THE GENESIS OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMUNIST PARTY

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Unlike communist parties elsewhere in Asia, the Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas (PKP) was constituted almost entirely by activists from the working class. Radical intellectuals, professionals and other middle class elements were conspicuously absent. More particularly, the PKP was rooted in the Manila labour movement and, to a lesser extent, in the peasant movement of Central Luzon. This study explores these origins and then examines the character, outlook and performance of the Party in the first three years of its existence (1930-33).

Socialist ideas began to circulate during the early 1900s, but were not given durable organisational expression until 1922, when a Workers' Party was formed. Led by cadres from the country's principal labour federation, the Congreso Obrero, this party aligned its policies increasingly with those of the Comintern. The struggle for independence, it asserted, had been betrayed by the Filipino elite and should be spearheaded instead by the toiling masses. Between 1925 and 1928 the influence of the Workers' Party within the Congreso Obrero grew steadily, resulting most notably in the affiliation of the federation to a subsidiary of the Profintern.

As the Workers' Party adopted the ultra-leftist and sectarian positions which characterised the Comintern's "third period", however, it attracted mounting hostility from moderate and conservative labourites, and in 1929 the Congreso Obrero split apart. The radical faction thereupon formed a "red" trade union centre which the following year was instrumental in establishing the PKP on the foundations the Workers' Party had laid. Highly belligerent in its stance, the PKP was quickly subjected to government persecution, and for this and other reasons was unable to make much headway during the depression years in either city or countryside.
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INTRODUCTION

The history of communism in the Philippines now spans some sixty years; the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), founded in 1930, can legitimately lay claim to a longer unbroken existence than any other party in the Islands. In a country where politics has traditionally revolved around personalities, patronage and the pork-barrel, the PKP and its Maoist offshoot can also claim to be the only parties with more than an ephemeral existence to have based their programmes and appeals on ideological principle. Socialist parties and parties of the ultra-right have come and gone; no anarchist or Trotskyist party has yet surfaced. Despite a near lifetime of illegality and suppression, the PKP has sustained a presence on the Philippine political scene whose importance if not virtue is beyond dispute. Most notably, the Party instigated the premier guerrilla resistance movement in Central Luzon during the Japanese occupation and then in the late 1940s and early 1950s led the armed struggle for national liberation known as the Huk rebellion. In more recent times it has played a significant role in championing progressive nationalist alternatives to neo-colonial subservience and dependency.

This study explores the origins of the PKP and examines the character and fate of the Party in its early years. My original intention was to open the dissertation at the revolutionary era (1896-1902) and to conclude with the outbreak of the Pacific War, but constraints of length have forced the recognition that it would not be feasible to cover such an extended period without an unacceptable sacrifice of detail. With some reluctance, the account has therefore had to be trimmed at both ends. Discussion of attitudes and events around the turn of the century has been severely compressed, and the fortunes of the PKP between 1934 and 1941 will have to await separate treatment elsewhere. The period reviewed most closely in these pages consequently commences in 1924, when the Partido Obrero was relaunched and Filipino labourites first attended a communist-sponsored gathering abroad, and ends in 1933, the year that the original front-ranking
leaders of the PKP began prolonged terms of imprisonment and internal exile. The basic framework of the study is chronological, but two chapters have been devoted entirely to the peasant movement and the discussion throughout has been sub-divided thematically wherever practicable.

In comparison with the communist parties of other Asian countries, the PKP has been strangely neglected by historians and other academic observers. Aside from Kerkvliet's study of the Huk rebellion, not a single scholarly monograph has been published on any phase of the Party's history. Students interested in the subject who do not have access to primary sources are obliged to turn either to the unpublished doctoral theses submitted by Hoeksema at Harvard in 1956 and by Araneta at Oxford in 1966 or to the sections on the Philippines in the regional surveys of communism in South East Asia by Brimmell, McLane and van der Kroef. These last three commentators all draw heavily on the pioneering study by Hoeksema, which has practically attained standard work status.

The value of Hoeksema's dissertation is however circumscribed by its pre-conceptions and its source materials. In his introduction the author proudly reveals himself as a combatant in the Cold War. "This thesis is as detailed as possible", he writes, "in order to build a source work for Anti-Communist students in the Philippines." Later he artlessly recounts how "International Communism spread from Moscow" and how Filipinos who travelled to the Soviet capital "received Communist indoctrination". Perhaps more seriously, those sections of the study dealing with the twenties and thirties suffer from an almost total neglect of Philippine sources. Practically the only contemporary materials used extensively by Hoeksema (and indeed by the other writers mentioned above) were articles appearing in communist journals printed overseas such as International Press Correspondence and The Pan-Pacific Worker. Inevitably this has limited the account in both depth and detail.

Araneta's dissertation is likewise flawed by political motivations, albeit of a quite different nature. Plainly sympathetic towards the left, the author is constantly at pains to stress the home-grown and nationalist aspects of the PKP and to be correspondingly dismissive about the Party's links abroad. It is an "evident fact", he states,
"that no direction or influence came from outside the Philippines during the formative time of the PKP" - a contention that could hardly be supported even were the meaning of "formative time" narrowed to the precise few months when the Party was actually constituted. More amazingly still, he further asserts that in its subsequent development the Party "always remained independent of the Comintern."(4) This viewpoint leads to errors and distortions beyond count. When assessing the contributions made by cadres who had visited Moscow, to cite just one example, Araneta remarks merely that the peasant activist Emilio Maclang "died shortly after returning to the Philippines". (5) In fact, and as Araneta must surely have known, Maclang was selected soon after his return to act as general secretary of the PKP, and in various capacities worked full-time for the Party for over ten years before meeting his death during the war. Despite its nationalist orientation, ironically, the study is also weakened by an excessive dependence on foreign sources. Such fresh information as Araneta was able to present was derived principally from interviews with Party and labour movement veterans. Even though the author made particular efforts to contact those who had been to China and the Soviet Union, however, his reluctance to probe the context and significance of their visits gives the impression that his interviewees offered little more than pleasant reminiscences of places been and people met.

Obviously it would be disingenuous to pretend that my own approach to this study has been entirely neutral: a measure of the affinity that colours my feelings towards the PKP may already be apparent. It would indeed be unusual for someone without firm predispositions to be attracted to this controversial subject. Throughout these pages I have nevertheless tried to distinguish clearly whether a statement is fact, interpretation or opinion, and to signpost also the alas innumerable occasions when it has been necessary to resort to surmise and supposition. Above all, the account has not been written to grind any present-day sectarian axe, or to depict the past in the selective light of present-day preoccupations. Norwithstanding the considerable assistance given to me by PKP members, it need hardly be said that the Party has neither been asked to give nor given this work any kind of official endorsement or approval. Some who helped, I suspect, may feel disappointed or aggrieved at the rather negative note on which the study concludes. This does not stem from any desire to belittle the undoubted
courage or commitment of the early Filipino communists, but simply reflects the parlous situation in which the PKP was then caught. A more positive note could have been struck, it would be fair to argue, had the account focused not so much inwardly on the Party and its mass organisations but more outwardly on the injustices they existed to fight.

The second pitfall which I trust has been avoided is an over-reliance on a limited number of sources. As in both the Hoeksema and Araneta dissertations, extensive use has been made of articles on the Philippines published in communist journals abroad. Like Araneta, I managed to talk with several notable veterans. But useful though both these sources proved, my account has been constructed primarily from contemporary Philippine materials that until now have lain almost entirely untapped. Especially valuable were the English-language Manila newspapers of the 1920s and 1930s, which I scanned fairly systematically at the University of the Philippines, and the unrivalled collection of labour magazines, pamphlets, broadsheets and clippings amassed by the late Cirilo S. Honorio of Marilao, Bulacan.

Besides enhancing the overall detail and reliability of the account, these and other sources provided the opportunity to locate the PKP and its antecedents more firmly in their economic, social and political setting. It has for instance been possible to delineate and trace back the contending currents of thought within the Manila labour movement which in the 1920s helped shape the early debates about "Bolshevism". An attempt has been made to progress beyond a generalised view of the labour and peasant movements and to differentiate more clearly their constituent parts. The collection and collation of biographical data has enabled the nature of union leadership to be examined more closely here than in previous studies. Rather than simply noting radical disenchantment with the campaign for independence waged by the elite-led Nacionalista party, I have tried to recount how this disenchantment arose and to chart its evolution. It has also proved possible to describe with greater precision than hitherto the profound manner in which the perspectives of the Comintern's "third period" affected the Philippine left, and to assess the consequences. It seems, indeed, that better documentation exists on the impact of "third period" doctrines in the Philippines than it does for most South East Asian countries, and in this respect it is hoped that the dissertation may hold some interest.
for students of comparative communism as well as for Filipinists.

All this said, I recognise most keenly that the sources employed in the compilation of this account have led to certain imbalances and still leave many questions unanswered. First, it must be acknowledged that the purposes and aspirations of the various labour organisations and political parties examined here are presented very much as they were articulated by their respective top leaderships. Written testimony as to the motivations of middle-level cadres and the membership rank and file, sad to say, is extremely scant. For similar reasons, secondly, it proved much more difficult to find primary materials relating to the Central Luzon peasant associations than to the city-based labour unions. Information on the peasant associations was derived mainly from newspaper accounts, which by their nature concentrate on specific incidents and disclose relatively little about organisational origins, programmes and membership. The character of union activity in the countryside prior to 1917 remains particularly obscure, as does the extension of radical influences within the Philippine National Confederation of Peasants (KPMP) during the mid-1920s. A third cause for regret is the paucity of the material I have been able to present on the organisations formed by Chinese workers in Manila and on the participation of Chinese cadres in forming the Communist Party.

Imbalances and lacunae attributable to my sources are augmented by others stemming from my interests, training and competence. Essentially this is a political study, whose central concerns are ideology, organisation and leadership. It does not address at any length the many cultural factors which bear on the fortunes of the Philippine left: the influence of the Catholic Church, for example, the importance of vertical social ties, or the national psyche. Nor does it seek to extract clues to understanding the labour scene from the popular literature of the period, or to analyse the idiom and imagery employed by Filipino radicals. Scholars whose knowledge of the language is less rudimentary, I readily concede, might well detect nuances of meaning in the Tagalog works cited here that my untutored eye has missed. From the regrettable rather abbreviated treatment of economic matters in these pages it may also be apparent that I cannot profess to be an economist; the almost total absence of studies on the Philippine economy during the American colonial period unhappily meant
there was virtually nothing upon which to build.

