BLACK AND WHITE IN SELF-GOVERNING NATAL:
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 1906-8 DISTURBANCES

by

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The Natal disturbances of 1906-8 have to be seen against the social, economic and political framework of the colony, and a distinction has to be drawn between the past history of Zululand and that of Natal itself.

In both areas however land and labour policies and considerable African poverty were the underlying cause of unrest and the 1905 Poll Tax has to be linked to this. The breakdown in communication between black and white was manifested in a spate of hostile rumours amongst both groups about the intentions of the other. Natal handling of opposition to the Poll Tax and the declaration of Martial Law after a relatively minor incident acted as a precipitant of further violence.

During the disturbances, responses varied from chieftain to chieftain and even within chieftains. Frequently this was related to the workings of traditional politics. As significant as why certain people rebelled is why others did not. In this, the past history of the group was highly relevant.

Despite a widespread belief that Dinamala was behind the rebellion and the unrest in Zululand in 1907, this is 'not proven', although his name was used by the rebels as an essential centralising device.
Allegations that the 'Ethiopian' Churches were responsible for the outbreak and that Christian Africans had played a prominent part in the rebellion were exaggerated, although Christian-inspired millenial beliefs contributed to the ferment in Natal.

In the long term, although the rebellion was a striking demonstration of the cost of armed resistance, it contributed to the growing sense of the need for political unity amongst both black and white in South Africa.
**Zulu Orthography**

In the spelling of Zulu names I have tried to use the most recent orthography where this is known, though occasionally this has produced names which are unfamiliar: thus Zibhethu rather than Unibehu or Sibeyu. In a number of cases however it has proved impossible to determine the correct orthography. The name 'Tlenako' for example also occurs frequently as Tlenakwe and Tlenako. Where applicable, in these instances I have followed the usage in James Stuart's *History of the Zulu Rebellion*. When this has failed, I have used the most frequently found version in the primary sources.

In the case of plurals, in general both the Zulu prefix and the English suffix have been omitted: thus Zulu and *induna* rather than Zulus and *indunas* or *isindana*. Certain Zulu prefixes have however been retained where this has been less clumsy: e.g. *Bantu* (rather than *Stu*) and *shemwene* rather than *numwane*.
Abbreviations

The following abbreviations have been used in the footnotes and text:

Bosman


J. Stuart


ABM

American Board of Missions (generally followed by a reference to the papers in the Natal archives).

AZM

American Zulu Mission.

A.M.

Assistant Magistrate.

A.G.O.

Attorney General's Office (Natal).

C.M.

Chief Magistrate.

Col. Col.

Coleman Collection (H. E. Coleman's papers in the Natal archives).

CO

Colonal Office.

C.N.A.

Commissioner for Native Affairs.

CR

Confidential Reports.

G.H.

Government House (followed by a reference to the papers in the Natal archives).
Killie Campbell Library (formerly owned privately, but now bequeathed to the University of Natal, Durban).

Magistrate.

Member of the Legislative Assembly (Natal).

Minister for Native Affairs.

Natal Legislative Assembly.

Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1906-7 (unless an alternate date is given).

Natal Native Congress.

Prime Minister (generally followed by a reference to the papers in the Prime Minister's Office, Natal).

Pietermaritzburg.

Resident Magistrate.

Secretary for Native Affairs (sometimes followed by a reference to the papers of the Department of Native Affairs, Pietermaritzburg).

Secretary of State for the Colonies.

South African Native Affairs
Commission, 1903–5.
Records of the Special Court appointed
to try Dinamulu and others.
Under Secretary for Native Affairs.
United Free Church of Scotland.
Zululand Archives (Pietermaritzburg).
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Finally this thesis must be dedicated to my husband, without whose prodding it would not have been written, and to Lama and Rafi, in spite of whom it has been written.
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Introduction

On the 6th February, 1906 Colonial Office officials in London were startled and dismayed to receive a telegram from the Governor of Natal that two white police officers had been shot in an attempt to arrest a group of African tribesmen on the farm Irewinnie, near the village of Kynsna. The colonists themselves were as startled, if rather less surprised. The imposition of a Poll Tax at the end of 1905 on all adult males in the multiracial colony led to widespread opposition from the African majority. Through the long, hot summer months rumour ran riot and when Africans started killing white animals and destroying implements of European manufacture, it was given the most sinister interpretation. Magistrates attempting to collect the Poll Tax at the beginning of 1906 were met by angry Africans brandishing weapons and with the killing of the two policemen most whites thought general rebellion imminent and inevitable. The atmosphere was further inflamed when it was learnt that the armed men were members of an African independent church, and the following day Martial Law was declared throughout the colony.

The Militia was alerted and the Natal Field Force under Sir Duncan McKenzie despatched to the Midlands and South Natal, both to hunt out the Irewinnie 'murderers' and to deter reportedly hostile chiefs from active rebellion. In all, between 10th February
and 30th March nine chiefs were fixed large numbers of sheep and cattle, crops confiscated and kraals burnt, in the belief that people were doctoring themselves for war and preparing to fight rather than pay the Tax. On February 15th, two of the African participants in the Premirro affray were captured and shot by Drumhead Court Martial, and, after a lengthy Court Martial held at Richmond, a further twelve of the participants were shot for the same offence on 2nd April, despite an abortive attempt on the part of the Colonial Office to delay the executions.

On the 13th February, a battalion of the Queen's Own Highlanders were stationed at Pietermaritzburg at the request of Natal ministers, and battleship H.M.S. Territorial docked at Durban a week before schedule. It was felt in Natal these actions would have a profound moral effect on the Africans. In London, they added to the feeling of general concern and responsibility felt about affairs in Natal.

On the 16th February a second column, the Umvoti Mounted Rifles under Col. George Leachars, was despatched to the Mapumulo division, where 'punitive' action was taken against a number of chiefs, the most important being Njobimwe, Maseni and Swazane, whose people had been 'defiant' over the tax. Within a month this column had been disbanded.

So far there had been no overt resistance to the activities of the troops. By the end of March this first and passive phase
of the disturbances came to an end. The Natal government felt confident that the 'rebellion' as a whole was over. Three days later, they were faced with open resistance for the first time, in a completely different part of the colony.

On the 3rd April, a petty chief, Zabathla, who had been deposed by the government, captured the regent appointed in his stead. The following day he fired on the magistrate sent to investigate the situation and on the 5th April ambushed a police rescue force at Keate's Drift, killing three of its members. Then, accompanied by a section of his tribe and by his newly appointed lieutenant, Gaikijana, who claimed to be the emissary of Dimmsala, son of the last Zulu king, he made his way across the Tagala to the rugged forested mountains of Mandla.

By the 16th April he had won over the oldest and most venerable chief of the Mandla, Sigamanda Cave, and his aid and the report that Dimmsala was behind the rebellion attracted an army of followers. Though few other chiefs in the Mandla joined him, sections of the surrounding chiefdoms broke away to join him, while the rest fled to the nearest magistracy or encampment for protection.

In the neighbouring Kraatskop division the attitudes of the Natal chiefs, Gayede and Hlangabasa gave rise to concern, and a number of Gayede's people joined the rebels. There were
also sinister reports from Ngata, where Mahlobaselu was reported to be in the bush awaiting events, while Ebulu's people across the Tugela in Umlanga were also reported disaffected.

On the 3rd May the magistrate of Tshabatini, M. H. Stainbank, was murdered, though his area was not up in arms, and this caused considerable anxiety, especially as the murderers could not be traced. Divisions of the Natal armed forces were despatched to various points in the disturbed area on the borders of Natal and Zululand, and offers of help flooded into Natal from all over South Africa.

The mountainsous terrain of the Xhosa division made military operations against the rebels exceedingly difficult, though a series of drives by the different columns acting from different directions, under the general command of McKenzie, enabled the troops to inflict the first real disaster on Zambetha's forces on the 5th of May. On that day, they were defeated at the battle of Bobe Ridge, a defeat which threw considerable doubt on Zambetha's assertion that through the use of a special charm he had received from Dinamala the rebel forces would be impervious to the white man's bullets which would turn to water. At this point there appears to have been some disagreement between Sigananda and Zambetha, who attributed the disaster to the former's bad generalship and rode off with Gakijana and his immediate followers to Masala. On the
17th May, the Zululand Field Forces converged on the area around Cetswayo's grave and inflicted a severe defeat on the rebels under Sigananda's sons. At the same time, Cakijana, Bambatha and Mangati made their way to Dimmsulu's headquarters, to find out what support they could expect from him.

While McKenzie was 'harassing' the rebels in the Mkandla, and attacking them at Tate Gorge, Noce and Mansipambana, Colonel Leuchars, heading the Natal Field Forces, was operating in the Buffalo River Valley; there he dealt with the section of Nala's tribe, under the headman Ntele, and with Mbalokasulu and Faku, who had risen, but had not yet linked up with either Bambatha or Sigananda. On the 25th May he defeated them at Pukinyoni, whereupon the survivors, including the leaders, made their way to Bambatha at Masala. The first week in June saw a number of bush drives by converging columns in the Mkandla forests, though until the 9th McKenzie did not know where Bambatha and the main body of his followers were.

On that day he discovered that they had hidden themselves in the Qedani forests somewhat to the east of the rebels under Sigananda, and that the two sections were planning to join up again at Noce Gorge, where Sigananda had taken refuge. A number of columns immediately marched on the Gorge from different directions, and were thus able to prevent the rebel armies from meeting. On this occasion, Bambatha and Mbalokasulu displayed an extraordinary lack of elementary
precaution. One of the major reasons for what turned out to be a rout was their decision not to enter the stronghold on the night of the 9th, but to camp at its mouth where they were easily trapped. In the battle of the 10th June, Nambatha, Mhlokazulu, Mtele and Nondubele were killed and their army crushed. On the 13th June Sigamandla and his followers surrendered unconditionally. They were tried by court martial at Empandiabi later in the month, where Sigamandla himself died shortly after.

The battle of Nama Gorge was believed to have ended the rebellion. Once again the troops were engaged in 'mopping up' operations before demobilisation when a further outbreak of rebellion occurred, this time across the Tugela in Natal, in the densely populated Mapumulo-Lower Tugela divisions. In this third phase the leaders were Meceni of the Qwabe, Natabwili of the Nkhetsha and Ndokeva ka Timani of the Sala Royal House.

This phase of the disturbances opened on the 18th June when a rebel impi ambushed a troop convoy and attacked a European owned store at Thring's Post, killing a trooper and the Norwegian storeman, and wounding a stock inspector. After a number of smaller skirmishes, on 1st July a postal official, O. R. Veal, suspected of being a spy, was found murdered and mutilated for medicinal purposes by Meceni's impi, an event which outraged the white colonists.
The first days of July saw a series of major defeats for the rebels: in the Moodesberg district, six hundred rebels were killed by Colonel Barkers’s Transvaal Mounted Rifles; on the 2nd and 3rd, converging columns killed four hundred of Maseki’s men, while on the 8th, five hundred and forty-seven members of Matabwili’s army were killed. On the 12th July, Maseki and Ndlova ka Timuni, who had fled to Zululand, were handed over at Esdevre.

This phase of the disturbances had not lasted long. Although the rebel armies outnumbered their European adversaries, they had very considerably, if somewhat inexplicably, waited until the colonial forces had dealt with Bambatha and the Khemela rebels first and were thus free to deal with them. Moreover, they lacked the natural advantages which Bambatha’s army had exploited in the Khemela. The resistance was now over. All that remained was for the troops to pursue the remaining fugitives in different parts of the colony, and several somewhat ambiguously termed ‘sweeping movements’ were carried out. Through July and August a large number of rebels were tried by Courts Martial and given sentences of varying severity. A number of death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment by the Governor. With the passing of an Act of Indemnity on the 2nd September Martial Law eventually came to an end for the time being. Some three to four thousand Africans had been killed and, at this time, there were about seven thousand prisoners. In
June 1907 twenty-five of the chief ring-leaders were deported to St. Helena with the agreement of the British government.

Despite the ending of Martial Law and the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry into African grievances - the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1906-7 - the government continued to track down rebel refugees in Zululand. This added to the unrest already caused by the poverty and bitterness following on the upheaval of 1906. In 1907 a few chiefs who had fought on the Government side were murdered, and other 'loyalists' feared for their lives. Many Natalians, both black and white, were certain that Dimasulu, ex-Paramount Chief and the son and heir of Cetshwayo, was behind these murders and the unrest in Zululand.

At the beginning of December, 1907, Martial Law was declared once more over Zululand, and the Northern districts of Natal, and a large force under Sir Duncan McKenzie made its way to Bongoa for the purpose of arresting him. Although there was no resistance to the armed forces, and Dimasulu gave himself up without a struggle, Martial Law was retained until August, 1908 while troops gathered guns and magistrates gathered evidence against Dimasulu.

For more than eight months, Dimasulu faced a preparatory examination before a colonial magistrate. He was finally brought to trial before a specially constituted court presided over by the Transvaal Chief Justice, Sir William Smith, in November 1908.
W. F. Schreiner was Senior Defense Counsel. In February, 1909, Dimusulu was found guilty on two and a half of the twenty-three charges originally laid by the Natal government and was sentenced to four years imprisonment and £100 fine. Shortly after sentence had been passed on Dimusulu, his chief advisers, Ngwaqo and Kanikalumane were also tried and found guilty on three counts of high treason and were sentenced to fifteen and nine months imprisonment respectively.

This then in barest outline was the Natal rebellion of 1906, "the last tribal revolt on South African soil" and the most severe crisis faced by self-governing Natal in her short history. Not surprisingly so traumatic an event was widely interpreted by contemporaries. To the Governor of Natal there was little doubt that the "Kelwa as Kelwa" was responsible, and that the rebellion had as its mainspring the cry "Africa for the Africans". This view was echoed by John Buchan some four years later in his novel, 

"Prester John", which was based on the events of 1906 but curiously bore closer resemblance to the Chilombwe uprising in Nyasaland yet to occur.

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1 See below, Chapter VII, p. 507-508

Captain James Stuart, who published a semi-official History of the Zulu Rebellion in 1913, agreed that the part played by Christian Africans was a large and prominent one, but felt the outbreak was rather more the "inevitable" result of the "attempt made to impose the European character and civilisation on the native races" - a view well in accord with the Social Darwinism of his day.

Military men in Natal had long prophesied a Zulu uprising. To them the disturbances represented a "golden opportunity" of inflicting the most severe punishment on Africans, who had been "insolent" and "out of hand" since the end of the Boer War. While however the Natal government and army were convinced that the first outbreak of violence had to be dealt with as swiftly as possible and that in doing so they were saving South Africa from "the nameless barbarities which the savage mind alone can conceive", other observers were less sure. From the Orange Free State, ex-President Steyn talked of Natal's "hysterical" handling of events, whilst Smuts, Botha and Merriman all expressed concern lest the methods taken to

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2 See below, Chapter V, p. 299.
suppress rebellion spur it on. Harriette Colenso, Church of England missionary in Natal, and many Radical-humanitarians in Britain, went even further in suggesting that the Africans were virtually being goaded into revolt.

The African case was put rather more simply, albeit dramatically by one Dhlozi, himself not a rebel, before the N.N.A.C. when he remarked:

"The reason for the rebellion was that the Natives feel overburdened and considered that they might as well fight and be killed straight away ... If any nation as strong as the British should appear the natives would fly to it owing to the heavy troubles that afflict them."

A compatriot added: "Happy are those who fought and are dead". No greater protest could be made.

The very diversity of interpretation suggests some of the diverse strands which make up the Natal disturbances. Each view has its echo in the events of 1906. With the passage of time however these views have to be put into perspective, and new questions have to be asked about colonial rebellions. If the older view that rebellions are an inevitable result of the contact between primitive peoples and civilization was an oversimplification so probably was the overready response of the humanitarians to see only the provocative actions of the army without considering the varied reaction
of Africans to the military presence.

Moreover, questions have to be asked about the nature of colonial society and the pressures and demands within it which made rebellion attractive, albeit to a minority of black Natalians, about the nature of traditional society which is carried over and transmitted in the colonial situation and which gives the rebellion itself its particular shape and form; about the pattern of participation, which in turn sheds light both on the colonial framework and traditional politics. Rebellion is only one possible reaction to conquest, but the rebellion situation itself acts as a kind of giant spotlight across society, examining its nooks and crannies, enquiring into men's hopes and ambitions, their fears and suspicions. Each section in society has its role to play amongst the Africans: Christians and pagans, tribesmen and migrant workers, traditional hereditary chiefs, government appointed chiefs, new political leaders. The question of non-participation is as relevant as participation: why even the most violent possibilities could not deter certain groups from rebellion while others found sufficient rewards within the same society to secure their neutrality if not their allegiance. On the white side too, the response is varied - officials, settlers, military men and missionaries, all making their different demands on the Africans, all seeing events through different eyes.1

1 For an excellent discussion of the various factors involved and useful comparative material see E. Stokes and L. Brown (eds.), The Zambesian Past (Manchester, 1966), Introduction and Chapters by T. Ranger and E. Stokes.
A considerable volume of material exists on the Natal disturbances of 1906-8, both official and private, published and unpublished. Undoubtedly the starting point for any fresh look at these events must still be Captain James Stuart's *History of the Zulu Rebellion of 1906 in Natal and Dimusulu's arrest, trial and expatriation.*

Stuart, a fluent Zulu linguist who had a long career in the Natal civil service, was an active participant in the events he describes: in 1906 he acted as Captain of the Natal Field Artillery and from 1906-9 was Intelligence Officer with the Zululand Field Forces. As a member of the Greytown Court Martial which tried many of the rebels with Bambatha in the Zandila he was able to get much inside information on the fighting there, and to hear at an early stage some of the evidence implicating Dimusulu in the disturbances. At the end of 1906 he was specifically delegated by the Commandant of the Militia on the advice of the Natal Attorney General "to gather and report on all allegations of a criminal nature concerning Dimusulu". Although he did not complete the task, he

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1 Capt. W. Bosman: *The Natal Rebellion of 1906* (London, 1907) also written by a participant, is far less complete a work even as a narrative of the military events of 1906.

2 AGO 1/7/56, Report in no. 2 in A.G. to Min. of Justice, 22.7.07.
was personally responsible for taking down the depositions of
Bambatha's wife and children who escaped from Dinumula's kraal
in the middle of 1907.

In 1906-7 he also acted as Secretary to the Natal
Native Affairs Commission and in 1909 he became, for the brief
period before Union, Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs.

Even before that, he had been associated with the Under Secretary
for Native Affairs, E. O. Samuelson, in drafting many of the laws
associated with F. R. Moor's so-called reform of native policy
in 1908-1909.1 A History of the Zulu Rebellion was commissioned
by the Natal government towards the end of the campaigns of 1906,
though it was finally completed after the unification of South
Africa and without the financial support of the Union government.2

It is thus not only the record of an extremely well-informed eye­

witness and participant, who had considerable knowledge of the
Zulu people, but also of someone who had access to much official
material.3

As an account of the military campaign Stuart's History
leaves little to be desired, and his work relieves the later historian
from having to trace in great detail the military aspects of

1 SMA 1/4/20 06, Minute, Flowman, Sec. to P.M., 19.2.08.
2 Preface to History of Zulu Rebellion, pp. vii and viii.
3 A good deal of official material was published in 1906-9, though
Stuart probably also had access to departmental files.
the 1906 disturbances, from either the European or the African side. Indeed his account of the military system of the Zulu,¹ although only marginally relevant to the 1906 story, remains one of the most valuable parts of the book to anyone interested in the Zulu. Stuart was to devote much of his time and attention in his later years to a study of Zulu history, and this interest is already clear in the History of the Zulu Rebellion, making it perhaps something of an exception to the general run of literature written as this time on colonial rebellions.

Yet having said all this, it is still necessary to point out that the value of Stuart's book is as a primary rather than a secondary source. While in many ways his association with the Natal government and militia was of great advantage, it did also result in a number of limitations in his work. The first of these was as much a product of his life and times, perhaps, as of any deliberate check as he may have placed on his frankness as a government servant. As a member of the administration and of the Natal settler community, he accepted many of the assumptions of the Natal administration about Africans, albeit with a greater tolerance and benevolence than the majority of his compatriots. He appears to believe that if only Natal had remained true to the great Shepstonian tradition all would have been well.

¹Z.R.A., Chapter IV.
As a government servant and member of the armed forces moreover he could hardly examine impartially all the many charges that the Natalians were handling the disturbances in a crude and provocative fashion — indeed he dismissed critics of Natal policy as "some good people, especially those living beyond the borders of this colony .... knowing very little of the facts". But critics like Archdeacon Johnson and Harriette Colenso, Smuts, Botha and Harriman could hardly be so lightly dismissed, however aggrieved Natalians might feel at the activities of "Exeter Hall", as the Aborigines Protection Society and allied radicals in Britain were still labelled in South Africa.

Of as great account as Stuart's failure to take into consideration criticisms of Natal's handling of the 1906 disturbances, was his failure to examine the nature of the evidence and judicial proceedings against Dimusulu in 1908-1909. His personal involvement in the arrest and trial of Dimusulu made it impossible to be objective on the subject. From an early date he became convinced of Dimusulu's complicity in the disturbances, and the basic assumption of his book is that Dimusulu instigated Bambatha to revolt and intended using the uprising for his own ends whilst at the same time protesting his loyalty. By and large he repeats the prosecution case at the time of Dimusulu's trial and supports also the Natal government view that Dimusulu deliberately prompted the
murder of loyal chiefs in 1907 to increase his own power: an accusation never tested before a court of law. Seeing Dinamul as the instigator-in-chief of the disturbances enables Stuart to give a plausible and coherent explanation of the disturbances, and there may be some substance in his belief; on the other hand he fails to indicate to the reader the enormous difficulties in the way of coming to so clear-cut a verdict, and to see how far the trial was affected by the entire history of Zululand and Natal, and their political relationships. He has even failed to point out the discrepancies between his view and the final judgment arrived at by Sir William Smith after hearing the very long trial before the Special Court.¹ A recent M.A. thesis by Miss I. Perrett at the University of Natal, Dinamul and the Bambatha Rebellion,² reaches similar conclusions to those of Stuart, although the author accepts the judgment of the Special Court in rejecting the idea that Dinamul actually sent for Bambatha to incite him to rebellion. In other ways however her work suffers from the same limitations as Stuart's, since it was based solely on Stuart and official sources.

¹Stuart's assumption that Dinamul was guilty runs through the whole book, but Chapters XXII and XXIV explicitly defend Natal's policy towards Dinamul.
The chief opponent of the Government-Stuart version, both of the 1906 disturbances in general and of the arrest and trial of Dinuzulu in particular, was Harriette Emily Colenso.1 Her papers in the Natal archives as well as her innumerable pamphlets, letters to the Colonial Office and the Aborigines Protection Society, have provided a useful corrective to the official view of politics in Zululand and, to a lesser extent, in Natal, from the eighties onward. Even normally hostile witnesses attested to her "immense and unparalleled influence" over the Zulu. According to Sir Matthew Nathan, Governor of Natal from 1907 till 1909, Harriette referred to the Zulu as "my people" and regarded Dinuzulu as her king.2 While this may be slightly exaggerated, the phrase "We Zulu" occurs frequently in her correspondence. Amongst the Zulu, her influence was continually exerted on the side of restraint and surrender rather than on what she considered would be futile resistance and bloodshed. In both 1888 and 1907, having advised Dinuzulu to surrender to the authorities, she was to devote herself with passionate intensity to securing a fair trial for the Chief and getting his sentence mitigated.

1For Harriette Colenso, see my "Harriette Colenso and the Zulus, 1874 to 1913", J.A.H., 1963, II, 3.
2Nathan Papers HS 366, p.125, to Lucas, 12.7.08.
Completely convinced of Dinuulu’s innocence of any rebellious intentions either against the imperial government in 1888 or against the Natal government in 1906–7, Harriette saw in his trials persecution of the kind which he had had to endure since becoming Cetshwayo's heir in 1883, persecution led by the ‘official clique’ in Zululand and Natal, who feared the Zulu Royal family as a focus of national resistance to the ambitions of white settlers and their schemes to obtain Zululand and labour. It is clear too that in the main Zulu political issues of the time, the bitter strife between the Usuthu or followers of Dinuulu and the Ndelekakazi followers of Zibhekhu, and the rivalry between Dinuulu, Cetshwayo’s declared heir, and Menzolwandle, the posthumous oldest son of his chief wife, Harriette was an ardent partisan of the Usuthu. Indeed it can be argued that this is the chief limitation on the usefulness of her contribution to our understanding of Zulu history.

Against Harriette Colenso it can also be argued that she was quite incapable of seeing Dinuulu’s shortcomings, and that her belief in the Chief was of an emotional rather than a rational quality. Apart from all else, it is difficult to know exactly how much Dinuulu would have divulged to her. On a certain level it is clear that they were on a very intimate footing: thus in 1897 when he was in exile Harriette could take it upon herself to send
a maternal letter of caution and advice to a young Englishwoman who had apparently intended accompanying Dinusulu back from St. Helena to Zululand, warning her of the impossible situation she would face not only as a result of settler hostility but also because she would not be accepted by the Zulu people as their King’s wife.\(^1\) In May 1907 she ordered clothes for Dinusulu’s visit to the Governor at Pietermaritzburg, and a couple of months later Dinusulu wrote her a somewhat distraught letter asking her how he should best get rid of those refugees who had sought sanctuary at the Usuthu.\(^2\)

Yet it is hardly likely that Dinusulu would have divulged his ulterior motives to her — if he had any. When, at the time of his trial, Dinusulu’s chief adviser, Nankulumana, was asked whether Harriette had been told of the presence of Bambatha’s family at the Usuthu, he replied “no — after all she is a white woman”.\(^3\) Nor is it likely that a white woman missionary, however sympathetic, would have been told of the plans to murder adulterous witchdoctors, to say nothing of loyal chiefs. Nevertheless, had Dinusulu’s plan been to have his power as Paramount Chief recognised by the Imperial

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\(^2\) See below, Chapter VII, p. 490

\(^3\) Natal Witness, 4.2.09.
government through his manifestations of loyalty in 1906 and a campaign of terror in 1907 as both Stuart and Miss Ferrett contend, one would have expected more evidence of this in the Colenso Collection.

Associated with Harriette Colenso were most of the individuals whom Stuart dismissed as "some good people". Through her brother Frank, who was living in London, Harriette had an extensive chain of influence which stretched to Radical members of Parliament like Keir Hardie and Ramsay MacDonald, who persisted in asking awkward questions inspired by her and her brother in the British House of Commons on the Natal disturbances.¹ She had also forged links in the last quarter of the nineteenth century with the Aborigines Protection Society and with a myriad of local independent radical-liberal organisations in Britain under whose auspices she had addressed meetings on Zululand in the nineties in a passionate campaign for the return of the Zulu chiefs. Her brother Frank also had contacts with South African Africans in Britain, and it would appear that Alfred Maagena was closely associated with him in his campaign against the Natal handling of the disturbances.² All these criticisms therefore have to be regarded

²Ibid., pp. 40, 68, 72,
as essentially emanating from the same source of information in Natal.

If the government version of what happened and Harriette Colenso's views are rather like 'Point, Counterpoint,' both sources have been used to illuminate not only the events of 1906 but their entire background. In addition, different perspectives were provided by the papers of mission societies working in Natal at the turn of the century, of which the most useful were those of the American Zulu Mission. I was however unable to see the archives of the Woalanian Methodist Mission Church at Rhodes University Grahamstown, although I have seen their printed reports and periodicals of the time.

For the aftermath of the rebellion Sir Matthew Nathan's papers at Rhodes House were particularly useful, though I was unfortunately unable to trace the papers of Sir Henry McCallum, his

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1 For the official sources used, see Bibliography, Sections IIA, IIIA.
2 For unpublished Mission records used see Bibliography, Section IIB.
predecessor in Natal. I should also have liked to have found more private papers of both black and white politicians in Natal; that I did not do so was in part through lack of time, in part the result of reluctance on the part of white Natalians to allow an outsider to look at family papers. Those that I did see were not very useful.

Finally, it is clear that increasingly work on African history in the colonial period will have to include field work. This proved quite impossible and would in any case have been somewhat impracticable in the time at my disposal. If Harriette Colenso was not told certain things because she was "a white woman" in 1906, it is highly unlikely that I would have been told much more in the short space of time I had in Natal in 1963. My only consolation is that the amount of African evidence found in the documentary sources was very considerable: Dimusula's Papers in the Attorney General's files and in the Colenso Papers, reports of interviews in the Native Affairs Department and in the Stuart Papers, the evidence before many Courts Martial and from thousands of Africans before the Natal Native Affairs Commission and South African Affairs Commission, the Zulu-English newspaper to say

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1For unpublished private papers consulted see Bibliography, Section 13, 2.
nothing of the thousands of pages of evidence in Dimisulu's
trials. Combined with all the other material they enabled
a detailed picture to be built up not only of human relation-
ships in Natal at the turn of the century, but also a reassessment
of many aspects of the 1906-3 disturbances.

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1For a discussion on the difficulties of handling the court material
see below, Chapter VII, passim. It was found in many different
forms and many different versions. Frequently the simplest reference
has been to the newspaper report. The sheer bulk of the material,
however, made it impossible to correlate the references to notes
taken over a considerable period of time both in London and Natal
and found duplicated as depositions in A.O.O. files, enclosed
in CO despatches, in the Colenso Collection and published in govern-
ment records and newspapers.
Chapter I

THE COLONIAL FRAMEWORK

"It is impossible in my opinion - it is absolutely impossible - to grant these people any terms of political equality for hundreds of years to come. We, the dominant race, are not going to tolerate it. We are the dominant race and we must remain so."1

1P. H. Moor (Farmer, ex-Secretary for Native Affairs, future P.M. and M.N.A.) before South African Native Affairs Commission 1923-4, Vol. IX, p.230; see also p.213.
Situated between the Drakensberg mountains to the west, which separate it from the dry plateau of the interior of South Africa, and the warm Indian Ocean to the east, Natal is one of the most favoured areas geographically in Southern Africa. It has a fertile, loam soil, high rainfall, lush, almost tropical vegetation and rolling grasslands, as well as a temperate climate healthy to both man and beast. At the beginning of the nineteenth century it was the homeland of numerous Zulu-speaking, Nguni chiefs. Of these the Zulu were to become the most powerful and famous, incorporating through assimilation and conquest most of the clans and tribes between the Portuguese territories to the north and the Zaniakulu River to the south, and lending their name to the many peoples between. The advent of 1834 of the first white traders to the capital of the mighty Zulu king, Shaka, must in the midst of these momentous happenings have appeared a relatively insignificant event, one indeed to be exploited by the king for his own purposes, but of little more importance than that. Nevertheless, Shaka's legendary deathbed prophecy, whether it was indeed his own or one invented by a later and sadder generation, that the swallows (i.e. the Europeans) would come to rule his kingdom,
was right. The handful of traders was an augury of things to come.

By the turn of the nineteenth century, the entire social, political and economic structure of the area had changed. The predominantly British traders of the 1820's had been followed by Dutch Voortrekkers, and their advent in 1837 had been followed in turn in 1843 by British annexation of the area between the Tugela and the Umzimkulu Rivers, part of which had originally been 'granted' to the traders and later to the Dutch by the Zulu kings. Imperial motives were a mixture of humanitarianism and a determination not to allow a port on the sea-route to India fall into the hands of a people who recognised neither British supremacy nor the rights of the African peoples in whose midst they found themselves. With the British annexation, most of the Voortrekkers turned on, soon to be replaced by settlers of British, German and Norwegian origin. The British settlers predominated, and by 1904 40% of Natalians were still British born. By 1874 the small colony was requesting Representative Responsible Government, and in 1893 self-government was granted the white population which two years before had totalled 46,000. The only bare to com-


plete independence of action on the part of the elected ministry of Natal were the powers of the Governor to reserve any bill affecting the non-white population for Imperial approval. After two years' suspension, any reserved bill could be disallowed by the Sovereign. In addition, the Governor had certain powers over the African population as Supreme Chief which it was envisaged he would be able, in the final analysis, to exercise independently of his responsible ministers.\(^1\) In the event, no Governor of Natal ever exercised these powers; as a member of the Colonial Office staff commented sadly in 1908, it was a position no Natal governor ever succeeded in living up to.\(^2\) Thus from being the dependents of the Zulu sovereign, by the turn of the century the whites of Natal had become the dominant ruling minority in a complex ethnic community.

The area of white settlement had also expanded. By 1904 the rough shanty town of Port Natal had become the finest harbour in Southern Africa; the colony boasted two fair sized towns (by South African standards) and a number of villages which were nothing more than a few simple houses clustered around the magistrate's office, the church and the local store. The boundaries of the colony stretched

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1\(^\) This was embodied in § 6 of the Royal Instructions to the Governor, see N.L.A. Sessional Papers, 1895, L.A. No. 3, pp. 5 ff. The clause was inserted on the insistence of the C.O. See CO 179/179/1595 for the minutes.

2\(^\) Minute E.L. Lambert CO 179/248/43579, 8.12.00.
from the Daminkulu in the south to Portuguese East Africa in the north: Zululand had been incorporated into the colony in 1897 after ten years of direct Imperial rule.\(^1\) Added to Zululand were the territories just to its north known as Amatongaland and which had been acquired by the British in 1895 after a protracted tussle with the Portuguese and the Transvaal Republic.

This area became the Ingwavuma Division of Zululand. After the Boer War Natal acquired additional territory from the Transvaal - the Northern districts of Vryheid, Utrecht and Paulpietersburg, which had been cut off from Zululand by advancing Boers in 1894. Known as the 'New Republic', it was three years later incorporated into the Transvaal. While there were but a few hundred whites in the rest of Zululand in 1900, and these were mainly traders, missionaries and government officials, whites had their eye on those lands suitable for grazing and sugar plantations in the remaining two-thirds of Zululand. Between 1902 and 1904 a Delimitation Commission set aside some of these lands for European occupation.

In addition to black and white in Natal, there were, in 1904, nearly 101,000 Asians and about 7,000 people of mixed descent\(^2\) in the colony. Neither of these groups was admitted to the ranks

\(^1\)See below, Chapter II.

\(^2\)This figure may have included a number of immigrants from St. Helena and Mauritius who were not governed by the Natal Native Code but who were beginning to feel discrimination in, for example, the schools of the colony. See H. F. Dickie Clark, The Navigial Situation. A Sociological Study of a Coloured Group (London, 1966), p. 54 ff.
of the ruling class. Socially, politically and economically, the 'Coloured' people of Natal were a very insignificant factor. Those who were the result of the miscegenation between white men and African women were regarded legally as part of the indigenous population, being governed under native law, unless specifically exempted from its provisions. Unlike their fellows in the Cape, they never constituted a buffer group between black and white, capable of softening and modifying race attitudes. In part this can be attributed to their short history and lack of numerical strength as well as to the homogeneity of the white population of Natal.

In Natal and Zululand, coloured men were even appointed chiefs over African people in succession to their white fathers who had served in a similar capacity. In Zululand the offspring of John Duna, a white trader who had been a favourite of Cetshwayo's and had later been appointed one of Sir Garnet Wolseley's thirteen chieftains, were able by themselves to maintain the Roman Catholic school in Ulaleni division! In Natal proper, both Charlie Pym and Tim Ogle, whose names reveal their connection with the earliest

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1See e.g. Report H.E.A.G., p.20, which recommends their exclusion from the operation of native law.
2See below, Chapter II.
3Tuna left 23 widows and 95 children on his death in 1895 according to the Governor.
traders in Natal, headed considerable groups of Africans in the colony. During the disturbances of 1906 no noticeable part was played by the Coloured population, although there does seem to have been considerable strain between the Coloured chiefs and their people at this time. Charles Fynn for example was reported unable to restrain the 'rebelliousness' of his people who were fined by McFrasie in the early days of the rebellion for their behaviour.1 Fynn was said to be 'loyal' to the government. Despite their virtual exclusion from white society, the Coloureds of Natal saw themselves as part of the white group. They resented being 'practically stigmatized as natives',2 were dissatisfied with their status under native law,3 their lack of political rights, the failure of the government to make adequate provision for the education of their children and their exclusion from the defence forces of the colony.4

The Indians were a far more sensible minority in Natal,5 though various discriminatory laws had prevented them from establish—

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1Cd 2905, No. 29, Gov. to Sec. St., 23.2.06.

2The phrase comes from a petition from the children of E. J. Rama who had been adviser to Rama, Cetawayo's half brother. Encl. in CO 179/254/910, Gov. to Sec. St., 17.12.07.

3H.A.C., pp. 9 and 27.

4See H.A.C. Evid., pp. 985-995.

5100,918 according to the 1904 Census.
ing themselves in Zululand. They had first been introduced in 1860 as indentured labourers for the sugar and tea plantations of Natal’s coastlands, at the request of the settlers themselves. By the turn of the century, their rapid numerical growth and the competition they provided against the smaller white traders, farmers and skilled artisans made them a violently disliked community.¹ If anything prejudice in the colony was stronger against the Indians than the Africans - who were generally referred to as ‘our natives’. In 1895 a 45 annual tax on Indians neither removing their indentures nor returning to India was imposed. The ambition of the Indian was to be accepted by the white community, to prove his worth as a citizen and share in the privileges and responsibilities of the white community.² Until 1896 free Indians (i.e. those who had completed their term of indentured labour or entered the colony at their own expense) had the same franchise rights as whites. Soon after the grant of self-government to Natal, the Natal ministry made attempts to have them removed from the electoral roll. After considerable opposition on the part of Lord Ripon as Colonial Secretary, the

¹For the anti-Indian feeling in the mid-90’s see especially despatches and enclosures in GO 179/195 and GO 179/196.

²Cf. GO 179/233/3457, Encl. 2. Protest of India Office to Natal Municipal Corporation’s Bill “The Indians resent most bitterly the distinctions of race and colour upon which many of the Colonial regulations are based.... Above all they resent being included in the same category with the indigenous inhabitants of Africa when the history of their country and people justifies them in regarding
colonists got their way by the invention of a face-saving device, when Joseph Chamberlain was Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Indian franchise had hardly constituted a threat at the time of its abolition, although it is interesting that amongst the arguments used - and with some effect at the Colonial Office - were that it was hard to justify the granting of the franchise to Indians who were 'foreigners' when 'our natives' did not have it, and that there was a danger of Indians outvoting the white men which would endanger African interests. The arguments that qualified Africans should therefore be given the franchise to protect their rights against both the Indian and the European does not occur in the Colonial Office minutes on the subject. In general the office would appear to have been sympathetically inclined to the settler view of the Indian as the legislation against Indians in Zululand where the Colonial Office had full power to prevent discrimination reveals. While there seems to have been more discussion over discriminatory legislation against the Indian

as standing far below themselves in the scale of humanity. Copy from Govt. of India's dispatch No. 16 of 1905, Simla, 14.5.09.

3 See CO 179/189/14245, Gov, to Sec. St., 14.7.94 and 6.6. minutes.
4 Cf. Minute E. Fairfield, 6.6.93, CO 429/16/11269, "Lord Ripon will find the former papers on Indians in Zululand interesting reading. They show that after all it is hardly for the British government to
community than over 'class' legislation against the Africans, this seems to have arisen from pressure by the India Office and by prominent ex-Indian officials such as Lord Ripon, rather than from any thought out or principled conviction in the Colonial Office.

While there was as yet little evidence of the later Natal African dislike of the Indians, in some areas of dense Indian settlement rumblings were beginning to be heard from Africans against the Indian settler. Yet it is a remarkable fact that during the disturbances no Indians were touched by Africans, nor was their property damaged. At the outbreak of the disturbances the leaders of the Indian community, headed by Mahatma Gandhi, offered their services to the Natal government in order to prove their loyalty. As had happened during the Boer War, they were not accepted for the armed forces; after some consideration an Indian was sent the first stone at the Boers in the matter of anti-Indian legislation. Though they were not discriminated against in so far as the regulations in Zululand saw to it that Indians were not allowed to buy town plots (before 1904 rural lands were not for sale) or granted trading licences.

1 See e.g. evidence H.M.A.C., p. 775, Charlie Sindane (ex-chief Nkrofeni, Richmond Division) who complained of the introduction of Indian labourers "who... had taken work which should have belonged to the Natives of the country.

2 See Indian Opinion, March-July 1906, passim, but esp. 29.4.06, Report of Meeting of British Indians in Durban 24.4.06. Gandhi’s speech.

Also Indian Opinion, 14.4.06.
however the Natal government invited them to accompany the white forces as an ambulance corps. Forty stretcher bearers were provided and paid for by the Natal Indian Congress. They served mainly during the final phase of the disturbances in the Hapumile division, tending the Africans wounded and flagged.

For the purpose of a study of the disturbances, however, black and white in Natal seems essentially Africans and Europeans. There is little need to refer further to these other minority groups. Nevertheless their position in Natal society confirms the impression that Natal in 1906 was an exclusive, hierarchial society with rigid caste and racial divisions. Despite their settled and outwardly confident character the whites were still an insecure frontier community. Surrounded on all sides by large and well organised African societies in Swaziland, Basutoland, Zululand and, on the south, the compact African populations of the Eastern Cape, there were also a host of internal 'frontiers' between white and black, perpetuated by the system of native administration first inaugurated by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, but enshrined in the later philosophy and practice of 'native policy' of self-governing Natal.

It is difficult to know exactly how far the colonial presence affected traditional African social and political attitudes. Even outwardly by the turn of the century African life had not changed very radically: the vast majority of the 900,000 Africans
of Natal and Zululand still wore tribal dress, lived in scattered homesteads consisting of the beehive shaped huts of the Nguni, were grouped under their chiefs, *abumungane*¹ and *induna*² and looked in most cases to them for leadership and guidance. Yet from being a nation of pastoralists, cultivators and hunters, the Africans of Natal had become, by and large, heavers of wood and drawers of water for white masters. Even the proud warriors of Zululand were being converted into the migrant labourers of Natal's farms, towns and mines — to say nothing of the gold-mines of the Witwatersrand. Although the process had not gone as far there as in Natal, Zululand's days of glory and independence were over. It would be wrong to minimize the impact of white rule, which in Natal and in certain parts of Zululand was far more omnipresent than in the majority of colonial territories in the same period. The many complaints of the Africans before the Natal Native Affairs Commission of 1906-1907 attest to the extent to which the white man's presence was felt even by Africans living on purely African reserve lands, far away from the white centres; the innumerable laws under which they were governed and which affected an important and large segment of their lives, the humiliating treatment they experienced from even the humblest Europeans.

¹ *Abumungane* — descent group or clan head;

² *Induna* — headman, not necessarily of hereditary rank.
and indeed African, at the magistrate's office, their anger and bitterness over the white man's attitude to black women. In 1905, 23,232 Africans were sentenced by magistrates mainly for statutory offences: 2,569.7 per 100,000 of the population. In 1906 there were 45,236 Africans charged, 4,482 for offences under the Masters and Servants Act (no. 40, 1894).\(^1\)

On another level however, it is easy to exaggerate the extent to which tribal values, indeed even tribal customs, had been affected by the white settlers. The syncretising genius of the Bantu has been frequently remarked on in the religious sphere; politically, too, while tribal relationships were distorted and changed by the European dominated administrative and legislative framework, they nonetheless showed a remarkable resilience and adaptability. Despite the domination of the settler community, there is an infra-structure of tribal life which has a surprising continuity and vitality.\(^2\)

Despite the expansion of white settlement and the insatiable demands for African labour and land,\(^3\) in Natal many of the features of tribal life had been retained and given statutory recognition,

\(^1\)Report of Prisons Reform Commission, p.326, Supplement to Natal Govt. Gazette, 5.6.06, Appendix II and SIA 1/2/390 202, Nathan to P.M., 17.12.07.

\(^2\)See below, Chapters VI and VII.

\(^3\)See below, Chapter III.
largely as a result of the influence of Sir Theophilus Shepstone. Shepstone, the son of a Cape missionary, came to Natal in 1846 and until 1875 acted as intermediary between the Natal colonists and their African neighbours, either as 'Diplomatic Agent' to the native tribes, or as Secretary of Native Affairs. As an extremely complex personality, there has as yet been no adequate examination of his character, philosophy or achievements.1 Faced with the tremendous problem of administering the African tribes of Natal, many of them completely shattered by the Shaka Wars and without their traditional chiefs, Shepstone was to evolve his own version of 'segregation' and 'indirect' rule. The constant influx of fresh refugees from Zululand, to lands already taken up by white settlers compounded his problems. Nevertheless by a feat of considerable administrative and psychological skill he was able to settle the disorganised tribesmen on reserve lands and to restore some semblance of tribal authority over them. Without resources of either manpower or finance, he was faced with a constant barrage of criticism from the settlers who were extremely suspicious of his attempts to govern Africans according to their own laws and customs. Nevertheless whenever it seems that the tribal Africans found Shepstone's rule for the most part acceptable, as the many references

to 'the good old days' of Sonstetn made before the Natal Native Affairs Commission of 1906-1907 and the relatively uninterrupted half century of peace during and following his regime reveal.

Though Shepstone through practical necessity was forced to administer Africans through their traditional authorities, he also realised when he took over the management of native affairs in Natal that the Government 'could not command a balance of power'; he was also aware of its inability to put down any kind of internal disturbances by means of the white settlers alone and therefore resorted to a policy of 'divide and rule'. In his own words:

"Instances constantly occurred of individuals, families and sections of tribes becoming dissatisfied with their hereditary chiefs and desiring to have them severed. I observed that these malcontents were not unwilling to be placed under headmen of no hereditary rank, all they cared for was that their new headman should enjoy the confidence of the government... These 'unborn' chiefs being annexed, have no interest in supporting hereditary pretensions; all their importance depends upon the breath of the government, and although their position is fully acknowledged, they are always looked upon as interlopers by the chiefs of ancient descent and weakners of their power and influence. It is by the gradual and judicious extension of this system... that I think can be found the shortest and safest means of breaking down the power of hereditary chiefs, without losing the machinery as yet indispensable to us, of tribal organisation."1

It would be wrong to see this as a purely Machiavellian process. Long before the arrival of the European settlers, there

were natural fissiparous tendencies within Nguni political life,¹ in part the result of the system of succession and the division of the family into 'houses'. In Natal and Zululand, the general rule of succession was that the oldest son of the chief wife of the chief, whose bride wealth was generally paid by the tribe and who was generally married late in the chief's life, should succeed his father. In pre-colonial times, and certainly after the Shakan wars, it would appear that in fact royal blood sufficed for a prince to attract a following and gain the support he needed to become a chief. Certainly the history of the Zulu Royal family illustrates the principle in the breach rather than the observance.²

When there was sufficient room for expansion, these divisive tendencies had generally led to the splintering off of new tribes under a new head, generally a member of the chief's immediate family. There were also checks and balances within the system to prevent the complete and constant disintegration of tribes.

There were two interrelated aspects of the traditional process

¹For a full discussion of this amongst the Cape Nguni, see W. D. Hammond-Jocke, "Segmentation or Mission in Cape Nguni Political Units", *Africa*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, April, 1965.

²Shaka, himself not the son of the chief wife, succeeded Senzangakhona in 1816; he was succeeded by two of his brothers, Dingane and Ngabe. Cetshwayo, son of Ngabe, eliminated his chief rivals in battle (notably Shabani in 1836) and was succeeded by Ndzimane, also not the son of Cetshwayo's chief wife, who bore Nkunzulwandle after the king's death. For the rivalry between Dimawule and Nkunzulwandle see below, Chapters III and VI.
of segmentation in Zulu politics. The first was the way in which men became chiefs, the second the way in which dissatisfied members of tribes attached themselves to new chiefs. Even under the Zulu kings, according to Professor Gluckman, "the continual segmentation of the constituent tribes was important in maintaining the power of the central government over them". Moreover despite the continuation of a large number of hereditary chieftaincies, a considerable number of new chieftaincies were created for those who had loyally served the King. Thus Mikala, Shaka's famous warrior and Dingane's Prime Minister, was appointed chief over the Ntuli tribe and given a large tract of land as a reward for his services. Similarly, the large tract of land occupied by the Ntuli tribe and its prominence in Zulu affairs was the result of their Chief Hneyana's having been Cetshwayo's Prime Minister. As Professor Barnes has pointed out in his analysis of the social structure of the Fort Jameson Ngoni, if a man was not the rightful heir in his tribal section "he could try to gain the support of the lord of a higher segment and hope thereby to change the distribution at the lower one. This consideration became particularly important after the


arrival of the Europeans, who exercised control over the whole state and at the same time were ignorant of and not bound by the values which bound the old system. These words apply with equal force to the situation amongst the Hguni of Natal and Zululand. Once European government took over, it almost inevitably became involved in succession disputes and intra-tribal factionalism.

By the turn of the century, this splintering process had been widely extended in Natal-Zululand. When Natal became a British colony there were only ninety-four known tribes of which about forty-three were still more or less intact. By 1906 there were two-hundred and thirty eight units in Natal and a further eighty-three in Zululand. In the latter colony, the process had been shorter, but since the Zulu War and on the advice of the Shepstone it had been much the same. This interaction between the traditional aspects of segmentation and fission and the Shepstone policy of 'divide and rule' is a fascinating study in itself. It was also to have considerable significance during the 1906-8

1 *Politics in a Changing Society*, p.33.

2 See below, Chapter VI, p.398 for an interesting example in Zululand.

3 *N.I.A.C. Hid. 1906-7*, F. House, p.47. In 1881-2 the number of 'tribes' in Natal was 102, under 175 chiefs and headmen. Of these, 99 were hereditary chiefs. *N.I.A.C. 1851-1882*, Appendix 6, p.33.
In order to study the interaction of the traditional position of the chiefs and lineage heads of the African people with the colonial administration, and the relationship between the two, it is necessary to turn to the Natal Code of Native Law, a Code which both reflected the situation at the turn of the century, and by defining changed it. Although even under Shepstone, Africans had been governed according to customary law, this was only codified in 1878 after he had left his position as Secretary for Native Affairs. With the growth in the number of magistrates and in the absence of a single figure of the understanding and ability of Shepstone, the need was increasingly felt in the colony for a Code of Native Law which would ensure uniformity in the administration of native law in the magisterial courts, and even to a certain extent in the chiefs' courts, where a maximum fine and limitations on the chiefs' jurisdiction were imposed.

After further debate on the subject and an expansion of the 1878 Code, Law 19 of 1891, the second Natal Code of Native Law was passed on the very eve of the grant of self-government to the colony. It was later reenacted by the Natal parliament, thus giving it statutory recognition. The Code laid down the law in detail on almost

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1 Cf. Intelligence Report H. C. Lagg, "I suggest to the Government the advisability of maintaining the old feudal system and to this end I would send out emissaries whose business would be to endeavour to renew the old feuds." GG 179/253/12460, Encl. 1 in desp. 41, 16/3.06.

2 See e.g. Evid. S.A.N.A.C. III, J. Benjmont, pp. 16-17.
every aspect of African life, provisions dealing with such varied matters as the position of the Supreme Chief, succession, adultery, the labour obligations of tribesmen and the requirements of "native good manners and respect to authorities".

In many ways there was much that was positive in the idea of a native law Code, and indeed in the underlying philosophy of Natal's native policy. The intention to govern African peoples under their own laws and customs in so far as these were not repugnant to civilized standards went back in Natal to as early as 1843. While it embodied a principle the very opposite of the Cape Colony's policy of "assimilation", even the Cape had been forced to recognize the value and resilience of tribal organisation and customary law in the Transkeian territories. Natal's method of allowing the African to "develop according to their own laws" was the only conceivable one in the early days of the colony; in the 1860's the Colonial Office was to remark that "the Natal system of dealing with the natives was a wise one, perhaps... the wise one, that of leaving the natives... to be governed in a great degree by their own... laws". As late as 1898 Lord Milner was more favourably impressed with the Natal practice than with any other in South Africa.

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2 Milner to Asquith, 19.11.1897. J. Headlam, The Milner Papers (Ed.) (London,1931-1933), Vol. I, p.177 has only an extract of this revealing letter. The full text has been published in J. Butler, "Sir Alfred Milner and British Policy in South Africa in 1897",
Nevertheless, recognition of customary law is not the same thing as its codification. 1 Although this was insufficiently recognized at the time, the very codification of customary law changed its character and introduced a rigidity which had not been present originally. 2 It was partly for this reason that when Zululand was incorporated into Natal in 1897 the Code was not extended there although the 1878 version had been applied since 1867. 3 This rigidity was especially unfortunate at a time when colonial society was undergoing vast changes and the influx of Africans to the towns, mines and white farms was proceeding apace, and making much of the Code inapplicable to their daily life. The Code moreover could only be altered by an Act of the Natal Parliament, although, as was admitted at the time of its introduction into the Natal Legislative Assembly, barely 5% of the members had any concept of what native law was. 5 This meant that when the Code was amended, as it was by Acts 13 of 1894, 40 of 1896, 8 of 1897, 1 of 1901, 25 of 1902 and 47 of 1903.


2See the evidence of Sir Marshall Clarke before S.A.N.A.C. 1903-5, Vol. IV, p. 73 on the dangers of "stereotyping a state of law and custom which is naturally in a state of transition."

3A. J. Kerr, "Reception and Codification of... Law", pp. 92-96.

4E. L. A. Debates 1890-1, p. 53.
these amendments were more in the nature of tightening up control over the tribal system from the European administrative point of view than illuminating and expanding customary law.

Even in Shepstone's day the fact that the interpretation of native law rested with white 'experts' carried with it the danger that it was the white men's interpretation of what constituted the principles of native law and those aspects of tribal life which suited the administration which were retained. Indeed according to Theophilus Shepstone's evidence given before the Cape Native Laws and Customs Commission this was the explicit intention. It is quite clear that entire sections of the 1891 Code have absolutely no parallel in native law; the more crude examples of this concern for example the registration of births and deaths, the more subtle concern the position of the Supreme Chief in tribal law. While the social and legal implications of the Code were profound, for the political historian it is the hierarchy of authority established by the Code that is of particular interest. This political hierarchy which was supposed to reflect and parallel African traditional tribal life was relatively straightforward. At the top of the ladder stood the Supreme Chief.

1 C.N.L.A C.C. (Cape Town, 1893),pp.10-12.

2 Cf. for example Chapter XVI, § 219 of the Code which laid down that "Native good manners and respect to authority require the observance of the following rules: a) That the supreme salute and recognition 'Havata' be accorded to the Supreme Chief, Secretary of Native Affairs, the Judges of the Court of Appeal and the Judge of the Native High Court."
a position first established for the Lienst. Governor of the colony in 1856 by Theophilus Shepstone, who was his chief adviser. From the Supreme Chief power was delegated to a number of lesser beings: the Secretary of Native Affairs, magistrates, chiefs, indunas, right down to the kraalheads, or descent group heads (abomnamosa). Clearly with the incorporation of foreign elements into 'native law', a change was being made in the whole delicate balance of duty and responsibility which constituted the relationship between a chief and his people. This was however rarely recognised in Natal, where the assumptions on which political authority in the colony were based were stated clearly and categorically in the middle of the nineteenth century by the 1852-53 Native Affairs Commission:

"The point upon which the whole of Kafir law hinges are [sic] mutual responsibility and unquestioning obedience to the order of the chief — his word is law, his power is absolute."¹

How little this conception of native law had changed can be seen from the memorandum prepared by S. O. Samuelson, Under Secretary for Native Affairs, and published by the Naor cabinet at the beginning of 1903 as a counterblast to the 1906-7 Natal Native Affairs Commission report, which had been fairly critical of Natal administrative practice if not of its theory. Samuelson stated in almost

...the system of native administration in Natal is a despotic form of government taken over from the natives themselves and is peculiarly suitable to their condition and circumstances... it carries with it mutual responsibility or suretyship and implicit obedience to authority.  

The Supreme Chief who headed native affairs was defined in the 1891 Code as the officer who was in charge of the administration of the colony — generally the governor, acting governor or administrator.  

Under chapter two, section forty of the Code:

"The Supreme Chief is not subject to the Supreme Court, or to any other Court of Law in the Colony of Natal, for or by reason of any order or proclamation, or in any other act or matter whatsoever, committed, ordered, permitted, or done either personally or in Council."

While, as Sweeney and Hitchins point out, the acts of the Supreme Chief were "open to review to ascertain whether they are within the scope of his authority or the sphere of his duty", as was shown in the case of Nekeni v. Simba's guardian, the Governor was clearly in a very strong position. When the Colonial Office agreed to the further entrenchment of the powers of the Supreme Chief under the Code of 1891, it was clearly hoped that the Governor, who was re-

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2. Part I, Chapter I, § 5.  
Responsible to the Imperial Government, would thus be able to exert some influence over the handling of native affairs in Natal. For this reason at the time of the grant of responsible government there was a long and important discussion over the independent powers of the Supreme Chief, which could be exercised without the interference of the Executive. Yet the Governor never succeeded in living up to the independent position envisaged by the Colonial Office and between 1893 and 1910 the Supreme Chief was virtually the executive council of the colony, which thus had extremely wide powers of administrative action over the African population. The Governor as Supreme Chief exercised all political authority and power over the natives of Natal, appointed all chiefs, could divide and amalgamate tribes "as necessity and the good government of the natives may in his opinion require". In Council, he could remove any chief found guilty of any political offence, for incompetency, or for any other just cause. He had 'absolute power' to call chiefs and their men out for the defense of the colony and to supply labour for public works. He could remove entire tribes or portions of tribes from any part of the colony to any other part. His orders were carried out by the

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1 For the debate see CO 179/179 passim and exp. 0.0. minutes.
2 See below for further detail on the isihala system, p65ff.
principal Executive Officer, the Secretary for Native Affairs (the title was elevated to a ministerial one in 1906) who was also his chief adviser, and the administrators of native law, or, as they all became under the Native (Courts) Act of 1896, the magistrates of the colony.\(^1\)

These powers were justified as being based on the despotic position of the Zulu kings under tribal law. There, it was believed, held the power of life and death over their subjects. This viewpoint however has been questioned frequently by anthropological work on the social system of the South Eastern Bantu. Even Sir Theophilus Shepstone recognised that chiefs administered their tribes and governed "with the advice of councillors", and pointed out how dependent chiefs and their councillors were on public opinion.\(^2\) If chiefs defied the views of their followers they would deprive themselves of the means to enforce their will. Nevertheless he maintained adamantly that this was not the case with the Zulu Royal family because of the large standing army they had built up in their own support. His views on the basis of the power of the Zulu Royal family were directly contradicted by no less a person than Cetshwayo himself when he appeared before the Cape

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\(^2\) Cape Native Laws and Customs Commission, 1893, p. 64.
Commission on Native Laws and Customs of 1883. When asked whether, as king, he could change the marriage laws of his people if he considered them morally wrong, whatever the views of his people, he replied quite categorically that

"...he would not consent to the law being abolished because of the right or wrong of it, but because the whole nation agreed to it."¹

Asked whether he had the power to act independently of his chiefs and councillors in making appointments he answered:

"No, the King has not the power of electing an officer as chief without the approval of other chiefs. They are the most important men. But the smaller chiefs he can elect at his own discretion."²

Even if the power of the Zulu king was bolstered by that of his large standing army moreover, that army was composed of his people, though of different tribes. Should the King become too despotic, they would rebel against his power and assassinate him; the lesson that could be drawn from the assassination of Shaka and the murder in exile of Dingane.³ Even if the King were not assassinated - the final resort of the desperate - he could well lose his following to a rival brother, uncle or son, should he not follow the consensus most of the time. This too happened under

¹ p. 328.
² Ibid., p. 324.
Dingane, when his brother, Npepo, was able to assert himself as chief and take his personal followers with him to Natal.

In colonial Natal, the power of the Supreme Chief, advised by his white ministers, was backed up by an almost entirely white army and police force. His susceptibility to African wishes depended on the tenderness of his conscience. Settler pressures in general proved a somewhat more effective spur to action.

While however the position of the Supreme Chief under the Code was so powerful, that of the African chiefs who were regarded as "minor deputies of the Supreme Chief" was extremely ambiguous.\(^1\)

Theoretically Natal was supposed to enjoy a type of 'indirect rule'; according to Sir Henry McCallum in 1907 the aim of the government was "to rule the black nations through their own chiefs, the chiefs having practically control of their tribes."\(^2\)

Justice Beaumont pointed out before the 1903-5 South African Native Affairs Commission however:

"In Natal you are undermining the authority of the Chiefs every day. Every act dealing with Natives that is passed more or less undermines the authority of the Chiefs, and, on the other hand, you are trying to bolster them up to retain their position. It

\(^1\)Chapter IV, § 46 of Code of Native Law.

\(^2\)CO 179/241/23101, Encl. 1, d/p. 56, 5.6.07. Interview of Governor with chiefs, p.28. McCallum appears to be echoing not only Natal’s Chapletonism, but the ideas of ‘indirect rule’ being evolved by Lugard in Nigeria at this time.
Though Beames did not mention it, the most fundamental props of
chieftainly power, the chief's power to grant his followers land
and cattle, had been undermined by the pressures of population
within the reserves, and the severe cattle diseases which had
decimated African owned cattle in the colony at the turn of the
century. While theoretically chiefs could still allocate allot-
ments within the locations to their followers, this was not always
a practical possibility. The same was true of those chiefs who
had tribesmen on European owned lands. While they might be able
to make minor adjustments over boundary lines, their old position
as land-givers and material benefactors had gone. This in itself
must have accounted in many areas for the waning of the hold chiefs
had over their following, which was so bitterly and frequently
complained of before the Natal Native Affairs Commission of 1906–
1907.

Under the Natal Code, chiefs were appointed by the Supreme
Chief and held office during his pleasure, "contingent upon good

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1 S.A.N.A.C. III, p.18.

2 See below, Chapter III, p. 182-185.

3 Chapter VII, § 80, Law 19, 1891 (Code).
behaviour and general fitness". As "minor deputies" of the
Supreme Chief they were responsible for the good conduct of
their tribes, "the prompt supply of men for the purposes of
defence or to suppress disorder or rebellion or as labourers
for public works or for the general needs of the Colony". They
also had jurisdiction in civil suits amongst members of their
own tribes and in minor criminal cases between members of their
own tribes; the maximum fine they could impose for contempt
or disregard of their authority was £2, and any fine they imposed
over 10/- had to be approved by the local magistrate, who had power
to enquire into any of their judicial or other actions. Their
privileges were "the rank they hold", their salaries from the
government, which ranged from £10 to £40 per annum, their fines

1Chapter IV, § 46.

2Increased to £5 and £2 respectively under Act 1 of 1909, "To
provide for the better administration of native affairs. See
below Chapter IX.

3The powers and jurisdiction of chiefs in Bululand under Crown rule
before its annexation by Natal had been greater. In 1894 Sir Marshal
Clarke increased the jurisdiction of specially nominated Bululand
chiefs who were entitled to hear criminal cases between members
of their own and other tribes. The appellate court in purely
African cases changed a couple of times in Natal under self govern-
ment, from the specially constituted Native High Court and 3 judge
"Court of Appeal" to the Supreme Court of Natal and back again.
In Bululand before annexation by Natal appeals were made to the Resident
Commissioner, thereafter, to the Native High Court. 00 477/19/11545.
Bd. in Secy. 57, 6,694, Res. Commissioner to Gov. S.A.N.A.C. III,
Evid. J. Hopestone, p.66, Native Courts Act, no. 49, 1895, Law 19,

and Zibhebhu

4Dimasu's salary could not be withdrawn without the approval of the Sec. of State.
See below, Chapters II and VII.
and face of court and "the right to the respect and obedience of the members of their tribes".\(^1\)

The duty of chiefs to call out labour for the roads and public works of the colony - the so-called Ixihela - was probably the greatest single cause of their unpopularity amongst their tribesmen. The Natal Native Affairs Commission went so far as to suggest that one of the reasons Africans were moving from location lands and on to private farms was because of their dis-taste for this corvée. The proportion of men to be called out from the locations was one in eleven hours or 15\(^o\)/c of the location adult males. This meant about 3,000 men were called out every six months. They were paid £1 a month and were given rations of maize.

Based upon what was supposed to be tribal law - the compulsory service which all young men were supposed to render their chiefs - this was another instance of the retention of those aspects of tribal law which suited the white man's purposes. The social system on which it was based, the system of regiments of young men formed by the chiefs in accordance with their age-sets liable both for military service and labour for the chiefs, had been cutlassed.

By the turn of the century, the Ixihela system was little more than a system of forced labour at uncompetitive wages. The Natal

\(^1\)See Natal Code, Chapter IV, §§ 38-7. Native Courts Act no. 49, 1893, Chapter IV, §§ 62-3 for powers delineated in this paragraph.

\(^2\)See 179/241/30351, see Moul. in dep. 122, 2.9.07.
Native Affairs Commission of 1906–07 which recommended its abolition stated that it had "no parallels in feudal, communal or tribal forms of Government - it is simply a question of present day economic policy".¹

The justification for retaining this system of labour on the public works of the colony did not vary much over the years. Thus the reasons for its retention given by the colonists to Lord Kimberley in 1873 when "he entertained much doubt as the occasion being of such urgency as to justify the resort to the measure of forced labour being called out through chiefs being adopted"² were much the same as those of successive Colonial Engineers before successive Secretaries of State and Commissions. In a memorandum to Lord Ripon in 1891 the Colonial Engineer reiterated these reasons. Amongst them were that "the native wants are so few that he would not render voluntary labour", that "six months labour at a fair wage in a life time is the least that a native can contribute towards the government to which he owes so much" and that Jephtha "reminds the natives that the Governor is Supreme Chief".³

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¹Report p 25. It was only discontinued by the Union Government in 1911. See Stuart R. R. pp. 26–7. Stuart objected to its abolition, though he recognised the abuses.


The major reasons for the extreme unpopularity of Isambalo was not simply that the rate of wages paid was considerably lower than those which could be earned in the towns, although they compared not entirely unfavourably with those paid on the farms; tribesmen complained that young boys were paid the same wages as the older and more experienced men and that there was no recognition of increased efficiency by the Public Works Department. There was no proper system of rotation, and this resulted in chiefs on occasions sending out repeatedly those men against whom they bore a grudge.\textsuperscript{1}

It may not have been entirely coincidence that one of the five European civilians to be killed during the disturbances was the overseer of a road party working for the Public Works Department.\textsuperscript{2}

It is significant that the chiefs like Sigwanda, Kula and Siluano, who were accused and suspected by the government of rebellion, were also accused of being tardy in fulfilling their obligations to send men to work on the road parties.\textsuperscript{3} There is no sign that the government recognised the extreme difficulty of the chief's position both as "father of his people" and as government servants. According to the magistrate J. Y. Gibson

\textsuperscript{1}See Evit. H.R.A.G. passim.
\textsuperscript{2}Stuart Z.R., p.420.
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p.124., p.394.
"it was a fairly general policy of the government that if a chief failed to do right, they deposed him. The impression he got from information supplied to him was that any fault committed by the tribe, the government regarded as either due to the chief's disposition to do wrong or his inability to enforce the right."

When chiefs expressed the grievances of their tribes, for example, this was not regarded as part of their legitimate duties and they were not infrequently punished for so doing.

The clearly subordinate position of chiefs was neatly illustrated in 1905 when a delegation visited the Minister for Native Affairs and Prime Minister, F. R. Noor to protest about the three bills on Native Affairs then before Parliament. Noor, clearly displeased at the criticism of his 'reforms' from the Africans, took the opportunity of remarking:

"I understand that there are a good many chiefs who have come here on this occasion and I wish to remind them that they are Government servants and that it is more than Magistrates can do to leave their districts without first obtaining the permission of the Government and in the case of Native chiefs reference should have been made to their respective magistrates. If this happens again, the Government will have to take serious notice of it..." ²

At the purely local level, each tribal area was divided into wards and sub-wards, which consisted largely of "dominant kinship units" each headed by a 'kralhead' or descent group head, etc.

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¹ H.N.A.C. Evid., p.334.
² CO 179/248/43519, Encl. in dep. 266, 6.11.08.
over the larger unit, induna or 'messengers' of the chief who were responsible for conveying the orders of the chief and of the administration to the people. These induna, who have their parallel in the great commoners of the Zulu king, appear to have had little foundation in the early tribal life of the Natal tribes, and may in fact have been an 'invention' of the Shaka monarchy. Nevertheless through the nineteenth century the use of the induna as the king's servant had spread the Zulu practice to a number of Natal chieftaincies, and by the end of the century were beginning to out the abumunana or descent group heads from some of their traditional functions. They were increasingly recognised by the administration, as the provisions of the Code show, and the fact that they were not of noble birth and owed their position solely to the chief or magistrate who had appointed them led to their being favoured over the descent group heads; who had closer links with the people under their care and from whose support they drew their power. It was through the abumunana that the chief consulted tribal opinion, though in important matters a meeting of all the adult males of the tribe might be held.  

In cases of people who were divided between more than one magisterial division, those members outside the division of the chief were generally under the authority of an appointed induna. With the attempt of the administration after the grant of self-government to break up the larger tribes and to rationalise the 'ward system',¹ these indunas were increasingly acting in the capacity of sub-chief, though they lacked the traditional magical and religious authority of those of royal blood. From the point of view of the administration, their powers were "almost equal to those of the chief".² On the death of a chief moreover, after 1893 it was the practice of the administration to have the outlying sections of any people, absorbed by their nearest chief territorially. In this way it was hoped to give chiefs a territorial rather than a personal jurisdiction, though it is difficult to know exactly how far this process had gone by 1900, or indeed how far it would in any case have gone without administrative interference; the Bantu speaking 'tribes' of South Africa always had a territorial definition in part,³ and in traditional society segmentation and fission of larger units, as we have seen, played a dominant part in politics.

¹See below, Chapter VI, pp.396-7.
²J. Stuart, Z. B., p.92.
Quite apart from those Africans living on rural reserves or European farms under their traditional authorities, there are two further groups of the African population to whom we must turn our attention in this preliminary sketch of the position of the black man in Natal at the turn of the century: the small, but increasing number of Africans in the urban areas of Natal, and the considerable and articulate Christian population, most of whom lived on Mission reserves, though a number were also to be found in the towns as professional men, traders and, to small extent, skilled artisans.

In 1904, there were 33,000 male Africans in the towns of Natal, the majority in domestic service; the remainder were employed as fort or daily labourers and Riksha pullers. Although this number only constituted a small fraction of the African population, and none of them could be regarded as permanent urban dwellers, a growing proportion of the Natal Africans was coming under the influence of the towns if only for short periods at a time. Thus in Durban for example in 1901 the average number of fort labourers, domestic servants and Riksha pullers in service at any one time was 1,150, though the estimated number of Africans who entered these services throughout the year was over 33,000.1

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1 Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1901, A.61.
The increasing importance of this movement to the towns is shown not only by the tightening up of the pass laws to control the influx, but also by Act 23 of 1902 and Act 2 of 1904.¹ The former laid down the regulations for 'foot labour' and the conditions under which Africans might enter the towns, while the latter was permissive legislation enabling town councils to erect locations in which it would be compulsory for Africans other than resident domestic servants, those exempted from Native Law or those with their own freehold property, to reside. In many boroughs, however, including those in Zululand, Africans were barred from buying land, so that the latter category was very small. In general borough regulations were not only designed solely for the white man's comfort, but were also the result of a philosophy which implied that the black man had no right in the white man's preserve, except on the latter's terms. Thus J. C. C. Chadwick, Assistant Chief Magistrate of Durban, advocating the reservation of footpaths in the town for the exclusive use of Europeans expressed a common point of view,² which was echoed by James Stuart on the following pages of the same Blue Book on Native Affairs, that the Africans

¹Both these enactments had earlier precedents: in 1865 Shekstone had tried to lay out a small township in or near Pietermaritzburg for African townsmen and in 1874 he succeeded in imposing regulations 'to deal with the problem of town labourers', very similar to the 1902 foot labour regulations. By 1881 there were about 7,900 permanent African townswomen. F. Velsen, Some Aspects of the Native Policy of Sir Theophilus Shekstone in Natal, Unpublished M.A. thesis, Univ. Witwatersrand 1946, pp. 66-70.

²Blue Book of Native Affairs, 1904, p.68.
should be given to understand

"that the towns of the colony are the special places
of abode for the white men, who are the governing
race, and that if they [Africans] go to those towns
to seek employment, they must comply with the re-
gulations made by the governing body."1

Amongst these regulations were a nightly curfew and restrictions
on the use of footpaths, rikshas and public transport by non-
whites, "owing to the uncleanly habits of the majority of coloured
persons".2 An attempt by F. R. Moor to exclude excepted Africans
from the provisions of the curfew was dropped because of the ob-
struction of the Natal Legislative Assembly in 1894.3 Any
"coloured person" found wandering in the towns after the curfew
hour - in Durban it was nine o'clock - and "not giving a satis-
factory account of himself may be arrested as idle and disorderly".4
About 100 Africans were arrested each month for contravention of
borough regulations.

Quite apart from the borough regulations, it was exceptionally
difficult for those Africans who wished to become skilled artisans
to find adequate apprenticeship or even work. Even the missions

1Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1904, p.69.
2Municipal Corporations Act 1905, s 162 subsections 77 and 78 and
subsections s 208.
3See 179/189/13161 Gov. to Sec. St. 6,7,94. Report of debate in N.L.A.
in Times of Natal, 3,7,1894.
4Municipal Corporations Act 1905, subsections above.
found their attempts to give Africans industrial training were frequently hindered by government actions. A number of witnesses before the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1906-1907, who were members of Natal's small manufacturing class, admitted that the Africans in their employ could have been trained beyond their semi-skilled positions, but that opposition either from other manufacturers or, more important, from white artisans, had prevented greater use being made of African skilled labour. As early as 1896, an article in the Asiatic Quarterly Review remarked on the strength of the white artisans in Natal compared with their position in the Cape and called it "a white artisans' paradise". At that time the attention of the white worker of Natal was directed chiefly against the threat of competition from Indian skilled and semi-skilled craftsmen; nevertheless the handful of Africans who, by the turn of the century, were seeking modern skills and techniques and a permanent way of life in the towns, were also finding their way barred by the social pressures and economic sanctions which white workers could bring to bear on the manufacturers and politicians of Natal. Traders, too, while primarily securing themselves from Indian competition, put up barriers to prevent Africans from opening up stores. Thus while there was no explicit


3See above, p. 38-42.
colour bar in the borough regulations governing the granting of licences to traders, most boroughs appear to have refused to grant them to either Indians or Africans ostensibly on grounds other than race.

It was not however simply due to the obstacles placed in their way by the white community that at this stage Africans failed to put down roots in the towns and still felt a primary attachment to their homes in the country. For was it only due to their having left their families behind them when coming to work in the towns. Even today, after over seventy years of industrialisation in South Africa, the pull of the countryside and the traditional way of life on the migrant worker is very strong. In this, as Philip Mayer has shown, a distinction must be drawn between the traditionalists, or 'Red' Africans, and the 'School' or mission educated workers. Of the former, a large majority, even of those who have spent up to twenty or thirty years in the towns, retain their attachment to 'home' in the rural districts and place great value on their traditional stores which are adapted to urban living and easily reverted to on periodic and frequent visits home. Though Professor Mayer's researches were in the Eastern Cape in the middle of the twentieth century, the same conclusions and generalisations appear to fit the situation.

in Natal at its beginning. There the distinction between town and country and the distance between the two were relatively small. The journey between the town and the reserves and farms on which the majority of Africans lived was a short one, most of the towns being surrounded by African reserves, and the ties with the tribal home of the ancestors and the chief were strong and abiding. There was little to attract permanent settlers to the towns where housing, sanitation and welfare organisation were non-existent for Africans, who were made to feel aliens in an alien world. Not surprisingly therefore at the turn of the century even the African working in the town still saw himself as part of a tribal unit and responded to the call of his chief or family head.

Probably the chief exception to this were those 40,000 Africans who had by the turn of the century come under the influence of the Christian Missionary, although even here one cannot generalise about the disruptive effects of Christianity on tribal cohesion: much depended on the particular denomination, even the individual missionary, and on the attitude of the chief to Christianity.  

Just over ten years after the first white traders arrived in Zululand, the first European missionary made his way to the Zulu

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2 For an interesting account of how traditional elements of Zulu culture have been incorporated into the fabric of orthodox Christianity see D. H. Ranger, Zulu Tribe in Transition, Chapter XIV.
King, Dingane, in the person of the irrepressible Captain Allen Gardiner R.N. In Zululand proper, both Gardiner, whose stay was short-lived, and the missionaries who followed in his wake, were destined to meet a disappointment in their Christianizing mission. The Zulu kings were interested in the skills, knowledge and equipment of the missionaries, especially with regard to firearms, but made little effort to encourage the conversion of their people.\(^1\) By 1839, after the murder of Dtiif both the Rev. F. Owen of the Church Mission Society, and the missionaries of the American Board who had hoped to start working in Zululand, were forced to withdraw. The American Board were soon to realise the advantages of confining their attentions to Natal where by 1830 they had 14 missionaries at 12 stations, and had been joined by missionaries of other denominations.\(^2\) Even after the Zulu War, which so many missionaries had hoped would facilitate the conversion of the Zulus, by breaking down the centralised monarchy and especially the regimental system,\(^3\) they met with relatively little success: Zululand was in too turbulent a condition politically for it to respond to the religious message of the missionaries. It was only in the last decade of the nineteenth century,


\(^3\) Ross, *Letters from Natal*, p. 328.
with the more settled conditions of the British regime, as well as the religious revival in America and Europe, that mission activity gained any momentum. By that time there were Norwegian, Anglican, German and Swedish missionaries in Zululand; the American Zulu Mission, despite their initial attempts and despite the fact that together with the Wesleyan Methodists they were the most important missionary organisation in Natal, had only a small settlement at Impapala, Nahove in the Zululand field. The Wesleyans were only to start mission work in Zululand in 1903. It may be for this reason that much of the political and religious ferment noticeable in Natal by the turn of the century was absent in Zululand, where politics had an entirely traditional aspect.

In Natal the missionaries had found the going considerably easier. There, traditional authority and customs had been broken down even prior to the appearance of Europeans on the scene. The Mfecane, plus the political upheavals in Zululand after the defeat and death of Dingane and during the reign of Nandile, meant that there was a large number of political refugees, rootless individuals, seeking asylum in Natal. The existence of this class of people -

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1 See below, Chapter VIII.
like John Dube's grandmother, one of the first Christians to be
converted by the American Daniel Lindley, or George Champion's
father — presented both a challenge and an opportunity to the
missionaries. In addition there were entire communities of politi-
cal refugees who were receptive to the Christian message. Such
were the Swazi who were forced in to the Wesleyan Methodist settle-
ments Indalen in 1847 and later at Edendale by the Rev. James
Alison. At the same time as the Reserve lands of Natal were set
aside for African occupation, certain lands were also set aside
as mission reserves: areas demarcated for one or other of the
mission organisations, within which it alone could operate. At
the turn of the century, there were nearly 175,000 acres of mission
reserve land, the largest and most important being those of the
American Zulu Mission.

By the turn of the century too, there were almost a score
of different missionary societies working in Natal. As well as

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1 For John Dube, see below Chapter VIII, pp. 542-548

2 George Champion (A. V. C. Champion) held the position of Secretary
to the Native Mine Clerks' Association. He later played a pro-
minent part in the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (I.C.U.).
In 1928 he broke away from Clements Edellie's organisation, forming
his own highly successful I.C.U. Yens Natal. See E. Bess, Time
Longer than Song (Wisconsin, 1964), p. 177 ff and p. 192 ff, and
unpublished MSS autobiography kindly shown me by Mr. S. Tregiio
(University of Durban).

3 See below, Chapter VIII, p. 533, 549-551

British, American and South African missionaries, there were also Scandinavians and Germans. With the religious revival in Europe and America towards the end of the nineteenth century several new organisations entered the field, many of them Baptist in belief and practice.\textsuperscript{1} Older bodies too were expanding their work at this time, perhaps in answer to a growing demand on the African side too, both for the solace religion could bring in times of disruption and change, and for the education offered by the missionaries. The Africans, especially in Natal, were realising increasingly that education and knowledge were the key to the developing industrial society in South Africa.\textsuperscript{2} Even Bambatha, in so much trouble with his white neighbours, had requested a missionary to teach his people from the Hermanns­burg Mission Society in the year before the uprising.

In both Zululand and Natal, African education had always been the concern of the missionary societies, though many heathen chiefs by the turn of the century were requesting Government sponsored schools. In Natal mission education was brought under government control for the first time in 1885 when the first Inspector

\textsuperscript{1}Sundkler, Bantu Prophets, p.28.

\textsuperscript{2}See e.g. Natal Blue Book 1900, Report of Inspect. of Native Education (R.Plant), p. 657. Plant noted an eagerness for education almost annually in his reports (see e.g. Blue Book 1893-4, C.49, Blue Book 1899, C.48.) By 1907 there were, according to the Wesleyan Methodist missionary, P. Mason, 40,000 communicants and 100,000 'adherents' to Christianity in the colony, "Native Policy in Natal Past and Present" in The Methodist Churchman, 193907.
of Native Education was appointed, although a grant in aid was paid by the Government to the missions from the £5,000 welfare grant established in 1848.\(^1\) There were, in 1895, sixty-four schools in Natal, with 3,783 pupils, an average attendance of 2,833, and a grant-in-aid from the government of £2,494. The number of government aided schools increased by leaps and bounds; there were 75 in 1893, 145 in 1896 and 196 in 1901, with 11,051 pupils. New regulations and more stringent qualifications demanded for head teachers led to a drop in 1904 of forty schools and nearly two thousand pupils.\(^2\) In Zululand, the first government grant in aid to mission education appears to have been in 1893, to schools approved by the Resident Commissioner and inspected by the magistrates of the districts. On the eve of annexation by Natal, there were seventeen schools for Africans in Zululand, receiving a grant in aid of £676, 0s. 3d.\(^3\) The syllabus was much the same in both Zululand and Natal: students were taught to read and write in English and Zulu, and learnt grammar, geography and "a little history". Boys were taught "some in-


Industrial work", girls were taught sewing, and in boarding schools, housework and cooking. The majority of the schools were 'bush' schools, directed from the central mission station, inspected both by the European Missionary - the American Salu Mission tried for a time to have its own special Superintendent of School work - and by the government inspectors who visited the schools two or three times per annum. It was compliance with the standards set by the government inspectors which determined whether or not a particular school should be 'recognised' by the government, and thus receive a grant in aid.\(^2\)

The amount spent by the Natal government on African education was, in the words of its Superintendent of Education, "infinitesimal".\(^3\) Compared to the 17s. 4d. per head of the population for Europeans, 5s. 9d. for coloureds and 1s. 1d. for Indians, the Africans were allocated 2d. per head of population for the year ending June, 1906.\(^4\) About 1\(^{\circ}\) of the African population were at school in 1906.\(^5\) Nor was the Natal government's attitude to African education

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2 According to the report of the N.H.A.C. 1906-7 "the requirements of the Government are out of proportion to the grants made...", p.27.


4 E.H.A.C. 1906-7, Evid. R. Hiscon, p.46. The equivalent figures per head on average attendance were 6s. 3d. 7s/4d., 63.16s. 9/2d. and 2s. 0. 01/4d. E.H.A.C. Report, p.27.

particularly encouraging in other ways. A large section of the Natal white community felt that education unfitted the black man for his station in life - that of labourer for the white man. This view was shared by a number of the magistrates. There was some advocacy of industrial training for the Africans, and praise was widespread for the efforts of the German Trappists for their efforts in this direction at their institution at Marischal. Yet while many Natal politicians paid lip service to the necessity for providing technical education for Africans, in 1892 the only government Industrial School on the Zwartkop location was closed down after only five years for a number of reasons, one of which was the cost per pupil per annum. In 1894 an outcry because of possible competition with skilled white labour led to "a modification of the regulations regarding grants in aid

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1 See below Chapter IX for the change after union.
2 See e.g. H.A.A.C., Evid., p.165, C. Leuchars.
3 See e.g. H.A.A.C. p. 254, Evid. of Kip River Agric. Society and Nathan MSS 431, p.231, Native Affairs Confid., McCallum.
5 C. T. Loewen, The Education of the S. Af. Native, pp. 60/1.
to industrial work". Offers by a number of chiefs - Nwadi at Bergville, Sibindi in Umgabza division and the Driefontein Africans - to provide the land and labour for a new industrial school were simply allowed to drop. In 1904 an amount actually appeared on the estimates for an Industrial School to be established at Driefontein - but the financial depression and the disturbances prevented anything coming of the proposal.

On a different level, the Government distinctly disapproved of the plans for setting up the inter-colonial, inter-denominational college at Lovedale which was recommended by the South African Native Affairs Commission. The grounds for their objection throw an interesting light on the Natal concept of African education at the time. According to the Superintendent of Education in Natal

"The native education policy of this Colony should aim rather at the lowering of the whole lump of heathenism and ignorance than at the raising of the

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1 Natal Blue Book 1894-1895, Report of Inspector of Education, C.S. See also S.P.G. Reports no. 107, 1895, where W. A. Goodwin, Varden, St. Alban's College, complained that after Responsible Government was achieved in Natal all government aid for industrial work was withdrawn.


3 Nathan MSS 372, p. 225 ff. James Henderson to Sir H. Nathan, 15.1.08, reporting a conversation with the P.H. and N.A.A. F.R. Hear on the subject. See also N.A.A. Blid., S.O. Samelson, p.19, who strongly objected to the project "because the natives would take it [the college] in hand and would do it in such a way as would not be desirable for the white population".
few to a giddy height above their fellows, a policy antipathetic to the creation of men like Umsimba and Duma and antagonistic to everything that savours of Ethiopianism. It has to be remembered that a College of this kind in South Africa will be no guarantee of immunity from the megalomania which overseas education induces in the native mind, nor will it prevent the native aspirants after cheap degrees from still going to American colleges, where the atmosphere is heavy with racial animosity.¹

Despite the fact that when representative institutions were granted to Natal in the mid-nineteenth century, some thought was devoted to the question of a non-racial franchise, this had never become a reality in the colony.² Under law 23 of 1865 Christian Africans could petition the Governor for exemption from native law; under law 11 of the same year, after seven years exemption, twelve years' residence in Natal, proof of their civilized way of life and with the requisite property qualifications, Africans could apply for the franchise. In practice however certificates of exemption were granted only very reluctantly. Throughout the period in which Sir Theophilus Shepstone controlled native affairs

¹GH 570 010 Conf. Minute on inter-colonial native college, 21.3.06 by C. J. Readie. Cf. E.H.A.C., p.21, Evid. B.O. Samuelson, which virtually echoes these words, adding only Ben Bembo and Tongo Jaba to the list of black undesirables.
in Natal, not a single grant of exemption was made. By 1904 there were still under 2,000 bearers of certificates of exemption, and there was considerable confusion over the status of children of exempted parents. For the Christian Africans being under tribal law could impose considerable hardship. It might well mean his being subject to a non-Christian and hostile chief. It would probably affect the form of his marriage — and the inheritance of his children. The complaints of the Kafirs, as the Christian Africans were called in Natal, were frequent and bitter on this score; indeed a special Exempted Native Society was formed at the turn of the century to turn the attention of the government to their grievances. According to F. R. Meikle the reason for Natal's reluctance to grant certificates of exemption was that it put the Africans in a false position because

"although they might come out of their laws and under ours, in the process of time our Parliament has found it expedient to set up a number of laws which impose disabilities on these people and I

1Brookes and Webb, A History of Natal, p. 77.
2Between 1906 and 1908 316 petitions were granted, 239 refused and 31 abandoned. SHA 1/1/7774 06
4See Evid. N.N.A.C., passim.
5SHA 1/1/236 02
do not think it is fair that we should get them out of their own laws where their status is clearly defined and place them under conditions where their status is very hazy and most indistinctly defined. ¹

Moor may have been influenced by consideration for the plight of the exempted Kalwa who, despite his exemption was still subject to a number of discriminatory laws. Perhaps however the Permanent Under-Secretary for Native Affairs, E. O. Samuels-
on, was being more honest when he called the law providing for exemption "a blot on our statute book" because he thought "the government should endeavour as far as possible to limit and keep down the potentialities amongst the natives for the attainment of the franchise".²

Samuelson was probably needlessly alarmed. If certificates of exemption were granted with the utmost reluctance the franchise was hardly ever granted at all. Even then all the formal require-
ments had been met, the franchise could still be withheld at the governor's discretion. At the time of Union there were thus believed to be some six African voters on the Natal electoral roll.³

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² KHA 1/1/316445 05, Minute 23.11.05.
It may be because the franchise in Natal had been so patently withheld, that at the time of the grant of Responsible Government to the Colony there was little or no debate on the question of protecting African rights through the grant of a qualified franchise on the lines of that imposed upon the Cape in the mid-century. It seems simply to have been assumed that Natal would never accept a colour-blind franchise and it was not worth pressing it upon her. By the turn of the century it was a common assumption that the franchise was no real safeguard, that it simply increased racial antagonism and could easily be subverted.¹

The spectacle in the Cape at this time of politicians attempting in various ways to limit the black electorate and the growing fear, even in the more 'liberal' colony, that whites were about to be swamped, taken together with the tragic failure of the negro franchise in the Southern states of the United States of America, played a part in this. By this time Social Darwinism and Imperial arrogance had also undermined an earlier faith in the possibility of transplanting representative institutions to non Anglo-Saxon communities.

Despite the reluctance of the Natal government to grant recognition to the acclimatized Africa, by the turn of the century

¹See for example the Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission 1903-5, pp. 66-70.
educated African opinion was becoming articulate for the first time and "a new independent spirit" seemed to be manifesting itself in the Separatist Churches which were springing up all over South Africa at the turn of the century, and in European type political organisations. Although the leaders of both these movements were indiscriminately lumped together by most whites as "seditious Ethiopians", busy-bodies... in existence more for the hope of the natives than otherwise,\(^1\) the movements were in fact two distinct "reactions to conquest". To some of the more sympathetic observers this new attitude, "although raising difficult problems was in certain ways an encouraging indication... an awakening from the sleep of ages and a willingness to assume responsibility" on the part of the educated African, both in Church affairs and in representing the views of the rest of the African population.\(^2\) More typical of the white reaction, however, were the words of V. R. Harthan who wrote in 1904:

"A strange leaven is at present working among the educated Kaffirs throughout the country, a leaven to which the affairs of the Ethiopian Church bear emphatic testimony... A new ideal is taking possession..."


\(^2\)ABN V/1/2 Annual Report of American Zulu Mission 1897, Rev. A. N. Bridgeman, B.D.
of the black man's mind. 'Africa for the Africans'...
The aim of the latter day educated native is freedom...
in all matters political and social. This spirit is
manifesting itself by a series of what are called new
movements, generally connected with religion...
The result has been the creation of much discontent and
restlessness throughout the country..."1

V. R. Narhman was probably correct in seeing a connection
between the religious and political movements, for both arose
out of the same general background factors, the imposition of
white rule, the resentment caused by the colour bar, the contest
for land and the demand of the whites for black labour.2 Moreover
both drew their leadership from the ranks of the Christian Africans.
Nevertheless, the 'Ethiopian movement', to use an inaccurate, but
shorthand term, was more complex than most contemporary observers
would allow, and the relationship between it and the early political
activity amongst the Africans in Natal, as expressed by the forma-
tion of the Natal Native Congress which was founded, in 1900, was
not simple.3

Christianity and education were probably the most important
factors making for constructive change in African society. Much
criticism of the missionaries in recent times has centred on their

2Sandiker, Bantu Prophets, Chapter I.
3See below, Chapter VIII, pp 557-8.
disruptive effect on tribal life and their undermining of traditional values. Indeed a number of witnesses before the 1906-7 Commission complained that since their womenfolk had donned European clothing and become Christian, they had become immoral and uncontrollable. Amongst the settlers it was a common belief that the education provided by the missionaries simply produced lazy good-for-nothings, and that secular agents for change, especially a spell of work on the farms or mines or in the cities, had a far more wholesome effect.

