

BRITISH MANDARINS AND CHINESE REFORMERS:  
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL CHANGE AT WEIHAIWEI,  
1898-1938

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requirements for the degree of Ph.D.

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### Abstract

This thesis is a study of local administration in the former British leased territory of Weihaiwei in the north-eastern Chinese province of Shantung from 1898 to 1938. The first seven chapters deal mainly with the years 1898 to 1930 during which time Weihaiwei was administered first, briefly, by British military officials and then, beginning in 1902, by Colonial Office staff. One of the central themes in these chapters is the fact that those who served in the highest administrative positions at Weihaiwei consistently chose, wherever possible, to maintain traditional Chinese governmental institutions, even to the point of modeling their own behavior on that of local district magistrates. Considerable attention is given to the important role of village headmen in managing local affairs and their relationship with British officials.

In spite of a conservative administrative approach, foreign occupation of this nearly three hundred square mile area of rural China for thirty-two years naturally brought with it a good deal of economic, social, and political change. The thesis attempts to analyze how these changes took place as well as the impact of major events occurring elsewhere. A point emphasized throughout is that while Weihaiwei was administered by Britain during these years, its inhabitants remained Chinese citizens, continued to view themselves as such, and were by no means unaffected by events outside the territorial borders.

The final two chapters of the thesis deal with the period beginning with Weihaiwei's retrocession to China in October 1930 and ending in March 1938 when the area was

occupied by Japan. A comparison is made between the administrative methods of the Western-trained, reform-minded representatives of the Nanking regime and their British predecessors. Although some welcome progress was made at this time, notably in the field of education, there were also numerous complaints that government was "interfering" too much in the daily lives of villagers as it superimposed a large and complicated bureaucratic structure on top of traditional institutions. Thus, it is concluded, that in their haste to "modernize" rural China, Kuomintang officials often ignored the most viable and useful aspects of their nation's governmental heritage and in the process lost the confidence of local people.



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### Introduction

In the opening lines of his classic study of local government in China under the Ch'ing, Ch'ü T'ung-tsu wrote in 1962 that there were at that time no "systematic and comprehensive" works which dealt with the functioning of chou and hsien administrative units in imperial China. As he observed: "The few available studies on Chinese government have dealt either with the central government or with provincial government, which merely exercised a supervisory function over the administration of local government."<sup>1</sup> Now, some twenty years later, it could still be said that the situation is much the same both for the late imperial period which was Ch'ü's concern and for the Republican period which followed. This is despite a widespread recognition among scholars that an understanding of Chinese local government is essential to an understanding of the Chinese political system as a whole.

One of the reasons for the dearth of such local level political studies has been the difficulty in locating primary sources of sufficient detail over a long enough period of time to provide a basis for analysis. It was the hope of discovering such a source that led me to investigate my friend James L. Watson's suggestion regarding British records on the leasehold of Weihaiwei in Shantung province. My first visit to the Public Records Office, then housed at Chancery Lane, was indeed a memorable one. One of the archivists I consulted there actually provided the first hint that I was on to a collection of considerable size when he looked at me with mild amusement and asked if I was sure I wanted to begin such a research project. When I then proceeded to

examine the indexes for Weihaiwei which listed nearly eight hundred separate entries for the commissioners' files alone, I began to understand his question. It was only later, however, when I actually was able to read a sampling of documents from these files that their full depth and range became apparent to me. It was also obvious from the haphazard way in which some of the papers were arranged that probably no one had consulted them since they were returned from China in the 1930s.

What I had in fact rediscovered was a vast collection of literally thousands of documents covering a period of more than thirty years, from 1898 to 1938, during much of which British military and colonial officials administered a rural territory roughly the size of a small Chinese hsien, or district. In addition to the commissioner's own files on every conceivable topic concerning the day-to-day governing of Weihaiwei, there were also additional record classifications which included correspondence between the commissioner and his superiors in Peking and London and supplementary classifications from consular officials in the nearby treaty port of Chefoo (Yen-t'ai). I soon found that each new file consulted held out the possibility of exciting discoveries since one could never be sure just what it contained. At times there were original Chinese materials, including local newspapers, personal letters, petitions, and propaganda publications which added another perspective and greater depth to the collection as a whole.

What makes the quality of the British documentation so unusually high is the fact that much of it was written by two colonial officials, James Stewart Lockhart and Reginald

Johnston, who began their careers as young men in the Hong Kong service and who studied the Chinese language, history, and culture with a diligence unsurpassed by any of their colleagues. What became clear in the course of my research was the extent to which their admiration of traditional Chinese society led Lockhart and Johnston to imitate the behavior of conscientious hsien magistrates in their roles as commissioner and district officer. In addition, their efforts to preserve, as much as possible, the existing social and political structures at Weihaiwei meant that when rendition took place in 1930 the new Nationalist administrators found much about life in the area basically unchanged since the late Ch'ing period. Such a situation enables one to make some significant comparisons between the traditional administrative methods of rural Chinese officials and those of the reform-minded Republican period who followed them. Since the British continued to maintain a consular post at Weihaiwei up to and even beyond 1938 when the Japanese occupied the area, it is possible to combine Foreign Office materials with official Chinese reports regarding government policy in the former leasehold to build up a reasonably complete picture of life there following the British withdrawal.

In addition to the British and Chinese sources just mentioned, there were also several sets of private papers which proved valuable in this study. Unfortunately, Reginald Johnston had chosen to destroy all of his personal papers, but those of his friend and colleague, James Stewart Lockhart, were readily accessible in Edinburgh. They too had only rarely been consulted and never for the purpose of understanding local government in China. Again, I found a



mass of information, more than seventy volumes in all, which contained a great deal of personal correspondence, both Chinese and English, numerous photographs, newspapers clippings, and other extremely interesting items from Lockhart's career in the colonial service.

Perhaps one of the most important insights gained in the course of researching this thesis was the recognition that a great deal of primary source material on China remains largely untouched in official and private archives around the world. If the material in these archives on Weihaiwei is any guide, then those collections will not only be of use to students of diplomatic history, but also to those concerned with the monumental changes which occurred in Chinese politics and society during the early decades of the twentieth century.

\* \* \*

I would like at this point to acknowledge my gratitude to the various institutions and individuals who helped to make this thesis possible. First, I would like to thank Dr. James L. Watson for suggesting Weihaiwei as a topic. I would also like to thank him and his wife, Dr. Rubie S. Watson, for the advice and encouragement they offered at various stages in the research. I must also thank my supervisor, Professor Stuart R. Schram, for his support and constructive criticism. Professor Ian H. Nish was most helpful in suggesting sources based on his own research on the Japanese and British naval connections with Weihaiwei. Parts of Chapters 1 through 4 were presented at the joint seminar on anthropology and Chinese social history sponsored by the Contemporary

China Institute of the School of Oriental and African Studies in the spring of 1981. I would like to thank those who attended the seminar for their comments and criticisms at that time. A special thank you also goes to Mrs. Mary Stewart Lockhart, Sir James Stewart Lockhart's daughter, for some extremely interesting recollections of her father and her life in Weihaiwei as a young girl. In this connection I am also grateful to Mr. Michael Gill and Ms. Shiona Airlie for sharing with me the Stewart Lockhart art collection now housed at George Watson's College, Edinburgh.

For financial assistance I am grateful to the Central Research Fund of the University of London and the Scholarship Committee of the School of Oriental and African Studies. I must also include a note of thanks to the librarians and archivists at the following institutions: the British Public Record Office, the School of Oriental and African Studies, the National Library of Scotland, the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, the United States National Archives, the Hoover Institution, Tōyō Bunko, the Institute for Humanistic Studies of Kyoto University, the Humanities Library of Kyoto University, the Academia Sinica in Nan-kang, Taiwan, and the National Taiwan University.

Perhaps my greatest debt, however, is to my husband, Dr. William S. Atwell, for his unfailing patience, friendly advice, and firm support through the long and at times trying process of thesis preparation.

Notes to Introduction

<sup>1</sup>Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, Local Government in China under the Ch'ing (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), p. xi.


## Chapter 1

## The British Come to Weihaiwei

Early Administrative History

During a state dinner in Berlin in May 1898, Kaiser Wilhelm II remarked to the British ambassador that the recent leasing of Weihaiwei would, he thought, "be a useless expense and indicated a departure from that practical common sense with which Englishmen were usually credited."<sup>1</sup> The Kaiser was not alone in this judgment. Many Englishmen also questioned the wisdom of acquiring such a distant piece of territory, while the vast majority could certainly not have said where it was. One might well ask, then, how and why Her Majesty's Government had managed to become involved in the diplomatic maneuvering which led to this acquisition.

Before turning to those questions, however, it is important to begin with the location of Weihaiwei, for in fact geography was the major reason it had been a place of some significance to the Chinese from as early as the Ming dynasty. The town of Weihaiwei and its harbor are strategically well located on the northern coast, about thirty-one miles from the eastern extremity of the Shantung peninsula, and just eighty-nine miles across the Gulf of Chih-li, or Po-hai, from Port Arthur. Facing each other as they do, Weihaiwei and Port Arthur form the two pillars of a kind of gateway to the Gulf and thus to Peking. The harbor at Weihaiwei is large, some six miles wide and three to four miles long, and contains within it the island of Liu-kung which serves both to protect it from strong northeast winds and to form the harbor's two entrances.




Source: Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York, 1970), p. 266.

One can trace the administrative history of this region back to Ch'in Shih Huang-ti (r. 221-210 B.C.) who divided the whole of the empire into thirty-six chün, or provinces. At that time the modern district of Wen-teng, including what is now Weihaiwei, formed part of the province of Ch'i which took its name from the Chou dynasty kingdom of Ch'i. It was not until the Han dynasty in 201 B.C., however, that a Chinese magisterial district was founded in the eastern peninsula for the first time with its administrative center at a place called Pü-yeh-ch'eng. This district, which contained the area later to become Weihaiwei, was assigned to Ch'ang-kuang prefecture and given the name of Wen-teng-shan hsien. Around 581 Ch'ang-kuang prefecture was abolished and Wen-teng became part of Tung-lai prefecture. Many more changes occurred after this which it is not necessary to list here except to say that in 1376 the prefecture of Teng-chou was created and Wen-teng hsien was assigned to it, remaining so down to the time the British arrived on the scene in the late Ch'ing period.<sup>2</sup>

#### Weihaiwei under the Ming

As its name suggests, the town of Weihaiwei was originally a guard station, or wei, having been created as such in the thirty-first year of Ming T'ai-tsu (1398).<sup>3</sup> Like Ch'eng-shan-wei, 120 li east of Wen-teng-hsien, and Ching-hai-wei 110 li south of Wen-teng-hsien, which were granted the same status at this time, Wei-hai-wei was garrisoned and fortified to protect the Shantung promontory from attacks by both Chinese and Japanese pirates.<sup>4</sup> From the time of the Northern Wei dynasty (A.D. 386-534) onwards various Chinese governments had found it necessary to protect the Shantung






The walled town of Weihai and its environs  
 Source: Wei-hai-wei chih, 10 chüan (1742 ed., revised and reprinted, 1929).

coastline, with its many small coves and inlets, from pirates. During the political and economic chaos of the late fourteenth century, however, the farmers and poor fishermen of the area begged for further assistance and Ming T'ai-tsu (r. 1368-1398) responded by establishing several wei.

A wei was a special defense outpost which constituted more than a mere fort or even a fortified town for it implied "the existence of a military colony and lands held by military tenure embracing an area of some scores of square miles."<sup>5</sup> Under this system bands of soldiers were allowed to occupy agricultural land and found families under the command of various leaders, the chief of whom was known as chih-hui. These chieftains were not regular military officers and the wei were not part of the general Chinese civil and military administration. It was the chih-hui, however, who was given responsibility for overseeing both the civil and military affairs of the wei and its "soldier-colonists."<sup>6</sup>

At first Weihaiwei was provided with a garrison of 2,000 soldiers but the number was gradually increased and a wall was built around the town in 1403 for additional security.<sup>7</sup> The efforts to repel pirate attacks met with only partial success, however. During the Chia-ching period (1522-1566), for example, a particularly ruthless Chinese pirate seized the island of Liu-kung and built houses there for himself and his band in order to have a permanent base for attacking the junks entering and leaving the harbor. They were finally driven off the island by a formidable imperial censor who then proceeded to make a careful survey of the arable land on Liu-kung in order that it could be cultivated by soldier-farmers. In 1619 the local prefect continued this cultivation project





The walled town of Wei-hai

by admitting a few immigrants to the island and making them subject to the land tax.<sup>8</sup>

The last years of the Ming were a difficult time in many parts of China as governmental authority disintegrated and bands of armed robbers, many of them ex-soldiers, pillaged the countryside. The troops at Weihaiwei became so disorderly that the civilian population was forced to flee to the hills and the chih-hui himself deserted his post. It was not until several years later that peace was restored under the new Ch'ing dynasty.

#### Changes under the Ch'ing

Though the Ch'ing rulers recognized that eastern Shantung still needed its fortifications and troops to defend against troublesome pirates, they also recognized that the existence of separate military districts free of interference from civil magistrates was perhaps only justifiable as a temporary measure under abnormal conditions. Thus, after careful investigations were made by both a provincial governor and a governor-general, it was decided in 1735 to abolish several wei on the promontory. Weihaiwei returned to its former place under the jurisdiction of the Wen-teng magistrate and Ch'eng-shan-wei was converted into a new magisterial district called Jung-ch'eng hsien. In the years to come the British leasehold of Weihaiwei would encompass territory largely drawn from Wen-teng hsien but would also include a small section of Jung-ch'eng hsien. The name Weihaiwei for the leasehold was, however, something of a misnomer since the area it encompassed was much larger than the original wei and by that time the military district as such had long

since ceased to exist. Nor by the terms of the convention did British jurisdiction extend to the walled town known as Weihaiwei.<sup>9</sup>

Although Weihaiwei lost its independent status as a military district during the eighteenth century, its strategic location and excellent harbor made it a logical choice for further development as a naval base when China, somewhat belatedly, struggled to strengthen her military forces. Defeat at the hands of the French in 1885 stimulated considerable official interest in matters of national defense, including the establishment of several new naval training centers. In 1886 a naval school was established at Liu-kung Island under Admiral Ting Ju-ch'ang who was later to figure dramatically in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. One English observer noted that the new institution comprised both a gunnery school and an Imperial Naval College, or Hai-chün Hsüeh-t'ang.<sup>10</sup>

Not surprisingly, Li Hung-chang was the central figure responsible both for the drive to reorganize China's military training activities and to build new fixed shore fortifications in north China at Port Arthur, Talien Bay, and Weihaiwei. The installations on the Gulf of Chihli were indeed massive. It was estimated that the facilities at Port Arthur were worth about six million pounds sterling.<sup>11</sup> Weihaiwei's fortifications, though not as costly as Port Arthur's, were also impressive. Rawlinson describes the results of this reconstruction effort begun in the late 1880s under foreign supervision:

Here was an excellent harbor with islands so placed across its entrance (Liu-kung, Kwang, and Jih islands) that ships could enter only by a western pass right under the Liu-kung and westshore forts. On the

islands and in the hills around the harbor were seventeen forts, mounting fifty-five guns, from four to ten inches, some of them quick-firers. Four of the island guns were of the latest disappearing type. The guns bore only to seaward. The water entrances were guarded by a quintuple bank of torpedoes, a quadruple series of sunken magnetic mines, and a massive boom made up of three strands of three-inch steel cable floated on heavy timber barks, well anchored to the bottom.<sup>12</sup>

There was also a machine shop at Weihaiwei where arms could be manufactured.

Armstrong reported that all of this construction activity brought in many more people to Weihaiwei. Within five years the population of Liu-kung Island and the area around the harbor had grown considerably and a village of about five hundred families had sprung up outside the wall of the town. Other villages emerged near each fort or camp. With this influx came various types of tradesmen and some beggars. During the herring season a large number of fishing vessels operated out of Weihaiwei and the Peiyang Fleet wintered there.<sup>13</sup> The area appeared to have a promising future.

#### The Sino-Japanese War

It should not be forgotten, however, that Li Hung-chang faced continual opposition to his "self-strengthening" efforts from an ultra-conservative Ch'ing court. Vast sums of money received from the provinces, ostensibly for the navy, were diverted to other projects. Consequently, in the 1890s while Europe and Japan were rapidly building up their naval forces, no additions were made to the Peiyang Fleet. Then, in spite of the fact that Li was anxious to avoid any confrontation with the Japanese, the two countries found themselves at war over Korea on August 1, 1894.

By mid-September the Chinese forces under Admiral Ting Ju-ch'ang had already been soundly defeated off the mouth of the Yalu River and the last major battle of the war took place at Weihaiwei between 30 January and 12 February 1895. Once again the Chinese fleet suffered bitter defeat with captured guns on the mainland actually being used against their ships trapped inside the harbor and the admiral and five of his officers committing suicide.<sup>14</sup>

According to the harsh terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed on 17 April 1895, Japan, in addition to many other things, was to be allowed to occupy Weihaiwei until indemnity payments had been made by the Chinese. Alarmed by Japan's surprising defeat of China, however, the three European powers, Russia, France, and Germany, lost no time in forcing the war-weakened Japanese to give up the Liaotung peninsula in exchange for additional indemnities. In spite of this "Triple Intervention," however, Weihaiwei was to remain occupied until the war payments had been made.<sup>15</sup>

The Sino-Japanese War and its aftermath were crucially significant to the events which unfolded in the closing years of the nineteenth century and, indeed, to those much later in the twentieth. The war demonstrated China's weakness and Japan's strength, but it also served to involve the latter in an intense and bitter rivalry among the world powers.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile, Great Britain was finding herself increasingly isolated in the Far East with her long-standing monopoly of political and economic power in China threatened. The British had chosen not to join the other European powers in their intervention against Japan.<sup>17</sup> The problem facing the prime minister, Lord Salisbury, and his ministers was a straight-

forward one: "to defend in an age of competition that which Great Britain had obtained in an age of monopoly."<sup>18</sup>

### The Scramble for Concessions

One of the immediate problems facing China at the conclusion of the war was how to pay the enormous indemnity she owed to Japan, a debt amounting to some 230 million taels, or approximately 35 million pounds. The powers wasted no time in making use of this newly-acquired lever for obtaining concessions as they competed with one another to grant loans to the Chinese government and to build railways across Chinese territory. It was at this time, for example, that the Russian-controlled Chinese Eastern Railway Company was formed in the north, while the French exerted pressure to win concessions in the south. Britain quickly followed suit by demanding and receiving counter-concessions.<sup>19</sup> All of this intense diplomatic maneuvering demonstrates the kind of rivalry which existed among the great powers in the late 1890s, but an event which took place in November 1898 served to initiate a qualitative change in the scramble for concessions.

Although they were somewhat late in joining the imperialist competition, the Germans from the late 1880s onward began to exhibit a desire for a more adventurous policy in China.<sup>20</sup> The Chinese initially refused to grant their requests for a naval and coaling station, but the Germans continued to investigate possible sites and finally decided upon Kiaochow Bay on the southeast coast of Shantung as the best choice.<sup>21</sup> The murder of two German missionaries in another part of Shantung in November 1897 provided the opportunity



the Kaiser had been seeking and he immediately ordered his Far Eastern naval squadron to Kiaochow. On 4 January 1898, the Chinese agreed to lease the bay and its surrounding territory for ninety-nine years.

Meanwhile, this new German presence in north China gave the Russians an additional pretext for occupying Port Arthur and Talienwan in December and seeking twenty-five year leases on both ports. By this time the British were becoming alarmed and some officials began to argue for a territorial counterpoise and further commercial concessions from China.<sup>22</sup> On 25 February 1898, Ambassador MacDonald advised London that, according to Sir Robert Hart, the Chinese government, in an attempt to counter-balance Russian pressures in the north, would be prepared to grant Britain the lease of Weihaiwei if it appeared their offer would be accepted.<sup>23</sup> Yet, despite rumors that Germany was likely to take the port, Salisbury declined the offer, fearing that any such action would immediately lead to the Russian seizure of Port Arthur. Even at this late date, in spite of an enraged British public, the prime minister was hopeful of avoiding further territorial carving up of the Chinese melon.<sup>24</sup>

On 7 March, however, it was reported in The Times that Russia was threatening to send troops to Manchuria in order to enforce her demands for the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan. Lord Balfour, at the time in temporary charge of the government in Salisbury's absence, decided that MacDonald should seek first refusal on a lease of Weihaiwei.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, it became clear in the days which followed that Russia planned to occupy Port Arthur as a closed and fortified port. A move of such grave political and strategic sig-

nificance called for a searching reappraisal of British foreign policy.

### The Leasing of Weihaiwei

Lord Balfour was by no means the first person to focus on Weihaiwei as a possible counterpoise to Russian and German advances in north China. As early as December 1897, Lord Curzon, then serving as under-secretary for foreign affairs, warned of these incursions and suggested that Britain should remain ready to occupy a piece of Chinese territory in the area if necessary.<sup>26</sup> It was not until Russian intentions in Manchuria became even clearer, however, that Curzon was taken seriously and asked to draw up a more detailed statement of his position regarding Weihaiwei for submission to the Cabinet.<sup>27</sup>

Faced with no less than a Russian seizure of Port Arthur and what would appear to have been a breach of faith with respect to their intentions there, the British Cabinet was faced with some difficult decisions when it met on 15 March 1898. The choice seemed clearly between allowing the Russians to lease Port Arthur and at the same time leasing Weihaiwei as a "makeweight," or insisting that they refrain from leasing Port Arthur and promising not to interfere with Manchuria. The latter alternative, of course, would require that Britain was willing to go to war with Russia, and possibly France and Germany, in order to force the evacuation of Port Arthur. Acquiring Weihaiwei, on the other hand, would signify a complete abandonment of the policy which called for maintaining Chinese territorial integrity and perhaps initiate a general free-for-all among the powers with respect to privileges in China.



However, the Admiralty had reservations about Weihaiwei's viability as a naval base.<sup>28</sup> Others, such as Francis Bertie, in charge of the China Department at the Foreign Office, though, argued that Weihaiwei would counter Russian and German influence in the north.<sup>29</sup>

In the end the British fleet was ordered to Weihaiwei and on 25 March, after a long Cabinet debate, MacDonald was told to obtain "'in the manner you think most efficacious and speedy, the refusal of Weihaiwei on the departure of the Japanese.'" It was further stipulated that the terms should be similar to those granted to Russia for Port Arthur.<sup>30</sup> In order to ensure German acquiescence, however, it was necessary to make an official declaration on 20 April that:

England formally declares that in establishing herself at Weihaiwei she has no intention of injuring or contesting the interests of Germany in the Province of Shantung or of creating difficulties for her in that province. It is especially understood that England will not construct any railway communication from Weihaiwei and the district leased herewith, into the interior of the province.<sup>31</sup>

It would appear that Weihaiwei's commercial future was to a large degree sealed with this declaration. Yet, interestingly enough, Baron Monk Bretton of the Colonial Office observed in a memorandum on Weihaiwei dated 1902 that there were certain parallels in this case with Hong Kong since initially there had been no railroad between the mainland of that colony and the province of Kwangtung either. Hong Kong's status as a free port, however, greatly enhanced its commercial value. Thus, he refused to rule out all possibility of commercial development for Weihaiwei despite the assurances given to both Germany and the United States.<sup>32</sup> We shall have

occasion to examine this argument in the chapters which follow.

One might well ask at this point how China was reacting to all of these territorial seizures. It is impossible to be absolutely certain what was in the minds of the Chinese officials called upon to negotiate the leasing of Weihaiwei. Earlier we have seen that the Territory was actually offered to the British at a time when the Chinese were under severe pressure from the Russians with respect to Port Arthur and no doubt thought they could possibly play one side off against the other. When MacDonald finally did ask for the concession, however, he found a change of attitude. Writing to Salisbury on 28 March, he said:

At an interview lasting three hours I pressed request for lease of Wei Hai Wei. Yamen greatly fear counter-demands of other Powers. They also state lease of Wei Hai Wei leaves them without a suitable harbour for their ships recently launched in England and Germany. Would it be possible to meet latter objection by any agreement for the use of the place by Chinese men-of-war? Yamen showed, what is now prevailing feeling here, great desire for England's friendship and support against Russia, and if we could hold out any encouragement it would prevent the change of feeling which will be produced if we have to gain our end by force. I am to see them again in four days' time when I have requested final answer.<sup>33</sup>

Salisbury did not object to this request but still the Chinese stalled for time. MacDonald reported on another meeting of 31 March:

I saw Yamen today and gave them till Saturday for final answer, telling them that if not affirmative matter would be placed in Admiral's hands. I believe that if I could have a few days' more time I could obtain lease but that they will not grant it so quickly.<sup>34</sup>

By 3 April, however, the Chinese did agree to the lease.

What can we make, then, of E-tu Zen Sun's belief, based on her reading of the Ch'ing-chi wai-chiao shih-liao and other sources, that the leasing of Weihaiwei was neither the result of "muddle-headed diplomacy" on the part of the British nor a complete disaster for the Chinese? First, she maintains that Weihaiwei, far from being a useless spot, had quite a good harbor, ranking second only to Port Arthur, and the British decision to lease it was not a random one. Second, she points out that the proposal was not a novel one to the Ch'ing court. One group of Chinese high officials had even hoped to establish more friendly relations with Britain and Japan in order to ward off the continental powers. These included Chang Chih-tung, Liu Kung-yi, and Sheng Hsüan-huai. Chang was especially interested in having the British train the Chinese navy. Thus, Professor Sun states that the negotiations were concluded in a matter of days and:

. . . we can be safe in our general deduction that when the British minister presented his demand for the lease of the harbor, the high officials at Peking were cognizant of certain sentiments in the country in favor of the lease and that the British were far from uncertain of the outcome of the negotiations.<sup>35</sup>

It should be noted here, however, that the situation may not have been quite as straight-forward as Professor Sun describes. Certainly the British ambassador was not overly confident that the Chinese would give in to his government's demands. In a telegram to Bertie at the Foreign Office on 1 April MacDonald complained about not having sufficient time to work out an agreement: "I will do my best but time is so infernally short. Russia took 30 days. Cabinet give me seven."<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, when the Yamen finally did consent

it was only after MacDonald had threatened them with military action. Obviously, it would have been impossible for the Ch'ing government at that point to hold out against such overwhelming pressure. The negotiations were completed quickly, but this does not in itself mean that the Chinese were pleased to have the British occupy Weihaiwei.<sup>37</sup>

Ch'ing officials did succeed in having provisions written into the agreement regarding the right of Chinese warships to use the harbor and it was understood that British officers would help drill the men of these ships. Professor Sun asserts that ". . . this was considered more than a naval expedience by the officials who negotiated the lease with the British. The Tsungli Yamen regarded it as a successful achievement in bringing the British closer to the dynastic government."<sup>38</sup> While this may be true, it must still be remembered that both Britain and China were being compelled by the force of events to make the best of a difficult situation.<sup>39</sup>

One can agree with Professor Sun, however, that the British decision to lease Weihaiwei was by no means an arbitrary one. It was in fact the only suitable harbor in north China which they could have taken given the Russian presence at Port Arthur. Nor was the decision made hastily when one considers the lengthy Cabinet debates on the matter and the fact that the idea did not originate in March. Still, Lord Salisbury in particular would have preferred not to have used China as an arena for settling the issue of Britain's international prestige. His desire was to keep China "in a peripheral position where differences could be settled peacefully as a regional issue."<sup>40</sup>

Members of Parliament and the British press were inclined to see the acquisition of Weihaiwei as even worse than "muddle-headed diplomacy," however.<sup>41</sup> The task of defending the Cabinet's decision in the Commons fell to Arthur Balfour, Salisbury's deputy at the Foreign Office. In a Parliamentary debate in late April, Balfour responded to criticism that the occupation of Weihaiwei had been too little too late by saying that even if it remained unfortified it could be of great diplomatic value in Peking during times of peace and of strategic value in times of war. To the charge that Britain was abandoning the sacred principle of maintaining China's territorial integrity he replied that there was a distinction between a sphere of influence and a sphere of interest and that the latter was legitimate. With respect to the assurances given to Germany, he responded that these had been a matter of practical politics since Weihaiwei had been taken for military purposes alone.<sup>42</sup> Parliamentary opinion on Weihaiwei appears to have been divided and could be summarized as Lord Curzon did when writing to his wife: "'General reception of our case fair, not enthusiastic.'" <sup>43</sup>

Public opinion on the issue of Weihaiwei also seems to have been divided if one reads letters to the editor of The Times published during this period.<sup>44</sup> Commercial opinion varied from those who saw the acquisition as a positive step toward restoring British prestige to those who thought it did not go far enough.<sup>45</sup> The Anglican bishop, Charles P. Scott, however, was inclined to see it as very helpful for missionary efforts in China.<sup>46</sup>

In the end one must conclude that Lord Salisbury's government saw itself as having little choice but to acquire

Wei-hai-wei faced as it was by a threat to its diplomatic prestige, its military presence in China, and its commercial position. If it was to have any influence on Peking with respect to north China given the new acquisitions made by Germany and Russia, a counterpoise in the north was required. Perhaps the most telling argument as far as Lord Salisbury was concerned, however, was the fact that an "enraged English public opinion might demand war with Russia."<sup>47</sup> Taking Wei-hai-wei, though it meant participating in the assault on Chinese territorial integrity, did prevent war and was seen as the lesser of two evils. It remains now to describe what Britain had actually acquired and what she intended to do with it.

#### Takeover from the Japanese

On 9 May 1898, the Chinese government paid the final installment of its indemnity obligation to Japan for the war of 1894-95. Shortly thereafter, on 24 May, Japanese troops were evacuated from Wei-hai-wei and the Union Jack was raised to signal its takeover by Great Britain. The following is a description of the ceremony which took place that day to mark an occasion which happened to coincide with Queen Victoria's birthday:

Then the British flag was hoisted alongside the Chinese already flying, the force presenting arms, the Commissioners and all officers and men on the ground saluting, and the band playing 'God Save the Queen.' This done, the Chinese National Anthem was played with the same formalities, and the ceremony ended with three cheers for Her Majesty the Queen and one for the Emperor of China.<sup>48</sup>

Thus, with typical British formality, a small piece of Chinese territory became part of the Queen's empire. It

should be remembered, however, that a careful distinction was made between Weihaiwei as a leased territory and a colony which would have been incorporated into the Dominions. Weihaiwei remained part of a foreign country within which Britain exercised legal jurisdiction but it was not a colony and the Chinese living there were not British citizens. The British government was anxious to preserve the myth of Chinese territorial integrity and not set any precedent which might be followed by the other powers. Furthermore, it was stipulated in the convention that Weihaiwei was to be leased from the Chinese for as long as the Russians occupied Port Arthur. There was, then, a certain ambiguity in the lease which made the length of British tenure at Weihaiwei indefinite and dependent upon Russian intentions in north China. This uncertainty was to remain a stumbling block to the economic development of the Territory for thirty-two years.

In terms of size the leasehold consisted of 288 square miles of territory, although a British sphere of influence extended for an additional 1,505 square miles, from about halfway to Chefoo (Yen-t'ai) on the west to the Shantung promontory on the east. Britain had the right to erect fortifications and station troops in this area but it never had occasion to do so and its administrative jurisdiction was confined to the leasehold proper. In another respect the British acquisition was somewhat less significant than those of the Russians and Germans for they were granted no special mining or railroad concessions along with their new territory. As has been noted, however, the British were not the first foreigners to occupy Weihaiwei.<sup>49</sup>

According to several reports in the North China Herald, during the three years Japanese forces were in the area the occupation was extremely businesslike and military discipline generally excellent. After describing a minor altercation which occurred in November 1896, one reporter wrote that:

. . . the above scene is not a common one here. During the occupation of Weihai by Japanese troops the writer has never before seen a squabble between the two nationalities. The soldiers mingle in the streets and the market with the Chinese and very little friction occurs -- thanks to the good discipline of the soldiers and the easy-going nature of John Chinaman.<sup>50</sup>

It should be remembered, though, that the Japanese had instilled considerable fear in the local population in January 1895 when large numbers of troops marched along the coast through villages and fields all the way from Jung-ch'eng to Weihaiwei.<sup>51</sup> That fear no doubt helped them maintain order in the area in the post-war period.<sup>52</sup>

From the available evidence it seems highly unlikely that the Japanese continually encountered fierce resistance from the local people during their three years there or that it was this resistance which forced them in the end to leave as is suggested in one article published in the People's Republic of China.<sup>53</sup> It appears rather that they maintained a relatively "low profile" at Weihaiwei, busying themselves with surveying the roads and the location of towns and villages in the area. Some suspected they intended to claim Shantung as their own upon the break-up of China and were gathering information that would assist them when that day arrived.<sup>54</sup> Meanwhile, the countryside as far as 200 li from the walled town was apparently safe enough for some Japanese merchants



to travel about selling their wares unconcerned about a hostile reception from the villagers.<sup>55</sup>

It must have come as quite a shock to the local inhabitants when the Japanese left Weihaiwei and were replaced with yet another set of foreign intruders. Earlier in 1897 when many Japanese troops were removed from the area, rumors circulated that they would soon leave altogether, that the old forts would be rebuilt, and that Chinese soldiers would occupy them as before. Farmers were even concerned that they should perhaps stop cultivating the land near these forts as they might soon be forced to anyway.<sup>56</sup> Then in November of that year, after the Germans had seized Kiaochow Bay, it was thought that the Japanese certainly had a good reason for maintaining their hold on Weihaiwei and would most likely remain for some time to come.<sup>57</sup> Yet this was not to be either.

As we have seen, on 24 May 1898, the Japanese flag was lowered and the Union Jack raised to fly for a time alongside the Chinese flag. In terms of numbers of troops, however the British presence on the mainland was miniscule compared to the original 7,000 Japanese soldiers stationed there. In fact, the mainland was initially declared off-limits to the men of the fleet anchored at Liu-kung Island. As a precautionary measure in June it was decided to put 800 men ashore on the mainland carrying rifles with fixed bayonets, hauling two field guns, and led by a brass band! The entire group then spent a day marching through the villages surrounding the town of Weihai as a means of "overawing" the people with their superior military strength. Afterward they returned to the island.<sup>58</sup>

Again, in order to gradually, but effectively, assert

their authority the British officials allowed the Chinese flag to fly on the mainland at Weihaiwei until 15 July at which time it was lowered and the Union Jack officially raised in its place. At the same time, both a British and a Chinese ship saluted the new flag and 300 British seamen were landed on the mainland as a signal that the Territory was indeed under Her Majesty's jurisdiction.<sup>59</sup> Still, the local people remained unconvinced that these newcomers would in fact stay for very long. As one observer remarked: "Even intelligent men in Weihaiwei itself think and say: 'Oh, these English will only stay here for a short time. They intend to get the money for the buildings that are being pulled down, then they will up with their anchors and steam away not to return.'" <sup>60</sup> No one would have guessed that this was just the beginning of an occupation that was to last for thirty-two years.

#### Location and Physical Features


One of the first things a newcomer to Weihaiwei might have done upon arrival was to familiarize himself with its location. Looking at a map of Shantung, one can see that the entire area east of the leasehold to the tip of the promontory was part of Jung-ch'eng hsien, while on the south it was bounded by Wen-teng hsien. The Territory was created from a strip of land ten miles wide along the coast and amounted to 288 square miles. It also included the Bay of Weihaiwei and adjacent waters and all of the islands in these waters. The boundary line was drawn from a point towards the south of the bay and continued in a semi-circle to the east and west. That section of the leasehold proper which originally



belonged to Jung-ch'eng hsien was located east of a line drawn from the sea near the village of Sheng-tzu to the southern British border. The rest of the Territory had been part of Wen-teng hsien. Weihaiwei itself could be considered roughly equivalent in area to a small hsien or district magistracy since each of the 107 hsien in Shantung averaged about 520 square miles.<sup>61</sup>

One of the first British officials to visit Weihaiwei noted in a rather unfavorable report that it appeared to him to be a "colder Aden."<sup>62</sup> Indeed, if one had considered only the coastline as it might have looked from a ship anchored in the harbor, this would have been a fairly accurate description. The island of Liu-kung presented a particularly uninviting and barren landscape as its rocky hillsides had, over the centuries, been stripped almost bare of trees by the local population. It was  $2\frac{1}{4}$  miles in length,  $\frac{7}{8}$  of a mile in width at its widest point, and had a circumference of  $5\frac{1}{2}$  miles. On the southern, landward side of the island there was some arable land with a small town of about 300 houses and a population of approximately 1,500, mostly fishermen.<sup>63</sup> As has been mentioned, it is the island of Liu-kung which actually creates the harbor at Weihaiwei and its two entrances. The total surface area of the harbor was estimated to be eleven square miles, could hold a large number of vessels of moderate size, and was considered easily accessible.<sup>64</sup>

The coastline of the leasehold was quite extensive and rocky in places, being some 72 miles long and featuring many small sheltered coves.<sup>65</sup> The Territory also contains several ranges of rugged hills though none rises more than 1,700 feet. A short distance over the border, however, in the Ku-yü hills



Map  
of  
WEIHAIBEI

*Boundary of Territory* .....  
*Boundary between North & South Divisions* .....

Source: Reginald F. Johnston, Lion and Dragon in Northern China (London, 1910).



to the southwest there are some peaks which rise above 3,000 feet. Many of the hills in the northern portion of the Territory and along the coast had at their summits the remains of stone-built signal stations where fires had once been lighted in times of war.

To the south of this range and opposite the area the British called Narcissus Bay there is a section of relatively flat land on which is found the town of Weihai. More mountains extend south of the town and all of them are primarily formed of granite and a kind of limestone used for building purposes.<sup>66</sup> They also contained white quartz, mica, and mineral deposits, including some gold, silver, lead, tin, iron, nickel, and copper. These deposits at first led to great excitement among early British visitors who saw possibilities for mining. In the vicinity of the village which was to become Port Edward, site of the British Territorial headquarters, there were also natural sulphur springs developed by the Japanese and providing an added attraction for summer visitors to the area.

As Weihaiwei was a rather mountainous area with no extensive tracts of good agricultural land, it could be considered to have been fairly densely populated. The Territory's approximately 315 villages, none of which could be called large, were not evenly distributed but were located in the valleys between hills and averaged three for every two square miles.<sup>67</sup> Evidently, the interior of the Territory was a pleasant contrast to the barrenness of the island. Although trees grew abundantly only in the vicinity of villages or numerous burial-grounds, "the streams were often lined with graceful willows and large areas on the mountain

slopes [were] covered with green vegetation in the shape of scrub oak."<sup>68</sup> There were hundreds of tiny streams throughout Weihaiwei, some of which could become raging rivers during periods of heavy rainfall, spreading sand over the soil.<sup>69</sup> But, generally speaking, the area suffered from a lack of running water as these short streams were only swollen a few days a year and even then the water quickly ran into the sea. In winter and spring some of them disappeared altogether.

### Climate

One of Weihaiwei's chief assets is its exceptional climate, often regarded as the finest on the China coast. It suffers neither severe temperature fluctuations nor oppressive humidity and averages about nineteen inches of rain per year.<sup>70</sup> The rainy season extends through June, July, August, and part of September while the coldest months of the year are January, February, and March. Even then, though, the temperature rarely falls below 6° F. and the annual snowfall is usually very small. The hottest months of the year are June, July, and August but the temperature seldom rises above 94° F. In spite of this generally fine climate, Weihaiwei does frequently experience strong northerly gales which can last as long as three days. Likewise, the variability of rainfall, as elsewhere in north China, makes agriculture always a gamble.

### Principal Towns and Villages

As we have seen, there was a village situated to the southwest on Liu-kung Island where the British administrative offices were at first located. An Anglican missionary, the

Reverend Roland Allen, wrote the following after his visit there in 1898:

On the island close to the sea there is a fairly large village with several foreign-built houses fringing a long straggly winding street unevenly paved with stone. Of the houses some are held by Chinese store-keepers, many are deserted, most dilapidated, a few practically ruins.<sup>71</sup>

The early administrators thought the only solution to these unsightly and unsanitary conditions was to simply pull down most of the old houses.<sup>72</sup> By 1902 the town had undergone other changes as well. The parade ground doubled as a cricket-pitch and the former Chinese yamen served as "Queen's House" containing government offices, the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company, and the British post office.<sup>73</sup> The principal shops in the town included naval and military compradors and Japanese souvenir shops and most were run either by Cantonese or by Japanese shop-keepers.<sup>74</sup> There was a new road in town which led from Queen's House and ran along the shore to the eastern end of the island, passing the nine-hole golf course, and ending at the East Battery where a new rifle range had been constructed. The marine camp where permanent barracks were to be erected was located to the west of the village separated by the cricket ground. Along the "bund" there were a few foreign business firms situated in small, two-storied houses and some newly-constructed bungalows for summer visitors.<sup>75</sup>

Across the bay on the mainland and to the north was the small fishing village of Ma-t'ou which had served as the port for the walled town of Weihai before the British came, but later became their administrative center and was renamed Port Edward. In 1808 this village of approximately 2,000 inhabitants was not considered very attractive.<sup>76</sup> Reverend Allen



wrote:

Ma-t'ou is not a pleasing village. Its situation is pleasant, but it is dirty, smelly, and disreputable. It has only one long, straggling street, without interest or beauty of any kind, inhabited mainly by sampan men; the Sampan Guild reckons seventy boats, used chiefly for fishing. Of late a few have been plying about the harbour to and from the fleet and the island.<sup>77</sup>

In contrast to those on the island, however, the houses in Ma-t'ou were well built of stone with thatched roofs and appeared more comfortable.<sup>78</sup>

There were also some foreign residences at Ma-t'ou and the headquarters of the Chinese Regiment which had been formed in the summer of 1890. The Regiment itself became an important feature of life in the town as it "marched almost daily through the main street to the parade ground outside the east gate of the walled city."<sup>79</sup> By 1890 the Plymouth Brethern missionaries owned a Gospel Hall inside the village and next door a boarding house to which they hoped to attract foreign visitors. Though Ma-t'ou was well located on the southwest side of the harbor where it was sheltered from storms, the water off-shore was too shallow for anything larger than sea-going junks or small coastal steamers to anchor. Eventually there would be a ferry operating several times a day over the 2½ mile stretch of water between the mainland and the island. In the early days, however, the Royal Navy assisted with transportation between Ma-t'ou and Liu-kung Tao.

The largest mainland settlement was the Chinese walled "city" of Weihai which remained outside British jurisdiction and contained approximately 3,500 people.<sup>80</sup> As it was built on a hill, the well-preserved town walls were visible from the

island and measured about four miles around, enclosing an area with considerable open space devoted to growing vegetables. One early observer noted that the "decaying" town contained only a few poor shops, some two to three hundred small private houses, a temple, and the offices of a police magistrate and a minor military officer.<sup>81</sup> It was certainly not a very prosperous place and remained a thorn in the side of successive British administrators as it sheltered numerous brothels, gambling and opium dens, and assorted disreputable characters.

### Markets

The Territory of Weihaiwei was very much an agricultural area with a population in 1902 of around 128,000.<sup>82</sup> Reginald Johnston, who served at Weihaiwei as a colonial official for sixteen years, notes that the British initially divided the Territory for administrative purposes into north and south divisions. The north contained about 100 square miles and 84 villages while the south had 200 square miles and 231 villages. There were six market centers all of which, except the town of Weihai, were located in the south.<sup>83</sup> It was at these market towns that the villagers sold their agricultural produce and purchased clothing, cooking utensils, and other household items. Foreign cloth and other imports had only a very limited market. Some farm animals were also bought and sold on regular market days, although it was at the annual fairs, or hui, where they changed hands in largest numbers. These fairs were important social and religious occasions for the villagers where a great deal of incense-burning and exploding of fire-crackers took place.<sup>84</sup>

Judging by the remarks in 1901 of one of Weihaiwei's earliest commissioners, Colonel A. Dorward, the walled town of Weihai was the "social and commercial centre of the Territory" and undoubtedly held the largest of the weekly markets. "Thousands of the country people" were said to assemble there on market days and, as Dorward somewhat ruefully admitted, were thus "continually reminded that Chinese jurisdiction has not entirely disappeared from their midst."<sup>85</sup> Over the years a rather antagonistic marketing relationship had evolved between the merchants of the walled town and Ma-t'ou and the country folk. In a report made by Captain Johnson of the Chinese Regiment and an Anglican missionary, Reverend H. J. Brown, in 1902 after a tour of the Territory it was noted that the country people complained of being dealt with unfairly by these merchants:

. . . for instance when the produce of the neighbourhood of these places and bought up by the merchants was selling in the case of beans at 300 cash a picul, the same beans from the country (or rather tendered for sale by a country man as opposed to a merchant of Ma-t'ou), would only fetch 270 cash a picul. Hence the well-known terms 'Weihai lang' and 'Weihai yang' -- the 'Weihai wolves' being the inhabitants of Weihai, Ma-t'ou and the neighbourhood, who prey upon the 'Weihai sheep' or country people who are fleeced by them.<sup>86</sup>

The monotonous toil of Weihaiwei's farmers was relieved only by the annual fairs, local holidays, and occasional theatrical performances held in village pavillions or temples. Wandering troupes of actors could be hired at such times and the expense was met either by an individual who was enjoying financial success or an entire village eager for entertainment.<sup>87</sup>

### Local Crops and Industries

As has been noted, the amount of arable land in Weihaiwei was relatively small and the local farmers were, therefore, extremely careful in cultivating it. The principal grain crops were wheat, millet, maize, barley, and buckwheat. Wheat was harvested around the end of June and beginning of July and this land then immediately replanted with beans. Most fields were farmed so as to yield three crops every two years and seldom allowed to lie fallow, though crop rotation was well understood. Vegetables were also grown extensively, including asparagus, onions, cabbage, garlic, celery, spinach, and sweet potatoes. Some fruit was cultivated such as apples, peaches, apricots, plums, pears, and melons. The diet of the local people was primarily vegetarian though supplemented by both dried and fresh fish and some pork. Rice was considered a luxury food.

Fishing was an important industry in Weihaiwei. Several early military observers remarked: "Doubtless fishing is a source of considerable profit to the inhabitants and in the sheltered bays around the coast, acres of ground are to be seen covered by nets, showing that this industry is extensively pursued."<sup>88</sup> In fact, when the British arrived at Weihaiwei its chief export product was salt fish which was sent by junk principally to south China.

There was very little in the way of handicraft industry, though salt-making, rope-making, boat-building, lime-making, and stone-cutting could be found on a limited scale. There was also a very small production of silk worms raised on the leaves of scrub oak to be found on the hillsides surrounding Weihaiwei. The cocoons were sent to Chefoo where they were

manufactured into a coarse silk for which this part of Shantung was known. For the most part, these other occupations were merely supplementary to a family's normal farming activities. Thus, the British had come to occupy an area very much at the pre-industrial level of development. Their subsequent efforts to encourage trade will form one of the themes of this thesis.

In 1898 the Territory could hardly have been called flourishing, yet there are somewhat contradictory reports as to the degree of its poverty. Sir Frank Swettenham, who served as a colonial official in the relatively more prosperous Federated Malay States, stated emphatically that there was only one well-to-do family living in the Territory and that eastern Shantung was the poorest part of a very poor province. Large numbers of laborers, he said, owned no land and were simply employed by other landowners for six or eight cents per day.<sup>89</sup> Another observer from the Malay States, G. T. Hare, also commented on Weihaiwei's extreme poverty which forced thousands to emigrate every year to Korea and Manchuria.<sup>90</sup>

Sir James S. Lockhart, who became commissioner at Weihaiwei in 1901, formed quite a different impression. Writing in 1903, he said: "In my opinion the people though not wealthy are far removed from poverty stricken. In my journeys through the Territory I have been struck by the healthy and well-nourished appearance of adults and children and by the almost entire absence of beggars."<sup>91</sup> Lockhart had served as a colonial officer for many years in Hong Kong and was not unfamiliar with conditions elsewhere in China. He was also unable to find evidence of large-scale emigration from Weihaiwei. Reginald Johnston, another long-time resident of China, also

noted an absence of poverty at Weihaiwei.<sup>92</sup>

The extremely healthy climate meant a generally low incidence of disease which certainly contributed to the favorable appearance of the local citizens. Weihaiwei was also blessed in not lying close to the Yellow River which wrought havoc in the lives of those inhabiting western Shantung. Though one could not consider the people here well-to-do, they did not seem to be subjected to the extreme conditions of poverty which affected so many other parts of China. Johnston characterized life in the Territory as "quiet and humdrum" with "no manorial system, no 'villeinage,' no landlordism, no rack-renting."<sup>93</sup>

#### Village Organization

Title deeds and tombstones in Weihaiwei villages indicated that many of the people living there were direct descendants of families who originally settled in the Territory as far back as the Sung, Yüan, and Ming dynasties. Many villages still bore the names of these early families. Johnston comments: "As a rule we find in Weihaiwei either that each village is exclusively inhabited by the people of one name, who are all inter-related and address each other as brothers and uncles and nephews, or that one 'surname' is in numbers, wealth, and social influence greatly predominant over the others."<sup>94</sup> Owing to the way in which Weihaiwei was settled, however, there were also descendants of immigrants who had come from other parts of China as military colonists or who had been transferred there by the government as a result of some political, social, or military problem.

Within single surname villages each family usually owned

its own lands and also had rights to a common tract of pasture land. It was expected to contribute to the maintenance of an ancestral temple, its tablets, a family burial ground, and any other land which had been reserved for the expense of religious ceremonies. If there were several surnames within the village there would be several temples, burial grounds, and plots of sacrificial land. Individuals who wished to dispose of their land or mortgage it were obligated by longstanding custom to first obtain the consent of their relatives. These relatives, in order of seniority, had first option to purchase the land and, prior to the British occupation, it was rare for any outsider to be allowed title to it. In fact, absolute sales of land in general were rare in Weihaiwei before the British arrived. It was assumed that no one would actually want to sell his land, and that having to do so was unfortunate and perhaps even reprehensible. Deeds of sale, therefore, stated in detail the reasons for the transaction and bore the names of the village headmen and the lineage members who acted as witnesses and had been consulted throughout the negotiations even to the point of setting the price. Mortgages of land were much more common in Weihaiwei and usually resulted in subsequent redemption of the property by the owner. Here, too, the lineage members played a major role, at times assuming the right of redeeming the land from an outsider even in the absence of the original mortgagor. Johnston discusses at length the litigation with which he frequently had to deal in such cases.<sup>95</sup>

Within each village a small group of elders under the leadership of a headman was responsible for village affairs but there was no regular village council. These elders were

the most respected members of their community but their number could vary. Johnston writes:

When important matters arise, affecting the interests of the whole village, they discuss them in the headman's house, or in a temple, or in the village street under the shade of an old tree. Nothing is discussed with closed doors. The whole village, including the women and children, may as a rule attend a meeting of elders, and any one who wishes to air his views may do so, irrespective of his age or position in the village. The elders have few privileges that their fellow-villagers do not share, and the headman himself is only primus inter pares. His authority, like that of the elders, is chiefly derived from his position as head of the family or clan.<sup>96</sup>

Prior to British administration, the villages were subject to the local district magistrate who appointed a ti-pao, a sort of constable or watchman, for each village or group of villages and he served as the official representative of the government but received little pay and had virtually no power. He was in turn responsible to the village elders who actually managed local affairs. The elders were sometimes selected by the rest of the community, or nominated by the larger landowners, or occasionally self-appointed. They were not necessarily the wealthiest men in the village, nor those with the most education but supposedly demonstrated a certain native ability for the job. They received no salaries but were given small amounts of money by virtue of their role as collectors for religious ceremonies and for other services. Also among their duties were the imposition of fines, collection of land tax, regulation of fairs, repairs to temples and wells, arranging transport for visiting officials, upkeep of river banks and roads, and the organization of groups of crop-watchers.<sup>97</sup>



The role of the ti-pao must have been very minor indeed, confined almost exclusively to making arrangements with the runners sent annually from the magistrate's yamen to collect the land tax. G. T. Hare remarked: "In this part of Shantung the tribunals of the village elders have practically no link with the district authorities and are entirely self-governed."<sup>98</sup> It is interesting to compare this situation with that which James Hayes described in certain villages in Hong Kong. Here, too, the local people seemed perfectly capable of managing their own affairs without interference from government officials.<sup>99</sup> As we shall see, this made the job of policing and administering the Territory considerably easier for the British.

Local management even extended to the promulgation of certain police regulations, or ts'un kuei, by the local elders. These rules, which were usually kept in the ancestral temple or headman's house, did not carry any legal sanction, but depended on village enforcement for their authority. They varied considerably as to penalties but the offenses were much the same everywhere in the Territory and included such things as desecration of graves, usurping portions of the common pasture land, stealing crops or fuel, and other minor crimes.<sup>100</sup> More serious offenses such as housebreaking, assault, or murder, of course, were referred to a higher authority for punishment.

In sharp contrast to the turbulent conditions existing in so many areas of south China where banditry was common and feuds often broke out among lineages, Weihaiwei was by all accounts an extremely peaceful region and there was seldom any need to refer to these higher authorities.<sup>101</sup> Though

there was no official police force in any of the villages, all of the adult males acted in a sense as policemen. As Johnston observed: "The bonds of family and village life are such that every male villager finds himself directly or indirectly responsible for the good behaviour of someone else. The bad characters of every village soon become marked men."<sup>102</sup> In serious cases a person could actually be expelled from his lineage. Understandably, in such a closely-knit community an outsider was looked upon with considerable suspicion and even hostility until his intentions were determined. The British themselves were soon to be the object of this suspicion as we shall see in Chapter 2.

#### Wei-hai-wei, Chefoo, and the Economy of Shantung

Having briefly examined the internal social and economic organization of the leased Territory, it might be well at this point to discuss its position within the economic structure of the province as a whole. As might be expected, this structure was to a large extent determined by the transportation network available at any given time. For example, David Buck has described the economic geography of Shantung in the early nineteenth century as consisting of four trading regions with centers at the cities of Chi-ning, Lin-ch'ing (both along the Grand Canal), Tsinan, and Wei-hsien. Prior to 1850 the inland areas around Chi-ning and Lin-ch'ing were the most populous as well as the most prosperous areas in Shantung. In the second half of the century, however, several factors resulted in a shift of resources away from these areas, especially Lin-ch'ing, and a stimulus to the economic development of the Wei-hsien region in the east.<sup>103</sup>

The northwestern city of Lin-ch'ing suffered tremendous devastation in April 1854 when it was taken by the Taiping rebels and then retaken ten days later by Ch'ing forces. Perhaps even more serious for the economy of the region than the fighting, however, had been the Taipings' closing of the Grand Canal to regular tribute grain shipments in 1853. As a result, many of the thousands of unemployed workmen turned to banditry as a means of survival and at times joined bands of Nien rebels active in the area until 1867. Complicating the matter even further was the fact that the Yellow River changed its course in 1855 flooding the wheat and cotton fields of northwestern Shantung. This, of course, caused great hardship but it also created new difficulties for transport with much of the Grand Canal effectively blocked for most of the period up until 1950. The economy of northwestern Shantung was crippled by all of these events, although Chi-ning and the southwest region where the Canal remained open did not suffer as heavily.<sup>104</sup>

Meanwhile, other factors were operating to stimulate the economy of the Wei-hsien trading system. This city lay in a rich and fertile portion of the North China plain and produced wheat, cotton, soybeans, coal, and silk. The handicraft industry of the area was especially well known and included fine embroidery work and articles made of strawbraid. Other exports included glass, vermicelli, and bean cake which was used as fertilizer in the Lower Yangtze Valley. There was also an extensive coastal trade in salt and fish. In the late 1850s the town of Chefoo on the north coast of the Shantung peninsula was made a treaty port and the presence of foreigners by 1862 increased the demand for handicraft

goods which had been adapted to Western standards. The coming of the foreigners also meant improved coastal transport and this greatly aided the vermicelli and bean cake industries.<sup>105</sup> Both of these factors undoubtedly had an effect on Weihaiwei, at least in creating a larger demand for wild silk cocoons.<sup>106</sup>

Indeed, some of the areas near Chefoo must have been regular thoroughfares for an expanding volume of trade in the late nineteenth century. As one observer remarked:

In this inn-yard of Laichow-fu /just to the west of Chefoo/ I counted forty-five animals at one time. There were carts, large and small, laden with goods of all kinds. Some were going west with bales of piece-goods, Manchester cottons, and woolen cloths. Some were en route for Chefoo with native produce, straw-braid for England and America, vermicelli for the south of China, great quantities of medicinal drugs, barks, and roots, and dye-stuffs, the saffron tistle, and indigo, besides miscellaneous articles for home consumption.<sup>107</sup>

Another decision taken in the late 1850s also had an impact on the economic growth of eastern Shantung and this was the encouragement of Chinese emigration to Manchuria in order to offset Russian expansionism in the region. Many settlers and migrant workers passed through the port of Chefoo en route to this new frontier and some undoubtedly came from Weihaiwei. As one scholar notes:

The opening of Manchuria . . . meant that for the first time during the Ch'ing dynasty the Gulf of Chihli became a thoroughfare of commerce and travel rather than a barrier to the outside world. This naturally had an impact on the activity in the peninsular and eastern portions of Shantung.<sup>108</sup>

Buck has observed that in the period under discussion Shantung could be described as divided both economically and politically along the lines of two ancient kingdoms from the

Warring States era (481-221 B.C.). The area around Chi-ning roughly corresponded to the former state of Lu while the area around Wei-hsien corresponded to the state of Ch'i. Ch'i was said to be more progressive than Lu in many ways and this could be seen in both political and economic endeavors. The fact that Chefoo was a treaty port undoubtedly contributed to this tendency toward republicanism, mass popular education, commercialization, industrialization, and Westernization. More than any other part of Shantung, the Ch'i region, from the nineteenth century on, experienced improved transportation, population migration, and growth in both traditional and modern forms of commerce.<sup>109</sup>

One must, however, qualify the statement that transportation improved in eastern Shantung in the second half of the nineteenth century. The situation there and in the province as a whole was still far from ideal. Baron Richthofen in his travels through Shantung in the 1880s observed: "'The most striking reason for Shantung's failure to exploit its economic potential was . . . because in no province has trade and commerce had to contend with such difficulties of transport and shipment as in this.'" <sup>110</sup> Unlike other coastal provinces, it had few navigable rivers or inland waterways and this was especially significant when the Grand Canal became partially blocked. Its only important port at this time was Chefoo which was handicapped by a relatively shallow, unprotected harbor and the fact that it was cut off from the rest of Shantung by a broad band of mountains. A canal dredging project between Tsinan and Yang-chiao-kou on the coast which was supported by salt merchants, general merchants, and officials in the 1890s helped alleviate the problem to some

extent.<sup>111</sup> Unfortunately, however, the coastal steamer service which grew up as a result of these efforts was discontinued during the Sino-Japanese War.

Overland trade in eastern Shantung in the 1890s was severely handicapped by primitive roads and the absence of a railroad. Products such as bean cake, reed matting, silk, and strawbraid were transported by carts, wheelbarrows, and mules over the 250 miles from the interior all the way to Chefoo at the rate of two miles per hour.<sup>112</sup> Thus, in the case of bean cake, for example, the price was doubled by the time it reached Chefoo. Even the journey from the major distribution center of Wei-hsien to the coast took six days.<sup>113</sup>

Obviously, the development of Kiaochow Bay by the Germans beginning in 1898 and their subsequent completion of the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway in 1904, had an enormous impact on the economic life of all of Shantung. Kiaochow, with its superior fifteen-mile wide harbor and location a full day's journey closer to Shanghai, was to give Chefoo some very stiff competition. And the railroad, of course, did much to reroute trade in this part of Shantung. In sharp contrast to the British at Weihaiwei, as we shall see, the Germans were keen to develop the commercial potential of their newly-acquired territory and regarded it in every way as a colony which they hoped would rival Hong Kong. During their brief occupation of the area from 1898 to 1914 they invested heavily in the area, transforming it from a tiny fishing village to a modern city and first-class port. From 1898 to 1900 alone the leasehold received 23,280,000 marks in subsidies.<sup>114</sup>

Those at Weihaiwei who would have been interested in promoting trade must have indeed been envious of Tsingtao

with its far superior transport links. In 1898 the British territory was connected with the outside world only by infrequent steamer service and unpaved roads which were impassable at certain times of the year. The most common mode of travel in the interior was mule litter or wheelbarrow and transportation was to be a major issue throughout the British occupation of Weihaiwei. Having discussed the economic context into which the British had moved in 1898, however, it remains now to investigate the political milieu in which they found themselves.

# Notes to Chapter 1

<sup>1</sup>Foreign Office (hereafter cited as FO) 64/1438 Germany (Prussia), Letter No. 168, "Very Confidential," Lascelles to Salisbury, 26 May 1898. This document may also be found in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War (London, 1927), vol. 1, no. 53, Lascelles to Salisbury, 26 May 1898.

<sup>2</sup>Reginald F. Johnston, Lion and Dragon in Northern China (London, 1910), pp. 43-4.

<sup>3</sup>Wei-hai-wei chih, 10 chüan (1742 ed., revised and reprinted 1920), 2/1b.

<sup>4</sup>Wen-teng hsien-chih (1897 ed., reprinted Taipei, 1976), pp. 39-45. The Jung-ch'eng hsien-chih (1840 ed., reprinted Taipei, 1976), pp. 59-64, in general corroborates the Wen-teng hsien-chih except for discrepancies in dates. The establishment of a wei at Weihai, for example, is given as the thirteenth year of Ming T'ai-tsu (1380). The Wei-hai-wei chih, however, states that this occurred in 1308 and probably should be regarded as the most authoritative source. See Wei-hai-wei chih, 2/1b.

<sup>5</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, pp. 13, 44, and 46-47; and Wei-hai-wei chih, 9/1b-2b.

<sup>6</sup>For more detailed information on the wei-so system and its origins see Romeyn Taylor, "Yüan Origins of the Wei-So System," in C. O. Hucker, ed., Chinese Government in Ming Times: Seven Studies (New York and London, 1969), pp. 23-40.

<sup>7</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, pp. 49-50; and Wei-hai-wei chih, 1/2a. According to the latter source, the city wall was restored around 1490, again about 1636, and during the middle of the Ch'ing dynasty before 1735. See 2/1b.

<sup>8</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, pp. 49-50. See also Wei-hai-wei chih, 1/12b.

<sup>9</sup>Though older atlases of China tend to call the town of Weihai, Weihaiwei, those published since 1949 simply call it Weihai. For purposes of this thesis I will use the term Weihaiwei to refer to the entire leasehold and Weihai to denote the "city," or, more correctly, walled town, of Weihai.

<sup>10</sup>Alexander Armstrong, Shantung, China: A General Outline of the Geography and History of the Province (Shanghai, 1898), p. 80. (Armstrong was principal of the Collegiate School for European children at Chefoo.) John Rawlinson notes that the naval college was "mainly for in-service refresher courses, although it did enroll some new recruits." There were both Chinese and foreign instructors at the school including an American, Philo McGiffen, who graduated from Annapolis and was later to serve in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Training in torpedo and mine installations was also offered at Weihaiwei. See John L. Rawlinson, China's Struggle



for Naval Development, 1839-1895 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), p. 157.

<sup>11</sup>Rawlinson, China's Struggle, p. 150.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 150-51. For detailed information on the Chinese defense build-up at Port Arthur, Weihaiwei, and Dairen, see Ma Yu-yüan, "Chia-wu chan-ch'ien Lü-shun, Wei-hai-wei, Ta-lien teng-ti chih ching-ying," Ta-lu tsa-chih, 20.8 (October 31, 1964):8-13.

<sup>13</sup>Armstrong, Shantung, China, p. 80.

<sup>14</sup>For a thorough account of military operations during the war, see Ch'i Ch'i-chang, Chung-Jih Chia-wu Wei-hai chih chan (Chi-nan, 1978). See also William F. Tyler, Pulling Strings in China (London, 1920), pp. 63-98.

The Japanese were apparently greatly moved by Admiral Ting's noble suicide. One observer noted that: "When the vessel [carrying his remains] passed out of the harbour, the Japanese men-of-war lowered their flags and fired their guns in honour of the late Admiral." See Inouye Jukichi, The Japan-China War, 2 vols. (Yokohama, Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Singapore, 1905), 1: The Fall of Weihaiwei, 25. Nor did this dramatic defeat fail to stir Ting's own countrymen. The famous Ch'ing poet and reformer Huang Tsun-hsien lamented both the fall of Weihaiwei and Ting's death in verse. See Chung-kuo shih-hsueh-hui, Chi-nan fen-hui, ed., Shan-tung chin-tai shih tzu-liao (hereafter cited as STCTSTL), 3 vols. (Chi-nan 1957-61), 3:10-22. This volume also contains a very detailed account of the actual battle at Weihaiwei. See *ibid.*, pp. 4-19. It should be noted that the collection of both primary and secondary materials contained in STCTSTL stresses the role of the "people" or "the masses" in the "revolutionary history" of Shantung from the mid-nineteenth century to liberation. While much of this material is, of course, extremely valuable, some sections appear to be more concerned with conveying an ideological message than with reporting facts which can be found in other perhaps less biased sources. Thus, the collection as a whole must be used with caution.

<sup>15</sup>Kajima Morinosuke, The Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922, 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1976), 1:262, 264, 266. For a complete account of the Shimonoseki peace negotiations, including official communications, transcripts of the meetings between Count Ito and Li Hung-chang, and the actual treaty, see *ibid.*, pp. 177-201.

<sup>16</sup>W. G. Beasley, The Modern History of Japan (New York, 1963), p. 163.

<sup>17</sup>L. K. Young, British Policy in China, 1895-1902 (Oxford, 1970), p. 18.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>19</sup>In January 1896 Britain and France agreed that any concession gained by either country in Yunnan or Szechwan

would be available to both. A treaty signed between Great Britain and China on 4 February 1897 granted Britain the right to construct railways in Yunnan which would connect with those in Burma and also opened the West River to commerce. The British desired the latter concession in order to prevent the diversion of trade from Hong Kong and Shanghai by way of the alternative Red River route to French Indo-China. See R. Stanley McCordock, British Far Eastern Policy, 1894-1900 (New York, 1976), pp. 151-55.

<sup>20</sup>Young, British Policy in China, p. 44.

<sup>21</sup>McCordock, British Far Eastern Policy, p. 103. See also Young, British Policy in China, pp. 44-5.

<sup>22</sup>McCordock, British Far Eastern Policy, pp. 221-22.

<sup>23</sup>FO 17/1340, Secret cable from MacDonald to Salisbury, 25 February 1898. See also Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, vol. 1, no. 25, MacDonald to Salisbury, 25 February 1898.

<sup>24</sup>Young, British Policy in China, p. 67. See also Nathan A. Pelcovits, Old China Hands and the Foreign Office (New York, 1969), p. 216.

<sup>25</sup>Young, British Policy in China, p. 67.

<sup>26</sup>Third Marquess of Salisbury's Private Papers, Curzon File, 1897-98, Curzon to Salisbury, December 29, 1897, Hatfield House. In this same letter, Curzon displays remarkable foresight with regard to the future role of Japan in world affairs: "'If the European Powers are grouping themselves against us in the Far East, we shall probably be driven sooner or later to act with Japan. Ten years hence she will be the greatest naval Power in those seas, and the European Powers who now ignore or flout her will be then competing for her alliance.'" See Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon, 3 vols. (London, 1928), 1:278.

<sup>27</sup>Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life, 1:281. See also McCordock, British Far Eastern Policy, pp. 242-43.

<sup>28</sup>McCordock, British Far Eastern Policy, p. 240. See also Young, British Policy in China, p. 71. Ian Nish argues that the Admiralty had reservations about Weihaiwei prior to its occupation, but its views were not a major consideration in the decision-making process. Furthermore, detailed knowledge of Weihaiwei was not even available until after the political decision had been taken. See Ian H. Nish, "The Royal Navy and the Taking of Weihaiwei, 1898-1905," The Mariner's Mirror, 54.1 (1967):46-7.

<sup>29</sup>FO 17/1357, Francis Bertie, Memorandum No. 24, 14 March 1898. See also Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, vol. 1, Memorandum by Mr. Bertie No. 24, 14 March 1898.

<sup>30</sup>Pelcovits, Old China Hands, pp. 223-24.

<sup>31</sup>McCordock, British Far Eastern Policy, p. 247.

<sup>32</sup>Memorandum on Weihaiwei, 1902, p. 4, Monk Bretton Papers, Box 98, Bodleian Library, Oxford University.

<sup>33</sup>FO 17/1340, Cable from MacDonald to Salisbury, 31 March 1898. See also Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, vol. 1, no. 42, MacDonald to Salisbury, 28 March 1898. For an official British summary of the actual negotiations which took place between representatives from the Tsung-li Yamen and MacDonald on 28 March, see FO 233/44 ("Record Book of Interviews with Chinese Authorities," 30 June 1897-31 October 1899) MacDonald and Chinese Authorities, 28 March 1898, pp. 137-42.

<sup>34</sup>FO 17/1340, Cable from MacDonald to Salisbury, 31 March 1898. See also Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, vol. 1, no. 43, MacDonald to Salisbury, 31 March 1898; and FO 233/44, MacDonald and Chinese Authorities, 31 March 1898, pp. 143-150.

<sup>35</sup>E-tu Zen Sun, "The Lease of Wei-hai Wei," Pacific Historical Review, 19 (1950):282.

<sup>36</sup>Salisbury Papers, vol. A/106, "China and Siam," Cable from MacDonald to Bertie, 1 April 1898.

<sup>37</sup>It should also be noted that even on 2 April, the final day of negotiations, Prince Ch'ing was still stalling in his interview with MacDonald. He insisted that he would only promise to lease Weihaiwei if the minister communicated three counter-demands to his government. These were that Weihaiwei should be leased on the same terms as Port Arthur, that Britain should help reorganize the Chinese navy and allow Weihaiwei to be used as a training ground, and that there should be no additional territorial demands. See FO 233/44, MacDonald and Prince Ch'ing, 2 April 1898, p. 151.

For a brief overview of the circumstances leading to the British occupation of Weihaiwei, the negotiations themselves, and the terms of the agreement according to a contemporary Chinese source, see "Ying-kuo ch'iang-tsu Wei-hai-wei yü ch'i chih-min chi-kou ti chien-li," excerpted from an unpublished draft of Wei-hai shih-chih in STCTSTL, 3:170. See also "Ying-kuo tsu-chieh Wei-hai-wei," originally published in Ch'ing-ch'ao yeh-shih ta-kuan, in STCTSTL, 3:172-3.

<sup>38</sup>Sun, "The Lease," pp. 282-3. See also Wang Yen-wei and Wang Liang (compilers), Ch'ing-chi wai-chiao shih-liao (Peking, 1932-35 ed.), 130:9a.

<sup>39</sup>These matters are also discussed by the eminent historian of the Ch'ing period Hsiao I-shan in his Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih, 5 vols. (Taipei, revised edition, 1962)3:1343-45.

<sup>40</sup>Young, British Policy in China, p. 75.

<sup>41</sup>William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902 (New York, 1960), p. 486.

The text of the actual agreement signed between China and Great Britain on 1 July 1898 reads as follows:

In order to provide Great Britain with a suitable naval harbour in North China and for the better protection of British commerce in the neighbouring seas, the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of China agree to lease to the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Wei-hai Wei, in the province of Shantung and the adjacent waters, for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia.

Territory leased. -- The territory leased shall comprise the Island of Liu-kung and all other islands in the Bay of Wei-hai Wei, and a belt of land 10 English miles wide along the entire coast line of the Bay of Wei-hai Wei. Within the above-mentioned territory leased Great Britain shall have sole jurisdiction.

Right to fortify. -- Great Britain shall have, in addition, the right to erect fortifications, station troops, or take any other measures necessary for defensive purposes, at any points on or near the region east of the meridian 120° 40' east of Greenwich, and to acquire on equitable compensation within that territory such sites as may be necessary for water supply, communications and hospitals. Within that zone Chinese administration will not be interfered with, but no troops other than Chinese or British shall be allowed therein.

Jurisdictional rights. -- It is also agreed that within the walled city of Wei-hai Wei, Chinese officials shall continue to exercise jurisdiction except so far as may be inconsistent with naval and military requirements for the defence of the territory leased.

Rights of Chinese war ships. -- It is further agreed that Chinese vessels of war, whether neutral or otherwise, shall retain the right to use the waters herein leased to Great Britain.

Expropriation of natives. -- It is further understood that there will be no expropriation or expulsion of the inhabitants of the territory herein specified, and that if land is required for fortifications, public offices, or any official or public purpose, it shall be bought at a fair price.

This convention shall come into force on signature. It shall be ratified by the sovereigns of the two countries, and the ratification shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible.

From John V. A. MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1804-1919 (New York, 1921), pp. 152-3.

<sup>42</sup>Great Britain, Parliament. Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 4th Series, 61 (1808):1550-70 and 1582-84.

<sup>43</sup>Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life, 1:285.

<sup>44</sup>Letter to the Editor, The Times, 5 April 1808, p. 14 and 12 April 1808, p. 6.

