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FOREIGN SETTLERS AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TANGANYIKA

UNDER BRITISH RULE 1920 - 1961

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by

Walter John Warrell Bowring

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines colonial agricultural policy in Tanganyika between 1920 and 1961. It describes how a dual system developed and the many and varied factors in East Africa and Europe which influenced the making of policy.

The dual policy was re-established after the first World War to satisfy immediate needs; but it could only be sustained by land laws and immigration policies which attracted private investment from overseas.

Before 1939, alienation of land was permitted if it aided the economic development of the Territory; but it was also permitted if it served a social purpose - it was believed that 'contact' was a practical means of modernizing African communities. During the inter-Wars period, above all else it was the German threat which influenced the official classes.

After 1945, emphasis was placed on development and the restructuring of the political system to permit orderly progress toward self-government. The dual system continued, each part of it involving policies which led to criticism and resentment of the colonial administration. Next, a third sector was added in the form of the public corporation. The groundnut scheme was the fore-runner of several developments in this sector.

Next, the political consequences of agricultural policy are examined. Decisions affecting land usage and soil conservation ensured the success of nationalism; conversely, changes in the political system ensured the end

of settler influence.

In the devising of land usage policies, there was an essential continuity; if this fact is taken into account, policies are more easily explained. Other conclusions are as follows: that support for the dual system, with a place for private investment in agriculture, has not been shown to be the cause of underdevelopment; that if time permitted, an efficient smallholder farming system might have developed; and finally, that the European settlers must at last be consigned to history.

Research Note

For the earlier chapters, the major source of information has been the files in the Public Record Office and the Official Reports which dealt with settlement, railway development and closer union. The papers in the Colonial Records Project collection, at Rhodes House, Oxford, and the records of the Joint East Africa Board provided a valuable insight into the perceptions of administrators and settlers.

For the post 1945 period, there are available many more secondary sources which contain valuable data. The files in the Public Records Office were available until 1947, and the Creech Jones papers, at Rhodes House, helped to supplement official publications. The international view was observed from a study of the three-year reports of the Visiting Missions of the Trusteeship Council; the metropolitan view could be discerned from the papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, the Joint Africa Board and the Capricorn Africa Society. Some observations are based on personal experience, based on notes made at the time and incorporated into official safari reports. I am also grateful to the many former colleagues and others who lived in Tanganyika who freely gave me advice and information.

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A note on terms and abbreviations

The following terms and abbreviations appear in the text or chapter notes:

- A.R. Annual Report submitted by the United Kingdom, at first to the Permanent Mandates Commission and later to the Trusteeship Council.
- C.A.S. Capricorn Africa Society.
- C.O. The prefix for Colonial Office files in the Public Records Office.
- E.A.R.C. The East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955.
- J.E.A.B. Joint East Africa Board; sometimes JECAB or JAB depending on the scope of its interests.
- Legco. Tanganyika Legislative Council
- P.M.C. Permanent Mandates Commission
- shamba An agricultural holding
- T.A.N.U. Tanganyika African National Union
- T.L.C. Tanganyika Legislative Council (see above)
- T.N.A. Tanganyika (Tanzania) National Assembly
- U.T.P. United Tanganyika Party
- V.M.R. Visiting Mission Report
- W.B.R. World Bank Report; the report of the Mission to Tanganyika organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

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## INTRODUCTION

Tanganyika, the mainland part of the present United Republic of Tanzania, became an independent state on 9th December 1961. In many respects the country was singularly ill-prepared for its new status and many people were surprised at the speed with which the procedural tangles of de-colonization had been sorted out. It was the poorest of the East African territories and neither of the other two, according to a visiting Royal Commission, had done particularly well when compared with other African countries.<sup>1</sup> Nationalist leaders made use of the observations of the Commission and the fact of colonial status was often blamed for the existing technical and material deficiencies. In much of the recent literature on Tanzania the country has been represented as 'underdeveloped' with the implication that in the past the best use has never been made of manpower and natural resources.

The painless transition to independence without the usual period of mass unrest, riots and detentions which had come to be expected in British colonies when nationalists asserted themselves was a tribute to the political skill of Dr. Julius Nyerere; nevertheless, the fact that the transfer of power was rapid made it difficult for the nationalist movement to retain its cohesion after its immediate aim of self-government had been realized. Political development had begun much later than in Kenya or Uganda and there was a real danger that the sudden and successful mobilization of the peasantry in support of the national leadership could

easily degenerate into crude racialism or parochial squabbling. To preserve a tenuous unity it was necessary to find a national aim and this soon emerged to be a crusade to end poverty, ignorance and disease. The national movement became a ruling party, dedicated to promoting national integration and economic development. The latter aim would be achieved, it was hoped, by following a comprehensive development plan and obtaining an effective mobilization of manpower to grow more crops to be sold overseas. Thus, as in the past, exports were to provide the means for future development and for meeting popular expectations. It was not for nothing that the first Five-Year Plan contained the scarcely concealed threat that if persuasion failed to stimulate increased productivity appropriate coercive measures would follow.<sup>2</sup>

Such determination was in sharp contrast to the attitude of the preceding colonial administration which generally adopted a more cautious approach to the problem of persuading African farmers to change their traditional methods of agriculture. But if colonial governments generally attempted to change rural practices only to the extent that African tribal leadership was prepared to cooperate, there is no denying the fact that, in Tanganyika at any rate, it was the creation of a centralised authority, first German and later British, which made it possible to introduce important changes in agricultural practices and thereby bring about changes in the landscape itself. The generalization that agricultural development depends on the relationship between man, land, climate and crops needs some

qualifying; the policies of governments constitute an intervening variable, creating situations in which a change in long-established customs becomes possible and desirable.

When considering East Africa during the colonial period it is evident that it is impracticable to limit any evaluation of policies to an inquiry into the application of the technical means of increasing production of food and cash crops. Changes in land usage, which sometimes were bound to lead to changes in the landscape itself, were often the result of government policies only remotely related to agricultural development. The growth of urban centres or the negotiation of commodity price agreements could, after a time, lead to substantial changes in the rural scene. Such causation is, of course, not confined to East Africa; there is the well-known example of how the landscape of Eastern France was changed forever by industrialization elsewhere.<sup>3</sup> The relative isolation of East Africa and the nature of pre-colonial contacts with the outside world combined with the environment to mould traditional agricultural practices and these constituted an equally important factor in influencing subsequent policies. Nevertheless, irrespective of whether the reasoning was correct or not, it was the rationale behind the agricultural policies of the colonial administrations in Tanganyika which brought about a transformation of the countryside. For although indigenous forms of husbandry would have gradually improved without the catalytic effect of an alien government armed with a superior technology, improvement would have been slower and would probably have been confined to the more favoured localities. Arnold Toynbee's

proposition that the greater the challenge the greater the response has its limitations; where the environment is unusually hostile progress becomes impossible without the aid of resources from outside.

An analysis of colonial policies soon becomes blurred with speculation and value judgments because there were so many factors which influenced policy decisions. In trying to unravel the threads it is easy to select events and statements which fit in with a particular theory and dismiss as irrelevant those matters which are best ignored. It is therefore important to identify the factors which affected agricultural policy and it will be seen that they can be placed in two broad divisions. The first can be conveniently termed the political factors, such as international pressures and events, the ethos of the colonial bureaucracy, the Colonial Office view and last, but by no means least, African reaction. The second group consists of those factors which involve technical problems of land usage and farm management and the difficulties caused by the environment. Whereas the influence of most of these factors fluctuated in an unpredictable manner, the environment and the Territory's spatial problems became progressively less important in determining the course of agricultural development as more money and expertise became available.

For most of the forty years under review, two different agricultural systems existed and developed in the Territory. In the African sector, the great majority were engaged in subsistence farming, occupying holdings of

less than ten acres and organizing cultivation on a family basis; a minority, in the more fertile areas, grew cash crops in sufficient quantity to satisfy their immediate needs and the demands of the tax collectors. After 1945, a larger proportion of these smallholders grew cash crops and a very small number began to operate on a larger scale.

The other sector consisted of farms, mostly between 500 and 2000 acres in size, and mostly owned or managed by Europeans or Asians. These farms required capital investment either from private sources or by means of loans or money raised by joint-stock companies. To be able to secure the required investment, the government had to provide reasonable security of tenure over the land, either by permitting a freehold title to exist or by granting a right of occupancy. Most of the holdings in the non-African sector were either plantations, concentrating on a single crop, or mixed farms, or cattle ranches. Apart from their managerial abilities, these farmers needed for success a favourable environment, stable crop prices and a supply of African labour. Many of the owners of the smaller estates were less concerned with these matters; their aim was to enjoy a comfortable life in congenial surroundings rather than to maximise profits. Whatever their intentions, if these farmers were Northern European in origin they were called settlers and thus distinguished from other expatriates.

But during the last decade of colonial rule, yet another sector of the agricultural system began to emerge. This consisted of large scale enterprises, managed by

public corporations. These, growing from the ruins of the groundnut scheme, became progressively more important when political developments made further private investment in agriculture unacceptable.

Confidence in the laws affecting land tenure was won by drafting land laws based on European rather than African experience. For most Africans, land was the property of the community and ownership could never be transferred by some legal device. Thus the alienation of land, whereby it was leased for a fixed number of years, was unacceptable to many Africans; it remained a potentially explosive issue throughout the period of British administration. It was not only irritation caused by a foreigner claiming ownership over tribal land; it was the fear that Africans might be progressively dispossessed of lands they occupied in order to create new estates. Perhaps it is only in industrial societies that we need reminding of the deep-seated emotions aroused when man finds it necessary to defend his property.<sup>4</sup> The often repeated observation that 'land was the mainspring of politics in Kenya' is something of a commonplace; it was no less so in Tanganyika, nor for that matter in Fiji or Rhodesia or anywhere else where views on the issue can be expressed. Lord Hailey gave clear warning of its importance when he wrote:

'Whatever other reasons may exist for the estimate made by Africans of the character of a government, the fact that a considerable area of native lands has passed permanently into the hands of non-natives will always tend to colour any judgement that is formed of it.'<sup>5</sup>

White settlement - to use a convenient shorthand - and land tenure combined to provide the most difficult problem the colonial administration had to resolve. An examination of the decisions which were taken and the numerous influences which were at work provide the means to obtain an insight into colonial administration and its influence over the patterns of land usage which developed. Whatever was decided, past experience was almost as important in influencing the policy-makers as their perception of the possibilities of the environment. The official mind takes kindly to precedent and on numerous occasions it was thought better to build on past successes rather than embark on doubtful experiments. This remains a constant theme, during, and even after, the period under review.

Similarly, it was possible to profit from past mistakes. In 1920, the incoming British officials had only to look across their northern frontier and observe the seemingly interminable confrontation between settlers and officials and the increasing signs of African discontent; political control remained firmly in the hands of the colonial administration and until the last three years of rule the Legislative Council exercised little influence over events. On the other hand, a limited amount of white settlement was permitted and even encouraged. Different arguments in support of this policy were put forward at different times. However, the economic arguments were more enduring and to understand the perceptions of those who wanted to see more settlement, the approach must be holistic;

the development of farming in one sector and the attendant problems often influenced the decisions taken in respect of the other.

But whereas the individuals and interest groups anxious to influence decisions were all too easily identified, it is still not an easy matter to decide where the responsibility lay for the land usage policies which were adopted in the Territory. Ultimately, the Colonial Secretary was responsible for the dependent territories in Africa, subject only to the agreement of the Cabinet. In the case of Tanganyika, he was answerable to two bodies; to the British parliament and to the Permanent Mandates Commission at Geneva.<sup>6</sup> The latter ceased to function in 1939 and after the war similar supervisory duties were entrusted to the United Nations Trusteeship Council. These international institutions undoubtedly exerted a restraining influence but the extent of this is difficult to ascertain.<sup>7</sup> Within the Colonial Office, the permanent officials exercised considerable influence until the point in political development was reached when initiative was passing to local leaders. While Colonial Secretaries came and went, the officials remained, developing a Colonial Office 'mind', a collective attitude to important issues. This rarely led to positive plans of action but it helped in providing effective supervision.<sup>8</sup>

In Tanganyika, sole authority was vested in the Governor, who was appointed by the Crown by an Order in Council. The Colonial Secretary could disallow legislation proposed by the Governor or could insist that British laws

were applied. Nevertheless, the Governor was responsible for the way in which laws were implemented and on occasions the Colonial Secretary of the day was presented with a fait accompli which had to be accepted. The wide discretionary powers accorded to the Governor permitted him to make policy rather than follow directions from London; at the same time it was in the best interests of both of them that they should appear to support the other.

Within the Territory, the Governor transmitted his directives to the various departments through the Secretariat in Dar es Salaam, a procedure which was not modified until the decade before independence; outside the capital, the country was divided into provinces which in turn were divided into districts.<sup>9</sup> Where possible, district boundaries were drawn in order to conform with tribal boundaries so that the geographical responsibilities of each district commissioner were the same as those of the native authorities appointed for that district.<sup>10</sup>

British policy for the Territory was based on the intention to act in the best interests of herself and the inhabitants of the former German colony. During the first twenty years, British interests were clearly associated with the resurgence of Germany after the debacle of 1918 and decisions affecting white settlement were often influenced by perceptions of the international scene. The best interests of the African inhabitants, it was believed, were served by the maintenance of law and order and correcting abuses. In addition, it was necessary to make the best possible use of natural resources and to make

Africans familiar with modern economic practices insofar as they were willing to accept the methods prescribed to meet these aims. Here, too, it was believed that white settlement could perform a useful function.

With the ending of the second world war and the removal of the German threat, the strategic reasons for retaining an African empire no longer existed. At the same time, the changing world power structure made it imperative to make positive plans for an eventual transfer of authority in the dependent territories of the Empire; this, it was argued, required economic development and the creation of sound infrastructures. In the official view in London, the financial backing for development on the scale required could no longer be left to private investors; an injection of public money and the underwriting of loans were necessary. These were the conclusions to be drawn from the comprehensive inquiries into conditions in the African territories conducted by Lord Hailey after the Depression; the changing world situation provided the spur. The consequence was the introduction of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 and Hailey's subsequent exposition of the development philosophy set the seal on the thinking of the official classes in respect of reform in colonial administration.<sup>11</sup> The fact that the change in colonial priorities took place during the Second World War when most of the world was undergoing a social upheaval gave added emphasis to the gulf in East Africa between pre-war and post-war situations. Henceforth the three governments were not only involved in spending money on development

projects on a far larger scale than had ever before been possible; they became progressively committed to a multi-racial philosophy whereby it was intended that each community should have equal rights and opportunities.

In Tanganyika, the changes in Colonial Office thinking had to some degree been anticipated. In 1938, a Development Committee had been appointed, charged with preparing a comprehensive plan on which future policy could be based.<sup>12</sup> Eventually, when it came to implementing some of the proposed projects and preparing further plans it was evident that the civil service was badly under-staffed, partly as a result of the War and partly because it had been accepted policy to keep civil service establishments as small as possible.<sup>13</sup> As the Groundnut Scheme clearly showed, it was impracticable to embark on ambitious plans with insufficient knowledge of the problems of tropical agriculture.

Although much critical comment on colonial policies fails to take into account the unavoidable delays in the immediate post-war period in recruiting new staff, there has also been much speculation on whether colonial administrations, and their successors which copied their methods too closely, could ever be effective in a development role.<sup>14</sup> It is perhaps inevitable that the question should be asked; since the War the metropolitan civil service has been repeatedly assailed for its lack of managerial expertise in an age of government intervention in economic affairs and it was therefore logical to apply the same criticism to the colonial situation where even greater initiative was called

for. It was De Tocqueville who observed that the French colonial service was a caricature of its metropolitan counterpart and a similar comment applied to the British equivalents might not be far off the mark. In several studies on Africa and Asia written after 1945 there is a tendency to emphasise the distinction between hitherto accepted administrative practices and 'development administration', the latter being what was required in newly-independent states. Whereas colonial administrations, it was assumed, were only interested in maintaining law and order, the succeeding regimes, if they were to survive, had to act quickly to secure a significant rise in living standards. To achieve this end, they had to re-organize and retrain their civil services so that people and resources could be harnessed to the task of improving living conditions. The distinction is misleading because no government, colonial or otherwise, could concentrate on performing one set of functions to the exclusion of the other. It is obvious that no sustained economic growth would ever be possible without a peaceful countryside and there were very few colonial governments after 1945 in Africa and Asia which failed to devote a proportion of their annual budgets to capital expenditure which could be classed as development.<sup>15</sup>

In Tanganyika, the development era brought with it an important change in the relationship between the colonial administration and the African population. Before the War, the major causes of friction between them had been the alienation of land and the collection of taxes. Most

Africans welcomed or at least accepted the imposition of an external regulatory authority which reduced the tensions and uncertainties which abounded in tribal life. Government officials were few and far between; they were well known and understood the people who came into contact with them. The post-war years brought a substantial increase in the number of technical officers and, with their arrival and the introduction of more positive measures to improve land usage, the instances of conflict increased a hundred-fold. The situation was not improved by the two facts that the new experts were almost without exception aliens and Europeans and that there was by now a growing awareness of racial animosities elsewhere in the world. Furthermore, although new sources of capital for development became available, the fact remained that Tanganyika was a poor country and a higher level of recurrent revenue would be needed to maintain the new services and improved infrastructure which were planned. If private investment in agriculture could be attracted, some of the returns on such investment would accrue to the government; thus it was argued that more land had to be alienated, with a consequent increase in African fears about their government's intentions.

What follows is an account of the changes in land usage and farming organization which were attempted or adopted during the period under review and the reasons, political, social or economic, for the decisions which were taken. There were many mistakes and disappointments; but to argue that development was deliberately minimal is to imply that there are now no obstacles to rapid improvement.

Others claim that the direction of development was wrong and that the political and economic consequences of past policies hinders improvement today. Since the prime source of wealth has always been agriculture, any comment on such a proposition must take into account the extent of the social and economic cost of the colonial policy which gave support to both African and non-African sectors of the agricultural system.

The expatriate settler farmer has all but disappeared from present-day Tanzania. The arguments that suggest that for a time he was an agent of modernization have provoked some scepticism; but as a member of a numerically small group, his economic contribution was often impressive and deserves to be placed on record. The political influence of the settlers, reflecting events in Kenya, was an important factor before 1939; it is only by being aware of their perceptions and attitudes that it is possible to understand the logic of multi-racialism. The disappearance of the privately-owned estates and plantations marked the end of the colonial agricultural system, with its two distinct and disparate sectors; whatever its failings it has provided the foundations on which more adventurous policies could be constructed, once Africans were masters in their own house.

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. East Africa Royal Commission Report 1953-55 cmd. 9475 (London 1955), p. 411. The Commissioners were impressed by the absolute and relative poverty of East Africa and compared the per capita net product of the region with other selected African countries. Such comparisons need to be treated with caution: see D. Usher, The Price Mechanism and the meaning of national income statistics, (Oxford 1968), where he argues that we can be misled 'if we attribute to income statistics a social meaning they do not necessarily possess.'
2. Tanganyika Five Year Plan 1964-69, Vol.I (Dar es Salaam 1964), p.19.
3. P. Vidal de la Blache, La France de l'Est, (Paris 1917).
4. cf. R. Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative, (London 1967).
5. Lord Hailey, African Survey, (Oxford 1956) p. 686.
6. The P.M.C. was created under Art.22(7) of the League of Nations Covenant. It consisted of ten to eleven members, appointed by the Council, to act in an advisory capacity to that body.
7. Contrasting opinions have been expressed on this issue; see especially B.T.G. Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship, (London 1961) and Lord Hailey, op.cit., p. 301.
8. E.g., between 1925 and 1947 there were twelve different Secretaries of State as opposed to only six Under-Secretaries.
9. In 1925 the districts were grouped into eleven provinces. In 1932 the number was reduced to eight but in 1958 increased again to nine with the division of Lake province.
10. Until 1951 native authorities were usually either individual chiefs or several chiefs acting together; thereafter there began a transition to a council system, with the councillors at first being nominated and subsequently elected.
11. Address to the Royal Empire Society, printed in United Empire XXXIII (1941), p. 168.
12. Report of the Central Development Committee, 1940 (Dar es Salaam).

13. As a result of the observations in 'Report of Sir Sydney Armitage Smith on a financial mission to Tanganyika', cmd. 4182 (London 1932).
14. cf. comments on the Pakistan bureaucracy in A.H. Hanson, Planning and the Politicians, (London 1969), p.199.
15. cf. G. Hunter, 'Development Administration in East Africa', Journal of African Administration, January 1967.

CHAPTER ITHE EAST AFRICA REGION

Primarily, this account of colonial agricultural policy is directed at achieving two objectives. First, it attempts to provide some insight into how policies affecting land usage were determined during the period of British control and into the factors and people who influenced those decisions. Second, it demonstrates that the policies which were adopted were themselves the product of a previous situation and in turn exercise a significant influence on the decisions which followed. In other words, decisions are not always the consequence of a reasoned appreciation of what can be achieved in a particular environment; in countries where the vast majority of the population owe their survival to their efforts on the land, any decision concerning land usage is affected by, and is often determined by, a variety of political and social factors.

Undoubtedly, there are many instances in the past when the actions of a government have inhibited rather than stimulated economic development; in Tanganyika during the period examined a number of decisions probably had this effect, but according to the view which prevailed at the time they were well justified. Conversely, the production of cash crops was substantially increased by government actions; this was exemplified either in the introduction of the conditions whereby the necessary confidence in just

treatment was established in that a fair return on investment or effort could be expected - or in the form of positive encouragement, aid and advice. Thus in an East African context, it seems unnecessarily restrictive to observe that the regulatory action by governments in prescribing rules affecting land tenure has an important bearing on land usage.<sup>1</sup> In all the three territories the land laws which were introduced and the customary laws which were allowed to remain in force undoubtedly influenced agricultural practices;<sup>2</sup> but equally important were the many other ways by which the respective governments sought to increase production. During the first few years of British administration in Tanganyika, the civil servants who took decisions and thereby established policies had little knowledge of agricultural possibilities and were prepared to adopt previous policies where they had been proved successful. But they also looked, and continued to look, at events in Kenya and Uganda and to be influenced accordingly.

Thus the starting point must be to suggest some comparisons and to mention some of the more important of the geographical, physical and social factors which determined land use in East Africa. It is evident that some of the environmental and social differences, although relatively unimportant when considered separately, sometimes combined to bring about important differences in agricultural policies.

The East African Region

With the ending of the first world war, all three territories were the responsibility of the Colonial Office and it was only to be expected that there would be plenty of support for the proposal to bring about a closer union between them. A number of economic arguments were clearly at hand. Contiguity made it possible to adopt common external tariffs; similar political systems, consisting of governments controlled by civil servants from the same metropolitan country and themselves for the most part possessing the same assumptions concerning their duties, made co-operation easy in routine matters; a universal lack of mineral resources in quantity made it imperative that economic development should be based on agriculture; finally, London-based commercial interests operating throughout the region, a common currency and a common legal system facilitated the progress towards a common market. Yet another unifying influence was the presence of the immigrant races, particularly the Asians, who caused a strengthening of the cultural, political and economic ties which developed after the first world war. The Africans, too, were not unaware of what was happening in the neighbouring territories, as is clear from the views of their representatives on the question of closer union. Later, too, when members of the Royal Commission of 1953 visited Uganda they were surprised to find that although the amount of land alienated to non-Africans was negligible, there was an underlying fear of further alienation, 'not unconnected with the history of Kenya'.<sup>3</sup> It was the passionate hostility to closer union

which caused frustrating delay in setting up the inter-territorial machinery to deal with those ecological problems which needed consultation, research and co-operation.

Thus during the colonial period, the region as a whole presented, for Africa, a picture of comparative uniformity. But a closer look reveals the important differences in relationships between the colonial administrations of the territories and the African and European inhabitants. These differences were caused by different historical experiences during the period in which Britain was asserting control in each territory and also by different environments.

Nevertheless, in 1920 and afterwards, there was in the pattern of African life an essential similarity to be found. Few were urban dwellers; the majority were either pastoralists in the drier areas or arable farmers in the remainder. Most of the latter group farmed on a subsistence basis, although already in Uganda the production of cotton was making an effective contribution to the economy. In the absence of the implements and the prophylactics which modern technology were soon to supply, farming methods were determined by the environment. The arable farmers, apart from the banana growers, practised shifting cultivation and kept some cattle when the absence of tsetse made this possible. The nomadic pastoralists preferred their way of life, maintaining that to cultivate land brought a loss of status; in more practical terms, it was safer to herd cattle than to waste time growing millet which would either be spoilt by drought or would be eaten

by baboons.

At this time, the European population of Kenya easily surpassed the combined total in the other two territories, a pattern which continued until the end of the colonial period.<sup>4</sup> Apart from the expatriate civil servants the majority of Europeans resident in Kenya, particularly before 1945, intended to live there permanently; in Uganda and Tanganyika, where there was a larger proportion of plantations in areas with a less 'pleasant' climate, many Europeans intended to live elsewhere after they finished working. This difference is reflected in the fact that in 1948 24.7% of the Europeans in Kenya had been born there, a far higher proportion than that found in Uganda or Tanganyika. Considering Kenya to be their own country, the settlers were more insistent on obtaining the right to participate in public administration; to them the expatriate civil servants who controlled the administration were merely transients. Thus the environment affected political attitudes; it is an important corrolary to any inquiry which emphasises the causal relationship between government action and altered geographical patterns.<sup>5</sup> It was not only the fact that the climate in the vicinity of the capital attracted European settlement; equally important was the existence of the Highlands area and the mobilisation of European support to ensure that its exclusive occupation by them would never be ended.

Of the other non-African communities in East Africa, the 'Asians' (Indians and Pakistanis), formed the largest group. The number in Kenya always exceeded the

combined total in Uganda and Tanganyika. Comparatively few of them were involved in farming, partly by inclination and partly as a result of government action to limit their opportunities.<sup>6</sup> Asian activity was almost entirely restricted to commerce and, as entrepreneurs, often in the most remote areas, they provided one of the most pervasive and important means of modernization by introducing Africans to a cash economy.

In the development of a pattern of land usage, the disagreements, which sometimes amounted to open conflict, between these three communities and the governments of Kenya and Uganda played a not inconsiderable part in influencing the decisions taken in Tanganyika after 1920. But of immediate interest there was the introduction of the Kenya soldier settlement scheme and its unforeseen consequences. The new settlers soon found themselves short of African labour and they claimed that the Kenya government had a duty to assist. The notorious Northey circulars followed and soon widespread criticism was being voiced at what was construed as a policy of providing compulsory labour for private profit. The policy was changed, but the problem remained and was further aggravated by other government decisions; the request to import labour from Asia was refused and, as a consequence of a financial crisis, Africans were encouraged to stay at home and grow their own maize. Contradictory policies were now being implemented; although the encouraging of African maize production was intended to be a temporary measure, both the Governor and a visiting Mission recommended that it should be continued.

At the same time, the economic future of the colony and the viability of the rail link was, as in the past, based on increasing production of European-owned estates.<sup>7</sup> A shortage of labour was the consequence, for which the government was blamed; but in spite of the extra maize being grown at that time and although the populations were roughly equal, in 1925 the total agricultural production by Africans in Kenya amounted to only one-tenth of the figure for Uganda. It was not until the adoption of the Swynnerton Plan in the nineteen-fifties that there was any sustained attempt to increase the production of cash crops from the African sector.

The basic economic problem in Uganda was the same as in Kenya, namely to change a subsistence economy by introducing a money sector and striving to make the latter predominant. But whereas in Kenya the method adopted required skill, enterprise and capital from abroad, in Uganda it was the peasant farmer who was assisted, encouraged and coerced in order to achieve the objective. When this strategy was adopted there was no reason to believe that in the long term an equal effort to develop plantation agriculture might not have been more successful. The arguments were set out in a series of reports prepared by a Land Settlement Committee and the outcome was in doubt for several years. It is evident that there are several explanations which can be offered to account for the decision in 1923 to make peasant agriculture the means to secure economic development in Uganda.<sup>8</sup> The non-African plantation sector was already in decline and the trend

continued. However, it was never completely extinguished during the colonial period and the sugar plantations in particular, owned and managed by two Indian families, made a substantial contribution to the Protectorate's economy. In the African sector, it was the spectacular success of smallholder cotton growing which provided an effective answer to the argument that in East Africa, efficient arable farming needed the investment of capital and operations on a large scale. In spite of the inevitable opposition of the planters in the Protectorate, by 1920 cotton provided the basis of the economy; between 1920 and 1925, exports soared and the number of buying posts and ginneries multiplied. Coercion was freely practised and in Buganda, the land tenure system countenanced by the Protectorate Agreement provided the means of exercising a complementary sanction. Moreover, the custom of personal tribute aggravated the situation; 'small customary gifts ..... were magnified into substantial demands of as much as one bag of cotton in every three harvested.'<sup>9</sup> Finally, to support these pressures on the growers, an effective marketing system operated; enterprising Asian buyers were at hand to ensure that any cotton grown was collected and used.

From the above, it is evident that the political and social factors played an important part in the expansion of cotton growing in East Africa during the period under review. They must rank equal in importance with the effects of the climate and the various technical problems that had to be resolved. In their perception of these

factors, the officials of the respective governments took decisions and implemented policies which also contributed to different results within the region. When the growth of cotton industry in Uganda is compared with the results in Western Kenya, the contrast is striking and to a great extent government action - or inaction - must be held responsible.<sup>10</sup>

In Tanganyika, these developments were studied with interest and it had to be decided whether to seek private investment in agriculture and, if so, on what terms. The result was the creation of a system mid-way between the other territories. Unlike what had occurred there, it was decided that it would be wrong to give outright support to one sector at the expense of the other. Although various political factors contributed to the adoption of this middle course, the geography of the region cannot be ignored. For although the three respective governments in East Africa could decide on the extent of their support to any sector of the agricultural system it was the environment which determined which crops could be grown. And since each crop industry had to be supported by a financial and commercial structure tailored to its needs, there had to be a close relationship between what was possible and what was politically acceptable. For our purposes a systematic and detailed description of the geographical features of the region is unnecessary since the information is available elsewhere.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, it is relevant to mention those physical factors which directly affected agricultural development at a time when there was never enough money

available to surmount the difficulties they caused.

First, there was the relative isolation of East Africa from the centres of world commerce. Although in pre-colonial times there had been continuous contact between the coastal ports and Asia, it had done little to stimulate economic development, particularly in the interior. Uganda was the worst affected by the remoteness factor and it is significant that the sugar industry mentioned above owed its success to there being a local market to be satisfied. In this case remoteness operated to the advantage of local entrepreneurs. In general, throughout East Africa long distances and inadequate communications discouraged and limited investment from private sources and for many years funds from public sources had to be allocated to improving roads and railways as a first priority. It is necessary to distinguish remoteness from isolation. Long distances did not necessarily discourage investors provided roads were open for most of the year and the products being exported had a high value relative to their weight. Thus large-scale cultivation of tea, coffee, pyrethrum and tobacco in the south-west of Tanganyika was quite feasible as soon as the roads were improved. On the other hand there were many fertile pockets of land throughout East Africa which could not be reached by motor transport and therefore remained undeveloped.

The effect of climate on the development of agriculture must also be considered. In particular, it has been the rainfall pattern which has decided the kind of farming activity which has been found possible in different

areas. The Royal Commission of 1953 observed that rainfall reliability was the basic guideline for land use; it decided that apart from a few notable exceptions it was possible to define the areas permitting arable agriculture as those where the reliable rainfall annual total exceeded thirty inches. It concluded that where the figure was under thirty inches or where the reliability of a thirty inch rainfall was poor, arable farming would be hazardous unless irrigation was also possible. The reliability factor is, of course, of immense importance since there are often dramatic variations in the mean annual rainfall figures. The lower the mean annual rainfall total the more critical becomes this reliability factor. However, since much of the benefit of rain is lost through evaporation at soil surface or by transpiration of plants it is useful to refer to the attempts to portray a more accurate picture of the rainfall factor. What emerges is that some of the areas which might have been considered as having adequate rainfall must be relegated to the marginal category. In these areas termed marginal, investment in farming requires strong nerves. Whereas the peasant farmer who loses his main crop can expect aid from more fortunate relatives or ultimately from the government, the non-African farmer operating on a commercial scale may well be ruined and forced to give up. Not only may he be faced with a wage bill to settle but he may also find he is unable to pay the interest on capital borrowed and invested in his farm. Elsewhere it has been suggested that the large-scale farmer was able to carry on in the marginal areas because as a

European he had access to credit facilities not available to an African.<sup>12</sup> It would seem that individual circumstances, the type of farming practised and the outlook for world prices introduce too many variables to make any generalizations possible. All that can be said is that the growing of perennial crops on a large scale has been confined to areas where not only has the rainfall been adequate in quantity but also other climatic factors have made the area attractive. The pattern of precipitation is nearly as important as the quantity received. Tremendous downpours can produce favourable annual statistics but they are less beneficial than a more prolonged rain falling at times to suit the crops being grown. On the other hand, prolonged periods of light rain are usually accompanied by cloudy conditions and this factor can reduce the yield of staples as well as of many cash crops. Finally, relief, altitude and soil conditions need consideration since they can all, on occasions, affect the retention of moisture in the soil. It is almost impossible under these conditions to find existing a simple relationship between the crop yield and rainfall.<sup>13</sup> It is therefore of interest to observe the effect of rainfall regimes on the pattern of settlement in the respective territories during the period of colonial rule. In Tanganyika and Uganda, applications for land to be alienated were approved in widely scattered parts of each country and the great majority of non-African settlement which followed was to be found in areas with better than average rainfall figures or where a particularly suitable rainfall pattern

could be expected. In Kenya, on the other hand, where specific areas were set aside for European settlement, a large proportion of such areas was considered unsuitable for arable farming.<sup>14</sup> Two observations are necessary. First, the objection to the exclusion of non-Europeans from the Highlands was more concerned with the government's acceptance of racial discrimination than with complaining that the best land in the Colony had been sequestered. Secondly, the defining of the Highlands area to include a large section which was climatically marginal does not necessarily mean that political decisions were not influenced by geographical factors. It was still suitable for profitable ranching and for this reason was likely to attract European settlers. And it was still much better than average when the climatic conditions in Kenya are considered as a whole. Table I indicates how little rainfall Kenya received when compared with the other two territories.

Apart from the rainfall factor there are other environmental problems which have affected agricultural development. The most important of them can be summarised thus: lack of water supplies, poor soils, tsetse fly and poor communications. The difficulties which they cause can be surmounted, to some extent, provided the money, the will and the necessary effort are forthcoming. Thus they were seen to fall into a different category to the rainfall factor which is difficult if not impossible to overcome. Nevertheless, the multiplicity of the problems and the amount of research and experiment required before practical solutions

could be implemented and the lack of funds for much of the colonial period meant that only partial success in solving them was ever possible. And when at last annual revenues increased and more generous financial aid from external sources was available there was a correspondingly greater pressure to divert funds from dealing with these problems in order to improve the social services. But by the end of the colonial period the steady increase in the African populations in the more fertile areas made it increasingly necessary for each administration to try and make improvements wherever possible. It is therefore necessary to identify these problems as they affected each territory.

First, the lack of water for domestic purposes and for animals reduced still further the total area of land which could be termed suitable for arable farming. Surprisingly, since it is well supplied with rivers and lakes, Uganda was described in 1936 as being sufficient in water supplies in only one third of its area.<sup>15</sup> Two thirds of Kenya has been classified as waterless desert; and sixty per cent of Tanganyika is virtually waterless and was almost uninhabited according to one report prepared in the nineteen thirties.<sup>16</sup> Conversely, before the second World War, where water was easily available, congestion and the consequent deterioration of the soil soon became evident. The cultivation steppe, the area running south-east from Mwanza, provided until the nineteen-fifties a good example of how the availability of water for domestic purposes affected land usage and the settlement pattern. From a population map of the period it will be observed that people

were concentrated in an oblong-shaped area with a distinct boundary between the settled and the unpopulated areas; and yet, outside the oblong there is no great difference in soils or in climate and it might be expected that there would be a gradual tailing-off of settlement as conditions became less favourable. The pattern can be explained by the easy availability of water within the settled area essential to people possessing primitive tools and skills, the water being restricted to that area by a particular geological structure. Once government intervention was a fact, bore-holes were dug, the restrictions of the environment overcome and the settlement pattern able to change. At the same time an ambitious programme of dam building was undertaken and river systems exploited wherever possible. Increased motor traffic sometimes played a part in solving the water problem, particularly where regular services could be utilised without additional expense.<sup>17</sup>

Secondly, the soils found in East Africa are not (with some notable exceptions) particularly fertile. In much of the region are found Pre-Cambrian rock formations, usually capped with lateritized soils; they are often lacking in humus and chemical properties and seem prone to leaching.<sup>18</sup> Areas of high rainfall cause better plant growth, thereby improving the soil, but when the growth is cleared away for cultivation the rain has a negative effect since leaching becomes more marked. Thus the characteristics of soil and rainfall have to be considered together. Relief introduces a further factor since the different


soil-slope relationships produce a complex, catenary pattern of fertile pockets of land. And throughout the region there are areas of high productivity set in an otherwise unpromising scene wherever there are alluvial deposits or where the soil has been enriched by a layer of volcanic ash.

But although the areas of fertile soil are not extensive, even on the poorer soils cultivation can be successful providing the land is not overworked and badly used.<sup>19</sup> Three practices in particular cause a loss of soil fertility and lead to falling yields. They can be summarised as follows: failure to prevent soil erosion, keeping too many goats and cattle, and allowing insufficient resting periods in the cultivation cycle. Thus any comparison between the soil characteristics found in the three territories should be made in conjunction with observations on the soil conservation measures which are practised. It is interesting to observe the difference in the figures for the use of fertilisers in Kenya and Tanganyika respectively at the end of the colonial period. Since both countries have to import the bulk of their fertiliser requirements, the amount used can be assessed with some degree of accuracy. Thus for 1962 it seems that Kenya imported five times the quantity used in Tanganyika.<sup>20</sup> What makes the difference even more striking is the fact that in Tanganyika there were more people engaged in agriculture and the soils in the arable areas are, if anything, inferior to those found in Kenya.

Next, the problem of the tsetse fly deserves

# TANGANYIKA

## Rainfall & Tsetse Fly



mention. For much of the colonial period eradication of fly was more difficult than it is today, now that long-acting sprays are available. Infestation in the past meant that certain areas in each country were virtually closed to human occupation. Kenya has been the most fortunate of the three countries in that only about ten per cent of the total land area is affected and much of this land is unsuitable for arable farming. In Uganda about 32 per cent is infested and in Tanganyika about 60 per cent. Clearing bush in order to eradicate the fly was often expensive and settlement in cleared areas had to be carefully supervised.<sup>21</sup> It was only by insisting that the families moving into the new clearings live close to each other that the fly could be prevented from returning.

Finally, road and rail networks were often inadequate until recently and this lack of a good communication system militated against economic development. Cash crops for export could only be grown in those areas close to existing road and rail systems. In such places, if expansion took place, congestion and soil exhaustion soon followed. At the same time governments were reluctant to encourage expansion in the more isolated areas from where it would be impossible to evacuate produce at a reasonable cost. Nor was there much inclination to participate in the money economy in places where isolation had delayed the start of any form of commercial activities. The standard pressures of modernization were slow to exert themselves; traditional values remained unquestioned and innovations were treated with suspicion. Where illiteracy was wide-

spread, face-to-face contacts were very important. These inevitably had to be less frequent in a poor country where settled areas are separated from each other by uninhabited bush. It was the spatial factor which delayed political development in Tanganyika when compared with her northern neighbours. Political development is not only a growing awareness of an identity of interest with a larger circle of acquaintances; it also stems from a growing awareness of one's own needs and potentialities. It was the emergence of new aspirations which generated economic development and often provided the peasant farmer with an interest to experiment with cash crops. As roads improved and a system of public transport was established it became easier for the more isolated families to travel to the market towns and administrative centres where they could observe the different needs and the changing way of life of the growing population of urban dwellers.

The amount of land available for agriculture varied between the territories and was determined to a large extent by the environment. (see Appendix i). In all three, a dual economy persisted throughout the colonial period and there is little doubt that the size of the subsistence sector was the cause as well as the consequence of the basic poverty of the region. Yet it is difficult to make any meaningful comparisons between the respective administrations in their attempts to promote a cash economy. There are too many factors involved and their significance varies between the territories. To name a few, there were the effects of climate, the amount of public and private investment, the

proportion of pastoral tribes to the total African population, the factor of distance, population changes, African reaction to coercion and finally government policies. With this catalogue of variables it is an oversimplification to suggest that policies found successful in one territory should have been copied in another.<sup>22</sup> Table II indicates the increase in the production of cash crops which occurred in the three territories; but these figures are the consequence of a social cost which must be taken into account and cannot be quantified.

For the British administration in Tanganyika in 1920, the aims of an agricultural policy could be easily recognized and quickly explained. First, it was necessary to prevent the recurrent famines which brought starvation and misery whenever the rains failed. Second, existing knowledge and capacity for producing cash crops had to be utilised so that the budget could be balanced and prosperity restored. The events and experience in the neighbouring territories provided guidance; but, as will now be told, it was the structure developed by their predecessors which was to be adopted by the officials of the new administration.

TABLE I

PERCENTAGE OF LAND AREA RECEIVING  
NOTED AMOUNTS OF ANNUAL RAINFALL  
IN FOUR YEARS OUT OF FIVE

	<u>Kenya</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>	<u>Uganda</u>
Less than 20 inches	72	16	12
20-30 inches	13	33	10
Over 30 inches	15	51	78

(source: J.F. Griffiths, 'Climate',  
in W.T.W. Morgan ed., East  
Africa: its peoples and  
resources (O.U.P. Nairobi 1972).

TABLE IIMAJOR CASH CROPS OF EAST AFRICA (£ MILLION)

	<u>Kenya</u>		<u>Uganda</u>		<u>Tanganyika</u>	
	<u>1928</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1928</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1928</u>	<u>1958</u>
Cotton	0.2	0.5	2.5	18.1	0.5	7.2
Sisal	0.5	2.3	-	-	1.1	10.4
Coffee	1.1	10.4	0.2	20.8	0.7	7.4
Total Exports of Agricultural Produce	2.7	29.3	3.4	41.9	3.8	31.4

(source: Tanganyika, Annual Trade Reports;  
Kenya, Statistical Abstracts;  
Annual Reports, Departments of  
Agriculture of Kenya, Uganda and  
Tanganyika.)

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. cf. W. Winnie, 'Communal Land Tenure in Chile' Annals, Association of American Geographers, Vol 55 pp 67-86.
2. In East Africa particularly in the case of Uganda, where land usage was affected by government inaction; see post, p.
3. EARC Report, op.cit., p.384.
4. In 1948, out of a recorded total of 43756 Europeans in East Africa, 29,660 lived in Kenya (EARC Report, p.11); details of the population of the three territories are included in Appendix i.
5. cf. J.R.V. Prescott, Political Geography (London 1972), Chap.5.
6. The 'White Highlands' policy was originally aimed at preventing Asian entry.
7. See Report of the East Africa Commission, (London 1925), p.181; also speech by Governor Sir E. Grigg: '... after communications what was needed was new settlers and capital'. Reported by East Africa Standard, 19.12.26. The policy had the support of the Colonial Secretary: see H.C. Debates Vol.198, Col.11.
8. For an account of the settlers in Uganda, see C.J. Ehrlich 'The Uganda Economy' in V. Harlow and E.M. Chilver eds. History of East Africa, Vol.II (Oxford 1965) pp 431-33; by 1922 the Protectorate Government had decided to rely on developing peasant agriculture: Governor's despatch no. 349 dated 27 June 1922 (CO/536/119/486).
9. C.K. Meek, Land Law and Custom in the Colonies, (Oxford 1949), p. 134.
10. cf. H.B. Fearn, An African Economy, (Oxford 1961), p. 17.
11. Some comprehensive accounts are listed in the Bibliography.
12. A. Warren 'East Africa in Transition' in B.W. Hodder and D.R. Harris eds. Africa in Transition, (London 1967), p. 203.

13. see J.M. Kenworthy, 'Rainfall and the Water Resources of East Africa' in R.W. Steel and R.M. Prothero eds., Geographers and the Tropics, (London 1964); for the importance of loss through evaporation see D.M. McMaster, 'East Africa: Influences and Trends in Land Use' in R.M. Prothero ed. A Geography of Africa, (London 1969); for the effect of altitude see W.H. Pearsall, 'Report of an ecological survey of the Serengeti National Park', Zoological Society, London 1957.
14. EARC Report, op.cit., p. 9, citing a report by L.G. Troup, 1953.
15. Ibid., p. 259.
16. C. Gillman, 'A Population Map of Tanganyika', The Geographical Review, March 1936, pp. 353-375.
17. e.g. at Ismani near Iringa, Tanganyika, a stretch of fertile land was virtually uninhabited until increased motor traffic in the mid nineteen-fifties made it possible to arrange delivery of water in steel drums.
18. For a comprehensive description of the soils of East Africa and a relevant bibliography see R.M. Scott, 'Soils', in W.T.W. Morgan ed. East Africa: its peoples and resources, (Oxford 1969).
19. e.g., compare description in the Royal Commission Report, op.cit., Chap. 20, para. 25 with the more optimistic assessment of soil potential in A. Hamersley, 'Agriculture and Land Tenure in Tanzania', Morgan, op.cit., p. 194.
20. 37,800 tons compared with 6,900 tons; source: E.A. Trade Statistics.
21. An example of a successful clearing project was the settlement of Geita district as part of the Sukumaland development scheme; in this case the clearing was accomplished comparatively inexpensively.
22. E.g., see C.J. Ehrlich, 'Some antecedents of development planning in Tanganyika', Journal of Development Studies, April 1966, where the slow development of the cotton industry in Tanganyika is compared with the satisfactory progress in Uganda.

CHAPTER IITHE GERMAN LEGACY

British control over Tanganyika was based on the Tanganyika Order in Council, 1920, which provided that the Territory was to be administered by a Governor assisted by an Executive Council. The British officials who were appointed knew little about the country and were only too glad to be advised by those with local knowledge. Thus policies adopted in the early years were essentially of a makeshift nature; but the decisions which were taken had far reaching consequences in that they confirmed the pattern of land usage and a dual system of agriculture and any radical change in policy could only be introduced with the knowledge that there would be a very hostile reaction from some quarters. It is therefore necessary to be aware of the perceptions of those who were responsible for these decisions, and of those too who supported or attacked the policies which were adopted. But because the new administration was aware of the success achieved by the Germans in fostering an economy which was rapidly expanding until the outbreak of the War it is first necessary to summarise conditions in German East Africa in 1914 and to describe the scene as it appeared to the new British administration.

German East Africa consisted of the territory which was to become Tanganyika, the kingdoms of Ruanda and Urundi and the Kionga area in the south of the colony. After the 1914-18 War the last named was transferred to the

Portuguese and Ruanda and Urundi became mandated territories administered by Belgium. It was only in these two kingdoms and the neighbouring Bukoba district of Tanganyika that the Germans gave formal permission to the tribal rulers to continue to exercise any real measure of authority over their subjects. Elsewhere, the district officer or military administrator was the sole authority over the African population although it seems he often delegated some of his powers to important chiefs.<sup>1</sup> On matters of routine administration local chiefs who were found efficient were encouraged to assist the district officer in the transmission of information or instructions from the government. If they co-operated in the collection of hut tax they received a percentage of the takings in addition to any tribute they could exact from their community. But co-operation with the district officer sometimes diminished their local prestige. In the Usambara area, chiefs who tried to enforce anti-erosion orders, or who were too energetic in recruiting labour for the plantations, soon became unpopular. On other occasions, particularly when their title to a chiefdom was disputed, government support and recognition was a valuable asset. For their part, when they found a tribal authority to be ineffective, the Germans made little attempt to improve the existing system but instead followed the Zanzibar practice by appointing an akida, usually an Arab or a Swahili from the coast. German officials were too few for effective supervision since it was thought to be a justifiable economy to employ lower-salaried local officials whenever possible.<sup>2</sup> As late as 1914 there were

only 79 expatriate administrative officers on duty in the colony.

The missionary, the plantation manager, the district officer and the government school eventually began to bring about a change in African attitudes and in some districts tribal structures were being impaired by the level of recruitment for the plantations. Nevertheless, there was still little communication between the different African communities and the cohesion of the tribal system, such as it was, remained. Often such systems denoted cultural rather than political integration although in either case the term 'tribe' remains the most convenient term to describe them. Until German control was established both tribal and clan structures were being progressively weakened by a combination of three institutions - Islam, slavery and portorage. But this process was by no means universal, for it was mainly restricted to the communities found along the slave routes or near the coast. Travel was a slow process and the distances between government stations seemed enormous. One gains the impression of a small population widely distributed and - excepting in two areas - with abundant land for their use. It was not surprising that many Germans thought that these empty spaces would offer a home for a large number of German immigrants. Touring the country in 1914, Von Lettow-Vorbeck describes the scene as follows:

'No traveller who visits these countries (Kondos-Irangi and Singida) can fail to observe that in the fertile, elevated interior there is room for the settlement of hundreds of thousands of Europeans. Here I would like to record an

impression which I only obtained later, during the war. At times we passed through fertile districts which were completely forsaken by the inhabitants, but which were known not to have been occupied even in the previous year. They had simply moved away, had settled somewhere else in the abundantly available, empty and fertile country, and had there begun to cultivate fresh fields.<sup>3</sup>

But encouraging settlers was only practicable if a prosperous economy could be established and it was not at all certain that this would be possible. After the collapse of the Maji-Maji rebellion in 1906 there was a greater emphasis on promoting the development of African agriculture. There were good reasons, it was argued, for this change of policy. Firstly, there was little doubt that the government-sponsored cotton schemes had contributed in no small degree in creating the resentment among Africans which culminated in the uprising. Secondly, the settlement of European immigrants had not proved an easy matter. A scheme to settle German peasants from Russia was a failure and the amount of capital needed by a would-be settler was such that all but the most adventurous were discouraged.<sup>4</sup> Thirdly, it was observed that the opening of the Uganda railway in 1901 had encouraged Africans near the Lake to grow more cash crops. Thus, it was argued, the building of a new railway line, at least as far as Tabora, would provide the necessary stimulus to generate increased productivity from indigenous peasant farmers.

In 1906, a new Governor, Freiherr von Rechenberg, openly encouraged the development of a 'commercial' economy, based on the export of cash crops grown by African smallholders; his policy received the full support of the

Colonial Minister, Dr. Dernburg.<sup>5</sup> Inevitably, it came in for strong criticism from the settlers who feared that the labour shortage would become even more acute. In order to implement the new thinking it was first necessary to construct a railway through the middle of the country in order to make it possible to evacuate cash crops from the more remote areas. To pay for the construction of the railway, loans had to be provided by Germany and to service these loans part of the territorial hut tax had to be used. The cost of building the railway was enormous and by 1912 over one third of the local hut tax was needed to meet the interest payments. Furthermore, a substantial proportion of the available labour force was needed to work on the line and this represented an opportunity cost since the plantations were often short-handed while the line progressed westward. In 1914 it reached Lake Tanganyika at Ujiji and was at last completed, but the War intervened before it was possible to judge whether Rechenberg's optimism was justified.<sup>6</sup> All the same, the line was there, and although it was damaged during the fighting it was a valuable asset to the new administration. Moreover, it was acquired for a near-nominal sum and the loans raised for its construction were not a charge to the mandatory power under the terms of the Peace Treaty.

The expensive railway programme, and the high cost of maintaining the Defence force which the Imperial government reluctantly continued to meet, undoubtedly stimulated the German administration to redouble their efforts to develop the economy. In spite of Rechenberg's 'commercial' policy the number of large-scale plantations and private

farms owned by settlers increased steadily. Apart from agricultural enterprise the total number of German residents also continued to grow, though never on the scale which had been hoped would be possible. In the period that some three thousand Germans went to East Africa a million of their countrymen entered the United States.

Nevertheless, the developments which took place provided substantial assets in addition to the railway for the incoming British administration. The total value of exports doubled between 1908 and 1910 to reach a total of nearly 21 million marks; by 1912 the figure had reached over 31 million marks. As had been hoped, the rise in exports had been matched by a useful increase in revenue. Although expenditure on administration was kept low there was a generous allocation of funds for improving port installations and for constructing good public buildings in the growing towns. Education of the African population was not neglected and the number and size of the government schools was steadily increased.<sup>7</sup>

The services and the expanding economy were the consequence of the increasing quantity of cash crops being exported. The plantations of ceara rubber in the coastal areas had provided a large proportion of this total until the market collapsed in 1912. Arabica coffee was first grown on Kilimanjaro in 1897, at the Kilema mission and three years later missionaries were growing it in Mbeya district. A number of settlers established estates, but it was soon found that the bushes only thrived in the areas of volcanic ash and lava soils. Coconuts and cotton were

also grown for export although cultivation of the latter was still in the experimental stage and yields were low;<sup>8</sup> nevertheless, the number of plantations continued to increase as communications to the interior improved.

But the most spectacular success was the foundation of the sisal industry and the rapid increase in importance of this new crop. The achievement of Dr. Hindorf in bringing agave sisalana to East Africa and the early history of the industry are described elsewhere;<sup>9</sup> for our purposes the significance of the development lies in the values of the exports - £367,961 in 1912, increasing to £535,579 the following year. In 1920, in spite of shipping difficulties, and the uncertain future of the Territory the figure was higher still; thus the industry provided a powerful argument for the need for plantations in the future.

In the African sector, the most important development was the expansion of the cultivation of robusta coffee in the Bukoba area after the government had established nurseries for the preparation of seedlings.<sup>10</sup> Groundnuts in the Mwanza area and cotton elsewhere in the colony contributed to the steadily growing output from African cultivators. The increase, particularly during the last three years of German rule indicates that African production of cash crops was not discouraged.<sup>11</sup> Thus at the end of the war there was an example of an economy soundly based on a dual system of agriculture to be studied and - as it turned out - to be copied by the incoming British administration.

But progress in agricultural production was not accomplished without the creation of other problems.

Alienation of land to settlers was of necessity mainly restricted to the accessible areas and as a consequence there occurred in some areas a serious deterioration in soil fertility due to a combination of overcrowding and bad land usage. In 1913, the Agricultural Adviser to the German government reported that soil conditions in West Usambara and Pare were very bad; he observed that long periods of fallow were needed but that this was no longer possible owing to the increase in the native population and alienation of land to German settlers.<sup>12</sup> The comment provides early evidence of the fact that as soon as shifting cultivation was no longer possible soil deterioration soon followed. The other unresolved problem concerned the shortage of African labour which from time to time had led to tension between the successive Governors and the settlers. Although the Maji-Maji rising had taught the Germans the need for caution, by 1914 it seemed unlikely that sufficient recruits for the plantations would ever be obtained without resort to coercion.

Another factor which represented a continuity with pre-war life was the presence of the Christian missions. In some areas the missionaries easily outnumbered all the other Europeans and thus provided the main point of contact between the races.<sup>13</sup> Their numbers had steadily increased during the German period and by 1913 there were some 465 mission stations in the colony. Between them they claimed to be teaching some 100,000 pupils. Although this figure may be exaggerated there is no doubt that the missions, together

with the government schools, had done much to provide a steadily increasing number of Africans with a basic education or training in a trade. In 1902 the government had begun to subsidise missions with the object of their teaching subordinate government officials. For their part the missions welcomed an arrangement which provided the way to compensate for the numbers of Swahili akidas and jumbes trained in the coastal schools. At the same time an increase in resources offered the means of making a greater effort to spread the Gospel through the ever increasing number of bush schools. Much of the contact with the villages was now in the hands of mission-trained African teachers and catechists and the make-shift village schools spread everywhere at a remarkable rate. The men the missions sent to the villages may have had little learning but they had no difficulty in attracting followers. The following comment offers reason for their popularity:

'To the African villager he was the apostle of the new learning, preaching emancipation from the old law, and opening vistas of a more ideal life which was attainable at least by the young and enterprising.' 14

On many occasions due recognition has been paid to a missionary achievement in providing education and medical attention at a time when communications were almost non-existent and the whole apparatus of government minimal. Their presence and their activities in remote areas provided a major influence in the changes in tribal life which were already under way. Their teaching, with its uncompromising emphasis on individual responsibility, did much to undermine the hitherto unquestioned loyalty to

traditional institutions and customs. New attitudes led in some cases to new ambitions and motivations, particularly in respect of economic decisions. But apart from these psychological influences the economic activities of the missions also offered an example to those Africans who worked with or near them. Many missions organised their own plantations, thus providing an insight into the operations of a wage-earning economy and the processes of selling cash crops after they had been harvested. It is sometimes overlooked that the Holy Ghost Fathers started plantations in the Bagamoyo area some fifteen years before Carl Peters arrived to make the treaties which marked the beginning of the colonial period.<sup>15</sup> Farther afield, in the remote area of Rungwe, north of Lake Malawi, the Moravians increased their influence by building villages peopled by their supporters, cultivating plantations and establishing their own trading post on the Lake Shore.<sup>16</sup>

Nevertheless, it was literacy which provided the leaven of modernization and the steady increase in the number of publications in Swahili from the Mission-owned presses gave Africans the opportunity to become aware of the narrow confines of their own traditional way of life. In times of crisis the missionaries provided comfort and advice and generally showed a capacity for leadership; in the early days of the German rule it was sometimes difficult for Africans to distinguish the mission from 'the government'. Their knowledge of Africans proved invaluable during the war; from the records of the UMCA we learn that one of their number was appointed District Officer at Korogwe by

the British Military Authorities and another commanded with distinction a steamer on Lake Nyasa (Malawi). Perhaps the most outstanding contribution came from Bishop Frank Weston. Concerned at the dubious methods adopted to recruit porters he undertook to raise his own Carrier Corps. He was given the local rank of major and subsequently commanded nearly two thousand men.<sup>17</sup>

Thus the German colony in 1914 presented a picture of a growing economy, an inadequate administrative framework and a missionary presence steadily increasing its influence in the rural areas. The War, which suddenly erupted onto this scene, bringing chaos and misery, might well have been kept out of East Africa, since the Governor, now Dr. H. Schnee, would dearly have liked to opt for neutrality.<sup>18</sup> However, he was unable to restrain his military commander, von Lettow-Vorbeck, who at once organized a series of raids on the Uganda railway. The British reacted by invading the territory and a war of attrition followed. Owing to the blockade, the German commander had to rely on the resources of the colony during the campaign. Dr. Schnee for his part became resigned to the inevitable collapse of his administration and settled for a policy of non-co-operation with his military commander, occasionally making dire predictions of a native uprising.<sup>19</sup> There were probably good reasons for his fears; in spite of the Dernburg reforms, corporal punishment was freely administered for a variety of minor offences up to the outbreak of the War and it would not have been surprising if some old scores had been repaid when the opportunity occurred. Meanwhile all exports of crops came

to an end and the plantations were allowed to become overgrown with weeds. But it was the African peasant who suffered the most. Both sides took his cattle and his crops and as many able-bodied men as could be found were pressed into service as porters. Men were always in short supply for this duty since losses from desertion, sickness and death were very high.<sup>20</sup>

Eventually von Lettow-Vorbeck was forced to leave the colony and when he crossed the Ruvuma River with his forces there was hope that there would be a steady return to normal. But this was not to be. In Mozambique the Germans were welcomed as liberators and thus were able to re-equip themselves with captured Portuguese weapons, much to the annoyance of the British commander.<sup>21</sup> Thus was the conflict prolonged and while it lasted little thought could be given to reconstruction. Some consolation, however, was offered in that the British missionaries, released from internment in Tabora, were able to return to their stations and offer some hope that better days were imminent. But without supplies and equipment of any kind there was little practical aid which they could offer. One of them, teaching at a mission near Korogwe, describes the conditions she found when she returned there in 1916 and her account gives some idea of what the War meant to the African villager:

'Even when they came back the teachers had a very difficult time at first. Their houses had been looted and had fallen down, and their schools and wattle and daub churches were just heaps of mud. Though their people were delighted to welcome them back, rebuilding was not so easy, for most of the able-bodied men had been carried off as porters either by the Germans or the English, and those who had escaped were afraid that they too would be captured if they were seen doing active work.'

Nevertheless, not all areas were affected by the fighting for the same length of time. In December 1916 a civil administration was established and Mr. Horace Byatt assumed charge of the area lying to the East of the Mwanza-Tabora road and north of the Central Line.<sup>23</sup> To assist him some experienced officials were seconded to his staff from British East Africa and South Africa. The military forces also provided men to join him. Subsequently, in January 1919, the Administrator assumed responsibility for the whole of the area which was to become known as Tanganyika except for the districts still under Belgian control.

During this period most of the German-appointed African officials were retained by the British and they carried on with their duties as before. The local knowledge and experience of the police force which had served the Germans was found invaluable and all but a few were reinstated.<sup>24</sup> The military authorities retained control of the railways and in spite of the damage which had been inflicted by the retreating Germans the Tanga line was working again by 1916 and the Central line a year later. A Custodian of Enemy Property was appointed to control the German plantations and to dispose of the crops. As a temporary measure the German owners or their agents remained in charge of the day-to-day management if they so wished; where the plantations had been abandoned by their former owners the Custodian offered them on short term leases. Since there were few British subjects of military age who were not with the forces most of the lessees were of Greek origin.<sup>25</sup>

Meanwhile elsewhere the debate on the future of the country was taking place. As the War continued the British missionaries in particular began to campaign to prevent Germany ever regaining control of her colony. The Bishop of Zanzibar wrote an open letter to General Smuts entitled "The Black Serfs of Prussia" and in Britain the UMCA published a pamphlet called "Bond or Free" in the hope that public sympathy would be aroused. Other contemporary accounts containing strong criticisms of German methods began to circulate. Thus it soon became clear that although there was uncertainty about which power would be responsible for the country the German administration would not return. In reply to a German protest about the wording of Article 119 of the Peace Treaty between the Allies and Germany the Government drafted an Allied Note to the effect that the former colonial subjects were strongly opposed to being under German rule again.

In spite of the British government's public pronouncements, in private there was more argument. Since the Allies were prepared to accept President Wilson's principle of self-determination - at least in those cases where it did not cause a conflict with their own special interests - the Colonial Office had asked Byatt whether it would be possible to hold a plebiscite in Tanganyika in order to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. His reply was not reassuring; he pointed out that the demands of the military for labour and livestock and the heavy casualties among the porters had left the African peasant farmer 'not particularly well disposed to the British'.

He clearly implied that a plebiscite might lead to a demand for the restitution of German control.<sup>26</sup> There is little doubt that Africans who had exercised authority under the Germans, the chiefs and minor officials, felt a good deal more comfortable working for a European who could make up his mind when a wrong-doer was apprehended and order swift, if harsh, retribution. To many Africans their new rulers seemed amiable but undecided. In some districts the British officials knew only too well that their control was extremely tenuous and that a light hand was necessary. Orde-Browne in a memorandum warned that the lives of government officers in the more remote areas would be at risk for some time to come.<sup>27</sup> P.E. Mitchell, ordered to proceed on foot from Nyasaland (Malawi) to take over the administration of Ufipa district, describes a situation which was repeated many times elsewhere in the territory as the new administration assumed control:

"In mid-1917, I arrived at a remote, unadministered part of the south east of German East Africa, seconded from my regiment with orders to set up at least a rudimentary civil authority. I had my servants, an African sergeant, porters for my goods, and some twenty police uniforms and rifles and a little ammunition for them. Arrived at the chosen place - a mission station, in itself typical of the sequence so frequent in those days - I summoned the local chiefs, explained that I was the government and would they please provide me with twenty young men to be policemen?..... They were courteous and affable, provided my police recruits, and assured me that they understood all I had said and would obey the new laws. No doubt they did nothing of the sort; but why did they not just knock me on the head, help themselves to the rifles, and have nothing to do with this self-appointed government?"<sup>28</sup>

The fact that the new British officials were the representatives of the Power which had driven the Germans

from the country earned them some respect at first although it was recognized as unlikely that such reflected glory would be particularly durable. Probably the majority of Africans contrasted the days of German rule with the chaos of the War years and were content to see the return of a more orderly state of affairs. In places bedevilled with parochial quarrels or the fear of witch-craft there was something reassuring in the presence once more of an impartial stranger representing the 'government'.

By 1919, there were 109 administrative officers in the Territory and in nearly all districts they were the representatives of all branches of government. Their life was uncomfortable and their task of restoring law and order made difficult by a severe famine, followed by epidemics of small-pox and influenza. In Dodoma and Kondoa Irangi, parents pawned their children for food and it was several years before families were reunited. In Masasi it was reported that 'there was no food left and people were existing by eating natural food in the wilderness.'<sup>29</sup> The same officer who made the report found that the damage caused by elephants made people disheartened and reluctant to plant crops when the drought ended.<sup>30</sup>

From the reports of the period, it seems clear that as soon as the famine was ended, priority was given to the task of selecting chiefs who would be recognized as native authorities and thereby expected to assist in the process of restoring normality. Administrative officers who found themselves bogged down with hundreds of competing claims and complained that many of those already recognized

were thoroughly ineffectual.<sup>31</sup> In some instances, the complaints were more serious; Barnes, in Kahama, described the Sultans in the western part of the district as being 'self-indulgent, existing on bribery and extortion.'<sup>32</sup>

With administrative officers fully engaged in political matters and with the economy in ruins, the new government found no tabula rasa which permitted the introduction of radical innovations. It has been observed elsewhere that the terms of the Mandate afforded plenty of latitude in deciding land policies;<sup>33</sup> nevertheless, in practical terms the options were limited. Britain had agreed to recognize freehold titles granted by the Germans; since some of these were estates or plantations the dual system of agriculture, to some extent, was bound to continue. Many of the holders of freehold titles were not German citizens and their rights had to be respected. Moreover, the potential contribution of the estates to the economy could not be ignored; to some extent, their development depended on creating confidence in the security of tenure over land.

Nevertheless, since he preferred the Uganda to the Kenya model, Byatt knew he needed Colonial Office support if expansion of the non-African sector was to be halted or even delayed; in a despatch, he summarised the issues and sought guidance.<sup>34</sup> On leave in London in 1919, he discussed his views with Amery, whose main concern was to increase British influence in the area.<sup>35</sup> A compromise was reached: German owners were to be expropriated; further alienation was, for a time, to proceed slowly; private corporations would start 'encouraging natives to grow produce for sale.'<sup>36</sup> Thus the stage was set for the even development of both sectors of the agricultural system.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. For an account of the German system of district administration, see report of S.St.J. Orde Browne in Tanganyika Annual Report, 1920, (London 1921), p. 33.
2. See G. Graf von Gotzen, Deutsch-Ostafrika im Aufstand, 1905-6 (Berlin 1909), p. 35.
3. P. von Lettow-Vorbeck, My Reminiscences of East Africa, (London n.d.), p. 11.
4. At the time it was estimated 'that settlers without capital resources of £500 or more would only succeed if they obtained land in the Usambara or Langenburg areas'; W.H. Dawson, Evolution of modern Germany, (London 1908), p. 395.
5. For a detailed examination of Rechenberg's governorship, see J. Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule, (Cambridge 1969).
6. Dr. Iliffe describes the Central Line as 'a monument to a policy which failed'. This seems a somewhat harsh judgement; the results of the policy could not be fairly assessed until the Line was given the opportunity to operate for a few years and the War intervened before this was possible. However it is difficult to see how it could have succeeded; after von Lindquist replaced Dernburg the settlers obtained much more control over policy and consequently would have probably prevented the development of the African agricultural sector.
7. At a time when it was unfashionable to compliment the Germans about anything it was conceded that they had been very successful in their programme for African education; A.R., op.cit., p. 41.
8. See A.R. op.cit., pp. 54-6; cotton was grown on plantations and African smallholdings, each source providing approximately equal proportions of the crop.
9. E.g., Hill and Moffett, op.cit., pp. 420-421.
10. Production by 1912 was approximately 1,000 tons, the greater part of this total coming from Bukoba.
11. cf. WBR p. 21, where a contrary view is expressed.
12. Extracts from the report are cited in the Governor's despatch dated 15 March 1921, CO 691/43/267.