While it is true that in many instances the lack of sociological understanding on the part of missionaries added unnecessarily to the burden of the Christian convert, it can be argued, as has been done recently by Dr. A. Vilakazi, that they were at

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2 E.g. even the views of S. O. Samuelson on the Christian African: "They are comparatively few in number and very many of them... have by no means improved by having become civilized; they are, as a rule less truthful, less honest and less trustworthy, they have as a rule adopted more of the vices and few of the virtues of the superior race; and are not an element that it would be desirable to intrude into the midst of loyal native population."
the same time enabling their converts to come to terms with the modern industrial society by breaking down tribal barriers and traditional attitudes, and by not simply allowing them to take refuge in a society which was bound to lose many of its positive features under the strain of white rule. In this way, the missionary bodies did play a vital role in the creation of the new, independent spirit so noted at the turn of the century\(^1\) - and from this point of view, the suspicion with which they were regarded by the settlers, determined to retain their political, economic and social dominance, was almost inevitable.

These then were the major population groups in Natal and the major divisions within the African population, as well as some of the salient features of their way of life at the turn of the century. It was against this backdrop that the events of 1906 were played out. In 1906 each of the different African groups - tribal, migrant workers, Christian - responded in a different way to the rebel cause. There was however sufficient unity between them in 1906 to rouse the concern of a colonial government prone to rely for the preservation of order on divisions between hereditary and appointed chiefs, between rival tribe men and

\(^{1}\) See below, Chapter VIII.
"the station and Israel Native".¹

Chapter II

A DICATION INTO ZULU HISTORY

He is the butt of the white people's writings
The white people wrote them and marked them
They were being written extensively by soldiers
and Carbineers

By the Abenguni and Amaswazi,
By the Bechuana and Beataha,
By the Musulmans and Mozambique,
By the Portuguese and Dutch.....
One mouth chances to make a reply
It goes to see those who have two months each
They take one another's part

1 Zibolu and Mase take one another's part
2 Ziwel and Mayuma take one another's part
He is the expeller of the Jackrabbit from Cena
And he takes up the whole place....

Come let us go, thou who are in bad favour

And let us make for the barren soiled land
Perhaps to the Uagazi district.

Part of Dinuzulu's Praise Song
(Tsibungo) translated in
R.C.A. Samuelson, Long, Long
Age, p.285.

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1 See below, p. 94.

2 See below, p. 140, 386.

4 The reference is to the defeat of Zikhobhu at Cena and his
expulsion from Northern Zululand in 1884. See below, p. 100-101

4 i.e. to the Bear territory of the 'New Republic', see below, p.102.
Although by 1906 Natal and Zululand were yoked together in a somewhat unequal union, political life in Zululand was still very different to that in the settler dominated south. The 1906 disturbances can only be understood in the context of Zulu politics from the end of the Zulu War of 1879 and against the background of the relationship of Natal and Zululand in the 1880's and 1890's. Indeed fully to understand so many of the fears in the minds of white Natalians one has also to bear in mind the nineteenth century history of the Zulu nation and the terror which the names of the Shaka, Dingane and Cetshwayo still inspired in the minds of white Natalians. It is true that, by the turn of the century, the Zulu king no longer existed in law, and Zululand had been incorporated into Natal; nevertheless it was almost inevitable that Dinisulu, a boy of fourteen or fifteen when his father, Cetshwayo died in 1884, should have been associated with all the threats - real and imaginary - which white Natalians still saw coming from Zululand.¹

Dinisulu, heir to his father's kingdom, was also heir to all the problems which had beset Cetshwayo in the last year of

¹For some of the imaginary ones see below, Chapter IV.
his life. After the Zulu War, Sir Garnet Wolseley, British High Commissioner in Zululand, had gratuitously granted the land disputed between the Boers and Zulu to the west of the Blood and Buffalo Rivers to the Boers from the Transvaal; yet the Boer desire for Zululand remained as unquenched as ever. To the south, white traders, concession seekers and farmers hoped for a British annexation of Zululand which would open up Zululand to their activities. Within the territory itself, anarchy and confusion reigned.

After the defeat and exile of Cetshwayo in 1879, Wolseley had divided his kingdom under thirteen independent chieftains, many of whom saw in the defeat of the Zulu King an opportunity of extending their own power. Chief of these thirteen chieftains were Zibhebhu, Dhamu, John Dunn and a Sotho chief, Mhudi, who was rewarded for his services on the British side during the Zulu War by a large tract of land in the Ngqutu district, taken from Sirayio and his sons for their alleged part in starting the war.² Zibhebhu,

¹D. R. Morris, The Washing of the Spears (J. Cape, 1966), p. 396 ff. Morris's summary of the period is the most recent and is on the whole more accurate than the coverage in Brecken and Webb, A History of Natal.

²Sir Bartle Frere, British High Commissioner in S.A., gave as his justification for presenting Cetshwayo with the ultimatum that led to the Zulu War the fact that Sirayio's sons had crossed into Natal territory in pursuit of two of Sirayio's absenting adulterous wives. The captured wives were killed in Zululand. Cetshwayo refused to hand over the culprit, one of whom was Mhlotshane. (see below, Chapter V. p. 345-7). Frere had offered to pay a cattle fine on their behalf. Although the Gov. of Natal, Sir Henry Bulwer, was disposed to accept this (though he would probably have demanded a larger fine) Frere rejected the offer outright.
the king's cousin, a descendant of Napita, had fought on Cetshwayo's side during the war, despite a violent quarrel with the King just before the outbreak of the war. He had led a regiment at Isandlwana and commanded some of the troops at the final battle of Ulundi. With Cetshwayo out of the way, he clearly saw it in his own interests to co-operate with the British and was granted a considerable location north of the Black Umfolosi in the Mkwanza district of Zululand, which included much land that had been settled by the King's most immediate followers. In addition he was granted authority over the king's brothers, Ndabuko and Ziwedu, as well as over Prince Dinamukhu, and a large number of the Usuthu—the direct followers of the King. Uhamu, the King's half-brother, had deserted to the British side during the actual war, apparently realising the hopelessness of Cetshwayo.


According to Bishop Colenso the term originated when Npanda, Cetshwayo's father, sent an impi against the Basuto and the Zulu "brought back much cattle which were greatly admired, being very much larger than the Zulu cattle. So Cetshwayo's personal followers of the Umzila kraal would say boastingly: 'We are the Suta cattle...' then they took the word 'Usuto' as their distinguishing cry and used it in their games." When the Umzila kraal later became powerful the 'Usuto' cry was retained, becoming the war-cry of his party in the civil war against Abulani in 1856. Thereafter it became the national cry "as the whole Zulu people are Usuto belonging to Cetshwayo". From Bishop Colenso's Digest of the Blue Books cited in P. H. Colenso and E. Durnford, *The Ruin of Zululand* (London, 1894-5), Vol. I, p. 584.

wayo's cause and hoping himself to get into British favour "in order to secure his appointment as King as successor to Geth-
wayne.o".¹ Under Wolseley's settlement he was the only member of
the King's immediate family to be recognised as a chief and he
was granted jurisdiction over the Calusi people, over whom
Gethshawyo had direct control, governing through an appointed
induna.

Nyasama, Gethshawyo's Chief minister, a man of extensive
power, and chief of the Buthelezi people, initially elected to
serve under Uhamu, apparently acting in the belief that Uhamu
would succeed to Gethshawyo's position under the new order, and
that he could retain his position as the King's chief minister.²

John Dunn, the fourth of these thirteen chieftains, was a case
on his own: a white trader who had settled in Zululand and
married several African wives, he owed his entire position in
the country to Gethshawyo, who had frequently used him as an
intermediary with the Natal government. During the war, despite
his initial attempt to maintain a precarious neutrality, he was
drawn over to the British side. As a reward, he was made chief
over a large area in Southern Zululand and by 1881 had grown as

¹C 3182, p. 35, no. 54. Encl. Minute K. Sadborn to Sir Evelyn Wood
n.d. (about 31.5.81).

²C 3182, p. 37, no. 54. Sir Evelyn Wood (Acting High Commissioner)
to Sec. St. (Earl of Kimberley) 23.6.81. If the reason for his
refusal def an independent chiefdom was loyalty to the king (Harris,
p. 595) his choosing to go under Uhamu 'the traitor' is seriou.s.
powerful that he even tried to get recognition from the British as Supreme Chief over the whole of Zululand.\(^1\) To the Zulu Royal family, he seemed the greatest traitor of all, and their feelings about him were exceedingly bitter. The entire basis of the Wolseley settlement was to "exclude all persons closely related to ex-King from official position and power";\(^2\) it paid little heed to existing divisions and rivalries and it was soon a fresh and fruitful source of new inter-tribal dissensions and violence.

There were frequent complaints from the adherants of the Usuthu of ill treatment at the hands of Zibhebhu and Uhamu, and the "eating up" of Usuthu cattle by these chiefs on the grounds that these were the King's cattle which should have been surrendered at the end of the war, was a critical source of friction. This policy of confiscating the Royal herd was particularly misguided, as most of the cattle in the hands of the Usuthu was in fact Royal cattle which had been "cise-ed"\(^3\) to them and from which they drew their sustenance.

\(^{1}\) C 3182, Encl. 1 and 2 in no. 90. Dunn to Osborne, 30.9.81. Osborn to Wood, 6.10.81. See also C. S. Shields, The Life of John Dunn with special reference to Zululand 1879-1897. M.A. South Africa (unpubl.) 1939.

\(^{2}\) C 3182, p.38. Minute encl. in no. 34. N. Osborn to Sir Evelyn Wood, n.d., c.31.5.81.

\(^{3}\) I.e. cattle which the King 'lent' to his subjects who cared for them and could use their milk. The natural increase however belonged to the King who recalled the cattle for 'periodic inspection'. 'Piss' cattle appear to have been an essential element in the hold the Zulu King and other chiefs had over their followers. See H. Gluckman,
An attempt to resolve the problem by placing Ndabuko, Dabulamansi and Dinumulu under John Dunn was even more bitterly resented. By 1880 moreover Mnyamana had realised that there was no intention of making Uhamu King, and when his request to be made chief in his own right was refused by the administration, who by now had labelled him a 'resister', he formed the Zulu National Party together with Cetshwayo's brothers to agitate for the return of the 'Bone', as the King was euphemistically called. The newly appointed chiefs resented these attempts to return to the old order, and further penalised the Umuthu for demonstrating and petitioning the government for Cetshwayo's return: attempts it may be added which met with every rebuff and obstacle at the hands of the officials in Zululand and the Governor in Natal. Very soon fighting broke out in a number of places in Zululand, the most serious of these episodes being Uhamu's attack on the Qulusi people, which amounted to a massacre. The arrival of a 'pretender' who claimed to be the true Mthethwa chief and contested the position of Mlandela, one of Wolseley's appointees, also led to considerable bloodshed. In the absence of the King or of any established British authority, there was


1 CO 3182, Encl. in no. 34, p.34. Minute Osborn to Wood.  

2 CO 427/14/21124, Encl. in no. 87, 5.10.92. Report of magistrates Boast and Gibbon on Western boundaries of Ndwandwe.  

3 Morris, p.602.
no-one with sufficient authority to restore law and order. It was left to Zibhebhu and John Dunn to aid their fellow-chiefs. Not surprisingly, the Natalians who looked on the entire situation with horror, called the thirteen chiefs "The Kilkenny, cats". In 1882 Cetshwayo was allowed to visit England, and made an extremely good impression both on the British public and on Queen Victoria. By 1885, reluctant to take on any further commitments in South Africa and as always preoccupied with the need for retraction, the British government had decided that the only answer to the confusion in Zululand was to restore Cetshwayo. But it was already impossible to return to the 1878 situation. A number of vested interests had been set up, and the British government were in honour bound to see that the 'loyal' chiefs would not suffer for their loyalty. Thus it was decided to set aside a large reserve as a sanctuary for John Dunn and Klubi and for any others who had some reason for not wanting to return to the King's jurisdiction. Similarly, north of the Black Umfolozi, Zibhebhu and Ubama were well secured in their possessions. Cetshwayo who had not been informed in London of the full extent of these reserves, returned to a severely truncated and divided kingdom. Zibhebhu barely bothered to pay his respects to the King.

on his return, and very soon after Cetshwayo had been installed back at Ulundi, fighting on a large scale broke out between the Usuthu and the adherents of Zibhebhu and Uhamu. In July, 1883 Cetshwayo was forced to flee from the Royal kraal to the Ekandla forests and was actually stabbed by one of Zibhebhu's followers. When he died in Eshowe in the following year, there were many Nalu who attributed his death to poisoning by Zibhebhu.¹

In an attempt to avenge his father's death and to regain the Usuthu lands taken by the Amandakasi, Dinisulu accepted Boer aid. In May, 1884 a party of Boers under Coenraad Meyer recognised Dinisulu as the new Nalu King, following the precedent set by the Voortrekkers of the Natal Republic, who had tried in similar fashion to win the favour of his grandfather, Mpande, and to assert their suzerainty over him. At the same time, they promised his aid against his rival.²

Dinisulu soon found himself in the position of the young lady who went for a ride on a tiger; Boer claims for a reward in cattle and land were so exorbitant as to threaten to swallow up even more of his domains than Zibhebhu's ambitions. In return for the Commando which was sent to fight Zibhebhu, and with whose

aid Dinusulu was able to utterly rout his rival, the Boers claimed nearly three million acres of the best cattle country in the healthy upper belt of Zululand, stretching to the natural harbour of St. Lucia Bay. Dinusulu and his councillors immediately protested that the Boers had grossly exaggerated any promises made to them and that the signatures appended to the documents in which Dinusulu was alleged to have agreed to their demands were fraudulent. Dinusulu's uncles, and guardians Ndabuko and Tshingana, appealed on several occasions for British intervention on their behalf, but initially the Boers rejected British offers to mediate. Finally however the British and the Boers came to an agreement over the boundary of the territory claimed by the Boers which was to be known as the New Republic, in return for British recognition of their annexation of the districts of Vryheid, Utrecht and Wakkerstroom, the Boers gave up their claims in the Entonjaneni district - which had already been subdivided into European farms and was known as Proviso B territory - and were also to give up St. Lucia Bay. They also gave up their vague claims to sovereignty over Dinusulu and the

1 Though Zibhebhu also had a small number of white 'advisers'. C 4214 Bulver to Lord Derby (Gov. to Sec. St.) 22.7.84, p.17.

2 See e.g. Declaration of William Grant 23.9.85, Col. Col. 126 Vol I. Grant was the Zulu 'agent' at the time. For a tribute to Grant's knowledge of the 'native question' see Transvaal Labour Commission, 1903-3, Evid., p.60. Sir C. Lagden on Grant, J.Y. Gibson, Story of the Zulu, pp. 278-80.
rest of Zululand. From the Zulu point of view this was almost complete acquiescence by the British in the Boer point of view, and indeed, after the fiasco of the annexation of the Transvaal, the British government was preoccupied with pacifying Boer opinion whilst safeguarding its own strategic interests, by denying the Boers an outlet to the sea. 2 Amongst the people most affected by the Boer's annexation of the New Republic were the Buthelezi, followers of Cetshwayo's chief minister Mhayama, the Gasini, a clan closely related to the Zulu Royal family, 3 and the Qalusi, who were amongst the King's closest adherents. In addition the cherished burial sites of the Zulu kings fell into the Boer domains. 4

Zulu protests at this demarcation had little effect. Appeals for outright British annexation soon came from the Natal officials stationed in the Southern Zululand Reserve, who found that they were powerless to deal with a steadily worsening situation. To their voice was added that of the Natal Government and members of Legislative Council, who wanted to forestall Transvaal expansion into their hinterland, as well as that of the humanitarian led

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3 A. T. Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, p.39.

by the redoubtable Colenso and Aborigines Protection Society. This combined effort resulted in the annexation of Zululand in 1887 by the British Crown. As D. R. Morris had remarked it was "seven years too late to do any good". By this time, the British stand over the New Republic as well as the attitude of the officials in Zululand to Zibhebhu, which seemed to the Usuthu to be open favouritism, had compromised them in the eyes of the Zulu, and their generous gesture of allowing Cetshwayo to return home after his exile had been obscured by the sorry events which had followed in its wake. Though the British Resident Sir Melmoth Osborn as well as Sir Theophilus Shepstone interpreted Zulu failure to express open opposition to the proposed British annexation as 'tacit approval' it is clear from what followed that a large number of Zulu were by this time disillusioned with Britain and not at all eager for her 'protection'. Dimusula appears to have tried to maintain a precarious independence throughout these years by playing off Boer and Briton. It was

1 Robinson and Gallagher, Afflik and the Victorians, p.216.

2 The Washing of the Spears, p.609.

3 To Zibhebhu and the British officials themselves the situation may well have looked different. Brookes and Webb suggest (p.154) that in 1884 British and Natal officials "saw him fall without rendering him any help". Certainly however by 1887 Osborn was rendering him considerable aid.

4 Sir Melmoth Osborn entered the Natal Civil Service in 1854 and remained in the Natal Civil Service for 23 years before going to the Transvaal in 1877 with Sir T. Shepstone as Colonial Secretary. In 1880 he was made British Resident in the South Zululand Reserve; in 1887 he became the first Resident Commissioner in Zululand. He retired in 1893.
a losing, indeed a hopeless struggle.

Throughout the eighties, Osborn appears to have misconstrued the nature of the situation in Zululand, overestimating Zibhebhu's strength and Zulu 'loyalty' and underestimating Dinisulu's following and the allegiance he had from the bulk of the Zulu people.¹

On the basis of information received from Osborn, on 14th May 1887 the whole of Zululand was declared a British reserve territory. Dinisulu however took little notice of this change in his status, about which he had hardly been consulted. He continued to rule his people and give judgments as of old, ignoring the various summonses from Osborn, who felt the chief was exceeding the jurisdiction allowed him under the new dispensation. He was also very suspicious of Dinisulu's visits to the New Republic where Dinisulu's most ardent supporters were to be found. Osborn felt sure Dinisulu was intriguing with the Boers once again. From Dinisulu's point of view, Osborn was far too closely allied with a policy of support for Zibhebhu's pretensions for him to be able to repose any trust in his impartiality. Osborn's major failure of judgment in fact came on this very issue, when he decided to allow Zibhebhu to return from the Reserve to which he had fled in 1884.

¹See e.g. C 5466, Encl. no. 20, 15.6.82. Osborn to Sir E. Bulwer (Gov. Natal) and CO 579/30/370 (Confidential Prints - African South), pp. 63-4 and pp. 66-7. Encl. Havelock to Knutsford, 10.9.86. Sim. CO 427/16/2111, Encl. Minutes Osborn to Gov. (Natal) 12.12.82 in which he expresses the opinion that 'it is certain that the bulk of the people... are anti-Usutu'. 
after his defeat at the hands of Dinisulu and Boers, to the lands north of the Black Umfolozi, from which he had been expelled at such tremendous cost. The supporters of the Usuthu who had always lived in this territory, as well as those who had fled there after the Boer annexations, found themselves displaced once more by their traditional enemies, the Mandlakasi, now supported by the full weight of the British administration. Though doubts were expressed at the time as to the wisdom of using Zibhebhi in this way as a counterweight to the Royal family, both the Governor of Natal and the Colonial Office had been persuaded by Osborn that the return would only lead to the displacement of a very small number of Usuthu.\(^1\) The official figures at the time suggested that only eight hundred Usuthu would have to be removed to provide for the return of the Mandlakasi. Using lists provided by the 1891 boundary commission, however, Harriette Colenso established that in all nearly five thousand people were rendered homeless by Osborn's decision.\(^2\) Not surprisingly, violence erupted once again in the Ndwandwe division between the two sides, and the sparse administrative and police

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\(^1\) GO 427/2/683, Gov. to Sec. St. 10.1.91. Tel., Minutes G. Fairfield and H. Holland (later Lord Hantsford).

\(^2\) See The Zulu Impeachment of British Officials in 1887-8 confirmed by Officiala records in 1892 (London 1892), p. 12 ff.
force found themselves opposed by armed and angry Usuthu. Osborn called in the aid of the Natal garrison as well as loyal Zulu levies — including the followers of Nyamana who had apparently been estranged from Dinisulu. After a couple of sharp encounters between the two sides, the Usuthu leaders, Dinisulu, Tshingana and Mshabuko, fled to Vryheid in an attempt to surrender to the Boers, or perhaps to enlist their aid.

The refusal of the embarrassed Boer officials to shelter them, and a somewhat anguished appeal from Harriette Colenso that they throw themselves on the mercies of British justice, led the three leaders to hand themselves over to the British authorities in Pietermaritzburg.

After a trial for high treason in which they were defended by Harry Escombe, the most eminent Natal advocate of his day and one of its most illustrious politicians, Dinisulu and his uncles were sentenced to ten and fifteen years imprisonment respectively, and exiled to St. Helena. Throughout the trial and after, the chiefs and their supporters, including Escombe, maintained that they had been completely loyal to the British government.

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1 CO 427/14/21124, Encl. in Gov. to Sec. St., 5.10.97. Report on the Buthelisi.

but that Coborn's mismanagement of Zulu affairs, his close
identification with the Mandakasi as well as the favours
shown by other officials to Zibebehu and his followers were in
large measure responsible for the disturbances. Various
allegations of brutality and extortion made against officials
— such as R. H. Addison who was described by Fairfield of the
Colonial Office as "an injudicious young man, one of the

1 See e.g., E. R. Buseabo and F. G. Burgwink, Interpretation: The
Trials of the Zulu Chiefs, June 1889, Natal; R. H. Coborn's
letters to Sec. St., esp. the one enc. in no. 35, CO 673/30/370
¢ 1892), The Zulu Impeachment of British Officials in 1887-8
confirmed by official records in 1892 (London 1892). R. H. Coborn
to the Gov. Sir A. Havelock, in January 1888, the minority of
the Usuthu was against Zibebehu personally and not the government
(C 5551, p. 59). Similarly E. Fairfield 5.11.88 on CO 427/3/2165
pointed out "If Dimusulu surrenders his conduct can only be explained
rationally by accepting his own assertion and that of Miss Coborn
that he did not realise that he was fighting the British government
and that when he found out he retired from the struggle."
Col. Cardew who acted for a short time as C.M. in Zululand and
headed the 1891 Boundary Commission in Zululand felt that the trouble
"had arisen from a long-standing error on the part of the British
authorities in treating [the Modweni division] ... as if the
followers of Usibebo were the only people who had any territorial
rights there, whereas in truth only a part of it was theirs as of
ancestral right, the rest belonging to other... sections of the
Zulu people over whom Usibebo and his father had no authority
except that of governmental representatives of the now deposed Zulu
kings" CO 427/14/16321, Minute E. Fairfield 18.8.92.
most potent causes of the Zulu rebellion..." were never inves-
tigated, though Addison was reprimanded by the Colonial
Secretary, Lord Knutsford, for exceeding his powers in flogging
members of the Onduthu. 2

It may well be that from their point of view Osborn,
Addison and other officials felt it necessary to inflict severe
summary punishment on people they considered to be disturbers of
the peace; but from the point of view of the Zulu people it
must have constituted a considerable shock to the body politic
to see members of the Royal family treated in a deliberately
humiliating way for punishing their own people for well recog-
nised offences under tribal law, whilst similar offences on
the part of Libshibba appear to have been very largely overlooked.

The causes of the disturbances of 1883 and the course of
events in Zululand in the eighties have never been looked at in
any detail; they would make a fascinating study in the politics
of collaboration and resistance. 4 That the upheavals were in

1 Minute on GO 427/20/2261 Gcv. to Sec. St. 11. 1.95

2 GO 427/6/20676, Minute on Mitchell to Knutsford 20.9.89. For
Addison's subsequent career, see below Chapter IX, p. 583

3 See below, p. 133

4 There have been a couple of extended essays (unpublished) on the
subject done at the University of Natal based on the Command Papers.
None as yet have tried to look at it in terms of African politics,
e.g. R. Cooper, The British Annexeation of Zululand, 1887, B.A. Essays,
1959; J. J. Guy, Ntschlabansi and Nkule: The Civil War in Zululand
large measure the result of the power vacuum after imperial
intervention in Zululand as well as of European encroachment
on Zulu lands can hardly be doubted. How far however the
disturbances of 1888 were also a typical 'first reaction' to
British annexation is difficult to say. Ceborn's policy of
deliberately ignoring the position of the Zulu King and his
followers and sponsoring Zikhethu as a counterweight would
appear to have made the transition from independence to being
a colonial possession particularly difficult.¹ There is little
evidence to suggest that after the defeat of 1879 the Zulu
Royal family would not have collaborated with the British. Bini-
salu was a young lad at the time of his accession, and sympathetically
handled and given paramount authority, as Nesheeshoe's sons had
been in Basutoland, he may well have responded. In Zululand,
fears from Fatal that the restoration of the Zulu family would
constitute a military threat to the colony meant that this form
of co-operation was barely contemplated. Even at the time however
members of the Colonial Office staff doubted the vision of bolstering
up Zikhethu against the Zulu Royal family instead of trying to
secure the loyalty and co-operation of these chiefs she had the
majority of the Zulu people behind them. Far from Zikhethu

¹See views of C.O. staff for example on CO 427/14/16322.
defending Imperial interests, in 1888 it appeared as if Imperial interests were defending Zululand. The disloyalty of the Usutu was taken for granted. How far it would have been possible for the Usutu to cooperate with the Imperial authority was never really put to the test. It is clear that Osborn, advised by the Shepstone family, never thought this a feasible policy; in fact he initially resigned his position as British Resident in South Zululand when he heard that Cetshwayo was to be returned from exile in 1883. Most of the other officials in Zululand shared Osborn's views, and would have agreed with the Governor, Sir Charles Mitchell's view, that, after annexation, despite his many protestations of loyalty to the Queen, the allegiance of Dinamani and the Usutu to the Queen was 'shadowy' and lasted only until they found out what the nature of British rule was.

It was unfortunate for Dinamani that the demands upon him for allegiance were made in the days before the niceties of indirect rule diplomacy had been perfected, and when allegiance to the Queen meant "supremacy of the dynasty of Cetshwayo".

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1 See Minute N. Fairfield, CO 427/2/12780 en Gov. to Sec. St. 26.6.88.
2 Sir Charles E. Mitchell, Governor Natal, 1889–Aug. 1895.
3 CO 427/6/17004 Sir C. Mitchell to Lord Knutsford, 30.7.89.
Amongst the officials of Zululand, the Shepstonean view of the Zulu Royal family prevailed. From an early date, but especially after his annexation of the Transvaal in 1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone looked upon the Zulu Royal family as a threat to white Natal. In an important article in the Natal Mercury of 1892\(^1\) he wrote of it as "a pure military despotism", contrasting the military chiefs of Zululand with lesser hereditary patriarchal chiefs. He termed the former, the Zulu kings, Shaka, Dingane and Cetshwayo, and also the Ndebele chiefs Ntshingwana and Lebengula, "an absolute hindrance in the way of civilisation". He felt their organisation was one "in which... public opinion or tribal councils have very little to say. This necessarily constitutes a daily danger to a neighbour". In Shepstone's view there was no such thing as a Zulu nation, only "autonomous tribes" yearning for "their ancient separate existence" and eager to throw off the "terrible incubus of the Zulu Royal family".\(^2\) This may have been true of the Natal tribes.

\(^1\) C 5331, pp. 30-1, anal. in Dept. 30 and also cited in H. E. Coleuse, The Present Position amongst the Zulus (London 1893) (Pamphlet), p.14. See also J. V. Shepstone, Submit or Die (Pietermaritzburg, 1907), (Pamphlet), p.13. "Shaka's efforts to weld the black tribes could never be permanent... because of the innate objection of the tribes to despotic rule. If the natives today reverted to their natural state they would have the strongest... objection to being made vassals of a paramount chief situated in Zululand."

\(^2\) Colmto, Tto roalUoa w>a*»t feo ~wlua (toadoa 1053) (Pap&Ut), p.ld*S#> ala# J. *« AwiteM. awolt or Pi# (ri#to*» xuuttobuxg, 1907), (?#aphl#t)» p.13* M ukt't iffwt* to w#ltV om fclaak tsitoa avid aavwr 0a fVMMitt.. toaaaea vf 0w laaato ofcjMtloa #t 0 m I m to daapoti# sola. If toa aattvaa ted# rirortvd to toalr aatoaal atoto to#? vsald km toa rtm iiit... ofcjMtloa to tolac aad# a m li of a paxaamnt ahlof #ltoal#d in Zulu!aad.*
shattered by the 

with which Shepstone came into contact in the early days of the colony of Natal and in the Eastern Cape by the 1890's, indeed by the time of Utrecht, if not of Nanda, it was already a highly exaggerated picture of the actual situation, one more necessary as a justification for Imperial and Natal policy towards Zululand than an accurate portrayal of reality. It is significant for example that Dimnmulu's most faithful servant, Mankulumana who acted as induna over the Usutu during his first exile and accompanied him on his second, was of the Ndwandwe tribe and a direct descendant of Zinder 1 the Ndwandwe had been Shaka's most formidable opponent in the early days of Zulu expansion. Nevertheless if one held this stereotype of autonomous tribes yearning for their ancient separate existence, it is not surprising that every indication that Dinnmulu held considerable sway over the allegiance and loyalty of the majority of the population in Zululand had to be accounted for in a sinister way. That, even in Natal, Africans regarded him with increasing awe and respect and considered themselves as part of the Zulu nation was seen as the result of the manipulation of the situation by Dinnmulu and a deliberate attempt on his part

to increase his power. Even matters of the most trivial nature were regarded by the officials as having "an ulterior motive behind it for the extension of [his] influence".  

The appointment of Sir Marshak Clarke as Resident Commissioner in Zululand in place of the retiring Sir Maltotb Ogborn in 1897 marked a brief spell of new thinking about Zulu problems. Clarke, a member of the Imperial colonial service (unlike most officials in Zululand who came from the Natal service) came to Natal from Basutoland, where he had been occupied in pacifying the country after the 1890 'Gun War' against the Cape Colony. He arrived in Zululand in the middle of 1897, with instructions to review the condition of Zululand and its people, the relationship of the people to the government and to one another, and to consider the question of Dinuzulu's future. He found the country at peace, but the people "cowed and depressed", so that it was difficult to get "any independent expression from them on any subject". By the end of the year however he was

1SMA 1/4/16 G-211/07 Magistrate Leslie, Kongoza to Attorney General, 2.3.07.
2He had previously been a magistrate in Natal, Special Officer in the Transvaal, Magistrate in Basutoland, Commissioner of Police in Cape Colony. After acting as Resident Commissioner in Basutoland and Zululand he ended his career as Resident Commissioner in B. Rhodesia. S.A.N.A.C., Vol. IV, p. 72.
3CO 427/16/69390, draft despatch from Lord Ripon to M. Clarke, 2.6.93.
fully convinced that the immediate return of Dlamini and his uncle was essential if Zululand was to be settled down and brought fully under Imperial control. Although the 'Anti-Umtata party' as Dlamini’s opponents were termed, tended to regard loyalty as "their monopoly", being, as they were, dependent on the government for their position in the country, Clarke felt strongly that if both sides were handled impartially, and bygones allowed to be bygones, the Umtata would also prove their loyalty and co-operate with the new regime in Zululand.¹

According to Harriette Culmanse, by 1892 the word name Umtata had acquired "a much wider and deeper meaning, and an Umtata

"is any Zulu who still dares to express the national feeling and the desire to remain one people under English rule with which thousands sympathise throughout the three Zulu provinces of the Transvaal as well as in British Zululand."²

Perhaps Marshal Clarke’s discomfiture with the 'loyal' chiefs lay in the fact that many of them and especially Zibhekho appear to have owed their loyalty rather more to the House of Shepstone — of which Shibheke could be regarded as an honorary member — than to the Crown.³ He felt that the past policy had simply exacerbated the tensions in the country by setting up inter-tribal feuds which

¹Co 427/28/3035, Encl. in desp. Conf. 24.1.94, Marshal Clarke to Sec. 19.1894. Also printed in Africana (South) Confidential Prints, 477.

²Co 427/15/22063 to Sec. State, 20.10.92.

³Co 427/2/20603, Minute, J. Fairfield on desp. 137, 19.9.1892.
led to land disputes and faction fighting. According to Fair- 
field at the Colonial Office, a competent albeit external ob-
server, by this time "the breaking up of tribes and the exaltation 
of mere hang-ups-on and constables of the Magistrates' Courts has 
been carried to monstrous excess in Bululand under the Shepstonian 
system".2

Marshal Clarke's aims were very different. Instead of 
trying to split the Zulu into factions and undermine the power 
of the hereditary chiefs he proposed to grant considerable power 
both to these hereditary chiefs and "to certain others who have 
rendered special service to the government", encouraging the 
Zulu people "to look to them in the first instance and through 
them to the Magistrates and the Resident Commissioner".3 This 
was the policy which he had employed in Basutoiland, but which 
involved "an entirely new departure in native policy as it has 
been understood in Natal under ... the late Sir Theophilus Shep-
stone and in Bululand under Sir Nelmoth Osborn".4

2Minute 22.1.94 on Marshal Clarke's report 8.12.93, CO 427/17/417.
4CO 427/17/417, Gov. to Sec. St. 16.12.93.
The new Resident Commissioner was fully aware that the return of Dimbushu would be fraught with difficulties. As he pointed out in a series of important despatches on the political situation in Zululand,\(^1\) it was clear that in the years since the Zulu War many interests had grown up, had indeed been deliberately built up by the Zululand administration. These would oppose Dimbushu's return to anything resembling the position of his forefathers. In the old 'reserve' territory of Southern Zululand, for example, a number of Natal chiefs had been established in an attempt to create a loyalist 'buffer' between Zululand and Natal. These chiefs feared that Dimbushu's return would provoke the Zulu under their authority to throw it aside and return their allegiance to the Zulu King. Moreover chiefs like Zibhebhu and some of the other thirteen chieftains appointed by Sir Garnet Wolseley still feared, not only that their extended authority and territorial acquisitions would be reduced, but that they might suffer reprisals from the Umthu. In many ways the situation resembled that at the time of Cetshwayo's return - except that the process of divide and rule had gone much further, and the Imperial power was now relatively well established. Yet if it was

\(^{1}\text{Report 6.12.93 Encl. in 60 427/17/417 and 427/10/3035. Report 18.1.94 Encl. in desp. 26.1.94.}
impossible for Dimusulu to return to the position of the Zulu King. It was equally impractical to imagine that he could or would return simply as one of the eighty-three petty chiefs of Zululand with authority only over his immediate followers, the Usuthu proper. As Marshal Clarke pointed out, however well-meaning Dimusulu himself might be on his return, an attempt would be made to make him the spokesman of the Zulu people. While he would not necessarily be the cause of such discontent as might exist, he would inevitably become its exponent. Clarke therefore proposed that, while Dimusulu should not be allowed to impose his authority on anyone unwilling to accept it, he should be returned to a central position in Zululand, as "adviser" on native affairs and "induna and confidant of the government". He was to be paid a liberal salary of £500 and a house was to be provided for his near Eshowe. It was at one time suggested that he should be confined to this government built residence at Eshowe, the seat of the Zululand administration, but the Commissioner opposed this on the grounds that it would needlessly restrict Dimusulu's freedom and limit his usefulness as a servant of the Government, for he would be out of touch with the people. Sir Marshal Clarke

1 CO 427/18/9639, Encl. 1 in desp. Secret 10.5.94, M. Clarke to Gov., 3.3.94.

2 Report 18.1.94 in CO. 427/18/5035.
also pointed out the futility of trying to prevent Dimusulu from receiving visitors or from "communicating freely with... his partisans throughout Zululand; without subjecting him to undue restraint." On this score as on others, Clarke's views differed very materially from those of successive subsequent Natal governments and indeed from "most, if not all the officials in Zululand". On this account Dimusulu was to run into the opposition of Sir Henry McCallum; thus his request in March-April, 1907 to be accompanied by some of his Zulu supporters from the Vryheid district on a visit to Pietermaritzburg was peremptorily refused by the Governor, despite the strong support of the Commissioner for Native Affairs, Sir Charles Saunders, who saw nothing sinister in the request and believed that compliance with it would tend to allay the suspicions felt by Dimusulu at that time about government intentions towards him. To the Natal government of the time the request was yet another example of Dimusulu's trying to exert influence over people outside his control.

1 GO 427/13/9639 and PICO 102/112, H. Clarke to Gov. Secret Minute 5.5.94.

2 Ibid., Private Letter, H. Clarke to Gov. 5.5.94, Enc. in desp. Secret, 10.5.94.

3 PICO 103/50/07 G.E.A. to P.H., 1.5.07, no. 6, and 60/00/203, Saunders to H. E. Colenso, 8.5.07, "Strictly private and confidential". 
Substantially the position envisaged by Marshal Clarke for Dimnsulu was very similar to the one proposed by Harriette Colenso in her innumerable letters and petitions to the Colonial Office during Dimnsulu's exile to St. Helena. In May, 1894, Clarke's final proposals were accepted by Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson as Governor of Zululand (he was also Governor of Natal at the same time) and in October the Colonial Office agreed on the date of Dimnsulu's departure from St. Helena.

On 22nd January, 1895 he and his uncles received a free pardon, and were informed by the Governor of St. Helena that they would be leaving the island within a few weeks.

At this point, however, the Natal government, who were not to have been informed officially of the departure until it was about to take place, appear to have got wind of the proposals. On the 17th January, 1895, they presented the Governor with an ultimatum demanding that Zululand be incorporated into Natal before Dimnsulu be allowed to return. This minute, unlike

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1 See e.g. her *The Present Condition among the Zulus and some suggestions for the future* (London, 1893 -n.d.).

2 PMC 101/112, Minute Gov. to Minis. 23.1.95.

3 CO 8732 Further correspondence relating to the affairs of Zululand, no. 1, Lord Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, 4.4.95 sums up the negotiations and includes a copy of the conditions.

4 CO 427/19/22549, Gov. to Sec. St., 6.12.94.

5 PMC 101/112, Confid. Minute P.M. to Gov., 17.1.95.
previous communications on the subject in 1894, was the unanimous opinion of ministers and both the Governor and Sir Diamond Clarke advised the Colonial Office to delay the departure of the chiefs lest their return be marred by demonstrations and agitation in the colony.¹

That there should have been some agitation in Natal against the return of the chiefs was not surprising. Yet the extent of the feeling of the Natal Ministry in 1895 in favour of incorporation seems to have taken the Imperial Government somewhat unawares, although Natal demands for Zululand had begun shortly after her acquisition of Responsible Government, if not earlier. How far this demand was backed by popular feeling is difficult to gauge - just as it is difficult to gauge the amount of popular feeling among whites in favour of Responsible Government itself, on which the Colony was very closely divided. On the question of Zululand it would appear that feelings were even more mixed. For many, its direct annexation by Natal would simply mean the addition of an unnecessary burden of defence on the colony. Far better that they should be protected from this potentially dangerous neighbour by the presence in Zululand of Imperial troops than that Natal's expenses should be increased. Indeed before it introduced the

¹CO 179/190/3031, Gov. to Sec. St. Secret 23.1.95.
annexation of Zululand bill before the House of Assembly in Natal in 1897, the Natal government sought reassurance that the Imperial garrison would be retained at Escombe, in order to strengthen its hand, as public feeling in favour of annexation "was not strong". The townsmen especially felt that they already had a major share of the trade of Zululand and that there was little reason why their business ventures would not prosper as well under Imperial as Natal administration.

Natal also already received a large share of Zululand's customs dues, under an agreement which was highly favourable to the colony and most unfavourable to Zululand. This led to frequent complaints from the Resident Commissioners in Zululand in the nineties. According to the Collector of Customs in Natal in 1896 for example, the amount which should have been due to Zululand from the combined collection of customs in the two territories was £6,000. The Treasurer of Zululand thought the sum should be £3,000. Under the Customs Agreement, she received £1,800. Thus even before incorporation, Zululand was beginning to lose financially to Natal.

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1 CO 427/22/24862, Gov. to Sec. St. tel. 18.11.97. See also PBC 101/112, Minute 76, P.I. to Gov., 12.11.97.
2 Natal Wills. 4.10.93.
3 CO 427/27/3407, Encls. in desp. 3, Gov. to Sec. St., 21.1.97.
On the other hand, for the sugar and cattle farmers of Natal there appeared to be more advantages to emigration: the prospect of good sugar lands along the coast and the excellent grazing lands of Nkandla and Nqutu to the South. Through the nineties there was constant agitation from the Boers in the south eastern Transvaal and from farmers in the Uplands of Natal for land in Zululand. The effects of even a small part of the better grazing lands being set aside for European occupation was fraught with far more difficulty than allowing sugar plantations on the sparsely inhabited and unhealthy coastal lands — though it was a common assumption of the time that eventually both these categories of land would be opened up to white settlement. The discovery of gold at Dundee in the Nqutu district aroused a certain expectation of mineral deposits to be found in the territory. Already by 1894 there were over a hundred and fifty Europeans on the Dundee gold fields. There was known to be gold in the Nkandla and Entonjaneni divisions, as well as deposits of coal in both those divisions and in Hlabisa. In addition to the direct demand for land on the part of farmers and speculators, it was also a common assumption amongst white

[1] Neither Webb and Brookes, A History of Natal, nor Stuart, Zululand, note the importance of cattle farmers in this agitation though they mention the sugar planters. In fact, most of the agitation for the breaking up of Zululand came from cattle farmers of the
Natalians that they could dispose of their surplus African population across the Tugela and so make room for further white settlement in Natal. ¹

Apart from the question of land, however, there were additional prestige motives which appear to have led ministers to make their claims for Zululand in 1894-1895. For British recognition of Transvaal jurisdiction over Swaziland, and, perhaps even more important, the Cape annexation of Pondoland, slices of territory Natal had also had designs on, led Natal politicians to feel that their just claims had been ignored in the final stages of the South African 'Scramble'. This disregard for their just due could only be offset by the recognition of their

5.E. Transvaal and from the uplands (N.E.) Natal. The coast lands were sparsely populated and unhealthy; the effects however of even a small part of the better grazing lands of the interior being set aside was far more portentous. It was only the tender-foot of 1894 which enabled it to be done at all.


¹See e.g. CO 427/16/3055, Gov. to Sec. St. 24.1.94 and CO 427/26/4451, Ppr. Zululand to Sec. St. n.d. received 29.2.96, printed in African 477. C.E. Saunders, at the time Acting Secretary, to the President Commissioner, had a further refinement of this proposition in 1894 when he suggested that a S.S.A. Company proposal to enlist 200 Zulu policemen be used to start an exodus of Zulu to the "wide open spaces" of Rhodesia CO 427/19/124682, Enol. 2 in desp. Conf. 30.6.94.

²The Cape also annexed British Basutoland in 1895 and though Natal had no plans there it did mean additional aggrandisement for the Cape.
claims in Zululand. At this stage however the Colonial Office were not disposed to take these claims too seriously. Natal's "eyes were big, but her teeth were poor" and the Colonial Office tended to brush off her fears that the arch-enemy Rhodes would get Zululand if she did not see more "childishness". Nevertheless, in August 1894, Lord Ripon assured the Natal ministry that at such times as Crown Colony government came to an end in Zululand, the "prior claims" of Natal to the territory "would be recognised". With this the Natal expansionists had for time being to be satisfied. When however the question of Dinuzulu's imminent return arose, the Natal cabinet clearly decided to use it as a card in the annexation game.

Ministers now alleged that the return of Dinuzulu and his uncles was attended by so great a danger of disturbances in Zululand and Natal that they could only agree to it if they had control over the administration of Zululand and the determination of

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1 Times of Natal, 2.3.94. Natal Witness, 2.3.94. CO 179/187/6345, Minutes and various despatches in CO 179/186 and 187. Also CO 427/18/6911, Gov. to Sec. St., 51.5.94. CO 179/187/3101, Gov. to Sec. St. 4.5.94 and Minl. minute P.M. to Gov. 2.5.94.

2 To adapt a phrase of A.J.P. Taylor's about Italy on the eve of World War I.

3 CO 427/12/7715, Gov. to Sec. St. tal. 5.5.94 and Minutes.

4 See CO 179/187/6345, Minutes on Ripon to Sec. St., 14.4.94, where Ripon refused to put a definite date to this, despite the minutes in favour in CO.C 5762, no. 1 to Hely-Hutchinson, 4.4.95.
the policies to be followed there in their own hands.

Both Marshal Clarke and Hely-Hutchinson rejected an assumption that Dimisulu's return would be heralded by disturbances as unwarranted by the evidence at their disposal,¹ but Natal's renewed and adamant demands put a brake on the plans for the return of the chiefs. Shortly before they were due to leave St. Helena they were informed that their departure had been delayed. Initially this was to have been a temporary postponement. The chiefs did not leave St. Helena till December, 1897.

With the advent of Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office in the middle of 1895, it seemed as if the departure of the chiefs was once again imminent. Initially Chamberlain appeared to favour both the immediate return of the chiefs and the incorporation of the territory by Natal, though he apparently hoped to keep the two issues separate.² He felt that with the incorporation of British BechuanaLand by the Cape there was little reason not to allow Natal to annex Zululand, which she would develop "better than we do".³

1 CO 5782, no. 1, Ripon to Hely-Hutchinson, 4.4.95.
2 CO 179/192/14677, Minute on Letter from Natal Agent General by E. Fairfield, 30.8.95.
3 CO 427/22/21092, Minute Chamberlain 31.11.95 (on H. E. Colenso to H. F. Wilson (O.O.) 24.11.95).
On the other hand he felt the Chiefs should be allowed to return immediately, irrespective of this issue, provided he could get Natal agreement. Chamberlain had hoped to use the annexation question as a "lever to get Natal to federate with the Cape and C.F.S.". After the failure of the Jasson Raid however this scheme had to be postponed for the time being, though there were those in the Colonial Office who favoured Natal's annexation of Zululand as well as of British Amatongaland as a "knock-down blow to the South African Republic". The argument went the other way as well; by handing over Zululand and Amatongaland Britain would lose her strategic advantages of being able to retain troops right on the eastern frontier of the Transvaal—an argument rather different to the one used by Fairfield before the Jasson raid in August, 1895 when he deplored the fact that a whole cavalry regiment was being locked up in Natal which was needed at Mauritius and the Cape.

1 CO 427/26/3993, Minute Fairfield (on H.B. Colenso to Sec. St. 21. 2.96), 16.3.96.

2 Or as it was more frequently known, of Ebegisa, Edheleni and Sambono's territory, which had just been taken over as a British colony.

3 CO 179/197/1481, Minute (T F. Graham).

4 CO 179/192/14677, Minutes Fiddes and Graham 22.8.95.

5 CO 179/192/14677, Minute 30.8.95.
Quite apart from the arguments in the Colonial Office however, the Natal government were unshakeable in their determination not to allow Dinumulu's return except on their own terms. The discussion dragged on through 1896-7. Each time the Secretary of State suggested that the time was ripe for the chiefs' return, the Natal government found some cause of objection; thus in 1896 it was delayed because part of the Natal garrison had to be removed to Rhodesia to help put down the Ndebele and Shona rebellions, while 1897 was a year of famine and cattle disease in Southern Africa and the Natal ministers again argued that this was not conducive to Dinumulu's peaceful return. Finally, when the principle of incorporation had been accepted by the British government, one of its prerequisites was to allow the return of the Chiefs. Amongst its other conditions were a five year pause before Zulu lands were to be opened up for European occupation; a joint Imperial-Natal Commission to lay aside sufficient lands for African occupation before that was done and a ban on the sale of liquor. African tribal courts were to be maintained, but a court of appeal from them was to be established. A proposal from

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1 FNC 101/112. Conf. Minute no. 59, Minutes to Gov. 7.10.96, GC 427/25/22541, Gov. to Sec. St. 9.10.96, which also encloses the above.

2 There were immediate protests in Natal that this was too long. FNC 101/112, EM. to Col. Sec. 8.7.97 (copy).

3 FNC 101/112, Gov. to Natal, Minutes 5.5.97. Conf. Minute no. 19.
the C.E. at the beginning of 1896 that the Natal vote for African welfare be increased by £5,000 for the benefit of Zululand was rejected out of hand by the Natal ministry.¹

Once the Colonial Office had given way to Natal pressure in January, 1895, the Natal hand was a strong one. The chiefs had already been promised their return and it was clearly a breach of faith to keep them in exile any longer than was absolutely necessary. On the other hand, if Natal were so vehemently opposed to the chiefs' return, this itself could create the disturbances Natal ministers professed to fear. This was a period in which many other weighty matters in South Africa were preoccupying the Colonial Office, and although Chamberlain was not the man to allow himself to be pushed around by a very small, if awkward, colony, this was also not a period in which the rights and interests of Africans were uppermost in Imperial thought. Moreover, by linking annexation and the return of the chiefs, Natal was able, at least temporarily, to win over the humanitarian element represented by the Colenso and by the Aborigines Protection Society, which took its cue in these matters at this time from Harriette, in support of their claim. Although she did not support the Natal claims for very long, there was even a report at one stage that

¹ZA 52 077 C.N.A. to S.H.A. 10.2.95 and Sec. F.H. Minute, 18.2.98.
Harriette Colemso intended persuading Dinusulu to refuse repatriation unless the immediate incorporation of Zululand took place. Indeed the Governor of Natal wanted to throw the responsibility for the delay in the chiefs' return on her shoulders on the grounds that she had encouraged the Natal ministers in their ambitions. Deluded by Escombe's presence in the Natal ministry into thinking that responsible Government had inaugurated a new liberal era in Natal's attitude to the Zulu, she felt that what Zululand needed was a consistent policy without interference from either Natal or the Colonial Office. The events of the eighties had disillusioned her about the ability of the Colonial office to control its officials and, above all, her zeal for Dinusulu's personal cause appears to have blinded her for a short while to the deeper implications of incorporation in Natal for the Zulu people as a whole. Dinusulu's perception of the dangers was keener. Referring to an attack on himself in the Natal Witness on the 8th August, 1896, he wrote to Harriette:

"... see now the animosity of the people of Natal... though we are safe it is on account of England who loves us and all the Zulus. They [Natal] wish to be in charge of us to oppress us, if we were in their hands we would know that we are dead and the Queen has forsaken us."

1 Col. Col. 166, M. Clarke to H. E. Colemso, 25.4.95.

2 See e.g. her "Zululand, the Exiled Chiefs, Natal and the Colonial Office 1893-5". London 1899.

3 Col. Col. 170, 7.10.96.
Yet by the time Dimusulu wrote to the Colonial Office on the subject his plea was rather muted. Having been informed by the Secretary of State that his return would only come after the incorporation of Zululand by Natal he wrote asking that the land "Should not be distributed into farms... if we are under Her Majesty's protection we shall be comfortable. We beg that though we may be governed by Natal, that we should be governed by England too. So that if we have any matter in which we are not satisfied by Natal's decision, that we should be allowed to appeal to England."¹

In all of this, the Zulu people were not consulted in any way. An attempt by Dimusulu and his uncles to visit London - a step which may conceivably have had some beneficial results - was rejected by the Colonial Office, as likely to be used by Harriette Colenso and her supporters for stirring up trouble, and lead Dimusulu to look to the Secretary of State over the head of the Government in Natal/Zululand, "whose word should be final".² In Zululand itself, the officials seemed to feel that the Africans did not care much whether they were to be under direct Imperial control or that of Natal. It is slightly surprising in the circumstances that there was little humanitarian

¹ CO 8782 1898, Encl. in no. 27, p.17, Dimusulu to Sec. St., 4.9.97.
² CO 427/25/22240, Minutes on Gov. to Sec. St., Conf. 2,10,96. CO 427/28/23958, Minute N. W. Inst.
opposition to the annexation, although the Bishop of Zululand was a notable exception.\(^1\) This can largely be attributed to Harriette Colenso’s attitude. While she was soon to withdraw her support for Natal’s schemes,\(^2\) and was particularly disillusioned when the 1897 elections removed Harry Escombe from office, her ardour to see the chiefs return probably prevented her from raising the outcry against the annexation of Zululand by a settler community which one would surely have expected from so indefatigable a champion of Zulu interests.

During the visit of Harry Escombe and the Natal Prime Minister, Sir John Robinson, to London in 1896, Chamberlain had made clear his determination to send back the chiefs in 1897; it was only at Escombe’s ‘urgent request’ that he agreed that the repatriation be delayed to the second half of the year.\(^3\) To this declaration he was determined to adhere, despite a last minute rear-guard action by the new Natal ministry to delay the return yet again until February, 1898. At the same time, by the end of 1897, the Anglo-Boer struggle was over-shadowing every other question in South Africa. The last remnant of Imperial

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\(^3\) See e.g. CO 427/26/22918, Interview J. Chamberlain and J. Robinson, 5.11.96.
opposition to Natal's incorporation of Zululand disappeared: it never seems to have been based on an appreciation of the difference between direct Imperial rule and settler rule over African peoples. Thus when Dinusulu arrived in Eshowe on the 10th January, 1896, it was to a Zululand already annexed to Natal, and with the conditions of his return subtly altered from those so optimistically presented to him at the beginning of 1895. The term 'confidant' was struck out of the English version, and while the deletion of the word was regarded as insignificant at the time,¹ it was symbolic of what Natal's future attitude was to be. Despite Marshal Clarke's warning that it would be impossible to treat Dinusulu as an ordinary petty chief,² from the very outset Dinusulu was expected to confine himself strictly to the affairs of the Usuthu in his own district. By pretending that his wider powers did not exist, Natal, ostrich-like, hoped to insulate herself from the effects of those powers. Natal's annexation of Zululand saw the transfer of Sir Marshal Clarke to Southern Rhodesia, and the appointment of Charles Saunders in his place as Civil Commissioner and Chief Magistrate. (Slightly later the title was changed to that of Commissioner of

¹ PNC 101/112, F. Graham (C.O.) to P.M. J. Robinson, 17.7.97, Confid.
² See above, p. 117
Native Affairs). While Saunders was undoubtedly a very able
and impartial administrator of the paternalist stamp, the
transfer did deprive Dimusulu of the support and advice of a
man who may have understood his predicament and who had had
no connection with the unhappy affairs of the eighties. Sir
Charles on the other hand, had been in Zululand in this
troubled period, and indeed in 1890 had discharged Zibheshu
for the murder of Umutsuhwana, an Umuthu supporter, on the
grounds that there was insufficient evidence though without
taking legal advice: it was an opinion with which the Natal
Attorney General disagreed. This is not to argue the rights
and wrongs of the case, but simply to point out that purely
from Dimusulu’s point of view, there was probably already a
barrier between him and the administrators in Zululand when
he arrived. In 1907, Saunders was to confess that neither he
nor anyone else in Zululand were “ever able to understand
the meaning and effect of his Dimusulu’s appointment as induna
and adviser” as envisaged by Sir Marshal Clarke. He never-
theless did everything in his power to help Dimusulu and until

1 Sir Charles Saunders had joined the Natal Civil Service in 1876
and transferred to the Zululand Service in January, 1888.

2 CO 427/6/17005, Gov. (Mitchell) to Rumsford (Sec. st.), 31.7.1890.

3 SMA 1/6/29, C.H.A. to Attorney General, 14.2.07, private.
Marshal Clarke made the same comment in 1894. CO 427/10/2639,
copy of private letter to W. H. Hutchinson, 3.5.94 with deep
secret, 10.5.94.
mid-1907 attempted to protect him from the many accusations made against him.

While Clarke's presence may well have eased political relationships in Zululand, and made Dismulu's position less frustrating, one must not overestimate the difference his presence would have made on the key question of settler penetration of Zululand. It was a general assumption of the time, even in the Colonial Office, that a certain amount of white settlement would be beneficial to the African population.\(^1\)

Even Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson\(^2\) who was aware that "from the point of view of the interests of the Natives... if it were possible to keep Zululand separate and govern it in paternal fashion, and preserving the existing system of community of uncultivated lands (sic) this would be best", felt that it was "hopeless to expect that it will be possible so to keep Zululand separate. Sooner or later it will become undesirable to resist the persistent demands of Natal for incorporation...."\(^3\) Clarke himself did not dissent from the provision in the terms of annexation which allowed for the delimitation of land in Zulu-

\(^1\) See e.g. CO 427/11/11095, Gov. to Sec. St., 4.5.91 and CO. Minutes.

\(^2\) Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson was Governor of Natal, 1895-1901.

\(^3\) CO 427/26/3995, Memorandum to Lord Ripon, 20.2.95.
land for European settlement after the lapse of five years, although his original suggestion was that there should be a ten year pause. Once there was Natal government control and whites in Zululand were given the franchise (which it was left open to the Natal government to grant under the terms of annexation), it is doubtful how far even an extremely able administrator could change the broad trend of events. On the land issue in any case it is clear that Saunders was as sympathetic towards the Zulu as Clarke would have been.

Despite his reduced status, and curtailed authority, there is little doubt that "the Zulu as a whole regarded return as a restoration to them of the recognised head of their Royal House". On the other hand, it was also soon evident that the traditional Natal hostility to the head of the Zulu Royal family had been but little changed during the years of his exile. The 'westernising' effects of his stay at St. Helena did not lessen this hostility. For many whites his effort to build a western-type house for himself and the progressive ideas about

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1 See for example his evidence before H.R.A.C.P. p.135-137.
2 SHA 1/6/29. CA to Attorney General, 14.2.07.
agriculture which he had acquired overseas, were enough to label him a "spoilt nigger". The stereotype of Dinuwal as a drunken debauched potentate, indulging in every kind of sensual vice was not an infrequent one amongst white Natalians, although this picture hardly squared with the opinions of the people who knew him best. The impression he created in St. Helena seems to have been almost entirely favourable. Thus E. A. Baradouh, his tutor there for two years, wrote to the Colonial Office of his "exemplary behaviour" and "his straightforward and manly character". Saunders himself, although admitting that he had never liked Dinusulu, denied that he was any more fond of liquor or women than any other chief in his position in Zululand. Nevertheless the image died hard, and was even repeated by the Attorney General of Zululand at the beginning of 1907, as well as by the Bishop of Zululand, who cited the opinion of his archdeacons there that Dinusulu was an immoral man whose influence on

1 Col. Col. 199, Vol. II, Correspondence H. E. Colenso to Mrs. Lyell, 8.9.92.


3 To Antrobus, 16.2.97, Enclos. in CO 179/198/1003.

4 CO 179/227/41441, Gov. to Sec. St., Enclos. 1 desp. 25.10.03, diary of events (Saunders made the remark to NcCallum).

5 S. Archives 29, Papers relating to Zulu Rebellion, C. H. A. to H.E.A., 5.2.07.

his people "is all for evil". ¹ In this view, the Archdeacons were echoing Anglican attitudes to the Zulu Royal family which predated the Zulu War. In part this was undoubtedly a reflection of the animosity felt by many missionaries² to the Zulu Royal family, who, they felt, impeded missionary progress in the country. In part, by this time it may also have reflected the bitter struggle between the Church of the Province and the Colenso Church of England in Natal — the price Dinamulu had to pay for Harriette Colenso's support.

More important however than these allegations about his personal behaviour — revealing as they are about the settler attitude to the acculturated or partly acculturated African — were the rumours which circulated immediately on his return about Dinamulu's schemes to build up the power of the Zulu Kings once more and to extend his authority over the whole of Zululand. Within a couple of months of his return the stream of young men who came to pay their respects to him were regarded by the police as evidence that he was deliberately trying to create a following and to regain

¹ CO 179/242/3806, Enc1. 5 in desp. secret, no. 1, 19.10.07, Pte and Confidential. Bp. of Zululand to Gov., 18.10.07.

² Though not those of the Hermannsburg Lutheran Mission established at Honguma who were very thankful for Dinamulu's protection during the Boer War. See Hermannburger Missionsblatt, 15.7.03, p.209.
his old position.\(^1\) The Commissioner for Native Affairs, Charles Saunders, wanted to give an order prohibiting the young men from going to Dimusulu's kraal without the permission of their magistrate, but Hely-Hutchinson, probably still under the impression of Marshal Clarke's visor councils, refused to give it.\(^2\) Even the public reconciliation of Dimusulu and his old enemy, Zibhetho, was regarded by the Secretary of Native Affairs, at that time, Sir James Liege Hulett, as dangerous because it would in some way indicate that the Government recognised Dimusulu's paramountcy.\(^3\) That both Dimusulu and Harriette Colenso were disappointed that the son of Cetshwayo had been returned as one petty chief amongst many, in defiance of the recommendations of Sir Marshal Clarke, seems clear.\(^4\) That they intended using sinister methods in changing that situation is not shown by any of the evidence even in the government files. There was much to be said for Harriette Colenso's contention that the question of Dimusulu's authority was not a question of the Natal or of the Imperial government "giving or withholding power from him, but of controlling the

\(^1\) SHA 1/4/22 017. Report of interview between S.H.A. and Inspec. Clarke, Natal Police, 6.5.98.

\(^2\) CO 179/203/5070, Gov. to Sec. St., Conf., 11.2.98.

\(^3\) ACO 1/3/113, S.H.A. to O.H.A., June, 1898.

power he has without us. If it is not recognised, it is not controlled and if he died tomorrow another of Cetshwayo's descendants would have it.\(^1\)

During the 1899-1900 Anglo-Boer War, Dimusulu's position caused even more anxiety to the officials and government of Natal. Thus Colonel Bottomley's use of Dimusulu's authority not only to defend the borders of Zululand but also to send scouts and cattle-raiding parties into Transvaal territory, was strenuously opposed by the Natal government and by the civil administration in Zululand.\(^2\) The authorities felt that these activities not only directly contradicted their declared policy that this was a "white man's war" in which the black man was to have no part, but that it also went against their efforts to minimise in every way the hold which Dimusulu had over the Zulu people. Reports that Dimusulu was put in charge by Bottomley of Tshanihezwe's Butheleni people, led Saunders to protest that this was a deliberate attempt on the part of Dimusulu to assume control over the Butheleni people.\(^3\) The Butheleni had become estranged from the Usuthu when

\(^1\) Col. Col. 142, Vol. V. H. E. Colenso to Agnes Colenso, 3.7.97. See also Chapter IX below for fears that his brother Nsamkhwandle would hold an equally powerful position after Dimusulu's exile.

\(^2\) See various despatches in CD 189/218.

\(^3\) CD 179/218/16421, copy enccl. in desp. 4.4.01, Saunders to F.M., 3.4.01.
Nyasse, Tshamanabe's father, had given his allegiance to the British in 1867, and fought against the Umtata during the 1868 disturbances.\(^1\) Behind these objectives lay the feeling that "arming the Mba would give them false ideas of their own powers... and create a position which would render much more difficult the ultimate settlement of Europeans in the province."\(^2\)

While not denying for one moment that Dinisimba, like any another African ruler, was fully capable of playing a subtle and complex political game in attempting to build up his power within the new political framework, in this case it would seem that an outsider like Bottomley, given a military task to perform, would look for the most efficient way of doing it. For this purpose, he simply recognised the natural ascendancy of Dinisimba in the areas bordering on the Transvaal Republic.\(^3\) Whatever the terms of Dinisimba's return, for the military authorities his hold over the allegiance of the tribesmen in the eastern Transvaal

\(^1\) See above, pp. 95-96.\(^2\) In 1898 a number of Tshamanabe's young men had gone to assist in the building of Dinisimba's home without reference to their chief who was reported as personally hostile to Dinisimba. CO 179/203/9054, Acting Gov. to Sec. St., Conf., 2.4.98. Encl. 4, C.C. and C.F. to Col. Sec., 1.4.98.

\(^2\) CO 179/210/4943, Gov. to Sec. St., 14.2.1900 tal.

\(^3\) As the C.H.A. pointed out in 1907: "It is not a question of Dinisimba having acquired his present position since his return; this he possessed in very much greater degree before his exile when... he succeeded his father. So long as he lives Dinisimba will never be regarded as an ordinary chief." SHA 1/6/29, C.H.A. to Attorney General, 18.2.07.
and especially in the Vryheid district was too good an opportunity to be missed of penetrating behind the enemy lines. During the war years a number of the Vryheid chiefs actually took refuge with Dinamulu at the Umtsi kraal, with the agreement of the government, and Dinamulu was called upon on several occasions to control the Qalusi people.  

After the war, with the restoration of full magisterial authority over Dinamulu, Saunders had his way that there should be no communication between Dinamulu and tribesmen other than the Umtsi without official consent. This was a matter of considerable perplexity to the Qalusi who felt that while Dinamulu was “authorised to exercise control over them when the British were faced with trouble, he is denied their friendship in time of peace.”

Apart from the Qalusi however, it is clear that in the post-war years even the Africans in Natal were looking to Dinamulu for some kind of leadership in times of considerable stress and change. Most striking of all was the fact that even Christian

\*See FHC 103/50, C.H.A. to P.M., 3.5.07, where he outlines the relationship between Dinamulu and the Qalusi people. 

\*FHC 103/50, C.H.A. to P.M., 1.5.07, no. 5, and Z.A. 29, C.H.A. to P.M., 5.5.07.

\*See e.g. 20 179/2/9350, Enrol. 2 in dep. 29, 23.2.06. Intelligence Report Lieut. Col. Leuchars to Gov.
Africans could now see a member of the Zulu Royal family as the embodiment of their national pride, a commentary on the unifying aspects of a policy of "divide and rule". Shortly after return from exile his name became the centre of a host of miscellaneous type rumours and when in 1906 rebellion broke out he appeared to many, both black and white, to be its instigator in chief.

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1 See below, Chapter VIII.
2 See below, Chapter IV.
"Oh, indeed we cannot understand where the Government is that they should be constantly demanding money from us. If we knew where they were, we might go and ask them where all the money is to come from which they are demanding from us. Would that we had died along with the cattle of the Rinderpest, Ndabesita.*

... They want us to pay the money so that when they destroy the country they may have devoured it. We have not the money, Mageba,* what say you?"

AGO 1/7/62 Letter from an anonymous writer to Dinusulu, 26.8.05.

*Praise names of Dinusulu. Ndabesita was the takaso of several clans (e.g. Sibiya, Mbata etc.) whose ancestor he was. Upon conquering these clans, the Zulu took over the takaso or praise-name, and it was solely applied to them. (Bryant, Zulu-English Dictionary, p.410)

Mageba was the son of Zulu.
If the colonial situation itself led the Africans even of Natal to look increasingly to Dinuzulu for leadership, their poverty at the turn of the century and especially after the Boer War made their need for a messianic-type saviour all the greater. 1904–9 found Natal suffering, in common with the rest of South Africa, from the post-Boer War depression; labour difficulties on the Rand, the problems of farming in the war-torn areas and the end of the reconstruction book in the conquered Republics, all had their repercussions in Natal, the economy of which was closely attuned to that of the interior. By June 1905 Natal’s public debt had risen annually since the Boer War by about £2M to a total of just over £18M, and the expenditure for that financial year exceeded the revenue by £429,750 – not much in relation to present day budgets, but a considerable deficit in relation to a total income of under £3 1/2M. The colony’s volume of trade, customs and railway profits “decreased alarmingly”. As railway rates

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4 Axelson, p.144.
accounted for 53\% of Natal's total income, and customs dues for a further 24\%,\textsuperscript{1} and as both these sources of income were dependent on South Africa-wide customs and railway agreements and were therefore to a large extent outside the control of Natal ministries, the financial situation appeared to demand drastic action.

Natal governments (there were three ministries between 1903 and 1905, the last being a coalition of the two former, formed largely to cope with the worsening financial situation) strove in various ways to make good these deficits. From 1904 onwards various taxation proposals were made in the Natal Legislative Assembly, but the situation was made far more difficult by the strong "no taxation" sentiment amongst whites in the colony.\textsuperscript{2} Thus while a measure imposing succession duties on property, estimated to bring in £5,000 was passed by both Houses, and an increased tariff on spirits and beer was agreed upon,\textsuperscript{3} attempts to introduce a graduated income tax, the most equitable of the remaining measures suggested, failed on more than one occasion.

\textsuperscript{1}Thompson, p.54.

\textsuperscript{2}CO 179/231/19167, Gov. to Sec. St., Conf. 1, 12.5.05.

to pass either the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council.\textsuperscript{1} Attempts to tax houses — the equivalent of the Hat Tax paid by Africans\textsuperscript{2} — also failed to become law as did the various proposals to tax non-beneficially occupied land.\textsuperscript{3} These proposals in fact antedated the depression, having been mooted for the first time in 1899, and had other motives besides the purely financial in view.\textsuperscript{4}

Suggestions for imposing additional taxation on the African population were far more favourably received both in the Assembly and by the electorate. These also antedated the depression and were not purely financial measures. Thus in 1903 a new rent of £3 was placed on the inhabitants of the Mission Reserves, which had just been taken over by the Natal Native Trust;\textsuperscript{5} in the same year the rent of "squatters" living on Crown lands was raised from £1 to £2;\textsuperscript{6} and in 1905 the Stamps and Licenses Act imposed

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\textsuperscript{1}In 1905, 1906 and 1907 Moor eventually managed to get an Income Tax measure passed in 1908. See for example CO 179/232/31526, Gov. to Sec. St., desp. 187, 8.8.05. Govt. Gazette of Natal, 1905-8.

\textsuperscript{2}N.L.A. Debates, vol. 38, p.549. Treasurer, 5.7.05.

\textsuperscript{3}N.L.A. Debates, vol. 38, p.141. Prime Minister for the 1905 measure. From 1899–1908 with the exception of the war years these proposals also recur almost annually.

\textsuperscript{4}The object was mainly to discourage the holding of large tracts of land by absentee owners who rented it to African tenants. Beneficial occupation was defined as bona fide occupation by a white man for 9 months of the year. It was also hoped that the tax would be partly
a £5 license fee on all native eating houses, which were commonly believed to be dens of vice. This tax was doubtless passed on by the owners to their clientele. By far the most important of these measures however was the Poll Tax which passed into law in August, 1905. This was in fact the second of two Poll Tax proposals. The first, entitled the Native Personal Tax Bill imposed a £1 tax on all African males over the age of eighteen, and a further £1 tax on all African wives after the first. Although the Native Personal Tax Bill passed in the Legislative Assembly by 26 votes to 9, it was rejected by the Legislative Council on the grounds that it would in any case be disallowed under section 8 of the Constitution, which reserved all class legislation for the Royal Assent. The act as eventually passed was somewhat milder: it applied to all adult males who did not pay the But Tax and passed on to the tenants who would then be forced to join the labour market. See also below, p.187ff.

5 Act 49, 1903; Mission Reserves Act.
6 Act 48, 1903.

1 CO 179/232/34982, Encl. in desp. 203, 4.9.05. Act to amend the Stamp and Licence Act §2.
2 Act 38 of 1905.
4 See above, Chapter 1
were not indentured Indians. That it was still intended as a measure "to get at the native and the coolie" was explicitly stated by a member of the government.¹

There was little discussion in the Colonial Office on the advisability of these taxation proposals. Indeed there is a remarkable dearth of informed discussion on economic issues in Natal in this period, whether in the Colonial Office or in Natal itself. By the turn of the century and probably even considerably earlier, the main outline of economic domination by the white settler, and of policy on land, labour and taxation had been firmly established, and the main principles accepted apparently by all settlers and by the Colonial Office. Thus even when Sir Henry McCallum wrote to enquire whether the Poll Tax should not be reserved, being neither just nor equitable and therefore "repugnant to the laws of England",² the attitude of the Colonial Office was summed up by H. Lambert who minuted "If Natal likes to revert to medieval methods of taxation I do not see that that is any business of ours".³

¹ J. R. Maydon, Minister of Railways and Harbours to a meeting of his constituents in Durban 20.4.06. Reported in Natal Mercury, 21.4.06. He stated "... Durban as loudly as any other part of the colony asked for some means to be devised of getting at the native ... The tax was also devised to get at the coolie and in order that they might get at these two classes they [i.e. the whites] had to agree to submitting to the incidence of the tax."

² Co 179/251/16127, Gov. to Sec. St., Conf. 1, 20.4.05.

³ Ibid., Minute.
There was little other comment on the subject, even when the Aborigines Protection Society wrote to protest against the tax and pointed out that its collection was likely to be fraught with difficulties. To their remarks that the tax was calculated to increase the labour supply of the colony, F. Graham, an Assistant Secretary at the Colonial Office, retorted somewhat smugly that "the A.P.S. have got it into their heads that the tax was levied for the purpose of forcing out the natives to work, whereas it was levied... for revenue purposes." The attitude of the Colonial Office towards the A.P.S. in this period was indicated by A. E. Cox on an earlier occasion when he said "We do not take these people seriously, I think." These views are understandable from the Colonial Office in the post-Boer War, "we must pacify South African colonists and get the labour supply organised" era of thought on South African affairs. The A.P.S. it is true tended to be somewhat awkward in their views on S. Africa and their suggestions were not infrequently rather fanciful and unrealistic, nevertheless it was far closer to the realities of the situation in Natal than the

1 CO 179/239/6249, A.P.S. to Sec. St., 21.2.06.
2 CO 179/239/6249, Minute 8.3.06.
3 CO 179/228/23321. The A.P.S. were urging the disallowance of the Natal Code Amendment Bill (25.6.03).
Colonial Office, which was only to wake up fully to Natal's handling of native affairs after the disturbances and the publication of the Natal Native Affairs Commission evidence and report.¹

It was commonly believed in Natal that the Africans did not contribute their fair share to the colony's exchequer. Figures were produced to show that they did not even contribute sufficient money to pay for the costs incurred in their own administration. Thus according to the Under Secretary for Native Affairs, S. O. Samuelson,² whereas £402,851 was spent on native administration and welfare³ only £510,000 was contributed by them to the colonial revenue. This latter sum was made up of the 14/- tax on huts paid annually on every hut in a kraal, a 5/- dog tax (it was 10/- in the Northern districts),⁴ pass fees and licences of various sorts, fines and fees of court and the rent paid by Africans on Crown lands and Mission Reserves. It also included an estimate of the amount paid by Africans in customs dues. There is however every indication that Samuelson's figure was both an underestimate of

¹See below, Chapter IX, p. 577 ff. c. 5 p. 315.

²CO 179/232/39275, Gov. to Sec. St., 11.10.05, desp. 227. Encl. 2.

³A figure which included the salaries of the Secretary for Native Affairs, the Commissioner for Native Affairs in Zululand, the cost of administering the Native Affairs Department, and two-thirds of the expenditure on police, militia and magistrates, apart from the rather meagre amount allotted to African education, health and agriculture.

⁴i.e. Vryheid Utrecht and Paulpietersberg (the latter had been part of the Wackdööroo district of the Transvaal).
the amount paid by Africans into the revenue, and an over-estimate of the amount spent by the state on the African population. Thus under the first heading, he did not include the amount paid by Africans into the railway revenue in 1903 — according to F. R. Moor it amounted to approximately half the total. ¹ His estimate, moreover, of the African customs revenue as £40,000 was probably far too low.

This was pointed out in the Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, which showed that this gave a total of £1/2d per head per annum, the figure for the African population in the rest of Southern Africa, including Basutoland and Bechuanaland where the figures were far more precise, was nearer 2/-d per head. ² Customs duties on articles intended for African consumption were as high in Natal as elsewhere in South Africa. If Samelson’s figures were accurate, they could be interpreted either as extreme poverty or exceptional backwardness amongst the Africans of Natal; poverty and backwardness greater than elsewhere in South Africa. ³

On the expenditure side, Samelson’s figures also do not inspire confidence; it is difficult to believe that Africans were


³ Customs duties on beads, blankets intended for the African market, and shawls, ranged between 200/o and 1000/o. Appendix 12, Blue Book on Native Affairs 1906, p.76. The general tariff in the colony was raised from 100/o to 150/o with a rebate of 30/o on British goods in 1906. Thompson, op.cit., p.57.
not in fact covering the cost of their own administration in 1905, when in Shepstone's day they were covering the cost of the administration of both black and white. In Zululand under Crown Colony government, the Africans had paid the entire cost of the administration purely from the proceeds of the Hut Tax and the very much lower fines and fees of court. Indeed before its annexation to Natal, Zululand was the one Crown Colony not to receive a grant in aid and actually to produce a small annual surplus.

In these various calculations, moreover, the actual earning capacity of the African population was frequently not taken into account. According to Samuelson once again, the average earnings of an African if he worked for a European employer all the year round were £18; the average wealth of the African population in 1905 was £3. When introducing the Poll Tax in the Legislative Assembly and defending it against members who protested that it would inequitably tax rich and poor alike, the Prime Minister, while admitting that in certain countries such a tax would operate with "gross unfairness", maintained that "in the conditions of

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3 SNA 1/1/318 715/06, Minute 21.3.05.
life in this colony, the incidence of a small Poll Tax will not be oppressive. This remark could only have been made with circumstances of the white community alone in mind. While I have been unable to trace figures for the average earnings of Europeans in this period or for their average wealth, it is clear that the disproportion in wealth between black and white was, in Natal, as in the rest of South Africa, very considerable. The lowest paid European workers in Natal were probably the agricultural labourers, who earned an average of £4-£5 a month. Their number was minimal. African farm labourers received 14s. 5d. on an average in the years 1903-5 — and the majority of Africans in Natal were probably still dependent on farm labour for their cash income. The qualifications which enfranchised two-thirds white male Natalians also suggest the very much higher level of the income of Europeans: to possess the vote white British subjects had to own immovable property to the value of £50, or to pay rent of £10 a year or receive £3 wages a month. Under these circumstances, the

1 N.L.A. Debates, vol. 58, p.253. Supply Bill debate. G. M. Sutton, 4.5.05. This was a few days before the fall of the Sutton ministry and its replacement by the 1905-6 Smythe cabinet.

2 461 in 1907. 550 in 1908. (Statistical Yearbooks 1907 and 1908). No strictly equivalent figures in earlier statistical yearbooks of C.20th.

3 Natal Statistical Yearbook 1903-5. In 1907 it had risen to 14s. 5d., but the wages in many places in the Midlands and Uplands were far lower than elsewhere.

4 Thompson, op.cit., p.110.
financial obligations of the African population to the state were relatively far heavier than those borne by whites.

Whatever the truth of the matter, Natal legislators proceeded on the assumption that Africans were not paying their fair share of taxation; and of the Africans who were escaping their tax burden, it was felt that the young, unmarried ones were the worst culprits. It was for this reason, among others, that a Poll Tax rather than an increased Hut Tax was imposed. A further reason given for imposing a Poll Tax was that it was in the interests of uniformity in Southern Africa - the Transvaal, Orange River Colony and Rhodesia levied a Poll Tax on their African inhabitants - and that it was in accordance with the recommendations of the South African Native Affairs Commission. What this argument failed to take into account was that there was no Poll Tax in the Cape, Bechuanaland and Basutoland, and that the Natal representatives on the South African Native Affairs Commission had opposed the introduction of such a tax in Natal unless the Hut Tax were first repealed, and the system of calling out young men from the locations for compulsory labour on the public works of the colony were first

1 N.N.A.C. Report, pp. 33-4.

abandoned.\footnote{1} While it is true that married men who paid the Hut Tax were exempt from the Poll Tax, the legislators overlooked the fact that it was the younger men who provided the money for their fathers' tax. It would appear that although the kraalhead was responsible for the paying of the tax, it was levied on all huts in his kraal, including those of bachelors, unmarried girls and widows.\footnote{2} It is probable that it was largely because the younger men were shouldering the Hut Tax that there were so many complaints from kraalheads that the imposition of the Poll Tax undermined their authority.\footnote{3}

It is almost impossible to calculate what the Africans received in exchange for their taxes in terms of state expenditure on them, apart from the administration which they shared with the white population and which was largely geared to the needs of the latter.\footnote{4} In Samuelson's estimate the African population were responsible for two-thirds of the expenditure on police, gaols and the militia - a total of £292,456. When one considers however that the main purpose of the police and defence forces was

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{1} S.A.N.A.C., I, p.90, § 419.
\item \footnote{2} N.N.A.C. Report, p.93.
\item \footnote{3} S.W.A 1/1/329-2302. \textit{Summary of reports of Magistrates... on African reaction to the promulgation of Poll Tax, n.d. c. 11.9.05.}
\item \footnote{4} See below, Chapter IV for example for attitudes of magistrates. Apart from expenditure on administration and education in 1902-3,
to protect the settlers against a black enemy, the true irony of the situation is apparent. While to some extent the police did investigate crime, faction fights and civil actions in the reserves and amongst Africans in European areas this was a very minor aspect of their duties, which were fundamentally to ensure the status quo and protect white property and labour. Magistrates too were far more preoccupied with the needs and pressures on them from the colonists and, despite the fact that Africans were expected to contribute two-thirds of their salaries, there is little doubt that their sympathies and interests were with the very small European population in their magisterial duties. Needless to say there was no black magistrate, and the major part of the money spent on administration, even in its lower ranks, provided the salaries of white colonists. Chiefs, court induna and African constables received only a very small proportion of it; there were no African clerks or interpreters – a fact which caused considerable complaint amongst the educated section of the African community.¹

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¹See evidence before H.N.A.C. of almost all the Christian Africans. In the early 90s there had been one or two African clerks and interpreters, but as a result of the objections of European officials who objected to sharing rooms, as well as the belief (substantiated by one
On the other hand the provision of state employment for white officials was of importance, especially during the years of depression, when one in every eight white males was in the employ of the Natal Government Railways quite apart from other civil service employment.  

It was generally argued by white settlers that the money spent on public works, on building roads and railways, setting up departments of agriculture and health, and generally expanding the economy of the colony, benefitted all sections of the community. It is probably true that in certain areas the expansion of the European side of the economy had beneficial side effects for the Africans. At times sheer self-interest led colonists to take African health or agricultural methods into consideration—such as for example in introducing compulsory vaccination against smallpox in the locations, or setting up dipping tanks for scab-infected sheep.  

On the whole, however, the main attention of the various government departments were devoted to the needs and interests of

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1 Nathan MSS 368 (Rhodes House), p.15. Sir M. Nathan to Lord Selborne, 15.9.07.

2 Blue Books on Native Affairs 1901-10. (Natal Departmental Reports.)
the European population. While the most important state activities at this period were railway building and the setting up of agricultural advisory services, neither of these activities did much for the non-white population. By 1904 not a single branch-line had been constructed through the Reserves.1 African squatters on private lands may have benefitted from the proximity of the railway line, although it is probable that in many instances the proximity of the railway and therefore of a market for produce would have been sufficient to raise rents on those particular lands. Although it is true the Department of Agriculture provided stock inspectors to tour the reserves the object would appear to have been to protect European stockfarmers rather than to help Africans improve their standard of agriculture. There were only four Inspectors deputed to supervise the old locations and two on Mission Reserves.2

In the period under consideration, action by the Department caused considerable grievance amongst the African farmers, largely because of the lack of communication between officials of the Department and the African population. The methods adopted to combat cattle disease especially increased African suspicion of the white man's intentions. In 1897, when the inoculation of African cattle against

1See Map in S.A.N.A.C. I, Annexure 6B.
2N.M.A.C. p.662, Evid. S. O. Samuelson.
the Rinderpest led to the death of apparently health stock\(^1\) and in 1905, when what Africans alleged were disease-free animals were quarantined with those already infected with East Coast Fever, there was a great deal of restlessness amongst tribesmen. On this latter occasion, the shooting of infected stock in the Mahlabatini and Mongoma districts of Zululand "caused the greatest dissatisfaction and unrest", and without the restraining action of Dinusulu the Commissioner for Native Affairs reported "the extensive slaughter and movement would never have been affected as peacefully as it has been".\(^2\) In 1907-8 the mere branding of cattle next to the locations by stock-inspectors almost led to another bout of violence amongst members of Silwane's Cunu people, who felt that "the Poll Tax is only a small thing in comparison with the taking of their cattle".\(^3\)

On the positive side, two irrigation schemes in the Upper Tugela Valley and at Kees's Drift, started by Sir James Liege Hulett and F. R. Moor respectively, should be noted. Yet the money expended on these schemes, unlike the money spent by the Department of Agriculture on European Settlement schemes, did not come from the general

\(^1\) CO 179/200/21500, Desp. Conf. Gov. to Sec. St. 11.9.97. On this occasion the Government were more careful than on the subsequent occasion, and forbore pressing inoculation on reluctant tribes.

\(^2\) SNA 1/1/325, Minute C.N.A. Zululand, 2.10.05.

\(^3\) SNA 1/4/19, Magis. Mapumulo to M.N.A. 6.11.07, and CO 179/245/18652, Memo. to Magis. Umvoti 21.4.06 by 2 Intelligence Men, Encl.8 in desp. Gov. to Sec. St. CO 179/244/12033, Gov. to Sec. St. 14.3.06.
colonial revenue, but from a special loan of £50,000 raised on the London market by the Natal Native Trust by mortgaging certain of its lands. By 1909 the Governor of Natal, Sir Mathew Nathan, was to regard schemes as failures and both "costly and ill-conceived".

In view of their economic situation, on being faced with the new Poll Tax most Africans stated that they simply could not afford to pay it. This contention was upheld, by and large, both by the reports of magistrates in different parts of the colony about the poverty of the African population, and by the report and evidence of the 1906-7 Native Affairs Commission. The enormous indebtedness of the Africans to the European population was one indication of this poverty. In many areas farmers spoke of it as the usual and general practice to advance loans to African labourers as the only way of obtaining labour. The labourers would then contract to pay the loan back by working at lower wages instead of interest. The interest charged ranged from 60%, which was common, to between 120 and 200%, which was not regarded as out

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2 CO 179/254/340, Sec. St. 6.12.09.
3 See Blue Books on Native Affairs (Departmental Reports), 1903-6.
of the ordinary. It was asserted by more than one witness that Bambatha and those members of his tribe who followed him into rebellion against the government forces were deeply in debt to the farmers on whose lands they lived. Bambatha himself had appeared before the courts on several occasions for failure to pay rent.

There were both long-term and short-term reasons for this impoverishment of the African people. The long-term factors differed to some extent in Zululand and Natal, and it is probably true to say that while the long-term trends were more important in Natal and Southern Zululand, the short-term factors were what were causing the greatest distress in Northern Zululand. It is significant that the disturbances did not affect Northern Zululand, although there were other reasons for this.

In Natal the most important long-term reason for African impoverishment was the system of landholding in the colony. As Prof. de Kiewiet has shown in his masterly analysis of "Land and

2 See below, pp. 74-5, 328
3 e.g. T. J. Mea, M.L.A., N.M.A.C. Evidence, p.530.
4 Bambatha was involved in 30 civil and criminal cases between 1901 and Jan. 1906. This in itself must have been a major factor in his impoverishment. SWA 1/1/333/78. 
Landedness in Natal in the 1870s and 80s, the system of land allocation in Natal had, from the earliest days of the colony, been extraordinarily wasteful. The traditions of the Voortrekkers, who had allotted two farms of three thousand morgen each to the first comers, and of the British government, which in the early days continued these extravagant grants in order to keep the trekkers within their jurisdiction, had lived on in Natal. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the average size of European owned farms was still between 2-3,000 acres, and farms of 4-5,000 acres were common. The same was true of the newly annexed Northern districts, where the system of land grants had been as lavish. Moreover large tracts of land were locked up in the possession of absentee owners. The largest of these was the Natal Land and Colonisation Company, with its headquarters and most of its shareholders in London. In 1902 it was in possession of 250,000 acres. Already in the period before the Zulu War Natal was suffering from an artificial land shortage. Yet the necessary land reform was not undertaken...

1 The Imperial Factor in S. Africa, pp. 188-9.
2 Agricultural Industries and Land Settlements of Natal, Dept. of Agric. 1907 Pietermaritzburg, p. 7
and by the turn of the century the land shortage was far more marked. The problem had been much aggravated by the tremendous growth in Natal's population at this time. Thus between 1894 and 1904 the minute white population had more than doubled, from 45,707 to 97,109, although the 1904 figure is probably somewhat inflated by the presence of Imperial troops and discharged soldiers who did not remain in Natal. At the same time, the African population was also increasing, although not as rapidly as the figures suggest: there were 503,208 in Natal alone in 1894, 910,727 in 1904 in Natal, Zululand and the Northern districts.

In addition there would appear to have been an Indian population explosion in the 1890's, whether the result of natural increase or immigration: their numbers leapt from 35,411 in 1894 to 100,918 in 1904. While however the majority of Europeans and unindentured Indians lived in the towns, the Africans were still predominantly a rural community.

1 *Natal Statistical Yearbook*, 1907, p.3. The figures for 1904 were taken from the Census held on 17th April 1904.

2 While the absolute figures of the European population remained minute, the doubling in their number did lead to a clamor for new lands for settlement. The old ideal of every colonist as a great land-holder died hard, even if, by the early 20th century the majority of white Natalians were town-dwellers.

3 *Natal Statistical Yearbook*, 1907, p.3. The 1904 Census was the first enumeration of the African population: the 1891 figures were based on an estimate of the number of inhabitants in each hut in the colony.

This meant that if the whites were complaining of land hunger, the Africans were suffering from acute land shortage. Of the twelve million acres of land in Natal proper, over $7\frac{3}{4}$ million acres had been alienated or were in the process of alienation to Europeans.¹ The population density of whites in rural Natal including Zululand after its delimitation, was 1 to 184 acres of land, of Africans - 1 to 8 acres.² Of the remaining 4 million acres in Natal, approximately $2\frac{1}{4}$ million acres had been set aside as Trust land for the occupation of the African population.³ This policy of setting aside land as 'reserves' for the Africans had its origins in the years 1846-1864, and was dictated both by humanitarian motives and administrative needs.⁴ Although it is impossible that, at the time of its definition, the amount of the land so set aside was, as is suggested by E. Brookes and H. Hurwitz, "enough, with a little to spare",⁵ after 1864 the reserves were neither added to, nor improved by the Natal Native Trust - the Executive Council of Natal - appointed to administer them. As a result, by the turn of the century, there can be no doubt that the reserves

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² Ibid., p.2. Acc. to S.A.N.A.C. I, p.18, it was 1:9 1/2 acres.
³ S.A.N.A.C. I, p.18. The figure given differed slightly in various publications, S.A.N.A.C. gives 2,192,566 acres.
⁵ Ibid., p.4. F. Wolfrom in Some Aspects of native administration in Natal under Thec. Shephore 1857-75 (N.A. Wits. 1945), p.29, maintains that "from the beginning"
were overpopulated and overworked. Almost every witness as the subject referred to them as barren, rugged, arid and cold.\(^1\)

Indeed, even in the 1850s, there were those who thought them "fit only for the eagle and baboon".\(^2\) Although Sir James Liege Hulett thought that if they were worked by Europeans the reserves would be able to hold four or five times their current population,\(^3\) this strikes a curious note when one remembers the actual size of European holdings in Natal and the amount of state aid they needed to make them economically viable. In the circumstances it is not surprising that over half the Africans of Natal proper lived on private lands belonging to Europeans, despite the labour and high rents demanded by farmers from their tenants. The rents just after the Boer War ranged from £2 to £7 a year per hut, and, according to the Surveyor General of Natal, J. L. Masson,\(^4\) in many areas amounted to rack-renting, as the farmers were charging the Africans more rent than the land was capable of giving in return.

