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THE PASTORAL TRIBES OF NORTHERN KENYA

1800 - 1916

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts a reconstruction of the history of the pastoral tribes of northern Kenya and concentrates largely, though not exclusively on the Somali, the Boran and the Samburu in that order.

The thesis begins with an outline of the pre-colonial situation throughout the area, and then deals systematically with the coastal Somali down to 1909. Later chapters concentrate on the interior - an area known after 1909 as the Northern Frontier District. Here considerable attention is devoted to the problems faced by nomadic tribes living on both sides of an international frontier, having their grazing in one country and their wells in another. However, since the tribes themselves are the focal point of this study, the diplomatic background to border negotiations and wider issues of imperial interest are only considered in so far as they have some bearing on the frontier tribes.

The thesis also tries to trace the impact of the Ethiopians, the Italians and the British in this area, and considers how far this affected the Somali pattern of life. The Somali reaction to colonial rule or to its absence, as the case may be, finally leads to a consideration of the central geographical area around Wajir and Serenli. Here the whole problem of the Somali migration westwards is considered. The sack of Serenli in 1916 provides a fitting end to a period that was often turbulent and always characterised by an administration that was overconfident in itself.
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There are two basic problems inherent in a historical study of the nomadic peoples of northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia and Somalia. Perhaps the more obvious is the difficulty in finding adequate source material, for this is scattered in small quantities over a wide area. And, although much of this thesis is based on material to be found in the Public Record Office of London, I have also made considerable use of the archives of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome and of the National Archives in Nairobi. At the same time I have consulted a number of other sources: American Zanzibar Consular Records occasionally proved useful, as did certain documents in the India Office and Swedish Missionary correspondence from a Lutheran station at Kismayu. Certain papers deposited at Rhodes House were particularly valuable as were private papers lent to me by friends.

On the other hand, the political situation in the Northern Frontier Province of Kenya, when this thesis was being prepared, made it impossible for me to collect oral tradition on the spot. This work is therefore based on material already collected and recorded by others, and I recognise that as a result my insight into the attitudes and experiences of these pastoral tribes is limited to a greater extent than might otherwise have been expected, had prolonged personal contact with the people been possible.
The second difficulty lies in the actual reconstruction of the historical past itself. The near annihilation of once important nineteenth century peoples in this area, such as the Laikipiak Masai and the Wardai Galla, has resulted in an atrophy of their traditions. Moreover, the extremely small size of political decision-making units amongst all these acephalous peoples, as well as their fragmented and small-scale social organisation, poses a problem of its own which the source material does little to alleviate. These two problems taken together inevitably impose severe restrictions on the sort of answers one can give to those analytical questions that every historian is likely to ask.

This study was made possible in the first place by a grant from the Central Research Fund of London University for which I am particularly grateful, and this enabled me to travel to Kenya and Italy. I must thank the chief Archivist at Nairobi, Mr. N. Fedha, for his assistance in finding material and also the staff of the Colonial and Foreign Office Libraries in London who were good enough to allow me to make use of Confidential Prints in their possession as well as of official publications unobtainable elsewhere. I am most grateful for the permission I was given to consult the Africa Collection at Rhodes House, and also for access to the Library of the Royal Geographical Society at Rome which was extremely valuable.

I have to thank numerous individuals for their kind help, their advice or their criticism. I wish to express particular thanks
to the following: Dr. Andrewejski, Professor Bennett, Dr. Richard Gray, Sir John Grey, Sir Vincent Glenday, Professor E. Haberland, Professor I.M. Lewis, Dr. H.G. Marcus, Sir Gerald Reece, Sir Richard Turnbull, and R. Tatton Brown.

Dr. Robert L. Hess provided me with the most useful information about Italian archives, and my thanks go also to Sn. Gazzini, the archivist at the Foreign Ministry's archives in Rome, who initiated me into the oddities of a system whereby files could be removed from the archives by private individuals for periods of over a year or more; to Professor Sven Rubinson who helped me to trace the Swedish Missionary records of Karl Cederqvist, and the officials of the Stadarkivet in Stockholm who facilitated the microfilming of this correspondence; to the National Archives and Record Service of the United States who made available to me microfilm of American records in Zanzibar.

My thanks go to Mrs. Byron de Mott who showed me some of Chanler's correspondence, to J.S.S. Rowlands who lent me material he had written based on archival and oral research, and to A.T. Matson who loaned me a copy of Talbot Smith's paper on the history of the Leroghi Plateau which used to be in the Secretariat Library in Nairobi but now seems to be missing; to Dr. Paul Baxter for valuable information about the Boran and to Dr. P. Spencer who loaned me a copy of his unpublished historical material relating to the Samburu; to John Bromley, H.M. Consul at Asmara, for making available to me
a most treasured copy of the Mega Consulate records, and above all to Hugh Walker who most generously loaned a number of papers in his possession written by earlier administrative officials in the Northern Frontier Province.

Almost from the start I was helped by Dr. T.H.R. Cashmore whose superior knowledge of this region has been a source of continual benefit to me, and I owe him a special debt of gratitude for all those chats which have helped to sharpen some of my perceptions. But above all I must thank my supervisor, Professor Roland Oliver, whose encouragement and guidance really made this work possible. I feel that I have been very lucky to have worked under him for three years. Finally, I must thank my wife who has not only endured the discomfort of a thesis but actively contributed towards its final form by collecting material with me and by translating all the German and Russian sources used. Without her patience and generosity the writing of this thesis would not have been possible.
### Abbreviations used

<table>
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<tr>
<td>A.Q.</td>
<td>Anthropological Quarterly.</td>
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<tr>
<td>B.S.G.I.</td>
<td>Bollettino della Società Geografica Italiana.</td>
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<tr>
<td>G.J.</td>
<td>Geographical Journal.</td>
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<td>J.E.S.</td>
<td>Journal of Ethiopian Studies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NADM.</td>
<td>References to clip files in the Secretariat Library, Central Archives, Nairobi.</td>
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<td>P.M.</td>
<td>Petermanns Mitteilungen.</td>
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<td>P.R.G.S.</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society.</td>
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<td>R.C.</td>
<td>Rivista Coloniale.</td>
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<td>R.S.E.</td>
<td>Rassegna di Studi Etiopici.</td>
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<td>R.S.O.</td>
<td>Rivista degli Studi Orientali.</td>
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<td>S.N.R.</td>
<td>Sudan Notes and Records.</td>
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T.B.G.S.  Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society.
T.N.R.  Tanganyika Notes and Records.
Chapter I

THE ECOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL SETTING

Between the highlands of southern Shoa and the northern limits of the Aberdare mountains there lies a belt of lowland savannah that opens out towards the coast. Geographically this is an extension of the Somali plains, though to the north-east the river Juba has at times provided a rough political bounding-line. To the west the savannah gradually rises to a height of some three thousand feet and is then brought to an abrupt end at lake Rudolf, only being linked to the area beyond by the Leroghi plateau, while the river Tana provides a convenient terminus to the south. The present study is confined to this area which was known loosely in 1900 as Juba- and Tana-land.

The greater part of this territory is covered by scrub bush, browse and desert grasses that reach only a foot or so in height. In the more favourable areas this grass forms a complete cover; elsewhere it grows in tufts separated by bare patches of soil, stone or volcanic rock. It is also largely an area of internal drainage and is characterised by an almost perpetual state of water scarcity. The rains are equinoctial, but they are also of relatively short duration, leaving long dry periods between, and the annual precipitation nowhere rises much above thirty inches.
until the greater heights of surrounding escarpments are reached to the north and south. On the lower plateaux, below four thousand feet, the major rains of the year fall between March and June. A shorter and lighter season of rain occurs around September/October within the coastal monsoon belt, but elsewhere the drought is severe between July and February.\(^1\) Only along the littoral does the average rainfall approach thirty inches a year, and this area is traditionally associated with agriculture and cattle-raising. In other places, but especially to the north and west, the annual rainfall is well below twenty inches. In some areas, mostly to the south of the present Ethiopian border, it is less than five inches a year which makes cultivation impossible. Camels are an asset in these more arid districts, though there are few places where cattle are not also to be found. Agriculture, on the other hand, is only possible inland along the banks of the Juba and Tana rivers, at the edge of lake Rudolf, or around a few perennial wells. Agricultural and riverine tribes sometimes possess small herds, though many live near the vector of animal typanosomiasis in order to gain protection from their pastoral neighbours.

There is still considerable controversy over what criteria should be used to distinguish herders who cultivate from

\(^1\)E.H.M. Clifford, "Notes on Jubaland", G.J., LXXII (1928), 436.
agriculturalists who also own stock; there is further confusion over what constitutes a typical pastoral society. Inevitably it is difficult to suggest a satisfactory model, since there are probably more distinct types of pastoralism in Africa, inhabiting a greater diversity of environment, than in Asia and the Middle East combined.¹ Yet initially it seemed adequate merely to stress the mutual inter-dependence of men and animals² until Kroeber, defining pastoralism in terms of a total symbiosis between herder and stock, also added the absence of cultivation as a precondition.³ When applied to north-western Kenya, however, this definition would exclude the Turkana and the Karamojong, who both cultivate to a very limited extent but whose nomadic existence, centred almost entirely around their herds, makes it difficult to fit them into any other category. More recently, the essence of pastoralism has been seen to lie in a dependence on livestock as the chief means of subsistence, irrespective of transhumance

¹A.H. Jacobs, "African Pastoralism", A.Q., XXXVIII (1965), 144ff. This article has been of great assistance for this section.


⁴For instance J. Barton's remark that the Turkana are "extremely nomadic" is very typical, see: "Turkana Grammatical Notes and Vocabulary", B.S.O.A.S., II pt. 1 (1936).
or cultivation. This is still probably an oversimplification, and Dr. Jacobs has now introduced a more perceptive and complex taxonomy of pure and semi-pastoralism.  

However, most writers about African pastoralism agree that this type of life represents an ecological adaptation to a specific generally semi-desert type of environment. This assumption is especially applicable to north-east Africa, where the symbiosis between herders and livestock, such as exists today along the northern borders of Kenya, is due basically to sheer ecological necessity. Admittedly, it is possible to find many examples in East Africa of fairly close inter-relationships between economy and habitat: the once agricultural Jie and Pokot have become semi-pastoralists after moving into less favourable and drier country. On the other hand, the formerly pastoral Nandi and Kipsigis have turned increasingly to cultivation after migrating to richer and more fertile areas. Nevertheless, the distinguishing feature of pastoralism in northern Kenya is the ecological pressure that compels the adoption of a nomadic way of

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2A.H. Jacobs, ibid.

3Imanishi Kinji, "Nomadism an Ecological Interpretation", Zinbun-Kagaku-Kenkyusu, Silver Jubilee Issue (Kyoto University, 1954), 504.

life, if there is to be any chance of survival. Throughout most of this area there is no alternative to be found in cultivation, and it has in fact been suggested that precisely those conditions calculated to make agriculture difficult - such as scattered showers separated by periods of drought - at the same time make for good grazing in this region. This is very different to the somewhat ambivalent approach of say, the Nandi and Kipsigis to agriculture and cattle-raising, or to the pattern of frequent oscillations between pastoral and settled life that is also found so often in the north-western Sahara.

The pastoral tribes of north-east Africa have differing social and political structures. Before describing the organisation of the tribes themselves it may therefore be useful to outline the salient features of their common pastoral economy. Inevitably the life of a herder centres around his cattle, water-points, grazing areas and his search to obtain all that is necessary for the well-being of his stock. As a result, the movement of stockholders is not haphazard but tends to be cyclical and confined, in

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the first place, to areas already well known to the group; secondly, it would tend to conform to any regular seasonal movements of the clan or sub-clan. Yet the freedom for members of the same stock-owning group to move where they please, perhaps even to undertake the care of another herd, is essential to most methods of stock holding.

The precise choice of a grazing area for his herd is always to some extent made by the individual stock-owner himself. It is a question of balancing poor pasture that is close to a water-point with the less heavily grazed areas further away, and this requires considerable judgment. There are also other factors which have to be taken into account, depending on the composition of the herd itself: regular salt licks must be provided for the cattle, and the sheep will need grass grazing, while the goats prefer browse. But whatever the choice, it is partly limited by the normal movements of the sub-clan or stock group. Moreover, in times of war or migration the importance of larger groups is always accentuated at the expense of the individual and the stock-owner's freedom to act on his own initiative further restricted. All the same, migrations are not normally an integral part of pastoral

\[1\] Poulton, An outline of the tribes of the Somaliland Protectorate, n.d. MSS. This was very kindly lent to me by Hugh Walker.

\[2\] Saline grazing is also especially important for camels, see: J.C.Morgan, "The Horn of Africa", Corona, IX (1957), 289. However, the accumulation of soluble salts in the soils of arid and semi-arid regions is pronounced, and so saline grazing is generally
life: they are only a response to political and economic pressure, and where they occur tribal warfare is almost certain to be the ultimate outcome.

An important factor determining the mobility of the stock group is the amount of time the various herds can remain without water. Dry (unmilked) camels can go up to four weeks without drinking,¹ while milk camels require water every five or six days. Cattle have to be watered at least once every three days, but preferably once every day if the drought is not too severe. Sheep have to be watered every other day. In the wet season, however, sheep, camels and goats do not have to be watered at all, which is an important consideration and allows them much more freedom of movement than cattle.

In order to give the greatest possible benefit to a mixed herd it is seasonally split up into two, three or more parts. There is always a subsistence or milk herd that follows the main settlement providing it with food. This will be divided into camel, cattle and goat sections, and grazing will be found close at hand. The surplus or dry herds will be similarly divided but driven instead to distant pastures, where they may be expected to plentiful, see both: L. Bernstein, "Salt affected soils and plants", and G. Aubert, "Arid Zone Soils" in *Proceedings of the Paris Symposium on the Problems of the Arid Zone* (UNESCO, 1962).

¹Somali camels are noted for the length of time they can go without water, see: J. Drysdale, *The Somali Dispute* (London, 1964), 10.
benefit from the better grazing. The settlement itself, with the old and the sick, can never be particularly mobile. Some fifteen miles a day is the maximum distance that it might be expected to move; by choosing different cattle, at different times, to go with the surplus herd the stock-owner can ensure that his animals obtain a balance of grazing, water and salt-licks. In fact long journeys towards permanent water-holes, in the dry season, normally involve cattle rather than people and camps rather than settlements. It is obvious that, given the greater mobility of camels, the division between settlement and camp will be far more pronounced when these are part of the herd. This separation between stock is least accentuated during the rainy season and most pronounced during the period of drought. As the dry season advances, the tendency is to draw close to those water-holes that have not as yet dried up. At the same time, the most mobile units will move outwards in search of better grazing until the onset of the rains, when the tribes will disperse more evenly over the land.

It is also important that the size of an individual's herd should be well adjusted to the size of the homestead. For as the numbers of stock increase so do the problems of husbandry; too large a herd with too few hands to manage it will inevitably lead to a deterioration in the quality of the stock.
There is no explicit ownership of grazing land in north-east Africa, and "nomadic Ogaden and the Galla have no system of land tenure and little or no system of grazing rights. It is merely the survival of the fittest."\(^1\) Although most areas are associated with a specific tribe or clan, effective occupation is everywhere the prerequisite for gaining access to grazing areas, and in the last analysis this access will be dependent on the ability to enforce it. Dominance of a clan in a certain area will also only be recognised by outsiders to the extent that it cannot be defied. Intruders can be expected to adopt a client relationship until they have built up their strength in sufficient quantity to challenge their original hosts. Sometimes the obvious imbalance of forces will lead one side to abandon the area; sometimes original rights will be defended and fought for. Amongst the agricultural tribes ownership of land is of course more pronounced and may even extend to pasture. Thus the agricultural Gasar Gudda, on the upper Juba, have at times allowed pastoral Somali sub-clans, such as the Marehan and the Aulihan, to make use of their pasture, though apparently always in return for some quid pro quo.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) H.B. Sharpe, Memorandum, KCL EM, II (1934), 1559. While it is generally agreed that there is no ownership of grazing land amongst pastoralists in north-east Africa, some people prefer to stress that there are 'traditional and tribal rights to grazing'; the point is whether they will be recognised or not, see Susan Brodribb-Pugh, "Background Information - Northern Province", MSS., who brings this point out clearly. I was very kindly lent a copy by Hugh Walker.

\(^2\) E. Cucinotta, "La proprieta ed il sistema contrattuale nel 'destur' Somalo", R.C. (June, 1921), 245.
However, competition between tribes and clans is centred far more on the right of access to wells than to grazing areas, since it is the proximity of water that determines the value of the surrounding land. Basically, there are two different types of water-holes: there are those that have been made by one or two people still living, and there are wells that are natural or that have been constructed earlier. In certain areas, especially in the dry river beds, water can be obtained by digging down a few feet. Through the actual digging and maintenance of a water-hole, a man establishes a specific right to use it as he pleases and he can make any arrangement he sees fit to share it with some other stock-owner. Another casual user will have to get his permission before watering his own stock there. On the other hand, the original digger will not be able to refuse permission, once approached, for no one can claim the right of exclusive ownership. Once a water-hole is neglected, then it is up to anyone who cares to do so to start the digging again.

Amongst the Somali extended family rights are more pronounced. Wells that have been dug are sometimes covered and marked with the camel-brand belonging to the stock group, may even be surrounded by a thorn bush and a definite claim thus be established. At the wells of Afmadu, in southern Somalia, they could become the property of families and be left to children, heirs or third parties; though the sub-clan as a whole would always be allowed free access,
it would be possible to charge visitors for the right of drawing water. Such action would have been keenly resented, however, and it would have been contrary to the generally accepted tenet that water is *res nullius* and a free gift to all pastoralists. But where money was paid it would have been divided within the *diya*-paying group\(^1\) as a whole.\(^2\)

Large or permanent wells are otherwise never the object of individual rights, since these depend on the personal effort that has gone into the construction of a water-hole. These wells are used by clans who establish a customary dominance in the region. Where the wells are extensive and cover a wide area they are likely to be the meeting point of different tribes or clans. Here the rights of clans to water their herds first will be defended by force, and this is the only arbiter that finally decides who has prior access to a well that is disputed over. However, as Dr. P.T.W. Baxter has pointed out, although the rules regulating water rights amongst the Boran are very similar to those of the Somali, in action the Boran interpret them very differently,\(^3\) since amongst

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1 This is the basic Somali stock-owning group. See page 25 for a more detailed explanation of this term.

2 Zoli, *Oltre Giuba* (Ministero delle Colonie, 1927), p.240. This custom may have been restricted to the Muhammad Zubeir Somali at Afmadu. It was not uncommon in 1924, but I am not certain that it still exists today.

the latter force is only used against outsiders, whereas the Somali fight with each other.

But if the pastoralist, as an individual, has only a qualified right both to his pasturage and to his water, the same must be said about his herd. To the outsider it may well appear, and the stock-owner will perhaps encourage the impression, that his herd is entirely his own. Nevertheless, many other people will almost certainly have a claim to part of his stock or have certain rights in specific animals and even their off-spring. A man's clan or stock group will not be indifferent, therefore, to the deterioration in an individual's herd. Moreover, whatever the basis of collective justice may be, a man will generally find that his herd is to some extent held as surety for his own good behaviour and that of his associates. A man could break with his stock group and go and live with his wife's affines, but if he were to take all his stock with him, even those he had previously left in the care of friends, and if he were to assert his ownership over them, he would turn himself into a social outcast. For his affines could not offer any collective security, and this could only be re-obtained by entering another stock group, where the interest of the group in one's cattle would be offset by their collective backing and support.

It is partly because the security and well-being of an individual lies so obviously in his close association with others
that a man dare not stand on his own. The assertion of complete and absolute rights over a herd also involves the renunciation of any claim for protection from others. Such a course would not only ostracise a man from society, but it would also deprive him of any form of legal redress for wrongs done to his person or property. Because it would lead to almost certain self-destruction it would be most unlikely to occur; instead, the stock-owner is generally content to possess his herd within a social framework that ensures him adequate protection and yet allows others to make their demands on him. Paradoxically, the stock-owner can be expected to encourage others to have claims on his animals or even to accept stock from him, since widely dispersed stock-friends are always the best protection available against freak droughts, epidemics and war. This framework of contractual liability, like the social control to which the pastoralist also submits, is an important aspect of the political and social structure of the tribal or clan system to which he belongs. ¹

The desert scrub where nomadic pastoralism is the prevailing economy does little to foster, and on the contrary positively hinders, the formation of stable territorial groups. In fact,

within the broad framework of pastoral husbandry, the degree of symbiosis between stock-owner and herd may be expected to increase inversely to the size of the basic political unit. Moreover, the population density in northern Kenya is only 1.6 persons to the square mile, so that little could anyway be expected in the form of political institutions, and the basic unit of political systems in this area is either the extended family or the stock group itself.

The term 'segmentary' is commonly, and perhaps rather misleadingly, used to describe the political systems of all the pastoral tribes in north-east Africa, when it is intended to mean that these possess no centralised political authority. Unfortunately, a certain amount of confusion has developed through the equivocal use of this term, which is also used more precisely to describe decentralised types of society where political authority is vested in lineage groups. In the latter sense, however, the only example that can be found in north-east Africa is amongst the Somali. For while the descent system of the Galla formally resembles a segmentary one, there are nevertheless important differences. In the first place, the Galla descent system is static

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2John Middleton & David Tait, *Tribes Without Rulers* (London, 1958). The title and subtitle, 'Studies in African Segmentary Systems' are calculated to cause confusion, since on page three one reads that the book is concerned only with "segmentary lineage systems".
and incapable of further development or fragmentation. Secondly, the subdivisions of the clan are not in themselves the basis for political alliance or conflict.1

On the other hand, the social and political structure of the Somali is based on segmentary patrilineages. There are five main levels of segmentation: the clan-family, the clan, the sub-clan, the primary lineage and the diya-paying group or rer.2 There are six main clan-families (Darod, Hawiye, Dir, Digil, Isaq and Rahanwein), who claim to have different eponymous ancestors, though only the first two are found in large numbers south of the river Juba. In this area the Darod are divided into three main clans: The Marehan, the Ogaden and the Herti, while the most important Hawiye clans are the Ajuran and the Digodia.3

All segments within Somali society are based on lineage but the clan-family, which is the largest grouping to be found, is generally too widely dispersed to have any political significance, and the basic unit of the political structure is the diya-paying


2I. M. Lewis (1961), p. 7. Elsewhere Lewis adopts other classificatory terms, but here it is the primary lineage that is the exogamous unit. Throughout this thesis I have used the term rer in the same sense as a diya-paying group, though I am aware that it can also be used less specifically in the sense of a lineage without any definite length.

3See Appendices at the end for genealogical tables of the Somali clans and sub-clans.
group. This consists of a joint or extended family based on a three- or four-generation lineage. The unity of this group is maintained and enforced by means of a contractual alliance, in which members are pledged to support each other and to accept collective political and legal responsibility. One of their most important commitments, in this respect, is the payment of blood-money and any other legal liability that may fall upon an individual member of the group. The full importance of the diva-paying group lies in the fact that it is also the basic unit of Somali social life. In effect, it holds each member's wealth in pawn, or in surety, for his good behaviour and for that of his associates. The brand-marks that are used to identify camels and cattle are common to the group as a whole, since the entire group has an interest in the herd while the individual has primary interests only in certain animals. Sheep and goats, however, are individually owned and carry particular markings for the purpose of identification, yet these are animals that are without


3 M. Colucci, Principi di diritto consuetudinario della Somalia Italiana Meridionale (Florence, 1924), 30, 35-6.

4 However, the individual can certainly recognise those animals in which he has primary interest.
social significance and they cannot be used to pay blood-money or a bride-price.

In common with other segmentary lineage systems there is a lack of clear definability in the division of political groups. The rer represents the widest range of social and legal contractual liability but it is also the smallest political unit to be found within a wide range of larger agnatic groupings. In principle, there is little difference between the authority of the sub-clan chief or that of the rer headman, and their positions are almost the same in the councils they preside over.

The affairs of the rer are regulated by a council (shir) which is composed of all adult men. A headman is elected from amongst the elders whose job is to regulate the internal affairs of the rer and also to control its relations with other similar groups. Within the clan or sub-clan there is generally a chiefly lineage from which the headman (garad), who is sometimes called sultan, is chosen. Thus amongst the Aulihan the chiefly section is the Rer Ali; amongst the Marehan it is the Rer Farah Ugas; amongst the Herti it is the Iusuf Mahmud section of the Rer Osman Mahmud, while amongst the Muhammad Zubeir, Ogaden, it is the Rer

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In their choice of a sub-clan headman the Ogaden often practice primogeniture, and most other clans have also at times chosen an eldest son. But, equally, a sub-clan or clan head may be chosen either from a specific family or lineage.

In political matters the sub-clan headman is responsible for maintaining peaceful relations amongst the segments that come under his jurisdiction. He acts as official arbitrator in all disputes for which he has responsibility, and on his authority fines and penalties are imposed by the elders. On the other hand, he is only a primus inter pares and cannot act on his own initiative; his political role is that of chairman rather than of leader.

Both the clan and the sub-clan can become the foci of political action, but the clan is the widest level of segmentation in which a corporate political grouping can be said to exist. These wide political alliances do not command the same binding attachment as the rer since they do not possess its sanction and since, within the clan, diva-paying groups oppose one another. Primary loyalty, therefore, is always given to the diva-paying group and, in fact, wider political unity can only be achieved

\[^{1}\text{Zoli (1927), 184; cf. I.M.Lewis (1955), p.99.}\]
with difficulty and generally for short periods in the face of common danger or where common interests are momentarily involved.¹

All the Somali are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi rite, and they differentiate clearly between the secular and religious in terms of men of religion (wadad) and warriors (warenleh). Ideally pastoral society is divided into these two categories but in practice the division is often blurred. For though the distinction between wadad and werenleh is theoretically maintained, both nevertheless belong to common da'wa-paying groups and both are encompassed by the same social system.² Unlike many other Islamic societies, where Sheiks combine secular with spiritual authority, in Somaliland Sheiks and wadads are not normally involved in political activity nor are they the traditional leaders of clan politics. The most important function of the wadads is to act as mediators between hostile lineages. In Somaliland they exercise a religious jurisdiction only, except amongst the cultivating brotherhood (tariqa) communities or in the small theocratic settlements that have grown up along the banks of the river Juba.³

¹See: Leo Silberman, "Somali Nomads", International Social Science Journal, IX no. 4 (1959), 560. This statement is not so valid after 1916 when the later growth of national political parties in Somalia forms an important exception.


Though Islam does not in theory approve of strong clan loyalties, in fact the Somali put membership of the clan before that of the religious fraternity. As I.M. Lewis has pointed out, amongst acephalous societies such as the Somali, and especially those with a strong delineated clan and lineage organisation, there has been a tendency to adopt the minimal criteria of Muslim identity - the five pillars of the faith - while rejecting or disregarding many of the more detailed prescriptions of Islamic law.¹

The Somali pastoralist, then, tends to ignore the shariah law in so far as it conflicts with the principles of his social and political way of life. Thus compensation (diya) for murder is always paid by the group, though the Koran stipulates that the individual alone should be responsible.²

At the same time, religion can be used for political ends. The Sufi brotherhoods (tariqa) have at times been the vehicle for mounting important political movements. Although the lineages and diya-paying groups have a larger hold on a man than the tariqa itself, nevertheless the Sufi orders provide the Somali with a new principle of association, and one that often conflicts with his position in the clan. For it is quite possible for the genealogy of the brotherhood, the chain of saints (silsilad al-baraka), to come into conflict with an individual's clan genealogy,

²J.N. Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa (H.M.S.O., 1945), pp. 19, 45, 57.
and the former may well represent religious obligations that are opposed to the political demands of the diva-paying group. Politically, the potential importance of any group that transcends the fissiparous nature of rer loyalties must be obvious, but while membership of the tariga unites people from different clans and lineages, it can never generate a strong enough allegiance to overcome the conflicting pressures of opposing rer. Thus, whenever the silsilad al-baraka comes into conflict with the demands of the diva-paying group, it is always the latter that ultimately determine an individual's action.¹

While the Somali also esteem living sherifs for the strength of their baraka (charisma) and their power to transmit miraculous gifts (karamat), the latter generally have far less political influence than the heads of brotherhoods.² Frequently the descendants of saints form lineages of holy men believed to inherit the baraka of their ancestor, which belief they exploit to the full. These lineages, depending on their size, form into clans or sub-clans and are organised on the basis of diva-paying groups. In Jubaland the Sheikh Al, who probably came originally from Arabia and who have a strong reputation for holiness, have lived interspersed amongst the Darod and Hawiye as mullahs since 1882. Before

that they had lived for some time amongst the Tunni, to the north of the river Juba, and only left after intervening in an internecine struggle between two rer, as a result of which the Tunni expelled them. They were a pastoral group particularly addicted to caravan trading, and at the beginning of the 20th century they acquired a reputation for gun-running.

The actual process of Somali migration has also to some extent affected the structure of Somali society, especially that of the southernmost Somali in Jubaland. The usual method of Darod and Hawiye penetration into a new area was to adopt a client relationship (arifa or shegat) with the people already there, and then slowly to consolidate their numbers until they had achieved parity with or even superiority over the original inhabitants. The close connection in Somali thought between political power and numerical supremacy has always made the size of the diya-paying group, lineage and sub-clan extremely important. But to the south of the river Juba, where the Somali had first to co-exist with the Boran and Wardai Galla and then to accommodate unpredictable numbers of new arrivals (galti), it was a matter of crucial concern. For, in such fluid conditions, the material

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1 M.B. Bertazzi, Goscia, n.d. ASMAI. Posiz. 171/1 1-5. See page

2 T.S. Thomas, Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District Handbook (Nairobi, 1917), p.17; Zoli (1927), 262, 273; I.M. Lewis (1955), 146; "Notes on Wajir's political background and Somali tribal organisation", anon. n.d. MSS. A copy of this was kindly lent to me by A.E. Walker.
prosperity of lineage groups normally depended on their success in becoming the allies or clients of stronger segments, thus acquiring access to wells and grazing areas. And while no established segment would be adverse to increasing its numbers and power, there was a natural bias to assimilate as many new arrivals as possible.¹

Amongst the Herti and, to some extent, amongst the Ogaden it became possible not merely to become the client of a strong sub-clan but even to become an integral part of it. In this way, there developed in the south an element of genealogical relativity unknown in the north, so that the lineage system of the southernmost Darod was able to accommodate clients to the extent that they achieved full genealogical identification at the diya-paying level. At the same time, the rer in Jubaland also had an aggregate complexion since it was generally composed of the first segments to have crossed the river Juba (guri), later arrivals from the same diya-paying group (galti), as well as clients from other lineages (shegat) who only achieved a partial identification with the patron group.²

The southernmost Darod and Hawiye also adopted the age-set system of the Galla. According to E. Cerulli, this was not the result of any direct contact with the Galla themselves but, instead

¹"Notes on Wajir's Political Background and Somali tribal Organisation", n.d. anon, pp. 3-4.
²C. Zoli (1927), 178.
of their close relationship with the Rahanwein. For the Darod only appear to have adopted the system after they had moved into Rahanwein territory at the beginning of the 19th century.¹ The Rahanwein, on the other hand, seem to have been in much longer contact with the Galla, and it is reasonable to suppose that their knowledge of Galla fighting techniques would have been shared with their Darod clients, one of whose obligations would have been to fight with their hosts.

Age-sets consisted of groups of Somali youths of a similar age, organised on a clan basis. Amongst the Darod there were two chiefs of age-sets with equal powers; one chosen from the Herti clan, the other from the Ogaden. Every eight years the set would move to a new grade, and another set would be formed of the youngest male adults. New sets were given derogatory names that could only be effaced with an act of valour on the part of the set as a whole, and the formation of a set was consequently a time when fighting and looting were most likely to occur. The leader of the second-lowest grade would nominate the leader of the set that was about to be formed, and within sub-clans the set would fragment into 'hundreds', each of which would have a leader who would in turn be subject to one of the two age-set leaders of

¹E. Cerulli, "Tradizioni storiche e monumenti della Migiurtina", *Africa Italiana*, IV (1925), 156.
the clan-family. ¹

The fundamental purpose of the age-set system was to organise an effective military machine, bringing together the fighting men of the clan more efficiently than the segmentary system of the Somali normally allowed. But it is not clear to what extent this made a political impact, though it is thought that the leaders of 'hundreds' challenged the authority of the sub-clan chiefs. Also the head of the rer had to be chosen from the senior set of the lef gebis (bone-breakers), the age-sets that had been initiated.² At the same time there is no evidence that the Somali ever allowed the age-set system to take the place of, or even to compete with, the contractual function of the diya-paying group.

Functionally, age-sets were the same for both the Galla and the Somali, and the only difference was that amongst the former they were subordinated to descent sets. However, both Cerulli and Zoli were wrong to suggest that the southern Somali had adopted the gada system of the Galla, and they were equally mistaken in identifying the gada as an age-set system.³ For though in the

¹Salkeld, "Notes on Somali tribal organisation in Jubaland", East African Quarterly, II no. 8 (1905), 548; Salkeld, Notes on the Province of Jubaland, 1908, FC/NFD/4/6/1.
²Ibid., p.548. See also I.M.Lewis (1955), 106; Zoli (1927), 189ff.
³E.Cerulli, "Tradizioni storiche e monumenti della Migiurtina" in Somalia; scritti vari editi ed inediti (Roma, 1957), I, p.73; Zoli (1927), 192.
distant past the gada may have been initially constructed as age-sets, they soon developed into fossilised descent sets with political and ritualistic significance only. The Galla military organisation was indeed based on age-sets, but these were known as harive and had little or no political significance.

It could be maintained, in fact, that the absence of descent sets amongst the Somali is the most important single characteristic that distinguishes them from their Boran Galla neighbours. Amongst the Boran it is from the horizontal divisions, which are based on the luba or gada system, that the political structure of the clan is formed, while the vertical divisions of descent lineages provide the social framework. Amongst the Somali, on the other hand, political and social units tend to be identical and are expressed through the vertical divisions of agnostic descent groups. The clans and sub-clans, which form the different levels of segmentation in the Somali political system, are based on genealogies that have been defined organisationally and have become institutionalised, whereas the clan segments of the Boran, which are defined simply by genealogical reference, are purely heuristic.¹

The origin of the age-grade system is still uncertain. It was once thought to have been an Hamitic institution,² though more

¹V. Luling (1966), 70.

recently a number of authorities have alleged a Bantu origin.¹ Yet the detailed investigation by Levine and Sangree into the age-grade organisation of the northern Bantu suggested that, while there might have been some borrowing from Nilo-Hamitic sources, the origin of age-grades would have to be sought amongst earlier inhabitants of north-east Africa, such as Murdock's Megalithic Cushites.² The wide diffusion of the age-set system was made possible partly, it seems, because it could be adopted without any disruption of descent groups already in existence, while at the same time it conferred a desirable military prestige.

The distinction between age-sets and descent groups is of fundamental importance when it comes to examining the structure of Boran Galla society.³ Yet it is a distinction that is generally overlooked, and as a result it is either asserted that there were no true age-sets amongst the Boran,⁴ or that these are only to be found within the gada system.⁵ Nevertheless, the southern Boran

² See: R.A. Levine & W.A. Sangree, "The diffusion of the age-grade organisation in East Africa", Africa, XXXII no. 2 (1962), 97-8. These points had also been made earlier see: Jensen, Neuere Notizen über das Gada System (Stuttgart, 1941), II, pp. 93-4; A.H. Jacobs, "Age class systems and political organisation in East Africa", Anthropology Tomorrow, IV no. 3 (1956), 29-37.
³ This point has been made by Dr. P.T.W. Baxter (1955),
⁵ See: E. Cerulli, Etiopia Occidentale (Rome, 1933), II, p.133.
and the Wardai Galla of northern Kenya regard both descent and age-sets as quite distinct though parallel institutions. Thus descent sets have a religious and political function, while age-sets have a military one. The structure of the two is also different. For while the descent system is frozen into a pre-determined pattern that can never be changed, the system of age-sets is not regarded as immutable and this underwent considerable revision towards the end of the 19th century.

The hariye or age-sets of the Boran were probably an offshoot of the gada system after the latter had lost its uniformity of age.¹ These sets were formed two months after each culmination ceremony of a descent set, and they were composed of all males born within eight years, from the age of seventeen onwards. After a period of eight years the age-mates of a set would move to a further grade, and a new set would be formed at the bottom. The set itself is constituted when the leader or haiyu hariye is appointed. The haiyu hariye, as well as the other officers of age-sets, are distinct from the officers of descent sets. Courage is the only qualification for selection and, whereas only eldest sons are considered for other Boran offices, age-set officers may be chosen from amongst younger brothers. The choice of the haiyu

¹This point has been made by V. Luling (1966), 40.
hariye, his deputy, the haiyu diqa, and his four assistant chiefs, the haiyu tirru, is made by the head of the descent sets, the haiyu gudda, whose decision must be approved by the gally, the highest ritual official, of the moiety of the chosen officers. Officers of the age-set handle disputes between junior age-mates, which are generally taken before the haiyu hariye. All stock disputes, however, go before the gudda elders or their judicial officers.

The first duty of every age-set is to raid. But because it is too large to be centrally controlled the set is divided into districts. These are not territorial units with defined boundaries, nor do they consist of fixed human populations or internal political organisations. Amongst the Boran the term signifies a loosely defined area, capable of supporting a group in a year of average rainfall. Basically, there are two sorts of raids: those for trophies and those that are designed to achieve some tactical objective. The latter are more organised, and an abba dirla would be appointed to lead the raiders. The junior age-set but one goes into battle first, followed by the most junior set, who in turn are followed by the junior set but two. Members of the senior set remain behind to guard the village and stock. Raids for trophies, on the other hand, are organised by fewer members of the set and

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1 P.T.W. Baxter (1955), 410.
2 Ibid., 421.
generally involve small numbers.\textsuperscript{1}

The system of descent sets is extremely complicated amongst the southern Galla, and it is not necessary to consider in any detail the formal arithmetical aspects of the system. All Galla are divided into descent sets and the number of these differ from tribe to tribe. The average is five sets which, for five periods of eight years, occupy five different grades one after another.\textsuperscript{2}

Every eight years one set moves beyond the scale of grades, and at the same time the remaining four are initiated into a higher grade than the one they previously occupied. As soon as one set disappears, another is formed at the lowest grade. There is always a period of thirty-two years between the retirement of a father and the entry of his son into one and the same hierarchic position, and it is this artificial institutionalisation of a generation, which is fixed at forty years, that makes for eventual distortion and unbalance. For a man's set will always be the same as his father's and, though it will be composed of men who were initiated at the same time, it will also be composed of men of very different ages.

Within each set there may have been one descent group which took precedence over the others and from which a leader or haiyu gada

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., 404ff.

had to be chosen, though this is by no means clear.\footnote{The suggestion that only members from certain families were chosen for this office is made by the following: A.H.J.Prins, ibid., p.79; E.Haberland, Galla Sud-Athiopiens (Stuttgart, 1963), p.228; G.Denhardt, "Bemerkungen zur Originalkarte des unteren Tana Gebietes", Z.G.E.B., XIX (1884), 141. The point is contested by P.T.W.Baxter in "Repetition in certain Boran Ceremonies", in African Systems of Thought (London, 1965), 67; edited by M. Fortes and G. Dieterlan.} At the time of their culmination ceremony the elders appoint six haivu a'du'la for the descent sets of their sons. These six rank next to the haivu gada, and together they form a group of seven which is known as the haivu torba. This group appoints six haivu garba to assist them with their judicial work, and together with the gallu, who is the chief religious functionary, they may also appoint judicial officers known as jalaba.\footnote{P.T.W.Baxter (1955), 343ff.}

It was generally through their descent system that the Galla governed themselves, and there was no more important institution in their political system. However, it does presuppose a degree of centralisation that is not everywhere possible, and along the arid desert to the south of Ethiopia the gada system has only a remote connection with government. There political activity is limited to the loose association of elders from neighbouring settlements who meet at ad hoc assembles to decide on matters of local concern. Settlement patterns of between five and twenty families make it impossible for the Boran to conduct their political affairs on any other basis. On the other hand, the southern Boran have not abandoned the gada system nor has it lost...
any of its potential political significance, but at most times the clan is too widely dispersed, and the movement of extended families too variable and unpredictable, for stable descent groups to have very much practical bearing on everyday life.

The basic unit of Galla society is the patriarchal extended family, which is authoritarian, and primogeniture ensures that the eldest son succeeds to the main herd of his father. Younger sons are given the minimum required to marry, though they may have the opportunity to increase their stock by theft or plunder. However, the Galla have a very strong religious and social sanction against all violence between members of the same tribe and, perhaps to offset this, an almost institutionalised attitude of aggression towards all outsiders.

The Boran are divided into two exogamous moieties (Gona and Sabho), which are divided into clans (gossa) and further divided into sub-clans (worra or mana), some of which are sub-divided into branches (balbal). None of these segments are localised, have any leader, senior lineage, or territorial loyalty. Descent sets contain members from all clans, which is one reason why their function is largely moral and ritualistic. This then is the picture

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2 The degree of exogamy has struck some observers as unusual, see: A. d'Abbadie, "Sur les Oromo", Annales de la Société Scientifique de Bruxelles, 41ème année (1880), 183.

3 D. Pecci, "Note sul sistema della Gada e della classi di eta presso le popolazioni Borana", R.S.E., I no. 3 (1941), 305.
of Boran social and political institutions as they existed during the colonial period. There is remarkably little information about the institutions of the Boran during the last century but, apart from the hariye system which was changed about 1888, there is no reason to suspect that other radical changes have taken place.

The divisions of the Wardai Galla were modelled on those of the Boran, and they were divided into two exogamous moieties (Irdida and Barietuma) who lived inter-mixed.¹ Their clans and sub-clans were the same as those of the Boran, though they were not always found at the same level of segmentation.² It is, in fact, extremely difficult to determine if there were any fundamental differences between the southern Boran and the Wardai. The gada system may have had greater political significance amongst the latter. There are two descriptions of the Wardai, written about 1896, where the haiyu gada is mentioned as a political figure of considerable importance and where it is suggested that he had far more authority than a Somali clan-chief. Along with the haiyu torba he is described as appointing other officers to supervise the running of various districts, and he was also said to appoint


²Communication from P.T.W.Baxter.
abuoti dirbua or "guardians of the road". Whether this was an office only to be found amongst the Wardai, or whether the phrase was a corruption of abba dirla, the leader of hariye raids, will probably never be known, and while the political terminology of the Boran and Wardai does not appear to have been identical, the implications to be drawn from this are by no means clear. Thus, throughout the 19th century the word moti or mati was used to describe the deputy of the Wardai haiyu gada and sometimes the haiyu gada himself, while the haiyu gada is also on one occasion called the arm rer. The term moti does not appear to be used by the southern Boran to describe an official, though amongst the Hoku and Uraga Galla the term abba motti is still used to describe the haiyu gada before he has taken up office. It would certainly be indefensible to assume some

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1. R.M. Ormorod to Rogers, 17 July 1896; "Notes on Galla Laws and Customs", anon., n.d. PC/CP/68/20; M.R. Mahoney, "Notes on Galla" (1929), DC/GRA/3/4. For the view that there were no haiyu amongst the Wardai see Brayne-Nicholls, "Boran and Sakuye social organisation", DC/ISO/4/1. I am assuming that abuoti is a corruption of abba motti, naturally this is very uncertain.


4. Neither P.T.W. Baxter nor E. Haberland mention the word moti with regard to the Boran.

connection with the Macha Galla system, according to which Knutsson maintains that moti signified a military leader of the hariye age-sets and that a moti organisation, where the power rests in the hands of the age-set leaders, can be contrasted with a gada organisation, where political power rests in descent groups. And it may well be that the term moti, when applied to the leaders of the Wardai Galla, implied nothing more than a mark of respect; it is possible that the term itself coming from the verb mou, meaning to rule, did not signify any particular office or system of government but, rather, pointed to the importance of the person referred to. ¹

From the middle of the 19th century onwards, when contact with the Wardai became more frequent, it was also suggested that their village organisation differed from that of the Boran. Earlier it had been thought that the Wardai had no villages at all, or at least none that were permanent, ² while later their village organisation was regarded as the one static element in the rotating system of gada officials. For though it was always accepted that the Wardai moved their villages, nevertheless it was thought that village heads were appointed for life and were not subject to any limited or fixed

²T. Boteler, Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery (London, 1835), I, 387.
period of office holding. It was further suggested that within each village there were two heads, each of whom controlled a ward, who were either equally responsible for the settlement as a whole or took it in turns to be so. A very similar dual organisation also existed among the Boni hunters, who were neighbours of the Wardai, so the possibility of borrowing cannot be excluded but, on the other hand, these descriptions may only have been the result of a misunderstanding of the complicated gada and harive organisation.

The division of the Wardai into left and right hand sections was also closely paralleled amongst the Boran, where it represented the remains of a dual order that had fallen into disuse through the integration of new clans into the old system. There is some indication that a similar process took place amongst the Wardai, where several sections did not belong to either the Irdida or Barietuma moieties. Yet the fact that the haiyu diga, the

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1 R. Schmidt, "Deutsch-Witu-land", Globus, LIV (1888), 175.


4 Haberland (1963), 116, 120.

5 A. Werner (1914), 140, 275. The Gardyed and Metta clans are mentioned as being in the centre, their role being to validate marriages between members of the two moieties. See also E. Gerulli, "Le popolazioni della Somalia nella tradizione storica locale", Somalia (Rome, 1957), I, p. 61.
deputy to the haiyu hariye, had to be chosen from the opposite moiety\textsuperscript{1} lent itself to the illusion that a dual organisation existed amongst the Wardai.\textsuperscript{2} Nor was it easy to distinguish between the plethora of office-holders, and the tendency to equate all haiyu was a temptation that many observers succumbed to which naturally led to the belief that the Wardai favoured multiple office-holders.

There is one other pastoral tribe to be mentioned; the Samburu, who linguistically and culturally resemble the Masai.\textsuperscript{3} They are divided into two moieties (L'Orok Ngishu, and En Oibor Ngishu) each of which is divided into four exogamous clans and then still further divided into sub-clans.\textsuperscript{4} The sub-clan is the politically significant unit, and though its members may be fairly widely dispersed they perform age-set ceremonies together, to the exclusion of all outsiders.\textsuperscript{5} In the semi-desert areas where they live, small settlements of about four to ten families are the norm, and where the ground is more difficult the tendency is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}P.T.W.Baxter (1955), 410.
\item \textsuperscript{2}M.D.W.Jeffreys, "Dual Organisation in Africa", African Studies, V (1946); A.H.J.Prins (1953), 80.
\item \textsuperscript{3}The Samburu are also called Burkeneji which is a corruption of the Masai Lo 'Oibor Kenejie, people of the white goats. They call themselves Lokop or Loikop, see: KLC EM (1934), II, p.1448.
\item \textsuperscript{4}J.B.Carson, "Among the Samburu", East Africa Annual (1946-7), 41.
\item \textsuperscript{5}P.Spencer, The Samburu (London, 1965). This section relies heavily on this work.
\end{itemize}
towards even smaller and more widely dispersed groups. Nevertheless, the age-set system of the Samburu provides an extremely effective political framework, in marked contrast to the largely ritualistic significance of the gada system of the southern Boran who live in a similar environment. The difference lies in the identification of the Samburu set with the sub-clan, a group small enough to maintain its formal character, whereas the Boran descent sets are composed of members of all clans in the same moiety.

The system of government amongst the Samburu has been aptly termed a 'gerontocracy', for political power rests in the hands of the elders alone, and the moran, the unmarried warriors of the tribe, are kept in deliberate subservience. They are sent far from the settlements as often as possible, and the age-set system is used to keep them in check. They are not allowed to marry, nor to have any say in the councils of the elders when matters of importance are discussed. The real and effective power of the elders lies in the threatened use of their curse and also in the monopoly they exercise over wives. The result is rivalry and tensions between different age-grades within the sub-clan. But there are several clans where the theoretical requirements of the age-set system are partly ignored and where moran are allowed to marry.

The Samburu have a special relationship with the Rendille, their north-eastern neighbours, with whom they have been in contact

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\[1^\text{P. Spencer (1965). Subtitle of book.}\]
for a considerable period of time. The Rendille are not inferior to the Samburu, though they may not be as strong militarily speaking, and the essence of their friendship probably lay in the mutual advantage it entailed. For the Rendille have a camel-based economy, which results in certain social problems. Herds increase slowly, if at all, and a nearly static number of stock cannot be made to support a growing population. The obvious solution was emigration to the cattle economy of the Samburu, where herd-boys could be readily absorbed and where the high degree of polygamy could also lead to a chronic shortage of women. At the same time the Samburu provided their allies with protection. Through long and close contact with the Samburu, the Rendille have adopted some of their customs. But though they have an age-set system this does not regulate tribal life to any great extent, and it has been suggested that the far more exacting life of herding camels ensures an adequate degree of social conformity without any additional institutional aids. The different economies also ensure that there is little competition between the two tribes over grazing.

The Galla (Boran and Wardai), the Somali (Darod and Hawiye), and both the Samburu and the Rendille all have contact with, and sometimes control over, servile or low caste people. Relations

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1 P. Spencer (1965), passim.
between the dominant tribe and its often despised neighbours vary considerably and in some instances are extremely complicated. The Samburu have a special relationship with the Dorobo, a small group of predominantly Masai speakers who live by hunting and gathering. For reasons of strategy or economy the Dorobo associated themselves with certain areas and then formed uneasy alliances with their pastoral neighbours. After a serious defeat or epidemic, pastoralists at times settled with them and became members of their tribes while they built up their herds. The degree of integration between certain Samburu sections and Dorobo clans seems to have gone even further: around Mt. Ngiro Samburu claim exclusive ownership to land and practice bee-keeping, which they have learnt from their Dorobo neighbours. Although in the last century these ties were probably less pronounced than they are today, they were nevertheless in existence and the Dorobo had a similar relationship with the Laikipiak Masai.¹

The Galla and the Somali both have contact with despised peoples, whose status is defined both by their descent and by their occupation. The Warta,² who are hunters and potters, are similar to the Tumal blacksmiths, the Yibir and Midgan hunters and leather

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¹A thorough analysis of the relationship between the Dorobo and their neighbours can be found in P. Spencer, "The Dorobo of Northern Kenya", Chapter vi of 'A Survey of the Samburu and Rendille Tribes of Northern Kenya' (1961) MSS. I must thank Dr. Spencer for showing me this chapter.

²This word is used by several peoples to describe despised tribes in general.
makers who are scattered throughout Somalia and southern Ethiopia. The relationship between the Galla and the Warta is that of patron and client; they cannot live with the Galla or marry them, but those who are subject to the southern Boran have their own tribal organisation and constitute one of their junior clans. Furthermore the Warta are supposed to have their own legal, social and political institutions, though little or nothing is known of these.

The Boran treat the Sakuye, Gabra and Garre as junior tribes, and though these are acknowledged as being inferior, and graze their herds separately, they nevertheless live under the same law. The Boran extend their peace to cover these junior tribes, who are always their closest allies in times of war. Boran and Gabra intermarry with apparent equality, but poorer Gabra give their daughters away to Tumtu, a despised exogamous group; this action even stockless Boran would not stoop to. The position of the Sakuye is not so favourable. Intermarriage with the Boran is not normally permitted, and should a Boran condescend to visit the tribe he would expect to be lavishly entertained, at any rate in the pre-colonial period. The same sort of relationship also existed between the Wasanye and Wapokomo; the clans of these inferior

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1 E.Haberland (1963), 132; V. Luling (1966), 25.
3 A. Werner, "A few notes on the Wasanye", Man, XIII (1913), 14; V. Luling (1966), 23.
tribes were linked to those of the Wardai Galla, but in general
the subject population was excluded from assemblies of the gada
and hence from tribal government. The Wardai also seem to have
exercised control over the Boni hunters and fishers, while to the
north several small agricultural and riverine tribes who lived
along the banks of the river Juba came under Somali sway. Some
of these tribes were linked to the Somali by ties of marriage, the
degree and the type of integration depending in a large measure
on the extent to which Islam had been assimilated by them.¹

While a great deal of effort has sometimes been expended
to show that various low caste peoples - such as the Boni - have
certain unique characteristics and may thus be considered autochthons,²
it is now more readily admitted that despised peoples can be the
product of wars and thus nothing more than an aggregate of dis-
placed persons.³ Yet, whatever their origin, all these groups
tend to be tribally very intermixed.⁴

The low population density throughout northern Kenya has
in fact been responsible for a considerable tribal intermixture

¹Powell-Cotton, Somali Notes, British Museum, Add.MSS (Ethnographic
Department).

²Parenti, "Gli Waboni", Rivista di biologia Coloniale, IX (1948), 65;
V.L. Grotanelli, "Note sui Bon cacciatori di bassa casta dell oltre

³E. Cerilli, "La Tribu Somala", Somalia (Rome, 1964), III, p. 90;
A. Werner, "The Native Tribes of British East Africa", J.A.S.,
XIX (1919-20), 285.

⁴A. Werner, ibid., 285.
amongst all the pastoralists there. It is doubtful if there are any tribes in this area that have not assimilated significant numbers of alien peoples. The Boran do not appear to be any exception in this respect, and, though the presence of junior tribes, such as the Sakuye or Gabra, may give the impression that full integration is never attainable, the number of Boran galu and the position of certain clans such as the Karayu point quite clearly to the opposite conclusion.\(^1\) Equally, one reason for the less rigorous application of the age-set system amongst certain Samburu clans lies in the fact that these contained absorbed peoples of non-Samburu origin.\(^2\)

At the same time, this tribal intermixture draws attention to the complexity of the history of this area. It makes impossible any easy or facile reconstruction of the past. And this complexity is further reinforced by the small scale of the political unit. The tendency towards temporary tribal alliances, and towards tribal interpenetration and client relationships, has made for extremely fluid conditions. Pastoral life is rarely static, and this applies as much to the political as to the economic sphere. Inevitably, these realities of pastoral life were not grasped at first, and

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\(^1\) Haberland (1963), 13, 780. The suggestion of general intermixture has been made by D.W. Wickham, "The Tomal or Smith Glass in Gurreh District" (1927), 4. Nairobi MSS NADM/Secretariat Library.

\(^2\) P. Spencer (1966).
the fragmentary observations of chance travellers in the 19th century generally contained serious misunderstandings. It was only as contact with the interior increased that the pastoral way of life in this area slowly began to be appreciated.
Chapter II

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY BACKGROUND

The underlying tendency throughout most of the 19th century was to make a theoretical knowledge of the African interior conform to European concepts and, no matter what the second-hand information gleaned, it was inevitably recast in a terminology that evoked the picture of centralised semi-urban polities all enjoying definable boundaries. There were references to towns and cities, to kings and kingdoms, yet, at the root of the problem, there was not just a question of semantics, there was also a fundamental lack of perspective due to the absence of first-hand experience. It is, perhaps, hard to realise that the decentralised character of nomadic life in this area was never fully appreciated until the very end of the century, when it had been empirically observed at close quarters, while the instability inherent in every pastoral frontier was equally overlooked. Even as late as 1895 the political structure of the Ogaden could be described as,

a limited monarchy, composed of a sultan with his council of sheiks or chieftains of clans, and bears a resemblance to that of the Sovereign and nobles of early British history. The wealthy lords hold the offices of Prime Minister, Chief Judge, Commander in Chief and so forth by reason of the strength of
their following and their own social position. The tenure of their offices, land and property generally is to a great extent feudal.¹

The simplification of complex relationships, that also went hand in hand with an ignorance of the interior, led to misleading antitheses. The sharp distinction that was made between Somali and Galla, or the emphasis that was placed on their supposed mutual enmity, was based on the false assumption that each represented an unadulterated ethnic group. As a result, the extent of very considerable Galla-Somali contact was never appreciated; where it was observed, moreover, it was also generally misunderstood, for the basis of close tribal contacts lay in the widespread adoption of shegat or client relationships and of temporary alliances of convenience that blurred any rigid division of peoples and led to an over-lapping of pastoral boundaries. Yet, to a European mentality, the adoption of clients would be readily mistaken as evidence of African empire building, or at any rate of the means whereby a stronger tribe widened the area under its control, whereas in practice this was a relationship generally chosen by the weaker tribe and not imposed by the stronger.²


² Menelick utilised this outlook to further his own political ambitions with great effectiveness, see Chapter V
Much of the myth that surrounded "the little known kingdom of Boran" and "Afelata - king as he terms himself of the Gallas... a kind of legendary African Prester John",¹ and which has survived today in an exaggerated idea of both Boran and Wardai power in the 19th century, can be traced initially to misunderstandings on the part of those who had to rely on the descriptions of others for their knowledge.

Throughout the 19th century it was also readily assumed, by European explorers and travellers, that the political boundaries of pastoral tribes to the south of the river Juba were both clearly demarcated and moderately stable. The illusion of stability was partly due to the unmistakable dominance of the Wardai and Boran Galla to the south of the river prior to 1867, which contrasted sharply with the equally complete Somali control of the area to the north. Contemporary descriptions generally remarked upon the function of the river Juba as a dividing-line, a frontier that was supposed clearly to separate and keep apart two hostile and entirely different ethnic groups.² This tendency to equate rivers

²D'Avezac, "Essai sur la Géographie du pays Scoumal", B.S.G.P., 2nd series, XVII (1842), 90, 97; W. Christopher, "Extract from a Journal kept during a partial enquiry into the present resources and state of N.E.Africa", T.B.G.S., VI (1844), 393; Léon des Avanchers, B.S.G.P. (1859), 159; Guillain, Documents sur l'histoire, la géographie et le commerce de l'Afrique Orientale (Paris, 1865), II, p.180; D'Abbadie, "Lettre à Mr. le President de la Soc."
with boundaries was characteristic of the century, though the initial oversimplifications were less noticeable in the second half, when a better knowledge of the interior and a greater familiarity with both place-names and topography led to the complex construction of riverine frontiers. It was popularly conjectured that the river Dowa divided the Wardai from the Boran Galla, while the river Sagan was supposed to mark the westward limit of Boran power and to divide them from the Arbore; it was also thought that the river Sabaki formed the southern limit of the Wardai, and after 1874 the river Tana was assumed to be the new southern limit of the Somali.

Superficially then the position was simple. For it is indisputable that at the beginning of the 19th century the Wardai were in a dominant position to the south of the river Juba, just as the Somali were in control to the north. Dr. Krapf, the missionary

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1 C(cf. the remark: "the only desirable boundaries in Africa were those which followed the course of waters, as those boundaries only were acknowledged by the tribes", Catalan to IBEACo., 7 Aug. 1890, F0.84/2089.

The Savannah Lowlands.
and one of the first people to contact the Wardai Gall a in the 19th century, suggests that this was so. Unfortunately, the traditions of the Wardai and of the Boran are too vague to be of any value for this period, and it is primarily from the observations of Somali traders who described the interior to Smee and Hardy in 1811, from the accounts of later explorers and from the traditions of neighbouring tribes that a more precise picture can be reconstructed.

The information that was given to Smee and Hardy, one of whose specific tasks had been to enquire about the Gall a and to "find out the limits they occupy along the coast", pointed to the control by the Wardai of the right-hand side of the river Juba from the coast to the river Daua; this was confirmed later in the century, moreover, by the traditions of the Gasar Gudda. To this should be added one of the few pieces of information about the interior gathered during Captain Owen's expedition of 1824 to East Africa, that the Wardai controlled the whole area between

1 Krapf to Coates, 10 Jan. 1844, F0.54/6.
2 Cpt. Smee and Lieut. Hardy were employed by the East India Co. They explored the East Coast of Africa in 1811.
3 Smee and Hardy's 'Journals', I.O. Marine Records Misc., 586.
4 Smee and Hardy always referred to the Wardai as Gurache Gall a. This was a name often given to the Wardai in the 17th and 18th centuries, though it occurred rarely in the 19th century.
5 V. Ferrandi, "Seconda Spedizione Bottego: Lugh emporio commerciale sul Giuba", B.S.G.I. (1903), 211.
6 Owen's job was to explore and map the coast of Eastern Africa
the Juba and Tana rivers. However, the exact limit of their power inland was never definable in the 19th century except in so far as the river Daua was concerned, and only from the traditions of the Garre is it now clear that at the beginning of the century the Wardai were in possession of both Wajir and El Wak, as well as the area to the north-east. What is not so clear is whether the Wardai also controlled wells to the west of Wajir—such as Buna and El Had, not far from Lake Rudolf. Although the traditions of the Garre do not rule out the possibility, neither do they offer any positive corroboration, while later developments in this area do not suggest that the Wardai were so far west in 1800.

At the same time, the closer one looks at the available material, the more it appears that even these tentative boundaries are misleading. In the first place they were certainly neither static nor precise, and it is extremely doubtful if either the river Juba or the river Daua ever marked the precise north and north-western limits of Wardai influence. The traditions of the Wagosha, for instance, mention a pact made with the Wardai at Demu but his tendency to exceed his brief sometimes gave him greater insight into the local political situation.

1 W.F.W. Owen, Narrative of Voyages to explore the shores of Africa etc. (London, 1832); I, p.172; Wolf, "Narrative of voyages to explore the shores of Africa etc"., J.R.G.S., III (1833), 216; T. Boteler, Narrative of a voyage of discovery to Africa and Arabia performed in H.M.S. Leven & Barracouta from 1821-1826 (London, 1835), II, p.220.


3 For the suggestion that the Wardai controlled the area as far NW
to the north of the Juba, an area the Wardai were supposed to control. These traditions are linked to migrations carried out under the leadership of Wanuka and have been dated to 1795-1805. Later, Léon des Avanchers, a Franciscan missionary who spent some time on the coast, was also told of a small village on the north side of the river Juba which was supposed to be Galla. Nor was the river Daua likely to have acted as a hard and fast bounding line, since Smee was told that the area to the north was characterised by its mixture of Galla and Somali tribes, which suggests an area where tribes met and overlapped rather than one where a frontier kept peoples apart. The same could be said also of the river Juba, and from both the traditions and the age-sets of the Darod it seems certain that from the beginning of the 19th century they were living amongst the Wardai, in small numbers, as herd-boys and shegats.

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2 Léon des Avanchers, B.S.G.P. (1859), 159.

3 Smee and Hardy, 'Private Journals', British Museum, Add. MSS. 8958.

4 C.W. Hobley, Kenya from Chartered Company to Crown Colony (London,
There are also reasons to suppose that the area controlled by the Wardai was in fact considerably smaller than an outline of their frontiers suggests. Much of the river Juba was fly-infested, and for that reason it was avoided by pastoral tribes who in any case would not have attempted to control its banks. Significantly, the Wardai also never completely dominated the coastal area, which is one reason why so little is known about them. They were considered to be "typical inland men", and were effectively shielded from outside contact by both the Wasania and the Bajun, who exercised provisional control along the littoral. Thus, throughout the 19th century, the term 'Bajun coast' was frequently used to describe the mainland between the Juba and Tana rivers.

1. R. Tozzi, "Cenni sulla regione della Goscia", L'Agricultura Coloniale, XI (1940), 467. It is interesting to note that after extensive floods in 1916, which led to the disappearance of fly along much of the Juba, pressure from Somali pastoralists on the riverine Wagosha increased noticeably, Salkeld to Director of Agriculture, 6 Dec. 1920, PC/JUB/1/16/1.


3. Léon des Avanchers, B.S.G.P. (1859), 165; New (1874), 173-4; T. Boteler (1835), I, p.400; C.P.Rigby, "Remarks on the North-East Coast of Africa and the tribes by which it is inhabited", T.B.G.S., VI (1844), 72. Smee and Hardy also only mention Buggunes on the coast, B.M.Add. MSS.8958.

Further inland in the driest regions where camel-based tribes were better adapted to the aridity, it is likely that tribes which were Somali in origin, such as the Rendille and the Ajuran, had long been in the area and were allowed by the Wardai to act as nominal clients and graze over large areas.¹ On this point traditions are extremely vague, though we cannot ignore a widespread conviction that Somali tribes inhabited an area generally associated with the Wardai Galla from at least the beginning of the 19th century, also that these tribes had long been in the area and that they were allies or shegats of the Galla.²

To the north-west of the Wardai, in the foot-hills of Ethiopia, the position of the Boran Galla appears to have been strikingly similar. Their control over a wide area, from Dirre to the Liban, does not seem to have prevented the Garre from migrating south from Filtu to Wagille around 1800, while the later Boran expansion eastwards appears to have gone hand in hand with a prior expansion of the Garre in the same direction.³ Much of the apparent

¹I have examined the pre-19th century history of this area, and the relationship between the Rendille and Somali, in a SOAS Seminar Paper entitled 'The relationship between Bantu, Galla and Somali migrations in the Juba/Tana area', 22 Feb., 1966.


strength of the Boran must, in fact, have consisted of Garre shegats and other allied tribes. Control of the lowlands was one that the Boran seem to have shared with these allies, and it could therefore have been lost with their defection.

In the lake Rudolf area, it has been suggested that the Nkor section of the Gelubba consisted of Boran who had moved to the west of the lake around 1800. The Arbore are also said to have been in origin a small Boran group that moved beyond the river Sagan, losing contact with the Galla further east, and becoming shegats to the Amar Kokke. Certainly, according to Léon des Avancher's information, there was a marked similarity between the names of Arbore and Boran clans, while the occasional reference in the 19th century to 'Arbore-Galla' may not be without its significance. But we know altogether too little to be able to satisfactorily unravel the historical development of any Boran-Arbore relationship, or even to determine its limits. For, if it was once thought that the Boran and Arbore were very closely related linguistically, it is now realised that linguistic evidence ties the Arbore

1 Chiomico, "I Magi nell Etiopia dell sud ovest", R.S.E., III (1941), 300; Shackleton, "The Merille or Gelubba", 1939, Lok/32.


3 Léon des Avanchers, B.S.G.P. (1859), 112; Bottego (1895), 338.

4 A. Sacchetti, "Ricerche Antropologiche sugli Arbore", Rivista di Biologia Coloniale, IX (1948), 54. A. Sacchetti mentions Gerulli as suggesting a close lexical and morphological connection between Galla and Arbore, but gives no reference.
to the Gelubba rather than to the Boran.\textsuperscript{1} Moreover, Boran expansion towards Tertale and the area further west took place very recently, according to Professor Haberland. Tertale is also sometimes considered to be the furthest west that the Boran expanded.\textsuperscript{2} All that seems certain is that Boran influence extended in that direction, and that later in the century the Arbore, who then had no political ties with the Boran, were dominating smaller tribes around the northern end of lake Rudolf, such as the Gelubba and the Amar Kokke.\textsuperscript{3}

The Laikipiak Masai controlled the area to the east and south of lake Rudolf, and their loosely associated clans stretched between lake Baringo in the west to the Merti plateau in the east.\textsuperscript{4} Contact, however, with Somali tribes such as the Rendille had probably led to a certain amount of overlapping.\textsuperscript{5} Moreover, one

\textsuperscript{1}A. N. Tucker and M. A. Bryan, \textit{Non Bantu Languages of north-eastern Africa} (London, 1956). However, Arbore does seem to be related to Boran too, see: M. M. Moreno, \textit{Introduzione alla lingua Ometo} (Milan, 1938).

\textsuperscript{2}E. Haberland (1958).

\textsuperscript{3}Léon des Avanchers, \textit{B.S.G.P.} (1859), 162.

\textsuperscript{4}The best account of the Laikipiak is that given by Ole Menye, born in 1878, who was a teacher at the Missionary schools of Moshi, Taveta and Mombasa. He served under Mr. Collier as Government Interpreter for Masai on the Laikipiak plateau in 1900-1903, see: \textit{T.N.R.}, nos. 41-2 (1965), 27.

\textsuperscript{5}"Ethnological notes on the tribes of Marsabit District", PC/NFD/4/1/2.
cannot entirely ignore the possibility that the south-east of lake Rudolf the position was considerably more confused and complex. For it has been suggested that a group of Didinga moved down the east side of the lake in the 18th century, subsequently settling in the Mt. Marsabit area, where their proximity to the Laikipiak led over a period of time to structural similarities between their languages. It is further alleged that the Didinga were driven by famine to migrate a second time and that a small section, led by the Nyikorama clan, travelled up the east side of lake Rudolf, while the bulk of the Didinga skirted its southern end and then moved north-westwards. From their age-sets Driberg dated this last movement to the very end of the 18th century. But it is difficult to reconcile this with the calculations of Captain King who worked independently on the age-sets of the Toposa and Donyiro, whom the Didinga later displaced from their traditional grazing grounds. Unfortunately, Driberg is the only person to have written at any length about the Didinga. Nor does there appear to be any independent verification of these

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1 Linguistically the Didinga are related to the Murle and Longarin groups. Today they straddle the Uganda/Sudan border.


unusual traditions, and without some further corroboration they must obviously be treated with some caution.¹

Despite the later hostility between the Garre Somali and the Boran and Wardai Galla, also despite the hostility between both these Galla groups and the Leikipia Masai, the major long-term threats to their respective 'spheres of influence', where their grazing rights were acknowledged, came from outside this area - both from the north and from the south.

The main threat from the north lay ultimately in the movement southwards of Darod Somali tribes towards the river Juba. Professor I. M. Lewis has noted that, "by the end of the 18th century, southern Somaliland as far south as the river Juba had assumed more or less its present ethnic complexion".² By this date, then, the Ogaden Darod had presumably already attempted to move through the country held by the Rahanwein and Hawiye agricultural tribes and, having failed to overcome them by force, had joined with the Elai section of the Rahanwein and settled amongst them as shegats at Bur Hacaba and at Matagoi near Dinsor.³ But, although the Darod posed the main longer-term threat to Galla domination south of the

¹From J.P. Crazzolara, ibid., it appears that a Fr. A. Pellegrini has done a considerable amount of research into the Didinga. I have not seen the results of this but judging from Crazzolara's own references I would be surprised if it in any way supported Driberg's hypothesis.


Juba, it was the rising power of Bardera that first undermined their position there.

The small town of Bardera had been founded in 1819 by Sheik Ibrahim Hasan Jebro¹ of the Jiambelul tribe of Dafet,² and a few years later a defensive wall was built around the collection of huts by Sheik Ali Cure,³ a Lisan.⁴ Bardera quickly established its reputation as a stronghold of the Qadariya⁵ and became the most important religious centre in southern Somaliland.⁶ But as its power grew, so it embarked on a serious of religious


²The Jiambelul are Rahanwein who form part of the Ṣhan Dafet tribal cluster. This is a territorial cluster of the Herdo, Ifmogi, Barbaro, Jiambelul, Hober (pre-Hawiye), see: I.M.Lewis (1955), 44.

³M.Colucci (1924), 81; but in O. Kerston, Von der Deckens Reisen in Ost Afrika (Leipzig, 1869), III, 317, it is suggested that Ali Cure founded Bardera, perhaps because he built the wall.

⁴The Lisan are a section of the Rahanwein.

⁵The Qadariya are a Sufi brotherhood. In East Africa they had no real ties with Iraq where they originated. They first penetrated inland along the Benadir in 1819, see: Gerulli, "Note sul movimento Musulmano nella Somalia", R.S.O., X (1923), 17; B.Martin, "Muslim resistance to colonial rule: Shaykh Uways and the Qadiriya tariqa in East Africa", J.A.H., X no. 3 (1969).

wars. Bardera's short-lived period of aggression had two important results. In the first place, it helped to strengthen and unite in their opposition the coastal tribes to the north of the river Juba. Secondly, though it made a less dramatic impact to the south of the river, it is nevertheless contributed directly to the exodus of the Wardai from the Juba/Daua confluence.

In the north the first Somali town to oppose Bardera was Lugh, an important trading centre, since Sheik Ibrahim had forbidden all trade in ivory. Lugh, however, was quickly defeated. Further raids against Lugh and against the Rahanwein then led, in 1837, to an alliance between the Gasar Gudda of Lugh, the Garre, the Galla and the Rahanwein, all of whom attacked Bardera, though without success. The immediate result of this failure was the burning of Lugh and its conquest and occupation by Bardera.

Once Bardera had gained control of Lugh, the logical extension of her influence lay in the direction of Brava, which was the terminal of the caravan routes now dominated by Sheik Ali Gure. The years immediately following the sack of Lugh were, therefore, a time of increasing pressure on the tribes of south-eastern Somaliland.

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1 V. Ferrandi (1903), 277.
2 M. Golucci (1924), 81; "Breve Monografia di Bardera", anon. ASMAI. Posiz. 171/1-5.
3 Guillain (1865), III, p.176.
4 O. Körston (1869), III, p.317.
and they culminated in the sacking of both Baidoa and Brava in 1841. 

During the next few years, British and American vessels visiting the Benadir found that at Brava they were obliged to pay illegal duty to a 'Sheik Ibrahim, sheriffa of Bardera', and from this it was plain whose authority was beginning to count on the coast. 

It was not until 1843, in fact, that Bardera was destroyed, when a joint Rahanwein and Gasar Gudda expedition completely overthrew the Qadariya stronghold. For twenty years the town remained deserted, razed to the ground, and the major threat it had posed to Rahanwein hegemony north of the Juba disappeared as suddenly as it had emerged.

Although initially Bardera appears to have remained on good terms with the Galla to the south of the river Juba and to have traded with them, in 1836 two razzias were undertaken against the Wardai. This hostility gradually increased, moreover, under Sheik Abiker who succeeded Ali Curre. In 1839 the Wardai were attacked at Uarai, just south-west of Mandera, while the following year they were defeated at El Wak, (Gerba) Gol and Seraro in succession.

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1 The date 1840 is favoured by: Guillain (1865), III, p.38; J.S. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia (London, 1952), 241; I.L. Robecchi Bricchetti, Somalia e Benadir (Milan, 1899), 78. On the other hand the date 1838 is favoured by R. Turnbull (Oct. 1957), 311; Minnis (1950).

2 "Report on the Proceedings of the French with respect to their aggression on the part of the territory of the Imam of Muscat", anon., 5 Jan. 1842, FO.54/4; Hamerton to Bombay Secretary, 2 Jan. 1842, FO.54/15; Christopher's Journals', I.O. MSS.13.

3 U. Ferrandi (1903), 280; Lovatelli to Ministero, 27 March 1893, Documenti Diplomatici (Rome, 1895), XIII.

4 "Breve Monografia di Bardera", ASMAI. Posiz. 171/1-5.
These defeats seriously weakened them at a time when they were being persistently harassed by a more tenacious enemy further west.

During the 1840s the Garre and the Boran were raiding as far east as Gerba Gelo and once or twice as far south as El Wak. As a result of these attacks the Wardai were forced to retreat from the river Daua by the middle of the decade. The offensive was carried on against them by the Garre, who allied themselves to the Garre Murre, the Gasar Gudda, the Gobawein and the Shermoga, all of them tribes of the Lugh area who were known collectively as the Her Galana, and together they pushed the Wardai as far south as Bardera. By the end of the decade the northern limits of the Wardai were generally represented as being somewhere to the south of Bardera and to the west not further north than Dif.

Both the Garre and the Boran filled the gap that had been left by the Wardai. However, the growing strength of the Garre, their ability to rely on support from the Her Galana and also from Somali tribes around Bardera, introduced an element of instability into any possible Boran/Garre condominium of the area. Taken together

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1 Information given by Ali Chamaka suggests the Wardai were on the banks of the Daua in 1840, see: D'Avezac, B.S.G.P. (1842?), 97. This is supported by information given by Muhammad Arrali Ilme Sayd Ali in 1841 to D'Abbadie: Géographie de l'Ethiopie (Paris, 1890), 335. They may still have been there in 1843, see: Christopher, T. E. G. S. (1844), 393; but by 1848 there were Garre in Lebine which is opposite Lugh, see: Guillain (1857), III, p.177.


3 Léon des Avanchers, B.S.G.P. (1859), 161, 159; Brenner (1868), 364; J. Christie (1876), 191; D'Abbadie (1890), 250; Zoli (1927), 140.
these Somali clans could stake their own claim independently of the Boran, and in 1846-8 they drove the Boran from the Lugh area, ousted them from Oddo country and defeated them at Bua Hererr, driving them westwards towards Sankurar. The Garre undoubtedly wished to gain exclusive control over an area that would allow them to maintain close contact with other Somali clans further north and east; their struggle against the Boran would appear to have had this limited objective since all the fighting took place in areas immediately adjacent to Somali country. Further south-west, in the Wajir area and to the west of Bardera, the Boran and their Ajuran shegats still retained control and the Garre did not attempt to oust them from these areas.

Nothing is known of the part played by the Ogaden Darod in the Rahanwein/Bardera wars, or what their role was in the defeat of the Wardai in the 1840s. But the hitherto accepted interpretation is that the Ogaden and Marehan Somali tried to cross the Juba between Bardera and Lugh in 1842 but were defeated, that in 1844 they tried again and this time were allowed to come as shegats, and that three years later they treacherously slaughtered the Galla and, taking

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1. L. Vannutelli & C. Citerini (1899), 139; Gurreh District Political Book, PC/NFD/4/1/2. However, Haberland (1963), 20, gives 1870 as the date of this defeat. The traditional view of the Boran-Garre alliance is that it was short-lived and an expedient measure to defeat the Wardai, see: P.T.W. Baxter (1955), 61.

them by surprise, annihilated them.¹

However, there is no evidence of such a crushing defeat at this period and this orthodox reconstruction is probably based on the misleading synthesis of two separate and fragmentary traditions. In the first place, the Garre do remember receiving help from the Ogaden in about 1843, and the age-set Samouyia which was initiated about that time amongst the Darod is said to have scored a notable victory over the Boran.² Quite possibly some Ogaden remained behind after the razzia and settled to the south of the river Juba; only there is no evidence of a large-scale migration, and it is difficult to maintain that "following in the wake of the Galla, the Darod moved into the land south of the Juba between 1842-1848",³ if a one-way movement only is envisaged. The Ogaden migration to the south of the river Juba, which is a central theme of another set of traditions, took place ten years later as a result of their defeat at the hands of the Rahanwein, and not because of any victory over the Galla; the crushing defeat of the Wardai came later still and took three years to accomplish.

The Ogaden raid around 1848 was connected with the initiation of an age-set, and the spoils that were won had to be shared with

¹See for instance C.W.Hobley (1929). Hobley says that 30,000 head of cattle were captured, 80,000 women and children were taken prisoners and 2,000 elders and chiefs were killed. Other authors vary the figures but the story is substantially the same.


³I.M.Lewis (1955), 48. I cannot find any mention of a Darod/Galla
their Elai hosts. It was their dissatisfaction with the proportion of spoils that had to be surrendered to the Elia, and also the small say they were allowed in cabila affairs,¹ that gradually led the Ogaden to demand certain concessions. Later, when these were refused, the Darod moved from Bur Hacaba to Mattagdi, where they concentrated themselves, and where they were defeated by the Elai in 1857.²

It was this defeat of the Darod that made it necessary for them to retreat towards the Juba. The Aulihan, Marehan and some Dir crossed at Bardera; the Scechal, Herti and other Ogaden crossed at Gheilab and Dacatch, a little to the south, after fighting a rearguard action against the Elai at Raccale.³ It is sometimes maintained that, immediately following their defeat at Matagoi, a group of Darod also pushed south towards the Tumni, at the mouth of the river Juba, and that they crossed the river at Giumbo, seeking refuge amongst the Wardai.⁴ This is unlikely; for one thing it overlooks the evidence of Vonder Decken, a German explorer

¹ alliance, however, in Guillain (1857), III, 179-80. Cerulli also understands Guillain to say that the Galla were to the south of the Juba, the Somali to the north, see: Il Libro degli Zengi, in Somalia (Rome, 1857), I, 286. But see J.M. Lewis (1960), 225 for a different interpretation.

² Zoli (1927), 142-3; Monografie, Residenza di Giuba, Dec. 1907, ASMAI. Posiz. 87/1-7. The date 1840 is suggested by W.B. Minnis (1950) and "Notes on Wajir's Political background" anon. MSS.


⁴ T. Carletti, Attraverso il Benadir (Viterbo, 1910), 126;
who visited Giumbo in 1864, while it appears that the Darod did in fact cross the Juba at Giumbo, only several years later. ¹

It is interesting to note that when Von der Decken sailed up the river Juba in 1865, he did not learn of any Darod living amongst the Wardai. The Ogaden were still to be found amongst the Boran, though their position had become increasingly difficult. The rebuilding of Bardera in 1863 by Sheik Muhammad Eden led to frequent Somali raids against the Galla, until in 1865 the Boran refused to allow the Ogaden access to the wells at El Wak and Wajir. ² The Boran were at first defeated in the war that followed. ³ However, in November 1865 the Boran were said to be planning an attack on Von der Decken, while later they regrouped and ejected the Darod from the area, so that the latter were obliged to retreat southwards

M.B.Bertazzi, Goscia, ASMAI. Posiz. 171/1-5; Turnbull (Oct. 1957), 311.

¹ O. Kerston (1868), III, p.295; Monografie, Dec. 1907, ASMAI. Posiz. 87/1-7; Consul to Sec. of State, 1 Nov. 1865, American Consular Records: Zanzibar, 1862-69, T.100 series, Roll 5.

² L. Vannutelli & C. Citerni (1899), 193; Breve Monografie di Bardera, anon., ASMAI. Posiz. 171/1-5.

³ Although the year 1865 is mentioned as that of the love-feast and slaughter of the Galla by J.S.Kirkman, Men and Monuments on the East African Coast (London, 1964), 43; I.M.Lewis (1965), 30; E.Cerulli, "Il libro degli Zengi", Somalia (Rome, 1957), I, 287, it is not likely to be a reference to this defeat. I suspect that the Darod attack on the Wardai at Afmadu in 1867 is what is referred to in traditions as the love-feast of the Galla and Darod.
and seek permission to live amongst the Wardai.\textsuperscript{1} It appears that the Darod/Wardai alliance was entered into cynically by the former as a matter of necessity, and from the start the Darod seemed intent on strengthening their position so that they could eventually overthrow their hosts.

The Darod sought assistance from several of their clans and sub-clans that lived along the Benadir, and these gradually made their way towards the Juba. After living amongst the Wardai for only a year, the Darod attacked them at Afmadu in 1867 and defeated them.\textsuperscript{2} The fighting lasted from 1867 to 1869 and the Wardai were successfully defeated at Tabda, Guloli and El Iain.\textsuperscript{3} The Somali offensive had achieved dramatic results indeed: within three years the Wardai had been pushed back to the Tana, and many were forced to cross the river and seek refuge along its southern bank. Those groups that remained to the north of the Tana sought refuge along the coast at Anola or behind the swamp of Ziwa la Kombe, where they were welcomed by the Sultan Ahmed bin Sultan

\textsuperscript{1}J. Simmons, "A suppressed passage in Livingstone's last Journal relating to the death of the Baron Von der Decken", J.R.A.S., (1936), 342.

\textsuperscript{2}It has been suggested that the Somali attacked the Wardai because the latter had been weakened by an outbreak of smallpox, see: R. Turnbull (Oct. 1957), 311; I.M. Lewis (1960), 226. Certainly the outbreaks of epidemic cholera amongst the Boran in 1865 and 1867 never reached the mouth of the Juba or the coast, see: Christie (1876), 192.

