghans had to fall back on their strongholds in Orissa.

The Afghans could not long hold Orissa; in 1592, it fell into the hands of the Mughal general Raja Man Singh. Even then, the loss of Orissa made the Afghans homeless wanderers. Even then, a large number of them did not accept Mughal rule but dispersed themselves in Bengal. They took service under the Bara Bhuyans (twelve great zamindars), who had installed themselves as independent rulers in their respective territories after the fall of the Karrani saltanate in 1576.

Qatlū Lūhānī's son Sulaimān Khān Lūhānī and his followers entered the service of Raja Kedar Rai of Bhusna. In 1596, he died fighting Raja Man Singh. 1 Khwaja Kamal and Khwaja Jamāl, two brothers of Sulaimān Khān Lūhānī, joined the service of Raja Pratapaditya of Jessore, 2 and strengthened his position against the Mughals. 'Isa Khān Masnad-i-Ālī, the powerful zamindār of Bhati and the leader of the Bara Bhuyāns in their struggle against Akbar, made Khwaja 'Usmān, another brother of Sulaimān Lūhānī, his ally by the grant of territories in Bukainagar 3 in eastern Mymensingh and western Sylhet districts. 'Usmān and his Afghans, in alliance with 'Isa Khān, and, after his death, with his sons Mūsa and Dāud challenged the authority of

1. A. N., III, 711.
3. A. N., III, 632; Baharistān, I, 110.
Akbar in Eastern Bengal. In spite of his best efforts, Akbar failed to subdue them and Bengal, though it was nominally conquered in 1576, remained in fact unconquered until his death in 1605.

Akbar's distrust of the Afghans:

Akbar thoroughly disliked the Afghans as a body. In view of their past conduct to Babur and Humayun and their hostility towards his own rule, his distrust of them was but natural. Akbar could not certainly forget that the Afghans had deserted Humayun and caused his expulsion from India.

Moreover, Akbar had seen from personal experience that the turbulent Afghan chiefs did not feel comfortable at the Mughal court, because a few of them who, being forced by circumstances, joined his service, proved deserters after a few days. Abdur Rahman Khan Sur, the son of Sikandar Khan Sur, and Ghazi Khan Tanuri entered Mughal service at the time of the surrender of Mankot by Sikandar Khan Sur in July, 1557. In 1560 when Bairam Khan rebelled, they left service and created trouble in Sambal. Suffering defeat in an engagement, they fled and took shelter with Raja Ram Chand of Panna. The Mughal general Aṣaf Khan, however, defeated them in a fight and killed many of the Afghans including Ghazi Khan Tanuri.

References:
1. A. N., III, 809; Baharistan, I, 141-2.
Junaid Karrani, the son of Sulaiman Karrani’s brother ‘Imad Karrani, was another deserter from Mughal service. In 1566, he fled from his uncle’s court and took refuge with Akbar. According to Abul Fazl, the Emperor bestowed princely favours on him and granted him a jagir in Hindaul; but Junaid deserted the Mughal service and went to Guzrat. In view of Akbar’s distrust of the Afghans, Abul Fazl might be exaggerating when he said that Junaid received princely favours from the Emperor; but undoubtedly he was admitted to the imperial service and he deserted it only after a few days. Junaid joined his fellow Afghans in Guzrat and, in 1572-3, fought against the Mughal invaders. After Akbar’s occupation of Guzrat, he went to Bihar and caused enormous trouble for the Mughals. Junaid afterwards joined his cousin Daud Karrani and was killed in the battle of Rajmahal in 1576.

Mahmud Khan Sur, a son of Sikandar Khan Sur, and Husain, a son of Adil Shah, also left the service of Akbar in 1572 and 1574 respectively. The desertion of these Afghan chiefs, in spite of his favours, naturally caused Akbar’s distrust of the Afghans.

1. A. N., II, 284. Abul Fazl says that Junaid fled owing to a groundless apprehension.
2. A. N., III, 119; B., I, 193; T., II, 304; Mir’at S., 339a and 341a.
4. Ibid., 181 and A. N., III, 16.
5. A. N., III, 102. Husain was later on captured and executed by Mun’im Khan.
This distrust is revealed in Akbar's conduct towards some of the Afghan chiefs. In 1557 when Sikandar Khan Sur surrendered the fort of Mankot, he was promised Jaunpur in jagir, though the territory was yet to be conquered. In 1558, Jaunpur was, however, conquered; but it was conferred on Khan Zamān and the Afghan chief was sent with a small force to conquer Bengal from his fellow Afghāns and to obtain his jagir there. Bādāuni says that in Bengal many accidents befell Sikandar Khan Sur and that such a position was created that he attached himself again to his friends and died shortly afterwards.

Bāz Bahādur, the ex-king of Malwa, who was induced to join the Mughal court, also did not receive any better treatment. Although nominally he was given a mansab of 1,000, raised later on to 2,000, yet actually he was confined in the fort of Agra until his death. The Mughal historians, except Bādāuni, are silent about Bāz Bahādur's fate after he was admitted to court. They simply mention him as a talented musician and a mansābdār of 2,000 and do not refer to his confinement. It is probable that Abūl Fazl and Niẓāmuddīn did not refer to Bāz Bahādur's

2 and 3. Ibid. Ibid.
confinement as it would have injured the reputation of their master. Writing his book in secret, Badauni, however, stated what he saw with his own eyes.

The reaction of Akbar to the news of the death of a petty Afghān officer, Daulat Khān Lūdī at Ahmadnagar in 1601, expresses his distrust of the Afghāns. The Emperor is said to have remarked, "This day Sher Khān Šār has departed from the world." This indicates the distrust with which Akbar still regarded the Afghāns even at a time when his empire had reached the zenith of its prosperity and they had ceased to be a political factor in India.

Certain economic measures of Akbar show his distrust of the Afghāns. Badauni says that, as the Šadār-i-Sudūr (Minister in charge of Ecclesiastical affairs and Endowments) of the Emperor from 1556 to 1561 A. D., Sheikh Gadāi cancelled madād-i-maṣfāsh lands and took away the legacy of the Khānzādās. Evidently by the Khānzādās, Badauni meant the Afghāns, because in his history we find him often mentioning them as Khāns or Khānzādās and the Mughals as Mirzās, Chaghtais and Qizilbāshīs. Moreover, the Afghāns had preceded Akbar and also Abūl Fażl accused Sher Shāh and Islam Shāh for their lavish grant of lands. So, it is reasonable to conclude that this land measure of Akbar

3. Akīn, ii, 29.
affected the Afghāns living in his empire.

Further evidence from Ā'in-i-Akbarī not only clears whatever doubt we might have had about our conclusion from Bādaunī's statement, but also proves that Akbar was determined to ruin the well-to-do Afghān families of his empire. Abūl Fazl writes that, in 1562-63 (971 H.), Emperor Akbar appointed Sheikh Ābdun Nahi as the Sadar-i-Sudūr of the empire. He then took away all the land grants (suyūrghāl) from the Afghāns and chaudhurīs and referred the case of the others to the Sheikh, who inquired into and certified their grants. Indeed this incident reveals Akbar's distrust of the Afghāns. He resumed outright the lands of the Afghāns, while he gave the other classes of landholders the benefit of inquiry and confirmation. The motive which actuated Akbar in the resumption of all Afghan lands was certainly to weaken them break their economic affluence and to weaken them so that they might not create any trouble in the empire.

Another incident, though small in itself, expresses Akbar's distrust towards the Afghāns. In 1579, some Afghāns came from their country and settled in the Panjab. On a report that they oppressed the people of the locality, Akbar ordered Sa'id Khān, the sībadār of the Panjab, to have them settled in batches

1. Ā'in, 1, 198.
in different places so that they might neither be able to oppress the people nor become vagabonds. The idea in thus scattering the Afghans over the province was, no doubt, to prevent them from causing any mischief locally.

Akbar's distrust of the Afghans is reflected in the writings of his secretary and court historian Abul Fazl, who often mentioned them with the epithets of "black fated", "black faced", "brainless", "turbulent", "vagabond", and "wicked". In making such remarks, Abul Fazl, who recorded the deeds and thoughts of his royal master, simply gave expression to the feeling of Akbar towards the Afghans.

A large number of Afghans entered the Mughal army, particularly after the loss of Bengal and Bihar in 1576. Although they served with devotion and valour, Akbar did not entrust them with any important post in his government. Malik Mustafa, a brother of Baz Bahadur, Fatih Khan Masnad-i-Ali, Hasan Khan Batni, Haji Khan, the brother of Khwais Khan, Salim Khan Kakar, Babui Mankali, Saiyid Khan Karrani, Shabbaaz Khan Niyazi, Ibrahim Khan Kakar, Ibrahim Khan Miyana, Muhammad Khan Niyazi, Habibullā, Fath Khan Sur, Daulat Khan Ludī, "-

1. A. N., III, 247.
5. Ibid, 14; T., II, 448.
8. Ibid, 608-9; T., II, 452.
9. M., E., V, 67. He was the father of historian Ni'matullā.
Fath Khan Ludî, 1 Bahâdur Khan Qurdîr, Salîm Khan Lûhânî, "Isa Khan Maswânî, Sulṭân Sûr, Allahadâd Khan Lûhânî, Ulugh Khan Lûhânî, Nasîr Khan Miyâna, Manu Khan Lûhânî, Tâj Khan Lûhânî, Sher Khan and others 2 joined Akbar's army and rendered him good service in different campaigns of the empire. None of them, however, attained any post of dignity and honour in the imperial service.

While Akbar was very free in his appointments of the Turks, Persians and even Hindus to responsible posts, he seems to have behaved very differently towards the Afgâns. There were 7 vakîls (Principal Ministers), 10 vazîrs (Ministers of Finance), 15 bakhshîs (Paymasters of the Army) and 8 sadars (Ministers in charge of Ecclesiastical affairs and Endowments) in the reign of Akbar, 3 but not one of them was an Afgân. The Afgâns were not appointed to governorship or to any other subordinate office in the provincial administration. Although they took part in many of Akbar's campaigns and distinguished themselves, yet they were never entrusted with a major army command.

Moreover, Akbar did not give any of the larger mansâbabs to the Afgâns. A study of the list of the mansâbîrs given in the A'în reveals this fact. 4

1. A. N., III, 807.
2. Ibid, 650.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mansab</th>
<th>Total No. of Mansabdars</th>
<th>No. of Afghan Mansabdars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>30 (excepting the princes)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>900</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 412, 9
The table shows that of the total number of 412 mansabdārs only 9 Afghāns received mansabs, and those too but lowly ones. Baz Bahādur, the musician and the ex-king of Malwa, was the recipient of the mansab of 2,000. 1 Another Afghān named Daulat Khān Lūdī received this rank. 2 Fattū Khān Masnad-i-ʿAlī, 3 Ḥasan Khān Batnī, 4 Bābūi Mānkālī, 5 and Salīm Khān Kākār, 6 were mansabdārs of 1,000. Ṣahmat Khān and Shāh Muḥammad, the sons of Fattū Khān, 7 and Bahādur Khān Qūrdār 8 obtained the mansab of 300, 250 and 400 respectively. Ḥasan Khān Miyāna, the father of Bahlūl Khān Miyāna, who rose to the mansab of 1,500 in the reign of Jahāṅgīr, has been mentioned as a mansabdar, but his actual command has not been given in the Aʿīn. 9

Most of the above mentioned Afghān chiefs, however, rendered distinguished service to Akbar's empire. Fattū Khān Masnad-i-ʿAlī, a noble of sultān ʿAdil Shāh, joined Mughal service in 1561 after the failure of Sher Shāh II's attempt to recover the lost sovereignty, surrendering the fort of Chunar to Akbar. 10

1. Aʿīn, I, 225.  
2. A. N., III, 785; T., II, 388-90.  
3. Badaunī (II, 77) mentions him as a mansabdar of 2,000, but Niẓāmuddīn (II, 44O) says that Fattū died a mansabdar of 1,000. The evidence of Niẓāmuddīn, who was a bakhshi, seems more reliable.  
5. Aʿīn, I, 227; Blochmann, I, 473; T., II, 440.  
6. Ibid, 225; T., II, 448.  
7. and see Ibid, 229; Blochmann, I, 528.  
8. Ibid, 228; T., II, 456.  
10. A. N., II, 149-50; T., II, 170; B., II, 63.
A valiant soldier, Fattu Khan fought the enemies of the Emperor in many a campaign. He took part in suppressing the rebel viceroy Khan Zaman in 1565 and the disturbances in the Panjab caused by the advance of ambitious Mirza Hakim from Kabul.

Hasan Khan Batni, one of the Afghan chiefs of Sulaiman Karrani, left the service of Daud Karrani before the fall of Hajipur to Akbar in 1574. The capture of Hajipur and Patna from Daud was mostly due to his valuable suggestion. When the Mughals had failed to capture the strong fort of Patna, Hasan Khan Batni suggested the destruction of the Punpun bridge and the siege of Hajipur, the supply centre to Patna, as the necessary preliminary. Following his suggestions, the Mughals captured Hajipur and the fall of the town broke the resistance of the Afghans of Daud. They evacuated Patna and the Emperor easily occupied the fort.

Babui Mankali was another noble of Daud Karrani who entered the service of Akbar after the fall of the Karrani sak saltanate in 1576. He took a good part part in the suppression of the Bihar-Bengal rebellion and in subduing the chiefs of Bengal.

Daulat Khan Ludii was another Afghan, who served

1. A. N., II, 257.
2. Ibid, 370; III, 167; B., II, 156.
3. Ibid, 325; III, 82-3.
valiently the cause of Mughal expansion. His ancestors, the
relations of Daulat Khan Ludi and Dilawar Khan Khan Khanan,
severed the Ludi and Sur sultans and his father Khan Ludi, 
after the battle of Panipat in 1556, fled to Guzrat and took 
service under Sher Khan Fuladi at Patan. 1 "Umar Khan fought 
against the Mughals in Guzrat in 1572-73 and was killed and his 
son Daulat Khan Ludi fled with fled along with other Afghans to 
Surat. Abu Turab, the author of Tarikh-i-Guzrat, invited him to 
Ahmadabad and introduced him to the Mughal subadar, Khan Azam 
Mizra Aziz Koka, who appointed the brave young Afghan in his 
army in 1575. 2

Khan Azam greatly appreciated the courage and fighting 
qualities of Daulat Khan Ludi and made a present of him to Mizra 
Abdur Rahim, the son of Bairam Khan, at the time of his Khan 
Azam sister's marriage with him. At that time, he said to 
Abdur Rahim that if he wished to rise high and to obtain his 
father's title of Khan Khanan, he should keep Daulat Khan with 
him and rear him. 3

Mizra Abdur Rahim had a great admiration for Daulat 
Khan Ludi and chose him for his companion. In his Memoirs, 
Jahangir says that Abdur Rahim regarded Daulat Khan as his own 
brother or even hundred times more than his brother. 4

1. Tuz., 42-3; Imamuddin - Khan Jahan's Ancestors, 
Islamic Culture, XXXIII, No. 3.
2. Ibid and Masir, II, 5.
3. Ibid.
4. Tuz., 43.
Khan had so much influence with his master that Badauni has mentioned him as his vakil (deputy).\footnote{1}

Indeed most of the victories of Abdur Rahim were due to Daulat Khan's valour and manliness.\footnote{2} In 1583, Abdur Rahim, then governor of Guzrat, was faced with the formidable rebellion of the renegade Guzrati sultan Muzaffar Shah III, who had collected 40,000 horse against Mughal force numbering only 10,000. The Emperor had sent instructions to him not to engage the rebels until the re-inforcements from Guzrat had arrived. Daulat Khan, however, said to Abdur Rahim at that time, "Then you will have partners; if you want to be Khan Khanan, you must win victory alone. It is better to be killed than to live with an obscure name."\footnote{3} Thus encouraged, Abdur Rahim instantly engaged the enemy at Sarkej, 3 kos from Ahmadabad. Daulat Khan fought with undaunted courage and defeated the rebels. This victory won Abdur Rahim from Akbar the title of Khan Khanan and the mansab of 5,000.\footnote{4}

Daulat Khan also played a heroic part in Abdur Rahim's conquest of Thatta in 1593.\footnote{5} His part in the conquest of Ahmadnagar in 1600 was no less distinguished. In recognition of

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] B., II, 367.
\item[2.] Tuz., 43; Rahimi, III, 1628.
\item[3.] Ma'asir, I, 694-5.
\item[4.] T., II, 376; B., II, 336.
\item[5.] Ma'asir, II, 5; Rahimi, III, 1628.
\end{itemize}
his courage and service, Abdur Rahim gave him the rank of 1,000 in his own contingent. 1

Prince Daniyal had great admiration for Daulat Khan for his valour and courage. At his request, Abdur Rahim, who was his (Prince's) father-in-law, transferred the service of Daulat Khan to the Prince in 1600. Daniyal gave him the rank of 2,000. Daulat Khan, however, did not live long to enjoy his new mansab; for in 1601 he died of colic in Ahmadnagar. 2

The authors of Rahimi and Ma'asir mention Daulat Khan as one of the bravest men of the age. 3 Indeed the victory of Sarkej and the conquest of Thatta and Ahmadnagar were largely due to his valour. Still Akbar distrusted him as an Afghan, and this is reflected in the remark he made when he received the news of his death. 4

Daulat Khan Ludi left several sons behind him of whom Pir Khan was destined to be the most influential noble in the court of Jahangir, with the title and name of Khan Jahan Ludi.

