

PAKISTAN : A GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS
(1947-1974).

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ABSTRACT.

Pakistan: A Geopolitical Analysis (1947-74). A study in Political Geography. Arif Hassan Syed, M.A., M.Phil. Thesis submitted for the Degree of Ph.D., London, 1976.

The main theme of the study is to examine and analyse aspects of the political geography of Pakistan in some detail.

The secondary objective is to relate the course of events in Pakistan's foreign relations and boundary problems, to the socio-economic and political conditions of Pakistan and her people as a whole. The study also endeavours to evaluate the inter-regional disparity in Pakistan.

The Partition of the Subcontinent and its effects are analysed in detail with special reference to the Radcliffe Awards.

Geopolitically Pakistan emerged as a dislocated state with a variety of inherent problems e.g., defence, political incoherence, economic and administrative disparities. Moreover, the birth of Pakistan was subjected to the tremendous psychological disadvantage that she would find herself in great economic distress and that its vulnerability in politico-economic fields would inevitably lead towards her eventual collapse.

Pakistan pursued an independent but active policy until 1954, and endeavoured to forge closer relations with countries of West Asia without jeopardising her relations with any of the big powers. However, in 1954 Pakistan chose a path of alignment with the western powers and entered into a number of bilateral and multilateral defence pacts in view of her geopolitical compulsions.

The study demonstrates that newly independent states, especially states which are geographically discontinuous such as Pakistan, are put under severe social, political and military pressures. In case such a state fails to achieve a measure of national unity and lacks a cohesive force, then the very existence of her separate regions might be threatened. In the case of Pakistan the bilateral and multilateral defensive arrangements became non-productive even counter-productive as was demonstrated during the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971.

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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION.

Geopolitics is the science of the relation of geography to politics. There is no universally accepted definition of the term geopolitics, and careful analysis is needed in order to distinguish between objective study of politico-geographical factors and power-political speculation in the field of geopolitics. Anyone might construe it to be a term combining geography and politics, and mistakenly conclude it to be a substitute for political geography. This term, however, is never used in this broad sense. Geopolitics attempts to study the applicability of geography in relation to the activities of the primary political groups i.e. states. Within this premise the term carries three connotations: (i) the term refers to the relative power of nations, and the relating of that power to their natural environment, (ii) the word denotes applied political geography, as distinct from the history, principles and theory of political geography and (iii) the importance of relative location as a factor in political power-territorial base of political power. Political Geography, however, has been defined as " ...the study of areal differences and similarities in political character as an inter-related part of the total complex of areal differences and similarities. The interpretation of area differences in political features involves the study of their interrelations with all other relevant areal variations, whether physical, biotic, or cultural in origin." ¹

1. Hartshorne, Richard, "Political Geography As a Field of Study: Definition" in the ed; Politics and Geographic Relationships, Jackson, W.A.D. London, 1964, p. 60.




Fig:1 Pakistan:1947-71.

The relation of international political power to the geographical setting is the crux of geopolitical analysis. Geopolitical ideas vary with the changing pattern of geographical environments, and the interpretation, by individuals, of the inherent change. The "kernel" of political geography has been defined as, "the political area...the political significance of any area bears well-defined relation to its climate, landforms and natural resources."² Furthermore, individual's political ideas might generate political forces within specific areas, "Political idea, in this sequence, means more than just the state idea. It means any political idea. It might be the idea of the state.... It might merely be a gregarious instinct, not consciously expressed. "War begins in the minds of men" and so does all other politics."³

Areal differentiation singularly stands out as the essence of geographical thought, whereas the differentiation of political phenomena from place to place is the soul of political geography. "Political area, or space, is multidimensional. Space is horizontal as viewed from the standpoint of the shape, size, location and natural resources of one political unit. Space is vertical as viewed from the interplay of man's objectives, laws, and economic and cultural tools upon the horizontal plane. Space has a third dimension, time, which considers the interaction of horizontal and vertical space at any given period. Thus, time can be thought of as a series of points that constitute a curve along the horizontal and vertical space axes."⁴

2. Whittlesey, D. The Earth and the State, N.Y. Henry Holt, 1944, p. 585.

3. Jones, S.B. "A Unified Field Theory of Political Geography" in the W.A.D. Jackson, edition, Politics and Geographic Relationships, 1964, p. 101.

4. Cohen, S.B. Geography and Politics in a Divided World, Methuen, London, 1964, p. 6.

The subject matter of geopolitics is derived from political geography, history and military strategy. The strength or weakness of a given state depends to a large extent on the geographic factors for example, location, size, shape, natural resources, manpower, industrial potential and political organisation (see below). Geopolitics is concerned with the analysis of politico-territorial organization, the spatial and territorial aspect of power.

Despite their contrasting viewpoints, most of the geopolitical ideas quoted above contribute a measure of understanding of past and present trends in the pattern of states. The underlying premise of these postulates is that configuration of lands and seas provides opportunities and sets limit within which the political relations of politico-territorial organizations have evolved and will continue to evolve.

The physical characteristics of the planet earth have invariably remained intact, and the geographic layout of lands and seas has retained its significance in the context of international power-politics. However, political values and the significance of geographic realities have really been metamorphosed, especially in the realms of modern technology. "To an extent far exceeding anything in the social sciences and humanities, scientific and engineering knowledge is cumulative. Most of the important discoveries and inventions of past 300 years appear, in retrospect, as links in a more or less continuous chain of interrelated events. . . . Technological advances, once achieved, may be regulated, but rarely can they be eradicated. People may yearn for the good old days before H-bombs and ballistic missiles, but mankind is stuck with these and thousands of other machines. Technological advance, in short, is not only cumulative and accelerative; it tends

also to be irreversible, barring totally disruptive social catastrophe."⁵ Technological advancement as such effectively operated to "...alter the range of opportunities and limitations. The same invention may expand or contract the opportunities of both sides. Or more typically the invention may serve the purposes of one to the disadvantage of the other."⁶ The significance of technological advancement, especially in the field of warfare and international power-politics cannot either be denied or minimised. The experiences of the Korean and Vietnam wars, however, clearly demonstrated that the proximity of land routes had decidedly neutralised the technological advantages enjoyed by the Americans and their allies; and one of the major contributory factors to the failure of American military strategy in South Vietnam was the problem of logistics within the framework and concept of distance. In addition to location, the distance between East and West Pakistan played the most vital role in the terms of military strategy. These areas of conflict, within the field of power-politics, have abundantly demonstrated the strength, significance and political validity of geographic variables. Distance, oceans, deserts and mountains still possess their political and strategic values in the context of geopolitics.

Foreign policy constitutes one of the fundamental elements of statecraft, and geopolitics helps to identify the methods for the application of the laws of space, in the context

5. Sprout, Harold and Margaret, Foundations of International Politics D. Van Nostrand Company, N.Y. 1963, pp. 215-216.

6. *ibid.* p. 225.

of foreign policy options, basing itself on the study of geography and history. Some of the assumptions of geopolitics incorporate a sense of continuous struggle among nations to establish preponderance, and the primacy of external policy over internal. Political ideologies and state-systems are explained as weapons of national survival and expansion in a given set of geographical conditions. Geopolitics is, in some respects, designed to aid governments in planning their respective foreign policies. Planning was conspicuous in German Geopolitics. Both Germany and Japan launched their expansionist wars, and based their calculations and decisions on geopolitical estimates of the relative strength and power potential of the Axis Powers and their adversaries. The whole concept of their planning was based on a subjective estimate of power, however, overvaluation of their own and undervaluation of their rivals' potentials.

Planning is a vital objective of those who advocate geopolitics for the world at large. The geopoliticians employ the term to mean that a nation-state should formulate its national policy only after a careful appraisal of the natural environment as an inalienable condition of its power position. Such untenable hypotheses, however, and their assumptions that state is an organism and has a natural and an inalienable right to Lebensraum, helped to bring a war, but did not demonstrate how to win it.

The Concept of the State:

By their nature, places are complex and multi-component in character. One component is the political variability of the earth's surface in the sense that the world is divided into a large number of political areas (political regions) each of which (a) has a degree of independence of action and (b) is administered to a greater or less extent differently from all other political areas. The most powerful of these areas are the so-called sovereign independent states.

Political subdivision may itself contain, therefore, impediments to self-fulfilment and may interact unfavourably with other components of the variable character of places and areas, and thus augment the adverse or beneficial effects that these components may have upon human material welfare.

A man's lot depends to some extent upon the environment in which he lives, the environmental effect being the total impact upon him at any time and through time of the variable character of places near and far.

The state idea.

It is desirable to discuss briefly here the state-idea as it is understood by various geopoliticians, so as to have a precise understanding of the emergence of Pakistan as an independent political entity." A state is an area organized politically in an effective manner by an indigenous, or resident, people with a government in effective control of the area. It is modern history's repository of legitimate authority."⁷ The term

7. Buehring, E.H. " Role of New States in International Politics", The Review, vol. 8, pp. 27-37, Indiana University, 1965.

state in Buehring's usage implies the mechanism of government through which the will of the state is formulated, expressed and exercised. The small, local, territorial unit is in many ways a microcosm of the state itself. A state as such is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming thereby, supremacy over all the institutions inhabiting its territory. The essential ingredients of a state are (a) territory, (b) population, (c) government and (d) sovereignty. In case any one of these essential features or fundamental constituents are missing then the state may be classified as non-full state, a half-state or a vassal. In most modern states people themselves have some bonds of union, for example, common language, common culture, common religion, common heritage and common ends. These are some of the unifying elements within the state structure, which separate those people who possess different bonds of unity within the comity of nations.

Unity, disunity and the spatial structure of the state:

If and when the disparate elements within the state fail to achieve a semblance of national unity and cohesion then the very substructure of the state-idea may be demolished, the superstructure is bound to disappear; and the state disintegrates. On the positive side, however, the state-idea suggests a strong possibility that if the unifying bonds are allowed to flourish then national unity and cohesion can be achieved, and the vested internal and external fissiparous elements can be defeated. A coherent and viable nation-state may be difficult to achieve if the balance between the centrifugal and centripetal forces is not effectively maintained. In fact, the centripetal forces should be helped to maintain their preponderance in the interest of national cohesion and unity. Polarisation of regional and intra-regional forces is likely to damage the fabric of the society, and as such the state itself is likely to be dismembered.

In most recently-independent countries there is a need for an explicit unifying concept if centripetal forces are to be dominant. The forces of inertia, vested interests, and fear of the consequence of change may keep it going more or less effectively for some time, but if a state-structure has lost its original legitimacy then the state is likely to collapse. Those states are the strongest in which the basic concept of state encompasses the entire body-politic.

If a state fails to achieve its ends and allows the fissiparous tendencies to flourish or does not effectively nip the evil of parochialism, regionalism and sub-nationalism in the bud, then internal and external vested interests will almost inevitably exploit these weaknesses within the state structure, and the secondary political groups i.e. political parties (such as the Awami League in East Pakistan and now the defunct National Awami Party in West Pakistan) are likely to be used as vehicles of disruption by internal and external political groups. Most of the secondary groups operate largely in the advancement of interests of various non-political groups, for example, linguistic, religious, industrial, commercial and agricultural.

The geographical basis of political power.

Political groups differ profoundly from one another in the relative degree of political power at their command. There are two ways to compare the strength or weakness of these political groups. One is "horizontal", that is, the relative power of coordinate groups is considered: nation versus nation, province versus province, or party versus party. The other is "vertical", the power of lesser groups being compared with that of the larger groups of which they form component parts, for example, local government ^e versus province, or provincial government versus central government. In a loose federation of states, the political power

of the smaller component is greater in relation to that of the whole federation than in a highly centralised state. In a totalitarian state a single secondary group, a political party, dominates the state structure, and necessarily practises monolithism.

Political power is derived from the inherent energy of political groups and from the material means that these groups possess for giving effect to that energy. The inherent energy of a group is largely a function of its cohesion. Cohesion may be achieved voluntarily by the component elements, as in democratic societies, or else it may be enforced upon them by the dominant elements as in a totalitarian state, autocratic politico-territorial organizations or military regimes. Cohesion may well be maintained by fear of aggression from without. Enforced cohesion brought about by repression or cohesion due to fear may at times give rise temporarily to mighty political power (the rise and fall of the military dictatorship in Pakistan provide obvious examples of negative and self-motivated endeavours towards national cohesion). Such cohesion, however, may evaporate when the dominant elements have lost their grip or the causes of fear have been removed.

Infrastructure of spatial cohesion.

A state should formulate a policy of direction, and a framework of operation which is in consonance with the state-idea, and must lead towards cohesion and away from disharmony and disunity. The first priority of the state should be that " all regions of a state are clearly included under the state-idea and have complete loyalty to the overall concept of the national unit, regional differences inevitably cause some differences in interpretation and implementation of these concepts. If those differences are minoe...the regions may a

PAKISTAN SINCE 1971.




Fig: 2.

accept unitary government from a single authority. If the differences are great, the attempt to impose such a uniform system may provoke opposition endangering the national unity."⁸

The position and power of a given politico-territorial organization depend upon (a) the national consciousness of the state-idea, (b) what it possesses in the shape of territory and natural resources, and (c) its position vis-a-vis other nation-states and their wealth.

In estimating the power potential of a given state or of a region one must examine its location, size, shape and boundaries in order to learn how its natural resources rank in relation to those of other political areas of the world.

a) Location: The location of a state may invite or answer a number of very important questions. The nearness to the world's major trade routes could prove a great boon for the socio-economic development of the people of the adjacent state, and inclusion, within the territorial limits, of natural seaports is of extreme value for the development of economic and trade links, intercoastal or international. A landlocked country, however, may face socio-economic and political pressures, for example, Afghanistan is largely dependent upon Pakistan's goodwill for the majority of her exports and imports.

Some states have small pockets of land lying outside the main body of their territory, as islands within the territorial bounds of their neighbouring states. Such dislocation may also cause geopolitical problems. These tiny outliers, however, are very unlikely to render the state fragmented, but these "exclaves" do have some significance in political geography which in some cases is important, for example, West Berlin is an "exclave" of West Germany but "enclave" of East Germany. The East Germans have, at times, blockaded the land access to West Berlin from West

8. Haettshorne, Richard, op. cit. w. A. D. Jackson edition, p. 95.

Germany, and invariably these actions were designed to extract some concessions from the Western Powers.

In the South Asian Subcontinent there are good examples of "enclaves", for example, Goa, Diu, Daman, Nagar Haveli, Pondicherry and Cooch Behar (see chapter 2 for Cooch Behar). Goa was a bone of contention between India and Portugal until the Indians forcibly integrated the territory within the Indian Union, and Goa and other "enclaves" were formally incorporated within the administrative structure of the Indian Union in consonance with the provisions of the 14th Amendment of 1963 (Indian Constitutional Amendment Act 1963). Cooch Behar posed some problems between Pakistan and India, but the two states seemed to have reached an amicable settlement (see chapter 2).

b) Size: The size of a given state is strongly related in many ways to problems of effective national control and organisation. It is a truism that the beginning of an empire is the very beginning of its end. The grossly exaggerated, enlarged and expanded state-areas are very difficult to control in an effective manner, and as such the centrifugal forces are greatly encouraged, and eventually succeed as the state collapses. The main contributory factors are: the problem of logistics, the lack of effective authority and control, different and distinct ethnographic and cultural patterns, religious distinctiveness and economic disparities. A number of states/^{that} have evolved over a period of time in different parts of the world eventually disintegrated or were dismembered because their frontiers were too extended.

Experts like Pounds and de Balij have further classified states on the basis of the size of the politico-territorial organization. In the context of this classification Pakistan may be designated as a large state.

c) Shape: In addition, the ~~shape~~ of a politico-territorial organisation is a significant contributory factor in determining the effectiveness or otherwise of the given state. For example, Pakistan as it emerged in 1947, consisted of two widely separated parts, interspersed by Indian territory, and as such was fragmented. This physical separation created a number of difficult problems, especially in the area of national integration since contacts between the population of the separate wings were very limited. These limitations were inevitably detrimental to national unity and cohesion. A longrange and more intractable problem for Pakistan has been the forging of national identity which transcended regionalism and parochialism, and which inculcated and embodied positive ideas than negative concepts: the development of a positive national identity.

Human Resources.

Human resources include not only manpower but also those characteristics required to make manpower effective for example, technical knowhow, national cohesion, sources of energy, resourcefulness, national traits and characteristics and the effectiveness of the government. The power and position of a state is measured by the degree to which it is able to achieve that which it desires. The sum total of these desires, ends and objectives may be termed as her national interests. The means that a territorial society employs to secure these objectives is known as national policy so far as it relates to internal affairs, and foreign policy as it relates to external relationships.

The soundness, or the lack of it, of a national policy may

effectively be measured by the success with which it uses the national resources and energies to provide prosperity, amiability at home and abroad, and the means to safeguard its territorial integrity and political independence.

The Raison d'etre of Pakistan.

Pakistan emerged as an independent political entity on the basis that the Musalmans of India were a separate nation, and as such entitled to a separate homeland. M.A. Jinnah expressed his thoughts on the subject in the following manner: " It has always been taken for granted mistakenly that the Musalmans are a minority. The Musalmans are not a minority. The Musalmans are a nation by any definition.... The problem in India is not of inter-communal character but manifestly of international one, and it must be treated as such.... The Hindus and Muslims belong... to two different civilizations which are based on conflicting ideas and conceptions...." ¹⁰

The partition of the Sub-continent and the political boundaries of Pakistan were established (see chapter 2) on the basis of the Radcliffe Awards. Each of the two Commissions was " instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab/Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so it will also take into account other factors." ¹¹

This was in conformity with the Lahore Resolution which is popularly known as the Pakistan Resolution, passed on 23rd March 1940, and asserted that " no constitutional

10. M.A. Jinnah, Address to the All India Muslim League Session, Lahore, 1940.

11. The Report of the Punjab Partition Committee, p. ii, 1947.

plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, namely that geographically contiguous units...be so constituted...that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in north-western and north-eastern zones of India should be...autonomous and sovereign."¹² In this manner religion formed the *raison d'etre* of Pakistan's territoriality as an independent state.

The present territorial limits of Pakistan, however, ⁱⁿ are much more ~~in~~conformity with the ideas of the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal. In 1930, Iqbal expressed his thoughts in the following manner: "I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India."¹³

Religion was the main unifying force of the state-idea as it emerged and materialised in August 1947. It appeared ~~however, to be,~~ a very tenuous bond between the distant, distinct and dislocated parts of Pakistan. In addition to religion, as the reason for existence, one may as well incorporate and consider the desire of the Muslims, in the Northwest and Northeast of British India, to achieve economic independence, and the right to order their life free from economic suppression and exploitation internally or externally. The objective, therefore, was to

12. The Pakistan Resolution, Lahore, March 23, 1940.

13. Muhammad Iqbal, Presidential Address, The All India Muslim League Session, Allahabad, 1930.

establish a state in which the Muslims could forge their socio-economic and political development without the spectre of Hindu domination, and as such the nascent state had to be organised and administered with a view "...to establish complete and exclusive control over internal political relations...the creation and maintenance of law and order. Local institutions must conform with the concepts and institutions of the central, overall, political organization...a state may tolerate considerable variation in its different regions...there is a tendency ...to exert unifying control even over the institutions...every state must strive to secure the supreme loyalty of the people in all its regions, in competition with any local or provincial loyalties and in definite opposition to any outside state unit!"¹⁴

For a geopolitical analysis of Pakistan it is imperative to study the circumstances under which Pakistan emerged as an independent political entity, and as such a study of her economic potential, or the lack of it, is necessary for a precise understanding of Pakistan's geopolitical problems.

The partition of the Sub-continent was hasty, patchy and incomplete (see chapter 2). The actual political division and the territorial awards created more problems than the apparent solutions (see chapters 2, 3 and 4). The chairman of the Award Commissions Sir (now Lord) Cyril Radcliffe was not very familiar with the economic, social, cultural and

14. Hartshorne, Richard, op. cit. W.A.D. Jackson, p. 86.

political patterns of the Sub-continent; thus his Awards in the Punjab and Bengal(see chapter 2) created serious difficulties for both the Hindus and the Muslims.

The partition disrupted the water system. The irrigation complex in the Punjab, was one of the most ancient homes of hydraulic society, and the Pakistani Punjab was made dependent upon Indian goodwill since some of the important nineteenth and twentieth century headworks and embankments were allotted to India.

The partition also severed some of the main road and rail links, for example, the Grand Trunk Road, Lahore-Bathinda-Delhi, Lahore-Ferozepur-Delhi, Karachi-Jodhpur-Jaipur-Delhi rail links in the west; and Jessore-Calcutta, Faridpur-Kushtia-Santipur-Calcutta, Comilla-Tripura-Agartala-Bahmanbaria-Silchar in the east (some of the river channels of East Pakistan were also affected) .

The political division and the territorial allotment also disrupted the long established social and cultural links, and seriously uprooted the existing economic structure (see chapter 3 and 4) .

Pakistan faced tremendous socio-economic and political problems at the very birth of this new country in 1947, and the nation was preoccupied with meeting its first real test --the transfer and relocation of more than seven million refugees from India--an unparalleled migration of human beings in the history of mankind. This monumental task was carried out primarily in the Punjab, whose boundaries became a source of instability and tension. The problems of Pakistan need to be studied in the proper historical context of her emergence as an independent state, and this leads to an immediate reflection upon her political boundaries.

CHAPTER 2.A SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF BOUNDARIES AND
THE PROBLEMS AFFECTING THEM.

Before entering into a detailed discussion of the boundaries of Pakistan and the problems affecting them, it seems reasonable at this point to study at some length the interchangeable terms i.e. frontiers and boundaries and the manners in which boundaries have been defined and denoted. Invariably almost all the discussions of boundary problems tend to treat the word frontier and boundary as if these were synonymous. One may speak of the boundary between Spain and Portugal, and in the phenomenon as projected on the map, a line or a string of positions separating the two states. It would be, however, advisable to denote frontier as a politico-geographical area lying beyond the integrated region of a given political entity, and into which expansion could be materialised. Experts like Kristof have very vividly expressed their line of thinking on the matter and suggested "frontier" implied what it suggests

etymologically, that is, that which is "in front"... it designated an area which was part of a whole, specifically that part which was ahead of the hinterland. Hence it was often called the foreland, or borderland, or march..... It had not the connotation of an area or zone which marks a definite limit or end of a political unit....The frontier meant quite literally "the front": the frons of the imperium mundi...Thus the frontier was not the end "tail" but rather the beginning "foreland" of the state; it was the spearhead of light and knowledge expanding into the realm of darkness and of the unknown. The borderlands - the marches - were areas of dawn..."¹ He further elaborated that "the frontier is outer-orientated. Its main attention is directed toward the outlying areas which are both a source of danger and a coveted prize. The hinterland - the mother land - is seldom the directing force behind the pulsation of frontier life... The frontier is a manifestation of centrifugal forces... an integrating factor. Being a zone of transitions from the sphere (ecumene) of one way of life to another, and representing forces which are neither fully assimilated to nor satisfied with either, it provides an excellent opportunity for mutual interpenetration and sway. Along the frontier life constantly manipulates the settled patterns of the pivotally organised socio-political and

1. Kristof, Ladis D. "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries" in the edition Jackson, W.A.D. Politics and Geographic Relationship. London 1964, pp 134-35

cultural structures. It is precisely this watering down of loyalties and blurring of difference, that the central governments attempt to forestall by substituting the semi-autonomous frontiers with a controlled and exact border line".² This concept postulates that stronger and more powerful states were able to expand into the peripheral frontier, and gain control over more and more of it. In these modern times the frontier may be described as an area of darkness, of the unknown, of dawn. The apportionment of Antarctica amongst various states is a modern case in point. Boundaries were often drawn as a consequence of frontiers. The protagonists of expansionism invariably confronted each other and at times the resultant contact initiated boundary treaties. The colonial invasion of Africa is littered with examples of such a process.

Boundaries, on the other hand, may be described as thin lines on the maps marking the limit of state sovereignty. As a matter of fact a boundary is not a line, but a plane, a vertical plane that cuts through the airspace, the soil, and the subsoil of adjacent states. To Kristof the word boundary "...indicates certain well-established limits (the bounds) of the given political unit, and all that which is within the boundary is bound together, that is, it is fastened by an internal bond... is a term appropriate to the present day concept of the state, that is, the state as a sovereign (or autonomous) spatial unit, one among many... the essentials of statehood both from the functional and legal point of view are: territory, people and a government in effective

2. ibid pp 135-37

control internally, independent externally, and willing and able to assume obligations under international (or federal) law. Sovereignty is territorial: hence it must have a certain known extent: a territory under exclusive jurisdiction limited by state boundaries. The borderland, the old march lands, are defined more and more exactly until there is, in principle, an exact borderline. The modern sovereign state is bound within and confined to its legal limits..integrated not only administratively and economically but also by means of a state idea or "creed"..... The boundary..... is inner oriented, It is created and maintained by the will of the central government.... a separating factor.... the boundary separates the sovereign (or federal) or autonomous, or any other) political units from one another...it remains always a fixed obstacle; it impedes integration across the borderline..."³. There is no denying the fact that all states have laws, and all boundaries mark the limits of territory where such laws are applied. All states have their respective policies, and all boundaries possess some degree of economic significance. Theoretically all states are sovereign and as such boundaries demarcate the limits of that sovereignty. However, these concepts, postulates and internationally recognized principles have been shattered and demolished either directly i.e. through aggression and invasion or indirectly through subversion, and the sacred cow of the inviolability of state sovereignty has at times been mercilessly slaughtered on the altar of expansionism, and boundaries have been

3. pp.
 ibid/135-37

redefined, redrawn or redemarcated. "Both frontiers and boundaries are manifestations of socio-political forces, and as such are subjective, not objective. But while the former are the result of rather spontaneous or at least ad hoc solutions and movements, the latter are fixed and enforced through a more rational and centrally co-ordinated effort; a conscious choice is made among the several preferences and opportunities at hand.... Boundaries are not boundaries of all political power. They are the limits of internal political power...External political power does not know territorial limits; it appears on the international scene ... in order to have some stability in the political structure, both on the national and international level a clear distinction between the spheres of foreign and domestic politics is necessary. The boundary helps to maintain this distinction"⁴

A.E. Moodie has expressed similar views "No aspect of international affairs reveals more clearly the limitations of mankind than the efforts to settle the disposal of these frontiers. Up to the present time decisions have often been reached by the exercise of force and they have succeeded in sowing the seeds of further antagonisms which are only worsened by the fantastic claims sometimes put irredenta" are shibboleths which have all too often been used as excuses for aggrandisement."⁵

Political geographers have tried to define the word boundary in such a manner that the definition would

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4. Kristof L.D. op. cit pp 143-44
 5. Moodie, A. E. "Geography behind Politics"
 London, 1947, p. 80

cover every aspect of the term, hoping in this way to relieve the world tensions created by boundary disputes. This discussion gathered momentum during the interwar period and vigorous efforts were made to weigh the merits of "artificial" and "natural" boundaries. However, it was commonly argued that no exhaustive or "ideal" definition could be suggested without a definite reference to functions. A boundary is an integral part of a politico-territorial organisation, and the bases for their establishment along with the effect of the use of these criteria will have. The term effect here denotes functions. A close study of the evaluation of international boundaries would reveal that a majority of political geographers have attached great significance to ethnic grouping and the boundaries defined, delimited and demarcated in accordance with this concept. Accordingly an effort is made to devise boundaries which would separate peoples who are racially dissimilar and unify those who are racially alike. The South African Bantustan scheme is a case in point, where people are assigned "homelands" according to their racial groups. A boundary devised on this principle is considered to minimise the chances of friction and tension and help eliminate the dangers inherent in boundary disputes. But such a definition could not possibly cover the multifarious racial characters and meet the exacting needs of a heterogeneous society. Invariably all the states have minority groups and it is very difficult if not well nigh impossible to identify correctly this specific racial group size. At times states have exchanged racial groups in an effort to mollify tensions, instead of

reconstituting boundaries e.g. Turkey and Greece. Since the British gave independence to Cyprus in 1960, the Turkish and Greek inhabitants of the island have been engaged in bitter squabbling over the future of this small but strategically placed state. There have been suggestions from different quarters that the island should be partitioned between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots or that the Turkish community should be exchanged with Greeks from the Salonika belt of the Greek Mainland so as to lessen tension between the two states, to eliminate racial tension by separating the racial groups through boundary demarcations, and at the same time to preserve the characteristics of their respective societies and institutions.

There are political geographers and political entities who have suggested and advocated the defining of boundaries on a linguistic basis - India is a typical example of this. The Indian Union has preferred to organise herself on these lines and the emergence of Hariana and Andhrapradesh is a vivid example of boundary demarcations on the basis of languages, especially where there is a multilingual society. "The Times" of London (5.1.73) commenting on the Indian problem stated, "Ironically, the cause of separatism, which was espoused originally by those living in the Telengana region of the state, is now being urged most hotly by their Andhra neighbours. This multiplication of the centrifugal forces at work has made it all the more difficult for the central government to play a unifying role." The same paper made some sharp but legitimate observations (16.1.73) regarding the

separatist tendencies and age old parochialisms and regionalisms in India, "The present trouble in Andhra Pradesh, which threatens to split the state into two new units, has revived the old debate about the dangers of regionalism in India.....India's first Prime Minister who had earlier endorsed the principle of linguistic states, now set his face steadily against the idea. The Prime Minister contended that fissiparous and parochial passions... would be encouraged unnecessarily if the units of the Indian federation corresponded too closely to linguistic or ethnic divisions." Tayyeb has made similar observations, "In spite of the geographic kaleidoscopic appearance of India and the resulting chain of Indian geographic unity and commensurate measures of political unity in India, the history of India regurgitates innumerable instances of cultural, political and social disunity, and the emergence of Pakistan as an independent political unit is the latest and the most comprehensive rebuttal to the claimants of such illusionary unity."⁶ This concept could have politically dangerous consequences and the politicoterritorial organisations might be liable to fragmentation and the unity of the state jeopardised. This type of boundary demarcation might create tension instead of eliminating it as the boundary would establish different characters and interests thereby separating the two peoples instead of bringing them together and developing a unifying bond. These groupings across the boundary might develop hostile attitudes and the significance of their mutual boundary could be undermined thus weakening the state structure.

6. Tayyeb A., op.cit. pp 24-25

Another method of defining a boundary is the recognition of a physical barrier, i.e. a mountain range, an escarpment, river or lake, such as the Karakoram Pass or watershed, the Naaf River, Ran of Kutch. Such physical features might have divisive or unifying effects. These physiographic boundaries have increasingly lost their significance in the face of technological development, especially in the field of warfare. The traditional geographic analysis of the South Asian Sub-Continent accepted the Himalayas as a very useful and effective physical barrier which helped keep the enemy at bay. But the concept received a shattering blow in 1962 during the Sino-Indian border conflict when the Chinese armies used the defensive mechanisms of this physiographic boundary to their advantage. It would be totally wrong to assume that such boundaries have completely lost their usefulness because physiographic features are generally well known and could be recognised as trespass line. The crestline of the Safed Koh range could easily be recognised as the natural physiographic boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan to consolidate the existence of the Durand Line and to eliminate the source of tensions in the region. The Andes have been considered the most convenient and natural divide between Chile and Argentina, in spite of the wranglings between the two states as to its correct definition and demarcation.

Rivers are very important elements in the process of boundary establishment but have not prevented friction or conflict. The Oder-Neisse line, the Beas-Sutlej axis,

the Ravi and the Chenab lines, the Ganges, the ~~Sutla~~ and the Pooran Kusiya lines are only a few examples. The use of the water by the riparian states is one of the major issues for discussion, and the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan is a case in point. Moreover, the persistent shifting of the river course creates very tricky problems especially when "char-lands" are established thereby necessitating the redefinition and redemarcation of the boundary. The rivers of East Pakistan have been notorious in this respect causing friction with India over the boundary alignment. Physiographic boundaries sometimes coincide with anthropogeographic boundaries. Such boundaries are invariably related to various features of human settlement and culture, the boundary between Spain and France along the Pyrenees is a typical example of a physiographic cum anthropogeographic boundary, in spite of the fact that there are several cultural contracts across this border, which may be a reflection of the historical role played by such a feature in functioning as a divide. In addition such anthropogeographic boundaries may cause frictions and tensions, especially when precise definitions are sought and the socio-cultural and religious compulsions are hard to reconcile e.g. the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Some trespass lines of history served to separate independently developing power cores, and some survived to become permanent, modern international boundaries. Boundaries that were defined, delimited and demarcated before the maturing of the present cultural landscapes are termed as antecedent boundaries e.g. the boundary between U.S.A. and Canada, west of the

Great Lakes. The boundaries that ran through the "virginal" territory were termed by Hartshorne as "Pioneer" boundaries and after the main elements of the state system had been established on either side of the antecedent or pioneer boundary, then such an alignment was described as a subsequent boundary.

Power is the most important recurring element that cannot be mapped with any precision and which is constantly in change. Powerful states at will have been able to dictate the redefinition and redemarcation of boundaries.

"A boundary is not only a line of demarcating legal systems but also a line of contact of territorial power structures...Spykman evaluated power in terms of resources and strategy, both on a grand scale. Peacemakers, he argued must think of the geography of power, for "interest in the frontier is now no longer in terms of the strategic value of the border zone but in terms of the power potential of the territory it surrounds."⁷

The two World Wars and their aftermath have provided sufficient material in the field of power politics as a result of which the powerful states were able to dictate the demarcation of boundaries according to their interests; the two German states, the two

7. Jones, Stephen B. "Boundary Concepts in the setting of place and Time" Jackson W.D.A. edit: Politics and Geographic Relationship, London, 1964, p.133

Korean Republics, the two Vietnams and the creation of Israel are living examples of this concept. However the permanence of such boundary demarcation is open to question.

Boundaries have also been defined in accordance with the geometric concept and most of these appear on the map as ruler-straight lines drawn along parallels or lines of longitude. These may also be represented by an arc drawn by a compass. "The use of long geometrical lines as boundaries required some geodetic sophistication.

-----Their application to America was of European origin. The Papal Line of demarcation - really a "line of allocation" and not a boundary - was the earliest. The Charters of English colonies specified geometrical boundaries in many cases. The conflicting western land claims of these colonies arose largely from the exploration of their geometrical boundaries. The parallel of forty-nine degrees was first suggested by the Hudson's Bay Company as a boundary between French and English possessions in eastern Canada, as early as 1714"⁸ Geometrical boundaries are features of Africa's political geography much more than that of Pakistan though triangulation is important in the North West of West Pakistan.

The adjacent states may come to an arrangement whereby they mutually accept a particular line of demarcation and as such establish a boundary through

8. ibid. p. 131

contractual agreement "The assence of the contractual concept of boundary is that two countries should agree on a line and stick to it, as individuals agree on property lines...the contract may be a mere facade to hide power politics."⁹ The boundary demarcations of Louisiana, Florida, Alaska and Gadsden strip may be cited as good examples of contractual boundaries. The incorporation of the boundaries of Gawadar into Pakistan is another case in point.

Another basis of defining a boundary is religion. Peoples of widely varied races and tongues have accepted the same faith. Peoples speaking the same language and belonging to the same race have opted for different religions. The Partition of the South Asian sub-continent in 1947 was essentially based on the "two nations theory" and the boundaries of the two states were defined by each of the two commissions and was "instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab/Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will also take into account other factors"¹⁰ The subcontinent was partitioned on these lines and as a result Pakistan emerged as a fragmented "truncated" and a "moth-eaten" state; and the ill effects of a hasty partition have haunted her ever since. The creation of the state of Israel and the defining of her borders in 1948 followed the religious concept of boundaries, and the effects of

9. ibid. p. 130

10. The Report of the Punjab Partition Committee, p.ii
1947.

the redrawing of the boundaries in the region are still being felt throughout the world. The resulting friction and tension has increasingly threatened world peace and at times has brought the "superpowers" on a collision course; the partition of the South Asian subcontinent in 1947 was described by Spate as "the expression of a new economic nationalism that has inevitably taken into its hands the immensely powerful weapon of immemorial religious and social differentiation."¹¹


Pakistan inherited approximately 7000 miles of frontiers in 1947, as a result of the partition of the subcontinent. Amongst these were internationally recognised boundaries e.g. the Durand Line in the north-west and the Pakistan-Iran boundary in the southwest. Some State and provincial boundaries were accepted as international such as Bahawalpur and Sind, and some District and Tehsil¹² boundaries were transformed into international boundaries. In East Pakistan the District and Thana¹³ boundaries in Assam and Bengal of the pre-partition period formed the boundaries between Pakistan and India. Consequent upon the boundary award Pakistan inherited a number of problems which were basically a reflection of wider political issues in the sub-continent. These concerned both the old established boundaries and the Radcliffe Awards of 1947.

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11. Spate, O.H.K. India and Pakistan, A General and Regional Geography N.Y. 1957 pp 144.
 12. The Durand Line was a recognized and established boundary, but still posed a number of problems for Pakistan thus, a problem boundary.
 13. Tehsil is an administrative (sub-District) unit in the Punjab.
 14. Thana was an administrative (sub-District) unit in East Pakistan.

Fig: 3.

THE BOUNDARIES OF PAKISTAN.

THE DURAND LINE.



Pakistan was unique among independent states in being divided into two parts separated by 1000 miles of Indian territory. Moreover, each part has some boundaries that are subject to dispute. These may be classified as (i) established-unestablished, (ii) problem-non-problem and (iii) secure-insecure¹⁵ boundaries. An analysis of each section of the boundaries of Pakistan should give a better picture of her geopolitical problems in terms of this classification.

The Western Boundaries

The Durand Line Agreement was signed on November 12, 1893, by Sir Mortimer Durand for the British Crown in India and by Amir Abdurrahman for Afghanistan. The Agreement was reaffirmed in the Anglo-Afghan Pact of 1905, the Treaty of Rawalpindi in 1919, and was further reaffirmed in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921.

The Durand Line starts (3) in the north-west of Karamsar Pass in the north of West Pakistan then stretches to the west passing through the Baroghil pass and the Kach Pass bordering on the Wakhan Region of Afghanistan in the snowy Hindu Kush, and descending towards the Dorah Pass. Thus leaving Noshaq and Tirich Mir, the two lofty peaks, well within the Chitral region of Pakistan. The descent becomes steeper towards the Shui, Shiran Shing and Shingara Passes. From this point the boundary zigzags towards the famous Khyber Pass and passes

15. Pakistan - Iran boundary was not fully demarcated, but still posed no major problems. The Pakistan - India boundary in the Rann of Kutch was neither established nor demarcated, therefore, an insecure and problem boundary.

through the important border post of Torkham, taking a westward direction to the Peiwar Pass in the vicinity of the Sufed Koh, leaving the scenic Parachinar and its poplar trees well within the Kurram Agency of Pakistan. The boundary then runs southwards through Waziristan, the Gomal Pass and the Quetta-Pishin region heading west through the dry and barren Chagai Hills and ending in the proximity of Koh-i-Malik Siyah, the trijunction of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. The boundary alignment is in conformity with the expressed thoughts of Amir Abdurrahman in his autobiography, Life of Abdurrahman, and establishes the fact that the signing of the Durand Line Agreement was free of duress and that it was mutually agreed upon"... to keep a record of every word which was uttered by Sir Mortimer Durand, myself, and other speakers of the mission, I had arranged for Munshi Sultan Muhammad Khan to sit behind a curtain without being seen or heard, or his presence known by anyone else except myself, to write down every word they spoke to me, or among themselves, either in English or Persian. He wrote in shorthand every word uttered by Durand or myself, and this conversation is all preserved in the record office. The short outcome of the conversation was this, that the boundary line was agreed upon from Chitral and Baroghil Pass up to Peshawar, and thence up to Koh-i-Malik Siyah (the trijunction of Persia, Afghanistan and Baluchistan) in this way that Wakhan Kafristan, Asmar, Mohmand of Lalpura, and one portion of Waziristan (Birmal) came under my rule, and I renounced my claims from the railway-station of New Chaman, Chagai,

the rest of Waziri, Bilind Khel, Kurram, Afridi, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Dir, Chilas and Chitral."¹⁶

The Durand Line was largely demarcated in 1895, and the boundary it seems, was a compromise between the British and Russian interests in the area, and established Afghanistan as a buffer state between the two powers, the Wakhan ridge serving as the divide between the two spheres of influence. This point is substantiated by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which acknowledged the line of demarcation of the two spheres of influence. The British in India had endeavoured to keep the Russians away from India and the approaches to the Arabian Sea, and as such "the first step forward in the new policy was taken in 1876" two years before the outbreak of the war with Afghanistan. This advance was made not on the North-West Frontier but from Upper Sind into the territory now known as Baluchistan. It was followed later by very important advances elsewhere, and consolidated by the establishment in 1893 of an agreed frontier with Afghanistan. And it was associated with general policy... to build a strategic line of defence against Russian pressure in Central Asia."¹⁷ The North-West Frontier Province has been the subject of innumerable irruptions and invasions and there is no denying the fact that most of the invaders passed through the passes of this frontier region to subjugate India, therefore, the British in India wanted to have a secure defence

16. Life of Abdurrahman, 1900, Vol. ii, p. 160

17. Caroe, Olaf, The Pathans: 550 B.C.-A.D. 1957, London, 1965, p. 370.

mechanism in the region to safeguard their geopolitical interests," the land frontiers of India appeared to the British less secure, especially to the north-west, where Russian expansion in Central Asia, along with her attempts to control the rulers of Afghanistan and Persia, alarmed and preoccupied British opinion. Policy makers in London and Calcutta were perplexed between the advantages of leaving Persia and Afghanistan as buffer states, or of controlling Afghanistan and pushing British outposts into Central Asia or of standing firm behind a forward Indo-British Line of strong strategic outposts."¹⁸

Alistair Lamb has expressed similar views, "However, in periods when it seemed as if the Russians might displace the Chinese in Sinkiang, the British gave thought to the extension of at least their theoretical sovereignty to the northern glacis of the Karakoram so as to keep Russia as far away as possible from the centres of Indian population. This glacis possessed few inhabitants and would require very little administration. A British boundary which embraced it would involve less the extension northwards of British rule than the extension eastwards of a buffer strip, almost a continuation of the Wakhan tract of Afghanistan which Anglo-Russian Diplomacy had created in 1893-95."¹⁹

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18. Phillips, C.H. et al, (ed) *The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858 to 1947, selected Documents*, p. 440.
19. Lamb, H.A. *Asian Frontiers, Studies in a Continuing Problem*, London, 1968, p. 103.


The tribal Pathans were not attracted by the establishment of the Durand Line, and to project their disapproval they mounted attacks against the Indian positions in 1897-98, but were quickly subdued with determination by the Indian Government. With the intention of placating the Pathans and of consolidating the defence line in the north-west the Indian Government on 9th November, 1901, created the North West Frontier Province. The Districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Hazara were detached from the Punjab to constitute the new province. In addition the government created five Tribal Agencies of Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan (Pakistan has added the Mohmand Agency since 1947). However, these Agencies do not cover the entire Tribal Belt, and the tribes such as Orakzais, Bhattanis and Adam Khel Afridis are administered by the Deputy Commissioners of the respective districts.

The Durand Line^(2,3,4) has not been drawn in conformity with the ethnic groupings and thus in some cases cut across the tribal territories e.g.²⁰ Mohmands, Shinwaris, Mahsud, and Waziri. The Durand Line is

20. As historical notes to C.J.Griffitta's book Afghanistan, Olaf Caroe writes: "The fixing of the Durand Line was one result of the Second Afghanistan war...It was, and is by no means, arbitrary. It generally follows tribal boundaries, separating those tribes which go to market in Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Tarak and Quetta from those with economic links with Khurasan having Kabul, Ghazni and Kandhar as their market towns.."