13. E.g., in 1914 out of a total white population of 190 in Ruanda and Urundi, 130 were missionaries. W.R. Louis, Ruanda-Urundi 1884-1919, (Oxford 1963), p. 204.
14. R. Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, (London 1952), pp. 201-2.
15. Sir Bartle Frere, Eastern Africa as a Field for Missionary Labours, (London 1874), p. 48, where he describes the Bagamoyo mission as cultivating plantations of some 80 acres. Liberated slaves worked on the land and were taught French and various manual skills.
16. Jahresbericht de Brudergemeine for years 1900-1910, cited by Oliver, op.cit., p. 174.
17. See A.G. Blood, History of U.M.C.A., Vol II (London 1957).
18. According to Art.X, Berlin Act 1885, either Power could have declared their colonies neutral in the event of a conflict between them.
19. A British Medical Officer at Morogoro has described how he learned from his German assistants that the settlers in the vicinity had been issued with poison for taking their own lives in the event of an uprising; R.W. Dolbey, Sketches of the East African Campaign (London 1918).
20. '...of 1,000 carriers recruited at Ukerewe .... after a few months only six remained.' C. Hordern, Military Operations East Africa (London 1941), p. 439 f.n.
21. The Portuguese natives welcomed him (von Lettow) everywhere as releasing them from the hated Portuguese.' General Northey, War Diary December 1917; CO 691/14/12.
22. An account by Miss Abdy, in History of UMCA, op.cit., p. 118; see also M. Fortie, The Black and the Beautiful, (London 1938), p. 156.
23. Sir Horace Archer Byatt (1875-1933) subsequently became the Territory's first Governor, 1920-1925.
24. A.R. 1920, op.cit., p. 76.
25. G.F. Sayers, Tanganyika Territory, (London 1930), p. 97.
26. From the minutes filed with Byatt's despatch in the Colonial Office it is clear that his view was respected and it was decided to abandon any idea of a plebiscite, despatch dated 22 March 1918  
CO 691/14/406

27. AR 1920. op.cit., p. 34.
28. P.E. Mitchell, 'Africa and the West in Historical Perspective', C. Grove Haines ed., Africa Today, (Baltimore 1955), p. 11. Sir Philip Mitchell (1890-1964), Tanganyika 1920-35; Governor, Uganda 1935-40; Governor, Kenya 1944-52.
29. W.S.G. Barnes, safari diary 22 February 1920, (O.C.R.P.)
30. Ibid.; '... the more they plant, the greater the attraction to the elephants ...'
31. For an insight into the relationship between District Officers and Chiefs, see Diaries, F.J. Bagshawe, 1919-1922. (O.C.R.P.)
32. Barnes, safari report 1921 (O.C.R.P.)
33. cf. K. Ingham, 'Tanganyika: the Mandate and Cameron', in Harlow and Chilver, op.cit., p. 550.
34. Memorandum enclosed with despatch dated 16 November 1918; CO 691/16/342
35. Ibid.; Byatt recognized the dilemma in that the estates were necessary for the economy, but if German owners remained in possession and if, as he wanted, no further alienation was permitted, British settlers would always be heavily outnumbered.
36. Minute, Amery to Colonial Secretary (Lord Milner); his proposals were issued as a directive to Byatt, dated 14 August 1919; CO/691/16/357

### CHAPTER III

#### THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAND TENURE LAWS

The most direct way that governments in Africa have been able to affect the course of white settlement is by the enacting of laws to regulate the occupation and transfer of land. Thus, in Tanganyika, the Land Ordinance and allied laws and orders which empowered the Governor to take decisions concerning land alienation are central to any discussion of the question of the settlement of non-Africans and it is necessary to know how this legislation came into existence. With its aid, the Governor could exercise his discretion and controlled not only the extent of the settlement but also the sectors of the Territory where it would be permitted.

#### African Land Rights

Several of the senior officials appointed to the new British administration of Tanganyika had previous service in Kenya and were well aware that whatever land policies were adopted, they were liable to lead to much controversy. Experience in Kenya had taught them that if land belonged to an African community but remained unoccupied it was difficult to refuse requests from would-be settlers who were prepared to make use of it. Furthermore, they had found that an African's rights were by no means assured even when he was in lawful possession of land; a Court decision had

made it clear that any security of tenure under customary law had been undermined by the Kenya Land Ordinance, 1915 and the Order in Council of 1921.<sup>1</sup> Even the provisional demarcation of Reserves had offered little protection. Since they had not yet been formally established, the Kenya government was quite prepared to allow excisions to be made when it was expedient to do so. Thus part of the Nandi Reserve in the Kipkarren area was excised to provide land for a soldier settlement scheme. It was therefore possible that similar inroads into native-owned lands might occur in Tanganyika if a settler community ever became a powerful pressure group.

But in Tanganyika there was an important difference. The terms of the Mandate required the British government to respect the rights over land of the native population and the Permanent Mandates Commission would, it was believed, ensure that the terms were observed. The first task of the new administration was to discover how these rights could be identified and protected. This was no easy matter since there was a great diversity in the traditional laws and customs relating to land usage. Physical conditions were a major influence on local custom; soil fertility in particular determined agricultural practices in an area and they in turn played a part in shaping the rules which gradually developed and which became accepted by a community. However, certain broad generalizations are possible. In most areas, individual rights in land were limited and ultimate ownership was vested in the tribe, clan or family. Nevertheless, the individual could acquire a right of user

and this could not be challenged provided he cleared his land and used it in the proper way. When customary law followed this pattern it was adequate provided two conditions were met: first, that there was sufficient fertile land available so that shifting cultivation could be practised; and, second, that perennial crops were not planted. Rules based on collective tenure were less popular once plantations of coffee or bananas were established and in some areas the rights over such plantations were only a little short of freehold. These crops need soils which are either naturally fertile or at least have been improved and, as elsewhere in the world, it is those who farm the most fertile land who are the first to demand individual ownership.<sup>2</sup>

Another type of customary land tenure existed in certain parts of Western Tanganyika. It was feudal in form and in many respects similar to the system existing in Northern Nigeria and near-by Buganda. In Bukoba district, where the best-known example occurred, the system was known as nyarubanja;<sup>3</sup> the German administration had approved of it on the grounds that it could provide an incentive in the development of African coffee growing. Uganda already provided an impressive and relevant example of what might be achieved by fear.<sup>4</sup> Over the years, the status of the occupiers of nyarubanja land gradually improved but no radical changes were made until after Independence.<sup>5</sup> Unless there were exceptional reasons the administration was never prepared to force the pace in changing native law and custom and it was recognized that in the case of land tenure the issues were particularly complex.<sup>6</sup>

The Germans were prepared to acknowledge that Africans enjoyed some form of rights over land and their guide-lines were prescribed in the Imperial Decree of 1895. All land was declared to be Crown Land but the right of the Crown was subject to the rights of private persons, chiefs and African communities being observed. A local ordinance the following year authorised the appointment of Land Commissions for the purpose of advising on what land might be suitable for alienation and of deciding the extent of native reserves they thought necessary. For the latter, the observed rule was to set aside at least four times the amount of land they found under cultivation. This was supposed to be sufficient to allow for shifting cultivation as well as for a future increase in the African population. In spite of these precautions, the extent of the land left for the Africans was sometimes insufficient, as the Germans themselves admitted.<sup>7</sup>

In the early days German settlers obtained a freehold title over land alienated to them. However, after 1903 it became the practice for the government to lease land for a term of twenty-five years. If he fulfilled certain development conditions, the lessee could apply to be granted a freehold title. It was also possible in some cases to acquire by prescription a freehold title; such instances most often occurred in the coastal areas and concerned town plots or coconut plantations. In all, by 1914, grants of freehold title amounted to about 1,300,000 acres of land.

Following the decision taken earlier, already described, freehold titles obtained before the publication of the Land

Ordinance, 1923 were recognized as valid, but if the title holders were German nationals, they were obliged to surrender their properties and leave the Territory. The Custodian of Enemy Property was empowered to dispose of these properties by auction and to use the proceeds to compensate British nationals, most of them being Indian traders, who had outstanding claims against the German administration.<sup>8</sup> Not all of these properties were offered for sale again. A number of estates, mostly undeveloped and situated in the mountain areas near the Northern border, were restored to tribal ownership.<sup>9</sup> The first annual report from the Territory had referred to the problems which had been inherited in this area, complaining of the legacy of an overcrowded and discontented native community on the one hand and with large and valuable properties handicapped for lack of sufficient labour on the other.<sup>10</sup> The restitutions which were made constituted a modest attempt to remove the first mentioned cause for complaint; nevertheless, since the extent of the problem was recognized it may seem strange that Byatt did not seize an opportunity which he must have known would never recur by handing back more estates than he did. The reason is apparent from the Colonial Office records.<sup>11</sup> Since outright expropriation was ruled out the properties had to be purchased and since at this time the Administration was unable to balance the Budget for the Territory it meant that the British Treasury kept a watchful eye on all expenditure. Thus, in spite of Colonial Office approval for his plans, the Governor was compelled to proceed cautiously; especially so, since the local Press

was highly critical of his actions.<sup>12</sup> The result was that a pattern of settlement was established in the Arusha area with nearly one third of the habitable area in the hands of settlers, described as constituting 'an iron ring around Mount Meru.'<sup>13</sup>

It was hoped that the second of the complaints quoted above would be answered by ensuring that the ex-German estates were auctioned as quickly as possible. A shortage of labour was not particularly a problem at this time and in fact the Administration had allowed labour recruiters from Kenya to operate in the Territory. The real problem was the difficulty caused by the lack of investment in the estates which was bound to persist until their future was decided. Delay had to be avoided and inevitably perhaps some estates were sold at well below their real value and soon exchanged hands again at much higher prices.<sup>14</sup>

There was an interval of over two years between the issue of the original Order in Council of 1920 and the enactment of the Land Ordinance. When it was finally promulgated it provided the guide-lines for the land policies to be adopted by the Administration and it consolidated the pattern of land settlement which had been emerging ever since the Imperial Decree of 1895. If the environment was chiefly responsible for what could be grown in Tanganyika this one law, which regulated land usage as well as land tenure, determined the sort of people involved and the means to be adopted in the development of agriculture in the years which followed. The Tanganyika Land Ordinance was drafted in the light of British experience in other parts of Africa,

notably Northern Nigeria, and on the interpretation of the terms of the Mandate. The Northern Nigerian Land Ordinance in turn had been based on the findings of the Lands Committee which had investigated the matter shortly before the First World War.<sup>15</sup> The Committee had come to the somewhat ingenious conclusion that the 'ultimate' ownership of the land had been vested in the chiefs but this had passed to the British by conquest; nevertheless, the Report was clearly of the opinion that the rights so acquired had to be exercised for the use and common benefit of the natives. The law based on these recommendations prescribed that all land whether occupied or unoccupied was subject to disposition by the Governor but that he had to administer them according to the principles declared above.<sup>16</sup> And since such principles seemed to be similar to those expressed in the terms of the Mandate it was convenient, when the land law for Tanganyika was framed, to make use of the Northern Nigerian example.

The wording of the Mandate was such that the administering authority was allowed considerable latitude in interpretation. Concerning land alienation, the following extracts are relevant:

Article 3:

The Mandatory shall be responsible for the peace order and good government of the Territory, and shall undertake to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of its inhabitants ....

Article 6:

In the framing of laws relating to the holding or transfer of land, the Mandatory .... shall respect the rights and safeguard the interests of the native population. No native land may

be transferred without the previous consent of the public authorities and no real rights over native lands in favour of non-natives may be created except with the same consent .....

From the above it is clear that there would have been little difficulty in justifying a policy of alienating land on a considerable scale providing it could be argued convincingly that the African population would obtain material benefit and social progress as a result. Thus, with very broad terms of reference, with directions which contained no reason for conflict with the policies the British government wanted to see adopted, the conditions of the Mandate gave no cause for international opinion to play an obvious part in determining the land policies adopted in Tanganyika during the Mandate.<sup>17</sup> Direct control was in the hands of the Colonial Secretary; he could determine what legislation was enacted, he could supplement the regulatory effects of the land laws by issuing administrative instructions, and he could get his decisions endorsed by seeking the collective approval of the Cabinet. But the laws, once approved, gave wide powers to the Governor and through him the Tanganyika administration was able to restrict or encourage white settlement as the needs of the Territory were perceived. All the same, it was appreciated in Dar es Salaam that the Colonial Secretary would expect international criticism not to be disregarded.

#### The Permanent Mandates Commission

Although they were in general agreement with the land policies, members of the P.M.C. for a time expressed

concern about the security of tenure over land enjoyed by Africans and were instrumental in causing the laws to be changed. Otherwise, the Commission's powers were very limited. It could advise the League Council 'on all matters relating to the observance of the Mandates'. It had no power to render any decisions or to make direct recommendations to the Mandatories. It received an annual report from every Mandate which was examined in the presence of representatives from the Governments concerned. It could therefore inform itself on how policies were being implemented but when it was dissatisfied there was no method of taking direct action. However, both the League and the P.M.C. managed to exercise some influence; Lord Hailey was himself a member of the Commission when he wrote as follows:

'It is not surprising that many consider the value of the proceedings of the Commission and Council to lie in the indirect influence of publicity rather than in the direct influence over policy.'<sup>18</sup>

Perhaps this view overstates the influence of international opinion at this time. However, Lord Lugard also considered that the Commission performed its function with success and attributed its influence to three facts. It never criticised a Mandatory directly, its opinions were always expressed as the collective view of the members and finally the members consistently maintained an attitude of political impartiality.<sup>19</sup> It would be easy enough to be cynical about his last point but nevertheless if today's delegates in the United Nations were permitted to adopt more flexible attitudes on world problems it might well increase the authority of the General Assembly. Others, however, notably

the settlers in East Africa and their friends in London, were consistently critical of the Commission and all it stood for. They never lost an opportunity to point out that whereas Britain provided any information which was requested and sought to act in accordance with the spirit of the Mandate, other powers often ignored with impunity inquiries from the Commission and other institutions of the League.<sup>20</sup>

But although the administration in Tanganyika was free to take decisions on the settlement issue providing the terms of the Land Ordinance were observed, nevertheless in the juridical sense Britain as a Mandatory power did have less freedom of action than would have been the case had Tanganyika been a colony or a Protectorate. Shortly after the commencement of the Mandate, it was agreed that the community of Tanganyika was the owner of the land and the British authorities were only trustees, possessing the power of management.<sup>21</sup> Thus, in contrast to the practice adopted in British possessions elsewhere, land in Tanganyika was not alienated in perpetuity. There were certain exceptions to this rule allowed, which are mentioned below. Although the principle behind the rule is important it is necessary not to exaggerate its significance. For however important it might be for a lawyer, to an African tribesman who found that his ancestral lands had been declared to be part of a settler's farm, there was little consolation for him to learn that the alienated land was only held on a ninety-nine year lease. Leasehold, as opposed to freehold, might affect the relationship between the Tanganyika

administration and the settler; in the African's eyes the settler was there and was likely to remain there.

### The Mandate and the Land Ordinance.

The terms of the Mandate when they were published did not escape criticism in Britain. For some it was very necessary to make specific guarantees to safeguard African rights over their land so that the problems which had arisen in Southern Rhodesia would be avoided. Concern was expressed by the London-based League of Nations Union. Through the medium of the Times newspaper, the government was asked to seek an amendment of the wording of the Mandate so that no African could ever be dispossessed of land which he lawfully occupied. The Union was not without some influence and the incumbent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, W. Ormsby-Gore, had himself been a leading member until accepting office. From the minutes on the files it is clear that the best course was to refuse the demand without provoking a confrontation and a deliberately non-committal reply ended the matter. Nevertheless, the incident provided a warning to the Colonial Office that the land laws for the Territory in the course of preparation would be expected to contain adequate safeguards for the African population.<sup>22</sup>

The Land Ordinance which came into operation in 1923, had the most direct bearing on land usage during the period of British administration. Its intentions were made clear from the preamble, which was as follows:

'Whereas it is expedient that the existing customary rights of the natives of Tanganyika Territory to use and enjoy the land of the territory and the natural fruits thereof in sufficient quantities to enable them to provide for the sustenance of themselves, their families and their posterity, should be assured, protected and preserved .....

But in addition to protecting the rights over land which Africans already enjoyed, the Ordinance was designed to secure the best possible use was made of land over which anyone claimed that he had a title as a result of alienation permitted by the Government. This is made clear, not only in the Ordinance but also, and more explicitly, in the Land Regulations published in 1926. Holding on to undeveloped land for speculative purposes had been common practice throughout the British Empire and the Colonial Office had several precedents for guidance in dealing with the problem when it arose. The usual methods adopted in previous cases had been either to impose a Land Tax on undeveloped land or to give governments powers of re-possession if land remained undeveloped after a specific period.<sup>23</sup> The second method was followed in Tanganyika; the Land Regulations prescribed the different amounts of investment in the property which had to be undertaken within three years and five years of the grant being made. The Regulations only partly achieved their aim since it was perfectly legitimate for the lessee to put no money into his farming enterprise but to spend his funds in building a substantial dwelling house for himself. However this at least displayed some interest in the property and was presumably better than leaving it derelict until a purchaser could be found.

In its attempt to provide some security of tenure for Africans, the Land Ordinance came in for considerable criticism.<sup>24</sup> In order to comply with the recommendations of the P.M.C. the Ordinance was later amended so that it was made quite clear that an African holding land under native law and custom had just as good a title as anyone holding a lease in the category of a right of occupancy.<sup>25</sup> In most cases responsibility for the disposition of public lands rested with the Governor. The exception to this rule was when the area in question exceeded five thousand acres, when the approval of the Secretary of State had to be obtained. Provided there was no devolution of the Governor's powers to Boards of Commissions having non-officials as members and providing the Governor was supported by the Colonial Secretary - or if necessary restrained - there was no reason to suppose that the principles of the Mandate and the declarations of intent by the British government would ever be overlooked. For it was not only the provisions of the Land Ordinance which afforded the Governor with the means to control white settlement. A Land Acquisition Ordinance was passed allowing the government to acquire any land, including that held under a right of occupancy, if it was needed for 'public purposes'. This term was specifically defined so as to include land required for the use of the native inhabitants. And another law made it possible to control land transactions. Under the Law of Property and Conveyancing Ordinance a native was prevented from transferring his land to a non-native.<sup>26</sup>

The powers to control land settlement and land

usage which were thus acquired by the Tanganyika administration were welcomed in London. In response to a request the Land Ordinance had been made available in the House of Commons and when the subject came up for debate Colonel Wedgwood for the Opposition commented as follows:

'.... the Land Ordinance ... shows the right spirit. Once you have the fundamental land law you save the liberties of these people; you allow them to work on their own land and you do not force them to go out to work for an employer.'<sup>27</sup>

In his reply the spokesman for the government observed that he was glad to hear that the Colonel had been converted

'to one of the oldest principles of Toryism namely peasant proprietorship, the traditional stage between tribal ownership and individual ownership.'<sup>28</sup>

Neither comment shows any insight into the crux of the problem of how to convince the peasant farmer that not only was he secure in his title over land he occupied and utilised but also that the alienation of apparently unoccupied land would not proceed on such a scale that he and his children would find there was no new land left for cultivation or that the opportunities for grazing cattle were badly affected. Similarly, the amendment to the Ordinance mentioned above, made at the instance of the P.M.C., failed to provide the necessary reassurance. Consequently when land was alienated for European settlers it became necessary to show that the tribal authorities agreed that it was unoccupied at the time it was alienated or that in cases where it was occupied, the residents were willing to move in return for compensation. Where compensation was accepted and paid, there is no indication that administrative

officers ever resorted to improper pressure to obtain agreement. Nevertheless, it is more than probable that there were occasions when chiefs or a headman might see an advantage in finding land for a potential settler. In such cases they may well have induced the occupant to relinquish his land, particularly when they were able to allocate land elsewhere in the same village.<sup>29</sup>

This problem, and the growing awareness that it was impossible to convince Africans that alienated land ceased to be tribal property, prompted the government to change the procedures used in negotiating land alienations. By 1938 previous instructions had been consolidated and incorporated into a new directive which was to be observed for the rest of the colonial period.<sup>30</sup> The procedure to be adopted was divided into three distinct stages. First, a preliminary report was necessary, in which the African reaction to the application would be recorded. The second stage consisted of an inspection of the properties of those who would be required to move on receipt of compensation. Third there was the payment of compensation against the signatures of the recipients; it had been found that there were instances in the past when compensation had been negotiated and paid on an informal basis and subsequently the recipients felt that they had been unjustly moved from their land. Finally, as a safeguard against the criticism that non-African settlement left the natives dispossessed and landless, the administrative officer making the inspection was required to certify that other land was available for anyone who was being asked to move.

The Land Laws and separate development.

As can be clearly seen in Southern Africa, the most striking example of political decisions affecting land usage occurs when a policy of separate development on a racial basis is adopted. To some extent and for a time this policy was followed in Tanganyika and it is necessary to know how it came to be accepted and the legal basis which supported it. Officials in Tanganyika in the nineteen-twenties perceived that complete segregation of races into settlement areas was clearly difficult to achieve since freehold titles to land obtained during the German period had been recognized as valid. Some of these parcels of land had common boundaries and formed large blocks but others were well scattered and surrounded by African cultivation. Nevertheless, it was still possible to ensure that future alienations were confined to land adjoining other areas of non-African settlement. In other parts of British-ruled Africa where there had been substantial white settlement it had been the practice to divide the available land into blocks either to be made available for settlement or for designation as native reserves with the ownership vested in tribal communities. To the Colonial Office the advantage in this formal division of land in a territory under its charge was that it was easier to resist pressure from a Governor or a settler lobby demanding that more land should be made available for settlement. Many local administrators preferred separation on a racial basis. When the races were intermingled a variety of disputes and tensions arose.

There was constant ill-feeling caused - or so it seemed to the European farmer - by repeated cases of trespass by neighbouring Africans as well as their failure to prevent the spread of diseases affecting both crops and cattle. To the African, the European settler was always the mgeni, an interloper who had no cause to be aggressive about his so-called rights, and particularly so when much of the land over which he claimed ownership was left undeveloped.

It has been suggested that the terms of the Mandate endorsed the principle that there should be no separation of settlement on a racial basis.<sup>31</sup> A White Paper of 1930 states that it would be contrary to the terms of the Mandate to depart from a principle of equality of opportunity 'in the disposal of all Crown (public) lands irrespective of race, colour or religion.'<sup>32</sup> More support comes from a comment of the Territory's second Governor, Sir Donald Cameron, who was convinced that the creation of reserves would be contrary to the Mandate.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand it would have been very easy to cite Article 6, extracts of which are quoted above, and argue that the creation of reserves was the best way of safeguarding the interests of the native population. After all, in Kenya Dr. Arthur, the missionary representing native interests, had pressed the government there for some time to publish in the Official Gazette the details of the Reserve boundaries so that no more land could be excised and made available for new settlers. Thus it depended on whether reserves were to be considered as designating a particularly favourable area for European settlement or whether they were intended to prevent

land required in the future for Africans being gradually infiltrated by European settlers. The administration in Tanganyika adopted a policy of segregation in practice while deprecating it in principle. Applying a policy followed by the German administration, large areas of the country were closed to alienation; and in areas where alienation was permitted Africans never had access to sufficient capital to satisfy development conditions and thus were effectively excluded.

It is quite certain that any strictly enforced division of the land into areas reserved for different races would benefit no one and to try to achieve separation where interspersions had already taken place would incur a prohibitive cost. In fact it was pragmatism and not principle which guided the administration in this matter. As already explained, in the early nineteen-twenties it was necessary to make the existing estates profitable wherever they happened to be. This required the granting of adequate security of title to the new owners so that they would be willing to undertake the necessary development. Thus, the status quo was confirmed and the interspersions of non-African estates and African settlements and shambas continued. To remove the Europeans and Asians to land elsewhere would have delayed the recovery of the existing estates; to move the Africans in the neighbourhood would have needed military forces on a scale which was not readily available. When questioned by the Parliamentary Select Committee, the Territory's second Governor, Sir Donald Cameron, explained that separation of settlement on a racial basis even if it

were desirable, was not a practical proposition. As he put it:

'You must either refuse to grant land which is available and suitable because it is surrounded by natives, or, alternatively, you must move the natives. And ... if you attempt to do the latter you will have to use armed force and you will not succeed even then.'<sup>34</sup>

The physical environment rather than commercial or social considerations had produced this mixed pattern of settlement. Possibilities for settlement in Tanganyika were very different from those found in Kenya where a comparatively compact area provided conditions not only suitable for mixed farming but also for Europeans to settle on a permanent basis. It was therefore not surprising that the European settlers and their supporters demanded that this area should be reserved for white settlement or that the Kenya government agreed to their demands. Tanganyika in contrast, had pockets of land with a development potential in widely scattered parts of the Territory with intervening areas which would never attract risk capital. There were hopes, too, that a much greater variety of crops might be grown successfully than was the case in Kenya by making the best use of differing climatic conditions. Mindful of the collapse of the rubber industry, the administration encouraged diversification in case the well-established crops, such as coffee and sisal, fell on hard times.

However, after a time political reasons were to carry more weight than economic ones and in spite of a commonly-argued case for interspersion on educational grounds discussed later, the administration came to prefer the alienated land to be concentrated and contiguous as far

as possible. In view of the difficulties of implementing such a policy, of necessity the solution was a compromise and it is of interest not only because of its influence on the eventual settlement pattern but also because it throws some light on the relationship between the Colonial Secretary and a Colonial Governor.

In the Report of the Hilton Young Commission investigating the possibilities of Closer Union it had been recommended that 'so far as possible, settled areas and native areas should be arranged in continuous blocks ... to build up homogeneous native and non-native units for local government.'<sup>35</sup> This suggestion was taken up by Mitchell, now Secretary for Native Affairs, and he persuaded the 1929 Administrative Officers Conference to recommend that certain provinces should be closed to alienation unless there were exceptional reasons for accepting an application. Mitchell argued that if the settlers ever obtained some measure of self-government, the division he advocated would prevent them from interfering with the native authority system which was in the course of development. As he explained the position at a later date to the Joint Select Committee, he wanted to see Native Territories withdrawn from non-native politics and mixed areas where association was emphasised in every possible way.<sup>36</sup>

Cameron proceeded cautiously with the proposal. First, he obtained comments on the value of white settlement from each of the provincial commissioners concerned and when he was certain that they wanted to see no further increase he forwarded their comments to London together with his

despatch explaining that he intended to restrict further alienation in five provinces. The Colonial Secretary accepted his proposals and in order to prevent any backsliding at a future date directed that any further alienations in these provinces must be referred to him.<sup>37</sup> Later the same month London received another despatch with the information that a leading settler had observed that a Governor's tenure of office was very temporary and the policy could be quickly changed when economic development was again given priority.<sup>38</sup> The Office reacted by telling Cameron to publish as an official notice a list of the provinces closed to alienation and Drummond Shiels, the Under-Secretary noted in a minute:

'It gives some guarantee of permanence of this wise policy when other Governors reign in Tanganyika.'<sup>39</sup>

Thus, a policy of limited separate development came to be approved and Lord Hailey in his description of Tanganyika merely mentions without further comment the need to preserve racial homogeneity.<sup>40</sup> Settlers predictably opposed the policy on the grounds that it might restrict opportunities for further settlement. The P.M.C. asked for a fuller explanation of the decision and subsequently recorded their approval of the move. Thereafter, the policy remained unquestioned while there was any possibility of settler interests exerting an adverse effect on the native authority system. It was eventually abandoned when there was a change of emphasis from the need to protect African interests to the aim of achieving better land utilization. But this was for the future; for the period of the Mandate the principles

expressed in its Instrument were endorsed and elaborated by the Land Ordinance and its amendments. Land utilization and the location of settlement meanwhile were controlled by the Regulations issued under the Ordinance and by the administrative action described above.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. Gathomo vs. Indangara (1920) EALR 129.
2. cf. land tenure in Chile where it has been found that there is common ownership of poor land and individual tenure of fertile land. Winnie, op.cit.
3. Similar systems existed in Ngara district (Matonge), and Ukerewe district (Obusi).
4. Ante, p.24
5. For a detailed account of the steps taken since Independence see R.W. James, Land Tenure in Tanzania, (Nairobi 1971).
6. The Tanganyika Order in Council 1920 prescribed that the courts should recognize native law subject to certain conditions; the Land Tenure Ordinance 1923, sec.13, provided that native laws and customs concerning the inheritance of land should be observed in appropriate circumstances. The Land Tenure Ordinance was subsequently renamed the Land Ordinance and became Cap. 113, Laws of Tanganyika, (1948) and in any reference to it the latter title is used.
7. Ante, p.47
8. German Property (Liquidation) Ordinance, 1921.
9. The extent of the properties reverting to tribal use amounted to 30,000 acres; AR 1922, p. 26.
10. AR 1920, p. 70.
11. Byatt (despatch dated 15 March 1921) was more concerned about the way adjacent estates impeded Africans' movements than about the actual extent of alienations permitted by the Germans. In the Colonial Office it was decided to inform the Governor that his proposals were approved but that he had to pay for the purchases of the estates by making savings elsewhere; it was also decided not to inform the Treasury of what was intended since the proposals were imprecise and would never therefore be sanctioned. CO 691/43/267.
12. The Dar es Salaam Times criticised the Governor's action in predictably extravagant terms; for a full account see Harlow and Chilver, op.cit., p.554
13. Lord Hailey, Native Administration in British African Territories, (London 1950), Vol.1, p. 280.

14. Report of Senior Commissioner, Arusha District, for 1923; Arusha D.O. file 43/115 date 19 Jan 1924.
15. Published by HMSO as cmd. 5102 (London 1910).
16. For a criticism of this arrangement see Lord Hailey, An African Survey, (Oxford 1938), p. 765.
17. Ante, p. 8.
18. Hailey, (1938), op.cit., pp. 219-220
19. Lord Lugard ms., cited by H.D. Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship (London 1948), p. 210.
20. Criticism was directed particularly at the Japanese and the Italians before their withdrawal from the League of Nations.
21. PMC 3rd Sess. pp. 144 and 317; ibid., 4th Sess., pp. 164ff.
22. For correspondence, see CO/691/52/480.
23. Examples of each form of sanction are Australia, The Commonwealth Land Tax 1910, and in Southern Rhodesia the Land Apportionment Act 1930.
24. Meek, op.cit., p. 105.
25. Land Ordinance (Amendment), 1928.
26. Land (Law of Conveyancing) Ordinance, 1923, which imported into Tanganyika much of the English law concerning land transactions.
27. H.C. 167, Col. 539.
28. Ibid., Col. 590.
29. This observation is based on numerous discussions with village headmen (makarani wa vijiji) in Iringa district in 1955/56 in settling disputes over boundaries and rights of way between settlers and neighbouring African farmers.
30. The previous circulars were no. 25 of 1932 and no. 13 of 1937. Colonial Office approval was sought and obtained for the consolidated instructions CO/691/160/42018.
31. Chidzero, op.cit., p. 247.
32. Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa, cmd. 3573, (London 1930).


33. Hence his dissenting conclusion on a Reserve policy in Conference of Governors of East Africa Dependencies 1926; summary of proceedings, pp. 13-17.
34. House of Commons Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, Report, HC 156, Vol. II, para. 1762.
35. Report of the (Hilton Young) Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa, cmd. 3234 (London 1929), p. 55.
36. Mitchell, evidence, Joint Select Committee, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 72; for his argument see P.E. Mitchell, African Afterthoughts, (London 1954).
37. C.S. despatch dated 8 August 1930, (CO 691/111/29777).
38. Jardine (Acting Governor) despatch dated 30 August 1930, (file 29777).
39. CO 691/111/29777
40. Hailey, (1938), op. cit., p. 768

CHAPTER IVIMMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE WARSThe Immigration Policy

It has been necessary to consider in some detail the aims and content of the Land Ordinance because it remained the basis for the alienation of land to non-Africans throughout the period that Tanganyika was administered by Britain. Nevertheless, the law on its own could only be used to exercise a negative effect on the changes in agricultural patterns which followed. Although the Ordinance was drafted, approved and made law, the local administration was still not compelled to adopt a policy of promoting white settlement. Why it did so requires an understanding of how policies were determined and what factors influenced those who took the relevant decisions. It soon becomes clear that various unrelated prescriptions and demands contributed to the introduction of the several policies concerned with immigration in general and with non-African agricultural settlement in particular.

First, there were the provisions of the Mandate which made it difficult for the British administration to discriminate against potential immigrants on grounds of race or nationality. Secondly, there was the need for some economic development and this, so it seemed at the time, could only be achieved with certainty if enterprise and capital were attracted from elsewhere. Finally, there were

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political and social advantages to be derived from the presence of settlers with certain skills and outlook, an argument which will be considered in the next chapter. Whatever the reasons for permitting the immigrants of various origins to enter the Territory, the effects of their presence were soon clearly observed. They brought with them their own customs and cultures and while some of them contributed to the transformation of the growing urban areas others joined the increasing number of settler farmers and set about changing the landscape under their control.

The policies adopted by the administration depended primarily on the ability and judgement of the Governor of the Territory. Although any new legislation or policy of major importance required the approval of the Colonial Secretary there was little in the way of positive and detailed direction from London. General principles were expressed in White Papers and Reports from time to time, but no Colonial Secretary would want, or had the time, to supervise the detail of putting principle into practice. In theory, the Governor adopted policies after consultation with his Executive Council; if he decided to go against members' wishes he was required to report the circumstances to the Colonial Secretary. From the records of meetings during the inter-War years, there is little evidence of disagreement over policies.<sup>1</sup> This is hardly surprising when it is remembered that the Governor appointed the heads of departments in his civil service and until 1939 the members of the Council were strictly ex-officio appointments.

When Cameron was appointed Governor, he was

authorised to introduce a Legislative Council, with a membership of 13 officials and 7 nominated unofficials. Once again the Governor was in a dominant position, for the officials were obliged to support him and the unofficials were his own nominations; knowing this they might criticise government policy while remaining generally co-operative.

In the control of immigration, successive Governors had little opportunity to change the policies of their predecessors. The basic law was the Immigration Ordinance of 1924 and it was regarded by the administration as a means of removing undesirable immigrants rather than as a method of regulating the numbers entering the Territory. But during the early nineteen-twenties the number of Indians arriving began to cause concern and Ormsby-Gore, appearing before the P.M.C. as Britain's accredited representative, warned members that as trustee for the Africans the Tanganyika administration might be obliged to restrict the entry of certain categories of immigrant.<sup>2</sup> But for some time there was no real problem. The European settlers never pressed the administration to restrict Asian immigration with the same passion as their opposite numbers in Kenya; and enterprising Indians preferred to settle in Kenya or Uganda where more promising opportunities for trade existed. Nevertheless, in the long term Tanganyika certainly seemed to offer a lot. In a message to East African Indians the Aga Khan said: 'Tanganyika is the one part of Africa which is an ideal field for Indian enterprise and energy.'<sup>3</sup> Many of his followers took his advice and the Ismaili Khoja community became the most influential of the Asian groups in

the Territory. Official opinion was divided as to the value of the Asian contribution. Whereas Cameron believed Indian immigration was an asset since it provided much needed clerks and artisans, Mitchell, his Secretary for Native Affairs observed that the numbers from India were too large to be easily assimilated and too many wanted to trade, an occupation in which they could only survive by cheating the African. By 1930, over half the male adult Indian population was engaged in trade and, as Cameron himself acknowledged, almost all the wholesale trade was in their hands.<sup>4</sup> Restrictions on entry were imposed during the second World War and never again entirely lifted. As Indians rightly feared, the ending of the Mandate made it possible to continue restricting entry and there is little doubt that a return to the more liberal pre-War position would have resulted in far larger numbers arriving than were actually permitted.<sup>5</sup> Without restrictions there would have been a much faster urban development and the scattered townships, minor settlements and trading centres would have grown very rapidly.<sup>6</sup>

Apart from imposing restrictions on Indian immigration, there was for a time during the inter-War period a possibility that restrictions might be imposed on German immigration. In London in 1934 there was some pressure on the Colonial Office to refuse entry to Tanganyika of any new German immigrants as soon as Hitler had carried out his notified intention of withdrawing from the League of Nations.<sup>7</sup> At the time, owing to the economic situation it seemed unlikely that there would ever be a large influx of European settlers and the idea was not followed up.

The Settlement Policy 1920 - 1931

Although at first the Tanganyika government placed little restriction on Indian immigrants wishing to become traders or artisans, there was reluctance to permit them to acquire agricultural land. First, there was a request to make land available for peasant farmers from the sub-continent. The scheme, put forward by the Government of India was intended to meet the problem of land shortage at home and to develop the resources of the Territory.<sup>8</sup> Before the terms of the Mandate had been settled Byatt had been asked for his opinion and without hesitation had rejected the proposal, asserting that as far as he knew there was no land available on the scale envisaged. He had plenty of local backing for his view for opposition to the proposal came from every quarter; it was perhaps the only time in East African politics that the official view was supported by both settlers and missionaries.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, the Government of India were always able to exercise influence in Whitehall and they did not abandon the idea until their own representative, sent to East Africa to investigate the position, reported as follows:

'The proposal to settle small cultivators in a special Indian reserve is in my opinion unsound both politically and economically; and I recommend that it should now be dropped.'<sup>10</sup>

But if Byatt was successful in this instance in preventing Indians acquiring land, he found it impossible to stop them as individuals from buying the ex-German properties which had to be offered for sale during the first years of the Mandate. Nevertheless, the Tanganyika

administration appears to have gone as far as possible to prevent Indians from acquiring these properties without infringing the terms of the Mandate and the fact that Indians were able to make purchases was largely due to the persistence of the India Office in London.<sup>11</sup> Officials in Tanganyika believed that Indian purchasers were only interested in the estates for speculative reasons and that they would make no effort to develop them. These suspicions proved to be justified in a number of cases and several Indians resold their properties to German nationals as soon as the restrictions on their residence in the Territory were lifted. However, there were some notable exceptions; Karimjee Jivanjee and Company bought several plantations and retained a major interest in the sisal industry. But such instances were rare and as elsewhere in East Africa, each racial group became closely identified with certain occupations. Government immigration and land tenure policies contributed in bringing about this social pattern.

In selling by auction the ex-German estates, the first stage in the consolidation of a dual system of agriculture was completed. By 1925, all save one of the properties scheduled for liquidation had been auctioned.<sup>12</sup> Security of title for the new owners brought development and in a few years there was a marked increase in production. The transfer of the estates to new owners aroused no real opposition and in view of the financial position of the Territory it was generally agreed that the plantations, particularly the sisal estates, had to be made more productive as soon as possible.<sup>13</sup> As Britain was required to observe

existing titles over land Byatt was content to see the old estates pass into new hands except where a special case could be put forward. But once this had been done he had definite ideas on the future development of the agricultural sector. In London in 1922 he explained that 'the future of the country lay in developing native cultivation only.'<sup>14</sup> Thus it seems that at this stage Byatt endorsed the policy of a dual system of agriculture only to the extent of accepting previous alienations; further development would occur when the African peasant farmer had been persuaded to grow cash crops. Having successfully opposed the Indian settlement scheme he was able to resist a proposal to organise a soldier settlement scheme similar to the one started in Kenya. In this case his opposition was not based on the lack of available land but because large-scale farming was impossible without sufficient capital and there was no indication that this would be provided. Although Byatt was strongly criticised in the local press for his negative attitude, he remained adamant.<sup>15</sup> By the end of 1922, his caution was seen to be justified since a sharp drop in prices had brought hardship to many of the new settlers in Kenya.

But Byatt's policies were only acceptable if African agriculture did in fact expand as expected. Some early local successes encouraged him and his supporters although as a result his critics became more vocal than ever. First, there was a significant increase in groundnut production in the Tabora area; settlers soon complained that it was responsible for a reduction of recruiting from

a district which provided their most efficient labour. Next, the Chagga, with official encouragement, took to the growing of arabica coffee in the Kilimanjaro area. By 1924, over 700,000 coffee bushes had been planted and of these 140,000 were already producing a crop; and in the same year the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association was formed with the aim of marketing the crop on a co-operative basis.<sup>16</sup> These developments led to bitter criticisms of Byatt and his officers and for a while some agitation to persuade the British government to transfer the Kilimanjaro area to Kenya.

In view of the continuing ill-feeling between government officials and settlers in Kenya during his term of office and the personal attacks on him appearing regularly in the local press, Byatt might be excused if he were prejudiced against any extension of white settlement, irrespective of whether it was in the interests of the Territory or not. In fact, his objection was on practical rather than political grounds, as the following extract from a speech of his made in London after leaving Tanganyika clearly shows:

'When we extend our railways we shall open up wonderful country in the Iringa and Rungwe districts which will hold numbers of European settlers without in any way interfering with native rights. But successful settlement can only take place when railway communications afford a means of sending produce to market. It is no use growing wheat when you have to send it 300 miles to the railway on the heads of porters.'<sup>17</sup>

Unless he was being devious when he said this, it seems he was more anxious to protect potential settlers from the consequences of their own rashness rather than to

prevent them from obtaining land. It therefore seems to be an over-simplification to suggest that on taking over from Byatt, 'Sir Donald Cameron altered the policy of his pro-native predecessor to the extent of supporting the policy of white settlement in the southern part of Tanganyika and elsewhere.'<sup>18</sup>

What had happened was that Byatt had changed his mind. For although African production had increased considerably in some parts of the Territory in far too many areas the response had been disappointing. This was hardly surprising at a time when the peasant farmer was being warned that growing food had to be given priority.<sup>19</sup> Subsequently Cameron too reaffirmed this policy in a circular to administrative officers making it abundantly clear that preventing famine had to have top priority.<sup>20</sup> But cotton production in particular had failed to expand at the rate expected. Communal plantations had not been a success; there was delay in finding suitably qualified Agricultural Officers; and the report that in the Utete district in Eastern province 'the native only grows cotton because he is told to do so' described a situation which existed in many other places.<sup>21</sup> Other factors such as a lack of feeder roads, fluctuating market prices, unsatisfactory seed and too few markets all contributed to making it clear that the development of the cotton industry would take a long time. Before Cameron arrived, alienation of land amounting to 26,000 acres took place thereby establishing the principle that more land would be made available for non-Africans when circumstances justified it.<sup>22</sup> These

allocations of land aroused no criticism either in the British parliament or at the meetings of the P.M.C. when the 1924 annual report was presented.

But the most important support for the principle of increasing white settlement came with the publication of the report of the East African Commission in 1925.<sup>23</sup> Just as the Land Ordinance provided the regulatory basis for land alienation, the recommendations of this Commission furnished the imprimatur making it possible for successive Governors to promote non-African settlement at whatever pace they thought best. For the Commission in its membership and the manner of its appointment reflected the common approach to Colonial matters adopted by all three political parties in Britain at that time.<sup>24</sup>

On the main issue of seeking means to promote economic development the members were in general agreement although in a separate statement one member recorded his objections to any policy which increased unduly the proportion of the African population working away from their homes.<sup>25</sup> All were agreed that white settlement was needed in places which were climatically suitable because, as they explained 'East Africa can only progress economically and socially on the basis of full and complete co-operation between all the races.' In the case of Tanganyika the Commission observed:

'... the north east and south west parts of the Territory were suitable for European settlement capable of producing under skilled management valuable crops of coffee and maize.'<sup>26</sup>

It was recognized that it would be almost impossible to grow cereals profitably in the south west unless a railway

was constructed and it was assumed, with misplaced confidence as it turned out, that there would be no difficulty in financing such a project. The Commission recommended that £10 million should be found for the development of railways in East Africa and that the interest due on any money loaned for this development should be paid by the Imperial Exchequer. The Commission argued that not only was there a moral obligation to help East Africa but also railway development would reduce unemployment charges at home.

The recommendations of the Commission are of interest in that they indicate that its chairman, Ormsby-Gore, had become converted to the dual policy as the means for development. Certainly on his past record it could have been expected that he would have supported Byatt's earlier views. He had once been dubbed 'an ultra-negrophile' and was on record as saying that he would have liked to see East Africa developing on West African lines.<sup>27</sup> It seems that he was favourably impressed by Lord Delamere and for a time he was enthusiastic about prospects for settlement in south west Tanganyika.

The Report had particularly important consequences for the course of white settlement in the Territory. In Kenya and Uganda the Commission had to accept what they found and could only recommend improvements; with Tanganyika there was a greater potential for changing the existing balance between the African and non-African sectors, leading to a similarity with either one of the other territories. In adopting a course mid-way between them, it cannot be said that the Commission made out a convincing case for their

recommendations on purely economic grounds and it is abundantly clear that other matters were taken into account. A Mandate was an entirely new concept in international affairs and both in London and East Africa many believed that the League of Nations was entitled to demand the withdrawal of the British administration from Tanganyika. With Germany already pressing for a return of her colonies and her publicists taking every opportunity to emphasise the German economic achievements in Africa before 1914, it was by no means certain that the local administration could afford to wait for African production of cash crops to improve. If better results could not be left to the chiefs as in Uganda an experienced and well-staffed Agricultural Department was necessary and this was manifestly lacking.<sup>28</sup> The Commission observed that Britain's security of title was best ensured by good administration and the opening up of the country to all legitimate enterprise. As a result not only would the African population benefit from a general increase in economic activity but also, it was clearly implied, its best interests were served if British control continued. Thus was policy adapted in the light of past results and international uncertainties and the way was open to promote white settlement on a much larger scale than had hitherto been attempted. But whereas at this time African opinion in much of the Territory was not averse to more European settlements, as will be described later, administrative officers in the districts showed more concern. Many were convinced that a settlement policy had to be determined by the labour position; otherwise, a

conflict between settlers and officials, similar to that which had recently occurred in Kenya, was inevitable. A resolution passed at the 1924 Administrative Officers Conference clearly expresses this view:

'This Conference is unable to reconcile the policies of non-native and native development since any expansion in the latter direction must gravely reduce the labour supply for non-native estates as it had in Uganda. In view thereof, this Conference entertains doubts as to the advisability of alienating more land for non-native development.'<sup>29</sup>

The East African Commission must have been aware of these views but made little attempt to offer an answer. It was already obvious that increased militancy from settlers and estate managers could be expected and earlier the same year the influential Tanga Planters Association had met and passed a resolution 'that government officials should be empowered to make natives available for work unless in possession of other visible means.' There was, therefore, little doubt that the pressure on the government for help in providing labour would grow stronger as the amount of investment in agriculture increased. For the time being no chronic labour shortage was expected.<sup>31</sup> A Poll Tax had been introduced in 1923 and this led to an increase in the number of African men seeking work. Also, the practice of permitting labour recruiters from Kenya to operate in the Territory was curtailed. In 1924 all requests from these recruiters were refused and the Annual Report for the year contained the observation that Kenya was wrong to suppose that the Territory would be relied upon to provide labour for another country whenever it was required.<sup>32</sup>

Although the principle that fresh land could be

alienated for development was established, certain limitations were at once imposed. First, in areas admitted to be already overcrowded no applications were considered. Secondly, the same rule applied in areas where it was considered that racial harmony might suffer if alienation was permitted; Masailand provided the most obvious example of the application of this rule, presumably because it was considered that it would take a generation at least to teach the Masai that stock theft was an unprofitable pastime.<sup>33</sup> Thirdly, in certain other districts where alienation would be permitted, it was decided that applicants for land would not be permitted to select any piece of land they desired.<sup>34</sup> Instead, they would only be allowed to apply for those areas scheduled as being suitable for alienation. The intention was to prevent would-be settlers from picking out the most fertile stretches of land for themselves and leaving the less attractive areas outside their proposed boundaries. This had happened in the past, with the result that it was immediately obvious to any visitor that the white settlers occupied the good land and the Africans had been left in occupation of the poorer areas. Within a short space of time the contrast became even more striking; with more capital and with different motivations the European farmers had little difficulty in improving their land further and the Africans were left to make comparisons and consider whether their interests were being properly protected.

Although Cameron was not responsible for a change in land settlement policy his method of implementation

showed that there was a different hand at the helm. There was a more systematic approach to finding which tracts of land were available for alienation and, once the choice had been made, less delay in negotiations with potential settlers. Undoubtedly, the new Governor could have adopted a negative policy in respect of any policy he disagreed with and on the settlement issue he could have seen to it that the amount of land available for alienation was kept to a minimum. That he did not do so is important, and it needs an understanding of Cameron's own views and the part he played in the alienations which followed. After all, he had come from the West Coast where he had served under Lugard whom he greatly admired. It was known that he was an enthusiastic supporter of the principles of Indirect Rule and a West African approach to development might have been expected from him. But he also approved of Lugard's ideal of the Dual Mandate and the need to combine the protection of indigenous interests with the duty to develop colonial resources for the benefit of the world.<sup>35</sup> When the Colonial Office demurred on receiving his proposals for developing the Territory he pointed out that 'he had not been appointed Governor to sit on the land.'<sup>36</sup> For Cameron understood the business of politics. He appreciated that the recommendations of the East African Commission had been accepted in London by those who mattered; even Lord Milner had found it necessary to issue a warning on the consequences of failing to develop the Territory.<sup>37</sup> Either he had to implement the policies as proposed or he had to provide good reasons for rejecting them. For

although he was well aware of African anxieties over the question of title to their land he also accepted the force of the argument of the Commission that in some areas the African population was very sparse and there was little or no justification in leaving fertile land unoccupied and undeveloped.<sup>38</sup>

In deciding on the course to adopt Cameron had surprisingly little direction from London. Before sailing for East Africa he had had discussions with members of the Commission on their return from East Africa. Presumably too he discussed the settlement question with the Colonial Secretary although it is clear that he was given no precise instructions.<sup>39</sup> Even when John Scott, the acting Governor before Cameron arrived, sent to the Office a copy of the minutes of the 1924 Administrative Officers Conference with its caveat on the question of further alienation, from the file now available it would seem that the warning was not worthy of comment. It was not surprising that when looking back Cameron criticised the officials in London at the time for their lack of constructive thinking.<sup>40</sup>

Shortly after arriving in Tanganyika, Cameron was asked by some potential settlers whether he was prepared to let them obtain land in Iringa province, the area the Commission had considered suitable for white settlement. Lord Delamere had already obtained land in the Iringa area and had formed a company, Colonists Ltd., which, as its name implied, was aimed at assisting and encouraging further European settlement.<sup>41</sup> Later in the year, Delamere convened a conference at Tukuyu at which settlers from

Eastern Africa and the Rhodesias discussed ways of promoting settlement. In view of the increased interest in land alienation, Cameron decided to obtain clear instructions from London on the policy to be adopted. He also arranged for a survey of the area in case the Commission had been over-optimistic in their assessment of its potential. Not unsurprisingly in view of his past experience and the absence of any guidance from the Office in the past, he explained in detail the instructions issued to his survey team.<sup>42</sup>

Learning of these developments, the Tanga Planters Association was soon voicing its fears that its members labour position would be in jeopardy. Attitudes to settlement in Tanganyika were already quite different from Kenya, where any extension of settlement was welcomed since it gave added weight to demands to be rid of Colonial Office control. In Tanganyika, economic advantages were more important than political aspirations, a consequence of the greater importance of plantation agriculture compared with mixed farming. For the former represented a business activity with the profit motive uppermost whereas the latter was often accompanied by a closer and more emotional identification with the land and the future of the Territory.

The Colonial Office reply to Cameron was cautious to the point of being obstructive. It was observed that if land for settlers was auctioned before the railway was constructed the successful bidder might feel that he had been cheated if the railway plan was abandoned or the alignment for it drastically changed. Therefore, it was

suggested, applications should be discouraged until the line had nearly reached Lake Nyasa.<sup>43</sup> Cameron retorted that people in the United Kingdom might be put off by official discouragement but this would not do as an answer to applicants already in East Africa. He suggested that either available land must be offered for sale by auction or 'there must be a frank declaration at once that the government does not propose to alienate any land at present.'<sup>44</sup> In the Office it was left to Ormsby-Gore, now Under-Secretary, to decide; he ruled that the Governor should await the report of his survey team and should, if possible, delay the auctions until the route of the proposed railway was decided.<sup>45</sup>

This exchange explains Cameron's often quoted remark that it was impossible to oppose non-native settlement in Tanganyika.<sup>46</sup> In spite of his evident rapport with Delamere he was always prepared, and able, to resist settlers demands if he thought them unjustified.<sup>47</sup> But he could not ignore the recommendations of a Parliamentary Commission which had been accepted by the British government; he believed the Colonial Secretary must take the responsibility and provide the explanation for his decision.

Having obtained some measure of support for his proposals Cameron used the occasion of the opening of the newly established Legislative Council to explain his settlement plans. He said that applications for land in the southern highlands would be considered, adding that non-native settlement would be encouraged wherever land was available, the climate suitable and transport facilities

adequate.<sup>48</sup> His announcement was well received by settler leaders since it met the demands made at the Tukuyu conference mentioned above.

The preliminary survey, which led to a number of new alienations, was only the beginning. Cameron had repeatedly said that there would be no hurried transfer of land to settlers as had occurred in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia. Following the recommendations of the Hilton Young Commission, Cameron appointed a Land Survey Team to investigate the possibilities for large-scale farming in every province deemed to be suitable.<sup>49</sup> He announced that further alienation of land would depend on the recommendations of the Team. The members of the Team were all officials and their predictably cautious attitude to white settlement, evidenced in the first report, caused disappointment among settlers. Mindful of this, in the second report the chairman, F.J. Bagshawe, justified his Team's policy of caution by quoting a warning contained in the Hilton Young report that 'it was vital to the future interests of the Territory and especially to those of the settler community to avoid unrest which land shortage would produce among the natives.' The Commission had observed that the African population would probably increase and that a generous area of land had to be set aside for this contingency; but, it was argued, there had to be a limit to the area reserved on this basis and 'native agriculture had to adopt improved and more intensive methods of cultivation.' Bagshawe concluded that this involved the African peasant farmer in copying 'the farming practices of his European neighbours who needed

for mixed farming about 5,000 acres to make a reasonable profit.<sup>50</sup> Therefore, he argued, it was not too much to set aside 320 acres for each African family since they would need all of this amount of land as they came to adopt improved methods of farming. In spite of setting aside plenty of land on this basis for the indigenous population Bagshawe and his team were able to recommend that substantial areas in the south-west could be alienated. It indicated how sparse the native population was at that time. This Report, and the others which followed it prepared by the same Team, was adopted by the government and became the basis of the settlement policy. Nevertheless, other factors besides the actual availability of land were taken into account; as already described a large portion of the Territory was declared to be closed to the usual kind of non-African settlement, thereby causing a concentration of sisal plantations in a relatively small area and other kinds of plantations and mixed farming in those provinces open to applications.<sup>51</sup>

Excluding plots of land of under 100 acres, by the end of 1931 there were 1,355 estates owned by non-Africans amounting to nearly 1.9 million acres. This total was divided almost equally between plantations and mixed farms and over one quarter of it represents land alienated during Cameron's governorship (Table III).

From these figures it is evident that in spite of the publicity given to the opening up of the south west for non-African settlement, much of the land alienated was situated elsewhere in the Territory. In a Report commissioned

TABLE IIILAND ALIENATED TO NON-NATIVES 1925-1930

<u>Year</u>	<u>South-western area (Iringa province)</u>	<u>Northern province</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
1925	1,320	1,279	7,268	9,867
1926	49,752	7,190	7,087	64,029
1927	24,205	69,463	22,533	116,201
1928	68,414	40,107	46,307	154,828
1929	29,250	47,567	47,476	124,293
1930	9,335	10,880	37,252	57,467
<u>Totals</u>	<u>182,276</u>	<u>176,486</u>	<u>167,923</u>	<u>526,685</u>

(source: Annual Reports of the Land  
Department (Government Printer,  
Dar es Salaam)).

by the Colonial Secretary, Sir Sydney Armitage Smith made this apposite observation:

'When some 130 square miles of land in the Iringa province was put up for auction in 1929, no bids were received .... 'suitable' land is not suitable for non-native development when it is inaccessible.'<sup>52</sup>

The settlement lobby which had by now become active in London was disappointed to learn that so few applications for the new land were forthcoming and attributed the lack of response to Cameron's policies. In fact, it was a combination of several factors which made Tanganyika an unattractive proposition for many potential settlers.

First, it seemed that Cameron only wanted a limited number of new settlers and was well aware of the likely political cost of making the Territory dependent on settler production for economic development in the future. He therefore tried to strike a balance between the obligation to follow the recommendations of the East Africa Commission and his determination to prevent any increase in settler political influence.<sup>53</sup> Many of his comments on white settlement could be construed as showing a lack of sympathy where encouragement was needed and it was apparent that he intended to observe the native paramountcy principle elaborated in the Devonshire White Paper in spite of the fact that Amery held different views. At meetings of the P.M.C. he argued that white settlement was useful because it provided the 'experimental factor' and would thus assist African development and that the white farmers were not real settlers, meaning colonists.<sup>54</sup> On another occasion he described much of the Territory's land as being 'quite

unfit for colonisation and there could be no permanent settlement of a European community unless its members were prepared to undertake all kinds of work.<sup>55</sup> Such remarks were not calculated to encourage a potential settler to make a home in the Territory. But apart from such statements it is impossible to know how many Europeans were put off by tales of excessive delays on the part of the government in carrying out surveys on land permitted for alienation. Writing privately to Cameron, Sir Sydney Henn, the chairman for the time of the Joint East Africa Board, mentioned that he had received a letter from Tukuyu which alleged that thirty men had been waiting for up to two years for a decision on their land applications and that 'it was such letters which were seized on by men like Joelson and used to spread the wrong ideas.'<sup>56</sup>

The second factor which discouraged settlement was the belief that an adequate supply of African labour might not be forthcoming. Cameron was determined to prevent the controversies which had followed the issue of the Northey circulars in Kenya and he therefore drafted precise instructions on the role of government officers in obtaining recruits for private employers. District Commissioners were told to encourage able-bodied Africans either to grow cash crops at home or to seek work on an estate; no attempt was to be made to influence them in their choice but they should be 'exhorted' to opt for one of the alternatives.<sup>57</sup> Cameron maintained that he wanted the administration to adopt an attitude of strict neutrality in the matter although to some it seemed that his circular contained a

bias towards persuading Africans to stay at home.<sup>58</sup> The settlers certainly believed that this was how it was interpreted and it was claimed 'that some administrative officers ordered natives to stay at home and grow economic crops.'<sup>59</sup> During the period 1920 - 1929 the proportion of cotton grown on plantations was being progressively reduced as African farmers came to realise the advantages in obtaining a cash income. Thus when the East Africa Standard came out with the headline, 'The Cotton Menace in Tanganyika', it was not referring to an imminent disaster brought about by drought or disease but to the threat to the labour supply for the plantations.<sup>60</sup>

Moreover, on the device of using taxation as a means of making Africans earn wages, the Governor was characteristically forthright. In a memorandum on the labour position in the Territory, he wrote: 'Coercion of labour by pressure of direct taxation is little, if anything, removed from the coercion of labour by force; the latter is the more honest course.'<sup>61</sup> Thus his approach to the labour problem differed from that of Scott, who had been acting Governor until his arrival. Whereas the latter observed that the administration had a certain obligation to help the non-native plantation owners to secure labour, Cameron decided that white settlement should proceed only as fast as the labour supply would permit.<sup>62</sup> Nevertheless, he acknowledged that if too many Africans were persuaded to grow cash crops on their own account and recruitment for the estates suffered, 'the Territory will get a bad name and capital will be driven away.'<sup>63</sup> As

more settlers obtained land the problem grew and Bagshawe in his Land Survey Reports warned that if all the land he found available for alienation was occupied by settlers there was no prospect of obtaining from the local population the necessary labour force. The warning did not go unheeded and Cameron on several occasions made it clear that the supply of labour for sisal plantations was his first concern.<sup>64</sup> Doubtless the problem was accentuated by the widespread under-employment of labour at the time. Plantation managers competed for labour by making the daily tasks very light and consequently the output per man was extremely low.<sup>65</sup>

Thirdly, the problems caused by the spatial factor, particularly the remoteness of the south-west, need to be considered. No doubt Armitage Smith was correct in observing that settlers were unlikely to bid for land which was inaccessible. Cameron had made it clear that white settlement in the south-west would only be encouraged if the proposed railway was constructed. His warning aroused little comment at first since there seemed to be no doubt that the British government would see that the recommendations of the East African Commission were implemented for the reasons stated. Already the necessary legislation had been passed to enable funds to be borrowed with repayment guaranteed by the British government.<sup>66</sup> But then the Treasury unexpectedly refused to provide funds to meet interest charges in spite of the fact that similar aid had been given in the case of the Kampala extension in 1923. Thus either the Tanganyika

government would be saddled with the burden of paying considerable sums annually or the line would have to be operated at a profit almost at once; and this according to expert advice could never happen.<sup>67</sup> Undeterred, the government applied for two million pounds from the loan fund for the project, stating in the application that the Territory would be unable to meet the interest charges from its own resources. Not surprisingly the Schuster committee, appointed to consider the applications to make use of the fund, turned down the proposal while recommending that a full survey should be carried out.<sup>68</sup>

The set-back to the railway proposal enabled Cameron to proceed more slowly with alienation in the southwest without it appearing that he was now rejecting the dual policy. He explained his position as follows:


'There is not the slightest prospect of the railway being built at present if Tanganyika has to bear the burden of the debt charges ... until more railways are built it would be impossible to alienate more land.'<sup>69</sup>

In this statement he implied that the initiative rested with London; later, however, he admitted that Britain would only help if a strong case was presented and in his view this was not possible. Nevertheless, he took care to comply with the recommendation of the Hilton Young Commission that a full economic survey should be carried out and a route for the line to be decided after more information was available.<sup>70</sup> Thus in 1930 the Governor appointed his friend, Henn, as chairman of a commission to consider several possible alignments. (see Appendix ii and Map III). By this time, the

Colonial Development Act, 1929 had been passed and it was possible for Britain to pay the interest charges on colonial loans.

Nevertheless, although the railway plan had been thwarted by problems of finance, there was no complete cessation of settlement in the south-west. As the settlers established there well knew, the absence of a railway was no longer an obstacle to large scale farming in every case. Since 1924 when the Commission report was written, motor transport was introducing another dimension. A new road from Dodoma to the Ruaha river was ready by the end of 1925 and a pontoon made it possible to take vehicles across the river. At once an enterprising trader started a passenger service and forwarding agency between Dodoma and the southern highlands. Two years later the route for a better road from Iringa to Northern Rhodesia was surveyed. In 1930 a bridge was built in place of the Ruaha pontoon, an improvement amply justified by the increase in road traffic. For while Cameron was Governor the consumption of motor fuel increased by more than five-fold. Some areas otherwise suitable for settlement, such as Upper Dabaga (south of Iringa township) remained isolated, with the roads often becoming impassable after heavy rains; elsewhere the closing of roads during the rainy season was no more than a temporary inconvenience. It is significant that when Cameron drafted a memorandum for the Joint Select Committee, he explained that European settlement on a larger scale was impossible because the amount of land available was limited.<sup>71</sup> He made no reference to the failure to construct the railway.

SOUTH WEST TANGANYIKA :  
PROPOSED RAILWAY ROUTES CONSIDERED  
BY THE HENN COMMISSION 1930



----- CENTRAL LINE  
----- PROPOSED LINE

0 50 100  
SCALE: 1 in TO 63 MILES

It seems that for a particular type of settler, the remoteness of the south-west made the area unattractive, at least until after the Depression. Much depended on what crops settlers intended to grow and how anxious they were to obtain the maximum return on their investment. Those who produced little, either because they were prepared to live frugally or because they had private means, were not particularly interested in the transport cost factor. Others who were satisfied were those growing crops of a high value relative to their weight or, as in the case of the Germans, those enjoying a special relationship with a trading company which would arrange transport for their clients.

More serious for the enterprising settler was the general uncertainty over the price he might expect for any crop he could produce. Although Cameron was fortunate in that there was a general recovery in world trade which lasted for most of his time in Tanganyika, it was by now well known that farming in the Territory was just as difficult as in most other parts of tropical Africa. The settlers had found that except for relatively short periods it was always more difficult to sell crops than to grow them.

Mitchell, speaking in London in 1931, echoed the disillusionment of many settler farmers when he said:

'It is difficult to think of a single raw material which is not over-produced already and either restricted in production or controlled by some government scheme and so prevented from conferring on Europe those extraordinary benefits which the raw materials of Africa were supposed to confer.'

'72

Although Mitchell was speaking during the Depression he

described a state of affairs which existed only too often in East Africa during the period between the World Wars.

It was an inevitable situation at a time when little diversification in the type of crop produced was possible and when domestic markets were virtually non-existent.

In the sale of products overseas, Tanganyika might have been at an even greater disadvantage than the other East African territories owing to the conditions of the Mandate which demanded the observance of an 'open-door' policy. As it turned out the British connection secured several advantages for the Territory. Exports to Britain were given the same preferential treatment as those from the Dominions and Colonies; and in commercial treaties with other powers Britain often managed to obtain concessions for Tanganyika exports.<sup>73</sup> The figures in Table IV give an indication of the pattern of trade during the period of the Mandate and from them it is evident that there must be reservations when describing the Tanganyika colonial economy as being 'complementary' to that of the metropolitan country. There were no restrictions imposed on the Tanganyika government making it necessary to direct the greater part of the export trade to Britain; and, more important, there could be no preference granted for imports from Britain owing to the provisions of the Congo Basin treaties. Nevertheless, it was certainly the intention to develop the Tanganyika economy in a way that would make it complementary to the industrialised nations. At the Governors' Conference in 1935, Sir Harold MacMichael stated that 'it was undesirable to accelerate the industrialization

TABLE IV

PERCENTAGE OF VALUE OF TOTAL DOMESTIC  
EXPORTS TO DIFFERENT COUNTRIES OF  
DESTINATION

	<u>Average</u> <u>1920-24</u>	<u>Average</u> <u>1925-29</u>	<u>Year</u> <u>1935</u>	<u>Year</u> <u>1939</u>
United Kingdom	24.1	18.6	31.3	37.1
Kenya/Uganda	26.9	28.9	22.9	23.4
Rest of Commonwealth	22.4	11.5	14.4	13.3
Foreign countries	26.6	42.0	31.4	26.2

(source: Annual Trade Reports;  
 Government Printer, Dar  
 es Salaam)

of East Africa' and added that it would be a country of primary produce for many years to come; and the same view was expressed by the Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons.<sup>74</sup>

What is of particular relevance to the settlement pattern is the steady increase in imports, particularly of agricultural products, from Kenya and Uganda. Not only did the trend provide an additional argument for Lord Chesham and his supporters, as described later, but also it was not overlooked by Cameron; when he wrote that the establishing of a sugar industry in Moshi district was an achievement giving him particular satisfaction, he no doubt expected the product to replace some of the sugar imported from Uganda.<sup>75</sup> Common tariffs had been introduced in 1922 and in 1927 a full customs union had been created providing an advantage for the better-organized producers of Kenya and Uganda. In the arguments which ensued, the Tanganyika administration maintained, not very convincingly, that the arrangements were not detrimental to the Territory's interests and the P.M.C., after requesting information, seemed unwilling to investigate the matter further.<sup>76</sup> The fact remains that the Territory's balance of trade with Kenya and Uganda steadily deteriorated.<sup>77</sup>

Next, there was the reluctance of both the British and Tanganyika governments to provide any financial help for new settlers. In accordance with the recommendation of the Hilton Young Commission that more positive support for settlers should be provided, Cameron appointed a committee of his Legislative Council 'to submit proposals in connection

with land development and the provision of financial assistance to settlers and planters.<sup>78</sup> In addition to other recommendations, the committee proposed that an Agricultural Development Loan fund should be created in order to help potential settlers who had insufficient capital to start farming. This and the other measures were necessary, the committee concluded, because any further development in the Territory depended on further investment in the non-African farming sector. Certainly, loans for settlers could have been justified more at this time than any other for it happened that the publication of the committee's report followed shortly after the publication of a booklet setting out the prospects for tea-growing in the Southern Highlands;<sup>79</sup> even more than in the case of coffee-growing, the tea planter needed adequate capital support to tide him over the years before his bushes began to yield and give him some return. In Kenya the Land Bank was to start the following year and in Southern Rhodesia it was already operating; Cameron's rejection of this, together with the other proposals of the committee, was just one more indication that at this time there would be no official encouragement for further settlement. There is little doubt that if loans had been obtainable there would have been more applications for some of the land known to be available.

Before sending his comments on the committee's proposals to London, Cameron discussed them at length with his Executive Council and he was able to end his despatch with the assurance that the members were unanimous in their support for his views.<sup>80</sup> His despatch amounted to a total

rejection of the committee's proposals for four reasons. First, no facts had been offered to support the contention that further development depended on increased investment in the non-African sector; second, funds for supporting white settlers would not be a charge on the general revenue of the Territory;<sup>81</sup> third, if the British government intended to provide funds they should be used to construct the railway to the south-west and this would by itself encourage settlement; finally, a rapid increase in settlement might endanger the supply of labour for the sisal industry. In a second despatch written the same day Cameron again referred to the report, observing that the aims of the Committee were 'primarily political, the desire of the unofficial element being to increase the number of Europeans in the Territory.'<sup>82</sup>

In the Colonial Office, Cameron's hostility to attempts to encourage settlement were supported and it was noted that whereas Colonial Development Funds might be used to construct the railway it would be improper to use them to aid new settlers from Britain. Passfield, who had succeeded Amery, noted that the Governor's views were sound and added, with a vagueness no doubt intentional, 'that when the time comes, road development might be coupled with a railway.'<sup>83</sup> And so, in spite of the recommendation of the Hilton Young Commission that settlement should be encouraged, it was decided to adopt none of the measures which were deemed necessary to make the Territory attractive to new settlers.