---

1. Ma'asir, II, 5; Rahimi, III, 1628.
2. A. N*, III, 785; Ma'asir, II, 5-6.
3. Rahimi, III, 1628-9; Ma'asir, II, 6.
CHAPTER VIII

Jahāṅgīr's policy to the Afghāns and their position in his court (1605-27)

The relationship between the Afghāns and Akbar was one of hostility and distrust. Jahāṅgīr, however, followed a conciliatory policy towards the Afghāns and favoured them with suitable posts in the imperial service and an honoured position at court. The Afghāns responded to this treatment with loyalty and devotion on the battle-field and in the council-chamber. Thus there dawned a new phase in Afghan-Mughal relations in India.

The Afghan historian Ni‘matullāh’s writings reveal this important fact. He says, "In the year 1021 H. (1612 A.D.), the Afghāns lost their rule in India and Emperor Jahāṅgīr, pardoning them their previous faults, attached them to himself by the bonds of bounty. He gave so much attention to them that they gave up their hostile attitude and bound themselves in submission and attachment to him even at the sacrifice of their lives. By their distinguished service, they raised themselves to the rank of great nobles and became worthy of being admitted to the Emperor’s company. They aspired after imperial favour and exalted rank and they were exalted by the conferment of illustrious titles."

1. The Afghāns had lost their rule in Northern India in 1556 and in Eastern India in 1576. It was only in Sylhet that a few Afghāns under Usman Lūhānī resisted Mughal rule till 1612.

2. M., 172b, 172b.
New Afghan policy with Jahangir's accession:

In fact, however, the new phase in Afghan-Mughal relations began, not in 1612 as Ni'matulla alleged, but in 1605, at the very beginning of the reign of Jahangir. In this respect, in 1612 the Afghan chief 'Usman Luhani died fighting the battles of a bygone period. Jahangir had already been willing to make peace with 'Usman Luhani by offering him a command of 5,000. 1

Jahangir sought the support of the Afghans from the very beginning of his reign just because he could not rely on many of the nobles of his father's time and felt the need of having a strong body of his supporters. Khan A'zam Mirza Aziz Kuka, at the head of a section of Mughal nobles, and Raja Man Singh, the chief of the Rajput nobles, had, in the last days of Emperor Akbar, tried to push aside his succession and place his son Khusrav on the throne. Their intrigues made him feel so insecure that he dared not visit his dying father. The support of the Barha Saiyids led by Saiyid Khan Barha and Murtaza Khan, however, foiled their intrigues and Jahangir succeeded his father without further hindrance from them. But Jahangir's faith in many of the nobles of his father's time was weakened naturally weakened and he felt the need of creating a group of nobles on whom he could confidently rely. For this he began to look towards the Afghans.

Besides, born in the freer atmosphere of his father's court, Jahāngīr felt able to go further than his father in conciliating ill-wisher and the vanquished foes of his empire. He conciliated the Rajputs of Udaipur whom Akbar failed to conquer. The favour he showed to Rana Amar Singh and his Karan Singh, after the conquest of his country in 1614, speaks of his conciliatory policy towards the vanquished.

When Karan Singh accompanied Prince Khurrām to court, Jahāngīr honoured him by giving him a place in front of the right hand of the circle as well as a robe of honour and a jewelled sword. In his Memoirs, Jahāngīr writes, "As it was necessary to win the heart of Karan, I everyday showed him some fresh favour. On the second day of his attendance, I gave him a jewelled dagger and on the next a special Iraqi horse with a jewelled saddle. . . . Nurjahan Begam gave him a rich dress of honour, a jewelled sword, a horse, a saddle and an elephant. After this I presented him with a rosary of pearls of great value." ¹ The same spirit of conciliation governed Jahāngīr's policy towards the Afghāns.

Moreover, Jahāngīr realised that the Afghāns were a race of good fighters and if they could be won over, they might render valuable service in his account. Already while he was a prince, a number of Afghāns served him with distinction. An

¹ Tūz., 135-6; R., II, 17.
Afghan chief named Ruknuddin earned from him the name of Sher Khan for his valour. Another Afghan chief named Ibrahim Khan Kakar performed meritorious service, a few days after the accession of Jahangir, in dealing with some rebelliously inclined Rajputs. Abhay Ram, Bijoy Ram and Shyam Ram, the grandsons of Bhagwan Das, the paternal uncle and adopted father of Raja Man Singh, tried to flee from Agra so that they might join the Rana of Udaipur. They were, however, placed in the custody of Ibrahim Khan Kakar and Hatim Mankali, the son of Babui Mankali. When Ibrahim and Hatim wanted to disarm these Rajputs they attacked them and wounded Ibrahim. Ibrahim, however, managed to kill them. Impressed Jahangir rewarded heroic Ibrahim with the title of Dilawar Khan and gave him advancement in the imperial service.

A comparison of the position of the Afghans in the court of Akbar and of Jahangir in the period, 1605-12, shows that Jahangir, from the very beginning of his reign, followed a conciliatory policy towards the Afghans.

1. Tuz., 7; R., I, 17.
2. Ibid, 12-3; Ma'asir, II, 9.
3. See, 205-7 and 216.
In the reign of Jahāngīr
(1605 - 12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subadārs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faujdārs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent commanders</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansābdārs:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the reign of Akbar
(1556 - 1605)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was also a good number of Afghān officers in the army whose mansab cannot be ascertained. Their mention in Jahāngīr's Memoirs and other contemporary works, however, suggests that they held suitable mansabs in the army. Ḥātim, the son of Babui Mānkāli, Bāyāzīd Mānkāli, ‘Alī Khān Niyāzī, Shāhbāz Khān Lūdī, Bāyāzīd Khān Panī, Jahān Khān Panī and Sher Khān Tarīn were some of the Afghān officers whose actual rank as mansābdār has not been mentioned in the contemporary histories.

1. Tūz., 12; R., I, 29.
2. Ibid, 80; 166.
3. Ibid, 88;
4. Ibid, 147; Iqbalnāma, 104.
In the year of his accession, Jahāngīr appointed Dilāwar Khān Kākar as governor of Lahur and raised his mansāb to 1,500 horse.\(^1\) He promoted Sher Khān to the mansāb of 3,500\(^2\) and gave him the charge of Peshawar and Khaibar Pass.\(^3\) In 1610, Jahāngīr elevated Ghaznīn Khān Jālūrī to the rank of 2,000 personal and 700 horse.\(^4\) Manglī Khān held the mansāb of 1,500 personal and 800 horse in the early years of the reign of Jahāngīr.\(^5\) In 1607, Jahāngīr appointed Mubārak Khān Sarwānī to the Faujdārship of Hisar and two years after he increased his mansāb to 1,000 personal and 300 horse.\(^6\) Tāj Khān Afghān, whose mansāb is not known, served the empire of Jahāngīr as governor of Thatta.\(^7\)

Moreover, Jahāngīr showed special favour to Fīr Khān Lūdī, the son of Daulat Khān Lūdī. In 1606, he gave him the rank of 3,000 personal and 1,500 horse and conferred on him the title of Šalābat Khān. He also presented him with a standard and drums and called him farzand (son).\(^8\) Jahāngīr always referred to him as "my son" and looked upon him as no less than his own sons. In 1607, he gave him the title of Khān Jahān and ordered that, in all the farmāns and corresponances, his name should be written by the new title.

\(^1\) Tūz., 23 and 27; Iqbalnāma, 7; Ma'āsir, II, 9.
\(^2\) Ibid, 7.
\(^3\) Ibid, 49 and 60.
\(^4\) Ibid, 85.
\(^5\) Ibid, 146.
\(^6\) Ibid, 55 and 76.
\(^7\) Ibid, 131.
\(^8\) Ibid, 42 and Iqbalnāma, 19.
About this time, Khān Jahān Lūdī received the rank of 5,000 personal and 5,000 horse and a special khilafat and a jewelled sword.  

By 1608 Khān Jahān Lūdī became one of the intimate and influential nobles at court. In his Memoirs, Jahāngīr writes, "I promoted him (Khān Jahān) beyond his fellows and equals." The Emperor also says, "Today there is in my government none of greater influence than Khān Jahān, so much so that, on his representation, I pass over faults, which are not pardoned at the intercession of any other servant of the court." In fact, Jahāngīr pardoned the offences of the nobles and officers at the intercession of Khān Jahān Lūdī. Dulip Rai, the son of Rai Rai Singh, committed an offence, which Jahāngīr, in his Memoirs, does not speak, and took shelter with Khān Jahān. For the sake of Khān Jahān, Jahāngīr passed over the matter.

The author of Ma‘āṣir says that Jahāngīr favoured Khān Jahān so much that he wished him to marry in the Mughal royal family. He also wanted to give him the title of sultan and to offer him a seat in the Ghusalkhana (Royal Bath). Khān Jahān, however, refused representing that these were two

---

1. Tūz., 61.
2. Ibid. 42.
3. Ibid. 43.
4. Ibid. 70.
privileges reserved for the princes. We do not know if the above statement of Ma'asir is a fact. But, considering Jahangir's intimacy with and strong affection for Khan Jahan, we can say that such offers were not improbable.

When in 1610, Khan Jahan offered to go to the Deccan campaign, Jahangir writes in his Memoirs, "I had never contemplated separation from him; but, as the affair was an important one, I necessarily gave him permission and ordered him that, as soon as matters had been arranged, he should return without delay and that he should not stay in that region more than a year." The Emperor gave him presents of many things and appointed faithful nobles and officers to accompany him to the Deccan. At the time of Khan Jahan's departure, Jahangir descended from the Jharokha (the place from which the Emperor used to give audience to the people) and placed his own turban on his head. He then took Khan Jahan's hand and helped him to mount the horse. The Emperor granted him the special privilege of beating his drums as he went from his presence. The author of Ma'asir writes that both Jahangir and Khan Jahan wept at the time of the separation. The above incident shows the position of the Afghan noble Khan Jahan in the court of Jahangir.

1. Ma'asir, I, 717.
2. Tuz., 77.
3. Ibid, 77.
4. Ma'asir, I, 718.
Noteworthy also as a proof of the new Mughal Emperor's attitude towards the Afghāns is his entrusting them with responsible posts and important commands. Jahāngīr gave them the charge of such strategically important places as the Panjab, Peshawar and the Khaibar Pass. In 1610, he vested the supreme command of the Deccan campaign to Khān Jahān Lūdī.

This new attitude produced the desired effect. From this time we find the Afghāns fighting in right earnest for the cause of the Mughal empire. Jahāngīr himself appreciated the service of his Afghan officers. Of Sher Khān he says that he did his duty of guarding the Khaibar Pass well. As the governor of Lahur, Dilāwar Khān also rendered valuable service to the empire of Jahāngīr. When the renegade and rebel Prince Khusrau advanced towards Lahur in 1606 and many of the Mughal officers had joined his standard, Dilāwar Khān remained loyal to the Emperor. He could have joined Khusrau along with other Afghāns of the Panjab. But, Dilāwar Khān did not do that. He prepared the defence of Lahur and stubbornly resisted the siege of the rebel Prince. Indeed it was his resistance which enabled Jahāngīr to defeat a and capture Khusrau and to avert a civil war in the empire.

Many Afghan officers fought in the war against Udaipur

2. Tūz., 86 ; Ma'āsir, I, 719 ; Iqbalnāma, 45.
3. Ibid, 60 ; R., I, 102.
4. Ibid, 27 and 29 ; Iqbalnāma, lo-l ; De Laet, 174.
and Jahāngīr appreciated their services. He says that Ghaznīn Khan Jalūrī showed the greatest zeal of all in fighting against the Rana. 1 Bayazīd Mānkālī and his brothers fought bravely against the rebels in Uch. 2

Khān Jahān Lūdī and many other Afghāns took part in the campaign against Ahmadnagar. At first Khān Jahān went to assist the supreme commander Khān Khānān ʿAbdur Raḥīm in the campaign. But, he found the commander lukewarm in his duty. So, he sent a representation to the Emperor accusing ʿAbdur Raḥīm and suggesting that if he was appointed to the chief command, he would conquer Ahmadnagar and Bijapur in two years. 3 Jahāngīr fell in with his proposals. He also appointed Khān Aʿzām to assist the new commander. Although Khān Jahān exerted himself with great zeal and ability, his campaign against Ahmadnagar did not fare better than that of ʿAbdur Raḥīm. The guerrilla tactics of the Deccanis and the genius of their commander Malik ʿĀmar foiled his efforts. The absence of a concerted plan of campaign on account of the differences of the Mughal generals also contributed to the failure of Khān Jahān. But whatever the reason for the result of the campaign, it illustrates the earnestness of an Afghān chief in fighting for the expansion of Jahāngīr's empire.

1. Tūz., 85.
2. Ibid., 82.
3. Ibid., 86; R., I, 179-80.
In 1611, a great offensive against Ahmadnagar was planned. Khan Jahān, Man Singh and Khan Aʿzam were to advance from the side of Berar and Khandesh. Abdūlla Khan was to advance from Guzrat in the direction of Nasik and Trimbak. He was to keep in touch with the main division of the army so that they might make a simultaneous attack on Ahmadnagar. Abdūlla Khan's vanity and his selfish passion for glory, however, spoiled the plan. He did not co-operate with Khan Jahān and made a dash towards Daulatabad.

The guerrilla tactics of the Deccanis and their blockade of his supply routes greatly reduced his army. Realising his folly, Abdūlla Khan retreated to Baglana and thence to Guzrat.

In his Memoirs, Jahāngīr writes that the great offensive under Khan Jahān Lūdī failed because of the pride of Abdūlla Khan, the disagreement of the generals and the carelessness of Khan Aʿzam.¹ We, however, think that the disagreement of the Mughal generals and the carelessness of Khan Aʿzam might have been due to the vesting of the supreme command in Khan Jahān. The proud Mughal nobles and generals probably could not reconcile themselves to the idea of being subordinates to an Afghān and a new-comer to the imperial service.

Jahāngīr's policy won over many Afghān chiefs to his service. Fīr Khan Lūdī and his brothers joined the army of

¹ Tūz., 107; R., I, 219-20.
Islam Khān, the governor of Bengal. In 1611 after the battle of Salka, Jamāl Khān Lūhānī left the service of Raja Pratapaditya of Jessore and entered Jahāngīr’s Bengal army. Naṣīr Khān Panī, Dariyā Khān Panī and their followers left Usman Lūhānī and joined the imperial army. Nasir Khan Pani, Bariya Khan Pani and their followers left Usman Luhani and joined the imperial army. Mīrza Nathan, the author of Baharistān-i-Ghayebī and a petty officer in the Mughal army, had 250 Afghāns under him. In the campaign of Islam Khān against the zamīndārs of Bengal and Usman Lūhānī, we see that Bāyazīd Khān Panī, Jahān Khān Panī, Sher Khān Tarīn, Muḥammad Khān Panī and other Afghān officers and soldiers fought in the Mughal army.

Notwithstanding the conciliatory policy of Jahāngīr towards the Afghāns in general and his fair offers to Usman Lūhānī in particular, a section of the Afghāns under Usman Lūhānī and Bāyazid Kārānī remained hostile to him. In alliance with Musa Khān, the son of Isa Khān, the leader of the Barabhuyāns of Bengal, they resisted Mughal authority in Eastern Bengal. Even after the submission of the zamīndārs in 1611, these Afghāns defied Jahāngīr’s authority in Sylhet. In the battle of Baulambapur in 1612, they fought against the vast forces of the Mughals with only 10,000 infantry, 5,200 cavalry

2. Ibid, 110.
3. Ibid, 100.
4. Ibid, 87.
5. Ibid, 74-6 and 78.
and 140 elephants. 1 ʿUsmān fell in the fight and many of his men were killed. The death of the leader dispirited the Afghāns and they surrendered themselves to the Mughal general Shujāʿ at Khān.

Afghan position after 1612:

ʿUsmān and his men had given the Mughals much trouble. The battle of Daulambapur had destroyed the last refuge of the Afghāns. They could obtain neither shelter nor service in Bengal as the power of the zamīndārs had been crushed and the whole country had passed into the hands of the Mughals. They could not also pass to Afghanistan or to Southern India through the Mughal territories. So, after the battle of Daulambapur, the Afghāns were either to surrender or to move as homeless wanderers in the hills of Assam or Tripura.

In the circumstances, Jahāngīr might have remained indifferent to the Afghāns. He, however, forgot their past conduct and favoured them. When the Afghāns surrendered after the battle, Shujāʿ at Khān and other Mughal officers received them honourably. The sons and brothers of ʿUsmān Lūhānī received robes of honour and 400 Afghan chiefs obtained the present of a pair of shawls each. On their arrival at Dacca, sūbadār

2. Tūz., 104. Jahāngīr writes that he could not at first believe that ʿUsmān, the great warrior, who had for years defied the Mughals, was dead at Daulambapur.
3. Bahārīstān, I, 196-7; Iqābālnāma, 64.
Islam Khan also presented them with robes of honour.\(^1\) Bayazid Karrani and his brothers who had also submitted received the same generous treatment from Jahangir.\(^2\)

Jahangir admitted the Afghans of Usman and Bayazid into the imperial army. This made a great impression on their minds and they fought loyally and heroically in the Mughal conquest of Koch Bihar, Kamrup and Kachar. The subjugation of these countries of the north-east frontier of the Mughal empire was largely due to this.\(^3\)

The subjugation of the Afghans of Sylhet in 1612 and Jahangir's clemency to them brought about a complete change in Afghan-Mughal relations in India. It dissipated the atmosphere of hostility and distrust that had existed between the Afghans and Mughals since the time of Babur. Jahangir trusted the Afghans unreservedly with responsible posts in the imperial service and honoured them with titles, presents and khil'ats. The Afghans, on their part, reconciled themselves to the loss of their sovereignty and independence and exerted themselves to better their fortune within the imperial service and to obtain an honoured position at the Mughal court. Thus the Afghans rose rapidly in the imperial service and though they ceased to be an independent political force in India, they succeeded in

\(^1\) Baharistan, I, 205.
\(^2\) Ibid, 195-6 and 208.
\(^3\) Ibid, 222-3, 230-2, 316, 371 and 410.
establishing their influence within the court of Jahāngir. A study of their position in the period, 1613-1627, will bear out this statement.