"illogical from the point of view of ethnography, of strategy and of geography."²¹ Irrespective of these local, potential causes of discord, the Line as a whole has been a constant source of tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan, hence it is certainly classifiable as a problem boundary, in spite of the fact that its alignment was mutually agreed in 1893, and subsequently upheld by the parties concerned as an international frontier. The boundary was fully demarcated in the early stages except in two areas (i) Chitral - Afghanistan border and (ii) the Nawa Sar-Sikaram peak section. The Chitral - Afghanistan border was defined during the World War II. In the Nawa Sar-Sikaram section a stretch to the west of the Khyber was demarcated in 1919, but the remainder has yet to be demarcated though an acceptable alignment would probably be easily found along the crest-line of the Safed Koh range. "Something should be said here of a sector agreed on the map but never demarcated on the ground, from the point on the watershed between Kunar and Ba-jaur, through Mohmand Country, across the west end of Khaiber, and thence skirting the Bazar Valley up to the great range of the Sufed Koh turning westward to its culminating peak, Sikarem. Along the Sufed Koh the failure to demarcate is of no consequence, for the range summit is unmistakable, one of the most obvious natural features in all this country. West of Khaiber the omission was rectified in 1919. But in Mohmand country there has been difficulty... due to the fact that geographical watersheds and tribal boundaries do not coincide in this sector. The Durand Line was conceived

Fig: 4



THE DURAND LINE AND THE TRIBAL LOCATION

as following the Kunar-Bajaur watershed as far as that was defined towards the Kabul River, leaving Lalpura to Afghanistan, and reaching the river at Shinpokh...left all the Kama Goshta Mohmands on the Afghan side, while it included on the side of India a number of Upper Mohmand clans...on the international line that divides the allegiance of a tribe is a fertile cause of disturbance.. British authorities, who were compelled to reserve a freedom of action to deal with these clans in the event of their using their Alsatia as a base of hostile action. Failing agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan it is certain that the last has not been heard of this anomaly."²²

The Indian suggestion in 1919 to Amir Amanullah, of an alternative boundary through Mohmand territory further to the east; offering the Bohai Dag Valley was not taken up. It is the Bajaur area of the undemarcated boundary which has been a constant source of friction and tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in 1961 Pakistan was forced to take punitive measures against the Pathans on this section "Afghan forces had attacked two Pakistani posts at Miskinai and Sangpura in Bajaur area on May 19-20, 1961. Pakistan planes attacked... and destroyed machine-gun and mortar positions; and prisoners confessed that 1000 Afghans

22. Caroe, Olaf, op. cit., pp. 382.

troops crossed into Bajaur!²³

A very important question may be asked at this point in time as to why the Durand Line has achieved such a political significance since the very emergence of Pakistan as an independent state. The answer, in fact, lies in the successive endeavours of the various governments of Pakistan, which have gradually but decidedly, through policy decisions, ~~have~~ made serious efforts to integrate the frontier region into her effective administrative structure, and as such eliminate the existence of the Azad Illaqa (free and uncontrolled zone), from within her political boundaries. This determined policy seemed to have two main aims: (i) the incorporation of the frontier region and as such the termination of the overt or covert Afghan interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan, and (ii) the socio-economic and political development of the region by a planned introduction of administrative reforms, establishment of educational institutions, growth of industrial units, building of roads and bridges, permanent supply of fresh water, irrigation schemes, hospitals and the provision of other amenities so as to bring the life of the region at par with the other integral parts of Pakistan. This is not acceptable to Afghanistan since it is bound to lay-bare and expose the weaknesses of her outdated socio-economic and political structure. The Pakistani point of view is that the above measures would help a great deal in consolidating the national traits of her people, and in addition would consolidate her political boundaries in the northwest. Pakistan has shown no interest, at all, in the expansion of her territorial limits, especially in the northwest, and as such the total abandonment of the ideas which were nurtured by the Old British Empire, when these areas

23. Keesings, op. cit., p. 18172.

served either as the areas of expansion or the buffer against possible Russian incursions at the expense of the British interests. In the eyes of Pakistanis and their policy makers the theoretical assumptions of Lord Curzon have lost their validity. In fact, Pakistan has endeavoured to terminate this concept in the interest of stability and permanent political boundaries.

The socio-economic and politico-administrative developments in the frontier regions of Pakistan are bound to undermine the vested interests of the anachronistic rule of the Yahya Khel (who normally speak Persian and not Pushto), and expose the temerity and the futility of the Afghan propaganda machine that the Pathans and Baluchis of Pakistan are living like serfs under the rule of the Punjabis. This is also likely to discredit the Maliks and Sirdars of the region (The Sirdari Nizam has been abolished in Pakistan w.e.f. April 8, 1976) who had enjoyed almost complete social, economic and political control over the poor masses of this region, and who have exploited the innocent people for their ulterior motives.²⁴

Pakistan-Iran Boundary.

The Pakistan-Iran Boundary in the south-west has been relatively a quiet one and has been recognised as an established boundary between the two states in spite of the fact that there have been some incidents which were of little significance in the wider context of the ever growing friendly relations and close cooperation between Pakistan and Iran. These two brotherly neighbours enjoy common culture, heritage and ethnographical affinities, in addition to their common faith and a sense of collective responsibility in the region. Both are members of the Central Treaty Organization (previously the Baghdad Pact) and are active participants in the Regional Cooperation for Development. To cement these relations both the countries agreed in 1947-49 to reach an amicable settlement of their boundary alignment; this extended to approximately 590 miles

23. Reesings, op. cit., p. 1872.

24. The question of Pukhtunistan has again been raised very actively by the Afghan rulers since the coup in that country in July 1973. Sardar Daud Khan the cousin of the ousted king Zahir Shah has been installed as the leader of the military officers. Daud's antagonism towards Pakistan is well known since his premiership during the late fifties. The difficulty with the Afghan leaders has been their failure to identify the "Pukhtunistan" problem or to give a correct definition of its boundaries. There seems to be a constant shift in their minds as to the degree of autonomy for this so called land of the Pukhtuns or the extent to which the boundaries of "Pakhtunistan" are to be delimited. Pakistan has largely been ignoring the Afghan propoganda in the interest of world peace and Muslim brotherhood but there are signs that Mr. Bhutto might be forced to take a much more aggressive line towards the Daud regime if the

along their common frontier. The boundary which was partially demarcated, runs from the tri-junction of Pakistan-Iran and Afghanistan i.e. the Koh-i-Malik Siah, to Gwadar Bay, in the Arabian Sea. Since this region had also been brought under the jurisdiction of the British Raj, Iran and the British India signed border agreements in 1871, 1896 and 1905. However, the Baluch-Iranian boundary was largely undemarcated until Pakistan and Iran reached an agreement in 1958, after carrying out a detailed and comprehensive survey of the boundary alignment. The agreement was fully implemented on 6th February 1959, when the boundary demarcation was formally completed. According to the agreement the Government of Pakistan transferred the Mirjawa-Zahidan sector of the Quetta-Zahidan rail track to the Iranian Railways. Pakistan and Iran exchanged the final protocol of the boundary agreement on 31st August, 1960. "The successful conclusion of this highly intricate work demonstrates once again what can be achieved by peaceful negotiations between two neighbourly nations whose relations are inspired by mutual respect, mutual goodwill and mutual trust.

Afghans do not adopt a good neighbourly attitude towards Pakistan. The Afghans must not forget that there are approximately 5 million Pakhtuns in Afghanistan (41% of the Afghanistan population) but 10 millions in Pakistan, and if referendum were to be held to determine the wishes of the Pakhtuns on both the sides of the Duran Line then there are good reasons to believe that the decisions would in all probability be in Pakistan's favour. Moreover the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkoman and Baluchis of Afghanistan cannot for long be kept out of the lime light.

Pillars of the stone and mortar may conceivably fall into disrepair and crumble one day, but I feel sure that the sentiments which inspire the settlement itself will remain untouched by the hands of time, for here is a boundary of love that joins rather than separates."²⁵

However, there was some criticism voiced in Pakistan against the agreement, especially in Baluchistan and the critics mentioned a figure of 3000 square miles that Pakistan had ceded to Iran under the agreement. But the Pakistan Government vehemently rejected the accusation, "It is not a fact that Pakistan has given away 3000 square miles to Iran. We agreed to give to Iran 310 square miles of its territory, which had been forcibly occupied by the British, when they were rulers of the subcontinent, and against which occupation the Government of Iran had always protested...While the Government of Pakistan will transfer some 310, and not 3000 square miles of territory which had been in de facto occupation of the British Government of India, the Government of Iran has ceded 95 square miles of territory, hitherto under its occupation, to the Government of Pakistan..."²⁶ The two states on 16th July, 1963, completed all the formalities by exchanging the documents and the related material. Mr. Baqi Baluch, a vociferous member of West Pakistan Provincial Assembly initiated proceedings in the West Pakistan High Court to question the validity of the agreement and the

25. General N.M. Raza, Pakistan Ambassador to Iran as reported by Dawn, Karachi September 1, 1960.

26. Bhutto, Z.A. Speech in the National Assembly on 24th July 1963. Cf. Important Speeches and Press Conferences p. 443.

consequent transfer of the territory but failed to pursue the matter and as such the case is still pending in the Court. It is this territory that Khan Wali Khan, the leader of the National Awami Party, which emerged dominant both in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, has mentioned in recent months and has accused the former government of President Ayub Khan of ceding national territory to Iran, a territory, which has enormous mineral potentials, according to the Pathan leader. The Pakistan-Iran boundary has posed no problems of significance for Pakistan and for all intents and purposes been a secure and satisfactory line of demarcation between Pakistan and Iran; indeed a source of strength for Pakistan.

The Boundary with India.

Pakistan has faced a number of problems with regard to her boundaries in the south-east (Rann of Kutch), along the Sutlej River and in Kashmir. (The part which is in the effectual control of Pakistan.) Disputes have arisen owing to (a) unestablished boundaries, (b) conflicting interpretations of the Radcliffe Award (Lahore-Montgomery-Ferozepur Districts), and (c) the absence of a defined or demarcated boundary (Gilgit-Hunza-Sinkiang).

The Rann of Kutch


The Rann of Kutch (Fig:5,6) covers approximately 8400 square miles and except for small patches of higher grounds (bets), it is a desolate area, unpopulated but for occasional herdsmen. The Rann was ^{the result of} an earthquake in 1819, when it was sealed off from the waters of the

Indus. It is Flooded from May to October by swollen rivers and high tides, and it is during this period that the bays are formed. Pakistan contended (Fig: 5) that since the Rann was a marsh/lake a central boundary was to be preferred, she therefore claimed approximately 3500 square miles to the north of the 24th parallel. India completely rejected this proposal and claimed the entire Rann (Fig: 6). In the absence of agreement the Indian forces in the Rann occupied Chhad Bet on 25th February, 1956, and in May 1965 an accidental patrol clash led to an enlargement of the incident. On 30th June, 1965 a ceasefire was agreed on the initiative of the British Government, and later the dispute was referred to a mutually agreed tribunal.

The Tribunal first met in February 1966, in Geneva and ruled that it was not entitled to give a political award but an award based upon the actual claims of sovereignty. Pakistan was represented by Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, and India by Ales Babler of Yugoslavia. Mr. Gunnar Lagergren of Sweden acted as the chairman. On February 19, 1968, by a 2-1 decision, the Tribunal awarded 90 per cent of the Rann (3200 square miles) to India and 10 per cent (350 square miles) to Pakistan. The Tribunal ruled that there was no historically recognised or well-established boundary between Sind (West Pakistan) and the State of Kutch (Gujrat-India). The presiding Judge remarked: "In respect of those sectors of the Rann in relating to which no specific evidence in the way of display of Sind


The Rann of Kutch As Claimed By Pakistan

Fig: 5



The Rann of Kutch As Claimed By India

Fig:6



authority, or merely trivial or isolated evidence of such a character, supports Pakistan's claim, I pronounce in favour of India... However, in respect of sectors where a continuous and for the region intensive Sind activity meeting with no effective opposition from the Kutch side, is established I am of the opinion that Pakistan has made out a better and superior title. This refers to a marginal area south of Rahim Ki Bazar, including Piol Valo Kun, as well as Dhara Banni and Chhad Bet, which on most maps appear as an extension of the mainland of Sind."²⁷ The Tribunal further decided: "It may be taken as positively established that in this century, prior to independence, outside Dhara Banni and Chhad Bet the police and criminal-jurisdiction of the Sind authorities over the disputed territory extended in the sector between the eastern loop and Dhara Banni to Ding, Vighokot, and Biarbet... Both the inhabitants of Sind who used the grazing grounds, and the Sind authorities must have acted on the assumption that Dhara Banni and Chhad Bet were British territory."²⁸ With a view to removing any further causes of tension in the area the Tribunal awarded the two deep inlets, on either side of Nagar Parker, to Pakistan "It would be inequitable to recognise these inlets as foreign territory. It would be conducive to friction and conflict, and since this territory is wholly surrounded by Pakistan it is logical that it should belong to Pakistan."²⁹ With a view to


27. The Times, London, 20-2-1968

28. Keesings, op. cit, p. 22838.

29. *ibid* p. 22838.


The Rann of Kutch: Details

Fig: 7



The Rann of Kutch:Details

Fig: 8



removing any further causes of tension in the area the Tribunal awarded the two deep inlets, on either side of Nagar Parker to Pakistan.^{29A}

The portion of the boundary between the Western Terminals³⁰ (Fig: 9) (marked as "WT") and the Western Trijunction (marked as Point "A") shall lie along the vertical line as demarcated on the ground...the Western Trijunction and Point "B", which is the easternmost point of the eastern loop...the boundary shall go in a straight line to Point "C" which is indicated as "Sadariaja Gat" ... from there straight eastnortheast until at Point "D" in the vicinity of the reported Karali outpost. From Point "D" it shall follow the boundary symbols until Point "E"...The boundary around Dhara Banni and Chaad Bet will be straight lines drawn from or through...the southernmost (B) and easternmost(H) points of Chhad Bet as appearing on Indian map B-33 amid two traverse stations marked on Indian map B-48 as small circles, one lying at a distance of approximately 5.8 miles south of Baliari next to the mark "5r" and the other lying at a distance of approximately 1.7 miles south of the letters "D" and "H" in Dhara Banni." The boundary shall go in a straight line through the middle of the first mentioned circle and touch the second circle as depicted Point "E" side of Nagar Parkar will constitute the territory of Pakistan.

29.A. The Tribunal further stated, "It would be inequitable to recognise these inlets as foreign territory. It would be conducive to friction and conflict, and since this territory is wholly surrounded by Pakistan, it is logical that it should belong to Pakistan" (Keesings p. 22838).

30. The boundary alignment is in conformity with the Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal Award, 19th February, 1968.

At the western inlet, the boundary will have the boundary symbols indicated on Indian map B-34 at the point marked thereon as "26" more precisely where the cart track is indicated as departing from the edge of the Rann in southeasterly direction. This point is indicated as Point "L" (figure 9) on the other side of the inlet, the point will be that where the Camel track is indicated as Point "M" (figure 9). Between Points "L" and "M", the boundary shall be a straight line where that line reaches the boundary symbols on the northern edge of the Rann. From Point "G", the boundary shall go straight west until at Point "F" it reaches the straight line originating at Point "E". From Point "B", it shall proceed to Point "H", touching the outer points of the two tongues of land as depicted (figure 9). From Point "H", the boundary shall go in a straight line north-northeast until it reaches the boundary symbols appearing on the most recent survey map of that side...That point is called Point "K". As from Point "K", and until the eastern Terminus the boundary shall follow the boundary symbols,... Indian Maps B-33, B-34, B-35, Pakistan Map 103 and Indian Map TB-28, with the following deviations:

The boundary will cross the eastern inlet at its narrowest point in a straight line between Points "N" and "O" (figure 9).

This boundary marked by symbols along the outer edges of the peninsula of Nagar Parkar and up to the

entry

Eastern Terminus is a jagged one. As such it is unsuitable and impracticable as an international boundary. The boundary shall accordingly lie in conformity with the depiction between the outer points on jutting-out tongues of land from Point "M" and until the Eastern Terminus, marked as "ET" (Fig: 9.1).

The Punjab Partition


The subcontinent was partitioned on 15th August, 1947, and the important task of devising the boundaries of the two Dominions was entrusted to two boundary commissions; both were headed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe who held ultimate control over the award. The Commission for partitioning the Punjab comprised Din Mohammad and Muhammad Munir for Pakistan, and Mehr Chand Mahajan and Tej Singh representing India. The Bengal Boundary Commission comprised Abu Saleh Muhammad Akram and S.A. Rahman representing Pakistan and C.C. Biswas and B.K. Mukerji on behalf of India. Each of the two commissions was "instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab/Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will also take into account other factors".³⁴ Both Pakistan and India agreed to accept and enforce the awards. However, the

31. The demarcation of the boundary in this area has since been satisfactorily completed.


34. The Report of the Punjab Partition Committee 1947, p. ii.

The Rann of Kutch: The Award

Fig: 9



The Rann of Kutch



Pakistan Claim ●●●●●●●●
India Claim - - - - -
Boundary Award —————

FIG: 10

terms of reference of the two commissions leave much to be explained and desired. The terms did not specifically state whether the partition was to be based on majority or majority/contiguous principles or "other factors", and whether the majority principle was to be applied at the provincial, divisional, district, tehsil or thana level. Had the partition been devised and implemented on the majority/contiguous basis at the provincial or, at least the district level, the people of the two areas might have been saved from the haunting uncertainty and the massacre that followed the partition. The terms were so vague and so uncertain that both the Muslims and non-Muslims were perplexed and taken by surprise. For instance, when Muslims were in a majority in one area, as in the Lahore District, and three of its tehsils, the whole of the District should have gone to Pakistan; instead the boundary ran diagonally (Fig: 12) across the Muslim majority Tehsil of Qasur, leaving the south-eastern half to India. This belied the economic, strategic, communal or special factors, which had evidently been ignored in this case. One fails to understand the necessity and advisability of such a division, especially when the Muslim majority Tehsil of Ajnala in the District of Amritsar was awarded to India in toto and the boundary was devised on the district basis.

The District of Gurdaspur represents another anomaly (Fig: 12). This was a Muslim majority area (50.2 per cent) ³⁵ and Muslims were in a majority in

35. C.M. Ali puts the Muslim majority at 51.4 per cent in his book The Emergence of Pakistan.

Fig: 11





Fig:12

THE RADCLIFFE AWARD IN THE PUNJAB



all but one of the four tehsils in the District. The area was crucial strategically and economically and should have been awarded to Pakistan. Instead the whole of the two Muslim majority tehsils and a big slice of the third (Shakargarh) were awarded to Pakistan. Instead the whole of the two Muslim majority tehsils and a big slice of the third (Shakargarh) were awarded to India. This represented an irrational decision heavily favouring the Indians and seemed to have been based on "other factors." "The award that Radcliffe gave in the Punjab lopped off a number of contiguous majority areas from Pakistan, but not a single non-Muslim majority area was taken away from India....Muslim majority Tehsils, or sub-districts, Gurdaspur, and Batala, were given to India...The Muslim majority Tehsil Ajnala, in the Amritsar district was also handed over to India. In the Jullundur district the Muslim majority tahsils, Nakodar and Jullundur, which lie in the angle of the Sutlej and Beas rivers, were assigned to India. The Muslim majority tehsils, Zira and Ferozepur, in the Ferozepur district, which were east of the Sutlej River, were also transferred to India. All of these Muslim majority areas were contiguous to West Panjab." 36

Had one set principle been applied, e.g. that of majority/contiguous areas, the Muslim majority district of Gurdaspur would have completely blocked Indian access to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The

36. Ali, C.M., The Emergence of Pakistan, N.Y. 1967, p.213

award of this Muslim majority area to India, in fact, paved the way for the future irruptions of the Indian armies in the State. As a result of the award in the Punjab the Indians were helped in establishing a direct link with the non-Muslim ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, "It was Radcliffe's Award to India of the Gurdaspur and Batala Tahsils with Muslim majorities which rendered possible the maintenance of an Indian force at Jammu based on Pathankot as railhead and which enabled India to consolidate her defence southwards all the way from Uri to the Pakistan border.³⁷

The Radcliffe Award in the Punjab was a constant source of tension between Pakistan and India, especially in Lahore-Ferozepur and Montgomery-Ferozepur sectors. The disputes concerned the Ferozepur and Suleimanki Headworks and resulted due to conflicting interpretations of this Award. The Radcliffe Award in the Punjab left her irrigation system in jeopardy and the Pakistani Punjab was made dependent upon the Ferozepur and Hussainiwala Headworks which were carved out to India though India had less irrigated area dependent upon these headworks. Furthermore, the award of Ferozepur Tehsil to India left Pakistan very much vulnerable to Indian interests geographically and economically since Ferozepur was a very vital rail and road junction and a military centre of considerable significance. The Pakistanis generally

37. Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, London, 1956, p. 74.

held the view that the award of Ferozepur Tehsils was not based on contiguous majority areas principle but on "other factors". This point is sufficiently elaborated by Michel Aloys, "for both India and Pakistan..... Ferozepur represented a test of whether the " contiguous majority area " principle or "other factors" mentioned in the terms of reference were to prevail. Although the Ferozepur District as a whole was predominantly non-Muslim (54.92) per cent in 1941 census; 55.44 in 1931) the two northern tahsils, Ferozepur itself and Zira were Muslim majority areas (Ferozepur, 55.25 in 1941, 50 :20 in 1931; Zira 65.26 in 1941, 65.02 in 1931). The Fazilka tahsil which extended southwest along the Sutlej to the Bahawalpur border was non-Muslim by 56.72 per cent in 1941, 56.36 in 1931. Thus the question arose whether a district should be partitioned....under the terms of the Boundary Commission, Radcliffe had authority to partition Ferozepur District and to award the two Muslim majority tahsils to Pakistan on a "contiguous majority" basis, especially as neither the Sutlej nor any non-Muslim tahsil separated them from the Lahore District. But here "other factors" came forward. Awarding the Ferozepur tahsils to Pakistan would preserve the Sutlej Valley project as far as headworks were concerned...but "other factors" extended beyond irrigation considerations."³⁸ Pakistan and India

38. Aloys A. Michel, *The Indus River: A Study of the Effects of Partition*, Newhaven, 1967, pp. 178-79.

reached a negotiated settlement on 11 January, 1960.³⁹ According to the Agreement four disputed areas in the region were dealt with. Two of the areas concerned were on Lahore-Amritsar border (a) Chak Ladheke (140 acres) and (b) Teh Sharja Marja (200 acres). Pakistan gave up her claims of Chak Ladheke and India renounced her claims on the three villages Sharja Marja, Rakh Hardet Singh and Pathanke.

The remaining two disputes related to the Hussainiwala and Sulemanki Headworks. Hussainiwala had been awarded to India according to the Award in spite of the fact that the Dipalpur Canal took off from this headworks and irrigated areas in Pakistan only. Radcliffe had however, suggested joint control of the water intake. Pakistan agreed to withdraw her claim over 9.3 square miles of the disputed territory under Indian control to show her goodwill.

Regarding the Sulemanki Headworks, the Boundary Commission had ruled that the boundary between Ferozepur and Montgomery Districts would constitute the frontier between the two states and as such recognised as the international frontier. The problem was that the Boundary Commission had awarded the Sulemanki Headworks, which lay in Ferozepur District, to Pakistan and as such the district boundary had effectively been altered. Precisely what were the lines of demarcation of the Headworks, and to what extent this altered the existing boundary became

39. Kharas, J.V. Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, for Pakistan; and Desai, M.J. Commonwealth Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs for India.

the crucial points. Pakistan maintained that the Sulemanki Headworks covered an area of 25 square miles but India vehemently disputed this contention. The 1960 Agreement allowed a total area of 13 square miles to Pakistan and the remainder was considered Indian territory, but the military commanders of India and Pakistan at a Conference in Lahore agreed that pending a final determination of the boundary and the exchange of territory in the area, the two states should desist from posting Border Security Forces within 150 yards of the de facto boundary."⁴⁰

The North Eastern Boundary.

The dispute concerning the north-eastern boundary (Fig:13) of Pakistan was more complicated since the final status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is yet to be determined. This sector involved "China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under actual control of Pakistan". The boundary alignment commences in the north-western extremity at Height 5630 meters (a peak, Longitude $74^{\circ} 34/E$ and Latitude $37^{\circ} 03/N$), generally running towards eastward and then southeastward along the main watershed between the tributaries of the Tashkurgan and Hunza rivers, and passes through the Kilik, Mintaka, Kharchanai, Mutsjilga and Parpik passes, before reaching the Khunjerab Pass, leaving the main watershed to follow the Akjilga River, the Taghdumbash (Oprang) River and the Keliman Su (Oprang Jilga). The boundary line then runs up the Kelechin River (Shakagam or Muztagh) along

40. Text of Communique: Dawn, Karachi, January 12, 1960.

the middle line of its bed to its confluence with the Shorbulak Daria (Shimshal or Braldu). From the confluence of Kelechin and Shorbulak rivers, the boundary according to the Chinese, ascends the crest of a spur and runs along it to join the Karakoram Range main watershed, belonging to the Shorbulak Mountain. According to Pakistan the boundary line from the confluence of Kekechin and Shorbulak rivers, ascends the crest of a corresponding spur and runs along it, passing through Height 6520 meters till it joins the Karakoram Range main watershed. From this point the boundary runs southward and then eastward following the Karakoram Range main watershed which separates the Tarim and Indus drainage systems, passing through the East Muztagh Pass, Chogri Peak (K²), the tops of the Broad Peak, the Gasherbrum Mountain the Indirakoli Pass and the top of the Teram Kangri Peak, and then reaches its southern extremity at the Karakoram Pass.⁴¹

The two sides had widely varying claims of territory in the area. According to Pakistan the dispute related to a total area of 3400 square miles. According to the Sino-Pakistan Agreement of March 2, 1963, Pakistan gained 1350 square miles including 750 square miles which were under the control of the Chinese (such as Kuz and Sokh - Bulak). Pakistan also received the Oprang Valley and the salt-mining areas of the Shimshal Pass. China, according to the Agreement, gained 2050 square

41. The details of the boundary alignment are based on the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of March 2, 1963.

miles, especially from the point where the agreed border met the Muztagh River, picking up another crest line and running through the Aghill Pass. However, the Indians claim that Pakistan gave up a total of 13000 square miles but Pakistan rejects the contention. Alistair Lamb has firmly supported the Pakistani contention, "...the 1899 proposed border runs north west of the 1963 line, and terminates at Russo-Afghan-British Indian terijunction near the Beyik Pass in the Pamirs...beyond the Shiuchal Pass by the 1963 agreement Pakistan has been given possessions to the north of the main Karakoram Watershed. The Karakoram Pass marks the eastern end of the boundary agreed upon in 1963 and the beginning of the disputed Sino-Indian boundary in Ladakh. The alignment here agreed (Kilik Pass and Khunjerab Pass) upon in 1963 coincides with that shown on most modern maps. It follows the watershed between streams flowing into the Indus and those flowing into the Taklamakan Desert of Sinkiang. This line, shown as the border on many modern maps, represents a theoretical British border including the Mir of Hunza's claims over the Raskun Valley. The British, in fact, never administered north of the main watershed, and in 1927 the Indian Government abandoned this boundary, even in theory. However, the 1927 decision did not find its way on to the maps, which explains why critics of the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of March 1963 have been able to find cartographical support for their claim that

Pakistan has surrendered much territory to China. In fact, the 1963 Agreement formalised the arrangement decided upon in 1927, which, in turn, represented the state of affairs obtaining since the end of the 19th century.⁴² The boundary has since been demarcated on the basis that where there are passes or dabans the watershed forms the boundary.


The end of the British Raj throughout South Asia in 1947-48 brought in its wake the dismantling of a strategic system, and the emergence of a new geopolitical order. The British, in the last century of their political and military ascendancy in South Asia, had enjoyed naval supremacy throughout the Indian Ocean area, and had carefully evolved a strategic frontier-zone policy based on control of the "reverse-slopes" of their land frontiers. This was much more than a frontier or zonal policy than a boundary or linear strategy. It was obviously designed to protect their geopolitical interests, and as such the British endeavoured to create buffer zones in the areas beyond the "reverse slopes", and guarded their rear with a string of military-cum-administrative encampments. These outposts were linked to major cantonments along the main trunk roads. The most vulnerable areas, notably those in the northwest, were the most heavily fortified and patrolled, however, the British did not attach much significance to the central Himalayan sector. The strategic calculus of the Himalayan region has been totally transformed, and India considers this sector as the most vulnerable border in her military strategy.

42. Lamb, A. The Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of March 1963, Australian Outlook, Vol. 18, No. 3.

Pakistan, however, has come to regard its common border with China as a major strategic and political asset. During the British Raj the delineation of linear boundaries in this region was very messy, patchy and incomplete, and as such open to varying interpretations by the Successor states. The Pamirs constituted the trijunction of Russia, China and India, and one corner of Kashmir's trapezoid shape pointed towards the trijunction. Kashmir was, however, divided culturally between Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists; the Muslims were the most dominant of the three cultural groups (see chapter 5). Outlying states such as Jammu and Kashmir were constructed as loosely cohering units around a core of paddy land in large intermont basins and eventually brought within the fold of the Raj. Afghanistan continued to enjoy the status of a buffer state, the Afghan Panhandle (The Wakhan strip) separating Russia and British India. Along the northwest a belt of Azad Illaqa (uncontrolled and unadministered tribal belt) lay within the boundaries devised by the politico-military strategists of the Raj. The Russian expansionist designs were the real threat to the area, especially in the northwest and Kashmir region. To ward off any Russian or Afghan irruptions, as stated earlier, the British had established a very comprehensive system of military cantonments which guarded the strategic passes, for example, Khyber, Bolan, Gomal and Tochi.

This important and extensive defense infrastructure, along with the inherent security problems of the western and northwestern frontiers, was inherited by Pakistan in their entirety. The geopolitical significance of the northeastern boundary with China was fully recognised by Pakistan, especially after the sharp Sino-Indian differences and the extent of Chinese presence in the Ladakh region was unfolded in 1957. This area bordered the

Fig: 13



THE SINO-PAKISTAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE




Fig:14

THE SINO-PAKISTAN BOUNDARY AGREEMENT

Pakistani held Kashmir and, therefore, Pakistan's geopolitical and military strategy was directly involved. Pakistan was very keen not to disturb her existing relationship with China, and as such sought an amicable settlement of the northeastern boundary. The Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 1963, effectively removed a possible area of tension, and helped Pakistan in strengthening her relations with China. The Karakoram Highway (largely constructed with Chinese assistance) has resulted in increased barter trade between Pakistan and China, and as such the old " silk route " has assumed great strategic significance for Pakistan.

The Boundaries of East Pakistan.

Pakistan and India experienced tension and friction in the various sectors of the boundary as awarded by Radcliffe in Assam and Bengal,⁴⁴ and as in the Punjab the problems resulted because of the varying interpretations of the Award. The Radcliffe Award seems to have been unfair to both Hindus and Muslims in the area. The Hindus lost the southern part of Jalpaiguri and the whole of Khulna District, and the Muslims lost the whole of Murshidabad and parts of Sylhet, Nadia and Jessore Districts.

Disputes seem to have arisen where the demarcation lacked a clear-cut basis. Frequently river channels served as ~~line~~ lines of demarcation, but it was not made clear whether the lines were to lie at mid-stream or along the thalweg or, indeed, even ~~at~~ along one or other of the river banks. More important still was the failure of the Award Commission to take due account of the future shifting of the channels "chars", a common occurrence in East Pakistan.

44. According to a report in The Times, London, May 17, 1974,

"...Mrs. Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman

THE BOUNDARY PROBLEMS OF EAST PAKISTAN




Fig: 15

On December 14, 1948, Pakistan and India agreed to put their respective claims before a tribunal, and it was mutually agreed that it should be headed by Algot Bagge, former member of the Supreme Court of Sweden. Pakistan was represented by M. Shahabuddin, and C. Aiyar represented India. The Tribunal held two separate meetings at Calcutta and Dacca in December 1949, and January 1950 respectively.


The first dispute related to the boundary (Fig: 16) following the Ganges, between Rajshahi and Murshidabad Districts. Subsequently the river changed its channel southward. Pakistan maintained that because of the shift in the course of the river the District boundary should be moved accordingly. This was not a sound proposition since it meant an ever fluctuating international boundary in the area. The Bagge Tribunal, therefore, upheld the Indian claim that the Radcliffe Award should form the permanent basis of the division irrespective of any shifting in the course of the river in that area.

The second dispute related to the thana boundary between Karimpur (West Bengal) and Daulatpur (East Pakistan) (Fig: 16). The boundary apparently followed one of the derelict channels of the Matabhanga (once active but now "non-perennial"). India maintained that

reached agreement on the elimination of scores of enclaves on both sides of the border whose history goes back to the days when Bangladesh was East Pakistan."

Disputes: 1 and 2

Fig: 16




the map boundary as awarded by Radcliffe should be considered without taking into account the actual position on the ground. Pakistan argued that the boundary should follow the Matabhanga, and that the upper part of the river actually lay westward of the map position; and that the incorrection should be ractified. As a result of the Tribunal Award, which accepted the Pakistani contention, Pakistan gained approximately 5 square miles of "char land".

The third dispute related to the Patharia Forest (Fig: 17). In the south-eastern corner of the Sylhet District the boundary was devised to follow the line separating the thana of Barlekha (East Pakistan) from the thana of Patharkandi (India). Pakistan argued that the whole of Patharia Forest was in the Barlekha thana, by pointing out that "The Barlekha police exercised jurisdiction over the forest in matters of crime, the census enumeration of 1941, and the registration of bicycles under the Defence of India Rules during World War II"⁴⁵. India objected to the claim by Pakistan on the ground that the evidence did not prove that the thana boundary was wrong, and that it merely indicated that the area could easily be handed from Barlekha rather than Patharkandi. The Tribunal accepted the Indian line of argument and decided the matter in favour of India.

45. Ahmad, N. Geographical Review, 1953, p.332.

Dispute: 3

Fig:17




The fourth disputed area was in the vicinity of the river Surma (Fig: 18). The dispute mainly arose because of the different names of the river Surma west of its junction with the Barak river. The two combined are known as Boglia, and after traversing some distance westward it assumes the name Kusiya. Another channel from the Boglin a course farther to the south adopts the name Sonai or Pooran Kusiya. The Radcliffe Award follows the Boglia or Kusiya i.e. the northern channel and then turns southwards to cross the Sonai or Pooran Kusiya. Pakistan contended that the boundary did not follow the northern but the southern channel. The Tribunal accepted the Indian stand that "the line drawn by Radcliffe on his map going north from Gobindapur to Barisari and thence along the river to Karimganj,"⁴⁶ should be the boundary between East Pakistan and India.

Subsequently India produced further evidence and contended that the thana boundary which the Radcliffe Award had accepted between Barisari and Gobindapura was wrong, and that it should be between the thana boundaries of Karimganj and Beani Bazar. The implementation of the Bagge Award, therefore, was held up. In 1959 Pakistan and India reached an amicable settlement. The results of which were that the Pakistani view was to prevail in the Kusiya River region, and the thana boundaries of Beani Bazar and Karimganj were to form the international boundary in the north-east.

46. ibid., p. 335.

Dispute: 4

Fig: 18



In addition to these disputes there were a number of outstanding boundary issues between Pakistan and India, along the entire borders of East Pakistan, of which Berubari Union, Cooch-Bihar enclaves and the Farrakha Barrage need to be mentioned so as to understand "these petty eruptions here and there".⁴⁷

Berubari union has a total area of about 9 square miles, and in accordance with the Noon-Nehru Agreement of 1958, was to be equally divided between the two countries. The population of Berubari was about 12000, out of which 8000 Hindus had emigrated from East Pakistan. India has yet to transfer this territory to Pakistan in spite of the fact that the initial constitutional obstacles regarding the territory have been overcome. According to The Daily Jang, London, 20.5.74, Bangladesh has agreed to cede Berubari Union to India.⁴⁸

According to the Noon-Nehru Agreement of 1958, the enclaves of the former Cooch-Bihar State in East Pakistan, and the Pakistani enclaves in West Bengal were to be exchanged without any compensation, Pakistan was to receive 28 square miles and 11,000 inhabitants in return for 17 square miles and a population of 9,000. The decision to exchange enclaves was arrived at in 1953 in principle but this was never implemented since no agreement ^{with} West Bengal on the loss of territory was reached.⁴⁹

47. Keesings, op.cit., p.17035 (Mr. Nehru in Lok Sabha).
 48. According to these reports "The Jang International" stated that a total of 1019 square miles have been ceded to India and the areas where the territory has been ceded are :1.Rangpur 133 square miles, 2. Dinajpur 250 square miles, 3. Bogra 93 square miles, 4. Rajshahi 109 square miles, 5. Kushtia 11 square miles, 6. Jessore 15 square miles, 7. Khulna 109 square miles

The Ganges Waters dispute dates back to 1951 when India made her plans public regarding the expansion and preservation of the Calcutta harbour; and the greater supplies of water to the Hoogly and Bhagiri rivers. According to the Indian plans this was to be achieved through the construction of a big dam/barrage on the Ganges at Farrakha, about eleven miles above the East Pakistan border in the area. Pakistan vehemently objected to this ambitious Indian plan which would render approximately 1,000,000 acres of land useless and barren affecting the lives of hundreds of thousands of people in seven of the Pakistani districts in the area; who were dependent upon these waters for fishing, transportation and farming. Mr. Arshad Hussain, the Pakistani Foreign Minister stated, "first, because of the diversion of waters at the dam, almost the entire flow of the River Ganges into East Pakistan could be stopped in the dry season, turning hundreds of thousands of acres of cultivated land into wasteland. Second, as a result, the channel of the river in East Pakistan will become silted, and in the flood season almost half the area of East Pakistan will be flooded every year. Third, the

8. Chittagang 92 square miles, 9. Noakhali 65 square miles, 10. Comilla 34 square miles and 11. Sylhet 174 square miles. Before the cessation of East Pakistan the total area was 55125 square miles but after these reported agreements Bangladesh has an area of 54106 square miles.

49. India and Bangladesh reached an agreement on these enclaves, according to The Times May 17, 1974.

coastal area of East Pakistan will become uncultivable in consequence of the greater penetration of seawater into the delta owing to the lack of drainage of fresh water into the sea. Fourth, as a result of the drastic reduction in water supply, a number of agricultural projects, including those being planned, will be seriously affected."⁵⁰ Moreover, Pakistan rejected the Indian contention that as a Lower riparian State she had no claims on the River Ganges, which, according to Pakistan, was an international river, and that the Indian position was totally untenable in international law in maintaining that the river "is overwhelmingly an Indian river." Pakistan's claim was that the Ganges-Kabadak project on the Padma was designed to provide irrigation facilities for 4.25 million acres on which depended 16 million people for their existence. The Indians rejected the Pakistan-i view on the grounds that the whole of East Pakistan should not be made to depend upon the waters of the Ganges since, in the Indian view, a considerable portion of East Pakistan really falls within the easy reach of the Brahmaputra and the Meghna. According to the Indian experts "...the maximum area which can justifiably expect to receive the Padma waters cannot be more than one million acres. The quantity of water required for this acreage would be a fraction of the 49,000 Cusecs Pakistan is demanding. This quantity would always be available to Pakistan by the regeneration process alone

50. Foreign Minister Arshad Hussain's Statement in the General Assembly, A/VP 1692, 11th October, 1968.

within its own territory. In other words, Pakistan would not have to depend upon any releases from Farakha for its reasonable needs. This implied that even if India diverted the entire waters of the Ganges into Hoogly Pakistan would not suffer in the least...Whatever water India releases at Farakha, it would certainly be in excess of East Pakistan's requirements and obviously, it would only pass through East Pakistan unutilised and flow into the Bay of Bengal."⁵¹ The Indians further argued that "The geographical area of the region (East Pakistan) dependent on the Ganges waters is 6.1 million acres with a population of 12 millions...the cultivatable area is 4.9 million acres...every acre of cultivatable land in this area is cropped at least once, and about quarter of the entire area has a second crop giving an intensity of 122.5 per cent cultivation. Pakistan wants more water to have two crops in the entire area i.e. about 200 per cent intensity of cultivation".⁵² The Indians obviously wanted Pakistan to have more waters from the Jamuna, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna leaving the Ganges entirely for the Indians to utilise it fully. In the period December 1968 to July 1970 a series of five Secretary-level conferences were held, and eventually some progress was made at the last of these meetings, when the two delegates agreed that "the point of delivery of supplies to Pakistan of such quantum of

51. Rangaswami Ganga Waters: Whose Needs are greater? Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 1970, p.6

52. *ibid.* p.7.

water, as may be agreed upon, will be at Farraka". This fully established, in principle, that India had accepted the Pakistani point of view that as a Lower Riparian State she was entitled to receive water from the Ganges below the Indian barrage and that the river was an international waterway. However, no agreement was reached as to the quantity of the water that Pakistan was ultimately entitled to receive; and this left the entire question of the Ganges Waters unresolved and a potential threat to peace and security in the area.⁵³

Regarding the demarcation of boundaries (East Pakistan-India) both the countries struck a hopeful note during their Secretarial meetings at Calcutta on August 17-19, 1959. The important decisions reached at the meeting were (a) peaceful defacto status not to be disturbed where actual pillar emplacements had not been implemented, (b) where temporary demarcation marks of land boundaries over river beds become covered by water during rainy season and new islands formed when the water level went down, adequate survey teams to be provided for joint seasonal demarcation at the earliest possible

53. Text of joint communique in Pakistan Horizon, 3rd Quarterly 1970

484x According to The Times 17.5.74 there were short differences between Mrs. Ghandi and Sheikh Mujib over the Ganges Waters, "The £80 million Farakka Barrage, which will come into operation later this year, is designed to divert a large part of the winter flow of the Ganges into the heavily salted West Bengal rivers system, mainly with the aims of improving the navigability of Calcutta Port. Dacca fears that a large-scale withdrawal would reduce surface water irrigation along the Ganges in Bangladesh and encourage salt-waters introsion up the delta".

time and (c) that the district officials to meet every three months to discuss administrative problems and to maintain law and order.

Regarding the East-Pakistan-Burma boundary the two countries faced some minor problems which were mainly due to the activities of the Muslim National Defence Organization (Mujahids) on the Arakan coast. The boundary question was solved peacefully and amicably in 1964, when the two countries agreed in principle that the "inherited fluctuating boundary" along the Naaf River should be transformed into a fixed boundary.⁵⁴ The delineation of the boundary based on the hydrographic survey of the Naaf River, took the two sides more than one year; thereupon the two states agreed that the fluctuating boundary of the Naaf River that runs along the internationally agreed boundary between Burma and East Pakistan should be determined in accordance with the thalweg of the said river. The two states also agreed that their nationals should be guaranteed free navigation in the Naaf River but the use of the river flow for industrial purposes was excluded. It was also agreed that proper contacts would be established to redemarcate the mutual boundary whenever and wherever the "char land" emerged, and furthermore to fix reference pillars on the land portion on both banks of the Naaf River; the latter work was completed in May, 1966.

54. Keesings op. cit., p. 20026 (Bhutto-Uthi Han Communique 22-1-1964).

The analysis of Pakistan's boundaries and the problems affecting them have made it possible to demonstrate to the effect that the nascent state started with a series of time and energy consuming problems. These problems were in addition to her enormous socio-economic and political difficulties, retarded her economic development, created divisive forces within and as such Pakistan was unnecessarily engaged in repudiating the various territorial claims of her neighbours. This state of affairs was instrumental in delaying, especially during the initial period, the process of nation building which was so vital for consolidating the territorial integrity and political independence of a united Pakistan. The different boundary disputes clearly demonstrated the regional thinking, and identified the direction and approach, in the two parts of Pakistan, toward the political boundaries of Pakistan in general, and some of the territorial claims between India and Pakistan in particular.

This was very true of the Kashmir dispute. The Bengalis were not directly affected by the territorial claims and counter-claims since they believed that the state had practically no geopolitical importance, and therefore, they took very little interest in the future of this princely state. For West Pakistanis however, the state of Jammu and Kashmir possessed immense geopolitical and strategic importance. According to the West Pakistanis, especially the Punjabis, this territory seemed to hold potentially very serious economic and political significance.

The future territorial disposition of the state is likely to determine the possible answers regarding two very crucial questions, (i) the validity of the two nation theory and the inherent principle of the majority/contiguous areas and (ii) the economic future of the Indus Basin; and this is bound to affect the future geopolitical patterns on the Subcontinent.

The Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent was partitioned on the basis of contiguous/majority areas. Kashmir is territorially contiguous to West Pakistan and is overwhelmingly a Muslim majority area. According to the Pakistani point of view the state should have automatically merged into Pakistan irrespective of the fact that the Maharaja of Kashmir was a non-Muslim (This was precisely the position of India vis-a-vis Junagadh and Manavadar since the geopolitical factors were quite incontra-distinction of the territorial disposition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. India invaded Junagadh and Manavadar in spite of the fact that the state had legally acceded to Pakistan). The Indian position was totally reversed in this instance simply because of the fact that India, right from the beginning, has endeavoured to negate the two nation theory and advocated the concept of Bharat Maata. The secession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 was vociferously recognised, in India, as a living proof that the two nation theory had finally been negated and demolished.

The three important rivers of West Pakistan i.e. the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab either flow through Kashmir or originate in the Indian held Kashmir. West Pakistan has the most comprehensive irrigation complex and this system is very much dependent upon the waters of these rivers. The protracted negotiations between India and Pakistan before the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, have left indelible marks, and there exist deep doubts in the minds of Pakistanis with regard to the future geopolitical designs and ambitions of India.

The history of Indo-Pakistan relations since 1947, is strewn with events which have effectively created a strong state of distrust between India and Pakistan, and which is not likely to dissipate in the near future.