\(^{1}\)See e.g. S.A.N.A.C. III, p.63, Evid. J. W. Shepstone.

\(^{2}\)The Native Reserves of Natal, op.cit., p.4. Cited.

\(^{3}\)S.A.N.A.C. III, Evid. p.149.

\(^{4}\)Ibid., Evid., p.143.
In addition to the ordinary reserves there were also about 174,000 acres of land which had been set aside at more or less the same time as Mission Reserves: defined areas within which only the officially designated missionary body, in which the trust of the land was vested, could carry on its work.\(^1\) These reserves were transferred to the Natal Native Trust in 1903 under the Mission Reserves Act.\(^2\) The motives for this act were mixed. On the one hand it was welcomed by the missionaries as relieving them of the burden of administering the reserves, an obligation which had interfered with their ordinary mission work.\(^3\) The residents on the Mission Reserves were not only Christian converts; the initial idea had been to provide the missionaries with a settled community amongst whom they could work. Partly for this reason, the missionaries did not always find it easy to retain control over the people on their lands. A major declared reason for the Act of 1903 was that it would enable the government to control the movements of the "Ethiopians"\(^4\) who, it was believed,  

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\(^1\) The Native Reserves of Natal, op.cit., p.16.

\(^2\) Act 44, 1903.

\(^3\) ABM V/1/4, Annual Report 1904 (J. B. McLeod).

were preaching sedition on the Mission reserve lands.

On the other hand, the imposition of a £3 tax on the inhabitants of the Mission Reserves, and some of the measures taken by the government ostensibly to stop the spread of Ethiopianism, were regarded by the missionaries with distinct disfavour. The missionaries of the American Zulu Mission especially felt that the tax and the regulations of the government were designed specifically at making residence on the Mission reserves less desirable, and thus at hampering their work.¹ The £3 tax roused considerable opposition from the African converts on the Mission Reserves of the A.Z.M., and in some cases led to a deterioration in the relations between the missionaries and their converts. Although some of these reserves were on good land, they were in general as densely populated as the ordinary reserves of Natal, and the tax of £3 was clearly excessive. Largely as a result of the representations of the American Zulu Mission, it was lowered to 30/-d at the end of 1906.²

For most members of the Natal Legislative Assembly, however, the Mission Reserves Act was probably regarded as a first step towards getting Mission Reserve residents to work for Europeans,

²ABM 111/1/3, p. 325, J. D. Taylor to Rev. Judson Smith, 27.4.06.
and towards acquiring the valuable lands along the coast for white settlement. The act sprang very directly out of the recommendations of the Natal Lands Commission Report of 1902, a Commission appointed to look into the land problems of the colony, and which regarded its prime function as encouraging closer settlement of whites in Natal.\(^1\) The Commission exhibited a very strong bias against the Mission Reserves, and especially those of the A. Z. M., which it deplored as a "stumbling block to the progress of the country", because they had locked up lands which could have been "utilised for European occupation and could have participated in the general progress of that part of the country".\(^2\) "That part of the country" was a reference to the land occupied by the American Zulu Mission Reserves of Umvoti, Umlazi, Amansimtoti, Infumi and Ifafa - all exceptionally good sugar lands. While the Commission were careful to stress that the vested rights of Africans on these lands - some of them had been granted freehold and quitrent farms on the A.Z.M. Reserves - should be protected, it also implied that the resumption of the lands would be in the interests of the colony as a whole.\(^3\) Once


\(^2\)Ibid., p.28.

\(^3\)Ibid., p.27-30. See also ABM IV/1/4, Report of Trustees of American Mission Reserves; Annual Meeting of Zulu Mission at Adams, 1902 (C. W. Kilbon.)
taken over by the Trust, presumably those portions wanted for
European settlement could be "cleared" of natives, who could
be provided with less valuable lands elsewhere. While the
hostility of the government to the A.Z.M. was the outcome of
many complex factors, the fact that they controlled half the
Mission Reserves of Natal, and that many of them were on valuable
land, was undoubtedly a powerful reason in predisposing it to
launch a vigorous campaign against this particular body from
the time of the Commission Report.

There were two other outlets for Africans on the land,
part from living on private farms or reserves - the first
"squatting" on the remaining Crown lands of the colony, the second
buying up Crown or private lands as they came on to the market.
Neither of these was very satisfactory. In view of the artificial
land shortage, the amount of land on the market was restricted,
and prices were generally beyond the reach of Africans. Although
in certain instances, entire tribes had clubbed together under
their chief and bought a tract of land, in general the idea of
buying land was foreign to African traditions. In certain areas

1 See below, Chapter VIII, p. 526-528
2 See below, Chapter VIII, p. 525
3 See e.g. S.A.H.A.C. 1903-5, Vol. IV, p.2. Evid. Rev. G. A. Wilder,
missionary of the American Board.
however, especially in the Klip River division where there were no reserves, syndicates had been formed in order to buy land.\footnote{S.A.N.A.C. III, Evid. R. Plant, p.246.} Wesleyan Methodist converts were generally behind this movement, at least in its early stages. By 1902 Africans possessed 106,000 acres of land in either freehold or quitrent tenure, and a further 204,000 acres were in the process of alienation.\footnote{Ibid., Evid. Surveyor General, pp. 140-1.} Clearly this could only provide for a very limited number of Africans. Nevertheless even land purchase on this minor scale was viewed with antagonism by most whites and was partly blocked by the government in 1903 or 4, when an instruction was given to the Lands Department that no further bids for Crown lands should be accepted from Africans.\footnote{N.N.A.C. Evid., p.652. According to S. O. Samuelson, 11.5.07, the instruction was given "3 or 4 years ago".} Both land and labour considerations would appear to have motivated this instruction. In Zululand, similarly, despite the recommendations of the Delimitation Commission to the contrary, Africans were not allowed to buy lands outside the Reserve areas.\footnote{GO 179/227/41439. Gov. to Sed. St., desp. 309, 21.10.03 and encl. P.M. to Gov. 15.10.03. Brookes and Webb, A History of Natal, p.186 are incorrect in suggesting that the recommendations of the Delimitation Commission on this were accepted. The files show very conclusively that despite the protests of the Commissioners and the Colonial Office the government refused to accept these recommendations of the Commission.} This would appear to have foreshadowed the South African Natives Land Act of 1913,
and one is therefore left to explain the views of Natal delegates before the 1903-5 South African Native Affairs Commission and the Natal minority report in the Beaumont Commission Report.

In both these instances, the Natal delegates were opposed to the banning of land sales between Europeans and Africans. It is possible that the representatives were out of tune with official policy in Natal and with general public opinion. It should however be remembered that the 1903-4 instruction applied only to the sale of Crown lands, and not to private lands, and the seemingly liberal sentiments expressed before the Commissions could be interpreted not only as a realisation that the existing reserves were far too small, but as reluctance of white Natalians to lose the chance of buying up African lands when they came on to the market. It was generally assumed in Natal that Africans were incapable of looking after their freehold lands, and that they would be bought out eventually by Europeans or, less desirably, Indians. According to the Surveyor General, there were very few sales of private lands to Africans in the years preceding the 1903-5 Commission, although


2 This rather than any liberal intent seems to be borne out by the fact that the Beaumont Commission recommendation of setting aside as African reserves was cut down by the Natal Provincial Commission from a suggested 3,340,341 acres by 934,340 acres. (R.L. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa (N.Y., 1928), vol. II, p.84.

3 This at any rate was the standard excuse given by the S.A.N.A. when he opposed the demands of those Africans who wanted to buy Mission and
it had been fairly common in earlier years.  

There were about 4,000 huts of Africans squatting on Crown lands in 1904. Although they were not subject to the exactions of landlords, and were not subject to compulsory labour as Africans on the Reserves were, they also suffered from certain disadvantages. Their government rent of £2 a hut per annum was not low when it is remembered that the 1,800,000 acres of Crown lands remaining in Natal and the 350,000 acres in the Northern district were only Crown lands because no European wanted them. They were in the least accessible parts of Natal, and in general the soil was poor. Moreover their inhabitants had no security of tenure and were liable to be summarily ejected when the lands were sold, unless the buyer wanted either their services or their rent, which he could then generally command on his own terms. This disability was shared by squatters on Crown lands with Africans living on private lands and on those on the Natal Land and Colonisation Company.

In the post-Boer War period when European settlement was sharply accelerated, this process of ejection occurred to a marked

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1 Reserve lands on individual tenure. By some curious logic the prohibition of sale of private or Crown lands to Africans was ostensibly to prevent Indians from buying them out. e.g. 00 179/229/9691, Gov. to Sec. St., tel. No. 2, 18.5.04.

2 Report U.S.N.A. Blue Book on Native Affairs (Dept. Repts.) 1906. 4,261 huts would give a population of c.20,000 people. In 1913 there were 37,000 according to Report of Natives Land Commission, op.cit., p.5.

degree, especially in the midlands, where farmers were taking up previous unused lands for wattle plantations and intensive dairy farming. In 1905, for example, over two thousand Africans were given permission to move from private lands to the already overcrowded reserves, while a further 115 huts (about 460 people or more) were moved from private lands on to Crown lands, presumably largely for this reason. A major reason for the restlessness amongst Tilonko's and Msikofeli's peoples in the Ixopo-Mid Illovo area would appear to have stemmed from this. The resumption of lands in this area by the Natal Land and Colonisation Company caused considerable insecurity amongst Msikofeli's people, which may well have led in part to the many rumours of rebellion in that part of the country, amongst both white and black. The desire of white farmers in the Richmond area to break up the tribes of these two chiefs, a desire which expressed itself in numerous petitions and public meetings, may also have been the result of


3 W.N.A.C. Evid. D. Strachan, p.395. For Tilonko and Msikofeli, see below, p. 319-323.

4 See below, p. 320.

5 A series of deputations and petitions about these chiefs were sent almost monthly to the P.M. or S.N.A. from the beginning of the disturbances until the end.
tension over land and the fear that these two most powerful tribes in the area would resist the expansion of the European settlers.

In the case of Bambatha, too, the importance of land cannot be overstressed. In 1905 the Assistant Magistrate of Greytown, H. von Gerard, wrote to the Under Secretary of Native Affairs that Bambatha

"wants the allotment of a location ... His people are oppressed and squeezed [sic] by certain landowners on whose private locations they live. T. J. Nel and P. R. Botha are joint owners of a certain piece of land on which they place these unfortunate people on very high rents. The land is useless almost for any agricultural pursuits. Within the last three days forty-eight summonses have been issued against Bambata's people ... for the rent due ... three weeks ago. Another batch of summonses, about twenty-five, is yet to come.... A most deplorable state of affairs, the more so as there seems no remedy for it.... My sympathies are entirely with Bambata's people, ... but I see no way out of the difficulty."}

Bambatha had been having an exceptional number of court cases with his white neighbours, very many of them Boer farmers, ever since the middle of 1900. At that time there were apparently attempts to victimise him and his tribe for informing against the farmers who were assisting the Boers in the war.\textsuperscript{2} To what extent Bambatha himself hoped to profit from turning informer against

\textsuperscript{1} SNA 1/1/324\textsuperscript{1912} 05, 21.7.05.

\textsuperscript{2} SNA 1/4/6 \textsuperscript{80} 0 \textsuperscript{1900}, Memorandum, U.S.N.A. 16.500.
the Boers and was disappointed is difficult to say. Neverthe-
less the increasing signs of lawlessness on the part of his tribe,
which were shown in 1905 in two fairly serious faction fights,¹
for example, must be seen against this background of poverty and
landlessness. This in turn was in part to lead to Bambatha's re-
action to government orders in 1906 over the Poll Tax and his own
deposition, and in the end to his fighting against the government
forces.² In the Mapumulo division too, where the final phase of
the disturbances took place the many disputes about land, and the
frequent faction fights revealed a situation of overcrowding long
before the disturbances. In the 390 sq. miles of the division
were 35,000 Africans - 215 huts and 89 people to the square mile.
In this area 97% of the cattle were killed by Rinderpest. While
there were many aspects to the restlessness in this division in
1906, clearly population density and poverty were among them.³

While it is clear that land was a burning issue for the Afri-
cans of Natal just before the disturbances, there were also those
whites who saw in the disturbances themselves a good opportunity of

¹Natal Witness, 21.11.08, Evid. Inspec. Rose at Dinzuulu's trial.
They were on 12.4.05 and Jan. 1906.

²See below, Chapter 7, p. 333

³See e.g. SNA 1/4/6 099 Magistrate J. J. Field to S.N.A. 4.10.99
and Blue Book on Native Affairs 1899, B.63, Rept. Magis.
solving their own land-hunger. The breaking up of African lands was the favourite solution of many Natalians to the problems of landlessness,¹ although usually it was restrained by the more responsible elements in the population. In general the advocates of this view did not say what would happen to the African population living on these lands. A not infrequent suggestion before the Natal Native Affairs Commission was the transference of the Africans on private lands to their natural 'homeland' in Zululand.² Sir Charles Saunders even suggested Southern Rhodesia as a possible outlet for Natal's surplus population. This hoary solution to the native problem was enshrined in Voortrekker philosophy on the subject - the first reference in Natal to transporting Africans to their own 'homelands' was the Volksraad decision of 1841 to move all Africans beyond the five families required on each farm as labour, to the area between the Umsimvubu and the Umtamvuna rivers.³ Shepstone toyed with this scheme as late as 1854,⁴ but

²N.N.A.C. Evid. p.135-6, where the Chairman, H. C. Campbell, asked Sir Charles Saunders whether natives on private lands in Natal could not be moved to Zululand.
³The Native Reserves of Natal, op.cit., p.1.
⁴Ibid. He also toyed with schemes of removing Natal Africans to Zululand or Basutoland (see Wolfson, op.cit., pp. 352-6, de Kiewiet, Imp. Factor p.33).
it was as impossible to move the Africans to the south then as it was to move them to the north in 1906. Partly because the first white traders and trekkers had arrived in Natal when it was still suffering the effects of Shaka's wars, the tradition that Natal was empty in 1830 and that the 'natives' who appeared on the scene were 'foreigners' with no inherent right to the land died hard, and lay at the base of much of the colony's justification and rationalisation of its land policy.

While some Natalians saw Zululand as a possible centre for the displaced Africans of Natal, others saw it as their own hinterland. While it would appear that the main motivation of the Natal ministry at the time of Zululand's annexation in 1897 was mainly political, within the colony there was a strong pressure group which saw the lands and labour resources of Zululand as their natural heritage. Appeals to the Governor of Zululand (who was at the same time somewhat ambiguously Governor of Natal) to throw open the lands of Southern Zululand to white occupation are a recurrent feature in the 1890s. Petitions came primarily from the farmers of the Natal midlands and highlands.

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1 E.g. N.N.A.C., p.113, Evid. J.F.C. Barnes, C.M.G., F.W.D. See for example a most interesting letter to the Sec. St. from the veteran Natalian J. Bird (the editor of Annals of Natal) on the traditional cry to break up the locations and for the rationalisation upon which it was based, CO 179/179/2379, 10.11.90.

2 See above, Chapter II, pp. 123-4.
and from the Boers in the Transvaal districts of Vryheid, and the "Proviso B" district of Zululand. The storekeepers and prospectors of Zululand formed a class of their own and were also interested in getting land grants from the British Government. With the incorporation of Zululand in 1897 and the "Northern Provinces" in 1902 into Natal, these various pressure groups combined in their demands for Zulu land. To them the decisions of the Commission appointed in 1902 to set aside certain areas of Zululand for white occupation and to reserve certain others exclusively for the Zulus appeared singularly misguided: according to the Final report of the Delimitation Commission (1905), the Commissioners were:

"met on all sides by residents and others who appear to be labouring under the impression that all the Commission was required to do was to indiscriminately throw open the whole of the lands suitable for European occupation, irrespective of the interests of the Natives occupying those lands...."

In all 2,613,000 acres were excluded from the area reserved for

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1 See CO 427/9/928, desp. 146, 12.12.90, Encl. Petition J. Palmers and 53 others to R.M. Nqutu
   CO 427/9/23350, Gov. to Sec. St. 5.11.90
   CO 427/11/11095, Encl. in desp 57, 4.5.91.
   CO 427/11/6019, desp. Conf. 25.2.91, Gov. to Sec. St. and Encl.
   CO 427/12/15530, Encl. Petition
   CO 427/16/58168, Gov. to Sec. St., 15.3.93.

the Zulu, who were left the remaining 3,887,000 acres.\textsuperscript{1} In
the areas set aside for white settlement as a result of government
instructions, Africans could neither buy the land nor live on as
rent-paying tenants - they had to become labour tenants (if wanted
as such by the farmer) or move.\textsuperscript{2} Nevertheless at the time almost
the only criticism of the work of the Delimitation Commission was
that it had disregarded the interests of the European population.

While F. R. Moor was Secretary of Native Affairs, a cabinet
position elevated to ministerial rank at the end of 1905, the
complaints of this group did not have much effect, although it
can also be argued that in any case the initial decisions of the
Commissioners who first delimited the coast lands and set aside
a very considerable area for sugar plantations were more generous
to whites than their later delimitations in the interior lands
suitable for stock-farming. The agitation of the colonists for
the release of more land was however supported both by the Sutton
and the Smythe ministries, although it appears to have had little
direct effect except in the restrictive regulations already mentioned.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1} The Native Reserves of Natal, \textit{op.cit.}, p.12.

\textsuperscript{2} Govt. Gazette, 14.8.06. Rules and Regulations for the disposal of
Crown lands, p.1149, \S\S 14 and 15. SNA 1/1/37\textsuperscript{1698}, C.R. Saunders
to M.N.A. 15.6.07. A Minute from Sec. Min. Agric. 15.7.07 indicates
that the dept. would however turn a blind eye to arrangements made
by tenants to pay rent in lieu of labour (ibid).

\textsuperscript{3} i.e. The prohibition on the sale of non-Reserve lands to Africans.
The lands most longingly eyed by the colonists were in the Nkandla and Nqutu districts in Southern Zululand. Both these divisions were densely populated, because it was good cattle country, and because severe inroads had already been made on the land of tribes of these areas by the Boer 'New Republic' of 1884 (which had become the Northern districts of Natal). In addition, tribes from Natal and the neighbouring Boer territory had removed to Nkandla and Nqutu under pressure from the white settlers at different times. After the Zulu war moreover it had been deliberate policy to settle 'loyal' Natal tribes as a buffer in this area. Already in the 1890s population pressure in these districts was showing itself in the number of boundary disputes and faction fights in these two areas. Nevertheless the Commission did delimit a certain amount of land in these districts for white occupation: 81,000 acres in Nkandla and 27,000 acres in Nqutu.

It is perhaps not surprising therefore that in South Zululand the land question would appear to have played an important part in determining the attitude of some of the tribes and chiefs to Bambatha when he fled there to organise his resistance to the Natal forces. Ilanga lase Natal indeed blamed the delimitation of

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1 CO 179/230/35662, 8th and interim Report of Zululand Delimitation Commission.

2 Out of 487,680 acres and 400,000 acres respectively, PM C 100 52/05 Minute F.M. (Natal) to Gov. 16.9.04.
Zululand for the rebellion that took place there.\(^1\) While this is not the entire story — for according to Sir Charles Saunders those people who had been most severely disturbed by the allotment of farms did not participate in the rebellion\(^2\) — it was certainly an important element in Sigamanda's decision to fight.\(^3\) Moreover, quite apart from the tribes actually affected by the alienation of land, there can be little doubt that the agitation in Natal for upsetting the awards of the Commission created a spirit of uncertainty and suspicion in Zululand, where, as Sir Charles Saunders remarked in a forthright statement to the Natal Native Affairs Commission\(^4\) there had already been so many "breaches of faith" over land, that the Zulu could hardly be blamed for taking threats of "land-grabbing" seriously.

On the other side of the coin, it should also be noted that it was in precisely the coveted areas of Nqutu and Nkandla that both the Commissioner for Native Affairs and the magistrate, C. J. Hignett, remark on the attempts of the troops to "push" loyal

\(^{1}\) 4.11.06.

\(^{2}\) N.H.A.C. Evid., p.156. Saunders suggests settling "an entirely new class of people on the kraal sites of rebels in S. Zululand. He recommended those people "who had been hurtled off lands taken up by European settlers. These were the people who might have been expected to revolt and yet they gave not the slightest trouble."

\(^{3}\) See below, Chapter \(\gamma\), p. 337-344.

\(^{4}\) pp. 136-7. See also Memorandum by Sir Charles Saunders on the subject in GO 179/245/22270.
or neutral chiefs into rebellion. While no motives were given for this, it may partly have been motivated by a desire for the confiscation of African land. Immediately after the disturbances, there was a strong movement to get the lands of 'rebels' in Zululand confiscated and granted to settlers instead. The attempt failed, although the tribes that had participated in the disturbances were, in some instances, removed and replaced with others who had been displaced elsewhere by the incoming Europeans.

If land pressure was the long-term reason for African impoverishment in Natal and Southern Zululand, there were also shorter term factors leading to the situation of extreme distress in 1905, as the dramatic rise in Hut Tax arrears between 1902 and 1905 shows. Of these, the disastrous Rinderpest outbreak of 1897 was undoubtedly the most serious. Between 1897 and 1898, six-sevenths of the Africans' cattle were wiped out. The importance of cattle

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1ZA 28, Papers relating to the Zulu Rebellion, C.R. Saunders to C. J. Hignett magis. Nqutu (personal letter) 14.6.06: "...I quite agree with your conclusions as to our men trying to goad the whole population into rebellion and you have no idea of the difficulties one had at Nkandhla in trying to protect people who one knew perfectly well were faithful to us..." See below, Chapter V.

2N.L.A. Debates, August 1906. Motion by Yonge and Brunner, Ms. L.A. for Zululand. See also Greytown Gazette 18.8.06, Report of Meeting at Nqutu which passed a resolution in favour of opening up confiscated lands of rebels for European occupation.

3See below, six p 563:9.

4SMA 1/1/322.1652. Summary of arrears of Hut Tax on 30.6.05. The arrears rose from £127.8.0 in 1903 to £511.0.0. in 1904 to £5056.2.0. in 1905; these figures are somewhat misleading as it is probable
in the social system of the Nguni made this far more than simply an economic blow. As a result of the Rinderpest, in many areas young men could not get married because their cattle for lobola were all dead. Moreover as the price of cattle soared, the ten head stipulated by the Natal Code of Native Law as the maximum payable for the wives of commoners, which had in fact become the norm, was far beyond the reach of eligible bachelors. The result was the sharp rise in immorality noted by magistrates all over the colony.¹ At the time of the outbreak it is true that magistrates remarked on the calm and philosophical way in which the Africans reacted to the loss of their cattle.² The extent of the disaster was masked during the Boer War because of the demand for their labour and the higher wages paid during it.³ Thus it was only with the depression that the reality of the loss was

that the arrears for 1903 and 1904 were taken from the final figures of the year, whereas the 1905 figure is probably the mid-year figure. The tax was generally collected in the first half of the year.


¹Blue Books on Native Affairs 1900-1901 passim. Also Natal Departmental Reports: Reports of Magistrates 1899 passim.

²Ibid.

³See below, p.191.
properly felt. The absence of cattle when Africans returned to
agriculture in the areas which had been invaded during the war
also created a further difficulty in that on many homesteads
there were no oxen to draw the plough.¹ The "growing neglect
of cultivation"² amongst the Africans may have been partly due
to this, although the almost annual visitation of some form of
agricultural pestilence - locusts in 1896, followed by wheat
blight, drought, war invasion losses, more drought, blemmards
and aphids³ - must have been sufficient to discourage all but
the most doughty agriculturalists. The position was exacerbated
by the fact that African farmers generally sold their produce
at a time when there was a general surplus and prices were low,
and then were forced to buy when there was a shortage and prices
were high.⁴ While this was generally attributed to their thrift-
lessness and shiftlessness, it is not an uncommon feature of the
poorer sections of any community. It was only partly a function

¹Blue Book on Native Affairs (Dept. Reports) 1901, p.1330.
³Natal Departmental Reports: Annual Report of Department of Agric.,
1905.
⁴See e.g. Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1904, p.v.
of lack of foresight and improvidence. It was at least as much due
to the fact that the immediate demands for cash, for rents or
taxation, could not be put off until prices rose, and there was
rarely a backlog of savings which could be drawn upon for immediate
exigencies. The accumulation of wealth and the saving of grain from
one season to the next were difficult in the social structure of
African life, where the demands of family, hospitality and mutual
aid tended to swallow up the savings of the more thrifty. Moreover,
although Africans had been drawn into the money economy in
very many ways by the turn of the century, in so far as wealth
was accumulated, it was accumulated in cattle. For many Africans
the ravages of the Rinderpest must have been the equivalent of
the great Wall Street crash.

European pastoralists had also of course been hit by the
outbreak, but had lost a smaller proportion of their cattle. In
any case they were in a far stronger position to recover from
the blow. Thus while African cattle holdings increased comparatively
little between 1898 and 1903, by that year European farmers had
more cattle than they had possessed before the outbreak. As a
result of the high price of cattle, sheep farmers found it profitable

1 About half. Annual Report, Department of Agric., 1902, p.14.

2 In 1904 Africans in Natal, Zululand and the Northern districts possessed
345,159 head of cattle. See p.182 n.5 above. Natal Census, 04, p.831.
In 1904 Europeans held 514,756 horned cattle by comparison with
152,583 in 1897 or 238,448 in 1895, the best year in the 1890s.
See H. Hurwitz, Agric. in Natal, op.cit., p.87 and Natal Census,1904.
to turn from sheep farming to cattle. In some areas the expansion of European cattle farming was made possible by elimination of African cattle: in Zululand for example the Commissioner for Native Affairs pointed out that the destruction of African cattle gave the colony a most favourable opportunity for delimiting African lands which had thus been vacated.

Nor was the Rinderpest the only cattle plague to affect stock in these years: lung-sickness, East Coast fever, scab and mange added to the tale of woes. It is not surprising that after 1897 the united voice of white stock farmers was heard far more loudly demanding state aid and protection; protection not infrequently given at the expense of the Africans.

In addition to these various agricultural disasters and because of them, Africans were also deeply affected by the post-war depression which affected the whole of South Africa, notwithstanding settler views to the contrary. As the avenues of employment contracted and wages fell, Africans could no longer fall

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1 Annual Report, Department of Agriculture, 1906, p.20.
3 Annual Report, Dept. of Agric. 1905.
4 See below, p.189 ff.
back on selling their cattle, or even, except in a few areas close to the towns, their surplus grain and vegetables, as they had in earlier years. Yet at the same time they were faced with increased rents and taxation. There was, it is true, a constant demand for farm labour and every indication that in this period of financial depression the agricultural sector of the white economy was expanding. Nevertheless, as has already been noted, the farmers paid the lowest wages in the colony.

A major motive behind the extra taxation imposed on Africans between 1903 and 1905 was undoubtedly the desire of the farmers to get Africans to work on their own terms. This in fact was explicitly stated by the Minister for Native Affairs when he justified the Poll Tax in view of the fact that

"For the last twenty years to my own knowledge, the inhabitants of this colony have asked for an increase in taxation, generally upon the natives of this colony as far as their wants are concerned, and what for? The cry has been for labour, and until you increase the natives' wants, so long you will be without labour.... The government of this colony are actually paying the natives 3/6 a day at the Point. The Corporation of Pietermaritzburg are paying 2/- per day, the farmers of this Colony are paying £2 to £3 per month... Every Farmers' Conference that has taken place for the last ten or twelve years have [Sig] agitated for an increased Hut Tax, and why?

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1 Annual Report, Dept. of Agric. 1906, Report Sec. Min. for Agric. pp. 5-6.
To increase the natives' wants and so bring about a better state of labour."¹

"To bring about a better state of labour" had frequently been a major motive in African taxation in settler Africa, and the efficacy of taxation in ensuring a constant labour supply for the white man was well recognised from the earliest days in Natal. From the beginnings of white settlement in Natal, the colonists had found considerable difficulty in persuading a sufficient number of Africans to give up their own cattle and gardens to look after those of the white man. At that time the cliché of popular economic philosophy in South Africa, "the wants of the native are so few that he won't render voluntary labour", had some validity. It was difficult for settlers to await the growth of new African needs before satisfying their own need for labour, especially as at that time the Africans had sufficient land to make the employment offered by whites in general unattractive. Although these conditions did not last long, the attitudes to labour and the solutions evolved lingered. Thus the solutions of resorting to forced labour for the Public Works of the colony² - a policy which appears to have


²For the policy of forced labour on public works or Isibalo as it was called by the Africans, see above, p. 63 ff.
been adopted in Nathaniel Isaacs’s day and which was officially established on a government basis in 1858\(^1\) — and of imposing additional taxation on Africans, were still believed in implicitly, despite the available evidence in the Natal census of 1904 that by that time the vast majority of African men and women were in active employment.\(^2\) The image of thousands of Africans whiling away their idle hours at beer drinks was simply not borne out by the facts.

Yet the object of the taxation measures in this period was not simply to get the Africans to work, nor even to work for the white man: they were to a large extent designed to get them to work for the white farmer. From the 1880s onwards the farmers of South Africa were faced with increased competition from the mines and towns and railway expansion. The Natal reaction to this labour drain was typical of South Africa as a whole. While proposals to raise the Pass Fee which Africans had to pay before they could leave the colony to seek work from 1/- to £1 failed,\(^3\) other proposals to stiffen the penalties under the Masters and Servants Law against desertion,\(^4\) to impose licences upon Labour Touts and


\(^2\) p.678. 61.76\(^0\)/o of native male population and 63.43\(^0\)/o of female population were breadwinners compared to 74.59\(^0\)/o and 13.67\(^0\)/o of the European population (p.681).

\(^3\) See for example *H.L.A. Debates*, vol. 22, p. 275 ff. Reply to address, speeches by C. J. Saythe and H. D. Winter, P.H. and M.N.A. respectively in 1905-6. Natal’s economic dependence on the Transvaal and the fact that she drew considerable labour from the surrounding territories, esp. Pondoland, probably account for the failure of this particular measure.
to prevent them from 'touting' on private farms without the permission of the land-owner, and to register and issue identification passes to farm labourers (also to prevent desertion) were more successful. The 1905 Poll Tax which had to be paid before passes could be granted for travelling outside Natal was a step in the same direction. Although European employment of African farm labour was extremely wasteful - the number of farmhands required per 100 acres of crop was 13.4 compared with 5.38 in Britain or 9.53 in Tasmania - there was no attempt to improve conditions or increase efficiency in order to solve the problem of labour shortage. African farm labourers were probably as inefficient as the farmers alleged, but there was little incentive for them to change their ways. Employed only seasonally at wages less than half those currently paid outside the rural areas, frequently heavily in debt to their employer, the Africans were bound to the land by restrictive laws which "made a serf of him" and which prevented

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4 Acts 40 of 1894, 35 of 1899 and 50 of 1901. Of the 45,000 Africans charged before magistrates in 1906, 45,000 were brought up under these acts (i.e. 1/10), SWA 1/1/3902, Minute Nathan to P.M. 17.12.07.

1 Touts Act of 1896, amended by Act. 46, 1901.

2 Acts 49 of 1901 and 3 of 1904.

3 10 of Act 38 of 1905. "All license, pass or registration officers ... are ... required, whenever any male person applies for a license pass or registration of any kind whatever, to inquire of such person whether he has paid the Poll Tax due upon the 1st day of the previous January or not..."

4 Natal Census 1904.
them from seeking the most remunerative work.¹

The Boer War had also affected the supply of African labour for the farms; the demands of the military all over South Africa for African labour, and the wages they were prepared to pay - and the nations they were prepared to issue² - roused the ire of the farming community of Natal. During the boom years of 1902 and 1903 also there was an unprecedented demand for black labour. In Natal the increase in the white population was probably another factor contributing to the increased demand. While however there is some indication of a rise in African wages during the war and immediately afterwards, the rise hardly appears excessive; thus at the Point (Durban Harbour) wages for Togt Labour (labour engaged by the day) rose from 30s. - 35s. to 30s. - 40s. for longer working hours. On the coal mines wages had risen from 30s. 6d. to 43s. and below the ground from 43s. 6d. to 50s. 4d.³ Here the 'solution' suggested by the mineowners and accepted by the government was to import labour from Portuguese East Africa. Between 1902 and 1906 1,350 "foreign natives" entered Natal for


²The Governor of Natal, Sir Henry McCallum, became most heated on this account. In 1902 he wrote to the Sec. of State: "I find that our Zulus were being demoralised by their drawing of military nations similar to those drawn by European troops instead of the inexpensive mealie rations to which they are accustomed. - I determined in this particular as Supreme Chief to make a stand..." CO 179/222/7666, 26.1.02.

twelve months' indentured labour, probably mainly in the coal
mines and to some extent on the sugar plantations. As in the
case of the indentured Chinese labour on the Rand in the same
period, this enabled mine-owners to lower their wages - a reduction
which found its echoes throughout the economy.

The largest employer of African labour towards the end of
the war and just after it was the army. At a special conference
called by Sir Henry McCallum at Newcastle at the beginning of 1902
to discuss labour problems - a forerunner of the more famous
Transvaal Labour Commission of 1902-3 - it was decided by all
employers, including the army, that the average wage of Africans
should be lowered to 30s. So essential did McCallum regard the
reduction of wages by the military, that he offered to use his
powers as Supreme chief to call out any additional labour re-
quired by the forces, and similarly to break up any strike action
on the part of dissatisfied Africans either under Martial Law or
under the powers conferred upon him by the Natal Code. Later in

1 N.N.A.C. Evid. H. Smith, Chief Immigration Restriction Office, p. 20.
2 CO 179/222/7666, op. cit.
3 See above p. 56-7, 60
4 CO 179/222/7666, op. cit.
1902 the Commanding Officer in Natal, Major General Fetherstonhaugh, remarked that the native labour question was "the only matter for some time to come to cause any disturbance sufficiently serious to call for the presence of troops".¹

Although the labour shortage complained of so bitterly must have been alleviated by the ending of the boom, the withdrawal of the Imperial forces and their labour needs, and the import of indentured labour, the complaints of the farmers continued. Initially this may be ascribed to the fact that during the war many families had earned enough to enable them to pay their taxes and other immediate exigencies, and wanted to follow their own agricultural pursuits. Nevertheless by 1903 the drought which affected most parts of Zululand and Natal soon consumed most of these earnings,² and on a tour of Zululand the Governor remarked on the absence of almost all the young adult males earning money in the colony or on the mines.³ In the same year, P. R. Moor pointed out that whereas the ratio of Africans rendering service to the white man in the Cape was one in eight, in Natal it was one in

¹ CO 179/223/36293. Copy of Confidential despatch to Adjutant General, W.O. 5.7.02, encl. in desp. 213.
² See Blue Books on Native Affairs 1903 and 1904.
five. By 1903 the number of Natal Africans seeking work in
the Transvaal exceeded the number in any pre-war year. By
1905, the shortage of labour probably meant shortage of labour
at the wages offered, and it is in this context that Winter's
speech on the Poll Tax must be seen.

What remains to be explained however is why the farmers
of Natal, who were only a small fraction even of the white popu­
lation, were able to affect the land and labour policy and the
entire tax structure of the colony so powerfully. On the one
hand, legislation was directed at immobilising African labour
and keeping it on the land; on the other, as Professor de Kiewiet
has pointed out, referring to the 1870s, "The story of native
taxation cannot be fully understood without remembering ... ![that](3)
in part native taxation was a device to avoid heavier land taxes."³

When referring to the more complex economic situation at
the turn of the century, the qualification 'native' is hardly
necessary. At this time, labour policy and the tax structure
reflected very clearly the political power groups in the community.
Thus the only groups to be directly taxed were Africans and free

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²The numbers also rose considerably between 1903 and 1905 and after
the disturbances rose 59% by 1909. In 1894 the number of Natal
Africans seeking work on the Rand numbered 10,500. In the later
90s it was nearer 20,000. In 1903 and 1904 c 23,000, in 1905 c 26,000

³The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p.190.
Indians. Both were wholly unrepresented in the Natal Legislative Assembly. Most indirect taxation on the other hand fell on the townsmen—who were woefully under-represented.

Although by 1904 more than half white Natal lived in the towns, the Legislative Assembly was largely in the control of the farmers of the interior—the midlands and uplands of Natal. The Assembly consisted of forty-three members from seventeen constituencies. Of these only eight were from the truly urban areas of Durban and Pietermaritzburg, which between them contained nearly half the white population and 35% of the electorate. Thus, according to Prof. L. M. Thompson, "the farming element always had the decisive say in Natal politics." This can be traced even before the advent of Responsible Government; what is significant however is that the rapid growth of the towns towards the end of the century was not accompanied by any loosening of the hold of the farmers over the Assembly. On the contrary, their influence became even more marked after the grant of Responsible Government. Before 1897, Sir John Robinson and Harry Escombe, the principal architects of Responsible Government, were able to ensure that the representation of their own urban constituencies

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1 See above, Chapter I, pp. 40-42, 83-86.

more or less equalled that of the farming community. The passing of an additional duty on imported meat by a vote of 25:11 in the Assembly, showed the waning of the urban influence in 1897.¹ In that year's election the farming interest returned two thirds of the members of the Assembly.² In 1906 five-sixths of the ministry were farmers. Yet the Natal census of 1904 gave the number of farmers in Natal as 6,500, many of whom must have been absentee farmers, as the Ministry of Agriculture generally gave the figure of 3,000.³ This was out of a total white adult male population of 56,758.⁴ It must also be remembered that when one refers to the influence of the farming community, one is not referring to the influence of the sugar planters on the coast, whose interests on questions of Free Trade and labour, for example, were very different to those of the stock and wattle farmers of the interior, and whose political voice at this time was minimal.⁵ The addition of two members to represent the whites in Zululand after its

¹ CO 179/201/119,Gov. & Sec. St. 10.12.97, desp. no. 191. It was rejected by the Legislative Council by 7:1.

² Ibid. Minute, H. W. Just, 13.1.98.

³ Natal Census, p.672. This equalled 7.5% of the white population.

⁴ For Ministry of Agriculture figures see e.g. N.L.A. Sessional Papers, L.A. no. 25, p.365.


⁶ CO 179/192/14677, CO Minute dated 3.9.95. The sugar planters used Indian not African labour and were in favour of free trade with the other S.A. colonies. Natal's tariff favoured the stockfarmers who, unlike the planters, faced competition from the rest of S.A.
incorporation in 1898, and the four members who were added to
the Assembly after the Boer War to represent the newly annexed terri-
tories of Vryheid, Utrecht and Paulpietersberg, further strengthened
the stockfarming element in Natal politics.

From the debates in the Natal Legislative Assembly it is
clear that the farmers were, in traditional South African style,
far more extreme in their views on the "native question" than many
of the planters and urban representatives. There were of course
notable exceptions on either side. Nevertheless the extremism
of urban whites tended to be directed against the Indian population,
which at this stage constituted the greater economic threat.
There were several reasons for the race attitudes of the stock-
farmers of the interior, many of them doubtless lying deep in
settler psychology. In general they lived furthest from large
centres of white population. Their farms were large and isolated,
and most of them had a number of African families living on them.

1 E.g. F. S. Tatham, member for Pietermaritzburg, on the one hand, and
F. R. Moor, who was, by comparison with the rest of the assembly, fairly
moderate, on the other. See below, pp.

2 See CO 179/195 and 196. Agitation by white artisans in the towns
against African skilled and semi-skilled labour was just beginning
to make itself heard in the 90s. The Indian trader and craftsman
however was a far greater object of racial hatred. This did not
prevent discriminatory laws against all non-whites being passed by
all the municipalities of Natal. See above, Chapter I.

3 For a discussion of this subject from another point of view, see
L. H. Gann and P. Dugan, White Settlers in Tropical Africa
Should there be any real threat of violence or rebellion on the part of the African population, they and their families would obviously be in the greatest danger.

Apart from the fears of people still living in the shadow of the Zulu War, there were also economic bases, and extremely important ones, for the attitudes of the stock farmers. In the earlier days of the colony before political factors had tipped the economy irreversibly in favour of the European farmer, there was, after all, the powerful conflict of interests between African pastoralists and European pastoralists, a conflict over land, water, cattle and labour. Unlike the sugar farmers of the coast, the stockfarmers relied entirely on African labour and regarded the failure of Africans to work for them virtually as a criminal offence.¹

While the struggle over land and water and cattle had, by the turn of the century already long been won, that over labour had not. The intense competition for African labour which has already been mentioned, sharpened this particular battle and gave the legislation during the twenty years of Natal's self-government its peculiar character. Finally the agricultural "ten plagues" which

¹See for example the report of Police Inspec. W. F. Fairlie to Chief Commissioner of Police: "With regard to crime the principal complaints made by Dutch farmers to patrols was of the refusal to work on the part of the natives..." Report of C. in C. of Police, Departmental Reports 1903, p.67.
hit Natal from 1896 onward increased the insecurity of the white farmer as it had of the black, and the new note of stridency in farming representations after 1896, and even more after 1903, is not entirely surprising. In view of the human tendency to search for scapegoats, many farmers treated their own failures in these years as if they were caused directly by the pernicious ways of the African population. Thus cattle disease was blamed on to the carelessness of the Africans and gave farmers a good excuse for cutting down the number of stock they were prepared to allow their tenants to hold, while the failure of sheep-farming in many areas was blamed on the innumerable "stock-thefts" by Africans, although many observers pointed out that most of the supposedly "stolen sheep" were probably lost in gullies and over cliffs, or died through exposure, largely as result of the farmer's failure adequately to check his animals.\(^1\) Increasing drastic cattle stealing laws were devised, some white farmers evidently feeling even death by hanging an insufficient penalty for this particular crime.

Whatever the reasons however, the fact that political power was in the hands of such small groups of unenlightened men probably accounts for the extremely narrow range of proceedings in the Legislative Assembly and its complete lack of any outstanding individuals.

From the inception of self-government, Natal politics had been very literally "parish-pump" - and railway branchline - politics. There was scarcely a time when there were sufficient individuals of the necessary calibre and character to form both a viable ministry and a lively and constructive opposition. For a couple of years after the Boer War, ministries were extremely unstable, one in particular having to rely on the casting vote of the speaker to get its legislation passed. Nevertheless divisions on ideological lines were virtually non-existent, although the entry of four labour members at the end of 1906, who held the balance between the 'ins' and 'outs' did introduce a semblance of party politics into the Assembly. The result of all this was, as Sir Matthew Nathan remarked scathingly after a few weeks in the colony:

"Far too much of the time, energy and money of the small community of this colony seems to be taken up in governing themselves badly - municipally and nationally - and the native population worse."4

Self-government was interpreted purely as "government in the interests

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1 CO 179/227/31474, Gov. to Sec. St., Conf. 31.7.03. The Nine ministry remained in office in 1903 after the Dec. 1902 election solely by wasting vote of the Speaker. The government resigned in August 1903.


of self, and the general good is too often set aside for individual 
and local advantages" he wrote to Sir Charles Lucas a little later.¹ 
Sir Matthew Nathan's views were shared not only by both previous 
governors of Natal under responsible government, but also by many 
contemporary South African statesmen and politicians, including 
Smuts, Botha, Merriman, Richard Solomon and Steyn.² Perhaps parochial-
ism and government in the interests of the individual is a not in-
frequent feature of small territories; in Natal natural smallness 
was aggravated by the unbalanced distribution of political power.

The dangers of this situation in a multi-racial society 
where the bulk of the population were excluded completely from 
political life are also manifest. As the Natal Native Affairs Com-
mission put it:

"Considering its origins and composition, Parliament 
stands virtually in the relationship of an oligarchy 
to the natives and naturally it studies more the in-
terests of the constituencies, to whom members owe 
their position, than to those who had no voice in 
their election, more particularly, when the interests 
of the represented conflict with those of the unre-
presented.³"

Some members representing rural constituencies nevertheless cherished

¹Nathan MSS 368, p.20. 
²L. M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, p.47. 
the illusion that they were also representing the interests of
the African inhabitants of their district. This somewhat implausible
argument was in fact urged against a more equitable urban-rural
redistribution of seats.¹

Of all the members supposed to represent African rights,
the Secretary for Native Affairs was theoretically appointed for
this purpose. With the exception of Sir James Idge Hulett, a
prominent, British-born tea planter, who held the office for a
brief spell in the Hanse ministry (1898-9), all the Secretaries
for Native Affairs were Natal-born stockfarmers. Both F. R. Moor,
who held the office for most of the period, and H. J. Winter, who
was Minister of Native Affairs (the title was changed during his
tenure of the office) from 1905 to the end of 1906, represented
the large sheep-farming district of Weenen, while Col. George
Leuchars (Secretary for Native Affairs, 1904-5) represented Umvoti
division, another stock farming area. Both Weenen and Umvoti
divisions had sizeable Dutch communities, although it is difficult
to assess how much this influenced the views of their representatives;
there is little to indicate that there was much difference between
British and Dutch farmers in Natal in their attitudes to native

policy, land or labour.\(^1\)

It is also not easy to estimate exactly what part the personalities and views of different Secretaries for Native Affairs played within the political structure. It is clear, for example, that there were considerable differences in the approach of P. R. Moor on the one hand and Leuchars and Winter on the other. Observers as favourably disposed to the Africans as Sir Matthew Nathan and Harriette Colenso, John Dube in *Tlanga lensa Natal*\(^2\) and the Natal correspondent of *Imvo*\(^3\) (the Cape-Xhosa-English newspaper founded and edited by J. T. Jaba), saw Moor as "a rare exception in this colony" - a man with "some sympathy" with the African.\(^4\) Harriette Colenso wrote in 1903 to a close friend and supporter in Britain:

"Here in Natal our Secretary of Native Affairs is really I believe doing his best to obtain some measure of fair-play for the natives...."

\(^1\) Of the evidence of T. R. Davenport, *The Afrikaner Bond* (O.U.P. 1967) who shows that in the Cape Afrikaans-speaking farmers were in general more extreme in their views than the English-speaking farmers, though he suggests much of the "liberalism" of the English-speaking farmers may have had a political rather than a principled derivation: it was a way of "scoring over" the Afrikanders, and may also have been devised to attract the non-white vote. In Natal, where the English-Dutch political division was non-existent and there was no non-white vote to attract it would seem there was little to distinguish Boer and British race attitudes, though the latter tended to rationalise and articulate their prejudices and give them a more legal framework, perhaps because of the tension between their attitudes and the more liberal approach taken in the outside world.
but he is very much alone....¹

Both Harriette Colenso and Sir Matthew Nathan were destined to be disappointed in Moor, Nathan largely because of his inability to bring his colleagues round to his way of thinking, Harriette Colenso because he was Prime Minister and Minister for Native Affairs at the time of Dinusulu's arrest. Moor was pre-eminently a white supremacist in the Shepstone tradition - as Sir Matthew Nathan remarked, he was shocked when the Governor "shook hands with some native Christian chiefs and is always fearful that I shall treat them in a way they are unaccustomed to";² He firmly rejected any idea of social, political or economic equality between black and white.³ Compared with even the Afrikaner members of the South African National Convention which met in 1908-9 to draw up a draft constitution for the unification of South Africa he was illiberal and extreme. Nevertheless he was less rigid than his Natal colleagues:

²Ilanga lase Natal, 3.5.07 and 26.6.08.
³Imvo, 19.6.99.
⁴Nathan MSS 368, Nathan to Lord Selborne, 15.9.07.

¹H.E.C. to Mrs. Rollo Russell, 18.4.03. Letters at Elangeni, Amersham. These views were shared by missionaries of other denominations also.
²Nathan MSS 368, Nathan to Lucas, 3.10.07.
³For Moor's views on native policy his evidence before S.A.H.A.C. and H.N.A.C. '06-7 is illuminating. His stand against the Cape franchise at the 1909 National Convention was also typical.
in his understanding of Zulu traditional life, in his realisation that the Africans were contributing their share to the economy of the country both in finance and labour, and in his opposition to the more extreme measures proposed by the upcountry farmers.

It was apparently for these reasons that Col. Leuchars, himself to follow Moor as Secretary for Native Affairs in 1904–5, accused him of being equal to, if not worse than, "one of the most raibd individuals of Exeter Hall". Nevertheless it was during Moor's period of office that many of the severe laws against cattle stealing and controlling labour in the interests of farmers were passed through the Assembly, having been introduced by him. Thus even if he wanted to, it was virtually impossible for him to withstand the combined pressure of the Assembly and his own cabinet - to say nothing of his Weenen constituents. Moor himself did not in any case possess a particularly forceful or decisive personality so that, as happened in 1907–8, his colleagues were frequently able to take actions of which he, as Prime Minister and Secretary for Native Affairs, disapproved. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that legis-


2 See p. 199 above. He was responsible for the Spoor Law of 1894; while he was not directly responsible for the 1899 Cattle Stealing Act he supported it.

3 e.g. Masters and Servants Act of 1894; Touts Act of 1896 and amendment of 1901; Native Servants Identification Act of 1901. The Act of Amending Law no. 10, 1876 (Spoor Law) of 1896. Act no. 6 of 1897 (Trespass Act) etc.

lation under Moor represented a difference in degree rather than in kind from that of his successors.

On the other hand, during the time that Moor was Secretary for Native Affairs, some of the worst excesses of the Leuchars and Winter regimes were avoided. Through his intervention, for example, officials were instructed not to apply the provisions of drastic laws too precipitately, as in the case of the Native Servant Identification Act of 1901. In addition, it is clear that he set his face firmly against the idea of cutting up Zululand simply for the benefit of the white man, and felt that the Delimitation Commission should be instructed to lay aside sufficient reserves for the Zulu without taking into account what areas would or would not be suitable for European settlement. In this he was overruled by the rest of the cabinet, but it was left to the Smythe and Sutton ministries completely to reverse his policies.

Under these ministries, instructions to officials and magistrates from unsympathetic ministers could make life far more difficult for the Africans. Under both Leuchars and Winter, chiefs were arbitrarily deposed by decree of the Supreme Chief, largely it would appear for daring to voice their people's feelings and apprehensions

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1 H.L.A. Debates, vol. 33, p.54. C. J. Yonge, member for Zululand, charged Moor with instructing police not to enforce this Act; in his defence of his native policy, Moor did not deny this charge.

2 CC 179/228/20439. Minutes enclosed in desp. 126 of 3.5.02 (2.5.02 and 3.5.02).
about new laws. Thus in 1904, Acting Chief Njengabantu was removed from his tribe allegedly for insulting the magistrate at the time of the Census enumeration. His version of the story was never examined before a judicial authority, although he maintained that the evidence against him had been given by a court induna, brother of a chief who had a long-standing feud with his tribe over land. All he had done, so he claimed, was to voice his people's fears as to the purpose of the census, which he considered his duty even though he did not share them.¹ In 1905 twenty-two kraalheads and other individuals were summarily removed from their respective tribes "for defiance of the authority of the Supreme Chief or their... tribal head".² At the beginning of 1906 when many chiefs were voicing their people's fears as to the purpose of the Poll Tax and their inability to pay it, the removal and punishment of chiefs without trial was the remedy suggested by the Secretary for Native Affairs.³ In the case of Bambatha this was to have considerable repercussions, for here was a case of one of these deposed chiefs suddenly turning round and defying the minister's order.⁴

² Blue Book on Native Affairs 1905, p.vii.
³ SHA 1/1/556/56. Resume of matters connected with the Poll Tax 23.2.06. Winter suggested the fining of Chiefs Charlie Fynn, Niskofeli, Ngobiszembe and Nseeni, and the deposition of Matonela, without trial.
⁴ See below, Chapter V.
Winter’s views as expressed before the Natal Native Affairs Commission which was appointed after the disturbances were in keeping with these actions. Thus on being asked whether Africans had any cause for grievance in Natal, he replied:

"he could give them a whole string of what the natives considered causes ... but not what he would consider causes of dissatisfaction. He did not know of any reasonable ground of dissatisfaction either against the European as landlords or against the system of administration."¹

When M. S. Evans, a member of the Commission, then pointed out that under those circumstances it could hardly have been worth while appointing the Commission, Winter confessed that the Commission had been appointed by Parliament, but he personally considered it unnecessary.² At the time of the formation of the Natal Native Affairs Commission Winter had tried to stop them from communicating with chiefs and informing them of the purpose of their visit. In this however he was overruled by the Prime Minister.³ The grounds for his objections to the aim of the Commission of giving Africans "an opportunity of opening their hearts and speaking such words as they desire" was expressed when he was asked, again by M. S. Evans, whether he thought all magistrates were suited for their duties in

¹W.N.A.C. Evid., p.221.
²Ibid.
³SWA 1/1/354-2631. Sec. N.W.A. to M.N.A., 27.10.06 and Minute Sec. P.M., 1.11.06.
connection with the African people and whether Africans were always informed of the laws affecting them. He then confided that, while he considered himself the "Protector" of the natives against unsuitable magistrates,

"You know what natives are. They will make a mountain out of a molehill. You will hear an ill-advised native who wants to make mischief say 'I never heard the magistrate.' Then you get the individual white man who backs the native up. These are the people we must guard against. If these people were not in existence you would not have any trouble with the natives and you would not get any complaints from them."¹

The agitator–theory of African grievances has always been a popular one in South African and indeed colonial folk-lore.

In these views Winter, who had been Minister of Agriculture in two previous administrations, would appear to have differed but little from his predecessor, Leuchars. A somewhat narrow man, with the stereotyped views about Africans of so many of his compatriots,² Winter is only of significance because of the position of power he held in the dangerous days of 1906, and because he was representative of a major element in Natal society and a majority element in the Natal Legislative Assembly. Both under him and under Leuchars, there was a complete and deliberate cutting off of communication between

¹N.N.A.C. Evid., p. 215.
²Cf. the evidence of Winter both before the Select Committee on Native Affairs April 7, 1911, SC 3' - 10 W.A. (Union Govt.) p. 457 and his evidence before the Select Committee on Native Affairs 1917, SC 6A 1917, p. 329 ff, which more than corroborates this view.
the governing power and the governed. The disturbances of 1906 can be in a large measure seen as having come very directly out of this failure of contact.
"I have had interviews with a Zulu of high family in Zululand ... a man who has been strongly attached to me for many years. His information to me is not 'rumour' ... it is ... absolute fact and I thoroughly believe him.

Dinuzulu is not loyal. He has been and is the head and font of the whole movement and is pulling strings in Zululand, Natal, Swaziland and here. All the chiefs in Zululand and nearly all in Natal look upon him as their king and take their orders only from him.

..... The warning has been ... to protect the women and children in the towns and especially Durban, as the orders and intentions are to rise at a given signal and have a massacre of the women and children when the towns are demused of men ...."

Theophilus Shepstone, Pretoria to the Prime Minister, Natal, 22.4.06.¹

¹Go 179/235/22656, desp. Gov. to Sec. St., Encl. 2.
In the tense and lean years after the Boer War rumours that the Africans were about to unite and rise against white rule were rife all over South Africa. In Natal, where a senior magistrate termed them "an annual hysteria", these rumours gathered intensity in the exceptionally hot summer at the end of 1905, after the imposition of the Poll Tax. Widespread African opposition to the tax, as well as to the other burdensome features of European rule noted in the previous chapter, manifested itself in the ominous killing of white animals and in a few acts of defiance to the magistrates attempting to collect the tax before it could be legally enforced. This hostility roused considerable alarm amongst the small white population of Natal, and many colonists began to build laagers or to trek from the remoter districts in the face of what was regarded as inevitable and imminent rebellion. When, on the 8th February, two police officers were killed by a group of Africans armed with assegais, the worst suspicions of the whites were confirmed. The following day Martial Law was declared throughout the colony and the militia called out.

For almost two months after the declaration of Martial Law, following the reports of magistrates, spies or neighbouring settlers,
that a particular chief or tribe was "rebellicous", armed forces marched through their locations, burning crops and kraals and confiscating cattle. After summary trials by Courts Martial, chiefs were fined, their tribes divided up, and in some cases deposed. Apart from their opposition to the tax, and a generally felt but unorganised feeling of antipathy to the Natal government, it is difficult to know exactly what 'rebellicousness' meant at this stage. The first overt African resistance to the activities of the troops came on the 3rd April, from one of the deposed chiefs, in the Greytown district, a considerable distance away from that in which the initial episode had occurred.

The importance of the nature of communications between groups, the different way in which events were perceived by black and white and the role of rumour in this sequence of events cannot be overstressed. Rumours and continued reports of 'rebellicousness' among the Africans were amongst the chief justifications of the Natal government for the declaration of Martial Law over the entire colony; once Martial Law was declared, the way in which the Militia and government obtained its information continued to be of overriding importance. Constant mutual suspicions and antagonism were a feature of Natal society even in times of peace. With the declaration of Martial Law they were given new scope and significance.
Within each community news and opinions were transmitted along certain regular channels. By 1906, roads and railways had linked most of the centres of white population, although the railroad had not yet penetrated to the recently annexed Northern Provinces or to the isolated European missionaries, traders and officials in Zululand. English-speaking Natalians had a fair range of newspapers to choose from, though their opinions represented a continuum of opinion rather than a spectrum, especially on 'native affairs'. Thus despite the isolation of many of the European farmers, they could get news and information from the newspapers, letters and books. There were in addition a couple of newspapers in Dutch. The tightly-knit nature of white Natal, the free mingling of officials and settlers, of farmers, shopkeepers and artisans led to a high degree of uniformity and conformity of opinions on most issues, and to stereotypes being formed of the other racial groups. During the disturbances, when whites felt it more necessary than usual to present a 'united front' both to the non-whites of Natal and to the outside world, this conformity was even more marked. After an attempt by the Natal government to impose press and telegram censorship
had been discouraged by the Colonial Office, \(^1\) the newspapers very willingly imposed a voluntary censorship on themselves. As the editor of the *Matal Witness* wrote to the Prime Minister's Secretary: "... I am only too anxious to coincide in every respect with his [the Prime Minister's] wishes and to see that matter was [sic] left out of the paper with which the authorities might not have been pleased."

Amongst the Africans, in precolonial times, orders and commands from the Zulu kings had been very rapidly relayed by specially trained and swift messengers. In addition, as befitted a military regime, there were spies in most parts of the country, the "eyes and ears" of the King.\(^3\) The penalty for transmitting false information was high. At the turn of the century, it is clear that each chief still had his messengers who could transmit orders to his followers through their kraal- or family heads, or whom he could send to neighbouring chiefs with or for information.\(^4\) There is plenty of evidence of cross-country communi-

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\(^1\) CO 179/235/3435, Gov. to Sec. St., 16.2.06. Od 2908, p. 13-14.

\(^2\) PMC 101/286, 9.4.06. See also Editor, *Matal Mercury*, to P.M., 21.5.0.6., ibid.


cation in the years before the disturbances - evidence which was prone to rouse fear and anxiety amongst the whites. Amongst the Africans news still travelled remarkably swiftly. Thus during the disturbances the return of tribesmen on the order of their chiefs, not only from Durban and Pietermaritzburg, but even from the Rand, occurred especially in the last phase of the disturbances in the Mapumulo-Lower Tugela area. In this case, migrant workers who carried news to and from the African areas may well have been responsible.

As in precolonial times, at the turn of the century, most of the important chiefs had contracted a large number of marriages of diplomatic significance. Dinusulu for example was related to every chief of importance in Zululand, though he only had one or two Natal wives. It is clear that these marriages had a political purpose and that messages could be transmitted through the family network, and that family occasions - wedding feasts, mourning parties - could be used for political meetings. Europeans generally interpreted these political purposes as anti-white, though in most cases they were probably part of the working out of tribal politics.

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1 SHA 1/1/367, Rept. Chief Magistrate P. Mims (Durban), 19.1.07.
In addition to the personal messenger system, by the turn of the century there was also an increasing class of literate Africans, largely the product of the mission stations.\(^1\) Dinusulu, who had himself learnt to read and write during his years of exile in St. Helena, employed a secretary from the time of his succession in 1884 until his arrest in 1907, and was in receipt of a large number of written communications.\(^2\) Literacy also meant that a fair number of Africans could read the colonial newspapers, and relate what they had read to their illiterate fellows. Several attempts had been made at starting up a Zulu newspaper,\(^3\) and by 1906, the Rev. John Dube's \textit{Ilanga lase Natal}, founded in 1903 and published in Zulu and English, provided a useful forum for African news and views.

Communications between black and white were less straightforward. While a small number of the colonists spoke Zulu and a small number of Africans spoke English, it is probable that their degree of competence hindered rather than aided understanding. Quite apart from language difficulties however, communication between the two groups was between superior and inferior, whether

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\(^1\)See above, Chapter I, pp.79-80.

\(^2\)See below, Chapter VII, p.437, 554.

\(^3\)The first newspaper in Zulu seems to have been started by the A.Z.N. in 1866, and possibly earlier. It was called \textit{Ikwebi} and obtained an annual grant from the government. See William Taylor, \textit{Christian Adventures in South Africa}, London, 1867, p.467.
It was looked upon as between father and child or master and servant. In either case it tended to be a one-way communication. If this relationship were not accepted by the African he was regarded as best as 'cheeky' or 'insolent', at worst as a 'dangerous sedition-monger'. To some extent, this attitude was reflected by the 1903-5 South African Native Affairs Commission, where interviews with chiefs who accepted the paternalist framework and their status within it proceeded far more courteously than interviews with Christian Africans who had a claim to equality which the Commissioners could not contemplate.¹ In Natal the attitude was strikingly revealed during the Dinusulu trial, when the Minister of Justice and Attorney General, T. F. Carter, retorted to a witness, who was refuting one of his allegations:

"What! Would you dare contradict a white man?"²

The extremes to which this attitude was taken may have been peculiar to South Africa and Natal; yet what Paul Bohannon has recently called "the working misunderstanding", the fact that inevitably Africans and Europeans look at a particular problem

¹See evidence S.A.H.A.C., Vols. II-V, passim.

²The Trial of Dinusulu on charges of high treason at Greytown, Address of W. P. Schreiner, p.51.
through totally different eyes, is common to all colonial situations. In Natal, the 'misunderstanding' was exacerbated by the extent of the arbitrary power held by the white group over the African population. As R. O. Samuelson, the brother of the permanent Under-Secretary for Native Affairs, remarked:

"One of the greatest mistakes is the belief of the Native Affairs Department that they are fully acquainted with the disposition of the natives, whereas they are not. The native... beats about the bush to find out the real wishes of the authority he speaks to, so that he may please him."2

For many Africans and even for chiefs, it seemed far too dangerous to voice their opinions openly, even to the magistrate who was the authority meant both to represent the government to them and to transmit their views back to the government. Thus one Mvandhla, giving evidence before the Natal Native Affairs Commission in 1906, was asked whether African could not go to the magistrate for information on different matters. He replied, almost with horror, that a man in his position would never dare do a thing of that sort because "as soon as he asked a question, he would be arrested".3 Even the chiefs, according to him, were

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2 The Native Question (Pietermaritzburg, 1906) (pamphlet).

3 N.M.A.C., p.698. See also evid. Ch. Sikumbu, N.M.A.C., p.789, who stated that "they who were the hereditary chiefs of the country were afraid to speak" lest they be deposed. Several other Africans
afraid to go to the magistrate on such questions as the Poll Tax. While Nyandhla's views may well have been exaggerated, and the situation differed from magistrate to magistrate, there is little doubt that there were immense barriers in the way of communication in the colony. Under the Code of Native Law, which regulated most aspects of African life, government instructions were supposed to be transmitted from the Supreme Chief through the Secretary of Native Affairs (later the Minister) and the Under-Secretary of Native Affairs to the magistrates. Next in line came the chiefs, then their headmen or indunas, kraalheads (or heads of families) down to the individual African at the bottom. That much could go wrong twice the cup and the lip, even if all the constituent parts in this long chain of communication were in harmony, is obvious. In the divided society of Natal, the chances of news being distorted in the transmission were high. While in the days of Sir Theophilus Shepstone there had been a personal element in native administration, and many African chiefs had felt free, at least to a certain extent, to discuss their problems with him, under Responsible Government, there was

in Ixopo divisions complained that they were afraid they would be arrested if they spoke openly before the Commission, and N.I.A.C., pp. 804-5.

1 See above, c. I, p. 51 ff.
little possibility of Africans bypassing any link in the chain.

Despite the limitations of the system, the government, on its side, generally derived its ideas of what was happening in the non-white areas from the reports of the local magistrate. The reliability of this source of information was of the utmost importance, for on it Government action depended, and, to a considerable extent, during the disturbances, so did military action. There were undoubtedly some very fine men in the Natal civil service, and what follows should not be construed as some special form of magisterial wickedness; nevertheless it is also clear that, as the Natal Native Affairs Commission remarked, Africans regarded the magistrates "not as their friends and protectors, but simply as the punishers of wrong-doers and the collectors of taxes".  

Ilanga lase Natal went much further, and called them bluntly "the oppressors of the natives".  

Natal—Zululand was divided in 1906 into forty-one magisterial districts. The magistrates, who had jurisdiction over all the inhabitants of their respective districts, were appointed by the Department of Justice, whose servants they were. Their actions with regard to the African population however were directed and

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2 3.7.08. The article was entitled "Inonje Amadoda amans" and translated in SNA 1/1/4052077.
controlled by the Department of Native Affairs. According to
the permanent head of the Native Affairs Department, the
Under-Secretary for Native Affairs, S. O. Samuelson, he was
not consulted as a matter of routine on their appointment, and
had no say, even when they were appointed over large native
areas.¹ Many magistrates could not speak Zulu and were com-
pletely dependent on their court headman or induna.² A large
number of them had no legal training and according to Samuelson their
appointments were unjustifiable. There were not infrequent
allegations that magistrates got appointed through political
favouritism — not surprisingly in view of the paucity of able
administrators in the colony. Because of the dual nature of
their functions, the magistrates were generally overworked and
underpaid, while the Africans got the fag-end of their time and
attention.³ For administrative ability there was a tendency
to substitute the lash, and to regret the passing of the good
old hanging days in Zululand.⁴

¹Evid., N.H.A.C., p. 654.
²Ibid. Evid., J. C. C. Chadwick, p. 469.
³Ibid., and p. 32, Evid., S. O. Samuelson.
⁴Cf. for example A 60 1/7/63, R. H. Addison, Magistrate, to W. S.
Bigby (Asst. Prosecutor in Dinamalu’s case) 5.4.07, in which he
regretted the passing of the old days in Zululand, when he had
seen “six men hanged before breakfast in the sight of a lot of
natives”. R. H. Addison was appointed in 1909 one of the four
Native Commissioners in Natal, chosen for their knowledge of the
African population under F. R. Moor’s reform of native administration.
In Zululand there were fewer complaints of the quality of magistrates, this was perhaps because there were fewer white settlers contending for magisterial attention and subjecting him to their pressure, perhaps because of the personality of the Commissioner of Native Affairs in Zululand from 1897 to 1909, Sir Charles Saunders, who was a firm but not unsympathetic paternalist, intelligent and capable. All the same, drawn as they were from the settler population, and being part of a unified Natal-Zululand civil service, the difference was one of degree rather than of kind. In general, the magistrates shared fully in the settler stereotypes of Africans and in its views on most subjects, especially in its pre-occupation with the questions of land, labour and stock-theft. When the magistrates were asked in 1904 for their opinions on the various laws under which Africans were governed, the bulk of their suggestions sounded remarkably like those of any Natal Farmers' Congress: raising native taxation, increasing the sentences for breaches of the Masters and Servants Law, and for stock theft (penalties which the Colonial Office had already called somewhat "Draconian" by comparison with those of the Cape), introducing flogging for

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1 In 1898 for example according to the Gov., Sir Henry Hely-Hutchinson, magistrates considered it infra dig to sit on a bench with chiefs (Under a Procln. of 1894, Zululand, this had been a first court of appeal). As a result, the composition of the Appeal Court was changed. See CO 179/203/10087, Gov. to H.W. Just, Private, 12.5.90.

2 CO 179/195/16201, Minute on desp. 123, Gov. to Sec. St., 9.7.96.
several new offences, and further limiting the grant of certificates of exemption from Native Law to educated Africans. ¹

The exceptions, men like J. Y. Gibson, who was magistrate at Richmond at the beginning of the disturbances, became unpopular with the Europeans in their district, and were liable to be transferred to less desirable posts by a Government sensitive to white public opinion. ² This indeed happened to Gibson for querying the necessity for the Courts Martial in the early days of the disturbances. ³ By and large, the magistrates had neither the will nor the desire to resist local opinion.

Both because they were overworked and because it was natural that magistrates should devote more of their attention to the dominant white community, the magistrates tended to rely on the police, spies or their own court induna for information about the African population. According to Judge Beaumont of Natal, the only officials really in touch with the African population were the police, who were, if anything, even more unsympathetic to the non-white population and out of favour with

¹See e.g. Reports of Magistrates to S.W.A., 1/1/309512.
²SMA 1/1/3671116. Reports to U.S.W.A of Asst. Magis. H. C. Colenbrander 26/1.07 and Major J. J. Field, 10.1.07 refer to this possibility.
³PM 56-236. J. Warwick (Richmond) to P.M., 2.4.06 and Govt. Gazette, 16.5.06, p.576.
them. It was the police-spy - both African and European - and, during the disturbances and after, the military spy or 'intelligence agent', who so often brought alarming rumours to the ear of the magistrate. In 1897, Sir James Liege Halett, then Secretary for Native Affairs, had instituted a system of specially paid Africans to report on the various tales of unrest which were reaching the government, as he felt that insufficient information was coming from the ordinary police and magistrates. The Intelligence Agent used during the disturbances varied from men like Captain James Stuart, who undoubtedly had a fine knowledge of Zulu language and custom, and was fairly disinterested, to local traders in Zululand, whose objectivity, disinterestedness and knowledge are open to considerable doubt. The Militia Intelligence which originated during the disturbances, was put on a firm basis at the end of 1906, and became a regular means of obtaining information.

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3 See above, Introduction, p.21

4 Like W. Calverley and E. Tittlestad.

Even the police-spy system was regarded as dangerous by some magistrates, who, after 1894, were no longer in charge of the police, and resented "... men prowling through their districts in search of information on some subject about which they have been told nothing".¹ This removal of the supervision of the police from the magistrates, while probably necessary with the increasing complexity of administration, was the cause of much dissatisfaction amongst magistrates, from the Commissioner of Native Affairs in Zululand downwards.² The militia spy system was probably even more questionable as a means of obtaining accurate information. In 1908, Sir Matthew Nathan was to remark after a particularly flagrant case in which a spy had deliberately tried to bait a prominent chief into seditious utterances:

"I have no doubt that if the views of these fishers in muddy waters are acted upon, it will not be long before we have trouble in the country again."³

While this view was hotly contested by ministers, there seems to be considerable substance to it. Part of the difficulty in knowing exactly what was going on amongst the African population in this period is that so much of what was reported was little more

¹ZA Conf. J. Y. Gibson to C.H.A.
²See Evid. C. Saunders, N.H.A.C., p.130. Also Evid. p. 686, J.C.C. Chadwick, Judge, Native High Court.
³PMC 10560, Minute to P.M., 27.2.08.
than unsifted rumour or idle beer-drink gossip. The situation was further complicated by the not unnatural desire of the African informant to give magistrates information which either suited his own particular interests, whether tribal or personal, or, as has already been mentioned, information which he thought would accord with the magistrate's own views and predilections. It is probably in this way that one can account for the totally different and incompatible pictures which were frequently held of the same chief by magistrates in neighbouring divisions. One would report that a particular chief was insolent and seditious, another that he was helpful and friendly. An area reported by one man to be seething with rebellion, would be reported by another quiet and peaceful. The significance of this during the disturbances once troops were actually operating on the basis of information received in this way hardly needs stressing.

The character of the magistrates was of particular importance as the permanent head of the Native Affairs Department, S. O. Samuelson, was not the kind of man to introduce any kind of rigour into his department. Reports were therefore forwarded by magistrates which often had no further basis than the prejudices

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1 For an elaboration of this theme see below, Chapter VI.
2 See below, p. 319.
and preconceptions, even the fantasies, of the particular magistrate in charge. Samuelson, the son of a Norwegian missionary, had an excellent knowledge of the Zulu language and a considerable, if somewhat biased, understanding of African customary law. He appears to have been a rather characterless individual, however, with few, if any, original thoughts. There was a similarity, extending even to phraseology, between his thought and that of the 1852-3 Natal Native Affairs Commission, while in 1908 the *Christian Express* was to cause something of a sensation by publishing next to his testimony before the Natal Native Affairs Commission of 1906-7, the exact sources from which it had been derived, sentence by sentence, if not word for word. The article was entitled "The Deadly Parallel": Samuelson in turn created something of a stir by publishing his answer to the Natal Native Affairs Commission Report in the Natal Government Gazette, also at the beginning of 1908. This step was hardly calculated to increase the confidence of those who saw the implementation of the Commission report as the only hope for a reform of Natal native administration and

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1S. M. Samuelson, one of the first Anglican missionaries to enter Zululand, in 1861. He founded the mission state of St. Paul's. Another of his sons, H. C. A. Samuelson, gained renown in the trials of Mzimahla both in 1886-9 and in 1908-9 (see below). A daughter, L. H. Samuelson published a couple of books on Zulu customs and folklore.

2See above, pp. 55-56 and below, p. 239-240
it led to Sir Matthew Nathan's expressing strong doubts as to the soundness of Samuelson's judgment. By April 1908 he went so far as to write to Roderick Jones "I have absolutely no belief in Samuelson." Nathan's predecessor as Governor, Sir Henry McCallum had already expressed his doubts on the subject.

Yet Samuelson was in charge of Native Affairs in Natal from 1893 to 1908. Not surprisingly he saw his own function as simply to carry out the different policies of the various political heads of his department. As a result he was known to many Africans as Yumasonke—one who agrees to all—and Ndambili—Mr. Facing—both-ways. In so far as he can be said to have had a philosophy of his own, it consisted in "separate development," "progress along parallel lines" and greatly increased powers for the Supreme Chief and his subordinates.

1 Nathan MSS 368, Nathan to Salborne, 21.1.08.
2 Nathan MSS 368, p. 88, 8.4.08. Jones was Reuter's correspondent in South Africa.
3 Nathan MSS 401, p.234. Paper marked "Native Affairs Confidential" n.d. and unsigned, but it appears almost certainly to be a memorandum from McCallum to his successor.
4 SWA 1/1/395 270 08, Minute Samuelson.
5 ABN 111/1/3, p.522, J. D. Taylor to Dr. Strong, 1.5.07 and R. A. Hanwick, "Why the Natives Rebelled", I, Rand Daily Mail, 20.9.06.
6 Evid. N.N.A.C., p.644 ff.
He believed that the only way of ensuring control over the African population was by securing their "unswerving and implicit obedience to constituted authority". For the Under-Secretary, there were only three ways of governing South Africa: government by one white section, by both white sections (i.e. English- and Dutch-speaking) or by the black section of the community. The fourth possibility of government by both the white and black sections of the population, even on the modest and limited scale attempted by the Cape, was not considered even for the remote future. When the 1906-7 Natal Native Affairs Commission suggested that regular meetings be held between magistrates and chiefs or headmen, in order to improve the obvious lack of communication between the administrators and their subjects, Samuelson objected most strenuously. He feared such meetings would lead to complaints against the farmers and officials, and that in order to satisfy the complaints, the country would have to be handed over to the Zulu, so that "the keynote to Ethiopianism, 'Africa for the Africans', may be realised even sooner than the natives would like to do so."


2 Govt. notice no. 39, 21st Jan. 1908. See p. 228 above.

3 Ibid.
In these views, Samuelson did not differ greatly from his political masters, who were even less likely to exert the necessary control over the magistrates. Most of them combined the portfolio of Minute of Native Affairs with another, and had neither the time nor the inclination to intervene on behalf of the Africans. The dangers of the situation were, however, highlighted in 1910 when Natal had become part of the Union of South Africa, and an 'outsider' had a look at the way in which she conducted her affairs. In that year the magistrate of Nkandla division fined Chief Siswana of the Biyela tribe for not reporting certain rumours to him. He further recommended the chief's deposition and his removal from the district for "general unreliability" and for "sitting on the fence" during the 1906 disturbances. His recommendations were supported without further question by the Acting Under Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, until the latter was specifically instructed to enquire into the matter by the Union Minister of Native Affairs, Henry Burton. As a result of this enquiry, the Natal Under-Secretary withdrew his support for the magistrate, finding that since the latter's assumption of office in the Nkandla division, Siswana had done nothing to warrant the proposed action against

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1 SNA 1/4/22 16 Minutes.
him. In view of what has been said as to the importance of the
magistrate as government informant on native affairs, and what
will be discussed below on the subject of rumour, Burton's
further comment on this episode is of considerable interest.
While noting the Under-Secretary's reversal of opinion, he con­tinued:

"...the Minister cannot allow so serious a dis­
closure to pass without observing that it is a
matter of grave concern and no little disquietude
that a local responsible officer, should, by
making ... 'a mountain out of a molehill' mislead
the Government as to the state of feeling amongst
the Natives, and persist in urging a course of
action which had it been pursued would have involved
the Department in a deeper travesty of justice than
it would appear had already taken place.

It is to be deplored that the Magistrate took
serious heed of a rumour without sifting it, with­
ot making sure of his grounds for reporting it and
without apparently taking such steps as would have
been reasonable to make the truth known and dispel
any possible alarm. He did wrong in representing idle
talk to the government in the light of facts of grave
concern..."2

The pathetically small white population of Natal was prone
to see sedition in the merest whisper of criticism from the
African population. There is, it would seem, a natural tendency

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1For speculations as to the sources of this kind of "information"
see below, Chapter VI, p. 405ff. where similar allegations against
other 'loyal' chiefs are discussed in a different context.

2SNA 1/4/22 018/10, Acting S.W.A. (Union) to Acting U.S.W.A. Natal,
24.12.10.
of the white settler to become authoritarian and despotic in his relationship with conquered colonial people. This can be seen very clearly in Natal. The psychological security of the white community depended upon the unquestioning acceptance of their superiority by the Africans. Any questioner – black or white – was considered as an extreme threat. R. C. Samuelsion, for example, who was one of Dinwidi's defence team, complained bitterly afterwards that his participation in the Chief's defence completely ruined his law practice, and that he was socially and professionally ostracised by the community. The animus shown against Harriet Colenso, the Chief's foremost defender, was even fiercer, though this may well have been related to her own passionate and partisan nature.

This reaction to criticism was also embodied in the extreme sensitivity which was felt towards lawyers appearing in African law-suits. Officials justified their reluctance to allow lawyers from appearing in African cases on the grounds that lawyers were unknown in African customary law, and that many second-rate lawyers made a living by fleecing their gullible African clientele. Nevertheless, while these reasons were partly

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1 Col. Col. 202, Correspondence R. C. Samuelson to H. E. Coleson, 29.7.10.
3 See e.g. N.N.C. Evidence, p.10, S. O. Samuelson. Also SMA 1/1/309 529 ø49 suggested alterations by magistrates of various native laws 8.3.04.
true, behind them appears to lie a dislike of any questioning of the authority of the magistrate, even where his actions were disapproved of the higher white authorities. Thus in 1904, when the magistrate J. W. Cross was under fire from the government for a tactless speech, the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum expressed the hope that the Colonial Office would not make their disapproval known as it

"would affect his prestige amongst the natives of the Colony. You will recognise ... how important it is in the interests of law and order among the natives that the authority of the magistrate be upheld as far as possible."

For the same reason, many magistrates opposed appeals from magisterial decisions in native cases to the Native High Court or the Supreme Court of the colony.

Under these circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that fear of an African uprising in Natal was "strong, enduring and, at times, almost pathological", from the very beginning of its colonial history. Rumours that the Africans were about to rise were accelerated and aggravated at times of particular stress. Droughts, depressions, crises in neighbouring states —

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1 GO 179/229/19920, Gov. to Sec. St., Conf. 2, 2.5.0.4.
all these produced their crop of rumours of an intended massacre of whites by blacks. Innumerable warnings to this effect appear in the files of the Secretary for Native Affairs.

How the perennial reports of a native uprising - which one experienced magistrated called "an annual hysteria" - were spread, was suggested by the Acting Assistant Magistrate of the City (Pietermaritzburg) division, when he stated in his Annual Report for 1905 that they were

"simply 'engineered' by interested parties who had some ulterior object in view, such as the removal of the restriction on the possession of firearms by a section of the community (a reference to the disarmament of the Boers during and after the Anglo-Boer War) or the establishment of a policy camp in the district or a garrison of troops or militia may be thought to be good for the trade of a district. The interested party sets the ball rolling by a sensational letter or two to the papers on some real or imaginary action by some chief or natives which he ingeniously makes out to be an indication of unrest... He talks of the matter in confidence to some nervous official or other person, hinting that he knows a good deal more than he cares to tell ... These nervous people make enquiries from the natives and write to the papers and babble on about it generally before children and other thoughtless people who in their turn question the natives and so on until the natives themselves get alarmed as they know of no cause on their part for it and talk about it among themselves. Someone hears them discussing the question and immediately comes to the conclusion that they are going to rise, and tells his friends and probably writes a letter to the papers and so it goes on and the natives themselves begin to wonder ... whether it may not be the white people

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1 SNA 1/4/14 051/05, Minute J.M. Mathews Dundee, 6.12.05.
who are going to rise and turn them out .... The educated natives read the letters in the paper and probably only half understand them and put their own construction on them and give them to their unlettered brethren, and thus the mystery grows deeper and deeper and suspicion of each other's intentions is engendered between black and white."

The above quotation has been given at length, because it is such a good analysis of the way in which rumour can snowball from a mere trifle. It is however an oversimplification to see rumour as always 'engineered' by interested parties. There were, it is true, specific incidents to which the Assistant Magistrate was alluding in the above extract, and one can sometimes trace a rumour to one individual. Thus in 1903 for example when the entire Greytown district was shaken by a tale that the Africans were about to rise, it was all apparently started by one man who had just returned from Rhodesia, where he had participated in quelling the rebellions of 1896-8. Similarly during the actual disturbances, the entire Melmoth and Eshowe districts suddenly became panic-stricken over a report that all Africans were going to join the rebels on or before the next full moon. According to the Commissioner for Native Affairs, it was sparked off by Col. Wools-Sampson, a man

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2 SMA 1/4/12 077, W. R. Wilson to Lt. Col. Lugg, Natal Mounted Rifles 27.7.03 and to G. Plowman, 13.8.03, and SMA 1/4/1283 A Barrater to Chief Commissioner of Police, Greytown, 3.8.03.
in high military command in Natal at the time, who had a particularly fevered imagination on this subject. In neither of these two instances however were the individuals doing more than giving expression to their own inner fears and fantasies.

The significance of the rumours aroused by Woolls-Sampson however can be gauged from Sir Charles Saunders' remarks on this alarum in Zululand that as a result as far as he could gauge the situation at the time, "we are far more in danger of such a rising being initiated by ourselves than by our supposed enemies."2

Before the Boer War, the magistrate of Nkandla was to write to the Resident Commissioner in Zululand that there was considerable agitation among the Boers of the districts bordering Zululand who talked of an imminent African uprising and feared that they were all going to be massacred on Christmas day. In accordance with this belief several Boers were trekking from Biggarsberg to the Orange Free State. This was a time of great tension between Briton and Boer in South Africa, and, in addition, the farmers of the Zulu border lands were eager to acquire even

1ZA 28, Papers re Zulu Rebellion, C.M.A. to R. H. Addison, 16.6.06.
2Cd 3027, p.79. Encl. 7 in desp. 114, no. 4, C.M.A. to P.M., 7.6.06.
3The frequency of Christmas as the critical day is partly accounted for by its being in the middle of the very hot Natal summer, and of the Zulu planting season which is generally a lean period for the African population.
more Zulu land, so that the magistrate’s remark that he would “be disposed to think that there is a conspiracy among the Boers to bring about some difficulty between the British Government and the Native population” was certainly plausible. He added however a remark that goes to the heart of the ambiguity of all these rumours — “The thing that puzzles me is the apparent evidence that they believe in what they profess to fear”.¹

A frontier society and a divided society is always subject to rumours, and Natal was still in some ways a frontier society. Nowhere else in South Africa were blacks and whites so closely intermingled and yet so apart.² Surrounded on all sides by the large African populations of Zululand, Swaziland, Basutoland and the Eastern Cape, within the colony itself the location system set up a further series of frontiers between white and black. These densely populated areas, physically bordering on the areas of white settlement, were yet terra incognita to the majority of the white settlers. The fact that many locations were “natural strongholds” from which it was believed that Zulu armies “could sweep the country in a single night and return with their plunder” was as much a source of anxiety and suspicion in

²C.W. de Kiewiet, The Imperial factor in S. Africa (1st. ed. 1937, C.U.P.), p.188. Written of the late 1870’s this statement was if anything even truer of the situation at the turn of the century.
Moreover while in the early days, the separate administration of Africans and Europeans under different codes of law was a practical and administrative necessity, the Natalians made a virtue out of necessity; as a result, the system lost that flexibility intended by the provision of terms whereby 'civilised' Africans could be exempted from the operation of native law. \(^2\)

Believing they had the best form of native administration in South Africa, the Natalians failed to realise that whatever the advantages of their method, this separate social and legal framework both perpetuated the existing barriers between the two groups and in many ways contributed to the tensions between them. It obscured the fact that Africans were no longer only governed under customary law, but also under a host of legislative enactments passed in the interests of the white electorate. Land could no longer be distributed freely by chiefs, and the traditional bases of their powers had been to some extent upset. \(^3\) Demands for African labour and taxation had no parallels in tribal life, and with the grant of Responsible Government to Natal, the belief

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\(^1\) SNA 1/4/1296, Memo. on native affairs by S. O. Samuelson to Commandant of Militia, 1903. The words used are identical to those in the 1852-3 Native Affairs Commission, p.17.

\(^2\) See above, Chapter I, p.83-85
that the colony was governing the African population according to their own beliefs and customs became even more of a fiction. This myth of 'parallel development' also obscured the fundamental fact that by the turn of the century both Africans and Europeans were subject to the same economic vicissitudes. Despite outward appearances, the two communities were interdependent, and economically and even culturally could not fail to influence one another.

Amongst the better informed in Natal, there was, in general, a greater understanding of African tribal life and less of a tendency to condemn it out of hand than say in the Cape.\(^1\) J. W. Shepstone,\(^2\) brother of Sir Theophilus, was to go so far as to remark to the South African Native Affairs Commission, that he thought the tribal system "well-night perfect".\(^3\) On the other hand, by constantly thinking in terms of the group, rather than the individual, and by failing to come to terms with the problems of transition and change, the Natal 'system' was exceptionally favourable to the formation of stereotypes and race prejudices. Across the barriers, each group's notion of the other became hazy and suspicious.

\(^1\) Cf. for example J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, or the writings of M. S. Evans on this point.

\(^2\) He was S.N.A. in Natal 1875-1884.

\(^3\) Vol. III, p.115. See also S.A.N.A.C., Vol. III passim, H.L.A. Debates (cf. Vol. III, p.68, where the Min. for Agriculture in 1903 congratulated the colony on our "all but, if not quite, blameless" native policy).
As Gordon Allport has pointed out, ethnic rumour is a highly sensitive barometer of group tension; he goes so far as to state it as a sociological law that "no riot or lynching occurs without its accompaniment of rumour".¹ The prevalence therefore of these rumours amongst both sections of the community in Natal, is an indication of the underlying distrust and the apprehension felt by each as to the intentions of the other.

For some members of both the black and white communities, prophecies of a native uprising may have been an expression of wishful thinking, for others the projection of their own hostility, and yet to others a reflection of their deepest and most genuine fears.²

With the attempts by Imperial governments to impose their authority on colonial territories in a real sense for the first time, the turn of the century had seen a spate of colonial rebellions and wars in many parts of Africa; the upheavals in Uganda in 1897, the Ashanti War, the Mahdist Revolt in the Sudan, the Sierra Leone Hut Tax rebellions, and, closer home, the Shona-Ndebele rebellions and the campaigns waged by the Germans in East Africa in


the 90's and in South West Africa in the next decade. Though the causes of all these events differed widely, both between themselves and from the situation in Natal, voices were not wanting to point out that what had happened elsewhere in Africa, to say nothing of the United States, would shortly happen in Natal. The Natal colonists were outnumbered by non-whites in the ratio of 1:10, a fact brought home by the 1904 census, the first complete count of the non-white population to be held. Determined to maintain their position and privileges as the ruling race at any cost and against any odds, they constantly felt themselves threatened.

While there were many rumours even before the Boer War, and especially during the difficult years of agricultural disaster which plagued the country just before its outbreak, this feeling of insecurity was certainly increased in large measure by the war itself. Whites all over South Africa feared that the spectacle of white men fighting one another could not but encourage African insurrection. In Natal in August, 1902, the Governor implored the Imperial government to leave garrisons at Pietermaritzburg.

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1 According to Sir Henry McCallum, the failure of the Germans to put down the uprising in Damaraland (i.e. amongst the Herero in S.W.A.) was a major cause of the disturbances in Natal, Gov. to Sec. St., 21.6.06, Col. 3247, no.1.


3 See above, Chapter III.

and Newcastle to defend the colony against a Zulu rising for it was said "that the war has brought the inevitable conflict between the black and white races nearer by twenty years."1

This fear of the dire effects of 'white men's wars' upon the 'native mind' is a recurrent theme in colonial Africa. While such fears may be exaggerated, there can be little doubt that European wars do have their repercussions on subject peoples, although perhaps for different reasons than those generally believed by whites. According to Ndabaningi Sithole, the fact that during World War II Africans saw "the so-called civilised and peaceful and orderly white people mercilessly butchering one another, just as his so-called savage ancestors had done... had a revolutionising psychological impact..."2 Professor Shepperson has recorded the similar impact made by World War I, especially on those Africans actually involved in it.3 But while these wars have undoubtedly encouraged Africans to look afresh at European pretensions and assumptions of superiority (as indeed in many cases they have led Europeans so to do) and have led to an awakening of African

1 CO 179/223/36293, Gov. to Sec. St., 6.8.02, no. 213.
nationalism in many areas, it was not simply the fighting, nor indeed "the familiar way in which the natives were treated by the soldiers ... [which] engendered feelings of contempt... [and] lessened [the Europeans] in the eyes of the natives".¹

In both World Wars, allied propaganda was directed against dictatorship and towards spreading the ideals of democracy and equity. This in itself was an important message to colonial people, for many of whom the distinction between paternalism and tyranny must have been fine. And British propaganda during the Boer War was not dissimilar to that in the World Wars. Among the ostensible reasons for the South African war, was the desire to free the oppressed Uitlanders from Kruger's 'tyranny' and to ameliorate the condition of his non-white subjects.² Africans can hardly be blamed for taking this propaganda seriously, though in some areas it apparently led to a belief that the Africans would be able to take over the position and property of the defeated Boers.³ The more sophisticated however noted the paradox between the declared aims of the British in the Transvaal

¹Sir Charles Saunders, C.M.G. Zululand, to J. Stuart, 5.12.06, Stuart Papers, (U.C.L.)
²See e.g. H. L. Le Hay, British Domination in South Africa 1899–1907, p.34 citing Lord Salisbury's statement of war aims, 4th Earl Deb., lxviii 257.
and the practice of the British colonists of Natal; as a corresp
pondent to Ilanga lase Natal wrote, when commenting on the dictatorial,
and, to his mind, biassed administration of the law by the Assistant
Magistrate at Umzinto, F. E. Foxon:

"If he is competent, must we understand that he
allows himself to be so carried away by bitter
feelings against a native .... that he forgets
what is expected of him? .... His very action ...
would have been held up by the same people (i.e.
the Natal colonists who applaud his severe sen-
tences) as one of the main reasons why Kruger's
government should have come to an end, had this
been done in the Transvaal."