Afgāns in Mughal imperial service (1613-27):

Sūbadārs 4

- Dīlāwar Khān Kākar
- Tāj Khān Afgān
- Jalāl Khān Kākar
- Khān Jahan Lūdī

Kashmir
Thatta
Kashmir
Multan, Guzrat and the Deccan

Independent campaign commanders 3

- Aṭāliq
- Sipāhsalār
- Faujdarṣ

Mubārak Khān Sarwānī
Mubāriz Khān
Sher Khān Afgān

Mansabdārs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>Khān Jahan Lūdī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Dīlāwar Khān Kākar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4,000 | 3,000  | Bahlūl Khān Miyāna (Sarbuland Khān)

1. Tūz., 203; R., I, 409.
2. Iqbalnāma, 222.
3. Lāhūrī, I, 182.
4. Tūz., 303; Iqbalnāma, 146.
5. Lāhūrī, I, 182.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Kamaluddin Ruhila</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Mubariz Khan Ruhila</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Sardar Khan Afghan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sher Khan (Nahir Khan)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Sheru Ruhila</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Allahadad Khan Ruhila</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Shahbaz Khan Dutani</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>Babui Khan Karrani</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Ahmad Khan Niyazi</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Asalat Khan Ludii</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shahbaz Khan Ludii</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Ghazin Khan Jaluri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Nannu Khan Afghan</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Mangli Khan</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Mubarak Khan Niyazi</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Jalal Khan Kaka</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Mubarak Khan Sarwani</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700</td>
<td>500 Kamaluddin Khan (son of Sher Khan Afghan)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. Lahuri, I, 311.
2. Ibid, I, 182 and 214.
3. Tuz., 344.
4. Ma'asir, II, 652; Lahuri, I, 78.
5. Ibid, 650-1.
7 and 8. Lahuri, I, 183 and 121.
9. Ma'asir, I, 185.
15-16. Tuz., 312 and 146.
Besides those listed above, there were in the army of Jahāngīr other Afghān mansabdārs whose actual rank as mansabdār is not known. Shāh Muḥammad Kākar, Muḥammad Khān Niyāzī and others ¹ have been mentioned as officers in the imperial army fighting against Koch Bihār and Kamrup in 1612-13. We, however, do not find any reference to the number of horse they commanded. Jahāngīr writes that, in 1617 after the death of Ḥasan Khān Miyāna, he granted mansabs to his sons.² In 1620 when Dilāwar Khān died, Jahāngīr also favoured his sons and sardārs with mansabs.³ Jamal Khān and Rustam Khān have been mentioned as Afghān officers in the Mughal army fighting the rebels of Kangra in 1620.⁴ As they were officers having Afghān followers under them, it may be said that they held some mansab in the imperial army.

To illustrate Jahāngīr's new policy towards the Afghāns and their loyal service to him it will be useful to examine in some detail the careers of Dilāwar Khān Kākar and Khān Jahān Lūdī. We have seen that Dilāwar Khān Kākar saved the empire of Jahāngīr in 1606 from a civil war by resisting the rebel Prince Khusrau at Lahur and by helping the Emperor to capture him. In 1614, along with Sher Khān and other Afghān officers,
he joined Prince Khurrām in the conquest of Udaipur and performed distinguished service.\(^1\) In 1618, Jahāngīr appointed Dilāwar Khān as governor of Kashmir and the latter promised to the Emperor that he would in the course of two years conquer Kishtwar, a mountainous country in South Kashmir.\(^2\)

In 1619, accompanied by his adventurous sons Jalāl, Jamāl and Ḥasan, Dilāwar Khān marched with an army of 10,000 foot for the conquest of Kishtwar. As the country was full of mountains, defiles, jungles, rivers and fords, they had to face great difficulties in the campaign. They, however, overcame all obstacles and, by the beginning of 1620, they completed the conquest of Kishtwar.\(^3\) Jahāngīr highly appreciated Dilāwar Khān's service. He honoured him and his sons with ḫilʿat and an increase in mansāb and granted him the revenue of the conquered territory which amounted to 100,000 rupees a year.\(^4\)

In his Memoirs, Jahāngīr wrote about him, "Among the nobles of high rank Dilāwar Khān was one who combined valour with leadership and knowledge of affairs. He always established his superiority in my service and worked with perfect sincerity."\(^5\) The Emperor patronised his sons, after Dilāwar Khan's death in 1620, and appointed his eldest son Jalāl as governor of Kashmir.

---

1. \(\text{Tūz.}, 27-9 \text{ and } 127 ; \text{Maʿāṣir, II, 10.}\)
2. Ibid, 225 ; \(\text{R.}, \text{II, 6.}\)
3. Ibid, 294-5 ; \(\text{Iqābānāma, 141-6.}\)
4. Ibid, 288 ; \(\text{146.}\)
5. Ibid, 311 ; \(\text{R.}, \text{II, 167.}\)
Jalāl and his men fought bravely in subduing the zamīndārs and chiefs who still defied Mughal authority in Kishtwar.  

Afghan influence at Mughal court:

The career of Khān Jahān Lūdī best illustrates the new policy of Jahāngīr. It also shows the rise of Afghan influence in the Mughal empire. Even after Khān Jahān's failure in the Deccan in 1611, Jahāngīr treated him with favour. He gave him a jagir in Thanesvar. In 1612, Jahāngīr summoned him to court because as he says in his Memoirs, "As I had a great desire to see my farzand Khān Jahān and wanted to inquire into the important affairs connected with the Deccan, I sent for him."  

About this time at his request, the Emperor raised the mansab of Shāhbāz Khān Lūdī to 2,000 personal and 1,000 horse.  

In 1616, Khān Jahān accompanied Prince Shāh Jahān to the Deccan. In 1617, Jahāngīr elevated him to the mansab of 6,000 personal and 6,000 horse - a rank, which no other noble except the princes of the blood enjoyed at that time. He also honoured Khān Jahān with the present of an Iraqi horse from his private stable.  

In the same year, Khān Jahān returned from the Deccan along with Prince Shāh Jahān, Mahābat Khān and others and Jahāngīr:

1. Tūz., 312 ; R., II, 171.
2. Ibid, 145 ; Ma'āsir, I, 719.
3. Ibid, 147 ; 719.
4. Ibi, 184 ; R., I, 372.
gave precedence to him over other nobles. Shāh Jāhān had the honour of audience with the Emperor in the Jharokā. After this, Jahāngīr ordered the bakhshīs to arrange the nobles according to their rank. In his Memoirs, he writes, "The first, who had the honour of audience, was Khan Jahan. Sending for him above (to the Jharokā), I selected him for the honour of kissing my feet. "

After this 'Abdullā Khan, Mahābat Khan and others were introduced before the Emperor. This precedence of Khan Jāhan over others shows that by 1617 he rose to be the premier noble at court.

Jahāngīr had greater trust in Khan Jāhan than in any other noble of his court. Even Empress Nurjāhan's brother Aṣaf Khan did not enjoy so much of the Emperor's confidence. An incident relating to the imprisoned Prince Khusrau reveals that Mahābat Khan, Khan Jāhan Lūdī and other nobles suggested the release of the Prince to the Emperor. Jahāngīr, however, feared that Khusrau might again create trouble for him. He agreed to release him if he could be placed in the custody of a trustworthy noble. The choice of Jahāngīr fell on Khan Jāhan. Khusrau was set free and made over to his care.

In 1620, Jahāngīr took Khan Jāhan with him to Kashmir for a change of air. About this time, the Emperor granted him a

1. Tūz., 195; R., I, 394.
2. Ibid, 195; 394.
very charming village named Inch near Srinagar which had been
given by Akbar to Ramdas Kachwaha.  

In 1621 when Jahāṅgīr was in Kashmir, he received news
that the Persians were threatening Qandahar. Thereupon he
appointed Khān Jahān as governor of Multan so that he might keep
watch in that quarter. He sent to him to his charge with the
present of a khilāt, a jewelled sword, a horse and an elephant.  
In 1621, Jahāṅgīr sent him the present of a special elephant
named Gaj Ratan  and raised the mansab of his son Aṣālāt Khān.  

In 1622, the Persian ruler Shāh Abbās II besieged
Qandahar with a large army and the Mughal commandant ‘Abdul Azīz
was shut up in the fort with a force of 300 soldiers. Khān Jahān
communicated the news to Jahāṅgīr and sought his permission to
proceed to the relief of the beleaguered fort. Under the influence
influence of Nūrjahān, who wanted to send Shāh Jahān to Qandahar
in order to humiliate and ruin him, Jahāṅgīr, however, refused
him saying that kings should be opposed by kings or princes.

A little later Jahāṅgīr sent a farman to Khān Jahān
summoning him to court. The opponents of Khān Jahān interpreted
this sudden call as a sign that the Emperor would humiliate him.
But to their disappointment and surprise, the Emperor received

1. Tūz., 312-3 ; R., II, 172.
2. Ibid., 323 ; 191 ; Iqbalnāma, 176-7.
3. Ibid., 332 ; 209.
4. Ibid., 337 ; 219.
him with his usual favour and presented him with a khilafat, an
elephant, a special horse, a jewelled sword and a dagger. In fact,
the Emperor required the presence of Khan Jahan at court so
that he might discuss Qandahar affairs with him. It was settled
that until Shah Jahan came from the Deccan to command the army
to Qandahar, Khan Jahan was to wait at Multan and make all
necessary preparations. 1

Shah Jahan, however, understood Nurjahan's motives and
he did not leave the Deccan on one excuse or another. In the
meantime after a siege of 45 days, the fort of Qandahar fell
into the hands of Shah Abbas II. 2

When in 1622 Shah Jahan rebelled, Jahangir summoned
Khan Jahan to court. As he did not come in spite of repeated
orders, Jahangir wrote to him, "If at this time Sher Khan Suh
were living, he would, notwithstanding his enmity, come to us
and yet you have not come." 3 It happened that Khan Jahan had
fallen ill at that time. When after 13 days he recovered, he
hastened to court. Jahangir treated him with favour and
ordered him to guard the fort of Agra and its treasures and to
take up his abode at Fathpur Sikri. 4

In 1623 on the death of Khan A'zam Mirza Aziz Kuka,
Jahangir appointed Khan Jahan as governor of Guzrat. In the

1 Tuz., 345; Iqbalnama, 192 and 196; Ma'asir, I, 719-20.
4. Tuz., 360, 373 and 380; Iqbalnama, 216; Ma'asir, I, 720.
following year, he appointed him atāliq to Prince Parvez and viceroy of the Deccan in place of Mahābat Khan, who had fallen into the bad graces of the Emperor. In 1625, Parvez died and Khan Jahan obtained the sole management of the Deccan affairs. By this time, Shāh Jahān was in full rebellion. Khan Jahan's position as a premier noble in the empire was definitely established when Shāh Jahān rebelled and Mahābat Khan lost his position with Prince Parvez. He had the favour and the confidence of the Emperor and he wielded considerable influence at court. So, when after a fruitless rebellion Shāh Jahān presented his petition of submission, the Emperor pardoned him at the intercession of Khan Jahan. De Laet also writes that in 1626 Khan Jahan was the most influential noble in the Mughal empire.

As a viceroy of the Deccan, Khan Jahan tarnished his good name by succumbing to the temptation of the Deccani gold. Instead of prosecuting the war against Ahmadnagar, in 1626 he made a treaty with the Nizām ul Mulk and his Abyssinian minister Hamīd Khan. By this treaty, he sold to them for an annual tribute of three lak of Huns the whole territory of Balaghat. The annual revenue of the territory was 55 crore of Huns. Khan Jahan sent orders to the Mughal officers to make over the territory to the Nizām ul Mulk's officers. All obeyed except Sipāhdār Khan, the

1. Ma'āṣir, I, 721.
2. Iqbalnāma, 248.
commandant of the fort of Ahmadnagar, who refused to surrender his charge without a farramān from the Emperor. 1

The court historian Muḥtamīd Khān has condemned Khān Jahan as a faithless Afghān for his sale of Balaghat. 2 The author of Maʿāṣir says that by this treaty Khān Jahān made friends with the Nizām ul Mulk so that he might find refuge at his court in the event of a change of fortune. 3 In view of the illness of Jahāngīr, Mahābat Khān’s coup and the rival parties at court on the issue of succession, Khān Jahan probably felt that he might fall on evil days after the death of the Emperor. So, to provide against future misfortune, he made friends with the Nizam ul Mulk. But, whatever might have been his motive, the sale transaction revealed his faithlessness and ingratitude to the Emperor and his patron.

Khān Jahan’s sale of Balaghat displeased Jahāngīr. In spite of this, Jahāngīr conferred on him a few days later the title of sipāhsalār. 4 It seems strange that, instead of humiliating the faithless Afghān, Jahāngīr favoured him with the highest military title of the empire. It was not, however, the strong affection of the Emperor for him rather the policy of Empress Nūrjahan, who was the de facto ruler of the empire.

1. Iqbalnāma, 283-4; Lāhūrī, I, 271-2; Maʿāṣir, I, 721.
2. Ibid.
4. Iqbalnāma, 289; Maʿāṣir, I, 721.
at the time, which accounted for this. Nurjahan wanted the succession for her son-in-law Prince Shahriyar and for this reason she had disgraced Shah Jahan and Mahabat Khan. The rebel Mahabat Khan joined Shah Jahan \(^1\) and their alliance threatened the ascendancy of Nurjahan. Besides, Nurjahan could not rely on her brother Asaf Khan, the father-in-law of Shah Jahan. She had to rely all the more on Khan Jahan, the powerful viceroy of the Deccan. Hence, Khan Jahan received the favour of the court and he continued to enjoy his great position in the empire till the death of Emperor Jahangir in 1627.

A favourite companion of Emperor Jahangir, an atalíq to a prince, a powerful viceroy of a great and covetous province and the sipahsalar of the empire, Khan Jahan had a unique position at the Mughal court. His intercession obtained for maharṣhad nobles and princes pardons from the Emperor for their offences.\(^2\) The author of Ma’asir says that, in point of intimacy and influence of words, Khan Jahan had no rival at court.\(^3\) The Emperor looked upon him as his son and offered him a seat in the Ghusalkhāna. He also wanted him to marry a princess of the blood. He helped him to mount the hazzand azm horse and even wept at his separation from him. The writings of

---

\(^1\) Iqbalnāma, 289; Ma'āṣir, I, 721.
\(^3\) Ma'āṣir, I, 717.
the European travellers also reveal the affections of Jahāngīr for Khān Jahān. Edward Terry, who came to the Mughal court in 1616, says that the Emperor Jahāngīr gave Khān Jahān the title of "the Lord of my Heart." 1

Indeed Khān Jahān held an enviable position at the court of Jahāngīr. The Emperor granted him many special privileges. Khān Jahān enjoyed the privilege of beating his drums in the royal presence. He had also the privilege of public and private reception. 2 The author of Ma'āṣir says that all the nobles had to receive Khān Jahān when he came to court. 3 One day Shāh Jahān said to Saiyid Khān Jahān Barhā, "This title (Khān Jahān) is of a man from whom we and all the princes desire to receive attention; but, out of contempt, he says nothing to anybody." 4 This illustrates the position and influence of Khān Jahān at the court of Jahāngīr. Indeed in Khān Jahān we find the culmination of the Afghān political influence in the Mughal empire.

1. Purchas His Pilgrimes, IX, 48.
2. Ma'āṣir, I, 723.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid, 730-1.
CHAPTER IX

The fall of Khan Jahan and the decline of Afghān influence

In the reign of Jahangīr, the Afghān influence at the court of the Mughals rose to its zenith in the person of Khān Jahān Lūdī. In the reign of Shāh Jahān (1627-58), however, there came a steady decline in Afghān influence and position in the Mughal empire. The hostile attitude of Khān Jahān to the succession of Shāh Jahān, his subsequent rebellion against him and consequent distrust of the new Emperor towards the Afghāns accounted for this.

Khān Jahān and Shāh Jahān's succession:

Jahangīr died in 1627 and there came an eclipse in the fortunes of Khān Jahān. Shāh Jahān, who was at Junair in the Deccan, proclaimed himself emperor at the news of his father's death and, desiring to win over the powerful viceroy of the Deccan to his cause against his rival claimants to the throne, he sent his confidential agent, Jan Nīshār Khān, to him with a farmān confirming him his viceroyalty. Khān Jahān, however, refused to support Shāh Jahān. The court historians say that Khān Jahān, who had great authority in the Deccan, aimed at sovereign power after the death of Jahangīr.¹

¹. Iqbalnāma, 299; Lahūrī, I, 270-1.
This view of the Mughal historians seems to have been based on their prejudice against Khan Jahan and the Afghans. In fact, Khan Jahan did not aim at sovereign power, though many of his friends and followers, particularly Sikandar Dutani and Dariya Khan Ruhila, formerly an officer of Prince Shah Jahan, incited him to seize the opportunity for the recovery of the Afghan sovereignty in India. ¹

Khan Jahan, however, wanted to be neutral in the succession dispute that occurred after the death of Jahangir. He saw that Empress Nurjahana supported the cause of her son-in-law Prince Shahrir and the latter had proclaimed himself as emperor at Lahur. A Saf Khan and the army officers who had been with the dying Emperor Jahangir in the camp in Kashmir had installed Dawar Bakhsh, a son of Prince Khusrau, on the throne. While there were three candidates for the throne, Aqa Afzal, the diwan of the Deccan whose brother was a diwan of Shahrir, advised Khan Jahan to remain neutral in the succession dispute and to join the service of whoever became emperor. ²

Besides, Khan Jahan was displeased with Shah Jahan because he conferred on Mahabat Khan the title of sipahsalar. ³ He feared that if Shah Jahan became emperor, he would promote Mahabat Khan and as such his own great position and influence

¹. Iqbalnama, 299; Ma'asir, I, 722 and 727.
². Ma'asir, I, 722.
³. Ibid.
at court would be gone. It wounded the feelings of Khan Jahan that
because Shah Jahan, in spite of his former intimacy with him, should
favour his rival Mahabat Khan, who had joined him only recently. 1
So, Khan Jahan did not wish to support the cause of Shah Jahan.
Moreover, he thought that, in view of Empress Nurjahan's support
of Shahriyar and the installation of Dawar Bakhsh by Aasaf Khan
and the army, Shah Jahan had little chance of obtaining the
throne.