Finally, the durability of Britain's mandate over the Territory was the subject of so much debate and speculation that it was only to be expected that private investors would look for safer havens for their money. In spite of Amery's forthright assertions that Tanganyika was part of the British Empire and Cameron's public statement that the Mandate could not be terminated, the doubts over the Territory's future persisted. For the P.M.C. took note of legal advice given to them to the effect that a mandated territory was never ceded to the mandatory and this ruling encouraged the German and Italian delegates at the League of Nations to argue that the system of mandates was no more than a temporary arrangement.<sup>84</sup> In Britain there were sections of the Liberal and Labour parties in favour of restoring Tanganyika to Germany. The Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, thought that it was a question of justice that all European countries should be allowed to possess colonies while a group of Labour M.P.s argued that if it was untrue that Germany had mismanaged her colonies there was no reason for not handing them back.<sup>85</sup> When Hitler came to power and the character of his regime became known much of the support for these arguments was diminished. Instead, other proposals were heard to the effect that Tanganyika might be handed over as part of a general settlement with the German dictator.<sup>86</sup> Colonies were still considered a necessity in most circles and it was feared that failure to satisfy German demands would lead to a renewal of the conflict broken off in 1918. Thus the Daily Mail in 1934 argued that steps must be taken at once to give Germany elbow room;

and as late as 1937 the Observer was prepared to publish an article which stated:

'In 1918 the (British) Empire was big enough. Yet we added German colonies to it. (Is) .. the youth of this country to be sacrificed in war to prevent Germany having colonies when everyone else is allowed to have colonies?'<sup>87</sup>

It is of interest to look back at these manifestations of moral indignation at the supposedly selfish attitudes of successive British governments and to observe how it was generally accepted at that time that it was more important to satisfy Germany's need for prestige than to take into account the interests of the colonial subjects. This was partly due to there being no clear appreciation of how such interests were best served and partly to the growing fear that the conflict which ended in 1918 would be renewed.<sup>88</sup>

But the apparent willingness to consider ending the Mandate caused dismay in the Colonial Office and in the Secretariat in Dar es Salaam. The more militant Germans in the Territory were encouraged to believe that British public opinion would support a transfer of authority to Germany and potential investors of other nationalities, whether interested in farming or light industry, had second thoughts before parting with their money. For the newcomer to East Africa, Kenya seemed more attractive, with title to land more secure, a durable government, markets more accessible and an administration which unequivocally favoured settlement.

#### Settler Pressure Groups

As might be expected, Cameron became progressively

less popular with the British settler community as it became clear that his professed support for European settlement meant very little in practice. His pre-occupation with his plans for African political development convinced the settlers and plantation managers that he had little time to spare for their problems.<sup>89</sup> The steps taken to improve communications met with only qualified approval; although there was satisfaction at the extension of the Tanga lines from Moshi to Arusha, it was only too evident that Cameron showed little enthusiasm for the proposed south-west railway, which, if constructed, would have made it necessary to attract new settlers in order to make it pay.<sup>90</sup> Consequently, support from British settlers for the plans for closer union with Kenya increased, as did calls for their rejection from articulate Asians and Africans.

It was in Northern province that most of the opposition to Cameron was concentrated. To the dismay of the Colonial Office at times the Governor seemed to enjoy the hostility he provoked and it was duly noted there that some of his opponents were by no means extremists.<sup>91</sup> For his part, Cameron dismissed the criticism from settlers as being irrational and exaggerated.<sup>92</sup> As proof of his support for the dual system, in 1929 he arranged the publication of his recommendations to London for funds to promote research to benefit the sisal and coffee industries.<sup>93</sup> However, he always took the trouble to try and retain the confidence of the Asian and African communities. In this he was successful, by his public disputes with the settlers, his obvious reluctance to encourage white settlement, and his opposition to closer union.

Nevertheless, although opposition to the Governor and his policies provided a common cause for British unofficial opinion, settler political organization remained fragmented and impotent. The spatial factor made it necessary for any political association to be tied to a particular locality, and involved in parochial rather than territorial problems. Thus there came into existence a number of Farmer/Planter Associations which usually operated within the confines of an administrative district. An exception was the European Constitutional Association, founded in 1928, but this was specifically designed to achieve a united outlook on matters affecting the future of the Territory rather than in influencing the policies of the local administration. However, the local Associations usually held annual meetings which provided opportunities to voice complaints and to seek the support of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council. As might be expected from meetings dominated by British settlers, in 1930 resolutions were passed approving of the principle of closer union providing that a substantial degree of local autonomy was granted and deploring the refusal of the British government to allow settlers in all three territories to be associated with the local administrations in sharing the trusteeship for the African inhabitants.<sup>94</sup> Two years before, at the 1928 meeting, Cameron's settlement policy came in for strong criticism on the grounds that the measures adopted were insufficient and unsatisfactory. The Governor was urged to establish a Land Board to facilitate settlement and to invite non-officials to become members of it.

Cameron took pains to answer the criticisms in detail and he had his observations issued as a circular letter so that there would be no misunderstanding of his attitude.<sup>95</sup> He observed that there were no funds to assist European settlement and the government received no grant-in-aid for this purpose, such as had been given to certain other British-administered territories; he went on to explain that although it was possible to tax Europeans in order to finance white settlement it would be improper to tax Indians and Africans in order to provide aid to European settlers. His arguments were impressive but the magisterial style of the circular was not calculated to increase his popularity. It is of interest to note that his successor, Sir Stewart Symes, who was reputed to be more sympathetic to settler aspirations, fully supported this view.<sup>96</sup> But although he ruled out aid to settlers from the general revenue of the Territory, Symes favoured what he termed 'a judicious promotion of British settlement', provided the numbers were limited and only settlers of good standing were accepted. In the Colonial Office the minutes dealing with his despatch contain the observation that since he was continuing Cameron's policies, no further directive was necessary.<sup>97</sup>

It is a commonplace to contrast the minimal influence exercised by the Tanganyika settlers with the very different situation in Kenya and to explain the contrast in terms of the many national origins of the Tanganyika settlers and their relative lack of numbers. But there were other reasons which were equally, if not more, important. First, the Kenya settlers secured from

the government early in the nineteen-twenties the right to be consulted. 'Government by agreement' as it was termed, was obtained largely through the efforts of Delamere. By the time the Tanganyika settlers were sufficiently numerous to demand more from their administration there was no one of the calibre of that remarkable man to speak for them.

Secondly, and closely allied to the first point, in Kenya, settlers exercised influence and obtained the detailed information about government policies as a result of the membership of unofficials on a number of important committees and boards; this was not the case in Tanganyika.<sup>98</sup> Third, after 1919 the European unofficial members of the Legislative Council were elected whereas in Tanganyika they were nominated by the Governor until the electoral system applying to all races was introduced shortly before Independence. Consequently, Cameron and his successors were never unnerved by settler criticism and were confident of support from London. Before the Joint Select Committee, Cameron pointed out that the term settler was used emotively and often, he implied, inappropriately:

'Every European is either an official, a missionary or a settler. The Iringa people talk of themselves as farmers ... when you get politically minded you use the term settler.'<sup>99</sup>

This observation was misleading, because by no means all non-official Europeans unconnected with the Missions considered themselves to be settlers. Very few of the commercial community and only some professional men would have been prepared to place themselves in this category. The occupational breakdown of the European

population during the period gives some indication of the number of true settlers and explains why Cameron was often inclined to ignore their demands (Table V).

In the face of Cameron's indifference, the settlers often reacted by lobbying individual M.P.s, the Joint Africa Board or the London Chamber of Commerce. The second named for a time also represented British interests in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and had been founded in 1926 with the aim of uniting all interests in East Africa in support of a common policy of development. It was recognized as a negotiating body by the Colonial Office and always included members of both Houses of Parliament on its executive committee. Nevertheless, its influence on the determination of Tanganyika policies seems to have been minimal and it was sometimes split by internal dissensions.<sup>100</sup> The other body, the London Chamber of Commerce was never an ardent supporter of settler interests on political matters and therefore little use as a means of putting pressure on Cameron.<sup>101</sup>

However, there was one organisation which exercised a powerful influence over the Tanganyika administration throughout this period, namely the Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association; this was hardly surprising, in view of the importance of sisal to the economy.<sup>102</sup> The Association, formed in 1930 was soon powerful enough to speak for the whole industry. Then in 1934, a statutory body, the Sisal Board, was created and came to act on the recommendations of the T.S.G.A. The Board was authorised to consider applications for land

TABLE VOCCUPATIONS OF MALE ADULTEUROPEANS 1921-1931

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>1921</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>1931</u>	<u>%</u>
Public Administration	602	41	1,075	24
Agriculture	284	19	1,081	24
Commercial	146	10	435	10
Professional	327	22	722	16
Other	124	8	1,167	26
<hr/>				
Totals	1,483	100	4,480	100
<hr/>				

(source: Reports on the census of non-native population, 1921 and 1931; Government Printer, Dar es Salaam)

specifically required for sisal growing and to make recommendations to the Governor after considering the suitability of the area and the experience and financial backing of the applicant. Thus the influence of the T.S.G.A. through the Board was considerable; it was able to oppose expansion when there was a danger of over-production and by the imposition of a cess it obtained funds to further the interests of the industry.<sup>103</sup>

Furthermore, the sisal growers were represented in the Legislative Council to a degree which many settlers thought over-generous and MacMichael in particular was criticised for failing to take other interests into account when making new nominations.<sup>104</sup>

In contrast to the local organization of the industry, which was no mean feat in view of the different nationalities and political views of those who controlled it, there was less unity among the London representatives. It was not until 1941 that a Sisal Growers Association was started in London, with the aim of promoting research into new uses for sisal and of protecting the growers' interests in fiscal matters. Growers and shippers were represented on the committee of this Association but since the interests of the two groups did not always coincide it was disbanded after six years and replaced by a committee representing growers only. But if there was no formal representative body it would be unwise to overlook the influence of men like Alfred Wigglesworth, the head of a firm with wide-ranging interests in hard fibres in different parts of the world.<sup>105</sup> In Tanganyika, Wigglesworth had gone into

partnership with Johann Franz and Walter Schoeller to form Amboni Estates Ltd., one of the most successful of the Territory's producers.<sup>106</sup>

By the outbreak of the second World War there were 131 sisal estates in the Territory; the nationalities of those controlling these estates is given in Table VI.

A further break-down of the figures reveals that at the outbreak of the War in 1939 local interests controlled nearly half the production and British interests in London controlled a quarter. It was therefore to be expected that representations to the Tanganyika government would more suitably come from the local Association rather than through the City via the Colonial Secretary.

### The Depression

By the end of 1930 the down-turn in world trade began to affect the Territory and the prices of most products fell sharply. The Depression severely jolted the settlers' confidence since they could never again argue convincingly that they alone could provide the required impetus for further economic development. The delaying tactics of Cameron during the years of prosperity aimed at preventing a labour shortage, also ensured that further expansion of non-African farming was effectively prevented until after the second World War. A number of settlers who obtained land shortly before the slump were not sufficiently firmly established to continue in business when the drop in prices occurred. On the other hand, it was soon evident

TABLE VIINTEREST IN THE SISAL INDUSTRY BY  
NATIONALITY IN 1939

<u>Control of Estates</u>	<u>Percentage of Total Production</u>
British	32.8
Indian	18.4
German	18.1
Greek	17.6
Others	13.1
Total	<hr/> 100.0 <hr/>

(source: A. Wigglesworth and Co.,  
Monthly Fibre Report).

that when times were bad the African sector could display a remarkable resilience. In 1931, a 'grow more crops' campaign was instituted in the knowledge that prices of produce might be lower. However, it was hoped that better supervised marketing arrangements would provide some compensation for the growers. The response to the campaign, in terms of production, was surprisingly good and the results enabled the Territory to survive the Depression without retrenchment on an even greater scale. Nevertheless, increased acreages of cultivation in the peasant farming sector brought other problems in view of the inadequate arrangements made to prevent soil erosion.<sup>107</sup> Certainly one of the more significant results of the campaign was the dramatic increase in cotton production in Lake province, and thereafter Sukumaland supplanted Eastern province as the most important area for this crop. Yields never again fell to pre-Depression levels, for the campaign coincided with the introduction of better seed, developed over the years to suit local conditions.

In the plantation sector, both coffee and sisal producers were badly hit by the general drop in prices. Sisal had averaged £23 per ton in 1930 but was soon down to little over £11. By 1931, many of the plantations were in difficulties and were either indebted to the banks or to the Usagara Company which was backed by the German government. Some of the sisal growers had to give up and in order to prevent any further reduction in the industry the T.S.G.A. asked the government for a subsidy of £5 per ton.<sup>108</sup> The Association argued that without a subsidy fresh planting


would be postponed, causing unemployment at once and stagnation when prices recovered. No help was forthcoming and both the sisal and the coffee growers had to accept prices which were barely sufficient to meet production costs. By 1932 wage rates had been lowered and, not surprisingly, recruitment of new labour was sharply reduced; there was also a steep increase in the number of desertions from sisal estates.<sup>109</sup> The T.S.G.A. appealed to the government for help in obtaining recruits but after reference to London the request was rejected. The tea industry was also affected but was better able to survive as a result of the international quota system; by keeping to the agreement the Territory was limited to a maximum acreage of 2,900 acres until 1938 a figure which was considered by the growers to be reasonably generous. With lower prices being received for the main crops there was an inevitable reduction in revenue and a consequent lack of funds for any development.

#### Prospects for agriculture after the Depression

By the end of 1935 throughout East Africa there were signs that prosperity was returning. In Tanganyika, although the owners and managers of estates had had to contend with severely reduced receipts for their crops it is of interest to observe that the rationale of the 'grow more crops' campaign had been accepted in the non-African sector as well; Table VII shows that production increased as prices fell. Nevertheless, when world markets improved

TABLE VII

## Principal Crops by Quantity 1924-1939



( source: Annual Reports, Department of Agriculture;  
Government Printer, Dar es Salaam)

there was no rapid recovery in the Territory and development in each sector of the agricultural system was hampered by different but equally intractable problems.

If it was to expand, the non-African sector needed private investment on a substantial scale; this did not materialise because a number of factors destroyed confidence and persuaded potential investors that ventures elsewhere would be more likely to succeed. This state of affairs was due partly to government policies and partly to circumstances over which no control was possible. In the latter category, the Territory suffered from adverse publicity when the usual hazards of tropical agriculture were augmented by a series of locust invasions from both north and south and which in the course of a single day could ruin a farmer.<sup>110</sup> Second, although sisal prices had staged a modest recovery, there was still little profit in growing coffee owing to over-production in South America.<sup>111</sup> Many farmers uprooted their coffee and planted tea, thus taking up the permitted quota already described and leaving little scope for further investment.<sup>112</sup> On the other hand there were opportunities for diversification; papain and pyrethrum were being grown successfully, the prospects for tobacco growing were brighter and for the farmers in the Southern Highlands province the increased activity in the Lupa goldfield led to new markets for cereals and dairy products.<sup>113</sup>

But government actions and omissions continued to affect the course of white settlement. The Governors who followed Cameron seemed to have been more favourably

disposed to an increase in the number of settlers, particularly in view of the German threat, if they were British nationals. Nevertheless, there was no relaxation of the rule that newcomers either should possess a substantial amount of capital or should enjoy an assured income. Second, in spite of the uncertainty caused by German colonial ambitions already described, no authoritative and convincing declaration was ever made to the effect that British control would never be voluntarily ended.<sup>114</sup> In such circumstances, no British national could invest with confidence in any enterprise in the Territory. Finally, there was once again some doubt as to whether the labour supply would be adequate. During the Depression many owners and managers had been forced to lay off a number of their employees; some had been compelled to close down altogether and found themselves unable to pay the wages due. As a consequence, employment, in African eyes, no longer guaranteed security; moreover, the 'grow more crops' campaign had led to an increase in the number of African farmers cultivating cash crops and many former labourers from estates found it more congenial to stay at home. Others were attracted by the increased activity in the goldfields and had no desire to return to agricultural employment. Thus when the plantations and estates could again be operated profitably, a labour shortage occurred. In view of past controversies, MacMichael, who had followed Symes, appointed a committee to investigate the labour position.<sup>115</sup> As might have been expected, the committee found that there was no shortage of men who were

available for work but that the majority evinced no wish to obtain regular employment. The remedy, according to members, was to make work conditions more attractive and use employed labour more economically. The report formed the basis of the Governor's reply to a Colonial Office inquiry into labour conditions in the African dependencies.

The major problem in the African sector was, as already described, the need to introduce measures to halt erosion. The extent of the problem was now recognized and it was realised that there was no chance of repairing past damage while the African communities remained confined within the same areas which had been cultivated in German times. Although little could be done to change the situation until more capital was provided, the first step was to make known the extent of the problem. If new land was to be brought under cultivation, the tsetse fly had to be controlled and domestic water supplies had to be provided in selected areas. A start was made with the creation of a Tsetse Research Department, mainly financed by funds provided under the Colonial Development Act of 1929 and the difficulties involved became better appreciated. Instead of the fly-belts receding as the population increased, it was found that there was a constant movement in progress, some belts being in the process of spreading while others diminished. Where the fly gained ground the population with their cattle moved elsewhere causing over-crowding, over-grazing and severe soil erosion.<sup>116</sup> In other areas, where there was no fly problem it was the lack of water for domestic purposes which prevented people moving to new land, the result being

that over-cultivation led to diminishing annual yields per acre.

To deal with these problems it was recognized that there would be a need to co-ordinate the development policies of the government departments concerned with agriculture and animal husbandry as well as to create a new department to plan water development policies. Also, in spite of the road building programme already undertaken the Territory's particularly difficult spatial problem required a relatively greater expenditure on communications than elsewhere in East Africa. Aware of these competing demands on the totally inadequate resources available, it became increasingly obvious that a co-ordinated development plan was necessary. The first step in devising such a plan was taken in 1938 when it was announced that a Development Committee would be appointed. In this way the government of the Territory anticipated by some two years the conversion of the official classes in London to the realization that development in such circumstances was synonymous with good government.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. For minutes of meetings see CO 736; the only reported disagreement between the Governor and his council was over the question of permitting German nationals to purchase land CO 691/78/133, Despatch dated 10 July 1925.
2. He added that this was only his personal view; nevertheless it accorded with policy as stated already, in Indians in Kenya, cmd. 1922 (HMSO London 1923) p. 18 reference PMC 4th Sess. VI., 96, 102-103.
3. Indian Review (May 1926) p. 340.
4. Cameron, evidence to Joint Select Committee, op. cit., p. 177; see also AR 1937, pp. 72, 73, where it was reported that 'Indian traders were an essential part of the economic structure and it would be difficult to replace them'; also, G. Delf, Asians in East Africa (London 1963).
5. See Emergency Laws (Transitory Provisions) Ordinance 1946 and Immigration (control) Ordinance 1947; also, Government of India Deputation Report 1946.
6. Urban centres in Tanganyika were designated as Townships; smaller centres where few services were provided were termed Minor Settlements; Trading Centres were usually collections of some dozen or so dukas, often in remote rural areas, where sometimes some services were supplied by the local native authority.
7. From the Foreign Office Sir Robert Vansittart urged such action, suggesting that it was inconsistent of the C.O. to declare that under no circumstances would Tanganyika be handed back to Germany while at the same time permitting Germans progressively to dominate the economic life of the Territory. CO/691/25290.
8. See CO 537/940 dated 9 December 1918.
9. It was also opposed by Indian nationalist leaders; see R.G. Gregory, India and East Africa (Oxford 1971) p. 174.
10. Report by Sir Benjamin Robertson, cmd. 1312 (HMSO London 1921).
11. The way in which the Kenya Indian leader, Mangal Dass, was for a time prevented from inspecting the estates is described in Gregory, op.cit., p. 379.

12. AR 1925, p. 63.
13. The first budget surplus was achieved in 1923-24 but the railway accounts did not begin to show a working profit for a further year.
14. Reported by Dar es Salaam Times, 3 June 1922.
15. Dar es Salaam Times, 10 July 1920; in Kenya 1031 farms were handed over to ex-soldiers, occupying an area of two million acres.
16. C.C. Dundas, Kilimanjaro and its People, (London 1924), p.p. 123-125.
17. Journal of the African Society, xxiv (1924-5), p. 51.
18. R.L. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, (2 ed. London 1965), p. 495.
19. The warning was backed by legal sanction; Native Foodstuffs Ordinance 1924.
20. 'To save a native community from famine is more important than the export of many bales of cotton', from Circular on Agriculture and Labour, dated 5 August 1926. (see CO 736/22).
21. Report by Cotton Specialist dated 10 July 1924 (CO 691/72/214).
22. AR 1924, p. 53. About half the land alienated at this time was intended for planting cotton in Morogoro district; the remainder was for coffee and mixed farming.
23. EAC Report, op.cit.
24. The Commission consisted of W. Ormsby-Gore, chairman, and two members, F.C. Linfield (Liberal) and Major A.G. Church (Labour).
25. Linfield disagreed with his colleagues on the important issue of the validity of the 'contact theory'; it could hardly therefore be claimed, as Altrincham suggested, that their findings were unanimous. Lord Altrincham, Kenya's Opportunity, (London 1955).
26. EAC Report, op.cit., p. 116.
27. Dar es Salaam Times, 27 January 1923 and H.C. 156, col. 254.

28. Recruiting staff was difficult; in 1924 there were only ten officers in the Department and the policy was to concentrate effort in those districts producing economic crops. Even so, Bukoba, one of the more productive areas, only had one visit from an Agricultural Officer in two years, EAC Report, p. 118.
29. For the report and relevant minutes, see CO 691/78/124.
30. Buell, op.cit., p. 507.
31. During 1924, labour shortages occurred because some districts were closed to recruitment due to sleeping sickness; also, construction of the Tabora-Shinyanga railway for many provided employment nearer home, AR 1925, p. 27.
32. AR 1924, p. 21.
33. Districts affected were Kondoa, Mahenge, Arusha, Masai, Mbulu, Pangani, Tanga, Usambara and Pare.
34. Districts affected were Iringa, Songea, Mbulu, Biharamulo, Kibondo and Kasulu.
35. Cf., F. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London 1922), p. 458.
36. D. Cameron, My Tanganyika service and some Nigeria (London 1939), p. 39.
37. Lord Milner, Questions of the Hour (London 1925), p. 148.
38. The Commission noted that the population density in Tanganyika in 1924 was 11 persons per square mile; comparable figures elsewhere were Kenya 11, Uganda 33, Gold Coast 50, Report, p. 26.
39. Cameron, op.cit., p. 38; cf. Altrincham, op.cit., p. 34 where he states that instructions given him on his appointment as Governor of Kenya were based on the Commission's recommendations.
40. Ibid, p. 255.
41. The other shareholders were Lord Egerton and Sir John Ramsden. The company depended for its success on the construction of the railway recommended by the E.A. Commission, provided that it followed the route advocated by the 1926 Conference of Governors; it was wound up in 1931.

42. Cameron, despatch No. 471 dated 10 July 1925, explaining instructions issued to the survey team and district commissioners, CO 691/78/83. Cameron was by training a 'Secretariat', and not a 'field' officer.
43. Despatch, C.S. to Governor (CO file 35484/25). The officials most directly concerned were Sir Samuel Wilson and C.S. Strachey.
44. Cameron, despatch dated 1 October 1925, (CO 691/79/271).
45. CO 691/79/280.
46. Cameron, op.cit., p. 39.
47. Cf. J. Claggett Taylor, The Political Development of Tanganyika (London 1967), p. 59.
48. T.L.C. 1st session, December 1926; further publicity was given in a special supplement edition of the East African Journal 7 July 1927.
49. Hilton Young Report, op.cit., p. 46.
50. Land Survey Report No. 2 (Dar es Salaam 1929) Bagshawe based his figures on advice given him by 'experts' but there is no indication as to how they made their calculations.
51. Government Notice 1054/30; also, see ante, p. 80
52. Armitage Smith, op.cit., p. 6.
53. 'Cameron feared the settler, although he came at last to accept white settlement as an economic necessity'. Altrincham, op.cit., p. 70.
54. P.M.C. 11th session (1927), p. 72.
55. Cameron, address to the Empire Parliamentary Association, 7 July 1927.
56. Sir Sidney Henn, M.P. was a member of the Colonial Secretary's advisory committee on trade and industry; he was also for a time chairman of the J.E.A.B. He corresponded regularly with Cameron, his letter in this instance being dated 18 July 1927. F.S. Joelson was the editor of the fortnightly publication 'East Africa' (later East Africa and Rhodesia).
57. Circular on Agriculture and Labour, op.cit.
58. See C. Leubuscher, Tanganyika Territory: a study of economic policy under Mandate, (Oxford 1944), p. 73.

59. According to evidence to Committee of Inquiry, see f.n. 115 below.
60. East Africa Standard, 24 November 1924.
61. Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, Labour in the Tanganyika Territory, Col. no. 19 (London 1926).
62. For Scott's comments, see Administrative Officers Conference 1924, op.cit.
63. Orde Browne, op.cit., p. 76.
64. See post, p. 200
65. 'A native who is energetic will go to two or even three estates and do a nominal days work on each, all in the same day.' Cameron, despatch 24 February 1926 (CO 691/83/239).
66. The Palestine and East Africa Guaranteed Loan Act 1926 enabled the territories concerned to borrow funds for approved purposes.
67. The Railway General Manager's prediction was that the line would be uneconomic for twenty years, Hilton Young Report, op.cit., p. 122
68. E.A. Guaranteed Loan Committee Report, cmd. 2701 (London 1926).
69. Cameron, address to Legco, 3 December 1929.
70. Hilton Young Report, op.cit., p. 123
71. Joint Select Committee, op.cit., p. 111, despatch dated 5 July 1930. His statement led to a sharp exchange with Lord Cranworth which ended with Cameron asserting 'the views of the settlers in Iringa and the views of the government as to the amount of the land to be left to the natives are diametrically opposed.' (Para. 1662).
72. P.E. Mitchell, address at R.I.I.A. 29 June 1931.
73. E.g., with Germany and Japan; see AR 1938, p.9.
74. Cunliffe-Lister, H.C. 293, col. 1945.
75. In fact between 1928 and 1938 the cost of sugar imported into Tanganyika trebled.
76. See memorandum enclosed with AR 1932.
77. The most important regular imports from Kenya were wheat and wheat flour.

78. Report of a Committee on Land development and the Provision of Financial Assistance to Settlers and Planters, (Tanganyika Legislative Council, 1930).
79. M.F. Bell, Tea Planting Prospects in the South West Highlands of Tanganyika (London 1928); however, many local experts were not convinced by the arguments put forward.
80. Cameron, despatch dated 15 March 1930, (CO 691/107/29610).
81. He had already made this point publicly, in a circular letter, see post, f.n. 95.
82. This despatch is also included in file 29610
83. Passfield, minute dated 28 April 1930, loc. cit.
84. P.M.C. 4th session p. 147; subsequently the League of Nations Council accepted the view that the termination of Mandates was not possible, League, Official Journal VI 1926, p. 1363.
85. Sinclair, H.C. 315 col. 1147 and P. Snowden, 'Give Germany her colonies', The Nation (New York) July 1926; also Lord Arnold H.L. 107, 694, 695.
86. See K. Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, (London 1947), p. 300.
87. Observer, 8 February 1937.
88. See the decidedly ambivalent guidance in the Labour Party manifesto, 1919, which appears to condemn 'imperialism, which seeks to dominate other races' as well as 'a selfish and insular non-interventionism'.
89. E.g., Major Lead's attack on the government for failing to promote research and encourage increased production in the sisal industry, T.L.C., 2nd sess. 1927-28.
90. 'Much of the purpose of railway extension is to increase white settlement rather than providing facilities for Africans'. Lord Lugard, P.M.C. Vith sess. 18th meeting, 7 July 1925.
91. E.g. Brigadier-General Boyd Moss, leader of the unofficials in Legco., attended a meeting of the Arusha Planters Association at which it

was resolved to request Amery to replace Cameron. Boyd Moss made a somewhat unconvincing attempt to explain his position at this meeting when he subsequently commented on the proceedings; T.L.C. 2nd sess. 1927-28. For an account of the friction between Governor and settlers, see Daily Mail 7 March 1929.

92. Cameron, despatch dated 10 August 1929; 'The Usambara Planters Association is a moderate and rational body who do not engage in political agitation', CO 691/104.
93. Legislative Council Paper: The Imperial Colonial Development Act (1929), SMP 13656, item 15.
94. Evidence to Joint Select Committee, op.cit., vol. 3, App. 7, p. 26; the suggestion that local settlers should be associated with the British government's duty of trusteeship had been made in Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa, cmd. 2904 (1927).
95. Circular 12985/45 dated 8 May 1929, filed with CO 691/104/29489.
96. Lt. Colonel Sir Stewart Symes, (1878-1962) became Governor in May 1931.
97. Symes, despatch dated 6 August 1932 (CO 691/125).
98. (a) No unofficials were appointed to the Governors Executive Council until 1939; in Kenya, provision for appointments to the Executive Council of a number of unofficials had been made in 1919.  
  
(b) '...(in Kenya)... a practice in Legislative Council of referring all questions of importance to select committees in which the official majority is seldom retained.' Hilton Young Report, p. 89.
99. Evidence, Joint Select Committee, op.cit., para. 1971.
100. E.g., over the issue of introducing income tax in Kenya.
101. The Chairman of the East African section of the London Chamber of Commerce, Sir H. Leggett, supported plantations but was not in favour of white settlement per se, as is shown by his memorandum to the Joint Select Committee, Vol. III, p. 47.

102. The Association was founded by Major (later Sir William) Lead, MLC., who became a member of the Executive Council in 1939.
103. Subsequently its influence was extended by its control of labour recruitment (Silabu) and by operating a produce inspectorate.
104. E.g., MacMichael's appointment of Major King in 1935 was criticized by the Maize Growers Association, for whereas the mixed farmers were unrepresented there were two members representing the sisal industry. Kenya Weekly News, 3 January 1936.
105. Lord Milner, when C.S., had appointed Wigglesworth his adviser on Tanganyika sisal matters. Later Wigglesworth was chairman of the Imperial Institute Committee on Vegetable Fibres.
106. Johann Franz, a Swiss national, managed a sisal estate in Tanganyika before the first World War. Wigglesworth had interests in two other estates in the Territory, Kikwetu and Ruvu Estates Ltd. He had other and major interests in sisal in Mozambique.
107. According to a later Director of Agriculture the campaign was a disaster since soil conservation measures were entirely inadequate, T.L.C., 20th sess., 1946-46, p. 42.
108. In Kenya maize growers received a subsidy until prices recovered.
109. Symes reported his refusal to assist plantation recruitment (despatch 804 dated 12 August 1932) and the C.S. (Cunliffe-Lister) agreed with him. The sisal labour force was 10% under strength and Symes reported that Lead had warned him that desertions were averaging 40%.
110. E.g., during the period 1928/30 there were four locust invasions from the north and one, Desert locusts, from the south; Agricultural Department A.R. 1929/30.
111. The selling price of coffee halved between 1928 and 1934.
112. The tea quota was increased to 4,950 acres in 1938; the quota permitted about 60% of the crop to be exported.

113. About 800 non-Africans and 17,000 Africans were engaged in gold mining in the Lupa area in 1935; see Report of the Committee Appointed to Consider and Advise on Questions Relating to the Supply and Welfare of Native Labour in the Tanganyika Territory (Dar es Salaam 1938), p.30.
114. The uncertainty was the consequence of Baldwin's statement in 1936 that no transfer would be made without reference to Parliament; H.C. 311, col. 552. Until November 1938, no assurance could be given because the ending of the mandate was a distinct possibility; see Daily Telegraph, 5 July 1972, 'Colonial Office tried to conceal Africa offer to Hitler'.
115. Report of Committee on Native Labour, op.cit.; also Colonial Secretary's despatch (circular) dated 24 August 1937.
116. E.g., the Chiefdom of Tinde, Shinyanga district, where in twenty years the population had fallen by over 50%; see N. Vicars Harris, East African Annual, 1934/35 and CO 691/25088.

CHAPTER VTHE SETTLEMENT POLICY: THE OTHER FACTORS

The argument over the need to increase European settlement lasted until the onset of the Depression dampened, for a time anyway, any enthusiasm for African financial adventures. The issue was confused, not so much by conflicting predictions of future economic benefits as by other arguments unrelated to any strategy for increasing the production of crops for export. Throughout East Africa there were those who believed that the social and political implications of increasing the numerical strength of the European community far outweighed any economic consideration. However extraordinary it may seem in retrospect there is no doubt that a considerable body of opinion was prepared to argue that white settlement had an educational value. To others the most important need was to take steps to encourage new settlers of British origin in order to counteract the influence of the Germans who returned to the Territory after 1925.

Those who believed that white settlement had a modernizing effect on African society based their arguments on two propositions. First, by what was termed the 'demonstration effect', it was suggested that the African peasant farmer, seeing the industry and expertise of his European neighbour, would learn from him either by working for him for a time or by following his example. The argument was much used by those who disliked the segregation

of races implicit in the creation of 'reserves' and 'scheduled areas'. Others thought that it was cheaper and less likely to lead to friction if the peasant farmer adopted improved practices by voluntary imitation rather than by being compelled to observe regulations imposed by the Department of Agriculture. 'The best school for the African is a good European estate,' observed Sir Edward Grigg;<sup>1</sup> Cameron too supported the argument and in a letter to Lugard he mentioned that even the Kenya settlers performed a useful purpose by setting a good example to the Africans.<sup>2</sup> Later, he arranged for 'a European with a good deal of financial backing in London', as he explained to the Joint Select Committee, to be given a lease of land in the remote district of Songea, partly to provide employment and partly to provide an example.<sup>3</sup> When questioned further he maintained that the example of the European farmer was only of value if he was successful.<sup>4</sup> This point had already been emphasised by the Hilton Young Commission which had commented:

'Governments ought to take account of their responsibility for controlling the quality of settlers ... (they) should be men who have not only the material resources necessary for success but also the qualities... to earn confidence and respect. The quality of the early settlers in these territories is almost as important to the government as the quality of its own officials..'<sup>5</sup>

This argument is of some importance because the policy being advocated was followed with some care by successive Governors in Tanganyika. The high standard required of potential settlers had an important influence on the pattern of land usage.<sup>6</sup> For whereas in Kenya, Grigg was prepared

to offer land to Italian peasants who would have farmed intensively comparatively small acreages, in Tanganyika the basis of any approval of a settler's application for land was that he had the necessary resources to survive during bad years, even if this meant that the total amount of alienations was thereby reduced. The result of this policy was that in spite of the Land Regulations the settler with private means often left much of his land undeveloped, consequently causing some resentment among Africans in places where new land was in short supply. There were other consequences of a calculated policy of impressing the African that the European settler possessed superior skills. It reinforced the widely held belief that social contacts should be kept to a minimum; it provided a basis for rationalizing some forms of discrimination; and it led to some anomalies similar to those which embarrass the South African government of today in their attempt to present a logical racial policy. Thus Cypriot Greeks, who often presented an image of being far too enterprising to be members of the squirearchy had to be explained as being distinct from wazungu (Europeans), whereas white Americans could be included in the term.<sup>7</sup> The Boer community of Northern province also caused problems in that many parents neglected to ensure that their children received even a rudimentary education and the government had to introduce measures to remedy the position.<sup>8</sup> Finally, the policy of reinforcing settler prestige led to problems of jurisdiction; a government spokesman had to admit that a native authority had no powers to arrest an offender residing on a settler's

farm-land.<sup>9</sup> If the native authority system was destined to increase in prestige and influence, problems of this nature would inevitably lead to political conflict. As described in Chapter III, steps were taken to prevent this happening by closing some provinces to ordinary forms of non-African settlement, a policy which was not formally abandoned until 1953.<sup>10</sup> It is therefore evident that Cameron believed that his plans for the development of African local government were too important to permit unqualified support for the contact argument.

The theory was examined with some care by the East Africa Commission and the following extracts illustrate members' thinking:

'the native advances in civilization, in physique, in skill and in independence by contact with European enterprise.'

and later,

'it is inconsistent with the economic progress of the whole country that he (the native) should be allowed to stagnate in a native reserve, leaving all the work to the women, the men doing nothing.'<sup>11</sup>

Both statements were considered to be accurate observations by nearly all the settlers in East Africa and by not a few officials as well. The fact of improvement in physique of those who became contract labourers was the only part of the statements which was in any way measurable and the remainder was pure speculation. But the second statement in particular expressed in a comparatively restrained way the European view of the African who stayed at home. One traveller in Kenya, shortly before 1914 wrote of brawny savages covered in oil, existing on the efforts of their

women-kind and weaker brethren.<sup>12</sup> Others used harsher epithets to describe this state of affairs.<sup>13</sup> Even the P.M.C. became concerned as to whether the Tanganyika administration was doing enough to prevent the exploitation of women.<sup>14</sup> As a consequence there were continuous vocal and passionate demands from settlers in Kenya and Tanganyika for more white settlement so that more Africans could benefit from the advantages of discipline and wage earning.

But equally vocal were those who held the opposing view, the missionaries who believed that prolonged absence from home, working on plantations or farms, led to the collapse of family life and the officials who argued that a shortage of men in the villages might delay the development of a viable form of local government. Their solution was to modernize the community as a whole rather than to improve the individual. In the Commission's report it is described as the tribal control theory and its aims explained by one member of the Commission in a separate memorandum.<sup>15</sup> Like the contact theory it not only attracted enthusiastic support but also it could never be proved to be sound or otherwise; comments on either theory have often been exaggerated or reductionist and generalizations are meaningless.<sup>16</sup> For example, it will not be disputed that the African labourer on a sisal plantation was unlikely to learn anything about farming practices which would be of value to him; against this can be argued that there was value in the experience gained from receiving a regular wage and meeting people from other African communities. The labourer obtaining employment on a settler's farm often moved there with his

family and the consequent feudal relationship was no doubt educative in some respects; at least it provided a change from the restrictions of tribal society.

The qualified support British officials gave to the 'contact' theory illustrates the empirical approach so often adopted in colonial policy. It was believed that unless there were obvious disadvantages for communities as a whole, it was necessary to provide opportunities for employment and for observing European methods of organizing work. Hence the apparent contradictions in the views expressed by Mitchell who, with his knowledge of local conditions was always able to command respect for his opinions. He was a firm supporter of the decision to restrict settlement in the 'native' areas, thereby implying that the advantages of 'contact' were of secondary importance. At the same time he recognized and supported the African desire to obtain regular employment within easy reach of the home. Writing of Ufipa during the early days of British administration he commented:

'...the district slowly fell to pieces for lack of any investment of capital, any enterprise which might have brought some productivity, some inducement to stay at home... the chiefs and elders had their own remedy which they urged on every occasion. Get us some Europeans to come and settle and cultivate here so that people can earn wages near their homes.'<sup>17</sup>

Barnes, in charge of Njombe in Southern Highlands province, reported that chiefs and people told him that 'there was a general advantage to have European settlers in the vicinity providing a ready market for produce and labour.'<sup>18</sup> It seems that these comments represent an accurate assessment of African opinion at that time in any district which was

isolated or sparsely populated; but there was little or no support for any proposal to provide land for settlers in those areas where land for grazing was already short or where it appeared that there was no land left for expanding cultivation in the future.

Both missionaries and administrative officers were anxious to preserve the cohesion of the tribal communities in which they worked and their support for a certain amount of alienation, with its consequent employment opportunities, is understandable. The alternative was apparent when a large proportion of the younger men was recruited for work elsewhere in the Territory. The popularity of such work varied from district to district and the reasons for leaving home were not always economic. In Rungwe district, for example, where African farmers by 1930 were producing considerable quantities of cash crops and where a number of large estates had been developed, an unusually large number of young males preferred to seek work outside the district.<sup>19</sup> In part, this can be attributed to the understandable desire to escape from tribal discipline and the anxieties caused by witchcraft, particularly prevalent in this area. Equally important, however, was the need to observe what has been described as 'one of the fundamental principles underlying Nyakyusa society, the spatial segregation of parents and children'.<sup>20</sup> It was a rule which became increasingly difficult to obey as the population grew and unoccupied land became scarce.

The German threat

If the opposing arguments over the contact theory appeared to be evenly balanced, the other political factor was less complicated. Anglo-German antagonism between the Wars stemmed from resentment of the Treaty of Versailles on the one hand and fears of a resurgent Germany seeking revenge on the other. It distorted the bases of policy-making for two decades in places utterly remote from Europe and in Tanganyika led to decisions being taken which had little bearing on economic factors. For the British this was no new situation; a generation earlier policy at different ends of Africa had been determined by being subordinated to the need to protect the route to India.<sup>21</sup> The argument that strategic advantage could best be secured by the occupation of territory varied in its persuasive influence. With the losses incurred in the East African campaign fresh in the memory of the British official classes, there was widespread support for the acceptance of the Mandate in order to prevent a repetition of that conflict. If this proposition was sound, and if the Mandate might be ended, then the position must be consolidated by incorporating the Territory in an East African dominion. But the opposing arguments also attracted support. First, provided British control of the seas could be maintained, a potential enemy was at a disadvantage if his forces were dispersed among colonial outposts; consequently, it was argued, there was no harm in Germany occupying territory in Africa. Secondly, it was desirable to remove the causes of conflict rather than

to accept them as inevitable and thus it was better to secure a detente with Germany even if this required the return of the former colonies. Both these arguments were hotly disputed, the first on the grounds of the growing potential of aircraft and the consequent threat to shipping and the second because it under-rated German expansionist ambitions.

These conflicting views and German national consciousness influenced settlement policies and aroused considerable interest in the alienation of land in the Territory. Within a few years of German nationals being permitted to return to Tanganyika it became apparent that they might soon form the major part of the settler population. They were hard-working and not easily discouraged by the difficult conditions they encountered. Those who had lived in East Africa before 1914 were sustained by the memory of past achievements while others were encouraged by the support of the German colonial organizations created in the nineteen-twenties, anxious to make amends for the traumatic events of 1918 and to reconstruct Germany's position as a world power. At first, the leaders were agreed on the policies to be adopted. First, it was necessary to nail the 'colonial guilt' lie so that Germany could become qualified in the eyes of the world to become a colonial power again. Second, following the geopolitik, advocated by Haushofer, it was necessary to break out of the boundaries of 'encircled' Germany and the logical direction was to expand in Africa again. Under the leadership of two ex-colonial Governors, the German Colonial Society, published a mass of literature

and held meetings throughout Germany before the collapse of the Weimar Republic. But these efforts aroused little support from the public and from the references to colonies in Mein Kampf there was little hope of support from the Nazis. As time passed spokesmen for the movement began to present different views on why colonies were needed. Whereas Solf, an ex-minister for Colonies, said they were needed for political reasons, Hjalmar Schacht argued that they were necessary for Germany's economic survival.<sup>22</sup> In 1927 a German member was appointed to the P.M.C. and he, and his successor, took every opportunity to make known German aspirations and anxieties.

In Tanganyika many pre-War settlers returned as soon as they were allowed entry and quite a few were able to obtain land in the districts where they had previously lived. Others went to the Southern Highlands province as soon as land became available there to become the first settlers in the Mufindi area, some 80 miles south of Iringa.<sup>23</sup> Several went further south, to Mbozi near Mbeya, and an eye-witness reported seeing some fifty German families squatting on land they had pegged out, awaiting the government surveyor. He observed that although they had had no time to erect temporary shelters they had already planted nurseries of coffee seedlings. They were confident that if they were able to obtain some kind of title over a piece of land they would be able to obtain enough funds from German land banks to pay expenses for one year's development.<sup>24</sup> Other groups of German nationals went to

Oldeani, Arusha and Moshi while others, with no desire to farm, settled in Tanga and Dar es Salaam. Whereas those with previous experience in Africa wanted their own estate at once, the new recruit from Germany was usually sent to another German settler to learn about local conditions. By 1928, there were more German settlers than British in many of the more important districts; a German language newspaper was started; and the Usagara Company and its affiliates such as the Uhehe Company provided financial aid for German farmers in the form of mortgages and credit as well as paying above-market prices for crops sold through them. Backed by the German government, the Usagara Company became the third largest importer of goods into the Territory. With support from Germany and with the increase in the German community maintained its position was assured; for in the eleven years from 1925, 3068 German nationals were recorded as entering Tanganyika to take up residence.

These developments inevitably caused anxiety in both Britain and East Africa and to some extent affected settlement policies. Once Cameron had over-ruled his Executive Council, no doubt with the approval of the Colonial Secretary, and German nationals were allowed to return and obtain land, it was not considered worth incurring criticism by taking discriminatory action against them.<sup>25</sup> When later Germany left the League of Nations and a further opportunity occurred of checking German settlement, as already described, no action was taken. As the British in Tanganyika well knew many of the European settlers in the Territory who by nationality were Poles, Czechs or

Lithuanians were in fact German by culture and sentiment, intensively loyal to the Fatherland. Their attitude to the Tanganyika administration was bound to be affected by the state of Anglo-German relations in Europe.

Amery was well aware of the possibility of conflict with Germany again at some future date and took pains to emphasise the strategic implications of the Mandate. As he described later, he was impressed by Smuts' warning to the War Cabinet:

'German aims are not really colonial, but are dominated by far-reaching conceptions of world politics. Not colonies, but military power and strategic position for exercising world power in future are her real aims.'<sup>26</sup>

Since Amery was at the Colonial Office for most of the time that Cameron was Governor it must be presumed that the latter was well aware of the views he held. Cameron's own attitude was unexceptional since when land in the Southern Highlands was offered to settlers he noted that he would have liked 'to see Britishers first off the mark.'<sup>27</sup> It had not been expected that German nationals in such relatively large numbers would have taken advantage of the offers and soon questions were being asked both in the House of Commons and in the Tanganyika Legislative Council. As Cameron himself remarked when invited to attend a meeting of the Joint East Africa Board, the British Government and the City were unable to assist potential British settlers whereas the German government and Hamburg were giving financial assistance.<sup>28</sup>

The official view in the Colonial Office played an influential part in determining government policy. In

the summer of 1927, Sir Hubert Gough acting on behalf of East African commercial interests, began negotiations with the Colonial Office to obtain support for a settlement scheme for ex-servicemen; in the first instance it was planned to settle fifty families in Southern Highlands province, providing the British government agreed to offer some financial assistance.<sup>29</sup> The officials in the East Africa department were strongly opposed to the plan, as the minutes reveal. Although Gough claimed that Cameron agreed in principle with the objects of the scheme providing the Association assumed financial responsibility for the settlers, in the Office it was observed that it was unlikely that the Governor would have supported such a scheme and anyway it would be contrary to the terms of the Mandate to provide funds for it.<sup>30</sup> But when legal advice on this point was obtained, it was found that some forms of aid would not be improper. Nevertheless, Strachey, who had been involved with the East African department since the inception of the Mandate, remained unimpressed, minuting:

'I cannot see what good they (the settlers) will be to T.T. If the experiment is tried I fully expect it to be a failure ... it is the result of a lot of nonsense talked by Mr. Joelson.'<sup>31</sup>

He advised Ormsby-Gore that the scheme should be discouraged and the latter agreed, observing that 'it was only the Germans who were there before going back. I do not anticipate any new ones coming.' Unable to obtain any firm promise of assistance Gough had to be content with the assurance that his scheme would be considered further when he had formed his Association. Not surprisingly, twelve months passed with no progress in the plans being made.

Meanwhile, following the meeting attended by Cameron, the Joint East Africa Board formed its own committee to promote settlement in Tanganyika. When this too failed to achieve anything the chairman resigned and a new committee was formed to include Gough. In January 1929, it reported that 'the Colonial Office was prepared to do everything in its power but settlement was blocked by the antagonistic attitude of Sir Donald Cameron.'<sup>32</sup> The Office seems to have attempted to attach the blame to Cameron on the basis of a despatch the previous year in which he had stated that although he was in sympathy with the object of the scheme it would be safer to proceed by following normal settlement policies.<sup>33</sup> Early in 1929 members of the committee had the opportunity to hear for themselves Cameron's views on the scheme when he attended a meeting at the Colonial Office called by Ormsby-Gore. It was duly noted that unofficials in Tanganyika were not concerned so much at the possibility of German political control as by the immediate problems caused by German settlers receiving subsidies and development aid from their home country. Cameron, asked to comment on criticisms of his settlement policies, replied by giving details of the amount of land alienated since his arrival in Tanganyika and explained how the need for accurate surveys and improved communications often caused delays in making more land available.<sup>34</sup> The other two matters discussed illustrated how legislation previously enacted could be used by civil servants to prevent decisions being taken in haste. The meeting noted that the Overseas Development Act of 1921

permitted the British government to provide funds for colonial settlers if the sum allocated was matched by a similar amount given by an overseas government or some private undertaking. If the Tanganyika government provided funds for British settlers, Cameron explained, under the terms of the Mandate a similar sum might have to be found for German settlers and thus the aim of Gough's scheme would be frustrated. The other difficulty concerned the Tanganyika Land Ordinance which prescribed that land for alienation had to be offered by auction. If a general amendment to the Ordinance was made before Gough's company was formed, there was the possibility that there would only be a German syndicate able to take advantage of the change. When shortly before this meeting Gough met Cameron again, he explained he had backers in the City who would support his scheme, but they wanted to remain anonymous until the Tanganyika government made a firm offer of land. Thus a stalemate had been reached and all that was decided was that Gough should seek further details from the Tanganyika government so that planning could continue.

Thus another year passed with no progress in Gough's settlement scheme. Meanwhile the J.E.A.B. had persuaded itself that the German threat had been exaggerated and was consequently less inclined to offer support for the proposal.<sup>35</sup> For his part, Cameron had never seen any cause for alarm; he maintained that after 1927 Tanganyika held little attraction to German settlers and many were put off by the Government's insistence that plots for alienation should not be less than 2,000 acres.<sup>36</sup> Eventually, Gough

could wait no longer and submitted a formal application to the Colonial Office for a grant of land in an area south of Iringa. Cameron, asked for his comments, agreed to reserve the land as requested for a reasonable period adding that he would need a grant from the British government to provide the necessary services. Having offered to co-operate he put on record his own opinion of the enterprise:

'My personal view of farming in the Iringa province is that with the lack of a railway and improved permanent crops it is definitely wrong to encourage any European to settle here and the local government should be careful not to identify itself with any such encouragement.'

37

Passfield, who had succeeded Amery, minuted that he fully agreed with Cameron and negotiations with Gough came to an end. It was not till after the Depression that interest in the scheme was revived as a result of initiative by Lord Chesham. He was instrumental in forming a company which obtained a Right of Occupancy over 110,000 acres in Iringa district, in the same area which had interested Gough.<sup>38</sup>

The Chesham scheme is of interest because its acceptance by the Tanganyika government amounted to an evident change of policy. The East African Commission and subsequent government statements had justified white settlement by relying on the argument that it was only by encouraging large-scale capital-intensive farming that the country's resources could be speedily developed. The supporters of the new scheme never suggested that profitability was the foremost aim but instead that a pleasant way of life would be secured by those who applied and were found acceptable by the sponsors. The holding was divided and sub-let in lots

of approximately 700 acres each and apart from being the landlord the company loaned equipment and offered advice and assistance. In general, the aim was to encourage the tenants to grow cereals on one-third of their holdings and reserve the rest for pasturing cattle.<sup>39</sup>

In the Colonial Office the project was viewed with much pessimism. Bruce Hutt, the district officer at Iringa had submitted a report with the observation that the scheme would fail since the grazing was extremely poor and others who had tried ranching there had come to grief. Hutt pointed out that the company had asked for 150,000 acres but of this some 40,000 had been excised in deference to the wishes of the local tribe.<sup>40</sup> The area in question was the most fertile portion of the land applied for. A minute on the Colonial Office file noted that in Chesham's brochure giving details of the scheme 'the section relating to markets was typically scanty and unconvincing.'<sup>41</sup>

But these views were not for the world at large. When Duff Cooper wrote to Ormsby Gore and asked whether Army Officers retiring from the service might be advised to invest their savings in the scheme, the reply, drafted according to Bottomley's directions, gave nothing away.<sup>42</sup> Ironically, the Colonial Secretary had to face a barrage of criticism in the House of Commons for having permitted the sponsors to receive especially favoured treatment. Why, Members asked, had the rules requiring an auction before alienation been ignored? One questioner described the transaction as handing over to a single company miles of extremely fertile land. Another implied that the Colonial

Secretary had evidently succumbed to pressure as a result of the applicant's friends in high places.<sup>43</sup> More embarrassing was the international reaction when it was recalled that an application from a German company for 4,000 acres at Mbozi had been refused.<sup>44</sup> The Governor was therefore asked to furnish a full report of the circumstances in order to reply to criticism. The P.M.C. were also interested in the scheme and asked for a description of how native interests were to be protected.<sup>45</sup>

There seems little doubt that the scheme as it was presented would never have been approved had it not been for the progressively worsening relations between Britain and Germany and the danger, as it seemed to those with an interest in the Territory, that Tanganyika might be sacrificed to secure an improvement in them. The manner in which the negotiations with Chesham were conducted indicate that MacMichael used his initiative and the Colonial Office was compelled with reluctance to support his actions.<sup>46</sup> It is of interest to note that officials were more concerned with the legality of making the applicant a direct grant of the land in question than with the soundness of the enterprise and their anxiety proved justified when the Colonial Secretary had to face the House of Commons. Whether MacMichael believed the scheme would succeed is not known, but from his despatch, he evidently felt strongly about the contrast between British and German settlement in the Southern Highlands; whereas many of the British settlers were absentee landlords, residing in Kenya and leaving their Tanganyika estates

undeveloped, the Germans in the same area worked hard to make their farms profitable. At least the Chesham scheme had the merit of attempting to secure a greater British presence in the area. But with a scheme amateurishly conceived and, as it turned out, inefficiently managed, only the most sanguine could ever have believed that it would become an effective counter-weight to the militant manifestations of German nationalism in near-by Mufindi.<sup>47</sup>

Although in the post-Depression period the tensions between Britain and Germany were obvious enough in Europe, in Tanganyika there were other considerations and it is difficult to make any useful generalizations. There were periods of fierce antagonism between British and German settlers, often sparked off by isolated incidents being given more attention by the Press than they deserved.<sup>48</sup> Certainly many British were alarmed when a branch of the Nazi party was formed and there was even more concern when it was rumoured that German citizens were smuggling arms into the country.<sup>49</sup> German farmers were often unpopular because they ostensibly lived well and enjoyed subsidies and help from German trading companies. For their part, many Germans resented the anti-German comments appearing regularly in East Africa.<sup>50</sup> At the same time the German community was itself deeply divided for there was no love lost between the ambitious members of the Nazi party and the ex-officials and aristocrats who had made their way back to Tanganyika and wanted to forget the problems of Europe. Moreover, Europeans in up-country districts had too much in common to permit national rivalries to become too important.

But in Germany the Nazi party progressively extended its control and there were inevitable repercussions in Tanganyika. E. Troost, the local leader, appointed a 'Judge of Honour' to enable Germans to settle disputes between themselves without recourse to the normal courts. Likewise in the economic activities normal in settler life there was a tendency to encourage withdrawal. In 1937 the Governor reported that many Germans were now living in self-contained agricultural communities, financed by their own companies.<sup>51</sup> By this time three different political organizations were active and requiring the attention of the administration. First, there was the Nazi party itself, responsible for political leadership; second, the German Youth Movement, aimed at recruiting members for the Party; thirdly, the Deutscher Bund which all German nationals were permitted to join and which had cultural as well as political and economic aims.<sup>52</sup>

Although the Nazi party was instrumental in encouraging an even greater sense of national consciousness among the German community, it also acted as a restraining influence on the wilder members. The Colonial Office was particularly incensed to learn that Africans were being told that the hut and poll tax they paid would be abolished when the Germans took control and MacMichael was told that he would be supported if he wanted to ban the Nazi party, a move already taken in South West Africa. However, the correspondence coincided with a visit by an important party official from Germany who addressed a number of meetings and warned his listeners that provocative actions and statements

by them would be counter-productive.<sup>53</sup> Assurances of co-operation were given to government officials and no action against the party was taken. But the sight of uniformed Nazis continued to give alarm to visitors who duly reported what they saw to the Colonial Office. Consequently, when MacMichael was in London in 1937, he was persuaded to introduce legislation banning the wearing of para-military uniforms or the displaying of flags unless exemption was granted.<sup>54</sup>

But although the German and British communities were able to co-exist, in London and Dar es Salaam the implications of a substantial increase in the German population were recognized and every year the immigration figures were studied with care. However, in spite of the often-expressed alarm, the total number of Germans arriving never outnumbered the British total to any substantial degree as the figures in Table VIII indicate. Nevertheless, for some the respective totals were too close for comfort and it was feared that if ever the Germans came to make up the majority of the European population of the Territory, it would become much more difficult to prevent Germany regaining control. Meanwhile, as already described, official statements in Britain concerning the Territory's future only served to arouse speculation. Mindful of the adverse effect on investment, Ormsby-Gore, who had become Colonial Secretary in 1936, attempted to restore confidence with some stirring declarations.<sup>55</sup> Eventually Hitler came to realize that the issue of the colonies was a useful bargaining counter and he made up for his previous lack of

TABLE VIIIBRITISH AND GERMAN NATIONALS ENTERINGTANGANYIKA 1933-1937

<u>Year</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>German</u>
1933	226	248
1934	260	244
1935	359	197
1936	363	249
1937	241	253

(source: Tanganyika Annual  
Reports, H.M.S.O.  
London).

interest by making a formal demand for the return of the territories under German control before the War.<sup>56</sup> In response to the threat, in London the Colonial Defence League was formed, with the stated object as being 'to stress the human, moral and political objections to the surrender of colonial or mandated territories.' Among the names of those who lent their support to the cause were nearly all the leading statesman and officials who had had a special concern with the African dependencies during the previous two decades.<sup>57</sup> In Kenya a society was formed with similar if more limited aims, the Tanganyika Defence League; and in keeping with the Colony's reputation for dramatic gestures in times of political controversy, the new association proclaimed its intention of preventing, by force if necessary, the transfer of Tanganyika to Germany. As a result of the international situation, in Dar es Salaam the issue of closer union was resurrected and the proposal attracted more support than before.

The deterioration in Anglo-German relations affected white settlement in Tanganyika, probably in more ways than one. There is evidence to suggest that a considerable number of potential settlers decided against investing in farming in the Territory while the future of the Mandate was uncertain. There is also the likelihood that by 1938 the Tanganyika administration was doing nothing to encourage settlement, to say the least. It is known that there was a division of opinion among officials in view of the international situation. One view was that non-African settlement was necessary for the future development

of the Territory and had to be encouraged; others maintained that since German settlers were more enterprising and better supported by their home government either it must be accepted that they would soon form the majority of the non-African farming community or the British government had to approve one of two courses of action. These amounted either to declaring that further alienation of land in Tanganyika would cease or that imperial funds would be available to assist settlers from Britain or the Dominions.<sup>58</sup> In the Colonial Office minutes the arguments were summarised and considered but no firm decision reached; it was assumed that it would be impossible to justify in public any government aid for settlers in Tanganyika and to stop settlement altogether would incur the criticism that economic development was being deliberately prevented. The solution proposed was to suggest to the Tanganyika government that it might be wise to move slowly in dealing with any new alienations rather than to refuse them outright. Certainly, to stop further alienation might have been construed as an over-reaction to a situation which as yet posed no real threat to the British administration; although by 1939 there were more German than British settler farmers, as Table IX indicates, there were several other nationalities represented in this sector of the agricultural system.

The outbreak of the second World War finally put an end to speculation about the Territory's future. Within a day or so, all but a few of the German males in the Territory had been arrested and interned.<sup>59</sup> Once again the non-African sector of the agricultural system was

TABLE IX

NATIONAL ORIGINS OF HOLDERS OF  
AGRICULTURAL AND PASTORAL LAND  
ON 1ST JANUARY 1939

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Number of holdings</u>	<u>Leasehold</u>	<u>Freehold</u>	<u>Total</u>
British	440	483,848	304,388	788,236
British Indian	278	88,873	187,434	276,307
German	554	300,335	176,016	476,351
Greek	223	116,622	76,179	192,801
Missions	406	34,168	56,908	91,076
Others	195	128,668	165,503	294,171
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,096</b>	<b>1,152,514</b>	<b>966,428</b>	<b>2,118,942</b>

(source: Annual Report, Department of Lands and Mines, 1938; Government Printer, Dar es Salaam)

immediately affected; German-owned farms were placed in the charge either of a neighbouring British farmer or of an official appointed by the Custodian of Enemy Property. But although for the next few years development activity came to a stand-still, standards of public administration declined and a maize shortage developed, at least the Territory was fortunate in that it escaped becoming a battle-field for a second time.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. Address to the Convention of Associations; see East Africa Standard, 30 October 1926.
2. Cameron, letter to Lugard, 6 April 1926.
3. Joint Select Committee, op.cit., Vol.II, p. 180.
4. Ibid., Vol.III, para. 1618.
5. Hilton Young Report, op.cit., p. 53.
6. Land Survey Report (1930), op.cit., p. 4.
7. Based on personal conversations with Africans in Iringa and Tanga districts.
8. Cameron, despatch dated 31 March 1927, reporting intention to introduce compulsion, CO 691/91/X18404.
9. T.L.C., 2nd session, 1928, in answer to a question by F.J. Anderson.
10. Ante, p.80 ; the policy was changed with the issue of Government Circular dated 23 April 1953.
11. E.A.C. Report, op.cit., pp. 36 and 39.
12. Lord Cranworth, Kenya: a Colony in the Making, (London 1912), p. 170.
13. E.g., 'the native farms his women rather than his land', Lord Francis Scott in East Africa Standard, 6 June 1925.
14. P.M.C., 18 session, p. 21; Tanganyika's Chief Secretary, D.G. Jardine, strongly denied that women were held in a state of practical slavery.
15. F.C. Linfield, E.A.C. Report, op.cit., pp. 115 and 116. See also J.C. Wedgwood, H.C. 187, Col. 155.
16. E.g., the (presumably to him) rhetorical question asked by A.P. Thornton, For the File on Empire, (London 1968), p. 339; 'when a sailor staggers into a local brothel one can say that one culture is contacting another?'
17. Mitchell, op.cit., p. 84.
18. W.S.G. Barnes, Half Year Report for Njombe District, July 1928, (OCRCP).

19. M. Wilson, Good Company, (Oxford 1951), p.16.
20. P.H. Gulliver, Land Tenure and Social Change among the Nyakusa, (Kampala 1958).
21. See R. Robinson, J. Gallagher and A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians, (London 1961).
22. H. Schacht, 'Germany's Colonial Demands', Foreign Affairs, 15 (Jan.1937), pp. 223-34.
23. Mufindi is an area of particular interest since a strip of some 400 sq. miles, enjoying a combination of favourable soil and climatic conditions, exists in sharp contrast with the surrounding countryside.'
24. See East Africa, 3 November 1927.
25. The Colonial Secretary's instructions were that German applications were to be treated with complete impartiality. CO 691/78/35484.
26. L.S. Amery, My Political Life, Vol.II, (London 1953), p. 160.
27. Cameron, op.cit., p. 39.
28. Minutes, J.E.A.B., 15 June 1927.
29. General Sir Hubert Gough (1870-1963), commanded the British Fifth Army during the first World War. He was invited to organize the settlement scheme by the Associated Producers of East Africa.
30. For comments on Gough's proposals, see CO 691/92/18479.
31. Ibid.
32. J.E.A.B. minutes, 27 January 1929.
33. Cameron warned that 'unless the scheme was vigorously supported it would lead to intenser efforts by the Germans', despatch dated 15 July 1928, CO 691/107/29060/28.
34. J.E.A.B. records, confidential notes on conference on 27 February 1929.
35. J.E.A.B. minutes 2 April 1930.
36. A rule criticised by the J.E.A.B. since it also restricted settlement by British nationals; J.E.A.B. minutes, 27 February 1929.

37. Cameron despatch 28 March 1930; CO 691/107/29610F.
38. Sao Hill in Iringa district; Chesham's company was registered as Southern Highlands Estates Ltd.
39. The scheme is described in Journal of the Royal African Society, April 1938, p. 184.
40. The whole area lies within the Hehe tribal boundaries; the local headmen (jumbe) and not the chief were empowered to allocate land under customary law.
41. Minute, F.G. Lee, CO 691/148/42042.
42. Duff Cooper (later Lord Norwich) was Secretary of State for War.
43. H.C. 324, col. 1131.
44. The Uhehe Company; for MacMichael's explanation despatch dated 13 March 1937, CO 691/153/42022.
45. P.M.C. 31 session, p. 190; 278 Africans residing in the area accepted compensation and moved to adjoining land, AR 1937, p. 148.
46. MacMichael despatch dated 7 March 1936, CO 691/148/42042, and accompanying minutes.
47. One resident in the area at the time described to me his apprehensions on 'hearing the Horst Wessel thundering out through the Mufindi mists every Saturday night from the German club.'
48. E.g., the incident at Moshi in 1933 involving Sir J. Sandeman Allen (see Harlow, op.cit., p.607) and a threat to have British settlers hanged after Germany resumed control, Truth, 11 October 1933.
49. Reported by East Africa, 5 October 1933 but the rumours were without foundation; MacMichael despatch dated 27 October 1936.
50. E.g., the demand that Germans in arrears in paying their labour should be forced out of business. East Africa, 1 September 1932.
51. The largest of these self-contained blocks was at Oldeani; MacMichael sent the Colonial Office a map with the locations of the German-occupied estates; enclosed with Secret despatch dated 13 March 1937, CO 691/153/42022.

52. The Bund leader, Dr. Zitzlaff, enjoyed strong local support and resisted direction from Troost.
53. Visit of Captain Baussutz; East African Standard Weekly, dated 10 February 1934.
54. Colonial Office letter to Foreign Office dated 4 October 1937, CO 691/153/42022.
55. E.g., an excerpt from his speech at the 1936 Corona Club dinner: 'British subjects are not for sale ... and do not want their flag taken from them.'
56. Hitler, Reichstag speech, 30 January 1937.
57. Lugard, Cameron and Samuel Wilson were all members.
58. The two views were put to the Colonial Office by MacKenzie Kennedy and G.F. Sayers respectively, CO 691/160/42022.
59. Citizens of other states not at war with Britain were also arrested if they were of German origin.

CHAPTER VITHE MANDATE IN RETROSPECT

The outbreak of the second World War is a convenient point in time for stock-taking. Like the war of 1914 it caused a hiatus in the development of the Territory although this time there was no complete breakdown of government and services. Consequently, some degree of continuity was maintained and planning for the future was still possible. But the background to planning was quite different, for at last there was an end to two obsessions which had influenced the British administration for the first twenty years; firstly, the need to safeguard the African way of life even at the expense of economic development and secondly the need for vigilance in countering German adventurism. Land usage was directly affected by the ending of the period of depressed economic conditions which had been responsible for the stifling of initiative and the curtailment of investment. With the War the supervision by the P.M.C. came to an end. Although the records give the impression that its debates were never particularly inspiring and the attitudes of its members were often a shade too legalistic so that the broader issues were overlooked, as a body it had performed a useful function. It had always demanded and usually obtained a great deal of factual material from the British administration and this had made it possible to conduct informed discussions on the policies being adopted.<sup>1</sup> More important, the ever-present threat

that it might require an explanation of why a particular policy was adopted provided reason and stimulus to resist any group, however influential, intent on obtaining decisions contrary to the best interests of the African inhabitants.

In the preceding chapters the decisions which concerned the settlement of non-Africans in Tanganyika have been considered chronologically for ease of narration but have been separated into two broad divisions of those policies designed to modernize the economy and those which were primarily political in object. No complete separation is, of course, ever possible and all the policies mentioned can be shown to have a bearing on the relationship between the different communities and the environment. In pursuing economic ends white settlement had to be adapted to the dictates of the environment, the fertile areas being scattered and there being insufficient funds available to provide good communications, to improve water supplies or to clear tsetse fly from areas of high potential. On the other hand, the primarily political decision to extend the Tanga line to Arusha made it possible to alienate a fertile stretch of country for settlers to grow cereals and thereby bring about changes in the landscape in this area. Again, government policies could have a negative effect in that where the landscape might have been changed the agents of change were prevented from obtaining a title over the land. Generally speaking, during the inter-War period decisions to refuse applications for land were based either on the observations of the Land

Development Surveys conducted between 1928 and 1932, or on Cameron's declaration, supported by the Colonial Secretary as already described, that large blocks of the Territory were to be considered as primarily native areas.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the environment played an equally important part in the development of the agricultural pattern of the period since there were few of the areas closed to alienation which might be termed by Europeans as being climatically pleasant; therefore there was no great demand for the policy to be changed. One of the few exceptions was Buha in Western province, which was added to the restricted areas in 1933; whereas most administrative officers agreed with the closure orders previously issued there was less support for the decision to extend the restriction to this remote area where an inward-looking community badly needed some contact with the outside world.<sup>3</sup>

And so, by 1938 the settlement pattern showed that alienations to non-natives were mainly concentrated within four provinces, namely Eastern, Northern, Southern Highlands and Tanga; there were also several sisal plantations located in Lindi district forming an isolated but compact block of alienated land. The total amount of land occupied by non-Africans amounted to some two million acres, about half as much again as in 1913 (see Table IX).

In the introduction it was noted that significant changes occurred in the role of the colonial bureaucracy during the forty years of British rule. During the inter-War years the civil service was very much the government and the ruling element in the local political system. Thus

there can be no neat separation between policy and administration on a geographical basis, with policy being decided in London and implemented, according to local needs, in Dar es Salaam. As described above, the local administration enjoyed a great deal of latitude in taking decisions affecting settlement and had to deal with a variety of pressure groups and institutions as did the Colonial Office itself. But if the Tanganyika administration was more than an agent of the British governments of the period it is useful to observe how it interpreted the various declarations of policy affecting settlement, made from time to time in London.