The result of mutual antagonism has been the establishment of enormous war machines in both the countries at the expense of social and economic development which both the countries, with teeming million mouths to feed, need very badly.

This state of affairs has definitely affected, and in fact, blocked the process of consolidation of a nation in Pakistan. National identity seemed to have been aligned with the policy of confrontation against India, and the consolidation of the nation was sought on very negative premises. These boundary disputes did not allow the development of a Pakistani identity based on positive nationalistic principles within the confines of which the Muslim homeland could be secured and fortified. Instead geopolitical relationships, at home and abroad, were sought on the rationale of negative thinking and attitudes which could only hurt the territorial integrity and political independence of Pakistan. These principles of policy also encouraged the development of fissiparous tendencies which in turn were very effectively exploited by the vested interests at home and abroad and as a result Pakistan was dismembered.

An Analysis of the Inherent Regional Disparities in Pakistan.

The Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent is often described as a land of complex diversity and indeed, vast areas of this enormous landmass are mountainous in their terrain, possess very rich and fertile soil and scenic countryside. The diversity is much more noticeable in human terms e.g., cultures, castes, socio-economic patterns, languages and religions. Both the northwest and northeastern regions of the South Asian Subcontinent are predominantly Muslim; the northwest ~~is~~ is near ~~to~~ to the heartland Islamic environment whereas in the northeast a form of Southeast Asian culture predominates, " East Pakistan is the population majority area, with 55 per cent of the total population ^{**} living under crowded rural conditions. Its basic economic characteristic is a monsoon rice-jute agriculture, and it is a relatively homogeneous cultural linguistic area. West Pakistan is geographically much more diverse than East Pakistan, is five times as large as the smaller Province, is dominated by an irrigated wheat-cotton-rice agriculture, and enjoys a significantly higher per capita income than East Pakistan. West Pakistan is culturally and linguistically more diverse, with several major mother-tongues spoken in various areas of the Province."¹ This contrast as well as the obvious factor of spatial separation affected the integration of East and West Pakistan into a whole, and a well-knit political entity. The perennial routeways in the northwest frontier zones, and nuclei of power have persisted at least from the Aryan invasions of the first millenium A.D., and

I. Stephen R. Lewis JR., Pakistan Industrialisation and Trade

Policies, Oxford University Press, London, 1970, p. XV.

^{**} According to the second census of Pakistan in 1961, the popu-

lation was 93.8 million compared to 72.99 million in 1951. The growth

rate was 2.2% per annum. East Pakistan: 54.3 per cent and West

Pakistan: 45.7 per cent. Density, E.P.: 922, W.P.: 138.

these geostrategic areas have retained their significance for ~~for~~ the present day geopolitics. These zones have their recent past in the partition of the Subcontinent, in the difficulty of pairing the two truncated wings of Pakistan, in the survival of large areas (such as Baluchistan and parts of North West Frontier Province) economically and politically poor and backward, which set a problem of intraregional and interregional integration.

The fact that East and West Pakistan emerged as an independent country in 1947, fundamentally established the overwhelming weakness of this truncated political entity. West Pakistan had six-sevenths of the population. The hour-glass shape of its irrigated core aligned along the single railway up the Indus Valley, posed almost insuperable strategic problems in the event of war with India (this was amply demonstrated during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 when the Indian forces succeeded in occupying vast areas in Sind and th^ereatened to cut off the only railway link between Karachi and Lahore-Rawalpindi sectors).

Pakistan inherited a number of problems as a result of the Partition and which were very much in evidence in the very nature of Pakistan's emergence as an independent state with two separate and distinct parts. In its early days the Government of Pakistan was faced with a difficult decision concerning the problem of language. There were arguments in favour of adopting the Swiss pattern, although the pro-Bengali faction wanted Bengali as the national language since the majority spoke Bengali. But the pro-Urdu faction argued fervently in favour of adopting Urdu as the national language and emphasized that the nascent state should have a language which could be identified with the rising tide of national independence, and as a matter of argument they contended that Bengali was an adjunct of Sanskrit, and therefore,

closely linked with Hinduism and Hindu nationalism. While it is true that Bengali was derived from Sanskrit more than 2000 years ago, nonetheless a religious literature and a popular dialect developed, which became a part of Bengali culture.

In West Pakistan several regional languages e.g., Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushto, Baluchi and Brauh^{are spoken}. However, Urdu is widely spoken and understood throughout West Pakistan and a proportion of East Pakistanis also understood Urdu, "In 1961, Urdu was mother tongue of 0.61 per cent of the people of East Pakistan, and 0.72 per cent spoke Urdu as an additional tongue."² Urdu had its origin in the United Province (U.P.) of British India. It spread into the northwest and became a language of convenience in the market-places and, increasingly, in the classrooms (it was basically adopted as a Lingua Franca for the armed forces comprising soldiers with multifarious backgrounds e.g., Persians, Afghans, Mughals and Indians). Urdu is rich and an exhaustive language "Urdu has become more than a lingua franca; today it is a richly cultural language with substantial and beautiful literature."^{2A} People in East Pakistan were totally dismayed at the thought of Urdu becoming one single national language, "The attempt was abandoned in 1954 after strong Bengali opposition, and both Bengali and Urdu were recognised as national languages. But neither tongue gained a substantial acceptance in both the wings."^{2B} The 1956 Constitution also made English as an official language for an initial period of twenty years.

Like the rest of the Subcontinent, Pakistan possessed a mosaic of languages, ~~each~~^{some} with ~~its~~^a rich tradition and literature. The

~~These figures have been taken from~~ : Pakistan, Ministry of

Home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs Division, Population Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol. IV, statement 5.3.

2A. Anderson, David D. Pakistan's Search for National Identity, Yale Review, Vol. 55, 1966, p. 560.

2B. Jahan, Rounaq, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, Columbia University Press, N.Y. 1972, p. 13.

single deciding obstacle to the adoption of Urdu as the national language was the fundamental fact that a minority language was being imposed by a minority region against the wishes of the majority. This untenable situation basically arose because of the historical role that Urdu had played in the development of Islam, and by a misconception that the *raison d'etre* of the state must be derived from the cultural characteristics of West Pakistan. Moreover, the Muslims of the United Province (U.P. now Uttar Pradesh India) were most sensitive to this issue since the leadership of the All India Muslim League generally came from their ranks and Urdu came to be closely linked with the Pakistan movement (leaders such as Liaquat Ali, Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Maulana Mohammad Ali and Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk had strong following in these areas). The cultural solidarity of East Pakistan, however, proved too strong for the Federal Government, and as such a genuine compromise was reached in 1956, in the interest of a united Pakistan.

Languages in Pakistan

Frequency of languages commonly spoken as Mother Tongues in Pakistan (percentage of population).

| Languages | East Pakistan | | West Pakistan | | Pakistan | |
|-----------|---------------|-------|---------------|-------|----------|-------|
| | 1951 | 1961 | 1951 | 1961 | 1951 | 1961 |
| Bengali | 98.16 | 98.42 | 0.02 | 0.11 | 56.40 | 55.48 |
| Punjabi | 0.02 | 0.02 | 67.08 | 66.39 | 28.55 | 29.02 |
| Pushto | - | 0.01 | 8.16 | 8.47 | 3.48 | 3.70 |
| Sindhi | 0.01 | 0.01 | 12.85 | 12.59 | 5.47 | 5.51 |
| Urdu | 0.64 | 0.61 | 7.05 | 7.55 | 3.37 | 3.65 |
| English | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Baluchi | -- | -- | 3.04 | 2.49 | 1.29 | 1.09 |

Source: Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs Division, Population Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol. 1. pt. iv, Statement 5.3.

Table.1.1

This decision was a singular concession for East Pakistan and her cultural identity. The same line of argument had been followed in support of maintaining separate electorates after the Partition. West Pakistan supported the separate electorates while East Pakistan supported Joint Electorates. Here again, East Pakistan won an important but tactical victory when Joint Electorates were adopted in 1956 Constitution of Pakistan.

National cohesion had also been retarded by a gradually widening gulf between the two parts of Pakistan in the rate of economic growth and development. Economists in East Pakistan were generally in agreement that although there was little difference in the per capita incomes of the two Wings in 1948, independence and its aftermath have not brought East Pakistan a fair share of the total increased production of the State.³ This point of view was aimed in 1960 when a group of economists from Dacca University insisted that "Pakistan had already become a two-economy country and that efforts should be made at the highest official level to approach the problems of East Pakistan from a more autonomous perspective."⁴

East Pakistan's feeling of economic neglect had been strongly influenced by the fact that the

3. In 1962-63 the per capita income in West Pakistan was Rs. 382, and in East Pakistan Rs.280.

4. "Pakistan: East-West Split? Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 41, 1963, p. 537.

Eastern Wing had contributed a large part of the hard-cash revenue of the government earned from the sale of jute but had received much less back in the shape of economic aid. In addition it was felt that much of the money spent in West Pakistan was for visible improvements e.g., Mangla Dam, Terbela Dam, Guddu Barrage, Cement and Textile Mills etc., whereas in East Pakistan most, if not all, of the funds were geared towards improving water transportation, constructing hydro-electric plants far from population centres, and on other kinds of economic development which was not easily observable by the ordinary citizen. The average farmer was actually conscious of the value of his cash crop i.e. jute and the cash crop of his counterpart in West Pakistan i.e. cotton. Each of these crops was the mainstay of its region, and as such a certain degree of rivalry could be detected in the agricultural policy of the Federal Government. This is supported by A. Tayyeb and as such the defeat of the Muslim League in 1954 elections in East Pakistan is ascribed to that effect and subsequently, the East Pakistan government insisted on an increase in the acreage and production of jute.⁵

However, for a fuller appreciation of the efforts made by the Federal Government to accelerate economic development in East Pakistan, it is necessary to bear in mind the state of the economy of East

5. Tayyeb A. Pakistan: A political geography, London, 1966, p.124

Pakistan at the time of the Partition in 1947. It is only in that perspective that the enormity of the problem and the extent of efforts made to solve it can be correctly and realistically analysed.

"At the time of political independence, Pakistan had no industry worth mentioning. Agriculture contributed more than two-thirds of domestic product and nearly all exports. The movement for Pakistan was led by an elite of Muslim landlords, traders and businessmen of India. This elite saw the opportunity for industrialising and modernising the nation through private enterprise, and this was attractive to them because it would ensure their leadership of the country."⁶ At the time of Independence, East Bengal (East Pakistan) inherited an economy which was to a very large extent dependent upon West Bengal for the processing of its raw material, export of excess commodities and supply of essential goods. Modern industrial capacity was insignificant and the infrastructure was extremely inadequate to foster economic development. West Pakistan had some advantages as a result of the measures taken by the British Indian Government primarily for strategic reasons. This region was generally better developed than the eastern wing and all the characteristics of a higher stage of development were present.

6. Griffin, K. & Khan, A.R. Growth and Inequality in Pakistan, London, 1972, p. 124.

A very comprehensive canal irrigation system had been completed during the British Raj which has since been enlarged. There were very good roads which were primarily completed for geostrategic reasons; and the administrative and educational infrastructure was superior to that of East Pakistan.

East Pakistan inherited a poor and inadequate system of communications particularly in respect of roads. At the time of the Partition there were only disconnected sections of roads, except in Sylhet. The total mileage of high-type roads was only 240 miles as compared to 5053 in West Pakistan. Similarly, the total numbers of vehicles (buses, trucks, etc.) was East Pakistan: 4380 and West Pakistan: 21025. There were good national waterways in East Pakistan but the development of inland ports, navigational aids and transport had either largely been neglected or ignored. The route mileage of railways in 1948-49 was only 1619 in East Pakistan as compared to 5316 in West Pakistan. In 1947, East Pakistan had only Chittagong as the sea-port with the limited capacity of 500,000 tons per annum, and the major portion of the exportable produce of the province was routed through Calcutta. On the contrary, West Pakistan had one of the major natural sea-ports of the subcontinent i.e. Karachi, with a handling capacity of 2.8 million⁷ tons annually.

7. These figures have been taken from Pakistan: Basic Facts, 1968-69, 1970-71.

Road Mileage in Pakistan




Fig:19

At the time of Partition, both East and West Pakistan were industrially underdeveloped, but large scale industry was more extensive in West Pakistan. While East Pakistan had a few jute bailing presses and 115 tea estates, the Western Wing had a variety of industries including chemicals, footwear and metals.

According to the estimates of the Central Statistical Office the gross value added by large-scale industry in West Pakistan was Rs. 200 million in 1949-50 as compared to Rs. 50 millions in East Pakistan. While there can be some controversy as regards the extent of disparity at the time of Independence, there can be little doubt that the Western Wing had a much better and a larger industrial base to start with. The census of the manufacturing industries carried out by the Central Statistical Office in 1957, indicated that the total value of fixed assets of reporting large-scale industries in East Pakistan was 26 per cent of the total for Pakistan, and the census disclosed the position of different important industries as in (Tab. 1.2) It may also be noted here that the generating capacity of public electricity supply undertakings in East Pakistan stood at 7,673 k.w. in 1948, whereas in West Pakistan the figure was 68,610. k.w.

It is generally accepted that the shortage of private capital had been more acute in East Pakistan, since there was very little indigenous Muslim participation

Value of Fixed Assets of Some of the Important Industries

| | East | West |
|---|------------------|-----------------|
| Number of registered reporting factories | 341 | 1,045 |
| Average daily employment in Pakistan factories | 55,074 | 117,355 |
| Income from mining and manufacture, assessed to tax | Rs.2.15 crore | Rs.3.8 crore |

| Industry | East | West |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-------|
| | (in crore rupees) | |
| 1. Food Manufacturing Industries | 1.87 | 9.14 |
| 2. Cotton Textiles | 4.39 | 47.51 |
| 3. Jute Textiles | 15.36 | -- |
| 4. Paper and Allied Products | 6.68 | 2.50 |
| 5. Chemicals | 1.21 | 11.22 |
| 6. Basic Chemical Industries | 0.18 | 1.34 |
| 7. Non-Metallic Minerals and Products | 0.9 | 5.41 |
| 8. Metallic Industries | | |
| A. Basic Metal Industries | 0.05 | 2.89 |
| B. Metal Working Industries | 1.06 | 3.01 |

Source. The Central Statistical Office (1948-49) Reports, Karachi.

in trade and industry at the time of the partition, and that in West Pakistan, capital had been made more freely available by private enterprises. At the time of independence, West Pakistan enjoyed a considerable experience of large-scale development and as such, data and skills were available for launching new projects. On the contrary, there was a general lack of data and skills in East Pakistan, because no major investment in the public sector had been undertaken there before 1947.

Therefore, it could safely be stated that economic imbalance and disparity between the two Wings had been inherited at the time of independence, and such facts must be taken into account when considering the prevalent economic inequality between East and West Pakistan. As a result of inadequate attention paid to such an important factor, the various governments in Pakistan were guilty of gross neglect and the economic development of East Pakistan did not achieve its proper rate of growth. Although, from 1958, the administration gave its most serious considerations to this vital problem and adopted a much more viable economic policy especially for the rapid economic growth in East Pakistan.

In spite of the efforts by the Central Government to eliminate economic disparity between the two parts, the Bengalis were not pleased with the situation and argued in favour of distribution of reserves on the basis of population, and pointed out that the revenue resources at the disposal of the respective provincial governments remained meagre. The Bengali elite gradually rejected the concept of greater scheme of Central taxes and demanded greater power in the field of taxation. The effects of the post 1958 policies on the inter-regional economic disparity/ were

widely debated embodying optimistic thoughts and pessimistic realism,"The second Five Year Plan basically laid the foundation for accelerated economic growth of East Pakistan...there is enough evidence to warrant the conclusion that the economy of East Pakistan has registered a significant improvement for the first time."^{7B} During the mid-plan review the Planning Commission stated, "interregional disparity is much more complex and stubborn a problem than was originally conceived. It can be resolved only through substantial efforts over a period of time"^{7C}

Relations between the two parts of Pakistan were considerably strained not only by government pricing and export policies toward the two cash crops of the country but also by resentment in East Pakistan against a government that was reluctant to adopt suitable agrarian system. This was particularly important to East Pakistani farmer, since policies under British India tended to create big landlords, and well over half of Bengal had fallen into the hands of large landowners. On the contrary, West Pakistan with its newly occupied irrigated lands, comparatively enjoyed a superior land tenure system, especially in the Punjab, whose average holdings were much larger than in the rest of Pakistan. The Bengal Estate Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950, abolished landlordism, but very little progress was made until the establishment of Land Reforms Commission in 1958. Although both regions suffered from their respective tenancy

^{7B} Pakistan, National Finance Commission Report 1964-65, pp. 9-10.

^{7C} Pakistan Planning Commission, The Mid-Plan Review of the Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70, p.43.

systems, East Pakistan was more volatile about changing it, owing, at least in part, to population pressure and to a lack of alternatives to staying on land.

Employment opportunities and foreign trade were inextricably bound together in East Pakistan. Jute production had consistently given East Pakistan a trade surplus, and over the years East Pakistanis contributed more than two third of the total exports of Pakistan while absorbing only approximately one-third of the total/ ^{imports} (Tab.1.3) ⁸ These figures clearly demonstrate a poorly diversified agrarian economy with few import demands. In spite of the fact that jute gave East Pakistan the position of surplus province in the national economy, yet she continued to enjoy the position of a deficit partner in intercoastal trade with West Pakistan, "This trend of heavier imports by East Pakistan is quite constant and shows the more limited economic range of this unit as well as its heavier dependence on West Pakistan for many of its needs."⁹

Interprovincial trade enjoyed a superior position and increased at the expense of closer trade links with India. This was one of the major arguments in the hands of East Pakistanis who favoured full autonomy and those who accused West Pakistan of enjoying the position of a growing industrialized region at the expense of East Pakistan. They also argued that East Pakistan was gradually being turned into the position of a supplier

9. Tayyeb, op. cit. pp 153.

8. Andrus, J.R. & Mohammed, A.F. Trade, Finance and Development in Pakistan, Stanford, 1966. p.26

FOREIGN Trade By Province

(in million of rupees)

| Trade Year | EXPORTS | | | IMPORTS | | |
|------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| | E.PAK. | W.PAK. | TOTAL | E.PAK. | W.PAK. | TOTAL |
| 1949-50 | 628.9 | 565.2 | 1,194.1 | 384.8 | 912.2 | 1,297.1 |
| 1950-51 | 1,211.1 | 1,342.5 | 2,553.5 | 452.9 | 1,167.1 | 1,620.0 |
| 1951-52 | 1,086.6 | 921.9 | 2,008.6 | 763.4 | 1,473.9 | 2,237.3 |
| 1952-53 | 642.5 | 867.4 | 1,509.9 | 366.4 | 1,017.3 | 1,383.6 |
| 1953-54 | 645.1 | 641.0 | 1,286.0 | 293.8 | 824.2 | 1,118.0 |
| 1954-55 | 731.6 | 491.4 | 1,223.0 | 320.2 | 783.0 | 1,103.3 |
| 1955-56 | 1,041.3 | 742.4 | 1,783.7 | 360.7 | 964.4 | 1,325.1 |
| 1956-57 | 909.4 | 698.2 | 1,607.6 | 818.5 | 1,516.1 | 2,334.6 |
| 1957-58 | 988.1 | 433.6 | 1,421.7 | 735.6 | 1,314.3 | 2,050.0 |
| 1958-59 | 880.9 | 444.4 | 1,325.3 | 553.8 | 1,024.6 | 1,578.4 |
| 1959-60 | 1079.6 | 763.1 | 1,842.7 | 655.3 | 1,805.7 | 2,461.0 |
| 1960-61 | 1,259.0 | 540.2 | 1,799.4 | 1,014.4 | 2,173.3 | 3,187.6 |
| 1961-62 | 1,300.6 | 542.9 | 1,843.0 | 872.8 | 2,236.2 | 3,109.0 |
| 1962-63 | 1,249.2 | 784.5 | 2,033.7 | 1,018.7 | 2,800.1 | 3,818.8 |
| 1963-64 | 1,208.0 ¹ | 835.0 ¹ | 2,043.0 ¹ | 1,449.0 | 2,981.0 | 4,430.0 |

Source: Central Statistical Office, Bulletin, Karachi, 1965.

¹Provisional

Table.1.3.

and as such open to socio-economic and political exploitation, which the people were bound to reject. The real problem was to look for an equitable solution so that both the regions could achieve development in harmony. This was made more and more difficult by the very infrastructure of the economy in East Pakistan, since this region had few minerals, an inadequate transportation system, a poorly developed power supply, and a population that could hardly feed itself.

The correct answer to any such investigation of the economic limitations of a given region should not be based only on an assessment which is essentially orientated towards the physical environment of the region. Nevertheless, soon after the creation of Pakistan, the government had to make certain very important decisions vis-a-vis the potentials of the two regions and their future development. Both the First Five Year Plans and the Second Five Year Plan allocated the greater part of the funds to waterpower, mineral, fuel, industrial, and transportation projects in West Pakistan, since this region promised healthier development, and the fact that private capital was much more forthcoming than in East Pakistan. Muslim investors such as Maaimons and Khojas from Bombay and Northern India flocked to Karachi and invested with initiative and zeal the cash balances that they had brought from India. There was no such migration of rich refugees towards East Pakistan and in contrast, many rich Hindus migrated to Calcutta, and East

Pakistani private capital was very shy. Only when industrial development became more competitive in the Western Wing did the private investment begin to turn toward East Pakistan. Given the superior infrastructure and investment base of the Western Wing, and the relative immobility of labour in East Pakistan, it was obvious that the two regions could increasingly become disparate economically and socially; " even the acceleration of the country's development programme is likely to accentuate rather than reduce the disparity between the two units."¹⁰

The pace of development in East Pakistan was particularly fast during the Second Plan period when a growth rate of 5.0 per cent was maintained and as such exceeded the planned growth target of 4.7 per cent, and this was achieved in spite of the bad year for agriculture at the end of the Plan period. The comparative rate of growth in West Pakistan was ^{**}5.5 per cent, which was primarily achieved due to a better

10. *ibid*, p.162.

** Sartaz-Aziz has given different figures of growth rate for the period in question. According to him the figures were as follows: Pakistan 5.2 per cent

East Pakistan 5.3 per cent

West Pakistan 4.9 per cent

(The Second Five Year Plan, Targets and Achievements, Pakistan Quarterly, Vol.13, 1965, pp.36-43.).

a better performance of the province in agriculture. However, the growth rate in the non-agricultural sector, which is more directly influenced by the level of investment and policy variables was higher in East Pakistan (Tables. 1.4, 1.5, 1.6).

It may be observed from the above figure that over the Plan period, a growth rate of 7.9 per cent was achieved in East Pakistan, compared with 7.2 per cent in West Pakistan in the non-agricultural sector.

The position regarding fluctuations in the level of disparity in per capita income between East and West Pakistan is summarised in the figure below (1.4-1.6). The income disparity between East and West Pakistan developed at a steady pace between 1959-60 and 1969-70. As well, the Government of Pakistan conceded that the disparity measured by the difference between per capita incomes in West Pakistan and her Eastern Wing expressed as a percentage of the per capita income of all Pakistan, excluding three per cent for allocable items, had increased from 38.1 per cent in 1964-65 to 47.1 per cent in 1969-70.^{11f} However, G.W. Choudhury has made the following observation, "In 1959-60 the per capita income in West Pakistan was 32 per cent higher than in the East. Over the next ten years the annual rate of growth of income in West Pakistan was 6.2 per cent, while it was only 4.2 per cent in East Pakistan. As a result, by 1969-70, the per capita income in West Pakistan was 61 per cent higher than in the East. Thus in ten years ... the income gap had doubled in percentage terms; it had widened more in absolute terms."^{11g}

11f. Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, The Budget in Brief 1970-71 (Islamabad 1970), p. 78.

11g. Choudhury, G.W. The Last Days of United Pakistan, C. Hurst & Co., London, 1974, p. 15.

Growth in Gross Domestic Product in East and West Pakistan and Regional
Disparity in per capita Incomes

| | Growth Rate | | Per capita income as per cent of all Pakistan average | | Level of Regional Disparity |
|---------|-------------|------|--|-------|-----------------------------------|
| | East | West | East | West | |
| 1950-60 | - | - | 84.6 | 111.6 | 27 |
| 1960-61 | 5.8 | 3.9 | 85.5 | 110.5 | 25 |
| 1961-62 | 6.2 | 5.0 | 85.9 | 110.2 | 24 |
| 1962-63 | 0.1 | 6.6 | 83.3 | 113.7 | 30 |
| 1963-64 | 11.3 | 5.5 | 85.6 | 110.7 | 25 |
| 1964-65 | 1.6 | 6.8 | 83.4 | 113.3 | 30 |
| 1965-66 | 4.5 | 2.6 | 83.7 | 111.4 | 28 |

Source: 1) Pakistan Economic Survey, 1973-74, 1974 Islamabad.

2) Pakistan Year Book 1973-74, 1974 Islamabad.

3) Pakistan Basic Facts, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970 Islamabad.

Table.1.4.

Growth Rates of Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Sectors (percentages)

| | Agricultural Sector | | Non-Agricultural Sector | |
|------------------------------|---------------------|-----------|-------------------------|-----------|
| | East Pak. | West Pak. | East Pak. | West Pak. |
| Growth rate: | | | | |
| 1959-60 to 1960-61 | 6.1 | (-)0.2 | 5.5 | 7.7 |
| 1960-61 to 1961-62 | 4.4 | 6.2 | 9.2 | 3.9 |
| 1961-62 to 1962-63 | (-)3.4 | 5.2 | 5.8 | 8.0 |
| 1962-63 to 1963-64 | 9.5 | 2.5 | 14.0 | 8.1 |
| 1963-64 to 1964-65 | (-)1.1 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 8.0 |
| 1964-65 to 1965-66 | 2.3 | (-)0.5 | 7.4 | 5.0 |
| Annual Compound Growth Rate: | | | | |
| 1959-60 to 1964-65 | 3.0 | 3.8 | 7.9 | 7.2 |
| 1959-60 to 1965-66 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 7.9 | 6.8 |

Source: 1) Pakistan Economic Survey, 1973-74, 1974 Islamabad.

2) Pakistan Year Book 1973-74, 1974 Islamabad.

3) Pakistan Basic Facts, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970 Islamabad.

Table.1.5.

Per Capita GDP in East and West Pakistan in
1959-60 constant prices.

| | Per Capita GDP East | Per Capita GDP West | West-East Disparity Ratio | Index of Disparity |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1959-60 | 269 | 355 | 1.32 | 100 |
| 1960-61 | 277 | 363 | 1.31 | 97 |
| 1961-62 | 286 | 376 | 1.31 | 97 |
| 1962-63 | 277 | 393 | 1.42 | 111 |
| 1963-64 | 299 | 408 | 1.36 | 113 |
| 1964-65 | 293 | 426 | 1.45 | 141 |
| 1965-66 | 295 | 427 | 1.45 | 141 |
| 1966-67 | 290 | 448 | 1.54 | 169 |
| 1967-68 | 307 | 468 | 1.52 | 163 |
| 1968-69 | 312 | 490 | 1.57 | 178 |
| 1969-70 | 314 | 504 | 1.61 | 191 |
| Growth over the Decade | 17 % | 42 % | | |
| Growth in Third Plan Period | 7 % | 18 % | | |

Source: Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan,
Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five
Year Plan 1970-75, vol.i. (Islamabad July 1970), p.22.

Table.1.6.

The economists from East and West Pakistan sharply disagreed as to the factors which were responsible for such a growth in disparity. The East Pakistani economists were of the view that the West Pakistan policy makers were really responsible for such a trend in economic disparity because the interests of the Eastern Wing were ignored and systematically neglected. From the West Pakistani economists view, it ~~were~~ were the economic factors, over which they had no control, and not the policy makers, and since according to them, East Pakistan received twice the public outlay of West Pakistan throughout the 1960s: "During this period considerable difference in private sector investment between East and West Pakistan and a dramatic breakthrough in agriculture in West Pakistan based on the new ~~technology~~ seed-based technology were the major factors resulting in the growth of disparity. Institutional arrangements for implementing large development programmes in the public sectors remained weak in East Pakistan despite considerable improvement." ^{11h}

This war of words and the growing interregional disparity built a bitter sense of opposition and resentment, in East Pakistan, towards the Central Government which was dominated by the Punjabi element, especially at the secretarial level in the Centre," In some of the key ministries associated with economic policy making, particularly at the secretary level, all the officers until 1969 were from West Pakistan or had emigrated from the Muslim Minority Provinces of India. In 1969... some kind of parity in the secretariat was brought about..." ^{11k}

^{11h}. Reports for the Fourth Five Year Plan, 1970-75, Islamabad, p. 107.

^{11k}. Sayeed, K. B. "The Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System" in International Journal, p. 389. (Vol. 27) 1971-72.

It may, however, be observed that the basic data available for annual regional income disparity is far from adequate and reliable to give a firm picture, and this is further complicated by large fluctuations in agricultural production and divergent nature of these fluctuations in East and West Pakistan.

The concept of economic parity was not of primary concern to Pakistan at its very inception, since per capita income was almost equal in the two parts of Pakistan. A belated recognition of the importance of the feelings and welfare of the inhabitants of East Pakistan resulted not only in major concessions (such as Tax holidays and increased public investment) to that Province but also in the reappraisal by the Government of the environmental limitations found there. The stereotype of the Eastern Wing as a high density, food deficit agrarian society doomed to a perpetual second class economic citizenship gave way to a belief that it was possible by government policies and programme, and by incentives in the private sector, to realise a long-term target of economic parity and equality between the two regions of Pakistan. Few other nations in the world had ever engaged in planning on such a broad-based scale. In most countries inhabitants tend to move ~~freely from~~

freely from a poorly developed economic region to a better-developed one seeking jobs and opportunity. Moreover, Geographical separation made communications between East and West Pakistan difficult and expensive, resulting in little mobility of population and resources between the two Wings. Pakistan with its physical discontinuity and diverse cultural regions, could not afford to be adventurous regarding regional economic difference, and therefore, demands for a real economic parity gained a considerable political significance.

As noted above a real effort was made to reduce regional economic disparity, and at the completion of the Second Plan in 1965 a sharp acceleration in the rate of economic development in East Pakistan had been achieved.

It would be fair to observe here that planning in Pakistan had not proceeded within the framework of any definite political philosophy, and economic plans were concerned as mere technical exercises which took the existing political and social institutions for granted rather than contained a blue-print for their orderly transformation. The economic system continued to be a curious mixture of free enterprise and public intervention, and the declared objective of the Pakistan Government was to encourage private enterprise, but its bureaucratic procedures and controls tended to favour allocations to the public sector. However, it was felt that economic planning could not proceed indefinitely in

such a philosophical vacuum, especially in a long-term perspective, the ultimate objectives of planning must be clearly defined and the socio-political framework must be charted.

The process of planned economic growth demonstrated the fact that East Pakistan was highly dependent on the largesse of the Federal Government, and a considerable amount of capital in the private sector continued to come from West Pakistan. To this effect the Pakistan Government made adequate provisions in the 1962 Constitution so as to eliminate inter-regional disparity in per capita incomes in the shortest possible time, "the plans...shall be to ensure that disparities between the provinces and between different areas within a Province, in relation to income per capita, are removed and that the resources of Pakistan (including resources in foreign exchange) are used and allocated in such manner as to achieve that object in the shortest possible time, and it shall be the duty of each Government to make the utmost endeavour to achieve that object."¹¹⁸ To make the policy more effective, the 1962 Constitution gave a greater responsibility to the two regions by making larger allocations from the national revenue.

The geopolitical framework of Pakistan allowed the development of another centrifugal force which was

118. The Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Article 145, clause 4, p. 53.

largely due to the great numbers of West Pakistanis who enjoyed high positions in the civil and military services of Pakistan. The dominant role that West Pakistan played in the new state was due, at least in part, to the concentration of political power there, Karachi, the initial capital city, was located in the West, and the influential people of the adjacent areas were more likely to succeed in their endeavours than those in the remote East. During the initial stages of nation building a large majority of officers, of necessity, hailed from the West. In military appointments, tradition played a prominent role in perpetuating an existing situation. Historically, higher physical health standards and a greater readiness to serve under the British Raj gave West Pakistan an added advantage. The officer corps was overwhelmingly from West Pakistan and enjoyed military traditions of many centuries, and moreover, they were in a good strategic position to serve the defence needs of the nascent state. On the contrary the Bengalis had shown little enthusiasm in adopting military as a career.

However, a better regional balance in the Civil Services was more easily attainable, and the acute dominance by the Western Wing was only a temporary phenomenon. The fact should be noted here that the Punjabis played a deciding role to that effect, especially after the creation of the One Unit in 1955, when under the so called "Daultana Doctrine" they accepted a 40 per cent representation instead of their natural right to 56 per cent in accordance with their numbers

within the framework of West Pakistan. Another very important measure adopted to achieve inter-regional parity was the fact that if a candidate from East Pakistan was placed amongst the first 20 percent successful candidates then he was to be awarded a merit seat, but if a Punjabi candidate was placed in the merit quota then his seat was allocated to him from the Punjabi quota. This procedure helped the East Pakistani candidates to enjoy a higher percentage of seat allocations than they would have enjoyed otherwise. This was a real step towards creating interregional parity in the Civil Services of Pakistan.

Moreover, Pakistan decentralized its administration by a variety of actions. East Pakistanis were allowed to fill government jobs in their own region whether or not they met the Civil Service requirements. East Pakistan had her own legislative body and Dacca was made the Legislative Capital of Pakistan. Pakistan's social, economic and political decisions making went a long way in reducing the centrifugal force created by the feeling that the people from the Western Wing had been exercising undue political pressure and control. Some observers were of the view that Pakistan Government had gone too far in succumbing to the pressures from East Pakistan in the name of regional parity, and there was a widespread and genuine feeling in the West that such socio-economic and political pressures in the name of regional parity would shake the basis of a two-part state; and the

concept of compromise might be misconstrued and the separatist tendencies would be encouraged and as such divisive forces would thrive at the expense of national unity and independence.

The economic planners in Pakistan endeavoured to accelerate the pace of industrial development of East Pakistan, with a view to removing the inter-regional economic disparity the time they realised the geopolitical realities of the situation. The Government of Pakistan made a more concrete and positive contribution towards the development of East Pakistan in the face of shy capital and the lack of enterprise in the private sector.

One of the first measures taken by the Central Government was to make industries a subject of Provincial List, as a result Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was bifurcated into two provincial concerns namely/ (East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation) and WPIDC (West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation), on July 1, 1962. These Corporations were primarily concerned with the industrial development, in the public sector, in their respective jurisdictions. After the bifurcation, the E.P.I.D.C. inherited 21 completed projects having a capital outlay of Rs. 83.3 crore, and the W.P.I.D.C. was transferred 33 completed projects costing 80.3^{**} crore. The completed projects in East Pakistan comprised 12 jute mills, 2 shipyards and dockyards, one cotton mill, 3 sugar mills and the giant gas fertilizer factory at Fenchuganj.

The inception of P

The inception of Pakistan was based upon the Two Nation Theory, a premise that the Indian Muslims needed a separate state, where " they could rule according to their own code of life and according to their own cultural growth, tradition and Islamic Laws." ¹²

** One Crore = ten million.

12. Jinnah M.A. quoted in Sharif al-Mujahid, National Integration in East Pakistan, Bureau of National Reconstruction, Pakistan

This particular theme presupposed an Indian Muslim Society with her own distinct culture, although it did not emphasize the diversity of their cultural heritage and background, "It is true that Society and Culture in both East and West Pakistan are based on Islamic Principles."¹³ However, there were important differences in both the Society and Cultural values of the two regions of Pakistan, and it was to be expected that each province would zealously guard its language and cultural distinctiveness. This was in evidence in the day to day broadcasts of Radio Pakistan," a typical day's program for Radio Pakistan includes new programmes in English, Urdu, and Bengali; Children's storyhours in the vernaculars, stressing both folk tales and stories of contemporary life, music programs from both traditions, lectures and informal talks on a variety of related topics; and daily readings from the Koran"¹⁴. It was strongly argued that the news media would help a great deal in establishing an ~~under~~ understanding of the cultural patterns of the two regions, and in time, more people in Pakistan would become bilingual or trilingual, and certainly the inhabitants of the two Wings would know a great deal more about each other. This should have resulted ⁱⁿ increased cohe-siveness, and the tenuous thread of the Islamic

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13. See Qureshi, I.H. The Pakistani Way of Life; Ikram, S.M. and Spear, p.ed.s. The Cultural Heritage of Pakistan.
14. Anderson, David D. Pakistan's Search for National Identity, Yale Review, Vo. 55, 1966, pp. 557-558.

faith would have been strengthened considerably. It was also argued that the diversity of culture and language often inhibited the development of national identity, but the example of Switzerland and Canada were not lost since a high degree of national unity had been achieved in spite of cultural and language disparity; and it was fervently hoped that with the sincerity of purpose such a success could also be achieved in Pakistan. If Pakistan continued to make visible progress in redressing the grievances of the majority, and in evolving a national culture flexible enough to allow a maximum amount of variations between the two regions, then its geographic dislocation, although unique as a spatial phenomenon, should not have unduly affected the solution of the problems that were strongly polarising the socio-economic and political differences; a veritable hostyeto separatism and secession.

From the preceding argument it may be deduced that the Government of Pakistan could not effectively plug the widening gap between the two halves of the country, and as a result, the original territoriality of the state-idea could not be held together.

The following argument would go a long way in demonstrating the reasons and explain the gradual but definite alienation of public opinion in East Pakistan which eventually ended the legal bonds between the two halves of Pakistan. It would be quite evident from the following that the state-idea i.e. a Muslim homeland, as it emerged in 1947, was very much weakened by the interplay of centrifugal forces which effectively outmatched the centripetal forces, and as such the balance of power was seriously jeopardised, and both

the internal and external vested interests were effectively allowed to exploit these inherent weaknesses to the disadvantage of a united Pakistan. The Central Government, as^a/result, was unable to hold the country as it had emerged in 1947, and the territoriality of the *raison d'etre* was severed.

The effective operation of the centrifugal forces in Pakistan may be ascribed to the following elements: i) the economic disparities, ii) the linguistic and cultural distinctiveness, iii) the administrative and bureaucratic elitism, iv) the predominance of the military machine, v) the electoral differences, vi) the effective operation of a quasi-unitary system, vii) anti-state activities of some of the secondary pressure groups, viii) the lack of allegiance, to the state-idea, amongst the Hindu minority, ix) the gradual spread of parochialism, regionalism and sub-nationalism (Bengali sub-nationalism), x) the gradual alienation of the intelligentsia in East Pakistan, xi) the entrenched opposition by India of the Two Nations Theory, and xii) the spatial separation of the two halves of Pakistan.

A very important area of activity of the centrifugal forces in Pakistan has been the process of constitution making, and the failure of the national leadership to fram^ae, at an early stage, a coherent and a workable constitutional framework for Pakistan. The obvious choice should have been a true federal structure since it would have been compatible with the spatial separation of Pakistan and very much inconformity with her geopolitical compulsions. Instead, a^lot of valuable time and energies were wasted. The country was ruled from 1947 to 1971 by leaders who were indirectly elected or held senior posts in the armed forces. In 1970 the first general elections were held on the basis of universal adult franchise, and as such the people of Pakistan were denied their political rights under the guise of "indirect

democracy", "controlled democracy" or "Basic Democracies". Most of the time the national political scene was dominated by ^a Punjabi or a Pathan, and the Bengalis were relegated to a secondary position especially in the area of decision-making in spite of the fact that they formed majority of the population. This gradually led to the alienation of Bengali political opinion, urban educated class (teachers, students, administrators and business groups), and the farming community (who resented the attitudes and the remote decision-making operation of the military and civilian machine).

The operation of a quasi-unitary system worked ^{strongly} against the ~~very~~ interests of a united Pakistan and the state-idea ~~was being~~ irreparably damaged. The first real blow was struck by the late Malik Ghulam Mohammed (the Punjabi Governor General and a former Finance Secretary) who dismissed the Khawja Nazim-ud-Din cabinet (the East Bengali Prime Minister) in 1953; and dismissed the Mohammed Ali Bogra cabinet (another East Bengali Prime Minister) in 1954 and at the same time dissolved the Constituent Assembly; the East Bengali Speaker of the Assembly; Kaulvi Tamiz-ud-Din won the first round of legal proceedings in The Sind High Court but lost the appeal against the Governor General's dissolution order in the Federal Court of Pakistan (the presiding Chief Justice Muhammad Munir was a Punjabi), and the Court upheld the Governor General's action. The dismissal of the Fazlul Haque's ministry in East Bengal (Fazlul Haque was popularly known as the Lion of Bengal), which was demanding a greater share of revenue for East Bengal, provoked a tremendous outburst in East Pakistan against the Central Government (incidentally the dismissal orders were issued by the Punjabi Governor General). Such drastic actions by the Central Government (with a Punjabi Head of State), against the Bengali leadership, both at the central and provincial levels, were considered highly provocative and indicative, according to the

Bengali point of view, of the Punjabi hegemony and as such unacceptable to the majority province.

The political parties in East Pakistan capitalized ^{on} the conflicts between the Central and the Provincial governments, and gradually but surely made a determined effort to advance their demands for greater provincial autonomy, and emphasized that it was an absolutely legitimate demand within the framework of a united Pakistan. The leaders of political parties in East Pakistan also exploited the conduct and the result of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. The Central Government was accused of leaving the Eastern Wing undefended, and at the mercy of the Indian armed forces. The criticism and resentment was particularly directed towards the army for failing in their supreme duty, and as such the Bengalis particularly emphasized the futility of allocating the lion's share of the Central budget (50-65 per cent) for the maintenance of the large army which had apparently left them defenceless (there were only about 8,000 men and officers in East Pakistan), and had failed in their thrust against the Indian held Kashmir. This meant, directly or indirectly, a criticism of the Punjabi domination, the army was overwhelmingly of Punjabi origin, " The Pakistan army has been almost entirely recruited from four districts of northern Punjab (Rawalpindi, Campbellpur, Jhelum, and Gujrat) and two districts of the Frontier Province (Peshawar and Kohat). Sixty per cent of the army is Punjabi and 35 per cent is Pathan. "

Sayeed, K.B. " The Role of the Military in Pakistan" in Jacques Van Doorn, ed, Armed Forces and Society (The Hague), 1968, p.276.

One of the fundamental aspects of elitism in a society is its exclusiveness, and to maintain their hold on the society, and to legitimize their policy-decisions, these elements are obliged to exploit the politico-ideological sentiments and aspirations of the masses. These were singularly missing in Pakistan, and therefore, the development of political institutions was painstakingly supervised by the elitist group comprising the civil and military services, especially in the newly emergent states (this is particularly true of the indigenous elements of the old British Colonial civil and military personnel) in which these elements acted as masters and not as public servants. This is particularly true of the civil servants who were posted in East Pakistan. Their dealings with the Bengalis were very officious and they tended to stay aloof; ^{very} A/ small minority ever ventured to learn the Bengali language, and this alienated the Bengalis. Both the military and the civil services used the democratic institutions for their self-aggrandisement, instead of acting as the instruments in the service of democracy for the socio-economic and political development of the people at large. The civil service of Pakistan (C.S.P.) is particularly ^{accused} of misbehaviour and maladministration especially those officers who were posted in East Pakistan. The civil service worked as "the most well organized political party in Pakistan", and very ^{jealously} guarded their service cadre. They were on top of the elitist group in Pakistan, and retained their preponderance in spite of the installation of the military regimes (since 1958) in Pakistan. In fact, the advent of the Ayub Regime in 1958, introduced the norm of regularly nominating military personnel to high civilian posts (most of these were filled in by the Punjabis or Pathans), and as such the so-called fusion of the civil and military personnel was launched. To cement this relationship the Military Junta decided in 1960S to send the civil service probationers

to the Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul, for a period of three months, to gain basic military training and discipline. The whole scheme backfired and the probationers were sent back to the Civil Service Academy, Lahore, and in fact Hafiz Muhammad Aslam, a probationer from Azad Kashmir (Pakistani held Kashmir) was removed from the C.S.P. cadre, though, as an act of mercy, he was allowed to hold his post from Azad Kashmir. However, the Bengali probationers were said to be in the forefront of the group who resented the very idea and the programme of military training.

The devastations of the 1970 cyclone in East Pakistan generated further hatred of the Central Government, and the masses in East Pakistan vociferously criticised the apathy and failure of the Government of Pakistan in their care of the millions who were devastated by the ravages of the huge tidal waves. The remoteness of the federal capital, the decision-making machinery, the elitist group, the military and the Punjabi hegemony were clearly identified as the real villains of the whole tragedy. This human tragedy was very effectively exploited by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman and his Awami/^{League} during the general elections of 1970, and they did not fail to point out the various other drawbacks of the existing relationship, and as such pursued, with added vigour the acceptance of the Six Points, which in effect, meant the establishment of a confederal structure.