Nor did Africans fail to point out the very different handling
they received from the Imperial Government once the war was over
as compared with the treatment meted out to the Boers, who had
actually fought against the British.

As a result of the white fears as to the way that the Boer
War would undermine the prestige of the white man, it was con-
stantly Natal's policy to maintain that it was solely a 'White
man's war' and to advise the African population not to partici-
pate in it, despite at times very considerable provocation. Much

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1See e.g. Ipupa lo Ilanga, 14.12.00., transl. in SNA 1/4/8 01901.

2F. E. Foxon: magistrate of Umzinto from 1897. In 1903 he had 102 out
of 135 sentences on participants in a faction fight reversed by the
Native High Court. (Minute, Prosecutor N.H. Court to Attorney General
17.6.03 re faction fight in Alexandra County, SNA 1/1/3022012 .) In
1904 he was apparently responsible for sentencing a 10 year old child
to 2 years Hard Labour and 15 lashes for stealing a goat (Natal Witness

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indignation was aroused in the colony by Colonel Bottomley's use of the Zulu as scouts and to raid the Transvaal-Zululand borders in the Dhleke expedition. It was felt that the "methods of native warfare are barbarous at all times" and that it was impossible "to restrain natives and keep them under control, even if officered by whites". It is interesting, but as we shall see, probably more coincidence than direct result, that the major area of conflict in 1906 was in the Mzandla and Nqutu districts of Zululand, which had been invaded and raided by the Boers during the War. On the other hand, the Ladysmith, Newcastle and Dundee areas of Natal which were the scene of the most bitter fighting in Natal during the Boer War, did not witness further violence in 1906.

On the whole there was very little in African behaviour during the war to merit the charges against the barbarous nature of their warfare. Yet the worst fears of the whites appeared to be justified by an incident on the 6th May, 1902, when a party of Boers was heavily defeated by Zulu at Holkrants in the Vryheid.

8.9.04). In 1906 he was once again singled out for personal attack by Ilanga lase Natal.

Letter from Umuntu Omosisi, 21.8.03.


1 CH 569, G 234/00, P.M. to Gov., Minute no. 3, 14.2.00.

See below, Chapter V,
district. The episode was the culminating point of a long period of hostility between the Zulu and the Boers in the district which dated back to the 'annexation' of the New Republic by the Boers in the eighties. During the Boer War, the Africans had been angered by the requisitioning of their horses and cattle by the Boers, who had failed to give receipts. According to Lieut. Col. Mills, who was appointed by the British government to enquire into the incident, entire herds had been acquired this way. Africans were said to have been shot for trivial offences without trial, sometimes simply on the suspicion that they were spies for the British. When in March-April, 1902 a Zulu impi came into the area, it encouraged local people to settle old scores. Goaded beyond endurance by the taunts of the Boer Commandant, three hundred Africans fell upon the Boer encampment and killed fifty-six of the seventy men there. They themselves suffered the loss of fifty-two killed and forty-eight wounded.

This incident, reawakening latent memories of the battles of Dingane and the Voortrekkers, of Weenen and Blood River, as well as of the more recent experiences of the Zulu War, left deep scars in Natal. The Boers especially desired revenge for the "massacre

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1 See above Chapter II, p. 102.

of Holkraats. General Botha called it "the foulest deed of the War";¹ according to Lieut. Col. Mills

"Every Boer expresses the most bitter hatred of the Zulus. They all express a wish that the Zulus would rise now while the British troops are in the country so that they may be practically wiped out. The Boers all say that in the event of a rising, every one of them would join the British troops in order to have a chance of paying off old scores against the Zulus ... when I first came here I visited farms and asked the Boers what they thought of the advisability of keeping troops here. They all said it was most necessary, as they were afraid of the Kaffirs and it would not be safe to stay on their farms if the troops withdrew ... Taking everything into consideration I cannot help being forced to the opinion that many Boers intend to provoke a Zulu rising if they can do so ...."²

These views were corroborated by the Commissioner for Native Affairs in Zululand and the Magistrate of Wdyheid, A. J. Shepstone. They both felt that the many rumours of a native uprising in the Northern Provinces which were annexed to Natal after the War, were deliberately fostered by the Boers, both in order to provoke the Zulu and also so that they might get back the arms which had been confiscated during the war.³ There certainly was a most prevalent post-war rumour amongst both black and white

¹GH 179/229/3558, Botha to Acting High Commissioner, Sub. encl. in 1, desp. 4, 6.1.04.
²GH 513 C 818/02, Conf. Lieut. C. A. Mills to Chief Staff Officer, Natal (Wakata), 1.7.02.
that, now that the issue between Boer and Briton had been settled, they were going to join hands "to teach the natives a lesson".

At the time of the 1906 disturbances, many Natalians, including James Stuart and Sir Charles Saunders, pointed to the Holkrants episode as the beginning of African restlessness, although in fact the Qalusi, the actual people involved, played no part in later events.\(^1\) This is of particular interest as the Qalusi\(^2\) were among Dimnulu's "most reliable and devoted followers".\(^3\) Towards the end of 1907, when rumours as to Dimnulu's intentions were once more rife, and troops were despatched for his arrest, there were again many rumours of an impending uprising in the Vryheid district to assist him.\(^4\) Despite this, however, when the troops carried out their search there for unregistered firearms and for incriminating evidence against Dimnulu, they met with no active resistance.\(^5\)

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\(^2\) The Qalusi were immediate followers of Cetezwayo and Dimnulu, cut off from their chief by the Boer 'New Republic' in 1884. See above, Chapter II, p. 102.

\(^3\) A A 29, C.H.A. to Acting P.M., 5.5.07.

\(^4\) CO 179/242/4454, Encl. 8, desp. Secr. Gov. to Sec. St., 30.11.07, tel. P.M. to Gov. 29.11.07.

\(^5\) See below, Chapter 7.
Boers in the Northern Provinces apart, the post-Boer War depression exacerbated the tensions in the rest of Natal also, and whites who felt insecure economically tended to express excessive fears about the hostile intentions of the African population. It is a commonplace among social psychologists that in a situation of economic insecurity, the members of the group which finds itself threatened try to find a more immediate object for their anger than abstract economic forces, and turn it against a socially accepted scapegoat in their midst.¹ In order to justify their own aggressive and largely irrational fears and feelings, the colonists found good reason in the 'insolence' and 'insubordination' of the African population, who were said to be seething with sedition and rebellion.

At the same time, Africans were also experiencing the economic depression, and were expressing their discontent in a host of millenial, or premillenial, fantasies, which in turn strengthened and confirmed white suspicions. Amongst Africans two broad categories of rumour can be distinguished: the first expressed their longing for a messianic-type saviour, who would

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rescue them from their woes, the second their conviction that
the whites were planning action against them — the converse of
the 'native uprising' rumour. Natal's military preparations
after the Boer War to make good the removal of the Imperial
forces; the compulsory conscription introduced under the Militia
Act of 1903,¹ and its concomitants of annual military camps;
the calling up of the reserves and their patrols through the
African locations — all these led to a spate of nervous rumours.
In 1902 it was believed by Africans in Durban that they were
going to be turned out before Christmas because of an impending
struggle between black and white.² The belief was apparently
related to the scheme under discussion by the Town Council to
erect barracks for Togt (day) Labourers. A similar rumour arose
in the following year as a result of the plague that had broken
out in Natal, and the measures taken to combat it.³

New legislation and government proclamations affecting
Africans, so many of which were transmitted only accidentally,

¹See below, Chapter V.
²SHA 1/4/10 0102/02, Report Special no. 4 and Special no. 5, 02.
³SHA 1/4/12 054 U.S.N.A. 31.5.03, Report of two natives visiting
Durban, and 042 U.S.N.A. 5.6.03, Information of native doctor,
PMG 124/144/03, p.55 (Correspondence book), P.M. to Mayor of Durban,
11.8.03.
similarly led to much anxiety. As forty-eight new laws and several new regulations affecting Africans were passed between 1893 and 1906, and native policy was a constant source of discussion in the newspapers and amongst whites in general, it is not surprising that these formed the subject of innumerable rumours amongst a semi-literate population to whom they were of intense importance and considerable ambiguity. The 1904 census was of especial concern: according to a report by a native police sergeant, "The Africans say that the Census is for an evil purpose and the Volunteer Force formed for the purpose of exterminating or making slaves of the blacks and thus the black races must cohere against a common foe." The Africans appeared more susceptible to this kind of rumour after the Boer War; Sir Charles Saunders attributed this to the fact that far more Africans were now reading the newspapers from which so many of the rumours emanated — but the economic factors noted above, 

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1 H.N.A.O., Rept. 1906-7, pp. 5 and 11.

2 Acc. Allport, *The Psychology of Rumour*, p.15, one of the dominant factors causing the spread of rumour amongst a particular group on any topic is its importance and its ambiguity.


4 SNA 1/4/14 0059 05, C.H.A. to H.N.A., 7.12.05.
as well as a certain disappointment that their position had not been improved at the end of the Boer War, may have been equally significant factors.

At the centre of the premillennial rumours amongst the Africans and of the 'native uprising' rumours amongst the whites was Dinisulu, officially only a petty chief, but in the minds and hearts of many, both black and white, still the 'Child', son and heir of Cetshwayo, King of the Zulu, and scion of the house of Shaka and Dingane.

The traditional hostility and fear felt by the majority of Natal colonists for the Zulu Royal House were amongst the reasons why "the ever-lasting bug-bear about Dinisulu inciting or being associated with a supposed native rising" should have been disseminated long before the outbreak of 1906. Deep suspicion of this "spoilt native" was felt by most Natalians, who were sure that the effects of the familiarity with which Dinisulu had been treated by the Governor of St. Helena and of the European tastes he had acquired while in exile could not fail to be deleterious. The fact that he was responsible for arresting a couple of whites for illicit trading with the Boers during the Boer War

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1 ZA 54 CR 1890, to H.F.A., 19.12.05.

2 Cf Stuart, History of Zulu Rebellion, p. 110. Stuart's views were probably more generous than those of most Natalians; he wrote of Dinisulu's treatment in St. Helena, "The Governor of the island, with no sense of the fitness of things, treated him just as he might have done Napoleon. The result was he was neither savage nor civilised. He was 'spoilt'."
was said to have antagonised all settlers and traders in the area, whether pro- or anti-Boer. ¹ Immediately after the war reports were circulated that he had hidden the guns and cattle captured during the Ibleke expedition and was going to fight rather than give them up. A stockade built quite legitimately during the war as a defence, and huts built to house the men used by the British troops were also the objects of much suspicion on the part of whites, ² and perhaps wishful thinking on the part of blacks.

The activities of the Zululand Delimitation Commission in the years immediately after the war increased the feeling of tension in Zululand and contributed to the unrest. ³ Even the Cape newspaper Iambo, which did not generally treat Natal-Zululand affairs in any detail, remarked on the grossly exaggerated reports of unrest from Zululand, which it felt could only end in disaster. ⁴

¹Col. Col 98, Statements Samuelson, pp. 157-6, Samsoni alias Nkipo ka Nhatshevena.
²SMA 1/4/10 C1902, Numerous intelligence reports.
⁴8.7.03.
Sir Charles Saunders, the Commissioner for Native Affairs, protested several times at the persistent exploitation of rumours of unrest associated with Dinusulu's name, all of which emanated from Natal, and especially from the Natal press. He maintained there was not an iota of truth in any of them.

Nevertheless the allegations went on. Saunders's view that they all emanated from Natal is probably too simple, as indeed was Harriett Colenço's opinion that they were part of a Natal conspiracy to get rid of Dinusulu. It seems far more likely that Europeans were picking up and misinterpreting the millennial fantasies current amongst the Zulu people. Thus there were reports of the hundreds of messengers Dinusulu was supposed to be sending to every part of Natal and Zululand. According to spy reports, their purpose was to foment unrest and enlist aid for Dinusulu's scheme of an uprising. Three men were arrested in the Weenen district at the beginning of 1906 for spreading an order purporting to come from Dinusulu that all Africans should destroy European manufactured utensils and kill their white animals; otherwise few

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1 SNA 1/4/13 O2, C.N.A. to P.M., 14.6.04. ZA 54 CR- 05 C.N.A. to H.N.A. 19.12.05. But note also C.N.A. to Admin. Natal in which he stated that his confidence in Dinusulu was absolutely misplaced. For this change in view, see below, Chapter VII, p.


3 E.g. ZA 54 CR- 25, Rept. Nat. police sergeant to magis. Mqunu, 29.6.04. Also CO 179/253/12465, Intell. Rept. Enqol. 1, 2.3.06 in desp. 41, 16.3.06.
of these messengers were ever traced. According to the evidence laid at the trial of these three men, none of them had been anywhere near the Usuthu, Dinusulu’s headquarters.

Fears of Dinusulu’s influence were not limited to Natal-Zululand. In 1903 he was alleged to be inciting the Zulu in the Piet Retief district of the Transvaal to refuse to pay their £2 Poll Tax on pain of death. Although he vigorously denied the charge, and was supported in this by the Commissioner of Native Affairs in Zululand, the Natal government was not as firmly convinced of his innocence. Despite the lack of any substantiating evidence, Prime Minister George Sutton declared there must have been a good deal of truth in the charge.

There were also frequent rumours that Dinusulu was in league with the Basuto, Swazi and Pondo – and even on occasion the Boers. In these instances, the most innocuous visit of a trader could give rise to clusters of rumours. Fear of a combination of the African peoples in Southern Africa is a thread which runs through

1Stuart, A History of Zulu Rebellion, p. 106.
3GH 575 CR/03, Minute 31.10.03.
much of her nineteenth century history, usually with a somewhat slender foundation. During the actual disturbances in 1906 Lord Selborne, British High Commissioner in South Africa, constantly received reports of Dinuzulu's being in league with the Swazi, and affidavits were forwarded to the Commissioner of Native Affairs in Pretoria of the inflammatory messages purporting to have come from Dinuzulu to Ngwanase, a chief in Tongaland. If true, they would have disclosed Dinuzulu as the instigator of a "widespread conspiracy amongst the native races of South Africa".

Natural phenomena, traditionally associated with the Zulu Royal family were now interpreted by Africans as signs from Dinuzulu either of imminent deliverance from the Natal government or of further disaster. Dinuzulu was believed to appear before them in different forms — and indeed even John Dube and his uncle, the Chief Ngawu, were given similar powers in the popular mind. This kind of interpretation was not unusual amongst a people accustomed to seeing the forces of nature in personal or semi-personal

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1 See e.g. The Zulu Invasion Scare of 1861 by O. B. Rowe (unpubl. M.A. thesis, 1948, Natal), p.32, who remarks on the rumours of "vast combination directed by Mosesah whose members were alleged to include the Basutos, the Zulus, the Swazis, ... Bondos and Kaffirs... for a concerted attack on the Europeans in S.E. Africa." The war of 1878-1879 in Southern Africa were similarly thought to have a single inspirer in Cetshwayo.

2 GH 585 g221/06, Secret CR13/06, g241/06, g12/06, several reports.

3 SNA 1/4/16 g184/06, Records of Cases of Rex v. Singha Gumede and 4 others (Barbeton) and Rex v. Ngasana, (Pietersburg)

Thus the disease which in 1905 attacked one of the Zulu staple crops, and the extremely severe hailstorm which hit the entire colony on May 31st of that year, were regarded as important omens and indications that Dinusulu had something portentous in hand.

One of the most important of the rumours associated with Dinusulu’s name was an order that Africans kill all white goats, pigs and fowl, and destroy implements of European manufacture. This was particularly prevalent in the very hot months at the end of 1905 and beginning of 1906. Many and varied explanations were offered by the non-white population for this killing of white animals, and the destruction of European-made implements. The most frequent was that there was an order from Dinusulu that anyone not carrying out the order would be struck by lightning.

Yet another was that on Christmas day Dinusulu was going to perform a miracle or divination by which all white people would be killed and the railways torn up. Then any Africans having pigs or “civilised clothing” would be instantly killed. Several chiefs in

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Natal in fact sent to Dinuzulu to find out whether he was behind the order. In Zululand proper, the most prevalent explanation appears to have been that pigs and lard attract lightning; if when an attempt was made to collect the 1905 Poll Tax, the people deposited lard on the hillsides, lightning would strike those attempting to collect the tax.¹ As the Zulu king was believed to have power over the elements, this had a particularly ominous sound.² According to Stuart however

"the underlying intention of the order to kill pigs and white fowls and to discard utensils of European manufacture was that the natives of Natal and Zululand should rise against the white man. Its purpose, was to warn as well as to unite by use of a threat."³

That this was the generally accepted interpretation amongst whites can be gauged from the fact that farmers in the Newcastle, Estcourt, Weenen and Lion's River divisions, where these rumours were particularly prevalent, were said to be leaving their farms and trekking with their cattle, either to the nearest town or to the Transvaal or Orange Free State.⁴ According to magistrate

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¹ SNA 1/4/14 072/05, Minute C.N.A. to M.N.A. 27.12.05.
³ Ibid., p.108.
⁴ SNA 1/11/14 083/05, Magistrates of above divisions to U.S.M.A., end of 1905.
Devitt, writing considerably later, rumours that Dinusulu "had said that every living white thing ... was to disappear" immersed the Piet Retief district of the Transvaal which bordered on Zululand, and had a large Zulu population, "in blood red fantasies".  

In many areas, whites were requesting arms and ammunition, and preparing to go into laager. Yet the magistrates in all these regions reported that nothing unusual could be detected in African behaviour, and, indeed, when the disturbances actually broke out, they did not take place primarily in these divisions. Nor do portions of the tribes most affected by these particular rumours appear to have broken away to join the rebels elsewhere in the colony.

While the white animal killing was an extremely frightening phenomenon for the whites, who could not help feeling that after pigs, white fowls and white goats, white people would be killed, this conclusion was by no means inevitable. The white animal killing undoubtedly represented an expression of hostility against whites and white rule, but it did not necessarily mean that further action was contemplated. It was a 'reaction to conquest' very similar in effect to the great cattle-killing in the Eastern Cape in 1857, following the Nonqause prophecy. In Basutoland too,

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2 See E. Roux, Time Longer than Hope (1st edition, 1948, London) pp. 44–52. Nonqause was a Xhosa maiden who prophesied that if the Xhosa killed...
when, in 1876, a wave of "anti-European propaganda" swept the country "the unrest worked itself out by the destruction of articles of European manufacture and went no further". Animal killing appears to have been a fairly frequent occurrence in Natal. According to the magistrate at Dundee, the Africans regularly disposed of their pigs at planting time. In 1904 an Intelligence Report told of the sacrifice of white goats to the Goddess of Plenty, Inkosasana Nkombulwana, who was confused by some Africans with Harriette Colenso. In 1900 there had been similar animal killings in the Umlazi and Lower Tugela divisions in Natal, while in 1898 in the Ingwavuma division, Zululand, "a deformed and shrivelled doctor, a Tonga, suddenly sprang into prominence by spreading a report amongst the natives that unless they killed their goats off, calamities of a dire sort would overtake them and their crops would rot in the ground."

all their cattle, destroyed their crops and failed to sow corn, the white man would miraculously be driven into the sea. Thousands of Xhosa tribesmen obeyed the order which was first supported by the Geleka chief, Sarili. Needless to say, on the appointed day, nothing happened, and the tribesmen faced starvation and poverty. Many streamed across the frontiers of the Cape colony to seek work and protection. The social structure of the Xhosa was very severely damaged and overnight the people more reduced than they had been by over seventy years of frontier warfare. E. Roux calls Nonquase the "Xhosa national prophet" and compares her in some ways to Joan of Arc. No full scale analysis of this fascinating and extremely important event in the history of the Eastern Cape peoples has yet been written.


2SHAA 1/4/14 051 05. Minute Haynord Matthews, magistrate to U.S.N.A. 6.12.05.
Hundreds of goats were killed before the doctor's deportation ended the episode.¹ The killing of pigs by the government to combat swine fever in 1905, and of cattle to combat East Coast fever in 1905-7, may well have been a factor in spreading these millenial fantasies, which continued into 1907.

Although it was this white animal killing and the rumours which were associated with it which lay behind the Natal government's decision to declare Martial Law over the entire colony after the killing of the two police officers, it may well be that, far from being a declaration of war, these were in fact safety valves, ways of letting off steam without the punishment that would assuredly follow were white people to be touched. It can be argued that by a process of sympathetic magic or 'transferred aggression' the white animals were white people, people who were themselves in too powerful a position to be touched.²

¹SNA 1/4/15 0⁴/⁰⁴, Report Intelligence Officer no. 1, n.d.

²See Dollard, Boob, Miller et al. Frustration and Aggression)
In spite of the very great hostility shown against white rule in both the rumours and the white animal killing, it is significant that only about half a dozen white civilians were killed during the disturbances. One of these was a highly unpopular magistrate, another a sub-overseer of a forced labour working party whose position was likely to have aroused antagonism. Had there been any real intention of "driving the white man into the sea" as the colonists alleged, one would have expected a far higher incidence of acts of violence against white men and their property. It is, however, a remarkable feature of the disturbances that both in the Mapumulo and Mkanda divisions where emotions had reached fever-pitch, there was no indiscriminate damage to white property, or the singling out of government and mission buildings, as happened during the Port Elizabeth riots of 1949. Even a stock-inspector, who had been engaged in the greatly disliked task of culling diseased cattle, though wounded by rebels in the Mapumulo division, had his life saved by other

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1 These were H. M. Stanbank, Magistrate, Mahlathini; Walters, a sub-overseer of a road party; Siegried, a storekeeper; O. E. Veal, a postal official believed to be a spy. H. Smith, a farmer of Ulans Road, murdered in January 1906 may or may not have been murdered because of his insistence that his employees pay the Poll Tax. Stuart includes him in the list of those murdered as part of the rebellion; in fact the evidence is far from conclusive. One could also include K. Hunt and G. Armstrong, members of the police force in this list, though this will be discussed more fully below. See Stuart, Zulu Rebellion, pp. 120, 125, 219, 240, 348-9, 377.
rebels who recognised him.\(^1\) Ndlovu ka Timuni, one of the leaders in this phase of the rebellion, personally saved the life of a missionary with whom he had had no previous connection. At the time he stated that the African quarrel was only with the magistrates and the troops.\(^2\) In Mapumulo and Nkandla-Nqutu, the only areas to see active opposition to the troops, missionaries of the Norwegian Mission Society and the Hermannsburg Lutheran Mission Society were to remark that their stations had been, with one or two exceptions left untouched by the rebel forces - only to be looted by the European troops.\(^3\) Similarly Anglican Mission buildings in the Nkandla-Nqutu area - the scene of the rebellion "proper" - were untouched by African combatants - though an outstation was "knocked to pieces by European troops in wanton destruction".\(^4\) For Africans then, antagonism against white rule and the Natal government, which was regarded as responsible for all their woes, had not yet

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\(^1\) Stuart, Z.R., pp. 349-50.

\(^2\) Norsk Missionstidende Dec. 1906 pp. 542-7, letter from Rev. J. Tvedt Otimati, 16.10.06 (pp. 542-7).

\(^3\) See Norsk Missionstidende Sept. 1906, letter from Rev. Titterstad 2.7.06 and Dec. 1906, letter from Rev. Tvedt, op.cit.

\(^4\) Report, Bishop Zululand, 1906, S.P.G. Reports '07, no.34.
generalised over to all white people.

Despite the fact that so few Europeans were killed during the disturbances, rumour also played an important part in exaggerating the atrocities which took place. The further away from the scene of action, the more lurid the details became. Whites, with their stereotypes of uncontrolled African savagery, talked in almost hysterical terms about the danger to their women and children.¹ Not a single white woman or child was touched during the disturbances. On two occasions the body of a European was used for ritual 'doctoring' for war, and this caused a sensation in the colony.² To the small, tightly-knit white community, the death of every white man was far more than the loss of one individual. It struck at the very foundations upon which white rule was based. It is only when this is taken into account that the measures against the rebels in 1906 and the ferocity of the European reaction can be understood.

²Stuart, Z.R., pp. 176, 376.
The role played by rumour during the actual disturbances, when both sides tended to act as if myth were reality, cannot be overstressed. Nevertheless, precisely for this reason it is not always possible to sift the corn from the chaff. Nor is it always important so to do: the fiction that Bambatha had a charm which would turn the white man’s bullets into water was strong enough to induce a large number of people to join him, despite the fact that we know it to be baseless. Similarly while the whole question of Dinuzulu’s complicity in the disturbances is an extremely complex one which will be discussed in greater detail, whether or no he was behind the rebels is less important than the fact that a large number of Bambatha’s followers were convinced of his support, and that eventually he would come to their aid.

In the years immediately following the disturbances, when poverty and despair were even more marked than before amongst the Africans who had undergone a very severe upheaval, ‘messianic’ and ‘pipe-dream’ rumours were, if anything, even more marked than before. Once again their intensity appears to reach a peak in the lean, hot months of the planting season. Most of them were associated with Dinuzulu’s name, especially after the sporadic acts of terrorism in Zululand, and the known disagreement between

1See below, Chapter VII.
the British government and Natal on the subject of his arrest and trial. There were however also persistent reports that such prominent leaders during the rebellion as Bambatha, Mtali, and Mekholakasulu had come alive and were ready to march on the colony, assisted by "black abalungu\(^1\) from America with modern weapons", that a great mountain had sprung up in the north which was sending forth many warriors, or that a mighty lion had appeared, which was devouring all white men.\(^2\)

At the time of his arrest and trial, the various rumours associated with Dinusulu's name were interpreted by the Natal government as part of a deliberate attempt on his part to obtain political concessions, and to get himself reinstated in the role of his forebears as King of the Zulu. This view has recently found support in an unpublished Natal M.A. thesis, which maintains that Dinusulu used the various rumours associated with his name quite deliberately for this purpose, and that had he so desired, he could have put a stop to them.\(^3\) The writer, Miss I. Perrett,

\(^{1}\) "Black abalungu" is presumably the African equivalent of the white South African 'foreign native' meaning a black man from outside South Africa. An umlungu is the Zulu term for 'a white man'; a black umlungu is an American negro.


\(^{3}\) I. Perrett, Dinusulu and the Bambata Rebellion (Univ. of Natal, 1960).
states categorically that had Dinusulu made it quite plain to the would-be insurgents "that he would have neither a part nor lot in the rebellion, the rising would not have taken place ... Dinusulu fostered the rumours of a general rising by his action." 1 While this may in part be true, there are other possible interpretations of the many rumours associated with Dinusulu's name. One of them was given by Dinusulu himself when he accused the Mandlakazi people, his traditional enemies, of being behind all the tales of his unrest. 2 It is interesting that the Mandlakazi had close ties with the Shepstone family, and it is possible for example that the rumour noted at the head of his chapter transmitted by 'Offy', son of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, came from this source originally. 3 It would not be unreasonable to imagine people who had been such bitter opponents of the Usutbu to continue the feud by using this information against him, much in the same way as in the past people could get their enemies removed from the tribe by accusing them of witchcraft to the king. This, however, while possibly the origin of some of the rumours, by no means accounts for all of them, though the technique was definitely

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1 p.41.

2 The Trial of Dinusulu, Address of W. F. Schreiner p.51.

3 For this feud, see above, Chapter II.
used in other parts of Natal, and indeed of colonial Africa.¹ On several occasions Dinuzulu did request an enquiry into the rumours about him and was supported in these demands by the Commissioner for Native Affairs, who felt, until the second half of 1907, that Dinuzulu’s conduct justified "a public refutation of the numerous calumnies against him".² It is difficult to know how else the rumours associated with his name could have been convincingly quashed, as it certainly appears that he himself denied all knowledge of their validity to African as well as European questioners.

Quite apart from the machinations, real or imagined, of either Dinuzulu or his enemies, there was a deeper basis to these many rumours. It is a fairly widespread phenomenon for an oppressed and poverty stricken people to invent a Messianic figure who will rescue them from all their woes, or to invest an historical personality with Messianic qualities. In Germany in medieval times, though the monarchy "was falling into ever greater impotence and discredit", millenial fantasies centred on the coming of "a supernatural German emperor, a poverty loving monarch sent by God

¹ For a somewhat analogous situation on the Kilimanjaro, see K. Stahl, The Chagga of Kilimanjaro (London 1964).
² ZA 34 CR 1909/05, C.N.A. to M.N.A., 19.12.05.
to institute a world-wide Messianic empire".1 What more natural then, that the Africans of Zululand and Natal should, at the turn of the century, invest the 'Child' with the supernatural qualities he was traditionally supposed to possess and to believe that he alone could lead them against the all-powerful whites. The disabilities they were suffering, their poverty and the stresses imposed by European penetration of Zululand, and the Zulu contact with the labour markets of Southern Africa, led to these many rumours expressing a yearning for a saviour and a messiah. As Professor George Shepperson has pointed out, this kind of "pre-millennial fantasy", and the "messiah mechanism"2 operates where there is a "deep distrust of the orthodox forces of reform open to a society".3


2This happy phrase occurs on p. 47 of S. Thrupp, "The Comparative Study of Millenarian Movements".

3"Nyasaland and the Millenium", p. 146 in S. Thrupp, Millenial Dreams in Action.
"As regards the recent rebellion he did not think there was any one special cause, but a combination of causes, among which were the attitude of the white man towards the black and the gradually growing antipathy of the black towards the white .... He thought the last straw was the way in which the Government had commenced to deal with the first indications of disaffection. He considered that the measures which were adopted were nothing more than an invitation to people who were irritated to go to worse."

N.H.A.C. Evidence Archdeacon Johnson, p.91.
Although rumours of uprising were a recurrent feature of Natal society, it was the Poll Tax which set off the last batch of rumours at the end of 1905 and led to a spate of white animal killing in the most densely populated rural districts of the colony.

If, as has been suggested in Chapter III, land and labour were the underlying and predisposing causes of the disturbances, the Poll Tax of 1905 can be considered in the three categories of underlying, predisposing and precipitating cause: in its relationship to the entire structure of land and labour policies it is part of the underlying causation; in imposing a new and heavy burden of taxation on the shoulders of an indigent population, not all of whom however rebelled against it, it can be seen as a predisposing cause; and finally in providing the occasion for certain groups to defy government authority and in leading to the declaration of martial law it can be seen as a precipitating cause of the 1906 disturbances. Despite Stuart's dismissal of the Poll Tax as "merely a contributory cause and not the most important of those that have been cited",¹ most

¹Z.R., p.520.
Africans attributed the disturbances to the imposition of the Poll Tax. It was at that point that "things began to go wrong".¹

So closely linked was the reaction to the tax to the 1906 disturbances, that they have frequently been called the Poll Tax rebellion, and most secondary sources have regarded the Poll Tax as the single most important cause. While the disturbances arose out of a number of complex causes which varied from tribe to tribe, and indeed from group to group within the African population, there can be little doubt of the importance of the 1906 Poll Tax and the Natal government handling of it.

Many Africans linked the tax with the unpopular 1904 Census which magistrates had promised would have no sinister repercussions; it was thus regarded as a distinct breach of faith on the part of the government. The translation of Poll Tax into Zulu as a "head tax" was rather unfortunate, and led to wry remarks amongst the Africans that a legs and arms tax would follow. The Minister of Native Affairs, it is true, in introducing the Poll Tax bill in the Natal Legislative Assembly asserted that "... the natives of this Colony will hail the present Bill, if it is made law, with pleasure .... I can assure [members].... that if this bill is made law there will be no difficulties

¹N.N.A.C. Evid. e.g. p.711, Mkantolo, Lower Umsimkulu Division.

²N.N.A.C. Report, p.54.
as far as the natives are concerned"\(^1\); magistrates in many parts of the colony were also initially sanguine as to the ease with which the tax would be collected.\(^2\) Nevertheless, when they actually attempted to collect the tax at the end of January and February 1906, they found they were generally met with passive resistance and even, on occasion, by open defiance. Thus on the 22nd January, the Acting Magistrate of Mapumulo was met by angry, gesticulating men of Ngobisembe's tribe, many of them brandishing weapons; in the same district the tribesmen of Swamana and Nesenai also refused to pay the tax. Although in the previous September, the magistrate of Hkandla had stated that the reports of the forthcoming tax had not roused "the slightest sign of disloyalty" in any of the chiefs or headmen to whom it had been announced,\(^3\) in January, Sigananda's tribe in that division maintained that they could not afford to pay the tax, apparently shouted their war cry and did a war-dance in front of the magistrate.

Yet while these chiefs and their tribes were later involved

\(^1\)N.L.A. Debates, Vol. 39, pp. 704-5, 25.7.05.

\(^2\)SNA 1/1/325\(2^302\)^05. Summary of reports of magistrates on African reaction to Poll Tax, n.d. c. 11.9.05.

\(^3\)Ibid., SNA 1/1/325\(2^302\)^05.
in the disturbances and fought against the white forces, several others, who also protested against the tax and at first refused to pay it, later remained neutral, or indeed, like Sibindi and his tribe, were conspicuously loyal to the government and provided men to fight on its side.\(^1\) It is difficult to know how to interpret this form of passive resistance to the tax in the early days of its collection, or indeed even the more violent expressions of hostility. Although the tax was due at the beginning of 1906, it was not legally enforceable until 31st May, 1906; at the same time as the Africans were voicing their protests against the tax, its white opponents were holding several very noisy meetings in Pietermaritzburg and Durban.\(^2\) For Africans however there were few ways of expressing opposition other than by passive resistance. Much depended on individual magistrates as to whether Africans were allowed to express their views or not - or indeed whether all tribes were adequately informed when and by whom the tax had to be paid. In Zululand, where the Commissioner for Native Affairs was a capable and not unsympathetic paternalist, the following circular was issued to magistrates

\(^1\) SNA 1/1/357, Report Magis. Krantzkop; see also B. Gleanbrander, 'The Bambata Rebellion,' unpubl. MSS, KCL 30515.

\(^2\) See eved. W.N.A.C., passim, e.g. H. Baseley, p.462 and H. A. Smith, p.506.
in December, 1905. Whether it was on his own authority or that of the Minister for Native Affairs is not clear:

"Chiefs now distinctly warned that no excuse will be accepted and any opposition to the Tax will be most severely dealt with; that the chiefs themselves as the government's representatives amongst their people will be held personally responsible that the tax is promptly paid on the dates fixed... that any neglect in this respect will be regarded as an indication that they are not fitted for their positions and responsibilities as Chiefs and render it incumbent upon the government to seriously consider whether they should not be deprived of their positions and the status attached thereto.

No discussion in connection with the matter should be entered into, the chiefs merely being informed that the foregoing are the Government's final words of warning and the sooner any people liable for the tax prepare to meet it, the better it will be for all concerned."

Partly as a result of the failure of the government to listen to their complaints, several chiefs sent messages to Dinusulu to find out what he was going to do about the tax. Nor were these chiefs only from Zululand; messengers were sent from prominent chiefs as far south as Tilonko and Sikukuku in the Ixopo division. Dinusulu's reply to these messages would appear to have been invariably proper: he pointed out that his tribe had been the first to pay the tax, and completely disavowed the rumour which was supposed to have emanated from him, that all white animals should be killed. More than one witness at

1 SHA 1/1/355, Circular 22.12.05.
Dinusulu’s subsequent trial affirmed that “If Dinusulu had refused to pay the Poll Tax we would have fought and died” and that “Dinusulu was the Peacemaker between us and the Government. He stopped what might have taken place.” Sir Charles Saunders maintained throughout the disturbances that Dinusulu’s example in paying the tax had prevented the disturbances from spreading throughout Zululand, although his view as to Dinusulu’s participation in the disturbances became less favourable later.

Even the overt signs of defiance were not taken equally seriously by all the magistrates; Chief Ngokwana’s tribe were initially reported disrespectful and insolent. Two weeks later they were apparently “paying well” simply having been reprimanded by the Commissioner for Native Affairs; A. J. S. Maritz, the magistrate of Entonjaneni who tried Sigananda’s men for their breach of the peace, thought sufficiently little of that episode to dismiss the men with a caution.

1 Col. Col. 98. Trial of Dinusulu. Precognitions, Renaud.
Sibhamu ka Mboro (Chief Matuta, Babanango Division), Mdabanuku ka Lukwazi (Chief Labudlungu), Madikane ka Mfigneli (Chief Mnyombe), Mjinji ka Kutshwayo (Chief Sigananda).


3 For Dinusulu’s part in the disturbances see below, Chapter VII.

4 ZA 34, Report Magis. Umkazi division, 24.1.06 and 5.2.06.

5 ZA 34 CH 16 16 06, 7.4.06.
views as to what constituted 'rebelliousness' was to persist throughout the disturbances, and became even more marked once the troops were in the field.

The Government were clearly in a difficult position over the collection of the tax; having imposed it with little consultation even with those magistrates who were closest to African public opinion, and despite those who had pointed out its effects in undermining African family life and aggravating their poverty, they were now faced with widespread opposition. Apart from military preparations — and even here, the Active Militia was reduced and the Militia Reserves still disorganised at the beginning of 1906 — there is little indication that the government considered what it would do if its authority were challenged over the collection of the tax. James Stuart, at that time First Criminal Magistrate in Durban, responsible for convening meetings of African urban workers to announce the tax, was one of the few people to face the issue squarely. After a couple of turbulent meetings at which the Africans had vigorously voiced their opposition to the tax he wrote to the Secretary for Native Affairs:

"On getting refusal, compulsion in some form or other may have to be resorted to, but is it desirable to resort to force when, as I think, the whole people are not only opposed to the tax, but regard it as oppressive and as calculated to disturb their social system.... I am one whose duties bring
him into close contact with the natives venture to think that the passing of this act brings the Colony ... face to face with a grave risk which cannot be too well considered beforehand.\(^1\)

Far from considering the risk however, the sole response of the M.N.A. was to reprimand Stuart for holding meetings of Africans and allowing them to get out of hand: his not proceeding through the traditional chieftainly authority (non-existent in the urban centres) was regarded as a far greater threat to the security of the colony, than a possible explosion over the Tax.\(^2\)

For the small white minority in Natal, there could, in any case, have been little question of retracting and repealing the tax in response to African opposition. Almost all whites even those who themselves opposed the tax, felt this would be an extremely dangerous precedent, undermining their authority and prestige. It would in their view have spelt the beginning of the end of white rule.\(^3\) On the other hand, there could not be much hope of relying on the police force in the event of widespread resistance to the tax: in the first place, as has been already mentioned it was not legally enforceable before May 31st; in the second, the policy force, which had been reconstituted in

\(^1\) SNA 1/4/14 042\(^{05}\), 8.11.05.

\(^2\) Ibid., Minute, M.N.A.

\(^3\) See e.g, Speech made by Col. Greene, M.L.A. at Wartburg reported in Greytown Gazette, 10.3.06.
1894, just after the grant of Responsible Government, then consisted of between two hundred and three hundred Europeans, and one hundred Africans; by 1906 the European section had risen to 40 officers and 1,126 of other ranks with 143 police stations to man. Even so, the European section was small. According to Assistant Commissioner Mardall of Natal Police the number of European police in each district was "so limited that they cannot be sent from one division to another"; in Umsinga division, for example, which had a native population of approximately 40,000, there were six European police officers and twenty native constables. The proportion in Mayumulo was similar. There was moreover considerable nervousness on the part of the Natal authorities about placing their confidence in African police. According to Mardall again, native police were reluctant to serve out of their own districts and were always subject to tribal influences and the control of their own chiefs. During the disturbances he complained that several of them "openly joined the rebels". African police in Natal were extremely poorly paid, and both because of this and because the Police Force

3Ibid.
insisted on a minimum contract of three years, there were con-
stant difficulties in the way of recruiting the requisite number. ¹
The change made in 1894 in handing over the control of the African
police from magistrates to the white Police officers had, according
to many observers, not had a beneficial effect. ² The Militia
Act of 1903 had made provision for the establishment of a permanent
Militia to deal with just this kind of contingency; but this
force which could be ordered to any part of the colony to act "in
aid of or as the police force" had never been created because of
lack of financial support. ³

Most Natalians however probably realised that in the final
analysis they could resort to the Active Militia, and that the
Maxim gun and dum-dum bullet could save them from the effect of
most internal disturbances. It was this assurance that enabled
Natal politicians to face the possibility of 'native trouble'
with equanimity. This appears to be borne out by the views of
Marshall Campbell, an influential sugar farmer who was one of
the Natal representatives on the South African Native Affairs Com-
mission. On his return from serving the Commission, he apparently

²e.g. M. S. Evans, The Native Problem (Pmbg, 1906), p.25.
brought up the danger of allowing the subject of native affairs to slide and suggested the formulation of a more liberal policy for Natal based on the recommendations of the Commission Report. At this he "was told by one cabinet minister with heat to let the danger come and we would settle it once and for all". There was little room for compromise with such a view.

Natal had begun to build up her permanent armed forces with the implementation of the Militia Act of 1903. Until that time, she had been defended by Imperial troops. These should have been withdrawn within five years of the grant of Responsible Government, but Anglo-Boer rivalry in South Africa in the nineties and the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War led to their retention in Natal until 1904-5. Even after their withdrawal, which was faced with reluctance by Natal ministers, the Natal Defence Force was accustomed to draw on Imperial supplies. Nevertheless much emphasis was placed on the importance of building up a purely colonial force, which would be free of any outside interference. Indeed a major cause of controversy between Natal and the British government in the 1902-3 discussions on the Natal's defence proposals was over who should command the Natal Militia. The Assembly were adamantly opposed in 1902-4 to placing the army under the command of the Officer  

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1 KCL Marshall Campbell Papers, Bantu Section. Draft of letter to the Natal Advertiser, April 1907.
in Command of His Majesty's Regular Forces, unless he were of the substantive rank of Major General. It was stated by several members in the Natal Legislative Assembly that the Natal Militia would probably never have to meet a European enemy in the field and that "in Native warfare Colonials would have more confidence in Colonial Officers than in Junior Officers of H.M. Regular Forces".  

While the original Militia Act of 1903 embodied colonial views on the subject, it was amended by Act 30 of 1905 which enabled a Colonel in the British army to take command of the Natal forces. In the event the change made little difference: in August 1905 Col. Bru-de-Wold, a Norwegian born Natalian, became Commandant of the Natal Militia to be followed in 1907 by Sir Duncan McKensie who was Natal born and bred.

The conviction that colonials knew best how to deal with native unrest was deeprooted in South Africa as a whole, and in Natal was doubtless strengthened by painful memories of the disasters of the Zulu War. In Natal the 'volunteering' tradition

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1. 00 179/230/50229, Conf. 1 Acting Admin. H. Bale to Sec. St. 2.8.04.

2. Col. H.T. Bru-de-Wold of Norwegian origin; served under Col. W. Royston in the Boer War, was Commandant of Natal Militia 1902-7. (H. C. Lugg, Historic Zululand and Natal, pp. 1-2, Pmbg, 1948)

of the frontiersman and Voortrekker also ran deep. From the earliest days of the colony, whites had been "accustomed to trust in their skill as shotists and horsemen" and volunteering for military service had become part of the way of life of the colonial farmer. With the passing away of the more rugged frontier conditions and with the advent of Responsible Government, Natal ministries tried to turn the somewhat haphazard volunteer forces into a method of defence for the colony. The first step in this direction was the Volunteer Act of 1895; after the Boer War however it was realised that that Act only attracted a very small number into the colony's active militia, and legislation was framed to provide for a larger, permanently organised and trained militia. The attempts at compulsory conscription and training were much opposed, many settlers feeling that the old burgher system was infinitely preferable to this new-fangled militia, the very embodiment of militarism and the antithesis of the ideal of the hardy, independent and adventurous pioneer.  


2Greytown Gazette, 14.7.06 and 21.7.06, 28.7.06, 18.8.06, 25.8.06, deplored amended Militia Act which gave increased power to officers of reserves. It maintained the bulk of the work in the rebellion was done by irregulars. A. F. Hattersley, *Carbineer*, pp. 29-30.
The Militia Act of 1903 was in fact an attempt to reconcile the two ideals. Under it, the Natal Militia was divided into four sections: the predominantly volunteer, permanent Active Militia which could be supplemented by ballot from members of the First Militia Reserve to reach its maximum peacetime strength of 4,000 and three compulsory Reserve forces. At the time of the disturbances these three reserve forces were however not properly organised and could not be called upon for active service very readily; in addition, the ballot system, which was highly unpopular, was not invoked either. Nevertheless, Natal was able to call on the aid of volunteers from all over South Africa, very many of them men who had not really settled down after the Boer War or were unemployed as a result of the post-Boer War depression. They were not unwilling to join a new 'Skiet-Kommando' for further adventure. These volunteers - who made up such groups as Royston's Horse and the Natal Rangers - enabled Natal to handle the disturbances without calling for direct Imperial aid, although at the very beginning of the trouble a garrison of the Queen's Cameron Highlanders was stationed at Pietermaritzburg, more as a gesture of moral support than anything else.

1 Stuart, Z.R., p.42.
2 Cd 2905, no. 6, Gov. to Sec. St., 10.2.06.
Within the Natal militia the 'burgher' principle was embodied in the clause which enabled Chief Leaders and Sub-leaders of the Reserves in each area to be appointed by the Commandant "in pursuance of a vote passed by the majority of the members of such Militia Reserves". As Stuart rightly points out this meant that in many cases the officers so selected were not particularly suitable through their military knowledge or experience, but simply happened to be the most popular or the wealthiest man in the district.\(^1\) It could also lead to unfortunate results for the African population, because the most popular candidate amongst the white farmers might well be the one with extremist views on the "native question". It is significant that the agitation for the removal of Tilonko and Msikofeli from their wards came not only from the Farmers Associations of Richmond and Ixopo, but also, as persistently, from the Chief Leader of the Reserves.\(^2\) In the Umsinga division too, the part played by the Leaders of the Reserves in securing the arrest of Chief Kula, despite the orders from Military headquarters, illustrates this particular aspect of popular election.\(^3\) Against this, on the

\(^1\)Z.E., p.43.

\(^2\)PM 58267, J. Marwick, Chief leader of Reserves to P.M. 24.3.06 and 20.3.06, and SHA 1/4/5 C86, Magis. F. E. Foxon 26.3.06 forwarding resolution of Bronk Vlei\(^1\) 06 P.A. for removal of Msikofeli and PM 58252, Ixopo Farmers' Association, 20.3.06.

\(^3\)See below, pp. 349 - 50, 352.
other hand it should also be borne in mind that on occasion
local reservists might be more likely to avoid acting pro-
 vocatively than outside volunteers with no stake in the district.
During the disturbances, the Militia Reserves were generally
alerted to serve in their own districts.

Although prior to 1906, most members of the Militia Re-
serves had had little formal military training, a large pro-
portion of the able-bodied white males were enrolled either as
Cadets or in Rifle Associations. Under the Cadet system, lads
between the age of ten and fourteen were drilled without arms
and instructed in musketry; at a later age they were also taught
marching, firing exercises, simple parade and field movements.
This institution founded in 1869 was upheld by most of the schools
of the colony. The Rifle Associations fulfilled a largely social
function in the rural areas, during peacetime but during war or
in an emergency could act as a reservoir of able riflemen who
could be called out compulsorily for service by the Governor.
Through membership of a Rifle Association whites could obtain
arms and ammunition at very favourable rates, subsidised by the
government. The number of Rifle associations grew to such an extent
from the end of 1905 onwards, and were clearly regarded as so
valuable an adjunct to the Militia during the disturbances, that
their 1906-7 budget showed 100% increase over that of the previous
year. Even before 1906 however these Associations had gone a long way towards inducing every white male in Natal to become, in M.N.A. Winter's phrase, "a shotist". Nor was Winter alone in feeling that in view of the sparseness of the European population of Natal all whites should become proficient marksmen. In a speech to the Annual encampment of the Natal Volunteer Force in 1903, the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, urged that it was the duty of everyone "in such a country as this where you are surrounded by a large coloured population" to learn to shoot. Indeed he went even further and stated that if he had his way he would also "like to see every woman in the country learn how to shoot".

The other military preparations of Natal consisted in the purchase of ammunition and especially expanding bullets, the coordinating of plans with the general Officer Commanding the British forces in South Africa, and, at the local level, preparations for the building of stockades and laagers at the various magistracies at the end of 1903 on the instruction of the new Commandant.

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3 Reported in Natal Witness, 16.4.03. 
4 See esp. GH 584, Secret 1904-5 passim.
of the militia, Col. Bru-de-Wold, as a "precautionary measure".¹

That these preparations were being made to fight a black foe was quite explicitly stated by members of the government and of the armed forces.² The importance of dum-dum bullets with their greater stopping power when fighting "members of savage races [who] it must be remembered are not creatures of nerves" was also stressed more than once, and not only by Natalians.³

While however the whites were making their military arrangements, the provisions under which Africans could obtain firearms were also being tightened up considerably. Various Firearms Laws restricting the supply of arms and ammunition to Africans and Asians had been passed in Natal since 1859; the last of these was Act No. 1 of 1906. This made the permission of the S.N.A. necessary before any non-white be allowed to possess firearms. Once given this permission, chiefs were to be allowed two pounds of gunpowder and two hundred rounds of ammunition, ordinary Africans, half a pound of gunpowder and fifty rounds.⁴ At the

¹ZA 34 CR ³⁰⁶, Copy Militia Conf. Circular no. 5, 1905.
²H.L.A. Debates vol. 31, p.59, e.g. S.N.A. speaking on Natal Defence Force Bill 6.3.02. See also vol. 33, pp.100, 103, 118-9.
³See e.g. CO 179/238/22382 W.O. to U.Sec. St. 21.6.06. This phrase is Sir Henry McCallum's in CO 179/236/30630, 26.7.06.
⁴§44 of Act 1, 1906.
turn of the century, there were said to be some five thousand rifles in Zululand alone,\(^1\) most of these being "old, obsolete and of very little use", mainly relics of the gun-selling days on the diamond fields and the Zulu War of 1879. During the Boer War it was believed that the Zulu had captured many more guns from the Boers, which they had failed to register or hand over to the magistrates. One of the reasons given for McKenzie's drives in Zululand after the surrender of Dinusulu was the ferreting out of the thousands of guns which were thought to have been hidden there and in the Vryheid district. Although a considerable number of unregistered guns were found at the Usuthu, thirteen or fourteen of which Dinusulu admitted were his personal possessions, the Chief Justice at his trial rejected as unestablished that these were collected with any treasonable intent.\(^2\) For was there evidence that these guns had been used in the rebellion in 1906.

Natal caution over allowing Africans to possess firearms was extended even to the loyal levies employed during the disturbances. When one thousand men of Silwane's tribe were called out to assist the troops they asked to be provided with rifles and blankets, both of which requests were apparently regarded as equally

Acc. to Stuart there were not more than 200 guns south of the Tugela.

\(^2\)The Trial of Dinusulu ... (Pmbg, 1910). Judgment Rex vs Dinusulu, p.xix.
outrageous and neither of which was granted.\(\text{1}\) Col. Bru-de-Wold though he was over-ruled by Maydon was also reluctant to allow the recruits from Edendale Mission Reserve organised by R.C. Samuelson to arm, despite the fact that they had aided the government on several previous occasions.\(\text{2}\) This failure on the part of the government to trust them with weapons was a source of considerable bitterness — and is interesting paralleled by the position of the equally 'loyal' Indians, who during the 1906 disturbances also felt the failure of the government to trust them was a slight on their loyalty. In the case of the Indians this obstacle was overcome by the government's accepting their services as stretcher-bearers.\(\text{3}\) On the other hand, it should be noted the Chief Sibindi\(\text{4}\) whose loyalty was apparently undoubted and who therefore repeatedly expressed fears that he would be assassinated, was granted a supply of rifles and a thousand pounds of ammunition while the disturbances were in full flow.\(\text{5}\)

\(\text{1}\) Stuart, Z.R., pp. 327-8.


\(\text{3}\) See above, Chapter I, p. 42.

\(\text{4}\) See below, Chapter VI, p. 393-5.

\(\text{5}\) CO 179/234/16341, Gov. to Sec. St. 20.4.06 (Cd 3027).
None of this for one moment implies that Natal was doing anything more than taking justifiable precautions against what was to her mind — and indeed to that of the War Office as late as 1909 — a very real danger.\footnote{See CO 179/255/21046 W.O. to C.O. 24.6.09. "The Army Council are of the opinion that Zululand is, of all the territories of South Africa, that in which there is the greatest likelihood of native disturbances."} It certainly does not mean that these preparations were made deliberately so that the Natal whites could goad the Africans into rebellion and then wipe them out. On the contrary, all these preparations are more an indication of Natal fears than their confidence. Under the stress of the financial position in Natal between 1904 and 1906 expenditure on the militia also fell — as did the membership of the armed forces.\footnote{Stuart, Z.R., p.49. Defence Corresp. 52 n.d. Statement to accompany letter to A.J. Hase, Durban, lying loose in file.} This also argues against too glib a theory of deliberate provocation. Nevertheless, once Natal had complete control over her armed forces, ministers could be less cautious about the policies they adopted and soldiers could think of "preventive action" and "teaching the natives a lesson", relatively secure in the knowledge of their superior arms and organisation.

Despite Stuart's interesting chapter\footnote{Chapter IV.} on the Zulu military system in his \textit{History of the Zulu Rebellion}, it is significant
that twenty-two of his pages relate to the heyday of Zulu military glory, two to rebel organisation of 1906. In 1906 the highly disciplined, drilled and swift regiments of 1879 were conspicuous by their absence. The Zulu military tradition had never had much reality in Natal, and in Zululand the regimental system had been outlawed after 1879. Although chiefs undoubtedly continued to form regiments, their military functions had virtually atrophied by 1906, only being exercised in the occasional faction fight. Stuart himself remarks that the Government probably gained more from loyal chiefs who were semi-organised than they suffered from those who were in open rebellion. These military functions in the past had been so closely tied to the Zulu Royal family, that once its independent position had gone, they were bound to disappear. Apart from his subject condition, Dinusulu showed little real inclination to follow in the Shaka-Cetshwayo tradition. It is true that before his exile in 1889 he had organised a couple of regiments, and that during the Boer War the 'Nkomindala' regiment had been formed. But this was really very small fry. The worst that witnesses against Dinusulu could maintain in 1907-9 was that the Nkomindala had continued drilling in secret after the Boer War - and that it

1Stuart, Z.R., p.90.
contained about fifty men with rifles:¹ Even this was not proven at his trial. If it were so, the best that one can say of this regiment is that Ritter’s conjecture as to the meaning of the regimental title, which Shaka earlier had bestowed on one of his regiments — "the toothless cattle" — is very apt!² By and large, the regiments which did exist, existed for the purpose of carrying out labour duties for their chiefs, such as hoeing and weeding his gardens, and to some extent for hunting purposes. During the actual disturbances, the numbers of fragments of tribes involved in the disturbances and the incoherent nature of the response of Africans to the rebellion makes it very difficult to discern much in the nature of military organisation. In so far as the Africans engaged in anything more than defensive operations, it consisted of doctoring themselves for war along traditional lines (which may have been as much a defensive as an aggressive act) and guerrilla warfare. It is true that there was an attempt to return to older military practices by Bambatha’s army in the Nkandla forests but this hardly got off its feet. The numbers of casualties on either side bear out this analysis of the respective military organisations.

¹CO 179/244/3802, Evidence Pokela ka Fogoti, Encl. in desp. Sec. 11.1.08.

²E. A. Ritter, Shaka Zulu: The Rise of the Zulu Empire (London, 1956), pp. 144-5. i.e. "The Old Contemptibles". Dinusulu’s explanation of the name is less imaginative: he said it derived from the Afrikaans "Wie kom daar" (Who goes there?), Natal Witness, 20.1.09.
The official figures given in mid-July were 3,500 Africans killed, with 2,000 wounded or surrendered.\textsuperscript{1} European armed dead amounted to twenty-four altogether with six others who died from causes other than the enemy (e.g. heart disease, self-inflicted bullet wounds etc.) Thirty-seven white soldiers were wounded and about half a dozen civilians were killed from January to September, including a Post Office messenger, a roads works overseer and a highly unpopular magistrate. The number of loyal (i.e. African) levies killed was six and thirty were wounded.\textsuperscript{2}

Whether militarily organised or not, however, the Zulu were judged by many Natalians to be in dangerous and threatening mood in 1905-6. Most prominent among these believers in an "inevitable and widespread rebellion" were two key-figures in the Natal Militia, Col. Bru-de-Wold and Col. Duncan McKensie. Even before the Boer War Bru-de-Wold recorded his view that there was a growing disrespect for the white man amongst Africans\textsuperscript{3} and as District Commander in Weenen, he

"observed... that there was a certain restlessness and disregard for authority among the younger section of the natives in his district..... He made a point of visiting the European homesteads in various parts where he found his suspicions corroborated ... By

\textsuperscript{1} CO 179/236/26169, Gov. to Sec. St. 17.7.06, no.1.

\textsuperscript{2} Stuart, Z.R., pp. 541-2.

\textsuperscript{3} Natal Blue Book 1893, F 12 Defence Report.
degrees there grew up in his mind the idea that an open rupture between the black and white races would occur in the near future."

He began to prepare for that contingency in his own area. Bru-de-Wold became Commandant of the Natal Militia in 1905, and immediately stepped up the order of Mark V and VI ammunition and issued the directive about laagers to magistrates which has already been mentioned.

McKenzie of the Natal Carbineers was a more ambitious and forceful man than Bru-de-Wold. During the 1906 disturbances he was placed in charge of all the Field Forces to be mobilised to deal with the situation in the Midlands and Southern portion of the colony at the outset of the disturbances. On the 1st June he was placed in charge of all the Field Forces in Natal and in the following year he became Commandant of the Militia. At the end of that year he again headed the Natal forces in the field, this time despatched under cover of Martial Law to arrest Dinuzulu and hunt out rebels and witnesses for the chief's trial. He was then largely responsible for the continuation of Martial Law long after the Governor, Sir Matthew Nathan, and the Commissioner for Native Affairs in Zululand, considered it necessary; Nathan described McKenzie with whom he had had several brushes.

1 K.C.L. Stuart Papers, Col. Bru-de-Wold to J. Stuart, 22.1.15.
as a man who held "in its utmost development the idea of govern-
ing the natives through fear"\(^1\) and a "dangerous counsellor"\(^2\) for Natal ministers. The *Times of Natal*\(^3\) in a remarkable article at the beginning of 1908 attacked him in no uncertain terms, for his handling of the situation both in 1906 and in 1907-8:

"In this colony we have two points of view with regard to the native population. On the one hand we have the negro-philic fanatic and sentimentalist as Miss Colenso...: on the other we have a fanatic of another sort, of whom Col. McKensie may be taken as the type, whose sole idea is of 'keeping top dog' and whose simple cure for most native trouble is systematic and wholesale 'walloping the nigger'."

It is difficult to say exactly how accurate and fair this newspaper assessment of Sir Duncan McKensie was; significantly enough he was called Shaka by the Africans.\(^4\) Despite the somewhat emotive language of the newspaper, it is undoubtedly true that from the very outset of the disturbances McKensie was convinced that only the most drastic punishment would deter the whole African population of Natal from rebelling - and he was in a sufficiently powerful position to give effect to this conviction.

\(^1\) Nathan MSS 368 to High Commissioner, 21.1.08.

\(^2\) Ibid. 3.1.08.

\(^3\) 8.1.08.

Bru-de-Wold and McKenzie were not singular in their views either as Natalians or military men. The existence of this kind of spirit in the Transvaal at the time is revealed by a letter written by Smuts to J. X. Merriman, then Prime Minister at the Cape, on the 3rd April, 1906 when he referred to "... a strong party on the Rand (among whom is our friend Woolls-Sampson) who pray ardently for a Kafir war, which will mean a relieving of the great pressure at the Rand, military contracts galore, and probably the forcing of the natives to go and work on the mines...."\(^1\) Lieut. Col. Sir Aubrey Woolls Sampson "was associated with leading figures in the gold-mining industry" and was a political opponent of both Smuts and Merriman, becoming a Progressive member of the Transvaal Legislative Assembly;\(^2\) according to the C.N.A. in June he was largely responsible for the widespread scare in the Melmoth division that all whites were going to be killed at full moon.\(^3\) Equally forceful opinions were held by such men as "galloping Jack", Col. J. R. Royston who was in charge of a voluntary troop of horsemen largely recruited in the Transvaal, or W. W. Barker who


\(^2\) Smuts Papers, Vol. IV, Bibliographical Notes, p.401.

\(^3\) ZA 28 Papers re Zulu Rebellion, Letter to R. M. Addison, 16.6.06; see above Chapter IV, p. 236-237.
remarked at a luncheon held in honour of the Transvaal Militia Reserve, whose commander he was, that:

"War was a fight to the bitter end. They did not start it, the other man did and it was for the white man to say when the 'cease fire' should sound. So long as a single native was in the field and did not put up both his hands with his assegais on the ground he was their enemy to be shot."

It is undoubtedly the duty of the military man to act decisively in moments of crisis and, when called upon by the civil authority, to inflict sufficient punishment to act as a deterrent to law-breakers. Only the naive would argue against the use of force by society whatever the circumstances. Nevertheless in the divided and easily charged atmosphere in Natal where so much of what passed as information among both black and white was rumour and half-truth, once the armed forces were called out a new dimension was added to any situation.

For those military men who had, like Bru-de-Wold, been prophesying an inevitable rebellion, the incident which led to the declaration of Martial law, moreover, undoubtedly represented a "golden opportunity" to inflict "the most drastic punishment on all leading natives found guilty of treason", disarming them and "instilling a proper respect for the white man".

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1 Natal Witness, 23.7.06.

2 Co 179/233/12460, Encl. 2 in desp. 9.3.06, McKenzie to M. of Defence and Cd 5027 p101 Encl. 4 in desp. 97. McKenzie to Dept. of Militia, 15.6.06.
In what followed therefore, the declaration of Martial law on the 9th of February played an important role, for Martial law is in some ways the very abrogation of law. Under it, any acts carried out "in good faith" by the governor, the Commandant of the Militia or their subordinates in an attempt to put down the disturbances would be indemnified thereafter by an Act of Parliament. Once there was "no law" in Natal, the normal restraints of society could be loosened. The element of force took on a new significance. As well as being a response to aggression whether overt or covert it could in turn become its cause. It was not of course the only cause. Many tribes who experienced troops marching through their locations took the government's advice and remained quiet - or even responded to the appeals for aid from the whites. And the same was true of those tribes which found themselves attacked by the "rebel force" in the second phase of the disturbances, when the men under Bambatha attempted to force other peoples to join them. Some responded positively, others fled to the nearest magistracy or to the bush. Nevertheless where there was a background of tension and conflict with white authority, administration, police or settlers, fears were aroused simply by the appearance of the white troops on the scene; Africans would arm and doctor themselves for war, sometimes it would appear

1 Stuart, Z.R. 228-9.
purely in self-defence, and this on the other side would rouse fresh apprehensions and forces would be sent to deal with a new outbreak of "rebellion". In much of what follows there is something in the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy: fearing, perhaps half wanting, rebellion the colonists and their leaders by their actions, gave substance to their fears. It is therefore necessary to trace in some detail the incident antecedent to the declaration of Martial Law.

II

One of the most important of the initial incidents of defiance over the collection of the Poll Tax occurred on the 7th February, when Chief Mveli of the Funzi tribe brought his people to pay their tax to the magistrate of the Umgeni division, T.R. Bennet, at Henly. On hearing from the chief that some twenty-seven armed members of his tribe had taken up a position almost two miles away, the magistrate sent a European trooper, who spoke no Zulu, and two African messengers to find out the reason for their behaviour. Both the African messengers were relatives of the chief, one of them his brother, called Jobe.

On arrival the emissaries addressed themselves to the leaders of the group, Makanda and Mjongo and asked what was going on. According to Jobe their reply was "we have come to the Chief or magistrate
who is collecting the money. We shall refuse our money for the Poll Tax*. They were then asked why they were carrying assegais and answered "These assegais, it is our day today. There will be blood today". At this point the rest of the men came forward suddenly - whether to hear what was being said, whether for some less innocent purpose, is not clear - and the messengers turned tail and fled.¹

Mjongo and his men then went off to their kraals on Henry Hosking's farm Trewirgie near Byrnetown. The following day a detachment of fifteen policemen including two Africans was sent to arrest the twenty-seven men accused of being in unlawful possession of arms. The police, under Sub-Inspector S. K. Hunt, arrived at dusk, having lost their way earlier in the day, and, despite Hosking's advice, decided to proceed with the arrest. At the kraals, about a mile away from the homestead, they asked for the wanted men and Mjongo and two others were found immediately, and were handcuffed. The police then began their search for the others who were some way away from the kraals in the bushes. According to the Court Martial evidence of Mbadi, one of the accused:

"After Mjongo had gone we decided to follow him. Then one police trooper saw us and turning round

¹CO 179/284/19935, Encl. in desp. Conf. Gov. to Sec. St. 11.5.06 in the evidence and judgment in the Richmond Court Martial. Henceforth cited as Richmond C.H. Evidence Jobe 12.3.06, and Mantasi ka Mjongo, 17.3.06.
called the others. The police came and .... said 'go home, go home'.

We noticed that they had drawn their revolvers, they were in front of us, so we drew back to the rocks, saying that we had done no harm in the location. They said: 'You have been carrying assegais'. We said 'There is no harm in that. Mveli sent us back.' We said 'Let Mveli come here we will talk to him. It is no good your coming here armed' .... They told us to lay down our assegais and we said, 'How can we do so when you have drawn your firearms.....' The others then shouted 'you have come for our money; you can shoot us. We won't pay', and 'We would rather die than pay'.

When Mjongo was released by the police to try and quieten the men who were flourishing small shields and assegais, he was pulled down amongst them. The police then apparently rode in on their horses amongst the group, who believed that they were trying to trample them down; this did nothing to improve their temper.

Eventually the police returned to the kraal, followed by the men, some of whom, according to their evidence had agreed to discuss matters there or at Hosking's farm, others of whom wished either to join or rescue the two men already arrested.

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1Richmond C.M. Similar evidence was given by the other accused, 17.3.06.

2Ibid. Evid. Manibuka and Ubuwini, 17.3.06.

3Ibid. Evid. Mbadi and Njaja, 17.3.06.
They trooped down after the police in twos and threes, according to Stuart "jeering and taunting ... ^them7 in the most insolent manner", according to some African witnesses singing and praying as they had done outside Henly. ^Suddenly one of the Africans grabbed hold of the bridle of the policeman in charge of the prisoner, Ngcuba. Sub-Inspector Hunt immediately fired his rifle and the other police followed suit. In the ensuing scuffle, four Africans were wounded and two of the police, Sub-Inspector Hunt and Trooper Armstrong, were stabbed to death. The following day, Martial law was declared throughout the colony.

Although the picture which emerges from the Court Martial evidence is not absolutely clear, and there are obviously great difficulties in interpreting the evidence of the accused, it would appear from this incident that no premeditated murder of the magistrate or the police officers was intended, let alone a widespread massacre of whites. Even if one follows the official account of what occurred, or Stuart, despite the jeers and gesturing, the Africans did not strike first. ^The first shot was fired by Hunt at a handcuffed prisoner. ^On the 7th February, the three messengers from the magistrate to the armed men, escaped unscathed; nor, if as was alleged, the group intended murdering the magistrate,

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1 Richmond C.M. Evid. passim 15.3.06 and 16.3.06.
2 Z.R., p.122-126 gives an account of the 'Trewirgie' affray.
3 Cf S.N.A. 1/6/284256, Petition of Ngcuba undergoing 20 year sentence and 30 lashes, Minute Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mardall to S.N.A. "Trooper van Aardt informs me that he believes that the prisoner was shot by Sub-Inspector Hunt. This would be the first shot fired."
is it clear why they should have taken up a position two miles away from the magistracy. Indeed some of them maintained they had been ordered to stop there by Nvali himself — presumably because they were carrying assegais, although this was not illegal, and because he wished to stop them from voicing their opposition to the Poll Tax before the magistrate. According to both Nomkuba, the sister of Makanda, and of Mntayi ka Mjongo, himself one of the accused, they were on their way to paying their taxes when they were ordered to stop.¹ Had they gone on to the magistracy it is conceivable that an incident no more serious than those already described as having taken place in Mapumulo and Nkandla might have occurred. Once it was reported, however, the magistrate could not ignore the fact that these men were armed, but his sending as the only Zulu speaking messengers relatives of the chief was perhaps unfortunate. The crucial mistake however would appear to have been the sending of so small a detachment of police to arrest them the following day, under a man like Sub-Inspector Hunt. Hunt himself, who knew no Zulu, was not well suited to his task.² Apparently convinced beforehand that this was going to be the start of a widespread

¹Richmond C.M., Evid. 15.3.06.
uprising, he felt that he had been selected as "bait" by the government. While there is no evidence to suggest that he had been selected as a victim by the Africans involved in the incident, his own somewhat extreme views on the "native problem" may have influenced his behaviour. Thus in a letter to his family shortly after his arrival in Natal in the early nineties he wrote in terms of "licking the niggers into shape" and "knocking hell out of them". It is possible that ten years in Natal had mellowed Sub-Inspector Hunt's approach to Africans. The tradition however that lives on in his family of an autocratic, overbearing man is borne out by the African evidence at the Court Martial.

Whatever the truth of the police handling of the matter, on the other hand, it can be argued that after all twenty-seven men had appeared armed in defiance of the Poll Tax and this in itself was sufficient indication of their hostility to the government.

Here again the picture is more complicated. While it would appear that the immediate reason for the group's defiance was their Chief's order to join other members of the tribe in paying the tax, the fact that they were all members of an independent

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1 Personal communication from Mr. K. Hunt, grandson of Sub-Inspector Hunt, and drawn from entries in his unpublished diary which I have not been able to see.

2 Letter from S. Hunt to his parents in Dorset, 15.2.96 kindly shown me by Mr. K. Hunt, Rhodes University.
church was significant. It did not mean that they were necessarily anti-white (though they probably were in this instance), but that they were estranged from their chief and his pagan followers.

There was a fairly long history of antagonism in the Funsi tribe between Christian converts and pagans. Thus in 1896 a case was taken from the Native High Court to the Supreme Court in which Christian members of the tribe alleged that they had been victimised by their chief (at that time Hemuhemu, Nwelile's father). Apparently as a result of the complaints of some of the older members of his tribe that their wives and daughters stayed out late when they had been attending services, Hemuhemu forbade the holding of services in public or the saying of prayers in private. The penalty for infringing this command was a £2 fine or a beast and when the local missionary came to hold services in his location, the chief actually sent his private policeman to note down the names of those who attended. The complainants at this time were orthodox members of the European controlled Wesleyan Methodist Church. While Chief Justice Sir Walter Wragg of the Supreme Court found in favour of the Christians in this instance, the complaint


of the chief that the Christians of his tribe were disrespectful of his authority is a familiar theme in missionary history. That the conflict did not die down in 1896 is borne out by a letter written by Joseph Baynes, M.L.A. to the Magistrate of Richmond in the middle of 1904 transmitting the complaints of "respectable kraalheads" in the area about the disruptive effects especially on the women of a Christian sect operating from Trewingie under Njongo, at that time a sawyer with Makanda in the Enon forests.¹ By this time however the Christians complained of would appear to have become independent of the European missionary.

The 1906 episode in some ways also suggests a continuance of this aspect of the conflict, and it is difficult to say how far antagonism was directed against the Chief as representative of the government, how far as representative of rejected tribal tradition. Kbadi’s statement "Let Nveli come here we will talk with him" suggests that the defiance was primarily directed against the Chief and not the government. Nveli’s own prompt reporting of the incident to the magistrate – unlike Bambatha’s subsequent behaviour – and his alacrity and zeal in hunting out the rebels, as well as his expressed wish to rid himself of their

women and children,\textsuperscript{1} may well have represented an attempt on his part to consolidate his hold over the tribe and rid himself of an unruly and undermining element in its midst.

Whatever the complexities of the incident, the fact that it involved members of a separatist sect and that two police officers had been killed undoubtedly increased white fears and made the incident appear particularly ominous. Taken against the background of rumours and isolated incidents of resistance to the Poll Tax this was the last straw. It led to the swift declaration of Martial Law over the entire colony within hours of an event which in normal circumstances would hardly have warranted more than the reinforcement of the local police force.

The participants in the shooting of Hunt and Armstrong were soon to suffer dearly for their actions. On the day Martial Law was declared troops were mobilised and a column under Col. Duncan McKenzie despatched to the Midlands. Together with Mveli and five hundred of his men, they searched the Bynetown area and the Enon forest. On the 15th February, just a week after the initial incident, two of Njongo's men were captured and, after trial by Drumhead Court Martial, were shot in the presence of Mveli and

\textsuperscript{1}\textbf{FRC 101/88 McKenzie to P.M. 15.2.06.}
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1 FMC 101/66 McKensie to P.M. 13.2.06.
his men.\textsuperscript{1} The remaining participants were rounded up in the weeks that followed and were tried by Court Martial which sat from 12th to 17th March. A further twelve were sentenced to death and were, after some delay as a result of protests from the Colonial Office, shot before assembled tribesmen and chiefs from the Midlands and Southern districts of the colony, on the 2nd April. Several others were sentenced to twenty years imprisonment with hard labour, confiscation of property and lashes.\textsuperscript{2} Finally, three remaining participants who had been too badly wounded after a brush with the troops hunting them out in February to be shot by Court Martial like the rest, were put to death after a trial by the Natal Supreme Court, in September 1906. Mjongo was hanged on this occasion.\textsuperscript{3}

When the news of the Court Martial sentences first reached London, it is brought into sharp relief the conflict of interests and ideals which constantly faced the Colonial Office in South Africa: the claims of the non-white population on its humanitarian impulses, its own belief in the inviolate nature of self-governing

\textsuperscript{1}Stuart, Z.R., p.138.
\textsuperscript{2}CO 179/234/19938, Sentence of Richmond C.M., 19.3.06.
\textsuperscript{3}Cd 3247, no. 46, Gov. to Sec. St., no. 2, 7.9.06.
institutions and the repercussions in the rest of South Africa if any "Downing Street interference" was suspected. As Sir Matthew Nathan, who was Governor of Natal, 1907-9, put it: "It is when a ruling democracy comes into close relationship with a subject race that the inconsistencies of democracy and Empire become apparent."¹ The problem of resolving the differences between the "Home idea of what is right... in the interests of the natives, and the Colonial view of what it is possible to [cede?] without danger to the safety of the Europeans"² was one which faced, if it did not baffle, the Colonial Office throughout the disturbances and their aftermath.³

The initial collision between the Natal Government and the Colonial Office over the Richmond Courts Martial was not an auspicious one for the Imperial power. Already disquieted by the news of the imposition and continuance of Martial Law, the Colonial Office felt that the presence of Imperial troops in Natal and the fact that the British Parliament would later have to sanction an Indemnity Act, rendered them "morally responsible" for the executions.⁴ On the 28th March a cable was sent to Natal

① Nathan Papers, MS 368, p.60 ff.
② Ibid.
④ CO 179/253/10712, Minute A.B. Keith, 28.3.06, Sim. H. W. Just and F. Graham.
pointing out that the executions were likely to cause strong criticism in Britain, and that pending the receipt by the Colonial Office of the Governor's "further observations on the matter" the executions should be suspended.\(^1\) There can be little doubt that the cable was intended as one of friendly advice. Nevertheless it caused a furore. When the Natal cabinet refused to comply with the request of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Elgin, the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum suspended them without further communication with London. The Natal ministry, also without further ado, resigned. Protest meetings were held in every corner of Natal, and messages of sympathy poured in from all over South Africa. The Australian Government objected to this interference with the affairs of a self-governing colony, while New Zealand, more prudently perhaps, cabled for further information.\(^2\)

In the face of this uproar, Elgin retracted, maintaining that further information from Sir Henry McCallum had reassured him as to the justice of the men's trial and sentences. He assured his critics that even if the Natal ministers had not resigned he would have acquiesced in the sentences on receipt of additional information.

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\(^1\) Cd 2905, no. 35, Sec. St. to Gov. 28.3.06.

information from the Governor. Although Winston Churchill, Colonial Under-Secretary, defended the Colonial Office's stand before a highly charged House of Commons along these lines, he summed up the incident in the Colonial Office files by minuting "This is a complete surrender." It may have been complete surrender, although in the face of the excited situation in Natal, where it was claimed that the intervention was endangering white lives, it was difficult for the Colonial Office to press their point. The fact however that the Natal government had felt it possible to resign at such a time and that it was their resignation which led to the publicity surrounding the clash, did not escape the attention of the Colonial Office.

The most outspoken member of the Colonial Office staff was A. B. Keith, who held views which were far more extreme than most of his colleagues. He maintained that the news that McKenzie's forces were demobilising on March 31st, and that the Richmond trial had lasted more than one week and examined nearly thirty witnesses, showed that executions under Martial Law were not justifiable, especially as the ordinary courts of the colony were functioning.

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1 CO 2905, no. 38, Sec. St. to Gov. 30.3.06.
2 CO 179/233/10712, Minute on draft reply (n.d. c. 29.3.06).
3 CO 179/233/14033, Minute F. Graham, 29.4.06.
perfectly normally. Keith's views were denounced by his colleagues at the time as "an outrage on a population which is quite as humane as Mr. Keith and has more knowledge of the circumstances". Nevertheless by the end of the disturbances, Winston Churchill had privately stigmatised Natal as "the hooligan of the British Empire", and his successor as Under-Secretary confessed that he had "not an atom of confidence in the Natal ministry"; while the Colonial Secretaries, Lords Elgin and Crew were more restrained in their language, there is every indication that they too had little confidence in Natal's ability to handle her affairs either rationally or humanely.

On the surrounding tribes the events of March, 1906, and their culmination in the Court Martial sentences undoubtedly had a profound effect. According to Stuart, news of the Drumhead Court Martial on the 13th February, "which was regarded as just and proper" by every loyal Native spread at once far and wide.

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1 CO 179/253/11321, Minute 31.3.06.
3 CO 179/243/2135, Minute 27.6.07.
4 CO 179/245/2833, Minute 3.2.09. This was over their handling of the Dinwiddi trial and proposed reforms of native administration.
Having dealt with these rebels, McKensie found it necessary to turn his attention to other chiefs and tribes in the district concerning whom there had been many adverse reports. Interviews were held with chiefs regarded as defiant in some way, or who were reported reluctant to pay the Poll Tax or to have doctor their tribes for war. McKensie was convinced from the evidence he had received from settlers and military spies that he was nipping in the bud a widespread conspiracy of the black man to rise against the white. Ultimatums were delivered to various chiefs to hand over their "rebellious" subjects and search their tribes for assegais. The tone adopted at these interviews was hardly calculated to reassure the chiefs as to the pacific intentions of the white man, whatever the proclamations in the Government Gazette or the reassurances from magistrates that "the quarrel of the Government is only with rebels". Thus in his interview with Chief Faku, whose tribe was reported to have assegais in their possession, McKensie was reported to have stated:

"I want fifteen head of cattle and all the assegais at Highflats. This is the last chance. Faku had just brought in eleven assegais in response to a previous demand. He need not come to me with a

1 Z.Bx. p.145, Od. 2905, Gov. to Sec. St., 16.3.06, p.36.
2 Co.179/235/12460, Encl. 2 in desp. 41, 16.3.06, Col. McKensie to Col. Bru-de-Wold, 11.3.06.
few assegais; I will go and collect them if he
does not bring them all and I will take every
beast he has got and burn his kraals if the
cattle and assegais are not there. He has to come
to the store at Highflats tomorrow at this time.
Has he heard?"

Failure to comply meant the confiscation of cattle, and not
infrequently the burning of crops and kraals. Courts Martial
were held before special courts set up by McKenzie, and sentences
of death, twenty-five years' imprisonment and fifty lashes were
not uncommon. On more than one occasion, the Governor-in-Council
found it necessary to mitigate the harshness of these Court
Martial decisions. Thus in March, when a Court Martial sentenced
seven members of Makofeli's people to death for "sedition", all
the sentences were commuted to imprisonment and forfeiture of
cattle as there had been no violence on the part of the accused.

At this point McKenzie handed his resignation to the government.

What happened next is not entirely clear; the resignation was
not accepted, McKenzie demanded that he be given a free hand in
future - and the sentences were not carried out. Some weeks later

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1 SHA 1/4/16 0137, Report of McKenzie's interviews with Faku,
Makofeli and Mnyamana, 12.3.06.

2 See e.g. Report in Natal Witness, 17.3.06 and GO 179/234/16020,
Encl. in desp. 60, 11.4.06, sentences of Umtwalumi Court
Martial and Governor's modifications.

3 Cd 2905, no. 57, Gov. to Sec. St., 9.3.06.

4 Cd 2905, no. 57, Gov. to Sec. St., 16.3.06.
when he sentenced five members of Chief Charlie Fynn's people at Untwalumi to death for similar offences, these sentences as well as some of his lesser ones, were also modified. The government decisions caused considerable dissatisfaction both amongst the troops and amongst local residents in the areas of the Courts Martial — and indeed it may well have been partly the fear of repercussions from McKensie and the troops which led the Government to take so adamant a stand on the Richmond Courts Martial. 2

While the government could mitigate the effect of the Court Martial sentences, it was more difficult for them to supervise McKensie's handling of the situation in the field. Although Stuart quotes an order from Col. Bru-de-Wold to McKensie instructing him to exercise restraint in his dealings with chiefs and to avoid provocation, 3 he fails to point out that the instruction added the proviso "until you have advised me in order that I may have time to prepare reinforcements by mobilising the rest of the Active

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1 CO 2905, no. 75, Gov. to Sec. St. 31.3.06. A number of sentences for example of 15 years Hard Labour with 30 lashes were commuted to 1 year Hard Labour and 25 lashes, GO 179/234/16020, desp. Gov. to Sec. St., 11.4.06 and encl. Others of 20 years, 50 lashes and confiscation of property were changed to 20 years, 25 lashes and no confiscation, CO 179/234/14990, Gov. to Sec. St., 6.4.06.

2 See above, p. 311 - 315

3 Zulu Rebellion, p.141.
Militia and possibly the First Military Reserve. At the same time, McKenzie's view of what constituted provocation and what constituted rebellion, may well have differed from that of a less high-handed individual.

While some of the magistrates would appear to have considered these proceedings essential to combat the growing restlessness of the tribes in their district, some were less sure. Thus in a private letter to the U.S.N.A. the magistrate of Richmond, J. Y. Gibson, who was soon forced to resign from this position for being too sympathetically inclined towards the Africans in general, and for opposing the Richmond Court Martial in particular, wrote:

"Men are still being continually arrested under Martial Law, but I have no idea what the charges are against them. I have discovered the spirit of Titus Oates prevailing to a certain extent and it is not possible at present to determine the extent .... A large number of men were taken away from my division I hear and tried at Ixopo. I have not been informed who they were or what they had done. Only occasional information reached this office in regard to some individual said to have been seen with one or more assegais.... There is a general belief... to that is is intended to send the force to deal with Tilonko. In the meantime, complete peace appears to reign, the people being all most amenable and anxious to do right... They are all poor people in this division and heavy fines and exactions are ruining them completely..."
As the troop movements were extended throughout the Midlands and Southern portions of the colony, many chiefs and tribes began to feel apprehensive. These fears were perhaps most marked amongst members of Tilonko's and Msikofeli's tribes in the Ixopo-Richmond divisions. Both these chiefs were at the head of large and important peoples, and both were extremely unpopular with their white neighbours. Thus from the very outset of his career as head of the Kuse tribe, in 1897, Msikofeli was faced by the opposition of the magistrate and local settlers who had been agitating for some years for the breaking up of his tribe.¹

In the Richmond area, suggestions for deposing Tilonko over reluctance to pay the poll Tax came from white residents even before the declaration of Martial Law and before there was any evidence of his or his tribe making any hostile moves against

¹See e.g. SMA 1/1/302 1810 05, Minute C.E.Foxon.

²SMA 1/1/338 940/06, 24.3.06.
the whites. On the 12th February there were reports that
members of Naiserofeli and Tlouko's tribes had taken up arms—
according to Stuart and even McKennie, because they feared
the arrest of their chiefs. The moving of all Europeans in
the area into a larger further increased their apprehensions;
according to the one local resident who did not join the flight
from the farms, the African population now "seemed to have one
idea and that was that the troops were coming to kill them all".
Now that the whites had moved out, Chief Naiserofeli openly ex-
pressed the fear that the troops had come to wipe him and his
people out. He was the grandson of Chief Langalibalele on
his maternal side, so that such a fear may have had its origins
in the previous history of his family.

Despite the reports that these tribes had armed themselves,
moreover, on the following day, the Minister for Native Affairs

1 Defence 31 Correspondence. H.L.1/55 V.2159. Mr. Power, Middelburg, to R.N.A.
23.5.06. SMA 1/2/556 06 364 06. H. Nicolson, Richmond to R.N.A. 31.1.06.
See also petitions from white residents in SMA 1/1/141 1/1/142. 1/1/559
1188. FH 615180 06.

2 Ibid. p.139.

3 Cd 2905, p.23. Enel. 1 in no. 31. McKennie to Dr. De Wold 23.2.06.
Cited also Bosman, p.5.


6 Langalibalele, chief of the Hlubi people, came into Natal from Zululand
in 1849. In 1873 he had difficulty in getting his people to comply
with a government demand that they register their firearms. On twice
and Under Secretary for Native Affairs risked meeting these chiefs to reprimand them for their unruly conduct before the magistrate collecting the Poll Tax. The meeting passed without incident and both the tribes began to pay the tax without further ado. Early in April the Embo people, including Tlonko's, had paid nearly all their taxes. Yet though Tilonko and Maikofeli played no further part in the disturbances, there was constant agitation through the months that followed to break up their tribes. Five months later, when virtually all the troops had been demobilised and the disturbances were at an end, Tilonko was summoned before the Minister of Native Affairs. He voluntarily went to Pietermaritzburg where he was tried by Court Martial behind closed doors for sedition and public violence. He was found guilty, fined five hundred head of cattle (later reduced by the Governor who thought the original sentence would inflict the punishment on his tribe to two hundred and fifty), deposed from

being summoned before the SNA Sir Theophilus Shepstone, he failed to appear and tried to flee with members of his tribe across the Drakensberg. Colonial troops sent in pursuit were fired on, whereupon the incident took on the aspect of a rebellion. Langalibalele and his followers were defeated, the chief deposed and exiled with many of his followers. Their lands were confiscated. In his trial which was the first but not the last of Natal’s great political trials he was defended by Bishop Colenso and his daughter Harriette. See W. Rees, Letters from Natal, p. 259 ff; Brookes and Webb, A History of Natal, p. 113-121.

1 Cd 2905, p.14. no. 25, Gov. to Sec. St., 16.2.06.

2 SNA 1/1/367 1116 07, Rept. Magis. H.C. Colenbrander.

3 Cd 179/236/31499, Gov. to Sec. St., 3.8.06. Cd 3247, nos. 9 and 10. Gov. to Sec. St. 24.7.06 and 30.7.06, nos. 21 and 25, 79.
his position and deported with the ringleaders of the disturbances to St. Helena.\textsuperscript{1} Xsikofeli who had handed over all the men wanted by the military in the early days of the disturbances, was not dealt with as harshly, merely being fined in cattle and having his tribe divided into three. Yet much of the Natal case of a dangerous conspiracy which could only be dealt with by Martial Law and armed forces, rested on the cases of Tilonko and Xsikofeli. There was much agitation from the Colensoes for a reduction of Tilonko's sentence and several appeals were addressed to the Supreme Court, Natal, the Colonial Office and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.\textsuperscript{2} The Natal government's reasons for not being able to consider these appeals for a reduction of his sentence were that: he was an important chief and "located in the heart of Natal, near to the seat of the government"; he was recognised as one of the principal leaders in the rebel movement in Natal and if he did not actually fight, the operations of the armed forces he

\textsuperscript{1}CO 179/236/28634, Gov. to Sec. St. Cd 3247, no. 42, desp. 195, 11.8.06, Gov. to Sec. St.

\textsuperscript{2}See e.g. CO 179/237/6476, Encl. in desp. 267 Affidavit, H.E. Colenso with "Tilonkwe's petition" of 6.9.06. See also The Trial and Conviction by Court Martial of a Natal Chief for sedition and public violence, n.d. and no author, script marked at top "Strictly Confidential, not to be published, F.E.O. F.E. Colenso/ encl. in above. CO 179/244/6495, Encl. 5 in Gov. to Sec. St., Secret 1.2.07; CO 179/241/21356, Gov. to Sec. St., 23.5.07, no. 79; CO 179/243/36484 and other despatches in CO 179/245 contain long correspondence on Tilonko's position between the Colonial Office, Natal and Tilonko's Council. CO 179/243/36484 22.4.07. Winston Churchill was to call the trial and deportation of Tilonko "a hateful business" though in fact the C.O. did not intervene.
summoned to him and which marched through the countryside armed, “were only repressed by reason of the prompt appearance of the troops” in his location and by his precipitate flight when he found that his plans had been forestalled; he was in direct communication with Dinuzulu in connection with a proposed general rising; he was defiant and insolent to the civil authorities in Natal prior to the actual rebellion; and finally he assumed and maintained to the last his attitude of defiance after arrest and enlisted on his side for the purpose of appeal to the Privy Council “the small but active section of English-speaking persons who regard rebellious and dangerous characters as useful instruments for the furtherance of political animosities” (presumably the Colensos are being referred to here).\(^1\) It is an interesting footnote to Tilonko’s rebellious and dangerous character that on the day following the arming of his men and their assembling at his kraal, he sent an apology to the neighbouring white farmer lest his tribesmen had inadvertently trampled his tobacco during the night’s activities.\(^2\)

In the first phase of the disturbances when there was no overt resistance to the activities of the white forces, the fears of punishment may well have cowed would-be rebels. It has been

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\(^1\) CO 179/240/4452, Gov. to Sec. St. 20.1.07, Pte and personal.

\(^2\) CO 179/257/44376, Evidence in Court Martial of Tilonko 30.7.06, p.37, G. Pople (Resident overseer of tobacco farm.)
stated as a psychological 'law' that with "the strength of frustration held constant, the greater the anticipation of punishment for a given act, the less apt that act is to occur".1 And certainly this would appear to have been borne out in the early weeks of the 'rebellion' when for nearly two months white forces were able with impunity to march through locations, fine and depose chiefs without trial, confiscate large numbers of sheep and cattle, burn crops and kraals and flog all Africans who were considered 'insolent'. Trials were held under martial law for offences as vague as those of "insubordination or contempt or defiance of public authorities or menaces or seditious language or acts inciting to insurrection".2 All this time the ordinary courts of the colony were functioning normally. By the end of March, McKensie considered he had sufficiently "impressed" the Africans in the Midlands and South Coast to be able to demobilise his column.