What follows, in short, is neither the first word on the beginnings of the PKP nor the definitive word. Rather, the study aims to advance our understanding of the subject by setting the early Filipino communists in context, against the backdrop of their environment and times. This work is offered in the desire that it may stimulate future researchers to pursue the points I have left at issue and to tread the avenues I have left unexplored.
Notes to Introduction


(3) Hoeksema op.cit. n.pp.

(4) Araneta op.cit. pp.199;201

(5) Ibid. p.233
CHAPTER ONE

THE URBAN SETTING: LABOUR AND POLITICS IN MANILA

In the closing years of the nineteenth century the Philippines witnessed a succession of dramatic and momentous events: a concerted nationalist uprising against Spanish sovereignty; the collapse of that sovereignty after a rule of over three hundred years; the foundation of the first national republic in Asia; and the beginnings of an ill-fated armed struggle against occupation by a second imperial power, the United States. This turbulent period has ever since been the primary focus of Philippine historiography and its major episodes are sufficiently well-known not to need recounting at this juncture. But the revolutionary era also has a profound importance beyond its own duration, for it was then that Philippine national consciousness was forged and first given political expression. The 1880s and 1890s bequeathed to the twentieth century an enduring ideological legacy which the drama of great events has commonly caused historians to neglect. Here we shall attempt to delineate the nature of that legacy and to examine the manner in which its social conservatism cast an imprint on the outlook of Filipino labour activists during the first two decades of American occupation.

Ilustrados and Americans

Whilst Filipino resistance against Spanish colonialism can be traced back to the very beginning of Hispanic contact and settlement, the sense of Filipino identity asserted during the revolutionary period emerged only during the nineteenth century. The initial expression of this national consciousness was related to the appearance within Philippine society of a group known as the ilustrados, educated scions of a rising, dominantly mestizo elite that derived its wealth from the colony's expanding cash-crop agriculture and trade. The leading
ilustrado spokesmen, known as the propagandists, drew their political inspiration primarily from enlightenment liberalism. Heavily Hispanicised, they at first demanded not independence but changes within the Spanish imperial framework: free trade, civil liberties, modern education and representation in the Madrid Cortes. Above all, they sought emancipation from what they called the "monastic supremacy", the pervasive, reactionary and obscurantist power of the Catholic religious orders. Later, as their demands for reform remained unheeded and friar influence remained unchecked, many propagandists did finally abandon their assimilationist position and turn towards separatism. Because of their class background and interests, however, not one was prepared to advocate immediate independence. Three and a half centuries of colonial rule, they feared, had left the Filipino masses so backward and untutored in moral and civic responsibility that Spain's precipitate overthrow would inevitably result in tyranny or anarchy. In either event, the wealth which had begun to flow from cash-crop agriculture and trade would be seriously threatened. Before a stable and prosperous future could be assured, the propagandists believed, it was necessary for "enlightened" Filipinos such as themselves to awaken in their less fortunate compatriots the sentiments of national identity, pride and fellowship that Spain had so successfully suppressed. As spokesmen for landholding and entrepreneurial interests, the propagandists laid particular emphasis on the virtues of industry, thrift and self-improvement, qualities they considered essential to the development of a well-behaved and efficient labour force.

The leaders of the armed struggles against Spain and the United States mostly came from less privileged backgrounds than the propagandists. Typically, they belonged to the urban petty-bourgeoisie, the lower tiers of the legal and teaching professions, or the provincial principalia, holders of municipal office. Notwithstanding their humbler origins and commitment to immediate independence, however, the revolutionists drew no ideological distinction between themselves and the ilustrado gradualists. Indeed they regarded the propagandists as national heroes, faithfully echoed their major themes, and repeatedly sought to attract wealthy and influential individuals to their ranks. Although closer to the masses, the revolutionists shared the propagandists' lack of confidence in Filipino capacities and felt they must intensify the work of "enlightenment" in tandem with the independence
struggle. Greater emphasis was laid on the need for national unity and discipline than on the correction of injustice. Exploitation and oppression were described only in the most general terms and were condemned on moral grounds—as infractions of brotherhood and good fellowship—rather than as inevitable features of a class-divided society. Labour and the labourer were glorified without any reference to social context. Work, advised one leading ideologue, should not be seen as a "corporal affliction", but as a "reward and a blessing", for "he who toils keeps away from a life of disorderly and bad habits and boredom, and becomes strong, prosperous and cheerful".(2) Aside from calls that the friar orders be dispossessed of their landed estates, nothing in revolutionary literature hints at the expropriation or redistribution of wealth or even at the equalisation of opportunity.

When a Philippine Revolutionary Government was established in 1898 any tendencies or movements which appeared likely to disturb the social order were firmly condemned. Government leaders wanted desperately to convince both the vacillating native elite and international opinion that they had formed a stable, proficient and "responsible" administration. It must be demonstrated, President Aguinaldo told the people, that "the most holy right of property" would not be threatened, and that "we (can) sufficiently guarantee order to protect foreign interests in our country".(3) To these ends even minor manifestations of internal dissent were to be avoided or suppressed at all costs. Strikes, warned the Manila provincial governor, "might give rise to false impressions concerning the depth of our national character". Maturity and responsibility, so far as Filipino workers and peasants were concerned, were to be gauged by what he applauded as their "naturally pacific, docile and honourable character."(4) Strikers on the Manila-Dagupan railroad, Aguinaldo proclaimed, were to be commanded to return to work "and not to ask for higher wages than they formerly received." This, he asserted, "is the aid required of them by the government."(5) Labour as a source of livelihood, in other words, was to take second place to labour as a service to employer and nation. And when exhortations alone proved insufficient to persuade workers and peasants of their civic obligations, the government was prepared to classify idleness and indiscipline not merely as irresponsible and unpatriotic, but also as positively criminal.(6)
Government policy was therefore geared more toward defending the social status quo than pursuing the opportunities for change that the revolution offered. Outside the revolutionary mainstream, scattered groups of the disaffected like the Negros sugar workers led by "Papa" Isio did see the struggles for national liberation and social justice as one, but at no time did these groups coalesce to present a serious or systematic challenge to republican authority. The incipient Filipino proletariat remained too small and scattered to perform any kind of leading role, and in the provinces the peasantry was both divided linguistically and separated by poor communications. Such structural considerations apart, Spanish rule had effectively denied the working class any independent political experience. Coherent ideologies of radical social change had been excluded from the colony by the clerically-imposed censorship, and modern forms of labour organisation had been effectively precluded by anti-combination laws.

Against this background, the labour movement that developed during the early years of the American occupation reflected the political traditions of the revolution in whose embers it grew. Either through deference or lack of self-confidence, Manila's early labour activists followed the revolutionists in seeking assistance and guidance from men of wealth and education. Their invitation was accepted by a number of ilustrados who saw unionism as an ideal vehicle for continuing the campaigns of civic and patriotic education begun by the propagandists. Viewed by American administrators as dangerous rabble-rousers, such men in reality also shared the propagandists' gradualist, pacifist and patrician approach to independence and the belief that social harmony could be attained through collective virtue, perspectives which in later, less tense years the new colonisers were to find entirely acceptable.

Before examining the outlook of the early twentieth century labour organisations in greater detail, it is appropriate to sketch the social and political milieu in which they emerged. Manila, then as now, was a true primate city, the unquestioned centre of the nation's political and industrial life. According to the 1903 Census the city accounted for about 55 per cent of both capital investment and workpeople in Philippine manufacturing enterprises with an annual product of over P 1,000 (\$500). The same enterprises produced over two thirds of the country's industrial output. (7) This metropolitan centralisation did not however provide the advantages for political and union organisation that it
might suggest. Given such a low annual product qualification, of course, many of the establishments represented in the Census statistics would be very small. But more striking still is the fact that the 19,640 workers employed in such enterprises constituted less than 15 per cent of Manila's total working population of 132,858. Only in the cigar and cigarette factories, which in total employed 4,983 men and 4,177 women, were large numbers of workers concentrated in the same place. (8) The great bulk of Manila's labour force, in other words, was scattered in workshops, stores, warehouses, offices and private homes, working either alone or in small groups.

To a large extent persisting throughout the American period, this diffuse pattern of employment is well illustrated by the Census breakdown of the city's major occupational categories. In descending order, these were labourers (22,368), merchants (11,973), servants (10,492), sailors (9,724), tobacco workers (9,160), launderers (7,840), salesmen (7,657), seamstresses (7,098), coachmen (5,649), clerks (4,757), carpenters (4,717) and cooks (3,395). The only other categories including more than one thousand people were equally dispersive: agriculturalists, boatmen, fishermen, constabulary and police, engineers and firemen, machinists, messengers, tailors, watchmakers and jewellers, and painters and glaziers. (9)

Aside from this occupational fragmentation, the Manila proletariat was further segregated by ethnic and linguistic divisions. The city's rapid late nineteenth century growth - from a population of 93,595 in 1876 to 219,928 in 1903 - had been created primarily by immigration from the surrounding Tagalog-speaking provinces of Central and Southern Luzon. But the 1870s and 1880s had also witnessed a large influx of Chinese workers, mainly from Fukien. As Chinese coolies were commonly regarded by employers as more reliable and hard-working than Filipinos, certain native workers - particularly stevedores, warehousemen and navvies - felt their livelihoods threatened and added their voice to a broadly-based exclusion campaign. (10) From a peak of some 51,000 in 1886, the Chinese population of Manila had by 1903 dropped to about 22,000, the remainder having either moved to the provinces or returned home. (11) The majority of those that stayed in the capital, moreover, had left the labour gangs to become retailers, cooks, carpenters, tailors or metal-workers, and were thus no longer in direct competition with Filipinos for unskilled or semi-skilled work. Communal resentment nevertheless
still ran high and found regular expression in labour politics.