<sup>45</sup>Pelcovits, Old China Hands, pp. 224-5.

<sup>46</sup>"Letter from the Bishop," North China and Shantung Mission Quarterly Paper: Land of Sinim (hereafter NCSMQP), 6.2 (21 April 1898):26.

<sup>47</sup>McCordock, British Far Eastern Policy, p. 243.

<sup>48</sup>Cabinet Papers 1, piece no. 2, file 410 (hereafter Cabinet 1/2/410), Miscellaneous Records, Enclosure no. 2 in China Letter no. 230, King-Hall and Hopkins to Seymour, "Proceedings of British Commissioners for taking over Wei-hai-wei," 2 June 1898, p. 7.

<sup>49</sup>For a brief description of the leasehold at the time of the British takeover, see "Ying-jen ching-ying Wei-hai chih ch'ing-hsing," excerpts from Wei-hai chih-nan, in STCTSTL, 3:173-4. Ian Nish provides a description of the diplomatic circumstances leading to Weihaiwei's transfer from Japanese to British hands. See his "Japan and China: The Case of Weihaiwei, 1894-1906," Bulletin of Fukuoka Unesco Association (1973):29-34.

<sup>50</sup>North China Herald, 13 November 1896, p. 835.

<sup>51</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 87; and C. E. Bruce-Mitford, The Territory of Weihaiwei (Shanghai, 1902), p. 8.

<sup>52</sup>North China Herald, 18 December 1896, p. 1060.

<sup>53</sup>"Jih ch'in Wei-hai," in STCTSTL, 3:3.

<sup>54</sup>North China Herald, 21 January 1898, p. 98. One foreign observer admitted ruefully that he missed the Chinese soldiers who used to maintain the local roads as the Japanese did not and many of the bridges on the Chefoo road were as a result quite useless: "They make good firewood for the adjacent villagers. In many places the pieces of bar iron let in to keep the stones together have been stolen, and they are beginning to fall to pieces." See North China Herald, 21 May 1897, p. 912.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, 18 December 1896, p. 1061.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, 22 October 1897, p. 740.

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*, 21 January 1898, p. 98.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*, 4 July 1898, p. 17.

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*, 15 July 1898, p. 157.

<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*, 4 July 1898, p. 17.

<sup>61</sup>One way of pinpointing the location of Weihaiwei is to consider its distance from various other places. From the town of Weihai to Wen-teng-hsien, for example, it is roughly 33 miles, while to Jung-ch'eng-hsien it is approximately 37 miles. From Weihaiwei harbor to Chefoo it is 42 miles by sea

and 56 miles by road; overland to Tsinan, 450 miles; 767 miles to Peking; 89 miles to Port Arthur, 194 miles by sea to Kiaochow Bay; 452 miles by sea to Shanghai; and roughly 1500 miles to Hong Kong by sea.

<sup>62</sup>Colonial Office (hereafter CO) 521/1, Frank Swettenham, "Report on Weihaiwei," July 1900.

<sup>63</sup>The Times, 17 August 1898, p. 5.

<sup>64</sup>Bruce-Mitford, The Territory, p. 2. The author of this book once served as head-master of Weihaiwei School and wrote that the harbor was large enough to hold six first-class battleships and "an unlimited amount" of smaller vessels. Although the eastern entrance, with a breadth of two miles, is much larger than the western entrance, which measures only three-quarters of a mile, it was the latter which was used by all ships drawing more than eighteen feet. The average depth of the harbor in 1898 one mile from shore was eighteen to twenty-four feet. See also, The Times, 17 August 1898, p. 5.

<sup>65</sup>Bruce-Mitford, The Territory, p. 2.

<sup>66</sup>For a detailed topographical description of Weihaiwei, see *ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>67</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, pp. 79 and 128.

<sup>68</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>69</sup>CO 882/6, J. F. Lewis, "Memorandum on Weihaiwei," Confidential Print No. 72 (Eastern), 9 March 1900.

<sup>70</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 81. In a special handbook prepared for the Peace Conference of 1919, the British Foreign Office noted that the mean temperature at Weihaiwei for the period 1900-16 during the hottest month of August had been 76° F., while during the same period in February, the coldest month, the mean temperature had been 30° F.. See Historical Section, British Foreign Office, Kiaochow and Weihaiwei (London, 1920), p. 48.

<sup>71</sup>Reverend Roland Allen, "Weihaiwei," NCSMQP, 6.4 (January 1899):66.

<sup>72</sup>Cabinet 1/2/410, G. T. Browne, C. Martin de Bartolome, and Reginald A. Norton, "Notes on Weihaiwei," Enclosure no. 3 in China Letter no. 230, 2 June 1898.

<sup>73</sup>Bruce-Mitford, The Territory, p. 18. Regarding the cricket-pitch, Prince Henry of Prussia remarked on a visit to Weihaiwei in 1898: "'The world is yours. . . . Across the straits the Russians are building forts and mounting guns in hot haste. I find you laying out a cricket-pitch.'" *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup>Henry James Lethbridge, "Sir James Stewart Lockhart: Colonial Civil Servant and Scholar," Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 12 (1972):66.

<sup>75</sup>Charles P. Scott, "Letter from the Bishop," NCSMQP, 7.4 (October 1899):7.

<sup>76</sup>Browne, et al., "Notes on Weihaiwei."

<sup>77</sup>Allen, "Weihaiwei," p. 67. See also, North China Herald, 24 July 1890, p. 173.

<sup>78</sup>Browne, et al., "Notes on Weihaiwei."

<sup>79</sup>North China Herald, 24 July 1898, p. 173.

<sup>80</sup>Browne, et al., "Notes on Weihaiwei."

<sup>81</sup>CO 521/1, Swettenham, "Report on Weihaiwei." See also "Weihaiwei: Its Value as a Naval Station," Blackwood's Magazine, 165 (June 1890):1069.

<sup>82</sup>Monk Bretton Papers, Box 98, "Memorandum on Weihaiwei," 1902.

<sup>83</sup>The other five market centers were Feng-lin, Ku-shan-hou, Ch'iao-t'ou, Ts'ao-miao-tzu, and Yang-t'ing. Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 129. For a table of market days and cattle fairs in each village, see Bruce-Mitford, The Territory, pp. 52-3.

<sup>84</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, pp. 129-30.

<sup>85</sup>CO 521/2, Dorward to Colonial Office, 16 July 1901.

<sup>86</sup>CO 873/25, Johnson and Brown to Lockhart, July 1902.

<sup>87</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, pp. 130-32. For another discussion of "the village theater" in China, see Arthur H. Smith, Village Life in China (Edinburgh and London, 1900), pp. 54-60.

<sup>88</sup>Browne, et al., "Notes on Weihaiwei."

<sup>89</sup>CO 521/1, Swettenham, "Report on Weihaiwei."

<sup>90</sup>CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 75 (Eastern), G. T. Hare, "General Report on the Civil Administration of the Territory of Weihaiwei, 1899-1901," 31 March 1902.

<sup>91</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902.

<sup>92</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 148.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 133.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., pp. 133-4.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid., pp. 135 and 142-153.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>97</sup>CO 521/1, Swettenham, "Report on Weihaiwei."

<sup>98</sup>CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 75 (Eastern), "General Report."

<sup>99</sup>James Hayes, The Hong Kong Region, 1850-1941 (Connecticut, 1977), pp. 15-16.

<sup>100</sup>Johnston translated one such document:

- |  |                |
|--|----------------|
| 1. Trampling on or desecrating graves or allowing domestic animals to desecrate graves in the ancestral burial-ground. | 10 <u>tiao</u> |
| 2. Usurping portions of the common pasture land ( <u>mu niu ch'ang</u> ) or ploughing up portions thereof.             | 5 <u>tiao</u>  |
| 3. Removing fuel from private land without permission, and cutting willows and uprooting shrubs and trees.             | 3 <u>tiao</u>  |
| 4. Allowing mules, ponies, pigs, sheep, or other animals to feed on private ground without the owner's permission.     | 3 <u>tiao</u>  |
| 5. Stealing crops.   | 5 <u>tiao</u>  |
| 6. Stealing manure from private gardens.   | 3 <u>tiao</u>  |
| 7. Moving boundary-stones.   | 5 <u>tiao</u>  |
| 8. Obstructing or blocking the right of way to the common pasture land.  | 5 <u>tiao</u>  |

If any of the above offences are committed at nighttime, the punishment is Expulsion from the Village.

If any person having committed any of these offences declares that he will die rather than pay his fine, let him be conveyed to the magistrate.

The following are exempted from punishment as being irresponsible for their actions and deserving of compassion: children under twelve, dumb people, and imbeciles.

(At the time, one tiao was worth eighteen pence.)

See Johnston, Lion and Dragon, pp. 160-1.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid., pp. 158-9. See also CO 521/1, Swettenham, "Report on Weihaiwei"; CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 75 (Eastern), "General Report"; and CO 873/65, General Report, 1902.

<sup>102</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 161.

<sup>103</sup>David D. Buck, Urban Change in China (Madison, 1978), pp. 22-3.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., pp. 25-6.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid., pp. 26-7.



<sup>106</sup>A missionary based at Chefoo wrote in the 1880s regarding this industry: "Every year thousands of bushels of cocoons are brought to the port of Chefoo. These are wound and spun at a large silkmanufactory recently erected by foreigners. Under skilled treatment the silk of the Tsingchou-fu district /Wei-hsien region/ is made most valuable for use in Europe, whither it is sent chiefly in the form of reeled yarn." See Isabelle Williamson, Old Highways in China (New York, n.d.) /ca. 1805/, pp. 102-3.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>108</sup>Buck, Urban Change, p. 27.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid., pp. 26-8.

<sup>110</sup>Cited in John E. Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 16.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid. and p. 32. See also North China Herald, 24 July 1896, p. 141.

<sup>112</sup>F. H. Chalfant, "Shantung's Undeveloped Resources," North China Herald, 16 August 1895, p. 279; 14 May 1897, p. 864; and 14 March 1898, p. 411.

<sup>113</sup>North China Herald, 14 March 1898, p. 411.

<sup>114</sup>Schrecker, Imperialism, pp. 60 and 64.

## Chapter 2

## British Administration, ca. 1900-1910

The year 1900 was an important one in modern Chinese history. Following the Hundred Days of Reform of 1898, the Ch'ing court, under the leadership of the Empress Dowager, had returned to a pattern of conservative domestic and foreign policies. Then in early 1900 a new wave of anti-foreignism swept the country spear-headed by the "Boxers" who were even encouraged in their activities by certain authorities in Peking. Interestingly enough, however, though other parts of Shantung experienced violent outbreaks of Boxerism, there is no evidence of their direct influence in Weihaiwei. Yet 1900 also proved to be an extremely eventful year here as the British for the first time encountered serious local resistance to their occupation of the area.

As was noted earlier, the British takeover of Weihaiwei had been gradual and rather low-key and may in part have contributed to the confusion which subsequently arose over such matters as the collection of taxes, the demarcation of territorial boundaries, and the general question of British intentions at Weihaiwei. Trouble began in the spring of 1899 when proclamations were issued by the British forbidding the payment of taxes to Chinese officials. Almost immediately counter-instructions were sent by the local Chinese authorities to leading Weihaiwei citizens in private letters and, when no action was taken by the British, those authorities may have hoped that their opposition had been successful.<sup>1</sup> Further incidents followed in which the Jung-ch'eng magistrate in particular tried to exert his authority over the leasehold, and it became necessary for Commissioner Dorward to request

that local officials not carry their umbrellas of office within the Territory, except inside the walled town itself.<sup>2</sup>

### Boundary Disturbances

The thorny issue of boundary demarcation was also very slow to be resolved. Though it had been arranged in October 1899 that Shantung's governor, Yüan Shih-k'ai, would appoint Chinese boundary commissioners to assist their British counterparts with the project, Yüan delayed his appointments until March 1900. In the meantime, the situation within the Territory was deteriorating. In January Dorward issued two proclamations informing the people and the neighboring officials that British administrators had been appointed for the leasehold and that Chinese jurisdiction in the area was to be confined to the town of Weihai. The people were also told that from the beginning of 1900 land taxes were to be paid to the British authorities at the same rate as previously and that no arrears would be collected in view of recent hardships.

In March, however, rumors were circulated by "various men of the literati class" that the British were about to levy all manner of heavy taxes, even on women, pigs, and cows, and as a result much discussion took place as to the advisability of refusing to pay.<sup>3</sup> Village meetings followed, apparently with the approval and even encouragement of the Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng magistrates, at which armed men gathered to begin drilling militia units and collecting funds for buying arms and ammunition.<sup>4</sup> Dorward broke up one such meeting and arrested three of its organizers, afterward holding his own meeting of village headmen to air grievances and

restate British intentions.<sup>5</sup> Dorward wrote to the War Office that the tone of this meeting was very satisfactory and that he expected no more militia gatherings as these had been due to "the ignorance and credulity of the people."<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately for the commissioner, however, local difficulties were just beginning. The neighboring magistrates, for example, were already busy informing Governor Yuan that the British were collecting taxes far beyond the leasehold territory.<sup>7</sup>

By 13 April the three Chinese boundary commissioners finally arrived in Weihaiwei led by Li Hsi-chieh, Tao-t'ai of Teng-lai-ch'ing Circuit. Li promptly informed Dorward that, acting under instructions from the governor, he had summoned a meeting of local leaders to explain to them the circumstances under which Weihaiwei had been leased and that he wished to await the results of this meeting before fixing a date to begin the demarcation. The commissioner in turn told Li that he considered this action highly improper and that he at least wished to be represented at the meeting. Li consented to this request but refused to come to any agreement regarding the collection of taxes in villages along the border, stating that he had no authority to do so.<sup>8</sup>

Dorward subsequently learned that the Chinese commissioners had held a secret meeting of local leaders and territorial headmen in the walled town at which a fabricated treaty was produced which said that the British had no right to collect taxes or exercise jurisdiction within the Territory. Dorward delivered a severe remonstrance to the commissioners for holding this meeting but continued to encounter delaying tactics from them when he attempted to set a firm date to begin demarcation. Finally it was agreed that work would begin

on 25 April, but the project even then had anything but an auspicious start.<sup>9</sup>

At the outset the Chinese commissioners refused the protection of the sixty soldiers accompanying the British party and the two groups camped separately -- on opposite sides of the border. Another indication of the spirit in which the work was undertaken is the fact that the Chinese commissioners told Dorward their orders from Governor Yüan were to mark the boundaries literally according to the convention whether or not this meant dividing villages in half.<sup>10</sup> Both sides no doubt were quite aware of the difficulties this might cause, but the British decided to push ahead to secure a boundary and work out further adjustments later.

Events took a turn for the worse on 28 April when the British camped near the market village of Ts'ao-miao-tzu close to the southern border with Wen-teng hsien. People from the village began to appear at the camp insisting that they would not sell their land and refusing to allow any boundary stones to be set in place even when it was explained that no land was to be purchased. Six of the more obstreperous villagers were arrested, though soon released, and the crowd dispersed.<sup>11</sup> On the twenty-ninth, however, a hostile mob of about two thousand assembled around the British camp and the officer in charge, while sending for reinforcements from headquarters, tried to deal with the people through the Chinese commissioners who promised to issue a proclamation to them. There is no evidence that they did so.<sup>12</sup>

Though the Chinese commissioners at this point urged the British not to proceed with the demarcation, the officer in charge decided to carry on, feeling that delay implied

timidity.<sup>13</sup> In the meantime, Governor Yuan had wired Dorward that the project should be stopped, that he would not recognize the boundary already laid, nor accept responsibility for any disturbances which might occur.<sup>14</sup> Shortly afterward, on 5 May, the first actual violence took place in which a small British party of about fifteen men was attacked by a mob of fifteen hundred near the British camp. British reinforcements soon arrived, however, and the result was nineteen Chinese dead and a number of wounded, while five of the British party were also wounded.

When the British returned to camp, a letter was discovered from the Chinese commissioners which disclaimed any responsibility for trouble which might arise. It was also being reported at this time that the commissioners and other Chinese officials were being detained in the village of Ta-t'ou by local residents who believed them to be cooperating in the sale of Chinese territory without government approval.<sup>15</sup> From this same village came letters urging people to resist the British.<sup>16</sup> The situation was ripe for further confrontation.

Another attack occurred on a British camp on 6 May, this time by about two thousand Chinese using firearms and a small cannon. There were no British casualties but ten villagers died in the battle.<sup>17</sup> Meanwhile the British consul at Chefoo recommended that Dorward secure the release of the Chinese officials and informed him that Chinese troops were on their way to the Territory.<sup>18</sup> Fortunately, all of this ended without further bloodshed. British troops did secure the "release" of the Chinese boundary commissioners and avoided confrontation with the four hundred Chinese troops

sent into the Territory by the governor for that purpose. The two sets of troops apparently passed one another on the road and simply exchanged friendly greetings. The demarcation was eventually completed on 17 May, though without Chinese participation. It was not until early June that Governor Yuan finally agreed to accept the boundary as definite after reappointing the Chinese commissioners to make an inspection.

Although there is no way to be sure who exactly was responsible for these violent incidents, one British observer felt fairly certain that two influential families in the area were behind an effort to delay the demarcation so as to gain time to persuade officials in Peking that their districts should be excluded from British jurisdiction. When this failed, he strongly suspected that these families tried to prevent the Chinese commissioners from proceeding with their task. He also believed that the commissioners in turn became willing prisoners of the villagers and were then conveniently unable to assume any responsibility for the disturbances. Supporting this theory is the fact that trouble did not occur until the district of Ts'ao-miao-tzu was reached where one of the families lived.<sup>19</sup>

The available evidence also seems to indicate involvement of the Chinese commissioners in efforts to delay the project and to misinform the villagers as to British intentions. Their calling of the secret meeting in the walled town was only one of many instances where they were active in stirring up trouble. It is also very peculiar that the so-called "capture" of the commissioners by the villagers just happened to take place at the same time that they had

written to the British party disclaiming any responsibility for violence which might occur. Thus, when British troops arrived to secure their release, the Chinese commissioners were at first unwilling to leave with them, hoping to be "rescued" by Chinese forces. At this time the headman of the village also told the British that the commissioners were not being held against their will.<sup>20</sup>

In the end, however, it was the villagers themselves who suffered the most. They not only experienced the casualties in the disturbances, but were also chastised by all of the Chinese officials involved. Some very self-serving proclamations were issued after the incident by Governor Yüan and local Chinese officials which accused the people of listening to idle stories and causing trouble. One of these proclamations read as follows:

If parents make an agreement how should their children dare to oppose it. I ask you villagers of Pao Hsin and Ts'ao Miao Tzu did I not frequently exhort you but you would not hear and so many of you were shot and there is no one to make good the loss -- you brought harm on yourselves to no purpose. Through listening to idle stories and received great injury. Surely you must know that it is a crime to create disturbances.<sup>21</sup>

It does seem strange, however, that no steps were taken by the Chinese authorities to bring the "guilty" parties to justice.

As for Yüan Shih-k'ai, though it is difficult to ascertain what he knew in advance of specific events at Weihaiwei, he did take part in the effort to delay the demarcation project as well as to confuse the situation somewhat by refusing to sort out the taxation problem or to instruct his subordinates not to collect taxes in the Territory when requested to do



so by Dorward in April.<sup>22</sup> His relationship with the British, though maintained with a veneer of politeness, is another example of his shrewd method of handling foreigners generally. His dealings with the Germans at Kiaochow were similar and displayed a keen knowledge of legal detail and bureaucratic maneuvering.<sup>23</sup> In addition, as one author has remarked: "An important technique Yüan used to offset foreign power was to encourage gentry and popular activity against the foreigners, but he wanted responsible gentry control of this activity . . ."<sup>24</sup>

Another question which arises here is to what extent the Weihaiwei disturbances were related to the Boxer movement. There is no evidence to suggest the existence of any Boxer organizations at Weihaiwei, nor was the violence there directed against missionaries who were very few in the area anyway. But it was anti-foreign and certainly bore some Boxer hallmarks such as the raising of local militia and the inflammatory role played by officials. It must also be said, however, that when the peak of the Boxer movement was reached in the summer of 1900, no further trouble occurred at Weihaiwei.<sup>25</sup> It does not seem, then, that the Weihaiwei incidents were part of the Boxer movement, but rather were similar to disturbances which broke out in 1899 in both Kiaochow and Hong Kong's New Territories over the issues of boundaries, taxes, and land.<sup>26</sup>

#### Early Administrative Structure

After this rather inauspicious start to their administration at Weihaiwei, the British encountered no further difficulties for more than a decade. In the interim,

the Territory was run efficiently and peacefully with a bare minimum of staff and no permanent garrison.<sup>27</sup> Though there had initially been elaborate plans to fortify Weihaiwei, it was announced in February 1902 that that decision had been reversed. The plan now was for the area to be classed as a "flying naval base" which could be rapidly evacuated in time of war and in peacetime serve as a training ground, sanatorium, and recreation area for the fleet.

The major reason for this shift in thinking seems to have been that almost the entire Board of the Admiralty as well as the Secretary for War had changed since 1898. Not only was it now regarded as too costly to fortify Weihaiwei, but it was also thought that the money could be spent far more constructively on ships. As the First Lord of the Admiralty put it: "What we want are more ships, and every penny that is spent on bricks and mortar and land fortification, which could be spent on more ships, is money unnecessarily and badly spent. Every garrison that we have to lock up hundreds and thousands of miles away from this country is an evil . . ."<sup>28</sup> It should be remembered also that this was a period of considerable anxiety regarding "the German navy menace" as well as the Russian-French Dual Alliance. Consequently, there was a rapid rise in British naval expenditures and ship construction.<sup>29</sup>

Initially, Weihaiwei had been under Admiralty control, but in 1899 was transferred to the Army with Colonel A. Dordward, R.E. serving as both civil and military commissioner. Neither the Army nor the Navy was particularly eager to retain control over the leasehold, however, and on 1 January 1901 it was handed over to the Colonial Office. On 3 May 1902

James Stewart Lockhart became commissioner. Since he had had many years experience as a colonial administrator in Hong Kong, it was hoped that Lockhart would be able to develop the revenue-producing potential of Weihaiwei, especially by persuading Chinese to invest there, and thus lessening the burden on the Treasury.<sup>30</sup> In this task he was assisted by what can only be described as a minute staff. Until 1906 there were, in addition to the commissioner, a secretary to the government, a financial assistant, two medical officers, three police inspectors and their assistants, one civil engineer, a Chinese clerical staff, and a small native police force. Obviously, the main responsibility for administering Weihaiwei remained with the commissioner, whose powers were similar to those of a colonial governor: "In certain respects he was rather more of an autocrat than a Colonial Governor, for legislative powers were vested in himself alone (subject of course to disallowance by the king) and not, as in most colonies, shared with a legislative council."<sup>31</sup>

#### The Chinese Regiment

In the early days it had been thought that the defense of the Territory would be in the hands of the Chinese Regiment. In fact, it had even been envisioned by one officer that Chinese troops trained at Weihaiwei could be used elsewhere when needed as were Indian recruits.<sup>32</sup> This idea was, of course, not acceptable to the Chinese government and it was decided to employ the Regiment only within the leased territory itself, though an exception was made during the Boxer uprising when it was sent to Peking and Tientsin.<sup>33</sup>

During its brief life the Regiment was a fairly controversial organization, severely criticized by some and staunchly defended by others. At its peak in 1902 it numbered thirteen hundred men, but by 1903 had been reduced to five hundred and by 1906 disbanded altogether. Most of the recruits came from Shantung, though several hundred enlisted from Tientsin and its vicinity.<sup>34</sup> The most severe criticism leveled at the organization was its high desertion rate -- some eight hundred men over a period of three years.

As Commissioner Dorward explained, however, one-third of these men deserted before the Regiment went to Tientsin during the Boxer affair and another one-third after active service there. Those who left before the force was sent to Tientsin were apparently reluctant to fight against their own people and feared for the safety of their families as many had received threatening letters. In general, however, Dorward found them very trustworthy and to have performed admirably during the Boxer incident.<sup>35</sup> Of the 385 who served at that time, 23 officers and men were killed and 18 wounded, while twenty percent of the force was presented with war medals.<sup>36</sup> Some difficulties did arise in 1902 when the force was greatly reduced in size and disbanded soldiers who continued to live in the area engaged in occasional banditry.<sup>37</sup> By 1904 it had become increasingly difficult to recruit men to the Regiment as better pay could be obtained by emigrating to Korea, Manchuria, or even South Africa.<sup>38</sup>

#### Village Headmen

In 1906 when the Chinese Regiment was completely disbanded, the police force in the Territory was expanded from

twenty-one to thirty-six men. Many of the new recruits were former Regiment soldiers. Basically, however, the British chose to rely on the traditional system of village headmen for policing the Territory rather than scattering police stations throughout the area. As Lockhart noted in 1902, the latter system would have meant not only doubling the current grant-in-aid, but also having British police inspectors dependent upon interpreters to communicate with the people which he felt invariably led to corruption and malpractices. Unlike the situation in the New Territories of Hong Kong where local people, as merchants or laborers, had had some contact with the British for fifty years, prior to 1898 the villagers of Weihaiwei had no understanding whatever of British law or administrative methods. Maintaining the existing system of village organization for all of these reasons seemed to be by far the most practical means of local control.<sup>39</sup>

The institution of village headman was discussed briefly in the previous chapter, but it might be well to make a few additional observations here since it was an important part of the British administrative system at Weihaiwei. As has been noted, village unity was based on kinship relationships and most of the villages were inhabited by people of a single surname. One observer remarked: "The senior representative of the senior branch of the family holds as a rule a dual responsibility; as the head of the family he is the natural arbitrator or judge in cases of domestic strife or petty crime, and as headman of the village he is held, to a limited extent, responsible by Government for the good conduct of his fellow villagers."<sup>40</sup>

Before the British arrived at Weihaiwei many of these

headmen had been "nominated" by the Chinese district magistrate to their semi-official positions and he retained the power to dismiss them. Normally, it was the senior representative of the senior family in the village who would be selected but if this family were "passed over . . . it was generally because one of its members had misconducted himself or because its wealth and social influence had passed to another branch."<sup>41</sup> In theory, then, headmen were either appointed by the magistrate or chosen by the villagers, but in practice many of them fell into the position as a result of their wealth, personality, or social prestige. Those at Weihaiwei apparently held their positions by virtue of a combination of these three factors.<sup>42</sup>

The eminent sinologist Hsiao Kung-chuan in a general discussion of village leadership in traditional China has distinguished between official and informal leaders noting that it was the latter who "had a much better hold on their fellow villagers than the 'official' headmen."<sup>43</sup> Official leaders, according to Hsiao were either elected by the villagers or appointed by the local government to perform specific duties, often acting as an administrative link between the village and the government. They were usually indistinguishable from their fellow villagers except insofar as they might possess more leisure time, a sociable personality, and the willingness to subordinate themselves both to village gentry and to local government officials.<sup>44</sup> Informal leaders, on the other hand, "emerged into leadership by virtue of their special qualification: age, wealth, learning, kin status, and personal capacity. They were recognized rather than elected."<sup>45</sup> These people were generally treated with more

deference both by the villagers and government officials than the "elected" leader who depended upon the government for his position.<sup>46</sup>

Martin C. Yang observed that the function of these two types of leaders often overlapped. At times they would both deal with other villages or mediate conflicts between families or lineages, but it was the official leader who always held a subordinate relationship to the informal one.<sup>47</sup> In fact, Yang states: "no villager of social rank or much self-esteem wanted to be an official, for he would lose face in dealing with those who outranked him in authority but not in social status. Besides, no one wanted to be at the beck and call of the government or to have to take orders."<sup>47</sup>

It would seem that the clear distinction both Hsiao and Yang make between official and informal leaders is not strictly applicable to Weihaiwei before the British arrival. The village headmen appear to have combined the two roles and to have not suffered loss of prestige through their liaison position with local government. It should, however, be added that the contact these men had with Chinese officialdom prior to the British occupation was by all accounts extremely limited. Perhaps because this part of Shantung was geographically rather remote and by no means wealthy, villages were left to run themselves, relatively free of government supervision.

Furthermore, there were very few people in Weihaiwei who would have qualified as informal leaders by virtue of education or wealth. Records show, for example, that in 1900 for the entire Territory of Weihaiwei there were only 70 degree-holders spread among 315 villages, and all but one of these held the lowest rank of sheng-yüan.<sup>48</sup> Earlier

Chinese sources indicate that during the late Ch'ing period neither Wen-teng nor Jung-ch'eng hsien had very many chin-shih or chü-jen degree-holders. From 1876 to 1903, for example, there were 25 chin-shih in all of Teng-chou fu but Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng had only one apiece. Likewise, from 1875-1903 there were 171 chü-jen from Teng-chou fu but only 7 from Jung-ch'eng and 12 from Wen-teng.<sup>49</sup> This relatively poor part of Shantung simply did not produce very many highly-educated people. Only 6% of the entire population of roughly 146,000 in Weihaiwei in 1911 was even literate.<sup>50</sup> The headmen, too, were "generally unable to read, or had forgotten the few 'characters' they ever learned."<sup>51</sup> We know also that the vast majority of Weihaiwei farmers were very small landholders. In 1909 only 235 people owned property worth \$5,000 or more<sup>52</sup> and this was at a time when the value of land had increased dramatically over 1898 levels. One must conclude, therefore, that the role of headman in Weihaiwei villages, which usually was equivalent to lineage head, undoubtedly carried with it more prestige than might have been the case in a wealthier, better-educated region of China.

It was accordingly vital for the new British government to establish a good relationship with village headmen. Initially, the government simply registered all headmen and thereby officially recognized their leadership role within the village.<sup>53</sup> These men were expected, when called upon to do so, to produce any villager summoned by the government and were held generally responsible for the maintenance of peace and good order in their areas.<sup>54</sup> They were also required to collect the land tax on behalf of the government,



to communicate official notices to their fellow villagers, and to register deeds of sale and mortgages.<sup>55</sup> Like the Chinese government at this time, however, the British did not pay the headmen for their services. They continued to receive only a small commission from the people for collecting taxes or settling minor disputes.<sup>56</sup>

Lockhart was generally pleased with this system, noting in 1902:

There have been instances in which Headmen have not evinced too great an eagerness to cooperate with the authorities, but on the whole the result of the working of the system has justified the favourable anticipation I formed regarding it and it is hoped that the Headmen may be encouraged to efficiently discharge their duties by rewarding such as display especial zeal.<sup>57</sup>

In fact, in 1904 during special Coronation Day ceremonies all the village headmen assembled at Port Edward and those chosen as most zealous in their work were given medals. The entire group was then entertained at a banquet and allowed to inspect the fleet anchored in the harbor.<sup>58</sup>

The British seem to have been very well aware of traditional Chinese techniques for maintaining order and encouraging virtuous behavior. Medals or carved complimentary tablets called pien were presented to headmen on other occasions such as the rescuing of crews and cargoes from junks wrecked on Weihaiwei shores.<sup>59</sup> Commissioner Lockhart, however, was careful in all cases not to exaggerate the importance of these rewards and thus instill an inflated sense of the individual's position within the community.<sup>60</sup> Ultimate government authority remained in British hands, for just as the commissioner could bestow rewards on headmen, he could, if offended for some reason, also cancel a headman's official

position or withdraw his medal.

An important qualification of the headman system was made in 1906 when it was decided to divide the Territory into new administrative districts. Under the new plan the two main areas known as the North and South Divisions were retained but within these twenty-six new subdistricts were created. The North Division contained nine of these districts as well as Liu-kung Island and Port Edward and was under the jurisdiction of the North Division magistrate who was also secretary to the government. The South Division contained all the rest of the Territory and was administered by the South Division magistrate or district officer, a newly-created post. This officer's duties were formidable when it is remembered that his entire police force for some 231 villages consisted of a sergeant and seven men, all Chinese. The district officer was also assisted by a Chinese clerical staff, but during most of the British period at Weihaiwei there were no other European officials resident in the entire area.<sup>61</sup>

Perhaps as a means of streamlining the government's system of liaison with villagers it was decided at this time to establish a new position known as district headman or tsung-tung. Each of the twenty-six subdistricts had a district headman which meant that, upon average, he was responsible for twelve villages.<sup>62</sup> This man, like a village headman, was chosen by the villagers in his district and "confirmed" by the government, receiving a chih-chao or official certificate of his appointment.<sup>63</sup> Unlike the village headmen, however, he received a salary from the government of \$5 per month as well as a small percentage on the sale of government deed forms for which a fee was charged. District headmen

also received "in less regular ways occasional presents, consisting chiefly of food-stuffs, of which the Government took no notice unless it appeared that he was using his position as a means of livelihood or for purposes of extortion."<sup>64</sup> These men were expected to attend regular quarterly meetings with British administrative staff in order to be informed of government decisions and to communicate their own views as well as those of their fellow villagers.<sup>65</sup> It was hoped that the new district headmen would identify their own interests more closely with those of the government<sup>66</sup> and the custom of awarding tablets or medals for outstandingly meritorious behavior was extended to include them.<sup>67</sup>

Many of the duties formerly performed by village headmen were now assigned to the district headmen. They were required to supervise the collection of land taxes in their respective areas, distribute to village headmen copies of all notices and proclamations issued by the government, as well as retain a copy in a book for themselves, distribute deed-forms to purchasers and sellers of property, and to "use their influence generally in the interests of peace and good order and in the discouragement of litigation."<sup>68</sup> It is not altogether clear whether this modification to the traditional village authority structure in itself diluted the prestige of village headmen. One observer, however, did note in 1910:

The position of headman is not altogether enviable and there is little or no competition for the filling of a vacancy. Sometimes, indeed, it is only after a village has been threatened with a general fine that it will make the necessary recommendation. This is especially the case since the establishment of British rule, for Government shows

-- or did show -- a tendency in Weihaiwei to increase the headman's responsibilities without giving him any compensating advantages. The headman, as such, has no very definite authority over the individuals of his village, but every individual is bound by rigid unwritten law to conform to the will of the maior et sanior pars and to fulfill his duties to the community even if they involve his own discomfort.<sup>69</sup>

Thus, it would seem, just as Martin C. Yang observed that the closer the relationship between a local leader and the government, the less prestigious and desirable that leader's position became.<sup>70</sup> The British at Weihaiwei faced a kind of subtle resistance to their attempts both to bind the local authority figures more closely to government as well as to increase their responsibilities. The new system was not without its problems. One official noted in 1907, for example, that of the twenty-six district headmen appointed only nineteen remained in office and several of those removed had proved untrustworthy.<sup>71</sup> Still, it never became necessary to abandon the scheme or even to make major changes in it. The task for the British authorities was to perform a difficult kind of balancing act. On the one hand, they were dependent upon the traditional headman system to help them maintain control in Weihaiwei villages and thus did not want to make any dramatic changes which would upset this system. On the other hand, British notions of what constituted efficient, responsible local government led them necessarily to institute certain reforms and to attempt to play a bit more active role in village life than Chinese officials had apparently done in the past. It remains to be seen how successful they were in preserving what they regarded as a basically sound, even admirable, traditional way of life while at the same time gradually introducing some modern reforms which they thought

would enhance that way of life and consolidate their own authority over it.

### The Administration of Justice

One area in which the British quite consciously combined Chinese and Western practices was in the administration of justice at Weihaiwei. In this matter the British magistrates were guided by the Weihaiwei Order-in-Council of July 1901, local ordinances issued by the commissioner, and the statute law of England. Though the Order-in-Council provided that both criminal and civil cases were to be decided in conformity with English law, it also specifically stated that ". . . in civil cases between natives the Court shall be guided by Chinese or other native law and custom, so far as any such law or custom is not repugnant to justice and morality."<sup>72</sup> In fact, Chinese law and custom were the basis for most legal decisions taken in civil cases at Weihaiwei.<sup>73</sup>

After 1906, as has been mentioned, there were two British magistrates residing in the Territory, one responsible for the North Division and one for the South and each presided over his own independent court. Their duties were extremely wide-ranging and have been described as follows:

The functions of the North and South Division Magistrates are quite as miscellaneous as are those of the prefects and district-magistrates -- the 'father-and-mother' officials -- of China. There are no posts in the civil services of the sister-colonies of Hong Kong and Singapore which are in all respects analogous to those held by these officers; but on the whole a Weihaiwei magistrate may be regarded as combining the duties of Registrar-General (Protector of Chinese), Puisne Judge, Police Magistrate and Captain-Superintendent of Police.<sup>74</sup>

The crime rate at Weihaiwei, especially in the early years, was remarkably low with serious crime almost non-

existent. The district officer and magistrate for the South Division remarked in 1910 that there had not been a single case of murder for at least seven years and that most of the piracies and burglaries in the area were committed by Chinese not resident in the Territory.<sup>75</sup> In fact, a good deal of the police work at Weihaiwei was concerned with minor gambling offenses.<sup>76</sup>

The British magistrates also had unlimited civil jurisdiction and it was in this area that their case load steadily increased. There were no other regular courts in addition to the magisterial ones, although the Order-in-Council had provided for a "High Court of Weihaiwei."<sup>77</sup> This body very rarely sat but when it did it consisted of the commissioner and a judge or either of them sitting separately. The assistant judge of the British Supreme Court at Shanghai was the person designated to serve at Weihaiwei when necessary, but from approximately 1904 to 1910 he heard less than ten cases of either a civil or criminal nature.<sup>78</sup> There simply were not sufficient resources to support a resident judge at Weihaiwei, though in fact the magistrates themselves were sanctioned by the Order-in-Council as exercising the High Court's authority and were, therefore, acting as judges whenever they made a legal decision.<sup>79</sup>

The Court of Appeal from the High Court of Weihaiwei (or, in practice, from the magisterial courts) was the Supreme Court of Hong Kong. By 1910, however, not a single appeal had been made to that court. The reasons were quite straightforward. First, there were no lawyers at Weihaiwei who might advise their clients to appeal. Those who were involved in a suit had to either present their case orally or by means

of a written petition. Furthermore, it was up to an individual who lost a case to show cause why a rehearing should be granted. Second, only a very small number of people in the Territory could have afforded the cost of an appeal to a Hong Kong court. One observer noted: "It is questionable whether, outside Liukungtao and Port Edward, there are more than a dozen families that would not be totally ruined if called upon to pay the costs of such an appeal."<sup>80</sup> The third reason was simply that very few Chinese in the Territory were even aware that it was possible to make an appeal.<sup>81</sup>

A question which immediately comes to mind, then, is whether or not the judicial system at Weihaiwei could be considered adequate to the needs of the community. The former Commissioner and District Officer Reginald Johnston was keenly aware of his somewhat peculiar position as both judge and jury at Weihaiwei. Though he thought the existing system worked well enough, he also realized that it was impossible for him to decide cases with absolute impartiality since he was responsible for doing both the preliminary investigative work as well as arriving at the final judgment in each case. It was always conceivable that a different judge might decide a case in another way, but it was up to the magistrate to choose which cases should even be referred to a judge. Clearly, it was impossible to have him review every decision. The paper work alone would have been completely unmanageable.<sup>82</sup>

If one compares the judicial role of the British magistrate with that of a Chinese hsien magistrate, however, it is clear that their wide-ranging responsibilities were very nearly identical. Ch'ü T'ung-tsu has made the following observations regarding Chinese magistrates during the Ch'ing

period: "The magistrate heard all cases in his area, civil as well as criminal. But he was more than a judge. He not only conducted hearings and made decisions; he also conducted investigations and inquests, and detected criminals. In terms of modern concepts his duties combined those of judge, prosecutor, police chief and coroner."<sup>83</sup>

Both Chinese and British magistrates had difficult jobs. Prior to the British arrival at Weihaiwei there had been only one court for an area much larger than the entire Territory. Petitions at that time were heard only six days per month and exorbitant fees were charged for even this very limited service.<sup>84</sup> It took very little time for the Chinese to recognize that the British were offering them a substantially improved system of judicial administration. Not only was the magistrate's court open every day, but it was also free. As one observer remarked: "The people have discovered that even their most trifling disputes are more easily, quickly and cheaply settled by going to law than by resorting to the traditional Chinese plan of invoking the assistance of 'peace-talkers' . . ."<sup>85</sup> These "peace-talkers" were usually elderly relatives, village headmen, or neighbors whose efforts had to be suitably rewarded with costly food and wine. Furthermore, since there were no lawyers in Weihaiwei and initially no court fees, the only expense which a litigant might incur was the small charge made by a licensed petition-writer for drawing up the petition.<sup>86</sup> In 1907, however, after many cases of bribery and extortion, it was decided to abolish this system and to revoke all of the petition-writing licenses.<sup>87</sup> Instead, those litigants who were illiterate and had no relative who could write petitions for them were allowed to plead



their cases orally.<sup>88</sup>

As one might imagine, this innovation greatly increased the British magistrate's work load for he now had to actually listen to a large amount of testimony which was often trivial, repetitious, or irrelevant.<sup>89</sup> There was also, until roughly the year 1913, a considerable backlog of civil cases at Weihaiwei due to the costliness and unavailability of judicial services prior to 1808.<sup>90</sup> Complicating the matter even further was the fact that many title deeds for land had been destroyed by the Japanese in 1895.<sup>91</sup> As one district officer remarked in 1913, the decline in litigation noted for that year was due both to eliminating the backlog and also to the growing prosperity which the inhabitants experienced under British rule: "Here, as elsewhere, there is no more prolific breeder of strife and lawlessness than Poverty, and now that improved roads and shipping facilities have made the marketing of his surplus more certain and profitable for the peasant, he is less liable than before to suffer destitution and its consequent temptation."<sup>92</sup>

Another factor which undoubtedly contributed to the reduction in law suits by this time, however, was the imposition in 1909 of a \$2.00 petition fee. The magistrates had found themselves inundated by trivial cases which consumed far too much time simply in hearing oral evidence. Thus, it was decided to have salaried government petition-writers and to charge a fee for each petition.<sup>93</sup> In 1913 it was necessary to raise the fee to \$3.00.<sup>94</sup> Yet even this increased amount seems small when it is remembered that prior to the British occupation of Weihaiwei a litigant in a hsien court might have encountered as many as ten different fees in the

process of having his case heard.<sup>95</sup>

In addition to reducing the work load, there was another important reason for the introduction of fees. The British recognized that villagers were bringing all of their disputes to the magistrates' courts for settlement which was in turn undermining the authority of the village elders and weakening the entire rural social structure. It seemed essential, therefore, to discourage excessive litigation and protracted quarrels as well as to bolster the traditional village authority structure upon which the British were so dependent.<sup>96</sup> It is interesting to compare this decision with the situation described by Martin C. Yang in Taitou, a village near Tsingtao, in the 1930s. Here the Nationalist administration sought to "modernize" many aspects of rural life by assigning new duties to official leaders and in the process inevitably diminished the role of unofficial leaders. As Yang observed:

The old type of chwang-chang does not fit the new requirements, and trained people are replacing him. This has had its effect on the old pattern of subordination to the laymen leaders, who observe this change with a good deal of resentment. The old assurance of their status is gone and in the present insecurity lies the core of much of their antagonism to the new government.<sup>97</sup>

British success at Weihaiwei undoubtedly owed much to their efforts to adapt themselves to their Chinese environment rather than attempting to institute radical change.

Nowhere is this process of adaptation more in evidence perhaps than in the role of the British magistrate and district officer. As was noted earlier, the duties of these officers very closely approximated those of a Chinese hsien magistrate. They came to carry out their duties in a very Chinese

way and were responded to by the local people almost as if they were Chinese officials, though, after a time, with considerably less fear.<sup>98</sup> As Reginald Johnston noted:

. . . the chief qualifications necessary for a judge or magistrate are not so much a knowledge of law and legal procedure as a ready acquaintance with the language, customs, religious ideas and ordinary mode of life of the people and an ability to sympathise with or at least to understand their prejudices and points of view.<sup>99</sup>

There is a striking similarity between Johnston's view of his job and the advice given to local officials in one of the most famous Ch'ing administrative handbooks, the Tso-chih yao-yen by Wang Hui-tsu:

The primary study for a legal secretary is to know the code, but skill in its application depends still more on being in sympathy with the ways of the people. Now as customs often vary from place to place, it is essential to find out all about them without preconceptions, and make it your chief concern to abide by them. If you never act on a penal law or an edict without first seeing that it does not conflict with what local custom values, then there will be harmony between yamen and people, the magistrate's fame will spread, and his secretary's prestige will increase accordingly . . .<sup>100</sup>

Clearly, the legal secretary's role in traditional China was an immensely important one. Many scholars have commented upon the way in which the magistrate was dependent upon his assistant's more detailed knowledge of the law codes and the written case summaries that he would provide in advance of court hearings.<sup>101</sup> The division of labor at Weihaiwei between the district officer and his staff was somewhat different. Johnston noted that in 1904 it became necessary for him to remodel the judicial procedure in the Territory in order to reduce the opportunities for extortion which existed for his staff. As he remarked at that time: "The

greatest vigilance on the part of the Magistrate cannot ensure that no money is passing from plaintiffs and defendants into the hands of his Chinese subordinates and it is all but impossible to make litigants understand that bribery of underlings does not and cannot have the slightest effect upon magisterial decisions."<sup>102</sup> He, therefore, insisted that all petitions be brought directly to him by the petitioner in person and for this purpose he kept his house and his court open at all times. The major responsibility for reading petitions or listening to evidence, then, remained with the magistrate and not with his Chinese staff. In 1904 he was assisted by an interpreter who was also the chief clerk, two Chinese writers, and four yamen-runners. In the investigation of crime he was aided by a European inspector and his Chinese detectives in the rural areas and two European police inspectors who supervised a small police force for Port Edward and the island.<sup>103</sup>

Obviously, a thorough knowledge of both written and spoken Chinese was a vital prerequisite for anyone serving as district officer at Weihaiwei. Court proceedings, for example, were all personally conducted by this official and it was his responsibility to ferret out the "plain unvarnished truth" from witnesses involved. In this difficult task it was knowledge and experience of Chinese "peculiarities of thought and speech" which proved most important and for a foreigner this undoubtedly took time to acquire.<sup>104</sup>

Johnston was especially concerned that the British officer have time to personally visit the sites of disputes brought to his attention so that the Chinese would come to view British methods as "rigidly just."<sup>105</sup> Conscientious

Chinese magistrates, of course, also conducted personal investigations and in some cases, such as homicide or robbery, were obligated by law to do so.<sup>106</sup> One innovation for which Johnston was responsible, however, was the petition-box, a locked letter-box which he set up beside a road in the South Division so that anyone who was afraid that he would not otherwise have direct access to the magistrate or who did not want to openly accuse a neighbor or a relative would feel free to address the district officer in this manner.<sup>107</sup>

Since serious crime was uncommon in Weihaiwei, it was civil cases which occupied most of the magistrate's time. These cases commonly involved questions of debt, encroachment on land, redemption of mortgages, tombstones and ancestral tablets, marriage contracts, inheritance, and adoption.<sup>108</sup> A good deal of the magistrate's time was also taken up in resolving relatively trivial family quarrels.<sup>109</sup> Frequently he was called upon to give an authoritative decision in such matters simply because the village headman or friends and relatives of the parties involved could not.<sup>110</sup> Again the British district officer was called upon to serve not as a Western administrator carrying out the letter of the law but rather as a Chinese "father and mother official" embodying Confucian values and promoting harmony among the people. Thus, for example, he was often involved in taming village shrews since wives in Weihaiwei were frequently much older than their husbands and the source of considerable difficulty.<sup>111</sup> Johnston took his role as teacher of virtue quite seriously and, as he observed in 1910, "frequently, in delivering judgments in both civil and criminal cases, used appropriate texts taken either from the Confucian classics themselves or

from the Sacred Edict, for the purpose of giving his hearers little moral discourses on points suggested by the cases before him."112

Some of the more difficult cases which arose in Weihaiwei were disputes over land ownership especially when the title deed was missing or not in order. To avoid inflicting hardship on those occupying land "illegally" in such cases the magistrate would often have to refrain from interpreting the law strictly.<sup>113</sup> Here was an important area for the exercise of magisterial discretion in the interests of justice and harmony, both of which were highly valued by traditional legal advisers such as Wang Hui-tsu.

Thus, it would appear, judging by the number of cases brought forward and the willingness of the Chinese to accept the district officer's decisions, that judicial administration was one field in which the British adapted themselves quite well to the local environment. In fact, one might even argue that the British provided a more efficient and certainly less expensive legal system than had the Chinese before them. It is interesting that they were able to operate with such a tiny staff even while attempting to make the yamen as accessible as possible. Citing a memorial of 1827, Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, for example, notes that in a small hsien in Shantung several hundred government runners were employed. In the rural territory of Weihaiwei in 1904 there were only four.<sup>114</sup>

The British magistrate was in a considerably less vulnerable position than his Chinese counterpart and this contributed to his efficiency. The Chinese official, who also operated without clear legal guidelines for many of his decisions, was constantly in danger of offending someone and

having ugly rumors circulated to his supervisors regarding his job performance. As John Watt has noted, he was in a sense "ringed by ill-wishers" who were "waiting to exploit every mistake."<sup>115</sup> It is easy to see why some hsien magistrates actually feared the entanglements that litigation could bring and preferred to let cases pile up rather than risk taking an unpopular decision.<sup>116</sup> In this connection, as has been mentioned, the British encountered a considerable backlog of civil cases when they arrived at Weihaiwei. The British district officer, on the other hand, was accountable only to the commissioner, except in the rare cases when his legal decisions were appealed to a higher court. Local bullies, corrupt clerks, or influential family leaders, therefore, had little power over him and he could feel free to handle local disputes with dispatch.

Likewise, one might argue that the British magistrate in the long run was perhaps even more familiar with his locality than the Chinese magistrates would have been since he stayed at his post much longer. Some Chinese officials were eligible for transfer to another area after serving less than three years.<sup>117</sup> Johnston served at Weihaiwei a total of sixteen years, while Lockhart served nineteen, and J. H. Walter eleven. Their wealth of experience and command of Chinese after so many years undoubtedly made the Colonial Office loathe to transfer them elsewhere.

#### Early Fiscal Administration

Like a Chinese magistrate, the British colonial administrator regarded revenue collection as an extremely important part of his job. Yet from the earliest days there were never

any illusions on the part of the British concerning the amount of revenue they could expect to obtain at Weihaiwei. It was estimated in 1900 that an annual income of about £6,000 could be derived with the introduction of certain new levies, since the land tax for the area had been fixed at £1,500 in the reign of the K'ang-hsi Emperor (r. 1661-1722) and had never been increased.<sup>118</sup> Furthermore, the land at Weihaiwei was considered among the lowest in value of all the assessed land in China.<sup>119</sup>

Although taxes were assessed in silver, in this part of China they were paid primarily in copper cash, combined with the occasional silver tael, Mexican dollar, and small silver coins.<sup>120</sup> In 1901 the British collected the tax at a rate less than half that at which the Chinese authorities would have imposed simply because they used the market exchange rate for converting silver taels to copper cash rather than the exchange rate normally used for land taxation. This meant that instead of collecting at a rate of 2400 cash to the tael, the British collected at a rate of 1100 cash to the tael.<sup>121</sup> Commissioner Lockhart remarked: "One cannot fail to be struck by the punctuality with which the tax is paid. The issue of a notice by the Government fixing the date of appointment is all that is required to secure the tax being paid in full at the appointed time, without any arrears."<sup>122</sup> He believed this to be ample proof of the success of the headman system.

Such punctuality, however, was undoubtedly also due to the fact that in 1901 the Chinese government, in order to pay the huge Boxer indemnity, had doubled the value of the silver tael for purposes of land tax collection to 4800 copper



cash. The people of Weihaiwei, therefore, must have been delighted at the "bargain" tax rates they experienced under the British. They also escaped the increase in salt taxes which the Ch'ing authorities levied in 1901 for the same purpose.<sup>123</sup> In December 1903 the land tax was collected in the Territory for the first time at the exchange rate of 2400 cash to the tael and again the British experienced no difficulty in doing so.<sup>124</sup>

The land tax at Weihaiwei was assessed in accordance with the tax registers handed over by the Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng magistrates at the time the British occupied the area. Though it was recognized that these old registers were often inaccurate, the high cost of carrying out a cadastral survey forced the British to rely on them as their second-best alternative. Books were kept by the government which listed each headman, the names of the village or villages for which he was responsible, and the total tax to be paid by each. When payment was due each headman collected it from his fellow villagers and took it to Port Edward where he was given official receipts to be distributed to the villagers upon his return.<sup>125</sup> This system spared the people of Weihaiwei from having to pay the additional burdensome charges known as "squeeze" which had formerly been extorted by government clerks and runners at the times of tax collection prior to British occupation of the area.<sup>126</sup> It should also be noted that there was a reciprocal agreement between the British and neighboring hsien officials that taxes collected from anyone owning land inside the Territory and residing outside would be turned over to the Chinese official in his place of residence and vice versa.<sup>127</sup>

In addition to the land tax, the British collected a variety of other fees such as rents on land and houses belonging to the government (these were mainly located on the island), junk and wharfage dues (the total of which increased considerably as trade expanded), licenses for laundries, wine and spirit monopolies, and an opium monopoly, as well as numerous others.<sup>128</sup> Although Commissioner Lockhart's preference for establishing a licensed monopoly of opium as opposed to an outright ban on the drug was to make control easier for the government, he was certainly not unaware of the financial advantages that such licensing would bring to his fledgling administration. Thus, in 1902 he called for and received tenders on a one-year opium monopoly for \$550.<sup>129</sup> In 1904 he decided to solicit new and higher offers from as far afield as Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements and by 1905 he had received a bid of \$5,600 for the annual license.<sup>130</sup>

In February 1906, however, Lockhart was instructed by the Colonial Office to gradually bring his government's policy into line with that of Hong Kong where opium had been prohibited.<sup>131</sup> On 20 September 1906 the Chinese central government issued a new edict to eradicate opium cultivation in China.<sup>132</sup> Subsequently, Lockhart was asked for information on the opium problem at Weihaiwei by an official in Peking and he reported the existence of twenty opium dens in the Territory and annual sales of 60,000 ounces of the drug.<sup>133</sup> It was not until June 1909, however, that the commissioner informed Weihaiwei's district headmen he planned to cooperate with the Chinese ban on opium and that henceforth its use would be restricted to those with a medical certificate.<sup>134</sup> Lockhart's long delay in abolishing the opium monopoly was undoubtedly due to its

success in producing much-needed government revenue and is one of the more unfortunate aspects of British fiscal policy at Weihaiwei at this time.

The road tax, which was instituted to replace the hated *corvée* labor system, represents a more respectable side of this policy. Initially the British had intended to make each village responsible for the upkeep of a certain portion of its nearby roads but this led to considerable difficulty with the headmen who were supposed to enforce the system. Thus, it was decided to have the work done by a private contractor for which an additional tax was levied on landowners.<sup>135</sup> This tax was somewhat similar in concept to the Ch'ing labor-service tax, or ting yin, which was assessed on all adult males in lieu of labor service. After 1725 this tax had been combined with the land tax in Shantung and the two together were known as ti-ting yin.<sup>136</sup> Those who owned no land were exempted from both taxes. Similarly, in Weihaiwei under the British those who owned no land were not expected to pay the road tax.

In connection with the general question of government revenue at Weihaiwei it should be noted that aside from the island of Liu-kung and a small amount of land on the mainland which had been purchased by the British government for military purposes, there was no large program to buy up land and then resell or rent it to raise funds.<sup>137</sup> When the Colonial Office took over the administration of the Territory in 1901, all houses on the island and mainland which were no longer required by the military were handed over to the new government and then rented out or sold. In 1902 the rents thus derived amounted to approximately £235, with some as low as

30¢ (Mexican) per month.<sup>138</sup> As for the renting of government land for cultivation by Chinese farmers, in 1902 \$105 was collected, in 1903 \$141, and in 1904 \$125 for the approximately 120 mou farmed.<sup>139</sup>

When Lockhart arrived at Weihaiwei in 1902 one of his staff members noted that land transactions up to that point had been few, adding: "At present and for some time past the Government has based its value of land on that of the price realized among the Chinese for plots in the vicinity." These varied from about \$40 to \$150 per mou for land around Port Edward. Road compensations were granted at \$10 per mou.<sup>140</sup> One can say then that, unlike the Germans at Kiaochow who implemented an extremely detailed plan for controlling land use and speculation,<sup>141</sup> the British carried out no cadastral survey in the Territory to determine what additional rents they might derive nor did they interfere to control land prices. As we have seen, with a gradual increase in prosperity at Weihaiwei, land prices also rose and the Chinese themselves benefited from this.<sup>142</sup>

In one looks at the following government figures for Weihaiwei from 1901 to 1911 it is possible to see how the leasehold revenues quickly exceeded early expectations:

Table 1<sup>143</sup>  
Government Finances, 1901-1911

<u>Year</u>	<u>Revenue</u>	<u>Expenditure</u>	<u>Grant-in-Aid</u>
1901-2	\$ 22,220	\$121,187	£11,250
1902-3	35,456	102,044	12,000
1903-4	58,586	165,873	9,000
1904-5	90,355	162,282	6,000
1905-6	105,934	146,120	3,000
1906-7	76,777	160,899	4,500
1907-8	80,331	173,340	10,000
1908-9	83,277	168,740	10,000
1909-10	83,499	145,687	4,400
1910-11	75,353	145,028	4,400

The sudden sharp increase in revenue between 1904 and 1905 was partly a result of the Russo-Japanese War and the shifting of trade and shipping to Weihaiwei which resulted from it.<sup>144</sup> Likewise, there was a fall-off in revenue in 1906-7 when the war was over and uncertainty over British intentions at Weihaiwei discouraged investment for a time.<sup>145</sup> Still, the general trend was one of growth in revenue and a gradual reduction in the grant-in-aid from the British Treasury. By eliminating the infamous "squeeze," improving methods of land tax collection, and establishing certain new sources of revenue, such as wharfage dues, the colonial administrators were able to reduce their dependence upon the subsidy without greatly increasing the financial burden on Weihaiwei's inhabitants.<sup>146</sup>

Thus, the British found the local Chinese consistently paid their taxes on time and without complaint. Of course, the importance of the grant-in-aid in maintaining Weihaiwei's financial solvency should not be overlooked. The British taxpayer in a sense helped keep the leasehold's tax burden

relatively low. The government at Weihaiwei and, to a certain extent, the local population also enjoyed relative financial stability as a result of this subsidy. Unlike most late Ch'ing magistrates who were forced to rely on all manner of surcharges and customary service fees to supplement woefully inadequate funding from the central government, the British administrators could at least be certain that their basic operating expenses would always be met.<sup>147</sup> Weihaiwei, being a poor area, had undoubtedly experienced this difficulty prior to the British arrival.

Considerable credit should be given to the administrators themselves, however, for keeping expenditures within reasonable limits, especially in the wake of the 1904-5 war when the Russians were forced out of Port Arthur. It then became official Colonial Office policy to restrict government activities as much as possible at Weihaiwei and to let the villages "run themselves" in order to reduce expenses.<sup>149</sup>

### Education

One area in which the British, especially in the first few years of their administration, decided not to interfere was that of education. As we have seen, there were very few local men who had acquired anything more than the most rudimentary level of literacy at Weihaiwei. Most schools which did exist in the villages, therefore, must have been confined to the traditional variety and undoubtedly only provided elementary education.

Although the Ch'ing authorities in 1652 required that every rural area establish a school and choose persons of "honest and sincere character" to serve as teachers, actual

government involvement in such schools was minimal and the major responsibility for them remained with local communities.<sup>150</sup> These schools were usually supported by wealthy benefactors or by individual lineages and were very loosely organized. There were no attendance or achievement records and students could come and go according to the agricultural chores they had to perform at home. The basic curriculum consisted of the Confucian Four Books and Five Classics and rote memory was the method employed for learning it.<sup>151</sup> In 1902 it was observed that most of the important villages in the leased Territory of Weihaiwei possessed schools maintained by villagers and that students were eligible to compete in the first level of literary examinations held in Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien.<sup>152</sup> As will be seen in later chapters, however, the British were eventually to be severely criticized for devoting so little of their financial resources to improving educational opportunities in the leasehold.

#### Relations with the Chinese Walled Town

The stable, smooth-running administration and relative tranquility of the leased Territory contrasted sharply with conditions which existed inside the Chinese walled town. It will be remembered that the town of Weihai had caused concern to the British as soon as they arrived in the area. In addition to being a haven for gambling and prostitution, it had also been the site of secret inflammatory meetings called by the Chinese boundary commissioners in 1900. As one observer remarked in that year:

It must be evident to anyone that this im-  
perium in imperio when the imperium is a  
squalid Chinese town, the refuge of all  
bad characters, the centre of sedition, the

focus from which petty Chinese officials can send out emissaries to disturb the minds of those who will now be British subjects, is a state of affairs which ought not to be allowed to continue.<sup>153</sup>

It was also thought that this town had a bad effect on the Chinese Regiment and that although it had been allowed to exist as a face-saving device for the Chinese in 1898, it need no longer be so regarded.<sup>154</sup>

As a means of maintaining some sort of control over the place the first commissioner at Weihaiwei, Colonel Dorrard, decided to pay the Chinese sub-magistrate in the town an allowance of \$40 per month to assist him in carrying out his civil duties. He also successfully appealed to the governor of Shantung to increase the official's salary. Even so he was unable to enforce his orders on the wealthier merchants and opium den-keepers without British assistance. The other Chinese official on the scene, a low-ranking military man, had received no salary since the war with Japan and was dependent on contributions from disreputable businessmen in the town who received protection from him in return. Dorrard was concerned that the town also provided the magistrate at Wen-teng with an excuse for parading through the Territory on his visits there, reminding the villagers of the continuing presence of local Chinese authority.<sup>155</sup>

As a remedy for this situation the commissioner suggested that the Weihaiwei Convention be used by the British as a basis for claiming the town since it stipulated that the Chinese could retain jurisdiction only so long as this remained consistent with defense requirements.<sup>156</sup> Although the matter was raised in 1901 with the British minister to Peking, Sir Ernest Satow, he felt it was not a politically



opportune moment to approach the Tsungli Yamen. He suggested rather that local Chinese officials be requested to exercise their jurisdiction effectively and that adequate funds be provided by the central government for doing so.<sup>157</sup> In the end, the problem resolved itself. The new commissioner, Lockhart, noted that since his arrival the sub-magistrate in the town had been willing to cooperate with the British and his \$40 monthly "salary" had been maintained. He suggested no change in the arrangement as long as it proved satisfactory.<sup>158</sup>

#### Anglo-Chinese Relations in Shantung

British relations with Chinese provincial officials were also surprisingly good during the first decade of their administration at Weihaiwei. Following the boundary disturbances of 1900 which strained relations between Shantung's Governor Yüan Shih-k'ai and the British, one might have expected considerable time to pass before diplomatic cordiality was restored. As we have seen, however, Governor Yüan acted swiftly during the summer of that year to issue a proclamation exhorting the local people to create no further difficulties. He reassured them that when the British lease expired the Territory would be restored to Chinese jurisdiction and in the meantime they should do their duty as loyal subjects and maintain peaceful relations with the foreigners.<sup>159</sup> Many Western scholars have observed that Yüan Shih-k'ai was largely responsible for a policy of nationalistic resistance to foreign imperialism, especially with respect to Germany.<sup>160</sup> It is highly likely that with this larger threat to Chinese sovereignty and economic interests at Kiaochow Bay, Yüan

preferred to make peace with the British at Weihaiwei.

This policy continued under Yüan's successor to the governorship, Chou Fu, who served from August 1902 until November 1904. In fact, Chou even paid a personal visit to Weihaiwei in 1902 which Commissioner Lockhart felt obliged to reciprocate in 1903. As the guest of the governor, Lockhart was treated with remarkable deference and lavish hospitality. He was conveyed from Weihaiwei aboard a Chinese cruiser to the entrance of the Hsiao-ch'ing Ho canal where he was met by an official military escort. His party of ten vessels then made its way up the canal to Tsinan with Lockhart sailing in comfort on a houseboat. The final leg of the journey was by sedan chair, at the end of which Lockhart received a thirteen-gun salute. Governor Chou then proceeded to entertain the commissioner in style. Lockhart noted, for example, that at the official banquet held in his honor the governor's private band "played foreign music throughout dinner and whenever it had the least excuse, God save the King."<sup>161</sup> It should be noted that Chou was responsible for implementing many modern reforms and was especially eager that the British assist in railroad construction so as to offset the German diversion of trade to Kiaochow. Lockhart, for his part, used the opportunity of contact with the Tsinan Chamber of Commerce and leading "gentry" figures to advocate commercial investment at Weihaiwei.<sup>162</sup>

Extremely cordial relations between the British and Chinese provincial officials continued under Chou's successor, Yang Shih-hsiang, who governed from March 1905 to September 1907. Again visits were exchanged as well as a great deal of mutual praise for one another's accomplishments. One of

the most interesting aspects of these formal visits is that they were conducted largely in a traditional Chinese manner. Lockhart's visit to Tsinan in 1906 hosted by Governor Yang was described in the Shan-tung kuan-pao with generous praise for the commissioner's views on education, especially female education. While visiting a school in the capital he exhorted students to work for a better China. Likewise, when the governor visited Weihaiwei, he was warmly welcomed and the two officials exchanged complimentary remarks filled with classical allusions.<sup>163</sup> The Ching-hua jih-pao noted that while the governor was very well received at Weihaiwei, he was not given similar treatment by the Germans.<sup>164</sup>

Governor Yang's successor, Yüan Shu-hsun, who served from October 1907 until July 1909, perhaps because of his experience as a former tao-t'ai in Shanghai, knowledge of foreigners, and support for "modernization" in China, was especially effusive in his praise of Commissioner Lockhart when he was received as a guest at Weihaiwei in 1908.<sup>165</sup> After mentioning Lockhart's "exceptional" knowledge of Chinese, he went on in a formal address to remark: "The improvements which have been made in Weihaiwei reflect great credit on his administrative capacity and the contented condition of the Chinese under his jurisdiction shows that they are grateful to him for his kind and sympathetic rule."<sup>166</sup>

#### Weihaiwei and the Russo-Japanese War

During the years 1900 to 1905 there were major shifts in the international balance of power and once again the British viewed with growing alarm the extent of Russian ambitions in the Far East. The result was an alliance with

Japan in 1902, later renewed in 1905. The military occupation of Manchuria by the Russians in the wake of the Boxer affair eventually led to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and a resounding victory for Japan. Part of the peace agreement provided extensive new rights and privileges for the Japanese in southern Manchuria and this was important in the history of Weihaiwei for two reasons: 1) because the original leasing of Weihaiwei had been contingent upon Russian occupation of Port Arthur, and 2) because the British now needed to consult their Japanese allies before taking any decisions as to the rendition of the Territory.

From secret British Cabinet documents it is clear that the issue of Weihaiwei was being reconsidered at least by October 1905. With the Russians gone from Port Arthur it was thought that a fresh lease would have to be negotiated with China in order to justify a continuing British presence in the north. At the time there were strong arguments put forward for returning the place to the Chinese. It was pointed out that \$100,000 had already been spent on naval works there which were now not even to be used in view of the additional expense required for fortification and the change in Admiralty policy regarding permanent advanced bases. Furthermore, although there had been a certain amount of growth in trade at Weihaiwei, there was as yet no manufacturing industry there and no prospects of any developing. Thus, retention could not be justified on commercial grounds. It was thought an ideal time to return Weihaiwei to the Chinese, both as a gesture of goodwill and as a means of preventing future difficulties from arising. This act could not be regarded as the result of fear or an evasion of responsibilities since Britain

still maintained its essential position in the Far East, especially through its alliance with Japan.<sup>167</sup>

The major obstacle to Weihaiwei's rendition at this time seems to have been the Japanese who were eager that the British remain as a check upon the Germans at Kiaochow.<sup>168</sup> The Chinese for their part were in a more confident mood in 1906 and were eager for the return of the former base at Weihaiwei in order to proceed with naval development. In the end, however, the British War Office, Colonial Office, and Admiralty all agreed that Weihaiwei should be retained for its usefulness as a "flying base" and as a check upon further German encroachment in Shantung.<sup>169</sup> No one, however, recommended increased expenditure at Weihaiwei. The Chinese were informed that they should regard Britain's continued occupation of the leasehold as a protection against the other powers and that rendition might be possible at some later date.<sup>170</sup>

The uncertainty over British intentions at Weihaiwei had its effect on those living there. On 24 March 1906 Lockhart received a joint petition from the European and Chinese merchants in the Territory asking that he secure from the Colonial Office a firm commitment to remain in the place as trade was paralyzed and no one wished to invest there when they could not be sure of British intentions. Lockhart passed along their concern but the only response from the Colonial Office was the bland statement that no change was contemplated.<sup>171</sup>

It would appear then that by 1906 the British envisioned a kind of diplomatic holding operation at Weihaiwei. They were not prepared to abandon their interests in north China to the Germans and certainly their Japanese allies strongly advised against withdrawal. Furthermore, the Navy found

Wei hai wei, with its fine harbor and healthy climate, to be an extremely convenient rest station for the fleet. The Colonial Office, however, had no illusions about the leasehold's commercial prospects and insisted that expenditures be kept to a bare minimum. Thus, one must ask what effect, if any, could the British presence have had upon the economic and social development of Wei hai wei given such limited objectives. The next chapter will deal with this question for the decade preceding the 1911 revolution.

Notes to Chapter 2

<sup>1</sup>CO 521/1, Barton to Dorward, May 1900. It should perhaps be noted that the Weihaiwei area had experienced at least one incident involving foreigners even before the British occupation. A British missionary had aroused local hostility in June 1897 and a complaint was lodged with the consul at Chefoo who relayed his concern to the minister in Peking. Apparently, the governor of Shantung, Li Ping-heng, who was well known for his anti-missionary views, had sent the consul "an important message and had practically told him that the matter did not concern him." He took this attitude in spite of instructions from the Tsungli Yamen to settle the matter as quietly as possible which indicates the problems the Yamen faced at this time in enforcing its authority over local officials. See FO 233/44, (Record Book of Interviews with Chinese Authorities, 30 June 1897-31 October 1899), Interview between British Ambassador and Yamen officials, 30 June 1897, p. 4. This incident is also described in "Shan-tung shih-pao so-tsai chiao-an tzu-liao: Wei-hai chiao-an," in STCTSTL, 2:304.

The British later encountered considerable difficulty in getting local officials to inform the people of Weihaiwei that they actually had been granted a lease by the central government. The Tsungli Yamen had supposedly instructed the governor of Shantung in July 1898 to issue such a proclamation but, according to the British, it was never posted. They complained again in April 1899 that there was still no evidence of any such proclamation and were told that the governor had issued it and that perhaps it had been defaced by the weather! See FO 233/44, Interview of 31 March 1899, pp. 480-81; and Interview of 20 April 1899, p. 495. It is hardly surprising, then, that a military surveying party was forced to "retire before a hostile demonstration of the local people" in the western portion of Weihaiwei in May 1899. The Yamen suggested that the British should resolve the matter with the local authorities. FO 233/44, Interview of 19 May 1899, p. 511.

<sup>2</sup>CO 873/779, Dorward to Yen Tao-t'ai, 12 April 1900.

<sup>3</sup>CO 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 23 May 1900.

<sup>4</sup>CO 521/1, Dorward to War Office, 6 April 1900.

<sup>5</sup>CO 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 23 May 1900.

<sup>6</sup>CO 521/1, Dorward to War Office, 6 April 1900.

<sup>7</sup>CO 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 23 May 1900.

<sup>8</sup>CO 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 16 May 1900.

<sup>9</sup>CO 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 23 May 1900. Dorward noted that anyone who had attended the secret meeting and insisted that the British in fact had not collected taxes in the Territory was forcibly removed and "hooted in the street."

CO 521/1, Dorward to MacDonald, 9 May 1900.

<sup>10</sup>CO 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 23 May 1900.

<sup>11</sup>CO 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 19 May 1900.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid. See also CO 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 23 May 1900. The situation at this point must have been tense for the vastly outnumbered British forces. On 1 May one of the officers wrote to the commissioner that there were probably five thousand people around the village in which the Chinese officials were camped and "'lots more watching us from the hills.'" CO 521/1, Bower to Dorward, 1 May 1900.

<sup>13</sup>CO 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 19 May 1900.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid. The Chinese commissioners had also cabled the Yamen in Peking that they had tried to get the British to delay the demarcation when crowds gathered, warning of possible violence, but that the foreigners "hurriedly proceeded with troops." The Yamen then warned MacDonald that any boundaries laid out could not be regarded as authoritative since they were not jointly drawn by Chinese and British officials. CO 873/4, "Boundary Disturbances, Papers Regarding," Translation of cable from Tao-t'ai Li to Yamen, Enclosure in Yamen to MacDonald, 5 May 1900.

<sup>15</sup>CO 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 17 May 1900.

<sup>16</sup>CO 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 23 May 1900.

<sup>17</sup>CO 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 19 May 1900.

<sup>18</sup>CO 873/4, Cable from Dorward to MacDonald, 9 May 1900.