The first two Governors were able to take decisions with immeasurable consequences. Although they could not prevent the dual system of agriculture continuing they could determine the extent of the peasant farmers' entry into the market economy and therefore control the amount of support for either sector. Their respective attitudes to economic development were affected by the demands of the day; unlike Byatt, Cameron was not faced by annual budget deficits and was therefore able to give political stability priority over increased productivity. The recommendations of the East African Commission were never in conflict with this aim since all that they required was that non-African agriculture should be developed pari passu with native agriculture. This only required equal consideration of the need of all communities and this was not a concept which could be measured with any precision. Inconsistency, where it arose, was for the Colonial Office to deal with;

it was obvious that equal consideration of the needs of all communities was a policy which was bound to conflict with the principle of native paramountcy as stated in the Devonshire White Paper.<sup>4</sup>

The decision to obtain economic development through the expansion of two agricultural systems rather than one was of some importance to Cameron. It made it possible to obtain an increased production of cash crops without exerting too much pressure on African communities in an attempt to induce a rapid change in traditional practices. The declared aim of protecting indigenous culture and creating African-operated institutions was no romantic ideal. Much of British colonial practice was based on Indian experiences and Cameron and his supporters knew it was necessary to avoid the mistakes which had been made there. Whatever the terms used to describe the problems of the sub-continent it was apparent that it was the contradictions of modernization which had caused frustration and stoked the fires of nationalism. Similar mistakes could be avoided in Tanganyika provided the native authority system furnished the means to allow an acceptable change in traditional society; the change to a market economy was accomplished without exploitation and misery; and African demands for a European-type education could be successfully resisted.

In order to achieve the first of these objectives Cameron concentrated on handing over clearly defined executive powers to traditional rulers and he and his officials spent much of their time in trying to ensure that

the new native authorities developed according to plan. The effort thus expended was often criticised by British settlers who believed that economic development should be given priority and the system of indirect administration was both costly and inefficient.<sup>5</sup> The second objective, which required that many more Africans should enter the money economy, needed a careful supervision of marketing arrangements as well as government encouragement to grow cash crops. Mitchell, when Secretary, Native Affairs, supported the proposal to start African co-operative societies which, he argued, would complement the native authority system by modernizing traditional economic practices without substituting control by foreigners.<sup>6</sup> In addition, the government attempted to protect producers by instituting Produce Markets to ensure that a fair price was paid in cash instead of the practice of barter. Finally, several attempts were made, with no great success, to provide an education for Africans appropriate for local conditions.<sup>7</sup>

Cameron and his successors were well served by the British colonial ethos with its implicit assumption that the primary duty of the government official was to protect the interests of dependent peoples in any dealings they might have with other aliens. It was assumed without question that this was no temporary expedient; the duty would remain until such time as the indigenous people changed, or showed that they wanted to change, their traditional ways. The apparent enthusiasm for assuming this protective role was largely engendered by the writings

of the functionalist anthropologists, notably Malinowski, with the result that Africans were able to choose whether to come into contact with a modern economy or to avoid it. The choice thus offered was a fact, but it was a fact which existed by force of circumstances. For if there had been a plainly visible source of wealth to be exploited it would have been almost impossible for the administration to justify a situation whereby the majority of the population lived in peace and in poverty outside the market economy. Thus, in contrast with Kenya, where the symptoms of underdevelopment were already becoming apparent, Tanganyika remained undeveloped. (These terms are dealt with at greater length in Chapter XIII). As yet there were no signs of the emergence of new structures or classes; instead, the existing local structures had been preserved and strengthened by the formal powers conferred on chiefs. Whereas in Kenya and Uganda after the Depression there was already evident some African resentment at the perceived limitations in opportunities, in Tanganyika there was little opposition to the established order. The contrast between Kenya and Tanganyika in race relations was so obvious to any visitor that to describe it became a commonplace.<sup>8</sup> In the case of Kenya the difference was usually explained in terms of land alienation but it is important not to overlook the greater impact of a market economy in Kenya and Uganda and the many consequences of this impact. In Uganda, a comparatively small amount of land was alienated and yet racial tensions before 1940 were almost as acute as Kenya. Again, in Tanganyika most of the instances of conflict with a racial

basis during this period occurred in Moshi district where the Chagga, growing Arabica coffee, had very definitely entered the market economy.<sup>9</sup>

#### Government policies and African reaction

Some of the reasons why the Tanganyika situation was different can be deduced from the preceding chapters. It is evident that events before the Mandate and subsequent factors combined with the environment to influence the course of economic development and the evolving pattern of land usage. While world markets were buoyant there was every reason to exploit the natural resources of the Territory to the maximum by encouraging any kind of agricultural enterprise which was socially and politically acceptable. When the effects of the Depression coincided with increased political uncertainties, there was a sound argument for insisting on increased output from the African sector in order to counteract the effects of a reduction in private investment. But an increased contribution from the African sector required not only activity in the extension services but also a carefully formulated policy on the amount of interference in traditional life styles which would be tolerated by the people themselves and by world opinion.

While Cameron was Governor, there was a steady expansion of the Department of Agriculture; the increased funds made available to the Department, a fact which can be ascertained from the annual estimates, led to increased extension work in the African sector. Although the 1930

Annual Report explains that 'there is no definite boundary between what is done for the planter and for the native farmer', from the disposition of staff and from the description of their duties, it seems clear that most activity was within the African sector.<sup>10</sup>

When settler spokesmen criticised these developments, Cameron at first was able to justify the increased expenditure by the results which were obtained.<sup>11</sup> However, after a time it was evident that expectations had been over-optimistic. Progress in cotton production was particularly disappointing and various reasons were suggested.<sup>12</sup> The remedy, a greater degree of compulsion, was unacceptable; without it no widespread change in traditional economic practices could be expected in less than a generation. Cameron firmly believed in persuasion only and the 1926 circular on agriculture and labour makes it clear that there was no necessity for the peasant farmer to produce crops for sale.<sup>13</sup> Writing to Oldham, Cameron remarked: 'you cannot force him (the African) to produce as do the Belgians.'<sup>14</sup> Those who suspected that such tolerance was misplaced in a country which was poor and undeveloped were told that toleration, if that was the correct description of the policy, was based on prudence rather than sentiment. Cameron was writing only twenty years after the Maji Maji rebellion which, it was believed had its origins in the forced production of cotton. The use of force was impracticable if there was protest over a wide area and it would have been embarrassing to let it be known that it was necessary in a mandated territory. The ideal way to deal

with the problem was to persuade the native authorities that particular policies were right and necessary and then induce them to ensure that they were implemented. No doubt this was done successfully on many occasions, but there were plenty of instances where the native authorities were reluctant to appear to be the agents of government policy or were unable to do so for other reasons.<sup>15</sup> A striking example of the subtleties of local politics occurred in Pare district during the second World War when a plan to introduce a graduated local rate (mbiru) destined to finance a schools expansion programme, had to be abandoned when the chiefs withdrew their support for the scheme.<sup>16</sup> Such instances demonstrated the limitations of the native authority system and, ultimately, of the extent of British control.

Nevertheless, it was tempting to make comparisons with French methods in another mandated territory, the Cameroons. Peasant agricultural production had been successfully increased, the infrastructure had been improved by the massive use of forced labour and an ambitious public works programme had been financed from local resources. It was observed that in a British colony, such plans would have to be met from loan funds.<sup>17</sup> Since there was never sufficient aid from this source to satisfy anything like the demands received, the result was that many worth-while plans could not be implemented. Thus it was a fear of the possible African reaction to coercion which, for most of this period, inhibited the Tanganyika government from taking more positive action to increase production in the African agricultural sector. There was a notable exception when

E. Harrison, on being appointed Director of Agriculture, introduced his 'grow more crops campaign' with the implication that at times coercion would have to be used.<sup>18</sup> But he made his proposals at a time when financially the Territory was in a desperate situation and it was recognized that extraordinary measures were called for. Once the Depression seemed to be over and the situation in the Territory had improved it was possible to relax the pressure and rely on there being no significant drop in output.<sup>19</sup> While the campaign was being conducted there were cases of officials over-stepping the law in order to obtain results but they were aware that they would receive no support if unwelcome publicity resulted.<sup>20</sup> Thus the British attitude stands in sharp contrast to the French policy on this issue. When a French official was reported on as a 'man of quantity' it was no doubt to be taken as a mark of approval; in a British report such an observation would have been considered somewhat eccentric.<sup>21</sup>

The evident lack of any sustained drive to eradicate the subsistence economy met with the approval of the field administrative officers and it was believed that there were good reasons for proceeding slowly. At a time when the Mandate itself was in question it was believed to be more important to retain the support of the African population and it is evident from MacMichael's despatches that in Dar es Salaam it was recognized that the Germans in the Territory were by no means unpopular.

As already mentioned, the greater productivity which resulted from Harrison's campaign focussed attention

on the need for stricter measures to prevent soil erosion.<sup>22</sup> Since the practices recommended were never accepted with any enthusiasm, widespread enforcement was only possible if coercion was used. This would have led to a great deal more conflict than demands for increasing productivity where at least a pecuniary advantage could be expected. As a result, the basis of the prescribed policy was patience combined with persuasion, with the main effort directed to the introduction of contour ridging. By 1937 several native authorities had been persuaded or cajoled enough to introduce soil conservation rules but there was little evidence that they were recognized by the public as being essential. Elsewhere in East Africa there was a similar problem and likewise the wisdom of relying on persuasion was recognized as this observation by Mitchell clearly shows:

'It is idle to suppose that what we have to do can be done by unreasoning and unexplained compulsion, by punishment or the use of force, except that in appropriate circumstances and with public opinion behind us, individuals can be prosecuted and punished for breach of rules of good husbandry.<sup>23</sup>

There were good reasons to claim that it was not necessary to risk a hostile reaction; after all, it was argued, when the deterioration to the land became obvious even the most conservative of chiefs would agree to enforce improvement measures. The example of Ukara island, where overpopulation was accompanied by carefully-applied soil conservation measures demonstrated what could be done.<sup>24</sup>

Tribal turn-outs in Sukumaland, where large numbers of taxpayers provided free labour for ten days each year for bush-clearing projects were not unpopular.<sup>25</sup> Finally, the

ever-present problem of inadequate funds severely restricted remedial measures; although in 1931 an advisory committee on soil erosion was formed it concluded that its activities would have to be limited to publicity, education and persuasion in order to preserve what remained rather than to repair damage already inflicted.<sup>26</sup> In the eight years which followed a variety of practical measures were adopted (see Appendix iii) although according to the critics they were never followed with sufficient determination.

Increased government activity was the cause of one of the most widespread examples of erosion. The Veterinary Department, by providing a means of curing a number of diseases, were primarily responsible for the large increase in the cattle population. At the same time the many attempts to introduce cattle taxes or compulsory culling usually met with unanimous opposition. Rather than risk incurring the hostility of the cattle-owning tribes, many officials took the somewhat cynical view that nature, in the form of periodic droughts would eventually do what the government was reluctant to do. They were dramatically proved right in 1949, when in the Sukumaland districts 1,500,000 cattle died or had to be slaughtered out of a total of 2,500,000. Consequently, in spite of the various measures described on paper designed to improve grazing opportunities and to protect the soil from being exposed to the danger of erosion there was neither recognition by the Africans nor determination by the government that something had to be done. In fact, the African pastoralist preferred the semi-arid conditions induced by over-grazing since a permanent grass

cover usually provided a harbour, for ticks, worms and flies. But once the scanty grass cover was removed, often the soil became hard and compacted and unable to accept or retain moisture. The damage was obvious enough, but while the practice of communal range and unrestricted individual ownership of stock was the rule, any more positive action by the government incurred political risks. Inevitably the settlement lobby contrasted the desert-like conditions in many of the areas of African occupation with the examples of more careful land-usage in most - but not all - areas alienated to non-Africans; white settlement, so it was claimed, would make the best use of the natural resources of the Territory.

#### Capital expenditure and the spatial factor

Economic development during the period was hindered by the limited amount of investment, the poor returns obtained from exports and the spatial factors, which caused problems which could only be solved when improvements occurred in the other areas preventing progress.

Funds from external sources were in three categories. First, there were direct grants and loans from the British Treasury; second, loans raised by public subscription and lastly, loans and grants made under the Colonial Development Act 1929.<sup>27</sup> This Act created a Development Fund, from which Tanganyika received reasonably generous allocations, exceeding those made to the other East African territories.<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, the Public Debt

rose steadily and by 1938 the charge on it amounted to about twenty per cent of the ordinary public expenditure.

More important, the lack of private investment prevented any rapid change from a subsistence economy. While the future of the Territory remained uncertain, British investors preferred Kenya and there was little investment emanating from other countries during this period.<sup>29</sup>

The reliance on agriculture, and sisal in particular, to provide the foundation of a sound economy has already been described. It was not until 1955 that the absolute predominance of agricultural products diminished as a consequence of the development of mineral resources.<sup>30</sup>

While world prices for all crops remained low, the Territorial revenues suffered as well. Short of funds, there was little chance of solving the problems of the spatial factor. The Depression, and in particular the levy on official salaries, combined to prevent any expansion of the civil service; the findings of Sir Sydney Armitage Smith in his inquiry into the Territory's finances in 1932 ensured that not only would the social services be cut back but also that little could be done in the immediate future to deal with the overcrowding - increased production-soil exhaustion syndrome.<sup>31</sup>

For much of Tanganyika's problem was caused by its being under-populated and over-crowded. As Gillman pointed out in his perceptive account of the size and distribution of the population of the Territory, two thirds of the African population lived in one tenth of the area.<sup>32</sup> Using the figures obtained in a recent census, he noted that whereas the mean density of the population was

was only 5.5 per square kilometre, in four widely dispersed areas the figure rose to over 250 per square kilometre.<sup>33</sup>

The fact that the centres of population were situated at different corners of the Territory made it necessary to construct and maintain an expansive road system which for long distances served very few people. Furthermore, unless feeder roads were constructed to link the fertile pockets of land to the main road system there was little likelihood of the peasant farmer in such places being persuaded to grow cash crops.

Finally, the Territory's rail system constituted another drain on the sparse resources available for development and consequently was one of the major causes of the relatively slow change from a subsistence economy. First, there were the far-reaching implications of the spatial factor which, however, obvious, are so often overlooked. The track alignments, as with the road routes, often traversed miles of countryside possessing no potential for producing any freight to be carried. Furthermore, with the capital situated at the coast there was a permanent disbalance of traffic; there were no inland towns of any size to which imports flowed from the coast. Again, the high cost of operating and maintaining the Central line was aggravated by the environment. The railway administration was always confronted by the problem of either too little or too much water; torrential downpours caused flooding of stretches of track and wash-aways of embankments and bridges or else, on the section between Dodoma and Tabora, water was in such short supply that the routine maintenance of

locomotives was hampered. Development projects were costly and sometimes failed dismally to come up to expectations, such as the line aimed at opening up fertile areas in Singida district.<sup>34</sup> Even the Moshi-Arusha extension, constructed to placate the settlers in Northern province at a time when there was much agitation to secure the transfer of the area to Kenya, failed to achieve the profitability expected; many farmers found it more convenient to continue to bring their produce by road to Moshi for onward transmission.

Secondly, settler interests in Kenya were well represented on the railway board and were anxious to see no change in the uneconomic freight rates aimed at assisting farmers in the Highlands growing cereals. Their aims could best be achieved if the profitability of the Kenya Uganda line could be increased, even if this had to be done at the expense of the Tanganyika railway. As is well known, in spite of powerful official support, they failed in their attempt to prevent the construction of the Tabora-Mwanza line;<sup>35</sup> however, they succeeded in ensuring that most of the Kilimanjaro produce should be sent to Mombasa rather than Tanga, with the result that the Northern line ran at a considerable loss. Kilindini (Mombasa) was the more convenient port and statistics made it clear that the provision of two ways to the coast for the Kilimanjaro traffic incurred an expense which was not justified at this time.<sup>36</sup> Finally, the chances of the railways being run profitably received another blow when the Belgian authorities decided in 1931 to route their copper exports via the west

coast. In terms of profitability, the details given in Appendix y give some indication of the importance, first of copper and later, of sisal; the consequences were far-reaching because the railways had to be supported by subsidies from the Territory's revenue and loan funds, thereby diverting resources which could have been employed elsewhere. Thus a combination of political influences and environmental difficulties added to the problem of finding funds for economic development.

#### White settlement and colonial policy

The problems of land usage in the African sector and the lack of an adequate supply of capital only served to emphasise the need to ensure that the non-African agricultural sector continued to contribute to the growth of the economy. Although it was generally admitted that private investment was needed and had to be encouraged, the measures to attract it were never more than half-hearted and often aroused deep misgivings. Thus, in contrast to the policies adopted with the aim of increasing production in the African sector, where the relevant issues can be clearly perceived, the policies which determined the pace of development in the non-African sector were influenced by a variety of political and economic factors and were hotly debated. Furthermore, this sector of the agricultural system could never be treated as an entity, for the problems and needs of the plantation manager and the settler practising mixed farming were very different and it was not always easy for the Tanganyika government to

take into account the variety of interests which demanded satisfaction. But where there is a conflict of interest, regulation is necessary and the actions and perceptions of the administrators need to be studied.

The kernel of the problem was that after 1925, the British in Tanganyika were faced with a multiple dilemma. To step up the development of the non-African sector, taken as a whole, might have provided faster economic development but, for reasons already described, would have led to conflict with the fulfilment of the 'protective' role. If however, emphasis was placed on expanding the plantation sector, there would emerge all the disadvantages stemming from having the Territory's economy tied to the fortunes of the sisal industry. And yet if European settlement was encouraged, thereby leading to balanced growth and the assumed advantages from 'contact', there was the danger that the Germans would soon form the majority of the European community and the Mandate would be in jeopardy. It was only by Britain remaining in control that the East African Dominion, with its consequent strategic advantages, could be created.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, those involved in the administration of the Territory, either in Britain or in Tanganyika, were never in doubt that the continuation of the Mandate served the best interests of the indigenous inhabitants.

Thus the settlement issue was crucial to the political development of the Territory and until the last vestiges of the imperial rivalries of the nineteenth century were extinguished it could not be reduced to an

argument on economic or social advantages. Consequently, it is somewhat unrealistic to suggest that with British colonial policy there was only disagreement over method rather than principle because colonial administrators, politicians and representatives of financial and commercial interests all came from the same background and therefore made similar assumptions about the system.<sup>38</sup> If this was in fact the general rule, Tanganyika must be noted as the exception for there was no general agreement as to the extent and the nature of non-African participation in the economic activities of the Territory. It was because the guidelines were never precisely defined in public to the satisfaction of all interests that the settlement policy was fundamentally affected by a series of extraneous events. For no such definition was possible while economic considerations were subordinated to the pressures of the international situation and while there were differing viewpoints on the strategic implications of retaining the Mandate. There is no other explanation for the consistent lack of success of the J.E.A.B., with its political and financial connexions, in obtaining assistance and encouragement for British settlers during the four years following the publication of the Report of the East African Commission. Economic interests, as the Commission appreciated, could not be ignored because to do so might call into question Britain's competence to administer the Territory. But once a modicum of success with the Dual policy was assured strategic interests could again take priority and if it was not always clear as to how they affected the settlement

issue it was because there was no agreement as to the effect of increasing the number of British settlers. While some argued that such an increase could only under-pin British influence, others were convinced that in a period of economic uncertainty it might be counter-productive, with the German settlers being prepared to continue farming unprofitably where the British settlers would give up. With these divisions of opinion, a policy of proceeding cautiously had its attractions and this suited the humanitarian lobby who feared that the Territory would go the way of Kenya. And so, for a time, the exigencies of international affairs exerted their influence and we are reminded of Victorian imperial policy thus described:

'It was not the pomps or profits of governing Africa which moved the ruling elite, but the cold rules for national safety, handed on from Pitt, Palmerston and Disraeli.'

39

The doubts about the value of settlement made it possible during the period under review for the issue to be determined primarily by the decisions taken by Cameron, by the perception of events in the Colonial Office and subsequently by the psychological and economic effects of the Depression. Added to this, it is necessary to take into account what can only be termed the dimension of accident. Once a large area of the Territory had been found to be suitable for alienation it was only a matter of time before Cameron was replaced by someone who was prepared to allocate more resources in order to encourage settlement. But Cameron's departure coincided with the worst effects of the Depression being felt in the Territory and the general lack of confidence in farming kept new

settlement to a minimum.

Cameron had little difficulty in gaining the approval of the Colonial Office for his settlement policies. Contrary to some views, it is apparent from the minutes on the files that the officials in the East Africa department usually found themselves in agreement with him and criticism was in most cases restricted to matters of detail.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, in spite of the support of the permanent officials it is surprising that he did not come into open conflict with Amery on the settlement issue; the latter's determination to create a British dominion of East Africa had to be based on the settlement of more British nationals in the Territory and this was bound to threaten Cameron's plans for African development. At the same time he had already given assurances that settlement would be permitted in areas found suitable by Bagshawe's committee and undue delay in allowing alienations would have led to much criticism. But as it turned out, it was possible to keep some check on the rate of new settlement by the delays which occurred in carrying out surveys of the new farms.<sup>41</sup> How much of the delay was deliberate is impossible to assess, but at the time it was never suggested that the reason for delays, namely staff shortages, was insurmountable. The consequences of delay, at a time when settlement could have proceeded quickly, were not insignificant; without an approved survey, no Right of Occupancy could be issued and without the formal title to land that this provided the average settler was unable to obtain loans for developing his farm. Thus settlement was effectively restricted to those who had

adequate capital resources of their own or to those who had no intention of doing more than satisfy the minimum development requirements.

Amery, like Grigg, was no doubt aware of Cameron's reluctance to encourage white settlement and in view of his interest in the strategic factor it might have been expected that he would have directed Cameron to move faster. As it was, there were three separate events and factors which precluded interference from London. First, there was the assumption by Amery and Grigg that there was no real obstacle to the plan for closer union and when this had been achieved there would be time enough to organize more settlement in Tanganyika. In fact, there was an advantage in delay because while matters moved slowly there was less likelihood of too many Germans entering the Territory. It was this confidence that the issue was as good as settled which provides the answer to Amery's otherwise inexplicable carelessness in failing to ensure that the members of the Hilton Young Commission were favourably disposed towards the principle of closer union before their selection was approved.<sup>42</sup> Too late it was realised that only the chairman was likely to agree with a plan which would lead to an increase in the power of the Kenya settlers and a last minute attempt to appoint another member whose views were similar to Amery's was turned down by the Cabinet on the grounds that the Commission was large enough already.<sup>43</sup> And so the Report when it was published clearly demonstrated the divided views on colonial policy prevalent at this time, the chairman being compelled to

submit a minority report of his own on the major issue. Amery tried to make amends by sending Sir Samuel Wilson to East Africa but in the heated debate which ensued, the imperial objective of closer union was thrust into the background and without the political consequences of some form of federation there was no chance of the Tanganyika settlers receiving more support.

Secondly, there was the unexpected removal of Amery from the Colonial Office as a consequence of the Labour victory in the 1929 General Election. In his 1927 White Paper, Amery had already indicated that settlers in East Africa could expect to be associated with the duties of trusteeship over the Africans and this could only mean that they could expect to have a greater share in deciding policies.<sup>44</sup> Passfield, succeeding Amery rejected the idea and firmly restated the paramountcy principle. Grigg was replaced by Byrne and it was soon obvious in Kenya that the influence of the settlers was much reduced. The Board of Agriculture there was reformed and much of the aid to white settlers withdrawn. It was common knowledge that Oldham was able to exercise a great deal of influence in the Colonial Office and that he was firmly opposed not only to 'closer union' but also to any support for the settlers' aims.<sup>45</sup> Aware of the developments, Cameron was able to ignore the Hilton Young Commission's observation that more aid should be provided for settlers; he therefore rejected the recommendations of the 1930 Legislative Council committee which, if implemented, would have led to some increase in white settlement as soon as the worst effects of the Depression were abated. In spite of the local

animosity against him, he was confident that he was supported in London.

Finally, there was the part played by Ormsby-Gore in the proceedings. As chairman of the East Africa Commission he had been convinced of the necessity for increased white settlement in the Territory. As Under Secretary in the Colonial Office when the Report was published and being responsible for East African affairs there, he was in the strongest possible position to see that his recommendations were implemented. Yet apparently he did little to contest the Treasury's refusal to help over the railway to the south-west and within two years of his Report he is on record with the observation that Tanganyika needed sisal planters but not small settlers as in Kenya.<sup>46</sup> Thus whatever he might have said in public it seems he remained unconvinced as to the advantages of white settlement. In 1928 he was the chairman of a meeting at the Colonial Office attended by officials and members of the J.E.A.B., at which criticisms were made of the Tanganyika government's settlement policies. He gave no indications of his own views but said that he would pass on the opinions expressed to the Governor.<sup>47</sup>

At first sight perhaps, it might seem that British policies on the settlement issue can be described as a series of vacillations, with the Colonial Office placing the blame for inaction on the Governor and the latter giving assurances of his assistance as soon as Britain agreed to provide aid to make settlement viable. In fact in retrospect, the policies were consistent and easy to

summarise. But because at the time there were imponderables it was never possible to predict with any degree of certainty the exact amount of alienation which would be allowed. There was, therefore, little which successive Governors could add to the 1926 circular on agriculture and labour and throughout the period the policy it prescribed remained the corner-stone of the government's position on white settlement.

As the effects of the land alienation which took place at the beginning of his term of office became apparent, Cameron believed the real priorities became increasingly obvious. First it was recognized that economic well-being of the Territory would, for some time, depend on plantation crops, particularly sisal; it was therefore necessary to ensure that the estates continued to obtain an adequate supply of labourers. Second, it seemed to Cameron that the consequences of expanding the mixed-farming sector were of doubtful economic value and the political and social gains and losses were evenly balanced. It was therefore necessary to restrict or at least not encourage the expansion of this sector in order to protect the sisal industry. As Cameron explained his position:

"The danger is always present in my mind which may be caused to the premier and most valuable industry in the country the cultivation of sisal by the diversion of labour to less robust forms of agricultural enterprise." 48

Although it was pointed out to him that experience elsewhere had shown that labour somehow materialised once it was known that vacancies existed, Cameron was convinced

that in the circumstances then existing in the Territory if settlement proceeded too quickly the opportunity cost would be unjustified. Furthermore, any signs of increased pressure on the chiefs to help the labour recruiters was bound to arouse criticism from the humanitarian lobby at Westminster.<sup>49</sup>

As a consequence, it was logical to oppose the many insistent demands for government aid for new settlers. Refusal was easy enough to justify since there was never sufficient funds to meet the very obvious needs of the Territory. Cameron made it clear that for the time being the government would only encourage the expansion of the plantation sector. To the Joint Select Committee he wrote as follows:

'Some of the settlement has been precarious and unprofitable. The view that the country is not one for individual enterprise but for plantation effort on a large scale is again being expressed.'<sup>50</sup>

But after ten years of British administration it was still too early to decide to favour one sector at the expense of the other and the Joint Select Committee were unable to come to any definite conclusions on the subject.<sup>51</sup> Statistics proved little apart from showing that the dual policy was indeed being followed and should satisfy those who were anxious to see that no great reliance was placed on results from any one sector (see Table X). Nevertheless, they reveal that Cameron was correct in his contention that sisal had proved to be the backbone of the economy and that the interests of the sisal growers had to be safeguarded. However, it is difficult to assess the extent of his influence on the development of the non-African

TABLE X

PERCENTAGE PROPORTION OF CASH CROPS  
FROM EACH SECTOR, 1923-1935

	<u>1923</u>	<u>1927</u>	<u>1931</u>	<u>1935</u>
African	61	48	42	49
Sisal	25	40	49	40
Other non- African	14	12	9	11

(source: Annual Reports,  
 Department of  
 Agriculture;  
 Government Printer,  
 Dar es Salaam).

agricultural sector as a whole. If a less determined Governor had been appointed to succeed Byatt, there is still no certainty that the scale of white settlement would have increased to any appreciable degree. But what is clear from the correspondence between Dar es Salaam and the Colonial Office is that the comment in the J.E.A.B. minutes that Cameron was antagonistic to white settlement is nearer the mark than some accounts of the period suggest.<sup>52</sup> For whatever Cameron said in public or wrote later, it is clear that he distinguished European-owned plantation development from the smaller-scale mixed farming usually based on the settler's own resources. He gave qualified support to the dual policy in that he recognized the value of the heavily capitalised plantation sector; in the case of the mixed-farming sector he supported settlement where the 'contact' theory could be seen to be valid and opposed it where it might hinder his plans for African political development. To his critics who claimed that he had reneged on his declaration in 1926 that he supported a policy of white settlement he needed only to point to the qualification he had added at the time to the effect that adequate transport facilities had to be provided if settlement was to be encouraged. In the case of cereal crops this meant a railway, which in turn required the approval and assistance of the home government. But, as has been described, with no sustained pressure being exerted on the official classes in London, there was never any likelihood either of the railway to the south-west being constructed or any form of subsidy being approved to help British

settlers.

The policy of making the sisal industry the basis of economic growth in the Territory was continued by Cameron's successors and the bigger companies, through the T.S.G.A., were able to exercise considerable influence. They were able to prevent any new plantations being started at a time when over-production would have resulted. Also, they were able to resist proposals which might have led to a fusion, in the case of this crop, between the two agricultural sectors. In 1937, a scheme with some official backing was launched whereby Africans living near estates would grow sisal and sell to the plantations on pre-arranged terms.<sup>53</sup> The arguments for the scheme were evenly balanced and possibly its supporters would have succeeded if the industry had been earning bigger profits. But for too long it had been a buyers' market. The effects were evident in the reaction to the installation of a sisal processing plant in Tanga in 1934; it was not long before commercial interests in London persuaded the owners to close it down and sell the equipment to a firm in Japan. The recovery in the price paid was not sustained and by 1938 had again dipped below £20 per ton. Output from Indonesia had steadily increased and by this time was nearly equal to the total production of East Africa.<sup>54</sup> There was, therefore, little incentive to invest in replanting and still less for the Territorial government to put public funds into sisal production. The record of company profits in Table XI provides good reason for pessimism at that time.

On the other hand, no viable alternative was in

TABLE XI

DIVIDENDS PAID BY TANGANYIKA SISAL  
COMPANIES QUOTED ON THE LONDON  
STOCK EXCHANGE, 1921-1940\*

<u>Year</u>	<u>E.A. Sisal</u> <u>Plantations</u>	<u>Bird &amp; Co.</u>
1921-1923	nil	nil
1924	nil	5%
1925	nil	7½%
1926-1935	nil	nil
1936	2%@	nil
1937	7½%@	nil
1938-1940	nil	nil

\* three other companies obtained a quotation in 1936, but none of them had paid a dividend by 1940

@ paid on reduced capital

(source: The Stock Exchange Official Year Book)

sight. Other forms of commercial farming had also suffered badly during the Depression and a combination of the conditions and events already described served to make farming on a large scale a precarious existence. Gillman, probably the country's leading expert of the day on such problems considered that white settlement might not be able to survive unless generous subsidies were offered.<sup>55</sup> Nevertheless, by 1938 it was generally agreed that commercial agriculture had to be based on a number of crops and it seemed possible that the contribution of the settler farmer might become as important as that of the owners of the sisal estates. This possibility was to exert considerable influence on the members of the Central Development Committee, which in turn provided the recommendations on which development was based after 1945.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. Nevertheless, there was a major defect in the constitution of the P.M.C. in that there were no formal arrangements whereby members visited the mandated territories.
2. Ante, pp.79-80
3. Based on conversations with administrative officers and various local officials (watwale and wateko) in the nineteen fifties; some believed that the presence of a few settlers might have served to reduce the intense rivalry between the missions which competed for influence in the area.
4. Indians in Kenya, cmd. 1922 (London 1923); for an interpretation of the dual policy see Conference of East African Governors, 1926.
5. Criticisms in this vein were made regularly by the unofficial members of Legco. between 1927-1935.
6. Mitchell left Tanganyika in 1935 on being appointed Governor of Uganda. His predictions on the future role of the co-operative societies were never fulfilled; instead they became a focus of opposition to both chiefs and government.
7. E.g., the so-called Malangali experiment, designed to provide an African-type curriculum; for a full account see W. Morris Hale, British Administration in Tanganyika from 1920 to 1945, (Geneva 1969).
8. 'To pass from Kenya into Tanganyika is to experience a sudden sense of calm.' M. Perham, The Times, 5 August 1937.
9. E.g., the racial unrest in Northern province in 1928 (AR 1928, pp. 87-91); for the troubled situation which followed the drop in coffee prices, 1934-35, see H.C. 328, col. 1624.
10. (i) The Department of Agriculture Estimates increased as follows: 1923/24, £22,000; 1925/6, £91,000.  
(ii) Department of Agriculture, AR 1930, Part I.
11. See Cameron's address to Legco., 1st session 1926.
12. The Empire Cotton Growing Advisory Council blamed the drop in prices; answers to a questionnaire issued by the Department of Agriculture, 12 October 1929 (SMP 12591) blamed the decision to pay chiefs fixed salaries instead of allowing them to receive tribute and salaries related to the amount of tax collected.

13. Circular, op.cit., Chapter 4, f.n. 20.
14. Cameron, letter to Oldham, 26 July 1926 (Oldham papers).
15. Cf., R. Heussler, British Tanganyika (Durham N.C. 1971), pp. 47-52, which places undue emphasis on the 'inefficiency' of many native authorities. The more perceptive district officer soon discovered that the status of chief did not always amount to the right to exercise authority over the tribal community.
16. See I.N. Kimambo, Mbiru, (Nairobi 1971).
17. M. Perham, The Times, 17 May 1933.
18. The 1932 Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture advised administrative officers to consider their districts as estates requiring management and development.
19. There was no falling off in the cotton growing areas of Lake province, the main target of Harrison's campaign, which had coincided with the introduction of improved seed.
20. The following comment was typical: 'My predecessor in charge of a Sukumaland district permitted physical coercion in order to get cotton planted; as soon as he went into the Secretariat he issued instructions that such methods were inadmissible.' (interview with an ex-D.C.).
21. W.B. Cohen, Rulers of Empire: the French Colonial Service in Africa, (Stanford 1971), p.112
22. AR 1937 provides a full account.
23. P.E. Mitchell, The Agrarian Problem in Kenya, (Nairobi 1948), p. 9.
24. Ukara island was, and is, part of the administrative district of Ukerewe.
25. From personal observations in the nineteen-fifties they were usually very much a 'social occasion' as well as demonstrating a real community spirit.
26. The work of the committee is described in E. Harrison, Soil Erosion, (London 1937) p. 4; he makes it clear that many non-African farmers were also unwilling to adopt remedial measures.
27. See Leubuscher, op.cit., pp. 156-160.

28. But per caput, a slightly smaller allocation than that approved for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Colonial Development Advisory Committee 10th Report, cmd. 6062, p. 43.
29. See S.H. Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa, (Oxford 1938) and Leibuscher, op.cit. p. 166.
30. The value of mineral production trebled in 1953 to £6 million and was soon to increase still further.
31. ArmitageSmith Report, op.cit.
32. Gillman, A Population Map of Tanganyika, op.cit.
33. Ibid.
34. The track from Manyoni to Kinyangiri, total length 93 miles.
35. Harlow and Chilver, op.cit., pp. 565, 566.
36. Report by Mr. Roger Gibb on Railway Rates and Finances in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika Territory, cmd. 4235 (London 1932).
37. Cf., Rhodes Memorial Lectures 1929 by J.C. Smuts and correspondence between Smuts and Amery, cited by W.K. Hancock, Smuts, Vol.2, the Fields of Force, (Cambridge 1968).
38. Cf., E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, (London 1973), pp.40-43
39. Robinson et al., op.cit., p. 463.
40. For a contrary view see J. Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika (London 1965), p. 105: '... in London, civil servants regarded Cameron with suspicion and disapproval'.
41. Ante, p.107
42. Apart from the Chairman, the members were Sir Reginald Mant, Sir George Schuster and Dr.J.H. Oldham.
43. The additional member, suggested by Grigg, was to have been Patrick Duncan: see E. Huxley, White Man's Country: Lord Delamere and the making of Kenya (London 1935), p. 225.
44. Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa, cmd. 2904 (London 1927).
45. Cf., J.H. Oldham, White and Black in Africa, A critical examination of the Rhodes lectures of General Smuts; also see Delamere's caustic reference to the Colonial Office as 'Oldham and Co.' Huxley, op.cit. II, p. 268.

46. CO 691/92/18479; minute to Lord Lovat.
47. JEAB minutes of meeting at the Colonial Office, 22 October 1928.
48. Cameron, despatch dated 15 March 1930, file 29489.
49. E.g., Colonel Wedgwood's plea to the Colonial Secretary 'leave them (the Africans) alone ... cease to press them into the labour market.' H.C. 187, Col. 155.
50. Enclosure to despatch dated 5 July 1930, included in the Report of the Joint Select Committee.
51. The Committee noted 'a tendency to eliminate the farmer settler in favour of the plantation manager', Vol.I, p. 24.
52. Cf., Harlow and Chilver, op.cit., p. 479.
53. The scheme was prepared by Major Notcutt and supported by the Provincial Commissioner Tanga, Tanzania National Archives, file 25019
54. For figures of world production see Hill and Moffett, op.cit., p. 426.
55. G. Gillman, 'White Colonization in East Africa', East African Geographical Review XXXII 1942, pp. 585-599.

CHAPTER VIIBUILDING FOR THE FUTURE

The end of the second world war signalled the beginning of a period of comparatively rapid development of the resources of the Territory. This was possible, partly because world trade was buoyant and partly because compared with the pre-war period, more funds were made available for increasing the output from the agricultural sector. These funds were either in the form of private investment or were receipts by the government in the form of loans, grants and revenue. Emphasis on the need to increase output led to support for a policy of encouraging white settlement and much new land was alienated and brought into use. Thus settlers and plantation owners, African farmers and public corporations, together played a part in bringing about substantial changes to the landscape.

The development plans which provided the framework for changes in land use, affected all sections of the agricultural system; in turn, the plans were affected by the three factors described below, which can be summarised thus: the new form of international control, now exercised by the Trusteeship Council, increased assistance and direction by Britain and the consequences of the creation of the East African High Commission.

The Trusteeship Agreement

At the end of 1946, Britain's mandate terminated and as a result of negotiations with the U.N. Trusteeship Council it was accepted that Britain should continue to administer the Territory under a new agreement. This development did not make it necessary to amend any of the territorial ordinances affecting land tenure and to the ordinary citizen these juridical changes were of no great importance. However, to some of the resident settlers the continuation of international control caused much disappointment since they believed that the defeat of Germany provided the opportunity to declare the Territory a Crown colony and thereby ensure that British control would continue indefinitely. This in turn would make it possible to provide the means to promote white settlement as had been done in Kenya some twenty years previously.

On the important question of safeguarding African rights over land, the new Agreement was worded much the same as the Mandate Instrument.<sup>1</sup> But in some of the other Articles there were changes which were to have an important bearing on the relationship between the different racial communities and between each of them and the Tanganyika government. And, as so often in the past, it was the potentially explosive issue of land alienation which often affected this relationship. These are some of the more significant changes. First, in common with agreements for the other Trust territories, it was categorically stated that the administering authority was obliged to

develop institutions 'towards self-government or independence.'<sup>2</sup> Second, the Trusteeship Council was empowered to send Visiting Missions to the Territory, thus permitting those who represented the Council, not only to gain first-hand information but also to bring to the local scene some of the tensions and attitudes which were part of current international conflict.<sup>3</sup> The Missions visited the Territory every three years and the reports they submitted did much to stimulate political consciousness. Third, Britain was required 'to develop the participation of the inhabitants of Tanganyika in the government of the Territory.'<sup>4</sup> Not surprisingly, the British government's interpretation of the word 'inhabitant' became a matter of some controversy.<sup>5</sup> In particular it has to be seen in contrast with Article 8, in which the term 'the native population' is used in order to provide protection for them in land matters. Thus it was decided there was a duty to provide equal treatment - and protection - for members of all races who could be classed as inhabitants. But what was intended to safeguard individual rights was soon being utilised to protect community rights and the settlers together with other minorities were accorded formal recognition of the influence they already exerted. The interpretation provided a firm support for the expedient policy of multi-racialism which was now developed. Finally, Article 10 of the Agreement made it obligatory for the administering authority to develop the economy of the country.<sup>6</sup> The Tanganyika government found this prescription most useful when answering criticisms for having alienated

land to non-Africans.

The British government and Tanganyika after 1945

At a time when the outcome of the War was still uncertain, British colonial policy had undergone a marked change. In a White Paper published in 1940, it was stated that after the war aid to dependent territories would not only be on a more substantial scale but also would be allowed for meeting recurrent as well as capital costs. Thus, the poorer parts of the Empire would no longer be restricted to providing those services which could be maintained from local resources.<sup>7</sup> Following the White Paper, Acts of Parliament provided Colonial Development and Welfare Funds which, in allocations to Tanganyika, began to make possible changes in the population distribution and in land utilization as will be described later. The Overseas Resources Development Act 1948 created the Overseas Food Corporation and the Colonial Development Corporation, both of which by their activities in Tanganyika were able to change in a dramatic manner the landscapes of parts of Central, Western, Southern and Southern Highlands provinces.

As well as the effects of increased aid on agricultural development in Tanganyika, the result of the General Election of 1945 also played a part in changing the relationship between the Colonial Office and every dependent territory administered by Britain. In the case of Tanganyika, local officials became aware of the fact that their development philosophy would be rigorously

examined by the new Labour government. In 1943 the Labour Party had published a detailed statement setting out a colonial policy and the chief architect of this endeavour had been Arthur Creech Jones, now Under Secretary at the Colonial Office.<sup>8</sup> Since George Hall, the Colonial Secretary, was soon fully occupied with the problems of Palestine, his Under Secretary was left to attend to African problems. Creech Jones brought with him to the Colonial Office a great deal more knowledge and experience than any of his immediate predecessors; before taking office he had been chairman of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, Labour spokesman on colonial affairs in the House of Commons and a member of at least one Colonial Office committee. Furthermore, when later he became Colonial Secretary he appointed experienced members of the Fabian Colonial Bureau to various Colonial Office Committees.<sup>9</sup> With this capacity to observe what was being done in different parts of Africa the new ministers in the Colonial Office were well aware of the difficulty in balancing political with economic considerations. Certainly they had to face the task of justifying their decisions to those of their supporters who found it necessary to voice the disquiet felt by many Africans when there was any increase in the numbers of white settlers. But Creech Jones, although willing to give assurances that the Colonial Office would watch the position carefully, also made it clear to the Fabian Colonial Bureau that he believed that European settlement had greatly contributed to the development of Kenya; it was thus only to be expected that further settlement in Tanganyika would meet

with his approval.<sup>10</sup> Two years later when criticisms of colonial rule had become more persistent, he said as follows:

'... the spirit of nationalism might be harnessed for development but often tended to be destructive and violent; it had to be met by paying heed not only to social needs which the authorities can supply but also to opportunities for self expression ... every colony must see that the social services now customary in Europe cannot be sustained on primitive peasant economies.'<sup>11</sup>

In Tanganyika, the plans for agricultural development had already been based on this argument. The difficult environment combined with traditional farming methods which were not going to be changed over-night, made it unlikely that any substantial increase in the cash earnings of Africans was immediately possible. Without more wealth, the revenue would not be forthcoming to pay for improved social services. In fact, the post-war planners argued that the output of cash crops from the African sector was likely to fall until remedial measures were applied.<sup>12</sup> The dual system therefore not only had to be retained but also further entrenched by encouraging the enlargement of the non-African sector. It was not only the need for additional revenue which prompted this course of action. Food production had failed to keep pace with the rate of population increase and either more food crops had to be grown on a commercial basis or funds had to be diverted from development projects to pay for requirements to be imported. Growing more food was the obvious choice and immediately after the war this was achieved by the payment of acreage grants to maize growers and by alienating land to the largest consumer, the sisal industry,

so that many estates could produce enough for their own requirements.<sup>13</sup> As it turned out, the African sector managed a steady increase in maize output during the years which followed and with hindsight it began to seem that the dangers of shortages had been exaggerated. Certainly, as the problems caused by famines receded, observers unfamiliar with conditions in more remote districts began to criticise the government's apparent obsession with the needs for Territorial and even district self-sufficiency in food.<sup>14</sup> But experiences in dealing with famines during the rains in the years before all-weather roads were constructed gave good reason for caution; furthermore, in view of the recommendations made to the Kenya government that maize growing, over and above self-sufficiency should not be encouraged, it could not be assumed that deficiencies could be made good from that quarter.<sup>15</sup>

In other ways too, conditions in Kenya affected policy in Tanganyika. Mitchell had already warned London in a seminal despatch that intractable problems had to be faced:

'At the present time characteristics common to all areas of dense African population include over-crowding, excessive pressure on the land, erosion and loss of fertility and a severe struggle to maintain the existing very inadequate standard of living ... East Africa is barely able to support itself in food at the present time, and would indeed be a large importer were it not for the production from European farms.'<sup>16</sup>

The importance of this despatch was three-fold. First, it provided ample justification for the alienation of more land to settler farmers until a more politically acceptable form of large scale agriculture could be shown

to provide a viable alternative. Second, since the deterioration in the African sector it described was also occurring in Tanganyika, it made it necessary to devise development plans which included schemes to improve specific danger areas as well as attempting to increase production in this sector by methods of general application. Finally, the despatch made a deep impression on a British Cabinet Minister and as a consequence great changes occurred in Tanganyika. The Minister, John Strachey, was to become the architect of the Groundnut Scheme which itself was the precursor of a third system of agricultural production, farming by public corporations. It was Mitchell's despatch which was to be used when Strachey sought the approval of the House of Commons for the enterprise. After quoting from the despatch he added:

'What is the use of providing schools for people whose primitive methods of production condemn them to evergrowing malnutrition? What is needed, is, as Sir Philip Mitchell put it, this breakaway from methods which form no basis on which to extend and develop life.'<sup>17</sup>

Thus the influence of metropolitan Britain on land usage in Tanganyika was three-fold. First, there was the close supervision of policy affecting alienation of land to non-Africans. Second, there was the financial aid made available to the majority of dependent territories but which was very important to Tanganyika in view of the lack of local resources and the absence of borrowing powers being enjoyed by African or municipal authorities. (see Appendix viii) Finally, there was the determination to intervene directly by employing machinery on a very large scale in a vain attempt to overcome the imperatives of a harsh environment.

The East Africa High Commission

One consequence of the change to Trusteeship status was the possibility of achieving closer union between the three East African territories without any question of legality being raised. However, the new Agreement made it clear that certain conditions had to be observed and the British government emphasised that the proposed inter-territorial organization was aimed at achieving administrative efficiency and economic development and not at fostering political unity. In Tanganyika, as in Uganda, there was still some suspicion that the Kenya settlers would dominate the organization but after protracted negotiations the proposal to create a High Commission was accepted, against some opposition, by the Legislative Council.<sup>18</sup> It consisted of the Governors of the three territories, supported by a Central Legislative Assembly responsible for a defined range of services.<sup>19</sup> Extreme caution was adopted before any of its powers were enlarged. The natural resources services of the High Commission were of considerable benefit to Tanganyika and both directly and indirectly affected land usage and settlement; the industrial licencing system, regulated by the East African Industrial Council, may have had a less beneficial effect on economic development.<sup>20</sup> Finally, the creation of the High Commission led not only to a number of new common interests but also a keener awareness of political events throughout the region. In particular, the Emergency in Kenya in 1952 profoundly affected the balance of power between the communities in

Tanganyika and the rapid political development of the Territory could not be ignored in Kenya.

#### Tanganyika in 1945

The institutions, and their representatives, described above provided the external factors which from time to time contributed to the development policies adopted by the Tanganyika government; there was also the situation in the Territory itself as perceived by those responsible for planning for the future. For in spite of memories of the years of the Depression, in 1945 there was every reason for confidence. The German threat, which had for so long deterred private investors, had been removed and both agricultural sectors had managed to live with the difficulties imposed by war-time restrictions and shortages. In the case of the major crops there had been no marketing problems since the whole crop produced in each case was purchased by Britain at a fixed price, an arrangement which was continued through 1945 and 1946. During the war years sisal production increased considerably; in contrast cotton production went down when the peasant farmer found he could obtain high prices for cereal crops. For both the plantations and the mixed farms there were by 1945 some serious obstacles to any further expansion, caused by a shortage of labour, a shortage of foodstuffs for feeding labour and a general scarcity of machinery and equipment. To meet these problems District Production Committees in the non-native areas made efforts to induce settlers to

increase production of cereals and Labour Utilization Boards were instituted to control the use of labour on estates.

To the planners, these difficulties seemed to be of a temporary nature and the steps taken to resolve them were expected to be successful. In fact it was sometimes suggested that the labour shortage was an advantage at a time when a large number of soldiers had to be re-settled into civilian life and it was not forgotten that in the last full years before the War there had been an unemployment problem.<sup>21</sup> There was every hope that funds for development would be on an unprecedented scale as a result of aid from Britain and from increased Territorial revenues. On the other hand, the geographical problems still remained and it was impossible to predict whether the increased resources for development would make any appreciable difference. The implications of the spatial factor may seem obvious enough but the huge cost of meeting the problem is sometimes overlooked when comparisons are made between Tanganyika and countries where the population is more concentrated. In the case of sisal, the most profitable crop at this time, expansion was essentially limited to those areas close to existing railway lines or to the coast line (Map IV ); in the case of cereal crops, once war-time shortages were ended the transport factor was bound to limit production on a commercial basis. One important reason for this was the lack of urban growth during the inter-war period; while this may have been an advantage for the colonial administration in that it delayed political

development it also left the grower of cereal crops with very limited local markets.<sup>22</sup> However, the position was changing rapidly; whereas in 1932 there were only six towns with a population of 5,000 or over, by 1952 there were sixteen and the process of moving to the towns was to continue at an accelerated rate.

In the preparation of plans it was necessary to take into account the increase in the African population which was taking place. Although no accurate estimate could be made when the plans were prepared, the 1948 Census figures were in accord with what had been generally predicted: since 1928 the population had increased from 4.7 million to 7.4 million, a mean annual increase of slightly over two per cent.

It was obvious that an increasing population would worsen the problem of soil erosion and if it also led to a shortage of land there would be political repercussions. It was therefore more necessary than ever before to accept the expense of opening up new land and to increase agricultural production to help meet this expense. The planners were helped to some extent by the much-improved road system which had been developed during the years after the Depression. Better roads not only stimulated interest in growing cash crops but also lessened the dangers caused by recurrent famines. On the other hand a factor which would make a sizeable inroad into development funds was the greatly increased cost and complexity of the processes of government. For it was not only the technical services which had to be expanded; the increasingly critical

attitudes to colonialism in the international community made it imperative that a substantial slice of the funds to be made available should be allocated to expanding the system of African education and to improving the social services. Also, in spite of the improvements to the road system mentioned above, it was still not adequate to sustain a more developed economy. It only required a slender increase in the number of heavy vehicles during the rains to turn an otherwise satisfactory murrum road into a quagmire. As crop tonnage increased, traffic likewise increased and in spite of the money and effort spent on them, the roads deteriorated.<sup>23</sup> Increased government activity in the many directions now planned required a reorganization of the machinery of government by a process of devolution. From the beginning of 1948 each official member of the Executive Council was made directly responsible to the Governor for a department or group of departments, thereby relieving the Chief Secretary of some of his responsibilities. More important, from the economic standpoint it became necessary more than ever before to encourage all forms of private investment in order to create the wealth to support the enlarged government structure. If as a consequence there was an increase in the number of European settlers, there were, it was recognized, obvious political risks; but, it was argued, there were also risks in delaying development measures or in concentrating on raising the productivity of the peasant farmer without proper heed of the consequences. The dangers are described in the following passage in the Report which set out the development plan for the next ten

years:

'Over the greater part of the country the soil is poor and the rainfall is often badly distributed. Nearly two-thirds of the Territory is closed to cultivation owing to the presence of tsetse-infested bush. The result is over-cultivation in the remaining areas with consequent soil deterioration and annually diminishing returns. On numerous occasions in the past economic depressions, arising out of circumstances beyond the Territory's control, or the need for maximum production for war purposes, have led to the soil being worked to an extent which has materially weakened its productive capacity; and there are signs over practically the whole of these areas of desiccation, erosion, destruction of forest and the general impoverishment of the soil. Evidence is accumulating on all sides to indicate that a continuance of the present practice of land exploitation will lead to conditions which spell disaster.'

24

#### The Development proposals

As already described, serious planning for the economic development of the Territory began before the War with the appointment of a Committee given the duty of describing the problem and giving recommendations on what needed to be done. The Report, described below, was published two years later and became the basis for post-war planning strategy. Its influence therefore on the course of non-African settlement for the rest of the colonial period was considerable and the circumstances which led to the appointment of the Committee are of some interest.

In 1938, Sir Mark Young replaced MacMichael and was soon to set about reassuring the unofficial members of his Legislative Council that settler interests would not be neglected. As he said:

'It has been thought, and to some extent it is still thought today, that the attitude of this government towards the settlement of non-natives is unsympathetic and even verges on the antagonistic. I do not think there is much justification for this view. Non-native settlement is not to be considered as inimical to the interests of the native population ... I propose to appoint a committee to examine and report on methods ... for the development of the Territory by natives and non-natives.'<sup>25</sup>

Following his statement, in a despatch to the Colonial Secretary, Young contrasted conditions in the Territory with those in French West Africa where better services for the native population were provided. He drew attention to 'the disproportionate ratio of its resources to its needs' and explained that in his view only a searching inquiry into development problems could improve the situation. The inquiry, he suggested should be conducted by a Central Development Committee of officials and unofficials which would be assisted by Provincial committees, also of mixed composition.<sup>26</sup> In the Colonial Office his initiative was welcomed as being opportune since at the time the Mandate itself was in question; from the minutes it seems that there was no interest expressed in the composition of the committees which would be preparing the plans. Young was therefore able to proceed as he intended and not surprisingly, in view of his statement to Legislative Council cited above, settler interests were well represented on the Central and Provincial committees.<sup>27</sup> In particular, the unofficial members of the former were accustomed to express their criticisms in a forthright way and were able to ensure that the Report in due course reflected their views on what needed to be done.<sup>28</sup>

The Report was published in 1940 and at that time there was little interest in the observations it made.<sup>29</sup> Emphasis was laid on the need for better communications, more determined exploitation of the natural resources, better use to be made of the under-populated areas and greater productivity from the African communities. It was suggested that Africans should be trained to replace Europeans and Asians in government service, a move which, it was acknowledged would require more investment in African education. On the question of non-African settlement, members were in favour of a further alienation of land and like the Taylor committee of 1930 they recommended the creation of a Land Bank and a Land Settlement Board.<sup>30</sup> Perhaps the Committee realised that in view of the criticisms of the findings of the Taylor committee a better case would have to be presented if the continuation of the dual policy was to be accepted. In the Report it was argued that in times of economic depression the settler farmer would have to increase production in order to meet his expenses whereas the peasant farmer, being a landed proprietor, merely ceased to produce cash crops until prices improved. It was observed that when the years 1928 and 1931 were compared sisal production increased significantly whereas there was a fifty per cent drop in cotton production. Furthermore, if soil erosion was a major problem, one of the worst areas was the Uluguru region of Eastern province where no economic crops were grown; pressure on African peasants in such areas to grow crops for sale would only make the situation worse. The fear that further settlement would cause a

labour shortage was unfounded; the Labour Committee of 1937 had concluded that the shortage then existing was caused primarily by the 'grow more crops' campaign. The answer, the Committee maintained, was to adopt a policy of 'interpenetration', in order to provide education and employment for Africans living close to alienated land; with this observation members showed that they fully supported the 'contact theory' described by the East African Commission in 1925.

An increase in non-African settlement, as recommended by the Committee, was to cause changes in the landscape in many parts of the Territory. But there is need to mention one suggestion which, when implemented was to cause more obvious change; this followed the Committee's concern for the development and conservation of water resources. Shortly after the end of the War, a Department of Water Development was created and by its operations it was able to contribute to the making of changes in land usage in many places.<sup>31</sup>

Although it was recognized that no action towards implementing the report was possible until the end of the War was in sight, some feared that it might be treated as just one more report which could be conveniently forgotten. Thus, in 1944 Lord Chesham tabled a question in the House of Lords asking what steps were to be taken to implement the recommendations and a debate ensued. The majority of those who spoke supported the findings but it was noticeable that there were reservations over the issue of further white settlement.<sup>32</sup> In Tanganyika, a small department had been

established in the Secretariat in 1943, with the task of planning in detail a post-war development program. The officials concerned concluded that their planning was limited by three factors: manpower (technical, supervisory and unskilled), equipment and finance. However, once the financial position had been clarified by a further statement from London, a Planning Committee was appointed to supervise the work of the development branch.<sup>33</sup> In 1944 it published a Report, recommending priorities for the allocation of funds;<sup>34</sup> it was emphasised, hopefully, that other recommendations would follow once policy decisions concerning land settlement and land usage had been announced. Most of the projects had been recommended by the Central Development Committee although there was now added provision for improving the marketing of produce sold by Africans, described as 'one of the Territory's most urgent and important problems.' Out of a total proposed expenditure of £12.6 million, £5.2 million had been promised as a grant from the Colonial Development Fund.

The Colonial Office view was that, among other reasons the Report was unsatisfactory because insufficient funds had been allocated to schemes for increasing the wealth of the Territory.<sup>35</sup> The comment is not without significance; for if absolute priority was to be given to economic development there was ample justification for encouraging non-African investment in agriculture since at the time this seemed the quickest and surest way of achieving this objective. In addition to this observation, the Tanganyika government was informed that the grant from

the C.D. and W. Fund would be increased. Soon an added fillip to the plans was given by the decision to allocate for development the Agricultural Development Fund, which had accumulated from bulk sales of cotton and coffee during the war.

In Tanganyika, it was decided to create a separate organization to plan and implement the development projects, with a Development Commission with strong non-official representation to supervise the task. This time, the membership of the Commission did attract some interest in Parliament and the Colonial Secretary was asked to make sure that non-officials and Africans were associated with the planning of the spending of money received from Britain.<sup>36</sup> When the membership of the Commission was announced it was seen that one Asian and one African were included.<sup>37</sup>

The Commission had a two-fold task; first, it had to draw up a comprehensive development plan for a ten-year period and second, to supervise the implementing of plans once approved. In the Commission's report it was clear that the views of the Central Development Committee on agricultural development were accepted; provision of funds for both a Land Bank and for a Land Settlement Board were included as well as a number of schemes designed to improve African agriculture. Although support was to be offered to both sectors of the dual system, it was clearly intended that in deference to the Colonial Office view, a major effort would be made to introduce change in the African sector. Whereas in the previous plan, 5.8 per cent of the total had been allocated to 'Conservation and

Development of Natural Resources', now it was intended to allocate 17 per cent of a larger amount; (the new total estimated development expenditure over ten years was £18 million). Even so, the amount was still only two thirds of what was to be devoted to road improvement, illustrating how the spatial problem continued to affect, if not determine, the pace of development. Furthermore, funds had to be set aside from the total for Railway development; one item of major expenditure was the new branch line to Mpanda, an enterprise which, like the Singida line before the War, failed miserably to justify itself.

The Colonial Office was satisfied that the Commission had selected the right priorities and the Plan, subject to two additions being made, was approved.<sup>38</sup> A firm promise of a total sum of £5,250,000 was given, supplemented by a further grant of £3,500,000 for inter-territorial schemes.<sup>39</sup> However in London it was still doubted whether there would ever be an adequate supply of unskilled labour to work on such a wide variety of projects and assurances from the Governor to this effect were met with disbelief.<sup>40</sup> Not only was the Groundnut Scheme about to be launched but also the extent of the expected expansion of the sisal industry was impossible to predict. It was however the spatial factor and not a shortage of labour which caused the revision of the Plan. In 1950, owing to the rise in capital costs as well as for other reasons it was found necessary to add considerably to the funds to be spent on the roads programme.<sup>41</sup>

The increased tempo of economic development which followed was primarily due to the external factors mentioned above; the nature of the development was determined by, above all else, the recommendations of the two committees and the Development Commission and for this reason they are of more than a passing interest. Their proposals were never exclusively concerned with the allocation of funds and the selection of priorities. For example, it was the 1944 committee which recommended the setting up of an authoritative commission to investigate the need to re-distribute tribal and alienated land in Northern province, a proposal which was to have important political consequences.<sup>42</sup> Meanwhile, as the outstanding points in the Plan were being settled, recruitment of new staff proceeded apace and the civil service rapidly expanded.<sup>43</sup> A new era was beginning.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. Mandate Art. 6 and T/AGR Art. 8.
2. T/AGR, Art. 76.
3. Ibid., Art. 89.
4. Ibid., Art. 6.
5. E.g., see Colonial Secretary's statement, H.C. 502, Col. 2240.
6. Viz., 'the over-riding duty of the administering authority to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of Tanganyika.'
7. Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare, cmd. 6175 (HMSO 1940), para. 6.
8. The Colonies: the Labour Party's post war proposals for the African and Pacific Colonies. (Labour Party, London 1943).
9. In particular, the four appointed to the C.O. Committee on Economic Development.
10. Creech Jones' address to the F.C.B. on 17 Jan. 1946: reported in East Africa and Rhodesia, p. 497; see also Colonial Secretary's reference to the Land Settlement Board, H.C. 421, Col. 2679.
11. Creech Jones address, London African Conference, 30 Sep. 1947 (reported in Colonial Review, No.7.)
12. See 'A Ten Year Development and Welfare Plan for Tanganyika Territory.' (Dar es Salaam 1946) para. 54.
13. E.g. in 1948 in Eastern Province £26,485 was paid in grants and land in the Wami valley leased to sisal estates for food production (Department of Agriculture, AR 1948.)
14. E.g., see E.A.R.C. Report, p. 66.
15. Ibid., p. 67, citing the Kenya Food Shortage Commission, 1943.
16. Mitchell, Kenya Despatch No. 44 of 1946.
17. H.C. 443, Col. 2019.

18. The Asian members voted against the proposal and the African members abstained.
19. The proposals were explained in Colonial Paper 210 (1947) which superceded Col. 191 (1945). The main services were Railways and Harbours, Posts and Telegraphs, Customs and Excise, Aviation Matters and joint research and scientific services.
20. VMR 1954 (TCOR T/1169), pp. 78-80; the E.A. Industrial Council had been formed during the war and was allowed to continue when the High Commission was established.
21. A.R. 1938, p. 85.
22. For further comment on urbanization, see post, pp 342-344
23. See T.L.C. 26 sess. Pt. III, p. 10 where one member complained that the roads were the worst within living memory.
24. A Ten Year Development and Welfare Plan, op. cit., p. 14.
25. T.L.C. 13 Sess. 1938-39, p. 47.
26. Young, despatch dated 7 January 1939; GO 691/175/42303.
27. The chairman of the Central Development Committee was the government Treasurer, G.R. Sandford. For the appointment of members of the central and provincial committees see G.N. 29/39 and 134/39 respectively.
28. Based on conversations with R.V. Stone, one of the unofficial members of the Central Committee.
29. Report of the Central Development Committee, (Dar es Salaam 1940).
30. This was the 1930 Legco. Committee, so called after the name of its chairman; see Chapter IV, f.n. 78.
31. C.D.C. Report, op.cit., paras, 284-295.
32. H.L. 130, Col. 1019-1020.
33. Colonial Office Command Paper No. 3 of 1944 stating that development expenditure would be met from a colony's surplus funds, from public loans and from grants and loans from Britain.

34. An Outline of Post War Development Proposals,  
(Dar es Salaam 1944).
35. C.S. despatch No. 86 dated 27 April 1945.
36. Question by Lady Noel Buxton, H.C. 421, Col. 204.
37. A.R. 1947, p. 53.
38. Ibid, p. 43; the Colonial Office stipulated  
that more should be found for African education  
and for African producers.
39. Ten Year Development Plan, op.cit., p. 1.
40. See minutes in CO 691/191/42303/8
41. J.F.R. Hill and J.P. Moffett, ed. Tanganyika:  
A review of its Resources and their Development,  
(Dar es Salaam 1955).
42. Tanganyika White Paper, The Meru Land Problem  
(Dar es Salaam 1952), para. 2.
43. E.g., civil service established posts between  
1938 and 1947 increased as follows: Europeans  
from 940 to 1,526, Asians from 758 to 1,112,  
Africans from 6,682 to 8,653.

CHAPTER VIIINON-AFRICAN AGRICULTURE AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

In the Territory, the news of the Labour party's victory in the 1945 General Election caused dismay to the European leaders hoping that in the post-war world more encouragement to potential settlers would be given. Instead, there was not only uncertainty as to whether any new alienations would be approved but also there was the possibility that most of the ex-German estates might revert to tribal ownership. The latter doubt was dispelled when it was announced that 'the Colonial Secretary had agreed to take over the German estates at a fair valuation for occupation by Africans and Europeans in accordance with local needs.'<sup>1</sup> It was decided that neither ballot nor auction had proved to be satisfactory ways of allocating estates to new settlers and instead the newly-formed Land Settlement Board would be responsible for selecting suitable tenants. In areas where there was already a land shortage certain estates reverted to tribal ownership while in some cases the original German owners were allowed to re-possess.<sup>2</sup> Those estates which were freehold were converted to leasehold and issued on a Right of Occupancy to new tenants.<sup>3</sup>

On the question of the alienation of new land the first official comment on the recommendations of the Central Development Committee appeared in 1944, when the Governor, Sir Wilfrid Jackson said that he was in favour of encouraging settlement.<sup>4</sup> He added, however, that there had to be 'a

scrupulous regard for the rights and interests, as well as the future needs of the African population.' By 'future needs', he explained, he meant 'possible new types of African land settlement', presumably such as had been tried at Kingolwira (see Appendix vii)

Confirmation from the British government that alienation of new land was permitted came with a despatch from George Hall, Colonial Secretary in the new Labour government.<sup>5</sup> Re-alienations and new alienations were allowed provided the following four principles were observed: the land was not, nor likely to be, required for native occupation; alienation was not likely to involve an element of continuing subsidization; that Africans compelled to move would be given land elsewhere; that there was no selecting the best land for alienation.

These reservations were presumably to meet expected criticism in Britain rather than give precise direction to the course of non-African settlement in the future; either they accorded with the practice and intentions of the Tanganyika government or, in the case of the last point, it was impossible to enforce. Nevertheless, it could be argued that it was important to place them on record in case the colonial administration ever lost control of the settlement policy, as had already happened in Kenya.

And so, with London approval for non-African settlement, the Tanganyika government was able to follow the proposals made by the Committee. Henceforth non-African settlement was to be encouraged, a Land Settlement Board was appointed and a Land Bank established. As related in the previous chapter, funds were provided for both institutions.

## The Land Settlement Board

The Board was given the responsibility of arranging for the disposal of the ex-German estates and for taking decisions in respect of new alienations of land. The powers of the Board were considerable and its decisions were likely to have far-reaching consequences. However, there was no danger that its actions would conflict with government policy; members of the Board were at first all Europeans, of British nationality and an official majority was maintained.<sup>6</sup>

Between 1948 and 1951 the major task of the Board was to dispose of the ex-German properties. First, pamphlets were published describing the properties available and district selection committees were appointed to investigate the qualifications of the applicants.<sup>7</sup> Credit was given for past farming experience or service in the Armed Forces. It was announced that all leases would run for 33 years only, a decision which, as explained later, was to be strongly criticised. In most cases the estates being offered followed the boundaries of the former German properties; an exception was made in the case of the Oldeani estates where the area was sub-divided into thirty mixed farms of some 840 acres each.

The re-allocation of these properties to new owners was criticised by the first Visiting Mission representing the Trusteeship Council and in the Report it submitted it was recommended that as a general policy the former German estates should be handed back to African ownership. The Tanganyika government, rejecting the proposal,

pointed out that the estates in question were among the most productive in the Territory and to place them in inexperienced hands would lead to a decrease in output which in turn would adversely affect the financial position of the country.<sup>8</sup>

But the same argument could hardly be used to justify new alienations, which, when they were begun also led to criticism from the same source. The Mission made no distinction between plantation development and mixed farming and merely observed that 'European colonization should be kept to the barest minimum consistent with the development of the Territory'.<sup>9</sup> The observation, mild enough as it was, probably was included to satisfy the critics of both types of agriculture.<sup>10</sup> A reply was hardly needed but the Tanganyika government took the opportunity to place on record the view that 'it was by non-indigenous effort in areas where there was no land shortage that a rapid expansion of the social services could be made possible.'<sup>11</sup> In fact, there was the more material reason why non-African settlement had to be encouraged which was based on the warnings contained in Mitchell's despatch cited in the preceding chapter. Although the Development Plan contained measures which were expected to lead to a substantial improvement in African agriculture it was realised that it might take a long time to obtain results. On the other hand, large scale farming involving the commercial production of cereals provided not only regular employment but also the domestic means to meet food shortages.