It would not be wrong to emphasize at this point in time, that the more the Central Government endeavoured to impose a unitary cultural-religious concept, the more difficult it became for the state-idea to hold sway over the territoriality of a united Pakistan. It is quite evident from the preceding argument that the more the politico-military leaders struggled to strengthen the unity of the state, the more certain its eventual severance became.

It is self-evident from the preceding pages that the inherent regional disparities were accentuated, and in fact magnified over the years. There was a growing sense of political and economic injustice among the Bengalis. The burden of their complaint was that they earned much of the country's foreign exchange, but most of the proceeds were utilised for the industrial development in West Pakistan which then exported often inferior products at comparatively higher prices to East Pakistan under the protection of tariffs and exchange controls. As stated earlier the Bengalis were quick to point out that most of the development projects, for example, the Mangla and Tarbela dams, among the biggest earth dams in the world, the most comprehensive irrigation scheme, especially under the Indus replacement project, heavy industries and a new national capital-went to West Pakistan. The Bengalis also argued that enterprises set up in East Pakistan were generally branch factories, banks and insurance agencies, and branch trading firms administered by non-Bengali entrepreneurs on behalf of the West Pakistani capitalists. It was for most Bengalis an untenable situation and a matter of considerable concern, therefore, that West Pakistan, with approximately 55 million people, seemed to be on their way towards more prosperity while, by comparison, East Pakistan could barely support in mere subsistence its population of about 70 million.

The Bengalis were highly suspicious of the Army and the top echelons of the civil service as well as the Central Government since these were predominantly controlled by the Punjabis. The Bengalis seemed to have arrived at the conclusion that the interests of the eastern region had for too long been subordinated systematically to those of West Pakistan, and therefore, they sought a radical readjustment in the balance of political and economic power within Pakistan.

CHAPTER 4.Economic Implications of the New
Geopolitical Structure.

Political potentials and foreign policy options of a given state are closely related to its economic system. Natural resources, military power, industrial base, lines of communication and transportation, effective administrative structure and sound financial institutions are important instruments of statecraft. A state's ability to back up its demands on other states, to attract and support allies, to bring pressure to bear upon adversaries, but above all to develop and maintain internal coherence, requires the ability to manipulate goods and services of many kinds, qualities and quantities; and even the intangible called national prestige may to a greater or lesser extent depend upon the characteristics of that state's economic system.

Strategy and national policies are often subject to the economic strength of that state. Ideas and concepts which are advanced by various national leaders are directly or indirectly associated with the economic potentials of their respective politico-territorial organisation.

The magnitude and comparison of a state's economic output depend upon a complex of variables: natural resources, manpower and socio-economic patterns of its institutions. The economic structure of a given state has a direct bearing on the external relations of that state. This may impose limitations on her foreign policy options or on the other hand remove such inhibiting constraints from the area of her international activities and relations.

The disruption of the existing system.

For a geopolitical analysis of Pakistan it is imperative to analyse the circumstances under which it achieved its status as an independent sovereign state, and therefore, an examination of its economic potentials is necessary for a better understanding of Pakistan's geopolitical problems.

The partition of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent in 1947, created a number of very intricate socio-economic, political and territorial problems which have practically eliminated any chances of good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan. Although the Chairman of the Award Commissions Sir (now Lord) Cyril Radcliffe had envisaged that after the chaos of the partition had died down, the two independent states, India and Pakistan, would develop very harmonious relationship and that there would be a political reconciliation between them; any outstanding boundary problems being settled in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and cooperation," I have done what I can in drawing the line to eliminate any avoidable cutting of railway communications and of river system, which are important to the life of the Province; but it is quite impossible to draw a boundary under our terms of reference without causing some interruption of this sort, and I can only express the hope that arrangements can be made and maintained between the two States that will minimize the consequence of this interruption as far as possible."¹

1. Radcliffe Awards, 12 August, 1947.

The partition disrupted the water system, and the irrigation complex in the Pakistani Punjab became dependent upon Indian political goodwill since some of the most important headworks and embankments were awarded to India, " Of the 48 million acres of cultivable land in the Indus Basin (32 million in Pakistan and 16 million in India) , only 26 million acres (21 million in Pakistan and 5 million in India) receive irrigation..."²

The partition also severed some of the most important rail and road links (Some of the river channels in East Pakistan were also affected) , the political division also disrupted the social and cultural bonds, and as such seriously uprooted the existing economic system.

A number of important market towns gained their socio-economic and cultural importance because these were sites of some of the most revered religious shrines (mazaars), temples, and religious centres (One must not, however, minimize the importance of some of these cities which are also the centres of economic and commercial activities, and which have played a significant part in the industrial and economic development of their respective regions, for example, Lyallpur is famous for its textile industry and is called " Manchester of Pakistan ", Multan is very important financial, economic and commercial city. Again Gujrat is known for its pottery, in addition to the Shah Dowllah Shrine). Ajmer (India) is highly respected by the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. A number of Pakistanis still travel to Ajmer, annually, if allowed by India. Thousands of Sikhs have been allowed by Pakistan to visit Nankana Sahib and Panja Sahib. The Ahmadis (Firzais) had their religious centre in Batala (India), and large parties have been permitted by India to visit their holy place. Lahore is a very

2. Khosla, A. N. "Development of the Indus River System", India

important socio-economic, political and cultural centre, and its added attraction to the Muslims of the Sub-continent is the shrine of Datta Ganj Baksh (Datta Durbar). Thousands of people visit the shrine every day to pay their respect and homage to this Muslim religious teacher.

In addition, a number of urban centres had achieved their significance because of the fact that annual horse and cattle shows were held there, for example, Lyallpur (Pakistan). This city was and is very famous livestock market for the whole of the Punjab. But as a result of the partition its links with the Indian Punjab have been severed in this respect.

The above examples clearly demonstrate the fact that the partition of the Sub-continent has resulted in the emergence of a new geopolitical structure, and ~~this~~ has effectively disrupted the existing economic system.

As a result of the political division of the Sub-continent, East Bengal (East Pakistan) received three quarters of the jute growing area but negligible manufacturing capacity. India on the other hand received one quarter of the jute growing land but all of the jute manufacturing industry.

India duplicated the jute production of Pakistan, which in turn was obliged to look for new and distant but unfortunately more expensive markets for her raw jute. In addition, Pakistan launched a comprehensive programme to achieve self-sufficiency in the manufacture of jute. There was a tremendous growth of interprovincial trade between East and West Pakistan (approximately 800 million Rupees per annum); this was obviously expanded at the expense of trading and commercial links between India and East Pakistan in particular, and India and Pakistan in general. Moreover, the Indians were forced to

~~create the transportation of their tea from Assam~~

reroute the transportation of their tea from Assam which proved to be quite an expensive policy change since the traditional channels of transportation through East Pakistan were denied to India. Again, for political reasons, Pakistan preferred to import coal from People's Republic of China, at comparatively very high costs, than the natural source of supply i.e. India.

The agrarian base:

Pakistan is predominantly an agrarian country, and more than seventy per cent of the civilian labour force is engaged in agricultural pursuits. This figure rose to 85.25 per cent in East Pakistan (Bangladesh). In Pakistan the man/land ratio was 0.66 cultivated acres per person, with a distinct disparity between the two parts of Pakistan (0.53 acres in East Pakistan and 0.8 acres in West Pakistan). In spite of this ratio the dependence on land is considerable and the existing situation is not likely to change in the near future, "...Pakistan, will remain predominantly an agrarian...for many years or decades. Since the very inception of Pakistan the various agrarian reforms

4. Spate, O.H.K. and Learmonth, India and Pakistan, Methuen, 1967, p. 225.

Index of Agricultural Production




Fig: 20

Source:- Pakistan Economic Survey, 1973-74, Islamabad

in
/Pakistan have endeavoured to eradicate sub-division and fragmentation, achieve a reasonable standard of land holdings and to better the lot of peasants and haris or cultivators.

The East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950, abolished the Permanent Settlement as established under Lord Cornwallis in 1793. The 1950 Act limited the individual holdings of Zamindars to 33 acres, and as a result of the amendment in the Act the ceiling of Khas (self-cultivated) land was raised to 120 acres, " With 120 acres in East Pakistan, one can have adequate production if one is prepared to work. The land is fertile and responsive."⁵ To consolidate the land tenure in East Pakistan the Central Government fixed a minimum of three acres at " subsistence" and eight acres at " economic " levels.

In West Pakistan the Ayub Regime in 1959, implemented a very comprehensive scheme of agrarian reforms. The Land Reforms limited the individual ownership to 500 acres of irrigated or 1,000 acres of unirrigated land. The Government promised to make the compensatory payments over a period of 25 years for the dispossessed land.

The Bhutto Land Reforms of 1972, further reduced the size of land holdings," The Bhutto Land Reforms were announced on March 1, 1972, affecting the landlords and jagirdars throughout the country. These Reforms put a ceiling of land holdings in the irrigated areas at 150 acres and 300 unirrigated acres or the equivalent to 15,000 produce index units."⁶

The partition in 1947 resulted in the disappearance of many non-Muslim moneylenders. Some Pathans who practised usury in towns were limited in their resources and were unable to advance any considerable loans to the village cultivator. The situation in East Pakistan was particularly serious because The Baniya

6. Syed, A.H. World Survey " Pakistan", The Atlantic Education Trust,

No. 76, April 1975, London, p. 6.

5. Khan, M.A. Friends Not Masters, Lahore, 1967, p. 91.

No. 76, April 1975, London, p. 6.

5. Khan, M.A. Friends Not Masters, Lahore, 1967, p. 91.

Production of Principal Crops, wheat and rice




Fig:21

Source:- Pakistan Economic Survey, 1973-74, Islamabad

(the Hindu moneylender) migrated to West Bengal and Assam. The Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Programme, the E Democracies and the Agricultural Development Corporation have been responsible for procuring and distributing fertilisers, implementing improved seeds, pesticides and agricultural extension activities.

Pakistan has had a serious foodgrain problem, especially with regard to East Pakistan until 1971. The problem had been particularly serious because of recurrent floods, water-logging and salinity,** which seriously affected agricultural production, reducing yield per acre. While population was growing at the rate of three per cent the growth of food production was two per cent. This has necessitated the import of foodgrains in large quantities. During the 1950s Pakistan imported 500,000 tons of foodgrain annually which had grown to 1,000,000 tons during the 1960s. The gap between the domestic supply and demand was widening and the import requirements in 1971 had reached approximately 2.5 million tons. This placed Pakistan in a very difficult situation since the import of foodgrain very heavily burdened the foreign exchange earnings and seriously hampered her development planning.

The main source of supply was the United States of America. The Americans were very willing to meet Pakistan's food requirements especially since 1954, the year Pakistan signed the Manila Treaty and joined the South East Asian Treaty Organisation. The foodgrain requirements of Pakistan were met under the provisions of the Public Laws 480. The whole programme was carried out as follows:

Item 1. Aid was provided on local currency terms i.e. the sale of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities against payment of Rupees in cash which was to be deposited in the U.S. Account of State Bank of Pakistan. The bulk of this amount was given back to Pakistan in the shape of loans or grants.

**Water-logging and salinity are widespread in West Pakistan but floods invariably affected agricultural products in East Pakistan.

Production of Principal Crops, sugar cane and cotton




Fig:22

Source:- Pakistan Economic Survey, 1973-74, Islamabad

Table.1.7.

| Year | Variety-Wise Acreage, Production and Yield of Rice | | | Production (000 tons) | | | Yield per acre (Maunds) | | | | |
|---------|--|-------|-------|-----------------------|------|--------|-------------------------|---------|------|--------|------|
| | Acreage (000 acres) | | | Basmati | Irri | Others | Total | Basmati | Irri | Others | |
| 1970-71 | 1,075 | 1,360 | 1,280 | 3,715 | 405 | 1,042 | 718 | 2,165 | 10.3 | 20.9 | 15.3 |
| 1971-72 | 820 | 1,800 | 979 | 3,599 | 378 | 1,386 | 462 | 2,226 | 12.5 | 21.0 | 12.8 |
| 1972-73 | 835 | 1,591 | 1,230 | 3,656 | 394 | 1,229 | 670 | 2,293 | 12.8 | 21.0 | 14.8 |
| 1973-74 | - | - | - | 3,720 | - | - | - | 2,405 | - | - | - |

Source: Planning Unit, M/o Agriculture

Table.1.8.

Acreage, Production and Per Acre Yield of Cotton

| Year | Acreage (000 acres) | Production (000 bales) | Yield per acre (Maunds) | Percentage change in yield per acre |
|---------|------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| 1970-71 | 4,284 | 3,051 | 3.4 | - |
| 1971-72 | 4,837 | 3,979 | 3.9 | +14.7 |
| 1972-73 | 4,967 | 3,947 | 3.8 | -2.6 |
| 1973-74 | 4,559 | 3,704 | 3.9 | +2.6 |

Source: Planning Unit, M/o Agriculture

Area, Production and Per Acre Yield of Wheat

| Year | Area (000 acres) | Production (000 tons) | Yield per acre (Maunds) | Percentage change in yield per acre |
|----------|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| 1970-71 | 14,771 | 6,374 | 11.7 | - |
| 1971-72 | 14,325 | 6,782 | 12.9 | +10.3 |
| 1972-73 | 14,754 | 7,325 | 13.5 | +4.7 |
| 1973-74* | 16,076 | 8,500 | 14.4 | +6.7 |

* Provisional

Source: Planning Unit, M/o Agriculture

Area, Production and Per Acre Yield of Rice

| Year | Area (000 acres) | Production (000 tons) | Yield per acre (maunds) | Percentage change in yield per acre |
|----------|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| 1970-71 | 3,715 | 2,165 | 15.9 | - |
| 1971-72 | 3,599 | 2,226 | 16.8 | +5.7 |
| 1972-73 | 3,656 | 2,293 | 17.1 | +1.8 |
| 1973-74* | 3,720 | 2,405 | 17.6 | +2.9 |

* Second Estimate

Source: Planning Unit M/o Agriculture

Item II. The Americans provided the assistance on convertible local currency terms. The surplus U.S. agricultural commodities were supplied and Pakistan was required to pay back in U.S. dollars within a period of 40 years.

Item III. The U.S. Government made gifts and donations of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities to meet relief requirements and to combat hunger and malnutrition.

However, there were far reaching conditions which very clearly affected, and in fact, limited Pakistan's relations with other countries especially those which were considered unfriendly states by the Americans e.g., Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam and for a considerable time China. There was ^{an} definite clause of the agreements that if and when Pakistan accepted aid and assistance under P.L. 480 then she must not have trade relations with Cuba, North Korea and North Vietnam.

In addition to these limitations on Pakistan's foreign policy options the Americans made Pakistan to purchase a certain amount of her agricultural requirements from American markets with cash payments. This stipulation was within the scope of P.L. 480 and was known as the Usual Marketing Requirements (UMR), and as a result Pakistan had to import 100,000 to 160,000 tons annually at comparatively higher costs.

In addition the recipient was required to pay the freight charges for all the aid and assistance received as such. Pakistan was not allowed to export the same or the like commodity either domestic or of foreign origin without U.S. clearance.

The total aid received under P.L. 480 was U.S. \$ 1.196m. upto 1965, and in 1974 the total had reached U.S. \$ 1.303⁷₄m. The fact

7. All these figures have been taken from The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 4.4.1975.

| Name of the Lending Country/Agency | (Million US Dollars) | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|------------------|--|
| | Pre-1st Plan | 1st plan (1955-60) | 2nd plan (1960-65) | 3rd plan (1975-70) | 1970-71 | 1971-72 | 1972-73 | Total | |
| A. Consortium sources: | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Belgium | - | - | 0.517 | 9.483 | 1.500 | - | 2.231 | 13.731 | |
| 2. Canada | - | - | 12.232 | 135.253 | 6.500 | - | 10.000 | 163.985 | |
| 3. France | - | - | 45.572 | 73.704 | 30.000 | - | 19.548 | 168.824 | |
| 4. Germany | - | - | 233.477 | 201.463 | 38.387 | 3.301 | 24.825 | 491.453 | |
| 5. Italy | - | - | 5.907 | 98.369 | 74.791 | 1.974 | 0.063 | 181.104 | |
| 6. Japan | - | 25.211 | 147.480 | 145.800 | - | - | 31.096 | 349.587 | |
| 7. Netherlands | - | - | 14.813 | 20.758 | 4.420 | 3.806 | 4.931 | 48.728 | |
| 8. Sweden | - | - | - | 18.025 | - | - | - | 18.025 | |
| 9. UK | 28.000 | 28.000 | 123.866 | 163.194 | 9.525 | 5.863 | 15.634 | 374.082 | |
| 10. U.S.A. a) Repayable in Dollar | 15.000 | 2.827 | 735.554 | 774.454 | 89.039 | 41.828 | 214.791 | 1,873.493 | |
| b) Repayable in local currency | 25.777 | 321.303 | 249.431 | 194.886 | - | - | - | 791.397 | |
| TOTAL | 40.777 | 324.130 | 984.985 | 969.340 | 89.039 | 41.828 | 214.791 | 2,664.890 | |
| 11. IBRD | 58.227 | 92.655 | 208.888 | 239.786 | - | - | - | 599.556 | |
| 12. IDA | - | - | 192.093 | 147.377 | 23.000 | - | 95.000 | 457.470 | |
| 13. IFC | - | 1.380 | 9.352 | 3.200 | - | - | - | 13.932 | |
| 14. ADB | - | - | - | 10.000 | 23.850 | - | 38.500 | 71.850 | |
| Sub-TOTAL (CONSORTIUM SOURCES) | 127.004 | 471,376 | 1,969.182 | 2,235.752 | 300.512 | 56.772 | 456.619 | 5,617.217 | |
| B. Non-Consortium: | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Austria | - | - | - | 5.484 | - | - | - | 5.484 | |
| 2. China | - | - | - | 220.000 | - | - | - | 220.000 | |
| 3. Czechoslovakia | - | - | - | 40.120 | - | - | - | 40.120 | |
| 4. Denmark | - | - | 7.409 | 2.000 | - | - | - | 9.409 | |
| 5. Kuwait | - | - | - | 4.958 | - | - | - | 4.958 | |
| 6. Poland | - | - | - | 9.769 | - | - | - | 9.769 | |
| 7. Switzerland | - | - | 0.114 | 33.036 | - | - | - | 33.150 | |
| 8. USSR | - | - | 36.930 | 92.966 | 200.351 | - | 30.197 | 360.444 | |
| 9. Yugoslavia | - | - | 29.131 | 33.654 | 3.057 | - | - | 65.842 | |
| 10. Supplier Credits from various sources | - | 42.285 | - | - | - | - | - | 42.285 | |
| Sub-Total (Non-Consortium) | - | 42.285 | 73.584 | 441.987 | 203.408 | - | 30.197 | 791.461 | |
| Sub-Total (Loans) (A & B) | 127.004 | 513.661 | 2,042.766 | 2,677.739 | 503.920 | 56.772 | 486.816 | 6,408.678 | |

Source: Economic Affairs Divisions

© Net of Cancellations; savings and surrenders

Grant Assistance Agreements signed by Pakistan since Inception of Foreign Aid Till 1972-73

(Million U.S. dollars)

| Name of the Lending Country/Agency | Pre-list plan | 1st plan (1955-60) | 2nd plan (1960-65) | 3rd plan (1965-70) | 1970-71 | 1971-72 | 1972-73 | Total |
|--|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| I. Consortium including outside Consortium sources: | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Canada | 11.719 | 64.268 | 59.066 | 62.634 | 12.299 | 1.872 | 12.000 | 223.858 |
| 2. Japan | - | 0.192 | 0.837 | 0.240 | - | - | - | 1.269 |
| 3. Norway | - | - | - | 4.961 | - | - | 1.672 | 6.633 |
| 4. Sweden | 0.369 | - | 1.103 | 13.941 | 1.114 | - | - | 16.527 |
| 5. U.K. | 1.151 | 3.633 | 5.697 | 3.954 | - | - | - | 14.435 |
| 6. USA | 128.626 | 467.479 | 486.540 | 189.302 | 36.014 | 18.381 | 9.134 | 1,335.476 |
| 7. UN and Specialised Agencies | 3.940 | 5.177 | 4.488 | 2.812 | - | - | - | 16.417 |
| 8. UNDP-Special Fund | - | 8.175 | 9.743 | 11.851 | - | - | - | 29.769 |
| 9. Ford Foundation | - | 17.230 | 19.329 | 14.116 | 1.744 | - | - | 52.419 |
| Sub-TOTAL (CONSORTIUM) | 145.805 | 566.154 | 586.803 | 303.811 | 51.171 | 20.253 | 22.806 | 1,696.803 |
| II. Non-Consortium Sources: | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Australia | 26.342 | 2.790 | 7.090 | 4.440 | 0.170 | - | - | 40.832 |
| 2. China | - | - | 60.000 | 47.485 | 2.884 | - | - | 110.369 |
| Sub-TOTAL (NON-CONSORTIUM) | 26.342 | 2.790 | 67.090 | 51.925 | 3.054 | - | - | 151.201 |
| Sub-TOTAL (I+II) | 172.147 | 568.944 | 653.893 | 355.736 | 54.225 | 20.253 | 22.806 | 1,848,004 |
| III. Indus Tarbeia development fund @ | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Australia | - | - | 27.099 | - | - | - | - | 27.099 |
| 2. Canada | - | - | 36.962 | - | - | - | - | 36.962 |
| 3. Germany | - | - | 58.603 | - | - | - | - | 58.603 |
| 4. India | - | - | 168.803 | - | - | - | - | 168.803 |
| 5. New Zealand | - | - | 3.902 | - | - | - | - | 3.902 |
| 6. UK | - | - | 92.250 | - | - | - | - | 92.250 |
| 7. US (a) Dollars | - | - | 295.590 | - | - | - | - | 295.590 |
| (b) Rupee contribution | - | - | 235.000 | - | - | - | - | 235.000 |
| Sub-TOTAL (III) | - | - | 918.209 | - | - | - | - | 918.209 |
| Sub-TOTAL (GENERAL (I + II + III)) | 172.147 | 568.944 | 1,572.102 | 355.736 | 54.225 | 20.253 | 22.806 | 2,766.213 |
| Grand TOTAL (LOANS & GRANTS) | 299.151 | 1,082.605 | 3,614.868 | 3,033.475 | 558.145 | 77.025 | 509.622 | 9,174.891 |

Source: Economic Affairs Division

@ The amount of contribution shown against countries relate to the contributions pledged under the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement dated September 19, 1960, and the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement (Supplementary) dated April 6, 1964 respectively.

that the total aid received by Pakistan under P.L.480, from 1965 to 1974 amounted to U.S.\$ 107 million, clearly demonstrates the point to that the American aid closely approximated/~~was~~ her political cordiality with Pakistan, and this definitely affected Pakistan's imports from the United States for the period in question. This point is further substantiated by the trade figures of Pakistan, especially from 1971 to 1972 (see figure: 52) with regards to her imports from U.S.A. The reason being that the United States has been the chief donor of aid to Pakistan and very effectively influenced the decisions of the Aid Pakistan Consortium. The Americans were instrumental in the suspension of the Consortium aid to Pakistan during the East Pakistan crisis in 1971, and the fact that the aid was not rehabilitated in full till Pakistan recognised Bangladesh in February 1974, is proof enough of/^{the} political limitations which Pakistan has been obliged to recognise, at times, because of her economic requirements.

The industrial base:

~~The industrial base:~~ In 1974 the total U.S. deposits in Pakistan stood at Rs. 6,620,000,000, as a result of her aid and assistance programme under P.L.480. The Americans have used this massive fund for the maintenance of her Embassy personnel, propoganda publications, the award of scholarships and exchange programmes. This huge fund has been a source of socio-economic and political embarrassment to Pakistan.

Pakistan's economy at the time of her independence was predominantly agricultural and she had no major industrial centres, and was without capacity for processing indigenous raw materials " At the time of independence, there were only 34 factories in Pakistan with a total daily employment of 26,400 persons. Although Pakistan inherited twenty per cent of the Sub-continent's

§.ibid.

that a total of U.S. \$ 107 were

Index of Industrial Production




Fig: 23

Source:- Pakistan Economic Survey, 1973-74, Islamabad

a) Jute:

population, her share in industry was less than 7 per cent and even this consisted of small scale and minor industrial units. Thus for instance, Pakistan was the home of jute, but had not a single jute factory."⁹ The growth of the domestic manufacturing industry in Pakistan, especially jute, ^{stemmed} from the Partition of the Indian Sub-continent in 1947, which split the world's main jute growing area in Bengal between East Pakistan and India. The division left India with almost all the processing and weaving facilities and only about a quarter of the growing area, and Pakistan with the bulk of the growing area but with negligible manufacturing facilities. In 1947 Calcutta was much the largest terminal market for jute from East Bengal (East Pakistan). This facility was disrupted in 1949 as a result of the dispute concerning the exchange rate between Pakistan and India. The Government of Pakistan were obliged to take measures aimed at reducing the impending hardships of the jute growing farmers and issued the Jute Ordinance 1949 (replaced by the Act in 1956) to establish the minimum support prices, to administer the purchase, sale and storing facilities on behalf of the government. Since the entire output of raw jute was exported and domestic requirements were met by imports, Pakistan found it imperative to set up her own Jute industry so as to eliminate dependence on foreign manufactured jute products, especially Indian. The jute manufacturing capacity

9. Pakistan Year Book, Karachi, p.215. (Pakistan Basic Facts, 1967-68, An official publication indicates that at the time of the Partition there were 14,569 industrial establishments in the undivided India and only 1406 units were located in the area which now formed Pakistan. This establishes that Pakistan had 10 per cent of the industrial units, but these were mainly flour mills, rice mills and cotton ginning factories).

Table.2.2.

FOREIGN TRADE IN JUTE AND JUTE MANUFACTURES

| Year (July-June) | IMPORTS | | | EXPORTS | | |
|---------------------|-------------|----------------------|-------|-------------|----------------------|---------|
| | Raw Jute | Jute Manufactures | Total | Raw Jute | Jute Manufactures | Total |
| 1951-52 | - | 22.9 | 22.9 | 996.0 | 0.2 | 996.2 |
| 1952-53 | - | 8.7 | 8.7 | 566.3 | 1.4 | 567.7 |
| 1953-54 | - | 0.9 | 0.9 | 556.4 | 9.6 | 566.0 |
| 1954-55 | - | 0.3 | 0.3 | 598.5 | 22.8 | 621.3 |
| 1955-56 | - | - | - | 829.2 | 105.5 | 934.7 |
| 1956-57 | - | - | - | 705.8 | 91.1 | 796.9 |
| 1957-58 | - | - | - | 853.4 | 91.3 | 944.7 |
| 1958-59 | - | 0.1 | 0.1 | 654.8 | 155.2 | 810.0 |
| 1959-60 | - | 0.1 | 0.1 | 729.1 | 227.1 | 956.2 |
| 1960-61 | - | - | - | 848.1 | 314.1 | 1,162.2 |
| 1961-62 | - | - | - | 849.6 | 321.8 | 1,171.4 |
| 1962-63 | - | - | - | 792.9 | 306.5 | 1,099.4 |
| 1963-64 | - | - | - | 752.9 | 323.2 | 1,076.1 |
| 1964-65 | - | - | - | 845.4 | 300.7 | 1,146.1 |
| 1965-66 | - | - | - | 863.2 | 575.4 | 1,438.6 |
| 1966-67(R) | - | - | - | 870.0 | 581.0 | 1,451.0 |
| 1967-68 | - | - | - | 758.9 | 619.6 | 1,378.5 |

(in million rupees)

(R):Revised

increased from a negligible level in 1947 to 8070 looms in 1961, and to 19428 in 1969.¹⁰ The Third Five Year Plan of Pakistan estimated a total installed capacity of 24,619 looms by 1970. The development of jute manufacturing industry in Pakistan and the diversification of her raw jute exports was a good example of the characteristics of Pakistan's geopolitical problems, and a reflection on the unhappy Indo-Pakistan relations.

A study of jute production and manufacture in Pakistan indicated that until 1952 Pakistan imported jute manufactured goods to the tune of 22.9 million rupees and her exports of jute manufactures amounted to only 0.2 million rupees. In 1967-68 the exports in raw jute amounted to 758.9 million rupees and the jute manufactured goods exported from Pakistan earned 619.6 million rupees. This picture of the jute production and manufacture in Pakistan materialised as a result of the realigned geopolitical priorities of Pakistan.

Raw jute and jute manufactures constituted the largest single source of foreign exchange earnings for Pakistan. In 1967-68 the exports earned a total of 1379 million rupees. After the Partition in 1947, the jute export trade has passed through some major vicissitudes. India was at the outset by far the most important consumer, taking 5.3 million bales as against 0.8 million by the rest of the world in 1947-8. In 1948-9 Indian purchases were at

10. The total looms installed were located as follows: 18,928 in East Pakistan and 500 in West Pakistan, at Jaranwala in the Punjab. There were 40 jute mills in Pakistan in 1968 and the consumption of raw jute amounted to 2.88 million bales and the production of jute goods was 490,535 tons. In March 1970, according to the Financial Times, August 17, 1970, there were 21,700 looms in Pakistan.

the more normal level of 3.9 million bales, exports to other countries increasing to 1.8 million bales. By 1950-51 two-thirds of Pakistan's exports of jute were absorbed by countries other than India, chiefly the U.S.A., the U.K., France, West Germany and Belgium...as Indian domestic production of raw jute rose from 1.7 million bales in 1947-8 to about 6.3 million bales in 1961-62, and Indian imports of raw jute from Pakistan were under 0.4 million bales in the latter year. India has thus achieved its goal of virtual self-sufficiency in raw jute...loss to Pakistan's exports is being absorbed by increasing manufacturing capacity (at home)....¹¹. The changed pattern of Pakistan's jute industry since 1947 was indicative of the eventualities of the division of the Sub-continent and its inherent geopolitical problems. The old and established channels of inter Dominion trade were gradually being eroded and new but economically expensive trade connections were established. Pakistan was exporting her raw jute and manufactured jute goods to distant markets. This involved extra and unnecessary freight and insurance charges which were endangering the competitiveness of the Pakistani jute and jute manufactured goods in the world market. India was the closest and the most natural customer in the field but the political considerations of the parties concerned outweighed the economic benefits, and which should be construed as a serious error of judgement. By 1960-61 Pakistan was exporting only 5 per cent of her

11. Andrus, J.R. and Mohammed, A.F. Trade, Finance and Development in Pakistan, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1966, pp.27,30.

*** These were expensive in the sense that had there been a continuous exchange of goods between India and Pakistan then both the countries would have saved unnecessary costs

commodities to India and was importing only 5 per cent from India. Since the Indo-Pakistan hostilities of 1965 the trading relations between the two neighbours have been almost at a standstill.^{11A}

B) Cotton:

Cotton is both the chief cash crop and the main kharif crop in West Pakistan and is grown mainly on the doabs (canal irrigated areas) of the Indus Valley.

Since 1914 good quality seeds have been imported from U.S.A. to improve the production and quality of cotton known as the Punjab-American has taken well to the indigenous soil and climate and now 87 per cent of the area in West Pakistan is under these improved varieties producing 90 per cent of Pakistan's cotton production. These varieties of cotton are grown in well-defined zones north to south along the Indus Basin of West Pakistan. Approximately three million acres were under cotton cultivation in 1947, but the acreage has been increasing gradually over the years and in 1967-68 there were 4.3 million acres under cotton cultivation in West Pakistan (3.7 million acres in 1964-65). In East Pakistan cotton is grown on the slopes in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Approximately 35,000 acres) and is generally known as "Comilla Cotton". This area produces between 10 to 55000 bales of harsh short-staple cotton, "The cotton is mainly used for mixing with wool and its acreage fluctuates widely because it depends on shifting cultivation (jhuming) by primitive tribes, predominantly Buddhist."^{11B}

11B. Ahmad, K.S. Op. Cit. Page 96.

Table.2.3.

FOREIGN TRADE IN COTTON AND COTTON MANUFACTURES

| Year (July-June) | IMPORTS | | | EXPORTS | | |
|---------------------|---------------|------------------------|-------|---------------|------------------------|-------|
| | Raw Cotton | Cotton Manufactures | Total | Raw Cotton | Cotton Manufactures | Total |
| 1951-52 | 6.5 | 625.3 | 631.8 | 777.5 | 0.5 | 778.0 |
| 1952-53 | 2.5 | 146.9 | 149.4 | 694.0 | 0.7 | 694.7 |
| 1953-54 | 3.7 | 67.2 | 70.9 | 497.4 | 0.9 | 498.3 |
| 1954-55 | 2.5 | 65.0 | 67.5 | 296.5 | 1.3 | 297.8 |
| 1955-56 | 12.9 | 78.6 | 91.5 | 462.1 | 35.7 | 497.8 |
| 1956-57 | 24.3 | 20.1 | 44.4 | 352.4 | 92.7 | 445.1 |
| 1957-58 | 8.5 | 8.7 | 17.2 | 215.8 | 32.0 | 247.8 |
| 1958-59 | 13.4 | 2.7 | 16.1 | 190.4 | 52.1 | 242.5 |
| 1959-60 | 8.4 | 12.9 | 21.3 | 188.8 | 231.4 | 420.2 |
| 1960-61 | 7.8 | 24.3 | 32.1 | 137.6 | 118.2 | 255.8 |
| 1961-62 | 18.4 | 16.8 | 35.2 | 123.5 | 43.0 | 166.5 |
| 1962-63 | 23.7 | 13.1 | 36.8 | 370.1 | 88.0 | 458.1 |
| 1963-64 | 12.3 | 13.2 | 25.5 | 340.1 | 189.3 | 529.4 |
| 1964-65 | 12.7 | 24.2 | 36.9 | 287.0 | 272.2 | 559.2 |
| 1965-66 | 9.4 | 11.0 | 20.4 | 278.4 | 254.2 | 532.6 |
| 1966-67(R) | 8.2 | 15.0 | 23.2 | 290.6 | 276.9 | 567.5 |
| 1967-68 | 19.8 | 7.9 | 27.7 | 441.8 | 200.3 | 642.1 |


(in million rupees)

(R):Revised

As a result of improved qualities of cotton and increased consumption at home and abroad the production of cotton has increased considerably in the last few years. The average production from 1955-56 to 1959-60 was 1.68 million bales (392 lbs. each bale) which increased to 2.92 million bales (450,000 tons) in 1966-67 and 2.92 million bales (511,000 tons) in 1967-68. In 1952-53 the crop reached a peak of 1.8 million bales. The food shortages that emerged in 1953-54 led to an official discouragement of cotton growing in favour of summer grains. Because of the increase in cotton consumption at home, which resulted from industrial expansion in this sector, a campaign was launched to grow more cotton in 1955-56 but it did not prove very effective. Yields remained stationary at 189 lbs from 1955 to 1960 and the failure of measures to increase the yield was ascribed to several factors. "Recurring weather difficulties insect damage and water shortages in the canals were held responsible in earlier years. Later, there was increasing recognition that the causes of stagnation lay deeper. Low applications of irrigation waters, the accumulation of salts in soil, unreliable seeds, inadequate plant production and uneven cover of plants have combined to keep the yields low. Market incentives have also worked against cotton. Sugar-cane has proved profitable, encouraging the diversion from cotton not of land as such but of precious irrigation supplies and peasant energy."¹². To improve the cultivation, marketing and manufacture of cotton centres of research and technology have been established

12. Andrus, Mohammed, op cit. p. 29

Fig:24



PAKISTAN'S MERCHANDISE EXPORTS

especially at Karachi and Lyallpur in West Pakistan. Egyptian cotton is being experimentally grown in Malir to Tatta areas of Karachi.

At the time of the Partition in 1947 the bulk of the cotton crop was exported and the industry was underdeveloped. This state of affairs was maintained during the first five years of independence. However, the need for development was realised and this sector of the industry was gradually being given importance. The figures of 1947 (29.7 million lbs. and 881 million yards of cloth) and those of 1967-68 (569.7 million lbs and 782.5 million yards of cloth) highlight rapid development of the industry since the Sub-continent was divided in 1947.

The fact that Pakistan emerged as an independent country with widely separated wings (East and West Pakistan) and consequently lines of communications and transportation, has complicated her socio-economic and political problems. In addition to social and economic development, Pakistan faced a very heavy burden of defence. Her physical separation underlines the need for welding the peoples of the two wings into a united whole, because without complete unity the security of Pakistan would always remain in jeopardy. The geography of Pakistan suggested her onerous responsibilities with regard to the defence of the frontiers in the northwest (of West Pakistan) and northeast (of East Pakistan). As the guardian of these frontiers Pakistan was obliged to undertake measures to strengthen her security and defence. This has been a very heavy and expensive exercise, "... it

is not unusual to find defence expenditures constituting more than one-half of revenue expenditures, although it cannot but be regarded as unfortunate that so much of a poor country's meagre tax revenues should be spent for non-development purposes. In the earlier years, through 1953-54, substantial expenditures on defence were debited to capital account; in 1952-3 there was peak spending of Rs. 211.2 million in addition to Rs. 783.4 in the revenue budget for a total Rs. 994.5 million as against receipts on revenue account of Rs. 1,334.3 million. Total defence expenditures were at a level of Rs. 1,000 million in the five years ending in 1962-63...¹³ The allocations to defence in 1964-65 indicated a marked increase (Rs. 1296.5 million) and the Indo-Pakistan hostilities of 1965 effected a further rise in the defence expenditure.¹⁴

In addition to the vast defence^{14A} expenditures Pakistan had to spend a considerable amount on the development of her own shipping industry so as to enable her, to some extent, to maintain a link between the two parts. This was considered to be a matter of crucial importance because the sea link was the only direct link after India withdrew permission for Pakistani flights over her territory (the railway connection had already been suspended).

13. Andrus, Mohammed, op cit. p. 218

14. These figures do not include American military aid.

14A. The events of 1971 and the aftermath have clearly demonstrated the overwhelming burdens of defence on the meagre economic resources.

The Changing Pattern of Pakistan's International Trade.

International economic and political relations are very closely interrelated. The volume of aid and trade closely approximates to the degree of political cordiality that exists between states. Both aid and trade have, at times, been used as the instruments of political pressure, for example, the ban on American military aid to Pakistan during the undeclared Indo-Pakistan war of 1965; the ban on American military supplies to both India and Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war over Bangladesh in 1971. Again the suspension of economic aid to Pakistan by the Aid Pakistan Consortium during the East Pakistan crisis, and during and after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, is a case in point.

Since Pakistan is predominantly an agricultural country her main exports (Figs: 39-55) consisted of primary products, though industrialisation provided considerable opportunities for the export of manufactured goods, especially textiles. The main imports (Figs: 39-55) of Pakistan consisted of industrial raw materials, food and live animals, machinery and transport equipment, animal and vegetable oils etc. Pakistan generally has had an unfavourable balance of trade since 1947 (Figs: 42, 42A).

Foreign Trade

(In crore rupees)

| Year (July-June) | Import | Export | Balance |
|---------------------|--------|--------|---------|
| 1948-49 | 100.92 | 54.24 | - 45.68 |
| 1949-50 | 87.38 | 53.51 | - 33.8 |
| 1950-51 | 116.71 | 134.25 | + 17.54 |
| 1954-55 | 78.30 | 49.14 | - 29.16 |
| 1955-56 | 96.45 | 74.24 | - 22.21 |
| 1959-60 | 180.57 | 76.31 | -104.26 |
| 1960-61 | 217.32 | 54.02 | -163.30 |
| 1961-62 | 223.62 | 54.29 | -169.33 |
| 1962-63 | 280.01 | 99.81 | -180.20 |
| 1963-64 | 298.16 | 107.50 | -190.66 |
| 1964-65 | 367.24 | 113.96 | -253.28 |
| 1965-66 | 288.03 | 120.36 | -167.67 |
| 1966-67 | 362.57 | 129.73 | -232.84 |
| 1967-68 | 332.72 | 164.48 | -168.28 |
| 1968-69 | 304.66 | 169.99 | -134.67 |
| 1969-70 | 328.51 | 160.86 | -167.65 |
| 1970-71 | 360.24 | 199.84 | -160.40 |
| 1971-72 | 349.53 | 337.14 | - 12.39 |
| 1972-73 | 839.83 | 855.12 | + 15.29 |
| 1973-74 (July-Mar.) | 875.10 | 627.23 | -247.87 |

Source: Statistical Division

- Notes: (a) Data on sea-borne trade with India are included since April 1948 because of the stand still Agreement up to March 1948, and land-borne trade since July 1, 1949.
- (b) Data on exports to Afghanistan are included since July 1949 whereas data on imports from Afghanistan are included from March 1951.
- (c) Data on land-borne trade with Iran are included since July 1949.
- (d) Data on exports do not include re-exports from 1959-60.


Table.2.4.

FOREIGN TRADE

Fig:25

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(IN CRORE RUPEES)



Jute (Tab.2.2.) and cotton (Tab.2.3.) formed the basis of Pakistan's exports (approximately 75 per cent), though a relative decline in the importance of export of the raw jute and cotton was registered. During the period 1964/65 raw jute and cotton constituted 46 per cent of total exports, in 1967/68 these shared 39 per cent of total exports. Jute still occupied the traditional role in exports, but cotton exports have dwindled for a period, because of increased domestic consumption, and wide fluctuations in prices coupled with tough competition in the world market. Jute and cotton manufactured goods were promising exports; and textile manufactures increased from 25 per cent in 1964/65 to 29 per cent in 1967/68. In spite of the increase in the export of manufactured goods, Pakistan is still dependent upon a limited number of agricultural products, which are affected by weather conditions and their fluctuating prices in the world market. In addition to these major exports Pakistan earned valuable foreign exchange by exporting, on a small scale, sports goods, carpets, rugs, oil cakes and tea.

The structural modifications in the economy of Pakistan necessitated substantial changes in the composition of her import trade (2.5,2.6.). The expansion of industry (Fig:24) relegated the importance of consumer goods, and the import of machinery, raw materials, fuels and spare parts have taken precedence. Moreover, the fast growth of population and relatively slow rise in agricultural production has compelled Pakistan to import food grains to meet the increasing requirements. In 1947/48 the

total imports were worth Rs.359.2 million, and since then there has been a steady trend towards rising imports which amounted to Rs.5,374.2¹ million in 1966/67. During the fiscal year 1965/66 Pakistan's imports fell considerably because of the undeclared Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, tighter import restrictions and the temporary stop in the flow of the American economic assistance. The imports, however, in the financial year 1966/67 recorded an increase of twenty three per cent which was basically necessitated by the increased import of food stuffs, coupled with the relaxations in the import policy. The imports fell by ten per cent in 1967/68 as compared with the previous financial year owing to the decreased import of food stuffs and the delay in the import of iron, steel and non-ferrous metals, caused by the pending negotiations of loans and credits.

Pakistan's trade relations with other countries have been largely determined by the following considerations: i) The inherited pre-partition trade relations,

1. All these figures have been taken from:

- i) Pakistan Basic Facts(1965,66,67,68,69.)
- ii) Statistical Fact Book, A U.S. A.I.D. Publication, Lahore, 1966-67.
- iii) Central Statistical Office(Pakistan) Bulletins.
- iv) Economic Report "Pakistan" Lloyds Bank Ltd., London, 1969.

ii) The source of foreign aid and the conditions thereof,
 iii) The structural changes in the economy of Pakistan and
 the development of markets for the newly manufactured
 products, iv) The Commonwealth Preferences and v) The
 development of barter trade.