Khan Jahan's hostile attitude towards Shah Jahan's
succession incensed the latter and he sent Mahabat Khan with an
army to Mandu, where Khan Jahan had left his family and men. At
this, Khan Jahan renewed friendly relations with the Nizam ul
Mulk and, leaving his sons and Sikandar Dutani in charge of
Burhanpur, he moved towards Mandu and occupied Malwa from its
governor Nuzaffar Khan Ma'muri, who was inclined to Shah Jahan. 2

But, although Khan Jahan did not support Shah Jahan, in
the end it was the latter who won the war of succession. Empress
Nurjahan's nominee Shahriyar was defeated and captured and the
proclamation of Dawar Bakhsh proved to be a ruse invented by
Aasaf Khan in favour of his son-in-law. Khan Jahan realised his
grave miscalculation. So, after Shah Jahan's accession, he sent
a vakil to court with suitable presents. 3 Emperor Shah Jahan
forgave him and reappointed him to the government of the Deccan. 4

1. Ma'asir, I, 1722.
2. Iqbalmama, 300 ; Lahuri, I, 272 ; Ma'asir, I, 723.
3. Ibid.
Shāh Jahān's Afghan Policy (1627-31):

At the beginning of his reign (1627-31), Emperor Shāh Jahān followed his father's policy of conciliating the Afghan. The fact that he forgave Khān Jahān and reappointed him to the government of the Deccan illustrates this. He also confirmed Khān Jahān's rank of 7,000 zāt and 7,000 sawār.1 Shāh Jahān even pardoned Dariyā Khān Rūhīla, who had deserted from his service and joined Khān Jahān. The Emperor also gave him a mansāb of 4,000 zāt and 3,000 sawār which, in 1628, was raised to 4,000 and 4,000.2

Besides, Shāh Jahān appointed Sher Khān as governor of Guzrāt and conferred on him the rank of 5,000 and 5,000.3 He also confirmed and raised the mansāb of a few other Afghan officers, such as Bahlūl Khān Miya, Nubāriz Khān Afghān, Shāhbaẓ Dūtānī 4 and Jalāl Khān Kākār.5 Moreover, he created a few mansābdārs from among the Afghāns, such as Bahādur Khān Rūhīla, the son of Dariyā Khān Rūhīla,6 Jahān Khān Kākār 7 and others. The following table will give an idea of the position of the Afghāns in the early years (1627-31) of Shāh Jahān's reign.

1. Lahūrī, I, 182.
2. Ibid, 202-3 and 297.
3. Ibid, 77-8; Ma‘āṣir, II, 652-3.
5. Ibid, 184.
6. Ibid, 117.
Afghan mansabdars (1631-4, D.):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>Khan Jahān Lūdı</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Sher Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Dariya Khan Rūhila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Bahlūl Khan Miyāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Bahādur Khan Rūhila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Aṣalat Khan Lūdì</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Sherū Rūhila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Shāhbāz Dutānī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Allahdād Khan Rūhila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Babui Khan Karrani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Mubārak Khan Niyāzī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Jalāl Khan Kākar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Ahmad Khan Niyāzī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Pir Khan Miyāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Jahān Khan Kākar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Lahūrī, I, 204.
5. Ibid, 296.
Although the Afghāns continued to enjoy an honourable place in the Mughal army, yet their political influence, which they had wielded in the empire through the great position of Khān Jahān Lūdī, disappeared in Shāh Jahān’s reign. On account of his sale of Balaghat and his hostile attitude to the succession of Shāh Jahān, Khān Jahān lost his position at his court. On the other hand, Ḍaḵtar Khān and Mahābat Khān who had helped the new Emperor in the war of succession became the premier nobles in the empire and they obtained the titles of Yamīn ud dawla (the Pillar of the State) and Khān Khānān respectively.

The rise of Mahābat Khān, his rival, in particular, meant the loss of Khān Jahān’s great position in the empire. So, the author of Maʿāṣir rightly says that men, who had not been admitted to the presence of Emperor Jahāṅgīr, claimed to be the equals of Khān Jahān and they even raised their heads above him.¹

It seems that Shāh Jahān appointed Khān Jahān as governor of the Deccan with the idea that he was to recover Balaghat from his friend the Niẓām ul Mulk. But as the latter could not do so, in 1628 the Emperor transferred him to Malwa and gave Mahābat Khān the charge of the Deccan.² Khān Jahān took

¹. Maʿāṣir, I, ⁷³⁰–³¹.
². ʿAmal, I, ⁴⁸ ; Lāhūrī, I, ₁₉₉ and ₂⁷₃.
part in the suppression of Jujhar Singh Bundela's rebellion. After that, he came to court on a summons from the Emperor. ¹

Khān Jahan's rebellion:

The court historians say that Khān Jahan remained eight months at court and, although the Emperor did not rebuke him, he continued to be moody and disconcerted and was ready to listen to trouble-makers. ² We, however think that Khān Jahan had reason to feel uneasy at the court of Shah Jahan. He found that his former position had gone and his inferiors had been made his superiors. Besides, Shāh Jahān received him only with cold and formal politeness. ³ This neglect wounded the feelings of Khān Jahān. Moreover, Shāh Jahān significantly referred to the strong contingent he had brought to court. He also transferred some parganas of Khān Jahan's jagirs to others. ⁴ These made Khān Jahan suspect that Shāh Jahān would humiliate and ruin him. ⁴

The rumour that he would soon be imprisoned added to Khān Jahan's suspicions. One day Mukhlis Khān's son Mirzā Laskarī mischievously told a son of Khān Jahan that his father would soon be imprisoned. The son informed the father. Khān Jahan feared for his safety and remained shut up in his house. Shāh Jahān sent him an amānnāma assuring him of safety.

¹. Lahūrī, I, 255; 'Āmal, I, 348.
². Ibid, 273.
³. Ma'āṣir, I, 723.
⁴. Ibid, 723-4.
Aṣaf Khan re-assured him. Khan Jahan, however, could not rely on the amānāmā and, in the night of October 5, 1629 (Safar 26, 1039), he fled from Agra with his family and followers. 1

Shāh Jahān sent Khwājah Abūl Hasan Turbatī to the pursuit of Khan Jahan. At Dhulpur, 18 kos from Agra, Muẓaffar Khan Barha and other Mughal generals encountered him. In the fight, Khan Jahan's sons Husain and Ajmal and his son-in-law Shams Khan Lūdī together with his brothers Muḥammad and Mahmūd, the grandsons of 'Ālam Khan Lūdī, and many other Afghāns were killed. 2 Khan Jahan crossed the Chambal and passing through Bundelkhand, the country of Jujhar Singh Bundela, and seeking in vain shelter in Gondwana, he came via Berar to Ahmadnagar.

Bahlūl Khan Miyāna, the jagirdār of Balapur, and Sikandar Dutānī of Jalnapur left the Mughal service and joined Khan Jahan. 3 A little later Dariyā Khan Rūhīla fled from Burhanpur and joined him at Ahmadnagar. 4 Several other Afghān officers deserted Shāh Jahān's service and swelled the ranks of the rebels. Considering Khan Jahan's coming as a great gain against the Mughal empire, the Nizām ul Mulk received him cordially and gave him and his companions money and fiefs. 5

In alliance with the Nizām ul Mulk, Khan Jahan raided

1. Lahuri, I, 274-5; Alma, I, 348-9; Mā'asīr, I, 724-5.
2. Ibid, 276-8; 725.
3. Ibid, 289; 356; 726.
4. Ibid, 300; 371.
5. Mā'asīr, I, 726.
and plundered the Mughal territories in the Deccan. Shah Jahan came personally to deal with him and from Burhanpur he directed the campaign, sending three forces against Ahmadnagar. Khan Jahān could not stand before the imperialists and in 1630, being defeated in a battle at Bir, on the road east of Ahmadnagar, he retreated to Daulatabad. 1

In the meantime, differences and distrust arose between the Nizām ul Mulk and Khan Jahān. 2 It was in the hope of getting some benefit against the Mughal empire that the Nizām ul Mulk had given shelter and help to Khan Jahān and his men. He, however, found that the Afghāns were a liability rather than an asset to him as in the event they failed to acquire any part of the Mughal territory for him. Moreover, the territories of the Nizām ul Mulk suffered severely from the inroads of the Mughal forces, which were in pursuit of Khan Jahān. 3 Khan Jahān also was disgusted with the interested "friendship" of the Nizām ul Mulk. 4 He thought it advisable to leave his territory.

Attempt for the recovery of Afghān rule:

On the advice of Dariya Khan Rūhīla, Aimal Khan Tarīn, Sardār Khan Rūhīla and his chief adherents, Khan Jahān resolved to go to the Panjāb so that he might obtain the help of

1. Lāhūrī, I, 324-6 and 328.
2. Ibid, 334-5.
4. Ma'āṣir, I, 728.
the Afghans there.1 This resolution changed the objective of Khan Jahan’s rebellion. A rebel turned a champion of Afghan national cause. Khan Jahan now determined upon rallying the Afghans for the recovery of the Afghan rule in India.

According to the author of Ma’asir, Khan Jahan originally rebelled in defence of his honour; but before the end, he was actuated by the desire to re-establish the Afghan rule in India.2 An analysis of his activities will indeed confirm Shāh Nawāz’s verdict.

In spite of the advice of Dariyā Khan Rūhīla, Sikandar Dutānī and others to make an attempt for the recovery of Afghan sovereignty, Khan Jahan at first recognised Shāh Jahān as Emperor, after he ascended the throne.3 Not until the third year of Shāh Jahān’s reign did he rebel as protest against what he considered his disgrace at court.4 But he could not have certainly improved his position in Shāh Jahān’s empire by means of rebellion. What was his object then? It seems that Khan Jahan was not clear in his aims. His sense of prestige had forced him to rebel and to ally with the Mughal enemy, the Nizām ul Mulk.

Indeed Bahlūl Khan Miyāna, Sikandar Dutānī, Dariyā

Khan Ruhila and other Afghan deserters from Mughal service joined Khan Jahan with the hope of making a bid for the restoration of Afghan rule under his leadership. At Daulatabad they wanted him to sit on the throne. But Khan Jahan did not consent and he said, "Fifty years of my life have gone; I do not know if after me my sons will be fit for the throne. Every Mughal will expel the Afghans with ignominy from every town and village and then the maid-servants will execrate me." This disappointed his supporters and Bahlul Khan Miyana, Sikandar Dutani and many other Afghans left him.

Desertions and reverses in the Deccan made Khan Jahan feel that he had no chance of success unless he could rally the Afghans under his banner by holding before them the ambition of reviving the Afghan rule in India. So, he resolved to go to the Panjab so that he might enlist the support of the Afghans there. Khan Jahan also wrote to Kamaluddin Ruhila, a deserter from Mughal service, who led the various Afghan tribes of the north-west frontier area against the Mughal empire. Kamaluddin and his confederates wanted to capture Peshawar. But the Mughal generals Sa'id Khan, Laskar Khan, Qulij Khan and others frustrated their plan.

2. Ibid, 728.
3. Ibid.
4. Lahuri, I, 335 311 ; 'Amal, I, 378; Ma'asir-i-Jahangiri, 63a.
5. Ibid, 311-4; 378-81.
Khan Jahan wanted to go to the Panjab via Malwa. Anticipating such a move, Shah Jahan sent Abdulla Khan to close the roads to that country. Finding all roads closed, Khan Jahan, in despair, entered Bundelkhand intending to push on to Kalpi. Jujhar Singh Bundela's son Bikramjit pursued him and attacked his rear. In an engagement on January 21, 1631 (Amma 17 Jamadi II, 1040), he killed Dariya Khan Ruhila, his son and many other Afghans. Khan Jahan narrowly escaped with his followers.

Dariya Khan's death greatly distressed Khan Jahan and weakened his strength. The imperialists followed him at his heels. Again on February 2, 1631 (29 Jamadi II, 1040), Muzaffar Khan Barha defeated him at Bhandar, north-east of Jhasi. In the fight, Khan Jahan lost his son Mahmud and many of his followers and he himself was wounded. His son Hasan was taken captive. Being hard-pressed, he fled to Kalinjar. Saiyid Ahmad, the commandant of the fort, attacked him and killed a large number of the Afghans. Khan Jahan's son Hasan was taken captive. The unfortunate Afghan chief fled to Sahindra, 20 kos north of Kalinjar. Muzaffar Khan Barha and Abdulla Khan, however, hotly pursued him.

Being surrounded by the imperialists on all sides,

1. Lahuri, I, 335.
Khan Jahan found no hope of escape. Disappointment and misfortune made him desperate and he resolved to die fighting with his greatly reduced army. On February 17, 1631 (Rajab 15, 1040), Khan Jahan engaged at Sahindra the Mughal advance-guard under Madhu Singh. Khan Jahan and his men fought desperately. Madhu Singh, however, fatally wounded him with an arrow and killed his sons Aziz and Aimal. Before Abdulla Khan and Muzaffar Khan arrived in the field, he had defeated the Afghans and cut off the heads of Khan Jahan and his sons. The Mughal generals sent our historian Khwaja Kamgar to Shah Jahan to Burhanpur with their heads. Khan Jahan's head was fixed for some days on the gate of the fort of Burhanpur and afterwards buried in the vault of Daulat Khan Ludi, the father of Khan Jahan.¹

With the death of Khan Jahan died in its embryo the last attempt at the restoration of Afghan rule in India.

Fall of Afghan influence:

The rebellion and fall of Khan Jahan ended Afghan influence in the Mughal empire. No other Afghan noble after him had such a great position at court. Besides, his rebellion caused lasting injury to the Afghan position in the Mughal imperial service. A few of the Afghan officers, such as Dariya Khan Ruhila, Bahlul Khan Miyana, Sikandar Dutani and others

¹ Lahuri, I, 350-1; Ma'asir-i-Jahangiri, 63a; Ma'asir, I, 729.
with their followers had deserted from service and joined him. Moreover, they had made an attempt for the recovery of the Afghān rule in India. These naturally shook Shāh Jahan's faith in them and he could not trust them with responsible posts in the empire.

No amount of loyal service of the Afghāns could win back the confidence of Shāh Jahan and their position in the imperial service. Many of the Afghāns, such as Sher Khān Tunūr, Bahādur Khān Rūhīla, Ahmad Khān Nīyāzī, Khān Jahan Kākār, Mubāriz Khān Rūhīla and others remained steadfastly loyal at the time of Khān Jahan's rebellion and even fought to suppress him. They also fought heroically in the Deccan, Qandahar and Balkh-Badakhshan campaigns of Shāh Jahan. Notwithstanding their distinguished services, however, they could win back neither the favour of the Emperor nor their rightful place in the army. A short summary of the subsequent careers of Bahādur Khān Rūhīla, Jalāl Khān Kākār and Ahmad Khān Nīyāzī illustrates this.

From the time Shāh Jahan was a prince, Bahādur Khān Rūhīla, a son of Dariyā Khān Rūhīla, served him with sincere devotion and loyalty. After his father had deserted from service and joined Khān Jahan, he attached himself more firmly to the Emperor. At the time of his accession, Shāh Jahan, in appreciation

1. Lahūrī, I, 301, 294, 296 and 298; 'Āmal, I, 368; Ma'āṣir, II, 653.
appreciation of his service, had promoted him to the rank of 4,000 zât and 2,000 sawâr and had given him a fief inu Kalpi. ¹ Bahâdur Khân Rûhîla fought against his father and Khân Jahân and in the campaigns against Ahmadnagar and Bijapur. ²

In 1647 in Prince Murâd’s campaign against Balkh, Bahâdur Khân distinguished himself for his courage. ³ But although he had made great exertions in the Balkh and Uzbeg campaigns, he fell into the bad graces of the Emperor. Certain malicious persons informed Shâh Jahân that Bahâdur Khân Rûhîla had neglected to pursue Nazr Muhammad, the ruler of Balkh and that his supineness was responsible for the defeat of Sa‘id Khân in the Uzbeg war. Shâh Jahân, who had already lost his faith in the Afghâns, believed the report and punished Bahâdur Khân by depriving him of his jagir. ⁴ This made Bahâdur Khân grieved at heart. He died in 1649 in the Qandahar campaign of Prince Aurangzib. ⁵

Jalâl Khân Kâkar, a son of Dilâwar Khân Kâkar, did good service in assisting Sa‘id Khân against an attempt of the Afghâns under Kamâluddîn Rûhîla to take Peshawar in 1630. ⁶ He also served in the Balkh and Qandahar campaigns with

１. Lâhûrî, I, 117 and 191 ; Ma‘âsîr, I, 416.
３. Ibid, II, 513 ; 420-1.
４. Ibid, 553-4, 666 and 691-2; 423 ; Khâfî K., I, 662-3.
６. Lâhûrî, I, 311 ; Ma‘âsîr, I, 530.
distinction. But his rank did not exceed 2,000 zāt and 1,500 sawār.