From the point of view of the subsequent history of the disturbances however, McKensie's operations and those of Leuchar's column which was operating in the Mapumulo area mainly against Chief Ngobisimbe and his tribe, may well have been converting

1Dollard, Doob, Millar et al, Frustration and Aggression, p.38.
2Cd 2905, p.24, Encl. 2 in no. 30, Bru-de-Wold to Leuchars, 23.2.06.
latent hostility into open aggression.¹ There appears to be a point at which punishment intended to deter aggressive action can actually become its cause where the punishment for minor offences is so disproportionate people feel they may as well commit major ones. Moreover for punishment to act as deterrent people must feel they have something to lose - whether it be property, status or family comfort and happiness. In the case of the next phase of the disturbances, when, for the first time there was open defiance of the government, there is an element of despair and desperation, so well expressed before the Natal Native Affairs Commission by one Mvinjwa - not himself a rebel - when he talked of Bambatha, Chief of the Zondi people and the leader of the rebellion:

"They were like Bambata. He went to extreme simply because he was tied hand and foot by the network of troubles in which he found himself. He then strayed off in revolt. He was very much like a beast which on being stabbed rushes about in despair, charges backwards and forwards and, it may be, kills someone that happens to be in his path."²

To modern African nationalists Bambatha has become a great national hero, and of course, in the simple sense that he resisted oppressive European rule and attempted to unite behind him the

¹See below, p. 332.
²N.N.A.C. Evid., p.713.
chiefs and people of many tribes he is rightly so regarded. Unfortunately however Bambatha himself has left no record of what he was trying to do and we are dependent therefore in analysing his motives and aims on the very imperfect assessments of administrative officials and the less imperfect but still inadequate views of his induna and followers as to what prompted him to take the fateful decision of taking up arms against the white man. From these records one gets no idea of a man with a clear plan of action, a plan for example of ousting the whites from Natal and re-establishing a Zulu kingdom there and in Zululand. Despite the widespread use of Dinusulu's name, war-cry and war-badge and an attempt to bring the ex-King of the Zulu into rebellion, one's predominant impression is that of a man gazed beyond endurance who was using the King's name as a centralising device and making an appeal to Zulu national feeling, but who was prepared to die fighting probably knowing that his chances of success were slender in the extreme. Already extremely unpopular with his white neighbours who called him "Bellicose Bambata the Chief of Misrule", Bambatha was involved in two


2 For details of Bambatha's early life see Stuart, Z.R., p.157 ff. For his poverty and landlessness as well as the law suits he was involved in with his white neighbours, Chapter III, p. 161, above.

3 Greytown Gazette, 27.1.06. See also that of 10.2.06.
faction fights in the course of 1905, and, on being brought before the U.S.N.A. at the end of 1905, was warned that any future misbehaviour would probably lead to his deposition.  

Bambatha's suspicions of white intentions were revealed in 1904 when he questioned the ulterior motives of the Census. At the time of the promulgation of the Poll Tax, no open complaint was made to the magistrate of the division, but considerable discontent was expressed by the Zondi tribesmen led by one of their induna, Nhlonhlo.  

The murmurings of those people living on private lands and like Bambatha himself heavily in debt were, not surprisingly, the loudest. As a result of this opposition, Bambatha's people were the last to be called upon to pay the tax in the Umvoti division, and the magistrate, J. W. Gross, decided to make the magistracy itself, Greytown, the centre of collection. On the 22nd February, the day appointed for the collection of the tax, Bambatha arranged to meet his men outside Greytown as was customary amongst many tribes, but found at the rendezvous that some of the younger men, suspicious of the change of venue, arrived armed with assegais and shields. Still others had failed to bring the money or were likely to contravene borough

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1SMA 1/1/324, Memo U.S.N.A. 3.11.05.
regulations by being inadequately clothed.\(^1\) Apparently swayed by the fears of those who thought that if he went to Greytown he would be arrested,\(^2\) and perhaps by the thought that he had better control the wilder elements in the tribe by remaining with them, Bambatha sent on those members of the tribe who were prepared to pay the tax; about ninety-seven men paid tax and fifty three were exempted on this occasion.\(^3\) He himself remained about two miles away with those men who had refused to lay down their arms, and sent an apology of ill-health to the magistrate.

According to Stuart, Bambatha's mistake at this point was in not reporting to the magistrate what had occurred, as Nveli had done under similar circumstances.\(^4\) From this time he became more and more closely linked with that section of his tribe that had armed, and it became more and more difficult for him to respond to messages from the white authorities instructing him to report to the magistrate. That Bambatha failed to have much confidence in the assurances of his local magistrate may in part


\(^2\) CO 179/241/33767, desp. 29.8.07, Encl. 1, Report no. 2, Evid. Folekile (Bambatha's daughter) before J. Stuart, 18.7.07.

\(^3\) Greytown Gazette, 3.3.06.

\(^4\) *Z.R.*, p.164.
have been related to the personality of the local magistrate, J. W. Cross. Although Cross had been in the colony some forty years, and by 1906 had been in government employ for over thirty of these, he was something of an alarmist and himself tended to believe exaggerated stories of African unrest. It was apparently for this reason that he had had to be temporarily removed from a magistracy near the Pondoland border in 1897.\footnote{CO 179/200/23628 desp. Gov. to Sec. St. 9.10.97, and CO 179/200/24495, desp. Conf. 2, Gov. to Sec. St., 23.10.97.} Despite the fact that he was an excellent Zulu speaker, in 1904 his tactless remarks to the Africans assembled to welcome him to his new post at Greytown, when he informed them that the land was the white man's and not theirs, had even led to a private reprimand from ministers.\footnote{CO 179/229/19920, Gov. to Sec. St., Conf. 2, 2.5.04.} In the same year the Governor expressed doubts as to the wisdom of his deposing of Acting Chief Njengabantu.\footnote{SNA 1/1/314 Minute McCallum, 28.10.04.}

Like many magistrates of his generation, he believed that a freer use of the lash for infringement of beer-drinking regulations, the Masters and Servants Acts and to prevent faction fighting, would vastly improve native affairs in Natal.\footnote{BNA 1/1/367, Reports of Magistrates 11.1.07, SNA 1/1/346 2756 06 27.5.06 and W.N.A.C. Evid. J.W. Cross, p. 627 ff.} He is unlikely to have
viewed with sympathy Bambatha's troubles with his tribe or his own past history of unruliness, whatever their economic causes.

The Chief's troubles were increased by the fact that on the night of the tax collection a wholly false rumour spread that his tribe had surrounded Greytown and intended attacking it.\(^1\)

All the whites spent the night in laager and extra police were sent to the area to deal with the emergency. At the same time the Umvoti Militia Reserve were called out. Members of Bambatha's tribe now became even more determined to prevent their chief giving himself up. The way the members of the tribe felt about it was expressed by one of them before the Greytown Court Martial when he said:

"The white people should they want the Chief must take him from our hands... our wish is that the Chief should not be shot as a buck nor as a beast or an ox driven to the slaughter house." \(^2\)

Bambatha's position became more difficult not only because of his own action, or inaction, and because his previous friction with the authorities made him fear punishment, but also because as the days passed it became clearer exactly what punitive action amounted to in different parts of the colony. His first reluctance to report the presence of armed men in his tribe occurred

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\(^{1}\) Stuart, Z.R., p.162.

\(^{2}\) SNA 1/6/28, Evidence of Greytown Court Martial, 4.7.06, p.21; evid. Gadupi; Sim. Mkhonhlo, Saka and Manise.
but a week after two of Mjongo's followers had been shot for their part in the Trewirgie affray; troops were still in the Midlands hunting out the rest of that armed band and burning their crops and kraals. While Mveli had reported the defiance of this group in his tribe and had later apparently welcomed the opportunity of ridding himself of a dissident element in his location, this course may well have appeared more and more impossible to Bambatha as the troop movements continued and came closer to Greytown. The proceedings against Ngobisembe in neighbouring Mapumulo on the 5th March may also have increased Bambatha's determination to evade the clutches of the police and armed forces sent to arrest him on the 9th. On the 11th, he made his way into Zululand, and ultimately to Dinusulu's kraal.

Much was made of this last fact by the Natal government in 1907-8 when it was discovered that Bambatha had left his wife and children there for safe-keeping. It was widely believed at the time of the disturbances and after that he had been given arms and ammunition by Dinusulu and had been actively encouraged by him to start a rebellion in Natal being assured of Dinusulu's support.

1 See above, p. 309
2 Stuart, Z.R., p. 164, suggests the comparison.
3 Ibid., p. 166.
The evidence for and against such a view—which was rejected by the majority of members of the Special Court which tried Dinuzulu—will be considered below.¹ Whatever happened at the Usuthu kraal however, at the end of March Bambatha returned to Natal, accompanied by Ngengengqe, one of Dinuzulu's messengers, and Cakijana ka Gezindaka, who was believed to be one of Dinuzulu's induna. Cakijana was soon to become a key figure in the rebellion as Bambatha's right hand man.²

It is difficult to know at exactly what point Bambatha made his momentous decision to oppose the white man with force.³ The evidence of both Ngengengqe and Cakijana seems to suggest that the decisive moment came when he returned back to his tribe and discovered that Magwababa, his uncle, had been appointed regent in his place.⁴ It was at this point that Ngengengqe, who had ostensibly been sent by Dinuzulu to find a doctor for him in the Greytown district, returned to Zululand—without the doctor—as he feared trouble. On this, the evidence of Ngengengqe is consistent and straightforward. There are many variants of Cakijana's evidence.⁵ In his very first deposition before R.C. Samuelson

¹See below, Chapter VII.
³Stuart, Z. R., assumes it came when Bambatha was at the Usuthu, accepting the evidence of Bambatha's wife and family implicitly. p. 166 ff.
⁴GO 179/244/3062, Conf. A. in deep secret 5.1.08.
⁵See below, Chapter VII.
which he subsequently repudiated, he stated that on the fourth day after accompanying Bambatha from his father's kraal - also to look for Dinuzulu's doctor - he came upon Bambatha talking to some members of his tribe. At this point he was told "Go back, we are still talking. I have found that the white people have placed some other person in my place". ¹ It was only after this that Bambatha appeared with guns. This would suggest that it was not until he heard of Magwababa's appointment that he decided to take up arms - although Cakijana's later evidence given both while he was detained at Nkandla gaol after his arrest and at his own and Dinuzulu's trial stated that he had been instructed to join Bambatha in order to start a rebellion by Dinuzulu and this was his motive in joining Bambatha in the first place.² The difficulties of interpretation will be appreciated when it is considered how in both instances Cakijana, an extraordinarily shrewd character, was giving the evidence he expected his audience to want - in the first instance he was talking to Dinuzulu's defendants (Harriette Colenso was also present), in the second to his prosecutors. (It is interesting that Cakijana's father reported to Dinuzulu's defence team that Cakijana said he joined Bambatha when he was surrounded

¹Col. Col. 98, Statements, Samuelson.
²AGO 1/7/68, Cakijana's Evidence at Krantz Kop, 20.5.08.
SC 111/3/7, Notes of evidence in Rex v. Dinuzulu - Cakijana's evidence.
by white troops after he had attacked Magwababa and he "could not escape"; this was also Cakijana's first version of his evidence).¹ Bambatha's first openly hostile move was on the evening of 2nd April, when he attacked Magwababa, whose life was only saved by Cakijana's intervention.²

There had long been a rift between that section of the tribe which now supported Magwababa as regent and the younger followers of Bambatha, a rift which was in fact revealed at the time of the Poll Tax collection when Bambatha identified himself with the more turbulent members of his tribe and which one of his followers expressed by saying:

"We dogs of Bambata had no quarrel with the government. Bambata's quarrel was with his father Magwababa because Bambata alleged that Magwababa was the means of getting him deposed."³

Once Bambatha attacked Magwababa, a government appointee, it was inevitable that his quarrel would be with the government, and he must have been aware of this. When Magwababa was captured, Bambatha was reported as saying "Where are your white friends now? We do not acknowledge a Natal king, but a black one."⁴ His

²CO 179/234/11743, Gov. to Sec. St., no. 49, 3.4.06. SNA 1/6/27, Evidence Gwazi Zulu, Greytown Court Martial, 3.8.06, p.138.
final decision to oppose the white man with force by attacking
the magistrate and police sent out to arrest him on the 4th
April may have been further prompted by a feeling that he might
as well be hanged for a sheep as a lamb, or die fighting. He
followed this up by looting a hotel and the house of a Mr. Varty
in the search for arms.\(^1\) Two days earlier the shooting before
the assembled Midlands tribesmen of twelve of Mjongo's men stood
as an awful example of the white man's punishment, an example
which could have acted as a spur to a man who felt that by this
time he had nothing to lose.\(^2\) By the 3rd April, Bambatha may
have felt that he had already so blotted his copy-book there
was no other alternative to taking up arms. Although the timelag
between the Richmond shootings and Bambatha's open rebellion was
so small the sentences had been announced several days earlier
and had received very widespread publicity as a result of the cabinet
resignation over Imperial intervention on this issue.

On the 5th April Bambatha fled to the dense Nkandla forests
on the borders of Natal and Zululand, an area which had more than
once in the past served as a Royal sanctuary.\(^3\) From the tactical
point of view, for defensive warfare this area could hardly have

\(^1\) Stuart, Z.R., pp. 168-169, Col. 2905, no. 84, Gov. to Sec. St.,
6.4.06.

\(^2\) See above, p. 311.

\(^3\) Bryant, O.T., p. 415.
been bettered. After a few days in hiding he began to build up a rebel army. Here apparently his plan was to keep to the forest, sending messengers to chiefs to come and join him, and using Dimusulu's name as his authority and maintaining he had his support.¹

There seems to have been little intention of attacking the Europeans in the open, but simply of waiting for them to come into the bush and then taking them unawares.² For the first time since the declaration of Martial Law on the 8th February a resistance movement was being built up. For this reason the disturbances are frequently referred to as the "Bambatha Rebellion." Despite an attempt by Bambatha to force the Africans in the area to join him, however, he met with little success until Sigananda and his Cube tribes, one of the largest in the Nkandla district and guardians of the Royal grave of Cetshwayo, decided to throw in their lot with the Zondi. At first accompanied only by his own Zondi followers - they were reported to be about two or three hundred strong - Bambatha now quickly began to attract individuals from the Nkandla chiefdoms.

¹ CO 179/234/16019, Encl. in desp. 60, 11.4.06. Statements Vava and Hlangabesa, Bambatha's messengers, 7.4.06 (publ. Col. 3027 pp. 4-6).
Sigananda’s tribe had already signified their opposition to the Poll Tax at the beginning of the year, as has been mentioned.\(^1\)Shortly thereafter his chief son was fined for failing to find eight men for compulsory labour for the Public Works Department.\(^2\)When Bambatha fled to this area, Sigananda, together with the other chiefs in the neighbourhood, was ordered by the Commissioner of Native Affairs to arm his men and hunt out the rebels, and on the 8th April Sigananda’s messenger reported that Bambatha had entered his ward.\(^3\)After an apparently half-hearted attempt to look for Bambatha for a few days, the attitude of the tribe changed. One of Sigananda’s sons, who had given information to the government that Bambatha had been seen, was victimised by the tribe, and on the 13th April Saunders began to suspect that Sigananda had joined the rebels. By the 16th Bambatha was apparently moving about freely amongst the Cube who had all been doctored for war by Bambatha’s Basuto war doctor, the whole force then consisting of twelve to fourteen companies according to one estimate – 700 to 1,000 men. Sigananda sent messages to the men of the surrounding chiefs, Ndube, Mpumela.

\(^1\)See above, p. 274
\(^2\)Co 179/234/18854, Encl. 9, desp. 79, C.N.A. to P.M. 28.4.06, publ. Cd 3027, Encl. 9, pp. 31-34. For the African dislike of this compulsory labour – *Isibalo* as it was called – see above, p. 43-5
\(^3\)Co 179/234/18854, Encl. 9, desp. 79, C.N.A. to P.M., 28.4.06.
Makubalo and others, and while these chiefs did not join, members of their tribes began to filter towards the rebel army.¹

Despite Stuart and Bosman's statements to the contrary, poverty appears to have been among the root causes of the Cube discontent.² Sir Charles Saunders who discounted the rumours that it was Dimisulu's messages which had led Sigananda's people to rebel, also pointed out that both Sigananda and his chief son and heir, Ndabanzingi were paupers.³ As in the case of Bambatha exceptional poverty is one of the clues to the above-average frustration being felt by the Cube people and its leaders, and therefore their low resistance in the face of an appeal to take up arms. The high correlation between low economic status and criminality both because of the higher level of frustration and because of the lesser "inhibiting influence of anticipated punishment" has frequently been noted. At the same time people who have been ground down by poverty for generations do not usually rebel against their lot. It is the recently poor and the recently conquered who are most prone to "do something about it". It should be remembered that the Mkandla-Nqutu area of Southern

¹CO 179/234/18854, Encl. 9 desp. 79, C.N.A. to P.M. 28.4.06.
³CO 179/234/18854, Encl. 9, desp. 79, C.N.A. to P.M., 28.4.06.
⁴Dollard, Doob and Miller et al, Frustration and Aggression, pp.112-113.
Zululand had only relatively recently come under colonial rule. Unlike the Natal Africans, the Zululanders had more recent memories of a glorious past very different to their present humiliation. That they should in so many cases therefore have responded to Bambatha’s call is hardly surprising. In the case of Sigananda especially these memories must have been a potent spur to action.

Sigananda, a venerable old man reputed to be about ninety-seven years old, had been an udibi or mat-carrier in the last days of Shaka’s army. He was also said to have witnessed the killing of Retief at Dingane’s kraal.¹ Be that as it may, he had had a more recent history of loyalty to the Zulu Royal family, having been closely involved in the troubles of the eighties. He it was who granted Cetshwayo sanctuary in his flight from Zibhebhu in 1883. In 1888 he was held in Eshowe gaol on a charge of treason during the disturbances of that year.² In a sense he was amongst the oldest living representatives of ancient Zulu military pride and tradition. Ritter for example in his account of the Rise of the Zulu Empire apparently relied very heavily on the oral traditions and memories of that time conserved by Sigananda.

¹ Bosman, p.109.
² CO 879/30/370, Encl. in no. 50, p.96. Return of untried prisoners 3.9.86 (African Conf. Prints.)
³ Shaka Zulu, The Rise of the Zulu Empire.
For such a man it must indeed have been difficult to become reconciled to European rule. Certainly a message he is reported to have sent to Dinusulu in reply to his instruction that he pay the Poll Tax fits in with this interpretation. He is reported to have accused him of cowardice in not openly fighting against the white man — a message which Dinusulu, a younger but perhaps wiser man, rejected with the words "He is 'boiling' talking nonsense when he says I am afraid. Who can fight the white man? I have been sent over the seas by 'them'. I do not want my children to suffer."¹

On the other hand, Stuart maintains that it was secret messages from Dinusulu to Sigananda instructing him to look out for Bambatha which led to his change in attitude.² While in fact Dinusulu admitted to having sent such a message he maintained it was before the outbreak of violence — before he knew that Bambatha intended starting up a rebellion. He thought he was simply looking for land on which to settle. At the Court Martial of Sigananda and his sons, evidence was led which suggested that the claims by Cakijana that he had been sent by Dinusulu made considerable impact on the Cube.³ How important this factor is in the light of

¹Natal Mercury, 2.6.06, Evidence Maliba Sijulana (Chief Jubdulungu) at Dinusulu's Preliminary Examination.
³SNA 1/6/26, Nkandla Court Martial, Polomba, 29.6.06, pp. 11-12.
Dinuzulu’s chief adviser Mankulumana’s subsequent visit to the Cube in an attempt to disillusion them is difficult to gauge. On the 23rd April Mankulumana arrived at the Nkandla stronghold and, according to his version of what happened, was given a very hostile reception by the tribe who refused to let him see Sigananda. While there were those who considered this visit simply part of Dinuzulu’s double-dealing, and that he had sent other more sinister messengers simultaneously, at the time the Commissioner for Native Affairs was sure that Mankulumana’s visit whilst not affecting the Cube decision to rebel, materially affected the decision of the tribes in the division and that “rebels from other tribes at least are melting away”.

Another interpretation was given to their actions by some members of the Cube tribe at the time of the court martial. Thus Polomba, the induna of the tribe stated that the tribe was only recognised to be in open rebellion after the arrival of the troops, and that when they did not report Bambatha’s trail (which Sigananda maintained had become imperceptible) they were treated

1 CO 179/234/18854, Encl. 9, desp.79, C.N.A. to P.M. 23.4.06.
2 See e.g. The Trial of Dinuzulu, Address of Attorney General, pp. 19-20.
3 CO 179/234/18854, Encl. 9, C.N.A. to M.N.A., 23.4.06.
forthwith as rebels. Cakijana, a highly unreliable witness but one who in every other way tended to implicate Dinusulu in the disturbances maintained in May 1908 that when Mankulumana addressed Sigananda’s tribe they said:

"We have no answer for you only that we have been armed by Matshiqele [Saunders] and we are now armed for good and intend fighting for he fired on us while we were still looking for Bambata."2

Several other defence witnesses in the Dinusulu trial gave similar evidence,3 and at the court martial of Sigananda and his sons even the Counsel for the Prosecution maintained that their fault lay in their attempt to remain neutral (instead of actively assisting the European forces) for "of course [in war] there is no such thing as neutrality".4 Although Stuart denies that the tribe were first fired upon by the white forces,5 it does appear as if it was simply assumed that they were in rebellion once they failed to hand Bambatha over and the evidence of some of the tribesmen that they were fired upon by the troops when they were still looking

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1 SMA 1/6/26, MSS Evidence of Nkandla Court Martial, p.9, Evidence 29.6.06.
2 AGO 1/7/68, Statement Cakijana, Krantskop, 20.5.06.
4 SMA 1/6/26, op. cit. p.59, Prosecutor Major v. der Plank’s address to the Court.
5 Z.R., p.218.
for the rebels does have to be taken into consideration. To expect a man with the background of Sigananda to relish handing Bambatha over to the white forces was probably to expect too much — or too little — especially when one considers that in the days of Mpande Sigananda had fled to Natal in fear of his life and was succoured, according to Bosman, by Jangeni, Bambatha’s grandfather.1

It would thus appear that at first Sigananda did try to remain neutral; his poverty, the tribe’s opposition to the Poll Tax and his own memories of past glory and the laws of hospitality made him reluctant to pursue Bambatha in any very enthusiastic fashion. When he and his people realised that if they did not hand over Bambatha they would be regarded as rebels — perhaps were so regarded already— they decided to throw in their lot with the rebels, though some of the outlying sections of the tribe may not have been fully aware of the decision.

After Sigananda, perhaps the most important chief to join Bambatha was Mehlokasulu of the Qungebe people, another man with his roots deep in the Zulu past. In many ways, however, the motives which induced him to throw in his lot with the rebels in the Mzandla forests appear to have been similar to those which initially spurred

1 p.108.
Bambatha into action. Once again, Mehlokazulu had a long history of past conflict with the authorities, both British and colonial. He had first gained notoriety at the time of the Zulu War, when he crossed the Natal border to kidnap two of the wives of his father, Sirayo's wives who had fled to the colony. This incident had provided Sir Bartle Frere with one of his pretexts for war against Cetshwayo in 1879. Prominent in the Zulu War and in the tussles between the Zulu Royal Family both against the British and against Zibhebhu, Dinuzulu's arch-rival, Mehlokazulu's existence during the 1880's and early 90's was turbulent and harried. He was driven from district to district, as now one loyal chief, now another accused him of offenses such as cattle-stealing from their white neighbours. He settled in the New Republic for some time, in Faku's location, but ran into trouble there when a Boer farmer accused him of insulting his wife; he was imprisoned at Vryheid for the offence. Finally he returned to Nqutu district where his father's people lived, and in 1893, when Sir Marshal Clarke became Resident Commissioner in Zululand and British attitudes towards the Zulu Royal Family and their adherents became less un-

1 See above, Chapter II, p. 24

2 ZA 22 R 618 Information from Majolo ka Sirayo. (According to the magistrate, "a very hostile witness" to Mehlokazulu. He was Mehlokazulu's brother.)
compromising, he was appointed as Chief of his father's tribe. It was felt that restoring him to a position of responsibility might ensure his loyalty. \(^1\) From that time indeed Mehlokazulu does appear to have led a peaceful, law-abiding life — though he betrayed considerable anxiety over the delimitation of Nqutu for white settlement in 1904, writing to Dinuzulu:

"Further Ndabesita, be careful and look out for the English, for the white people are well prepared. They are looking for a pretext by which they can catch you. See the country is looking to you as one man, do not forget. The chief of the land should be wide-awake. For the whole land is looking for your word." \(^2\)

On the day appointed to pay the Poll Tax in 1906, he failed to appear before the magistrate with his men, and the magistrate was disposed to take a serious view of the matter. \(^3\) Nevertheless for the first three months of Martial Law Mehlokazulu made no openly hostile move, despite many rumours that he was planning to do so. As the armed forces drew nearer to his district however, Mehlokazulu apparently became apprehensive of white intentions towards him. These apprehensions increased as rumours spread amongst the whites that he had been sending messages to Chief

\(^{1}\) SNA 1/4/15 059 06, 25.1.06, Magis. to U.S.N.A.

\(^{2}\) SNA 1/4/15 059 06, 25.1.06, Magis. to U.S.N.A.

\(^{3}\) SNA 1/4/15 059 06, 25.1.06, Magis. to U.S.N.A.
Kula in Umsinga division and that they were planning joint action
against the whites. There were close ties of kinship and friendship
between these two chiefs, and it is true that Mehlokasulu had sent
messages both to Kula and Dinusulu about the Poll Tax. It is
not unlikely that these messages tried to find out whether joint
opposition to the Tax was possible. It must therefore have been
with considerable fear and trembling that Mehlokasulu saw the
arrest of his friend and neighbour by the white forces on the 8th
May.

Kula, one of the most important of the government appointed
chiefs, headed an amalgam of tribal fragments formed into a 'new
tribe' by Sir Theophilus Shepstone in 1869. Conspicuous in
their loyalty to the government both in 1879 and during the Boer
War, the tribe had always considered itself the "government's
tribe" - a fact which tended to draw on it the enmity of its
neighbours, both of other tribes and of the Boers. At the end
of 1905 and the beginning of 1906, there were several reports
of pending faction fights amongst the many tribes of the very
densely populated Umsinga district, where Kula's was by far the

1 Gov. to Sec. St., desp. 95, 18.5.06, publ. in Cd 3027, no. 49, pp. 44-45.

2 Times of Natal, Evidence Magadisa 29.2.06. Report of Dinusulu's Pre-
liminary Examination.

3 SNA 1/4/12 96/03, Report U.S.N.A. to Commandant of Volunteers, 18.6.03.
largest. Perhaps as a result of the arming of young men for these faction fights, and also because this was an area of white animal killing from October, 1905 onwards, white farmers in the area, predominantly of German and Dutch descent, began to express their fears of being wiped out. At the beginning of March there was a 'panic' amongst the white settlers in Kula's division over "nothing definite", which was followed in turn by the arming of one of the sections of Kula's tribe under the induna Hbulawa "who feared arrest". At the same time, the magistrate of Umsinga division, with whom Kula's relationship was of the worst, was sending frequent complaints about the chief's behaviour to the Minister for Native Affairs, although "he furnished no specific charges". In part his suspicions may have been roused by his chief informant who was a man from Sibindi's tribe, a tribe which had been involved in many boundary disputes with Kula's people.

Finally Kula was summoned before the minister at the end of March, and was warned that if he did not mend his ways, his fate would be similar to that of the chiefs the government had already dealt with.

1 SNA 1/4/14 05. Magistrate Umsinga (A. E. Harrington) to U.S.N.A., 22.10.05.
3 SNA 1/1/33 726 06, Magis. to U.S.N.A. nd.
4 SNA 1/1/33 886 06, Interview of Kula with H.N.A. 26.3.06.
5 Ibid.
Apparently awed by this warning, Kula returned to his tribe and handed over Nabalawa, despite the obvious dissatisfaction of the rest of the tribe at this action. At this point in fact his uncle, Ntele, led the dissidents into open rebellion, being joined by another small tribe in the division. Kula, however, though with some reluctance, continued to do his duty as a government servant, and, on the 4th May, reported Ntele's rebellion. A few days later, when the local magistracy had been reinforced with Militia Reserves from Helpmekaar and by the Natal Mounted Rifles, because tribes were expected to come in to pay their taxes, Kula with several of his leading men, once more made his way to the magistracy to tell of further developments in his tribe. On the advice of the magistrate, the officers decided to transfer him to the Officer Commanding the troops at Helpmekaar, where, after being questioned, Kula was detained in custody. Despite orders from the head of the Defence Headquarters in Pietermaritzburg to the Chief Leader of the Reserves in Helpmekaar that Kula should be released immediately as he had been arrested while visiting a magistrate, and should have been regarded as holding a safe-conduct, the Leaders of the Reserves at Helpmekaar, Uys,

1Stuart, Z.R., p.322.

2The magistrate, A.E. Harrington, believed many rumours brought to him that Kula intended murdering him. He was apparently prone to accepting rumours at their face value as McCallum's remark on hearing that Harrington believed Bambatha to be alive at the end of 1906 indicates: he laconically commented "He would".

3Stuart, Z.R., p.323.

4SNA 1/1/341 1493 06, 9.3.06.
Adendorff, Muller and Henderson, telegraphed to headquarters that the release of the chief would cause the spread of rebellion amongst adjoining tribes and would "cause grave condition amongst our men which we will not hold ourselves responsible for".¹ According to the Resident magistrate in the neighbouring magistracy of Ladysmith, the Boers (and the names of the leaders of the Reserves at Helpmekaar bear out his interpretation) were seeking to avenge themselves on Kula for his services to the British during the Boer War.²

In the face of this threat of mutiny from the Reserves, Kula was removed to Pietermaritzburg, where he was held for the duration of the disturbances. A few days later another portion of his tribe under his brother Manuka joined Mtele and Nondubela in open rebellion.³ This may have been the result of resentment at the government action in removing their chief or lack of adequate control once Kula had been detained; to the local settlers it was evidence that Kula himself had been fomenting rebellion all along. The government however considered that there was in-

¹Times of Natal, 12.9.06.
²SNA 1/1/347 1627 06, Pte letter to MNA, 29.5.06.
sufficient evidence to prove this, for although Kula was deposed and removed from his tribe at the end of the disturbances, he was not brought before either a civil or a military tribunal.\(^1\)

Other chiefs, and Mehlokasulu in particular, were left however to draw their own conclusions from Kula's visit to the magistrate and his consequent arrest. Mehlokasulu's followers feared that his would be a like fate and almost immediately after Kula's arrest, when Mackay's Column marched through the Nqutu district, urged him to hide in the forests to save his life and cattle.\(^2\) When he was instructed by the Officer Commanding to provide men to fight that portion of Kula's tribe which had rebelled and crossed the Buffalo River, he refused, and fled with his wives, cattle and a few followers to the bush.\(^3\) The majority of his tribe apparently took no further action on either side.

The magistrate of Nqutu tried his best to keep up negotiations with Mehlokasulu and persuade him to return to his tribe, but according to one witness, Mehlokasulu's reply was "I can't go back now, I have been surrounded by troops. I do not know what harm I have done".\(^4\) It was at this time that the government found

\(^{1}\) Col. 3247, Gov. to Sec. St., no. 60, 28.9.06. Stuart, p.319 ff.

\(^{2}\) CO 179/251/10868, C de B. Perse to Sec. St., 27.3.08.

\(^{3}\) CO 179/235/20725, Gov. to Sec. St., 18.5.06, desp. 95.

\(^{4}\) Col. Col. 98, Mankulumana and Ngwako Prosecutions, p. 83 ff. Evid. Magadisa. See also Times of Natal, 29.2.08 and CO 179/235/22649, Encl. in desp. 106, CNA to P.M. 26.5.06.
it necessary to send a circular to the magistrates of Dundee, Lady Smith, Estcourt, Greytown and Kranz Kop to assure Chiefs in their divisions that they need have no fear of being interfered with;¹ in Nqutu division where the magistrate asked permission of the government to hold a meeting to allay the fears of the chiefs, Col. Mackay in charge of the troops in the district instructed the Commissioner for Native Affairs to "discontinue any further diplomatic negotiations" with Mehlokasulu and the conference of chiefs was apparently not held either.² Finally after a few days in the bush, Mehlokasulu decided on 18th May to throw in his lot with Bambatha and made his way to the Mkhanda stronghold. It is possible too that his action was partly influenced by the burning of Cetshwayo's grave by white troops on the previous day. There he was joined by members of Faku's tribe under Labudlungu who had originally been armed in accordance with the instructions of the magistrate to watch the drifts when Mtele and Mavugutu had crossed into Zululand. Their story was that after Mehlokasulu's flight, they saw their kraals burning, and thinking that it was being done by the rebels went to see what was happening, but were fired on by the white troops.³ They therefore

¹PM 102/231, 16.5.06.
²PM 102/228, C.H.A. to P.H., 25.5.06, no. 143.
³See also Gov. to Sec. St., 18.5.06 (CO 179/235/20725, desp. 95): "No more huts are to be destroyed on the Natal side of the Tugela unless the troops are fired on from them. In Mkhanda however where our chief weapon... is cutting off supplies, all kraals will be destroyed as well as crops wherever this is possible so as to compel natives to leave the close shelter in which they are now concealed."
"ran away and .... joined Mhlolamulu and went to Nkandhla with
him, without Faku's orders".1 This may of course have been a
convenient excuse on the part of men who had already decided to
rebel against the government; that most of the tribes of Zulu-
land were reluctant to fight against their fellows in Natal,
despite previous tribal enmities, was an undoubted fact. Whether
this in itself constituted rebellion depends on one's viewpoint.
Their situation is reminiscent of that of Boers in the Cape at
the beginning of the Boer War./ The plaint of Faku's men that
they were fired on by the white troops when they were in fact
assisting them is to some extent supported by a very interesting
correspondence between the commissioner for Native Affairs in
Nkandla and the magistrate of Nqutu, in which reference is made
to the white troops "trying to goad the whole population" into
rebellion and of the difficulties of magistrates in protecting
"people who one knew perfectly well were faithful to us".2
Hignett's words are strikingly supported by a long, and for him,
unusual letter sent by Archdeacon Johnson, S.P.G. missionary at
St. Augustines in the Nqutu district to the secretary of that
organisation in London. He wrote:

1 Col. Col. 98, Precog. Samuelson Nkuno ka Ziningo, brother of Faku.
See also Times of Natal, 29.2.08, Evid. Magadisa in Dinusulu's Prelim.
Examination.

2 ZA 26 Papers relating to the Zulu Rebellion C.W.A. to Hignett
14.6.06 agreeing with these sentiments, apparently originally
expressed by Hignett. I have not seen the original letter.
"Many thinking people have been asking themselves 'What are we going to do with this teeming native population?' Some strong-handed men have thought that the time was ripe for the solving of the great question. They knew that there was a general widespread spirit of dissatisfaction amongst the natives of Natal, FreeState and Transvaal, but especially in Natal, and they commenced the suppression of the rebellion in the fierce hope that the spirit of rebellion might so spread throughout the land and engender a war of practical extermination. I fully believe that they were imbued with the conviction that this was the only safe way of dealing with the native question, and they are greatly disappointed that the spirit of rebelling was not strong enough to bring more than a moiety of the native peoples under the influence of the rifle. Over and over again it was said, 'they are only sitting on the fence, it shall be our endeavour to push them over' and again speaking of the big chiefs, 'We must endeavour to bring him in if possible'. Yes, they have been honest and outspoken enough - the wish being father to the thought, they prophesied the rebellion would spread throughout South Africa; had they been true prophets, no doubt the necessity of solving the native question would have been solved for this generation at least."

Archdeacon Johnson was a highly respected member of the Natal community. He was one of the four non-official members on the Native Affairs Council set up by the government after the disturbances. Here no wide-eyed novice or fiery philanthropist. Johnson had been in Natal since the age of seven, and justly described himself as "no negrophilist in its narrow rabid sense..."
a colonist and proud of that position".\textsuperscript{1}

It could also however be argued that it was only the already disaffected and guilty who would allow themselves to be provoked into aggressive action by the troops. The case of Chief Matshana ka Mondisa would appear to illustrate both the degree of military provocation and this latter point. Although the majority of his tribe assisted the government forces at Nkandla and the chief himself remained in touch with the authorities ever since Bambatha had fled to the district, some members of the tribe broke away under five of his sons with whom Matshana had been having considerable difficulty for several years.\textsuperscript{2} During the third week in June the tribe was fined five head of cattle per rebel. These were promptly paid by Matshana to Col. Mackay who was in charge of the column operating in the area, and he was given a "complete discharge". A week later, a further column under Col. Royston swept through Matshana's ward, gathering up "almost every beast it could find". According to the Commissioner of Native Affairs in Zululand, Royston's "handling of the matter in view of what had already happened under Col. Mackay and Leuchars, (to whom Matshana had rendered every

\textsuperscript{1}S.P.G. Archives, Letters 1906, no. 71, 24.7.06.

\textsuperscript{2}SNA 1/1/325-1741, Interview between magistrate and members of Matshana's people.
assistance) was, to say the least, extraordinary." The civil authorities immediately reassured Matshana and his people that their cattle would be restored to them.  

Although this had not been done by December 1906, no further members of the tribe joined the rebels.  

In the midst of offensive operations it must have been very difficult in any case for the troops to distinguish between black friend and black foe, even had they been willing to make the effort. With many of the columns, especially those of volunteers from outside the colony, there was often only one European who knew any Zulu. For them it must frequently have seemed impossible to draw the distinction between "goading into rebellion" and "taking the necessary precautions". In the Nkandla-Nqutu area where there was undoubtedly open rebellion, whatever the initial reasons for its outbreak, from the European point of view that rebellion had to be stamped out as swiftly as possible. The terrain was extremely difficult to operate in, the home forests and the Nkandla mountains constituting a natural stronghold, with steep cliffs, deep gorges and dense bush. If in the course of the con-

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1 SNA 1/1/360 4206/06, 8.1.07.  

2 See also Stuart, Z.R., p. 397 who calls the episode "a mistake".  

3 See e.g. Za 34 CR 34/06, R.H. Addison to P.M. (copy), 23.6.06 stating that he was the only one with the Transvaal Mounted Rifles to know any Zulu.
verging movements considered necessary for surrounding the rebels and hunting them out, other, more-or-less innocent, chiefs and tribes were dragged into the hostilities, it could be held that this was an unfortunate, but unavoidable concomitant of warfare.

It is however more difficult to accept these arguments in the case of the third phase of the disturbances, the outbreak of 'rebellion' in the Nqumulo division. On the 10th June McKerrie inflicted a crushing and decisive defeat on Bambatha and his followers at the battle of Nome Gorge. Most of the leaders of this phase of the disturbances, including Bambatha himself, who had his head cut off for identification purposes, and Mahlokasulu, were killed. The Governor believed that this blow had brought the rebellion in Zululand to an end, and that there was "no chance whatever of the rebellion spreading into Natal". On the 18th June the tribesmen of Nqumulo attacked Thring's Store killing a trooper as well as destroying some wagons at Otimati River; it was reported that hundreds of tribesmen had taken up arms. The timing of this was the more surprising as Nqumulo, a very densely populated almost entirely African area, had been amongst the first of the districts reported to be disturbed over the Poll Tax.²

¹Cd 179/235/24596, Gov. to Sec. St., desp. 161, 16.6.06.
²See above, p. 274
After the initial refusal on the part of the followers of Ngobizembe, Swaimana and Neseni to pay the tax and a subsequent meeting of the Minister for Native Affairs with chiefs in the area, a strong body of police was sent there at the beginning of February. Following further adverse reports from the division, where tribes had doctored themselves for war, a second column of the Field Forces was mobilised under Col. George Leuchars especially to deal with them. At the end of February Leuchars delivered an ultimatum to Ngobizembe to hand over within six days three hundred men who had "giya-ed" in front of the magistrate in January.\(^1\) Ngobizembe protested that after the lapse of nearly six weeks it would be impossible to find all the offenders in the allotted time. He only handed over twenty of the culprits and, as a result, on the 5th March, Leuchars bombarded his kraal with artillery fire from a distance of two hundred yards.\(^2\) This was reported to have had a "splendid effect". Leuchars, who had been Secretary to Native Affairs, was congratulated on his superb understanding of the "native mind" and all over the natives were reported to have "changed their attitude of studied insolence to one of thorough submission''.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Cd 2905, Gov. to Sec. St., desp. no. 70, 2.3.06.

\(^2\) Ibid., no. 37, 9.3.06.

\(^3\) Cd 2905, Gov. to Sec. St., 9.3.06.
with a large portion of his tribe and plans were made to send
him to northern Zululand. Half his lands were confiscated and
the people thereon placed under adjacent chiefs. He was further
fined 1200 head of cattle, and 3,500 sheep and goats. A
mounted column 'drove' the country for further 'rebels' and
cattle. No opposition was shown to these disciplinary actions,
although Bambatha at this time deposed from his chieftainship
was in the neighbouring Umvoti bush, watching no doubt with some
interest.

While Ngobisembe's was the most drastic fate in Mapumulo
at this time, Leuchars also demanded the 'rebels' from Nesen and
Swaimana's tribes to be given up. Nesen himself had not actually
been present at the time of the alleged defiance of his tribe
over the Poll Tax. He had been attending a trial at the Stanger
magistracy for a faction fight which had involved his tribesmen,
at the end of 1905. Nevertheless for not handing over more than
fifty-five of the hundred men demanded by Leuchars for trial by
Court Martial for their participation in the defiance of the
Mapumulo magistracy he was imprisoned without trial for six weeks.  

1 Stuart, Z.R., p.149.
2 Ibid., pp. 344 ff.
The opportunity was also taken of limiting his jurisdiction to the Mapumulo-Ndwedwe divisions of his tribe ostensibly as punishment for his part in the 1905 faction fight.

In March, Ndlovu ka Timuni, another chief in the Mapumulo division, was summoned to Stanger for having failed to appear before the magistrate on two previous occasions and was "owing to a mistake" detained for more than a month before he too was released without trial.1 The arbitrary nature of these proceedings was further illustrated by the case of Acting Chief Gevesa of the Cele tribe. Arrested for failing to obey a command to report himself to Leuchars, who apparently wanted his presence when the proclamation of Ngobisenbe's deposition was read out, he was sentenced under Martial Law to three months imprisonment. Gevesa's tribe was in fact divided between the Krantskop and Mapumulo divisions, and it would appear that the original summons to hear the proclamation had gone to the induna of the Mapumulo section of his tribe, Gevesa himself residing at Krantskop. The Krantskop magistrate himself thought this the most likely account of his behaviour. The induna in charge of the Cele people in Mapumulo had actually been present at Leuchars' command.2 This episode took

1 SNA 1/4/16 Col. Leuchars to Commandant of Militia, 20.3.06 and Memo. Magis. T. Maxwell, Mapumulo, 2.4.06.
2 SNA 1/1/371 Magis. Maxwell and U.S.H.A. 11.5.06 and Magis. Leslie (Krantskop) 4.5.06.
Although the bulk of Leuchars' column which had been operating in the Mapumulo-Lower Tugela area was demobilised in the middle of March, small numbers of troops, especially the Umvoti Mounted Rifles were retained there. These were later supplemented by a garrison of the Natal Mounted Rifles and the Durban Light Infantry, who were sent there on account of the rumours of rebelliousness amongst the tribesmen, although nothing of a definite nature was proven at this stage.\(^1\) At the end of April some of Ngobisembe's men joined Bambatha in the Nkandla forests.\(^2\)

By the middle of April there were indications that the presence of the troops was not entirely beneficial. The magistrate of the neighbouring Kranzkop division wrote to the Under Secretary of Native Affairs on the 19th April that the Chief Tshutshutshu, who had men in both divisions like Gevesa above, had complained that several members of his tribe had been unjustly flogged by the troops at Mapumulo and that he (the magistrate) had heard several other complaints of a similar nature.\(^3\) The young men of

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\(^1\) Stuart, Z.R., p.344.
\(^2\) Ibid., p.318.
\(^3\) SNA 1/1/340-1224\(^{06}\), Magis. A.W. Leslie, 19.4.06.
Tshutshutshu's tribe were later described as having been "insolent and insubordinate" during the initial Poll Tax collection, but, during the actual outbreak of violence in the division, to have been "loyal and zealous" in hunting out rebels.¹

On being asked for an explanation of these allegations against the troops of unjust flogging, the head of the Umvoti Mounted Rifles replied to the Commandant of the Militia that:

"The natives in question were punished for insolent behaviour and for not showing the required respect for the King's uniform. Strong measures had to be resorted to to teach the natives who had utterly got out of hand... to pay their respects to the white man."²

This action was fully approved by the Commandant of the Militia and apparently roused no further comment at the time.³ Yet a few weeks later Sir James Liege Hulett, a man who had held various responsible positions in the colony, having been a member of the Natal Parliament since Responsible Government and Secretary for Native Affairs in 1899, as well as being one of the largest sugar farmers in the colony with considerable interests in Zululand, was to write earnestly and urgently to the Prime Minister from his

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¹SNA 1/1/314 3263/08, Report Magis. Krantskop 27.8.06.
²SNA 1/1/340 1224/06, Minute Capt. Moe to Commandant of Militia, 30.4.06.
³Ibid. Commandant of Militia to Minister of Justice, 1.5.06.
sugar estates in the neighbourhood of Mapumulo of the serious state of affairs there. Once again these words cannot be dismissed as those of an attention seeking negrophile and have to be quoted at some length:

"The native population is absolutely docile and quiet throughout the district, [though] how long they will remain so depends upon the government; if they are to be harried by irresponsible men who act as demi-Gods and who, armed with a kind of self-imposed authority think it the correct thing to flog unoffending people ... then the area will be drawn into the area of disaffected with the result that the [European] people here ... will have to leave their homes, wives and plantations to the mercy of an outraged foe... Pray let us have a level-headed man at the head of affairs at Mapumulo and put a stop to this nonsense of having every man in uniform requiring every native to conform to his idea of what salutation consists of. This [illegible] people is being driven into rebellion and it speaks volumes for [their] good sense... that they have not risen."

A few days later ministers heard from another source that the troops were using their leather stirrups to impress upon the natives "due respect" and for obtaining information, and gave as their unanimous opinion that this "should immediately be put a stop to".  

Even in peace-time, the extent to which Natal magistrates resorted to the lash was greater than in any of the South African colonies at this time. As Professor de Kiewiet has remarked, the

1 PM 60575, 20.5.06.

2 CO 179/235/22649, Gov. to Sec. St. desp. 106, 1.6.06, publ. Cd. 3027, p.54.
temptation for a small, insecure white population to resort to rule by terrorism was immense. The government of the natives of Natal, was in the absence of consent, by a thinly veiled use of force even in peacetime.

In all the South African colonies except Natal, sentences involving flogging had to be reviewed by a Judge of the Supreme Court. In 1907, in Natal, where there was no such check, one in every four hundred of the total male population was flogged, exclusive of young boys sentenced to birching; while during the disturbances according to the Times of Natal seven hundred Africans had their backs lashed to ribbons and four thousand seven hundred sentences including lashes were carried out, before the government itself put an end to this "judicial violence". The paper continued: "We wonder if any official record exists of the number flogged so to say on sight, during the ... expedition ... in that year".

1. The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p.36.

2. See e.g. Supplement to the Government Gazette, 5.6.05, Report of Prison Reform Commission, p.317, which talks of "the cult of the lash".

3. Nathan Papers MSS 401, p.247, copy Minutes Nathan to S.N.A. 25.10.07 and p.255 to P.M. 6.1.08 and 25.1.08, p. 258 to Attorney General 31.12.08 and Nathan MSS 368 Nathan to Selborne, 11.12.08. The comparative figures in 1907 were, for the Cape, one in 850 of the adult male non-white population, in the Transvaal, one in 680 and in Natal, one in 400 of the total male adult population. As the number of whites flogged was very small, the Cape's figures are more favourable.
In Natal there was little of the lynching and public violence which has characterised so much of race relations in the Southern states of the United States; nevertheless this form of legalised brutality appears to have constituted an adequate substitute and was, in many ways probably the outcome of the same psychological factors. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore this aspect of settler mentality, nevertheless as a final spur prompting into action those Africans who had already watched their cattle confiscated and their kraals destroyed it cannot be ignored. It would also go a long way to explaining the ‘puzzling’ feature of this last phase of the disturbances -

than the figures show. In addition one in thirty-seven of the whole African population were in prison during some part of the year and one in nineteen of the whole male population. Nathan MSS 368, Nathan to Selborne 11.12.08.

Flogging had become such a scandal in the colony that Sir Matthew Nathan personally headed a crusade for its abolition. Even the Attorney General of Natal, T.F. Carter, certainly no negrophile, was shocked by the evidence of its savagery. He sent some photographs of lacerated men to Nathan in December 1909 with the covering note that these were not special cases. He added: "I should be sorry for the sake of the colony that anyone but yourself or Lord Selborne should see these photographs." (Nathan MSS 401, p.266, Carter to Nathan 20.12.09.) It stands to Carter’s credit that he tried to pass an act abolishing flogging altogether. Though he failed, he did secure some modifications in the type of cane used. In the debate before the Natal Legislative Assembly, Carter stated that if he told all he knew on the misuse of the lash in Natal "he would be giving the colony a bad name." See N.L.A. Debates 11.11.09.

why it was that after the rebellion was so clearly a hopeless and dying cause the chiefs in the Mapumulo-Lower Tugela area should suddenly have taken up arms, especially after many of them had already paid their Poll Tax and had paid also for their previous recalcitrance. If the doctoring of tribes in January and February regarded by Stuart as revealing the most hostile intentions to the white man were intended as a preliminary to war, it is difficult to explain why more of the Mapumulo men did not either join the Nkandla army or rise at the same time when the bulk of the forces were engaged there. Stuart's explanation of this very odd course of action is that messengers had been sent from Dinuzulu's uncle Siteku to Meseni, Matshwili and Ndlovu ka Timuni inciting them to rise. Yet this hardly seems a sufficient reason for their curious course of action, especially as the Commissioner of Native Affairs himself found these allegations "most unsatisfactory"; he had had a long interview with Meseni and Ndlovu ka Timuni when they surrendered and despite the most careful examination on the question of whether they had been encouraged from Zululand "they gave not the slightest hint that that was so".

1Z.R., p.347.
2Ibid., pp. 347-8.
3AGO 1/7/52, Minute C.N.A. on statements made by Ndlovu and Meseni before J. Stuart, 20-21.7.06.
Many may have been induced to take up arms by the rumour that the Africans had been successful at Home Gorge and all the white soldiers had been killed which was apparently circulated in the Mapumulo area by survivors of the Home Gorge battle.¹

That this rumour could long have lasted in the face of the overwhelming disaster inflicted on 10th June however seems most unlikely. Yet a member of Chief Ngobisembe's tribe in this division would appear to be putting the situation as it appeared to many Africans when he stated:

"Before they had an opportunity of making any reply and stating that they thought the taxes already existing were heavy enough, they were threatened with being shot. They thereupon paid, but while they were still paying, hostilities broke out. It was a matter of curiosity on their side as to whether the government really wanted this tax or whether they wanted their lives."²

The Mapulumo rebels were to pay dearly for their uprising. In that division, about 1,500 Africans were killed, 1,300 prisoners taken and thousands of people rendered homeless and starving by the burning of their crops and kraals.³ Even after the surrender of the chief leaders of the rebellion here, and long after the

²N.N.A.C., Evidence Maranda la, p.698.
government considered such action to be necessary, these "punitive measures" continued. It was to the "sweeping actions" and "mopping up operations" in this division and the neighbouring Lower Tugela that the Governor referred to as "continued slaughter" and Fred Graham at the Colonial Office, a man not given to hyperbole, as "the massacre". While many atrocities had been alleged on the part of the troops in other areas it could be argued that these were generally in the heat of battle. In this area they continued long after the heat of battle had departed and was only eventually stopped after several complaints had been lodged and the Government stepped in.

There were those, even at the time, who saw the entire rebellion as deliberately contrived by the government, the white settlers or, indeed, by that bogey of left-wing thought in the early twentieth century, the Transvaal mine-owners, for the purpose of grabbing the Africans' land and forcing them out to labour. There is little evidence to support these views. Both government and settlers feared rebellion as much as they were determined to

2 PM 61/815, Gov. to P.M. 10.7.06.
3 GO 179/236/24787, Minute 10.7.06 on tel. Gov. to Sec. St. 9.7.06 no.1.
4 PM 61/829, 815 as above. Proclamation, Govt. Gazette no. 3552, 12.7.06. See also ABM 111/1/3, Letterbook J. D. Taylor to M.H.A. 9.9.06 to Judson Smith 13.7.06, to F. F. Churchill 13.7.06, to Marshall Campbell 21.7.06.
stamp it out completely once it occurred. Their blundering, misunderstanding and insensitivity must however be accounted amongst the factors which led to the flare up of violence in 1906; there is more evidence, although even this, perhaps in the very nature of things, is not absolute, that once the military men were in the field they exacerbated the situation considerably. While it is true that in the long run the mineowners profitted from the 1906 disturbances as the number of Africans forced on to the labour market of the mines increased from 17,900 in 1906 to 34,200 in 1910\(^1\) it was certainly not only the rebellion which caused this. Nor of course can one in any way argue from this that the mineowners were in any way directly or indirectly responsible for this result, however much they had wanted an increase in their labour supply. Amongst neither blacks nor whites is there much evidence of a conspiracy, although much of "cross purposes rampant on a sea of rumour".

Nevertheless the official Natal view that the campaigns were conducted with the utmost humanity and that only their swift action saved thousands of white women and children from being murdered by black hordes also does not bear much scrutiny.\(^2\) Of both extreme

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2 See Stuart, *Z.R.* passim for this view.
views it can be said "not proven". The words of the veteran Cape politician John X. Herriman summed up the feeling of the more liberal element in South Africa when he wrote to Goldwin Smith in September 1906:

"We have had a horrible business in Natal with the natives. I suppose the whole truth will never be known, but enough comes out to make us see how thin the crust is that keeps our Christian civilisation from the old-fashioned savagery - machine guns and modern rifles against knob-sticks and assegais are heavy odds and do not add much to the glory of the superior races."¹

¹Herriman Papers No. 202, 16.9.06.
"Although there is some foundation for the taunt that the Government is without a native policy because of the absence of consistent purpose, high aim or clear principles, it would be an injustice to pronounce it non-existent or wholly featureless. Its leading features appear to have been the preservation of peace, in reducing the size of tribes and curtailing the powers of chiefs...."

In the previous chapter, the role of the military factor in "inviting a people who were already irritated to go on to worse" has been traced in some detail. Yet this is not the whole story. Even amongst those people who were probably finally spurred into action by the appearance of the troops on the scene, a whole complex of frustrations and motives were necessary before an individual chief took the dangerous decision to oppose them. Moreover what was traced there was mainly the attitude of the major chiefs who carried the bulk of their tribesmen with them. This chapter, it is hoped, will show a rather different aspect of motivation: why it was that certain individuals saw it in their political interest to join in the rebellion, while others decided to remain neutral, and yet others actually took up arms in support of the government. This question appears especially pressing in the case of those chiefdoms that split in two on the question of participation or non-participation in the rebellion. In answering it moreover it is hoped that light will be shed on the working of traditional politics within a colonial framework. It cannot be claimed in what follows that

\[1\text{See above, Chapter \(\gamma\).}\]
the answers given are final; in working from administrative records one is necessarily dependent on those aspects of the political life of the African which impinged on the consciousness of the rulers. Nevertheless in the aftermath of the disturbances especially, many of the features of the political life of the Africans did come to the attention of the magistrates, although in many instances they were only dimly aware of what was actually happening. One is not able to be dogmatic in one's interpretation of these events, especially as it was impossible to trace and correlate the oral memories and traditions of all the groups and sub-groups involved. Nevertheless if the limitations of what follows are realised and even if the picture is of necessity somewhat hazy and incomplete, sufficient detail of this substratum of politics can be garnered from the documentary sources alone to make the endeavour worthwhile.

It was a popular theory at the time of the disturbances that the participants on the African side were the younger generation, the wild young bloods, who had had no memory of war against the Europeans and who, in addition, had experienced the demoralising influence of the towns. Thus (even before the outbreak of open rebellion) the Minister for Native Affairs pointed out that the
disaffection over the Poll Tax in Zululand was not in the re-
moter districts where the tribesmen were as yet little affected
by the white man and his ways, but in those districts closest
to Natal and its railway line. Many witnesses before the
Natal Native Affairs Commission noted the part played by young
men in the disturbances, and the Rev. J. D. Taylor of the
A.Z.M. stated that the rebellion was started by the “riff-raff”
of the native population, although others were later drawn in.

It was tempting for Natalians to regard the 1906 disturb-
ances in these terms, to point to the disintegrating effects
of urban life on the pristine simplicity of the tribal way of
life and to suggest that it was only the foolish young men,
thirsting for traditional military glory, or those who had been
demoralised on the Rand, who would think of taking up arms against
the white man. Natal, they believed, had been distinguished from
all the other colonies in her attempt to allow “the natives to
develop along their own lines” and the inherent superiority of
their method of native administration was rarely doubted. In

1Cd 2905, p.10, Encl. 2 in desp. 21 and M.M.A. to Gov. 30.1.06.

2See Evid. passim. See also SNA 1/1/367-1116. Rept. Assist. Magis.
H. C. Colenbrander who thought the direct cause of the Rebellion
was the disolute life led by the younger generation - the
Amarusu and Isigebengu (teddyboys and gangsters) - “The centres
they inhabit do not come under tribal or kraal head control and
are practically infected by Native foreigners, the scum of other
colonies and states.”

3ARH 111/1/3 p.348, Letterbook to Rev. W. D. Drew, 30.6.06.
1904, F. R. Moor made the remark to the South African Native Affairs Commission whose irony must have been recalled in 1906 by many of his contemporaries that

"We rather congratulate ourselves that our Natives are the best-mannered, and the best-behaved, and the most law abiding people that we have got in South Africa."\(^1\)

The great belief in the docility of the tribal African who had the right kind of respect for the white man and who would never have risen against his rule, led the colonists to look for the sinister external influence, whether of the American-inspired Ethiopian agitator\(^2\) or of the white man's towns, with their liquor and loose women. This also led Natal authorities to underemphasise the fact that the disturbances were basically tribal in origin and organisation. Far more attention was paid to the handful of black preachers\(^3\) attached to the tribal forces than to the fact that they were all doctored for war in the traditional way by traditional war doctors; greater concern was aroused by the fact that a number of the men captured or found dead on the field wore articles of European clothing, than that the majority did not, but wore instead the tshokobesi.

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\(^2\)For the influence of Ethiopianism on the rebellion see above Chapter V, and below Chapter VIII.

\(^3\)See below, Chapter VII.
badge - a bushy white or red and white ox or cow-tail bound round their heads, the traditional Zulu war symbol - and tribal dress. Similarly great play was made of the fact that it was the younger man who defied the government and broke away from their chiefs, although the leaders of the disturbances could hardly be described in the same terms: Sigananda was in his nineties, Mehlokasulu must have been about fifty and Bambatha himself was at least forty. It was of course true that the younger men were most truculent over the Poll Tax which was going to fall as an additional burden on their shoulders; moreover in any society, it is the young men who bear the brunt of battle. Nevertheless in July, 1906 the Christian Express was to remark on the large proportion of "middle-aged and older men" surrendering after the operations in Mapumulo, men "who could not have entered lightly upon the campaign". At the same time the magistrate of Ndwedwe division, one of the most densely populated African areas close to both Pietermaritzburg and Durban wrote that of two hundred and fifteen rebels of that division whom he tried

"many were grey-headed kraal heads, many were old trusted servants. The usual explanation was that they

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1 Bosman, p. 87 and 109, Stuart, p. 157 and p. 198.
2 1.7.06.
were 'dogs' and that their chief had called them out.\(^1\)

It is a notable feature of the disturbances that the only time that there was a noticeable movement from Pietermaritzburg and Durban was in late June and early July when the disturbances spread to the Mapumulo-Lower Tugela area. When the urban workers were asked why they were leaving, they replied that they feared for the safety of their women, children and cattle — and that they had been called upon by their chiefs to return home.\(^1\) This reason was clearly taken seriously by the government, for when these same men returned to their jobs in town some weeks later it was decided to take no punitive action against them on this account.\(^2\)

That the town workers should have responded to the call from their chiefs to help them in the struggle is not surprising. Urbanisation in the true sense of the word was a reality for a minute number of Africans at that time — and indeed they would have had the most to lose had they come out in rebellion.\(^3\)

For most migrant workers in the towns the primary ties were back home to the chief and the tribe; as yet no widespread

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\(^2\) CO 179/236/25677, desp. 150, Gov. to Sec. St. 5.7.06.

\(^3\) See below, Chapter VIII and above, Chapter I.
African urban organisation was in existence. If Africans were
to defy the white man, the only way it could be done was on
their homeground and through their traditional authorities.
There were the usual rumours that Africans had come to the towns
armed with assegais which they had hidden in their compounds,
and that they would all rise once the troops had departed for
the troubled areas, but these were completely unfounded. A few
youths were fined for seditious utterances in the towns and
Assistant Magistrate Stuart’s meetings with the town workers
were extremely unruly when he announced the Poll Tax – but that
was about all. Although in both Durban and Pietermaritzburg
the African and European male population were almost equally
balanced no outbreak of violence took place in the towns.

With all the attention that was paid to the fact that a
large number of chiefs were unable to control their followers,
and the tendency to blame it on the Ethiopian preacher and the
urban riff-raff, what was overlooked was that the fundamental

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1 See e.g. CO 179/235/22656, Enols. 1 and 2, T. Shepstone (Pretoria)
to P.M. Natal, 16.4.06 and 22.4.06. E. Roux, Time Longer than Rope,
pp. 90–91.

2 See above, Chapter V, p. 2.78

3 Acc. to the 1904 Census (p.14) there were 8,134 white males and
8,060 African males in the municipality of Pietermaritzburg and
18,777 white males and 18,286 African males in Durban. As most,
if not all, the Africans were in towns seeking work the number
of Africans of ‘fighting age’ was probably higher than that of
the Europeans, which included old men and children.
pattern of allegiances during the disturbances still ran along lines of kinship and lineage. Even many of the members of the African Presbyterian Church group under Makanda and Mjongo responsible for the initial outbreak appear to have been closely related as fathers and sons, brothers and brothers-in-law.\(^1\) While it is true that a great number of people did break away from their chiefs, by and large they still followed the lead of traditional authorities in the tribe: either another member of the chiefly family, a prominent induna or their own umnumzane.\(^2\) Thus of the thirteen prominent rebels of the Nkandla division who were still wanted by the government at the end of 1907 and who were specifically exempted "in the event of a proclamation of amnesty", seven were the sons of chiefs and six were kraalheads, or abenumzane. One of these kraalheads was also the son of a chief, and another was also an induna, or approved headman.\(^3\) The only one who did not have any hereditary rank appears to have been Cakijana ka Gezinaka who acted as Bambatha's right-hand man, and held his position reputedly as Dinuzulu's induna and personal emissary.

\(^1\)See evid. passim Richmond Court Martial, encl. in CO 179/234/1993.

\(^2\)e.g. The rebels amongst Mbuza's people were led by Fogoti the brother of the chief and a kraalhead; the rebels from Mapoisa's people were led by the chief's son Uwohlo, whilst the rebels from Ndube's people were led by the chief's maternal cousin Nomadindeni ka Qetuka whose father Qetuka in the Lower Umlalazi division also rebelled and the chief induna. SNA 1/1/345 Report B. Colenbrander 27.9.06.

\(^3\)CO 179/243/41176, Encl. 4 in Gov. to Sec. St. desp. Secret., 3.11.07, no. 1.
In Natal and Zululand the attempt made in other parts of Africa to take the hereditary chiefs into government confidence had never really been made. Indeed, it was the stated intention of the administration to undermine the position of the hereditary heads of tribes. Unlike the appointed chiefs, the hereditary chiefs had no a priori reason to feel loyalty or gratitude to a government which made little effort to engage their loyalty and gratitude. More than one hereditary chief complained of the scornful and humiliating way in which they were treated in the magistrates' courts by the humblest official, black or white. As early as 1893 Sir Marshal Clarke remarked in Zululand that the main cleavage in the territory was between those people who followed their hereditary chiefs and those who supported the appointed chiefs. Even at the purely local level there seemed to be an increasing division between the appointed induna or headmen, who were in general commoners appointed by the chief and the magistrate, and the hereditary descent group heads or abemamasane. While in the case of both the hereditary chiefs and the abemamasane the mainsprings of their authority were drawn as of right and from the amount of popular support they could achieve, the appointed

1 Cf. e.g. SHA 1/4/1296/03, Report U.S.M.A. to Commandant of Volunteers, 18.6.03.

2 CO 427/17/417, Encl. in desp. 16.2.93 Marshal Clarke's Confidential Report on Zululand, 8.12.93.
chiefs and induna were responsible to an alien government. The
former were therefore on the whole more responsive to the popular
opposition and indignation against the government and had their
own source of grievance against the government in the weakening
of their power. ¹

In the early days of the disturbances, for many chiefs the
conflicting demands of the government and the desires of their
people led to ambivalent and ambiguous actions. This has been
particularly well analysed recently in a study by D. H. Reader
of the Kanya people of Natal. Reader shows very clearly how the
various pressures on the Chief Mtambo operated and how he, his
immediate council of relatives, and his appointed induna were
opposed to taking up arms over the Poll Tax, whilst the ordinary
tribesmen and their descent group heads were strongly against
paying the tax and insisted on being doctored for war. Mtambo’s
course was to temporise - to try to dissuade the tribe from arming,
allowing them to be ‘doctored’ when they became adamant, but in
fact preventing them from going any further.² With many other of
the peoples who were reported to be seditious in the first phase

¹ See D. H. Reader, Zulu Tribe in Transition (Manchester U.P. 1966)
p. 264 ff. for an excellent analysis of the present situation. That
the abenumsane were already feeling ousted from their position at
the turn of the century is shown by evidence before the S.A.N.A.C.

² Zulu Tribe in Transition, p. 230 ff. See also SNA 1/1/351/06, Lt.
Col. Lugg to Ct. of Militia, 7.9.06 and Minutes esp. of Acting Magis.
Umlazi, 9.2.07, which show clearly it was the strong stand of the
magistrate H. C. Golenbrander against the military which prevented
further action being taken against Mtambo for the arming and doctoring
of his tribe.
of the disturbances the process appears to have been the same: the young men and their descent group heads eager to take up arms, their chiefs and ward induna in opposition. This seems to have been true both of appointed and hereditary chiefs.\(^1\)

In the second and third phases of the disturbances however, when the opposition to the Natal troops had become open and violent, it is remarkable how many of the leaders were hereditary chiefs, or important abenumzane of prestigious clans. In the Mapumulo-Lower Tugela area, the leaders of the last phase of the disturbances were Meseni, Matshwili and Ndlovu ka Timuni, whilst the last to lay down his arms was the induna Sambela, the brother of Chief Ngobizembe and his chief induna\(^2\). Both Matshwili and Ndlovu were hereditary chiefs of famous people: the latter was a Zulu of the Royal House, being the grandson of Mudhli, brother of Sensengakhona, Shaka's father, whilst the former, Matshwili, was a Mthethwa and a grandson of Dingiswayo.\(^3\) Their influence over their followers as well as over neighbouring chiefs and tribesmen may well have been related to their historical pre-eminence. Moreover their resistance to the humiliating behaviour of the troops

\(^1\) See e.g. Court Martial of Tilonko, Evidence of Mqakana, "My Chief was willing for the tax to be paid. It was not me, it was his subjects who spoke about it.\(^", p.146. Sim. ead. Wiete, kraalhead and Tilonko's uncle, p.153 encl. in CO 179/237/44376. Also SNA 1/1/367116 Report Acting Magis. Colenbrander of Umlazi division.


\(^3\) R.C.A. Samuelson, Long, Long Ago, p.257.
may have been related to national pride and memories of their proud preconquest tradition. It is tempting to go even further than this and suggest, as Stuart has done, that the Bambatha rebellion represented an attempt to return to this past, to turn away from the new system of government brought by the white man and return to their old way of life.¹ There may have been an element of atavism amongst some of the rebels. Nevertheless in Ndlovu's own case this seems a misleading simplification; his intervention to save the life of the missionary, Rev. Tvedt, has already been mentioned. It is noteworthy that after the disturbances, while he was undergoing sentence in Eshowe gaol, he strongly urged his people and sons to become Christians and exhorted them to acquire a western education.² While it can be argued that this was the wisdom born of hindsight, it none the less argues against his having an atavistic approach in 1906.

Meseni's participation in the disturbances has to be explained on slightly different grounds. He also headed an extremely important people - the Qwabe - whose founder, Qwabe, was the older brother of Zulu himself according to tradition, and who always prided themselves on their superiority to the Zulu. Meseni however only headed half

¹See above introd., p. 13
the tribe, which had been divided on the death of the previous chief in 1897 by a Supreme Court decision as a result of a very complex succession dispute.\textsuperscript{1} The heir in the chiefly line was still very young at this time, and his section of the tribe was under the 'regency' of the local magistrate, F. P. Shuter. There was constant friction between the two sections of the tribe, largely over the question of a boundary between them.\textsuperscript{2} It may well be that it was this dispute which led to threats against the magistrate's life at the time of the Poll Tax collection in this division.

In the Mkandla phase of the disturbances, Bambatha, Sigamanda, and Mbholokazulu were all hereditary chiefs, whilst Mangati ka Godide and Mtele, both of whom led large sections of their chiefs' people to join the rebels, were men of considerable rank. Thus Mtele was the Chief Kula's uncle and his chief induna and an eminent descent group head; Mangati was the oldest son of the previous chief of the Ntuli people, Godide, and grandson of Ndhlela, Dingane's Prime Minister who was the "most important personage in the Zulu nation" of his time.\textsuperscript{3} Mangati himself was closely related by marriage to

\textsuperscript{1}See N.L.A. Debates 1900, Debate on Native Code Amendment Bill no. 29, 1900. See also Bosman, pp. 159-160.

\textsuperscript{2}SNA 1/4/12\textsuperscript{96} 1903 Report U.S.N.A. on strength and combination of tribes in Natal, to Commandant of Volunteers, 15.6.03. SNA 1/4/14 C41\textsuperscript{05}, C42\textsuperscript{05} Minutes Magis.

\textsuperscript{3}Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, pp. 59-60.
Dinudulu's chief induna, Mankulumana,¹ and according to one report had himself acted as induna for Cetshwayo. The appointed acting chief of the Ntuli people in 1906, Mpumela, was Godide's younger brother. Whilst Mangati was championing the cause of the heir to Godide's chief house, Ntuliswe, Mpumela and his supporters favoured a rival candidate. While Mpumela apparently remained loyal to the government, the supporters of the heir to the Chief House in the succession dispute followed Mangati into battle.²

In pre-colonial times, it is clear that many succession disputes led to the splitting up of tribes, and a man in Mpumela's position may well have been able to become regent of a tribe and exert pressure for his own candidate to the throne, so that one should not be led from this into making facile generalisations about the inviolability of the hereditary principle. What seems to be illustrated here, however, is that the Natal government intervention on one side or the other in a succession dispute of this nature seems to have determined the stance people took up during the anti-government disturbances and the way in which a people would split. A similar example is provided by the succession dispute in the Xanyile tribe, also in the Nkandla division, between Acting Chief Makubalo and Baleni ka Mbayimbayi, the heir, who wanted


²SNA 1/1/345/2305. Report B. Colenbrander 27.9.06.
to be made chief on attaining his majority.¹ He agitated to this effect in 1905, but to no avail. In 1906 he joined the rebellion whilst Makubalo the Regent sought refuge with the loyal section of the tribe at Fort Yolland. The defeated or frustrated candidate in a succession dispute did not only have a grievance against the Natal government. This in some cases though might have provided the final spur to action at the time of the disturbances, and the disappointed candidate may have hoped through the rebellion to overturn the existing leadership in the tribe. Because they had claims to the chieftainship however, these candidates also had the necessary rank and following to make rebellion appear more worthwhile and indeed possible.

In Zululand, the process of breaking down hereditary chiefs and promoting government appointees had gone furthest in the south. Archdeacon Roach's remarks before the Natal Native Affairs Commission that the tribal system had broken down in Zululand and that the 'tribes' under most of the Chief "were nothing more or less than agglomerations of people from different tribes" applied most to this area.² As we have seen after the Zulu War and under British rule

¹ SNA 1/1/3452205⁶, Report of Magis. 27.9.06, op. cit. A similar example was provided in the case of Inkosana, heir to a chieftaincy in Mapumulo division, who joined the rebels, whilst the regent, Mahlube, was "exceptionally active" on the European side. Inkosana was arrested and deposed. Mahlube became full chief over this tribe and also over a section of Xegwana's Nyuswa. SNA 1/1/3452262 Rept. Maxwell, 26.1.07.

² H.H.A.C., Evid. p.574.
this area had been regarded as a buffer between Natal and Zululand.\textsuperscript{1}

It had acted as a reserve for those chiefs who were unwilling to return to the rule of Cetshwayo and had also served as a sanctuary for Cetshwayo himself. In Mkandla, Nqutu and Eshowe districts especially, a number of Natal chiefs had been introduced, also as part of the policy of "divide and rule" which the Shepstones and their disciple, Sir Malmoth Osborn, advocated for Zululand. The intense rivalries of Zululand in the eighties still had their repercussions in this area, and in addition to the old rivalry between Zibhebhu and Dinuzulu a new dividing factor was arising with the attainment of his majority by Dinizulu's younger brother, Manzolwandle. Although Manzolwandle had been born shortly after Cetshwayo's death, there were those who regarded him as the true heir to the Zulu king, as he was believed by many to be the eldest son of Cetshwayo's Chief Wife. Although Manzolwandle's position was only recognised by the government after the disturbances when he was made chief over Faku's, Mehlokazulu's and the lateNkukwana's people it seems clear that already the pattern of allegiances in Zululand were being affected by his claims.\textsuperscript{2} It is thus not surprising that

\textsuperscript{1}See above, Chapter II, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{2}ZA 35 CR\textsuperscript{27}, Magis. Hignett, Nqutu to C.N.A. 19.12.06. Cd 3027, pp. 63-4. Encl. in desp. 106, CNA to P.M., 29.5.06. Even before this, Cetshwayo's brother Zixulu and Sitzaku supported Manzolwandle against Dinizulu. In 1904 Dinizulu was cautioned against the holding of meetings of headmen and chiefs from Zululand and Eryheid to discuss the succession to Cetshwayo as proposed by Zivedu. Col. Col. 171 Magis. A.W. Leslie to Dinizulu, 1.2.04.
southern Zululand presented a chequerboard of participants and non-participants in 1906, and that the old feud between the Usuthu and Mandlakazi had some bearing on the situation even in the ostensibly anti-government rebellion. It is significant for example that the war-cry of the Zululand Mounted Rifles which was shouted in answer to the 'Usuthu' cry of the rebels was 'Watshetsha' - the war-cry of Zibhebhu's Mandlakazi. Though the feud had ostensibly been patched up on Dinuzulu's return from exile there was still considerable tension between members of the two chiefdoms. In the middle of 1906 Dinuzulu complained it was the Mandlakazi people who produced rumours that he supported the rebels and this may not have been unconnected with the fact that in the Vryheid division a large number of the Mandlakazi were recruited as policemen. While the government regarded the fact that a number of Dinuzulu's old supporters who turned rebel in 1906 as evidence that he had instructed them to rebel, this is not the only possible explanation. By and large, those people who had actively profited from British rule in the eighties at the expense of the Zulu Royal Family were less likely to jeopardise their position.

1 Bosman, pp. 133-9.
by taking up arms against the Natal government in 1906.\footnote{But note the position of Khambe, son of the loyal Uhamu, who was suffering very considerably as a result of white expansion by the turn of the century. He nevertheless remains "loyal" to the government and seeks redress and help from it. In turn the government hopes to benefit from finding him land because he is a supporter of Manzolwandle. See e.g. Nathan MSS 401, no. 226, Confidential Report on Native Affairs n.d. unsigned (prob. McCallum).}

In the Nqutu division it is hardly surprising that Hlubi's people who had been settled after the Boer War should have assisted the government forces, or that Mehlokamulu, whose father, Sirayo, had been ousted from many of his lands by Hlubi, should be dissatisfied:\footnote{See above, Chapter II, p. 44} that these "Basuto", as the Zulu called them, still felt very vulnerable was indicated by Mayime ka Hlubi's remark that they were "a mere handful amongst a vast people. If anything cropped up they were bound to be mixed up in it. The natives now said that they [Hlubi's followers] were 'white men'....". Mayime returned the compliment by referring to the Zulu as "savages".\footnote{N.N.A.C. Evid. Mayime, p. 668.}

By far the most bitterly torn area in 1906 was Nkandla, and while this was partly because it was the scene of military operations chosen because of the fortress like qualities it offered the rebels, this must also be related to the whole policy of the government in introducing "loyal" appointed chiefs into the division. Through the nineties for example the number of faction fights there...
and in Nqutu was far higher than elsewhere in Zululand, and this was related directly to the government policy. Chiefs there were constantly complaining about inter-tribal boundaries, and according to the Governor in 1894 the trouble was due to "the large number of petty chiefs have sprung up and are asserting themselves". Many of these were simply court induna or police constables. Long before Bambatha appeared on the scene this was an irritated and disturbed area.

In Eshowe district however where this process had probably gone furthest and where Sir Melmoth Osborne had established his most devoted servant, Yamela, with three large tracts of land, a chieftaincy and many followers and cattle, and in the Umlalazi district where the headmen of the late Chief John Dunn held sway, there were but few break-away rebels. Yet both these divisions bordered immediately on the most disturbed divisions in Zululand and Natal. Perhaps the rewards of collaboration there had been so conspicuous, perhaps in these divisions the government had been most successful in obliterating older loyalties. Eshowe moreover was the seat of the Zululand government and therefore more directly

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2 CO 427/19/17655, Gov. to Sec. St. 13.9.94. See also CO 427/17/417 Encl. in desp. 16.12.93 Marshal Clarke's Confidential Report 8.12.93.

3 By 1906 Yamela had died leaving a number of equally compliant successors.
under the control of Sir Charles Saunders who was able to assure
troubled chiefs in the division of his protection and support.
The peacefulness of Eshowe may have been a tribute to Sir Charles
Saunders' personal hold over the division. Nevertheless from
these two examples, and the fact that so many of the hereditary
chiefs and abumumzane had participated in the disturbances,
the Natal government could argue, from its point of view that
the disturbances themselves had shown how wise Shepstone's policy
had been and the main trouble was that it had not been taken far
enough.

This contention however would probably have been mistaken
as has already been suggested in the case of the Ntuli people
cited above. Even where they had appointed a 'loyal' chief, though
he might personally remain loyal and keep his personal following
intact there was always the possibility that the section of the
tribe which felt itself aggrieved would try to have off under
another rival candidate to the chieftaincy or try to join another
chief altogether in the absence of such a candidate. During the
disturbances, quite apart from the particular succession disputes
amongst members of the chiefs' family, it could be that the "loyal"

1See e.g. the flattering remarks made about him by the Eshowe chiefs
in their interview with the Gov. 5.6.07 encl, CO 179/241/25101.

2For the prevalence of this pattern in traditional politics see
M. Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society (Oxford, 1965),
p. 136 ff.
chiefs whose people broke away were not in tune with the true wishes and desires of their followers vis-a-vis the administration and had become too dependent on the government. In the words of the Africans themselves, they had become the government's "boys." When this happened, and when it was felt that the chief had gone too far to the white man's side, the Africans appear to have followed the lead of the next most suitable traditional leaders, whether a member of the chief's family or their own descent group head.

This appears to have been what happened in the case of those chiefs who offered to aid the white forces, without determining first the attitude of their people. In some cases, the response of the tribesmen to their chiefs' wishes was decidedly lukewarm. Thus Acting Chief Ngamuzana of the Tembu, who offered the government six hundred men to assist the troops was only able to raise two hundred men. Certain headmen, including his brothers, refused to fight Kula's people "although... long-standing animosity existed between them in consequence of an old boundary dispute." In an interview with the Governor, Ngamuzana attempted to excuse his tribesmen on the grounds that they were too ill-prepared to fight, as

1 See A. Vilakazi, Zulu Transformations (Pietermaritzburg 1962), p.106.
2 CO 179/235/21497, Gov. to Sec. St. desp. 102, 26.5.06.
they were no longer allowed to drill in regiments. To this
MoCallum retorted drily "He who excuses himself, accuses himself."\(^1\)

There was a similar reaction to having to fight the rebels
on the part of Silwane's Cunu people. The Cunu were one of the
largest chiefdoms in Natal at the turn of the century. Although
Silwane was closely related to Bambatha, there had been a number
of faction fights between tribes.\(^2\) At the beginning of April, 1906
when Bambatha sent two messengers to Silwane asking him to join
the rebellion, Silwane promptly handed them over to the magistrate.\(^3\)

On the other hand, when members of the Cunu people were actually
instructed to arm and fight with the white troops, they were most
unenthusiastic. Whether because they resented being refused the
rifles and blankets they had requested, or whether they disliked
the idea of fighting their fellow-Africans, six hundred of the
thousand men Silwane had promised to send to them and of the govern-
ment decamped on the eve of the battle.\(^4\)

Remaining "loyal" to the government did not invariably mean
the alienation of the chief from his tribe. There were chiefs - both

\(^1\) CO 179/241/23101, Encl. 1 in desp. 86, 5.6.07, p.22.
\(^2\) SNA 1/1/302-1752\(^05\), U.S.N.A. to Magis, New Hanover Minute, 30.5.03.
\(^3\) Stuart, ZR, p.178.
\(^4\) Ibid., p.328.
hereditary and appointed — who were able to remain "loyal" to the government and to carry almost all their followers behind them. The most outstanding example of this was Acting Chief Sibindi of the Bomvu people. Sibindi was a court induna who had acted as a servant to Major Maxwell, the local magistrate of Umsinga division where the Bomvu people lived. During the Boer War he had served with R.C.A. Samuelson with forty of his men as scouts. As Major Maxwell wrote to the Secretary for Native Affairs Sibindi could be "absolutely depended on to take an active part in suppressing the rebels" — and he did. According to the Greytown Gazette, which did not bestow such praise lightly, he was "the most loyal chief in the country". He sent a thousand men to aid the Umvoti Mounted Rifles and several times acted upon his own initiative in capturing and killing rebels. On being thanked by Col. Leuchars for his aid, Sibindi remarked: "We originally came from Zululand where we were being killed off and found shelter in Natal under the British government"; this

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1 **Greytown Gazette**, 24.3.06.
3 **P.M.C. 102/231**, Magis. to S.N.A. 5.4.06.
4 **Greytown Gazette**, 24.3.06.
5 Ibid.
was not a typical reason for loyalty in 1906, though it was perhaps less frequently given than it had been for example in 1879.

Sibindi, for all his ardour in suppressing the rebellion, was at the same time a man who was well aware of the grievances his people were complaining of, and prepared to speak his mind to those in authority. Unlike many of the other loyal chiefs who were summoned to a farewell interview to the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, in the middle of 1907, Sibindi was quite outspoken about the Governor's previous inaccessibility and his anxiety that nothing would come of the Natal Native Affairs Commission of 1906-7. While himself not a Christian, during the rebellion he had allowed the Kolwa in his tribe to be preached to daily, and had himself remarked that he thought God must be on their side. After the disturbances he was to give considerable support to the Hermannsburg Lutheran missionaries in his midst. In the eyes of his people, however, Sibindi did not become "a government boy" - and his remarks to the Natal Native Affairs Commission show that while he realised the difficulties of his people, his solution was to request representation and the

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1 CO 179/241/23101, Encl. in in desp. 86, 5.6.07, p.3-4.
franchise. Sibindi's loyalty was no mere kowtowing to the
white man; he saw the advantages in political terms of the
path he took. As early as 1903 the Under Secretary for Native
Affairs remarked on the implacable enmity between Sibindi's people
and Bambatha, and it would appear that relations between the
Bomvu and the Qamu under Kula were also very strained.2

In 1906 therefore he could probably present his stand to
his people not simply in pro-government terms, but also as part
of a continuation of traditional political rivalry.3 He was re­
warded by the government for his loyalty by having his acting
chieftainship made into a permanent full chieftaincy, and by having
his jurisdiction considerably extended over portions of tribes
in the Mapumulo district whose former chiefs had rebelled.4

Sibindi's approach contrasted dramatically with that of chiefs
like Sitshitshili or Napoisa of Nkandla whose evidence before the
Commission consisted in giving thanks to the Government for its
bounty and stating that they had no grievances. Sitshitshili was

1H.M.A.C., p. 843 ff.
2SMA 1/4/1286, Report of U.S.N.A. to Commandant of Volunteers, 15.6.03.
SMA 1/1/296.2271 U.S.N.A. Memorandum on Bambata.
been able to co-operate with the Government and at the same time
make it clear to their people that they are playing a double game."
This comment is of course on the contemporary situation but refers
esp. to Natal.
4CO 179/241/23101, Encl. in desp. 5.6.07, Gov.'s interview with chiefs,
p.21. It was suggested that he be made chief over the newly constituted
'Ngubane Tribe' made up of fragments of Ndlouvka Timuni,
Ngobinembu Mtshvili Neseni and Ngqokwana's people. CO 179/240/7988, Gov.
to Sec. St. 7.2.07 (see also Od 3888).
later murdered for his attitude to the rebellion and the ferocity with which he hunted out the rebels in his own tribe, while an attempt was also made on Nqoiswa's life.

Apart from succession disputes and differences of opinion between tribesmen and their chiefs over whether or not to participate in the disturbances actively on the side of the Europeans, there seems to have been another line of cleavage in some of the chiefdoms which was opened wide during the disturbances, and which seems to be another facet of why it was that in certain tribes only some of the tribesmen rebelled, while in others small groups remained loyal and the chief and the bulk of his followers fought against the government.

Under Responsible Government in Natal, effort had been made to give chiefs purely territorial jurisdiction. Thus under section six of Act 40 of 1896, which gave the Supreme Chief the power to redefine intertribal boundaries,

"All natives shall be deemed to be under the chief on whose side of the boundary they may reside; provided that when any boundary may separate a Native from his own tribe or chief, he may remove to the other side of the boundary within two years of such boundary being defined."

Of course Nguni chiefdoms have always had a territorial and political, rather than a purely kinship basis. Nevertheless, in

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1See e.g. D. H. Reader, Zulu Tribe in Transition, p.95.
precolonial times, this territorial definition depended on other factors than the arbitrary redrawing of boundary lines by a remote Supreme Chief. And presumably too in the precolonial period the stranger within the gate could be a source of weakness and division at times of crisis.\(^1\) Certainly during the disturbances, it would appear that in some instances a recently redrawn jurisdiction putting people of one chief under another was a source of division. Thus in the case of Tulwana in the Nkandla district some members of his tribe joined the rebels, although the Chief personally assisted the white forces; the rebels, seem to have been Cube – members of Sigananda’s tribe – who had been placed under Tulwana when their boundary had been defined.\(^2\) Similarly, but illustrating the principle in reverse, so to speak, a small section of Meseni’s people, under their headman Haoala, refused to join their chief in his fight against the whites. These people, although also Qwabe, had been under Chief Jemusi who had left the division; on being ordered at that time to join some chief, they had gone under Meseni, “more or less under compulsion”.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Cf D. H. Reader, *op. cit.* on the concept of “the stranger” in Zulu society.

\(^2\) ZA 21 R\(^{25}\)\(^{07}\), Copy of evidence against Tulwana from Nkandla division.

\(^3\) SMA 1/1/549\(^{2806}\)\(^{06}\), Magis. J. J. Field, Mweswe n.d. c 3.4.07.
In Natal and Zululand, every magistrate had an induna or headman, who was frequently considered to have great influence with him. According to both the Governor of Zululand and its Resident Commissioner in 1895, these induna "all grow rich in cattle and other property". According to both the Governor of Zululand and its Resident Commissioner in 1895, these induna "all grow rich in cattle and other property". A number of them also acquired a large following and were given the position of chiefs. Even when they were not rewarded for their conspicuous loyalty and good service to government officials by actually being made chiefs they could greatly influence the position and destiny of other chiefs in the district through the information they gave the magistrates. The disturbances gave these ambitious individuals the chance of furthering their ambitions towards

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1 CO 427/22/19122 Gov. to Sec. St. 5.10.95 Conf.

2 It is significant for example that Nketsi who was appointed acting chief of the Mandlakazi on the death of Zibhebhu was the personal servant of Sir Charles Saunders. (Nathan MSS 360, p.26, Information from S. O. Samuelson 30.12.07.) Equally significantly, the rival candidate to the succession, Maneli, appealed to Dinisulu for his support. It was the old game of rival candidates seeking the support of the head of a higher segment in the society in their disputes, the one to Sir Charles Saunders, the other to the ex-Zulu king.

3 See e.g. the accusations of Chief Silwane of the Gunu people who was deposed in 1909 (below Chapter 18, p.567) who alleged that this was brought about by his induna, Dhlayise, who repeated rumours about him to the magistrate in the hope of himself gaining the chieftainship. CO 179/255/26470, Gov. to Sec. St. Secret, 15.7.09.
chieftainship. This seems to be what for example the court induna at Richmond, Ntlwakeni Tahesi contrived. According to the magistrate of Ixopo, F. E. Foxon, Ntlwakeni was a bit of a martinet, but a very useful man who had given the witness (i.e. the magistrate) "most valuable information in so far as it is the recent Rebellion". Other witnesses had rather different versions of Ntlwakeni's behaviour. Thus according to farmers in the district he was the cause of an immense amount of friction and dissatisfaction, deliberately insulting chiefs and keeping people waiting. No-one was allowed to enter the court at all unless he had first been interviewed by the induna and if he was "unfriendly to the man or his tribe, the difficulty of access to the Court was greatly increased......" It appears to have been largely on this man's information however that Foxon became convinced of Chief Nelkofela's "rebelligiousness", and it may well be that the unfriendliness of the induna towards Nelkofela was a

1 Cf. also evidence given in the Court Martial of Charlie Fynn's men by Njoyvu and others; "There is ill feeling between the chief and Tahesi's section [Tahesi was headman over the defiant men] Tahesi applied to be made chief of his section [he] ... helped control these men and got them to put down their sticks and salute the magistrate which Fynn could not do." SHA 1/6/27, Evid. Court Martial, p.22.

2 For F. E. Foxon see above, p.245 - 246, p.319.

3 N.H.A.C. Evid., p.365.

factor in Foxon's views about that chief long before the disturbances. Certainly the magistrate of the neighbouring division, J. Y. Gibson, disagreed with Foxon's views. ¹ After the disturbances however, Msikofeli's tribe was divided into three, one section remained under the chief, one was transferred to his brother Pata and the third was handed over to Msiwakeni together with a portion of Mnyamana's tribe. ² The process by which this was achieved was also interesting.

According to Col. W. Nicholson, a farmer at Richmond, the tribesmen involved initially elected another brother of the Chief Msikofeli as their head. On the same day, however, a prominent settler called together a meeting of whites in Richmond and they nominated the court induna, Msiwakeni, as chief. After that meeting, Harwick "got together some Africans at the magistrate's court to support his nomination, "most of them being his tenants". ³ Msiwakeni was confirmed in the appointment by the government.

One wonders in this situation who was making use of whom.

While Msiwakeni's is a particularly illuminating case because he started so to speak from scratch, loyalty during the disturbances

¹ For Gibson's views see above, p. 319-20
³ FM 67 1166 ⁰⁷, Col. W. Nicholson to P.M. 12.10.07.
not unnaturally paid dividends to other chiefs, and this may well have formed part of their calculation. In general, it probably paid those chiefs who had a close relationship with the local magistrate beforehand particularly well.