\textsuperscript{3}Zoli (1927), 144; V. Rossetto, \textit{Memoria sul Basso Giuba} (Rome, n.d.), 38.
(generally known as Simba) of Witu. At Witu Godana Jara's Wardai were drawn into the Sultan's dispute with the Arabs of Lamu, and they helped him maintain his independence after 1866.

Throughout this period the Wardai Galla were also being attacked by Masai and Kamba moran, and in 1860 Dado Bone at, heiyu gada of the Tana river Galla, had been murdered by Masai. Hemmed in on all sides, they were frequently raided and by the end of the century had been all but annihilated in these wars of attrition. In 1872, the Swahili chief of Kau on the river Ozi combined with the Somali and destroyed the power of the Galla long the coast to the south of the river Tana. Their declining strength was reflected in the gradual abandonment of tribute normally paid to them, especially in the coastal towns. Yet until 1886 the Wardai south of the Tana still received one tusk from every elephant killed in the area, and it was only in that year that combined Somali and Kamba attacks so reduced the Galla as to deny them even this tribute.

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1 A. Werner, J.A.S. (1914), 122; "Memorandum re. the sultanate of Witu", enclosed in Malet to Granville, 4 June 1885, FO.84/1714.

2 Bismarck to Munster, June 1885, FO.CP.5156. A. Werner met Godana Jara in 1912, see A. Werner, ibid.


4 Sir Charles Eliot, "The native races of British East Africa", East African Quarterly, II no. 7 (1905), 471.

5 McDougall (1914), DC/MAL/2/3; Holmwood to Salisbury, 2 March 1877, FO.84/1849.
To the north, the river Tana never provided an effective barrier to Somali raids, though the sheer extent of their recent conquests made it unnecessary for the Darod to settle permanently further to the south. In years of drought and during the dry season the Somali frequently crossed the Tana in search of water and better grazing. From 1874 there are a number of references to the ford at Massa being used to facilitate a temporary Somali occupation of the right-hand side of the river,¹ and the Galla were unable to offer any serious resistance to these incursions. In fact, when the river Tana was visited in 1888 by Churchill, a British Vice-Consul at Zanzibar, it appeared to him that the Galla were "rapidly becoming extinct". He suggested two reasons for this. The first, that they were a "puny and effete race", was wide of the mark and confused the effect with the cause. The second reason, however, was that "they generally have herds of cattle and sheep... this draws the cupidity of the marauding Masai and Somali tribes".² The observation was pertinent, and it is somehow ironic that so many of the peoples who had lived in dependence on the Wardai had refrained from owning cattle, because it would have exposed them


² Churchill, "Memorandum on the Tana river", 25 July 1888, encl. in C. to E.-S., 21 Aug. 1888, F0.84/1905.
to precisely this sort of danger: whereas the Wardai themselves
never appreciated the depredations they were encouraging in a
similar position — through possessing coveted goods that could not
be adequately protected. On the coast at Anola and Port Durnford
the Wardai were periodically raided, while at Witu they suffered
badly at the hands of the Somali in 1884 and 1888. Though the
Wardai did not become extinct, they were never again a power to be
reckoned with.

Most of the Darod who crossed the river Juba moved on
further inland to the west or the south-west, but there were some
who remained on the coast. In 1868, a few Mijertein Herti arrived
from Berbera by sea and settled at Kismayu in order to trade, "much
to the disgust of other Somali", according to Christie. They were
later strengthened by further contingents arriving over-land and,
in alliance with the Ogaden from Afmadu, they were able to drive
off the Tunni to the north as well as the Galla remnants to the
south. The Galla presented no further problem as they were clearly
unable to offer further resistance, but the position of the Tunni

1 e.g. the Pokomo who did not own cattle for this reason, see:

2 McDougall (1914), DC/MAL/2/3; C.W. Hobley (1929), 176–8; E.–S. to
S. 21 Aug. 1888, F0.84/1908; Holmwood to S., 2 March 1887 F0.CP.5497.

3 James Christie (1876), 202.

4 Zoli (1927), 146; C. Ettore, R.C. (1925), 330; Sir Bartle Frere,
"Memorandum on the position and authority of the Sultan of Zanzibar",
17 April 1873, F0.96/176.
was different. They were not only quite strong, but they also had powerful allies to whom they could turn in times of need, and the following year, helped by the Wazegua Wagosha and Elai Rahanwein, they attacked both the Herti and the Ogaden. The Tunni were once again defeated. However, this time the fight had been close, and they now turned to Ahmed Yusuf, the powerful Sheik of Geledi, for the assistance they needed to overcome the Darod. In 1870 Yusuf headed an alliance that defeated the Herti and drove them back to Kismayu. Their defeat might have been serious if the Mijertein had not previously sought the help of the Governor of Lamu who, coming to their aid, had enabled them to hold the town.

This time intervention on the part of Lamu, and ultimately of Zanzibar, into Somali politics at the mouth of the river Juba was to have important consequences. For the interest first shown by an Arab ruler in this area was later shared by other European powers, and the foothold that Zanzibar had acquired in Kismayu was to be the first step towards the eventual dismemberment of the Somali peoples.

The prompt assistance given to the Herti had been motivated by commercial considerations. The Governor of Lamu, who had apparently acted in his own interests and to encourage private trade, favoured

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1 G. Ferrari (1910), 1226; Zoli (1927), 145-146.
2 T.S. Thomas (1917), 21; Churchill to Sec. of State for India, 8 Nov. 1870, I.O. Secret Department/49.
the settlement of Kismayu, and Majid the Sultan of Zanzibar, who saw the means of turning the whole affair to his own advantage, readily agreed. The potentialities of the area were easy to perceive, and Kirk, the British Consul at Zanzibar, was not making an adventurous prediction when he wrote, "although at present trade at Kismayu is insignificant there can be little doubt in time it will rise to importance as the natural harbour of the river Juba." The death of Majid in 1870, however, delayed further action, and it was not until two years later that Sef Nur was appointed Wali and sent to Kismayu with ten men. But this force was inadequate and in 1874 Hamed bin Hamed, one of the most vigorous and able Arab administrators, took over the town supported by 80 troops.

Hamed's first task was to complete the stone fort which would house the garrison, and he then suggested that a small mud fortification should be built at the mouth of the river Juba so that he could collect revenue. At the same time his presence guaranteed the safety of Kismayu for the Herti, and through the adroit selection

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1 Kirk to F.O., 12 July 1870, F0.84/1325.

2 Later Kirk claimed to have been instrumental in Majid's decision and his correspondence at the time suggests that this might have been so: J. Kirk, "Visit to the Coast of Somaliland", P.R.G.S., XVII no. 5 (1873), 342.

3 Kirk to Granville, 31 May 1873, F0.84/1374.

4 Between 1870 and 1872 there was an unofficial Arab Governor at Kismayu. Churchill to Sec., 8 Nov. 1870, I.O.Secret Department/49; Zoli (1927), 153.

5 Holmwood, "Tour of the North coast of Zanzibar", November 1874, F0. 84/1423.
of an ally they had won the first round in their struggle with
the Tunni for control of the south bank of the river Juba.

The Tunni, however, were unlucky in their attempt to out-
manoeuvre their enemies. In 1875 the Egyptian Government had
sent McKillop Pasha, a retired Scots admiral, on an expedition
designed to bring the whole of Somaliland under Egyptian control. McKillop sailed down the East African Coast and, through intrigue,
managed to gain control of Brava which had surrendered without
fighting. At Brava there were two Tunni chiefs who offered to
accompany the Egyptian force to Kismayu and there to act as
intermediaries between the invaders and the local inhabitants.
Kismayu was only taken after a fight and after 350 troops with
camp equipage, artillery and horses had been landed and deployed.

The Tunni then attempted to involve the Egyptian troops in their
own quarrels with the Herti and also with the Wagosha tribes under
Furahen Mucica. In this way, they hoped to re-establish control
over the river Juba at little cost to themselves. First, the Tunni
persuaded McKillop to ask the Wagosha to come and pay homage to
the Egyptians, and then, after Mucica had arrived at Kismayu at the
head of a delegation, the Tunni insinuated that he was untrustworthy;

\(^1\) Stanton to Derby, 14 Nov. 1875, FO.141/94; I have looked at some
of the broader implications of this expedition in an article entitled:
"Kirk and the Egyptian invasion of East Africa in 1875: a re-

\(^2\) K. to Derby, 11 Nov. 1875, no. 158, FO.84/1417.
in the ensuing mêlée he was killed by the Egyptians, perhaps inadvertently. This initial success, however, brought no real benefit to the Tunni. For the Wagosha, whose strength had in no way diminished, chose as their new chief Nassib Punda who was a redoubtable fighter and an ex-Tunni slave. Under his leadership hostility between the two groups became even more intense. At the same time, the Egyptians tried to extricate themselves from their premature involvement in a sterile conflict. Since the Herti alone were to be found in the vicinity of Kismayu, where the Egyptians were stationed, McKillop decided to support them instead of the Tunni who were found to the north of the river. The former were therefore able to gain control of Giumbo and the northern side of the Juba.

But within a month the Egyptians had left, and the Sultan of Zanzibar, Said Barghash, once again re-established his position along the coast. Sporadic fighting between the Tunni and the Darod continued, until in 1878 the Herti were pushed back to the south of the river. Since the Tunni were naturally hostile towards the Arabs it became increasingly important to prevent them from gaining control over the mouth of the river, for this would also have given them control over the riverine trade. The re-building and occupation

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1Mucica was head of all the Wagosha, except for the Wazegua who lived in their own villages and supported the Tunni, see: Powell-Cotton (1932); G. Ferrari (1910), 1232; V.L.Grotanelli (1953), 258.

2M.B.Bertazzi, "Goscia", ASMAI. Posiz.171/1-5; Zoli (1927), 150, 154.
of Giombo by Zanzibar troops seemed inevitable, though it was another three years before the necessary steps were taken.\(^1\)

Part of the delay can probably be explained by the tensions that developed between the Herti and the Arabs in 1880, when the Wali accepted a flag from a French ship that had called at Kismayu. The Herti destroyed the flag and killed an Arab askari. Threatened by the garrison, they refused to cooperate and, after a Herti had been killed, general fighting broke out, with only the Osman Mahmoud and the Muhammad Ismail sections of the Herti trying to keep on good terms with the Governor.\(^2\) Thus, when in 1881 the Sultan decided that Giombo should be re-occupied and asked for assistance from the Herti, the latter refused and it was the Muhammad Zubeir Ogaden who offered their support.

This action on the part of the Muhammad Zubeir led to a bitter schism between them and the Herti, which lasted for many years. Although as early as 1873 Kirk had noticed two distinct settlements of Somali around Kismayu, the Herti and the Ogaden, there had been no more than the usual rivalry between them and on many occasions they had helped each other in their struggles against the Tunni. Now, however, their rivalry was based on a blood feud since Muhammad Ismail, head of the Herti, had committed suicide after being arrested by the Arabs and their Ogaden allies. Ali Nahar, one of the most respected

\(^1\)K. to S., 12 Nov. 1878, FO.84/1515; G. Révoil, *Voyage au Cap des Aromates* (Paris, 1880), 62.

\(^2\)Zoli (1927), 154.
Hertti, escaped detention and the Hertti revolted, attacking the Wali's house at Kismayu. The Arabs succeeded in stationing fifty troops at Gebwen, on the river Juba, but they were exposed to frequent attacks from the Hertti.¹

The fighting continued till 1884, when the Wali tried to make peace on the terms of the Hertti.² But the relationship between the small garrison and the Somali inhabitants in and around Kismayu had deteriorated at the time that they were about to be scrutinised from the outside. However, the yet increasing interest on the part of European countries in the African littoral had not escaped the Sultan's notice, and in 1885 the garrison at Kismayu was doubled; while Ali bin Abdullah was sent to Port Durnford to act as the Sultan's akida and to establish a small station, supported by ten to twelve askari and flying the Sultan's flag.³ These moves were undertaken none too soon, for Port Durnford had already been visited several times by Germans interested in that part of the coast. Indeed, Kirk had already written of these initiatives "there certainly ²the Germans ²... will find no rival, as there is not a village or settlement of any sort on its banks and no sign of possession";⁴ and it was soon being predicted in a German

¹K. to G., 31 May 1873, FO.84/1374; G. Révoil, "Voyage chez les Benadirs, les Comalis et les Bayouns", Tour du Monde, LVII (1888), 394.
²Zoli (1927), 154.
³Commander Forsyth to Cpt. Brackenbury, 7 Dec. 1889, FO.84/2077.
⁴K. to G., 27 Feb. 1885, FO.84/1724.
newspaper that Port Dumford would become the first important settlement of the German East Africa Company on the Benadir [sic] coast, and that it would be known as Hohenzollern harbour.¹

Then, at about the time that the Kismayu garrison was being doubled, Ceôchi, an Italian explorer who had been sent on an official mission to East Africa, arrived at Zanzibar and asked for a concession of the mouth of the river Juba, on condition that the revenue from customs duties was divided equally between Zanzibar and the Italian Government. This request was rejected brusquely, though later Italy was to claim that it had in fact been accepted.²

But growing European interest in the East African mainland also led in 1886 to the appointment of a Joint Delimitation Commission,³ which visited the coast in an attempt to ascertain the limits of the Sultan's dominions. On the 24th March they visited Kismayu and heard evidence from the Somali chiefs about their relationship with the Sultan, as they understood it. The questions and answers offer a fascinating glimpse of Somali cunning and some indication of how completely they controlled the situation:

¹*National Zeitung*, 24 November 1886.

²K. to S., 15 Sept. 1885, FO.84/1730. See also for a full account, Robert L. Hess, "Italy, Zanzibar and Somalia 1885-1893", in *Boston University Papers on African History*, ed. J. Butler (Boston, 196).

³The Commission was made up of Britain, France and Germany.
Q. does Kismayu belong to the Sultan Said Barghash?
A. You can see his flag. Q. Are you subjects of the Sultan? A. We would prefer to give you an answer tonight. Q. tell us simply if you obey the orders of the Sultan, yes or no? A. In the town of Kismayu we obey him; outside it is another matter; we will see about that later. Q. The country between Kismayu and the river Juba, does it belong to the Sultan or to the Somalis? A. Why do you ask us that question? Q. We want to know if this country belongs to the Sultan and if you obey him. Answer us that. A. If it is a question of a good thing we obey him, if it is a bad thing we don't obey him. Q. Can the Sultan's soldiers go from here to Lamu without being attacked? A. If there is no war they can pass. Q. Are you satisfied with the way in which the Sultan is established at Kismayu? A. The Sultan is in the town; we are outside; there is peace between us.¹

To Kitchener, who was the British representative on the Commission, "the Somali chiefs at Kismayu appeared on examination to be doubtfully loyal subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar."² The mistake Kitchener made, however, was to imagine that the Somali had ever been "subjects" of the Sultan, and the last sentence of their testimony summed up their relationship with the garrison perfectly. It indicated that the Sultan's writ was confined to the walls of the town and, whenever attempts were made to prove that the Somali lived within the Sultan's dominions, the evidence always turned, in one form or another, on the minuscule presence of an Arab force at Kismayu. It was here that the Somali paid

¹ Enclosed in K. to Rosebery, 30 April 1886, FO.84/1798. The original is in French, the translation is mine.

² K. to R., 9 April 1886 no. 11, FO.84/1798.
customs duty. It was from this port, and generally in the Sultan's ships, that they travelled to Zanzibar bringing presents. Visitors to the coast generally obtained passes from the Sultan, and yet the Somali had also made it very clear that anyone who had an interest in their land outside Kismayu town had to deal direct with them and not through the Sultan's agents: "The Sultan is in the town; we are outside". The individual traveller who relied on the good offices of Zanzibar officials alone got nowhere.  

In fact nothing seems to have changed since 1873, when Sir Bartle Frere observed that "where the Galla and Somali tribes come down to the coast [the Sultan's] authority is still less recognised beyond his Arab garrisons", then mentioning specifically that the Somali at Kismayu "do not recognise the Sultan authority".  

In effect, the position of the Sultan's forces at Kismayu was extremely delicate and required the most careful handling. They were unable to impose their authority without the cooperation of the Somali themselves - and what sort of authority was that? - and being subjected to conflicting pressures were continually forced to compromise. The apparent cause of the deteriorating relationship between the Herti and the Zanzibar garrison in the

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1 G. Révoil, Tour du Monde (188), 390 wrote, "l'autorité de Said Bargach ne dépasse pas les murs de la ville". He also noted how ineffectual the Sultan's letter was and how it did not enable him to go beyond the walls of Kismayu.

2 Frere, "Memorandum on the position and authority of the Sultan of Zainzibar", 17 April 1873, F0.96/176.
1880s lay in the latter's attempt to maintain a closer control over the local trade up the Juba river by building a fort at its mouth. As the main traders, the Herti had the most to lose, but there was in fact another quite different reason. At a time of increasing contact between the coast and visiting European ships, the Somali were concerned about their own relationship with European agents and they were determined to secure their own bargaining positions. The possibility that Zanzibar might utilise the friendly assistance of a European power to increase its own authority was feared and visits from foreign ships were generally greeted with suspicion.

Somali reaction to foreign visitors at Kismayu or at the mouth of the river Juba had never been encouraging, even at the best of times. From the very end of the 18th century, when several British sailors were murdered at the mouth of the river, the Somali had gained a decidedly bad reputation, and the India Pilot warned all ships that "the inhabitants of these towns [the Benadir ports] like those of Juba may be considered hostile to Europeans". But more significantly, when a group of Frenchmen attempted, without success, to establish themselves on the river Juba in 1870, one of their men was killed by a Somali, said to have been exasperated.


2 J. Horsburgh, Directions for sailing to and from the East Indies China etc. (London, 1809), I, p.187.
at the "arbitrary treatment he had received at the hands of the Arab Governor of Kismayu and attributed it to the presence of white men". 1 Again ten years later, when the Wali in order to make a good impression on Europeans accepted a flag from a French ship that called at Kismayu, we have seen the troubles that ensued. Yet these had been largely due to the fact that the Herti were afraid they might come under French control. 2

Finally, in 1886 Dr. Juhlke was murdered after insulting a Somali, 3 and two years later they made their position quite clear: "Somalis on the coast here", the British Consul at Zanzibar telegraphed back to Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary, "also sent to inform Sultan that they have the power and will expel any Europeans who try to settle to Kismayu". 4 As a result of this telegram, Lord Salisbury tried to dissuade the Italian Government who were hoping to colonise this part of the coast, from taking any immediate action, and warning that any attempt to gain control of Kismayu would meet with serious resistance from the Somali. 5

1 Churchill to Sec. of India, 8 Nov. 1870, I.O. Secret Department/49.
2 See page 85
3 H. to F., 7 Dec. 1886 and H. to I., 21 Dec. 1886, FO.84/1776. It was said that Dr. Juhlke was trying to forestall Italian initiatives on the river Juba.
4 Evan-Smith to S., 27 July 1888, no. 55, FO.84/1908. The Somali mentioned this at a time when the Sultan was under considerable and obvious pressure to cede Kismayu to the Italians, see: R.L.Hess in Boston University Papers on African History, ed. J. Butler (Boston, 1966).
5 S. to Kennedy, 13 Sept. 1888, FO.84/1896.
The Somali attitude to European intervention, however, was not entirely hostile. It seems in fact that they were prepared to accept a European presence at Kismayu, and even to welcome it, but only on their own terms. Their apparent xenophobia was largely directed towards Zanzibar, and their main fear was that some arrangement would be made without their being consulted. That was the one thing the Somali would not tolerate; any bargain was to be struck with them, and they made that abundantly clear.

For one thing, the Somali had already benefitted very considerably from itinerant Europeans, so far at little cost to themselves. When Denhardt visited Kismayu in 1885, Sheik Ali Nahar of the Mijertein signed a treaty ceding all his land in return for "large gratuities".\(^1\) A few years later the same land was once again ceded to Dr. Juhlke after suitable payment, and when the Italians afterwards visited Kismayu the performance was repeated.\(^2\) By 1889 the Imperial British East Africa Company (I.B.E.A.Co.) also trying to get treaties signed, but the prices had risen through competition; Murgham Yusuf, head of the Muhammad Zubeir, told the Company's agent that while willing to cede his land prompt action was necessary. Thus the Somali also were actively engaged in the

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\(^1\) Simons to E.-S., 2 Dec. enclosed in E.-S. to S., 4 Dec. 1889, FO.84/2059.

\(^2\) About £35 changed hands and Dr. Juhlke was asked not to tell the other chiefs. Holmwood to Anderson, 23 Nov. 1886, FO.84/1776; Lumney to S., 27 Aug. 1886, FO.84/1707; Il Ministro Esteri Germanico al Ministro, "Memoria", June 1886, ASMAI. Posiz. 55/1-1; "Recent changes in the Map of East Africa. Based on the Kolonial Politische Korrespondenz, a weekly newspaper published by the Soc. for German colonisation, a weekly
search for revenue and offered to cede their territory to any bidder who named the right price.¹

To each and every European power concerned these treaties had a political significance, but it seems more than probable that this significance was not perceived by the Somali themselves. Commenting with a frankness that was maliciously motivated, the British Vice-Consul at Lamu noted that the German treaties were purely commercial, and this surely must have been the way they appeared to the local contracting parties.² The concept of ceding land was foreign to Somali pastoralists, whereas the payment of money for friendship was readily understood: the Somali later thought they were being paid to keep the peace and that this was a symbol of their own autonomy and the subservient status of the to European visitors. Of course, the Europeans the acceptance of money and of a regular payment was considered evidence enough as to who were the masters. Yet Somalis like Sheik Ali Nahar, who had long received a monthly stipend of eight dollars from the Sultan of Zanzibar,³ would hardly have considered themselves in the employment

newspaper published by the Soc. for German colonisation, J. Wagner's 'Deutsch-Ost Afrika' and other publications of the German East Africa Company", P.R.G.S., n.s. IX no. 8 (1887), 492.

¹E.—S. to S., 7 Dec. 1889, F0.84/1984.

²Sandys to Portal, 6 Aug. 1889, F0.GP.5977.

³S. to E.—S., 2 Dec. in E.—S. to Salisbury, 4 Dec. 1889, F0.84/2059.
of the Sultan or even particularly beholden for the cash—after all, they knew they were being paid 'protection money' to avoid trouble; "Said i bara sella ma i bara fitna" was a current epigram, the Sultan wanted peace not war. When the same Somali were paid regularly by the I.B.E.A.Co., they perceived no difference.

On the eve of the partition of East Africa, the coastal Somali had evidently not yet grasped the significance of the events that were rapidly overtaking them. Their relationship with the British Company, and later with the British Government, was complicated by their past experience of Zanzibar authority along the coast. Their problem lay in the adjustments they would have to make in the face of a new centre of power. Inland, the most important single development had been the decline of the Boran and the virtual collapse of the Wardai Galla. Here the problem consisted in the relative vacuum of power and in the ensuing competition to fill the empty spaces. Tribes on the perimeter were brought into closer touch with each other and converged on the savannah plains of northern Kenya. The greatest and most persistent pressure came from the Somali in the north; later the Ethiopians advanced from the west, but from quite early on there had also been important population movements into the area from south of Lake Rudolf itself.

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1 G. Revoir, Tour du Monde, L (1885), 195.
The first recorded attempt of the Laikipiak Masai to extend their power as far as the Lorian Swamp appears to have been frustrated by the Wardai or their allies at the beginning of the 19th century. Nevertheless, this was a period when the strength of the Laikipiak was rapidly increasing through their assimilation of other defeated Masai clans. The collapse of the Uasin Gishu after a series of Il Maasai victories, at the end of the 18th century, led to the entire population moving to the Leroghi plateau. A similar movement took place some twenty years later, when the Il Maasai defeated the Wakwavi in a series of battles near Mt. Meru. The Wakwavi migrated in sufficient numbers to break through Kikuyu held territory and

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2 I have adopted the term Il Maasai, following Dr. Jacobs, to describe the so-called 'Masai proper' as distinct from the Wakwavi. See also, A. Low in History of East Africa, ed. R. Oliver and G. Mathew (Oxford, 1963), I, 304ff.


finally established themselves amongst the Laikipiak.¹

The resulting population increase on the Leroghi plateau was apparently welcomed by the Masai clans already there, but it had one serious drawback. The increase had taken place before a succession of very severe droughts which seem to have accelerated a gradual movement southwards of Laikipiak clans. By the end of the 1830s, when the drought was at its worst², considerable pressure was being exerted from the north on the southernmost of the clans, the Samburu, who were then centred around Lake Baringto.³

Originally, the whole valley from Baringo to the Leroghi plateau had been occupied by the Samburu and they had shared grazing with other Laikipiak clans as far north-east as the El Barta plains.⁴ Under pressure from these clans, however, they had also moved south, but they were now exposed to attacks from the powerful Il Purki Masai

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¹G.A.Fischer, Das Masailand (Hamburg, 1885), 10; Joseph Thomson, Through Masailand (London, 1887), 242–3; Krapf, Vocabulary of the Engutuk or the language of the Wakwati nation in the interior of Equatorial Africa (Tubingham, 1854), 4; R.F.Burton, Zanzibar; City, island and coast (London, 1872), II, 72–3.

²J.L.Krapf (1960), 142. Krapf mentions the date 1836.

³Dundas "Notes on the tribes inhabiting the Baringo district of the East Africa Protectorate", J.R.A.I., XL (1910), 51; Talbot-Smith, "Leroghi Plateau and notes on the tribes of Baringo District", 1908. I am very grateful to A.T.Matson who lent me a copy.

⁴C.W.Hobley, "Notes on the Geography and people of the Baringo district of the East Africa Protectorate", G.J., XXVIII (1906), 475; H.B.Bader, Memorandum, 10 March 1932, KLG.EM. (1934), II, 1706.
clan to the south-west and faced famine conditions in Baringo itself. About 1840 the Samburu migrated, leaving behind only four villages of the Il Doigio clan, and moved north along the Suguta river bed, turning past Lomelo towards the El Barta plains.

Here the Lorogushu Samburu came into contact with the Rendille, who occupied the plains to the south of lake Rudolf as far west as the Kerio river. Perhaps they were not altogether strangers, for it is remarkable that within two years they had forged a close alliance that led to the capture of Mt. Ngiro and Mt. Kulal from the Gabra Boran, and Mt. Marsabit from the Laikipiak Masai.

The Samburu and Rendille continued their movement towards the north and north-east. The Boran, for instance, remember being constantly attacked by Kore, who are generally identified as Rendille, when they moved into Wajir in the 1840s or 1850s. By

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2 G.W. Hobley, *G.J.* (1906), 475; Baraza with the Samburu at Kisimi 8 Jan. 1033 in KL.C.EM. (1934), II, 1605.


4 "Report on the Tribes in Baringo District", anon., 1907, NADM, Nairobi; Bois to P.C. Naiwashsha, 10 Aug. 1908, and "Intelligence Report on the Samburu tribe", n.d., anon. DC/MBT/5/1. The Samburu later claimed to have taken a route south-east of Maralal.


6 P. Spencer (1965), xviii.

7 "Notes on Wajir's Political Background", MSS.
the 1850s, according to the Samburu age-sets, they had already reached the northern end of Lake Rudolf and were dominating the Reshia tribes in the area.\(^1\) Inevitably, however, they gradually lost contact with the Lake Baringo region and, in their expansion, abandoned the plains to the south and west of Lake Rudolf. These were now slowly filled by southward-moving Turkana\(^2\) and Suk\(^3\).

By the 1880s the Turkana were raiding the Samburu to the east of Lake Rudolf and had established themselves on the Lorui plateau.\(^4\) Together with the hostile Laikipiak they now blocked any possible Samburu movement south towards their former grazing areas.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) P. Spencer, *A History of the Samburu & Rendille*, 1961. Unpublished. This was kindly lent to me by the author.

\(^2\) The Turkana are an offshoot of the Jie, see: P.H. Gulliver, *The Family Herds* (London, 1955), 5. There is a possibility that the Turkana did not exert any pressure on the Samburu to migrate, and that the former moved into empty grazing areas, see: R.W. Baker Beall, "Frontier Tribes", 1932, NADM, Nairobi; Gulliver (1953), 54. But cf. Weatherby, *Azania*, II (1967), 137.


\(^4\) The second Turkana raid on the Samburu has been dated 1888, see: J. Barton, "Notes on the Turkana tribe of British East Africa", *J.A.S.*, XX (1920) 1, 110. Also, Von Hohnel, *The Discovery of Lakes Rudolf and Stephanie* (trans. N. Bell), (London, 1894), II, p. 230 suggests raids took place after 1860. See also R.W. Baker-Beall, Memorandum, in *KLC.EM.* (1934), II, p. 1763.

\(^5\) James Christie (1876), 225.
On the whole, the Samburu and Rendille concentrated on fighting the Boran to the north-east, by now their traditional enemies, and they coped with the Turkana to the south as best they could. The Rendille nevertheless seem to have grazed over a vast region. Not merely did they move from the northern end of lake Rudolf to the Uaso Nyiro and east towards Wajir, but if the explorer Chanler can be relied on, and there is no reason to doubt his word, the Rendille were also to be found to the south of the Lorian Swamp, as late as the 1870s, in an area called Kirimar. However, just after this period there were two outstanding events that combined to make some retraction of the area under their control absolutely imperative.

As a result of rinderpest epidemics in the 1880s, which were followed by outbreaks of small-pox in the next decade, the fighting strength of the Samburu and Rendille was brought too low for them to be able to hold their own against Boran attacks in the north. The Turkana too were increasingly menacing. This was a critical time for the Samburu; their loss of stock had been so extensive that some became temporary Dorobo and lived by hunting and gathering. Others were enslaved by the Turkana. Those who had stock concentrated

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1 A detailed account of the fighting between the Ariaal Rendille in the south and Kiriami allies of the Laikipiak can be found in P. Spencer (1961), Unpublished, pages 3ff.

2 I have been unable to identify Kirimar. Chanler to Directors I.B.R.A.Co., 22 Sept. 1893, FO.2/59.

3 Donaldson-Smith, Through unknown African countries (London, 1897), 295-6; V. Bottego (1899), 392; L. Von Hohmel (1894), II, 2-3.
them in favourable areas like Mt. Marsabit, where they attempted to build up slowly their economic and political strength.\(^1\)

Although the Samburu and Rendille expansion northwards had been achieved largely at the expense of the Boran and their allies, it is by no means clear how far south the Boran had in fact moved at the beginning of the 19th century. The suggestion that they had a foothold in Laikipia and in northern Kikuyu at the time of the 1830 droughts remains to be substantiated.\(^2\) However, it is likely that the Gabra were near Mr. Kulal at this period, and the Algan section probably suffered most from Rendille and Samburu attacks since the explorer Joseph Thomson mentions Galla camels being killed in these raids.\(^3\) The Boran, on the other hand, would have been further north, and their traditions mention Samburu attacks into Dirre but not the area further to the south-west.\(^4\)

As a result of natural disasters these attacks were contained, but what was the position of the Boran further east, and what effect did the Somali/Wardai wars of 1867-1869 have on them? It used to

\(^1\)P. Spencer (1961), 3-4; H.S.H. Cavendish, "Through Somaliland and around and south of Lake Rudolf", G.J., XI (1898); Von Hohnel (1894), II, 230; Chanler to IBEACo., 22 Sept. 1893, II 0.2/59. It is interesting that the one author who claimed the Samburu had many cattle also admitted that they were kept well out of sight and that he had not seen them. A.H. Neumann, Elephant hunting in East Equatorial Africa (London, 1898), 253.


\(^3\)J. Thomson (1887), 225. Algan Gabra had camels but not the Boran.
be thought that the Boran benefited from the collapse of the Wardai and that they "streamed southwards into the grazing grounds which had been vacated by the Wardai".\(^1\) It was understood that with the Ajuran they took possession of the wells at Wajir and El Wak until the beginning of the 20th century, when the Somali attacked them and drove them out.\(^2\)

But the Boran were already in control of Wajir and El Wak before the crushing defeat of the Wardai,\(^3\) and it is probable that this defeat had no immediate effect on the Boran further inland.\(^4\) On the other hand, Somali attacks against the Boran Galla took place earlier than has generally been appreciated. Thus several sections of the Marehan crossed the Juba in 1872 and immediately moved north-west against the Boran. Three years later Ogaden attacked the Boran at Wajir and on the Lorian Swamp.\(^5\) These early probes, especially towards the Lorian Swamp, would explain Rendille traditions that they were pushed out of this area in the 1870s.

But whether it was these attacks against the Boran or the spread of an epizootic disease that weakened them is a matter for speculation.\(^\)* By 1883, however, they had been so weakened that

\(^2\)R.G.Turnbull (Oct. 1957), 310; I.M.Lewis (1963), 54.
\(^3\)See pages 72ff.
\(^4\)However, for a contemporary view that the Boran were extending their
all clans reorganised the 'harîyê' age-sets in an attempt to forge a tighter-knit organisation, better able to resist their enemies.\(^1\)

Despite these Somali attacks against the Boran, the Darod, after defeating the Wardää Galla, did not attempt similarly to crush the former. In fact, had they continued their movement towards the Lorian Swamp, they would have outflanked the Boran, and this was precisely what Abdi Ibrahim, head of the Abd Wak Ogaden, attempted to do himself. In 1886, he led a mixed army of Abd Wak, Aulihan, Muhammad Zubeir, Herti and Marehan from Afmadu to the middle reaches of the Uaso Nyiro to test the possibilities of plunder beyond Boran country. This expedition was not a success; on the way it was ambushed by Dorobo, Samburu and Rendille, but Abdi Ibrahim was sufficiently impressed by the pasture to return four years later, when he was again defeated by the Rendille.\(^2\) Finally in 1892 he set out with a large force and made for Garba Tula; from here he tried to go past Burbalga, the scene of a previous defeat, and on this occasion he was defeated by the southern frontier, see: James Christie (1876), 200. Also in 1887 they did attack Bardera, see: V. Rossetto (1890), 20.

\(^{5}\) C. Zoli, (1927), 146, 153.

\(^{1}\) P.T.W. Baxter (1955), 408.

many of the Somali deserted him when they learnt of the route he intended taking. Those that remained were practically annihilated by a group of Meru and Rendille, and Abdi Ibrahim himself was killed.¹

At the same time, the defeat of the Laikipiak by the Il Purko had led to their dispersal at the end of the 1880s, and the Momonyot section of the Laikipiak retreated to the Lorian, where they also came into contact with the Somali but were worsted in a clash.² However, these encounters led to no permanent population movement; the Somali never settled on the Uaso Nyiro, and the Laikipiak did not long remain near the Lorian Swamp. They were a symptom of the vacuum of power in the area and they brought the Somali into contact with the Samburu, Laikipiak, Rendille and Meru within the space of a few years. There were other ways, though, besides war, in which these different peoples were brought into contact with each other, and the most important was probably trade. So far, all the population movements that have been considered resulted in fighting and in competition for pasture; most of them had been motivated in the first instance by the desire to find better

¹W.A.W.Clarke (1933), DC/GRA/3/4; H.E.Lambert (1950), 13; Chanler to IBEACo., 22 Sept. 1893, FO.2/59; A.Donaldson Smith (1897), 351.

²G.A.Fischer (1885), 97; K.G.Lindsay, Memorandum, 23 Oct. 1932, in KLC. EM., (1934), II, 1572; "History of Meru", n.d., anon., in Meru District Record Book, PG/CP/1/9/1; Cf. W.A.Chanler (1896), 117, who thinks Wakamba & Meru also attacked Momonyot.
grazing and more abundant supplies of water. These movements created their own sort of contacts but they destroyed others. Trade, however, favoured intercommunication on a far wider scale than war, and it was trade moreover that brought the interior and the coast into contact with each other.

Basically, there were two different types of trade affecting two distinct areas. In the first place, there was the coastal trade that generally required little organisation; secondly, there was the inland caravan trade that frequently involved considerable expense, much planning, and took months rather than days. The coastal trade between the Juba and Tana rivers, with the exception of Lamu, was extremely local. Ocean-going vessels that called at Lamu avoided the coast-line to the north, until they reached the Benadir ports, and trade was therefore carried on by canoes and small boats that kept close to the shore.¹

There was regular contact with Brava, and the Bajuni coast was visited annually by an Arab factor who bought grain and other produce, especially from Kiamboni.² However, most trade was carried on from Giumbo, at the mouth of the river Juba, which maintained regular contact with Pate. When Giumbo was visited in


²C.W. Devereux, A Cruise in the Gorgon (London, 1869), 392.
1799, cattle, slaves and ivory were offered for barter and these were to remain throughout most of the century the principle articles for export.

Most of the ivory probably found its way to the Benadir ports whence it was exported to Zanzibar or Arabia.¹ Cattle, on the other hand, may have been bought and sold in Giumbo itself, though they were also traded along the coast to passing ships. The usual procedure was to drive the cattle onto the sea shore, well in view of a vessel, and thus to invite trade. Bartering for food and water was likewise commonplace.² After the Wardai had been defeated the Mijertein Somali travelled regularly from Kismayu to the mouth of the river Tana, and even to Lamu, a distance of over two hundred miles, in order to sell their cattle. They also carried on an active trade with the coastal Bajun and would travel south to Kodai or Kiamboni.³ Eventually, hides became the chief export item of Kismayu, but this was not until after 1875.⁴

It was the sale of slaves, however, that brought most profit. This was the only trade along the coast that involved large sums

²Blankett to Banier, 16 April 1799, Adm.1/69; Log. H.M.S. Barracouta, Master Bucuth, 17 Dec. 1825, Adm.52/3941.
⁴Holmwood, "Agricultural and commercial Report on the northern dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar", 1875, F0.84/1415.
of money and, at times, careful organisation. In the 17th century Giumbo had been a slave exporting town of some significance, and it is probable that some export of slaves was still being carried on at the beginning of the 19th century. However, there is not much evidence to support this last point. An Indian trader, who had been on four trips to Brava, claimed in 1801 that there was a considerable trade in slaves on the river Juba, though this may have been an exaggeration since certain other details in his report were rather inflated. A few years later, the Sultan of Pate also volunteered the information that many slaves were exported from the Juba, but he was not exactly well informed about that part of the coast. The Sultan was unable, for instance, to name a single tribe living on the banks of the river, and at the same time he suggested that the Juba had its source in Europe (sic). This information about the slave trade did not fit in well with other details which Smee and Hardy picked up at Zanzibar from traders who had actually visited the Juba mouth itself. For these traders emphasised that little was exported from this region. Moreover, when Captain Owen visited the coast in 1824, he claimed that far from being an export of slaves from this area, slaves were in fact

1 J. Lobo, Itinerario, Braga MSS. 813.
imported from the south. This fits in with later information which mentions the shipping of slaves from Ibo to the Jubain the late fifties, and whatever the position in the first half of the 19th century, the trend was certainly towards importing slaves.

It was probably not until the beginning of the 1850s that exceptionally large numbers of slaves began to be shipped to the Benadir, and when in the following decade the coast was closely patrolled, the trade gradually switched to the land route instead. In this way slaves would be brought overland in caravans from Tanzania to Lamu or the Benadir, where they were either absorbed or re-exported to Arabia.

The Somali/Wardai wars of 1867-9 naturally made the northern end of this route unpractical for a few years, and its importance can to some extent be measured by the very considerable increase in the number of slave-carrying ships intercepted by British cruisers at this time. However, the land route reopened in 1871 and became

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1 Owen to Adm., 8 March 1824, Adm.1/2269.
2 Rigby to Sec. of State for India, 1 Sept. 1859, FO.84/1090.
3 Rigby to Anderson, no. 23, 1861, I.O.Secret Department/38.
4 Playfair to FO., 30 May 1865, FO.84/1245.
5 Another result of these wars was to make the Somali south of the river Juba large slave-owners themselves. Some of the implications of this are considered on page 204.
6 G.L.Sullivan (1873), 200-1;
the mainstay of the trade, especially after 1873, when the sea traffic was completely prohibited by Said Barghash.\textsuperscript{1} It is impossible to estimate, even approximately, the number of slaves taken north from Lamu along the coast to Kismayu or Brava. This was supposed to be the least profitable part of the route since the rate of mortality amongst slaves was estimated, perhaps with exaggeration, to have been at least 75\% by the time caravans had reached Bajun country, immediately north of the river Tana.\textsuperscript{2}

On the other hand, as Holmwood, an assistant of Kirk, also observed, "north of Lamu the slave trade is entirely in the hands of the Somalis who are able to work it with little further outlay than that of procuring slaves".\textsuperscript{3}

One of the more important side-effects of the McKillop expedition of 1875, however, was to give Kirk and the British Government sufficient leverage to pressure Said Barghash into completely outlawing the slave trade both by land and by sea.\textsuperscript{4} The Sultan's edict

\textsuperscript{1}Kirk to FO., 20 June 1871, FO.84/1344; "Memorandum on the Somali Slave Trade", encl. in Kirk to G., 31 May 1873, FO.84/1374; Capt. Ward to Rear-Admiral Gumming, 31 Dec. 1874, FO.CP.2624. See also R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa 1856-1890 (London, 1939), chapter x.

\textsuperscript{2}Holmwood to Prideaux, 17 Nov. 1874, FO.84/1400.

\textsuperscript{3}ibid.

\textsuperscript{4}See my forthcoming article in the J.A.H., on Kirk and the McKillop expedition.
to this effect appears to have been largely effective, due to its energetic implementation at the Benadir ports; and despite the fact that one Arab Governor was murdered for too vigorously suppressing the slave trade, Kirk estimated that at the end of 1876 the trade in slaves was virtually at an end north of Lamu.¹

Thereafter, it revived occasionally but never on a large scale. In 1884, when a lack of rain led to a failure of crops and famine amongst the WaNyika, children were exchanged for food. It was said that large numbers of Somali were bringing herds of cattle to Lamu to exchange for children, but the trend did not last.² The Somali, however, continued to acquire slaves from razzias, though this was an inefficient method of collection and did not yield large numbers. The canoe trade by night, which was also small-scale, could not be entirely suppressed either.³

The most interesting feature of the Juba/Tana coastal trade is that it was not linked to any inland caravan routes. The river Juba itself was not used as a trade route, and the Bajun traders distributed their wares only on the coast.⁴ If goods found their way inland it was through unorganised and chance exchange. This

¹K. to D., 11 Dec. 1876, FO.84/1454; K. to D., 5 Jan. 1877, FO.84/1484.
²Haggard to Kirk, 8 Sept. 1884, FO.84/1678.
³Simons to E.-S., 24 June 1890, FO.84/2062; K. to G., 16 March 1884, FO.84/1677.
⁴See: V.L.Grottanelli (1955), 85, 144.
and the desire of the Boran to bypass the Benadir ports. But in 1870 itself Kismayu was still only a village of sixty families living in reed huts; five years later, however, a stone fort had been built, over one hundred Zanzibar troops were stationed there, and an estimated 1,000 Somali were living in this burgeoning town. Nevertheless, it is true to say that trade on the coast between the Juba and Tana had no hinterland of any significance, and it was the initiative of the Boran in the interior that led to contacts with the coast, and not the other way round.

The long-distance caravan trade linked Lugh, which was situated more than four hundred miles up the river Juba, with the Benadir ports. At the end of the 18th century Lugh had a reputation for its trade in ivory and slaves, though cattle, goats and sheep were also exchanged there. Imports consisted largely of Surat cloth and dungaree, as well as copper wire, lead and iron, which were turned into spearheads and other articles of war by craftsmen in the town itself. The importance of Lugh lay in its position as the terminal of an important caravan route, and a commercial centre with an enormous economic catchment area that extended along

1 Churchill to Sec. of State for India, 8 Nov. 1870, I.0. Secret Department/49; K. to D., 11 Nov. 1875, no. 158, FO.84/1417.
2 Seton, 1801, I.0. Marine Records Misc. 586; Smee & Hardy, T.B.G.S., (1844), 59.
the whole of southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya, almost as far west as Lake Rudolf itself.

Trade between Lugh and the coast was highly organised, since the Benadir ports were open to shipping for less than four months in the year. Also it was only during two months that ships could sail from the coast to Zanzibar, where most of the ivory and hides were exported. Caravans had to return from the interior in time to be able to sell their goods for export, and they had to leave for the interior when the goods they were importing had arrived.

Most caravans went inland at the beginning of the north-east monsoon in December, and returned two and a half to three months later. During the first half of the 19th century, caravans probably did not go further inland than Lugh, while presumably the Boran brought their goods to the town where they were bartered. Nevertheless, there is an account of a Somali crossing the river Juba before 1840 to trade with the Oromo (Wardai Galla), but no indication of how far west he went or whether this was an isolated incident. It may also be significant that Galla was the language

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1Guillain (1859), II, p.534.
2W. Christopher, T.B.G.S. (1844), 393; D'Abbadie (1890), 16; C.P.Rigby, T.B.G.S. (1844).
3D'Abbadie (1890).
of commerce and was also spoken at Lugh. But with the defeat of the Wardai around 1848, and the presence of Garre Somali to the west of the river Juba, caravans from the coast ventured much further inland and the Somali began to extend their journeys into Boran country itself. Gradually they attempted to monopolise this trade and it became tightly controlled by the Garre and the Rer Galana around Lugh. Traders from other Somali clans were discouraged and, if they persevered, taxed, while non-Somali traders, and especially the Boran, were actively prevented from sending their caravans to Lugh at all.

The 1850s, then, was a period when Somali penetration of the area to the west of the Juba was gradually advancing. The explorer Chanler was clearly mistaken in his view that the first Somali/Rendille trade contacts dated to 1888. Well over twenty-five years before that the Somali had begun to trade with the Rendille nearly lake Rudolf. But that was not all. They had also established contact with the Konso and Burghi, to the north-west of the Boran, and with the Samburu to the south. It is also quite possible

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1L. Vannutelli & Co. Gitermi (1899), 83.
2Guillian (1859), II, 534ff; V. Ferrandi (1903), 316.
3Chanler to IBEACo., 22 Sept. 1893, F0.2/59.
4Léon des Avanchers (1859), 393ff; Wakefield (1870), 323ff; G.L. Sullivan (1873), 44; L. Vannutelli & Co. Gitermi (1899), 199.
that they had reached Mt. Marsabit by the 1860s and, if not, they nevertheless knew of it from the Boran.  

However, one result of this growing Somali domination of all long-distance trade with Lugh was to make the Boran search for some alternative route. Since around 1830 to 1840 the Boran had apparently sent at least one caravan to Bardera, yet the destruction of that town in 1845 halted any further development of trade in that direction.  

With the rebuilding of Bardera in 1862, however, and increasing rivalry between Bardera and Lugh, the Boran began to send their exports to the former. Moreover, the route to Bardera passed through El Wak which was a convenient stopping-place on the way to Kismayu; and after 1875 the Boran began to experiment with sending the odd caravan down to the mouth of the Juba when political conditions permitted.  

But while it is possible to trace the gradual evolution of long-distance trade routes in northern Kenya, it is much more difficult to be at all precise about the actual quantity of trade that passed through.

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1 Somali traders mentioned 'Saku' to Avanchers, and this is the Boran name for Mt. Marsabit, see footnote 1.

2 "Breve Monografia di Bardera", anon., n.d. ASMAI. Posiz. 171/1-5.

3 V. Ferrandi (1903), 316; J. Christie (1876), 184; F.G. Dundas, "Expedition up the Juba river", G.J., III n.s. (1893), 219.

4 E.G. Ravenstein, P.R.G.S. (1884), 268; K. to D., 6 April 1876, FO.84/1453.
that was carried on, or even to be certain of which goods were the most important items of trade. Throughout the 19th century there are vague and rather unspecific references to ivory and slaves being exchanged at Lugh. Guillain, a French sailor who visited the East African coast in 1848, claimed that most ivory exported from the Benadir ports came from Lugh and also mentioned that 1,000 frasilahs were shipped that year from Mogadishu. But even his detailed figures are of little value since the bulk of the trade between Lugh and the Benadir was carried on at Brava, and Guillain had no figures relating to exports from that town.1

Thus, almost nothing is known about the slave trade that is said to have flourished at Lugh, of how it was organised or whence the slaves were procured. The Galla apparently did trade in slaves and bought some from the Konso. But amongst the southern Boran slaves were rare, and slavery did not play an important part in the traditional Galla social system. Possibly more Boran became slaves than owned them, though where the bulk of the slaves that were bartered at Lugh came from remains a mystery.2

At the same time, the Somali were not the only people who were penetrating into the savannah lowlands of northern Kenya. This area

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1 Guillain (1959), II, 534. 1,000 frasilahs = 37,000 lb. approx.
2 V. Luling (1965), 15.
was also being approached from the south by Swahili traders. Thus, by the 1860s, Swahili caravans had reached Mt. Marsabit, though most stopped at Reya, a short distance to the south, and also the Lorian Swamp.\(^1\) It was important that the Samburu and the Rendille, who had come into contact with the Somali in the 1850s, should in the course of the following decade have become "accustomed to Swahili traders".\(^2\) This contact between the Samburu and the Swahili was also probably facilitated by the occasional movement southwards of the former towards Isiolo district.\(^3\) But the Swahili also outflanked the Samburu, and later traders such as Jumbo Kimameta penetrated to lake Rudolf where they bartered with the Turkana.\(^4\) The Kamba also participated in this trade with the Samburu, though it is said that they did not normally go further north than the Uaso Nyiro.\(^5\)

Inevitably these two trade routes, from Mombasa and Brava to the savannah plains of northern Kenya, helped to bring this area to the attention of the coast, and it cannot be entirely coincidental that when Europeans first pushed into this region, their

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\(^1\) C. New (1873), 460; J. Christie (1876), 198; Wakefield, "Notes on the Geography of Eastern Africa", *J.R.G.S.*, XL (1870), passim.

\(^2\) A.H. Newman (1898), 252.

\(^3\) J. Christie (1876), 198.


\(^5\) G. Lindblom (1916), 136.
paths corresponded fairly closely to those of earlier long-distance caravans. Thus, at the end of the 19th century, ivory poachers and hunters, adventurers of fortune, explorers and eccentric travellers all made their way towards northern Kenya. No matter how rapidly they passed through the area, they still introduced a new element into the lives of the people they met. Their very presence opened up a whole gamut of possible new relationships around which the history of this area was to turn. But if by 1890 Lake Rudolf had been explored by Europeans, while the area between the upper Juba and the lake was on the point of being opened up, the coastal region between the Juba and Tana rivers was still virtually unknown. No traveller had as yet moved more than a few miles inland there, and then only from Kismayu, Port Durnford or the mainland opposite Lamu. Beyond that lay an enormous stretch of unknown country. It is slightly ironic, therefore, that the first steps towards an administrative penetration of the northern interior were taken from this coastal area and without much success. It is perhaps not altogether surprising that when administrative posts were thrown out into the interior the river Juba proved to be an unsatisfactory line of communication, and the older route from Mombasa- (Nairobi)-Meru-Uaso Nyiro-Marsabit-Moyale turned out to be a more effective way of reaching the northern frontier district. Thus, as was to be expected, the earlier exploration
of the far interior was not followed by any prior administration of that area. It was the coast, much of it unexplored, and the coastal Somali who were first subjected to European administration, and in this respect the climacteric came in 1890 when the Imperial British East Africa Company accepted responsibility for the Juba/Tana Protectorate.
Chapter III

COASTAL DAROD AND THE I.B.E.A. CO.

The introduction first of Chartered Company rule and later of a Protectorate government appears, from an outside point of view, to mark a watershed in the history of north-eastern Kenya. Perhaps, in so far as these first steps presaged others that would lead ultimately to the imposition of administrative control throughout the area, it is justifiable to overlook "the gradualism enforced upon European Governments in this first period of their rule"¹ and to maintain instead that British power burst upon East Africa and established itself towards the end of the 19th century.² Nevertheless, as far as the pastoral tribes of northern Kenya were concerned, there does not seem to have been any immediate experience of a turning-point, while the direct impact of protectorate rule was sometimes considerably delayed, and even when it came only made itself felt slowly and by degrees.

Can it be maintained, therefore, that the initial period of the Colonial era had a special significance with regard to the

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pastoral Darod of Jubaland? Paradoxically it can, despite the fact that the administration of northern Kenya was not seriously undertaken until the second decade of the 20th century. At the same time, however, the precise nature of this significance does not seem to conform to several assumptions about Colonial involvement in Africa that have been, or are still, widely accepted.

On the one hand, it used to be suggested that though the actual extension of administration throughout Kenya was a gradual process, the appearance of Europeans in East Africa made an overwhelming impact from the very start. According to this opinion, the superiority of the British was so incontestible, and the attraction of their civilization so great, that the region to the south of the river Juba offered "an easy field for the extension of European influence when it [was] ... commercially and financially worth while", and that once the Somali had seen a few hundred white men there could "hardly be any doubt as to the result".¹ Thus, although the penetration of Jubaland was slow, this was thought to be due to economic factors and was not considered to be a reflection of the limited power at the disposal of the Colonial government. The nature and extent of Colonial involvement in East Africa were to be explained by 'European ambitions' alone; it was

¹Sir Charles Eliot (1905), 122.
taken for granted that the impact was one-sided and that African tribes had no influence over policy. ¹ According to this opinion the significance of the first part of the colonial era for the pastoral tribes of northern Kenya lay in the extent of their contact with European explorers, officials and missionaries, and in the results that were presumed to follow from this.

On the other hand, there has been an increasing tendency to emphasise how very limited were the resources available to early colonial administrations. It is now abundantly clear that European civilisation was not so overwhelmingly present in Africa that resistance to it could be brushed aside or ignored. Not only is the local situation seen to have had greater historical importance than was previously thought to be the case, but it is also sometimes considered to have been the key factor determining the shape of government plans. Thus it is stressed that there was "a lack of policy on the part of Whitehall on the one hand and local initiative on the other hand". ²

Yet it is difficult to maintain convincingly that the local agent of colonial rule could have set in motion a positive policy, if the resources at hand were at the same time really limited. In


Jubaland these resources increased significantly only when a punitive expedition had to be undertaken, and the conclusion that seems unavoidable is that "only a serious military crisis brought forth reinforcements and forced up grants-in-aid to a level which permitted some rough policing of the whole territory".¹

The necessity for considerable capital expenditure, before administration could be extended in Jubaland, was recognised by the British Consul at Zanzibar as early as 1893;² the relationship between capital expenditure and military campaigns was noted by the Swedish missionary at Kismayu, Karl Gederqvist, in 1900.³

An important aspect of this equation, local crisis plus punitive expedition equals extension of colonial involvement, lies in the knowledge that such expeditions were not sought after, and the temptation has been to argue that colonial involvement was similarly a reluctant procedure. As a result it is maintained that "the European powers sought initially no more than a light, inexpensive consular control to keep out rivals; only the necessity of putting down internal resistance led them on to become the conquerors of Africa in their own despite". According

²Rodd to Rosebery, 28 August 1893, F0.107/5.
to these arguments the initial adjustment of political relationsh­ips between African and European should be seen as a "pragmatic process in which the 'local crisis' was the key determinant, and in which the type of historical interaction can be broadly pre­dicted by the local type of African society". ¹ Thus the import­ance of colonialism was not supposed to lie in any European action but rather in the African reaction, and the historical initiative was placed almost exclusively in the hands of African peoples. According to this hypothesis, the importance of the first decade of the Colonial era in Jubaland lay in the close succession of punitive expeditions. The Colonial impact was thus measured in terms of the resistance movements it evoked.

Yet there was nothing uniform about the incidents of East African resistance.² In the face of a local crisis the admini­stration of Jubaland was as likely to contract as it was to expand. Furthermore the relationship between the I.B.E.A. Co. and the Ogaden and Herti Darod was strikingly complex. The rivalry of clans, and even of diya-paying sections, led to varying groups of friendly segments. The Somali reaction to the Company's presence was far from uniform, and it is not possible to generalise about


the motives that led some sections to cooperate and others to resist.

To the Ogaden and to the Herti, the fundamental significance of the first two decades of colonial rule lay in the reversal it entailed of the relationship between Afmadu and Kismayu. Ever since the Galla had come down to the coast in the 16th century, and perhaps even earlier still, Kismayu had been dominated from Afmadu and the Deshek Wama. Both the Galla and the Somali had imposed their own terms upon the Arab villages near the mouth of the river Juba, and from the interior they had controlled the coastal centres of trade. It was this process that had been irretrievably reversed. The Herti eventually accepted that they had lost control over Kismayu, but only after they had experienced several years of Company rule, and it was considerably longer before the Ogaden at Afmadu adopted a similar attitude.

Kismayu was a growing centre of power, one that increasingly overshadowed the interior and which, as a result, emphasised the dichotomy of Ogaden pastoralism. For until 1909 the threat to the Ogaden Somali was limited to the attempted extension of government control over Afmadu, and those segments that were closely connected with the coastal plains had to compromise in their relationship with the administration. But there were also other segments that could more easily retreat further into the interior towards Wajir and El Wak. These could adopt a hostile attitude towards the government.
without suffering the consequences. Access to the interior beyond Afmadu, however, was limited largely to the camel-owning segments of the Ogaden, while those that owned cattle alone were more ecologically tied to the coast with its better grazing.¹ This distinction between cattle and camel-owning segments explains to some extent the variable relationship between the Ogaden and the government during the first two decades of their administration.

But the first years of the Company's rule were dominated by treaty making, and the Company's aims were not immediately grasped by the Somali. It was probably for this reason that the Somali did not seem to experience any significant turning-point at the start.

In July 1890, Britain and Germany had ratified an agreement defining their respective spheres of influence in East Africa.² Shortly afterwards Britain had also come to an understanding with Italy, whereby she agreed to renounce any claim to the coast or hinterland immediately north of the river Juba.³ These were the diplomatic preliminaries that paved the way for the establishment of British rule. As an indirect result of these negotiations, the


I.B.E.A. Co., to which the administration of the British sphere of influence had been entrusted, undertook the government of Jubaland in two distinct steps.

In the first place, the Anglo-German agreement of July 1890 had involved the abolition of the German Witu Protectorate, which extended from the river Tana to Kismayu, and in November 1890 Britain declared a Protectorate over this area. The Company assumed control of this Juba-Tana Protectorate from January 1891, but, as a result of negotiations with the Italians, it was not until the following July that they undertook the administration of Kismayu and its ten-mile radius. As long as the Company retained control over both these sections of Jubaland, the potential weakness inherent in this artificial division went unobserved. Yet when the I.B.E.A. Co. was later faced with the necessity of abandoning the Juba-Tana Protectorate, Kismayu was virtually isolated from the interior, and the British Government's approach to developments around Afmadu and the Juba was governed by events far to the south, in Witu and along the river Tana, the area to which Afmadu had been unrealistically linked.

1 This Protectorate, declared by Britain on 19 Nov. 1890, was referred to in dispatches as either the 'Juba-Tana Protectorate' or as the 'Northern Protectorate'. It is better known, however, as the Witu Protectorate and thus confused with the Witu Sultanate which was integrated into the Protectorate in December 1890.

2 The Delimitation Commission of 1885-6 had agreed that the Sultan of Zanzibar's possessions included Kismayu and a ten-mile radius.
The dominant motive behind the foundation of the I.B.E.A. Co., which received its charter on 3 September 1888, had undoubtedly been commercial, though there had also been a strong desire to further Imperial interests and to combat the slave trade.\(^1\) However, in the last analysis, the success or failure of the Company must be judged in purely financial terms, since the undertaking to administer large areas of British East Africa was subordinated to economic rather than political ends.

The first concern of the I.B.E.A. Co. in the Juba-Tana area, after it had received its charter, was to isolate the German Witu Company, already operative there, and to stake a prior claim, if possible, to the interior beyond the German Protectorate.\(^2\) Thus the Company attempted to forestall the German explorer, Dr. Peters, on the river Tana, and to prevent Von Toeppen, manager of the German Witu Company, from making treaties with the Somali to the north-west.\(^3\) The I.B.E.A. Co.'s strategy consisted in claiming pre-emptive treaties of friendship with the local tribes, despite the fact that these were generally signed after the German Protectorate had been officially declared in the area, and were therefore illegal.\(^4\) In fact Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary, found


\(^2\)Portal to Salisbury, 27 Oct. 1889, F0.84/1984.

\(^3\)Sandys to Portal, 21 July 1889 in P. to S., 29 July 1889, F0.84/1979; Simons to IBEA Co., 24 Oct. 1889, F0.CP.6025.

\(^4\)However a number of treaties did pre-date the declaration of a
it necessary to warn the Company's agents to be "circumspect in their negotiations and treaties with local chiefs and not precipitate matters as regards Witu". Thus, from the very start, the treaty of friendship was to play a crucial role in the Company's aims. It both conferred a theoretical legality on any intervention in the area and was also a preliminary step towards the peaceful penetration of the interior.

As a result of this attempt to outflank the German Protectorate, the Company, almost inevitably, attached far greater importance to securing the friendship of those Somali clans that lived in the interior, instead of those that lived on the coast. It appeared to the Company, therefore, that the Ogaden were the first people that they needed to deal with and that the Herti, who were largely confined to the environs of Kismayu, could be approached later. This assumption was further reinforced by the knowledge that Murgham Yusuf, head of the Ogaden, was a "trader on a large scale" who had dealings with a French commercial firm, and that any arrangements made with him were bound to have a favourable economic, as well as political, repercussion. Nevertheless,

German Protectorate, see: S. to Hatzfeldt, 12 Nov. 1889, FO.CP. 6025. Also: P. to S., 29 July 1889, FO.84/1979; FO. to P., 29 Oct. 1889 tele. FO.84/1983.

1 FO. to Mackinnon, 2 Sept. 1889, FO.CP.5977.
2 S. to IBEACo., 24 Oct. 1889, FO.CP.6025.
3 Simons to Evan-Smith, 26 May 1890, FO.84/2062.
it was also considered important that the Germans should be
denied the opportunity of making further treaties with the Herti,
for Denhardt's treaty with Sheikh Ismail in 1885 was considered
an advantage that needed to be neutralised.

In order to make it easier to open negotiations with
the Somali, Mackenzie, the Company's chief representative in
East Africa, tried to secure the services of Dualla, a Somali
who had acquired a certain notoriety through accompanying Stanley
on his previous journeys and who had also been with Count Teleki to
lake Rudolf in 1888.\textsuperscript{1} However, Dualla who was then in Aden was
unobtainable, and so on 30 September 1889, Simons, the Company's
agent at Lamu, sent Ali Mohamed, a Herti Somali from Kismayu,
to make preliminary arrangements with Murgham Yusuf, head of the
Ogaden, and Shurwar Ismail, Sultan of the Herti, in anticipation
of his own visit a few months later.\textsuperscript{2} It was hoped that Ali Mohamed
would persuade these two leaders to assemble all the other Somali
clan headmen for a baraza with Simons which was to take place
at Lama Dat and at which some 30 chiefs were expected to be present.\textsuperscript{3}
Although the plan was a shrewd one it was ineptly followed up.

\textsuperscript{1}Mackenzie to Sec. IBEACo., 2 Dec., 1889 and IBEACO. to FO., 2 Jan. 1890,
FO.84/2072.
\textsuperscript{2}S. to IBEACo., 24 Oct. 1889, F0.CP.6025.
\textsuperscript{3}Simons to IBEACO., 26 Sept. 1889, F0.CP.6051.
For when Simons arrived at Kismayu in January 1890, he attempted to negotiate immediately with the Ogaden and refused first to make a treaty with the Herti. Although this reflected the greater importance attached by the Company to an agreement with the Ogaden, it was nevertheless a serious miscalculation. It underestimated the ability of the Herti to prevent any contact with the interior without their consent. It also presupposed that the liwali of Kismayu, Hamed bin Hamed, would be able to act as an effective counterweight to Herti opposition.

In fact one reason why Simons had overlooked the importance of gaining support from the Herti Somali was that he had counted on the backing of the liwali, judging him to be a strong man capable of independent action. Yet the liwali had almost no power of his own, and faced with the determination of the Herti that Simons should not proceed inland, he could only temporize. First, he refused Simons permission to go inland on the grounds that his letter of introduction was inadequate. Then, later, he called a baraza of the Herti, to whom the purpose of Simon's visit was explained, though it had already become well known. Ali Nahar, one of the most influential elders of the Herti, was particularly explicit in stating that the I.B.E.A.Co. would have to come to

1E.-S. to S., 13 March 1890, F0.84/2060: Mackenzie to E.-S., 24 April 1890, F0.84/2061.
terms with them before they could make contact with the Ogaden, and this view was also expressed by other elders. After that, every obstacle was placed in Simons's way, and he had to leave Kismayu having achieved nothing, though having gained the knowledge that the Somali had "the upper hand". 1

In April Simons visited Kismayu again. This time he was accompanied by McKenzie, who then sailed further north to inspect the Benadir ports. 2 Simons now had a personal letter of introduction addressed to the liwali from the Sultan of Zanzibar, and he also approached the local Mijertein Herti of Kismayu first, before attempting to deal with the Ogaden. Nevertheless the bargaining was tough, and Simons was subjected to a ruthless process of intimidation designed to make him raise his offer. Eventually the Mijertein agreed to accept payment of 3,000 dollars and a monthly stipend of 750 rupees. 3 However, the figure was not considered final till McKenzie had visited the port again, and confirmed the figure, since the Somali hoped he might increase it.

McKenzie's arrival led to assurances that the Company was not prepared to pay any more, and the Mijertein were therefore

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1 S. to E.-S., 26 May 1890, FO.84/2062; S. to E.-S., 23 Jan. 1890, FO.84/2059; E.-S. to S., 27 Jan. 1890 tele. FO.84/2069.

2 M. to E.-S., 24 April 1890, FO.84/2061.

3 There were 15 Rs. and 7 dollars to the £.
given the amount already agreed to. The bargaining should have been over but, in fact, it had hardly begun. For while the Mijertein accepted the payment made to them, they refused at the same time to sign the treaty of friendship and demanded more money. Their intransigence was not without its logic, for Ali Nahar, who owned property at Lamu and travelled frequently along the coast, was told by the liwali of Malindi, Said bin Hamed, that the Company was prepared to pay considerably more if sufficient pressure was exerted. Said bin Hamed had been travelling with McKenzie and his hint that larger payments might be made destroyed any hope of an early settlement.¹

Simons had to begin bargaining again, only this time his life was openly threatened. The Somali expressed their dislike for Christians, wadad were hired to pray for his death, and maximum pressure was brought to bear upon him. Already outmanoeuvred, and unable to face the combined demands of the Herti, Simons attempted to detach several segments by bargaining directly with each one. He managed in this way to come to an agreement with the Warsangeli and Dolbahanti Herti segments, promising the former 225 Rs. and the latter 81 Rs. a month. For a time the Mijertein remained obstinately uncooperative but finally the Omar Mahmoud and the Ismail

¹E.-S. to S., 21 June 1890, FO.84/2062.
Mahmoud segments of the Mijertein settled for a monthly payment of 185 Rs. each. The remaining Mijertein, finding themselves out of step, had to ask Ali Nahar to intercede on their behalf and they also agreed to the Company's terms. Simons, however, had no doubt that the Mijertein would again cause trouble in order to increase their pay. When that happened he suggested that a firm policy should be adopted, that all payments should be stopped, and their leaders imprisoned. In the meantime he was particularly anxious to limit communications with the northern Somali coast, and to prevent any further migration of Herti Somali from the north to Kismayu lest the growing numbers of Mijertein ultimately proved too strong for the Company. But these two hints of possible trouble in the future were wrapped in a cocoon of self-congratulatory paragraphs that did much to dispel any fear of future complications.

Before Simons had left Kismayu he had signed treaties not only with the Herti, but also with the Ogaden, and as a result he claimed to have annexed "the Somali country extending from the river Tana in direct line to the river Juba". Yet the appearance

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1 Simons to McKenzie, "Report on a visit to Kismayu and Mission respecting Ogaden Somalis", 26 May 1890, FO.84/2062.

2 S. to M., "Report", 26 May 1890, FO.84/2062.

3 S. to E.-S., 31 May 1890, FO.84/2062.
of success was largely an illusion. The majority of the Mijertein Herti were dissatisfied with their payments and consequently ill-disposed towards the Company. It also seems likely that in the process of bargaining Simons had lost sight of the necessity of proportioning payments according to Herti customary law. In these circumstances it was particularly dangerous for the I.B.E.A. Co. to ignore the resentment that their payments were causing. Moreover, although the Company had now signed treaties with the Ogaden, Murgham Yusuf had not himself come down to the coast; he was undoubtedly playing a waiting game, as were most other important Somali elders, and gaining kudos by bringing dollars to the Somali without selling them to the infidel.

Within a month, however, the urgency of treaty-making had disappeared, and the Anglo-German agreement of June 1890 ensured that the whole of the Juba-Tana area would come within the British sphere of influence. So the Company now delayed taking any further action. Another reason for procrastination lay in the I.B.E.A. Co.'s unsatisfactory relationship with the Italian Government.

In August 1889 the Company had unwisely agreed to the joint occupation and equal control of Kismayu with Italy;¹ this agreement had been intended to break a deadlock in delicate Italian-Zanzibar negotiations, and while it was successful in this respect,

¹Sir P. Anderson, Minute, 30 July 1894, FO.45/720.
it later proved to have been an extremely embarrassing concession. Although at one point it appeared to the British Consul at Zanzibar that the Company was thinking of sub-letting Kismayu to the Italians, the Directors were in fact soon trying to secure the port for themselves alone.

At first the Company suggested to Catalani, the Italian Ambassador in London, that since the river Juba had been recognised as the frontier between the British and Italian spheres of influence, and since neither party - or so it was alleged - had realised that Kismayu was ten miles to the south of the river, it should now belong to the Company alone. A few months later, McKenzie was suggesting to the British Government an additional argument why the Company should have complete control over Kismayu. He emphasised how the Somali there were "disgusted and disappointed at finding themselves turned over to the administration of the Italians" and claimed that this would gravely compromise British efforts in the area. Moreover, the Company's Directors maintained that since treaties had been signed with the local Somali,

1"Agreement between IBEACO. and Italian Government", 3 Aug. 1889, F0.84/1962. It has also been suggested that this agreement was made to frustrate German ambitions, see: De Kiewiet (1955), 141.

2E.-S. to S., 13 March 1890, F0.84/2060.

3IBEACO. to Catalani, 24 May 1890, F0.84/2083.

4E.-S. to S., 29 April 1890, F0.84/2061; IBEACO. to F0., 11 June 1890, F0.84/2083.
they alone had the right to exercise control over tribes in
their territory.¹ McKenzie then warned the Italians on the im-
practicability of joint administration, and threatened to with­
hold the Company's representative if joint occupation were
insisted upon.² For a time the Company also played with the idea
of trying to administer Kismayu without the agreement of the
Italians, and the Foreign Office was approached for permission
to appoint the liwali of Lamu as the Company's agent at Kismayu.
This request, however, was refused with the reminder that it was
ultra vires to act in a spirit contrary to the earlier agreement
with the Italian Government.³

The Anglo-Italian mésentente was resolved towards the
middle of 1891, and the British Company was then confronted with
the task of undertaking the administration of Kismayu. The timing
was not auspicious. At the beginning of 1891, the old Herti-Ogaden
rivalry had once again flared up; the liwali had been sent 100
troops to strengthen his position, but trade up the river Juba was
obstructed and the interior was very unsettled.⁴

¹ IBEACO. to Signor Dossi, 24 July 1890, FO.0.C.P.6051.
² Memo. handed to Catalaní by McKenzie, 29 July 1890, FO.0.C.P.6051.
³ FO. to IBEACO., 4 Dec. 1890, FO.84/2096; IBEACO. to FO., 20 Nov.
  1890, FO.84/2095.
⁴ S. to S., 27 March 1891, FO.84/2147.
Yet the Company's policy hinged on the prospect of active trade. It depended on the ability to place steamers on the river Juba, so that caravans could be diverted from Brava to Kismayu. It was also to be trade along the Juba that would open up the country around Bardera and even the northern portion of Borana.¹

Not only that, it was to be trade with the Boran and the Wagosha that would lead to the taming of the Somali, and McKenzie argued that,

the Somali barrier between these two powers (the Wagosha and the Boran Galla) is ... capable of being broken down by means of well organised and frequent caravans and once these two powers come into contact, there will be a powerful lever at hand to hold the lawless Somali in check, and bring him rapidly under civilizing influence. The opening of the river Juba to navigation is, I consider, second only in importance to the construction of a railway to the Victoria Nyanza.²

In short, trade was to have special political as well as economic functions.

However, before the Company's caravans could achieve any of these admirable results, they had first to be able to enter Somali territory, and it was acidly pointed out by General Mathews, who commanded the Sultan's troops that,

although treaties have been made with the Somalis, the Company are now unable to enter their territory and should they attempt it, at the present time, with their weak administration they would be attacked.³

¹S. to E.-S., 26 May 1890, FO.84/2062.
²M. to E.-S., 24 April 1890, FO.84/2061.
³L.W.Mathews, "Notes on the Political Map forwarded by the IBEACO.", 16 June 1891, FO.84/2153.
There could be no doubt at all that the treaties of friendship so far signed, had granted the Company no rights whatsoever. On the other hand, the Somali and the Company both wished to trade. Nor did the Somali mind trading with Europeans, provided they stayed in Kismayu. Yet it was this proviso that wrecked the chance of a purely peaceful penetration of the Jubaland coast.

The previous Arab administration had been accepted because it did not interfere with the Somali, and the Company likewise kept the peace for as long as it followed a 'policy of non-interference'. This was a policy full of contradictions. On the one hand non-interference ruled out the possibility of active Company trading in the interior which was so central to the I.B.E.A.CO.'s designs. On the other hand, it also prevented the establishment of close contact with the Wagosha and made it certain that the Somali would not be outflanked. This theoretical policy of administration by trade, and of trade without interference, was a non-starter. It may have provided an abstract justification for the absence of administrative machinery, but it was to be a manifestly inadequate basis on which to maintain the Company's presence at Kismayu.

1 Ainsworth to De Winton, 29 Nov. 1890, FO.84/2066.

2 E.-S. to S., 13 March 1890, FO.84/2060.

3 E.-S. to S., 4 March 1890, FO.84/1977.
The I.B.E.A.Co. lacked the necessary staff to administer the Jubaland coastline, and the economic prospects did not justify, according to the Company, the sort of expenditure that alone might have led to an effective influence and direction over events in the interior.\(^1\) The most that they were prepared to do was to station an agent at Kismayu who could accomplish little beyond the collection of customs duties.\(^2\)

At first sight, then, there was a striking similarity between the British Company, and the earlier Arab, administration at Kismayu. In both cases there was a notable absence of political control, and what little evidence of administration there was centred on the collection of custom dues. Yet the underlying weakness of Arab administration was not just that it was spread too thinly over too wide an area. It had also been far too static, and the garrison at Kismayu had remained unchanged for years; the soldiers had intermarried with local Somali women and their sympathies and allegiance had become identified with the local Somali interests.\(^3\) As a result, the liwali had little independent power of his own, while his soldiers were more likely

\(^1\) E.-S. to S., 23 Feb. 1891, FO.84/2152.


\(^3\) E.-S. to S., 4 March 1889, FO.84/1977.
to represent the Somali viewpoint in any dispute.

Ironically, after the I.B.E.A.Co. first arrived at Kismayu, its first objective was also to represent as far as possible the Somali viewpoint, in the hope of gaining their sympathy. It was not realised at the time that this would entail a corresponding diminution of the Company's authority. But while the liwali had tended to side with the Herti, the Company concentrated on winning the friendship of the Ogaden. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the Ogaden should have sought every advantage from their new relationship with the Company, and that they should have exploited their position to the full.

Simons, who had already concluded treaties of friendship with the local Somali, was appointed the Company's first superintendent at Kismayu. He was almost immediately faced with three demands from Murgham Yusuf and the Ogaden, designed to test the Company's willingness to be helpful. First, the removal of the liwali was requested, then a claim for bloodmoney from the Sultan of Zanzibar was pressed and, finally, larger monthly payments were asked for.

The removal of the liwali only took a few months. It was widely acknowledged that Hamed bin Hamed got on extremely badly with the Ogaden, and Berkeley, the Company's chief administrator advised his removal from the post. Hamed had already undermined his position by informing Berkeley that in his view the best way
to deal with the Ogaden was to fight them, at the same time requesting a large consignment of Maxim guns.\(^1\) Suliman bin Hamed was appointed in his place and he was thought to be very popular with the Muhammad Zubeir.\(^2\)

However, the question of a claim for bloodmoney was more involved. In November 1891, Murgham Yusuf wrote to Simons claiming that the Sultan of Zanzibar owed the Ogaden 2,400 dollars as bloodmoney for three Somali who had been killed, and that no settlement had yet been reached. This same claim had been raised the previous year when Euan-Smith, the British Consul-General at Zanzibar, had brought the matter up with the Sultan, who promised to look into the allegation, but had subsequently let it drop.\(^3\) Berkeley now took the matter up again, frankly admitting that,

although the sum is small the matter is important to the Company... The Somalis have now placed themselves under our protection are keenly expectant as to the results of such action on their part, and will undoubtedly be very much influenced by the result of this first case in which they have asked for our intervention.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) BEACO. to FO., 23 Dec. 1891, FO.C.P.6338.

\(^2\) Berkeley to Piggott, 15 Nov. 1891, FO.84/2229.

\(^3\) E.-S. to Sir F. de Winton, 21 June 1890, FO.CP.6340.

\(^4\) B. to P., 15 Nov. 1891, FO. 84/2229.
Yet the case for the Somali claim was not very convincing. The incident was already old and, in any event, the culprits had already been punished. Also, before blood-money was paid, it was customary to produce the dead body, and in this case no bodies had ever been seen. Nor had any charges been brought until the British Company had arrived on the scene, and it looked suspiciously as though the Ogaden were using the Company's goodwill to press a worthless claim.¹

Nevertheless, the Company tried to get the British Consul at Zanzibar to put pressure on the Sultan so that the case could be reopened, while the Somali also agreed to settle for only 1,200 dollars.² Eventually, in February 1892, a Somali delegation went to Zanzibar accompanied by Mr. Lemmi, the Company's new superintendent at Kismayu. The delegation was a strong one and it was well picked. It consisted of Ahmed bin Murgham, son of Murgham Yusuf, Sheik Hassan Yiri, Murgham Yusuf's private secretary, Sheik Abdi Hersi, head of the rer Hersi segment of the Muhammad Zubeir,³ as well as Sheik Jebrail Tara, a relative of the murdered Somalis.³ However, this visit accomplished nothing positive, since the Sultan

¹P. to S., 4 March 1892, FO.84/2230.
²S. to B., 18 Jan. 1892, FO.84/2230.
³This was the section to which Murgham Yusuf belonged.
refused to admit any liability, and when the matter was taken up in London, the Principal Secretary at the Foreign Office also declined to help remaking pertinently that "this case seems pretty clear. The Company's agents wish to get credit from the Somalis by getting this claim settled".  

Yet the Company's prestige was too far involved for the matter to be dropped. Unable to get the claim settled, Berkeley hinted that the Somali might take the law into their own hands and murder the allegedly guilty Arab soldiers. Since they were unable to obtain justice, the Company, he maintained, would refuse to accept responsibility. The threat however was half-hearted, since the Arabs concerned were employed by the I.B.E.A. Co. itself, and nothing came of it. Eventually Berkeley agreed that the Company would pay the blood-money itself. The question of justice had long ceased to be either important or relevant, and he was now concerned to avoid any possible loss of face. The Sultan of Zanzibar co-operated to the extent that he wrote a letter saying that he would pay the Somali claim; later Berkeley produced this letter as evidence of a notable victory for the I.B.E.A. Co., and then paid the claim out of Company funds.

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1Sir P. Anderson, Minute, 25 March 1892, F0.84/2230. Also, F0. to IBEACO., 22 June 1892, F0.84/2252.

2P. to S., 5 May 1892, F0.84/2231.

3P. to S., 11 Aug. 1892, F0.84/2232.
The other demand made by Murgham Yusuf had been for a marked increase in the monthly payments made to the Ogaden, and the Company resisted this demand no better than the others. For nine months Simons and then Lemmi ensured that there were only marginal increases in the regular payments, but in April 1892 there was a crisis that resulted in the renegotiation of the earlier treaties and the adoption of far more generous rates of payment.

This crisis developed out of the attempt of Captain Dundas to sail up the river Juba in the Company's stern-wheeler 'Kenia'. The ship's progress was threatened by the hostile behaviour of both the Herti and the Ogaden, and when Murgham Yusuf "granted permission" for the 'Kenia' to proceed, he also made it clear that the ship had no right to be on the river without Somali authorisation which had not previously been obtained.¹

In June 1892 Berkeley visited Kismayu to settle what he imagined to be a relatively simple misunderstanding. But on arriving he found the situation much more complicated than he had anticipated. In the first place, it had become embarrassingly clear that Simons had overlooked the Herti, and that they had never given their consent to let the Company use the river Juba. Nor were they being paid enough; the Isa Mahmoud segment of the Mijertein had only

¹F.G. Dundas, "Expedition up the Jubri river through Somaliland, East Africa", G.J., I n.s. (1893), 211; IBEACO. to FO., 12 June 1892, FO.84/2232.
received payment after putting pressure on Lemmi, while other segments complained of not having been paid at all. Berkeley held a two day baraza with the Herti and eventually came to what he termed "a thoroughly friendly understanding", which meant no more than an increase in the monthly payments from 1,200 Rs. to 2,300 Rs.

Having satisfied the Herti, Berkeley now turned his attention to the Ogaden. Murgham Yusuf had been on the point of fighting with Hassan Burgham, head of the Abdulla section of the Ogaden, and they both agreed to come to Kismayu, though they had to be kept well apart from each other. First, Murgham Yusuf visited Berkeley privately and asked how much he would be paid for allowing the Company's steamer to go up the river Juba. He also insisted that previous treaties had settled aman, peace or friendship, but not ruksa or permission to go into the interior. According to Berkeley, however, the previous treaties had given the Company the right to trade inland, yet when Yusuf produced his copy of the treaty there was no mention in it of any right to travel inland. Berkeley's copy was found to be different, but both copies had been signed by Simons, the Company's representative. The rectification of this discrepancy now cost an additional 7,000 dollars, which had to be distributed to Murghan Yusuf's followers, while Yusuf was paid 1,000 dollars and his council 1,400 dollars. Monthly payments were also increased,
and in addition Yusuf was allowed to employ twenty men for a small salary to guard the Company's ship.¹

Hassan Burgham was then paid 700 dollars, and three of his men were placed on the Company's payroll. Such largess not unnaturally stimulated fresh demands from the Herti who had to be given an additional 500 dollars. Within a few weeks Berkeley had spent £2,000. This was the price the Company had to pay to secure, once again, the good-will and the cooperation of the Somali. As Berkeley himself explained, "there was no alternative except to abandon our position altogether",² yet what had these agreements secured?

The I.B.E.A.Co. now had the right to send caravans inland to trade with the Wagosha and the Boran, but they had already destroyed the possibility of building up a close relationship with the Wagosha through their defence of Somali slave-holding. The problem of slavery was of course one of the most emotive that the Company had to handle. In theory, the Company worked for the abolition of slavery.³ The instructions that had been given to their local administrators laid down that slavery was either

¹B. to IBEACo., 27 July 1892, FO.CP.6341.
²B. to IBEACo., 27 July 1892 tele., FO.84/2255.
to be abolished outright or at least discouraged. Yet the officials who came into contact with the Somali found another line more practicable.