At the time of partition in 1947, U.K. was the main source of imports^{**} (Tab.2.5,2.8) and destination for Pakistani exports (2.5,2.6.) (U.K. imported 17 per cent of Pakistan's total exports in 1948 and 25 per cent of Pakistan's total imports for the same period originated in U.K.). The United Kingdom has maintained her top position as the chief importer of Pakistani exports, which amounted to Rs. 396 millions in 1967/68, and the United States has been chief exporter (Tab.2.5,2.6) to Pakistan, and in 1967/68 she exported goods worth Rs.1436² millions to Pakistan. Pakistan has been diversifying her trade ever since it became aware of Britain's interest in joining the European Common Market. The United Kingdom is still Pakistan's main customer although the relative importance of the British market has diminished Pakistan's exports to U.K. constituted about 14 per cent of the total in 1963/64, but only 12 per cent in 1967/68. Pakistan has mounted export drives in the Afrasian and the communist countries. The increasing trade with the communist countries, whose trade is state controlled, prompted Pakistan in 1967 to set up the Trade Corporation of Pakistan. The commodities that the Trade Corporation of Pakistan is now importing include pig iron, rubber, sugar, betel nuts, aluminium

2. ibid. ** Oxford Economic Atlas of the World
 Third Edition, O.U.P. 1965. p.234

Table.2.5.

| Regions, Countries and Territories | 1969-70 | | 1970-71 | | 1971-72 | | 1972-73 | | 1973-74 (July-March) | | | | | | |
|--|----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------------------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| | Imports | Exports | Imports | Exports | Imports | Exports | Imports | Exports | Imports | Exports | | | | | |
| GRAND TOTAL | 3,228.51 | 1,602.86 | -1,625.65 | 3,602.24 | 1,991.84 | -1,604.40 | 3,499.54 | 3,371.14 | -12.40 | 8,295.83 | 8,552.17 | +15.29 | 8,752.10 | 6,272.23 | -2,479.87 |
| 1. American Region | 90.50 | 13.55 | -76.95 | 1,144.57 | 14.52 | -1,003.05 | 79.71 | 21.24 | -58.47 | 2,562.52 | 43.92 | -212.60 | 2,521.70 | 43.99 | -2,103.71 |
| (a) North America | 90.48 | 13.22 | -77.26 | 1,144.52 | 14.10 | -1,003.42 | 77.19 | 20.52 | -56.67 | 2,214.45 | 42.95 | -1,781.90 | 2,444.41 | 40.32 | -2,044.09 |
| Of which: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| U.S.A. | 78.68 | 12.10 | -66.58 | 1,029.96 | 12.65 | -90.31 | 72.88 | 17.41 | -55.47 | 2,094.41 | 34.88 | -1,744.53 | 2,222.25 | 32.21 | -1,900.04 |
| Canada | 11.80 | 1.11 | -10.69 | 111.56 | 1.45 | -10.11 | 4.31 | 3.11 | -1.20 | 12.04 | 7.66 | -4.38 | 22.12 | 8.10 | -14.02 |
| (b) Central America | 1 | 21 | -20 | 4 | 27 | +26 | 2.03 | 48 | -1.55 | 40 | 61 | +21 | 19 | 3.01 | +2.82 |
| (c) South America | 1 | 12 | +11 | 4 | 15 | -25 | 49 | 24 | -25 | 34.67 | 76 | -33.91 | 8.10 | 56 | -74.4 |
| 2. Western Europe | 1,264.46 | 371.33 | -893.13 | 1,231.65 | 41.60 | -82.05 | 1,169.99 | 73.78 | -43.21 | 2,354.46 | 213.21 | -22.25 | 2,416.53 | 1,721.25 | -744.28 |
| (a) E.C.M. | 1,172.29 | 342.20 | -830.09 | 1,125.63 | 37.99 | -77.64 | 1,078.87 | 64.22 | -43.65 | 2,107.07 | 181.15 | -28.92 | 2,222.52 | 1,404.42 | -822.10 |
| Belgium - Luxembourg | 4.20 | 1.35 | -2.85 | 4.82 | 1.42 | -3.40 | 4.12 | 2.85 | -1.27 | 10.65 | 7.93 | -2.72 | 17.15 | 7.48 | -9.67 |
| France | 12.51 | 2.22 | -10.29 | 6.37 | 2.51 | -3.86 | 7.62 | 6.22 | -1.40 | 12.24 | 18.34 | +6.10 | 21.57 | 15.31 | -6.26 |
| West Germany | 39.10 | 4.22 | -34.88 | 40.58 | 6.17 | -34.41 | 34.40 | 10.53 | -23.87 | 74.87 | 30.99 | -44.28 | 59.18 | 24.85 | -35.05 |
| Italy | 18.50 | 6.25 | -12.25 | 19.28 | 6.35 | -12.93 | 19.17 | 12.53 | -6.64 | 23.08 | 43.44 | +20.36 | 17.28 | 28.24 | +10.96 |
| Netherlands | 4.76 | 2.10 | -2.66 | 3.55 | 2.25 | -1.30 | 6.30 | 5.10 | -1.20 | 18.32 | 13.24 | -5.08 | 39.12 | 10.85 | -23.47 |
| U.K. | 37.36 | 17.44 | -19.92 | 40.21 | 18.83 | -21.38 | 35.33 | 25.99 | -9.34 | 68.33 | 63.02 | -5.31 | 65.79 | 47.93 | -17.46 |
| Denmark | 86 | 62 | -24 | 82 | 46 | -36 | 53 | 110 | +17 | 2.58 | 4.59 | +2.01 | 1.95 | 3.64 | +1.69 |
| (b) E.F.T.A. Excl. U.K. | 8.47 | 2.62 | 5.85 | 7.73 | 3.07 | -4.66 | 8.58 | 6.09 | -2.49 | 23.94 | 18.28 | -5.68 | 22.93 | 22.10 | -83 |
| Of which: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ziiland | 60 | 7 | -53 | 60 | 9 | -51 | 85 | 12 | -73 | 98 | 82 | -16 | 2.36 | 1.52 | -84 |
| Austria | 51 | 15 | -36 | 69 | 9 | -60 | 83 | 21 | -64 | 2.33 | 79 | -1.54 | 40 | 55 | +15 |
| Norway | 1.47 | 13 | -1.34 | 1.65 | 1.8 | -1.47 | 43 | 16 | -7 | 2.64 | 73 | -1.91 | 5.61 | 1.08 | -4.53 |
| Portugal | 17 | 12 | -5 | 20 | 10 | -10 | 13 | 45 | +32 | 3.20 | 1.19 | -2.01 | 1.49 | 67 | -82 |
| Sweden | 1.54 | 89 | -65 | 2.26 | 10 | -2.16 | 2.62 | 1.46 | -1.16 | 6.98 | 4.44 | -2.54 | 6.40 | 5.06 | -1.34 |
| Switzerland | 4.18 | 1.26 | -2.92 | 2.34 | 1.54 | -0.80 | 3.71 | 3.69 | -2 | 7.83 | 10.32 | +2.49 | 3.67 | 13.21 | +9.54 |
| (c) Eastern Europe excl. E.C.M. & E.F.T.A. | 64 | 51 | -13 | 29 | 54 | +25 | 53 | 3.47 | +2.94 | 1.43 | 13.78 | +12.35 | 1.09 | 9.73 | +8.64 |
| Of which: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Malta & Goso | 1 | 2 | +1 | ** | 4 | +4 | - | 47 | +47 | 3 | 1.35 | +1.32 | - | 76 | +76 |
| Spain | 61 | 31 | -30 | 25 | 24 | -1 | 33 | 1.77 | +1.44 | 1.23 | 9.29 | +8.16 | 67 | 7.98 | +7.21 |
| Greece | 2 | 14 | +12 | 2 | 22 | +20 | 20 | 1.18 | +98 | 16 | 2.98 | +2.82 | 40 | 96 | +56 |
| 3. Eastern Europe | 28.12 | 28.56 | +46 | 31.43 | 38.17 | +6.74 | 36.10 | 39.58 | +3.48 | 55.85 | 64.04 | +8.19 | 57.22 | 26.31 | -30.91 |
| Of which: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| U.S.S.R. | 7.62 | 7.98 | +36 | 9.69 | 16.20 | +6.51 | 8.43 | 13.58 | +5.15 | 16.53 | 22.26 | +5.73 | 16.10 | 13.00 | -3.10 |
| Bulgaria | 1.03 | 3.29 | +2.26 | 4.53 | 2.71 | -1.82 | 1.98 | 3.82 | +1.84 | 2.22 | 4.58 | +2.36 | 1.20 | 21 | -99 |
| Czechoslovakia | 5.81 | 1.86 | -3.95 | 4.80 | 3.41 | -1.39 | 5.21 | 3.19 | -2.02 | 4.53 | 4.93 | +40 | 5.44 | 1.14 | -4.30 |
| Hungary | 77 | 1.27 | -50 | 69 | 2.47 | +1.78 | 1.19 | 2.92 | +1.73 | 1.63 | 3.86 | +2.23 | 4.68 | 93 | -3.75 |
| Poland | 4.81 | 7.94 | +3.13 | 5.73 | 7.86 | +2.13 | 10.24 | 9.50 | -74 | 18.69 | 11.84 | +6.85 | 15.03 | 9.83 | -5.20 |
| Rumania | 70 | 3.97 | +3.27 | 1.71 | 1.78 | +7 | 2.94 | 3.01 | +7 | 3.65 | 4.35 | +70 | 9.46 | 50 | -3.76 |
| Yugoslavia | 7.34 | 2.26 | -5.08 | 4.21 | 3.73 | -48 | 5.93 | 3.55 | -2.44 | 7.58 | 12.08 | +4.50 | 9.79 | 63 | -9.16 |
| 4. Middle East | 20.68 | 22.54 | +1.86 | 26.53 | 28.16 | +1.63 | 27.34 | 45.55 | +17.71 | 76.67 | 78.78 | +2.11 | 1,032.66 | 1,02.97 | -99 |
| (a) A.C.D. | 8.93 | 2.25 | -6.68 | 10.51 | 2.03 | -8.48 | 7.32 | 2.18 | -5.14 | 15.27 | 6.13 | -9.14 | 11.92 | 11.91 | -1 |
| Turkey | 10 | 14 | +4 | 23 | 15 | -6 | 94 | 11 | -83 | 5.18 | 13 | -5.35 | 1.54 | 10 | -1.44 |
| Iran | 8.84 | 2.11 | -6.73 | 10.28 | 1.88 | -8.40 | 6.38 | 2.07 | -4.31 | 9.79 | 6.00 | -3.79 | 10.38 | 11.81 | +1.43 |
| (b) Asian Countries | 11.62 | 18.43 | +7.31 | 16.01 | 23.40 | +7.39 | 20.48 | 41.67 | +21.19 | 60.21 | 66.70 | +6.49 | 87.39 | 84.79 | -2.60 |
| Of which: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Aku Dhabi | 6.77 | 91 | -5.86 | 5.83 | 94 | -4.85 | 3.36 | 2.03 | -1.33 | 55 | 3.86 | +3.31 | 8 | 4.62 | +4.55 |
| Bahrain | 1 | 3.16 | +3.15 | 1.25 | 2.04 | +79 | 21 | 2.87 | -2.66 | 1.8 | 2.52 | +2.34 | 36 | 2.06 | +1.52 |
| Dubai | 7 | 2.48 | +2.41 | 11 | 2.97 | +2.86 | 60 | 4.08 | +3.43 | 89 | 11.03 | +10.14 | 68 | 9.85 | +9.13 |
| Iraq | 44 | 1.18 | +74 | 35 | 5.77 | +5.02 | 53 | 5.49 | +4.96 | 66 | 10.62 | +9.96 | 55 | 6.25 | -5.70 |

Cont.

ingots, copper rods and copper ingots. The Government of Pakistan intend to authorise the T.C.P. to import bulk commodities as the sole importer. Pakistan's trade with U.S.S.R. and the Peoples Republic of China provides a good example of the changing trends in Pakistan's international trade (Tab.2.5-3.1.). In 1960/61 Pakistan imported from the Soviet Union, goods worth Rs.25,025,000, and her exports to the Soviet Union for the same period amounted to Rs.14,201,000. In 1966/67 the imports from Russia totalled Rs. 179 millions, and the exports to that country for the same period amounted to Rs.137 millions.

Pakistan's trade with China (Tab.2.5-3.1.) has considerably increased over the years. In 1960/61 Pakistan imported goods worth Rs.15,463,000, from China, and her exports to China for the same period amounted to Rs.74,784,000. Pakistan in 1966/67 exported goods worth Rs.222 millions to China, and for the same period imported goods totalling Rs.159 millions³ from China. The barter deals between Pakistan and the Sino-Soviet block provide a very important element in the ever increasing trade relations of Pakistan with the communist countries.

In percentage terms Pakistan's imports from China in 1959/60 amounted to 0.8 per cent, and exports for the same period stood at 2.4 per cent (see figures:48,49). For the period 1964/65 Pakistan's exports to China were 7.5 per cent as against her imports from China for the same period/^{which} stood at 1.8 per cent.

3. Ibid.

Since religion formed the *raison d'etre* of Pakistan as an independent political entity, her leaders, in the scheme of things, naturally sought closer links with the Muslim countries of South East and West Asia. Pakistan's trading and commercial links, and her economic ties with these countries have greatly been improved and strengthened. Pakistan has set up joint ministerial commissions with Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi, Jordan, Kuwait and Libya, to carry out joint projects on bilateral and multilateral bases in the economic and industrial fields.⁴ This policy has been carried out with added vigour since the secession of Bangladesh, and
Pakistan has

4.

Iran is setting up industrial complex in Baluchistan to meet the growing needs of the region, and this is bound to affect the socio-economic and cultural life of the people in the region, and / ^{as} such a number of their genuine grievances would have been met,

Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Dubai are giving economic assistance for the development of chemical and textile industries in the Punjab.

been very successful in finding new market for her products which were previously consumed in her former eastern wing. Pakistan has earned a considerable amount of badly needed foreign exchange as a result of the imperative redirection of her trading links which are very much inconformity with the changed geopolitical structure, and since 1971, substantially, a new pattern of her international trade seems to have emerged, "West Pakistan's exports amounted to \$ 419.8 million in 1970/71. An increase of 40.3 per cent was recorded for 1971/72, and the exports were to the tune of \$ 590 million. This was made possible to some extent as a result of the diversion of exports which were previously earmarked for East Pakistan, and the bulk of this diversion had been effectively managed by June 1972. The resultant increase of exports by 38.3 per cent to \$ 816 million in 1972/73 were highly encouraging for the economic growth; and the growth momentum seems to have been maintained, especially in the exports sector." ⁵

A recent statement from an official spokesman of the Economic Affairs Division of the Government of Pakistan clearly established the point that the oil rich states of West Asia have been more than generous in extending significant economic assistance to Pakistan, and as such Pakistan, after all, survived the oil price rises far more easily than India or Bangladesh. Pakistan's Islamic image was a very important contributory factor in her relations with Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran, Abu Dhabi, Qatar etc; and the large economic assistance that Pakistan received from these countries.

5. Syed, A.H. op cit. World Survey "Pakistan", p.8.

According to the official spokesman (as reported in Daily Jang,London,21-1-1976) the economic assistance covered general purposes credits,as well as loans,for the implementation of priority development projects,and as such Pakistan had secured commitments of general purposes credits to the tune of 770 million dollars.Of this,Iran would contribute 150 million dollars during the next financial year i.e. 1976-77.The remaining 620 million dollars had already been received towards meeting the balance of payments needs of Pakistan.

The breakdown of these commitments was as follows: Libya 80 million dollars;Abu Dhabi 100 million dollars;Qatar 10 million dollars;Iran 580 million dollars.

Besides general purposes credits,Saudi Arabia, Libya,Iran and Abu Dhabi have further pledged a total of 391 million dollars to finance Pakistan's various projects through loans and equity participations.Out of this 84 million dollars had already been disbursed,and Pakistan expected further economic assistance from her rich friends of West Asia e.g.,Saudi Arabia has agreed to pay 30 million dollars towards the completion of the fertilizer plant at Mirpur,and Kuwait has pledged to finance the additional Tarbela-Karachi transmission line(500 KW),to the tune of 44 million dollars.

The magnitude of economic assistance clearly reflected their confidence in Pakistan's economic growth,planning and management.Moreover,Pakistan had taken concrete steps to stimulate exports to these countries,consonant with her endeavours to forge closer economic,social,cultural and political ties with the Muslim states of West Asia.

PAKISTAN

IMPORT TRADE

VALUE OF PRINCIPAL IMPORTS (RUPEES MILLIONS)
(FISCAL YEARS ENDING 30TH JUNE)

| | 1970/71* | 1971/72* | 1972/73 |
|--|----------|----------|---------|
| WHEAT | 63.2 | 269.8 | 1112.1 |
| IRON AND STEEL | 373.7 | 372.9 | 737.8 |
| PETROLEUM AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS | 262.7 | 256.5 | 649.1 |
| SUGAR AND HONEY | 0.8 | 27.4 | 431.7 |
| ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES | 193.4 | 139.8 | 398.2 |
| MANUFACTURED FERTILISERS | 117.6 | 52.8 | 389.9 |
| TEA | 11.3 | 160.5 | 336.6 |
| ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE OILS AND FATS | 181.9 | 130.8 | 329.7 |
| TEXTILE AND LEATHERS | | | |
| MACHINERY | 142.8 | 198.8 | 214.7 |
| ELECTRIC POWER MACHINERY | 87.0 | 110.3 | 164.0 |
| ELECTRIC MEDICINAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS | 55.8 | 79.5 | 120.0 |
| TOTAL, INCLUDING OTHERS. | 3602.4 | 3495.4 | 8398.3 |

* FIGURES PRIOR TO DECEMBER 1971 REFER ONLY
TO WEST PAKISTAN.

Table.2.7.

Source: Lloyds Bank Ltd. " Pakistan " Economic
Report, London, 1974.

PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF IMPORTS (RUPEES MILLIONS)

| | [*] <u>1970/71</u> | [*] <u>1971/72</u> | <u>1972/73</u> |
|----------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------|
| U.S.A. | 1029.6 | 728.8 | 2094.1 |
| WEST GERMANY | 405.8 | 344.0 | 748.7 |
| JAPAN | 358.5 | 349.6 | 721.1 |
| UNITED KINGDOM | 402.1 | 353.3 | 683.3 |
| SAUDI ARABIA | 37.9 | 92.0 | 365.9 |
| CHINA | 55.2 | 99.1 | 361.9 |

*Figures prior to December 1971 refer only
to West Pakistan.

- Table.2.8.

Source: Lloyds Bank Ltd. "Pakistan"

Economic Report, London, 1974.

In 1970-71, the value of Pakistan's total exports to the Middle Eastern countries were to the tune of 48.80 million dollars, a mere 12 per cent of her total exports. ** But in 1974-75 these figures had more than doubled since Pakistan's exports to these countries were one quarter of her total exports. The trade with Iran has been expanded in an enormous manner, for example, in 1972-73 exports to Iran stood at \$ 5,786,000 but in 1974-75 the exports had risen to \$ 60,025,000, *** an unprecedented increase. These figures more than vindicate the earlier contention that the volume of aid and trade closely approximates to the degree of political understanding and cordiality between states.

It is evident from the preceding argument that Pakistan's international trade has had to be realigned to meet the exigencies of the situation, and it responded to the new geopolitical structure on the Sub-continent. Initially the trading links with India were maintained but later on Pakistan had to reorientate her economic and commercial activities in line with her changed geopolitical interests. The first and foremost reorientation took place in 1949, when Pakistan declined to devalue her currency in line with the Indian devaluation in November 1949, and as such Pakistan took effective measures to diversify her trade links. The Korean War was a God-sent gift for Pakistan since her surplus of cereals and raw material was readily purchased, and Pakistan was fully compensated for the loss of traditional Indian market. Moreover, Pakistan developed a comprehensive inter-provincial trade on permanent lines which effectively diminished and neutralised the importance of the Indian market.

** All these figures have been taken from Daily Jang, London, 21-1-1976.

*** Daily Jang, London, 6-12-1975.

Pakistan has begun to emerge from the deep crisis that engulfed it in 1971, and as a result of which the unity of the state was shattered; the severed wing, East Pakistan, comprised fifteen per cent of the total area of the state. The 1961 census, population of East and West Pakistan respectively was 50,800,000 and 42,900,000. The common economy of the two parts of Pakistan, built up and progressively improved over a period of twenty-five years, was disrupted and the whole situation required totally a new look at the geographical set-up of what was left of the state, its resource base and distributable services.

The break-up of Pakistan in 1971, and the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent sovereign state brought in its fold a number of very serious problems for Pakistan, and doubts were cast at the very existence of Pakistan as an independent political entity. A number of important questions were asked with regard to the politico-economic viability of Pakistan after the loss of its eastern wing along with its massive jute earnings. In addition, Pakistan lost a very substantial market for its manufactured goods which were said to be of very inferior quality as compared to the accepted international standards.

The advent of the Bhutto Regime in the last days of 1971, brought in its wake a number of far reaching socio-economic reforms in quick successions. The change, therefore, in the economic and socio-political context in 1972 led to the replacement of the Fourth Five Year Plan (The Plan had already defaulted as a result of the East Pakistan crisis and the resultant emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state), by a series of annual plans geared to extend a more flexible response to the urgent and pressing problems of the country. The state lay split, resources had shrunk, debts were high and the external economic assistance

was in a state of suspension. Public sector had little investable capital and the private investment was very shy indeed.

The main objective, therefore, was to bring about a recovery of the battered economy in the shortest possible period. It aimed at revival and acceleration of production process based on the socio-economic reforms launched by the new Government in the first few months of 1972. The concerted effort to regain momentum of growth and production and to inject a new life in the sagging economy was, however, met with obstacles by way of severe inflationary pressures by the close of 1972-73. This had a particularly adverse effect on the country's efforts to raise earnings through the expansion in her exports.

The task in 1973-74 was to strengthen the process and consolidate the measures adopted for economic recovery during 1972-73. The idea was to achieve a semblance of stability and to make the economy broad based, while initiating a strong anti-inflationary policy. The results achieved were encouraging in spite of the huge losses suffered due to the disastrous floods that ravaged the country in August 1973.

Some of the targets achieved were: wheat 8.5 million tons, rice 2.4 million tons, sugar cane 22.7 million tons and cotton 3.7 million tons.

The economic progress, therefore, has to be examined in the light of the new problems that have emerged in Pakistan's economy as a result of changing trends in the world price situation. The prices of the country's major exports are no longer rising. As a matter of fact, a reversal of the earlier gains in prices of Pakistan's major exports began towards the latter part of 1973-74 in the midst of slackening demand from major trading partners.

On the other hand, Pakistan was required to bear a very

heavy burden arising from rising prices of major import items—the heaviest being that of oil and oil products which directly raised the national energy bill, and indirectly affected the cost of items which are influenced by petroleum prices as raw material or energy input. The balance of payments which had shown signs of favourable emergence, registered a sharp adverse swing. There were, as a result lesser resources for consumption and saving and far lesser opportunities of employment.

The current economic strategy is aimed at short term revival of the national economy within the framework of distributional justice in a balanced setting, the Annual Plan 1974-75 aims at initiating programmes and policies which would tackle longer term problems. It also endeavours to coordinate the strategy of the annual plan with that of the more comprehensive Five Year Plan.

The major problem facing the economic development in Pakistan is to overcome the impact of the world energy crisis and the resultant inflation. This demands not only an interim solution in the shape of efforts to maintain a viable balance of payments, mobilise higher domestic saving and obtain larger foreign inflow, but also a strategy to strengthen the domestic economic base with particular emphasis on sectors where Pakistan's vulnerability has been exposed in the recent world developments.

The basic economic strategy, therefore, is primarily geared to augment agricultural production, develop domestic resources, reduce dependence on external assistance and provide increased benefits to the common man.

It is quite clear (from the preceding pages) that Pakistan has managed to cope with the new geopolitical structure in spite of the overwhelming difficulties, especially since the state was dismembered in 1971, and the direction of her socio-economic and political development " is a response to the prophets of doom who were predicting the total demise of Pakistan after its eastern wing had been lopped off, and to those who castigated Pakistan for exploiting the riches of East Pakistan, and were suggesting that Pakistan with the loss of its " colony " could not survive economically as a viable state."⁶

6. *ibid.* p. 8.

EXPORT TRADE

VALUE OF PRINCIPAL EXPORTS (RUPEES MILLIONS)

(FISCAL YEARS)

| | * 1970/71 | * 1971/72 | 1972/73 |
|------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|---------|
| TEXTILE YARN AND THREAD | 357.5 | 606.3 | 1977.7 |
| COTTON FABRICS WOVEN | 311.3 | 387.1 | 1247.1 |
| COTTON RAW | 285.3 | 982.5 | 1199.7 |
| RICE | 173.0 | 274.1 | 1136.1 |
| LEATHER | 107.0 | 173.5 | 544.9 |
| FLOOR COVERINGS AND TAPESTORIES | 66.7 | 109.8 | 282.4 |
| FISH, FRESH AND PRESERVED. | 52.9 | 96.8 | 192.5 |
| ANIMAL FEEDING STUFFS. | 15.2 | 13.2 | 148.1 |
| RE-EXPORTS | 112.4 | 51.8 | 72.3 |
| TOTAL, INCLUDING OTHERS. | 2110.8 | 3423.2 | 8623.5 |

* FIGURES PRIOR TO DECEMBER 1971 REFER ONLY TO WEST PAKISTAN.

Table.2.9.

Source: Lloyds Bank Ltd. " Pakistan " Economic
Report, London, 1974.

DESTINATIONS OF EXPORTS (RUPEES MILLIONS)

| | 1970/71 | 1971-72 | 1972-73 |
|----------------|---------|---------|---------|
| JAPAN | 194.6 | 540.1 | 1562.1 |
| HONG KONG | 246.5 | 505.2 | 961.0 |
| INDONESIA | 30.3 | 50.3 | 659.0 |
| UNITED KINGDOM | 188.3 | 259.3 | 630.2 |
| ITALY | 63.5 | 125.3 | 434.4 |
| U.S.A. | 126.5 | 174.29 | 348.8 |
| WEST GERMANY | 61.7 | 105.3 | 305.9 |
| SINGAPORE | 60.8 | 61.3 | 295.8 |
| U.S.S.R. | 162.0 | 135.8 | 222.6 |
| SRI LANKA | 57.9 | 65.3 | 205.3 |

FIGURES PRIOR TO DECEMBER 1971 REFER
ONLY TO WEST PAKISTAN.

Table.3.1.

Source: Lloyds Bank Ltd. "Pakistan"

Economic Report, London, 1974.

CHAPTER 5.

Analysis of Each Problem of External
Relationship.

Pakistan's external relations have throughout been formulated on the basis of sovereign equality of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Since religion formed the *raison d'etre* of Pakistan's territoriality as an independent sovereign state, one of the cornerstones of Pakistan's external relationship has been the development and further strengthening of the close political, social, economic and cultural bonds with the Muslim states of West Asia. Two of the Sixteen " Directive Principles of State Policy" as enunciated by the second report of the Basic principles Committee (presented on December 22, 1952, by Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din, the Pakistan Prime Minister, to the Constituent Assembly) embodied (a) "strengthening the bonds of unity between Muslim countries ", and (b) " promotion of peace and goodwill among the peoples of the world ".¹

Since the establishment of Pakistan, however, there have been a number of external problems which have haunted this nascent state. The most significant of these are discussed below.

The Kashmir Dispute.

The Kashmir dispute is more specific locationally than the general attitude of India towards Pakistan, and it is complex in detail. It is essential, therefore, to trace the history and geography of the dispute with great care.

1. The Basic Principles Committee Report, Karachi, 1952.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir has an area of 84,571 square miles which is only slightly smaller in area than the U.K. According to the Census Report of 1941, the population of the State was 4,021,616 i.e. four fifths of Lancashire. The following figures give a comparative percentage of the various communities in the State :

| Name of Province. | Total Population. | Muslims | Non-Muslims |
|--------------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Jammu | 1,981,433 | 1,215,676 | 765,757 |
| Kashmir | 1,728,705 | 1,615,478 | 113,227 |
| Frontier Districts | 311,478 | 270,093 | 41,385 |

These figures clearly indicate Muslim majorities in all three major divisions of the State though the Indians now claim a clear cut non-Muslim majority in Jammu (According to the 1961 figures published in India, Muslims constitute 38 percent and Hindus 59 percent of the population). This change can be explained first by the continuing emigration of Muslims to Pakistan and, secondly, by planned settlement of Hindus and Sikhs by the Indian authorities in order to strengthen their claims.

"The State occupies a strategic position in the extreme north-western corner of the Indian subcontinent. Not only does it have common borders with India and Pakistan, but also with the Chinese controlled regions of Tibet and Sinkiang, and for a shorter stretch, with Afghanistan as well. Less than fifty miles of unpopulated mountains separates the extreme north-western tip of the State from the territory of the Soviet Union."¹

1. Lamb, Alastair, Crisis in Kashmir: 1947-1966, London, 1966, p. 17.

The Kashmir dispute seems to have been engendered, in the absence of a precise understanding among the ~~div~~ devisers of the partition plan of 1947, in the Hindu obduracy which has failed to accept the "two nations theory" and in the Hindu "refusal to recognise the full implications of Pakistan". Had the Radcliffe Award been pronounced on the majority/contiguous basis and had the District of Gurdaspur (A Muslim majority area) been transferred to Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute would have been nipped in the bud.

The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 ended the British Paramountcy over the Princely States, which were given the choice to accede either to Pakistan or India. The Maharaja of Kashmir failed to reach a ^{positive} decision to this effect though he signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan on 12-15 August, 1947, but no such agreement was exchanged with India. The massacre of Muslims in the State and the District of Poonch by the Hindus and the Dogra Forces resulted in a popular uprising. The tribal Pathans from the North Western Frontiers of Pakistan entered the State on 24th and 25th October, 1947, with the hope of saving their brethren from genocide. On 25th October, 1947, Lord Mountbatten presided over a meeting of the Indian Defence Committee in which it was decided to send V.P. Menon to Srinagar to negotiate the accession of Kashmir to India. Menon flew back and forth, and during his second trip to the State capital, he succeeded in obtaining the Instrument of Accession on 26th October, 1947, and on 27th October a Sikh Battalion was flown into Srinagar; this began the Indian occupation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

The entry of the Indian forces in spite of the Instrument of Accession is difficult to justify since the Standstill Agreement had entrusted the defence, foreign affairs and communications to Pakistan. More important still the letter accepting the Instrument of Accession on behalf of the Indian Government clearly established the right of the people to self determination... in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute.... it is my Government's wish that...the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people."²

Pandit Nehru emphasised the same point in a telegram sent to Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, on October 28th, 1947... In regard to accession also it has been made clear that this is subject to reference to people of State and their decision..."³ The promise was repeated in Nehru's radio broadcast of November 2, 1947. "We have decided that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not, and cannot back out of it. We are prepared...to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nation..."⁴ These promises and pledges abundantly establish the interim nature of the Indian occupation

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2. Lakhanpal, P.,., Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute, New Delhi, 1965, p.57
 3. White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi 1948, p. 48.
 4. Ibid., pp. 52-5.

of the State, and the right of its people to decide their future in a fair and free plebiscite. The Indian leaders committed themselves unequivocally to the right of the Kashmiris to self determination. This was further endorsed by the Security Council of the United Nations in a resolution passed on April 21st, 1948...Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided through the democratic method of free and impartial plebiscite."⁵

There is no denying the fact that considerable economic progress has been achieved in Pakistan and although the socio-economic problems facing Pakistan have scarcely been so vast and complex as those of India, it is perhaps not surprising that she should have sought to strengthen her position in the 1950s by securing economic assistance from the United States. To India this seemed to threaten the delicate structure of her version of non-alignment which she was endeavouring to build and as such her immediate reaction was to wriggle out of her international commitment vis-a-viz a fair and free plebiscite in Kashmir. Kashmir is of greater economic value to Pakistan than to India since much of the irrigation of the Punjab and the Lower Indus Plains depends on the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab; the Pir Panjal foothills supplied much timber to the Punjab and there are enormous resources of hydro-electric power (Mangla Dam & Tarbella Dam), anthracite,

bauxite, iron ore - marginal to India's needs but perhaps sufficient to make all that difference to Pakistan's future industrial development. The natural economic and geostratigic links of Kashmir are decidedly with Pakistan.

The Indus Waters

"The Indus gave India its name. Now it is to give India a large portion of the waters of its eastern tributaries. This is provided for in the recent Indus Waters Treaty which took twelve years to negotiate and will take ten years to implement."⁶ The Indus Waters Dispute originated in the partition of the Punjab (Land of five rivers) in 1947, and quickly became critical when, on April 1, 1948, the flow of canal water from East-Punjab (India) to West-Punjab (Pakistan) was cut off.

The Indus Waters Treaty was signed on September 19, 1960, between Pakistan, India and the World Bank. The treaty provided that the three western rivers the Indus, Jhelum and the Chenab were to be used exclusively by Pakistan, and India was to be allowed their use only for domestic, non-consumptive and agricultural purposes and for the generation of hydro-electric power. India was given the exclusive right over the three eastern rivers the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej. Pakistan was authorised to use the eastern rivers for "domestic and non-consumptive" purposes. In addition Pakistan was given the right, for agricultural development, to use the waters of Basantar, Bein, Tarnah and Ujh tributaries of the Ravi. Pakistan is

6. Mueenuddin, G. Indus Waters Treaty, Lahore, 1960, p.7

authorized to withdraw from the Basantar' such waters as may be available and necessary to irrigate not more than 100 acres annually...may also withdraw... for Sailab cultivation of as much area on each of the four tributaries Basantar, Bein, Tarnah and Ujh, as was cultivated on 1st April, 1960, and which cannot be so cultivated after that date, to maximum of 14,000 acres on Basantar, 26,600 acres on Bein, 1,800 acres on Tarnah and 3,000 on Ujh annually. If, however, there are extraordinary floods during any year then Sailab cultivation may be extended beyond these limits. The treaty does not give Pakistan any rights to any releases by India in the tributaries of the Ravi or Sutlej..."⁷

Both Pakistan and India agreed to cooperate in the effective implementation of the treaty and accepted their responsibilities in the setting up of "hydrological and meteorological observation stations within the drainage basins", and to give early warnings on the flood levels of the rivers. The two countries also agreed to set up a commission of experts to deal with any disputes; and further agreed to refer any such dispute to a "Neutral Expert" in case there was a difference of opinion between the two.

The Indus Waters Treaty was accompanied by other agreements regarding the replacement works and the financial requirements. Although India was required under the financial arrangements to provide \$62 millions,

7. Ibid., p.9.

she was not allowed to participate in the decision-making that affected the replacement works, (Figs:below). The treaty provided that in case of request from Pakistan for the extension of the interim period the Bank will pay the following money to India:

| | | |
|------|-------------|-------------------------|
| i) | One Year | £3,125,000 |
| ii) | Two Years | £6,406,250 |
| iii) | Three Years | £9,850,000 ⁸ |

The Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement was put into effect on October 1, 1960, and accordingly the signatories agreed to make the following contributions:


| | | |
|--------|----------------|-------------------------------------|
| Grants | Australia | 6,965,000 Australian Pounds |
| | Germany | 126,000,000 Marks |
| | Canada | 22,100,000 Canadian Dollars |
| | New Zealand | 1,000,000 New Zealand Pounds |
| | United Kingdom | 20,860,000 Pounds Sterling |
| | U.S.A. | 177,000,000 U.S.Dollars |
| Loans | U.S.A. | 70,000,000 U.S.Dollars |
| | World Bank | 80,000,000 U.S.Dollars ⁹ |

Pakistan also agreed to make contributions in foreign currency (£440,000) and in Pakistani currency equal to £9,850,000. The Indus Waters Treaty provided broad terms for future cooperation between Pakistan and India, and it was hoped that the two countries would sincerely initiate concerted efforts towards a peaceful settlement of their disputes, but the hope has yet to materialise.

8. Ibid. p. 16

9. Ibid

Fig:26



THE INDUS BASIN : The Indus Waters Treaty.

Junagadh and Manavadar

The accession of Junagadh and Manavadar to Pakistan on September 5, 1947 engendered further bitterness between Pakistan and India. Junagadh was a small state on the very tip of the Kathiawar peninsula. It had an area of 3,337 square miles, and a population of approximately 670,000, and more than 80 per cent were Hindus. The state was contiguous to Pakistan only by sea. a distance of approximately 300 miles between Karachi and the state. Legally speaking the ruler was right in taking his decision to join Pakistan since it was fully in conformity with the basic principles of the partition, but it was very much a questionable decision since it clearly violated the majority/contiguous bases and totally ignored the interests of the majority. The Indians were equally wrong to have forcefully occupied the state in violation of the Instrument of Accession which had already been exchanged between the State of Pakistan:" On November 1, the enclaves of Babariawad and Mongrol were taken over by Indian forces. Manavadar had already been occupied by India some days earlier. On November 7, , , , 20,000 men with not a viable country and when they have got what's left we'll ensure that it can't be worked economically."¹⁰ Hindus preached for "Akhand Bharat" and the Congress had accepted partition in anguish and in anger. They were frustrated in their designs of a united India and were shocked at having failed to rejuvenate the Maurayan or Ashoka Empire. They were bitterly disappointed at the non-fulfilment of their

10.

Sir Francis Tucker, While Memoray Serves, London, 1950, p. 257.

dreams of being a great power of the future: "The Pacific is likely to take the place of the Atlantic in the future as a nerve centre of the world. Though not directly a Pacific state, India will inevitably exercise an important influence there. India will also develop as the centre of economic and political activity in the Indian Ocean area, in South East Asia and right up to the Middle East. Her position gives an economic and strategic importance in a part of the world which is going to develop rapidly in the future...the small national state is doomed. It may survive as a culturally autonomous area but not as independent political unit."¹¹

These principles seem to be entrenched in the foreign policy of India as an independent state, especially, when one reviews her attitude towards smaller neighbouring states such as Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. India seems to have nursed the same designs regarding Pakistan and, therefore, has never hesitated totally to reject Pakistani policies, and it appears (from previous pages) as if the Congress had calculated to this effect immediately before the partition and no wonder that only 72 days were earmarked for the partition: " I agreed to partition as a last resort, when we should have lost all...Mr. Jinnah did not want a truncated Pakistan but he had to swallow it. I made a further condition that in two months' time power should be transferred."¹² Indians, from the beginning, had thought of subordinating the policies of Pakistan especially in foreign affairs: "The Commonwealth issue is looming large.

11. Jawahar Lal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, Bombay, 1961, pp. 569-70.

12. Quoted in Kewal L. Panjabi, *The Indomitable Sardar*, Bombay, 1962, p. 124.

There has been a fair indication of Patel's policy on this subject in the leading article of today's Hindustan Times. Ismay drew attention to the relevant extract, which runs as follows: If there is a settlement between the Congress and the League as a result of which the Muslim majority areas are allowed to constitute themselves into separate sovereign States, we have no doubt that Union will not stand in the way of British establishing contact with those States. It must be clearly understood, however, that the Indian Union will consider it a hostile act if there is any attempt by Britain to conclude any treaty or alliance involving military or political clauses."¹³ These words clearly indicate that the Hindu leadership was bent upon treating Pakistan as the secessionist part of "Mother India" which must be treated as the Indiansphere of influence. India prided herself as the only successor to the British Crown in India and has tried hard to realise this claim. Foreign observers noted this element of the Indian foreign policy at the time of the acceptance of the U.S. military aid by Pakistan in 1954 "Every conceivable argument against the offer and Pakistan's acceptance of it was adduced, every device of organized propandanda applied...But what it all amounted to, and at the higher levels of the Indian Foreign Office it can hardly have remained subconscious, was that, in the average Hindu heart even now, years after mutually-accepted partition, Pakistan as an independent state had no real right to exist; she must not devise a foreign

13. Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, p.72.

London Hale, 1972.

policy of her own; her destiny was to be an Indian satellite."¹⁴

The former president of Pakistan has stated similar views in his autobiography while discussing the essential features of the Indian foreign policy "At the back of it all was India's ambition to absorb Pakistan or turn her into a satellite." This is further vindicated by India's ready acceptance of the U.S. and Commonwealth military aid (including an "air umbrella") in 1962, when she suffered setback in the disputed McMahon Line. India was not ashamed to have accepted so graciously, the very aid for which she had so ruthlessly criticised Pakistan on the pretext that Pakistan had brought the cold war and tension in the area. The irony of it was that India had entered into a "Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement" with U.S.A. in 1951. The agreement was reached through an exchange of letters between Mr. James E. Webb, the Acting Secretary of State, and Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, the Indian Ambassador in Washington. On March 7, 1951, Mr. Webb wrote "The Government of the United States of America understands that the Government of India is prepared....to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defence...to participate in the defence of the area of which it is a part, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state."¹⁵ To this Mrs. Pandit replied: " I have the honour to inform you

14. Ian Stephens, Pakistan, Aylesbury, 1964, pp.267-268

15. United States Treaties and other International Agreements, Department of State, Washington D.C. Vol. 2. Part I, 1951, p. 872.

that the Government of India are in agreement with the terms, conditions and assurances proposed."¹⁶ Pakistan entered into the mutual assistance agreement openly, India satisfied her wishes in a more subtle manner to further shroud her posture of non-alignment. It would not be wrong to suggest here that India took the initiative in stirring up the trouble with the Chinese, "General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated in a secret Congressional testimony made public here today that India might have started the border fight with Communist China."¹⁷

17A

The Nehru move against the Chinese in 1962 was calculated to secure massive military and economic assistance from all sides; and as a result India reaped a rich harvest in the shape of western military aid of which the emergency aid alone is reported to have amounted to approximately \$ 120 millions. But Nehru also succeeded in creating bigger gulfs between his countrymen and the Chinese who had once been acclaimed as brothers (The Indian slogan: Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai). In essence his China policy failed him and his non-aligned posture, which had already been described as "alignment with both the super-blocks" and "immoral". G.W. Chaudhury has given a good analysis of Nehru's ambition in South Asia: "Nehru seemed to be sensitive to anything in South Asia of which he was not the architect. India wants to establish a "sphere of influence" in South Asia."¹⁸ For achieving his

16. ibid. p. 874

17. New York Times, 16-12-1962.

18. Chaudhury, G.W. Pakistan Relations with India, London, 1968, p. 4.

17A. It would not be out of place to suggest here that the Indians were confident at the time that the Chinese would not retaliate in an overwhelming fashion to counter the Indian moves in the area.

ambitions to be the inspired and undisputed leader of South Asia. Nehru had set his eyes on Pakistan with a view either to total reannexation or to reincorporation in an Indian dominated confederal structure. "As late as 1963, Nehru regarded Pakistan as an area which should be reincorporated into an Indian dominated confederation."¹⁹

In spite of the Indian Foreign Office declaration that "Pakistan has come to stay as ^a viable political and economic entity,"²⁰ it is very difficult to envisage a real change of heart on the part of Hindus and the Indian hierarchy. The former president Ayub of Pakistan has explained the Indian concept of "Akhand Bharat" and "Bharat Varsha" in the following lines: "The Indian theoreticians were claiming boundaries from the Oxus to the Mekong...India was not content with her present sphere of influence and she knew Pakistan had the will... to frustrate her....designs. She wanted to browbeat us into subservience. All we wanted was to live as equal and honourable neighbours, but to that India would never agree. It was Brahmin...arrogance that forced us to seek a homeland of our own where we could order our life according to our own thinking and faith...There was the fundamental opposition between the ideologies of India and Pakistan. The whole Indian society was based on class distinction in which even the shadow of a low-caste man was enough to pollute a member of the high caste."²¹

19.

Tager, F.N. *The United States and Pakistan: A Failure of Diplomacy*

20.

The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 27-8-1967.

21.

Ayub, Friends not masters, p. 172.

ORBIS, Vol. 14
No. 3. 1965

The Pukhtunistan Issue

In 1947, when Pakistan succeeded to the international rights and obligations of the Crown in India, she naturally assumed the legality and established validity of the Durand Line. But Afghanistan considered it an opportune moment to question the established frontiers because it was their view that Pakistan as a newly emergent state did not automatically succeed to the rights of the Crown in India since these, the Afghans believed, had lapsed with the transfer of powers on August 15, 1947. In the wake of her claims Afghanistan voted against the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations, thus casting the only negative vote.

At the same time the Afghan government demanded the creation of Pukhtunistan (Land of the Pathans). The Pakistan government rejected the idea and pledged to defend her territorial integrity. She has been fully supported by the U.K. and the overwhelming majority of other countries. Mr. Noel-Baker, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, on June 30, 1949 stated: "It is His Majesty's Government's view that Pakistan is in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Government of India...in these territories, and that Durand Line is the international frontier."²² This view was further affirmed by the British Prime Minister on March 1, 1956, "In 1947, Pakistan came into existence as a new, sovereign, independent member of the Commonwealth. Her Majesty's Government regard her as having, with the full

22. Parliamentary Papers, Commons. 1948-49 Vol. 466, p. 1491-92.

consent of the overwhelming majority of the Pushtu speaking peoples concerned...succeeded to the exercise of the powers formerly exercised by the Crown in India on the North-West Frontier of the subcontinent. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully support the Government of Pakistan in maintaining their sovereignty over the areas east of the Durand Line and in regarding this Line as the international frontier with Afthanistan..."²³

The validity of the Pakistani claim has also been upheld by the S.E.A.T.O. members: "The members of the Council severally declared that their Governments recognized that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line, the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan."²⁴

" PUKHTUNISTAN " Fig:28

From the Pakistani point of view the successive Afghan governments, have tried at times, to elicit support in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province. Some elements in these provinces, who are at odds with Pakistan and sympathize with the Afghan claims, clearly draw their support from without and as such hope that these two provinces might secede from Pakistan. It is an indication, not of the weakness of the scheme, but of the incoherence and inconsistency of their case, and that there is no viable single definition or definite approach to explain the extent or validity of their claim. Some speak of

23. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1955-56, Vol. 549, p. 1367.