<sup>19</sup>CO 521/1, Barton to Dorward, 9 May 1900. Liang Tsung-han, in an article published in STCTSTL, presents a different view of the boundary disturbances. He argues that the "traitorous foreign policy of the Ch'ing government" aroused the anger and patriotism of the local people of Weihaiwei who violently resisted the sell-out of their territory to English imperialism. He goes on to describe the actual incident in which his father and brother participated and notes that their failure was due to weak organization and the absence of any "vanguard of the proletariat." British sources certainly support Liang's contention that some local people were violently aroused against their own government and the British at Weihaiwei. What is completely lacking in his analysis, however, is mention of the crucial role played by local Chinese officials and the boundary commissioners in stirring up this opposition as well as the way in which they misrepresented British intentions. See Liang Tsung-han, "Weihaiwei ch'un-chung k'ang Ying shih-lueh," in STCTSTL, 3:177.

<sup>20</sup>CO 521/1, Dorward to Macdonald, 12 May 1900.

<sup>21</sup>For original proclamation by Yüan Shih-k'ai and the Wen-teng magistrate, see CO 873/4, Enclosure in Dorward to MacDonald, 12 June 1900.



<sup>22</sup>CO 873/4, Dorward to MacDonald, 16 and 23 May 1900.

<sup>23</sup>Schrecker, Imperialism, pp. 112-114.

<sup>24</sup>Buck, Urban Change, p. 42.

<sup>25</sup>The agent working for John Swire and Sons at Chefoo wrote to the secretary of the China Association in Shanghai during the Boxer disturbances that he was concerned about possible repercussions at Chefoo where the firm had considerable property holdings. He noted that Weihaiwei, on the other hand, was experiencing no difficulties and that the firm had no property there anyway. See John Swire and Sons, Ltd. Archive, School of Oriental and African Studies, Box A23, Chefoo agent to Leonard Kerr, 7 July 1900. See also CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 75 (Eastern), G. T. Hare, "A General Report," 25 April 1902, p. 82. Weihaiwei was actually used as a transport and hospital base in 1900 for the China expeditionary force when it was sent to relieve the legations in Peking. Lord Curzon, by then serving as Viceroy of India, noted this fact with delight when he wrote to Lord Hamilton in August 1900: "'I have been quite pleased to hear that Wei-hai-wei -- which was in a particular sense my own child . . . has turned out trumps. I only regret that we have not done more to utilise and develop it during the past two years.'" Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon, 1:286.

<sup>26</sup>For a detailed discussion of the incidents in the Kiaochow area, see Schrecker, Imperialism, pp. 72-3. Regarding the boundary disturbances in the New Territories, see Henry James Lethbridge, "Sir James Haldane Stewart Lockhart: Colonial Civil Servant and Scholar," Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 12 (1972):61-3. See also G. B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (London, 1973), pp. 260-9; James W. Hayes, "The Pattern of Life in the New Territories in 1898," Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 2 (1962):87; and Peter Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty, 1808-1997 (Hong Kong, 1980), pp. 45-87.

<sup>27</sup>It is, therefore, difficult to agree with the anonymous author of an article in STCTSTL who asserts that the colonial administration at Weihaiwei was designed to ruthlessly suppress the people's resistance. See "Ying-kuo ch'iang-tsu Wei-hai-wei yü ch'i chih-min chi-kou ti chien-li," excerpted from an unpublished draft of Wei-hai shih-chih in STCTSTL, 3:171.

<sup>28</sup>Great Britain, Parliament. Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 4th series, 105 (1902):303.

<sup>29</sup>A. J. Marder, British Naval Policy, 1880-1905 (London, 1940), pp. 460-7; and Young, British Policy, pp. 305-7.

<sup>30</sup>CO 521/3, Minute of 1 May 1902 on G. T. Hare's Confidential Report, "The Political and Commercial Importance of Weihaiwei," 31 March 1902.

<sup>31</sup>Reginald F. Johnston, "Weihaiwei," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 18.2 (April 1931):177.

<sup>32</sup>Cabinet 37/48/88, Memorandum by Field-Marshal Wolseley, 1 December 1898.

<sup>33</sup>William P. Ker, Chinese under British Rule in Malaya, Hong Kong, and Weihaiwei (London, 1929), p. 41.

<sup>34</sup>CO 521/3, Watson to Dorward, December 1901.

<sup>35</sup>CO 521/2, Dorward to Colonial Office, 12 December 1901. For additional discussion of the controversial Chinese Regiment, see also FO 17/1511, Major-General Creagh to Secretary of State for India, "Diary of Events Ending 12 October 1901," and "Diary of Events Ending 19 October 1901"; CO 521/3, Report of Captain M. Watson, December 1901; CO 521/3, Cowan to Colonial Office, 18 April 1902; and CO 873/94, Daniell to Bruce, 19 November 1903 and Commissioner to Bruce, 5 December 1903. Nish has quoted one critic of the Chinese Regiment as having complained about the barracks in which they were housed: "These barracks are far too sumptuous, and infinitely superior to those that are considered good enough for the brigade of Guards in London and elsewhere." Nish, "The Royal Navy," p. 49. In spite of these "sumptuous" living conditions, however, desertion was a serious problem in the Regiment and was even admitted by British officers serving with it. One of these officers believed the Chinese were simply not used to being "tied down" as military discipline demanded. See John H. Smith Journals, 27 May 1901, School of Oriental and African Studies, Library, University of London.

<sup>36</sup>CO 521/4, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 20 January 1903.

<sup>37</sup>CO 521/4, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1903, p. 6.

<sup>38</sup>CO 873/142, Purdon to Johnston, 10 June 1904. For a detailed description of the recruitment procedure, terms of service, and local response to the Chinese Regiment, see "Shan-tung shih-pao so tsai Ying chan Wei-hai tzu-liao," materials originally published in the Shan-tung shih-pao, in STCTSTL, 3:174-76. See also A. A. S. Barnes, On Active Service with the Chinese Regiment (London, 1902); Johnston, Lion and Dragon, pp. 82-3; CO 873/329, Annual Report, 1906; and Bruce-Mitford, The Territory, pp. 22-4.

<sup>39</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902, Section 7, "Police."

<sup>40</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 156.

<sup>41</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1904, p. 8.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Hsiao Kung-chuan, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle, 1960), pp. 274-5.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid, p. 272.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 273.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 269.

<sup>47</sup>Martin C. Yang, A Chinese Village: Taitou, Shantung Province (New York and London, paperback edition, 1965), p. 185.

<sup>48</sup>CO 873/281, Register of Weihaiwei Electors for 1909 Provincial Assembly.

<sup>49</sup>Shan-tung t'ung-chih, 5 vols. (reprinted Shanghai, 1934-35), 2:2950-5, and 3097-3108.

<sup>50</sup>CO 873/300, Weihaiwei Census, 1911.

<sup>51</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1904, p. 20.

<sup>52</sup>CO 873/281, Register of Weihaiwei Electors for 1909 Provincial Assembly. It should be noted that, unless otherwise stated, all dollar figures cited in this thesis are Mexican dollars. Chan has indicated that during the late Ch'ing period, however, the Mexican and Chinese dollars (yüan) were equal in value. See Wellington K. K. Chan, Merchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), p. 247.

<sup>53</sup>CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 75 (Eastern), G. T. Hare, "A General Report," p. 77.

<sup>54</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902, Section 7, "Police."

<sup>55</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1904, p. 19. See also CO 873/428, "Regulations Regarding the Purchase of Land in the British Territory of Weihaiwei," 14 October 1899.

<sup>56</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1904, p. 19.

<sup>57</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902, Section 7, "Police."

<sup>58</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report, 1904, "Police," p. 10.

<sup>59</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, pp. 288-9. See also CO 873/184, Johnston to Lockhart, 25 April 1905; and CO 521/10, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 9 April 1907. This latter document includes a sample of an actual medal especially created for awards to headmen at Weihaiwei. The first-class medal was to be cast in gold, while the second-class one was of silver. The Colonial Office was concerned that it be clearly stipulated, however, that these medals were granted solely by the local British authorities and not by the King.

<sup>60</sup>CO 873/184, Johnston to Lockhart, 28 July 1905 and Lockhart to Johnston, 29 July 1905.

<sup>61</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, pp. 97-8.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 156.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>65</sup>CO 873/230, Annual Report, 1906, "Crime."

<sup>66</sup>CO 873/205, Annual Report of Secretary to Government,  
1905.

<sup>67</sup>CO 873/256, Johnston to Lockhart, 5 October 1907.

<sup>68</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 95.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 156.

<sup>70</sup>Yang, A Chinese Village, p. 185. See page 82 above.

<sup>71</sup>CO 873/265, Annual Report of Secretary to Government,  
1907.

<sup>72</sup>CO 521/2, Corrected draft of Weihaiwei Order-in-Council,  
25 February 1901, p. 7.

<sup>73</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report of Secretary to Government,  
1904.

<sup>74</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, pp. 98-9.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>76</sup>CO 873/265, Annual Report of Secretary to Government,  
1907. See also CO 521/11, Annual Report, 1900, "Judicial."

<sup>77</sup>CO 521/2, Corrected draft of Weihaiwei Order-in-Council,  
p. 6.

<sup>78</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 99.

<sup>79</sup>CO 521/2, Corrected draft of Weihaiwei Order-in-Council,  
p. 6.

<sup>80</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 101.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

<sup>82</sup>Johnston to Lockhart, 12 August 1910, Lockhart Papers,  
Box 9, Bundle of Letters "72," National Library of Scotland,  
Edinburgh.

<sup>83</sup>Ch'u T'ung-tsu, Local Government in China under the  
Ch'ing (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), p. 116.

<sup>84</sup>CO 873/377, Annual Report of District Officer, 1913.

<sup>85</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 102.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., pp. 102-3.

<sup>87</sup>CO 873/265, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1907.

<sup>88</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 103.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid.

<sup>90</sup>CO 873/377, Annual Report of District Officer, 1913.

<sup>91</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1904.

<sup>92</sup>CO 873/377, Annual Report of District Officer, 1913.

<sup>93</sup>CO 521/11, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 7 March 1910.

<sup>94</sup>CO 873/377, Annual Report of District Officer, 1913.

<sup>95</sup>Ch'u, Local Government, pp. 47-50.

<sup>96</sup>CO 873/377, Annual Report of District Officer, 1913.

<sup>97</sup>Yang, A Chinese Village, p. 186.

<sup>98</sup>G. T. Hare observed, for example, in 1902: "The Chinese of the district take full advantage of the personal accessibility of the District Magistrate, and evidently appreciate dealing directly with him." CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 75 (Eastern), "A General Report," p. 78. The local people of Weihaiwei were also most appreciative of Reginald Johnston's efforts as magistrate, for in 1904 they presented him with a scroll in which he was described as "the father and mother of the people." CO 873/163, Annual Report, 1904, "Crime." See also the Chinese text of a stone tablet erected by Weihaiwei district headmen in Lockhart's honor in 1921, Lockhart Papers, Box 1.

<sup>99</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 124. See also Austin Coates, Myself a Mandarin: Memoirs of a Special Magistrate (Hong Kong, 1968), pp. 9-11 and 17-18.

<sup>100</sup>Wang Hui-tsu, Tso-chih yao-yen (Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng ed., Shanghai, 1937), p. 15. Translated in Sybille van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions in Manchu China: A Sociological Analysis (Reprinted London, 1971), p. 150.

<sup>101</sup>Ch'u, Local Government, pp. 124-7; and van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions, p. 69.

<sup>102</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1904.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid.

<sup>104</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, pp. 104-117, *passim*.

<sup>105</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1904.

<sup>106</sup>Ch'u, Local Government, pp. 119 and 122.

<sup>107</sup>Johnston noted that the petition-box was in fact frequently used:

Into this box, the contents of which are examined by myself alone, petitions of various kinds are dropped almost daily; and though a large majority are anonymous denunciations of the private enemies of the writers, and are immediately destroyed, a considerable number have led to some discoveries of great value from the administrative point of view . . .

See Lion and Dragon, p. 115.

<sup>108</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1904.

<sup>109</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 112.

<sup>110</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1904.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid.

<sup>112</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 123. See also Coates, Myself a Mandarin, pp. 31-2 and 61.

<sup>113</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1904.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid.

<sup>115</sup>John Watt, The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China (New York, 1972), p. 223.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid.

<sup>117</sup>Ch'u, Local Government, p. 32.

<sup>118</sup>CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 72 (Eastern), "Memorandum," and CO 521/1, Swettenham, "Report on Weihaiwei."

<sup>119</sup>One early observer noted that the best land in the Territory was assessed at 10¢ (Mexican) per mou, while the majority was valued at only 3-5¢ per mou. In more favorable parts of China land was valued at 15-30¢ per mou and even in the New Territories of Hong Kong a tax of 8¢ per mou was assessed on the poorest land. See CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 75 (Eastern), "General Report"; and CO 873/90, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1903. For rates of taxation in Weihaiwei during the early Ch'ing period, see Weihaiwei chih, 4/1a-9b. G. T. Hare noted in 1902 that the total land tax collected in the Weihaiwei Territory by Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng officials prior to the arrival of the British was \$6,300. See CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 75 (Eastern), "General Report," p. 80.

<sup>120</sup>CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 75 (Eastern), "General Report," p. 80.

<sup>121</sup>CO 873/99, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1903. For a discussion of taxation in Shantung during the late Ch'ing period, see Ching-chi hsüeh-hui, ed., Ts'ai-cheng shuo-ming-shu: Shan-tung sheng (Peking, 1915).

<sup>122</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902, Section 20, "Government Lands."

<sup>123</sup>Ibid and CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 75 (Eastern), "General Report."

<sup>124</sup>CO 521/4, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1903.

<sup>125</sup>CO 873/99, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1903. The British instituted an important change in the tax collection procedure when they decided to issue one provisional tax receipt to each headman as he turned in the revenue from his area. He was then instructed to return in a month's time to receive the receipts which could be issued to individual taxpayers. This simple modification was a great improvement over the traditional system whereby individual heads of families paid their taxes in person and then waited about for long periods at the yamen to collect their receipts. See CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 75 (Eastern), "A General Report," p. 79.

<sup>126</sup>CO 521/4, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1903.

<sup>127</sup>CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 75 (Eastern), "General Report, p. 80. According to this report, the British in 1901 collected \$144 and \$155 for the Jung-ch'eng and Weng-teng magistrates respectively and they in turn handed over \$51 to the British.

<sup>128</sup>Other fees included prospecting licenses, dog licenses, sampan and cart licenses, boarding-house licenses, hawker licenses, a European land tax, a slaughter-house tax, transfer charges for the sale and mortgaging of land, a Chinese and European house tax, and fines for criminal offenses. See CO 873/99, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1903.

<sup>129</sup>CO 873/61, Lockhart to Walter, April 7, 1903. See also CO 873/33, Correspondence between Lockhart and various others, 21 October-20 November 1902.

<sup>130</sup>CO 873/143, Lockhart to Johnston, 11 May 1904; and CO 873/190.

<sup>131</sup>CO 521/9, Colonial Office to Lockhart, 6 February 1906.

<sup>132</sup>Mary C. Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913 (New Haven and London, paperback edition, 1971), p. 15.

133 CO 873/260, Lockhart to Leech, 21 November 1907.

134 CO 873/285, Commissioner's speech to headmen, 16 June 1909. As one might have expected, however, illegal opium consumption continued to be a problem at Weihaiwei for a number of years, especially as the standard of living improved and there was money to buy it even at vastly inflated prices. CO 873/437, Moss to Lockhart, 4 January 1915. References to opium can be found in the commissioner's files as late as 1928. See CO 873/724.

135 CO 873/109, Annual Report, 1903.

136 Ch'u, Local Government, pp. 131-2.

137 The island was purchased by the War Office and Admiralty for about £25,000. The Admiralty made no use of the mainland, but the War Office owned a small amount of property which was used by the Chinese Regiment. See CO 521/3, G. T. Hare, Confidential Report, "The Political and Commercial Importance of Weihaiwei," 31 March 1902.

138 CO 873/65, General Report, 1902, "Government Lands"; and CO 873/11, Bartlett Report, 20 November 1902.

According to the latter document, the revenue was used for the repair and maintenance of all buildings for which rent was payable and the adaptation of some Chinese buildings for use by Europeans. The minimum rental rate was fixed at 12% of the value of the land and house. Tenants were informed that in the event the War Office or government needed the property, it could be reclaimed after a month's notice.

139 CO 873/11, Bartlett to Lockhart, 26 November 1902. This file also contains a complete list of government lands on the mainland, their location, the names and residences of renters, the size of each plot, and the amount of rent paid for 1901-04.

140 CO 873/18, Colonial Engineer to Lockhart, 26 August 1902.

141 Schrecker, Imperialism, pp. 65-72 and 212-13.

142 In this regard, I think one can agree with the anonymous author of one article in STCTSTL that by their very presence at Weihaiwei the British colonial administrators were assuming a role normally reserved to the Chinese themselves and any revenue they received could be considered illegitimate. Within the context of the agreement reached with the Ch'ing government, however, they were entitled to collect taxes and rents and the manner in which they did so could not, I think, be labeled wholesale exploitation. One must remember that the Colonial Office did not assume control of the Territory with the intention of making a profit and for many years the Treasury had to supply a large subsidy simply to cover administrative expenses at Weihaiwei. See "Ying-kuo ch'iang-tsu Wei-hai-wei yü ch'i chih-min chi-kou ti chien-li," in S<sup>MC</sup>STL, 3:171; and "Shan-tung shih-pao so tsai Ying chan



Wei-hai tzu-liao," materials originally published in the Shantung shih-pao, in STCTSTL, 3:176.

<sup>143</sup>These figures are taken from Annual Reports for 1901-1913.

<sup>144</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report, 1904.

<sup>145</sup>CO 873/239, Trade Report, 1906; and CO 873/219, Petition from Weihaiwei merchants to Lockhart, 28 March 1906.

<sup>146</sup>It is interesting that the German administrators at Kiaochow, through systematic new methods of tax collection, were able to obtain three times the revenue that their Chinese predecessors had without increasing the rate of taxation. See Schrecker, Imperialism, p. 214.

<sup>147</sup>For a discussion of the severe financial difficulties faced by late Ch'ing magistrates, see Wang Yeh-chien, Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750-1911 (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), pp. 54-6; and Ch'u, Local Government, pp. 22-32.

<sup>148</sup>Wang, Land Taxation, p. 37.

<sup>149</sup>CO 521/10, Minute on "Estimates 1908-9," 16 October 1907.

<sup>150</sup>Evelyn S. Rawski, Education and Popular Literacy in Ch'ing China (Ann Arbor, 1979), p. 33.

<sup>151</sup>Ibid., ch. 2. See also Liao T'ai-ch'u, "Rural Education in Transition: A Study of Old-Fashioned Chinese Schools (Szu-Shu) in Shantung and Szechwan," Yenching Journal of Social Studies, 4:2 (1949):19-67.

<sup>152</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902, section 11, "Education."

<sup>153</sup>CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 72 (Eastern), p. 63.

<sup>154</sup>Ibid.

<sup>155</sup>CO 521/2, Dorward to Colonial Office, 16 July 1901.

<sup>156</sup>Ibid.

<sup>157</sup>CO 521/2, Foreign Office to Satow, 3 October 1901.

<sup>158</sup>CO 521/3, Confidential letter from Lockhart to Colonial Office, 1 September 1902.

<sup>159</sup>CO 873/4, Enclosure in Dorward to MacDonald, 12 June 1900.

<sup>160</sup>See, for example, Buck, Urban Change, p. 42 and Schrecker, Imperialism, p. 250.

<sup>161</sup>CO 521/4, James Stewart Lockhart, "Confidential Report of a Journey in the Province of Shantung," 16 June 1903. (Also published in CO 882/6, as Confidential Print No. 84.)

<sup>162</sup>Ibid.

<sup>163</sup>Lockhart Papers, vol. 3, clippings from Shan-tung kuan-pao, 21, 23 and 25 May 1906; and Shan-tung jih-pao (no date).

<sup>164</sup>Lockhart Papers, vol. 44, clipping from Ching-hua jih-pao, no. 329 (no date).

<sup>165</sup>Buck, Urban Change, pp. 43-44.

<sup>166</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 24, "Visit of Yüan Shu-hsun, Governor, to Weihaiwei, 1908," translation of speech delivered 23 October 1908.

<sup>167</sup>Cabinet Papers 17/65, "China and Weihaiwei," 7 October 1905.

<sup>168</sup>Cabinet Papers 17/65, "China and Weihaiwei: Memorandum Respecting Weihaiwei," 2 November 1905. See also, Nish, "Japan and China," p. 33.

<sup>169</sup>FO 881, Confidential Print No. 10427, "Memorandum Regarding Weihaiwei," January 1907, pp. 1-4. Jordan's view, as noted here, is especially interesting. He was of the opinion that Britain should not in any way encourage the growing "chauvinist movement" inside China since this could only lead to further difficulties for foreigners there.

<sup>170</sup>Ibid., pp. 4-5. See also, Lockhart Papers, Box 3, Newspaper Clippings.

<sup>171</sup>CO 873/219, Petition from merchants to Lockhart, 24 March 1906; and Lockhart to merchants, 3 July 1906.

## Chapter 3

## Economic and Social Developments at Weihaiwei

## During the Last Years of the Ch'ing

Improvements in Transportation

Although the British were at first primarily interested in Weihaiwei as a naval base and gave clear assurances to Germany that they did not intend to contend her interests in Shantung, it soon became clear that the Colonial Office would welcome any economic developments which did not require much government expenditure and might help to offset administrative costs.<sup>1</sup> It was also recognized, however, that any such developments would depend to a very large extent on improvements in Weihaiwei's still quite primitive transportation network. Thus, from the beginning of their administration of the leasehold, the British gave road construction and maintenance a high priority. As early as 1902, for example, it was reported that the Territory had a total of forty miles of new or improved roads. Moreover, since the area was criss-crossed by numerous small streams it was also necessary to construct many new bridges and to constantly repair the entire network.<sup>2</sup>

Local villagers warmly welcomed these public works projects, as did foreign travelers who visited the leasehold.<sup>3</sup> One such traveler observed in 1906, for example, that the road leading from Chefoo to the Weihaiwei border was a mere track in places and impossible for carts to traverse. Only pack animals were to be seen carrying goods to and from the treaty port. In sharp contrast was the new territorial road which he described as follows: "The last ten miles of road

into Wei-hai Wei are most excellent going, as smooth as a billiard table, with not a single rut or loose stone to be found on it . . . The last seven miles were even marked by mile-stones."<sup>4</sup> Likewise, when this man made his way southward to Wen-teng hsien he again found the territorial road to be excellent with new stone bridges constructed over all streams. Once over the border, however, he found himself back on a hilly track where there was little traffic aside from a few mules and wheelbarrows. In fact, he found conditions equally primitive throughout eastern Shantung all the way to Tsingtao.

One can readily understand, then, why cart traffic which had been virtually unknown in Weihaiwei prior to 1898 increased dramatically during the first decade of British administration and by 1909 was regarded as commonplace.<sup>5</sup> So great was the expansion of this traffic, in fact, that the British were soon required to budget an even greater proportion of funds toward road maintenance.<sup>6</sup> The inhabitants of Weihaiwei were so pleased with their new roads that in 1909 some of them addressed a petition to the commissioner urging that the Chinese authorities be requested to construct cart roads between Weihaiwei, Jung-ch'eng-hsien, Wen-teng-hsien, and Ning-hai. Although the governor of Shantung expressed approval of the idea, funds were lacking and Lockhart thought the project would be delayed.<sup>7</sup> The district officer, however, suspected that the provincial authorities were actually not eager to aid Weihaiwei's economic development when it might be at Chefoo's expense.<sup>8</sup>

Another important change occurred in transportation facilities at Weihaiwei with the establishment of a regular

steamer link between Port Edward, Shanghai, and Tientsin which meant reliable mail, freight, and passenger services for the leasehold. The number of steam vessels calling at Weihaiwei rose from 146 in 1902 to 567 in 1909 and junk traffic also increased.<sup>9</sup> There was a corresponding increase in the export of native produce such as peanuts and salt fish and an increase in the import of items such as foreign kerosene oil, cotton yarn, sugar, and dyes. In 1902 only 151,809 tons of freight had been carried in and out of Weihaiwei by steamer, but in 1909 this figure had risen to 481,291 tons.<sup>10</sup> In addition, the increase of exports handled by steamers docking at Port Edward led several agents working for shipping and banking firms to move their headquarters from the island to the mainland. Chinese merchants also discovered that by utilizing Port Edward's pier facilities they could eliminate the need for lighters conveying goods across the harbor from the island and thus lower their expenses.<sup>11</sup>

Although the British had as early as 1902 seen the need for new sea walls and stone piers at both Liu-kung Tao and Port Edward, they decided to wait to see how much trade would develop at Weihaiwei before considering the construction of a pier in deep water off the mainland for the unloading of steamers.<sup>12</sup> As we shall see in Chapter 5, the volume of trade at Weihaiwei had increased to such an extent by 1915 that the new pier did indeed become a necessity.

The ground nut industry is an especially important example of how improved roads and steamer services contributed to economic growth at Weihaiwei. In fact, this commodity became the Territory's largest export product as can be seen from Table 2.

Table 2  
Ground Nut Exports, 1902-1910<sup>13</sup>

<u>Year</u>	<u>Ground Nuts (piculs)</u>	<u>Ground Nut Seeds (piculs)</u>
1902	918	--
1903	10,847	475
1904	9,832	2,799
1905	5,219	2,877
1906	24,168	13,505
1907	12,294	25,320
1908	15,939	60,753
1909	39,600	100,700
1910	6,893	141,293

The fluctuations from year to year, of course, were the result of weather conditions and the size of the nut crop.<sup>14</sup>

It is apparent from the figures, though, that the Chinese quickly took advantage of Weihaiwei's free port status and an expanding European market to develop the trade in this item.<sup>15</sup>

It should also be noted that the improvement in Weihaiwei's transport links with the outside world after 1898 helped local merchants in other ways. The British fleet, for example, regularly called there during the summer months and stimulated a considerable amount of business. In addition, the leasehold's fine climate also gained a reputation for itself among the foreign community throughout China and Weihaiwei soon became a popular resort with hotel and other rented summer accommodation facilities.<sup>16</sup>

#### The Search for Commercial Opportunities

Although the British enjoyed some success in their efforts to develop Weihaiwei, they were disappointed in a number of projects. Commissioner Dorward, for example, wrote

to the Colonial Office in 1901 that "the want of any capitalists" was hampering his attempts to promote the sale of locally-made silk in America and the establishment of a bean oil factory. The uncertainty over British intentions to remain at Weihaiwei discouraged both Chinese and Western businessmen for a time from investing in the area.<sup>17</sup>

There was considerable optimism in 1902, however, that James Stewart Lockhart, with his many contacts in Hong Kong and experience of the Chinese business world, would be well equipped to overcome some of Weihaiwei's handicaps. Indeed, Lockhart regarded this task as among his highest priorities and gave it much attention. His efforts were greatly assisted in 1903 when the Chinese government decided to continue to treat Weihaiwei as a foreign port where no duties would be charged on goods imported. In addition, there were to be refunds on foreign and native goods which had been taxed elsewhere in China.<sup>18</sup> This gave Weihaiwei a considerable advantage over Chefoo and Tsingtao where various types of duties were levied.<sup>19</sup> It remained to be seen, however, whether the leasehold could actually attract trade away from the traditional outlet at Chefoo or the rapidly developing and well-located German port at Tsingtao.

In his attempt to determine which products offered Weihaiwei the best possibility for success, Lockhart dispatched Captain Johnson of the Chinese Regiment and the Reverend H. J. Brown, a local missionary, to make a tour of the Territory in July 1902 to consult with village headmen on the subject. They learned that at that time all of Weihaiwei's surplus produce was sent to Chefoo, but it would be marketed in the Territory if it was thought possible to sell it there.<sup>20</sup>

It was noted, for example, that the wild silk cocoons sent to Chefoo could be processed in Weihaiwei if capital could be attracted for investment in a filature as there were only a very few looms then operating in the Territory.<sup>21</sup>

Another possible commodity was bean oil. The commissioner's two agents learned that twenty years earlier there had been more than ten bean oil and bean cake factories in the walled town of Weihai and Ma-t'ou, but that frequent losses at sea of junks which brought the beans from Manchuria gradually forced the various owners out of business.<sup>22</sup> Although Lockhart reasoned that as a free port Weihaiwei should be able to expand this trade, there was still the problem of competing with Chefoo and Newchang for a supply of Manchurian beans.<sup>23</sup> Another major stumbling block was to convince a local man to invest his money in a factory which would not show a profit for at least a year and perhaps longer. Lockhart was warned in one report that merchants in North China had traditionally preferred to open small establishments with reasonably secure profits rather than to risk all of their capital in the hope of great profits in the future.<sup>24</sup>

One industry which seemed to offer brighter prospects in terms of supply and smaller operating costs was salt production. Although the export of this product had previously been banned at Weihaiwei in order to ensure a sufficient supply for local fishermen, Lockhart decided to allow exports if there proved to be enough salt and to refrain from taxing it as well.<sup>25</sup> In spite of these measures, however, there was little growth in salt production for many years.

Vermicelli made from beans was another commodity which was widely produced in eastern Shantung and exported through



Chefoo. Here again, though, there was the difficulty of bean supplies and the establishment of a factory to compete with the Chefoo trade. Similarly, with the manufacture of strawbraid it was feared there was little chance of attracting the industry away from the districts in which it had traditionally existed.<sup>26</sup>

For a time tobacco-growing seemed to offer commercial possibilities at Weihaiwei. In 1904 the British and American Tobacco Company was experiencing difficulties with Chinese customs officials at Shanghai in trying to import tobacco to manufacture cigarettes and had also been forced out of Japan when the industry became a government monopoly there. It was hoped, therefore, that the company might be persuaded by Weihaiwei's supply of cheap labor and excellent climate to consider relocating, especially if the British government offered assurances that they intended to retain the leasehold.<sup>27</sup> It was not until 1913, however, that the firm did finally make some tentative efforts to encourage local farmers to grow tobacco and met with little success.<sup>28</sup>

In 1898 there had been considerable excitement over the prospects for mineral development in the Territory, especially of gold. By 1902 Lockhart had granted several prospecting licenses and a firm known as the Weihaiwei Gold Mining Company with a capital outlay of \$600,000 was seeking to attract investors in Shanghai.<sup>29</sup> There was even concern in 1903 that the Germans might seek to claim mining rights within Weihaiwei. One Foreign Office official actually hoped that they would so that the British would have an opportunity to withdraw their pledge not to construct a railway connecting the leasehold with the rest of Shantung.<sup>30</sup> The Germans

never did so, however, and the mining efforts at Weihaiwei were largely a failure.

Commissioner Lockhart himself proposed a trip to Hong Kong in 1903 to make personal contact with those he thought might be persuaded to invest in Weihaiwei. It is significant that the Colonial Office agreed to pay the expenses for his journey but cautioned him as follows: "You will of course be careful not to involve the Government in any responsibility towards persons who may by your representations be led to invest capital in Weihaiwei."<sup>31</sup> Lockhart's superiors would have been happy for any investment which led to additional government revenue for Weihaiwei but were not prepared to assume responsibility for business failures which might also occur and require compensation.

So serious was the commissioner in his efforts to foster economic development in the leasehold, however, that in 1904 he acquired the services of a trained fruit-grower to experiment with agricultural production. Although this expert viewed the soil and climate as excellent for certain varieties of fruit and successfully cultivated them in government orchards, it proved impossible to attract sufficient capital, either Chinese or foreign, for investment in the scheme and the horticulturalist returned to England in 1908. One worthwhile benefit of this project, though, was the introduction of new trees on the bare hills around Weihaiwei. Prisoners at the jail continued to plant them in large numbers on the island even after the Englishman left, thus greatly aiding soil conservation and the appearance of the area.<sup>32</sup> Various headmen also exhibited interest in fruit-growing, although it was to be some time before the project became a commercial

success. It proved extremely difficult to persuade the average local farmer to innovate unless the material advantages were immediately apparent to him and large-scale fruit marketing clearly involved considerable investments of time, capital, and professional advice.

Another project which seemed somewhat less demanding of local expertise was the construction of bonded warehouses which were in short supply at all of China's treaty ports. Weihaiwei's duty-free status seemed to make it a logical place for storing such items as coal, kerosene, oil, yarn, staple piece-goods, and even opium. There were considerable obstacles to this plan, however, including the expense of erecting the buildings, the necessity of trading firms employing an agent to clear goods at the port, and the remoteness of the area which might discourage dealers from wanting to take delivery there.<sup>33</sup> In 1912 Commissioner Lockhart wrote of his disappointment that this proposal had never materialized.<sup>34</sup>

One unforeseen development which did contribute to economic growth for a time in Weihaiwei, however, was emigration of Chinese workers to South Africa and Vladivostock. In 1904 an emigration depot was constructed in the leasehold with accommodation for two thousand men en route to the gold mines in South Africa.<sup>35</sup> Although the depot was eventually moved to Chefoo, its temporary presence at Weihaiwei meant that the laborers were at least spending money in the Territory before departing. In addition, those who were residents of Weihaiwei sent back some of their earnings to their families and this money was then reinvested locally. Emigration to Vladivostock in 1907, however, was less successful as many who went there

were unable to find work.<sup>36</sup> One consequence of foreign remittances from overseas laborers was a steady increase in the value of agricultural property at Weihaiwei and the redemption of mortgaged land. One observer felt, however, that this manifestation of prosperity was actually a sign of economic backwardness since Weihaiwei's conservative farmers chose only to invest their money in land and not to risk it in modern commercial ventures.<sup>37</sup>

During the years 1898 to 1910 there was no economic boom at Weihaiwei, but there was gradual and relatively steady growth. Trade figures showed considerable improvement and were aided by British efforts to build roads and develop shipping facilities. As trade expanded in the towns of the leasehold there was a need for modern banking facilities. In addition to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, the Imperial Bank of China, and the Russo-Chinese Bank which all had offices in Chefoo,<sup>38</sup> there were shops in the Territory itself which began to issue their own promissory notes around 1904 to facilitate the ground nut business. This system was considerably more convenient than carrying around heavy coins but it led to another problem. In 1907 these shops had issued more notes than they could cover with cash and it became necessary for a newly-organized branch of the Chefoo Chamber of Commerce operating in the walled town of Weihai to provide security for them.<sup>39</sup>

There were other difficulties at Weihaiwei around this time, as in Shantung generally, with the currency system. In 1906 there was an enormous increase in the production of copper coins which dramatically lowered their value and caused considerable losses to individuals.<sup>40</sup> In fact, the value of

copper cash fell to the point where the British at Weihaiwei decided to collect the land tax in silver. Apparently this was done without causing any local hardship.<sup>41</sup> By 1909 the entire Shantung provincial currency system had become unstable as a great deal of paper money was issued by banks and provincial authorities to supplement revenue sources, often without adequate metallic reserves.<sup>42</sup> Under British administration Weihaiwei was somewhat protected from this phenomenon. In 1907, for example, as non-secured promissory notes began to circulate in the Territory, Commissioner Lockhart took steps to regulate them.<sup>43</sup>

Although not spectacular, there was enough commercial development at Weihaiwei during the early years of the British occupation to attract the attention of Shantung's Governor Sun Pao-ch'i. In his search for additional funds to promote development efforts in the province, he proposed that, in return for abolishing likin charges in Shantung, Chinese customs houses be established at Weihaiwei, Chefoo, and Tsingtao to collect a  $2\frac{1}{2}$  percent surtax on foreign imports and native exports.<sup>44</sup> Though the Maritime Customs Commissioner at Tsingtao was in favor of this proposal, Weihaiwei's Commissioner Lockhart was opposed unless it could be used as a means of securing the right for Britain to retain the leasehold indefinitely.<sup>45</sup> In the end, the governor's plan was rejected by the British and Weihaiwei continued to enjoy its advantageous duty-free status.<sup>46</sup> Since the leasehold was handicapped through geographic location, lack of rail links, few natural resources, an absence of local capital, and the relative indifference of the British Colonial Office, this one competitive advantage was indeed crucial

to its economic growth.

### Changes in Education

Along with economic development, Weihaiwei experienced a certain amount of social change as a result of the British presence. As early as 1901, for example, the government began to take an interest in education. Colonel Dorward remarked in that year that schools should be established in villages where there were none in order that "cleanliness, tidiness, good manners, and good attendance" could be inculcated.<sup>47</sup> He estimated that 80 percent of the natives of the Territory were illiterate and more than half the villages had no schools. In Dorward's opinion, cheap labor was Weihaiwei's chief resource and he thought it would be sensible, therefore, to educate workers for future industries. In 1901 the commissioner recommended that matching government grants be made whenever private funds were raised for village schools. He also thought that scholarships should be provided for the destitute and that headmen and teachers should be rewarded for collecting groups of students.<sup>48</sup> Dorward was replaced in December 1901 by a new commissioner, however, and never had the opportunity to implement his proposals.

In 1902 the Anglican missionary at Weihaiwei established an Anglo-Chinese School at Port Edward with nine students. As he observed: "The scholars are mostly lads belonging to tradesmen and well-to-do families resident in the Territory, which at once secures to us a connection with some of the best people in Weihaiwei . . ."<sup>49</sup> Commissioner Lockhart decided that rather than supporting village schools as Dorward had suggested, it would be better for the government to en-

courage the teaching of English and, for the present at least, leave the local people to provide for their own "native schools" as they had always done. He noted that most of the important villages already had schools anyway.<sup>50</sup> Thus, he chose to provide three-year scholarships for five boys to attend the new Anglican school with preference to be given to the poor and selection to be made in a competitive examination. By 1903 attendance at this school had risen to twenty-five. Along with courses in Chinese, English was also taught, as well as an advanced course in letter-writing, commercial correspondence, and book-keeping.<sup>51</sup>

Lockhart held quite a practical view of education in Weihaiwei, attempting in 1903, for example, to establish a program for training Chinese in Western medicine. Unfortunately, the program was designed in such a way as to exclude virtually anyone in the Territory from participating. It was intended to last for five years during which time the students would have to provide their own maintenance and upon graduation promise to work for the government or the local hospital for a further three years.<sup>52</sup> When it became clear that this would cause extreme financial hardship for any family whose son came forward, Lockhart modified his proposal, suggesting that only two medical apprentices be trained instead.<sup>53</sup> It proved impossible to attract more than one boy, however, with sufficient English and intelligence to profit from the training.

In 1904 the government decided to establish its own tuition-free school for Chinese boys at Port Edward in which both English and Chinese would be taught.<sup>54</sup> By 1905 it had attracted twenty-one students.<sup>55</sup> Lockhart was surprised,

however, that attendance figures were not higher. When the British district officer inquired as to the reasons for this some of the leading Chinese merchants told him that people were afraid their children might be forced to become Christians if they enrolled. Further inquiry revealed that attendance at religious services was mandatory at the Anglican school which was partially government sponsored.<sup>56</sup> In 1906 Lockhart, therefore, decided to disassociate the government from the latter institution by transferring scholarship funds to the new free school and in September of that year enrollments there had risen to fifty-six.<sup>57</sup>

In 1905 the traditional Chinese examination system was abolished by imperial decree and the commissioner was concerned that the school system in the leased territory be brought more closely into line with changes taking place in neighboring Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien. He wanted to ensure that local students could continue their education outside Weihaiwei if they desired and thus requested that a survey be made to ascertain the availability of educational facilities in the Territory as well as the level of interest in their further development.<sup>58</sup> The survey revealed that the Territory actually contained 287 village schools with 3,276 pupils.<sup>59</sup> In 1911 the population of boys and girls between the ages of 6 and 13 was roughly 26,000. Thus, if one includes the 123 pupils attending schools in Port Edward and on the island in 1906, this means that roughly 13 percent of school-age children in the Territory in that year were actually being educated.<sup>60</sup>

The survey also showed that while people theoretically were in favor of educational improvements, they were quite



reluctant to pay more taxes to provide for them. The exception to this was a few headmen who were eager to promote higher education in their own villages. As the British official carrying out the survey observed, however: ". . . rumour has it that their chief object is to gain face (and possibly gain) and that the people generally do not care and cannot afford to care about the advantages of higher education."<sup>61</sup> One headman even went so far as to petition the commissioner to assist the new school he had already established in his village with seventeen students, nine of whom were studying English. The headman's proposal was for far-reaching changes in education at Weihaiwei which would be financed either by the allocation of temple funds or a new house tax.<sup>62</sup> In accordance with his general policy of soliciting the views of district headmen, Commissioner Lockhart decided to first circulate the petition among them before making a recommendation on educational policy in the Territory.

Local reactions to the proposal were interesting. Most headmen felt, as noted above, that the people would not support new schools since they saw no immediate gain for themselves in education. Nor, it was observed, did young people have enough time to spend studying when their help was needed at home.<sup>63</sup> The district officer, Reginald Johnston, was largely in sympathy with this view and felt that no general program of education was needed in the Territory as the people were too poor to make use of it and even if they did would not be able to find appropriate jobs locally anyway. He thought it best to teach them Chinese rather than English and to simply develop one secondary school at Port Edward. Village schools could be aided by a tax on theatricals and

the best teachers and students could receive some sort of government recognition.<sup>64</sup> He was particularly opposed to the idea of diverting funds derived from temple lands to support schools, stating that this would deprive the local priests of their only source of income as well as lead to a good deal of litigation and unrest.<sup>65</sup> In Johnston's opinion, the maximum income which could be derived from this source would be \$1,000 and it seems his estimate was probably not far wrong. According to a 1906 report, the Territory contained a total of 62 temples supported by 1,765 mou of land.<sup>66</sup>

In deciding not to use funds derived from temple lands to maintain local schools, the British authorities took a different position from some of the new educational promotion officers operating at the hsien level elsewhere in China as a result of the educational reform movement which began in late 1905. Buck has noted that: "The first task of educational promotion officers was to convert community property such as academies, temples, and endowed schools (i-hstueh) into property of the state school system."<sup>67</sup> Such changes became common after 1906 and Buck thinks marked a major turning point in the educational modernization of China since many of the nation's local "gentry" leaders thereby signified their willingness to let the state assume the responsibility of supporting local schools. Yet the change was in some ways only symbolic since the actual financing of schools at the hsien level and below still remained dependent on local resources, not official funds. The chief source of revenue was local surtaxes which could only be levied if local leaders, including the new educational promotion officers, were willing to do so.<sup>68</sup> In this respect, as we have seen, the

situation was not so different at Weihaiwei. Operating on a very slender budget, the British administrators decided to support the Government Free School at Port Edward but offered only limited aid to traditional village educational institutions. The local people themselves, with only a few exceptions, felt they did not have the resources to improve their schools and usually did not even see the need for such improvements.

Thus, the British very deliberately chose to maintain the traditional way of life at Weihaiwei by emphasizing a classical Chinese education in village schools rather than introducing a more modern curriculum incorporating English and other Western subjects. One district officer noted that most villagers were illiterate and unable to deal with everyday sorts of documents such as market accounts, adoption deeds, mortgages, sales of land, and commercial agreements, depending on friends or the local school teacher to help them when necessary. He thought, therefore, that a basic level of literacy in Chinese would be extremely useful for them, especially when they were involved in litigation. What they did not need was the modern education being adopted elsewhere in China. This same officer even felt too much education would lead to discontent.<sup>69</sup> Obviously, this view carried with it very definite political implications. The new educational program which had been proposed by the Chinese central government, on the other hand, recommended that each school include English in its curriculum. As Buck has noted, however, in these early years of the twentieth century throughout China "the general school system was still composed largely of small schools that were modern in name only."<sup>70</sup>

It should perhaps also be mentioned that in Weihaiwei, as elsewhere in China, there was a sharp contrast between the kind of traditional education favored in the rural areas and the more modern curriculum available in Port Edward, the only town of significant size. Evelyn Rawski suggests that the popularity of these traditional schools in many areas as late as 1949 indicates the rejection by China's villagers of a Western-based educational system which did not meet their needs or correspond with their values.<sup>71</sup> Rather than attempting to radically change those values, the British preferred to maintain the status quo in Weihaiwei's village schools in line with their own resources and local preference.

All of Weihaiwei's schools, until 1907, were intended for boys as was true in other parts of China. By 1907, however, a new anti-foot-binding society, the Tien Tsu Hui, made up of local influential citizens, had plans to establish a girls' school in Port Edward which would teach the reading and writing of Chinese, needlework, and other domestic skills, but not English. The school was to be supported by voluntary contributions and the government was asked to assist by providing a building. The society planned to limit enrollments to twenty "strong and healthy girls" who would be charged no tuition fees for the three-year course but would be required to buy their own books and to unbind their feet. Lockhart decided to encourage this effort by providing a rent-free building.<sup>72</sup> In 1909 the government granted further assistance by meeting half of the school's operating expenses, and in 1910 Lockhart reported that the new institution had had another good year.<sup>73</sup>

It is interesting that the establishment of this school at Weihaiwei in 1907 occurred just as the Chinese central government was beginning to provide schools for girls elsewhere in China.<sup>74</sup> By 1909 there were three schools for Chinese girls at Weihaiwei. In addition to the one mentioned above, there was also a mission school where the unbinding of feet was compulsory, and a smaller private girls' school. In 1911 the largest girls' school in the leasehold was the mission "Native Girls' Workroom" with thirty-five students who were taught reading, writing, mathematics, geography, lace-making, needlework, and Christian doctrine. The Chinese-run anti-foot-binding school had by this time grown to twenty-five students.<sup>75</sup>

It should also be noted that the anti-foot-binding society itself achieved a small measure of success with a membership in 1907 of fifty people. Unfortunately, however, except for some of the pupils at the local school, the majority of these members were natives of other parts of China (mainly Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Kwangtung). The group did make an effort to inform local people of its views, though, by distributing literature and attempting to get village headmen to join the organization. They also made it known that a government ban on foot-binding would be welcomed by them, but Lockhart decided instead to simply exhort villagers about the evils of the custom in the hope that it would gradually die out.<sup>76</sup>

In the meantime, interest continued to grow in the Government Free School at Port Edward and by 1911 it had sixty students.<sup>77</sup> The curriculum was organized along the lines of Chinese government standards so that it would be

possible for graduates to enter a Chinese upper middle school. The British administrators at Weihaiwei were pleased, however, that there was no tendency among the students at this school to form societies for the purpose of "dictating" to their teachers. Lockhart also noted:

There is undoubtedly a keen demand among the people for English education but it is not desirable to encourage this too much and to create thereby a class of half-educated Babus who disdain the homely trades of their fathers and whose sole ambition is to fill a government post.<sup>78</sup>

Thus, government aid to education at Weihaiwei remained very limited. Only the free school in Port Edward was wholly subsidized and even here it was noted that salaries were too low to attract good teachers.<sup>79</sup> There were a few other private schools for Chinese students at Port Edward, as has been mentioned, and two schools for European boys and girls. In the countryside, however, the only real improvements to village schools were the establishment of a book depository to supply books at cost price and the raising of a small amount of revenue, beginning in 1910, through a tax on theatricals.<sup>80</sup> All of the large villages maintained schools as did groups of smaller villages and in 1910 they were attended by a small "though gradually increasing proportion of the village children."<sup>81</sup> In only a few of these schools were such new subjects as arithmetic or geography taught. Rote memorization of Confucian texts remained the rule for most, and the teachers were apparently neither very learned nor hardworking which is not surprising since they were able to earn only a meager living at their profession.<sup>82</sup> As one district officer noted with respect to education at this time: ". . . Weihaiwei and the neighbouring regions have

more in common with the Old China that is passing away than with the New China that is coming and to come."<sup>83</sup> And, in the eyes of the government, this was not necessarily a bad situation.

### Public Health

As has been frequently mentioned, one of Weihaiwei's chief assets was its extremely healthy climate. The earliest British observers noted that despite poverty conditions there was a remarkable absence of disease in the area.<sup>84</sup> In 1902 it was noted that the leasehold had managed to escape the epidemics which were prevalent in surrounding areas and it was free from both enteric and malarial fever.<sup>85</sup> The Admiralty was, therefore, delighted to make use of Weihaiwei as a sanatorium and summer recreation area for the fleet. Yet there was room for improvement in matters of public health and the earliest British colonial administrators soon took steps in that direction.

Unlike the Germans at Kiaochow who compelled the Chinese residents of Tsingtao to live in a newly-constructed village separate from the European quarter,<sup>86</sup> the British, with a much smaller European population and budget at Weihaiwei, at first simply chose to implement new sanitary regulations and replace those buildings which were considered beyond repair on the island and in Port Edward.<sup>87</sup> In addition, a sanitation officer made regular inspections of public buildings, gutters were constructed, and latrines were frequently cleaned and whitewashed. In 1902 a new abattoir was erected on Liu-kung Tao as well as a market in Port Edward, while in 1909 two new dairies were built on the island and efforts were underway to get wells in Port Edward covered

and fitted with pumps.<sup>88</sup>

Medical facilities available in the leasehold were also gradually improved. By 1902 there were free hospitals for Chinese on the island and at Port Edward, and in 1904 a total of over 5,700 patients were treated at the two institutions.<sup>89</sup> A free, voluntary smallpox vaccination program was also inaugurated and over 7,500 people were innoculated in 1905 in the hospitals and by vaccinators going from village to village in the rural areas. In spite of an outbreak of the disease in the walled town during that year, there were no cases reported in the Territory itself. It was decided, however, not to make vaccinations compulsory, but rather to try to persuade the local people of their beneficial results and thus gradually increase the numbers of those protected from the disease.<sup>90</sup> In 1911 a further improvement was made in medical facilities with the establishment of another free hospital in the rural area beyond Port Edward.<sup>91</sup> A serious public health problem arose in 1911 with the outbreak of plague at Chefoo and a highly effective campaign was launched to prevent its spreading into the leased territory. In addition to other measures, every effort was made to keep outsiders from entering Weihaiwei with guards and village headmen posted along the borders.<sup>92</sup>

Steps were also taken at Weihaiwei to improve public health education. As suicides, especially among women, continued to be a problem the government issued instructions to village headmen on how to administer first aid.<sup>93</sup> In 1909 Commissioner Lockhart also had free copies of a specially printed text on hygiene distributed in the villages and local teachers were told to give instruction on the subject in the



schools.<sup>94</sup>

In summarizing the economic and social effects which the British administration had at Weihaiwei during its first decade there, one must conclude that the area was a considerably different place in 1910 from what it had been in 1898. Perhaps the most notable improvement was in transport facilities which, in addition to its duty-free status, greatly aided Weihaiwei's economic growth. As we have seen, efforts to introduce new agricultural products and industries to the leasehold were somewhat unsuccessful due largely to traditional Chinese conservatism, lack of investment capital, and the uncertainty over British intentions to remain at Weihaiwei.

Social change was similarly less than dramatic, although one can cite improvements in standards of public health and educational opportunities as tangible benefits derived from the foreign presence. Perhaps the most important contribution which the British made at Weihaiwei during their first decade there, however, was to provide a stable and relatively efficient administration of the area based largely on existing village institutions. Those social and economic changes which occurred were, therefore, gradual and not disruptive of the quiet, traditional life for which Weihaiwei was noted. As we shall see, however, the ability of the British to maintain the peace in the leasehold was to be repeatedly challenged during the remaining years of their tenure there as even this small backwater of rural China was soon caught up in a series of violent political events with far-reaching consequences.

Notes to Chapter 3

<sup>1</sup>FO 881, Confidential Print No. 8384, J. W. Jamieson, "Memorandum Regarding the Future Prospects of the Leased Territory of Wei-hai Wei as a Commercial Centre, in Relation to the German Dependency of Kiao-chou and the Province of Shantung in General," November 1904.

<sup>2</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902, Section 6, Public Works.

<sup>3</sup>CO 521/11, Annual Report, 1909.

<sup>4</sup>Parliamentary Papers, "Report of Mr. W. J. Garnet of a Journey through the Provinces of Shantung and Kiangsu," 99 (June 1907):4.

<sup>5</sup>CO 873/592, Departmental Reports, 1909.

<sup>6</sup>CO 521/11, Annual Report, 1909. For a detailed history of road construction at Weihaiwei through early 1914, see CO 873/425, Whittaker to Lockhart, "History of Roadmaking in the Territory," 6 April 1914.

<sup>7</sup>CO 521/11, Annual Report, 1909.

<sup>8</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 94.

<sup>9</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902; and CO 521/11, Annual Report, 1909.

<sup>10</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902; and CO 873/292, Departmental Reports, 1909.

<sup>11</sup>CO 521/11, Annual Report, 1909.

<sup>12</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902.

<sup>13</sup>These figures are taken from the following documents: CO 873/163, Annual Report, 1904; CO 873/220, Trade Report, 1905; CO 521/10, Annual Report, 1906; CO 521/11, Annual Report, 1909; and CO 521/12, Annual Report, 1910.

<sup>14</sup>There is an additional factor which accounts for some of the fluctuation in these figures. After 1909 it was decided to take advantage of European demand for ground nut seeds. The freight costs were much lower for this lighter commodity and Europeans were not interested in buying the nut shells, so the Chinese exporters simply sold them the seeds. See CO 521/2, Annual Report, 1912.

<sup>15</sup>It should be noted that the ground nut industry was not entirely new to the area around Weihaiwei. A missionary living in the nearby coastal town of Shih-tao in Jung-ch'eng hsien informed Captain Johnson that in 1900 there had been quite a boom in the trade and most of the farmers grew large quantities of peanuts which in turn led to insufficient food supplies. At that point, the Jung-ch'eng magistrate issued a proclamation forbidding farmers to grow peanuts. Johnson

reasoned that Weihaiwei farmers should be encouraged to grow the nuts, however, for even if this was done at the expense of cereals, he thought the profits from the new industry "would more than enable the people to buy imported foodstuffs to compensate." See CO 873/27, Johnson to Lockhart, 26 September 1902.

<sup>16</sup>CO 873/114, Trade Report, 1903; and CO 873/99, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1903.

<sup>17</sup>CO 521/2, Dorward to Colonial Office, 6 and 18 September 1901.

<sup>18</sup>See CO 521/4, Hobson to Lockhart, 30 June 1903; CO 873/81, Lockhart to Oliver, 13 July 1903; CO 873/96, Lockhart to Townley, 16 July 1903; Lockhart Papers, Box 9, Bundle marked "37 letters," Satow to Lockhart, 18 November 1903; CO 521/5, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 14 December 1903; CO 873/109, Annual Report, 1903, "Trade"; and CO 873/114, "Trade Report, 1903," March 1904.

It is interesting that in July 1903 Commissioner Lockhart complained to the British chargé d'affaires in Peking that Weihaiwei was not being treated as a foreign port by the Chinese customs officials in Shanghai. Duty was being charged on goods in transit from Hong Kong to the Territory and customs refunds were not being allowed on re-exported items to Weihaiwei. Lockhart expressed his alarm at this "new and sudden departure" from the former practice of recognizing Weihaiwei's status as a foreign, and therefore duty-free, port. See CO 873/96, Lockhart to Townley, 16 July 1903. The British commissioner of customs at Shanghai meanwhile had written to Lockhart reminding him that: "You will realize that with heavy indemnities to pay China can ill afford to lose any of her sources of revenue." There was obviously a conflict of interest between those British officials serving in the Maritime Customs Service who tended to sympathize with the Chinese view on customs matters (which, of course, also satisfied the foreign governments receiving indemnity payments based on customs revenue) and the view of colonial officials like Lockhart who were trying to encourage trade in their own areas of jurisdiction. See CO 521/4, Hobson to Lockhart, 30 June 1903.

<sup>19</sup>For an analysis of the relative advantage Weihaiwei enjoyed over Chefoo in terms of duty, see FO 881, Confidential Print No. 8284, pp. 3-4. See also CO 521/4, Lockhart Report on Trip to Kiaochow, 26 June, 1903.

<sup>20</sup>CO 873/25, Johnson and Brown to Lockhart, July 1902.

<sup>21</sup>It was also noted, however, that with nineteen filatures already located in Chefoo it would be difficult to induce either workers or capital to move. See FO 881, Confidential Print 8284, p. 2; and CO 873/114, "Trade Report," 1903.

<sup>22</sup>CO 873/25, Johnson and Brown to Lockhart, July 1902.

<sup>23</sup>FO 881, Confidential Print No. 8284, p. 2.

<sup>24</sup>Johnson estimated the cost of establishing a bean oil factory, based on what a former owner told him, as \$1,000 simply for the purchase of plant rollers, cooking pots, mules, etc., in addition to the monthly wages of eight or nine men, maintenance of four mules, and the purchase of beans. The monthly profit, he was told, would only amount to \$180. CO 873/27, Johnson to Lockhart, 22 September 1902.

<sup>25</sup>CO 873/26, Johnson to Lockhart, 24 September 1902; and Lockhart to Johnson, 24 September 1902. This latter letter contains a translation of the original temple inscription of a Sung magistrate from Wen-teng hsien forbidding the export of salt from Weihaiwei. See also CO 873/26, Walters to Lockhart, 22 September 1902.

<sup>26</sup>FO 881, Confidential Print No. 8284, p. 2.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>28</sup>CO 873/378, Annual Report, 1913.

<sup>29</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902.

<sup>30</sup>CO 521/4, Minute by C. P. Lucas, 29 August 1903.

<sup>31</sup>CO 521/5, Colonial Office to Lockhart, 9 May 1903.

<sup>32</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 168; and CO 873/205, Annual Report, 1905. By 1909 over 200,000 trees had been planted on Liu-kung Tao and it was hoped to have the entire island forested by 1912. See CO 521/11, Annual Report, 1909. By 1914 considerably more attention was given to the problem of afforestation on the mainland. Local residents were encouraged to grow government-provided acacia trees and a staff of forestry coolies was employed to plant trees along Weihaiwei's roads and around Port Edward. It proved difficult, however, to ensure that villagers planted their trees properly and then to protect them from those seeking firewood. See CO 873/386, Lockhart to Moss, 20 January 1914; and CO 873/346, Whittaker to District Officer, 12 April 1915.

<sup>33</sup>CO 881, Confidential Print No. 8284, p. 6.

<sup>34</sup>CO 873/359, Annual Report, 1912.

<sup>35</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report, 1904, Appendix VI. For more detailed information on the coolie trade, see also CO 873/103, 121, 125, and 136. CO 873/136 contains a very interesting account of Reginald Johnston's discussions with the governor of Shantung over the regulation of this trade. The governor proposed that two Chinese officials be appointed to look after the coolies' interests in Africa, one permanently based in the Transvaal and one to travel back and forth between China and Africa to make inspections and carry the miners' petitions. See CO 873/136, Johnston to Lockhart, 29 August 1904. Johnston, of course, was eager to ensure that the newly-constructed emigration depot at Weihaiwei be used and that the trade not be diverted to Chefoo. By September, however, the governor expressed dismay at the information he had received in anonymous letters from Singapore

and Saigon that Chinese workers in South Africa were being exploited and subjected to appalling conditions in the mines. It would be valuable to know if these letters emanated from any of the revolutionary groups working among the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia at this time. See CO 873/136, Johnston to Lockhart, 12 September 1904. In any event, the bulk of the coolie traffic was routed through Chefoo, although Weihaiwei did benefit as mentioned from the return flow of miners' wages back into the Territory. See also Peter Richardson, "The Recruiting of Chinese Indentured Labour for the South African Gold Mines, 1903-1908," Journal of African History, 18.1 (1977):85-108.

<sup>36</sup>CO 873/265, Annual Report of Secretary to Government, 1907.

<sup>37</sup>CO 873/265, Annual Report of District Officer, 1907.

<sup>38</sup>CO 873/8, "Introduction of British Dollar into Weihaiwei."

<sup>39</sup>CO 873/61, Johnston to Lockhart, November 1907. Shirley Garrett notes that in 1902 the Ch'ing government had given official encouragement to the establishment of Chinese Chambers of Commerce or shang-hui, but in 1908 they existed in only 31 major cities and in 135 smaller towns. Thus, it would seem that the Weihaiwei-Chefoo area was fairly progressive in this regard. See Shirley S. Garrett, "The Chambers of Commerce and the YMCA," in Mark Elvin and G. William Skinner, eds., The Chinese City Between Two Worlds (Stanford, 1974), p. 218.

<sup>40</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 3, "Instability of Chinese Currency," unidentified newspaper clippings.

<sup>41</sup>CO 873/229, Walter to Lockhart, 14 January 1907.

<sup>42</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 3, "Instability of Chinese Currency."

<sup>43</sup>CO 873/261, entire file "Private Chinese Banks."

<sup>44</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 4, Envelope marked "Confidential Weihaiwei and Hong Kong," Lockhart to Lucas, 1 August 1910.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid. See also CO 521/11, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 7 July 1910.

<sup>46</sup>CO 873/313, Annual Report, 1910, "Customs."

<sup>47</sup>CO 521/2, Dorward to Colonial Office, 21 November 1901.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>H. J. Brown, "Weihaiwei," NCSMQP, 10.4 (October 1902): 18.

<sup>50</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902, Section 11, "Education."

<sup>51</sup>H. J. Brown, "Anglo-Chinese School, Weihaiwei, Report for Year 1902," NCSMQP, 11.3 (July 1903):13-14.

<sup>52</sup>CO 873/84, Commissioner to Walter, 1 August 1903.

<sup>53</sup>CO 873/84, Commissioner to Hitchin, 10 July 1905.

<sup>54</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report, 1904, "Education."

<sup>55</sup>CO 873/239, Annual Report, 1906.

<sup>56</sup>CO 873/199, Johnston to Lockhart, 20 September 1905.

<sup>57</sup>CO 873/213, E. Carpmael, Report on Government School.

<sup>58</sup>CO 873/217, Lockhart to Walter, 17 March 1906.

<sup>59</sup>CO 873/217, Walter to Lockhart, 13 December 1906.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid. See also CO 521/9, Annual Report, 1905; and CO 873/300, Weihaiwei Census, 1911.

<sup>61</sup>CO 873/217, Walter to Lockhart, 13 December 1906.

<sup>62</sup>CO 873/215, "New School at Mengkia Chuang," February 1906. One of the teachers at the school was a former government scholar who had attended the Anglican mission school.

<sup>63</sup>CO 873/217, Walter to Commissioner, 17 December 1906.

<sup>64</sup>CO 873/217, Johnston to Lockhart, 24 March 1907.

<sup>65</sup>CO 873/217, Johnston to Lockhart, 13 December 1906.

<sup>66</sup>CO 873/217, Walter to Lockhart, 17 December 1906.

<sup>67</sup>David D. Buck, "Educational Modernization in Tsinan: 1899-1937," in Elvin and Skinner, eds., The Chinese City, p. 182.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., pp. 182-3.

<sup>69</sup>CO 873/217, Johnston to Lockhart, 14 March 1907.

<sup>70</sup>Buck, "Educational Modernization," p. 192.

<sup>71</sup>Rawski, Education and Popular Literacy, pp. 162-7.

<sup>72</sup>CO 873/263, Petition from Tien Tsu Hui, 12 December 1907.

<sup>73</sup>CO 873/313, Annual Report, 1910, p. 13.

<sup>74</sup>Ida Belle Lewis, The Education of Girls in China (New York, 1919), p. 84. See also E. G. Kemp, The Face of China (London, 1909), p. 25.

<sup>75</sup>CO 521/11, Annual Report, 1909, p. 8; and CO 873/335, Annual Report, 1911, "Education."

<sup>76</sup>CO 873/218, "Report on Tien Tsu Hui," 4 April 1907; and Walter to Lockhart, 20 March 1906. See also CO 873/373, Walter to Lockhart, 16 June 1913. There was also an official Chinese edict against foot-binding in effect at this time which apparently had little impact in the area around Weihaiwei. One traveler in Wen-teng hsien in 1906 noted that local people simply remarked: "'When the Mandarin's wife and daughters cease to bind their feet, we will follow their example.'" See Parliamentary Papers, "Report of Mr. W. J. Garnet," p. 5.

<sup>77</sup>CO 873/335, Annual Report, 1911, "Education."

<sup>78</sup>CO 873/313, Annual Report, 1910, p. 13.

<sup>79</sup>CO 873/335, Annual Report, 1911, "Education."

<sup>80</sup>Ibid. See also CO 521/10, Annual Report, 1907, p. 114.

<sup>81</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 172.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.. See also CO 873/335, Annual Report, 1911, "Education."

<sup>83</sup>Johnston, Lion and Dragon, p. 172.

<sup>84</sup>CO 882/6, Confidential Print No. 75 (Eastern), "A General Report"; CO 873/65, General Report, 1902, Sections 1, 12 and 13; and CO 873/19, Starr, Memorandum, 16 August 1907.

<sup>85</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902, Section 13.

<sup>86</sup>Schrecker, Imperialism, pp. 70 and 215.

<sup>87</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902, Section 13; and CO 873/109, Annual Report, 1903, "Public Works."

<sup>88</sup>CO 873/65, General Report, 1902, Section 6; and CO 521/11, Annual Report, 1909, "Sanitation."

<sup>89</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report, 1904.

<sup>90</sup>Parliamentary Papers, "Report on Wei-Hai-Wei for 1905," 75:940-1. At first, local men objected that vaccinations made their arms sore and prevented them from working, while women did not like to bare their arms to strangers, and children were simply afraid of the whole idea.

<sup>91</sup>CO 873/335, Annual Report, 1911.

<sup>92</sup>CO 873/315, "Plague at Chefoo."

<sup>93</sup>CO 873/280, Annual Report, 1908. Reginald Johnston observed in 1908 that the suicide rate for women would remain high "so long as they are treated as marketable commodities and are allowed to remain totally destitute of education." See CO 873/265, Annual Report of District Officer, 1908, p. 4. The rate was still high in 1911 with 94 cases reported.

Of these 63 were women and 31 men. The major cause for male suicides was said to be debt. See CO 873/335, Annual Report, 1911.

<sup>94</sup>CO 873/282, Lockhart to Secretary to Government,  
7 April 1910.



## Chapter 4

## Weihaiwei and the 1911 Revolution

Shantung Provincial Assembly Election of 1909

British relations with local and provincial authorities evidently remained quite good throughout the last few years of the Ch'ing. Thus, in 1909 when the court called for the election of provincial assemblies as part of its modern reforms, officials were sent to Weihaiwei to register persons qualified to vote. There were 355 such people in the leased Territory,<sup>1</sup> or roughly .24% of the total population. This is a somewhat lower figure than the proportion of electoral voters to population in Shantung as a whole which was .38%. It is also below the average figure for the entire country which was .42% and only slightly above the lowest provincial figure which was Heilungkiang at .23%.<sup>2</sup> Given what we know about the income and educational levels in the area, however, such a small number of electors is not surprising. According to the method of indirect elections which the Ch'ing government had established for the new assemblies, each magisterial district was divided into a number of precincts where the first round of voting took place. A fixed number of delegates was chosen to form an electoral college which then elected Shantung's one hundred assembly members. One of these assemblymen, Yü Ch'ün-hsüan (Yü Yung), was from the leased Territory and was later to figure dramatically in local events surrounding the 1911 revolution.

When Commissioner Lockhart requested information about the 1909 election from his secretary to government, he was furnished with clippings from the North China Daily News describing some of the corrupt practices which took place during

China's first experience with modern democracy. He also noted that the attitude of the Weihaiwei community was generally one of "good-natured indifference."<sup>3</sup> The modern scholar Chang P'eng-yüan states that with the franchise available only to an extremely small portion of the male elite, most Chinese in 1909 were apathetic toward the election. He notes that an even more serious defect was the existence of fairly widespread bribery. In spite of these difficulties, however, the elections did serve to introduce Western practices of self-government to China for the first time.<sup>4</sup>

More significantly, those who were elected to the assemblies found themselves in a new and powerful position to influence local and even national affairs. Buck notes, for example, that in Shantung the "lower gentry," though "still underrepresented in proportion to their numerical strength," made clear gains in both status and power through the provincial assembly. The "upper gentry," too, gained a new access route to political power since by the traditional laws of avoidance they had never before been allowed to serve in their home areas.<sup>5</sup> He goes on to describe how Tsinan became the main setting for provincial political and commercial interests to assert themselves in the last decade of the Ch'ing dynasty. When the revolution took place in 1911 it was the new provincial assemblies which played a leading role in bringing down the Ch'ing regime.<sup>6</sup>

Earlier chapters of this thesis have dealt with the conservatism of Weihaiwei's largely rural population which was perhaps even reinforced by the British preference for traditional administrative methods and their protection of

local village social structure. The foreign presence here certainly did not make Weihaiwei's inhabitants feel any less Chinese nor did the leasehold boundaries cut them off from events taking place in neighboring towns and villages. Although daily life in the Territory continued to be fairly tranquil, however, and the majority of people, as elsewhere, did not participate in the election, there was a growing awareness of national and international affairs, especially among the younger generation. One district officer made the following observation in 1911 concerning boys at the Government Free School in Port Edward:

. . . they have a sturdy patriotism and a tendency to take a keen interest in the political conditions of China. This tendency was visible long before the outbreak of the Revolution. The work of some of the young essayists affords an interesting proof that the educated people of Weihaiwei, while conspicuously law-abiding and submissive to our rule, remain true Chinese at heart, and make no pretense of being sentimentally attached to the British flag.<sup>7</sup>

There is no direct evidence of involvement by Weihaiwei's secondary students in the revolutionary activities which characterized such modern schools as the Shan-tso kung-hsüeh in Tsinan, the Tung-mou kung-hsüeh and the Yü ts'ai hsüeh-t'ang in Chefoo, the Chung-hsüeh t'ang in Teng-chou, and so many others scattered throughout Shantung.<sup>8</sup> Yet one suspects that when political events outside Weihaiwei took a sudden and dramatic revolutionary turn in October 1911, there were many occasions when British officials wondered how long the terms "law-abiding and submissive" would continue to accurately describe the local population.

The Revolution of 1911

Eastern Shantung, and especially Chefoo, played an interesting if somewhat complicated role in the revolution. As one scholar has noted: "In the weeks immediately following the Wu-ch'ang uprising, Tsinan and Chefoo became the two centers of political activity in Shantung. . . . Chefoo was the outpost of militant republicanism, where military men, police, the chamber of commerce, and newspapermen all favored the Republican cause."<sup>9</sup> Thus, the declaration at Tsinan of Shantung's independence from the central government occurred almost simultaneously with the establishment of a revolutionary government at Chefoo on 12 November. The two operations were, however, carried out quite separately. Although nominally under the jurisdiction of Wen-teng hsien, officials in the walled town of Weihai, taking instructions from the republicans at Chefoo, peacefully declared the town also independent of the central government.<sup>10</sup> Neither Wen-teng nor Jung-ch'eng hsien, however, declared their independence until somewhat later.

Meanwhile, the British commissioner at Weihaiwei, in assessing the situation for the Colonial Office, noted that in spite of the events at Chefoo there was no great cause for alarm and all was quiet in the Territory. His one fear was that there might be an influx of refugees from other parts of China suffering from famine and various other hardships. As a precautionary measure, therefore, he stationed guards at several points along the Territorial borders.<sup>11</sup> Soon afterward he was instructed by the Colonial Office to communicate with the revolutionary officials in the surrounding area only so far as was strictly necessary so as to avoid

implying formal recognition of their authority.<sup>12</sup> Lockhart's superiors were most anxious that British neutrality be preserved in this instance, but, as we shall see, the commissioner was to have great difficulty in doing so.

The revolution at Tsinan turned out to be extremely short-lived, but while it lasted it involved Lockhart in an intriguing series of communications from Shantung's Governor Sun Pao-ch'i. As one might expect, Sun, under pressure from the revolutionaries, was anxious to protect himself in a highly volatile situation. Immediately following his reluctant announcement of Shantung's independence, he wrote to Lockhart to inform him of the event. Lockhart found the letter quite remarkable and described it as follows in a confidential communication with the British ambassador:

The despatch which I have now received from the Governor is so skillfully worded in the original that it would be very difficult if not impossible for anyone who read it and who was not acquainted with the actual position of affairs to realise that it emanated from the head of a government that had declared its independence. In addition to the equivocal nature of the language employed in his despatch, it is sealed with the official seal used by the Governor of Shantung in communications addressed to his Government before the declaration of his independence of the Province and is dated the third year of the reign of the present Emperor of China.<sup>13</sup>

In a message which Lockhart also sent along to the ambassador from the revolutionary leader at Chefoo to the governor, the latter is referred to as "president" and the revolutionary dating system is used.<sup>14</sup> A translation of Sun's letter to Lockhart reads as follows:

The present state of affairs presents many difficulties and the people's minds are restless and disturbed. In view of the circumstances, the gentry, merchants, and scholars of the province have submitted a

petition in which they have requested me to devise some means of dealing with the situation.<sup>15</sup>

He goes on to emphasize his duty of adopting a temporary expedient to protect the common good and reassures Lockhart that foreigners will be protected. He also flatters the commissioner by saying that he has always been "most sincere" in his political relations and he is sure that he would understand his position.<sup>16</sup>

By 24 November Sun, it would seem, had been drawn more securely into the revolutionary web and in another letter to Lockhart referred to himself as the "Commander-in-Chief of the Commandery of the Republic of China in Shantung," noting that he had been publicly elected to the position by the people of the province in order to prevent chaos from developing. He also pointed out, however, that it was impossible at this point for orders from the Ch'ing authorities to have any effect at a distance. This time he signed the letter as Commander-in-Chief, but combined dating systems, using the lunar day and month but the revolutionary year.<sup>17</sup>

Soon afterward on 30 November, Sun Pao-ch'i, following Yüan Shih-k'ai's instructions, revoked Shantung's independence and again wrote to Lockhart recounting the sequence of events leading to this state of affairs:

My chief duty as Governor is to protect the province under my charge and to preserve peace among the people. In taking the steps already narrated I did so regardless of my personal reputation, and yielded to the pressure of circumstances solely on account of temporary exigencies and in order to maintain public tranquillity. Now, however, affairs are gradually resuming their normal condition . . .<sup>18</sup>

This time he once again used the governor's official seal.