Thus the policy being implemented by the Land Settlement Board as a consequence of the British acceptance of the proposals of the Central Development Committee represented a break with the more cautious pre-War approach to alienation and the change did not go unnoticed. In a memorandum in 1948, the Fabian Colonial Bureau Advisory Committee warned Creech Jones that the recommendations of the Central Development Committee 'were diametrically opposed to the advice given by Cameron on alienation.' The Committee was not convinced that there was any place for the European as a mixed farmer in the Territory. And yet, as the memorandum explained:

'The Land Settlement Board which is now operating is based on those recommendations and is apparently engaged in a study of the possibility of supplementing the 1940 proposals for new European settlement. Thus without public discussion or public announcement an important change of policy appears to be taking place.'<sup>12</sup>

In a subsequent discussion of the matter with the Committee, Creech Jones emphasised the need to develop the Territory and gave assurances that the situation would be carefully watched. But the Bureau too maintained its interest in the matter and two years later was again expressing concern at the policy being adopted. On this occasion exception was taken to a statement by the Territory's Member for Lands and Mines to the effect that the Land Settlement Board had fixed a target of 100 farms of 1000 acres a year and this alienation of land could be continued indefinitely.<sup>13</sup> The Colonial Secretary was able to reply that changes were already being made or would be made and that these would meet the criticism from the Bureau. For in the same year

the Land Settlement Board was reconstituted and renamed the Land Utilization Board. The Member for Local Government and an African were appointed members of the new Board thus ensuring that the political implications of the alienation issue would be given more consideration.<sup>14</sup> Announcing this change, Twining explained that in future, the policy to be adopted by the government would make sure that any land would be developed in the common interest of all communities.<sup>15</sup> The following year another African member was appointed to the Board;<sup>16</sup> and shortly afterwards the Governor explained that the Board 'was continuing its programme of investigation' and that the three local committees of the Board in Eastern, Northern and Southern Highlands provinces all now included Africans as members.<sup>17</sup>

Whereas the old Board had seemed to concentrate on the settlement of non-Africans, the new Board had much wider interests in how suitable agricultural land was used. As explained below, economic as well as political factors, made this change necessary. The terms of reference for the new Board give an indication of the variety of specific problems they were expected to examine:

The preparation of plans for making the best use of potential development areas.

Selecting areas suitable for alienation to non-Africans.

Selecting persons suitable to receive a Right of Occupancy.

Ensuring that conditions of Rights of Occupancy were observed.

Recommending measures to reform African land tenure.

The Land Bank

The introduction of an agricultural credit scheme was the surest way to promote the development of estate farming in the Territory. Without a means of obtaining a low-interest loan a settler restricted the development of his land to that amount of his own capital he was prepared to put at risk. Political uncertainties prior to 1939, the hazards of tropical agriculture and the possibility of falling market prices were all restraining influences. Settlers who were pensioners often had little capital to invest and in cases where they had obtained land which was marginal and then failed to develop it there was little point in revoking the lease for failure to comply with the Land Regulations. But once it was possible to obtain a loan from the Land Bank, estate agriculture became an attractive proposition for a more enterprising type of settler and more development and better land usage resulted.

Before the second World War there had been two valid objections to the proposal for a Land Bank. If the Bank was funded by the British taxpayer it was assumed that he would expect its services to be used for helping British settlers and such discrimination was impossible under the conditions of the Mandate; and if the funds came from the local taxpayers who before the War were predominantly African there was little justification for providing a service which would be almost exclusively enjoyed by non-Africans.

After the War, with the increased emphasis on productivity, it seemed that improved large-scale farming helped the whole country and the provision of capital was the means to achieve this improvement. Thus, the creation of the Land Bank, recommended by the Central Development Committee, was approved and £200,000 provided for it out of the C.D. and W. grant. The capital on which the Bank based its operations had to be increased at regular intervals to permit an expansion of its lending activities. There was, however, no lack of confidence in the way it was operated. By 1958 the capital had risen to £1,200,000, the sum being provided by government grants, by loans raised by public subscription and by overdrafts provided by commercial banks. During the period interest rates charged by the Land Bank rose steadily, at any time varying with the length of time before repayment became necessary.<sup>18</sup> The annual amount of loans granted is given in Table XII and the sums indicate the valuable measure of support the Bank gave to the non-African sector.

#### The settlement policy implemented

With the Board to investigate applications and with the Bank to support the new settler, alienations were able to be made at a steady rate. An examination of non-African settlement in 1946, (see Table XIII) reveals a pattern which can be described as dividing the eight provinces almost equally between 'settled' and 'native' areas, as Cameron and Mitchell had hoped would happen.

TABLE XIILOANS GRANTED BY THE LAND BANK1949-1958

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total of loans granted</u> <u>£</u>
1949	91,045
1950	126,060
1951	149,166
1952	81,867
1953	249,312
1954	187,940
1955	134,577
1956	191,771
1957	294,355
1958	481,568

(source: Annual Reports, the Land Bank; Government Printer, Dar es Salaam)

TABLE XIII

AVAILABILITY OF LAND AND NON-AFRICAN  
HOLDINGS OF AGRICULTURAL AND PASTORAL  
LAND BY PROVINCES, 31 DECEMBER 1946

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
<u>Province</u>	<u>Population density per sq.mile (a)</u>	<u>Land area for use and occupation (b) (million acres)</u>	<u>Total land area occupied by non-Africans (acres)</u>	<u>Non-African holders of land</u>
Tanga	38	7.63	570,305	371
Southern Highlands	18.5	22.54	409,138	378
Northern	17.5	18.11	363,447	563
Eastern	22	22.41	330,623	442
Southern	17	31.01	124,093	120
Western	12.5	34.30	20,848	84
Lake	47	22.11	22,407	126
Central	22	22.26	5,417	53

(a) based on 1948 census figures

(b) total land area, less the area designated or planned to be designated as Game Reserves, Forest Reserves or both.

(source: Annual Report, Department of Land and Mines, 1946; Government Printer, Dar es Salaam)

This was in part the consequence of the restrictions on alienation in certain areas which were not finally and formally lifted until 1953. Much of the land in Central, Western and Lake provinces occupied by non-Africans had been handed over to the various Christian missions operating there.

Further comment on the Table is necessary in that it provides little indication of the potential amount of land available for alienation in 1946 and still less of the possibilities of increasing the numbers of non-African settlers in each province. Whereas good arable land could be allocated in viable units of 600 acres, marginal land would only be sought for cattle ranching, for which much larger areas would be needed by a lessee. For example, it will be observed from the Table that Northern and Southern Highlands provinces were approximately equal in their respective population densities and available land areas. In addition, in both provinces there were localities of overcrowding where alienation of even small areas would have been politically undesirable. But here the resemblance ends, because climatic conditions determined whether particular areas would be attractive to potential settlers for the kind of farming they wished to practise. Thus the difference in settlement potential can best be judged by comparing the different proportions of the respective provinces in which the rainfall was likely to make some form of arable farming reasonably profitable. Whereas in Northern province arable farming could only be conducted in three relatively small areas where a combination

of climate and fertile soil was present, in the Southern Highlands the areas where rainfall was likely to be adequate were larger and spread throughout the province. In Tanga province too, decisions to permit further alienations were not easy to take. On the one hand, sisal for the foreseeable future would provide the basis of economic progress for the Territory and seemed to thrive on poor-quality soils; thus there was every reason to suppose that there would be no great demand for such land to be reserved for African smallholdings. On the other, some 70 per cent of the sisal labour force were locally born or now resident in the province and wanted to live outside the estates where they worked but near the perimeters. Thus over-crowding occurred and expansion of existing estates was difficult.

A final comment on the Table concerns the figures in column 5, which refer to land in freehold possession as well as rights of occupancy. At the time there was no accurate record of the amount of land in the Territory classed as freehold, but in 1951 the total was estimated at slightly under a million acres.<sup>19</sup> Nearly one third of these freehold properties were situated in Tanga province and much of the remainder in Eastern and Northern provinces.

With crops continuing to command good prices after the War, there was no lack of applications for land. In 1949, the Governor made it known that in response to demand, much new land had been alienated.<sup>20</sup> Further alienation followed and the achievement of the Land

Settlement Board can be summarised by describing what was done between 1949 and 1952 in respect of alienations to individuals or private companies. Three provinces in particular were affected:

- (i) North Province. In 1949, 22 farms were offered at Ol Joro and 15 applications for these were approved; at Ol Molog, West Kilimanjaro, 4 new farms were allocated; a few alienations in Mbulu district were approved; following the recommendations of the Arusha-Moshi Lands Commission, approximately 125,000 acres in the Sanya Corridor area were set aside for alienation for ranching and dairying purposes. Also in 1949 three blocks, each of 100,000 acres at Essimigor were made available for large scale ranching schemes. After a few years a tenant was found for one block and the government used the remainder for its own trials. In 1951, 8 new farms offered in the area north of Kilimanjaro led to tenants being found for six of them.
- (ii) Southern Highlands Province. In Iringa district, the tsetse-infested area of Mloa-Idodi was opened up for would-be tobacco farmers. Some settlement was permitted at Usangu, Mbeya district. In 1952, the Chesham enterprise (Southern Highlands Estates) was re-alienated to a new owner. Finally, a pilot scheme was started at Dabaga, south of Iringa township and subsequently expanded; much of this cold, damp area was sparsely populated and therefore particularly suitable for settlement and large scale farming.
- (iii) Eastern Province. In 1949, 8 new farms in the Wami valley were made available. The following year, 33 new farms were laid out at Magole and leased mainly to Arab and Asian farmers. In 1951, ten farms of 1000 acres each were made available at Msowero and a further two in the Wami valley.<sup>21</sup>

From the Reports of the Land Settlement Board it is evident that considerable care was taken in the selection of applicants for land; for example, in 1949, only 113 applications were approved out of a total of more than 600 received. Apparently, as in the nineteen thirties, it was

believed important that settlers should project the correct image. But there was still a sufficient number of suitable applicants willing to try their hand at tropical farming and by 1953, the amount of land in non-African hands had risen to about three million acres.<sup>22</sup> This compared with a total of about two million acres in 1939. In terms of Rights of Occupancies, the consequences of the government's post-war land policy can be observed from the figures given in Table XIV, which cover the period during which the fastest expansion of the non-African sector occurred. Although the increase in the total area of land alienated was substantial, (by 1960, the figure was 2,489,000 acres) the number of settlers did not increase proportionately; the total number of holders of long-term Rights of Occupancy for arable or pastoral purposes in 1960 is recorded as being 1,666, an increase of 613 over the figure for 1946. The national origins of the leaseholders in 1960 were as follows:

British 470; Asian 287; Greek 279; others 630. The last-mentioned figure includes 265 leases held by missions and 35 held by Africans.

The increase in the amount of land selected for commercial farming denotes a potential for a significant alteration in the land usage pattern. Although considerable change did occur, more might have taken place if technical and political factors had not intruded. For a better understanding of the intentions behind much of the alienation, it is necessary to study the Annual Reports to the United Nations which gave details of the different types of enterprise carried out on alienated land. Extracts from

the data provided are given in Appendix ix and they offer a fairly composite picture of alienation after 1946. From these figures it will be noted that after 1953, there was a reduction in the number of new leases granted annually to private individuals. Partly this was caused by a fall in demand for land and partly because it was no longer government policy to encourage new settlement, as had been done by the Land Settlement Board until it was reformed in 1950. Nevertheless, alienations were still approved and - as can be seen from Table XII - the Land Bank was progressively extending its aid to farmers who lacked capital.

#### Changes in settlement policy

From this description of events, there can be no doubt that the decision of the British government to permit new alienations was the first step in the causal chain leading to many new estates being created and not a few of the older ones being extended. But while Twining was Governor, commercial farming was also affected by changes in government land policy and to complete the picture these changes must be mentioned. They concerned three matters: the change of emphasis from land ownership to land usage; second, and following from the first, the ending of restrictions on where land could be alienated; and, finally, the question of permitting long leases.

The replacement of the Land Settlement Board by the Land Utilization Board was, it is clear, more than just a change of name. It was prompted by a growing concern

that by encouraging Africans to grow cash crops and by the modest development of an industrial base, the government was inviting the risk of food shortages in all but exceptionally good years. At the same time the problems of the Groundnut Scheme clearly demonstrated the difficulties to be encountered in large scale arable farming in much of the Territory. It was therefore decided to encourage the full use of land of high potential irrespective of where it was situated and regardless of the race of the person prepared to use it.<sup>23</sup> It was not only the pragmatists who supported this argument; others saw it as a logical extension of the principle of multi-racialism in that all inhabitants of the Territory ought to have equal opportunities in making use of its resources. At the same time it was decided to ensure that once land had been alienated, the development clauses in the leases were properly observed. A new inspectorate was established, and the staff, known as Land Rangers, began making visits to any estate where it was believed that no development was taking place. The more demanding 1948 Land Regulations (see Appendix x), had now come in force and by 1960 nearly half of the occupiers of alienated land were subject to them. Nevertheless, there were still a number of settlers who continued to regard farming as a secondary source of income and the Chesham scheme in particular showed no signs of developing into a viable enterprise. In background and attitudes, the tenants in 1951 accorded with what Chesham would have thought desirable; at least half of them continued to make use of an honorary military title.<sup>24</sup>

The decision to encourage the more intensive development of alienated land would, it was believed, provide adequate justification for further alienation. The second change in policy, the removal of the pre-war restrictions on settlement in certain areas, was aimed at widening the choice for prospective applicants for land. In future, it was explained, land might be applied for in any province in the Territory without special conditions being imposed. In part, this was a logical extension of the argument for the first change; also, however, it happened because it was thought that there was no longer any valid reason for restricting non-African settlement in certain provinces. Cameron and Mitchell had argued successfully for their policy of limited separation because they wanted the native authorities and any form of African local government which replaced them, to evolve in their own way without outside interference. Now, at Creech Jones' insistence, democratic local councils were to be created in the colonial territories and in Tanganyika this was to lead in 1953 to a local government system based on English practice and organization. With the rejection of the former policy involving a gradual transformation and modernization of native authorities, there was no longer any need to support the principle of separate development. The new policy in respect of alienation was explained as follows:

'The old theory...endeavouring to keep non-African farming areas segregated from mainly African zones has been abandoned... It is now accepted that the health, wealth and general interests of the African are not best served by leaving him in isolation surrounded by great tracts of undeveloped land which may be needed for his anticipated progeny.'

The effects of this change in policy can be judged from Table XIV which compares the situation before and after the period of greatest activity in alienating land; it is clear that there was no rush to take advantage of the change.

Nevertheless, by emphasising the need for better land usage the government gave notice to its critics that it was believed necessary to encourage any move which led to increased productivity even when this made it necessary to alienate more land to non-Africans. If after 1952 the demand for arable land had continued at the same level as in previous years, there might have been a more pronounced change in the geographical distribution of non-African settlement.

The decision to re-introduce 99 year leases was a victory for settler-power or for commonsense - depending on the readers' preferences.<sup>26</sup> When the Land Settlement Board was established after the War, members were persuaded by the Tanganyika government to limit leases to 33 year periods.<sup>27</sup> In London, this limitation was welcomed and the Colonial Secretary insisted that it should be observed. Predictably, the decision was bitterly criticised by the Northern Province Council, which at that time represented settler opinion.<sup>28</sup> Kenya settlers were soon adding their weight to the protest and their leader, Sir Alfred Vincent, in a letter to Creech Jones complained that to restrict leases to 33 years 'strikes at the very root of white settlement in Tanganyika and has given rise to a great deal of misgiving.'<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, African spokesmen

TABLE XIV

ACREAGES UNDER RIGHTS OF OCCUPANCY  
FOR ARABLE AND PASTORAL USE, 1946 AND 1956

<u>Province</u>	<u>1946</u>		<u>1956</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Acres</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Acres</u>
Lake	63	5,202	74	17,908
Central	28	1,924	50	205,319*
Southern	88	53,798	136	253,064*
Western	69	18,433	94	262,961*
Northern	238	196,984	359	501,172
Eastern	226	123,684	420	386,665
Southern Highlands	287	338,739	331	440,072
Tanga	54	49,274	108	308,962
	<u>1,053</u>	<u>788,038</u>	<u>1,572</u>	<u>2,376,123</u>

\* Including land alienated for the groundnuts scheme as follows:

Central 150,000 acres; Southern 154,000 acres;  
 Western 180,728 acres.

(source: Annual Reports, Department of Lands and Mines, 1946 and 1956; Government Printer, Dar es Salaam)

meeting the 1948 Visiting Mission had wanted the 33 year rule to remain and had the Mission's support for this practice. In having to decide, Creech Jones had to balance the political argument against the effects on development and came to a compromise solution. The ex-German estates in Northern province, alienated for 33 years would remain on that basis but elsewhere in the Territory leases could be extended for the longer period. The 1958 Visiting Mission again requested 33 year leases but the Tanganyika government was adamant; such leases, it was explained, 'were generally unattractive as an investment proposition and contrary to good land use in that it tempts owners to mine the land, leaving it in a worse condition than it was at the beginning of the lease.'<sup>30</sup> The decision was crucial to the course of white settlement. Either the estate farmer was a resident, with a stake in the future of the Territory or he was a bird of passage, on a par with the expatriate civil servant or the manager of a London-based business.

The majority of the new settlers were British and, as in the past, many of them came looking forward to a life of interest more than expecting to make a fortune. Many soon found that however hard they worked, they were lucky at the end of the year if they found that they were not out of pocket; the number of leases revoked each year gives an indication of how many decided to give up.<sup>31</sup> The following examples illustrate two extremes of success and failure:

Ol Molog, Northern province

"The eight farms here occupy 10,000 acres. In 1952, the land was covered with lantana and sage bush to a height of seven to eight feet. It was not used by the Masai owing to the high bush. By 1957, we were producing £50,000 wheat, £15,000 barley and £15,000 pyrethrum and using a labour force of 400. The total capital invested amounts to £200,000." 32

Mpwapwa, Central province

"I obtained a right of occupancy over 2,000 acres near Mpwapwa. Although half the land turned out to be unusable bush on a rocky hillside there was a permanent water supply. On irrigated land I was able to grow, on 50 acres, papain, chillies, vegetables, maize, sorghum and castor. Successive droughts ruined crops planted elsewhere on the farm. After four years, during which time my annual loss averaged £2,000, I gave up and the farm was taken over by the Land Bank and re-let to a previous owner." 33

Between these extremes, there was a great variety of less spectacular achievements. As a general rule, where the climate permitted the growing of perennial crops, estate farming was assured of success and investment and development followed. In terms of increased production, of both cereals for home consumption and cash crops for export, the decision to permit new alienations after 1945 seemed amply justified. Although sisal remained the mainstay of the economy and provided the major share of the total contribution to production made by the non-African sector, it was believed necessary to diversify and encourage other less lucrative forms of commercial farming. After 1945 little support for the 'contact' theory was heard. Nevertheless, with an increased number of Africans now interested in obtaining a regular wage, there was the undiminished advantage in the scattered nature of

alienations whereby employment opportunities were available for those who wanted to remain living in their own tribal community. All the same, it was the development of a few crops, described below, which provided a rebuttal to the political objections to the non-African agricultural sector.

Sisal: 1945-1961

The period under review included the golden age of the sisal industry. During the six years following the War there was a dramatic increase in output and profitability which in turn encouraged further investment and provided added revenue for the Territory. The expansion which took place after 1945 can be judged from the details given in Appendix xiii.

The sharp increase in value of the exported crop was partly due to the higher-than-expected world demand and partly the result of the devaluation of the pound in 1949. Soon afterwards a further fillip to prices appeared as a consequence of the Korean war and the unexpected delay in restoring production on the Indonesian estates. More land and more investment were needed in order to make the most of a favourable opportunity which was not expected to last long. The first requirement was met by the government in that suitable land was made available where possible. During the period 1951-1956 the area planted with sisal for the first time was almost equal to that being cleared and replanted (see Appendix xiii); the increased acreage of sisal amounted to a major change in the landscape in those areas where estates were concentrated.

The second requirement, increased investment, was also available to pay for new planting and for new machinery. In view of the history of the industry, investment usually had to be funded from profits and its extent was dependent on past success. During the critical post-war period when investment decisions had to be taken, the profitability of the industry might have been higher if the growers had been released from the bulk purchase contract they had concluded with the British Ministry of Supply. Nevertheless, it must not be assumed that this agreement was responsible for limiting investment in the industry at this time of rising world prices. The agreement selling price was raised three times between 1946 and 1948, making it roughly comparable with ruling world prices; moreover, since no one could foresee the events which caused the sudden rise in world price, it is not at all certain that investment on a larger scale would have taken place or whether it would have been practicable.

The government derived much benefit from the years of profitability and, inevitably, it was suggested that it might have taken more.<sup>34</sup> Appendix xiii gives details of the percentage of profits paid in taxes by the leading estates; during the best years, 1950-1953, an export tax was also levied and the additional revenue from this source amounted to £2.5 million. Since it was known that planting on a substantial scale was taking place in Brazil, a heavier tax burden would almost certainly have reduced the amount of new planting. As it was, there were several other factors which placed a restraint on

over-ambitious planting plans. First, there was always the possibility that with all the other development projects being undertaken, there would be a shortage of unskilled labour. An unexpected factor, the Groundnut Scheme had intruded since the Central Development Committee had so confidently predicted that there would be no shortage after the War and much of the potential supply of labour was attracted to the three areas made available for the Overseas Food Corporation. Furthermore, the daily task performed by the unskilled labourer had diminished and for a labour-intensive industry the effects were significant.<sup>35</sup>

Remedial measures were two-fold and both eventually proved successful: recruiting became better organized with the creation of the Growers own agency (SILABU) and mechanization measures supplanted some of the work done by hand. Tractors were used for ripping up old plantings preparatory to their being ploughed into the soil and mechanized weeding processes were adopted. These latter measures were only possible with new planting when the double-row lay-out was followed enabling a tractor to pass between the wider rows. But cutting still had to be done by hand and the sisal when cut had to be carried to the nearest collecting point. Nevertheless, the effects of limited mechanization were considerable; as the figures in Appendix xiii make clear, with barely any addition to the number of adult males employed during the post war period, an 85% increase in crop production was possible.<sup>36</sup>


The second factor causing restrictions on output was the effect of the loss of soil fertility. Although,

as stated above, sisal flourishes on poor soils, it was appreciated that plants on exhausted soils soon led to declining yields and deficiency diseases. With land alienation increasingly becoming a political issue it became progressively more difficult for estates to obtain permission to extend their boundaries and bring new land under cultivation. However, only some estates were adversely affected; the majority had sufficient reserves of fallow or unplanted land for use when required. A summary of the planting achievements during the years of expansion is provided in Appendix xiii.

The third factor has already been mentioned elsewhere, the fact that the location of the industry depended on communications with the outside world. Although the government assumed that better roads and new railways would lead to the planting of sisal in new areas, during the colonial period the demand for land for sisal was determined by accessibility to the ports of Tanga, Dar es Salaam, Lindi and Mtwara.<sup>37</sup> In spite of increased planting in Eastern province in places served by the Central Line, Tanga remained the home of the industry and the greatest concentration of estates was to be found within forty miles of that town. The location of the estates throughout the Territory can be judged from the relevant Table in Appendix xiii.

Sisal was not only the most valuable export from the Territory during the period under review; it also made Tanganyika the largest producer of the fibre in the World. Ownership of the industry remained diffuse, being in the

# TANGANYIKA RAILWAYS AND ALIENATED LAND 1948



hands of Greeks (32%), British (31%), Asians (24%) and nationals of at least four other states. Unlike the sisal industry in Brazil it was not a smallholders enterprise but at the same time it never grew into a typical plantation industry whereby privately-owned estates were gradually taken over by companies financed by public subscription. It remained a heavily capitalised, somewhat speculative enterprise, success being dependent on the demand for two insignificant commodities, binder twine and baler twine.

#### Other crops from estates and plantations

Although sisal retained its leading position throughout the colonial period, the more important of the other crops produced on estates also require mention.

In the case of coffee, the total production from estates increased steadily after 1950 as a consequence of investment in new planting. In 1954, most of the 242 estates selling their crop through T.C.G.A. were in private ownership. At this time good quality beans fetched high prices and the larger and better-managed estates were making high profits. Even the average sized estate with 100 acres of mature bushes was able to show a net profit of between £1500 and £2000 per annum (see Appendix ix). Nevertheless, there was some reduction in investment in owner-operated estates during the period of uncertainty before independence; at the same time overhead irrigation, which required a heavy capital outlay, was tried and found

successful. It was not long before a number of estate owners were following suit and a substantial increase in production resulted. By the end of the colonial period the estates were producing about one quarter of the total of mild (arabica) coffee exported and were utilizing 18,470 acres of land for this purpose.<sup>38</sup> As a crop it remained fairly labour-intensive and only moderately capital intensive. It therefore was well suited to production by the individual settler-farmer and not unexpectedly most of the coffee estates were to be found in Northern province, the centre of European political activity.

Tea was a plantation crop which remained entirely in non-African hands until the end of the colonial period. The crop was grown in four areas: the Usambaras, Mufindi, Tukuyu and Uwemba-Lupembe. Some estates were owned and managed by individual settlers, often with the business registered as a private company; either they accepted the risk involved in the expense of erecting their own factory or they arranged to sell their leaf to a larger concern. The largest organization, the Tanganyika Tea Company, owned estates in Tukuyu and Mufindi and processed their leaf in three factories.<sup>39</sup> The company had managed the Mufindi estates for the Custodian of Enemy Property during the War and was subsequently able to gain control of them when the time came for their disposal. With the ending of the pre-War quota system a rapid expansion of the estates took place particularly in the Usambaras. In Mufindi and Tukuyu, expansion was limited to utilising the land already alienated

in view of the strong demand for land by Africans in the neighbourhood of the estates. This restriction was of particular importance in Mufindi, for only about a half of the land in the company's possession was climatically suitable for growing tea; the mists (nyahenge) which provided for much of the year the moisture for the tea bushes was prevalent only in a very localised area. The fact that much of their land was of no value for tea growing caused no concern to the company; forest plantations were needed to provide wood fuel for the two factories when other supplies were exhausted and grass lands were required for the herds which were kept to supply labourers' rations. Nevertheless, the knowledge that land was not being utilized for the prime activity of the company made it difficult to convince African opinion that it was necessary for such a large area of good land to be retained by a foreign company.<sup>40</sup>

Although the government attempted to introduce an African smallholders scheme there were several major obstacles. Not only was it difficult to provide the tea producers with adequate guarantees that leaf would be supplied to them regularly in due course, without which they were reluctant to invest in new equipment to process large amounts; also they feared that they would be buying their own leaf, picked at night on their more isolated estates. Thus, when the local nationalists looked for situations which could be exploited to their advantage, the tea industry was particularly vulnerable; not only did it seem that Africans were prevented from participating

(in Kenya a smallholders scheme was already in existence) but also all the higher managerial posts were held by Europeans. In the case of this crop, in spite of the value of the product the amount of land actually directly utilised was very limited; by 1959, the total area planted with tea was only 15,334 acres, of which 7,475 acres could be termed 'mature', 3,575 acres semi-mature and 4,284 acres immature. The industry was a good example of the skilful exploitation of the natural resources by a small group of dedicated experts with little interest in, or understanding of the political undertones of the situation they were creating.

Sugar was another crop with which non-African enterprise made an important contribution to the economy. The government kept a firm control over the industry with the aim of securing for producers a fair return on the capital they expended. Being more capital intensive than tea it was a typical plantation crop and one which did not readily lend itself to an arrangement allowing smallholder participation. It was not only that high standards of cultivation were required: also, cropping had to be carefully planned in order to produce a regular supply of cane for the factory. Until the end of the period under review the main producer was the Tanganyika Planting Company near Moshi. Production was maintained and expanded by making use of the Pangani river to supplement the inadequate annual rainfall. In addition to this company there were a number of small plantations producing jaggery for a local market. Most of these were in Eastern province and the remainder in Lake province.

In 1946 it was thought to be enough if the existing company undertook to increase production. In return, the government agreed to control imports and to organize the marketing of the crop. Further planting on a substantial scale took place on the estate and production increased accordingly. However, it was never anticipated that demand would rise even faster, from 8.4 lbs. per caput in 1953 to 13.5 lbs. in 1962. This increase led to an even larger shortfall in production and the monopoly of the existing estate had to be ended.<sup>41</sup> Eventually, some 13,000 acres were alienated for cane production near Missenye (West Lake province), a decision which aroused opposition from local political leaders.<sup>42</sup> Elsewhere, several river valleys were investigated, but the flood danger was the limiting factor until adequate data could be collected. In the end a site in the Kilombero valley was selected for a major project, with the aim of making the Territory self-sufficient within a few years.

The development of tobacco farming in the Territory provided an example of how different racial groups became associated with different methods of producing the same commodity. Whereas flue-cured tobacco, first Ehlers and later Virginia, was grown by the settler-farmer, both fire-cured and coil tobacco were regarded as 'African' crops. It was only after the failure of the groundnuts scheme that the cleared land at Urambo provided an opportunity to organize the production of flue-cured tobacco by both European and African tenant farmers. Until then, Iringa was the sole area of the flue-cured industry. The element of risk was always present and

the industry was beset with difficulties, both financial and technical. Although things improved after the growers union took over the marketing arrangements in 1949, the sale of the crop was always difficult until the change-over to growing Virginia was accomplished in the mid-fifties.<sup>43</sup> The technical problems were two-fold. First, adequate measures to prevent soil deterioration were seldom taken; most of the growers were of Greek origin, many of them anxious to obtain a quick return in order to invest the profit in commercial enterprises. Their attitude was compounded by a government policy of alienating areas of land to them which were often far too small to prevent suitable land being over-utilised.<sup>44</sup> Consequently, in spite of protests from Agricultural Officers, the practice of 'tobacco-mining' continued. Second, the expansion of the industry was restricted by a shortage of wood fuel, needed in quantity for the curing process. Eventually, growers were required by law to plant their own fuel reserves, a measure which provided no short-term solution. The total amount of production remained steady, limited by the technical factors, the quota which could be accepted by the East African Tobacco Company and the uncertain prospects of selling in a highly competitive world market.

In the preceding chapter it was observed that the commercial production of cereals became increasingly necessary to match the growing population and many settlers were persuaded to meet this need by the cultivation of wheat and maize. From data collected in 1958, it is evident that a much larger proportion of land on estates

was used for growing cereals, particularly maize, than for any other crop excepting sisal.<sup>45</sup>

Wheat production was never enough to satisfy local demand and wheat flour was regularly imported from Kenya.<sup>46</sup> The area in the Territory where wheat could be successfully grown was limited, since it only thrived at altitudes exceeding 4,000 feet. Crops grown in the most favourable areas, West Kilimanjaro and Oldeani, were subject to stem rusts and settlers growing the crop in Iringa district usually obtained totally uneconomic yields. A certain amount was grown by Africans, but yields were low and the total amount they produced amounted to about one-tenth of that obtained from the non-African sector. One curious ecological effect of growing wheat on a large scale in Northern province was the recurring problem of crop depredation by the Sudan Dioch (quelea quelea). After feeding on grain, these tiny birds are able to multiply rapidly and whereas the African farmer could make use of children to drive them off his shamba, there was no way of ejecting them from a large field of grain. Thus large scale cultivation in this instance introduced a problem almost as serious as the locust menace before the War. Some of the flocks were estimated to number over two million birds and an idea of the damage they could do can be gauged from the fact that a million birds could eat the equivalent of 650 bags of wheat in a day. The remedy, to attack them either when they were roosting or when they settled in their breeding grounds, required great ingenuity.<sup>47</sup>

Many settlers grew maize as a cash crop and it will be remembered that one of the reasons advanced for alienating more land was the need to encourage the commercial production of cereals; it was only by government action that it was possible to change the situation whereby the Territory was dependent on imports of maize for four years out of five. The Crops (Increased Production) Ordinance, a wartime measure, remained in force afterwards and its provisions continued to be administered by District Production Committees, composed of settlers and officials. A system of guaranteed minimum returns encouraged settlers to cultivate maize on marginal land. Maize, like rice, had to be sold to the Grain Storage Department at a fixed price and the Department arranged for reserves to be stored in various parts of the Territory. The aim was not merely self-sufficiency; it was intended to produce an exportable surplus in most years. In 1955, when this seemed assured, the guaranteed return arrangement was ended; for a short time a support price system was adopted to cushion the effect of the change. In the Agricultural Department Annual Report for 1955 it was admitted that the guaranteed price arrangement 'came to be used, quite unintentionally, as a basis for granting short term credit'. In that year £70,000 was paid out to farmers in this way.

With increased production and with the ending of the fixed price, the profit margin to maize growers dropped by 25 per cent.<sup>48</sup> However it continued to be a popular crop with settlers and in 1958 a quarter of the non-African

farmers of Eastern and Northern provinces claimed that growing cereals, which in most cases meant maize, was their predominant farming activity.<sup>49</sup> Until 1953, and perhaps for some time afterwards, this relatively small number of non-African farmers were producing 40 per cent of the marketed maize.<sup>50</sup> As a crop it was moderately capital-intensive, since to obtain good yields a higher outlay on fertiliser is necessary than in the case of soya or sorghum. But it is not particularly labour-intensive and the total labour required was at the time found to be about one third of that needed for a similar area of groundnuts. When grown in quantity, the principal problem, as with sisal, was the means of moving the crop; thus the presence of a large local market was often a powerful stimulus to production.<sup>51</sup>

Finally, many of the European and Asian farmers kept cattle, either as a primary source of income or as a means of supplementing income from crops. Ranching seemed to become more popular after 1955 and the majority of grants of land for this purpose occurred after that year. Some indication of the importance of ranching can be gained from the 1958 census figures which show that of the 898 respondents to the questionnaire, 391 kept herds of cattle.<sup>52</sup> Certainly animal husbandry badly needed improving in the Territory and there was little hope of this happening while the majority of African cattle owners kept their stock for prestige and social purposes. In spite of the increased ranching activity after 1955, the World Bank Mission estimated that in 1959 a further 60,000

head of cattle were needed annually to replace imports of slaughter cattle from Kenya.<sup>53</sup> At the same time as ranching activity increased, dairy farming also became important. In the Arusha-Moshi area some eighty European owned farms produced milk in quantity, the collection and sale being arranged by the Tanganyika Farmers Association. A similar organization started in Iringa district, but it was never as successful as the Northern province scheme.

In terms of land usage, pastoral farming by non-Africans had two important implications. First, in the case of ranching, large areas of land had to be made available; it was only by intelligent pasture management that the carrying capacity of the land could be increased. Thus by the end of the period, over a quarter of the alienated land was being used as pasture. Second, since ranching was usually confined to areas unsuitable for arable farming, the government could rebut with confidence the often repeated allegation that the more fertile areas were selected for alienation to non-Africans.<sup>54</sup> The 1957 Visiting Mission attempted to distinguish alienation of arable and pastoral land respectively with the following figures:

'The total amount of alienated land ... represents approximately 1.6 per cent of the total land available and suitable for agricultural and pastoral purposes; it represents just under 4 per cent of the total land being used for both arable and pastoral purposes; and the alienated arable land represents about 5 per cent of the total land being used for arable purposes at the present time.'<sup>55</sup>

Acknowledging the contribution made by the settlers, the same Mission feared that the government was

still not taking seriously the dangers caused by the 'explosive' issue of alienation. It suggested that in future when alienation was necessary for economic development, preference should be given to large companies with which Africans living in the vicinity of their operations could be associated.<sup>56</sup> The facile assumption that there were plenty of private investors anxious to operate in the Territory bears little relation to fact.<sup>57</sup> But at least the comment indicated that a distinction was now being drawn between the settler's farm and the plantation. Within the Territory the importance of plantation agriculture had been an accepted fact since Cameron's time and with the approach of independence it became increasingly apparent that this was the only part of the non-African agricultural sector which was likely to be allowed to expand in the future.<sup>58</sup>

Both the Royal Commission and the World Bank Mission recognized the importance of the non-African sector to the economy.<sup>59</sup> Neither report suggests that there was any significant opportunity cost involved insofar as land usage was concerned. From the foregoing description it is clear that not all land occupied by the immigrant races was effectively utilized. But where conditions were favourable for growing perennial crops the occupiers usually made the best possible use of the situation and produced more than would have been possible if their land had been divided into smallholdings. As a general rule, where alienated land was insufficiently developed, there was no land shortage in the adjacent African areas.<sup>60</sup> In some instances the Land Regulations might have been invoked to ensure that development took place; but in doing so caution was necessary,

since there was little point in revoking a Right of Occupancy unless it was certain that others could make better use of the land.

When independence became certain, a number of the less developed estates in the more marginal areas were abandoned by their owners if no purchasers could be found; in the Land Bank annual report for 1960 it was observed that farms in Northern province and in the Mufindi area were changing hands at very low prices. There followed a substantial reduction in the number of Europeans engaged in farming (1563 in 1958 and 1105 in 1963) and an accompanying reduction in the employment of agricultural labour. Nevertheless, there was no reduction in the aggregate amount of investment in commercial farming and during this period there was a substantial increase in the acreage under cultivation on alienated land, mainly due to increased production of wheat, sugar and seed beans.<sup>61</sup> For the first few years after independence the non-African sector managed to continue as before.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1. East Africa and Rhodesia, editorial, dated 4 April 1946; also TLC 7 March 1946.
2. Some 36,000 acres were returned to German nationals and 21,000 acres reverted to tribal control, VMR 1951, p. 24.
3. German Properties Disposal Ordinance 1948.
4. TLC 19 sess., pp. 16, 17.
5. TLC 20 sess., pp. 127, 128.
6. The Board consisted of six officials, three non-officials and an Asian Executive Officer.
7. Land Settlement Pamphlets Nos. 1-4 (Dar es Salaam 1948).
8. TCOR 4th sess. supp. No.3.
9. Ibid., pp. 95, 96.
10. The Mission received complaints about further alienation from the African Association, Northern province and the Tanga District Council.
11. TCOR 4 sess., p. 296.
12. Memo. Hinden to Creech Jones (Creech Jones Papers).
13. FCB letter dated 29th June 1950 (FCB(50)4).
14. Land Settlement Division AR 1950.
15. TLC 25 sess., 1950, p. 9; Sir Edward (later Lord) Twining (1881-1966) Governor, 1949-58.
16. Land Settlement Division AR 1951.
17. TLC 26 sess., 1951, p. 16.
18. Land Bank AR's provide details.
19. VMR 1954, p. 90.
20. TLC 24 sess., p. 23.
21. Collated from annual reports, Land Settlement Division, Department of Lands and Surveys.
22. EARC Report, op.cit., p. 22.
23. Government Circular No.4 of 1953, p. 2.

24. From the Chesham papers, by courtesy of Mr.A. Ross.
25. Circular 4/53, op.cit.
26. Land (Amendment) Ordinance 1950.
27. See explanation of E.C. Phillips, himself a member of the L.S.B. TLC 24 sess., p. 119.
28. See post, p. 395
29. Filed in Creech Jones papers.
30. VMR 1957, p. 97.
31. Details given in Tanganyika ARs.
32. Letter, Ol Molog farmers to Ambassador Max D'Orsinville, Chairman, 1957 Visiting Mission, copied to Capricorn Office CAS 11/62.
33. Personal communication from an ex-farmer.
34. VMR 1951, p. 24.
35. G. St.J.Orde-Browne, Labour Conditions in East Africa (Col. 193: London 1946), pp.17, 18.
36. In part compensated by employing females and juveniles for the lighter tasks (17,000 in 1960).
37. By 1955, the port of Mtwara, primarily intended for handling OFC groundnuts, had supplanted Mikindani.
38. Agricultural Census 1958 (Dar es Salaam 1958).
39. Shortly before independence the company was taken over by Brooke Bond (EA) Ltd.
40. A matter frequently raised at barazas I attended, 1956/57.
41. In 1953 production was 10,708 tons, leaving a shortfall of 19,745 tons; in 1962, production was 36,880 tons, a shortfall of 20,824 tons. (source: E.A. Common Services Organization).
42. VMR 1957, p. 27 and p. 96; TANU, Bukoba objected to the project.
43. In 1958, the Iringa estates produced 2.7 million lbs. valued at £400,000.
44. Several of the estates south of Iringa township were less than 350 acres in size.

45. Agricultural Census, op.cit., p. 11.
46. E.g., in 1958, a typical year, more than £ $\frac{1}{2}$  million of wheat flour was imported from Kenya.
47. See 'Control of the Sudan Dioch', J.W. Haylock and H.H. Disney in E.A. Agricultural Journal XXI, p. 210; the most effective method of control was to destroy the nesting areas by using gelignite attached to drums of petrol.
48. This occurred in 1956, embarrassing the struggling TAC scheme at Nachingwea; see R.F. Lord, Economic Aspects of Mechanised Farming at Nachingwea (London 1963), p. 43.
49. Agricultural Census, op.cit., p. 12.
50. Hill and Moffett, op.cit., p. 11.
51. E.g., maize was produced in quantity in Handeni district as soon as it was confirmed that neighbouring sisal estates would be willing buyers.
52. Agricultural Census, op.cit., p. 16; about half the herds were larger than 50 head of cattle.
53. WBR, p. 145; the Mission estimated imports to be valued at at least £ $\frac{1}{2}$  million.
54. If an area was both accessible and fertile it would usually be occupied; since those in occupation would have to be compensated before alienation was approved, applicants for land tended to ask for sparsely populated areas.
55. VMR, 1957, pp. 29, 30.
56. The Bena Wattle Scheme (see Chapter IX) provided an example.
57. Borne out by the fact that tax incentives to attract capital were considered necessary; see also WBR pp. 244, 245 on this point.
58. See A.M. O'Connor, An Economic Geography of East Africa (London 1966), pp. 22, 23, for contrasting attitudes to plantation agriculture found elsewhere in East Africa.
59. EARC Report, p. 30; WBR, p. 16.
60. E.g. the Sao Hill area of Iringa district; very few of the Chesham estates ever fulfilled their development obligations but adjacent African-occupied land was sparsely populated.
61. Agricultural Census 1958 op.cit., and Census of Large Scale Commercial Farming in Tanganyika, October 1962 (Dar es Salaam 1963)

CHAPTER IXCHANGE IN THE AFRICAN SECTORIntroduction

The successive Colonial Secretaries of the Labour government of 1945 may have started with doubts over the wisdom of supporting expansion in the non-African agricultural sector. Nevertheless, once they had accepted the arguments in favour of such a policy, they were positive enough in defending it. At the same time it was repeatedly made clear to the Tanganyika government that resources and effort had to be directed toward improving the African sector. The various schemes and items in the Development Plan indicate the way it was thought that improvement was possible. As recruitment proceeded after the war and as more officers became available for field work, the means to implement the plans became available.

The three major objectives in the African sector after 1945 were as follows. First, in view of the fears of a food shortage, to insist that farmers could supply their own needs. Second, where it was practicable, they were to be encouraged to grow suitable cash crops, in order to overcome all the disadvantages associated with a subsistence economy. Third, in achieving these two objectives measures had to be found to protect the fertility of the soils found in the Territory which for the most part were vulnerable to bad treatment. Moreover, improvement

measures had to be adopted in those areas where soil erosion was already making even subsistence farming difficult.

To achieve these aims there was an unknown amount of good land which could be made productive and there was a reserve of labour which was under-employed. The main instrument for making use of these was the Department of Agriculture, through the research and extension services it was able to provide. A large increase in staff was necessary and recruitment and training took time; however the numbers employed rose steadily, the total number of personnel in the five major grades increasing from 883 in 1950 to 2,257 in 1960.<sup>1</sup>

But the other 'natural resources' departments were also fully involved and, as marketing produce became more important, so did the Department of Co-operative Development. District and provincial 'teams' were introduced under the chairmanship of the senior administrative officer in order to co-ordinate development plans. The role of the district commissioner changed perceptibly; although his responsibility for law and order remained, less of his time was now spent on tax collection and more on co-ordinating departmental activities. This required his attendance at an ever-increasing number of committees as well as devoting time to the supervision of more ambitious development plans being undertaken by his native authority.

#### Improving peasant agriculture

The short-comings of traditional farming practices

were well known and have been frequently described. They were summarised in the World Bank Mission Report as follows:

- primitive methods and resistance to change
- lack of managerial ability
- poor equipment and lack of capital
- no interest in economic incentives
- restrictions imposed by customary land tenure.<sup>2</sup>

The interesting point about this summary is that it was written at the end of the colonial period after fifteen years of intensive effort to improve the existing system. Was, therefore, any worthwhile progress ever achieved, or ever believed to be attainable? Although accurate figures cannot be obtained, it would seem that the subsistence sector represented about 59 per cent of the total agricultural production throughout the period and there was little to suggest that its share would diminish unless new policies were adopted.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, there was a steady increase in the value and quantity of cash crops produced by African farmers throughout the last decade of the colonial period (see Table XV). It was argued that the growing popularity of cash crops would have a demonstration effect and furthermore with the rapid increase in opportunities for education there would be a greater demand for consumer goods. In some areas it was evident that people wanted better homes, constructed with permanent materials. Elsewhere money was needed as never before to pay taxes, to contribute to paying school fees of relatives and to buy cattle for prestige and social purposes.

Increased production of cash crops did not lead

to an appreciable increase in the total acreage cultivated; it has been estimated that during the period 1945-1960, this rose by 900,000 acres in the African sector, about half an acre per taxpayer.<sup>4</sup> It has been suggested that in Sukumaland the amount of land cultivated by the average household actually declined, from 6.66 acres to 5.7 acres.<sup>5</sup> This is somewhat surprising in view of the increase in the use of tractors and ox-ploughs; it can be explained by the fact that the subsequent weeding is not reduced by the use of ploughs and in fact sometimes is increased.

A combination of factors can explain the rapid increase in cotton production in Sukumaland after 1945 and can be summarised as follows. A rapidly increasing rural population; a growing awareness of the need for cash; new and more fertile land becoming available; better agricultural practices once effective supervision was organized; the provision, after years of research at the cotton experimental station at Ukiriguru, of a seed suitable for local conditions; finally, a mobilization of effort stemming from the co-operative movement. Elsewhere, it was found that there was little enthusiasm for innovation; those who were responsible for extension policy knew that to reform peasant farming methods a social revolution was necessary and this was unlikely to occur within the context of the existing political structure. In this respect the Territory was no different from other British-administered lands in Africa, a fact recognized by the Colonial Office when regional research into the problem was organized.<sup>6</sup>

If the rise in output created optimism, there was no cause for complacency. With the lack of consumer goods during the war years, production of cash crops had fallen and comparisons with 1945/46 figures were bound to show some improvement. But the doubt remained that rural incomes for the majority of peasant farmers would never match urban wages or even those which could be earned working on an estate. In the banana-growing areas, four acres under cultivation could sustain seven persons, produce enough finger-millet for social occasions and provide an annual income from a cash crop; in Sukumaland, six acres under cultivation could provide a similar standard of living, although with less certainty. In the case of the former, there would be no available land for extending the cultivated area; in Sukumaland, an increased acreage planted would, in the more densely populated areas, lead to a reduction in the amount of land in fallow. Until adequate use of fertilisers became common practice, this could be counter-productive.<sup>7</sup> Elsewhere, soil regeneration took even longer and the long resting period required for the poorer soils was a substantial discouragement when farmers contemplated planting larger acreages. The damage to the land caused by the increased productivity drive, launched during the Depression, had provided a lesson which could not be ignored. To avoid any repetition, time was needed for experiment and planning, as well as for winning collaboration from that section of the community most suspicious of change.

With so much of the Territory's land area under-

utilized, some planned movement to uninhabited areas was possible. The choices open to the planners were as follows: either families were to be persuaded to move to a designated area where they would continue to cultivate as in the past or else they could be offered new land on condition that they became participants in schemes in which they were required to accept a certain amount of direction. But the chances of Group farming schemes succeeding always seemed in doubt; the pre-war experiment at Kingolwira had collapsed and the participants had returned to their own communities; more recent examples of Group farming in Northern Rhodesia and Kenya gave no cause for encouragement. Nevertheless, the search continued for an adequate substitute for peasant farming in the traditional manner and the Royal Commission was able to give a cautious welcome to the efforts of the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation (TAC) described in more detail in the following chapter.

The post-war policy for the development of the African sector can be discerned as falling into two distinct phases. At first, there was a concentration of effort on provincial schemes, aimed at the conservation and rehabilitation of soil conditions in selected localities. The plans for these were based on the recommendations of the Central Development Committee and pre-War reports; the expenditure estimated to be necessary for them is described in the Ten-Year Development Plan and the revision published in 1950. In most of the schemes (some of the more important are described in the following paragraph), the major policies adopted were to introduce rules to prevent

further deterioration of the land and to settle elsewhere some of the population of the over-crowded areas. Once these objectives were attained, it was intended to concentrate on increasing productivity.

The second phase began in 1956. Officials in the Department of Agriculture headquarters were well aware of the unpopularity incurred by their field staff in enforcing regulations. They were, therefore, receptive to the idea that a 'focal point approach' should be adopted, with staff concentrated in those areas found to be receptive to advice. At the same time the African members of Legislative Council, anxious to see an increase in revenues in order to improve the social services, submitted a list of projects which would lead to increased productivity. Many of these suggestions were implemented and a re-deployment of staff took place. As a consequence of the policies followed in both phases some significant changes in the landscape occurred.

#### Phase one: the provincial schemes

In order to achieve the aims described above, it was necessary to provide inducements in the form of services, water supplies, roads and new land. Plans therefore had to be prepared on an integrated basis, involving a number of different government departments. With the exception of the Mbulu scheme, which was partly financed by C.D. and W. funds, all the provincial schemes were financed from the Agricultural Development Fund, supplemented by funds from

the native treasuries of the district or districts in which the plans were implemented.

(i) The Sukumaland development scheme. The five administrative districts known as Sukumaland were the scene of the colonial government's most ambitious project for rehabilitation and resettlement.<sup>8</sup> Even before the War, it was a matter for concern that as the human and cattle population rose so had the fertility of the soil decreased. The main proposals embodied in the scheme can be summarised thus: to prevent further loss of soil fertility; to introduce improved agricultural methods; to encourage increased production of both food and cash crops; to introduce livestock control; finally, to transfer some of the population from the overcrowded areas. Since these proposals required the co-operation of officials and native authorities in a number of districts, a re-organization of existing political structures was also necessary. Although during the nineteen-thirties a political federation of Sukuma chiefs had been proposed, no real progress had been made. After the War, Donald Malcolm, an administrative officer who had previously made a detailed study of the area, was given the task of constructing the political and administrative framework which would sustain the development programme. Recognizing that radical changes in traditional practices could never be achieved by the edicts of a colonial administration, he sought to make full use of the authority and prestige of the Sukuma chiefs. All the chiefs in the five districts were made members of a federal council which deliberated and

introduced the legislation considered necessary. The council of chiefs would be expected to accept responsibility for policies and every member would have to explain the decisions taken when he returned home. The chiefs would be advised as to the best course of action by a team of specialists who became resident at Malya, the new headquarters of the development scheme.

But although the Sukuma chief enjoyed more prestige than most of his counterparts elsewhere in the Territory, it was in nobody's interest that he should appear to be the mouthpiece of the government. There was, therefore, a need for popular representatives to take a share of the responsibility for policies and it was painfully clear that the democratic element in the council was inadequate. Although each chiefdom sent 'councillors' they were usually nominated by the chief and often related to him. The allowances paid for attendance at meetings were generous and the duty was therefore a popular one. Hans Cory, a government sociologist, was asked to find an answer to the problem. His solution rejected Cameron's philosophy of building on 'native institutions' and instead was based on, as he explained it, 'the necessity for complete emancipation from traditional institutions'.<sup>9</sup> He proposed the creation of an elaborate system of parish, sub-chiefdom and chiefdom councils. The parish councils at the base of the pyramid consisted of members chosen by direct elections. Elections were conducted in a rough and ready manner but the councillors usually represented the popular choice at the time.<sup>10</sup> The difficulty was to

sustain a popular interest in the councils once the excitement of the elections was over.

But it was soon apparent that there was a world of difference between recognizing the existence of real representatives and persuading them to share in the responsibility for irksome regulations. It needed the framework of party organization to sell the new policies and ironically, when parties did appear the new leaders found it good tactics to oppose rather than support the measures for the improvement of the land. Rules unfairly applied led to grievances and both the T.A.A. and the Sukuma Union flourished on the discontent which the government seemed unable to remedy.<sup>11</sup>

This, of course, is obvious with the advantage of hindsight. At the time the only obvious facts were the deterioration of the soil, the patent need for culling and the opportunity, with more funds and staff than ever before, to do something about the problems. Norman Rounce, an experienced and energetic Agricultural Officer, was responsible for working out the details of the plans for improvement. The remedies he advocated were in two categories. First, there were the indirect measures; a large number of Agricultural Instructors were to be trained, the native authorities were to be converted and school teachers were to instruct in new techniques in both primary and secondary schools. Direct measures he proposed included providing water points, re-settlement, soil conservation rules and 'the rational utilization of stock products'.<sup>12</sup> By the last-mentioned measure he expected

more than a culling programme to reduce the ever-increasing herds; he was anxious to see the use of manure on the land, now made necessary as shifting cultivation became less possible. Although Rounce, like most other officials would have preferred to rely on persuasion in the task of reform, he was adamant in insisting that compulsion was justified.<sup>13</sup> A plethora of rules and orders followed, restricting many customary activities in order to protect the countryside. The Instructors were unable to enforce so many regulations with any degree of uniformity; the fact that some offenders were prosecuted while neighbouring farmers equally at fault were left alone gave rise to rumours of corruption. There was even less uncertainty about the resentment caused by arrogant and threatening behaviour and some native authorities feared that unless there was a change of policy organized opposition to chiefs and government would grow rapidly.<sup>14</sup> The compulsory de-stocking regulations were even more unpopular and the gulf between African and European seemed unbridgeable. While the ownership of cattle maintained such a powerful social significance there was no possibility of mutual understanding and even the most loyal native authorities were not prepared to support the government proposals for the reduction of herds. When the Deputy Provincial Commissioner explained to the Maswa native authorities that they were free to choose the actual number of cattle in the district which had to be offered for sale provided they accepted responsibility for the decision he was told that 'if he was the government it was his duty to give an order.'<sup>15</sup> This is what happened, for

there seemed little chance that the solution would again be provided for the government by natural causes; the prolonged drought in 1949-50 which had caused the death of 600,000 head of cattle was never a disaster in the eyes of the conservationists.<sup>16</sup>

As African reaction to the various regulations became increasingly hostile and nationalism gained support, the authorities were made aware of the stick they were creating to beat their own backs. Twining, after paying a visit to Lake province in 1954, recorded that the Sukumaland scheme was a classic example of how not to do things:

'It has undoubtedly done a great deal of good, but it has never been properly put across to the people who, as far as I can make out, cooperate only to the minimum and then with reluctance...'<sup>17</sup>

Although in the light of four years of disturbances which followed, there is much truth in this observation, nevertheless it is difficult to believe that any amount of explanation would have convinced the Sukuma peasant that the three major evils - destocking, cattle tax and cotton cess - had to be patiently endured. The remedies, Twining suggested, were development committees and better public relations; in the particular circumstances of the time these were hardly likely to make any appreciable change. Instead, the will to enforce many of the regulations began to evaporate. By 1955 many of the cultivation rules were no longer enforced and for a time tie-ridging and manuring in particular were not practised. The de-stocking regulations were less rigorously applied than they should

have been in view of the damage being done to the land. In spite of the outcry against this unpopular regulation the cattle population between 1950 and 1954 rose by 40 per cent. But there was no dramatic about-turn in government policy because, coinciding with the less vigorous application of the rules, there was a progressive reduction in the importances of the Federal Council. In 1955 a policy of devolution was adopted; district councils had been established and the development plan was broken down into its component parts at district level. In the following financial year, 1956/57, the Sukumaland scheme officially came to an end.

Nevertheless, the pyramid of councils, constructed in order to obtain public support for the development policies, continued in existence. The many rules and regulations too were still there although they were becoming increasingly difficult to enforce. To the Provincial Commissioner, S.A. Walden, 1958 was 'the end of an era of paternalism.'<sup>18</sup> Describing the increasing opposition to government policies, he wrote:

'The upsurge of nationalism and the consuming desire of agitators to seize upon anything unpopular has led to widespread resentment being actively fostered against much salutary and worthwhile legislation. As a result the Sukumaland Federal Council decided at its meeting in November to cancel much of its natural resources legislation .... noticeable that those who led the agitation against cattle dipping and rinderpest inoculation were not cattle owners.'<sup>19</sup>

The Provincial Commissioner's comments were intended to draw attention to the irresponsibility of nationalist politicians. But they also made it clear that the

restrictions necessary to save the land could only be enforced by a government acceptable to the people.

The solid achievements of the Sukumaland scheme have always been overshadowed by the political events of the period. Nevertheless, much was accomplished. The land area utilised in 1945 was 8,000 square miles; by 1957, with the transfer of population to Geita district and the peripheral areas of Shinyanga and Maswa districts, the total land area used had increased to 13,000 square miles. Settlement had been successfully carried out in areas heavily infested with tsetse fly and sleeping sickness kept under control. A large number of dams, hafirs and bore-holes had been provided and in spite of the growing opposition to any form of government initiative, many of the anti-erosion measures were accepted and retained. Although these achievements would have led to some increase in cotton production the extent of the increase was largely due to the factors mentioned earlier. With the co-ordinated plan supervised by the team of experts based at Malya, the aim of increasing production without causing further damage to the land was largely satisfied. It was unfortunate that much of the extra money which went into the farmers' pockets was spent on acquiring cattle, which otherwise would have been slaughtered. Increased production provided the means to seek ways of further development; the Lint and Seed Marketing Board offered funds for experimenting with mechanical equipment and several local authorities attempted to run ploughing schemes.

On the other hand, the provincial administration

never won the overt support of the chiefs for the need to enforce the rules the experts required. It was clear to all that in Tanganyika, the principles of indirect rule were of limited application only. Second, the plan to win the support of a younger, better-educated generation also came to nothing. The school agricultural syllabus was too inflexible, there were too few trained teachers and there was a rapidly growing tradition that at school only academic achievement counted. Furthermore, better public relations advocated by Twining came too late to be effective in the battle for 'hearts and minds'. A few years later the newspaper 'Ukulima wa Kisasa' and the radio programmes on farming matters made a significant impact. Finally, there was no progress with the intractable problem of attitudes to the ownership of land; while grazing land was held in common, there was no reason to limit the number of cattle owned and while arable land had no value in itself there was no incentive to improve it or even plant fruit trees.<sup>20</sup> Cory describes the Sukuma chief as 'being responsible for the fertility of corn, cattle and mankind.'<sup>21</sup> Is the absence of 'soil' from this list not without significance?

(ii) The Uluguru Land Usage Scheme. The Uluguru mountain area, to the south of Morogoro had been the object of concern before the War.<sup>22</sup> In 1947, £50,000 had been allocated from the Agricultural Development Fund for remedial measures. A report by an Agricultural Officer is of interest because the problems he described were to

be found over and over again in East Africa at that time:

'The fertility of the land was rapidly destroyed due to the removal of the surface soil by sheet erosion... each family cultivated four or five times as much land as was necessary thirty years ago and cannot carry all the population at present living there... the Luguru are living at a level of marginal subsistence with an average cash income of shs. 70/- per annum.'<sup>23</sup>

The remedy prescribed was a reforestation programme and the construction of bench terraces to save what remained of the surface soil. But since land protected by terraces was not obviously more fertile than other land there was very little co-operation from the people. Nor could adequate support from the native authority be secured. Owing to the existence of a rival faction the chief's authority was limited. Consequently, rules to compel compliance were introduced; and these had to be enforced by Agricultural Instructors who, it was alleged, were far from incorruptible.

However, progress was made in tree planting and in establishing experimental plots with the object of finding a suitable permanent crop. Terracing remained unpopular and in 1953 a determined effort was made to secure support for the practice by an education programme. The official view of this effort was optimistic; it was confidently believed that 'the absence of serious opposition to the scheme can be directly ascribed to careful preparatory publicity in all three areas.'<sup>24</sup> This apparent harmony, if it ever existed, proved to be of short duration. With the founding of TANU in 1954 a more critical and united opposition to the scheme appeared. The ubiquitous Agricultural Instructors were the obvious targets of

criticism as they persisted, with threats and exhortation, to apply the terracing policy. There were demonstrations and one serious riot, the hillsides were deliberately fired and many terraces destroyed. Without co-operation there was no point in continuing and the scheme officially came to an end in mid 1959 without any change of heart being evident. The Provincial Commissioner had already pronounced the epitaph with the observation that 'after ten years hard work there is little result.'<sup>25</sup>

(iii) The Usambara-Pare schemes. Two other schemes, in the north-east corner of the Territory, are also of interest. The farming practised in the Usambara mountain area had caused concern for many years and after the War the first priority was aimed at the rehabilitation of the Mlalo Basin area. This was a relatively dry area of some 60 square miles; its problem was overcrowding and deteriorating soil conditions. From the start of the scheme in 1947, government officers were met with hostility and suspicion. This perhaps was not surprising, since the remedy consisted of introducing a number of restrictions which were bound to cause resentment. Cultivation on the steeper slopes was forbidden; the valleys were planted with elephant grass; the stall feeding of cattle was advocated and grazing of animals on hillsides was prohibited. As with the Uluguru scheme, the only way the measures might have been made acceptable was to obtain the active support of the chief. In this case this proved impossible; his authority turned out to be too fragile to survive the

tensions which were generated and he was forced to resign in favour of his son. The answer was to turn away from the traditional authority and establish a representative council. Unfortunately, by the time this was in being, opposition to the scheme was widespread.

But the scheme provided the government with experience which turned out to be useful when in 1950 the measures adopted were extended to apply to the whole Usambara area. The major aim of this larger scheme was to combine the introduction of better farming practices in the mountain areas with the transfer of some of the population to the relatively unoccupied plains below. To encourage a conservative people to co-operate, farmers were provided with a ploughing service at sub-economic prices as well as other social services.<sup>26</sup> Once again, it proved difficult to gain voluntary acceptance of the many regulations deemed necessary. Until 1955, official reports of progress were optimistic, in the belief that the peasant farmers of the area would eventually comply with the rules, either through force of habit or because improvement to soil conditions became obvious for all to see. Where there was opposition, it was discounted as being 'politically inspired'.<sup>27</sup> The Provincial Commissioners' reports for 1955 and for 1956 continued to give the impression that apart from the Korogwe division the scheme was accepted everywhere. However, in the following year it was reported that the penal sanctions in the conservation rules had been abandoned; and in the report for 1958 the following despairing observation was

made:

'..the removal of sanctions has left its mark on the countryside. Some of the steepest hillsides have been laid bare and there is hardly a tie-ridge to be seen outside the school shambas.'<sup>28</sup>

As with the majority of such schemes, in the tense political situation which developed shortly before independence, no government initiative was acceptable unless the material gains were obvious and immediate.

In the neighbouring Pare district, similar problems existed, but the method of dealing with them was different. Mindful of the hostile reaction to a graduated rate a few years before, the government decided to rely on persuasion only. Conservation measures were explained as a follow-up to a mass literacy programme and amounted to stall feeding of cattle, the planting of barrier hedges and the reafforestation of hill-tops. People were attracted to leave the mountain areas by a subsidised mechanical cultivation scheme established on the plains. With no enforcement measures at the behest of the government there were never the same opportunities of confrontation to be exploited by the 'situationists.'

#### Phase two: the productivity schemes

The change in policy, from an emphasis on rehabilitation to a drive for increased productivity, was welcomed in the Department of Agriculture for the reasons already mentioned. But it never led to a cessation of departmental activity in all the areas of the provincial

schemes; Sukumaland, for example, with its vast potential for increased cotton production, required a large number of extension staff to be retained there. Elsewhere, staff were concentrated in areas where there was not only a potential for increased productivity but also the probability of co-operation from farmers. The 'focal point approach', the fore-runner of later attempts in East Africa to create 'growth-pole' areas, was aimed at increasing the production of cash crops as quickly as possible. Although in some instances pilot projects were instituted, it was not often that sufficient time was allowed for a proper evaluation. There were dangers in this sudden haste to increase output. In view of the devastation caused by the post-Depression 'grow more crops' campaign, a certain amount of caution was necessary. Instead, the emphasis on production and the unpopularity of the soil conservation measures made it convenient to ignore the loss of soil fertility which would occur unless good husbandry was practised.<sup>29</sup> To implement the new policy, a re-deployment of the available extension staff was necessary and it was soon apparent that plans for concentrating staff in receptive areas could not always be achieved. In all, 85 projects were selected for implementation; if they were to be properly investigated and supervised either more personnel had to be recruited and trained or some schemes had to be postponed. The project in the cotton growing areas of Kilosa district provides an example of what was done. The aim in this case was to double the cotton yield and increase output accordingly; the method

of achieving this aim was to provide a series of demonstrations, to encourage approved farming practices and to organize the supply of inputs. Eventually, it was found possible to provide one field assistant for every 200 farmers.

The new policy placed emphasis on the expansion of coffee production. Of the total implemented, 43 schemes were concerned with this crop and the production of arabica rose substantially, particularly in the Southern Highlands. Subsequently, the emphasis changed from increasing the area planted to improving output and quality. The extension staff remained fully engaged, not only in providing advice but also in organizing the supply of materials and equipment to those farmers who were not entirely convinced that they were necessary.<sup>30</sup>

The change to the focal point approach provided a substantial increase in the output of cash crops; in retrospect it seems difficult to justify in terms of cost benefit the continued use of large numbers of extension staff on some of the schemes; on the other hand it could be argued that in tropical agriculture, immediate success is not always forthcoming.

The focal point approach, as it developed in some areas, aimed at changing attitudes as much as at increasing quantities of produce. The demonstration effect of the increasing prosperity of those who co-operated was considered important.<sup>31</sup> Tribal traditions set store on conformity and reinforced suspicion of change; where individual initiative aroused derision or unpopularity, it was necessary to offer encouragement and give support. The

aim was total development; by organizing adult literacy and hygiene classes in the same area, it was the government's aim to complement the demonstration effect of the successful farmer and also to show that if local leaders were far-sighted enough to take advantages of the services which could be supplied, the whole community would benefit.

#### The African sector: the balance sheet

The increase in the production of cash crops after 1945 in the African sector was no less substantial than in the estates and plantation sector. The factors which contributed to this increase can be summarised thus: an increased interest in obtaining a cash return; better techniques and knowledge; an increase in the population; the effects of the development schemes and subsequent policies aimed at increasing the volume of exports. Food production also increased at an adequate rate and government control over marketing of staple crops was progressively relaxed.<sup>32</sup> An indication of the increase in the value of export crops is evident in the figures given in Table XV. Since by 1960 tea was the only crop which was entirely produced on estates, it will be seen that there was a substantial increase in the cash inflow into the African sector; it is also obvious that apart from sisal, the contribution to the economy from estates had become much less important.

On the other hand, several factors caused disquiet; there was the generally low standard of farming

TABLE XV

TERRITORIAL EXPORTS OF THE SIX CROPS  
OF GREATEST VALUE 1950 AND 1960

<u>Item</u>	<u>1950</u> (£000)	<u>Item</u>	<u>1960</u> (£000)
Sisal	11,846	Sisal	15,442
Coffee	3,471	Lint cotton	8,827
Lint cotton	1,443	Coffee	7,326
Sunflower	358	Cashew nuts	2,126
Pulses	322	Tea	1,151
Tobacco	233	Groundnuts	1,053

(source: Annual Trade Reports,  
1950 and 1960; Government  
 Printer, Dar es Salaam)

techniques observed by the World Bank Mission, cited above; the soil conservation measures continued to be resisted or at best barely tolerated; and the increasing population made it necessary to devote time and space to growing more food crops. The amount of fertile, uninhabited and climatically suitable land was obviously finite; the technical problems of irrigated cultivation, particularly alkalinity and salinity, had yet to be resolved; with independence looming ahead, agricultural officers predicted that a popular-based government would be more interested in the short-term advantages to be gained from increasing output than in the long-term necessity of maintaining soil fertility. Finally, there had been high hopes of several benefits to be derived from the introduction of mechanization into the African sector; these proved to be just as ill-founded as the optimistic predictions for the groundnut scheme, described in the next chapter.

In making generalizations about these experiments with mechanization, a degree of caution is necessary. It was soon to become conventional wisdom to point out the drawbacks of using tractors where the return was uncertain; the high cost and effort involved in the complete clearing of land, essential if damage to implements was to be avoided; the cost and difficulty of maintaining equipment in remote places; the need to charge farmers an economic rate for tractor use and their reluctance to pay the charges demanded;<sup>33</sup> finally, the financial and opportunity cost in providing technically qualified and responsible personnel to supervise schemes which often were not on a

sufficiently large scale to justify such costs. All these factors provided powerful arguments against the use of tractors; however, not all of them were universally applicable and most of them represented problems which, with perseverance could be resolved.

The type of crop being cultivated was relevant and the attitudes and goals of the farmers who grew it. The use of tractors for the cultivation of cotton by peasant farmers was often uneconomic because the family was unwilling to weed and sometimes even to harvest a larger area than that traditionally cultivated. Costs were affected by the terrain, the lay-out of plots and by the soil conditions; easy-worked soils could be ploughed by light wheeled tractors for which the maintenance costs were comparatively low. With so many different variables to be considered, the government adopted a cautious approach; a number of schemes were started as pilot projects, financed by Native Authorities. The Rufiji scheme, started in 1948, was one of the more successful. Its object was to increase the production of rice in an area where cultivation was known to be limited by dependence on the hoe. In order to keep costs low, farmers agreed to group their holdings in blocks and to form societies in order to pay the fees in advance.<sup>34</sup> Even so, in 1952, in spite of careful supervision, raised fees and a record area ploughed amounting to 7,720 acres, the official view was that 'much had to be done to put the scheme on an economic basis'.<sup>35</sup> Other schemes, less well-managed and on a smaller scale were even more costly to keep running;

it was therefore no surprise when the Director of Agriculture announced that support for tractor schemes had been withdrawn.<sup>36</sup> The Rufiji scheme was handed over to the native authority, but when in 1956 the fees were raised to sixty shillings per acre, very few orders were forthcoming and the scheme was wound up.