Divisions within the ethnically Filipino workforce, though less deep, presented another source of potential factionalism. Rural-urban migrants newly arrived in the city naturally tended to seek out former "town-mates" or "province-mates" for security, companionship and assistance in finding work and accommodation. Employers and foremen, in turn, felt that staff recruited from their own town, province or linguistic group were more likely to prove honest, diligent and loyal than outsiders. Spread amongst the proletariat there thus appeared a myriad of regionally-based clusters. Particularly in the less skilled occupations these would on occasion compete for work contracts and constitute a significant basis for inter-union rivalries. One much larger regionally-based concentration - of Visayans in the waterfront district of San Nicolas - complicated union organisation amongst fishermen, stevedores and mariners.

The political climate in which the early labour activists - known as obreristas - worked was naturally dominated by controversies over conflicting attitudes and responses to the American occupation. Some wealthy and prominent Filipinos had rejected independence in favour of American tutelage even before hostilities had commenced in February 1899. Many more had withdrawn their support from the Revolutionary Government and become advocates of "peace and order" once their prosperity was threatened by the disruption and destruction of war. In December 1900 these pacificados launched the Federal Party, so named because its founders desired the country's eventual annexation as a state of the Union. More immediately, they concentrated their efforts on persuading those Filipinos still in the field to surrender and swear allegiance to the Stars and Stripes. In appreciation of this service, three Federalistas were co-opted onto the governing Philippine Commission headed by Civil Governor William Howard Taft and over the next few years it was generally acknowledged, in Taft's own words, that Federal Party membership "was always a good recommendation ... for appointment."(12) Prior to 1906 attempts to organise any effective opposition to the party were consistently denied official sanction.

Having seen government posts given to those campaigning for peace, and faced with continuing military reverses, several Filipino army commanders became persuaded that collaboration was preferable to continued resistance. Surrendered were rarely even detained if they
took the oath of allegiance, and if an officer also arranged for the demobilisation of his men he might be rewarded with a high position in the area where he could wield most influence. From the American viewpoint this flexible policy not only had the desired effect of persuading thousands to lay down their arms but also helped to neutralise the lingering resentment of defeat by installing prominent revolutionary leaders in positions that would have been unattainable under the Spanish regime.

The vast majority of ordinary Filipinos, however, had neither the inclination to join the Federalistas' obsequious pursuit of Americanisation nor the prospect of securing prestigious positions under the new order. Political argument thus revolved less around colonialism versus independence than around differing forms of nationalism and alternative strategies for achieving independence. The bravest option was continued armed struggle. Despite the overwhelming imbalance in firepower and resources, many were aware that American domestic opinion was deeply divided over the Philippine venture. They cherished the hope that a prolonged guerrilla war might destroy the retentionist case. After the republic's most renowned military leaders had either been captured or followed the civilian plutocrats into collaboration, Constabulary officers noted that the die-hard resistance was upheld almost entirely by less privileged elements who had less to lose from protracted war and less to gain from surrender. Denigrating the intransigents as "miserable specimens" and "outlaws", the colonialists recognised that these men won broad sympathy from working class Filipinos in town and country alike.(13) Any form of political or economic organisation amongst workers and peasants was for this reason regarded with grave suspicion.

Non-military nationalist responses to American rule varied enormously, ranging from retreat into folk mysticism to headlong scramble for modernity; from developing the unrealised potential of Tagalog to defending the cultural legacy of Spain; from advocating civil disobedience to promoting fulsome co-operation as a proof of political "maturity". Seemingly divergent tendencies often mingled in a single platform or credo. The dominant themes of early twentieth century nationalism, however, were those that had pre-occupied the propagandists and guided the revolution. The leading proponents of mainstream nationalism had in various capacities formerly supported the Revolutionary
Government. Some had acted as its accredited diplomatic representatives in Madrid or Hong Kong; some had worked on revolutionary newspapers or been faculty members at the republic's short-lived university. Others had served in the republican congress, and a few had been commanders in the field. Almost all were ilustrados. Until the officially authorised organisation of pro-independence parties in 1906, most diverted their political energies chiefly into literary and journalistic channels, treating the independence issue with caution and commonly concealing their nationalist sentiments behind a welter of imagery and symbolism.

A small ilustrado minority, however, took a less circumspect approach, articulating its frustrated nationalism more openly and diversely. Most prominent and controversial among this minority were Pascual Poblete, Isabelo de los Reyes and Dominador Gomez, three former exiles in Spain who in the years 1901-3 were together involved in four major nationalist undertakings: the organisation of a semi-clandestine Nacionalista Party; newspaper publishing; the launching of a schismatic church named the Iglesia Filipina Independiente; and the leadership of the country's first labour federation.

Known as the Union Obrera Democratica (UOD), the labour federation was launched at a meeting held at the Teatro de Variedades on February 2, 1902. Among the organisations represented were four neighbourhood associations (from Cavite and the Manila districts of Quiapo, Santa Cruz and Sampaloc); company guilds from the San Miguel Brewery and the L. R. Yangco Shipping Company; and trade or shop associations of printers, tabaqueros, tailors, sculptors, seamen and cooks. In succeeding months the federation attracted additional affiliations from groups of mechanics, barbers, hemp-pressers, seamstresses, rig-drivers, draughtsmen, farm tenants, stevedores, municipal employees, commercial clerks, railwaymen and workers in the Customs and Quartermaster Corps. At its peak in mid-1903 the total membership was estimated at around 20,000.

Here it is not proposed to discuss the structure or recount the industrial activities of the Union Obrera, but merely to examine the political orientation given to the organisation by its founding president, Isabelo de los Reyes, and by his successor, Dominador Gomez. Both men were bohemians, but in entirely different styles. De los Reyes
owned lucrative real estate in Manila and the provinces but lived a frugal and ascetic existence above an ordinary Tondo store. A squat, corpulent figure, mostly Filipino by blood, he dressed like a labourer, and but for a peculiar shambling gait and other odd mannerisms would have blended unnoticed into the teeming city crowds. (17) Dominador Gomez, by contrast, was a tall, muscular, womanising Spanish mestizo who lived in a Quiapo mansion and positively revelled in public attention. Dressing in an immaculate white suit, straw boater and gold-rimmed glasses, he travelled the streets in his own private carriage drawn by magnificently groomed horses. (18)

The notion of launching a labour federation originated when de los Reyes was approached for advice by a group of lithographers who had formed a small association at the Carmelo and Bauermann printing works. "Don Belong", as he was popularly known, had been renowned in Manila prior to the revolution as a newspaper proprietor, folklorist and prolific commentator on the events of the day. Arrested in June 1897 as an anti-friar propagandist, he had been deported to Spain and for a few months was incarcerated in Barcelona's Montjuich Prison. Following his release he had travelled to Madrid and prior to returning to the Philippines in October 1901 turned his polemical talents to championing the Revolutionary Government in newspapers and pamphlets. Besides being known in printing circles and being admired for his crusading republicanism, there was probably a further reason he was sought out by the Carmelo and Bauermann lithographers. Whilst imprisoned in Barcelona, de los Reyes had become acquainted with several Spanish dissidents, and from them had acquired a keen interest in their contending theories. When returning to Manila he had carried in his luggage a small library of anarchist and socialist texts in Spanish translation, including works by Proudhon, Kropotkin, Malatesta and Marx. (19) Certainly he would have discussed these books with friends, and may have started writing articles based on his reading for the Manila press.

Since contemporary radical theories had not been in circulation prior to the revolution, de los Reyes was in a literal sense probably justified in later boasting that he had "introduced socialism into the country". (20) Whether he himself could be called the first Philippine socialist is more debatable. Certainly extracts from his writings can be cited in support of such a claim. Into the official doctrine of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, for example, he wrote a belief in
utopian communism as the supreme form of human society:

"In what is the divine seal of the teaching of Jesus found? In its unfading freshness, in fact, the freedom and heavenly democracy which two thousand years ago the divine Master preached, frankly and without conventional limitations, in that epoch of barbarous tyrannies, redemption of the disinherited classes, community of goods and abolition of frontiers, making of the Universe a single people of brothers who love one another without the restrictions of egoism, which it is generally agreed property and privileges create." (21)

Through such statements de los Reyes can legitimately be seen as an ideological innovationist. No pre-revolutionary writer had espoused the abolition of frontiers and common ownership. But, no less than his fellow-propagandists, de los Reyes approached political philosophy primarily as a moralist. He did not see socialism as something that might be achieved through class struggle or the agency of trade unions or political parties. It would be attained rather by a gradual improvement in the human state of mind, an ethical evolution to the point where everyone recognised and honoured their overriding duty to their neighbour. The rich, he contended, should show charity to the poor and pay their employees just wages, treating them always with kindness and understanding. Workers should regard the wealthy with neither hostility nor envy, and should win the confidence of their employers by loyalty, integrity and conscientious toil. (22)

As conceived by de los Reyes, the Union Obrera would foster this symbiotic harmony by bringing together workers and employers in a spirit of friendship, mutual respect and recognised inter-dependence. "Our aim", he wrote "is to achieve the longed-for alliance between capital and labour"; to encourage this end "we elected the richest industrialists and owners in Manila to the (Union's) executive board." (23) Evidently it was to the rank and file, however, that the federation's didactic mission was to be principally directed. The Katipunan, the revolutionary organisation which in 1896 had launched the struggle against Spain, was, he wrote, "a terrible association, because it was composed of common and ignorant folk, because the masses think little". (24) Like other ilustrados, the UOD's founder was not content to see the masses remain in such a lamentable state, and considered their uplift an essential prerequisite to modern nationhood.

De los Reyes' successor as Union Obrera president, Dominador Gomez, also professed to be a socialist and was described as such by
others. The celebrated Tagalog playwright Aurelio Tolentino even penned a "socialist drama" in his honour.(25) But in reality his old-style ilustrado elitism seems to have been scarcely complicated by modern intellectual currents at all. In a proclamation he published in April 1903 just prior to the first celebration of May Day in the Islands, for example, he suggested that the theme of the festivities should be "fraternisation with capital, which there is a duty always to defend, respect and love". Socialism that was "red and incendiary" in nature, he advised in the same message, should be rejected in favour of a "socialism white and pure ... which spreads tolerance and compassion".