While, then, ambitious individuals could, through playing the right cards, become chiefs, it could be argued that this was at the expense of the tribesmen themselves who got little of the spoils. They were simply "put" under a chief loyal to a government which they found generally oppressive. This is only partly true. In the early days of the colony there was a certain prestige and status attached to those chiefs who were "in" with important European officials and this seems to have provided a certain satisfaction for followers in the same way as close attachment to the Zulu kings had done. With the extensions and the greater pervasiveness of European rule this was probably less true; nevertheless as late as 1903 Kula's people apparently called themselves "the government's tribe", and while Sibindi felt his life in danger from other tribesmen for the conspicuous part he had played with the European levies, the large addition of territory and followers he received after the disturbances doubtless acted in some measure as compensation, even to his followers.

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1SHA 1/4/1296, Report U.S.N.A. to Commandant of Volunteers, 18.6.03.
Nor were dissatisfied sections of tribes completely barred from breaking away from their chiefs. Indeed the dual process of chief and tribe "making" can be seen clearly in the creation of the new "Mapumulo tribe" in 1905.

In the Umgeni division a number of kraals under Chief Swaimana ka Manyosi claimed that they had been members of Bambatha's father's people originally and wanted to be transferred back, though Swaimana denied the validity of the claim.\(^1\) T. R. Bennet, the magistrate in the Umgeni division, however, backed up their claim for separation from the chief on the grounds that he had heard several complaints about Swaimana's behaviour.\(^2\) This was corroborated by the previous magistrate, Captain Ritter, of New Hanover division where Swaimana had the bulk of his followers, who maintained that Swaimana was partial and unjust and that even members of his own family wanted to leave him.\(^3\) This view was not upheld by the magistrate of New Hanover at the time.\(^4\) Nevertheless in November, 1905 a meeting of dissatisfied kraalheads was held and they apparently elected to go under the induna, Magusu.

\(^1\) SNA 1/1/320/05, Statement Swaimana before U.S.N.A., 17.4.05.
\(^2\) SNA 1/1/318/05, Magis. T.R. Bennet, 16.3.05 (Umgeni Division).
\(^3\) Ibid. Minute Capt. A. E. Ritter, 16.9.05 (The father of E. A. Ritter, author of Shaka Zulu).
\(^4\) Ibid, Magis. Maxwell, 3.10.05.
ka Nganu who was thus appointed chief over the new Mapumulo "tribe". Significantly enough, Magusu was the sergeant attached to the Umgeni magistracy - from whom no doubt the magistrate had received much of his information about Swaimana's misdeeds.¹

As we have seen the disturbances themselves gave many people the opportunity of breaking away from chiefs whom they found unsatisfactory - although the experience in the case of those who joined rebel chiefs can hardly be said to have been rewarding. Many instances of this have already been cited in different contexts - Mangati ka Godide and the followers of Ituliswe in the Ntuli tribe, Jemusi's followers amongst Neseni's people, the Cube people under Tulwana's jurisdiction.² In the case of Tilonko, also, elements within the tribe may have been trying to arouse the suspicions of the magistrate against him on the grounds of "rebellion" in an attempt to get him out of the way and so win their case in a succession dispute. The background to this story has already been given.³ Amongst his own people it was said that his trouble arose out of family dissensions. "Those who were against him had got him into trouble with a view to

¹ SHA 1/1/518670 05, Minutes T. R. Bennet 6.11.05, M.N.A. 20.11.05, Letter of Appointment 16.12.05.
² See above, pp. 320-324.
³ See above, p. 320-324.
carrying out their own notions as to the succession.\(^1\)

At the same time some chiefs appear to have used the disturbances as a useful opportunity of ridding themselves of dissentient elements in their tribes. Thus Hveli's attitude to Mjongo and his followers may well have been activated by this motive.\(^2\) Another, though less successful, example of this was provided by acting chief Sigungu of the Klaba people. In this tribe there was a bitter dispute between Sigungu, the acting chief recognised by the government, and Makuwane, the chief son of the previous head of the tribe who had died in 1893.\(^3\)

Both parties to the dispute seem to have regarded the rebellion as a useful opportunity for forwarding their claims. While it was actually in progress, although they did not actively participate, the supporters of Makuwane thought it would enable them to open the dispute again if the rebels were successful. When the extremely unpopular magistrate of Mablabatini, H. M. Stainbank, was murdered in their ward, it is clear that Sigungu hoped to fasten the blame on these dissidents in his tribe who were making his life a misery. He even bribed his brother to confess to being one of the conspirators. At the trial of these men Sigungu went

\(^{1}\) SNA 1/4/16 C 224, Rept. Intelligence Officer, Mid. Iellovo, 7.8.06. See also SNA 1/6/27, Encl. in Court Martial of Sikuku, 16.8.06 and Evid. Court Martial Tilenko, 30.7.06, p.18, CO 179/237/44576.

\(^{2}\) See above, p. 308-309.

\(^{3}\) CO 179/240/17830, Gov. to Sec. St. conf. 2.
so far as to admit under cross-examination that he was prompted in his accusation by a desire to get rid of them. The accused were all acquitted. ¹

During the actual disturbances it is not always possible to see how far magistrates and troops allowed themselves to be used — albeit unconsciously — to further the political ambitions of individuals or sections within a tribe. Clearly these "machinations" on the part of Africans were most successful when their ambitions coincided with the desires of the magistrate and the European population, as the examples of Ntawakeni and Tilonko both show in opposite ways. In the immediate aftermath of the disturbances where tribal relationships had been so strained and embittered in many areas, the attempts made to dispose of unpopular chiefs were greatly increased. Many ex-rebels felt that the way to get rid of the chiefs who had betrayed them both by reporting their defection and by not coming to their aid, was to accuse them in turn of being secret rebels. It may of course be that many of these accusations were true, though they generally follow natural lines of revenge and rivalry. Thus the accuser became the accused, the former accused the accuser. Impart the philosophy of the new

¹ZA 28 Papers relating to the Zulu Rebellion, Minute (copy) C.M.A. to Attorney General, 1.2.07; Natal Witness, 15.7.07, Repts. of murder trial.
accusers also appears to have had something of the element of "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em" in it. Thus a number of participants in the rebellion were in turn to become police informants; the most outstanding example of this was Cakijana, Bambatha's right-hand man and supposedly Dinusulu's emissary. This was a rather later development, however, and more closely connected with the accusations made against Dinusulu in 1907-8, which will be discussed in greater length. It should however be noted in passing that the accusations made against Dinusulu fall into much the same category and deserve the same prefatory remarks as many of the cases which follow, despite the far greater complexity of his situation.

It is necessary here however to turn to a simpler example, that of Acting Chief Xegvana of those Nyuswa people living in the Edwedwe division. A large number of his people, including the heir to the chieftaincy, who was still a minor, joined Meseni's army in the third phase of the disturbances in the Mapumulo-Lower Tugela area. At the time there was no evidence that they had been instructed to do so by Xegvana who did not accompany them. Immediately after the disturbances, however, accusations were made

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1 See Chapter VII.
by the tribe that Xegwana had incited them to rebel. They also accused him of cattle-stealing. The most prominent of his accusers was Goboai, the man whom Xegwana had replaced at the beginning of 1906 as Acting Chief of the tribe. Goboai, who was the most influential member of the tribe and of higher rank than Xegwana, was himself a convicted rebel who had been doctored for war with Nesen'i's impi. As a result of this testimony as well as that of the heir who maintained that Xegwana had ordered him to arms (this may have been in fact in response to a magisterial order that he be prepared to assist against the rebels) the Acting Chief himself was deposed at the beginning of 1907 and this section of the Nyuswa people together with Swaimana's rebels were placed under the loyal chief Mehlube.¹

In the Mxandla division these accusations were particularly rampant. Here ex-rebels maintained that Natahana ka Mondisa, Tulwana, Ncube, Muso and Mpuhela were all secret rebels, despite the fact that all of them had either openly aided the European levies or had fled to the nearest magistracy at the beginning of

¹SNA 1/1/345 2262/06 Minute Magis. Maxwell, 26.1.07. SNA 1/1/330 1117/07 Minutes, Magistrate, U.S.N.A. and J. Stuart: Papers on Zulu Rebellion: Native Habits and Customs of War (K.C.L.). Evidence Nsime ka Beje, 26.12.06. A similar attempt was made to implicate Msolwa of the Lower Tugela division in the rebellion by men of Nesen'i, Tahingumusi and Sobantu's chiefdoms who were ordered under his jurisdiction. This attempt however was seen through by F. R. Moor, K.N.A. SNA 1/1/370 1617/07 Minutes and enclosures 1907-8 and esp. Moor's minute 8.1.08.
the fighting in the division.\(^1\)

Matshana ka Mondisa headed a tribe of about three hundred on the Qudeni mountains. He was a Natal chief who had fled to Zululand after a skirmish with John Shepstone\(^2\) and was regarded in the early days of British intervention in Zululand as anti-white and likely to be disaffected, though by 1884 he was reported a "loyalist". In 1906 five or six of his sons joined the rebels with a large number of the rest of his tribe. Nevertheless there is every proof that Matshana not only remained loyal, but aided Leuchars' column and personally reported the desertion of his sons. The discord between father and sons predated the disturbances. Thus in 1905 the Magistrate of Mkandla acting at Matshana's request ordered one of his sons, Ugudhla, to remove his kraal from Matshana's ward. Matshana disinherited Ugudhla and the feeling between the two was very strong. The father felt his son was trying to claim his inheritance before his death and that he was inciting his other sons against him.\(^4\)

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1Stuart, Papers on Zulu Rebellion, Native Habits and Customs of War, Evid. Nsuse ka Mfelafuti and Dunjwa, SNA 1/1/3452305, Rept. B. Colen­brandner, Magis. Mkandla 27.9.06, ZA R25 Copy of Evidence against Tulvana, Mkandla division.


3C 4214, No. 28, Osborne to Gov., 6.8.84, Encl. 4.

4SNA 1/1/323 1741, Minute, Magis. B. Colenbrander to C. Commissioner, 26.6.05.
In July 1906, the magistrate of Nkandla wired the Commissioner for Native Affairs:

"I have strong evidence of acts of disloyalty against /? by/ Matshana ka Mondisa and recommend his immediate trial by Court Martial .... A number of his people joined the rebels. Evidence against him is being given by these including some of his sons." ¹

The case against Matshana ka Mondisa - as that against Tulwana - was heard before the C.H.A. Neither of them was found guilty. Had it rested solely with the local magistrate however, it is possible that their enemies would have triumphed.

Acting Chief Hupumela's case is as interesting - and in its outcome more tragic. Hupumela was the appointed acting chief of the very important Ntuli tribe in the Nkandla division. At the time of the disturbances, being both old and infirm, he fled to the Kranskop magistracy. A large section of his tribe who even prior to the disturbances had supported the candidature of Ntuliswa to the chieftaincy followed Kaagati into battle. The matter did not however rest there.

After the disturbances, a considerable attempt was made to incriminate Hupumela in the actions of the rebels. In the trial of rebels of the Ntuli tribe accusations that Hupumela had caused the people to arm and then deserted them were made by most of

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¹ PMC 102/229 Encl. in C.M.A. to P.M., 29.7.06, no.143. ka Mondisa
² ZA 31 CR 1186/06, Cases against Matshana and Tulwana.
those tried.\(^1\) In 1907 members of his tribe, Makolwa ka Marelana and Ngecindesi, maintained that on receipt of a message from Sigananda Mpumela had sent them to order his district to arm. He was also said to have sent messengers to Mbuyu's district with a similar message. According to them, Mpumela was angry over the Poll Tax, especially as he had sent some members of his tribe to request exemption at the magistracy and they had been arrested. According to these same two witnesses, Ntuliswe had met them coming from Hube's district and had opposed their going to fight the whites.

It should however be noted that these witnesses probably supported Ntuliswe's candidature for the chieftaincy, and the fact that Marelana, the father of one of them, had been Godide's induna makes this a not unlikely supposition.\(^2\)

Several other participants in the disturbances however made similar accusations about Mpumela's rebellious intentions: according to Somsica ka Godide - another rival candidate to the chieftaincy - and Febana ka Nomaqonqota - a very prominent rebel - Mpumela had actually encouraged them in their fighting and his own sons had taken part until after the Bobe Ridge fight when they had deserted.

\(^1\) SMA 1/6/26, Trial of Mpumela's men, pp. 75-6, 28.7.06.

\(^2\) Col. Col. 98, Statements Samuelson, 74 and 77.
and joined the white troops. To some extent this is borne out by the remark made by Sir Charles Saunders that after this fight the curious spectacle was observed of former participants on the rebels' side offering their services to the European levies. Cakijana and Mangati ka Godide made similar accusations against Mpumela and his sons. His double-dealing would have been a potent reason for the bitter hatred with which he was regarded. All this therefore may well have been true, and Mpumela may have been trying to use the disturbances to get rid of Godide's people as was alleged at the time. On the other hand the motives for Mpumela's opponents giving this evidence were extremely strong. If the government could be convinced of Mpumela's disloyalty and Ntulise's loyalty, despite the disasters inflicted during the disturbances on the sons of Godide, they would be able to avenge themselves on Mpumela and his sons.

1 Col. Col. 98, Statements Samuelson, 124b.
2 H.M.A.C., Evid., p.133.
3 AGO 1/7/68, Cakijana's statement at Kamiskop magistracy. 20.5.08.
4 Mangati evidence 23.11.07 in CO 179/242/4454, Encl. 4 in deep. Secret 30.11.07, and at Dinusulu's Trial reported in Natal Witness, 7.1.09.
In this instance also the attempt failed. The bitter feeling however did not die down, and Npumela was murdered on the 20th November, the day on which he sent witnesses to the magistracy against Mangati, who prophesied the event a couple of hours before it happened. Even S. O. Samwelison thought his murder was the result of his having taken over the property belonging to the chief.

Feelings were as bitter against two other chiefs in the Nkandla division, Napoisa and Sitshitshili. The latter was shot in August, and an attempt was made to take the former's life on

100 179/242/45350 Encl. 7 in desp. Secr. 7.12.07, Magis. Nkandla to C.N.A. 28.11.07.

7th October, 1907. Mapoisa was the chief son of Chief Mbuso, who, at that time, though still head of the tribe, was very old, deaf and almost blind. During the disturbances, he fled with many of his followers to Sibindi. His son however worked closely with the white levies and was very much hated by the rebel members of his tribe who said that "he was the one who told the authorities who were rebels". Sitshitshili who was Osborn’s messenger as early as 1882 was responsible for hunting out the rebels in Nkandla with great ferocity, and there was said to be great jubilation amongst the fugitive rebels at the Usuthu when he was murdered. Dinusulu was said to have deplored his murder for Sitshitshili had granted him refuge during his struggles with Zibhebhu in the '80s. He had feared for his life long before he was actually shot. Thus in mid 1907, in a farewell interview with Sir Henry McCallum, Sitshitshili remarked revealingly:

"We cannot understand how matters stand at present. Although we are British subjects we still seem to be subject to danger. We do not seem to be protected in the way we ought to be ... There still seem clouds

1 SNA 1/1/395/3305 Rept. B. Colenbrand, Magis. 27.9.06, Mbuso was a 'loyalist' in the Dinisulu-Zibhebhu struggle in 1884. C 4214, Osborn to Gov. 6.8.54, no. 26, Encl. 4.
2 C 3466 (1882) Encl. 1, no. 27, p.54, J. Dunn to Osborn 15.6.82.
3 Co 179/242/45176 Encl. 1, Gov. to Seco. St. 5.11.06, undated Report by Coenraad Meyer to General L. Botha, Co 179/244/3062, Encl. in desp. secr. 5.1.08, Evid. Mankokowan ka Bedja.
over us which cause us to leave our kraals and make us go and live in the bush. We are chased into the country...

The murders of Sitshitsili and Mpuvela and the attempted murder of Mapoisa as well as three or four other attempted murders in Zululand at about the same time immediately aroused the fears of other chiefs who had been conspicuously loyal in 1906. Many Africans immediately associated the murders with Dinusulu. Stuart as late as 1913 was still convinced that Dinusulu or "his immediate attendants presumably on Dinusulu's instructions" were causing loyalists to be shot down in cold blood. As we have seen the evidence for this viewpoint is not fully convincing. The Commissioner for Native Affairs in Zululand however put a very prevalent, perhaps understandable, opinion when he wrote at the beginning of October to the Prime Minister:

"Whether he has actually instigated these murders or not, the palpable fact remains that if he had not actively sympathised in the way he has done by harbouring rebels .... creating a belief that he is beyond the reach of law no-one would have been emboldened to perpetrate these outrages in the manner in which they have been perpetrated."
That these acts of terrorism did not happen in Natal proper can be accounted for on several grounds, quite apart from that of Dinuzulu's influence. The recent establishment of colonial rule in Zululand as compared with Natal, its far sparser administrative staff and police force, and, probably most important of all, the fact that many desperate and embittered rebels had taken refuge in Zululand itself, were all cogent reasons for these acts of terrorism. The failure of the government to declare a general amnesty perpetuated the existence of this class of fugitive leading a rootless life and plotting revenge on those chiefs who had failed "the Black House". It is in fact surprising that there was not more violence in Zululand in 1906 and 1907.

The government view however was that there was no motive for these acts of terrorism apart from the orders of Dinuzulu. They were however unable to bring these charges against him, as there was insufficient evidence, although murder charges formed part of the indictment at the time of his Preliminary Examination. They were a major reason for his arrest as well as for the changed and rather uncontrolled attitude of the Commissioner of Native Affairs towards him.¹ The murders of three medicine men in the Usuthu division in 1906-7 further strengthened the Government in their

¹Cd 3998, no. 8, Gov. to Sec. St., no.2, 31.1.08. See also Chapter VII, p. 440 - 442.
conviction that Dinusulu was behind the political murders.

While the murders of two of these medicine men, Mnqandi on May 4th, 1906, and Tshigana in February of the same year were never satisfactorily explained, that of the third, Gence, in April, 1907, was traced to Cakijana, Mayatana and Njiji. Gence was one of Dinusulu's many medical attendants; at the beginning of 1907 he was accused by Dinusulu of adultery with one of the Chief's wives, and brought before the local magistrate. The magistrate however dismissed the case, and shortly thereafter Gence was found shot. He died about a week later of his wounds, which turned septic. After his capture, Cakijana, who turned Crown Witness for the series of cases heard before the Special Court in connection with Dinusulu and the rebellion, admitted that he had killed Gence together with Mayatana. Both Mayatana and Cakijana maintained adamantly that their sole motive was that they had been ordered to commit the murder by Dinusulu and the judges of the Special Court, Dove Wilson, J. C. Boshoff, and H. C. Shepstone, who heard the case, accepted this plea.

1 Despite Miss Perrett's assertion to the contrary (Dinusulu and the Bambatha Rebellion, p.148). Lokobwayo was acquitted on this charge. Even Judge Boshoff, while dissatisfied with the nature of the defence evidence agreed to his acquittal. Lokobwayo was one of Dinusulu's personal attendants. Judges Summing Up, Rex. v. Lokobwayo 21.4.09. SC 111/3/8. Also cited Col. Col. 109, Reports in Natal Witness, April 1909.

2 Mayatana was sentenced to death but later reprieved; Njiji to two years with Hard Labour.

3 SC 111/3/8, Rex v. Mayatana and Njiji, Evidence Mayatana, Cakijana and Njiji. Also 66 3998 encl. 2, no. 10, Encl. 1, no. 65 (Depositions in Dinusulu's Preliminary Enquiry).

Certainly in this instance there are good prima facie grounds for suspecting Dinuzulu's complicity at least, and possibly even his command. After all in tribal law, death is the penalty for adultery with the chief's wives. That Dinuzulu felt very strongly about adultery with his wives was shown in 1900 when one of his wives had her teeth knocked out and an ear removed for a similar act of unfaithfulness.¹ In 1907, the wife accused of adultery was maltreated by the other Royal women at the Uethu and became one of Dinuzulu's most implacable enemies. In addition to his affair with Dinuzulu's wife, Gance was reported to have been thinking of becoming Mankolwandle's doctor: Mankolwandle was Dinuzulu's rival as head of the Zulu Royal family, being Cetshwayo's posthumous eldest son of his Chief Wife. As such he had a large following in Zululand as the true heir to the throne. Further than this however one cannot go: neither Dinuzulu, nor Cakijana himself was brought to trial for the murder of Gence, nor was Dinuzulu brought as a witness in the case against Mayatana, Mjiji and Cakijana. Cakijana may have had other motives for wanting to get rid of Gence, as there was a very real possibility that he would reveal the presence of the rebels, including Cakijana, to

¹SHA 1/4/80-9 1900, C.M.A. to S.M.A. 16.1.00.
²See Evidence, Mahayibhayi at Dinuzulu's Trial, Natal Witness, 2.12.08.
the local magistrate.\textsuperscript{1} Cakijana was, as we shall see, a most unreliable witness, and certainly in this and other cases was interested in drawing blame on to Dimuzulu in order to shield himself.\textsuperscript{2} It is even conceivable that the very murder of Genoe was part of a scheme of Cakijana's to draw Dimuzulu into his plan of further rebellion by pushing him into an inescapable position vis-à-vis the government.

In the case of the murders of the Nkandla chiefs the evidence implicating Dimuzulu is even less satisfactory, and, although it is impossible to be dogmatic, appear far more satisfactorily explained as the acts of rebels against those chiefs who they felt had been Amambuka - betrayers.\textsuperscript{3} If there was a single master mind behind them, it seems more likely to have been Cakijana than Dimuzulu, although it is impossible to assess how far Dimuzulu knew or approved of these schemes. The incentive both for Cakijana and the other accused to throw the blame on Dimuzulu was considerable, and there appears to have been positive inducement to do so. Thus at his trial, Mjombolwana, who was accused and found guilty of the murder of Sithithshili, stated that at the Nkandla police

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1}Evid. Miji to Magistrate, Encl. 2 in desp. no. 10, 12.1.06, Cdt. 3998.
  \item \textsuperscript{2}See below, Chapter VII, p. 468.
  \item \textsuperscript{3}CO 179/242/45350, cf. evid. spy Encl. 9 in desp. Secret of 7.12.07 that the "young men" at the Umthu say "Even if the white men fight and beat us ... there will still be a few of us left to revenge ourselves on the Amambuka..."
\end{itemize}
station he was told by the "officials": "You give Dinusulu away and you will save yourself." It was Willie Calverley (who was one of the detectives securing evidence against Dinusulu for his trial, and was also a shopkeeper in Zululand) who came to his cell in company with a native policeman and said "even if you did not murder Sitshitshili you will establish your own safety by incriminating Dinusulu". For five days he was "troubled by the authorities in this way". When he was found guilty and sentenced to death, Mnombolwana's final words were "I am glad I have not been compelled to make any false statements about Dinusulu".\(^1\) It may of course be that Mnombolwana's attachment to the Zulu king was so great that even if he were able to mitigate his own punishment, he would go to the gallows rather than betray him. Nevertheless the procedure he describes, which took place under Martial Law and which is borne out by very many other examples,\(^2\) does not leave one with much confidence about the evidence which was obtained against Dinusulu. Mnombolwana was said to have been wounded during the disturbances by Sitshitshili and to have known Cakijana.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) *Natal Witness*, 19.10.08. "Report of Jombolvana's trial before the Special Court." Also in SC 111/3/1, Rex v. Mnombolwana.

\(^2\) See below, Chapter VII, p. 459 - 463

\(^3\) Col. Col. 96, Statements Samuelson 114, Evid. Maxana ka Piti.
In the case of Mapoisa, Rolela ka Fogoti admitted that he and Tobela ka Mzilikazi had attempted the murder. As Rolela turned Crown Witness he was not brought to trial however, so there is little way of testing his evidence. He maintained that they had been despatched by Cakijana who gave them orders coming from Dinuzulu, which however he checked, to kill both Mapoisa and Chief Mjanji. Rolela was Mapoisa’s first cousin and they were said to hate one another “very bitterly”. As late as 1910 Mapoisa felt his life in danger from Fogoti’s descendants. Fogoti – Rolela’s father – had been an important man in the tribe who rebelled and was killed – it was alleged – by Mapoisa or through his actions. Certainly Cakijana may have given Rolela and Tobela the final orders to kill the chief’s son – but clearly also Rolela needed little urging. The evidence that Dinuzulu was behind the murders cannot be substantiated. Thus according to Masaanzela ka Vovo, also of Mbuso’s tribe, Cakijana originally approached him to do the killing. When he said he was going to Dinuzulu however to find out whether they were really his orders, Cakijana apparently became very angry.

1In his evidence in Rex. v. Mkipeni-Nsolo, SC 111/3/8.

2Col. Col. 95, Statements Samuelson 141 (o) Nembe ka Mlinde.

3SHA 1/1/456, Statement to T. A. Jackson, Nkandla, 11.2.10.
While Mazauzela stated before C. McKenize, the clerk at Mkandla, that Dinuzulu actually admitted knowledge of the plot to him, he retracted this at Dinuzulu's preliminary examination. On this occasion he maintained that he said it was Cakijana who sent him, though he was pressed for six days at Mkandla to say that the Chief had also sent him, and he had been too timid to go and find out.  

Similarly Rolela who stated that he did not check on whether the orders really were Dinuzulu's, maintained later that he suspected they were not.  

While in one variant of his evidence he said that Dinuzulu enquired how he had managed on his return, in another he said he had felt some surprise at not being punished for his failure to complete the mission.  

The evidence in the murder of Mpuwela is even more difficult to interpret. Here the accused were Mkipeni and Nzolo. They too were supposed to have received orders via Cakijana from Dinuzulu, in this instance to get two guns of Dinuzulu's which were said to have been hidden by one Nqalamba ka Febana in Mpuwela's ward, and to use them to kill the chief. Their departure on this mission was

3 Judges Summing Up in Rex v. Nzolo and Mtipani re evid. Rolela, SC 111/3/8 30.3.09 and reported in Natal Witness, 2.4.09.
further confirmed by the evidence of Rolela ka Fogoti. Mkipeni was the son of Mpumela's sister and according to the prosecution a rebel. The other main witness against them was Nqalamba ka Febana who maintained that he gave them the gun and that they then disappeared on their mission. As however he was the first suspect in the case, his evidence is hardly conclusive. His father Febona, also a rebel, had been expelled from the division by Mpumela. While Mkipeni and Nzolo were found guilty and sentenced to death, there were considerable doubts expressed at the time about the management of the case. According to the Chief Justice the only motive which could be found was an order from Dinuzulu.

The man who was defending the two accused, R. C. Samuelson, was at the time exhausted from the work he had just completed in the Dinuzulu case, and apparently in no fit state to conduct the defence. Mpumela's people said that the murderer had been hired by Godide's people and Mpumela's heir and successor, Mlokotwa believed Nqalamba

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1 He maintained that he had been ill during the disturbances and had simply remained in hiding in the bush. (Natal Witness Report of trial before Special Court, 30.3.09.)

2 See Reports of trial in Natal Witness, 30.3.09, 31.3.09, 1.4.09.

3 Letter H. E. Colenso to Gov. 29.11.09, encl. CO 179/253/17431 (copy).


and Somzika ka Godide had been responsible.  

If this has been a somewhat long digression on the 1907 Zululand murders—a subject which in some ways belongs to the Dinusulu story yet to be related—it is because it also fits into this discussion of the working of inter-tribal politics, and the ways which were adopted when pushed to extremes, of getting rid of an unpopular chief. While the government accounted for the difficulty of getting evidence against the murderers in these cases by maintaining that it was fear of Dinusulu, who was deliberately prompting the murders in order to terrorise the African population into supporting him, a more satisfactory explanation lies in the fact that in killing these "loyal" chiefs, the assassins were acting in accord with popular feeling.

Not all the tribesmen of Natal-Zululand rebelled in 1906. Indeed it was only a very small number of the whole who did. That a far larger number would have done so had they thought there was any chance of success seems undoubtedly true. Their passivity, as the Natal government realised and feared, was not through love or

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2 See below, Chapter VII.

3 Cf. the views of Rev. O. Staves of Eshowe who wrote on 27.1.08 to the Norskmisionstidende dö 6 March 1908 (p.127): "these crimes have been the outcome of personal revenge, they did not necessarily have anything to do with planned revolt... The murdered chiefs seem to have been guilty of actions which had to cause revenge, even in people as unvengeful as the Zulu." (Kindly trans. by Rev. I.E. Hodine).
loyalty to a government they had little reason to love or be loyal to. Under these circumstances, while it was necessary for them to find a scapegoat in Dinuzulu, on a more objective reading of the situation this hardly seems necessary as part of the explanation either for the murders or the rebellion. It has been suggested that under indirect rule in East Africa the position of the chief was actually strengthened vis-à-vis his subjects. Once he became a government servant, traditional curbs on his powers were removed, and his actions sanctioned by a more formidable external agent. There is a certain validity in this view in Natal too, where chiefs were expected to be "obeyed implicitly" whether the people liked it or not. Thus in mid 1907, the Governor of Natal informed Acting Chief Mciteki who had replaced Zibhebhu at the head of the Mandlakazi people that by opposing his (Mciteki's) succession, the Meenteli faction "put themselves .... amongst the category of rebels". Under colonial rule, it is true that once a chief was firmly entrenched in government favour, it became difficult for his followers to find an alternative chief and simply break away to form a new chiefdom, as had been Nguni custom in the past. The argument however cannot be stretched too far: as we have seen it was not impossible for breaks to occur, or for dissatisfied

1CO 179/241/23101, Encl. I desp. 5.6.07, Gov.'s interview with Chiefs, p.30.
tribesmen to use the government's desire to "divide and rule" to their advantage. With Government permission Africans could even move to another chief. The room for manoeuvre was undoubtedly more limited, but it still existed. Dissatisfied individuals could, if they found their chiefs unsatisfactory, make their way to the towns, mission stations, farms and mines which the whites brought in their wake. During the disturbances, for instance, people who found that their chiefs provided little or no protection against the violence of the times did seek protection from white employers,¹ though for the majority of Africans, with deep roots in their tribal area, these options hardly existed. There was however another alternative: to attempt to play the game according to the colonial rules, and, where possible, to use the colonial administrative officers as instruments of a policy which was not very different to that of pre-colonial times. This can be illustrated by examples before, during and after the disturbances. Very frequently, as has been shown to a certain extent already, attitudes taken up during the disturbances reflected earlier inter and intra-tribal relations as much as they reflected attitudes towards European Rule.

While in many of the examples cited above, the old rivalries, the old inter and intra-tribal feuds, continued through the disturb-

¹See H.N.A.C. Evid. Mavandhla and Joji (idem), p.698.
ances and determined men’s attitudes, it was the many examples of inter-tribal cooperation, the unity of the rebels from many different groupings which caused the government, so used to relying on inter-tribal feuds for its security, the gravest concern. In 1903 Samuelson wrote a long memorandum on the feuds and factions still prevalent amongst Natal Africans, while at the same time pointing out somewhat ominously that as a result of improved communications, missionary conferences, newspapers, “community of interests and so forth”, the Africans might well agree on some concerted action against the government in the future, “notwithstanding alleged tribal disunions and jealousies”. The events of 1906 were to prove these fears partly justified. Thus while traditionally the Government had been able to rely on the rivalries between certain tribes to prevent them from combining, and to count on the loyalty of other chiefs and tribes who would fight on their side, on this occasion some of the traditional feuds appeared to break down and there was noticeable reluctance on the part of many tribes, if not their chiefs, to actually fight on the government side.

\[\text{See e.g. the comment of the magistrate of Ndwedwe on the participation of a section of the Nyuswa people in the disturbances:}\]

\[\text{See e.g. Evidence P.R.Hoff before S.A.N.A.C., p.222.}\]

\[\text{SNA 1/4/1296, U.S.N.A. to Commandant of Volunteers, 18.6.03.}\]

\[\text{See e.g. the comment of the magistrate of Ndwedwe on the participation of a section of the Nyuswa people in the disturbances:}\]
"community of interests and so forth" was probably the most important. The many and heavy grievances which Africans stated they were suffering from before the Natal Native Affairs Commission differed but little from area to area in the colony. There was also a greater interchange of views between tribal Africans perhaps as a result of the migrant labour system, although the importance of this can be overestimated. It should also be noted that the earlier divisions between tribes were probably overestimated and exaggerated by the colonists. Whether one can call the inter-tribal co-operation at this stage "nationalism" to some extent depends upon one's definition of that word. The use of Dinuzulu's name, war-cry and war badge seems to indicate a "pan-Zulu feeling" and though this was not anything new, it is significant that even peoples who had previously seen themselves as refugees from the Zulu kingdom and regarded its king as their enemy were now prepared to look towards the Zulu Royal Family for their inspiration. Whether or not Dinuzulu was behind the disturbances or approved of them was immaterial. Some centralising figure was absolutely

"What induced the Nyuswa to throw in their lot with Nzeni they themselves cannot say, especially as there was a long standing feud between the two tribes." HFA 1/1, 1567/116, Report to J.J. Field, 10.1.07. Similarly Stuart Papers on the Zulu Rebellion, evidence Msime ka Beje, 26.12.06. (K.C.L.)

1 On the mines Africans tended to be grouped together according to tribe, and even in the towns clan members and fellow tribesmen tended to keep together.

2 At the time of the 1888 disturbances (if not before) H.E. Colenso was referring to the supporters of the Zulu Royal Family as the "National Party".
essential if the disparate tribes of Natal-Zululand were to unite for common purposes. No sufficiently strong new-type leader had yet emerged out of the traditional structure of African life in the territory. The leaders of the rebellion therefore chose a figure who had had such power and authority in the past in order to overcome their present divisions. Ironically enough it was the Natal government itself however with its insensitive handling of administration, its innumerable demands for land, labour and taxation, and its own policy of dividing and sub-dividing the tribes which must be regarded as the greatest unifying factor. It is both significant and ironical that the rebellion broke out not only in two very densely populated areas—Nkandla and Mapumula—Lower Tugela but also in areas where this process of "divide and rule" had gone furthest.

1 See e.g. SNA 1/1/345. Minute Major Maxwell (Mapumula) (above, p. 175) and above, p. 383 on Nkandla. For population density in these districts.
Chapter VII

ZULU HAMLET

"I am guilty only of being Cetshwayo's son. I have done nothing against Hulumeni of Natal. The real charge against me ... is kept in the shadow... Bambata is made a pretext, whereas it is the old charge ..."


1The Government.
For many in Natal, both black and white, there was little doubt that the mastermind behind the disturbances and their instigator-in-chief was Dinusulu, son of Cetahwayo, head of the Zulu Royal family and heir to the great military tradition of the Zulu people. So tangled are the strands of suspicion and rumour charge and counter charge, that it is still difficult to unravel with complete certainty the exact role played by Dinusulu in the events of 1906-7.

We have already seen how from the moment of his return to the newly annexed Zululand, Dinusulu's name was associated with a host of rumours which reached their peak towards the end of 1905 and the beginning of 1906, and how at the time of the promulgation of the Poll Tax, several Natal and Zululand chiefs sent to Dinusulu to find out what he intended doing about it. Throughout the disturbances, the rumours that he was the "head and font" of the whole movement continued. Cakijana, Bambatha's second in command, claimed to have been sent specifically by Dinusulu and used his name

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1 See e.g. Times of Natal, 2.5.06; Natal Mercury, 25.4.06.
2 See above, Chapter IV.
3 See above, Chapter V, p. 276-7
very widely in order to gain support for the movement. Throughout the fighting in the Mkandla forests, Dinusulu’s war-cry “Usuthu” was used,¹ and the traditional Zulu war emblem the tshokobesi was also worn by the rebel fighters.² Throughout Dinusulu protested his loyalty, and maintained that the rebels were using his name without either his permission or approval. The full ambiguity of his position was shown in April, 1906 when he was appealed to by the Natal authorities, to prove his loyalty once and for all. His response was to offer to raise a levy to aid the Natal forces and to send a letter message expressing his loyalty to the King.³ The levy was refused on the grounds that it would result in hundreds of young men flocking to his standard from all over Zululand, with the danger that they would get out of control and fight for Dinusulu instead of for the government.⁴ The letter of thanks sent to Dinusulu on behalf of the King for his expression of loyalty was not delivered on the grounds that it would lead him to think that he had a different position to other chiefs.⁵

¹Stuart, Z.E., p.171.
²Ibid., p.198.
³Cd 3027, Encl. in no. 15, Gov. to Sec. St., 20.4.06, Dinusulu to G.H.A., 18.4.06.
⁴Ibid., Gov. to Sec. St., 20.4.06, quoting Saunders’s views. Stuart, Z.E., p.215.
⁵GO 179/234/14522, Gov. to Sec. St., 26.4.06, no. 2, tel.
Despite the fact that the government suspected that Dinusulu had a good deal more to do with the rebels than he was willing to admit, and the many rumours that Bambatha, Mangati and Cakijana had all at some time or another made their way to the Usuthu kraal, the military took no action against him during the actual disturbances, apart from accumulating evidence. This was partly no doubt because of the calm attitude of Sir Charles Saunders,¹ who pointed out the soothing effect Dinusulu was having on surrounding tribes, and partly because so long as he took no overt action against the government, it was far safer to take no action against him. Despite their pugnaciousness in Natal, the military, who were convinced of Dinusulu's complicity in the rebellion by June, 1906, were probably aware that to take action against Dinusulu would need far greater resources than they needed to deploy against the lesser chiefs of Zululand and Natal.² Proceedings against Dinusulu in the inflamed atmosphere of 1906 would have given far wider scope to the entire rebellion and would have brought in all Dinusulu's supporters who had so far failed to rise. Had the Natal government sanctioned military proceedings against Dinusulu it would have given the rebels that unifying factor which they

¹Stuart, Z.R., p. 213.
²CO 179/237/46339, Gov. to Sec. St., 20.11.06.
in fact tried to create for themselves by using his name, war-cry and badge. Without him, as the rebels themselves realised, they were lost. It is in fact because of this realisation that the various visits to find out his intentions were made by Mangati, Bambatha and others. They may well have hoped moreover that by using his name they would be able to draw him into the actual hostilities. The restraint of the military authorities could have been one of the reasons for their ultimate failure in this regard.

It could also be that throughout the disturbances, Dinusulu never fully made up his mind what to do. There were those amongst his following who would dearly have liked to join the rebels in one final effort to win back his old position. By and large wiser counsels held sway. He may have been waiting to see what would happen to the rebel cause without committing himself fully to any one side. In maintaining this ambivalent attitude he was helped by the government attitude towards him. They were never able to deal with Dinusulu rationally. On the one hand, the government wanted his help - and in certain instances they received it - on the other they were afraid that by utilising it, they would in some way thus recognise his "special position". If he proffered

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1 See above, Chapters V, p. 336, VI, 337, 421-8
2 Stuart, Z.R., p. 313.
help it was rejected, lest it encourage his "pretensions"; if he failed to give it, he was regarded as disloyal, as failing to exert his natural authority over the Zulu in the interests of law and order. Even his undoubtedly proper replies to those chiefs who sent to him in the early days of the Poll Tax, were later construed to Stuart as mere show of loyalty, and he was blamed at his trial for not immediately reporting these chiefs who sent him to the local magistrate, a step which, as the defence team pointed out, would have lost him whatever influence for the good he might have had.

II The Trial

After the actual disturbances were over the distrust between Dinusulu and the Natal Government grew worse. Far from subsiding, the unrest in the country intensified. In the area of the military operations, crops and kraals had been destroyed and the male bread-winners had in many instances been killed or imprisoned. The government failed to declare a general amnesty on the grounds that

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1 The Trial of Dinusulu, Summing up of Chief Justice Sir Wm. Smith, p. xii.
3 See The Trial of Dinusulu, Address of Attorney General, p.12.
4 Ibid., Address of W. P. Schreiner, p.49.
it would disappoint those Africans who had remained loyal, although a very different viewpoint was expressed by the Acting Magistrate of Mapumulo, J. B. K. Farrer. He maintained that the punishment inflicted during the disturbances had been quite sufficient as a deterrent, and that it was a mistake to imprison the rank and file afterwards. At the beginning of 1907 there were about 4,000 rebels still in prison and the Imperial Government in June 1907 assisted with the deportation of twenty-five of the "ringleaders." According to Farrer, the method adopted by the government simply kept the Africans

"in a constant state of unrest and fostered discontent, as it is impossible for them to settle down when one half of their friends and relatives is in goal and the other half is wandering about trying to evade arrest..."

His further comments that far too much time was spent on pondering "what the natives would think" and that "we should try to see things as they are and deal with them on that basis" were equally apt.

When Sir Matthew Nathan came to the colony as Governor in the middle of 1907 a general amnesty had still not been declared and it was his constant endeavour to impress upon ministers that

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1 SHA 1/3/372/1907, Minute 7.6.07.
2 Stuart, Z.R., pp. 404-5.
the failure to declare an amnesty was what lay behind most of
the tension and unrest especially in Zululand. One of the main
reasons however for not declaring a general amnesty was the fact
that several of the leading rebels were still at large.1

Increasingly it came to the government’s attention that these
men had sought refuge with Dinusulu at the Usuthu.2 From the end
of 1906 the government received disturbing reports that Dinusulu’s
activities during and after the rebellion were not as innocent as
they had initially appeared to Sir Charles Saunders. Neverthe­
less although in September and December, 1906 and January and
February 1907 either Sir Charles or Dinusulu asked the government
for an independent enquiry to be made into the allegations being
made against the Chief, none was undertaken.3 In January 1907
Winston Churchill was to comment “It is a wonder all these constant
suspicions do not drive Dinusulu mad”.4

By far the most important of these reports against Dinusulu
came at the end of 1906 from one A. G. Daniels,5 an “exempted”

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1 See e.g. Nathan MSS 368, pp. 59-60, Nathan to Elgin, 19.1.06.
CO 179/242/37900, Encl. 2 in desp. 174, 5.10.07. Minute, Gov.
to Prime Minister, 5.10.07. CO 179/242/44554, Gov. to Sec. St., 30.11.07,
Secret. CO 179/242/40283, Gov. to Sec. St. Secret, 26.10.07. (See
extracts in Cd 3888).

2 See e.g. CO 179/240/5286, Extract publ. Cd 3888, Gov. to Sec. St., Secret
1, 18.1.07.

3 SHA 1/4/16 0:252, SHA 1/4/17 0:37.

4 CO 179/237/47424, Minute 18.1.07, on desp. Secret 1, 26.11.06.

5 He was chosen for Dinusulu as his interpreter by the Native Affairs
Department in Natal in 1890. Acc. to H. G. Shepstone he was educated at
African who had served as Dinusulu’s secretary while he was in exile in St. Helena and again on his return to Natal. On both occasions he had been dismissed from Dinusulu’s service being accused of fraud, and at the time of his present deposition was involved in suing Dinusulu for his unpaid salary—a case which he was to lose in the following April. Clearly there was considerable ill-will between the two men, and Daniels’s report to the S.N.A. on the Usuthu was calculated to rouse the greatest possible suspicion. According to Daniels, Dinusulu and his entourage had been intriguing with the tribes of Natal, Zululand and, indeed, the rest of South Africa, in order to have his position as King recognised. The rebellion of 1906 was premature, but Dinusulu had actually planned to join Bambatha later in the year, as his sheltering Bambatha’s family revealed. There was a large number of unregistered guns at the Usuthu and the Nkomindala, a military regiment which had been formed during the Boer War, had been kept on and drilled afterwards. He further stated that Dinusulu had been involved in the murder of the two medicine men at Lovedale and had a second class teachers certificate and had passed the Cape University Examination (2nd Class), CO 427/8/7095. Copy S.W.A. to Gov. Encl. in desp. Conf. 15.3.90.


2Col. 3888, no. 5, Gov. to Sec. St. Secret, 29.12.06. His evidence before Special Court was given, Natal Witness, 9th, 10th-12.08. For his evidence before the Prelim. Enquiry see Times of Natal, 26.3.08.
in his district in 1906 - Mnqandi and Tshigane, as well as that of the magistrate, H. M. Stainbank.

While Saunders pointed out that Daniels was hardly a disinterested witness, a few weeks later the evidence of a government spy, Ngunguluso, who had been employed at Port Tolland by the Militia during the rebellion, corroborated at least some of what Daniels had said. He also stated that he had seen several rebels at the Usuthu, and named as many as twenty-eight, amongst them some very prominent individuals. At the same time, the enquiries being made in the Mahlabatini district neighbouring Dinusulu’s territory had resulted in considerable evidence that Dinusulu knew more of the murder than he was prepared to disclose. The murder, in April 1907, of a third medicine man, Gence, who had been in attendance on Dinusulu and accused of adultery by him, began to shake even Sir Charles Saunders’s faith in the Chief.

Nevertheless in May, 1907 when Dinusulu came to Pietermaritzburg, ostensibly to bid farewell to the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, it seemed as though an attempt could be made by both sides to come

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1 Cd 3888, no. 5, Gov. to Sec. St., Secret, 1, 29.12.06.
4 See above, Chapter VI, pp. 415-418.
nearer to one another. McCallum at any rate left the interview feeling he had handled Dinusulu tactfully and firmly, and convinced that Dinusulu had played no part in the actual disturbances, even though it was necessary to warn him that the government knew that Bambatha's family had found shelter with him and that he had also sheltered several other rebels. He also took the opportunity of informing Dinusulu what kind of behaviour was expected from a loyal servant of the government. Dinusulu's own preoccupations were somewhat different. He had come to Pietermaritzburg despite the very deep misgivings of his people that he would be arrested as Kula and Tilonko had been. Nevertheless he felt it his duty to speak out to the governor about the need felt by the Zulu for a spokesman who could represent their grievances to the Government, a kind of Paramount Chief. While denying that he would necessarily be the one chosen, he added "I do not wish to conceal ... that the whole of the Zulus like me as the son of my father who was their King formerly". The Zulu, he said, felt unfairly treated by comparison with the Boers who had just been granted Responsible

1 CO 179/241/21367, Encl. desp. Conf. 2, 25.5.07, Interview 21.5.07.
2 Cf. McCallum's letter to Nathan 7.1.08 after Dinusulu's arrest: "Dinusulu has been an infernal fool not to take my advice and warning to heart; he has been spoilt by Miss Colenso, who is a most dangerous woman and whom I had much pleasure in keeping in her proper place and not allowing her to interfere" /sig/ Nathan MSS 375, p.24.
3 CO 179/241/21367, Gov. to Sec. St., Conf. 25.5.07.
4 CO 179/241/21367, Interview with Governor, pp. 6-8, 35-6.
5 Ibid., p.29.
government, though they had so recently fought against the
British. He was not used as Government induna, despite the
stipulation in the conditions of his return and, continued -
"I feel that it is hard that I should be blamed for the conduct
of people outside of my own district over whom I had no control
or direction".1

At the same time he denied all knowledge of Bambatha's
family being at the Usuthu and promised to hand over any rebels
he should find to the magistrate at Hongoma. On his return to
the Usuthu, six rebels were handed over to the magistrate.2

By far the most sensational and damaging evidence against
Dinusulu came however in July, 1907 when Bambatha's wife and two
children suddenly surrendered themselves to the magistrate at
Mahlabatini, stating that they had spent the last seventeen months
at Dinusulu's kraal. Dinusulu, apprehensive that the authorities
would find them at his kraal, had wanted to send them across the
Pongola into Swasiland, and they had fled.3

By the 12th August, Sir Charles Saunders had completely
swung round from his previous views about Dinusulu's innocence and

1 CO 179/241/21367, Interview with Governor, p. 28.
2 Cd 3888, Officer Administering the Government, to Sec. St., 9/7/07, no. 1.
3 CO 179/241/33767, Encl. in desp. Conf. 29/8/07. Evidence Bambatha's
wife, Sdekiwe, before James Stuart, 12/7/07, 18/7/07. For this
evidence, see below, p. 472-3.
wished the Natal government would "go for him bald-headed". The government, fearful that this would lead to another uprising, were, however, still reluctant to embark on this course of action. Saunders himself was now fully convinced that Dinuzulu was guilty and had to be removed for the peace of Zululand. The unrest there had still not died down, loyal chiefs reported themselves in fear of their lives, and their anxiety was enormously increased by the murder of the "loyal" chief Sizishitshili at the beginning of August and by the failure of the government to capture the remaining rebels. They were convinced that all the unrest emanated from Dinuzulu. The fact that the Commissioner for Native Affairs, Sir Charles Saunders, had staked so much of his personal trust in Dinuzulu made him particularly bitter against the Chief. In addition, by August Saunders felt particularly disillusioned by the Natal government "policy of drift" in Zululand, and lacked all faith in his political masters. He admitted to the Officer Administering the Government before the arrival of Sir Matthew Nathan that he felt "perfectly sick" of his position in Zululand.

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1CO 179/241/53767, Encl. 3, Rept. Conf. C.N.A. to P.M., 12.8.07.
2SNA 1/6/29, C.N.A. to Admin. Beaumont, Minute 20.8.07. PM C 103-07

Admin. to P.M. 15.8.07 and minute.

3See above, Chapter VI, p. 4.1.2 - 4.1.4.


From believing in Dinusulu's innocence Saunders now believed that Dinusulu was keeping the rebels at the Usuthu for a set purpose and was bent on "a course of self-aggrandisement, of cool defiance or indifference to the wishes of the government and of open hostility to those natives who had been loyal...". The belief that Dinusulu had instigated all the murders in Zululand was widespread and Saunders feared that Dinusulu "would win over the allegiance of heretofore loyal natives, increase his power and independence and so bring on another rebellion" if matters allowed to continue as they were.1

Shortly after his arrival in Natal, Sir Matthew Nathan was thus persuaded2 that for the safety of Zululand Dinusulu would have to be removed.3 Despite the extra two hundred police drafted into Zululand at the end of September, and who were patrolling the country, on the 7th of October attempts were made to kill Chief Mpmela and one of his favourites, Mdlela.4

At the same time it was clear that Dinusulu was getting increasingly apprehensive that the government were going to direct force against him. In August at his annual hunt in the Black

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2 "by Beaumont 'the level headed judge', by Moor [P.M. and M.H.A.], by Haydon [ex Minister] by Saunders, and by various members of the House of Shepstone..." Nathan MSS 368, pp. 18-19, Nathan to Lucas, 3.10.07.
3 CO 179/241/32547, Gov. to Sec. St.
4 CO 179/242/38806, Desp. Secret, Gov. to Sec. St. 12.10.07.
Umfolosi Valley he held an inspection of arms and according to one informant practically the whole Nkomindala produced breachloading rifles. The report was that there were one hundred and fifty rifles including a number of small-bore rifles of modern pattern. He was supposed to be getting ammunition from Portuguese agents at Delagoa Bay and to be expecting a further two thousand rounds in the near future. When, at the beginning of October, a police patrol came unexpectedly to the Usuthu kraal, it occasioned a minor panic, and there were apparently those who wanted to take up arms against the police. Shortly after this his tribe was reported to have doctored itself for war. Clearly the extra police movements and the constant spy reports—of which he complained to Harriette Colenso towards the end of 1907—made Dinusu manufacture fearful and anxious. On the 27th October he wrote to both the Governor and the U.S.N.A. To the first he pleaded that the Governor not listen "with one ear only" and that opportunity should be given to the person complained of to make a reply; to Samuelson he stated:

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1 For the Nkomindala see above, p. 294.
2 CO 179/241/33767, Encl. 4, desp. Conf. 29.8.07. C.N.A. to P.M. 23.8.07.
3 CO 179/242/38806, Encl. 2 in desp. Sec. 12.10.07. Rept. Inspect. of Dimmick, Natal Police, to C.N.A.
4 AGO 1/7/62, 10.10.07.
5 CO 179/242/41993, trans. copy Encl. in desp. Secret, 8.11.07.
6 Ibid., Encl. 2.
"However much they may say against me, it will be you people who will fight. For my part I will never fight against the Government because the Government [sic. He probably meant Cetshwayo] fought and was beaten by the Queen.".

Rumours about Dinusulu's intentions reached fever pitch again in October and November, 1907. Various spy reports suggested he was contacting different tribes, but especially his very loyal followers in the Vryheid district to arm and come to his support in the event of his being arrested by the Natal government. A report, forwarded by Lieut. Hedges of the Zululand Mounted Rifles, stated that if a small force were sent to arrest Dinusulu the Usuthu would be assisted by five Zulu regiments who had been given orders to be ready. The arrest of Dinusulu would be a signal for every man in Zululand and elsewhere to rise.¹

Both in September and at the beginning of October, Natal requested Imperial aid in order to effect Dinusulu's arrest.²

Lord Elgin, who felt that the evidence so far led against Dinusulu amounted to very little and did not provide adequate grounds for his arrest, refused to give it.³ At the same time, General

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¹ See e.g. CO 179/242/39532, Encl. 1 in desp. Sec. 19, 10, 07, CO 179/242/45350, Encl. 4 in desp. Secret, 7, 12, 07, CO 179/242/45350, Encl. 10 desp. Sec. 7, 12, 07. Unsigned Report 24, 11, 07 forwarded by Intelligence Officer, General Staff, Pretoria. Encl. 11 similar rept. Magis. Umvoti, 1, 12, 07 (see Cd 3888, Encl. 7 in 101).

² See e.g. CO 179/241/32533, Gov. to Sec. St. 10, 9, 07, Conf. Prints African (M.) (South), Memo no. 867, P. Hopwood 2, 10, 07 (Secret).

³ Cd 3888, Elgin to Nathan, 14, 10, 07. See also Elgin to Nathan 31, 10, 07, Nathan MSS 371, p.123.
Botha\(^1\), then Prime Minister of the Transvaal, offered to mediate between Dinusulu and the Natal government, and sent a personal emissary, Coenraad Meyer, who knew Dinusulu from the old days of the "New Republic".\(^2\) Even this visit by Coenraad Meyer found its way into a spy report as evidence of an intended Boer-Zulu combination against Natal! Meyer returned from his six day visit to Dimusulu's kraal convinced that he "was a man of rank without following"; there were few men at the Usuthu and those there were employed in weeding the Chief's gardens. He was sure that Dinusulu was loyal to the government and that the misunderstanding with the Natal government was due to the failure of the ministers to meet Dinusulu personally.\(^3\)

This was the most encouraging report that the government had received for some time, and to a certain extent the agitation died down.\(^4\) With the murder on the 20th November of another loyal chief, Mpumela, all the old rumours revived, and all members of the government became convinced that they would have to take action.\(^5\)

\(^1\)Botha knew Dinusulu from the old days of the New Republic and had been part of the expedition in 1884 against Zibhebhu. From 1886-1894 he had been veld-kornet and collector of taxes in Ubombo, see H. Spender, General Botha, pp. 37-40 (London, 1919), 2nd ed.
\(^2\)See above: Chapter II, p.102 for the "New Republic".
\(^3\)CO 179/242/41176, Encl. 1 in desp. Secret, 3.11.07, undated Conf. Rept. Coenraad Meyer to General Botha.
\(^4\)CO 179/242/40263, Gov. to Sec. St. 26.10.07 (Extract printed Cd 3888).
\(^5\)Nathan MSS 368, pp. 59-60, Nathan to Elgin, 19.1.08.
the 25th November, Sir Matthew Nathan, while keeping the other South African governments informed of his actions and the reasons for them, issued a proclamation strengthening the forces for the protection of chiefs in Zululand. The militia was mobilised, a step which caused dismay at the Usuthu. On the 3rd December Dinusulu expressed surprise that troops were being sent against him, and was instructed to surrender himself to the magistrate at Nongoma forthwith. When he tried to procrastinate, the Governor, much against his will, and on the advice of the Colonial Office, was forced by his ministry to declare Martial Law on the 7th December over the whole of Zululand. This was extended to the Vryheid-Paulpietersberg Districts of Natal on the 9th. Making use of the opportunity, Nathan tried to extract a promise from ministers that with the arrest of Dinusulu the rank and file prisoners of the 1906 disturbances be released - there were still over 2,000 at the end of 1907 - and that Martial Law be

1 Cd 3888 (extract) Gov. to Sec. St., 30.11.07.
2 Cd 3888, Elgin to Nathan, 2.12.07; CO 179/242/42410, Minute R. V. Vernon, 4.12.07.
4 CO 179/242/2162, Gov. to Sec. St., tel. 28.12.07.
lifted as soon as possible. On neither of these two issues were his wishes complied with. His only resort was to insist he be allowed to publish his opinion that the declaration of Martial Law before there had been any breach of the peace or armed resistance to the state was premature. In a private letter to Lord Selborne, Nathan wrote justifying his stand:

"It seemed to me that the time had come when the welfare of the colony required a public protest, and that, feeling as I did, it was for me to make it by allowing my views to be published. I suggested to Moor that I should be allowed to resign when the Blue Book appears, but he was strongly averse to it."2

Under the circumstances, one would have expected either Sir Matthew or his ministers to have resigned.

Nathan did not resign. This was probably not so much because the Prime Minister of Natal was averse to his resignation as because it was highly unlikely that the Earl of Elgin would have accepted the resignation of a man he had personally pressed into taking the position and in whom the Colonial Office had every confidence.3 That the Moor ministry did not resign can only be attributed to its thick skin. It was, on the other hand, difficult for Nathan

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1 CO 179/242/2162, Gov. to Sec. St., 3.12.07, publ. Cd 3866 no. 106. See also the long wrangle between Nathan and Minister of Justice, Carter, when Nathan accused ministers of a breach of faith on the issue of release of prisoners in GH 381 G248, Minutes.

2 Nathan MSS 368, 11.1.08.

3 Nathan MSS 371, no. 103-4. Elgin to Nathan 27.4.08. References to Nathan's able handling of the situation are frequent both in CO files and in letters to Nathan from Elgin and Sir Charles Lucas.
to dismiss them as Sir Bartle Frere had dismissed his ministry in the Cape in 1878.\(^1\) Nathan's choice of alternative ministers was extremely limited – as he pointed out there were not enough men in the Natal Parliament of sufficient calibre to form a Government and an Opposition.\(^2\) In addition, weak a Prime Minister as Moor was, he was still widely regarded as the most sympathetic of the available Ministers of Native Affairs towards the African population.\(^3\) Sir Duncan McKenzie, now Commandant of the Militia proceeded to Zululand with nearly 3,000 members of the Active Militia.\(^4\) Despite the apprehensions he expressed about the intentions of the Militia towards him and the fear that he would be tried by Martial law, Dinuzulu surrendered himself for trial on the 7th December with little further ado, having been promised a fair trial in a letter from Frank Colenso forwarded by the C.O. as well as by the representations of C.E. Renaud.\(^5\) He was brought to Pietermaritzburg and lodged in the women's quarters of the gaol.

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\(^2\)Nathan MSS 368, p.126 to Sir Charles Lucas, 12.7.08.

\(^3\)See above, Chapter III, p.205-6, below Chapter IX, p.572-573.

\(^4\)Cd 3888, Gov. to Sec. St. 4.12.07, no.1.

\(^5\)Cd 3998, no. 35, Sec. St. to Gov. 20.2 of no. 1. Cd 3888, no. 104 Encl. 4, Ann. B., Renaud to Dinuzulu, 7.12.07.
with his induna Mgwaqo and Mankulumana and attendants. On the 23rd December his Preliminary Examination before the magistrate of Umgeni Division, T. R. L. Bennet, began behind closed doors.¹

Dinusulu and the two induna were charged with high treason, murder, the incitement to murder, the incitement to sedition and rebellion, being an accessory to murder, sheltering rebels and contravening the Firearms and Ammunitions Act of 1905. With his arrest and the imposition of Martial Law over Zululand and its extension to the Northern Districts the previous trickle of witnesses against the Chief became a flood. In all, one hundred and twenty-nine witnesses appeared, and the examination lasted two hundred and twenty-one days. Of these, fifty-three were eventually examined before the Special Court.² An appeal by Dinusulu to the Supreme Court for an interdict against Bennet on grounds that he was biased was rejected. The Court ruled that mere infirmities of temper were not evidence of bias.³ It is unlikely that any other Natal magistrate, with perhaps one or two exceptions, would have handled the case any differently. The Preliminary

¹Stuart, Z.R., p.460.
²CO 179/252/5463, Gov. to sec. St., Secret desp. 23.1.09.
³See Report in Natal Witness, 3.4.08. Also in Cd 3998 Encl. 2 in no. 65.
Examination may have been within the limits of Natal law;

Sir Francis Hopwood, Under Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, was not, however, alone when he minuted that while this may have been true, Natal's legal code was then unlike any other in the civilised world.\(^1\) As late as the end of April, 1908 he remarked of the evidence so far led in the Preliminary Examination that

"In this country no judicial officer would commit Dinisulu for trial on any of the evidence we have seen. But the colonial magistrates are not independent of the Government of Natal and where would Moor and his colleagues be if after Martial law, troops, great expense and blood shed there was nothing to justify such drastic and unhappy action?"\(^2\)

Largely because of the way in which this Preliminary Examination was handled and the many doubts which were expressed about it both in Britain and in South Africa itself - the Attorney General of the Transvaal echoed the views of many even in South Africa when he called it "a fishing enquiry"\(^3\) - the Colonial Office was to make it their concern to see that Dinisulu received a fair trial. They were, under the terms of his return to Zululand

\(^1\)In June 1908 Lambert in the Colonial Office called the prolongation of the Preliminary trial scandalous (Minute on CO 179/245/22739) whilst Lord Elgin had already called the procedure "provocative" (Nathan MSS 371, pp. 103-4, Elgin to Nathan, 27.4.08).

\(^2\)CO 179/244/13875, Sim. Minute Lt. Crewe ibid on dep. of 28.3.08. Sim. Nathan MSS 371, no. 123, Elgin to Nathan 31.10.07 on the nature of depositions taken before Dinisulu's arrest.

\(^3\)Schreiner Papers, 1290. Richard Solomon to W. P. Schreiner, 4.6.08.
in part responsible for him, which made their position stronger than it would otherwise have been. There had been a major clash between the two governments on the question of the arrest of Dinusulu and the declaration of Martial Law in which the Natal government gained its way. Thereafter the events of 1908 constituted a series of minor brushes between the Colonial Office and Natal ministers over the defence and trial of Dinusulu, in which the former not infrequently triumphed.\footnote{1} It would be tedious to relate here all the obstacles placed in the way of the defence by a Minister of Justice, T. F. Carter,\footnote{2} who must hold the record for obstinacy and narrow mindedness even in the annals of Natal. As Sir Charles Lucas, who had replaced Just on Natal Affairs at the Colonial Office remarked, "If the Natal Government had deliberately intended to set public feeling in... Britain against them, they could not have done it more effectively than has been the case.\footnote{3}"

The most important successes of the Colonial Office were over the payment of Dinusulu's salary, the appointment of eminent defence Counsel - W. P. Schreiner was a Colonial Office suggestion - \footnote{4}

\footnote{1}{For a defence of the Natal Ministry's actions see Stuart, p. 460 ff.}
\footnote{2}{Minister of Justice 1906-7 and Attorney General 1908-10.}
\footnote{3}{Nathan MSS 374 no. 81, 5.6.08.}
\footnote{4}{The other members of the defence team were Natalians - C. E. Renaud and R. C. A. Samuelson.}
and the establishment of a Special Court under a Judge from outside Natal to hear the Chief's case.\(^1\) On the question of Dimusulu's salary, which the Natal government suspended on his arrest, the Secretary of State was on particularly firm ground: under the conditions of his return in 1897 it was stipulated that the salary could only be suspended with the prior agreement of the Secretary of State. Natal's failure to comply with this condition, as well as their assumption that Dimusulu was guilty before he had been tried, led to a long wrangle between the two governments. Eventually the Natal government agreed to pay the £500 owing him to his defence counsel.\(^2\) That the Colonial Office had been "in honour bound" to see that the salary was paid in order to sustain his defence was unanimously agreed to by both sides in the Imperial Parliament.\(^3\) It must have been a rare occasion of unanimity in the life of the 1906-11 British Parliament! In Natal itself moreover there was some public support for the Imperial view and a reaction against Carter's attempt to portray the fight as one between defenceless little Natal and a despotic and tyrannical Colonial

\(^1\)See Nathan MSS 371, 115, Elgin to Nathan 14.2.08, and Cd 3998, no.18, Sec. St. to Nathan, 11.2.08 where he suggests Nathan select an "eminent barrister" from the Cape Bar, and CO 179/244/5489, Sec. St. to Gov. 15.2.08 (draft tel.) Cd 3988, Sec. St. to Gov. 14.10.06.

\(^2\)See Cd 3998, CO /179/245 and passim and esp. 246. Cd 3998 no. 7, Sec. St. to Gov. 30.1.08, no. 2, and 4.2.08.

\(^3\)CO 179/246/30824, Encl. 5 no. 2 (Report of N.A.R.A.A debate) Sec. St. to Gov. (copy), 27.7.08.
At the initiative and on the firm insistence of the Colonial Office, W. P. Schreiner was engaged to defend Dinuzulu. Schreiner, who was amongst the most brilliant South African advocates of his day and had played a prominent and distinguished part in the political life of the Cape Colony, having been Prime Minister there during the Boer War, was a far wiser choice than the original counsel engaged by the Colenso, E. G. Jellicoe; fortunately, Jellicoe threw in his brief after three weeks in Natal in January-February, 1908, so convinced was he that Dinuzulu would not get a fair trial in that colony. That Jellicoe was proved wrong, however, was in large measure due to Imperial insisting on a fairly constituted Special Court, along the lines of the impartial tribunal first suggested by Lord Elgin in October, 1907. It was headed by Sir William Smith, Chief Justice of the Transvaal, and although the other two members of the court, H. C. Shepstone, brother of Sir Theophilus, and J. C. Boshoff, a Natal born judge,

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1See e.g. Speech by M. S. Evans reported in Natal Advertiser, 1.8.08. Editorials in Natal Mercury, 2.6.08 and 5.6.08. Sim. Natal Witness, 3.6.08, 5.6.08.

2Nathan MSS 371, p.115, Elgin to Nathan, 14.2.08.


4Stuart, Z. R., p.463. Walker; Schreiner, p.278.

5See Cd 3886, Elgin to Nathan, 14.10.07 and Memorandum, Hopwood to Elgin in Confidential Prints African (South) no. 887 Secret. This advice
were objected to by the defence and were not particularly wise choices, there is no doubt that when he eventually appeared before the Special Court Dimasulu received a fair and impartial trial by all standards. That he was found guilty on only two and a half of the twenty three counts of his final indictment (the murder charges were dropped) was undoubtedly the result of Imperial intervention. Before hearing the Dimasulu case, the Special Court heard and sentenced the cases of Cakijana, Mangati and Njombolvana.

After Dimasulu had been tried, his two induna, Kgwago and Mankulwana were tried on the charges Dimasulu was found guilty of, and sentenced to minor terms of imprisonment and fines. The judicial proceedings against Dimasulu, and against the various captured rebel "ring-leaders" and murderers, in 1906–9 throw an interesting light on the nature of these proceedings in a racially divided society. For the historian the numerous allegations and counter-allegations by defence and prosecution against one another's methods of procuring evidence, tend in the end to invalidate almost all evidence qua evidence. Its chief use is not to illuminate the course of events in the past so much as the interests

was repeated in Elgin to Nathan, 14.2.08 (Nathan MSS 371, pp. 112-5) having been echoed in The Times of that date.

1See e.g. The Dinuzulu Special Court by F. E. Colenso (pamphlet) 1908, Walker; Schreiner, pp. 287-9. H. C. Shepstone had been one of the Transvaal representatives on the memorable Boundary Commission of 1878 which led Cetshwayo to identify the Shepstones with his enemies.

2See above, Chapter VI, p. 418-419.
and rivalries in the present. The difficulties in the way of interpretation are enormous. The first consideration is that almost all the evidence was initially given in Zulu and translated by men who were not necessarily very competent linguists. In his evidence before the Natal Native Affairs Commission, the magistrate of Umvoti division, J. W. Cross, who was himself to act as interpreter for the Special Court, remarked that defective translations at preliminary examinations frequently led to injustice. Evidence was discredited in the Higher Court because "it was found that... statements at the trial differed from what was contained in... depositions at the preliminary enquiry, whereas the witness had told the same story in both courts." This may well account for different versions often quite contradictory, given before the magistrate, at the Preliminary Examination and in the different cases before the Special Court. Quite apart from defective translations, however, in the case of the Dinuzulu enquiries, there may have been different reasons for the many variants of the same man's evidence. In the case of Cakijana, for example, one of the main witnesses against Dinusulu, there are at least five versions given under differing circum-

1 N.N.A.C. Evid. p.635.
stances - and they do not all tally even on very material issues. It was only before the Special Court and so long as W. P. Schreiner acted as defence and Sir William Smith was Judge President, that witnesses were subjected to any searching cross-examination, and the inconsistencies in their evidence drawn out. During the Preliminary Examination according to the defence - and this would seem to be borne out by the collapse of the Prosecution case in the Special Court - long typed statements of many pages were read out to witnesses by the Crown Prosecutor. When they gave signs of disapproval or dissent, they were told to "Tula" and wait until the entire statement had been read through. In this way many corrections material to the defence had been lost.

The circumstances under which an individual gave his initial deposition to the police or magistrate differed materially also from both the circumstances of the Preliminary Examination and those of the Special Court. Most of these depositions were gathered in Zululand whilst Martial Law was in force. Indeed it was admitted quite openly by the government that Martial Law was retained so that

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1 For Cakijana's part in the disturbances, see above, Chapter V - VI, pp. 325-326 and below, Chapter VII, p. 465 ff. passim.
2 "Shut up".
that this evidence could be gathered, to arrest criminals
and search for guns. Thus although there was no state of war
or rebellion in Zululand, Martial Law was maintained there for
eight months, "pending the completion of the case for the Pro-
secution at the Preliminary Examination". The constant pleas
of the Governor and the Secretary for State that Martial Law
was totally unjustified and unjustifiable were ignored by the
Natal government. It was equally convinced that the ends of
justice would be defeated if Dinuzulu's defence counsel were
allowed into Zululand to "tamper" with their witnesses. Even
when the defence teams were eventually allowed into Zululand,
they were constantly followed by police spies. There were fre-
fquent allegations on the part of the government that the defence
was "interfering" with its witnesses, and Harriette Colenso was
a special object of suspicion. At one point, through ministerial
injunction, she was forbidden to act as translator for Samuelson
and Renaud in their visits to Dinuzulu. The Minister of Justice

1 Nathan MSS 368, p.131, Nathan to Selborne, 18.7.08.
2 e.g. CO 179/246/29960, Gov. to Sec. St. 18.7.08. Cd 3888, No. 100,
Sec. St. to Gov. 27.12.07.
4 AGO 1/7/63, B. Colenbrander, magis. Mzandla to W. S. Bigby.
alleged she was likely to defeat the ends of justice and was totally unsuitable to see the prisoner except in the presence of a member of the police force or some other official who understood Zulu.¹

Despite – or perhaps because of – the maintenance of Martial Law, the government found it difficult to get people to give evidence. This they felt was yet further evidence of the "enormous influence" Dinusulu had over the minds of his fellow Zulu, even when in captivity.² The evident constraint of prosecution witnesses and the contradictions in their stories were also attributed to this cause. In part this was undoubtedly true. To betray their King in times past would have meant death. There may however have been other reasons. Quite apart from whether their stories were true or not, witnesses giving evidence against their King, could be expected to feel a certain amount of guilt and disloyalty. Their motives for giving evidence in the first place may not have been disinterested. It was therefore far easier to do this before a magistrate and black policemen and induna eager for this information to be given, than to do it in Dinusulu's presence. Moreover the government's difficulty was

¹Natal Witness, 14.5.08, Report of Appeal before Supreme Court, Natal against this injunction.

²The Trial of Dinusulu, p.10. Address of Attorney General, Stuart, ZR, p.454.
not simply the result of Dinusulu’s power. In the first instance
the reason was its own grievous unpopularity with the Zulu people.
For many silence must have been the one way they had of showing
hostility and “passive resistance” to a government they had little
reason to love and much cause to fear.

Yet many witnesses were found. After all, great as Dinusulu’s
power over the minds of his followers may have been, the power of
the authorities, so recently shown during the disturbances, was
far far greater. The fact that there was Martial Law in Zululand
was of enormous importance. It did not matter whether or not there
were glaring acts of injustice under it;¹ the fears which it aroused
may well have induced people to talk – and indeed to say whatever
the person who was noting down the deposition wanted. There were
numerous examples of depositions unfavourable to Dinusulu being
modified before the Preliminary Examination or even before the
Special Court Judges in very material ways. This may be accounted
for by the fact that people were afraid to tell the truth in front
of Dinusulu. On the other hand, during the Preliminary Examination
witnesses were not allowed to look at the Chief, but sat facing
three magistrates; generally one of these magistrates was involved

¹For acts of brutality under Martial Law see above, Chapter V.
and CO 179/251/34191, Encl. H. E. Colenso to F. E. Colenso, 15.5.08,
CO 179/251/1998, Encl. F. E. Colenso to Sir F. Hopwood, 1.6.08.
CO 179/246/29959, Encl. 7 in desp. Secr. 25.7.08, Copy of proceedings
in the original noting down of their depositions.¹ There is little doubt that witnesses were frequently bullied into making their original depositions and the tactics used were not of the most savoury.² As the Natal Witness of 5.3.09 remarked, it is an unpleasant reflection upon the case that out of twenty-

¹See Natal Witness, 3.4.08, R. C. Samuelson’s affidavit in Dimusulu v. T. R. Bennet.

²Cf. W. P. Schreiner’s views, cited in E. A. Walker: Schreiner, p.295. In the nature of the case this is difficult to document from the Prosecution side, but of this letter from J. P. Hedges employed to get evidence from Africans together with William Calverley, a Zululand storekeeper and member of the Intelligence in 1906:

"I had a wire from Calverley urging me to come at once as things are right as he puts it. I take it the result of our combined labours with C/akijana/ are bearing good fruit and I consider it d—d hard that I should not share in some of the pleasures of eating it. There may be many reasons for my being knee-haltered at this place, but I reckon they weigh as nothing compared with the issues at stake in the Dimusulu business. It is not for me to talk about it and I don’t think my good little chief would understand if I tried to explain. Calverley would not wire me for nothing and I am anxious to come in at the death having had nothing much more than the preliminary dirty work to contend with…"

AGO 1.7.62. J. P. Hedges to W. S. Bigby, 5.5.08, Senior member, Prosecution.

While several witnesses for the defence maintained they had been brow-beaten into making false statements this evidence also has of course to be treated with great caution. I have therefore only given direct references to those witnesses (and not all of them) who have stuck to this statement in court. The most striking example illustrating Prosecution tactics was that of Njombolwana cited in Chapter VI above.
three counts of one of the more formidable indictments with which a prisoner was ever confronted twenty should have failed. According to one Mbarulama he did not give the same evidence at the Nkandla magistracy as before the Preliminary Examination because "we were not allowed to make our statements we were told certain things and told to admit them". Another, Sisila, maintained that

"we were kept at Nkandla for six months surrounded by witnesses and they were trying to compel us to say something we knew nothing about. They wanted us to tell lies. Hashi and Lukulweni.... used to come with their people as witnesses."2

Yet another stated that the magistrate's clerk at Nkandla did not conduct the enquiry properly. "He brought witnesses against us whom we were disputing with". Three other witnesses who were actually tried and found guilty of perjury during the trial for maintaining that their evidence before the Preliminary Examination was incorrect, maintained that they had been told by their interrogator that they would "kill themselves" if they did not admit that they were at the Usuthu.4 In yet another instance, one of the

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1 *Times of Natal*, 14.5.08, Col. Co. 99 (iii), pp. 56-7.
2 *Times of Natal*, 12.2.08.
3 *Idem*, Evidence Mlonyeni.
4 *Natal Witness*, 18.11.08.
white detectives, Willie Calverley, engaged on gathering
evidence for the prosecution, was charged with assaulting one
of the witnesses. Found guilty of "an indiscretion" he was dis-
charged with a caution.¹

The fear generated by the white magistrate must in many
cases have equally if it did not surpass that roused by Dimusulu.
One witness, fined for perjury during the Preliminary Examination,
was reported by R. C. Samuelson to have said:

"I have spoken, but I am not of good hearing. I
cannot contradict your worship... I do not wish
to trouble the magistrate... The magistrate gave
me a list of names only /of the rebels at the Ustutha/
and I followed him. If the magistrate wants me to say
anything I will say it. I do not want to trouble the
magistrate. No one should trouble the magistrate."²

None of this perhaps amounts to very much, but it does cast
considerable doubts on the validity of the evidence. Quite apart
from those cases where evidence was gathered with difficulty, if
not actually "planted" on a witness, there were other cases where
simply the inducement to incriminate Dimusulu and so lessen one's
own possible sentence, was enormous. Thus Stuart's contention that
Cakijana, Mangati, Rolela, Mayatana, and others all give their
evidence "voluntarily" is besides the point.³ Cakijana, Mayatana

¹ Natal Witness, 21.11.08. For further evidence of the methods used
see Col. Col. 98 and 99, Recognitions Samuelson and Runand, The
Trial of Dimusulu and AG0 1/7/56 and 1/7/62. Correspondence between
Magistrates and members of the Prosecution team.
² Natal Witness, 3.4.06. Affidavit in Dimusulu vs. T.R.Bennet.
³ Z.R., p.466.
and Rolela all had murder trials hanging over their heads in addition to trials for rebellion. During Dimmsulu's trial written evidence was produced showing that Cakijana had been promised that the murder charges against him would be dropped provided he gave evidence satisfactory to the Crown. It is significant that Mangati, whose original deposition at the Xkandla magistracy was very damaging to Dimmsulu, toned it down very considerably before the Preliminary Examination and the Special Court Judge. The other voluntary witness, Stuart mentions by name - Kgunguluso - was a police spy! In certain areas, according to at least it was child's play to collect evidence against Dimmsulu. Thus defending himself against the censure of the Attorney General for not having forwarded more evidence, C. F. Hignett stated:

"You will notice that the bulk of the evidence already led has been because the giver 'had a reason' - hatred, fear or to save his own hide if possible. In such places as Xkandla it is child's play to collect evidence, as almost every tribe is split as a result of the rebellion and many give useful evidence through being animated by a spirit of resentment, or, as is common to the Native, with the object of 'favours to come' together with the hope of paying off an odd score or two."

The way in which this operated in the accusations made by rebels against the other loyal chiefs has been traced in the previous

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1 Natal Witness, 13.12.08.
2 See Natal Witness, 7.1.09, Cross-examined by Renaud and compare Times of Natal, 31.1.08.
3 AGO 1/7/62, 3.3.08.
chapter. In Dinusulu's case it is clear also that the most damaging evidence was given by people with a "motive" of one kind or another. That of Daniels and Bambatha's family has already been mentioned. Another very glaring example was Mahayihayi, one of Dinusulu's wives, who had been accused of adultery with the medicine man, Genoe, at the end of 1906. Although she had been acquitted of this charge before the Magistrate's Court, she was violently treated by the other women at the Usuthu and left the kraal incensed against Dinusulu and his other wives. Both before the Magistrate and again at various trials before the Special Court she gave evidence that Dinusulu was directly responsible for Bambatha's rebelling as well as for the murder of Nqandi. She further maintained that she had overheard Dinusulu plan the murders of the magistrate of Nongoma and the C.I.A. The improbabilities and impossibilities in her evidence however were glaring and it was rejected in toto by the Judge President of the Special Court both in the trial of Dinusulu and in the trial of Lokotwayo for the murder of Nqandi.

1 See above, pp. 436-8, 440.

2 See Times of Natal, 10.2.08; Natal Witness, 16.4.09.

3 The Trial of Dinusulu, The Judgement, pp. viii-x, and SC 111/1/8, Rex v. Lokotwayo: The Judgement points out Mahayihayi gave evidence of conversations and transactions she could not have witnessed, having been confined at the time they were supposed to have happened. They were uncorroborated by anyone else.
Far more important however and more interesting than any of the cases cited above was the evidence of Cakijana against Dinusulu. Cakijana it will be remembered was the man whom Dinusulu was supposed originally to have directed to join Bambatha when the latter returned to Natal after his first visit to Zululand in February, 1906.¹ Cakijana's previous history reveals his friction with whites - he spied on the Boer side during the Boer War,² unlike most of Dinusulu's other supporters and, in 1905, was in gaol for cattle raising - was under Chief Natuta in the Vryheid district.³ In Natal he rapidly became Bambatha's chief assistant, and together with Mangati was the most prominent of the rebel leaders. He participated in all the major battles from the time of Bambatha's attack on the Magistrate at KwaZimo Drift on the 3rd April, until the Battle of Home Gorge, when he escaped into Zululand. For nearly two years he was a refugee in Zululand, spending time at the Usuthu. After Dinusulu's arrest he took once more to the bush. Eventually, perhaps fearing arrest at the hands of the military and trial under Martial Law in Zululand, he fled to Natal and handed himself over to Harriette Colenso at

¹ See above, Chapter V, p. 332.
² Col. Col. 98, Statements Samuelson, Evid. Cakijana.
³ SMA 1/1/389/08, Minute, Inspector of Natal Police, 20.1.08.
Bishopstove. Apparently Harriette had constantly sent messages to Zululand in the hopes that they would reach him and induce him to surrender - she realised until he was captured there would be no chance of a general amnesty.¹ She kept him and his companion, Tobela ka Msilikazi, a suspect in the attempted murder of Chief Napoisa, at the house until she had recorded their statements together with R. C. Samuelson and then drove them herself to an astonished Chief of Police.²

Once arrested in Pietermaritzburg, Cakijana and Tobela were immediately moved to Mkandla - which was under Martial Law.³ Although six weeks later Harriette Colenso and R. C. Samuelson managed to obtain a Supreme Court injunction that the Chief of Police show cause why Cakijana should not be returned to Pietermaritzburg gaol, the prisoner then turned round and requested a government appointed lawyer for his defence.⁴ The Crown appointed A. H. Hime, who decided it was not in Cakijana’s interest to return to Pietermaritzburg and he was then moved to Kransekop gaol.⁵

³Cd 179/245/16025, Gov. to Sec. St. 5.5.08.
⁴Natal Witness, 5.4.08, Report on application by C. E. Renaud and R. C. Samuelson and H. E. Colenso to Supreme Court 2.4.08 calling for return of Cakijana to Central Gaol, Piwb.
⁵Cd 179/245/16, Gov. to Sec. St., 9.5.08, no. 1. Cd 4194, no. 7, Gov. to Sec. St. 2.5.08.
In an affidavit before the magistrate of Kranskop - who was presumably chosen by the government because this district though bordering on Zululand was not under Martial Law, Cakijana maintained that when he had given his statement to Samelson he had been instructed to deny the truth - to shield Dimasulu and to deny that he had been to the Usuthu or received his instructions there.¹ He feared that he was going to be used by Dimasulu’s defence team “as soap” to wash away someone else’s “dirt”. The deposition made before the magistrate differed very considerably from that made before Harriette and Samelson.²

From now on his defence was to be very consistently that he had acted throughout on the instructions of Dimasulu.³ In all the cases that followed he turned State Witness - at Dimasulu’s

¹AGO 1/7/68, Evid. Cakijana at Kranskop, 20.5.08.
²Cd 4194, no. 7. Encl. in Gov. to Sec. St., 2.5.08. Cakijana before B. Colenbrander and C. McKenzie. Of the statement of Mlonyoni ka Hbessel, Chief Zinyongo to Mkandla magis. 6.12.07 who stated that he had seen Cakijana at the Usuthu and that Cakijana said that “he himself was disappointed in Dimasulu, that that was Dimasulu who had selected him... to go to Natal and start the rebellion there and now he, Dimasulu was afraid after all this fighting and denied having anything to do with the rebellion... Cakijana even went so far as to express his disgust at Dimasulu’s attitude towards us [and]... said he had a mind to go to the authorities and tell them about Dimasulu’s complicity in the late rebellion.” CO 179/242/1285, Encl. 1 in desp. Secret 22.12.07.
³See e.g. Natal Mercury, 5.11.08, 6.11.08.
Preliminary Examination, at his own trial before the Special Court in October, 1908, in Dimusulu's case before the Special Court, and in the trial of Mayakana and Mjiivi for the murder of Genoe, also before the Special Court. For his part in the rebellion he was sentenced by Sir William Smith to seven years imprisonment with hard labour,¹ in itself a reflection on the different attitudes of the Special Court Judges and the Court Martial judges of Tilonko, who was given ten years and deportation,² for an offence which may well have been dismissed by the Special Court. That Cakijana was informed in advance that he could expect a mitigation of his own sentence by turning State's witness and implicating Dimusulu is clear.³ Within two years he had been granted a pardon on licence and was working once more as a government agent and spy. The following year - 1911 - he was granted a complete pardon.⁴ That his freedom had been held out to him as an inducement was clearly shown by W. P. Schreiner in the course of his cross-examination during Dimusulu's trial. This of course does not necessarily invalidate his evidence. Nevertheless there is little

¹ Natal Witness, 11.11.08, Report of Judgement in Cakijana's case.
² See above, Chapter V, pp. 329; Chapter VI, p. 404
³ AGO 1/7/63, Letterbook, p. 28. W. S. Bigby (Prosecutor) to B. Colenbrander, 15.10.08.
⁴ AGO 1/7/58, Minute A.V. Leslie to Acting Under-Sec., Ministry of Justice, 23.5.1911.
doubt that Cakijana was very shrewd and knew exactly how to fit his evidence to his audience - except perhaps in the case of Sir William Smith. He indeed completely dismissed Cakijana's plea that he had committed all his treasonable actions as well as the murder of Genoe, under compulsion from Dinusulu; an instruction from the Zulu king, according to Cakijana, could only be disobeyed on pain of death. This defence was used similarly in the murder trials of Nsolo and Nkipeni as well as that of Mayatana who was tried for the murder of Genoe and later that of H. M. Stainbank. While Sir William Smith however was to dismiss this plea completely as both "unwarranted by law and not supported by the evidence" in Cakijana's case, in the cases of the other murder culprits, the Judge President of the Special Court in the later cases, Judge Dove-Wilson of Natal, was far less decided. According to him, the orders of Dinusulu was the only motive shown, even though it had not been proven that Dinusulu himself had issued the orders personally.

For the historian the problem is of course more difficult. The judge can decide according to law. The historian has to try

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2 Natal Witness, 20.6.12, 29.6.12, 3.7.12.

3 Natal Witness, 11.11.08, Report of Judgement in Cakijana's case.

4 SC 111/3/8, Rex v. Nkipeni and Nsolo, Judge's Summing Up. See also Natal Witness, 24.4.09 for Rept.
to reconstruct the past. Stuart solved the problem by simply using the evidence as it was given in the depositions before the magistrates. Miss Perrett in her thesis on Dinuzulu's role in the Bambatha rebellion does the same thing. She does not appear to have used the complete proceedings before the Preliminary Examination or the Special Court, or even W. P. Schreiner's summing up for the defence.¹ That she arrives at almost the same conclusions as the Natal government is therefore hardly surprising.

The evidence before the Special Court consisted of 6,148 folio pages; it stood two foot high in the Colonial Office — and as one official remarked "anybody who reads through them will be as well or as ill qualified to revise the Court's decisions as he was before he embarked on the enterprise".² Even reading through the newspaper reports of the various trials is a considerable task; a book could be written about the Dinuzulu trial alone. Despite the great bulk of the evidence accepted by the Special Court, the evidence rejected by it and not entered in the record, is not therefore necessarily invalid as historical source material. Cakijana's evidence at his own trial that he acted under compulsion from Dinuzulu, while rejected on the grounds that it would prejudice Dinuzulu's

¹Dinuzulu and the Bambatha Rebellion, M.A. University of Natal, 1960 (Unpubl.)
²CO 179/252/11628, Minute Lambert 5.4.09.
trial may not have been proven - but in the nature of things it could not be unproven either. Stuart and Miss Perrett can argue in favour of their course of action that the version they follow which is found in the files of the Attorney General and the Native Affairs Department, is the first version, and that by the time of the Special Court trials, people would have had a chance to get cold feet and back out of their original depositions. Nevertheless, as has been indicated, little confidence can be placed in the methods used to obtain the depositions in the first place, so that it can equally be argued that in the freer atmosphere of the Special Court, witnesses may have come nearer the truth. In any event, what is clear is that in a colonial society, where people have very different concepts of justice and even more divided concepts of loyalty, evidence produced has to be handled with the greatest amount of caution. Despite their impressive written form, the records of the trial are oral tradition with more than all the usual pitfalls! In what follows, all that can be attempted is to show the major lines of dispute between the two sides, and to discuss the possibilities.

As the Judge President of the Supreme Court pointed out, the twenty-three charges against Dimusulu can most conveniently be divided

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1 They do not appear however to realise the necessity for defending their choice!
into four groups; counts 4 to 8 and 11, 12, 13 and 15 concerned the visits of Bambatha and other leading rebels to the Usuthu during the disturbances, as well as the harbouring of Bambatha's family; counts 16–18 and 23 concerned the harbouring of rebels at the Usuthu after the cessation of hostilities, while counts 1, 2 and 22 were connected with the collection of guns at the Usuthu.\(^1\) The remaining counts dealt with various isolated acts.

Of the first group, clearly the most important dealt with Bambatha's visit to the Usuthu in March, 1906. The government charge, based on the evidence of Bambatha's wife, Siyekwe, and her two children, was that at the time of Bambatha's defiance of the Greytown magistrate, Dinuzulu seeing a "fit tool" for his plans of rebellion sent one Nqeqeqengqe, his mat carrier, to fetch Bambatha.\(^2\) On his arrival, Dinuzulu was said to have accused Bambatha of cowardice for not fighting the police sent against him on the 9th February and fleeing to Zululand. The following night, in the presence of Bambatha's wife and children, Mankulumana was said to have given Bambatha a gun and cartridges and instructed him to return to Natal together with Nqeqeqengqe and Cakijana (generally referred

\(^1\)The Trial of Dinuzulu on Charges of High Treason, 1908–9, The Judgement, pp. i–viii.

\(^2\)The Trial of Dinuzulu..., Address of Attorney General, p.12; also Stuart, Z.R., p.166.
to at the Usuthu as Sukabakuluma) and start an uprising. He promised him future support. At the same time he was allowed to leave his wife and children at the Usuthu for protection and proof of Dinusulu's support.

This story of Dinusulu actually inciting Bambatha to rebel was dismissed by Sir William Smith as most improbable and based on highly questionable evidence - for there were major inconsistencies not only in the stories told by Siyekiwe and her children between themselves, but also in the stories told by Ndagayake and Kolekile to the magistrates and then before the Special Court. Nevertheless it must be further examined, if only because it is repeated as fact by Stuart, who was responsible for taking down the evidence from Bambatha's family after their escape to the magistracy in July 1907.