It took another ten years for the lesson to be understood, that labour was plentiful but capital was in short supply. The tractor was a status symbol, a visible proof of modernity; in taking decisions on its usefulness, political as well as economic factors had to be considered. Secondly, in spite of the evidence, many remained unconvinced that the tractor could not be made cost-effective, particularly when there were examples of African entrepreneurs providing a hire service with their own tractors. But for the schemes started by both government and by native authorities there were psychological as well as technical factors to be taken into account; the proper care of expensive equipment could only be based on personal ownership, professionalism or dedication and without any of these being present no tractor scheme could succeed, however favourable the circumstances.

But in the meantime the growing popularity of the ox-plough had provided a far safer alternative to the tractor.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, there was plenty of evidence to suggest that there was room for improvement in the African sector by using the extension services and retaining the traditional farming units of production. For example, it was argued that it was only a question of time before

farmers appreciated the need to adopt better methods. With coffee, it was estimated that a ninety per cent increase in the amount produced was possible without any more bushes being planted. Not only was an increased quantity expected; with better husbandry and improved preparation of the beans, higher prices could be obtained.<sup>38</sup> For improving the cotton crop, the action required was even more evident. First, yields could be considerably increased if proper weeding took place. Next, it was necessary to convince farmers that yields could be increased by early planting. Finally, tie-ridging, despite its unpopularity could be demonstrated to prove that, if practised, yields could be increased by 15-20 per cent.<sup>39</sup>

But there were two problems during the colonial period which continued to limit progress and for which no answers could be found. One concerned the lack of capital available to the peasant farmer and the difficulty he experienced in obtaining credit facilities. The other, the absence of any real ownership over the land he cultivated. The two are clearly inter-related; being unable to offer his land as a security, the average farmer was unable to borrow enough to purchase labour-saving implements, the direct inputs needed for producing cash crops, or funds for paying wages to casual labour hired to help out at times of peak activity. A few were fortunate enough to take advantage of the measures the government introduced. Two loan funds were started, but the results were disappointing.<sup>40</sup> A large number of small loans were required for the purposes described

above; instead, for ease of administration, comparatively large amounts of money were lent, often for projects which were over-ambitious and which ended in the borrowers being unable to repay their loans. In theory, the co-operatives could administer such loans, recovering from the borrowers when they were paid for their crop sales.<sup>41</sup> In practice, there were still many defaulters, with losses being borne by the other members of the society. In a period of transition this was inevitable. When the parish councils were started in Sukumaland many of the councillors elected were lineage heads or chiefs' relations, thus confirming the continuity of the traditional authority pattern; likewise the leadership of the co-operatives often fell into the hands of similar dignitaries, who voted each other loans and later combined to resist demands for repayment.<sup>42</sup> Officials supervising the societies argued that if the committee members were blatantly corrupt, they would be replaced by others; but until this happened it was impossible to expand the system of loan schemes operated by these means. Furthermore, the individual farmer/member of the societies often displayed great ingenuity in avoiding repayment of borrowed money; relying on the bonds of the extended family the borrower would transfer his crop to a relative and through him obtain full payment of the proceeds.

But the lack of capital can never fully explain the relative poverty of the peasant farmer. To those who owned some cattle and intended to continue to cultivate six acres of land without help from hired labour, the need

to borrow money was unimportant - once a few labour-saving implements had been obtained. Instead, the capital he required was in the form of improvements to the land itself and these, once introduced, would lead to increased profitability in the future; much was possible if the effort was made to plant some permanent crops, some trees to act as wind-breaks, to take some soil-conservation measures, to prepare some pastures and adopt a different attitude to animal husbandry.

But to offer such prescriptions was clearly impracticable until there was a change in attitude toward land ownership and some support for a change in customary law affecting land tenure. Until this occurred, there could be little interest in land improvement or in the adoption of more enterprising farming methods. This theme was elaborated by the Royal Commission and became the basis of their most important recommendation.<sup>43</sup> However, the Report makes it clear that it was accepted that changes would be resisted by many Africans who believed that the existing situation whereby land was owned by the tribal community offered sure security. This fact had been recognized when the Land Ordinance was drafted and became the declared basis of policy affecting land tenure.<sup>44</sup> Although the government of Tanganyika agreed with the Royal Commission, in the twilight of colonial rule there was little enthusiasm for new initiatives and the inevitable opposition which would follow. Thus, it was argued, it might be better to await a change in attitude to land tenure instead of trying to direct and influence public opinion. There were already signs that land ownership

on an individual basis was becoming accepted.<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, if conservation rules could not be applied, the government had a clear duty to seek a way to arouse interest in protecting the land through the spur of ownership.

Bowing to the political realities of the times, the government did no more than publish in a White paper a cautious exploration of the idea of private ownership.<sup>46</sup> No more was possible, but the contrast between the Territory and Kenya is striking; in the latter, the Swynnerton Plan published in 1954 had based the development of African agriculture on, among other factors, the individual ownership of land, and energetic steps had been taken to implement this policy. There was already among Africans much interest in securing a proper title to land, not only in the rich coffee lands but also in some of the pastoral areas farther west.

As the colonial period came to an end in Tanganyika, it was apparent that the achievements in the improvement of the African sector had been purchased at the price of the ending of acceptance of the political status quo.

Improvement was synonymous with interference. As a result, the tribal unions, the T.A.A. and eventually T.A.N.U. gained support in the countryside by showing themselves as willing to take up complaints and to mobilize opposition to official policies.<sup>47</sup> The colonial bureaucracy, even if it had been more flexible and more attuned to public opinion could never have been able to react with enough speed to disarm such opposition. The Iringa Dipping Scheme provides a clear example of the rapid mobilization

of opposition to what had been a highly valued service. It is incorrect to suggest that the aims of the scheme had been insufficiently explained to the cattle owners; the officials who established the scheme knew the local people well and refused to extend the scheme into any area until there was unanimous acceptance of the obligations imposed.<sup>48</sup> Nevertheless, in 1957 as a result of growing unrest and lack of confidence in the scheme the whole operation was abandoned.<sup>49</sup>

This event in the Southern Highlands, the unrest in Sukumaland, the riot in the Ulugurus and the increasing opposition to regulations in the Usambaras: four widely separated areas, where communities lived which only a few years previously had little in common with each other and were essentially inwardly-focussed. Since African reaction to improvement by regulation was to have a significant effect on government policy, some further comment is necessary.

The generally accepted explanation is that the peasant farmer everywhere is suspicious of innovation and the Africans of this category in Tanganyika were no exception. Although the term 'peasant' has been used to describe the smallholder farmer, its use is concerned with the mode of production and associated land tenure rather than implying the existence of a peasant culture. During the decade preceding independence, there was no universal resistance to exhortations to change traditional practices or adopt new methods.<sup>50</sup> The acceptance of innovations often depended on the personality of the Agricultural Officer attempting to introduce them and the degree of tact shown

by his subordinate staff; sometimes the crucial factor was the support he was given by the native authority and his subordinates. It is significant that in the areas where resistance to government measures was most pronounced, the legitimacy of the native authorities was being challenged by opposing factions.<sup>51</sup> Two other factors help to blur the picture of universal hostility to a well-intentioned but insensitive colonial bureaucracy. Responses differed according to the types of crop being grown; whereas advice concerning cash crops was usually followed, suggestions for improving yields of food crops were more often ignored. There was an understandable dislike of innovations, which, if wrong, put the whole family at risk. Again, responses varied according to the prevailing view about putting capital at risk; many farmers were unwilling to spend money on inputs such as fertilisers in order to increase the eventual return when there were so many other factors which might cause the loss of the entire crop.

Nevertheless, the rising tide of nationalism and the well-publicised instances of hostility to government initiatives in promoting the 'improvement' strategy stimulated the search for more effective ways of gaining the confidence of the peasant farmer. Persuasion rather than regulation became the watch-word and the speed with which the natural resources departments adopted a 'low-profile' image meant losing the initiative which had to come from a centralised authority and which, in the case of Tanganyika, remained a major factor in determining Man's relationship with his environment. In 1959 the coffee

growers of Buha (Western province) put the policy to the test when by almost unanimous consent they asked for rules to be introduced which would ensure that the coffee grown there reached a reasonable standard. Their request was refused by the Director of Agriculture because the rules would have to be enforced by staff from his department and to this he would not agree. The significance of this decision was two-fold. It showed the growing importance of the political factor when change in land usage practices was contemplated; it also gave notice to the officials on the spot that the days of the colonial system of government were numbered. With political objection to expansion of the non-African sector and with the likelihood of slow improvement in the African sector, more reliance had to be placed in the large-scale enterprises in which the Government was more directly concerned.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1. Extracted from figures in WBR, op.cit., Table 16, p. 107.
2. Ibid., p. 101.
3. Cf., H. Ruthenberg, Agricultural Development in Tanganyika (Berlin 1964), p. 2.
4. Cf., N.R. Fuggles Couchman, Agricultural Development in Tanganyika, 1945-60 (Stanford 1964), p. 23.
5. M.P. Collinson, Farm Management Survey, (Unpublished mss. Ukiriguru), in which he compares his findings with the earlier figures recorded by N.V. Rounce; but also see data recorded by D. von Rotenan in H. Ruthenberg, ed. Smallholder Farming and Smallholder Development in Tanzania (London 1968), p. 55 which suggests a slightly higher figure.
6. J.M. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government (Oxford 1967), p. 125.
7. Rounce estimated that the usual practice was three years cultivation followed by three years fallow.
8. Between 1945 and 1956, £ $\frac{1}{2}$  million was allocated for the scheme; Hill and Moffett, op. cit., p. 516.
9. H. Cory, The Indigenous Political System of the Sukuma (Dar es Salaam 1951), p. 96.
10. In Shinyanga district the usual method was to call a meeting and ask everyone to line up behind the candidate of their choice; the ensuing 'band-waggon' activity provided much entertainment.
11. The T.A.A. was formed with official encouragement when Cameron was Governor; the aims of the Sukuma Union were to increase prosperity and publicize malpractices committed by N.A.'s. For details see G.A. Maguire, Toward Uhuru in Sukumaland, (Cambridge 1969).
12. See N.V. Rounce, The Agriculture of the Cultivation Steppe (Cape Town 1949), Chap. XIX.
13. Ibid., p. 93; 'The African will have to be compelled to help himself'.
14. From notes made of discussion with Kidaha (David) Makwaia, shortly after his resignation from being Chief of Usiha (Shinyanga district).

15. From notes of meeting between J.V. Shaw, Deputy Provincial Commissioner, Sukumaland, and the Maswa Native Authorities, Mwagalla, July 1952.
16. In 1949, 37% of the cattle in Shinyanga district died as a result of rinderpest or drought.
17. Memo. Governor to Chief Secretary, dated 1 September 1954, cited by Maguire, op.cit., pp. 157, 158.
18. Lake Province AR 1958, p. 58.
19. Ibid., p. 145.
20. But in Sukuma law certain individual pasture rights are recognized (njingo and ngitiri).
21. Cory, op.cit., p. 6.
22. Hence the Kingolwira Settlement Scheme: see Appendix vii.
23. Memo. by A.H. Savile, Senior Agricultural Officer, 'Soil Erosion in the Uluguru Mountains', 1947.
24. Hill and Moffett, op.cit., p. 523.
25. Eastern Province AR 1958, p. 31.
26. The schemes started with pilot projects at Mombo and the Luangera valley.
27. E.g., Tanga Province AR 1954, p. 152.
28. Tanga Province AR 1958, p. 145.
29. See WBR, p. 108 for further comment.
30. E.g., although the Co-operative Union in Tukuyu (RACU) held the necessary stores, it often required the agency of the District Agricultural Officer to ensure that they were utilized by farmers.
31. In Western Province in 1959 the practice was adopted of sending farmers on visits to other villages to observe 'modern' methods; it was believed to be effective.
32. The Department of Grain Storage, created in 1949, brought the more important cereals at fixed prices. All produce control was ended in 1957 and the Department was closed down.
33. The majority of ploughing schemes failed because debts remained unpaid and most farmers were unable or unwilling to pay in advance.

34. The Ndunda (Rufiji) ploughing scheme was operating successfully in 1953. Although in this case, the principle of paying in advance was accepted arrears remained outstanding and the scheme was therefore closed down. (Interview, D.C. Randall, Field Officer).
35. Department of Agriculture AR 1952, p. 77.
36. TLC 33 sess. p. 19.
37. Fuggles Couchman, op.cit., states that by 1960, 90% of land preparation in Arusha district was done by ox plough.
38. WBR p. 363; comparing the poor yields of Chagga growers with yields obtained in Kenya by Embu and Meru.
39. See J.E. Peat and K.J. Brown, 'Effects of Management in increasing crop yields in Lake Province' in EA Agricultural and Forestry Journal, Vol. XXVI, p. 104.
40. These were the Local Development Loan Fund and the African Productivity Loan Fund, each with a capital of £100,000.
41. WBR, p. 122.
42. The loan funds administered by Native Treasuries had the same problem.
43. EARC Report, op.cit., pp. 50-51.
44. Viz. preamble to the Land Ordinance: 'It is expedient that the existing native customs with regard to the use and occupation of land shall as far as possible be preserved.'
45. E.g., in Kilimanjaro it was already possible to buy and sell certain categories of land.
46. Government Paper No. 6 of 1958 (Dar es Salaam 1958).
47. See L. Cliffe, Nationalism and the Reaction to enforced agricultural change in Tanganyika during the colonial period, a Paper presented to EAISR Conference December 1964, in which he argues that the TAA gained support for their taking up complaints concerned with the regulations on agricultural practices. But it is better to specify what these complaints were since they differed from district to district. Sometimes it was opposition to the rules themselves - for which the native authorities were in part

responsible; sometimes it was against the manner of enforcement - for which the District Agricultural Officer was responsible.

48. Cf. Ruthenberg, op.cit; I accompanied G. Yeoman, Veterinary Officer in charge of the Dipping Scheme on many of his meetings with cattle owners.
49. Southern Highlands Province AR 1957, p. 143.
50. E.g., in 1945 no Africans cultivated flue-cured tobacco, pyrethrum or seed beans; in 1960 they cultivated 7,000 acres; there is no recorded instance of protest at the rules which were imposed.

CHAPTER XLARGE SCALE AGRICULTURE AFTER 1945:THE PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

After 1945, the experiments in commercial farming financed by public funds provided the basis for the development of the third sector of the agricultural system. The enterprises were on a sufficiently large scale to make substantial changes in the landscape; furthermore, although the results were often disappointing, the experience gained could be used for seeking alternatives to traditional farming practices. State-financed farming provided a way of combining the advantages of estate farming with none of the political disadvantages associated with non-African ownership.

The Overseas Food Corporation

The groundnut adventure in Tanganyika deserves its own special niche in British colonial history. It was based on an imaginative plan which might have succeeded if a more cautious and more flexible approach had been adopted. It ended in neither triumph nor tragedy, the only losses being a few reputations and a lot of money supplied by the British tax-payer. Fortunately, it provided a valuable boost to the Tanganyika economy; if the production of groundnuts had been the only objective there was little reason for selecting the Territory for

the enterprise. More important, it provided a foundation on which a variety of undertakings could be developed and a great deal of information obtained. There are already several accounts of the economic aspects of the Scheme and the political controversy which arose in Britain when predictions were proved wrong.<sup>1</sup> However, from the standpoint of noting the activities of Man as an agent of geographical change, more needs to be said. For once the Territory had been selected for the main thrust of the enterprise there still remained the task of selecting the site, or sites, from a number which would have been suitable. What emerges is an example of 'possibilism' on a very large scale. In the greater part of the three areas eventually selected, man had only passed by, collecting honey or hunting wild animals. Now, within a brief period all was changed; the tsetse fly was expelled, bore-holes were sunk, services and shops established. All was possible while the political will remained to provide the funds to support life in unfavoured environments. When the original scheme collapsed and the financial input was reduced, the majority of the residents were compelled to move elsewhere; nevertheless, some support was given throughout the remainder of the colonial period and it was recognized that if it had been totally ended it was only a matter of time before the fly and the bush returned.

Except for the initial stages, the scheme was managed by the British Overseas Food Corporation and its publicly declared objective was to provide edible oils for consumption in Britain.<sup>2</sup> Three sites were selected in

Tanganyika; at Kongwa (Central province), at Urambo (Western province), and at Nachingwea (Southern province). The project was a dramatic and costly failure, summed up in the official explanation in what must rank as a masterpiece of understatement:

'the original aims of the scheme have proved incapable of fulfilment.'<sup>3</sup>

An account of the events which occurred is unnecessary, but a brief summary is given in Appendix xi. Nevertheless, certain questions need to be answered since the enterprise caused a substantial change in some landscapes and had a considerable effect on the development of the third sector of the agricultural system, in which the government, or government-established corporations, were directly involved in farming. First then, was the reason for failure the method of farming which was adopted? Second, if the primary objective was to grow groundnuts, were the most suitable sites chosen - or is it yet another example of land usage being determined by political rather than physical conditions? For if in a vast, under-populated country the sites, Kongwa excepted, provide examples of the average conditions with which the arable farmer has to contend, the OFC and TAC experiences underline the fact that adequate inputs of capital and expertise cannot guarantee success.

At first, criticism of the OFC operation was directed at the clearing and cultivating techniques which had been adopted. Thus, when failure was imminent it was an apparent over-indulgence in mechanization which was blamed for the disappointing results. As one account of

the scheme explained at the time:

'The bubble of mechanization has been pricked and ... the OFC has taken to heart the (view) that mechanization has a place in agriculture but only a very small place because of its heavy cost.'<sup>4</sup>

This view was repeatedly expressed in subsequent accounts of the enterprise although the more perceptive qualified their comment by adding 'in marginal areas'.<sup>5</sup> It was a combination of several factors which led to failure at Kongwa and disappointing results in the other areas. Not all of these factors could have been foreseen before the plans were implemented. For instance, the authors of the plan were justified in assuming that machinery suitable for the various operations would be procured, would be expertly used and properly maintained. This was not the case, because those in charge were ordered to press ahead regardless of cost or consequences. And so, when problems arose it was inevitable that interest should be directed toward the techniques employed rather than the sites themselves.<sup>6</sup> These however, were far from ideal and it is necessary to know why they were selected.

The reasoning of the Wakefield Mission is apparent in the following passage from the Report:

'areas of sparse population unencumbered by native or other rights, are necessary if operations are to be started quickly. Uninhabited, tsetse infested and waterless areas, therefore, offer special attraction to the project provided the soil is suitable and the rainfall adequate...'<sup>7</sup>

It had already been argued that machinery was to be used on a grand scale and therefore large expanses of land had to be found. But the larger the area involved, the more

likely native rights would be present and would have to be considered; this to the Mission meant delay which had to be avoided at all costs. Consequently, the least inhabited area was the best for the purposes of the enterprise. The fact that the larger the area, the more likely the possibility that the soil characteristics and even the rainfall pattern might show variations was never considered. Nevertheless, the possibility of drought was not entirely ignored although the following observation proved to be over-optimistic:

'... the ill effects of short droughts can be largely mitigated by the adoption of soil conservation measures and the application of other principles of good farming...'<sup>8</sup>

These principles are explained elsewhere in the Report. The Mission had been particularly impressed by the sandy, red, loams they had been shown at Kongwa and felt sure that they were, or could be made, very suitable for growing groundnuts. It was observed that the soil to some extent lacked humus; however, this defect could be remedied and when in addition the land had been properly contoured and furrowed it was argued that it would be capable of retaining enough moisture to tide a crop over the short droughts which had to be expected. It was recognized that Kongwa was in a particularly dry area but it was argued that if the recommended measures were adopted, groundnuts could be grown successfully. The Mission came to this conclusion after a visit to a settler's farm at Mlale, adjoining the Kongwa plain.<sup>9</sup> Although the visit took place during a year in which the effects of drought were particularly severe, they were shown groundnuts being grown and were much impressed

by sample checks carried out in their presence.

Several other sites were investigated and they are described in the Mission's report. With the exception of Urambo and Nachingwea, all the sites required the removal of a number of Africans resident on them unless operations on each site were restricted to one or two units only. This arrangement would have added considerably to the administrative costs of the scheme and was not favoured. On the other hand, the Mission strongly recommended that there should be more than one site and that the areas selected should be located within different rainfall regimes so that local droughts would not spoil the entire crop. Even so, it still seems remarkable that in spite of the vastness of the Territory and the very sparse population throughout much of it, the mission should have selected the Kongwa area as one of the places for the scheme. It clearly lies within that area of the Territory where the rains are most likely to fail (see Map I). In adding an extra hazard to an enterprise already replete with unknown factors the mission left itself open to the suspicion that it attached or was too easily persuaded to attach, undue weight to the advantage of selecting a relatively uninhabited area. Possibly, the help provided by the Department of Agriculture was counter-productive; Wakefield acknowledged the value of the preliminary investigations undertaken before the visit of the Mission which resulted in the members 'being taken to areas of suitable terrain'.<sup>10</sup>

In London, the Ministry of Food had to decide whether to accept the Mission's recommendations. A

'Special Section' was established to consider the Report and they duly observed that 'the evidence concerning rainfall is perhaps not wholly satisfactory and leaves an element of doubt'.<sup>11</sup> Other counsels prevailed and the fact that this warning was ignored proved to be a very expensive error. It soon turned out that the years at Kongwa when the crop would not be at risk due to drought were the exceptions rather than the rule. In the White Paper outlining new plans for the OFC, it was observed:

'In 1952/3, the drought which prevailed in varying degrees over the whole of Tanganyika were particularly severe at Kongwa ... in 1953/54 the rainfall has been patchy and some loss seems inevitable ... at Kongwa uncertain rainfall in the area makes any further investment too hazardous for anyone to undertake.'<sup>12</sup>

Most of the responsibility for the choice of Kongwa was assigned to Wakefield since in the mission, he alone had previous experience of farming conditions in the Territory.<sup>13</sup> The conventional explanation, that he was given misleading information on his visit to Bain's farm at Mlale lacks credibility.<sup>14</sup> While there, he was shown groundnuts being successfully cultivated; it is a fact that the sample yields which so impressed him there, amounting to 1000-1200 lbs. per acre, were never in the most favourable conditions at any time achieved by any unit of the OFC farming in that area. Perhaps he disregarded the great difference in climatic conditions between Mlale and the Kongwa plains stretching below and this difference was enough to affect the cultivation of groundnuts. But it must be remembered that the reasons for the unsuitability of Kongwa were not immediately apparent. Even after a year of concentrated

experiment and observation, the OFC technical advisers were still satisfied that the site was suitable.<sup>15</sup> Firm conclusions were difficult to arrive at because the effects of rainfall were so unpredictable; thus the Macheenje unit at Kongwa, which in the 1951/52 season received a seemingly inadequate amount of rain over much of the area planted with groundnuts, obtained the highest yield per acre.<sup>16</sup> In fact, it became increasingly clear that it was a combination of factors which had to be taken into account: the quantity of the rainfall, the timing of the precipitation in relation to the growth cycle of the crop and the degree of soil compaction which followed the rains.<sup>17</sup> It was this complex relationship more than 'the uncertain rainfall' mentioned in the extract from the White Paper quoted above which made large scale production an extremely risky enterprise.

As the nature of the problems became clearer there was every reason for the OFC Board to adopt a less ambitious timetable until more information was available. When, for reasons of political expediency, it was decided to implement the Wakefield recommendations with the least possible delay no objections had been raised. It was confidently expected that with all the resources which were to be made available, any difficulty could be surmounted. Two members of the mission which selected the sites, Wakefield and Rosa, were appointed to the OFC Board and thus shared the responsibility for the decision to press ahead regardless of what mistakes might be made. Addressing a meeting of soil scientists Wakefield explained the position as follows:

'Urgency was the keynote; the usual series of experiment and pilot project could not be awaited. It had to be all or nothing.'<sup>18</sup>

And in the same address he explained how he had come to support the project:

'The groundnut scheme appealed to me as providing the opportunity for the economic application of scientific principles on a very grand basis.'

But the application of scientific principles must be concerned with experiment and observation and it was this basic contradiction which was to lead to so much trouble. Later in the same year it seems that Wakefield began to counsel a more cautious approach to further development. Now he found it difficult to explain his change of heart to the other members of the Board. With the scheme running into trouble, disagreement ensued and became public knowledge. In Britain, criticism of the scheme increased and in 1949 Strachey announced in the House of Commons that he had terminated the appointments of both Wakefield and Rosa. He explained that they were not being made scapegoats for the failure of the enterprise but that there was a need to strengthen the Board for the future. Not surprisingly, this explanation failed to satisfy the opposition.<sup>19</sup> The fierce argument in the political arena over the wisdom of the scheme and Strachey's handling of the affair had the effect of inducing, in the years which followed, a cautious approach to subsequent proposals for using public corporations for development projects. At the heart of the problem was the difficulty which occurs in any democracy, the inability to win support for schemes involving heavy expenditure unless the action contemplated can be shown to be in the public interest. Thus no one questioned the primary aim of the scheme as outlined by the Wakefield mission,

namely to make up the deficiency in edible oils in Britain and to obtain groundnuts at a lower price than had to be paid for them elsewhere.<sup>20</sup> Such arguments may have had the desired effect of quietening domestic criticism but it left the official classes with the uneasy feeling that world opinion might see little difference between self-interest and exploitation. It was one thing for private enterprise to seek profits in dependent territories; the colonial government, it was believed would safeguard the interests of the native inhabitants and could expect support and encouragement from the Colonial Office. But in this case the entrepreneur was the metropolitan government itself, a situation which in the House of Commons was observed with either cynical amusement or deep misgiving according to the political leanings of those who spoke.<sup>21</sup>

But although Britain's need provided the opportunity for launching the enterprise, it seems probable that the needs of the Territory were also considered. If the primary aim was to obtain groundnuts as a matter of urgency, there were more certain ways of obtaining them at much less financial risk. First, in Nigeria, owing to a shortage of rolling stock as a result of the War, a vast stock of groundnuts had accumulated at Kano railhead and this was being moved very slowly. Two years after the Scheme had been in operation in East Africa a large stock still awaited removal.<sup>22</sup> Not only would it have been easier to obtain rolling stock than the complicated machinery needed for Tanganyika; also, it would have been possible to increase production in West Africa with far

quicker and more certain results. Second, it is worth noting that the Wakefield Mission observed that a substantial proportion of the British government's requirements could be obtained if Tanganyika farmers were offered a price guaranteed for three years. This suggestion was ignored in the White Paper which followed the Report. Neither of the two sources mentioned above would have provided more than a partial solution to the shortage but together they offered a far safer alternative.

The British government was won over by Strachey's optimism; here at last there was the opportunity to effect a dramatic transformation of uninhabited, inhospitable areas of territories for which Britain was responsible. Where there were doubts they were quickly dispelled by Strachey and the sceptics were silenced by a mixture of enthusiasm and idealism rather than by solid reasoning. Others too caught his mood and showed the same optimism; one senior government official in Tanganyika resigned his appointment in order to join the scheme because, he informed Creech Jones, he thought 'it would go down in history as the greatest experiment in civilization ever conceived and ever attempted to date.'<sup>23</sup>

Even when things began to go wrong, Strachey sought to win support because the scheme provided the opportunity to justify colonial rule and the means for an economic take-off in a hopelessly undeveloped territory.<sup>24</sup> It was the unfortunate mention of the advantage to be gained by the British housewife which made it infinitely more difficult to locate the scheme in parts of the Territory

where it might have succeeded.

### The Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation

Following the publication of the 1951 White Paper, the OFC operations were progressively run down. Between 1951 and 1954 some of the assets and equipment were sold and the number of employees much reduced.<sup>25</sup> In 1954, the TAC was created in order to continue operations in all three areas. The new Corporation was not expected to operate profitably for some time and it was arranged for the annual deficits to be met by the British government. Profitability was not the only concern of the Corporation; experimental work was to continue with the consequence that it was impossible to estimate the return on capital in respect of the solely commercial operations.<sup>26</sup>

Only a brief description of the Corporation's activities is necessary since the details are available elsewhere.<sup>27</sup> During the first six years it existed, the Corporation managed farming schemes in the three areas of the former OFC scheme, a cattle ranch at Ruvu, near Dar es Salaam, and a tobacco scheme at Lupa Tingatinga; in conjunction with the FAO it also managed the Rufiji Basin Survey. More needs to be said about the achievements in the ex-OFC areas; the practical problems which had to be faced provided experience useful in the future and the social and political aspects of the operations offer an insight into the attitudes of African farmers at the time and into post-independence ideology.

By 1952, the farming area at Nachingwea consisted of approximately 15,000 acres, divided into twenty farms, each under a European manager. Seventeen farms were 'paid labour' units, ranging in size from 200 to 1,800 acres. The remaining three were developed as African tenants farms, each under an experienced manager. The average size of each farm was twenty acres. The Corporation provided goods and services for the tenants, deducting the costs when purchasing their crops.

Gradually, experience provided the necessary information, which, had it been available, might have made the OFC enterprise a viable concern. With groundnut crops, rosette continued to play havoc until in 1954, a disease-resistant seed was introduced.<sup>28</sup> In addition to groundnuts, maize, sorghum and soya bean were found to be suitable crops in this area, each of them placing different demands on the farmers and their advisers.

It was found that groundnuts needed a high level of technical and managerial ability for growing and marketing the crop, a dependence on manual labour and no expensive measures to counteract loss of soil fertility. Maize was reliable and variations in annual yields were smaller than with the other crops; costs of production were comparatively low but soil fertility needed conserving. Sorghum was found to be the easiest crop to grow but the returns were comparatively low and it often suffered from pest damage. Finally, soya beans had many advantages over the other three crops; as a crop it stored well, was relatively free from danger from pests and diseases and production costs were

low; technical and managerial ability were necessary when the crop was planted and harvested.

R.F. Lord has provided detailed comparisons of the costs of producing the major crops during the period 1954-1957.<sup>29</sup> He also has compared the results obtained from the operating of medium-sized estates in the same area. His figures, therefore not only indicate what sort of return the smallholder tenant might expect but also offer a comparison between smallholder and estate farming. It must be concluded that in the particular circumstances which existed in this area, there was no great gain in the usual economies of scale. The large estates, under expert management and with the TAC resources at hand, were unable to prove that farming in this way was a sound commercial proposition. It confirms the view that settlers farming outside the favoured areas were unlikely to become wealthy from their farming activity. On smallholdings, the use of tractors, in spite of careful supervision was shown to be a doubtful asset. The position was well described by the comment:

'success ... was not due to mechanization but to a really profitable crop, farmed intensively.'<sup>30</sup>

Another fact which was to represent a pattern repeated after independence was the high rate of turnover of tenant farmers, not only at Nachingwea but also at Kongwa. In the first mentioned, only one third of the tenants recruited during the period 1952-56 stayed for a third year and five years later the position had not changed.<sup>31</sup> The chief complaints were the lack of social life, the irksome

supervision which was exercised, the high cost of the compulsory services and the disappointing return after a lot of hard work. The same complaints were to be heard from the residents in some of the post-independence settlement schemes.<sup>32</sup>

The events at Kongwa provide an example of the environment finally succeeding in determining the pattern of land usage. At first a settlement scheme for tenant farmers similar to the Nachingwea system was attempted on half the land; on the other half the TAC managed a cattle ranch. Arable farming could not be made a commercial success and eventually the tenant farmers took to ranching under supervision and cultivating enough to provide their own food. Certainly ranching had more chance of succeeding than growing crops commercially. Although its chances of success were likely to improve, it was not an enterprise likely to show quick profits and it was evident that it would take a long time to repay the amortisation and interest charges.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, of the three areas, it was at Urambo that the most successful examples of supervised farming were to be found. Although maize and groundnuts were still grown, the major crop was flue-cured tobacco. The area was divided into three types of unit: large farms (1200 acres), medium (150-200 acres), and a farming settlement scheme. The amount of tobacco grown varied from an average of five acres in the settlement scheme to sixty in the large farms. At first, all the large farms were leased to Europeans but by 1964, two large farms and eleven medium-

sized farms were tenanted by Africans. The attitude to the scheme shown by the tenants was noticeably different from experience at Nachingwea and the majority remained satisfied with their choice in spite of the hard work necessary and the usual close supervision. At Urambo, not only were the rewards higher but also there was the opportunity for an improvement in status.<sup>34</sup> Nearly half the work performed at Urambo was by the use of paid, seasonal labourers; the tenants had to develop managerial as well as technical skills. The importance of the project is three-fold. First, it represented, at last, a meeting place for the racially based sectors of the agricultural system; on the settlement European and African farmers were facing similar problems and producing the same crop. Second, it offered a viable alternative to the plantation as the means of growing flue-cured tobacco, thus ending what had been a European monopoly in its production. Finally, it provided another example of how African enterprise in agriculture might have developed if the consequences of the reaction to colonial rule had been different. The concept of the 'master-grower' was bound to conflict with the egalitarian ethos which became part of the Tanzanian version of African socialism and the project came to an end - in that form - in 1965.

#### The Colonial Development Corporation

The Corporation was created in 1947 and, like the OFC, was able to bring about notable changes in the

landscape of the Territory. Its aims were explained by Creech Jones as follows:

'..... total borrowing powers of the order of £100 million. It will operate on commercial principles. Its object will be to establish or assist any enterprise in the colonies which is designed to increase the general productive capacity.'<sup>35</sup>

In Tanganyika, the major agricultural enterprise undertaken by this Corporation was the development of wattle planting in Njombe district. After the War, when wattle was fetching high prices, the government had commissioned a private company to start a project there; in much of the district the soil was poor and a higher than average number of young men left home and sought employment elsewhere. By 1948 the company had run into difficulties and the scheme was taken over by the C.D.C. With good management progress was rapid and the countryside was soon transformed as the trees grew. The scheme consisted of five units and a farm for producing food for the labour force. By 1956, 32,000 acres were planted with wattle and 600 acres with pines.<sup>36</sup>

Originally, it had been intended that the Corporation would make use of some 56,000 acres of land in the district. However, the Bena, who lived in this area, were opposed to planting on this scale and it was eventually agreed that 20,000 acres should be planted by the people themselves. For their part, the Corporation agreed to prepare land for planting and to buy the bark when it was ready for stripping. The scheme represented an opportunity for peasant farmers to cultivate a cash crop in an area where subsistence farming predominated and many Africans were

willing to participate. However, since the scheme coincided with an upsurge in the demand for independence, many farmers were reluctant to be seen to co-operate with an enterprise being promoted by the colonial government. Consequently, progress was not as fast as had been anticipated.<sup>37</sup> Looking ahead, the Corporation had to settle two other problems; Njombe was far from any potential market for the wood fuel which remained once the bark had been stripped and secondly, there was always the uncertainty as to whether the price for tannin extract would make the venture viable. Nevertheless, the factory was built according to schedule and processing started in 1959. By this time the C.D.C. project had been merged with a private company thereby ensuring that the project was adequately capitalized.<sup>38</sup>

The Wattle scheme, like the other enterprises managed by public corporations, provided an example of how a landscape in the Territory could be changed once outside resources on a sufficient scale were provided. It differed from the TAC and OFC schemes in that it was concentrated in one area, it was easy to control and the aim was to establish a profitable enterprise. Both the corporations existing at the end of the colonial period were tolerated by neighbouring Africans and the opportunities of obtaining employment were welcomed. If support for them was only luke-warm it was because the majority saw little difference between the corporations and any other large company. The management at the time was in the hands of Europeans and local leadership was insufficiently associated with the decision-making processes. All the same, the emerging leaders of the

nationalist movement were aware of the distinction between the corporations and private enterprise and pressed for future development to be undertaken by institutions such as the former, which, it was thought, were less likely to oppose their political aspirations.

### Government Farms

It will be noted that the government's involvement in the TAC enterprise was brought about by extraneous circumstances; if the aims of the OFC had been achieved, there would have been no need to create the local Corporation. Thus, in order to ascertain the official attitude to direct investment in commercial agriculture, it is necessary to consider the appropriate post-war development plans and the way they were implemented.

In spite of their professed anxiety at the possibility of food shortages, both the Central Development Committee and subsequently the Development Commission based their plans on the assumption that any increased production would be forthcoming from private enterprise. Nevertheless, the Department of Agriculture received generous allocations for experiments in irrigation and mechanized cultivation and if their schemes proved viable, there was no reason why they could not be expanded into profitable farming enterprises. The wording of the Department's annual reports is indicative of how matters developed; until 1952 a section of each report is entitled 'Government Food Farms', whereas in subsequent reports, after the closure of Kilangali the

remainder are termed 'pilot schemes'.<sup>39</sup> After a few years these schemes were also ended and it was only too apparent that the official view was that the functions of the Department should be confined to research and extension activities and that commercial farming was best left to private enterprise.<sup>40</sup>

NOTES TO CHAPTER X

1. E.g., A. Wood, The Groundnut Affair (London 1950) and S.H. Frankel, The Economic Impact on Underdeveloped Societies, (Oxford 1953).
2. Until 1945, India had exported approximately half a million tons of groundnuts annually, mostly to Europe.
3. The Future of the Overseas Food Corporation (cmd. 8125), (London 1951), p. 10.
4. Economist, 13 January 1951.
5. E.g., Ruthenberg, op.cit., p. 47.
6. Bush clearing proved to be a slow and expensive business when performed by machines; but also the mechanical harvesters proved inefficient when used on the Kongwa soils.
7. A Plan for the Mechanised Production of Groundnuts in East and Central Africa, cmd. 7030 (London 1947), p. 22.
8. Ibid.
9. The farm of Mr.T. Bain, Mpwapwa district.
10. Cmd. 7030, op.cit., p. 19.
11. Wood, op.cit., p. 48.
12. Memorandum submitted by the OFC, included in The Future of the Overseas Food Corporation, cmd. 9158 (London 1954) p. 7.
13. Strachey's comment to Lady Listowel: 'Wakefield couldn't have been more wrong'. Listowel, op.cit., p. 153.
14. In the Mission report Wakefield acknowledged Bain's help and records his efforts to secure the selection of the Kongwa site, cmd. 7030, op.cit., p. 48.
15. OFC AR 1948-49, Appendix v.
16. Total rainfall for the year was 11 inches; the yield was over 600 lbs. per acre, OFC AR 1953.
17. A summary of the Kongwa soil conditions is given in OFC AR 1948-49.

18. A.J. Wakefield, 'The Groundnut Scheme' in E.A. Agricultural Journal, January 1948.
19. HC 470, Col. 54.
20. Cmd. 7030, op.cit.
21. Cf., Gammans at HC 458, Col.767 and Segal at HC 446, Col. 152.
22. Over 110,000 tons; shortly before it had been as much as 320,000 tons. HC, SCE Fifth Report, para. 83; see also HC 470, Col.105.
23. Letter dated 21 January 1948; filed with Creech Jones Papers.
24. HC 430, Col. 1262.
25. E.g., between 1951 and 1952 the following reductions in staff took place: Europeans, from 1125 to 598; Asians from 142 to 96; Africans from 17,848 to 14,766.
26. The Corporation ceased to exist in 1964 its assets being transferred to the Rural Settlement Commission, which was itself dissolved the following year.
27. E.g., WBR pp. 402-408 and Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation, Annual Reports and Statement of Accounts 1955/56 to 1962/63.
28. Asiriya Mwitunde; for an account of its development, see J. McEvans, E.A. Agricultural Journal, July 1956, p. 27.
29. Lord, op.cit., Chapters 2 and 3.
30. G.A. Bridger, Planning Land Settlement Schemes, Agricultural Economics Bulletin For Africa, (Addis Ababa, September 1962).
31. Based on personal discussions with tenants at Nachingwea, September 1961: a typical comment was 'if I do well this year I'll leave and start a shop'. Confirmed by the earlier figures cited by WBR., p. 403, from which it seems of the earlier settlers only one third remained for a third year.
32. Post, pp.435-437
33. At Kongwa it was agreed that breeding would be a more profitable form of ranching than fattening immatures, once the scheme's own herd was established; for a financial analysis of ranching in these conditions, see WBR, pp. 435-441.

34. Once skills were acquired, the tenants could become 'master-growers, with their own field and tobacco barn.
35. HC 439, Col. 439.
36. CDC Report 1955.
37. The Bena Wattle Scheme had resulted in 9644 acres being planted by the end of 1959:  
CDC Report 1959.
38. This was E.A. Tannin Extract Company.
39. Kilangali was intended 'to contribute considerably towards rice and maize production in (Kilosa) district' Agricultural A.R. 1948, p. 37; two other projects Lupiro and Kivukoni (Kilombero Valley) continued until 1957 before being closed.
40. Cf. Hill and Moffett, op.cit., p. 486:  
'State farming has marked the decline of more than one civilization in the past.'

CHAPTER XITHE PRESSURES OF NATIONALISM

The five years of dialogue between the colonial government and the Tanganyika African National Union ended as suddenly as it had begun, with the obtaining of independence; it is a remarkable story of how a small group of Africans from different parts of the Territory organized a mass movement and kept it united until their purpose was achieved. Colonial policies affecting land usage are central to these events; and in turn the changes in the political system subsequently affected the pattern of land usage hitherto accepted.

After 1945, direct support for the African sector of the agricultural system consisted of the allocation of funds for rural improvement, the deployment of the majority of natural resources staff for extension work in improving traditional forms of farming and in promoting new forms of marketing crops through co-operative structures. Direct support for the non-African sector consisted of creating the Land Bank and protecting the rights associated with the possession of property. Whereas before the War the district commissioner, in the eyes of most Africans, was there to protect their interests, he now appeared to have become the champion of a small minority. The government's reply to such criticism was based on the requirements of the Trusteeship Agreement whereby the rights of all the inhabitants of the Territory had to be protected. Africans viewed matters

differently and were apt to lose confidence in a district commissioner who appeared too ready to listen to settlers' complaints. But doubts concerning the impartiality of government officials were soon compounded with outright hostility, provoked by a number of policies designed to bring improvement in agricultural practices. In such conditions it was easy to resurrect old fears over alienation and it is therefore understandable that the rural population were soon mobilized in support of new leaders.

There are already several accounts of the development of TANU as a mass party and how it achieved a dominant position within a few years of its creation.<sup>1</sup> The advent of a vigorous nationalist movement was no surprise; with most of world opinion adopting a critical view of continuing colonialism, with the fact of the Trusteeship Agreement, with positive encouragement from newly independent countries, there was reason enough for such a development. The effects of past government policies were also important. Increased opportunities for higher education not only provided more competent staff for government service but also stimulated interest in the ideals of western democracy with its emphasis on the rights of the individual; and greater interest in the money economy led to an influx into the urban centres, providing foci of opposition to the government and eroding the position of traditional authority.

But these modernising processes were at work in other parts of Africa and they do little more than provide

a reason why a nationalist party, dedicated to achieving independence, should be established. It is, however, less obvious why, within a space of a few years, almost the whole of the African population of the Territory supported that party and no effective opposition to it could be organized. In spite of the fact that the majority of the branch officials were inexperienced and lacked organizing ability, TANU emerged from the elitist TAA as the driving force behind a mass movement, with African support in town and countryside mobilized to an extent that nationalist leaders in Kenya and Uganda never managed to achieve.

The usual explanation for this difference is based on a comparison between the tribal composition in African society in the three territories. Thus it is argued that in Tanganyika there were a far larger number of tribal communities, none of them being powerful enough to arouse fear or jealousy and thus threaten the unity of the nationalist movement. Even when in some areas tribal patriotism was assiduously fostered, it never came into conflict with the TANU twin aims of independence and national unity.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the explanation given above is not entirely satisfactory since there is no significant difference in the proportion of the leading tribal groups to the remainder of the populations of the respective territories (see Table XVI). It is suggested that since national integration, like modernization, depends on communications, it is equally important to take into account the location of the tribal groupings, a factor

TABLE XVITHE LARGEST TRIBAL GROUP IN EACH  
OF THE EAST AFRICAN DEPENDENCIES1957-1962

	<u>Tribe</u>	<u>% of total African population</u>
Kenya	Kikuyu	19.8
Uganda	Baganda	16.3
Tanganyika	Sukuma	12.6

(source: E.A. Statistical Abstracts; figures relate to censuses in Tanganyika, 1957; Uganda, 1959, and Kenya, 1962).

which is often overlooked. The fact that the Sukuma were situated almost on the periphery of the Territory, in a physical environment which supported a form of farming which at that time provided a modest return when compared with the coffee-growing areas, not only affected inter-tribal relationships but also, for the reason which follows, affected the rate of change in the process of national integration.

In Kenya and Uganda, the capital cities, the centres of political life, are situated in fertile areas supporting large populations and in which cash crops were grown, thereby providing wealth which in turn led to better-than average chances of education. Wealth also led to increased commercial activity and more contact with Asian entrepreneurs; in the case of Nairobi, there were opportunities for contact with the large European population resident on land adjacent to the city. In both cases, the physical environment becomes progressively harsher the further one goes from the capitals and the tribal communities, with some exceptions, less affected by the pressures of modernization. Nairobi and Kampala are typical 'core-areas', and it is from such areas in the past that many nation states have grown.<sup>3</sup> In the case of both Kenya and Uganda, it was events within the core area which largely determined the content of the political dialogue between nationalist leaders and the colonial administrations. In both cases, too, the land surrounding the capitals was occupied by the largest and most influential tribal groups in the territories. Thus, by 1954, whereas Kenya had been

shaken by the Kikuyu revolt and Uganda disturbed by the events leading to the exile and subsequent recall of the Kabaka, Dar es Salaam was living up to its name as the haven of peace.

For this state of affairs the location of Tanganyika's capital city at the coast was an important factor. Communications are always the key to modernization and a net-work based on the circumference rather than the centre is inevitably less effective. Tanganyika had no single core area and the communities most susceptible to modernization were to be found on the periphery, with their own rapidly growing urban centres such as Tanga, Moshi and Bukoba. The isolation of the capital has always been recognized and been the subject of debate. The Germans intended to transfer their capital to Tabora as soon as the Central Line was open and the street plan there was designed accordingly. For a time the British considered a move to Morogoro, but by the nineteen fifties the amount of public expenditure on government building in Dar es Salaam made the move difficult to justify.<sup>4</sup> The isolation of the city was accentuated by the temperament and attitudes of the Zaramo, the tribal community inhabiting the surrounding countryside and in 1956 forming about two fifths of the city's population.<sup>5</sup> The majority were Moslems and at this time showed little interest in acquiring a formal education, probably as a consequence of the Islamic influence.<sup>6</sup> Lack of education more than outweighed the potential modernizing effect that should have been derived from close contact between the city population and the inhabitants of the surrounding countryside.

But this did not mean that the city population was apathetic in political matters. There was widespread poverty and unemployment among the African population together with the visibly high standards of living enjoyed by the Asian and European residents and there were the usual bruising encounters which occur when peoples of different races and cultures live together. To the majority of Africans in the city, any change in government could only be for the better. It was not surprising that in 1957 the city could be described as 'almost 100 per cent. a TANU town.'<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, this focus of nationalism remained in isolation and distinct from those examples where 'a core area and a national nucleus generated the processes of political integration.'<sup>8</sup> However, the case of Rufiji district needs to be mentioned since it provides an example at variance with this general picture. This rice-growing area had close commercial contacts with the capital and provided a large proportion of the highly-politicised dock labour force. Either as a consequence of these factors or because the district was the home of Bibi Titi Mohamed, the colourful leader of TANU's womens section, Rufiji district was mobilized to support TANU at a comparatively early date.

From the above, it is evident that the location of the capital, although inconvenient for administrators, contributed to the delay in organizing concerted opposition to colonial rule. But when a campaign for independence was eventually launched, its rapid success can only be explained by observing a combination of circumstances

existing within the Territory and events elsewhere which altered British attitudes toward the nationalist movement. At the time, within the Territory, many of the African communities were entering a stage of transition; even in remote rural areas a better-educated generation was beginning to question traditional values and to seek new forms of association without, as yet demanding any change in the system of government or the social order as they perceived them. But modernization, whether measured in terms of indices such as literacy, urbanization or exposure to mass media, or by the development of interest groups, growing differentiation or change in economic practices, does not necessarily proceed hand in hand with national integration. They are discrete processes and not only modernization does not necessarily assist the other but also on occasions it can impede its progress. Thus the timing of the growth of nationalism in Tanganyika is crucial to the understanding of its success. The emerging leaders of the national movement were to find that they were well received in rural areas which might have been expected to be indifferent to the message they brought.

This fact can be explained by observing the diverse effects of the modernizing process during the critical years, 1951-1960. First, the growth of nationalism depended primarily on communications and the expectations which were aroused. As already described, the location of the capital, the immense distances and the consequent difficulty for those interested in politics to be informed, were obstacles which were only being surmounted after 1950. It was some five years later that the mass

media began to make any impact. On the other hand, the rapid growth of the smaller towns was substantial enough to provide local centres which provided information and ideas for the surrounding areas and in some cases undoubtedly compensated for the remoteness of the capital. As the economy diversified, many Africans were attracted to these towns, finding employment in the burgeoning service industries and commercial enterprises. For the twenty years after the end of the second world war, the population in these urban centres increased at a rate of six per cent. per annum.<sup>9</sup> In all of them there were to be found Africans living far from their own tribal areas and more inclined to discuss national rather than parochial affairs. Throughout the Territory, opposition to colonial rule itself, as opposed to specific policies, was organized in the towns.

But these urban centres might well have remained isolated from the surrounding countryside. The successful immigrant to the towns was often able to earn more in a month than the peasant farmer obtained in a year and there was always the possibility that the differences in lifestyles might lead to rivalry and envy. In time, this might have resulted in the reinforcing of parochial attitudes in the rural areas, in fact a repetition of the tension between town and country, or core and periphery, reported in many different parts of the world. There seem to be two reasons why this was not the case in Tanganyika; the characteristics of the new urban dwellers and the increasing mobility of the population. The move to the towns only occurred after 1945 and the recent arrivals retained their

links with the countryside. Although most African town-dwellers retained some association with a tribal community - the right to return one day and obtain land in the tribal area was the most effective old age pension scheme which could have been devised in the existing circumstances - the newcomers, if they came from villages not more than a day's journey away, were able to maintain face-to-face contacts with friends and relatives. As roads improved a vast network of bus services came into existence; at the same time there was a substantial increase in the number of bicycles. The importance of the urban-rural link in promoting social change needs emphasising although its effects can only be judged intuitively.<sup>10</sup> The variations in the composition of the African population in the towns, which can be judged from Table XVII, gives some indication of the link between town and countryside.

In addition to this rapport between town and village, the nationalist movement was undoubtedly aided by the delay in the emergence of an African middle class; if it had existed in more strength at this time it might well have exercised a divisive influence in seeking to advance sectional interests. The fact that there were few wealthy Africans can be attributed to the lack of opportunities to obtain higher education or commercial experience.<sup>12</sup> It was also due to the nature of tribal society, to the observance of obligations to the extended family and the widely held attitude that it was socially unacceptable to try too hard to make money. Nyerere explained this point

TABLE XVIIPERCENTAGES OF URBAN POPULATIONS OF TRIBESOCCUPYING ADJOINING OR SURROUNDING LAND,1957<sup>11</sup>

<u>Town</u>	<u>Neighbouring tribe(s)</u>	<u>% of tribe(s) in town</u>
Morogoro	Luguru	53
Tanga	Digo/Bondei/Sambaa	43
Moshi	Chagga	41
Iringa	Hehe	40
Tabora	Nyamwezi	30.5

(source: East Africa Statistical  
Department 1958 )

of view as follows:

"...the very desire to accumulate it (personal wealth) must be interpreted as a vote of no confidence in the social system. For when a society is so organised that it cares about its individuals, then, provided he is willing to work, no individual within that society should worry about what will happen to him tomorrow if he does not hoard wealth today.'<sup>13</sup>

Nevertheless, a class of more enterprising African was beginning to appear by the end of the pre-independence decade, particularly in the more fertile areas. One can only speculate as to the effects of the individualization of land ownership which might have followed had the government's White Paper of 1958 been implemented.<sup>14</sup> Four examples serve to illustrate the changes taking place. In 1957 at Ismani, Iringa district (mentioned in an earlier chapter), the majority of farmers had little or no capital and over half of them cultivated less than ten acres. Some, however, obtained loans and purchased tractors or ox-ploughs, which they hired out to their neighbours. Gradually, the more capable accumulated land until they could claim possession of plots of two hundred acres. These farmers often employed their neighbours as casual labourers when there was work to be done; sometimes they leased to friends part of their holding on an annual basis. Thus inequalities developed, but since there was no landless class resident in the area there was little conflict. At first it was believed by Agricultural Officers that Ismani would rapidly lose its fertility and when this occurred, some of the inequality would disappear. Nevertheless, it is significant that Ismani in 1971 was one of the few areas in the country

where opposition to Ujamaa settlements was evident.<sup>15</sup> In Northern province, in coffee growing areas there was also a marked degree of differences in wealth, but again there were very few Africans who worked for other Africans on a permanent basis. In Western province in the Luiche delta, landless peasants from Buha worked on a share-cropping basis for Ujiji landowners. In Sukumaland, some farmers employed contract labour to help with the cotton harvest; much of this labour force came from Burundi and returned there after payment. From these examples it is evident that without a substantial section of a rural population being unwilling or unable to acquire land there was little likelihood of the growth of divergent attitudes in territorial political matters. Attitudes on cattle ownership at this time are also of interest; although those who owned large herds made use of an unfairly large proportion of communal grazing land and were responsible for a great deal of the erosion which occurred, there was little or no popular support for the government's attempts to introduce cattle taxes or to insist on compulsory culling.

In the towns, in spite of the disparities in wealth between the salaried clerk and the under-employed casual labourer, such differentials were accepted as inevitable while the existing order remained. The wealthy African town-dweller had to suffer endless visitations from indigent relatives; but at least this was better than living too comfortably in his tribal environment and finding that envy could explode into witchcraft. In fact, the colonial period ended before there were enough well-paid

Africans to make it possible to refer to a 'middle-class'; in 1952, of the Africans in paid employment only 2.7 per cent. of males and 0.3 per cent. of females received more than shs. 150/- per month.<sup>16</sup> The threat to the existing order was perceived, but it took time to provide remedies; in Twining's view a property-owning African middle-class would emerge as the result of the provision of revolving funds for miscellaneous loans.<sup>17</sup>

In the tactics they adopted, the nationalists were anxious to rebut the Governor's assertion that they represented no one but themselves.<sup>18</sup> To gain support among peoples of different cultures, attainments and religions issues had to be selected which could be easily understood and which would arouse fear or resentment. The educated élite and the urban poor could be won over without difficulty with the prospect of material rewards following Africanisation of the civil service and more job opportunities. The rural peasant, particularly those content with 'target' or subsistence economies needed to be impressed by other arguments. These were conveniently at hand and the opportunity they provided used to good effect. The issues? As might be expected from the previous chapters they were the need to reduce the influence of European settlers in political matters, the continuing alienation of land and the practice of evicting Africans from their ancestral home-lands. All these points could be illustrated in one example, the Meru Land Case; the chronicle of the events, as the government sought to resolve the problem it had created for itself, made an unexpected impact on rural

communities often many miles from the place where the conflict arose. Other issues too were raised by local leaders, often without the support of the national leadership. Nevertheless, if they could be utilized to arouse resentment and suspicion, the message to the peasant farmers was clear enough; that to be ruled by another country was humiliating and only by obtaining self government could African interests be properly protected. This was the message constantly hammered home by Nyerere, echoing Nehru's comment a decade before that nationalism was essentially 'an anti movement'.<sup>19</sup> The numerous issues raised by local leaders provided examples of alleged misgovernment; the TANU declaration of intent provided the remedy. Consequently, support was soon forthcoming, even from that section of the community which in the nature of things could be expected to remain parochially-minded and intractably apathetic.

Many of the issues described below arose as a consequence of government policies in the past aimed at achieving better land usage. In addition, however, the spatial factor added another dimension in that without the rapidly improving system of roads, and the means to make use of it, the political mobilization of the African population on a substantial scale would have been difficult, if not impossible to organize.

#### The Meru Land Case

Every U.N. Visiting Mission to the Territory drew

attention to the disquiet caused by land alienation, but it is in the 1954 report that the fullest treatment is given to the land policies of the government affecting Northern Province. It was here that tensions were most noticeable, partly because of the proximity of Kenya and partly due to a rapidly increasing African population finding difficulty in obtaining enough suitable arable land (see Table XVIII). In the past on several occasions the government had acquired land previously occupied by settlers and had made it available for African occupation. The Arusha-Moshi Lands Commission, already mentioned, was yet one more attempt to meet the needs of an increasing African population and to make the best use of the land.<sup>20</sup>

The most controversial part of the Commissioner's Report concerned the area known as the Sanya corridor, part of the plain lying between the mountain features of Meru and Kilimanjaro. In the opinion of the experts, it was necessary to segregate the European and African residents by creating a homogeneous block of alienated land in the northern part of the area. Once this had been done, compulsory dipping would be introduced and cattle ranching on more efficient lines achieved. In the official view, it was necessary 'to build up a ranching industry on modern lines on a considerable scale and a meat industry which is urgently required in the Territory.'<sup>21</sup>

The 'European' residents of the area at the time were mixed British and Afrikaners, the latter being the descendants of a group which settled in German East Africa after the Boer War; the Africans there were some 330 Meru

TABLE XVIIILAND USAGE IN ARUSHA  
AND MOSHI DISTRICTS

	<u>Arusha</u>		<u>Moshi</u>	
	<u>sq.m.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>sq.m.</u>	<u>%</u>
Forest areas	198	17.95	735	36.63
Roads	4	.36	10	.49
Other	35	3.17	50	2.49
Alienated	397	35.99	274	13.65
Balance	469	42.53	938	46.74
	<u>1,103</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>2,007</u>	<u>100.00</u>


(source: Visiting Mission Report, 1954)

taxpayers and their dependants.<sup>22</sup> Much of the land was unoccupied for part of the year when it was not in use by nomadic Masai. Once the scheme was implemented, the four areas of Oldonyo Sambu, Engare Nairobi, Engare Nanyuki and Sanya Juu would be a continuous block of alienated land, with a fenced corridor to allow the Masai to pass through to their southern grazing area. The Meru who were required to move were to be offered compensation and found land in the Kingori area, to the south, where a piped water supply and other services would be provided.<sup>23</sup> Some European-occupied land in the Usa area would be returned to the Meru and farther east more land held by settlers would be acquired for use by the Chagga. The Meru chief, at the time the sole native authority, agreed with the proposals and in June 1949 the Government announced that the scheme would be implemented. From Map V, it is quite clear what the scheme aimed to achieve; African settlement between the two mountain forest reserves would in future be confined to the southern area only.

But it was soon apparent that the Meru remained resolutely opposed to the scheme and were determined to refuse to move. The chief's support for the scheme did little to assist the government's case since his appointment a few years previously had been strongly challenged and his position was still not secure. In practical terms it meant giving up good grazing land and access to some salt pans used by the Meru in pre-colonial days;<sup>24</sup> in political terms the racial segregation which would be achieved by implementing the scheme was a matter for much suspicion.

# TANGANYIKA

## The Sanya Corridor



The focus of opposition in the first instance was the branch of the T.A.A. at Arusha; its secretary, Kirilo Japhet, was later to appear as a petitioner on behalf of the Meru before the Trusteeship Council. By 1950, the chief too had changed his mind and wrote to the Provincial Commissioner requesting him to obtain permission for the Meru living in Engare Nanyuki to be allowed to remain.<sup>25</sup> His conversion did little to help him regain his popularity and within a few years he was compelled to resign. In January 1951, the Meru Citizens Union was formed and it was this organization which collected funds for sending Japhet to New York and which persistently lobbied members of the U.N. missions visiting the Territory.

In mid 1951, the Member for Local Government visited Arusha and told the Meru that the government intended to proceed with the scheme. Since it was clear that the Meru were not to be persuaded, legislation was necessary to enable government to evict those who continued to refuse to move. A Bill, introduced into Legislative Council was passed without opposition, the Meru were forcibly evicted and their huts and store-houses burned down. The land in question and the unoccupied parts of the adjoining area were divided into thirteen farming units amounting to 78,000 acres; these were all alienated during 1952 and 1953 on 99 year leases.

Ironically, after all the controversy, cattle-ranching in the area was never a success and thus the basic aim of the scheme never achieved. Exposed to the hostility of their African neighbours, the new settlers were reluctant

to commit themselves to investment to the extent required by the development clauses in their leases. By the end of 1954, four of the leases had been revoked for lack of development and a new committee was appointed to reconsider the scheme.<sup>27</sup> As a result, four adjoining units were re-divided, the northern part being offered for alienation again and the southern part reverting to tribal occupation by Meru and Chagga. Over the next few years other units also fell vacant and were also re-occupied by the Meru.

At the time, it seemed that substantial economic benefit might result from the scheme and the decision to go ahead regardless of opposition was proof of a determination to comply with Article Ten of the Trusteeship Agreement.<sup>28</sup> Although it was admitted that the Meru required to move were unwilling to do so, it was pointed out that they were being offered generous compensation and, it was thought, their reluctance would disappear as soon as it was clear that the government was determined to proceed. Furthermore, it was argued, opposition came, not from the residents of the area, but from nationalist politicians who were known to be accepting advice from 'subversive' leaders of the K.A.U. Other factors, it was claimed, made the government's case overwhelming: the consent of the native authority had been freely given and his subsequent change of mind could be disregarded; the fact that much of the land from which they were required to move did not 'traditionally' belong to the Meru;<sup>29</sup> the Kingori area was more fertile and would grow better crops; that unbiassed observers accepted that the scheme was

advantageous to the community as a whole;<sup>30</sup> that the European farmers required to move accepted the fact and had complied; finally, the unanimous approval of Legislative Council was obtained before any evictions took place.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, it required no great perception even at the time to realise that the enterprise was open to a most unfavourable interpretation; in effect, it required the mass removal of Africans, against their will, by a European-controlled government in order to make land available for European settlers. This description of the scheme was used so often and to such good effect that it was repeated later in otherwise objective accounts of the period.<sup>32</sup> Commenting on the incident after his retirement, Twining admitted that 'it was a psychological mistake to force the issues when the strength of the Meru opposition had been displayed, but at the time there was a conviction of the rightness of the case.'<sup>33</sup> What made it doubly difficult for the government to reverse its policy was the support for the proposals given by Legislative Council. That this should have been forthcoming was no surprise; the European members wanted 'strong' government and racially segregated blocks in that part of Northern province, the Asians were indifferent and the Africans, influenced by past differences, unprepared to offer support to the T.A.A. and its allies.<sup>34</sup>

If the attitude of the Tanganyika government is understandable, it is less easy to discern why the Colonial Office allowed the Governor to remain set on a collision course. Incidents in the history of Britain itself, such as the evictions of the Highland crofters and the Durham

miners provide, if nothing else, one obvious lesson; once force is used to remove families from their homes, the legalities of the situation are forgotten and only resentment remains. With the groundnut scheme in ruins, any claim that the economic justifications behind the move were paramount, was hardly likely to be greeted with enthusiasm. It must have also been known that there were other areas of the Territory suitable for ranching and these could have been developed with much less trouble. Moreover, although the details were not made public until 1953, the government had by now adopted a settlement policy incorporating the view that racial segregation was unnecessary.<sup>35</sup> The plans for the Sanya area clearly contradicted the policy being adopted elsewhere.

Obviously there were immense technical difficulties in introducing a successful ranching scheme in an area still grazed by cattle herded in the traditional African manner. Although this was the argument used to justify the scheme, probably the government was equally influenced by political pressures. The ever-increasing number of stock thefts from settlers' farms in the area and the difficulty in recovering stolen animals were factors already endangering racial harmony.<sup>36</sup> It was believed that the arrest of cattle thieves would be made easier once a degree of racial segregation was achieved.

Nevertheless, in the Colonial Office it was the potential economic gain which made the scheme acceptable. Before the evictions took place, a petition to the Colonial Secretary received the reply that he fully supported the

Territorial government.<sup>37</sup> Soon afterwards, Lennox Boyd had to answer some awkward questions in the House of Commons and must have wished that the matter had been handled better.<sup>38</sup>

The main interest in the Meru incident is no longer in assessing the accuracy of conflicting accounts but in noting the manner in which it was exploited to promote national integration, so that Africans of differing backgrounds could find an identity of interest in the anti-colonial movement. The incident contained all that was necessary to play upon the fears and resentments of peasant farmers even in districts where the amount of land alienated was minimal. But equally important, Kirilo Japhet became sufficiently well known to be able to attract interest wherever he was invited to speak. To some extent, the regular visits of the Trusteeship Council missions provided the means of gaining publicity; however, more important for Japhet was the opportunity the incident gave to tour the country with Abbas Sykes, a leading member of T.A.A., to raise funds to pay the costs of appearing at the Trusteeship Council's hearing of the petition submitted by the Meru Citizens Union. The necessary funds were collected without difficulty and in July 1952 Japhet presented his case at the Council meeting. Although he failed to obtain sufficient support either in the Trusteeship Council or in the subsequent hearing before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, the fact that Japhet had been able to present the Meru case before a world forum and obtain considerable support created a deep impression on those unfamiliar with the United Nations.

After being allowed to speak at a further meeting of the Trusteeship Council in mid 1953, Japhet returned to Tanganyika and with T.A.A. leaders toured the Territory, describing the events in New York. Meanwhile the government provided extra staff and resources in Arusha district with the aim of inducing the Meru to forget the past. In spite of this, many of those who had been moved continued to refuse to accept the compensation offered and thus end the matter. The 1954 Visiting Mission, although assured by the government that the dispute was now settled, concluded that this was not the case.<sup>39</sup> For the Meru involved, the matter was not ended until the situation prior to 1951 had been restored.

One final comment on the affair is necessary. In charting the course of political development in the Territory, the Meru problem is important for its effect in undermining confidence in the Territorial government; the way in which the dispute was kept alive for so long was one of the more successful tactics adopted by the nationalist leaders.<sup>40</sup> But also the incident provides an exception to the general rule that changes in the landscape during the colonial period were to a large extent the result of government decisions. By 1951 in Tanganyika, a greater degree of co-operation from the people themselves was necessary before plans affecting the land could be implemented.

#### The land alienation issue

The anxiety felt by Africans in different parts of the Territory whenever the alienation of land was discussed

made it inevitable that a major reason given by nationalists for wanting independence was the necessity for stricter control in the future. Even before the end of the second World War, the T.A.A. was voicing its opposition to the proposals of the Central Development Committee, complaining that the arguments used were wrong and that 'settlement was disastrous for Africans.'<sup>41</sup> Opposition to more land being alienated was a consistent theme in the Association's representations made to successive visiting missions. In the case of Northern province there was ample proof that in some areas a land shortage was already a problem. Elsewhere, with the change in government policy from protection of African interests to land utilization and with a fast-increasing African population, it was not difficult to arouse fears that shortages would soon be evident.

But it was not only the occupation of the land which caused the controversy; the issue was inextricably linked with the supposedly inordinate amount of political influence enjoyed by the settlers. If the number of settlers were allowed to grow, it was argued, their influence would also increase. Thus, when the native authorities of Western province told the 1954 Visiting Mission that settlers were welcome in the province since they would provide employment, their remarks were strongly criticised by local TANU leaders.<sup>42</sup> To the same Mission, it was made clear that it was for political reasons that settlers were not welcome. African organizations in Bukoba objected to non-Africans being called Tanganyikans since they 'might claim rights which they did not yet possess and particularly rights to land.'<sup>43</sup> At the other end of the Territory the Mbeya

chiefs expressed similar fears as follows:

'The main thing is no more alienation. We do not want to see the things that are happening in Kenya and South Africa. All the troubles there are because of land.'<sup>44</sup>

This remark impressed the Mission, coming as it did from the more conservative element of the African population. The reference to South Africa no doubt stems from the accounts of labourers returning from the Rand; Rungwe and Mbeya districts provided a large proportion of contract labour taken south.<sup>45</sup>

Thus it was no surprise when the Mission concluded that African opposition to alienation was now a serious political matter; there was little doubt that in the future opposition would be expressed more forcefully and more vocally than in the past. It was probably recognition of this trend rather than the prospect of criticism from the Trusteeship Council that prompted the Governor to assure the Mission that 'it was unlikely that much more land would be alienated for individual European agricultural settlement.'<sup>46</sup> In any case, it was not enough for the members of this Mission and in their report it was recommended that land should be acquired from settlers and a policy of land redistribution adopted. It was the kind of observation which made the private investor look elsewhere before committing money and effort to enterprises in the Territory.

After the visit of the 1954 Mission, the government had no difficulty in slowing down the pace in dealing with plans for new alienations. Applications for land decreased rapidly once the racial harmony of previous years was seen to be in jeopardy. Furthermore, once organized

branches of TANU were established in each area district officers found it more difficult to obtain unanimous consent from Africans affected by an application for land. For even when the people most directly affected were willing to give their consent, they were also reluctant to ignore the official nationalist view that any new alienation should be resisted.<sup>47</sup> In addition, the more militant leaders made sure that alienations previously made were called into question. Survey boundary stones disappeared with increasing frequency and where a settler or plantation manager neglected to make use of fertile land near his boundary, squatters were encouraged to move in and plant crops. To evict them often required police action and this was sufficient to create greater tension.<sup>48</sup>

#### TANU as a mass movement

The African political leaders now beginning to attract attention made use of several other issues in their bid to capture the interest of the scattered rural communities and the skill with which they were argued became an important factor in the process of national integration.