Sun's remarkable ability to steer a safe path through an exceedingly dangerous period apparently saved him from execution as a traitor. He was also fortunate in being on good terms with Yüan Shih-k'ai and this no doubt aided his cause.<sup>19</sup> The interesting point in this correspondence, however, was, as Lockhart observed, the cleverly understated way in which Sun downplayed the revolutionary nature of his position. One senses that he was in a very subtle way assuming that Lockhart, as a fellow administrator, would understand his delicate situation. He almost seems to take him into his confidence as a sort of ally. He may also have been eager to forestall possible foreign intervention by reassuring Lockhart of his good intentions.<sup>20</sup>

Although Shantung at this stage was officially back in the loyalist camp, however, the revolutionaries at Chefoo continued to maintain their independence for many months. In fact, the more radical elements operating at the treaty port attempted in December to force the city's military commander to march to Tsinan, arrest the government officials there, and install himself as president of Shantung. This effort was successfully resisted by the more moderate commander who, with insufficient troops and funds, was eager to maintain the armistice recently arranged with Tsinan authorities. Subsequently, most of the radicals were either deported to or fled to Manchuria.<sup>21</sup>

By mid-January 1912, however, the commander was forced to give way to a new military government sent from Shanghai with several ships and 2,500 troops. These men had been ordered by republican leaders to establish a revolutionary provincial headquarters at Chefoo since Tsinan was once again

under Manchu control. Although some of the republican forces succeeded in taking the prefectural capital of Teng-chou and advancing into Huang hsien, government troops prevented them from going any further toward Peking. As the British consul at Chefoo noted, the revolutionaries were able to recruit local "coolies" to serve as soldiers but with no training and old weapons they suffered heavy casualties against government regulars and deserted in large numbers. There was also a fundamental division in the local revolutionary forces between those serving under General Lan T'ien-wei, the rebellious tu-tu of Manchuria, and the main group of southern troops who refused to support the northerners. Matters became even worse for the revolutionary regime at Chefoo when the Chamber of Commerce, backed by local police and soldiers, forced the unpopular new tu-tu to resign. His attempts to squeeze large financial contributions from the merchants by holding their stocks of opium for ransom and other measures completely alienated the business community. The southern revolutionaries subsequently complied with requests for a change in leadership and a new man was sent to take over at Chefoo, but he fared no better in uniting the various military forces. The separatist movement by late March posed no serious threat to Yuan Shih-k'ai in Peking.<sup>22</sup>

Although eventually defeated in their broader national objective, the new revolutionary troops which arrived at Chefoo in mid-January caused serious political repercussions throughout the surrounding area. As one observer described the situation:

Villages and towns which had hitherto remained quiescent, enjoying a 'nominal independence' under their former Magistrates, were pushed by



extremists into taking more effective measures to show their sympathy with the revolutionist movement. District magistrates were dismissed and local champions of freedom elected in their stead.<sup>23</sup>

It was at this time that both Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien demonstrated their support for the republican cause.

The independent walled town of Weihai had up until this point caused the British no trouble, but that was now to change. Upon learning that the town's magistrate had on 23 January been arrested in his own yamen by a band of revolutionaries who had marched through the Territory from Wen-teng, the British district officer went to investigate the situation for himself. He discovered that the magistrate was indeed being held, supposedly under orders from the new independent Wen-teng hsien government. The revolutionaries were threatening him and demanding money although he insisted he had none. The British district officer promptly ordered the rebels out of the yamen, placed it under protective guard, and escorted the magistrate to Port Edward. Since two of the rebel leaders were residents of the Territory, one a Cantonese and the other a schoolmaster of a village school, who stated that they were instructed to take over the yamen by the Wen-teng government, the district officer demanded that they appear before him in court and provide guarantees that they would cause no more trouble at Weihaiwei. If they failed to do so they would face banishment from the Territory. He emphasized that as Great Britain was maintaining official neutrality with respect to the revolution, Territorial residents could not be allowed to participate in it. The Cantonese revolutionary then decided to leave the area but the schoolteacher produced the necessary guarantee and

remained in Weihaiwei.<sup>24</sup>

Meanwhile, it became clear that a member of one of the most influential families in the walled town, who was also head of the Chamber of Commerce there and a personal enemy of the Chinese magistrate, had taken a leading role in the affair.<sup>25</sup> Most of the other businessmen in the town, however, were opposed to this man and desired that the former magistrate be reinstated. In a petition addressed to the secretary to government at Weihaiwei, representatives of ninety-two firms requested that the revolutionary government at Chefoo be informed of their wishes. The official translation of the petition mentions so-called "bad characters" who had plotted with members of the revolutionary party and seized the opportunity to gratify their "private spite" against the magistrate. It also expresses fear that disaster will befall the "commercial classes" of the town if he is removed as "all power will fall into the hands of mean creatures whose sole aim will be the filling of their own purses." The petition refers to the harmonious relations which had previously existed between merchants in the Territory and in the town as well as those between the British magistrate and the Chinese magistrate.<sup>27</sup>

The commissioner did in fact inform the British consul at Chefoo of the petition and he in turn notified the Chinese head of government there that if the rebels took over in the walled town the British would have nothing to do with them.<sup>28</sup> The consul, however, was not very confident that the Chefoo authorities would act decisively to reinstate the magistrate. In a cable to Lockhart he made the following comment: "I fear . . . that influence of new government over surrounding

districts is very slight and steps calculated to restrain action of independent revolutionaries are only reluctantly taken as those in power fear to expose themselves to attack on account of supposed lukewarmness in the cause."<sup>29</sup> In spite of these fears, the magistrate was reinstated but was personally reluctant to accept the post since for many months he had received no salary. Again the British at Weihaiwei intervened to ensure his return. For many years they had paid the magistrate in the walled town a supplementary salary of \$40 per month to ensure the maintenance of order there and, although they had withheld payment since November pending recognition of the republic, it was decided to resume the arrangement so that stability could be restored. The magistrate subsequently returned to his job.<sup>30</sup>

One of the most striking features of this attempted takeover in the walled town was the way in which long-standing personal quarrels became the basis for political action. The revolution and its ideology at this point seem quite irrelevant to the power struggle which took place between one group of influential citizens in the town and another. What the unstable environment of this revolutionary period did provide, of course, was the opportunity for one group to attempt a power grab from the other. It is not clear, however, whether the revolutionaries from Wen-teng hsien were manipulating the situation for their advantage or whether they in fact were being used by the head of the Chamber of Commerce for his own purposes. No doubt it was a case of mutual opportunism. The decisive factor in the affair, and one perhaps not taken into prior consideration by the rebels, was the interventionist attitude taken by British officials

in the leased Territory.

One could certainly question whether the British were within their rights to involve themselves in this political squabble. Initially there was some confusion over the matter at the Colonial Office in London with at least one person noting that in urging the Chefoo revolutionaries to comply with the merchant petition to reinstate the former magistrate of the town, Commissioner Lockhart was interfering in matters which were not strictly his business.<sup>31</sup> In the end the Colonial Office more or less agreed that at least the district officer's intervention in the town had been necessary and proper under the terms of the original Weihaiwei convention in order to preserve order within the Territory.<sup>32</sup> One might still question, however, whether or not the British were maintaining strict neutrality with respect to the revolution. In effect, by evicting the rebels affiliated with the Wen-teng faction from the yamen, by recommending the previous magistrate's reinstatement, and by resuming payment of his "salary," they were taking the side of one faction as opposed to another. Although the walled town did not cause further trouble of this sort, the commissioner was soon faced with a potentially much more dangerous situation on his borders.

It will be remembered that revolutionary forces operating on the Shantung promontory were far from united in leadership, or objectives. The new tu-tu, Hu Ying, sent by Sun Yat-sen to take over the independent government at Chefoo in February 1912 at first seemed unable to assert his authority over the various military units. In some areas brutality and extortion became commonplace as troops sought to maintain

themselves.<sup>33</sup> The "revolution" which had taken place earlier in both Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien and resulted in declarations of independence from the central government, had been relatively peaceful affairs similar to that at Chefoo itself. Small groups of revolutionary soldiers and members of the T'ung-meng-hui had been dispatched by the new military government at Chefoo to various hsien capitals in the area, including Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng, where they were expected to gather arms and enlist local people in the effort to overthrow Ch'ing officials. The strategy of actual takeover seems to have been the same at both places. Relatively small groups, perhaps less than a hundred, armed with only a few modern weapons, but mainly axes and farm implements, entered the towns at dawn and met no resistance from the few regular troops on guard duty. The majority of yamen functionaries had already fled and it was an easy matter for the revolutionaries to occupy the administrative buildings and establish new military governments. Chinese accounts of this period, however, emphasize that they were handicapped by having so few personnel and made the mistake of trusting and retaining some former yamen employees who, in league with local influential citizens and "evil gentry," eventually turned against them. They also admit to making inadequate defense preparations, no doubt assuming that their revolutionary program would readily win over the "hearts and minds" of the people.<sup>34</sup>

#### The Counter-Revolution in Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien

The new revolutionary regimes proved to be extremely short-lived. By early February waves of counter-revolutionary

violence swept the young administrators from office and resulted in many deaths. The available sources on these events are unclear as to exactly why and how such a situation could have occurred, but if one pieces the various accounts together, it is possible to arrive at a reasonably accurate picture of what took place. Official British sources and newspaper stories point to a pattern of "high-handed" interference by the revolutionaries in traditional customs which incensed the rural population. For example, the temple of the city god at Jung-ch'eng was reportedly cleared of idols by the republicans and pressure was brought to bear on local people not to burn incense at the new year festivities. Perhaps even more serious were the new regimes' threats to sell off common land used by villages for grazing purposes. Furthermore, it was stipulated that no headgear, clothing, or buttons of rank associated with the Ch'ing regime could be worn. There were also reports of brutality and extortion on the part of certain military forces in the area, while revolutionary sympathizers were said to have gone from village to village demanding money and, in some cases, threatening to hold people for ransom until they got it.<sup>35</sup> Bearing in mind the complete lack of centralized governmental authority on the promontory at this time, it is not difficult to see how such chaos occurred. Likewise, with the disruption of normal revenue-collecting procedures, financing the various new regimes quickly became a problem. And, as the revolutionaries themselves readily admit, they were desperately short of experienced personnel to staff the government offices as well as soldiers and weapons to defend them.

Those who have written about their treatment at

the hands of the counter-revolutionary forces tend to describe them as a combination of disgruntled ex-imperial officials, "evil gentry," local bullies, and ordinary villagers who were incited to riot.<sup>36</sup> Certainly, one can understand how the former occupants of local power positions could have recognized the weaknesses of the new regimes as well as their unpopularity with a conservative rural population and organized a movement to recover the hsien capitals. One can also imagine groups of villagers themselves spontaneously resisting the "high-handed" interference in their traditional way of life and organizing the defense of their own areas. From the available information it is difficult to determine exactly who led the "counter-revolution." What is clear is that different groups played varying roles depending upon location, circumstances, and timing of a given incident.

It appears that the initial impetus to recapture the hsien capitals may well have been organized by former officials and certain influential citizens who were unhappy at their loss of power and, in some cases, wealth to the young revolutionaries. These people seem to have joined forces with bandit leaders and others to mobilize ordinary villagers who were resentful of the treatment they had received from the new republican regimes. The villagers' dissatisfaction undoubtedly stemmed in part from demands for money and interference with local customs. This combination of people then acted with appalling brutality in the retaking of both Weng-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien in mid-February 1912. They greatly outnumbered the handful of revolutionaries occupying the towns and thus easily overpowered them even with the old weapons at their disposal. A few republican officials and

soldiers managed to escape into the leased Territory but many faced torture and execution at the hands of the angry mob.<sup>37</sup>

The new republican tu-tu at Chefoo, Hu Ying, at first repudiated the actions of his fellow revolutionaries in Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien and refused to take action against the counter-revolutionaries. Hu was facing considerable difficulties at this time with a defiant group of so-called "progressive" party members who were in control at the prefectural city of Teng-chou, and the threat of open hostilities between himself and the new acting governor of Shantung, Chang Kuang-ch'ien.<sup>38</sup> Commissioner Lockhart was also finding the situation increasingly alarming with large numbers of refugees streaming into the Territory from the two neighboring hsien and a growing possibility of violence and banditry spreading over the borders.<sup>39</sup>

#### The Weihaiwei Peace Conference and its Aftermath

In addition to requesting one hundred British troops to guard Weihaiwei's boundaries, Lockhart decided about this time to offer Port Edward as a neutral meeting ground where representatives from Chefoo, Wen-teng, and Jung-ch'eng could come to discuss means of restoring peace to the area.<sup>40</sup> By the time the conference was held, however, the situation had greatly worsened as the Chefoo republicans had finally dispatched troops to Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng to suppress the uprising and punish the guilty parties. Their burning of villages further incensed the people and led to the retaliatory executions of several republican prisoners at Wen-teng, including Weihaiwei's provincial assembly representative, Yu Ch'un-hsüan.<sup>41</sup> The national political picture had also changed considerably with the abdication of the Hsüan-t'ung



emperor on 12 February. Many people in the area around Weihaiwei, however, refused to believe the news.<sup>42</sup>

After much confusion and delay the peace conference took place at Port Edward on 22 February and an agreement was quickly reached. The representatives of the Chefoo revolutionary government promised to halt the advance of troops into the two hsien if the Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng peace delegates could persuade the counter-revolutionaries to return to their homes. After the agreement was reached, however, it was learned that the republican prisoners had been executed only the day before and more troops were being sent to the area from Chefoo. Many of the counter-revolutionaries by this time viewed the peace conference as a cover for further troop movements and several of the peace delegates were forced to hide for a time to avoid being captured by them. Some people also felt the British were to blame for calling the conference and spreading false stories of peace negotiations. Renewed efforts were made by certain counter-revolutionary leaders to recruit villagers to fight with them and a fresh influx of refugees poured into Weihaiwei.<sup>43</sup>

One especially incorrigible leader, and a native of the Territory, actually threatened to attack the leasehold itself if various queueless refugees who had fled there from Jung-ch'eng were not handed over to him. The British official on the scene sent a communication to him emphasizing that, as his fu-mu kuan (or "father and mother official"), he would do his utmost to arrest him on a murder charge if he did return to the Territory. The threat evidently helped dissuade him from launching an attack on Weihaiwei.<sup>44</sup> This particular incident serves to illustrate two important points.

First, it is clear that by this time various bandit leaders and their gangs were playing a leading role in the continuing wave of violence sweeping the countryside around Weihaiwei. Second, the British found themselves in a somewhat ironic predicament. Whereas one might have expected them to come under attack, at least verbally, from nationalist, anti-imperialist republican forces, they in fact had little difficulty with these people during the revolution. Rather it was the counter-revolutionaries who accused them of collaborating with the republicans who gave the greatest cause for alarm. One can safely assume that the republicans based in Chefoo, as in other treaty ports, were extremely fearful of military intervention by foreigners and thus took pains to avoid offending them. Some of the less sophisticated "counter-revolutionaries," however, were not afraid to at least threaten the British at Weihaiwei. There is no evidence, though, of any actual physical violence being directed even by them at foreigners living inside or outside the leased Territory.

In the aftermath of the unsuccessful peace conference at Port Edward, many more republican troops were sent into Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien in early March 1912 and order was eventually restored. Both hsien capitals were retaken by the revolutionaries and those viewed as responsible for the counter-revolution were dealt with severely. Villages were burned and counter-revolutionary leaders shot in brutal retaliation for the earlier attacks on republican troops.<sup>45</sup> In a somewhat more conciliatory vein, however, a new proclamation was issued stipulating that temples earlier destroyed by the revolutionaries could be restored and traditional

theatrical performances resumed.<sup>46</sup> Nevertheless, a renewed campaign of queue-cutting in June and general unrest sent more refugees fleeing into Weihaiwei and sporadic fighting continued in the area until July. Commissioner Lockhart found it necessary to retain a company of British soldiers in the leasehold until March 1913.<sup>47</sup>

What conclusions can be drawn about Weihaiwei's role throughout this turbulent period? Certainly, the British officials on the scene found themselves playing a not altogether neutral part in the whole affair. When the sub-magistrate at the walled town came under attack, for example, the British district officer and the commissioner acted as much more than intermediaries between the revolutionary authorities at Chefoo, the sub-magistrate at Weihai, and the business community there. A definite stand was taken in favor of the threatened official and the majority of the Weihai merchants. This position was backed by physical force and the power of British influence over the revolutionary regime at Chefoo. It should be remembered, however, that most of the local leadership from the walled town, in fact, asked for British help in maintaining order there when one of their own citizens, in conjunction with an outside political faction, sought to take advantage of the revolution to further his personal ambitions. The fact that the walled town was surrounded by British territory, though, served to insulate it from the much more violent disturbances which later broke out in Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng.

When the counter-revolution erupted it was the British again who sought to defuse the situation by advocating a peace conference on neutral ground at Port Edward. Leading

Chinese merchants within the leasehold, at the urging of the British, agreed to use their influence in Wen-teng hsien to persuade the counter-revolutionaries to send representatives to the conference.<sup>48</sup> Commissioner Lockhart at various points offered his own suggestions to the Chefoo representatives regarding the use of force to put down the disturbance and acted as a conduit for proposals between them and the counter-revolutionary delegates.<sup>49</sup>

The Territory of Weihaiwei itself provided a convenient sanctuary for large numbers of refugees, including republicans, anti-republicans, and innocent villagers simply escaping the violence or trying to avoid being dragooned into the armed forces of either side. Peace delegates who found themselves threatened by counter-revolutionaries after the conference, as well as certain wealthy families who were being pressed for financial contributions, also sought shelter in British territory.<sup>50</sup> Soon after the disturbances broke out the commissioner let it be known that he would not oppose the entrance of genuine refugees into the leasehold.<sup>51</sup> This came, in fact, as a response to numerous written appeals from various groups of villagers living close to the borders in Chinese territory.<sup>52</sup> It is interesting in this connection that British officials were regarded by at least some of the grateful villagers as performing a most valuable service and their work was acknowledged in terms of praise similar to those which would have been accorded to upright native officials in traditional China.<sup>53</sup>

As for the citizens of the leased Territory themselves, it seems that, with the exception of the incident at the walled town, no armed uprisings took place within the borders,

either in sympathy with the republicans or the counter-revolutionaries. Yet there were many who were actively involved in various sorts of political activities and Reginald Johnston may have somewhat underestimated the appeal of republican ideology in the area when he wrote the following of the people of Weihaiwei: "For weeks their attitude was one of silent incredulity. Enthusiasm for the revolution was wholly lacking in that little section of Confucius's native province, and probably not fifty of its inhabitants had the slightest conception of what a republic was."<sup>54</sup>

According to Chinese sources, however, there was indeed a branch of the T'ung-meng-hui operating within the walled town which had been established by republicans sent from Chefoo. In fact, this branch was partly responsible for organizing the independence movements which captured the capitals of Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien. It proved a convenient hiding place for republican activists.<sup>55</sup> It would seem, however, that this branch kept its existence secret from the British as I have found no references to it in British sources. This is not surprising since they would undoubtedly not have approved of it had they known. Perhaps unknown to them as well was the fact that one of their own translators, Hsia Chun-ch'ing, actually aided several revolutionaries who had fled the violence in Jung-ch'eng hsien and took refuge in the walled town of Wei-hai. Presumably he provided them with food and helped them continue their political activities. No doubt he knew of their clandestine meetings at the home of a local prostitute where they wrote a report on the recent events at Jung-ch'eng and prepared two members of their group, dressed as merchants, to take a steamer to Chefoo

in order to request troops from the new tu-tu. When the counter-revolutionaries were finally suppressed and republican governments reestablished in Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng, these political refugees were summoned out of hiding from Weihaiwei to again take up various duties on behalf of the new regimes.<sup>56</sup>

There were also Weihaiwei residents who served as republican activists in Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng, at least five of whom were killed by counter-revolutionaries there as a result. If one analyzes the biographical information available for twenty-seven "martyrs" of the Wen-teng uprising, it is apparent that the work of the revolution was not carried on by outsiders. Twenty-one of these people appear to have been from Wen-teng hsien, mostly from rural villages, and five were from the leased Territory, while only one was from Kwangtung. They were all male and, of the sixteen whose ages we know, ranged from twenty to forty-six sui, with ten being thirty or younger. Almost all of them had had some education, four had studied in Japan, and at least four were T'ung-meng-hui members. Three held traditional degrees but ten had had a "modern" education. Fourteen were from educated families, four of these being prominent ones, and apparently only four came from poor backgrounds. Four were specifically involved in commerce of some sort and at least seven were teachers. Eleven were related to one another.

Compared to Rhoads' sample of Revolutionary Alliance members from Kwangtung, it would seem this group was somewhat older, less well-traveled, and less wealthy. Like his sample, though, they mostly bridge the Confucian and post-Confucian eras in China, with many having begun their schooling in the traditional manner and then having continued with

some version of the "new learning." The formal revolutionary party does not seem to have been a factor for most of them, and one suspects that family or school ties were of greater importance in persuading them to work for the revolution.<sup>57</sup>

Sympathy for the revolution apparently also extended to ordinary Weihaiwei residents who perhaps had not assumed leadership roles as those mentioned above, but had at least cut their queues and participated to some extent in the republican activities at Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng. They were then terrified that the counter-revolutionaries would kill them if they succeeded in entering the Territory.<sup>58</sup> There were also some rather infamous former Territorial residents who became notable for their cruelty in leading counter-revolutionary violence on the other side of the border. Lockhart was even requested, in the event peace negotiations failed, to prevent these men from carrying out further atrocities in the area.<sup>59</sup>

Clearly, then, the rather artificial leasehold boundaries which were indicated only by a few stone markers and quite inadequately patrolled by a few British soldiers could not possibly isolate Weihaiwei from the political turmoil taking place on the Shantung promontory in 1911 and 1912. Although the British proclaimed their Territory neutral, prohibited political activity either for or against the revolution, and the movement of troops through the area, they were unable to completely block either the flow of ideas or people across their borders. It is true, however, that the people of Weihaiwei, as well as many refugees from the two neighboring hsien, were spared the worst violence and disruption of this period because of British jurisdiction.<sup>60</sup> This security

was to become even more important in the chaotic warlord years to follow.

Perhaps the most significant question which arises regarding the 1911 revolution in the eastern-most portion of Shantung is why, living in such close proximity to the strongly pro-republican treaty port of Chefoo, the people of this area reacted so violently against it in 1912. In spite of the usual image of the republican revolution as a mild, relatively bloodless affair, there were estimates of at least seven hundred people being killed during and after the Wen-Jung counter-revolution, with many more made homeless or faced with other hardships.<sup>61</sup> Even if, as the Chinese sources indicate, certain "evil gentry," former officials, and "local bullies" did succeed in organizing the villagers to oppose the fledgling republican regimes, it is not entirely clear how they did so. One account, however, states that 98% of those involved were using the revolution as a cover for settling private quarrels and they were not really very loyal to the emperor. Furthermore, this source maintains that the targets of the violence were not merely those who had actively led the revolution, but anyone who had gone to a modern school and read "new books." All were branded as yang or foreign.<sup>62</sup>

It is necessary to remember here how conservative and remote the rural promontory was at this time. Transportation and communication links with Chefoo were extremely poor. The literacy rate was low and the economy was dependent, not upon treaty port trade, but agriculture as it had been for generations. If Weihaiwei village life is any sort of model, and one suspects it was not unusual, then traditional social



and political structures must have been largely intact in Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien. Certainly, there were very few foreigners, including missionaries, living in the area. In short, contact with the outside world had been rather limited prior to 1911. Thus, the sudden emergence in 1912 of queueless young republicans who installed themselves in the official yamen and immediately set to work implementing revolutionary economic and social programs could not fail to alienate large portions of the population, especially when this led to interference in local customs and the collecting of new taxes.

In assessing the chances for revolutionary success in a given area, Rhoads has stressed the importance of what he calls "the climate of opinion."<sup>63</sup> In certain parts of Kwangtung where large numbers of people responded to the call for revolution, for example, confidence in the Ch'ing government had fallen to very low levels. Rhoads remarks:

Clearly, by the end of the summer of 1911 most groups in Kwangtung, gentry, merchants, students, and peasants, had become disenchanted with their government. The recurrent panics in Canton, the growing number of peasant anti-tax riots, the frequent criticism of the officials in the press and in memorials to the throne, the sometimes blatant sympathy for accused revolutionaries all indicated that public confidence in the government had practically vanished.<sup>64</sup>

The people of Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng simply did not seem to have such grievances against the government. The late Ch'ing reform movement which had succeeded in raising expectations elsewhere in the province apparently did not have much of an impact in this area. Perhaps local people were not called upon to subsidize reform measures, such as new schools, and thus did not engage in anti-tax riots. Nor had

the area become dependent upon commercialized agriculture and experienced sharp ups and downs in its economic fortunes as had say the region around Canton just prior to the revolution.<sup>65</sup> Organizations which played a prominent role in the republican movement in South China such as secret societies and local militia forces used in the frequent feuds between strong lineages there do not appear to have been very active in the area in and around Weihaiwei.

Roxann Prazniak has attributed the serious tax protest which erupted in eastern Shantung's Lai-yang hsien in 1910 to an alliance of small and middle farmers, some small merchants, artisans, and small landlords who were opposed to the abuses of a group of merchant tax-farmers implementing late Ch'ing reforms. She describes how a new county political elite had emerged in this area based on the extensive commercial interests of these tax-farming firms but still dependent upon degree status and bureaucratic influence. The new elite, according to Prazniak, was increasingly less motivated to respect the traditional community authority structure and this led to a violent rebellion.<sup>66</sup> Though Prazniak does not see a direct relationship between this incident and the revolution of 1911, it does serve to illustrate the kind of rural unrest present in some parts of Shantung in the closing years of the Ch'ing dynasty. Perhaps one could also argue that the apparent absence of such unrest at this time in Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng and certainly in Weihaiwei may again indicate the continued existence of a largely traditional authority structure. The British, at least, went to great lengths to preserve this structure within the leased Territory. It also seems safe to say that this area, unlike

Lai-yang, did not show any extensive growth of commercial interests which could have provided a new political elite. In any event, the intensity of counter-revolutionary sentiment in Wen-Jung would tend to suggest that radical republican activists sent to the area were not attuned to the area's conservative biases.

Yet one must be careful not to create the impression that Weihaiwei and its neighboring hsien remained impervious to political change. The impact of a new national and political awareness came to be recognized by the leasehold's British administrators in the fall of 1912. The district officer resident in the interior of the leasehold voiced his concern over the possible consequences if troops which had been temporarily stationed along the border were removed. He observed: ". . . I have reason to believe that there is a steady pro-republic propaganda being carried on within the Territory, and that new ideas of patriotism . . . are gradually making way among the people."<sup>67</sup> He went on to point out that people were making a real effort to inform themselves as to current affairs in the outside world:

Newspapers are eagerly read in villages where until last year a newspaper was hardly ever seen. A few days ago a district headman astonished me by his familiarity with the 'Loan Question' in Peking. . . . The problem of Tibet, is mentioned by simple farmers who till recently hardly knew that such a place existed; and I have good reason to believe that the denunciations of Great Britain by the irresponsible vernacular press in connection with various outstanding political questions are becoming matters of daily discussion, and cannot fail to foster the growth of a feeling of restlessness.<sup>68</sup>

The awakening of nationalism at Weihaiwei made itself felt in an even more dramatic way about this same time when a question arose as to whether local residents would be

allowed to vote in forthcoming elections for the Provincial Assembly at Tsinan and the National Assembly at Peking. Both the British minister in Peking and colonial officials in London initially took the position that Chinese authorities should not be allowed into the Territory even to make a list of qualified voters since Great Britain did not yet recognize the new republic. In the end, perhaps partly due to the strenuous complaints of the British commissioner at Weihaiwei, the Foreign Office ruled that it had no objection to Chinese electoral deputies making private inquiries within the Territory to obtain the information they required so that local people could exercise the franchise they retained as Chinese citizens.<sup>69</sup> The election, however, was not allowed to take place within Weihaiwei. Local residents had to go to Chinese territory to cast their ballots. This decision must have been a welcome one to the British district officer in the interior of Weihaiwei who had earlier received a petition from various village headmen complaining that no steps had been taken to allow them to vote.<sup>70</sup> Commenting on the level of discontent which had arisen over this issue, the British official noted: ". . . the people of our Territory are inclined to repudiate any suggestion that the temporary residence of three or four British officials in their midst affects in any way their rights and privileges as Chinese subjects."<sup>71</sup>

So it would seem a great deal had changed at Weihaiwei in the years following the arrival of the British to the area in 1898. Local fears, as reflected in the boundary disturbances of 1900, that the British had come to confiscate their land and levy onerous taxes had been alleviated and

the leasehold had even functioned rather smoothly under the foreigners with some tangible economic and social benefits to the Chinese living there. But gradually as change worked its way into the social fabric at Weihaiwei the British were forced to deal with a threat to their authority which could in the long run prove far more devastating than that posed by mobs of angry villagers shouting abuse and wielding clubs as they had in 1900. New ideas about the very nature of society and the way it should be ordered were slowly taking hold in this tiny piece of British territory, a fact of which the colonial officials working there were quite well aware.<sup>72</sup>

Notes to Chapter 4

<sup>1</sup>CO 873/281, Register of Weihaiwei Electors for 1909 Provincial Assembly. It should be noted that in his departmental report for 1909, CO 873/292, Johnston states that there were 500 electors in the Territory which is considerably more than the 355 actually listed on the register. I can offer no explanation for this discrepancy but have preferred to use the statistics provided in the official register. To be entitled to vote a person had to be male, over 25 years of age, have had experience in teaching above the primary level, or in some other occupation contributing to the public welfare, hold a kung-sheng degree or higher, hold an official post higher than seventh rank in the civil list or the fifth rank in military positions, or own 5,000 yüan worth of property. See Buck, Urban Change, p. 63 and Chang P'eng-yüan, "The Constitutionalists," in Wright, ed., China in Revolution, p. 146.

<sup>2</sup>Chang, "The Constitutionalists," p. 150.

<sup>3</sup>CO 873/286, North China Daily News, 10 June and 7 August 1909. See also CO 873/292, Walters, Departmental Report, 1909.

<sup>4</sup>Chang, "The Constitutionalists," pp. 147-9.

<sup>5</sup>Buck, Urban Change, p. 65. For an analysis of the 1909 election and the resulting assembly in Kwangtung, see Edward J. M. Rhoads, China's Republican Revolution: The Case of Kwangtung, 1895-1913 (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), pp. 155-161. His findings parallel those of Buck and Chang.

<sup>6</sup>Buck, Urban Change, pp. 72-3.

<sup>7</sup>CO 873/335, Annual Report, 1911, p. 3. When reading some of the students' essays this same observer also remarked that they "regard us (as they regard Europeans in other settlements in China) as foreigners whose presence in their country is regrettable and to some extent humiliating." Though the schoolmaster had marked their essays down for their anti-foreign comments, both Johnston and Lockhart felt this should not happen and that the students should be free to express their views. See CO 873/320, Johnston's Report, 19 July 1911 and Lockhart to Johnston, 20 July 1911.

<sup>8</sup>Regarding the Shan-tso kung-hsüeh, see Buck, Urban Change, p. 61. The Chung-hsüeh t'ang and the Yü-tsai hsüeh t'ang are discussed in Chang Chi-jen, "Hsin-hai kuang-fu Jung-Ch'eng hui-i lu," Chin-tai shih tzu-liao, no. 4 (1957), pp. 22-3. The Tung-mou kung-hsüeh is mentioned briefly in Tsou Lu, "Shan-tung chü-i," in Chung-kuo-shih hsüeh-hui, ed., Hsin-hai ko-ming, 8 vols. (Shanghai, 1957), 7:318. It should also be noted that many of the revolutionaries later killed in the Wen-Jung uprisings were graduates of these institutions and some were residents of the Territory. See Pi Yüan-ch'un and Ts'ung Chung-hao eds., "Hsin-hai Wen-teng wu-shih-chiu lieh-shih chuan," in STCTSTL, 2:188-213.

<sup>9</sup>Buck, Urban Change, p. 72. Buck may have somewhat overstated the amount of support Chefoo's business community was willing to give the new republican regime. By late January 1912 as the new tu-tu Tu Ch'ien exacted large contributions from them and seized opium stocks for ransom, panic spread through the town and business came to a standstill. Eventually the Chamber of Commerce, supported by police and soldiers, forced the tu-tu to resign and Sun Yat-sen was requested to send a new man (Hu Ying). For a time this tu-tu maintained better relations with the merchants, but by summer 1912 as unruly troops still occupied the area and business was disrupted, their patience with the independent regime was exhausted. See CO 873/327, Porter to Jordan, 6 February, 13 March, 31 May, and 18 July 1912.

<sup>10</sup>CO 521/12, Cable, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 14 November 1911. In Lockhart Papers, vol. 1 there is the first republican flag hoisted over the walled town of Weihai.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Lockhart Papers, vol. 1, Lockhart to Minister, 21 November 1911 and FO 371/1095, Cable, Colonial Office to Lockhart, 20 November 1911.

<sup>13</sup>Lockhart Papers, vol. 1, Lockhart to Minister, 20 November 1911.

<sup>14</sup>Enclosure in *ibid*.

<sup>15</sup>Lockhart Papers, vol. 1, Lockhart to Minister, 20 November 1911.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Lockhart Papers, vol. 1, Lockhart to Minister, 24 November 1911.

<sup>18</sup>CO 521/12, Lockhart to Minister, 7 December 1911. There is an exchange in the minutes on this file which reads: "Sun seems to be playing a curious game." And the response: "The game of trying to keep his head on his shoulders."

<sup>19</sup>Sun was in fact granted a pardon by the government and when the dynasty fell he went into business with Prince Ch'ing. By December 1912 he was again serving in the national administration. He held various official posts throughout the remainder of his career. See Buck, Urban Change, p. 44 and Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard, eds., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 4 vols. (New York, 1967-1971), 3:169-170.

<sup>20</sup>For a chronological account of the events surrounding Shantung's declaration of independence and its aftermath, see Kuo Hsiao-ch'eng, "Shan-tung tu-li chuang-k'uang," in Hsin-hai ko-ming, 8:323-336. See also Chung-kuo k'o-hst'eh y'uan Shan-tung fen-y'uan li-shih yen-chiu-so, "Shih-lun Hsin-hai ko-ming shih-ch'i ti Shan-tung tu-li y'ün-tung," in Hu-pei-sheng che-hst'eh she-hui k'o-hst'eh hst'eh-hui lien-ho-hui,

ed., Hsin-hai ko-ming wu-shih chou-nien chi-nien lun-wen chi (Peking, 1962), 2:564-578. There are also accounts by foreign observers in the North China Herald beginning in November 1911. See also Buck, Urban Change, pp. 72-5.

<sup>21</sup>CO 873/327, Porter to Jordan, 5 December and 21 December 1911 and 10 January 1912.

<sup>22</sup>CO 873/327, Porter to Jordan, 6 February, 24 February, 13 March, 10 April, and 22 April 1912. The British consul at Chefoo, summarizing the local political situation for the minister in Peking in April, noted that when the emperor abdicated and the republic was declared, the Chefoo revolutionaries and their supporters in Nanking "lost all excuse for further aggression in Shantung." They then attempted to at least secure the right of electing their own governor and this too was resisted by Yuan Shih-k'ai who appointed one of his followers, Chou Tzu-ch'i, to the position in February 1912. See CO 873/327, Porter to Jordan, 23 April 1912. There followed several months of wrangling among the various revolutionary leaders at Chefoo as to who was in control and also between them and Peking authorities over the disbandment of the several thousand troops still in the area. See CO 873/327, Porter to Jordan, 29 June, 4 July, 18 July, and 24 July 1912 and Kirke to Jordan 7 August 1912.

<sup>23</sup>CO 873/327, Porter to Jordan, 6 February 1912.

<sup>24</sup>CO 873/331, Johnston to Lockhart, 24 January 1912 and CO 521/13, Enclosure in Lockhart to Colonial Office, 26 January 1912.

<sup>25</sup>CO 873/331, Johnston to Lockhart, 24 January 1912. In this document Johnston notes that this prominent citizen of Weihai, Ch'i Yu-t'an, keeper of a medicine shop, was already well-known to him as only a few months earlier he had sent his agents into the leased Territory to "arrest" someone and had himself been served with a banishment order. The original banishment order in both Chinese and English can be found in this file. It had been lifted when Ch'i wrote a formal apology for his behavior. Johnston described Ch'i as a "truculent and arrogant person who has been in the habit of defying Chinese official authority." CO 873/331, Johnston to Tsinan consul, 25 January 1912. As late as 1916 the British were still debating whether or not to lift another banishment order on him. CO 873/331, Johnston to Lockhart, 22 February 1916.

<sup>26</sup>CO 873/331, Johnston to Lockhart, 31 January 1912.

<sup>27</sup>CO 521/13, Enclosure in Lockhart to Colonial Office, 30 January 1912.

<sup>28</sup>CO 873/331, Johnston to Lockhart, 24 January 1912.

<sup>29</sup>CO 873/331, Cable, Porter to Lockhart, 23 January 1912.

<sup>30</sup>CO 873/331, Johnston to Lockhart, 19 February 1912 and Lockhart to Johnston, 21 February 1912.



<sup>31</sup>CO 521/13, Minute of Lockhart to Colonial Office, 30 January 1912.

<sup>32</sup>CO 521/13, Minute on Lockhart to Colonial Office, 26 January 1912. The minutes on this letter are interesting for several reasons. One official at the Colonial Office noted that the district officer's action could be described as "irregular" but he also hoped that the very complexities of the issue would prevent it from ever being raised as a legal matter. The Weihaiwei convention itself was ambiguous, he said, since the walled town, being located within the leased Territory, was in a sense under British jurisdiction and yet was also specifically excluded from such except insofar as naval and military requirements for the defense of the Territory were concerned. Thus, both the British and the Chinese in theory had jurisdiction over the town and yet in practice this was of course impossible. Another official remarked: "The whole Convention was 'fearfully and wonderfully made' but this 'walled city' business is about the most curious part of it." Yet another official concluded that the district officer's action had been proper and that the Chinese authorities evidently thought so too since they had not objected. The British crown advocate at Shanghai had earlier instructed the commissioner regarding the legalities of his position at Weihaiwei in view of the revolution and he too had observed that no "belligerent activities" should be permitted within the walled town lest they compromise British neutrality. See CO 873/329, Wilkinson to Lockhart, 28 November 1911. Thus, it would seem that Johnston may technically have been justified in his actions but that the Colonial Office also hoped the matter would not be raised by the Chinese since their case was not a particularly strong one.

<sup>33</sup>CO 873/331, Porter to Jordan, 24 February 1912.

<sup>34</sup>Chang Chi-jen, "Hsin-hai kuang-fu Jung-Ch'eng hui-i lu," Chin-tai shih tzu-liao, no. 4 (1957), pp. 22-57; Wang Hsi-san, "Wen-teng Hsin-hai ko-ming ts'an-shih chi-shih," in STCTSTL, 2:213-15; Liang Tsung-han, "Wen-Jung liang-hsien Hsin-hai ko-ming shih-k'uang," in STCTSTL, 2:215-16; Pi and Ts'ung, eds., "Hsin-hai," in STCTSTL, 2:188-213.

<sup>35</sup>North China Herald, 24 February 1912, pp. 504-5. See also CO 521/13, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 24 February 1912 and CO 873/327, Porter to Jordan, 24 February 1912.

<sup>36</sup>See note 34 above.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid. See also Lockhart Papers, vol. 44, Carpmael to Lockhart, 11 February 1912; CO 873/337, Translation of oral report by escaped republican soldier, Wu An-ch'un, to British authorities, 11 February 1912; Johnston to Lockhart, 13 February 1912; Carpmael to Lockhart, 14, 16, and 19 February 1912; CO 512/13, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 24 February 1912; North China Herald, 13 January, 17 and 24 February 1912, pp. 105, 424-5, and 504-5.

<sup>38</sup>CO 873/337, Cable, Porter to Lockhart, 12 February 1912.

<sup>39</sup>CO 873/337, Crudge to Lockhart, 10 February 1912; CO 521/13, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 10 February 1912.

<sup>40</sup>CO 521/13, Cable, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 17 February 1912; Lockhart to Colonial Office, 24 February 1912.

<sup>41</sup>CO 873/337, Lockhart to Johnston, 17 February 1912; Carpmael to Lockhart, 19, 21, and 22 February 1912.

<sup>42</sup>CO 873/337, Carpmael to Lockhart, 14 February 1912.

<sup>43</sup>CO 521/13, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 24 February 1912; CO 873/337, Carpmael to Lockhart, 21 February 1912; Porter to Lockhart, 28 February 1912; CO 873/340, Crudge to Kirkpatrick, 24 and 28 February 1912. See also North China Herald, 16 March 1912, p. 705.

<sup>44</sup>CO 873/337, Carpmael to Lockhart, 23 February 1912. This man was Liu Chung-hai who was a native of Huang-an-shan in the Territory but who had worked outside Weihaiwei as a hill watchman. At the beginning of the counter-revolution he had been selected to head a band of villagers in Jung-ch'eng hsien and had become the executioner of many queueless prisoners. Since then he had continued searching the countryside (with a group of seven hundred men) for republican sympathizers. This illiterate "local bully" actually kidnapped some Territorial residents and held them across the border outside British jurisdiction demanding that the queueless refugees in the Territory be handed over to him. It was at this point that the British official issued his warning with the effect that many of Liu's followers dispersed. He is mentioned again in April 1912 along with Tai Ssu and Ping Ch'ang-fa as having returned from Manchuria armed with modern weapons and again causing trouble in the area. See CO 873/337, Carpmael to Lockhart, 7 and 9 April 1912, and also a letter in Chinese to Carpmael, 1st day, 3rd month. Liu and Tai are also mentioned in Liang, "Wen-Jung liang-hsien," in STCTSTL, 2:216.

<sup>45</sup>CO 873/340, Carpmael to File, 1 March 1912; Crudge to Kirkpatrick, 9 March 1912; CO 873/337, Johnston to Lockhart, 4 March 1912; CO 521/13, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 5 March 1912.

<sup>46</sup>CO 873/337, Carpmael to Lockhart, 9 March 1912.

<sup>47</sup>CO 873/359, Annual Report, 1912; CO 521/13, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 18 June 1912. See also North China Herald, 16 March 1912, p. 705; 27 April 1912, p. 246; 11 May 1912, p. 391.

<sup>48</sup>CO 873/337, Johnston to Lockhart, 13 February 1912.

<sup>49</sup>CO 873/337, Lockhart to Johnston, 17 February 1912; Cable, Porter to Lockhart, 21 February 1912; and Carpmael to Lockhart, 21 February 1912.

<sup>50</sup>CO 873/340, Crudge to Kirkpatrick, 24 February 1912.

<sup>51</sup>CO 873/337, Lockhart to Carpmael, 16 February 1912.

<sup>52</sup>Lockhart Papers, vol. 44, Carpmael to Lockhart, 7 February 1912; CO 873/337, Crudge to Lockhart, 10 February 1912;

and Chinese letters from villagers at Nan-kang and Pu-yeh-ts'un to Carpmael, 29th day, 12th month.

<sup>53</sup>See Lockhart Papers, vol. 1, Chinese text of stone tablet erected by Weihaiwei district headmen in Lockhart's honor in 1921. See also CO 873/337, Chinese letter from villagers of Ts'ao-miao-tzu to Carpmael, 29th day, 12th month. The villagers express hearty praise for Sergeant Bickham, a British officer temporarily posted to their area, for his attempts to preserve order. They are also most eager to see that he is kept on the job there and urge Carpmael to arrange it. It is especially interesting that Ts'ao-miao-tzu was the site of violent disturbances between Chinese villagers and British troops over the issue of boundary demarcations in 1900.

<sup>54</sup>Reginald F. Johnston, Twilight in the Forbidden City (London, 1934), p. 89.

<sup>55</sup>Pi and Ts'ung, eds., "Hsin-hai," in STCTSTL, 2:200.

<sup>56</sup>Chang, "Hsin-hai," pp. 26-7. In a personal interview on 7 April 1981, Mrs. Mary Stewart Lockhart, daughter of the late commissioner, noted that most of the people at Weihaiwei were ignorant of Sun Yat-sen, with the exception of some government clerks.

<sup>57</sup>Pi and Ts'ung, eds., "Hsin-hai," in STCTSTL, 2:188-213.

<sup>58</sup>CO 873/337, Carpmael to Lockhart, 23 February 1912.

<sup>59</sup>CO 873/337, Carpmael to Lockhart, 19 and 23 February 1912.

<sup>60</sup>Among the complimentary remarks made about Commissioner Lockhart on a stone tablet erected in his honor at Weihaiwei when he retired in 1921 was one relating to the revolution. The translation sent to Secretary of State Churchill read as follows: "During the revolution in 1911 Wenteng district joined the revolutionary party and thousands of people were massacred. His Honour guarded the borders and admitted the good but repelled the wicked, regardless of their belonging to the leased territory or not." See Lockhart Papers, vol. 1, translation of stone tablet.

<sup>61</sup>CO 873/337, Carpmael to Lockhart, 12 March 1912.

<sup>62</sup>Chang, "Hsin-hai," p. 26.

<sup>63</sup>Rhoads, Revolution, p. 274.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 214.

<sup>65</sup>Winston Hsieh, "Peasant Insurrection and the Marketing Hierarchy in the Canton Delta, 1911," in Elvin and Skinner, eds., The Chinese City, pp. 119-141.

<sup>66</sup>Roxann Prazniak, "Tax Protest at Laiyang, Shandong,

1910: Commoner Organization Versus the County Political Elite," Modern China, 6.1 (January 1980):41-71.

<sup>67</sup>CO 521/13, Johnston to Lockhart, 20 October 1912  
(Enclosure in Lockhart to Colonial Office, 22 October 1912),  
p. 4.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>69</sup>CO 873/337, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 20 December  
1912.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>CO 521/13, Johnston to Lockhart, 20 October 1912  
(Enclosure in Lockhart to Colonial Office, 22 October 1912).  
It should also be noted that as the financial requirement  
in this election had been reduced from 5,000 yüan to 500 yüan,  
many more people qualified as electors. There were 1,410 in  
the Territory. In the end, however, only one resident was  
elected to serve in the Provincial Assembly. See CO 873/356,  
Johnston to Lockhart, 3 January 1913 and 8 January 1913.

<sup>72</sup>CO 521/13, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 13 December  
1912.

## Chapter 5

## Weihaiwei in the Wake of Revolution

Although the worst of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary violence in the area surrounding Weihaiwei ended during the summer of 1912, it was some time before life returned to normal in the Territory. The unsettled conditions and influx of both refugees and various disreputable characters led to an increase in serious crime with murders reported for the first time since the British had administered the area.<sup>1</sup> Piracy was also a problem on the Shantung promontory and posed a threat to coastal villages and local fishermen alike. Thus, the British decided in January 1912 to send a naval cruiser to patrol the long coastline which legally fell within their sphere of influence. Reginald Johnston went along on this mission and reported that when he and the crew called at various towns and villages seeking information about the pirates they received a warm welcome from beleaguered local inhabitants.<sup>2</sup> So successful were later navy raids in capturing some of the scoundrels that two Weihaiwei fishermen were deliberately murdered as a retaliatory gesture by others.<sup>3</sup> Pirate raids had been a problem in this area, it will be remembered, since the Northern Wei dynasty (A.D. 386-534) and were not to be wholly eliminated even by the well-armed British Navy.

Economic Conditions and the Question of Government Revenue

In spite of this unrest, however, there was actually a decrease in the number of civil cases brought to court in the leasehold in 1912 as economic uncertainty and the general distraction of political events apparently prevented people

from seeking arbitration as frequently as they had previously.<sup>4</sup> Trade, though not dramatically active, did not suffer the disruption experienced at Chefoo or in many other parts of China at this time. Nevertheless, British officials expressed dismay that foreign capital could not be attracted to the area and noted that the trade which existed was financed largely by Chinese investors. The question of long-term British intentions at Weihaiwei still remained unresolved and discouraged greater commercial development. As one official remarked: "One after the other schemes for building godowns so that the Port might become a depot for goods going north to Tientsin and North China, schemes for oil mills and silk filatures, schemes for fruit firms have all fallen through . . ."<sup>5</sup> In spite of this handicap, however, the local population was showing signs of increasing prosperity and land prices around Port Edward were rising.

In fact, economic conditions in Weihaiwei improved to such an extent that in 1913 and 1914 the British were able to implement new revenue-raising schemes without encountering serious opposition. After consultations with district headmen in 1913, it was decided to impose a tax on carts and wheelbarrows in order to help finance the repair and maintenance of Territorial roads. The headmen suggested that increases in petition fees (from \$2.00 to \$3.00) and in registration fees for land sales would also be acceptable, but they did not recommend raising the rate of land taxation.<sup>6</sup>

In 1914 the question of how to increase revenue was explored still further with District Officer Moss proposing that all land be registered for a fee, that it be reassessed

for tax purposes, and that henceforth registration of land be made compulsory. He argued that the old Chinese registers were completely inaccurate and that land taxes collected between 1905 and 1914 had been virtually the same each year at roughly \$24,500. Many landowners held so-called "white deeds" which dated from before the British occupation, were unsealed, and had no legal sanction. These people, he pointed out, were simply evading the registration fees. Moss went on to note that in the distant past when the population of the Weihaiwei area had been much smaller and emigration less common, land had frequently been held under government grants in large, vaguely defined tracts. As the population grew and these tracts were subdivided it was rare to find a parcel of land exceeding twenty mou and most holdings at the time of the British occupation were ten mou or less. Yet even after land had been subdivided many times, Moss asserted, old inaccurate deeds were retained. His plan was to make the registers correspond with actual holdings and compel everyone to purchase a deed issued by the British authorities. Thus, the land tax would be paid by individuals rather than in a lump sum by villages as was the current practice.<sup>7</sup>

The district officer for the southern portion of Weihaiwei offered several arguments against this scheme. First, he noted that the British were not entitled to make pre-1898 land deeds appear somehow less valid than those issued after the occupation. This, he observed, would call into question the sovereign rights of the Chinese state. Furthermore, it would place too heavy and onerous a burden on Weihaiwei's headmen to make them responsible for the revaluation of land. To do the job properly would entail a full-scale cadastral survey which the leasehold simply could not

afford. He added that a similar project carried out in Hong Kong by trained surveyors from India had cost \$100,000.<sup>8</sup> In addition, it had previously been ascertained from a meeting with district headmen that a reassessment of land with a view toward tax increases would be extremely unpopular with the villagers and that they would not cooperate with the plan. These men stated that local farmers could not afford such increases and suggested that additional revenue be raised through a tax on animals, on houses larger than five chien, on sales made by merchants, or by increasing the levy on ground nuts.<sup>9</sup> It is interesting that about this same time considerable agitation was taking place in areas just beyond Weihaiwei's borders opposing new Chinese government efforts to levy house taxes and compel land registration.<sup>10</sup> Given such an atmosphere it is not surprising that some of Weihaiwei's district headmen hurriedly petitioned the commissioner not to initiate a \$1.00 per year poll tax which they mistakenly thought he was planning to do.<sup>11</sup>

In the end the commissioner decided that neither a cadastral survey nor higher land taxes would be practical at Weihaiwei. Instead he chose to employ a few temporary clerks to correct the land registers in the case of land transfers only.<sup>12</sup> In 1915, however, District Officer Moss, again interested in increasing revenue, pointed out that some Weihaiwei farmers were cultivating government land without paying taxes and he recommended that they either be fined or evicted.<sup>13</sup> District Officer Johnston once more opposed Moss' idea, noting that it had traditionally been the practice in China to rent out government land for very small sums and even to purchase it back from the cultivators.



if later required by the state. There had never been any intention of charging the equivalent of the land's value in rent, nor were these farmers entered on the tax registers.<sup>14</sup> Lockhart in this instance also sided with Johnston's view, deciding to charge only a nominal rent since the land was poor and not to collect rent arrears. He ruled that 50¢ per mou was probably a fair amount.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, it appears that the British basically desired to maintain a "low profile" at Weihaiwei and to adhere to traditional Chinese practices even when it meant foregoing sizeable increases in tax revenue. In this policy they differed greatly from the new breed of administrators appointed by Yüan Shih-k'ai in Shantung in 1913. A major new fiscal program was inaugurated at this time under Governor Chin Yun-p'eng by which commercial taxes were levied and tax collection firms authorized to collect them on behalf of the government. A property title tax was also instituted as well as compulsory reregistration of titles.<sup>16</sup> Of course, the fact that the British did not need to maintain a large army and chose not to implement expensive modern reforms, meant that they managed to keep their operating expenditures relatively low. Except for a brief period in 1916-17, they were also able to rely upon an annual grant-in-aid from the Treasury to help meet their expenses. The table below summarizes government revenue and expenditure figures at Weihaiwei for the period 1911 to 1920:

Table 3

Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1911-1920<sup>17</sup>

<u>Year</u>	<u>Revenue</u>	<u>Expenditure</u>	<u>Grant-in-Aid</u>
1911-12	\$ 74,673	\$153,690	£6,000
1912-13	79,582	146,146	6,000
1913-14	93,780	166,960	8,300
1914-15	109,898	148,185	5,000
1915-16	115,967	155,967	3,500
1916-17	126,908	139,300	none
1917-18	142,877	175,652	650
1918-19	150,723	184,600	4,000
1919-20	176,450	207,141	7,900

In addition to keeping their operating expenses within reasonable limits, the British also desired to maintain the most amicable relationship they could with both Weihaiwei tax-payers and village headmen. Thus, they consistently sought advice from local leaders as to which tax proposals would meet with the widest acceptance. District Officer Johnston in particular seems always to have been aware of local customs in administrative matters and strenuously urged that these be maintained. Commissioner Lockhart was likewise eager to reinforce the position of village headmen whenever possible and in 1914 reaffirmed the need to have their signatures on deeds of land sales as was the traditional Chinese practice. The British also chose to communicate with the people in a manner which was most familiar to them. Lockhart's speeches to the headmen, for example, could almost have been delivered by a Chinese magistrate, so filled are they with classical Confucian overtones. The basic impulse was to exhort and persuade rather than to rule through Western-style legislation and bureaucratic mechanisms.<sup>18</sup>

Although there was no dramatic commercial boom at Weihaiwei from 1912 to 1919, there was a fairly steady growth of trading activity. In fact, by 1915 the local merchant community agreed that the construction of a new pier at Port Edward was definitely needed to facilitate the expanding volume of commerce.<sup>19</sup> After an engineer's survey it was determined that the pier would cost about \$35,000, a sum the government felt it could not possibly provide in the form of a direct grant. The merchants, however, decided that the money could be raised through an increase in shipping dues.<sup>20</sup> When British Treasury officials expressed concern about interest payments on a loan for this project and the number of years over which it would be repaid, the merchants petitioned the commissioner to implement a special shipping levy immediately so that the loan could be repaid about the time the pier was completed. This arrangement was agreed to and the pier was ready for use in late 1918.<sup>21</sup>

The following table illustrates the improving trade picture at Weihaiwei as reflected in shipping dues collected during the period 1911-1918:

Table 4

Shipping Dues, 1911-1918<sup>22</sup>

1911-12	\$ 4,512
1912-13	6,261
1913-14	14,520
1914-15	24,997
1915-16	31,707
1916-17	30,527
1917-18	32,932

One must bear in mind, of course, the fact that the war in Europe from 1914 to 1918 inevitably affected the Far

East and there was some falling off of trade due to a shortage of steamers, a surge in the prices of foreign commodities, and the elimination of certain overseas markets for Chinese goods.<sup>23</sup> The inhabitants of Liu-kung Island were hit particularly hard by the absence of the British fleet during the war and many small shopkeepers and laborers found themselves in dire straits. As all island property was government owned, a petition was presented to the commissioner requesting that rents temporarily be waived and this was granted. The British were reluctant, however, to allow poor island residents to become completely dependent on government relief and hoped rather that they would find work on the mainland as domestic servants or seek help from their relatives there.<sup>24</sup>

The war also had some positive effects on the Weihaiwei economy. The Japanese takeover of Tsingtao in 1914, for example, led many dealers to transfer their shipments of ground nuts to Weihaiwei for export. A bumper crop in 1917 meant an even greater volume of trade in this commodity as shown below:

Table 5  
Ground Nut Exports, 1911-1919<sup>25</sup>

<u>Year</u>	<u>Ground Nut Seeds</u>
1911	142,961 piculs
1912	123,223
1913	176,036
1914	187,793
1915	247,372
1916	173,934
1917	244,097
1918	no figures available
1919	269,160

The war years also saw an increase in the export of salt and fish from Weihaiwei and there were hopes that tobacco would become an important new product. The British-American Tobacco Company in 1913 established an experimental farm at Weihaiwei and was impressed with the suitability of the climate and soil for cultivation of this plant. The plan was to provide local farmers with seeds and instructions on how to grow them and to overcome their resistance to the idea of cultivating a new crop by demonstrating how profitable it could be. In 1915 it was noted that: "The Company intends to withdraw its American manager and hand over the barns in which the tobacco is dried to Chinese who will continue to cultivate the American seed."<sup>26</sup> In spite of these efforts, however, tobacco production never did become a major industry in Weihaiwei.

One industry which did flourish there for a time was the manufacture of hair nets with a firm based in Chefoo commencing operations in the leasehold in 1913. Chinese hair was first sent to Germany to be specially prepared and then sent back to Weihaiwei where it was made into nets.<sup>27</sup> Some five hundred young girls and women were soon employed at this job with an average output of ten nets per worker per day. The technique could be learned in less than a day at a wage of 1-3½¢ per net depending on its size.<sup>28</sup> The possibility of new duties being levied at Chefoo in order to construct a much-needed breakwater there tempted a number of other firms to consider moving to Weihaiwei. In 1917 a soap factory was established and in 1918 a new silk filature.<sup>29</sup>

## Weihaiwei and the Chinese Labour Corps

Perhaps the most important economic opportunity for Weihaiwei during the war years, however, was the decision in 1916 to make it the embarkation point for the Chinese Labour Corps.<sup>30</sup> In fact, it was this development which helped most to offset other negative effects of the war. By April 1918, 44,000 "coolies" had been enrolled at Weihaiwei for labor service in Europe. Their wages ranged from \$10-\$20 per month for unskilled labor to \$13-\$30 per month for skilled labor. Initial contracts were for three years and the laborers agreed to work ten hours per day on railroads, roads, factories, mines, and dockyards. Clothing, food, housing, fuel, and return passages were provided to each man as well as a \$20 bonus upon embarkation. In addition, each worker's family received \$10 per month as an allowance while he was away.<sup>31</sup> One district officer remarked upon the effect the Corps was having in the Territory:

" . . . several beggar families in [my] district [are] doing quite well owing to the fact that sons and relatives [have] gone to Europe. Not only [are] they buying small pieces of land but they even [have] made subscriptions to the temple as a thanks offering for their improved conditions in life."<sup>32</sup>

The presence of the labor depot in Weihaiwei also meant that workers spent some of their money there before embarkation and this benefited local shopkeepers. It is significant, however, that although one-third of the laborers sent to Europe were residents of Shantung, those who were natives of Weihaiwei were few. One can only assume, then, that economic conditions in the Territory must have been relatively good compared to other parts of the province.<sup>33</sup>

The British police inspector in 1917 remarked upon other ways in which the Labour Corps contributed to better living standards in the leasehold: "The villages are affected in many ways, supplying farming produce, pigs, making of clothing and shoes, fodder to the mule camp, all leads to prosperity for the colony. Demand for carts and mules for transport. Even the local women are busy making money, by making clothes for the depot."<sup>34</sup> Thus, the decision in 1918 with the end of the war to move the center of Corps operations to Tsingtao because of its superior transportation facilities had an adverse effect on Weihaiwei's economy.<sup>35</sup>

#### Other Economic Developments

Yet by 1918, Weihaiwei showed signs of considerable economic prosperity. The "Victory Pier" was completed and so many new buildings were being erected in Port Edward that they extended from the eastern end of the town to the city walls of Weihai a mile away. Land prices around Port Edward rose dramatically with some particularly desirable plots fetching the grand sum of \$1,000 per mou in 1917 when in 1900 they had only been worth \$60.<sup>36</sup> By this time also there was a new Chamber of Commerce in Port Edward. In 1916 one of the district officers was asked for advice by some of the local Chinese merchants on how to form such an organization noting that their traditional kung-hui, though it contained between seventy and eighty firms, was at a disadvantage in dealing with other cities which had modern chambers. They also had had difficulty in forming an executive body to represent and manage the kung-hui and thought it best to organize an elected committee. By July 1916 they succeeded in establishing the Chamber of Commerce and

electing a twenty-member executive council to run it. Four of these men had also served as electors during the 1909 provincial elections. Among the problems the new chamber hoped to deal with first was the alarming proliferation of notes issued as currency by shops in the Territory with inadequate financial backing. At the same time, they hoped to cooperate with rather than displace other traditional merchant organizations such as the shang-hui based in the market town of Yang-t'ing in Weihaiwei's southern district.<sup>37</sup>

Commenting on the emergence of the new Chamber of Commerce, a British official noted that especially in comparison with Tsingtao: ". . . the natives of Weihaiwei have gradually and steadily come to lean more and more on the Government officers for advice. They now refer to Government far more problems than they did formerly. Since my own tenure of office they abolished the old half-hearted Merchant Guild and established a proper Chamber of Commerce which is doing excellent work."<sup>38</sup> Andrew Nathan notes that such chambers assumed rather wide responsibilities in China, including the protection of local industries, the formulation of fiscal policy, and the regulation of prices, accounts, and enterprises, to name just a few.<sup>39</sup> By establishing such an organization the merchants of Weihaiwei made it clear that they wanted Port Edward to continue its transformation from a quiet fishing village to a modern trading community fully equipped to compete with its neighbors at Chefoo, Tsingtao, and other ports on the China coast.

The British Treasury too was hopeful that Weihaiwei would continue along the path of economic development in order that its own local revenues would eventually free it from dependence on imperial subsidies. Immediately following



World War I an especially urgent appeal was made to all colonial administrators to help in the nation's war recovery program by stimulating economic growth in their respective areas. In line with this request, Commissioner Lockhart called a meeting of Weihaiwei's British businessmen in August 1919 to discuss ways in which the leasehold might participate in this effort.<sup>40</sup> By October two reports had been prepared for the commissioner, one by the British merchant community and the other by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.

It was noted in the British report that the total value of trade at Weihaiwei in 1918 was approximately \$8,128,000 with a healthy balance between exports and imports. Ground nuts already comprised 40 percent of the export trade but it was felt this figure could be improved upon if scientific methods of fertilization, better irrigation, and new seed were introduced. In addition, ground nut oil could be manufactured if machinery were made available. The report also noted that although in 1919 there were eight silk filatures with eighty looms producing about seven thousand pieces of silk annually at Weihaiwei, the bulk of local cocoons was still sent to Chefoo for processing. It was suggested that both British and Chinese investors be encouraged to build enough additional filatures to accommodate this trade. The fishing industry, it was thought, could be greatly expanded with the introduction of steam trawlers and the construction of factories for canning and the conversion of fish to meal for fertilizer and animal feed. Salt was considered another promising commodity, although as yet there were only four collection pans in place along Weihaiwei's extensive coastline. It was recommended that this trade be enlarged with

a view to supplying the huge foreign markets. Weihaiwei's abundant granite and lime resources could likewise be exploited and other mineral deposits investigated. Continuing efforts were also required in afforestation. Furthermore, if the needs of the growing Chinese population were carefully studied, it was thought possible to stimulate greater use of British-made goods perhaps through a permanent industrial exhibition. And, it was optimistically noted: "There is perhaps no place in China where the native is so kindly disposed towards Europeans as in Weihaiwei. The merchant class is intelligent, conservative and thrifty. The peasant is peaceful and industrious, working his own fields and living in a well-built stone house . . ."<sup>41</sup>

Other British suggestions included a renewed attempt to educate local farmers in commercial fruit production and the possible development of brickmaking, cement, and glass industries. It was also recommended that unless reciprocal agreements could be reached with the Japanese respecting British steamers carrying cargo between Japanese ports, Japanese ships should not be allowed to operate between Weihaiwei and Hong Kong.<sup>42</sup>

In its report the Chinese merchant community emphasized the need for railroad transport at Weihaiwei, the establishment of a large banking facility, construction of various factories, and an industrial school.<sup>43</sup> Finally, in making his own recommendations, Commissioner Lockhart agreed that a railway was vital and stressed the importance of retaining the British lease at Weihaiwei until 1998, under the same terms by which Japan occupied Port Arthur. He also thought that the Territory's duty-free status should be maintained

with no new Chinese customs agencies permitted.<sup>44</sup>

### Education

The trend toward "modernization" was demonstrated at Weihaiwei in other ways during the post-revolutionary decade as interest continued to grow in education, especially in Port Edward.<sup>45</sup> Educational opportunities in the Territory compared quite favorably with conditions existing in neighboring hsien at this time where the republican revolution had led to disorganization and a lack of funding for schools.<sup>46</sup> This was especially true after 1913 as Yuan Shih-k'ai's policy of withholding power from provincial legislatures made local "gentry" less interested in contributing to the maintenance of state institutions. Buck notes that the earlier enthusiastic support of Shantung's local elite was, in fact, never fully recovered.<sup>47</sup> Educational policy and funding at Weihaiwei, however, remained relatively consistent. Table 6 below illustrates the gradual rise in enrollments at government and private schools in Port Edward from 1913 to 1919:

Table 6

Enrollments at Weihaiwei Schools for Chinese Students  
(Excluding village ssu-shu)<sup>48</sup>

	<u>1913</u>	<u>1915</u>	<u>1917</u>	<u>1919</u>
Government Free School	70	78	70	92
Anglo-Chinese School	49	49	40	50
Mission Workroom for Girls	41	100	*	*
St. Joseph's Mission School for Boys	9	20	22	18
Mission School for Girls	32	46	59	50
Anti-Foot-Binding School	24	15	16	*

(\* No figures available.)

In 1916 the new Wen-teng magistrate, who was especially interested in educational affairs, requested that the British authorities allow him to investigate the finances and property of Weihaiwei's schools. He was promptly informed that this was not possible as he had no authority inside the leasehold. Apparently, this man was something of an educational fanatic, for as one district officer reported: "There are complaints in his district that he hardly ever finds time to hear lawsuits, and that the people cannot get decisions from him, as he devotes his energies almost wholly to educational matters."<sup>49</sup> This very minor incident, which ended peacefully, was the prelude to a series of much more serious conflicts which the British were to experience in the late 1920s with Kuomintang officials over the issues of education and political jurisdiction in the Territory.<sup>50</sup>

In 1919 the Chinese authorities governing the walled town of Weihai closed all the private schools there, forcing many additional students to seek admission to the Government Free School in Port Edward. Thus, during the 1918-19 academic year there was an all-time high enrollment of 92 with 109 applicants for the following year. The government thought it necessary at this stage to separate the school into two branches, although the students continued to be taught jointly. One branch, called the Huang Jen Free School, remained tuition-free for poor boys, while the second branch, known as Huang Jen College, was for wealthier students who were charged a modest annual fee. The ever-growing interest in education as reflected in the enrollment figures was, to the dismay of the conservative headmaster at the government school, accompanied by a similar

increase in enthusiasm for the study of English.<sup>51</sup>

Unfortunately, however, there were by this time far more graduates from Weihaiwei's schools than there were suitable jobs within the Territory, especially following the closure of the Chinese Labour Corps offices. The Anglican headmaster of the Anglo-Chinese School expressed his concern in 1919 that there was little demand in the leasehold for English and that many of the boys attending his school, at the age of seventeen or eighteen, were too old to begin to study the language anyway. He hoped that by introducing typing and bookkeeping courses he could at least provide them with additional marketable skills. Some of the wealthier graduates from his school went on to Nankai College in Tientsin or more advanced schools in Tsinan. Others were employed in local Chinese shops as apprentices or returned to their villages to become farmers. Two of the more fortunate ones found jobs at the Chinese Bank of Communication in Chefoo.<sup>53</sup> As in so many of China's rural areas, however, there simply was no way to employ large numbers of educated people. Nevertheless, one must assume that even those students who simply returned to their native villages upon graduation would still have had an important impact there merely by being literate and having been exposed to new ideas from the "outside world." No doubt many of them later became local leaders and perhaps even pressed for reform in traditional primary schools.

#### Public Health

Change came to Weihaiwei's villages in other ways too as a result of the British presence. In 1916 a new hospital

was completed in the rural town of Wen-ch'uan-t'ang where the southern district officer had his headquarters. Yet even this new institution was established in a very traditional manner as it was the kung-hui for eight local villages which both donated the site for the hospital and agreed not to charge rent on it. In return for this generosity, it was expected that the government express its appreciation in an appropriate manner. Thus, the commissioner and his staff spent considerable time deciding upon the proper Chinese inscription for a commemorative plaque, or pei-wen, which was erected and conspicuously displayed in honor of the kung-hui.<sup>54</sup>

Continuous efforts were also made to have as many people as possible protected against smallpox at Weihaiwei and by 1918 it was estimated that 50 percent of the population had been vaccinated.<sup>55</sup> In the same year it was decided for reasons of sanitation and with a view toward a larger tourist industry at Weihaiwei, to tear down the dilapidated buildings which made up the Chinese East Village on Liu-kung Island and to ask most of those living there to move to the mainland, especially those with no visible means of support. All cultivation using human fertilizer was also prohibited. In addition, the British drew up elaborate plans for new East and West Villages with modern shops, markets, latrines, drainage systems, and water supply.<sup>56</sup> In 1919 it was estimated that East and West Villages would cost \$26,000 and \$23,000 respectively to build.<sup>57</sup>

In the meantime, as one might have expected, the new restrictions on cultivation and the efforts to move people to the mainland caused hardships for some. A correspondent

for the North China Herald observed that the Chinese did not understand this policy and "were rather put out that they had to leave these old unsanitary houses, and seek new quarters on the mainland." He continued: "It has been a bit hard for some of them as empty houses are not easy to get on the mainland, for the place is growing rapidly in all directions."<sup>58</sup> Acting temporarily in Lockhart's absence as commissioner, Reginald Johnston wrote a lengthy memorandum to the Colonial Office proposing that the old buildings should indeed be demolished and new ones erected for those allowed to remain as employees and shopkeepers servicing the island's naval facilities. The arable land, he thought, should be utilized under a carefully regulated scheme for dairy-farming, market gardening, and fruit cultivation on a fairly large scale. Lots could be leased on stringent conditions to Europeans or Chinese. This scheme, he felt, would provide the people with food and enhance Weihaiwei's value as a health resort.<sup>59</sup>

It is not entirely clear just how many of Johnston's proposals were incorporated into the two villages eventually constructed on the island, but after some delay due to a shortage of British funds for the project, the old buildings were demolished and many new garden plots were laid out in the open spaces thus provided. In 1921 East Village was completed and West Village had acquired two blocks of new shops with a third block planned for 1922.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, in response to complaints by island inhabitants that private school facilities were both inadequate and too expensive for poor children to attend, the government agreed to help subsidize a new school organized by the Chinese and operated on

a subscription basis. In 1920 there were thirty-five students in attendance.<sup>61</sup> At roughly the same time that these improvements were occurring on the island, similar steps were being taken at Port Edward to eliminate dilapidated buildings and widen the streets.<sup>62</sup> Thus, it would seem that at least some parts of the leased Territory by the early 1920s had acquired a more modern outward appearance as well as new social institutions and attitudes.