(26) When Gomez inherited the Union Obrera presidency, conservative Filipino observers greeted him almost as a political bedfellow. The Federal Party organ La Democracia confidently predicted that he could "satisfy the aspirations of the proletarian class without (causing) a deterioration in the interest of capital or the public."(27) La Patria related with similar approval that "Senator Gomez knows ... that ... in the present transitional era, unjust pretensions in regard to wages may redound with great force to the damage of the country".(28) Also indicative of Gomez's outlook is a pro-independence petition that he and other constitutionally-minded nationalists presented to a visiting United States congressional party in 1905. In arguing that the Filipinos were capable of managing their own destiny, the petitioners contended that "the only two (factors) by which to determine the political capacity of a country (are) an entity that knows how to govern, the directing class, and an entity that knows how to obey, the popular masses." The Philippines possessed this magic formula and could therefore be granted independence without fear of "disturbances or deep political commotions".(29)

Socialist principles are no less difficult to discern in the Union Obrera presidents' attitude towards Chinese workers. De los Reyes, despite his professed ethical concern for universal brotherhood, petitioned Governor Taft and President Roosevelt to retain exclusionist legislation and fanned popular anti-Chinese feeling with scurrilous stories about the immigrants forcing young Filipinas into concubinage. (30) Agreeing that good morals were threatened, Dominador Gomez - a doctor by profession - added the clinical opinion that "even in his physical ailments (the Chinaman) is worse than the man of any other race; his diseases are extrapathological".(31) Such afflictions, though,
were apparently not totally incapacitating. Properly limited and regulated immigration, Gomez thought, would be beneficial so long as the Chinese came "merely and purely as work animals for the cultivation of our fields". (32)

To American officialdom the successive Union Obrera presidencies of de los Reyes and Gomez signalled that the emergent labour movement had fallen under the sway of dangerous nationalist extremists. De los Reyes was officially characterised as a "crack-brained insurrecto agitator"; Gomez as a "professional agitator and blatherskite" who was aiding and abetting the "insurrectos". (33) Due more to these suspicions than to their involvement in the strikes called by Union Obrera affiliates, the two ilustrados were prosecuted under the Spanish anti-combination law then still technically in force. Each eventually served a brief jail sentence, and upon the arrest of Gomez in May 1903 the labour federation itself was placed in the hands of a receiver. With hindsight, though, it is clear that both Union Obrera presidents were entirely sincere in their repeated protestations that they wished to campaign for independence "only by legal processes and through peaceful means". (34) Through the efforts they made to persuade guerrillas still in the field to abandon the armed struggle, indeed, they played a crucial role in de-revolutionising Philippine nationalism and diverting it into constitutional channels. They were "radical" nationalists solely in the sense that they articulated and mobilised support for independence at a time when most of their peers felt it discreet to remain silent or masked.

In using the Spanish anti-combination law against de los Reyes and Gomez the government practically admitted that it was merely seizing upon a convenient device. Governor Taft himself, when authorising de los Reyes' early release, noted that the statute "was not in line with current American thinking on the subject." (35) American officials in fact shared many of the ilustrado union leaders' perspectives. They too felt that Spanish rule had stifled industrious instincts by offering insufficient incentives and fostering the belief that manual labour was degrading. Filipino labour, the new colonisers commonly agreed, was a "problem" which threatened to retard the exploitation of the Islands' obvious economic potential. A government construction engineer, for example, complained to the Philippine Commission as follows:
"I cannot bring too strongly to your attention that as a labourer the Filipino is a flat, absolute failure, a man of no energy and less judgement, ignorant, sly, deceitful and lazy, working only because he is forced to do so, caring nothing for the money he gets at the end of the week. He wearily drags through the six days of his martyrdom, and then with greater alertness than he has exhibited for a whole week he sets his face homeward and is seen no more."(36)

In some cases, an official investigator noted with dismay, the Filipino whose wages had been increased "has been known to lessen correspondingly the number of days per month which he would work."(37)

Such alarming irrationality had to be corrected. Attitudes inherited from the past had to be changed. Associations of workingmen, Governor Taft advised Manila obreristas in June 1903, could make a positive contribution to these processes by encouraging a belief in the dignity of labour and a feeling of pride in a job well done and a wage diligently earned. Beyond this form of missionary activity, Taft hoped, the unions would confine themselves to economic goals and avoid political controversy - in other words abandon their links with the continuing movement for independence.(38) Taking a longer view, another American observer commented that

"It is much preferable that (the labour movement) should be governed by American rather than by South European ideals.... This might lessen the probability that a political labor party will arise, with great influence.... Persons familiar with Filipino character consider that the existence of such a party, if it commanded a large and well-organised body of voters, might greatly hamper the authorities in maintaining peace in case of strikes or other labour difficulties, as well as embarrass the general administration of the government."(39)

As a major battleground in the conflict between ilustrado nationalists and the American authorities, the Manila labour movement served in 1902-3 as a central focus of public controversy. With the legalisation of pro-independence political parties and the inauguration in 1907 of an elected branch of the legislature, however, nationalist debate became centered elsewhere and the limelight swiftly receded. De los Reyes and Gomez, the men whose notoriety had given the Union Obrera its political lustre, gradually withdrew from the labour scene after finding more orthodox platforms in the Manila municipal board and the Philippine Assembly. Leadership of the union movement then passed
partly to relatively skilled and educated workers and partly to lawyers and journalists, involved in labour affairs through their own callings, through idealism or through political ambition. Government hopes that unionism would become depoliticised as ilustrado involvement was reduced were disappointed. But although workmen's associations remained fervently nationalistic, and whilst many became enmeshed in party factionalism and electoral manoeuvring, American fears that the labour movement might give birth to an independent working class party were proved premature.

**Weakness, Discord and Fragmentation**

The government's willing accomplice in trying to steer the capital's labour activists along less controversial, more instrumental paths was the American Federation of Labor, which in June 1903 despatched a special commissioner, Edward Rosenberg, to the Islands. Rosenberg's prime mission was to gather information that could buttress the AFL's opposition to Chinese immigration proposals, but he saw himself also as a roving evangelist for AFL-style unionism. Workers in the United States and England, he told a specially-arranged meeting of Manila labourites, had learned that they "gained most ... by excluding politics from their unions" and by organising "along strictly trade union lines". Although sympathetic outsiders might be elected to honorary positions in the unions, only actual workers were permitted to be active members and officers.(40) After this meeting a group of obreristas had further discussions with Rosenberg and with his assistance drafted a constitution for a new labour federation "in conformity with the constitution of the AFL."(41)

The new federation was called the Union del Trabajo de Filipinas (UTF), and its first president was Lope K. Santos, a former printer turned journalist. The heavy American involvement in the UTF's formation has led some commentators to conclude that Santos was an imperialist stooge who betrayed the "socialist" and fervently nationalist legacy supposedly left by de los Reyes and Gomez.(42) As may be gathered from the foregoing discussion, such an analysis is rather superficial. De los Reyes, in fact, welcomed the Union del Trabajo's foundation in his newspaper and Gomez apparently assisted in arranging the meetings at which the new federation was discussed.(43)
Santos, furthermore, had if anything slightly better credentials as a nationalist and as a "socialist" than the two ilustrados. Whilst they were fulminating against the American occupation from the safety of Spain, he was with the revolutionary army in the forests of Laguna and Batangas. To promote broader discussion of working class ideologies, he and the printing unionist Hermenegildo Cruz gave evening classes for interested labourites at what he called a "School of Socialism" in Quiapo, where study focused on European radical texts. Cruz, according to Santos, was "an ardent disciple of Carlos Marx, Emilio Zola, Eliseo Reclus, Maximo Gorki and others", and based his lessons mainly on their works.\textsuperscript{44} Santos himself reached a much larger audience as editor of Manila's only Tagalog daily paper, \textit{Muling Pagsilang} (Rebirth), which periodically printed translations from Spanish versions of Russian, German and French writings on labour questions. In 1904, for example, the paper serialised extracts from Karl Kautsky's Erfurt programme.\textsuperscript{45}

In the same year \textit{Muling Pagsilang} also carried the first installments of Santos's most celebrated original work, \textit{Banaag at Sikat} (First Rays and Full Brilliance), which was eventually published as a full-length novel in 1906. Written when popular prose literature was still dominated by the lives of saints and sagas of medieval European chivalry, \textit{Banaag at Sikat} portrayed characters from contemporary Philippine life, among them newspapermen and obreristas. The novel's main storyline revolves around familiar dilemmas of love between poor boy and rich girl, but amidst the romance Santos intersperses heated dialogues on basic anarchist and socialist concepts. The politically most "advanced" characters, called "Heroes of the New Life", are presented as moderate socialists who recognise that their ideals cannot be attained in the Philippines until the workers and peasants have been made aware of their importance in society and of their legitimate rights. The dialogues in the book suggest however that Santos like de los Reyes tended to confuse socialism with the moral and legal egalitarianism of enlightenment liberalism. The American constitution, according to the sympathetically-portrayed character Delfin, "is brimming with socialist aspirations"; the US government is "based almost entirely on socialist principles, more so perhaps than (the governments) of socialist countries themselves." One wonders which countries, in 1906, Delfin's creator had in mind.\textsuperscript{46}
After an initial surge of activity - when affiliates were reported in several provinces as well as Manila - the Union del Trabajo made little headway. Partly this was because between 1904 and 1910 the economy in general and basic commodity prices in particular were relatively stable and the material impetus of collective working class action was correspondingly weakened. Organisational stagnation might nevertheless have been avoided had the UTF been stronger internally. Wilfully or otherwise, its effectiveness was impaired by its transplanted, American-designed constitution. In the United States, where there were large industrial concentrations and the AFL's components were relatively well-established, a weak federal centre was arguably no great problem. But in the Philippines, with a small, fragmented proletariat and with the few trade associations that existed still in their infancy, a weak centre enfeebled the whole movement. In addition, potential militancy amongst the UTF's rank and file was subdued by a constitutional requirement that any strike had to be approved by 90 per cent of the striking union's membership before qualifying for support from headquarters.\(^\text{(47)}\) In these respects, the charge that the UTF was less aggressive than the Union Obrera has some validity.