First, there was the widespread dislike of the government's regulations associated with the various development schemes already described.<sup>49</sup> The rules were irksome and the manner in which they were applied often unfair. It was therefore a popular proposition to suggest that they would one day be abolished, together with the cesses levied on certain cash crops. But the encouraging of opposition

to such measures was a sure way of provoking retaliation from government officials convinced that they were necessary and from native authorities charged with seeing that they were observed. Thus in Sukumaland, no TANU branch was permitted to be registered until 1958 since the party there was believed to pose a threat to 'the maintenance of peace, order and good government.'<sup>50</sup> In Tanga province, the Korogwe branch was required to be closed after the chairman announced that there was no longer any need to obey the agricultural rules. In most parts of the Territory similar conflicts between local political leaders and government officials developed in spite of action taken by Nyerere to prevent it happening. As early as 1954, he had visited Kondoa and expressed support for the unpopular soil conservation measures; when TANU was allowed to function in Lake province he spoke in Mwanza, warning the audience that the laws had to be obeyed;<sup>51</sup> after the incident at Korogwe related above, he saw to it that the chairman was replaced; on another occasion he made it clear that he disapproved of the agitation in Iringa which led to the closure of the dipping scheme.<sup>52</sup> For him the major difficulty was the conflict between the need to retain popular support and the equally important objective of demonstrating to the world that TANU could provide responsible leadership if self-government was achieved. From his statement to the Trusteeship Council in 1955, it seems that he never wanted TANU to develop as a mass movement because it might prove difficult to control the more irresponsible local leaders.<sup>53</sup>

Changes in the structure of local government

provided yet another cause of opposition in rural areas to the policies introduced by the Government. The changes in part were the logical outcome of the much criticised policy of multi-racialism, which, as already mentioned, required the Territorial government to protect the interests of all the inhabitants regardless of race.<sup>54</sup> The Constitutional Committee, appointed by Twining recommended that changes in the composition of the Legislative Council were necessary if the new policy was to be taken seriously. The answer, it was argued was to introduce the principle of parity of representation for each of the major racial groups.<sup>55</sup> The careful enunciation of rules to govern communal representation and the ensuing debate was a sure way of introducing racial politics into the Territory and the recommendation of the Committee, accepted by the Colonial Office, has been described as 'in retrospect, the principal blunder of the Twining regime.'<sup>56</sup> In fact, at the time the options were severely limited; the European settlers, who still provided the major part of the export crops on which the economy depended would not have settled for anything less than parity. If their support had been withdrawn, the consequent publicity would have discouraged investment at a time when it was more necessary than ever before to demonstrate to a sceptical world that a colonial administration could provide the surest way to prosperity. At a meeting of the Trusteeship Council, Mason Sears, who had never endeared himself to the Tanganyika government, expressed the view which at the time was widely accepted: 'The multi-racial approach is ... designed to keep alive European and Asian interests which

have contributed so much knowhow and capital to the development of the Territory....<sup>57</sup> In London, the Colonial Secretary explained that the proposals were intended 'to safeguard the proper rights and interests of all the different communities.'<sup>58</sup>

The respective attitudes of officials and settlers to the multi-racial ideals are discussed in the following chapter. Here, it is only necessary to observe that once the principle of racial representation was accepted in respect of central government institutions, it was logical to apply it to local government.<sup>59</sup> In 1950, Twining still supported Cameron's argument that native authorities should be permitted to adapt to new conditions in their own way and in their own time.<sup>60</sup> By the following year, he accepted the proposals whereby non-Africans would participate in new forms of local government which were to be established in both urban and rural areas.<sup>61</sup>

The consequences were two-fold. First, under the new local government legislation a county council was established with jurisdiction over the South East Lake area, which included all the territory controlled by a council of which all the Sukuma chiefs were members.<sup>62</sup> Thus at a time when the chiefs were prepared to resist the incursions of the urban-based nationalists, they learned that their power-base was to be abolished. It was therefore not surprising that they began to act more circumspectly in their dealings with nationalist politicians. In other parts of the Territory, the former native authority councils were effectively replaced by the new multi-racial local (later called

district) councils. Nyerere, being well aware of the chiefs dislike of these innovations, took the opportunity to win their support. He pointed out that their position was threatened not by TANU but by the colonial government:

'.....what we should have done is to evolve our local authorities around the chief as the centre. That is what has been taking place all the time and .... local government should not tend to rule out the chief.'<sup>63</sup>

Second, the statutory right of non-Africans to participate in local government councils provided nationalists with yet another opportunity for confronting the government. Whereas in 1954, the official TANU view was that members of all races should be invited to take part in local government deliberations and many Native Authority councils co-opted non-Africans as members, any attempt to insist that they had a right to full membership was, in some instances, strongly opposed.<sup>64</sup> The government view was that there was a difference between districts with a comparatively large settler population and those without; in the latter, since non-Africans would always remain a very small minority, it was predicted that there would be little opposition to multi-racial councils.<sup>65</sup> In such districts, where the new councils had been established they were already functioning well.

The government's plans to proceed with creating more district councils were examined by a select committee of Legislative Council and, with a few minor amendments, the plans were approved. However, by 1957, TANU policy was firmly opposed to statutory multi-racialism and conflict was inevitable. In the following year, an attempt in Geita

to establish a district council led to some disturbances and in the ensuing argument Africans in many rural areas for the first time became aware of the implications of the intended innovations.<sup>66</sup> Not only was it widely believed that Europeans would tend to dominate proceedings in the Councils; also, it became clear that the bringing together of the representatives of the communities in the council chamber only served to draw attention to the differences between them. Even in Dar es Salaam, where the parity principle had been adopted in the municipal council, it was found necessary to revive the post of district commissioner. Although this seemed at the time to be a retrograde step, in that it reinforced racial exclusiveness, it was argued that the central government was still the most suitable institution

'to maintain law and order, to provide administrative conciliation between Africans and the municipality and to promote the growth of representative institutions for the African population.'<sup>67</sup>

Yet another reason for Africans disliking the parity principle was based on the suspicion that it could be invoked in order to justify an unfair allocation of available resources. For example, when the funds obtained from the sale of enemy properties confiscated in 1939 were made available for spending, it was announced that equal sums were to be allocated to each of the three communities for spending on improving their education facilities.<sup>68</sup> Since by now education to Africans was a much-prized asset, it seemed unfair that with the disparity in numbers and the obvious deficiencies in the African school system, the

government should contemplate parity in distribution of these funds. It was not difficult for nationalists to arouse resentment against a politically ham-fisted decision.

The reform of the native authority system and the introduction of local elections helped TANU to consolidate its influence in the rural areas and the chiefs became progressively more reluctant to declare open support for government policies. In a bid to stop this unwelcome trend, Twining used the occasion of his address to Legislative Council in May 1957 to emphasise the importance of chiefs in African society and suggested that in a future parliament there might be a place for an 'Upper House' consisting of traditional rulers.<sup>69</sup> A territorial Chiefs Convention was established and although regular meetings were arranged it never lived up to the government's expectations; there were by this stage few traditional rulers who were willing to risk their position in their own communities by making an open declaration of opposition to TANU and its aims.

Finally, the co-operative movement made an important contribution to the growth of TANU. The close association of the organisations representing political and economic change was recognised by giving representatives of the three major unions seats on the party's National Executive. In Sukumaland in particular the co-operative movement was both the cause and the consequence of the growth of opposition to colonial rule.

The movement started in Tanganyika in 1925, when the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association was formed. In

1932, in the face of spirited opposition from traders, rules were introduced enabling a Registrar of Societies to be appointed. Thereafter the number of societies rose steadily, from 23 in 1934 to 77 in 1948 and to 140 in 1951. During this period the majority of these societies were affiliated to four unions, three dealing almost entirely with coffee and one, in Southern province, with tobacco.<sup>70</sup> As might be expected, in 1951 the majority of the societies were located in the peripheral areas of the Territory (Table XIX).

These figures are significant in view of what occurred during the next five years. For although there was a steady increase in the number of societies throughout the Territory, in Sukumaland the jump in the number of registered societies was spectacular once the co-operative marketing of cotton was introduced. This was stimulated by discontent with the organization of the cotton industry in the province. The ginneries, all Asian owned, appointed their own buying agents each season. Such appointments were lucrative since it was not difficult to cheat illiterate farmers; for good measure the latter often retaliated by concealing stones in their loads of cotton. In 1947 the TAA appointed independent weighers in Ukerewe, an innovation quickly copied in other Sukuma districts. Even so, the buyers continued to employ sharp practices.<sup>71</sup> Consequently, when Paul Bomani, at the time the secretary of a Traders co-operative toured Sukumaland in 1952 seeking support for the co-operative idea, he found many farmers willing to listen. He could by now explain his plans with some

TABLE XIXAFRICAN CO-OPERATIVESOCIETIES 1951

<u>Province</u>	<u>Affiliated to Unions</u>	<u>Unaffiliated</u>
Tanga	-	5
Northern	29	3
Lake	51	1
Southern Highlands	11	3
Southern	17	1
Eastern	-	1

(source: Annual Report, Department  
of Co-operative Development)

authority, since he had been made a member of the Lake Province Council and had visited Uganda to study the cotton co-operatives which functioned there. Between 1953 and 1960, 360 registered societies, organized into 19 unions, were started in the South-East Lake area.

Undoubtedly, the rapid increase in the number of societies in Sukumaland was the consequence of African farmers being persuaded that they stood to gain if a new system of marketing their crop was introduced. At the same time, the men who toured the countryside seeking support for co-operative principles based their appeal to a suspicious peasantry on political arguments as well and these found a ready response. They aroused resentment against a system which tolerated a 'foreign' buyer growing rich at African expense; they sought to appeal to local pride by suggesting that African 'umoja' (unity) could best be demonstrated by the people themselves controlling the marketing organization; they criticised the government and the chiefs for instituting the two cents cotton cess and promised to campaign for its abolition. The fact that the Sukuma Union and T.A.A. were also encouraging opposition to the cess made evident the close association between the co-operative leaders and the African politicians. Furthermore, when the number of societies increased a new bureaucracy to manage them came into being and this proved capable of acting on behalf of TANU when registration of branches in Sukumaland was refused. Even more important, the new organization provided the necessary link between town and country with the result that parochial barriers were

progressively reduced and Africans from different communities were able to appreciate a sense of common purpose.

When the development of the co-operative movement in Sukumaland is linked with the rapid spread of nationalism it is necessary to remember that the crucial dimension throughout was time. For although each movement gave impetus to the other, the co-operative organization was only an asset to TANU as long as it retained the support of the farmers. At first, this presented no difficulty since the government quickly made it clear that the co-operative marketing of cotton would be encouraged. There were good reasons for this policy in spite of the suspicion of Bomani's motives in official circles due to his close association with Mwanza nationalists. It was argued that with government supervision and emphasis on the societies being run on sound commercial lines, the members could be persuaded to concentrate on economic rather than political issues. With this aim in mind, Twining agreed to an experienced administrative officer being made responsible for the development of the Sukuma societies. In any case, support of co-operatives accorded with previous government policy in that any form of African commercial enterprise was to be encouraged. And so, with the assurance that government would supervise accounting procedures, the more sceptical farmers were also won over. More important, the period of most rapid growth in the number of societies coincided with a substantial rise in prices paid for raw cotton; the more plausible committee members of the societies had no difficulty in convincing their members that co-operation was responsible for the improvement.

But five years later, the picture was different. The distance and communication factors had always made the marketing of produce a difficult operation and by their nature co-operatives are cumbersome and inefficient organizations in situations where quick decisions on commercial transactions are necessary. However competent the paid staff may have been, adequate discretionary powers could not be permitted without incurring unacceptable risks. The bureaucracy needed for the effective running of the organization grew rapidly and became expensive to maintain. Then, once the difference was perceived between the price paid to the growers and that received from the ginners, criticism of the societies and the unions became widespread.<sup>72</sup> When in 1959 there was a threat that rival organizations would emerge the Victoria Federation was appointed the sole buying agent in Sukumaland.<sup>73</sup> This did little to stifle opposition, particularly since the move coincided with a drop in world prices. Inevitably, since TANU was committed to supporting Bomani and the VFCU, opposition to the co-operative unions led to a reduction in the support for the national movement.

Similar developments occurred elsewhere in the Territory. In Rungwe, for example, R.A.C.U., the coffee marketing organization, by 1957 was deducting 14.7 per cent. from proceeds due to growers for marketing expenses, R.A.C.U. levy and commission and, finally, a levy payable to primary societies.<sup>74</sup> Legislation enforcing one channel marketing was introduced, in order to prevent farmers taking their coffee crop to Mbeya to sell to Asian traders there.<sup>75</sup> Even

before this, trouble had occurred in Bukoba. In 1955, discontent with the Union led to the creation of a rival organization with enough support to enable its promoter to be elected chairman of TANU the following year.<sup>76</sup> Nevertheless, from Dar es Salaam TANU headquarters made it clear that it was desirable for the monopoly enjoyed by the existing Union to continue and as a consequence division within the local leadership was accompanied by increased opposition by farmers to the marketing arrangements. The political significance of the co-operative movement at this time can be summarised in this way. First, in the short term it reinforced the nationalist movement in the rural areas. But if the process of winning independence had been prolonged it seems clear that the struggle to control marketing arrangements in many districts would have led to a lessening of support for TANU. Within a few years of independence being achieved, a full-scale inquiry revealed the extent of the malaise within the movement. Second, the co-operative organization provided a new and important link between the town-based headquarters of unions and the committees of the primary societies elected from among the farmers. It was the overwhelming support for TANU in the rural areas during the critical years of the party's dialogue with the colonial government, 1955-1958, which undermined the confidence of the chiefs to such an extent that they were unwilling to unite and become an effective political force.

Thus it seems that the manner of the expansion of the co-operative movement, and in particular its development

in Sukumaland, ensured that it was at the stage in its growth when it was best able to give support to the demand for independence. On the other hand, the more the diversity in forms of African enterprise the more likely the appearance of factions which tended to weaken the opposition to the government. Thus, although the government rated some districts as 'difficult', it cannot be claimed when the predominantly rural districts are compared that support for TANU followed any well-defined pattern.<sup>77</sup> During this period the arguments advanced by the new political leaders made an impression on Africans of very different backgrounds, abilities and interests and whether the issues raised were clearly understood or not was immaterial; the effect was to arouse resentment at European and Asian dominance in political and economic affairs. Much of Twining's unsympathetic attitude to TANU can be attributed to his concern at the inevitable damage to racial harmony which occurred. He stated bluntly 'that the party's policy was racial - it was pure racialism.'<sup>78</sup> He and his advisers were well aware of the gap between the reasoned and reasonable arguments skilfully presented by Nyerere at international gatherings and on formal occasions in the Territory and, on the other hand, the inflammatory and misleading statements made by his subordinates in the vernacular press and at public meetings. As elsewhere in Africa at this time the new leaders were Africanists rather than nationalists.<sup>78</sup> In the situation which existed, the appeal to racial awareness was only to be expected and there seems no reason to try to justify it in such extraordinary terms such as 'non-racial

racialism.<sup>80</sup> The consequence was confrontation with the colonial government, since the attack was shifted from the settlers as a group to non-Africans in general.

Many officials were surprised at this turn of events. To most of them it seemed so obvious that government policies were aimed at improving African living standards that all that was necessary was to ensure that this fact was fully appreciated. The Public Relations department produced three newspapers for this purpose and an official description of the department published in 1954 added, with a touch of complacency, that Tanganyika 'was in a rare position among British dependencies in that at the moment it possesses no critical vernacular press.'<sup>81</sup> What was not appreciated at the time was that official hand-outs appearing in government-sponsored newspapers made little impression. Instead what mattered was the power of the local demagogue who could address meetings in the language that people understood, who made no mention of past achievements but instead promised a future with plenty of excitement and satisfaction as well as assured prosperity. With the aid of a remarkable degree of support from the African population, Nyerere and his supporters were able to demand and extract concessions with more success than they dared hope for. Within a short space of time, settlers throughout the Territory were compelled to take cognizance of the changes which had occurred and which were to influence the course of land utilization in the future.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XI

1. E.g., Maguire and Claggett Taylor, op.cit., and H. Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, (Princeton 1967).
2. The Chagga flew their own flag and observed a 'Chagga day'; several other tribes adopted similar customs.
3. 'The core area is that portion of the state that supports the densest population and has the closest mesh of transportation lines ... is more richly endowed by nature than the rest of the state.' D. Whittlesey, The Earth and the State, (New York 1939), p. 2.
4. In 1974 it was announced that Dodoma had been chosen as the future capital.
5. J.A.K. Leslie, A Survey of Dar es Salaam, (O.U.P. 1963), p. 40.
6. In 1955, only 18 per cent. of boys in the city were attending primary school. Leslie, op.cit., p. 130.
7. Ibid., p. 268.
8. C.f., K. Deutch 'The Growth of Nations: Some recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration', World Politics iv (1953), 168-195.
9. For Dar es Salaam, the growth rate was about seven per cent.
10. During the nineteen fifties, I was struck by the number of Africans of Shinyanga district who would travel by train to Mwanza for a few days visit. At nearly every council meeting at least one absentee would be described as being 'on safari to Mwanza'.
11. Dar es Salaam is omitted as it has already been considered. Mwanza is also omitted since the figure, without explanation, would be misleading; few Sukuma lived within the town boundaries, but the area surrounding the boundaries was heavily populated, almost entirely by Sukuma.
12. E.g., in 1962, of the 4,000 wholesale trading licences issued, not one was taken out by an African.

13. J.K. Nyerere, 'Ujamaa: the basis of African Socialism' first published 1962, and later in Freedom and Unity, (London 1967) p. 164.
14. Ante, p. 304
15. Culminating in the murder of the Regional Commissioner in December 1971.
16. Department of Labour, A.R. 1952.
17. Record of meeting of J.E.C.A.B., 17 June 1955, addressed by Twining.
18. Governor's speech to Mwanza Federation of Chiefs, (Mwanza District files).
19. J. Nehru, Towards Freedom, (New York 1941) p. 74.
20. Cf. K. Deutch, 'Social Mobilisation and Political Development', American Political Science Review 55, pp. 493-514.
21. TCOR 11th sess. 432 meeting.
22. The Government figure, quoted in VMR 1954, p.51. The Meru Citizens Union maintained that the number stated should have been higher.
23. £46,000 was allocated for improvement; The Meru Land Problem (Dar es Salaam 1952), p. 8.
24. In fact, the salt pans were excised from the land alienated; see TCOR 452 meeting, para 21.
25. Mangi Sante to P.C. Northern Province, letter dated 12 Aug. 1950; in record of TCOR 451 meeting.
26. Ordinance No. 48 of 1951.
27. See Report of the Sanya Corridor Committee 1955 (Dar es Salaam 1955).
28. Ante, p. 213
29. Farms 31 and 328 had been alienated during the German period.
30. Trusteeship Council Resolution 468 (ix), A.2150, pp. 49-50.
31. TLC 26 sess. p. 440
32. Bienen, op.cit., p. 26.
33. Chidzero, op.cit., p. 245 f.n.
34. A breach which dated from the failure of the African members to offer positive opposition to Col. 210, the plans for an E.A. High Commission.

35. Government Circular 4/53, op.cit.
36. In response to settler pressure, a special police unit had been established but the problem remained; see TLC 21 Sept. 1957, Vol I, p. 121.
37. VMR 1954, p. 51.
38. HC Vol. 494, Col. 2371.
39. VMR 1954, p. 54.
40. E.g., further debate, Trusteeship Council 20th sess. 1957 (T/PV 815 pp. 52-53).
41. TAA 3rd Conference at Dodoma, 24 March 1945, pp. 1-11.
42. VMR 1954, p. 16.
43. Ibid, p. 11.
44. Ibid, p. 92.
45. The recruiting bureau, WENELA, was based in Rungwe district until 1961 when it was closed down.
46. VMR 1954, p. 90.
47. Based on personal experiences in Iringa district when investigating applications for alienation in 1956.
48. E.g., the Singisi-Poli affair, VMR 1954, para 371; also the squatters on Tapscott's farm, Mpwapwa; TLC 33 sess. Vol I, p. 157.
49. Ante, p. 284
50. Registration became necessary with the introduction of the Societies Ordinance 1954; for TANU in Sukumaland see TLC 31 sess. Vol. I, p. 65.
51. Tanganyika Standard, 25 November 1958
52. VMR 1957, p. 13.
53. TCOR, 7 March 1955.
54. Ante, p. 213
55. Report of the Committee on Constitutional Development (Dar es Salaam 1951)
56. Maguire, op.cit., p. 32.

57. Procès Verbaux, 820 pp. 61-62; cited by Chidzero, op.cit., p. 211.
58. H.C. 482, Col. 1168.
59. Constitutional Committee, op.cit., p. 13.
60. See Twining Despatch No. 88 of 1950.
61. Development of Local Government in Tanganyika (Col. 277) (London 1951).
62. The county council was soon abolished, being too unwieldy and remote; see Governor's address, TLC 33 sess. Vol. I, p. 17.
63. TLC 33 sess. Vol. I, p. 202.
64. For TANU view, see VMR 1954, p. 62.
65. Two reports on the County Council were written by F.H. Page Jones in 1956 and 1957 and published by the Government Printer, Dar es Salaam.
66. VMR 1960, p. 11.
67. E.A.R.C. Report, op.cit., p. 235.
68. Governor's Address 20 April 1955; TLC 30 sess, p. 27.
69. Governor's address, 6 May 1958; TLC 33 sess. Vol. II, p. 483.
70. The Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU), the Rungwe African Co-operative Union (RACU), the Bukoba Native Co-operative Union (BNCU), the Ngoni Matengo Co-operative Marketing Union.
71. Based on personal impressions gained when visiting a buying post. Although the buyer and the independent weigher were not in collaboration, the buyer's demeanour and his obvious anxiety at my presence suggested that faulty weighing was not the only way of cheating the seller.
72. E.g., the cotton price in 1958 was 54 cents (Grade A). Deductions amounted to 2 cents to the Native Authority and 9 cents to the various tiers in the co-operative structure.
73. E.g., the Saidia Waafrika company, incorporated in 1959 with the intention of buying cotton.
74. In addition there were other charges for transport and native authority cess, bringing the total deduction to about 20 per cent; see Rungwe African Co-operative Union Ltd., Ninth Annual Report, 1956-1957 (Tukuyu 1957).

75. See complaint by J. Kasambala of 'unfair competition', TLC 36 sess. Vol II, dated 6 December 1960.
76. The Bukoba Coffee Planters Association, started by H. Rugibizwa.
77. The districts graded for responsibility allowances were listed in Tanganyika General Orders, issued at intervals by the government.
78. Lord Twining, 'The Last Nine Years in Tanganyika', African Affairs LVIII, 1959, pp. 15-24.
79. Cf., Hailey (1956), op.cit., pp. 251-253.
80. The use of these terms is discussed in J.S. Nye, Pan-Africanism and East African Integration, (London 1966).
81. Hill and Moffett, op.cit., p. 117.

CHAPTER XIISETTLERS IN A CHANGING WORLD

From the preceding chapters it is evident that the policies implemented by the Tanganyika government after 1945 made a major contribution to the changes in land usage which occurred. Consequently, it has been necessary to take into account African reaction to colonial rule during this period and to be aware of the constraints it placed on government policy. Also important during this period was the influence exerted by the non-African communities, insignificant in numbers but essential for the economic progress of the Territory. Although the period 1950-55 saw the end of the predominance of the European settlers, it was also a time of increasing production on plantations, small estates and mixed farms. It was a time of confidence in the future, with the probability of expanding world trade and increasing opportunities in local markets; of increased financial support from the Land Bank; of adequate labour supply, more agricultural machinery and new techniques; finally, a time of conviction that the existing complementary agricultural systems would have to continue indefinitely.

When Twining was appointed Governor in 1949, the European settlers were confident that their influence would remain undiminished. They had powerful allies in Kenya, spokesmen for their interests in London and generous representation on numerous statutory Boards and advisory committees in the Territory. In Legislative Council, the

unofficial seats were distributed as follows: Europeans, seven; Asians, three; Africans, four. In Executive Council, of the four unofficials, three were Europeans and the fourth an Asian. At the same time, the rapid increase in the non-African population between 1948 and 1952 and the subsequent up-turn in economic activity seemed to confirm the importance of the immigrant communities.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, although it was recognized that investment had to be encouraged to promote economic development, it also became evident that opposition from the non-Africans might not prevent constitutional changes being introduced. There was only a modest increase in the number of settler farmers and they were well aware that they came at their own risk and did not enjoy the same degree of sponsorship as their counterparts in Kenya.<sup>2</sup> The Asian communities had always been divided by religion and culture and the differences had been sharpened by the partition of Imperial India. Finally, the new Governor had come with clear instructions to take measures to modernize an out-of-date political system and this he proceeded to do without delay.

#### The London view

Since any significant innovation needed Colonial Office approval, Twining had to take into account metropolitan as well as local opinion. It is now suggested that there was never any dramatic and radical change in British colonial policy.<sup>3</sup> After 1945, the official classes

concerned with colonial affairs became increasingly aware of the essential contradictions which were bound, sooner or later, to lead to major crises. Colonial Secretaries of both parties had declared their intention to ensure that the inhabitants of the dependent territories of the Empire were trained to manage their own affairs.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, in those territories where British settlers lived it was necessary to compromise and avoid confrontations, which the Colonial Officer feared would end in public opinion supporting their colonial kith and kin. But compromises cause delay, and from 1947 there was also the growing realisation that there was, no longer, unlimited time available. For the first time plans were made outlining the constitutional and economic measures necessary so that colonial administrations in the African territories could be gradually changed into self-governing states.<sup>5</sup> In the multi-racial territories of East Africa it was therefore necessary to prepare a new African élite to participate in the colonial institutions. There was no longer time for African political processes to 'evolve' as Cameron had hoped would be possible. There was, as Sir Fred Clarke had observed, 'unconscious universalizing of what is distinctively English', a process which years later caused more resentment against colonial rule than it did at the time.<sup>6</sup>

In 1950, only a minority of Conservative M.P.s would have supported a rapid transformation of Empire into Commonwealth. It was therefore a relief for the settlers of East Africa when a Conservative government took office in 1951 and in Tanganyika many Europeans were confident that

a number of the proposed innovations which they disliked would be quietly dropped. They were soon disillusioned. A number of events brought about the change in Conservative attitudes to colonies and overseas commitments. The Mau Mau rebellion provided a salutary shock. Once it became evident that the cost of a military campaign was too great to be met from local resources, it was argued in London that the British government must find and, if necessary, impose a political solution so that future conflicts involving armed intervention might be avoided. A clear warning was given to the settlers when Oliver Lyttleton visited Nairobi in 1952, when he told their leaders that 'rule by a small minority was over and that political advance, when it took place, must embrace all the races in the country.'<sup>7</sup> Although at the time the warning went unheeded, there were soon other indications that Britain had neither the will nor the capability to provide unlimited military aid in colonial wars. The Suez adventure and the sudden about-turn in Cyprus made this only too clear.

Thus, if minority groups in the British African dependencies were no longer to be guaranteed special status, some form of power-sharing had to be devised which would command the support of the majority of the inhabitants. The argument for multi-racial constitutions seemed to be confirmed; the role of the local administrations henceforth was to hold the balance between the competing racial groups. Gradualism had to be re-interpreted; instead of being seen as a long-term process of instructing Africans

to assume positions of responsibility it now became a process of making an orderly retreat from a position of parity toward a new one of supervised majority rule. To those who clamoured for a confrontation, the realities of the situation had to be spelled out, often with brutal frankness.<sup>8</sup> Once the significance of the Gold Coast becoming independent became apparent, the pressures mounted; and with the appointment of Iain McLeod there was a Colonial Secretary who was prepared to act decisively when the need arose. As he described it later:

'The ends of British colonial policy do not change with the change of parties, nor with different Secretaries of State from the same political party. What does change is the sense of urgency of the Secretary of State, or his estimate of how much time is left in the hour-glass - or both ..... Independence once given to the African in the Gold Coast could not for long be denied to his brother in Kenya, and in particular it could not be long delayed only because of the presence of European settlers.'<sup>9</sup>

But in fact, policy had changed as he admitted on another occasion:

'When Harold Macmillan, after the 1959 election, gave me this post (Colonial Secretary) he knew very well, and indeed it was implicit in the offer, that I was going to operate a different form of regime from my predecessor.'<sup>10</sup>

It seems clear that Macmillan was aware that he was altering course and knew that his position within his party was strong enough for him to do this without causing open dissension; otherwise, in finding a replacement for Lennox Boyd he would have appointed someone who was prepared to risk some delay in the ending of British responsibilities if the nationalist leaders in the multiracial dependencies as a result could be persuaded to offer more precise guarantees to their non-African communities.

In the case of Tanganyika, Macleod soon found that there was no need to urge more haste in introducing reforms. The first Territorial elections had provided TANU with an overwhelming victory and Turnbull, now Governor, had responded by appointing a committee with Sir Richard Ramage as chairman, charged with considering further constitutional changes. The proposals submitted by TANU to this committee amounted to internal self-government as well as the demand for new elections based on a common roll and universal adult suffrage. From the nationalists' point of view there could have been no more opportune moment to obtain further concessions from the British government. With public opinion still disturbed by events to the north and south of Tanganyika, namely the Hola Camp affair and the Devlin Report on Nyasaland, it was more necessary than ever before to avoid any further trouble in the area. Returning from a visit to London, Nyerere stated that he was satisfied with the British attitude towards Tanganyika.<sup>11</sup> Two months later, the Governor announced that the date of the next elections, to be based on a common roll, had been brought forward.

It was at this point that Macleod became Colonial Secretary. He called Turnbull to London in order to discuss the proposals in the Ramage Report and on his return to Tanganyika, the Governor was able to announce that with only a few exceptions the recommendations would be implemented.<sup>12</sup> African majority government was thus assured and it became clear that independence could not be long delayed. Once this was understood, many leaders of TANU branches changed

their attitude to expatriate civil servants. For the preceding three years there had been an increasing tendency to make verbal attacks on European officials as if they formed a rival political party. With the Governor's announcement these attacks diminished; expatriate morale improved and there was less talk of leaving at the first opportunity. This was to have an important influence on decisions taken a year later. One of the only valid objections to a rapid transfer of power was based on the fear of an administrative breakdown and an end to law and order. The events in the Congo in July 1960 showed only too clearly what could happen if the government lost control of the situation and there might have been a greater delay between internal self-government (October 1960) and independence if it had been necessary to replace all the expatriates at once. But as it was, Turnbull was able to maintain a pace which satisfied Macleod's own plans for colonial disengagement. As one senior official in the Colonial Office remarked: 'Your Governor seems to be going far too fast in our view, but nobody in Tanganyika seems at all concerned.'<sup>13</sup> Past attempts at predicting a timetable for constitutional changes proved to be utterly wrong; as late as January 1959, it was thought that Tanganyika might achieve independence in 1970; instead, it was to be accomplished within three years.<sup>14</sup>

It can be misleading to place undue emphasis on the change of Governors in 1958 by suggesting that Turnbull understood better than his predecessor the emotive appeal of African nationalism.<sup>15</sup> Comparisons are pointless, since

the situation in 1959 was quite different from what it had been two years earlier and the contest between nationalism and multi-racialism remained undecided. Once it became clear that self-government meant handing over control to a TANU-led administration, it was necessary, as never before, to ensure that the party leadership stayed in the hands of someone who had already gained the confidence of all communities. There were already signs that extreme racialists in the Trade Union movement and in the party itself could attract support and it was therefore necessary to demonstrate that under the existing leadership all aims could be achieved without delay.<sup>16</sup> The turning point in British policy had been the event of the first election, which made it clear that the European settlers no longer existed as a political force. Since everything that followed was affected by this fact, it is necessary to observe how the settlers were compelled to come to terms with African nationalism.

#### Settlers in the post-War era

In spite of their apparent ability to influence government policy in the past, it was soon evident that the European settlers in Tanganyika were too disunited to prevail in the event of a direct confrontation with the colonial administration. Soon they were being forced to accept innovations which they disliked without the crises which would have occurred in Kenya under similar circumstances. There are a number of explanations which, taken together, provide the answer. Hailey has suggested that the diversity in nationalities and the absence of a compact area of settle-

ment similar to the White Highlands of Kenya were the important factors.<sup>17</sup> Although by 1947 the proportion of British nationals in the total European population was considerably greater than before the War, this change was due to the larger number of persons employed in the public services and their dependants, mostly of British origin.<sup>18</sup> The preponderance of British nationals in the settler population was much less than in Kenya and it was only this section of the European community which could provide organized opposition to government policies.

The geographical distribution of the settlers undoubtedly affected their collective impact in political matters although the absence of a single highlands area was not the only factor involved. Table XX describes where the different categories of large-scale farming units were situated in 1952. It will be noted that although the areas where settlers were farming are separated by considerable distances, most of these areas are located in only four provinces. It was a case of separated concentrations rather than scattered settlement.

But more important than the location of the areas of European settlement was the factor already mentioned - the peripheral siting of the capital and the absence of a core area around it. For the majority of settlers, Dar es Salaam was too remote for anything more than the occasional visit; in contrast, Nairobi was within easy reach of most of the Kenya settlers who were able to keep informed on political developments. The towns of Tanganyika although growing rapidly, provided no adequate substitute, as

TABLE XX

LOCATION OF NON-AFRICAN  
FARMING UNITS IN 1952

<u>Province</u>	<u>sisal</u>	<u>tea</u>	<u>coffee</u>	<u>tobacco</u>	<u>mixed</u>	<u>total</u>
Northern	19		86		157	262
Tanga	91	10	9		94	204
Eastern	71				212	283
S. Highlands	-	14	31	31	134	210
Central	-				31	31
Lake	22		1	1	23	47
Southern	19			2	46	67
Western	4		1	1	53	59
						<u>1,163</u>

(source: Report on the Census of the non-African population held on 13 February 1952.)

can be noted from Table XXI. Although these urban centres (Kongwa excepted), provided convenient meeting places for settlers and permanent residents, when compared with Kenya they contained relatively few European residents who were not employed in the public services. A lack of readily available support made it more difficult to organize effective opposition to government policies.

But there are several other factors which help to explain why the settlers were unable to offer any real resistance to the erosion of their influence. First, different forms of economic activity in different areas, as evidenced in Table XX, led to different expectations and attitudes toward African advancement. Those who were determined that the status quo had to be maintained derived support from the owner-farmers and others owning properties and small businesses. In contrast, owners and managers of the large plantations or mining and commercial enterprises were in effect no more than long-term residents, more interested in preserving conditions in which their businesses could prosper. As in the pre-war period the managers of the large estates had little in common with the true settlers who were potential competitors in times of labour shortages.<sup>19</sup> As might be expected it was the sisal interest which carried the most weight with the colonial administration, particularly during the first years of Twining's governorship. Nearly one third of all African paid labour worked for the industry; in 1950 sisal accounted for 55 per cent. of the Territory's exports; equally important, when the sterling area was short of dollars, in 1949 89 per cent. of the dollar

TABLE XXITHE LARGER URBAN CENTRES  
OF EUROPEAN POPULATION

<u>Town</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>Population</u>	
		<u>1952</u>	<u>1957</u>
Dar es Salaam		3603	4479
Arusha	Northern	974	878
Tanga	Tanga	566	768
Kongwa	Central	482	502
Moshi	Northern	459	441

(source: Censuses of non-African  
population held in 1952  
and 1957)

earnings of Tanganyika came from the sale of sisal. Compared with Kenya the contrast is striking. At this time the settlers there were producing eighty per cent. of the colony's exports from a variety of enterprises; of these, the sisal interests, which produced such a divisive effect in European politics in Tanganyika, were much less important.

Second, the pre- 1945 residents in the Territory in the European community formed a comparatively small minority of the group as a whole and their ability to exercise influence was affected accordingly.<sup>20</sup> The more recently arrived settlers were usually more amenable to proposals for change.

Third, the fact of settler over-representation on Boards and committees can be misleading. On the two most important institutions for exercising influence, the Legislative and Executive Councils, by 1948 settlers were by no means adequately represented. They campaigned in vain for the right to elect the European non-official M.L.C.s, well aware that successive Governors had been careful to nominate those who would support the 'official' view on the major issues. As a consequence there was a continuous conflict between the M.L.C.s and the spokesmen for the settlers each branding the other as being unrepresentative.<sup>21</sup> Indeed, one M.L.C. considered it necessary on one occasion to echo Edmund Burke and remind his colleagues that in advising the Governor, nominated M.L.C.s were under no duty to speak for areas or interests.<sup>22</sup>

Fourth, the settlers attracted little support in London which might have counteracted some of the influence

of comments from the Trusteeship Council and pressure from the Fabian Colonial Bureau. Settler supporters in Parliament found themselves increasingly isolated and unable to extract firm promises from the successive Colonial Secretaries.

Finally, a change in the structure and conditions of employment in the Civil Service effectively reduced the opportunities open to resident Europeans to enter government service.<sup>23</sup> The East African governments introduced a unified pay structure in order to avoid complaints of racial discrimination and at the same time provided attractive terms for expatriate recruits by paying an inducement allowance. Since employment in the public services provided a greater proportion of job opportunities in Tanganyika than in Kenya, the effects of the new arrangements were all the more keenly felt; settlers planning careers for their children came to realize that there was little chance of finding employment in the Territory at salaries at the expatriate level.

These diverse factors discouraged and sometimes divided the European community and, as will be seen in the following paragraph, played some part in determining how their political organizations were to develop during the decade preceding independence. If these were not always very effective, it must be remembered that more willing support was always given to the numerous functional associations which seemed more likely to achieve results.

#### European political organizations

After the War, Northern province became the centre of European political activity. Interest was aroused and

maintained by the criticism of white settlement made in the Visiting Mission's Report of 1948, by the Report of the Arusha-Moshi Lands Commission and by the decisions of the Land Settlement Bureau. In 1945 the value of protest had been clearly demonstrated when the settlers of the province had supported the Kenya Europeans in condemning 'Colonial 191' and its proposals for the composition of the East African Legislative Assembly. This protest was important in that it achieved its objective and revealed the gap between the Northern province settlers and the European unofficial M.L.C.s in Dar es Salaam.<sup>24</sup> In 1947 a Northern Province Council was formed, with a full-time executive officer. A monthly news sheet was published setting out the policies to be followed. In brief, these amounted to putting pressure on the government to encourage more European settlement, demanding the re-alienation of the ex-German estates and asking for amendments to the Land Acquisition Ordinance. The last two matters were of particular interest in the province in view of the uncertainty as to what the government would do to meet African demands.

Shortly after Twining's arrival in the Territory the Northern Province Council was changed into the Tanganyika European Council (TEC).<sup>25</sup> In its first bulletin it was pointed out that all the members of the council had been elected, the inference being that there was no reason why European unofficial M.L.C.s should not be chosen in a similar way. Thereafter, increasing criticism of the practice of nominating M.L.C.s. was heard at meetings and was the subject of correspondence in the Press.<sup>26</sup> But it was already too

late. Twining had come to Tanganyika with instructions to see that more Africans participated in the decision-making processes and he fully intended to see that this occurred. With characteristic energy, he set about seeking support for multi-racial provincial councils and for fundamental changes in the existing Legislative Council. A Constitutional Committee was appointed and all the unofficial M.L.C.s were invited to be members.<sup>27</sup> Twining submitted his own confidential memorandum to the Committee, proposing that the provincial councils once established should act as electoral colleges to choose M.L.C.s and that in an enlarged Legislative Council, one half of the unofficial members should be Africans. It was not long before extracts from his memorandum were being published in the local press and, after some incitement from Kenya, causing anger among the settlers.<sup>28</sup> In London, when the Colonial Secretary was asked to comment on Twining's memorandum he replied, somewhat ambiguously, that his predecessor had not received a copy before its issue.<sup>29</sup>

It is curious that Twining should have made proposals which conflicted with the cardinal principle of multi-racialism, which he was to advocate with enthusiasm the following year; this required strict adherence to the rule of parity of representation for the three racial groups. In Kenya, parity between Europeans and Asians had been the rule for a time between the Wars in the composition of membership of the Nairobi Municipal Council. After 1945, the parity principle again became popular when Mitchell, preparing the draft for 'Colonial 191', persuaded the

Colonial Office that for some multi-racial states it provided the only solution. As he described it:

'I had long thought that where there was a problem of several communities, with political capacity in more or less inverse ratio to numbers, the only workable solution was the equal representation of them all without any regard to numbers.... (In Fiji) it seemed to me to work well, and I suggested the same arrangement for the East African assembly '30

The Committee opted for the parity arrangement. Their report was published and, predictably, bitterly attacked by the TEC. Criticism was redoubled when it was learned that the Report had been presented to the Legislative Council and duly approved; since all the unofficial M.L.C.s has been members of the Committee it seemed like constitutional incest to go through the farce of obtaining their approval. To describe the debate as uninspiring would be charitable, the speeches of Phillips and Scupham excepted.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, it is of interest in that it revealed that those who served on the Committee had decided that the parity proposal was only a temporary expedient.<sup>32</sup> Perhaps it was the memory of this occasion that led Twining some years later, to assert that at the time 'all clear-thinking people realized the arrangement was only a temporary measure.'<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, it would seem that in the Colonial Office either it was believed that there was nothing temporary about the parity proposals or else it was decided that it would be wise to declare that there was every intention of retaining the arrangement for some time. Both Lyttleton and his successor, Lennox-Boyd, made such declarations, thereby forcing Twining to assert his own confidence in the policy of parity.<sup>34</sup>

The publication of the Report and the public debate which followed are now remembered as factors which contributed to the decline in inter-racial amity in the Territory. In observing the year which followed, there are two other points worthy of note.

First, in spite of the vehemence of their opposition to the proposals and the promises of support they received from Kenya, the settlers were unable to obtain any concessions. As Twining correctly judged, they could do nothing but pass resolutions. For although individual settlers were usually on good terms with government officers stationed in the same district and no doubt often managed to obtain preferential treatment in a number of ways, collectively their influence was minimal, once the administration was controlled by a determined Governor who, like Cameron, was not afraid to make enemies.

Second, the debate over the Report brought an end to the brief unity of European political opinion under the aegis of the T.E.C. The differences could not be concealed or resolved and led eventually to new political alignments under different leadership. The T.E.C. adopted the line that experiments in power-sharing should be delayed until further economic development had been achieved and that the only immediate constitutional development necessary was to obtain some unofficial M.L.C.s more representative of European opinion. Accordingly, the Regional Associations of the Council were invited to hold meetings and obtain support for these views. At meetings in Northern province, as might be expected, more positive rejection of the Report

was demanded and it was even suggested that outside aid should be sought in order to prevent the Report being implemented.<sup>35</sup> Such suggestions alarmed settlers in other provinces and were roundly condemned by the T.E.C.

Most of the Regional Associations decided to support the policies recommended by the T.E.C. However, the Tanga Association, dominated by the sisal interest, came out firmly in favour of the proposals in the Report.<sup>36</sup>

It was the chairman of the Association, Eldred Hitchcock, who persuaded the Tanga Europeans to reject T.E.C. policy. Although he had previously agreed to be nominated as a Vice-President of the Council, Hitchcock's views were usually poles apart from contemporary settler opinion; when he observed that 'European leadership was an anachronism and change was inevitable', his associates wondered why he had ever agreed to lend his name to the Council.<sup>37</sup> His influence was enormous and although he was a comparatively recent arrival in East Africa he already dominated the sisal industry. During the second world war he had performed an outstanding service as negotiator for the sisal growers in making agreements with the British Board of Trade; he was the General Manager of the extensive estates owned by Bird and Company; in 1949 he founded his own selling organization (TASMA) which was soon responsible for over two-fifths of the sisal exported from Tanganyika and Kenya. Eccentric and often perverse, he was no admirer of colonial establishments; now, however he was proving to be a useful ally for Twining. In 1955, Hitchcock was himself nominated to join the enlarged Legislative Council, thereby involving him in the political developments in the following year.

While the debate on the Report continued and European opinion remained divided on the correct tactics to adopt, other influences were at work which were soon to cause further loss of support for the T.E.C. Colonel D. Stirling, President of the Capricorn African Society, became a frequent visitor to the Territory and, with official approval, began to recruit people who would be willing to take an active part in promoting the Society's objectives in Tanganyika.<sup>38</sup> In the Capricorn Declaration, published in December 1952, the Society was dedicated to bringing an end to all forms of racial discrimination, to promoting the development of the area jointly by all races and to working to encourage federations of adjoining territories under British administration.<sup>39</sup>

In Dar es Salaam, Stirling found a valuable ally in T.W. Tyrell, Vice-President of the T.E.C. and Chairman of the local branch. Tyrell had already drawn away from settler opinion in the belief that opposition to the Report should be ended; however, he now found that although the supporters of the T.E.C. were prepared to accept the parity arrangement, there was no enthusiasm for the ideal of racial partnership inherent in the Capricorn contract. He therefore resigned from the T.E.C. and with Kidaha (David) Makwaia, now a member of the Executive Council, started a Capricorn group in the capital.<sup>40</sup> In Northern province, Stirling asked Robin Johnston, a former administrative officer, to accept the post of Executive Officer for the Capricorn Society in Tanganyika and to recruit supporters wherever possible. With no end of the Kikuyu rebellion in sight and with trouble from Mau Mau supporters in Northern

province, Europeans were now more ready than in the past to listen to the exponents of the Capricorn ideas and the old-guard settlers found themselves in an increasingly isolated position. For the T.E.C. it was the end of the road; in June 1953 it was announced that the Council would try to make the parity arrangement work successfully and henceforth would concentrate on economic matters.<sup>41</sup> Thus there was a three-way split within the European population. The old guard continued to insist that no change was necessary; the T.E.C. supporters occupied the middle ground accepting the multi-racial principle based on the parity arrangement; finally, the Capricorn Group advocated a non-racial society in which leadership would emerge on merit.

The new and enlarged Legislative Council met for the first time in April 1955 and from the start, proceedings were accompanied by good-will and co-operation between all races. Moreover, during the year the same amity existed throughout the Territory.<sup>42</sup> Unfortunately for the government this state of affairs was short-lived. No sooner had the parity proposals been adopted and the new Council assembled than further reforms were introduced which effectively undermined the new system over which there had been so much argument.

The Constitutional Committee had considered not only the composition of the Council, but also the possibility of introducing an electoral system. A Special Commissioner was appointed and recommended how elections might be held in selected constituencies on the basis of a common roll.<sup>43</sup> When Twining was prepared to accept these recommendations,

he found that the reply from the Colonial Office was not over-enthusiastic; all the same, he was authorised to proceed with making arrangements as he wished, provided there was a substantial demand for elections, that it was practicable to hold them and the parity system was maintained.<sup>44</sup> A Committee chaired by the Chief Secretary was appointed to work out the qualifications to be demanded of potential voters.<sup>45</sup> The report, when submitted was forwarded to the Colonial Office for approval with the following observation by Twining:

'If ... all those qualified to vote will duly register and vote, then Africans will in all constituencies except Dar es Salaam have a majority over the combined European and Asian votes.'<sup>46</sup>

Thus if a general election was held and voting followed a racial pattern, the difficulty in continuing the parity arrangement was obvious. Twining disarmed the potential critics by adding that 'as far as I am at present advised elections are unlikely to be held in more than three or four constituencies.'<sup>47</sup> Within a few months all was changed; it was announced that elections would be held in all ten constituencies in two stages.<sup>48</sup> When the elections for the first stage were held in September 1958, TANU achieved such an overwhelming victory that the opposition virtually ceased to exist.

These political developments need to be remembered when the final stages in the decline of the settler influence are examined. When the T.E.C. ceased to function as a political organization, other leaders began to emerge. At the same time once it was realized that the government were

unwilling to take counter-measures in order to weaken TANU, there was a perceptible reduction in investment in agricultural development in some of the crop sectors. Thus, in this case indirectly, government decisions and actions in the political arena were to affect land usage in the future. The decisions which were taken were influenced, not only by African reaction to events but also by the government's capacity and will in resisting any resurgence of settler influence both within the Territory and elsewhere.

From the settlers' point of view, once the threat from TANU was perceived and the government had decided to hold elections based on a common roll, it was necessary to create an organization to replace the defunct T.E.C. The most sensible tactic seemed to be to infiltrate TANU and thus reduce the growing tensions caused by its racial exclusiveness. The only other alternative, the Capricorn Group in Tanganyika, was not a political party and in any case it was compromised by the paternalistic flavour of some of its statements and its declared objective of encouraging federations of adjoining territories. Policies which might appeal to Africans further south, in Tanganyika led to irritation and suspicion.

Twining was thus left to find an answer to the problem he had himself created by allowing the rapid march of events leading to the inevitability of elections on a common roll. His solution was to persuade his nominated M.L.C.s of all races to unite to oppose the nationalist threat. When Stirling stayed at Government House in October 1955, Twining told him that he had decided to

encourage Ivor Bayldon to form a new party; Stirling later commented, 'he implied, but did not say, that the Capricorn Society would be superfluous.'<sup>49</sup> The Governor explained that the name Capricorn and the support of the idea of federation aroused suspicion and a new start was necessary.

Stirling took these comments to heart and when he found that the promoters of the new party were not interested in uniting with his supporters he had Capricorn in the Territory renamed the Tanganyika National Society. Shortly afterwards, the formation of the new party was announced, the name chosen for it being the United Tanganyika Party (UTP).

Its aims were to be as follows:

'to evolve the most suitable form of franchise  
 ... to resist proposals which would result in  
 the domination of one racial group over another  
 ... to resist racial discrimination ... to stress  
 the interdependence of races and to build a  
 nationhood of Tanganyika.'<sup>50</sup>

It is necessary to treat with caution the widely accepted comment that the U.T.P. was a European-dominated party. It is true that the European members were the most articulate, mainly because there were considerable disagreements between Bayldon and the members of the Dar es Salaam branch, who preferred the more liberal policies advocated by Tyrell. But the Asian members of the party, although tending to remain in the background, provided much of the financial support without which no organization could have survived. Finally, since the registered African voters outnumbered the combined totals of the other races, support from that community was essential and explains why in 1957 two thirds of the members were Africans.<sup>51</sup> But the price of retaining African support was for the party leaders to accept policies

which were little different from those being proclaimed more stridently by TANU. Thus the second policy statement, issued in October 1957, demanded a date to be fixed for self-government and an electoral system based on single member constituencies. More important however, was the party's reaction to the election proposals. It will be recalled that Twining expected elections to be held in three or four constituencies. A Bill to make this possible was introduced in May 1957, with unexpected results. For the government, it was prudent to slow the pace of constitutional change without provoking the more impatient nationalists; it was believed that the limited scope of the elections could be effectively justified on administrative grounds. For the U.T.P. it was an advantage to limit the elections to a few constituencies because it was certain that these would be the major urban areas where support for the party was strongest. From the record of the debate in Legislative Council, it would appear that opinions were divided on racial lines. The African speakers, most of them U.T.P. supporters, tabled an amendment calling for elections in all constituencies. The surprise came when Bayldon also spoke in favour of the amendment asserting that 'piece-meal elections would exacerbate tension.'<sup>52</sup> As a member of Executive Council and in view of his close collaboration with Twining, his support of the government's Bill was only to be expected. But many European members of U.T.P. disliked the proposals which they found doubly restrictive, both in the extent of the franchise and in the limited number of constituencies which would be involved.<sup>53</sup> It seems probable that Bayldon

was following a decision taken by his party's executive, well knowing that to do otherwise might have caused the break-up of the party. The government was thus placed in an awkward position; to have passed the Bill using the official majority would have invited a boycott of the elections and civil disobedience. After an adjournment, the Bill was withdrawn, with the warning that elections would probably be delayed. In London, Lennox Boyd explained that he was having consultations with the Governor and that 'whatever was decided, those steps will not be taken out of pique.'<sup>54</sup> Soon it was announced that during 1958 and 1959 elections would be held in all ten constituencies.

African influence over party policy had two obvious consequences. First, the small settler farmer either ignored the call for support or at best gave it half-heartedly. Long before the election debacle, Twining had commented: 'the trouble with Europeans was that they did not like or did not see the need for politics.'<sup>55</sup> While this might have been true at first, by 1957 most of those settlers who with-held their support were either disappointed with the leadership or disliked the compromises in policies which were adopted in order to attract African support. Second, as the party moved closer to TANU thinking there emerged the possibility for a time of a merger between the parties.<sup>56</sup> That this could be contemplated at all reveals that there was an inter-racial consensus on ending colonial rule to an extent never found in other British-administered African territories with plural societies.

Whereas the settlers, with very few exceptions, were firmly opposed to self-government on any terms, the leaders of the sisal industry and members of the business community viewed things differently; for them, there was less concern with the kind of government in power and more interest in its potential capacity to govern effectively so that private investment could continue. Their opposition to TANU was founded on the belief that the nationalist leaders were too inexperienced and their followers too undisciplined to provide stability; it was therefore necessary to support U.T.P. Help from the sisal industry was assured from the beginning; Hitchcock, who had found himself opposed to the T.E.C. and unconvinced by the arguments of the Capricorn Group, organized support for the party in Tanga and it was here that the main strength of the party existed until the end. In contrast, some members of the business community were slow in offering help; this was hardly surprising since many of the more liberal-minded had been members of Tyrell's Capricorn Group and were no doubt confused at the turn of events. Twining, on his visit to London in 1956, explained the position to the Executive Council of JECAB.<sup>57</sup> The following year, the Chairman reminded his members that more active support was still needed: 'the UTP is a body which we believe to be the only hope for the territory'.<sup>58</sup> He went on to ask his members, whether as firms or individuals, they were giving the party the support it deserved.

After he left Tanganyika, Twining, somewhat uncharitably, attributed the dismal failure of UTP to poor leadership. While there is some truth in this, there were

more fundamental reasons for the lack of success.

First, the majority of Asians, who as a community provided the second largest number of voters, were not willing to be seen as opposing a nationalist party. When Amir Jamal, elected with TANU support gave this advice, 'the only way for Asians to live in Tanganyika was to identify themselves with the indigenous majority', many acted accordingly and provided generous financial aid to TANU.<sup>59</sup>

Second, for the African voters, UTP could only offer an alternative to the emotive appeal of TANU if material self-interest was better protected in the event of power being transferred to the multi-racial party. But the elections took place before the entrepreneurial sector of the African middle class had become large enough to count.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, in the professions, Africans occupying positions of responsibility stood to gain more from a transfer of power to a government representing the aspirations of African nationalism; if TANU won their elections their skills would be in short supply and their position assured.

Finally, the emotive issue of land alienation provided the real difference between the parties. Whatever reassurances concerning security of tenure the TANU leaders offered the non-Africans, it never seemed credible that promises made in such circumstances could ever be kept. To outside observers at the time the following comment summarised the situation:

'the main reason for friction between Africans and Europeans is over land and the nationalist land policy has vastly more popular appeal than the multi-racialist. TANU's canvassers (though not its leaders) promise that European land will

ultimately be shared out between Africans; the UTP asks for the granting of long-term rights of occupancy and an unequivocal policy over land tenure.<sup>61</sup>

Compared with the TNS manifesto, which stated that 'all residents have the right to acquire and enjoy property', the UTP policy went further toward recognizing African susceptibilities over land occupied by settlers. Whereas the former implied that alienation might continue, the latter restricted its interest to providing security for those already in possession. The distinction is an important one; the Capricorn Declaration, which was similar in this respect to the TNS manifesto, attracted the retort from the nationalists that it was meaningless to proclaim the principle of equality of treatment in purchasing or leasing land when only the immigrant races had the necessary accumulated wealth or credit backing.<sup>62</sup> The European spokesmen in UTP realized that security of tenure of land and ownership of property were the two issues which were most important for their non-African supporters; providing they could persuade their African members to agree to the necessary assurances, they were prepared to make any amount of concessions in other matters. For their part, the TANU leadership both before and after the elections were persuaded to accept as a political necessity the fact that Nyerere on many occasions gave positive assurances to non-Africans that their right to possess land would remain unchanged after independence was gained.<sup>63</sup>

The consequences of these developments were a growing similarity between policy statements emanating from TANU and UTP respectively and a blurring of the racial

divisions in political alignments to an extent that had never occurred before in a multi-racial territory in Africa. For Nyerere and his closest followers, the greatest danger came from within the nationalist movement. There also seemed to be differences between those who spoke for the European community although they were generally agreed on the proposed constitutional developments.<sup>64</sup> The active supporters of TNS prudently called themselves independents and were able to obtain TANU support in the elections;<sup>65</sup> afterwards, Nyerere adroitly made use of their influence in negotiating further concessions from the colonial administration so that the majority of his supporters remained satisfied with the progress toward independence. Moreover, it was not only in Tanganyika that these expatriate nationalists were influential; in Britain their support for the demand for independence made a profound impression, and their contact with Stirling ensured the full use of informal channels.<sup>66</sup> The European leaders of the now defunct UTP also made statements welcoming the progress toward independence and this apparent harmony in views received world-wide publicity. Thus the orderly and rapid transfer of power could be arranged without causing indignation in Britain that 'kith and kin' were being betrayed. Furthermore, commercial interests were well satisfied with the political developments. More than once it was observed that nationalists who were prepared to use constitutional means to obtain their objectives deserved co-operation. In his annual statement, the Chairman of JECAB drew attention to the 'amicable atmosphere' prevailing in Tanganyika and

the fact that 'all other territories with which the Board was concerned were in a disturbed political state in 1960.'<sup>67</sup>

Nevertheless, at this time the average settler farmer was far from optimistic about the future. According to one account, 'morale in Northern province is at an all time low.'<sup>68</sup> The major reason for this was the increasing danger of a breakdown in law and order, which posed an obvious threat to those who lived in remote areas. Recent events in Kenya and the Congo provided alarming examples and there was a growing realization that the colonial government's capacity to keep control was now in doubt. Turnbull had given fair warning of the difficulties to be expected when in the previous year he announced the appointment of five TANU-approved ministers and added:

'The government we are establishing today is designed to bridge the gap between - on the one hand - the old form of colonial government in which the Executive Council, consisting of government officers plus a number of nominated unofficials, worked to a largely nominated legislature, and - on the other - what is known as 'responsible government' in which the Executive will contain a majority of unofficial ministers and will work to a legislature of which the majority of the members will be elected. Transitional governments of this sort are by repute the most difficult of all to operate...'<sup>69</sup>

Second, the settlers were convinced that the growing power of the trade unions threatened their economic survival. A series of strikes from 1956 onwards demonstrated what could be done with organization and plantation manager and settler farmer were particularly vulnerable to the effects of a prolonged withdrawal of labour. The co-operation between the TFL and TANU was complete at this time and with local nationalists showing scant sympathy towards immigrant farmers

it seemed as if demands for higher wages would continue until every employer was forced out of business. It was the worst of all possible situations, the usual tensions between management and worker being exacerbated by the racial differences between them.

To these problems there was an answer; the settlers discovered Thomas Hobbes and came to realize that divided sovereignty, as existed during the transition period, was the road to chaos. Thus, if crime was to be punished and restraints imposed on union leaders and other over-mighty subjects it was better if sovereign power was unambiguously handed over to the nationalist leaders.<sup>70</sup> By the following year, most settlers were convinced that providing they were making a contribution to the country's economy, they would be allowed to continue as before. Thus the fact of independence brought no immediate end to the pattern of large-scale farming which had developed through the colonial era. It did however make it improbable that any new alienation of land would take place except where additions to existing leases were considered to be in the public interest. It remains necessary to assess the relative importance of the many factors mentioned above which together contributed to the failure of the European settlers in Tanganyika to make any impact while the debate on the Territory's future was being conducted. First, they were disorganized and divided at the time when they had to meet the challenge from Twining's innovations; the size of the settler population and some of its characteristics, the environment which determined the economic activity and the spatial distribution all contributed to leave them in a weak position.

Secondly, there were the external factors, chiefly the British government's willingness to divest itself of responsibility for Tanganyika and the failure of the settler's allies to provide help. In the case of the Kenya settlers this is understandable since they were soon pre-occupied with their own problems; but in the case of JECAB, which claimed to represent their interests in London, some further comment is necessary. Some indication of what the Board thought it could do is given in these extracts:

'Balanced presentation of the facts to the authorities .... (is) of the utmost importance. In this we have been well served by our members in the House of Commons.' 71

and later:

'We can go and see Ministers when we receive letters or any form of representation. Without saying anything or committing Ministers at all, one can go quietly and tell them what has been said.' 72

But JECAB primarily represented commercial interests, controlled by men who accepted that the old Colonial Empire had to change. There were no objections to Twining's innovations and no concern expressed about developments until the extent of the support for TANU was perceived. After 1957, the government was firmly committed to its policy of disengagement and was more interested in the views of officials and nationalist politicians from the dependencies than in satisfying the requirements of the Board. Whether the close contacts with the government were ever as valuable as members of the Board were led to believe is something which would be difficult to decide; what is clear, however, is that it became increasingly difficult for the

government to give the Board any firm indications of their future intentions in East Africa. The final entry in the Board's files, a history of its activities, contains this revealing comment:

'visitors were provided with up-to-date information on what the actual policies of HMG were and with a fair warning of what was actually happening and likely to happen in the territories.'<sup>73</sup>

The changes which stemmed from the Report on Constitutional Development, the rising expectations among African leaders following the Visiting Mission Report of 1954 and events elsewhere in Africa made change inevitable. The critical stage in the process was the event of the first elections. Critical, because the decisions taken affecting the elections and in response to events immediately following them undoubtedly prevented a situation arising which would have led to a general disruption of the estate farming system. First, there was the much criticized triple-vote system which prevented political alignments corresponding with racial divisions. It provided the necessary political education for both Europeans and Africans; each was made to realize that if electoral success was to be achieved they could not disregard the fears and hopes of the other. Second, the fact that the British government took the correct decision - as it turned out - to make no objection when progress to independence was speeded up after 1959. The rapid change in the political system and the amicable atmosphere in the negotiations ending with independence did nothing to solve the economic problems of the new state. In spite of the absence of violence which attended the

changes, within one year nearly half the expatriate civil servants had resigned, private investment was disappointing, unemployment had risen, there was a marked deterioration in race relations and the moderates in the TANU leadership had lost ground.<sup>74</sup> The situation was not encouraging, but it would have been infinitely worse if the European settlers had been better organized, more militant, effectively represented and able to delay the inevitable march of events.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XII

1. In these four years, the European population increased from 10,648 to 17,885 and the total non-African population from 70,160 to 93,434: Report on the Census of the non-African population held on 13 February 1952 (Dar es Salaam 1954).
2. In Kenya settlement of ex-servicemen was encouraged by the European Agricultural Settlement Board; for a summary of its activities see L.W. Cone and J.F. Lipscomb, The History of Kenya Agriculture, (Nairobi 1974).
3. See I. Macleod, 'Britain's future policy in Africa', Weekend Telegraph, 12 March 1965.
4. Statements by Oliver Stanley (1943) H.C. 391, Col. 48 and J. Griffiths (1950) H.C. 477, Col.1388.
5. Prepared by A.B. (later Sir Andrew) Cohen, at the time Permanent Under Secretary, Colonial Office Africa Division; the outcome was the Creech Jones despatch on local government, 1948.
6. Cited by Lee, op.cit., p. 79, which see for further comment. Also see post, p.431
7. M. Blundell, So Rough a Wind (London 1964) p. 115.
8. Ibid, p. 266; according to Blundell, a Tory M.P. expressed the prevailing mood with the memorable words 'what do I care about the \*\*\*\* settlers, let them bloody well look after themselves.'
9. Macleod, op.cit.
10. I. Macleod, 'Blundell's Kenya', Spectator, 20 March 1964.
11. Kenya Weekly News, 21 August 1959, p. 20.
12. Governor's address to Legco., 12 December 1959.
13. Personal discussion with Sir John Macpherson, Permanent Under Secretary.
14. Conference of East African Governors at Chequers, January 1959 (see Blundell, op.cit., p. 261.)
15. Listowel, op.cit., p. 167; 'Twining's successor ... knew the realities of modern Africa'; see also similar comment J. Hatch 'Bright Star of Africa', New Statesman, 12 September 1959.

16. This was not always easy; in March 1959 a crisis arose when Nyerere, to retain the confidence of his followers, demanded self-government before the end of the year, adding that failure to meet the demand would result in a campaign of mass disobedience. Being unable to meet this demand, Turnbull had to produce other concessions.
17. Hailey (1956) op.cit., p. 302.
18. In 1952, 69.6 per cent. of the European population were British subjects; Census 1952, op.cit.
19. In Northern province annually 1948-52 there was a shortfall in the labour supply with the position gradually growing worse. Northern Province Labour Utilization Board Report (Dar es Salaam 1952).
20. According to the 1952 census, less than one third of the European population had been in the Territory for more than five years (Census, Appendix XII).
21. C.f., Bayldon, TLC 26 sess., p. 208.
22. Hourii, loc.cit., p. 219.
23. Report of the (Lidbury) Commission on the Civil Services of the East African Territories and the EAHC (London 1954).
24. As a result of settler protest, Colonial 191 was replaced by Colonial 210.
25. The decision to form the TEC was taken at Dodoma in October 1949.
26. Tanganyika Standard, 5 July 1949.
27. The chairman was the Member for Law and Order; for a full account of the Committee's work, see M.L. Bates, Tanganyika under British Administration, Thesis held at Rhodes House, Oxford.
28. Known as the 'cockshy', the substance of Twining's memorandum was discussed in the Lake Province Council in December 1949; see also Tanganyika Standard, 3 December 1949.
29. Griffiths, H.C. 474, Col. 940.
30. Mitchell, op.cit., p. 219; see also Inter-Territorial Organization in East Africa, (Col. 191) (London 1945), p. 8.
31. E.C. Phillips was Chairman of Tanganyika Packers Ltd; Brigadier W. Scupham was an ex-administrative officer. Both were subsequently knighted for services to Tanganyika.

32. TLC 26 sess. pp. 168 and 174.
33. Twining, tape-recorded interview, held at Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Library.
34. Governor's address, TLC 30 sess. 20 April 1955.
35. VMR 1951, p.6; on the demand for intervention see East Africa and Rhodesia, 13 September 1951.
36. East Africa and Rhodesia, 18 October 1951.
37. E.F. (later Sir Eldred) Hitchcock, 1887-1959; arrived Tanga 1937; MLC 1955-1958, see V. Bartlett, 'Struggle for Africa', (London 1953), p. 206.
38. His brother was a Director of Stirling Astaldi Ltd., a firm which undertook several major road building contracts with the Tanganyika government.
39. The Declaration was eventually ratified at the Salima (Nyasaland) Convention in 1956. Dr. J.H. Oldham, chairman of one of the London Capricorn committees based his book, New Hope in Africa, on the Capricorn ideals, C.A.S. files, 15, 16.
40. Kidaha Makwaia, Chief of Usiha, Shinyanga district until he resigned in 1952. Appointed MLC and became the first African member of Executive Council. Member of the 1954 Royal Commission on East Africa.
41. East Africa and Rhodesia, 18 June 1953, p. 1351.
42. C.f. J. Hatch, New from Africa (London 1956) p. 53.
43. Professor W.J. Mackenzie; see Constitutional Development Commission Report of the Special Commissioner (Dar es Salaam 1953),
44. Colonial Secretary, confidential telegram No. 206 dated 4 April 1956.
45. Committee regarding election qualifications, Paper No. 1 of 1957 (Dar es Salaam 1957).
46. Twining, despatch No. 1170, dated 23 November 1956.
47. Ibid.
48. TLC 33 sess. 17 September 1957.
49. I.F.C. Bayldon, MLC 1952-1958, member of Executive Council; Stirling, letter to Johnston and Tyrell dated 2 November 1955, CAS 11/15.

50. Summarised from statement published in East Africa and Rhodesia, 1 March 1956.
51. See VMR 1957, p. 13; the Mission was told that the total number of enrolled members was about 10,000.
52. TLC 32 sess. p. 99.
53. Personal communication from a UTP committee member.
54. H.C. 569, Col. 761.
55. Twining, confidential meeting with JECAB Executive Council, 5 September 1956.
56. For comment on possible merger, see Tanganyika Standard, 26 June 1958; negotiations ended abruptly when the news was leaked to the Press.
57. JECAB meeting, loc.cit.
58. Earl De La Warr at Annual General Meeting, 1957.
59. A. Jamal, as reported by East Africa and Rhodesia, 25 September 1958.
60. Ante, p. 348 also refers.
61. Economist, 26 October 1957, p. 300.
62. N.K. Japhet in Manas, (Calif.U.S.A.) 12 December 1956.
63. E.g., 'Nobody asks him to give up his sisal estates... he should only give up the privilege of being regarded as a special Tanganyikan', J.K. Nyerere in Kenya Weekly News, 19 September 1959.
64. Particularly on the subject of representation; the Northern province settlers continued pressing for communal representation, which TNS and UTP opposed.
65. After the elections a Capricorn Newsletter congratulated 'members Bryceson and Chesham on their electoral successes', in spite of their close association with TANU, CAS Newsletter 17/58.
66. Although Stirling resigned the leadership of the Capricorn Society in 1958, he maintained close contacts with successive Colonial Secretaries, including Macleod.
67. Chairman's statement, Annual General Meeting 1960.