### Political Developments

In view of the economic and social changes taking place in Weihaiwei, plus the Territory's greatly expanded contact with the outside world after 1912, it is hardly surprising to also find important changes in the political life of the area at this time. Mention has already been made of the general unrest which affected the area following the 1911 revolution. One district officer in February 1913, for example, observed with alarm that within his jurisdiction seven robberies had occurred in a period of ten days. Furthermore, he had had to deal severely with a local radical who was making a nuisance of himself:

A revolutionary gent has been showing his contempt for the religious observances of his fellow villagers by smashing shrines and images. The whole village has a case against him and I have had him arrested. . . . I shall probably make an example of him as it will be a good opportunity to let the people of the Territory know that we do not support people who break up t'u ti shrines.<sup>63</sup>

The prescribed penalties for such a crime were heavy: a jail sentence of two years and/or a fine of \$500.

The district officer's behavior in this case is quite consistent with overall British policy at Weihaiwei, namely



that local religious practices be respected and traditional social institutions preserved. One might go even further, however, to say that this officer displayed remarkable insight into the workings of Chinese local society and his own relationship to it. In his introduction to Studies in Chinese Society, Arthur Wolf has noted: "In traditional China government and religion were so closely related that the imperial bureaucracy, temple organization, peasant insurrection, and popular conceptions of the supernatural all belonged to the same sphere." Thus, Wolf argues, "the supernatural world of the Chinese peasantry was a faithful replication of their view of the Chinese social landscape. . . . Taking the view of the peasant we find that the gods were thought to have essentially the same characteristics as posted officials."<sup>64</sup> The t'u ti kung, or "earth god," for example, like a local official was responsible for the welfare of a specifically defined area. His functions, as those of the district magistrate, were twofold: to act as policeman guarding against supernatural bandits, the local kuei or ghosts, and, as a kind of "spy," to make reports to his superiors regarding the activities of humans in his charge.<sup>65</sup> By protecting the t'u ti shrine in his locality, then, as the equivalent of the hsien magistrate, the British district officer was in a sense also preserving his own position within the village authority structure since, to the Chinese peasant, the supernatural and natural order were the mirror images of one another. If a "revolutionary gent" were allowed to shatter such an important part of the villagers' spiritual world he would also have seriously undermined the authority of those governing the villagers' temporal world.

Wolf concludes his analysis of this aspect of Chinese local society by saying:

Assessed in terms of its long-range impact on the people, [the Chinese imperial government] appears to have been one of the most potent governments ever known, for it created a religion in its own image. Its firm grip on the popular imagination may be one reason the imperial government survived so long despite its many failings. Perhaps this is also the reason China's revolutionaries have so often organized their movements in terms of the concepts and symbols of such foreign faiths as Buddhism and Christianity. The native gods were so much a part of the establishment that they could not be turned against it.<sup>66</sup>

It will be remembered that when republican revolutionaries attacked "the establishment" in neighboring Jung-ch'eng-hsien in 1912, they turned their wrath on the temple of the city god as well as the yamen of the district magistrate.<sup>67</sup> It will also be remembered, however, that in so doing they helped stimulate violent counter-revolutionary hatred among the local population. The British, on the other hand, by openly demonstrating their respect for religious practices in Weihaiwei, also very skillfully reinforced their own position within the established Chinese social order.

Unlike the revolution of 1911, the 1913 uprising against Yüan Shih-k'ai, often referred to as the "Second Revolution," had little impact in Weihaiwei or in Shantung generally.<sup>68</sup> Yet it was about this time that the British took steps to once again ensure that traditional village practices and institutions were maintained. As has been mentioned, the legal petition fees were raised in 1913 in order to both discourage excessive litigation and encourage greater reliance on village elders for resolving disputes.<sup>69</sup> A continuing effort was also made to ascertain local Chinese opinion on various

matters before any government policy was enacted. The motivation behind this was of course to assist the British administration in making informed decision, but it was also to provide local leaders with a sense of involvement in and hopefully commitment to the existing government at Weihaiwei.

The British for many years had been acutely aware of a problem which Martin Yang has discussed, namely that in traditional China the closer the relationship between a local leader and the government, the less prestigious and desirable that leader's position became.<sup>70</sup> In 1914 Commissioner Lockhart was especially concerned about the increasing difficulty of getting "respectable" men to serve as village and district headmen due to the defamation these positions were receiving by a minority of local citizens. When questioned about existing procedures of selection, the headmen themselves stated that election by rotation was an unsatisfactory method as it led to quarrels and diminished their authority. They also disliked the responsibility of having to sign all land deeds and thought the government should simply issue them without their signature.<sup>71</sup>

After further consultation it was decided that headmen throughout the Territory should be selected in a uniform manner and that there should be certain minimum standards both for those holding the office and those entitled to vote for it. Thus, village and district headmen were to be elected by local villagers, subject to the recommendations of the British district officer, and confirmed in office by the commissioner. Candidates were to be men of good character who owned at least ten mou of land, with preference given

to those having an education. To be an elector one had to be free of any criminal record and to have paid land tax on at least one mou of land. A majority vote of 60 percent was required for election, but if the district officer was not satisfied with the man chosen or if one-third of the electors requested it, a new election could be held.<sup>72</sup>

Clearly the British were attempting with these new electoral procedures to strengthen traditional leadership roles and to promote the modern self-government movement which was quite popular at that time in China, even in a rural area like Weihaiwei. By stipulating that candidates for the office of village or district headman had to own ten mou of land and that preference would be given to those with an education, the British were simply regularizing certain minimum standards which had long been recognized by local customary practices.<sup>73</sup> It is doubtful that these regulations altered the balance of power already existing within Weihaiwei's villages. They were intended to guarantee, though, that every village and district would have one person actually filling the somewhat unpopular position of middleman mediating between village interests and those of the British administration. Making the election of headmen subject to the approval of the local district officer and confirmation by the commissioner also ensured that the British retained overall political control.

It is significant that these foreign rulers, like so many Chinese officials who served before and after them at Weihaiwei and indeed throughout China, encountered a degree of local resistance which they were never able to fully overcome. This resistance does not appear to have been based

upon any sort of widespread anti-foreign feeling among the villagers or their leaders. Rather it reflects a basic problem in the relationship between Chinese local society and those who governed it on behalf of the central authorities. It seems accurate to describe the British in this case as nearly analogous to Chinese officials since they modeled their behavior so closely on that of hsien magistrates and were responded to by the Chinese as if they were hsien magistrates. Try as they might to tie the village and district headmen more closely to their administration, they continued to find a spirit of independence and reluctance to accept further widening of their responsibilities. Although Frederic Wakeman is referring more specifically to the problematical relationship between local "gentry" and hsien magistrates, his analysis could apply equally well to that existing between Weihaiwei's village and district headmen and British officialdom when he states that: "Local social organizations . . . embodied contrary principles: integration into the imperial system and autonomy from it. The dynamic oscillation between these poles created the unity of Chinese society, not by eliminating the contradictions but by balancing them in such a way as to favor overall order."<sup>74</sup>

The British were certainly not alone at this time in attempting to integrate local leaders into a more unified administrative structure. Philip Kuhn, for example, has described the ways in which Yüan Shih-k'ai's government responded to the challenge presented by newly-formed self-government assemblies in 1913 and 1914. Alarmed that some of these bodies were competing with the traditional county bureaucracy for control of financial resources, the central

government in February 1914 simply declared all such assemblies illegal. It went even further in December of that year by issuing a new code called "Experimental Regulations for Local Self-Government" which, as Kuhn notes, "envisaged a restricted form of popular participation, closely hedged about with franchise limitations and official prerogatives, based on a unit called the 'self-governing ward' (tzu-chih ch'u)."<sup>75</sup> These large wards, four to six per county, in theory were to manage such things as education, public health, and roads and were intended to provide the central government with an additional level of coordination between the counties and villages. In practice, however, it was the late Ch'ing system based on much smaller units, known as ch'u, and largely controlled by local "gentry-managers" which continued to function in most parts of China until 1929 or later. Commenting on the failure of these bureaucratic mechanisms to curb the power of local elites in early republican China, Kuhn concludes:

It seemed for a time as if the control-autonomy relationship in local government was going to be left at the point it had reached by the empire's end: a substantial ramification of the infrastructure of sub-county government by means of formal control of wards and ward-like units by the lower elite, but without a workable system whereby that elite might be disciplined in the public interest, much less brought into a system of mobilization appropriate to a modern nation.<sup>76</sup>

It is, then, perhaps all the more remarkable that the British at Weihaiwei attained some measure of success in both encouraging local participation in government while at the same time retaining ultimate administrative control. Equally remarkable is the fact that they did so largely by

relying on traditional village institutions. A report filed in 1914 after the electoral reforms had been implemented noted that every village had selected an official headman and that in many cases he was assisted by a village council. The new system also ensured that each of Weihaiwei's twenty-six districts was represented by a district headman.<sup>77</sup>

In a continuing effort to recognize "good citizenship" in the Territory, Commissioner Lockhart made a number of honorary awards in 1914, including one to a man described as "native gentry," who received an inscribed tablet or pien, for the encouragement he had given to villagers in supplying labor for road construction since 1906. This tablet was to be displayed in his ancestral hall. In addition, medals were awarded to four headmen who had either helped in settling disputes, promoted education, or simply conducted themselves in a praiseworthy manner.<sup>78</sup> Based on his statistical studies of the Ch'ing shih-lu for the period 1796 to 1911, C. K. Yang has made the following observation regarding the distribution of "honor awards" by the Chinese government in recognition of the traditional virtues of loyalty, piety, and chastity:

. . . when the system was threatened by crises, one of its responses was to reinforce the faith in fundamental values in order to restore the effectiveness of traditional guidelines of social action. . . . The data show clearly that as the frequency of mass actions increased, the political system responded by frantically increasing the number of honor awards to reassure the population of the soundness of traditional values.<sup>79</sup>

Although the British at Weihaiwei in 1914 were not threatened by the kind of violent opposition with which Yang is primarily concerned, they clearly saw the need to counteract the

passive resistance which was undermining the headman system upon which their administration depended. Thus, they too chose to increase the number of "honor awards" to "reassure the population of the soundness of traditional values" and to reinforce their own position within the local authority structure.

In a speech delivered at the 1914 awards ceremony, Commissioner Lockhart reminded the assembled headmen of their duties, impressing upon them the need to have all land deeds, transferals, or mortgages registered. He also urged them to support the government's program of afforestation whereby free seed and seedlings were supplied to villagers for planting along roads and on wasteland. He further informed them of new cart taxes and shipping levies and asked for suggestions as to additional measures for increasing revenue.<sup>80</sup> Lockhart was then clearly making a very strong effort to simultaneously buttress the authority of Weihaiwei's headmen and to mobilize them to serve both "the public interest" and British administrative purposes.

The First World War, as we have seen, had a considerable economic impact upon the Territory but caused little political concern. One district officer wrote in 1915:

There was some uneasiness during the time when active operations against Tsingtau were being conducted and during the early months of the year under review, but this anxiety never became acute as the people were well aware of the fact that the Japanese were allies of Great Britain and that there was therefore no possibility of a movement of Japanese troops in the direction of Weihaiwei.<sup>81</sup>

Growing awareness of international political alignments among the people of the Territory is perhaps the most significant



fact illustrated by the above comment, though the news that China had severed relations with Germany and joined the allies in 1917 apparently aroused no interest in Weihaiwei.<sup>82</sup>

Unsettled conditions continued to exist in Shantung throughout the decade following the 1911 revolution and made the British authorities in Weihaiwei wary of reducing their police force. Pirates were active in southern Manchuria and along the promontory coastline with gangs at times operating near the Territory. One British officer noted in 1915 that so far only British prestige and the fear of their guns had kept the bandits away, but he was concerned that this deterrent might be losing some of its effectiveness. He was also worried that Japanese aggression in Manchuria might discourage Chinese from settling there and persuade them to return to Shantung without any means of supporting themselves. He added that the Japanese, through their occupation of Tsingtao, issuance of the infamous "Twenty-One Demands," and troop buildups along the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway, had incurred deep resentment in Shantung and he feared that this could produce hostility toward foreigners in general. Furthermore, he believed that Yüan Shih-k'ai's restoration of the monarchy could lead to trouble from Chinese republicans or Japanese using Shantung as a base for their activities.<sup>83</sup>

Given Yüan Shih-k'ai's blatant suppression of parliamentary democracy after assuming office in 1912, it is not surprising that Territorial residents showed little interest in the provincial elections of 1915. Electoral regulations made it extremely difficult for anyone to qualify to vote as it was again necessary to own \$5,000 worth of property

and to produce elaborate documentation verifying such ownership. Only four people did so and even they were not informed by the Chinese authorities about where and when to vote.<sup>84</sup>

Political participation at Weihaiwei took place in a somewhat more alarming manner in 1917. It should be noted that Sun Yat-sen in that year had formed a separatist military government based in Canton. In December an anonymous Chinese letter addressed to District Officer Johnston revealed that "a number of the adherents of Sun Yat-sen's section of the 'Southern' political party were holding secret meetings in Port Edward and were plotting to bring about an armed attack on Wen-teng City . . . with a view to holding it as an advance-post of the 'Southern' republicans in their struggle with the Peking Government."<sup>85</sup> Johnston was especially concerned that the meetings had been held "within a stone's throw of the police headquarters" and yet he had received no report from his men about them. He decided to take swift action:

A midnight raid on the premises of the plotters was successfully carried out, and among the persons arrested were a personal friend of the notorious Sun Yat-sen, several 'Southerners' from Shanghai and Canton, and a few natives of this Territory, who had already been concerned in previous revolutionary movements.<sup>86</sup>

Johnston, however, at this point found himself in an awkward situation for to deal with the conspirators too severely would make enemies who might later take advantage of the Territory's relatively defenseless position. To be too lenient, on the other hand, would encourage continued use of Weihaiwei as a convenient staging ground for political intrigue. As a compromise he chose to banish the outsiders

from the Territory and insist on guarantees of good behavior from the Weihaiwei residents.<sup>87</sup>

It is interesting that this small band of revolutionaries formed quite an exclusive group in Shantung in 1917.

As David Buck observes:

After the 1916 uprising [an abortive attack on Tsinan organized by the southern Revolutionary party and aided by the Japanese], Sun's support in Shantung disappeared almost completely. The few Shantungese who remained closely associated with Sun and his cause during the next decade nearly always operated outside their home province. The only activity of Sun's Revolutionary party and the later Nationalist party in Shantung was clandestine propaganda or organizing work.<sup>88</sup>

The Weihaiwei conspirators must have considered the leasehold an ideal location for their activities and nearly equivalent to a site outside the province as it was safely beyond Chinese jurisdiction and had the added advantage of containing some republican sympathizers, perhaps even within the police force itself. As is well known, however, Sun Yat-sen's plans once again collapsed as he was forced out of Kwangtung by Lu Jung-t'ing in May 1918 and fled to Shanghai to begin yet another reorganization of his revolutionary party. According to British sources, Weihaiwei for the next several years remained free of further political intrigue.

Conditions elsewhere in Shantung at this time were far less peaceful. Following the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai, each shift in the balance of power at Peking ultimately led to a change in the military and civilian leadership of Shantung. From 1916 until 1928 no fewer than eleven men held the offices of military and civil governor and "actual power was constantly shifting between the two posts, as well as from one man to another in the seemingly unending chain of new appoin-

tees."<sup>89</sup> There was obviously little opportunity for each of these men to consolidate his authority over the province and a continual shortage of funds meant inadequate protection for those living outside the larger cities. The British consul at Tsinan observed in 1918 that well-armed, roving bands of over one thousand men roamed the southern and western border districts burning villages and robbing the wealthy. Trade in many areas was at a standstill and farmers left their fields untilled.<sup>90</sup>

In the immediate post-Yüan Shih-k'ai period the Shantung promontory was not badly affected by the general lawlessness existing in the province as bandit gangs were reluctant to move too far from their bases of supply in western and southwestern Shantung. They reportedly also avoided the Tsingtao region, demonstrating a "wholesome dread of the Japanese."<sup>91</sup> By 1918, however, conditions near Weihaiwei's borders began to deteriorate with both bandits and beggars from the disturbed parts of the province creating difficulties. In Jung-ch'eng hsien an armed gang of forty men landed on the coast and proceeded past the hsien capital where no attempt was made to arrest them. They then raided a village about five miles from the Territorial borders and carried off several Chinese for ransom, among them a resident of Weihaiwei. A successful escape was made by sea. Further robberies took place in July of that year with some even occurring inside the Territory. At this point the commissioner decided to expand his police force with twelve special Chinese constables and one Chinese non-commissioned officer. As an added precaution, British troops were sent from Tientsin to reinforce Weihaiwei's borders.<sup>92</sup> All of this new protection

encouraged several wealthy families living outside the Territory to seek temporary sanctuary in Weihaiwei.<sup>93</sup>

Perhaps even more alarming than the bandit raids of this period, however, were the serious civil disturbances which took place in Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien in opposition to the implementation of new salt taxes. In May 1918 District Commissioner Johnston, who was temporarily serving as Weihaiwei's commissioner in Lockhart's absence, expressed his concern about neighboring districts to the Colonial Office as follows:

Indeed the severe fighting which took place there in the year of the revolution (1911) seems to have had a thoroughly unsettling effect on a large proportion of the inhabitants. Riots accompanied by bloodshed have taken place on more than one occasion during the past year, within a distance of four miles from the British boundary, and the authority of the Chinese District Magistrates has been defied with impunity by uneducated rustics and fishermen.<sup>94</sup>

Johnston was not worried that this particular unrest would spread to Weihaiwei unless the anti-Japanese feeling at the time so prevalent in Shantung were extended to her allies. He noted that thusfar he had observed no signs of "Boxerism" in the Territory, but he had no doubt there were a "number of people, not wholly without influence, who were decidedly anti-foreign or anti-British in sentiment; and it was but too probable that these persons would welcome the outbreak of any disturbance which involved the Government in embarrassment or in loss of prestige."<sup>95</sup>

Another provincial election was held in Shantung in 1918 following the appointment of a new military governor, Chang Shu-yuan. There was some hesitation by the British authorities at first over whether to allow local residents to vote, but they were petitioned by six district headmen

who argued that if this right had been recognized in 1909 under the Ch'ing government, it certainly could not now be refused under the republic. No doubt anxious to avoid providing any excuse for a disturbance in Weihaiwei, especially given the unsettled conditions nearby, the British acquiesced to this request. They also dispatched a few of their police to act as observers at the polling places located inside the walled town and at Meng-chia-chuang, a large market town in the south of the Territory. More people were officially qualified to vote in this election than in the previous one of 1915, and there was considerable rivalry between competing factions. In fact, the incidence of duplicate voting and irregularities led to complaints and a second balloting shortly afterward. Although local interest in self-government would appear to have increased by this time, it was not accompanied by profound respect for the niceties of democratic procedures.<sup>96</sup>

Yet in the midst of so much turmoil elsewhere in Shantung, Weihaiwei must have seemed a model of peace and tranquility. Reginald Johnston remarked in 1918:

The vast majority of the inhabitants of Port Edward are as yet but very slightly affected by the reforming activities of 'Young China.' Even the queue, which is now rarely seen in the treaty ports and other commercial and industrial centres, is still cherished by multitudes of the people in this Territory and the conservatism which insists upon the retention of this so-called badge of servitude to the extinct dynasty is powerful in moulding the thoughts and habits of the people in more important respects than the arrangement of the hair.<sup>97</sup>

As will be seen in the next chapter, however, the British were once again to find to their surprise that the leasehold and its "conservative" inhabitants were indeed affected by events elsewhere.

Notes to Chapter 5

<sup>1</sup>CO 873/359, Annual Report, 1912.

<sup>2</sup>CO 873/330, Johnston to Lockhart, 17 January 1912. The merchant guild at Shih-tao offered to hold a banquet in their honor, but the British declined saying they did not have time to stay. They were somewhat chagrined to learn, however, that the German navy had recently captured a group of pirates operating in the area and taken them back to Tsingtao.

<sup>3</sup>CO 873/348, Johnston to Naval Executive Officer, 21 May 1912, and Johnston to Lockhart, 22 May 1912.

<sup>4</sup>CO 873/359, Annual Report, 1912.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid. The Weihaiwei spirit monopolist at least had confidence in the local economy as he offered a tender in 1912 for \$21,040 in order to gain the new three-year contract which represented an advance of \$3,240 over the previous agreement. See CO 873/349, Spirit Tenders, 1912.

<sup>6</sup>All cart-owners in 1913 were required to pay a licensing fee of \$4.00 per year and wheelbarrow-owners \$2.00 per year. It was estimated that this would bring in about \$2,000 annually. See CO 873/372, Walter to Lockhart, 3 July 1913, and Jennings to Lockhart, 29 January 1914. In 1917, after consultation with the merchant community, it was decided that the increase in cart traffic throughout the Territory and the damage it caused to roads called for additional revenue in order to make the necessary repairs. Thus, cart- and wheelbarrow-owners were obliged each year to pay a license fee of \$6.00 and \$3.00 respectively. See CO 873/495, Sly to Lockhart, 19 January and 20 August 1917. This increase apparently led to some grumbling among residents in outlying areas. Johnston felt that the fee was too high and that the tools of a man's trade should not be taxed in any event. As a compromise, those cart-owners who lived in areas still without government-constructed roads were exempted from the licensing system. See CO 873/512, Johnston to Lockhart, 18 September 1917 and Johnston to Southern District Officer, 22 January 1918. The fees to bring petitions before the British magistrates were also raised in 1916 to \$5.00 and in 1917 to \$10.00. See CO 521/21, Annual Report, 1919.

<sup>7</sup>CO 873/438, Moss Report on Land Tax, January 1915. Ch'u T'ung-tsu has noted that during the Ch'ing period a tax was collected whenever property changed hands. In order to maximize the revenue from this source, however, one clerk received payment for stamping the deed with the official seal and another for recording the transaction. It is not surprising, then, that Weihaiwei residents sought to avoid a procedure which had previously been quite costly. See Ch'u, Local Government, p. 48.

<sup>8</sup>CO 873/419, Johnston to Lockhart, 9 June 1914. See also CO 873/426, Johnston to Lockhart, 8 August 1914.

<sup>9</sup>CO 873/387, Jamieson to Lockhart, 13 March 1914, and Moss to Lockhart, 17 June 1914.

<sup>10</sup>CO 873/387, Moss to Lockhart, 16 January 1914.

<sup>11</sup>CO 873/406, Commissioner to Jamieson, 27 April 1914.

<sup>12</sup>CO 873/426, Lockhart to Moss, 10 June 1914.

<sup>13</sup>CO 873/434, Moss to Lockhart, 9 March 1915.

<sup>14</sup>CO 873/434, Johnston to Lockhart, 3 March 1915.

<sup>15</sup>CO 873/434, Lockhart to Johnston and Moss, 10 March 1915, and Lockhart to Moss, 19 December 1915.

<sup>16</sup>Buck, Urban Change, pp. 81-2. See also CO 873/389, Kirke to Jordan, 7 February 1914.

<sup>17</sup>These figures are taken from the following documents: CO 873/378, Annual Report, 1913; CO 521/16, Philips to Colonial Office, 4 October 1915; CO 521/17, Annual Report, 1915; CO 873/518, Annual Report, 1917; CO 521/20, Annual Report, 1918; and CO 521/21, Annual Report, 1919.

<sup>18</sup>The original Chinese versions of nearly all Lockhart's speeches to the headmen of Weihaiwei are contained in Lockhart Papers, Box 46.

<sup>19</sup>CO 873/458, Annual Report, 1915.

<sup>20</sup>CO 521/17, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 25 January 1916.

<sup>21</sup>CO 521/17, Enclosure 2 in Lockhart to Colonial Office, 27 May 1916. See also North China Herald, 30 November 1918, p. 523. In the Lockhart Papers, Box 4, there is a file labeled "Weihaiwei, 1902-21" which contains some interesting photographs of the special opening ceremony held in 1918 for the new pier which was known as "Victory Pier," or "Sheng-li mat'ou," to commemorate the ending of World War I.

<sup>22</sup>CO 521/17, Enclosure 1 in Lockhart to Colonial Office, 27 May 1916, p. 3; CO 521/18, Annual Report, 1917; CO 521/20, Annual Report, 1918.

<sup>23</sup>Higher prices for foreign milled flour, for example, meant that Weihaiwei residents began to use native flour imported by junk from Kiangsu, with the differential being \$2.85 as compared to \$4.50 per unit. Likewise, the soaring cost of kerosene caused people to revert to traditional bean oil for lighting purposes. See CO 873/493, Annual Report, 1916.

<sup>24</sup>CO 873/446, Crawley to Moss, 16 June 1915, and Moss to Lockhart, 9 July 1915.

<sup>25</sup>CO 873/359, Annual Report, 1912; CO 873/378, Annual Report, 1913; CO 521/17, Annual Report, 1915; CO 873/518, Annual Report, 1917; CO 873/654, Annual Report, 1921, Appendix III.



<sup>26</sup>CO 521/17, Annual Report, 1915, p. 5. See also CO 873/378, Annual Report, 1913.

<sup>27</sup>North China Herald, 31 January 1914, p. 307.

<sup>28</sup>CO 873/378, Annual Report, 1913. By 1915 this industry had become so large in Shantung that the province alone provided nearly the entire supply of hair nets for the huge American and European markets. See FO 228/3287, Intelligence Report for Chefoo Consular District, December Quarter, 1921.

<sup>29</sup>North China Herald, 1 December 1917, p. 526. See also CO 873/349, Annual Report, 1918.

<sup>30</sup>CO 521/17, Culett to War Office, 28 September 1916.

<sup>31</sup>B. Manico Gull, "The Story of the Chinese Labour Corps," The Far Eastern Review, 15.4 (April 1918):125-35.

<sup>32</sup>CO 873/518, Annual Report, 1917, p. 5.

<sup>33</sup>CO 521/20, Annual Report, 1918, p. 4.

<sup>34</sup>CO 873/518, Annual Report, 1917, Inspector Whittaker's Report, p. 2.

<sup>35</sup>CO 873/538, Bourne to Lockhart, 9 August 1918. See also CO 873/549, Annual Report, 1918. For an historical account of the Chinese Labour Corps and its activities, see A. P. Jones, "Britain's Search for Cooperation in the First World War," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, London School of Economics, 1977).

<sup>36</sup>North China Herald, 31 January 1914, p. 307, and 18 August 1917, p. 375. See also Lockhart Papers, Box 9, Bundle of 54 letters, Johnston to Lockhart, 3 May 1918; and CO 521/19, Annual Report, 1918.

<sup>37</sup>CO 873/474, Sly to Lockhart, 23 June 1916 and 28 July 1916. This file also contains a complete list of the chamber's executive committee members and their alternates from 1916 to 1927.

<sup>38</sup>CO 521/18, Sly to Lockhart, 22 November 1917. See also CO 873/502, Sly to Johnston, 16 May 1917.

<sup>39</sup>Andrew J. Nathan, Peking Politics, 1918-1923 (Berkeley, 1976), pp. 13-15. For a detailed discussion of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce movement, see Edward J. M. Rhoads, "Merchant Associations in Canton, 1895-1911," in Elvin and Skinner, eds., The Chinese City, pp. 97-117. See also Chan, Merchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise, especially ch. 11.

<sup>40</sup>CO 873/574, Lockhart to Blunt, 11 August 1919.

<sup>41</sup>CO 873/574, Southcott to Lockhart, 22 September 1919.

<sup>42</sup>CO 873/574, Clark to Lockhart, 27 August 1919.

<sup>43</sup>CO 873/574, Blunt to Lockhart, 2 October 1919.

<sup>44</sup>CO 873/574, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 18 October 1919.

<sup>45</sup>Interest was especially strong at this time in athletics, drill exercises, and the wearing of uniforms along the lines of educational theory in Japan. In 1913, for example, it was noted that at a school thirteen miles from Port Edward thirty-two boys in white uniforms, under the leadership of a teacher trained in Japan, were able to demonstrate their drill routines complete with goose-step! See CO 873/377, Secretary to Government's Annual Report, 1913.

<sup>46</sup>CO 873/378, Annual Report, p. 13.

<sup>47</sup>Buck, "Educational Modernization," p. 191.

<sup>48</sup>These figures are taken from the following documents: CO 521/15, Annual Report, 1913; CO 873/458, Annual Report, 1915; CO 521/17, Annual Report, 1915; CO 873/518, Annual Report, 1917; CO 873/585, Annual Report, 1919. As early as 1912 there had existed in Wen-teng hsien a training college to help provide sorely-needed local teachers of the "new" curriculum. Among the sixty pupils enrolled at this institution was a forty-year-old man from Weihaiwei who displayed remarkable enthusiasm for the reform movement. He was, in fact, a village headman who had been cured of opium addiction and had a traditional education. See CO 873/359, Annual Report, 1912.

<sup>49</sup>CO 873/469, Sly to Lockhart, 6 May 1916; Lockhart to Sly, 19 May 1916; Johnston to Lockhart, 23 May 1916; and Sly to Lockhart, 18 December 1916. In this latter piece of correspondence it is noted that a few Territorial schools had registered in previous years with the Wen-teng authorities simply to ensure that their students would be allowed to take the entrance examinations for secondary schools there.

<sup>50</sup>The Wen-teng magistrate demonstrated his concern for educational improvement in yet another way in 1916 when he wrote to a Weihaiwei district officer regarding an "in-service" teacher training college which he was establishing in Wen-teng-hsien. He requested that a notice regarding this new college be posted in the Territory. He also sent along new regulations regarding the type of schooling permissible in his area. These included a ban on the private village schools known as ssu-shu. Again the magistrate was informed that the notice concerning the training college could be posted in the Territory although without his official seal affixed to it. District headmen were told of the college but also advised that any teacher wishing to take advantage of the opportunity would first have to obtain the permission of his employer. The new curriculum regulations imposed in Wen-teng were regarded as optional inside the Territory, but one district officer observed that most village schools had already adopted some "modern" textbooks anyway. See CO 873/466, Sly to Lockhart, 22 and 29 March 1916.

<sup>51</sup>CO 873/585, Annual Report, 1919.

<sup>52</sup>CO 873/524, Sly to Lockhart, 27 April 1918. See also CO 873/549, Annual Report, 1918.

<sup>53</sup>CO 873/585, Annual Report, 1919. The institution referred to as Nankai College here is probably Nankai Middle School in Tientsin, rather than the university of the same name. Boys graduating from schools in Weihaiwei would not be advanced enough to enter a university.

<sup>54</sup>CO 873/402, Johnston to Lockhart, 12 October 1915; Johnston to Lockhart, 19 April 1916; and Crawley to Johnston, 8 September 1916. In this file see also the lengthy correspondence between Johnston and Lockhart from 15 April 1916 until 29 July 1916 regarding the correct classical phrases to be used on the pei-wen.

<sup>55</sup>CO 873/549, Annual Report, 1918.

<sup>56</sup>CO 873/539, Johnston to Sly, 2 April 1918; and Johnston to Colonial Office, 23 May 1918. See also CO 873/542 for the West Village plans, September 1918.

<sup>57</sup>CO 521/20, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 20 February 1919.

<sup>58</sup>North China Herald, 27 July 1918, p. 206.

<sup>59</sup>CO 873/539, Johnston to Colonial Office, 23 May 1918. See also CO 873/522, Sly to Johnston, 4 and 13 March 1918; Johnston to Sly, 4 March 1918; Bell to Johnston, 8 March 1918; and Sly to Johnston, 14 April 1918.

<sup>60</sup>CO 873/585, Departmental Reports, 1919; CO 873/627, Departmental Reports, 1920; CO 521/21, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 23 March 1920; and CO 873/654, Annual Report, 1921. See also North China Herald, 26 April 1919, p. 219.

<sup>61</sup>CO 873/562, Muir to Lockhart, 1 May 1919; Lockhart to House, 2 May 1919; and Binney to Lockhart, 5 December 1920.

<sup>62</sup>North China Herald, 26 April 1919, p. 219.

<sup>63</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 10, Johnston to Lockhart, 1 February 1913.

<sup>64</sup>Arthur P. Wolf, ed., Studies in Chinese Society (Stanford, 1978), p. viii.

<sup>65</sup>Arthur P. Wolf, "Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors," in *ibid.*, p. 134.

<sup>66</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 145. For further discussion of the close relationship between traditional Chinese government and religion, see also Stephan Feuchtwang, "School-Temple and City God," in *ibid.*, pp. 103-30; Hsiao, Rural China, pp. 220-35 and 275-81; and C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 96-9 and 156-8.

<sup>67</sup>See Chapter 4, pp.

<sup>68</sup>CO 873/377, Annual Report, 1913. See also, Buck, Urban Change, p. 87.

<sup>69</sup>See Chapter 2, pp. 92-3.

<sup>70</sup>See Chapter 2, p. 82.

<sup>71</sup>CO 873/384, Sly to Lockhart, 15 January 1914.

<sup>72</sup>For these and additional regulations, see CO 873/384, Lockhart to District Officers, 15 January 1914.

<sup>73</sup>For a detailed discussion of Weihaiwei's traditional village leadership and modifications instituted by the British, see Chapter 2, pp. 79-88.

<sup>74</sup>Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "Introduction," in Frederic Wakeman, Jr. and Carolyn Grant, eds., Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China (Berkeley, 1975), p. 4.

<sup>75</sup>Philip A. Kuhn, "Local Self-Government under the Republic," in *ibid.*, p. 279.

<sup>76</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 280.

<sup>77</sup>CO 873/438, Moss to Lockhart, "Land Tax Report," p. 14.

<sup>78</sup>CO 521/15, translation of commissioner's address to district headmen, 18 April, 1914. For the Chinese version, see Lockhart Papers, Vol. 43.

<sup>79</sup>C. K. Yang, "Some Preliminary Statistical Patterns of Mass Actions in Nineteenth-Century China," in Wakeman and Grant, eds., Conflict and Control, p. 205.

<sup>80</sup>CO 521/15, translation of commissioner's address to district headmen, 18 April 1914. It should perhaps be noted here that in response to a question regarding the effectiveness of the headman system at Weihaiwei, Stewart Lockhart's daughter, Mrs. Mary Stewart Lockhart, who spent most of her childhood and adolescent years there, noted that these men literally ran local government as they "were the only ones who could get things done." She also remarked that her father's relationship with these men was excellent. Personal interview, 7 April 1981.

<sup>81</sup>CO 873/458, Johnston's Report, Annual Report, 1915, p. 8.

<sup>82</sup>CO 521/19, Johnston to Colonial Office, 26 May 1918, p. 5.

<sup>83</sup>CO 521/16, Johnston to Lockhart, 7 October 1915. For a thorough study of Japanese involvement in Shantung at this time, see Craig N. Canning, "The Japanese Occupation of Shantung during World War I," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1975).

<sup>84</sup>CO 873/447, Johnston to Lockhart, 11 November 1915; and Sly to Lockhart, 20 November 1915.

<sup>85</sup>CO 521/19, Johnston to Colonial Office, 26 May 1918, p. 3.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid.

<sup>88</sup>Buck, Urban Change, p. 91.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., pp. 99 and 103.

<sup>90</sup>CO 521/19, Extracts from Tsinan Consul's Quarterly Intelligence Reports, March and June Quarters, 1918, enclosed in Lockhart to Colonial Office, 11 October 1918.

<sup>91</sup>CO 521/19, Johnston to Colonial Office, 16 May 1918, pp. 1-2.

<sup>92</sup>CO 873/537, Johnston to Lockhart, 15 July 1918. See also CO 521/19, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 11 October 1918; and Jordan to Foreign Office, 8 October 1918.

<sup>93</sup>CO 873/549, Annual Report, 1918.

<sup>94</sup>CO 521/19, Johnston to Colonial Office, 26 May 1918, pp. 2-3. See also CO 873/536, Johnston to Lockhart, 6 August 1918.

<sup>95</sup>CO 521/19, Johnston to Colonial Office, 26 May 1918, p. 3.

<sup>96</sup>CO 873/513, Johnston to Southern District Officer, 29 January 1918; Junior District Officer's Report, 1 July 1918; Sergeant Chang's Report, 2 July 1918; Detective Ts'ung's Report, 2 July and 17 July 1918; and Whittaker to Junior District Officer, 17 July 1918.

<sup>97</sup>CO 521/19, Annual Report, 1918, pp. 18-19.

## Chapter 6

## Nationalism and the Growing Pressure for Rendition

The May Fourth Movement at Weihaiwei

Though it would be a gross exaggeration to describe local activities surrounding the May Fourth incident as a major watershed in Weihaiwei's political history, it is certainly fair to say that they symbolized an important new awakening of nationalism among some of the Territory's residents. As elsewhere in China, these activities were among the earliest attempts to organize a broadly-based protest against both Japanese imperialists and those regarded as traitors in the Chinese central government who had cooperated with them. Following the announcement at the Versailles Peace Conference on 30 April 1919, that Japan would be granted full control of German concessions in Shantung, huge demonstrations broke out in many Chinese cities. The largest of these took place in Peking on 4 May and led to the arrest of several young protestors which in turn triggered a widespread student strike and a boycott of Japanese goods.<sup>1</sup>

Among the Shantung cities participating in this great mass movement were Tsinan, Chefoo, T'ai-an, Liao-ch'eng, and Wei-hsien.<sup>2</sup> In Chefoo the economic boycott was organized by a group called the Home Industries League and it continued to operate with remarkable effectiveness until the former German leasehold at Kiaochow was returned to China by the Japanese in December 1922.<sup>3</sup> The durability and intensity of this movement at Chefoo is perhaps not so surprising when it is noted that the city had a modern history of political activism including strong support for the 1911 revolution as well

as serious economic grievances against Japan especially with regard to its declining silk industry.<sup>4</sup> As an additional factor contributing to the strength of the local May Fourth movement, it should be stated that Chefoo had a fairly large student population from which emerged much of the anti-Japanese leadership.

From the available sources it would appear that May Fourth activities at Weihaiwei were less volatile and on a smaller scale than those carried out at Chefoo. Nonetheless, here too there was an organized protest against the Japanese and an economic boycott which lasted until December 1921.<sup>5</sup> From a printed broadsheet issued by the "Weihaiwei An-li-kan t'ang chiu-kuo hui" (Weihaiwei Anglican School Save the Nation Society) in response to the student arrests in Peking and directed to the fu-lao (elders) of the entire country, it is clear that at least some of the students of the Anglican school at Port Edward were deeply concerned about the declining fortunes of their once proud nation. In this virulent anti-Japanese document the students also lashed out at national figures such as Ts'ao Ju-lin, Chang Tsung-hsiang, and Lu Tsung-yü whom they regarded as having sold out to the enemy. Further demonstrating their considerable awareness of national affairs they emphasized that the question of Japanese rights in Shantung was bound up with the much broader issue of China's political destiny and they called for a boycott of Japanese goods as well as greater use of Chinese products.<sup>6</sup>

It is not clear whether the Weihaiwei Anglican School Save the Nation Society was the umbrella organization responsible for the publication of another broadsheet by a group describing itself as part of the shih-jen t'uan (ten-man teams)

movement. This was another technique first used by students in Peking and later copied by May Fourth activists elsewhere whereby small groups from secondary schools and universities were deployed to organize strikes and boycotts.<sup>7</sup> In an effort to publicize itself and to recruit more volunteers the Weihaiwei group behind this document discussed ways in which teams could be organized, the amount of dues which might be collected, and future alliance with similar bodies in Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking, Tsinan, and elsewhere. To promote the popular notion of fu-kuo ch'iang-kuo (a rich and powerful country) the students stressed the need for education, morale-boosting, and various constructive projects which could be carried out on a nationwide basis. Clearly, then, there were a number of individuals in Weihaiwei in 1919 who saw themselves as part of a great national movement attempting nothing less than the salvation of their country.<sup>8</sup>

The specifically anti-Japanese activities of these individuals eventually elicited an angry response from the Japanese consul at Chefoo who complained to Commissioner Lockhart in August 1919 that meetings for the dissemination of hostile propaganda were being held in Weihaiwei and that Japanese citizens were not being allowed to board steamers, rickshaws, or sampans in the Territory.<sup>9</sup> British documentation from this period confirms that there were incidents of harassment of Japanese nationals at Weihaiwei, at least partly instigated by local students, and that the commissioner was compelled to issue a warning to all schools that such behavior would not be tolerated.<sup>10</sup> An article from the Manchurian Daily News of 8 August 1919, the details of which are confirmed by British sources, indicates that rumors were spread both in



Chefoo and Weihaiwei accusing the Japanese of poisoning village wells. Lockhart acted immediately to reassure the inhabitants of the Territory that such stories were false and further warned that rumor-mongers would be severely punished.<sup>11</sup>

It was undoubtedly the economic boycott at Weihaiwei which proved the most effective means of demonstrating anti-Japanese feeling there. During the 2½ years in which the boycott was enforced there was a marked decrease in the volume of Japanese goods imported to Weihaiwei as well as in Chinese products destined for the Japanese market. One British official remarked somewhat ruefully in 1922: "The boycott of Japanese trade referred to in the last two Annual Reports continued with unabated vigour up till December last, with loss to the trade of the Territory, and none to that of Japan."<sup>12</sup> Although the British generally did not attempt to interfere with the boycott, they did intervene in at least two cases when trading interests of their own nationals were involved. On one occasion in 1921 they successfully called upon the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to mediate with local "coolies" so that a Japanese steamer could be loaded with goods destined for London.<sup>13</sup>

Perhaps the most surprising thing about the Japanese boycott at Weihaiwei is that it lasted as long as it did and aroused such strong feelings in a part of China which would hardly appear to have had the necessary preconditions for such an outburst of nationalism. The large student communities primarily responsible for leading May Fourth activities elsewhere simply did not exist in Weihaiwei. Nor had very many of the Territory's students been educated abroad and thus exposed to the "radicalizing" experiences John Israel has dis-

cussed in his study of Chinese student nationalism.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, with no railroad links to the rest of Shantung and lacking even one territorial newspaper or journal in 1919, Weihaiwei did not seem to be in very close contact with the highly-charged political atmosphere elsewhere at this time. As has been previously noted, Reginald Johnston wrote in early 1919 that "the vast majority of the inhabitants of Port Edward were as yet but very slightly affected by the reforming activities of 'Young China.'"<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, a fair proportion of these inhabitants later in that same year demonstrated a rather remarkable degree of political awareness and the ability to organize a new and effective type of protest.

#### The Rendition Question

One cannot help but suspect that at least some of the British residents at Weihaiwei in the course of the Japanese boycott must have felt apprehensive that this new wave of anti-imperialism might eventually be directed against them and perhaps even force their withdrawal from the leasehold. In fact, as has been mentioned many times in this thesis, the uncertainty of British tenure at Weihaiwei had almost from the beginning posed one of the greatest obstacles to the area's economic development. And the issue of rendition, as we have seen, had been raised as early as 1905 with the forced evacuation of the Russians from Port Arthur by the Japanese.<sup>16</sup>

It was also the Japanese who brought about a reconsideration of the general question of all foreign rights in China by entering World War I on the side of the Allies, forcing the Germans out of their leasehold at Kiaochow, and then securing a number of agreements with China, Russia, Great Britain,

and the United States to buttress the special privileges they demanded in Shantung at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. In the months leading up to this conference the British made a thorough reappraisal of their entire China policy. One of the Far Eastern experts called upon for an opinion regarding Weihaiwei was Reginald Johnston who in 1918 was temporarily serving as commissioner in Lockhart's absence. In his view the Territory had no strategic or commercial value and had not even added to British prestige. Many Chinese, he noted, were contemptuous of how little had been spent to improve Weihaiwei in comparison to other foreign leaseholds. Johnston therefore felt strongly that Weihaiwei should be returned to China with the possible exception of Liu-kung Island which the Admiralty might find useful to retain.<sup>17</sup>

Sir John Jordan, then serving as minister plenipotentiary in Peking, agreed that Weihaiwei should be given up but only as part of a major restructuring of British policy in China which would include the surrendering of all leased territories, the internationalizing of treaty port concessions, and other far-reaching reforms. Sir James Macleay of the Foreign Office Far Eastern Department argued, however, that as long as other countries such as Japan were demanding privileges in China it was necessary for Britain to protect her own interests there. He even repeated the familiar idea that China might actually want the British to remain at Weihaiwei as a counterweight to the Japanese presence in Shantung.<sup>18</sup> The Admiralty also desired to maintain its right to use Weihaiwei as a convenient training ground and sanitorium.

Although not very carefully considered by many of the British officials involved in this policy review, Chinese

opinion on the issue of foreign "rights" was becoming quite clear. By the time of the Paris Peace Conference China's chief delegate, Wellington Koo, argued forcefully for the complete abolition of extraterritoriality, the return of all leaseholds, the expulsion of Japan from Shantung, as well as for other measures designed to restore Chinese national sovereignty. In the end, as is well known, the Chinese did not attain their objectives at Paris and refused to sign the peace treaty. The British, for their part, decided in favor of a policy which would both preserve their own interests and attempt to restrain Japan from making further advances in China.<sup>19</sup> This policy did not include the rendition of Weihaiwei. The Chinese national outcry over the Paris settlement and especially American dissatisfaction with the concessions granted to Japan among other things eventually led to yet another international meeting, known as the Washington Conference (12 November 1921-2 February 1922), which, in addition to discussing world disarmament and other major issues, sought once again to deal with the "China Question."

It is significant that in the period between the Paris and Washington Conferences, from June 1919 to November 1921, as many world leaders and ordinary people alike began to have second thoughts about the justice of the peace agreements with regard to China, the question of Weihaiwei's rendition was raised once again. The American consul-general at Shanghai, for example, noted with some amazement that the staunchly pro-British editors of the North China Daily News urged in April 1921 that this matter be quickly resolved and even admitted that many people favored the return of Weihaiwei to China as a goodwill gesture.<sup>20</sup> And in fact during the second half of

the Washington Conference itself both France and Britain offered to give up their leased territories of Kwangchow Bay and Weihaiwei respectively if other powers would do likewise. Though objecting vigorously to any discussion of leased territories obtained before 1920, the Japanese were finally persuaded under the considerable pressure of world opinion and Anglo-American diplomatic efforts to relinquish their territorial claims to Kiaochow in December 1922 while retaining certain important economic interests in Shantung.<sup>21</sup> The Weihaiwei issue, however, proved surprisingly difficult to resolve.

Although Britain had proposed publicly at the Washington Conference on 1 February to return the leasehold to the Chinese with the proviso that arrangements be made for the fleet to continue to use the area as a summer recreation facility and sanatorium, the Chinese delegation was informed privately that other details remained to be worked out regarding the status of the port and the safeguarding of foreign property rights.<sup>22</sup> Both the foreign and Chinese communities at Weihaiwei responded swiftly to the rendition proposal. British residents sent a petition to London on 18 February requesting that their interests be protected.<sup>23</sup>

Two representatives of the Chinese merchant community also presented their views on the matter at a meeting of the newly-revived Weihaiwei Advisory Council on 22 February. Ku Ming-hsün, a native of the Territory, vice-chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, and a man described as the most prominent Chinese merchant in Weihaiwei,<sup>24</sup> proposed that in the event of rendition the various public services at Port Edward (road maintenance, sanitation, lighting, policing, etc.) should be

supervised by a municipal council made up of Chinese and foreigners. Financial support for these services, he thought, could be provided through special taxation as allowed by the new Chinese administration. In addition, he optimistically maintained that even if Weihaiwei were made a treaty port where customs duties could be levied, trade would only decline by 30% at most as Port Edward would continue to be a convenient transit point for ground nut exports. The other Chinese representative on the council was Li Yi-chih, an English-speaking Cantonese businessman who was also chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, acting British postmaster, and manager of a foreign-owned provisions shop. He agreed with Ku that those Chinese whose businesses served Chinese needs would be little affected by rendition but he also warned that those serving the foreign community would be hit hard as would property values in Port Edward.

The gloomiest view put forward at the council meeting was, of course, that of a British merchant who felt that the import-export trade at Weihaiwei would decline by more than 50% following rendition and the imposition of customs duties. He was convinced that since the Territory produced little in the way of export goods itself and since most items were only brought there for transshipment in order to avoid customs duty, this trade would simply shift to the more convenient ports of Chefoo and Tsingtao. Furthermore, he felt municipal services would rapidly deteriorate and that there would be an exodus of foreign residents and tourists. As a precaution, all of those attending the meeting, with the exception of Ku Ming-hsün, signed a resolution urging that proper compensation be made to both British and Chinese residents in the event of

losses following rendition.<sup>25</sup>

Concerned Chinese merchants at Weihaiwei cabled Peking in March 1922 for permission to organize a police force in order to deal with any bandits who might be tempted to take advantage of a British withdrawal from the area. The British journalist reporting on this development also noted that farmers in the more remote parts of the Territory believed that the British were being forcibly evicted from the leasehold and he warned of the dire effects this might have on national prestige.<sup>26</sup>

The appointment of Liang Ju-hao as Chinese Rendition Commissioner stimulated the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in May 1922 to hold a series of meetings with district and village headmen and other local leaders in order to formulate proposals for the future administration of Weihaiwei. Although two hundred people attended one of these meetings, no foreigners were invited and it is clear from the ideas put forth at the time that rendition was viewed by Weihaiwei's more influential citizens at least as an opportunity to gain formal control over local government. It was proposed, for example, that a local Chinese council be responsible for administering the area, that the present police force, including foreign inspectors, be retained, though with some additional volunteers, that the system of taxation remain the same, that funds be provided to build more roads and stimulate trade, that Port Edward remain a free port for ten to fifteen years, and that there be no large garrison of Chinese troops.<sup>27</sup> It would appear then that the notion of self-government was quite popular at Weihaiwei in 1922 and, judging by the manner in which these very specific proposals were articulated, it would also appear that a fair number of

people there were eager to assume responsibility for their own affairs.

When British and Chinese officials actually commenced negotiations concerning the retrocession of Weihaiwei, however, it soon became obvious that the two parties disagreed on many issues. The major problem was to determine the nature and extent of British naval privileges at Liukungtao. The Admiralty was eager to retain unrestricted access to many of its facilities on the island and to be allowed the right to use the harbor for training operations. The Chinese, on the other hand, felt that upon rendition the naval base should revert to exclusive Chinese control and that Britain could only expect to use the harbor and the island as a "guest" at the discretion of the Chinese authorities. Initially, the British were also concerned that some provision be made by the Chinese government for linking Weihaiwei either by rail or by road to its hinterland. In addition, they sought many guarantees for the protection of foreign property rights, international trade, and the maintenance of public services in Port Edward.<sup>28</sup>

During much of 1922 articles appearing in the Ai Kuo Pao at Chefoo expressed strong nationalistic arguments regarding the Weihaiwei negotiations. It was observed, for example, that according to the original 1898 agreement Weihaiwei had been leased on the same terms as Port Arthur which was for twenty-five years. Thus, it was argued, since the expiration date would arrive in 1923 there was no need for the Chinese to grant Britain any concessions in exchange for the return of the leasehold, nor to lose the "face" that had just been gained at the Washington Conference. The authors of these articles also argued that the harbor should be for the exclusive use of the



Chinese and that no compensation should be paid for the acquisition of former British government property.<sup>29</sup>

As the negotiations dragged on attention was even drawn to the "Weihaiwei question" in Peking when about one hundred members of the Shantung Guild demonstrated in September 1922 outside the president's office demanding the leasehold's unconditional restoration.<sup>30</sup> By this time Liang Ju-hao was coming under personal attack for his position in favor of allowing British warships to anchor at Weihaiwei.<sup>31</sup> And in January 1923 the new British executive official at Weihaiwei, A. P. Blunt, described the negotiations as having broken down. He also observed that rendition would be welcome among the Chinese residents of the Territory and that although local criticism thus far had been muted, he felt agitation could become a problem if the British insisted on terms that were too severe. Some local people had even remarked that British actions did not correspond with their promises at the Washington Conference and that the negotiations were undermining confidence in Britain's "good faith."<sup>32</sup>

As might be expected, such criticism was expressed much more openly outside the Territory in neighboring Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien as well as in Chefoo. The guilds of Wen-teng sent a written complaint to the government in Peking in January and in the following month a group calling itself the "Wen-teng Self-Government Society" called for a boycott of British goods.<sup>33</sup> In March representatives were sent from both Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng to make their demands personally in Peking while students from those hsien who were studying in the capital held a meeting to discuss possible ways of influencing the government.<sup>34</sup> The similarity at this stage with May Fourth anti-Japanese

activities was becoming painfully obvious, but still the tortuous negotiations continued.

In November 1923 a group of Shantungese living in Peking issued a public manifesto calling for the unconditional rendition of Weihaiwei and threatening to initiate an anti-British boycott and to submit the entire matter to an international court for settlement. Certain statements in this manifesto made it clear that both parties in the Weihaiwei negotiations were concerned that the outcome would set a precedent for the return of other leased territories and concessions in China and neither side, therefore, was prepared to give too much away.<sup>35</sup> By May 1924 criticism of Liang Ju-hao had evidently become so intense that he resigned his position and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs became directly responsible for the continued discussions on Weihaiwei.<sup>36</sup> In the course of these renewed deliberations a draft rendition agreement was finally produced which was acceptable to both sides and yet in October, just before it was due to be signed, Feng Yü-hsiang overthrew the government in Peking. The British then felt, given the general chaos and absence of a constitutionally mandated administration, that it was impossible to withdraw from Weihaiwei. By the time negotiations were resumed again in the late 1920s, relations between Britain and China were even more strained and the actual return of Weihaiwei did not take place until October 1930. The continuing uncertainty of political conditions both inside and outside the Territory during the intervening years was to make administration of the area increasingly difficult as will be seen later in this chapter.<sup>37</sup>

The Famine of 1920

There were other factors quite unrelated to the rendition problem which made the 1920s an unsettled period in Weihaiwei's history. One of these was the great drought famine of 1920-21 which affected 300,000 square miles and five of China's northern provinces including Shantung.<sup>38</sup> Lack of rain on the Shantung promontory had almost completely destroyed Weihaiwei's crops in 1919, but true famine conditions only developed in the spring of 1920 when for a second year there was very little rain.<sup>39</sup> According to Commissioner Lockhart, the full extent of the suffering in some of Weihaiwei's villages did not become known to the government until late March since many people were reluctant to "lose face" by admitting their destitution.<sup>40</sup> The worst affected areas were south of Port Edward in the region of Chang-feng, Wen-chüan-t'ang, and Pei-k'ou, but districts along the Chefoo road were also in dire straits. Making matters even worse was the fact that fishing had also failed at this time.<sup>41</sup> Some families, it was reported, were reduced to eating corn husks, peanut shells, and sweet potato runners and there were a good many more beggars about than usual.<sup>42</sup> The Chinese Chamber of Commerce estimated that at least two thousand families, or approximately ten thousand people, were on the verge of starvation.<sup>43</sup>

Although the Chamber of Commerce and at least one of Weihaiwei's district headmen were already making efforts to secure outside loans to help the destitute, it soon became apparent that a massive government-aided relief operation was needed to sustain the Territory's needy until the next rainfall and a normal harvest.<sup>44</sup> Thus, the Weihaiwei Famine Relief Committee was formed of both British and Chinese residents with

the commissioner as chairman. The purpose of the committee was to assist the government in raising funds for the purchase of grain and to help in its distribution. The first step taken by the group was the purchase of nearly 200,000 catties of kaoliang from local stocks and the hiring of carts to transport it to six distribution centers scattered throughout the Territory. With the aid of village headmen a complete list was compiled of all families requiring assistance and these same headmen were then required to guarantee with their signatures that they had actually received and distributed grain in strict accordance with the lists for their villages. A British district officer and police inspector went along to the distribution centers to ensure that the grain was properly handled. In addition, the committee made arrangements to purchase over 2,800,000 catties of grain from Manchuria both as an immediate food supply and as seed for the next planting. Some 8,600 people received free grain over a four-month period at Weihaiwei but it was also decided to respect the wishes of many small landowners who did not want direct relief and preferred loans which they agreed to repay within a year with their land serving as security. Village elders and the respective district headmen were co-guarantors of these grain loans which were provided to about 29,000 people for two months. The total grain loaned was valued at nearly \$55,000 and in every case was promptly repaid.<sup>45</sup>

The relief effort at Weihaiwei was financed partly by an emergency grant from the British Treasury but primarily from public subscriptions to the Weihaiwei Famine Relief Fund which were solicited from local merchants, from individuals in treaty ports all over China, and from abroad. The total

cost of the relief effort was approximately \$90,000. It would have been even more expensive except for the fact that the desperately-needed rain did arrive in June 1920 and quickly restored agricultural production to more normal conditions.<sup>46</sup>

The most interesting feature of the famine relief methods employed at Weihaiwei is once again their close resemblance to traditional practices. As natural disasters were a perennial fact of life in China, there was a long-established and quite detailed "code of practice" for local magistrates responsible for their alleviation. As one might expect, tax reduction was high on the list of essential measures for famine relief and there were even prescribed formulas for computing the amount of such reduction according to the damage suffered on each piece of land.<sup>47</sup> Similarly, Commissioner Lockhart found himself having to explain to a revenue-hungry Colonial Office in 1920 that he could not possibly impose new or increased taxation given the drought conditions at Weihaiwei and that he in fact was concerned local farmers would not even be able to pay their current taxes, especially with the added burden of famine loans to repay.<sup>48</sup>

There were other parallels as well. One conscientious Ch'ing magistrate, Wang Feng-sheng (1776-1834), for example, on the basis of his own experience in crisis management recommended that the best way of determining who was most in need of relief was "to have a record of the people stricken by calamity prepared by the village heads, examined by the gentry, and then sent to the commissioners [assigned by the magistrate's superior officials] for further investigation."<sup>49</sup> Although "gentry" were not involved in this procedure at Weihaiwei, probably because there were so few of them, the listing of

famine families was done by village heads with British authorities and district headmen acting as a check on the enumeration. The rationale for this system at Weihaiwei must have been quite similar to Wang Feng-sheng's. He was concerned that this important task, if left to clerks or pao-chia heads, could lead to corruption and if left exclusively to the "gentry" would result in favoritism. Clearly, though, the magistrate himself could not possibly visit every household so the above compromise was selected. The distribution system used at Weihaiwei, though not trouble free, was on the whole quite successful according to the following account:

The system was excellent. Many complaints were subsequently received of alleged abuses by village headmen: in preparing lists (in favouritism), in distributing at destination, in charging too high a rate of exchange when repayment was made, in charging too heavy expenses. I think these abuses probably prevailed in a majority of villages but only to a minor extent. It is difficult to see how they can be avoided, but a serious warning in advance, should the necessity arise again, would do no harm.<sup>50</sup>

Magistrate Wang was well aware of the frequent inadequacy of government relief and recommended that additional funds be obtained from local well-to-do residents and especially shopowners. He also suggested that the magistrate himself set an example by making a personal contribution and that a relief board made up of local notables be set up to manage the relief fund.<sup>51</sup> All of these measures were taken by the British at Weihaiwei in 1920 and Commissioner Lockhart, in his proclamation to the people during the famine, again resorted to a very traditional style in exhorting them to obey local regulations.<sup>52</sup> The commissioner was especially careful after the crisis was over to recognize the efforts of those involved

in the relief campaign. Members of the Chamber of Commerce and hospital staff received a thank you in the form of appropriate four-character phrase calligraphy while headmen had their choice of a framed letter from the government or a small silver replica of a special memorial pei or tablet erected in Port Edward to commemorate the prompt way in which Weihaiwei's farmers repaid their famine loans. There was also a special famine memorial ceremony at Port Edward in April 1921 during which the commissioner and local dignitaries delivered addresses of mutual praise.<sup>53</sup>

The harmonious relationship which clearly existed at Weihaiwei between the Chinese population and British officials during and after the famine of 1920 is in sharp contrast to the difficulties experienced by those working for the China International Famine Relief Commission in other parts of north China, especially during the even more severe famine of 1928-31. Nathan writes, for example, that at that time: "The commission discovered that Chinese outside the westernized fringe of society through which it operated showed a limited appreciation of its wider aims and viewed it as a source of funds to be exploited in any way possible."<sup>54</sup> I would suggest that the success of the Weihaiwei relief effort, especially the fact that all of the grain loans were repaid with the next harvest, is a very good indication of the attitude people had toward their local government. It was clearly not regarded as a foreign body dispensing charity, but rather as the recognized governing authority to which certain obligations were owed. In the final analysis it must be said that the enforcer of these obligations was certainly not physical power for the combined military and police apparatus at Weihaiwei was miniscule.

It would seem rather that the ultimate sanction for default on a government loan was the contempt of one's neighbors, and "loss of face" in Chinese society was a powerful threat indeed. Yet one must conclude that this particular sanction would not have existed at Weihaiwei if the British administration, operating through the Chinese village and district headmen system, had not by this time been rather well accepted as the "legitimate" governing body.

It must also be noted here that the famine at Weihaiwei did not have the disastrous effects experienced elsewhere in north China. There is no mention in British records, for example, of the sale of farm animals or children as a means of raising cash for food. Nor were houses torn down so that the timber could be sold. The official British census of 1921 states that deaths due to the famine were not a serious problem, although there may have been a greater number than usual of people leaving the Territory to seek temporary work elsewhere.<sup>55</sup> In addition, the fact that Weihaiwei made such a rapid recovery is both a sign that the famine was not as severe as that suffered in other parts of China and that the relief operation was effective. Similar measures were taken once again in 1925 when drought struck Weihaiwei's farm output and the price of grain was even higher than it had been in 1920.<sup>56</sup>

#### Economic Development, 1921-1927

It is significant that throughout the 1920s British officials frequently described economic conditions there as being seriously affected by national or international factors. As the years went by the Territory's economic health was to



a greater and greater degree determined by such things as world market prices for export commodities, national and international political problems, the stability of Chinese and foreign currencies, and a host of other variables which were completely beyond local control. The expanding commercial community at Port Edward was especially vulnerable to such conditions but farmers and fishermen in the more remote areas were also affected.

The most important single export commodity at Weihaiwei continued to be ground nuts for which demand and price frequently fluctuated. The value of ground nut kernels in 1921, for example, was 25% higher than it had been in 1920 and business was brisk.<sup>57</sup> The general deterioration in political conditions in China in 1924, on the other hand, made the money market very tight and many dealers that year were forced to sell their ground nuts quickly, even at a loss, rather than wait for the price to rise.<sup>58</sup> Further difficulties arose in 1925 as anti-foreign agitation disrupted trade at Shanghai, while at Hong Kong the British were especially hard hit by a fifteen-month strike and boycott beginning in the summer of that year. The diversion of the British fleet to riot-torn Shanghai meant a great loss of business to Weihaiwei merchants and irregular shipping to Hong Kong posed difficulties for local ground nut dealers.<sup>59</sup> This ever-fluctuating trade pattern continued in 1926 and 1927 as the ground nut market once again improved both in terms of total volume exported and price received.<sup>60</sup>

The peanut trade also encountered problems of a more localized variety as indicated in several Advisory Council meetings of 1922. Disputes repeatedly arose, for example,

over what should be considered a standard unit of measurement for nut purchases and sales and over the dishonest practice of watering nuts which was employed by some farmers and dealers to increase their weight. In the end the Ground Nut Guild and Chamber of Commerce agreed that only an authorized foreign scale should be used for weighing purposes. They also asked that the government issue proclamations banning the practice of watering nuts and that even greater cultivation of peanuts be encouraged through a system of cash rewards and medals.<sup>61</sup> With a membership of some ninety-eight firms in 1922 the Ground Nut Guild at Weihaiwei was evidently a fairly powerful organization and assumed responsibility not only for weight standards, but also for market days and hours, as well as supervising the testing and conditioning of nuts before shipment, and at times acted as a sales agent for its members.

The guild's efforts to eliminate disreputable practices led to a certain amount of opposition from the small number of middlemen involved. They in turn retaliated by posting anonymous placards which threatened action against the guild whenever the Territory was returned to Chinese jurisdiction. The clear implication was, of course, that the guild acted under British protection. Thus, even though the placards were not specifically anti-government, the British had them removed and noted that only those few individuals guilty of watering nuts were actually opposed to the guild anyway. The majority of firms were concerned that Weihaiwei maintain its reputation in foreign markets for supplying a high quality product.<sup>62</sup> It is interesting that those opposing the guild, an organization which, along with the Chamber of Commerce,

certainly spoke for the bulk of Weihaiwei's business "establishment," regarded them as closely identified with the British administration. It is also significant that local businessmen by this time had learned a great deal about how to organize themselves to compete effectively in a modern trading environment and recognized the need for British assistance in protecting their own interests.<sup>63</sup>

There were other areas of economic development at Weihaiwei in the 1920s as well. The ever-increasing demand for silk cocoons to supply Chefoo's filatures led one firm to plant 30,000 mulberry trees in the Territory, with the hope of improving upon the traditional scrub oak sericulture practiced there. There were even suggestions that a silk expert be hired to stimulate the industry at Weihaiwei. Unfortunately, the government did not act upon this recommendation even though the number of workers employed in the weaving of silk thread had doubled between 1911 and 1921.<sup>64</sup>

Salt output was also increasing in the Territory with 87,500 piculs produced in 1920 as compared with 11,000 piculs in 1907. The international demand for this product was subject to great fluctuation, however, and never guaranteed a large income to its producers at Weihaiwei or to the British who taxed it. In 1921 the Chinese government decided to enforce its monopoly on the salt trade by prohibiting shipment of the product between Weihaiwei and other parts of the country.<sup>65</sup> This in effect greatly limited the Territory's potential for expanding salt exports to the large Korean market since its own output was relatively small. One way in which Weihaiwei's salt was profitably utilized, however, was in its own thriving fishing industry. This trade was greatly aided

in 1925-26 by the introduction of motorized boats. The larger catches made possible with these boats were then salted for export to both Shanghai and Hong Kong.<sup>66</sup>

A few handicraft industries continued to contribute to Weihaiwei's relative prosperity in the 1920s. Foreign demand for hair nets, for example, boomed in the period 1920-23 and local workers benefitted, especially since the finished nets were exempted from duty. According to official British sources there were 623 female workers employed in this industry in 1921.<sup>67</sup> The obvious drawback to this largely American market, of course, was that it was entirely determined by the whims of Western fashion and by the second half of the decade hair net manufacturing appears to have greatly declined.<sup>68</sup>

Other industries employing similar skills, however, continued to do well including lace-making, embroidery work, and the weaving of silk hosiery. The Roman Catholic Workroom was especially active in training young women in the art of lace-making. It was observed, for example, in 1921 that:

This class of skilled workers is a valuable asset to the community and their economic value is being felt in their employment by traders from lace centers further north who have opened small branches of their establishments in Weihai City. Native employers also engage the trained workers, sometimes in small factories and often in the workers' own homes.<sup>69</sup>

By 1927 it was reported that there about a dozen workrooms for embroidery and hosiery weaving in the Territory.<sup>70</sup> The 1921 census listed 183 female laceworkers and 242 "weavers" employed in the leasehold.<sup>71</sup> As the cost of living continued to rise at Weihaiwei in the 1920s, these new opportunities to supplement family incomes were undoubtedly welcomed.<sup>72</sup>

Weihaiwei also had the advantage of enjoying peace and

relative political stability throughout this decade in contrast to turbulent conditions elsewhere. In fact, the increase of banditry just over the territorial boundaries began to strain the small local police force and it was expanded in the mid-1920s. Economic growth itself brought more people in and out of the Territory and demanded greater police vigilance.<sup>73</sup> The town of Port Edward in particular must have presented a picture of bustling activity and new growth. Here the native wheelbarrow had been largely replaced by carts and bicycles and by 1927 there were even a few automobiles to be seen in the Territory.<sup>74</sup> At the same time there was a flurry of building activity in the town and this created work for local masons and carpenters.<sup>75</sup> There was even a new cinema in Port Edward by 1921 and requests for permission to build many more followed in the period 1925-30.<sup>76</sup> It must have been with some pride, therefore, in 1921 that Stewart Lockhart who had come to Weihaiwei as commissioner in 1902 with the object of encouraging economic growth finally retired from his post and returned to England.

#### Lockhart's Retirement

Lockhart's retirement was in fact an important occasion in the history of British administration at Weihaiwei for it gave the local population an opportunity to express their appreciation to him personally for his nineteen years of "enlightened" service. On 21 April there was an elaborate ceremony at which many local Chinese dignitaries read speeches of praise, erected a stone table in his honor, and presented farewell gifts, including a traditional silk robe and umbrella, a vase of pure water signifying the purity of his administration,

and a silken scroll. The speech delivered by a representative of the district headmen is typical of the sentiments expressed on this occasion. A British translation follows below:

His Honour the Commissioner, Lo Kung,  
 Came from the British Empire.  
 With diligence he administered us,  
 Not shunning laborious toil.  
 He was kind and polite to scholars,  
 And treated the peasants bounteously.  
 His methods of rule were good,  
 And he planned to enlighten and improve.  
 He encouraged and bettered education,  
 And taught farming and mulberry planting.  
 He was attentive to commerce,  
 Directing and advising where necessary.  
 He protected the good  
 And punished the wild and wicked.  
 He was kind and stern, as required,  
 Just as seasons have rain, dew, ice, and frost.  
 During the famine of last year,  
 When anxiety engulfed the whole land,  
 He raised subscriptions for the people's relief  
 And gave grains of kindness and gruel of love.  
 The thirsty ones were satisfied  
 And the hungry were fed.  
 Thousands of the lives of the people  
 Were favoured by the light of his grace.  
 Suddenly, hearing of his glorious departure  
 Our hearts are breaking with sorrow,  
 As if we were losing a merciful mother. . . ??

Ku Ming-hsün also spoke at the ceremony on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce and emphasized Lockhart's contributions to the Territory's economic prosperity.<sup>78</sup> No doubt a traditional Chinese magistrate would have been delighted to hear such generous praise for the successful fulfillment of his two main responsibilities: protecting the people's welfare and administering justice.<sup>79</sup> Lockhart in turn responded that he had been dependent upon the cooperation of the local inhabitants whom he hoped would always remain simple and upright. And he went further to say: "I regard myself as fortunate in having always had to deal with the affairs of such an eminently reasonable and lovable race as the Chinese whom

I have always found as loyal as the Highlanders of my own country and ever ready to lend me their assistance in sunshine and storm."<sup>80</sup> The man who succeeded Lockhart as chief administrator concluded that "the deep and universal regret felt by the Chinese population" at his predecessor's retirement was "as high a tribute to British administrative methods and as helpful to British prestige in China as would have been more material progress and up-to-date methods . . ."<sup>81</sup>

Lockhart's retirement also signalled the end of an era at Weihaiwei, for no one after him, except Reginald Johnston who served as commissioner for three years from 1927-30, would command either the knowledge of Chinese or local customs which this man had. Nor, I think, would there ever again be such close rapport between the British and their subjects here for no one would serve as long as Lockhart had. In all fairness, however, it must be said that the character of life in the leasehold was also changing and with it so too the expectations of the people from their government.