The UTF's original aim of uniting all organised workers under a single banner was further undermined by the federation's involvement in job brokerage and "politics", twin diversions that thereafter remained major sources of labour discord throughout the American period. At best, these pursuits sacrificed class solidarity to narrower personal and sectional loyalties; at worst, they spawned graft and corruption. Neither activity, in other words, was undertaken in accord with professed obrerista ideals, and consequently both tend to be excluded from the public and historical record. Their prevalence even in the Philippine labour movement's first decade is however quite clear.

Job brokerage had first become a common practice in the nineteenth century, when both the Spanish administration and foreign trading companies had often preferred to hire their workers not directly and individually but in gangs from labour recruiting agents. These agents were generally known by a word connoting "boss" - cabecilla. Agents who supplied Filipino labourers reportedly demanded at least 20 per cent of their gang's wages.\(^\text{(48)}\) Chinese labour agents, who customarily advanced their men's steamship passage from China and provided them with lodging in crowded dormitories, probably exacted a much higher percentage.\(^\text{(49)}\)
As mentioned earlier, the fact that many employers seemed to favour Chinese labourers was a source of considerable racial resentment and tension. As anti-Chinese sentiment found expression in the Union Obrera's campaign against further immigration, the labour movement itself became implicated in the brokerage system. In 1903 Pascual Poblete, a political associate of de los Reyes and Gomez, attempted to demonstrate that Chinese labour was unnecessary by assembling more than a thousand Filipinos in Manila and arranging their transportation northwards to work on the construction of the Benguet mountain road. Unfortunately the performance of these so-called "Poblete Obreros" was not altogether satisfactory, and some observers felt the exercise had the opposite effect to that intended. (50) When the Union del Trabajo was formed, Isabo de los Reyes nevertheless counselled its leaders to follow Poblete's example. Aside from destroying the pretext for immigration, Don Belong advised, the creation of labour gangs would be much appreciated by employers, who could deal with a cabecilla and thus save themselves "the aggravation of dealing with each and every employee and, above all, the difficulty of meeting them." (51)

Job brokerage could thus be justified even after the Chinese immigration debate had been settled, for it contributed to "labour-capital harmony". Once this argument was accepted, non-militant labour leaders could logically consider it legitimate to supply work squads to ease the problems of employers troubled by strikes or unrest. The deployment of work-squads, in other words, having originated in the union movement as an anti-Chinese device, could be adopted as a weapon against Filipino labour radicals. Until 1908 there was little reason for the weapon to be used. In that year, however, the Union del Trabajo's status as the country's principal trade union centre was threatened by the reconstitution of the Union Obrera Democratica de Filipinas, seemingly inclined to follow a less conciliatory path. Two episodes recorded in the newly-formed Bureau of Labor's annual report for 1909-10 show how the UTF used job brokerage to counteract the UODF's challenge. In September 1909 more than a thousand UODF-affiliated tabaqueros went on strike at the El Oriente factory, their main demand being for wage increases of 15-25 per cent. The Bureau of Labor intervened and persuaded the proprietor to grant an 8 per cent increase, but the UODF general president, Jose Turiano Santiago, then advised the strikers to hold out for further concessions. Annoyed at this
"irresponsible attitude", the Bureau of Labor thereupon withdrew from the case, but recorded in its report that "later the vacancies left by the strikers were gradually filled by new labourers belonging to the workmen's association entitled Union del Trabajo de Filipinas."(32) The second case concerned a strike against the Shipowners' Association organised by the UODF-affiliated Gremio de Marinos Mercantes, which was headed by the renowned Dominador Gomez. In this case the Bureau of Labor reported that the UTF, "considering the strike unjustified ... saw fit to assist the Shipowners' Association in finding men to replace the strikers, and thanks to this assistance it was possible to furnish crews to the steamers that needed them".(33)

Notwithstanding its comparative militancy, the UODF's reappearance was probably not solely due to dissatisfaction at UTF meekness and moderation. Most likely "politics" was involved. Here the word "politics" is used, as it is frequently used in the Philippines, in a very limited sense, referring to the faction-fighting, intrigues, fusions and splits that typically plague the nation's personality-oriented rather than principle-oriented political organisations. Why these pastimes should have excited the labour movement in the 1900s is at first sight somewhat mysterious, because the vast majority of workers were unable to vote. The franchise was limited to males over 23 years who either owned real estate worth over P 500, were literate in English or Spanish, or had been principales prior to 1898. In the two electoral districts of Manila the total number that actually voted in the first Philippine Assembly elections of 1907 was 7,206 - a figure equivalent to roughly 7 per cent of the 1903 male working population. (54)

If only a small minority of workers could enter the polling booths, however, many more could be called upon to push a campaign bandwagon by canvassing and attending rallies. UODF and UTF members were accordingly aligned in loose, ad hoc groupings known as bloques behind candidates and factions with which their respective leaders were identified. In 1907, for example, the UODF was linked to the Partido Nacionalista, whose candidate in Manila's north district was Dominador Gomez himself. Secretary of the Nacionalista committee for the key north district waterfront neighbourhoods of Binondo and San Nicolas was Leopoldo Alba, UODF vice-president and secretary of Gomez's Gremio de Marionos Mercantes. No less significantly, Alba was also secretary to
the Shipowners' Association, a post which he presumably used to secure employment for UODF mariners. The Union del Trabajo, on the other hand, was connected through a network of personal and professional ties with a breakaway group from the Partido Nacionalista known as the Liga Popular. Among the directors of the Liga Popular were Ramon Diokno, a young lawyer who was honorary president of the UTF-affiliated Union de Marinos and at some stage held the presidency of the UTF itself; Hermenegildo Cruz, the editor of the UTF organ Paggawa; and Fernando Ma. Guerrero, sometime editor of the Spanish language sister paper of Lope K. Santos's Muling Pagsilang.

During the period of rivalry between the Union del Trabajo and the Union Obrera, such organisational advances as occurred in the labour movement were mostly made by associations which either were unconnected with the two federations or at least distanced themselves from the internecine strike. Once again printing unionists were in the forefront. Around 1908 the Gremio de Tipografos, Litografos y Encuadernadores, which had formed the original Union Obrera nucleus in 1902, was re-organised as the Union de Impresores de Filipinas (UIF) under Hermenegildo Cruz and four of his students at the "School of Socialism": Arturo Soriano, Melanio de Jesus, Crisanto Evangelista and Felipe Mendoza. These and other UIF officers all worked in the industry the union represented; the existing prominence of "outsiders" in labour circles, the printers felt, was in great measure to blame for the debilitating UTF-UODF schism. Endeavouring to persuade others to follow their lead, the printers in February 1909 called a meeting of UTF- and UODF- affiliated unionists from Manila's largest tobacco factories and exhorted them to forget their factional differences and unite under a single Union de Tabaqueros, to be led only by their fellow-workers. As evidenced by the El Oriente strike mentioned earlier, this initiative did not meet with immediate success, and for a time the new union had to co-exist alongside UTF and UODF branches which refused to disband. In the long run, however, the Union de Tabaqueros like the Union de Impresores won a leading position in its industry. Independent trade unions were also successfully founded at this time by lithographers and house painters, but similar associations launched by street cleaners, belt-makers, carpenters and others proved short-lived.
If trade unionism was gaining a foothold only gradually, voluntary organisations of other types were appearing in profusion. The new-found freedom to form associations, to strive for personal betterment, and to contribute to the nation's material and cultural progress gave birth to civic leagues, sporting clubs, choral societies, amateur dramatic troupes, literary circles and study groups by the score. Aside from the clubs catering for specific interests there were a host of nationalist societies (kapisanang makabayan) and mutual benefit societies (samahang abuluyan) which were open to all, and which became linked in varying degrees with the labour movement. Collectively, organisations of both types were known simply as kapisanan, and their most ardent devotees - who usually belonged to several at once - were called kapisanistas. Frequently the nationalist societies would administer insurance schemes and the mutual benefit societies would participate in nationalist parades, so in practice there was no clear demarcation between the two.

Altogether more than sixty nationalist and/or mutualist associations can be identified as being active in Manila during the decade 1910-1920, and most probably this figure could be doubled or trebled. The kapisanan fulfilled several needs that otherwise would have gone unmet. With no government or company insurance schemes in existence, they offered assistance in the event of sickness, unemployment or retirement, and gave aid to cover funeral expenses and support dependants when a member died. These friendly society functions gave particular assurance to migrants from the provinces who were separated from the customary security of family and kin. To the newcomers also the associations' activities could accord fellowship and a sense of belonging, easing their adjustment to life in a strange city. With substantive political involvement circumscribed by language barriers and the franchise limitations, the kapisanan provided common tao and learned Tagalista alike with the opportunity to affirm their nationalist commitment in the vernacular, in the Katipunan's own idiom. For those with limited formal education, including many whose schooling had been curtailed by the revolution, some associations held evening classes and discussion groups, helping satisfy the contemporary urge to self-improvement. Organised as they usually were on a district basis, finally, the kapisanan could accommodate the fragmented, isolated workforce of artisans, clerks, storeworkers and servants that workingmen's societies based on trade or workplace could not reach. For all these reasons, most leading
union activists were also enthusiastic kapisanistas.

In the years 1911 and 1912 the living standards of Manila's workers were reduced by sharp increases in rice prices, caused in the first instance by bad weather and poor harvests and then accentuated by speculative hoarding. Having been fairly stable for the previous five years, average wholesale prices in the city's markets rose from P 5.42 per 57 kilogram sackful in 1910 to P 6.09 in 1911 and P 7.21 in 1912. Rice held such a key place in household budgets, according to the Philippine Commission, that its price served as the premise upon which most wage schedules were based. Nevertheless, employers were hardly likely to be enthusiastic about granting wage increases at every temporary fluctuation, and their resistance to wage demands produced a minor wave of unrest and strikes. In the fiscal year 1911-12 the Bureau of Labor recorded twenty industrial disputes (sixteen in Manila) - more than in the previous two years combined. Viewed in anything but relative terms, however, the response of organised labour to the price inflation had to be acknowledged as feeble. The total number of workpeople involved in the disputes of 1911-12 was only 4,500, roughly equivalent to just one city worker in thirty. The defence of workers' livelihoods in such times of difficulty, it became more widely acknowledged in obrerista circles, presented a challenge that the labour movement was ill-equipped to meet. The UTF-UODF rivalry, job brokerage, political factionalism and the scattered activities of the independent unions and kapisanans, it was recognised, were all symptoms of a disunity which barred the way to further progress.