Dinusulu's own story was rather different. He maintained that Bambatha had come to the Usuthu in March, looking for a place to live, life having become impossible on the private farm in the Umvoti division where his tribe was. Not having any room, however, he told Bambatha to return to Natal, at the same time sending a message to Sigananda, instructing him to afford protection to Bambatha, should he pass that way. As Bambatha's wife was pregnant

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1 Sir William Smith indeed went so far as to state "If under the circumstances I find to have existed in this case, the prisoner did incite him to rebel, I should be inclined to say that he deserves to be acquitted on the ground of insanity. As it is, I think he is entitled to be acquitted upon the facts." The Trial of Dinusulu, The Judgement, pp. xii, xiii. It is clear however that the Natal Judge, J. C. Boshoff was far less certain and though he reluctantly concurred in Sir William Smith's acquittal on Count 4 it is clear that he was far from satisfied. H. C. Shepstone fully concurred in the judgement. The Trial of
and in no fit state to travel, Dinusulu agreed that she and the children should stay in the hut of his wife Oka Navele to whom they were related. At the same time he took the opportunity of sending Nqgenqgenqge to Natal to find a doctor, Simiti, whom Bambatha had recommended, as he was ill. Nqgenqgenqge was instructed to find another messenger at Gesindaka's hut to accompany him to Natal, as it was customary for two messengers to be sent on an errand.1

On the face of it, this seems a far more likely story; both Nqgenqgenqge and Cakijana maintained that they had gone to find a doctor for Dinusulu, and, in fact, Nqgenqgenqge returned as soon as the fighting broke out, with another doctor, as he did not want to become involved in the rebellion.2 Cakijana's evidence though, as has already been noted more than once, extremely difficult to handle, was, that he was at his father's hut quite by chance, having just returned from a spell of work on the Rand when Bambatha came there to find another messenger.3 As the Judge President remarked,

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3 Trial of Dinusulu, Judge's Summing Up, p.iv.
on small details like this, there would be no reason for Cakijana to be telling a falsehood. Moreover, in several versions of his evidence he maintained that he only became involved in the fighting when Bambatha discovered that Magwababa had been appointed Chief in his place.2

There was a further weakness in the Prosecution argument that Dinusulu had deliberately sent for Bambatha - several witnesses were produced who had shown Bambatha the way to the Usuthu kraal, something which would hardly have been necessary had they been accompanied by an agent of Dinusulu.3

Be this as it may, there is considerable force in Miss Perrett's argument that while Dinusulu may not have sent for Bambatha, once Bambatha arrived at the Usuthu he told Dinusulu of his plans for an uprising, and asked for his support; she feels that Dinusulu in fact promised him support, hoping to use the rebellion for his own ends while maintaining a "loyal" front for government purposes. She maintains that Dinusulu's failure to admit to Sir Charles Saunders, who visited the Usuthu shortly after Bambatha's return to Natal, that Bambatha had been at the Usuthu


2. See above, Chapter V, p. 335-5

3. *The Trial of Dinusulu, Summing Up by W. P. Schreiner*, pp. 60-2,
and had left his family there, was not the action of an "innocent" man.\(^1\) Dinuzulu's own account of his failure to speak out to Sir Charles Saunders was that having heard about Bambatha's attack on the police at Impensa he was afraid, lest he be associated with the rebellion. Moreover he had failed to report Bambatha's presence in the first place, because he had arrived without a pass and he feared Bambatha would get into trouble with the magistrate. All this is possible. A further excuse used was that Bambatha was always referred to by the Usuthu as Magadusela - which may initially have accounted for some confusion as to whom was being talked about.\(^2\) This last excuse does not really sound very plausible. It seems far more likely that Bambatha told Dinuzulu of his troubles with his own magistrate, and the likelihood there was of his being arrested, and that Dinuzulu, with the examples of Natal's handling of other recalcitrant chiefs in February and March, 1906, very vividly before him, decided not to hand Bambatha over to the government's not so tender mercies. It is not necessary to infer from this that Bambatha at this stage announced any intention of starting an uprising in Natal - although he may have done so, again without Dinuzulu necessarily committing himself. In general, Dinuzulu's

\(^1\) E. Perrett, Dinuzulu and the Bambata Rebellion, pp. 76-79.

utterances at this time seem to show fully that he realised the
tolly of opposing the white man by force of arms. Indeed the
very Sigananda whom he was supposed to have incited to rebel chided
Dinuulu for cowardice for refusing to do so, and for having paid
the Poll Tax. If one does conclude that Dinuulu knew of Bambatha's intentions and failed to try to prevent him from rebelling
for his own political purposes, one implies a cynicism and dis­
regard of human life on his part, which do not seem to be borne out
by his other actions. Moreover had he known of Bambatha's plans
beforehand, it seems odd that he should have allowed his family
to remain at the Usuthu where they would bring down suspicion on
his head - and indeed Ng Longengengge said that when he brought back
the news of Bambatha's attack on the police, Dinuulu immediately
tried to send Siyekiwe and the children to Cakijana's father,
Gesindaka, who, however, refused to take them. To have sent two
men from the Usuthu with Bambatha was also a foolhardy act if he
intended using Bambatha as his instrument.

All three members of Bambatha's family maintained that Bambatha
left the Usuthu with a gun and cartridges wrapped in a white rag,

1 Cf "The Present Situation in South Africa", Report by Director Hams
in Empangweni and Missionary C. W. Dedekind in Nasareth. Hermannsburg
Missionsblatt, no. 5, 1906. ‘I am in the position of relating a word
of him. I can vouch for. A Christian African asked him [Dinuulu]
whether he has been gathering all the Blacks in order to wage war
on the Whites. Whereupon Dinuulu has answered ‘Not very likely;
they would exile me to St. Helena and you would stay here and
feed yourselves with beer.'

2 See above, Chapter V, p. 341.
of the gun at the Usuthu varied as between the evidence of Siyake and her children, although they were supposed to be together at the time; and their description of the cartridges was also inconsistent. Dinusulu himself maintained that Nqgenqgenqge reported back to him that Bambatha said that he had been given a gun at the Usuthu, but that he thought that the guns had been acquired at Gesindaka's. All the evidence on this score was too unreliable to prove that Bambatha had been given a gun on Dinusulu's authority; it is conceivable that he had in fact brought his own gun to the Usuthu which was the one seen by the children and Nqgenqgenqge, and used against the magistrate and police at Keate's Drift and Impansa. On both those occasions more firearms were captured by the rebels.

Count thirteen of Dinusulu's charge sheet alleged that between March and May he conspired with Sigananda, Cakijana, Mangati, Bambatha, and Mehlokazulu and incited them to rebellion, and this charge has to be considered together with the charges that he harboured various rebels during the course of the disturbances, including Mangati, Cakijana and Bambatha. Dinusulu's message to Sigananda instructing him to "look out" for Bambatha has already

3 See Reports, Natal Witness, 27.11.08, 1.12.08.

2 The Trial of Dinusulu, The Judgement, pp. vi ff.

been noted, as well as the different interpretations put upon it by the government and the defence. To the Judge President of the Special Court at any rate, the refusal of the Cube people to allow Dinusulu's envoy to see Sigananda when he went on his errand of peace-making was only explicable in terms of their knowledge that Mankulumana was against the rebellion and would chide them for using Dinusulu's name in their rebellion.¹

The government however maintained either that Mankulumana carried also some secret message which warned Sigananda to keep out of the way, or that one of the three men accompanying him did the same.² The Special Court did not, however, accept this, contradicted as it was by both Mankulumana himself, Lusizi (one of Dinusulu's men who accompanied him, and later was witness for the Prosecution),³ and indeed by Sir Charles Saunders who was very grateful to Mankulumana at the time for dampening down the rebellion.

The visits of a number of the rebel leaders to find out Dinusulu's intentions during the disturbances are rather better authenticated. The problem here however is still to decide on what happened at their various interviews. The first of these visitors was

¹The Trial of Dinusuulu, The Judgement, p.viii.
²I. Perrett, pp. 105-106.
³The Trial of Dinusuulu, The Judgement, p.viii.
Cakijana who apparently returned to the Usuthu shortly after the Impanza fight to find out whether Dinuzulu's aid was going to materialise. Cakijana reported back that he had not found the doctor, and that fighting had broken out in Natal. According to Cakijana, Dinuzulu's initial response was one of anger that he had remained behind in Natal and not returned to Mgengengengwe. After being questioned by Mankulumana though, he reported what had happened in Natal, and was finally promised future aid. He stayed at the Usuthu for two nights, and was given food and drink. Dinuzulu admitted that he saw Cakijana but maintained that he simply reprimanded him for not returning to Usuthu immediately fighting broke out in Natal. It is not clear why Dinuzulu should have been angry if he had been behind Bambatha all the time - after all, the rebels had been successful so far in their encounters with the magistrate and the police and had augmented their gun supply. The length of Cakijana's stay was not corroborated by anyone with the exception of Mahayihayi, Dinuzulu's wife, whose unreliability has already been commented upon. Cakijana's stay at the Usuthu may also possibly be explained by his relationship to one of Dinusulu's wives, Oka Maweli.

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1 Natal Witness, 7.11.08, Evidence Cakijana, and 16.12.08, cross-examined by Schreiner.

2 Ibid.

3 The Trial of Dinusulu, pp. vii-viii. The point was made by Sir William Smith.

Shortly after the burning of Cetshwayo's grave by the troops, Dinuzulu was visited by a couple of members of Sigananda's tribe, who came to report the episode to him. Not surprisingly, Dinuzulu made no effort to hand them over to the government as rebels. More important, however, was the visit of Mangati and Bambatha together with two others, also soon after the burning of the grave. By this time Mangati had joined Bambatha and Cakijana as one of the most important rebel leaders. Stuart maintains that on this occasion, Bambatha and Mangati were both shown into Dinuzulu's presence, and the Chief told them

"If you people want to fight, do so. It is not my doing. Go and join Mehlokamulu. I hear he has also joined the rebels. After joining him, go and join Sigananda and go on fighting until you reach Natal... I tell you now go and join Mehlokamulu and do what he tells you."²

While it is perfectly true that this represents the first version of Mangati's evidence given before the magistrate of Nkandla after his capture at the end of November, in his evidence both at Dinuzulu's Preliminary Examination and again before the Special Court, he withdrew the second part of it.³ There he stated that Dinuzulu's reaction was one of extreme anger that the rebels should have made

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¹ AGO 1/7/53, Dinuzulu to Harriette Colenso, 2.6.06.
³ See amendments made in gaol to Statements by Mangati, Times of Natal, 31.1.08; Natal Witness, 7.1.09.
use of his name and tried to implicate him in their uprising.

When Mangati asked him where the impi they had been promised by him was, Dinusulu denied all knowledge of the impi, and pointed out that the Zulu War, which took place when his people had been far stronger and more united, had revealed the uselessness of this method of opposition to the white man. Dinusulu ordered them from the Usuthu, but they begged to be allowed to stay as they were weary and had no horses. Finally this was allowed.¹ As the Judge President pointed out in his summing up, a curious feature of Mangati's evidence was that though Bambatha was present at this interview, and a prime object of Mangati's was to find out whether Bambatha's allegations that the impi was Dinusulu's was true, Bambatha made no contribution to the conversation.² His only comments were that Sigananda had destroyed their impi through bad generalship. While the Judge President felt that this threw doubt on Mangati's other evidence, it can be argued that if Dinusulu already knew about the disturbances, as Mangati's first evidence implied, there would be no need for Bambatha to defend his actions.³ Thus Stuart's view could be correct, and it may

¹Natal Witness, 7.1.09. Mangati, cross examined by C. Henaud.
²The Trial of Dinusulu, p.ix.
³Ibid.
be that Mangati's words in the moment of bitterness when he was captured and when he felt particularly angry at Dinusulu's failure to support the rebels adequately were nearer the truth than his statement later, when he had time to reconsider the implications of his attack on the Chief. That he had little time for Dinusulu in November, 1907 was indicated by his remark: "Dinusulu is nothing but a drunkard. He is ruining himself, his family and his people by drinking grog." Nevertheless, it may be that by the time of the Preliminary Examination, his patriotism and loyalty to Dinusulu as king rather than as person, overcame his initial outspokenness. Even on that occasion however he remarked: "My feelings against Dinusulu are very strong because I consider I have been reduced to my present condition by Dinusulu." On the other hand, even the words quoted by Stuart cannot be taken too far. It is possible that the burning of Cetshwayo's grave— and the way in which it was reported to him— disinclined Dinusulu to take a very firm line at that moment with the rebels; still he dissociated himself from the rebellion, and his advice that Bambatha and Mangati join Makholasulu who was already known to be in the bush and fearful of the troop movements in his area,

1 Cd 3886, no. 95, Encl. 4. Statement Mangati, 23.11.07. Report also in Times of Natal, 31.1.08. "Grog" is probably a translation of "ugologo" which is better rendered as "whiskey".

2 Natal Witness, 7.1.09.
was hardly military intelligence of the highest order. Bambatha and Mangati had already "joined" Sigananda and indeed Dinusulu was really saying - this is all your own doing; join those who have decided to rebel - don't draw me into it. Mangati maintained at the Special Court that he knew when he left the Usuthu that Dinusulu was not behind the rebellion, although that did not deter him from rejoining the impi and telling them that they had Dinusulu's backing.¹

There is little or no evidence that Mehlokazulu was prompted into the course he took by secret messages from Dinusulu. The circumstances surrounding his rebelling have been traced in some detail.² At the time both the Commissioner for Native Affairs and the magistrate of Nqutu were quite adamant that the rebels in that area did not associate the rebellion with Dinusulu.³ One report - probably just hearsay - was that Mehlokazulu refused to contact Dinusulu though this course was suggested by the magistrate, who hoped that Dinusulu would be able to deter him from rebelling. Mehlokazulu did not want to be accused yet again of bringing trouble on the Royal House as he had at the time of the Zulu War.

¹Natal Witness, 7.1.09. Cross examined by Renaud.
²See above, Chapter V, pp. 345-6, 351-3.
³Co 179/235/24596, Encl in desp. Secret 121, 16.6.06 (Cd 3027,p.90).
⁴Col. Col. 93, Mamkulumana and Ngwaqo, Prosecution, p.83, Evid. Magadisa ka Camela.
The remaining charges against Dinuzulu can perhaps be disposed of more easily. The allegations that he had collected firearms intending thereby to promote rebellion was regarded as completely unproven by the Special Court. It certainly is true that Dinuzulu had a considerable number of guns at the Usuthu, some of his own personal possession; others left there by members of the Nkomindala after the Boer War. According to the magistrate of Nongoma he had never been asked to give up his guns at the end of the Boer War. Nevertheless there was no evidence at all that Dinuzulu actually contemplated using these guns against the government, and the Special Court Judge was quite categorical upon this point. On the other hand, the charges of Dinuzulu's complicity in the Zululand murders of 1906-7 were not tried before the Special Court, and as the Judge President himself remarked, though evidence was led that the gun which was supposed to have been used to kill Sitshishili was found among the guns hidden by his attendant Lusizi at the time of Dinuzulu's arrest, it was not discussed. Similarly it was alleged that the gun which was used to kill Stainbank was also traced back to the Usuthu.

1SC ill/3/7, p. 5732 ff et passim, e.g. Evid. Lusizi.
2The Trial of Dinuzulu, The Judgement, p.xix.
3Idem.
4SC ill/3/7, p. 5732 ff et passim. Record of Dinuzulu's trial.
Again Sir William Smith maintained that there was no evidence to show that Dinuzulu knew of its presence at the Usuthu. It certainly seems possible that in their searching out of guns the troops found a number which did not belong to Dinuzulu personally but were in the possession of various members of his tribe, and hidden at the same time. It was however an allegation of the Prosecution at the time of the first trial for Stainbank's murder, that the weapon had come from the Usuthu and it was alleged that Dinuzulu had sent Hpeta to find the empty cartridges after the murder lest they incriminate him. On the other hand, the man eventually tried and found guilty for this murder, Mayatana, was according to Dinuzulu, on bad terms with him, as he had stolen one of the Chief's guns and hides during his visit to Pietermartizburg and was later found hawking guns at the Usuthu, including the stolen ones. On the face of it, Sir William Smith's remark that had Dinuzulu known of its existence, he would surely have seen

1 Trial of Dinuzulu, p.

2 CO 179/240/9666, Encl. in desp. Secret 1 of 20.2.07, Attorney General (Natal) to Min. of Justice (Natal) Extract Cd 3999.
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Mayatana admitted to having killed Gonce but not Stainbank; it is possible that in the Stainbank trial in 1912 Sir William Smith would have assessed the evidence rather differently. It is interesting that Mayatana like Cakijana was employed as a police spy in 1903: Mayatana indeed was used to try and track down Cakijana apparently - and there were reports that Cakijana was used to look for the Stainbank murderer! Evid. Mtakala, Natal Witness, 7.4.09.

that the gun used for the Sitshitembi murder was destroyed between 3rd December when he was summoned to Nongoma and 9th December, when he eventually surrendered, seems to make very good sense.¹

Several counts in Dinuzulu's indictment charged him with sheltering rebels after the rebellion with hostile intent. Undoubtedly, the number of rebels who sought shelter at the Usuthu after the cessation of hostilities was large. The government interpreted this as a directly hostile action against the government, calculated to build up Dinuzulu's power against that of the government and with plans for further rebellion. Dinuzulu's own explanation, however, especially when taken together with his letter to Harriette Colenso cited below,² deserves serious consideration. From his point of view, these were "his father's dogs" whom he simply could not hand over for punishment and revenge.³ In granting sanctuary to "his father's people" Dinuzulu was clearly torn in two

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¹ The Trial of Dinuzulu, The Judgement, p.xix.
² See p. 490
³ Dinuzulu, cross examined by T. F. Carter, Natal Witness, 30.1.09.
directions, represented in fact by opposing factions within his own entourage. From the evidence both before and at his trial, it would appear that initially his induna, and especially Mankulumana, tried their best to discourage people from coming to the Usuthu, largely through their fear of the consequences. Several witnesses testified to their having been turned away by Mankulumana, who accused them of endangering the Child.\(^1\)

As the pressure became greater, however, the policy became more vacillating, probably in response to those who felt in sympathy with the rebels, and averse to simply abandoning them. Thus several witnesses maintained that there was a profound split between Dinuzulu's two chief induna, Mgwaqo and Mankulumana, on this score. Some even maintained that Mankulumana was so disgusted with what was going on at the Usuthu towards the end of 1907 that he wanted to leave. Mangata suggested he might even be poisoned because he was accused of siding with the White Man.\(^2\) That this was clearly nonsense was shown by Mankulumana's quite outstanding loyalty to Dinuzulu both during his trial and subsequently, when, although it meant never returning to Natal, Mankulumana joined Dinuzulu in exile, and to the last maintained his innocence.\(^3\) It may well have been the pressure of those members

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\(^1\)See e.g. CO 179/241/3376, Encl. 2 in desp. Conf. 29.8.07, Report no.3. CO 179/241/33248, Encl. 4 in desp. Seer. 27.9.07, Statement Mkokobi ka Gamandi to C.N.A. CO 179/244/5062, Encl. in desp. Seer. 5.11.08, Evid. Mankokewana ka Bedja, also reported Times of Natal, 24.1.08. Also evid. Langalibomvu, Natal Witness, 6.1.09, Evid. Mazauwumela, before C. McKenzie 11.4.08, reported Times of Natal, 13.5.08.

\(^2\)CO 179/242/4454, Encl. 4, desp. Secret 30.11.07, Evid. Mangati.

\(^3\)SHA 1/1/464\(^\frac{161}{10}\) Minutes A.J. Shepstone, S.N.A. 23.5.10 and 28.6.10.
of the Usuthu who had been restrained with difficulty during the actual disturbances as well as Dinuzulu's own very real consciousness of what his responsibilities to his people were, that determined the attitude eventually taken up towards the rebels, although it was also said at the end of 1907 that many of Dinuzulu's followers were bitter about the way in which the rebels had got their chief into trouble.

That Dinuzulu should have felt reluctant to hand over these people to the government is only too understandable in the light of the mood of revenge which permeated Natal society through 1907. As late as May, 1907, death sentences were passed on seven of the nineteen Africans accused of participating in the murder of the postal official Veal, whose body had been used for purposes of doctoring for war during the Mapumulo phase of the disturbances.¹

No amnesty had been declared, and in that month, Harriette Colenso wrote a letter — which was to become notorious — to Dinuzulu advising him to hand over the minor participants in the rebellion but to advise the leading rebels to "take a long leap" out of Zululand if they wanted to be safe.² While she attempted to put an innocuous gloss on these words later,³ when the Natal government

¹ CO 179/241/18285, Gov. to Sec. St., tel 1, 23.5.07. Winston Churchill called the sentences "further disgusting butchery".

² See Natal Witness, 14.5.08, in which it is cited as evidence in case of H. E. Colenso vs. Attorney General.

³ Natal Witness, 21.5.08, Report of above case.
quoted them in an attempt to prove just what a dangerous woman she was, they probably meant what they said - and she was probably right. That Mangati and Cakijana in the end only got terms of imprisonment - and terms as short as they did - is only to be explained by the fact that they were tried by Sir William Smith and the Special Court, and not by an ordinary Natal court.

In June, 1907 Dinusulu was to write "confidentially" to "his aunt" on the matter, after his visit to the Governor had led him to believe the net was closing in on him:

"If a person should know of these people who were in the bush; if he were in a position to catch them, in what manner should he bring them up in such a way as might best serve them in order that they should not be burnt up in affliction."

These are not the words of a man harbouring rebels with a set purpose. There must moreover have seemed something odious to Dinusulu in acting as Government informant and policeman. As the Losi proverb has it "A Chief is not a Policeman." Hanksuluma stated it slightly differently when he remarked that he had always wanted a proper government enquiry into the allegations against Dinusulu, because he did not want his Chief to become "an informer" and so turn all the people against him. Dinusulu himself very neatly put it when

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1 AGO 1/7/53, 22.5.07, transl. by O. Oxland.


3 Natal Witness, 4.2.09.
cross-examined at his trial; he stated that he was following the Zulu custom of leaving a conquered people alone, in the hope that they would settle down and become the people of the chief on whose land they had found refuge...."It was distasteful for me to go catching people.... I should have raised bad feeling amongst my people". While it is true that this action can be construed - as it is by Miss Perrett - as sheer self-seeking, a political manoeuvre on Dimasulu's part to build up his dwindling power - Dimasulu himself was fully aware of the dangers he was running by following this course. The official view lacks an appreciation of the degree to which a chief was, and had to be, influenced by the views of his tribe and the duties and obligations he owed them. Torn between his desire to avoid conflict with the government and his desire to do his duty to his people, in the end Dimasulu was to get the worst of both worlds. On the one hand he was accused of treason by the government, on the other he was, to some extent, accused of betrayal by the rebels themselves, who felt that he had failed them in 1906 and that he should have led a new uprising in 1907. The incompatibility of the picture held

1Natal Witness. 30.1.09.

2See above, Chapters I and VI for a discussion of the ambivalent position of chiefs in Natal and Natal government attitude to them. See also M. Gluckman, "The Kingdom of the Zulu", pp. 43–4 in African Political Systems, ed. M. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard.

3See e.g. Statement Mongeni ka Mbeso to Nxandla magis. Encl.1 in desp. Secret 22.12.07, cited above, p. 481 footnote 2.
by the African people of Dimusulu ka Cetshwayo, scion of Shaka, King of the Zulu, and father of his people, and the attempt of the government to reduce him to a petty chieftain, a servile government "boy", must, almost inevitably have led Dimusulu in the path he took. It is not difficult to see why his actions in these years betray Hamlet-like qualities of indecision, and that on many occasions he was to take refuge in procrastination and excuses of illness that were only half-feigned.

Even before the disturbances, the magistrate of Hongoma was to note the odd quality of Dimusulu's actions - how on the one hand he would render him extremely valuable aid carrying out various government instructions and laws

"and yet again I have had reason to be bitterly disapperointed at his apparent neglect or dilatoriness ...
... any such neglect has been brought to the attention of the Government, but has not so far resulted in any investigation in... which ... he might have satisfactorily explained his seeming neglect or apathy." 2

Here again, the explanation seems to lie in the conflicting demands made of Dimusulu by Government and people, a conflict which the Natal Government, with its demands for absolute and implicit obedience was incapable of recognising, let alone resolving.

1The phrase "Zulu Hamlet" is Stuart's - Z.R., p.109.
2 P.M.C. 10565, G.W. Armstrong to G.W.A. Eshowe, 6.4.07.
Behind Dimusulu’s actions during the disturbances, then, there is this same split and undecided quality. It was therefore possible for the defence to contend that had Dimusulu thrown his weight behind the rebels, the disturbances would have been far more widespread and far more serious than in fact they were. Dimusulu not only restrained his own immediate followers and forced them to pay the Poll Tax with almost indecent haste (paying the tax had apparently been made the precondition of the tribe’s being allowed to attend the wedding of Chief Haboko’s daughter in the Vryheid division); according to the Commissioner for Native Affairs Mankulumana rendered him valuable aid on several occasions. It was he it will be remembered who went as a messenger to Sigannanda’s people in the Mzandla forests. He also stopped the people on the Upper Umfolosi from joining the rebels, even handing over Chief Bejana to the authorities for rebellion. Similarly during the disturbances, Dimusulu handed his uncle Sukana, a small chief in the Eshowe district, to the magistracy from which he had fled on being summoned to give evidence against a member of his tribe

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1Sir William Smith felt this was "unequivocally" true. The Trial of Dimusulu, The Judgement, p.xii.
2Ibid., p.vi.
3SMA 1/6/29, Memo. C.M.A. 6.4.08, pp. 15-16.
who was said to have been inciting his people to rebellion.¹

The magistrate of Kranékop reported that Hlangabesa and Gayede had completely changed their attitude on hearing that Dinusulu did not back the rebels.² Many witnesses before the Special Court maintained that but for Dinusulu "they would have died" - that is joined the rebels. The closest of Dinusulu's followers, in the Vryheid district, did not join the rebels either, although there were many rumours at the end of 1907 that they had been summoned to help Dinusulu resist arrest.³ The Special Court even rejected these allegations that Dinusulu had tried to seduce Maboko and Matutsa from their allegiance to the government, although a Natal judge earlier in 1906 had found a Vryheid chief, Tahibela, and the most prominent member of his Nafu people, Mabekëtshiya, who was Dinusulu's cousin, guilty of sending armed men to Dinusulu with the purpose of defying the government.⁴ Wherever then Dinusulu had direct and strong authority it can be argued that he used it in favour of restraint.

¹CO 179/235/24596, Encl. 2, desp. 121 of 16.6.06 (Cd 3027, p.91).
²GH 798/282, Synopsis of wires, 27.4.06, see above, Chapter V.
³See above, p. 444
⁴Report in Times of Natal, 13.7.06. According to the Times of Natal a marked feature of this trial was the attempt by the Prosecution to prove the unreliability of their own witnesses. "Several of the witnesses showed such evidences of terror when in the Box that the Bench had to get the interpreter to reassure them."
On the other hand, it has been argued by Stuart and Miss Perrett that this was simply part of Dinusulu's plot to mislead the government.\(^1\) Obviously if he wanted to avoid being implicated in the rebellion, whilst still using it for his own political purposes, this was the only course to follow. Behind this facade he could secretly encourage the rebels and refrain from actively stopping them. Thus Miss Perrett even maintains that Dinusulu's advice to the various Natal chiefs that he had paid the tax, and that their paying of it was their own affair, was also evidence of this: had he said firmly - "you must pay the tax", all the chiefs would forthwith have paid it.\(^2\) This sounds plausible, except that she singles out as the chiefs to whom Dinusulu was supposed to have given this instruction all those who later ran foul of the Natal government. But there were many others who at the time of Dinusulu's trial maintained they had been told the same thing - and that this was what prevented them from rebelling.\(^3\)

It is true that Dinusulu had little reason to feel any great confidence in the Natal government. He had often been told not to interfere in the affairs of tribes outside of his own jurisdiction. He felt many grievances against the officials of Zululand

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\(^2\) Perrett, p.45.

and remarked that he even felt alienated from Sir Charles Saunders because of the latter's attitude towards him during the Boer War.  

In 1903 and 1905 he complained to Harriette Colenso that all his requests were refused by the government, and that all his father's property had been "eaten up" by the government. He was then referring to part of Cetshwayo's cattle which had been seized with the Buthelesi; the government refused to entertain a demand for their return, not unjustifiably feeling this would open the way to endless lawsuits for the return of Cetshwayo's cattle which had been similarly placed all over the country.  

There were numerous other similar grievances, many of them pin-pricks, but still enough to make Dinusulu complain at the end of 1907, that there was no other chief in Natal or Zululand with whom he had been made an equal who was treated with the degree of suspicion he was.  

Thus it may well be true that when the rebels came to him in the course of 1906 he knew perfectly what they were up to - and that strictly speaking he should have arrested them and handed them over to the magistrate, but he turned a blind eye on all these

1 Col. Col. 103, Remarks by Dinusulu at Greytown to H. E. Colenso.

2 AGO 1/7/53, 4.6.03 and 22.4.05. transl. T. A. Jackson. SHA 1/1/320^15946 05  
Dinusulu to G.N.A., 7.4.05. Saunders to Dinusulu, 20.4.05. Minute Attorney General, 8.5.05.

3 see e.g. AGO 1/7/78, F.15. G. W. Armstrong (magis.) to Dinusulu 21.11.05.  
Dinusulu to Armstrong 22.11.05. AGO 1/7/53, Dinusulu to H. E. Colenso, 27.10.02.

4 AGO 1/7/62 to H. E. Colenso 10.10.07, transl. T. A. Jackson.
goings on. It had nothing to do with him. They could "fight their own fight" - and that was all. By controlling his immediate followers he had done his duty, both to the government and to them, by saving them from unnecessary bloodshed. If the rebels were going to fight anyway - he would point out their folly, but do nothing more active than that. It may be that the various acts of terrorism and the murders were regarded in a similar light.

At the beginning of 1906 Dinusulu himself handed over Mpoqe and Lokotwayo, for trial for the murders of Tahigana and Mnqandi. The murders happened within his district and the suspects were immediate members of his entourage. Stainbank was murdered in the Mahlabatini district. Even if he knew who the murderer was, there was no immediate reason for him to act if he did not want to. (Dinusulu may simply not have known who the murderer was - and he was not going to try to find out either). The extraordinary difficulty the Crown had in acquiring evidence in this case was accounted for by the Government at the time by the fact of Dinusulu's complicity, although such an explanation is not entirely necessary. For most of the tribesmen in the area, Stainbank's murder on the 6th May, 1906 probably came as a relief. He was extremely unpopular in the division, not only because of his slaughter

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\[CO 179/235/22649 (Cd 3027, p.65), O.H.A. to P.M. 29.5.06, no.164, minute on tel. from magis. Nongoma.\]
of infected cattle during the outbreak of East Coast fever, but also because he was extremely highhanded and rude to the leading chiefs of the area.\(^1\) In April, 1906, the Commissioner for Native Affairs had actually recommended his transfer for this reason.\(^2\) Not only did the people of Mahlabatini not want to become involved in the processes of an alien law – they also sympathised entirely with whoever it was who killed the magistrate. Eventually, as has been mentioned, the murder was pinned on Kayatana, and once again the defence was that he had been ordered to commit the crime by Dinusulu. This was about the fourth or fifth trial for this particular murder.

The other murder cases in Zululand in 1907 have already been dealt with; it seems unlikely that Dinusulu personally hatched the plots, or was party to them. There is really little evidence to suggest that he was – the Natal government for all their trying, were simply unable to gather the evidence on this score. It was the allegation of the Natal Government, the loyal chiefs and both Stuart and Perrett, however, that through these acts Dinusulu was trying to terrorise Africans into his support. At that game he must have found it hard to compete with McKenzie and the Natal armed forces after the Battle of Home Gorge. Not

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\(^1\)SHAF 1/4/20 022\(^{22}\) 09, Report C. G. Jackson on Stainbank Murder, 26.3.09.

\(^2\)ZA.28, Papers relating to the Zulu Rebellion, C.H.A. to Attorney General, 1.2.07.

\(^3\)Stuart, Z.R., p.484. Perrett, p.175.
for nothing was McKenzie called Shaka by the Africans. The way
in which Africans feared making their support of Dinusulu known
was to some extent revealed by the large number of representatives
in the Northern districts who alluded before the Natal Native
Affairs Commission to their need for a representative and spokesman.
On being asked who this spokesman was, one Somcuba remarked:

"We are rather afraid of answering that question and
saying who it is that I have in mind. To mention his
name would be to be arrested and made a prisoner.
I refer to the Governor, but the Governor represents
the Queen and the Queen reigns over all the white people
as well as ourselves. The whole Zulu nation are un-
animous as to the need of some person to voice their
feelings."1

Miss Perrett indeed sees these remarks, as well as Dinusulu's re-
marks to the Governor in May 1907, as evidence that he was trying
to manoeuvre his way back to a Paramount position, under the aegis
of the Imperial Government.2 Thus she claims the known disagree-
ment between Natal and the Imperial Government was a factor in Dinu-
sulu's handling of affairs and as support for her thesis that Dimus-
ulu "used" the rebellion to this end. He hoped to show in 1907

1See above, Chapter V, p. 297.

2N.N.A.C. Evid. p.744. For a justification of Somcuba's fears see Gov.'s
interview with Nyyaisa, pp. 57-8, Encl. in desp. 86, GO 179/241/23107,
5.6.07 when the Gov. warned Nyyaisa that if he were not himself leaving
Natal, he would depose Nyyaisa and break up his people, putting someone
in charge of the remnant "who did not recognise Dinusulu" (my italics).

that while the Natal Government were unable to control the situation in Zululand, he, Dinusulu could. He hoped the Imperial Government would regain control of Zululand and that he would be returned to the position of King as his father had been. This may be so; though there is something rather touching in the straightforward way in which Dinusulu asked the Governor to grant the African people a spokesman and representative. Moreover Dinusulu's own papers reveal very little of this attempt to be restored as Paramount Chief under the aegis of the Imperial Government. He had after all, little reason to feel that Imperial rule would have been much of an improvement over that of Natal; his own experience of it had been far from happy. His concept of himself as intermediary between the government and the Zulu people, while perhaps a trifle naive in the circumstances of Natal, was surely a considerable advance on the only schemes which the Natal government could propose on the recommendation of the Natal Native Affairs Commission that Africans be given some way of voicing their grievances and that their government become more personal. Schreiner viewed Dinusulu's interview before the Governor in rather a different light to that

1 See above, p. 439-440
2 See above, Chapter II.
3 See below, Chapter IX., p. 588
adopted by Miss Perrett. He maintained that here was a man yearning to be taken into the confidence of the Government, to be trusted and given greater scope for his energies. He felt Dinusulu could hardly be blamed for hoping that he could be incorporated into the framework of African administration in a rather more constructive way than hitherto, and for hoping that the rebellion might have caused some change of heart amongst his white rulers.

Dinusulu was not the stuff of which martyrs - or heroes - are made. He was grossly overweight and physically ill. He drank too much. Nevertheless his remaining letters show a man of considerable stature. His words to the Government at the outset of the disturbances after the murder of the two policemen:

"It would be well for the Government to call those subjects of theirs who have killed the white men and not call out an army, for I say it is just an accident...... Let them call those men peaceably and try the case, because if the Government uses force and calls an army, the country will be upset...... startled, for I hear they are pained by this Poll Tax and even those who pay it, do not like it....."  

were sound - as well as brave for a man in his position. His words to the Governor in May of 1907, his letter to Harriette Colenso in June of that year, his sympathy and understanding for

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1 The Trial of Dinusulu..., p.56.
2 ACO 1/7/53, Dinusulu to H. E. Colenso, Encl. copy 2.6.06.
the young Congress movement, do not entirely fit in with the picture which the Natal government painted of him in 1907-8.

Nevertheless ultimately, from their point of view, the Natal government was right. Within their concept of a white Natal, narrow, closed, privileged, there was no room for Dinusulu. They showed this long before the trial was over. Their refusal to pay his salary was after all not dependent on his guilt before a court of law. As W. P. Schreiner pointed out, Dinusulu's was a great political trial "to achieve in the long run a certain long desired result which it has been determined at any cost and at any risk shall be achieved."\(^1\) The Natal Government and even Sir Charles Saunders had "always" known that the return of Dinusulu "could never work". Saunders indeed confessed that he had never understood Sir Marshal Clarke's "settlement".\(^2\) James Kirkman, M.L.A., who wrote to the Prime Minister at the beginning of December 1907, suggesting that Dinusulu should be removed without trial, for the entire conflict between Dinusulu and the government was political,\(^3\) was speaking more truly than he perhaps

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\(^1\) The Trial of Dinusulu..., p.48. See also remarks of G. A. de R. Labistour to C.M.A., 11.2.07 in SHA 1/6/29. "There are people who will not be satisfied until he is turned out of the country and that must happen sooner or later... This is purely a political matter and the government have quite enough before them to act."

\(^2\) See above, Chapter II, p. 133.

\(^3\) 104297 07, 3.12.07.
realised. The long treason trial in the case of Dinusulu was evidence ultimately of the weakness of Natal's white population and especially of its government, which could not face the storm which would undoubtedly have arisen both in South Africa and in Britain had Dinusulu simply been deposed by administrative action, as his uncle Sukana or his follower Bejana had been. Perhaps too it revealed the semi-mystical belief in the processes of the law which white South Africans still have.¹

Yet in the final analysis it was really immaterial whether Dinusulu had handed Bambatha a gun; whether he had incited Mangati, Cakijana and the rest to revolt; whether he had been responsible for the murders of three medicine men, two chiefs and a magistrate - or not. After all Cakijana, who by his own testimony had carried out one of these murders and was directly implicated in the planning of all the others - whether with or without Dinusulu's connivance - was reprieved after but two years of his seven year sentence had elapsed and granted a free pardon. Cakijana, the lieutenant of Bambatha who had fought at Keate's Drift and Npansa, Home Gorge and Cetshwayo's grave - Cakijana could be converted into a police spy. Whatever Dinusulu did - whether he handed over rebels or paid the Poll Tax - in his last account was irrelevant. From the

¹See e.g. J. Lewin, Politics and Law in S. Africa (London, 1963) Chapter 4, Power, Law and Race Relations.
point of view of the Natal government as well as of the Zulu people, he was the son of Cetshwayo. He was the embodiment of Zulu national pride and sentiment. Innumerable phrases used before the Natal Native Affairs Commission and elsewhere come to mind; he is our "husband" to whom we are married; he is the "egg" whom Cetshwayo left behind; he is the "high tree on which all the birds feed and congregate". Without him, the Zulu people would be like "coolies" as one spy report put it. And from the point of view of white Natal, and especially that part of it with interests in the sugar plantations, wattle fields, mining concerns and expanding white population of the delimited areas, Dinuzulu and his followers had to be destroyed.

From that point of view, even though the Natal Minister of Justice felt that Sir William Smith's sentence erred grossly on the side of forgiveness and generosity, his sentence was a triumph for the Natal government. Although he was found guilty only on the counts of harbouring Bambatha's family, sheltering Mangati and Bambatha during the disturbances and sheltering rebels afterwards,
he was deposed from his position as Chief and sentenced to four
years' imprisonment from the time of his arrest and a fine of
£100 or 12 months. One of the first acts of the Union government
was to release Dinusulu, although he was to be exiled for the
rest of his life from Zululand and Natal. On his lonely farm
near Middelburg in the Transvaal, with but Mankulumana for com-
panionship and sixteen oxen, three milch cows, a cart and a plough,¹
it availed him little that his "friend" Louis Botha,² Prime
Minister of the newly formed Union government, saw fit to grant
him his freedom and an allowance of £500 a year. He was indeed
a man "of rank without followers". But three years later, he
died a comparatively young man, presumably of rheumatic gout and
Bright's disease – though Mankulumana said it was of a broken heart.³

¹Col. Col. 140/Vol. III, H. E. Colenso to W. F. Schreiner, 8.4.1911.

²Col. Col. Corresp. 133. L. Botha to H. E. C. n.d. Telegram proposes
an amnesty because he is "a friend of Dinusulu".

³See Mankulumana's oration at Dinusulu's funeral, Fryheid 31.10.1913.
Cutting (no heading) found Nathan MSS 182, p.48. D. Reits: No
"Discontent and rebellion are only the natural consequences resulting from education aided by missionary influence. The education of the native cannot be retarded though it may to some extent be controlled and directed into the proper channels. Missionary influence tends to inculcate an equality between black and white which is a dangerous doctrine in Natal and must result in discontent in the subject race."

Despite the fact that by and large the 1906 disturbances were led by chiefs and headmen and in so many cases the reasons for participation or non-participation can be traced to inter- or intra-tribal disputes, it was the participation of another section of the African population, the Christian Africans, or as they were called in the colony, Amakolwa, which caused the greatest consternation in Natal. At the time it was believed that the role of the Amakolwa in the disturbances was "a large and prominent one". Sir Henry McCallum, the Governor of Natal from 1902-7, was not alone in his belief that the "Kolwa as Kolwa" was behind the rebellion. His views were dramatically repeated in John Buchan's Prester John which was supposedly based on the 1906 rebellion but which curiously bore a closer resemblance to the Chilembwe uprising yet to occur when Buchan published his book in 1910. Too much reliance need not perhaps be placed on the historical accuracy of Sir Henry's views either - four years earlier he had informed the trustees of the American Zulu Mission that "... He had a distinct distrust of Christian natives,

2 CH 579 G, Conf. to Lord Selborne, High Commissioner, S.A., 27.9.06.
both in Natal and elsewhere. He said that he had given instructions to those concerned in India never to send him a Christian Indian for a servant.¹ For McCallum, the Supreme Chief, African evangelists, exhorting their congregations not to extol their Chiefs or the Governor but their Saviour Jesus Christ, were "firebrands ... preaching against constituted authority", examples of misdirected and dangerous missionary activity which ought to be suppressed." Nevertheless Captain James Stuart, in his History of the Zulu Rebellion, echoed these views in somewhat less forcible terms and maintained that some 5⁰⁄₀ of the rebel prisoners being held in July, 1907, admitted to being Christians, a figure he clearly regarded as excessive; amongst these 214 Christians were seven preachers.² Unfortunately, Stuart gives no indication as to what his criterion of Christianity was, nor has it been possible to trace their various denominations. Most of them would appear to have belonged to independent sects.


²SNA 1/4/304/801. Gov. to P.M., 13.9.01. There seems little doubt that McCallum actively encouraged the Natal government in its obstructive policy towards mission work (see below p. 525). See SNA 1/1/3043/76 Minute McCallum, 19.9.03 and SNA 1/1/3533471 where it is the Governor who opposed grants of land to Wesleyan Methodists and Church of the Province in Zululand, despite the support for mission requests from the C.N.A. and the Minister for Agriculture (Minute 2.11.06).

³Z.R., pp. 420-1.
rather than to orthodox missionary organisations. On the other hand, the present day traditional Zulu attitude appears to be that the Amakolwa were Adambuka, traitors to their people, "loyalists" who fought on the government side. ¹

In a bitter struggle in which more than three thousand Africans lost their lives and about thirty Europeans were killed, it is perhaps not surprising that the Government should have adopted the attitude that "those who are not for us, are against us";² nor is it remarkable that amongst the African tribesmen, the spectacle of the small groups of Christian levies fighting on the government side should have lingered on as a stereotype of the entire African Christian community acting as "traitors".³ Nevertheless an examination of the situation in detail, suggests that the Kolwa response to the events of 1906 was far more complex than the views of either of the protagonists would allow, and sheds interesting light both on why people rebel and, equally important, why they do not.

In fact, rank and file mission converts could be found fighting on both sides in 1906. While the vast majority of Christians remained unaffected by the disturbances, as indeed did the

²See below, p. 547.
³The total of native levies employed 26.5.06 was 1800. Very few of these were in fact Christian. CO 179/235/22649, Annex A and B to Encl. in desp. 106.
vast majority of tribesmen, in the actual area of military operations there were almost certainly rebels from every denomination. Of these, the members of the independent sects, or so-called Ethiopians, would appear to have been most prominent, although at a time when Natal was even more obsessed than the rest of South Africa with the thought of the Ethiopian menace,\(^1\) it would be dangerous to accept without qualification white allegations as to the part played by "Ethiopians" in the disturbances. It is therefore necessary to look a little more closely at the meaning of the terms *Kolwa* and "Ethiopian", as well as to examine the nature of the Natal African Christian community.

As Professor George Shepperson has remarked, by the turn of the century, "Ethiopians had become for the whites of Southern Africa a "Black peril", the equivalent of the 'Yellow peril' of the yellow press in Great Britain of that period".\(^2\) And nowhere was this fear of "Ethiopianism" more marked than in Natal. It was Mr. Payne, M.L.A., the Natal delegate to the Inter-Colonial Customs Conference at Bloemfontein in March 1903, who proposed that concerted action be taken by all the South African territories against Ethiopianism.\(^3\) He recommended that clergymen of African

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\(^1\) See below, passim.


\(^3\) Minutes of Inter-Colonial Customs Conf. p.9.
churches should not be licensed as marriage officers or in any way recognised, and that continued efforts be made to suppress the "propaganda of dangerous political and reasonable teaching which is doubtless unsettling the native mind". These proposals were rejected as needlessly alarmist by the other South African representatives.¹ It was the Natal members of the South African Native Affairs Commission who felt most anxious on the subject of independent African Churches.² Natal too was the only South African territory to bar entry to members of the African Methodist Episcopal Church which Captain James Stuart was to regard as "the harbinger of general revolution among the native population of South Africa... with its supreme and persistent ideal... nothing less than a reclamation and recovery not merely of South Africa but Africa".³

Although Natal government policy had never exactly encouraged missionary endeavour,⁴ it was in the immediate post-war period with all its concomitant stresses and strains that anti-missionary feeling expressed itself most strongly. The Rev. F. Mason, a man

¹Minutes of Inter-Colonial Customs Conf., p.9. These suggestions were virtually identical to those made by U.S.N.A. S. O. Samuelson, in 1908, as a basis of Union policy towards "Ethiopianism" and which B.G.H. Sundkler suggests were the result of Natal's experiences in 1906. In fact they predate the disturbances. See Bantu Prophets in S.A. (O.U.P., 1961), 2nd edition, pp. 69-70.

²See esp. questions asked by S. O. Samuelson of African witnesses, S.A.M.A.C. passim.

³Stuart Papers; Press copy of a paper on "The Ethiopian Movement" compiled and partly written by J. Stuart to S.M.A. Jhb 22.6.04, p.30.
who had first come to Natal as a Wesleyan Missionary in the 1850s, and had considerable experience and knowledge of native affairs, wrote in the *Christian Express* in July 1906 - "the vilification of African Christians has been going on a long time, but of late there has been a kind of violence and volcanic outburst of anti-missionary hatred, without any reason or provocation whatever."¹

While the disturbance of that year contributed to the violence of anti-missionary feeling in 1906, there can be little doubt that the Rev. Mason’s views were correct. Nor did this feeling reflect itself only in the calumny of the post Boer War period; it was actively expressed in the legislation even before the war. The first step in the process can perhaps be seen in Act No. 25 of 1895 - an act to regulate the use of mission reserves. Under it, the Governor and Governor-in-Council were given extensive powers over mission reserve land and their inhabitants. According to the Natal Lands Commission of 1902, however, this law remained a dead letter, largely owing to the opposition of the American Zulu Mission, which had more land in its possession than all the other mission bodies in Natal combined.²

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¹ See above, Chapter I, for example on Natal attitudes to education.

² *Christian Express*, 1.7.06 (Lovedale), "Native Christians and their Calumniators", Part I.

*(Pb cg 1904)* pp. 69-70.
In September 1903 the Mission Reserves Act (Act 44 of 1903) renewed this policy of government control over the mission lands; with the agreement of the majority of the missionary bodies, the Natal Native Trust took over the administration of the mission reserves, and a tax of £3 was levied on their inhabitants. Although half of this tax was to be handed over to the missionaries for missionary and welfare purposes and half to the government, it was felt by most of the Africans on the mission reserves to be excessively high, and many of the missionaries agreed with them. Again however it was the American Zulu mission which was most outspoken in its criticism. The tax created a certain amount of resentment in the mind of some of the converts who felt that the money was going into the pockets of the white missionaries and that the latter were responsible for the tax.

According to George Leuchars, the Minister of Native Affairs in 1903, the aim of the Act was

"to check and if possible stop a movement in this colony amongst the natives which was growing very

\[\text{References:}\]

1. AEM 111/1/3, p.325, Rev. J. D. Taylor to Rev. Judson Smith (Boston) 27.4.06.

2. AEM 111/1/3, p.313, Rev. J. D. Taylor to M.N.A. n.d. (c March 1906) and see Ilanga lase Natal, 15.11.07, 20.11.08.
quickly... of throwing off white control and achieving for itself and its supporters independence and self-government presumably in the first instance in a matter of Church control but no doubt ultimately also policy.¹

Further efforts on the part of the government to stamp out "Ethiopianism" were to cause even greater disquiet amongst almost all the missionaries of the Colony. From 1892, even prior to Responsible government, it has been the policy of the Natal Native Trust to insist that mission work on lands subject to its jurisdiction be in the personal charge and under the supervision of a resident European missionary.²

Nevertheless, it was really only after 1902 that missionary complaints became really bitter on this score, perhaps because under the Mission Reserves Act lands which had previously been free of government restrictions were now also under the control of the Natal Native Trust. Possibly also in the post war years the restrictions were applied more rigorously. In the years immediately prior to the disturbances, six African places of worship were pulled down by the Natal government for allegedly not being under the control of a resident white missionary.³

According to the A.Z.M. at least two of these were directly


²CO 179/241/19587, Minute O. O'Grady Cubbins to Gov. quoted in Samelson Memorandum, 10.5.07.

³Cd 3027, no.87, Gov. to Sec. St. 14.6.06.
under their supervision whilst one was under the supervision of Rev. Suter of the South African General Mission. The American missionaries whose preachers were not granted marriage licences by the government on the grounds that the African Congregational Church was an "Ethiopian" Church – and not the official church of the American Zulu Mission as was claimed by the white missionaries – were not alone in protesting that although the policy of the Government was due to exaggerated fears of Ethiopianism, the practical effect "is to stir up the very spirit which it is sought to suppress". The 1906–7 Natal Native Affairs Commission concurred in this opinion.

Norwegian, Wesleyan and Anglican missionaries were as certain that the conditions set out by the Secretary for Native Affairs that there should be a resident European missionary in charge of all stations was "impossible". E. Markham of Ipolela complained to the Society for Propagation of the Gospel year after year that he could not get land for a church at St. Mark's, although he had 150 converts there, because of the interference of the Under-secretary for Native Affairs who apparently sided with the local Chief in his...

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2 ABM V/1/4, Annual Rept. for 1905, S.H.C. Ransom.

3 p. 28.
opposition to mission work. Although the reason given was Ethiopianism he maintained that "there is not a single Ethiopian here in the district - nor in the whole of Ipoolea that I have heard of..."  

Several deputations of the Natal Missionary Conference, a body founded in 1877 to express missionary views and to discuss common problems, and to which most of the larger missions with the exception of the Dutch Reformed Church and the Roman Catholics belonged, petitioned the government to reconsider its policy towards the missionaries but to no avail. In a memorial forwarded by the Missionary Conference in 1905 they stated -

"these repressive measures instead of securing the objects presumably sought by the government are... actually operating to produce feelings of unrest and dissatisfaction among the native Christians in the locations... The regulations now in force have the effect of preventing the spread of Christianity and education, and of keeping the people in their present state of ignorance and heathenism."  

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1 S.P.G. Missionary Reports 42. See e.g. B. Markham to Sec. 30.6.02. Sim. S.P.G. Missionary Reports 1897, no. 111 and 1896, no. 116.  
2 C. P. Groves, Planting of Christianity in Africa, Vol. III, p.179 suggests it was founded in 1884; the first meeting however was held in April 1877 (See Report of Natal Missionary Conf. 1877, K.C.L.)  
3 See e.g. SNA 1/1/325-1885, Report of meeting between M.N.A. and Natal Miss. Conf. and Ep. of Natal, 22.12.04. SNA 1/1/320, Letter of Durban Church Council to Col. Sec. (J. Maydon) 5.5.05, Petition of Durban and Pietermaritzburg Church Councils, 22.8.05.  
4 SNA 1/1/323-1885, Memorial 19.7.05.
This was neither the first nor the last of such pleas.  

The attitude of the government to the missionaries as a whole was well summed up by S. O. Samuelson at the end of 1902 when he remarked:

"Too much of our Native Education is in the hands of foreigners and the subjects of other nations, who are loyal to their traditions and proud of their history and antecedents, and who cannot but exercise a seditious influence on the loyalty and affection of our natives.

Missionaries, mission agents and teachers are ever increasing in our midst and throughout South Africa. I do not think that it is their sole aim to hold up the prestige and interests of the British people and government among our natives. They may be passively, but not actively loyal."  

The worst suspicions of the Natalians about the Ethiopians appeared to have been justified at the very outset of the disturbances when it was revealed that the twenty-seven armed Africans who had resisted their chief's orders to pay the Poll Tax on the 7th February and who had been involved in the shooting of two police officers the following day were members of an independent church.  

Indeed the fact that these men, under the leadership

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1 Sim. views e.g. were expressed by Rev. J. Astrup (Norwegian), N.M.A.C. Evid., p.525, Rev. J. O. Chater, Springvale I55, p.581. It should however also be noted that in 1904 for example 25 Hermannsburg Missionaries appear to have requested the govt. to suppress Ethiopianism because "they are a dangerous sect undermining the Christian Church and the State". Petition publ. in Greytown Gazette, 9.7.04.

2 SNA 1/4/10 O78 02, Minute, 23.10.02.

3 See above, Chapter V, p. 301-311
of Makanda and Mjongo, two woodcutters from the Enon forests near Richmond, were separatists tended to blur certain other equally important features of the incident.

The group under Makanda and Mjongo were all members of the Presbyterian Church of Africa,¹ which had been founded in 1898 by Pambani J. Msimba, a Fingo who had broken away from the United Free Church of Scotland Mission at Lovedale.² His church had spread in Natal under the leadership of John Sibiya, who under the influence of Msimba had also broken away in 1898 with 150 communicants from a Scottish Mission Station at Spandikron.³ While Sibiya was regarded by the government as a "dangerous propagandist"⁴ and Msimba as a virulently anti-white crusader,⁵ Msimba himself claimed, perhaps somewhat ingenuously, that he had no connection with the "Ethiopian movement" and that his break with the missionaries at Lovedale had been purely on account of "religious difficulties".⁶ These "religious difficulties" appear to have arisen

¹And not the African Congregational Church as stated by E. Roux, Time Longer than Rope, p. 89.
²Sundkler, Bantu Prophets, pp. 42-3.
³U.F. Ch. of Scotland records: U.F.C.S.-14-368, Meeting of Natal Mission Council, 10.4.01.
⁴Though a missionary of the United Free Church described him as "beloved by his people, respected by the Dutch farmers", there was "never a word of scandal about him" U.F.C.S.-14-258, Dr. Dalsell to Sec. 21.9.98.
⁵Cd. Gov. to Sec. St. 14.6.06.
largely over his handling of the large sums of money handed to him while representing his people at the Free Church of Scotland Jubilee celebrations in 1692. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the split may have been, however, before the South African Native Affairs Commission Msimba dissociated himself from political matters¹ and in 1908 he wrote to the Prime Minister of Natal in order to establish the respectability of his church that although his aim was to establish an independent church he bore

"no opposition to the white race as such. Our experience is that the missionaries of the United Free Church are at present unable to understand the South African native or work with him. In the meantime we are anxious to work for the welfare of our people..."²

Despite Msimba's publicity hand-outs for government consumption, and despite the fact that no charge of sedition could be proven against Sibiya, who was under police surveillance both during the Boer War and in 1906, when he was detained in the Central gaol, Pietermaritzburg,³ it can be argued that this was no guarantee that Makanda and Mjongo, who used to preach to their followers

¹S.A.N.A.C. II, 1903-5, p. 795.
²SMA 1/1/599 1506 08, 16.5.08.
³SMA 1/1/375 2344 07, Minute U.S.N.A. 10.8.07.
three times a week in Sibuya's absence, were not preaching insurrection. Precisely what they preached is not clear. As the Rev. J. D. Taylor (A.Z.N.) pointed out "Ethiopians" were hardly likely to be communicative to hostile whites. According to Makanda's sister at their Court Martial, both Makanda and Njongo were "good preachers", "they preached, but not about assegais... I heard nothing wrong with their preaching".  

The evidence of the Anglican vicar of Richmond, the Rev. Algernon J. Fryer, is probably more illuminating. He had visited the "victims of the Court Martial" on several occasions, in order as he put it to bring them to realise the error of their ways "by God's help and by the assistance of my very able and sympathetic interpreter". According to the statements they made to him

"They had been taught by native preachers and evangelists that the whole of the Holy Scripture pointed to the fact that the curse on the black race which was to keep them under, was now to be removed and

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1 In a paper before the Natal Missionary Conference, reprinted in Christian Express, Oct. 1903, Part I, p.150.

2 The evidence in the Richmond Court Martial in enrol. in CO 179/234/19935, Evid. Honkuba.

3 CO 179/234/14956, Enrol. 2 in desp. 53 of 5.4.06, A.J. Fryer to Gov. 3.4.06. To this claim Winston Churchill at that time Under-Sec. for Cols. retorted (2.5.06. Minute on above): "The Rev. A. J. Fryer has evidently distinguished himself. I should think the exertions he made with the combined assistance of the Almighty and the interpreter to impress upon the prisoners the justice of their sentence and the abounding grace of the Church should be brought to the attention of the ecclesiastical authorities in this country in order that some special mark of favour be accorded him."
that it was time that blacks should take the upper
dand reduce the whites to a state of subordination.
The witness examined them in their knowledge of
scriptures at length and he found that they were ex-
ceptionally well acquainted with the main facts, more
especially of the Old Testament, but that they had
ignorantly twisted... these facts into superstitious
notions affecting their relations with Europeans. 1

Although this evidence would appear to be very similar to that
about militant, millenarian - type sects both in Africa and
elsewhere, it does not necessarily suggest that the men intended
resorting to force at the beginning of the incident on the 7th,
nor does it imply, as was widely implied at the time, that theirs
was the beginning of a widespread plot aimed at the overthrow
of white authority. Indeed, as has been shown above, 2 the first
armed resistance to the white forces which were called out to
deal with this widespread plot came almost two months later in a
different part of the colony and amongst rural tribesmen. Never-
theless, as so often in history, what people believe to be true
is frequently more important in determining the subsequent course
of events, than the reality; and the psychological reality of
the "Ethiopian menace" after this incident played an important
part in the government's reaction to the disturbances and led
whites to exaggerate the part played in the disturbances by

1 W.M.A.C. Evid. p.349.
2 Chapter V, p. 326 ff.
"Ethiopian" preachers.  

Undeniably, Christian preachers accompanied the rebel forces after Bambatha came out into open resistance on the 4th April and led the disturbances into a new phase. His men were preached to by Moses Abhele who had broken away from the Dutch Reformed Church with about a hundred of his followers in the 1890s and had been ordained by Msiaba, although he had formed his own church, *Ibhandla li ka Nosi*, in the Upper Umvoti division.  

Interestingly enough, Bambatha had tried unsuccessfully before this to acquire a missionary from the Hermannsburg Lutherans in his neighbourhood. Abhele had been for him a second choice. A Salvation Army teacher with Sigananda's people also joined Bambatha with most of his followers: the majority of them were killed. Other chiefs also, notably Moseni in the Kapumulo division in the last phase of the disturbances, were accompanied by the black-hatted, white-chokered figure with a prayer book in his hands which roused particularly

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1 For lurid descriptions of the activities of Ethiopians, see the contemporary novels by Bertram Hifford, a popular author in Natal at the turn of the century — esp. *The White Hand and the Black*, p. 50 ff (written about the 1906 disturbances) (London, 1907). Also *Black Odyssey* by J. Grad (pseud.) 1929. John Buchan's *Prester John* is the best known work of this genre.


4 SHA 1/1/460-1210 , Magis. T. A. Jackson, Khendla, 2.4.10 to Assistant Native Commissioner.
angry emotions in the breasts of white observers.¹ The same
chiefs were also invariably accompanied by a number of war-doctors
and witchdoctors - as a form of double insurance. Their presence
passed almost unremarked. Nor did the appearance of a preacher
with Sibindi's loyal forces who offered up a short prayer for
their success every morning, surrounded by kolwa on the inside
and heathen on the outside, provoke similar hostile comment.²

The activities of "preachers" apart, the participation
of the Amakolva would appear to have been most marked in the final
phase of the disturbances in the Lower-Tugela and Mapumulo divisions.
In the latter division there were, at the turn of the century,
about 6,400 Africans living on Mission Reserves, not all of them
of course converts. In this division, almost all the converts of
the Nazareth mission station - a Hermannsburg German Lutheran
station under the Rev. Dedekind - were reported to have joined
the rebels.³ As early as 3rd March, Dedekind was warned by Chief
Hermann Mounu that he should leave the Station lest he be murdered,
for "the people want war. They say: in the South part of

¹Cd 3247, Encl. 1 in no. 32, Gov. to Sec. St., Col. Barker to Militia
Dept., 17.7.06. One of these was Andrew Mbulangwa, Minuti. Acc. to
the govt., he was of the A.Z.M. who however disowned him and said
he was C. of E. As the Church of the Province also disowned him,
he may originally have been a Colenista. (CO 179/241/19587 Samuelson
Memo on A.Z.M.) See also SNA 1/4/17 067, Statement ex-chief Meseni
to magis. Lower Tugela, 20.3.07. CO 179/241/2198, Gov. to Sec. St.
25.5.07. CO 179/224/16341 Gov. to Sec. St. 20.4.06.
³Ibid., pp. 137-40. SNA 1/1/3462492 06, G.A. Jackson, C.I.D., K.F.F.
to O.C. Helpenburg.

there is war, the Ab&ungu [whites] have started it, why should we look on inactively. A fair number of Wesleyan Methodists - or ex-Wesleyan Methodists - would also appear to have been amongst the participants, as at least two of the four preach*ers said to have accompanied the Mapumulo rebels were originally of this denomination. Some Christians from the Norwegian Mission Station at Ekhombe also joined the rebels: some volunteered, but most had been forced to join on fear of death. This was also true of a number of members of the A.Z.M. and other denominations. Thus Rev. J. D. Taylor actually asked the Officer in Command at Mapumulo for protection for loyal Africans and pastors on their Mission Stations who had been threatened with death unless they joined the rebels. George Champion, himself a member of A. Z. M., writing his autobiography years later, confirms this situation remarking that on two occasions he had been forced through fear of rebels to sleep in the veld. It is significant however that the rebels

1 Hermannsburger Missionsblatt, May 1906, Report, Rev. Dedekind.
4 AWM III/1/3, p.352.
5 p.9. Unpubl. MSS, Life of G. W. Champion recorded by S. Trapido who kindly showed it to me.
from the two American Zulu Mission stations in the area appear to have attracted the most attention.\(^1\) McCallum\(^2\) was convinced that the A.Z.H. converts joined "to a man" and this statement made in public led to a long and acrimonious correspondence between the Governor and the missionaries, some of which found its way to the Colonial Office and some to the Natal Press.\(^3\)

Certainly their estimate of the number of their converts involved made by the American missionaries in the heat of battle differed considerably from their later re-appraisal. Thus in July, 1906, the Rev. J. D. Taylor wrote to the Secretary of the American Board in Boston that the most serious side of the rebellion was that most of their people in Mapumulo had joined the rebellion, only a few of the most faithful standing by their African pastor.\(^4\) He felt that the "whole church" at the two affected stations had "spiritually at least been snuffed out by

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\(^1\) For a typical attack see SNA 1/1/340\(^{1250}\), Capt. Moe to Commandant of Militia, Mapumulo, 14.4.06.

\(^2\) Of the private views of McCallum expressed in a long memorandum to Sir Matthew Nathan, his successor: "You will have no peace until you make the position of this Foreign Mission impossible and induce them to hand over their own particular mission stations to the other Christian denominations who can exercise more effective European control." Nathan MSS 401, p. 227, McCallum to Nathan, Native Affairs Confidential n.d. (c July 1907).

\(^3\) See the long memorandum by S. O. Samuelson on the A.Z.H. 10.5.07 Encl. in CO 179/241/19587 already cited. See also Cd 3247, nos. 31 and 32.

\(^4\) ABM 111/1/3 Letterbook p. 359 to Dr. Judson Smith, 6.7.06. Even in 1905, J. D. Taylor was complaining that the Mission was understaffed and undersupervised. See ABM 111/1/3 to Rev. Judson Smith 12.5.05, p. 158 ff Sim.5.4.05, p. 145 ff.
joining the rebellion.\(^1\) On the other hand, at the beginning of 1907, when faced by the accusations of the government, Taylor and the other missionaries of the A.Z.M. staunchly maintained that relatively few of their actual converts had been involved in the rebellion — about thirty out of their four thousand full members — and that many of the people on their mission reserves whom the military accused of rebellion were not Christians at all, although they might wear European-type clothing.\(^2\)

As the oldest, largest and richest of the missionary bodies in Natal, one run on Congregationalist lines which it was believed was fundamentally "unsuited to the native mind" and by American pastors, who, according to the Governor, could "not be expected to advocate the principle of honouring the King as much as that of fearing God",\(^3\) it was perhaps natural that the A.Z.M. should bear the brunt of the Government attack on mission work. Their American origin was an additional handicap in that it was feared that South African Africans would be "contaminated" by American negro influences. There were at this time apparently 150 South African Africans studying

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 373, 20.7.06.

\(^2\)e.g. in letters to Natal Witness, 9.1.07; Natal Mercury, 23.1.07. See also AEM VII/8/1, Transcript of notes taken at interview between M.H.A. and Rev. Goodenough and J. Dexter Taylor, 26.2.07. J. D. Taylor to M.H.A. Hooper 18.6.07. AEM V/1/4 Report of negotiations with the Govt. 1906-7 by J. D. Taylor. Cf. Rev. Eriksen of the Norwegian Mission Society who also remarked that a man sentenced for "rebellious talk" on being asked by the Judge whether he was a Christian replied "I wear European clothes". Norskmisjonstidende, June 1906, pp. 248-9. Eriksen was writing from Durban, 14.2.06.

\(^3\)GH 579 807 Conf. to Lord Selborne, 12.8.06.
in the States, 20 of them from Natal. That their mission reserves were on excellent sugar lands, looking up it was alleged thousands of acres of valuable land and hundreds of valuable African labourers, was an important factor in colonial dislike of the A.Z.M. Nor did the outspokenness of the American missionaries both on the general grievances of the African population and on the atrocities committed by the troops during the 1906 disturbances particularly endear them to the government. Finally, by calling its purely African church, the African Congregational Church the mission had incurred the suspicion of the Native Affairs Department: although this body was under the control of the white missionary society, the Government were convinced that it was an Ethiopian sect and had refused to grant marriage licences to its preachers or allow them to preach in the locations from 1903 onwards.2

There was a more general reason for the government attack on the A.Z.M. The changed attitude amongst the Amakolwa at the turn of the century which was causing so much concern to white observers all over Southern Africa and which manifested itself both in the independent church movement and in the new, European-type political organisations was, in Natal, not closely connected

1 See e.g. ABM 111/1/3, p.362, J.D. Taylor to T. F. Churchill, 13.7.06, p. 375 (loose in book), J. D. Taylor to R. Campbell 21.7.06, p. 394, J. D. Taylor to Rev. J. Bruce, Sec. Natal Missionary Conference, suggesting that the Missionary Conf. take the initiative in asking for an enquiry into alleged atrocities. See also ABM V/1/4, Report of Negotiations with govt., 1906-7. See also above, Chapter V, p. ABM VII/8/1, J. D. Taylor to Moor, 18.6.07.

2 SNA 1/1/31 C 207, Transcript of interview between M.H.A. and deputation from A.Z.M. 16.2.05.
with the converts of the A. Z. M., Wesleyan Methodists and the United Free Church of Scotland. But while the Wesleyan Methodists and to a lesser extent the U.F.C. had a strong European church within the colony and in Britain, this was not the case with the A.Z.M. whose converts were its church. It was thus in a peculiarly vulnerable position.

It is difficult to assess how far the Natal Government's fears of Ethiopianism were justified and to what extent independent Church leaders were preaching rebellion in the years before the disturbances. While some Separatist church members undoubtedly participated in the disturbances, it is at least as remarkable that many more did not.

There was, moreover, a tendency in Natal to see every educated African as a dangerous Ethiopian, ready to drive the white man into the sea. As long as the Zulu accepted their inferior position - as indeed the bulk of tribesmen in Natal, many of them refugees from Shaka's wars, had initially been prepared to do in return for the increased security the white settlers offered - the whites felt little anxiety about their position. But as soon as anyone began to question the basis of the caste system, he was felt to be

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1See e.g. S.A.M.A.C. vol. III, p.628, Evid. Rev. V. H. Goodwin (Anglican missionary) on the subject.
a threat far out of proportion to the actual danger he represented. As the Rev. John Dube succinctly remarked: "The reason that the Christian Native has a bad name, among the lower classes of European especially, is that he does not submit to being treated as a dog." 2

Perhaps because the educated African was so totally rejected by the whites of Natal, the need for solidarity between the tribal and Christian African was appreciated somewhat earlier there than in the older colony. It may have been this realisation that lay behind John Dube's reprimand to the Edendale "loyal levies" for fighting their brethren, although at the same time he cautioned the tribesmen against the folly of taking up arms against the whites. 3

Thus, whereas in the past the government had been able to count on the traditional hatreds between the Christian and non-Christian sections of the African population, in 1906 the old division, while undoubtedly still in existence, was no longer as clear-cut as it had been at the time of the Zulu War, when Christian Africans seem to have responded with considerable enthusiasm to the anti-Zulu cause. 4

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1 For Dube, see below, p. 542-548
3 GH 579 C Conf. 807, Gov. to Lord Selborne, 6.8.06.
By the turn of the century, however, even the epithet "Zulu" had for some educated Africans pan-Natal and nationalist connotations. Thus Mark Radebe, one-time Secretary of the Natal Native Congress defined himself before the South African Native Affairs Commission as a Zulu, though he agreed with a questioner that he was of "Sesutho" origin.\(^1\) Alfred Mangena, the first African advocate in South Africa and one of the founders of the South African Native National Congress in 1912, also called himself a "Zulu", though he was probably not of true "Zulu" origin.\(^2\) Increasingly too a number of educated Africans would appear to have turned to Dinusulu as representative of the Zulu Royal House and therefore a symbol of unity. Thus in 1902, Nokema M. Fose, an African of Natal — probably of "Lala" origin — wrote to Dinusulu:

"I therefore say to you Zulu, it is well for you to be wise and to stand upon your rights and to remember that you are the only representative of the House of Tshaka, and that all the country is in your hands. You should fight for that which is yours by right as all people do .... [but] now our only resource is to fight in a lawful way as do all wise nations under the sun. Indeed I say this to you because I fear that if you are quiet and do nothing we shall find out that you are left alone and all the Zulu nation scattered from you by cunning and alienated from you so that you shall have no place of refuge and be in want of all things.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) S.A.N.A.C. III, p.531.

\(^2\) See below, Chapter IX, p. 609 for Mangena.

\(^3\) A.G.O 1/7/53, Nokema M. Fose transl by T. A. Jackson.
In this case, it can be argued that Magensa who had been Bishop Colenso's interpreter and printer, was influenced by his association with the Colenso family. On the other hand, it may well be that it was the views of people like Magensa that enabled the Colensos to see the Zulu Royal family in so different a light to that of most of their contemporaries. As we shall see, however, Harriette Colenso was in contact with the early nationalist leaders and undoubtedly through her there was an interaction between the affairs of the Zulu Royal family and Zulu nationalism on the one hand, and the relatively later and broader nationalism of the western type, educated Christian leadership at the turn of the century.

If Christian Africans were claiming to speak on behalf of their pagan brethren and were trying to create a Zulu nationalism, it is also significant that while there were undoubtedly many chiefs who wanted to get rid of the Christians in their tribes and who felt that they and the traditional values of

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1Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, p.498. Col. Col. 139 vol. II. Correspondence R. Clarke to Agnes Colenso (copy) 28.3.96. For a eulogy on Magensa who was his chief informant see Bryant, O.T., p.498. Magensa was also the author of a traditional history, Abantu Abanyanza (Black People). In the 1890s he had accompanied the Royal Family to St. Helena and had taught Dinnsulu to read and write. The Governor however thought he might cause trouble and replaced him with Daniels instead. For Daniels see above, Chapter VII. CO 27/10/4682, Harriette Colenso to Sec. St. 11.3.90 and Minute, E. Fairfield, 12.3.90.

2Below, p. 554.

3See e.g. the remark of E.H.A.C. that "the cleavage between the kraal kaffir and the Christian is no longer as great as it used to be." pp. 8-9, Report.
their people were being undermined by them, there were others who while not wanting themselves to become converted Christians were beginning to realise the value of western education. It is significant that, as has already been mentioned, although there were a number of mission stations in the heart of the troubled areas, none of them were destroyed by the rebel impi, even though they were deserted by the white missionaries and their black converts were intimidated into joining the rebel forces.  

While however it can be shown that the bulk of Christian Africans did not join the uprising, it is also clear that they did not join in the defence of the government as heartily as on previous occasions. Amongst Sibindi’s Bonvu people it is true it was the Kolwa apparently who first rallied to his call for aid. They were adherents of the Norwegian Mission Society. Some three hundred inhabitants of the Wesleyan Methodist settlement at Edendale, traditionally the most enthusiastic and effective of the government’s allies, fought for it again this time. Their constant

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1 Of the complaint of Mnqandi (Newcastle) before the N.M.A.C. 1906-7 that “most of the girls who became pregnant amongst them were those who wore clothes...[which] had been brought about by the introduction of Christianity...” This is one example amongst many.

2 See above, Chapter V.

3 Cd 3027, no. 49, Gov. to Sec. St. 18.5.06.
loyalty had its roots in origins of their settlement which had been founded by Rev. Allison with a band of Swazi refugees in 1847. On the other hand, the Driefontein Wesleyans who had broken away from Edendale and bought their own farm in 1865 though they had remained orthodox members of the church at the time, were noticeably reluctant to take up arms for the Government in 1906. There were several reasons for this. In general there would appear to have been sympathy with the grievances of the rebels, although the Kolwa realised the futility of violent methods as H. C. Matiwane, Secretary of the Natal Native Congress pointed out. There were also more specific reasons for the lack of enthusiasm at Driefontein. Several men there complained that they had not been adequately rewarded for their services during the Boer War, and that they had not been trained as a fighting corps, despite their requests for military training over the past twenty years. There was also some opposition to R.C.A. Samuelson’s recruiting schemes from the local magistrate. Perhaps one of the most important factors, however, was the conversion of a large number of the men to the Catholic Apostolic Church in Zion, a distinctly pacifist body


2Ibid., p.369.


4R.C.A.Samuelson, Long, long ago, p.150 (Durban, 1929), and SHA 1/1/3411 Report R.C.A.Samuelson.
which claimed with pride at the end of the disturbances that none of its converts had participated on either side. The son of the chief at Driefontein, Johannes Kumalo, was, according to *Leaves of Healing* the sect's newspaper, their leading advocate there; to McCallum, this was proof that the Driefontein men were "rebels at heart".

Apart from their realisation however that there was little likelihood of success against the white man's machine guns, there were other reasons for the neutrality of the Amakolwa as a group. Fundamentally they still identified themselves with the values of the white man, and wished to be received by him as an equal. Armed warfare could not achieve these rights - as Dube pointed out on several occasions in *Ilanga lase Natal*, what they needed was education and political organisation.

The formation of the *Natal Native Congress* in 1900 is an indication of the Amakolwa's awareness of the importance of political organisation. This developed out of a small group of exempted Zulu

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1. SNA 1/1/364-630, Minute U.S.M.A.
2. 19.4.07, Report of a two weeks' conference held at Kalkoenkrants. A copy of this paper was found in SNA 1/1/364-630 heavily scored in blue pencil by Samuelson and McCallum who felt that "Zionism" and pacifism were distinctly dangerous.
3. SNA 1/1/347-1700, Minute Gov. 2.7.06.
4. eg. 23.2.06 and 2.3.06. See also Chapter IX, p. for the increased awareness of this after the disturbances.
calling themselves the "Funemalungelo" into a more representative body. It was then called the Natal Native Congress, probably following the example of the Natal Farmers' Congress and the Indian Congress which had originally been founded by Gandhi in the Transvaal, but had spread to Natal by 1894 as the Natal Indian Congress. Its first meeting, held in July 1900, set the tone for subsequent assemblies. Thus after prayers and hymns, loyal resolutions were passed and votes of thanks proposed to the Queen, the Prince of Wales, Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Milner, the Governor of Natal, Lord Roberts, Sir Redvers Buller and all those who had fallen in the Boer War.

George Herbert Hulett, a solicitor in Verulam and son of Sir James Liege Hulett, a former Secretary of Native Affairs, was in the Chair. It was in Hulett's office that H. C. Matiwane, the first Secretary of the Natal Congress, worked. It would appear that both G. H. Hulett and his father took a not unsympathetic interest in the Christian community at Groutville. Sir Liege, himself one of the most important sugar farmers in the colony, helped the Groutville farmers market the sugar they had been growing since 1859, and had a fairly high opinion of the settlement. In his opening

2 In the Bums Cabinet of 1897-9.
3 Report in Natal Mercury, 8.6.1900.
address, Mark Radebe, another of the founders of the Congress, and twice its Secretary, welcomed George Hulett's presence because he felt "The natives must not rely on themselves too much, but endeavour to enlist the sympathies of English gentlemen". Although Hulett's presence at the meeting led the Under-Secretary for Native Affairs to refer to the "serious political significance of this movement, promoted and engineered ... by Europeans", Hulett's remarks at the Conference were chiefly devoted to advising the Africans to advance slowly and to supporting the views of the meeting that sympathetic white members should represent them in Parliament. From his evidence to the 1903-5 African Native Affairs Commission, Hulett would appear to have been a firm believer in cutting up Reserve land into individual allotments. Otherwise it is difficult to see what he had in common with the Congress, though his family were known for their Methodism which may have provided the link. He had also acted as adviser to the Swazi in 1894. He was, however,

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1 For Radebe, see pp. 538, 540 below.
2 SNA 1/4/8 C529, Minute 89.00.
3 Natal Mercury, 8.6.1900.
4 S.A.N.A.C. III, p. 915.
one of the few people in Natal who saw the advantage of the
public holding of political meetings, and believed in freedom
of speech as a safety valve for the more educated and prosperous
Africans. Even G. H. Rulett, however, felt that formal permission
should be obtained from the Governor for the holding of public
meetings by Africans, that "under no consideration" should the
African obtain the franchise, and that, however highly educated,
he could never be "put on the same level" as the white man.¹

Within a couple of months of this meeting, Congress claimed
to have twenty three different local committees scattered throughout
Natal.² In August all of these sent their representatives to a
meeting held under the Chairmanship of Chief Isaac Nkize.³ Its
aim according to spokesmen like Stephen Mini, Mark Radebe, Martin
Luthuli and John Dube, was to enable the native population to
express its feelings and bring its grievances to the attention
of the Government. Prominent amongst the resolutions of this
time were requests for direct representation in Parliament - by
four elected European members - and that Native and Mission Reserve

¹S.A.N.A.C., III, p.923.
²Christian Express, 1.10.1900, p.147.
³Ibid.
lands be cut up into allotments with fixed title. Throughout its existence, individual land-tenure was to be one of the most important issues to Natal Native Congress members. In 1901 there also was, apparently, a proposal to send a deputation from the Natal Native Congress to England, in order to express Zulu view on the war settlement. ¹ Nothing came of it however.

At the same time as the formation of the Congress, the first non-missionary paper in Natal - Inyana lo Khanga - appeared, apparently sponsored very largely by the same group of people that founded the Congress. Thus the editor was Mark Radebe, perhaps a typical representative of the group. He was born in Pietermaritzburg, of Sotho origin and had been educated at Lovedale; after working in a large departmental store in Pietermaritzburg, he had acquired his own drapery store. In addition to his political interests, he was a Methodist local Preacher, choir master and organist, and was generally extremely active in Church matters.² By 1901, Inyana had five-hundred and fifty subscribers and distributed fifty free copies. The publishers were Chief Isaac Krise and James Mjosi, both Wesleyan Methodists.³ The paper, however, did not last

¹ Inyana, 10.6.01.
² Mweli Skota, The African Yearly Register (July 1931), p.84. The African Yearly Register is an invaluable "black man's Who's Who" - unfortunately it only appeared once!
³ SMH 1/4/9 0-0, Minute 15.1.07.
very long - at the end of 1901, after a couple of apparently inflammatory letters had appeared in its columns, Nhise and Mjosi were summoned before the Under Secretary for Native Affairs. As a result of his "friendly warning", the chiefs "voluntarily" refused to take out a licence for its publication in the following year.

Most leaders of the Natal Native Congress were to denounce the "Ethiopian Movement", at any rate in so far as it was anti-white, and to dissociate themselves from it. Nhise and Mjosi maintained that it was "the young people" who were responsible for the inflammatory tone of *Ipepa*. This may simply have been an attempt to overcome government hostility, but the entire policy of the Congress, its tone of cautious accommodation and its appeal for white support, would seem to have arisen out of a response to the European settlers which was different in kind from that of the Ethiopian Churches. Thus timidity and moderation (to say nothing of suspicion of Booth) may well have lain behind

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1 See e.g. *Ipepa* 14.12.00. Translation in SNA 1/4/8 01. "The Boers say that Africa is theirs, but the English say it belongs to them, but we the aborigines of the country what do we say? God ... is strong Africa belongs to the black man... If you do not remember me I will send you a strange nation, it will be fierce and devour all." This passage which combines both millenial and political beliefs is one of the few using both approaches I have found.

2 SNA 1/4/9 01, Minutes 15.1.01, 29.1.01 and 27.2.01.

3 SNA 1/4/9 01, Minute 27.2.01.

4 *AEM V*/1/2, Annual Report 1897 by B.H. Bridgeman M.D. who suggests Africans mistrusted his motives.
the rejection of Joseph Booth's schemes by the intellectuals he called together to discuss his proposals for establishing his African Christian Union in 1896.¹ The reason given by Shepperson and Price — that after the death of Bishop Colenso the Zulu were unable to trust any white man — may perhaps have been the view of a small number of the hundred and twenty men present; on the other hand, a white man had been called on for assistance in the formation of the Congress. In 1907 when the passions which had been kindled by the disturbances were still running high, Congress enlisted the aid of Ralph Tatham, another advocate and member of parliament. Although at this point there was controversy over whether a white man should be invited to the meeting — Mark Radebe being very strongly opposed to it — the majority of those present considered that he was necessary.²

Almost all the leaders of the Natal Native Congress and of the Iliso LeSiswe Esimnyama which was founded after the 1906 disturbances to oppose Frederick Moor's proposed reform of native legislation, appear to have remained members of European controlled

¹Cf. the attitude of J. T. Jabavu in the editorial columns of Imvo who regarded Booth "as a great enemy to our people" because he will arouse enmity between white and black. (Imvo, 12.1.96)
²G. Shepperson and T. Price, Independent African, p.76.
³See below, Chapter II, p. 604
⁴Ilansa lase Natal, 14.6.07 and 26.7.07.
⁵See below, Chapter IX, pp. 581 - 587
missionary bodies. Most of them were drawn from the Wesleyan Methodist and United Free Church of Scotland missions and from the stations of the American Zulu Mission — men like Stephen Mini, Saul Msane and Mark Radebe from the first, B. Cele and S. Nyongwana from the second, or Martin Luthuli, P. J. Gumede and John Dube from the third. Many of them remained prominent in Church politics.¹

Thus Martin Luthuli and John Dube played a prominent part in trying to get the group which broke away from the American Zulu mission in 1896 under Simungu Bafasini Shibe to rejoin the parent body in 1901, but with only partial success.² It is incidentally of interest to notice that at the meeting of reconciliation between representatives of the mission and some of the Separatists, by that time known as the Zulu Congregational Church,³ it was necessary

¹In 1909 for example Maphtali Qule, Simeon Kambula and the Revs. A. Mthukulu and Ngana were elected to the Wesleyan Methodist District Committee; the first three were all active politically. J. M. Majosi, I Mhise, S. Matiwane and Z. Mdumng were elected lay representatives to the Wesleyan Methodist Conferences; the first two were associated with Ipepa la Hlanga and Congress, the two later share surnames with the Secretary of Congress in 1906, H. C. Matiwane, and with Selby and Richard Mdumng who were later prominent in A.N.C. and even I.C.U. activities. (Methodist Churchman, 16.2.09.) Similarly though there were signs of tension both between Bryant Cele (1st Vice Pres. of N.N.C.) and the missionary Dr. Dewar, and Dube and the A.Z.K., neither seem to have left their parent organisation. Dube remaining a pastor in the Church until 1908 (see p. 544 ) and Bryant Cele acting as Secretary of Natal Native Preachers Conference. (U.F.C. of Scotland 5-14-161, Dewar to Smith, 6.3.02).

²ABM IV/1/4, Committee Reports, C. W. Milbon, Report of Native Annual Meeting, 23.1.01.

³For the split see "Christianity and the Natives of S. Africa" by A. Lea, pp. 77-8 in A Yearbook of S. Afr. Missions, compiled and ed. J.D.Taylor (Lovedale, 1927), Sandller, Bantu Prophets, pp. 45-6 and ABM VII/5/1 Matters relating to Native Churches 1897-1904.
to find a name for the African section of the mission. Not one vote was cast for the Zulu Congregational Church; "what seemed to carry the vote against it was that it was too tribal, sectional, limited - 'African' having wider meaning than 'Zulu'." As early as 1906 Dube advocated an African National Congress in South Africa.

The Rev. John Dube, in some ways the epitome of the new independent African, was perhaps in a class of his own in Natal. The object of much suspicion on the part of the Natal government, he was regarded as a "pronounced Ethiopian" who ought to be watched. He himself at a later date viewed his activities as a struggle "to harmonise the best Native aspirations with the best European opinion", and complained of being called an Ethiopian by those who misunderstood his attitude. Although this remark was made in 1922, Dube's letters to Marshall Campbell and F. R. Moor in 1907–8 would appear to conform with this view. Born in 1871 he was the second son of James Dube, pastor of the Inanda Church.

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1 ABN IV/1/4, Committee Reports, Report of Annual Meeting, 23.1.01, op. cit.
2 CO 179/235/22645, Gov. to Sec. St., 30.5.06.
4 Marshall Campbell papers, Bantu Section, K.C.L. See also the attack on Ubuto</nosetab>nia ("Ethiopianism") in Ilanga, 2.3.06.
of the American Zulu mission. His grandmother had been one of Daniel Lindley's earliest converts in Natal. In 1887, Dube went on his first trip to the United States with the Rev. W. C. Wilcox, his journey being paid for, so the story goes, by thirty gold sovereigns left by his father for his education.1

According to Wilcox, it was on Dube's second visit to the States that he met Booker Washington whose work at Tuskegee was to have a profound effect on him and led to the founding of Dube's own Zulu Christian Industrial School.2 It was on this occasion too that he met both Joseph Booth and Chilembwe who were in the United States for the purpose of raising funds for missionary endeavours in Africa.3 During the course of his visit he also came into contact with other negro independent Church leaders in the States. Although Shepperson and Price state that he was assisted in his efforts to raise money for his school by the leaders of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, on his return to Natal he retained his links with the American Zulu mission, whose pastor he was at Inanda until 1908, when he resigned from the pastorate.

1 For Dube's early background see J. L. Dube, A Talk upon My Native Land, Rochester, 1892 (microfilm obtained from N.Y. Public Library).


but not, it would appear, from the A.Z.M.¹ There were, however, signs of tension in his relationship with the white missionaries after his return from a fund raising tour of the States in 1905². According to Jordan Ngubane, who knew him personally, he was even on one occasion barred from holding a service in the church at Inanda by the white missionary.³ Unfortunately, Mr. Ngubane does not state at what date this occurred.⁵

On his return from his second visit to the States, Dube was watched by special detectives. He and his uncle, Chief Mgawe, whose son was also studying in the States, were said to be harbouring treasonable designs against the State as early as 1898.⁴ During the Boer War Dube was detained for some time for alleged treasonable statements,⁵ and in 1902 the fact that he was friendly with a couple of American negroes in Natal was noted somewhat ominously, and the teachers and pupils of his school blacklisted.⁶ Dube's "questioning"

¹ AHM V/1/4, Annual Report, 1908.
² Articles in Ilanga lase Natal and Dube's extreme anger at the Mission Reserve Act—at what he felt was the collusion of missionaries in it could partly explain friction at this time. See e.g. Ilanga 15.11.07 and 20.3.08.
⁴ SNA 1/4/5 0²80 0²98, Intell. Reports. Sim. SNA 1/4/12 0⁶ 0⁵, Reports on J. Dube's teachings.
⁵ SNA 1/1/296 0¹³80, Minutes of interview between S.N.A. and A.Z.M. missionaries, 8.4.02.
attitude, his belief that "justice would be done only when the 
African ruled the country", perhaps not surprisingly, led whites 
to regard him as an agitator. The fact that his speeches were, 
on the whole, reported back in rather dramatic terms by the native 
constable appointed to follow his movements did not improve matters. 

In 1903 Dube started his paper *Ilanga lase Natal* in Zulu 
and English, a paper which is still in existence today. Dube was 
to use its columns to express the grievances he felt the Africans 
of Natal, both tribal and Christian, were suffering under. On 
several occasions the Minister for Native Affairs, between 1904 and 
1906, H. J. Winter, was sorely tempted to suppress this "mischievous" 
paper, but was apparently restrained by the advice of the Attorney 
General. Dube, being exempted from Native Law, could not be dealt 
with as summarily as both the Minister and the Governor might have 
wished. During the disturbances, however, especial exception was 
taken to an article he wrote in *Ilanga* on the 4th May entitled 
*Vukani Bantu*. In this burden of his message was that while the

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2 See reports in files SNA 1/4/9 31/01, SNA 1/4/12 6/03.
3 SNA 1/1/349 2675/06, Minutes Gov. and M.N.A. 21.8.06, 20.9.06.
4 Translated in SNA 1/1/340 1340/08, but acc. to the missionaries of 
the A.Z.M. not very accurately. *Vukani Bantu*, meaning "Arise, O people",
was interpreted as an invitation to rebellion.
Indians and Coloureds raised funds in order to bring their grievances before the Imperial Government, and were aided in this by their friends in Britain, amongst the Africans there was only indifference.