#### Proposals for Self-Government, 1921-27

Attention has already been drawn to the increasingly important role played by the Chamber of Commerce at Weihaiwei. It should be noted that as early as 1919 this body had proposed that, in view of the menacing bandit problem along territorial borders, it might be a good idea to have a volunteer defense force similar to those existing at Chefoo and Antung. In order to protect Port Edward it was suggested that local firms could supply volunteers according to their size and that these men could perform daily drills under government supervision with arms paid for by the Chamber. Meanwhile,

the rest of the Territory could be defended by village volunteers allotted on the same basis as the ancient pao-chia system with one man per ten households. Each district would have a drill ground and the police could serve as instructors with guns borrowed from the government and ammunition supplied through village funds. Each village was to also have four watchmen. It was further recommended:

The Headmen of the various villages who all know well whether their neighbours are good or bad, should make a register and having inserted in it the names of all those who have no occupation or property or whose movements are unsatisfactory, should daily keep them under investigation. If any suspicious outsider happens to arrive, his antecedents should be thoroughly investigated.<sup>82</sup>

The government finally agreed to have these forces as auxiliary units to the police provided that they, and not the Chamber of Commerce, maintained control over them.<sup>83</sup>

On behalf of local fishermen and headmen in 1924, the Chamber of Commerce also asked the government for greater protection from Manchurian bandits who were preying upon the fishing fleet.<sup>84</sup> In the end, however, the Chamber was forced to act upon the government's suggestion to hire themselves a motorized trawler for their own protection.<sup>85</sup>

In 1922, as negotiations were taking place to return Weihaiwei to Chinese jurisdiction, Ku Ming-hsün and Li Yi-chih, the vice-chairman and chairman respectively of the Chamber of Commerce, proposed at an Advisory Council meeting that the local headman system be revised. They made the following complaint about the existing system:

When the 'right people' are selected for this position, they usually are respectable but do things in a perfunctory manner and do not know how to promote what is good and get rid of what is evil. When the 'wrong people' are selected, they make arbitrary decisions in the rural areas and bully those who are stupid and



weak. Therefore, in our humble opinion this system should be abolished and in its place a system of self-governing districts should be established.<sup>86</sup>

Under the existing system there were 25 district headmen and 357 village headmen, but Ku and Li wanted to greatly expand this so that there would be one district for every 600-1000 families and one village headman and one sub-headman for every village of 100 families. Villages with 150 families would have one headman and two sub-headmen and so on in that proportion. The new total of elected headmen would then be about 570 with 36 districts. Each district would have a committee made up of all the village headmen who would choose a chairman and vice-chairman. The committee would meet weekly to discuss such matters as education, social reform, sanitation, afforestation, improvement of agricultural methods, new crops, and so forth. It was also recommended that there be a meeting place in Port Edward to which experts on the above subjects could be invited to speak.<sup>87</sup>

Commenting on these proposals the British noted that the machinery for self-government already existed in China although the movement had been somewhat in abeyance since Yuan Shih-k'ai's takeover. In any event, it was observed: "The results attained have not been very encouraging."<sup>88</sup> The new administrator, Blunt, stated that he did not think such a plan was suited to Weihaiwei, but it might be possible, he thought, to initiate it at Port Edward and then extend it if the British retained the leasehold. Of course, it must be remembered that negotiations by this time were underway regarding Weihaiwei's future and the British were obviously not keen to institute such important changes until the rendition question had been resolved.<sup>89</sup> The significant point here is

that some of Weihaiwei's leaders sensed that an opportunity perhaps existed for them to assume more responsibility for their own affairs and chose this time to make their views known. The Advisory Council meetings were a good forum for them to discuss all sorts of issues, including the need for storm signals, ground nut problems, changes in the land tax registers, the installation of telephones, and local markets.<sup>90</sup>

For his part, the new executive appears to have been eager to maintain cordial relations with Weihaiwei's district headmen and in 1923 decided to entertain them all at a banquet twice annually in order to give them a bit more "face" in the community.<sup>91</sup> Throughout the remaining years in which Britain held Weihaiwei, however, the basic administrative structure was unchanged and apparently functioned with a fair degree of success. One of the British police inspectors in 1921 even went so far as to say that he believed the sharp contrast between Weihaiwei's relative security and the violent conditions in neighboring hsien was due primarily to the influence and authority of the headmen.<sup>92</sup>

#### Education, 1920-27

The decade following the May Fourth movement was a period of considerable intellectual activity in China, a period in which "modern" education was seen to hold the answers to many of the nation's most fundamental problems. In Weihaiwei, too, school enrollments continued to rise and there were some attempts to make the benefits of education more widely available. The following table gives a general indication of the rising enrollments in Port Edward's schools:

Table 7

Enrollments at Weihaiwei Schools for Chinese Students,  
1920-1928<sup>93</sup>

	1920	1922	1924	1925	1927	1928
Government School	116	122	153	180	200	200
Anti-Foot Binding	no figures	35	38	42	no figures	50
St. Joseph's	27	no figures	151	241	264	170
Plymouth Brethern	50	no figures	77	126	no figures	190
Anglican School	no figures	90	120	140	80	63
Ch'i-tung					40	100

In 1920 the government carried out a survey of all primary schools in the Territory and discovered there were 284 with 307 teachers and an average attendance of roughly 4,700, only 100 of whom were girls. The annual cost of these private schools was \$15,000. It was observed that although a modern curriculum was being taught in some of the village schools, there were also a great number which were conducted along more traditional lines. The biggest problem was finding "modern" personnel to staff the schools and such teachers in general came from outside the Territory.<sup>94</sup> Referring to the old-style village schools, one observer noted: "There is, however, a commendable keenness to gradually abolish this type of school and substitute modern schools. The difficulty is the dearth of suitable teachers on the one hand and a reluctance on the part of some of the villages to discard the old style of teacher who finds it difficult to adjust himself to the requirements of modern educational methods."<sup>95</sup>

Taking their inspiration from James Yen's 1000 character movement for illiterate adults, some of Weihaiwei's leading

citizens in 1923 proposed the establishment of night schools for the poor and by 1924 the idea had been so well received that there were twenty-six of them. The association behind this program was called the "P'ing-min chiao-yü hui" (Popular Education Society) and by 1926 it was requested that the proceeds of the theatrical tax be devoted to its support.<sup>96</sup>

Further interest in educational affairs was demonstrated in 1927 when Weihaiwei's district headmen petitioned the government for a special levy on the land tax in order to support a new middle school for boys. The British also agreed for a time to pay the rent on the school building. During 1926, its first year of operation, Ch'i Tung Middle School had an enrollment of 40 boys and in 1927 the figure had risen to 100.<sup>97</sup> This new institution was mainly supported by public subscription and was staffed by university graduates.

While the British generally looked with favor upon educational efforts at Weihaiwei, they were not unaware of the predominant role which China's schools were playing in the growth of nationalism. Thus, when anti-British strikes broke out in Shanghai in 1925, for example, some of Weihaiwei's students attempted to organize a demonstration in favor of the movement. Half of the boys at the Anglican School stopped attending classes after this so-called "May 30th Incident" on the grounds that the school was under British management. Some of the older students from this school also asked for and received the government's permission to hold a memorial service in commemoration of those killed in the riot at Shanghai and to raise funds to aid their families. A meeting was subsequently held in the walled town with representatives from twelve schools in which subscriptions were called for and an

effort made to organize lectures and the distribution of circulars at Weihaiwei explaining the strike movement. At this point Blunt asked the Chamber of Commerce to use its influence to prevent the students from leading any sort of political agitation. At the same time the British also arrested four men they said were distributing propaganda in connection with the strike, declaring: "The sole menace to the peace and order of the Territory would appear to be in the activities of Chinese professional agitators who may work their way across the frontier with intent to incite the people against the Government."<sup>98</sup> A warning was also given to a government clerk not "to meddle in politics."<sup>99</sup> The students at the Government School apparently did not participate in these events. Their headmaster commented that a few of the older boys showed a certain "enthusiasm" for the recent student movement but still attended classes regularly. He found them generally rather conservative and "not too much infatuated in the Western civilization." They did, however, make an effort to start a student union and asked that they be provided with footballs and newspapers. Significantly, the British approved the footballs but not the newspapers.<sup>100</sup>

### Newspapers

It is interesting that the first attempt to publish a Chinese newspaper at Weihaiwei occurred in August 1923 but perhaps floundered when the new administrator, Blunt, discouraged it.<sup>101</sup> Another effort was made in 1927 with the launching of the Wei-hai wu-pao in December and by this time Reginald Johnston had become commissioner. Though he informed the would-be publishers that they would have to provide the

government with the names of responsible people who could be sued in the case of libel, he also made it plain that the government would not reject the paper out of hand.

With the appearance of the first issue of the Wu-pao Johnston observed that, though it could not be described as a "first-class production," it was not at all offensive and in fact was highly complimentary to British administration at Weihaiwei. At the same time, however, he reserved judgment as to whether this was merely a temporary diversion since the paper's publisher, Sun Han-ch'uan, made no secret of the fact that he had been in Russia.<sup>102</sup> Other members of the newspaper's staff also came under suspicion by the fact that they did not seek the support of the local business community but rather appeared to have outside funding. Two in particular were described as "men of neither means nor repute who would turn their hands to any job for the sake of anything they could make. Both are opium smokers."<sup>103</sup> In any event, the paper does not appear to have given the British any trouble during its short life. Those issues which have survived from 1927 and 1928 carried articles much more critical of corruption within the walled town and in China generally than of the leasehold administration.<sup>104</sup> The fact that Port Edward was in a position to support a daily newspaper by 1927 is perhaps the most interesting thing that one can say about it. Another paper which emerged in 1929-30, however, proved to be a bit more of an irritant as will be seen in the next chapter.

### Social Problems

Though Weihaiwei was clearly assuming many of the attributes of a "modern" society in the late 1920s, it still retained

other features which were strangely impervious to change. The cruel custom of foot-binding, for example, continued to be practiced despite official and unofficial campaigns against it. Blunt again addressed the district headmen on the evils of foot-binding in October 1921 and, although the men expressed agreement with him, they noted that the older women in their own families refused to be persuaded. Although Blunt had copies of his proclamation against this custom circulated throughout the Territory and even sent to the Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng magistrates, he was reluctant to make foot-binding a crime especially in view of possible rendition. He warned the people, however, that future Chinese officials were not likely to take such a lenient view of the subject.<sup>105</sup>

The incidence of suicides at Weihaiwei also remained high, especially among young women.<sup>106</sup> This phenomenon, however, was not unique to the Territory and seemed rather to be the result of extreme pressures which traditional Chinese families exerted on young married women.<sup>107</sup> Other social problems with which the police frequently had to deal were gambling and opium smoking. With respect to the latter, the government was fairly successful in discouraging opium smuggling at Weihaiwei by increasing the penalties against it and by lowering the price of the drug sold legally to licensed addicts. They were, of course, unable to eliminate the large supplies available just across the border and rumored to be of Japanese origin.<sup>108</sup> Yet life in British-controlled Weihaiwei remained a model of law and order compared to the increasingly anarchic conditions existing elsewhere in warlord China.

## Political Conditions

By May 1925 Shantung had acquired the dubious distinction of having one of the most notorious warlord regimes in the entire country. As a subordinate of Manchuria's powerful Chang Tso-lin, Chang Tsung-ch'ang owed his survival as Shantung's military governor entirely to intimidation and brute force. Until his ouster in April 1928, he managed to almost completely destroy the Shantung economy through a combination of ruinous taxes, the printing of unsupported paper money, confiscation of bank reserves, and plundering of the countryside by undisciplined troops. Matters were made even worse in 1927-28 by a series of natural disasters which forced thousands of people to seek relief by emigrating to Manchuria.<sup>109</sup>

Even prior to this particularly appalling period, however, Weihaiwei found itself at times caught up in the endless series of battles between contending warlord factions. In June 1924, for example, after an abortive attempt to seize a Chinese gunboat at Chefoo, a band of about twenty adherents of the Canton government fled into the Territory en route to Shanghai.<sup>110</sup> A few months later in October it was noted that representatives of the so-called "Red Cross Society" had entered Weihaiwei, apparently acting as spies for Wu P'ei-fu in an attempt to observe the movements of any Fengtien followers who might be using the leasehold to gain access to Shantung. After it was discovered that these men were soliciting the support of local well-to-do citizens, the British decided to close down their office and they moved instead to the walled town.<sup>111</sup> With the arrival of Chang Tsung-ch'ang's armies, the police at Weihaiwei were especially vigilant to ensure that increased banditry did not spill over their borders.<sup>112</sup>



By 1927 the continuing battles to gain control of China were being conducted in ideological as well as military terms and Reginald Johnston, now commissioner at Weihaiwei, found himself being asked by Chinese authorities at both Chefoo and Tsinan to extradite suspected "bolsheviks." Johnston at this time initiated a policy of strict political neutrality to which he adhered consistently until rendition in 1930. He stated, for example, that it was not against English law for a person to be a Communist and unless it could be proven that subversive activities had occurred, no action would be taken.<sup>113</sup> There was to be a whole series of similar demands made upon him from 1928-30, all of which he successfully resisted.

Johnston was especially apprehensive that if Chiang K'ai-shek's forces were to extend their influence into Shantung: "Chefoo would be a centre of intrigue and anti-British demonstrations against us in Weihai."<sup>114</sup> By November 1927 he wrote: "We still survive but we are threatened continually by bandits, who indeed have already crossed our boundary several times, though fortunately without doing much damage." A new permanent garrison of 150 British soldiers was added at this point to help stem the tide of bandit incursions.<sup>115</sup>

Johnston found himself complaining in this same year that Weihaiwei was not the old "Wu Wei place" it used to be and that he spent a good deal of his time hunting down "Chinese and Korean bolshevik spies." He also found himself "almost at war with the Shantung government" for refusing to extradite "innocent refugees" who were accused of being bolsheviks but were actually pursued for their money.<sup>116</sup> He felt relieved at this point, however, that Weihaiwei's more permanent residents thus far displayed neither bolshevist nor anti-

British sentiments.<sup>117</sup> No one in fact seemed eager for rendition given the upheaval which then existed throughout China. Yet pressure would soon be brought to bear once again upon the British to withdraw from Weihaiwei, not by those inside the Territorial borders, but by a new and extremely nationalistic government under Chiang K'ai-shek.

Notes to Chapter 6

<sup>1</sup>For a detailed account of events connected with the May Fourth Movement, see Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

<sup>2</sup>Buck, "Educational Modernization," p. 109. For a full discussion of May Fourth activities in Tsinan, see also Buck, Urban Change, pp. 114-120.

<sup>3</sup>FO 228/3287, Cecil Kirke, Chefoo Intelligence Report, 1st and 4th Quarters, 1922.

<sup>4</sup>It was observed, for example, in 1920 that over the preceding four to five years Chefoo's supply of silk cocoons from Antung (a city now known as Ta-tung in the extreme south-eastern portion of the Liaotung peninsula near the mouth of the Yalu River) had decreased dramatically due to the development of that port by the Japanese. Not only was this major source of raw materials being largely monopolized by the Japanese, but their modern machine-made pongees were also far superior to silk which the Chinese could produce using traditional hand labor. High duty and other charges on Antung cocoons used in Chefoo silks also made them more expensive than the Japanese produced fabric and locally supplied cocoons were of inferior quality. It is understandable, then, that those connected with Chefoo's handicapped silk industry were resentful of Japanese competition. See FO 228/3570, Enclosure No. 1 in King to Diplomatic Body, 27 March 1920. It is also noted here that attempts to improve Chefoo's competitive position by a newly-formed Foreign Silk Association had thusfar failed "... due primarily to an unavoidable lack of cohesion and the impossibility of securing concerted action of all parties concerned in the Chefoo Silk Industry, particularly that of the weavers in the interior whose general ignorance and hand to mouth policy have proved unyielding to reform." Another similar situation existed in the manufacture of beancake where Japanese control over Manchurian soybeans and their superior steam-operated mills caused a severe decline in what had once been a major industry in Chefoo. See Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports on the trade, industries, etc. of the ports open to foreign commerce . . ., 1912-1922, vol. I, Northern and Yangtze Ports, (Shanghai, 1922), p. 19.

<sup>5</sup>CO 873/585, Departmental Reports, 1919; and CO 873/654, Annual Report, 1921.

<sup>6</sup>CO 873/572, Undated broadsheet of the "Weihaiwei An-li-kan t'ang chiu-kuo hui."

<sup>7</sup>Buck, Urban Change, p. 116. See also Chow, The May Fourth Movement, pp. 140-141 and 147.

<sup>8</sup>CO 873/572, Undated broadsheet promoting the shih-jen t'uan movement.

<sup>9</sup>CO 873/577, Acting Japanese Consul, Chefoo, to Lockhart, 28 August 1919; and Lockhart to Consul, 29 August 1919.

<sup>10</sup>CO 873/572, Lockhart to Junior District Officer (hereafter J.D.O.), 6 June 1919; J.D.O. to F.A., 14 August 1919; Haller to J.D.O., 19 August 1919; and Lockhart to J.D.O., 21 August 1919.

<sup>11</sup>CO 873/572, clipping from Manchurian Daily News, 8 August 1919; and Lockhart to J.D.O., 21 August 1919.

<sup>12</sup>FO 228/3460, Annual Report, 1921. See also North China Herald, 14 June 1919, p. 699, in which it is noted that dock workers at Weihaiwei were refusing to load salt onto a Japanese steamer. In 1919 Japanese cotton yarn imports declined to 2,789 bales valued at \$603,850, while in 1918 they had amounted to 4,170 bales worth \$1,084,200. This deficit was partly offset by the import of Chinese cotton at Weihaiwei. Naturally, the export of cotton also declined during this period from 962 bales valued at \$250,122 to 9 bales worth \$2,340. In addition, the vigorous new salt export trade at Weihaiwei, which had risen from 62,931 bags valued at \$67,058 in 1918 to 434,841 bags worth \$521,809 in the first half of 1919 virtually ceased as a result of the Japanese boycott. See CO 873/585, Departmental Reports, 1919. The lack of freight due to the withdrawal of Japanese shipping, of course, also had its effect on other imports. It was reported, for example, that the number of Japanese steamers calling at Weihaiwei declined from 31 in early 1919 to 3 in 1920 and that junk traffic also fell. All of this meant less revenue in the form of shipping dues for the government. In CO 521/21, Annual Report, 1921, p. 9, the situation was described as follows: "Trade during 1919 was affected adversely by the boycott of Japanese goods throughout China and by the refusal of the Chinese in the Territory to have any dealings in, or to handle goods emanating from Japanese sources. Complaints were made of such refusal but it was not possible to persuade the Chinese to change their attitude."

<sup>13</sup>CO 873/572, Chinese document "I"; Government proclamation in Chinese, 30 July 1919; and related Chinese correspondence from Weihaiwei Chamber of Commerce to British officials, 28 and 31 July 1919. These documents reveal the difficulties faced by the Chamber of Commerce in mediating between the British on the one hand and the anti-Japanese students, workers, and merchants on the other. It was also by no means an easy task for either British officials or the Chamber to determine the extent of Japanese middle-man involvement in any given business transaction. See also CO 873/572, Senior District Officer (hereafter S.D.O.) to Acting Commissioner, 9 and 10 June 1921.

<sup>14</sup>John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937 (Stanford, 1966), p. 6.

<sup>15</sup>CO 521/19, Annual Report, 1918, pp. 18-19.

<sup>16</sup>See Chapter 2, pp. 111-12.

<sup>17</sup>FO 228/3459, Johnston to Colonial Office, 21 May 1918. The minutes written by various Colonial Office staff three years earlier in 1915 indicate that there was strong support

for Johnston's view at that time as well. The consensus seemed to be, however, that since it did not cost a great deal to retain Weihaiwei, and since the Chinese would not be prepared to provide much in the way of compensation if it were returned to them, there was no advantage in doing so. It was even thought that the Chinese might actually view the British presence at Weihaiwei as a counterweight to Japanese activities in Shantung. See FO 371/3191.

Ian Nish has noted that in 1916, midway through World War I, Germany and Britain were both offering Japan the possibility of concessions in China in the hope of obtaining her assistance in their respective war efforts. Weihaiwei was at one point considered among such concessions, but the British minister in Peking, Sir John Jordan, objected so strongly to the proposal that the whole idea was dropped. See Ian H. Nish, Alliance in Decline, A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23 (London, 1972), pp. 178-183.

<sup>18</sup>For a thorough analysis of the various schools of thought regarding Weihaiwei and Britain's overall China policy at this time, see Peter Richards, "British Policy towards China with special reference to the Shantung Question," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of London, 1970), especially pp. 55-57 and 71-80.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 79. See also Nish, Alliance in Decline, pp. 266-76.

<sup>20</sup>U.S. National Archives, United States Department of State, Records Relating to British Asia, 1910-1929, File 846h (hereafter USDS, 846h), Consul-General at Shanghai, E. S. Cunningham to U.S. Department of State, 5 May 1921. See also the editorial Cunningham attached to this memorandum from the North China Daily News, 28 April 1921.

<sup>21</sup>For further discussion of the significance of the Shantung settlement, see Buck, Urban Change, pp. 122-4. For a detailed analysis of the Washington Conference negotiations as they related to China, see also Richards, "British Policy towards China," ch. 9.

<sup>22</sup>USDS, 846h, U.S. Consul-General, London to U.S. Department of State, 17 March 1922. It is clear from Richards' analysis of British policy at this time that the rendition of Weihaiwei was only very reluctantly offered as a means of pressuring Japan to give up her territorial claims in Shantung. See his "British Policy towards China," pp. 348-82.

<sup>23</sup>Peking and Tientsin Times, 27 March 1922.

<sup>24</sup>CO 873/657, Blunt to Colonial Office, 9 March 1922.

<sup>25</sup>CO 873/659, Minutes of Advisory Council Meeting, 22 February 1922. For a thorough discussion of the trade conducted at Weihaiwei and estimates of the projected "rendition effect," see CO 873/659, Lavers and Clark report, 30 May 1922; and Lockhart Papers, Box 1, Miscellaneous Correspondence,

Clark to Rendition Committee, July 1922. See also CO 873/661, Clark to Colonial Office, 17 October 1921. In this latter document Clark actually describes Weihaiwei's trade as a kind of smuggling operation in which native goods were reexported from the Territory as "the produce of Weihaiwei," although not more than 10 percent had in fact been produced there. Although Chinese customs officials were aware of the situation, they found the amounts involved too small to be concerned about. The North China Herald also predicted economic disaster for the leasehold. See 24 June 1922, p. 882.

<sup>26</sup>North China Herald, 11 March 1922.

<sup>27</sup>CO 873/661, S.D.O. to Blunt, 3, 16, and 9 May 1922. See also North China Herald, 12 August 1922, pp. 431-2. Liang Ju-hao (also known as M. T. Liang and Liang Lu-hao) was born in Kwangtung in 1860 and studied engineering in the United States. He held many government posts during the late Ch'ing and Republican periods. See China Weekly Review, ed., Who's Who in China, 4th ed., (Shanghai, 1931), pp. 254-5.

<sup>28</sup>Peking and Tientsin Times, 27 March 1922. See also CO 521/24, Collins to Duff, 26 July 1922; secret letter, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 8 October 1922; and secret cable, H.M.S. "Hawkins" to Admiralty, 7 October 1922. In this cable it is noted that the former naval officers serving as Chinese delegates to the joint commission on the rendition of Weihaiwei argued forcefully that Liu-kung Tao was the birthplace of their own navy and therefore must be returned to Chinese control. See also The Times, 23 September 1922 for the entire draft agreement which had been worked out between the two parties at this stage. The most remarkable aspect of this document is the degree to which Britain had at least tentatively succeeded in obtaining many of its objectives at Weihaiwei, including a large voice for foreigners in the future administration of the area. This seems especially noteworthy in view of the small number of foreign residents (less than one hundred) who planned to remain there.

<sup>29</sup>FO 228/3287, Chefoo Intelligence Report, 1st and 3rd quarters, 1922. See also CO 521/23, Minute on Blunt to Colonial Office, 10 July 1922.

<sup>30</sup>North China Daily News, 13 and 27 September and 7 and 18 October 1922. See also Manchuria Daily News, 20 August 1923.

<sup>31</sup>Peking and Tientsin Times, 14 September 1922.

<sup>32</sup>CO 521/25, Blunt to Colonial Office, 22 January 1923.

<sup>33</sup>CO 873/675, Kirke to Clive, 15 February 1923 with enclosed translation of Chung-sheng pao, 31 January 1923. See also Carpmael to Blunt, and Blunt to Clive, 7 February 1923. The threat of a boycott stimulated the Weihaiwei senior district officer to ask the Wen-teng magistrate to control such public utterances. See S.D.O. to Wen-teng magistrate, 7 February 1923.

<sup>34</sup>CO 873/675, Kirke to Macleay, 5 March 1923 with enclosed clippings from Ai-kuo pao, 2 March 1923.

<sup>35</sup>Tung-fang jih-pao, 10 November 1923, p. 3. The Chefoo Chamber of Commerce sent what was described as a "mildly worded" telegram to the authorities in Tsinan and Peking demanding the cancellation of the proposed Weihaiwei rendition treaty and the unconditional restoration of the Territory to China. One particularly active individual also deposited copies of a "dossier" on the rendition issue at five locations in Chefoo and invited interested citizens to examine the materials for themselves. See FO 228/3287, Chefoo Political Report, 3rd quarter, 1923.

<sup>36</sup>USDS, 846h, Sherman, Peking to U.S. Department of State, 3 June 1924.

<sup>37</sup>One difficulty which was observed in 1924, for example, was a decline in the morale of Weihaiwei's police as it was feared the force would be disbanded when a new Chinese administration took over. See CO 873/692, Annual Report, 1924.

<sup>38</sup>For a detailed study of the famine and the international relief effort which accompanied it, see Peking United International Famine Relief Committee, The Famine of 1920-21 in North China (Peking, 1922). See also, Walter H. Mallory, China: Land of Famine (New York, 1926); and Andrew J. Nathan, A History of the China International Famine Relief Commission (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

<sup>39</sup>CO 521/21, Annual Report, 1919. Summarizing reports from Weihaiwei's district headmen, one British official noted that crop yields were only 10 to 30 percent of their average and he added that relief work should probably begin at once. He also complained that part of the blame for these conditions should go to the British Treasury for not having provided adequate funds to construct reservoirs in the leasehold. See CO 873/576, Blunt to Lockhart, 27 September 1919.

<sup>40</sup>CO 873/593, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 31 March 1920.

<sup>41</sup>North China Daily News, 20 March 1920.

<sup>42</sup>CO 873/590, Jennings to S.D.O., 8 March 1920. Yet even this meager diet was a good deal better than that reported in other parts of north China where such things as sawdust, thistles, elm bark, and pumice stone cakes were eaten and sweet potato vines were "considered a great delicacy." See The Famine of 1920-21 in North China, p. 13.

<sup>43</sup>CO 873/584, Minutes of Chamber of Commerce meeting, 13 March 1920.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid. The district headman was Liang Yu-t'ang of Wen-ch'uan-chai who had even sought funds in Peking and who stressed the need for loans to the "middle class" rather than charity donations which would imply a loss of "face." See CO 873/593, Binney to Lockhart, 12 March 1920.

<sup>45</sup>CO 873/593, Blunt report on work of Weihaiwei Famine Relief Committee, 7 June 1921; and Distribution Committee Report, 8 May 1920. See also, Lockhart Papers, Box 2, Lockhart report on Weihaiwei Famine Relief Fund, 25 June 1920. This report can also be found in CO 873/599 along with a relevant cable from Lockhart to Colonial Office, 14 April 1920.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid. See also, CO 873/593, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 31 March 1920; and E. E. Clark's Statement of Account for the Weihaiwei Famine Relief Fund, 10 August 1920. Another interesting method used to raise relief funds in the leasehold was the organization of a "Grand Open-Air Entertainment" which was held at Port Edward in March 1920 and included village theatricals and dances, demonstrations of Chinese boxing, wrestling and swordplay by the Indian troops stationed at Weihaiwei, drill work and singing by students of the Anglo-Chinese School, and a fireworks display. See CO 873/593, File on "North China Relief Fund," Printed Circular.

<sup>47</sup>Ch'u, Local Government, p. 160.

<sup>48</sup>CO 521/21, Treasury to Colonial Office, 21 February 1920; and Confidential, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 10 June 1920. Although the details of the tax remission program at Weihaiwei are a bit vague, it appears some relief was granted during 1920. See especially a letter from Sun Pao-ch'i in which Lockhart is praised for reducing taxes during the famine crisis. Lockhart Papers, Box 2, Sun Pao-ch'i to Lockhart, June 1920. The government revenue figures for April to December 1920 are also markedly lower than those for the same period in 1921: \$147,182 as compared with \$167,570. See CO 873/654, Annual Report, 1921.

<sup>49</sup>Ch'u, Local Government, p. 160.

<sup>50</sup>CO 873/593, Blunt report, 7 June 1921.

<sup>51</sup>Ch'u, Local Government, pp. 160-1. Hsiao Kung-chuan also has a lengthy discussion of famine relief in traditional China. See his Rural China, ch. 5.

<sup>52</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 2, official proclamations dated 17 and 23 March 1920.

<sup>53</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 2, replicas of the thank you calligraphy, October 1920. See also CO 873/593, notice of 5 April 1921 and translation of commissioner's address made at the special ceremony which read, in part, as follows:

In human relations there is nothing more important than good faith, and as the classics say 'Good faith is the foundation of all virtues.' In the present case the farmers have shown in a most striking manner that they are men of their word and true to their promises. They have proved that their word is as good as their bond and have thus afforded an excellent example of that honesty for which the Chinese farmers, who are the backbone of China, have long enjoyed a high reputation.



In addition, there was a Chinese address delivered in honor of the commissioner which was translated as follows:

We put our gratitude into song:  
 The past year's famine  
 Left the people without food  
 The 'call to save'  
 Was sounded by you.  
 The hungry were fed  
 By your bounteous grace.  
 Your merit we sing,  
 Your virtue we praise,  
 And vow we will ne'er forget.

See CO 521/22, Enclosure in Lockhart to Colonial Office, 14 April 1921. This file also contains pictures of the ceremony.

Regarding the headmen's awards, there was an interesting exchange between Lockhart and the Colonial Office which ended with the colonial secretary at the time, Winston Churchill, granting permission for a memento as long as it was not a medal which could be worn as Lockhart desired. See CO 521/22, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 18 October 1920; Cable, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 9 April 1921; and Churchill to Blunt, 8 August 1921. See also, Lockhart Papers, Box 6, Bundle marked "Weihaiwei," Blunt to Relief Committee, 18 October 1921.

<sup>54</sup>Nathan, A History, p. 52.

<sup>55</sup>CO 873/649, Weihaiwei Census, 1921. According to this document, the severe north China cholera epidemic of 1919 led to a great many more deaths at Weihaiwei than the famine. The British appear to have handled this crisis as effectively as possible under the circumstances. See CO 521/21, Annual Report, 1919.

<sup>56</sup>CO 873/584, Minutes of Famine Relief Committee, 16 June 1925; and CO 873/694, J.D.O. to S.D.O., 4 July 1925.

<sup>57</sup>CO 873/654, Annual Report, 1921.

<sup>58</sup>CO 873/692, Annual Report, 1924.

<sup>59</sup>CO 873/697, Annual Report, 1925.

<sup>60</sup>CO 873/705, Annual Report, 1926; and CO 873/758, Annual Report, 1927. The expansion of this trade in 1926 was described as a "boom" which was demonstrated by the hundreds of carts passing back and forth throughout the Territory. CO 873/612, Burdett memorandum, 1 January 1926. One British observer remarked: "All spare places are being used as cart stands for parking carts; carts used only to be seen on market days, every fifth day, but now hundreds come in daily, mostly with peanuts." See CO 873/705, Annual Report, 1926.

<sup>61</sup>CO 873/659, Li to Blunt, 20 February 1922; Minutes

of Advisory Council Meetings, 1 March, 5 April, and 21 June 1922; and Li to Blunt, 26 June 1922.

<sup>62</sup>CO 873/672, Memorandum regarding Ground Nut Guild, 16 November 1922. This file also contains translations of the anonymous placards and guild circulars.

<sup>63</sup>A report read out at the 1 March 1922 Advisory Council meeting described how the ground nut industry had grown at Weihaiwei. It was stated that in 1920 there were about 34,000 mou of land devoted to peanut cultivation in the leasehold which produced approximately 57,000 piculs of shelled nuts (or 85,000 piculs of nuts in the shell). In that same year the neighboring hsien of Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng produced around 101,000 piculs of nuts which were also shipped from Weihaiwei along with 143,500 piculs from elsewhere. The total of 301,600 piculs was a remarkable improvement over the 475 piculs exported from the Territory in 1903. See CO 873/659, Advisory Council Meeting, 1 March 1922.

<sup>64</sup>The figures were 165 workers in 1911 and 332 in 1921. See CO 873/300, Weihaiwei Census, 1911; CO 873/649, Weihaiwei Census, 1921; and CO 873/673, Annual Report, 1922. The Chinese government in the 1920s sponsored scientific research in various centers of the silk trade, including Chefoo, which was designed to improve the quantity and quality of silk produced. It was undoubtedly hoped by interested parties at Weihaiwei that the British administration there would do likewise. See CO 873/598, J.D.O. to Lockhart, 5 May 1920; FO 228/3570, King to Dean, Diplomatic Body, Peking, 27 March 1920; and FO 228/3287, Chefoo Intelligence Report, December quarter, 1920.

<sup>65</sup>CO 873/654, Annual Report, 1921. In 1920 the British decided to impose extra shipping dues on salt and to register all salt pans in the Territory. The object of these measures was to cooperate with Chinese officials in preventing the dumping of untaxed salt at Weihaiwei as well as to raise additional revenue. See CO 873/627, Annual Report, 1920; and CO 873/575, Lockhart to Blunt, 6 July, 1920 and Ku to Lockhart, 28 June 1920.

<sup>66</sup>CO 873/705, Annual Report, 1926.

<sup>67</sup>CO 873/649, Weihaiwei Census, 1921. Harry Franck provides a fascinating description of the impact this handicraft industry had in Shantung in the 1920s:

Everyone took to turning discarded cues and combings into nets; children learned to tie them; coolies forced their clumsy fingers to it when nothing else offered; in mission churches women pinned the things to one another's backs and went on tying the little knots while they listened to the sermon. The making of hair-nets kept many from starvation in famine days, even though the wholesalers took advantage of the situation and paid the hungry toilers as little as possible.

See Harry A. Franck, Wandering in North China (New York, 1923), p. 312.

<sup>68</sup>CO 873/654, Annual Report, 1921; and CO 873/673, Annual Report, 1922. See also North China Herald, 11 February 1922, p. 369; and FO 228/3287, Chefoo Intelligence Reports, December quarter, 1921, pp. 19c-e; June quarter, 1922, pp. 11a-b; and March quarter, 1923, pp. 10-11. The Chefoo materials provide an interesting description of the ups and downs in this industry and the way in which Chinese businessmen attempted to cope with them. Charles Corbett also makes the following observation about both the hairnet and lace industries in China: "An interesting by-product of these home industries was that girls, who had hitherto been considered a rather unprofitable investment compared with boys, began to be rated higher than their brothers." See Charles H. Corbett, Shantung Christian University (Chee-loo) (New York, 1955), pp. 210-11.

<sup>69</sup>CO 873/654, Annual Report, 1921.

<sup>70</sup>CO 873/758, Annual Report, 1927.

<sup>71</sup>CO 873/649, Weihaiwei Census, 1921.

<sup>72</sup>CO 873/620, Jowett to Lockhart, 6 November 1920. From 1918 to 1920 the price of flour at Weihaiwei, for example, rose 46 percent, cotton cloth 58 percent, coal 25 percent, and millet 59%. It was estimated that a month's living expenses would have cost \$12.00 in 1914, \$18.30 in 1920, and \$31.45 in 1923. CO 873/620, Enclosure in Blunt to Colonial Office, 4 November 1923.

<sup>73</sup>CO 873/612, Burdett memorandum on Territorial police, 1924-26, 1 January 1926.

<sup>74</sup>CO 521/27, Russell-Brown to Colonial Office, 16 January 1925; and Lockhart Papers, Box 9, Johnston to Lockhart, 22 July 1927.

<sup>75</sup>CO 873/612, Burdett memorandum on territorial police, 1924-26, 1 January 1926.

<sup>76</sup>CO 873/560 and CO 873/618 contain a great deal of correspondence on the subject of cinemas and theaters at Weihaiwei in the 1920s.

<sup>77</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 1, Original speech by district headman, Miao Tso-pin, and official translation.

<sup>78</sup>CO 521/22, Enclosure in Lockhart to Colonial Office, 7 May 1921.

<sup>79</sup>Ch'u, Local Government, p. 166.

<sup>80</sup>CO 521/22, Enclosure in Lockhart to Colonial Office, 7 May 1921.

<sup>81</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 1, Blunt to Colonial Office, 7 May 1921.

<sup>82</sup>CO 873/571, Blunt to Lockhart, 24 June 1919.

<sup>83</sup>CO 873/571, Lockhart to Blunt, 6 July 1919; and Blunt to Lockhart, 10 August 1919. Wellington Chan has described how Shanghai's Merchant Volunteer Corps was the original model for many such treaty port militia forces. Chan, Merchants, p. 233.

<sup>84</sup>CO 873/683, Brown to Leveson, 14 April 1924.

<sup>85</sup>CO 873/683, Brown to Chiaotung taoyin, 24 April 1924; and Brown to Crown Advocate, 5 May 1926.

<sup>86</sup>CO 873/659, Letter from Ku Ming-hsün and Li Yi-chih read out at 9 March 1922 Advisory Council meeting. The relevant section is headed "Kai-ko tsung-tung chih."

<sup>87</sup>Ibid. See also Jowett to Blunt, 28 February 1922.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid.

<sup>89</sup>CO 873/659, Minutes of 9 March 1922 Advisory Council meeting.

<sup>90</sup>CO 873/659, Agenda for 7 March 1922 Advisory Council meeting.

<sup>91</sup>CO 521/25, Blunt to Colonial Office, 2 November 1923.

<sup>92</sup>CO 873/612, Jennings to Lockhart, 1921.

<sup>93</sup>CO 873/627, Departmental Reports, 1920; CO 873/673, Annual Report, 1922; CO 873/692, Annual Report, 1924; CO 873/697, Annual Report, 1925; and H. G. W. Woodhead, ed., The China Year Book (Tientsin and Shanghai, 1928 ed.), p. 908; and 1929-30 ed., p. 88.

<sup>94</sup>CO 521/22, Annual Report, 1920; and CO 873/589, Report on Schools, 1920.

<sup>95</sup>CO 873/654, Annual Report, 1921, p. 28.

<sup>96</sup>CO 873/679, S.D.O. to Blunt, and Blunt to S.D.O., 17 September 1923; J.D.O. to Blunt, 27 June 1924; and J.D.O. to Forcey, 28 April 1925. See also CO 873/682, Annual Report, 1923; CO 873/692, Annual Report, 1924; and CO 873/705, Annual Report, 1926. It is interesting that Ku Ming-hsün and Li Yi-chih were among the prime movers in this initiative.

<sup>97</sup>CO 873/699, S.D.O. to Commissioner, 14 January 1927; CO 873/714, Johnston to S.D.O., 23 August and 6 December 1927; and CO 873/758, Annual Report, 1927.

<sup>98</sup>CO 521/27, Confidential, Brown to Colonial Office, 18 July 1925. See also CO 873/572, Brown to S.D.O., 14 June 1925; J.D.O. to Commissioner, 15 June 1925; Commissioner to S.D.O. and J.D.O., 26 June 1925; and CO 873/697, Annual Report, 1925.

<sup>99</sup>CO 873/572, S.D.O. to Brown, 19 June 1925. There was considerably more student activity, as usual, in Chefoo in the form of parades, placards, a threatened general strike, and an anti-British boycott. See FO 228/3287, Chefoo Political Reports, June, September, and December quarters, 1925.

<sup>100</sup>CO 873/524, Liang to Brown, 14 July 1925.

<sup>101</sup>CO 873/678, Johnston to S.D.O., 27 October 1927.

<sup>102</sup>CO 873/678, Johnston to S.D.O., 16 December 1927. This file also contains a copy of the first issue of the Wei-hai wu-pao.

<sup>103</sup>CO 873/678, S.D.O. to Johnston, 26 and 28 November 1927.

<sup>104</sup>Lockhart Papers, vol. 50, Wei-hai wu-pao, 1927-28.

<sup>105</sup>CO 873/655, Blunt to S.D.O., 17 January 1922; S.D.O. to Blunt, 27 January 1923; and Blunt to S.D.O., 28 January 1923. There were hopes that the demands of modern industry might eventually lead to the abandonment of this custom. It had been observed in Weihaiwei, for example, that women with bound feet were unable to climb to the hillsides to tend silk worms feeding on scrub oak there, while the men were too pre-occupied with agricultural labor for this chore. See CO 873/598, J.D.O. to Lockhart, 5 May 1920. Similarly, a foreigner studying labor conditions for women at Chefoo in 1926 noted how difficult it was for those with bound feet to walk long distances to work in the city's factories and that it was women with unbound feet who became supervisors in these industries and earned the higher salaries. See Harriet Rietveld, "Women and Children in Industry in Chefoo," Chinese Economic Monthly, 3.12 (December 1926):559-62.

<sup>106</sup>CO 873/649, Weihaiwei Census, 1921. See also the suicide figures provided in Annual Reports for each subsequent year.

<sup>107</sup>Margery Wolf, "Women and Suicide in China," in Margery Wolf and Roxanne Witke, eds., Women in Chinese Society (Stanford, 1975), pp. 111-141.

<sup>108</sup>CO 873/628, Jowett Report, 23 February 1921. See also CO 873/673, Annual Report, 1922.

<sup>109</sup>Buck, Urban Change, pp. 125-29.

<sup>110</sup>CO 873/685, Brown to Macleay, 13 June 1924, enclosing Smith report of 12 June 1924.

<sup>111</sup>CO 873/688, S.D.O. to Brown, 6 and 11 October 1924. For another account of this incident, see FO 228/3287, Chefoo Political Report, June quarter, 1924.

<sup>112</sup>CO 873/697, Annual Report, 1925.

<sup>113</sup>CO 873/712, entire file, May 1927. See also, CO 873/721, Johnston to taoyin, 8 December 1927.

<sup>114</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 9, Johnston to Lockhart, 3 April 1927.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., 12 November 1927.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid., 22 July and 18 December 1927

<sup>117</sup>Ibid., 13 May 1927.

## Chapter 7

## The End of an Era

The Northern Expedition Comes to Shantung

The strong tides of nationalism were indeed flowing across China in the late 1920s, but these years, if anything, brought even greater administrative chaos and economic deprivation to the long-suffering people of Shantung than had the earlier portion of this turbulent decade. In the autumn of 1927, with serious disputes dividing the Kuomintang internally and relations with Japan causing difficulties externally, Chiang K'ai-shek's great Northern Expedition to eradicate warlordism and unite China suddenly came to a halt in southern Shantung. Given this reprieve, Chang Ts'ung-ch'ang temporarily remained in power in Tsinan until the Nationalists forced his withdrawal to Manchuria in the spring of 1928.

Even then, however, the Nanking regime was prevented from immediately consolidating its position in Shantung. Serious fighting, later known as the "Tsinan incident," broke out in May between Kuomintang and Japanese troops and, although a cease-fire was quickly negotiated, the Japanese continued to occupy the provincial capital and the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad until the spring of 1929. By then disputes had arisen between Chiang K'ai-shek and his erstwhile ally Feng Yü-hsiang over who should actually control the province. Timely defections by two of Feng's commanders, Han Fu-ch'ü and Shih Yu-san, however, settled the matter in Chiang's favor and in September 1930 Han was repaid for his support with the chairmanship of the

Shantung government, a position he retained until the Japanese invasion of 1937.<sup>1</sup>

Although the struggle to control the provincial administration at Tsinan ended in 1930, certain parts of Shantung remained in the hands of minor warlords for some time afterward. The Chefoo region, for example, had been primarily controlled since 1928 by General Liu Chen-nien, a former subordinate of Chang Ts'ung-ch'ang, who had in that year declared his somewhat dubious loyalty to the Nanking forces. With its proximity to Manchuria and relative remoteness from Tsinan, the Shantung promontory was an ideal staging ground for battles between various groups of northern militarists and those claiming to be affiliated with the Kuomintang. Chang Ts'ung-ch'ang himself even attempted an unsuccessful return invasion of Shantung from this area in February 1929. Thus, the American consul reported in May 1929 that there had been no less than six changes of flags and nine different factions in power in Chefoo in the past year alone.<sup>2</sup> Such instability inevitably had repercussions in the leasehold of Weihaiwei.

In fact, as the political fortunes of all these competing groups rose and fell in rapid succession, the British territory proved once again to be a conveniently neutral sanctuary for many displaced soldiers and generals as well as civilian refugees.<sup>3</sup> Those with their own financial resources made a considerable contribution to economic growth in Weihaiwei during these final years of the British occupation. In August 1928 one observer remarked: "Northern and Southern partisans, ex-officials and others, are now jostling each other for houses in which to live.



The owners of home property are reaping an abundant silver harvest, and the building trade is booming."<sup>4</sup>

Not all of the effects of this influx were positive ones, however. As well as having to deal with a constant barrage of extradition demands from neighboring Chinese officials and the legal problems they presented,<sup>5</sup> the commissioner at Weihaiwei was also faced with large numbers of armed soldiers entering the Territory as they deserted from warlord armies. By early 1929 there were so many of these men coming in that a proclamation was issued throughout the leasehold specifying the conditions under which they could remain.<sup>6</sup>

### Banditry

Of greater concern to the British administrators than individual refugee soldiers were those who decided to form new bandit gangs or reinforce the many already in existence in areas bordering the Territory. As continued war and extortionate government brought ever greater poverty to Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien, the relative prosperity within Weihaiwei's borders presented an attractive and tempting contrast.

The annual presence of British ships at Weihaiwei during the summer of 1927 was an effective deterrent to local armed gangs, but the withdrawal of the fleet in the autumn encouraged a few bandits to make exploratory visits along the borders and into the market towns. During the winter of 1927-28 there were a number of armed robberies in the Territory, some of which were led by bandits operating from the western border regions. There in a rugged

range of mountains over 3,000 feet high there were several ancient temples which they used for shelter.<sup>7</sup> The commissioner became especially concerned after receiving anonymous letters which threatened armed raids into Weihaiwei by these men who were said to number in the thousands and to be equipped with guns supplied from Dairen. Fortunately, the raid was never carried out and most of the violent crime of this period took place outside the Territory.<sup>8</sup>

In February 1928 the British commissioner was able to report that the Territory to that point remained basically secure and added:

The only plausible explanation of the comparative immunity of the leased Territory from the unwelcome attentions of bandits seems to be that they come from an extremely ignorant and superstitious section of the population, that they are badly equipped and led, that they have heard of, if they have not seen, British men-of-war and sea-planes, and that they entertain a very healthy dread of the fighting capacities of the British soldier and of the British-trained Chinese police.<sup>9</sup>

He also voiced his fear, however, that the recent "surrender" of the Hankow concession and "unpunished outrages" at Nanking would inspire greater boldness among bandit gangs, especially when backed up by armed, runaway soldiers.<sup>10</sup>

The breakdown of law and order in the Chefoo area gave even more cause for alarm in 1929 as was noted by the British consul there:

It is difficult to write of conditions in the interior without giving way to superlatives. The whole of the consular district with the exception of such main routes as Chefoo to Ninghai and Chefoo to Lungkow is overrun with robber bands and Red Spears

and even those exceptions must be qualified for armed robbers and kidnappers operate, in small bands, as opposed to small armies elsewhere, in the very outskirts of Chefoo.<sup>11</sup>

Weihaiwei, however, even at this stage remained immune from large-scale attacks and by 1930 the commissioner had learned from certain anonymous letters addressed to himself that there was a more important reason for the leasehold's relative security than British "prestige" or its meager defense force. He explained:

. . . the bandit-leaders regard the Leased Territory not only as a very convenient place of refuge in time of need but as a safe and advantageous meeting-place for local branches of the semi-religious and semi-political secret societies with which the majority of bandits are associated. By rigidly abstaining from entering the Territory as bandits, they feel they can pass through it in safety, or become temporary residents, without any serious risk of being recognised either by villagers who might have been among their victims or by the British police.<sup>12</sup>

Many local residents undoubtedly knew of this practice but were reluctant to inform the commissioner and upset the status quo as long as they were left in peace. And the commissioner, with his small security force, was certainly not in a position to launch a bandit extermination campaign anyway. The safest course, and the one in fact adopted, was to turn a blind eye to the bandit presence in the Territory so long as its residents were not themselves the object of attack. It was a precarious method of peace-keeping to say the least, but one which worked over the short period remaining until the British withdrawal.

The Struggle for Political Control of the Walled Town

In addition to endemic banditry, there were other indications of the near anarchy which existed in Shantung in the late 1920s. As on previous occasions when disputes arose over who should exercise national or provincial administrative authority, problems soon developed in the walled town of Weihai. As early as June 1927 the Chinese sub-magistrate there requested that the British assist him with security measures by supplying weapons as well as a telephone link with Port Edward. Although the commissioner replied that he had no spare rifles to offer, he promised to help in the event of actual violence in the town.<sup>13</sup> It is interesting that Reginald Johnston should have been the one to receive such a request, since it was he who had rescued an earlier Weihai official during the 1911 revolution.<sup>14</sup> In March 1928 the Chinese magistrate shrewdly reminded Johnston of this precedent and again asked that he help to prevent "Communists" from creating disturbances. The commissioner, however, informed the Colonial Office that this particular official was in reality less afraid of "Communists" than of either a revolution against the Chang Ts'ung-ch'ang administration in which he served, or a local rebellion against himself as he was quite unpopular within the walled town.<sup>15</sup>

In August 1928 a new man was appointed to the Weihai sub-magistracy when the administration at Chefoo came under nominal Nationalist control. The commissioner was impressed with this official's intention to launch anti-opium and anti-gambling campaigns but doubted they could actually be implemented given the town's dependence on

these major sources of revenue.<sup>16</sup> In the following months a good deal of the commissioner's time was taken up responding to pleas for assistance from rival claimants to the Weihai post. In September he was asked by two different individuals for support in removing the incumbent magistrate from office and declined. Explaining this peculiar situation to his superiors, the commissioner wrote:

That there should be so severe a competition for the chief post in the town of Weihaiwei may surprise those who know that its trade is almost extinct, all but a few of its leading merchants having long since migrated to the leased Territory. It is probably less populous than it was thirty years ago, and at the present day it can hardly be described as anything better than a walled village. The truth is, however, that the town possesses three sources of revenue -- or rather of 'squeeze' -- which are quite sufficient to attract the cupidity of those who from lack of influence or opportunity cannot hope to attain higher spheres of enrichment. These three sources of profit are opium, gambling and prostitution.<sup>17</sup>

The commissioner again received a call for help from the magistrate in November 1928 when one of the factions seeking to control Weihai sent an armed gang to terrorize the town. At that point he decided to position police outside the city walls to arrest anyone carrying arms.<sup>18</sup> The battle, it appears, was essentially between the incumbent official who was a representative of Liu Chen-nien, then in control of the Chefoo area, and various individuals sent by the new provincial government located at T'ai-an. (Tsinan in 1928 was still occupied by the Japanese.) In the meantime, with its own position in Shantung far from assured, the Nanking administration was reluctant to back anyone with troops against General Liu. The T'ai-an can-

didates, without military support, were repeatedly thrown out of Weihai by Liu's forces and finally gave up trying to control the town although Kuomintang agents were reportedly in the area as late as February 1929.<sup>19</sup>

The fact that the Nanking authorities at this point were highly suspicious of Liu's loyalty made it important for them to also maintain agents in the area to keep an eye on him. As the British commissioner noted, the leased Territory itself was highly valued as a safe haven for spying and propaganda operations by all of the political factions involved. At the same time, the town was valued because it was surrounded by foreign territory and, in the event the British chose to clamp down on such political intrigue, could itself become a place of refuge for the various agents. It was also a convenient place from which to survey British activities.

As one might expect, none of the Chinese factions competing for Weihai in early 1929 was eager to arouse British hostility and consequently refrained from propaganda operations with which they could be directly linked. The commissioner was worried, however, that local Kuomintang agents were secretly forming a party of their own to take part in an anti-British campaign whenever the government at T'ai-an or Nanking felt strong enough to initiate it. He added that while most of the leasehold residents were well-disposed toward their foreign administrators, there could be something to fear from:

. . . dissatisfied litigants, ex-convicts, village bullies who have been prevented from tyrannising over their neighbours, headmen who have 'lost face' by being detected in acts of petty extortion, and

persons who have been dismissed for misconduct from the public service. To these must be added the numerous people, here as elsewhere, who would sell their services to any party that promised them money, influence or official position.<sup>20</sup>

Rumors abounded at this time that Chiang K'ai-shek and Feng Yü-hsiang intended to stir up anti-British agitation as soon as relations with Japan improved and, with the question of Weihaiwei's retrocession hanging in the balance, the commissioner hoped that such agitation would not compel a humiliating withdrawal by his government and future dangerous repercussions for British citizens remaining in the area.<sup>21</sup>

In the meantime, it seemed a good idea for the British to maintain as cordial a relationship as possible with Liu Chen-nien, the T'ai-an authorities, and the Nan-king regime. As long as the leased Territory was important to all of these people for their various political purposes and as long as they remained at odds with one another the British felt the possibility of an armed attack by any of them was remote.<sup>22</sup> As so often in the past, the leasehold during this chaotic period once again proved useful to a wide variety of Chinese: bandits, deserting soldiers, political refugees, frightened villagers from neighboring hsien, spies, propagandists, and its own 180,000 residents. It was clearly becoming ever more of a burden, however, to the British who derived little benefit from it but were responsible for its administration and security. The possibility of retrocession thus began to appear, at least to some, as the best solution to the problem.

### Growing Pressure for Rendition

Not surprisingly, one of those most in favor of rendition in 1929 was Weihaiwei's Commissioner Johnston who was especially worried about Kuomintang activities. The local warlord, Liu Chen-nien, had never exhibited any great affection for the party, but his relationship with the Nanking authorities became distinctly more intimate after a meeting with some of them in the summer of 1929. Several of Liu's numerous tax bureaus subsequently came under central and provincial government control and permission was given for the establishment of an official branch of the Kuomintang as well as a new civilian form of government at Chefoo.<sup>23</sup> The commissioner was concerned that KMT activists operating openly and with Liu's support would now feel encouraged to initiate new moves to hasten the British withdrawal from Weihaiwei.

Danger signs had been emerging since September 1928 when Johnston noted the appearance of anti-imperialist slogans in the Chinese-controlled walled town. Furthermore, he wrote: "I have reason to believe that a stealthy attempt is being made to instill subversive and anti-foreign ideas into the heads of some of our schoolboys, and that the Kuo-min-tang intend to establish -- if indeed they have not already established -- a branch of their propaganda department in this Territory."<sup>24</sup>

It will be remembered that the British had reached agreement on the rendition of Weihaiwei with the Ts'ao K'un regime but were then forced to postpone implementation when Feng Yü-hsiang engineered a coup in Peking in November 1924. The matter was left unresolved during the



next few years as Chiang K'ai-shek's southern troops battled with the warlord armies of the north for control of the country. During 1928 the problem was once again discussed at length by Colonial and Foreign Office staff, but it was thought impossible to withdraw from Weihaiwei as long as Chang Ts'ung-ch'ang remained in power in Shantung.<sup>25</sup> By the end of the year, however, his regime had been toppled and the British found themselves in a difficult negotiating position as they faced the nationalistic and anti-imperialist government of Chiang K'ai-shek.

Flushed with the success of the Northern Expedition and supported by a rising tide of nationalism among the public, the Nationalists at this point felt confident in pressing their demands for tariff autonomy and the recovery of foreign concessions and leaseholds. The British soon discovered to their dismay that the original 1924 Weihaiwei agreement so painstakingly negotiated was now considered unacceptable to the Chinese because it allowed the Admiralty a perpetual loan of naval facilities at Liu-kung Island.<sup>26</sup> In fact, by June 1929 a complete deadlock developed in the discussions as the Chinese Naval Ministry suddenly expressed the desire to make Weihaiwei its principal base and to expel all foreigners from Port Edward without compensation for financial loss. Furthermore, the British were offered only a three-year loan of facilities on the island with no provision for renewal. Both the Foreign Office and the Admiralty found these new proposals totally unacceptable and the talks were stalemated until January 1930.<sup>27</sup> In the meantime, however, civil war again broke out between Chiang and his

warlord enemies and when discussions were resumed the British negotiating team found the Chinese more willing to compromise. This long delay was somewhat less helpful, however, to the Colonial Office staff on the scene in Weihaiwei where Kuomintang activists made life increasingly difficult.

In February 1929 the commissioner reported that many copies of an article entitled "The Scandal of Weihaiwei and its Rendition," which had appeared in a Peking journal in June 1927, were being circulated in the Territory "by persons whose aim it was to couple the rendition of Weihaiwei with the humiliation of Great Britain."<sup>28</sup> The author of the article, according to the commissioner, took a strongly nationalistic position, was favorable to the Communists, and very anti-British in his criticisms of the first Weihaiwei draft agreement. His demands included an unconditional withdrawal, financial compensation to China, and an official apology from the British for occupying the area beyond the terms of the original convention. Otherwise, it was argued, there should be a complete break in economic relations between the two countries and a boycott of British products.

The Kuomintang at this time took further political advantage of the Weihaiwei issue by publishing a list of national "Humiliation Days" which included the date on which the Territory had been leased from China in 1898.<sup>29</sup> Also worrying was a telegram written by the Shensi provincial KMT organization which appeared in many Shantung and north China newspapers. It urged the Chinese people to

demand the return of the leasehold and accused the British of bad faith in not already having done so.<sup>30</sup> Such publicity demonstrates the importance given to the Weihaiwei issued by the Kuomintang at the national level. And there were a number of other ways in which the party carried out what one observer described as a "policy of pin-pricks" designed to put the British on the defensive.<sup>31</sup>

With the highly-charged issues of extra-territoriality and China's ability to implement a modern and humane system of law being extensively discussed at this time, it is not surprising that the KMT chose to focus its attention upon British legal procedures at Weihaiwei. It will be remembered that both civil and criminal law were administered in the Territory by the commissioner and his district officers and cases were only rarely referred to the British Supreme Courts at Shanghai or Hong Kong for review.<sup>32</sup> At least one of Weihaiwei's senior district officers had in the past expressed uneasiness at having to fill the roles of judge and jury simultaneously. As has been noted, this system was very similar to local government administered by traditional Chinese hsien magistrates. To the young, westernized KMT party activists sensitive to foreign criticism of "backward" Chinese legal practices, however, Weihaiwei proved a most convenient target for counter-criticism. Commissioner Johnston in late 1929 observed, for example:

I should explain that I have reason to believe that our legal practice here is at present being studied, with an interest which is not at all likely to be benevolent, by members of the Kuomintang, of which a branch now exists in Weihaiwei City. They are presumably reporting the results of their

investigations to their headquarters and anything that they can construe to be a legal irregularity, or a miscarriage of justice, will no doubt be seized upon and emphasized in order to convince their fellow countrymen, if not foreigners, that Western legal principles and methods are no better than their own. The fact that the ordinary work of the courts in the Territory is carried on by men who are not trained lawyers, has doubtless not escaped their observation.<sup>33</sup>

The propaganda campaign against the British continued throughout 1929 and another alarming article was reprinted from a Chinese journal in the Shanghai Morning Post in August. This particular author again insisted upon Weihaiwei's unconditional return to China, but went even further in calling attention to the similarity between this issue and that of the British presence at Hong Kong. It was suggested that Great Britain should also be expected to withdraw from the latter in the near future. The vastly greater importance of Hong Kong to British commercial and military interests made this an especially disturbing point of view and an underlying concern throughout the Weihaiwei negotiations.<sup>34</sup>

Although successive administrators from 1898 to 1930 unanimously agreed that the local Chinese population was, with minor exceptions, content under British rule, Commissioner Johnston in 1929 was under no illusion regarding the depth of its loyalty, especially if faced with KMT intimidation. He remarked:

In the event of a skillfully-organised propaganda campaign being started against us, with Chefoo as its main centre and Weihai City as a minor base, our own people . . . would be far too timid to raise a finger in our favour or to make the smallest attempt to organise a counter-movement on our behalf.

They have their own lives and property to think of, and they know that the Kuo-mintang, when it has Chinese 'traitors' to deal with, is utterly merciless and capable of any cold-blooded barbarity.<sup>35</sup>

The irony of this situation was, as the commissioner pointed out, that British prestige within the immediate Weihaiwei area had probably never been higher, at least with respect to security matters and economic prosperity. Both local residents and refugees from the war-torn neighboring hsien were particularly grateful at this time for the relative peace provided inside the territorial borders.<sup>36</sup>

The commissioner felt somewhat more vulnerable to criticism, however, regarding the low level of public spending at Weihaiwei and stated in early 1930 that if rendition were not so likely he would feel compelled "to press for authority to apply a very large proportion of our accumulated surpluses to various much-needed public works and other projects of development."<sup>37</sup> More money, he thought, was needed for additional road-building, for a telephone network, for harbor improvements, and especially to expand educational opportunities. The Kuomintang was quick to seize upon this latter issue in its Weihaiwei propaganda campaign.

In October 1929 difficulties arose when the director of the education bureau for Wen-teng hsien requested authority to bring the Weihaiwei educational system into harmony with that of surrounding districts. He complained that many of the village schools in the Territory were still of the traditional private variety and did not adhere to new national regulations.<sup>38</sup> Although rejecting

the director's request for jurisdiction at Weihaiwei, the commissioner readily admitted to the Colonial Office that the condition of local schools, especially in the rural areas, was indeed deserving of criticism due to government neglect. In his view, a much larger education budget was called for as well as a third district officer fluent in written and spoken Chinese to serve as an inspector of schools.<sup>39</sup> The most he was actually able to achieve, however, was approval for larger government grants to Port Edward schools. Whereas in 1928 educational expenditures for the year stood at a mere \$3,000, the budget for 1929-30 was increased to over \$11,000. Nearly half of this sum was for a grant to improve the Chinese established Ch'i-tung Middle School. Interest in this school was so great in 1929 that, after encouragement from the commissioner, local merchants were able to increase their building fund to \$20,000 and a new building was opened in the autumn.<sup>40</sup> The commissioner no doubt reasoned that greater government support for the middle school would help deflect KMT criticism, but he was also aware that annual grants could serve to maintain a degree of control over the way in which the school was operated. As he remarked:

In this way I have endeavored to convey to those concerned an intimation that the interests of the School are bound up with those of the British Government of the leased Territory. The realisation of this fact will I think tend to strengthen the hands of the School authorities in their efforts to maintain a high standard of good order and discipline, and enable them to prevent the students from engaging in any undesirable political activities or from being victimised by subversive propaganda.<sup>41</sup>

The commissioner had good reason to fear "subversive propaganda" emanating from the Territory's educational institutions. The efforts of the Wen-teng official mentioned above appear to have been part of a general KMT campaign to infiltrate the schools and use them as centers for anti-British activities. By December 1929 the situation was becoming serious, as the commissioner observed:

By use of the underhand methods practised everywhere in China by the Kuomintang, its agents or those of the allied educational bureaus have already caused trouble and dissension in the largest and most important of our schools -- the Weihai Middle School, /i.e., the Ch'i-tung Middle School/ which owes so much to British encouragement and support -- and have succeeded in establishing at least an indirect control over one of the leading village schools in the heart of the Territory. They have also secretly distributed parcels of their propagandist school textbooks among many other village schools and in some cases have persuaded the teachers (partly by veiled threats) to make use in their schools of the books so distributed.<sup>42</sup>

In spite of the efforts of Ch'i-tung's headmaster who tried to keep "politics and anti-foreignism" out of the school, the older boys apparently succeeded in causing so much trouble that by January 1930 it was necessary to temporarily close the institution.<sup>43</sup> At the same time, the headmaster was labeled a "counter-revolutionary" and his name was added to a KMT black list along with the twenty-seven other "running dogs of British imperialism" who were Weihaiwei's most prominent and successful merchants.<sup>44</sup> The commissioner was even forced to station police at the school to prevent students from taking equipment. In the end, 30 of Ch'i-tung's 180 pupils were expelled, a new man from Jung-ch'eng hsien was appointed headmaster, and the school itself was reopened

in February. By this time rendition negotiations were once again making progress and the British administration at Weihaiwei felt that as long as the Territory appeared destined for a speedy return to China, further difficulties at the school were unlikely.<sup>45</sup>

It is interesting, however, that in this critical period both the British government and its Kuomintang adversaries were keenly aware that Weihaiwei's schools had a significant political role to play. The commissioner in particular was convinced that his government's previous policy of non-interference in traditional village schools was no longer adequate to meet either the KMT threat or to serve the educational needs of Weihaiwei's children. Given the imminence of rendition, however, it was hoped that some additional expenditures and the maintenance of school discipline would help the British at least make a graceful exit from what had become an embarrassing situation.

#### Agreement Reached on Rendition

Fortunately for the British, the Chinese were in a somewhat more conciliatory mood when negotiations over Weihaiwei were resumed in January 1930. At this point Chiang K'ai-shek was faced with the possibility of yet another war between his forces and the combined warlord armies of Feng Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. In order to obtain the strategically important base at Weihaiwei, therefore, Nanking was more willing to compromise on the issue of British naval privileges and foreign property rights. Chiang's hold on the rest of eastern Shantung in



early 1930 was by no means secure. One British observer reasoned that with Weihaiwei in their possession the Nationalists would have two possibilities for dealing with the recalcitrant General Liu Chen-nien who was reported to be again considering an alliance with the anti-Chiang northerners.<sup>46</sup> The leasehold could either be offered to him as a bribe for supporting Nanking, or, if sufficiently fortified, it could be used to intimidate him.<sup>47</sup>

After several more difficult bargaining sessions between the Chinese foreign minister, Dr. C. T. Wang, and the British ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson, an agreement was at last signed on 18 April whereby Weihaiwei would be returned to China on 1 October, with the confidential proviso that the Nanking regime at that time exercised "effective control" over Shantung.<sup>48</sup> According to the terms of rendition, Britain was to be granted the free use of island naval facilities for ten years with the option of renewal. Moreover, foreign property-owners were to be given new perpetual leases on their holdings. If the Chinese later decided to close the port, it was agreed that foreigners would receive compensation. In the meantime, existing public services and municipal regulations were to remain, as much as possible, unchanged and the views of foreigners were to be taken into account in the future Chinese administration of Port Edward. The British, on the other hand, agreed to hand over all government land and buildings, as well as works and purchases made under various improvement schemes, the Chefoo-Weihaiwei cable, and certain other assets.<sup>49</sup> The British ambassador was basically pleased with these arrangements, arguing

that naval privileges had been secured for a time at least as well as protection for property owners. Furthermore, he felt that previous discussion of closing the port had only been a bargaining position and that the Chinese "now having secured the right to do so in return for buying out property owners would probably forget about it."<sup>50</sup> With the work of the negotiating teams at an end, all that remained, it seemed, was to implement the agreement on 1 October. As always with Weihaiwei, however, things were never as simple as they seemed, and there was considerable skepticism even as late as September that the Territory would actually be returned.

In the meantime, there was growing anxiety within the leasehold itself as rendition appeared more and more likely. One particular manifestation of this concern aroused a good deal of attention as far away as Peking and even in London. One of Weihaiwei's most prominent residents, Liang Te-jang, who was a descendant of a former governor of Shansi and for many years an active promoter of local public works projects, took it upon himself in April to petition the British government to postpone rendition until more stable conditions existed in China. This document in turn found its way into the North China Daily News where, not surprisingly, there was a good deal of satisfaction expressed that the Chinese themselves (unlike the Indians) recognized the advantages of British rule. Even The Times in London played up the significance of this petition. Commissioner Johnston provided the following additional information about it to the Colonial Office:

I may add that various appeals similar to that made by Mr. Liang reached me during the past year or two, but hitherto they have seldom been committed to paper and never signed. This is the first time that a signed petition on this subject has been presented, and it probably indicates that the general dread of what is likely to happen to the Territory after retrocession has been intensified by the newspaper reports that rendition is imminent. I am informed that the inhabitants of the adjacent Chinese districts are also in a state of growing alarm at the prospect of the rendition of the Leased Territory, which has always been to them a haven of refuge when their sufferings became intolerable.<sup>51</sup>

One local British businessman who was especially worried about possible financial losses upon rendition made use of the petition to support his own public protest through the China Association. When criticized by the commissioner for not consulting him in advance about this action, E. E. Clark remarked that although he was of course concerned for his own future, he had also responded to local Chinese who had been "pressing" him to do something to postpone rendition.<sup>52</sup>

The Chinese merchant community, fearing possible KMT reprisals, felt it had to act with discretion in mounting any sort of protest movement of its own. Even so, its actions were apparently closely monitored by Port Edward's newly-established, nationalistic newspaper, the Wei-hai jih-pao. In May 1930 a dispute arose between the owners of the paper and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce when articles appeared accusing "some Weihai people" of having sent a telegram to the British authorities in Hong Kong requesting the retention of the Territory. Although it is not clear whether such a cable was ever sent, the merchants did want the British to remain at Weihaiwei and

the paper was attempting in a way to blackmail them. The commissioner characterized the author of the objectionable articles, a "Mr. Sun," as a "left-wing revolutionary of the Bolshevik type" who was attempting to instill class hatred and anti-imperialist feelings among his readers. He added: "Fortunately very few people in Weihai are likely to pay any serious attention to what he writes; otherwise we might have to prevent its publication in the Territory." Whether or not the combined displeasure of the Chamber and the government had any effect on the newspaper is unknown, but Mr. Sun's articles stopped appearing at the end of May.<sup>53</sup>

The long delay between the initialing of the rendition agreement in April and implementation in October gave ample opportunity to those who wished to publish further anti-British material in the national press. In late July, for example, both foreign and Chinese-language newspapers began carrying stories, issued through a Japanese agency, that at the instigation of the British Weihaiwei's rendition was about to be canceled or postponed. These papers reported that the British had sent a note to Nanking refusing to return the leasehold for an indefinite period and citing China's political instability as a reason for their action. Although Foreign Minister Wang publicly denied these rumors, they had the effect of stimulating further hostility toward Britain.<sup>54</sup> Commenting on this fact, Weihaiwei's commissioner noted that there was already talk of organizing an anti-British movement in China in retaliation for this alleged breach of faith.<sup>55</sup>

During the summer of 1930 the commissioner found himself in a difficult position as both the ambassador in Peking and officials in London were eager for his assessment of the political situation in Shantung in order that a final decision could be made on rendition. With the very real possibility of civil war taking place once again in Shantung between the Nationalists and their warlord opponents it was impossible to say for certain which side the wily Liu Chen-nien would support. The commissioner complained in July that his own information about conditions even in the Tsinan area was often based on unreliable stories from Chinese newspapers and it was much more difficult to find out anything regarding the interior of the province.<sup>56</sup> Apparently, the Nanking authorities themselves were uncertain as to who would control eastern Shantung by October for they devised a contingency plan to take effect in the event that they were not. It was hoped, in order to avoid the humiliation of postponing rendition, that the Manchurian regime of Chang Hsüeh-liang would assist with the administration of Weihaiwei on Nanking's behalf and that Admiral Shen Hung-lieh, who commanded the northern Chinese naval squadron and took his orders from Mukden, would be responsible for the area's defense.<sup>57</sup>

In mid-August the problem was still unresolved and the commissioner admitted that there was no guarantee even if Shantung was under Nanking's firm control in October that conditions would be any more tranquil than if the northerners took over. It was his personal opinion that Britain in fact had less to fear from Liu Chen-nien, even aligned with the north, than it had from the anti-imperialist

Nanking regime.<sup>58</sup> As mentioned earlier, however, the sudden defection of General Han Fu-ch'ü to the Nationalist cause finally decided the matter in Nanking's favor. On the very day that Han was appointed chairman of Shantung a meeting took place between the British ambassador and Dr. C. T. Wang in which the latter announced that there was no longer any question of his government's control over the province.<sup>59</sup> On 15 September Weihaiwei's commissioner was informed by the Colonial Office that ratification of the convention for rendition would take place as planned on 1 October.

#### Conditions in Weihaiwei in 1930

To many observers it must have seemed as if the Chinese were reacquiring Weihaiwei at a time when its economic health had never been better. Signs of prosperity were everywhere in 1930. What had been the tiny, non-descript fishing village of Ma-t'ou in 1898, was now the bustling town of Port Edward with 20,000 inhabitants and a thriving import-export trade. The once common mule-litter was now considered largely a relic of the past with carts and bicycles by far the more usual form of transportation over a fifty-mile network of modern roads. It was even possible by 1929 for local residents to take a bus all the way from Port Edward to Chefoo, Wen-teng, Jung-ch'eng, and other neighboring towns.<sup>61</sup> Nor was prosperity limited to the leasehold's town-dwellers.