The Congreso Obrero de Filipinas

The need for reconciliation and organisational consolidation was stressed by speakers at a banquet held in February 1913 to commemorate the original foundation of the Union Obrera. Here it was agreed that, as in 1902, an attempt should be made to bring all workingmen's associations under a single umbrella, and it was resolved to hold a congress to which all interested societies would be invited to send delegates. An organising committee was set up under Hermenegildo Cruz to make the necessary preparations. On May Day, 157 delegates representing 36 societies with a total of 40,000 members convened at the Cine Oriental on Azcarraga to inaugurate the new federation as the
Congreso Obrero de Filipinas (COF). With the notable exceptions of Isabelo de los Reyes and Dominador Gomez, nearly all those who had previously held key offices in the labour movement were among the delegates. The Union Obrera and Union del Trabajo were both dissolved, and for the next sixteen years the Congreso was to remain indisputably the country's foremost labour centre.

The size of delegations at the 1913 and succeeding annual congresses was determined by a rough form of proportional representation. Affiliated societies with less than 500 members were entitled to send two delegates, and larger societies could send two further delegates for every multiple of 500 that their membership exceeded. A large proportion of delegates to the first congress were connected more closely with nationalist and mutualist societies than with trade unions. If the congress roster is divided rather crudely into organisational categories, the breakdown shows that 37 of the 157 delegates represented three patriotic societies and 43 were accredited by 22 mutualist associations. A further eight were Filipinas from two civic-minded women's organisations. Two general labour organisations, based in Mandaluyong and Cebu, sent one representative each. This leaves 67 delegates - less than half the total - who attended as representatives of seven trade unions. Of these, 36 delegates were in the Union de Tabaqueros deputation and 20 with the Nuevo Gremio de Marionos Mercantes, an organisation formed after the original Gremio de Marionos Mercantes had been wound up following a crisis with the funds. Smaller delegations came from another tabaqueros' association and from unions of printers, slipper-makers, shoesmiths and mechanics.

The printers', painters', slipper-makers' and mechanics' deputations and the large Union de Tabaqueros contingent consisted entirely of workers actively engaged in the trade concerned, but in most other delegations several occupations were represented. Listed according to trade and profession, 43 congress delegates were tabaqueros, 24 "employees" ("kawani" - presumably mostly white-collar workers), 19 typographers, 8 mariners, 6 mechanics, 6 clerks and 6 journalists. Among the miscellaneous remainder were half a dozen assorted politicos, three businessmen, two lawyers, two teachers, two accountants and a doctor.
This occupational pattern was on the whole fairly reflected in the federation's leadership: the journalists, politicos and professionals, in other words, did not exercise an influence greatly disproportionate to their number. The Congreso's various standing committees and the editorial board of its organ, Tambuli, were composed mainly of manual workers, with printers and tabaqueros much to the fore. (67)

Typically, the early Congreso activists had been born to working class families in Manila and the surrounding Tagalog provinces in the 1880s and early 1890s. Having left school relatively young, they had subsequently gained further informal or part-time education as apprentices or in evening classes at the city's new secular colleges. Most had at least some knowledge of Spanish and English as well as being fully literate in the vernacular. All three languages - somewhat confusingly - were used in Congreso proceedings and publications. Through aptitude, diligence or good fortune, many leading obreristas had risen in their chosen occupations to become technicians, foremen or inspectors. As a group, therefore, the principal Congreso activists were better educated, more highly skilled and consequently better paid than the average city worker.

But this is not to say that the Congreso in any way constituted a "labour aristocracy", a stratum of skilled workers jealously protecting their own privileges from other members of their class. The affiliated unions and kapisanan embraced supervisors, craftsmen and labourers alike. The Union de Tabaqueros, for example, included both the tobacco factory seniors - foremen and maestros cigarreros - and hundreds of low-paid strippers, sorters and packers. Nevertheless, the obreristas' standing relative to the mass of their fellow-workers undoubtedly did have a bearing on their social outlook. A discussion of this outlook may usefully begin with the following extracts from "Our aim", an editorial in English printed in Tambuli's second issue:

"Because of the scant amount which is paid for their heavy labor (our laborers) are often deprived of the vital necessities of life such as good food, wholesome air and proper shelter and clothing - a deprivation which results in the most distressing spectacle - a sight which is beyond the power of the human heart to bear. Here we see a family that almost die from starvation; there we see another family whose children are almost naked; others we hear of them being robbed and murdered; still others are found in low moist barns or cots with beds a little better than those of beasts and food scarce to satisfy the hunger, while in many other occasions we witness several persons living in a single
apartment to economise their living; or found in apartments connected with the stable where no sunlight and pure air enter and where the odor is offensive; others are forced to beg; and numerous others, especially women who have a weak character and have no strength to struggle with the hardships of existence, are known to fall into the abyss of vice and are seen rolling in sin in the red light district or seen whirling and dancing to seduce the young students to spend the pensions they receive from their parents - scenes which are a perpetual menace to the peace and morals of the public.

But the examples cited above are not all the most lamentable situation of our laborers. Besides being refused a corresponding just pay for the work they have done they are, because of their weakness, abused by their masters. Their rights are trodden, their reasons unheeded and their protests unheard. The idol of the master is gold and they are his slaves. They work for his gain, but they have no share of that gain. Whenever they raise a voice of protest against his absolute and unjust policy, they are silenced by his menace of sending them out of position, without which their families will starve....

As poverty keeps the poor laborers in the same tenor every day, education is neglected and as a result of ignorance and extreme need, crimes of the most horrible nature are committed.... We will try, though a hard task, to blot some, if not all, these crimes from the dictionary of criminal cases by means of brotherly councils. And when we have accomplished all of these, we have done our duty to our country, and to humanity in general."

Compared against writings from the revolutionary period, this editorial contains themes both familiar and new. Like debates within the Congreso itself, Tambuli and other contemporary labour literature reflected the balance and tension in obrerista thinking between perspectives inherited from the propagandists and revolutionists and ideas derived from the socialist and anarchist classics. The most striking legacy from the 1880s and 1890s was the obsession with moral regeneration, the conviction that the problems confronting the ordinary Filipino were in large measure internal, springing from weaknesses of his own soul and character. Not only were these failings a barrier to personal advancement, they were in the Tambuli editorialist's nightmare vision a danger to public peace and morality. This view of the common masses was clearly still coloured by that amalgam of shame, disgust and fear that had troubled the nineteenth century ilustrados. Like the ilustrados, the obreristas had a sense of self-appointed mission, a "duty to country and humanity" to drag their less fortunate fellows away from the "abyss" of ignorance, crime and vice and to guide them towards the virtues of education and good citizenship. As a starting point in the
crusade against disorderly habits, delegates to the Congreso's inaugural sessions unanimously approved a resolution (proposed by an ex-Katipunero) that an anti-gambling campaign should be launched, denouncing such popular recreations as cockfighting, lotteries, billiards and the card games monte and pangingi. (69)

Offered as prophylactics to combat waywardness and temptation were the stock remedies of diligence, thrift, self-respect, pride in one's labours, brotherly love, and enlightenment through the pursuit of justice, truth and reason. To encourage a healthy outlook and upright conduct, labour writers addressed their readers with improving tracts, and enunciated itemised ethical codes to which they felt the ideal worker should aspire. At least two authors devised workers' versions of the Ten Commandments. Like their direct antecedents - the inspirational decalogues drawn up by the revolutionists Bonifacio, Jacinto and Mabini - these codes listed the workers' duties and obligations; to God, family and fellow man. Generally they made no reference to the workers' rights or material needs. This omission, of course, was not one with which employers were likely to quarrel. It is indeed hardly surprising that those obreristas who most consistently emphasised responsibilities rather than expectations, who dwelt on moral rather than economic issues, tended also to be those who most faithfully followed the early ilustrado labour leaders in calling for class collaboration rather than confrontation. The two sets of Ten Commandments both explicitly instructed workers to "Foster labour-capital harmony", and one version included further enjoinders to "Defend the capital that employs you" and even to "Put into your work more effort than you are paid for." (70)

On the other hand, radicalism was certainly a much stronger and more coherent force in the Congreso than it had been in the federations of the early 1900s. Labour conservatives, we have seen, maintained that the solutions to the Filipino worker's problems lay primarily in individual self-enhancement - through personal good conduct, hard work and the establishment of harmonious relations with his employer. Labour radicals, whilst by no means indifferent to moral concerns, naturally laid more emphasis on external factors - on the worker's economic and political grievances and on the necessity of social change. Here again there was at least one echo from the revolutionary past: the Catholic religious orders were still denounced as prime enemies of enlightenment
and progress. Although the friars' educational and spiritual stranglehold had been broken by Spain's defeat, obrerista writers warned, monastic influence was still disturbingly potent, and any relaxation in the attacks initiated by the propagandists would be dangerously premature. A resolution at the 1913 COF sessions, for instance, condemned a "labourers' pilgrimage" to the Antipolo shrine of Nuestra Señora de Paz y Bien Viaje being organised by the friars and Jesuits. As in the past, Tambuli warned, the friars were attempting to undermine nationalist aspirations. Employers who tried to coerce their workers into joining the excursion, the paper added, "must understand that we are no longer in an age of tyranny and submission. This is the age of free speech, free press and free religion".