The Somali had been particularly sensitive to any hint that slavery might be disallowed, and the Herti believed that the abolition of slavery was the 'raison d'etre' of the Company's presence at Kismayu. Simons had therefore agreed that the Company would pay compensation for any slaves that were freed. But an indication of how the Company's agents acted on the spot can be seen from Lemmi's behaviour when returning from Zanzibar with the Somali delgation. They had encountered by chance several escaped Galla slaves at that time in the care of Bishop Tucker. The Somali had demanded their slaves back and Lemmi had supported them vigorously being particularly anxious to maintain their good-will. However, it was Berkeley's visit in 1892 that showed the lengths to which the Company was prepared to go in order to satisfy the local Somali.

Both the Herti and the Ogaden claimed to be dissatisfied with the way in which their slaves escaped to the Wagosha. During

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1"Instructions to the Principal Representatives in Africa of the IBEACo", 1890, FO.84/2062.

2Gobwen Station Record Book, DC/Kism./3/1.

3C. to P., 20 March 1894, PC/CP/68/19.

Berkeley's stay at Kismayu eight of Ali Nahar's slaves escaped, and he asked what action the Company would take. Having already paid considerable sums of money to secure the friendship of the Herti, Berkeley did not feel inclined to jeopardize his relationship with them. As a result of this, Nassib Pundo, the most influential Wagosha chief, was forced to free 60 Somali slaves and agreed to turn back any further slaves who attempted to escape and seek protection in his territory. This unusual defence of slavery was then justified on the dubious grounds that slaves were enticed away from their masters or kidnapped, but for as long as it lasted the Company's relations with the Wagosha were far from friendly. Moreover, the I.B.E.A.Co. had originally planned to strengthen the Wagosha and to make an alliance with them that would act as some counter-weight to the Somali. Now the Company was weakening the one group of people who could have offset their growing dependence on the local Somali.

As it was, Berkeley's capitulation in June 1892 to the demands of the coastal Somali had failed to secure any commensurate benefit for the Company. In fact, when Todd succeeded Lemmi as the Company's superintendent, towards the end of 1892, the situation at Kismayu

1 B. to IBEACO., 13 Aug. 1892, FO.84/2250.

2 De Kiewiet (1955), 236-7; IBEACo. to FO., 19 Jan. 1894, FO.2/73.
was fast deteriorating. The most pressing and the most urgent problem consisted of the relationship between the Company and the Herti in Kismayu itself. Shirwar Ismail, the Sultan of the Herti, had been dissatisfied with the payments made to him. There was also a genuine sense of grievance amongst the Herti at the Company's preference for a close alliance with the Ogaden.¹

At the same time, Todd caused deep resentment by imprudently stating that all land in Kismayu belonged to the Company, unless a claim had been registered in Zanzibar. Most Somali owning property and land suddenly found themselves deprived of any legal title to their effects. Somali property in Kismayu was, for the most part, leased to Indians, and they therefore pressed for Todd's removal and allied themselves strongly with the Herti. Todd does not seem to have appreciated the seriousness of the complaints, and, since there was some doubt as to the legality of his arbitrary ruling, the whole problem of property rights was discreetly covered up.² Instead, the unrest was explained away by other motives.

It was suggested that the Ogaden were directly threatening the Company's position. Todd mentioned bands of fifty or more coming fully armed into Kismayu and using threatening behaviour.³

¹Todd to Scullard, 31 Jan. 1893, FO.107/10.
²Todd to R., 10 Feb. 1893, no. 47, FO.107/2; R'odd to IBEACo., 5 Jan. 1893, PO/CP/77/55; E. Coronaro, R.C., XX no. 2 (1925), 5; R. Ettore, R.C., XX no. 1 (1925), 39; C. Zoli (1927), 155; T.S. Thomas (1917), 22-23.
³Todd to Piggott, 9 Feb. 1893, FO.2/57.
As a result, Rennell Rodd, the British Consul General at Zanzibar, thought that the "Ogaden Somalis in the hinterland of Kismayu were assuming a very threatening attitude", and, as events moved towards a local crisis, it was the Ogaden who were blamed for the worsening situation.

The motive that was suggested, to explain this development of Ogaden hostility, was the dissatisfaction felt at the way in which Murgham Yusuf had distributed money paid to him by the Company. This reason is not entirely convincing. It does not account for the close alliance between the disaffected Ogaden elements and Shirwar Ismail, in the first place, and the subsequent failure of the Ogaden to support the Herti when the crisis materialised.

Amongst the Ogaden, opposition to Todd was organised by three sub-clan elders, Abdi Hirsi, Arise and Gulu Ali Hersi, all of whom had been appointed by Murgham Yusuf to act as intermediaries between the I.B.E.A.Co. and Afmadu. One reason for their appointment was that they all held property at Kismayu, lived in or near

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2 The crisis of February 1893 was blamed on the Ogaden by Rodd, supra., and recently by De Kiewiet (1955), 238.

3 R. to Rosebery, 10 Feb. 1893, FO.107/2. Dissatisfaction over the distribution of blood-money was held to be the cause of the crisis by J. Drysdale (1964), 36 and H. Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles (Aldershot, 1956), III.
the town and were, therefore, easily contactable by the Company's superintendent. But their association with Kismayu involved them, as much as the Herti, in the dispute with Todd over the Company's right to sequester property not already registered at Zanzibar. It is possible, however, that Gulu Ali Hersi had another grievance as well. He had been appointed by Berkeley to guard the Company's steam-ship 'Kenia' and had sailed up the river with Captain Dundas. But his monthly salary, and that of twenty men paid to assist him, was less than that paid to Murgham Yusuf's other assistants, and it was known that he wanted more pay. The organisation of armed bands appears to have been largely the work of Gulu Ali Hersi, and Ogaden dissatisfaction was limited mainly to those few who had interests in the town. The majority of the Ogaden, however, considered Kismayu to be essentially a Herti town, and they had little wish to get involved in a dispute that did not concern them.

By the end of January 1893, the situation at Kismayu had so deteriorated that Todd was virtually a prisoner in his own residence. He had also weakened his position by removing the liwali from Kismayu and reducing the garrison to fifteen askaris and

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2 Haffa in particular was an exclusively Herti quarter of Kismayu adjoining the stone fort. G. Ferrand, Les Comalais (Paris, 1903), 174; Berkeley, "Report on Kismayu", 8 Nov. 1891, in IBEACo. to FO., 23 Dec. 1891, FO.CP.6338; J. to H., 23 Nov. 1897, FO.107/82.
a small band of irregular viroboto. His authority was openly questioned, and Shirwar Ismail, aided by the Ogaden who had interests in Kismayu, was beginning to organise a general Herti revolt. Todd's analysis of the situation that "all trouble with these people is principally on account of the question which has arisen as to whether the Company or the Somalis are in charge of Kismayu", really only left him with one course of action; and he asked for immediate naval support to be sent so that he could re-establish his position.

Captain Scullard arrived on January 29th in the 'Widgeon' and the following day he investigated the various grievances and interviewed many of the elders of Kismayu. The trouble seemed to be limited to four individuals - Shirwar Ismail and the three Ogaden. Hadji Ahmed, who was Murghan Yusuf's chief representative at Kismayu, was thought to be friendly but not capable of restraining Arise, Gulu and Abdi Hirsi. Murghan Yusuf had also written to Todd to say that he could punish the three Ogaden malcontents and, though they might have had some local support, there was never any evidence of general Ogaden hostility. Captain Scullard came to the further conclusion that Shirwar Ismail did not have the

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1Viroboto were Arab irregulars generally from Zanzibar. It was claimed later that Todd never informed his superiors that he was reducing the garrison. IBACo. to F0., 18 April 1893, F0.2/57; Craufurd to P., 27 Jan. 1894, F0.2/73; R. to Rosebery, 10 Feb. 1893, F0.107/2.

2T. to Scullard, 31 Jan. 1893, F0.107/10.
backing of all Herti sections.\(^1\) On the other hand, it was felt that if prompt action was not taken against him, potentially friendly Herti might switch their allegiance.\(^2\) Todd's plan to arrest the four trouble-makers alone was frustrated by their unwillingness to meet him individually, and so it was agreed to call a general *baraza* on February 1st. The Herti Somali who attended were all armed and extremely nervous. They knew that there was a warship in the harbour, they may have known that there were marines concealed in the building, and they certainly suspected treachery. The critical moment in the meeting came after Todd had extracted an apology from Shirwar Ismail, and when he attempted to separate the friendly Herti from those he wished to arrest. His movements were misunderstood, and Arise, who stabbed Todd, was shot at close quarters and killed with Abdi Hirsi. General fighting then broke out, and the Herti, now all implicated in the mêlée, together backed Shirwar Ismail in his revolt.\(^3\)

The immediate effect of Todd's *baraza* was the flight of the whole Somali population of Kismayu, who took with them their possessions and livestock. The Company's employees also evacuated the town and

\(^1\)Unfortunately it is no longer possible to identify the Herti sections that were considered friendly, and though it may have included the Warsengeli and Dolbahanta, it must also have included some Mijertoin.


\(^3\)The best known account of Todd's *baraza* is to be found in T.S.Thomas (1917), 23-24 and it is followed by J. Drysdale (1964), 36 et.al. However,
boarded the 'Widgeon' in the harbour. However, the liwali of Malindi was left in charge of the town, and he proceeded to burn down the Somali huts and to destroy the township of Haffa nearby. Work was begun at once on a stockade around Kismayu, and messengers were sent to the Company's steamship 'Kenia' on the river Juba to make sure that all was safe.¹

When Rennell Rodd arrived at Kismayu on February 7th, the town was being turned into a defensive fortress capable of withstanding the most violent Somali attack. Otherwise, the Company's presence in Jubaland was confined to the 'Kenia', but its boilers did not work and its rudder needed repair. Had it been possible to move the 'Kenia', this would have been done; instead, she remained moored in midstream, a target for Somali marksmen and a liability to the Company.

Rodd's view of the crisis was surprisingly optimistic, but then he had a low regard for the Herti and the Ogaden, considering them to be cowards and poor fighters. His general impression was "that the Somali will be thoroughly cowed by the energetic handling which they have received, that the majority will now quietly submit, while some may possibly change their marauding grounds"; and he also thought that "in a waterless

¹S. to C., 7 Feb. 1893, FO.107/10; Alexander to P., Feb. 1893, FO.2/57.
country where no food is obtainable" they would soon be reduced by starvation.¹ He therefore favoured the present defensive policy, but was scathingly critical of the Company's past handling of the Somali problem.

In the first place, Rodd deplored the Company's "policy of conciliation" and advocated a system of "imposing and not pur-chasing order and submission".² He thought that the Somali now needed firm handling, and he ordered the payment of subsidies to the Herti and the Ogaden to cease from February 1893 — an order the Company subsequently endorsed.³ Rodd also felt very strongly about the way the Company had placed a young, inexperienced man like Todd at Kismayu, and then left him isolated and without proper support for fourteen months. But, more positively, he maintained that what the Company ought to have done was "to play off the Watoro (Wagosha) against the Somalis who are really afraid of them and would probably retire from the country altogether, or at any rate to a convenient distance if the former were properly encouraged", and then "if the Company would arm from ten to twenty men in each village with good muzzle loaders, supplying powder and caps, for

¹ R. to Rosebery, 10 Feb. 1893, FO.107/2.
² TBEACo. to FO. 13 April 1893, FO.2/57.
³ M.-Smith to FO., 10 Feb. 1893, FO.107/7.
which they would pay, in limited quantities, the Somali folk would soon have less 'big-heads' as they call the disease they are now suffering from". ¹

Yet Rodd seems to have missed the point that purchasing order was in the short run considerably cheaper than imposing it. For even when such a policy failed it was not the Company that bore the expense of sending a warship to re-establish order, and expense was the all important factor. In May 1893 the I.B.E.A.Co. decided to abandon Witu, since the Government would not contribute adequately to the cost of imposing order and submission in that area. ² The question as to whether the Company would remain at Kismayu was also raised, and the decision to stay was based purely on financial expectations. ³

At the same time, the Company's withdrawal from Witu made Rodd's suggestions entirely impractical, since Witu was identified with the British Protectorate of November 1890. This meant that the Company abandoned the whole of Jubaland, and, after July 31st 1893, its administration was confined to Kismayu and a ten-mile radius. ⁴ Of course it could be argued that the Company had in fact abandoned nothing, since it had never administered the area concerned, and

¹R. to Sir Percy Anderson, 14 Feb. 1893, FO.107/2.
²IBEACo. to FO., 18 and 24 May, 1893, FO.2/57.
³I have analysed the Company's financial situation at the end of this Chapter. Although there was a yearly deficit the Company did hope for improvements and did not realise how much money was being lost.
⁴IBEACo. to FO., 4 and 10 July 1893, FO.2/58.
that therefore its position was unchanged.¹ But this was not strictly true, for the Company's freedom of action was now severely limited. The payment of subsidies to the Wagosha became technically illegal, since they were outside the ten-mile limit, so the possibility of carrying out Rennell Rodd's advice, and establishing close contact with them, vanished. Furthermore, both Yonte, the headquarters of the Herti, and Afmadu, where the Ogaden were centred, were also outside the ten-mile limit, and the Company even had to juggle with figures and falsify distances just to establish a feasible position on the river Juba. All that was possible, after the abandonment of Witu, was a holding operation at Kismayu designed to maintain the Company's defensive position in the town; and between July 1893 and July 1895, when the Company finally came to an end, the policy was one of retrenchment and economy as far as was possible.

Todd's baraza of February 1st 1893 had demonstrated the danger of negotiating with the Somali from a weak position. The immediate task, therefore, of forging a workable relationship between the I.B.E.A.Co. and the Herti now went hand in hand with the attempt to strengthen the Company's position at Kismayu and at

¹This was Rodd's view, R. to Rosebery, 14 July 1893, FO.107/4.
Gobwen, on the river Juba; and the most important single factor that delayed the establishment of friendly relations was the weakness and duplicity of the Company's garrison.

By the beginning of April, a stockade had been built around Kismayu and the garrison there had been strengthened by 300 men. Todd, however, had asked for trained men to be sent and, instead, he had to make do with Hyderabad viroboto, who turned out to be undisciplined raw recruits. Almost a third of this force was immediately sent to Gobwen to protect the 'Kenia', but the town did not offer the same defensive possibilities as Kismayu. When it was visited in April by Bird Thompson, the Company's new superintendent, and W.G. Hamilton, who was in charge of the viroboto and other troops, they decided that a military camp should be built on Turki hill nearby, which would both protect the town and also control a further section of the river Juba. Though permission to begin building was requested, the work was undertaken almost at once. In the circumstances this was understandable; Gobwen needed immediate protection, while it would have been several months before authorisation to build the camp could have been obtained. But as it happened permission was never given, because

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1 R. to Rosebery, 10 Feb. 1893, FO.107/2; Farrant to Piggott, 2 Sept. 1893, FC/CP/68/19.

2 Rodd to Rosebery, 10 Feb. 1893, FO.107/2; T. to P., 1 May 1893, FO.2/58.

3 The hill was so named after McKillop's expedition of 1875 had established a temporary fort there. B.-T. to P., 13 April 1893, FO.2/58.
Bird Thompson fell seriously ill and had to be taken to Mombasa. The administration of Kismayu was, therefore, left in the hands of an inexperienced and young assistant, R.G. Farrant, and, in so far as the Company's chief administrator at Mombasa was concerned, the question of a camp on Turki hill was shelved for the present. Farrant's instructions had been to "simply carry on the work at present, letting things remain 'in statu quo' and not taking any active measures". Unaware that the construction of a camp on Turki hill had not been sanctioned, he completed the work that had already been undertaken.

This strengthening of Kismayu and Gobwen was meant to assist the opening of talks between the Company and the Herti. Apart from its purely defensive character, it was designed to show the Somali that the Company meant business and that they could not be evicted by force. In the same spirit Todd remained on at Kismayu, although he had been badly wounded, so that the Somali could not claim to have been instrumental in his departure.

After the baraza of February 1st, the Herti had retired to Yonte which had become their traditional gathering place in times of war. Throughout the month light skirmishing took place around

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1 P. to IBEACo., 23 Aug. 1893, FO.2/59.
2 P. to F., 19 July 1893, FO.2/59.
3 R. to Rosebery, 10 Feb. 1893, FO.2/59.
Kismayu, but the Herti only attacked the town once, when they were driven back by shells fired from a warship in the harbour.¹

When Captain Campbell visited Kismayu on March 22nd, the situation was much the same, except that Todd had received some indication that the Herti desired peace. To test this rumour, a messenger was sent to Yonte, and the reply was to the effect that the chiefs wanted peace and were willing to hear the Company's terms, but that they were afraid to come to Kismayu while there was a man-of-war in the harbour.² It was impossible to start negotiations straight away, since neither Ali Nahar nor Shirwar Ismail would agree to come to Kismayu, but Todd felt that a decisive step had been taken towards the establishment of peaceful relations. The Company's display of force had apparently had the desired effect, and the presence of a warship was now regarded as unnecessary and a hindrance to the further development of friendly relations with the Somali.³

As a first step towards normalising their position, the Company allowed Somali women to barter their goods in Kismayu.⁴

¹F.W. Lamb, "History of Gobwen and adjacent country and events leading to its occupation", 1911, DC/Kism/3/1; S. to C., 7 Feb. 1893, FO.107/2.
²Campbell to R., 2 April 1893, FO.107/3.
³C. to Rear-Admiral Bedford, 4 April 1893, FO.107/3.
⁴Bird Thompson to Piggott, 13 April 1893, FO.2/58.
Then, in the middle of April, Bird Thompson¹ and the chief administrator at Mombasa drafted a copy of proposed peace terms. There was to be an indemnity of 10,000 dollars and 200 guns were to be surrendered. Somali entering Kismayu were to leave their arms with the guard at the gate, and they were to be bound by the laws and regulations of the Company. Also Somali slaves who had escaped to Kismayu since the outbreak of hostilities were to be freed without compensation for the owners. The abolition of slavery, however, was not proposed since the Somali would not have agreed to this condition, and because it was unlikely that the Company would have been in a position to enforce it.²

On 4th May Ali Nahar and five other Herti chiefs came down to Kismayu, where the peace terms were read out to them outside the town, as they feared treachery. They made no reply except to say that they wanted peace, and then left. It had been agreed that they would return on May 6th. This time they did all the talking, presented their grievances, but reiterated their wish to be friends with the Company. On May 6th there was a third meeting. Bird Thompson made a few concessions; it was now agreed that the escaped slaves should be valued at 3,000 dollars, and that

¹Bird Thompson took over from Todd on May 1st 1893.
²"Proposed Peace terms", 24 April 1893, FO.2/58.
this sum could be deducted from the indemnity. Herti cattle and property destroyed in the fighting was also to be valued and the amount accepted in lieu of actual payment; so too were the 4,775 Rs. which Todd had confiscated from Indian traders and which represented the amount the Herti had placed in their hands.¹

These meetings were a success and, before leaving, three Herti agreed to sleep in Kismayu and live there permanently, as a surety for the good behaviour of the clan. The Herti were now free to trade in Kismayu, and, until the Company had ratified the peace proposals, a general amnesty was declared. As a further sign that the crisis was at an end, Sayid bin Hamed, the liwali of Malindi, now left Kismayu.²

While Bird Thompson had been negotiating with the Herti, he had discovered that the Ogaden also wished to get in touch with him. They had taken no part in the disturbances and had given no help to the Herti. Yet they had lost a certain amount of property in Kismayu and they were now asking for compensation. This claim was refused, and it was pointed out by Bird Thompson that the Ogaden had suffered loss only on account of the Herti. Writing to the chief administrator at Mombasa he said:

¹B.-T. to P., 24 April 1893 and B.-T. to P., 11 May 1893, F0.2/58.
²P. to IBEACo., 5 June 1893, F0.2/58.
I do not think that the Company would object to them taking what they wanted by force and giving the Herti a good beating as well. That this would show that they were friends of the Company and were ready to punish their enemies.¹

However, there is no evidence at this stage of the Company attempting to manoeuvre the Ogaden against the Herti. What was surprising, in fact, was the way in which the Company had abandoned its former policy of establishing a close alliance with the Ogaden. The crisis in February 1893 had led the Company to concentrate on their relationship with the Herti; it had also led to a contraction in the range of the Company's interests which made the Ogaden seem rather remote. The I.B.E.A.Co.'s new attitude towards the latter was decidedly negative, and it was largely limited to the hope that they would not support the Herti in any act of aggression.

Although it is doubtful whether an attempt to gain the active support of the Ogaden would have been successful, it was, nevertheless a possibility that the Company could not really have afforded to overlook. For oneJune 27th, Bird Thompson was taken to Mombasa seriously ill, and Farrant, who had had little experience, was left in charge. Within a few days there were rumours that the Hyderabad viroboto had decided to desert and throw in their lot with the Herti. A section had been fined for refusing to garrison Turki Hill, but from their subsequent behaviour Farrant did not

¹B.-T. to P., 11 May 1893, F0.2/53.
judge the situation to be particularly dangerous.

Yet, throughout July, Ali Nahar used the possibility of a viroboto desertion to put pressure on the Company so as to obtain a revision of the peace terms. The Herti now also claimed that Bird Thompson had made a verbal agreement on May 6th that all Herti slaves seeking refuge in Kismayu would be returned to their masters, so long as the Somali remained peaceful. They pressed for the implementation of this agreement - of which there was no record - and began to adopt a less friendly attitude.¹

On August 8th, the viroboto at Cobwen and Turki Hill told Farrant that they no longer wished to serve the Company, and asked to be paid. However, fifty-four deserted with their arms - a Snider rifle - and thirty rounds of ammunition each.² Two days later it was learnt that they had joined the Herti, and together at 4.30 a.m. on August 11th they attacked Turki Hill. Hamilton was shot through the heart, the camp was overrun. Two cannon and a considerable amount of powder was seized. A week later Kismayu was also attacked, but the Herti and mutinous viroboto were repulsed.³

¹ F. to P., 28 July 1893, PC/CP/68/19; F. to P., 11 Aug. 1893, FO.107/5.
² From Lamu Rogers telegraphed the number incorrectly as 74. This number and even higher ones occur in all later correspondence. Farrant's own estimate seems to have been correct, see: Moyse-Bartlett (1956), 112; F. to R., 10 Aug. 1893, PC/CP/68/19.
³ F. to P., 11 Aug. 1893, FO.107/5.
The garrison at Kismayu was now the second largest in the Company's concession area. It was time for strong measures, but, as Farrant observed, "it is not obvious what could be done except to strike and then retreat". Clearly vigorous action was beyond the capability of the Company's forces, and it was not until Lieutenant Lewes arrived in the 'Blanche' that a blow could be struck at the Somali. On August 23rd Lewes recaptured Turki Hill, and the Company's stern-wheeler 'Kenia', which had just been repaired, was then taken up the river Juba. The Somali villages of Hajualla, Hajowen and Magarada were destroyed and burnt; afterwards the boat returned to Gobwen where it broke down. The 'Kenia' was moored in mid-stream and then abandoned. Two friendly Arab akidas undertook to guard the boat, while all forces were withdrawn from Turki Hill and Gobwen.

The blow had been struck and the retreat had followed, but had the blow been aimed at the right people? As Rennell Rodd correctly observed, it was Ogaden villages that had been attacked and punished, and the Ogaden had not so far joined with the Herti in any act of hostility. Nor had the Company's objective been achieved, since the Herti made no attempt to come to terms. The Ogaden, on the other hand, now saw the wisdom of being accepted

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1 F. to R., 10 Aug. 1893, FO. 2/59.
2 Lewes to Senior Naval Officer Zanzibar, 25 Aug. 1893, FO. 2/59; Rodd to Rosebery, 1 Sept. 1893, no. 77, FO. 107/7.
3 Sir Rennell Rodd (1922), I, p. 335.
as friends of the Company. Hitherto they had adopted a neutral stand, waiting to see what the outcome of Herti aggression would be, and as a result of that aggression they had suffered considerable loss of property and livestock.

The possibility of establishing better relations with the Company occurred with the arrival of McDougal, on September 13th, as the new superintendent of Kismayu town and district. Realising that further punitive measures would not be undertaken, since the Company was without the resources, and that any self-imposed isolation of Kismayu town from its hinterland only resulted in a loss of income, McDougall decided to encourage the Somali to come into the town and trade.¹ A message was sent to Murgham Yusuf that no harm would come to Ogaden who traded at Kismayu, and this guarantee was almost immediately put to the test. Within a week increasing numbers of Ogaden women were coming to the town and on September 25th two important Ogaden headmen visited Kismayu. They had been trading in ivory and seemed anxious to be on good terms with the Company. This was undoubtedly a sign of growing confidence in the new administrator, but it did not mean, as McDougall supposed, that the Ogaden were "beginning to understand that we are their friends and not their foes, and that we shall give them justice as well as protection, and that finally they

¹McD. to P., 13 Sept. 1893, PC/CP/68/19.
shall have to give in.¹

This unrealistic hope, that moral suasion would achieve the same effect as force, was the typical by-product of an administration incapable of imposing its will, yet pretending to be effective. It was an illusion that justified inaction and encouraged optimism, but it achieved nothing concrete. What had probably become reasonably clear to the Ogaden, and perhaps also to some Herti, was that the British administration could not be dislodged from Kismayu. The Ogaden had accepted this position. What was only dimly understood was that the British would attempt to extend their administration into the interior, and that was a development that the Ogaden would implacably resist. Already the Herti had fought the I.B.E.A. Co. over what they considered to be an unjust extension of the Company's rights in Kismayu, and this was surely indicative of what was to be expected when any further extension was attempted.

With the advantage of hindsight, it is clear that the Ogaden had agreed to trade at Kismayu out of self-interest alone, and not because they were beginning to appreciate the Company's allegedly avuncular role. Firstly, the Ogaden benefited financially from the trade and they secured an outlet for their ivory. Secondly, they

¹Mc. to P., 26 Sept. 1893 (two letters), PC/CP/68/19.
minimised the risk of being identified with the Herti and having their property destroyed and pillaged. Also, and perhaps most important, these benefits did not involve any concomitant interference in their own autonomy.

By the end of October 1893, several Ogaden elders and their wives had come to live within the stockade at Kismayu, as a surety for the good behaviour of other members of the clan. Within two months McDougald had re-established satisfactory relations with the Ogaden, and, when Craufurd took over the district on November 28th, he attempted to maintain this position. Craufurd was successful in this, and the Ogaden remained on good terms with the I.B.E.A.Co. until July 1895. The widespread knowledge that the Company was soon to be superseded by British Government administration helped to reduce tension, and it greatly facilitated the maintenance of a cordial atmosphere. The only difficulty occurred in February 1894, when the Herti murdered an Ogaden in Kismayu and tried to cause trouble. The Ogaden fled from the town and a few days later the Herti unsuccessfully attacked Kismayu, no doubt hoping to implicate the Ogaden in this act of hostility. But, by the end of the month, Murgham Yusuf had managed to normalise the situation.

1McD. to P., 14 Nov. 1893, PC/CP/68/19.
2C. to P., 19 Feb. 1894 and C. to P., 7 Feb. 1894, PC/CP/68/19; C. to P., 21 Feb. 1894, F0.2/73.
3Murgham Yusuf to C., 28 Feb. 1894 in P. to IBEACo., 11 April 1894, F0.2/74.
The Company, however, was still faced with two serious problems that were not to be solved until eight months before they left Kismayu. On the one hand, there was their relationship with the Herti and, on the other hand, closely associated with this, there was the problem of making their presence at Kismayu appear to be unassailable. The mutiny of the Hyderabad viroboto had created doubt amongst some Herti sections about the Company's ability to maintain its position at Kismayu, and this doubt persisted. The wali of Kismayu, who was once more Hamed bin Hamed, encouraged the Herti to believe that together they could get rid of the administration. Also the viroboto were replaced by one hundred of the akida of Mbaruk's men, who proved to be equally unreliable. They virtually mutinied on 30 March 1894, and had to be confined to barracks before being sent away.¹

The Company's less orthodox attempts to strengthen its position were even less successful. In February 1893, Said bin Hamed had suggested that runaway slaves should be armed, but, although Bird Thompson and McDougall approved of the idea, no more than twenty were ever given systematic training.² A more serious suggestion was that the Wagosha should have been armed,³

¹C. to P., 9 April 1894, FO.2/74; C. to P., 24 April, 1894, PC/OP/68/19.
²P. to IBBACo., 12 June 1893; B.-T. to P., 11 May 1893; B.-T. to P., 13 April 1893, FO.2/38.
³They did have some guns, though this was perhaps not known to the Company's administrators. Lloyd Mathews had supplied them with 500 Enfields in the reign of Barghash. H. to S., 1 Oct. 1897, FO.107/80.
and in fact Nassib Pundo had asked for guns and ammunition so that he could assist the Company in their efforts to subdue the Herti.\textsuperscript{1} Ronnell Rodd strongly advocated the arming of between ten and twenty Wagosha in each of their villages, and then using them to support the administration.\textsuperscript{2} But it was feared by Farrant and Piggott, the chief administrator at Mombasa, that guns given to the Wagosha might fall into the hands of the Somali, and also that once armed it might later prove difficult to disarm them if necessary.\textsuperscript{3} So, although the Company's avowed policy was to supply the Wagosha with a limited number of guns, about 75, this was never done.\textsuperscript{4}

After 31 July 1893 the Company's activities were restricted to a ten-mile radius around Kismayu, and legally they were unable to do anything outside this area.\textsuperscript{5} So while the Wagosha repeatedly asked for arms, the Company was unable to carry out its policy, and, instead, had to resort to interesting the Zanzibar Government in the matter. It was suggested that, in return for supplying a

\textsuperscript{1}T. to P., 1 May 1893, F0.2/58; Nassib Pundo to C., 12 March 1894, F0.2/74.

\textsuperscript{2}R. to Sir P. Anderson, 14 Feb. 1893, F0.107/2.

\textsuperscript{3}F. to P., 26 July 1893, PC/CP/68/19; P. to S., 20 Feb. 1893, in IBEACO. to F0., 22 Sept. 1893, F0.2/59.

\textsuperscript{4}IBEACO. to F0., 19 Jan. 1894, F0.2/73; C. to P., 28 Nov. 1893, PC/CP/68/19.

\textsuperscript{5}This sentence only refers to the Company's position in Jubaland.
few guns, agricultural implements and seeds, to the Wagosha, they could expect an annual income of £100,000 a year. From a Company that was going bankrupt the suggestion must have been taken with a pinch of salt, and it was not acted upon.¹

The I.B.E.A.Co.'s weakness was clearly a source of hope for the Herti Somali that they might regain their original position in Kismayu, and until September 1894 they maintained their hostile attitude. Yet despite the mutinies of the viroboto and Mbaruk's soldiers, no attack on Kismayu was ever successful, and it must eventually have been realised that with the support of the navy the position could be held. It is not certain what eventually led the Herti to begin negotiations with the Company. One suggestion was that the cattle plague from 1891 to 1894 had resulted in an appalling loss of livestock which was leading to famine.² Another factor prompting them towards a settlement was that at the beginning of 1894, the Herti, who had been defeated by the Wagosha, wanted to make peace with them and the latter refused, until the Somali had first come to terms with the Company.³

¹However a few Wagosha who lived within Kismayu District were armed and trained by the Co. in 1895. C. to K., 12 April 1894, F0.107/19.
²C. to P., 21 Feb. 1894, F0.2/73.
³C. to P., 20 Feb. 1894, PC/CP/68/19; H. to S., 1 Oct. 1897, F0.107/80. See also the interesting reference in L. Robecchi Bricchetti (1899), 209.
Several Herti sections were undoubtedly thinking of making peace as early as January 1894, but then changed their minds. In February 1894, Ali Nahar learnt that there was going to be a change of administration and that the British Government would take over from the I.B.E.A.Co. At the same time, he was advised by friends in Zanzibar not to make peace until the change had taken place. It was this advice, coupled with the liwali's suggestion that the Company could be made to leave, that delayed a détente for several months.¹

However, on September 10th 1894, peace was concluded. The Herti surrendered the two cannon and the rifles captured on Turki Hill. They also provided sureties for their future good behaviour, and during the following eight months both the Herti and the Ogaden remained on good terms with the Company. Nevertheless, it is interesting, in view of the subsequent developments, that Craufurd thought he had established better relations with the latter rather than the former.²

In effect the wheel had turned full circle. The Company had originally tried to construct a friendly alliance with the Ogaden and, as a result, had somewhat underestimated the importance of

¹It is rather ironic that Craufurd should first have heard about the proposed change of administration from the Herti themselves. C. to P., 8 Feb. 1894; C. to McLenna, 22 March 1894; C. to P., 26 April 1894, PC/CP/68/19.

²C. to P., 25 Jan. 1895, PC/CP/68/19; C. to P., 18 May 1895, FO.107/56.
first coming to terms with the Herti. Then the baraza in February 1893, and the mutiny a few months later, had necessarily focused the Company's attention on its relationship with the Herti. In the new situation its previous overtures to the Ogaden became largely irrelevant. Moreover, after July 1893, the initial importance attached to Ogaden control over the interior ceased to have any practical bearing on the Company's position, which was then restricted to a ten-mile radius. The main concern of the local administration centred on the attempt to make peace with the Herti, and the choice lay between closing Kismayu to all Somali until peace had been agreed to, or opening the town to traders before a settlement. The latter policy was adopted towards the end of 1893 and it was the Ogaden, not the Herti who came and traded. As a result, an apparently friendly alliance had after all been constructed between the Company and the Ogaden; the original aim had been achieved. But by this time there was no longer any question of gaining access to the interior. All that was hoped for was an increase in revenue.

The problem of correlating expenditure with revenue overshadowed the last two years of the Company's administration at Kismayu, but, in reality, the problem had been there right from the beginning. What tended to be overlooked was that the accounts would only have been truly balanced once revenue had covered, not just the expenses.
on the spot, but also the annual rent paid to the Sultan of Zanzibar.\(^1\) This rent was estimated at 23,404 Rs. by Craufurd.\(^2\) In the only year when revenue reached this figure, there would have been under 5,000 Rs. left for administrative purposes, had the accounts been balanced. As it was, 108,262 Rs. were spent on administration during that year producing a deficit of over 100,000 Rs.\(^3\)

In fact between 1891 and 1895 there was no year when the Company was not faced with a sizable deficit. During this period there was a visible deficit of at least 375,826 Rs. (£25,055). For in addition there were certain expenses connected with the defence of Kismayu that were paid at Mombasa and not included in the Kismayu accounts. There was also the depreciation on the stern-wheeler 'Kenia', which was left to rot on the river Juba. Perhaps even more unsatisfactory, the total revenue during these four years only amounted to £4,541; a pathetic figure when contrasted to the £300,000 a year that the Company's first superintendent at Kismayu confidently predicted.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) The Company paid the Sultan a fixed rent for its entire concession. The total figure was probably only broken down once to show what proportion applied to Kismayu. No attempt was ever made to integrate this smaller figure into the Quarterly or Annual Accounts of the District.

\(^2\) C. to P., 18 May 1895, FO.107/36.

\(^3\) H. to S., 17 Sept. 1895, FO.107/37. See also Table I on page 180.

\(^4\) C. tp P., 27 Jan. 1894, FO. 2/73. See Table I.
This miscalculation over revenue reflected the lack of realism and knowledge with which the potentialities of trade had been assessed. The Company charged a 5°/o ad valorem tax on all imports and exports,¹ and the first trade figures for July-December 1891 might have been encouraging if they had been regarded as capable of improvement. Had they only been maintained, income over the four years would have amounted to £10,000. But exports during the second half of 1891 were inflated by the cattle plague, and hides made up almost 75°/o of the total value. As the plague disappeared this source of income was bound to contract, and in 1892 hides only accounted for 25°/o of the value of exports, a percentage that diminished yet again the following year.²

More important than hides, however, was the trade in ivory. Yet here again the value of ivory exported between 1891 and 1894 was decreasing. Taken together, these two commodities accounted for over 90°/o of the value of exports in 1891 and 84°/o the following year. Moreover, nearly all ivory exported at Kismayu was seized from the Boran, and this was a source of supply that was bound to be uncertain.³

¹There was also an additional source of income known as Income Revenue. In 1895 this totalled 4,273 Rs. and it was largely made up by charging interest on loans to traders in Kismayu. There was, moreover, a charge of one dollar for living near the walls of the town. F. to C., 28 April 1896, PC/0P/68/19.

²Not only was the value of hides being exported a smaller proportion of the total value of trade, but this total value was also contracting. See Table 2. C. to P., 18 May 1895, FO.107/36.

³A little of the ivory exported at Kismayu came from Boni in contrast to what was at first supposed.
Until the end of 1893 exports were falling, and there were several months when there were no exports at all. The disturbed state of affairs along the coast must have been largely responsible, and it is significant that the only item to improve in 1893 was orchella weed, which was gathered and sold by women, who alone would trade in times of trouble.1 But, after September 1893, when the Ogaden began to trade actively in Kismayu, the overall situation improved. The export of relatively unimportant products, such as tortoise shells, ostrich feathers, rubber and dried fish (items not normally associated with the Ogaden), increased. Yet the most important development was the sharp rise in the export of livestock,2 which to some extent made up for the fall in the value of hides sent to Zanzibar. These improvements, however, came nowhere near to producing an income that could have covered the cost of administration.

The increase in trade from 1894 onwards also seems to have gone hand in hand with the gradual emergence of the Somali as the dominant traders on this part of the coast. For the establishment of peaceful relations between the Herti and the Wagoshia in November 1894 opened the door to Somali penetration of the Wagoshia market.

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1See Table 2.

2This increased from 13,000 Rs. in 1893 to 35,000 Rs. in 1895. In 1891-2, livestock were actually imported on account of the cattle plague.
Previously almost all trade with the Wagosha had been in the hands of Arabs, but their share of this market was now reduced to only 540/o. The Herti began to move increasingly into the export market, in contrast to their previous position as middlemen, taking cereals to Tula Island and even to Zanzibar.\(^1\) It is certainly ironic that the improvement in trade, and the additional revenue this brought with it, should have been the work of the Somali; ironic, because, as De Kiewiet has pointed out, "the whole purpose of the Company's administration at Kismayu was to break the Somali monopoly over the Juba trade".\(^2\) Perhaps this avowed policy was one reason for the poor trade figures. But, while the Company's administrators may have hoped to promote Arab and Indian interests in Kismayu, they were conspicuously unsuccessful.\(^3\)

The improvement in trade during 1894 and 1895 had been the particular achievement of Craufurd, the Company's superintendent at Kismayu from 28 November 1893 to 31 July 1895. When Craufurd arrived he had found no maps of the district, no charts of the coast, no copies of any treaties. No arrangements had been made for the safekeeping of a large amount of cash on hand. Correspondence

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\(^1\) C. to P., 21 Nov. 1894, PC/CP/68/19.

\(^2\) M. J. De Kiewiet (1955), 236.

\(^3\) Ainsworth to De Winton, 29 Nov. 1890, FO.84/2066; Berkeley, "Report on Kismayu", 8 Nov. 1891, in IBEACo. to FO., 23 Dec. 1891, FO.CP.6338.
was neither filed nor indexed, and there was a large sum of money that had not been reported to the Company's chief administrator at Mombasa. No monthly, quarterly or even annual report had yet been written and no trade returns had been submitted. Correspondence was irregular and some was missing.¹

Craufurd was the first superintendent at Kismayu to submit quarterly and annual reports, and to write once a week irrespective of whether any boat called or not. But, even more important, he was the first Company administrator to remain in charge of Kismayu for any length of time. In the twenty-seven months before his appointment there had been seven different officers in charge of the district: an average of one every four months. Not unnaturally, Craufurd felt that the frequent change of administrators had led to a disbelief in the stability of the administration. His own fifteen months in office helped to counterbalance this, and it also gave him time to become familiar with the Somali.²

Before relinquishing his post, Craufurd made one important recommendation, and it was completely ignored. He thought that the setting up of separate administrative units at Lamu, Witu and at Kismayu was the wrong approach to governing the area. Instead, he

¹C. to P., 27 Jan. 1894, PC/CP/68/19; "IBEACo. Instructions to Station Agents", 1891, PC/CP/109/90. Monthly Reports had been requested since 1891.

²C. to P., 25 Jan. 1895, PC/CP/68/19.
advocated that "the whole country from Witu proper and the Juba river should ... be placed under one administration" and, by way of justification, he added, "it is a Somali country quite different from the negro districts to the south and requiring a very dis-similar government".¹ This was probably the most important observation that had so far been made about the Somali in Jubaland, and its implications for the future were portentous. Here was the first sign of an attitude of mind that was eventually going to determine the development of this area. For once it was assumed that dissimilar government was required in the region, or that the Somali were quite different to other people, then, from the start, it could have been confidently predicted that no attempt was likely to be made to integrate the Somali into the East Africa Protectorate; and Somali separatism was already encouraged from above.

But, at the same time, Craufurd also quoted with approval a statement by Rennell Rodd, which suggested that the Somali south of the Juba should perhaps be regarded as temporary immigrants only. Rodd had written that "the Somali ... have no business south of the river Juba", while adding, "it is certain that the more of them that return to their old habitations north of the Juba the better

¹idem supra.
for the development of territories in the British sphere".\(^1\)

This view was extreme, and its importance lies only in the recognition that land recently acquired by the Somali did not necessarily belong to them. When the moving Somali frontier came within the sphere of administration, and not just the sphere of influence, some limit had to be determined, and it was then that the whole question of Somali expansion had to be critically examined.

However, these were problems of policy that only became pressing later, when the administration had been extended inland. In the meantime, the I.B.E.A.Co. was dissolved in 1895, and Sir A.H.Hardinge, the Consul General at Zanzibar and the first Commissioner of the East Africa Protectorate, undertook in the name of the British Government, the administration of the new Protectorate. Hardinge's approach to the Ogaden and the Herti had been determined, however, by his contact with the Tana, and by his previous handling of the Abdulla Somali.

\(^1\)Rodd to Rosebery, 10 Feb. 1893, F0.107/2.
**TABLE 1**

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<tr>
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<td>1893-1894</td>
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<td>1894-1895</td>
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**TABLE 2**

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A. to S., 17 Sept. 1895, F0.107/37.
B. The year runs from July 1st to July 1st.
C. These figures are taken from C. to P., 27 Jan. 1894, F0.2/73 and C. to H., 30 April 1896, F0.107/52.
D. The figures for 1891 only cover half a year from July to December.
Chapter IV

THE COASTAL DAROD AND THE PROTECTORATE GOVERNMENT

When the I.B.E.A.Co. had abandoned Witu in 1893, the responsi¬bility for protecting the Swedish, German and British mission stations on the river Tana from the Abdulla Somali had been the subject of an acrimonious exchange of letters between the Company and the Foreign Office.¹ Opinion differed as to where respective obligations lay, and Hardinge was drawn into this dispute. But it was perhaps unfortunate that the first Somali he had to deal with were the Abdulla, one of the most truculent of the Ogaden sub-clans, and one the Company itself had been particularly unsuccessful in influencing, for it was to be on the basis of this experience that Hardinge formulated a policy for dealing with the Somali as a whole.

The Abdulla had maintained little contact with the I.B.E.A.Co. While their villages included Hajowen, on the river Juba, their main grazing lands lay much further south, and the relative inaccessibility of the Tana hinterland enabled Hassan Berghin, head of the Abdulla, to remain isolated. Moreover, he claimed to be independent of Murgham Yusuf and was not therefore normally approachable through Afmadu.² Also he very rarely visited Kismayu, where

¹ IBEACo. to F.O., 23 Jan. 1895; F.O. to IBEACo., 7 Feb. 1895, F0.2/96.
² B. to IBEACo., 26 March 1892, F0.CP.6340; Portal to S., 25 March 1892, F0.84/2230.
he felt he might be overshadowed by the more powerful head of
the Muhammad Zubeir, and Hassan Berghin never willingly played
second fiddle to anyone.¹

Nevertheless, in 1890 he had signed a treaty of friendship
with Simons, and had received the usual subsidy. At the same time
he had obtained permission to establish a stronghold at Korokoro,
a Pokomo village on the river Tana, with the hope that eventually
it would rival Afmadu in importance. As a result the Abdulla had
undertaken a campaign against the Pokomo with the Company's tacit
approval and with a liberal supply of their flags, while Simons
had also written to the Company's superintendent at Lamu requesting
that all Somali with flags be looked upon as friendly and not
interfered with.²

From the point of view of Lamu, however, the presence of Abdulla
Ogaden on the river Tana was far from welcome. In 1889, for
instance, it was being reported that Von Toeppen, a representative
of the German Witu Company, was trying to secure the friendship of
the Abdulla,³ while in that same year Korokoro had to be abandoned
by the Pokomo as a result of a severe famine and Somali raids.⁴

¹J. to H.¥. 29. Deš. 1897, FO.107/88.
²S. to E.-S., 26 May 1890, FO.84/2062.
³S. to IBEACo., 24 Oct. 1889, FO.CP.6025.
⁴J. Bell Smith to IBEACo., 17 Oct. 1889, FO.CP.6025.
But after 1890 the Abdulla began to raid further down the river, often as far as Ndera, and their approach towards the coast was regarded as a contributory factor exacerbating the unsettled state of affairs in Witu. Their constant raids against the Pokomo and the Galla at times also endangered the mission stations on the river. Yet, initially, the main concern at Lamu was that trouble in the Juba region might spread to the Tana. After the mutiny on Turki Hill in August 1893, it was feared that armed viroboto would move south and join the Abdulla. Though the possibility may have been remote, it was in order to prevent this that a Government station was opened at Port Durnford.

The coastal road between Kismayu and Lamu was known to pass very close to Port Durnford; its control was therefore thought to be of considerable strategic importance. Yet the Abdulla were able to maintain contact with the Herti and Afmadu Ogaden without going anywhere near the coast. So the station never succeeded in isolating the Abdulla from other Somali sections, as was intended, and its only value lay in the opportunity it provided for increased contact with Hassan Berghin.

But for several years the station exerted no influence over the Somali at all. In 1893 there were no Europeans who could be spared.

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1 The history of Witu and of the Arab coast of Tanaland after 1895 has been made the subject of a study by Dr. T.H.R. Cashmore, "Studies in District Administration in the East Africa Protectorate", Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Jesus College, Cambridge, 1965), Chapter iv, 'The Problem of the coastal communities'.

2 Chanler to IBMACo., 28 Nov. 1892, F0.2/57.

3 Rodd to Rosebery, 23 Sept. 1893, F0.107/7.
as administrators, and so Mzee Seif, head of the Bajun, was appointed political officer and sent to Port Durnford with an escort. He used his position, however, to enforce his authority over Bajun villages that previously had been independent in the area. In July 1895, he was removed and imprisoned in Zanzibar for acting in concert with the Abdulla, and a new Bajun chief, Tiro, was appointed in his place. In fact it was not until 12 September 1895, that Reddie, the first District Officer, arrived at Port Durnford. Yet he was supported by only 30 Soudanese troops and this was too small a force to make any significant impact.

Reddie initially seems to have built his hopes on the prospect of encouraging trade with the Abdulla. It was claimed, apparently incorrectly, that the Abdulla were most anxious to come to Port Durnford and there dispose of their ivory. Yet, when they did come for ivory in June and August 1896, it was to seize it from the coastal Galla and Bajun. The raids were particularly vicious, and it was said that Hassan Berghin was joined by Ahmed Murgham, the

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4 Or between Kismayu and Mkowe, the mainland village opposite Lamu.
5 Hardinge to Salisbury, 16 Sept. 1895, no. 171, F0.107/37.
1 R. to General Mathews, 20 Aug. 1893, F0.107/5; H. to K., 10 Oct., 1894, F0.107/23; W.W.A.Fitzgerald, Travels in British East Africa (London, 1898), 466.
2 H. to S., 12 July 1895, F0.107/36.
3 H. to S., 16 Sept. 1895, no. 171; R. to H., 28 Aug. 1895, F0.107/37.
4 H. to S., 9 May 1896, F0.107/52.
son of Murgham Yusuf. Moreover, within a few months Reddie had to leave Port Durnford because of ill-health. The station was left in the hands of Captain Ibrahim Effendi who adopted a purely passive attitude towards the Somali.

Thus the gradual development of an administrative post at Port Durnford did not provide an adequate means for making contact with the Abdulla Ogaden. Moreover, there was still no way of putting any pressure on them, and the ability to do so was becoming increasingly important. There was evidence that the Abdulla were in touch with the people of Witu, who were selling them slaves and assisting them on their forays against the Pokomo, and, as early as 1894, continuing Abdulla raids against villages on the lower Tana had persuaded Hardinge that they would need to be taught a sharp lesson. Finally, attacks on the mission station at Golbanti in 1894 and 1895 led Hardinge to visit the Tana in February 1895, and to determine how to handle the problem on the spot.

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2 H. to S., 1 Feb. 1896, no. 23, FO.107/5.
3 R. to M., 5 July 1894, FO.107/21; H. to K., 13 Nov. 1894 and "Judgement in Fumo Omari's trial", 30 Nov. 1894, FO.107/24. It is perhaps ironic that the Pokomo encouraged a Roman Catholic mission to settle amongst them in 1889, on the assumption that it would provide them with protection against the Somali. However, in 1890 the mission came to an end, not as a result of Somali raids but because of floods from the Tana. See: A.T. Matson, "The Holy Ghost Mission at Kosi on the river Tana", The Bull. of the Soc. for African Church History, II no. 2 (1965), 175.
4 H. to Kimberley, 10 Oct. 1894, FO.107/23.
5 W.W.A. Fitzgerald (1898), 323; H. to K., 2 Nov. 1894, FO.107/23; H. to K., 5 Feb. 1895, no. 8A, FO.107/41.
After taking the necessary steps to protect the mission stations, Hardinge came to the conclusion that the place from which to tackle the roots of the Abdulla menace was not so much Lamu or Port Durnford as Kismayu, and he wrote:

When the withdrawal of the Company from Kismayu enables us to teach Murgham Yusuf and his Ogaden the sharp lesson which they so greatly need, Somali raids may be stopped at their source and defensive measures on the Tana dispensed with.¹

Thus Hardinge favoured a forward policy in Jubaland and was prepared to defend this on the grounds that it would be cheaper than undertaking any defensive measures that would have to go hand in hand with the adoption of a purely passive attitude. Yet his freedom to put this policy into practice was circumscribed by the instruction that "caution must be exercised ... in dealing with the Somali", and by the unwillingness of later Secretaries of State to allow the use of reserve forces in Jubaland for minor crises.²

A forward policy was therefore initiated that could not be backed up when it was later challenged by the Somali, and only in the event of a major crisis developing was the backing produced. Hardinge's initial policy was only half approved and consequently it was only half applied; the anomalies this produced were an important factor influencing the Government's relations with the Ogaden.

¹ H. to K., 6 Feb. 1895, FO.107/34.
² K. to H., 5 May 1894, FO.107/16.
Hardinge's altercation with the Company also made him very much aware of the problems associated with an administrative frontier running along a river. For until July 1895 the British Company had been responsible for a ten mile strip along the coast as far north as the river Tana, and that had been part of the problem.\footnote{H. to K., 25 Feb. 1895, no. 15, FO.107/41.} Hardinge was convinced therefore that the future administration of Tanaland should control both banks of the river.\footnote{Ibid.} He felt that "the Tana itself would in practice be a very bad boundary", and there can be little doubt that he felt the same way about the Juba river.\footnote{H. to K., 25 Feb. 1895, FO.107/34.} Although Great Britain only controlled one bank of the Juba, Hardinge suggested:

a joint Anglo-Italian system of police for both banks, both parties enjoying equal rights to cross to the other's territory for the apprehension or punishment of offenders.\footnote{H. to S., 17 Sept. 1895, no. 172, FO.107/37.} However, this was a suggestion that the Italian Government turned down. They also rejected other suggested arrangements for closer collaboration,\footnote{E. to S., 17 Sept. 1895, FO.45/736; C. to Filonardi & Co., 27 April 1895, FO.2/97.} and the real cooperation that was supposed to exist between the two administrations remained something of a myth. But Hardinge had been right in thinking that cooperation with the Italians...
was important, and that the Juba was "an artery of communication" rather than a dividing-line.¹ The Ogaden, Herti and Wagosha, all had sections on both sides of the river. They frequently crossed the Juba. Thus there was the real possibility that Italian Somaliland would become a sanctuary for disaffected Somali elements in revolt against British rule, and it was a possibility the Somali were fully alive to.

Lastly, Hardinge maintained that the administration of Jubaland ought to be subordinated to the British Consul General at Zanzibar but nevertheless undertaken by the Sultan's staff. He thought it was very important for the Sultan to administer the coast, as it would then be possible "to use his name and forces in the numerous little wars with Somali and other coast chiefs".² The idea was fascinating; yet this was another of Hardinge's suggestions that came to nothing, though it did have important consequences. It led to the appointment of Jenner as Kismayu's first Sub-Commissioner³ and the subsequent removal of Craufurd from the Province. While Jenner favoured a forward policy like Craufurd,

¹ H. to K., 16 May 1895, no. 92, FO.107/36.
³ Hardinge recommended Jenner for the post as this was whom Sir Lloyd Mathews, First Minister to the Sultan, would have wished to appoint. H. to K., 25 Feb. 1895, FO.107/34.
he lacked the latter's restraint and sense of caution; quick to give others advice, he did not always follow his own suggestions. Jenner tended to be overconfident, perhaps also overtrusting, and he never mastered the intricacies of Ogaden politics. It was this moreover that ultimately led to his death and to the failure of his policies.\footnote{Jenner was murdered in Nov. 1900. The circumstances of his death are discussed on pages 239-2.} But when Jenner arrived at Kismayu on 10 July 1895, he first tackled the problem of the Herti, and in this he was more successful.\footnote{J. to H., 11 July 1895, FO.107/37.}

When the Herti made peace with the I.B.E.A.Co. in 1894, they had still hoped to arrange better terms with the Consul General at Zanzibar, as soon as he became responsible for the administration.\footnote{C. to H., 25 March 1896, FO.107/51.} The submission of Shirwar Ismail and Ali Nahar had been partly tactical, and it was probably only as a result of three visits, in rapid succession, by Government officials that finally induced their complete surrender.

In June 1895, Shirwar Ismail insulted Todd\footnote{The same Todd as was involved in the fracas of February 1893. He returned to Kismayu briefly in 1895.} and refused to let him enter Yonte. Craufurd therefore set out with 85 troops and two maxim guns determined to enforce his admittance.\footnote{H. to S., 17 Sept. 1895, FO.107/37.} The Herti were
given to understand that they would have to pay tribute and this they agreed to. But, on approaching Yonte, Craufurd was told that he would not be allowed to pass through the town and was asked to turn back. Nevertheless he continued on and warned that any trouble would be dealt with severely. Herti warriors were drawn up outside the town, but the strength of the caravan was obvious, and they passively accepted the situation, as the column passed through the town without a shot being fired. Ali Nahar then came and paid tribute; he was told that the conduct of his warriors was unsatisfactory and it was impressed on him that power lay in the Government's hands. A successful visit of this sort undoubtedly had an impact on the Herti elders.

Craufurd visited Yonte again in July. This time he was accompanied by Jenner. They were welcomed by Ali Nahar and allowed to pass through the town. The Herti chief also promised obedience to the new administration and undertook to visit Kismayu after he had been assured that neither he nor Shirwar Ismail would be arrested. Jenner and Craufurd then visited Gosha, but on their way back they passed through Yonte once again and this time Shirwar Ismail met them, though he was still too afraid to visit their camp or to go

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1 C. to S., 13 July 1896, FO 107/60.
2 J. to H., 13 July 1895, FO 107/37.
back with them to the coast.¹

In September Hardinge visited Kismayu and stayed there for several weeks. Shirwar Ismail and Ali Nahar both wrote to him asking to be paid, but Hardinge was determined to be tough. "The Somalis", he wrote, "have been too much in the habit of assuming that any abstention on their part from raids or rebellion is a favour to be paid for."² On September 24th, Hardinge visited Yonte on his way to Gosha district, and the Herti finally realised that it was time to make their complete submission.³

In October Shirwar Ismail and Ali Nahar placed themselves, their families and their possessions under Government protection.⁴ They agreed to collaborate fully with the Government and as Hardinge noted "it [was]... the combination of diplomatic and military forces that has produced the present satisfactory state of affairs".⁵ The simple sub-clan structure of the Herti had also been a factor facilitating the settlement. For the Dolbahanta Herti were largely confined to Italian Somaliland, and there were not many Warsangeli around Kismayu. Thus the Jubaland Herti were almost all Mijertein; Ali Nahar was head of the Ali Suleiman, the most numerous section

¹J. to H., 28 July 1895; H. to S., 17 Sept. 1895, no. 172, F0.107/37.
²H. to S., 17 Sept. 1895, no. 172, F0.107/37.
³H. to S., 1 Oct. 1897, no. 242, F0.107/80.
⁴Protection Order no. 45, 29 Oct. 1895, F0.107/39.
⁵C. to H., 9 Nov. 1895, F0.107/39.
of the Mijertein, and Shirwar Ismail was head of the Osman Mahmoud, the chiefly Herti lineage which was nevertheless rather small. Together they formed a powerful partnership. The only other Mijertein sections which were particularly numerous were the Ismail Suleiman and the Omar Mahmoud, and the latter proved to be especially uncooperative.¹

The acceptance of Government protection was not just an idle gesture on the part of the Herti. It placed Ali Nahar and Shirwar Ismail firmly on the Government side and ranged them against the Ogaden. Their continuing loyalty was, in fact, later explained in terms of the latent rivalry within the Darod clan-family, but there were also other reasons.² As Sheik Ali Nahar was at pains to explain to Murgham Yusuf, Tonte and other Herti villages were within easy striking distance of Kismayu, and their cooperation with the Government was basically a recognition of this reality.³

At the same time Craufurd made full use of this new Herti willingness to cooperate. He almost immediately appointed Shirwar Ismail and Ali Nahar Political Officers, and used them as part of a propaganda campaign to make the Ogaden more conciliatory.⁴ They

¹ T.S. Thomas (1917), 10; F. Elliott, "Jubaland and its inhabitants", G.J., XLI (1913), 560.
² H. to S., 5 April 1898, FO.107/100; Eliot to L., 8 March 1901, FO.2/446.
³ C. to H., 25 March 1896, FO.107/51.
⁴ C. Ettore, R.C. (1925), 94.
accompanied two expeditions to Afmadu, the first in November 1895, the second in January 1896. Craufurd hoped "to impress upon Sultan Murgham Yusuf of the Ogaden Somalis the fact that Potentates of equal importance held obedience and service to Her Majesty's Representative to be honourable". Murgham Yusuf, however, was not impressed, and branded Shirwar Ismail as a traitor and a slave of the ferengi (Europeans). Nevertheless, it was probably the refusal of Ali Nahar to support the Ogaden in any act of hostility, or even to remain neutral if war broke out, that forced the Ogaden reluctantly to accept the intrusion of Government forces into the Afmadu area.

However, the tendency of Jenner, and later Sub-Commissioners at Kismayu, to rely exclusively on Ali Nahar for the implementation of their policies undoubtedly caused some resentment. The local administration increasingly ignored the Herti council, though it is difficult to assess to what extent Ali Nahar followed their example. Shirwar Ismail died in 1900, but, during the last years of his life, Ali Nahar was assumed to be primarily responsible for controlling the Herti. Also, since Mohamed Shirwar was too young to become Sultan on his father's death, Ali Nahar was appointed Regent.

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1 C. to H., 17 Dec. 1895, FO.107/39.
2 C. to H., 25 March 1896, FO.107/51.
3 H. to S., 17 March 1897, no. 54, FO.107/76; Zoli (1927), 158.
4 Major Harrison, "Memorandum on Jubaland", 8 July 1902, PC/JUB/2/1/6.
The first signs of discontent came in 1896, when Ali Nahar was stabbed in the back by Hamed Muhammad Ali, a nondescript Herti trouble-maker. Jenner had already asked him to arrest Hamed, but the Isa Mahmoud Mijertein had protected the latter in the hope of embarrassing and discrediting Ali Nahar. As a result of this assault Ali Nahar was allowed to employ four more men to "assist and protect him in the execution of his duty".\(^1\) Yet the number was evidently not enough, for a few years later Ali Nahar had to request further help from Jenner. Several Herti were refusing to obey his orders and were intriguing against him. Both the Warsangeli and the Omar Mahmoud Mijertein were inclined to be uncooperative and the two ring-leaders had to be deported to Mombasa before the situation could be brought under control.\(^2\) By and large it seems that the more a Somali leader cooperated with the administration, the less authority he would have over his own followers and hence the less use he would be to the Protectorate Government. In the search for collaborators this was a dilemma that was not noticed often, though there are many telling references to the extreme weakness of those Somali chiefs the administration felt it could rely on most. However, Ali Nahar himself certainly experienced

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\(^1\) J. to C., 5 Aug. 1896, FC/CP/74/45.

something of the problem and Jenner wrote that "he admitted it himself that his power amongst the Herti had considerably waned since he entered Government service".1

Ali Nahar's position was strengthened by his appointment as Regent, but a crisis finally developed in 1906, when an Osman Mahmoud Mijertein named Ashgar proclaimed himself 'Mullah' and began to collect followers near Yonte. Salkeld, who was then the Sub-Commissioner at Kismayu, acted at once before a movement could develop and Ashgar was killed in a skirmish.2 There can be no doubt that Salkeld thought he had prevented a movement similar to that of "Muhammad Abdille Hassan's" spreading to Jubaland, and this was an obsessive preoccupation at that time.3 At the Colonial Office, news of Salkeld's quick handling of what was assumed to have been a potential uprising was met with considerable approval, and one official minuted: "this method of dealing with Mullahs must save a great deal of blood-shed"; while Winston Churchill, then Under Secretary of State, added tartly "doubtless some Cromwell guiltless of his country's blood".4 But how far did Ashgar's

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1J. to H., 26 July 1898, FO.107/95.


3Otherwise known as the 'Mad Mullah' by the British, he began a rebellion in British Somaliland that lasted from 1898 till 1920.

4Sheik Muhammad's impact south of the river Juba was multiform and spread over the period 1898 to 1916. In this thesis I have dealt with the impact piecemeal in the relevant chapters, but I have also dealt with it as a single topic as an article, "The Impact of Mohammad Abdille Hassan on the East Africa Protectorate", J.A.H., X no. 4 (1969).

5Minutes on dispatch 18 Jan. 1906, quoted from T.H.R.Cashmore (1965), 327.
reputedly 'seditive preaching' represent a serious politico-religious movement? Salkeld's precipitate action, above all the early death of Ashgar and the lack of any proper subsequent investigation into the incident, has made an evaluation of these proceedings extremely difficult.

Nevertheless, it is obviously significant that Ashgar had only been in Jubaland a short time, and that the previous year he had visited Sheik Muhammad in northern Somalia. Undoubtedly there was contact between the Jubaland Herti and those in the British Protectorate. How much contact is not known but a number of Herti associated with Ashgar appear to have been traders rather than pastoralists, and so may be presumed to have kept in touch with the north. One in particular, Ahmed Abdi had been to Lamu, Mombasa and Nairobi. He had written articles for the East African Standard and there can be little doubt that he would have been well acquainted with Sheikh Muhammad's rebellion. The administrative authorities in Jubaland were convinced that the trouble had been caused by "northern chiefs".

Sheik Muhammad's jihad had initially at least been closely associated with the Salihyya brotherhood (tariqa) and it is interesting that the first representative (khalifa) of that tariqa in Jubaland, Sheik Ali Nairobi, should have arrived in 1906. The exact

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1 Sadler to S., 23 May 1907, CO.533/29; Salkeld to S., 6 Feb. 1907, PC/JUB/2/2/2.
date of his arrival is not known, though it was probably after Ashgar had been killed for he was never associated with his movement. However, most of Sheik Ali's supporters were drawn from those Herti sub-clans and lineages that had given their support to Ashgar, though, perhaps remarkably, he was never associated with sedition and his tariqa never seems to have had a political impact.

Ashgar's death had other repercussions however. The Omar Mahmoud Mijertein and the Warsangeli held that Ali Nahar was responsible for Ashgar's death and out of revenge five men from these two sections murdered him in May 1906. The Dan Wadag and Yusuf Ali sub-sections of the Osman Mahmoud Mijertein were also implicated, since they had assisted the murderers, but other sections remained loyal to the Government. For a short time there was a real possibility of internecine civil war amongst the Herti, though in the end this was avoided. The administrators at Kismayu, however, wished to undertake active measures to punish the murderers, while the Governor, Hayes Sadler, fearing complications thought the imposition of a fine and an embargo on Herti trade the best policy.

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1C. Zoli (1927), 265; K. to S., 30 May 1906, PC/JUB/2/3/1; T.S. Thomas, "Precis for week ending 18 Feb. 1916", CO.533/167.

2K. to Italian Resident at Giumbo, 30 May 1906, PC/JUB/2/3/1.

3K. to H.-S., 6 July 1906, CO.533/16.

4H.-S. to Elgin, 19 June 1906, CO.533/15.

5H.-S. to E., 3 Aug. 1906, CO.533/16.
Yet this was a policy that achieved its objective slowly. It contributed therefore to the climate of uncertainty that surrounded Government relations with the Herti, and in the end it necessitated a re-examination of that relationship. Serious consideration was given to the possibility of abolishing the Herti Sultanate. Though this step was not taken it was decided to give Government pay to more heads of Herti sections, and to utilise these officials for the implementation of Government policy. The earlier attempt to control the Herti through their Sultan, or his wakil (attorney), was thus reversed.¹

Some attempt was also made to revise the near monopoly of Government jobs enjoyed by the Herti. It was recognised that the Warsangeli had the Omar Mahmoud Mijertein were creating trouble and refusing to pay their fine, because in this way they hoped to obtain large salaries and Government posts to keep them peaceful.² But their discontent only served to draw attention to the dangerous preponderance of Herti in Government jobs.

The initial intention of the administration at Kismayu had been to offer a share of the advantages of Government to both the Ogaden and the Herti.³ Graufurd had advanced the view that:

¹S. to H.-S., 6 Feb. 1907, PC/JUB/2/2/2.
²"Jubaland Intelligence Circular", Salkeld, 7 April 1907, 00.533/28.
³J. to Ahmed Murgham, 26 Feb. 1898, FO.107/91.
pending the institution of direct control by Government
Officials, the employment of the natives of the territory
was... a politic and economical proceeding.¹

And this had been accepted by Lord Salisbury, then the Secretary
of State, without comment. In 1896, the Ogaden had been allowed
to select two men for employment in the customs department, with
the promise of further jobs if they behaved themselves well.² But
the necessity of undertaking punitive expeditions against the
Ogaden in 1898 and in 1901 made it impossible to employ them at
the same time.

On the other hand, from January 1896, Herti were employed as
scouts and mail-runners.³ A number were also trained as Government
askaris and some served in Uganda for four years.⁴ They supported
the Government in 1898 and so secured the implacable hatred of
the Ogaden.⁵ The following year three Herti were killed in a serious
dispute over grazing rights with the Ogaden, and Herti askaris
were involved in the fighting.⁶ They also participated eagerly
in the punitive expedition of 1901, which was brought about by the
murder of Jenner and many of his Herti escort;⁷ and in December 1901

¹C. to S., 9 Oct. 1896, Fo.107/60.
²J. to H., 24 June 1896, FC/CP/74/45.
³C. to H., 25 March 1896, Fo.107/51.
⁴J. to Ahmed Murghan, 28 Feb. 1898, Fo.107/91.
⁵Perducci to Dulio, 24 Feb. 1898, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/l-II; H. to S.,
9 April 1898, Fo.107/92; J. to H., 28 April 1898, Fo.107/93.
⁶Dr. Radford to F.O., 27 Nov. 1900, Fo.2/384.
⁷H. Moyse-Bartlett (1956), 115-6; T. S. Thomas (1917), 31; T. to L., 23 Nov.
over 100 Herti were fighting with the Government against the Ogaden.¹

Moreover, after 1898 all the Kismayu police were recruited from the Herti, and one of Ali Nahar's brothers was a Sergeant Major.² They were also used with considerable success to seize Aulihan and other Ogaden cattle in 1897 and 1898. Police parties were frequently sent to reconnoitre and bring back intelligence of Ogaden movements during periods of hostility.³ Jenner thought the use of Herti policy in 1898 had "obviated on more than one occasion the employment of military force", and he therefore proposed an increase in pay for all Herti chiefs as a reward.⁴ In the last year of his life, Jenner also thought of using his Somali police to open up the interior to administrative control. In 1899 he had advocated setting up a military station at Bardera, but a year later he wrote: "I think, however, I was wrong, and that our principle ought to be to dot these cheap police posts about".⁵ Consequently Jenner had tried to recruit Ogaden police as well. A few were accepted in February 1899, and a year later there were

²S. to S., 10 Oct. 1907, FG/JUB/2/2/2.
³J. to H., 3 March 1898, FO.107/91; F. to H., 1 April 1898, FO.107/92.
⁴After 1902 their combative quality was explicitly recognised and they were referred to as Military police. J. to H., 26 Oct. 1898, FO.107/98; H. to J., 8 Oct. 1902, FO.2/574.
⁵J. to T., 1 Nov. 1899, FO.2/293.
over forty. In 1900 Abdurrahman Mursaal, head of the Aulihan Ogaden, was sent to establish a customs post at Serenli with eighteen police. There was also a plan to open a post at Wajir, but Jenner's death led once more to a monopoly in the Jubaland police force of the Herti, and their use in a semi-military capacity against the Ogaden. Yet even when peace was restored, the Ogaden felt that the Herti police were biased against them, and they also resented having to deal with the Herti as intermediaries between them and the Government. They wanted direct contact with the administration.

The most important Herti intermediary was Adam Musa, the Government Interpreter. His wide experience had singled him out for special attention by both Graufurd and Jenner. Adam Musa had lived for many years in Aden, and his earlier services to the Government had earned him Her Majesty's Egypt medal with the caslp for 'El Teb', and the Khedive's star for the campaign in the Eastern Sudan in 1884. He was clearly a man who could be trusted with responsibility.

The Ogaden naturally coveted the post of Government Interpreter, and felt that the choice of a Herti was particularly inappropriate

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1 J. to H., 6 Feb. 1899, F0.2/189; Dr. Radford to F0., 27 Nov. 1900, F0.2/384.
3 C. to H., 17 Dec. 1895, F0.107/39.
when it came to handling their own relations with the administra-
tion. Moreover, although Adam Musa at first did no more
than accompany Craufurd and Jenner on their visits to Afmadu,
he was soon given important additional duties.\footnote{1}

In 1897 it was suggested that he should be sent to Serenli
with sixty Somali irregulars to build a fort and temporary post
there.\footnote{2} The following year he played a crucial role in arranging
a settlement between the Ogaden and the Government. His in-
structions were to obtain an acknowledgement from the Ogaden that
they owed obedience to the Government. Once this had been achieved
he was given the responsibility of collecting a fine that had been
agreed to.\footnote{3}

The following year, Adam Musa travelled with a caravan to
Moyale, via Bardera and El Wak, returning through Rendille and the
country around the Lorian Swamp. He obtained valuable information
about the interior and brought back enough ivory to cover the cost
of the expedition. More important, however, he explained to the
Boran and Ajuran \"about the Somalis and Kismayu Government\",\footnote{4}

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{1}{C. to H., 25 March 1896, F0.107/51.}
\item \footnote{2}{H. to S., 1 Oct. 1897, F0.107/80.}
\item \footnote{3}{J. to H., 23 Nov. 1897, F0.107/36; H. to S., 4 Feb. 1898 and
H. to S., 19 March 1898, F0.107/91.}
\item \footnote{4}{\"Statement\" by Adam Musa, 14 Feb. 1900, F0.2/285.}
\end{itemize}
the political implications of this were later significant.1

The Ogaden strongly resented this extension of Adam Musa's responsibilities. Equally, they resented their virtual exclusion from Government jobs. Yet their opportunity to challenge the Herti did not come until 1906. Up to that date, the Herti were thought of as loyal and dependable servants of the administration.2 The Ogaden, by contrast, were assumed to be untrustworthy. But the murder of Ali Nahar changed all that. The Ogaden and the Herti were now tarred with the same brush, there was little to choose between them. Just as the Herti had previously offered to help the Kismayu administration when there had been trouble with Afmadu, so now the Ogaden offered to chastise those Herti who were in revolt.3 However, this new image of the Ogaden as Government supporters had been preceded by ten years of tempestuous resistance to Government advances, and it was by no means clear that a period of calm lay ahead.

Between 1895 and 1905, the essential difference of a forward Government policy from the point of view of the Ogaden and of the

1Cederqvist to Missionsdirekctor, 16 March 1900, AS/IFA/IS/314.

2However of. Cpt. Ward's view, which was endorsed by Elliot, that the Herti were of "doubtful loyalty" and only "nominally friendly". W. to E., 2 Dec. 1901; E. to L., 9 Dec. 1901, FO.2/451.

3K. to H.-S., 21 June 1906, CO.533/16.
Herti was that, for the latter, this entailed their immediate encirclement, whereas, for the former, it presented a frontal attack with the consequent possibility of retreat. The Herti had no room for manoeuvre, and so they submitted. On the other hand, the Ogaden found that their own mobility was socially divisive and fissiparous, since it was not shared equally by all sections. Those that could break away and retreat did so, while those that remained behind had to come to terms with the new administration, and this increased the level of social tension amongst the Ogaden.¹

At the same time, a forward Government policy threatened the existence of a relatively new but important addition to the economic and social structure of the Ogaden. Victories over the Wardai and Boran Galla had led them to become the owners of large numbers of slaves. As a result they had departed from a purely pastoral way of life and, around Afmadu, cereals were extensively grown.²

Within a year of Jenner's arrival, however, it was certainly clear to the Ogaden "that when the British officers would their country, their slaves and wealth necessarily pass away".³

¹It was often noticed that sections furthest from the coast were the most bellicose. H. to S., 27 Nov. 1898, FO.107/98.

²A description of Ogaden agriculture at Afmadu can be found in C. to H., 25 March 1896, FO.107/51.

³Idem.
It was unfortunate that this realisation came so quickly. Perhaps it had already been there before the I.B.E.A.Co. had withdrawn from Kismayu. But Jenner's instructions had specifically mentioned a stricter enforcement of the abolition of slavery, though, until he was backed by more armed forces, he was told not to make a public or ostentatious announcement on the subject and just to apply the law quietly.\(^1\) Craufurd anticipated little difficulty with regard to the Herti, who did not own many slaves, but the reaction of the Ogaden was likely to be altogether different.\(^2\)

When Jenner wrote to Murgham Yusuf informing him that there had been a change of administration, the Sultan replied peremptorily and requested the Government to stop interfering in his country and to restore his pay.\(^3\) Hassan Berghin had acted in much the same way for, though he sent messengers to Kismayu with assurances of friendship, he had declined to make any personal contact, which was tantamount to an insult.

However, Jenner and Craufurd ignored these signs of Ogaden hostility and waited until they were ready to act. They assumed that the tactics already used against the Herti would be equally

\(^{1}\text{H. to J., 5 July 1895, PC/JUB/2/1/1.}\)

\(^{2}\text{J. to H., 13 July 1895, FO.107/37.}\)

\(^{3}\text{H. to S., 17 Sept. 1895, FO.107/37.}\)
Successful against the Ogaden, and they imagined, therefore, that a few rapid marches to Afmadu would achieve the desired results.

After securing the submission of the Herti, towards the end of 1895, Graufurd thought it was time to "take steps to demonstrate the reality of Her Majesty's Protectorate over the Ogaden country".\(^1\) He set out for Afmadu on 27 November with a strong escort. On the way he stopped at Melkana, a village belonging to the Abdulla Ogaden, but the Sultan and chiefs were absent. A quarrel developed over the rights of the caravan to use the wells, and only the adroit handling of a tricky situation prevented fighting between the inhabitants and the escort. This was the first of several occasions when Graufurd avoided bloodshed with great skill and good luck.

Both Murgham Yusuf and Hassan Berghin sent a message that they would fight if Afmadu was approached, stating "that this was their country, and that Graufurd had no right to be in it without their permission, which would not be given". The attitude of the Ogaden had at first been one of defiance, but, as Graufurd drew closer, the Ogaden council veered towards capitulation. At one moment the council agreed that tribute would be paid by each sub-clan

\(^1\) C. to H., 17 Dec. 1895, FO.107/39.
with a double donation from the Sultan. But panic ensued in the end and Murgham Yusuf and his advisors fled.¹

Furthermore, the Ogaden council was divided and Sheik Jebril Farah, head of the rey Hersi, and Ali Murgham, Yusuf's brother, were both conciliatory, since their own lands would have suffered in the event of fighting. Murgham Yusuf appears to have shared their view, but the Abd Wak and the Abdulla were both keen to fight. In the end there was a skirmish, not between the Ogaden and the caravan, but amongst the Ogaden themselves; and after that Murgham Yusuf refused to see Craufurd. After Craufurd had returned to Kismayu, however, he received two letters from the Ogaden promising obedience, which were signed by the heads of all the main sub-clans except the Aulihan.²

To put this letter to the test, Craufurd set out for Afmadu once more on 25 January 1896, with an escort of 112 men. Again he passed Melkana, where this time he managed to secure the payment of tribute. On January 29th he arrived at Afmadu. The Ogaden elders were respectful and submissive. They offered to pay tribute at once. A well had been set aside for the expedition and water had been drawn and troughs filled for the camels to drink from. Fowl.

²An explanation for the absence of the Aulihan may lie in the death of Ahmed Agan, head of the sub-clan, in 1896, and the discussions that would have taken place before Hersi Degaja was chosen in his place. They were also absent from the formal act of submission on 30 January 1896.
and milk were also provided. The Ogaden succeeded in making an extremely good impression, and on 30 January they formally submitted to the Government. Murgham Yusuf was too ill to sign himself and he sent two wakils to sign for him. Then, after listening to a recitation of complaints, Craufurd returned to the coast satisfied that he had secured the submission of the Ogaden.

Craufurd's success, however, was not as complete as he imagined. His view that "the holder of the wells of Afmadu has the Ogaden nation in the hollow of his hands" was based on an ignorance of the interior beyond Afmadu and was certainly exaggerated. On the other hand, he underestimated the element of sheer luck which had contributed to the effectiveness of his expeditions. Murgham Yusuf had also been a dying man, but he had done his best to bribe Ali Nahar to fight on his side. He had finally agreed to submit after the Herti refused to connive at any Ogaden hostility. Yet other Ogaden sections, whose wealth lay beyond the reach of the administration, were inevitably going to act independently for as long as they could, and the signatures of their elders was unlikely to be a factor making the slightest difference.

What had so far been achieved was a demonstration of Government authority, but this had not been followed up by the imposition of

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1"Ogaden Submission", 30 Jan. 1896, FO.107/51.
2C. to H., 25 March 1896, FO.107/51.
3C. to S., 13 July 1896, FO.107/60.
Government control. When Murgham Yusuf died in May 1896, Farrant wrote to Afmadu to find out who had been chosen to succeed him, and there was still no attempt to determine or influence the decision. Nor was this merely a reflection of limited Government authority, it also emphasised the absence of reliable intelligence about Ogaden politics, and this was a recurrent problem.

All that Farrant learnt was that Yusuf's heir was to be his son Ahmed Murgham, who was too young to assume control, and that Ogaden affairs would be dealt with by a Council of Regency. Graufurd assumed that this would lead to improved relations with the Ogaden, while Jenner explained Ahmed's friendship towards the Government in terms of Ali Nahar's assumed influence over him, yet neither was right.

The most alarming aspect of Ahmed Murgham's position was the lack of support given to him by other Ogaden sections, and it was almost certainly this that prompted him to establish friendly relations with the Kismayu administration. Hersi Degaja, head of the Aulihan, told Jenner that he would not recognise Ahmed's authority

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1 R.G.Farrant had first served with the I.B.E.A.Co. In 1896 he was posted to Kismayu as a Collector (the equivalent of the D.G. or District Commissioner).

2 Perducci to Dulio, 26 March 1898, ASMAI. Posiz.68/1-11.

3 F. to H., 16 May 1896, FO.107/52.

and, while expressing his complete obedience to the Government, hoped that in future the administration would discuss Aulihan affairs with him directly. Hassan Odel, head of the Abd Wak, and Hassan Berghin, head of the Abdulla, also refused to recognise Ahmed Murgham's position, and declined to maintain any further contact with the Government. Since several Abdulla sections were, anyway, committed to raiding on the river Tana, the clan's relations with Kismayu had inevitably been somewhat strained, while the Abd Wak grazing grounds were still inaccessible from Kismayu.

Ahmed Murgham's support, therefore, came almost entirely from the Muhammad Zubeir, his own clan, and from the Mukhabul, whose head, Ali Murgham, was Ahmed's paternal uncle. Additional government support was clearly necessary. Ahmed Murgham offered to go to Kismayu to swear his allegiance to the government, but before going he asked Jenner if he could bring three to four hundred followers with him. Jenner, thinking of the expense, had at first been inclined to refuse the request but then changed his mind:

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1 J. to H., 24 June 1896, PC/CP/74/45.
2 J. to C., 5 Sept. 1896, PC/CP/74/45.
4 Ahmed may also have received support from the Suleiman and the Her Muhammad, sub-sections that are not mentioned in the official correspondence. J. to H., 24 June 1896, PC/CP/74/45.
It was pointed out to me", he wrote, "that his position as Sultan was rather precarious, and would be shaken if a disposition was shown by the Government not to recognise his new dignity.\footnote{J. to C., 5 Sept. 1896, FO.107/60.}

It was therefore recognised both by the Ogaden and the Kismayu administration that the purpose of the visit was to strengthen Ahmed's position. Yet Jenner nevertheless refused to give Ahmed the same privileges as Shirwar Ismail, though these were requested. The Ogaden were still on probation.\footnote{Agreement signed by Ahmed Murgham, chief of the Ogaden tribe, 1 Sept. 1896, PC/CP/74/45.}

Jenner never explained in his correspondence why Ahmed Murgham's position should have been so precarious. It is easy to assume that on Murgham Yusuf's death there was a centrifugal tendency amongst the Ogaden clans. Jenner himself encouraged this impression, it usefully substantiated his pretension to be supporting the legitimate claimant to the Ogaden Sultanate. But was Ahmed's claim really legitimate? According to Sir Charles Eliot,\footnote{From 1900 to 1904 Sir Charles Eliot was Commissioner and Consul General, East Africa Protectorate and Agfe^, and Consul-General, Zanzibar.} Murgham Yusuf had designated Omar Murgham, Ahmed's younger brother, to succeed him and had given him his ring on his deathbed. It had been Jenner's subsequent recognition of Ahmed Murgham as the Sultan that had encouraged the Muhammad Zubeir and the Mukhabul to back Ahmed, but this line was not followed by the other Ogaden
sub-clans who refused to be represented on the Council of Regency.\(^1\) Furthermore, it was suggested that Murgham Yusuf had chosen Omar Murgham to succeed him because of his greater ability, and one of Ahmed's problems consisted of his unprepossessing character: "he was young, and rash, lacking the personal influence of his father".\(^2\)

Yet, whatever the root cause of Ahmed's weakness, Jenner was supporting as Sultan of the Ogaden a man who exercised little personal authority, and this in itself was a dangerous policy, especially since his council was scarcely more effective. Craufurd recommended that Ahmed should be given 40 Rs. a month plus a small sum for his followers, on the understanding that he would be of some assistance to the government, but his craven attitude towards the Kismayu administration made him an even less effective tool in Jenner's hands.\(^3\) For, the more his cooperation was guaranteed, the less likely it was that other Ogaden would follow his example.