In sharp contrast to those in nearby Chinese territory, Weihaiwei's villagers lived in peaceful surroundings free to pursue their agricultural tasks without fear of

extortionate taxation or conscription into a warlord army.<sup>62</sup> The worst these people had to be concerned about it seems was the perennial north China problem of drought. Local crops were badly affected in 1927, 1928, and 1929 by a lack of rainfall, but grain held in reserve was sufficient to prevent famine conditions like those of 1920 from developing.<sup>63</sup> In fact, by late 1929 there must have been a considerable recovery since it was observed in that year that with the great influx of destitute refugees from other parts of Shantung many local farmers were "in a position for the first time to engage hired labourers to assist them . . . at wages which would have been rejected with scorn by the poorest Weihaiwei natives . . ."<sup>64</sup>

The chaos existing outside the leasehold boundaries had also led to a change in the distribution of local markets. Whereas in previous more peaceful times many Weihaiwei residents had frequented markets held in Chinese territory, in the late 1920s three of these had been relocated just over the border in the British zone safely beyond the reach of Chinese tax-collectors and bandits. There were then, in addition to the walled town, nine marketing centers in the leasehold, four more than when the British arrived.<sup>65</sup>

Although many of Weihaiwei's merchants suffered losses in 1929 due to price fluctuations in ground nuts, timber, and grain, the total volume of goods shipped through Port Edward in that year was at an all-time high. Whereas in 1902 only 146 steamers had entered port with 152,000 tons of goods, the total for 1929 was 1,139 steamers carrying 1,307,000 tons. Enormous quantities of cotton yarn

and piece goods were now being shipped through Weihaiwei from Japan via Dairen and then distributed into the Shantung interior and neighboring provinces. The ground nut trade was still important to the leasehold, but there were also large amounts of sugar, rice, and paper coming in from Hong Kong for transshipment to Chihli and elsewhere.<sup>66</sup>

In addition to the flourishing import-export trade at Weihaiwei, there were several other prosperous sectors in the local economy in the late 1920s. The traditional fishing industry, for example, was given a considerable boost through the use of motorized trawlers as well as ice in shipments to Shanghai and Tientsin. The wide variety of fish caught near Weihaiwei had by this time, it seems, established a high reputation for itself in many parts of China. Salt production, too, had greatly expanded since the British first arrived in the area. In 1902 less than thirty acres of land were covered with salt pans, but in 1929 one thousand acres were devoted to this product. The handicraft industry of lace-making, originally introduced by missionaries, was by this time largely in Chinese hands and employed quite a number of local women who had been trained at the Roman Catholic convent. With so much construction taking place in Port Edward, the building trade and related industries of brick and tile manufacturing boomed in the late 1920s as did tourism and businesses which catered to foreign souvenir-hunters.<sup>67</sup>

Naturally, the government shared in Weihaiwei's prosperity through increased tax revenue, the bulk of which came from shipping dues and not from land. Other categories which showed considerable increases included



house taxes in Port Edward (in 1929-30 this figure was equal to the entire amount collected from land taxation), and court fees.<sup>68</sup> Table 8 below illustrates the favorable financial position in which the British found themselves during the last decade of their administration:

Table 8  
Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1924-1930<sup>69</sup>

<u>Year</u>	<u>Revenue</u>	<u>Expenditure</u>	<u>Surplus</u>
1924-25	\$189,554	\$179,944	\$ 9,610
1925-26	219,142	187,432	31,710
1926-27	240,763	214,331	26,432
1927-28	256,494	247,014	9,480
1928-29	324,636	313,228	11,408
1929-30	433,774	316,830	116,944

As has been mentioned, Commissioner Johnston, in his final years at Weihaiwei, actually found the growing surplus of accumulated revenue and the relatively low level of public expenditure to be an embarrassment. In late 1929 he reported that only \$52,750 had been spent since 1922 on "improvements" in the Territory, all of which had come from local taxation and not Colonial Office subsidies. These included, among other things, a major new road across the northern peninsula, a new hospital and police station, bridge repairs, wells, and telephone installations.<sup>70</sup> It should also be noted that shortly after Weihaiwei became self-supporting in 1922, the British began building up a "reserve fund" from their surplus of revenue over expenditures. As rendition appeared more and more likely, the Treasury was anxious that expenditures be kept to a minimum and that sufficient funds be available for staff pensions and other expenses when the British

withdrew. In fact, in October 1930 this fund stood at over \$300,600 and its removal from Weihaiwei was opposed by the new Chinese commissioner-to-be as early as July 1930.<sup>71</sup>

A further indication of Weihaiwei's relative prosperity during the last decade of British rule was the fact that the local merchant community on its own initiative was able to raise sufficient funds through a surcharge on shipping dues to finance several public works projects. It will be remembered that Port Edward's "Victory Pier" which was completed in 1918 had been financed in this manner. Weihaiwei's businessmen were apparently so pleased with the result that they decided to reinstate the surcharge in 1920 in order to provide new cargo storage facilities at the pier and this project was completed for a total cost of \$60,000. Similarly, in 1921 they took \$10,000 from the fund to purchase a new boat for the government to use, among other things, as a coastal patrol vessel. Plans were also made in 1925 to construct a much-needed breakwater for the protection of vessels anchored at Port Edward, but for a variety of reasons this project had to be postponed. By 1930 the so-called "Harbor Improvement Fund" contained more than \$80,000 and the merchants were eager that it be spent on further community projects before the British withdrew. Thus, it was decided that a new stone pier and road should be built at Narcissus Bay, a rapidly growing area south of Port Edward and east of the walled town where it was assumed further commercial expansion would inevitably take place. The merchants also agreed at this time to allocate a further \$6,500 from the harbor

fund for the electrification of Port Edward's streets and \$10,000 was invested as a kind of educational endowment fund.<sup>72</sup>

The existence of these various civic improvement projects demonstrates several points about Weihaiwei's merchants in the 1920s. First, it is apparent that they felt wealthy enough by this time to donate a portion of their profits to public works which would win them respect and appreciation in the wider community. In this regard, they were assuming to an even greater extent than previously a role which would have been filled in many parts of traditional China by the local degree-holding elite or "gentry."<sup>73</sup> As has been mentioned, however, there were relatively few degree-holders to perform this function in Weihaiwei even during the late Ch'ing period. Then, with the abolition of the examination system in 1905, the formation of provincial assemblies in 1908, and the emergence of chambers of commerce about the same time, merchants in the Territory, as elsewhere in China, found themselves playing a larger part in the management of local affairs.<sup>74</sup> By the 1920s their influence continued to grow along with their wealth. With sufficient revenue to administer the Territory, British officials, unlike many of their Chinese counterparts at this time, saw little need to press the merchants, or anyone else, for more taxes. As a result, the relationship between the government and the business community was largely a cooperative one, with the latter often supplying supplementary funds and the former expertise and supervision for the implementation of public works.

Furthermore, all of the undertakings mentioned above were designed to enhance commercial growth at Weihaiwei and thus served to conveniently combine "public-spiritedness" and personal gain for the merchants. It should also be noted that the type of projects chosen reflects the degree to which the leasehold, and Port Edward in particular, were now dependent upon international trade for a good portion of their income.

The eagerness of the merchants to carry out their projects before the British withdrew from Weihaiwei indicates the uncertainty and even mistrust they felt toward the incoming Chinese administration. In fact, the \$10,000 donation for education actually came about when the newly-formed, KMT-affiliated "Weihai Educational Association" strenuously objected that none of the surcharge revenue was going to be spent on the Territory's schools. Since the merchants greatly feared antagonizing this group with its important political contacts, they decided to offer their \$10,000 donation as a "compromise" and to ensure that the rest of the money could be spent as they wished.<sup>75</sup> It must have seemed likely to the merchants by this time that the largely harmonious relationship they had enjoyed with the British would soon be replaced by a struggle with the new Chinese authorities for control of Weihaiwei's financial resources.

The merchants were not alone in their fears for Weihaiwei's future at this time. In spite of so many signs of prosperity, the British commissioner observed in 1930 that both the government's finances and ultimately the entire leasehold economy were in a precarious condition.

He was well aware that Weihaiwei's current well-being was largely due to its duty-free status and convenience as a transshipment point. He was also aware that trade at nearby Chefoo and other places had suffered as a result of the leasehold's tax advantage. Even representatives from the Maritime Customs and Salt Administration had become concerned that too much revenue was being lost as a result of goods passing through the Territory and evading taxation. The commissioner was convinced that the only reason steps had not been taken earlier to deal with this problem was the likelihood of rendition and the inevitable establishment of customs offices at Weihaiwei.<sup>76</sup> He was, therefore, quite worried that the Territory would suffer economic hardship when its duty-free status was removed.

In July he had an opportunity to share his concerns with the chief delegate of the Chinese rendition committee, Commander Hsü Tsu-shan, formerly of the Chinese Navy and soon to become the new high commissioner at Weihaiwei. While investigating local conditions in the Territory and making arrangements for the actual handover in October, Hsü held talks with the commissioner at Port Edward. He informed him at that time of the decision to make the entire leasehold, including the walled town, into a special administrative area under the direct control of the central government. This meant that shipping dues, stamp duty, and salt taxes would all have to go to Nanking. When asked about the possibility of raising taxes in order to finance local government, the British commissioner replied that a moderate increase in the land tax would be possible

since it was presently collected at a much lower rate than in neighboring hsien. He also strongly recommended, however, that the new commissioner refuse to accept administrative responsibility for the area without guarantees of financial assistance from the central authorities as he was certain that increased taxation alone could not make up for possible losses in shipping dues if trade declined.<sup>77</sup>

Another detail with which Commander Hsü was concerned was staff for his new administration. He was eager to offer re-employment to all of the Chinese clerks working for the British and invited them to meet with him at a Port Edward hotel to discuss the matter. Somewhat surprisingly, the entire group refused, stating (wrongly) that they were British subjects, serving the British government, and that he would have to come to them in their government offices. Embarrassed and somewhat irritated at his staff's behavior, the commissioner carried out an investigation and discovered that the clerks were actually afraid Hsü would replace them with a staff loyal to himself within a few months and, with this face-saving operation, were demonstrating their independence at a time when he needed their services. Hsü handled the matter graciously, however, and did rehire all of the Chinese involved. At the same time he told the British commissioner that he had discarded a large number of petitions from local people "abusing" British rule and implied that they were undoubtedly trying to curry favor with a representative of the incoming government.<sup>78</sup>

## Rendition

Predictably, in the months leading up to rendition there was considerable nervousness among the local population at Weihaiwei as merchants, farmers, and government employees alike wondered whether the still shaky Nanking regime could actually maintain peace and preserve the area's economic prosperity. It was reported in early October, for example, that "a number of merchants had already dispatched money elsewhere while many salt merchants sent their supplies to Japan before the rendition."<sup>79</sup> Even the local hawkers who sold lace, needlework, and stockings to summer tourists thought it unlikely that many foreigners would return there in 1931.<sup>80</sup> There was also talk of bandit raids into Port Edward and a possible invasion by Liu Chen-nien's troops.<sup>81</sup> On the day before rendition those in favor of the British withdrawal made their feelings known with posters bearing such slogans as "sovereign rights," "China for the Chinese," and "down with imperialism" which were attached to all the electric light poles in Port Edward. It was reported that some of the students from the Ch'i-tung Middle School produced the most extreme of these posters.<sup>82</sup>

On this same day, however, sentiments of a different nature were expressed at a special public gathering attended by district headmen and "representatives of all classes of the Chinese and foreign communities" in honor of the retiring Commissioner Johnston. After delivering a farewell address, he was thanked for his many years of service at Weihaiwei, given the traditional bowl of pure water to

symbolize the purity of his administration, and presented with scrolls from the community at large, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Educational Association.<sup>83</sup>

On the following day, 1 October, there were no signs of unrest and the formal transfer of power took place without incident. Commissioner Johnston himself had carefully planned the rendition ceremony to include parades of full dress military guards accompanied by buglers and two bands, as well as the firing of two fifteen-gun salutes, and, of course, appropriate receptions for the Chinese and foreign dignitaries present. He also insisted that both flags be flown together until sunset when the Union Jack would be discreetly lowered.<sup>84</sup>

Again, there was ample opportunity for speech-making. The chairman of the Chamber of Commerce referred in glowing terms to British officials as having "loved the people" (ai min) during the course of their administration at Weihaiwei. In a somewhat different vein, the new Chinese commissioner noted that these same people had been under foreign control against their will for thirty-two years. He also admitted, however, that the British had ruled wisely and well and that it would be his desire to build upon their record if possible in order to achieve even greater prosperity under the Chinese flag. In addition, Hsu took the opportunity to issue his first proclamation as high commissioner warning that some "evilly-disposed persons" might use the transition period to create difficulties. He promised that his administration would strive to preserve peace and to govern all nationalities under the equal protection of the law. He also specifically



asked for the obedience of merchants and an end to need-  
less alarm throughout the community.<sup>85</sup> All that remained  
then in order to complete the rendition procedure was to  
fire the final salutes, lower the British flag, and turn  
over the yamen keys to the new staff. When this was accom-  
plished the former British commissioner sailed out of  
Port Edward harbor to a well-earned holiday at the Empress  
Hotel in Victoria, British Columbia.

## Notes to Chapter 7

<sup>1</sup>For a more detailed description of events in Shantung during this period, see Buck, Urban Change, pp. 156-70. See also, FO 228/3826, Chefoo Political Reports, March, June, and September Quarters, 1928; and FO 228/4005, Chefoo Political Reports, March, June, and September Quarters, 1929.

<sup>2</sup>U.S. National Archives, United States Department of State, Records Relating to Internal Affairs of China, class 893 (hereafter USDS, 893), Consul at Chefoo, Leroy Webber to Ambassador J. F. A. MacMurray, Peking, Chefoo Political Report for April 1929.

<sup>3</sup>Some of the more famous individuals who either sought or were actually granted refuge at Weihaiwei included Yüan Shih-k'ai's eldest son, Yüan K'o-ting; Wellington Koo (b. 1887) who was there during 1925 and again in 1928; Admiral Ts'ai T'ing-kan (1861-1935), formerly Sir Francis Aglen's Chinese associate as head of the Maritime Customs; Hsu Shih-ch'ang (1855-1939), who served as president of China from October 1918 until July 1922; and even the deposed Emperor P'u-i himself (1906-1967). See CO 521/42, Johnston to Colonial Office, 2 July and 18 October 1928. Johnston had a particularly close relationship with the former emperor since he had served as his personal tutor from 1919 to 1925. In spite of their friendship, or perhaps because of it, however, he discouraged P'u-i from coming to Weihaiwei as he was afraid his relatives and attendants were likely to make him the focus of further political intrigue there.

<sup>4</sup>CO 521/42, Johnston to Colonial Office, 1 August 1928. See also, USDS, 893, Webber to MacMurray, Chefoo Political Report for August 1929.

<sup>5</sup>See, for example, two entire files which deal with this problem during the period 1928-30: CO 873/752 and 778. See also, CO 521/45 and CO 228/3712, Johnston to Colonial Office, 30 June 1928.

<sup>6</sup>In general, deserting soldiers seeking refugee status were required to hand over their arms to the British authorities who then, in some cases, provided them with a small amount of money and clothing and permission to remain as long as they caused no trouble. See CO 873/763, Johnston to Jennings, 24 February 1929. Those who entered with arms and captured loot seem to have had both confiscated and were then sent out of the Territory with a small amount of money and clothing. See CO 873/765.

<sup>7</sup>CO 521/42, Johnston to Colonial Office, 9 February 1928. See also, Lockhart Papers, vol. 10a, Johnston to Lockhart, 22 February 1928. Abandoned temples had long been used by criminal elements in China as convenient shelter. See an eighteenth-century comment to this effect cited in Hsiao, Rural China, p. 458.

<sup>8</sup>CO 521/42, Johnston to Colonial Office, 9 February 1928. Relations between British soldiers and local villagers during this difficult period, with a few exceptions, remained quite good. See CO 521/42, Johnston to Colonial Office, 16 January 1928 and CO 873/747. On one occasion in early 1929, however, a group of bandits from Wen-teng hsien did cross into Weihaiwei and kidnap four people playing mahjong. The arresting group was a local "self-defense association" or pao-wei-t'uan which brought the gamblers before a kind of people's tribunal and fined them \$150 which they paid. The commissioner observed that these local defense groups existed in many parts of Shantung and were ostensibly designed to protect people against bandits. In many cases they received semi-official recognition from the provincial authorities and were independent of magisterial control. They were also suspected of being in league with powerful secret societies, such as the Ta-tao-hui, which were flourishing at this time. When Weihaiwei officials reported this incident to the Wen-teng government they received a polite response but no action against the guilty parties. As the commissioner remarked, "The truth of the matter probably is that they are more afraid of the pao-wei-t'uan and its affiliated societies than they are of the British government, and dare not take the decisive action desired by us." See CO 521/59, Johnston to Colonial Office, 28 January 1929. By March, however, as a result of orders from Liu Chen-nien, the extortionists were finally brought to justice. See CO 521/59, Johnston to Colonial Office, 5 March 1929. For information on other instances in which Weihaiwei villagers were kidnapped, see CO 873/769 and 770. In the latter file the commissioner urges that the traditional institution of village guards or watchmen be reestablished as a defense measure. See S.D.O. to Johnston, 12 October 1929.

<sup>9</sup>CO 521/42, Johnston to Colonial Office, 9 February 1928.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>CO 521/56, Enclosure, Pratt to Lampson, 14 June 1929, in Johnston to Colonial Office, 19 June 1929. Regarding the activities of the Red Spears, see also FO 228/3826, Chefoo Intelligence Report for Half Year Ended 30 September 1928; FO 228/4005, Chefoo Intelligence Report for Half Year Ended 31 March 1929; and USDS, 893, Webber to MacMurray, Chefoo Political Reports for January, February, June and August 1929. The officials who wrote these reports had mixed feelings toward the Red Spears, stating that in some areas they functioned in place of government and as an anti-bandit force, while in others they had degenerated into a kind of Mafia using terrorist tactics against villagers and officials.

<sup>12</sup>CO 521/69, Johnston to Colonial Office, 15 August 1930. Although there were relatively few major crimes committed in the Territory during the late 1920s, commercial expansion, as well as the influx of refugees, and a large annual contingent of fishermen from neighboring areas increased the workload of the police force so that it was necessary to increase it to 160 men by 1928. See CO 873/612, Whittaker to J.D.O., 30 March 1928.

<sup>13</sup>CO 873/710, Johnston to J.D.O., 13 June 1927; Jennings to Johnston, 13 June 1927; and Johnston to Whittaker, 22 June 1927.

<sup>14</sup>See Chapter 4, p. 164.

<sup>15</sup>CO 521/42, Confidential, Johnston to Colonial Office, 28 March 1928. In this same document the commissioner expresses his reluctance to offer protection to anyone except those living within the official leasehold boundaries. When various villagers living just over the border within the British "sphere of influence" requested help against bandits they were told not to expect it as it had never been offered in the past and could not be given then either, especially with rendition becoming ever more likely. They were granted permission to enter Weihaiwei as refugees, however. This decision is similar to that taken by the former Commissioner Lockhart in 1911 and 1912. See Chapter 4, p. 175. See also USDS, 893, Webber to MacMurray, Chefoo Political Report for November 1928.

<sup>16</sup>CO 521/42, Johnston to Colonial Office, 7 August 1928.

<sup>17</sup>CO 521/42, Johnston to Colonial Office, 25 September 1928.

<sup>18</sup>CO 521/62, Johnston to Colonial Office, 16 November 1928.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid. See also, CO 521/59, Johnston to Colonial Office, 28 January 1929; 1 February 1929; and Colonial Office to Eastern Extension Telegraph Company, 16 February 1929; and Colonial Office to Johnston, 25 February 1929.

<sup>20</sup>CO 521/59, Johnston to Colonial Office, 1 February 1929. Traditional Chinese magistrates frequently had to deal with troublemakers such as these mentioned by the British commissioner. Sometimes known as yu-min, or "weed people," they included unemployed ruffians or village bullies who engaged in petty crime during peaceful periods, but in times of general disorder often turned to banditry or even "full-fledged rebellion." See Hsiao, Rural China, p. 374 and pp. 454-62.

<sup>21</sup>CO 521/59, Johnston to Colonial Office, 1 February 1929.

<sup>22</sup>CO 521/56, Johnston to Colonial Office, 12 July 1929.

<sup>23</sup>FO 228/4005, Chefoo Political Report for September Quarter, 1929.

<sup>24</sup>CO 521/43, Johnston to Colonial Office, 14 September 1928. See also, Lockhart Papers, Box 9, Johnston to Lockhart, 21 March 1928.

<sup>25</sup>See minutes on CO 521/43 for all of 1928.

<sup>26</sup>CO 521/43, Lampson to Foreign Office, 12 December 1928 and CO 521/67, minute of interview, 11 January 1930.

<sup>27</sup>CO 521/55, Lampson to Foreign Office, 22 June 1929; Admiralty to Foreign Office, 1 July 1929 and 23 July 1929; and Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 8 July 1929. See also, CO 521/56, Johnston to Ellis, 12 July 1929; and USDS, 846h, Memorandum of MacMurray/Lampson Conversation, 11 and 12 July 1929 and U.S. Consul, Nanking to U.S. State Department, 26 June 1929.

<sup>28</sup>CO 521/55, Johnston to Colonial Office, 3 February 1929.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

<sup>30</sup>CO 521/55, Johnston to Colonial Office, 25 February 1929. Enclosed with this letter is an article regarding the telegram which appeared in the Peking and Tientsin Times, 4 February 1929.

<sup>31</sup>CO 521/56, Johnston to Lampson, 23 August 1929.

<sup>32</sup>See Chapter 2, pp. 88-98 for a discussion of the legal system administered by the British at Weihaiwei.

<sup>33</sup>FO 371/14696, Johnston to Colonial Office, 6 December 1929. See also, CO 521/79, Johnston to Colonial Office, 31 July 1930. For a discussion of KMT legal policy, see Meredith P. Gilpatrick, "The Status of Law and Lawmaking Procedure under the Kuomintang, 1925-46," Far Eastern Quarterly, 10.1 (November 1950):38-55.

<sup>34</sup>CO 521/66, Enclosure in Johnston to Colonial Office, 20 August 1929, including article from Shanghai Morning Post, 9 August 1929.

<sup>35</sup>CO 521/56, Johnston to Colonial Office, 12 July 1929.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>CO 521/66, Johnston to Colonial Office, 19 February 1930.

<sup>38</sup>FO 371/14606, Enclosure in Affleck to Johnston, 9 October 1929.

<sup>39</sup>It should be noted here that beginning in 1927 the government had established a new education surtax of one tiao (100 coppers) per unit of land assessed but obviously this brought in only a small amount of additional revenue. See CO 521/52, Financial Returns, 1927-28, 10 September 1928.

<sup>40</sup>CO 521/65, Johnston to Colonial Office, 16 August 1929. In this document the commissioner observes that some of the subscribers to the school building fund were

residents of neighboring hsien who had taken refuge in Weihaiwei during the civil war and wanted to "demonstrate their goodwill towards the people of the Territory in a practical way." Perhaps as a means of ensuring future good relations with Weihaiwei's merchant community, as well as the British administration there, General Liu Chen-nien himself had also made a personal contribution to the fund. See FO 371/14697, Johnston to Colonial Office, 3 January 1930. The general was ostensibly interested in "freeing China from the shackles of foreign education" and his contribution to this school established by Chinese in Weihaiwei was in line with his educational policies in Chefoo. See FO 228/4005, Chefoo Intelligence Report for Half Year Ended 31 March 1929. Missionary schools experienced considerable difficulties at this time in Chefoo and elsewhere in Shantung as a result of KMT activities. See Pratt to Lampson, 28 December 1929 which includes a translation of an article appearing in the Chefoo Chung-sheng pao of 26 and 27 December. This article describes the anti-Christian activities of the local Eighth Middle School Student Society and quotes the pamphlets distributed by the students in the "streets and markets of Chefoo" condemning foreign religious activities as a means of ruining the country and extinguishing the Chinese race. See also, FO 371/14697, Johnston to Colonial Office, 18 February 1930; and FO 371/14696, Johnston to Lampson, 8 November 1929.

<sup>41</sup>CO 521/48, Johnston to Colonial Office, 21 November 1928.

<sup>42</sup>CO 371/14696, Johnston to Lampson, 8 December 1929. At the same time that the British were being pressured by party activists locally, they were also being pressured by the Shantung provincial authorities to treat Kuomintang personnel "with respect." The commissioner's response was to ask his police force to act with "circumspection," but to report any suspicious circumstances involving possible agents. See CO 873/772, Johnston to Colonial Office, 3 December 1929.

<sup>43</sup>FO 371/14697, Johnston to Colonial Office, 3 January 1930. Boys from the Ch'i-tung Middle School had been involved in political activities of a different nature on an earlier occasion as well. In June 1928 the commissioner reported that a few students there were eager to make the school into a center for anti-Japanese protests following the Tsinan incident. The firm disciplinary action taken by the headmaster at that time, however, prevented any serious trouble. Most of the boys pressing local merchants to initiate a boycott of Japanese goods and shipping were, in fact, from the Anglican Mission School. Those from the Roman Catholic and Chinese schools played only a minor role. See CO 228/3712, Confidential, Johnston to Colonial Office, 29 June 1928. It will be remembered that pupils from the Anglican Mission School had also been active in earlier anti-Japanese activities at the time of the May Fourth and May 25th Movements. It is unclear from available sources exactly why this pattern of activism should have developed, although the varying attitudes of the respective headmasters undoubtedly was a factor. See *ibid.* and FO 371/22154, Burdett to Shanghai, 4 March 1938.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.* See also FO 371/14697, Johnston to Teichman, 25 January 1930.

<sup>45</sup>FO 371/14697, Johnston to Colonial Office, 25 February 1930.

<sup>46</sup>FO 371/14696, Cable, Johnston to Colonial Office, 22 January 1930.

<sup>47</sup>CO 521/68, Johnston to Teichmann 25 January 1930.

<sup>48</sup>CO 521/68, minutes of interview, 7 May 1930; and Orde to Colonial Office, 11 July 1930. This file also contains a copy of the actual rendition agreement.

<sup>49</sup>CO 521/68, terms of rendition, 18 April 1930.

<sup>50</sup>CO 521/68, Lampson to Foreign Office, 29 April 1930; and minute of interview, 7 May 1930. It is interesting that the British should have given so much weight to naval considerations both in the original 1898 leasing of Weihaiwei and in its return to China in 1930. The Admiralty at one point argued that the port was "indispensable" as a sanatorium and recreation area for the fleet. See CO 521/55, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 1 July 1929. The key British adviser throughout these negotiations, Sir Eric Teichmann, later commented: ". . . naval considerations are with Britain always paramount . . ." See his Affairs of China (London, 1938), p. 197. As in 1898, when attempting to persuade a reluctant Ch'ing court to grant them the lease of Weihaiwei, the British in 1930 once again offered to help train and advise the Chinese navy in return for continued use of Liu-kung Island. The offer was accepted on both occasions. See CO 521/67, Lampson to Foreign Office, 11 January 1930.

<sup>51</sup>CO 521/68, Johnston to Colonial Office, 7 April 1930; and articles from North China Daily News and The Times of 5 May 1930, enclosed in Johnston to Colonial Office, 19 May 1930.

<sup>52</sup>CO 521/69, Johnston to Clark, 8 September 1930; and Clark to Johnston, 9 September 1930.

<sup>53</sup>CO 873/678, A. H. to Johnston, 12 May 1930; and Johnston to A. H., 22 May 1930. In the course of discussions with the commissioner about various legal options open to them, the Chamber's representatives accused the newspaper of receiving "hush money" from officials in the walled town for not disclosing their corrupt activities. Clearly neither the British nor the merchants, however, desired further difficulties with the local KMT organization and no legal action was taken against the newspaper. CO 873/678 contains the following issues of the Wei-hai jih-pao: 28, 29, 30 April and 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, and 12 May 1930.

<sup>54</sup>CO 521/69, Johnston to Colonial Office, 1 August 1930. Although it is unclear who was behind these rumors, the technique of using unfounded newspaper stories for political purposes was a favorite one in China at this time. In September of the same year the Chefoo Chung sheng

pao had reported that Britain was about to give way on the issue of naval facilities in the Weihaiwei negotiations. The commissioner suspected then that Nanking might have been trying to create an atmosphere of optimism among the public so that if the discussions failed the disappointment that would result could be used for anti-British propaganda. See CO 521/59, Johnston to Lampson, 3 September 1929.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid. In fact, the British themselves had foreseen in May 1930 the undesirable political repercussions which could result if there was any hint of their involvement in a delay of rendition. It was suggested that if the Nanking regime was not in control of Shantung in the late summer it would be best to wait for the Chinese to suggest a postponement. Presumably, if anti-Chiang forces were in control of Shantung, Nanking would then have welcomed a continued British presence at Weihaiwei anyway. See CO 521/68, Johnston to Colonial Office, 16 May 1930.

<sup>56</sup>CO 521/69, Johnston to Lampson, 12 July 1930.

<sup>57</sup>CO 521/69, Johnston to Colonial Office, 10 July 1930.

<sup>58</sup>CO 521/69, Johnston to Colonial Office, 15 August 1930. It was also Johnston's opinion, as expressed in this document, that Britain had no choice but to leave the leasehold regardless of who controlled the area and that protecting the remaining British citizens afterward would not be a problem in view of Weihaiwei's coastal position. He added: "If asked the question, what specific British interests are served by our retaining our territorial jurisdiction over the mainland of the Leased Territory of Weihaiwei, I should feel obliged to reply that I am aware of none." The minutes of some Colonial Office staff indicate considerably greater reluctance to implement rendition. "G. G." observed, for example: "One can but be sorry for the Chinese inhabitants of Wei-hai-wei, but with our own Commissioner against us, it seems hopeless to try to postpone rendition for their sake." See CO 521/69, minute of G. G., 10 September 1930, and of Walter D. Ellis, 10 September 1930.

<sup>59</sup>CO 521/69, minutes of interview, 10 September 1930.

<sup>60</sup>CO 521/69, Cable, Colonial Office to Johnston, 15 September 1930.

<sup>61</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 67, Annual Report, 1929. Police Inspector Whittaker was not entirely satisfied with all the changes taking place at Weihaiwei, however, as he indicated in a letter to his old friend, Stewart Lockhart:

The villagers are about the same, but in the town we are getting a new class of Chinese, not at all nice. All young bloods, apeing foreigners, mostly Yankee



style, goggles and plus fours and horrible caps, and they are most insolent; it's a treat to get into the country amongst the old style of Chinese. These youngsters pose as officials and appear to have a half-baked American education and all call themselves graduates, not school boys.

See Lockhart Papers, vol. 6, Whittaker to Lockhart, 21 April 1929. Regarding the decision to lift a long-standing prohibition of motor cars at Weihaiwei, see CO 873/727. For a Chinese view of Weihaiwei at this time, see En Yüan, "Wei-hai-wei i p'ieh," Kuo-wen chou-pao, 7.40 (October 1930), non-consecutive pagination. See also, Yang Wen-hsun, "Wei-hai-wei hsing-cheng ch'u," Shan-tung wen-hsien 4.4 (March 1929):130-4.

<sup>62</sup> Another indication of Weihaiwei's prosperity was the degree to which land values had risen. It was reported that sites on the outskirts of Port Edward which were sold in 1902 for \$20 per mou, in 1921 for \$200-800 per mou, and in 1927 for \$1,300 per mou, had skyrocketed to \$4,000 per mou in 1928. See CO 873/759, Departmental Reports, 1928.

It is also interesting that some villagers living just over the border in Jung-ch'eng hsien actually petitioned the commissioner in 1928 for permission not to pay their onerous Chinese taxes. When it was explained that the British had no jurisdiction over these levies and that the penalties for non-compliance could be high, the villagers decided to pay. See CO 873/726.

<sup>63</sup> FO 371/13899, Annual Report, 1928. See also, Lockhart Papers, Box 67, Annual Report, 1929.

<sup>64</sup> Lockhart Papers, Box 67, Annual Report, 1929.

<sup>65</sup> These included the five markets which were in existence in 1898, Ku-shan-hou, Feng-lin, Ch'iao-t'ou, Ts'ao-miao-tzu, and Yang-t'ing, and four additional ones: T'an-hou-chia, P'o-i-chia, Pei-chiang-hsi, and Hsiao-yen-t'an. See CO 873/759, Annual Report, 1928.

<sup>66</sup> Lockhart Papers, Box 67, Annual Report, 1929. See also, CO 873/759, Departmental Reports, 1928.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. It was noted in the 1929 Annual Report, for example, that those making items from silver and pewter, as well as model junk builders, had a steady demand for their wares. For a general description of conditions in the Territory in 1930, see also Reginald F. Johnston, "Weihaiwei," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 18.2 (April 1931):175-93; En, "Wei-hai-wei i-p'ieh"; and Yang, "Wei-hai-wei hsing-cheng ch'u."

<sup>68</sup> CO 521/56, Johnston to Lampson, 15 November 1929, with enclosure by G. H. Jennings, 9 November 1929. See

also CO 521/66, Johnston to Colonial Office, 19 February 1930; and CO 521/44, Minutes of R. Johnston, 22 and 23 February 1928. Commissioner Johnston noted on 19 February 1930, that the sharp rise in revenue from shipping dues beginning in 1928 was due to the growth of trade, the issuing of revised regulations in that year, and also the creation of a new revenue collecting department "under close European supervision."

<sup>69</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 67, Annual Report, 1929.

<sup>70</sup>CO 521/56, Johnston to Lampson, 15 November 1929, with enclosure by G. H. Jennings, 9 November 1929.

<sup>71</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Foreign Office, 8 October 1931; and CO 521/69, Johnston to Colonial Office, 10 July 1930.

<sup>72</sup>CO 521/73, Archer to Lampson, with enclosure, 21 November 1930. This entire file deals with these projects. See also CO 521/60; CO 521/55, Johnston to Colonial Office, 17 December 1928, and Johnston to Lampson, 29 May 1929.

<sup>73</sup>Ch'u, Local Government, pp. 168-9 and 183.

<sup>74</sup>For a general discussion of the rise of the merchant class in China at the end of the Ch'ing and the beginning of the Republican periods, see Marie-Claire Bergère, "The Role of the Bourgeoisie," in Wright, ed., China in Revolution, pp. 229-95.

<sup>75</sup>CO 521/73, Johnston to Ellis, 19 March 1930, and Johnston to Colonial Office, 29 April 1930.

<sup>76</sup>CO 521/66, Johnston to Colonial Office, 10 June 1930; CO 521/69, Johnston to Colonial Office, 15 August 1930; and CO 521/59, Johnston to Colonial Office, 29 October 1929. See also "Wei-hai-wei shou-hui chih hou," Ta kung pao, 7 October 1930, reprinted in Kuo-wen chou-pao, 7.40 (October 1930), non-consecutive pagination.

<sup>77</sup>CO 521/68, Cable, Lampson to Foreign Office, 8 July 1930, and minute of interview, 21 April 1930. See also, CO 521/69, Johnston to Colonial Office, 10 July 1930, and enclosure in Ingram to Ambassador, 9 October 1930.

<sup>78</sup>CO 873/777, J.D.O. to Johnston, 3 July 1930, and J.D.O. to Johnston and Johnston to J.D.O., 4 July 1930. See also J.D.O. to Johnston and Johnston to J.D.O., 5 July 1930; and Lockhart Papers, vol. 72, Whittaker to Lockhart, 8 October 1930.

<sup>79</sup>North China Herald, 7 October 1930, p. 3.

<sup>80</sup>North China Herald, 14 October 1930, p. 39.

<sup>81</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Foreign Office, 31 October 1930.

<sup>82</sup>Lockhart Papers, vol. 72, Whittaker to Lockhart,  
8 October 1930.

<sup>83</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Foreign Office, 31 October  
1930.

<sup>84</sup>CO 521/76, complete file.

<sup>85</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Foreign Office, 31 October  
1930, with enclosure of Commissioner Hsu's first proclama-  
tion. For a discussion of the speech delivered by Reginald  
Johnston on this occasion, see North China Herald, 7 October  
1930, p. 4. For the complete speech, see Lockhart Papers,  
Vol. 64.

## Chapter 8

## Hsü Tsu-shan and the Early Years of Chinese Rule

The Transition to Chinese Rule

Although the Nanking authorities were regarded by the British as being in sufficient control of Shantung in October 1930 to allow the retrocession of Weihaiwei to take place, there were many other parts of the country where the Kuomintang's position was anything but secure. In spite of Chiang K'ai-shek's avowed intention to unify China and consolidate his own rule over the entire nation, the period 1930-37 brought a whole series of threats to his political survival from the left and right wings of the Kuomintang, from various regional militarists, from the Communists, and from the Japanese. There was hardly a month in which war was not raging in some part of the country at this time. This fact helps explain the difficulties which so many Chinese administrators, including those at Weihaiwei, faced when attempting to obtain funding or other forms of assistance from the central government for their own local projects. Even though the recovery of Weihaiwei had been regarded by the government as an issue of considerable national importance, its attention following rendition was soon drawn to other matters and the problems of administering the area within a changed set of economic circumstances became the responsibility of the somewhat beleaguered new Chinese commissioner.

In many ways Hsü Tsu-shan (1890-19??) was an ideal choice to head the new government at Weihaiwei. A native of Kiangsu province, he had graduated at the top of his

class from the Nanking Naval Academy in 1908, served in the Chinese navy from 1908 to 1910, and then studied naval construction at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he received a master's degree in 1915. After working two more years in American naval yards, Hsü was deputized by the Chinese government to observe European war operations and was attached to the British, French, and Italian fleets during which time he received the Distinguished Service Order. He then served as assistant naval attaché to the Chinese legation in London following the war and was an adviser on naval affairs at the Paris Peace Conference. Upon his return to China, Hsü held posts in the naval ministry and aeronautical bureau and in 1922 was placed in charge of harbor affairs at Tsingtao. With his resignation from the navy in that year he retained his post at Tsingtao and was also appointed superintendent of customs at Tientsin. In 1927 he became a military adviser to Chiang K'ai-shek and in 1929 director of the Lung-hai railway.<sup>1</sup> His naval background, service in Europe, and varied administrative experiences certainly seemed the perfect combination to equip him to govern the former British leasehold. But, as will be shown in this chapter, there were many circumstances which made the chances for his success at Weihaiwei unlikely from the very outset.

In spite of the fact that rendition of the leasehold had been discussed at the highest levels of government over a period of several years, the actual transfer of authority on 1 October 1930 occurred without adequate preparation on the part of the Chinese. This was at least partly due to the struggle which was going on for control of Shantung at

this time between the Nanking regime and Feng Yü-hsiang. Hsü Tsu-shan told the British consul that he had not even received definite orders to go to Weihaiwei to assume his new position as high commissioner until 25 September. The "advance" party from the Chinese foreign ministry did not arrive there until 29 September and Hsü himself only reached Port Edward on the morning of 1 October, barely in time for the rendition ceremony itself.<sup>2</sup> British sources indicate that the new administration was most reluctant to even take charge of the government storeroom and its supplies the following day. The former commissioner, therefore, thought it essential that some key British personnel, such as the financial secretary and chief of police, be kept on as consular assistants in order to complete important transitional functions which had not been carried out earlier.<sup>3</sup> It is not surprising, in view of this lack of planning by the Chinese central government, that Commissioner Hsü soon found himself without adequate revenue to support his new regime.

#### Problems of Government Finance, 1930-31

It will be remembered that Hsü had expressed his concern to Reginald Johnston as early as July 1930 that it would not be easy to ensure adequate funding for his administration as most revenue raised at Weihaiwei would inevitably be forwarded to Nanking.<sup>4</sup> Following the British withdrawal in October there was a good deal of confusion as to whether or not a customs office would be established, whether it would simply be a branch of the Maritime Customs Service or include a native customs office, and whether the new

commissioner could expect to receive at least a portion of local shipping dues or customs levies as well as a supplementary grant-in-aid from the central authorities. It should be noted that the commissioner and his staff were appointed by and directly responsible to the Executive Yüan in Nanking, but many of the decisions regarding financial affairs were taken by the Ministry of Finance under T. V. Soong. Commissioner Hsü was, therefore, forced to present his appeal for operating funds and special consideration of Weihaiwei's financial situation to the latter who held a differing view on the subject. While the commissioner would have preferred for his grant to have come out of customs duties and for the area to have had only a gradual introduction of these and other taxes so as to provide for a transitional period from its former duty-free status, T. V. Soong's ministry and the Customs Service which reported to it were loathe to grant any locality control over these sources of revenue or special dispensation from national finance policy. Disputes between Hsü and the Customs Service in fact delayed the appointment of a customs official for Weihaiwei until 28 October.<sup>5</sup>

The customs issue was one which also worried many of Weihaiwei's citizens and led to a street demonstration against the establishment of a customs house on 3 October, only two days after rendition. Nanking's vice-minister for foreign affairs was visiting Weihaiwei at this time in order to discuss the matter of financial support with Commissioner Hsü and three hundred protestors took advantage of his presence to publicly express their views. In an "orderly" march through the streets of Port Edward they positioned

themselves first in front of the main government offices and then at the vice-minister's hotel to shout anti-customs slogans.<sup>6</sup> The vice-minister promised to appeal personally to the central government to provide adequate funds for Weihaiwei, but a decision was nevertheless taken by the Ministry of Finance on 9 October to open a customs house at Port Edward. This new establishment was designated a sub-office of the Chefoo Maritime Customs under the Chefoo customs commissioner.<sup>7</sup>

At the same time, a concession was made to those opposing customs levies at Weihaiwei when it was decided to abolish the old native customs office in the walled town which would have charged duty on junk-borne cargo. According to the new arrangement for Weihaiwei, all duties were levied by the Maritime Customs office. Cargo coming from or going abroad was charged according to Maritime Customs rates while goods coming from or going to other places in China were charged according to the tariffs levied at the Chefoo native customs office. Revenue derived from both junk- and steamer-borne cargo coming from or going abroad was retained by the Maritime Customs Service while native customs receipts were forwarded to the Chefoo native customs office. Although local merchants were no doubt pleased that there was no separate native customs office in Port Edward, Commissioner Hsu found himself receiving no share in any of these new taxes.<sup>8</sup>

There were many in Weihaiwei who felt that no customs duties of any kind should be levied there and peaceful protests took place once again on 12 October against the pro-



posed opening of new customs and salt administration offices. This time a group of about four hundred people presented a petition to a visitor from the Ministry of Finance. It was reported that the petition was signed only by Weihaiwei's less important businessmen such as "chicken-dealers, the hotel-keepers' association, and the rickshaw-men's guild."<sup>9</sup> By December, however, even the wealthier merchants of the area were feeling the financial pinch and petitioned Nanking to either make the port once again a duty-free zone or, for a time at least, reduce the rates of duty being charged so as to allow for adjustments to the changed trading environment.<sup>10</sup>

As noted in earlier chapters, Weihaiwei during the British period had served primarily as a transshipment area for foreign goods or goods from other parts of China. With the loss of the duty-free advantage, traders naturally chose to ship from the port located nearest them. Thus, the ground nut and piece goods trade soon declined and a number of Chefoo firms with branches in Weihaiwei recalled their staff to the home offices.<sup>11</sup> Making matters still worse for local people was the fact that, in addition to the new customs house, there were now also at Weihaiwei several new tax bureaus under Nanking's control which imposed levies on cigarettes, flour, stamps, liquor, and tobacco, as well as a "consolidated commercial" tax. By December 1930 it was reported that over thirty firms had been forced to close down as a result of all the new exactions.<sup>12</sup>

As one might expect, it was not only the business community which was suffering at this time. Commissioner Hsu's administration also found itself hard-pressed for funds.

With trade declining and so much of locally-raised revenue ear-marked for Nanking's coffers, there was, as Reginald Johnston had predicted, bound to be a large operating deficit for the new regime. Hstü's resources immediately following rendition consisted primarily of the land tax, collected at the existing relatively low rates, the old shipping dues, and a new 50 percent surcharge on the land tax for educational expenditures.

It should be noted that government expenditures at Weihaiwei rose in the post-rendition era because there were ambitious plans for developing the area, but much of the outlay went for official salaries. Modeled on the Tsingtao municipal model, Weihaiwei's new government structure allowed for a staff of approximately fifty people spread over five major departments: General Affairs, Financial Affairs, Public Works, Public Safety, and a Secretariat.<sup>13</sup> This large number contrasted sharply with the British period in which there were only about a dozen foreign officials to administer the entire leasehold.<sup>14</sup> In order to maintain the elaborate new arrangement, the Chinese commissioner was forced to plead with his Nanking superiors for a subsidy, even asking permission to resign when he did not receive one, but this request too was denied.<sup>15</sup> Finally, however, in January 1931 the central government issued a policy directive on Weihaiwei which called for "moderate" taxes in line with the area's "peculiar conditions," special efforts by the local administration to reduce expenditures, and a subsidy from the central treasury to make up any deficit.<sup>16</sup>

By October 1931, on the first anniversary of Weihaiwei's rendition, the commissioner was able to report a

balanced budget but only because he had received a subsidy of \$120,000 from Nanking. Hsu estimated that if the British had remained at Weihaiwei, they would have collected revenue amounting to approximately \$420,000 in the financial year 1930-31, as compared to his total of \$207,000. Expenditures, he estimated, would have been approximately the same: \$295,000 for his government and \$298,000 for the British.<sup>17</sup> Without a regular subsidy from Nanking, therefore, it seemed impossible for the new administration to remain solvent. The only other option was a significant increase in taxation and to this Commissioner Hsu was strongly opposed.<sup>18</sup>

It is hardly surprising, given all of the other tax bureaus already at Weihaiwei, that the commissioner did not welcome the opening of new salt administration offices in late January 1931. The Shantung district inspectorate of the central salt administration decided, in fact, that there should be five collection offices established in the former leasehold in order to tap this potentially lucrative source of revenue. Once again local merchants and salt producers were unhappy that there would not be a gradual introduction of the new taxes. The salt tax formerly imposed by the British had been relatively low and had thus provided a competitive advantage over other salt-producing areas in China. Although in 1931 the demand for salt in Japan, Korea, and Hong Kong was quite good, and the new tax in that year easily absorbed, the market was highly volatile and it was feared that Weihaiwei might eventually lose ground to its rivals in Tsingtao and elsewhere without its former tax advantage.<sup>19</sup>

Another perhaps more disturbing feature of the new salt administration offices at Weihaiwei was the way in

which they were policed. When the salt magistrate arrived in the area he was accompanied by thirty of his own salt guards who were promptly refused entry into the former leasehold by Commissioner Hsü until direct orders to do so were received from Nanking. Hsü undoubtedly regarded the salt police as a threat to his authority at Weihaiwei, but the British consul noted that even the local inhabitants were "strongly opposed to them being stationed at the producing centres, owing to their well-known corruption and methods of extortion . . ."<sup>20</sup> Eventually, however, they had to be admitted to their posts. As will be shown below, the new system of salt taxation and its accompanying security system were to cause increasingly serious problems for the people of the area and Hsü Tsu-shan himself.

#### Commissioner Hsü and the Kuomintang

Financial pressures were not the only difficulty faced by Weihaiwei's Chinese commissioner. Equally serious was the stormy relationship he soon experienced with a newly-organized local branch of the Kuomintang. Although Hsü had been a firm supporter of the revolution, he had also been abroad for several years after 1911, and, as a native of Kiangsu, was somewhat out of touch with the younger politicians further south when he returned. His strongest loyalties seemed to lie with Dr. C. T. Wang, the foreign minister who had negotiated Weihaiwei's rendition, and the Chinese navy which was controlled by Chang Hsüeh-liang's Manchurian faction.<sup>21</sup>

Understandably, then, the establishment of a party office in Weihaiwei in early 1931 was not welcomed by Com-

missioner Hsü, especially since he had already been criticized by KMT activists in Wen-teng hsien for modeling his administration too closely on British procedures.<sup>22</sup> Complicating the matter further was a dispute between officials of the central party headquarters in Nanking and those of the provincial branch in Tsinan as to who should control KMT affairs in the former leasehold. By March 1931 the issue was finally resolved in favor of Tsinan and the authorities there appointed several directors of the local party organization, including Mi Yi-shan, a wealthy Weihaiwei building contractor. Commissioner Hsü for a time, however, claimed that he had received no instructions from Nanking and refused to grant the organization a monthly subsidy of \$600 or provide a building for its use. It was impossible to keep the Kuomintang out of the area for long, of course, and Hsü was to find himself frequently at odds with local activists throughout his administration. Although the duties of the party branch were never clearly defined, it was nevertheless given "wide powers of criticism, interference, and censorship combined with the right to make independent reports to the capital through the provincial tang-pu headquarters."<sup>23</sup>

One example of the type of problem caused by the local party organization occurred in March 1932 when news of the anti-Japanese disturbances in Shanghai reached Weihaiwei. A large protest meeting was held by students from Port Edward's five largest schools and the local Chamber of Commerce to discuss ways to end the importing of Japanese products from Dairen at Weihaiwei as well as the promotion of nationally-manufactured goods. A fight soon broke out between

some of the more radical students and merchants whom they considered to be traitors for dealing in Japanese merchandise. This incident was followed by a further riot during the court hearing on the matter the next day. A force of five hundred police and marines was said to have merely looked on while their superiors refused to give orders to disperse the mob which then broke windows and looted shops selling Japanese goods. The commissioner was finally able to restore order and to get local shops reopened by persuading the students to apologize for their actions.<sup>24</sup>

While too afraid of offending either the students or the tang-pu to take direct action themselves, many of Weihaiwei's business community resented the fact that the government had not reacted swiftly enough to prevent either incident. Commissioner Hsu explained to the British consul that the local KMT organization was actually responsible for inciting the riot and seemed determined to embarrass his administration.<sup>25</sup>

On another occasion in early 1933 two members of the tang-pu were accused of encouraging some local villagers not to cooperate with the government's new road repair program. It will be remembered that the British, after encountering opposition to a system of road maintenance based on village labor, by 1903 decided instead to levy a tax for this purpose and found the people quite willing to pay. The Chinese administration, however, with its severe financial problems returned to the much-hated corvée labor system and expected the villagers to pay a road tax as well as to provide necessary materials. In the court case which followed the villagers' refusal to cooperate, the charge against the

tang-pu members was dismissed but the judge also ruled that further opposition to the government would be considered illegal. In order to counter the strong resentment felt by the local people it was necessary for the government to hold several meetings of village headmen to explain the financial situation which compelled the use of corvée labor.<sup>26</sup>

### Security

Although faced with serious economic and political problems, the new administration was in a somewhat more fortunate position with regard to security matters. In addition to a marine garrison of three hundred well-trained men, a group of fifty salt guards, and Admiral Shen's north-eastern fleet, Weihaiwei also enjoyed the continued presence of its British-trained police force which was rehired en masse following rendition. Thus, in spite of the fears of many local residents that the British withdrawal would mean a greater threat from bandit gangs, the combination of navy and police was apparently sufficient to deter most criminals from entering the former leasehold.<sup>27</sup> In one incidence of kidnapping carried out by a former notorious subordinate of Chang Ts'ung-ch'ang the death penalty was recommended and such a severe sentence may have served as an added deterrent to others.<sup>28</sup>

Nor was Weihaiwei's new administration threatened by the neighboring warlord regime of General Liu Chen-nien. On the contrary, when ordered to do so by Nanking the general peacefully handed over control of the walled town of Weihai to Commissioner Hsü. Liu's behavior may perhaps be explained by the fact that after 1930 he found himself at odds with Shantung's Governor Han Fu-ch'ü and no doubt wished to avoid

a simultaneous confrontation with Admiral Shen Hung-lieh who was responsible for Weihaiwei's defense.<sup>29</sup> By October 1932 any possible threat from the warlord general was removed altogether as Governor Han finally succeeded in ousting him and his troops from Shantung. Although much of the promontory at this time suffered heavily at the hands of pillaging soldiers, both Chefoo and Weihaiwei were largely spared the effects of the violence.<sup>30</sup>

In order to further protect the citizens of Weihaiwei from criminal elements and as part of his effort to make the former leasehold a model of good government, Hsü Tsu-shan planned to rid the walled town of its notorious brothels and thirty-nine opium dens. As soon as funds allowed, he also hoped to integrate Weihai more fully into the surrounding area by pulling down its ancient walls and building two modern roads through it.<sup>31</sup> Thus, the old town was soon assimilated into the Chinese-controlled territory of Weihaiwei and no longer served as a convenient sanctuary for either political or criminal conspirators. In fact, the entire Weihaiwei area throughout most of the period 1930-37 retained its reputation as a generally peaceful district. As in the days of British rule, this situation contrasted sharply with conditions in neighboring hsien and led some villagers there to request that their areas also be governed by the Weihaiwei authorities.<sup>32</sup>

It should also be noted that although the reputation of the police force with regard to honesty and discipline remained fairly high among local residents, there was some dissatisfaction that the police now "meddled" too much in their private affairs. As elsewhere in China at this time, it was government policy to make ever greater use of the



police in all aspects of law enforcement. They were engaged, for example, in such tasks as maintaining census records, making investigations into school attendance, enforcing the anti-foot-binding campaign, and ensuring payment of taxes. The policeman was, therefore, in much closer and more frequent contact with the daily lives of ordinary villagers than he ever had been under the more loosely-structured British system of administration which was in turn modeled on the traditional Chinese pattern. It is not surprising, then, that there were complaints of interference from some of the inhabitants.<sup>33</sup>

#### Administrative Divisions and Local Self-Government

There were other ways in which Weihaiwei residents found their new administration playing a more active role in their lives, especially with regard to the establishment of local self-government. Sun Yat-sen himself had regarded this as one of the most important aspects of his program of political reform for China and there were many directives from Nanking in the 1930s to local administrators on how to implement it.<sup>34</sup> If Weihaiwei was to be seen as a model of good government it was clear to Hsü Tsu-shan and his diligent staff that these directives should be carried out immediately.

One of the first steps to be taken was the establishment of internal and external administrative divisions. It was decided to retain the former leasehold boundaries as laid out by the British. Just prior to rendition a survey was carried out and only five of the original seventy-six stone markers were moved slightly. To emphasize that Wei-

haiwei was once more under Chinese jurisdiction, however, all English words were removed from the stones and Chinese inscribed in their place.<sup>35</sup>

With regard to internal divisions it was thought necessary to make some changes in order to bring Weihaiwei more closely into line with national policies. Thus, after a meeting of headmen in February 1932, a careful survey was carried out of all villages and new ch'u and fang boundaries determined. Whereas the British had established twenty-six districts averaging about twelve villages apiece, the Chinese divided Weihaiwei into eight larger ch'u which contained between thirty-two and forty villages, and were further sub-divided into smaller fang with about four villages in each.<sup>36</sup>

Although the British system of district headmen was eliminated in this administrative realignment, it is significant that the new government did not attempt to remove the traditional village headmen. The official explanation for this was that the ts'un-tung system had been in existence a very long time and had functioned quite effectively at Weihaiwei even under the British. It was also noted that the former leasehold was still very much a rural area where distances between villages were often considerable and where local customs and historical development varied accordingly. Furthermore, since Chinese jurisdiction had only recently been restored at Weihaiwei, there were special circumstances there which made it impossible to implement national laws on local government without some modification. The major modification in this case was to retain the village headman system under the supervision of the new fang and

ch'ü officials. Commissioner Hsü does indeed seem to have been impressed with the effectiveness of village headmen at Weihaiwei and no doubt retained them as a useful administrative tool. But his decision was clearly also taken to ensure the political cooperation of a very important segment of the local population.<sup>37</sup>

It was expected that in matters affecting an entire fang all of the ts'un-tung concerned would meet for discussions, but the opinion of the fang-chang, or fang head, was to take precedence. Likewise, in matters affecting an entire ch'ü all of the fang-chang involved would meet but the view of the ch'ü-chang, or ch'ü head, was to take precedence. Each village was further sub-divided into neighborhoods of lin and lü. Individual lü-chang were expected to meet and choose from among their ranks a village headman.<sup>38</sup> It is not clear whether those chosen were in every case the same men who had previously served as village headmen, but one can guess that they would be in the most advantageous position to influence their fellow villagers.

According to this new system, both fang-chang and ch'ü-chang were eventually to be elected by the population at large. It is not clear whether or not ch'ü-chang elections were ever held, but in August 1933 seventy-five fang-chang were selected through local balloting. The right to vote was enjoyed by all men and women over the age of twenty sui who had sworn an oath of loyalty to the government and registered with their respective fang offices. Those eligible to serve as fang-chang included "qualified" school-teachers, but not those actually teaching, middle school graduates, past and present ts'un-tung who had passed a government exam-

ination, and members of local merchant associations (shang-hui).<sup>39</sup>

Chinese and British sources of this period are vague as to what the duties of all these local officials were or how they were distinguished from those of the existing village headmen. As was mentioned in an official government report of 1931, however, there were far too many new tasks for either the former village or district headmen to be able to handle them on their own. Much of this work consisted of information-gathering (regarding such things as opium addiction, grain surveys, school attendance, foot-binding, the wearing of the queue, etc.) and the active promotion of government programs (tree planting, mass education, road construction, self-government, etc.). The fang-chang, according to British sources, were quite poorly paid and were assisted in all their duties by a local "self-governing council," whose manner of selection is not specified. Both the fang-chang and the councils took their orders from the commissioner, the tang-pu, and the police, which at times led to considerable confusion as to who had the highest authority. In fact, it finally became necessary by 1933 for the commissioner to assert himself in this regard in order to prevent the party organization from completely controlling the self-governing councils.<sup>40</sup>

Although the Chinese regime may have hoped that those serving as ch'u-chang would function as a liaison between the fang-chang, the people of their area, and the commissioner's office, it is clear that ultimate control over who filled these positions was retained by the government. Only those who had completed a training course and examinations

were eligible to become candidates for the office. The difficulty with this cumbersome three-tiered system was that it led to more officials and paperwork but did not stimulate true self-government. If anything, the greatly increased contact between the people and officials was largely viewed by the former as interference. It might be said that at Weihaiwei, as elsewhere in China, the Nationalists spoke a great deal about the importance of mass political participation but tended to stifle it with their over-bureaucratic institutions and procedures. One observer implied that the true motivation behind these elaborate structures was not so much the encouragement of self-government as the facilitation of greater government control at the local level.<sup>41</sup> In his article, "Local Self-Government under the Republic," Kuhn has noted that "the intensification of control through the proliferation of bureaucratic infrastructure in local society" was a technique employed by the Nanking regime throughout China at this time.<sup>42</sup>

### The Mediation of Disputes

One important task which the fang and ch'u officials were responsible for was the mediation of disputes. As the British consul observed: "In all civil cases litigants are compelled first to attempt arbitration out of Court, under the guidance of an official of the Court, and no Court fees, regular or irregular, are demanded unless the arbitration fails and a formal judicial hearing has to take place."<sup>43</sup> Initially, the new system did not come in for much public criticism, according to the consul, but neither were there crowds of civil litigants to be seen as used to appear out-

side the British senior district officer's headquarters.<sup>44</sup>

Local people who were always suspicious of outsiders and change of any kind were no doubt hesitant to avail themselves of a new system staffed by officials unknown to them. Those disputes which were handled by the court, as in the pre-1930 period, were mainly concerned with land, debts, and property in the form of houses.<sup>45</sup>

By the latter half of 1933, however, there was real dissatisfaction with the way in which the new law court functioned. Complaints were heard not about dishonesty but against its rules and delays, the increased cost of litigation, the indecision of the judge, and the number of appeals allowed.<sup>46</sup> The court at Weihaiwei was not responsible to Commissioner Hsü but, as a branch court of Fu-shan hsien, was answerable to the Shantung provincial high court at Tsinan and ultimately to the Ministry of Justice in Nanking.<sup>47</sup> Local people unhappy with legal proceedings at Weihaiwei, however, may not have been aware of this administrative separation of powers and no doubt blamed government in general for their difficulties. The commissioner also had the misfortune of not receiving any of the legal fees and fines levied by the court to supplement his meager resources.<sup>48</sup>

### Education

One area of reform in which the government enjoyed considerably more success was that of education. Having been severely critical of the British for their lack of attention to this matter, it was incumbent upon the new regime to take action almost immediately. A key feature of educational policy at Weihaiwei was, in Hsü Tsu-shan's own

words, "to forcefully stop the running of private [village] schools" in order to ensure that government regulations regarding both teachers and curriculum were observed.<sup>49</sup> Although local residents were generally in favor of greater educational opportunities for themselves and their children, there was "much dissatisfaction" regarding the removal of teachers who had not been through officially approved teacher training courses and were, therefore, in the government's view not properly qualified.<sup>50</sup>

Nevertheless, one British observer in March 1932 commented that the most noticeable progress at Weihaiwei since rendition had been in the field of education. With revenue from the new surcharge on the land tax and half of the shipping dues, Hsü's administration had reorganized or established nearly two hundred elementary schools in the rural areas, taken over and expanded the Chinese-run middle school in Port Edward, as well as the middle school for girls, founded a teacher training school, provided scholarships to needy students, published a weekly educational journal, opened a free public library, and instituted licensing of all teachers. Special attention was also given to the promotion of female education which was offered free of charge in the villages. Five girls were even employed in the government offices as copyists which, the consul remarked, was considered a "revolutionary" innovation in such a conservative district as Weihaiwei.<sup>51</sup>

### Social Reform

Another aspect of government plans to improve conditions for women in the former leasehold was a vigorous anti-

foot-binding campaign. At the time of rendition it was observed that women at Weihaiwei generally had bound feet. In order to emphasize his personal opposition to this custom, Commissioner Hsu sent his own wife to address several public meetings of women on the subject. He then appointed a number of female "social workers" to campaign against the practice in Port Edward and finally issued a notice that after 15 January 1931 no girl with bound feet would be permitted to work in any factory. It was remarked that: "This last move . . . achieved some success, as considerable numbers of girls were employed in embroidery and other factories at fairly high wages." The plan was to carry the campaign to the villages and eventually to fine any offenders.<sup>52</sup>

Equally contrary to Kuomintang policy was the wearing of the queue which in 1930 could still be seen among 50 percent of Weihaiwei's male population.<sup>53</sup> Eradicating it, however, was a relatively simple matter, at least in the Port Edward area, where police were stationed at the town entrances armed with scissors.<sup>54</sup>

Combating opium addiction, though, was not so simple. The government decided first to abolish the British system of licensed smoking as well as the many opium dens in the walled town. According to the consul in March 1931, however, some of these dealers continued to exist there and in Port Edward as well as in the rural areas.<sup>55</sup>

In October 1932 yet another social reform took place when the central government directed that all nu-pei, or "slaves," should have their status legally changed to a non-servile one. There were fifty-two women at Weihaiwei



in this category and the directive was implemented immediately.<sup>56</sup>

Continuing Economic Problems for the Government, 1931-33

If the former British commissioner, Sir James Stewart Lockhart, and the first Chinese commissioner, Hsü Tsu-shan, had ever had an occasion to discuss their respective experiences at Weihaiwei they might have been surprised to learn that inadequate financial resources were as much a problem in 1930 as in 1901. It will be remembered that one of Lockhart's primary tasks upon arrival at Weihaiwei was to encourage outside investment in the area so that the British grant-in-aid could be reduced. Likewise, when Commissioner Hsü realized how unreliable Nanking could be in forwarding his monthly subsidy, he decided to try to find other means of developing Weihaiwei independently.<sup>57</sup>

Hsü himself even edited three volumes of detailed plans which were presented to a visiting delegation of businessmen from Shanghai on how to carry out such development. The first volume deals with Weihaiwei's potential as a major producer of seafood. In addition to its regular fishing trade, he thought certain products could also be profitably cultivated in coastal areas. Seafood processing plants and a ship repair plant would create new jobs, as would an expansion of existing harbor and storage facilities.<sup>58</sup> In the second volume extensive consideration was given to Weihaiwei's farming and forestry potential. Like the British before them, the Chinese believed the area was well suited to fruit and nut production as well as poultry raising and sericulture. An excellent climate and low wages were viewed as good reasons for attracting investors.<sup>59</sup> The third volume

deals with the development of hotels and a tourist industry at Weihaiwei, including detailed schemes for new water supplies.<sup>60</sup> In all of the volumes it is clear that those formulating the plans had been trained in Western techniques of accounting, management, engineering, and agriculture.

There were other ways in which the government sought to "modernize" Weihaiwei so as to provide the proper conditions for commercial expansion. As well as introducing the metric system of weights and measures to the area, for example, there were considerable efforts to improve the monetary system by prohibiting small shops from issuing their own paper notes and by substituting the uniform national currency for the wide variety of money in use at Weihaiwei at this time.<sup>61</sup>

In order to draw attention to the area's potential value as a trading center, a large exhibition of national products was held in August 1933. Partly in response to the threat of Japanese economic aggression, the exhibition drew participants from all over China and generated a good deal of business for local people as well.<sup>62</sup> A permanent display of national goods was also maintained in the Chamber of Commerce building from which orders could be placed.<sup>63</sup>

In spite of all these efforts, however, Weihaiwei's economic growth remained largely confined to the blueprint stage. China was, of course, by 1932 experiencing the effects of the world-wide depression and, as an agricultural producer, Weihaiwei was dependent on perpetually unstable international markets for commodities such as ground nuts.<sup>64</sup> Another serious difficulty was the continuing uncertainty of government revenue which made the financing of long-range

development programs, or even day-to-day administration, nearly impossible at times.

Following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Weihaiwei's monthly subsidy from Nanking was suspended indefinitely and Commissioner Hsu was compelled to place his government on an austerity budget with cuts of 10 to 40 percent in official allowances and spending on public works. Even then, however, he soon accumulated a deficit. When the grant was resumed in October 1932 it had been reduced to half the original amount and left Hsu once again in great difficulty.<sup>65</sup>

By late 1932 the British consul, G. S. Moss, felt the situation was becoming so serious that he should personally inform his friend, Finance Minister T. V. Soong. In his letter to Soong he noted that since the suspension of Weihaiwei's subsidy many projects were suffering, including roads, the telephone cable, and harbor facilities. Moss also warned Soong that if services continued to deteriorate the public would undoubtedly direct its criticism at the minister. In spite of the fact that the total amount of tax revenue at Weihaiwei was now nearly double that collected at the end of the British period, the new Chinese administration was only allowed to spend two-thirds of the sum the foreigners had. With the suspension of its subsidy from Nanking the government had soon gone into arrears.

Moss suggested that a possible solution to the problem would be to expand Weihaiwei's territorial boundaries to include neighboring Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien so as to have a much larger tax base to support the newly-established "municipal" government. As the consul observed, the Weihaiwei administration was inappropriately modeled on the Tsing-

tao precedent. Thus, a small territory of approximately 200,000 poor farmers was being asked to support an urban-style government with many specialized departments, central government tax offices, and separate law courts. Moss concluded: "As it is now run the Municipal Government machine suggests to the disinterested observer a high-powered motor-car running at 10 m.p.h., the highly capable Driver and Mechanics being under the compulsion of events."<sup>66</sup> Unfortunately, however, the consul's advice was not taken and Commissioner Hsü began to experience serious political problems in addition to his financial ones.

#### The Removal of Hsü Tsu-shan

As has been mentioned, Commissioner Hsü from the outset of his career at Weihaiwei had frequently been at odds with members of the local party organization. By 1933 he had apparently made so many enemies within this group that he was forced to defend himself against their complaints to the Nanking authorities that he had been neglectful of his duty, was too pro-British, and that he was even an opium smoker. Hsü was exonerated of these charges and his offer to resign was rejected, but the matter did not end there.<sup>67</sup>

In November 1933, while ostensibly on a visit to Peking for medical treatment, the commissioner was suddenly summoned to Nanking to answer his critics again. And to the surprise of many at Weihaiwei, he was removed from his post in December. The chairman of the local Chamber of Commerce confided to the British consul at the time that:

. . . Hsü had the confidence of the merchants and farmers who felt generally that any change would be for the worse. He had, however, made bitter enemies in the ranks

of the tang-pu officials and the school-teachers, and had been so unfortunate recently as to estrange the Law Court officials needlessly and tactlessly.<sup>68</sup>

The commissioner's difficulties consisted of more than a clash of personalities or a power struggle with local political enemies. In Hsü's own view of the situation his many protests to Nanking over the Weihaiwei subsidy, the excessive tax burden levied in his area, and his refusal to increase taxation provoked many at the Ministry of Finance and contributed to his own dismissal.<sup>69</sup> Nor were his enemies content to let him leave Weihaiwei without further recriminations. Although Commissioner Hsü attended several farewell lunches and dinners in which there were genuine expressions of regret at his departure, the commander of the marine garrison nevertheless felt it necessary to arrange extra military patrols in case of demonstrations organized by the tang-pu against him.<sup>70</sup> Two days before Hsü left Weihaiwei, fifteen members of this group published an open letter in local newspapers accusing him of financial irregularities. According to the British consul, these charges were groundless and were the work of the local deputy to the Shantung provincial party organization and his colleagues, eight of whom had been jailed during Hsü's administration.<sup>71</sup>

The marine commander was especially bitter about the commissioner's treatment at the hands of the KMT members, noting that they had spent \$20,000 in the campaign against him and that they would definitely expect to have more power in local affairs under his successor. When representatives to the Chamber of Commerce were asked why they had not stood up for Hsü, they replied that, while recognizing him as their

"champion," they were at the same time very afraid of the tang-pu "who were like wolves."<sup>72</sup>

Just prior to his departure the commissioner himself observed that, while he was glad to at least leave behind a credit balance of a few thousand dollars for the next administration, he had had to cut his budget to the bone and to reduce his staff considerably. In view of Weihaiwei's poor trade position and a tax burden which was already making conditions "deplorable" for local people, he wondered how the new commissioner could possibly raise sufficient revenue to attend to such basic tasks as keeping the roads repaired, paying and clothing the police, and maintaining schools.<sup>73</sup>

The British consul had mixed feelings about Weihaiwei's present situation and future prospects. In late 1933 he had observed that there was considerable local interest in some of the government's new programs, especially adult education, and that younger people were even inclined to appreciate the public meetings, uniforms, and bands provided by the tang-pu. And, while admitting that "of its kind" the present administration was "fairly good," the consul also thought it was costly in terms of its numerous personnel.<sup>74</sup> Unaware of the extent of Hsu's political difficulties, the consul remarked only days before the former was fired:

It is currently an advantage for him, and for the Territory that he has many close friends in high places. His prestige and the confidence derived from his former administrative appointments give him an advantage over an official with only an academic and civil service career. Such a one would be more liable to be a mere tool of the politicians.<sup>75</sup>

It remained to be seen whether the new man with just such a background would prove the consul correct.

Notes to Chapter 8

<sup>1</sup>China Weekly Review, ed., Who's Who in China (Shanghai, 1931), pp. 167-8. A careful search through other biographical reference works from this period has revealed no further information regarding Hsu's connection with Chiang K'ai-shek. It would seem, however, in view of his later difficulties with the central government, that he was probably only a low-ranking adviser without a close personal relationship to Chiang.

<sup>2</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Lampson, 4 October 1930.

<sup>3</sup>CO 521/75, Archer to Lampson, 14 October 1930. See also, FO 371/15448, Archer to Foreign Office, 31 October 1930; and Archer to Lampson, 1 and 10 November 1930. The latter document indicates that by 1 November all government functions, except the maintenance of sanitation on Liu-kung Island, had been taken over by the Chinese.

<sup>4</sup>See Chapter 7, p. 313.

<sup>5</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Foreign Office, 4 and 31 October 1930; Archer to Lampson, 1 November 1930. See also, FO 371/14698, Archer to Lampson, 16 October 1930; FO 371/18092, Moss to Lampson, 11 December 1933; and CO 521/69, Johnston to Colonial Office, 10 July 1930. It is not surprising that Commissioner Hsu made little headway in his appeals to the Ministry of Finance at this time as important decisions regarding national economic policy had been made only two years earlier at a National Economic Conference convened by T. V. Soong in Shanghai in June 1928. It was agreed then that Nanking would derive its revenue mainly from customs duties and the salt tax and that the land tax would be reserved for provincial governments. See Hung-mao Tien, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927-1937 (Stanford, 1972), pp. 74-5. See also Ch'u Ying-sheng, "Wei-hai-wei niao k'an," Shih-shih yüeh-pao, 4:2 (February 1931):99.

<sup>6</sup>CO 371/15448, Archer to Foreign Office, 31 October 1930.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid. See also, Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1922-31, p. 432.

<sup>8</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Lampson, 9 December 1930; and Archer to Foreign Office, 29 December 1930. By April 1932 it was reported that the native customs levies had been abolished altogether which meant that native products carried by junk to Weihaiwei enjoyed duty-free status as in the days of British rule. The result was an improvement in trade and an increase in the import of such items as ground nuts from nearby areas, bean oil and bean cake from Dairen, and general merchandise from Chefoo, Tsingtao, and other places. See FO 371/16189, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1932.

<sup>9</sup>FO 371/14698, Archer to Lampson, 16 October 1930. While it may seem that the hotel-keepers' association would



represent a wealthier segment of Weihaiwei's business community, this group was undoubtedly made up of those operating small inns and not the large, foreign-operated tourist hotels.

<sup>10</sup>North China Herald, 30 December 1930, p. 435. It was also noted here that a delegation of Weihaiwei's three most prominent merchants presented this petition in Nanking on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce.

<sup>11</sup>North China Herald, 3 February 1931, p. 151. See also, Ch'ü, "Wei-hai-wei niao k'an," p. 99; and Yen Chung, "Shan-tung sheng chih shang-yeh ch'ü-yü," Kuo-chi mao-i tao-pao, 5.2 (March 1933):51.

<sup>12</sup>North China Herald, 16 December 1930, p. 364, and 30 December 1930, p. 435.

<sup>13</sup>Hsü Tsu-shan, ed., Wei-hai-wei ch'ou-shou, chieh-kuan, hsing-cheng kung-tso pao-kao shu (Yen-t'ai, 1931), Part III, pp. 4-6. This report also contains a list of all documents (incoming and outgoing) handled by the new government. In the first twenty-five weeks following rendition 1,504 pieces of correspondence were received at Weihaiwei and 1,345 pieces were sent out. See *ibid.*, pp. 9-12.

<sup>14</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report, 1904. This figure varied only slightly during the entire British occupation of Weihaiwei.

<sup>15</sup>North China Herald, 16 December 1930, p. 364. See also, Hsü, ed., Wei-hai-wei ch'ou-shou, Part III, p. 34. For statistical information on Weihaiwei during the first year of Chinese rule, see Wei-hai-wei kuan-li kung-shu mi-shu-ch'u, ed., Wei-hai-wei shou-hui chou-nien t'e-k'an (Yen-t'ai, 1931), Part II, pp. 14-27. Hung-mao Tien has noted that the land tax was a more lucrative source of revenue in China than customs duties or the salt tax and that provincial governments (and in this case the special administrative area of Weihaiwei) were fortunate in some ways to have it allocated to them by Nanking. As he also states, however, there were a number of difficulties in collecting the land tax, especially the fact that accurate land registration and assessment had not been carried out for decades in rural China. This was certainly true in Weihaiwei where the British had basically continued to rely on tax records of the late Ch'ing era which were in turn handed over to Commissioner Hsü in 1930. The land tax rate in the former leasehold had also continued to be lower than that in surrounding areas. See Tien, Government and Politics, p. 75.