Ahmad Khān Niyażī was another Afghān who performed meritorious service in the reign of Shāh Jahān. In the Deccan campaign, his courage forced a large combined forces of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar to retreat. He also played a distinguished part in Mahābat Khān’s capture of Amarkot, an outer fort of Daulatabad. His mansāb, however, was only 3,000 zāt and 3,000 sawār. 1

After Khān Jahān’s rebellion, Shāh Jahān did not appoint any Afghāns as provincial governors. In the suppression of Khān Jahān’s rebellion and the conquest of the Nizām Shāhī territories, Sher Khān Tunūr greatly helped the Emperor. He, however, retained his post as governor in the reign of Shāh Ṫahān of Guzrat until his death in 1631. 2 After that we do not see any Afghān as provincial governor in the reign of Shāh Jahān. Also he did not entrust any Afghān with an independent army command. The Afghāns were attached as assistants to other Mughal generals.

A study of the mansāb of the Afghāns at the end of Shāh Jahān’s reign indicates a marked decline of their position in the Mughal empire.

2. Ibid, II, 653 ; Lāhūrī, I, ii, 294.
Mansabdārs (excepting the princes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>No. of Afghāns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Hazārī</td>
<td>1 Ḍāhaf Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1½</td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sādī</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. 'Āmāl, III, 451
2. Ibid, 452.
3. Ibid, 454.
5. Ibid, 462.
6-8. Ibid, 465; 471; 472-3.
The above discussion shows that Khan Jahan's rebellion caused a revival of the Mughal Emperor's distrust of the Afghans and that no amount of loyal service could win them back the confidence of Shah Jahan. One incident illustrates how Shah Jahan's mind reacted against them. In 1640, as Abdulla Khan Firuz Jang had failed to suppress the rebel Bundela chief Champat, the Emperor appointed the distinguished Afghan general Bahadur Khan Ruhila in his place and gave him the fief of Islamabad in Bundelkhand. Immediately after the appointment, Shah Jahan thought that he had acted unwisely in sending Bahadur Khan to Bundelkhand and he feared that he might convert Bundelkhand into Ruhilkhand. So, he recalled him.  

1. 'Amal, III, 476.  
2. Ibid., 479-80.  
3. Ibid., 481, 483 and 485.  
4. Ma'asir, I, 420.
This distrust of the Mughals towards the Afghans continued even down to the reign of Aurangzib; indeed it was so very marked that foreigners even noticed it. The Venetian Niccolao Manucci, who came to Agra towards the close of the reign of Shāh Jahān (1656) and lived in Dārk Delhi for many years in the reign of Aurangzib (1659–1707), wrote, "It is a rule in the Mughal empire not to trust the race of the Pathans." ¹

But through the complicated political conditions of his reign, the rise of Shivaji and the Marathas in the Deccan, wars against the Deccani saltānates, the alienation of the Rajputs and the rebellion of the Jats and the Satnamis, Aurangzib in fact had to depend more on the arms of the Afghans. The Afghān general Dilīr Khān Rūhīla distinguished himself in many a campaign in his reign. Still Aurangzib never entrusted him with an independent army command. In 1683, Dilīr Khān was fighting against the Bijapuris as second in command in command to Prince Shāh Ālam. Shāh Ālam intended to rebel against his father and seize the throne. He tried to induce Dilīr Khān to join him. Failing to win him over, the Prince secretly poisoned him.² Manucci says that Aurangzib was grieved at the death of so faithful a general, for whom he had considerable affection, in spite of his being a Pathan.³

---

2. Ibid ; Na'āṣir, II, 55-6.
3. Ibid.
Manucci's writings further reveal the distrust of the Mughals for the Afghāns. He says, "Upon birthdays, days of festival and New Year day, the emperor and the princes are weighed. On those days, the chief ladies of the court are obliged to attend at the palace to make their compliments to the queens and princesses. From this ceremony the wives of the Pathan captains are exempted." ¹ To pay compliments to the queens and princesses on festive occasions was an honour for the ladies of the court and the exclusion of the Afghān ladies from such an honour shows that, although the Mughals continued to enlist the services of the Afghāns, yet they would not rely on them even in the reign of Aurangzib. The writings of the French traveller Bernier, who lived in India from 1658 to 1667 and was intimately connected with the Mughal court, express the same spirit of distrust of the Mughals towards the Afghāns. They confirm that it was military necessity only which compelled the Mughal emperor to engage the Afghāns in his service. ²

---

¹ Storia, II, 345.
² Bernier, 210-1.
CHAPTER X

Conclusion

Although politically the rise of the Afghan saltānate was not an unexpected event, yet from the point of view of institutional development, particularly the institution of the monarchy, it came as a break in the political tradition of India, even in the tradition of Muslim India. The typical form of government in India was absolute monarchy. The Turks only developed this tradition further, indeed to an extent undreamt of even by the imperial Guptas.

Racially and culturally, the Turks and the Mughals of India had an affinity and Bābur was the lineal descendant of both Timur, the Turk and Chengīz, the Mughal. Hence, he considered himself as a rightful claimant to the empire of Hindustan. The Afghāns, however, had affinity with neither their predecessors, the Turks, nor with their successors, the Mughals. Mughal rule in India saw the perfection of the Turkish institution of absolute monarchy. At the time of the Afghāns, however, we see the introduction of a monarchy different from the Turks and the Mughals and hence their saltānate caused a breach in the history of absolute monarchy in India.

In the period of the Afghan saltānate, India underwent the experiment of a monarchy based on tribal lines and it is
this fact which gives especial significance to the history of Afghan rule in this country. Absolute monarchy was alien to the nature and temperament of the Afghan people. On account of their excessive attachment to their own tribes and tribal chiefs as well as their love for tribal independence, the Afghans converted the monarchy to a sort of confederacy of the tribal chiefs presided over by the king. The chiefs accorded him the honours of a leader of equals rather than of a master.

The experiment of this new type of monarchy, however, could have been an interesting deviation from the monotonous history of absolutism, if the Afghans could have shown more aptitude for compromise in their ideas and actions. The Afghan chiefs were the accredited leaders of their own tribes and this gave them a representative character. Had they been balanced and judicious in their ideas of freedom and their respect for law and authority, they could have easily constituted themselves as the parliament and cabinet of the sultanate. This would have introduced the experiment of a constitutional monarchy in the fifteenth and sixteenth century India and this would have entitled the Afghans to a dignified position as the greatest benefactor and contributor to the history of this country. This would have given permanence to their rule in India and also saved the country much trouble. But their ignorance,
uncompromising nature and individualistic spirit prevented the Afghāns from appreciating the value of constitutional government. So great was their individualistic spirit that even foreigners noticed it. Bernier, who visited India in the middle of the seventeenth century, wrote that even the menials and water-carriers of the Afghāns thought themselves worthy of the throne of Delhi. Indeed this spirit of the Afghān chiefs accounted for their failure to introduce constitutional monarchy in their saltanate. So, Muslim monarchy in India lost a good chance of a change for the better.

On account of their tribal nature and ideas, the Afghāns, however, introduced in India a period of bitter conflict. The Afghān chiefs fanatically maintained tribal independence and vehemently resisted all attempts of the king to establish a strong monarchy. So, in the Afghān saltanate, we see the conflict between the principle of kingship and the idea of tribal independence and this was primarily responsible for the loss of their saltanate in 1526 and 1556.

If the Afghāns failed to give constitutional form to their monarchy, then the only alternative form for them was a strong monarchy or an absolute monarchy of the type of the Turkish saltanate. The Afghān saltanate as such represented misgovernment and the attitude of the Indians towards them

reflected it. They began their rule as strangers to India and ended as strangers to India. 1

Islam Shah felt the need for a strong centralised monarchy in the sultanate. Bold in his ideas as well as in his actions, he ruthlessly suppressed tribal independence and returned to an absolutism reminiscent of the days of Balban, Ālāuddīn Khıljī and Muḥammad bin Tughluq. He also introduced and developed ideas and institutions which provided a worthy legacy for the absolute rule and imperial system of Akbar, the Great Mughal. Thus, Islam Shah healed the breach in the history of the institutional development in India and linked together the Turks and the Mughals in this country, in one common political tradition.

Intellectually and culturally, the period of Afghan rule in India presaged the intellectual renaissance of the time of the Mughal Emperor Akbar. It saw a great development of Persian, Hindi and Bengali languages and literatures as well as of poetry and music. Makhdum ul Mulk Sheikh ʿAbdullā Sultānpūrī and Sheikh ʿAlāi whom the contemporary historians regarded as most proficient in all the sciences of the time flourished at the time of the Sūr sultanate. The period was particularly rich in Persian poetry. Great poets like Mir Saiyid Niʿama, Sheikh ʿAbdul Hai, Haiti and Saifi belonged to the

court of Islām Shāh. The king and the nobles also vied with one another in the composition of verses in Persian.

The Sūr sultāns patronised Hindi. Their coins bear Hindi names. Islām Shāh's noble Shāh Muḥammad was a good Hindi poet and Mīrzā Kāmārān remarked that if he wrote in Persian, he would have earned international fame. The great Hindi poet and musician Surdas adorned the court of Islām Shāh.

The Afghān period produced the greatest musicians of medieval Indian history. Sulṭān Muḥammad ʿĀdil Shāh was a master musician who counted among his disciples Miyan Tansen and Bāz Bahādur who afterwards became the most illustrious musicians of the court of Akbar. Bāz Bahādur, the Afghān ruler of Malwa, maintained 900 songtresses and dancing girls and made his court the most illuminating centre of music of the middle age in India. They composed songs both in Persian and Hindi. The love-songs, which Bāz Bahādur and his favourite Rupamati composed pouring their hearts for one another, are a valuable piece of Hindi literature and music and still popular in India. 1

Islām Shāh and Sulaimān Karranī took a great interest in literary and philosophical discussions. Poets and scholars assembled in the court and debated questions of literature,

poetry and philosophy. Indeed these literary and philosophical discussions in the court of the Afghāns encouraged Akbar later to hold such meetings in his court. This led to the building of the Ḥidatkhāna and brought in the great intellectual awakening of his reign.

The period of the Afghān sultanate also witnessed the rise of the Mahdavi movement whose ideas had considerable significance in introducing rationalism and also liberating Islam from the influence of the orthodox ʿulema in the reign of Akbar. It also saw a marvellous development of Sūfīsm in the person of Sheikh Salīm Chishti of Fathpur Sikri.

The period of Afghan rule also saw a brilliant development of the Bengali language. The great stimulus to Bengali literature under the patronage of the Iliyās Shāhi sultāns and Saiyid sultāns continued in the period of the Afghan rule in Eastern India. After the loss of Northern India, the Afghāns adopted Bengal as their home and patronised Bengali intellect. The rise of Srihari Bikramaditya and Janakiballava Basanta Rai illustrates this.

The period is particularly rich in Chaitanya Kavyas and Manasamangal Kavyas. The poets, Ramchandra Khan, Dvija Raghunath, Isannagar, Bansidas, Brindaban Maś Das, Lochan Das, Krishnadas Kaviraj, Daulat Wazir Bahram, Bijaya Gupta, Muktaram Sen, Raghunath Pandit, Madhabacharya, Saiyid Sultan and Manik...
Ganguli flourished in this period. Mukundaram Chakravarti, called Kavikankan Chandi, the Crabbe of Bengali literature and the Chaucer of Indian story-tellers, was also a product of this period.

Another significant event of the period was the Satyapir movement which aimed at a synthesis of the Hindu and Muslim creeds. The Bhakti movement also received a great impetus due to the great development of the Vaishnava literatures of the time.

One especially significant fact of the history of the Afgâns in India was their relations with their conquerors, the Mughals. Unlike other conquered peoples, the Afgâns would not tamely submit themselves to the Mughal rule and the Mughals also could not trust them. So, their relations with the Mughals passed through the various phases of distrust, conciliation and suspicion. Nevertheless, through military necessity, the Mughal emperors had to appoint them in the army and it is indeed a paradox of history that Shâh Jahân's reign, which saw the revival of the Mughal distrust of the Afgâns, also laid the basis of the Afgân revival in India.

On account of his distinguished services and particularly for his suppression of the turbulent Hindu chiefs

of Katehr, Shāh Jahān granted Dilīr Khān Rūhīla, a son of the deserter Dariyā Khān Rūhīla and brother of Bahādur Khān Rūhīla, some villages in the sarkar of Kanauj. Dilīr Khān colonised them with the Afghāns and built there a city, which he named Shahjahanpur.¹ These Afghān colonies naturally attracted more Afghāns to India, particularly in the later days of Aurangjib's reign, and they formed the nucleus for the establishment of the Afghān states in Farrukhabad and Ruhilkhand. The first was established in 1712 by Muḥammad Khān Bangash known as the Nawāb of Bangash and the second in 1737 by `Ali Muḥammad Khān Rūhīla.²

Settled near Delhi, the Afghāns could also exercise great political influence in the Mughal court in the days of its decline. An Afghān jagirdār of Ruhilkhand, Najīb Khān, indeed, became so influential that in 1757 he made himself a protector of Emperor Ahmad Shāh.³

Thus, although it seems contradictory, yet it is a fact that the unruly nature and fighting spirit of the Afghāns brought them once more in the lime-light of history as these qualities had also, on several occasions, paved the way for their great national misfortune.

¹. Khāfi Khān, I, 662-3; Ma'āsir, I, 423; Akhbar-i-Mahabbat, 64b-5b; District Gazetteer, Shahjahanpur, XVII, 136.
². K. Rahman - The Rise and Fall of the Rūhīla Afghāns, 8 and 48.
³. Ibid, 122-5 and 133.
Evaluation of the Sources:

This thesis is entirely based on origin sources. The contemporary Persian histories form the main source. A few Sanskrit, Arabic, Hindi and Bengali works have been consulted. The Bengali works in particular have supplied a good deal of useful information about the Afghan rule in Bengal and the Afghan-Mughal relations in Eastern India. The accounts of the foreign travellers, particularly of the Europeans, have been very profitably utilised. They have thrown interesting side-lights on the Afghan-Mughal relations in India. Their accounts have supplemented and substantiated the evidence gathered from the contemporary Persian sources and have in a few cases added valuable facts to the subject under study. The coins and inscriptions of the period have also been consulted. The varieties of sources have, however, helped me greatly in weighing the statement of one by that of the others and in making correct estimate of facts.

The contemporary Persian historians who wrote about the Afghans and the Afghan-Mughal relations in India fall according to nationality into three classes: (A) Afghan, (B) Mughal and (C) Provincial.
The Afghan historians are naturally inclined to idealise their Afghan kings. On the other hand, the Mughal historians are generally hostile to the Afghans, the great enemy of the Mughals. The two sources, however, enable us to obtain an idea of the Afghan and Mughal viewpoints. The third class of historians, who were neither Afghans nor Mughals and whom we might for the sake of convenience give the name of Provincial, also volunteer their evidence in many cases. Their evidence has, however, been helpful in arriving at many conclusions.

Although these historians have been divided into three classes, it should not be thought that all the Afghan historians were pro-Afghan and anti-Mughal, all the Mughal historians were pro-Mughal and anti-Afghan and the Provincial historians were impartial narrators of facts. In fact, the merit of the histories of these three classes of historians depends on many factors, particularly the circumstances under which they wrote, their personal likes and dislikes of a particular people or a person and their qualities as an honest narrator of events they saw or heard.

All the Afghan historians wrote during the time of the Mughals and some of them directly or indirectly compiled their works under the supervision of the Mughals. Thus Abbās Khān Sarwānī wrote his work Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī at the order of Emperor Akbar. Mīr matullā compiled his Makhzan-i-Afghāna at the
time of Jahāṅgīr and under the patronage of the Emperor's favourite Afghan noble Khān Jahān Lūdī. The Tārīkh-i-Shahi and Tārīkh-i-Dāudi were also compiled in the reign of Jahāṅgīr, though not under any direct or indirect supervision. Under these circumstances, the Afghan historians would have found it difficult to have idealised their kings at the expense of the Mughals.

We also cannot brand the Mughal historians as necessarily hostile to the Afghāns. Even Abūl Fazl, Akbar's court historian, has highly appreciated the qualities of Sher Shāh, Islām Shāh, Hemū and Lūdī. He might have been a great adorer of his royal master in whom he saw no wrong whatsoever, but as regards others he has largely given facts if they did not go against the reputation of his master and patron. Niẓāmuddīn Āḥmad Bakhshī has been recognised as a most celebrated historian of medieval India. In many instances, he gives us facts; but in some instances, where the question of the prestige of his master, Emperor Akbar, was concerned, he has remained silent.

Although a Mughal historian, Mulla ʿAbdūl Qādīr Badāuni is favourly disposed towards the Afghāns. He wrote his history in secret and it was not made public until some years after his death. Being an orthodox mūllā, Badāuni was bitterly
hostile to the religious innovations of Akbar as the pages of his history show. But in matters not affecting his religious convictions, he was fair to the Emperor. Considering the circumstances under which Badaunī compiled his history and his fairness to the Afghāns as well as to the Emperor, his work is a very valuable source of information for the period in which he lived.

The Provincial historians were not necessarily impartial as between Mughals and Afghāns in their statements. Q J >

Firishtā was neither an Afghan historian but wrote in the court of Ibrāhīm Adil Shāh of Bijapur. Sometimes, however, he is more Mughal than even the Mughals. The same outlook is found in Rizqullā, the author of Wāqī'at-i-Kustaqī and in Tahir Muḥammad, the writer of Raużat ut Tahirīn.

In view of these factors, the convenient classification of the Persian materials into Afghān, Mughal and Provincial must not be pushed too far. Individual examination of each history's source will illuminate this and confirm the need for caution.
A. Contemporary Afghān historians:

(Arranged alphabetically)

ʿAbbās Khān Sarwānī - Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī also known as Tuhfāh-i-Akbar Shāhī.