In December Ahmed Murgham paid his tribute a few days late and brought with him an insufficient number of cattle. Although he happened to be the only Ogaden leader willing to pay any tribute at all, Jenner began to adopt an unrealistically rigid attitude towards the Muhammad Zubeir in particular. For a few months the policy

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\(^1\) E. to L., 8 March 1901, F0.2/445; Intelligence Division to F.O., 21 July 1898 encl. 1, F0.107/104.

\(^2\) T.H.R. Cashmore (1965), 319.

\(^3\) C. to S., 9 Oct. 1898, F0.107/60.
seemed to pay off and Jenner wrote:

On the whole I am satisfied with Ahmed Murgham's attitude, and I consider that in his heart he really wishes for peace with us, recognises our strength, and is prepared to submit to the orders of Government, but he is not a strong man.\[1\]

What tended to be overlooked was that the real problem lay in persuading other Ogaden sub-clans that the administration was strong, and this was an impossible task for a weak Sultan. The job would ultimately be Jenner's, and he did not sufficiently realise that his own rigidity towards the Muhammad Zubeir, and Ahmed Murgham in particular, was likely to advance the date when he would have to accept this task or admit the government's weakness.

The confrontation came in February 1897, when Jenner discovered that the Ogaden were preparing a razzia against the Boran, and it was one of his own choosing. Since the Boran were theoretically friends of the British Government, Jenner foolishly prohibited the raid and then dispatched part of the Kismayu garrison to a village near the Deshak Wama as a warning.\[2\] However, the best policy would have been to ignore the proposed attack altogether since it could not be prevented, and Jenner had already been advised not to get involved in outside disputes.\[3\] The troops only deterred

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\[1\] J. to C., 31 Dec. 1896, PC/CP/74/45.
\[2\] H. to S., 17 March 1897, FO.107/76.
\[3\] H. to J., 5 July 1895, PC/JUB/2/1/1.
a few nearby villages from joining in; the Ogaden ignored Jenner's prohibition.

What had happened was that Jenner had entirely misjudged the nature of the Ogaden raid, which was not intended as an ordinary hunt for loot and ivory. The Bombi age-set now wanted to whet their spears and eradicate their shameful name by a deed of valour. The prestige of the whole age-set was at stake and their leader was Ahmed Murgham. Inevitably he was implicated in the raid, though Hersi Degaja was said to have led the Ogaden northwards. A raid of this sort had deep social implications that Jenner was largely unaware of, he did not even know of Ahmed's important position amongst the Bombi, and so he publicly and unnecessarily forbade an act the Ogaden would feel socially compelled to carry out.

The raid happened to be a failure and the Ogaden obtained no loot from the Boran. But Jenner at once strongly recommended that Afmadu should be occupied for three to four months, that some of the walls should be destroyed and that Ogaden cattle should be

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1 However for another view see: H.Moyse-Bartlett (1956), 113.

2 R.S.Salkeld (1905), 548.

3 J. to H., 27 March 1897, FO.107/76.

4 J. to H., 13 June 1897, FO.107/78.
confiscated.\textsuperscript{1} Hardinge energetically supported these proposals and also sent a telegram to Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary, to say that Major Hatch, Officer Commanding Troops in the Protectorate, recommended a punitive expedition.\textsuperscript{2}

Salisbury, however, naturally hesitated before sanctioning the use of force and acted with due deliberation. He took two and a half weeks to answer Hardinge's telegram, and then only asked for more details. After further delays totalling a month, Salisbury decided that the Uganda rebellion necessitated the indefinite postponement of active measures in Jubaland, and the matter was shelved.\textsuperscript{3}

Yet this decision, understandable though it was, undermined the whole basis on which a forward policy was being constructed in the Juba area. Jenner had only followed Craufurd's valedictum; "my policy", he had written shortly before leaving Kismayu, "has been to show the Somalis that I could gain my ends by force; but, nevertheless, to achieve them by peaceful means whenever possible".\textsuperscript{4}

Now, on the other hand, the sting had been removed from any government threat, for the use of force was not to be sanctioned. It was

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{1} J. to H., 27 March 1897, FO.107/77.
\item \textsuperscript{2} H. to S., 4 April 1897 tele. no. 27, FO.107/84; H. to S., 4 April 1897, no. 72, FO.107/77. For further details about this telegram and its reception at the F.O. as well as Ogaden developments see: G.H.Munro (1966), 30-31.
\item \textsuperscript{3} S. to H., 21 April 1897, FO.107/83; H. to J., 10 June 1897, FO.107/78.
\item \textsuperscript{4} C. to H., 25 March 1896, FO.107/51.
\end{footnotes}
perfectly clear to Jenner that, if this policy was not soon reversed, it would mean the end of any attempt to control the Ogaden. Perhaps for a short while some bluff might succeed, but, as early as August 1897, Jenner was writing to Hardinge:

Our prestige will suffer, as it will be evident that we are acting hostilely to the Ogaden, and yet dare not go up to Afmadu and attack them.¹

As a result of Salisbury's decision, Hardinge had already instructed Jenner to take advantage of any disposition on the part of Ahmed Murgham to arrive at a peaceful settlement. After the payment of a fine the incident was to be regarded as closed, but what action could be taken if the Ogaden remained defiant and refused to pay? Hardinge was now able to recommend nothing more drastic than an interdiction of Ogaden trade in Kismayu, and Jenner thought that this would hurt the administration more than the Somali.² There would be a drastic reduction of income in Jubaland, while the Ogaden could still send their produce to Italian ports.³ For it was not possible to prevent the Ogaden from trading with the Benadir, and Jenner argued that an ineffective blockade was worse than no blockade at all. He now favoured the adoption of a friendly attitude.

¹ J. to H., 11 Aug. 1897, FO.107/79.
² H. to J., 10 June 1897, FO.107/78.
³ H. to S., 24 June 1897, FO.107/78.
towards the Ogaden, since they could not be punished.\footnote{J. to H., 11 Aug. 1897, FO.107/79.}

In June 1897, Jenner began negotiations with Ahmed Murgham and offered to remit the fine if the Sultan was prepared to show some sign that he regretted his action, but this was going too far.\footnote{J. to H., 13 June 1897, FO.107/78.} Haringle did not want the impression to be given that the Government was retreating from an embarrassing position and Jenner was informed that delay was the best tactic.\footnote{H. to J., 23 June 1897, FO.107/78.}

As a result a period of increased lawlessness followed. Omar Murgham killed two Herti police, and the Baha\-ka Ogaden refused to pay adequate \textit{diva}. A few months later, the Aulihan murdered a Wardai Galla who was trading with the Gosha.\footnote{J. to H., 3 March 1898, FO.107/91.} Haringle tried twice, therefore, to reopen the question of a punitive expedition. "Putting aside all questions of justice", he wrote to Lord Salisbury, "it is impossible, with any regard for our prestige, and for the security of persons under our protection, to let such an incident pass without notice." The Ogaden moreover appeared to expect some form of retaliation and Hardinge hoped that "perhaps next year Your Lordship may permit us to take more active measures".\footnote{H. to S., 2 Oct. 1897, FO.107/81.}
He specially stressed that an expedition need not be expensive, and now advocated a quick march to Afmadu, where all the wells would either be destroyed or rendered unusable. However, this was not sanctioned, and false hopes were later engendered by Hardinge's impression that Ahmed Murgham was anxious to avoid a quarrel with the Government.¹

Yet there does seem to have been some evidence that the Bahahla Ogaden were willing to come to terms with the Kismayu administration. The Muhammad Zubeir, Aulihan and Suleiman sections all paid small sums towards their fine; the Maghabul also contributed four hundred dollars worth of property. There were several reasons why Ahmed Murgham was anxious to re-establish friendly relations with the Government. In the first place, the threat of an expedition against Afmadu had led to the temporary abandonment of agriculture around the wells, and a consequent scarcity of grain. Greater stability was required before sowing could begin again, and the delay was proving irksome. It was also realised that the Government threat was primarily directed against those sections that were most associated with Afmadu, and their desire to minimise the danger was consequently an important factor in inducing a conciliatory attitude.

¹H. to S., 19 March 1898, FO.107/91.
But, after February 1898, the Aulihan were bent on mischief. Herti police had seized twenty-six of their cattle as a reprisal for the death of a British protected Galla, and this put an end to their further cooperation. Before Jenner could seriously improve relations with Afmadu, Ahmed Murgham had been swept along and involved in the growing scale of Aulihan lawlessness. On March 31st, the Aulihan killed two Arabs and a Galla on the Kismayu-Turki Hill road. The following day they raided cattle near Kismayu and attacked a party of Herti police. Then slowly the number of Ogaden sections involved in raids began to grow. On 23 March, six Waboni were murdered, and this time Omar Murgham and nine Abdulla were implicated. By the end of the month an Ogaden messenger was claiming that Ahmed Murgham had instigated all these murders, and that his present policy was to send out small marauding parties in different directions to embarrass the administration as much as possible. Similar information regarding Ogaden intentions was also obtained by the Italian Resident at Giumbo, though, more realistically, Ahmed Murgham was not credited with any initiative in the matter.

There is no precise information, however, about which Ogaden sub-clans were involved in a general agreement to harass the Kismayu

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1 H. to H., 3 March 1898, FO.107/91.

2 T. to H., 1 April 1898, FO.107/92.

3 Perducci to B., 26 March 1898, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-11.
administration. The Abdulla do not appear to have been involved in the later hostilities against the Government, and, with a few exceptions, seem to have remained neutral in the dispute.¹ It is probable that there were other sections who followed their example.² But from the point of view of Kismayu, where information about the Ogaden was in any case scarce, no fine distinctions could be drawn, and Hardinge wrote that: "all the sub-sections of the Ogaden tribe were... said to be implicated."³ In these circumstances a punitive expedition appeared unavoidable, and Hardinge pressed once more for the requisite permission:

The submission of Afnadu will never, I fear, be a reality until we can prove to the Ogaden that we are able to enter their country and adopt in our dealings with them an offensive and not merely a defensive attitude.⁴

But neither this oblique approach, nor a more formal request, achieved any immediate results.

Thus Hardinge's options were becoming drastically limited. In the face of repeated and indeed almost daily acts of hostility he was prohibited from ordering the use of force. When Craufurd was sent to Kismayu on 1 April, he was told to bring the Ogaden Somali

¹Reddie to Rogers, 27 Feb. 1898 and Rogers to H., 28 April 1898, FO.107/93.

²It is interesting to note that when the Ogaden subsequently made peace the Abdulla, the Rer Muhammad and the Muhhabul did not tender their submission, the implication being that they had not taken part in the hostilities.

³H. to S., 2 April 1898, FO.107/100.

⁴F. to H., 1 April 1898, FO.107/92.
to reason by every possible means in his power, "short of an actual hostile movement against Afromu", a proviso that made the task impossible. The most that could be done was to prohibit any trade with the Ogaden in Kismayu, to confiscate all their property in the town, and to disarm those that could still be found in the district.

On April 5th, Hardinge telegraphed that the Protectorate Council had unanimously recommended the occupation of Afromu, it was the last shot in his locker. This telegram was forwarded to the Intelligence Division of the War Office for their comments, and, though the occupation of Afromu was agreed to in principle, Sir John Ardagh, the Director of Military Intelligence, thought that the time was inopportune because of events in Uganda. Salisbury had little choice but to send Hardinge a telegram on 13 April informing him that it was not yet convenient to undertake an expedition.

A fundamental weakness of the East Africa Protectorate was the lack of sufficiently large reserve forces and this severely limited the occasions when military action could be threatened.

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1. H. to C., 1 April 1898, FO.107/92.
2. F. to H., 1 April 1898, FO.107/92.
3. H. to S., 5 April 1898, FO.107/100; Intelligence Division to F.O., 9 April 1898, FO.107/104; S. to H., 13 April 1898, FO.107/99.
4. S. to H., 13 April, FO.107/99. See also Sir A. Hardinge (1928), 222, where he explains Salisbury's action in terms of developments in the Southern Sudan.
Delay in handling a small crisis in Jubaland, however, had resulted in a much larger one. It was ironic and tragic that on the very same day that Salisbury informed Hardinge that a punitive expedition was inopportune, the Government post at Yonte was overrun and destroyed. If there was any lesson to be learnt, it was surely that there was no substitute for the quick and efficient handling of potential crises, even using force if necessary, and that delay only tended to exacerbate difficult situations, since it was invariably considered a sign of weakness. But if Hardinge sometimes felt like imitating Reddie, the District Officer at Port Durnford, who asked for "a freer hand... to act as circumstances indicate", there can be no doubt that the Ogaden crisis had been compounded by two very senior Protectorate officials trying to initiate a forward policy against the wishes of the Secretary of State.

The first aims of the 1898 punitive expedition were to clear the Ogaden from the Gosha and Kismayu districts, and then to establish a line of posts between Kismayu and the Deshek Wama. But the ultimate objective was to advance on Afmadu where a permanent military post

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1 J. to H., 15 April 1898, FO.107/92.
2 R. to R., 1 April 1898, FO.107/93.
3 I have deliberately avoided as far as possible any account of the military operations. These have already been described by H. Moyse-Bartlett (1956), 113-114.
was to be set up. Once this had been done, it was assumed that the Ogaden would be faced with the choice of either evacuating the country or coming to terms with the Government. Jenner thought that the Ogaden would leave the district altogether and "settle down on the outskirts of Boran", where he predicted the "eventual breakup of the tribe".

However, these assumptions were never put to the test because, at the beginning of July, Major Quentin, Officer in Command of the expedition, decided that it would be madness to set out for Afmadu. At the same time, there was a growing realisation that the wells were not as important as had first been thought. Jenner now wrote that: "the lake and not the Afmadu wells are the key to the situation". This change of view had perhaps been partly encouraged by the realisation that the capture of Afmadu was beyond the capability of the expedition, but it was also becoming evident that during the dry season there was not enough water at the wells for all the Ogaden cattle, while the Deshek Wama provided an additional and indispensable source of supply.

By the beginning of August, therefore, Hardinge had abandoned the idea of setting up a military post at Afmadu, and he had settled instead for an administrative station on the Deshek Wama. But Jenner objected that the area was unhealthy and no suitable site could be

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1 H. to J., 20 April 1898, F0.107/92; H. to S., 31 July 1898, F0.107/95.
2 H. to S., 9 April 1898, F0.107/92.
3 J. to H., 29 April 1898 and H. to S., 10 May 1898, F0.107/93; "Notes on the Expedition against the Ogaden Somalis", Intelligence
found. So when Hardinge visited Jubaland in September 1898 to conclude peace talks with the Ogaden, he also toured Kismayu and Gosha districts, finally deciding that the new post should be built at Yontë, on the river Juba, less than twenty miles from the sea.

As a result, the 1898 Ogaden expedition did not lead to any significant administrative expansion. Militarily the Ogaden were defeated, but the further step of bringing them under political control, which had originally been a principal objective, was now abandoned. What then had the punitive expedition achieved apart from restoring the status quo ante.

In the first place, the prestige of the Ogaden had undoubtedly suffered. But perhaps the most significant change lay in the access now granted to Jenner and other members of the Kismayu administration to the interior beyond Afmadu. It was supremely ironic that immediately after their defeat the Ogaden should have welcomed, and in fact demanded, some sign of British occupation; though this was due more to fears of Ethiopian aggression than to the success

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Division, War Office, 21 July 1898, FO.107/104.

1Major Quentin to J., 4 July 1898, FO.107/95.

2J. to H., 6 July 1898, FO.107/95; J. to H., 7 Nov. 1898, FO.107/98.

3J. to H., 26 Aug. 1898, FO.107/96.

4H. to S., 18 Sept. 1898, FO.107/96.

5J. to H., 6 Feb. 1899, FO.2/189; Statement by A. Musa, 14 Feb. 1900, FO.2/285; M. Mohamed Agil 'Report', 1899, PC/CP/78/65.
of the punitive expedition. There seems to be a mistaken impression that the defeat of the Italians at Adowa in 1896 emboldened the Jubaland Darod into thinking that the Europeans having been defeated once, could be defeated again. In fact the Ethiopian victory and the Amharic expansion southwards caused very considerable alarm. In 1898 and 1899 there was near panic amongst the Ogaden that the Amhara would advance as far as Afmadu, and Ahmed Murgham urgently requested a British Protectorate flag as proof of British occupation and sovereignty. One result of this panic, then, was to open up Ogaden country to penetration from the coast. Dr. Radford, the Medical Superintendent in the Province, remarked that in 1899 and 1900 frequent expeditions were made through Ogaden country, "with and without military escorts, the Somalis daily becoming more friendly". As a result of these expeditions the area around El Wak and Wajir was explored for the first time, and valuable information about the territorial limits of the Ogaden was gained.

Relations between Kismayu and the Ogaden Sultan improved dramatically once hostilities had ended. By 1900, the possibility of any further Ogaden hostility seemed so remote that on several occasions Farrant took his wife to Afmadu. Cederqvist, the Swedish

1 See: G.H. Mungeam (1966), 30 who cites the opinion of Hardinge in H. to S., 4 April 1898, F0.107/77.

2 H. to S., 30 Sept. 1898, F0.107/96; Pestalozza to M., 20 Aug. 1899, ASMAI, Posiz. 68/1-12.

3 Dr. Radford to F.O. 27 Nov. 1900, F0.2/384.

4 H. to S., 5 March 1900, F0.2/285.
missionary, also felt that it was quite safe to travel anywhere amongst the Ogaden. Conversely, Ahmed Murgham now often visited Kismayu and in 1900 he travelled to Mombasa and Zanzibar in order to say farewell to Hardinge, who was retiring from the Protectorate.

At the same time, this progress probably gave rise to a misleading and dangerous optimism. There were two inherent weaknesses in Jenner's essentially euphoric approach to the Ogaden that tended to get overlooked whenever there was an amelioration in his relations with the Somali. Firstly his intelligence system was far too rudimentary, and only functioned spasmodically. During the 1898 conflict, Major Quentin had constantly complained that it had been impossible to obtain authentic information about the enemy. Jenner's Herti spies were far too conspicuous for the job, and his best success was achieved with Shirwar Ismail's Galla herdsmen, but what he needed at the time were Ogaden informers and of these he had none.

After hostilities had ended, there was still a need to obtain detailed information especially about the Ogaden, but little scope for accomplishing this. The gradual re-employment of Ogaden in

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1 H. to H., 24 July 1900, AS/EFA/IS/313.
2 H. to S., 22 March 1899, F0.2/190.
3 Major Quentin to Major Hatch, 5 Nov. 1898, F0.107/98.
4 J. to H., 26 July 1898, F0.107/95.
Government services was only just beginning in 1899, and it was still too early to use these recruits for gathering information. Military intelligence in Jubaland was also practically non-existent.¹ So Jenner had to rely on the gossip of travellers, the talk of headmen and elders, and the views of his own Political Officers and Herti police. Where this system broke down was in obtaining details of potentially hostile Somali sections. The elders of these sections were generally the most difficult to contact, while other segments friendly to the Government frequently kept quiet about disturbing developments out of loyalty to their kinsmen.

Thus there was an inbuilt tendency for Jenner to receive only the more encouraging news. As long as the Ogaden were peaceably inclined there was perhaps little danger in this, but with the advantages of hindsight it is easy to see how vulnerable Jenner was to any unexpected deterioration in their political cooperation.

Lack of adequate information also made it impossible to give differential treatment to various segments. Jenner never attempted, for instance, to make use of the divisive factors in Ogaden society to weaken and control the clan. Instead, he adopted a uniform policy towards the Ogaden as a whole, which encouraged their unity in the

face of any crisis. Rather revealingly, it was later stated that the Abd Wak fought the Government in 1901 because they felt the administration could not distinguish one sub-clan from another and so would treat them all as guilty.¹

Jenner appears to have underestimated the feeling of hostility that existed among some of the most important Ogaden sections. Frequent communication with Ahmed Murgham (head of the Muhammad Zubeir), Abdi Liban (head of the Suleiman) and Egal Hassan (head of the Mukhabul), was offset by a lack of contact with potentially dangerous sub-clan chiefs such as Hassan Odel (head of the Abd Wak) and Hersi Degaja (head of the Aulihan).² Moreover in 1899 the Abd Wak and the Aulihan were the two sub-clans that needed watching the most closely. Although Jenner realised that the Aulihan were the "most troublesome section", he nevertheless failed to see that after their surrender in August 1898 their attitude had undergone little change, and the basic dangers remained unaltered.³

The Aulihan had been responsible for the start of hostilities and they had also been the first to surrender. This last fact had made a good impression on Jenner. Hersi Degaja also returned fifteen out of the twenty-seven Henry Martini Mark 4 rifles that he

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¹ W.J. Monson, "Intelligence Report", n.d. FO.2/446.
² E. to L., 8 March 1901, FO.2/445; T. to L., 23 Nov. 1900, FO.2/294.
³ J. to H., 26 Aug. 1898, FO.107/96.
had captured, while less than half the Sniders in the hands of other Ogaden sub-clans were returned to the Government. At the same time, the Aulihan refused to hand over Gure Hersi who had been responsible for the murder of a Galla, and this was a good example of how little they were really prepared to concede.

Moreover, since many sections were found on both sides of the river Juba, the Aulihan also successfully managed to involve Jenner in disputes with the Italian administration, which ranged him firmly on their side without giving him any control over their affairs.

The most important instance concerned Abdurrahman Mursaal, a powerful Aulihan elder, who had crossed over from the Italian side of the river. He received full support from Jenner when he claimed compensation from Perducci, the Italian Resident at Giumbo, and when Perducci claimed that Abdurrahman was an Italian citizen, Jenner declared him to be a British Protected person and proceeded to employ him in the Kismayu administration as a Political Officer.

However, it was A. Mursaal who had actually led the attack on Yoste at the beginning of hostilities in 1898, and the employment of a man whose friendship was so uncertain turned out to be a bad

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1 H. to S., 9 Sept. 1898, FO.107/96; Q. to H., 5 Nov. 1898, FO.107/98.
2 J. to H., 31 Aug. 1898, FO.107/96.
3 P. to J., 29 June 1900 and H. to S., 23 July 1900, FO.2/289.
mistake. He was subsequently involved in later Ogaden revolts, while Jenner was led to imagine that he had secured his cooperation.¹

Equally dangerous during the post-1898 period was Hassan Odel, head of the Abd Wak. After visiting Kismayu once to tender his submission, he had then isolated himself from further contact with the coast. Jenner seemed to regard his one visit as something of an achievement for the administration, but the fact that it was not repeated was more a sign of its weakness.² The Abd Wak had played a key part in the 1898 rebellion, and their subsequent isolation strongly suggested that they were unrepentant and hostile.

Apart from all the problems caused by inadequate intelligence, Jenner's second weakness, in his handling of the Ogaden, sprang largely from his temperament. Perhaps the kindest observation that could be made of Jenner was that he was altogether too optimistic, too trusting of the Ogaden "whom he unfortunately credited with high qualities foreign to their real character", and that this misjudgement ultimately cost him his life.³ But there was also another side to his character. Both Perducci and Cederqvist who came into close contact with Jenner agreed that he was a man of violent temper.⁴ This was a serious liability and it inevitably

¹ P. to Z., 17 July 1898, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-11.
² J. to H., 5 Aug. 1898, FO. 107/96.
³ Papers relating to the Murder of Mr. Jenner, C. 7823 (1901), item 23, quoted in T. H. R. Cashmore (1965), 322.
casts doubt on the soundness of his judgement. Acts carried out in anger by Jenner were capable of arousing the most bitter and longstanding resentment amongst the Somali, and it was two such acts that seem to have been ultimately responsible for his death.¹

In July 1900, several Wagosha were killed by Muhammad Zubeir after a quarrel about ivory.² The incident was not of great importance in itself, and Jenner asked Hassan Yera, qadi to the Ogaden, to arrest the murderers. When Hassan failed to act, Jenner charged him with complicity and fined him 1,000 Rs. When he failed to pay, Jenner had him arrested and angrily imprisoned him in Kismayu. This was a great insult and it was not forgotten.³

One of the first people to plot with Hassan Yera was an Aulihan, Hassan Warfa, whose son had been whipped by Jenner, and together they sought the assistance of Hassan Odel, which was readily given.⁴ Towards the end of September, Jenner set out on a tour of the interior. In his last letter, dated 1 November, he wrote of the "absolutely peaceful" conditions "now that we have pacified the Ogaden". But Hassan Odel was waiting with 300 Ogaden for an

¹Jenner is also said to have been a sodomite, which could explain other antagonisms. But until these traditions are thoroughly investigated they should obviously be treated with reserve. Information from T.H.R.Cashmore.


³E. to L., 8 March 1901, FO.2/445; C. Zoli (1927), 158.

opportunity to ambush Jenner. The one person who could have warned Jenner was Ahmed Murgham, but he had just been fined 1,000 Rs. himself for not making Hassan Yera pay, and when Jenner met him he revealed nothing.¹

Several other people of importance were implicated, though their motives remained uncertain. Omar Murgham acted as a spy and visited Jenner's camping sites twice to find out their strength. Aden Hagem, a Muhammad Zubeir elder, was also implicated and so was A. Mursaal, indirectly.² On 16 November, Jenner was killed and his camp was overrun. A new punitive expedition had to be undertaken.³

The basic aim of the second Ogaden expedition was no different from that of the first. On both occasions the capture and retention of Afmadu was initially assumed to be imperative, and on both it was an objective that was soon abandoned. But, whereas the 1898 expedition led to the opening up of the hinterland beyond Afmadu, at least to exploring parties, the 1901 campaign, by contrast, resulted in a complete withdrawal from the interior; and this antithesis

¹J. to T., 1 Nov. 1900, F0.2/292.

²Perducci to Dulio, 20 Nov. 1900, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-17; T. to L., 4 Dec. 1900, F0.2/294.

³The military details of the campaign can be found in H. Moyse-Bartlett (1954), 115ff.
reflected the adoption in the spring of 1901 of a new policy towards Jubaland that radically altered the development of the Province.

The murder of Jenner took place during an awkward hiatus in the administration of the East Africa Protectorate. On 7 October Hardinge left Mombasa to take up a diplomatic post in Persia, and Sir Charles Eliot, who succeeded him, did not arrive until the end of December. The responsibility for organising a punitive expedition fell, therefore, on Ternan, the Acting Commissioner, who arrived at Kismayu on 25 November.

By 8 February 1901, he had occupied Afmadu in force and captured Ahmed Murgham. Ternan then pushed a further fifty-seven miles into the interior with a flying column in an attempt to inflict a decisive defeat on the Ogaden. But within two weeks Ternan had abandoned Afmadu and returned to the coast through a misunderstanding over his instructions. The punitive expedition, therefore, came to an unexpectedly rapid end. The precipitate withdrawal of all Government forces to the coast made it necessary to consider anew the relationship between Kismayu and the interior.

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1 G.H.Muggeam (1966), 67ff.

2 Ternan was also the Officer Commanding Troops in the Protectorate.

3 E. to T., 19 March 1901, F0.2/446; E. to L., 16 March 1901, F0.2/456.
Jenner's death had, in fact, made some change almost inevitable. For, towards the end of his life, he had abandoned the idea of establishing permanent administrative posts and planned instead to erect temporary stations which could be visited from time to time by peripatetic officials. The great merit of this scheme was that it entailed practically no capital expenditure, and this was especially important in a Province that did not have sufficient income to offset the cost of its own administration. It was also well suited to the nomadic habits of the Jubaland pastoralists. But it necessarily presupposed the friendly cooperation of the Somali, since these stations were not designed to withstand sieges or repeated attacks from a hostile neighbourhood.

When, therefore, at the beginning of 1901, both Sir Clement Hill and Ternan advocated setting up an administrative post at Afmadu, they were not thinking in terms of a provisional station. In the new circumstances, the continuation of a forward policy depended on the building of substantial and expensive military camps. Ternan estimated that the construction of military quarters at Afmadu would cost £5,000, that payment of the garrison would come to £10,000 a year, and that transport would involve a further £1,800 per annum. These were extremely large sums - only £400 was allocated

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1 Sir C. Hill was head of the Africa Department at the Foreign Office. Hill to L., 1 Jan. 1901, FO CP.IXIV; Correspondence Relating to the death of Mr. Jenner, and the Ogaden Punitive Expedition, CO. 591 (1901), 20.

in 1910 for setting up Jenner's type of 'temporary stations' at both Afmadu and Serenli\(^1\) and Lansdowne, the new Secretary of State, telegraphed Eliot in April, suggesting that he should visit Kismayu to consult with Ternan on future policy in Jubaland.\(^2\)

However, even before leaving Mombasa, Eliot had assumed that Lansdowne did not intend to sanction the permanent occupation of Afmadu.\(^3\) And after a short visit to Kismayu, he categorically dismissed the idea of a forward policy in the strongest possible terms:

I very much doubt whether this province is worth the money which is spent upon it... and I am strongly of the opinion that, unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to spend much more money on this Protectorate, it would be better to leave the deserts alone for the present, and to devote our attention to those parts which are both accessible and profitable. I am, therefore, quite willing to abandon all posts in the interior, including Mfudu, and to hold only Yonte and Kismayu... This withdrawal, of course, means that we must let the Somalis quarrel amongst themselves.\(^4\)

A few months later, as if to emphasise the point, he again wrote:

I am penetrated with the conviction that it is useless to spend lives and money on subduing the barbarous inhabitants of barren deserts, and that most punitive expeditions are a mistake.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Butler, Minute, 11 May 1910, CO. 533/72.

\(^2\) L. to E., 13 April 1901, FO.2/455.

\(^3\) E. to L., 18 April 1901, FO.2/456.

\(^4\) E. to L., 29 April 1901, FO.2/456.

\(^5\) E. to L., 1 Oct. 1901, FO.2/450.
Eliot's arguments against a forward policy were uncritically accepted at the Foreign Office, but his original idea had not just been a retreat to the coast and the abandonment of the interior. Eliot had also envisaged the formation of a camel corps. Combining speed with surprise, he expected it to have a considerable influence on developments in the Afmadu area.¹

However, the Treasury refused to sanction any expenditure on a camel corps, quoting Eliot's dispatch to the effect that money spent on Jubaland was largely wasted, and that anyway it was better to leave the deserts alone. As long as that policy was accepted they could see no justification for a camel corps.² So, as a result, there was a complete abandonment of the interior, which the Foreign Office later and somewhat laconically termed a policy of 'abstention'.³

Yet there were other reasons too why a policy of retrenchment should have been favoured. Sheik Muhammad's rebellion further north was beginning to have a strong psychological impact on the Jubaland administration, as well as on the Protectorate Government.⁴ There were real fears that the rebellion would spread southwards, and

¹E. to L., 18 April 1901, F0.2/456; E. to L., 20 May 1901, F0.2/447.
²Treasury to F.0., 9 Aug. 1901, F0.2/520.
³F0. to Co., 10 March 1905, CO.533/3.
⁴See my article in the J.A.H., X no. 4 (1969) for a more detailed analysis of this.
these fears were heightened - especially in 1902 - by inaccurate rumours coming from the Italian Protectorate. These mentioned that Muhammad Abdille Hassan was marching south at the head of large numbers of troops, and that the Italians were abandoning the interior of their Protectorate. Moreover, after the battle of Erigo in October 1902, where Sheik Muhammad scored a notable victory over the British, Lansdowne admitted that the Sheik could not now be prevented from moving south, and Eliot was instructed to take all necessary military steps to defend the few administrative posts in Jubaland. Although Sheik Muhammad's threat to the East Africa Protectorate was more imaginary than real, his rebellion nevertheless continued to cast its shadow over Jubaland, and while in later years rumours that he was about to move south lost some of their potency through sheer repetition, they still discouraged a forward policy.

After 1905 this policy of 'non-intervention' underwent slow and subtle changes. By 1909 it had become a policy of 'observation', and there was some argument as to whether this should be 'active' or 'passive'. Yet until 1910, there was no significant administrative

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1 J. to L., 18 Oct. 1902, F0.2/576; Perducci to Harrison, 7 Oct. 1902 and Dulio to Perducci, 28 Sept. 1902, FO.CP.LXXI.

2 L. to E., 10 Nov. 1902, F0.2/576.

3 A more detailed analysis of the gradual development of a forward policy in Jubaland can be found in T.H.R. Cashmore's thesis, page 324ff.

4 G.H. Mungeam (1956), 234.
advance into the interior; the occupation of Afmadu was often mooted, and it became a "symbol of the Forward policy" but, nevertheless, it was repeatedly delayed.¹

Until the oral traditions of the Herti and Ogaden have been utilised, this period of Jubaland history must remain extremely obscure. In the first place, only a small proportion of the official correspondence was ever forwarded to England. Then all the copies that were kept in Nairobi were destroyed in the Secretariat fire of 1938, while the District and Provincial archives also suffered considerable damage from natural hazards. But, even more important, this was a period when official policy itself encouraged a minimum of contact between the coast and the interior. Consequently little was known about developments amongst the Somali themselves.

However, one trend that clearly emerged over this period was the growing disunity of the Ogaden. There were several reasons for this. For a start, the crisis that developed as a result of Jenner's murder instead of leading to a united Ogaden stand, only served to underline the internal divisions of the clan. Through the mishandling of this situation, no account was taken of these divisions when the second Ogaden expedition was undertaken. In fact, Terman mistakenly assumed that Jenner's death involved a general revolt, masterminded by Ahmed Murgham, of all Ogaden sub-clans. The subsequent

¹T.H.R. Cashmore (1965), 325.
mounting of a punitive expedition against the Ogaden in general was the logical outcome of this attitude, but it credited the clan with a degree of unity that it did not possess.\(^1\)

It would have been much better to have treated the murder as a crime, rather than as an act of political revolt.\(^2\) For, as Sir Charles Eliot acutely observed:

> The murder of Jenner was due to personal motives; its only political importance was that it showed the audacity of the Somalis and their small respect for our government. But it was not part of a revolt or a rebellion.\(^3\)

The Abdulla remained quiet, and neither the Mukhabul nor the Rer Muhammad joined in the fighting.\(^4\) Ahmed Mupgham and most of the Muhammad Zubeir also tried to remain uninvolved, but Terman saw to it that they were all implicated in the murder.\(^5\) Government troops were therefore opposed only by the Abd Wak and the Aulihan, with the Muhammad Zubeir reluctantly joining in. The Mukhabul and the Rer Muhammad retreated to the Tana. The campaign itself lasted a short time and was inconclusive from a military point of view. However, the capture of Ahmed Murgham and ten other Somali chiefs in February 1901 might have proved decisive had they

\(^1\)T. to L., 26 Nov. 1900, FO.2/294.

\(^2\)Sir Charles Eliot (1905), 120.

\(^3\)"Report on the Native tribes of East Africa", in E. to L., 9 April 1902, FO.2/570. This view was also shared by others Major Harrison, "Memorandum on Jubaland", 8 July 1902, PC/JUB/2/1/6; Cederqvist to T., 31 Dec. 1900, AS/EFA/IS/317.

\(^4\)T. to L., 22 Dec. 1900, FO.2/294; E. to L., 8 March 1901, FO.2/445.

\(^5\)Cpt. Fisher, "Memorandum re. the state of affairs in Jubaland",
not been badly treated and imprisoned in Kismayu, which made
the Ogaden disinclined to yield.¹

Ironically, it was the fortuitous escape of Ahmed Murgham
from prison at about the same time that Government troops were
withdrawn to the coast, which provided the right conditions for
a negotiated settlement. A fine of five thousand cattle was
accepted by the Ogaden, but its payment remained uncertain for
Ternan, contrary to instructions², allowed a contingent of Indian
troops to leave the province before the fine had been paid and
Lansdowne would not allow a recommencement of hostilities to be
used as a threat enforcing its collection.³ While Eliot probably
agreed with the Secretary of State, he nevertheless saw the
absolute necessity of maintaining what he euphemistically called
'administrative pressure', if there was to be any real prospect
of ensuring the collection of the fine.⁴ In practice, there
turned out to be a similarity between the application of this
sort of pressure and the forbidden use of military force, at least
in 1901. The phrase was applied to the economic blockade of
Jubaland and an embargo on all Ogaden trade until the fine was paid.⁵

³0 Dec. 1900, F0.2/445.
¹E. to L., 8 March 1901, F0.2/445.
²E. to L., 18 June 1901, F0.2/449.
³L. to E., 9 Aug. 1901, FO.2/443; W. to T., 3 Nov. 1901, PC/JUB/2/1/4.
⁴E. to L., 18 April 1901, F0.2/456.
⁵E. to L., 4 Feb. 1902, F0.2/569.
Yet these were policies that depended for their success on a joint Anglo-Italian campaign along the river Juba, and it was the systematic destruction of Ogaden canoes, plus the regular patrolling of the river, that secured prompt payment by the Aulihan of their share of the fine.\footnote{Anglo-Italian relations are analysed in greater detail later in this chapter.} Equally, it was a rapid expedition to Afmadu that secured the final payment of the Muhammad Zubeir portion.\footnote{McD. to E., 14 March 1902 and Harrison to Hatch, 13 March 1902, F0.2/570; Cpt. Coke to E., 7 May 1902, F0.2/571.}

Owing to the absence of any central authority amongst the Ogaden, there was considerable difficulty in apportioning the fine between the various sections.\footnote{McD. to E., 13 Dec. 1901, F0.2/569.} The possibility of turning these divisions to good account was mooted by Captain Ward, the Officer Commanding Troops in Jubaland, but he then rejected the idea on the grounds that it involved too many complications.

It would I think be possible, he wrote, to arrange terms with each section of the tribe separately; each would then become a lever to increase the pressure on the others, but from a military point of view the situation is already very complicated owing to the presence of nominally friendly Herti Somalis in and around Kismayu and Gobwen. The difficulty would be accentuated if there were friendly Ogaden as well.\footnote{W. to OCT, EAP., 2 Dec. 1901, F0.2/451.}
This desire to deal with the Ogaden as a whole necessitated the pretence that their Sultan, Ahmed Murgham, was the only representative of the whole clan. McDougall, the new Sub-Commissioner at Kismayu, made it known that the fine was to be divided amongst the Ogaden sections by Ahmed Murgham, and that all payments were to be made through him alone. Letters from the Abd Wak and Aulihan, refusing to acknowledge Ahmed Murgham as Sultan and asking for direct negotiations with the Government, were left unanswered by McDougall. Instead, they were forwarded to Afmadu, where Ahmed Murgham was left to establish his position.

However, there was little point in drawing attention to the Sultan's technical superiority, when his authority was widely recognised to be purely nominal. The evidence suggests that the Sultan had absolutely no influence over the payment of the fine by sections other than the Muhammad Zubeir. The Aulihan paid their portion because of the pressure that had been put on them by the Kismayu administration. Ahmed Murgham paid because he desired peace and further Government support.

By February 1902, therefore, only two Ogaden sections had fully paid their fine. The Abd Wak had only surrendered a derisory total of 36 cattle, and McDougall decided to alter his policy.

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1 The number of cattle to be paid 5,000 was divided as follows: Muhammad Zubeir, 1,300; Abdulla, 1,000; Abd Wak, 1,050; Aulihan, 700; Sheik Ali, 400; Makhabul, 400; Habr Suleiman, 150.

2 McD. to L., 2 July 1901 plus enclosures, FO.2/449.
He wrote to Sir Charles Eliot:

My principal object is to bring pressure to bear upon the two tribes that have paid the fine viz. the Mohamed Zubeir and the Aulihan, to cooperate with the Government against the Abd Wak, Shir Ali and Maghabul, who have trekked into Tanaland, to pay 500 cattle.¹

At the same time, McDougall reduced the fine on the Abd Wak and their allies by over half, though he was careful not to draw attention to this adroit manipulation of previously agreed figures.² There was little possibility of putting any pressure on these sections, but in October 1902 it was claimed that the fine had been entirely paid.³ No figures were given and one is not likely to be far wrong if it assumed that only token payments were made, enabling an embarrassing situation to be brought to an end.

Ahmed Murgham's ready compliance with Government demands, and his attempt to secure the cooperation of the Telemugga (the Abd Wak, Abdulla and Reh Muhammad), weakened his already precarious position amongst the Muhammad Zubeir and led to the hostility of the Telemugga themselves. For while the Balhala (the Muhammad Zubeir, Suleiman and Aulihan) paid their share of the fine, there

¹McD. to E., 15 Feb. 1902, CO.2/569.
²The total fine remained unaltered and so this reduction went unnoticed. McD. to E., 14 March 1902, FO.2/570.
is every indication that the Telemugga, on the contrary, only
paid a small proportion of theirs, and the limitations of Ahmed's
authority were clearly revealed. Hassan Odel did not acknowledge
Ahmed's position as Sultan, and relations between the Abd Wak and
the Muhammad Zubeir worsened, though fighting did not break out
between them.¹

Relations between the Muhammad Zubeir and the Abd Wak were
equally bad. As a result of the first Ogaden expedition, the Abdulla
had temporarily left their customary grazing areas around the
Deshek Wama, and retreated southwards towards the river Tana.
Once peace had been restored, however, the Muhammad Zubeir made
use of their absence to trespass, and in 1899 serious fighting
broke out between these two sub-clans of the Ogaden over water
and grazing rights.² Terman managed to arrange a temporary settle­
ment, but the basic problem remained unsolved.³

Hardinge had hoped that the Abdulla would return to the Deshek
Wama, but was unable to put any pressure on them to do so.⁴ They
remained near the Tana, therefore, threatening the Pokomo and
Galla to the south of the river. Small bands of Abdulla and Wardai -
some of the latter were now Muslims - broke away from Hassan Berghin
and began to live exclusively by raiding on their own, and extracting

¹ Abd Wak to Hakim at Kismayu, n.d. in E. to L., 14 July 1901, F0.2/449.
² Radford to F.O., 27 Nov. 1900, F0.2/384; F. to H., 5 April 1899,
PC/CP/78/65; C. to F., 5 July 1899, PC/CP/63/18.
³ R. to H., 12 Aug. 1900, F0.2/290; R. to C., 2 June 1899, PC/CP/69/22.
⁴ H. to S., 17 Jan. 1899, F0.2/188.
tribute from the coastal Bon and Bajun. It was clearly a profitable occupation and there was less danger of Government interference in the south. Yet, because the Abdulla were making increased use of grazing on the Tana, their contact with the Dasheki Wama was becoming more intermittent, and challenges to their traditional position in this area were bound to increase as long as their contact waned. At the same time, the Muhammad Zubeir were also beginning to graze further south which exacerbated the situation.

Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the Abdulla helped the Muhammad Zubeir during the 1901 campaign. Sir Charles Eliot claimed that they had agreed to look after Muhammad Zubeir cattle and drive them to comparative safety. Captain Osborn, who led two expeditions in 1902, also thought that they had been fighting together. Yet McDougall and Reddie, the District Officer at Port Dumford, were just as convinced that the Abdulla were not on good enough terms with the Muhammad Zubeir to collaborate with them;

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1 McD. to H., 10 Jan. 1899, F0.2/188; E. to L., 20 June 1901, F0.2/449.

2 Sheik Hassan Berghin to Rogers, in R. to H., 12 Aug. 1900, F0.2/290; Ahmed Murgham to Bwana Masuno bin Kombo, Nov. 1902, PC/JUB/2/1/6.

3 E. to L., 8 March 1901, F0.2/445.

4 Capt. Osborn to OCT. EAP., 7 June 1901, F0.2/449.

5 McD. to E., 2 July 1901, F0.2/449; R. to E., 31 Dec. 1900, F0.2/445; R. to E., 8 March 1901, F0.2/446.
and Reddie had justified a friendly policy towards Hassan Berghin since 1898 with the exhortation "let's keep them apart". If there was some cooperation between the Abdulla and the Muhammad Zubeir at the beginning of 1901, however, there was certainly none at the end of the year. In October, the Abdulla killed four Waboni slaves belonging to the Muhammad Zubeir, and the latter then avenged this by murdering five Abdulla slaves. A feud started that dragged on for many years, and after 1901 there was no possibility of even a limited partnership between these two Ogaden sub-clans.

Ahmed Murgham's own standing amongst the Muhammad Zubeir was also a matter for internal dispute. A Government policy of non-intervention did little to strengthen the Sultan's position, and he eventually found himself without sufficient administrative support. From 1902, Abdi Salaam, head of the powerful Rer Hersi section, began to unite Muhammad Zubeir elements opposed to Ahmed Murgham. By the beginning of 1905, the Muhammad Zubeir were so evenly divided into rival sections that they asked the Kismayu administration to settle the issue, threatening otherwise to choose a chief themselves. Ahmed Murgham suggested splitting the

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1 R. to R., 1 & 13 April 1898, FO.107/93.
3 H. to S., 19 Feb. 1903, FO/JUB/2/1/5.
Muhammad Zubeir into two, but the Governor, Sir Donald Stewart, who visited Kismayu at the time, decided on a compromise. Ahmed Murgham was confirmed in his position as Sultan, but Abdi Salaam was appointed his deputy. Since both men loathed each other, this solution only went a short way towards re-introducing unity into the section, and the divisions continued to weaken Ahmed's authority.¹

In 1906, however, Ahmed Murgham was involved in a serious personal feud with the Aulihan, and the Government's policy of observation was put to the test. The full implications of Sir Charles Eliot's nonchalant remark that "we must let the Somali quarrel amongst themselves" were about to become embarrassingly clear.² In October it was reported that the Muhammad Zubeir and the Aulihan were disobeying Government orders and fighting amongst themselves, so Kismayu was closed to the Ogaden.³ But towards the end of the year the rer Dumal and the Aulihan assassinated Omar Murgham near Bardera. The circumstances surrounding Omar's death remain obscure; however, his brother, Ahmed Murgham, immediately proceeded to Kismayu where he 'borrowed' 80 Government rifles and with the help of these carried out a successful raid

²E. to L., 29 April 1901, F0.2/456.
³K. to McCullen, 4 Oct. 1906, PC/JUB/2/3/1.
against the Aulihan, reportedly killing 150 and capturing very large numbers of cattle and camels. The Muhammad Zubeir soon gained the upper hand in subsequent skirmishing, but there were fears that the struggle would widen and that the Aulihan would seek the support of their kinsmen, the Rem Afgab, who grazed between the Webi Shebelle and the river Juba, and who were in any case moving west away from the areas disturbed by Muhammad Abdille Hassan's wars.

The administration was faced with the problem of having conscientiously adopted a policy of non-intervention and now suddenly finding that intervention was necessary. Salkeld, the Provincial Commissioner, maintained that the fighting between the Muhammad Zubeir and the Aulihan had nothing to do with the Government. Indeed, both parties had stressed that they wished to remain on friendly terms with the Kismayu administration, which seemed good enough while the official policy was based on the assumption that there was nothing to be gained from interfering in Jubaland more than was necessary to protect Kismayu from raids.

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1 T.S. Thomas (1917), 39; Zaphiro to S., 10 Dec. 1906, CO.533/28.
2 T.S. Thomas (1917), 39; S. to J., 7 Jan. 1907, PC/JUB/2/2/2 or CO.533/27.
4 Jackson to Sec. of State, 19 Jan. 1907, CO.533/27.
But Salkeld held that the attitude of Government chiefs did matter and could not be so easily overlooked. He wished to withdraw Government recognition of Ahmed Murgham and to terminate his subsidy, because he had taken Government rifles without permission, showed no disposition to return them, and had used them in a way that could not be approved of. In his defence Ahmed claimed that he had not begun hostilities with the Aulihan, and what could be more natural when one was threatened than trying to secure arms with which to defend oneself.

The excuse was inadequate yet there was little pressure that could be exerted on the Sultan of the Muhammad Zubeir. Force had been ruled out, and as Salkeld remarked:

the moral influence which can be brought to bear from Kismayu to attain that end [peace/ is little or none, for I do not think that the Mohamed Zubeir who are at present the winners think they require to refer the matter here.

Yet Jackson, the Acting Governor, also ruled out any attempt to dismiss Ahmed Murgham from Government service. While admitting that Ahmed's position as a Government functionary was scarcely consistent with his actions, he nevertheless wished to leave him a loop-hole in case he decided to return to his allegiance. After Salkeld had pointed out that Ahmed was not likely to be of further

1 S. to J., 7 Jan. 1907, PC/JUB/2/2/2 or CO.533/27.
2 J. to S., 19 Jan. 1907, PC/CP/2/2/2 or CO.533/27.
use to the administration, Jackson reluctantly agreed to his dismissal if it was felt to be absolutely necessary, but warned: "if he seems likely to become openly hostile to us I am opposed to measures of any kind being taken against him". In the tradition of the best opéra bouffe, retribution was to be withheld if Ahmed was truly antagonistic, and administered only if he showed himself to be harmlessly repentent; it was a lamentable indication of how limited a policy of observation really was.

In view of these instructions no immediate action was taken against Ahmed Murgham. At the beginning of February he sent his wife to Gobwen as she was sick, and she then went to Kismayu. Other Ogaden chiefs were there and from the informal discussions that took place, it was felt that peace between the Aulihan and the Muhammad Zubeir could somehow be arranged. Negotiations were begun and dragged on until in April hostilities were finally terminated. But the peace was not considered to be permanent. The blood-feud left a legacy of latent hostility between the two

1 S. to J., 7 Feb. 1907, CO.533/27.
2 J. to S., telegram n.d. forwarded in McD. to S., 2 Feb.1907, PC/JUB/2/2/2.
3 S. to J., 7 Feb. 1907, CO.533/27.
4 S. to Chief Sec., 7 April 1907, CO.533/28; Kirkpatrick, "Intelligence Report", April 1907, CO.533/29.
which Ogaden sub-clans/could easily flare-up, and there were occasional incidents between them later.¹

Immediately after the peace had been arranged, however, optimism returned, and it was felt in administrative circles that there had been a marked improvement of the situation in Jubaland.² The policy of interfering as little as possible in the affairs of the Ogaden was continued, but Ahmed Murgham refused to visit Kismayu fearing arrest if he did so.³ Being unwilling to re-establish contact with the Government, Salkeld dismissed him as a Government chief in July, and fined the Muhammad Zubeir 1,000 Rs. The fine presented the usual problems. About half was collected fairly rapidly within two weeks, and a 33⁰/₀ tax was levied on all Ogaden transactions in Kismayu.⁴ But the remainder of the fine was paid exceptionally slowly.

The Aulihan/Muhammad Zubeir conflict and the dismissal of Ahmed Murgham had unexpected repercussions. In the first place, the dismissal of their Sultan did not deter the Muhammad Zubeir from further hostility. A new age-set, the Bopto, was initiated towards the end of 1906, and the following year the Rendille were singled

³J.O.W. Hope, "Intelligence Report", May 1910, CO.533/75; Sultan Osman Geyli Murghau, Dahri Omar and Ismail Abdi, Mohammed Zubeir to Power, 26 Feb. 1916, DC/GOS/6/3.
²Sadler to Sec. of State, 7 May 1907, CO.533/29.
³Kirkpatrick, "Report on affairs in Jubaland", 5 April 1907, PC/JUB/2/2/2.
⁴S. to Chief Sec., 7 March & 6 Aug. 1907, PC/JUB/2/2/2.
out as the target for a raid and Ahmed Murgham led the Muhammad Zubeir to the Lorian Swamp.\(^1\) Towards the end of 1907, the Aulihan were formally warned to take normal precautions against a raid.\(^2\)

These conflicts also drew attention for the first time along the coast, to the growing importance attached to guns by the Ogaden. The Muhammad Zubeir had obtained their first large consignment from the Government and this was a source that could not be tapped again, but soon there were rumours that they were sending their camels to the Boran in southern Ethiopia to be bartered for rifles.\(^3\) This was an important trend that was only just beginning in 1907, but soon it was to pose formidable problems for the administration.\(^4\)

The dismissal of Ahmed Murgham seems to have strengthened his position amongst the Muhammad Zubeir, and it was bolstered further by later rebuffs from the administration.\(^5\) Abdi Salaam, on the other hand, who tried to remain loyal to the government, gradually...

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\(^1\) S. to J., 6 Feb. 1907, PC/JUB/2/2/2.
\(^2\) S. to Chief Sec., 7 Nov. 1907, PC/JUB/2/2/2.
\(^3\) S. to Chief Sec., 7 April 1907, CO.533/28.
\(^4\) Hope, "Intelligence Report from the Abyssinian Frontier", May 1910, CO.533/74.
\(^5\) Filleul to PC. Jubaland, 10 Feb. 1914, DC/KISM/13/5.
lost power. Nevertheless, Afmadu was too close to the coast to be comfortable, and Ahmed Murgham seems to have felt that he would never again be secure in Kismayu. The cessation of hostilities in 1907, therefore, marked the beginning of a north-westward migration towards Wajir. It is rather amusing that when a forward policy was initiated in 1909, an advance to Afmadu some 80 miles from the coast could be justified on the grounds that it was the political and strategic centre of Jubaland. The prolonged policy of 'observation' had evidently resulted in a high degree of myopia, for by 1909 Ahmed Murgham and the Muhammad Zubeir had already established themselves in strength at Wajir. By that date, then, Afmadu had ceased to be a centre of political importance to the Ogaden; their westward movement had carried them beyond and it was in Wajir and on the Lorian that an eventual confrontation with the Government would take place.

Later it was said that this Muhammad Zubeir migration had been motivated by the search for water alone, that the wells at Afmadu had become insufficient and that the Deshek Wama was too exposed to interference from the coast. The desire to avoid Government

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1 Filleul to PC. Jubaland, 8 April 1914, DC/KISM/13/5.
2 Gov. to Sec. of State, 27 May 1909, CO-533/59.
3 Filleul to PC. Jubaland, 10 Feb. 1914, DC/KISM/13/5.
interference may also have been a factor, but by 1910 the Ogaden sanctuaries inland from Afmadu or in the region of the Lorijan Swamp were no longer entirely beyond the reach of Government forces. For another frontier was in the process of being established, and the Ogaden now experienced European pressure from the far interior itself, as well as from the coast.

This gradual elimination of sanctuaries to which the Somali could retreat and evade contact with a potentially hostile administration, was an important factor in the extension of Government control. In so far as this process involved the methodical widening of the area under administration, the problems appeared to be straightforward enough. But where sanctuaries were contiguous to international boundaries, the problems increased immeasurably. Although the river Juba was supposed to be an effective frontier, it also provided easy access to two administrations, each harbouring the other's malcontents. ¹

The fluctuating collaboration between the British and Italian administrations had an extremely important influence, therefore, on the Ogaden themselves. The successful extension of Government control over the Aulihan, for instance, depended, in the first place, on denying them access to Italian Somaliland; and Anglo-Italian cooperation was absolutely necessary for the establishment of a secure boundary.

¹ For instance Jenner’s murderers took refuge in Bardera where the Italian Resident refused to surrender them. The same story was repeated with Ali Nahar’s murderers. See: Kirkpatrick, "Intelligence Report", April 1907, CO.533/29; M. to S., 19 Nov. 1907, CO.533/41.
By 1909, the Ogaden had become aware of two gradually evolving frontiers, both of which ultimately threatened their freedom of movement – one along the river Juba, the other along the foothills of Ethiopia. However, this transformation of the river Juba, from an artery of communication to an impassible border, had been taking place slowly from 1895 onwards and it had been a factor in the Ogaden rebellions, and in the relationship between the Somali and the Kismayu administration.

Many problems arose from the fact that, behind a facade of cordiality, there lay little real Anglo-Italian cooperation. Jenner himself once described the atmosphere of distrust that existed: "it is a mistake to suppose", he wrote, "that the Italian authorities regard our interests in this country as identical with their own".¹ This was a view that Hardinge shared; and it was one the Italian administrators also held strongly.² The Italians were painfully aware of frequent attempts to divert trade away from the Benadir ports to Kismayu, and British motives were generally considered to be unfriendly.³ This keen sense of economic rivalry made it particularly difficult to secure collaboration on political issues.⁴

¹J. to H., 14 June 1898, FO.107/94.
²H. to S., 20 June 1898, FO.107/94; Ferrandi to Presidente R.G.S., 8 Oct. 1896, ASMAI, Posiz. 70/1-8.
⁴"Rapporti con le autorita della Colonie Inglese", Monografie (1911), ASMAI. Posiz. 87/2-20.
However, the sort of political cooperation that the British desired was also seen to be undesirable in its own right. There was no approval for the suggestion that the Sub-Commissioner at Kismayu should be allowed to cross to the Italian side of the Juba, in order to apprehend criminals or recapture political refugees.\(^1\) Jenner's suggestion that the frontier should be regarded as purely nominal, until it was administered, aroused deep suspicions about British intentions. To the Italians the frontier was inviolate. When the British Ambassador at Rome in 1901 informed the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs of "certain reasons which might induce Her Majesty's Government, in certain circumstances, to regard the crossing of the frontier of the Italian sphere of influence as a military necessity",\(^2\) this caused considerable apprehension.

Equally, the suggestion that chiefs, like Nassib Pundo, head of the Wagosha, whose villages were situated on both sides of the river, should be responsible to both administrations, received little practical support.\(^3\) While Hardinge hoped to "impress upon the Somalis on both sides of the border the community of interests and of policy",\(^4\) Perducci, the Italian Resident at Giumbo, felt it

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1. H. to K., 16 May 1895, FO.107/36; E. to S., 13 Sept. 1895, FO.45/736.
2. This referred to the border with British Somaliland. Currie to L., 10 Jan. 1901, FO.2/503.
4. H. to S., 24 June 1897, FO.107/78.
intolerable that Italian protected chiefs should also receive pay from the British Government. In 1898, a minor crisis developed, when Jenner tried to persuade Nassib Pundo to cross over to the British side of the river. Jenner hoped to arrest him on the charge of murdering a Somali, and certain nefarious practices, but Nassib declined to surrender voluntarily. Furthermore, he was supported by Dulio, the Commissioner for the Benadir Coast, who claimed that it would be extremely difficult to explain to Italian protected Gosha how their chief came to be arrested by the British.

A similar problem occurred when the British appointed and paid an Ogaden, who lived at Bardera on the Italian side of the river, to be their representative at Serenli. In practice, then, cooperation between the two administrations tended to be minimal. At one point McDougall remarked that:

So long as the Italians pursue their present policy, or so long as the river Juba designates the Italian frontier below Bardera, effective administration of Jubaland Province is practically impossible, because the river divides the Ogadens as well as the Wagsha.

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1 Carlo della Valle "Giumbo etc.", 39. ASMAI. Cartella no. 2/7-10.
3 H. to S., 6 March 1899, FO.2/191.
4 Dulio to Hardinge, 23 May 1899, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-13.
5 H. to S., 23 July 1900, FO.2/289.
6 McD., to E., 7 Aug. 1901, FO.2/450.
What actually did, in the end, stimulate a greater degree of collaboration were the repeated crises in the British sphere, which the Italians always dreaded would spill over into their territory. In 1893, 1894 and 1901, during the one Herti and the two Ogaden uprisings, the Italians reacted unpredictably, but always with the aim of isolating the armed uprisings to the British side of the river.

When the Herti rebelled in 1893, the I.B.E.A.Co. controlled the Italian station at Giumbo, and had access to both sides of the river. The problem of Anglo-Italian cooperation did not, therefore, seem to arise. But Lovatelli was so concerned that the fighting might spread to the Italian sphere, that he marched from Brava with a small force of viroboto and occupied Giumbo. It seems reasonably clear that he was acting without instructions and also without authority. The Company, therefore, made his position difficult, and, by the time the Italian Government had been informed of the plan to establish a garrison at Giumbo, Lovatelli had retired from the post. Filonardi, head of the Italian Company administering the Benadir, was subsequently persuaded to accept the British Company's presence at Giumbo and the

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1 Giumbo was on the Italian side of the river and the IBEACo. set up a post there without the explicit permission of the Italian Co. It was abandoned in 1895, IBEACo. to Fo., 23 Feb. 1895, Fo.2/96.

2 Lovatelli had been sent to East Africa by the Italian Gov. to advise on the formulation of policy, see: R.L. Hess (1966), 40ff.

3 F. to P., 29 July 1893, PC/CP/68/19.

4 R. to P., 4 Sept. 1893, Fo./2/96; Filonardi, tele. 22 Aug. 1893, ASMAI. Posiz.55/6-42.
In 1898, however, the situation was far more difficult for the Italians. The rebellion in the British sphere was led by Abdurrahman Mursaal, the son of Sheik Mursaal, head of the Ogaden in the Italian sphere. Perducci feared that if he helped the Kismayu administration, Sheik Mursaal would join his son in the rebellion; so the Italians adopted a neutral position, with a bias towards the Ogaden. Ahmed Murgham wrote promising that no disturbances would be caused in Italian territory, and he was allowed to trade freely in Giumbo. Anglo-Italian relations were very strained when several attacks were thought to have originated from the Italian side of the river. Nevertheless, Perducci successfully prevented the outbreak of any large-scale hostilities to the north of the river Juba, and this had been his main objective.

However, the re-adoption of a similar policy of neutrality, with a pro-Ogaden bias, was not possible in 1901, when the second Ogaden punitive expedition was undertaken. Relations with the British had certainly not improved, and Perducci had no desire to be accommodating. In 1899, Jenner hoisted a British flag on Mombasa.

1 P. to R., 8 Sept. 1893, FO.2/96.
2 P. to M., 17 July 1898, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-11; J. to H., 30 June 1900, FO.2/289.
3 P. to P., 26 July 1898, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-11.
4 J. to H., 19 April 1898, FO.107/93.
5 The Ogaden did extend a few raids into Italian territory: one Italian askari was killed and others wounded. H. to S., 6 April 1898, FO.107/100.
island, in the river Juba, theoretically at the request of the Wazegua who inhabited it.\(^1\) Afterwards Perducci decided it was Italian, and Bertazzi, a junior administrative official, was ordered to visit the island as often as possible, so that their claim could be kept alive.\(^2\) A series of small disputes followed all of which tended to sour relations.

The basic difference to the Italians between the outbreak in 1898 and that in 1901, was that during the former they had been on good terms with the Ogaden, whereas, during the latter, they were not. In 1900 Sheik Mursaal bin Omar had fled to the British Protectorate, and Ogaden on the Italian side of the river attacked the Wagosha whom Perducci supported.\(^3\) How far Perducci in fact helped the Ogaden in 1901 is a matter of dispute. The British administrators at Kismayu pointed to the fact that the Ogaden were allowed to trade in Giumbo, and adduced from this that Perducci secretly supported them.\(^4\) But it is worth pointing out that the Italian post was supported by very few troops, and it is debatable whether Perducci had sufficient strength to carry out a blockade. It was also recognised that many reports of Ogaden trading were exaggerated

\(^1\) J. to H., 19 Feb. 1899, FO.2/190.

\(^2\) E. to M., 7 Oct. 1899, ASMAI. Posiz.68/1-4.

\(^3\) H. to S., 6 Sept. 1900, FO.2/290.

\(^4\) E. to L., 5 May 1901, FO.2/447; E. to L., 14 June 1901, FO.2/449.
by the Herti in the hope that these stories would lead to a
relaxation in the prohibition of trade at Kismayu, which was
applied to them as well.¹

The most important accusation levelled against Perducci, was
contained in a statement made by an Ogaden to McDougall, which described
a conversation with the Italian Resident:

After compliments. To inform the Ogaden that he,
Perducci, would supply them with all their wants
from Brava, with which port he had established a
regular camel transport. He further informed us
to remind the Ogaden of the advisability of reconsidering
their promise to pay a fine in cattle to
the Serkali [British] Government, because they were
really now endeavouring to induce the Ogaden to pay
diya [blood-price] by hela or hida (?) diplomacy,
and that Government would surely afterwards lure
their Ogaden chiefs into a shouri [meeting] and seize
them all and imprison them. He thus warned the Ogaden
not to pay the fine. He also said that Sultan Ahmed bin
Murghan would ultimately be deported to Ulaya [Europe].²

What credence should be given to this statement? Perducci himself
admitted having received envoys from the Ogaden chiefs at Afmadu,
asking for his advice in July, but said that he sent them back
without an answer.³ The conversation reported by McDougall's
informant, Ali Jebril, took place at the end of May, and it would
hardly have been necessary to send envoys in July to ascertain
Perducci's views, if these were already well known. Moreover,

¹W.J.Monson, "Intelligence Diary, Ogaden Punitive Expedition", 11 June 1901, FO.2/449.
²McD. to T., 10 June 1901, FO.2/449.
³"Extract from a report from Chevalier Badolo to Royal Consul General at Zanzibar", 20 Sept. 1901, FO.45/570.
Ali Jebril's account was a secondhand one, and the Somali who
told him the story had only visited Jamama, a small Italian
military post some distance from Giumbo. Jamama was often visited
by Ogaden where they bought cloth and coffee beans, but there is
no evidence that Perducci visited this outpost in May, while
there are many references to his having been at Giumbo.

Yet whatever the truth of these allegations, they were
believed by the British authorities and complaints were made
to the Italians at the highest level. The incident was investigated
and Perducci was prompted to show more definite signs of friendliness
towards the British. Within two months a new policy of collaboration
was under way.

Towards the end of July 1901, McDougall visited Gosha in
a new steamer. This was the first trip up the river since 1893,
and the possibility of exercising greater control over the Aulihan
and Wagosha, through regular voyages up the Juba, occurred once
again. This time, however, it was absolutely necessary to confiscate
all canoes on the river.\(^2\) In September, Perducci and McDougall set
out together and travelled some two hundred miles up the Juba,
taking possession of all the canoes they could find.\(^3\) After this

\(^1\) McD. to E., 2 July 1901, FO.2/449; Harrison to Hatch, 11 Feb. 1902,
                                                FO.2/570.

\(^2\) McD. to E., 7 Aug. 1901, FO.2/450.

\(^3\) McD. to E., 10 Oct. 1901, FO.2/451.
a policy of regular patrols, and frequent visits to the few parts of the river that were fordable, was all that was necessary to make the frontier a reality; and this policy was successfully carried out in 1902.¹

The effect of this Anglo-Italian cooperation appears to have been dramatic. According to McDougall:

The elders of the Ogaden, with Sheik Abdi Liban at their head, have assembled in Afmadu, and are discussing the question as to whether the Italians have transferred their territory to the British Government.²

This joint action on the river Juba stimulated the Aulihan to pay their fine more quickly, and put an end to unrestricted Ogaden access to the Italian Protectorate. Afterwards canoes were registered, numbered, and a small tax was levied on them; their use was restricted and controlled. In theory a new era of Anglo-Italian cooperation was to be ushered in, but, in practice, much of the old suspicion remained. In 1906, the Italians refused to surrender Ali Nahar's murderers, and even employed them in Government service; the British, of course, had done the same with Somali chiefs considered persona non grata to the Italians.³

¹ McD. to E., 14 March 1902, FO.2/570.
² McD. to E., 7 Aug. 1901, FO.2/450.
³ P. to H., 29 Aug. 1906, PC/JUB/2/3/1; Prinetti to Currie, 10 Jan. 1902, FO.45/567; P. to M., 17 Nov. 1903, ASMAI, Posiz. 69/1-3; H. to H., 11 Jan. 1902, FO.2/569.
Yet, despite the limitations of this cooperation, it did secure some measure of control over the Anglo-Italian frontier south of Bardera. It did mean that, logically, the advance of administrative posts inland would follow the river, rather than some line projected through Amandu. In a sense it made the current arguments for and against setting up a post at Amandu utterly irrelevant. The wells were only 80 miles from the coast and, when there was to be an advance, Serenli two hundred miles inland on the Juba, was the obvious site for a station.

The full utilization of the river Juba necessitated a fairly radical mental readjustment at the beginning of the 20th century. McKenzie had seen that it was the key to a rapid advance into the interior, but after 1893 constant preoccupation with the coast, and with Amandu, had obscured this simple fact. For years administrators laboured under the illusion that progress into the interior involved a very slow advance into a desert, whereas the means were at hand to outflank this area and even to surround it. Perhaps the fact that there was no adequate steamship had some bearing on this attitude, but it was surprisingly long before the river Juba's importance was recognised.  

Predominant contact with the coast entailed a very simplified picture of the interior. When Hardinge had tried to describe the ethnic composition of Jubaland in 1895, he had envisaged Herti on

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1 Butler, Minute, 8 July 1909, CO.533/66.
the coast, Ogaden in the interior, and Boran in the far interior behind them.¹ The first mention of the Marehan Somali was in April 1899, and it was not until that year that, for the first time, other pastoral peoples such as the Rendille, the Garre, the Ajuran, were to come into contact with traders from Kismayu.² From that date it was possible to glimpse some of the complexities of the area beyond Afmadu. Yet, from the point of view of the coast, the interior must have appeared very static; though in fact it was seething with movement, with population pressures, and with conflicts every bit as vital to those concerned as any that occurred on the littoral.

¹H. to C., 30 Oct. 1895, PC/JUB/2/1/1.
²J. to H., 2 April 1899, FO.2/196.
In the interior of Jubaland, the dynamic of pastoral migrations was greatly accelerated towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century by the growing weight of population pressures. There were two main reasons for this: the Amharic movement southwards, and the impact of Muhammad Abdille Hassan's jihad in the north. In many ways the effect of Sheik Muhammad's wars was to revive and intensify a pattern of migrations that had been in progress for at least a century, and which had probably been in the process of slowing down. This renewed pressure from the north-east was not a momentary affair, and when a large-scale population movement got underway in the 20th century it generally consisted of men who were armed, and who had either been trained in rebellion or were consciously fleeing from its effects. It was a migration, therefore, that also involved a traffic in arms and the possible dissemination of ideas that might be considered dangerous to a new administration in the upper Juba area.

At first sight, the Ethiopian expansion that took place under Menelick merely substituted a northern for a north-eastern pressure

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1See also: T.H.R.Cashmore (1965), 318.
on the pastoral plains of Kenya, but in fact the difference was more fundamental. In contrast to the Somali push south-west, the Amharic movement was unconnected with the desire to obtain additional pasture, nor did it involve direct competition between rival pastoral groups. It was aimed solely at securing the conquest and subjugation of the indigenous peoples, and the indirect rather than the direct utilisation of their land. While traditional pastoral warfare in north-east Africa had its own momentum and strategy, it invariably led in one way or another to the substitution of stock which made use of the available pasture. With the Amhara, however, there was no stock substitution, since they brought none with them; instead, they deprived the Boran of their cattle when they offered resistance, and later treated them, it was said, as "cattle producing machines" for the purpose of securing adequate tribute and taxation.¹

There is much that is still obscure about the Ethiopian advance southwards into Borana, and it is often accepted that the Boran were conquered in 1896. It has been maintained that towards the end of that year Ras Därge² invaded Liban and Dirre, overrunning the Boran and setting up an Ethiopian post at Arero which dominated

¹P.Maud, "General account of the tribes fron lake Stephanie to the Ganale river and the Abyssinian relations with them," 1903, F0.1/48.

²Ras Därge was Menelick's uncle and he was given the Province of Arussi. The campaign is sometimes attributed to him, and sometimes to his son Asfau.
Southern Ethiopia and the N.F.D.

- Addis Ababa

- L. Zwai
- L. Shala
- L. Abaya
- Abra
- L. Chamo
- Gardula
- L. Stephanie
- Arero
- Liban
- Anole
- Sogida
- Gorille
- Gof
- Moyale
- Takabba
- Dobel
- Korondil
- Buña
- El Wak
- Marsabit
- Wajir
Tertale, Liban and Dirre.¹

In May 1897 Gleichen and Wingate, two Intelligence Officers attached to the Rodd Mission,² also came to the conclusion that the "country up to the shores of Lake Rudolf Ḥadj/ for some time Ḥbeen/ effectively occupied" by the Ethiopians.³ In fact, the Rodd Mission accepted Menelick's claim that the greater part of Borana and Arussi had been subdued, and this claim was never subsequently challenged.⁴ Yet there can be little doubt that both Wingate and Gleichen were deceived about the exact limits of Ethiopian expansion in 1896, and that while the subjugation of the Boran had undoubtedly been planned, it had nevertheless not been achieved even by the end of May 1897.⁵ It seems that rumours about Ethiopian conquests, perhaps deliberately circulated in an attempt to influence negotiations, were accepted at the time in


²Rennell Rodd, who earlier had been Consul at Zanzibar, headed the first British diplomatic mission to Menelick. Its purpose was both commercial and diplomatic. The key topics for discussion were Ethiopia's borders with the Sudan and British Somaliland, see: Sir J. Rennell Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memoirs 1894-1901 (London, 1923), 112ff; H.G.Marcus, "The Rodd Mission of 1897", J.E.S., III no. 2 (1965).

³Wingate & Gleichen, Memorandum, 7 May 1897, FO.1/32.

⁴Count Gleichen, With the Mission to Menelick 1897 (London, 1898), 315; H.G.Marcus, "A History of the Negotiations concerning the border between Ethiopia and British East Africa 1897-1914", Boston University Papers on Africa, African History, II (Boston, 1966), 240-2. The only exception is to be found in McD. to S., 30 Aug. 1897, FO.2/44, and this letter is based on Cavendish's evidence, for which see next page.

⁵The Rodd Mission left Ethiopia at the end of May 1897.
good faith, and have since acquired the appearance of historical validity.

Admittedly the main reasons for doubting the traditional account are negative. In the first place, the southern Boran maintained intermittent contact with the Kismayu administration throughout this period. Yet, when a Boran caravan arrived at Kismayu in May 1896, there was no news of an Ethiopian attack.¹ Again, when a Government Interpreter met a Boran Galla at Bardera in July 1896, no mention was made of any aggression.² Finally, in February 1897, when traders from the Liven visited Kismayu, there was still no hint that the Boran were in immediate danger.³ However, when the Ethiopians did attack them, from July to October 1897, the Boran were certainly not slow to ask for help from Kismayu.⁴ Had there also been a previous attack, it seems inconceivable either that no knowledge of this should have reached the coast, or, equally, that there should not have been an earlier request for assistance.

Furthermore, the raid undertaken by Ras Darge towards the end of 1896 appears to have been directed primarily against the Arussi, as one would have expected, and Hardinge cannot have been far wrong in assuming that instead of actually overrunning Borana, the raid only came close to Dirre and Liban.⁵

¹ Capt. O'Callaghan to Adm., 26 May 1896, FO.107/68.
² J. to C., 22 Sept. 1896, FO.107/60.
³ J. to H., 27 Feb. 1897, FO.107/77. Jenner writes 'Libin'.
⁴ H. to S., 2 Sept. 1897, FO.107/81.
⁵ H. to S., 17 March 1897, FO.107/76. Also: J. to C., 2 April 1899,
exploring southern Borana at the time, mentions that while the Galla around Lugh were attacked, Boran further to the west remained unaffected by the raid.¹

The conquest of Borana was not, in fact, undertaken until June 1897, when Dejjazmach Wolde Gabriel left Addis Ababa at the head of a sizeable expedition.² He was accompanied by Léon Darragon, a famous French explorer, and what little is known about this expedition is based on his accounts.³ Wolde Gabriel followed a route just to the east of lakes Zwai, Shala, Abaya and Chamo, arriving at Sogida by the end of July. Lack of rain prevented the expedition from proceeding further south and so without delay returned northwards. Indeed, the outward and return journey was completed so rapidly - with only a few exceptions Wolde Gabriel did not halt in the same place for longer than a single night - that, at first sight, it seems incredible that conquest rather than exploration should have been the chief objective.⁴ However, the six

FO.2/196; G. to G., 20 May 1907, FO.371/192.


²A. Colli Felizzano, "Nel Paese Galla", B.S.G.I. (1905), 101. Although the Province of Borana was given by Menelick to Fitaurari Hapta Giorgis, H. to S., 3 June 1899, FO.1/44, he did not conquer it as maintained by: H. Marcus in Boston University Papers on Africa, ed. J. Butler (Boston, 1966), II, 242; G. Keller, Alfred Ilg: Sein Leben und Seine Werke (Leipzig, 1918), 166.

³G. Roncali, "Viaggio del Signor Darragon dallo Scioa al paese die Borana e viceversa", B.S.G.I., XI (1898); L. Darragon, "Voyage", Comptes Rendus des Séances de la Société de Géographie de Paris (1898), (1898), 138.

⁴Lord Delamere's journey across southern Borana took him within 20
days that were spent in Afalata's capital at Anole left the Boran in no doubt as to Wolde Gabriel's intentions; and, though the expedition only stayed a few days at Anole, a small garrison remained behind protected by the certainty of further reinforce­ments after a few months.

What made an extremely rapid advance through Borana possible was of course the almost total lack of resistance encountered by the Ethiopians. There were two main Boran leaders, Guyo Ana, head of the Gona Boran, and Afalata, head of the Sabho Ana is known to have skirmished with the Ethiopians but was quickly defeated, while Afalata apparently capitulated without resistance and was therefore allowed to keep fourteen villages for himself.¹ The reason why Ana attempted to resist Ethiopian encroachment and Afalata did not is unknown, but there is one point worth noting. Prior to the advent of the Ethiopians, Afalata's position amongst the Sabho had been extremely precarious, and it was strengthened rather than weakened by official Ethiopian recognition of his title. The legitimate head of the Sabho should have been Geydu who was born after his father's death and his mother's marriage to Afalata. In theory, Afalata should only have been Regent for a certain number of years, but he had tried to maintain that Geydu was his son and relations

¹H. to S., 2 Oct. 1897, F0.107/81; Capt. Maud, "Mr. A.E.Butter's expedition", 1903, F0.1/48.
between the two were not amicable.\textsuperscript{1} Thus, while Afalata remained on good terms with the Ethiopians, Geydu on the contrary did not, and Ethiopian support for his step-father was probably an important factor leading him to adopt a more recalcitrant position.\textsuperscript{2}

As a result of the B97 expedition, Ethiopian garrisons were set up at Gardula in Konso, and Abera in Jam Jam.\textsuperscript{3} The station in Jam Jam was under the command of the powerful Dejjasmach Balcha, but it was too far removed from Borana to have a direct impact.\textsuperscript{3} The station at Gardula, however, became the main military centre in southern Ethiopia. For many years it controlled the area as far south as lake Rudolf and to the east of the Omo; it also supported the smaller station of Arero in the Liban.\textsuperscript{4} The exact date when the Ethiopians established a station at Arero is uncertain, but it was definitely not before the end of 1898, as is sometimes alleged.\textsuperscript{5} For about a year there was an Ethiopian garrison in Anole, and it was only after this was abandoned towards the end

\textsuperscript{1}T.S.Thomas (1917), 86; P. Maud, "Exploration in the southern borderland of Abyssinia", G.J., XXIII (1904), 566.

\textsuperscript{2}J. to H., 20 May 1906, F0.371/192; J. to G., 5 April 1899, F0.2/196.

\textsuperscript{3}J. to H., 15 Jan. 1898, F0.2/91.

\textsuperscript{4}Erlanger, "Sulla spedizione e relativo soggiorno in Abyssinia e nei paesi Galla e Somali", B.S.G.I., III 4th series (1902), 540, and "Bericht uber meine Expedition in Nordost Afrika in den Jahren 1899-1901", Z.G.E.B., II (1904). Balcha was a close relative of Menelick.

\textsuperscript{5}Felizzano, B.S.G.I. (1905), 101ff; Maud, G.J. (1904), 566.
of 1898, or the beginning of 1899, that Afalata was forced to move his headquarters to Arero and that a station was set up there.¹

Can it be assumed, therefore, that the Ethiopian conquest of Borana had been completed by the end of 1898 at the very latest? By that date, at any rate, the permanent residence of Ethiopian troops in the Boran capital had also been accompanied by their dispersal in small numbers throughout the country.²

Then, in October 1897, a deputation of Boran elders arrived in Addis Ababa and formally submitted to Menelick.³ Both Ana and Afalata were given minor official posts and assimilated into the Ethiopian bureaucratic structure. They were both made responsible for collecting tribute in their areas, and were given a few Ethiopian soldiers who came under their command.⁴

But this does not mean that all the Boran had been conquered; and one clue to the limits of Ethiopian rule can be found in the continuing requests from the Boran for assistance against the Amhara. From 1898, the Boran were constantly asking the Kismayu administration to help them, and a deputation of Boran elders visited the Jubaland

² Maud, "Mr. A.E.Butter's expedition", 1903, FO.1/48; Donaldson-Smith, Memorandum, 6 Aug. 1900, FO.1/44.
³ H. to S., 7 Nov. 1898, FO.1/34.
⁴ Z. to H., 14 April 1906, FO.371/192.
coast in 1900. However, it is noticeable that while the earlier requests for help came from Ana and Geydu in southern Ethiopia, all requests after 1899 came from Boran in Wajir, in the extreme south, or from other wells in the East Africa Protectorate. By the end of the century, then, it was only the Boran in the highlands who had been effectively conquered, those in the 'golbo', the lowlands, were merely raided.

It is far from easy to decide precisely what Ethiopian ambitions were directed towards the savannah lowlands of northern Kenya, but it appears that conquest was not one of their primary objectives. It was argued by P. Zaphiro that the Ethiopian movement into the 'golbo' was at first motivated by the search for ivory and the desire to collect tribute from the Garre and Gabra, and this seems a reasonable assumption. For it was only later, when the right to collect tribute from the Garre was contested by the British, that the Ethiopians attempted to secure a more formal claim to the area.

In practice most rumours of Ethiopian bands pushing deep into

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3 He was the first border Agent along the Ethiopian/East Africa Protectorate border.

the arid savannah later turned out to be false, and there is no example of Ethiopian troops permanently garrisoned in the 'golbo'. Thus, while large concentrations of Ethiopian fighters were noticed at Gof, Gorille or Moyale, they were never noticed further to the south.\footnote{Penetration of the 'golbo' was conspicuously unhurried, and when it did occur it seems to have been undertaken with limited objectives in mind.}

In the first instance, these objectives were closely linked to Wolde Gabriel's assumption that the Garre, Gabre and Ajuran were either Boran sheqats or sub-sections, and consequently that Ana and Afalata ought to have been collecting tribute from them. But the Ajuran and Gabra refused to make any payments and retreated southwards instead, and the Boran were in no position to influence the Garre who were anyway completely independent of them.\footnote{In 1898 a large, well organised party of Ethiopians raided Buna and Takabba in order to obtain tribute from the Ajuran.\footnote{As a result of this occupation, Ali Abdi, head}

\footnote{Adam Musa "Report", 14 Feb. 1900, FO.2/285; Mohamed Agil, "Report", July 1899, PC/CP/78/65.}

\footnote{Cpt. Maud, "Mr. A.E. Butter's expedition", 1903, FO.1/48.}

\footnote{Pestalozza to M., 20 Aug. 1899 and Dulio to M., 23 Oct. 1898, ASMAI. Posiz. 68-1-12; Adam Musa, "Report", FO.2/285; Butter, "General account of the tribes from lake Stephanie to the Ganale river etc", FO.1/48.}

\footnote{\textit{Meridionale: Journal de mon voyage au pays Amhara, Oromo et Sidama, Sept.1885-Nov.1888} (Paris, 1890), 344-5.}
of the Garre, began to pay tribute regularly for a short while, but after delaying one payment, El Wak was again attacked in December 1901.¹

Nevertheless, what is most striking about the period 1897 to 1902 is the relative infrequency of these raids into the savannah plains of northern Kenya. Almost every raid can be identified and followed in detail, whereas after 1902 there is a significant increase in the number of incursions, as attempts were made to prove more than a merely superficial contact with the area.²

Throughout this period, the stereotype of Ethiopian incursions remained fundamentally the same and was based on the construction of temporary camps, which could be inhabited for perhaps as long as two months, while the surrounding countryside was ravaged.³

Yet, precisely because incursions into the 'golbo' had at first been infrequent and the Ethiopian conquest of the Boran had thus only half been accomplished, there was a strong inclination on the part of the southern, peripheral, Boran groups to move even further south and out of reach of the Amharic invaders.⁴ The feasibility of this movement, however, depended to a large extent on the degree of

¹McD. to E., 15 Jan. 1902, F0.2/569.
²Z. to H., 20 May 1906, F0.371/192.
³R.H.Tate, "Statement by Mohammed bin Habib", 18 March 1902, F0.2/571.
⁴Cf. Cerulli's remark that the Boran in Kenya came from Ethiopia after the Amharic invasion, though this is an exaggeration: "Le
rapprochement between the Boran and the Somali, and also, perhaps surprisingly, between the Somali and the Kismayu administration.