24. Keesings Contemporary Archives, Bristol, 1956, p. 14840A

Pakistan and her Northern Neighbours

Fig: 27





Fig: 28

The " Pakhtunistan " Claim



"Greater Baluchistan" and others of "Pukhtunistan" and, except in rare cases, they have avoided defining the territories of "Pukhtunistan". It has been defined at various times as a state stretching from Jhelum to the oxus, Margalla to the Oxus, N.W.F.P. renamed "Pukhtunistan" within Pakistan, a new country comprising both N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, or a greater Afghan state going upto the Arabian Sea with the Indus as its eastern border, "Pustoonistan", an illdefined area which would seem to include the Pakistani provinces of the North West Frontier (NWFP) and Baluchistan. Afghanistan, with some help from dissident Pushtoon tribesmen and leaders, argued that this vast territory should not form part of Pakistan... it should be recognized as the national territory of the Pushtoons...While the Afghans are still unclear on the details, the proposed Pushtoonistan would in some way be united with Afghanistan. This would mean that the new expanded Afghanistan would have not only a solid Pushtoon majority to match her Pushtoon ruling class but also direct access to the sea (via non-Pushtoon Baluchistan) instead of depending on Pakistani (or Soviet) facilities."²⁵

To the most vociferous group "Greater Baluchistan" means the incorporation of Pakistani Baluchistan, the Jacobabad Kashmore areas of Sind, the Dera Ghazi Khan area of the Pakistani Punjab, a slice of NWFP, and all of Baluchistan's Pathan majority areas in pockets adjoining NWFP. The territory demanded from Pakistan constitutes less than half the area claimed on the map.

25. The World Today, London, January 1974, pp.26-27.

The remaining area would draw the Afghan territory of Farah and parts of Helmand Valley and good part of Iran, especially the entire length and breadth of Iranian Baluchistan. Its western boundary would run from Lingeh on the Gulf coast of Turkemenistan (U.S.S.R.) covering Kerman, Zarind, and Turbat-i-Haideri, and its southern extremities would encompass approximately a thousand miles from Lingeh along the Gulf Coast to to Sonmiani near Karachi, Pakistan. As stated earlier there is no precise territorial definition of "Pukhtunistan" and no coherent lines of demarcation. A postage stamp issued by the Afghanistan Government shows this map covering the territory of Baluchistan, blotting out its name and calling the whole area "Pukhtunistan."²⁶

These inconsistencies do not end with territory. They extend to arguments, supposedly on ethnic grounds, advanced in favour of the claims made by Afghanistan on Pakistan territories. While Mr. Abdul Wali Khan, the leader of the National Awami Party and his colleagues vehemently support the idea of four nationalities, the father of Mr. Abdul Wali Khan (Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan) has advocated very interesting ideas. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in his "Pukhtunistan Day" speech in 1967 and in his autobiography written for him by Mr. Kanwar Bhan Norang, has stated that all Tajiks, Hazaras, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Baluchis and Pathans, whether they speak Pushto or not, should in effect forget their separate identities and call themselves Pukhtuns, living in a state extending from Amu Darya (OXUS RIVER), to the West as far as Herat²⁷

26. Government of Pakistan, White Paper on Baluchistan.

27. Government of Pakistan, White Paper on Baluchistan.

Major Ethno-Linguistic Groups in the Northern Tier

| Group | Afghanistan | Iran | Pakistan | Total | Comment |
|-----------------|-------------|------|----------|------------|---|
| | % | % | % | (millions) | |
| Punjabis | | | 63.1 | 36.6 | Educated speakers use Urdu |
| Persians | 11 | 66.9 | | 16.6 | Shia Muslims. |
| Pushtoons | 41 | | 13.1 | 7.6 | Dominant in Afghanistan:tribal |
| Sindhis | | | 11.9 | 6.9 | Most educated use Urdu |
| Azeris | | 20.6 | | 5.2 | Also in Azerbaidzhan,U.S.S.R. |
| Urdu Speakers | | | 7.2 | 4.2 | Official language of Pakistan. |
| Tajiks | 22 | | | 3.5 | Linguistically close to Persian, Sunni. |
| Baluchis | 2 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.3 | Mainly tribal |
| Hazaras | 12.5 | | | 2.0 | Shia-Persian-dialect,Mongolian |
| Uzbeks | 9 | | | 1.8 | Tribal.Uzbek S.S.R. |
| Turkoman | 8 | 1.7 | | 1.4 | Tribal.Turkmen.S.S.R. |
| Kurds | | 5.6 | | 1.3 | Tribal.Iraq, Syria,Turkey. |
| Brauhi | 0.7 | | 0.9 | 0.6 | Tribal.Baluch. |
| Arabs | | 2.0 | | 0.5 | Khuzistan. |
| Kirghiz | 2 | | | 0.3 | Tribal.Kirghizia. |
| Total(Millions) | 16 | 25 | 55 | | |

Source: Stephen Oren, The World Today, January 1974, p.27.

Table.3.2.

and to the south as far the Jhelum River. Surprising enough, whereas Ghaffar Khan advocates unity amongst different nationalities inhabiting different territories, he openly supports the concept of four nationalities as advocated by Khan Wali Khan and their right to self-determination. This is construed by the Government of Pakistan as preaching secession of NWFP and Baluchistan from the federation of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan believed that Afghanistan with the help of dissidents in NWFP and Baluchistan was sowing the seeds of secession over a wider area and endeavoured to attract support and sympathy for secessionists in the areas, hoping that the process might engender a process of simultaneous secessions and the eventual dismemberment of Pakistan. The strategy seemed to have been geared, according to the Pakistani point of view, towards concurrent and not consecutive action, so as to establish the fall of "dominos" at once rather than in broken successions, "Kabul's position has never been clearly stated, but it appears to be a straightforward irrendentist claim to the Pathan-inhabited areas of the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan though usually cloaked in the more respectable guise of a plea for "self-determination for the Pathans.... India has not publicly supported Kabul's position on Pakhtunistan- as the Pathan areas of Pakistan are sometimes called -but Delhi has made it abundantly clear that its sympathies lie with Afghanistan."28

28. The Times, London, May 31, 1974.

"Pukhtunistan" The covert Iraqi Involvement.

It is desirable to observe here that the Embassy of Iraq played a very undiplomatic role in Pakistan when large stores of arms were discovered in Islamabad after the Pakistani authorities had forced their way into the Embassy. The Pakistan Government has accused Iraq of being party to an anti-Pakistan conspiracy following the recovery yesterday of large stocks of arms and ammunition, mostly of Soviet origin, from the Iraq Chancellery here. The Iraq Ambassador, Mr. Hikmat Suleiman, has been declared persona non grata and the Pakistan Ambassador in Baghdad has been recalled...What was described as a veritable arsenal was discovered in the Iraq Embassy. It included 300 submachine guns and carbines, 40,000 rounds of ammunition, 40 incendiary bombs and equipment for training in guerilla warfare."²⁹ According to the Pakistani point of view the arms were destined for Baluchistan where dissident tribes were engaged in sabotage and as such "...arms and ammunition imported by the Iraq Embassy under diplomatic cover were meant for distribution among elements "within and outside" Pakistan who sought to subvert the security and tranquility of the country....The authorities here have been concerned for some time about the Iraq-based movement for Free Baluchistan which, according to informed sources, sought to establish an independent state comprising the adjoining Baluchi-inhabited areas of Pakistan and Iran."³⁰ A careful analysis would reveal that the point of view as propounded by Pakistan should

30. The Times, February 12, 1973.

only be taken as half-truth. There is no denying the fact that some of the arms were definitely meant for Pakistani Baluchistan but the rest were destined for the Iranian Baluchistan, especially the areas of Sistan, Kuhiri, Konarak and Chah Bahar (a sprawling military/ naval base). This would seem to be in line with the Iraqi thinking who ^{were} ~~have been~~ annoyed with the Iranian attitude towards the Kurdish problems, and Iraq ~~has~~ openly accused Iran of giving large scale arms and sanctuary to the Kurdish insurgents. The Iraqi arms were meant to support the idea of "Greater Baluchistan" and were especially meant to subvert peace and security in Iranian Baluchistan that naturally involved Pakistan. This line of thinking is partly shared by the Economist; "The smuggled arms might have been meant to end upon the hands of guerillas not in Pakistan but in the Arab emirates of the Gulf, or in Iranian Baluchistan. The Iraqis have undoubtedly been striving to foment revolution in the emirates and to make as much trouble as they can for the Shah. They have financed, and provided guerilla training and an office in Baghdad for, a Baluchi "liberation movement" in Iran."³¹

31. The Economist, February 17, 1973.

The hope of Afghanistan succeeding in her designs were influenced by Indian propanganda suggesting that Pakistan's life as an independent state was likely to be short. The Afghan rulers were convinced that Pakistan was a weak state, which could hardly survive the socio-economic and political strains of the immediate future. Therefore, they advanced their claims with the hope of reaping a rich harvest after the demise of Pakistan. The Afghan government laid claims for an integral part of Pakistan where people had declared their allegiance, in overwhelming majority, to the newly born state in a free and democratic manner: "On 15th August, 1947, after a plebiscite, the Frontier Province, with every sign of enthusiasm, became a part of Pakistan. And in November of the same year this lead was followed by all the tribes upto Durand Line (Figs: 3,4.) and the Chiefs of the Four Frontier States of Dir, Swat, Chitral and Amb, the former signifying their loyalty in open jirgas, the latter by means of Instruments of Accession."³²

Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have not followed the fraternal patterns which should have been expected between the two Muslim neighbours. In fact these have been blurred and confused because of the Afghan attitude and the outside interference. In December 1955, the Soviet Union entered the scene openly by sympathising with the Afghan claims of Pakistan's territory and the Pukhtunistan issue, Marshal Bulganin declared: ".... We think the demands of Afghanistan to give the population of Pushtunistan an opportunity of freely expressing their

will be justified and well grounded."³³ This statement apparently indicated the Soviet displeasure at the Pakistani membership of the U.S. sponsored military pacts. Again in March 1960, the Soviet Union repeated her support of the Afghan claims on Pakistan territory. The Government and people of Pakistan resented the Russian interference in the internal affairs and declared in unequivocal terms the inwoability of the territories of Pakistan. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Manzoor Qadir, stated that it was "regrettable that the Soviet Union deemed it fit to interfere in this country's internal affairs."³⁴ He further challenged the validity of the Pukhtunistan issue and invited Afghanistan to hold referendum on her side of the Durand Line, "It is reasonable to assume that Pakhtoons (Pathans) whether they live in Pakistan or Afghanistan, want to be together and under the same flag. That flag can be either the flag of Pakistan or of Afghanistan....Since a referendum has already been held among the Pakhtoons of Pakistan, who by overwhelming majority decided to be in Pakistan, it is only logical that we should now ask the Pakhtoons in Afghanistan what their wishes are..."³⁵ The Afghans have yet to accept this invitation.

The Russians had hopes of gaining concessions in the area which had become an American sphere of influence after the British withdrawal. But the immediate reason for the Soviet support in 1960 of the Afghan claim, was the

33. Ibid., p. 14654

34. Ibid, p. 17323

35. Ibid, p. 17321.

shooting down of the American spy plane U2 over Sverdlovsk, about 1100 miles inside the Russian territory. The plane had apparently flown from Peshawar in the north west of West Pakistan, and was said to have landing facilities.

(One cannot but strongly disagree with the policy of the then government of Pakistan who had allowed the flight.)

It may not be wrong to suggest that the Russians had no other immediate objectives in the region where they must seek peace in their long range interests. This point is clearly vindicated by the policy which is being pursued by the present Russian leaders who have endeavoured to placate the parties in the area. The Tashkent Agreement signed by between Pakistan and India on January 10, 1966, under the aegis of the Soviet Union is a case in point. The recent plans of organising some kind of collective security as propounded by Mr. Brezhnev is another very important element in the geopolitical developments of the region, and a pointer to the vested interests of the Soviet Union.

The attitude of the successive Afghan governments has caused innumerable hardships to the people of this landlocked country, and has at times, jeopardized the peace and tranquility of the region. The various unfriendly moves of Afghanistan eventually resulted in tough Pakistani retaliation in the Bajaur area (Fig:3,4.) of the North Western Frontier after the Afghans had committed repeated raids. Pakistan also closed the Torkham border, thus denying the Afghans access to their traditional and most natural transit route, which had been extensively used. In fact as much as 80 per cent of the Afghan trade (Figs:below) had relied upon this route.

AFGHANISTAN
PRINCIPAL DESTINATIONS OF EXPORTS (AFGHANIS MILLIONS)

| | 1966/67 | 1967/68 | 1968/69 | 1969/70 |
|----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| U.S.S.R. | 1,608 | 1,668 | 1,978 | 2,321 |
| INDIA | 636 | 816 | 1,174 | 1,200 |
| UNITED KINGDOM | 702 | 805 | 553 | 965 |
| PAKISTAN | 400 | 416 | 427 | 401 |
| SWITZERLAND | 227 | 284 | 223 | 348 |
| U.S.A. | 408 | 420 | 342 | 185 |
| LEBANON | 76 | 144 | 179 | 133 |

AFS 45 = U.S.\$ 1
AFS 210 = £ 1

Table.3.3.

Source: Lloyds Bank Ltd. "Afghanistan" Economic Report, London, 1972.

Source: Lloyds Bank Ltd. " Afghanistan " Economic Report, London, 1972.

Table.3.4.

| | AFGHANISTAN | | | |
|----------------------------|--|---------|---------|---------|
| | PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF IMPORTS (AFGHANIS MILLIONS) | | | |
| | 1966/67 | 1967/68 | 1968/69 | 1969/70 |
| U.S.S.R. | 6,044 | 5,026 | 3,561 | 3,146 |
| JAPAN | 715 | 803 | 892 | 1,100 |
| INDIA | 507 | 478 | 850 | 863 |
| PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA | 228 | 424 | 690 | 791 |
| U.S.A. | 1944 | 1341 | 784 | 527 |
| WEST GERMANY | 550 | 847 | 838 | 525 |
| UNITED KINGDOM | 165 | 271 | 238 | 391 |

AFS 45 = U.S.\$ 1

AFS 210 = £ 1

The relations between the two countries were normalised as a result of the efforts of Mohammad Reza Pehalavi, the Shahinshah of Persia. The Torkham route was reopened on July 20, 1963, and the Afghan trade was allowed to operate once again. Fortunately for both the countries the relations were considerably improved after the exist of Prime Minister Daud Khan, a cousin of the King, from the Afghan scene. A transit trade agreement was signed on March 9, 1964, and since then relations tended to be quite cordian in spite of occasional qualms in Afghanistan, which merely reflected the internal situation of that country.

The Reassertion of the Afghan Claim.

The coup-d -état in Afghanistan and the installation of the Daud Regime in Afghanistan has made things very difficult for Pakistan, especially since President Daud singled out Pakistan as the only country with whom Afghanistan had territorial dispute. To this effect the Afghan Government has been sympathetic towards the dissident groups in Baluchistan and NWFP, in an effort to influence Pakistani domestic policies in these provinces with the hope that the National Awami Party supported by the Jameet-Ulema-e-Islam headed by Mufti Mahmood would be encouraged to seek more militant solution to the political problems in NWFP and Baluchistan and as such force the hand of Pakistan. Pakistan's reaction to such soliciting from Afghanistan has been moderate to say the least, but the situation might get out of hand if Afghanistan did not stop in supporting the dissidents in Baluchistan and NWFP. Pakistan does not necessarily have to take military action, because of her economic

preponderance over Afghanistan, a landlocked country, whose 80 per cent of the trade is conducted through Karachi. Pakistan has and would, if need be, take economic measures against Afghanistan and deny her access to Karachi, which according to the latest U.N. agreement would be considered aggression against Afghanistan.

The importance of the north-western entry where the mountain core of Asia narrows to approximately 250 miles between Oxus and Indus and the Hindu Kush has practicable passes through which both the religions zealots and soldiers have travelled. However, the first Muslim landing on the subcontinent was in the Mekran Coast when Mohammad Bin Qasim landed in Sind in 711. Although during this day and age the Chinese domination of Tibet has revitalized a long - dormant frontier, the Northwest remains the major geostrategic area which would increasingly be under pressure from the interested parties. "The Frontier" of the old Indian Empire was simply on the northwest and more specifically with Afghanistan; all of this has been inherited by Pakistan. The boundary with Iran has posed no problems, but an extension of Soviet influence into the erstwhile British/U.S. sphere of influence in Southern Iran would pose serious problems, especially if and when the Soviet Union embarked upon a policy to project and demonstrate her interests as a "continental and oceanic Superpower". Pakistani Baluchistan marches along Southern Afghanistan

and Southern Iran is open to tribal movement across the border and as such open to subversion; and an effective control of the Quetta-Peshawar-Kabul-Kandahar quadrilateral could only be effected by one single political administration, and therefore, an open temptation to the parties concerned. This frontier is, therefore, very much alive and a potential zone of hostility.

Financial hardships and the preoccupation with the Indian and Kashmir borders have in a sense added to Pakistan's difficulties in dealing with the thorny and complex problems of this region, especially in Baluchistan. But a concerted effort is being made to develop the socio-economic potentials of this area, and the discovery of iron ore and copper deposits has further strengthened the possibilities of greater economic activity in the region. The Government of Pakistan is actively working to extend the supply of Sui Gas for domestic and economic use in Baluchistan which had been denied to the province. Moreover, efforts have been made to supply fresh water in the area and as such another requirement of the province seems to have been provided for. The dismantling of the Sardari Nizam in the area would go a long way in alleviating the socio-economic plight of the people in Baluchistan and substantially reduce the international feuds and rivalries which is symptomatic to the basic ills of the province. The ^{Iran} Pakistan economic cooperation is bound to strengthen the economic fibre of the region and as such gradually eliminate poverty and backward looking socio-economic structure.

The Pukhtunistan issue backed by Afghanistan, the Soviet-American rivalry and the intertribal feuds in the

region may very well play into the hands of the Soviet Union, who would hesitate very little in capitalising the situation to her advantage, and embark on adventurous move in this geostrategic borderland in her quest for the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Pakistan's Indian Ocean interests are less direct and tangible: although she has important trading links with South-West Asia. Islamic ideology and economic ties are the real bond.

Pakistan and the Arabs.

The Arab countries have generally been sympathetic and friendly towards Pakistan, and her relations with Saudi Arabia and Jordan have been particularly good. Pakistan has always supported the Arabs especially with regard to Palestine. However these relations have been clouded and marred since Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact on September 23, 1955, because the Arab countries especially Egypt considered the Pact contrary to their interests, "Egypt was opposed to joining military alliances sponsored by the west which were contrary to her interests, and was pursuing a policy of neutrality between world blocks ...what was good for Pakistan was not necessarily good for Egypt, and that both countries had their own problems which necessitated a different approach to various problems."³⁶ The Arabs criticised the Baghdad Pact as a "western stooge" designed to disrupt and divide the Arab World. These fears may not have been totally unfounded since Pakistan's attitude, as a member of the Pact, during the Suez Crisis in 1956, was confused and illogical; and it would not be wrong to suggest that considerable damage

36. Keesings Contemporary Archives, Bristol, 1956, p. 14160

was done to Pakistan's image in the Arab World by the statement of her Prime Minister, Mr. Suhrawardy, on 23rd November, 1956, "The Suez Canal must be cleared as soon as possible and the U.N. must see to it that all hindrances and obstructions are removed. We are beginning to feel the results of its closure, and our economy will be seriously disturbed if the Canal is not cleared soon. Our entire economic policy may well have to be reorientated to meet the situation. Indeed, there are many countries who, with us, wonder what requirements of military strategy or tactics necessitated the sinking of so many ships in the Canal, thereby adversely affecting the lifeline of so many countries who depend upon it for their trade and their essential supplies."³⁷ President Nasser viewed this as anti-Egypt and anti Arab, and rejected Pakistan's earlier offer of a contingent for the United Nations Emergency Forces.

The Arabs were led to believe that Pakistan could not be a genuine friend of the Arabs so long as she remained a partner of both Britain and France, who had committed aggression against Egypt in collusion with Israel. Pakistan managed to salvage some of her lost prestige when Turkey announced on November 29, 1956, that she had recalled her minister Mr. Istinyeli from Israel "Until the Palestine question has been finally settled with justice."³⁸ This move was reported to have been successfully initiated by Pakistan intended to recover her own position and to strengthen the Baghdad Pact.

37. Ibid., p. 15231

38. Ibid.

On July 14, 1958, the military coup led by General Abdul Karim Qassem ousted Premier Nuri-as-Saeed and his pro-western government in Iraq, and consequently on March 24, 1959, decided to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact. The withdrawal of Iraq changed the whole complexion of the western oriented defensive arrangements along the southern periphery of the Soviet Union since its primary objectives of drawing the Arabs, with their mineral wealth and strategic position, into the western fold were largely alienated; and the plans to contain the possible "communist subversion" in the area seemed to have backfired. The validity of this argument is established since the three regional members of the Pact (Pakistan, Iran and Turkey) have evolved an understandable equation with the Soviet Union, and have apparently succeeded in defusing the tension in the area.

The Military Revolution (October 27, 1958) in Pakistan was instrumental in changing her attitude towards the defensive pacts, and she was further helped by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, which had labelled these military pacts as "Pactitis". As a result a new relationship was initiated between Pakistan and Egypt. The visit of President Ayub to Egypt in 1960, considerably helped to remove the unfortunate misunderstandings between the two countries, and the relations have been improving ever since.

Another irritant between Pakistan and the Arabs led by Egypt, was the existence of very friendly ties between

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The two Arab states had basic ideological differences, Saudi Arabia leading the conservatives and Egypt the progressives. In this delicate situation Pakistan had a limited room to manoeuvre between the two feuding factions. Saudi Arabia always supported Pakistan in her endeavours to win the Kashmiris their right to self-determination, but Egypt on the other hand followed a neutralist policy; and cultivated very friendly relations with India. Egypt objected to the supply of Pakistani arms to Saudi Arabia, because some of these had found their way to the Yemini Civil War, in which Egypt and Saudi Arabia were backing the progressives and conservatives respectively. Fortunately this issue has come to a happy end since King Faisal and President Nasser reached agreement in 1967, and ceased hostilities.

Consistent with her policy, Pakistan has continued to establish closer relations with the Arabs. She signed the Defence Training Agreement with Saudi Arabia on August 7, 1967, under which Pakistan agreed to render technical advice to the Saudi armed forces, and provide training facilities. Relations between Pakistan and Jordan have been very friendly, and she has extended every possible moral and material help to the Kingdom.

The Islamic Conference at Rabat in 1969, proved that Pakistan enjoyed the status of a friend in the Arab world in spite of the Indian overtures towards the Arabs to alienate pro-Pakistani feelings, "India's foreign policy

suffered a humiliating setback today as a consequence of the reports that the Arab world had sided with Pakistan and had excluded India from the Islamic summit conference in Rabat on the Al Aqsa Mosque fire."³⁹

Pakistan's relations with Arab countries have been improving considerably since the Indo-Pakistan crisis of 1971. These friendly relations have assumed greater significance, since the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, and the consequent use of the oil boycott of the West by the Arabs and the dramatic rise in oil prices. Pakistan imports approximately 90 percent of the oil from the Persian Gulf area including Iran; and the prohibitive rise in oil prices have adversely affected Pakistan's balance of payment situation. She cannot meet these requirement on her own and in addition she is finding it difficult to finance her development programme since the rising oil and commodity prices resulted in the exaggerated worldwide inflation. During 1974/75 Pakistan received \$450 millions from Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms.** These countries have promised Pakistan with further financial assistance and there have been reports in the press that the Arab countries were helping Pakistan.

* There has been a marked shift in the Egyptian policy, especially since President Anwar Sadaat assumed power in 1970. There has been a gradual shift towards Islamic Brotherhood and the old Nasserite slogan of "Arab first, Arab second and Egyptian Third" has been replaced by Muslims First, Egyptians second and Arabs Third.

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39. The Times, London, 26-9-69.

to buy badly needed armaments since her major source of supply (U.S.A.) had not given a positive response to repeated Pakistan requests for lifting the arms embargo which was imposed after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan hostilities. Pakistan has tried in vain to remind the United States her treaty obligations especially under the Central Treaty Organization.

The Second Islamic Conference which was held at Lahore provided Pakistan with a splendid opportunity to cement her close relations with the countries of West Asia and she seems to have succeeded in her endeavours to forge closer collaborations with the World of Islam.

One minor disadvantage of sponsoring the Second Islamic Summit has been the lukewarm relations between Iran and Pakistan. It is believed that the Iranian Ruler wanted Pakistan to ignore Libya and withdraw her invitation to Colonel Qaddafi, the Libyan leader. But Pakistan refused to oblige and as a result the Shahinshah declined the request to attend the conference personally. Ever since the relations between Pakistan and Iran have remained somewhat cool. Moreover the Pakistani overtures toward the Arabs, especially the Persian Gulf States, have been suspect in the Iranian eyes, because Iran considers these States and the Persian Gulf as her sphere of influence. From a close study of Pakistan's foreign policy of recent months it can be safely deduced that Pakistan intends to seek closer relations with the Arabs and at the same time assure Iran that her intentions are friendly. This has been the main purpose behind Pakistani Prime Minister Mr. Bhutto's personal exchanges and visits to Iran. It should further be stressed that Iran cannot feel safe from all the sides, especially

when she faces difficulties in the Persian Gulf, and an air of mutual distrust prevails with the Soviet Union in spite of the increased cooperation in the socio-economic fields. Pakistan is trying very hard to keep the delicate balance between her increasing relations with the Arabs and Iran, but this balancing act could come under severe strains if Iran adopted an adventurous policy in the Persian Gulf; or if Iran endeavoured to woe India over and above Pakistan's interests.

Pakistan's relations with Iran have been very good and both the countries have refrained from interfering in the internal affairs of each other, and have shown a good deal of understanding in matters of foreign affairs. Pakistan and Iran are members of the Central Treaty Organisation (Baghdad Pact) along with Turkey, U.K. and U.S.A. (U.S.A. is not a full member). Both Pakistan and Iran have gained considerably in the socio-economic fields. The western participants have helped the three Muslim members in developing transportation and communications. A microwave telecommunications network has been completed linking Ankara, Tehran and Karachi (Fig:29). The system when stepped up to full capacity, would provide as many as 600 simultaneous telephone connections or more than 14,000 teletype circuits, or a combination of the two, bringing Pakistan, Iran and Turkey closer

It should be noted here that Pakistan became very much disenchanted with the Central Treaty Organisation immediately after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, mainly due to the lack of support from U.K. and U.S.A. However, Pakistan has taken a much more positive part since the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971; and Pakistan actively participated in the naval exercises in the Arabian Sea in 1974.

together. In addition, the CENTO members have started work on an all weather road and rail link between the three Asian members. This would supplement the already existing rail and road link between Zahidan (the main Iranian town bordering Pakistani Baluchistan) Quetta and Karachi, thus facilitating their mutual cooperation.

The Regional Cooperation for Development(R.C.D.).

Pakistan, Iran and Turkey organised the Regional Cooperation for Development, on July 3-4, 1964, a group "parallel to but outside CENTO". This was intended to promote industrial, cultural and socio-economic cooperation between the three countries. The member countries have already reached a number of agreements in promoting the development of the organisation. These include a Regional Cultural Institute, a Tripartite Shipping Conference, a Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and an R.C.D. commercial bank. Pakistan, Iran and Turkey have already agreed on joint industrial ventures, and among the products to be produced exclusively in Pakistan are Kraft paper, textile machinery, diesel engines, electrical equipment, aluminium sheets, machine tools, polyester fibres and wires and cables. A joint Iran-Pakistan oil company is to be set up and under the plan "Iran would place a newly discovered oilfield at Pakistan's disposal in return for guarantees that Pakistan would consider Iranian oil as a "domestic" product...Iran and Pakistan...hope to reduce-or even eliminate-their dependence on the western countries through a joint venture in exploiting and marketing oil...The oil field is probably in Baluchistan, the desert province bordering Pakistan, where surveys have been made with very

promising results."⁴⁰

The member countries agreed to abolish visas for tourists at the first meeting of the Ministerial Council held in October 1964. The conception of mutual understanding and cooperation between the three Muslim neighbours has ushered a new era of political stability into the region. Bearing in mind their enshrined objectives the R.C.D. members have kept the organisations' doors ajar for other countries of the West and Southern Asia and also those of South East Asia irrespective of their political alignments. Pakistan is reported to have sounded Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia about participation as equal members in achieving the ends of the organization, in the collective interests of their peoples; but their response has been rather lukewarm because of their political compulsions.

The Impact of Iranian Economic Resurgence.

Iranian policy has undergone change since Iran discovered her economic power which geology has bestowed upon her, and the change in Iranian attitude has special significance for Pakistan who is already being pressed hard by India, Afghanistan and by proxy the Soviet Union. During the 1971 war Iran urgently warned India of the consequences if she sought to occupy West Pakistan. Reflecting their fear of a further disintegration of Pakistan, whether due to external subversion or internal fragility, Iran moved quickly to intensify her ties with Pakistan in the wake of 1971 crisis. The Shah visited Pakistan on 8 January 1972, and the Shah paid another visit on 16-18 January 1973. Iran reacted sharply to the Baluchi insurgency in Baluchistan and cooperated militarily with Pakistan and issued strong

warnings. In April 1973 both Iran's Prime Minister Hoveyda, and her Ambassador in Pakistan Mr. Zelli, affirmed the importance attached by Iran to Pakistan's territorial integrity.⁴¹ During President Bhutto's visit to Iran the following month the Shah warned that Iran would not remain indifferent to, or oblivious of, any separatist movement in Pakistan.⁴²

Iran was totally dismayed at the event in East Pakistan in 1971 and is reported to have voiced ~~its~~ strong opposition to military action there, but this did not detract/ ^{Iran} from viewing the fact that India invaded and dismembered Pakistan, and considered it a very dangerous precedent, and which convinced Iran that she had to rely on herself alone and so should other regional states.

A chain of events made Iran to come to that conclusion, first the Iranian point of view that America could not act, with any effectiveness, as the world's policeman, second, the withdrawal of British forces from the East of Suez, third the dismemberment of Pakistan and finally the inherent dangers of external and internal subversion in the Persian Gulf and Baluchistan.

It is generally felt in America that the Soviet Union seeks to cause trouble in the area -using Iraq as her chosen client and instrument. It is also reported, but strongly denied by both the Russian and Iraqis, that Russia has a sprawling naval facility at Umm Qasr in Iraq and maintains an enlarged and active Indian ocean fleet. As such the Soviet Union seems to go for the jugular vein, and the Persian Gulf is the oil jugular for America, the

41. Kayhan International (Weekly edition) 7, 21 April, 1973.

42. Ibid, 19 May 1973.

West and Japan. Iran is keenly aware of this fact and as such to dissuade the Russians from any adventurous move, signed a \$600 million contract to supply much needed natural gas to the Soviet Union.

To counter any Soviet sponsored subversive move and to protect their independence and territorial integrity the littoral states in the Persian Gulf have spent a good deal of their petrodollar on the large scale purchase of arms, and an arms race is in full swing all over the gulf. Saudi Arabia has signed contracts worth \$600/^{million} with the British for the supply of air defence equipment, and is also taking delivery of 50 F.5E's and \$ 350 million worth of French tanks. The Saudi defence bill amounts to one billion dollars annually. Abu Dhabi has ordered a squadron of Hawker Hunters and Twelve Mirages, and Oman spends more than half of her total oil revenues on fighting the insurgent in Dhafar, where Iranian troops are also engaged. Kuwait and United Arab Emirates are also spending millions of dollars on armaments.

It is estimated that by 1980, America, the World's largest oil consumer, will be buying approximately 3.6 billion barrels every year (compared with 2.2 billion barrels in 1972), and other industrial nations will be increasing their oil consumption and as such higher oil imports. The Persian Gulf is the only oil rich region which can meet these requirements, and yet the lifeline that connects the Gulf to the world- the route through the strait of Hummuz, seems very precarious, and can easily be sabotaged by an unfriendly action, and a line of oil tankers can be

effectively put out of action. American options would severely be limited so long as she continued to support Israel against the collective Arab World, hence the need for an alternative/^{policeman}~~politician~~ and the ready appearance of Iran for such a role in the Gulf is an understandable phenomenon. Iran's economy is improving rapidly and the Shah seems to be a strong, dependable and a willing ally. Iran's military hardware and muscles seem to guarantee the free flow of oil to the industrialised world. This in turn would greatly depend on how Saudi Arabia and the other littoral states react to such ambitions, and as to how the Soviet Union views the Iranian intentions and interests in the region.

Pakistan's wooing of the Arab West has been of some concern to Iran. Since the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, Pakistan has intensified her contacts with the Arabs, and President Bhutto organised and hosted a large gathering of Islamic Heads of States in Lahore in February 1974, where the status of Jerusalem and the Arab-Israeli question figured prominently. The conference was a clear indication that Pakistan intends to pursue her contacts with the Arab States.⁴³ In particular Pakistan's relations with Libya have annoyed the ruler of Iran, especially the extension of Muammar Qaddafi's stay after the Islamic Summit in Lahore. However, Pakistan and Libya have much in common, apart from the religious ties, each has what the other needs: Pakistan has an abundance of human resources and negligible hard currency, while Libya is

43. The Times, 21,27 February, 1974.

wealthy from oil revenues and deficit in trained personnel. However, if Iran continued to distrust some of the Arab States, and latent, and occasionally open, rivalry continues to exist between Iran and some of the Gulf States, the Iranians are likely to frown on any entente between Pakistan and the States of the Persian Gulf. Although Pakistan's cultivation of the Arabs both in the Gulf and to the west should not necessarily damage her close relations with Iran, insofar as this leads to dilution of Pakistani support for Iranian interests in the region, it may be expected to diminish ^{the} Shah's enthusiasm for ties between Iran and Pakistan.

However, Iran is not ^{convinced} that the region's stability will be enhanced by a weak and dependant Pakistan and as such Iran tried, for a time to bolster Pakistan's defence needs, which the Indians totally disagreed with. It seems highly unlikely that Iran has accepted the rationale that India required an overwhelming margin of superiority over Pakistan as a contingency against a two-pronged war i.e. from Pakistan and China. In addition, Iran still deeply distrusts India's intentions in providing trained personnel to Baghdad.

There have been widespread reports that Pakistani pilots and military personnel have recently begun to replace Egyptians in ⁴⁴ Libya and that these military advisers have been authorised to fly combat missions in the Libyan air space to counter foreign intrusion. ^{If the reports} If the reports are accurate, then this development would be logical militarily, for both Pakistan and Libya use similar French aircraft.

44. The Guardian, London, 19-2-1974.

Moreover, since the Islamic Summit at Lahore, Libya and Pakistan have established a joint ministerial commission which has already held its sessions at Tripoli and Islamabad respectively. According to the deliberations of the ministerial commission agreement has been reached to establish a joint bank, a shipping company, an Islamic centre and a publishing house. The two governments have also agreed to facilitate the transfer of capital and a mutual exchange of commercial and technical knowhow. Libya has also agreed to finance the installation of a fertilizer plant, sugar plant, cement plant, paper and textile mills in Pakistan. This cooperation between Libya and Pakistan in the social, economic and political fields is bound to benefit the peoples of the two countries and strengthen Pakistan's close ties with West Asia and help to neutralise India's projected preponderance in the region. As stated earlier Iran is not convinced as yet as to the real purpose of Indian links with Iraq, and has been worried about the larger strategic implications of close "...politico-military relations between India, Iraq and the Soviet Union. So entangled had the issues of relations between Iran and Iraq and India and Pakistan become that mutual anxiety gave way to mutual recriminations." 46

Recognising the importance of stressing the Islamic dimensions in Pakistan's external relations, Mr. Bhutto undertook an extended whirlwind trip of the Islamic Middle East from May 28 to June 10 1972. Since then Pakistan has been successful in cultivating the Gulf Sheikhdoms, by emphasizing the common Muslim heritage, and by providing trained personnel. As a result, Pakistan has had a considerable success in consolidating her commercial, political and military relations with West Asia.

Another important development has taken place in the context of Middle East and the Pakistani interests in the region.

46. Kayhan International, Tehran (Weekly Edition) 28-7-1973.

Libya and Turkey seem to be drawing nearer to each other since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Both the countries have agreed to a number of joint industrial projects and to strengthen socio-economic and cultural relations." Turkey and Libya signed wide-ranging agreements in Ankara that will bring Turkey three million tons of Libyan crude oil this year and initiate joint military and economic projects between the two Moslem countries."⁴⁷ Turkey has declared her support for the first time ^{and} demanded the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories. Libya in turn has fully supported the Turkish position on Cyprus. This alignment could be of immense significance both to Libya and Pakistan. Libya has a large number of Pakistanis working in the country including military personnel, and according to the Jang International, Turkey has agreed to supply about ⁴⁸ six hundred thousand labourers, doctors, engineers etc. Pakistan and Turkey have no points of dissension and both have been cooperating in a number of fields since 1954, and both are engaged in bilateral and multilateral elegance and economic arrangements. The increased Turkish friendship with Libya might ease the mind of Iran vis-a-vis Pakistan's growing cooperation with Libya and as such remove the clouds of suspicion which might be hanging over Iran-Pakistan relations.

47. The Daily Telegraph, January 6, 1975.

48. The Jang International, London, January 9, 1975.

Pakistan's Relations with the United States




The emergence of Pakistan warranted adequate economic and defence requirements to withstand the imperatives of independence. She, therefore, looked for external assistance to build up the social overheads and provide initial outlay; to this the United States responded generously. The foundations of friendly relations between the two countries were laid by Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, during his three and a half weeks state visit to the United States in 1950. These relations were further cemented in 1954 when the two entered into the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement under which the U.S.A. agreed to supply Pakistan with military assistance to maintain her territorial integrity and political independence. Pakistan and the United States also signed the Manila Pact in 1954, which established the South East Asia Treaty Organisation; and the Baghdad Pact (Central Treaty Organisation) in 1955. These relations were further consolidated with the signing of the bilateral Agreement of Cooperation in 1959, which was designed to reinforce the defensive role of CENTO.

The U.S. extended enormous economic assistance to Pakistan in the shape of grants, loans and gifts, which reached the pinnacle during the financial year 1965, amounting to \$ 411,617,000; and the total U.S. economic assistance to Pakistan between the financial years 1952-1965 amounted to \$ 3,113 millions.⁴⁹.

⁴⁹. These figures have been taken from "Statistical Fact Book" prepared by U.S.A.I.D. Pakistan, June 1966.

Fig: 30

U.S.A. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN FY 1952 THROUGH FY 1965



GRAND TOTAL \$3.113

The Effects of the Sino-Indian Border Conflict:1962.

The relations between the two countries took a sharp turn in September-October 1962, when the United States supplied India with massive military aid as a result of the Sino-Indian conflict along the NEFA borders and the Ladakh-Aksai Chin areas. Pakistan "a friend of immediacy and constancy" was deeply disturbed and felt ignored; a relationship which had been developed after a good deal of hardwork during the fifties was losing respect. The United States had agreed that Pakistan would be informed and consulted before any such assistance was extended to India "the assurance given by President Kennedy to me that Pakistan would be consulted before any decision was taken on the question of giving arms to India."⁵⁰ More important still, Pakistan argued that these arms would be used against her rather than China; a point which was vindicated in September 1965, when India crossed the international boundary in the Lahore sector, threatening the very existence of Pakistan. The United States had publicly assured Pakistan that "The Government of the United States...has similarly assured the Government of Pakistan that if our assistance to India should be misused and directed against another in aggression, the United States would undertake immediately...appropriate action both within and without the United Nations^{to} thwart such aggression."⁵¹ These assurances public and private were of no consequence as far as India was concerned since she used these weapons against Pakistan. During the undeclared war of September 1965, between Pakistan and India, the United States assumed a neutral position and immediately stopped the military aid to both the belligerents. Pakistan.

50. Auyb, op cit. p. 145.

51. State Department Release, 17.11.1962.

vehemently resented the American policy of "equal treatment" since she was aligned with the United States through various pacts. The Americans argued that they were under obligations to help Pakistan only in the case of communist aggression. This argument may be accepted as half-truth since there is such a stipulation in the Manila Treaty of 1954, as the "understanding" of U.S.A. "The United States in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding of its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack...apply only to communist aggression..."⁵² But no such reservations can be detected in the American commitments under the bilateral Agreement of Cooperation 1959, "...the members... affirmed their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression direct or indirect... The U.S. Government, in accordance with the Mutual Security Act of 1954...reaffirms that it will continue to furnish...military and economic assistance as may be mutually agreed upon...in order to assist...in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective formation of its economic development."⁵³

American policy towards Pakistan may be described as a curious mixture of sympathies and antipathies. She cultivated extremely friendly relations with Pakistan during the fifties which resulted in the complete political identification of Pakistan with the west; and virtually alienated Pakistan from the Soviet Union. With the thaw setting in the U.S.-Soviet relations, the enunciation of

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52. Story of Seato, Seato Publications, Bangkok, p.44.
 53. Treaties and Alliances of the World, Keesings, Bristol, 1968, p. 140.

the principles of co-existence by Khrushchev and the exchange of Sino-Soviet polemics, America largely over-looked Pakistan's friendly overtures towards the Soviet Union. But Pakistan's "courtship" with China seemed to have been rebuffed by the Americans, who communicated strong displeasure in 1963, when Pakistan signed the Boundary Agreement with China. The relations between Pakistan and China have remained suspect in the American eyes, and the American policy seems to have been hardened on this question by the Indian propanganda of "Sino-Pakistan collusion". The relations between the United States and Pakistan have never been the same though a marked improvement has been noticeable since the inauguration of the Nixon Administration.⁵⁴

The U.S.-Iranian Understanding.

The American policy is very much linked with her investment and oil interests in the Middle East and this region has gained further eminence as a result of the Arab-Israel war of October 1973, and the Arab oil embargo. There have been suggestions in the various Western quarters that America should take military action against the Arabs, especially the Persian Gulf States and occupy the oil fields. Direct intervention seems out of question, for the time being at least. This appears to be a very tempting proposition but fraught with dangers and such an action might lead to global conflagration because the Soviet Union might be tempted to protect her interests in the region, where she is so heavily committed.

54. During the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war President Nixon showed a marked tilt towards Pakistan and reminded India of U.S.A. treaty obligations towards Pakistan, and this seemed to have warded off larger Indian invasion of West Pakistan.

Since December 1971, Pakistan has gradually tilted towards the Arab world especially the Persian Gulf states and Libya. This has largely annoyed the Iranians especially the Shahinshah who considers this area as one of his "spheres of influence." The Iranian policy has tended to be adventures and aggressive in the area since the Iranians occupied the tiny islands (the Tunbs) in the Persian Gulf and agreed to help militarily the Sultan of Mascat and Oman against the insurgents (the Front for the Liberation of the occupied Arab Gulf) "Iranian Forces are still fighting alongside Omani forces in the south of the Sultanate... A military communique this week reported that nine Iranians were killed and one was missing after an ambush in the southwestern mountains, where Government forces launched a new campaign against Leftist guerillas on December 2.... The communique was not only the first to reveal the Iranians continued presence in southern Dhofar, it was also the first time the army had ever mentioned Iranians in a public statement since a "task force" was sent in at the request of Sultan Qaboos Bin Said, the ruler, about two years ago."⁵⁵ The Iranians have ^{also} been actively mending the fences with India and a number of joint projects are underway.

The Iranian posture towards the subcontinent eminently suits the American and Soviet thinking, which is geared to keeping Pakistan very much involved in the subcontinental matters and political developments have

55. The Financial Times, 13-12-1974.
The Guardian, London, 13 December, 1974.

shown that this policy has met with success. Pakistan and India agreed in November 1974 to renew trade links which were severed in 1965, and the postal and communication links had already been established. The Americans do not want Pakistan to be linked with the Persian Gulf or the Middle East and they want to see India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as one economic unit, obviously under the Indian preponderance. Precisely for these reasons the Americans for quite some time refused to restart the supply of armaments to Pakistan which were suspended after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965.⁵⁶ There is a general understanding amongst the American leadership that Pakistan's close relationship with the Arabs might draw her out of her sphere of influence and that could jeopardize her political standing in the area. The "Iranians are being armed to the teeth and they have increasingly been supplied with sophisticated weapons, and the Iranians believe that they would emerge as the most powerful nation in the region, and possibly serve U.S. interests. However, there seems to be a contradiction in the Iranian policy towards the Arabs in the sense that they^{were} directly concerned and involved with the Kurdish movement in the northeast of Iraq, which_{was} struggling hard to win some kind of independence from

56. These restrictions have now been lifted both against India and Pakistan. But it should be stressed here that America did not lift the arms ban on Pakistan to bolster Pakistan's defence capabilities but to support American geopolitical interests in the area, especially with regard to the oil rich Persian Gulf, and Pakistan enjoys a very desirable geostrategic location to that effect.