ʿAbbās held the post of wāqī-anavīs in the court of Akbar and wrote the history of the Afghān rulers at the Emperor's order. His work begins with Bahlūl and ends with Sher Shāh. It was completed in 1587 (995 H.). ʿAbbās claims to have been related to the family of Sher Shāh and obtained information from his father, grandfather and other elderly Afghāns.

Though he was engaged by Akbar to write the history of the Afghāns, ʿAbbās has idealised Sher Shāh by crediting him with the introduction of many political institutions. This shows that, in the composition of the history, he had full freedom to narrate facts. Himself an Afghān, ʿAbbās has exposed the tribal nature of his people. Indeed his work is useful in acquiring an insight into the nature of the Afghān people and the character of their government.

India office Ms., 218
British Museum Ms., Or. 164.

ʿAbdulla - Tārīkh-i-Dāudī.

This is a complete history of the Afghāns from Bahlūl to Dāud (1481-1576). There is no date of compilation in the work; the occasional reference in it to Emperor
Jahāngīr, however, suggests that ʿAbdullā wrote his history at the time of Jahāngīr (1605-27), though without any supervision from the Mughals.

Although deficient in dates and chronology, Dāūdī gives us detailed information on the Sūr period, particularly of the successors of Sher Shāh. ʿAbdullā has taken much of his materials from the works of Abbās and Rizqullā. As the portion of Abbās’ work dealing with the successors of Sher Shāh is not available, Dāūdī has, however, preserved for us the original information about them. But, its evidence in many cases, particularly in the cases of Afghān-Mughal relations, needs corroboration, because it represents purely an Afghān view-point.

Dāūdī is, however, very useful for the administration of Islām Shāh. Although without a sense of perspective, ʿAbdullā has branded Islām Shāh as a tyrant and an ambitious man who reversed many of his father’s measures to earn a name for himself, yet we find in his evidence the nature and ideals of Islām Shāh’s monarchy and administration.

British Museum Ms., Or. 197
Oriental School Ms., 46451.

Ahmad ‘Yadgar - Tārīkh-i-Shāhī also called Tārīkh-i-Salāṭīn-i-Afghānā.

Ahmad Yadgar says that he was engaged to compile the history of the Afghāns by Dāūd Karrānī, the last
Afghan ruler of Bengal. The fact that he often quoted Tabaqat-i-Akbari—shows that he compiled his work after 1595, the date of the compilation of Tabaqat.

ʿAbdullāh wrote his history beginning from Bahlūl to the fall of Dāud Karrānī in 1576. Tārīkh-i-Shāhī is full of mistakes in dates and events and very deficient in chronology. The author very often indulged in fantastic stories and seems very unreliable. His evidence cannot be entertained unless it is corroborated by that of the others.


Hāfiz Rahmat Khān – Khulāsat ul Ansāb.

Hāfiz Rahmat, the diwan of the Rūhīlā Afghan state of Ruhilkhand, compiled his work in 1771. The only utility of his work is that it shows how the Afghāns even in the eighteenth century clung to the theory that they came from Semitic stock.

British Museum MS., Egerton 1104.

Mahabat Khān – Akhbar-i-Mahabbat.

In 1850 Mahabat Khān, a grandson of Shāh Jahan's great general Dilār Khān Rūhīlā, wrote this general history of India with particular reference to his ancestors. His work is useful in so far we obtain some information about the Rūhīlā Afghāns in the reign of Shāh Jahan and his successors.

British Museum MS., Or. 1714.
Muhammad Kabir - Afsan-i-Shahan.

Kabir, a daughter's son of Sheikh Khalilullah Haqqani, who died in the reign of Akbar, compiled his work sometime in the eighteenth century. In his work, he has given us a series of anecdotes of the Afghan kings of India. Although his work has little historical value, yet it gives us an insight into the spirit of the rule of some of the Afghan kings and particularly their intellectual interests.

British Museum MS., Add. 21,911.


- Tarikh-i-Khan Jahan Ludi. IO., MS., 2649.

Nicmatulla's two works are almost the same except that the latter has devoted two additional chapters for Khan Jahan Ludi's ancestry. Nicmatulla served in the Khalisa department of Akbar for 30 years and in 1595 as the librarian of Khan Khana Khan Abdur Rahim. In Jahangir's reign, he was waqianavis and after dismissal in 1608, he was engaged by Khan Jahan Ludi. On February 13, 1612, under Khan Jahan's patronage, he commenced writing the history of the Afghans.

Nicmatulla first wrote about the Semitic origin of the Afghans. With the exception of the legendary portion, his genealogy of the Afghans, showing their tribal divisions, is useful. Although he derived much of his materials from Tabaqat, yet his work has introduced additional information revealing Jahangir's conciliatory policy to the Afghans and Qatlu Luhani's treachery in the battle of Rajmahal which is not found in any other contemporary work. Makhzan-i-Afghana has been translated by Bernhard Dorn. London, 1829.
Contemporary Mughal historians:

Abūl Fazl Allāmī - Akbarnāma and Ín-i-Akbarī.

Abūl Fazl, the court historian of Akbar, compiled his two monumental works before he was killed at the instigation of Prince Salīm in 1603 (1011 H.). His work was, however, completed to the close of the reign of Akbar by Inayetullā.

Abūl Fazl had the fullest facilities in obtaining information in the compilation of his works. The author himself says that the Emperor made all possible arrangements for his materials. The state papers of the Afghāns as well as of the Emperor were before him. He obtained information from the old members of the ruling family. He examined both prudent and veracious old men and active-minded and virtuous young men. Royal commands were issued to the provinces that those who remembered with any certainty the events of the past should copy out their notes and submit to the court. ¹

As a result, Abūl Fazl's Akbarnāma is fuller and more detailed in its information than any other contemporary history. Although a court historian and naturally hostile towards his master's enemies, the Afghāns, whom he mentions with the epithet of "Black faced", "Black fated", "Wicked", etc., yet Abūl Fazl has never distorted facts. He refers to Sher Shāh as a wicked man and Islām Shāh as a person who surpassed even his

¹ A. N., I, 9.
father in wickedness, but he also appreciates their merit when he says that, if they had been in the service of a master like Emperor Akbar, they would have earned renown. Even his mention of them as wicked shows that they were shrewd men. Abul Fazl also appreciates the genius of Hemu and regrets that Bairam Khan killed him; if he could be induced to serve the Emperor, he would have done great things for the empire.

Abul Fazl's work, particularly the portion dealing with the Afghans in Eastern India, is very useful. He has justified Akbar's conquests by saying that the peace of mortals is connected with one ruler, one rule, etc.; but this gives us an insight into the aggressive policy of Akbar on the Afghans in Eastern India.

In short, although Abul Fazl eulogises his master fulsomely and tries to justify his actions, yet he has never concealed or distorted any fact.

Text - A'in-i-Akbari, Bibliotheca Indica, 1877; H. Blochmann, Jarret and J. N. Sarkar's translation, Bibliotheca Indica, 1927.

Abdul Qadir Muluk Shah of Badau called Badau - Muntakhab ut Tawarikh.

Badau was born in 1540 (947 H.). In early life, he entered the service of Akbar. He died in 1596 (1004 H.). Being
an orthodox mulla, Badauni was bitterly hostile to the religious innovations of Akbar and expresses that hostility in his book. He wrote his work in secret and it did not become public until some years after the accession of Jahangir. Excepting the religious Ad baduni's narration of the events of Akbar's reign deserves credence.

Although a Mughal, Badauni is favourably disposed towards the Afghans and deplores their bad luck. He even thinks himself fortunate that he was born in the reign of so just a king as Sher Shāh. Considering that he was not prejudiced against the Afghans and that he wrote his history in secret, his evidence cannot be ignored on the score of his being a Mughal. Badauni had been eye-witness of many of the events affecting the Afghans and the Mughals. In this respect, he supplements others and adds new materials.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1868;
George S. A. Ranking and Sir Woolsey Haig's translation, Bibliotheca Indica, 1898 and 1925.

'Abdul Baqi Nihavandi - Ma'asir-i-Rahimi.

This work was compiled in 1691 (1103 H.) under the patronage of Khan Khanan Abdur Rahim. Chiefly it supplements other contemporary histories.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1924-31.

'Abdul Hamid Lahuri - Badshahnama.

Lahuri was a court historian of Shah Jahan. He died in 1654. Badshahnama is a history of Mughal rule in India up to the
twentieth year of the reign of Shāh Jahān. Lāhūrī gives very
detailed information of the events of Shāh Jahān's reign. For the
rebellion of Khān Jahān Lūdī and the position of the Afghāns in
Shāh Jahān's court his work is a good source of information. But,
he is not fair to the Afghāns.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1867-68.

'Abdul Wahāb - Intikhāb-i-Jahāngīr Shahī.

'Abdul Wahāb was a companion of Jahāngīr and died in 1622-3
(1032 H.). Being close to the court, he gives some valuable
information of the reign of Jahāngīr. No manuscript of his work
is available. A few extracts of the work have been translated in
Elliot, vol. VI.

Bābur - Waqīyat-i-Bāburi or Bāburnāma.

Bābur wrote his autobiography in Turki. It was rendered
into Persian at the time of Akbar by Khān Khānān Abdur Raḥīm. In
his Memoirs, Bābur, with his characteristic frankness, has
recorded all the events of his life. He has not concealed even his
own failures and weaknesses. Bābur claims, "In this
history, I have held firmly to it that truth should be reached in
every matter and every act should be recorded precisely as it
occurred. From this it follows of necessity that I have set down of
good or bad whatever is known concerning of father and elder
brother, kinsmen and strangers." Indeed in

Indeed in Bāburi's Memoirs, we find a
faithful picture of all his activities, policies and campaigns

and his likes and dislikes of persons and things. Babur abhors the rustic behaviour of the Afghāns, but he was generous enough to arrange a ceremonial funeral for his enemy Ibrāhīm Lūdī. His Memoirs really reveals his policy of conciliation towards the vanquished Afghāns.

Oriental School MS. 46627;
A. S. Beveridge’s translation from original Turki, London, 1921

Bāyazīd Biyāt - Tārīkh-i-Humāyūn.

An attendant companion of Khān Khānān Mun‘īm Khān, Bāyazīd Biyāt compiled his work at the command of Akbar in 1591-2 (1000 H.). His history deals with the period from 1542 to 1591. Being an attendant of Mun‘īm Khān, the viceroy of the eastern provinces of the Mughal empire, Bāyazīd Biyāt supplies us with some useful and first hand information of that quarter.

India Office MS. 216;
B. P. Saksena’s translation, Allahabad Studies, 1939.

Gulbadan Begum - Humāyūnmāma.

Gulbadan, the eldest daughter of Babur, compiled the history of her brother’s reign in 1587 (995 H.). In some respects, her work supplements other Mughal histories.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1902.

Jahāngīr - Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī.

Like his great grandfather, Jahāngīr wrote his autobiography with characteristic frankness and concealed nothing except his marriage episode with Nurjahan. He wrote himself up to

-----------------------------------------------------------------
the nineteenth year of his reign and, as he later on became incapable of writing on account of bodily infirmity, the Memoirs were completed by Muhammad Hādī in 1624.

*Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī* is the best source of information about Jahāngīr's relation with the Afghāns. It shows that he sincerely followed a conciliatory policy towards the Afghāns by elevating them to positions of honour and dignity at court and won them over to the service of his empire.

Text - edited by Saiyid Ahmad Khān, Aligarh, 1864; Alexander Rogers' translation, Bibliotheca Indica, 1909 and 1914.

Jauhar Aftābohī - *Tazkīrat ul Waḥīfāt*.

Humāyūn's cup bearer Jauhar wrote the events of his master's reign at the command of Akbar in 1587 (995 H.). As an eye-witness of the events of Humāyūn's reign, Jauhar supplies valuable information which we do not obtain in any other contemporary work.

Oriental School MS. 46451.

Khwāja Kamgar Khān - *Mā'āṣir-i-Jahāngīrī*.

Kamgar Khān wrote his history of the last years of the reign of Jahāngīr and early years of the reign of Shāh Jahān in 1631. He fought in the imperial army against Khān Jahān Lūdī and brought his head to Shāh Jahān to Burhanpur.

British Museum MS. Add. 26, 220.

Mīrza Nathan - *Bahāristān-i-Qhayebī*.

A junior officer in the Mughal army in Bengal, Mīrza Nathan wrote his work before 1641 (1051 H.). As an eye-witness of the Mughal-Afghan relations in Bengal in his period, he gives us many valuable information.

This work has been translated by M. I. Borah, the Professor of Persian in the Dacca University in 1936.
Muhammad Sālih Kambū - 'Āmal Sālih.

A mansabdār of 500 in the reign of Shāh Jahān, Kambū wrote the history of the Emperor from his birth to death in 1665 (1065H). Except that his work gives a list of the nobles and mansabdārs of Shāh Jahān's reign, it is a repetition of Lāhūrī's Bādshāhnāma.


Muhammad Hāshim Khāfi Khān - Muntakhāb ul Lubāb.

Khāfi Khān compiled his work in the reign of Emperor Muhammad Shāh, who died in 1748. He is a judicious writer. His work supplements the other Persian histories.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1869.

Muṭamīd Khān - Igbālnāma-i-Jahāngīrī.

Muṭamīd Khān was a court historian of Jahāngīr. He completed his work in 1627-1628. His work is simply a repetition of the Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1865.

Mustaid Khān - Maʿāṣir-i-Jahāngīrī Alamgīrī; written in 1707-10.


Nizāmuddīn Ahmad Bakhshī - Tabaqat-i-Akbarī.

Nizāmuddīn was a Bakhshī in the reign of Akbar. He died in 1595 (1003 H). His Tabaqat is considered as one of the most celebrated histories of India. Even the irascible Badāunī has greatly appreciated his work. Fīrishta and the author of Maʿāṣir ulʿUmara had high praise for Nizāmuddīn and they freely utilised his history in the compilation of their works.

Nizāmuddīn fought against the Afghāns in Guzrat and hence had direct information about the Afghan-Mughal relations in that country. As a very reliable man, he supplies valuable materials for history; but he also sometimes conceals facts which might injure the prestige of the Emperor. For example, he gives some
detailed information about Baz Bahadur, but does not mention his imprisonment which Badauni does.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1927 and 1939
B. Deo's translation, Bibliotheca, 1937 and 1939

C. Provincial historians:

Abū Turāb ʿAlī - Tārikh-i-Guzrat.

Abū Turāb was in the service of Iʿtimād Khān, one of the chiefs of Guzrat and, after the conquest of Guzrat by Akbar, he joined imperial service. His work deals with the history of Guzrat and gives some first-hand information about the Afghāns of that country in his time. Abū Turāb died in 1594.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1907.

All Muḥammad Khān - Mīrāt-i-Ahmādī.

A history of Guzrat up to the defeat of the Marathas by Ahmad Shāh Abdālī in 1761. The author was a diwān of Guzrat in the reign of Muḥammad Shāh.

Text - Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1835;

Ghulām Husain Salīm - Riyāz us Salātīn.

Salīm wrote his history in 1786-7 under the patronage of George Mām Udney, the commercial resident of the East India Company at Malda. Though not a contemporary historian, he collected materials from many older works which are not available now. His evidence in many respects corroborates others. He also supplies some data not found elsewhere.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1890.
Mulla Muhammad Qasim Hindu Shah *Firishta* - *Gulshan-i-Ibrahimi* or *Tarikh-i-Firishta*.

Firishta compiled his work in 1612 A.D. at the court of Sultan Ibrahim Adil Shah of Bijapur.

Mostly he has copied verbatim the *Tabaqat-i-Akbari* and *Akbarnama* and is sometimes led away by his sentiment for the Mughals. He, however, gives a detailed information about the Afghan activities in Guzrat. But the part of his work dealing with the Afghans in Eastern India is based on hearsay. The chief utility of his work is that it corroborates in many cases the evidence of the Afghan and Mughal historians.


*Rizqulla Mustaqi* - *Waqi‘at-i-Mustaqi*; compiled in 1581 - 989 H.

Rizqulla was a contemporary of Abbas Sarwānī. His work gives a comprehensive history of Afghan rule in Northern India. His father was in the service of the Afghans from the time of Sikandar Lūdī and so he had great facility in obtaining information.

*Waqi‘at-i-Mustaqi* is valuable because it reveals the tribal character of the Afghan salṭanate and the ascendancy of the Afghan chiefs. From it also we obtain contemporary information on the administrative measures of Islam Shah. Like Bādauni, Rizqulla was an orthodox Mullā and strongly denounces Hemu.

*British Museum MS., Add. 11,633.*
Nawāb Samsamud dowla Shāh Nawāz Khān belonged to the Saiyid family of Khwaf in Khurasan. His great great grandfather Mīr Kamāluddīn came to India in the reign of Akbar. Shāh Nawāz was a minister of Nawāb Šalābat Khān of Hyderabad. He began writing his biography of the Mughal nobility in 1769. Before he could complete the work, he died. His son ʿAbdul Hayy, however, finished the work of his father, in 1780.

In his Maʿāṣir, Shah Nawaz says, "From the beginning of the years of my understanding and discretion, I had a love for investigating biographies and chronicles." Indeed the volume and quality of his work prove that he was a genuine student of history. He consulted a good number of contemporary works, many of which have perished since then.

The portions of Maʿāṣir dealing with the Afghan nobles in the court of the Mughals are very valuable for us.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1888-91 ;
H. Beveridge and B. Dey's translation, Bibliotheca Indica, 1941 and 1953.

Sikandar Manjhu - Mir'at-i-Sikandari.