Relations between the Boran and Somali appear to have been unduly complex, and they were very far from conforming to a pattern of simple hostility. From 1879 till the end of the century, Hawiye Somali lived near Anole under Afalata's special protection, and Jebril Farah, one of the most important Ogaden elders at Afmadu, claimed to have lived for several years amongst the Boran. Moreover, Jebril Farah told Craufurd, then the Sub-Commissioner at Kismayu, that "many Somalis and Arabs have lived in Boran on good terms with the natives", and this statement seems to have been substantially true. But, although most Somali living amongst the Boran were traders, and throughout Africa it has long been usual to extend special protection to those engaged in trade, there were also Somali shegats living with the Boran. These were Somali who had formed an alliance with the Boran or had become their clients, and who together with them at times fought other Somali sections.

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2. C. to H., 23 April 1896, FO.107/52.
3. These Somali shegats included the Ajuran and at times the Garre.
On the other hand, these friendly Somali/Boran contacts were offset by frequent Darod raids. As a result of the terrible cattle plague in 1891, Darod Somali from Fangal, near Afmadu, successfully attacked the Boran further north with a view to obtaining stock from them. Abdi Ibrahim, head of the Abd Wak, also led a raid at about this time which reached Buna, where Yaltano Kuno’s Sakuye and Ajuran shegats were defeated. There was also a successful raid by the Majah age-set which was trying to prove its valour. Then, at the beginning of 1893, the Bardera Somali attacked El Wgk, though the Boran poisoned the wells and the raid was therefore a complete failure. Before the end of the year, however, the Somali had again raided the Boran, this time successfully judging from the considerable amount of ivory that they were later selling.

Very little is known about most of these raids, and many can only be inferred by indirect evidence, such as the sudden acquisition of ivory or slaves by the Darod Somali. Thus, while the administration

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1 M. to S., 5 Sept. 1891, F0.84/2153.
2 Yaltano Kuno was head of the Boran at Buna until 1911, W.O.P. Hope, "Report", in G. to C., 1 Aug. 1910, CO.533/76, and Dida Kuno was head of the Sakuye at Buna, C. to G., 20 May 1907, F0.371/192; R. Turnbull, Kenya Police Review (Oct. 1957), 310.
3 J. to H., 29 April 1898, F0.107/93; J. to H., 18 Dec. 1898, F0.2/188.
5 Craufurd, "Report for quarter ending March 1894", PC/CP/68/19.
at Kismayu discovered in May 1894 that the Ogaden and Herti had just captured large numbers of Galla slaves, nothing was known about the fighting that this news necessarily presupposed must have taken place; and although between 1894 and 1897 there is no direct mention of a single Darod raid, the fact that the head of the Ajuran at El Wak was killed in 1895 suggests that there had probably been a fight.

The turning point came in 1898, when the Bombe age-set carried out a disastrous raid against the Boran. The reason why the Somali raid was so unsuccessful is unknown, but quite possibly the Darod unexpectedly found themselves fighting against southward moving Ethiopians instead of Galla. At any rate, after the failure of this attack, the Boran themselves began to move southwards, and for a number of years there were no further Somali raids. When Adam Musa and Mohamed Agil visited El Wak in 1899, they found many Boran there who had only recently moved south, so as to avoid the Ethiopians. There were also large numbers of Boran at Takabba and Dobel, both well complexed in the 'golbo', towards

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1 C. to P., 10 Oct. 1894, PC/CP/68/19.
3 They were both Somali political officers employed by the Kismayu administration and sent on different expeditions inland.
which the Boran from further north were evidently moving in some numbers. In 1898, Jenner mentioned that the nearest Boran wells to Fangal were at Wajir, while, a year later, there were evidently so many Boran at Wajir that they had moved as far south as Diff. ¹

When a deputation of Boran elders arrived in Kismayu in 1900, they stated that there had been a considerable migration towards Wajir and the area to the south. ² Furthermore, the Boran also succeeded in coming to terms with the various Somali sections that normally used the wells around Diff. ³ This arrangement, however, was short lived, for the second Ogaden revolt in 1900 led to the deliberate destruction of a Boran caravan that earlier had been trading at Kismayu. ⁴ Ironically, therefore, the Boran at Wajir could not come to terms with the Somali at Afmadu until these Somali had re-established good relations with the Kismayu administration.

It is curious, in fact, how very crucial the relationship between Afmadu and Kismayu appeared to the southern Boran. Perhaps the main reason for this was that the Somali around Afmadu were always liable to limit or prevent Boran contact with the coast, and


² J. to T., 24 Oct. 1900, FO.2/293.

³ J. to T., 1 Nov. 1900, FO.2/293.

⁴ Perducci to Dulio, 20 Nov. 1900, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-17.
access to the coast was important to the Boran. Contact between Borana and Kismayu had been established before the Amharic movement southwards, and the principal motive on both sides had been trade. In 1894, as soon as news reached Afalata that the I.B.E.A.Co. had made peace with the Ogaden, he sent messengers to Kismayu asking for permission to trade directly with the coast;¹ and the subsequent partial cessation of Darod raids against the Boran between 1894 and 1897, in addition to the increased trade in and export of ivory, can be directly attributed to the peaceful relationship that existed at that time between the administration at Kismayu and the Ogaden at Afmadu.

When Afalata's messengers had reached Kismayu towards the end of 1894, the I.B.E.A.Co.'s administration there was drawing to a close. Earlier, in 1893, after the Herti revolt had been overcome, the liwali of Kismayu had suggested that a caravan should be sent to Borana, so that trade could be started and advantage taken of the temporary peace with the Somali. But at that time the Company's chief administrator had felt that the undertaking was likely to prove too expensive, and a year later this feeling must have been doubly reinforced since the Company's debts had increased.

¹C. to P., 21 Nov. 1894, PC/CP/68/19.
and no quick return could be expected from sending one caravan to Borana.\textsuperscript{1} As a result no immediate action was taken.

Nevertheless, Craufurd's instructions when he transferred into the employment of the E.A.P. on 1 July 1895, stated clearly that he was to find out about the Boran and if possible open up trade with them.\textsuperscript{2} As a first step in this direction, Craufurd got in touch with the Sheik of Bardera at the beginning of 1896.\textsuperscript{3} The only information he seems to have obtained was to the effect that the Boran did not trade in slaves, which was not exactly true. But it suited Harfinge and Craufurd to believe the story, though they both had their doubts. Craufurd was subsequently asked to let Afalata know how satisfied the British Government had been to hear of his prohibition of the slave trade, and to assure him that:

\begin{quote}

a perseverance in this policy will greatly strengthen the friendly relations which we hope shortly to establish with him.\textsuperscript{4}
\end{quote}

In order to establish contact with the Boran, Craufurd recommended sending Jebril Farah at the head of a sizeable caravan.\textsuperscript{5}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1] B.-T. to R., 27 April 1893 and P. to IBECO. 12 July 1893, F0.2/58.
\item[2] Craufurd, who had been Superintendent at Kismayu under the Company accepted the post of assistant to Jenner, the new Sub-Commissioner, for a few months.
\item[5] C. to H., 23 April 1896, F0.107/52.
\end{footnotes}
Hardinge supported this suggestion and thought that the journey could develop from being purely financial one into a "diplomatic Mission" that might have a very beneficial impact on Galla/Somali relations. Expenses were put at £300, but it was estimated that presents worth more than that sum might easily be brought back.¹ Lord Salisbury eventually sanctioned the visit, on condition that all expenses were met out of estimates for current contingencies. But it had taken more than four months to get permission for the scheme and by that time Jebril Farah had fallen seriously ill, so the plan had to be abandoned.²

However, in May 1896 an ivory caravan unexpectedly arrived at Kismayu after travelling from Bardera along the Italian side of the river Juba.³ Jenner realised that it was important to open up trade with Bardera, and the caravan was provided with an escort on the condition that it would return along the British side of the river. Thirty Ogaden were specially enlisted and the cost of the operation was 1,200 Rs.⁴ The caravan set out for Bardera in July and the escort arrived back in September with a Boran Galla.⁵

¹ H. to S., 9 May 1896, FO.107/52.
² C. to J., 2 July 1896, PC/CP/74/44; S. to H., 5 June 1896, FO.107/48.
³ Cpt. O'Callaghan to Adm., in Adm. to FO., 16 June 1896, FO.107/68.
⁴ J. to C., 31 July 1896, PC/CP/74/45; C. to S., 10 Oct. 1896, FO.107/60.
⁵ J. to C., 22 Sept. 1896, FO.107/60.
Although it seems unlikely that the caravan had originally come from Borana, the ivory it carried undoubtedly had. It was clear that Bardera was a most important terminal for Boran caravans, and Jenner began to realise that some sort of station at Serenli, on the British side of the river opposite Bardera, was a prerequisite to establishing contact with the Boran. He suggested placing "an intelligent native", Adam Musa, at Serenli with fifty Somali police for protection, and ever-optimistically estimated that he would "quickly acquire an extending influence over the natives of Libin and Boran".

Since Bardera was over two hundred miles from Kismayu, Jenner also began to think of building a half-way house to make the journey there easier. As a result, a Government station was opened at Mabungu Kisungu, and though this was partly designed to facilitate the administration of the Wagasha, it was also meant to act as a food depot on the route from Kismayu to Serenli.

When, at the end of 1896, Iugh and Bardera were threatened from Ethiopia, Jenner began to press for a much speedier and more expensive advance inland. His letters became increasingly full of emotional pleadings on behalf of the Boran whom he realised would

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1 The suggestion that the caravan came from Borana was made by O'Callaghan, Adm. to Fo., 16 June 1896, F0.107/68.

2 J. to C., 22 Sept. 1896, F0.107/60.

3 C. to J., 28 Sept. 1896, PC/CP/74/44; J. to C., 31 July 1896, F0.107/60.
soon be attacked by the Amhara:

We must sooner or later interfere to save the fine nation of Boran Gallas, whose country equally with Zanzibar forms part of a British Protectorate, from the horrors of the slave raid, the slaughter of their warriors, the castration of their youths, the capture of their women... From a military and financial as well as from a philanthropic point of view it seems better to make our advance while we have a comparatively strong nation united under a friendly chief to help us, and whilst we can be developing trade and securing an increase of revenue partially reimburse ourselves for the expense, than to wait until the nation is broken up into disunited sections and the trade is gone.¹

Hardinge of course realised at once that the Treasury would never sanction the expense involved in defending the Boran however desirable this might have been, but he did recommend opening a station at Serenli.² In fact Jenner’s proposals for defending the Boran were given short shrift, but by a curious irony both Hardinge and Salisbury later advocated essentially the same proposals themselves. For, despite the emotionalism which clouded Jenner’s arguments, it was abundantly clear in the last analysis that only force could secure the northern frontier of the East Africa Protectorate which Britain claimed to be legitimately hers; and, though Salisbury made a point of defending frontiers wherever possible by diplomacy rather than by force of arms, there was one important exception in north-east Africa and that was the Sudan.

¹J. to H., 27 Feb. 1897, FO.107/77.
²H. to S., 4 April 1897, FO.107/77.
In March 1897, Salisbury decided to send Major MacDonald at the head of an expedition to the Sudan. It has been suggested that the name given to this expedition - the 'Juba Boundary Commission' - was a blind aimed at diverting attention from its secret objective, which was to gain control of Fashoda and the Upper Nile. On the other hand, two scholars have recently pointed out that in the early stages of its planning the expedition had a dual purpose. It was intended to combine the capture of Fashoda with the exploration and delimitation of the Anglo-Italian sphere of influence in southern Ethiopia.

The idea of a 'Juba Boundary Commission' was originally Lord Salisbury's, and though it was ultimately used to disguise MacDonald's real goal, it does not seem to have been suggested in the first instance merely as a 'cover'. Salisbury had thought of several ways of getting to Fashoda and Barrington, Salisbury's Private Secretary, passed these ideas onto MacDonald orally for his comments. MacDonald took up Salisbury's suggestion of combining the march to Fashoda with the delimitation of the East

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1. Major McDonald surveyed the Uganda Railway in 1892, and in 1893 he investigated Cpt. Lugard's actions in Uganda.


4. MacDonald to Barrington, 27 March 1897, FO.2/144.
Africa Protectorate's northern boundary with Ethiopia, and he drew up two separate plans for putting this into practice. Both schemes involved marching from Kismayu up the river Juba, and both necessitated additional reinforcements and provisions being sent from Berbera to Dolo.\(^1\) The necessity of sending supplies from Berbera, however, proved to be a fatal drawback to the scheme and Hill\(^2\) minuted: "I don't think Lord Salisbury will like this".\(^3\) Evidently he did not, for the plans were not adopted, yet it is easy to understand how tempting it must have been for Salisbury to try and solve two problems at one shot.

It was Salisbury who had suggested to MacDonald that he would be "surveying and laying down the Boundary" of the East Africa Protectorate and Ethiopia, that he would be making treaties with the local tribes, and that he would be setting up stations at Dolo and to the north of Lake Rudolf.\(^4\) Had these suggestions in fact been carried out, the Boran would have been protected and Jenner's ambitions for expansion towards the Daua amply fulfilled. But this attempt to combine the two different goals failed. In the first place, Salisbury needed to get MacDonald to Fashoda without too much delay, and it was quickly appreciated that delimiting the

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\(^1\) McDonald "Juba Boundary Commission", 27 March 1897, FO.2/144.

\(^2\) Minute n.d. on MacDonald "Juba Boundary Commission", FO.2/144.

\(^3\) Hill was head of the Africa Department at the Foreign Office.

\(^4\) This clear from MacDonald's remark at the beginning of his Report of 27 March: "I can now make it clear how I propose to carry out Lord Salisbury's ideas", FO.2/144.
E.A.P.'s northern frontier would take some time. Then, although Salisbury's plans were flexible enough for MacDonald to have surveyed the boundary on his return from Fashoda, the problem of supplies was insuperable.

Although the MacDonald expedition had no direct influence on developments along the Ethiopian/E.A.P. border, it did have an important psychological impact throughout the area. In Jubaland the expedition's arrival was eagerly anticipated and it was expected to lead to the real subjugation of the Somalis. Menelick also feared a direct clash with MacDonald and went out of his way to ensure that this did not happen.2

A further by-product of the abortive Juba Boundary Commission was the suggestion from the Director of Military Intelligence that a post should be set up at Dolo, so as to prevent Ethiopian incursions into British territory.3 When Salisbury asked Hardinge whether the idea was feasible, his answer was virtually no, since he felt that the lower Juba had to be tackled before the upper Juba could be approached. The control of Afmadu and the opening of a station at Serenli were seen by Hardinge to be essential prerequisites

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1 Cederqvist to M., 2 Jan. 1898 and 28 Dec. 1898, AS/EFM/IS/305; C. to M., 8 April 1899, AS/EFM/IS/306.

2 H. to Sanderson, 22 Sept. 1897, FO.1/35.

3 S. to H., 20 Aug. 1897, FO.107/74.
that could neither be by-passed nor avoided before a station was opened at Dolo. On the other hand, Jenner had been authorised to visit Serenli in 1897, and the possibility of a fairly rapid administrative advance inland was not ruled out.

This idea of a gradual extension of the area under administrative control along the river Juba was one that Hardinge developed and added to, but towards the end of 1897 it became totally irrelevant in the face of the first Ogaden rebellion. Jenner was unable to visit Serenli, and the establishment of a station there had to be postponed; Hardinge also reiterated his belief that: "Any extension up the Juba must entail, as a preliminary condition, the submission of the Ogadens".

As a result of the Ogaden revolt, Jenner enlarged his own ideas about the minimum size necessary for the proposed administrative station at Serenli. The possibility of a Somali attack on the station had to be taken into account and, instead of planning to make do with Adam Musa and a few Somali irregulars, Jenner now wanted one or two British administrative officers to be posted there, backed by a sizeable Somali levy. These suggestions were

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1 H. to S., 12 Oct. 1897, FO.107/81.
2 H. to S., 10 May 1898, FO.107/93.
3 H. to S., 9 April 1898, FO.107/92.
4 H. to S., 31 July 1898, FO.107/95.
accepted by Hardinge who began to link the advance towards Serenli with the need for a more effective resistance to Ethiopian ambitions in the area, and he wrote to Lord Salisbury in July 1898:

In view of the present pretensions of Abyssinia, it is somewhat important for us to show our control of the Juba regions is effective and not merely confined, like that of the Sultans of Zanzibar, to a small strip in the vicinity of Kismayu.  

By the beginning of 1899, Hardinge had already begun to plan beyond the construction of a single station at Serenli. On 6 January he sent Salisbury a telegram strongly advising the utilisation of military officers for administrative and political duties in, as he put it, "the new districts which in the course of the next two years may be created on the northern frontier". Whether Hardinge was only thinking in terms of expanding northwards towards Dolo, or whether he also envisaged an expansion westwards towards El Wak, is not known; but in so far as he was advocating an effective defence of the E.A.P.'s northern frontier, Hardinge too was implicitly endorsing Jenner's earlier plan to defend the Boran, who were after all in the British sphere of influence.

Hardinge probably imagined that Salisbury favoured an expansion towards Dolo, whereas that only made economic and political sense to Salisbury in so far as it fitted into a much wider framework

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1 H. to S., 10 May 1898, FO.107/93.

2 H. to S., 6 Jan. 1899, FO.2/194.
that also embraced the Sudan. At the time when MacDonald's expedition was being organised it seemed feasible to combine the problem of the E.A.P.'s northern frontier with that of the southern Sudan. But once that plan had fallen through, Salisbury felt inclined to postpone as long as possible any extension of active authority towards the northern frontier of the E.A.P.¹

Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1899 Jenner visited Serenli and told the elders that a station would shortly be opened there.² When Jenner returned to the coast, he learnt that the decision to open a station had been postponed indefinitely. However, since he had already given the Somali around Serenli a very firm impression that a station would soon be opened there, he maintained that some Government presence at Serenli was unavoidable if there was not to be a serious loss of face. Instead of advocating the establishment of a political station at Serenli, Jenner now suggested that Farah Ibrahim, an Aulihan elder, should be made a Government agent. He was to be paid a small stipend and given ten Snider rifles; his duties were to be limited to the collection of customs duty.³

¹F.O. to C., 25 July 1899, FO.2/195.
²J. to H., 12 March 1899, FO.2/196.
³J. to C., 2 April 1899, PC/GP/110/9; F. to H., 4 April 1899, and J. to C., 27 April 1899, PC/GP/78/65; Jenner "Memorandum", 6 July 1899, FO.2/196.
This was an ingenious solution, the cost was negligible, the risk non-existent; yet it could still be claimed that some administrative advance inland had taken place.

At the same time, Jenner was told that the Government had no intention of extending its frontiers northwards or of increasing its liabilities, and he was warned that the Boran should not be encouraged to think that they could receive any help.¹ This explicit reference to the Government's desire to limit its involvement was more than necessary. In February 1899, Abdi Hersi, an Ogaden from Afmadu, arrived at Kismayu after visiting the Boran. He brought back news of a large Ethiopian garrison at Anole, and he also passed on numerous Boran appeals for help.² As a result, Jenner decided to send Mohammed Agil with 40 Somali police to give moral support to Geydu and Afalata. The Boran were to be offered British flags and invited to assist the Government in stopping the export of slaves to the Italians, they were also told that the Kismayu administration had come to terms with the Ogaden.³ As far as the most southern Boran were concerned, this last piece of information must have been the most important, and it was one of the first points that they themselves asked about.⁴

¹ J. to E., 14 Jul. 1899, PC/CP/68/16.
² J. to H., 23 Feb. 1899, FO.2/190.
³ J. to C., 5 April 1899, FO.2/196.
Muhammad Agil got within one days' march of Anole and then turned back. The presence of Ethiopian troops there made it impossible for him to establish direct contact with the Boran leaders. Later he claimed to have been careful not to give the Galla the impression that they might get Government assistance.\(^1\) At the same time, Muhammad Agil frequently told the Boran that he represented the British Government, and he also sent Afalata two Protectorate flags so that the Boran should know that they were under British protection.\(^2\) It was precisely this sort of adventurism that the Foreign Office was most anxious to discourage.

Nevertheless, by the summer of 1900 Jenner was once more recommending the occupation of Wajir and El Wak, and the establishment of a small police post at both places.\(^3\) This time Hardinge seems to have received the idea favourably, though he suggested that no steps should be taken until the following year.\(^4\) Jenner's murder in 1901, however, wrecked these plans. In any case, Salisbury had already warned that, pending a settlement with Ethiopia, great discretion had to be shown along the northern frontier so as not to

\(^1\)C. to S., 10 July 1899, FO.2/197.

\(^2\)Mohamed Agil "Report", PC/CP/78/65.

\(^3\)J. to H., 6 July 1900, FO.2/289.

\(^4\)H. to J., 23 July 1900, FO.2/289.
commit British policy, and in the circumstances the establishment of even the smallest posts at Wajir and El Wak could not have been considered discreet.

After 1901, however, the idea of counteracting a gradual Ethiopian advance southwards by extending north-westwards the area under effective administration received no further support either from the Foreign Office or from the Protectorate itself. In the first place, the new Commissioner, Sir Charles Eliot, was strongly opposed to any further advance whatsoever. Moreover, the second Ogaden revolt in 1901 led to a contraction rather than an expansion of the area under control. Nor did the river Juba seem any more to provide the sole route inland towards the frontier, and Eliot pointed out: "in the event of our wishing to open up relations with the Boran country, we could probably do so quite as well from Kenia and Ukamba as from Jubaland".

After 1901, therefore, a solution to the frontier problem was sought through diplomacy instead of by way of effective occupation. Though, by this data also, the British representative in Addis Ababa had come to the conclusion that a diplomatic solution was bound to be unfavourable to Great Britain, that effective occupation alone would provide the basis for a satisfactory solution.

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1 S. to H., 4 Sept. 1900, FO.2/252.
2 E. to L., 29 April 1901, FO.2/576.
and that in any case it was bound to be the main criteria for eventually deciding the frontier.¹

The Rodd Mission of 1897 had not in fact discussed the frontier between the E.A.P. and Ethiopia, since at that time Britain considered that this was a matter for discussion with Italy alone.² Nevertheless, Menelick informed Rodd of claims which he had made in a circular letter dated April 1898 and sent to the European powers.³ Ethiopian claims instead of being merely latitudinal were basically tribal, unlike the territorial pretensions of Britain, Germany and Italy in Africa, which tended to be circumscribed by straight lines drawn across a map with little parallel consideration for geographical or ethnic factors.

In 1891 Menelick alleged that the Arbore, Boran and Arussi came within the confines of Ethiopia, and this was to be the irreducible minimum of all later proposals. With time, however, Menelick became more specific about those peoples he considered to be sections or sub-sections of the Boran, and inevitably he adopted Wolde Gabriel's mistaken idea that the Garre were related to the Galla. Because of this, his claims at times appeared to be without foundation, but having conquered the highland Boran the

²F.O. to Rodd, Feb. 1897, FO.1/32.
³Rodd was unaware of this circular and claimed that in fact it had never been sent to Queen Victoria, but a copy can be found in the F.O. Confidential Prints enclosed in I.O. to F.O., 9 July 1891, FO.403/155. But I have not been able to find the original. R. to S., 4 May 1897, FO.1/32.
Ethiopians naturally felt that those they considered to be Boran shegats should also be included in Ethiopia.

Rodd also gave other reasons for not opening discussions on the E.A.P./Ethiopian border. He claimed that he had received no instructions on the subject, but he also felt that the matter did not call for urgent settlement, to which he added the further assumption that:

these questions should be left for future solution, which I do not doubt will be easy matter when approached in a spirit of mutual conciliation and goodwill.

This was a view that was to be repeated later, and there was certainly a feeling that since the border was essentially of secondary importance, the problem itself could not be that intractable.

At the beginning of 1898, Harrington, formerly Vice-Consul at Zeila, was accredited British agent to the Emperor. He was given his instructions on 2 March 1898 by Cromer, the British Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, and was warned to avoid committing himself to any recognition of frontier claims in southern Ethiopia or to any protests about these, without first seeking the advice of the British Government. In comparison to the negotiations and

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1 R. to Menelick, 14 May 1897, FO.1/32.
3 F.O. to Treasury, 29 Nov. 1897, FO.1/35.
4 C. to H., 2 March 1898, FO.1/35.
settlement of the Ethiopian/Egyptian border and the British Somaliland/Ethiopian border, the southern Ethiopian boundary question was given low priority. Moreover, Harrington's instructions effectively ruled out any sort of speedy settlement, and the necessity to refer back to London time and again for instructions meant that several important opportunities for a compromise solution were allowed to lapse through months of slow correspondence.

Harrington's first recommendation was to "suggest pushing forward outposts in the country between Webi river and Rudolf".\(^1\) It was significant that from the start Harrington implicitly recognised that diplomacy alone was not going to secure the boundary Britain wanted. Furthermore, after the failure to combine MacDonald's expedition to Fashoda with a survey of the frontier and the establishment of posts there, it should have been obvious that effective occupation was unlikely to precede a diplomatic agreement, and that in these circumstances every effort should have been made to achieve as soon as possible a diplomatic solution.

However, when diplomacy did not yield the results required, the tendency at the Foreign Office was to postpone discussions, despite the fact that it was generally agreed that time was on the side of Menelick, and that discussions would ultimately have to be resumed.

\(^1\) H. to S., 19 May 1898, FO.1/35.
Menelick, at any rate, seems to have been genuinely anxious to arrange a compromise settlement, and there is little to indicate that he regarded Borana as part of the sacred trust of ancient Ethiopian territory that could not be bargained over. But when Menelick discussed the southern border with Harrington in May 1898, the British representative was forced to admit that he had no instructions. In fact Harrington seemed to suggest to Menelick that negotiations were perhaps unnecessary, since the only criteria for deciding to whom the disputed land belonged was effective occupation, which was something to be established on the spot and not at the negotiating table. Nevertheless, in June Menelick proposed to compromise slightly and agreed that the Turkana and Marehan Somali could remain in the British sphere. He insisted, however, that the Garre, Sabq Gabra and Tertale should remain within the Ethiopian borders.

This last suggestion was based on a number of misconceptions. Firstly, there was no tribe called the Tertale. Yet, as a further concession in 1900, Menelick stipulated that the Tertale should be included in Ethiopia if they were found to be a sub-section of

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2 H. to S., 26 May 1898, F0.1/36.

3 H. to Cromer, 3 June 1899, F0.1/44. These proposals are mentioned by H. Marcus, supra. But Marcus simply repeats contemporary claims and views with all their inconsistencies and without in any way clarifying their contradictions. He also seems oddly unfamiliar with
the Boran. In fact, however, the Karayu were a sub-section of the Boran, and Tertale was a toponym. Nor were the Sahoor Gabra tied to a specific locality, but they were scattered amongst the Boran. Basically, therefore, Menelick was still claiming sovereignty over the Boran and the Garre, yet Harrington now urged Salisbury to accept these proposals so as to put some limit on the Ethiopian expansion actually taking place, and he explained:

I could see that effective occupation would be the basis of settlement, and I could see the Abyssinians were getting the better of this game.¹

As a result, Menelick's scheme was forwarded to Sir A. Hardinge for his comments, which in the event turned out to be completely unrealistic and unhelpful. He wrote:

I think Menelick's proposals rather audacious. He shoves our northern frontier two parallels of latitude back, and annexes Lake Stephani, Reshiat and the whole or two thirds of Boran. He talks about effective occupation; but a) he is not a party to the Berlin Conference, and b) his effective occupation consists of the establishment of a few posts, by raiding parties.²

Jenner also wrote a Memorandum to the same effect, and Harrington's final say on the subject was that: "Sir A. Hardinge seemed to me to treat the subject of a frontier as if Menelick were the ordinary squeezable petty African potentate."³

¹H. to S., 3 June 1899, FO.1/44.
²Hardinge, Memorandum, 20 Oct. 1899, FO.1/44.
³H. to Sanderson, 17 Feb. 1900, FO.1/44.
But by this time Sir Thomas Sanderson, Permanent Under Secretary of State, had decided that Menelick's proposals were not sufficiently attractive to form the basis of a settlement and Harrington was informed accordingly.¹ Then, when war broke out in South Africa in 1900, the whole subject was shelved and Sanderson wrote to Harrington: "It is an elementary maxim that one should not attempt too many things at once - and South Africa is quite sufficient to keep our hands full."²

At the same time, Menelick himself was anxious to settle the frontier without increasing his claims, though he candidly told Harrington that he had been advised that he would obtain a more satisfactory frontier agreement with Britain while the latter was engaged in the South African war.³ In May 1900 Harrington wrote to say that he had had four long discussions with Menelick regarding the southern boundary, and that the Emperor had put forward several new proposals.⁴

¹ Sanderson, Minute, 27 March 1900, FO.1/44.
² S. to H., 30 March 1900, FO.1/44.
³ H. to S., 20 June 1900, FO.1/37.
⁴ H. to S., 16 June 1900, FO.1/44.
These proposals seemed to be extremely favourable to Harrington; in fact, he considered them to be the most favourable terms that Britain could obtain and he urged their acceptance. Yet the proposals themselves were essentially no different to those that had previously been put forward. For Menelick still conceived of the frontier as following tribal limits, and he made no alteration to the list of tribes he felt ought to be regarded as Ethiopian. What he did do, however, was to limit his prior latitudinal claims, a concession that was worthless since these were subject to the still unknown ethnic borders. The sop, however, proved sufficient and Harrington was authorised to conclude an agreement along the lines that Menelick suggested.

Clearly the most important job now lay in the determination of the tribal frontiers. Towards the end of 1900, Major Gwynn was chosen to assist Harrington in his negotiations, and also to help delimit the Sudan/Ethiopian and the E.A.P./Ethiopian borders.¹ But Gwynn found that he could only handle the Sudan/Ethiopian frontier, and it was not until 1902 that Harrington secured the services of Captain Maud for the purpose of surveying the southern Ethiopian borderland.²

Maud's instructions were that he should collect sufficient information to provide the basis for a settlement of the frontier.

¹Sanderson to G., 27 Sept. 1900, FO.1/38.
²Sanderson to I.O., 2 Aug. 1902, FO.1/47.
He was also told that the frontier itself should not interfere with the local tribal organisation i.e. does not divide tribes between the two spheres. On the other hand, Maud faced very real difficulties in collecting his information. He himself admitted that the presence of Ethiopians travelling with their party southwards "had the effect of terrorising the natives and either completely sealed their lips or made their information totally misleading and unreliable". How then did he collect information of any value or reliability?

Maud found that the Ethiopians had been putting pressure on the Garre to make them say that they were Boran; and at Gabra Murri and El Mole, near Banissa, he discovered that the Ethiopians had constructed villages merely to give the impression that they were settled in the area. It would seem in fact, that Maud was not in a position to ferret out detailed and accurate information about the tribal limits of the Boran. The presence of Ethiopians in his party effectively precluded this. Indeed, Maud admitted that he had great difficulty getting in touch with people without Ethiopian officials actually being present, and, though he went to great lengths to achieve this, he does not appear to have been very successful.

\(^1\)Cap. Maud "General Instructions", n.d. in FO.1/47.

Ultimately, Maud seems to have ignored his instructions that the boundary was to be decided along tribal lines. Instead, he advocated a border that was clearly definable by its physical features, the river Daua to the east, and the Goro escarpment to the west. Maud appears to have based his proposals on the principle of effective occupation, claiming that they reflected the limits of direct Ethiopian control. In this way he justified what would otherwise have appeared to the British Government as an overhasty concession to the Ethiopian Government. But he also claimed that by coincidence, the limit of Ethiopian occupation not merely coincided with an admirably definable physical frontier, but also with an ethnic one.

In this respect Maud was doubtless hoping to convince the Ethiopians of the validity of his proposals, since tribal limits were supposed to be their determining factor. Yet here Maud was clearly oversimplifying and distorting the reality. While claiming that there were very few Boran to the south of the Goro escarpment, he could not overlook the fact that they were widely scattered in significant numbers further south. He even admitted that there were Boran at Aja, Buttelu, Buna, Elussi and Wajir, all of them places well to the south of the escarpment. However, the essence of Maud's argument was that because the Boran to the south of the Goro lived intermixed with other peoples, who had previously
been their clients, they were no longer true Boran.\footnote{Cf. B.J. Webster, "The Boran Rendille and Samburu: The Nomadic tribes of the N.F.D.", in The Peoples of Kenya, no. 16 (1944), 2.} He admitted that prior to the Ethiopian advance southwards, Boran power had extended as far south as Wajir, but claimed that since that advance they had lost their influence south of the Goro. Finally, because the southermost Boran did not send tribute north, he correctly concluded that they were independent of the Amhara; and he then added a blatant non sequitur, that they must also be different to those Boran under Ethiopian control. The embarrassing fact was that the Ethiopians had only subjugated part of the Boran, so that if tribal limits were to be recognised, the boundary was going to be drawn much further south. Yet by ignoring his instructions, Maud recommended a frontier that cut right across ethnic groups, dividing some tribes into two and separating others from their wells or their grazing. It was a frontier that was bound to cause intense local friction, its inherent defects would see to that:

if you make an arbitrary division, even if this is on a clearly defined natural feature, you shake up the native's ideas of boundary and property utterly, and you make a frontier which the natives have never recognised and probably never will.\footnote{V.R. Stigand, Administration in Tropical Africa (London, 1914), 272.}

Another important element of Maud's recommendations was that whatever frontier was finally negotiated, it would have to be
defended by military posts, since Menelick's "very independent
officers who rule the Boran country" could not be relied on to
respect it. He recommended three posts: one at Jara, a second
near Korondil, and a third near El Wak or Lugh. Each post was
to have at least 100 rifles, and the post near Lugh 150. Opti-
mistically, and later events would show how wrong he was, he
claimed: "the remainder of the line would I think take care of itself".
He also supported the idea of a British inspecting officer with
50 troops, which he regarded as essential. In theory the cost of
these proposals was to be met from a hut tax.\(^1\)

Clearly Maud had been right to stress that his proposals did
no more than take into account the limits of Ethiopian occupation,
because even so they appeared more than Britain was prepared to
concede. As Harrington explained, in March 1903:

Matters in our so called sphere of influence are
even worse than I expected. Abyssinian influence
extends beyond Menelick's proposals as far south
as 3° 30 N. No doubt when the frontier question
comes up for discussion we shall find Menelick's
proposals not worth the paper they are written on.

It seems to me that we shall be face to face with
two alternatives either to accept, with a view to
saving what otherwise will be lost of our sphere
of influence, a considerable diminution of our East
African Protectorate, or else go in for the expensive
means of making good our claims by effective occupation.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Cpt. Maud, Contents of Report, FO.1/43. Maud had evidently over-
looked the problem of taxing nomads who had no fixed abode.

\(^2\) H. to Sir Thomas S., 19 March 1903, FO.1/47.
It was becoming increasingly obvious to those who favoured a diplomatic solution, that this alone could not be counted on to prevent the Ethiopians from continuing their movement southwards. As Clement Hill minuted of a negotiated frontier: "it will be of little value unless we occupy it in such a manner as to be able to defend the tribes on our side".¹

To Eliot at any rate the prospect of giving up a large part of the E.A.P. did not seem particularly serious. Although a loss of prestige appeared to be involved and Britain seemed to have made a concession, Eliot was quick to point out that in fact all that was involved was recognition of a fait accompli. He also supported Maud’s suggestion that there should be three frontier posts, and suggested that this was the only way to maintain the frontier.² At the Foreign Office, also, the necessity of defending the frontier once it had been agreed on was being increasingly recognised:

There are the strongest reasons of policy and real economy for not now shirking the expense and responsibility involved in affording protection to the tribes under our authority. The policy of drift and retirement had invariably led to immeasurably larger sacrifices of money, blood and prestige (which means security) than would have been required by an early recognition of our responsibilities.³

¹Minute, n.d. on H. to T., 19 March 1903, FO.1/47.
²E. to L., 17 July 1903, FO.1/47.
³Crowes, Minute, 22 Aug. 1903, FO.1/47.
This was a view that was thoroughly endorsed by Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, though some doubt remained as to where the money would come from.¹

Yet the immediate problem was not so much whether to defend the frontier, but whether to negotiate a frontier at all. In November 1903, when it was thought that Menelick would accept Maud's line, Eliot began to suggest that it would now be better for Harrington to keep his hands free and not to commit himself. The question of giving protection to tribes in the Protectorate was one that Eliot was quite prepared to shelve. Harrington reported that there were tribes to the west of Lugh demanding British protection, and that he had sent them letters saying that they were in British territory. This was obviously a little premature. Some may well not have been in the E.A.P. yet others obviously were, such as the tribes around El Wak, and in so far as the latter were concerned Eliot adamantly maintained, "I don't see how we can give [them] effective protection", and he tried to ensure that such offers were not made again.²

Thus a policy of drift though formally denounced seems in practice to have been accepted. But if the British Government was not prepared to accept the Maud line as a basis for negotiation, there was no reason why the Ethiopians should do so either. Throughout

¹Lansdowne, Minute, 22 Aug. 1903, FO.1/47.

²E. to L., 4 Nov. 1903, FO.1/48.
November and December 1903, reports filtered in of an Ethiopian advance southwards that by all accounts went far beyond the frontier recommended by Maud. These reports stated that the Ethiopians had reached a place called Gedu, apparently not marked on any maps, but thought to be ten hours march north of Wajir. By the middle of December it was claimed that there were 1,000 Ethiopians at Gedu, all armed with rifles, and the occupation of Wajir and El Wak, two extremely important and strategic well complexes, seemed to the British authorities to be only a matter of months away. This news forced Lansdowne's hand. Urgent telegrams were dispatched to Addis Ababa stating that the British Government did not expect the Ethiopians to take any action prejudicial to the solution of the frontier while negotiations were pending, and two weeks later he informed Harrington that he would in fact be willing to start negotiations on the basis of Maud's recommendations.

The decision to negotiate brought a timely reminder from Sir William Nicholson, the Director-General of Military Intelligence. He pointed out that, according to all previous experience, no frontier agreement had ever produced the desired effect where it was not followed up by effective occupation. He reminded Lansdowne

1 Presumably Ghedu, an area or district to the south of El Wak.
that Capt. Maud had recommended three frontier posts along the border, but anticipated that Lansdowne would not accept the extra expense. He suggested, therefore, that Boran chiefs on the British side should watch the frontier, and that a camel corps from Kismayu should occasionally visit the boundary.¹

In 1904, it seemed to Italian observers that Harrington and the Emperor had agreed in principle about the frontier, but in fact negotiations did not go well.² Maud's recommendations did not sufficiently take into account the proviso that tribes should be divided between spheres of influence. To Menelick, on the other hand, the crucial questions were who constituted the Boran and what were their boundaries. Once these matters had been determined, the frontier could be agreed upon.³ In the meantime the inevitable controversy over whether or not the Garre were Galla in origin continued.⁴

This failure to reach an agreement, coupled with continued Ethiopian raids deep into British territory, left Britain in an unacceptable position. In the first place, Harrington got Menelick to agree that, though there had been no agreement, the Maud line

¹ N. to L., 8 Dec. 1903, FO.1/48.
² Pecori to M., 15 Aug. 1904, ASMAI. Posiz.70/2-16.
⁴ While the British negotiators always maintained the Garre were not related to the Galla, the Jubaland administrators all seem to have thought that the Garre were islamised Galla, J. to H., 2 April 1899, FO.2/196.
would be accepted as a provisional frontier and that as such the Ethiopians would respect its integrity. Secondly, Harrington put forward again an earlier suggestion that neatly obviated the necessity of erecting expensive military posts along the border. In 1901 he had suggested placing a British representative on the frontier to gather information.\(^1\) Capt. Maud had also put forward the idea of a travelling inspector backed by an armed escort.\(^2\)

In 1905, Harrington now suggested that some British representative should be placed on the frontier to ensure that it was not violated by the Ethiopians, and also to be able to report back any overt violations and gather information about them.\(^3\) Before the end of the year, a Greek citizen called Zaphiro had been appointed, and the first tentative step had been taken towards administering the frontier. The Boran were at the centre of the frontier problem, both politically and geographically, but Zaphiro had also to deal with the effects of Ethiopian expansion on both sides of them: in the east towards Lugh and the river Juba, in the west towards Lake Rudolf.
Chapter VI

ETHIOPIA AND LAKE RUDOLF

The Ethiopian advance into Borana was preceded by a similar movement further west, towards Lake Rudolf, that had a direct impact on the Samburu, Rendille, Geleda and other peoples in the area. This advance towards Lake Rudolf was consistent with Menelick's claims of 1891 that the Arbore and lake Rudolf were part of Ethiopia, but it also reflected a fear that Macdonald might try to stake a claim there first. In 1896 the Ethiopians raided the lake Rudolf and lake Stephanie area getting as far south as the arid lowlands where they attacked the Gabra Algan.¹ The Rodd Mission was given to understand that a permanent station had been set up in Reshiat, but when Cavendish passed through the area in April 1897 he found none there.² In fact, the main advance southwards did not begin until January 1898 when Ras Wolde Giorgis of Kaffa accompanied by Boulatovich, a Russian explorer, led an army to the northern tip of Lake Rudolf.³ By the end of March, the Ethiopian standard had been raised at the mouth of the Omo.

² McI. to S., 30 Aug. 1897, FO.CP. 7032.
³ Menelick claimed that he sent Wolde Giorgis south to anticipate Macdonald's possible intrusion in the area, and said: "I'll send Ras Wolde Giorgis with 20,000 men - they can check his passport", quoted in G.N.Sanderson, J.A.H., V (1964) 94. But if the numbers sounded impressive the state of the troops was not, and Wolde
and before Wolde Giorgis returned north two posts had been set up: one at Kerre, the other further east amongst the Amar Kokke.\footnote{1} The fort at Kerra was placed under Fitaurari Imani, who commanded a small number of troops, and these he used to subdue the local population and also to raid the Boran.\footnote{2} But in 1899 the country bordering the Omo, which had been governed by Dejazzmach Tasamma, was put under the control of Count Leontieff, a Russian explorer and adventurer who had entered Menelick's services, and the latter set out at the head of a large expedition to more thoroughly subdue the area.\footnote{3} By October 1899, Leontieff had reached the south-western edge of lake Rudolf, where he set up what he called "Poste Menelick II". However, this only appears to have been a temporary camp which was soon abandoned, though Leontieff claimed rather grandly that as a result "the occupation \textit{had} become completely effective".\footnote{4} The severe droughts of 1898 and 1899 also made the posts amongst the Amar Kokke and at Kerre untenable and they were abandoned in 1900, when their troops were assimilated.

Giorgis found it difficult to remain even four days on the edge of the lake, see: A.K. Boulatovich, "Iz Abissinii cherez stranu Kaffa na ozero Rudolfa", \textit{Izvestiya Imperatorskovo Russkovo Geograficheskovo Obshchestva}, (XXXV (1899), 280.


\footnote{2}{H. to C., 28 March 1899, FO.1/36.}

\footnote{3}{H. to S., 14 June 1899, FO.1/51.}

\footnote{4}{"l'occupation devient tout à fait effective". Leontieff, "Exploration des Provinces équatoriales d'Abbyssinie", \textit{La Géographie}, II (1900), 116, 118.}
into the garrison at Gardula. ¹

Ironically, therefore, Leontieff's expedition went hand in hand with an abandonment of direct control over the lower Omo, instead of the increased domination of the area which had been intended. The post amongst the Amar Kokke was permanently abandoned, but by 1903 the Ethiopians had re-established a post just north of Kerre at Labuko, and it was from this area that fresh advances were made in the following years. ² Moreover, though the post at Labuko was some distance from lake Rudolf, the fear of Ethiopian raids was felt far to the south of the area directly controlled by their troops.

Despite the physical abandonment of posts immediately north of lake Rudolf, Leontieff subsequently gave considerable publicity to his trip to the Lake and the permanent posts he claimed to have established there. The first occasion was at the International Exhibition at Paris in February 1900. He had contributed a considerable amount of ethnographic material for the Jibuti pavilion, and, when he was interviewed by the Paris correspondent of The Times, he claimed that he had effectively occupied the area around lake Rudolf, stating: "the country is being regularly governed... and

¹ J.S. Harrison, "A Journey from Zeila to Lake Rudolf", G.J., XVIII (1901), 289.

² Maud, "Exploration in the southern borderland of Abyssinia", G.J., XXIII (1904), 565.
Senegalese have drilled the natives. Later in the year, when Leontieff went to England, he visited Stanley and boasted that he would soon establish a post at the southern end of Lake Rudolf backed by forty troops. Stanley at once wrote to Sir Clement Hill in alarmist terms about the British sphere of interest being threatened, but Leontieff's schemes were not taken very seriously at the Foreign Office.

In June 1899, Harrington had assumed that Leontieff's expedition posed no special problem to the frontier negotiations then in progress. He had written to Lord Salisbury of the destination of the expedition:

So far as can be ascertained this country, though perhaps not properly subjugated is well within the limits of Abyssinian effective occupation. At any rate it is well within what Menelick proposes as a frontier and claims to have effectively occupied.

Moreover, Harrington was aware that Leontieff's expedition had ended on a note of disapproval. He had been summoned back to Addis Ababa where Menelick had wanted to degrade him for crossing into Ras Wolde Giorgis's territory. The Emperor also recalled those troops that Leontieff had left behind in the Lake Rudolf area.

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1. *The Times*, 12 Feb. 1900. Leontieff had recruited 130 Senegalese in Dakar and he brought them with him on his expedition, as well as a small number of Cossacks whom he claimed had been in the Imperial Guard.


3. H. to S., 14 June 1899, FO.1/51.

But by March 1900 it appeared that Leontieff might visit lake Rudolf again, and Harrington felt that it was time for the British Government to "take some steps to show that they consider such country as being within their sphere of influence". The meeting with Stanley, which took place a few months later, led Sanderson to suggest that Leontieff should be given moral support by the Government in return for an assurance that he would respect the frontier. One reason why Leontieff's threat never caused much concern, however, was because of his known duplicity. In July 1900 he had seen Sanderson at the Foreign Office for a confidential chat. Then in October he saw Harrington in London and said he wished to talk to him privately, and they arranged a meeting in Paris. On both occasions the motive was the same, and the conversation similar. Basically, Leontieff was asking for British support in the eventuality of Menelick's death which he felt would occur soon. He said that he would shortly be visiting the Omo and lake Rudolf, this time taking boats there. When Menillick died, he wished to declare himself independent and saw the necessity of getting support from some European power. He said he had chosen Britain because he liked the country and he claimed he was playing

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1 H. to S., 24 March 1900, FO.1/37.

2 Sanderson, Minute, n.d. on S. to H., 12 Sept. 1900, FO.1/38.
for his own hand. But though it was quite clear how Britain could be useful to him, Harrington made the point that it was difficult to see how Leontieff could be useful in return. And his mild threat to establish posts around Lake Rudolf and claim effective occupation there was worthless, for, as Harrington calmly pointed out, Menelick had withdrawn all claim to the larger part of the lake. This news apparently took Leontieff by surprise and completely upset his calculation.¹

A second reason why Leontieff was not taken too seriously was the obvious lack of rapport between him and Menelick, yet he could not be entirely ignored. At the beginning of 1901, Leontieff prepared to send another expedition to Lake Rudolf, and at that time it was certainly feared that he intended to cross into British claimed territory.² In June the expedition set off very tamely. Leontieff had intended to assemble several boats on the river Omo and on the lake, but this had been forbidden by Menelick.³ A month later it was being reported that Leontieff was on very bad terms with Menelick and with Ilg, his foreign adviser. It is clear that the main cause of friction was Leontieff's desire to exploit the Omo area for his own ends. Without Menelick's permission he

¹ Harrington, Memorandum, 11 Oct. 1900, FO.1/37.
² H. to L., 24 May 1901, FO.1/51.
³ Lord Cromer to L., 11 June 1901, and H. to L., 6 July 1901, FO.1/51.
had founded the Abyssinian Exploration Company declaring that
the Equatorial Province of Ethiopia had been given to him by
the Emperor. He offered to lease land for 50 years and
also to begin mining for gold, though both acts would have been
illegal. In July Menelick informed Harrington that the Equatorial
Province would be taken away from Leontieff. A few months
later the Abyssinian Exploration Company went into liquidation.
Menelick declared that Leontieff had no right to mine gold,
and his financial adventures seemed to be at an end. However,
in 1902 the Foreign Office became aware that Leontieff's interest,
had in fact been sold to a syndicate called Goldfields of Ethiopia Ltd. Their promoters had approached Lord Delamere asking if he
would become a director, and Delamere had referred their offer
to Clement Hill at the Foreign Office because they claimed
rights to land he thought came within the British sphere. The
Company succeeded in sending the explorer Cavendish to southern
Ethiopia, but it appears to have accomplished little else and
it never discovered or mined any gold.

1 H. to L., 6 July 1901, FO.1/51.

2 T. H. Sanderson to the Law Officers of the Crown, 7 Sept. 1901 and
H. to L., 16 Dec. 1901, FO.1/51.

3 Delamere to Clement Hill, 22 Feb. 1902 enclosing A. E. Tinsbrell to
Lord D., 5 Feb. 1902, FO.1/40.
Yet, precisely because Leontieff failed to establish any new, permanent garrison in the region of lake Rudolf and because the posts already there had to be withdrawn, raiding still continued. In fact, by 1902 annual elephant hunts by large numbers of armed Tigrean soldiers were taking place to the east and west of the lake, and in the process tribes were attacked, cattle captured, and villages razed.¹

The Ethiopian advance towards lake Rudolf in the 1890s altered the balance of power in the area. By and large it is true to say that those tribes which had previously been in a dominant position emerged weakest, and that those which had been the wealthiest lost most. Towards the end of the 19th century, two tribes appear to have been dominant in the area: the Arbore and the Rendille. The former concentrated their power in the highlands around lake Stephanie, while the latter were camel pastoralists inhabiting the lower ground. When the American explorer Donaldson-Smith visited the Arbore in 1895, he described them as a large and warlike tribe independent of the Boran Galla and rich in cattle.² They dominated the Amar Kokke and other bordering peoples.³ Indeed, during the

¹Baird to L., 19 Aug. 1902, F0.1/40. See also: J. Barber, The Imperial Frontier (1968), although this book deals with the Ethiopian advance to the west of Lake Rudolf it also covers the thrust southwards to the east. But its usefulness is severely limited by its reliance on too narrow a cross-section of source material and in particular on the Entebbe archives.

²A. Donaldson Smith, Through Unknown African Countries (London, 1897), 262; "Expedition through Somaliland to Lake Rudolf", G.J., XVIII
seven years between Von Hohnel’s discovery of lake Rudolf in 1888 and the first push southwards by the Ethiopians in 1896, the Arbore were one of the main causes of impoverishment of the peoples to the east of the lake.¹ But the arrival of the Ethiopians in 1896, led to the devastation of their villages. Their reappearance a year later led to the gradual elimination of their cattle until, by the end of the century, they only survived in small numbers, totally impoverished and without any of their former power.

Like the Arbore, but unlike the Boran, the Rendille did not at once migrate under the pressure of the Ethiopian advance southwards. To some extent this must have been because the Amhara did not penetrate far enough into the lowlands to constitute a dominant threat, but it must also have been because they suffered greater pressure in the south from the Turkana, and to a lesser extent from the Somali in the east. They had no entirely safe area to retreat to, and they had to accept a steadily shrinking frontier.

When Von Hohnel explored the area in 1888 he found the Rendille well integrated with the Gelubba² at the northern end of lake Rudolf.

¹H.S.H. Cavendish, "Through Somaliland and around and south of Lake Rudolf", G.J., XI (1898), 381.
The population of the Gelubba was estimated to be between two and three thousand and it was said that they preferred Samburu wives. There were three settlements of Samburu and Rendille amongst them, just to the west of the Omo.\(^1\) Yet it is clear that the Gelubba did not get on equally well with Samburu sections not habitually connected with them, and in 1886 they fought certain Samburu clans that were contesting their grazing grounds from the south.\(^2\) When Bottego visited the area, he also found Rendille to the north-west of the lake, but living on slightly higher ground than the Gelubba.\(^3\) This close interconnection between the Rendille and the Gelubba led at least one explorer to conclude that they were one and the same people, and that the agricultural Gelubba were in fact a sedentary offshoot of the Rendille who had got tired of nomadic life.\(^4\)

Even before the Ethiopian raids of 1896, both the Gelubba and the Rendille had been seriously weakened by Boran (or Arbore) raids,\(^5\) and by the outbreak of rinderpest and a smallpox epidemic; and as a

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\(^1\) H.S.H. Cavendish, G.J., (1898), 393.


\(^3\) L. Von Hohnel, J.R.A.S. (1938), 32.

\(^4\) A. Arkell-Hardwick, An ivory trader in North Kenya (London, 1903), 228; W.A. Chanler, Through Jungle and Desert (London, 1896), 303, 313. Chanler estimated that there were 20,000 Rendille amongst the Gelubba.

\(^5\) Donaldson-Smith (1897), 262, 295-6. He claims the Arbore and Boran lived intermixed.
result of these last two disasters they were on the verge of famine.\(^1\) In March 1898, the Gelubba were raided by Wolde Giorgis, and when Austin visited them a few months later he found them starving, partly as a result of the raid and partly because the rains had failed.\(^2\) In 1899 they were again raided, this time by Leontieff, and, when the American explorer Donaldson Smith visited them in 1900, he found them very poor and weak in comparison to their state in 1895 when he had first seen them.\(^3\) The following year, however, they appear to have slightly recovered and were successfully growing corn again, though when they were visited in 1903 they still presented the abject spectacle of an impoverished tribe frequently raided by the Ethiopians and thoroughly subjected to them.\(^4\)

Paradoxically, what seems to have contributed most to the revival of the Gelubba was the reintroduction of an Ethiopian fort at the mouth of the Omo in February 1909.\(^5\) For as long as they were raided the Gelubba had no alternative but to pay their tribute or have it forcibly taken from them. Either way they lost and

\(^1\) H.S.H. Cavendish, *G.J.*, XI (1898), 382.


\(^3\) A. Donaldson Smith, "An Expedition between Lake Rudolf and the Nile", *G.J.*, XVI (1900), 607. Other travellers confirmed this; H.H. Austin, "A glimpse of Western Abyssinia", *J.R.A.I.*, XXXVII (1938), 362-3; O. Neumann, "From the Somali coast through southern Ethiopia to the Sudan", *G.J.*, XX (1902), 386.

\(^4\) H.H. Austin, *Among Swamps and Giants in Equatorial Africa* (London, 1902),
collaboration brought no positive benefit, but only a negative and hyperthetical diminution in their suffering. Yet, once there was an Ethiopian post in their midst, their role quickly changed to that of raiders. By throwing in their lot with the Ethiopian garrison, by obtaining guns from them and by raiding with them, the Gelubba gradually attained an ascendancy over neighbouring tribes and especially the Samburu and the Rendille. They not merely regained their former power, but seem to have increased it considerably and they were the one tribe along the shore of lake Rudolf capable of resisting Turkana raids successfully. The acquisition of guns and ammunition may also have given the Gelubba a certain independence of the Ethiopians themselves. It certainly gave them the initiative, and raids were increasingly undertaken by the Gelubba alone or with a few Ethiopians participating. ¹ In 1913, for example, one of the most provocative raids that almost got as far as Mt. Marsabit was undertaken by 30 Gelubba and 8 Tigreans. It illustrates both the startling reversal of their former fortune and also the relative

¹Shackleton, "The Merille or Gelubba", 1939, l0k/32; J.K.R. Thorp, "The Gelubba of the Omo Delta", p.6. According to Thorp it was not until 1913 that the Gelubba started raiding on their own, and there is some confirmation for this view in L. to H., n.d. in H. to Chief Sec., 20 May 1913, CO.533/119. For a description of a fairly similar process to the west of lake Rudolf, see: J.Barber (1968), 101.

lack of Ethiopian control over them.\footnote{Kittermaster to Thomas, 1 May 1913, CO.533/118. For Gelubba raids against the Gabra, see Chapter IX.}

Throughout this period, almost nothing is known of the relationship between the Gelubba and the Turkana, though Von Hohnel mentioned that they were on bad terms with each other\footnote{Von Hohnel (1894), II, 168.} and Cavendish also discovered that the Gelubba at one time paid tribute to the Turkana to avoid being raided by them, presumably in the early 1890s.\footnote{See: E. Gerulli, Peoples of South West Ethiopia and its borderland (London, 1956), 83.} When Austin visited the Gelubba in 1898, he noted that their principal villages were at Lumian, Komogul and Nongolibe, all of them places to the west of Sanderson's Gulf and in the vicinity of the Turkana.\footnote{H.H.Austin, "Lake Rudolf", G.J., XIV (1899), 151.} In 1903 members of the East Africa Syndicate who visited the region to the west of lake Rudolf came across Gelubba grazing to the west of Komogul, less than twenty miles from the nearest Turkana villages.\footnote{"Sketch Map of the region west of lake Rudolf by members of the East Africa Syndicate Expedition, July 1903-Feb.1904", G.J. (1905).} There may have been close ties between them, but Bourg de Bozas's observation in 1901 that they belonged to the same tribe was clearly an overhasty judgment based on too fleeting a visit to the area.\footnote{Bourg de Bozas, "D'Addis Ababa au Nil par le lac Rudolph", La Géographie, VII (1903), 98.}
At the same time, the Turkana do appear to have gradually consolidated and extended their hold over the western littoral of lake Rudolf. This process cannot be followed in detail, but their relationship with the Amhara which was complex must have been a crucial factor. On the one hand, the Turkana were frequently raided by the Ethiopians — and so weakened by them — on the other hand, from around 1914, if not earlier, the Ethiopians began to sell the northern Turkana rifles which greatly strengthened their position. Thus the Amhara were at once the strongest allies of the Turkana, but also their greatest potential enemies. Yet by 1934 the Turkana had seized control over virtually the whole of the western shore of lake Rudolf. By that date they had a settlement at Todenyang, on the northern tip of the lake, though intriguingly enough Akal, the Turkana chief there, was of Rendille extraction. It seems clear from oral evidence that there has been considerable intermarriage between the Gelubba, Rendille and Turkana, as well as cross-culturation, and that hostility between them was only one facet of their inter-relationship. Indeed, it is quite possible

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2 See: J. Barber (1968), 178ff.


that rivalry and hostility between the Turkana and the Gelubba has been exaggerated.

The extension of Turkana control to the northern tip of Lake Rudolf may have been connected with the fact that the Gelubba expansion after 1909 took place almost entirely to the east of the river Omo. It is not inconceivable that as a result of this expansion, the Gelubba gradually vacated their grazing grounds to the west.

The tribes most affected by the Gelubba expansion eastwards were the Samburu and the Rendille. Yet their relationship with the Gelubba from the 1890s onwards is extremely difficult to reconstruct. It has been suggested that, as a result of the smallpox epidemic and the Ethiopian raids at the end of the 19th century, the Rendille migrated southwards from the area around the northern end of the lake. But if this was so they seem to have been able to return again at the beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, there were Rendille sections that had completely integrated themselves into the clan structure of the Gelubba, and these remained in the area. The Namuraruth sub-section of the Shir, a Gelubba clan, were almost entirely Rendille, and when the Gelubba began to raid after 1909 they were led by a Rendille chief.

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1 P. Spencer, "A Survey of the Samburu and Rendille tribes of Northern Kenya", Unpublished MSS.

In 1902, Tate was told that the Rendille had a base amongst the Gelubba.\(^1\) In fact their settlement at Nongolibe (Ngilibbi?) under chief Lingirriomai was said to have been much larger than anything found amongst the eastern Rendille near the Lorian Swamp.\(^2\) At the same time, it seems probable that Ethiopian raids often made it impossible for the Rendille to visit the Gelubba. Thus in 1907 it was reported that Rendille who used to live to the north and east of lake Rudolf had moved as far south as Mt. Marsabit because of Ethiopian raids. But it is interesting that the Rendille apparently wanted to return north and were trying to get British protection.\(^3\) However, the following year when they returned north without any support from the administration, the Sale and Raguomo sections of the Rendille were very badly defeated by the Ethiopians. Raids continued until November with increasing severity when they reached as far south as Mt. Kulal.\(^4\)

It is not surprising, therefore, that Stigand did not encounter any Rendille further north than the Hurri hills in 1909.\(^5\) The fact that the Gelubba were now also joining the Ethiopians in their

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\(^2\) H.R. Tate, "Nairobi to Samburu and Rendile", East African Quarterly I (1904), 100.

\(^3\) H. to G., 19 Nov. 1907, F0.371/192.


\(^5\) See: Stigand (1910).
raids must also have had some impact on their former relations with the Rendille. The following year there was another Amhara raid down the east side of the lake which led to the temporary abandonment of Koroli by the Samburu and Rendille. Moreover, in 1911 the Rendille camel herds were much reduced in size by what the Chief Veterinary Officer of the E.A.P. diagnosed as coccidiosis—a disease similar to rinderpest but fatal to camels. The following year it was being reported that there were no Rendille north of Longedotte, while in 1913 Kittermaster, the Provincial Commissioner, reported that there were no Rendille between Loiyangalani and the frontier further north. The very severe raids which took place in 1913 would appear to have made this inevitable. The Ethiopians got as far south at Mt. Marsabit and Mt. Kulal, while Cpt. Lloyd Jones of the King's African Rifles was wounded in a clash with one group of raiders.

Many years later, it seemed to a Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Frontier Province that this had been the turning point when the Samburu and Rendille were forced south for the last time never to return north again. There are in fact only two pieces

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3 Llewellyn, "Report and Diary of operations against an Abyssinian raiding party on lake Rudolf", May 1912, CO. 533/165.

4 Kittermaster, "Continuation of report on reconnaissance to the north of Mt. Kulal and the wounding of Lloyd Jones", Sept. 1913, CO. 533/123.

5 W. Lloyd Jones, Havash (London, 1925), 284-5; L.-J. to Adjutant,
of evidence to suggest that in the period immediately preceding
1913 the Rendille were grazing further north, and neither are
entirely satisfactory. First, G. Archer, a young administrator
in the Protectorate, wrote an article published in 1913 in which
he claimed that the Rendille watered their cattle amongst the
Gelubba. But it is far from clear what precise date he is writing
about, and it would not be improbable that he was referring to the
pre-1909 period. \(^1\) Secondly, there is the very specific statement
of J.C.Cotter and James Fay, two settlers who visited the Samburu
in 1912 and got as far north as Laisamis. \(^2\) The Samburu apparently
told them that they lived as far north as Merille. \(^3\) If this is
taken to mean Garba Merille, just to the west of lake Stephanie,
then it contradicts all other contemporary evidence and it would
be hard to reconcile with the accounts of severe raiding at that
time. \(^4\) But it seems more likely that the Samburu were referring
to Seri Merille, just to the south of Laisamis or to a small wadi
of the same name that ran to the east of the wells. \(^5\) For it would

\(^1\) G.F.Archer, "British East Africa", G.J., XLII (1913), 432.
\(^2\) J.C.Cotter, Evidence before the Commission at Rumuruti, 18 Aug. 1932,
KLC.EM.II, p.1506.
\(^3\) Merille is of course another name for the Gelubba, but the reference
here seems to be to a toponym.
\(^4\) Garba Merille appears in the 1965 SK 57A Route Map of Kenya. Its present
importance lies in its proximity to the newly negotiated Ethiopia/Kenya.
would seem that 1909 was a far more important turning-point, and that this was based not so much on the attitude of the Amhara towards the Samburu and Rendille, but to their changed relationship with the Gelubba.

Throughout this period, the Rendille also experienced pressure from the Somali to the east, though this does not seem to have been a matter of great importance. For a considerable period of time the Rendille managed to more than hold their own, while their contact with the Lorian Swamp appears always to have been intermittent and of secondary importance to them. At the beginning of the 1890s, the Ogaden attacked the Rendille near the Lorian Swamp and were defeated by them. Apparently another expedition was sent to revenge this defeat, though whether it was successful or not remains unknown. Another expedition was undertaken against the Rendille in 1896 when a certain amount of ivory was captured, but the Rendille were tough opponents and in 1900 the Abd Wak abandoned a raid against them. It is not known when the Rendille


1S. to IBEACo., 26 May 1890 & S. to E.-S., 28 May 1890, FO.84/2062.

2In 1900 there was still a Rendille village on the Lorian Swamp: Adam Musa, 14 Feb. 1900, in H. to S., 5 March 1900, FO.2/285.
were finally forced to abandon the Lorian Swamp region. The gradual dessication of this area may have led them to leave voluntarily, though in 1902, Lassergi, head of the Rendille at Mt. Marsabit, told Tate that there were a considerable number of Rendille just to the north of the Lorian but that they were gradually being pushed westwards by the Somali.¹

Yet far more important than the Somali threat from the east was the Turkana threat from the west. It is symptomatic that while Von Hohnel's guide expected to find the Samburu and the Rendille near lake Stephanie in 1888, none were there because they had all gone south to fight the Turkana.² At that date the Turkana were clearly the dominant threat and the battle fought in 1888 appears to have resulted in a serious defeat for the Rendille who moved towards Mt. Marsabit and the Uaso Nyiro.³ This defeat seems to have been the prelude to increased Turkana raiding towards Mt. Kulal and Koroli. It was serious enough for the Rendille to have claimed in 1893 that, in order to avoid these raids, they would have liked to leave "Samburuland" had that been

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¹ H.R. Tate, East African Quarterly (1904), 98; "Information on the Rendille" (1908), DC/MBT/5/1.
² Von Hohnel (1894), II, p184, p.215.
possible. Nor were the Rendille the only people to be affected. When in 1896 the Gabra retreated south to avoid Ethiopian raids, they soon moved north again after they had been attacked by the Turkana whom they feared more. However, by the end of the decade, it was reported that substantial numbers of Rendille had been enslaved by the Turkana, though the first people to attempt to move to a new grazing area were not the Rendille but the Samburu.

It has been suggested that relations between the Samburu and the Rendille underwent a marked change between 1880 and 1900. Whereas earlier the Samburu had suffered most from the rinderpest epidemics of the 1880s, and had been reduced to poverty and political dependence on the Rendille, they are said to have recovered in the following decade. The Rendille, on the other hand, who had been untouched by the rinderpest - since they owned camels - suffered far more severely than the Samburu from the smallpox epidemics of the 1890s, when it is said that they were much reduced in numbers and had to rely on the Samburu for support against their enemies.

These conclusions are unfortunately based on little more than a

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1 Von Hohnel to Cracknell, 20 Dec. 1893, FO.107/5.
4 P. Spencer, MSS., pp. 6-7.
a comparison of the accounts of Chanler, who visited the Samburu in 1893, and Arkell Hardwick, who visited them in 1900. While they may be correct there are small pieces of evidence that suggest that the contrast may be overdrawn. Arkell Hardwick himself mentions the wealth of the Rendille in 1900, while another explorer, Cavendish, mentioned how poor the Samburu still were and also how dependent on the Rendille. Yet, if the Rendille really were suffering economically at the end of the century from a lack of numbers, at a time when the population of the Samburu was increasing, this might partly explain why the latter were the first to migrate, though clearly there were other factors also which were involved.

While the camel owning Rendille could retreat to a harsher and drier habitat, the cattle owning Samburu had no such option open to them. In 1897 the Samburu were found to the south of the Uaso Nyiro for the first time since the 1860s, but their movement south of the river was strongly contested. At Kianjai there were remnants of the Laikipiak Masai, who had earlier been defeated by the Meru social system and together they raided the Samburu.

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1 Chanler (1896), passim; A. Arkell Hardwick (1903), passim.
2 H. S. H. Cavendish, G. J. (1898), 390.
3 Precis of specific proposals and applications affecting the Boundaries of the Native reserves in the N.F.P. 1934, KLG.EM., II, p. 1448.
4 "History of Meru", anon. n.d. but c. 1910, in PO/CP/1/9/1.
The Samburu were also raided by other Masai settlements at Mnyiso and Mzara, and they were afraid of Purko Masai attacks, though the settlements of the latter cannot be identified and it is difficult to gauge the threat they posed. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of these attacks was to make it very difficult for the Samburu to hold their own south of the Uaso Nyiro. Moreover they were also attacked by Somali askaris in the pay of two German adventurers who were trying to make a quick profit from cattle stealing and ivory poaching. Dr. Kolb and Von Bastinelle attacked both the Rendille and the Samburu.

By 1902, the Samburu push southwards had ended in failure. The hostility of tribes to the south of the Uaso Nyiro was one reason. It may well have been the crucial one, though it is worth nothing that there was an extremely severe drought at the turn of the century, and when in 1903 the Samburu moved north again it was the lack of rain that they gave as a reason. Indeed, when Tate visited them that year, he found that they had abandoned Laisamis and were one hundred and fifty miles to the north of the Uaso Nyiro at Reti.

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1 Tate, *East African Quarterly* (1904), 91-2.

2 Samberlich to Gilkison, 1 June 1900, FO.CD.LXII.

The Samburu attempt to move southwards would appear to have had little to do with the Turkana. In 1888, the boundary between the Turkana and the Rendille had been along the Trrawell river.\(^1\) The defeat of the Rendille that year enabled the Turkana to push down the western side of the lake, but even in 1900 and later the Samburu and Rendille were to be found to the south of lake Rudolf where the El Barta plateau was divided between them.\(^2\) There was a wide divergence between the area raided by the Turkana and that controlled by them. For example, in 1903 it was claimed that the Gorai Boran were moving towards the east in order to avoid Turkana raids, though these camel pastoralists were not to be found further south than Turbi or further west than the Hurri hills. This seems to indicate that the Turkana were penetrating a very considerable distance to the east of lake Rudolf. Yet that same year the Samburu were found at Mt. Kulal, Sil and Indumumara.\(^3\)

The Samburu did not attempt to move southwards again until after 1904, when the Purko Masai slowly abandoned their northern grazing grounds.\(^4\) While the Protectorate administration imagined

\(^{1}\) Von Hohnel (1894), II, p.236.

\(^{2}\) The El Barta plateau remained the dividing line between the Rendille and the Turkana until after 1911. In 1909 Stigand was asked to arbitrate in a dispute over the boundary but refused. Stigand (1910), 84; J.O.W. Hope, "Intelligence Report", June 1911, CO.533/88; Welby, G.J., XVI (1900).


\(^{4}\) "Precis of Specific Proposals...", KLC.EM., II, p.1449.
that the Uaso Nyiro was still the southern border of the Samburu in 1908, they had in fact already moved as far south as the river Lakiundu between the Ngare Ndare and the river Isiolo.

By 1909 there were a number of villages belonging to the Samburu south of the Uaso Nyiro and thereafter their expansion tended to be westward. In 1910 their villages were found just to the east of lake Kelele, the following year they were encountered at Baragoi and on the Leroghi plateau. With the resettlement of the Purko Masai in 1913, the Samburu encountered for the first time the determined resistance of the Protectorate Government to their migration south-westwards. Several attempts were made to move them further north across the Uaso Nyiro if possible. In 1914 they were allowed to settle old scores with the Turkana, and participated in a Government expedition against the latter.

It was hoped that once the Turkana menace had been reduced the Samburu could safely move northwards, but the First World War made it impossible for the administration to offer the Samburu

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1 Capt. Bois to Chief Sec., 11 Sept. 1908, CO.533/47.
2 "Intelligence Report on the Samburu tribe", DC/MBT/5/1.
4 "Precis of Specific Proposals...", KLC/EM., II, p.1449.
5 Spencer, MSS., p.8.
any protection against Ethiopian raids which penetrated down to the very southern end of the lake. In the end Ethiopian pressure had a decisive influence on the Samburu and though they were refused permission to migrate south of the Uaso Nyiro in 1915, they nevertheless did so in large numbers and abandoned Marsabit completely.\footnote{A.A.C. Ashton, "Uaso Nyiro Annual Report", 1915, PC/NFD/1/4/1.} It is ironic, therefore, that the one part of the frontier that Maud had maintained would look after itself had by 1916 been violated more persistently and more seriously than anywhere else.

Thus the Samburi migration northwards which had begun in the 1840s was to be reversed fifty years later. The reasons for this can only be guessed at: overpopulation may have been one cause and drought another. But it is clear that the Amharic expansion towards lake Rudolf in the 1890s precluded a further Samburu advance in that direction, while the Somali also blocked any possible expansion eastwards. Nevertheless, the movement of the Samburu southwards was only achieved slowly and in the face of stiff opposition. Initially the Samburu were resisted by the Purko Masai and remnant Laikipink groups, and they were also attacked by two German adventurers and their Somali askaris armed with guns. By 1902 their push south had been halted, yet two
years later they began to move south again. This time the Purko Masai were gradually abandoning the area. The Samburu movement was unchecked, but equally important it proceeded unnoticed or unremarked by the Protectorate administration. When finally in 1913 an effort was made to move them north again, it was already too late and this was underlined by the growing Ethiopian violation of the frontier.
Chapter VII

ETHIOPIA, ITALY AND THE UPPER JUBA SOMALI

Ethiopian expansion towards the Juba led to the development there of a far more complex situation than had been the case in their advance down the Omo or into Borana. For though the Ethiopian expansion southwards led all the tribes between lake Rudolf and the river Juba, who were directly threatened, to appeal for European protection and support, few in fact managed to actively involve a European power on their behalf. Thus the Samburu in the west welcomed the appearance of the British to the south, though this did not lead to their being given any immediate support against the Amhara.¹ The Rendille were also anxious to obtain British protection, and in 1900 it was reported that: "the Rendille very much desire the English Serkal should come and take over their country".² And Farah Ibrahim, head of the Aulihan Ogaden opposite Bardera, was equally alarmed at the possibility of an Ethiopian advance in his direction and appealed for British assistance.³ Yet none of these requests led to any administrative

¹ P. Spencer, MSS.
² R.H. Tate, "Statement by Mohammad bin Habib", 18 March 1902, in Eliot to Lansdowne, 15 April 1902, F0.2/571.
³ Hardinge to Salisbury, 21 Sept. 1898, F0.107/96.
advance inland within the East Africa Protectorate. A request for help from the Sultan of Lugh, on the other hand, did lead to the involvement of the Italians in the upper Juba, and to a direct confrontation between them and the Amhara.

This early Italian penetration inland was probably connected to, and certainly facilitated by, their earlier, rapid exploration of this area. The Anglo-Italian Convention of March 1891 provided a new stimulus for Italian explorers, while the desire to discover the sources of the Omo and Juba rivers (two outstanding geographical problems then still unsolved in Africa) was also a further attraction. However, none of the earliest expeditions were successful in their aim of reaching the upper Juba. It was not until 1892 that Ugo Perrandi managed to travel from Brava to Bardera, thus rivalling Von Der Decken's journey of 1865, or until 1895 that Ruspoli managed to reach Lugh. Ruspoli, moreover, had to fight his way southwards and his reception at Lugh was not

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2 These included both Ferrandi's and Ruspoli's first expeditions, as well as one by Baudí di Vesme, see: Spedizione de Daudi di Vesme, ASMAI, Posiz. 70/1-1; E. Ruspoli, Nel Passe della Mirra (Rome, 1892); Spedizione del Principe Ruspoli 1891-2, ASMAI, Posiz. 70/1-3; F. Bonola, "Les explorations Italiennes dans le pays des Somalis", Bull. de la Soc. Khediviale de Géogr., VIII-IX 4th ser. (1896), 538; G. Dainelli, Gli explorati Italiani in Africa (Turin, 1960), II, pp. 580-1.

encouraging. After entering the town, members of the expedition were kept prisoners there for over a month.\(^1\) Luckily Ruspoli had been followed by another Italian expedition led by Bottego, which set out from Berbera to explore the Juba in September 1892, and, after splitting into two, one section under Grixoni reached Lugh in the middle of March 1893, rescuing the Italians there. Grixoni, however, only stayed in Lugh two days and then marched down the Juba to the coast with the sick members of Ruspoli's expedition.\(^2\)

Ruspoli had arrived at Lugh at a time when the menace of Ethiopian expansionism was becoming increasingly self-evident in that area. The Ethiopian advance into Arussi, to the north of Lugh, had begun in 1882 when Ras Darghe had been sent to conquer that region.\(^3\) Yet, presumably Ras Darghe was not entirely successful, for Menelick had to dispatch further expeditions in 1885 and 1886.\(^4\) Then, at the beginning of 1891, a large Ethiopian raiding party devastated the area around the upper Webi Shebelle.\(^5\) Thereafter,

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\(^1\) A. Rossi, "La seconda spedizione Ruspoli in Africa", Nuova Antologia, LXXXIII, fasc. 668, 4th ser. (1899), 637ff.

\(^2\) See: V. Bottego, Il Giuba Esplorato (Rome, 1895).

\(^3\) J.S.Trimingham (1952), 208.

\(^4\) C.E.Cadwell, "Report as to the southern limit of Abyssinia", 14 Nov. 1890, enclosed in Intelligence Department to F.O., 17 Nov. 1890, FO.84/2095.

\(^5\) J.Jopp to E.-S., 10 Feb. 1891, FO.84/2146; Ewen-Smith to Salisbury, 24 Feb. 1891, FO.84/2152.
raids continued every year for the purpose of levying tribute and subduing more thoroughly the south-eastern Galla. Given these conditions it might have been expected, therefore, that Prince Ruspoli would have been welcomed at Lugh as a potential ally against the Amhara. There were two reasons why he was not.

In the first place, the behaviour of Ruspoli's expedition resembled that of the Amhara too closely to inspire confidence. There had been numerous complaints from the time of his first expedition, when he had refused to pay his porters. On his second expedition, the Sheik of Hargeisa accused Ruspoli of using force to obtain camels and also of ill-treating Somali clans. But, and this was the crucial point, the people around Lugh also maintained that Ruspoli employed force without justification and did not come in peace. Secondly, Ruspoli's arrival at Lugh provoked a mixed reaction that needed handling with great tact. The Sultan of Lugh, Hassan Nur, and his Chief Secretary, Muhammad Urkei, both seem to have been anxious to get Italian help against the Amhara. Yet the wadad, the religious leaders, felt it necessary to be hostile, probably for reasons of prestige. The situation was

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1 Jopp to Ass. Sec., I.O., 9 Aug. 1892, FO.84/2257.
2 Jopp to Cecchi, 4 Jan. 1893, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/1-4.
3 Sultan of Lugh to Ruspoli, n.d., ASMAI, Posiz. 70/1-4.
therefore extremely delicate, and the chief wadad forbade Ruspoli
and his followers to enter Lugh as they were Christians.¹
Ruspoli, however, does not appear to have possessed much tact.
On the contrary he had a reputation of being a "caractère violente".²
In a fit of temper he had shot and wounded one of his companions,
and it was pointedly noted that there had not been a duel.³ It
was Ruspoli's deliberate rejection of the wadad's request that
precipitated a crisis and led to the temporary imprisonment of
members of the expedition.

On the other hand, many exploring caravans also encountered
brief resistance when they were genuinely mistaken for an Ethiopian
 raiding party. Later in 1893 the Garre and Gabra resisted Ruspoli
for this reason, and in 1897 Bottego similarly had to fight the
Arussi Galla.⁴ There were also other examples of tribes too
frightened of Ethiopian raids to identify peaceful intruders in
time.⁵ However, after Grixoni left for the coast, Ruspoli did
succeed in establishing friendly relations with the Sultan of Lugh,
and the Italian then continued his exploration westwards until he
was killed by an elephant in Arbore country.

1 A. Rossi, Nuova Antologia (1899), 637ff.

² However, Cecchi, then Italian Consul at Aden, dismissed these allegations
with the remark that he did not believe that an aristocrat could be
violent.

³ Italian Consul, Port Said, to Ministero, 14 May 1893, ASMAI. Posiz.
70/1-4.

⁴ U. Ferrandi, Lettera al Presidente, B.S.G.I., VII 3rd ser. (1894),
321-2; V. Bottego (1895), 127.

Ruspoli's expedition achieved two things. In the first place it put Lugh on the map. Ruspoli, of course, exaggerated its importance and claimed that it was probably the most valuable commercial centre in the Somali peninsula. Moreover, this claim was not just made in the relative obscurity of an article in some Geographical Journal, but also in letters to his father, then Mayor of Rome, which were given due publicity in the national newspapers. Secondly, it was also widely claimed that Hassan Nur had asked for Italian assistance against the Amhara and that Ruspoli had signed a treaty with him, which placed the Sultan and Lugh under Italian protection.

Although Ruspoli appears to have signed nothing more than a treaty of friendship with Hassan Nur, it was not without its significance that the treaty should have been negotiated about the same time that Italy assumed responsibility for the Benadir ports. As early as 1891 it had been thought that the Ethiopian thrust into Arussi was aimed ultimately at Merca. By 1893 it had become evident to the Italians that the Amhara were trying to reach the coast and conquer the Benadir ports. Lugh was a strategic

1 Ruspoli to his father, 1 June 1893, Tribuna, 2nd Nov. 1893.


3 "The Sultan wrote to Ruspoli: vogliamo fare uno scritto col tuo re, per essere fra noi amici", this was the basis of the Treaty. "Spedizione del Principe Ruspoli - trattato col Sultano di Lugh", ASMAI. Posiz. 70/1-4.

4 Jopp to E.-S., 10 Feb. 1891, FO.84/2146.

5 Ferrandi to Cottoni, Feb. 1893, enclosed in Roda to Rosebery,
post of considerable importance and, in these circumstances, it soon came to be considered the first line of defence for the Benadir ports and the Italian sphere of influence in southern Somalia.¹

Italian interest in the defence of Lugh gradually increased from the time of Ruspoli's visit, though concrete assistance was slow to materialise. The second half of the Bottego expedition arrived at Lugh in July 1893, when the Sultan again asked for help, but little could be provided.² Nevertheless, there continued to be intermittent contact with Italian explorers. Thus, in February 1894, Luigi Lucca passed through Lugh on his way back from the Arbore,³ but when after several months no help was forthcoming Hassan Nur wrote to Filonardi, head of the Italian Chartered Company that administered the Benadir Concession, requesting troops. He sent his son to Mogadishu with the letter, but when the latter arrived there in October he was told that the Company had no troops to spare.⁴ By February 1895, the explorer Ugo Ferrandi was writing to Cecchi, the Italian Consul at Zanzibar, to say that the Ethiopians were only three days march away from Lugh devastating the countryside, and that help was urgently required.⁵ This letter had some impact.