<sup>16</sup>FO 371/15448, Extract from Kuo Min News Agency report, 23 January 1931. See also North China Herald, 27 January 1931, p. 111.

<sup>17</sup>FO 371/15448, Enclosure in Archer to Peking, 8 October 1931.

<sup>18</sup>FO 371/16189, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending March 1932; and FO 371/18092, Moss to Ingram,

28 December 1933. Commissioner Hsü was in general favorably disposed toward the British and the way in which they had administered Weihaiwei, especially given their limited resources. He was also aware, however, that in the final years of their occupation of the area the emphasis had been on austerity and as little expenditure as possible on public works. The result of this policy, according to Hsü, was to leave his government a considerable amount of "catching up" to do. He compared the situation to a northern Chinese fable about a tenant being asked to vacate his home by the landlord and, in retaliation, pulling down the roof. He added: "Although the British are not tenants of that description, they were naturally not inclined to make such decorations of the house as are necessary for the successors to live in comfortably." See FO 371/15448, Enclosure in Archer to Peking, 8 October 1931.

Hsü was not alone in his struggles with Nanking over revenue at this time. In Tsinan, for example, Governor Han Fu-ch'ü had taken matters into his own hands in the autumn of 1931 by installing his men in central government tax offices and refusing to remit the revenues. See FO 371/16192, Combe to Lampson, 16 March 1932. See also, FO 371/16213, Combe to Lampson, 17 May 1932 regarding Nanking's proposals to Han for increasing his subsidy in return for control of these offices.

<sup>19</sup>FO 371/15449, Archer to Ingram, 27 February 1931. This document provides the actual rates of salt taxation levied under the British and the new Chinese administration at Weihaiwei. It is interesting that throughout their tenure there the British had actually retained the Ch'ing tax known as tsao k'ou, or "stove tax," which had traditionally been paid by certain families in salt-producing villages and over time had become amalgamated with the land tax. Hsü Tsu-shan continued to collect it after rendition but the new salt administration official in 1931 declared it should be abolished so that all salt taxes would be under his jurisdiction alone.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Lampson, 23 March 1931; and FO 371/18080, Weihaiwei Political Report for March Quarter 1934.

<sup>22</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Lampson, 23 March 1931. There is no further detail here on what is meant by "British procedures" but the consul is quick to point out that in spite of this criticism Hsü was indeed "an ardent Nationalist." Perhaps it was felt by the party activists that the new commissioner was not acting swiftly enough to remove any reminders of the foreign occupation.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid. Archer reported that Mi Yi-shan had formerly been granted many contracts by the previous British administration and, although his KMT connections were well known at the time, he had never caused any problems for foreigners in the past. See also Lockhart Papers, Box 1, Anonymous, "Notes on Weihaiwei," April 1934 (handwritten). Although the author of this document is unknown, he was clearly very

knowledgeable about events taking place in the former leasehold at this time.

<sup>24</sup>FO 371/16166, Cable, Moss to Lampson, 18 March 1932; FO 371/16168, Moss to Lampson, 18 and 19 March 1932; and FO 371/16189, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending March 1931. See also, North China Herald, 22 March 1932, p. 437.

<sup>25</sup>FO 371/16168, Moss to Lampson, 18 and 19 March 1932. In the latter document Moss noted that since the Tsinan tangpu had stopped providing a grant to the Weihaiwei party office, it had been attempting to find its own funds partly by levying heavy fines on merchants who sold Japanese goods and through a subscription list, ostensibly to support the Nineteenth Army's anti-Japanese activities at Shanghai. Although a boycott of Japanese goods continued following the riot at Weihaiwei, no further violence occurred. Commissioner Hsu told the British consul that he had been specifically instructed by Nanking to avoid trouble with the Japanese. He added, however, that if there was a landing of their troops at Weihaiwei he would personally see that it was resisted by local forces. See FO 371/16162, Moss to Lampson, 16 February 1932; and FO 371/17066, Weihaiwei Political Report for December Quarter 1932. Hsu himself held strong personal feelings about the Japanese and, in a speech on the first anniversary of rendition in October 1931, drew attention to Japanese aggression in Manchuria, emphasizing the contrast between this act of imperialism and "the friendly act of the British in returning Weihaiwei to China." See FO 371/15448, Archer to Peking, 7 October 1931. In 1932 and 1933 there was apparently some concern that the Japanese might actually attempt to seize Shantung and land troops at Weihaiwei. Consul Moss noted that, although the decision to defend the area against such an invasion was not to be made public for fear of alarming local residents, the Chinese marines were drilling incessantly and even singing "warlike songs." See FO 371/17056, Moss to Lampson, 3 March 1933; and FO 371/17069, Moss to Foreign Office, 23 June 1933.

<sup>26</sup>FO 371/17067, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending March 1933. The government also justified itself by pointing out that workers who would otherwise be unemployed during the slack agricultural season were at least receiving a minimum wage for road work. For a description of the road construction system under the British, see Chapter 2, p. 102.

<sup>27</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Lampson, 31 October 1930 and 23 March 1931. See also, FO 371/53566, Henneker to Donner, 8 August 1946, citing a report by Archer of 2 April 1931. The initial fears of local residents upon the withdrawal of a British regime at Weihaiwei in 1930 brought a return of the old night watchman system for the first time in many years. See Lockhart Papers, Vol. 72, Whittaker to Lockhart, 8 October 1930. By 1933 Weihaiwei's police force, under orders from Nanking, had been expanded to include a special reserve militia of eighty men. In addition, all police were expected to pass through a training course which included elementary written Chinese in order to equip them for census-

taking and other functions which they had not carried out under the British. See FO 371/17067, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1933.

<sup>28</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Lampson, 23 March 1931.

<sup>29</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Lampson, 1 November 1931.

<sup>30</sup>WO 106, Extract from Peking Despatch No. 8, September 1932; FO 371/16194, Moss to Ingram, 22 October 1932; and FO 371/16189, Herbert to Ingram, 17 October 1932. See also, North China Herald, 21 September 1932, p. 445; 5 October 1932, p. 8; 12 October 1932, p. 43; and 19 October 1932; and Buck, Urban Change, pp. 169-70.

<sup>31</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Lampson, 19 November 1930. By early 1933 two of the town gates had been demolished and it was hoped to remove the remaining two by 1935. See FO 371/17067, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1933.

<sup>32</sup>FO 371/17067, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1933.

<sup>33</sup>FO 371/16189, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1932. The people of Weihaiwei were fortunate to have a well-disciplined force which was paid regularly and was led by a trained police commissioner. The latter was a native of Hankow who had studied at St. Cyr and Saumur and spoke both English and French.

<sup>34</sup>For a good summary of national policies on self-government and the difficulties encountered in implementing them in the 1930s, see C. M. Chang, "A New Government for Rural China: The Political Aspect of Rural Reconstruction," Nankai Social and Economic Quarterly, 9.2 (July 1936):239-95. See also, Kuhn, "Local Self-Government under the Republic;" and Guy S. Alitto, The Last Confucian (Berkeley, 1979).

<sup>35</sup>Wei-hai-wei kuan-li kung-shu, ed., Wei-hai-wei shou-hui ti-san chou-nien kung-tso pao-kao shu (Weihaiwei, 1933), p. 2. See also, Hsu, ed., Wei-hai-wei ch'ou-shou, Part III, p. 1; and Yang, "Wei-hai-wei hsing-cheng ch'u," p. 130. Another example of the new government's eagerness to eliminate the most obvious reminders of the former British presence at Weihaiwei was its decision to remove several stone memorial tablets which had been erected between 1898 and 1930. These included one presented by the officers of the former Chinese Regiment in honor of men who had died during operations against the Boxers, various appreciation tablets to local government officials, and one which recorded the cooperation of the government and people of Weihaiwei during the famine of 1920. The only one allowed to remain in place was in honor of residents who had died during World War I. It should be noted that the tablets were not destroyed by the Chinese but were reportedly placed in storage with the intention of eventually housing them in a museum. See FO 371/15448, Archer to Peking, 19 December 1931.

<sup>36</sup>Wei-hai-wei shou-hui ti-san chou-nien, p. 1; and Hsu, ed., Wei-hai-wei ch'ou-shou, Part III, pp. 13 and 16.

<sup>37</sup>Wei-hai-wei shou-hui ti-san chou-nien, pp. 1-6.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-6. When one compares the names of those elected, as provided in this document, with Chamber of Commerce membership lists from 1919 to 1927, it appears that there was no overlap between these two roles. See CO 873/474. As for ch'u-chang officials, it seems that the government may initially have appointed men who had previously served as district headmen under the British to fill this position until elections were held. Regarding the new ch'u-chang training center, see Hsu, Wei-hai-wei ch'ou-shou, Part III, pp. 17-22.

<sup>40</sup>FO 371/17067, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1933. See also, Lockhart Papers, Box 1, "Notes on Weihaiwei;" and Hsu, ed., Wei-hai-wei ch'ou-shou, Part III, pp. 13-15.

<sup>41</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 1, "Notes on Weihaiwei."

<sup>42</sup>Kuhn, "Local Self-Government under the Republic," p. 296.

<sup>43</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Peking, 23 March 1931.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Wei-hai-wei shou-hui ti-san chou-nien, p. 10. For a complete list of civil and criminal cases which were heard in court at Weihaiwei between October 1932 and September 1933, see pp. 64-79.

<sup>46</sup>FO 371/17070, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1933.

<sup>47</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Lampson, 1 November 1930. Fu-shan hsien was the small district west of Weihaiwei which contained the treaty port of Chefoo.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid. The loss of this revenue was significant as in their final year at Weihaiwei, the British had obtained nearly \$17,000 in fees and fines of court. Archer mentions in this document also that the prisons were administered by special warders sent from Chefoo and were not within Commissioner Hsu's jurisdiction.

<sup>49</sup>FO 371/15448, Enclosure in Archer to Peking, 8 October 1931.

<sup>50</sup>FO 371/16189, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1932. There would have been a sizeable number of such teachers, for in 1922 a British report stated that of the Territory's 293 teachers in the rural primary schools, only 99 had some sort of recognized qualification. Similarly, the area's 279 schools consisted of only 97 "modern" ones and 182 of the traditional variety. See CO 521/33, Hardy Jowett, Memorandum on Chinese Education in the Territory, 17 February 1922.

<sup>51</sup>FO 371/16189, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1932. According to this report, the greatest problem with regard to education was finding and paying enough well-trained teachers to staff Weihaiwei's schools. By the end of 1931, however, forty-eight teachers had graduated from the newly-established normal school. See Hsü, ed., Wei-hai-wei ch'ou-shou, Part III, pp. 50-6; and Wei-hai-wei shou-hui ti-san chou-nien, pp. 26-33. Obviously, all of these improvements meant that the government was spending a great deal more on education than the British had. In his March 1932 intelligence report the consul stated that the British budget estimates for 1930-31 had included only \$9,000 for education, whereas the Chinese had allocated \$48,000. According to a report of September 1933, primary education was to become compulsory in the Port Edward area in 1935. See FO 371/17070, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1933.

<sup>52</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Peking, 23 March 1931.

<sup>53</sup>Hsü, ed., Wei-hai-wei ch'ou-shou, p. 35.

<sup>54</sup>FO 371/15448, Archer to Peking, 23 March 1931.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

<sup>56</sup>Wei-hai-wei shou-hui ti-san chou-nien, p. 15. See also, FO 371/17070, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1933. For a discussion of indentured servitude at Weihaiwei, see CO 873/319, Lockhart to Carpmael, 17 March 1911; and Carpmael to Lockhart, 13 April 1911.

<sup>57</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 1, Moss to Lockhart, 1 September 1933.

<sup>58</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 1, Hsü Tsu-shan, ed., Fan-jung Wei-hai-wei chi-hua chih i (1932).

<sup>59</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 1, Hsü Tsu-shan, ed., Fan-jung Wei-hai-wei chi-hua chih erh (1932).

<sup>60</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 1, Hsü Tsu-shan, ed., Fan-jung Wei-hai-wei chi-hua chih san (1932). There were even plans discussed as early as August 1931 to open an air service between Weihaiwei and Shanghai in order to compete with the resort town of Tsingtao. See FO 371/15448, Archer to Peking, 28 August 1931. In 1933 the government had published five thousand copies of a new Guide to Weihaiwei in English and Chinese. A copy of this book is available in Lockhart Papers, Vol. 65.

<sup>61</sup>Hsü, ed., Wei-hai-wei ch'ou-shou, Part II, p. 38; and Wei-hai-wei shou-hui ti-san chou-nien, pp. 15-16. See also, FO 371/17067, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1933.

<sup>62</sup>Wei-hai-wei shou-hui ti-san chou-nien, pp. 17-26.

<sup>63</sup>FO 371/18081, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1934.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid. See also, FO 371/19302, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1935. Another factor which hurt Weihaiwei's economy following rendition and the removal of its duty-free status was a large increase in the smuggling of goods from Manchuria and Korea. Those neighboring areas which formerly purchased their supplies from Weihaiwei could now obtain a large portion of them at much lower prices from the well-organized smugglers operating along the coast. See Lockhart Papers, Box 1, "Notes on Weihaiwei."

<sup>65</sup>FO 371/16162, Moss to Lampson, 16 February 1932. See also, FO 371/17067, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1933.

<sup>66</sup>FO 371/16025, Moss to Ingram, 5 November 1932; and Moss to Soong, 4 November 1932. In the first document Moss notes that Soong had asked him to write occasionally regarding Weihaiwei. In the actual letter to Soong which is enclosed in the second document Moss addresses him as "T.V." Moss had been in the consular service in China since 1902 and by 1931 was the Acting-Consul General in Nanking where he no doubt had had dealings with Financial Minister Soong before being posted to Weihaiwei. See Who Was Who, 1951-60 (London, 1960), p. 794.

<sup>67</sup>FO 371/17070, Weihaiwei Political Report for September Quarter 1933.

<sup>68</sup>FO 371/18092, Moss to Lampson, 14 November 1933; and Ingram to Simon, 13 January 1934.

<sup>69</sup>FO 371/18092, Moss to Ingram, 28 December 1933.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid. See also, FO 371/18092, Moss to Ingram, 3 January 1934.

<sup>71</sup>FO 371/18092, Moss to Ingram, 3 January 1934.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., Moss to Ingram, 28 December 1933.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid. In this document it is also stated that whereas the British had raised a total of about \$400,000 in 1930, Chinese tax revenues in 1933 had reached \$1.5 million of which only \$260,000 was retained by the local administration. It is not surprising that Nanking refused to give up its control of the highly lucrative customs duties and salt taxes at Weihaiwei which made up the bulk of revenue there. Hung-mao Tien has observed that throughout China during the years 1928-37 customs revenues accounted for 48.5 percent of the central government's total income, while salt levies accounted for 32 percent. See Tien, Government and Politics, p. 78.

<sup>74</sup>FO 371/17070, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending October 1933.

<sup>75</sup>FO 371/18092, Moss to Lampson, 11 December 1933.

Moss was also concerned that anyone replacing Hsü Tsu-shan might not be as pro-British as he had been and even suggested that a "reminder" of his government's confidence in Hsü might be decisive with the Nanking regime in determining his future at Weihaiwei. See *ibid.*, Moss to Lampson, 14 November 1933.



## Chapter 9

## Weihaiwei and the Slide Towards War

Hsü Tung-fan

Although many people assumed in early 1934 that a change of commissioners would mean an entirely new staff of officials and perhaps major shifts in policy at Weihaiwei as well, it soon became apparent that such dramatic events were not to take place after all. It was reported that many residents backed by the local tang-pu as well as fifty other people from as far away as Chefoo and Tsingtao who had come to Weihaiwei in the hope of finding employment with the new government were disappointed to learn that most of the old staff was to be retained. The commissioner-to-be in fact brought with him only three new secretaries upon his arrival at Port Edward (now known as Ma-t'ou) on 15 January.<sup>1</sup>

The commissioner himself had a background in many respects quite similar to that of his predecessor. Hsü Tung-fan (1887-19??) was born in Chekiang and completed all of his university education abroad, receiving a B.A. from Birmingham University in 1916 and also pursuing doctoral studies in international law, political science, and public finance at the Universities of London, Lausanne, and Zurich from 1916 to 1918. He then served as chief diplomatic secretary to the civil governor of Shantung from 1919 to 1920 and in 1921 was a councilor to the Chinese delegation at the Washington Conference. In 1922 Hsü was a member of the Sino-Japanese Joint Commission for the Settlement of the Shantung Question and from 1923 to 1924 served as a rendition commissioner at Tsingtao as well as a member of

the National Financial Commission and the Foreign Affairs Commission. From 1924 to 1929 he held a number of civil service posts dealing with foreign affairs and from 1929 to 1933 increased his knowledge of Shantung provincial matters as commissioner for foreign affairs at Tsinan.<sup>2</sup>

Like Hsü Tsu-shan, the new commissioner was a firm supporter of the former foreign minister Dr. C. T. Wang, described himself as an "anglophile," and had considerable expertise as a government official in dealing with foreigners.<sup>3</sup> Unlike Hsü Tsu-shan, however, he had retained close political links with Nanking and was not a naval officer but rather a scholarly diplomat, "by nature a cautious man . . . [who] had learned not to quarrel with the Party men."<sup>4</sup> The British consul at Weihaiwei observed that local tang-pu officials wasted no time in asserting the importance of their organization in Hsü's presence, even as early as the inaugural ceremony held in the new commissioner's honor.<sup>5</sup> And Hsü Tung-fan seems to have governed in a manner less likely to alienate the party than had his outspoken predecessor. The British consul made the following comment: "As might be expected there is a subtle change in the bureaucratic atmosphere. It is now definitely more 'Chinese' and more Kuomintang, more evasive and potentially more hostile, though polite on the surface."<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, relations between the British and the commissioner during his two and one-half years at Weihaiwei remained cordial and there was no outbreak of anti-foreignism.<sup>7</sup>

#### Anti-Salt Tax Agitation

Commissioner Hsü's first major problem at Weihaiwei was how to deal with those who were violently opposed to

the high level of taxation on salt. By December 1933 the salt gabelle had raised the tax in all districts of Shantung from \$1.50 to \$2.50 per picul on ordinary salt and from \$0.30 to \$1.00 per picul on salt used for preserving fish. Since salt production was at this time the second largest industry in Weihaiwei, such a large increase in the tax rate was bound to cause considerable resentment. Adding to the problem was the fact that local people were "oppressed by multiple taxation," suffering the effects of world-wide economic depression, and in general "much less prosperous" than they had once been.<sup>8</sup> In spite of these conditions, however, the revenue derived by the salt inspectorate at Weihaiwei and forwarded directly to Nanking in 1933 was so large that it exceeded all other municipal taxes of the local government. While deriving no benefit from the salt levies, the Weihaiwei administration was forced to deal with the rising level of violence in opposition to them.<sup>9</sup>

Theft from salt stocks was a particularly serious problem and in one incident in early 1934 a captured thief was shot and killed by a salt guard in what were described as "peculiarly brutal circumstances." A riot then ensued in which angry villagers looted salt heaps and so intimidated the unpopular guards that they refused to carry out further patrols. Commissioner Hsu handled the matter rather effectively by first turning the offending guard over to the court and then sending representatives from the marine garrison, the police, the court, and the Chamber of Commerce to a meeting of "village elders" from the area involved. At this gathering the villagers were told that if robbery from the salt stocks ceased no further action would be taken by

the government. For a time the disturbances did come to an end, although it was necessary to reinforce the discredited salt guards with a number of marines in order to maintain order.<sup>10</sup>

Commissioner Hsü's troubles with the salt administration were by no means over, however. Riots broke out again in the Lu-tao-k'ou western coastal region of Weihaiwei in June of the same year when "agitators" were said to have circulated pamphlets announcing a free issue of rice. When the rice did not materialize villagers robbed the salt pans of some 70,000 piculs of salt. The Ministry of Finance then demanded that the commissioner forward the tax revenue lost as a result of this incident. Hsü successfully resisted the demand but only after a personal visit to Nanking.<sup>11</sup>

#### "Development" Projects and Continuing Financial Difficulties

The commissioner found it necessary to travel to the capital again in late 1934 in order to request that the reduced subsidy to his government be restored to its former level so that he could eliminate a deficit of nearly \$40,000. Hsü must have been able to exercise at least a modicum of influence in Nanking at this time since he returned to Weihaiwei with the necessary funds and a promise of more to come. As in the past, however, the promises proved unreliable and by October 1935 the government had again accumulated a large deficit.<sup>12</sup> The continual shortage of revenue for even basic operating expenses made it impossible to carry out very many of the commissioner's long-term development schemes for Weihaiwei, although some projects were initiated during the brief periods when cash was available to finance them.<sup>13</sup>

Once again education seems to have been among the government's highest priorities. A new vocational school for horticulture and sericulture was opened in late 1934 and by that time compulsory primary education had been extended to all of Weihaiwei's eight ch'u divisions.<sup>14</sup> By April 1935 fifteen special schools had been opened for the illiterate aged between seventeen and forty-five and enrollments reached seven hundred.<sup>15</sup> In a continuing effort to improve teacher training a summer school for elementary teachers was held at Weihaiwei in August 1935. About this time a special health education committee was also formed consisting of health workers and teachers for the purpose of providing hygiene instruction in local schools.<sup>16</sup> Other measures taken to improve public health included a program of mandatory vaccination in rural areas, the covering of wells, and the inspection of local factories for sanitation.<sup>17</sup>

As their British counterparts had done before them, the Chinese administrators at Weihaiwei made many attempts to encourage the planting of trees throughout the area.<sup>18</sup> A "model orchard" of 1800 fruit trees and a government-sponsored vineyard were also established in the hope of increasing and diversifying Weihaiwei's agricultural output.<sup>19</sup> Another important local industry was aided by a special training school for masters of fishing vessels in July 1935 which was attended by 140 people.<sup>20</sup> Less welcome to the area's many seamen, however, was the establishment in March 1934 of a new KMT-sponsored union which all were obliged to join. According to British sources, local seamen felt that such a compulsory organization, in spite of its stated objective of improving working conditions, was simply another

means of extracting revenue.<sup>21</sup>

One might suspect that many of Weihaiwei's residents also questioned the wisdom of constructing new law courts at Port Edward in 1934 or the need for a \$10,000 park and open-air cinema at a time when roads in the area were rapidly falling into disrepair.<sup>22</sup> One can only conclude that at a time when budget deficits would seem to have called for careful spending, Weihaiwei's ambitious new administrators appear to have emphasized a certain number of "prestige" projects which were not of vital long-term importance but which gave the area a more "modern" appearance. The decision taken in 1930 to develop Weihaiwei along the lines of the Tsingtao municipal model continued to influence successive administrators there in spite of the fact that the former leasehold remained fundamentally a rural area.

#### Economic Conditions at Weihaiwei, 1934-36

It should also be noted that the mid-1930s were far from prosperous years for the people of Weihaiwei or for China generally and this fact in itself was a serious obstacle to any plans the government might have hoped to carry out. Not only was it a period of great political instability and civil war which drained off both human and material resources, but there were external pressures as well from the ever more menacing Japanese and from a world-wide economic depression. The Chinese found themselves especially hard hit by the fluctuating value of precious metals which led to an enormous outflow of silver in 1934-35. This in turn undermined the new national currency introduced in 1933 and led to an extremely tight money market.<sup>23</sup> The dampening

effects of these conditions certainly contributed to the difficulties faced by Weihaiwei's ground nut dealers. Even though the crop itself was quite good in early 1935, there was a general lack of international demand for the product and many nuts remained unsold. This was especially serious to the large number of people at Weihaiwei who had gambled on prices and demand remaining at high 1934 levels and had become speculators in the commodity. As one British observer remarked in April 1935: ". . . unfortunately practically everybody in this place have tried their luck in the ground-nut trade -- shoemakers, tailors, piecegoods dealers, comprador shops, carpenters, etc."<sup>24</sup> The downturn in the market and the inexperience of many of these people combined to cause many bankruptcies.<sup>25</sup>

Conditions were also not very favorable at this time for tourism which both Commissioners Hsü Tsu-shan and Hsü Tung-fan had hoped would become a real growth industry at Weihaiwei. There was no doubt a good deal of uncertainty among foreign investors as to the ability of the Chinese to adequately defend and administer the former leasehold when it was returned to them in 1930. It was stated, for example, that land around Port Edward which had sold for \$2,000 per mou before rendition would not even fetch \$600 per mou in late 1933. There may have also been concern among Chinese and foreign investors alike that, as had been suggested in the rendition negotiations, the Nanking authorities would suddenly decide to close the port in order to use it exclusively as a naval base.<sup>26</sup> It seems, then, that neither British nor Chinese administrators were able to provide the kind of guarantees about Weihaiwei's future

which were needed to attract large-scale investment.

#### Further Administrative Changes

Another factor that may have discouraged potential investors was the rate at which commissioners were replaced at Weihaiwei following rendition. While Hsü Tsu-shan served for only a little over three years, his successor, Hsü Tung-fan, left after less than two and a half, ostensibly due to illness. British sources note, however, that the primary reason for replacing the latter in May 1936 may have been in order to partially satisfy Governor Han Fu-ch'ü's desire for a larger role at Weihaiwei.<sup>27</sup>

The governor's struggles with the Nanking authorities and with Chiang K'ai-shek in particular for greater control of Shantung's resources in the 1930s are well known.<sup>28</sup> Perhaps less well known is the fact that after ousting the warlord Liu Chen-nien from his satrapy in neighboring Chefoo in late 1932, Han was said to have turned his attention to Tsingtao and Weihaiwei, the two special administrative areas in Shantung whose revenues primarily benefited Nanking. In November 1933 when it seemed possible that Hsü Tsu-shan might be removed from office at Weihaiwei, the chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce told the British consul he had heard that Governor Han was "intriguing" for control of the two former leaseholds and that a proposal had even been made to separate Port Edward from its rural hinterland with the latter returning to the administrative jurisdiction of Jung-ch'eng and Wen-teng hsien.<sup>29</sup> This did not occur but Han did ask in 1936 that Weihaiwei be placed under the authority of the provincial government. Although his request was denied by Nanking, it was decided as a compromise to appoint a



provincial official to the post of commissioner.<sup>30</sup> This move was to bring a number of changes in local administrative policy.

As on other occasions when the administration had been replaced, there was at this time considerable apprehension as to what the new regime would mean for Weihaiwei. One observer commented:

The local residents are divided between hopes that the new High Commissioner will display greater zeal in improving local conditions (the roads are disgracefully kept at present) and fears that the well-behaved Marine Garrison, to which they are accustomed, will be replaced by soldiers, who may prove here, as so often elsewhere, a source of untold trouble and expense.<sup>31</sup>

Fortunately for the people of the area, there were no major changes in the garrisoning arrangements at Weihaiwei through 1936 and for a good portion of 1937, nor was there a need to augment the marine forces at this time as neither banditry nor internal disturbances posed a threat to the new regime.<sup>32</sup> There were, however, many other changes in the style of governing which soon led to great dissatisfaction among a wide cross-section of the population.

The new commissioner, Sun Hsi-feng, or Dr. Georges Sun as he was also called, came to Weihaiwei with a considerably less prestigious set of credentials than either of his predecessors. At forty he was relatively young for the post, although as a graduate of a French university he had at least had some experience in dealing with foreigners toward whom he was said to be extremely friendly. Sun's only previous administrative experience as a protégé of Han Fu-ch'ü had been to serve as president of the military court in the provincial government at Tsinan and he soon demonstrated a

strong tendency toward militaristic methods at Weihaiwei.<sup>33</sup>

After only two months one observer summarized his approach and its results as follows:

Dr. Georges Sun has up to the present proved more remarkable for energy than tact. He has antagonised the local gentry, who are of a conservative and bucolic temperament, by his disregard of their opinions, his ultra-drastic treatment of venial gambling and drug-taking offences and his openly expressed dislike of the unsystematic methods of administration which he found in operation at the time of his arrival. The popular sentiment of the moment is an ardent hope that his energy and zeal for reform will lead him into some major indiscretion, which will bring about his downfall.<sup>34</sup>

It should be noted that Commissioner Sun was in most matters acting under direct orders from Han Fu-ch'ü with whom he kept in constant touch. The severe penalties meted out for gambling and drug violations, including public floggings of both male and female petty offenders and the imposition of heavy fines on persons of means, reflected the governor's own well-known attitudes on questions of public morality.<sup>35</sup> So intensive was the campaign at Weihaiwei against drug-taking that by the end of March 1937 it was reported there had been 19 executions, 650 cases dealt with by the court, and 700 people cured of their addiction. Anti-opium posters were widely distributed throughout the area and many public meetings were held to warn people of the punishments they would face if they violated the law. The commissioner himself toured the countryside and delivered lectures on the subject in all the larger villages.<sup>36</sup>

Helping Sun Hsi-feng to implement all of the policy changes at Weihaiwei was an entirely new staff of department heads.<sup>37</sup> Perhaps it was felt by this administration that

with so many other "reforms" coming into effect it was also a good time to tighten up the system of labor conscription for carrying out road work. According to this program, each household was to provide one man for every five family members as needed by the government. The result was some improvement in local roads, although it was noted that such an unpaid "volunteer" labor force was not very careful in its work and repairs tended to be "slipshod."<sup>38</sup>

The new commissioner also desired reforms in the administration of Weihaiwei's land taxes which were still charged at 1921 British rates and were largely based on long out-of-date Ch'ing registers. Since the land taxes were considered quite low in the former leasehold, there must have been some alarm among local residents that any change in the status quo could only bring higher taxes. Nevertheless, the government proceeded to train an entire team of land surveyors chosen from the middle school with the intention of remeasuring all titled land and recertifying all deeds of ownership under the supervision of village headmen. One British observer remarked that the administration seemed unaware of the difficulties it was about to encounter with this project, including long-standing boundary disputes, questions of inheritance rights, and many other extremely complicated matters.<sup>39</sup> Given the chronic shortage of funds, however, it may have been that the government did not mind facing these problems knowing that it would in the end probably bring in additional revenue. It must also be said that Sun's new regime did manage to show a surplus in its budgets for 1936 and 1937 without a subsidy, largely through drastic cuts in the salaries of government employees.<sup>40</sup>

The tax registers were not the only item to come up

for closer scrutiny. The Public Safety Bureau also carried out a census in order to help detect "undesirables" among the local population. Included in this category, no doubt, would have been persons either unknown to local residents with no fixed address, or those regarded as potential trouble-makers for one reason or another. Other police measures included the removal of stray dogs, the control of patent medicines, the inspection of goods hawked on the streets, the examination of well-water, and the licensing of barbers and doctors.<sup>41</sup>

The atmosphere of increased regimentation at Weihaiwei also extended to government employees who were ordered in December 1936 to do a certain amount of calisthenics and drill work each week. This policy was probably copied from Han Fu-ch'ü's similar program for all government workers in Tsinan.<sup>42</sup> Weihaiwei's government clerks found a good deal more of their time taken up in 1936 with the onerous task of registering all of the area's eligible voters and then counting ballots in an election for a delegate to the national congress. The electoral machinery for this purpose was so complicated that even the commissioner considered the project a complete waste of his staff's time.<sup>43</sup>

Other government measures which were no doubt of much greater long-term importance to Weihaiwei's residents were in the area of education. As had the two previous Chinese administrations, Sun Hsi-feng's regime placed special emphasis on improving school facilities and ensuring that more people, children and adults alike, made use of them. By September 1936 it was reported that twenty-six new primary schools and a library had been opened and that another summer session has been held for 260 male primary teachers.<sup>44</sup>

Not surprisingly, given the keen interest of both Han Fu-ch'ü and the Nanking authorities in physical fitness at this time,<sup>45</sup> the main focus of attention during the summer school was on athletics. One British observer felt that the attention given to military drill in Weihaiwei's primary schools was "amateurish" and "useless," but that the encouragement of sports and games was of definite value and was enthusiastically received by local people.<sup>46</sup> They were a good deal less enthusiastic in 1937, however, when some of the boys attending Weihaiwei's schools were conscripted for military training at Tsinan.<sup>47</sup>

In addition to raising educational standards, Commissioner Sun's government was also eager to improve the quality of local agricultural products and hopefully thereby increase market demand for them. One problem which was brought to the commissioner's attention by the Chamber of Commerce concerned recurring complaints of ground nut dealers that some rural producers were soaking their output with water before selling it in order to increase its weight and their profit. Ultimately, of course, the dealers were left with a product which had to be dried before reshipment and was thus more expensive. If allowed to continue, this practice would cause considerable damage to the reputation of the entire nut industry at Weihaiwei. The government, therefore, decided to assign police the duty of inspecting nuts before they were sold and of returning any wet ones to the producer. Repeat offenders were to be fined.<sup>48</sup> In a related move, fruit growers were strongly urged to spray their crops in order to improve their quality but this measure proved too expensive for the area's small growers to adopt. As so many

earlier administrators, Chinese and British alike, had recommended, this regime too hoped to further develop scrub-oak silkworm production and to expand the variety of seafood products exported from Weihaiwei.<sup>49</sup> In the end, however, Sun Hsi-feng's government was in office for too short a time to realize very many of its objectives.

One great commercial hope, the tourist trade, proved especially disappointing. It was reported in the spring of 1937 that Weihaiwei's mainland hotels could only depend on a profitable working period of two months per year where formerly this had extended to four months. The reasons given for the change were improved living conditions in Shanghai and Hankow from which many foreign tourists had once been drawn, as well as the general tightness of money in China. Nor did prospects for the future look very promising, as noted in the following comment: "It is doubtful whether, when money becomes easier, the old habits will return, as visitors have learnt to expect more from a holiday resort than Weihaiwei can provide, and have found out that health does not require the longer change of air."<sup>50</sup> It seems unlikely that such an unpopular commissioner as Sun Hsi-feng could have eventually led the people of Weihaiwei into more prosperous times even if economic circumstances had been more favorable. In late 1937, however, events quite beyond his control were dramatically to bring about the demise of his regime and the beginning of one of Weihaiwei's most unhappy periods.

The Japanese Occupation of Weihaiwei

After the Marco Polo Bridge incident near Peking in July 1937 Japanese forces began to move on a number of fronts in China and it appeared that the nation would soon face full-scale invasion. Although Shantung remained mysteriously unmolested until very late in 1937, perhaps due to a secret arrangement negotiated by Governor Han Fu-ch'ü,<sup>51</sup> preparations were nevertheless being made at Weihaiwei for a possible Japanese attack during the summer of that year. In spite of objections from both the foreign community and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Commissioner Sun called for and received a brigade of provincial troops, ostensibly to save face whenever the Japanese decided to take the port. One British commentator, however, observed that these soldiers also helped to free Weihaiwei, and its government, from complete dependence on the Chinese navy for its defence. Since Sun was frequently at odds with the local naval commander, he probably had good reason to doubt the personal loyalty of his men should an emergency arise. In any event, by September the navy had withdrawn its remaining marines to Liukung Island,<sup>52</sup> and it appeared that Weihaiwei would have to rely on other forces for its security.

Some advance preparation for this situation had already been made during the summer months as six hundred local men were conscripted at Port Edward and given military training by instructors from Tsinan. From October to December a further five hundred were trained and the entire force, as with similar groups elsewhere, was known as the Peace Preservation Corps (Pao-an Tui).<sup>53</sup>

After the fall of Nanking on 12 December 1937, and

Han Fu-ch'ü's retreat from Tsinan in the face of advancing Japanese troops, the people of Weihaiwei began to brace themselves for the inevitable enemy attack. It was widely expected that Commissioner Sun and his staff would flee at the earliest possible opportunity. There was some hope, however, that the chief of police, Lieutenant-Colonel Cheng Wei-p'ing, who was not on good terms with Sun, might remain behind with his two hundred armed police, all residents of Weihaiwei, to assist in the event of Japanese occupation.<sup>54</sup> At this time, Admiral Shen Hung-lieh had ordered the destruction of Japanese property at Tsingtao as well as part of the city's harbor and public service facilities and no cables were being accepted at the Weihaiwei telegraph office for despatch there. The telegraph wires to Chefoo had also been cut in November and Weihaiwei was virtually dependent on British coastal steamers and radio for any communication with the outside world.<sup>55</sup>

The general collapse of the central government was further evidenced locally by the mutiny in January 1938 of three hundred salt revenue guards stationed at various points along the promontory coastline. The majority of these men then marched into the interior, reportedly to form anti-Japanese guerrilla units. Others came into Port Edward to extract funds from the salt administration office and some became common criminals, murdering and robbing local villagers or forcing them to loot the salt pans. Conditions in Weihaiwei's border areas became particularly dangerous as over two thousand armed men, consisting of either former soldiers turned guerrillas or bandits, were said to be in hiding there.<sup>56</sup>



Given this alarming situation and distrusting the Chinese commissioner's intentions and commitment to the people of Weihaiwei, members of the Chamber of Commerce soon found themselves thrown into a difficult new leadership role. Their first response to the emergency was to request British help; both in forming a new committee of local residents to supervise the maintenance of peace and order and to provide a larger naval force to defend the area. The consul responded that he would not approach the Admiralty for additional help unless he was convinced that local authorities were completely unable to discharge what he considered to be "a purely Chinese responsibility."<sup>57</sup> In the meantime, however, the Chamber of Commerce was able to come to an agreement with a Chinese marine commander in the area that, if paid, his 250 men would assist Weihaiwei's police force.

Commissioner Sun's reaction to the crisis consisted mainly of measures to ensure his own personal safety and an escape route from Weihaiwei well before the Japanese arrival. Upon receiving orders, ostensibly from Han Fù-ch'ü, on 1 January to resist the enemy, destroy all means of communication, and then withdraw any armed forces from the area, Sun flatly refused to comply, saying that to do so would be "folly" and that the command was probably not from the governor anyway. Instead, he began to pressure local residents to pay all of their annual taxes immediately and to insist that the British allow him to take refuge in the consulate or on a warship. This request was denied by the consul who offered to evacuate him from Port Edward when the Japanese had actually arrived. The commissioner accordingly stepped up the training of the remaining Pao-an Tui forces and made alternative plans.<sup>58</sup>

On 14 January the Chamber of Commerce became suspicious that Sun was about to leave and, fearing a complete breakdown of law and order, made arrangements for their marine force to enter the outskirts of Port Edward. They also guaranteed the police that they would continue to receive their salaries and made a \$3,000 payment to the Pao-an Tui on the understanding that it would disarm and disperse when the commissioner left. The British consul called for a party of sailors to guard the consulate.<sup>59</sup> Two days later on 16 January the commissioner, his brother, and two officials of the finance department made their escape on a Chinese ship bound for Hong Kong, the Pao-an Tui having cleared the streets of Port Edward for them just prior to departure. This latter move was no doubt especially important to Sun as he and his staff took with them all available government funds. His brother, who was the commanding officer of the Pao-an Tui, also pocketed the \$3,000 his men were to have received from the Chamber of Commerce. As a result many of them went on a looting rampage in Wen-teng hsien. Matters became even worse when the magistrates of both Wen-teng and Jung-ch'eng hsien fled to Port Edward with most of their police forces as did many of the remaining salt revenue guards.<sup>60</sup>

Fortunately, in cooperation with the Chinese marines still at Weihaiwei, the local police were able to disarm the more unruly elements among all of these armed men and restore order.<sup>61</sup> Upon the departure of the marine commander soon afterward, his 250 men were reorganized as a "Merchant Volunteer Corps" paid by the Chamber of Commerce.<sup>62</sup> The latter organization was no doubt also the driving force behind a new "Assembly of People's Delegates" formed to temporarily administer Weihaiwei in the absence of any repre-

sentative from the Chinese central government. On 29 January the authorities at Hankow appointed the chief of police, Cheng Wei-p'ing, as acting high commissioner but the assembly was determined to continue functioning under him. For his part, Cheng agreed to work in close consultation with the new group to maintain order until the inevitable arrival of the Japanese. The British consul at this time believed the new assembly to be absolutely essential to the maintenance of peace in Weihaiwei. He also stressed the loyalty of its members to the central government which seems at least questionable given their determination to continue functioning in spite of Cheng's appointment to the post of commissioner. Having experienced so much trouble at the hands of previous officials, local leaders were no doubt eager to have a say in administration at such a critical time.<sup>63</sup> Their anxieties were intensified even further when news arrived that Chefoo had been occupied by the Japanese on 3 February.<sup>64</sup>

Several emergency meetings were soon held at the British consulate which included the acting commissioner, the executive committee of the people's assembly, and Captain Chang Chu-ts'ai, a member of the former marine garrison at Weihaiwei. Captain Chang, who was married to a Japanese, volunteered to negotiate personally with the enemy at the border in order to ensure a peaceful occupation. It was also decided to rename the people's assembly the "Peace Maintenance Commission" and to move the Merchant Volunteer Corps away from the Chefoo Road along which Japanese troops would certainly approach the area. Captain Chang and the acting commissioner, however, were both concerned that the presence of at least one thousand armed bandits and self-

styled guerrillas in a mountainous region between Chefoo and Weihaiwei could nevertheless give the enemy an excuse for attacking the former leasehold. The acting commissioner, therefore, worked out a special agreement with various bandit leaders that they would not invade until after the transfer of control had been effected.<sup>65</sup>

One serious problem which developed as soon as actual negotiations began to take place between the Japanese naval authorities and some of those participating in the meetings mentioned above was the eruption of considerable hostility directed at the latter by many of the local population. Former teachers at the now closed Government Middle School who had previously staged anti-Japanese protests, some junior staff members of the former administration, and even some policemen threatened to execute as traitors Captain Chang, members of the Chamber of Commerce, and any others who had dealings with the enemy.<sup>66</sup>

The acting commissioner, Cheng Wei-p'ing, in a show of patriotism attempted to persuade the police force to cooperate with him in making a stand against the Japanese, then kidnapping the wealthy merchants, and fleeing to the mountains to join the guerrilla forces there. Not surprisingly, many members of the Chamber of Commerce chose this time to escape to Liu-kung Island and then tried to enlist the security services of those in the police force who were opposed to Cheng's plan. It became nearly impossible under these circumstances to even convene a meeting of the Peace Maintenance Commission to make further contingency plans for the occupation. Captain Chang, in the meantime, decided that as he was not a local man and as no one had the courage

to support him any longer his best course of action was to depart which he did by steamer on 22 February along with two hundred other residents of the area.<sup>67</sup>

In the few remaining weeks before the Japanese took Weihaiwei conditions continued to deteriorate. The acting commissioner, Cheng, who also served as chief of police, found himself with almost no support among community leaders. The few wealthy men of Weihaiwei were seriously considering leaving before the Japanese moved in and the Peace Maintenance Commission was meeting only sporadically and in secret. Meanwhile, the entire police force was said to be demoralized and the attitude of the Merchant Volunteer Corps uncertain.<sup>68</sup> On 3 March, however, just five days before the arrival of Japanese troops, it became quite clear that the people of Weihaiwei could not depend on the latter group to protect them. On that day a mutiny took place in which the commanding officer of the corps was shot and wounded in the presence of his own officers who then led the entire force out of Port Edward, it was said, to join a bandit gang camped only thirteen miles away.<sup>69</sup>

Fearing that he would be labeled a traitor if he remained at Weihaiwei, Acting Commissioner Cheng finally decided just prior to the Japanese arrival to lead the remaining security forces out of Port Edward to join guerrilla groups. At the same time, he took along all communications equipment which could be used by the enemy. The British consul praised Cheng highly for his handling of this difficult situation and noted that by leaving at the last moment he prevented much of the looting which might otherwise have occurred.<sup>70</sup> On 7 March Japanese ships arrived in Weihaiwei

harbor and seaplanes began dropping leaflets which suggested the occupation would be peaceful as long as the Chinese offered no resistance. And the next day as four hundred marines came ashore that was exactly what they encountered.<sup>71</sup>

Not surprisingly, given the presence of so many armed men in the surrounding countryside, however, the peace was not to last for long. On 12 March the first guerrilla raid into Port Edward took place with about three hundred men from the Weihaiwei police force and Merchant Volunteer Corps participating. The plan was for a fire to be set at the power station followed by a larger attack on the town. Unfortunately, the first group was discovered at the power plant with the loss of around thirty men. The Japanese responded the next day by landing one hundred additional marines ashore and by bombing villages in the northwest and southwest foothills around the town. This pattern was repeated following a second guerrilla raid on 16 March in which sentry posts were attacked and the Japanese suffered a number of casualties.<sup>72</sup> The occupying army at first made no attempt to penetrate further into the territory than Port Edward itself, the outskirts of which were not even under its control. They preferred instead to send daily search parties out into the villages to carry out reprisals. When the Chinese destroyed bridges over the roads on which they traveled, the Japanese responded by executing a headman and eight villagers.<sup>73</sup>

As was the case in so many other parts of China, the new conquerors of Weihaiwei found it impossible to get any local residents to accept office in their regime. Thus, on 23 March seventeen Chinese officials and forty armed police

were sent to Port Edward by the puppet administration at Chefoo.<sup>74</sup> Theirs was certainly not an enviable task. As one observer remarked at the end of March:

Not since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 can this district have suffered such misery as has overwhelmed it during the past six months. The fishermen are starving, most local industries are moribund or dead, the cost of living rises from week to week, and only the export of ground nuts brings any money into the territory.<sup>75</sup>

Perhaps the saddest fact of all was that these conditions were not to show much improvement until 1945.

Notes to Chapter 9

<sup>1</sup>FO 371/18092, Moss to Ingram, 20 January and 3 February 1934.

<sup>2</sup>Who's Who in China (1931 ed.), pp. 168-9.

<sup>3</sup>FO 371/18080, Weihaiwei Political Report for March Quarter 1934. See also, FO 371/18129, Moss to Cadogan, 20 March 1934; and FO 371/18092, Blunt to Lampson, 23 November 1933.

<sup>4</sup>FO 371/18080, Weihaiwei Political Report for March Quarter 1934.

<sup>5</sup>FO 371/18092, Moss to Ingram, 20 January 1934.

<sup>6</sup>FO 371/18081, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1934.

<sup>7</sup>FO 371/18129, Moss to Cadogan, 20 March 1934. A British official serving in Nanking observed of Hsu Tung-fan that he was a man of "private means" interested in Chinese literature and paintings who had also published several articles on the Shantung question. See FO 371/18092, Blunt to Lampson, 23 November 1933.

<sup>8</sup>FO 371/18092, Moss to Lampson, 11 December 1933.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>FO 371/18092, Moss to Ingram, 20 January 1934. The salt guard was later found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. See *ibid.*, 3 February 1934.

<sup>11</sup>FO 371/18083, Weihaiwei Political Report for September Quarter 1934; and FO 371/18084, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1934. It is impossible to know if the salt riots were in any way the reason for the introduction of the pao-chia system to Weihaiwei in 1933 or if it was simply part of the central government's effort to suppress Communist activities. See FO 371/18081, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1934; and Lockhart Papers, Box 1, "Notes on Weihaiwei."

<sup>12</sup>Ibid. See also, FO 371/19301, Weihaiwei Political Report for December Quarter 1934.

<sup>13</sup>FO 371/18082, Weihaiwei Political Report for June Quarter 1934. In April 1934, for example, it was reported that the government had managed to repair both of the area's piers and to open a new market place in Port Edward with seventy-two stalls. See FO 371/18081, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1934.

<sup>14</sup>FO 371/18084, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1934.

<sup>15</sup>FO 371/19302, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1935.



<sup>16</sup>FO 371/19304, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1935.

<sup>17</sup>FO 371/18084, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1934.

<sup>18</sup>FO 371/18081, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1934.

<sup>19</sup>FO 371/19302, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1935.

<sup>20</sup>FO 371/19304, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1935.

<sup>21</sup>FO 371/18092, Moss to Cadogan, 17 March 1934. This document also includes a translation of an official statement from the new Weihaiwei branch of the Chinese Seamen's Union published in the Huang-hai ch'ao-pao of 11 March 1934 concerning the organization's regulations and objectives. The local tang-pu had earlier established a Wharf Coolies Union and a Junk Seamen's Union at Weihaiwei but was refused permission to organize a peasants' union by the former commissioner, Hsü Tsu-shan. See FO 371/16189, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending March 1932.

<sup>22</sup>Lockhart Papers, Vol. 6, Moss to Lockhart, 22 March 1934. See also, FO 371/19304, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1935. In his letter to former British Commissioner Lockhart, Consul Moss also criticized Hsü Tung-fan for constructing new flower gardens and tennis courts to embellish his headquarters at Government House.

<sup>23</sup>FO 371/19288, Ogden to Department of Overseas Trade, 18 October 1935. See also, Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China (New York, 1970), p. 664.

<sup>24</sup>FO 371/19302, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1935.

<sup>25</sup>FO 371/19304, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1935.

<sup>26</sup>FO 371/18129, Moss to Lampson, 12 December 1933; Moss to Ingram, 18 December 1933 and 12 January 1934. These documents also provide information on the issue of land leases for foreigners which arose at the end of Hsü Tsu-shan's administration in 1933 and was taken up by the new commissioner in 1934. Although the British consul, Moss, was eager to secure perpetual leases for any land purchased by foreigners after rendition, both Chinese commissioners argued that they could only grant leases for definite fixed periods in accordance with the policy of their central government in other voluntarily opened ports. In the end, the Minister of Foreign Affairs ruled that such leases could be issued to foreigners purchasing land in the Port Edward area only, and initially for twenty years with the option for two renewals of the same duration. See *ibid.* and also Moss to Cadogan, 20 March 1934; Cadogan to Foreign Office, 6 April 1934; and Orde to Cadogan, 14 June 1934.

<sup>27</sup>FO 371/20254, Weihaiwei Political Report for March Quarter 1936.

<sup>28</sup>See, for example, Buck, Urban Change, pp. 165-70.

<sup>29</sup>FO 371/18092, Moss to Lampson, 14 November 1933. It is interesting that the chairman of Weihaiwei's Chamber of Commerce, Sun Hsin-t'ien, was strongly opposed to the idea of Han Fu-ch'u taking over the former leasehold. In his view, this would lead to a much larger military presence in the area, inevitable friction with the Chinese navy, and arbitrary taxation. He also observed that while the navy dreaded the possibility of Han's takeover, it was too unsure of its own position to oppose him. Weihaiwei's revenue was also regarded as insufficient to maintain a sound administration, while its location placed it too far away from the navy's main base at Tsingtao.

<sup>30</sup>FO 371/20254, Weihaiwei Political Report for March Quarter 1936.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>FO 371/20255, Weihaiwei Political Report for June Quarter 1936; FO 371/20256, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1936; and FO 371/20983, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1937.

<sup>33</sup>FO 371/20254, Weihaiwei Political Report for March Quarter 1936; FO 371/20255, Weihaiwei Political Report for June Quarter 1936.

<sup>34</sup>FO 371/20255, Weihaiwei Political Report for June Quarter 1936. Unfortunately, the only biographical information I was able to locate on Commissioner Sun was in British documents, perhaps in itself indicating that his career was less than a distinguished one.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid. and FO 676/396, Burdett to Peking, 5 January 1938. Regarding Governor Han's views and administrative policies, see Buck, Urban Change, pp. 172 and 174. Commissioner Sun's eagerness to please the governor was demonstrated in mid-1936 when he spent \$3,000 to entertain several hundred of his military officers who had been invited to visit Weihaiwei. See FO 371/20255, Weihaiwei Political Report for June Quarter 1936.

<sup>36</sup>FO 371/20256, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1936; and FO 371/20983, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 March 1937. It should perhaps be remembered that the penalties imposed by Sun's regime at Weihaiwei were a sharp contrast to those employed in previous years by the British for similar offenses.

<sup>37</sup>These included a new chief of police, chief secretary, secretary to government, chief of financial department, chief of public works department, superintendent of the civil hospital, and judge of the law court. See FO 371/20256, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1936.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid. See also, FO 371/20254, Weihaiwei and Chefoo Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1936; and FO 371/20983, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1937.

<sup>39</sup>FO 371/20256, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1936.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid. See also, FO 371/20983, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1937.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Buck, Urban Change, p. 174.

<sup>43</sup>FO 371/20256, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1936. One of the reasons this task was so time-consuming was that an entirely new system of electoral machinery had to be specially created for this occasion. Thus, the clerks were kept busy "morning and night," first registering voters and then counting the votes.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>The "New Life Movement" initiated by the central government in 1934, in addition to stressing traditional moral values, gave considerable attention to hygienic practices and the encouragement of physical education, especially military training, as means of revitalizing China and counter-acting Japanese aggression. See Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, p. 668. The influence of New Life Movement ideas can be seen in such activities as a baby show sponsored by the new Public Educational Institute in May 1936. The three hundred entrants were judged on such things as "physique, manners, cleanliness, and the like." Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>FO 371/20256, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 30 September 1936. The consul found bugle-blowing classes in local schools particularly objectionable. See FO 371/20983, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1937.

<sup>47</sup>FO 371/20983, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1937.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>For a discussion of Han's maneuvering at this time, see Buck, Urban Change, pp. 181-5. See also, FO 371/20985, Chefoo Political Report for September Quarter 1937.

<sup>52</sup>FO 371/20985, Weihaiwei Political Report for September Quarter 1937. See also, FO 371/22128, Burdett to Peking, 21 December 1937; and FO 676/396, Burdett to Peking, 5 January 1938.

<sup>53</sup>FO 371/22129, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1938.

<sup>54</sup>FO 371/22128, Burdett to Peking, 21 December 1937.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

<sup>56</sup>FO 371/22129, Weihaiwei Intelligence Report for Half Year Ending 31 March 1938; and FO 371/22154, Burdett to Peking, 20 January 1938.

<sup>57</sup>FO 676/396, Burdett to Peking, 5 January 1938; and FO 371/22154, Burdett to Peking, 20 January 1938.

<sup>58</sup>FO 676/396, Burdett to Peking, 5 January 1938.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid. and FO 371/22154, Burdett to Peking, 20 January 1938.

<sup>60</sup>FO 371/22154, Burdett to Peking, 20 January 1938.

<sup>61</sup>FO 371/22042, Cable, Burdett to Peking, 19 January 1938.

<sup>62</sup>WO 196/5352, Weihaiwei Political Report for March Quarter 1938. The British consul had been told on 18 January in strictest confidence by the marine commander that his orders from Admiral Shen Hung-lieh, in spite of instructions from the central authorities to offer strong resistance to the invading Japanese, were to use his own discretion in this matter, and then to escape into the interior to conduct guerrilla warfare. See *ibid*.

<sup>63</sup>FO 371/22043, Cable, Howe to Foreign Office, 2 February 1938; FO 676/396, Burdett to Peking, 15 February 1938; and WO 106/5352, Weihaiwei Political Report for March Quarter 1938.

<sup>64</sup>FO 371/22043, Cable, Howe to Foreign Office, 8 February 1938.

<sup>65</sup>FO 676/396, Burdett to Peking, 15 February 1938.

<sup>66</sup>FO 371/22154, Burdett to Shanghai, 4 March 1938. The consul noted that most of the teachers were not natives of Weihaiwei and he felt that, in spite of their loud protests, they would probably not stay to fight but rather flee the area at the first opportunity. The threats from these people were viewed with special alarm since some "traitors" from the nearby Mou-p'ing region had already been executed for collaborating with the enemy under similar circumstances. See *ibid*.

<sup>67</sup>FO 371/22154, Burdett to Shanghai, 4 March 1938.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid.

<sup>69</sup>FO 371/22043, Cable, Burdett to Shanghai, 5 March 1938.

<sup>70</sup>FO 371/22154, Burdett to Shanghai, 8 March 1938;  
and FO 371/22129, Burdett to Shanghai, 29 March 1938.

<sup>71</sup>FO 371/22043, Cable, Burdett to Shanghai, 8 March 1938; and WO 106/5352, Weihaiwei Political Report for March Quarter 1938.

<sup>72</sup>FO 371/22154, Burdett to Shanghai, 8 March 1938;  
and WO 106/5376, Intelligence Report from H.M.S. Capetown  
to Admiralty, 20 April 1938.

<sup>73</sup>WO 196/5376, Intelligence Report from H.M.S. Capetown  
to Admiralty, 20 April 1938. British naval staff were distinctly unimpressed with the officer in command of Japanese landing forces at Weihaiwei, who was said to be a "rough-looking individual" who spoke no English and was extremely anti-British.

<sup>74</sup>FO 371/22129, Burdett to Shanghai, 29 March 1938;  
and WO 106/5352, Weihaiwei Political Report for March Quarter 1938.

<sup>75</sup>FO 371/22129, Burdett to Shanghai, 25 March 1938.

### Conclusion

Weihaiwei's much-heralded return to Chinese control lasted only a little over seven years, from late 1930 to early 1938, after which the residents of the former leasehold found themselves once again subject to the dictates of a foreign power. The long wartime occupation of Weihaiwei was, by all accounts, a period of extreme deprivation with trade disrupted, food costly and in short supply, and continual fighting in the nearby rural areas between Japanese and guerrilla forces. Nor did the hardships end in 1945, for war with Japan was immediately followed by a long and bloody civil conflict between Communist and Nationalist forces. During these years the relatively tranquil days of British rule must have indeed seemed a thing of the far distant past for the people of Weihaiwei.

Since the officials appointed by Nanking in the post-rendition era had such a limited time in which to administer the area, it may in some respects be unfair to compare their experiences with those of the British who governed for thirty-two years. And yet because the British had chosen to rely largely on traditional institutions at Weihaiwei rather than to institute far-reaching changes there, it is possible with such a comparison to highlight the difficulties which faced so many Chinese administrators in rural areas throughout the country in the 1930s.

Those in official circles, in academic communities, and in private agencies in China at this time showed great interest in the problem of defining and implementing "good government" at the local level.<sup>1</sup> Within these groups there was a strong conviction that the vast majority of the Chinese

population, the rural masses, needed to identify their interests much more closely with those of the central government if the nation was to solve its enormous economic and social problems and at the same time become a more unified political entity. The notion of local self-government, or ti-fang tzu-chih, was seen by politicians and intellectuals alike as the key to resolving many of these difficulties, especially as a means of eliminating the mistrust Chinese peasants often felt toward the state and its officials.

When Hsü Tsu-shan succeeded Reginald Johnston as high commissioner at Weihaiwei he was eager to prove that the Chinese could manage their own affairs by making the former leasehold a model of prosperity and sound administration. It is clear from the lengthy reports he prepared for his superiors at Nanking, however, that he recognized the impossibility of implementing national regulations on such matters as self-government without considerable attention to local conditions. Weihaiwei was in his view a "backward" and somewhat neglected area as a result of the "minimalist" policies of its former foreign rulers. He found it difficult, for example, to locate enough "qualified" people, either in terms of literacy or experience, to take on the roles of ch'ü-chang or fang-chang as required by law.<sup>2</sup> The government, therefore, first established training centers for ch'ü-chang candidates who had been recommended by former district headmen. As has been mentioned, it was only after successfully completing an entrance examination, three months of training, and a final examination that these people were to be considered eligible to be ch'ü-chang.<sup>3</sup> There were special requirements for those wishing to become fang-chang as well.

One question which arises at this point is if local people were as unprepared for the task of self-government as Hsü and the authorities in Nanking believed, how had the British managed to run their administration for over thirty years by relying so heavily upon them? Hsü himself, in fact, was clearly of two minds on this issue. In explaining why it was necessary to retain the village headman system alongside the new self-government structure, he noted that it suited Weihaiwei's geographical distribution of villages and had functioned well in the past as a simple and inexpensive method of maintaining order at the local level.<sup>4</sup> While recognizing the merits of this traditional institution and, no doubt, the political difficulties which could arise if he were suddenly to remove it, Hsü was also compelled by law to establish a new and more modern system for the promotion of self-government. He remarked that the British had, after all, retained the village headmen as a matter of convenience and that they had not been interested in stimulating mass participation in government.<sup>5</sup>

One can certainly agree with Hsü that economic efficiency, simplicity, and a minimum of political disruption were high among British priorities in administering the leasehold of Weihaiwei. What he perhaps did not realize, however, was that colonial administrators such as James Stewart Lockhart and Reginald Johnston took a conservative approach to governing the Territory in part because they personally valued much about the Chinese social and political tradition.

They were especially impressed by the degree to which villagers at Weihaiwei succeeded in managing their own affairs.



As Commissioner Lockhart remarked in 1904: "Regarded impartially from an administrative point of view, the Chinaman is a most desirable person to govern for being a great believer in home rule, his chief desire is to be left alone to govern himself and his family."<sup>6</sup> Another British observer even described Weihaiwei's villages as "self-contained republics" and added:

Nearly every man has his few acres of arable land and his share in the common pasture land; everyone is responsible to someone else for his correct behaviour, and all owe some obedience to the elders of his house or the village headman or ts'un-tung. . . . There is then a clear sense of mutual responsibility, and a general obligation to cooperate for common ends.<sup>7</sup>

So strong was this sense of mutual responsibility within both families and villages that there was a remarkable absence of serious crime at Weihaiwei. The British, therefore, saw no need to station large numbers of security forces in the countryside, but preferred to rely primarily on village headmen to police their respective areas as they had traditionally done.

British admiration for Chinese methods of local government took them beyond mere dependence upon village headmen, however. What Lockhart and Johnston consistently attempted to do at Weihaiwei was to model their own behavior on that of a conscientious hsien magistrate who was supposed to be nothing less than a fu-mu kuan, or "father and mother official," to those entrusted to his care. Such an intimate, familial relationship implied wide-ranging moral obligations on the part of the magistrate and not simply the maintenance of peace or the collection of taxes. In ideal circumstances, the end result was the achievement of mutual trust and respect

between the official and his subjects. It is, therefore, to the credit of British commissioners at Weihaiwei that local people appear to have accorded them both the title and the respect due only to a Chinese fu-mu kuan in the full sense of the term.

Officials in Nanking in 1930, however, regarded such traditional concepts and institutions as outmoded at best and at worst as obstacles in the task of stimulating local people to identify their interests with those of the nation as a whole and to participate more actively in true "self-government." Unfortunately, as the Weihaiwei case so vividly demonstrates, it was the tendency of these same officials to think that these tasks could be accomplished by official command from above operating through a multi-layered bureaucratic structure at the sub-hsien level.<sup>8</sup>

The establishment of this complicated system took considerable time and effort on the part of a rather large administrative staff working with local people, as has been shown. In the end, however, the lines of authority within the system remained confused and there were numerous complaints from villagers that government representatives of one sort or another were "interfering" too much in their daily lives. At this stage at least they did not view their increased contact with officialdom or their new self-government agencies as providing them a larger voice in managing their own affairs. There was, on the contrary, a good deal of resentment that the new system was resulting in far greater control over the individual, which of course it was. Many of the registration and surveying procedures undertaken by the government were designed to place strong pressure on

villagers to participate in their modernization programs and to facilitate security by identifying "undesirables" in the community.

It is obvious from this discussion that the British and Chinese administrators at Weihaiwei held widely differing views as to their ultimate objectives in governing the area. The British had originally leased the territory for a limited time period, primarily as a counterpoise to Russian and German maneuvers in north China. Initial plans to fortify the area were soon abandoned and it was reclassified as a "flying naval base" to be used only as a training ground, sanatorium, and recreation center for the fleet. Any possibility of large-scale commercial development had been eliminated with the promise given to Germany in 1898 that there would be no railroad built to connect Weihaiwei with its hinterland. Furthermore, the area was only a leasehold and not a colony. Its residents were Chinese, not British subjects, and there was always the underlying assumption that someday Weihaiwei would return to Chinese jurisdiction. In short, the British commissioners who served there were acting as temporary caretakers only whose function was not to make the territory more like Britain, or to "modernize" it, but simply to govern in as efficient and inexpensive a manner as possible.

Commissioner Hsü Tsu-shan and the officials who followed him had a much larger task on their hands. Weihaiwei was to be assimilated into a political entity still itself in the process of construction, namely the modern Chinese nation-state. More than this, however, it was also intended that the former foreign leasehold would become a shining

example of economic prosperity and social harmony under the enlightened leadership of its Kuomintang administrators. And it must be said that the first two groups of officials in the post-rendition era, under Hsü Tsu-shan and Hsü Tung-fan, were well-trained and highly motivated civil servants. The Nanking regime was no doubt anxious to ensure that a territory so recently under foreign control should have an especially competent local government qualified both to handle the area's unique problems and to bolster the image of Chinese officialdom in general. Yet, even with this advantage at a time when such personnel were in short supply, the government's hopes for Weihaiwei were not fulfilled. Why?

One of the most striking differences between the British commissioners and their Chinese counterparts was the freedom of the former in decision-making. The British official was at liberty to make policy choices for the area, after consultation with his staff and various leading representatives of the Chinese community, based on local conditions and within his financial limitations. There was little interference from the Colonial Office in far-away London or from other British officials in China. As we have seen, however, the Chinese commissioners who served at Weihaiwei were required to consult continually with their superiors in Nanking and then, under Sun Hsi-feng, with those in Tsinan. In many cases the decisions they took were based less on the needs of the people of Weihaiwei than on the needs and attitudes of those at higher levels of government. Hsü Tsu-shan's interminable battles with the Ministry of Finance over matters of taxation constitute a prime example of this problem. The decision to model Weihaiwei's government apparatus on

that of the urban center of Tsingtao is another. Once high-level decisions such as these had been taken it became nearly impossible for subordinate officials to get them modified, inappropriate though they may have been to local conditions. Flexibility in policy-making was often sorely lacking due to authoritarianism in national and provincial bureaucracies.<sup>9</sup>

In Weihaiwei, as elsewhere in Republican China, insecurity of tenure was also a factor in the low quality of local administration during the 1930s.<sup>10</sup> As was mentioned earlier, the long-serving British officials at Weihaiwei had a clear advantage over their Chinese successors in this regard. Considering the nature of the changes which the Nanking regime desired in the former leasehold and the way in which those changes often clashed with the community's traditional customs and practices, the time allotted to its commissioners for implementation seems especially short.

Moreover, in some respects the Nationalist administrators at Weihaiwei enjoyed less authority over the district and its inhabitants than had officials such as Lockhart and Johnston. Neither of them was compelled to compete with representatives from a wide variety of central and provincial government agencies within the territory in the way their successors were. This situation not only weakened the Chinese commissioner's personal authority, but, perhaps even more seriously, deprived him of the largest proportion of locally-raised revenue. The financing of local government thus became ever more uncertain and dependent upon subsidies from the central treasury.<sup>11</sup>

Another enormous difficulty left unresolved at Weihaiwei and throughout Republican China was the uneasy relation-

ship which existed between the party organization and the state. Patrick Cavendish has observed that: "By the end of 1930 Sun Fo was speaking of the 'yamenization' of the [party] branches, which had degenerated, so he claimed, into negative, destructive, and secretive 'super-governments' preying on the administration and confusing the people."<sup>12</sup> We have seen the extent to which lines of authority became confused at Weihaiwei, with party, police, and administrative officials simultaneously issuing orders to self-government offices. Commissioner Hsü Tsu-shan himself ultimately lost out completely to the party activists in his area and was removed from office. One wonders how frequently this sort of power struggle may have occurred in other localities.

It is particularly unfortunate that the Chinese were unable to capitalize on the economic progress which had been made at Weihaiwei under the British. One of the major reasons for this, of course, was their removal of the area's artificial though advantageous duty-free status. The implementation of this policy was part of the price which the former leasehold was forced to pay as it was reintegrated into the Chinese state. In another way, however, both the government and the people of Weihaiwei were simply unlucky that rendition took place at the same time as the effects of a worldwide economic depression were beginning to be felt in China. While one could criticize the Nationalists for establishing an unnecessarily large and expensive bureaucracy at Weihaiwei and for draining the area of locally-raised revenue, it would not be fair to blame them for international circumstances over which they had no control.

In the final analysis the most important measure of success for any government is probably the degree to which it maintains the trust and confidence of those it governs. As has been shown, the British were surprisingly successful in this regard at Weihaiwei, largely due to the efforts of a few individuals who chose to study and adapt themselves, as much as possible, to local customs. As one retiring commissioner observed to his Chinese audience: "So far from it being the case that we have turned you into Englishmen, I am not at all sure that it would not be truer to say that you have turned some of us into Chinese."<sup>13</sup>

Why did the Chinese administrators at Weihaiwei, some of whom were eminently well qualified for their jobs, find it so difficult to establish the same kind of rapport with local people? Part of the problem clearly was the speed with which the Nationalists attempted to implement their reform programs. Equally important, however, was the fact that Weihaiwei's villagers were being asked to support a government which was taxing them at record levels, which was compelling them to provide corvée labor, and which by 1936 was carrying out very severe punishments for what had previously been regarded as minor offenses. Furthermore, many of the officials who arrived following rendition were "outsiders" from distant parts of China "who differed in thought, speech and tradition from the natives."<sup>14</sup>

British administrators, on the other hand, had carefully nurtured an image of the accessible, "caring" official who took a personal interest in the lives of those he governed. It was he who could be depended upon to mediate disputes, distribute relief, reward the virtuous, and punish the wrong-

doer. When one recalls the terms of praise lavished upon these officials by the community after years of continuous service, it is the warmth of the relationship which seems particularly remarkable. Ironically, in attempting to extend formal government to an ever lower level within Weihaiwei's villages, the Nationalist officials of the 1930s appear to have actually distanced themselves from the people. Government was no longer represented by a single authoritative figure but was rather a multiplicity of offices and individuals, who seemed to demand more from local residents than they were able to provide in return.

Among the government's most important demands was the expectation that the people of Weihaiwei would see themselves less as members of a particular lineage or village and more as citizens of China. That quality which Stewart Lockhart so admired in the Chinese villager, the belief in "home rule" for himself and his family, had been regarded by Sun Yat-sen as a major deficiency among his countrymen. It was his great ambition and that of those who followed him to somehow transform an enormous "plate of loose sand" into a strong and cohesive nation-state. To achieve this, however, required a degree of trust and cooperation between the government and its citizens at the local level which, as the history of Weihaiwei in the 1930s perhaps indicates, the Nanking regime was not able to inspire.



## Notes to Conclusion

<sup>1</sup>For a discussion of the rural reform movement of this period, see Guy S. Alitto, "Rural Reconstruction during the Nanking Decade: Confucian Collectivism in Shantung," China Quarterly, no. 66 (June 1976):213-46. See also, Franklin L. Ho, "Rural Economic Reconstruction in China," Nankai Social and Economic Quarterly, 9.2 (July 1936):469-535; and Chang, "A New Government," pp. 239-95.

<sup>2</sup>Hsu, ed., Wei-hai-wei ch'ou-shou, Part III, p. 13; and Wei-hai-wei shou-hui ti-san chou-nien, pp. 3-4.

<sup>3</sup>Hsu, ed., Wei-hai-wei ch'ou-shou, Part III, pp. 16-22; and Wei-hai-wei shou-hui ti-san chou-nien, pp. 3-4.

<sup>4</sup>Hsu, ed., Wei-hai-wei ch'ou-shou, Part I, p. 48; and Wei-hai-wei shou-hui ti-san chou-nien, p. 6.

<sup>5</sup>Hsu, ed., Wei-hai-wei ch'ou-shou, Part III, p. 13.

<sup>6</sup>CO 873/163, Annual Report, 1904.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Guy Alitto argues that it was this notion of self-government which "ultimately prevented the Kuomintang (KMT) from being able to utilize the idea of rural reconstruction." See his "Rural Reconstruction," p. 213.

<sup>9</sup>In fairness to the Nationalists, however, it should be noted that the problem of over-centralization in government decision-making was not new in China. As Ch'ü T'ung-tsu has observed, Ch'ing officials were often prevented by rigid administrative regulations from exercising their personal judgment or initiative. Ch'ü, Local Government, p. 193. It has also been emphasized in a recent study of modernization in China that the Ch'ing regime from the outset was more concerned with maintaining dynastic security through elaborate measures of surveillance than in promoting "the health of rural society." As a result, local officials interested in furthering their careers often displayed more "cynicism and timidity" than vigor and creativity in their response to local problems. See Gilbert Rozman, ed., The Modernization of China (New York and London, 1981), pp. 88-9.

<sup>10</sup>Chang, "A New Government," pp. 290-1.

<sup>11</sup>It must also be remembered, of course, that in spite of many financial handicaps, the Chinese administrators serving at Weihaiwei between 1930 and 1938 were able to carry out some important and long-overdue programs of reform in the area, most notably in the field of mass education. It took a Chinese government with a genuine commitment to change and a stake in Weihaiwei's long-term future to take on this difficult task.

<sup>12</sup>Patrick Cavendish, "The 'New China' of the Kuomintang," in Jack Gray, ed., Modern China's Search for a Political Form (London, 1969), p. 161.

<sup>13</sup>Lockhart Papers, vol. 64, Reginald Johnston's Farewell Speech to District Headmen, 29 September 1930.

<sup>14</sup>Lockhart Papers, Box 1, "Notes on Weihaiwei," p. 6.

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