Implicit in this last statement is the conviction that Spain's displacement by the United States constituted a clear change for the better. Aside from welcoming political liberalisation, the Congreso's publicists did not - in marked contrast to the nineteenth century writers - hold the colonial power responsible for the nation's economic backwardness and poverty. Independence was claimed less as an economic deliverance than as an ethical, racial and cultural right. So far as they did consider broad commercial issues, labour spokesmen argued rather optimistically that Philippine products should be granted further preferences in the United States market whilst native manufacturers should at the same time be accorded trade protection. For the most part, however, obrerista attention focused on more immediate economic concerns, such universal workplace pre-occupations as wages, hours and conditions, matters which the propagandists and revolutionists had virtually ignored. From this working class viewpoint, Tambuli's "Our aim" editorial in effect argues, blame for the Filipino people's economic plight rested not so much with colonial interference as with the heartless, mercenary practices of employers, foreign and Filipino alike.

These bad practices, in the radical view, were not rarities exhibited only by a nefarious minority of employers; they were a normal everyday experience, stemming inevitably from capital's inherent desire to keep labour in subjugation. Trade unionism, in this light, had to be fashioned above all as a weapon of working class resistance and counter-attack. In the foreward to a pamphlet published by the railroad workers' union in 1919, for example, union vice-president
Fausto Carlos advised members that:

"...wherever workers are resigned to their fate, divided in their feelings and work merely to survive, the freedoms and rights of Labour are always oppressed, defeated and enslaved, Capital becomes more greedy and voracious, selfishness is ascendant and tyranny is intensified."(72)

A similar view is embodied in a declaration of principles drawn up by the Union de Impresores, which was subsequently adopted also by the Union de Tabaqueros. "Whosoever of our employed brothers does not associate with those of his condition", this credo warns, "shall sooner or later be enslaved by capital." Significantly departing from the customary liberal affirmations of unqualified universal brotherhood, the Impresores urged workers to recognise and give priority to their own particular class interest. "We labourers", the declaration states, "should be united and love our co-workers in preference to those who are not .... in case of accident or misfortune none of us has to help other than those who, like us, are slaves to capital."(73) In its attempt to deny labour's legitimate rights and aspirations, Tambuli's more militant contributors argued, capital had powerful allies. In the courts, workers suffered from dual standards; there was one law for the rich and one for the poor. In government, the legislators gave protection and support to landlords and businessmen but showed no compassion or consideration for the ordinary worker. Labour was denied a voice in national affairs.(74)

Given that polemics against capital and its allies were already a regular feature of labour literature by 1913, why was it not until the mid-1920s that concerted efforts were made to organise a radical working class political party? The most obvious restraint, of course, was the limitation on the franchise. Under the voting qualifications described earlier, which applied to the 1907, 1909 and 1912 Assembly elections, the proportion of adult males eligible (but not necessarily registered) to vote was in the region of 10-15 per cent. In 1916 the franchise was extended to males of voting age who were literate in a native language, and as a result registration was doubled. Even so, the total votes actually cast in Manila in the 1919 Assembly elections was only about 20,000, whereas the previous year's Census had recorded the city's male population of voting age as being over 85,000. In the country as a whole the proportion of adult males registered to vote did not exceed 50 per cent until the 1930s.(75)
But this was by no means the only factor that delayed the emergence of a labour party. First it should be remembered that the Congreso Obrero had been founded as an attempt to unite the labour movement after a period of internecine rivalry, caused in part by political factionalism. Domestic experience had seemed to bear out the advice given by the American Federation of Labor's commissioner back in 1903 that "politics" should be excluded from labour affairs. Fresh contacts with the AFL possibly led to the advice being restated in 1913. The Congreso's organising committee, AFL president Samuel Gompers proudly informed his members, had "naturally turned to the AFL for assistance" when drafting a constitution and programme. Congreso leaders subsequently regarded their federation as being "attached" to the American body, and news from the United States dominated Tambuli's regular column on the labour movement overseas. Due to direct contacts or not, the Congreso officially adopted the AFL's "apolitical" stance, a compartmentalised view of labour and politics which carried an intrinsic bias against the formation of a class-based party.

For the Congreso's supposed political neutrality as an organisation did not, of course, oblige its members to renounce whatever party and factional loyalties they had as individuals. The second reason why a radical opposition was slow to develop, at the risk of tautology, was that most labour activists remained bound to the established parties, usually to one or another faction of the Nacionalista Party. Often these allegiances were strained by disappointment. There were regular complaints that the politicos merely used labour support as a stepping-stone to their personal ambitions, and that once in office they showed no concern for labour's plight. Even well-meaning progressives, the more disillusioned obreristas argued, were fated either to be corrupted by power or to be rendered impotent by the oligarchical, conservative-dominated party machines. The majority view, however, was that even if the established parties were effectively controlled by capitalists and landlords they still possessed at least some leaders who had workingmen's interests at heart. So far as Nacionalistas in the labour movement were concerned, there was in particular Manuel L. Quezon, the dynamic, magnetic super-politician whose presence was to dominate Philippine public life for the greater part of the American period.
Quezon's outstanding success sprang above all from his masterful cultivation of personal relationships, through which he was able to convince widely diverse individuals - and by extension groups - that he was their best friend, confidant and champion. His initial contacts with Manila's labour leaders were made whilst he was serving as representative for Tayabas and majority floor leader in the first Philippine Assembly, at a time when most politicos from rural provinces would scarcely have given the disenfranchised urban working class a second thought. In 1908 Quezon gained specific credit in labouring circles for initiating a workmen's compensation law and the legislation that created the Bureau of Labor. Between 1909 and 1916 he held office as resident commissioner in Washington but his domestic following, including its labour component, was assiduously maintained. Upon his return he was elected president of the newly-created upper house, the Philippine Senate, and in 1922 he finally won his struggle for the Nacionalista Party leadership.

Even as Assembly floor leader, Quezon carried considerable sway in the allocation of government appointments, and naturally he carried greater weight as his career progressed. Patronage, he recognised, was an invaluable instrument for sustaining the loyalty of a heterogenous clientele, both to himself and to his party. Largely through his influence and upon his recommendations, the Nacionalista hierarchy showed itself flexible and prescient enough to make room in government for a few self-educated leaders from the working class, a policy which was demonstrably successful in neutralising potential dissidents.

In 1910, for example, Lope K. Santos was appointed governor of Rizal, the province bordering Manila to the east. Instead of gaining notoriety as a socialist maverick amongst provincial governors, the author of Banaag at Sikat became renowned for his enthusiastic suppression of gambling joints, which won him the title "Terror of Vice". Later he secured further appointments as governor of Nueva Vizcaya (1918-20) and senator for the non-electoral twelfth district (1919-22). Santos's erstwhile collaborator in the "School of Socialism", Hermenegildo Cruz, had by the time of his election as the Congreso's first president in 1913 left the printing shop floor to take up post as librarian to the Philippine Assembly. In 1918 he was appointed Assistant Director of the Bureau of Labor, and in 1922 was promoted to Director. In this capacity Cruz wrote a truncated workers' decalogue, a "Seven Sayings"
which reveal the one-time "ardent disciple of Carlos Marx" as tamed beyond recognition. Workers, he now decreed, "must never try to assert their dominance through any movement that furthers their own interests alone." They should "assist their employer wholeheartedly, so that his product or output is improved, and so that (the business) will become more prosperous with less expense."(84)

As the Nacionalista Party never lost its control over the Filipino sectors of the administration, the power to dispense offices and other favours to stimulate or reward political loyalty worked continually to its advantage. The parties that successively formed the main oppositions - the Progresistas, Terceristas and Democratas - simply could not compete. A second permanent handicap suffered by these three parties was their line of descent from the old Federal Party. Despite having adopted a pro-independence stance (and having been joined in 1914 by several Nacionalista dissidents) the core of ex-Federalistas within these parties never entirely buried the stigma which attached to their assimilationist past. After 1914 the oppositionists were arguably more progressive in their social outlook than the Nacionalistas, but any resultant kudos they may have gained in labouring circles was largely nullified by their alleged "weakness" on independence.(85) Because the Nacionalistas remained publicly committed to "immediate, absolute and complete independence", conversely, many obreristas were prepared to endure their disappointment at the party's meagre response to demands for labour and welfare legislation.

American arguments against early independence usually hinged on the Filipinos' supposed "incapacity" or "unreadiness" for stable and democratic self-government. Seeing the sharp class divisions within Philippine society, the retentionists argued that if the masses were under elite control it was best to delay independence for fear of oligarchy and caciquism. If on the other hand the masses were beyond elite control, independence could not be granted for fear of anarchy. Most working class nationalists believed that in order to overcome this retentionist catch the independence campaign had to be conducted with what the Americans might concede was political maturity and responsibility. Taken to its logical conclusion, this view demanded that the formation of a more radical, more aggressively anti-imperialist party to oppose the Nacionalistas should be avoided lest it merely serve to
bolster the retentionist case.

The Congreso's "apolitical" stance, the lure of patronage, Quezon's charisma and the perceived need for national unity in the struggle for independence thus all tended to sustain obrerista loyalty to the Nacionalista Party and to exercise a concomitant restraint on political radicalism. But, despite all these factors, dissatisfaction with the Nacionalista and other parties was sufficiently strong for the question of establishing a working class party to be at least given serious consideration. The ultimate reason why no determined attempt to launch such a party was made until the 1920s was that obrerista radicals felt too daunted by the practical difficulties involved. The franchise limitation aside, they were deterred by apprehensions that public opinion was as yet unwilling to accept political leadership from men who lacked the traditional qualifications of wealth and education. Crisanto Evangelista stated the dilemma in an article written in December 1913. Workers in Germany, he wrote, had won respect through having their own party, and this might be the only recourse available in the Philippines if labour continued to be denied its rightful place in national affairs. But, he warned:

"It must be understood that we cannot properly or effec-tively establish a Partido Obrero while most people would only sneer at and belittle us if they see it is only labourers who are active in the enterprise, something that still happens. Everything would be useless ... as if we winked in the darkness."(86)

If this pessimistic view were accepted, there were only two possible options: either to postpone establishing a labour party until the climate of opinion was more propitious, or to enlist support from sympathetic outsiders who already had a proven political track record. Evangelista himself clearly favoured deferral. The Partido Obrero, he insisted, should not be maintained by

"professional politicians, who live and prosper by politicking, but by workers who are experienced in their trades, who understand the needs of their workmates and fellows .... By far the best preparation in this respect is to be a trade unionist, for in a unionist are the beginnings of a socialist."(87)