Dube therefore called upon the Zulu people to raise money and send delegates to England to try to remedy such grievances as the high rents imposed on Mission Reserves, the compulsory labour system, the Pass laws as well as various other laws considered oppressive by both Christian and tribal Africans. As a result of this article, Dube was brought before the Governor and forced to make a public renunciation and apology, both in his own paper and in the other Natal newspapers. In the view of the American missionary, John Dexter Taylor, Dube's writings were not intended to stir up seditious feelings amongst the African populace - indeed in February and March 1906 Dube warned the tribesmen that an appeal to arms would never help the black man and that even if some of the laws were not approved, the Zulu were obliged to obey them. The American missionary was sure, after translating the article himself

1 CO 179/235/22645, Gov. to Sec. St.k 30.5.06.

2 Itlanga lase Natal, 23.2.06 and 3.3.06. Cf also Itlanga lase Natal, 10.11.05 (transl. H. C. Lugg in SNA 1/1/329 1905). "... If the Itlanga does find fault with this [Poll] Tax it has to find more fault with the remarks made by those natives in Durban, who said they would not pay the money. Such contemptuous speech to the Government is not right... It is well that the natives should learn to be more respectful."
and getting an independent Zulu translation of it, that S. O. Samuelson, the Under Secretary for Native Affairs, misinterpreted Dube in several instances and read into the Zulu words more than was actually there.¹

The crux of the matter, however, was probably expressed by the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum when he declared in his interview with Dube ² which was already been partly quoted,³ "You will find from our newspapers that even the white people, who are the ruling race – and I presume you will acknowledge that we are the ruling race – have determined that there shall be no discussion in native affairs while the rebellion exists. In the same way ... we expect you ... to lend us your influence ... by advising the chiefs and members of the tribes rightly. You must understand that those who are not for us, are against us."³

Dube's rather humble reply, that he was a young man, rather easily swayed by his feelings and not guilty of any intentional disloyalty towards the government, and his promise to fully retract his words in the next issue of Ilanga to some extent apparently

¹ABN 111/1, p.347, Letterbook: J. D. Taylor to F. F. Churchill, M.L.A.
²See above, p. 500
³Co 179/235/22646, Gov. to Sec. St., desp. 103, 30.5.06. Encl. interview with J. L. Dube,
assuaged the government; a few months later McCallum was able
to write of the admirable way in which Dube was aiding the
government in preventing the spread of a rebellion.\footnote{Cd 3247, Gov. to Sec. St., no. 27, 4.8.06.} There can
be little doubt that even before his meeting with the Supreme
Chief, Dube was fully aware of the impossibility of fighting
the white man's bullets with assegais and the incantations of
witch doctors.\footnote{See e.g. Ilanga lane Natal, Feb. and March 1906.} It was apparently his influence which kept the
Chief Nqawe and the bulk of his people, the Qadi, from joining
the resistance despite the fact that many of them were right
in the heart of the troubled area (Mapumulo) and were clearly
restless over the Poll Tax. Four hundred Qadi aided Col. McKenzie
in the Mapumulo district.\footnote{Cd 3247, Gov. to Sec. St., no. 27, 4.8.06.}

It is not surprising that the emergence of the "new movement"
in both religion and politics was noted especially amongst the
members of the American Zulu Mission and of the Wesleyan Methodist
Missions.\footnote{To some extent what follows applies in lesser degree to the United
Free Church of Scotland which also was producing politically
conscious and articulate converts like S. Rhyongwana and Bryant Gela
at this time.} The Wesleyans and the American Board were the earliest
entrants in the Natal Mission Field, and could count among their

\begin{enumerate}
  \item Cd 3247, Gov. to Sec. St., no. 27, 4.8.06.
  \item See e.g. Ilanga lane Natal, Feb. and March 1906.
  \item Cd 3247, Gov. to Sec. St., no. 27, 4.8.06.
  \item To some extent what follows applies in lesser degree to the United
    Free Church of Scotland which also was producing politically
    conscious and articulate converts like S. Rhyongwana and Bryant Gela
    at this time.
\end{enumerate}
followers second and even third generation Christians.\(^1\) Outstanding men of both missions had had the opportunity of studying outside Natal, whether in the Cape Province at Healdtown or Lovedale as was the case with most of the Wesleyan converts like Saul Msane or J. T. Gumede, or in the States like Dube or Pixley ka isaka Seme, both of the American mission.

The missionaries of both these bodies had had great faith in the educative value of individual land tenure and had encouraged their converts to acquire their own land and settle down as Christian communities. The Wesleyan Methodist settlements at Edendale and Driefontein, for example, were on land bought by the Africans themselves and were governed by twelve officers elected by the shareholders, important training in self-government.\(^2\) Other syndicates had been formed on similar lines and fairly extensive farms amounting in all to 37,000 acres had been bought, especially in the Klip-River and Dundee magisterial divisions, where there were no government reserves. It was largely due to the endeavours of Aldwin Court of the American Zulu Mission that large Mission Reserves had been set aside by the Government of Natal in 1856, an important factor in giving the Christian Communities cohesion and

\(^1\)See above, Chapter I, p. 74-78

stability.\(^1\) There had also been an experiment in individual
land-tenure at the Groutville Mission Station (A.Z.M.). Although
this had not been entirely successful, largely it would appear
because of the failure of the sugar-mill set up by the government
at the Station,\(^2\) it had whetted the appetite of the American Board’s
converts for the further cutting up of the Mission Reserves into
individual allotments.\(^3\) This it was felt would provide incentive
for the improvement of lots, and would give a man the necessary
security and status in the community. It would also free the
Christians from being under the jurisdiction of a Chief, who was
not necessarily sympathetic to their beliefs.\(^4\) These converts laid
great emphasis on the importance of private property and felt that
men of property should have the vote in order to protect their
interests.\(^5\) It is also clear that men who had a fair amount of
property, as was the case for instance with Stephen Mini or Martin
Luthuli, would not care to jeopardise it by rash actions.

It is noticeable also that both the Wesleyan Methodists and
the American Zulu Mission had provided scope for the evangelical seal

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3. SHA 1/1/295 824. This seems to have been a constant preoccupation of the
American missionaries and their converts. In 1902 Martin Luthuli organised
a petition amongst American Zulu Mission converts which was signed by
767 residents in favour of individual tenure. When a bill for the
establishing some form of individual leasehold tenure for Africans
fell through in 1906–9 it was decided to put this into operation in
the Umvoti Mission Reserve. (See below, p. 587.)
of their converts. Among the Wesleyans, the *Usondela* movement was founded in 1874 largely as a result of William Taylor and Charles Pangla's revivalist meetings held in Natal in 1866. This was officially recognised and designated the Wesleyan Native Home Mission in 1878 and initially was run by four missionaries and eight African evangelists. The W.H.H.M. was paralleled in the American Zulu Mission by the *Xitupa* or committee of six Zulu members founded in 1885 entrusted with the indigenous missionary movement. Similarly within the indigenous African Congregational Church, which was regarded as the fruit of American Board's missionary endeavours, each individual church or congregation had the right to decide for itself all matters of a purely local nature; each congregation could choose and call its own minister subject to the approval of the American missionaries though the ministers were still trained by the Mission at schools like *Amansintchi* under European supervision. All the congregations of the African Congregational church met annually to consider general matters and the rulings of this conference were accepted by all constituent churches as binding. This taken together with the letter from the American

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Board to all its foreign missions in February 1895 strongly advo­cating a self-supporting, self-propagating church — again a feature which can be paralleled by John Kilner’s visit to South Africa in 1882 and his very similar suggestions — was yet a further factor in the Government’s hostility to the American Zulu Mission.¹

Their congregational structure may well have predisposed the American Zulu Mission to schism, and it has been frequently noted that protestant and especially congregational missionary organisations seem to suffer far more from schismatic movements than the more hierarchal and structured Roman Catholic and Anglican churches. In part this may perhaps be attributed to the greater encouragement of independence and enquiry given by the congregationalist missionaries as well as to their decentralised organisation. While the schisms were extremely upsetting to the missionaries, the kind of education provided and the values inculcated do seem to have fostered the growth of a considerable cadre of political leadership from amongst both the Wesleyan Methodists and the A.Z.M., and to some extent from the United Free Church of Scotland.

The activities of the Colenso family, independent Church of England missionaries in Natal were probably also among the important formative factors in the crystallisation of African political

¹Sundkler, Beutu Propheta, p.30.
opinion and techniques. And perhaps also in creating the atmosphere of separatism! After all, Bishop Colenso was the first leader of an independent Church in Natal, after his excommunication by the Bishop of Cape Town in 1863 on charges of heresy.¹ Part of this heresy was that polygamists should be admitted to Baptism. The Colenso contribution was perhaps rather different to that of the other mission bodies mentioned. The actual mission work of the Colenso Church would appear to have been negligible after the excommunication of the Bishop, and certainly after his death.² Their converts did not become leaders of either separatist sects or political organisations. Instead there seems some evidence that a couple of separatist church preachers at the Usuthu actually joined the Church of England (i.e. the Colensite body) in the years before Dinisulu's arrest. On the other hand, as has already been pointed out, members of the Colenso family, but especially the Bishop and his daughter Harriette, themselves became spokesmen of the Zulu. On the whole Harriette was more concerned with the situation in Zululand, and the plight of the Zulu Royal family, after the 1879 war, although she also took a keen interest in the affairs of Natal.


While the part she played as adviser to Dimasulu has been discussed in greater detail above, the type of agitation she initiated—pamphleteering, petitioning, organising pressure groups—was to constitute an important lesson in "Clapham sect" methodology for the Africans of Natal. Her activities could not fail to have their impact on the intelligentsia of Natal, for there was interaction between the affairs of Zululand and the affairs of Natal. Martin Luthuli for example was Dimasulu's secretary during the 1880s, and must then have become aware of the political forces at play in Zululand, while Dimasulu's secretary, Leonard Nosipani, in 1907-8 was also a member of the Groutville community. Presumably it was through their joint efforts on Dimasulu's behalf that Martin Luthuli and Harriette Colenso first met. In 1899 he, Saul Mesane and Josiah Gumede met her to discuss the formation of the Natal Native Congress. She maintained her sympathy and contact with the educated and politically conscious Africans for the rest of her life.

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1 See E. M. Boscoe, Saints in Politics for 'Clapham sect' methodology.

2 Col. Col. 189, Letters from Martin Luthuli to H.E. Colenso date from 1885 onwards.

3 Col. Col. 120, H.E. Colenso diary, 21.12.00.

There was at the turn of the century an evident "ferment" amongst the educated Africans in South Africa as a whole which was commented on by several authorities. To the A.Z.N. missionary Rev. Bridgeman this was a not unwelcome sign: "Although raising difficult problems was ... an encouraging indication... an awakening from the sleep of ages and a willingness to assume responsibility".¹ Other observers were less sympathetic. Many labelled the entire phenomenon "Ethiopianism", a movement which had as its aim "Africa for the Africans". Yet in Natal, this "Ethiopianism" can be seen to be composed of many strands. At one level it was expressed in millenial fantasies and dreams, like those of the lunatic who

"got up in Durban outside the gardens, sprang up on the pallisade there and cried that he was the Lord Jesus Christ and that he came there to lead the Natives into their own kingdom, and to take possession of the land which was a black man's land."²

On another, it was represented by the African who informed a member of the Natal Legislative Assembly that in two years time he would own a store on the main street in Durban and "that a white man would work for him".³ Mjongo and Makanda and the separatist sects were


³Ibid.
evidence of it, as were Dube and Radebe and Stephen Mini, and the Natal Native Congress. It was the product of many and varied factors, although nervous whites were of course correct in attributing it predominantly to the work of the missionaries. Political episodes gave it substance: the defeat and subjection of Zululand on the one hand and the Anglo-Boer war on the other were obviously shaping events. To all these factors must be added the effect of the whirlwind visit in 1896 of Joseph Booth, that turbulent spirit in African missions and politics. Although his scheme for setting up an African Christian Union to regain "Africa for the Africans" was rejected at the time, the readiness with which the Africans attended his meetings, and their "unmistakeable general approval of his utterances and plans" not only "illustrated the spirit and danger of the times", and increased white suspicions of African intentions; they undoubtedly contributed to the "strange leaven working amongst the educated Kaffirs throughout the country".

While all the politically conscious Kols, however moderate, were indiscriminately lumped together by most whites with the leaders of

1See above, p.517-2/ and Chapter V, p. 301-311.


3AHM V/1/2, Annual Report 1897 by B.H.Bridgeman, M.D.

all the independent sects as "seditious Ethiopians", "busy bodies, in existence more for the harm of the native than otherwise", their approach would appear to have differed considerably from that of the sect leaders, and they were at great pains to deny their "Ethiopianism". It is true that both the movements - the religious and the political - arose to some extent out of the same general background factors: the imposition and extension of white rule, the resentment caused by the colour bar, the struggle over land and labour. They also both drew their leadership from the ranks of the Christian converts of Southern Africa. Nevertheless the relationship of the two was not the "directional one" argued by many authorities. Chronologically the independent church movement preceded the more conventional political activities; but their relationship can best be expressed as that between different sides of the same coin.


2 Acc. to A. Vilakazi "the Separatist Churches... are regarded as catering to the uneducated people and as being led by illiterate men." But this attitude may be a later development. Zulu Transformations, p.101.

3 B.G.M. Sundlov, Bantu Prophets, pp. 32-3.

4 For an extreme statement of this viewpoint see for example P. Worsley, 'Millenarian Movements in Melanesia' in Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, no. 2, p. 18 ff.
It would be wrong to label all the independent sects "anti-white" — indeed not all of them even participated in the 1906 disturbances, and I have been able to find no references to the largest of the A.Z.M. splinter groups, S. B. Shibe's Zulu Congregational Church as actually taking part in the fighting\(^1\) — nonetheless there would appear to have been a considerable difference between their act of breaking away from a European dominated church and the aspirations of the majority of the politically conscious Amakolwa, who sought acceptance by white society and integration within it. This difference probably explains in large measure the difference in their degree of participation in the disturbances.

Thus it can be seen that the Kolwa of Natal took up no single stand on the 1906 disturbances: they were as divided as their fellow tribesmen. While about three hundred Christian levies fought on the government side, an equal number joined the rebels, while the majority even in the areas of military operations, tried to retain a precarious neutrality. It is of course difficult to estimate the influence of those who joined the rebels, but it would not appear to have been profound. As we have seen, the rebellion, in so far as there was a real rebellion, was predominantly a tribal one.\(^2\)

\(^1\)For Shibe see Sandkler, Bantu Prophets, p.45. SNA 1/1/392. Minutes on Shibe, attempting — unsuccessfully — to find him guilty of seditious preaching during the Boer War.

\(^2\)See Chapters V and VI.
run as far as possible on traditional lines. The popular white belief that the Ethiopians had fomented the disturbances would appear to coincide with the theory so familiar in South Africa and indeed colonial history of "agitator" caused rebellions. As the Rev. E. D. Goddenough wrote in his Annual Report to the American Board of Missions in 1906:

"As for the Ethiopian Church stirring up rebellion, I fully believe they are capable of any amount of mischievous and seditious talk, but that they have sufficient influence with the heathen people to be able to stir up several large tribes to open rebellion seems to me in the absence of positive proof, incredible."

Chapter IX

EPILOGUE

"I thank Bambata. I thank Bambata very much. Would this spirit might continue! I do not mean the Bambata of the bush who perished at Nkandhla, but I mean this new spirit which we have just heard explained."

Christian African at a meeting held by John Dube in Zululand to explain the new South African Native National Congress and appeal for African unity.

K.C.L. Marshall Campbell Papers
Bantu Section, Letter from District Commissioner, Zululand. R 156/1912/32.
The Natal disturbances were over; in all, between three and four thousand Africans had been killed and about thirty whites.\(^1\) The rebellion and the expedition to arrest Dinuzulu cost the colony over £880,000.\(^2\) The trials before the Special Court cost the Natal government £15,500 and the defence £11,044, of which the Imperial government paid 2,000 guineas.\(^3\) Dinuzulu’s trial ate up Harriette Colenso’s private resources,\(^4\) even though W. P. Schreiner went without his fee so that the private members of the defence team could be paid.\(^5\) Even they were never paid in full.\(^6\)

For the African population, the cost was far greater. Whatever the long-term results of the rebellion were, its immediate

\(^1\) Stuart, E.R., pp. 540-1.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 550.
\(^3\) CO 179/253/24398, Gov. to Sec. St., 26.7.09.
\(^4\) See The Times (London), 8.3.09, CO 179/251/34522, F.Mac to Sec. St., 12.9.08. In the ’90’s she spent £5,000, 1907-09 £1,600 in defence of Dinuzulu. In 1910 under the Church Properties Act the remaining mission lands of the Church of England were incorporated with those of the Church of the Province and in recompense the Colenso sisters were granted an annuity of £150; in addition Lady Schwanz organised a fund in Britain to help in their support. See Col. Col. 121, Diary H.E.C. Natal Witness 18.9.10, Letters from C. de B. Perasse.
results were to exacerbate the poverty and distress of the African population, especially those living in the disturbed areas. Coming on top of the plagues and pestilences of the last ten years,¹ for many Africans the rebellion must have been the last straw. In Mapumulo, for example, half the breadwinners had been killed or imprisoned. For months afterwards no-one could be found to bury the dead bodies in the area.² In Mapumulo, Mdvedwe and Lower Tugela, 6,700 huts had been destroyed and well over 30,000 people rendered homeless.³ In June 1907, 25 ringleaders including were deported to St. Helena and there were over 4,000 political prisoners in Natal gaols; at the beginning of 1908 this figure had been reduced by half and more of these were released by the end of March 1908.⁴ By moving looted stock which was infected with East Coast fever and Tick fever from one part of the colony to another, the troops had introduced cattle disease into areas hitherto unaffected, and in 1907 there was unrest, especially amongst Silwane's Cunu people over the further quarantining

¹See above, Chapter III.
²Letter, Rev. H. D. Goodenough to Natal Mercury, 28.11.06.
³SHA 1/1/352 3322, Minute Magis. Maxwell to U.S.N.A., 12.10.06
⁴CO 179/240/5287, Gov. to Sec. St. Conf. 19.1.07 and Cd 3998, no. 61. Gov. to Sec. St., 27.3.08.
measures and the killing of stock that were considered necessary by the Department of Agriculture. According to a missionary report in Zululand in 1907 "famine and starvation have been keenly felt ... and cattle have died in their thousands". Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the rumours of unrest and the dreams of a messianic saviour continued unabated.

At the same time, Africans were taking more practical steps to alleviate their distress. Thus the numbers of Africans seeking work in the European areas immediately after the disturbances suddenly leapt forward. In Zululand, according to one estimate in 1909 80% of the adult males were away at work. In the proclaimed labour areas of the Transvaal, the figure of labourers from Natal—Zululand in 1909 shows a 59% increase over that in 1906. The presence of Chinese indentured labour on the gold mines until 1910, and in the Natal towns and collieries of 'rebel' prisoners who were hired out at a nominal fee to any municipality, township, company public body or individual enabled employers

1 CO 179/242/553, Gov. to Sec. St., 15.12.07.
2 Zululand Mission Report, 1908 (Wesleyan Meth.)
3 See above, Chapter 4.
4 Zululand Mission Report, (Wesleyan Meth.), 1909. (Wesleyan Meth.)
5 SHA 1/1/460/1154, S.M.A. Pretoria to S.M.A. Pietermaritzburg, 30.3.10. Acc. to Axelsson, Taxation in Natal, the number of Africans from Natal employed in Transvaal increased from 17,900 in 1906, to 22,600 in 1907, 23,000 in 1908, 26,500 in 1909 and 34,200 in 1910.
to keep down wages. At the same time, the numerous petitions from farmers to the Department of Native Affairs for the women and children of rebels as apprentices and domestic servants show how their labour problems were being tackled. In August, 1908 the Minister of Railways and Harbours in Natal could report with satisfaction that the wages of Africans on the railways had been reduced from 30s. to 22s. 6d. and 25s. 1

The disturbances also gave rise to changes in the political configuration of Natal-Zululand. First and foremost of these was, of course, the removal of Dinusulu, and his permanent exile from the territory. In Zululand itself, his kraal was ploughed down and destroyed to prove to his still hopeful followers that he would never return. Needless to say the Mandlakazi under the appointed chief Mciteski were 'very pleased' to hear that Dinusulu had been deposed and exiled. 2 In 1910 the Usuthu were divided between Mciteski of the Mandlakazi, Mpikanina, Dinusulu's cousin and son of Siwedu, and a newly appointed chief, Noys. The King's people went under Chief Mkandwamba ka Mnyamana of the Buthelezi and brother of Tahaniubeswe who died in the middle of 1906. 3 At the same time.

2 SMA 1/4/22 0 11/10, Minute Magis. Edwandwe G. G. Jackson, 16.4.10 to District Native Commissioner Eshowe.
every effort was made to destroy the most prominent pro-Usguthu members of the Zulu Royal family. Dimisulu's uncle, Tahingana and his family were exiled from Zululand, largely because of the difficulty any other chief would have in controlling them. He must have been about seventy years old at the time. Hakoboko, Chief of the Tshangesa people, Dimisulu's brother-in-law and one of his prominent followers from the eighties onward, was arrested and flogged by Mackenzie when the Field Forces were in Zululand and the Northern Provinces on suspicion that he had sent aid to Dimisulu at the time of his arrest and had been responsible for hiding his firearms. He was deposed from his position, as was Chief Tahibela, head of the Nafu people in the Vryheid division, who was said to have sent armed aid in Dimisulu's support at the end of 1907. Mabekeshiya, the most influential man amongst the Galusi, was removed for the same reason. In Tahibela's place ruled Msindo, who had been the one to give evidence of their planning to aid Dimisulu in 1907. Ironically enough —

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1 For Tahingana's part in events of the '90's, see above, Chapter p. 106. Col. Col. 140, Vol. III, H. E. Colenso to W. P. Schreiner, 8.4.11.

2 Cd 3998, no. 24, Gov. to Sec. St. Secret 25.1.08 (CO 179/244/5605).

3 SWA 1/1/460 1159/10, Minute D.N.C. C. Emmett, 1.4.10.

4 Ibid.
but not perhaps surprisingly — once Dimusulu himself had been deposed and exiled, official fears began to centre round his brother Mansolwandle, whose claims to the chieftainship they had formerly sponsored. Thus in 1909, the Ndwandwe magistrate wrote to the District Commissioner in Zululand about the illicit liquor traffic which he accused Mansolwandle of indulging in, remarking:

"you will... agree with me that now that Dimusulu is no longer the tangible pivot of disaffection in Zululand it is to be expected that Mansolwandle will become the centre round which the reverence for the Royal House will gravitate and that however loyal his present intentions may be, the pernicious effect of an unlimited supply of liquor together with the insidious influences which will probably be exercised upon him by malcontents may be a fruitful source of trouble in the future."1

It was left to the Union Government to appoint a regent for Dimusulu's young son, Solomon, on his death in 1913, and to the present Nationalist government to support the paramountcy of his grandson, Cyprian Bekhesulu to the hilt!2

So much for the Usuthu. At a local level the disturbances also made considerable changes in the political landscape. During the disturbances fourteen chiefs had been killed or deposed. In

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2 And apparently for Cyprian to support the Territorial Tribal Authorities of the Nationalist Government equally strongly, see G. Hill, Bantustans p. 96.
their place, and that of the ten chiefs who had died during the
course of 1906, thirty-two new chiefs and acting-chiefs were
appointed. Seven chiefdoms were cut up in Natal and two com-
pletely new units were formed in Zululand. In Natal the main
people to be divided up were Talent's Embo, Hiskofeli's Kuse
and Ngobisa's Balu who had been divided into three in the
early days of the disturbances. In 1910 Silwane's Gumu, one
of the largest groups in the colony were divided into four
sections, after Silwane himself had been deposed, ostensibly
for insolent behaviour to the magistrate, while under the in-
fluence of alcohol. Silwane had had over 10,500 men of fighting
age under his sole control, and was rumoured to have been in
sympathy with Dimashu.  

From the inception of self-government in Natal, an attempt
had been made to give chiefs a purely territorial jurisdiction,
and to institute a 'ward-system' whereby the people in a particular
division of territory or ward, would all be subject to the same
chief. The upheaval caused by the disturbances enabled the
government to take this a stage further than hitherto and to break

1 Annual Rept. on Native Affairs, 1906, Pietermaritzburg, 1907, p. 40, and
Appendix 5, p. 39.

2 SNA 1/1/438 2286. SNA 1/1/457 518, 519, 520. Minutes S.M.A. and
Magis. New Hanover, Wenen and Estcourt, see also SNA 1/4/437 1940
and 1950. Co 179/253/26470, Gov. to Sec. St., 15.7.09.

3 See above, Chapters I and VI.
up the larger 'tribes'. According to E. D. Winter, Minister of Native Affairs in 1906 - never a particularly perceptive witness - "the natives took this process in good part". Thus in the Lower Tugela division, the disturbances afforded a useful pretext for an all round adjustment of the boundaries in a division which was "almost a byword for confusion and unwieldiness".

In that area, during the disturbances, the number of chiefs was reduced from nineteen to nine, and the magistrate of the division tried to reduce this number even further by finding chiefs Moolwa, Makowu, Cakijana and Tahingumusi guilty of rebellion, although they had none of them played any overt part in the disturbances. By the beginning of 1908, Moor, by then Minister of Native Affairs and Prime Minister, decided against so drastic and logical a form of the ward system, and decided against taking action against any of them except Tahingumusi, whose tribe was simply merged with those of other chiefs under the ward system.

In the Nkandla division too, despite the initial desire of the Commissioner for Native Affairs to completely smash Sigananda's Ciskei people, by 1908 wiser counsels had prevailed, and the people

\[1\] N.W.A.C. 1906-7, p.218.

\[2\] SMA 1/1/374-2220, Minute S. O. Samelson, 7.1.07, and E. H. Addison, F. P. Shuter and E. R. Moor, 1.2.0.8. SMA 1/1/370-1641, Report Magis. 7.8.07, Minute Moor, 8.7.08. N.W.A.C. p.497, Evid. Magis. F.P. Shuter, Lower Tugela.

\[3\] SMA 1/1/351-3222-08, Moor to U.S.W.A., 9.1.08.
were allowed to reconstitute themselves under a son of Sigananda's, approved of by the government.\footnote{See SNA 1/1/354 3606\textsuperscript{06}, Minute C.H.A. to H.N.A., 25.10.07, and Moor, 1.2.08, Colenbrander, 24.2.08.} Despite considerable pressure in the Natal Legislative Assembly from the members of Zululand, Yonge and Brunner, their lands were not opened to European settlement, although it was decided not to allow any Africans to settle in the old haunts of the Cube people, which had proved of such strategic value to Bambatha and his followers.\footnote{SNA 1/1/34 1859\textsuperscript{06}, Minute Sec. F.K., 10.8.06. This on recommendation of Col. Bu-De Wold, 17.6.06.} While the disturbances provided an opportunity for the redrawing of inter- and intra-tribal boundaries, many of them for genuine administrative convenience, there is no evidence that they provided any additional land for European settlement. On the other hand, the removal of Dinisulu from Zululand and the crushing of the Umtuthu cause, must in no small measure have facilitated the occupation by Europeans of those lands which had been set aside for white settlement by the 1902-04 Delimitation Commission. When Margery Perham visited South Africa in 1931 she was immediately struck by the contrast presented with native administration in Tanganyika; in South Africa, she remarked

"... the strong tribal feeling of the Zulus, defeated, restrained and neglected, made me think of some large
power machine pushed on its side, still working, its energy running to waste, a sad, if not dangerous sight.¹

Those then were the immediate and negative results of the rebellion. It has, however, been argued recently that in colonial Africa even resisters achieve some, if not all, of their aims. A rebellion heightens awareness of African grievances, and, even if it involves considerable suffering, it can produce a change in administrative practice and even political structure, if only because the predominant aim of almost every colonial administration is to keep the peace. While it is necessary to bear in mind that Natal, because of its large white settler community, is not entirely typical of the colonial situation in tropical Africa, it is useful to examine this hypothesis in the context of the aftermath of the disturbances. What was the lesson learnt by Natal from the rebellion?

In looking for these changes one must not expect any radical departures. Natal was not a Company-governed possession over which the Colonial Office could reassert control.² At a time when the Imperial government was looking forward to a unification of Southern Africa and was pre-occupied with granting self-governing


²i.e. unlike the situation in Rhodesia after the Natabale-Shona rebellions.
institutions to the defeated Boer Republics, it would have been virtually impossible for Liberal statesmen to have contemplated returning to "quasi Crown Colony Government" in Natal, as had happened for five years in 1875 in part as a result of Natal's mishandling of the Langalibalele disturbance of 1875.\(^1\) It was probably equally unrealistic to expect the 1906-11 Liberal government to have accepted the suggestion that Zululand revert to direct Imperial rule,\(^2\) as Basutoland had done in 1884 after the 1880/1881 Gun War.\(^3\) That had been at the direct request of the Cape ministry concerned. In Natal, ministers were far too weak politically to have contemplated doing this.\(^4\) Indeed most of them found that the best way of raising their political stock was by raising the anti-Imperial interference cry.\(^5\) Though many South African statesmen were extremely critical of Natal's handling of her affairs, a good deal of their criticism was spurred on by the fear that she would force the Imperial government to intervene.

\(^1\) In this case however the incident provided Carnacyn with a useful lever in further his confederation schemes for South Africa. See C. W. de Kiewiet, *The Imperial Factor in South Africa*, pp. 36-46.

\(^2\) This possibility it appears was discussed by the Aborigines Protection Society; CO 179/243/43061 to Elgin, 9.12.07. The New Reform Club Political Committee, "a little body of Radical M.P.s and others" in 1908 felt Zululand should be taken away from the special control of Natal and put under 'federal control' presumably of the forthcoming union. See J. A. Hobson to J. C. Smuts, 14.6.08. For the response of South Africans outside of Natal see Smuts' reply to Hobson, 13.7.08. Smuts Papers, ed. v.d. Poel and Hancock, Vol. II, no. 355, 388.

\(^3\) The Cape decision to ask the Imperial govt. to take over Basutoland was
through sheer mismanagement. To men who had lived through the Jameson Raid and the Boer War, this appeared both dangerous and evil. The Liberal government were fully aware of this — indeed they refrained from interfering in Natal's legislative plans in 1909/10 precisely because they feared it would impede the forthcoming union — and despite the fact that the proposed legislation was discriminatory and therefore clearly within the category of legislation which could be disallowed. ¹

Thus the changes which one is looking for as a result of the disturbances are a more subtle affair; shifts in emphasis, some change in attitude, reforms introduced by a body of rulers and administrators relatively unaltered from those who had been in power through all the years of self-government. That the rebellion did jolt some white Natalians out of their complacency is perhaps to be seen in the replacement of Winter by Moor as Minister of Native Affairs at the end of 1906. Moor was still

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⁴ See e.g. T. Hyllop to J. C. Smuts, 22.11.09, Smuts Papers, Vol. II, no. 449 and Nathan MSS 368, p. 98, to Hely-Hutchinson, 10.5.08.

⁵ See e.g. Moor's speech on the subject, *Times of Natal*, 23.3.08. See below, p.

¹ See e.g. CO 179/256/8664 Minate Lambert, 24.3.10 on Regulation under Act no. 1, 1909, re Native Assemblies and CO 179/256/5725, Bale to Sec. St. 14.1.10 on Act no. 1, 1910, which excluded non-whites from provision made for govt. servants at time of union. CO 179/256/5960 Nathan to Sec. St. 2.2.10. Bill to provide for teachers in Govt.-aided schools, which excluded non-white teachers from its benefits.
widely considered the most sympathetic of the possible Natal ministers to the Africans. Extraordinary as this may seem to anyone who has read his evidence before the South African Native Affairs Commission or at the National Convention of 1906, he indubitably represented a change for the better by comparison with Lechmere and Winter. By any other than Natal standards, he was a short-sighted and illiberal man; to expect vast changes in the philosophy and practice of native policy from him was clearly unwarranted by anything in his previous record. That he would prove amenable to a policy of removing unnecessary friction however was likely, and was shown in a sense in the action decided upon by the government as a result of the recommendations of the Natal Native Affairs Commission. As important as the replacement of Winter by Moor, was the replacement of Sir Henry MacCallum by Sir Matthew Nathan in the middle of 1907. Sir Henry, left the colony fully satisfied that he had left native affairs "fairly flattened out"; a phrase which led Winston Churchill to minute

"fairly flattened out" is a good expression and does justice to the wisdom and humanity that have inspired, no less than to the beneficent results that have attended the native policy of the Natal government and Sir Henry MacCallum (sic)"2

1See introductory quotation to E. I. Moor thought the ideas of "equality and brotherhood" between black and white "preposterous". Nathan MSS 572, p. 226 ff. Henderson to Nathan. See above, p. 195 ff.

200 179/241/19723. Minute on Gov. to Sec. St., 1.6.07.
This was probably an over cautious judgment. There is evidence that after the disturbances, Sir Henry took a keen interest in the recommendations of the Natal Native Affairs Commission which he was responsible for appointing at the end of 1906, and that he urged on ministers the wisdom of releasing the rank and file of political prisoners at the rate of 600 a month. Even before the Natal Native Affairs Commission had reported he urged on ministers that rate of wages paid to labourers under the Isibhalo system be brought nearer the minimum market rate. Before he left Pietermaritzburg he decided to hold a meeting of the principal chiefs, by which both they and he were suitably impressed. Initially called as an attempt to avoid giving Dinuzulu any reason for thinking that he was unique in having a meeting with the Governor, MoCallum was to suggest to Sir Matthew Nathan that this meeting become an annual function. Fundamentally however he was a man of autocratic temperament who would brook no interference, resented and suspected the educated African, and who proved very adaptable.

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1 See Nathan MSS 401, no. 226, Report on Native Affairs Confidential n.d. unsigned but in MoCallum's handwriting and probably written before his departure to his successor.

2 UN 577 Cons. 226 Minute Gov. to P.M., 20.5.05. SNA 1/1/577 4024 Minute from Sec. of Gov. to M.N.A., 11.12.06.

3 See Nathan Papers, MSS 401, no. 26, op. cit.

4 00 179/241/231.01, Min. in dep. 86 of 5.6.07, Interview with Chiefs, p.53.
to Natal mores. Indeed the Natal ministry of 1906 more than once begged Lord Elgin that McCallum be allowed to prolong his governorship of Natal, so well did he understand their problems.¹

Sir Matthew Nathan, described by Inwo as the "most able and brilliant ... enlightened and beneficent" Governor of Natal, had a very different temperament.² Chosen specifically for the position by Lord Elgin, he was a man of wide experience and sympathies. On arrival in Natal, he rapidly informed himself on every aspect of native policy. Within the first few months after his arrival he had visited most parts of the colony and had interviewed a large number of chiefs. He even visited Zululand under martial law despite the open opposition of ministers and of the formidable Sir Duncan McKenzie with whose views he was to have the profoundest and most fundamental disagreements.³ Throughout his period of governorship he conducted a passionate crusade against the practice of flogging in Natal as well as the inordinate amount of state-made crime in the colony.⁴ He took

¹Inwo 1/4/16 G202, Minute H.N.A. 9.7.06. G0 179/240/7991, Encl. in depo conf. 9.2.07. See also G0 179/245/18622, Gov. to Sec. St., 29.4.08 and C.O. minutes.

²Inwo, 17.11.08. See also private letter from J. T. Jabava praying that Nathan be made first Governor of United S.A. and praising his "warm sympathy" for all the people of South Africa. Nathan MSS 375, p.151, 8.9.09.

³See esp. G0 179/244/3029, Encl. 2a in depo Secret 4.1.06, P.N. Office to Gov. 51.12.07 and 26, Gov. to Col. Sec. (Natal), 1.1.08.

⁴See above, Chapter V, p. 362-4.
up the recommendation of the Natal Native Affairs with zeal and
lost no opportunity of pressing the necessity for their fulfil-
ment on ministers.¹ His sympathy with the Christian Africans was
very considerable, and the Rev. Bridgeman of the American Zulu
Mission, which had had such a tussle with Sir Henry McCallum, came
away from a meeting with Nathan "very favourably impressed with
his genuine interest in the welfare and progress of the native
together with his sympathy for mission work". Nathan even con-
ceded to open a new school building erected by John Dube at
Chlange. Not surprisingly, Bridgeman found him "a refreshing
contrast to his predecessor."

It is true that the room which Nathan had for manœuvre
was severely limited. He could try to bring ministers round to
what he considered right, but he had neither the machinery nor
the finance to force his views upon them. In the final analysis
he had to accept their decisions as responsible ministers in a self-
governing colony, however much he disagreed with their policies.
It was clearly impossible for him to change the underlying structure
of Natal society, its racial attitudes or even most of its ad-
ministrative practices. Nevertheless the importance of a Governor's

¹Nathan MSS 366, Nathan to Eloy Hutchinson, 2.1.09. Nathan to
Selborne, 11.12.08.

²AHM 111/1/5, p.583, Bridgeman to J. L. Barben, 10.10.07. For
the contrast with McCallum, see above, Chapter VIII, p.
ability to influence in a colony the size of Natal through the weight of his prestige and experience must not be completely dis­
counted. That the Colonial Office were successful for example in 1908 in bringing Natal to its view, was in part the result of having Sir Matthew as their intermediary. While he was not able to succeed over major issues such as the declaration of Martial law in Zululand, on less vital issues, he was, at times, able to prevail. In general, he was more successful when his views co­
incided with those of some of his ministers, and at times he felt frustrated at not being able to influence ministers "more to the home idea of what is right". Nevertheless, after he had recovered from the initial "repugnance" which Natal’s native policy caused "to a man of [his]... former training", he handled the situation with tact and understanding.  

As has already been mentioned, immediately after the disturb­
ances, Sir Henry McCallum appointed a Commission to enquire into native affairs in Natal. The Commissioners were all chosen from amongst the Natal colonists, though in general they could be described

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1 Nathan MS 369, p.60, Nathan to Elgin, 19.1.08.

2 Ibid., Nathan to Gold-Adams, 14.9.07.

3 Perhaps as a result of his efforts, by the middle of 1908 Sir Matthew could note that "public opinion in this colony is certainly more active than it has been before to the necessity of dealing generously with the Natives." Nathan MS 369, p.105, to Elgin, 23.5.08.
as falling within the Natal benevolent paternalist tradition, and represented the moderate viewpoint on 'native policy'. Thus they included such men as M.S. Evans, a man of wide sympathies and interests, a member of the Legislative Assembly for Durban, who had already written a pamphlet on The Native Problem, and was later to publish a book on Natal — Black and White in South-East Africa; the Rev. James Scott, Free Church of Scotland missionary; Col. H. E. Rawson who had represented the Imperial government on the Zululand Delimitation Commission, James Liege Bullet, member of the Legislative Assembly of Natal, a very prominent sugar farmer and one time Secretary of Native Affairs. The two remaining members were G. J. Bircenstock and T. K. Murray whilst H. C. Campbell, Judge of the Native High Court, acted as Chairman. It gathered the evidence of three hundred and one Europeans and nine hundred and six Africans — in itself a remarkable step forward — over a very wide range of topics — administration, land, labour, customary law, liquor, education, the problems

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1 Pubg, 1906.
3N.I.A.C., Report p.7.
of representation. Some 5,000 Africans sat in on its hearings
in thirty-four centres of the colony. By and large the philosophy
which lay behind the report was very similar to that of Sir
Theophilus Shepstone, though Ilanga lase Natal welcomed it as "the
most honest and comprehensive reports ever presented to a government"
and expressed its appreciation for "the sympathetic spirit it
contains". At the same time they were also strongly influenced
by the Social Darwinist thinking of their day and quoted with
approval the words of a "recent writer" that equality between black
and white was impossible because

"It has been demonstrated that the black and white
races are opposites in many cardinal points. The one
has a large frontal region of the brain, the other
a large posterior region; the one a great reasoner,
the other eminently emotional, the one domineering
but having great self-control, the other meek and
submissive, but violent and lacking in self-control
when the passions are aroused."2

The Commission saw as its ideal a policy which would very
ggradually wean the African away from tribalism, and would progress
towards the "higher and firmer grounds" of "individualism". In
the meantime, the "native was a minor who had to be safeguarded
against things which he otherwise might think right."4 Its

1Ilanga lase Natal, 23.8.07. Cf. the verdict of S. O. Sammelson
in the Natal Government Gazette that the Report "would do more harm
than good, because its extravagant language is calculated to embitter
both sections of the community, making negrophobes more oppressive
and so-called negrophiles and philanthropists and native malcontents
more insistent and aggressive." Government Notice no. 39, 18.1.08.

2Ibid., p.13.
fundamental tenet was still that "the natives are a people accustomed ... to the patriarchal system, the leading feature of which is a paternal despotism" that therefore the administration of native affairs "must be based on the autocratic principle of control". To this they added the proviso that the government should be "a benevolent and sympathetic father" -- as in the "good old days" of Shepstone and his personal control of native affairs. To this end they recommended that the powers of the Supreme Chief be more clearly defined, and that he should be free of interference from the courts and to make the position of the Secretary for Native Affairs a permanent one. Their reform of the administration also included four new district commissioners who would act in a general supervisory capacity over the magistrates, would be in more direct and personal contact with the African population and, by encouraging them to look over the heads of their chiefs, to break down tribalism. On the other hand, and in contradictory vein, the powers of chiefs were to be increased in order to prevent the disintegration of family life, for the chief as head of a patrilineal clan was recognised,

4 Col. Rawson to H. L. Colenso, N.N.A.C. Evid., p.121.
5 N.N.A.C., p.15.
though it was hoped that increasingly the powers of the chiefs could be made territorial through application of the ward system, rather than personal. A Council on Native Affairs was also recommended to advise the government on proposed native regulation, consisting of four official and four non-official members with the S.N.A. as Chairman.¹

All these recommendations of the Commission were embodied in the Act No. 1 of 1909 "to provide for the Better Administration of Native Affairs". The Act however went rather further than the Commission had suggested in extending the powers of the Supreme Chief, further defined and now unassailable, to all the deputies of the Supreme Chief, down to the magisterial level, making these officers answerable in turn only to their superior officers.

The act was apparently designed as early as 1905, by S. O. Smealson² who in 1906 expressed his regret that the office and powers of the Supreme Chief and his subordinate officers had been "so much restricted and pared down through the instrumentality of those who did not understand the nature, value and requirements of native life".³ On a previous occasion he had expressed his conviction that

¹N.W.A.G. pp. 14-17.
²Nathan ES3 368, p.169, Nathan to Lucas, 27.10.06.
³Government Notice no. 39, 18.1.06.
"Everything which leads the natives to believe that the powers possessed by those in authority are incompetent or restricted as compared with the power of them... they have been accustomed to see possessed and exercised by their native rulers and that their rulers are liable to errors of judgment and undecided in action only tends to bring the authority of their rulers into contempt and disrepute."¹

Sir Matthew Nathan, who supported most of the 1909 Act, confessed that he disliked Part III² which "opens the door to arbitrary action by subordinate officials",³ and this part of the Bill received considerable opposition not only from politically conscious Africans but also from the newly formed Native Affairs Reform Committee, a committee of about a hundred public spirited residents of Durban who had formed themselves into a body after the disturbances.⁴ Nevertheless this Act was the only one of three major legislative enactments to pass through all its stages in the Natal Legislative Assembly, though it did not last long being abolished by Union Act 1 of 1912.

An accompanying measure, the bill to increase the membership of the Natal Legislative Council from thirteen to seventeen members, by the addition of four members chosen by the Governor-in-Council for

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²Part III, § 27 of the bill read: "No interdict or other process of a court of law shall issue for the stay of an administrative act or order of the Supreme Chiefs or of any other such officer aforesaid, or for requiring any such officer to answer any suit or proceeding in respect thereof, unless the court shall first be satisfied that such act or order is without any lawful authority."

³Nathan MSS 368, p.189, Nathan to Lucas, 27.10.08.

⁴Co 179/248/45579, Petition from H.A.R.C. adl. in deep. Gov. to Sec. St., 6.11.08.
their especial knowledge and regard for the African population did not become law,¹ and the link recommended by both Sir Matthew Nathan and the Natal Native Affairs Commission between the Native Affairs Council and the Natal Legislature thus failed to materialize.²

While the Act for the Better Administration of Native Affairs is described by Stuart as part of the special and successful effort made by the Moor government "to improve the relations between the two races"³ in Natal, Sir Matthew Nathan puts his finger on its key weakness when he pointed out that even the District Commissioners were still chosen from the general run of Natal magistrates - and what he saw of their work did not impress him with their calibre.⁴ The first four Commissioners included R. H. Addison, who had played so prominent a part in the disturbances in Zululand in the eighties and who had been described by Fairfield at the Colonial Office as a "most injudicious young man", "one of the most potent causes" of the 1888 rebellion.⁵ Its second member, J. L. Knight, had been closely associated with Addison and the disastrous boundary Commission.

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¹Printed in Natal, Govt. Gazette, 21.4.06, p.298.
²Nathan NES, p.145. Nathan to Lucas, 6.9.06.
³Stuart, p. 326.
⁴Nathan NES 368, to Gov. Haly-Hutchinson, (Cape), 28.10.07.
⁵Minute on CO 427/20/2261, deep. 11.1.95, Gov. to Sec. st.
of 1887 which tried to settle the boundaries between the Umuthu and the Mandlakasi, a settlement which caused grave dissatisfaction to the Umuthu.¹ The third member was R. H. Beachcroft, who had been in the Natal service since 1883, while the fourth Commissioner was Cheere Emmett, a Vryheid farmer, one of the Boers who had aided Dinamali against Zibhebhu in 1884.² He seemed to owe his appointment to no better reason than that he was Botha’s brother-in-law and it would please the Boers.³ At the same time there was a general shuffle in the Department of Native Affairs. With the appointment of the four District Commissioners, Sir Charles Saunders gave up his position as Commissioner for Native Affairs in Zululand. As the new and permanent head of the Native Affairs Department yet another Shepetone was chosen, this time Arthur J. Shepstone,⁴ the son of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, as it was felt that there should be “a new man for new measures”.⁵ As Brookes and Webb point out, there is something “almost endearing” in the faith Natal had that

¹ CO 427/2/14969, Minutes of Fairfield 26.7.88 on deep. Gov. to Sec. St., (Havelock to Knutsford) 22.6.88.
³ Nathan MSS 368, p.300, Nathan to Carter, 19.6.09.
yet another Shepstone would help them solve their "native problems". ¹

His Assistant as Under-Secretary of Native Affairs was Captain James Stuart.

The Secretary of Native Affairs was also made head of the Native Affairs Council under the 1909 Act. Sir Matthew Nathan took exception to this step also, as he felt this went against the 1906-7 Commission by exalting the permanent official at the expense of the four district Commissioners whom the Commission had hoped would be the principal executive officers in the scheme of native administration.² It is doubtful however whether this was a matter of much moment considering the background of the Commissioners which was virtually the same as that of A. J. Shepstone in the magisterial service of the colony. What lay behind Nathan's objection was apparently his feeling that what Natal needed was "four Sir Charles Saunders, not one magnified Samuelson".³

One of the ways in which the Commission saw Africans could be 'weaned' away from tribalism and also could be given some form of local self-government was through a form of leasehold individual tenure and local council system similar to that adopted under the

¹ p. 229.
² GO 179/245/18629, desp. 69 of 30.4.06. Minute Gov. to P.M.
Glen Grey system in the Transkei. In 1908, the Native Affairs Department actually sponsored a small deputation consisting of the A.Z.M. missionary, Dr. F. B. Bridgeman and two Africans, Martin Luthuli and P. J. Gumede to study the Glen Grey system and report back on its applicability to Natal conditions.1

The deputation came back duly impressed, that Rhodes' "Bill for Africa"2 could be applied in Natal, and the Natal administration framed a bill3 for the creation and administration of Native Land Settlement, designed to "promote an inceptive form of self-government",4 and which included local taxation and the issue of conditional titles to secure fixity of tenure. It was widely believed that individual tenure would improve African agriculture and thus enable the reserve lands to hold an even greater number of Africans. Very similar in some ways to the Glen Grey system, there were minor differences. Thus whereas under the Glen Grey Act, the local district councils and general councils in which there was a large popular element had considerably say over the disposal of locally raised funds,5 in Natal, these 5 member

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1 Their report was published in Govt. Gazette, July, 1908, Govt. Notice no. 420.

2 Though Rhodes introduced the measure as P.M. in the Cape Legislature in 1894, J. M. Grp an claimed to be its true father (Nathan MSS 576, p. 75, Orpen to Nathan 25.5.08). In fact the idea of individual leasehold tenure for Africans had a long history in the Cape colony. It was the provision for local self government (with certain limitations) which was novel.

3 For this Bill see Natal Govt. Gazette, 21.3.08, p. 302 ff.

4 C 4194, no. 6, Gov. to Sec. St. 1.5.08.
village councils were to be appointed by the District Commissioners in consultation with the local inhabitants, and to hold office for one year "during pleasure" of the Government; the decisions over the disposal of funds were to lie entirely with these Commissioners. There was to be no general council though local councils could join up to form divisional councils. On the other hand, the proposed grant of 10 acre allotments was more generous than the Transkei 4 acre plots and the provision made for paying survey fees would probably have been more successful. Even this moderate measure of reform however fell through as a result of the opposition both of the educated Africans who felt it did not go far enough and of the Natal Legislative Assembly which presumably felt it went too far.

5The District Councils under the Glen Grey Act consisted of 4 members nominated by landowners and 2 nominated by the government in surveyed areas. In unsurveyed areas 4 members were nominated by headmen from among their number. Resident Magistrates were ex officio members of the District Councils and acted as their chairmen. Provision was also made for a General Council (which became known as the Bunga) to be headed by the Chief Magistrate of the Transkei, to include Resident Magistrates and 3 African representatives from each district, 2 nominated by the District Council and one by the Govt. In all these councils the magistrate had the final say - a matter of considerable complaint later on. See Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, Vol. I (Nev. York, 1923), pp. 88-93.

1It was however decided to implement parts of the reform on the Umfani Mission Reserve.

2Nathan MSS 368, p.145; Nathan to Lucas 6.9.08; Govt. to Sec. St., 30.10.08, CO 179/247/42738.
One of the major complaints of Africans before the Natal Native Affairs Commission was that they lacked any means or kind or representative to voice their demands and make their grievances known. While on the whole the Commission construed this as the need for a primitive race for a father figure,¹ it can be argued that the actions and attitudes of successive Secretaries of Native Affairs, but especially Leuchars and H. D. Winter, gave very real meaning to these complaints.² On the score of representation the Commissioners were very cautious, though they suggested various ways in which African grievances could be made known to the "ruling race". Thus the four additional members to be appointed by the Governor to sit in the Natal Legislative Council³ and the members of the Native Affairs Council were considered to be sufficient representation for the tribal African. For the 'exempted' African two different proposals were made. A minority of the Commission argued that exempted Africans be allowed to elect one non-official member of the Native Affairs Council, while the majority favoured a separate electoral roll for

¹N.N.A.C. pp.12-14
²See above Chapter II, p. 206-210
³This failed to materialise in any case, see above, p.582-3
'exempted' and qualified Africans who would return up to a maximum of three members for the whole colony who would represent African interests. These members would be selected by ballot from candidates nominated by ballot by the Governor-in-Council. Behind their recommendations lay the firm conviction stated by the Commission at the beginning of its report that

"the natives must be clearly made to understand... that the presence and predominance of the white race will be preserved at all hazards and ... all attempts to destroy its hegemony... will be promptly punished."

The franchise was seen as an outlet for grievances, not a political weapon. It should be added that their views on the franchise were shared by many an 'authority' on the 'native' at the turn of the century and bear a close resemblance to the recommendations of the S.A.H.A.C. Even Sir Matthew Nathan expressed himself as opposed to the grant of the franchise to Africans, though he based his opposition on somewhat novel grounds: he felt that any attempt to grant the franchise with a property and educational qualification would lead the settlers community in Natal to withhold both property and education from the African in an attempt to keep him back.

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1They would need educational and property or income qualifications (unspecified).

2S.A.H.A.C., p.10 § 20.
politically. Nevertheless it is significant that amongst the loudest voices against the Cape franchise at the National Convention of 1906 were those of Hyslop, Moor and H. M. Greene, the Natal representatives, while it was Greene who moved the amendment to exclude non-European from membership of both Houses of Parliament in the forthcoming Union.

On education, the Commission were equally cautious. While recognising the growing desire for education on the part of the Africans, the Commission suggested that enough education should be provided "as would enable the Government to keep the control of it"; it should be "up to but not beyond their own growing (i.e. the Africans') needs". As Sir Matthew Nathan pointed out, they did not recognise

"the principle followed in the Crown Colonies that it is the duty of the Government to give as many natives as possible as good an education as they

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1 It is interesting to note that the curious scheme which came before the National Convention suggesting that suitably qualified Africans be granted the franchise at 51, their sons, if still qualified, at 30 and so on until in the 10th generation from the present a 'civilised' African would get the franchise at 21 appears to have originated with Sir Matthew Nathan.


3 This comment is Nathan's in CO 179/244/3756.

4 H. N. A. C., Report, p. 19.
are capable of assimilating and to do all in its power to raise them to the moral and intellectual plane of European civilisation.\footnote{CO 179/244/3756, Gov. to Sec. St., 6.1.08 Encl. Proposals by Sir Matthew Nathan on Native Affairs, No. 2.}

Here the recommendation of the Commission was the establishment of a separate Board of Education for Africans, on which all the different missionary denominations would be represented as well as the Government Inspectors of African schools.\footnote{N.N.A.C. Report, p.28.} Despite the opposition of the Natal Department of Education, this Board was officially constituted in 1909, largely as a result of the pressure of the Superintendent of Education, the Native Affairs Council and the inspiration of Sir Matthew Nathan whose own interest in educational work was profound.\footnote{CO 179/254/992, Encl. 1 in desp. 232, 9.12.09, Ann. I, Rept. by Council of N.A. on Native Education Advisory Board. CO 179/244/3756, op.cit.; ANM V/1/4 Annual Report of A.Z.N. 1909 by Margaret McCord.} The Commissioner's recommendation that small industrial schools be established and greater attention be given to agricultural training in the educational system, also seemed to have borne fruit;\footnote{N.N.A.C. Report, p.28.} by the 1920s the Phelps-Stokes Commission on "Education in East Africa" commented enthusiastically that Natal had the most successful educational system in Africa, one which was superior to the Cape system \[\text{in} \]
general organisation, effectiveness and adaptation to the real needs of the Native people". At least in the matter of education, there does seem to have been a change for the better, though the enthusiasm of the Phelps-Stokes Commission, so dominated by the Booker T. Washington philosophy of education does have to be treated with a little caution. Nevertheless, even the amount spent by the government on African education trebled in the period between 1906 and 1915, though it was still below that contributed by the Cape government to its programme of African education.

The other recommendations of the Commission can be dealt with more summarily. As a result of their recommendations, legislation was prepared on the subject of the indebtedness of the African population, though Sir Matthew Nathan pointed out

1 e.g. T. J. Jones (N.Y., 1925), p. 194 ff.
2 The change was certainly not in the pre-Union period; indeed in 1907 the Edendale grant was still £50 p.a., and the situation was the same in 1909, despite an extra £225 on the estimates which was not paid. Wesleyan Methodist Church of S. A. Reports of Missionary Society, Edendale Report, p.54 and 27th Report, 1909.
4 Under the Act of Union, all education other than higher education remained under the control of the provincial administration. By the Financial Regulations Act of 1922 the Union government took power to provide funds for native education, while the Provinces were held to a certain minimum of obligations. At that time in the Cape 20% of government appropriations were paid on non-white education, in Natal 17%, in the Transvaal 7% and the O.F.S. 10%. Malherbe, A History of Education in S. Africa, p.424; Phelps Stokes Commission, p.191.
that the measure failed to tackle the most common forms of money lending – loans to secure labour and store debts, which the Commission had suggested should not be recoverable against kraal-heads (as was stipulated by the 1891 Code) unless he had incurred the debt personally. A new liquor law was drafted which regulated the sale of utshwala in villages, and opened the way for municipalities to establish monopolies over the sale of this brew, using the funds for African Welfare purposes. This legislation seems to have prepared the way for the sections on beer-brewing in the Urban Areas Act passed by the Union government in 1923. Finally, action was taken on the suggestion that the position of children born after their parents had been exempted from the provisions of native law be themselves exempted. On this question of exemption, the Africans found a champion in Sir Matthew Nathan, who took a very different stand on the subject to that of his predecessor; though he agreed the law as it stood was unsatisfactory, Sir Matthew maintained that the way to deal with the problem was to inform applicants of its limitations, and allow them to make their own decision as to whether

1 CO 179/245/22270, Gov. to Sec. St., 27.5.08.
2 See GD. 4326, Gov. to Sec. St., desp. 175, 18.3.08 (CO 179/246/ 33500).
...they wanted to continue in their request. By January, 1906, Nathan had granted ten petitions and refused three, and thereafter it would appear that petitions were granted more freely than before.¹

Recommendations of the Commission which were not acted upon were basically those which most affected white settlers on the score of labour and land, and those granting any form of direct representation to Africans.² Thus the proposal that further alienation of land in Zululand be stopped was not accepted by ministers,³ not was isibahlo ended.⁴ The Pass Laws, contracts between native tenants and landlords and Cattle Stealing Acts, remained unchanged. The colony found it impossible to change its methods of selecting magistrates, though various circulars were sent to the existing magistrates on the question of the proper treatment of natives at public offices. In 1909, the Natives Courts Act of 1898 was amended, and trial by jury which had been proven an abysmal failure and resulted in "notorious miscarriages of justice" in Natal was abolished as unsuitable in

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¹ See Min. Nathan to M.M.A. 22.10.07, 8.11.07 and 3.1.08. See also GO 179/244/3756, Gov. to Sec. St., 6.1.06, Encl. Proposals on Native Affairs, no. 1, Exemption. ² See GO 179/244/3756, Gov. to Sec. St., 6.1.06, Encl. Proposals on Native Affairs, no. 1, Exemption. ³ See Min. Nathan to P.H. 18.10.07 and P.M. to Gov. 22.10.07. ⁴ See Min. Nathan to M.M.A., 15.12.07 and 29.12.07.
African-European cases. It was still found impracticable to inform Africans of contemplated legislation in advance and laws were not translated into Zulu. The Government remained as fearful as ever over possible "combinations"; indeed the administration was horrified when it heard of proposals in 1909 to hold meetings of Africans over the forthcoming unification of South Africa. The meetings were promptly banned.

This then was the attempt made by the Moor ministry to reform native affairs on the basis of the recommendations of the 1906-7 Native Affairs Commission. On the African population itself the disturbances had a profound and positive impact in other ways. Thus soon after the disturbances, missionaries of a number of different denominations noted an upsurge of interest amongst Africans in Christianity. In some places this amounted to "a great revival"; the conversion of rebel prisoners at Bahowe gaol was described by the Wesleyan Methodist evangelist there as "an extraordinary work of grace". After the arrest of

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1. This comment is T. F. Carter's, Min. of Justice and Attorney General, encl. in CO 179/256/5965. For a scandalous example of this see CO 179/241/20385, desp. 72, Gov. to Sec. St. 15.5.07.

2. See e.g. SNA 1/1/331, Letter to Xaba 10.5.09. Reply U.S.N.A. Samuelson, 22.5.09 and SNA 1/1/427, Minute Samuelson to March, 1909. See also SNA 1/1/342, 09 Clerk M.N.T. to U.S.N.A. 18.8.09 and Minute U.S.N.A. to Sec. Law Dept., 29.6.08 on regulations designed "to check the influx of irrepressible native preachers" and forbidding assemblies of natives except at an authorised mission centre.


4. The Methodist Churchman, p.7, 8.9.08.
Dinusulu there was even a 'revival' amongst a section of the Zulu at Kongoma.\(^1\) Despite Dinusulu's own bitter remark at his trial on being asked whether he was a Christian "I do not know who is a Christian in this country. It was only Christ who was a Christian."\(^2\) even two of the Chief's wives became converts in 1908.

Together with the spread of the white dominated Christian church, there also seems to have been a spread of separatism at this time - both of those independent churches already in existence, and of a couple of new ones.\(^3\) In the Greytown and Ladysmith areas, the missionaries complain of the activities of the 'Zionist' churches, whilst in the Ixope region John Sibiya was extending the fame of the African Presbyterian Church, whose first martyrs had been provided by Makanda and Njongo.\(^4\) It is significant that the most prominent members of Isaiah Shembe's Nazarite Church are Ixopo's Qvabe people. Though this was a slightly later event, it is clear that the events of 1906 played a major part in the wholehearted support of the clan for a prophet who claimed to "revive the bones of Hessen and of the people who were killed in Zambata's rebellion".\(^5\)

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\(^2\) *Natal Witness*, 29.1.09. Dinusulu was apparently converted just before he died in 1913.


\(^4\) *MBA 1/4/19 024407*, Rept. Magis. F. E. Foxon, 14.11.07.

Not surprisingly, in the light of their experience and philosophy, the Natal government took little heed of the judgment of the Natal Native Affairs Commission that their actions in dismantling unauthorised places of worship on Trust land was "needlessly" alarmist. Indeed a fresh regulation issued in April, 1907 stipulated that no African evangelist be allowed to preach in gaols except in the presence of a European Zulu-speaking missionary. Numerous deputations, reinforced by the support of Sir Matthew Nathan and the Officer Administering the Government in 1909, Sir Henry Dale, failed to sway the government on this issue. Nor was Sir Matthew able to get the Natal government to rescind its ban on the African Methodist Episcopal Church, despite its renewed application to be allowed to work in Natal and spread the gospel of "moral excellence, business integrity, obedience to government and religious intelligence". By the end of his stay, however, together with Moor, Nathan seems to have been able to persuade the remaining ministers to take a more enlightened view towards the African agents of the American

1 p.28.
2 GO 179/254/31870, Dale to Sec. St. Conf. 4.9.09. GO 179/253/20586, Gov. to Sec. St. Conf. 25.5.09, Reports of various deputations on the subject.
Zulu Mission. A decade later it is interesting to note that the Phelps-Stoke Commission remark on the smooth relations between the Natal provincial administration and the missionary organisations in the territory but it would appear that it was the result of some intervention by the Union Native Affairs Department.

Apart from the purely religious aspect of this revival, one which can be explained in terms of the solace religion can afford in times of distress and despair, the disturbances also brought about an increased awareness of the value of the education provided by the missionaries. Once and for all, armed rebellion had been proven futile. The Kolwa who had advised against it had been shown correct in their analysis. Education was the new weapon, and even 'rebel' chiefs like Ndlovu ka Timuni were heard advising their sons and people "to learn". Chief Gayede, who was said to have been disaffected during the disturbances but restrained from overt action by the advice of the African Lutheran teacher amongst his people, also "begged" his children and

1 AEM 111/1/3, p.956, Bridgeman to Barton, 11.12.09.
2 Education in East Africa, p.195.
3 SHA 1/1/396, C. H. Maxwell, A.Z.M. to Lt. Col. Ligg, R.M. 12.3.12, where he states that there has been a change in govt. policy to mission work in locations which he gathers "from recent correspondence and interviews with Barton and others".
4 See also N.M.A.G. Evid. passim, but esp. Chief Ekabana, Newcastle p. 802-3, J. L. Dube, p.960 (though in his case this does not represent a new stand).
people to seek education in 1907. 1 Chief Sibindi, who became convinced during his fighting on the government side that God was with him, allowed schools to be built in his tribal area for the first time after the rebellion, and a large number of his Bosvu people came to the missionaries for instruction in Christianity. 2

At the same time as the tribal Africans were turning to education and Christianity, the Christian Africans seem to have been drawn closer to their non-Christian fellows by the disturbances and to have their feeling of common race aroused. This process had indeed already started before 1906 3. Nevertheless in the dramatic events of 1906 there must have been much heart-searching about which side the Kolwa really was on. Immediately after the disturbances for example when an A.Z.K. missionary gave a sermon based on what he had seen during the disturbances it caused an uproar in his congregation and a very bitter editorial and correspondence in Ilanga Lane Natal. 4 After a discussion with Martin Luthuli on the cause of the incident, the Rev. J. D. Taylor concluded that the missionary had

1 Hermannsburger Missionsblatt, Jan. 1909, p.13.
2 Hermannsburger Missionsblatt, May 1907, p. 134, Rept. Director Harris.
3 See above, Chapter VIII.
4 17-8-06. For Ilanga Lane Natal and its editor John Dube, see above, Chapter VIII.
"failed to correctly estimate the depth of feeling on the part of the people, who, though not in sympathy with the rebels, could not bear a recital of its events from the lips of a white man without feeling that he was gloating over the success of his own race..."\(^1\)

The disturbances also provided a potent spur to political action.

With the announcement of the formation of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, the Natal Native Congress met in order to choose the witnesses which would best represent its views before the Commission.\(^2\) Even before the report of the Commission, Dube was urging from the columns of *Ilanga lase Natal*\(^3\) that what the Africans needed was representation in the Natal parliament, by two or three European members chosen expressly for this purpose. It was probably a mark of the political realism of Natal Africans at this time that none of them requested representation in the Legislative Assembly by any other than a white candidate.\(^4\)

advocated a separate voters roll comprising two classes of African voter: the first, exempted and literate Christians with property to the value of £25 and secondly, Chiefs and headmen. As early as

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\(^1\) AIR 111/1/3, p.409, J. D. Taylor to J. L. Dube, 14.9.06.

\(^2\) *Ilanga lase Natal*, 12.10.06.

\(^3\) See esp. his "Address to the Zulu People," 2.11.06. Also *Ilanga*, 31.8.06. Report, R.H.N.A.C., p.21.
September, 1906 Dube was calling for a meeting of the Transvaal, Cape and Natal Congresses and welcoming "signs that tribal antagonisms are dying down as indications of progress".¹

The election of Ralph Tatham² to the Natal Legislative Assembly as member for Durban City in September 1906 brought a man of socialist leanings for the first time into Natal politics, and also seems to have lain behind a revival of a scheme which bears some resemblance to Joseph Booth's African Christian Union of the 1890's amongst the Africans of Natal. The main points of this scheme, which he called a "Native Centralisation Scheme", were to "provide means of cooperation where by Native ownership of land may be increased so as to cover all branches of agriculture...", to provide means whereby Africans could get trade "now carried on by Indians" into their own hands, "by establishing businesses from the central organisation under native management", to provide a centralised legal organisation, and savings bank, to provide for the political representation of African grievances and to eliminate the ill-feeling between black and white in Natal by co-operating with the Government to improve race relations.³ Tatham had visited

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¹Ilanga lase Natal, 14.9.06.
²Born in Natal in 1867, he was one of the four labour members to be elected to N.L.A. in Sept.1906. (Natal Who's Who, 1906, p.195) He was the brother of P. S. Tatham, a prominent opponent of Union in 1910. In view of the attitude taken by white labour leaders on the Rand to Africans at this time, as well as the later close links between breakaway members of the Labour Party (like S. P.
Dinusulu at the end of 1906, and it is interesting that an unsigned and undated typescript found amongst Dinusulu papers was found headed "A Scheme for Arranging Native Affairs", which, making allowances for the vagaries of different translators, was the same as the scheme sent by Tatham to Harriette Colenso in May, 1907.¹ Behind the scheme may well have lain considerable consultation with the politically conscious Africans of the day;

S. Nyongwana, at that time Chairman of Congress, worked in Tatham's office, whilst Tatham was also closely in touch with John Dube, Josiah Gumede and Saul Msane.² Saul Msane, originally born in Natal and educated at Edendale, had by 1907 spent some dozen years as compound manager on the gold-mines, where in 1904 he was a member of what was called the Sotho committee, and on whose behalf he had visited Britain as a member of the 1904 delegation.³ In 1907 he visited Natal where he was occupied with launching this Native Centralisation scheme or fund, which was given the Zulu title Isivivane, and it is interesting to note that he had been a

Bunting and Ivor Jones) with African political movements, it is interesting to note this early connection in Natal both in the case of Tatham and apparently Nelson Palmer (see below, p. ) with educated African opinion.

³ Col. Col. 206, Copy attached to letter R. Tatham to H. E. Colenso, 5.5.07.

¹ A60 1/7/53 transl. T. A. Jackson.

² Of also address to F. R. Moor from Members of N.N.C. forwarded by R. Tatham, 20.6.07 in SHA 1/1/3691561. SHA 1/1/371-1806, R. Tatham to J. Gumede, 9.8.07 and Col. Col. 206, R. Tatham to H. E. Col. 5.5.07.

a supporter of Booth's African Christian Union.\(^1\) Josiah Gumede\(^2\) had been a member of a delegation to Britain, at the end of 1906 over the land laws of the Orange Free State. In this he acted as the agent of a group of Sotho who had bought land in the Orange Free State some years back, but were unable to take control of it under the laws of the Free State. For leaving Natal without a pass (for which he had applied but had not been granted) he was arrested and fined £10 or three months on his return apparently at the suggestion of McCallum who felt that his going was "a piece of insubordination" that ought to be punished.\(^3\) Gumede who participated in the founding of the Natal Congress in 1900 and was for several years its general secretary, later became the President of the African National Congress. One wonders whether

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\(^1\)See letter from the Johannesburg C'ttee of the A.C.U. to the Watchman reprinted in INTO, 12.1.96.

\(^2\)J. T. Gumede was educated at Grahamstown and taught for some time at Somerset East in the Cape Colony before going to Natal where he became adviser to Natal and O.F.S. chiefs. He was a founder member of the S.A.R.N.C. and later became its President. He was also President of the League of African Rights and delegate to the First International Conference against Imperialism in Belgium (1926). He appears in Harry Benson's The African Patriots and in Édouard Boux's Time Longer than Hope as James T. Gumede. Mveli Shoka, p.150; Boux, p.211 ff.

\(^3\)SHA 1/1/369\(^{1469}\), Minutes Magis. Bergville, 25.12.06 and Gov. to SHA 15.1.07 and 2.2.07.
his later left-wing views\(^1\) were in any way affected at this time by his contact with Tatham. Despite the attempts of Tatham to launch this scheme through Congress, it was abandoned a few months later according to Tatham because "neither the natives nor the Europeans are ready for it".\(^2\) The fact that by the middle of 1907 Tatham had gone bankrupt and was being sued in the courts by Ryongwana for his backpay may have had something to do with his disillusionment with African politicians.\(^3\) As a result of his insolvency, Tatham was forced to resign from the Natal Legislative Assembly and the hopes of Congress that he might represent their views there fell to the ground. From the outset there had been those members like Mark Radebe who were strongly opposed to Tatham's presence at Congress meetings - on the ground that no white man should be allowed to their meetings. Although at the time Radebe was overridden by other members of Congress who felt that Tatham was necessary and useful, Radebe's heightened race consciousness may well have been in part due to the 1906 disturbances.\(^4\)

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\(^1\)See E. Roux, Time Longer than Eppers, p. 211 ff.

\(^2\)Col. Col. 206 to H. E. Colenso, 13.5.07.

\(^3\)Natal Mercury, 6.7.07 and 8.7.07.

\(^4\)For Radebe see above Chapter VIII, pp. 538, 540
The arrest and trial of Dinuzulu must also have been a factor at this time in heightening African political consciousness. The Attorney General and Minister of Justice, T. P. Carter, constantly feared the political use to which the trial would be put by the defence, especially by Harriette Colenso, and the action taken by the government in suppressing any meetings and preventing funds from being raised for Dinuzulu's defence in Natal and Zululand prevented any overt signs of this being shown at the time. Although Dube himself advised Dinuzulu that his only course was to surrender,\(^1\) Ilanga lase Natal reported the very deep sorrow and bitterness occasioned by his arrest\(^2\) and in April 1908 Dube wrote to Harriette Colenso after a visit to Cape Colony that "all the natives there admire your pluck and purpose in the defence of Dinuzulu."\(^3\) In 1912 Dinuzulu was invited to become Honorary Vice President of the newly formed South African Native National Congress, of which John Dube had become President, and it was probable that the events of 1906-8 were very much in African minds at the time.

\(^1\) AGO 1/7/53, Dube to Dinuzulu, n.d. ? Dec. 1907.

\(^2\) See e.g. Ilanga, 20.12.07, 27.12.07 and 12.3.09, appealing for mercy in his sentence. On 27th Dec. 1907 Ilanga commented on reports that Africans were pleased at the arrest of Dinuzulu: "... You should come into contact with the real Zulu in Durban and you would there see the bitterness, I saw an educated native boy buying a paper containing a picture of him being marched by the soldiers which the boy was showing the natives. A young Zulu man looked at the picture again and again and then the tears streamed; he beat his breast and walked on..." Transl. in SHA 1/1/38912 of 08.

\(^3\) Col. Col. 169, corresp. Du-Dy, 22.4.08.
The opposition of the Christian Africans to Moor's proposed reform of native administration was far more open. Perhaps it was felt that Moor was in some ways responsive to African political pressure on this score, and it is also possible that the presence of Sir Matthew Nathan encouraged the educated Africans to make their views felt far more vigorously than they had dared in the time of Sir Henry McCallum. Thus shortly after the publication of the three main bills in April, 1908, a deputation of seventy-four Christian Africans met Moor to protest especially about the bill for the "Better Administration of Native Affairs". Their meeting was adjourned until the 10th and 11th June, when the number of the African deputation had swollen to a hundred and fifty-six. Now opposition was expressed against all three bills. The resolutions against the bills were signed by Simeon Kamhale as Chairman and John Dube as Secretary, leaders apparently of a special fifteen men committee appointed by the Natal Native Congress formed specifically to handle the opposition to the proposed legislation. On the 13th July Dube and eight others presented a petition through Mr. Nelson Palmer, M.L.A. for Pietermaritzburg, another of the four labour members to have been elected in 1906. In September there were further deputations and a petition

\[1\] See above, p. 581-587
with over two hundred names appended to it. In all these petitions and delegations the familiar names appear and reappear — S. Mini, Mark Badebe, J. T. Gumede, P. Gumede, S. Laba, Mark Sivetye amongst others.¹

The most bitterly opposed of the three major bills introduced by Moor was the measure entitled "To provide for the Better Administration of Native Affairs". Africans pointed out that Parts III and IV opened the way to arbitrary action by a host of officials and closed all doors to redress through the courts. They also objected to the establishment of the four District Commissioners who, they felt, would block their access to the Secretary of Native Affairs, and asked instead for District and General Councils as in the Transkei.² The Lands Settlement measure they maintained did not satisfy their aspirations either to local self-government nor to individual freehold tenure, and they felt that Africans should be consulted over the four members who were to represent their interests in the Natal Legislative Council. In addition they thought there should be African consultation in the Lower House which controlled finance. Above all, they expressed their dissatisfaction that no provision had been made for an African franchise.³ In a

¹See also CO 179/248/43579, Enals. in desp. Gov. to Sec. St. 6.11.08, contains all the information on which the above paragraph is based. See also CO 179/247/41751, Gov. to Sec. St. 19.10.08.

²Ibid and Letter J. T. Gumede, Natal Witness, 3.10.08, and SHA 1/1/3971161 08, P. Gumede in meeting with Moor,11.6.08.

³See SHA 1/1/3971161 08 Meeting between F. R. Moor and Christian Africans
letter to the National Convention sitting in Durbar at the end of 1908 the N.C.C. similarly asked for "some degree of representation" in the legislation of the coming Union.¹

In these protests members of Congress were joined by the members of a new organisation which had been formed initially in 1907 in the Dundee and Newcastle area, and consisting predominately of Wesleyan Methodist converts and chiefs. It seems to have been called Iliso Le Masi originally, though later the name was changed to Iliso Xesane Xesane. The first meeting I have found record of was called to protest at the regulation hindering Africans from purchasing Crown lands, and was held under the Chairmanship of Chief Naphtali Gule.² In 1908 a constitution was drawn up and signed by Z. M. Nazuku and J. T. Gwede, in which the declared aims were to unite the people of Natal and Zululand into a contented and prosperous and united people to bring about harmony and .... mutual co-operation.³

11.6.08, esp. Rev. W. G. Mcbride, Nathan MSS 368, Nathan to Lucas, 6.9.08.


³The Preamble and Constitution of I.L.R. was found in SNA 1/4/20 022 together with a list of delegates expected at the annual meeting.
There seems to have been some attempt to draw tribal Africans
and especially chiefs into their deliberations and plans were
made for the representation of tribal units in its forum.1

If the disturbances heightened political consciousness in
Natal, they also appear to have increased political activity
outside the boundaries of the colony. Thus one of the most active
opponents of the Natal version of the 'rebellion' was Alfred
Mangena,2 author of several petitions to His Majesty's Government
against the Richmond Courts Martial. According to Natal Intelligence
Reports which were widely publicised in the British press by the
Natal agent in London, Col. William Arbuckle, Mangena, whom he
accused of being a tool in the hands of the 'anti-Natal sedition
mongers'3 was not a Natal Zulu at all, but a Fingo from Griqualand
West. Mangena himself maintained he was a Zizi from the Estcourt
division in Natal,4 he had however been in the Cape Colony at
the turn of the century, where he had been prominent in collecting
money for the defence of certain Africans arrested for obstructing

1Ibid. See also SMA 1/1/410 2727, Z. Masuku to U.S.E.A., 12.9.05,
and Minutes of Meeting held by T.E. (Report C. Kempe).

2For Mangena's background see Indst. 4.8.08, Letter from Pixley ka
Isaka Zulu and Nkati Shoko, African Yearly Register, p.45.

3Cd 4403, p.15. Papers relating to the case of Mr. Alfred Mangena

4Cd 4403, p.5.
the implementation of the anti-Bubonic Plague measures in Cape Town in 1901; according to the Rev. E. Micolomba serving at that time with the loyal Natal Native Horse, and whose Wesleyan congregation Mangena had left to join the Church of England, Mangena absconded with the money he had raised to England to further his own studies. Against these allegations, Mangena subsequently won four libel actions so too much reliance need not be placed on their veracity. On the other hand, Mangena was associated in Cape Town, whether only as interpreter as he maintained, or more intimately, with two men, Wilkinson and Karie who were engaged in the defence of Africans in Cape Town and who may well have been implicated in the original opposition to Cape Town municipality's attempts to move Africans to a location further from the town. During the disturbances Mangena presented two petitions against the Natal government actions at Richmond and was also responsible for laying a charge at Bow Street against the Governor of Natal for the illegal declaration of Martial law. Along with Mangena, the name of one Ahilappa Osakampa Sawyer appears in the instructions to E. G. Jellicoe of the Middle Temple to petition the Judicial Committee of Natal against the Richmond

1 CO 179/255/21724, Gov. to Sec. St., 17.6.06.

2 Cd 4403, pp. 30-32. See also NSS Brit. Exp. S 22. G 198 (A.P.S. Papers, Rhodes House), Resolutions of a Meeting held under the auspices of the Native Vigilant Association of Mabeni Location, 27th Sept. 1906.

3 Cd 2927, Petition to H.M. in Council by A. Mangena.
Another West African to have taken an interest in the Natal situation was Prince Omonoyi Bendele of Ife who published A Defence of Ethiopianism in Edinburgh, which seems to have had a 'pan-African perspective'. Hangena himself returned to South Africa to become the first African Barrister at law and was one of the founder members of the South African Native National Congress. Hangena's actions were also approved by a resolution of a body calling itself the South African Native Congress in Cape Town.

The disturbances were thus one of the factors leading politically conscious and articulate Africans to think in terms of a wider political organisation which would embrace Africans all over Southern Africa. An equally potent factor was the growing movement towards the unification of all the South African territories, amongst white South Africans. Whilst the unification of South Africa was the product of many factors which it is unnecessary to examine here, the rebellion in Natal and the Natal government's handling both of the 1906 uprising and the arrest and trial of Dlamini seemed to many South Africans as well as

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1O.D 2905, p. 33, no. 43.


3Neville Skota, African Yearly Register, p. 43.

4See Brit. Emp. S 22 G 196, op.cit.
to the Imperial government to illustrate the dangers of
"leaving large questions affecting the future of all South Africa
to be dealt with by a small colony like Natal, where there is
neither the largeness of vision nor the wholesome check of a
strong opposition and influential leaders."

Throughout the disturbances of 1906-8 South African states-
man like Herriman, Smuts, Botha and Steyn were extremely
critical of her handling of affairs. It is not surprising
that in 1908, stung by Natal's attack on the Cape franchise
and by the somewhat smug attitude of the colony to its own native
policy, Herriman should have written to Sir Matthew Nathan:

"The Natal contingent always talk as if their system
of government had been a complete and magnificent
success. It is precisely because it has created a
sort of plague spot and public danger that we are
anxious for Union which may put an end to misgovem-
ment. Naturally we are too polite to tell them the
truth in the Convention."

It is a sobering thought that for the Africans of Natal
at least in its early years and probably until 1948 the ad-
vantages of Union outweighed the disadvantages.

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1 Herriman Papers 93, Smuts to Herriman, 3.4.06, publ. Smuts Papers,
ed. Hancock and v.d.Pellen p. 253, no. 294. Cf. also 60 179/255/24799
C.O. Minutes on Gov. to Sec. St. 2.7.09, on report on allegations of
flagging by Natal. "We cannot take away Natal's control before Union
and we hope that after Union a better and wiser administration will
take the place of the present Government." See also Brookes and Webb,p229.

2 See e.g. Herriman Papers 125 and 160, 147, Smuts to Herriman n.d.
1907, M. T. Steyn to Herriman, 7.5.06, Botha to Herriman 15.12.07,
Marshall Campbell Papers, Bantu Section, W. Hosken to M. Campbell,
29.2.08, no. 26. Herriman to M. Campbell, 30.11.07; Smuts Papers ed.
Hancock and v.d.Pellen, Vol. I. nos. 299, 295-6, 303, 305-6 (mainly
Smuts and Herriman's views).

3 Nathan MSS 375, p.149, Herriman to Nathan, 1.12.08.
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This Bibliography has been divided into:

I  Unpublished Sources
   A. Official
      1. British
      2. Natal
   B. Non-Official
      1. Mission Records
      2. Private Collections and Unpublished Typescripts

II  Published Contemporary Sources
   A. Official Records
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      3. Other
   B. Newspapers and Periodicals
      1. Natal
      2. Mission Papers
      3. Cape
   C. Contemporary Books and Pamphlets
   D. Documents subsequently published

III  Secondary Sources
   A. Select Books and Articles
   B. Unpublished Theses
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

I Unpublished Primary Sources

A. Official

1. Public Records Office

CO 179/177 - 256 Despatches, Gov. Natal to Sec. St. 1890-1910.
CO 427/1-28 Despatches, Gov. Zululand to Sec. St. 1897-1897.
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2. Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg.

(i) Attorney General's Office

AGO 1/7/51 - 1/7/51. Proceedings of the Special Court 1908-1909.
Evidence and briefs in the criminal proceedings: Rex v. Njambelwana
Dinasulu
Mayatana and Njiyi
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AGO 1/7/53 Contains Dinasulu's papers found at the Usuthu in December 1907 (incl. copies and translations).

(ii) Defence Records

3/1-3. Correspondence 1891-1908. Records in this Department were extremely meagre and of little value. It is possible that the bulk of the material is elsewhere, perhaps transferred to the Union Defence Department.

(iii) Government House Records

GH 798-804 Correspondence re Native Rebellion 1906-1909.
GH 569-582 Confidential Correspondence (General) 1900-1910.
GH 583-586 Secret Correspondence 1900-1910.

(iv) Native Affairs Department

SNA 1/6/4-1/6/22 Papers, Confidential 1890-1910.
SNA 1/6/25 Papers related to the employment of armed Zulu in looting the Boer population 1901-2 by Col. Bottomley.
SNA 1/6/26-31 Native Rebellion 1906. Court Martial Proceedings.
Brief sketch of Zulu History for each tribe for which the Delimitation Commission was required to delimit Reserves.

(v) Prime Minister's Office
FM 57-74 Minute Papers 1906-1909

(vi) Special Court Records
Proceedings (transcript) in Special Court (for cases, see 2 (1) above).

(vii) Zululand Archives
ZA 22, 23 Miscellaneous Correspondence 1891-1909.
ZA 28-35 Confidential Correspondence 1890-1908.
ZA 28-29 contain most of the material on the disturbances.

B. Unpublished Non-Official Sources

(i) Mission Records
American Board Mission Collection (Natal Archives)
ABM VII/2-4 Annual Reports 1897-1915.
ABM IV/1-3 Committee Reports 1898-1903.
ABM VII/4/1 Draft plan for a native agency.
ABM VII/7/1 Matters relating to Native Churches 1897-1904, and letters from Commissioners of Foreign Mission Boards 1895-1904.
ABM 1/1/7-1/1/8 Minutes, 1900-1907.
ABM 14/1/3 Letters from Mission Secretary to ABM headquarters and others 1904-1910.
ABM 14/3/4 Letters to Sec. ABM and between missionaries, 1902-1907.

These were by far the most important of the mission records consulted.

(ii) Society for Propagation of the Gospel (London)
Missionary Reports and Correspondence from Natal, 1896-1909.
(iii) Church of Scotland (National Library, Edinburgh)
United Free Church of Scotland, Natal Correspondence 1892-1910.

(iv) Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society
I was unfortunately unable to see the unpublished records of
the Wesleyan Methodist Church in South Africa, at Rhodes
University, Grahamstown.

The records of the W.M.M.S. in London - outgoing Letters to
the South African Conference 1883-1907 - were not very useful.

2. Private Collections and Unpublished Typescripts

Anti-Slavery Papers (Rhodes House, Oxford)
MSS. Brit. Emp. S 18
C 154/1-11 Booth Papers
C 150/177-183 F. H. Colenso to H. R. Fox Bourne 1889-1906
C 150/184-222 H. R. Colenso to H. R. Fox Bourne
C 130/90 Dimusulu to H. R. Fox Bourne
C 167/62-75 Elgin to Travers Burton
C 161-166 Official letters arranged chronologically.

Marshall Campbell Papers (Bantu Section, Killie Campbell Library, Durban)

G. W. Champion: Unpubl. Autobiography (in possession of
Mr. S. Trapido, Durham Univ.)


H. E. Colenso Collection (Natal Archives)

Boxes 85-206 contain MSS of miscellaneous statements,
treatises and articles by a variety of authors,
incl. H. E. Colenso and Alice Werner.

Boxes 98-113 Zulu trials, mainly material on Dimusulu's trial
and records of the Defence Counsel.

Boxes 120-121 Diaries - are incomplete, many of the entries
by Agnes M. Colenso.

The remaining boxes contain correspondence arranged
alphabetically.

Box 170 contains Dimusulu's correspondence (5 vols.)
Box 181 contains a number of letters from S. T. Plaatje
Box 199 includes the C.E. Renaud Papers.

F. E. Colenso Papers (kindly shown me by Mr. Grovo, 'Klangeni',
Ameresham) - some correspondence, mainly between Francis
Ernest and Harriette Colenso. The bulk of F.E.C.'s papers are
in the H.E.C. Collection.
Clemente Kadalie: Unpublished Autobiography (kindly shown me by Mr. S. Trapido).

H. McKensie: "Reminiscences of Sir Duncan McKensie" and an article on him by W.N. (K.C.L.)

P. McKensie: "The Epic of Transport Riding" (by a brother of Sir D.M.) (K.C.L.)

J. X. Merriman Papers (in South African Public Library)

Nathan Papers (Sir Matthew)
- Nathan MSS 369-405 (Rhodes House)
- Nathan MSS 42-5 (diaries, 1906-9 - not very useful) in the Bodleian

C. E. Remaud: Some papers, incl. a typescript "The arrest of Dinganu in 1907". (K.C.L.)

J. Schofield Collection - neither very useful

Sutton Collection - neither very useful

W. P. Schreiner Papers (in South African Public Library)

J. Stuart Papers: mainly drafts of his published work, but including a typescript article on "Ethiopianism" and transcripts of informants' evidence on the 1906 rebellion (in "Native Habits and Customs in time of War") not included in L.R.

By far the most useful of the above were the Colenso Collection and the Nathan Papers.

II Published Sources

A. Official

1. British


(11) Parliamentary Papers

1882-1890  C 3182, C 3247, C 3270, C 3293, C 3466, C 3616,

C 3703, C 3964, C 4037, C 4191, C 4214, C 4274,

C 4587, C 4645, C 4913, C 4980, C 5143, C 5432,

C 5890, C 5909, C 6070.

Correspondence re Natal and Zululand.

1893-1894  C 7013. Correspondence re establishment of Responsible Government in Natal.

1898  C 6782. Correspondence re Zululand 1895-1898.
1903 Cd 1640. Minutes of Proceedings of S.A. Customs Union Conference held at Bloemfontein, March 1903.


1906-1908 Cd 2905, 2927, 3247, 3888, 4001, 4194, 4195, 4328, 4404. Correspondence re Native disturbances in Natal.

1907 Cd 3563. Correspondence re removal of native prisoners from Natal.

1908 Cd 4403. Papers re case of Mr. Alfred Mangana.

1909 Cd 4585. Further correspondence re the trial of Dinusu and other natives in Natal.

The P.P. were read in conjunction with the records in CO 179 and CO 427, notes generally being referenced to unpublished material which often contained significant additional material.

(iii) Great Britain: War Office

Précis of information re Zululand 1879, 1884, 1895, 1905.

2. Natal

Departmental Reports

As Colin Webb has pointed out in his Guide to the Official Records of the Colony of Natal (Natal, 1965), these appear in a baffling variety of forms. At times, they were published in a composite 'Blue Book', at other times as separate publications of the particular department in the Natal Government Gazette or as Sessional Papers.

(i) Agriculture

Blue Books 1896-9
Sessional Papers 1899-1900
Separate Publications 1902-8 (under a variety of titles).

(ii) Defence and Police

Blue Books 1890-1900
Government Gazette 1.10.07.
Monthly Police Statistics for 1905-1907
G.G.
Annual Police Statistics 1900-1909 Blue Books Reports of Commissioner of Police 1902-1909

(iii) Education

Reports of Inspector of Native Schools and of Superintendent
Inspector of Schools (who included reports on Govt. recognised African schools from 1894-5).  

Blue Books 1890-1900  
Separate publications 1902-1909.

Educational statistics were included in Blue Books 1900-1909 and in Natal Government Gazette (which even listed African teachers).

(iv) Native Affairs  
Blue Books 1890-1 to 1893-4  
Department of N.A.: Blue Book on Native Affairs/Annual Reports (sep. pub.) 1894-1909.  
These included reports from magistrates.

(v) Zululand: Blue Books 1889-1897 (include all the departmental reports).

Reports of Commissions and Special Reports

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Native Affairs Commission Report and Proceedings 1861-2  
Report by Col. G. A. Hills, C.B., on the causes which led to the ill-feeling between the Boers and the Zulus culminating in the attack on the Boers by the Zulus under Chief Sikhobobo at May 6, 1902. (Sep. pub. 1902)  
Land Commission Report and Appendices 1902  
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Report of Industries and Tariff Revision Commission (G.C. 6.2.06)  
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Extent Circulars issued to Magistrates by Dept. of N.A. 1890-1905.

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The Natal Mercury " "
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The Greytown Gazette 1904–1906
Ilanga laa Natal 1903–10 (Zulu-English weekly; key articles were conveniently found translated in files of S.M.A.)
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The Christian Express (Lovedale) 1891-Dec. 1909.
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African Monthly 1907–1910 (Grahamstown).
4. **Newspaper Cuttings**

4 Books of press cuttings collected by H. E. Colenso (K.C.L.)
4 Books of press cuttings on the native question, collected by Alice Werner (1888-1907) (Royal Commonwealth Society Library).

C. **Contemporary Books and Pamphlets**

**American Zulu Mission Annual** 1900-1901, 1901-1902 (Durban, n.d.)
J. Baynes, C.M.G., M.I.C.: Letters addressed to H.E. the Governor of Natal and H.W. Secretary of State for Colonies about the absence of consideration... for our coloured population (Fmbg. 1905)

Capt. W. Bosman: *The Natal Rebellion of 1906* (Durban, 1907)
R. Fox Bourne: *Blacks and Whites in South Africa* (London, n.d.)
J. Bryce: *Impressions of South Africa* (London, 1899)
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- "The Zulu Imprisonment of British Officials in 1887-8 confirmed by official records in 1892" (London, 1892)
- "Cases of six Usutu ... punished for having taken part in the disturbances of 1888" (London, 1893)
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*Zulu Affairs*: Correspondence between H.E.C. and J.R. (London, 1897)

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- "The Natives of Natal in Relation to the Land", *S.A. Jnl. of Sci.*, 1918, pp. 235-246

**E. Farmer:**  

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Rev. F. Mason: Native Policy in Natal: Past and Future (Durban, 1907)


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