Iraq, and on the other hand Iran wished to align herself with the Arabs, "The Shah of Iran said in an interview published today that another Arab-Israeli war would involve all Moslem countries and not just the Arab States..." Certainly it will be our war this time. None of us has a choice"... We will never accept any change in the identity of Jerusalem."⁵⁷

This policy would have to be further streamlined if Iran has any idea of establishing closer links with the Arab World as such. In this field Iran would have to reconcile with the Pakistani efforts in developing close socio-economic, political and military links with the Arabs, especially in the Persian Gulf. Pakistan has already signed agreements with United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Libya and as such joint ministerial boards have been set up to coordinate socio-economic and cultural development. Such cooperation already existed between Iran and Pakistan and some joint ventures are either under study or are being implemented. The Regional Cooperation for Development has provided both Iran and Pakistan to coordinate policies in various fields but the progress has really been slow and the cooperation has not been on the desirable scale. This is especially true of Pakistan-Iran cooperation with Turkey, the third member of R.C.D. The Turkish trade with Iran and Pakistan amounts to

57. The Financial Times, 13-12-1974.

⁵⁸ "Iran is to close its northern borders to Kurdish rebels from Iraq, ending a long-standing over the path of an international boundary line through a river estuary on the Arabian Gulf. Iraq has agreed in principle to make concessions on its territorial claims in the Shattal-Arab estuary, which provides a river access to the Iranians' largest refinery at Abadan, in return for closing of all the borders to "infiltration of a subversive character"⁵⁸

58. The Times, London, 7-3-75.

one percent of her total foreign trade. The total imports from Iran and Pakistan during the first nine months of 1974 amounted to 0.11 per cent of total Turkish imports, and the total amount of exports to Pakistan and Iran during this period were to the tune of 0.98 per cent of the total Turkish exports.⁵⁹ This is a clearcut indication that mutual trade amongst the R.C.D. countries is very negligible, in spite of the fact that the member countries could benefit tremendously during this high inflation period which was specially caused by the soaring oil prices. This would eminently suit Pakistan because the mutual trade and trade concessions would benefit the member countries in the sense that new market would have been discovered closer at home, and the damaging effects of inflation and highly exaggerated oil prices would be effectively met. Cooperation between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan could have been based on the principles of regional economic community but such coordination does not seem to meet the growing demands of increasing Iranian interests in the Indian Ocean area. Iran visualises greater interests and her ambitions have grown considerably since the flow of petrodollar, and she envisages herself as "big power" in the geopolitical complexion of the region. She seems to be interested in controlling lines of communications and transportations between the Nile and the Straits of Malacca and beyond, and Pakistan's growing friendship and involvement with the Arabs, especially in the Persian Gulf seems to lay bare at the roots of expansionist designs of Iran and her posture of aggrandisement.

59. These figures are taken from "The Jang International, London, 11-12-1974.

The Americans have tended to support the Iranian designs and as such she has been supplied with the ever increasing quantity of sophisticated weapons. In spite of the widely publicised pro-Pakistan "tilt" during the Pakistan-India crisis of 1971, it seems that America would not help Pakistan to such a position where she could effectively challenge the Indian preponderance, although the American policy would tend to support the continued territorial integrity and political independence of Pakistan. America would increasingly endeavour to improve her relations with India and her policy would be geared towards establishing a politico-economic structure under which a weak but defensible Pakistan would be allowed to exist, and Indian hegemony would prevail. Unfortunately for Pakistan, this also seems to suit the Soviet cynical realism and the close Soviet cooperation with India, and, for the time being, increasing accommodation and detente with the United States seems to have established a common interest under which Pakistan could not be allowed to challenge the Indian position and as such the Soviet-American cooperation. This tripartite understanding and cooperation also eminently suits the growing Iranian interests in the region. But the situation would not appear so desperate for Pakistan so long as she succeeded in unifying the forces at home and she possessed the kind of technical knowhow the Arabs want and with the help of the Arab petrodollar she could effectively neutralise the tripartite or quadripartite stranglehold on Pakistan's foreign policy options; and in this the Chinese reactions might hold the key to Pakistan's survival as an independent and sovereign state. It is important to observe here that

China's policy towards Pakistan, for the last five years has been to deduce her support for Pakistan's independence and state sovereignty", this was ambiguous in relation to East Pakistan, although it certainly represented a firm commitment to the survival of the nucleus of Pakistan in the West, and this position of course defined very precisely the character of the Chinese State in Pakistan; deeply committed to the maintenance of a strong and independent West Pakistan. What Pakistan required of China and the United States was a firm commitment to the "national unity and territorial integrity" of Pakistan - a formula which implied the defence of Pakistan and as such of East Pakistan against the possibilities of invasion from India. In the event both China and America decided not to adopt such a policy and their commitments towards Pakistan remained dubious. The U.S. Government probably shared the Pakistani assessment that the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to the peace of Asia, which partially accounts for the American "tilt" in favour of Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, and President Nixon was quick enough to remind Mrs. Gandhi that the United States had treaty obligations towards Pakistan. Thus, although it is at the moment fanciful and simplistic to envisage a Washington-Tehran-Islamabad-Peking axis in South Asia, these four States do have some convergent interests in containing a Soviet advance into, or hegemony in, the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.

The refusal of Pakistan to participate in Soviet schemes for "collective security" and regional cooperation

in the subcontinent have so far prevented Russia from deepening her influence in India, and by engaging India in regional preoccupations Pakistan's hostility also reduces India's capacity to support the Soviet Union in its rivalry with China. If Pakistan were to agree to come to the "good neighbourly" terms with India which the Soviet Union has been impressing upon her for more than a decade, India's regional preponderance would have been decisively confirmed and it would be much able to compete for regional influence with China, especially in the Himalaya States including the Chinese Tibet, and as such India would be able to command a position of strength and respect in the area with or without the help from the Soviet Union. The recent exchanges between India and America and a genuine desire of the parties concerned to settle their differences amicably, have not been viewed with favour either in Islamabad or in Peking. Such endeavours on part of the United States are bound to put heavy strains on the fickle minded Sino-American understanding, and as such further enhance the Soviet position in Asia, especially in the subcontinent.

Pakistan and the Soviet Union.

Pakistan's relations with her mighty neighbour Russia were bedevilled by her membership of the Western sponsored military pacts. The Soviet Union very severely criticised and resented Pakistan's participation in these pacts, and went as far as to question the very existence of Pakistan. Mr. Khrushchev the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on December 10, 1955, at Srinagar, Kashmir, stated: "It made us very sad when

imperialistic powers succeeded in bringing about the division of India into two parts...we are absolutely convinced that, when passions have calmed down and people realise the significance of such an artificial division of India, they will regret it... The present Government of Pakistan openly profess its close ties with American monopolistic circles. They were among the first to initiate the notorious Baghdad Pact. We do not like the Baghdad Pact at all, but we are patient and confident that it will burst like a soap-bubble.. we should very much like to have...friendly relations with Pakistan, and it is no fault of ours if such relations have not developed."⁶⁰ The Baghdad Pact (Central Treaty Organisation) was essentially a defensive arrangement of non-aggressive nature designed to forestall any internal subversion or external aggression, especially from the Soviet Union," West Pakistan lies in the middle of the "Crush Zone", or "rimland" which extends from Finland... to Manchuria. It also lies at the junction of the Russian, Chinese and Indian (previously British) spheres of influence. Excepting India...and China...Pakistan is the most populous state on the rimland...any Russian plans to expand on the Western flanks were stemmed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The chain of American bases and garrisons from the Atlantic to the Philippine Islands similarly blocked the threat of expansion by Russia or its ally China into the sphere of the Pacific

60. Keesings, op. cit., p. 14604

Ocean... only the southern flank by its physical and political fragmentation indicated a number of loopholes vulnerable from the interior...the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorous, the Persian Gulf, and the Indus Lowlands which connect them to Central Asia.⁶¹ These defensive arrangements, bilateral or multilateral, were specifically designed to consolidate these weak geostrategic points. The Pakistan participation in the scheme of "the Capitalistic encirclement" of the Soviet Union has not been viewed with kindness by the Kremlin even after 20 years of the existence of these pacts, "They may not be hurting us, but they give us no pleasure either."⁶² The pro-western stance of Pakistan proved very expensive for her since the Soviet Union ignored Pakistan's geopolitical compulsions, in supporting Afghanistan (over Pakhtunistan) and India (over Kashmir and East Pakistan), with whom Pakistan had territorial frictions and politico-ideological differences. The acceptance of the "gospel of coexistence" by the United States and the Soviet Union ushered a new era of relative understanding between Pakistan and Russia; and as a result the two countries signed the oil exploration agreement in October 1961, under which the Soviet Union advanced a loan of \$ 3,000,000 for a period of 12 years, at 3½ per cent interest. The loan was to be utilized for the purchase of machinery for oil exploration by Pakistan, and in addition the Soviet Union agreed to utilize the repayments for the purchase of textile/farm products from Pakistan. The relations between the two countries remained cordial for some time, thereafter. The Pakistan-India war of 1965, provided the Soviet Union with a good

62. Khan, op. cit., p. 171

Khan, op. cit., p. 171

61. Taryeb, op. cit., p. 218.

opportunity to exert her influence on the two neighbours, which resulted in the signing of the Tashkent Declaration in January 1966, "Mr. Kosygin expressed the Soviet Governments' profound satisfaction" that the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India were meeting in Tashkent "in order to establish direct contact with a view to improving relations and eliminating the conflict between India and Pakistan...We regard this...a turning-point in the relations between India and Pakistan... to strengthen friendship between India and the Soviet Union, between India and Pakistan, and between Pakistan and the Soviet Union."⁶³

For a better understanding of the Soviet position it is advisable to study in some detail the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union in this area. The international frontiers of the Soviet Union in Asia extend for 8,000 miles, and straddle across South-West Asia, and the Far East. Since 1938 the Soviet acquisitions in Asia total about 80,000 square miles and include Tannu Tuva, South Sakhalin, the Aleutian Islands and Port Arthur. The Soviet boundaries in Asia have been relatively calm and stable as compared with her European boundaries. These frontiers might give a nation of separation but they mostly lie in country remarkable for its scanty settlement, lofty mountains, and high arid plateau - international tension at points, at times has been considerable e.g., Ussuri River (Damansky Islands). However, it should not be assumed that, because the Soviet boundaries in Asia have changed very little therefore the Soviet position on her Asiatic marches has not been

63. Keesings, *op. cit.*, pp. 21187-89

strengthened by other means. The pattern of Soviet satellite states in European U.S.S.R. is seemed to have been repeated in Asiatic U.S.S.R., and the Soviet foreign policy has been, and remains very active. The success of this policy has mainly been due to (a) the multi-national character of the Soviet Union and (b) the methodical application of Western technology to Soviet Middle Asia and Southern Siberia.

Asiatic U.S.S.R. borders on Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan (Pakistan and U.S.S.R. have no common borders). The Soviet policy towards Turkey embodies elements of hostility, and she is considered as a stumbling block in the path of Soviet approaches to the Mediterranean, and a possible enemy base. Iran also poses the same problems to the Soviet geostrategic interests in the area since it is interposed between the U.S.S.R. and the Indian Ocean by way of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. The Soviet Union borders Iran both in South Caucasus and in Central Asia, and shares with it the navigation of the Caspian Sea. Iran has survived as a buffer state, in spite of her weak defences, merely because of the fact that this situation suited both the Soviet Union and British interests in the area and moreover, this constituted a major element in the Soviet concept of cynical realism as against the Marxian Utopian precepts. To safeguard their special interests in the area both the Soviet Union and Britain carved their respective "spheres of influence" and in 1941 the two powers occupied their respective zones when German intervention in Iran was threatened. In fact, Iran served as a good supply route to the Soviet Union during the Second World War and the Allied Powers very effectively used this route to fight the German forces which had penetrated the Soviet heartland. At the

end of the war the Soviet Union was very reluctant to vacate the occupied zone in northern Iran by the agreed date of March 2, 1946, because she had her eyes set on the oil wealth of Iran. Moreover, the Soviet zone also included the Iranian Azerbaijan which adjoins the Azerbaidzhan S.S.R., both these regions are mainly inhabited by Azerbaijan Turks. Tabriz the Capital of Iranian Azerbaijan is an important centre geostrategically and commands roads into Turkey and Iraq and is linked by a line to Jolfa. Tabriz is also a vital link in the Cenco communications complex.

During her occupation of the northern Iranian zone the Soviet Union engineered to set up a separatist regime led by the Iranian Tudeh Party in Azerbaijan so as to win some oil concessions and the presence of the Soviet troops was used as an ineffective weapon in her adventurous foreign policy. These manoeuvres failed to materialise; Soviet troops were withdrawn, the puppet regime was overthrown and the Tudeh Party was banned.

The Soviet Union has tried to establish more cordial relations with Iran, in spite of Iranian participation in the Central Treaty Organisation; and this endeavour seems to have met with some success though the basic suspicions have not been removed and the atmosphere of mutual distrust still prevails.

Three of the Soviet Central Asian republics e.g., Turkmen, Uzbek and Tadzhik adjoin Afghanistan, which, as a semi independent state, acquired international prominence

only with the steady advance and railway-building of Russia in Central Asia in the late 19th century. This landlocked country of rugged mountains and semi-desert plains, the population of which comprises many ethnic elements, might well have passed under Russian rule but for the fact of its geostrategic position commanding the chief landward approach to the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Although railways reach the frontiers of Afghanistan at Kushka and Termez on the Soviet side and at Landikotal and Chamman in the Khyber and Bolan Passes on the Pakistani side, Afghanistan still lacks a comprehensive system of railways. Although communications in the past have been difficult, yet about 7000 miles of good primary and secondary roads now exist, of which about 1300 are paved, and motor transport is rapidly becoming the chief method of transport in place of ponies and camels. A tunnel through the Hindu Kush has opened a short route to the Uzbek S.S.R. and the Trans-Caspian Railway system. There are no railways in Afghanistan itself but air links exist and there are airports at Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Herat and several other places. Since there are no ports, the usual port for consignments destined for Afghanistan is Karachi, Pakistan. The historic highways leading, via Herat, Kabul and Kandahar, to the gateways of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent still possess their geostrategic significance.

The British Forward Policy of the 19th Century sought to create a friendly and a viable Afghan buffer state to stem the Russian encroachments in the region and as such in 1893 the Durand Line was agreed upon as the line of demarcation, and Russia accepted this region as the "British Sphere of Influence."

A close study of the north western frontier of Pakistan would clearly establish that its significance lies in the fact that it contains the important Khyber, Kurram, Tochi, Gomal and Bolan Passes (Peshawar, Bannu and Quetta have served as effective and useful military encampments for the defence of these geostrategic points), and these passes provide the only viable overland link between Pakistan and the rest of Asia. Almost all past invasions of the Indus Valley and the plains of India beyond have come through these passes; the geostrategic points the defence of which now devolves on Pakistan. To the east of Indus there is no physical barrier of any significance to check the advance of the invading armies until the Burmese frontier is reached. The control and defence of these passes is, therefore, of absolute importance to ^{the} security of Pakistan.

Even more important than these frontier passes of Pakistan are the passes of the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan and as such the Hindu Kush is a much stronger proposition and an effective barrier against any hostile force from the north than are the frontier foothills of the Pak-Afghan border. The undemarcated frontier between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in the Wakhan region does not pose much problem simply because of the mountainous and difficult terrain of the forbidding Pamirs and the lofty Hindu Kush. However, the control of the passes in the Hindu Kush range can give a hostile power a strong offensive advantage (this point has clearly been vindicated by the Chinese offensive in the North East Frontier Agency in 1962). Therefore, it has been the aim of both the defenders and invaders of the subcontinent to control the Hindu Kush and as such the routes

which connect Afghanistan with the Soviet Union or Central Asia on the one hand and with Pakistan on the other.

Invariably all the invaders who came from across the Durand Line in the past have strengthened their hold upon the Hindu Kush as a corollary to an attack upon the subcontinent. Invaders like Alexander the Great, Kinishka, Mahmud of Ghazna, Mohammad Ghauri, Babur, Nadir Shah, and Ahmad Shah Durani all marched into India from their military bases in Afghanistan. Many of these invaders and their successors were able to establish large empires in India and were able to check effectively the fresh waves of invasions from Central or Western Asia. At times a strong and unified India was able to reverse the normal pattern of invasions. The Indian Emperor Asok^h (250 B.C.), for instance, was able to consolidate India under his rule, and pushed the frontiers of his empire over the Hindu Kush to protect the Western approaches to his empire and to provide it with more stable a frontier than the Indus. The Moghuls also carried out extended struggle to retain their hold and control of Afghanistan, especially the important foci of routes as Herat, Kabul and Kandahar. The duration of the empires of India largely depended in the past upon the control of the Hindu Kush and the loss of this control invariable encouraged fresh waves of irruptions from Central or Western Asia. The region of the Hindu Kush, or modern Afghanistan, throughout history has been a region of transition through which central and south Asia were united. Before the emergence as a separate state in the middle of the eighteenth century, it formed part of a central Asian, a western Asian, or Indian empire. Its emergence as a separate

state did not change its strategic location or its role as a transitional region. During the nineteenth century its existence was as much dependent upon political events in Central Asia and the subcontinent as it had been in the past.

The British, who had united the whole of India under their control, were twice in Central of the Hindu Kush during the nineteenth century, but political expediency rather than lack of power made them accept the present north western frontier of Pakistan as the valid frontier between Afghanistan and British India. Russian expansion in Central Asia was one of the main factors which determined the British Forward Policy in the area. To avoid a direct clash both the Czarist Russia and British India recognised the necessity of a neutral territory between their two empires and as such the Anglo-Russian Convention (St. Petersburg) of 1907 accepted the buffer status of Afghanistan, and it would not be out of place to state here that until 1919 Britain handled foreign affairs of Afghanistan, and after the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 the defence of the north-western marches became the primary concern of Pakistan. In spite of the fact that the Pakistan-Soviet territories are only 25 miles apart in this area, their proximity holds no geostrategic significance in this case. But this argument may not hold in the case of Soviet Tadzhikistan, Kirghizia and Kazakhistan bordering Chinese Sinkiang (Aksai Chin) which in turn borders Pakistani held Kashmir and controls the new all weather road (the old silk route), linking China and Pakistan. Soviet troop movements have been reported and tension remains in the area, which looks potentially ominous, because this

important Chinese region is very much open to the Soviet politico-economic penetration since the area is Soviet oriented geopolitically.

The Soviet Union in its embryonic days did not lack space; now in its strength it enjoys a spacious lebensraum such as the expansionist Hitler only dreamed of. The aggrandizement of the U.S.S.R., achieved by diplomacy and by force, can in some areas look justifiable in terms of history and ethnography, although in others it amounts to an arbitrary decision of the victor. During the initial period the Soviet Union was territorially curtailed Russia, confined by the cordon sanitaire of a suspicious and hostile world; and as such the consolidation of the Revolution at home took precedence. The result of such a policy and the aftermath of world war II have greatly been exploited, and the Soviet Union has recovered its "Western Lands" and gained much else both in Europe and in Asia. The new frontier zones of the Soviet Union characterized by their breadth provide the thresholds to further Soviet adventures.

It ought to be emphasized here that the Soviet interests in this borderland have not diminished, and in fact, since the Tashkent Declaration of January 1966, these interests have manifestly increased. These interests have been projected in a variety of ^{ways,} and the first link in the chain of policy manoeuvres the idea of the so called Brezhnev's "collective security" was floated. Pakistan had no hesitation in rejecting the idea because she viewed it as an anti-China campaign, and as a friend of the Chinese Pakistan could not possibly enter into such an arrangement.

In fact Pakistan expressed the view that it was an Indo-Soviet endeavour to dominate the area and to impose the Brezhnev's concept of "limited sovereignty" on the States of South and South East Asia. The Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia had manifestly demonstrated the ruthlessness with which such a concept had been imposed, and in Pakistani opinion this procedure could as effectively be employed in South Asia.

The Indo-Soviet "Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation" was the Second most important link in the chain and it further demonstrated the Soviet interests in the area, "Russia will back India with force if necessary in the event of War with Pakistan under a 20- year treaty, signed in New Delhi yesterday, that put India firmly in the Russian camp after years of non-alignment...If India were attacked, there would be immediate consultation with the Russians to remove the threat and "to take appropriate effective measures" to counter it. Clearly, then, in the event of an Indo-Pakistan war, Russia might wage war on Pakistan..."⁶⁴

The Treaty was signed in a very hurried manner, "After several blunt statements by...Pakistan threatening to go to war with India, Delhi sent the former Ambassador Mr. Dhar back to Moscow. Mr. Gromyko forthwith flew to Delhi and signed the treaty within a few hours."⁶⁵ Article 9 of the Treaty stipulates,"....In the event of either party being subjected to attack or threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations with a view to eliminate this threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure the peace and security of their countries."⁶⁶

64. The Daily Telegraph, August 10, 1971.

65. Ibid.

66. Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.24773.

Immediately after the entry of Indian forces in East Pakistan both Russia and India had made direct contact with each other, and as soon as the Indian forces were engaged into war on 3rd December 1971, in West Pakistan, India despatched Mr. D.P.Dhar to Moscow and Russia sent a senior representative (Mr. Kuznetsov) to Delhi to coordinate action against Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. These two diplomats remained at their respective posts during the whole duration of the war. This was an active Russian participation in coordinating her anti-Pakistan policy with India. The Western press had already forecast this policy. The Guardian correspondent Inder Malhotra wrote, "India and the Soviet Union today signed a treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation" under which Russia has virtually underwritten Indian defence in the event of an attack by Pakistan with or without connivance, support, or encouragement by China."⁶⁷ The contents of the Treaty also shed light on the Indian concept of non-alignment and foreign observers were of the view that "Taking the world by surprise, India today discarded her policy of non-alignment and entered into a formal alliance with the Soviet Union."⁶⁸ However, India rejected these interpretations and firmly stated her position to the contrary, "Mrs. Gahdhi similarly emphasized on August 9 that the Indo-Soviet treaty did not represent a reversal of India's policy of non-alignment."⁶⁹ These denials and firm rejections by India that she had entered into a formal defence alliance with the Soviet Union were not taken seriously by Pakistan, and

67. The Guardian, August 10, 1971.

68. The Times, August 10, 1971.

69. Keesings Contemporary Archives p. 24773.

the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 substantiated Pakistani point of view.

The Soviet Union has tried to mend her relations with Pakistan ever since the events of East Pakistan and the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. Pakistan has also shown some willingness to reciprocate the Soviet overtures of goodwill and as a result the Soviet Union has been cooperating with Pakistan in social, cultural, geological and economic fields. The Russians have already pledged £ 114 millions for the Karachi Steel Mill (The present estimates are very much greater £325 million) and has helped to train the personnel. Mr. Bhutto is said to have succeeded in persuading the Russian leaders, during his official visit to Moscow in November 1972, to impress upon Afghanistan to desist from helping the dissidents in Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. These pledges and understandings must be viewed with a degree of scepticism since the Soviet Union as a "continental" and "oceanic superpower" is bound to avail of any opportunity which might strengthen her hold in South Asia and her eyes are specially trained on the south-west coast of Pakistan. This would be of greater temptation to the Soviet Union in the event of further dismemberment of Pakistan, "Russia's plans to isolate Pakistan continue to prosper. As a result of her alliances with Iraq and India she is both increasing her pressure on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean and also tightening the encirclement of China. It was the pact with India in 1971 that gave Mrs. Gandhi the green line to intervene in East Pakistan...Pakistan was cut down to half its former size, and pro-Indian, pro-Russian Bangladesh was created....Mr. Bhutto's problems in residual Pakistan have been exacerbated by subversion from Afghanistan

with full Russian support. The aim here was the familiar one of trying to detach much of the North-West frontier Province and Baluchistan to form a separate state of Pakhtoonistan This is the background against which America, after much heart-searching , decided to lift the 10 year old embargo on arms for both Pakistan and India...." ⁷⁰

The failure of Pakistan to secure some permanent benefits in the field of external relations may be ascribed to a number of very important reasons, for example, the short-sightedness of the foreign policy makers of Pakistan especially in the context of India and the " Superpowers ". The leadership in Pakistan always believed , and this was presented as a major feature of her foreign policy, that Pakistan's allies, especially the United States of America would come to her assistance in case of war against India. The policy makers also emphasized that such aid would materialise in the shape of moral, diplomatic and military support for the Government and people of Pakistan.

70. The Daily Telegraph, London, February 2, 1975.

The United States and its allies in SEATO/CENTO, however, were very reluctant to make any such commitment in spite of their treaty obligations to Pakistan. The United States was very correct to ignore Pakistan's request for help, under the Manila Treaty of 1954, during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. According to the Americans such a help could only be given in case of communist subversion and aggression, and not against India. The Manila Treaty is clearly on the side of the Americans on this point, however, the United States was under obligations to come to Pakistan's aid under the Cento and the 1959 Pak-American bilateral defence Agreement of 1959. The fact is the United States openly denied that it had any such obligations, and furthermore, pursued a policy of even-handedness which meant more harm to Pakistan than India since India's friends, the Soviet Union in particular, continued to give military assistance to India during the 1965 war.

For a number of reasons the Johnson administration, during the 1965 crisis, was not very friendly towards Pakistan in spite of their treaty relations. First, the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962, and the Pakistani protests against a unilateral supply of arms to India without prior consultations with Pakistan. Secondly the open American involvement in Vietnam, and the bombing of North Vietnam under the pretext of the Gulf of Tonkin incident; and the lack of support from Pakistan towards the American policy in Indo-China. Thirdly the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of March 1963. This did not please the Johnson Administration, since the President was personally hostile to China because of its support for North Vietnam; and as^a result the Americans denied ~~Pakistan~~ any military assistance to Pakistan.

Again the Americans refused to give any military assistance to Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, and in fact , suspended Pakistan's economic aid during the crisis in East Pakistan (This aid was not ^e resumed till late in 1972).

During the 1971 war against India, Pakistan requested help from the United States within the provisions of the bilateral defensive arrangements. This was announced by an official spokesman in Rawalpindi on December 11, 1971, that Pakistan had invoked its " understanding " with friendly nations to come to its assistance. The statement was an obvious refernce to the bilateral defence agreement of 1959 between Pakistan and the United States, which stated in its preamble that " the Government of the United States regards as vital to its national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan," and lays down that " in the case of aggression against Pakistan the U.S. Government ...will take appropriate action, including the use of armed forces as may be mutually agreed upon." ⁷¹ In Washington, however, the State Department denied on December 14, 1971, that under the 1959 agreement the U.S.A. was obliged to come to the aid of Pakistan, and emphasized that it had been made clear to Pakistan on numerous occasions that the commitment would become operative only in the case of communist aggression. ⁷²

The reason for such a denial was very simple. The

71. See Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.16748A.

72. *ibid.* p.25071.

Americans were not prepared to militarily side with Pakistan against India, which according to the American point of view, it seems, held greater geopolitical importance and could prove an effective bulwark against Communist China. The Americans were not prepared to alienate the Indian public opinion which they valued very highly. This situation was never really fathomed by the Pakistani policy makers who repeatedly gave a totally distorted picture to their countrymen. The Pakistanis as such were made to believe that the American military support was guaranteed as a result of her membership of the military pacts.

Such an understanding, in Pakistan, completely ignored the inherent contradictions and the paradoxical nature of the interests of the participants within the framework of SEATO and CENTO. Apparently Pakistan joined these defensive arrangements to safeguard her territorial integrity and political independence, specifically against a possible Indian military action. Iran joined CENTO to protect her interests against communist subversion or aggression. Turkey joined the Pact to safeguard her territories against a possible Soviet incursion. The Americans were clearly interested in the containment of the communist expansion in the region. Pakistan faced a similar situation in SEATO and found the same contradictions, and in fact, had very little in common with New Zealand, Australia, Philippines, Thailand and France. These states were only interested in safeguarding their territorial integrity and political independence against communist subversion or aggression. The United Kingdom had already started to pursue a policy of withdrawal from the East of Suez, and moreover, it enjoyed very close cultural and economic ties with India, and was not prepared to jeopardise its economic

investment simply to please Pakistan. France had learnt her lesson after the Dien Bien Phu debacle and decided to minimise her activities within the framework of the Manila Pact of 1954. These were some of the inherent contradictions which the leadership in Pakistan had failed to appreciate, and ^{that} the Manila Pact had practically no value for Pakistan.

Pakistan's failure to attract support from the Soviet union in her disputes with India was due to (a) Pakistan's membership of the western sponsored military pacts, (b) Pakistan's increasing friendship with China and the deepening Sino-Soviet rift, (c) Pakistan's refusal to join the " Collective Security System " as propounded by Mr. Breshnev in 1969, and (d) the growing Indo-Soviet relations especially since the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of August 9, 1971.

People's Republic of China gave Pakistan moral and material help against India in 1965, however, this was severely limited during the East Pakistan crisis and the war with India in 1971, because China apparently did not wish to openly and militarily side with Pakistan since the Chinese leadership considered the movement in East Pakistan as a national liberation movement against a military dictatorship; and also because of the massive concentration of the Soviet forces along China's north-western borders, and the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971. China, however, emphasized its interest in preserving the " state sovereignty and national independence of Pakistan " which practically meant that China had, in fact, reconciled with the idea of a dismembered Pakistan, in view of the situation prevailing in East Pakistan, and the consequent military intervention by India.

With regard to Pakistan's troubled relations with Afghanistan it is important to emphasize here that her territorial disputes along the Durand Line are mainly due to the fact that the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan are strictly speaking a border zone (The presence of Azad Illaqa or the unadministered tribal belt in the area is a good example) where the territorial limits must be clarified, defined, delineated, demarcated and effectively consolidated so as to bring some stability in the area. The Pak-Iran Boundary Agreement of 1958 (implemented on 6-2-1959 and the final protocol exchanged on 31-8-1960), is a case in point.

These are some of the obvious examples where Pakistan's external relations have singularly failed to achieve their ends, and as a result of which Pakistan found itself totally helpless, at home and abroad, and was allowed to be dismembered in 1971.

CHAPTER 6External Relations of Pakistan : The Alignment Period.

The emergence of Pakistan as an independent sovereign state with physically separated areas presented her with enormous economic, political and security problems. To ensure her socio-economic development and safeguard her territorial integrity Pakistan opted to align herself with the West and some of the Asian countries e.g. Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Thailand and Philippines. These groupings projected the divergent requirements of the participants in the context of international relations and the prevalent power politics. The West spearheaded by the United States of America was primarily concerned with the containment of the rising tide of communist influence and its threatened inroads amongst the emerging nations of the world especially in Asia and Africa. The West endeavoured to extend friendly co-operation and assistance in the economic, defence, cultural, social and technical fields and offered security and protection, in the guise of multilateral and bilateral treaties, against communist threat and subversion. The newly emergent nations on the periphery of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were considered suitable and effective points of deterrence against communist infiltration or subversion.

The United States of America and her allies held the view that by injecting massive economic aid coupled with security guarantees the communist advance in South and Southeast Asia could effectively be stemmed and the

"Dominos" consolidated. Pakistan was identified as one of the prospective participants whose economic base and defensive potentials required to be strengthened. From the western point of view Pakistan with her Islamic ideology and zeal looked an ideal candidate in the western scheme of global interests and strategy aimed at curtailing the communist advance, and precisely for this reason Pakistan was invited to join the anti-communist alliances. However, the reason for Pakistan's participation in the military pacts with the West was not dictated by her hatred or contempt for communist ideology or actions but by the instinct for survival and self-preservation in particular against possible Indian action aimed at undoing the partition"... there were several important parties and personages in India who had made it very plain that they will unite Pakistan and India and undo partition... India, for some reason, which it considered to be justifiable, massed her troops on the borders of Pakistan in March 1950, poised for attack... again in July 1951 India considered it necessary... to mass its troops on our borders...to overawe us and to invade us"¹. Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, told the Pakistan National Assembly:"The main driving force behind a nation's foreign policy is its urge to maintain its independence and territorial integrity...to preserve its distinct ideological personality."²

The important clash of ideas within the multilateral defence alliances has very clearly manifested the paradoxical attitudes of the participants and their

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1. Pakistan's Prime Minister H.S.Suhrawardy, Dawn, February 23, 1957.
 2. BHUTTO, Z.A. Foreign Policy of Pakistan, Karachi 1964, p.27

divergent interests. There were sharp and divergent views among the signatories of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation and the Manila Treaty of 1954 was a vivid example. Whereas Pakistan considered the provisions of the Treaty to be effectively applied against any external aggression or internal subversion, the United States of America understood the provisions to be applicable only against the communist aggression or subversion. Pakistan invoked the provisions of the Treaty during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 but the United States refused to oblige and the other signatories acquiesced with the American position.

Pakistan's membership of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation, the Baghdad Pact (Now Central Treaty Organisation) and her friendship with the United States of America were dictated by her economic requirements and the preservation of her territorial integrity. Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact (Central Treaty Organisation) to safeguard West Pakistan and to foster closer relations with the countries of the Near East with whom she had common affinities (Religion, history and culture). Mr. Hamidul Haq Chaudhary, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressing the National Assembly said, "the development of the closest friendship with the Middle Eastern countries has been the cornerstone of our policy...pursuant to our policy to strengthen the fabric of peace in this vital region and to ensure its stability, Pakistan acceded to the Turko-Iraqi pact along with Iran and the United Kingdom." ³ The Arab opinion, however, was sharply split over the viability and the purpose of such a defensive arrangement. The Egyptians considered/

** Iraq withdrew after the coup of 1958.

3. Foreign Relations (O.P.), Karachi, April, 1956, p. 35.

to split the Arabs, and King Ibne Saud of Saudi Arabia was perturbed to learn that "Islamic state as that of Pakistan should accede to those who have joined hands with zionist Jews".⁴ Egypt's dislike of the pact may be attributed to (a) deep rooted hatred for Turkey (b) Nasser's friendship with "non-aligned" India and (c) the prospective challenge to Nasser's leadership in the area. The Suez crisis of 1956 brought some of the underlying fears to the surface and Pakistan's relations with Egypt were put under strain. In November 1956 at a meeting of the Baghdad Pact held without the presence of the United Kingdom, the three Muslim members of the Pact condemned Israel for invading Egypt, and demanded that the United Kingdom should withdraw her forces from Egyptian territory. The meeting also admitted the sovereign rights of Egypt in her nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy, after the meeting on 23rd November issued a statement in which he criticised Egypt for blockading the Canal. This was considered hostile to Egypt, and in order to manifest his resentment President Nasser rejected Pakistan's offer to participate in the United Nations Emergency Force while accepting India's contingent. Mr. Suhrawardy in a rejoinder in December 1956 said "the Arab world is divided among themselves and even if they were united, zero plus zero plus zero is after all equal to zero".⁴ Mr. Suhrawardy's statement could only be considered in the light of Egyptian attitude towards

4. Prime Minister's Statement on Foreign Policy, 9th December (O.P.), p. 17

Pakistan and her dispute with India over the status of Kashmir since President Nasser had stated "Suez is as dear to Egypt as Kashmir is to India".⁵ President Nasser seemed to follow the Russian way of thinking on Kashmir since he openly sided with India and vehemently criticised Pakistan for having established good and friendly relations with the United Kingdom and France through the S.E.A.T.O. and the Baghdad Pact. These two western countries had invaded Egypt in collusion with Israel, therefore, the Egyptian leader doubted Pakistan's credentials as a friend of the Arabs. This whole episode made Pakistan to reappraise her policy vis-a-vis the Arabs and the Pan-Islamic movement. Pakistan initiated a more realistic policy towards the Muslim countries and her emotive attitude towards Pan-Islamism seemed to disappear. President Nasser's actions thus caused Pakistan "to be guided more by facts and less by theories and sentiments".⁶

Pakistan signed the Manila Treaty of 1954 largely with a view to safeguarding her truncated eastern half against Indian action because she believed Indian policy to be based on the view "that the creation of Pakistan was a tragic mistake which might still be corrected, at least as East Bengal is concerned".⁷ Thus Pakistan became fully aligned with the West and, for a time, acted as a pawn in the global strategy of the United States of America. Pakistan had offered communications facilities to U.S.A. in the

5. Stephen, Ian, Pakistan, p. 172

6. Round Table, 1956-57, p. 174

7. Callard K. Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, New York, 1957, p.11

vicinity of Peshawar in the northwest of West Pakistan and the United States had been using Pakistan territory for U-2 flying missions over the Soviet Union. There is no denying the fact that Pakistan enjoyed great technical and economic benefits owing to her membership of S.E.A.T.O. and CENTO, but at the same time she suffered greatly in her relations with the Soviet Union, Egypt and to some extent the People's Republic of China. These countries not only suspected the defensive arrangements but openly criticised these western oriented military groupings and denounced these pacts as the instruments of American "imperialism" directed against the emerging nations of Asia and Africa.

Pakistan achieved a notable success during the first Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia from 18 to 24 April 1955. This Conference was sponsored by Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan and was attended by 24 Asian-African countries in addition to the sponsors. The Pakistan Prime Minister Mr. Mohammad Ali Bogra was successful in allaying the misapprehensions of the leaders of the People's Republic of China with regard to Pakistan's membership of the military pacts. Mr. Chou En-Lai the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China while addressing the Political Committee of the Bandung Conference on 23 April 1955 said "...I paid a visit to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He told me that although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China.

Pakistan had no fear China would commit aggression against her. As a result of that, we achieved a mutual understanding... The Prime Minister of Pakistan further assured me that if the United States should take aggressive action under the military treaty or if the United States launched a global war, Pakistan would not be involved in it....just as it was not involved in the Korean war...through these explanations we achieve a mutual understanding. This creates agreement and harmony amongst us in understanding each other on collective peace and co-operation.⁸....The Bandung Conference provided Pakistan with a good opportunity for a dialogue with the People's Republic of China and the perusal of the initiative resulted in the establishment of friendly and good neighbourly relations between Pakistan and China in spite of their ideological differences,"...the difference between the political systems of China and Pakistan and the divergence of views on many problems should not prevent the strengthening of friendship...with a view to promoting further the cordial and friendly relations existing between China and Pakistan, due importance should be given to commercial and cultural relations between the two countries.⁹" These friendly ties have been strengthened between China and Pakistan because of the absence of any "real conflict of interests".

Pakistan achieved another diplomatic success during the Bandung Conference where she effectively challenged the

8. HASAN, K.S. Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan, Karachi, 1966, pp. 361-62

9. Ibid. p. 363

the proclaimed Five Principles "Panch Sheel" of the Indian foreign policy. These Five Principles were agreed upon between India and China during their discussions on "Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet Region of China, 29 April 1954 and were as follows : (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence.¹⁰ It may be deemed surprising that agreement failed to incorporate the right of self-determination, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the admissibility of collective security. All of these principles had a direct bearing on the Indo-Pakistan relations especially with regard to Kashmir and the military pacts of which Pakistan was a member. As a substitute to "Panch Sheel" the Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Mohammad Ali Bogra presented his "Seven Principles" to the Conference. They were (1) sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; (2) equality of all independent nations; (3) non-interference in the internal affairs of one country by another; (4) non-aggression; (5) rights of self-defence of each country to be exercised singly or collectively; (6) self-determination for all peoples and abhorrence of colonial exploitation in every shape; (7) settlement of dispute through peaceful means, that is, by negotiations, mediation and arbitration.¹¹ These principles specifically

10. Ibid p.40

11. Chaudhury, Pakistan Relations with India, 1947-1966, p. 248

include self-determination, peaceful solution of disputes and individual or collective security, all three of which are accepted standards of international conduct and enshrined in the precepts of the U.N. Charter.

The Bandung Conference modified the "Five Principles" and in its final communique enumerated "Ten Principles" for the conduct of relations among the independent sovereign states and emphasized the need for the recognition of "the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small".¹² These principles were in conformity with the cherished goals of the U.N. and upheld "the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively" but without "the particular interests of any of the big powers"¹³ and upon the Afro-Asian countries to abstain "from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force"¹⁴. Prime Minister Nehru was unhappy at the endorsement of collective security, he had no other choice but to accept the compromised version since the majority accepted the principle. The Times special correspondent to the conference reported in a despatch: "It has been Mr. Chou En-Lai's week...From Turkey to Philippines, Mr. Chou En-Lai spread reason and tolerance",¹⁵ and in its editorial The Times observed: "Indian diplomacy displayed all its customary adroitness but could not have succeeded in overcoming the distrust which Delhi's neutralism implies

12. Hasan opcit, p. 60

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. The Times, April 23, 1955.

in such powers as Turkey, Iran, and Thailand..."¹⁶. India in the person of her Prime Minister Nehru seemed to have lost the charm of a leader and failed to impress the Afraisian states and Nehru's reputation suffered a setback. Prime Minister Chou En-Lai seemed to have stolen the show "the delegates from states which had not recognised the communist regime were favourably impressed by his attitude, and in general greater respect for and sympathy for Communist China was generated".¹⁷ As a result Pakistan appeared to have partially succeeded in breaking the Indian policy of containment against her in Asia and Africa.

The Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 seriously affected the political and military thinking of the regional and world powers. The conflict underlined the vested interests of China and India, and projected a serious rupture between the two countries. As a result the United States showed her great eagerness to bring India to her fold and rushed massive military aid to India with a view to containing the People's Republic of China. The Kennedy Administration in U.S.A. believed that India had the right size to serve as a bulwark in the containment of China. Therefore, it was considered expedient to give large scale aid to India so as to strengthen her economic base for the struggle against communism"...in Kennedy's view, the long-range struggle with communism in Asia depended on how India solved its economic problems. His goal was described as an attempt to turn India into a "showplace" for his ideas on what the Western world should do for an Asian country".¹⁸ Mr. Kennedy was never

17. Ibid.

18. Hindu, November 16, 1960.

16. The Times, London, April 23, 1955.

enthusiastic towards Pakistan and the direction of American policy to the subcontinent after the Sino-Indian conflict has been clearly analysed by the American columnist in the following words : "Washington recognizes Pakistan's loyalty to the two Asian alliances arranged by the Eisenhower administration and rather less enthusiastically endorsed by Kennedy. But we also recognize that Pakistan represents only 20 per cent of the subcontinent and is divided into distant halves. The sole hope of establishing a viable competitor to China is India. So our affection for an ally is tempered by geographical reality,"¹⁹ The changed tone of the American administration and their support for "neutral" India gave Pakistan an opportunity further to normalise her relations with her two mighty neighbours, that is, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Pakistan has shown a keen interest in the development of closer commercial and trade relations with these countries especially in the field of barter trade. The legendary "Silk Route" has been converted into an all season road which has facilitated the trade between Pakistan and China and provided the Chinese products ^{with port facilities at Karachi.} Since 1962 Pakistan has signed a boundary agreement, an air agreement and commercial agreements with China. In addition China has supplied Pakistan with considerable military hardware. Pakistan has also received military aid from the Soviet Union.

Pakistan's disillusionment with her allies made her reshape and redirect her external relations. Pakistan had no desire to take second place or live under Indian

19. C.L.Sulzberger, in New York Times, December 24, 1962

20. Round Table 1960-61, p. 409

hegemony and leadership. The American Vice President Lyndon Johnson had made a very disturbing statement in 1961: "At President Kennedy's request, I had urged Mr. Nehru to extend his leadership to other areas in South-East Asia".²⁰ Johnson seems to have followed these lines after succeeding to the Presidency in 1963, and the America's neutralist attitude during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 clearly established the changed direction of her policy. Pakistan was obliged to adopt counter measures and began to take an independent and positive line in international relations. Pakistan showed indifference to SEATO and CENTO and helped render these military pacts ineffective.²¹ Pakistan has manifested increasing desire to be linked with the "non-aligned world" and endeavoured to adopt a more open and realistic approach in her external relations. The "most allied ally" was beginning to find independent identity and positive direction in foreign policy.