A guzrati and a companion of Jahāngīr, Sikandar compiled the history of his country in 1613 (1020 H). He also served under Khān Aʿzam, the Mughal viceroy of Guzrat, and witnessed the Mughal-Afghan struggle in that part of India.

Oriental School MS. 46422 ;
Fazlulla Lutfulla Faridi's translation, Dharampur, 1889.
This is a general history compiled in 1607.

The portion of this work dealing with the Karranī Afghāns of Bengal is a useful contribution to later Afghān history.

British Museum MS., Or. 168.

In addition to the above histories, the following Persian and Arabic works have been consulted for Chapter I:

Minhājuddīn - Tabaqat-i-Nāsirī.

The work was compiled in 1261 A. D.

From this work some information about the Afghāns in the period of the Turkish sultānate is found.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1864.

Utbi - Tarīkh-i-Yamini.

This work has been compiled in 1026 (411 H.).

Tarīkh-i-Yamini is useful in so far as it speaks of the Afghāns of the time of Sultān Mahmūd Ghaznavī.


Yahya Sarhindī - Tarīkh-i-Mubārak Shāhī; compiled in 1434.

This work shows the position of the Afghāns under the Saiyid sultāns of Delhi.


Ziyāuddīn Barānī - Tarīkh-i-Firūz Shāhī; compiled in 1357 ḫūr (758 H.).

Barānī's history helps us in ascertaining the position of the Afghāns under the Turkish sultānate of Delhi.

Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1862.
Amīr Timūr - Hafuzat-i-Timūrī.

This is an autobiography of Timūr.

The extracts of the work has been translated in Elliot, vol. III.

Arabic work:
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdullā ibn Batūta - Tuhfah-i-nuzzār fil Gharāyeb ul Āmsār; written in 1354 A. D.

This work enables us in making a comparative study of the court etiquette of the Turkish sultāns and of the Afghan sultāns and also supplies us some information about Bengal at the time he visited it (1346). Edited by Saqīād Ḫūsain al-Ḫurshī Text published in Cairo, 1901 (1322 H.).

Sanskrit work:
Baraha Mihir - Bhṛita Sanhita.

Written in the early half of the sixth century, this work shows the existence of the Afghāns in that period. Text - Bibliotheca Indica, 1865.

Hindi work:
Malik Muḥammad Ḫaṣī - Padmaavati.

A great Hindi poet, Ḫaṣī composed his work in the reign of Sher Shāh. The work shows the development of Hindi in the Sur Afghan period.

Padmaavati has been translated into English by A. G. Shirreff and published in Bibliotheca Indica, 1944.
Bengali works:

Rajmala - A family chronicle of the kings of Tripura compiled at the time of Amaranthi Amaranikya about 1586. The work is useful as it shows the Afghan relations with Tripura and Arakan.

Ramrampas - Pratapaditya Charitra. This is the first Bengali prose work published at Serampur in 1802. Essentially a biography of Pratapaditya, the son of Daud Karrani's minister Srihari Bikramaditya, it gives some rare information - Srihari's treachery to Daud. Though a later work and written in a fantastic way, some of its evidence is substantiated by the evidence of the contemporary historians and also by circumstances.

India Office MS.

European works:

Bernier, Francois - Travels in the Mughal Empire. A highly educated Frenchman, Bernier visited India at the time of Shah Jahān. During his stay of twelve years, 1658-67, in India, he travelled extensively in the Mughal empire and had been a physician of the Emperor for some years. In 1670 after his return to France, he compiled this accounts of his
travels. As an eye-witness to some of the events of the reign of
Shāh Jahān, Bernier gives us some useful information. His remarks
on the Afghāns are particularly valuable. His description of
social conditions is also very useful.

Bernier's work was written in French. It was translated
into English by Archibald Constance, London, 1891.

Laet, Joanner - De Imperio Magni Mogolis.

Laet was a Director of the Dutch East India Company.
Though he did not visit India, he gathered materials for his work
from European travellers, missionaries, envoys, etc. His work
gives a good deal of information of the reign of Akbar and
Jahānɡīr and is a good supplement to the contemporary Persian
histories.

The work was translated from Dutch into English by
J. S. Hoyland and was published in Bombay in 1928.

Manucci, Nicholas - Storia De Mogor.

A Venetian, Manucci came to India in 1656 and served
Prince Dara and then Jai Singh. He also served as a physician to
Prince Shāh Ālam from 1678 to 1682. Afterwards he went to Surat,
made a Catholic widow and settled there. He died in 1707.

A voluminous writer, Manucci recorded much that he heard
and saw in the Mughal empire. His work gives a good idea of
social conditions of the people of India at that time. Manucci
also throws light on the Afghan-Mughal relations in the empire.

The work has been translated into English by William Irvine, London, 1906-7.

Roe, Thomas -

Roe came as an ambassador from James I of England to Emperor Jahangir in 1615 and stayed in India until 1619. He has left a long account of the Mughal court which has been edited by William Foster and published by Hakluyt Society, London, 1899.

Terry, Edward:

Terry came to India in 1616. He has given a description of the Mughal empire. His accounts of the geography and art and the social and economic conditions of India are useful.

Terry's accounts have been published in Purchas His Pilgrimes, vol. IX.

Secondary works:


Beniprasad Saksena - History of Jahangir, Allahabad, 1922.


Botham, A. W. - Catalogue of the Provincial Coin Cabinet, Assam, Allahabad, 1930.

Davies, C. C. - The Problem of the North West Frontier, Cambridge, 1932.

Elphinstone, Mounstuart - An account of the Kingdom of Cabul, London, 1839.

Elliott and Dowson - History of India as told by its historians, vols. IV-V, London, 1872.
Gait, Edward - History of Assam, Calcutta and Simla, 1926.
Purchas, Samuel - Purchas His Pilgrimes, London, 1616.
Qureshi, I. K. - The administration of the Sultanate of Delhi, Lahur, 1944.
Sahungo, K. R. - Sher Shah, Calcutta, 1921.
Rennel, James - Bengal Atlas, 1781.
- The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultans of Delhi, Delhi, 1936.
Thomas, Edward - Chronicles of the Pathan kings of Delhi, London, 1871.
Tripathi, R. P. - Some aspects of Muslim Administration, Allahabad, 1936.

Journals and Gazetteers:

Bengal Past and Present, Calcutta.
Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica, Calcutta, Delhi and Karachi.
Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta.
Journal of Indian History, Calcutta.
Journal of Indian Historical Congress, Calcutta and Allahabad.
Islamic Culture, Hyderabad.
Imperial Gazetteers of India, Oxford, 1908.
Prachin Pulikir Bibaran, Calcutta.
The following Ph. D. theses have been consulted:

Hardy, Peter - The treatment of history by medieval Indian Muslim historians, London University, 1953.

Kunwar Muhammad Ashraf - Life and conditions of the people of Hindustan, London University, 1932.

Rahman, A.F.M. Khalilur - The Rise and Fall of the Rohila power, University of London, 1936.

EASTERN INDIA
IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
CHITTAGONG UNDER THE PATHAN RULE IN BENGAL

By MUHAMMAD ABDUR RAHIM, M.A., Lecturer in History,
University of Dacca

(Paper received on 28th September, 1951)

The present essay aims at a discussion of the history of Chittagong in the period of Pathan rule in Bengal (1539–1576 A.D.). A proper understanding of the period requires a brief survey of the history of Chittagong in the pre-Pathan period.

An emporium of foreign trade and a gateway to Bengal from the south-east, Chittagong had been a bone of contention among the rival kingdoms of Arakan, Tripura and Bengal. A tripartite war seems to have been going on among the three kingdoms over the possession of Chittagong, throughout the medieval period of its history. According to an Arakanese tradition, an Arakanese king occupied Chittagong, in the ninth century and built a pillar in the town. The town is said to have derived its name from a remark made by the Arakanese king, who conquered it. The duration of Arakanese rule over Chittagong is not known. A copper plate inscription, dated 1165 Saka/1243 A.D., found in a village named Nasirabad, indicates the possession of Chittagong by Damodaradeva, a king of East Bengal, in the middle of the thirteenth century.

The first Muslim ruler to conquer Chittagong was Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah of Sonargaon, about 1338 A.D. Shihabuddin Talish says that Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah connected Chittagong with Chandpur on the Meghna by a raised cause-way and built there mosques and tombs. If Dr. N. K. Bhattasali’s identification of Ibn Batuta’s Sadkawan, is taken to be correct, it will be an additional evidence of the possession of Chittagong by Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah, about 1345-46 A.D. From 1338 to 1459 A.D., Chittagong remained under the rule of the kings of Bengal. The Chinese accounts regarding the visits of the Chinese embassies to the court of Gaur, in 1409, 1412-13 and 1415, the Chitragama

1 Eastern Bengal District Gazetteers, Chittagong—O’Malley. The Arakanese king remarked ‘Tsit-ta-gung’, i.e. to make war is improper. According to Buddhist tradition, Chittagong is a corruption of Chaityagram (land of the Chaityas or Buddhist monuments). Another version is that its Hindu name Chattal was changed by the Muslims into Chatigaon (Chati means earthen lamp and gaon means place). Bernouilli, in the ‘Description of historique de l* Inde’ (1786), derives the name from Arabic Shat (delta) and Ganga, meaning the city at the mouth of the Ganges. O’Malley considers that the name Chatigaon was probably derived from Chaturgrama or four villages.


3 Sarkar’s ‘Studies in Mughal India’, p. 122.

4 Ibn Batuta mentioned Sadkawan as the name of the Great Port he visited. History of Bengal, Vol. II (p. 100) has identified Sadwakan with Satgaon on the Hughli. Dr. N. K. Bhattasali (Coins and Chronology of the Early Independent Sultans of Bengal, p. 145) makes Sadkawan identical with Chittagong.

5 Dr. P. C. Bagchi—‘Political Relation between Bengal and China’ (Visva-Bharati Annals).

‘The Chinese missions disembarked at Chati-kiang (Chittagong) where they were received by the officers of the Bengal king. Thence by small boat they came to Sonargaon and from Sonargaon they reached Pandua by overland route.’

(21)
22 MUHAMMAD ABDUR RAHIM [Vol. XVIII,
coi of Danujamardan dev, dated 1395/1417 A.D. and the Chat gaon coins of Jalaluddin Muhammad Shah, dated 823 H./1419 A.D., are evidences of the sway of the Bengal kings over Chittagong in the early years of the fifteenth century. The fact that a dethroned Arakanese king, named Meng-tsaumum, recovered his throne, in 1430 A.D., with the help of the Gaur king (Jalaluddin Muhammad Shah) and recognized his vassalage, goes to show the hold of Gaur court on Chittagong about the time. Meng Khri (1434-59), successor of Meng-tsaumum, continued to be a vassal of the king of Gaur. He adopted Muslim title ‘Ali Shah’ and inscribed the ‘Kalima’ and the Arabic legend in his coins. The assumption of Muslim titles and the use of Arabic legend in the coins became a tradition with the successors of Meng Khri Ali Shah. But, this does not prove that the subordination of Arakan to Gaur was continued for an indefinite period. Towards the close of his reign, Meng Khri Ali Shah repudiated the vassalage and occupied Ramu. His successor Basaupya Kalima Shah conquered the town of Chittagong, in 1459 A.D.

Arakan’s hold on Chittagong seems to have been very short-lived. The inscription of Rasti Khan found in the tomb of Alau, dated 1473-74 A.D., indicates the recovery of the town by the king of Gaur (Rukuddin Barbak Shah, 1459-1474 A.D.). The sway of Gaur over Chittagong continued till 1512 A.D., when the town fell into the hands of Dhanyamaniyka, king of Tripura. Tripura’s authority over Chittagong was brought to a speedy termination by the Arakanese. The Arakanese also lost the town to Alauuddin Huzain Shah (1493-1519 A.D.) of Bengal, about 1517 A.D. The evidence gathered from the writings of the poets Kavindra Parmeswar and Srikaran Nandi as well as the local Muslim traditions of Chittagong proves beyond doubt that the Arakanese were driven out of the Chittagong area by Prince Nusrat (son of Huzain Shah). The statement of De Barros that when Joao de Silviera landed at Chittagong, in 1517, the port belonged to the king of Bengal and Arakan was a vassal of the Bengal king, may refer to the result of Nusrat’s campaigns. Prince Nusrat commemorated the conquest of Chittagong by renaming it Fathabad, i.e. place of victory. That Chittagong had the name of Fathabad is also known from a poet named Daulat Wazir Bahram, who says:—

नगर के देरबार, देशित है भुवन शाख,
चाटिगाँध स्वाम एकाश।
मनोहर मनोहर, अनाह नगर सम
शते शते अनेक निवास।।
करबूली नगर, अन्ति निरामान।।

1 N. K. Bhattasali—Coins and Chronology of the Early Independent Sultans, of Bengal, pp. 119-126.
3 Dr. A. B. M. Habibullah—Arakan, J.A.S.B., 1945.
4 Dr. Habibullah—Arakan, J.A.S.B., 1945.
5 Das Gupta (Bengal in the 16th century, p. 142) identifies Ramu with a village called Ramu, which is in the southern part of the Chittagong district; it is now a police station.
6 Phayre—History of Burma, p. 171.
8 Dr. Habibullah—Arakan, J.A.S.B., 1945.
9 Ahadieul Khowamim (Hamidullah)—Blochmann, J.A.S.B., 1871 and 1872.
10 A. Karim—Prachin Puthir Bibaran, Pt. I, 1320 B.S.
A study of the Portuguese accounts reveals the fact that the Husain Shahi dynasty had uninterrupted sway over Chittagong from 1517 to 1538 A.D. The year 1538 A.D. saw a revolution at Gaur. The Pathan Chief Sher Khan captured Gaur (6th April, 1538) and the ousted king Ghiyasuddin Mahmud Shah, the last king of the Husain Shahi dynasty, died at Kailgaon. Humayun came to Gaur and occupied it. After a short stay at Gaur (Jannatabad), he moved towards Agra. Sher Khan intercepted Humayun at Chausa and defeated him. The victorious Pathan Chief came to Gaur and reconquered it from Humayun’s governor Jahangir Quli, in October, 1539. Sher Shah installed himself as an independent ruler at Gaur. With the vast resources of Bengal at his command, he now prepared to make a bid for the throne of Hindustan.

Sher Shah inaugurated the Pathan rule in Bengal and it continued down to the year 1576 A.D. The history of Chittagong during this period is rather obscure. In the History of Bengal, Vol. II, published by the Dacca University, practically no reference has been made about the fate of Chittagong in this period. In some places, there are vague statements, which amount to an expression of doubt, regarding the hold of the mighty Pathan rulers Sher Shah and Islam Shah on Chittagong. But, the materials prove beyond doubt that Sher Shah and Islam Shah had jurisdiction over the place.

On the evidence of the Portuguese accounts, it can be said that Sher Shah conquered Chittagong. Even before his final occupation of Gaur (Oct., 1539), he sent his generals to occupy the outlying districts of Bengal. When he was invading Gaur in 1538, he sent one ‘Nogazil’ to occupy Chittagong. Sher Shah was conscious of the strategic importance of Chittagong. Besides, he felt the necessity of preventing the Portuguese from coming to the aid of Ghiyasuddin Mahmud Shah, who was a friend of the Portuguese of Chittagong at the time. The expedition of Nogazil had the desired result. The Portuguese could not come to the help of Ghiyasuddin Mahmud Shah at Gaur and Nogazil easily took possession of Chittagong. The quarrel between Khudabaksh Khan and Amirza Khan, the officers of Ghiyasuddin Mahmud Shah at Chittagong, made the task easy for Nogazil. Due to divided opinion, the Portuguese could not take advantage of the troubled condition of Chittagong. Of course, the Portuguese made an attempt to establish their hold over Chittagong. But, it was too late; Sher Shah’s authority over Chittagong had already been established on a firm footing. Hence, Castanheda remarks, “Through the folly and indiscretion of Sampayo (Portuguese captain), the king of Portugal lost Chittagong which could easily have been taken possession of, considering that Sher Shah was busily engaged on the other side of Bengal.” Dr. Qanungo says that after the victory of Chausa, Sher Shah became the de facto ruler of the vast territories bounded on the west by the bend of the Ganges from Kanauj to Chunar, on the south by the hills of Jharkhand (Rohitas to Birbhum) and the Bay of Bengal, on the east by the hills of Assam and Chittagong and on the north by the

1 Campos—History of the Portuguese in Bengal, pp. 30-40.
3 History of Bengal, II, p. 378 says—“A Burmese king of Arakan had wrested the Chittagong district from the independent Sultans of Bengal in 1469. In Jehangir’s reign, the Mughals had recovered the country up to the Feni river....” This statement gives an idea that, after 1459 A.D., the rulers of Bengal had no hold on Chittagong till its conquest by the Mughals.
4 Qanungo—Sher Shah, p. 138 and Campos—History of the Portuguese in Bengal, pp. 36-38.
5 Campos—History of the Portuguese in Bengal, p. 43.
Himalayas. Dr. Habibullah also has incidentally referred to the occupation of Chittagong by Sher Shah and his hold over it till his death in 1545 A.D.

A Bengali poem named 'Laila-Majnu', written by Daulat Wazir Bahram, speaks of the Sur rule over Chittagong. The poem, at first, makes mention of the conquest of Chittagong in the reign of Husain Shah and then says that, after some generations, Nizam Shah Sur became the ruler of Chittagong.