¹17 March 1893, FO.107/3.
²Filonardi to Ministero, 25 Oc. 1895, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/1-8.
³N. Noll, Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales, I (1897), 418.
⁴A. Rossi, Nuova Antologia (1899), 637ff.
⁵V. Ferrandi, Segunda Spedizione Bottego (Rome, 1903), 15.
Within a month an agreement was reached between the Italian Foreign Ministry and the Rome Geographical Society which had been about to send Bottego on a second expedition. Bottego was now given the dual task of following the boundary of the Italian sphere of influence and founding a station at Lugh. At first it was emphasised that this was to be a 'commercial station' with a Political Resident, and that Bottego was to encourage trade to pass through Lugh. Nevertheless, by the end of the year, emphasis was being placed on the function of Lugh as a 'military station', with a Political Resident supported by a number of troops. The new Italian post at Lugh thus had a dual purpose from the start. Initially it was supposed to provide some protection for the coastal towns against Ethiopian raids, but it was also to have an economic raison d'être of its own.

Filonardi later tried to excuse his dilatory handling of Hassan Nur's requests for assistance, which had brought the Benadir Company into disrepute. He explained that the Sultan of Lugh's first letter had merely requested Italian troops but not Italian protection. This was contrasted with a second letter that did ask for Italian protection and which Filonardi claimed opportunely coincided with

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1President Rome Geog. Soc. to Bottego, 3 May 1895, ASMAI. Posiz.67/1-7.

2U.Ferrandi (1903), 16; Ministero to Bottego, 12 April 1895, ASMAI. Posiz.67/1-6; Ferrandi to Cecchi, 18 August 1896, ASMAI. Posiz.70/1-8.

plans to send Bottego on an expedition.\textsuperscript{1}

However, when Bottego arrived at Brava in September 1895 with 250 armed men and a large quantity of ammunition, it seemed that he had arrived too late. For on October 4th, and before Bottego had set out for the interior, news arrived that over 2,000 Ethiopians had already reached and occupied Lugh since the beginning of September. They had met with little resistance. The Gasar Gudda and the Goba-\textsuperscript{2}wein, despairing of Italian help, had fled the town which was virtually abandoned before it was taken. Only a few Somali traders remained behind and they had to pay the Amhara a tribute before their lives were spared. Moreover, the Ethiopians had succeeded in capturing the son of Hassan Mur.\textsuperscript{2}

As Bottego approached Lugh on 18 November, the Amhara abandoned the town and there was no confrontation between the two forces. Soon afterwards, Bottego signed a treaty with Hassan Mur which placed the town under Italian protection.\textsuperscript{3} After remaining in Lugh for over a month and with the rainy season coming to an end, the likelihood of a further Ethiopian raid diminished, so Bottego decided to continue with the other objects of this expedition. On 26 December

\textsuperscript{1}F. to M., 22 March 1896, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/1-3.

\textsuperscript{2}U.\ Ferrandi (1903), 16; L. Vannutelli and C. Citerni, L'Omo (1899), 44; F. to M., 25 Oct. 1895, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/1-8.

\textsuperscript{3}The Treaty was signed on 9 Dec. ASMAI. Posiz. 67/1-10; Dr. Conscritta, "L'Azione della Compagnia Filonardi in Somalia prima della occupazione Italiana" (Unpublished Thesis, Rome n.d.), 140ff.
the day before Bottego left Lugh, the Sultan and all the inhabitants of the town swore their allegiance to Ugo Ferrandi who was then nominated the first Political Resident and left in charge at Lugh with 45 askaris.  

Bottego's arrival at Lugh in 1895 discouraged further raids that year and, given the normal timing of these incursions, this meant that Lugh would be safe until the following September or October. Thus in March 1896, Ferrandi could report back that all had been peaceful. Nevertheless, the Italian defeat at Adowa that same month was to have a considerable impact in Italian Somaliland. On the one hand, it discredited Italian undertakings along the Benadir coast and, on the other hand, Italian prestige suffered around Lugh. The Italians were still welcomed along the upper Juba as a counterweight to the Ethiopians, but confidence in their power collapsed. One result of this was that the Sultan of Lugh tried to get British help in addition to Italian assistance. Another was that when Lugh was threatened by the Amhara later that year, the local tribes fled instead of giving the Italians their support.

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3 E. Pini, "Eritrea e Benadir", L'Esplorazione Commerciale (1899), 298-9; N. Noll, Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales, I (1897), 418.
5 N. Noll, Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales, I (1897), 418.
By the beginning of September 1896, Ferrandi was anticipating another Ethiopian advance towards Lugh. The possibility of abandoning the town was discussed and then rejected. Ferrandi was given the opportunity of leaving if he so desired, but instead he chose to stay and merely requested additional troops. About two months later, on 13 November, the Ethiopians under Wolde Gabriel began probing the defences of Lugh. Rafts were constructed but before a full-scale attack was mounted Wolde Gabriel suddenly decided to push further east into Rahanwein country. The following day, the English explorer Cavendish arrived at Lugh to find the ground covered with cartridge cases and hoof marks, the countryside had been devastated. As he approached the town, he found the Italian flag hoisted and troops manning the walls uncertain as to whether his party were Ethiopians or not. Although Ferrandi's position was not desperate, he had nevertheless run very low in ammunition and food. A few days later, however, Mamini arrived with 56 askaris, and a quantity of ammunition and other supplies. These were the troops that Ferrandi had requested in September and

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1 Ferrandi to Cecchi, 3 Sept. 1896, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/1-8; U. Ferrandi (1903), 146.

2 U. Ferrandi (1903), 162. See also: R.L. Hess (1966), 63.

3 H.S.H. Cavendish, G.J. (1898), 374.
which had succeeded in reaching Lugh only after the main danger was over.¹

It is impossible to tell whether Wolde Gabriel abandoned his attack against Lugh because of the approach of Cavendish's expedition or whether he felt he would meet with less opposition further east.² He captured Baidoa without any resistance being offered. Thereafter Wolde Gabriel's movements cannot be followed in detail, but it appears that the expedition was lured further and further into Rahanwein country, where the Ethiopians were decimated by famine and thirst. Finally, they had to abandon their raid. Only a few hundred returned home out of an expedition of over one thousand men. On their way back, they again looked as though they were about to attack Lugh, and then failed to do so.³

In some respects this expedition of 1896 was a turning point. The Italians, however, reeling under the disaster at Lafole⁴ never seem to have realised the extent or the importance of this Ethiopian

¹G. Mamini, "Itinerario e note del viaggio Brava-Lugh etc.", B.S.G.I., XI 3rd ser. (1898), 207-8.

²Cavendish claimed he arrived at Lugh the day following Wolde's withdrawal but Ferrandi suggests that it was five days later, see; U. Ferrandi (1903), 162.

³U. Ferrandi (1903), 171; Dulio to M., 31 Dec. 1896, ASMAI. Posiz. 55/7-50. See also R.H. Hess (1966), 64-5.

⁴This was when Cecchi, the Italian Consul at Zanzibar, set out in Nov. to counter the Ethiopian advance into Somalia but was surprised and attacked by Somali; Cecchi was murdered.
defeat, probably also because they themselves had not really been involved in it. Yet, in Addis Ababa, the whole expedition was shrouded in the greatest secrecy and Rennell Rodd, the British Representative there, heard of the "severe defeat" that the Ethiopians had suffered.  

Ironically, the effect around Lugh of Wolde Gabriel's expedition was to restore confidence in the Italians. Somali clans such as the Ajuran now openly pledged their support and sent presents. Moreover, there were no further Ethiopian raids against Lugh until 1907, though the post often looked vulnerable to attack.  

Once the period of crisis seemed definitely to have passed, Ferrandi was replaced as Political Resident by Said Mohammad, a brother of the liwali of Brava. The change over coincided with Lord Delamere's arrival at Lugh on his first sporting trip to the East Africa Protectorate, and Dr. Atkinson, who had accompanied his expedition, returned to Brava with Ferrandi. However, during 1898 and 1899 the value of Lugh as a military outpost was seriously questioned. For during both these years the post was outflanked.

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1 Rodd to Salisbury, 3 June 1897, F0.1/32.
2 U. Ferrandi (1903), 196.
on several occasions, and more than once the Ethiopians got as far south as Serenli on the right-hand side of the river, either raiding or spying out the land.¹

Indeed, the garrison at Lugh did not appear to act as a deterrent to Ethiopian advances along either side of the river Juba. When in September 1898 Wolde Gabriel undertook an expedition against the Rer Afgab, he passed by Lugh and sent letters to Said Mohammad, the Resident there. Said Mohammad replied tersely that he would resist any attack by force, though the letters written in Italian and Amharic had assured him of Wolde Gabriel's intention to avoid a conflict. Having come so close to Lugh, the Ethiopian commander was merely sending the Commissario his best regards, but at that time there was no one at Lugh who could understand either Italian or Amharic, and the Amharic letter had to be sent to Zanzibar to be translated.²

The problem of Lugh was its isolation and the poor morale of troops there. In years when the harvest was bad, food had to be transported to the post from the Benadir. The askaris stationed in the town were frequently on half rations, and they generally demanded to be sent back to the coast at the earliest possible moment. Said Mohammad also wanted to be replaced saying that he

¹Rapporto dal Benadir, 26 Nov. 1898, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/1-12; Pestalozza to M., 26 Aug. 1899, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/2-13; Perducci to Pestalozza, 7 Aug. 1899, ASMAI. Posiz. 69/1-12.

²Dulio to M., 10 Sept. 1898, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/1-12.
had served his term. To these problems there was no easy
solution as long as the Italian administration was tied to the
Benadir.¹

Eventually, Italian fears that Lugh might succumb to an
Ethiopian attack led to the determination to set up a post at
Bardera, which could support Lugh at short notice and would also
ease the long supply lines.² The Sultan of Bardera, Sheik Abdio,
had received an Italian flag from Ferrandi at the beginning of
1893, and he had also signed a treaty of friendship with the Ruspoli
expedition later that year.³ But it was not until Badolo's ex-
pedition in 1902, to examine the defences of Lugh and to open a
station at Bardera, that any further progress was made.⁴

Thus the garrison at Lugh only seems to have been of marginal
military importance to the neighbouring Somali. For it neither
offered them effective protection against Ethiopian raids nor
did it appear seriously to deter the Amhara from pushing southwards.
On the other hand, the town was not as commercially successful
as had originally been hoped, though it was due to their economic

¹ Rapporto dal Benadir, 28 Nov. 1893, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/1-12.
² Carminati to Ministero, 16 Nov. 1901, ASMAI. Posiz. 75/5-47;
  C. to M., 27 March 1902, ASMAI. Posiz. 75/5-46; both are quoted
³ "Treaty between Ruspoli and the Sultan of Bardera", 3 April 1893,
  ASMAI. Posiz. 70/1-4.
⁴ Report of Badolo's expedition to Lugh; Dulio to M., 25 Aug. 1902,
  ASMAI. Posiz. 70/2-20.
ambitions that the Italians made their greatest impact on the Somali tribes to the west of the river Juba.

In the first place the Italians had discovered Lugh when it was in full economic decline. Ruspoli had exaggerated its wealth and importance and so had other Italians who favoured a forward policy in that area. The problem of Lugh's decline was largely connected with the unsettled state of affairs along the upper Juba, which acted as a deterrent to trade. The migration of new Somali clans into the area naturally upset the equilibrium which was so important for commerce. Moreover in 1893 Lugh was largely destroyed by fire, while the Ethiopian advance southwards further dislocated trade in the area.¹

Italian attempts to prop up and, indeed, to revive the trade of Lugh meant that they became increasingly interested in its economic catchment area, which naturally they wished to control. The crucial fact, however, was that Lugh remained essentially the terminal point of two caravan routes, one of which lay wholly in the British sphere of influence. Thus there was the problem of deciding how far Italian political influence should be extended to the right bank of the Juba and the area beyond which, though technically in the East Africa Protectorate, was still unadministered by Britain. It was also obvious to all Italian administrators at

¹U. Ferrandi (1903), 387.
Lugh that since the British could control the Boran end of
the trade, they could just as easily divert it from Lugh; and
this led to the same sort of political and commercial rivalry
along the upper Juba between the two administrations as occurred
further down the river.

In fact, Italian administrators became obsessed with
the possibility that trade might be diverted from Lugh, and
every British advance up the river Juba was construed as a potential
threat to their legitimate interests. The fears were not entirely
unjustified. As early as 1893 it had been obvious to Dundas,
the explorer, that when the Juba was opened, trade would be
diverted to Kismayu from both Bardera and Lugh. And while the
I.B.E.A.Co. did not have the funds to put such a scheme into
operation, one of Jenner's aims from 1896 onwards was to encourage
the economic development of Jubaland.

Yet when in 1896 Jenner tried to establish contact with
Afelata, head of the Boran, the Italians oversimplified in concluding
that this was purely a manoeuvre to divert trade from their own
sphere of influence, and their pleasure at Jenner's failure was
misplaced. Again, when it was learnt two years later that Jenner

1 C. Rossetti, "La via del Basso Giuba", L'Italia Coloniale, I no. 11.
(1900), 6.
2 Capt. Dundas, G.J., I n.s. (1893), 220.
3 Consul at Zanzibar to Ministero, 30 Aug. 1896, ASMAI. Posiz.
69/1-7; Ferrandi to Presidente Rome Geog. Soc., 10 Oct. 1896,
ASMAI. Posiz. 70/1-8.
hoped to open administrative posts opposite Bardera and Lugh, the motive was thought to have been purely commercial and unfriendly towards Italy.¹ Later the Italian consul at Zanzibar noted the tendency for progressive expansion north-westwards in the British sphere and recommended that the Italians should take a corresponding interest in their own side of the river.² However, other methods of dealing with British competition were also put forward.

In the first place, Ferrandi had been specifically instructed by Cecchi to combat British influence amongst the Boran and along the upper Juba. Although Ferrandi was primarily preoccupied with the defence of Lugh, he was also troubled that any success he might have reviving trade with the Boran would ultimately benefit the British alone.³ For he was quick to point out that all ivory traded at Lugh came from the British sphere. The solution that Ferrandi tentatively proposed was that Italian influence should be extended westwards and Italian control with it. By way of justification he maintained not only that the Boran had full confidence

¹Festalozza to Ministero, 6 May 1898, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-11.
²P. to M., 20 Aug. 1899, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-12.
³P. to C., 20 Aug. 1896, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-7.
in the Italians, but also that they hoped that one day Italian
influence would spread to the west of Lugh and act as a counterpoise
to the British. To nullify the growing British influence in the
area, Ferrandi suggested establishing a station in the middle
of the upper Daua. Naturally the problem centred on whether such
a station would ever fall into British hands. 1

Of course there was nothing very extraordinary in these plans.
They were thrown out informally and merely indicate the conflict
of national interests as experienced by a junior but zealous
administrator. What was more unusual, perhaps, was the initial
support given to these ideas by Cecchi, the Italian Consul at
Zanzibar, in a curiously artful and dishonest way. Cecchi pointed
out that the terms of the 1891 Anglo-Italian Agreement could be
revised by common agreement for hydrographical reasons. He then
suggested that Bottego's expedition had altered the geographical
criteria by establishing that the Daua and not the Canale Doria,
as had previously been supposed, was the main source of the Juba.
Thus Cecchi claimed that it would be possible to construct a fort
on the upper Juba. 2 On the other hand, Bottego's findings seem to
have been the result of chauvinistic zeal instead of being based

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2 C. to F., 19 Sept. 1896, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-7.
on scientific data. Moreover, the British never agreed that the Daua formed the boundary of their sphere of influence according to the 1891 Agreement with Italy.

Secondly, Cecchi drew attention to the fact that it was the power in occupation that had a right to land previously unexplored, as though this somehow was pertinent to the situation. The observation, however, was gratuitous seeing that both Italy and Great Britain had already limited their freedom of action by agreeing to different spheres of influence. But before the matter could be discussed further Ferrandi had been replaced. Thereafter, Italian claims that the frontier should run along the river Daua were made through diplomatic channels.

However, Italian administrators still experienced the necessity of extending their political influence to the west of the Juba, though in a less ostentatious manner than Ferrandi had proposed. For it had always been necessary for Lugh either to control both sides of the river Juba or, at the very least, to arrive at a modus vivendi with the tribes occupying the Oddo and the edge of the river Daua. Without this basic minimum, trade with the Boran was

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1 G. to F., 19 Sept. 1896, ASMAI., Posiz. 68/1-7.

2 These discussions lasted until 1904. The issue was an extremely complex one but it never had any tangible effect on the Juba area and pertains more to diplomatic history. The correspondence is in FO.1/47 and ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-7.
simply not possible. Thus, the rulers of Lugh had always been on good terms with the Garre who controlled both sides of the river Daua. The Garre virtually monopolised trade with the Boran and they are said to have recognised the nominal suzerainty of Lugh by paying annual tribute to the Sultan.\(^1\) Equally, the Marehan had been assimilated into this system and by the end of the 19th century they were themselves trading with the Jam Jam and the Garre.\(^2\) Moreover, they lived in close proximity with the Gobawein,\(^3\) even sharing villages with them such as Bentel.\(^4\) The Italians also found it necessary to establish close ties with the Garre, but at first they were more concerned with their relationship to the Digodia.

From the middle of the 19th century, Ogaden pressure along the upper Webi Shebelle had led to the gradual movement of the Digodia westwards from El Bai.\(^5\) By the end of the century the Digodia were centred in the area between the Ganale Doria and the Webi Gestro, and also along the Juba to the north of Lugh.\(^6\)

\(^1\) A. Rossi, *Nuova Antologia*, LXXXIII (1899), 438.

\(^2\) U. Ferrandi (1903), 133.

\(^3\) The Gobawein and the Gasar Gudda were the tribes that inhabited Lugh. They were traders and agriculturalists.

\(^4\) Bottego (1895), 358.

\(^5\) Gerreh District Political Record Book, PC/NFD/4/1/1.

\(^6\) Bottego (1895), 132 and Map.
The Digodia were amongst the richest pastoralists in this area, owning large herds of camels and some cattle. Initially, their arrival in the region of Lugh had involved no more than small groups. These had established good relations both with the Rahanwein and also the Gasar Gudda. However the cumulative effect of the Digodia migration must ultimately have had some disruptive impact, though the Italians argued later that it was largely through the mistakes of Ali Hassan Mur, Sultan of Lugh, that they became his bitterest enemies after 1887.

This enmity between the Digodia and the Gasar Gudda threatened to undermine the commercial position of Lugh. For Ethiopian pressure from Arussi led to a dispersal of the Yaben sections of the Digodia, and one group moved towards and intersected the important trade routes to the Boran, thus preventing trade from taking place. This group, the Her Muhammad Livin, began to move westwards about 1890. Instead of trying to force their way southwards through the Garre Marre, they moved parallel with the Dupa until they were stopped by the Boran. By 1893 they had crossed the river Dupa.

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2 U. Ferrandi (1903), 98; Bottego (1895), 391.

3 T.S. Thomas (1917), 87.
The Digodia Migration.
somewhere around Muddy Eri and were moving south towards Takkaba.\(^1\) The area to the north and around Takkaba was jointly grazed by the Boran and the Garre.\(^2\) No doubt it was easier to move through this border area threatening neither group.

South of Takkaba, the Her Muhammad Livin allied themselves with the Garen and Gelberis sections of the Ajuran, and then continued on to Yako reaching Wajir in 1904.\(^3\) The reason for this close alliance between the Ajuran and the Degodia is not known, but it seems to have afforded obvious advantages to both parties. On the one hand, the Ajuran had only recently suffered at the hands of Abdi Ibrahim who had stationed himself at Buna for a year and terrorised the surrounding country-side.\(^4\) The Ajuran must have been seriously weakened by this intrusion, while the Boran, their traditional allies, failed to offer them any effective protection. Later in 1895 an Ajuran headman at El Wak was murdered.\(^5\) The prospect of strengthening their position by assimilation was considerable and the Her Muhammad Digodia were until 1916 known

\(^1\)A. Rossi, Nuova Antologia, (1899), 438; F.G. Jennings, "Memorandum", in KLC. EM. II, p.1650.


\(^5\)Ibid.
as the Mohammad Ajuran. At the same time the Digodia gained access to the wells at Wajir as clients to the Ajuran. But by moving south fairly rapidly they only disrupted the caravan routes west from Lugh for a short time. However the Her Mohammad were only one group, and there were others that followed them.

Thus there is a tradition that a group of Digodia tried to push through the Garre Marre and managed to cross the Daua near Dolo. Here they came into contact with the Marehan and in 1892 were victorious over them, establishing themselves in the Humbale area. With the help of the Gasar Gadda and the Gobawein, however, the Marehan managed to defeat the Digodia both at Malca Re and in the Humbale driving them to the north of the Daua. This brief war is said to have taken place between 1892 and 1894 and was brought to an end by the mediation of Sherba Alio Omaro and Ali Abdi, both Garre headmen who recognised the threat posed by the Marehan and valued the Digodia as fighting men. Some apparently remained amongst the Garre as shegats, but the majority recrossed the river near Nerboi. After remaining two or three years in Oddo under the authority of a young wobur of the Digodia, this group again turned south, crossing the Daua at Ramu and pushing on to Muddo Eri, Takabba and finally Wajir, where they are said to have arrived in 1908.

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2 Ibid.
What this tradition illustrates is the very considerable amount of disruption caused by the Digodia to the west of Lugh, though this may have been unwittingly exaggerated. So far, the alleged Digodia invasion of Humbale, the defeat of the Marehan and the two years of warfare there, is still uncorroborated by any supporting evidence. Moreover, from 1893 onwards Malca Re and that stretch of the river Daua was frequently visited by explorers, but none of these mention the presence of Digodia to the south of the river, and all without exception pinpoint the Marehan in the Humbale area. It is not very likely that any major clash between the Marehan and the Digodia which also involved the Garre should have been so completely overlooked at the time. Equally, the area known as the Oddo today was also visited by most travellers to the area around Lugh, but in the last decade of the 19th century none mention the presence of Digodia in this region, though again all say that the area was controlled by the Garre Marre.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that whatever Digodia penetration into Humbale occurred, it must have been repulsed quickly.

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1 These included: Bottego, Citerini, Lord Delamere, Cavendish, Ferrandi, Rossi, Ruspoli, Vannutelli etc.

2 One complicating factor is that the term Oddo may have been used in the oral traditions to describe the area between the Ganale Doria and the Webi Gestro. It was used in this sense at times by Léon des Avanchers. Moreover, at the end of the 19th century this is precisely where the Digodia were to be found.
and thus have escaped the attention of explorers who visited
this area approximately once every six months. And, secondly,
when the Digodia did retreat, it was not just to the north of the
Daua but to the east of the Ganale Doria as well.

Yet other parts of the tradition can be substantiated.
For instance, there is evidence of a second movement westwards
by the Digodia of the Gelibileh sub-section. When precisely this
started is largely a matter for conjecture. In 1895 there were
reports of fighting between the Digodia and the Garre to the
north of the Daua, which could have been connected with a movement
towards Ramu. Some time about the turn of the century there
were also Digodia living amongst the Garre as shegats. Lastly
there were several Digodia chiefs in Takabba and Muddo Eri in
1906, and this group apparently did not arrive at Wajir until 1908.

The second group of Digodia, like the first, also became
clients of the Ajuran. But it would be a mistake to imagine that
by forming this alliance, the Ajuran severed their close ties
with the Boran. Between 1906 and 1908 there were still a considerable

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3 T.S.Thomas (1917), 87.
4 C. to G., 20 May 1907, FO.371/192.
number of Ajuran chiefs who were living amongst the Boran and the Sakuye - some of them in Ethiopian territory - who nevertheless still had their main wealth at Wajir. Initially, at least, the Ajuran-Degodia alliance did not conflict with Ajuran-Boran friendship.¹

There was little the Italians could do about these Digodia movements westwards. They could not prevent them, nor could they neutralise their disruptive impact on trade between Lugh and the Boran. The Italians were more successful, however, when it came to dealing with the Digodia to the east of Lugh, who were potentially more dangerous than those further to the west. When the Ethiopians had approached Lugh in September 1895, one group of Digodia had moved down the left side of the river since they were unable to cross the Juba as it was still swollen by rains.² Eden Muhammad, head of the Digodia, had tried to get permission from the Sultan of Lugh to cross the Juba in December, and the initial reaction of Ali Hassan Mur had been to oppose this at all costs. But when Bottego arrived at Lugh in December 1895, he quickly saw the importance of establishing good relations with the Digodia. Bottego appears to have done two things. On the one hand, he carried out a raid against the Arussi with whom the

¹Zephiro to Harrington, 15 Sept. 1906, F0.371/192.
²U. Ferrandi (1903), 316.
Digodia had several scores to settle and thus earned their gratitude. Secondly, the Digodia were not prevented from crossing the Juba, further to the south of Lugh.¹

Thus there were two main Digodia movements: one initially westwards and parallel to the Daua, the other southwards, down the river Juba, both ultimately converging on Wajir. The Digodia began crossing the Juba between Marda and Marille in small numbers from 1893 onwards.² For the rest of the century the Digodia continued to move very slowly down the Juba, frequently crossing it and harassing the Marehan. When Jenner visited Lugh in 1899 he asked Muhammad Abdullah, the Italian representative there, to restrain the Digodia. The problem, as the liwali admitted, was that he was not strong enough to prevent the Digodia from crossing the river. He advised the Marehan to come to terms with the Digodia and suggested that in the event of a raid from a common enemy – such as the Amhara – the Digodia should be allowed sanctuary in Marehan country. He then promised that when a station was opened at Bardera (and that was still three years away) the Italian Government would see that the Marehan did not lose their land, presumably by then restraining the Digodia.³

¹L. Vannutelli and C. Citerni (1899), 101, 113, 128ff.
²Bottego (1895), 475; Political Records, DC/MDA/4/4.
³J. to H., 2 April 1899, in C. to S., 20 May 1899, No. 2/196.
Italian support for the Digodia, though nominal, made it impossible for them to establish friendly relations with the Marehan, but it in no way affected their relationship with the Garre, who initially at least saw the advantage of Digodia support against their Marehan neighbours. And the Italians were not altogether unsuccessful in extending their influence over the Garre. Thus they paid Ibrahim Yero, head of the Garre Marre, a monthly stipend, and they taxed the Garre Kuran. They also paid subsidies to Gobaweiin chiefs, such as Ali Addo who lived to the west of the river Juba, and they taxed the Somali in Dolo. Yet they never managed to gain control over the Boran trade.

At first the Italians had tried to get two friendly Somali, Sheikh Muhammad and Muhammad Noor, to organise the trade with the Boran, but Ethiopian competition proved too severe. For whatever influence the Italians acquired over the Garre, it could always be more than matched by the Amhara. After the Garre Kuran had been attacked by Dejazmach Wolde Gabriel and Asfao of Arusiland, they began paying taxes to both these Ethiopian governors, as well as to Fitaurari Hapta Giojjis. The Amhara also took away with them several important Garre hostages such as the son of Chaban Alio.

1 Z. to P.C.Kismayu, 29 Aug. 1906, CO.533/27; C. to G., 20 May 1907, FO.371/192.

2 Z. to G., 14 April 1906; Z. to E., 15 April 1906; E. to G.,
the old head of the Garre Kuran. Other Garre were pressed into Ethiopian service, in particular Aba Woresa, a young and exceedingly able supporter of Ali Abdi, head of the Tuff Garre, who was employed by the Amhara to control the caravan trade with the Boran. Initially he was placed in charge of the customs and levied a 5°/o ad valorem tax. But the post was so important that Menelick appointed several followers of Nagadras Haile Giorghis to set up customs houses in Karayu and Tertale. Aba Woresa then did no more than make sure that every caravan passed through Le, where customs officials would be told of their approach.¹

The Italians failed because they were unwilling to use their troops to the west of the Juba, or to offer the Garre protection against the Ethiopians. They had force enough, but perhaps the frontier really did act as a deterrent and, while the extension of political influence westwards was considered permissible, the use of military force was not. In 1906, however, the Garre were offered protection against the Amhara not by the Italians but by the British. The appointment of a British Border Agent in 1905 added a new element to the relationship between the border tribes and the Ethiopians. Yet by then Ethiopian penetration southwards had reached alarming proportions. Thus, in May 1905, some 600 Amhara

¹Z. to C., 14 April 1906; Z. to H., 16 April 1906; C. to G., 20 May 1907, FO.371/192.
under Wolde Gabriel and accompanied by Geydu visited El Wak and Muddo Arele. Geydu was brought with the expedition, so it was rumoured, to point out the limits of his domain. It was also being said, a few months later, that the Ethiopians were forcing the Boran to carry material with which to build stations at Wajir, El Wak and Madowa (Mandera?) opposite Iugh, and that they had already marked out stations in these places. Then in January 1906 it was reported that the Ethiopians under Guide and Dima had occupied El Wak with 150 riflemen and were robbing the inhabitants and taxing the people there. During that month there were several expeditions to Wajir, Muddo and El Wak "to shoot elephants and collect tribal levies". Yet, when Sir John Harrington complained strongly to Menelick about these incursions, the Emperor maintained that they were only raids by elephant hunters who were acting without permission and against orders, but that he did not have the power to check them. Menelick in fact did not see why he should be forced to maintain order unilaterally along the frontier, and with regard to the raiders Menelick asked: "Why the Protectorate

1 S. to Dep. Comm., Mombasa, 13 July 1905, CO.533/3.
2 S. to H.-S., 4 Sept. 1905, CO.533/11.
3 L. to C., 26 April 1906, CO.533/3.
4 C. to G., 20 May 1907, FO.371/192.
authorities do not capture them?". It was a shrewd point for it drew attention to the E.A.P.'s own lack of authority in the area. Thus Zaphiro's appointment was extremely opportune.

1Sir John Harrington to Cromer, 8 May 1906, CO.533/8.
CHAPTER VIII

THE INTERVENTION OF BRITAIN ON THE BORDER

On 15 November 1905 Zaphiro left Addis Ababa for the junction of the Daua and Ganale rivers. His instructions were to patrol the border from east to west, to find suitable sites for frontier posts, and, lastly, to discover whether the Garre were of Boran or Somali origin. It was hoped that Zaphiro's presence on the frontier would act as a deterrent to Ethiopian raids which he was asked to stop, though one man with a tiny escort patrolling over five hundred miles of difficult frontier could hardly achieve much in that direction. More important, in this connection was the information that Zaphiro was supposed to gather from tribes in the British sphere concerning Ethiopian incursions. For his job consisted first and foremost of gathering intelligence which, when passed on to the legation at Addis Ababa, would support and facilitate diplomatic representations made there. This was the rationale behind his link with the legation in Addis, whence he received all his orders, though he was paid by the East Africa Protectorate.¹

It is clear that Zaphiro also received further instructions from time to time, but no copies of these have survived. Thus he

¹"Instructions for Frontier Inspector", n.d. in FO.371/2.
was asked to investigate the trade in arms along the Juba as well as to divert trade to Kismayu and away from Lugh and the Italian sphere. Zaphiro was also given to understand that he would remain exclusively in Ethiopian territory and he was only to cross into the East Africa Protectorate upon the explicit orders of Harrington. However, in 1906, because of the hostility which his appointment had aroused amongst the southern Ethiopians, which in turn influenced Menelick, Harrington had to prohibit Zaphiro from residing in Ethiopia at all and he then chose Moyale as his headquarters.

Although in appointing Zaphiro Harrington's main aim was to check Ethiopian incursions across the border, it seems clear from Zaphiro's instructions that Harrington was also particularly preoccupied with Menelick's claim that the Garre were an offshoot of the Boran, since their ethnic origin was the criteria for deciding the position of the frontier. By sending Zaphiro first to the junction of the Daua and the Ganale Doria it was obviously this question above all that he wanted to have settled as quickly as possible.

But the position of the Garre to the south of the Daua was more complicated than Harrington supposed. When Zaphiro reached

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1 Harrington to Grey, 9 July 1906, FO.371/3.
2 H. to H.ES., 20 Sept. 1906, PC/JUB/2/3/1.
3 H. to G., 16 May 1908, FO.371/394.
the upper Juba, he discovered that the Garre had been exposed
to considerable Ethiopian and Italian influence, while Muhammad
Abdille Hassan had written to Ali Abdi, head of the Tuff Garre,
saying that he might require their assistance. Yet Zaphiro
seems to have devoted most of his energy to systematically under­
mining Italian influence not just in the British sphere, but in
southern Ethiopia as well. He objected to the fact that the in­
habitants of Lugh cultivated cereals on the west side of the
river and that Somali chiefs in the British sphere were paid
by the Italian authorities. He also claimed that pressure had
been put on some Somali to move to the Italian side of the river
and further that they had been told not to obey orders from the
British Government.2

To combat Italian influence, Zaphiro sought the support of
the Garre and he quickly found an ally in Aden Chaban Alio.
Having recently returned from Addis Ababa, where he had been held
hostage, he had become head of the Garre Kuran, but his position
was not very strong and it is possible that he was not popular.
What Aden Chaban succeeded in doing, however, was to gain Zaphiro's
support for the extension of his power eastwards over the Garre
Marre and the Gobawein, claiming that for centuries they had paid

1 Zaphiro to P.C.Kismayu, 29 Aug. 1906, GO.533/26; P.Maud,
"Exploration in the southern borderland of Abyssinia", G.J.,
XXIII (1904), 570.

2 C. to G., 20 May 1907, FO.371/192.
tribute to his people but that now due to Italian influence he had no control over their chiefs, Ibrahim Yero and Ali Addo. Zaphiro supported these mythical claims and erected two customs posts at Dolo and Woralo, in Gobawein and Garre Marre country, and placed them under his control.  

The expansion of Aden Chaban's power eastwards seems to have resulted in a conflict between him and Ali Abdi over their respective spheres of influence. Zaphiro successfully mediated in this dispute and confirmed Ali Abdi as head of the Garre south of Muddo to Takabba and El Wak, while Aden Chaban was made head of the Garre on the Daua from Dolo to Muddo.

This compromise was not really to Ali Abdi's advantage, but no doubt he was in a weak bargaining position having already received support from Zaphiro against the Amhara. At the beginning of March 1906, a party of Boran visited Takabba, where Ali Abdi was staying, with an order from the Ethiopians at Arero demanding seventy sheep, thirty cows and twenty camels to be delivered within two days. At the same time Aba Woresa brought a message from Geydu ordering ten ozen, ten cows and four camels to be delivered immediately. On Zaphiro's instructions Ali Abdi did nothing, and later Zaphiro wrote a letter to the Ethiopian garrison explaining that the Garre were to the south of the Maud line, and thus in British territory. This seems
to have deterred further tax or tribute gathering expeditions. Most of Zaphiro's other steps were aimed at reducing Italian influence.

Zaphiro admitted quite openly that his motive in erecting a post at Dolo was not just because it was a suitable site for a market and fort, but also because it would prevent the Italians having any influence over tribes in the British sphere. As he observed with affected understatement, "I don't think the officer at Lugh will like it", then adding condescendingly: "I am very sorry for him".

The Italians were certainly quick to appreciate the potential harm that the post at Dolo could do their trade, but they also claimed that Zaphiro's actions were irregular as well as unsatisfactory. For not only did Zaphiro prohibit the export of all ivory to Lugh from the British sphere, but he appeared to be trying to regulate its export from Ethiopia as well. While he granted one passport to a Somali in Borana authorising him to trade with Lugh, the Italians collected a file of his chits all saying that trade between Ethiopian Borana and Lugh was prohibited. As a result, strong complaints

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2 Z. to P.C., Jubaland, 10 Dec. 1906, GO.533/28.
4 Passport, Mohamed Safari, 15 March 1907, signed by Zaphiro at Mega, ASMAI. Posiz.70/3-28; "Azione inglese nel Boran e sul Giuba" and "Azione inglese sul Giuba", 1906-7, ASMAI.Posiz.70/3-27.
were made by the officials at Lugh and on the Benadir, and these were ultimately transmitted to the British Foreign Office via the Italian Ambassador in London.

At about the same time, the Acting Commissioner for the E.A.P. had also come to the conclusion "that there are very real grounds for complaint on the part of the Italians". It gradually became clear that Zaphiro had somewhat exceeded his instructions. In the first place, he had no authority to interfere in the trade between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. Nor was he justified in charging customs duty on exports from the British sphere. Zaphiro's stand as an extreme Anglophile who wanted to "see the whole map of Africa painted red" led him to act imprudently on several other occasions, and in a way that was ultimately embarrassing to the British Government.

Zaphiro's actions were strongly supported, however, first by Harrington and then later by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. While fully admitting that Zaphiro had exceeded his instructions, Harrington counterattacked by claiming that the Italians were also to blame by paying chiefs in the British sphere in order to divert trade to Lugh, adding: "There is no doubt the Italians very much dread our taking any steps to show our authority in what

1 Jackson to Sec. of State, 17 Jan. 1907, CO.53/27.
3 G. to Count A. de Bosdari, 18 Feb. 1907, ASMAI. Posiz.70/3-28.
is our own territory along the Juba.\textsuperscript{1} In the end Read at
the Colonial Office noted Zaphiro's vindication by observing
that, while the Acting Commissioner of the E.A.P. thought Zaphiro
to be in the wrong, "the F.O. have had the advantage of a personal
conference with Sir J. Harrington and do not share this view".\textsuperscript{2}

Considering the protests that were made in London by
the Italian Ambassador, it is rather ironic that the Italians them­
selves should have indulged in much the same tactics as Zaphiro.
No doubt what the Italians resented most were the orders that
Zaphiro gave to the Garre chiefs not to allow exports to go
through Lugh. Since the trade route from Borana to Lugh passed
through Garre country this was a matter of considerable concern.
Thus, at the end of September 1906, it was reported that two Casar
Gudda merchants from Boran had been stopped by the Garre on Ali
Abdi's orders, and they were forcibly prevented from reaching Lugh.\textsuperscript{3}
Equally, it was known that Zaphiro had given the Boran orders that
they were to trade with Kismayu instead of Lugh or Bardera.\textsuperscript{4} However,
at the beginning of 1907 the Governor of the Italian Protector­
ate was himself giving instructions to Nur Elmi Ualo, head of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}H. to C., 31 Jan.1907, CO.533/35.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Read, Minute, 14 March 1907, CO.533/27.
\item \textsuperscript{3}"Report from Resident at Lugh", 18 Sept. 1906, CO.533/35.
\item \textsuperscript{4}K. to S., 29 Nov. 1906, CO.533/19.
\end{itemize}
Garre in the Italian sphere, to try and divert trade away from Kismayu to Lugh.\(^1\) There was therefore a certain amount of 
intrigue on both sides. The Anglo-Italian border had to be respected 
but Molinari, the Resident at Lugh, was nevertheless asked by the 
Governor of Somalia whether acting secretly and with prudence he 
could not counterbalance the actions of Zaphiro.\(^2\) The head of the 
Gona Boran apparently let Molinari know that he was ready to help 
the Italians.\(^3\) There is also an interesting letter in the Italian 
files written by a trader at Lugh to Sherif Osman and Sherif Hassim 
bin Nurgal seeking information as to the whereabouts of Zaphiro 
and his irregulars. The reply indicated that Zaphiro moved around 
a great deal, that the Digodia were afraid of him, and lastly that 
the people of Mereh (?) would have preferred to be under Italian 
rather than British administration.\(^4\) In these circumstances it is 
amusing that Zaphiro should have been accused of actually helping 
the Italians by a Director of the Boma Trading Company.\(^5\)

> "My own opinion of Zaphiro's methods", he wrote, 
"formed on a two months sojourn on the frontier is 
that he is deliberately driving the whole of the 
border trade into the hands of the Italians at Lugh."\(^6\)

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\(^1\) Governor to Minister, 25 Jan. 1907, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/3-28.

\(^2\) Gov. to Molinari, 10 July 1906, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/3-28.

\(^3\) Molinari to Gov., 30 Dec. 1906, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/3-28.

\(^4\) Sherif Osman and Sherif Hassim bin Sherif Nurgal to Said Hamid bin 

\(^5\) This company was formed in 1907 by a Major Ward for the purpose of 
developing trade with Ethiopia and on the border of the E.A.P.

\(^6\) Gardolphi to Hornyold, 30 June 1907, CO. 533/51.
Zaphiro's methods were certainly open to criticism, though on different grounds. He was encouraging the Somali and Boran to sell their goods at Kismayu at precisely the time that the administration there was trying to enforce an embargo on all trade.¹ There had been absolutely no coordination between Zaphiro and the administration in Jubaland. The first time that Kirkpatrick, the Provincial Commissioner of Jubaland, heard of Zaphiro was when a group of Boran unexpectedly turned up at Kismayu saying that he had sent them to trade there. In August Kirkpatrick wrote to the Governor of the E.A.P., Hayes-Sadler, asking who this man was. But even the Governor did not know. He thought it might have been an employee of the Emperor Navigation Company, a small commercial concern that was operating steamers on the Juba up to Bardera, yet he was not sure; and it was not until the middle of December that he wrote back to the Colonial Office making enquiries.² In the meantime Zaphiro had written to Kirkpatrick. "Harrington told me to report to Kismayu if Italians at Lugh attempt to exert influence in our sphere", he began, then giving a little information about the nature of his appointment.³ But Zaphiro's attempt to promote a

¹ Political Records Book, Marsabit, PC/NFD/4/1/2 or DC/MBT/7/1/2.
² K. to H.-S., 29 Nov. 1906; H.-S. to Sec. of State, 19 Dec. 1906, CO.533/19.
³ Z. to K., 29 Aug. 1906, CO.533/27.
policy diametrically opposed to the one being followed in Kismayu was not conducive to collaboration.

Zaphiro's method of running the border was also highly individualistic, even ingenious, given the limited resources at his command. In the first place, he tried to impress upon the Ethiopians the power of the British Government, in the hope that this would act as some restraint on their activities; secondly, he threatened tribes in the British sphere that unless they obeyed his orders, he would lead a large force of Ethiopians across the border against them. This stratagem was only partly effective. Zaphiro's successor on the frontier claimed that he did not prevent the Ethiopians from crossing into British territory, though his threats kept tribes on the British side quiet.¹

Zaphiro's main problem consisted in the lack of force at his command. He always had an escort, which varied in size from time to time, but it was only composed of irregular Ethiopians, who were recruited in Addis Ababa.² Surprisingly, the Ethiopians did not in the least object to this,³ though it made Zaphiro

¹W.E.H. Barrett, "Records of Moyale Station", PC/NFD/1/3/1 or DC/MIL/2/4.

²Zaphiro never had more than 40 irregulars as an escort.

unpopular with some of the border tribes and led to misunderstandings over his relationship to the Ethiopian Government. But this escort was never large enough to really overawe or intimidate recalcitrant tribes. So Zaphiro tended to threaten that he would organise and conduct Ethiopian raids if his orders were not obeyed. Thus, in December 1906, he threatened the Warta\(^1\) in the British sphere that he would call in Ethiopians from Konso unless they agreed to give the Government one tusk from every elephant that they killed and exported the other to Kismayu. The threat was apparently effective.\(^2\) The following year Zaphiro wrote to Ahmed Murgham threatening that if the road to Kismayu was closed to traders, he would come with Ethiopians to open it. In reply he received an obsequious letter.\(^3\) This policy, therefore, did seem to have some effect, but it was not based on pure bluff. For, even more surprisingly, Zaphiro had already received sanction from the legation in Addis to put this sort of threat into effect. In dealing with the troublesome Rendille, Clerk, who worked in the legation, advised Zaphiro:

You may take some Abyssinians and raid them as a punishment. If the Abyssinians know that they may loot the cattle etc. they will be ready to accompany you. It is however a question that must be left

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\(^1\) Warta were a despised group of elephant hunters.

\(^2\) Z. to P.G. Kismayu, 10 Dec. 1906, CO. 533/28.

\(^3\) Z. to H., 5 Dec. 1907, FO. 371/394.
largely to your discretion and you should bear in mind that under no circumstances are the Abyssinians to be allowed to carry off women and children.¹

Where Zaphiro seems to have been most successful was in checking the spread of Ethiopian influence over the Garre. His presence on the frontier effectively brought to an end the semi-official expeditions south-eastwards that were intended to push the Ethiopian sphere of influence as far as Wajir and El Wak. But he was far less successful in handling two rather different sets of problems that occurred particularly along the centre and western end of the boundary.

In the first place, there was the whole question of how to handle those nomadic tribes that were to be found on both sides of the frontier. Decisions had to be taken concerning their freedom of movement and how their migrations from one country to another could be supervised, encouraged, or prevented. Access to wells and to grazing had to be discussed, and it was necessary to formulate some policy concerning their taxation, and in particular how double taxation could be avoided. Yet these were issues that Zaphiro was particularly ill-equipped to understand, since he maintained that the boundary was essentially an ethnic one which a priori ruled out the possibility of this type of problem; and consequently

¹Z. to H., 5 Dec. 1907, FO.371/394.
Zaphiro tended to avoid these questions. Nevertheless, it was one that had to be faced by his successors and above all it concerned the Boran.

Zaphiro's view was that the Maud line indicated exactly where Boran country ended. He assumed that the Boran had not begun to move further south until they had been conquered by the Ethiopians, after which he considered they had become agents of the Amhara conniving at still further Ethiopian expansion. So, although on one occasion Zaphiro admitted that the Boran moved south during the rainy season and north during the dry period, he was unable to dissociate in his mind this purely ecological grazing movement from preconceived ideas of Ethiopian imperialism, and when he did find the Boran to the south of the boundary, he always suspected that there was an underlying political motive and that their search for grazing was simply a convenient cloak for other objectives. At the same time, Zaphiro evidently hoped that Borana could be secured for the British through negotiation, and this probably also coloured his views. "Efforts ought to be made", he wrote to Harrington, "to secure the Borana country. It is a rich country and the natives are shamefully ill-treated by the

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1 Z. to H., 30 May 1906, FO.371/192.

2 Z. to H., 14 April and 20 May 1906, FO.371/192.
Abyssinians.  

The most that Zaphiro would admit to was that the boundary ran slap through the middle of the Gabra Algan, who grazed between the Tertale hills and Gebel Burolli. And Zaphiro admitted this because most of their permanent wells were situated on the Ethiopian side of the frontier and access to them was imperative. Indeed, without seasonal access to wells north of the frontier, their grazing to the south would not have been viable. The same was also alleged to be true of the wells at Gaddaduma which although in Ethiopia were said to be primarily used by the Garre on the British side of the line. But, rather typically, Zaphiro took no initiative in these matters.

The second problem consisted of stopping incursions across the border. When Zaphiro first arrived on the frontier, the novelty of his presence had a considerable impact of its own. Then the boldness of his conduct, his willingness to command and to bluff was temporarily effective. When Zaphiro had first arrived in Tertale, at the beginning of 1906, he had heard that there were several Ethiopian raiding parties to the south of the line. After hurrying to Gorai

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1 Z. to H., 15 Sept. 1906, FO.371/192.
2 H. to G., 19 Nov. 1907, FO.371/192.
3 G. to H., 27 Jan. 1909, CO.533/66. This is also discussed further in the following Chapter.
he succeeded in turning back three hunting expeditions.\textsuperscript{1} Speed was important, but when Zaphiro's real weakness was better appreciated raiders paid less and less heed to his demands.\textsuperscript{2} The border was long enough for it to be easy to elude him and his escort. Moreover, hunting expeditions took place during the rainy season when water was plentiful, when raiders were not tied down to permanent wells, but possessed a maximum amount of manoeuvrability.

Zaphiro had rather less success trying to control ivory hunters in 1907\textsuperscript{3} than the previous year, but his complete failure did not become apparent until 1908, when Zaphiro complained that there had been a change in Ethiopia's policy towards the border. It was alleged that Menelick, then seriously ill and seemingly on the point of death, had given ivory hunters permission to cross into the British sphere to shoot elephants. By the end of the year, Zaphiro reported that there were over one thousand Tigreans south of the frontier. Perhaps even more serious, they were quite clearly not all hunters in the strict sense of the term, for many were also soldiers employed by Ras Mangasha, Ras Zibhat and Agos Tafari.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1}C. to G., 20 May 1902, FO.371/192.
\textsuperscript{2}See: Lord Hindlip, British East Africa, Past, Present and to come (London, 1905), 50.
\textsuperscript{3}H. to G., 11 Nov. 1907, FO.371/192.
This was obviously an important development, though it may be doubted whether Menelick ever sanctioned these expeditions. What really mattered was that growing lawlessness on the frontier now went hand in hand with a breakdown in the structure of authority. Due to Menelick's illness, commands given at the centre of government were apt to be ignored in outlying provinces, and this meant that Anglo-Ethiopian cooperation in Addis Ababa produced scant results on the southern frontier.

This was particularly disappointing because it vitiated the whole purpose of Zaphiro's appointment. Once the chain of command from Addis to the frontier was broken, Zaphiro's contacts with the legation at Addis ceased to bring any dividends; and in the previous two years it had yielded a few results, small though these may have been. Thus, towards the end of 1906, Clerk had written to Zaphiro enclosing a letter from Fitaurari Hapta Giorgis to Fitaurari Woldi, indicating the provisional frontier with a list of place-names and with instructions that hunting parties should not be allowed to go south of the line, and that tribute was not to be collected in the British sphere.¹ Zaphiro, however, did not make use of this letter because he claimed that most of the place-names in it were well to the south of the frontier. But in April 1907 another letter was sent with similar instructions.

¹ C. to Z., 12 Dec. 1906, FO.371/192.
only this time defining the border more satisfactorily.¹

Yet the large-scale incursions of 1908 and 1909, when Zaphiro was writing of 2,000 Tigrean hunters in the British sphere, could not be off-set by any amount of cooperation at the top.² Although in 1909 Fitaurari Hapta Giorghis ordered Boran chiefs to build houses just to the north of the border and stationed one hundred soliders there to intercept raiders, his authority on the frontier was too weak for his orders to be obeyed.³

Zaphiro's failure to prevent Tigrean hunters from crossing the frontier, coupled with the obvious defects of diplomatic representations at Addis, naturally led to increased discussion both about Zaphiro's appointment, as well as other schemes for protecting the frontier. Harrington had always envisaged the appointment of Zaphiro as a purely temporary expedient, and that is why it was limited to only one year. Moreover, at the time of his appointment, Harrington promised Lansdowne, the Colonial Secretary, that as soon as he obtained additional information, and when the boundary question was definitely settled, he would:

submit a scheme for the protection of the boundary from the Abyssinian side with a view to enabling your Lordship to decide as to whether the boundary

¹ C. to G., 20 May 1907, FO.371/192.
³ H. to G., 11 June 1909, FO.371/595.
can be more efficiently and economically controlled from Addis Ababa than by the British East Africa authorities.\(^1\)

However, at the end of 1906 no scheme had been produced and the Colonial Office had not yet been forwarded any of Zaphiro's reports. Harrington found it absolutely essential to keep Zaphiro on at his inspection work, and his appointment was therefore extended for a further year.\(^2\)

This, however, was not so satisfactory. For a bitter campaign was mounted against Zaphiro in Ethiopia, and it became so virulent that Harrington decided to recall him from the frontier and to replace him with an Ethiopian caravan leader called Adga.\(^3\) But as lawlessness on the frontier increased it was thought wiser to leave Zaphiro there after all.\(^4\) Then at the beginning of July, when Harrington was on his way to England, Menelick successively complained about Zaphiro and requested his recall.\(^5\) It was rapidly becoming urgent to start planning on the assumption that Zaphiro would not long continue at his post.

Yet when Harrington reached England at the end of July he minuted that Zaphiro was far too valuable to be dispensed with, and that no action was necessary.\(^6\) This apparent complacency was

\(^1\) H. to L., 30 Nov. 1905, F0.371/2.

\(^2\) H. to G., 10 Dec. 1906, F0.371/3.

\(^3\) H. to Maxwell, 21 April 1907; C. to G., 15 May 1907, F0.371/192. The appointment of Adga was described by John Boyes as "setting the cat to watch the cream", The Company of Adventurers (London, 1928), 291.

\(^4\) H. to G., 2 June 1907, F0.371/192.

\(^5\) Hohler to G., 2 July and 4 July 1907, F0.371/192.
due to a scheme that the Colonial Office had already drawn up for entrusting control of the frontier to British officers, and which had been jointly approved by the Colonial and Foreign Office. At the beginning of 1907, Sir Charles Eliot's earlier proposals of 1903 for defending the northern frontier had been resurrected, almost certainly by Harrington himself. These plans were based on the assumption that Mt. Marsabit would be occupied by about 20 police under one officer, and that from this advanced base two other officers backed by 100 troops would patrol the border. These proposals were also favoured by Hohler in Addis, though at the Foreign Office it was coolly observed that Eliot's proposals had earlier been open to objection.¹

However, whether by accident or design, Read at the Colonial Office also seems to have been thinking along the same lines, and after reading a summary of Zaphiro's Reports in July, he supported the idea of some sort of frontier control along lines similar to Eliot's proposals, and suggested that Lord Elgin, then Colonial Secretary, should discuss the matter with Harrington and other members of the Foreign Office. By the end of the month it had been

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¹H. to G., 2 June 1907, FO.371/192.
agreed between Read and Harrington that there should be two
or three officers on the frontier and that Zaphiro should be
under one of them.¹

A copy of these proposals was also sent to Hayes Sadler,
who agreed to them, while suggesting that Ainsworth² should
be appointed to Marsabit. But at the Colonial Office it was felt
that it would be a pity to take Ainsworth away from his important
work "in the civilised part of the Protectorate". Read also made
the important point that the frontier officers would be under
Harrington's control: "as he will be at headquarters in Abyssinia
and in a position to induce Menelick to recall raiding parties
of Abyssinians".³ In fact, the question of control was crucial
for ultimately it was to determine who should pay, though at
the time this was not fully appreciated and the scheme had already
been costed at £4,000 by Hayes Sadler.⁴

Thus, when Zaphiro submitted his own plan in December for
stations at Dolo, Moyale and lake Rudolf, each occupied by 100
soldiers, there were already signs of growing opposition to this
type of scheme.⁵ The most serious and persistent obstacle was

¹C.O. to F.O., 23 July 1907, FO.371/192; Read, Minutes, 12 July
and 26 Aug. 1907 on Zaphiro's Reports, CO.533/35.

²J.D.Ainsworth had joined the staff of the I.B.E.A.Co. in 1889, in
1906 he was Sub-Commissioner Naivasha Province and im·1907 Sub-
Commissioner Nyanza Province.

³Read, Minute, n.d. on S. to E., 18 Sept. 1907, CO.533/31.

⁴S. to E., 18 Sept. 1907, CO.533/31.

⁵Z. to H., 5 Dec. 1907, FO.371/394.
certainly financial. For when Lord Elgin's proposals were sent to the Treasury, the latter demanded more information at the end of December before giving an opinion, and added the warning that it was not thought desirable to increase expenditure. Then towards the end of January, the Treasury demanded still further information, this time observing that if expenses were charged it would surely be to the Diplomatic and Consular vote. At the beginning of April the Foreign and Colonial Offices agreed to approach the Treasury for funds to increase the size of Zaphiro's patrol. The previous month Harrington had been making anxious enquiries as to whether any decision had been taken about protecting the frontier, where he claimed the situation was becoming daily more difficult. By the end of April, however, the Treasury also turned down this last request, and the Colonial Office's resolution to appeal to the Treasury again only led to a second rebuff in May. The Treasury, in fact, did not want to spend any

1 Treasury to C.O., 23 Dec. 1907, CO. 533/56.
2 Treasury to C.O., 21 Jan. 1908, CO. 533/51.
3 F.O. to C.O., 2 April 1908, CO. 533/50.
4 H. to G., 27 March 1908, FO. 371/394.
5 Treasury to C.O., 27 April 1908, CO. 533/51; Treasury to F.O., 22 May 1908, FO. 371/394.
money on the frontier until it was delimited and that was not expected to be completed before 1909.1

The second obstacle was that Churchill, then Under Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, had brought back several schemes of retrenchment from his 1907 East African tour, one of which involved the abandonment of any attempt to exercise control along the E.A.P.-Ethiopian frontier.2 When Churchill was in Nairobi he had been approached by Capt. Riddell, a Director of the Boma Trading Company, who sought an interview in order to get permission to trade on the border. Shortly afterwards, Churchill, Hobley3 and Hayes Sadler, arranged a meeting with three directors of the Company and being suitably impressed gave them permission to trade along the frontier. Churchill was influenced by the directors' arguments that they did not want soldiers and officials on the frontier, as this would disturb the tribes there. One director argued that any administration of the northern frontier would be disastrous for the success of the Company which wanted peace, and claimed with obvious exaggeration that administration could only lead to conflict.4 Although Churchill was astute enough to realise

1G. to H., 20 Sept. 1908, FO.371/394.
2Clerk, Minute, 7 March 1908, FO.371/394.
3He was then the Sub-Commissioner for Ukamba Province.
that these arguments were far from disinterested, he nevertheless maintained that they did represent the facts.

Churchill's view was that the activities of the Boma Trading Company had an important bearing on any plans that might be drawn up to control the frontier. This was indisputable, the more so since the Company had plans for erecting what it called fortified trading-posts along the border itself, and at the end of December it was trying to get permission to trade through Ethiopia. But Churchill went a step further by suggesting that the Company's presence on the frontier made any further control unnecessary and he strongly argued not just for retrenchment, but the actual abandonment of what he termed the worthless deserts of northern Kenya:

I therefore see no necessity to police the frontier at present... I think it much better for the Government to abstain from any extension beyond the Guaso Nyiro river and to make that their final frontier in this part.

When Churchill spoke to Asquith at the Treasury early in January 1908 about the southern Ethiopian border and the Boma Trading Company, it was obvious that Elgin's scheme had been sabotaged by his assistant.

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1 Ward to Sec. of State, 22 Dec. 1907, FO.371/193.
3 Churchill, Minute, 28 Jan. 1908, CO.533/51. But see G.H. Mungam (1956) who argues that because Churchill supported the Boma Trading Company he indirectly contributed to opening up the border area. p.190.
But once it had become clear that the Colonial Office would not get any money from the Treasury for its scheme, Lord Elgin shrewdly tried to get the Foreign Office to shoulder the burden. This was an easier task by a Foreign Office proposal that frontier officers should police the border on Ethiopian soil, thus making them all the more dependent on the legation at Addis.\footnote{C. to Read., 1 Feb. 1908, CO.533/51.} And Lord Elgin told the F.O. that in no circumstances could frontier inspectors be under the control of the E.A.P., for if the frontier tribes became dependent on them the Protectorate would then be led to assume effective administration over the area—"a result which is not at all desired". Indeed, Elgin made it absolutely clear that his scheme was no longer to be connected in any way with a forward administrative policy, which he wanted to avoid in the immediate future also, because of the problem of communications and the great distance between Nairobi and the border area. He stressed three priorities on the frontier: first, to protect the tribes in the British Protectorate; secondly, to divert trade to Kismayu and Nairobi and, thirdly, to have two or three reliable officers on the border capable of collecting intelligence. Elgin argued that all these tasks could be performed quite adequately by officers controlled from Addis Ababa. But Elgin's \textit{coup de grâce} was his casual
reference to the Treasury's suggestion that the Foreign Office should pay for all this.¹

Harrington had no objection to the frontier inspectors being under the control of the Legation at Addis and suggested that two inspectors and one hundred men would probably be sufficient to check further incursions. Yet it was highly unlikely that Menellick would allow them to reside in Ethiopia, while there was no chance of the Foreign Office being willing to pay for what it considered to be an essentially Colonial Office responsibility.²

By the end of the year the Foreign Office was gently prodding the C.O. by enquiring what steps they would take to check incursions and mentioning the general lawlessness on the frontier.³ But Elgin had ruled out any administrative advance towards the border, and so for the time being there was nothing to be done.⁴ The impasse over the question of finance could not be circumvented, yet once again pressures were building up for some action, this time from a new source.

¹C.O. to F.O., 2 March 1908, F0.371/394; Read, Minute, 22 Feb. 1908, CO.533/51.
²H. to G., 16 May 1908, F0.371/394.
³F.0. to C.O., 18 Dec. 1908, CO.533/50.
⁴Read, Minute, n.d. in CO.533/47; C.O. to F.O., 6 Jan. 1909 and Clerk, Minute, 12 Jan. 1909, F0.371/595.
Towards the end of 1908, Major Gwynn who was delimiting the frontier sent back some strong, lucid dispatches. He described the unsettled state of affairs on the frontier in great detail. He warned that if permanent occupation of the frontier was delayed, a very serious situation would arise, not because of the threat of Ethiopian raids, but because of the growing number of rifles coming into the country. This recognition that the gradual arming of the Somali was the chief danger on the border was not new, for Zaphiro had already mentioned it, but attention had never been drawn to this problem quite so forcibly. There was so much inter-tribal fighting in fact that Gwynn was forced to tell the Somali that administration was coming soon, so as to get them to accept the fragile authority of Zaphiro. Gwynn naturally wrote back saying that he also hoped for a permanent force on the frontier by the end of 1909.

Gwynn was especially scathing in his remarks about the Boma Trading Company which had received permission to trade on

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1 The delimitation of the frontier and the diplomatic background to this is discussed later in this chapter.

2 G. to C., 11 Dec. 1908, CO.533/54.

3 G. to C., 28 Dec. 1908, CO.533/54.

4 G. to C.O., 30 Dec. 1908, CO.533/54.
the Ethiopian border in the middle of 1908. By November it had opened what one director called "two thoroughly equipped" stations at Moyale and Dolo. But Gwynn wrote that their post at Dolo did little good and that it was insecure, yet he could not recommend its withdrawal because of the bad effect this would have on the local tribes. It was clear that the Somali did not understand the position of the Company's officers, but tended to look on them and to appeal to them as though they were Government officials. They also got on very badly with Zaphiro, and Gwynn thought it was most unfortunate that the Company had ever been allowed to trade in the area, though now the only solution was some form of permanent occupation. As one official noted at the Colonial Office: "Major Gwynn seems to think that there is danger of the Boma Trading Company landing us in trouble if we leave the country to them".

Gwynn wanted frontier inspectors to be appointed at once so that there was no gap in the protection of the frontier. However,

1 H. to G., 9 May 1908, CO.533/50; Further Notes on Marsabit District, DC/MET/7/1/2.
2 Riddell to Sadler, 17 Nov. 1908, CO.533/47. Also: Ward to Sir Francis Hopwood, 23 Nov. 1908, CO.533/56.
3 G. to C., 12 Dec. 1908, CO.533/54; Zaphiro, Report, 10 Aug. 1907, DC/MLE/21(A).
4 Col. Seely, Minute, 12 Sept. 1909, CO.533/59.
5 Ellis, Minute, n.d. CO.533/54.
these proposals needed money and the problem still remained as to where to find it. ¹ But in January 1909, Hayes Sadler, who was not yet aware of Gwynn's proposal, suddenly recommended establishing a post at Marsabit at an early date, to counteract the serious Ethiopian incursions along Lake Rudolf. Sadler had become convinced like Zaphiro that Ethiopia was adopting a more aggressive policy towards the E.A.P. He also observed that the position of the Boma Trading Company was a further argument in favour of strengthening the Protectorate's position.² Three weeks later Sadler was requesting permission to proceed at once with the formation of a station at Marsabit.³

Although under Elgin it had been decided not to set up a post at Marsabit because this would have involved an extension of administration, under the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Crewe, the Colonial Office was cautiously reverting to the idea of a gradual extension of administration along the northern frontier, though one precondition was a consultation with W.S. Clark at the Foreign Office, who had first-hand knowledge of the area.⁴

¹Read, Minute, 4 March 1909, CO.533/54.
²Sadler to Sec. of State, 12 Jan. 1909, CO.533/57.
³S. to Sec. of State, 2 Feb. 1909, CO.533/57.
⁴Read, Minute, n.d. on S. to Sec. of State, 12 Jan. & 2 Feb. 1909, CO.533/57.
Harrington supported Sadler's plan as well as Gwynn's recommendations, but this new evidence that the Colonial Office was once more thinking of a forward policy only drew a cautious reflection at the Foreign Office: "they must not be encouraged to think that we shall pay". It was a reflection moreover that was not entirely out of place; for the Treasury had only sanctioned the retention of Zaphiro's services three months after his contract had expired; money was clearly still a problem.

What was needed to get Treasury backing at this moment was detailed plans from Sadler for administering the frontier. In April 1909, however, Sadler was offered the post of Governor of the Windward Islands and he left the Protectorate for good. Until Girouard the new Governor, arrived in September, the affairs of the Protectorate were left in the hands of Jackson, and during this period of hiatus no important decisions were taken about the Northern Frontier.

In September 1909 Zaphiro was recalled. He had served for four years on the frontier without leave, and was now ill and exhausted. At relatively short notice Jackson, the Acting Governor

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1 Langley, Minute, 25 March 1909, FO.371/595.
3 G. H. Mungeam (1966), 205.
4 H. to G., 11 June 1909, FO.371/595;
of the E.A.P., agreed to send Barrett to perform Zaphiro's duties during his absence.\(^1\) Barrett arrived at Moyale on October 23rd not only without instructions - except that he was to relieve Zaphiro - but even uncertain from whom he was to receive orders.\(^2\) The situation on the frontier was also particularly difficult at this time. Just before Zaphiro left, Wolde Gabriel had called an assembly of all the Boran chiefs and told them that the British had no right to the Golbo lowlands, except for the Garre districts. Zaphiro, likewise, called a meeting of all the Golbo tribes which seems to have been devoted to accusing the Ethiopians of aggression. This situation was exacerbated by Zaphiro's withdrawal, for it further encouraged the local Ethiopian officials to press for a more favourable frontier.\(^3\)

Moreover, Barrett arrived at Moyale with a totally inadequate escort. Zaphiro had used Ethiopian irregulars and it had been planned that on reaching Addis Abeba would recruit more and send them to Barrett. But Barrett quickly came to the conclusion that he would not employ Ethiopian irregulars, and his suggestion that a frontier force should be formed from the King's African Rifles,

\(^1\) C. to J., 11 Aug. 1909; J. to C., 23 Aug. 1909, FO.371/595.
\(^2\) H. to G., 18 Nov. 1909, FO.371/595.
\(^3\) H. to G., 23 Oct. 1909, FO.371/595.
though sensible enough, could not be put into practice straight away.¹

These developments were viewed with some anxiety at Addis, where it was felt that Zaphiro's irregulars ought to have been kept on. In the first place, the Ethiopians were uneasy over the placing of regular troops on the frontier, and it gave them the impression that the Protectorate was going to adopt an aggressive policy.² But, secondly, Thesiger, the new resident, was convinced that the Ethiopians would not allow Barrett to patrol wells to the west of Moyale in Ethiopian territory with regulars. This would have made it impossible for Barrett to ensure that tribes on the British side had adequate access to wells they traditionally used in the Ethiopian sphere.³ However, by this time new proposals had been made for securing the frontier more thoroughly.

With quite remarkable speed, in fact less than two months after his arrival in Nairobi, Girouard began to unfold sweeping plans for the administration of the northern frontier. In November

¹Cpt. Barrett's Reports, DC/NLE/2/4; G. to C., 15 Nov. 1909, CO.533/63. However, within a month of arriving in East Africa Girouard sent Cpt. Aylmer with a detachment of troops to support Barrett, but even a detachment was much too small.

²T. to G., 10 Jan. 1910, FO.371/821.

³T. to G., 10 Jan. 1910, FO.371/821.
he telegraphed Crewe to say:

I consider the time has now come to supercede Zaphiro and substitute control by officers of this Protectorate on the Abyssinian boundary. I regard this as essential both for administrative reasons and owing to the growing importance of trade in horses and cattle. I suggest that the frontier district should be formed with stations at Meru, Marsabit and Fort Harrington [Moyale].

He argued that it was clear from Gwynn's correspondence that the time had arrived to take the frontier administration firmly in hand. He proposed that the frontier district should be a separate entity, and that its senior officer should report direct to the secretariat. "The policy", he wrote in a dispatch, "would be to work through chiefs and tribes along the boundary, strengthening and protecting those who are friendly."

But soon Girouard was proposing two additional frontier posts to Moyale, one at Dolo and the other in the vicinity of lake Rudolf. Between these posts he envisaged patrols on pretty well continuous inspection. The cost of the three stations was estimated at £3,000, though it was far from certain that all three would be established at the same time. The Colonial Office approved the scheme and the

15 Nov. 1909, CO 533/63.

G. to C., 22 Nov. 1909, CO 533/63.

Treasury agreed to £3,000 being added to the 1910-11 estimates.¹

By April, Girouard had appointed Hope as the first Officer in Charge on the newly constituted Northern Frontier District, and the latter set off at once on an inspection tour of Moyale and Marsabit. ² Girouard had already accepted Barrett's recommendation that:

the administration should be as simple as possible and for the first few years at least need mean little more than the prevention and settlement of tribal quarrels.³

The speed at which effective administration was to be introduced was still a matter for argument, but the first problem was to decide which frontier Hope was to patrol.

Girouard's plans had all hinged on the adoption of the revised frontier, which had been suggested by Gwynn and supported by the Government.⁴ He maintained that if Gwynn's line was not accepted by the Ethiopians, then he would not attempt any sort of administration north of Marsabit. Moyale would have to be abandoned, Barrett would have to be recalled, and he would have to revert to Zaphiro, and his antiquated methods. "This would in my

¹ Treasury to G.O., 5 March 1910, CO.533/81.
² G. to O.C. of N.F.D., n.d. encl. in G. to G., 8 April 1910, CO.533/72.
⁴ Gwynn delimited the frontier in 1908 and suggested modifications to Maud's line. Thus there were two proposed border lines, Maud's known as the Red line, and Gwynn's known as the blue line. Ethiopia accepted neither.
opinion", he concluded, "involve a disastrous loss of prestige and would perpetuate the existence of an Alsatia on our northern frontiers which cannot fail to be a continual source of trouble and annoyance in the future".¹ No doubt there was a certain amount of bluff here. The implied threat of retrenchment, the reference to a loss of face were probably designed to exert maximum pressure to secure backing for Gwynn's proposals. At any rate the Colonial Office did not wait for the outcome of these Anglo-Ethiopian negotiations before informing the Foreign Office at the beginning of January 1910 that they had now made arrangements for the administration of the frontier, and that in future officers were to receive their instructions from Nairobi and not from Adis Ababa.² Moreover, when Gwynn's line was not accepted by the Ethiopian Government, Girouard did not alter his arrangements to administer the Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.) or indeed change his plans in any way.

Nevertheless, the problem of the frontier was a serious one. When Hope arrived at Moyale in October 1910, he discovered that the Government post there, and his headquarters, were almost certainly in Ethiopian territory even according to Maud's line. As Hope put

¹G. to C., 5 Jan.1909, CO.533/71.
it, things were going to be awkward. Administration of the frontier was being undertaken while the border itself was still in dispute and this was largely the result of the 1907 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty.

In 1907 it had seemed that there would be a diplomatic break through after nine years of fruitless negotiation over the E.A.P. Ethiopian border. For Menelick agreed to sign a Treaty with Great Britain virtually accepting Maud's line as a frontier with the E.A.P. There were the usual last minute hitches: approval to sign came too late for by then Menelick seemed to have changed his mind, while all copies of the proposed Treaty were lost by the Legation in Addis as well as by the Ethiopian Government. Nevertheless an Agreement was signed in December, though one of its clauses stipulated that the border should be delimited by a joint Anglo-Ethiopian Boundary Commission. The Commission, moreover, had power to make such modifications in the frontier line as geographical or other conditions necessitated. However, the 1907 Agreement was to be binding pending delimitation.

By March 1908, three months after the Agreement had been signed, Harrington began to feel that there was a certain urgency in getting

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1 H. to G., 10 Oct. 1910, CO.533/83.
2 G. to C., 21 Jan. 1907; G. to G., 11 and 12 April 1907, FO.371/190.
3 G. to G., 11 April 1907, FO.371/395; H. to G., 1 Jan. 1908, FO.371/395.
the Commissioners appointed. Menelick requested either Delmé Radcliffe or Gwynn be appointed British Commissioner and this information was passed on to Lord Elgin. The Colonial Office was opposed to the appointment of Delmé Radcliffe, whom they considered to be an intriguer, so Gwynn was chosen.¹ He left England in May at the head of a small team composed of Cpt. Waller, the Assistant Commissioner, Cpt. Gordon, the Transport Officer, Dr. Drake Brockman, the Medical Officer, and two assistant surveyors.² Yet when they arrived in Addis Ababa, Menelick had still not appointed an Ethiopian Commissioner, and there seemed little likelihood that he would. At the time Menelick was seriously ill, and no one could be found who would act on their own initiative, and take responsibility for the decisions that needed to be made.³

At the beginning of November, the Foreign Secretary decided that Gwynn should wait no longer, but should begin delimiting the frontier even though an Ethiopian Commissioner had still not been appointed.⁴ After Gwynn had left, Hervey, from the British

¹H. to G., 27 March and 17 April 1908; F.O. to C.O., 2 April 1908; C.O. to F.O., April 1908, FO.371/395.
²C.W.Gwynn, G.J. (1911), 114.
⁴G. to H., 16 Oct. 1908, FO.371/395.
Legation in Addis, managed to obtain a personal interview with Menelick. Apparently the Emperor had already ordered Dejazmach Balcha and Fitaurari Hapta Giorgis to send reliable men to help Gwynn, but that was all. So Hervey told Menelick that though only one Commissioner had been appointed the boundary would still be officially recognised; and Menelick agreed.¹

This amount of the meeting was a particularly important one, for later much misunderstanding seems to have stemmed from the conversation. Presumably Hervey was referring here to the boundary that Gwynn was in the process of delimiting, inclusive of any modifications he might recommend. But there is a certain amount of ambiguity in the wording of the letter, or at the very least considerable vagueness, and it is far from clear whether Menelick was agreeing to abide by the 1907 Agreement (which made no provision for a unilateral delimitation of the frontier) or offering a carte blanche to Gwynn. From Hervey's account, the Foreign Office later concluded that Menelick had given a firm undertaking to support and recognise any alterations to the boundary that Gwynn might make which were compatible with the terms of the Treaty.

Moreover, when Gwynn wrote back from Moyale in January 1909, it became clear that he was going to recommend quite considerable

¹H. to G., 5 Dec. 1908, FO.533/66 or FO.371/395.
and important modifications to the frontier. In the first place, Gwynn modified the boundary around Kuffole, giving to Britain a small but valuable area that included the important wells of Gaddaduma. Minor deflections were also made to the north-west of Roka, where further wells were given to Britain. Then Gwynn discovered that Moyale had been placed incorrectly on Maud's map with the result that Zaphiro's post was in Ethiopian territory. So once more Gwynn re-routed the boundary to Britain's advantage. In return he gave the unimportant and seasonal wells at Callago to the Ethiopians.

It was not very hard to see which country was getting all the advantages in these recommended boundary alterations, and Gwynn did write at one point that the Emperor would not be pleased. Nevertheless he defended his recommendations on two grounds. First, he claimed that: "a literal acceptance of the treaty line would have given us a frontier line absolutely impossible to patrol or watch". Secondly, he claimed that Maud had been misinformed both about the habitat and the inhabitants of the Golbo. For the wells at Gaddaduma were not at the foot of the escarpment but at the edge of the highlands, and according to Maud's reasoning they should have been used by the highland tribes which meant the Boran. But Gwynn claimed that the wells were primarily used by the lowland tribes and that generally they far outnumbered the Boran there.¹

¹G. to H.; 27 Jan.1909, CO.533/66.
However, Gwynn's observations suffered from one major defect. The failure of the rains in 1908 and an outbreak of rinderpest amongst the Boran led to abnormal population movements, which made it extremely difficult for Gwynn to learn what the usual clan concentrations would have been.\(^1\) And it seems more than probable that the large concentration of Garre at Gaddaduma in 1909 was far from usual.\(^2\)

Hervey had been careful to point out to Lord Grey that Gwynn's line differed markedly from the 1907 Agreement. The Foreign Office, however, supported Gwynn's line with the observation that it was "almost identical" with the one accepted locally by the Aphiara when Zaphiro had been on the frontier. Someone was clearly misinformed.\(^3\)

The problem remained, therefore, of how to present Gwynn's proposals to the Ethiopian Government. The main justification for altering the frontier was that it was unworkable in practice. The fallacy of this argument, indeed its basic dishonesty, lay in the conclusion that the only remedy consisted in the actual transfer of sovereignty over land and wells. Of course this remedy

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\(^1\) General Report by Major Gwynn respecting the Anglo-Abyssinian Boundary Commission 1908/9, 3 Nov. 1909, CO.533/69.

\(^2\) G. to C., 27 Jan.1909, FO.371/596.

\(^3\) F.O. to C.O., 1 April 1909, CO.533/66.
suited the British, they were bound to gain the most from it, but it was not in the interests of Ethiopia and it was not the only solution. It would have been quite possible to site British frontier posts within Ethiopian territory. This would not have been so convenient for Britain but it would have been a more equitable solution.¹

Meanwhile Menelick decided to send his own border commission to the south. It indicated that the Ethiopians were suspicious of Gwynn and this made it very unlikely that they would accept his proposals. At first the Foreign Office felt that it would be best to play a waiting game, but Zaphiro soon came up with the suggestion that the implications of Gwynn’s line should be hidden by an indefinite verbal description. This plan was strongly resisted by Gwynn, however, who maintained that it was out of the question to ‘doctor’ or suppress new maps of the frontier.²

Yet the Ethiopians refused to accept Gwynn’s line and its forcible occupation was ruled out for a number of reasons. On the one hand, it would have antagonised Menelick at a time when it was hoped to open trade routes from Addis to Gambala and the Sudan. Then Menelick was still very ill and it was not thought wise to antagonise the Shoan faction in case of his death. Lastly, there was

¹This solution was suggested at the FO, but quickly dismissed, see: Clark, Minute, 23 March 1909, FO.371/596.

possibility that Germany would have offered Ethiopia strong diplomatic support.¹ So Britain tried to find a diplomatic solution to the problem.

But diplomacy achieved nothing. The Ethiopian demanded a new Joint Commission and refused to accept Gwynn's unilateral suggestions. It was also denied that Menelick had ever agreed that a single Commission should be conclusive.² It soon became apparent to Harcourt, the new Colonial Secretary, that there was little to be hoped for from the discussions at Addis. He therefore sent instructions that the frontier officials of the N.F.D. should be instructed to occupy Maud's line at once, to hold on to Moyale, and finally to inform Addis in the event of occupying Gwynn's line. Thus, one year after the frontier had begun to be officially administered, border officials were given their first definite instructions as to precisely what frontier they were to defend and occupy; it was about time.³

This compromise, however, was not really much of a solution. Officially it was Maud's line that had been accepted, but the British were not prepared to give up Moyale and they continued to occupy it without reference to any Agreement. They refrained

¹Macleay, Minute, 31 Dec.1910, F0.371/821; Thesiger, Minute, 21 Jan.1910, F0.371/822.
²T. to G., 21 Jan.1910, F0.371/822.
³H. to G., 21 Feb.1911, F0.371/1042.
from seizing any wells in the Ethiopian sphere, but they maintained their right to do so if raids continued. So the frontier was to remain a problem, and a source both of tension and of conflict. It was unfortunate that the advent of border administration could do nothing to solve the frontier quarrel, any more than diplomatic discussions had done before. On the contrary, the extension of administration if anything increased the acerbity of the dispute. Only now the stakes were higher, the conflict more dangerous. Border incidents did not diminish but escalated dangerously, and in the end Gwynn's line was forcibly occupied, leaving a legacy of distrust and discontent.
Chapter IX

THE BORDER PROBLEM: THE BORAN, GABRA AND GARGE

The E.A.P./Ethiopian border problem involved other issues apart from the dispute over the frontier to be adopted. For with the creation of the Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.) in 1910, the Protectorate Government became increasingly involved in the problem of its own border peoples. In 1910, however, there was still a considerable degree of detachment, and it was not even clear if the official policy of "observation (with no intention of enforcing compliance to our orders)" was to be followed on the frontier as well as throughout the N.F.D. and Jubaland.¹ The initial assumption was that the policy of observation was to be limited largely to Jubaland, and in particular to the station at Afmadu, where it was feared that the Muhammad Zubeir might be hostile and where there were not enough troops to deal with them. Along the border, on the other hand, it was assumed that there would be effective administration.²

Thus it only emerged gradually that there was to be no effective administration anywhere in the N.F.D. or Jubaland, not

¹Girouard to Hope, 8 April 1910, CO.533/72.
²Thesiger, Minute, 11 May 1910, CO.533/72.
even along the Ethiopian border itself. The main stumbling block as usual was the lack of funds. It was stated that effective control of the border was to be introduced as the opportunity presented itself, and this meant when the money was available and as cheaply as possible.¹

This position was one that many people felt to be unsatisfactory, including Lord Crewe, the Colonial Secretary. Both Gwynn and Thesiger in Addis had also favoured effective administration of the frontier. Zaphiro thought that frontier posts were a mistake, especially weak ones. He pointed out that previously he had been able to retire gracefully in the face of superior force, but a permanent post would involve loss of prestige if it could not provide protection for the people in its vicinity and if it could not repel the Ethiopians. Zaphiro could not envisage an intermediate stage between his own irregular form of influence and effective occupation.² Moreover, the number of troops at first assigned to the N.F.D. were hardly sufficient to guard one frontier officer, quite apart from the other duties they might be expected to assume.³

¹ Butler, Minute, 12 May 1910, CO.533/72; Further Notes on Marsabit District, DC/MBT/7/1/2; G.F. Archer, G.J., XLII (1913), 421. See also: H. Moyse Bartlett (1956), 212.

² Butler, Minute, 24 June 1910, CO.533/72.

³ Thesiger, Minute, 11 May 1910, CO.533/72.
Then the Inspector General of the King's African Rifles (K.A.R.) argued that by sending political officers and troops to the frontier a so-called policy of observation became impossible. The necessity of preventing Ethiopian raids remained. Moreover, it was impossible to remain entirely detached from the problems of the frontier tribes, and having too few troops on the spot was inviting disaster.¹

The weakness of the Protectorate Government on the frontier was also a factor that encouraged its repeated violation, for it led to the feeling that Britain was not really serious about enforcing the boundary. As Thesiger explained:

The Abyssinians cannot understand that the question of the expense for the maintenance of another one or two hundred men can enter into the consideration of a power like Gt. Britain, and they attribute our omission to have a proper police force at the disposal of the frontier officers solely to indifference.²

And it was not the ivory poachers who most threatened the stability of the frontier. It was, on the contrary, the growing official disrespect of the border that posed the greatest problem, and this was based on differing Anglo-Ethiopian interpretations of the 1907 Agreement and the effects of Gwynn's recommendations. Ultimately, however, the problem of the frontier and of the frontier tribes overlapped so that the two could no longer be treated separately.