21. Pakistan withdrew from SEATO in 1972.
20. Round Table, 1960-61, p. 409.

CHAPTER 7Conclusion

Geopolitically Pakistan emerged as a dislocated State with a variety of inherent problems e.g., defence, political incoherence, economic and administrative disparities; and it needs emphasizing here that the "possession of an uninterrupted territory is one of the principal requirements for the smooth functioning of a political entity."¹ Moreover, the birth of Pakistan was subjected to the tremendous psychological disadvantage that the State would find itself in great economic distress and that its vulnerability in the economic field would inevitably lead towards its eventual collapse. The two distant and distinct parts of Pakistan were bound by Islamic faith and an inborn desire to free themselves from socio-economic and political exploitations. The people believed that the inception of Pakistan would able them to throw off the yoke of economic exploitation and to rehabilitate their position through an acceptable democratic process. However, the fragmented nature of the State caused serious problems and in spite of the fact that "Pakistan's two Wings"... were united by a common religious faith - but divided by numerous cultural contrasts. As happens frequently with fragmented States, one part of the State, in this case the East, felt itself

1. Robinson, G.W.S., "West Berlin" Geography of an Enclave," Geographical Review, Vol.43, p. 540, 1953.

the victim of political discrimination. Charges of "domestic colonialism" abounded, and in the end the State broke up as East Pakistan - new Bangladesh - fought for independence, aided by neighbouring India."²

These were some of the high ideals which the people cherished within the concept of a strong and prosperous Pakistan, but their hopes of achieving these objectives were eroded by the entrenched position of internal and external vested interests." In every state there are forces tending to reduce its cohesion. In extreme cases they break the state into two or more parts, as Czechoslovakia was broken up early in 1939... In other cases, it may serve merely to make administration more difficult and to weaken the political power of the State.....The division of a state area into two or more parts by the territory of another, as Pakistan...is a matter of serious importance."³ Externally the very existence of Pakistan as an independent state was challenged by India who never gave up the idea of the eventual reunification of "Bharat Mata". India used various economic, political and military means to demonstrate her dominance as the arbiter of the future political patterns on the subcontinent and in the pursuit of her policy she received useful help from outside powers especially the Soviet Union. To counterbalance this

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2. de Blij, H.F. Systematic Political Geography, London, 1972, p. 40
 3. Pounds, N.J.G., Political Geography, McGraw Hill, N.Y. 1972, p.7.

inherent threat to her security and independence, Pakistan opted to align herself with America since Pakistani leaders held the view that the Americans with their world-wide influence would help Pakistan to strengthen her defences and assist her economic development. The Americans were more than keen, at the time, to aid Pakistan in both the fields since they thought that a strong Muslim Pakistan would serve a useful/^{purpose} in their global strategy of containing Communist influence especially in the Middle East and South Asia. Consequently Pakistan proved more than willing to support American policy by joining bilateral and multi-lateral defensive arrangements e.g., South East/^{Asia} Treaty Organisation and Central Treaty Organization (Baghdad Pact). These pacts gave Pakistan a sense of security and considerable economic and technical assistance in addition to strengthening her armed forces. However, her membership of the various defensive arrangements marked her out as one of the active pawns in the game of powerpolitics and the cold war. The Soviet Union openly and vehemently criticised Pakistan for allowing herself to be drawn into powerpolitics. Pandit Nehru (the then Indian Prime Minister) showed his indignation and criticized Pakistan for bringing the cold war to the subcontinent and employing this as an excuse to wriggle out of his international commitments over Kashmir, and accused Pakistan of having "destroyed the entire basis for a plebiscite in Kashmir."⁴ President Nasser of Egypt accused Pakistan of subverting the Arab world and collusion with the pro-Israeli powers. These were some of the formidable

4. Keesings op. cit., p. 14895.

obstacles that Pakistan had to face as a result of her close association with the Americans and which consequently proved more damaging than the help she received from America and her allies was beneficial.

Had India accepted the emergence of Pakistan as an independent sovereign State and showed some degree of magnanimity towards her immediately after partition, Pakistan's fears would have been allayed and an atmosphere of cordiality generated. A logical requisite for the two developing countries who shared a variety of common interests. Instead, an atmosphere of suspicion and mutual hostility was nurtured on both sides much to the detriment of the two peoples, and as such provided opportunity for outside powers to influence the chain of events on the subcontinent.

The fact that a large Hindu minority (20 to 25 per cent) remained in East Pakistan after the partition, the process of national integration was undermined since this large minority had never opted for Pakistan and had rejected the very idea of "Two Nations" and the concept of Pakistan. There is no denying the fact that a Muslim minority remained in India (ten per cent), especially in the United Province and the Central Province, and many Indians considered them as "Pakistanis in disguise" but their position was comparatively weaker than the Hindus in East Pakistan and Sind. The Muslim minority in India was not in a position to influence the fissiparous tendencies in India and were not effective in terms of their geopolitical location. Had this minority been located within the outer fringes of India especially in the Northwest of post partition India then their position would have been

much stronger and they might have played more active role in the Indian politics particularly in the area of Indo-Pakistan relations. This point is amply vindicated in the case of Northern Ireland where a substantial Catholic minority remained after the partition in 1922, and who have shown every sympathy towards the Irish Republican Army, the Republican Movement and have shown a real desire towards the reunification of Ireland. Moreover the division of Indian Punjab into Haryana and Punjab clearly demonstrated that the large Sikh population was not pleased with the state of affairs within the Indian Union and were clamouring for more autonomy and possibly desiring the establishment of Khalistan, independent of the Indian Union. Had the Muslims not migrated to Pakistan from Gurdaspur, Jullundur, Ludhiana, Ferozepur and Amritsar the position of the Indian government would have been comparatively weakened vis-a-vis the Sikh demand for Khalistan and instead of dividing the Indian Punjab into two states Haryana and Punjab, the Sikhs could have been encouraged and helped towards the establishment of their own homeland or at least a fully autonomous state within the Indian Union; which in turn would have given valid grounds to the people in Tamilnad, Mizoland and Nagaland for greater autonomy, if not outright independence. As a result India would have been deprived of her geopolitical competence to assimilate or annex Bhutan and Sikkim into the Indian Union.

The position of the Indian Muslims weakened further since the Indian leadership advanced their argument that if they allowed the promised plebiscite in

Kashmir the potentials of communal bloodshed would seriously jeopardise the lives and property of the Indian Muslims and their interests could be seriously damaged. In fact this argument was simply advanced to multiply the concept of "Two Nations" which the Indians never really accepted. There have been more than nine hundred communal riots in India since independence resulting in bloodshed and wide scale loss of property, and the Muslim minority in India has been the real sufferer. This has also belied the Indian claims of secularism and democratic socialism," Despite the assertion in the Indian Constitution that the State has no official religion, it is difficult to deny that in fact it has been established around the Hindu faith."⁵ Therefore, the Indian argument cannot be considered as tenable.

The separatist tendencies in East Pakistan could be explained in the socio-economic and political/dissatisfaction of the people in the eastern wing, the total lack of enthusiasm for the concept of Pakistan amongst the Hindu minority, who had always favourably looked towards Calcutta rather than Dacca, and the politically disenchanted dissidents whose only interest vested in the possibility of wielding political power. One of the foremost duties of the political parties and their leadership in Pakistan should have been (was) to forge national unity through tolerance and political

5. Pounds, N.J.G., op. cit, p.7.

compromise so as to effectively check the growth of
parochial^{ch}ism and regionalism, and stem the tide of
fissiporous tendencies, especially in East Pakistan,
which could ultimately prove fatal for the territorial
integrity and the very existence of an independent
Pakistan. It would not be out of place to note here
that such a goal could very well have been achieved
through some degree of democratic processes and by a
sustained effort towards interregional understanding
and cooperation. Unfortunately the political leadership
in Pakistan failed to fully appreciate the geopolitical
compulsions of a dislocated Pakistan, and the gradual
drift towards authoritarianism generated a strong feeling
of mistrust, fear and hatred for the central government,
which the regional political leadership exploited to
their advantage very effectively. The gradual disinteg-
ration of the Pakistan Muslim League (the political
party which was largely responsible for the creation of
Pakistan) provided the regional political parties to
voice their demands with added confidence and with a
definite parochial^{CH} and regional lines, which proved so
damaging, and consequently led to the disintegration of
Pakistan.

Keeping in view the geopolitical limitations
of Pakistan a true federal structure with a bicameral
legislature would have safeguarded the legitimate rights
of the federating units, eliminating the parochial^{ch}
tendencies and the vicious circle of suspicion, hate and
fear among the people of Pakistan as a whole. Instead a

Quasi federal or more appropriately a Quasi Unitary State was established under the Republican Constitution of 1956 and the Ayub Constitution of 1962, which brought the centrifugal and centripital forces into a direct clash, and as such the fissiparous elements were allowed to work fast and effectively in destroying the unity of Pakistan. This process had amply been demonstrated in the failure of United Arab Federation (Iraq and Jordan dissolved in 1958), United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria dissolved in 1961) and the Malaysian Federation (Malaya and Singapore dissolved in 1965). In the case of Pakistan the need for national integration was much more important because of her specific geographic location," The extreme case in the division of Pakistan into West and East Pakistan....The two are accessible to one another by ship, but the difference between the ports of Karachi and Chittagong is about 3000 miles. This fact alone has necessitated a federal Constitution; it has increased innumerable the defence problems, and weakened seriously the homogeneity of the State..."6. The founder of Pakistan had warned in 1948 of the inherent dangers, "I would like now to offer a word of advice to the people of this province..."⁷

A close study of the geopolitical factors of Pakistan would reveal that there were a number of inherent problems in the very method of partitioning the sub-continent which adversely affected the geopolitical and

6. *ibid*, p. 57

7. ~~Quotation from the speech of Quaid-e-Azam
Muhammad Ali Jinnah broadcast on Radio Pakistan, Dacca,
28-3-1948.~~

economic life of the nascent state, "...few modern states started their independent existence...under such severe initial difficulties as Pakistan. Not only the new country split into two wings...many vital arteries were severed in the process. Thus the east wing lost its principal port, the pivot of its railway system, and the industrial complex that had processed its jute, while the West Wing's frontiers with India cut across the extensive and all-important Punjab irrigation network, leaving vital headworks in Kashmir and India...lacking an established political and administrative capital and commercial and financial centre...born in communal strife and political and economic chaos bordered by hostile neighbours, the country's mere survival as a political unit was remarkable."⁸

Edwards has also expressed similar views, "Radcliffe had had great difficulty in drawing his lines on the map. Indeed he found it almost impossible to get hold of large-scale maps on which to draw them... and Radcliffe had been forced to work with inadequate data. His problem in the Punjab was not just that of dividing areas of community as it mainly had in Bengal. In the Punjab it was a matter of water."⁹

8. Myrdal, Gunnar, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Vol. 1, London, 1968, p. 305.

9. Edwardes, P.S. Nehru: A Political Biography, London, 1971, p. 215.

The Radcliffe Award in the Punjab left her irrigation system in jeopardy and the Pakistani Punjab was made dependent upon Ferozepur and Hussainiwala Headworks (Fig: 71) which were carved out to India though India had less irrigated areas dependent upon these headworks (see Chapter two). Furthermore, the Award of Ferozepur Tehsils to India left Pakistan very much vulnerable to Indian interests geographically and economically since Ferozepur was a very important rail and road junction and a military centre of considerable significance. There is a general belief in Pakistan that the award of Ferozepur Tehsils was not based on contiguous majority areas principle but on "other factors".

Again the award of Gurdaspur to India facilitated the Indian occupations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir which negated the contiguous majority areas principle but unfortunately the "other factors" were employed and again the Indians seemed to have been favoured. In fact the Indian Independence Act of 1947, had provisionally included the whole of Gurdaspur District in the new province of West Punjab, "Districts provisionally included in the new Province of West Punjab. In the Lahore Division, the districts of Gujranwala, Gurdaspur, Lahore, Sheikhupura and Sialkot. In the Rawalpindi Division, the districts of Attock, Gujrat, Jehlum, Mianwali, Rawalpindi and Shahpur. In the Multan Division, the districts of Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Multan and Muzaffargarh."⁹

9. Poplai, S.L. India - 1947-50: Select Documents on Asian Affairs, Internal Affairs, Volume One, O.U.P. London, 1959, p. 40.

It would not be out of place to remark that had Mountbatton given the same advice to the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir which he is said to have given to the Maharajah of Jodhpur, the peoples of India, Pakistan and Kashmir would have been saved the misery that ensued the questionable decision of the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir. Lord Mountbatton is reported to have impressed upon the Maharajah of Jodhpur, "...that the Maharajah had every legal right to accede to Pakistan if he wished, but did he really realize what the consequences might be? As a Hindu ruler of a largely Hindu State, he was surely going against the principle that India was being divided into a Muslim and a non-Muslim Dominion. His decision to accede to Pakistan might cause considerable communal disturbance in Jodhpur...The Maharajah was quickly reduced to bluster..."¹⁰

The division of Gurdaspur district becomes more questionable when one, ^{learns} about the reported statement made by Lord Mountbatton vis-a-vis the partition of the Punjab, " I put that in for the simple reason that the district of Gurdaspur in the Punjab the population 50.4 per cent Muslim, I think, and 49.6 percent non-Muslim. With a difference of 0.8 per cent you will see at once that it is unlikely that the Boundary Commission will throw the whole of the district into the Muslim majority areas."¹¹ These observations,

10. Mosley, L. The Last Days of the British Raj, London, 1961, p. 178.

11. Ali, C.M., op. cit. pp. 215-216.

to an impartial mind, seemed to be improper and highly prejudicial and were bound to influence the State of Jammu and Kashmir and its position vis-a-vis India and Pakistan.

The geopolitical interests of both India and Pakistan demand the practical implementations of the principle of peaceful co-existence and a complete rejection of the policy of Confrontation, and a failure to reach an amicable settlement of the outstanding disputes between the two neighbours is bound to encourage outside interference; a potential threat to stability peace and security in the area, " That Pakistan will survive appears certain; it could not be destroyed short of war, and although in that event the dice would be very heavily loaded against Pakistan (owing to the negligible war potential vis-a-vis India, and the almost impossible strategic lay-out), India would be very unlikely to add to already numerous internal problems that of holding down a hostile population in the granary of the sub-continent; Kashmir alone may prove a quite sufficient strain."¹² If and when India decided to take a major military invasion of Pakistan aimed at the total disintegration of Pakistan then India would have done irreparable damage to her own unity which to many observers seems tenuous and full of fissiparous and divisive elements, "In spite of the geographic Kaleidoscopic appearance of India and the

12. East, W. G. and Spate, O. H. K. The Changing Map of Asia: A Political Geography, London, 1961, p. 170.

resulting chain of Indian geographic unity and commensurate measures of political unity in India, the history of India regurgitates innumerable instances of cultural, economic, political and social disunity, and the emergence of Pakistan as an independent political unit is the latest and the most comprehensive rebuttal to the claimants of such illusionary unity."¹³

It is geopolitically desirable that India should abandon her intransigent attitude towards an amicable settlement of the Kashmir question and help to remove the potential threat of war. Both India and Pakistan have previously committed themselves internationally towards a peaceful solution of the dispute, and United Nations Security Council has passed resolutions demanding a plebiscite to determine the future status of the State and her people. A unilateral action by any one of the interested parties is bound to complicate the matters and jeopardise peace and security in the region.

The continued Indian occupation of Kashmir could very well jeopardise the very existence of Pakistan, especially if the policy of confrontation is pursued by the two neighbours, "West Pakistan is fundamentally better-found... and it has the makings of a decent if not spectacular agrarian prosperity,

13. Tayyeb, A. op. cit. pp. 24-25.

if only the Kashmir crisis can be settled by genuine agreement and relations of real cooperation between the two Dominions established. Otherwise the prospect is bleak indeed; at the very best a continuance of the present armed peace is likely so to strain the modest resources of the State as to produce social stagnation or even retrogression..."¹⁴ This is not a very happy situation for the peoples of the sub-continent whose energies are bound to be sapped and their socio-economic development seriously hampered. Therefore, it is highly desirable for India and Pakistan to come to a peaceful and equitable agreement on Kashmir so that their resources may be diverted from a military purpose to that of raising the socio-economic standards of their peoples.

If and when the troubled relations between India and Pakistan are put on a friendly basis then Afghanistan could be persuaded to realize that her safety would be strengthened by a strong and stable Pakistan. The Pak-Afghan relations could be helped if Pakistan took some practical step vis-a-vis the North West Frontier Province, Though Pakistan should not, and indeed, could not accept the concept of Pakhtunistan" yet the North West Frontier Province could be renamed so as to meet the wishes of some of its people, and a desirable name would be Afghanistan; this would be quite a logical step since in the word Pakistan the letter "A" stands for Afghanistan (N.W.F.P.).

14. East and Spate, op.cit., p. 170.

A detente between India and Pakistan and Pakistan and Afghanistan would greatly help in lessening the tension in the region and give the peoples of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma and Srilanka a real chance to live in peaceful co-existence, and to achieve wider geopolitical, commercial, cultural and social objectives. This would be directly in line with the basic principles agreed at the Bandung Conference. The outside powers such as the Soviet Union, USA, the People's Republic of China and Japan would be compelled to seek open and fair competition rather than sow the seeds of dissension, exploitation and carving out their respective spheres of influence. Developing nations such as Pakistan cannot afford to be pawns in the game of power-politics as such serve the entrenched interests of great powers. They must look around for friendship, commerce, collective ventures and economic cooperation instead of looking towards distant corners for friends and protections. For Pakistan, these aims and objectives could very well be served best by seeking closer relations with Iran, Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh, China and the countries of West and South East Asia. This would be very much in conformity with the geopolitical location of Pakistan.

Pakistan has succeeded, at times, to establish useful dialogue with the Soviet Union which has shown increasing interest in the region since

the signing of the Tashkent Declaration in 1966. However, the Soviet policy seems to have done more damage to the Pakistani interests than brought constructive help to Pakistan in socio-economic and cultural fields. The increased activities of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area and the gradual exposition of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" of "Collective Security" in Asia have adgered ill for Pakistan. The Soviet Union seems to be working towards a gradual dominance in the region as a "Super-Continental Power" and a "Super Oceanic Power". This policy seems to have been developed around the concept of "Heartland" as propounded by Sir Halford Mackinder and later amended by N.J.Spykman. According to Mackinder the three contiguous continents of Europe, Asia and Africa formed the "World-Island", in relation to other "Islands" such as North and South America, Australia, the "Islands" of Eastern Asia are satellites. Mackinder's "World-Island" contained the "Heartland", stretching from the Volga to the East Siberian mountains and from the Arabian Sea to Himalayas; most of the area occupied by Soviet Union, Iran, Tibet and Mengolia. According to this concept the glacies of the "Heartland" is Eastern Europe, from the volga to the Flenesburg-Trieste line, and included in the area are Eastern Germany and Austeria, and whoever dominated one of these regions is bound to covet the other regions. Mackinder in Democratic Ideals and Reality (1919)

advanced the idea that "who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-island; who rules the World-island commands the World." This proposition was later restated by Spykman, "Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the World."¹⁵ That this concept contained an important element of truth seems to have been demonstrated by the events since 1933. From Germany Hitler attempted to gain control of Europe and then the "Heartland". Soviet Union seems to rely even now on the strategic value of the glacis of "Heartland", of which she has gradually been gaining control of since 1939, regardless of the air-power and the development of missiles including the intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple nuclear warheads. D.W. Meinig in his essay "Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History" emphasized that Mackinder and Spykman focused their attention upon the geopolitical context of their time, which resulted in the inflexible interpretation of their concept and as such the concept became an historical relevance than a dynamic force affecting the changes of the changing world. According to Meinig if the terms "Heartland" and "Rimland" were to be inscribed some significance and applicable beyond any momentary context of strategic patterns, these definitions must become specific in concept yet flexible in historical-spatial use...Our definitions of heartland and Rimland must...be rooted in cultural, or, I should like to term

them, functional criteria."¹⁶ As a result of this exposition Meinig endeavoured to retrace the criteria on the basis of which Mackinder propounded his concept of Heartland, emphasizing the importance of hydro-graphic considerations. The properties of Meinig's Heartland included broadly similar cultural and physical features as that of Mackinder's, and involved the nexus of all the historic land routes interconnecting the several rimland areas of China, India, the Levant and Europe. Meinig's reevaluation of Spykman's Rimland is more significant since it endeavours to draw a definite attention to the fact that both Mackinder and Spykman viewed the area as the natural realm of the Sea Powers around the world; and Meinig questioned the validity of such an evaluation since the geostrategic position of the States constituting the Rimland was not made very clear. According to Meinig the constituent states of the Rimland change both their ideological and geopolitical alignments vis-a-vis the Heartland, and time has been of great importance in projecting these changes. These changes have either been outward or inward ("outer" or "inner") and as such Meinig has suggested a "continental rimland" and a "Maritime rimland". According to him Yugoslavia changed from "inner" (towards the Heartland power) to "outer". Moreover, according to Meinig's concept, a state may be transitional or neutral

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16. Meinig, D.W. "Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History", *Western Political Quarterly*; 9(1956) pp. 555-556.

rimland powers; and Pakistan could be considered as an "outer" state which might be moving towards "inner" position; and it is further suggested that Pakistan might have to go through a neutral phase, just like Yugoslavia. Some of these concepts have already been confirmed, and Cohen basically agrees with the geopolitical interpretation of the Heartland as enunciated by Mackinder and Spykman and as reevaluated by Meining.

Keeping in view the geopolitical tenets of the above concept one is bound to reflect for a moment and give serious considerations to the extension of Soviet geopolitical activities in the region i.e., the Soviet naval build up in the Indian Ocean Area. "The 1967 edition of the Soviet Strategic publication, Military Strategy, not only stressed the growing importance of the Russian Navy but, for the first time, included South and South-East Asia in the sphere of Soviet interests. In March 1968, a Russian flotilla - a cruiser, a missile carrying destroyer, a nuclear-powered submarine and a navy oil tanker - called on various ports in India, Ceylon, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and South Yemen. /Soviet Union sent 12 Surface Warships and auxiliaries in 1968, 17 in 1969, 22 in 1970 and 17 in 1971 to the Indian Ocean... In 1972... there were more 100 Russian Naval Vessels... A recent report from Tokyo says that there are about 30 Russian Warships including the 15,000 ton "Leningrad", an anti-submarine helicopter carrier, in the Indian Ocean"¹⁷. In addition the Soviet Union has taken considerable diplomatic steps

to bolster her position in the area. The Soviet Union has succeeded in securing useful naval facilities from the littoral states in return for socio-economic and military assistance, "At present there are 600 Soviet Military advisers in Somalia, 500 in South Yemen and more than 1000 military advisers in Iraq."¹⁸ Furthermore, in order to widen the area of Soviet influence and presence Moscow has concluded a number of treaties since 1970 with nations of the Indian Ocean littoral. The treaties it has concluded with countries like Mauritius, Somalia, Iraq, Sri Lanka and India and the fleet port facilities it has acquired in many of them are indications of its systematic progress in ^{entrenching} itself in important strategic points of the region. Recently, the American President, Mr. Gerald Ford, in his first Press Conference on August 28, 1974, disclosed that the Soviet Union has three "major bases" - Berbera in Somalia, Umm Qasr in Iraq and Aden in South Yemen - in the Indian Ocean."¹⁹

The attitude of India towards the increased Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean area seems paradoxical, whereas she is totally unfriendly towards American efforts to secure naval facilities in the region, especially Diego Garcia, "the Indian attitude tends to be soft towards the Soviet Union."²⁰ If India really wishes a "Zone of Peace" then she must endeavour to keep both the Superpowers out of the Indian Ocean, so that the

18. Rhw-S The Daily Telegraph, London 11-3-1974.
 19. The Round Table, op. cit. p. 62
 20. ibid. p. 67

possibility of a future confrontation between the two is eliminated. India has at times, tried to minimise the Soviet presence in the area and grossly exaggerated the American intentions, "Moreover, there is a lurking fear... that India indirectly promotes Russian naval activities in the Indian Ocean."²¹ It would be correct to note here that a vast majority of the littoral states are much more apprehensive of the Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean than the Anglo-American project vis-a-vis Diego Garcia. Furthermore, it would not be very helpful to agree with the Indian view that the Soviet intentions in the region are purely peaceful. Keeping in view the geostrategic location of the Soviet Union and their socio-economic and military interests, one is likely to conclude that the Soviet intentions are not purely peaceful or flag showing exercise but calculated plan to intimidate states which are not amenable to the Soviet interests, and to promote such factions which would help the global designs of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would endeavour to dominate the entire region especially the Persian Gulf to ensure a reasonable share of the wealth of the area, and would very much want to have ports or port facilities in the warm waters of the region. "The Soviet Union which arms and trains the Afghan military forces has never given up its dreams of access to a warm water port on the Arabian Sea. If "Pakhtunistan were ever to emerge as an autonomous unit or aligned with Afghanistan, it would provide the Russians with the corridor it would require to the coast."²¹

21. The Guardian, London, 14-3-75.

This does not augur well for Pakistan, especially in view of the Afghan interests in North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, and in this respect the Soviet interests direct or indirect cannot be ignored or dismissed, "only if Afghanistan, as a Soviet satellite, were able to further the cause of Pakhtunistan inciting the Pathans to open revolt against Pakistan,"²² then the Soviet Union would be willing to lend help in this direction and seek the total dismemberment of Pakistan. Although, Cohen points out that "an open Soviet-Afghan alliance with strenuous efforts to dismember Pakistan would produce the contrary effect of bringing Pakistan and India closer together to face the common threat;"²³ the position has not remained so simple since a number of very important events have taken place, especially the creation of Bangladesh and the Indo-Soviet involvement in the whole affair after the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971, "Although London did not see anything had in the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971, which was signed with the limited purpose of coping with the situation in Bangladesh, the actual working of the treaty during the last three years has given rise to suspicions. Mr. Bhutto has also expressed his thoughts over the Indo-Soviet Treaty, "It was to a large extent Soviet Union's involvement in the subcontinent which made possible India's invasion of East Pakistan...whatever

22. Cohen, Saul Bernard, Geography and Politics in a Divided world, Methuen, London, 1964, p.202

23. *ibid.*

motivated the U.S.S.R. to enter into this pact, it certainly gave India the backing, both military and psychological, to embark upon her armed aggression."²⁴ As a matter of fact there is a strong suspicion now that India is clandestinely providing special facilities, for Russian Warships and submarines in Indian ports. This suspicion was further strengthened by the admission of India's External Affairs Minister, Sardar Swarn Singh, last year in New Delhi that the "Soviet naval engineers" were present in the Visakhapatnam dockyard."²⁵ The situations look more sinister to Pakistan, especially since President Daud actively renewed Afghan claims on Pakistan territories and voiced support for dissidents in North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. There are signs that India sympathizes with Afghanistan over the Durand Line question, and the fact that India has close treaty relationships with the Soviet Union who seemed to be well entrenched in Afghanistan after the succession of President Daud in July 1973; a concerted effort by these three states is likely to put pressure on Pakistan to realign her geopolitical interests in the region. The increased Soviet interests and activities in the area, the close Soviet-Afghan cooperation and the increasing Indo-Soviet collaboration is bound to adversely affect Pakistan's geopolitical interests and if these interests come into direct clash with the interests of her northern and eastern neighbours then there would be a concerted effort to isolate her. To counter any such

24. Foreign Affairs, April 1973, p.550

25. The Round Table, op. cit. p. 69

move Pakistan would be obliged to seek greater and closer collaboration and understanding with China, Iran and other countries of West Asia especially the States of the Persian Gulf, and in addition forge closed ties with Nepal, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Malaysia. Moreover, Pakistan would have to maintain close economic and cultural links with the United States and the European community to safeguard her economic interests, but Pakistan would have to be very careful in the maintenance or development of these relationships and Pakistan should not allow any of the states small or big to exploit her geopolitical location to suit the vested interests of such a state. If Pakistan allowed such a situation to develop then the opposing forces are bound to exploit the situation to the detriment of Pakistan and her so called ally/allies might not be willing to support Pakistan in her distress and let her suffer and possibly fall prey to the socio-economic, political and/or military pressures of her opponents.

It ought to be made clear that in this day and age a small incident might become an international problem and threaten peace and security as such; and it would not be wrong to suggest that either America or Russia or both might be directly or indirectly involved in such a situation. It is also clear here that the Indian Ocean is slowly but surely becoming a theatre of cold war and the Soviet/American interests are bound to clash in the region. This

dreaded thought is likely to occupy the American mind for quite some time, and therefore, persuade the Pentagon to stay its hand over a possible military action against the Arabs to secure the oil supplies. If and when the Arab-Israeli problem is either solved or the threat of war is removed then one can envisage a greater American and Arab collaboration in the area and the Soviet Union would find it very difficult to secure inroads in the Arab World. Pakistan and Iran can really play an important and effective role in bridging the gap between America and the Arabs. Both Pakistan and Iran have historical and religious ties with the Arabs. Iran in addition shares her oil interests with the Arabs and is not very happy over the Russian dispositions in the region. Even the Chinese would not oppose such a cooperation between the various states of the area. With this background in mind the strategic location of Pakistan cannot be underestimated and Pakistan can play an effective role in the geopolitical affairs of the regions although "Pakistan's destiny is inevitably intertwined with that of the subcontinent...her geopolitical position is not circumscribed by the subcontinent. There is a 371-mile-long border between Chinese Sinkiang and Pakistan-Controlled Kashmir with its ancient silk route, and only Afghanistan's Wakhan Corridor, varying in its width from seven to 31 miles, divides the Soviet Union and Pakistan along 188 miles. Situated at the head of the Arabian Sea, Pakistan flanks the entrance to the oil-rich Persian Gulf and is therefore of strategic importance to many countries of the Middle East.

Pakistan is also strategically placed in relation to the sealanes between Europe and the Indian Ocean, once they regain their former importance with the reopening of the Suez Canal. Moreover, Pakistan provides an overland passage from Europe to the Indian Ocean, an area on which international attention is being increasingly centred."²⁶ Keeping in view the geo-political compulsions, Pakistan should adopt a balanced and positive approach in her policies, and that should be in confirmity with her national interests. A positive approach would also help towards the consolidation of a nation whose leaders have at times tried a negative argument in support of national cohesion and unity. This approach would also have to be applied in the social, cultural, economic and political fields. The emphasis should be on building a nations with values of her own, and should not be based on negative understandings or assumptions.

Pakistan faced her most difficult period during 1970/71 when military rulers misjudged both the world opinion and the flow of events at home. The Yahya Regime had envisaged a prolonged

26. Bhutto, Z. A. Foreign Affairs, April 1973, p.553.

period of political squabbling amongst the various political leaders of Pakistan after the elections of 1970, because in the regime's view, no party was in a position to dominate the political scene in the country. The Military Junta thought that the elections would inevitably result in minor victories for the various political parties in the five provinces of Pakistan (The One Unit had been dissolved with effect from 1st July 1970), and this would result in the military emerging again as the stabilising force in the country. But all their hopes were dashed to the ground when two major political parties, The Awami League and The Pakistan People's Party emerged as the dominant political force in East and West Pakistan respectively. The Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won a landslide victory (167 out of 169 seats) in East Pakistan on the basis of "The Six Points". The essence of its platform was to secure complete provincial autonomy for the eastern wing of Pakistan under the aegis of the Awami League, the plan envisaged a Central Government with powers in the field of Defence and Foreign Affairs but without foreign trade and aid. This looked like a prescription for a confederated Pakistan which at the time was totally unacceptable to Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan

Details of the Six Points:

1. The establishment of a Federation" on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and a parliamentary form of government, with supremacy of legislature to be directly elected on the basis of adult franchise. 2. It demanded that the Federation should only have powers in the field of defence and foreign affairs, and all other powers should rest in the federating states". 3. This demanded that there should be two convertible currencies for the two parts or one single currency for the whole country provided that the constitutional guarantees were clearly enumerated to stop the flight of the capital from East to West Pakistan. In addition a

there should be a separate banking reserve and a separate fiscal and monetary policy for the Eastern Wing.4. This clearly denied the Federation the right of taxation and instead authorised the federating units to levy such taxes and the federal government was to be handed a fixed amount.5. This point mainly dealt with foreign trade and the conduct of it as such, and demanded that there should be two separate accounts for the foreign exchange earnings of East and West Pakistan and both the provincial governments would be authorised to control these earnings. The foreign exchange requirements of the Federation would equally be met by the federating units or an agreed ratio would be determined by the units. A free movement of the indigenous products without the payment of any duty was to be guaranteed; and it further demanded that the federating units be authorised to carry out trade and commerce with foreign countries.6. This point clearly demanded the establishment of a paramilitary force or militia for the Eastern Wing.

These details have been enumerated after consulting the following works: 1. Bhutto, Z.A. The Great Tragedy, Vision Publications Ltd., Karachi, 1971.

2. Kabir Uddin Ahmad, Breakup of Pakistan, The Social Science Publishers, London, 1972.

3. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: failure in national integration, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1972.

4. Sheikh Mujib-Ur-Rahman, Six Points, Demand for Survival, pp. 2-11.

People's Party had won (88 Out of 144 seats) a sweeping majority in the Punjab and Sind. The National Awami Party of Khan Wali Khan had successes in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province. Mr. Wali Khan and his associates advocated provincial autonomy but presented no concrete proposals or plan; and their position was very dubious vis-a-vis the Durand Line and the question of " Pakhtunistan " which is so vital for the territorial integrity and political independence of Pakistan.

The dismemberment of Pakistan.

At the time of the emergence of Pakistan as an independent state, Islam was one of the most powerful elements in the composition of its people. The national leadership, however, failed to establish a stable political edifice, based upon consent and capable of reconciling the disparate tendencies. The internal divisions, the geographical separation, and the cultural-linguistic distinctiveness accentuated the sense of relative socio-economic deprivation felt by the East Bengalis with respect to their compatriots in West Pakistan. The East Bengalis identified these inadequacies with the state-structure itself, whose tenuous unity was increasingly undermined by the constant tendency in Pakistan to centralise authority, especially since 1958, in the shape of military dictatorship. In 1969, the Ayub Regime was dissolved, and his successor General Yahya Khan attempted to rehabilitate the principle of consent but by that time the situation had changed drastically, and as such the political concession was considered too little, too late.

The emergence of sub-nationalism (East Bengali nationalism) had gathered momentum in 1970, particularly after the devastations of the cyclone in East Pakistan. The break between East and West Pakistan could yet have been averted, had there evolved a constitutional system guaranteeing the East Bengalis access to power, and the reward of economic expansion and communal self-expression within the framework of a united Pakistan. Such a system could have attracted sympathy and support of the moderate elements right across the political spectrum in both East and West Pakistan, and the polarisation of forces could have been averted. This would also have discouraged the external vested interests from precipitating the events in East Pakistan. The divergent interests, however, of the two main political parties in Pakistan, after the 1970 general elections, left very little room to manoeuvre, and as such they were heading towards a collision, undermining the unity of Pakistan as it emerged in 1947. The flight of the refugees to India from East Pakistan furnished the Indians with a golden opportunity to justify their intervention and subsequent invasion designed to dismember Pakistan.

The hostility between India and Pakistan was a well established phenomenon, and their antagonism has been expressed in the mutually incompatible principles upon which the two political entities were founded. Indian reluctance to accept the Islamic principles on which Pakistan was founded has been the main contributory factor towards their incompatibility, and the entrenched hostility that has existed between the two states. The instinctive Indian attitude to the events in East Pakistan was discernable in her deep rooted hostility to the very existence of Pakistan as an independent political

entity. The pattern of events in East Pakistan, after the army " crackdown " in March 1971, was largely determined by the impulses of Indian policy and by the complex interrelations of India's actions with Pakistan's responses, by the mounting pressure of terrorism and guerrilla activities within East Pakistan and across her borders, and by the increasing diplomatic involvement of the great powers under pressure from India. The extensive foreign tour of Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1971, is a case in point.

The international reaction represented a fair description of the international power-politics and the fundamental reconstruction of the system as envisaged by the great powers, especially with regard to South Asia. The Soviet Union sympathised with the Indian point of view; France, United Kingdom and U.S.A. refrained from condemning Pakistan, People's Republic of China condemned the Indian motives and activities but fully supported Pakistan's position.

A kind of rapprochement had been established between China and the United States which seemed to have opened new vistas for international balance of power, and naturally, involved the South Asian Sub-continent. Geopolitically the South Asian landmass represents an areaⁱⁿ which both China and Russia have increasingly demonstrated their interests, in particular, since the Sino-Soviet rift and the subsequent border clashes along the Assuri River and the Damanski Islands. The rapid development of nuclear technology and its inherent dangers have obviously convinced these mighty neighbours of the necessity to defuse the situation along their common borders, and to shift the area of their activities to regions where the risk of direct confrontation is not so acute; South Asian Sub-continent is an obvious choice.

Until today the Soviet Union has been very carefully excluded from the Sub-continent, basically as a direct result of the deliberate policy followed by the British Empire, in creating the buffer zones, during the last quarter of the 19th century; the Wakhan region of Afghanistan is a good example. This is a very narrow strip (at one point only seven miles wide) occupied by the Kirghiz of Afghanistan separates Pakistan (Azad Kashmir: the Pakistani held Kashmir) and the Soviet Union; and as such there does not exist a direct overland link, to the annoyance of the Russians, between India and the Soviet Union. China, on the otherhand, is geopolitically better placed since it has common borders with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

Neither the Soviet Union nor China, however, is impelled by these circumstances to contemplate territorial readjustment to improve its geopolitical interests in the Sub-continent. Although the Sino-Pakistan Agreement of March 1963, is strictly a provisional one, and as such could easily be exploited by one or the other interested party. The geopolitical characteristics of the northwestern region of the Sub-continent have largely influenced the pattern of the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the area. There is no denying the fact that the Soviet Union has enjoyed the Indian diplomatic support against China, but this has equally been neutralised by the close ties between Pakistan and China, and the antagonism between India and Pakistan. In addition, both Pakistan and Afghanistan straddle Soviet land communications to India. Moreover, Pakistan has not allowed the transit trade across its territory either between Russia and India or between Afghanistan and India. Pakistan has, at the same time, dissociated itself from the Brezhnev endeavours to establish the " collective security system " in Asia, since Pakistan considers it as a

manoeuvre to isolate China. This refusal, on the part of Pakistan, has compelled the Soviet Union to rely on the distant ocean routes to maintain her links with India. The current geopolitical factors have only allowed diplomatic understanding between India and the Soviet Union and as such Pakistan has been instrumental in the failure of the Soviet Union to deepen her influence in the Sub-continent. Pakistan's rejection of the " collective security system " in its present shape has also meant the failure of India in imposing her geopolitical preponderance in the region. The Indian pre-eminence would decisively be confirmed if and when Pakistan accepted the " Brezhnev Doctrine " and joined the proposed scheme, and as such the valued principle of sovereign equality of states, as advocated by Pakistan, would have lost its significance. Moreover, without Pakistan's co-operation, direct or indirect, the Indo-Soviet attempts to dominate the region, and to isolate China are likely to end in failure.

Since the eruption of the Sino-Soviet rift there seemed to appear a gradual shift in the Soviet policy vis-a-vis the Sub-continent. The exclusive support for India was replaced by the Soviet policy which sought to reduce the mutual hostility between India and Pakistan; The Soviet efforts in this direction during and after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, and the Tashkent Declaration, is an example. This policy, to some extent, improved Soviet relations with both India and Pakistan. The Soviet leadership tried, for a time, this evenhandedness especially during the initial stages of the crisis in East Pakistan, which was later dramatically replaced by its outright moral and material help and support for India. This was obviously a retaliatory move

to counterbalance the Sino-American rapprochement, which in itself reflected the deepening Sino-Soviet antagonism. The crisis in Pakistan touched on vital Chinese interests in this rivalry.

From the previous argument it is quite obvious that if Pakistan represented Soviet Union's gateway to India, it is also central point in Chinese security system, for the reverse of the same argument. Pakistan as such is the crucial gap in what otherwise be a ring of hostile powers encircling China's most vulnerable salient. Pakistan has also provided China with useful outlets to vital geostrategic region of West Asia. This clearly establishes the fact that China is very actively interested in the preservation of Pakistan's present territorial limits since China's security system is directly involved therein. The Chinese Premier, the late Chou En-Lai, made this abundantly clear in his letter to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan on 13-4-1971, in which he stated: "... the Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence." ^{26 A} The last part of the letter is very crucial and carries great significance since it does not mention the territorial integrity and political independence of Pakistan. In the diplomatic parlance this obviously meant that China was apparently committed to the maintenance of a strong and independent West Pakistan (present territorial limits of Pakistan), and supported Pakistan's military action in East Pakistan simply to oppose and undermine Indian policy, and to minimise the Soviet influence in Pakistan. As a result the Indians rapidly achieved

26A Chou En-Lai, Letter to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan, Pakistan Horizon, XXIV. No. 2.

their objectives in East Pakistan but definitely failed to crush the military machine in West Pakistan, and the west wing remained intact. Pakistan's relations, as a result, with the Soviet Union were severely undermined but her ties with China were strengthened and Pakistan was forced to realign her external relationships consonant with the changed geopolitical structure.

The opponents of Pakistan, in the past, have rejected the concept of " Two Nations " on the basis of their paradoxical contention that the South Asian Sub-continent was inhabited by one people but with different social, cultural, linguistic and religious values and affinities. These elements argued that the economic and political viability and validity of Pakistan was highly questionable, and therefore, it was bound to disintegrate. They apparently rejoiced at the dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, and contended that the " Two Nations Theory " had been totally negated and demolished.²⁷ Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto has very succinctly expressed his thoughts on the subject and argued that the break between East and West Pakistan did not, however, mean that Bangladesh was willing to be absorbed into India. The nascent state very vociferously proclaimed her independence, an independence which can only be predicated upon her distinctive Muslim character and separateness, and the claim of Bangladesh to secularism in no way alters this fact. Indeed, secularism, in the sense of tolerance and the rejection of theocracy is very much a part and parcel of the Islamic political culture. Moreover, India never really reconciled herself to

27. Bhutto, Z.A. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 3. April 1973, p. 545.

the premise on which the two states were founded, and as such the relationship between the two nations has been disturbed. The Chinese Premier the late Chou En-Lai stated in December 1971, " The fall of Dacca had laid completely bare the Indian expansionist's wild ambitions to annex Pakistan...the fall of Dacca is definitely not a so-called " milestone " towards victory for the Indian aggressors, but the starting point of endless strife on the South Asian subcontinent..."²⁸

The recent events in Bangladesh have largely substantiated the main point of the argument, and the Soviet backed victory of India over Pakistan, now looks hollow. Indian hegemony in South Asia is once again very much threatened by the emerging Muslim unity. In fact, right from the outset, many Bangladeshis have accused India of exploiting their country and treating it as an Indian colony.²⁹

The *raison d'etre* of Bangladesh as such was neither secularism nor Bengali-nationalism, on the contrary it was manifestly regionalism, parochialism, provincialism and districtism. A survey carried out a few years before the secession of Bangladesh showed that the vast majority of respondents named their country (In Bengali the word "country" and " district " is the same "desh"), while educated people identified themselves as Pakistanis rather than East Pakistanis or Bengalis.³⁰ The whole scenario would remain incomplete so long as Bangladesh demonstrated her independence and rejected India's hegemonic role or

28. Chou En-Lai, as reported by New China News Agency, 17-12-1971.

29. See Oren, S. After the Bangladesh Coups, The World Today, January 1976, pp. 18-20.

30. *ibid.*

designs of preponderance in South Asia. Moreover, to establish a true Bengali nation, the two Bengals (Bangladesh and West Bengal-India) would have to be united either as an independent political entity or fully absorbed into the Indian Union.

The vast majority of Bangladeshis is very proud to identify itself with Islamic ideology and heritage, and these deep rooted links cannot easily be destroyed by the Indian arms or by reactionary forces from within. The Muslim Bengal is very likely to retain its distinctiveness and independent identity since Islam is clearly the strongest religious force within the territorial limits of Bangladesh.

Since the events of 1971 Pakistan's economy has managed to overcome a number of serious problems. The economy is no longer stagnant and the inertia has given place to dynamic efforts for the collective betterment and socio-cultural uplift of the people as a whole (see chapter 4). This has been effectively demonstrated in overcoming the problems created by the floods of 1973, basic reforms have been carried out and effectively absorbed in the system. There are sufficient grounds to suggest that domestic production would achieve higher targets especially in the agricultural sector and as such attain economic stability which is so vital for the healthy development of socio-economic and political stability of Pakistan," In bold statistical terms Pakistan's economy has performed exceptionally well ...and taking a quick glance at the performance of its neighbours, Pakistan has achieved economic marvels, at least in terms of straight growth.... The performance is the more impressive when one recalls the gloomy forecasts made when Pakistan was cut in half and ...the disruption by floods.... This disaster

seems only to have served to encourage Pakistani farmers to greater efforts....The wheat crop helped to produce agricultural growth of 5 per cent.Industrial growth in 1973-74 is put at 7 per cent;and industrial output has expanded by 20 per cent,in the past two years....³¹"Similar views have been expressed by other experts," However,stunning and distressing the events of 1971...West Pakistan - has at last gained some cohesion by the defection of its distant eastern province.It has become a manageable entity,both administratively and economically. The economic benefits are apparent at once.For example,Pakistan now has a valuable surplus of rice which can be sold abroad just as textiles which would formerly have been assigned to East Pakistan at artificially low prices can be exported more profitably,to considerable national advantage."³²

From the preceding argument it may be concluded that the *raison d'etre* of Pakistan has not been demolished,and that the present geopolitical disposition and the territorial limits of Pakistan have further strengthened her chances to survive as an independent political entity.Pakistan cannot be further dismembered without a massive covert or overt subversion or aggression.The present geostrategic location,size and compact territoriality of Pakistan have enhanced her chances to emerge as an important regional power.

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