According to Dr. Shahidullah, Daulat Wazir Bahram was a contemporary of Sher Shah and Nizam Shah Sur, mentioned by him, was brother of Sher Shah. It is rather difficult to believe that Sher Shah had appointed his brother merely as a district officer, when he appointed Khizr Khan, a man who was not related to his family or race, as the governor of Bengal. Granted that Nizam Khan Sur was appointed to the government of Chittagong, why should he assume the title of Shah? The title Shah was a privilege enjoyed by the independent rulers and Sher Shah or Islam Shah could not have tolerated the assumption of the 'Shah' title by Nizam Khan Sur. Besides, no mention of Nizam Khan Sur is found in any contemporary Persian history after the capture of Rohtas by Sher Shah, in March, 1538. This might be interpreted in two ways: Nizam Khan Sur had either died after the capture of Rohtas or had played no significant rôle in the subsequent history of his great brother.

There is also another side of the picture. It might be that Sher Shah was alive to the great importance of Chittagong and to the danger from the Portuguese and the Arakanese. To secure the distant south-eastern frontier against the imperialistic Portuguese and the Arakanese, Sher Shah appointed his loyal brother to the government of Chittagong. It is not unlikely that poet Daulat Wazir Bahram had, either through carelessness or in his enthusiasm for the lord of Chittagong, called Nizam Khan Sur as Nizam Shah Sur. The Portuguese accounts have referred to one Nogazil whom Sher Shah sent to occupy Chittagong. Can this Nogazil and Nizam Khan Sur or Nizam be identical? The Portuguese have generally corrupted Muslim names. They have called Sher Khan Sur as Xercansur, Khudabaksh Khan as Cadavascao and Amirza Khan as Amazacca. They might have corrupted Nizam into Nogazil.

Whatever might be the relation of Nizam Shah Sur with Nizam Khan Sur or with Nogazil, the poem of Daulat Wazir Bahram bears testimony to the fact that Chittagong enjoyed Sur rule after the fall of the Husain Shahi dynasty. That the Sur rule over Chittagong continued throughout the reigns of Sher Shah and Islam Shah is evident from the Portuguese records. De Barros, writing in 1552 A.D., says, ‘Chatigaon is the most famous and wealthy city of the kingdom of Bengal, by reason of its port, at which meets the traffic of all that eastern region’.

1 Qanunco—Sher Shah, p. 200.
2 Dr. Habibullah—Arakan..., J.A.S.B., 1945.
3 A. Karim—Prachin Puthir Bibaran, Pt. I, 1320 B.S.
4 Dr. Shahidullah—Bangla Sahitye Musalman—Mahe Nao, June 1951.
5 Tariikh-i-Sher Shahi—Elliot and Dowson, Vol. IV, p. 337.
6 Campos—Hist. of the Portuguese in Bengal, p. 43.
7 Eastern Bengal District Gazetteers, Chittagong—O'Malley.
an integral part of Bengal in the medieval period, though it sometimes passed into the hands of the Arakanese and the kings of Tripura. The records of the foreigners prove this fact. Ralph Fitch, who visited Chittagong, in 1585, says, 'From Chatigaon in Bengal, I came to Bacola'.1 Whenever foreigners had referred to the kingdom of Bengal, they had generally meant the kingdom or the territory of Bengal which commenced from the borders of Patna (Bihar) and Orissa. Barbosa, a Portuguese who visited Bengal about 1514 A.D., remarks, 'On the other side of this river (the Ganges) commences the kingdom of Bengal'.2 This undoubtedly refers to the territory whose seat of power was at Gaur. That De Barros, by his kingdom of Bengal, has also meant the same territory with its seat of power at Gaur, is clear from his statement on another occasion. He says that when Joao de Silviera landed at Chittagong, in 1517, the port belonged to the 'King of Bengal and Arakan was a vassal of the Bengal king'.3 The Chinese records also, in referring to the kingdom of Bengal, mean the same territory with Gaur or Pandua as Capital.4

It is evident, therefore, that Chittagong, in 1552 A.D., was a part of the Gaur kingdom and was under the rule of the Sur Emperor Islam Shah.

An Arakanese tradition claims that Chittagong was conquered by the Arakanese king Meng Beng (1531-53 A.D.). He minted a coin at Chittagong. The coin bears his name and title of 'Sultan'.5 Perhaps the coin was issued to commemorate his conquest of Chittagong. But, due to the absence of date in the coin, it is difficult to say when the coin was minted. The Sur Pathans retained their hold on Chittagong up to 1552 A.D. The conquest of Chittagong by Meng Beng might have taken place in 1553 A.D. This is borne out by the following facts. Islam Shah Sur died in 1553 A.D.6 and his death was an occasion for succession disputes among the Pathans. The boy Sultan Firoz was killed, on the third day of his accession, by his maternal uncle Mubariz Khan, who ascended the throne under the title Sultan Muhammad Adil. This usurpation bred discontent and ambitions in the Pathan nobility. Several pretenders arose and they came to contest the sovereignty of Hindustan with Sultan Muhammad Adil. Muhammad Khan Sur, the governor of Bengal, did not sit idle. He assumed the title of Sultan Muhammad Shah Ghazi and declared himself as an independent sovereign of Bengal and prepared to contest the throne with Sultan Muhammad Adil. With his eyes riveted to the north, Muhammad Khan Sur might have neglected the defence of Chittagong. Meng Beng might have seized the opportunity and conquered Chittagong towards the close of 1553 A.D.

Relying on an Arakanese tradition, Phayre maintains that Meng Beng (1531-53 A.D.) conquered Chittagong from the possession of Tripura.7 But, this is not borne out by facts. It has been proved that the

---

1 Cited in Das Gupta's 'Bengal in the Sixteenth century', p. 144.
2 Ibid., p. 113.
3 Campos—History of the Portuguese in Bengal, p. 28; Dr. Habibullah—Arakan . . . . . .J.A.B., 1945.
4 Mahuan’s account cited in N. K. Bhattasali’s ‘Coins and Chronology of the Independent Sultans of Bengal’, p. 109; Mahuan says, ‘The kingdom of Pang-ko-la (Bengala) is reached by ship . . . the vessel arrives first at Choh-ti-gan (Chittagong)’.
5 Phayre—History of Burma, p. 72.
6 As to the date of the death of Islam Shah, there are different views. Dr. N. K. Bhattasali (Bengal Past and Present, July-Dec., 1929) dates 1552 and Majumdar (Advanced History of India) dates Nov., 1554; N. B. Ray (Successors of Sher Shah) has placed the death of Islam Shah on 30th October, 1553. History of Bengal II, D.U. agrees with N. B. Ray.
7 Phayre—History of Burma, p. 72.
Sur rulers had hold on Chittagong up to 1552 A.D. and Meng Beng con­quered the town after the death of Islam Shah, i.e. towards the close of the year 1553 A.D. Rajmala 1 and the Arakan coin of Muhammad Shah Ghazi 2 (Muhammad Khan Sur) speak of the conquest of Chittagong by the king of Gaur, in 1554 A.D. from Bijoymanikya (1540–71 A.D.), the king of Tripura. From this, it is clear that Bijoymanikya captured the town from the Arakanese, in the early part of 1554 A.D.

Bijoymanikya enjoyed a few months’ authority over the great port. Rajmala records its capture by the Pathans of Gaur. The mutiny of the Pathan horsemen 3 in the army of Bijoymanikya and its ruthless suppression 4 by him enraged the Pathan ruler of Gaur. He sent an army under Mamarak Khan (Mubarak Khan) to Chittagong.

The Pathan general Mubarak Khan captured Chittagong from the forces of Bijoymanikya. 6 Who was this ruler of Gaur who sent Mubarak Khan? There are reasons to believe that the Gaur ruler referred to in Rajmala was Muhammad Khan Sur. Muhammad Khan raided Arracan 7 (Arakan). Raid on Arakan is impossible without the conquest and occupation of Chittagong area.

A coin of Ghiyasuddin Muhammad Shah Ghazi (Muhammad Khan Sur), dated 962 H./1554 A.D., bears Arakan as mint place. 8 The coin was perhaps issued to commemorate the conquest of Arakan by Muhammad Khan Sur. This coin testifies to the conquest of Chittagong by Muhammad Khan Sur, in 1554 A.D. That Muhammad Khan Sur conquered the place from Bijoymanikya, in 1554, is also proved by the subsequent events.

After the occupation of Chittagong by the Pathan general Mubarak Khan, Bijoymanikya sent fresh forces to Chittagong. The Tripura forces fought for eight months with the Pathans, but they failed to recover the town.

1 K. P. Sen—Rajmala, Part II, p. 44.
2 Lanepoole—Catalogue of Indian Coins, p. 56. The Arakan coin speaks of the conquest of Arakan by Muhammad Shah Ghazi (Muhammad Khan Sur). The conquest of Arakan must have been preceded by the occupation of Chittagong.
3 Rajmala (K. P. Sen), Pt. II, p. 46:—
4 Ibid. The Pathan soldiers were taken prisoners and sacrificed before the Fourteen gods.
5 and 6 Ibid., pp. 46-47.
7 History of Bengal, II, D.U., p. 179.
8 S. Lanepoole—Catalogue of Indian Coins, p. 56.
Dr. Habibullah (J.A.S.B., 1945) says that the name of mint-town has been incorrectly read; the correct reading would be Rikab. But, Rikab was not an important town and had never been a mint-town. The reading ‘Arakan’ seems correct.
Bijoymanikya sent his veteran commander Kala Nazir; Kala Nazir fell in a fight with the Pathans. At night-fall, the victorious Pathans returned to the fort of Chittagong. The Tripura forces dug holes beneath the walls of the fort and made a surprise attack on the Musalmans. The Pathans fell fighting and Mubarak Khan was taken prisoner to Rangamati, capital of Tripura. Mubarak Khan was slaughtered as sacrifice before the Fourteen Gods. Chittagong passed into the hands of Bijoymanikya. *Tripur Bansabali Puthi* and Raimala record a daring raid of Bijoymanikya in Eastern Bengal after the recovery of Chittagong from the Pathans. Bijoymanikya came up to the Brahmaputra, the Lakhya and the Padma. He bathed in these rivers and minted coins to commemorate the events. A Lakhya coin, dated 1481 Saka/1559 A.D., has been discovered. The legend on the obverse of the coin records: বিহরমানিক্য = The doubly illustrious Bijoymanikya who bathed in the Lakhya.

The daring Eastern Bengal raid of Bijoymanikya, in 1559 A.D., was an event subsequent to his recovery of Chittagong. On the evidence of the ‘Arakan coin’ of Muhammad Khan Sur, it can be said that Muhammad Khan Sur had held on Chittagong, in 1554 A.D. Hence, the recovery of Chittagong by Bijoymanikya must have taken place sometime in the period from 1554 to 1559 A.D. This period saw the most disastrous internecine wars among the Pathans and their consequent weakness and loss of sovereignty and territory. Humayan had recovered the throne of Hindustan, in 1555 A.D. The internecine wars had also disastrous results on the kingdom of Bengal. Ambitious Muhammad Khan Sur had been defeated and slain at Chhapar-ghat, in December 1555, by Himu, Muhammad Adil’s general. Bahadur Shah (Muhammad Khan Sur’s son) had to recover the throne by fighting Adil’s governor Shahbaz Khan (1556). He had to avenge his father’s death. He fought Adil at Surajgarh and defeated and killed him (April, 1557). Bahadur Shah had, then, to consolidate his position on the throne of Bengal. These troubles of the rulers of Gaur helped Bijoymanikya to recover Chittagong and encouraged him to undertake a daring raid in Eastern Bengal.

In 1554 A.D., Chittagong was in the hands of Muhammad Khan Sur. The Tripura forces fought for eight months to capture the town, but failed. Kala Nazir, who was afterwards sent by Bijoymanikya, fell in a fight with the Pathans. Then the Tripura forces planned a night attack by digging holes beneath the walls of the fort and, by this, they succeeded in capturing the town. From the above discussions, it may be concluded that the Tripura forces captured the town, in 1556 A.D. It was a time when Muhammad Khan Sur had died and his son Bahadur Shah had been fighting with Shahbaz Khan to recover the throne of Gaur. Hence, no reinforcement came to the Pathan army which had been fighting against the fresh streams of Tripura forces.
The Sur rulers of Gaur had lost Chittagong in 1556 A.D. and, for some years, the place enjoyed the rule of Bijoymanikya. Bijoymanikya was a powerful ruler. Abul Fazl says, 'He has a force of two hundred thousand footmen and a thousand elephants'. It seems that Bijoymanikya maintained his hold on Chittagong till his death, in 1571 A.D. His successor Anantamanikya (1571-72) was assassinated by the commander of his army Udaymanikya (1572-74), who usurped the throne. Udaymanikya shifted the capital from Rangamati to Udaypur. The death of the powerful king Bijoymanikya and the usurpation of the throne by a person, who did not belong to the royal family, encouraged the king of Gaur to send an army to conquer Chittagong. Who was this king of Gaur who sent the expedition to Chittagong? Bijoymanikya died of smallpox. Generally smallpox breaks out in March and April. It might be that Bijoymanikya died in April, 1571. His son Anantamanikya reigned for a year and a half. Hence, Udaymanikya might have come to the throne about October, 1572 and this was the time when Sulaiman Karrani had also died. Sulaiman Karrani’s successor Bayazid Karrani had a very short and disturbed reign and, as such, he could not have sent any expedition to a distant place like Chittagong. Daud Karrani (1573-76), who was very ambitious, might have sent the Chittagong expedition and perhaps it was sent in the early part of 1573 A.D.

As the Pathan troops were marching to Chittagong, a Tripura army of 52,000 soldiers and 3,000 generals advanced to intercept them. Ignoring the unfavourable omens of the flapping of the vulture’s wings, falling of fire from the sky and the barking of foxes, the Tripura army attacked the Pathans at Khandal. The Tripura troops were routed with a loss of 40,000 soldiers; the Pathans lost only 4,000 men. The victorious Pathans entered Chittagong. The king of Gaur (Daud Karrani) became very glad at the news of the victory and sent a fresh army under Piroj (Firoz) Khan Anni and Jamal Khan Panni. They were helped by the ‘Twelve Chiefs of Bengal’.
The Pathans under the command of Firoz Khan Anni and Jamal Khan Panni invaded Tripura and defeated the army of Udaymanikya at Meharkul. The war proved a great calamity to Tripura; it brought starvation and epidemics in the country.

On the evidence of Rajmala, it may be said that Daud Karrani recovered, in 1573, the town of Chittagong, which had been lost by the Sur Pathans, about 1556 A.D. Rajmala is a fairly contemporary work of the Pathan period in Bengal. It is a family history of the kings of Tripura. Since, it admits the defeat of a king of that family and the loss of Chittagong, there is no reason to disbelieve it. The conquest of Chittagong by Daud Karrani may be accepted as a fact.

There are indirect evidences which go to prove that the Karrani rulers might have had a hold on Chittagong. In the Rent Roll introduced by Todar Mal, in 1582 A.D., one Mahal of Sarkar Chittagong has been mentioned as Sulaimanpur. Names generally reflect the ideas of the time and the places are named after the names of important persons. Sarkars and Mahals have been generally named Husainshahi, Husainpur, Nusrat Shahi, Mahmud Shahi, Sher Shahi, Sulaimanabad, Sulaimanshahi, Sulaimanpur, Daud Shahi, etc. after the names of the rulers and princes.

A Mahal or Pargana of Sarkar Chittagong could not have been named Sulaimanpur, unless Sulaiman or anyone of his dynasty had ruled over the place. The name could not have been introduced at the time of the Sur rule, when Sulaiman Karrani was a governor in south Bihar and was not connected with Bengal.

The name could not have been introduced by the kings of Arakan or Tripura. Of course, the Buddhist kings of Arakan adopted Muslim names. But, we do not know of any Arakanese king, flourishing before 1582, who adopted Sulaiman as his title.

Again, the Mahal Sulaimanpur must have existed in Sarkar Chittagong before Todar Mal's entry in the Rent Roll of 1582 A.D., with its estimated revenue of 11,424,310 dams. The Mughals could not conquer Chittagong before 1666 A.D. Shihabuddin Talish admits that 'when Bengal was annexed to the Mughal Empire, Chatgaon was entered in the papers of Bengal as one of the defaulting and unsettled districts. When the Mutasaddis did not really wish to pay any man whose salary was due, they gave him an assignment on the revenue of Chatgaon'. Chittagong was not conquered at the time of Akbar; still it is entered as a Sarkar with all its Mahals in the Rent Roll. From this, it may be
concluded that Abul Fazl had copied them from the records of the previous rulers, who had authority over Chittagong. The existence of the name of Sulaimanpur Mahal in the records, from which Abul Fazl copied, suggests that the records belonged to the Karrani Sultans, who preceded the Mughals, in Bengal. It is likely that Daud Karrani, after the conquest of Chittagong, had named a Mahal of his newly-acquired territory after the name of his father.

Chittagong might have come into the possession of Daud Karrani about 1573 A.D. Udaymanikya fought with Jamal Khan Panni, general of Daud, for five years and failed to recover Chittagong. This indicates that Daud Karrani retained his hold on Chittagong till his death, in 1576 A.D. It is difficult to say what became of the great port after the death of Daud Karrani. It might be that independent Pathan chiefs ruled for some time until it fell into the hands of the Arakanese. Ralph Fitche, who visited Chittagong, in 1585, wrote, 'From Satagam, I travelled to the country of Tippera or Porto Grande (Chittagong), with whom the Mogores or Mogen have almost continual warres. The Mogen which be of the kingdom of Recon and Rame, be stronger than the kingdom of Tipperra, so that Chatigaon or Porto Grande is often times under the king of Recon'.1 Rajmala also records the conquest of Chittagong by Amarmanikya from the Arakanese.2 Arakanese accounts claim that the Arakanese king Meng Phalaung Sikardar conquered it from Tripura, in 1586.3 From 1586 A.D., Chittagong remained under the Arakanese till its conquest by the Mughal general Shayesta Khan, in 1666.4

---

1 Cited in Dasgupta’s ‘Bengal in the 16th century’, p. 141.
3 Ibid.