¹Thesiger, "Memorandum on military aspects of the southern Abyssinian Boundary", 23 May 1910, CO.533/72.
It became impossible to ignore the fallacy behind Maud's conclusion that ethnic and physical boundaries coincided along the frontier, and that the escarpment that divided the highland from the lowland also divided Boran from Garre and Gabra from Rendille. It was an idle pretence - but it had enabled Britain to secure a more favourable boundary than would otherwise have been possible - and Zaphiro had maintained the myth as best he could. However, when Gwynn visited the area in 1909, he was the first person to mention the existence of the Golbo Boran.\footnote{Girouard to Crewe, 27 Jan. 1909, F0.371/596.} These were lowland Boran who were in the British sphere, who traditionally lived below the escarpment, and who had every right to remain there. This information completely invalidated Maud and Zaphiro's assumptions about the frontier and introduced a new set of problems. Zaphiro had admitted that the Gabra were to be found on both sides of the frontier, but the difficulties this created were not really faced up to until 1910 when Thesiger, the British Representative in Addis, noted:

The establishment of the Red line (Maud's line) cut off from Abyssinia a considerable section of the Borana and Gabbra tribes whom we recognised to be Abyssinian subjects. Had the Agreement been a territorial division of British from Abyssinian subjects we might claim that by the recognition of

\footnote{Girouard to Crewe, 27 Jan. 1909, F0.371/596.}
the Red Line all natives south of it became British subjects and vice versa. We did not do this, however, but agreed upon a tribal division by which Borana and Gabbra were to be left to Abyssinia.¹

The crucial problem did not really centre, however, on the citizenship of those Boran and Gabra who normally lived in the British Protectorate. The most difficult question was connected with the policy to be adopted towards the Boran and Gabra that crossed from Ethiopia into the E.A.P. Thus in April 1910 a number of Boran moved into British territory saying that they had once lived there. But Ethiopian officials at once demanded their return which was refused.² Later Geydu, the head of the Boran, and a few Ethiopian soldiers approached Barrett, the D.C. Moyale, and asked that the Boran be returned to them, again this was refused.³

The situation was especially delicate for a number of reasons. In the first place, most of the Boran in the E.A.P. crossed over into Ethiopia at least once a year, either to gain access to water and grazing or to visit their chiefs and religious leaders.⁴ They were therefore particularly vulnerable to Ethiopian

¹T. to G., 9 Nov. 1910, CO.533/83.
²G. to C., 3 June 1910, CO.533/74.
³G. to C., 7 June 1910, CO.533/74.
⁴T. to G., 29 Oct. 1910, CO.533/78.
reprisals, and towards the end of the year Ethiopian officials began to seize Boran who came to Gaddaduma from the Protectorate. Secondly, there was the confused status of Boran who lived in the no-man's land between Maud's line and Gwynn's line. Ethiopian officials continued to regard these Boran as Ethiopian citizens and levied taxes on them.¹

Towards the end of 1910 a number of compromises were suggested. A proposal, that Boran living between the two disputed frontier lines should either return to Ethiopia or pay the Ethiopians tax for ten years and remain under the control of the E.A.P., was eventually changed to an agreement not to levy any taxes at all on people living within that area.² Then Thesiger put forward the view that Britain was under an obligation to return all Boran who crossed over into the Protectorate. He also suggested that all Gabra and Boran in the E.A.P. (even those at Wajir) should be returned to Ethiopia, since according to him they were Ethiopian citizens. His plan was to arrange for the Ethiopian recognition of Gwynn's line in return for the exchange of wells at Muggado and Gorai and the repatriation of the Boran and Gabra. It was also to be stated explicitly that future refugees would not be handed over.³ This was a plan that gained the support of Girouard,

¹H. to G., 19 Oct. 1910, CO.533/83.
²Macleay, Minute, 31 Dec. 1910, CO.533/83; Moyale District Political Records 1902-1942, DC/MLE/2/4.
who thought that it could produce a lasting settlement.\footnote{Girouard to G., 29 Nov. 1910, CO.533/78.}

The situation, however, grew more serious in 1913 when Barrett reported large parties of Boran crossing into the Protectorate. These Boran did not claim to have lived previously in the Protectorate, but complained of Ethiopian oppression which they gave as the reason for their mass movement. They were also chased and attacked by some 80 Ethiopian soldiers.\footnote{B. to H., 20 May 1913, CO.533/118.} The situation seemed to be particularly dangerous since Gerezmach Gashi threatened that unless the Boran were handed back Ethiopia would create trouble. He also added that if the Boran had any complaints they should have made them before Fitaurari Waldo.\footnote{H.G. Dickinson to Barrett, 23 April 1913, CO.533/118.} And it was felt that the frontier force was inadequate to protect the Boran in the event of the Ethiopians really deciding to recapture them.\footnote{Hope to Chief Sec., 9 Oct. 1913, PC/NFD/4/3/1.} Then, at the beginning of May, some thirteen more Boran cattle \textit{bomas} crossed into the British Protectorate. It was clear that the southern Ethiopians were not going to tolerate this situation for long.

Anticipating a crisis, Barrett felt compelled to compromise:

"I know the Government does not want war with Abyssinia suddenly
forced on them", he wrote perhaps rather over-dramatically.¹
He therefore proposed that Gerezmach Gashi and Geydu should
tour the area with him persuading the Boran to return, and promising
that they would be given a written guarantee of good treatment if
they did so. This proposal was accepted by Belfield, the Acting
Governor, but it was received with open disapproval at the Colonial
Office.² As Fides minuted:

I dont know why our officials should be in such a hurry
to hand these Boran back to Abyssinia... As the Abyssinian
Government is in a state of chaos it seems to be unnecessary
to consider their susceptabilities.³

Read also thought that Barrett had exaggerated the risk of war
and that whatever the risk, it was more likely to be increased
through acting feebly.⁴ Indeed, opinion was unanimous that the
Boran should not have been handed back and that stronger action
should have been taken. A telegram was drafted to this effect.
The Colonial Office also pointed out that in the case of the Uganda/
Congo boundary negotiations great stress had been laid on not having
to hand back people who threw in their lot with the British. It
was felt that this was a norm to be observed elsewhere.⁵

¹B. to Chief Sec., 1 May 1913, CO.533/118.
²B. to H., 20 May 1913, CO.533/118.
³Fides, Minute, 21 May 1913, CO.533/118.
⁴Read, Minute, 17 June 1913, CO.533/118.
⁵Moyale District Political Records, 1902-1942, DC/MLE/2/4.
As it was, events in the first week of May added a new dimension to the problem and Barrett never had to send the Boran back to Ethiopia. The situation improved, in one sense at least, and Barrett did not invite Gashi or Geydu to go along the British frontier with him. Nevertheless, in the recriminations that followed, Barrett found himself defending his earlier suggestion even as late as August, by which time the whole matter had become purely academic. By that date there was no longer any real Ethiopian pressure to have the Boran repatriated. Earlier some Tigrean hunters had tried to entice a group of Boran across the frontier, but otherwise there was little disturbance. By that date too there was no question of the Boran being encouraged to leave the Protectorate, though later it was suggested that Ethiopian Boran should not be allowed to graze with Protectorate Boran since it caused trouble. Yet it was certain that most of the Protectorate Boran would migrate northwards at some time or other, largely because they wanted to make use of wells in Ethiopia. They were always warned that they would be arrested by the Ethiopians.

1 At the very beginning of May, Cpt. Aylmer was killed by a group of Tigre raiders. This raid had nothing to do with the Boran but was more connected with the Gabra and is dealt with in the next section. However, this misfortune led to reduced tension along the border.

2 B. to Chief Sec., (A) 26 May 1913, CO.533/119.

3 B. to OC.NFD., 27 August. 1913, CO.533/124.

4 B. to Chief Sec., (B) 26 May 1913, CO.533/119.

5 V.G. Glenday, Handing Over Report 1915, PC/NFD/2/6/1.
if they did so, but the decision was then left entirely up to them and they were never prevented from leaving the E.A.P. ¹

At the same time, the problem of the Boran was never far removed from that of the Gabra. There were two lots of Gabra: one section under chief Gallarassa, who lived at Waye, moved and grazed to the west of Moyale; another section under chief Chiromo was centred on Gamud, and the area to the south and east of Moyale. Since chief Gallarassa's village was only a few hundred yards from the frontier, he was particularly vulnerable to Ethiopian raids. Moreover, the cattle sections of the Gabra frequently crossed the frontier and for part of the year they were generally concentrated around Magado in Ethiopia.² The camel Gabra sections, on the other hand, were found further south at Turbi and around the Hurri hills. They also tended to migrate to the Lorian Swamp by a route to the east of Mt. Marsabit, with the result that they came into less contact with the Ethiopians. In 1908 the Gabra lost most of their cattle through rinderpest, but Zaphiro came to their assistance and gave them stock taken in a raid on Wajir.³ Then in 1912 Gallarassa's camel sections lost at least 25⁴/⁰ of their herds through disease.⁴ They were not

¹ Hope to Chief Sec., 25 Aug. 1913, CO.533/124.
² Later attempts to persuade Gallarassa to move to Marsabit, especially after it had been evacuated by the Samburu failed. T.S. Thomas (1917), 86.
³ Hope "Report", 30 July 1910, CO.533/76.
therefore particularly rich in stock.

Nevertheless both sections of the Gabra were periodically harrassed by elephant hunters from the east and from the west, though for a time it did seem that the Ethiopians were making some attempt to control the situation. Early in 1910 one hundred Ethiopian soldiers under the command of Garazmach Tezamma arrived on the border with instructions to arrest all hunters there.¹ But they were unable to operate in the vicinity of lake Rudolph which was the area that was most raided.

Both sections of Gabra were also troubled by Ethiopian tax collecting expeditions. In May 1910, Hope reported that Ethiopian soldiers from Arero had crossed the frontier and levied taxes on the Gabra at Gadder, to the south-east of Moyale.² Yet Hope, the Officer Commanding Troops in the N.F.D., never anticipated a really serious situation developing as a result of these Ethiopian incursions, though Girouard did ask him to draw up a scheme of needs in case of trouble.³ When the Gabra began to migrate in large numbers across the frontier in 1913, however, the position became much more dangerous and the Protectorate administration was no better prepared to deal with it.

¹G. to C., 3 June 1910, CO.533/74.
²G. to C., 12 July 1910, CO.533/75.
³G. to C., 1 Aug. 1910, CO.533/76.
In 1913 large numbers of Gabra crossed the border near the Hurri hills and moved on to Maikona. It was estimated that fully half of all the Gabra previously in Ethiopia were involved in this migration. Dudda Koritcha, one of the head chiefs of the British Gabra, later reported that they had been attacked by Ethiopians shortly after crossing the frontier. They were then raided again at Maikona. About sixteen Gabra were killed and some 4,000 sheep were stolen: about ten bomas of sheep. The raid was undertaken by Dejazmach Marid and a certain amount of looted stock was subsequently recovered by Fitaurari Woldé, who also took disciplinary action against Majid himself. But at about the same time the Gabra at Nalatcha were also raided twice. The first raid was carried out by eight Gelubba, six of whom were armed with rifles. Six days later there was a larger raid, again carried out by Gelubba. Then on 25 April, the Samburu were raided around Mt. Kulal by thirty Gelubba and six Ethiopians, and though the latter appeared to be soldiers of Fitaurari Makonnen, whose district lay between lakes Stephani and Rudolf, there was not enough evidence to be certain.

1 H.B. Sharpe, Marsabit Political Records Book, 1928, FC/NFD/4/1/2.
2 B. to Chief Sec., 1 May 1913, CO.533/118.
3 "Memorandum on Mr. Thesiger's Journey to the southern frontier of Abyssinia and Nairobi", in T. to Grey, 15 May 1914, F0.371/1880.
5 K. to Sec., 1 May 1913, F0.371/1572; "Memorandum" in T. to G., 15 May 1914, F0.371/1880.
Events came to a head on 1 May when an Ethiopian raiding party was surprised by Captain Aylmer, who was shot and mortally wounded in the engagement that followed. Aylmer's death was in many respects a turning point. For one thing it immediately eased Ethiopian pressure on the frontier. Fearing a reprisal, Ethiopian officials became markedly more cooperative and more anxious to ensure that further raids were not carried out. In a way Aylmer's death was the price that had to be paid for an ineffective control of the border, as Thesiger later pointed out, but, once paid, it significantly helped to remove the earlier tensions.

Aylmer's death also raised a broader problem. A question that was hotly debated was whether it necessitated any revision of policy towards Ethiopia, and as a result it became particularly important to discover who had been responsible for Aylmer's death. The initial telegrams had all stated that he had been killed by Tigrean hunters. Moreover, shortly after Aylmer's death Barrett encountered a group of Tigrean hunters near Koobi Sigud and he was convinced that this must have been the band that had fought Aylmer;

1. Barrett to Chief Sec., 4 May 1913, PC/NFD/4/1/5 or MLE/15.
3. T. to Tilley, 7 June 1913, FO.371/1572.
4. Mure to Sec., 28 May 1913 and Browning to Harcourt, 10 June 1913, CO.533/119.
he noticed particularly that none were Ethiopian soldiers.¹

A week earlier a group of Tigre led by the hunter Aba Nyencha
had moved from Gaddaduma to Ajao. It is quite possible that
it was this group that Barrett encountered, but if so they had
had nothing to do with Aylmer's death since they had left
Gaddaduma after 1 May.²

Quite early on Hope had concluded, on the other hand, that
the evidence pointed to soldiers under Dejazmach Balcha and
Balamarbas Welde Gabriel as the culprits.³ But it was suspected
that the Garre were spreading these stories themselves, and that
they were trying to shield Tigrean hunters by throwing the blame
on to Ethiopian soldiers.⁴ There was no doubt that the Garre
and Tigre were at this time very closely allied and even took
part in joint raids. In fact they were far more closely associated
than any administrative official yet realised. Nevertheless,
by the beginning of June Barrett also had come round to the view
that the people responsible for shooting Aylmer were soldiers
belonging either to Dejazmach Balcha or to Balamarbas Welde Gabriel;

¹B. to Sec., 26 May 1913, C0.533/119.

²Dickinson to Chief Sec., 12 May 1913, C0.533/120.

³Hope to Chief Sec., 17 June 1913, C0.533/120.

⁴B. to Chief Sec., 26 May 1913, C0.533/119.
and by the end of the month he was convinced that the responsibility lay with the soldiers belonging to Bālāmbarās Waide Gabriel.¹

When Thesiger, from Addis, investigated Aylmer's death several months later, it was being conveniently attributed to a certain Basha Jangur, an officer under Dejazmach Baloha, who was said to have gone hunting on his own initiative and to have been surprised by Aylmer. It was also said that he had died a few weeks later from wounds received in the engagement between Barrett and the Tigrean hunters at Koobi Sigud.²

This explanation conveniently laid the blame at the door of a dead man. It was a story that seemed designed to fit all the facts, but fitted them rather badly. For officials on the frontier were confident of their ability to distinguish Tigrean hunters from Amharic soldiers, although at times both may have been intent on the same business. Either this confidence was misplaced or Basha Jangur and his followers adopted disguise—a suggestion never made in any of the correspondence. Had Basha Jangur not died so soon and had the story not connected him with Barrett's brief encounter with Tigre at K. Sigud, it would have been a lot more convincing! Nevertheless, the story was accepted without criticism, and this meant that complaints had to be made against

Dejazmach Balcha, a very powerful Ethiopian. The wisdom of this was naturally questioned.

Towards the end of May, and before the Colonial Office had yet received news of Aylmer's death, they had requested the Foreign Office to make strong representations in Addis about earlier and less important incursions. The answer which the Foreign Office returned was hardly encouraging, and was based on a minute by Langley an Assistant Under Secretary:

It is not a favourable moment for any application to the Abyssinians as the administration is in a state of chaos and no one will take the responsibility of doing anything.2

But when in June news of Aylmer's death reached London some action had to be taken.

Thesiger's view was that precisely because the central government in Addis Ababa was so weak, it would fail to react to any request unless this was backed by maximum pressure; and he wished to threaten to break off diplomatic relations if British demands were not complied with.3 He also suggested that these demands should not be trifling. In the first place he ordered the Ethiopian Government to send an expedition without delay to

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1C.O. to F.O., 27 May 1913, FO.371/1572.

2Minute on C.O. to F.O., 27 May 1913, FO.371/1572.

3T. to G., 7 June 1913, FO.371/1572.
capture and destroy all hunters on the border, and suggested that they should be allowed into the British Protectorate so as to be able to finally destroy all Tigre.\(^1\) He also wanted to press for a rectification of the frontier, which in effect meant the acceptance of Gwynn's line. Finally he asked whether he was authorised to insist that 300,000 dollars be paid to Aylmer's family as compensation and that no less than ten of the guilty band involved in his death be executed, half in Addis Ababa and half in Moyale.\(^2\)

The general reaction at the Foreign Office to these proposals was that they were excessive. Thesiger in fact had pitched his demands far higher than those made by the Colonial Office, and Tilley, senior clerk in the Africa Department, held that it was not possible to hold Ethiopia entirely accountable for an incident that happened outside its territory and where Britain was responsible for maintaining order.\(^3\) The Colonial Office only pressed for a rectification of the frontier on the assumption that Gaddaduma would be occupied.\(^4\)

\(^{1}\) T. to Girouard, 5 June 1913, FO.371/1572.

\(^{2}\) T. to Grey, 4 June 1913, FO.371/1572.

\(^{3}\) Tilley, Minute, n.d. on T. to Grey, 4 June 1913, CO.371/1372.

\(^{4}\) C.O. to F.O., 21 June 1913, FO.371/1572.
When Thesiger met the Council of Ministers in June they attempted to postpone discussion of the incident, and this led him once again to urge that a definite stand should be taken against this way of dealing with European affairs. He argued that the Council would agree to the British terms, "if they feel they are forced to the wall. They realise they cannot afford to lose British friendship". But at the Foreign Office this analysis was accepted with scepticism, and there was some surprise at the suggestion that British friendship was so important to Ethiopia.

At the same time the Colonial Office did not press for any extreme diplomatic pressure. Bellfield, the Governor of the E.A.P., maintained that Aylmer's death did not necessitate any revision of policy towards Ethiopia. The possibility of a military campaign was soon ruled out:

Colonel Graham (O.C.Troops, Jubaland) thinks the case is one for diplomatic representation because military action would probably end in a stalemate. I am not sure that diplomatic representation would fare better.

Tilley of course was right. The only way to obtain leverage was by a combination of military and diplomatic pressure. When the

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1 T. to Grey, 19 June 1913, F0.371/1572.
2 Tilley, Minute, n.d. on T. to G., 19 June 1913, F0.371/1572.
3 B. to Harcourt, 23 June 1913, C0.533/119.
4 Tilley, Minute, 15 July 1913, F0.371/1572.
Colonial Office refused even to strengthen their position on the frontier, the diplomatic initiative was bound to be abortive.  

It was the refusal to place effective forces on the frontier that ultimately undermined the Colonial Office's demand for a rectification of the border. Public opinion in Ethiopia was strongly against the cession of territory, and, without an ultimatum of some sort, the Council of Ministers could not be forced to agree to Gwynn's line. But even if a territorial concession had been made, it was doubted whether the E.A.P. would have had enough troops to take advantage of it. Any concession would have been strongly resisted by the local Amhara, and the majority of wells could be defended by a small number of men entrenched among the surrounding rocks. This applied especially to Gaddaduma where the Tigre were largely in control. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in September Bowring, the Chief Secretary of the E.A.P., recommended that the threat to occupy Gaddaduma be abandoned.

When Thesiger visited the frontier in 1914, he was scathing in his criticism of the Protectorate administration. At Moyale he found 40 K.A.R. and 30 irregular police. But both groups were armed with worn out Martinis and a miscellaneous selection of rifles.

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1 Thesiger met the Council of Ministers three times, twice in June and once in July. Accounts of these meetings can be found in F0.371/1572.

2 T. to G., 31 July 1913, F0.371/1572.

3 T. to G., 8 Oct. 1913, F0.371/1572; B. to H., 5 Nov. 1913, CO.533/124.

4 B. to H., 9 Sept. 1913, CO.533/121.
captured from Tigrean hunters. In one or two cases the back sights were missing, in all the rifling was worn, stocks were loose, and ejectors jammed after a few shots. At Marsabit the Assistant District Commissioner had collected 16 Martini rifles that did not work, though being something of a mechanical expert he managed to get eight to fire by interchanging parts. Thesiger strongly condemned this state of affairs since police and troops were called upon to fight Ethiopians armed with modern magazine rifles, and he also advised a thorough reorganisation of the frontier administration with the establishment of effective control. If this was not done, he predicted that there would soon be a very costly expedition with serious complications.¹

Thus Aylmer's death drew attention to the dangers of observation on the frontier, but it also led to increased alarm at the growing incidence of Tigrean raids and the gun-running that was associated with them. Since the Tigre were centred at Gaddaduma it had originally been hoped that this problem could be solved by simply enforcing Gwynn's line. But when the occupation of Gaddaduma by force was ruled out Read suggested that the East Africa Protectorate should adopt the Sudan policy of establishing consular trade agents in Ethiopian territory. This system had worked well

¹"Memorandum", in T. to G., 15 May 1914, F0.371/1880.
at Gambela and was apparently highly recommended by Sir Reginald Wingate and Major Doughty Wylie. As a result of this suggestion, Wingate shortly afterwards sent Armbuster, the Consul for north-west Ethiopia, and an Inspector under the Sudan Government, to the Colonial Office to discuss the possibility of establishing one or two consular posts in southern Ethiopia.  

Towards the end of November 1913, Harcourt wrote to Belfield for his views, and the Governor replied that he was in complete agreement with the proposal. Thesiger also suggested independently: "the appointment of a Protectorate officer as Consul for Abyssinia to reside at the headquarters of Fitaurari Walde either at Mega or at Gardula". And he pointed out a further benefit from this plan. Whenever Fitaurari Walde was asked to investigate a claim, he was wont to reply that he was too ill or too busy. A consul could force matters on to his attention; he could also collect evidence on the spot and avoid interminable delays.

In 1914 Thesiger appointed Hodson consul for southern Ethiopia under a section of the Abyssinian Order in Council of 1913. He

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1 Read, Minute, 7 Aug. 1913, CO.533/119.
2 Read, Minute, 16 Aug. 1913, CO.533/120.
3 B. to H., 8 May 1914, CO.533/136.
4 "Memorandum", in T. to G., 15 May 1914, FO.371/1880.
arrived at Nairobi on 2 December and then set out for Addis to obtain his credentials before going to the frontier. The main problem still remained the inadequate force with which the frontier was defended, and not everyone had an accurate idea of Hodson's role, as this letter to Belfield shows:

"It is clear that his [Hodson's] appointment will be of intense value to your frontier officers at Moyale and elsewhere, as he will be able to facilitate their food supplies."

But Hodson's real value did not lie in the catering field, and by the end of the first World War it was being readily acknowledged that his presence on the frontier had been extremely beneficial.

Nevertheless, the appointment of a frontier consul and the gradual strengthening of the border administration did not in any way lead to the eradication of the old frontier problems. Raids continued all along the border, and in 1922 the Boran around Moyale were given guns with which to defend themselves against the Tigre, now generally referred to as shifta. The border tribes such as the

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1 B. to H., 2 Dec. 1914, CO.533/143; Walker "Intelligence Report", 8 Feb. 1915, FO.371/2227.


3 The Consulate at Mega was so valuable that it was kept on till 1960. Campbell to Balfour, 31 Jan. 1918, FO.371/3126. But the General Committee of the E.A.P. Legislative Council voted 25 to 4 against continuing to pay for Hodson in 1920, since they did not feel that he achieved sufficiently tangible results. Bowring to Milner, 27 May 1920, FO.369/1350.

4 Coryndon to Churchill, 2 Sept. 1922, FO.371/7150.

5 Shifta is the Boran for bandit or robber. Political Records, PC/NFD/4/1/2.
Boran and the Gabra were always to remain a problem as they migrated backwards and forwards from the Protectorate to Ethiopia. After the First World War, however, the Officer Commanding in the N.F.D. had the discretion to refuse to admit refugees. In general those without stock were allowed to remain, but few people travelled without cattle. The real problem however centred on the Tigre.

In 1917, Tigre bandits forced Ethiopian troops to evacuate Gaddaduma and Godala; they then established their control in the area and proceeded to raid the Boran mercilessly. The gradual strengthening of the E.A.P.'s forces on the frontier naturally increased the temptation to occupy Gaddaduma, but Thesiger proposed to the Ethiopian Government that a joint campaign be undertaken against the Tigre. The agreement was that either force would be allowed to cross the frontier, and that British troops would occupy Gaddaduma temporarily. Thus Gaddaduma was successfully occupied in 1919 and the power of the Tigre temporarily broken. The wells were evacuated by the British after five months, though Protectorate officials wanted to remain in control there. The wells were re-occupied again for a short time in 1921 and then more permanently

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1 Coryndon to Jones, 7 April 1924, CO.533/309.

2 Kittermaster, Handing Over Report, 1919, PC/NFD/2/1/1; Hodson to Campbell, 5 May 1919, F.O. Mega Consulate Records.

3 A.W. Hodson, Seven years in Southern Abyssinia (London, 1927), 158, 172.
Lake Rudolf Area

El Had

Maggado

Turbi

Longondoti

Sogida

Mega

Cellago

Waiye

Jammok

Moyale

Gaddaduma

Kalacha

Maikona

Buna

Marsabit

'Yako

Wajir
in 1924, but even this did not lead to a solution of the Tigrean problem.¹

Controversy over the Tigre, however, was also for a time closely associated with the Garre. When Aylmer had been killed, it was said that the Garre were shielding Tigrean bandits implicated in the murder,² and Fitaurari Walde blamed them for most of the border troubles saying that they invited the Tigre into the E.A.P.³ There was undoubtedly much truth in this, though at first sight it seems inexplicable in a Somali clan that was considered to be friendly towards the Government and extremely loyal.

The Garre in fact had always succeeded in making a very good impression on Protectorate officials, and Zaphiro had written: "We shall have no trouble from them, they are a good people".⁴ But their geographical position on the river Daua exposed them to considerable pressure from the Ethiopians, the Aulihan, Marehan and the Digodia. If they were friendly towards Zaphiro and other Protectorate administrators, it was surely because they were a weak tribe surrounded by more powerful neighbours. Zaphiro's presence on the frontier brought to an end Ethiopian attempts to acquire

¹ On both occasions there were border incidents to provide a motive. In 1924 the choice seemed to be between occupation of the wells and preparing a case against Ethiopia for mis-government to be put before the League of Nations. The former action was preferred: Lord Arnold, Minute, 11 July 1924 and Bottomley, Minute, 24 June 1924, CO.533/309.
² Barrett to Chief Sec., 26 May 1913, CO.533/119.
³ H.O.W.Hope, Handing Over Report, 1 Jan. 1914, PC/NFD/2/1/1.
⁴ C. to G., 20 May 1907, FO.371/192.
political control over them, but he was powerless to offer them protection against their Somali neighbours and this became increasingly necessary after 1907. From then on the Garre relied heavily on Government support and when this was not sufficiently forthcoming, they could not afford to be particular in their choice of allies.

Raiding between the Marehan and the Garre got progressively worse after 1907. There were frequent skirmishes, and some of these were serious. In 1908, Shirre Jama led a galti Marehan raid which resulted in the death of Garre chief Gababba's only son, as well as a brother, and their loss of a considerable quantity of stock. But throughout the first eight months of 1908 there was also a gradual migration of Rer Afgab Aulihan into the E.A.P. as a result of Ethiopian pressure; and, once across the river Juba, they began systematically raiding both the Marehan and the Garre. When Gwynn arrived at the Juba/Daua confluence towards the end of 1908, he managed to arrange a temporary settlement but it did not long survive his departure.

During 1909 Marehan and Aulihan attacks against the Garre continued, and what made these so devastating at this juncture was

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1 Girouard to H., 21 Feb. 1912, CO/533/102; C. to G., 20 May 1907, FO.371/192.

2 Ward to Hopwood, 23 Nov. 1908, CO.533/56; T.S.Thomas (1917), passim.

3 G. to C., 12 and 28 Dec. 1908, CO. 533/54.
the relatively large number of rifles owned by both these Somali
groups, while the Garre by comparison possessed few or no guns.\textsuperscript{1} The psychological effect of rifles was so great, according to
Gwynn, that no resistance would be offered to a raiding party
armed with them. This greatly increased the temptation to raid,
it also led to fewer deaths; but, by a curious anomaly, it led
to the injured party contracting the largest debt. For the Garre
killed far more Rer Afgab through acts of vengeance, and they
always owed the Aulihan considerable \textit{diya}. This was the fact
that made any settlement between them particularly difficult to
arrange.\textsuperscript{2}

Events reached a turning point in 1910. Supported by the
Ajuran the Garre managed to defeat the Marehan on one occasion,
but otherwise they were not so successful. Owing to insufficient
water at the wells of El Wak, they were forced to move their stock
to Yagleah and Dadableh close to Marehan territory.\textsuperscript{3} Here they had
to endure further raids.\textsuperscript{4} On several occasions the Garre wrote
to Hope, the Officer Commanding in the N.F.D., complaining of the
Marehan and requesting assistance. Hope, however, was not in a
position to do anything and could only advise patience; but the

\textsuperscript{1}Honyold to Gwynn, 18 Jan. 1909 and Gwynn to C.O., 3 Nov. 1909,
00.533/69.

\textsuperscript{2}General Report by \textbf{M}ajor Gwynn re. the Anglo-Abyssinian boundary
Commission 1908/1909, 00.533/69.

\textsuperscript{3}W.E.H.Barrett, Intelligence Report from the Abyssinian frontier,
29 Jan. 1910, 00.533/72.

\textsuperscript{4}J.O.W.Hope, Intelligence Report, \textit{May} 1910, 00.533/75.
patience of the Garre was almost exhausted and at the beginning of the year 19 Garre villages moved into Ethiopia, since they did not consider their life and property safe in the British Protectorate.¹ Those that remained behind were anxious to retaliate against the Marehan and Hope had much difficulty in restraining them. He wrote to the Chief Secretary in June saying that he had promised the Garre a reply by August, and that every month that passed only increased the gravity of the situation. Ali Abdi had told him that his people were getting out of hand and that they were buying as many arms as possible. Reports were coming in that the Garre had forty elephant tusks and were trying to exchange these for rifles.²

The full implications of this limited Garre migration into Ethiopia and their acquisition of guns was not immediately apparent. Inter-tribal fighting continued and the Garre were still worsted in their encounters with the Marehan. In 1911 there were reports that the latter had captured over 500 camels belonging to the Garre, and Col. Thesiger, the Inspector General of the K.A.R., was asked to consider the likely effects of a Government sponsored

²Hope to Chief Sec. 12 & 17 June 1910 and 10 Dec. 1910, PC/NFD/4/1/3; Intelligence Report Moyale, 4 May 1910 in G. to G., 7 June 1910, CO.533/74; Hope, Intelligence Report, June and July 1910 and G. to H., 1 Aug. 1910, CO.533/76.
raid by 4,000 Garre against their aggressors. He came to the conclusion, however, that it would be undesirable, since Marehan sections considered to be friendly towards the Government would also have been attacked.  

Nevertheless, there was evidence of a growing crise de conscience over the Government's policy towards the Garre. Col. Thesiger also argued that a policy of non-intervention could not be continued for long. The Garre were depicted as a friendly tribe that had always assisted the Government and was prompt in providing baggage animals.  

Yet the administration refused to allow them to retaliate against the Marehan, and the question was whether it did not in the process incur a certain responsibility for protecting the Garre and for recovering stock stolen from them.  

This then was the dilemma, for in 1912 the administration of Moyale was extended eastwards so as to provide the Garre with some protection, while they were promised that in 1913 the Marehan would be taken in hand. Yet precisely because Government support had been so long in arriving, the Garre had now placed themselves in an ambiguous position vis à vis the Protectorate authorities.

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1 Intelligence Reports, Oct.-Nov. 1911, PC/JUB/1/17/1; "Memorandum on the effect on the military situation of the N.F.D. and Jubaland which a raid by the Garre on the Marehan would be likely to have", Col. G. Thesiger, 4 Dec. 1911, PC/NFD/4/1/3.


3 Col. Thesiger, Memorandum on the NFD., 29 Jan. 1912, CO.533/103.

The main reason for their limited migration into Ethiopia in 1910 had not been to secure the support of the Amhara there. They had moved to Banissa and Gaddaduma, both of which places were usually controlled by Tigrean elephant hunters and bandits. Thus the 1910 migration led to a Garre-Tigre alliance in which the former were offered very considerable assistance by the latter, who frequently accompanied the Garre on their raids and fought with them. But the Garre also benefited in another way, for the main centres of the arms trade in southern Ethiopia were closely associated with the Tigre. Through their alliance the Garre had easy access to rifles, and though they bought a few from Somali traders, it was from the Tigre at Gaddaduma that they got their main supply.

It is easy to see how the Garre benefited from their association with the Tigre; but there had to be some *quid pro quo* and this seems to have consisted in the protection the Garre extended to the Tigre when they entered the E.A.P. They would be sheltered and hidden by the Garre, and shielded from contact with Protectorate officials. In fact it only gradually dawned on the N.F.D. administrators that the Garre and Tigre were working hand in glove.


The first really definite suspicions occurred in May 1913 when it was thought that the Garre were shielding Tigre implicated in Aylmer's murder. By the end of the month, Hope felt that he had almost proved that Ali Abdi was guilty of collusion with the Tigre.\(^1\) In September he had him brought before Fitaurari Wolde who accused him of helping the Tigre and becoming blood-brothers with them.\(^2\) But Tigre-Garre relations suddenly deteriorated at this time after an important Garre chief had been killed by them at Derkali. And so although Hope had initially wanted to have Ali Abdi deported to Nairobi, he now suddenly changed his mind.\(^3\)

However, when Thesiger, the British representative at Addis, visited the frontier in 1914, he investigated a number of border incidents and amongst these was one involving the Garre. Ali Abdi did not deny the main points against him, and so his deportation was recommended and sanctioned in May 1914.\(^4\) A year's detention in Nairobi was said to have had a salutary effect on him. He swore an oath of loyalty before the Sheik ul Islam and was then allowed to go back to the N.F.D. But the truth was

\(^1\) H. to Chief Sec., 25 Aug. 1913, CO.533/124.
\(^2\) Hope to Chief Sec., 4 Sept. 1913, CO.533/125.
\(^3\) Hope, Handing Over Report, PC/NFD/2/1/1; Hope to Chief Sec., 4 Sept. 1913, CO.533/125.
\(^4\) B. to H., 14 May 1914, CO.533/136; T. to G., 15 May 1914, FO.371/1880.
that the administration was finding it far harder to control the Garre through their sub-chiefs, and it was hoped that Ali Abdi's return would make matters easier.¹

Ali Abdi, however, was no more able to ignore political realities in 1915 than he had been three years earlier. Initially the Garre-Tigre alliance had been formed against the Marehan, but it was soon turned to good effect against the Digodia who proved the most serious menace to the Garre. The first Garre-Digodia skirmishes were reported in 1911, but it was not until the following year that really serious raids began.²

During 1912 there was a constant influx of Digodia from the Oddo and the northern bank of the Daua to the south of the river. There were raids and counter-raids, yet Aylmer managed to patch up a settlement whereby both parties returned raided stock.³ However, the following year there was increased Digodia pressure on the Garre who were raided at Dulessa and Yabitcha. A large number of Garre are said to have fled to Gaddaduma, and these included chief Dababa from El Wak.⁴ The eastern Garre were unable to resist the Digodia and they abandoned their traditional grazing areas along the Daua; those to the west, however,

¹B. to H., 13 May 1915, CO.533/154.
²G. to H., 2 June 1911, CO.533/88.
³Gerald Reece, Gurreh Annual Report, 1928, PC/NFD/1/3/1; Political Records, DC/MDA/4/5.
⁴Political Records, DC/MDA/4/5;
had more success since they were helped by the Tigre. When Ali Abdi was deported in 1914 it was precisely for taking part in a joint raid with the Tigre against the Digodia. When he was freed a year later, on the other hand, the same problems existed and there was still no real alternative to the Tigrean alliance.

In 1914 a serious attempt was made to extend administration to the area south of the river Daua. In May that year, Deck was appointed Assistant District Commissioner for the newly constituted Garre Sub-District, and he succeeded in persuading the Garre from Ethiopia to return to the Daua. But in July Deck was recalled and the Garre returned at once to Gaddaduma. When Butler, his successor, arrived in August, the Digodia were in complete control of the southern side of the river. Moreover it proved impossible to restrict the Digodia to the eastern part of the district. This was partly due to the growing influx of the Digodia into the E.A.P. which could not be controlled, and partly to galti Marehan pressure on them to move westwards. The only solution that could be offered was to supervise this Digodia movement and to permit them to infiltrate into Garre grazing areas. The Garre were unable to resist

2 Political Records, DC/MDA/4/5.
this, but they embarrassed Butler by claiming that Hope had promised them in 1913 that if they returned raided stock to the Digodia – which they had done – then they would not be compelled to receive Digodia into their country again.¹ Yet this was a promise that Butler could not keep, for there was simply not enough room for the Digodia.

When Glenday succeeded Butler in September 1915, it was obvious that the majority of the Garre in Ethiopia would not return to the E.A.P. unless materially assisted by the Government. After some encouragement a few did return, but the situation suddenly changed when Glenday was ordered to evacuate the area in March 1916.² All protection was immediately removed from the Garre, and within two days of his departure the Digodia began to cross into the E.A.P. in large numbers and to move towards Garre grazing areas.³ It was anticipated that the Garre would be incensed with the Protectorate administration for leaving them unprotected, but on the contrary they proved more than a match for their adversaries when the government did not interfere with their methods.⁴ Ali Abdi and Gababa obtained the support

² Political Records, DC/MDA/4/5; T.S. Thomas, Precis for week ending 15 April 1916, CO.533/168.
³ K. to Chief Sec., 16 April 1917 (P.80/la/17), CO.533/182.
⁴ T.S. Thomas, Precis for week ending 20 May 1916, CO.533/168.
of the Tigre and immediately took the offensive against the Digodia. In March 1916 they suffered a defeat, but in July and October they were overwhelmingly successful and they drove the Digodia out of the Protectorate. Further attempts by the latter to enter the E.A.P. were unsuccessful and the Garre re-established themselves on the river Daua. Ali Abdi sent the Government a message to say that having defeated the Digodia, he was now in a position to help them against the rebellious Aulihan.

When Glenday was sent back in 1917 to administrate the river Daua there were no recriminations. This time Ali Abdi was not blamed for his reliance on Tigrean troops to defeat the Digodia. The attitude of the administration was now one of humble contrition. It was felt that the Government should try to "make amends for outrages endured by [the Garre]... during the past few years". The Garre succeeded in maintaining their position on the river Daua, but henceforth they relied on the Government instead of the Tigre. Glenday inflicted a resounding defeat on the Digodia in 1917, and the following year a strong force of

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2 K. to Chief Sec., 30 July 1916, CO.533/169.

3 Bowring to Long, 14 June 1917, CO.533/182.
askaris was sent to defend the Garre.¹

Yet the Garre/Digodia conflict remained unresolved. The large number of Digodia who lived amongst the Marehan posed a threat that could never be entirely eliminated, and as the Garre came to rely more on the Protectorate administration so the Tigre began to form an alliance with their previous enemies, the Digodia.² Moreover, throughout this period those Digodia sections that had earlier moved to Wajir were also a complicating factor. For during 1914 they were allowed to move north again as far as the river Daua. Here it was thought they would offset Digodia pressures to the north of the river, but this proved to be a mistaken assumption. Eventually they moved south once more and this meant that an additional flank of the Garre was exposed to possible pressure.³

The problem of the Garre was far more complicated than that of either the Gabra or the Boran, but there were good reasons for this. Their relationship with neighbouring tribes was more complex and they were also closer to the area of maximum population pressure. However, there was also one other Somali group that was even more exposed than the Garre to external pressure, though it

¹K. to Chief Sec., 16 April 1917 (P.79/la/17), CO.533/182; K. to T., 26 July 1918, FO.371/3127.

²Cambell to K., 23 Oct. 1918, FO.371/3127; K. to Chief Sec., 16 April 1917 (P.81/la/17), CO.533/182.

³Political Records, DC/MDA/4/5.
was better able to defend itself. This was the Marehan who lived close to Dolo and along the Juba to the east of El Wak. They posed a problem that was every bit as complicated as that of the Garre, yet it was a very different sort of problem. While the troubles of the Garre stemmed from their relative weakness and their search for allies, those of the Marehan were caused by their strength and independence of spirit. And whereas the Garre solved their problem to some extent when the administration withdrew, it was only through the intervention of the Protectorate Government that the Marehan threat was kept within bounds.
THE MAREHAN AND THE AULIHAN

The Marehan were undoubtedly the strongest Somali clan in the region of the Juba/Daua confluence. In fact they were the only people who successfully defied the threat of Ethiopian hostility. About March 1905 some 600 Ethiopians under Wolde, and accompanied by Geydu, visited El Wak and Muddo Arele. Geydu had been brought to point out the limits of his country and when, on the edge of Garre territory, the Ethiopians threatened the Marehan, the latter sent back a bow and poisoned arrow. This was a challenge to fight and the Amhara wisely chose to ignore it. But not having suffered from Ethiopian aggression, the Marehan saw no reason to welcome the advent of Zaphiro's inspectorate on the frontier, while their dominant position on the upper Juba went hand in hand with a refusal to acknowledge any superior authority.

Thus the Marehan were the only people along the border over whom Zaphiro did not gain some control. Consequently his attitude towards them was unfavourable:

They are all fanatic; they never paid tribute either to the Abyssinians or to the British Government ... From these tribes we shall have some trouble for the first few years until the British Government has made some

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arrangements for checking them.\textsuperscript{1} And the necessity to check them became particularly apparent as inter-tribal raiding increased.

In the first place, the growing lawlessness on the frontier was largely attributed to the Marehan. A cycle of retaliatory raiding was set in motion and as a result skirmishes became endemic. The Garre, the Aulihan and the Marehan were all involved in raids.\textsuperscript{2} Relations between the Marehan and those Somali clans that were trying to force their way into the British Protectorate was also at times particularly bitter. Thus there were violent clashes between the Marehan and the Digodia in the north and between the Marehan and the Rer Afgab Aulihan to the east.\textsuperscript{3} Although the latter had allied themselves with the Amhara in their attack on Lugh in January 1908, they soon afterwards fell out with the Ethiopians and throughout the remainder of 1908 crossed into the E.A.P. in large numbers.\textsuperscript{4}

Of course, it would be an oversimplification to imply that the Marehan initiated all the raiding that occurred. In resisting the Digodia and the Rer Afgab, they were doing no more than defend

\textsuperscript{1}C. to G., 20 May 1907, FO.371/192.

\textsuperscript{2}T.S.Thomas (1917), 92; Hope to Chief Sec., 12 June 1910, PC/NFD/4/1/3.

\textsuperscript{3}Z. to G., 10 Dec. 1906, CO.533/28.

\textsuperscript{4}Salkeld to Sadler, 9 Jan. 1908, CO.533/41; H.A.Ward to Hopwood, 13 Nov. 1908, CO.533/56.
their rights over a certain area. Their relationship with their traditional neighbours, the Garre to the west and the Aulihan to the south, was also far from being one-sided. When in 1909 the Marehan twice raided the latter, the first time killing Hassan Warfa, an Aulihan chief, Hope and Salkeld were of the opinion that this unrest was to be partly attributed to the Aulihan themselves and, in particular, to Abdurrahman Mursaal who had been extremely keen to raid the Marehan. The latter knowing this had struck before the Aulihan - who by themselves were weak - had managed to form an alliance with the Rer Afgab.¹ Thus towards the end of 1908, Gwynn had failed to establish more than a temporary cessation of raiding between the Rer Afgab, the Garre and the Marehan.² With the aid of Sheik Abdul Bari Sherif, Gwynn had managed to see all the Marehan chiefs together at a baraza where he had told them that the Government would soon come and that in the mean-time they should settle their disputes before Zaphiro. He had hoped that the imminence of outside control would have acted as a stabiliser, but it had not been long before raiding recommenced. Moreover, when a station was opened at Serenli in June 1910, the agreement that was patched up between the Rer Hassan section of the Marehan and the Aulihan to the south of the Juba proved to be equally transient.³

¹T.S. Thomas (1917), 42.
²G. to C., 11 and 28 Dec. 1908, GO.533/54.
³T.S. Thomas (1917), 43.
At the same time this inter-tribal fighting also had wider implications. In their skirmishes with the Rer Afgab and the Digodia, the Marehan paid scant attention to international boundaries. They frequently crossed the Italian border and in 1909 this led to a complaint from the Italian Ambassador in London. It could of course have been pointed out that the Somali on the Italian side of the river also made raids into the E.A.P., but the reaction at the Colonial Office was conciliatory in the extreme and one official minuted:

We have no sort of administration on our side of the Juba, and altogether we have not got much to say for ourselves. The only thing I can think of is to suggest to the F.O. that they might tell the Italians that the question of the administration of the frontier will engage the attention of the newly appointed Governor of the E.A.P. 1

This at least was honest and very different to the misplaced moral arrogance displayed a few months earlier by Read, another official in the C.O. For, commenting on a report from the Rome correspondent of The Times which had described the Ethiopian attack against Lugh, he had written: "What is really needed, I think, is that the Italian standard of administration should approximate more closely to ours". 2 The Italian complaint, however, made it more difficult for Protectorate officials to remain entirely complacent in the face

1 Butler, Minute, 8 Oct. 1909, CO.533/56.

2 Read, Minute, 9 Jan. 1908, CO.533/41; The Times, 9 Jan. 1908.
of inter-tribal feuding. The policy of non-interference in clan disputes became harder to defend when there were also the wider considerations of international relations to be taken into account.

In January 1910, there was another outbreak of serious raiding between the Marehan and the Rer Afgab. First, the Marehan attacked the latter at Shidileh not far from Dolo. As a result, the Rer Afgab raided Dolo from Italian territory. Since they found no Marehan in the vicinity, they moved down the river recrossing the Juba at Lolleshid (Hillishid) taking with them large quantities of Gobawein stock. In fact the entire Gobawein population to the south of the Juba fled to Lugh, leaving their stock behind. Then in April Abdurrahman Mursaal was reported to be at Fanwen, on the edge of the Marehan territory, with a group of Aulihan and Rer Afgab. It was being rumoured, probably by his enemies, that he intended to start an anti-government policy and to break away from the administration. Dubhar Ugash, head of the Rer Afgab, was said to be in Sidinia (Sidimo?) planning a joint attack on the Marehan with Abdurrahman; the Garre had also been invited to participate but they had refused.

The failure of the E.A.F. to control the frontier was leading to it being increasingly ignored. The Somali had obviously long

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1 W.M.H. Barrett, Intelligence Report from the Abyssinian Frontier, 29 Jan. 1910, CO. 533/72.

2 Intelligence Report from the Abyssinian Frontier received 10 May 1910, in G. to C., 3 June 1910, CO. 533/74.
ignored it, but now the Ethiopians were once again beginning to cross the border near Dolo. In April 1910 Ethiopians under Hussein camped at Dolo and entered the British Protectorate in pursuit of some Rer Afgab. Shortly afterwards, a group of Rer Afgab, Digodia and Galla entered Gobawein territory near Lugh accompanied by Dadi, an Ethiopian official, and nine other Amhara. This was evidently a raiding party searching for loot.¹ Then, as a result of Marehan raids across the Juba, the Italian officer at Merille also crossed the river and fought the Marehan at Ilo Merere (Hillamera) in British territory, capturing many prisoners and stock.²

Yet the factor that made it so necessary to control the Marehan was not just that they were engaged in raiding, but that many were armed with guns. What had made the Ethiopians hesitant of attacking them, and what made them such formidable opponents, was the relatively large number of rifles in their possession. In this respect they differed from all the surrounding tribes. At the end of 1908 the Marehan elders themselves admitted to possessing 500 to 600 guns.³ Just over a year later, it was being suggested

¹G. to C., 7 June 1910, CO.533/74.
²idem, footnote 2.
³G. to C., 28 Dec. 1908, CO.533/54.
that at a low estimate the Marehan must have possessed at least 1,000 guns.\textsuperscript{1} Most of the later figures were merely guesses and when in the middle of 1910 Hope suggested 800 guns, his low figure reflected an optimism that was later proved to be false.\textsuperscript{2}

What had become obvious to Gwynn as early as 1908 was that a greater danger lay in the increasing number of guns in the hands of the Marehan than in the threat of Ethiopian border raids.\textsuperscript{3} Moreover, in the short run the Marehan were also a potential threat to the post at Dolo. Gwynn had considered that the Boma Trading Company fort at Dolo was insecure but dared not recommend its withdrawal because of the adverse psychological effect this would have on the Somali.\textsuperscript{4}

The Marehan obtained their guns from two sources. One was by trade, the other from the migration southwards of fully armed Marehan clans. Since the Marehan were rich in cattle, they were certainly able to engage actively in the arms trade, and Zaphiro had already concluded that there was a considerable traffic in arms across the river Juba. Yet it may be doubted whether this trade was itself a major factor before 1911 in the arming of the Marehan. Most of the guns traded across the Juba came originally

\textsuperscript{1}Intelligence Report from the Abyssinian Frontier, 4 May 1910, in G. to C., 7 June 1910, CO.533/74.

\textsuperscript{2}Hope, Report, 30 July 1910, CO.533/76.

\textsuperscript{3}Cf. the view of Ass. D.C. Mansergh in 1907 that it would be a "big problem", M. to Salkeld, 19 Nov. 1907, CO.533/41.

\textsuperscript{4}G. to C., 12 Dec. 1908, CO.533/54.
from Jibuti via Ethiopia. They were French and their price increased progressively the further west they were sold. At Serenli a rifle could be bought for seven milch cows whereas at El Wak the price was eleven milch cows. On the one occasion when definite figures were available, and when the Garre were said to be buying very heavily, a sale of 26 guns was recorded, but this appears to have been exceptional. It would seem more probable that before 1911 this trade was very limited. This can be inferred from the very few guns in the hands of Somali clans apart from the Marehan. Then, even amongst the Marehan, the Rer Hassan did not possess large numbers of guns. In fact, it was generally agreed by all observers that most of the guns were in the hands of the galti Marehan who had brought these with them from further north.

Another dimension to the problem was added by the fact that almost all the galti Marehan had previously fought in Northern Somaliland under Sheik Muhammad Abdille Hassan. Nor could it be assumed that because they had left Sheik Muhammad, they were now opposed to his aims. The galti, as far as one can judge, only appear

1For a general picture of the arms trade in East Africa in the period 1885-1902, see: R.W. Beachey, "The arms trade in East Africa", J.A.H., III no. 3 (1962).
3Intelligence Report from the Abyssinian Frontier, 10 May 1910, CO.533/74.
5Hope to Chief Sec., 7 June 1910, FC/NFD/4/1/3.
to have been dissatisfied with the material spoils from the jihad further north. In coming south they intended to acquire cattle, and the galti under Shirre Jamaa, a former headman of Sheik Muhammad's were noted for their indiscriminate raiding.¹

While the migration of the galti Marehan towards the Juba did not in itself imply any necessary extension of Sheik Munammad's rebellion, the British were very concerned at the possibility of links between the galti and the Sheik being renewed. At the beginning of 1910, Abdulahi Moho Igo was reported to be raiding ten days to the east of Lugh, but a few months earlier he had sent a letter to the Marehan saying that the Sheik had appointed him governor of Jubaland. This news was treated very seriously.² So too was the news from Aden Ali of the Habr Awal that several hundred galti Marehan had very recently come from Sheik Muhammad and had settled to the south of the Juba. These Marehan had already attacked the Shagal and had also crossed the Juba between Bardera and Lugh raiding into Italian Somaliland. It was even said that they intended to raid the whole of Borana.³ Certainly the Garre were a prime target.⁴

¹T.S.Thomas (1917), 92; G. to C., 11 Dec. 1908, CO.533/54; I.N. Dracopoli, Through Jubaland to the Lorien Swamp (London, 1914), 44.
³G. to C., 7 June 1910, CO.533/74.
⁴J.O.W.Hope, Intelligence Report from the Abyssinian frontier, May 1910, CO.533/75.
From the very beginning, when the problem was first recognised, Gwynn had suggested disarming the Marehan. Having made peace between the various sections at the end of 1908 he had wished to ensure its continuation. Yet the Marehan had wisely refused to surrender their rifles unless offered armed protection in return, and at that time Gwynn's other proposals for securing the frontier had to be shelved because of the difficulty in getting Treasury approval for the expense. In the process, the suggestion that the Marehan be disarmed was forgotten. In May 1910, however, Col. Thesiger, the Inspector General of the K.A.R., once again drew attention to the problem by noting that the new administration of the frontier and the plan to occupy Dolo would necessitate the disarmament of the Marehan. With too few troops on the frontier and the Marehan being well armed, Thesiger argued that a policy of observation was inviting disaster; and he was supported in this view by Barrett, a new District Commissioner on the frontier.

A few months later, Hope, the new Officer Commanding in the N.F.D., also pointed out that the Marehan had to be taken in hand

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1 G. to C., 23 Dec. 1908, CO.533/54.

2 Gwynn, General Report, CO.533/69.

3 G. Thesiger, "Memorandum on military aspects of southern Abyssinian boundary question", 23 May 1910, CO.533/72.

without delay. He considered the disarming of the Marehan the most serious problem to be settled, and suggested sending a company from Serenli to Dolo in September - when the Juba was in full flood and could not be crossed - to show that the Government meant business. But he also formed the over-hasty and naive impression that disarmament would be quite easy. Girouard had to warn him that for the time being the policy was one of observation, and so, despite a growing consensus that the Marehan needed to be disarmed urgently, nothing was done. ¹

Thus there began more than three years of debate, during which time the problem was allowed to grow. The main stumbling block was undoubtedly the speed with which administration had been introduced into most of Jubaland and the J.F.D. Having decided to double the area administered in the E.A.P. in one year, Girouard was not in a position to sanction further expense. As it was, the administration that had been approved had been spread too thinly over too wide an area; too much had been undertaken too quickly and a costly expedition to disarm the Marehan was out of the question in 1910.

At the beginning of 1911, Girouard was still insistent that there was no need to disarm the Marehan, despite advice from Salkeld

¹Hope, Report, July 1910, in G. to C., 1 Aug. 1910, CO.533/76; Hope to Chief. Sec., 7 June 1910, PC/NFD/4/1/3.
and Thesiger (in Addis) to the contrary, and he now began to suggest that it was more important to gain the confidence of the Marehan than to take any action against them. At the Colonial Office there was general agreement with Girouard and Read minuted: "No case has been made out for disarmament". But when Girouard next wrote about the Marehan it was in two rather contradictory letters, both dated 24 June. In one he suggested united action with the Italians on the river Juba so as to prevent the Marehan from crossing the river. In the other he claimed that it was impossible to prevent the tribes from arming themselves and also that it was unfair to leave tribes in the British Protectorate unarmed, unless the administration could protect them. He then suggested arming tribes along the border with old rifles which, somewhat incongruously, he thought would help in the "pacification of the frontier". It was this muddle-headedness that led Lord Lucas, then Under-Secretary for the Colonies, to minute:

Sir P. Girouard is as usual difficult to follow. On 23555 he suggests disarming on 23404 he suggests arming - anything in fact that will relieve him of his responsibility of keeping order himself. The drawbacks to disarming a tribe seem obvious... I should do neither the one nor the other... We would like to be given an idea of his policy... we cannot deal with these matters piecemeal.

1 T. to G., 27 April 1911 and G. to H., 25 May 1911, CO.533/88; Blois to Salkeld, 12 April 1911, PC/JUB/1/17/1. Cf. Archer to T., 12 Sept. 1911, PC/NFD/4/1/3.

2 Read, Minute, 24 June 1911, CO.533/88.

3 G. to H., 24 June 1911, no. 348 and 349, CO.533/88.

4 Lord Lucas, Minute, 20 July 1911, CO.533/88.
A further suggestion was now made by Col. Breiding, the new Officer Commanding Troops in the N.F.D., who thought that small detachments which had been planned at Dolo and Banissa were inadvisable. He wished to put civil officers in these posts backed by a few troops. He also thought that Salkeld's and Hope's proposals to disarm the Marehan would not work. For the first time it was mentioned that the Somali would be unlikely to hand over their guns without bitter resistance; it was a good point, and an important one, but surprisingly it was soon lost sight of.¹

Naturally, Girouard backed Breiding's judgment concerning the disarmament of the Marehan and advised that only two courses were open to the Government. Either the policy of observation could be continued and internal tribal affairs left alone, or all administration could be withdrawn as had happened in British Somaliland.² These alternatives, however, were really far from realistic, for six months later Girouard himself was suggesting, and indeed implementing, an entirely different policy. This was based on the results of Col. Thesiger's journey of Nov. 1911 with Archer across Marehan country.³

A few weeks after the latter had returned to Nairobi in January 1912, a small conference was held in which the N.F.D. was discussed. Both Thesiger and Archer had prepared Memoranda, and


³G.N. French, "A Journey from the river Juba by Dolo, Moyale and Mt. Marsabit to the Uaso Nyiro", G.J., XLIII (1913), 430.
Thesiger maintained that it was no longer possible to continue with a policy of non-intervention. He pointed out some of the anomalies of the system. The administration restrained the Garre from raiding the Marehan, but then allowed the Marehan to raid them in return. He claimed that this was having a very bad effect on those tribes which were thought to be pro-government - precisely because their attitude was dependent on their receiving protection. At the same time, Thesiger did not think that this was the right moment for disarming the Marehan. Instead, he suggested that the first step was to gain some control over them. He recognised that this would necessitate additional troops and thought that another company or two sections of camel corps would suffice.¹

Archer also thought that disarming the Marehan would involve a serious risk of hostilities, and he concluded that the wisest course was to let the whole matter rest until political officers had got into closer touch with the clan. Archer also agreed with Breading that the posts at Dolo and Banissa served no useful purpose, and he also thought it would be wiser to rely on political officers in those areas.²

Given these very similar and very cautious approaches to the problem, both with their very clear insistence that disarmament

¹ Thesiger, "Memorandum on the N.F.D.", n.d. in CO 533/103.
was unwise at the moment, it is somewhat surprising to find Girouard writing that during the conference both Archer and Thesiger advised that the Marehan had to be disarmed at once. Could Girouard have oversimplified their views or did they both change their minds in the space of two weeks? Girouard, at any rate, wrote at once to Lord Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary, to say that, anticipating Government approval, he had told Hope to return to the frontier with a message for the Garre chiefs, that administration would be extended to Marehan country in 1913. Archer was also told to get in touch with the Marehan and to inform them of this. It was clear that what Girouard was attempting was not the disarmament of the Marehan, however, but their closer administration; limited interference in tribal matters was to be the new norm.¹

At the beginning of October 1912, a patrol under Hope moved into Marehan territory. Within two weeks it was being suggested that the patrol would end by December, when one company would be left to garrison Marehan country and the other would return to Serenli.² The rapid success of the patrol seemed assured, but early in 1913 it became apparent that it had not produced the good

¹G. to H., 21 Feb. 1912, CO.533/102. Another important outcome of this conference was that the NFD administration was given control over its police, see: T.H.R. Cashmore, Unpub. Thesis (1965), 347.
results that had been anticipated. At the beginning of January, Hope seemed optimistic enough. He had just concluded a tour of Marehan country and he felt that they were inclined to obey the government and keep quiet, though more disturbingly he also said that they might revert to their old raiding habits:

The Marehan are not yet convinced, he wrote, that the government intends to remain in the country and I have heard from several sources that the galti think that if they keep quiet for a month or two the government will withdraw.

Yet on the surface everything was satisfactory. Hope pointed out that energetic patrolling would continue to be necessary for it would be a pity to risk an outbreak of trouble by reducing the number of troops too soon. Paradoxically, it was now also important to protect the Marehan from their former enemies, such as the Rahanwein, who were threatening to settle old scores; this would only have started another round of fighting. At the time Girouard felt that matters were satisfactory, but as it happened Hope's forebodings turned out to be only too true.

On March 6th, Mure telegraphed from Lugh that the Far Ugas Marehan had been openly defiant. He requested permission to take

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1 B. to H., 17 Oct. 1912, co.533/107.
2 T.S.Thomas (1917), 47.
3 Hope to Sec., 14 Jan.1913, co.533/116.
immediate action against them, and this was given two days later when he was told to take whatever action he felt to be necessary. On 12 March Mure telegraphed again to say that a large party of Rer Ali Aulihan had crossed the Juba and that the Far Ugas had seized them. The Rer Ali had thirty rifles and about 900 camels, but the Far Ugas refused to hand them over and were unfriendly. By the end of April, however, he had concluded a successful punitive expedition against the Far Ugas. Then on 2 May, Mure suddenly requested permission to disarm all the Marehan sections. He said he thought it necessary and that the opportunity was favourable. Yet he gave no further reason and the request was contained in an extremely short three sentence telegram of less than 24 words.¹ This request involving an important policy decision was passed on to Col. Graham, the OCT in the Protectorate who gave this amazing reply:

Mr. Mure is the man on the spot, and he will naturally have discussed the project with Cpt. Soems and has doubtless gauged the feelings amongst the Marehan and what effect such action would have. I think the proposal is sound and disarmament will have to be carried out sooner or later.²

But the proposal was not sound. Of course disarmament would have to be tackled some time, though to attempt this with only 150

¹ B. to H., 19 July 1913, CO.533/120 plus all the enclosures.
² idem.
troops was little short of foolhardy. Yet even more fantastic, once the Governor had given his approval, the Chief Secretary sent Mure a telegram approving his scheme.\(^1\) It was not until 18 July that Harcourt was sent a telegram saying that there were no grounds for anxiety, but that the situation in the north could become serious. Bowring, the Acting Governor, explained for the first time that on 8 May the disarmament of the Marehan had been approved: "Without telling us!!!", Harcourt minuted, adding "a stupid telegram and a dangerous situation".\(^2\)

The situation was indeed serious and complicated. The only cause for optimism lay in the fact that the Marehan were divided, and, given careful handling, the government need only expect to be opposed by a few sections. There were two main Marehan segments: the Rer Hassan and the Rer Isaq. The Rer Hassan were generally found further to the south and it was said that they wished to cut themselves off from the latter. The two sections did not get on well, and there had been occasions when they had raided each other.\(^3\) The head of the Rer Hassan was Ahmed Aden Roble, and it was assumed from the start that he would help the government.\(^4\)

The Rer Isaq were divided into four main groups. The Rer Farah Ugash under Farah Got, who though old was still very much in command. He was, however, assisted by two sub-chiefs, Guhad Fihli, \(^\text{idem.}\)

\(^1\) Harcourt, Minute, 18 and 19 July 1913, C0.533/120.
\(^3\) Col. Theiger, "Memorandum on the NFD", 29 Jan. 1913, C0.533/103.
who was young with a quick brain, and Haili, who was old and without much say. Then there were the Ali Dera under Sheik Ismail, though it was claimed that he had little control over his section, and the Ahmed Wet who were led forcefully by Shirre Jamaa. The latter had always refused to meet a government official. Lastly there were the Her Tallhe, a small section of little importance.¹

But the most important division within the Marehan was between galti, the new arrivals, and the geydu, those who had been in the area some time. Most of the new arrivals belonged to Her Isaq sub-sections; many had fought under Muhammad Abdille Hassan and almost all had arrived without stock. They raided, not only other tribes, but also other sections of the Marehan as well.²

Government policy was based on the assumption that the galti were only to be found amongst the Her Isaq, that they alone were responsible for raids against the Aulihan, the Garre and the Gobawein, and that other Marehan sections were friendly towards the administration. This, however, was an oversimplification. It was also felt that Sheik Ismail was the only important Her Isaq sub-clan head who was friendly and that with Government backing

¹ idem.

² Capt. Blois, Notes on the Marehan, PC/NFD/4/6/1.
his influence would increase. Yet because of serious ill-health, his influence was in fact not very great and he was unable to be of any assistance to the administration.¹

The Protectorate Government obviously needed to exploit the inherent divisiveness amongst the Marehan sections, though before an attempt was made to disarm them the administration had succeeded in arousing a very widespread sense of hostility amongst most of the important segments. Hope had antagonised the Ahmed Wet when he had mediated in a dispute between them and the Ref Farah Ugash. He had ordered the Ahmed Wet to pay blood-money for a man killed, and they had stalled sending in too few cattle. He had then arrested five of their chiefs when the diya was paid at once. But Hope's decision in the dispute and his manner of enforcing it meant that he forfeited any goodwill the Ahmed Wet may have had for the frontier administration.² Yet having alienated the Ahmed Wet, Hope and Mure then proceeded to lose the support of the Farah Ugash by ordering them to hand over some Ref Ali Aulihan whom they were virtually keeping prisoners. The limited punitive expedition of March 1913 had been aimed against the Farah Ugash in order to make them comply with this order. Admittedly there was

¹Hope to Sec., 14 Jan. 1913, CO.533/116.
little chance of an alliance between these two important sections, for they were engaged in a struggle over which should be considered the senior section. Yet both were now firmly antagonistic towards the government. Thus the immediate background to disarmament could hardly have been considered particularly favourable, what followed was fiasco.

When Mure asked for, and received, permission to disarm all the Marehan sections in May 1913, he appears to have planned their disarmament one at a time, and he decided to begin with the Rer Ahmed Wet. On 19 May they were ordered to surrender their arms and it is clear that Mure never considered the possibility that the Marehan might have resisted just such an order. At any rate, this was the impression that he later gave to Graham, while at the same time he wrote revealingly that "the employment of force was not then contemplated". He appears to have completely misunderstood the nature of his earlier success over the Rer Farah Ugas and to have drawn the wrong conclusions from it.

As late as May 25th it was being confidently and unrealistically predicted that the Ahmed Wet would surrender half their rifles, but by the end of the month reports began to reach Serenli that the Ahmed Wet and the Ali Dera were preparing to resist the government.

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1 Cpt. Soames to G., 16 March 1913, CO. 533/118.
3 Mure to Sec., 11 June 1913, CO. 533/120; Graham to French, 14 July 1913, CO. 533/136.
4 Extract from Cpt. Soames's Diary, CO. 533/123.
To Mure the explanation seemed to lie in false rumours that
the government intended raiding the Ahmed Wet, yet the adminis-
tration’s intelligence was both patchy and unreliable. No good
reason was found for explaining why the Ali Dera should have
thought of joining with the Ahmed Wet. It was assumed that Sheik
Ismail was responsible for forming an anti-government alliance,
despite the fact that he was then extremely ill and died in the
middle of June.¹

It was also at first naively assumed that the Rer Farah
Ugas and the Bon Marehan were friendly towards the government
simply because they had sent in messages pledging their loyalty
to the administration, though from their subsequent actions it
was obvious that they had been simply playing for time.² The
Farah Ugas had herds of cattle that were close to Semeli and
so vulnerable to attack; they doubtless wished to remove them
to a secure area. Mure was certainly more realistic when he
wrote that all the Marehan sections had combined against the
government, and that the best policy was to wait until they
broke up.³

Towards the end of May, when both Mure and Cpt. Soames
realised that the Marehan as a whole were firmly opposed to

¹Ib id.
²Major Hickson, "Report", CO.533/123.
³Mure to Sec., 11 June 1913, CO.533/120.
surrendering their arms they decided to withdraw; but on June 7th orders were received to disarm all sections of the Marehan. Yet by this date most sections had moved a very considerable distance from the government post at Serenli and there was no possibility of surprise. The Rer Ahmed Wet and the Ali Dera were grazing at Rumbali, Arras, Makalla and on the river Daua. The Bon Marehan were also very far north, while the Farah Ugas were at Garba Harre and Burgudud. Apart from the Farah Ugas the other Rer Isaq sections were thought to possess 430 guns and the Rer Hassan 200, but these were vague guesses.

In July two government agents, Deria Chakal and Sheriff Abdul Bari were sent to inform the Marehan that they had to surrender their arms, but the Marehan ridiculed the idea and threatened the agents. They sent letters to Serenli saying that they wanted peace yet they refused to disarm. Moreover, there were rumours that the Marehan were buying particularly large amounts of ammunition and that they had sent envoys to the Garre, Digodia and Boran asking leave to enter their territory if pursued by the British. There was also a possibility that the Marehan would unite. For at the

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1 Extracts from Cpt. Soames's & Major Hickson's Diaries, CO.533/123.
2 In Jan. 1913 the Marehan were transferred from the Northern Frontier District to Jubaland, and so had to be approached via Serenli.
3 Extracts from Cpt. Soames's diaries, CO.533/123.
beginning of July, just one week after Sheik Ismail died, Haj Muhammad crossed over from Bardera into the Protectorate. He was a Mrehan with a reputation for holiness, he had spent several years in Mecca and it was said that he had been a disciple of Sheik Muhammad Abdille Hassan. He was soon to provide the Ali Dera with the leadership that they lacked. But there were further reports, all of them unconfirmed, that he was trying to combine all sections of the Marehan and that he had sent envoys north to get support from the Sheik.¹

It was a situation that needed careful handling and there is little evidence that it received this. On August 27th Bowring telegraphed to say that the disarmament of the Marehan ought to be enforced but that this required additional troops. He added that he had consulted with Graham.² The minutes on this telegram were scathing. Sir John Fiddes wrote:

Mr. Bowring's telegram is quite inadequate. Either there are reasons which have made disarmament imperative in which case he should have stated them; or there are not in which case he should not have made the proposal.³

More information was requested, as was the substance of Col. Graham's views.

¹Extracts from Major Hickson's diary, CO.533/123.
²B. to H., 27 Aug. 1913, CO.533/121.
³Fiddes, 29 Aug. 1913, CO.533/121.
This led Bowring to telegraph again his opinion that disarmament was necessary and also the contents of a Memorandum by Graham which stated, for the first time, that the Marehan had been given an ultimatum. They had been told to disarm by 15 August; not only that, but Graham with apparent unconcern had written: "I don't think they will"! Harcourt's reaction was acid:

In my opinion the matter has not been handled satisfactorily by the Government. I understand that an ultimatum was sent to the Ahmed Wet and the Ali Dera to bring in their rifles by the 15th August although it appears that you were not in a position to enforce that ultimatum.

Harcourt pointed out that shortly before Bowring had stated that there were sufficient troops, and now he was requesting more. The tone of the letter was bitter and stinging in its rebuke. Bowring's muddled and semi-coherent replies did not help matters. He argued that the military position in Marehan country was normal and the reason for disarming the Somali was purely political. Now that the ultimatum had been given it had to be enforced, since not to do so would appear weak; this, despite the fact that Graham claimed he had never intended to enforce the ultimatum anyway.

2 H. to B., 26 Sept., 1913, CO.533/121.
3 B. to H., 1 Sept. 1913 and G., Memo., 25 Aug. 1913, CO.533/121.
Not surprisingly, Sir G. Fiddes, then Assistant Under-Secretary, advised: "I would write stiffly about this", and Harcourt agreed adding, "think we have been badly treated by our local representative".\(^1\) By November Belfield, the Governor, had come to the conclusion that Col. Graham had committed a grave error of judgment and that he had not succeeded in justifying his action. The most that Graham could say in his defence was that it had been necessary to give the Marehan a time limit "for reasons of prestige", and that he had not thought of attacking them if they had not complied. This of course left unanswered the question of how he had proposed to deal with the loss of prestige in the event of his orders being disobeyed.\(^2\)

One result of these recriminations was that active measures against the Marehan were delayed. Major Hickson was ordered to disarm the Marehan by peaceful methods and naturally enough he claimed that this was not possible. It was not until the end of December 1913 that permission was given very reluctantly for operations to begin against the Marehan. By then there was the risk of a general Marehan revolt if firm action was not taken promptly.

Col. Graham was told to deal with the situation as he thought best and to bear in mind that vigorous action at the outset could

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\(^1\) T. Minute, 2 Sept. 1913, CO.533/121.

\(^2\) G. to Sec., 1 Nov. 1913 and B. to H., 14 Nov. 1913, CO.533/124.
prevent prolonged hostilities. Since a short campaign was essential, the poor communications between Jubaland and Nairobi posed a problem. Telegrams were sent in code from the Italian wireless station at Bardera, yet many arrived mutilated and barely comprehensible; some were quite unintelligible. On November 17th a telegram from Jubaland was so badly mutilated as to be undecipherable. The reply, however, suffered the same fate, and this sort of mishap led to frustration and delay.¹

It always seemed unlikely to the Protectorate administration that the Garre, the Aulihan or the Muhammad Zubeir would join with the Marehan.² But one disturbing development towards the end of 1913 was the very large number of Ajuran who were crossing from the Italian Protectorate into Marehan country. It was estimated that 30 Ajuran villages with 400 rifles had moved into the British Protectorate. Moreover there were other Ajuran ready to cross the Juba under Isslo Saddik who were said to possess 300 rifles. If these figures were correct, then the number of rifles in Marehan territory had suddenly almost doubled; and it was unlikely that the Ajuran would submit to disarmament any more than the Marehan, while their presence in the Protectorate was just one more

² Read, Minute, 18 Dec. 1913, CO.533/125; H. to B., 23 Nov. 1913, CO.533/132.
additional factor exacerbating an already difficult situation.¹

In November, Hoskins, the new Inspector General of the K.A.R. held two barazas at Serenli: the first with the Malimigs, a sub-section of the Rer Hassan, the second with the chiefs of the Rer Farah Ugás. He concluded that the Ahmed Wet, the Ali Dera and almost all the Rer Hassan were hostile, but that the Farah Ugás were probably prepared to help pay off old scores, while the Bon Marehan and the Rer Tullha were waiting to see how events developed. Yet as Hoskins readily admitted, the collection of intelligence was extremely difficult. He also thought that the Marehan were rapidly increasing the number of rifles in their possession, though he attached little importance to his maintaining that they did not know how to use them effectively. The problem of collecting reliable intelligence was that there were no Somali speaking officers. Interpreters had to be used all the time and they were not always trustworthy.² One of the most important, Ibrahim Aden Effendi, had been found guilty of working in collusion with the Marehan who were often unusually well informed about the government's intentions. Later it was discovered that he was married to a niece of Sheik Ismail.³

¹Major Hickson's Diary, CO.533/123.
²H. to B., 2 and 23 Nov. 1913, CO.533/132.
³Thomas to Chief Sec., 22 Sept. 1913 and "Evidence in the case of Somali Ibrahim Aden commonly known as Ibrahim Effendi", PC/NFD/4/1/5.
The growing catalogue of complications made depressing reading at the Colonial Office. "I am weary of this business", Harcourt minuted, and Sir John Anderson, the Permanent Under-Secretary, added: "a very unsatisfactory position. We must wait as proposed but we may be let in for a big affair. I hope Colonel Graham is better in the field than he has shown himself as an advisor". But Graham did not distinguish himself in the field. On January 19th a convoy left Serenli for Gare Bahare. Three days later it was ambushed and attacked. The tenacity and determination of the attacking force was considered quite exceptional and it was certainly unexpected. Lieutenant Bentinck was wounded and the convoy, too small to divide, was forced to return ignominiously to Serenli. Graham himself later admitted that the numbers, arms and spirit of the Marehan had been hopelessly underestimated. The position was that there were 205 rank and file at Gare Bahare. They were without transport but they had food till mid-May, and 300 rounds per man. Yet contact with them was impossible. The Marehan controlled the roads and prevented messages being sent. As a result

1Anderson, 3 Feb. and Harcourt, 4 Feb. 1914, CO.533/132.

2Moyse-Bartlett (1956), 255 ff., has written a very anodyne account of the Jubaland expedition of 1913 which completely glosses over the incompetence of Col. Graham and other difficulties. This seems to have been due to his exclusive reliance on the K.A.R.files and his failure to consult the CO.533 series.

Graham did not even know if the garrison was being besieged, though he assumed that it was, and in these circumstances he requested reinforcements.¹

This request, when forwarded to London, once again led a weary Harcourt to comment on Belfield's failure to keep him informed. He replied sarcastically that he assumed the failure to relieve Gare Bahare was due to lack of transport rather than to any lack of troops, but it was clear that Graham felt his problem to be a lack of men. Belfield's problem at this juncture, however, was that most of the telegrams that Graham was sending arrived partially mutilated so that it was difficult for him to get a clear idea of the situation in Jubaland.²

By February it was being admitted that the situation at Serenli was very serious indeed. The Gare Bahare detachment was cut off, and Graham felt that he could not get through without active Aulihan support. Moreover, if the Somli presented a united front he did not think he had enough troops. Having once been over optimistic, he now seems to have wanted to prepare in advance for the worst possible contingency. For the likelihood of a general Somali alliance had become so remote as to have no practical bearing on the course of events. The Aulihan, however, proved sufficiently reliable and with their assistance Graham reached Gare Bahare on February 23rd. Three

¹G. to B., 4 Feb. 1914 and B. to H., 16 Feb. 1914, CO.533/133.  
days later he left for Makalla, and on 6th March he arrived at Lugh.¹

The sudden success of the Marehan expedition seems to have been as unexpected as its earlier failure. Yet there was no crushing victory. Graham very sensibly remained content with a show of force, and quietly abandoned the whole object of the expedition. He came to the conclusion that he did not have enough troops to enforce disarmament, and after a short stay at Lugh he returned to Serenli. When he moved up to Gare Behare in April, all the Marehan sections had surrendered a few rifles, except for the Rer Hassan. A small fine was imposed and by June it was decided that all opposition was at an end. The total number of guns surrendered was a derisory 192.²

An important element in the final success of the Marehan expedition had been the active support given to the government by the Aulihan. It was surprising, therefore, that even before the expedition had finally come to an end, Col. Graham was writing that some action would soon have to be taken against the latter.³

But the truth was that their relationship with the Marehan was

²B. to H., 29 June 1914 and G. to Sec., 23 April 1914, CO.533/138.
³G. to B., 7 April 1914, CO.533/137.
extremely complex and very far from conforming to a stereotype of simple hostility.

Nevertheless, there was considerable friction between the Marehan and the Aulihan, and the causes were multiple. In the first place, there was direct competition over grazing. The northernmost Aulihan sections often skirmished with the southernmost Rer Hassan and it is interesting that, from the time of the very first reports of this fighting, the Aulihan were always depicted as the aggressors. Yet initially they must have been weaker than the Marehan and, though capable of harassing a section or two, they cannot have posed any very serious threat. With the migration of the Rer Afgab Aulihan to the south of the Juba from 1908 onwards, however, the situation radically altered. The Rer Afgab upset the balance of power between the Marehan and the Aulihan, and by greatly strengthening the latter encouraged them in their aggressive thrust northwards.

In the following three years, Abdurrahman Mursaal, head of the Aulihan, frequently planned raids against the Marehan in conjunction with those Rer Afgab sections that still remained behind in the Italian Protectorate; while those that had crossed into the

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2 Ward to Hopwood, 23 Nov. 1908, CO.533/56.
E.A.P. generally fought with him.¹

Other causes of enmity could be traced to the support offered by the Marehan to the Muhammad Zubeir in the latter's dispute with the Aulihan in 1907/8, when Omar Murgham had been killed.² Then in 1909 Hassan Warfa, a highly popular Aulihan chief, was killed as a result of a Marehan raid and the blood feud that followed also embittered relations between the two groups.³ It is possible that the differing relationship of the Aulihan and the Marehan on to Sheik Muhammad's jihad further north was yet another factor leading to friction. For it was generally agreed that the Rer Afgab had migrated south in order to escape from the detrimental effects of the Sheik's wars, and that they had been the victims of his raids; they certainly had no sympathy with his cause.⁴ The Marehan, on the other hand, were closely linked to Sheik Muhammad's movement and many had fought with him.⁵

¹The numbers were far from negligible and in July 1910 Hope wrote of 1,000 Rer Afgab fighting with the Jubaland Aulihan: Hope, Intelligence Report, CO.533/76; W.E.H. Barrett, Intelligence, 29 Jan. 1910, CO.533/72; G. to C., 3 June 1910, CO.533/74; Hope, Intelligence, 10 May 1910, CO.533/75; G. to H., 2 March 1911, CO.533/85.
²Elliott to G., 1 Feb. 1914, CO.533/138.
³T.S. Thomas (1917), 41-2; E. to G., 1 Feb. 1914, CO.533/138.
⁴T.S. Thomas (1917), 92; G. to C., 3 June 1910, CO.533/74.
⁵See my article on Sheik Mohammad Abdille Hassan's impact in Jubaland, J.A.H., X no. 4 (1969), for further details.
But the government's attempt to disarm the Marehan in 1912/1913 introduced a new and complicating factor into their relationship. No doubt the Aulihan welcomed the possibility that their powerful neighbour, whose interests often clashed with theirs, would be seriously weakened. Yet the Aulihan also feared that the disarmament of the Marehan would be a forerunner to the disarming of all other Somali clans, and when the Rer Hassan appealed to the Aulihan for help against the government, they played upon this fear and argued that it was in the latter's self-interest to join with them. The Rer Afwa Aulihan gave a favourable reply but refused to commit themselves to any definite scheme; the Rer Ali also vaguely promised support but urged delay.\(^1\)

At the time, however, there does not seem to have been much enthusiasm to get involved in what was still a localised dispute between the administration and the Marehan. Yet as an insurance against future complications, the Aulihan made a secret treaty with the Muhammad Zubeir in September 1912, in which they agreed to combine against the government if any attempt was made to disarm either of them.\(^2\)

However, it appears that the threatened disarmament of the Marehan became an extremely divisive issue amongst the Aulihan.

\(^1\) E. to G., 20 May 1914, CO.533/138.
\(^2\) E. to G., 1 Feb. 1914, CO.533/138.
From the middle of 1913, there were reports of Her Tullha Marehan living peaceably amongst the Her Afwa Aulihan and buying arms from the latter. On the other hand, there was also evidence of a desire amongst the Her Afgab to assist Government troops against the Marehan, while Abdurrahman Mursaal attempted to steer a moderately pro-government course. Yet in December 1913 this led the Aboukr Jibrail Aulihan (which included the Her Afwa, Her Ali and Her Kassim) to break away from Abdurrahman. They made secret arrangements with the Marehan to live in peace with them and to forego all claims for past raids. As this was by far the largest Aulihan section around Serenli, the government could only count on the support of the Her Afgab and the Her Wafata both of whom continued to back Abdurrahman. This had been one factor delaying Col. Graham's advance on Gare Bahare. For he could not obtain sufficient Aulihan support and even Abdurrahman was suspected of playing a double-game and passing information on to the Marehan.

With the return to peace and the settlement of fines, almost the first question to be put to the civil administration that was about to be introduced was what sort of relationship would there be between the Marehan and the Aulihan. Would the Marehan be

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1 Extract from Major Hickson’s Diary, 11 Aug. 1913, CO.533/123.

2 E. to G., 1 Feb. 1914, CO.533/138; G. to B., 7 April 1914, CO.533/136.

3 B. to H., 20 Feb. 1914, CO.533/133; G. to Chief Sec., 12 Feb. 1914, CO.533/134; Intelligence, Precis of Information, 1 Feb. 1914, CO.533/138.
administered from Serenli which they associated with Abdurrahman and Aulihan control, and what was to happen to those Aulihan living in Marehan country.¹ These questions revealed deep fears that were not stilled by the absence of convincing answers.