68. Letter dated 9 August 1960 from a settler to Capricorn Office, CAS/11/97.
69. Turnbull, Swearing in of Ministers, 1 July 1959 (Dar es Salaam 1959).
70. Confirmed by the fall in man days lost through strikes; in 1960, 1.49 million, reduced to 74,000 in 1961.
71. Chairman's statement to Annual General Meeting.
72. Ibid
73. JECAB files, final entry.
74. (i) Race relations were adversely affected in 1962 by publicity when four 'arrogant' Europeans were deported and by a spate of provocative editorials in the vernacular press.  
  
(ii) Extremists in TANU gained a temporary advantage with the reorganization of the government following Nyerere's resignation as Prime Minister in the same year.

CHAPTER XIIICOLONIAL POLICY: SOME CONSEQUENCES

At the beginning, it was emphasised that land usage during the colonial period was profoundly affected by government policies. Nevertheless, from the description of the events and pressures which influenced the decisions affecting agricultural development during the period under review, it is evident that at different times there were important changes in priorities. Hence, if explanation of patterns of land usage is attempted, the point in time is important; no one conceptual model could portray with any accuracy the variety of factors which at all times determined the crucial relationship between Man and Land. Instead, a series of constructs would be necessary, taking into account innovations in farming organization and the consequences of a combination of greater financial resources and improved technical knowledge. Change in the African sector of the agricultural system was particularly affected by government policies as acquired knowledge, more finance, more staff, and an improved infrastructure permitted a gradual release from the tyranny of the environment so that the underlying mechanism governing the development of spatial patterns has to be explained, to an ever-increasing extent, in political terms set in a world context. For Africans the tangible signs of colonial rule represented a decisive break with their past; the infrastructure of communications, market organization and the various services provided the foundation

on which Africans themselves would build after independence; on the other hand the colonial presence in the Territory was of such short duration and contact with non-Africans so limited that it is doubtful whether it affected more than superficially the basic cultural continuity in many of the African communities. Nevertheless, among historians the debate will no doubt continue; either the colonial period is an episode of African history to which the various indigenous communities made the necessary adaptations or, on the other hand, it introduced a disruptive element with such traumatic consequences that in the post-independence era political and social structures need psychological decolonisation.<sup>1</sup>

These arguments may be relevant in the case of many newly-independent African states when explanations of social behaviour are sought; in the case of Tanganyika, both are valid when the post-independence developments in the agricultural sector are considered. On the one hand, in the rural areas an essential continuity could be discerned, not only in attitudes and perceptions, but also in the planning of innovations. On the other, the leaders were well aware of the need to assert new values before too many people had a vested interest in preventing change. The two strands came together in the creation of the Ujamaa settlements, combining the knowledge gained by past experience with a new ideology, based on the desire to make the term 'African socialism' more than empty rhetoric. Whereas the latter was the product of African reaction to colonial rule, the former was the consequence of an equilibrium maintained

between the different sectors of the colonial agricultural system.

For this reason, it helps to understand the foundations on which innovation could be based and the events which led to the development of the dual, and later the triple, system of agriculture in the Territory. Each situation which developed was linked to the one which preceded it and explanations of the phenomena of the present are best found by genetic study. Although the utility of this approach has been questioned, from events in Tanganyika it is evident that innovating policies have often been limited or influenced by the situation resulting from previous decisions;<sup>2</sup> in particular, where environmental and spatial factors limited choices in land usage policies it was found to be unwise to embark on major projects without the benefit of past experience or of adequate research. In any study of land usage during the colonial period in Africa the conclusions are likely to be incomplete unless there is an understanding of the political and social factors which determined the course of development; for these are nearly as important as the various practical steps taken in the Territory after 1945 which led to a rapid expansion of the agricultural sector, a development already ably described by others.<sup>3</sup> Hence it is necessary to finish by summarising the major aims of colonial policy to which substantive agricultural policies were always subordinated and the changes in the cultural landscape which resulted from these policies. It is then possible to assess the political and social consequences of implementing these policies and the

economic structures which had developed at the time of independence.

Aims, achievements and consequences

There is no satisfactory answer to the question concerning the degree of Colonial Office control over events in any of the territories administered by Britain. As with other African colonial dependencies, after 1945 the administration in Tanganyika was more effectively supervised than in the past; this was made possible by the increase in the number of committees and advisory bodies working within the Colonial Office and was stimulated by M.P.s showing more interest in African affairs as well as more critical international comment. But supervision is essentially negative and in the post-war period the new emphasis on the government's role in economic development made it more necessary than ever before to ensure that budgetary policies were appropriate. Nevertheless, even when the Territory's annual estimates gave cause for misgiving, the Colonial Office officials could do nothing about it. When this occurred in 1947, it was observed that by the time the details were received in London it was already too late to insist on changes being made.<sup>4</sup>

In order to comprehend the Colonial Office 'thinking' it is necessary to make assumptions from the public statements of Colonial Secretaries and Governors. Within the guide-lines imposed by substantive aims of British policy for Tanganyika, the local administration

devised their own empirical policies. In the case of agriculture, these were subjected to the environmental limitations already described, but were adapted to meet new demands, to make use of newly-found knowledge and to exploit new opportunities. The substantive aims mentioned above can be discerned without difficulty and can be briefly summarised. Before 1939, the aim was to govern in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Mandate and to take precautions against the German threat; after 1945, it was to encourage economic development and prepare, without undue haste, for self-government. Throughout the period of British control, it was necessary to observe the iron law of colonial self-sufficiency, imposed by the British Treasury.

Colonisation, the settlement of British nationals in the Territory on a permanent basis, was encouraged if it contributed to these fundamental aims. The only time that it was considered desirable for political reasons was when the German threat was perceived and required counter-measures. In retrospect, the decision to step up alienation after 1945 has caused more controversy than was apparent at the time; Creech Jones, having decided that settlement might aid the Territory's economy, was able to reassure those who feared the consequences of settler influence. It must be remembered that in 1947, no one could foresee the extent of the sisal boom and the immediate concern was to achieve self-sufficiency in cereals. In short, settlement was encouraged while it was expedient; with no freehold grants or 999 year leases, it cannot be concluded that there was any attempt to implant a white community on a permanent basis.

Moreover, the colonial administration was able to steer the Land Settlement Board on a course which took account of the intention to expand the non-African sector on one hand and of African anxiety on the other. The number of applicants for land was never so large that it was necessary to yield to pressure and permit more alienation than was deemed expedient; at the same time there were enough would-be farmers to make it unnecessary to offer extra inducements in the form of subsidies or grants. When prior to independence applications for land diminished substantially, there was cause for satisfaction; the economic contribution which might be expected from new settlers had become progressively less important as more funds than ever before were allocated for expanding other methods of commercial farming. In social terms, too, there were no advantages now from increased white settlement; the 'contact' theory had been made irrelevant for a number of reasons. The increasing opportunities to obtain formal education provided a more direct way of changing attitudes and customs; the enlarged natural resources departments were better able to furnish information and advice; the Department of Community Development was expanded and extended its operations in the more remote rural areas; finally, there was a substantial increase in the activities of the Christian missions, thereby providing one of the most important forms of contact with African communities.<sup>5</sup>

In the preceding chapters it was opportune to consider the consequences of colonial agricultural policies in Tanganyika in the context both of their economic effects

and of their influence on the growth of African nationalism. In the case of the latter, it has been pointed out that policies unpopular with rural communities gave African political leaders a tactical weapon which they exploited to good effect during the period of confrontation with colonial authority. Nevertheless, the consequences of colonial policy in the long term are of greater importance and require further explanation.

In retrospect, it is evident that after 1945 the Colonial Office insisted on the adoption of policies which not only revealed the political limitations of colonial administration but also provoked an African reaction which was to influence post-independence agricultural policy. The many facets of development policy were always interconnected and problems arose because innovations could not be introduced piece-meal in an orderly fashion. Long before the dissolution of the British Empire was contemplated, Oliver Stanley had placed on record the plan for the dependent territories, observing that 'political development towards self-government had to follow investment in education and economic development'.<sup>6</sup> His successors at the Colonial Office were soon to be persuaded that there was no question of political change being delayed until the other aims had been fulfilled. Independence granted to India and Pakistan created expectations in other dependent territories which had at least to be recognized; in Tanganyika, more than elsewhere, innovation leading to political development was necessary if Britain was to be able to justify her stewardship.

Thus, in line with other dependent territories, the

government of Tanganyika exchanged its negative, 'protective' role after 1945 for more constructive policies. This fact and the progressive rejection of the device of indirect rule which operated in much of the Territory combined to bring about a change in African attitudes to colonial rule. They were far more complex and enduring than what might be attributed to a temporary resentment at alien rule. The development of agricultural policies after independence reflects a continuing awareness of the colonial experience as well as a handed-down acceptance of the shortcomings of traditional farming practices.

Colonial agricultural policy was based on the need to continue with the dual system with the expectation that the African sector would contribute a progressively increasing proportion of the total amount of cash crops. The searching investigations of the Royal Commission had led to its members expressing their confidence that the African sector of the agricultural system would be modernized through the efforts of the existing extension services once the traditional pattern of land tenure was changed; in turn, the World Bank Mission while agreeing with the argument, amended it in the light of changed political circumstances and the observed results of later experiments in land usage. It was suggested that the policies being followed needed to be supplemented by a more radical plan of action; the Mission's report recommended the adoption of the 'improvement' approach, aimed at persuading peasant farmers to change methods and attitudes and the 'transformation' policy, requiring close control of land use when new land was made

available.<sup>7</sup> The latter prescription found favour with the African leadership after independence for a number of reasons, technical, social and political. They are important, not only because they were the consequence of colonial policies but also because they illustrate the variety of the factors which affect the crucial relationship between Man and the land he cultivates.

First, the technical reasons for adopting the transformation approach require little in the way of further explanation. Except where perennial crops were grown, peasant farming organization had been linked with small cash incomes and usually with soil deterioration. Group farming schemes, although they had often not been well supported and had proved difficult to administer, could nevertheless provide some genuine economies of scale as well as the opportunity for effective supervision. Furthermore, much of the land destined to become available for farming would be based on irrigation schemes which would require farming practices to be more closely supervised than was necessary in the dry-farming areas. More important, by 1959 the T.A.C. experiments had begun to provide some hope that supervised schemes would eventually be both popular and profitable. Finally, the opening up of new land offered opportunities for enterprising Africans to use modern equipment and farm larger areas; by copying the methods adopted on the estates and with the added advantage of expert advice from the extension services, there was every likelihood that the farmer who was prepared to take risks would usually find his efforts rewarded.

But to Nyerere and his colleagues, the transformation approach was attractive since it provided an opportunity to show that independence made it possible to introduce new policies and to question the generally accepted view that progress depended on Africans adopting commercial attitudes to farming. The perceived need was to create a national identity and to put an end to the thoughtless admiration of European technical and cultural superiority.

Such attitudes, which caused Nyerere much irritation, had developed rapidly after the second world war. At a time when a number of new policies had to be implemented, the civil service received an influx of newly-recruited expatriates; most of them were freshly discharged from the Forces, a fact which set them apart from the old hands.<sup>8</sup> Posted to remote areas, they had little understanding of traditional customs or patience with a more leisurely attitude to life. Progress, they said or implied, could only be achieved if European standards were adopted. At the same time, Africans were discovering the economic advantages of a formal, westernised education and soon there was more prestige in having attended a secondary school than that formerly accorded to a 'swahili'.

The consequences were two-fold. Muslim organizations formed their own pressure group and for a time exercised a divisive influence within TANU.<sup>9</sup> Secondly, at a time when the sudden event of independence made it necessary to create a national identity without delay, some form of protest became necessary whenever expatriate advisers

appeared to assume that modernization was synonymous with the adoption of European customs and attitudes. Nyerere's speeches after independence criticising colonial rule contain many more references to 'humiliation' than to economic injustice or neglect. On one occasion he observed:

'Of all the crimes of colonialism there is none worse than the attempt to make us believe we had no indigenous culture of our own and what we did have was worthless.'<sup>10</sup>

But this retrospective resentment was more than an appeal to national pride; it helped to reassure the middle-rank TANU leaders, most of whom had had little opportunity for achievement within the colonial bureaucracy.<sup>11</sup> Many of these suspected that although they had been in the forefront of the independence struggle, they would be supplanted by men who had obtained a better formal education.

Nevertheless, observations about the past had to be translated into something more positive, if independence was to be seen as more than the exchange of one élite for another. Thus Nyerere's well-known explanation of African socialism went further than reminding his followers of the value of the communal loyalties and social obligations of traditional society.<sup>12</sup> It constituted an attack on the basic tenets of western liberalism, whereby political, economic or social restraints on individual liberty should be as few as possible. Colonial administration had been anchored on the assumption that economic development and the improvement of living standards would be achieved, on the one hand by encouraging private investment, which would create wealth and on the other, by supporting those Africans who were prepared to emulate the foreign entrepreneurs with

whom they came in contact.<sup>13</sup> The Royal Commission Report, the result of a searching inquiry by acknowledged experts, did not challenge these assumptions: the contribution of the non-African sector to the net money product was acknowledged and it was recommended that enterprising Africans, 'who wanted to live differently from their neighbours', needed encouragement.<sup>14</sup> This was forthcoming; aid was given to the 'progressive' farmer and annual competitions were instituted to name the most successful.<sup>15</sup>

The advocates of the new socialist philosophy looked askance at this support for individuals who sought personal gain, and Nyerere's arguments repeated more forcefully his past opposition to attempts to implement the Royal Commission's proposals for individualization of land ownership. In 1958 he had warned that if a freehold system was introduced 'it would be just possible that within eighty or a hundred years, all the land in Tanganyika would belong to wealthy immigrants and the local people would be tenants.'<sup>16</sup> At the time his fear seemed exaggerated since the government had already confirmed that control over transfers of land would be retained where transactions involved Africans and non-Africans;<sup>17</sup> nevertheless, if multi-racialism required the abolition of discriminatory laws, the situation might well have changed. Now, with independence achieved, it was evident that it was not enough to reject the proposals in the 1958 White Paper;<sup>18</sup> instead, it was decided to nationalise the freehold lands, most of which had been granted during the German period and to convert them into government leases for a period of 99 years.<sup>19</sup>

But in addition to changing the law, it was felt necessary to question the motives of the all too few African entrepreneurs and Nyerere argued that attitudes encouraged by colonialism had to be attuned to new conditions:

'In the old days the African had never aspired to the possession of personal wealth for the purpose of dominating any of his fellows. He had never had labourers or 'factory hands' to do his work for him.'<sup>20</sup>

But for the time being, no objection was made to non-Africans engaging in commercial farming and two years later, with the publication of the Five Year Plan, more land was promised to estate owners who increased output and, where applicable, took African-grown produce for processing.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, the ideological guide-lines had to be prescribed and the colonial capitalist thesis had to be matched with the socialist antithesis, duly provided with a cultural slant. Even so, the new philosophy was at first of more interest to foreign diplomats and the academic world than to the great majority of African farmers; to reach the rural areas, it was necessary to translate it into specific policies which could be acted upon.

The consequence was a synthesis between ideology and the technical advice, expressed in the form of the decision to adopt the transformation approach suitably tailored to meet post-independence exigencies. What emerged was more than just another attempt at group farming or supervised smallholder schemes following the TAC model. Instead, it was planned to start farming settlements in which the residents would live in compact villages, where they could enjoy a comparatively high standard of services,

and where they could easily be mobilized to support the local TANU organization.<sup>22</sup> The aim was to counteract the lure of the towns by making rural life more comfortable; even if the income return for the residents was no better than the norm - as the World Bank Mission had warned would probably be the case with most supervised settlement schemes - the political advantages seemed substantial.

In addition, the 'villagisation' plan could assist in resolving another problem. Independence had stimulated interest in hundreds of 'self-help' schemes, an indication of the public's willingness to support nation-building projects. Some of these schemes had been farming settlements started as a result of the initiative of local party officials; most of them needed supervision if they were not to fail and damage the party image. Again, the popular enthusiasm for participating in self-help schemes could be utilized in building the new settlements with facilities for all the services which would prove that independence had brought progress. On the other hand, the safer and less spectacular improvement approach offered far less. Where it was successful it would lead to progressive class differentiation, undermining national unity and conflicting with avowed socialist principles; where it failed, an impoverished peasantry would feel that independence had brought nothing new and the familiar contrast between urban and rural life-styles, noted elsewhere in Africa, would have led to resentment.<sup>23</sup> The inevitable consequence, so it seemed, would be the growth of populist forces, the radical democracy associated with peasant revolts, thereby weakening the party and threatening the image of a united nation.

The twin aims of implementing the transformation policy and villagization were entrusted to a Rural Settlement Commission and the 1964 Five Year Plan provided funds on a generous scale.<sup>24</sup> Ten pilot village settlements were started, planned by the Village Settlement Agency, the executive arm of the Commission; in addition, a number of co-operative and irrigation schemes were made the responsibility of the Agency. No rigid commitment to collective farming was prescribed and instead much depended on what crop was being grown. Thus at the Kabuku settlement, established to grow sisal, land was held and cultivated on an individual basis but cutting was organized collectively.<sup>25</sup> The usual practice was to allocate plots to residents for growing their own food and to cultivate the main crop on a collective basis, particularly if a saving in tractor costs could be achieved. But the results were disappointing; in spite of the lavish allocation of funds and staff, both of which could have been employed more profitably elsewhere, most of the settlements never looked like becoming viable and there were many instances of friction between the farmer residents and the supervising government staff.<sup>26</sup> After three years it was decided that no new pilot village settlements would be created and those already established would either be reorganized or closed down. Announcing this surprise decision, the second Vice-President observed that people in the settlements had shown far less enthusiasm than those in unassisted schemes and that 'they are full of complaints and expect the government to give them everything.'<sup>27</sup> But if these schemes, based on the premise that efficient

production was only possible with close supervision, were unable to provide promise of eventual success, at the same time the Ruvuma settlements were demonstrating that, with good leadership, much could be achieved.<sup>28</sup> It was therefore a logical step to introduce the much-publicised policy of Ujamaa villages, based on voluntary co-operation and communal living, where, in Nyerere's words 'people would live and work together and govern themselves.'<sup>29</sup>

This digression into post-independence developments is necessary for three reasons. First, it illustrates how accumulated technical knowledge was combined with a developing ideology, itself the product of the previous political situation. Second, it shows that, once again, the familiar farming lessons of the past could be ignored and no doubt will continue to be ignored. They are important enough to justify any repetition and are as follows: mechanized farming equipment owned collectively was usually uneconomic unless other inputs could lead to above-average yields; likewise, administrative overheads or the generous provision of services and amenities tended to undermine the economic viability of settlement schemes unless their costs were carefully related to a profitability which often fluctuated considerably from year to year.<sup>30</sup>

The second point is well illustrated by the example of the Israeli-run Agridev schemes started in 1962.<sup>31</sup> In this case the aim was to establish co-operative villages in Sukumaland which were to be self-supporting. Within three years 200 families had joined the scheme and 854 acres were cultivated. Cotton was expected to be the main crop.

Irrigation, machinery, pesticides and fertilisers were used and these factors, coupled with the seed improvements resulting from past research, led to phenomenally high outputs per acre.<sup>32</sup> In spite of this, the scheme could not be run at a profit and was terminated. In sharp contrast with this course of events the settler farmer managing his own estate knew that if his enterprise was to survive he had to keep costs to a minimum.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, on these controlled settlement schemes, initial enthusiasm too often gave way to disillusionment. From the description of the colonial TAC schemes it is evident that the resident farmers were irritated at the supervision which was exercised; similarly, in the post-independence schemes a high cash return was the only real compensation for the loss of freedom. The Agridev schemes provided no such incentive, since the profits were eaten up by the overheads. In the pilot village schemes the situation was no better; in some of them there was an additional irritant caused by the policy of insisting on the adoption of village lay-outs often at variance with the residents' past experience. It is not easy to describe a typical rural village in Tanganyika during the colonial period; however, over much of the Territory it is safe to state that once law and order had been established, settlement was evenly distributed throughout an arable area.<sup>34</sup> People tended to avoid living in close proximity because they preferred it that way; where clusters of houses were to be found, it was usually because local custom expected members of the same family to remain together. Such people found it hard

to adjust to an imposed lay-out which provided for a more compact settlement. Perversely, in some settlements the residents complained that the houses were expected to be too scattered.<sup>35</sup> Gathered settlements are common in the coastal areas where the houses are usually clustered around the mosque, the shops and the fish market and the same pattern developed in some areas further inland; it was only to be expected that farmers recruited from such places would dislike the unfamiliar lay-out of the pilot villages. Nevertheless, if the residents had obtained a more substantial cash return and if better than average amenities had been developed, it seems probable that the schemes would have aroused more enthusiasm and support.

The settlement schemes and the Ujamaa villages which followed them stand in sharp contrast with colonial agricultural policy which was based on the assumption that the majority of family farming units would gradually become more prosperous and enterprising. In time, it was believed that the less efficient would lose their independence and become the hired labourers of the more successful. The latter would prosper, providing they observed the rules which had proved so difficult to enforce.

#### Underdevelopment; a colonial legacy

An examination of colonial agricultural strategy would be incomplete without consideration of its effect on other aspects of development. In the case of Tanganyika, the two major inquiries into economic policies conducted by

the Royal Commission and the World Bank Mission respectively drew attention to the potential of the Territory as well as observing that living standards enjoyed by most Africans were very low. Both reports emphasised the need for the increased production of export crops and the same view prevailed six years after independence in the Arusha Declaration.<sup>36</sup> The dual system, and particularly the expansion of the non-African sector in this system after 1945, played an important part in increasing crop production for sale in the world markets and therefore made a substantial contribution to implementing the broad economic policy. It is only recently that it has been suggested that the private investment which enabled the non-African sector to expand was also the cause of the undeveloped state of the Territory at the time of independence or, as some would prefer to call it, a state of underdevelopment.

These terms can be misleading and some definition is necessary. A closed society with no external trading contacts, stagnating in isolation can be termed 'undeveloped'; in Tanganyika at the end of the colonial period there were a few communities in the more remote areas which fitted this description but their size and number render them insignificant. But in the sense that pre-capitalist modes of production predominated, the Territory was undeveloped; as late as 1958, the agricultural and livestock subsistence sectors were still substantially larger than the respective monetary sectors.<sup>37</sup> If the change from a subsistence to a market economy provides the basis for development, the contribution of the estates to making this change possible must be examined. They provided work for over half the

total number of wage earners in the Territory, thereby increasing the diffusion of knowledge and the circulation of currency.<sup>38</sup> On the other hand, because they provided a large proportion of the export crops it was less necessary for the government to take more positive measures to increase the production of cash crops in the African sector. But unless it is suggested that coercion might have been employed in the interests of the community at large, without specific proposals the argument remains conjectural. Obviously, in some areas, farmers would have responded to more assistance and encouragement as the 'increased productivity schemes' demonstrated; in others, however, the attitude persisted - and still persists - that effort should be related to a 'target' income.<sup>39</sup>

Since it was widely believed that Africans preferred leisure to wealth, there seemed little purpose in questioning the wages structure prevailing on estates and plantations; if the target income theory was correct, any action by the government which caused wage levels to rise might have contributed to a labour shortage. Thus wages, particularly those paid to unskilled labourers, remained very low until the Trade Union movement was sufficiently organized to negotiate better terms. The main reasons for low rates were as follows. First, there was the slow rise in the rural per capita purchasing power and the large subsistence sector; as a consequence the average peasant farmer, unless he was fortunate enough to be able to grow perennial crops, earned less than most wage earners in towns and often no more than the labourer on a sisal estate.<sup>40</sup> It

has been observed that only the return obtainable from growing maize was above the average daily wage of a labourer in the agricultural industry.<sup>41</sup> Second, since after 1945 there was a steady inflow of recruits for the estates from neighbouring territories, it was less necessary than in the past for the owners and managers to offer more generous wages.<sup>42</sup> Finally, the Provincial Wages Boards exercised a pervasive influence, since every year they decided the minimum wage rates for government employees.<sup>43</sup>

From a study of the wages structure in 1952, it is apparent that there were some enormous differentials; for example, a labourer on a Mufindi tea estate was paid a basic wage of 18 shillings a month, approximately a quarter of that paid to an African clerk and one hundredth of the salary of an expatriate estate manager.<sup>44</sup> On the sisal estates wages were not much higher; being the largest agricultural industry the wage scales influenced those paid by other estate owners. But in fact the wage levels were not so inequitable as might first seem the case, owing to the mechanisms of the subsistence sector. Although the basic rates quoted above were low, they were supplemented by inducements for those who were prepared to work regularly. This however rarely happened; the majority of the unskilled labour force, if they brought their wives with them to the estates, spent much of their time obtaining a second income by engaging in a variety of commercial activities.<sup>45</sup> It was not until after independence that it became the practice to punish persistent absentees and thereby bring about a reduction of the reserve labour force carried by most estates.

The single man, usually having no second income, would work more regularly and would earn a higher wage than the norm. But often his objective was to earn a specified sum and then to terminate his employment. The high turnover scarcely made for efficiency and, to the extent that development required a change to a money economy, the wage earners on the estates were acquiring little surplus cash to spend and thereby to introduce new consumption patterns. At the time, however, this did not seem important; vestigial support for the contact theory led administrators to approve of any arrangement whereby some of the under-employed in their districts left to work elsewhere. Exploitation, it was believed, existed not on the estates but in the villages where the women were expected to bear the major share of the work burden.<sup>46</sup>

It is more difficult to assess whether the dual system of agriculture caused underdevelopment. It is a term lacking a precise definition and before it is applied to Tanganyika at the time of independence, some explanation is necessary. It is sometimes used to denote the transitional stage between a traditional society and the establishment of a 'modern' economy; it is also used comparatively, when the economies and wealth of different countries are contrasted. If either of these meanings of the word is accepted, Tanganyika was underdeveloped at the time of independence. In view of the many factors already described, environmental, historical and spatial, the existence of the dual system cannot have been the cause of a situation which existed at the beginning of the colonial era before the

estates and plantations were established. However, in yet another meaning given to the word, a more detailed examination of the effects of the dual system is necessary.

Underdevelopment, within the meaning currently attributed to it, describes the situation in a country which has to endure a position of servile dependency on a 'developed' state and its economy and its infrastructure are distorted, in most cases in order to benefit an indigenous élite or expatriate investors;<sup>47</sup> inevitably, excessive profits are extracted and little or no improvement in the living standards of the majority of the population is possible. When this situation is combined with a rising population and inefficient methods of cultivation, the situation gets worse. It has been argued that the solution is to reject the long-accepted arguments that an international division of labour can be nothing but beneficial to all concerned. It is not enough to increase the export of raw materials or to develop import-substituting industries if foreign capital has to be offered attractive terms to achieve this objective.<sup>48</sup> It has been asserted that foreign investment was responsible for underdevelopment in Tanganyika and it is therefore appropriate to consider whether such investment in the agricultural sector was a contributory factor in slowing down development and in causing a distortion of the economic system.<sup>49</sup>

Certainly growth was the consequence of such investment and - as has been observed on numerous occasions - 'growth' needs to be distinguished from 'development'. In Tanganyika during the pre-independence decade both were taking

place and events moved too rapidly for any judgment to be made on whether the distinction was important or likely to become important. For this period, plantations were serving a useful purpose in the efficient production of cash crops; the settlers, whose contribution has always been more suspect in the case of annual crops, nevertheless provided employment opportunities and helped substantially, as already explained, in making good the shortage of cereals which occurred after 1945. Provided there was diversification and opportunities for entrepreneurs in the African sector, the subsistence sector was gradually reduced and a change occurred in the spending habits of consumers, development might well have continued as a parameter of growth. But this is speculation; time did not permit the necessary changes in economic structures and attitudes to take place.

The comprehensive inquiries into development problems, conducted at intervals during the colonial period, all have one point in common; better road or rail communications were essential if there was to be any improvement in living standards. The experts seemed to be obsessed with the spatial problem, the vast distances which had to be traversed over sparsely inhabited land in order to exploit the advantages of the more fertile areas. Thus a circular argument was evolved; better communications were necessary in order to extract the crops produced and these crops had to be exported in order to pay for the communications. It was inevitable that the communications network would be outward-looking, linking the farming areas with the coast and the adjacent territories. The critics of the export-

orientated economy point out that the Territory's road system is visible evidence of the distortion caused by the wrong policies and that it must be re-designed to suit the change in direction which is sought for the economy. Moving the capital away from the coast is in accord with the restructuring of communications which is now thought necessary; it is a reflection on the new approach to development that it should now be decided to make this move.<sup>50</sup> Since the non-African sector was a major contributor in supplying the export crops, it is plausible to suggest that the expenditure on roads was designed to meet the wishes of a wealthy and influential minority. After 1945 the expense, not only of constructing roads but also of maintaining them, took a progressively larger slice of the available funds, as Table XXII shows.

But without further elaboration the argument is untenable because the roads were necessary whatever strategy for development was adopted; there were only isolated instances of road/rail expenditure being undertaken primarily for the benefit of non-Africans and production for local consumption needed not only an efficient marketing organization but also the capability of transporting products without undue difficulty.<sup>51</sup> But when the post-war development plans were made the most compelling argument for improving the main roads was based on the relationship between good communications and food supplies. It was the frequent experience of being isolated by impassable roads which lent support to the policy of condoning district self-sufficiency which in turn prolonged the practice of purely

TABLE XXIIROAD AND BRIDGE CONSTRUCTIONAND MAINTENANCE COSTS

	<u>1948</u> (£000)	<u>1950</u> (£000)	<u>1955/56</u> (£000)	<u>1958/59</u> (£000)
Capital expenditure, Roads and Bridges	112	1094	1172	849
Total capital expenditure	996	3438	4084	5159
Recurrent expenditure, Roads and Bridges	185	281	785	970
Total recurrent expenditure	5842	8127	18491	19527

(source: Tanganyika Statistical Abstracts)

subsistence agriculture.<sup>52</sup> The remedy, according to the Royal Commission Report, was 'improvement in communications and the removal of all unnecessary obstacles to trade.'<sup>53</sup>

The master-plan for main road development was based on a grid design, three all-weather roads running north and south, intersected by three running east and west. Any informed criticism of this basic plan would have to be founded on specific proposals amounting to an alternative strategy for development in which the non-existence of main roads was of no consequence.<sup>54</sup> This has never been suggested and yet, as Table XXII indicates, the more new roads are constructed and old ones improved, the greater the annual maintenance costs will be;; unless foreign aid or increased revenue can be obtained there must be an increasing drain on available resources.<sup>55</sup>

Next, it is necessary to consider whether the estates and plantations contributed to the emergence of a distorted economy by their labour needs, a situation often associated with underdevelopment. The argument hinges on the opportunity costs involved when numbers of unskilled labourers leave their home districts and are therefore unable to contribute to the process of development in their own villages. The fact that the annual earnings of an estate labourer were often more than he might have obtained working at home has already been noted; nevertheless, in a mainly subsistence economy, his usefulness in a family farming organization can only be judged after studying work loads in the group during the peak season and the length of the period of under-employment which so often exists for the rest of the year.<sup>56</sup> Thus recruitment of migrant labour

must be linked with the potential of the home areas from which they came. After 1945, these areas were of two kinds; either they were districts where overcrowding occurred, or they contained a high proportion of land on which cash crops could not be grown profitably. If the recruitment figures for 1951, a typical year, are studied, it will be seen that the districts supplying most recruits (excluding those which were reception areas for immigrant workers from Mozambique or Ruanda Urundi) were as shown in Table XXIII. In the first two districts mentioned, in Central province, arable farming produced meagre returns in much of the area; in the latter two, overcrowding in localised areas was the cause of the comparatively large number who left home to seek work on estates. At no time after 1945 was there any suggestion that the exodus was contrary to the best interests of the home communities.

One of the more common characteristics of underdevelopment was manifest in the sisal industry in that it was entirely owned by foreign private investors and African participation was restricted to the performance of menial tasks. Unlike the tea industry, in which some progress in securing African smallholder participation had been possible, the plantation sisal industry continued to reject any suggestion of processing fibre grown outside the plantations.<sup>57</sup> Managers and estate owners saw little advantage in being obliged to accept African-grown sisal; profitable sisal growing required expert management, a fact which was often overlooked by those without practical experience.<sup>58</sup> It was therefore not surprising that the colonial government avoided

TABLE XXIII

DISTRICTS PROVIDING THE MOST  
TANGANYIKA-BORN RECRUITS FOR  
AGRICULTURAL WORK IN 1951

<u>District</u>	<u>Sisal</u>	<u>Tea</u>	<u>Mixed Farming</u>
Singida	-	-	2401
Dodoma	1527	-	113
Mbeya	5532	555	386
Njombe	3433	86	-

(source: Department of Labour,  
Annual Report 1951)

a confrontation with the powerful TSGA on the subject of smallholder participation; it needed the revenue it derived from the industry and, if the level of investment was to be maintained, it needed to maintain confidence in profitability in the future. After 1955, when the outlook for sisal became uncertain it became even more difficult to persuade the estates to enter on experiments for political rather than commercial reasons. It was therefore not until the end of colonial rule was certain that smallholder participation was introduced, too late to save the industry from nationalization. Thus it is to be expected that conflicting views of the sisal industry during this period will continue to be aired; on the one hand, plantation owners for a time made enormous profits, much of which they spent outside the Territory; on the other, in view of the need to encourage investment and the ever-present possibility that prices would fall to pre-1939 levels, the imposition of an Export Tax and a progressive system of personal taxes provided the most practical way of sharing the wealth derived from the industry.

Finally, it is a characteristic of the under-development model that the surplus derived from production should be utilized for the benefit of the metropole rather than its dependent territory. It has already been noted that a substantial proportion of the profits of the sisal industry left the Territory; the same applied in the case of other enterprises in that when profits were spent, either in re-investment or in personal consumption, the beneficiaries were usually the overseas suppliers and the local

importers. Nevertheless, the Territorial revenues derived benefit in import duties and there was little support for adopting a policy of self-sufficiency.<sup>58</sup> More serious was the use made of retained earnings; some left the Territory by way of a direct transfer of funds and much of the remainder was invested elsewhere in the world by the commercial banks, acting in their clients' interests. A more comprehensive system of exchange control might have led to improvement but this was considered impractical and counter-productive when the perceived need was to attract further investment.

But even this argument, which only needs to be considered in respect of the final decade of the colonial period when at last wealth was being created, rests on two questionable assumptions. First, it implies that public expenditure on development projects was adversely affected by a lack of funds and secondly that the non-African population could have been made to make up this deficiency. At the time it was believed to be better to adopt a timetable in executing projects rather than to try to solve the technical and administrative problems which would arise if too much was attempted too quickly. Delay was caused more often by shortage of technical skill than by a lack of funds. Moreover, local resources contributed less than half the total amount of development finances, thus reducing the significance of an increased influx of funds from non-Africans.<sup>60</sup> Secondly, it is necessary to retain in perspective the actual amount which might have been raised; the Royal Commission pointed out that the capital required by

the East African Railways and Harbours administration was more than the entire voluntary savings of the immigrant communities of East Africa.<sup>61</sup> It is unlikely that the non-African farmers of Tanganyika represented a large proportion of this group.

Thus in the case of Tanganyika, in spite of some obvious shortcomings, the decision to continue providing support for both sectors of the agricultural system does not appear to have delayed development before independence; conversely, to have expanded the non-African sector with more determination in order to secure faster growth would have incurred unacceptably high political risks. As it was, the course of events ran counter to what might have been predicted; where the distribution of rewards is unequal, those who receive most will usually increase their capacity to influence political institutions.<sup>62</sup> That this did not happen was due, primarily, to Twining's handling of the events leading to constitutional reform; although he was helped by the fact that both in Kenya and in London the settler lobby were beginning to lose credibility, nevertheless, it was by his personal authority that he was able to prevent the emergence of any united European opposition to his plans.

Furthermore, the existence of the dual system was never responsible for what some see as a disappointing rate of progress after independence. If explanation is sought it would be more appropriate to consider whether capital invested is income-generating, to take account of the many new calls on scarce resources which arose after 1961 and

finally to emphasise the need for time in solving the various technical and spatial problems which exist.<sup>63</sup> But like other private investors, the settler-farmers and the plantation owners from time to time obtained concessions or were the beneficiaries of government spending; but this does not justify the simple reductionism implicit in the argument that since private investment needed attractive terms it must therefore be inimical to development. Instead, with the proviso that sensible controls are imposed and honest government exists, the observation in a U.N. report published twenty years ago is equally valid today:

'In every territory of Tropical Africa the main impetus to the growth of an exchange economy has come from outside, through non-indigenous business enterprise and government administrations which have provided the means and incentives to bring certain of the products of tropical Africa within reach of world markets.'<sup>64</sup>

With the approval of the Colonial Office, the government of Tanganyika provided such incentives by the decision to honour the German grants of freehold and by alienating land on leases of sufficient duration to encourage the lessees to invest capital in improving their holdings. The settler-farmers and the plantation owners and managers, although never numerous, have become part of the country's history. Their influence on events was limited and became progressively less important, in spite of their substantial contribution to the Territory's revenues. Today, the visible signs of their achievement can still be found, although they are unlikely to endure in tropical conditions. Of Britain itself it has been observed that 'the landscape is the fullest and most certain

of all documents.' It is a statement worth remembering while all the arguments over aims and motives continue.

It has been suggested, incorrectly, that British colonial policy lacked an ideology. In Tanganyika, whatever policies were adopted, the aim throughout the forty years under review was to employ the authority of the government to provide the conditions for social change rather than insist on the acceptance of traumatic innovations. Modernisation was to be encouraged, but the measures to bring it about were to depend on the will and the capacity of a particular community to adopt them. Government interference, whether direct or through native authorities was restricted to fundamentals; although a farmer ran the risk of prosecution if he failed to try to grow food crops for his family, he had a free choice on whether to grow cash crops. It was a policy born of necessity; the means of exercising coercion were almost non-existent and official edicts were seldom successful in inducing a change of attitude. It required the impetus of a national movement to create the organization and the leadership which could insist on change.<sup>65</sup>

Throughout the colonial period it was assumed that African arable agriculture would have to remain based on the family unit of production; however inefficient and whatever the threat to the continued fertility of the land, it was believed that this type of smallholder farming was the foundation of stability and happiness. The importance of the non-African sector is that it provided the time needed to try to improve the existing structure; if its

contribution to the economy had been less, the consequences during the decade of colonial development would have been serious. Agronomists will be satisfied that time ran out and more radical innovations were adopted; but some, who have a more perceptive eye for human relationships will argue that it is no sentimental attachment to outdated tradition which leads them to hope that the African smallholder in this corner of the continent can adapt and endure. Their message is already on record:

'The peasants are the great sanctuary of sanity, the country the last stronghold of happiness. When they disappear there is no hope for the race.' 66

Postscript

When Turnbull announced the plans which would make independence a reality within months instead of years, opinion among European settlers was equally divided on the question of their future under an African government. The pessimistic view was based on the argument that a popularly elected government would be unable to withstand demands from party workers for the termination of Rights of Occupancy; when this happened, the occupants would lose their land and the capital invested in it.<sup>67</sup> Neither the British nor the Tanganyika government offered reassurance on this issue and Fletcher Cooke, presenting the official view to the final Visiting Mission, emphasised that although Nyerere recognized the value of the non-African contribution, his supporters did not.<sup>68</sup>

The opposing view was based on the belief that providing the settlers made an effective contribution in the production of export crops and were politically inconspicuous, independence would change nothing as far as they were concerned. Since both Nyerere and the British government wanted to show settlers elsewhere in Africa that majority rule could be granted without forcing the immigrant communities to leave the country, the more extreme nationalists would be kept in check. Nyerere himself had consistently provided unambiguous assurances and his personal standing was unassailable;<sup>69</sup> moreover, in 1960 and again in 1961 successive Ministers of Lands and Surveys confirmed that rights of tenure would be respected.<sup>70</sup>

As it happened, neither prediction was completely accurate. Apart from places of past contention, such as the Sanya corridor, the post-independence government was able to resist grass-roots demands for the termination of leases. Instead, when changes affecting land tenure were made, they were clearly the consequence of considered policy formulation; the abolition of freehold and the moves to nationalize the sisal industry are examples. Similarly, it was the development of the new State's socialist ideology which illuminated the anomalous position of those settlers who were still farming; after the Arusha Declaration it was inevitable that the non-African sector would contract further.<sup>71</sup> Speaking to a group of European farmers in West Kilimanjaro in 1972, the President gave a clear indication of what was to come:

'The private capitalist farmer whether he has a large estate or a small farm has no place in socialist Tanzania .... There is no room for capitalist producers.....We would be delighted if some of you stayed on as managers of Ujamaa villages or state farms, or if you helped us to train managers until Tanzanians can take over. But in the long run this is no country for you - it is a country for Africans.'<sup>72</sup>

With changes affecting both its sectors, the dual system of agriculture was at last coming to an end.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII

1. C.f. J.F. Ade Ajayi and A. Adu Boaken writing in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan eds. The History and Politics of Colonialism 1914-1960 (C.U.P. 1970); for the psychological aspect see O. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban (London 1956) and F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London 1965).
2. For a comment on these arguments see C.T. Smith, 'Historical Geography: current trends and prospects' in R.J. Chorley and P. Haggett eds. Frontiers of Geographical Teaching (London 1970).
3. C.f., Ruthenberg, op.cit. and Fuggles Couchman, op.cit.
4. See CO 691/188/42154, minute J.B. Williams, criticising the 1947 Estimates.
5. By 1959, in the course of ten years the number of expatriate missionaries had increased by fifty per cent to a total of 2,797. Over two-thirds of these were Roman Catholics.
6. H.C. 391, Col. 348.
7. W.B.R., pp. 131-133.
8. The distinction was given formal recognition for some years after the War; the annual reports of the Department of Agriculture published a nominal roll of staff and designated those with war service.
9. The All Muslim Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT); the dissension in TANU became public with the expulsion from the party of Sheikh Takadir, leader of the Elders section.
10. Address to TNA, 10 December 1962.
11. Reinforced by the rule that civil servants were not permitted to become members of political parties.
12. Ujamaa: the basis of African socialism: address by J.K. Nyerere to a conference at Kivukoni College, April 1962.
13. Creech Jones asserted that the Labour government had no intention of 'exporting socialism'; A Creech Jones ed., New Fabian Colonial Essays, (London 1959) p. 21.
14. E.A.R.C. Report, p.30 and p. 426.

15. A practice continued after independence; hence the following news item: 'Shabani Musa was selected the best farmer of Mara region having increased his income to more than £1,150 on his 140 acre farm', Tanganyika Standard, 25 August 1965).
16. Pamphlet, Mali ya Taifa (1958): see also J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity (London 1967), p. 53.
17. See Summary of Observations by the Tanganyika Government on the Major Recommendations or Conclusions of the Royal Commission Report 1956 (Dar es Salaam 1956), p. 55.
18. Ante, p. 304
19. Freehold Titles (Conversion and Government Leases) Act 1963: the leases which ensued could be made subject to development clauses.
20. Ujamaa etc., loc.cit.
21. President's address to T.N.A. 12 May 1964.
22. President's address to T.N.A. 10 December 1962.
23. C.f. A.A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup (London 1966), p. 95, for a comparison between life in Accra and the surrounding countryside.
24. Five Year Plan, op.cit., Vol.II, p. 55: £6 million was allocated for 35 schemes.
25. In Handeni district; financed by Britain, the Tanganyika government and Amboni Sisal Estate.
26. See James, op.cit., for a short summary of the Village Settlement Scheme and a list of some relevant accounts. Most of these concentrate on the behavioural aspects of the scheme; nevertheless there were a number of unsound administrative and technical decisions which contributed to the failure of the project; a view based on my own observations at the time and recently confirmed in an interview with the Settlement Officer, Bwakora Chini.
27. Announced by the Second Vice President at University College, Dar es Salaam; his speech was published, Tanzania Information Service, Press Release 4 April 1966.
28. The Ruvuma Development Association (RDA) established 15 settlements, the first sited at Litowa, Songea district; see Mbioni, Vol. III, No.II (Dar es Salaam).

29. This statement reveals the contradiction which was to lead to the conflict between the RDA and TANU. In a one party state can any institution be permitted to 'govern itself'?
30. As an example of the services and staffing of pilot villages see the Commission's circular VSC/E7/1/II undated, advertising the post of settlement manager. The applicant is expected to supervise a staff of 24, although there are only 250 settlers resident.
31. Report on the Co-operative Farming Schemes at Mbarika, Kalamera and Nyetwali in the Lake Victoria Territory of Tanganyika (Tel-Aviv 1966), published by Agridev.
32. Estimated at over 1000 lbs. per acre in the Agridev Report.
33. Some Native Authorities charged settlers if estate labour made use of their dispensaries. Moreover, if numbers justified it settlers often employed teachers and established schools for the children of estate labour.
34. For a number of articles on the layout of villages, see Tanganyika Notes and Records, between 1937 and 1954; for Nyakyusa customs see Wilson, op.cit.
35. Interview, Settlement Officer, Bwakora Chini; see also N. Georgulas, Settlement Patterns and Rural Development in Tanganyika (Syracuse 1967).
36. C.f. EARC Report, pp. 77-78; WBR, pp. 13-15, Arusha Declaration, pp. 12-14.
37. Estimates vary but to no great extent; for a comparison of different figures, see WBR, p.419.
38. E.g., in 1958 they provided employment for 213,092 persons out of a total number of employed persons amounting to 430,547; Department of Labour, AR 1958.
39. There are enough examples to support any view in this matter; a personal recollection concerns a farmer in Maswa district who invited the District Office staff to help themselves to the cotton they would find on his land - he told me he had already sold some of it and been paid £300, adding that he did not know what to do with so much money. Also see Tanganyika Standard, 11 July 1966, for one of the many reported instances of pombe clubs being closed until farmers were willing to harvest all their cotton. The official view was reflected in Report of the Committee on Rising Costs (Dar es Salaam 1951), p. 42 where it was observed that when their wages were increased the attendance of dock workers dropped immediately.

40. See Ruthenberg ed. op.cit., pp. 327-354, where the average gross return per household in Sukumaland is calculated at £ 61 p.a.; see also Village Economic Surveys 1961/62 (Dar es Salaam 1963), where the equivalent figure in Morogoro district in 1961 was £12 p.a. cash income.
41. Fuggles Couchman, op.cit., p. 39.
42. In 1957 twelve per cent. of the total African labour force were recruited from outside the Territory, mostly from Ruanda-Urundi and Mozambique. Many arrivals were not recorded AR 1957, p.166.
43. Summary of Observations, op.cit., p.25; the average daily rate for casual labour employed by government in 1955 was 80 cents per day, without house or rations.
44. Department of Labour AR, 1952, p.67; a labourer was provided with house and rations.
45. This was the conclusion of a post-independence report; Report of the Plantation Agricultural Workers Minimum Wages Board (Dar es Salaam 1963).
46. The situation began to change more rapidly after independence when the growing of cash crops became compulsory; but see Nyerere, Arusha Declaration 1967, p.15; 'the women in the villages work harder than anybody in Tanzania'.
47. Some qualification of the statement is necessary; Senegal, for example, comes within the category of a dependant, distorted economy, but this seems to be the result of having obtained a favourable trading agreement with France for the sale of groundnuts.
48. C.f. A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (London 1969).
49. See A.M. Babu, writing in W. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London 1972). As Minister for Economic Affairs and Development, Mr. Babu must have been aware of the realities of financing development.
50. The cost of the move in 1960 was estimated at £7m; in 1973 the estimated cost had risen to £228m; 'Coast gives up its long rule', The Times (Special Supplement), 9 December 1974.
51. The extension of the railway from Moshi to Arusha was primarily for the settlers' benefit; the bitumenising of the Tanga-Korogwe road was to benefit the sisal industry, but construction was financed by the sisal export tax.

52. E.A.R.C. Report, p.66: 'Restrictions on the movement of crops fasten upon the producer the strait-jacket of subsistence production'.
53. Ibid, p. 66.
54. See WBR, where it is argued that only when the main road programme was completed should funds be provided for feeder roads.
55. Bitumenising roads increases maintenance costs considerably, a fact which is sometimes overlooked.
56. See Ruthenberg ed., op.cit., for some interesting studies of the labour economy in peasant agriculture; see also R.S. Ray, Labour Force Survey of Tanzania (Manpower Planning Unit, Dar es Salaam 1966), where it is observed from data obtained in 1965 that less than half the total of male adults working on their farm plots showed no under-employment on the basis of a 40 hour week.
57. Plantation sisal needs to be distinguished from African-grown hedge sisal; the latter was processed and marketed separately.
58. Prior to nationalisation world market prices had fallen to £55 per ton f.o.b. compared with £108 in 1962. Only well-managed estates could operate profitably at this lower price. For low efficiency on communal plantations, see Ruthenberg ed., op.cit., p. 350; also see Financial Times, 30 June 1972, where A. Shaba, Chairman Tanzania Sisal Corporation states that production costs on government estates was £65 per ton compared with £25-28 on private estates.
59. In 1953 one third of all taxation was derived from import duties: E.A.R.C. Report, p.91. The Commission was satisfied that autarchy would prolong poverty: Report, p.80.
60. Ibid, p.95.
61. Ibid, p.84.
62. See Brett, op.cit., p.17, where the argument is developed; the writer concluding that 'a process of cumulative causation can be shown to operate in these matters.'
63. This can best be adduced from the pamphlets, Annual Background to the Budget and the 1964 FYP. It will be noted that there was a rapid increase in the bureaucracy after 1962 and a significant increase of expenditure on internal security, defence and foreign affairs. There was also the fact of a rapid increase in the population with extra demands on the social services, a problem foreseen by J.E. Goldthorpe in his memorandum to the Royal Commission, p.473.

64. Enlargement of the Exchange Economy in Tropical Africa, (New York 1954) prepared by the U.N. Department of Economic Affairs.
65. 'Many people would prefer to be left alone; we are not going to leave them alone.' President Nyerere speaking to M. Wolfers, The Times Special Supplement, 9 December 1974.
66. Virginia Woolf, quoted by E. Newby, Love and War in the Appenines (London 1972).
67. VNR 1960, p.17.
68. Ibid, p.60. J. Fletcher Cooke was Deputy Governor at the time.
69. E.g., Nyerere's repetition of what he had said in an earlier speech: 'Asians and the Europeans in the country ... are our neighbours and they are going to be permanently our neighbours.' Trusteeship Council Procès Verbaux, 819, cited by Chidzero, op.cit., p.199.
70. Chief A. Fundikira, writing in Month, 1960 p.6 and P. Bomani in Tanganyika News Review, July 1961.
71. Between 1967 and 1973 a large number of the estates in private hands were expropriated; negotiations over compensation continue, with the British government assisting in providing funds for this purpose. For the taking over of fifty farms in the Kilimanjaro region, see W. Tordoff 'Tanzania', in H.B. Hodson ed., Annual Register of World Events 1973 (London 1974), p.255.
72. 'President Nyerere spells it out for whites in Tanzania', The Times, 30 June 1972. (Article by J. Listowel)

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Land Availability in East Africa

Throughout East Africa in the past it was only in certain areas that there was a shortage of land for arable farming. In Kenya, according to the World Bank Mission in 1962, the most intractable problem was to prevent the loss of soil fertility in areas being cultivated. The Mission concluded that managerial practices were more important than the availability of land.

In Uganda there are still large tracts of uninhabited and undeveloped land. Many of these were once occupied but were closed to habitation by the colonial administration through fear of sleeping sickness. A large area of potentially good land, (approximately 6000 square miles) has been designated as swamp and has never been used. A certain amount of reclamation was undertaken, particularly in the Kigezi area, but unless there was an immediate danger of over-crowding it was not considered that the high cost of such work was justified.

In Tanganyika the overall density of the population was low throughout the colonial period but this did not prevent problems of over-crowding arising in certain areas; in such places soil erosion and a general loss of fertility usually resulted. The system of shifting cultivation was practicable as long as it was only intended for providing the food requirements of a well-dispersed population. As numbers increased it became necessary to adopt different farming practices or to persuade people to move elsewhere.

The undermentioned table, compiled on the basis of data supplied for the 1953 Royal Commission gives an indication of the position at a time when the post war development plans were being implemented.

	<u>Kenya</u>	<u>Uganda</u>	<u>Tanganyika</u>
Estimated population 1953:			
African	5,644,000	5,286,000	7,965,000
Asian <sup>+</sup>	160,300	49,200	78,800
European	42,200	6,600	20,300
Land area (sq mls) <sup>*</sup>	219,789	74,789	338,325
Percentage of forest Reserves	15	6	8.8
Percentage of land in Game Reserves/Nationals Parks	4	3	2.5
Percentage of land with tsetse fly infestation	10	32	60
Percentage of land area in large farms and estates	4	1	1.1
African population density (per sq mile) in the most populated province	167 (Nyanza)	129 (Eastern)	47 (Lake)

+ Includes Indians, Pakistanis, Jews and Arabs.

\* Figure excludes water areas and swamps.

THE RAILWAY COMMISSION 1930

The East Africa Commission recommended that a line should be constructed to join the Central line to a terminal serving the Lake Nyasa basin, thereby opening up the southern highlands area for development. Between 1925 and 1929 preliminary surveys of various routes were carried out. A committee appointed to submit proposals to be financed under the Imperial Colonial Development Act recommended in 1929 that lines should be constructed from Dodoma to Iringa and from Kilosa to Ifakara. Shortly afterwards, Mr C Gillman, Chief Engineer, published his own report stating that in his view the Dodoma - Iringa route was an unsound proposition; his view was endorsed by Brigadier-General Hammond, in a report published in the autumn of 1929, commissioned by the Colonial Secretary.

The Hammond and Gillman reports disappointed and incensed the Iringa settlers and the supporters of the plan for 'an Imperial Link'. As a consequence Sir Donald Cameron in July 1930 appointed a Railway Commission, chairman Sir Sidney Henn, to consider, among other questions three possible alignments for extensions south of the Central Line (see Map III). The Commission noted that the most western alignment, from Manyoni, would only be useful if the Lupa Goldfield developed rapidly as some believed was possible. The Commission considered they could ignore this alignment for the time being and members were soon divided on the choice between the remaining two proposals. However, it was unanimously agreed that constructing the Kilosa-Ifakara line was the first priority and it was expected that revenue would meet expenditure within five years.

The Commission noted that non-native settlement in Iringa province was unlikely to expand unless a railway was constructed at least as far as Ubena junction and better roads were provided. They added that they were opposed to the principle of uneconomic railway rates as a means of subsidising the growing of particular crops. With the Chairman and one member (Mr Chitale) dissenting; members recommended the construction of a line from Dodoma to Ubena, 'on the assumption that H.M.G. will provide the capital free of interest for at least 20 years'.

In October 1930 Sir D Cameron wrote a despatch concerning the Commission's report; he recommended the line Kilosa - Ifakara should be constructed and that the proposed line from Dodoma should be rejected. The Depression and the Second World War effectively ended the controversy.

SOIL EROSION MEASURES 1920-1939

By 1937 the Director of Agriculture was able to report some progress in measures to prevent further soil erosion. Although some action had been taken in all provinces it was only in three that a wide variety of measures had been introduced on anything like the scale required. A summary of the measures adopted in those three provinces indicates the kind of action taken.

Lake Province

Dam construction; selection of areas for deferred grazing; seasonal movement of stock to selected pasture areas; wind-breaks; hillside tree plantations; contour walls, banks and hedges; tie-ridging; storm drains.

Northern and  
Tanga Provinces

Demonstrations to show value of green manuring and contour hedging;  
 assistance to native coffee growers  
 coffee rules controlling cultivation and layout  
 50 yard rule preventing cultivation of steep river banks  
 Re-forestation of steep hill slopes  
 Public meetings to discuss measures taken  
 Planking of Mauritius thorn hedges  
 Reservation of pastures for dry season grazing  
 Meetings with Planters Associations  
 The use of box terraces and uncultivated contour strips  
 Better control of water used for irrigation  
 N A Rules covering all cultivation in Moshi, Usambara, Pare, Arusha, Mbulu  
 Riverside rules in Moshi, Arusha

FINANCIAL RESULTS OF RAILWAYS AND PORTS WORKING 1920 - 1939


YEAR	RECEIPTS £	EXPENDITURE £	WORKING LOSS £	WORKING PROFIT £	LOAN CHARGES £	NET LOSS £	NET PROFIT £
To 31/ 3/20	103,778	278,591	174,813	-	-	-	-
" 31/ 3/21	157,393	346,300	188,907	-	-	-	-
" 31/ 3/22	196,682	387,819	191,137	-	-	-	-
" 31/ 3/23	223,719	335,110	111,391	-	-	-	-
" 31/ 3/24	238,553	331,668	93,115	-	-	-	-
" 31/ 3/25	333,118	354,965	21,848	-	-	-	-
" 31/ 3/26	408,973	405,712	-	3,261	60,331	42,681	-
" 31/ 3/27	503,899	486,249	-	17,650	107,476	-	44,712
" 31/ 3/28	632,452	480,263	-	152,188	115,674	-	119,623
" 31/ 3/29	803,794	568,497	-	235,297	171,016	-	12,560
" 31/ 3/30	797,716	614,140	-	183,576	183,551	-	57,830
" 31/ 3/31	900,708	659,327	-	241,381	252,972	208,880	-
" 31/ 3/32	557,792	514,600	-	43,192	252,972	50,078	-
" 31/12/32	421,345	309,607	-	111,738	161,816	112,635	-
1933	532,092	353,328	-	178,764	291,399	124,254	-
1934	565,842	366,177	-	199,665	323,919	11,059	-
1935	662,269	350,893	-	311,376	322,435	-	52,875
1936	730,171	362,042	-	368,129	315,254	-	83,198
1937	780,565	384,913	-	395,652	312,454	-	-
1938	662,556	373,660	-	288,896	309,676	20,780	-
1939	712,642	426,947	-	285,695	311,585	25,890	-

N.B. - including, at times, electricity supplies and some minor enterprises.

# FREIGHT CARRIED ON TANGANYIKA RAILWAYS

1924-1939

METRIC TONS (THOUSANDS)



## Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Schemes Costing More Than £30,000

Scheme	Locality	Capital Cost	Recurrent Cost	Total Cost
Training of agricultural instructors	Territorial	25,000	70,000	95,000
Central breeding station, Mpwapwa	"	16,500	15,000	31,500
Improvement of copra industry	"	7,500	35,000	42,500
Development of Sukumaland	Lake Province	63,400	150,000	213,400
Extension of Ukiriguru experimental station	"	38,000	21,000	59,000
Development of Mbulu District	Northern Province	75,000	50,000	125,000
Demonstration farm, Northern Province	"	35,200	72,000	107,200
Cotton experimental station, Ilonga	Eastern Province	34,000	21,000	55,000
Rehabilitation of Uluguru mountains	"	10,000	40,000	50,000
Ulanga rural development scheme	"	26,000	72,500	98,500
Others	"	128,200	202,400	330,600
		458,800	748,900	1,207,700

(source: The Ten Year Development Plan, Government Printer Dar es Salaam 1946)

The Kingolwira Settlement Scheme

By the early nineteen-thirties, African peasant farmers in the Uluguru hills above Morogoro, Eastern province, were faced with a land shortage and problems of falling yields as a result of the impoverishment of the soil. The settlement scheme near the Kingolwira prison was started in order to alleviate this situation. The government took over a tract of land and provided farms for the landless. Some cattle could be kept and farmers were encouraged to grow food crops and some cotton, under controlled conditions. The Empire Cotton Growing Committee supported the scheme by giving financial aid.

The scheme was started in 1933, each farmer being given 14 acres, approximately. The aims of the scheme as published and the conditions which the occupants had to accept were as follows:

- (i) Soil fertility was to be maintained so that it would be possible to reduce the amount of manual labour necessary.
- (ii) Systematic methods of soil conservation and of crop rotation would be observed.
- (iii) Residents would be encouraged to adopt a more varied diet.
- (iv) Security of tenure would be given but no sub-division of plots would be allowed.

By 1938 some 40 applicants had obtained holdings and the progress of the scheme was viewed with optimism.

(source: Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1938, Government Printer,  
Dar es Salaam 1938)

## Sources of Finance for Post-War Development Plans in East Africa

( £ ' 000 )

	<u>Total</u>	<u>C.D.&amp;W funds</u>	<u>Loan Funds</u>	<u>Local Resources</u>
Kenya	42,450	3,500	23,450	15,500
Tanganyika	24,450	5,349	10,000	9,101
Uganda	28,500	2,500	2,000	24,000

( source: The Colonial Territories 1953-54, Appendix III, (HMSO cmd 9169) )

Year	Alienation of Agricultural Land up to 1,500 Acres and Pastoral Land up to 2,500 Acres		Alienation of Agricultural Land over 1,500 Acres and Pastoral Land over 2,500 Acres		Alienation to Public or Semi-Public Bodies		Total Alienations During Year		Surrenders Revocations etc. During Year		Net Increase in Alienated Land During Year		Total Area of Long-Term Rights of Occupancy at end of Year	Acres See Note (a)	
	No.	Acres	No.	Acres	No.	Acres	No.	Acres	No.	Acres	No.	Acres			
															Agricultural up to 1,500 Acres
1946	3	3,673	-	-	2	5,171	-	-	5	8,844	6	10,482	1	1,638	(b)788,038
1947	3	1,140	-	-	4	8,320	-	363	8	9,823	4	1,707	4	8,116	795,68
1948	11	8,575	-	-	3	32,960	-	1,000	15	42,535	251	175,836	-236	-133,301	663,10
1949	101	65,353	1	500	30	130,082	-	-	132	195,953	23	72,541	109	123,394	786,24
1950	186	102,583	-	-	22	71,804	-	-	211	370,016	40	33,139	171	336,877	1,122,01
1951	91	44,888	2	693	43	189,063	-	-	136	234,644	16	14,797	120	219,847	1,341,15
1952	128	68,559	4	3,678	33	188,398	10	135,698	179	731,632	21	132,411	158	599,221	1,938,94
1953	76	44,669	2	4,403	16	95,514	4	42,080	99	186,691	23	15,916	76	170,775	2,109,98
1954	40	20,888	2	2,545	14	54,339	2	13,900	58	91,672	25	21,627	33	70,045	2,180,16
1955	78	21,681	-	-	10	23,497	1	18,647	92	133,229	45	60,239	47	72,990	2,248,36
1956	51	27,443	9	12,969	12	31,433	4	152,275	81	226,400	33	98,967	48	127,433	2,376,12
1957	50	30,785	8	6,284	7	26,152	5	85,874	74	155,008	28	43,291	46	111,717	2,488,46
1958	40	15,372	5	8,227	10	58,934	4	33,962	61	119,021	36	63,110	25	55,911	2,533,96
1959	26	8,806	6	4,805	4	18,726	2	7,200	38	39,537	22	19,651	16	19,886	2,554,86
1960	16	8,000	-	-	8	64,624	-	-	25	73,055	18	135,006	7	-61,959	2,488,74

NOTES: (a) Includes minor adjustments not reflected in preceding columns.

(b) This total takes into account 1,043 holdings previously alienated

(source: Tanganyika Annual Report 1960 HMSO London)

DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS IMPOSED WITH RIGHTS OF OCCUPANCYLand Regulations 1926 (Extract)

Area of Land	Minimum value of improvements within first 3 years	Nature of improvements	Value of additional improvements within first 5 years	Nature of additional improvements
Over 300 acres (120 hectares or more)	Shs.6000/00 and in addition Shs 4/00 per acre in respect of every acre over 300 acres	Permanent and/or Non-Permanent**	Shs.3000/00 and addition Shs.2/00 per acre in respect of every acre over 300 acres	Permanent and/or Non-Permanent**

\*Permanent Improvements:

Embanking or protective works;  
Planting of long-lived crops;  
Planting trees or live hedges;  
Clearing land for agriculture;  
(Cultivating gardens, nurseries;  
Sheep or cattle dips;  
Road making;

Swamp reclamation;  
Water Tanks;  
Irrigation works;  
Fixed machinery;  
Reservoirs; Dams;  
Water races; Bridges;

Farm buildings;  
Fencing; Walls;  
Water furrows;  
Wells;  
Draining land;  
Water boring;

\*\* Non-Permanent Improvements: Livestock; Dairy appliances; Agricultural implements and machinery;

Land Regulation 1948 (Summary)

- Land held for agricultural purposes only: the occupier of such land was to fully cultivate  $\frac{1}{8}$  of the total area during the first year of the term of occupancy. During each of the next four years of the term an additional  $\frac{1}{8}$  of the total area was to come under full cultivation. Therefore, at the end of five years  $\frac{5}{8}$  of the total area of the right of occupancy was to be fully cultivated and maintained.
- Land held for pastoral purposes only: the occupier of such land, in the first year of the right of occupancy, was to stock with his own cattle  $\frac{1}{7}$ th of the total area held, and during the next four years to fully stock a further  $\frac{1}{7}$ th of the total area per year. Thus, after five years,  $\frac{5}{7}$ ths of the total area of the grant was to be fully stocked.
- Land held for mixed agricultural and pastoral purposes: the occupier was to cultivate  $\frac{1}{50}$ th of the total area and stock  $\frac{1}{10}$ th of the area held in the first year. Increments of the same proportions were to be added in each of the next four years.

### The Groundnut Scheme

In 1946, the British government appointed a special mission to investigate the possibilities of the mechanised production of groundnuts in East and Central Africa. A J Wakefield, a former Director of Agriculture in Tanganyika, was appointed chairman; with two other experts, the mission visited the areas suggested and submitted a report confirming that the proposal was viable.

As a consequence of the report and guarded acceptance of its conclusions by Ministry of Food officials, it was decided to establish 107 farming units, each of 30,000 acres. These were to be distributed as follows: Nachingwea, 55; Kongwa, 15; Urambo, 10; remainder in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia. The cost was estimated at £23 million.

In May 1947, work in clearing the bush started at Kongwa; although it was the least likely of the three areas to be profitable, it was more accessible. Meanwhile, a temporary jetty was constructed at Mkwaya, near Lindi, which was to be utilised until the new port of Mtwara was ready. Development at Urambo was delayed at the request of the Tanganyika government until the new rail link to Mpanda was ready.

The bush was difficult to clear; after one year instead of 150,000 acres being ready, the total was 10,000. The first harvest was well below expectations. The following year yields were poor through drought at Kongwa and rosette at Urambo.

In 1951 in a White Paper (cmd 8125) it was decided to attempt no more clearing at Urambo or Kongwa; at Nachingwea, clearing would continue until 60,000 acres were prepared. The aim of the scheme was changed to investigating whether large-scale, mechanised, tropical agriculture was a practical proposition. Responsibility for the scheme was transferred to the Colonial Office; in 1954 the assets were transferred to the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation. The loss to the British taxpayer amounted to £36 million.

(Sources: White Papers cmd 7030 and 8125; Report of the Kongwa Working Party; OFC Annual Reports)

Distribution of coffee estates and approximate  
income obtainable from a medium size estate  
1949 - 1954

I. Coffee from estates was sold by the Tanganyika Coffee Growers Association. During the period under review there were 242 estates selling their crop through the Association in five separate areas of the Territory, as follows:

<u>Average over five years of production of clean coffee</u>	<u>Moshi</u>	<u>Arusha</u>	<u>Oldeani</u>	<u>Usambara</u>	<u>Southern Highlands</u>
0 - 10 tons	39	41	22	24	57
11 - 115 tons	24	18	12	-	5
Totals	63	59	34	24	62
	==	==	==	==	==

II. Estimated cost and profit from an estate producing ten tons of clean coffee from 100 acres of land planted with mature bearing coffee.

	£		£
Cost of production	2500	Sales at £500 per ton	5000
Export tax	500		
Income Tax	340		
Surtax	-		
Net profit	1660		
Totals	5000		5000
	====		====

(source: Report of a Committee of Enquiry into the Coffee Export Tax,  
Dar es Salaam. 1955)

THE SISAL INDUSTRY AFTER 1946

The expansion of the Sisal Industry during the latter half of the British colonial period can best be summarised by providing details from the relevant statistics. The figures are based on those included in Department of Agriculture Annual Reports, the Annual Trade Statistics and Budget Surveys and extracts from data compiled by C W Guillebaud, Economic Survey of the Sisal Industry.

A. Export Production and Value over Twelve Years

<u>Year</u>	<u>Exported</u> ( <u>'000 tons</u> )	<u>Value £million</u>
1946	112	3.9
1948	117	8.9
1951	142	23.7
1954	168	10.9
1958	198	10.4

B. New Land Planted with Sisal 1951-1956

<u>Year</u>	<u>Acres</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Acres</u>
1951	13807	1954	8544
1952	15183	1955	7454
1953	9749	1956	8751
Total new area planted			63488
Total area replanted 1951-56			69166

C. Land and Labour Utilization 1945 and 1960

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of adult</u> <u>males employed</u>	<u>Tons exported</u>	<u>Acreage</u> <u>Under sisal</u>
1945	102,478	110,637	448,784
1960	104,413	207,200	664,482

D. Location of Sisal Estates and Production 1956

<u>Area</u>	<u>No. of Estates</u>	<u>Production (tons)</u>	<u>% of total</u>
Northern	18	9600	5.2
Tanga	71	113700	61.2
Central Line	64	49900	26.9
Southern	16	11400	6.2

E. Profits and Distribution, ten Largest Companies 1951-56Total Profit £9.6M

<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Capital expenditure	27
Current assets	8
Taxation	24
Dividends	37
Capital re-organization	4
	—
Total	100
	—