During 1915 raids between the Aulihan and the Marehan reached new proportions, and the claims and counter-claims between them became increasingly complex. Elliott, the new head of the constabulary at Serenli, tried to make peace between them and failed. His offer to arbitrate was accepted by the Marehan but rejected by the Aulihan;² and as a result he began to put pressure on the Aulihan to stop them raiding. This gave the Aulihan the impression that Elliott was biased against them, and in January 1916 it was being reported that they were very disturbed at not being allowed to regain stock looted from them. The Rer Afgab asked for permission to recross back into the Italian Protectorate, and Abdurrahman told Elliott that all the Aulihan wanted to leave the E.A.P.³ Elliott, however, took his time before giving a decision and Aulihan patience ran out. On 1st February they attacked the Marehan and it was said that they seized about 700 camels.⁴ Elliott's

¹Memo on a Baraza with the Marehan, 16 June 1914, CO.533/139.
³Power to Chief Sec., 4 Jan. 1916, CO.533/167; "Evidence at Court of Enquiry in the sack of Serenli", in P. to Chief Sec., 10 March 1916, CO.533/167.
⁴Rayne, to OCT.N.F.D., 14 Feb. 1916, CO.533/167.
reaction was to refuse permission to cross over to the Italian side until all the looted cattle had been returned. Moreover, he issued an ultimatum that it had to be returned within three days or the Aulihan would face the consequences, and Abdurrahman was warned that if the ultimatum was not complied with he would be sent to Kismayu and imprisoned.¹

Elliott's decision to force a confrontation may have been good policy, but his utter failure to realise the risks involved indicates a faulty judgment. The day after the ultimatum had been given, Abdurrahman consulted with ten other Aulihan elders and proposed attacking Serenli. The preparations were hasty and were not made entirely in secret. For a Herti trader learnt of them and went to Elliott to warn him. It was claimed that in reply Elliott took an egg and dropped it saying "So end all Somali attacks".² The Herti then crossed over to Bardera where he informed the Italian Commissioner of the planned Marehan attack. The Commissioner also warned Elliott who replied brusquely that he could look after his own affairs. On the day of the attack Abdurrahman sent Elliott a black bullock, a black goat and a black sheep. It was a menacing sign signifying hostility, but again Elliott dismissed its significance. He rejected a suggestion that the troops be allowed to

¹Llewellyn, Intelligence, 1 May 1916, WAJ/16.
²E.A.T. Dutton, Lillibullero or the Golden Road (Zanzibar, 1944), 290.
sleep with their rifles that night, and yet perhaps, after all, he was not totally blind to the impending danger. For that night he gave his orderly a rifle, and the latter had been without a gun for months. Maybe this small act - so out of keeping with the otherwise total abandonment of all precaution - offers a clue to the true state of Elliott's mind; or perhaps it was without significance. Yet the orderly himself was surprised at this act and never discovered for certain why he had been given a gun,\(^1\) while on February 3rd 1916, Serenli was sacked, Elliott was killed.

For Elliott the Aulihan problem consisted almost entirely of their relationship to the Marehan. Yet, in fact, the Aulihan problem seen in its totality was rather broader than this. For other sections had moved further west to Wajir and to the Lorian Swamp. In 1915/1916 there was a confrontation in this area too, one that was perhaps less dramatic, but nevertheless it was to exercise the minds of future administrators to a far greater extent than the crisis at Serenli which did not really have any long term implications.

\(^1\) Power to Chief Sec., 29 Feb. 1916, CO.533/167; Llewellyn, Intelligence, 1 May 1916, WAJ/13.
Chapter XI

WAJIR AND THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT

When Zaphiro had handed over to Barrett in 1909, he had pinpointed two main trouble spots along the northern frontier: Wajir and the upper Juba. Wajir was an important well complex. The supply of water there seemed inexhaustible and it was the only water for about 70 miles in any direction; it was also on the caravan route from Moyale and southern Ethiopia to Kismayu. The wells themselves were spread over twenty miles from north to south, and from the end of the 19th century they had been shared by the Boran, the Sakuye, the Ajuran and the Gabra.

The main problem at Wajir was to maintain the status quo in the face of a continuing Somali migration towards the wells and the relative weakness of the Boran and Ajuran there. But the convergence of the Somali towards Wajir — from the north, the east and the south — was only part of a much more general westward movement, and this was the crucial problem in the area.

\(^1\) Cpt. Barrett's Reports, 1909-12, Political Records, DC/MLE/2/4.

\(^2\) In 1912 a trade route between Wajir and Nairobi was opened; see: C.W. Haywood, To the mysterious Lorien Swamp (London, 1927), 184.

\(^3\) T.S. Thomas (1917), 80.
It was a question of trying to stabilise a shifting nomadic frontier. It was also a question of trying to allocate pasture, and then of fusing to allow further modifications in the predetermined grazing areas. Above all, it was a question of preserving a balance of power, of assuming the role of protector of the weakest tribe, and preventing its further domination. Yet, from whatever angle one looks at it, the ultimate goal was also to crystalise an essentially fluid situation and to ignore the inevitable flux that was part and parcel of nomadic pastoral life.

The first Somali to reach Wajir were not Darod from the south but Hawiye from the north. In 1904 a group of Yaben Digodia arrived as shegats to the Garen and Gelberis sections of the Ajuran. At that date there were three main chiefs at Wajir: Ido Roble of the Ajuran Gelberis, Bare Sadeko of the Ajuran Gashe, and Aleka Guna of the Boran. Ido Roble's section was by far the strongest and the first Digodia arrivals attached themselves to him.¹

Then, two years later, small groups of Muhammad Zubeir began to appear from the south led by Ali Guled. They were followed by their Habr Suleiman shegats and they occupied the southernmost of the Wajir wells.² Later it was to be suggested that these Somali all

¹ Zaphiro to H., 20 May 1906, F0.37I/192; R. Turnbull, The Darod Invasion, p. 6, and "Some Notes on the History of the Digodia up to 1912", (1953), PC/HTI/4/1/1.
² Hope, Intelligence Report, 10 Dec. 1910, CO.533/85.
lived in peace with the Boran and Ajuran; they were not particularly numerous then, the water was plentiful, and there was room for everyone. But the situation changed in 1908 with the arrival of relatively large numbers of Somali from around Bardera. These consisted of Rer Matan and Rer Muhammad sub-sections of the Digodia under Gora Han, who had allied themselves with the Ugas Guleid section of the Muhammad Zubeir under Abdi Mulu. They had crossed into the British Protectorate near Serenli several years earlier in order to seek refuge from Ethiopian raids, and then they had been driven westwards by the Aulihan. At about the same time a relatively large group of Digodia Fai arrived from the north.

This fresh influx of Somali led to increased tension between them and the Boran. Most of the Digodia now arriving at Wajir were becoming shegats to the Muhammad Zubeir, and there was a growing polarization between the Boran and their clients, on the one hand, and the Darod with their shegats, on the other. Skirmishes between the Boran and the Somali became more frequent, with the threat of

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1 "Notes on Wajir's Political background and Somali tribal organisation", Appendix 'A', p. 6.
2 J.O.W. Hope, Report, 10 May 1910, CO.533/76.
4 Only the Rer Muhammad Lābin and the Gelibleh Digodia were shegats to the Ajuran until 1916. R.G. Turnbull, The Darod Invasion; "Notes on Wajir's Political background"; F.G. Jennings, Memorandum, KLC., EM. (1934), II, p.1650.
even more serious clashes in the future.

Zaphiro felt compelled to intervene in a situation that seemed certain otherwise to develop into a major confrontation between the Boran and the Somali. But since he was acting from a position of weakness, he was scarcely in a position to put any pressure on the Somali or to try and re-establish the status quo ante. Instead he removed most of the Boran and their clients from Wajir, and re-settled them to the north of Buna. After this, a rumour spread that the Boran had left the district for good, and the number of new Ogaden immigrants increased rapidly. From a short term point of view Zaphiro succeeded in defusing a potentially dangerous situation, but in the long run he failed. For the Somali push westwards had to be checked. It was a problem that could not be entirely overlooked. Yet Zaphiro was facilitating a deeper Somali penetration into the Protectorate, while this was a policy that was bound to be reversed by the new administration which was introduced into the area the following year.

At the beginning of 1910 the Boran began to return to Wajir, but the Somali had so increased numerically that they were afraid to really settle there. They were also confused by a clever stratagem master-mined by Ali Guled. He sent some Muhammad Zubeir to Kismayu where they got a letter from the Provincial Commissioner addressed

to the Boran and telling them to live peaceably together. Ali Guled then showed this letter to the Sakuye saying that it was their authority from the Government to stay at Wajir and transferring the land to them.¹

The Boran appealed to the new administration for help, yet there was little that could be done for them. The policy of observation then in force did not permit any active intervention in tribal disputes. Barrett visited Wajir early in the year and asked the Somali to leave, but he lacked the necessary sanction to make his orders carry conviction. The Somali left readily enough, though he was powerless to prevent them from returning as soon as he had gone.²

When Hope visited Wajir in December 1910 he warned the Somali that they would have to move since the wells belonged to the Boran, but he was powerless to do anything about it.³ The following year, however, a decision was taken to occupy Wajir and a station was opened in January 1912 under the control of Deck. The main purpose of this post was to prevent either the Boran or the Ajuran from being driven away by the Somali, and also to encourage the former to

¹Hope, Intelligence Report, 10 Dec.1910, CO.533/84: "Notes on Wajir's Political Background".
²W.E.H.Barrett, Records of Moyale Station, PC/NFD/1/3/1.
³Hope to Chief Sec., 10 Dec. 1910, DC/MHT/5/1.
resettle at Wajir as far as was possible.\textsuperscript{1} Over the years a certain amount of success was achieved. In 1912 the Boran who then tended to visit Wajir for short periods only, gradually rebuilt some of their villages there. Yet the habit of stressing that every well at Wajir was the personal property of some individual Boran, and that the Somali had to be entirely evicted, gradually became pro forma.\textsuperscript{2} In the end it was obvious that the Somali never would be pushed back, and in 1918 it was finally stated that "the Somali claim to Wajir is recognised.\textsuperscript{3}

But with the introduction of administration, the problem that most preoccupied officials at Wajir was not so much the Somali-Boran conflict as the growing discord amongst the Somali themselves. Initially, the main cause for concern was the rivalry between the Muhammad Zubeir and the Aulihan, later it was the escalation of armed conflict between the Muhammad Zubeir and the Abd Wak.

A few Aulihan had arrived about 1906 and their numbers, though small at first, had gradually grown. They remained independent and were not tied as shegats to any other section.\textsuperscript{4} However, the Aulihan-Muhammad Zubeir conflict of 1908 in which Omar Murgham was

\textsuperscript{1}F.G. Jennings, Memorandum, KLC.EM. (1934), II, 1650; East Africa Protectorate Annual Report of 1912-13, CO.533/125; Castle-Smith, Handing Over Report, 10 Dec. 1913, WAJ/16.

\textsuperscript{2}Kittermaster, "Administration of Jubaland and NFD from NFD point of view", 28 Oct. 1918, PC/JUB/1/10/7; C.W. Haywood (1927), 161.

\textsuperscript{3}"Extract of Conference Minutes held at Kismayu on 9 Nov. 1918 to discuss Administration of Somalis", PC/JUB/1/10/7.

\textsuperscript{4}F.G. Jennings, Memorandum, KLC.EM. (1934), II, 1651.
killed near Bardera later spread to Wajir when Omar's brother, Ahmed Murgham, moved there around 1909. The following year there were a number of reports of raids and clashes between these two sub-clans, but one factor that limited their seriousness was the still relatively small number of Aulihan at Wajir.¹

Moreover, the Muhammad Zubeir were weakened by internal divisions. When Ahmed Murgham arrived at Wajir he behaved as though he was the sultan of the entire sub-clan, as he had been at Afmadu. But those sections of the Muhammad Zubeir that had not come from Jubaland, and in particular the Ugas Guleid under Abdi Mulu, refused to acknowledge his titular leadership.² And since administrative officials considered Ahmed Murgham to be sullen, uncooperative and slow to obey orders, they encouraged this split. The Ugas Guleid were separated from the other Muhammad Zubeir sections, given their own wells, and allotted the status of an independent tribe.³

Another set-back was the arrival of one more group of Digodia at Wajir in 1912 - the Jibrahil. The numbers of the Digodia had now

¹G. to C., 12 July 1910, CO.533/74; Hope, Intelligence Report for June and July 1910, CO.533/76; Hope Intelligence Report, 10 Dec. 1910, CO.533/85.
²Castle Smith, Handing Over Report, 10 Dec. 1910, WAJ/16.
³Idem.
increased to such an extent that they reverted to their independent status and broke away from the Muhammad Zubeir. On the other hand, Ahmed Murgham greatly strengthened his personal position amongst the Jubaland sections of his sub-clan by his uncooperative attitude towards the administration. In particular he gained a large measure of popularity when Hope kept him under restriction at Moyale for six months in 1913. Hope had thought of having him deported, but since there was nothing definite against him he let him go. Any hope the Government may have had of further weakening the Muhammad Zubeir by backing Abdi Salaam, who was considered friendly towards the administration, against Ahmed Murgham vanished after this. In 1913, moreover, the Muhammad Zubeir were still by far the strongest Somali sub-clan at Wajir. The population was estimated at 8,000 fully half of whom were thought to have been Ogaden.

The conflict between the Muhammad Zubeir and the Aulihan persisted, however, though with time it came to have little or no connection with the earlier hostility of 1908. Its root cause could now be traced to the westward migration of the Aulihan, especially after 1913. This resulted in a contest to see which sub-clan could

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1 F.G. Jennings, Memorandum, KLC.EW. (1934), II, 1651.
2 Hope, Intelligence Report, 20 Nov. 1913, PC/JUB /1/9/1.
3 Filleul to Provincial Commissioner Jubaland, 8 April 1914, DC/KISM/13/5.
4 B. to H., 23 June 1913, CO.533/119.
gain control not just over Wajir, but also over Buna to the north and the Lorian Swamp to the south. There was a perceptible increase in the number of Aulihan migrating to Wajir, and in 1914 there were estimated to be 1,400 there. This was a most serious development which, if allowed to persist, was quite definitely going to lead to a trial of strength with the Muhammad Zubeir. Deck, the District Commissioner at Wajir, handled the situation with aplomb:

Acting on his own initiative, he quietly moved the Aulihan from Wajir to put an end to their bickering with the Mohamed Zubeir. His success, because it created no crisis, went unnoticed.

But if it is true that his immediate success drew no observation, his ultimate failure did. For the following year Kittermaster, the new District Commissioner, wrote anxiously to say that the Aulihan were returning and he asked for instructions. Abdurrahman Mursaal had returned from a trip to Nairobi in 1915 claiming that the government had given the Aulihan all the land between Serenli and Wajir. Kittermaster predicted a very serious fight in the near future, but he was told that the administration had every confidence that he would be able to deal with the situation. He should not issue

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2 Deck to Sec., 20 Jan. 1914, CO.533/134.

orders that would not be obeyed, and the use of force was ruled out. In the event Kittermaster's prediction proved to be correct, only the fight took place one month later than he had estimated and it was between the Aulihan and the administration at Serenli.\(^1\)

Yet the sudden increase in the momentum of the Aulihan movement westwards after 1914 was also the outcome of a victory over the Muhammad Zubeir which they shared vicariously with the Abd Wak. Ever since 1912 relations between the Abd Wak and the Muhammad Zubeir had been bad. For the former had gradually moved up the river Tana, eventually settling near the Lorian Swamp. In 1912, however, they had moved up to the Lorian itself where Deck ordered them to leave as they were much too far north; instead they attacked a Muhammad Zubeir village.\(^2\) Thus there were three main Ogaden sub-clans attempting to gain control of the Lorian; the Abd Wak, the Aulihan and the Muhammad Zubeir. It appears that in 1913 the Aulihan intrigued with the Abd Wak to break the power of the Muhammad Zubeir.\(^3\) After months of inconclusive skirmishing there was an important battle on the Lorian Swamp in January 1914. The numbers involved do not appear to have been large and it was said that there were only 400 Muhammad Zubeir with 200 rifles. The Abd Wak were not much

\(^1\)Kittermaster to Chief Sec., 6 July 1915; Chief Sec. to K., 13 Aug. 1915, PC/NFD/4/1/5.

\(^2\)East Africa Protectorate Annual Report, 1912-13, CO.533/125; B. to H., 5 March 1914, and R.E. Salkeld, "Short History of the Muhammad Zubeir and Abd Wak fighting", 1914, CO.533/134.

\(^3\)Deck to Chief Sec., 20 Jan. 1914, CO.533/134.
more numerous but they inflicted a crushing defeat on their enemies. Ahmed Murgham was killed with most of his brothers and relatives, and a very large number of important headmen.¹

This competition amongst the Ogaden was a reflection of a much broader problem, for it was the movement of the Somali in general to the west and the south that was responsible for these tensions and rivalries. As early as 1905 Sir Charles Eliot had noted: "Our real task at present is... to see that they [the Somali] do not encroach to the south and prevent them from raiding the Tana".² Much the same preoccupation was in evidence in 1913 when Col. Graham pointed out: "We cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that the Somali movement should be checked".³ But in the meantime there had been one crisis, and another was looming. Already in 1909 there had been an unpleasant situation when it was said that some 10,000 Somali were massed on the Tana due to an abnormal drought. One company of the K.A.R. plus a maxim gun was rushed to the spot, with instructions that great care should be taken to avoid a collision. It was feared that the Somali would raid the Pokomo and the Galla or, if they crossed the river Tana, push far to the west.⁴ But there

¹B. to H., 13 Feb. 1914, CO.533/133; R.E.Salkeld, "Muhammad Zubeir and Abd Wak", CO.533/134.

²Sir Charles Eliot (1905), 121.

³Graham, Memorandum, 25 Aug. 1913, CO.533/121.

⁴H.—S. to Sec. of State, 12 March 1909, CO.533/58; M.R.Mahoney, "Memorandum for District Records: Somalis and Gallas", 2 May 1928, DC/GRA/3/4; Moyse-Bartlett (1956), 212.
was also a fear that the Somali would not leave the Tana even after the next rains had fallen, and this proved to be absolutely correct. The Abd Wak remained on the Tana, gradually moving north towards the Lorian Swamp with results that have already been described.¹

Yet while the dangers remained obvious enough, it was by no means apparent what could be done to halt this movement. The large numbers of Somali involved generally dwarfed the lone District Commissioner, backed by a mere handful of police, who had to tackle the problem. Thus Graham, who was most anxious to put a stop to the continual migration of Somali into the Protectorate from the Italian sphere, nevertheless had to allow a group of Aulihan to cross the Juba in 1914. He simply could not prevent them, for he was faced with 1,000 Aulihan who had with them an estimated 6,000 camels, 4,000 cattle and 10,000 sheep.² In the first six months of 1914, it was estimated that 4,000 Somali had crossed the river Juba into the British Protectorate, and many of them possessed rifles. It was a little pointless to spend thousands of pounds on a punitive expedition against the Marehan which resulted in the destruction of 192 guns, when many times that number were entering the Protectorate

¹Gilkison to H.S., 13 March 1909, CO.533/58; T.S.Thomas (1917), 40-41.
²Graham to Chief Sec., 30 March 1914, CO.533/135.
every month. Salkeld offered three suggestions for solving the problem. First, a Convention between Italy, Ethiopia and Great Britain, though the difficulty here would be in implementing any meaningful agreement. Secondly, considerable grants of secret service money to enable officers to get information, and flying patrols to follow up clues. No doubt this idea grew out of Salkeld's quaint method of collecting intelligence which consisted in making a small cash payment to any Somali travelling in the Province who told him something useful. Lastly, he suggested that it was time to consider the feasibility of a Somali Reserve, precisely with the object of checking the westward movement of the Somali.  

Other suggestions were also made from time to time. Salkeld, for instance, also thought that by encouraging small shops at Wajir the Somali might become less nomadic in their habits. But the most important suggestion was that there should be a Somali Reserve. No agreement could be reached on this, however, and Kittermaster felt that while the idea was fine in theory, it would fail in practice. The whole discussion, moreover, was abruptly terminated by Great Britain's transfer of Jubaland and its Somali inhabitants

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1 Salkeld to Chief Sec., 7 July 1914, CO.533/139.
2 S. to Chief Sec., 6 April 1914, CO.533/137.
3 The whole question of a Somali Reserve has been discussed in more detail and more broadly by T.H.R. Cashmore (1966), passim.
4 K. to P.C. Tanaoland, 13 May 1919, PC/JUB/1/10/7.
to the Italians; yet the problem remained unsolved for, despite the transfer, there were still Somali to be found after 1920 in Kenya Colony.

Yet, prior to that date almost nothing had been done to prevent the Somali from pushing further and further south-west. This had already been pinpointed as a crucial problem that needed immediate tackling, but the means were never at hand to deal with it. That is why those theories that the British saved the Bantu tribes of Kenya from almost certain Somali conquest always seem to be so irrational and unhistorical. Nevertheless, it had been recognised that the Somali movement west carried within it the seeds of a grave political crisis, and in 1918 Plowman, the Acting District Commissioner at Moyale, wrote:

I would urge most strongly the immediate removal of these undesirable aliens. They are a stumbling-block to the progress of the District and a standing menace to its internal peace. This reform has often been advocated in the past but it still awaits execution, and the longer we delay the more difficult it will become as these Somalis will, before long, be able to point to years of residence there. Further there is a great danger of their importunity causing people to forget that Wajir is Galla country, though the rightful owners have temporarily been dispossessed owing to Government slackness.

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1 The transfer of Jubaland to Italy in 1924 lies outside the scope of this thesis but the political background and reason for this transfer can be found in Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (London 1960).


3 P. to OCT.NFD., 4 Jan 1918, PC/NFD/4/1/4.
The danger was obvious enough then, but it required force to evict the Somali and the Northern Frontier District never possessed that sort of force. It was this failure, therefore, to gain control over the Somali that made nonsense of those brave demands that their advance into the Protectorate should only be regarded as a temporary phenomenon.

The sack of Serenli in February 1916 led to the complete evacuation of the whole of Jubaland as well as much of the N.F.D. Yet this was not really a turning-point in the history of the area because it did not lead to any new shift in policy, and most of the suggestions that were being made in 1918 had been discussed at least four years earlier.

Nevertheless, the sack of Serenli was the end of a chapter; it marked the final episode of a long period of bluff on the part of the Protectorate administration, though some claimed that it was the Somali who had been bluffing. As Kittermaster, the Provincial Commissioner for the N.F.D., noted just after the First World War:

At the present time we are suffering from the inheritance of a vicious administrative legend. Never yet until the last eighteen months has any order given to the Somalis been really enforced. We have been afraid to call the Somali's bluff. I consider that Cpt. Salkeld's policy is largely responsible for this.¹

It was clearly unfair to place all the blame on Salkeld alone,

¹K. to P.C. Tanaland, 13 May 1919, PC/JUB/1/10/7.
but the disaster at Serenli demonstrated very forcibly the dangers inherent in a so-called policy of observation. At the beginning of the First World War, in fact, there were an increasing number of people who were stating openly that, as far as administration was concerned, there had been little real progress since 1897. In marked contrast to so many glib, earlier statements that the Somali were fully under control, it was now being readily admitted that the Protectorate had hardly begun to administer them.¹

There were many reasons for this new pragmatism. The very considerable anxiety engendered by the Marehan expedition was one. But, equally, the very important and large clash between the Muhammad Zubeir and the Abd Wale near the Lorian in 1913 was another. For Salkeld, who passed by the Lorian two days later, and Deck who was in the vicinity, knew nothing of the fight for several weeks. Both these events helped to underline the limitations of the Protectorate's control over the Somali.²

This reassessment of the Protectorate's achievements and impact along its northern frontier also went hand in hand with a more realistic reappraisal of the Somali mentality. There were still plenty who assumed that the Somali were grateful for the advent of administration and were longing to savour the fruits of civilisation. The whole philosophy of paternalism was too comforting and self-


²Harper, Minute, 27 May 1914, CO.533/134.
assuring to die a quick death. Yet from 1914 onwards there is also evidence of a more detached cynicism amongst certain of the most pro-Somali administrators. It could now be admitted that the Somali were largely indifferent towards the Government. It could be stated that the Somali looked upon the administration as a weak and harmless irritant. There was a growing awareness that the Somali regarded the administration's payment to Government headmen to be a sign of its impotence and not of its strength. The fact that Jenner's murderers were still at large and that the Somali had on three occasions faced up to the Government without any real defeat lent evidence to this view.¹

Nevertheless, precisely because the Protectorate administration was becoming increasingly aware of its own limitations, there was a tendency to assume that what was beginning to be called 'the Somali problem' was due solely to the fact that the northern frontier was one of the last areas of the Protectorate to be brought under effective control. It was assumed, therefore, that once the number of troops there had been increased and once expenditure on the Province had risen that the Somali problem would cease to exist.²

Yet the essence of the Somali problem was of course only partly connected with the whole question of Government control, just as it was only partly connected with the policy to be adopted

¹Filleul to P.C. Jubaland, 10 Feb. 1914 and 8 April 1914, DC/KISM/13/5.
²Isaak to Chief Sec., 25 Nov. 1919, FC/JUB/1/10/7.
towards pastoral peoples in a predominantly agricultural country. A far greater problem lay in the way in which the Somali could be fitted into the framework of the E.A.P., and this had been pinpointed by Craufurd in 1895. It was easy for Kittermaster to write "obviously our aim must be to civilise our natives as much as possible", what was more to the point was the view of another official: "I don't think the Somalis will ever be civilised along the lines of the Bantu tribes in this country".

Moreover, in addition to this sense that the Somali were different was a feeling amongst many administrators that they were superior to the Bantu. Again one can turn to Craufurd's view in 1896 when he wrote: "the race, in my opinion, has no equal in this part of Africa either in intelligence or in courage".

Yet given the fact that the Protectorate's policy towards the Somali was essentially a negative one, to prevent their movement westwards, there also developed a doubt as to whether this was good enough. "We try to stop him", one administrator wrote, "Are we right? He is obviously better material than many of our tribes".

What in retrospect is most interesting is to observe how

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1 Kittermaster to Plowman, H/O Report 1919, PC/NFD/2/1/1.
3 Craufurd to Salisbury, 13 July 1896, FO.107/55.
the whole question of the status of the Somali should have been implicitly raised first by Protectorate officials. So that when after the First World War the Somali themselves entered the arena of political protest pressure-groups and demanded parity with the Indians and a non-native status, it was particularly difficult to resist their demands. Why this political development does not come within the scope of the thesis is not just a question of chronology, however, but also because it was a movement that started outside the N.F.D. amongst people who were later to be termed alien Somali and who came from the British Somali Protectorate. Their protests were initiated in Nairobi and not on the Northern Frontier. Nevertheless, it was their agitation that was to be the first step along the road to a growing political consciousness amongst the Somali in the N.F.D. And the most important later steps would also be initiated by Somali outside the N.F.D. itself. The first impulse came from the south, the second came from the north after the Second World War with the formation of the Somali Youth League. But because of the history of the N.F.D., and because of the way in which the Somali had been administered with the underlying assumption that assimilation was impossible and should not be encouraged, any chance of rationally opposing later irredensist claims was undermined from the very start.
CONCLUSION

The middle of the nineteenth century forms a turning-point of the utmost importance in the history of the savannah lowlands of northern Kenya. For, while throughout the rest of east Africa, large-scale migrations of people were coming to an end, in northern Kenya they were just about to begin. And while the ethnic composition of east and north-east Africa had more or less assumed its present state, north-eastern Kenya proved on the whole to be a striking exception. As a result of Samburu and Darod Somali migrations, the main pastoral inhabitants of a very large part of this savannah lowland had been displaced by the end of the 1860s. Two entire peoples (the Wardai Galla and the Laikipiak Masai), who between them had controlled a region somewhat larger than the United Kingdom, were so entirely crushed that they barely survived as independent entities.

These upheavals are to be explained by factors that reach back to the first decades of the nineteenth century. Both the Samburu and the Darod, searching for better pasture, had been involved in earlier population movements that had come to a temporary halt in the first half of the century;¹ and one cause of their recommencement can be found in the growing friction

¹Supra, p.68, 96.
between the Il Purko and Samburu, on the one hand, and the Darod and Elai Rahanwein on the other. At the same time, there were various factors that contributed to a decline in strength of the Laikipiak Masai and the Wardai Galla before their respective spheres of dominance were threatened. The former were weakened by famine, they were disunited and they had begun to move southwards before the Samburu thrust northwards. Furthermore, Samburu success against the Laikipiak was achieved in alliance with the highly mobile camel-owning Rendille, though how far this alliance was crucial to their victories remains an open question.

The position of the Wardai to the south of the river Juba seems to have been gradually undermined from the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Darod shegats (clients) began to infiltrate amongst them as herdsmen. Moreover, during the 1830s the Wardai were weakened by the rise of Bardera. They suffered several important military defeats at the hands of its inhabitants, being simultaneously harrassed by the Garre and Boran Galla in the west; and these two factors led them to relinquish control over the upper Juba. The vast increase in the number of Darod shegats living amongst the Wardai in the 1860s was also an important prelude to the final Somali challenge to Wardai dominance. And, lastly, at precisely the time when the Wardai were attacked by the Somali in the north, they were also threatened by Kamba and Masai
in the south.¹

However, the long term impact of the Somali and Samburu migrations was to be very different. For the Somali movement to the south of the river Juba did not cease in the 1860s, and, after the very rapid acquisition of an enormous area, the Darod and Hawiye continued to move slowly but inexorably westward in the direction of lake Rudolf and the Merti plateau. It was precisely this element of continuous population movement that lay at the very core of what was later to be called the Somali problem. On the other hand, the expansion of the Samburu soon came to a halt. Rinderpest epidemics in the 1880s and the outbreak of small-pox in the next decade seriously reduced the size of their flocks and the numbers of their people. Thus weakened they found themselves over-extended; and, in the following decades, the area they controlled contracted as they were attacked by the Ethiopians in the north, harrassed by the Turkana in the south and raided by the Somali in the east.²

It is important to note that the displacement of the Wardai occurred in two distinct phases: during the 1830s they abandoned the upper Juba to the north of Bardera, while it was not until the 1860s that they were dislodged from the coastal Juba/Tana region. Loss of control over the upper Juba initially led to the substitution of one Galla group by another for the Boran moved into the abandoned area, but ultimately it benefited a Somali group that was not directly connected with either the Darod or the Somali of Bardera.

For Boran expansion towards the upper Juba was undertaken jointly with Garre shegats, and in the 1840s the latter made themselves independent. Perhaps the most significant result of Garre control over the western side of the upper Juba was that it enabled them first to dominate and later to reconstruct the long distance caravan trade that linked the Benadir coast with southern Ethiopia. Previously, long distance trade had been in the hands of the coastal Somali who generally penetrated no further inland than Lugh, where they met Boran who came from the west. The Garre greatly increased the economic catchment area of the upper Juba by extending the distance of the caravan routes until they almost reached Lake Rudolf and Mt. Marsabit in the west. At the same time, they gradually prohibited the Boran from trading directly with Lugh, discouraged other Somali from trading to the west of the river Juba, and with the Gasar Gudda from Lugh established something of a monopoly for themselves.

It was to be of great importance that the Ogaden (the strongest of the Darod clans south of the Juba), who had been instrumental in the defeat of the Wardai, never came to control either of Jubaland's two major trade outlets. Trade through Lugh was dominated by the Garre and the Gasar Gudda; while Kismayu and the mouth of the river Juba came under the control of the Herti who had taken no part in the defeat of the Wardai, only sailing from Berbera to Kismayu once

1 Supra, pp.72-3. 2 Supra, pp.112-3.
news of the Ogaden victories had reached the north. Thus the two major trade outlets of Jubaland were to be controlled by clans that were comparatively weak. The Garre and the Gasar Gudda found it extremely difficult to hold their own against later Somali immigrants, such as the Marehan and the Digodia, and they were incapable of countering Ethiopian expansion southwards.¹ On the coast, the Herti likewise found themselves unable effectively to oppose the Tunni in the north.² As a result, both these Somali groups attempted to involve outside powers on their behalf: both succeeded, and there can be no doubt that their success radically affected the history of this area. The Gasar Gudda received Italian assistance just in time to prevent Lugh from falling into the hands of the Ethiopians, while support given to the Herti in 1870, by the Governor of Lamu, led to the involvement of Zanzibar at Kismayu.³

One of the consequences of this outside intervention was that the developing situation on the coast, and in the interior of Jubaland, came to be affected in the late nineteenth century by British, Italian, and Ethiopian ambitions. In this thesis an attempt is made to show how these external forces interacted with local developments amongst the pastoral peoples: first, dealing with the coast of Jubaland, and then, later, considering events in the interior.

¹Supra, p.346. ²Supra, p.80ff. ³Supra, pp.110, 348.
Outside involvement along the coastal area increased steadily from 1870 onwards. Zanzibari support for the Herti led to the establishment of a permanent garrison at Kismayu with the result that the Joint Delimitation Commission of 1886\(^1\) recognised Kismayu and a ten mile radius to be part of the Zanzibar dominions. By this time, various European powers had shown an interest in this part of the coast. In 1885, the Italian Government attempted to gain control over the mouth of the river Juba and failed. But, two years later, Germany declared a Protectorate over the interior between the Juba and Tana rivers. Then, in 1890, the Imperial British East Africa Company (I.B.E.A.Co.) set out to administer this region which had been ceded to Great Britain in the Anglo-German Agreement of July that year.\(^2\) However, growing financial problems soon led to the liquidation of the Chartered Company, and in 1895 the British East Africa Protectorate was established. Yet, until 1909, the Protectorate administration in Jubaland was tied to the coast, and, though expeditions far into the interior were undertaken from time to time, its impact was extremely limited.

The assistance which the Herti received from the liwali

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\(^1\)The Joint Delimitation Commission, consisting of France, Germany and Great Britain, attempted to ascertain the limits of the Sultan of Zanzibar's dominions. See: Supra, p.87.

\(^2\)Supra, pp.124-6.
of Lamu brought the coastal Somali important benefits. The building of a stone fort at Kismayu, and the stationing of 100 Zanzibari troops there, protected the Herti from Tunni aggression. Under the umbrella of this protection, trade expanded until in 1875 Kismayu had become a flourishing commercial centre with 1,000 inhabitants. This trade centred on the export of ivory and hides which were obtained by the coastal Somali, and cereals which were grown by the Bantu Wagosha. However, in the 1870s the first long-distance Boran caravans reached the coast; and this reflected the growing importance of Kismayu, though the route from southern Ethiopia to the mouth of the river Juba was too hazardous ever to assume great economic significance.¹ The Herti, moreover, gained these very tangible economic and military benefits with scarcely any loss to their political independence. For the legal and political jurisdiction of the liwali did not extend over the coastal Somali who governed themselves under their own law, while in Kismayu the local Arab garrison remained unchanged for many years intermarrying with Somali women. Their sympathies and allegiance became identified with Somali interests, and they were likely to represent the Somali viewpoint in any dispute.²

Nevertheless, the presence of the Arabs in Kismayu was

¹Supra, p.104. ²Supra, p.138.
not wholly advantageous to the Herti. European countries tended
to acknowledge the Sultan of Zanzibar's authority over the Somali
at Kismayu, and increasing European interest in the coast led to
friction between the Arabs and the Herti. The latter were afraid
that the Arabs would utilise their contacts with European visitors
so as to strengthen their political position at the expense of the
coastal Somali. Between 1880 and 1884 there was open and bitter
warfare between the Herti and the Arabs, though eventually the
liwali made peace on the terms of the Herti.¹

One important result of these strained Arab/Herti relations
was that the Arabs in Kismayu allied themselves with the Ogaden in
Afmadu, and this development quickly resulted in a conflict
between the Herti and the Ogaden with the inevitable long-
lasting blood-feud as a concomitant. In the period prior to 1880,
the Ogaden had on several occasions assisted the Herti in their
struggles against the Tunni at the mouth of the river Juba, despite
the fact that Ogaden interests were centred further inland and to
the south; but, from this time onwards, the Herti and the Ogaden
were to be opposed to one another, and it became an essential part
of Arab policy to play on this division and deliberately to
encourage it. Moreover, the Ogaden also supported an attempt by
the Arabs to establish a fort at the mouth of the river Juba. This
move was bitterly contested by the Herti. It further exacerbated

¹Supra, p. 85.
relations between the Herti and the Ogaden, and also led to economic competition between the Herti and the Arabs for control over the Wagosha export trade.¹

Distrust of the motives behind Arab/European contacts did not deter the Somali themselves, however, from getting in touch with European visitors to Jubaland. The Somali seem to have been anxious to benefit from increased European interest in the coast, though only on their own terms. Nevertheless, according to British, Italian and German accounts, Somali headmen were all too prepared to go through the motions of ceding their land, occasionally several times over, for payment of money. These claims must be treated sceptically, however, for the very concept of ceding land was one that was foreign to Somali pastoralists.² On the other hand, they were well acquainted with the practice of being given money as a *quid pro quo* for gaining their friendship and cooperation, and it seems that they treated European advances in this light.

On the eve of the partition of Africa, the coastal Somali had evidently not grasped the significance of events that were overtaking them. Their relationship with the Imperial British East Africa Company (I.B.E.A.Co) was to be complicated by their past experience of Zanzibar rule; for the Somali do not seem to have anticipated any change in the pattern of authority along the

¹ *Supra*, p. 86.
² The attitude of the Somali towards ownership of land is discussed *Supra*, pp. 19ff. See also: *Supra*, pp. 92-3.
coast, and very great changes were about to take place.

At first sight, however, the I.B.E.A. Co.'s impact on the Somali was to be very similar to that of the previous Arab administration: for both groups were overwhelmingly preoccupied with trade and less concerned with imposing political control over the coastal peoples, and both were anxious to keep the cost of administration to a minimum and thus prepared to allow the coastal Somali a large measure of autonomy. Yet, while the Arabs were primarily concerned with exports from Kismayu, the Company was interested in opening up the interior to long-distance caravan trade. Thus the Company attempted first to gain the support of the Ogaden around Afmadu, without in any way threatening their autonomy. The Company dismissed a liwali known to be hostile to them and then obligingly appealed to the Sultan of Zanzibar to pay the Ogaden blood-money which the latter claimed they were owed; and when the Sultan refused it paid the money to the Ogaden itself. The Company also proved to be very sympathetic when the Ogaden demanded that escaped slaves should be returned to them. Moreover, it also tacitly encouraged the migration of the Abdulla Ogaden south-westwards, and their attempt to found a town on the river Tana that would rival Afmadu, by giving them Company flags; however, Company agents on the river Tana were not so enthusiastic at the intrusion of the Abdulla.¹ ¹Supra, pp. 139ff.
One result of the Company's preoccupation with the interior, and with long-distance trade, was that the prior necessity of coming to terms with the coastal Herti Somali was overlooked. But an insurrection at Kismayu in February 1893 and a mutiny amongst the Company's troops a few months later inevitably focused attention on the coast. Todd's baraza in February 1893 was the first occasion of Somali resistance to British administration in East Africa. Earlier accounts are extremely confused about the motives behind this resistance, and there have been disagreements over whether it was masterminded by the Ogaden or the Herti. In this thesis, it is argued that the insurrection was limited almost entirely to the Herti. There were a number of reasons for Herti discontent: the Company's preference for a close alliance with the Ogaden was one, its attempt to undermine a Herti monopoly over the Juba export trade another, but by far the most important reason was Todd's sequestration of all Somali property in Kismayu unless a prior claim had been registered in Zanzibar. Only a few Ogaden who owned property in Kismayu were involved in the uprising, but as a result of Todd's clumsy handling of a delicate situation all the Herti sections united against the Company.¹

When in May 1893 the Company abandoned Witu its sphere of

¹Supra, pp.148ff.
influence in Jubaland was restricted to Kismayu and a ten mile radius. In the new situation the Company's previous overtures to the Ogaden thus became irrelevant and it tried to come to terms with the Herti. Kismayu which had been closed to trade was now opened, but it was the Ogaden who came and traded and the Company found it extremely difficult to make peace with the Herti. The main reason for this was that the Company's offer to establish peaceful relations had very different implications for the Ogaden and the Herti. The former had everything to gain from accepting peace. They ran less risk of being identified with the rebellious Herti and having their property destroyed; and this was not an unimportant consideration because after the Herti uprising of 1893 the first punitive measures were undertaken against Ogaden villages by mistake. Then the Ogaden secured an outlet for their ivory, but, even more important, they gained those benefits without any loss to their autonomy. For the Herti, however, peace meant an acceptance of their loss of control over Kismayu and thus entailed a very real political reverse. It took the Herti several years to accept that the Company could not be evicted from Kismayu. Mutinies amongst the Company's troops, the unreliability of new recruits sent to replace rebellious units, and the knowledge that the Company was going to leave East Africa, helped to give the Herti

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1Supra, p.172.  
2Supra, p.166.
the impression that time was on their side. Their final submission was probably due most to the realisation that with naval support the Company could not be dislodged. The Herti had also suffered appalling losses in cattle due to a rinderpest epidemic and they had been worsted in fights with the Wagosha. Moreover, the latter would not agree to make peace with the Herti until they had come to terms with the Company. Thus the period of Chartered Company rule did have an important impact on the coastal Somali, for the Company successfully gained real control over Kismayu and got the Herti to accept this. In all other respects, the period of Company administration in Jubaland was one of dismal failure. Attempts to win the friendship and confidence of the Ogaden by a supine policy of giving way to their demands achieved nothing concrete and was interpreted quite correctly as a sign of weakness. This policy, however, was to be reversed in July 1895 when Sir Arthur Hardinge became the first Commissioner of the East Africa Protectorate (E.A.P.), for he believed that the Somali needed to be taught a sharp lesson and that force would have to be used.

The modest Government movement into the interior, set in motion by Hardinge in 1895, did not have the same significance for the Herti as it did for the Ogaden. To the Herti it meant their total encirclement. They had already lost control over

1^Supra, p. 170

2^Supra, pp. 173, 177-8, 186.
Kismayu and were quickly to be overawed by rapid and repeated visits by Government troops to their chief villages close to the coast.\(^1\) To the Ogaden, on the other hand, the movement merely represented a frontal threat with the possibility of resistance and retreat. At the same time, the position of the Ogaden was complicated by the fact that not all segments were equally mobile. These segments that owned large numbers of Galla slaves and used them to cultivate crops around the wells of Afmadu were clearly the most vulnerable, while those whose grazing areas were to be found deepest in the interior or whose herds consisted of camels rather than cattle were the least threatened.\(^2\)

Thus when the Protectorate administration sent its first armed caravan to Afmadu there was a skirmish, not between the Ogaden and the Government forces, but amongst the Ogaden themselves who were unable to decide whether to resist the approach of troops or to capitulate. In 1896 the Ogaden surrendered to force majeur, but it was only a submission on paper and the signatures of Ogaden leaders was not enough to change the strong feelings of hostility in some Ogaden sub-clans, mostly those furthest inland and out of the reach of Government forces. Moreover, the administration unwittingly undermined the impact of their show of force when they failed to follow it up by imposing some measure of control over Afmadu.\(^3\)

\(^1\)Supra, pp.190-2.  \(^2\)Supra, p.204.  \(^3\)Supra, p.207.
The submission of the Herti, however, was very different. Their leaders placed themselves and their families under Government protection, and agreed to collaborate fully and actively with the administration. Herti leaders such as Shirwar Ismail and Ali Wahar were made political officers, given armed escorts and utilised in a propaganda campaign against the Ogaden. Herti were employed as scouts and mail-runners, some were trained as askaris and they made up a large proportion of the tribal police, until after 1898 when all the Kismayu police were exclusively recruited from amongst them. In this capacity they helped the administration against the Ogaden both by gathering intelligence and also by fighting. Individuals such as Adam Musa, the Herti Government interpreter, played important political roles. Adam Musa himself acted as an intermediary between the administration on the coast and potentially hostile Somali sections in the interior, collected fines and gathered intelligence. Most important, it was this collaboration of the Herti that enabled Jenner\(^2\) and Hardinge to attempt a forward policy, for an essential element of this policy was the necessity to avoid any capital expenditure, and this was only possible with Herti cooperation and initiative.\(^1\)

Although with time the Herti came to enjoy a virtual monopoly of government jobs, this had not been intended from the

\(^1\)Supra, p.192.

\(^2\)The first Sub-Commissioner of Jubaland.
beginning, Jenner had planned to recruit Ogaden as well and as early as 1896 they had been allowed to select two men for employment in the Customs Department, with the promise of further jobs if they behaved themselves well. Government employment, then, was used as a reward for collaboration; and a focal point of later Ogaden resentment was to be their exclusion from government jobs.¹

The benefits to be gained from collaboration were clearly valued and sought after. Herti headmen gained a new source of patronage, through being able to give their supporters salaried jobs, and they acquired a new official status backed by an escort and Government pay. Yet, despite the advantages to be gained from collaboration, the overall effect was to weaken the position of some Herti leaders. Ali Nahar himself admitted that "his power amongst the Herti had considerably waned since he entered Government service"², and there were three reasons for this. First and most important, the tendency of the administration to rely on Ali Nahar for the implementation of government policy, and thus to by-pass the Herti council, undoubtedly caused widespread resentment. Then, while patronage was a new and valuable source of power, it also tended to be a highly divisive one and important Herti segments, dissatisfied with their share of government jobs, attempted to undermine Ali Nahar's position. Lastly and in this case much less important, collaboration with the British was at times unpopular. Nor was this an isolated

¹Supra, p.199  
²Supra, pp.194-5.
phenomenon. By and large, the more any Somali leader cooperated with the administration the less authority he was likely to retain over his followers, and hence the less useful he became to the Government. In the search for collaborators this was a dilemma that was generally overlooked. Yet it seems to have been at the root of the problem of Jenner's relationship with Ahmed Murghan, the Sultan of the Ogaden, for the latter's cooperation went hand in hand with a diminishing control over Ogaden sub-sections. It was in fact only many years later, when Ahmed Murghan had fought against the British and been imprisoned by them that his popularity and authority amongst the Ogaden began to recover.¹

The mishandling of the Ogaden was perhaps the most important and certainly the most costly of the mistakes made in the period of Foreign Office rule in Jubaland, and much of the blame for this must rest on Jenner. In the first place, Jenner only approached Ogaden sub-sections through Ahmed Murghan, though the latter's authority was not recognised by several segments and though his character left much to be desired. Jenner completely overlooked the fact that the real problem lay in persuading all Ogaden sub-sections that the Government's authority had to be respected, and that this was an impossible task for a weak sultan.²

There were also more personal reasons behind Jenner's short-

¹Supra, p. 498. ²Supra, p. 212.
comings. Character faults such as a violent temper, a tendency towards hasty ill-conceived actions and a poor judgement of men played a part; so too did his overconfidence and his exaggerated estimation of the value of Ogaden submission in 1896. These characteristics, moreover, were made the more dangerous because of the inadequacy of Jenner's intelligence service which was geared to filter optimistic news and left him desperately out of touch with potentially hostile Ogaden sub-sections.¹

Jenner thoughtlessly forced a confrontation with the Ogaden by prohibiting them from undertaking an age-grade raid against the Boran, unaware of the social implications of his order and mistaking the proposed raid for a simple razzia. The Ogaden naturally disobeyed the order and a punitive expedition against them became inevitable. Thus, while the Herti were the collaborators, the Ogaden are to be classed with the resisters. Yet what is most noticable about their resistance is not the provocation that caused it, but the devisive response that this provocation elicited. For three Ogaden sub-clans never took part in the 1898 confrontation with the Government, while others participated most reluctantly. In fact, there only appear to have been two sub-clans, the Abd Wak and the Aulihan, who really wished to resist.² Yet the political significance of this disunity was systematically disregarded both by Jenner and by later administrators who, quite

¹Supra, pp.226-7, 230-1. ²Supra, p.213ff
the contrary, did their best to unite the Ogaden. As one official observed in 1901 when contemplating the possibility of dealing with Ogaden sub-clans on the basis that their attitudes towards the Government differed: "the situation is already very complicated... The difficulty would be accentuated if there were friendly Ogaden as well". According to this official it was difficult enough dealing with "nominally friendly Herti Somalis in and around Kismayu and Gobwen". It was so much easier when fighting to label all Somali as resisters, but the reality was rather more complicated.

The 1898 Ogaden punitive expedition did not lead to any significant military expansion. Once more the Ogaden submitted to superior force, but once more no active measures were taken to bring them under control. The Government gained access to the interior, though this was probably due more to Somali fears of Ethiopian aggression than any reflection on the success of the punitive expedition itself. Thus the impact of the Ethiopian victory at Adowa on the Jubaland Somali seems to have been very different to that normally suggested. Far from encouraging the Somali to believe that they could achieve a similar success against a European power, it led them to demand British Protectorate flags and British protection against Ethiopian aggression of which they had a very real fear. These demands unfortunately gave the mistaken impression that the Aulihan and the Abd Wak could now be

1Supra, pp.238, 241.
classed as friendly.\footnote{\textit{Supra}, pp. 224-5.}

Failure to impose control over the Ogaden after the 1898 campaign and the crystallisation of resentment against Jenner led to his murder in 1901 and a second punitive expedition against the Ogaden.\footnote{\textit{Supra}, p. 232.} In this campaign Italian cooperation was particularly important in securing the submission of the Aulihan. For the Juba was patrolled by a joint Anglo-Italian force, and all canoes found on the river were destroyed. The impact on the Somali was considerable, and according to McDougall they assembled at Afmadu and discussed whether the Italians had transferred their land to the British.\footnote{\textit{Supra}, p. 263.} Moreover, it was becoming clear that without Italian cooperation administration of the northern Ogaden in Jubaland was practically impossible. But while the 1898 expedition had led to an opening up of the interior beyond Afmadu, at least to exploring parties, the 1901 campaign by contrast led to a complete withdrawal to the coast and the initiation of a new more restricted policy towards Jubaland.

Abandonment of the interior was advocated for financial reasons, while the psychological impact of Sheik Muhammad Abdille Hassan's rebellion further north also encouraged a policy of retrenchment. There were real fears that the rebellion would spread southwards and that any advance into the interior would be fraught with danger. These fears may have been largely imaginary.
in 1902 when they were heightened by inaccurate rumours, but they nevertheless continued to discourage a forward policy.¹ Sheik Muhammad's movement, however, also had a more positive impact on the Jubaland coast — one that ended by estranging the Herti from the administration. For, in 1906, Salkeld killed a Herti named Ashgar who had been associated with the Sheik and was said to be spreading sedition, and in retaliation disaffected Herti elements murdered the government-backed Herti sultan. There was no general uprising, but the loyalty of the Herti was suspected and the administration toyed with the idea of abolishing their sultanate.² Ashgar's movement also coincided with a revival of the long-distance caravan trade with Kismayu, and, in February 1905, the first Garre caravan from Boran country since 1901 arrived on the coast. By the end of the year, however, two or three rifles from Ethiopia were discovered in the possession of the coastal Somali. Officials were deeply worried at the possibility of an arms trade developing, especially at the time that Ashgar was beginning to acquire a following. So in 1906 all long-distance trade with Kismayu was prohibited.

It was recognised by the administration at Kismayu that withdrawal from the interior after 1901 meant an implicit acceptance of inter-clan fighting, and one of the most striking developments in this period was the growing disunity, not to say rivalry, amongst the Ogaden. These differences did not stem from different

¹Supra, pp.236-7.   ²Supra, p.195ff.
attitudes towards the European administration on the coast, for the latter barely impinged on Somali life. The gradual migration of the Abdullah away from the Juba region led to a grazing dispute with the Muhammad Zubeir who moved into areas once controlled by the former. Then there was a succession dispute to the sultanate, and Ahmed Murghan's own standing amongst the Muhammad Zubeir was threatened after 1902 by Abdi Salaam, head of the Reer Hersi. Finally, Ahmed Murghan became involved in a serious personal dispute with the Aulihan, when his brother Omar Murghan was murdered by them in 1906.\textsuperscript{1}

These divisions and conflicts led once more to Government intervention into their affairs, only this time with surprising results. In 1906 Ahmed Murghan "borrowed" 80 Government rifles to settle scores with the Aulihan. The guns were not returned. As a result he was dismissed as a government headman, his stipend was withdrawn and his clan was fined. Ahmed Murghan took no notice of government demands for a cessation of fighting, but he did not feel safe close to the coast and this led to his migration to Wajir in 1907, his position amongst the Muhammad Zubeir strengthened by government disapproval. One additional reason for moving to Wajir may have been the search for more water as the Deshek Wama was then drying up.\textsuperscript{2}

When the government initiated a forward policy in 1909 its

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\textsuperscript{1}Supra, p.246.  
\textsuperscript{2}Supra, pp.247, 251-3.
attention was still focused on Afmadu some 80 miles from the coast, which was then considered to be the strategic and political centre of Jubaland. By that date, however, its political importance had declined for it was no longer the residence of the Ogaden Sultan. On the other hand, one year later the attention of the administration had also shifted so completely to the interior around El Wak, Wajir and the Lorian Swamp that it is impossible to trace further the history of the coastal Somali in Jubaland from government records alone.¹

By 1910, then, the impact of outside forces on the coastal Somali had been considerable. The Herti had been brought fully under Government control, turned into collaborators, and closely associated with the administration. Ashgar’s movement of 1906 caused alarm but, apart from the conviction of the Sub-Commissioner, Salkeld, that it was seditious, there is no further evidence that it was in fact so, and by 1910 the Herti had resumed their cooperative attitude towards the Government. The position of the Ogaden was more complex. Those elements that were centred on Afmadu, and were thus most vulnerable to pressure from the coast, moved far into the interior in 1907. Thus, unexpectedly, the effect of a weak and ineffective administration at Kismayu was to cause the Sultan of the Ogaden to abandon Afmadu in favour of Wajir. Other Ogaden segments were

¹Supra, p.253.
either out of range of government forces or mobile enough to become so without any difficulty: on these segments the Kismayu administration made no impact at all.

In the interior of Jubaland, the turn of the twentieth century was characterised by a great increase in the outside pressure on this area, which can be traced to the migration south-westwards of new Somali clans as well as to the political ambitions of Italy, Ethiopia and Great Britain. The destruction of Wardai power along the upper Juba in the middle of the nineteenth century had soon led to a relatively stable balance of power between, on the one hand, a group of Somali clans centred on the upper Juba and consisting of the Garre, the Gasar Gudda and the Marehan and, on the other hand, the Boran and their shegats who controlled Wajir and much of central Jubaland. Political and demographic pressures towards the end of the nineteenth century did not immediately upset this Galla/Somali balance, but instead they indiscriminately undermined the position of all Boran and Somali segments that lay towards the edge of north-western Jubaland, along the river Daua and the upper Juba. The most important and persistent threat to the savannah pastoralists came from the gradual Ethiopian expansion southwards over a very wide front from lake Rudolf in the west to the upper Juba in the east. And this Ethiopian advance made an impact on two quite different levels. In the first place,
it very naturally affected the history of the local populations who were conquered or raided. Secondly, it posed a problem to the two European powers, Great Britain and Italy, that had also advanced claims to precisely the area towards which Ethiopia was expanding.

Ethiopian expansion southwards had an impact on the savannah pastoralists that was fairly complex. For though it altered the balance of power over a wide area in favour of the Amhara, this was not detrimental to all groups. Those peoples that previously had been in a dominant position, and were conquered, probably lost most: the Arbore in the west were totally impoverished, while in the east the Boran were much weakened. Yet, most peoples found the period when they were raided by Ethiopians far worse compared to actual occupation when it followed. Indeed, those who were only raided had nothing to gain, while those who were conquered could at least hope to benefit from collaboration. Thus the Gelubba suffered greatly from Ethiopian raids, but, once an Ethiopian fort was constructed amongst them, they threw in their lot with their conquerors, obtained rifles and ammunition and participated in raids. There can be no doubt that the Gelubba ultimately benefited very greatly from their contact with the Ethiopians, and that their possession of guns gave them a considerable

\[^{1}\text{Supra, p.319.}\]
The Turkana were another group to benefit conspicuously from their contacts with Ethiopia, but they were never conquered. For though the Turkana suffered from Ethiopian raids, they also gained access to guns and ammunition which gave them a decided advantage over their other enemies, and ironically made them more formidable adversaries for their suppliers of arms when the latter raided them.

At the same time, the process of Ethiopian expansion southwards was characterised by the extreme rapidity with which the highlands were conquered and the corresponding slowness with which they moved into the lowlands. It seems that conquest of the savannah lowlands of the E.A.P. was not one of Menelick's primary objectives. No permanent garrison was ever built in this area and its penetration was unhurried and spasmodic, related to the vagaries of haphazard raids. Nevertheless, penetration of the lowlands was always connected with assumptions about the ethnic relationship between 'tribes' in the lowland (golbo) and those in the highland (goro). The Ethiopians were convinced that they were inter-related and that they had a right to control the lowland people. But largely for reasons of climate and ecology they were unwilling to exercise this right to the full. It was precisely this reluctance on the part of the Ethiopians to move into the lowlands that later made for a more

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1 Supra, pp. 322-3.  
2 Supra, p.325.
intractable frontier problem. For it enabled some of the Boran and Gabbra to migrate further south out of their reach, thus accentuating the disparity between the area under effective Ethiopian control and that inhabited by people the Ethiopians claimed to be its citizens.¹

Ethiopian expansion in the late nineteenth century also had a special significance for the Somali. In the first place, it caused a very great increase in the Somali movement southwest towards the upper Juba. It heightened the population pressures in this area, making for much greater instability and inter-clan competition. Secondly, the Ethiopians attempted to gain direct control over the Garre Somali, whom they thought were related to the Boran.² The position of the Garre, however, was complicated by the arrival of the Italians on the upper Juba in 1895.

Almost all the peoples threatened by the Ethiopian advance southwards appealed for European intervention and help at one time or another. The Boran Galla, a people then considered to be within the British sphere of influence and likely to be of some importance to Great Britain, repeatedly asked for assistance;³ so too did the Garre, the Gasar Gudda,⁴ the Aulihan, the Samburu and the Rendille.⁵ But Britain and Italy responded in different ways to these appeals, and, while Britain seems to have favoured

a diplomatic solution to the problem of Ethiopian expansionism, Italy reacted on the basis that Ethiopia's ambitions could only be contained by force.

Thus, a request from the Sultan of Lugh for help led to the involvement of Italy in the upper Juba and to a direct confrontation with the Ethiopians. Yet the defeat of the Italians at Adowa undermined the confidence of the local population around Lugh in their ability to defend them against Ethiopian aggression. It was only after Wolde Gabriel's severe defeat in Somalia late in 1896 that confidence in the Italians was restored and their position on the upper Juba made secure. The military importance of an Italian presence at Lugh, however, appears to have been overrated, and the garrison there was only partially successful in deterring Ethiopian raiding parties.

At the same time, Italian attempts to prop up and revive the trade of Lugh led them, at the very end of the nineteenth century, to take an increasing interest in its economic catchment area to the west, which they thought of bringing under control. The Italians were particularly anxious to benefit from contacts with the Boran, and the Garre were the indispensible middlemen for conducting this trade. Garre headmen were paid by the Italians while the Garre Kuran who lived near their station at Lugh were taxed. For a very short time the Italians also

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1 Supra, pp. 346-8. 2 Supra, pp. 352ff.
succeeded in getting the Garre to organise the long-distance trade with the Boran, but Ethiopian competition proved too severe. Ultimately, Italy failed because it was unwilling to use troops to the west of the Juba river and was thus unable to offer the Garre protection against Ethiopian aggression. And the reason for this was that all the Garre on the upper Juba were to be found in the British sphere of influence. Italy was apparently not prepared to commit itself too decisively or openly in this area.¹

Ethiopian expeditions to the Garre for the purpose of levying tax had at first been fairly leisurely. But when Britain queried Ethiopian claims that the Garre were related to the Boran – and thus to be considered within the Ethiopian sphere of influence – a more methodical attempt was made to bring them under effective occupation. Ethiopian troops were stationed at El Wak, Muddo Eri and the area of Gedu, for several months in the year. Taxes were levied on all Garre sections, and they were pressed into Ethiopian service levying customs duties on traders throughout southern Ethiopia (as far west as the river Omo) and supervising the caravan trade with the Boran. Moreover, important hostages such as the son of Chaban Alio, the aged head of the Kuran Garre, were taken to Addis Ababa as a surety for the good behaviour of the clan.²

¹ Supra, pp. 359-60, 369-70. ² Supra, pp. 369-70.
However, Ethiopian pressure on the Garre was brought to a dramatic end by the intervention of Great Britain, for in 1906 Photius Zaphiro, a British border agent, arrived on the frontier supported - and this surely was the supreme irony - by an escort of Ethiopian irregulars recruited in Addis Ababa. Zaphiro's outstanding success was the termination once and for all of Ethiopian pretensions to control the Garre, and it was a remarkable achievement for one man. His presence on the frontier also for a time checked Ethiopian raids across it.¹

But these benefits were secured with several drawbacks. In the first place, Zaphiro relied on Ethiopian irregulars to enforce his demands, and he also threatened people in the British sphere with Ethiopian raids if his orders were not obeyed. Moreover, these threats were not idle ones, but sanctioned by the British Legation in Addis Ababa. They led to some confusion amongst the border peoples as to his relationship with the Ethiopians, which tended to undermine confidence in his role as the defender of British protected peoples against Ethiopian aggression.² Secondly, Britain was attempting to halt the Ethiopian advance southwards by diplomacy, yet Zaphiro did not appreciate the basis on which the border was being negotiated.

Britain and Ethiopia had started negotiations over the E.A.P./Ethiopia frontier on the understanding that the border

¹Supra, pp. 376-7, 382, 384. ²Supra, p. 383.
would be a 'tribal' one. According to Menelick the frontier was to be determined by the 'natural' frontiers of the peoples themselves, and he was essentially concerned with the problem of deciding which people were to be considered Ethiopian.⁴

Many subsequent difficulties can be traced to the actions of Captain Maud, a British representative sent to collect material on the border area, whose recommendations concerning the frontier were later accepted with minor modifications by Britain and Ethiopia and determined the de facto boundary.

Maud's instructions explicitly stated that the frontier he was to recommend would not "divide tribes between the two spheres", yet he deliberately disregarded these instructions.⁵ Instead, he recommended a boundary which followed clearly definable physical features, at the same time maintaining inaccurately that this coincided exactly with the limits of Ethiopian occupation as well as with the 'natural' frontier of the border peoples. What Maud completely failed to point out was that there was in fact a very large discrepancy between the area effectively occupied by Ethiopia, and that occupied by the peoples she claimed to govern. So that any solution based on the area occupied by peoples alleged to be Ethiopian, such as the Boran, would have led to a large extension of the area considered to be a part of Ethiopia. Yet his attempt to

¹ Supra, p.302. ² Supra, p.303.
produce a frontier solution by turning a blind eye to ethnic realities was misguided for it only resulted in a far more intractable frontier problem.¹

Thus Zaphiro's main weakness stemmed from his defence of the claim that Maud's line was a 'tribal' one, for it led him to overlook the very real 'tribal' problems caused by a border which ran through the middle of Boran and Gabbra grazing grounds, and often left water-holes in one country and grazing in another. He failed to understand the ecology of pastoralism in the golbo (lowlands) and, because of his preconceived ideas about Ethiopian imperialism, suspected quite erroneously that the Boran to the south of the Maud line had been sent there for political reasons. This anti-Boran bias also led him to evade the larger problem of the Somali movement westwards for, when the Somali clashed with the Boran at Wajir, Zaphiro moved the latter away from an area to which they had a prior claim, thus facilitating a migration that all later authorities would attempt to halt.² Moreover, Zaphiro's success in halting Ethiopian incursions across the border was undermined by Menelick's illness in 1908, since this led to a breakdown of law and order on the frontier and a further breakdown in the chain of authority. Representations in Addis Ababa achieved nothing, and Zaphiro's efforts brought diminishing returns as

¹Supra, p. 304.  
²Supra, pp. 373, 385, 388.
the weakness of one man with a tiny escort was increasingly appreciated.  

Zaphiro's intervention had been a very limited one but, nevertheless, he succeeded in identifying the most acute problems in the interior of Jubaland (to be called the Northern Frontier District after 1910). First, there was the question of halting the continuous Somali migration south-westwards and maintaining a rough status quo in what was necessarily a fluid situation. This, moreover, was a double-ended problem for there was the migration of Somali into the British Protectorate as well as their movement within it. By 1908 this was leading to an increase in scale of disputes between Somali clans as well as to a confrontation between the Boran and the Somali at Wajir. Secondly, there was the question of ensuring that the Ethiopian thrust southwards was halted and that a negotiated frontier was respected. Lastly, and this was a problem that did not really emerge until after 1910 when administration was introduced into this area, there was the question of supporting friendly 'tribes' that somehow always tended to consist of peoples who were weak and vulnerable.  

These were the main problems that officials attempted to solve with the sudden introduction of administration in 1910 throughout the whole of the Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.)

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1 Supra, p. 388.  
2 Supra, p. 491.
and Jubaland, though with limited success. Thus it was 
unfortunate that the advent of frontier administration could 
do nothing to solve the border quarrel with Ethiopia, and 
that on the contrary the extension of administration north­
wards exacerbated the dispute. Throughout years of negotiation 
it had seemed that all that was needed to make an agreement 
stick was some show of force on the frontier. Yet in 1910 
the frontier was still disputed with the result that border 
incidents escalated dangerously.

In the east, Ethiopian incursions across the river Daua 
began once more to take place after a three years lull, while 
in the west, near lake Rudolf, the border was openly and 
frequently violated by repeated Gelubba/Ethiopian raids that 
reached as far as the southern tip of the lake. These raids 
led the Samburu to migrate southwards across the Uaso Nyiro. 
Government attempts to protect them by stationing a K.A.R. 
detachment at Loyangalani were abortive. When in 1913 attempts 
were made to move the Samburu north again these had to be 
abandoned because the area was largely in the control of 
Ethiopian raiders. Along the centre of the frontier the Boran 
and Gabra also suffered from Ethiopian incursions which at times 
assumed alarming proportions.

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1The background to the establishment of administration in this 
area is discussed, Supra, pp.389ff. / 2Supra, pp.409-12. / 3Supra, p. 457. / 4Supra, p. 323. / 
5Supra, pp.335-6. / 6Supra, p. 425. /
Ultimately, a price had to be paid for this ineffective control of the border area. Aylmer's death was part of that price and it succeeded in temporarily easing Ethiopian pressure. But generally it was the border peoples themselves who paid dearly for British administrative weakness, just as they suffered most from an unrealistic frontier line which made it absolutely necessary for Boran and Gabra to cross from one side to another. They risked double taxation, extortion and interference with their movements from the Ethiopian authorities, while on the British side the lack of security made them vulnerable to raids, stock thieving and banditry. This failure to make the border respected inevitably exacerbated another problem: that of protecting peoples considered to be friendly towards the administration.

There were two peoples who were considered to be particularly cooperative and friendly towards the administration, and who were to ask urgently for assistance against external aggression: the Samburu and the Garre. But while neither were to be given sufficient help, their fortunes were to be very different. The Samburu were given a small amount of K.A.R. protection but it was completely inadequate and they were driven from their grazing grounds to the east of lake Rudolf. The Garre, on the other hand, despite heavy pressure managed to hold their own. The

1^Supra, p. 427. / 2^Supra, pp. 419-20. / 3^Supra, pp. 335-7.
Garre were exposed to considerable population pressure caused by the Somali movement south-west towards the upper Juba. Their grazing areas were threatened by the Rer Afgab Aulihan and the Digodia. Moreover, these pressures greatly increased in intensity after 1909 with the introduction of relatively large numbers of firearms amongst the Aulihan and Marehan both of which clans were hostile to the Garre.¹

In these circumstances the Garre turned to the government with repeated pleas for assistance, but they were only advised to be patient. The real problem of the government's declared policy of working through "chiefs and tribes along the boundary, strengthening and protecting those who are friendly" lay in the fact that it was made virtually impossible by the additional statement that the policy was also to be one of "observation only, with no attempt to effect compliance with orders".² The end result was that restraint was imposed only on those peoples friendly towards the administration. Thus the Garre were dissuaded from raiding the Marehan, but nothing could be done to prevent the Marehan from raiding the Garre. This situation was extremely embarrassing to the government and it helped to produce a crise de conscience, but when help finally arrived it was too late for the Garre had already placed themselves in an ambiguous position with regard to the administration by forming

¹Supra, pp.440-4. ²Supra, p.404.
an alliance with the Tigre.

Obviously unable to remain patient in the face of repeated raids by their enemies, the Garre bought arms from Ethiopian Tigre bandits and built up a very close relationship with the latter. They raided together in the British Protectorate, while the Garre fed, housed and concealed them from the British authorities. The Garre benefited very greatly from this alliance. They acquired easy access to firearms and an ally that was much feared by other Somali clans. Moreover, their alliance with the Tigre enabled them to hold their own successfully against their enemies. However, in 1914 Ali Abdi, head of the Garre, was arrested and deported by the administration for his part in harbouring Tigre bandits, though he was freed one year later because the government was finding it harder to control Garre sub-chiefs.¹

Between 1914 and 1916 the Garre were prevented from seeking Tigrean assistance and instead a small detachment of government troops was stationed amongst them. Nothing indicates the inadequacy of the administration's support better than an examination of this period. For officials were too weak to prevent the Digodia from encroaching on Garre grazing grounds, and many Garre had to migrate to Ethiopia to obtain the protection they required. Then in 1916, after the sack of Serenli, the Garre were completely abandoned by the Government which evacuated all

¹Supra, p. 445.
forces from the upper Juba. Once more the Garre reunited with the Tigre and together they were overwhelmingly successful against the Digodia who were driven out of Garre grazing areas and into south-western Ethiopia. When Glenday returned in 1917 to administer the Garre there were no recriminations for the alliance with the Tigre and, on the contrary, a very much stronger government force was sent to protect the former.\(^1\)

Thus the Garre solved the problem of their weakness in their own way; a way, moreover, that proved decidedly more effective than anything the E.A.P. administration could offer, though it happened to be one that they disapproved of.

The Somali movement south-westwards, which was such a serious threat to the Garre, presented two rather different problems to the administration: the one very generalised, the other considerably more specific. On the one hand it concerned a very broad movement of almost all the Somali to the west of the river Juba, and extending from the river Tana in the south to the river Daua in the north. On the other hand, it was also associated in a very special way with Marehan migrants into the Protectorate.

Almost all the galti (new arrivals) Marehan had fought with Somali Mohammad Abdille Hassan in the British/Protectorate further north; and the fact that they had abandoned the Sheik's movement did not imply that they had rejected his ideas, merely that the material

\(^1\)Supra, p.449.
spoils had not been sufficient. Moreover, almost all these new arrivals possessed firearms, and it was the Marehan who introduced large numbers of guns into the upper Juba area from 1907 onwards. Thus the Marehan presented a special problem; for the migration of this one clan went hand in hand with an active arms trade and the possible dissemination of an ethos of rebellion and resistance to colonial rule.¹

The problem of the Marehan also had wider international implications, for they became involved in a cycle of retaliatory raiding that carried them across the river Juba into the Italian Protectorate. This led to complaints being made by the Italian Ambassador in London to the Foreign Office, and made it more difficult for the E.A.P. officials to defend a policy of non-interference or to maintain a complacent attitude towards inter-clan feuding. Thus a growing priority was the disarmament of the Marehan and their subjection to some form of government control. It was not an easy task and it was made no easier by bad planning, bad communication with the upper Juba, a foolhardy over-optimism due to a patchy unreliable intelligence service, and giving ultimatums which it was said were never intended to be enforced, but which somehow had to be when face was lost. The problem was mishandled by Col. Graham, the Officer Commanding Troops, in a way that has been obscured by later anodyne accounts of his activities.²

¹Supra, pp. 458-9. ²Supra, pp. 455ff.
The main weakness of the Marehan lay in their internal divisions. The administration needed to exploit these; instead they aroused a very widespread hostility and only the deep antagonism between the Ahmed Wet and the Farah Ugas prevented a united Marehan stand. The position became more serious, however, when in 1913 Haj Mohammad, who had been a disciple of Mohammad Abdille Hassan, crossed into the Protectorate and allegedly tried to unite all sections of the Marehan. In the end the Marehan were subdued and had to submit to a certain amount of government control, but the attempt to disarm them was abandoned and a derisory total of 192 guns was all that could be confiscated. Their disarmament did not take place until after the First World War.

Final government success against the Marehan was to a large extent due to the support they received from various Aulihan sections. Yet the attempted disarmament of the Marehan had an extremely divisive impact on the Aulihan, some of whom sided with the Government while others (the Abioukr Jibrahil) aided the Marehan by supplying them with arms. Moreover, the Aulihan were themselves in the somewhat anomalous position of possessing sizeable quantities of arms. The relationship between the Aulihan and the Marehan was extremely complex, and, after the Marehan had been subdued by the government, friction between the two Somali groups soon got out of hand. ¹ The overbearing

¹ Supra, pp. 483-5.
intervention of Elliott, head of the Constabulary at Serenli, in this dispute, and his decision to force a confrontation with the Aulihan without realising the risks led to a major crisis in which Elliott was murdered, Serenli was sacked and the Aulihan rebelled.¹

The sack of Serenli by the Aulihan under the command of Abdurrahman Mursaal took the administration completely by surprise, and lacking a ready explanation it put forward a large number of hypotheses. Yet Mursaal's appeal to Sheik Mohammad for assistance is no indication of a close connection with the rebellion in British Somaliland, while his appeal to Islam was almost perfunctory and placed after clan solidarity. On the other hand, the struggle between the Aulihan and the Marehan undoubtedly had a great deal to do with Abdurrahman Mursaal's standing in his own clan which was far from undisputed. His prestige was at stake and Elliott's actions seemed likely to threaten his political position. It is here that an explanation for the rebellion is most likely to be found.²

In so far as the wider problem of a general Somali movement westward is concerned the administration had ambitious aims: it hoped to crystalise an essentially fluid situation and to halt a shifting nomadic frontier. But these were aims which necessitated a considerable amount of force, and it was lack of force that undermined the government's policy. Thus attempts to get the

¹ Supra, p.490. ² Supra, p.489.
Somali to leave Wajir under a policy of 'observation' were unsuccessful. Administrators had no sanction with which to back up their commands which were therefore ignored with impunity. Gradually support given to Boran claims to Wajir became pro forma, until in 1918 it was stated that "the Somali claim to Wajir is recognised". ¹

Perhaps the most serious problem caused by the westward movement of the Somali before 1916 was not the conflicts that resulted with other peoples to the west, but the growing internecine conflicts amongst the Somali themselves. Bitter hostility between the Aulihan and the Mohammad Zubeir, and between the Mohammad Zubeir and the Abd Wak, after 1911 was directly linked to a contest for control over Wajir and the Lorian Swamp area; and this hostility was brought about by the migration of these clans westwards. The administration had no real answer to this unsatisfactory situation. Some officials achieved temporary success by separating competing factions, but they were always told not to use force and without force little could be achieved. Large-scale fighting took place with the administration often totally ignorant of what was happening and completely unable to bring it to a stop. ²

In the years immediately preceding the first World War there was also a very large-scale migration of Somali into the British Protectorate. In the first six months of 1914 it was estimated

¹ Supra, p. 496. ² Supra, pp. 498ff.
that some 4,000 Somali crossed the river Juba, and many of them armed with rifles. Under these circumstances it was a little pointless spending thousands of pounds on an expedition against the Marehan which resulted in the confiscation of 192 guns when many times that number were entering the Protectorate every year. The migration of the Somali westwards posed many problems, therefore, and carried within it the seeds of a grave political crisis; but without force there was little the administration in the N.F.D. could accomplish before 1916, except express the pious hope that the problem would vanish.\(^1\)

By 1916, then, British authority had not been effectively established in Jubaland and the N.F.D., and it is suggested that the weakness of British administration was detrimental to the interests of the Samburu, the Somali and the Boran. This is not to argue that the advent of full colonial government represented the *summun bonum* for the pastoralists of the N.F.D., but all three groups had sought to involve Britian in this area. Initially, the Garre and the Tunni had sought outside aid because they were vulnerable to pressures that they could not withstand, yet this was also the case with all those people who experienced the threat of Ethiopian expansion southwards. British intervention finally halted this advance, but only after it had proceeded to such an extent that the area under Ethiopian control cut across ethnic boundaries causing a major frontier problem.

\(^1\) *Supra*, p. 502.
Moreover, much of the help given by the British administration to people threatened by Ethiopian aggression was either totally inadequate, as in the case of the Samburu, or arrived too late, as the northern Boran discovered. Sometimes administrative aid was positively detrimental, as in the case of the Garre, who were inadequately supported by the British against Digodia and Marehan attacks, while at the same time they were prevented from entering into an alliance with the Tigre which would have offered them adequate protection.

Another indication of the weakness of British administration lay in the fact that by 1916 the migration of the Somali south-westwards had still not been halted. At times it had even been accelerated to the detriment of other peoples, such as the Pokomo on the river Tana or the Boran at Wajir. A major factor behind this migration was the continuous influx of additional Somali into the British Protectorate. Again the British administration failed to halt this influx, yet there were many Somali clans in the Protectorate that wished for it to be halted. In fact, one of the first requests that Jenner received for help came the Marehan who were irritated by Digodia pressure across the river Juba, and there were other Somali clans too that were anxious for a British intervention that would preserve the status quo.¹

This thesis has concentrated on the interaction between local developments and imperialist intervention along the coast

¹Supra, p.368.
and in the interior of Jubaland. This is not the only way in which the developing historical situation in this area can be understood. But it is probably the only way in which it can be presented from documentary evidence alone, for there is so little evidence or material relating to the pastoral peoples of this area until they came within the ambit of administrative concern. And this point can be seen clearly with regard to the coastal Somali for after 1910 when attention was focused on the interior they are scarcely mentioned in any surviving document.
I. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES


(a) Foreign Office Records:

Series F.O. 1. (Abyssinia) Diplomatic and Consular, 1897 to 1904.

Series F.O. 2. (Africa) General, 1899-1905. Those volumes relating to the East Africa Protectorate were consulted.

Series F.O. 45. (Italy) Diplomatic and Consular, Volumes with material relating to East Africa begin in 1893.

Series F.O. 54. (Muscat) 1834-1867.

Series F.O. 73. (Egypt) Several volumes from this series which contained material relating to southern Somalia were consulted.

Series F.O. 84. (Africa: Slave Trade) This contains material relating to East Africa up to 1892.

Series F.O. 96. (Miscellaneous) This series contains the Minutes, Memoranda and dispatches relating to Sir Bartle Frere's visit to East Africa.


Series F.O. 141. (Egypt) Consular. Only a few volumes were relevant.

Series F.O. 369. (Abyssinia) Consular. The Mega records are to be found here after 1919.
Series F.O. 371. (Diplomatic General) Volumes relating to Ethiopia from 1906 were consulted. Up to 1918 these include Consular material as well.

Series F.O. 403. (This is a series of Confidential Print) 'Correspondence re. Germany and Zanzibar' in 26 parts can be found in vols: 93-107, 117-120, 136-139, 158-159. Parts 27 and 28 of this series can only be found in the Foreign Office Library. The same series continues as 'Correspondence re. East Africa' in parts 29-41 which are found in vols: 172-173, 181-184, 193-196, 208-210.

(b) Colonial Office Records:

Series C.O. 519. This consists of only one volume and contains the original correspondence on the hand-over of the Protectorates from the F.O. to the CO.

Series C.O. 533. (East Africa Protectorate) Files from 1904 to just beyond 1916 were consulted.

Series C.O. 534. (K.A.R.)

Series C.O. 544. (Sessional Papers) This series contains E.A.P. administrative reports.

(c) Admiralty Records:

Series Adm. 1. (General Correspondence) Several volumes with material relating to the Jubaland coast were utilised.

Series Adm. 51. (Captain's Logs) The logs of ships known to have visited the Benadir and Jubaland coast were consulted.

Series Adm. 52. (Master's Logs)
2. India Office, London.

(a) Secret Department.
There are a number of volumes with material relating to the East Coast of Africa.

(b) Political Department.
The first volume in this series contains material on Zanzibar and East Africa.

(c) Miscellaneous.

Capt. Smee and Lieut. Hardy's papers, Marine Records Miscellaneous, 586.


List of Charts, A.C. 51.

3. Foreign Office Library.

(a) Foreign Office Confidential Print.

2624. Report of Rear Admiral Cuming to the Sec. of the Admiralty, 27 July 1875.

5076. Reports re. German colonization schemes 1875-1884.

5284. Memorandum on the state of business in the African Department, 30 July 1886.

6003. Memorandum re. the southern boundaries of Abyssinia, 3 Dec. 1890, F.H.T. Streatfield.

6240. Memorandum on the state of business in the African Department, 1892.

7075. Memorandum on work in the African Department from July 1895 to December 1898.


7439. Memorandum: questions pending in the African Department, 1900.
7514. Memorandum on administration of African Protectorates by the P.O., 1901.

7759. Memorandum on the state of the African Protectorates, 1902.

7764. Memorandum re. current work of the African Department, 1902.

(b) Miscellaneous.

Mega Consulate Records. (These consist of two slim volumes of correspondence from the middle 1920s. They have not as yet been catalogued having only recently been surrendered to the P.O. by Her Majesty's Consul at Asmara.)


1. Nairobi Archives. (The archives were being re-catalogued when I consulted the following volumes. Those District Records which are not preceded by a D.C. follow the old catalogue numbers.)

(a) Provincial Material

i) Jubaland (PC/JUB).

1/2/1 Questions respecting Arms traffic across the Juba in the House of Commons.

1/4/1 Kismayu Crown Case no. 1.

1/5/1 Effective occupation by Italian Government of territory around Lugh.

1/9/1 Northern Frontier District Correspondence.

1/10/5 Evacuation of Alexandria in fear of hostile Aulihan Somalis.

1/10/7 Administration of Jubaland and N.F.D. Somali Reserve.
1/10/9 General: Ethnographic.
1/16/1 Monthly reports on health of Alexandria District, 1920.
1/17/1 Serenli. Correspondence, In and Out, 1911.
2/1/1 Commissioner's Records, 1895.
2/1/3-6 Miscellaneous, D02.
2/2/1 Miscellaneous, 1900.
2/2/2 Miscellaneous, 1907, Bundle 1.
2/3/1 Miscellaneous, In and Out, 1906.

ii) Coast Province (PC/CP).
46/1073 Fathili bin Omar 1917.
68/18 Sub-Commissioner's Office Kismayu, Outward 1899.
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   1 Moyale District Records Book 1902-1942 (Old Catalogue no.).
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Appendix 'A'

THE DAROD CONFEDERACY

Darod
  /   
Saddah    Kablalla
  / 
Marehan   

Kombi
  / 
Herti     Gaileh

Mijertein Warsengeli Dolbahanta

Kumadi

Absume

Ogaden

Gidwak

Balaad

Bartireh
Appendix 'B'

TABLE OF SOME OGADEN SECTIONS

Ogaden
- Muckabul
- Mifr Walal

Balhala
- Muhammad Zubeir
- Aulihan
- Suleiman

Telemugga
- Abd Wak
- Abdulla
- Rer Muhammad
Appendix 'C'

MAREHAN SECTIONS

Marehan

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Appendix 'D'

AULIHAN SUB-SECTIONS

Aulihan

Rer Tur Adi

Rer Hawash  Rer Songat  Rer Aoukr

Rer Ali  Afwa  Kassein

Rer Jibrail

Rer Moumin Hassan

Waffatu  Aden Kheir  Afgab
Appendix 'E' 

HERTI SUB-SECTIONS

Herti

- Warsengeli
  - Kaptanle
    - Deshishe
  - Mijertein
- Dolbahanta
  - Ogad Suleiman
  - Aden Suleiman
- Herti
  - Kaptane
    - Aden Suleiman
    - Aderahin Suleiman
  - Wabeneya
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