From this perspective, labour radicals could take some comfort from organisational advances made within the trade union movement itself. After the Congreso Obrero's inaugural sessions in 1913 progress had initially been slow. "Much was decided", Evangelista sadly noted a
year later, "but little fulfilled". (88) Few new unions were formed, industrial disputes were relatively minor and infrequent and Tambuli, the federation's organ, ceased regular publication. The years 1917-20, however, witnessed an unprecedented economic boom, stimulated by the rapid growth in the international demand for Philippine products, particularly sugar, abaca and coconut oil, that resulted from the World War. Business prosperity, a greater demand for labour and price inflation produced a favourable climate for effective trade union organisation and action. In the light manufacturing and service sectors new organisations appeared to represent bakers and confectioners, civil servants, hatmakers, tailors, barbers, slipper-makers, shoemakers and sawmill workers. But the most marked expansion, naturally enough, was in occupations linked to trade and transportation. Among merchant seamen the Nuevo Gremio de Marinos Mercantes was joined by five other unions (based either on a particular shipping company or loyalty to a particular organiser), four of which claimed memberships of between two and three thousand. (89) In June 1917 longshoremen at the Bailey and Luzon stevedoring companies formed the initial nuclei of the Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (UOEF), which has survived until the present day. (90) Another stevedores' union was founded at the Simmie and Grilk company. In 1918 Manila Railroad Company employees established the Union de Obreros del Ferrocarril, and at about the same time the first motor transport union was organised, a 900-strong Union de Chauffeurs.

Although the Bureau of Labor recorded only those industrial disputes in which it became directly involved, its statistics give at least a good impression of the union movement's new impetus and confidence. Taking the two 4-year periods 1913-6 and 1917-20 as a basis for comparison, the number of officially listed industrial disputes jumped from 49 to 269 and the number of workpeople involved from 9,094 to 37,420. Whereas over half the disputes in the first period had been initiated by non-unionists, moreover, all but 39 of the disputes recorded during 1917-20 were declared by workers who were unionised. The proportion of disputes adjudged by the Bureau of Labor to be settled in the workers' favour rose from 45 to 73 per cent. (91) And in most trades, it seems, the wage increases awarded during this time were more than sufficient to keep abreast of rising prices. (92)
Having hit its peak in 1920, the commercial boom was succeeded by a recession, during which most economic indicators fell back to the levels of 1917. In these circumstances the bargaining position of the trade unions inevitably became weaker again, and the proportion of disputes which the Bureau of Labor deemed as settled in the workers' favour once more fell below 50 per cent. Conflicts concerned "re-adjustment", a euphemism for wage cuts, more often than demands for wage increases. In contrast with previous periods when the trade union movement had been forced onto the defensive, however, there was no marked decline in union activity. Whereas almost all the organisations active in the 1900s had proved ephemeral, the larger unions formed during the 1917-20 period not only survived the subsequent recession but in general held their memberships steady. Between 1921 and 1924, it is true, the Bureau of Labor recorded many fewer industrial disputes than in the preceding four years - 105 as against 269 - but the aggregate number of workpeople involved actually rose from 37,420 to 49,852. Nor was there a return to the pre-1917 state of affairs whereby unorganised workers initiated as many disputes as did unionists. More than 70 per cent of the 1921-4 disputes were union-led. Certainly there was no cause for complacency. The total membership of Manila-based unions, according to the official figures for 1921, was 43,298, equivalent to less than one city worker in four. The provinces, with 18,637 organised workers in that same year, were practically virgin territory. Some twenty years after its birth, Philippine trade unionism had nevertheless gained a secure foothold at last. Radicals like Evangelista would hope that it was not only a matter of time before labour would also find its political voice.
Notes to Chapter One

(1) The themes sketched in the next few paragraphs are explored more fully in the latter chapters of Jonathan Fast and Jim Richardson *Roots of Dependency* Foundation for Nationalist Studies, Quezon City 1979 pp.55-112

(2) Emilio Jacinto "Work", translated from the Tagalog and reproduced in Epifanio de los Santos *The Revolutionists: Aguinaldo, Bonifacio, Jacinto* National Historical Commission, Manila 1973 pp.183-4


(4) Ambrosio Flores "To the Inhabitants of the Province of Manila" proclamation issued on October 4, 1898 translated from the Spanish and reproduced in *Ibid.* pp.378-9

(5) Emilio Aguinaldo "To my Fellow-Countrymen" proclamation issued on September 23, 1898 translated from the Tagalog and reproduced in *Ibid.* p.361

(6) See, for example, the decree issued by Secretary of the Interior Teodoro Sandiko on May 3, 1899 translated from the Spanish and reproduced in *Taylor op.cit.* vol.IV p.525


(9) *Census of the Philippine Islands 1903* vol.II p.1003


In September 1902, when Dominador Gomez succeeded to the presidency, the suffix "de Filipinas" was added to the Union Obrera Democratica's title.

(32) Ibid.


(34) Manila Times October 19, 1901 (Interview with Isabelo de los Reyes)

(35) Ragsdale op.cit. p.442

(36) United States, War Department Annual Reports for the F.Y. ended June 30, 1902, as cited vol.X p.172


(39) Ibid. pp.849-50

(40) Rosenberg op.cit. pp.1030-1

(41) Ibid. p.1029

(42) See for example Runes and Cid op.cit.p.54; also Jose Ma. Sison Struggle for National Democracy Progressive Publications, Quezon City 1967 p.45

(43) La Redencion del Obrero Yr.I no.1 October 8, 1903; Rosenberg op.cit. p.1029; Clark op.cit. p.846

(44) Lope K. Santos "Ang Kapatid ko si Bindoy" ("My friend Bindoy") in Talambuhay ni Hermenegildo Cruz (Biography of Hermenegildo Cruz) Alejandro de Jesus, Bureau of Printing, Manila 1955 p.18 Among those who attended the "School of Socialism", Santos remembered Felipe Mendoza, Melanio de Jesus, Leopoldo Soriano, Arturo Soriano, Alejandro de Jesus, Crisanto Evangelista, Angel de los Reyes and Luis Pery (all printworkers); Francisco Sugui (a binder); and Julian Kalimbas and Potenciano Salita (both tabaqueros).
These extracts, which reportedly occupied Santos for several months, were eventually published as a booklet: Karl Kautsky Ang Panatatagong ng mga Manggagawa at Ang Pag-Araw na Walong Oras (The Defence of the Workers and the Eight-Hour Day) translated by Lope K. Santos Mabuhay, Manila 1933

Lope K. Santos Banaaq at Sikat (First Rays and Full Brilliance) Manlapaz Publishing Co., Manila 1959 p.236

Clark op.cit. p.846

United States, War Department Annual Reports for the F.Y. ended June 30, 1902, as cited vol.X p.172

Wickberg op.cit. pp.170-1,176;231

United States, War Department Annual Reports for the F.Y. ended June 30, 1903, as cited vol.V (Report of the Philippine Commission Pt.1) pp.54;358; Clark op.cit. p.798

La Redencion del Obrero Yr.1 no.3 October 22, 1903


Ibid. p.31


Islas Filipinas, Cuarta Legislatura Filipina, Primer Periodo de Sesiones Directorio oficial del Senado y de la Camara de Representantes Bureau of Printing, Manila 1917 pp.144-5

Ibid. p.136; Talambuhay ni Hermenegildo Cruz, as cited p.5 Teodoro M. Kalaw Aide-de-Camp to Freedom translated by Maria Katigbak Teodoro M. Kalaw Society, Manila 1965 p.61; Jose Esperanza Cruz Ang Pahayagang Tagalog (Tagalog Periodicals) Bureau of Printing, Manila 1938 p.17

Crisanto Evangelista "Kung Alin-Alin ang mga Paraang Lalong Mabisa sa Ikalalahanan ng Unionismo sa Pilipinas" ("Ways in which Unionism could be Established more Effectively in the Philippines") Tambuli special edition Ang Unang Araw ng Mayo 1915 (May Day 1915) p.22

"Maikling Kasaysayan ng Makabagong Kilusang Manggagawa sa Pilipinas" ("Short History of the Modern Workers' Movement in the Philippines") Mimeograph c.1947 p.6 (Manila Court of First Instance)

Ibid.; Evangelista loc.cit.
Trade unionists were in fact slightly better represented at the 1913 COF congress than this breakdown suggests, for in addition to those actually accredited by trade societies a few attended as delegates from various kapisanan. Crisanto Evangelista, for example, attended as a delegate from a mutualist society centered on the government printing office.

"Unang Kapulungan ng mga Manggagawa" ("First Workers' Congress")

Tambuli Yr.I no.1 May 1, 1913 pp.1-2

It is the latter version which asks workers to toil harder than their reward might warrant - "Ipagpatulo ka ng pawis na labis sa iyong kabayaran."

"Laborer's Pilgrimage to Antipolo" Tambuli Yr.I no.2 May 10, 1913 p.11

Union de Obreros del Ferrocarril, as cited pp.2-3

Reproduced in Labor Conditions in the Philippines, as cited p.71

"Ang Report ni Worcester" ("The Worcester Report") Tambuli Yr.I no.13 July 26, 1913 p.2; Crisanto Evangelista "Kung sa Paanong Paraan Dapat Itaguyod ang mga 'Uniones de Oficios!'" ("How 'Trade
(74) Unions' Should be Organised") Tambuli Yr.I no.18 December 1913 p.16


(76) Samuel Gompers "All Hail Philippine Labor Movement" American Federationist vol.XX no.9 September 1913 p.747

(77) Extracta del acta de la sesion del Consejo Ejecutivo del Congreso Obrero de Filipinas, celebrado el 5 de septiembre de 1915, sobre la inmigracion extrangera en Filipinas (Quezon Papers Box 143)

(78) "Our aim", as cited p.1

(79) See, for example, Evangelista (1913) loc.cit.; "Ang Sosyalismo sa Pilipinas - Sa Gawa at Hindi sa Bunganga" ("Socialism in the Philippines - By Deeds and not by Mouthing") Tambuli Yr.I no.16 October 1913 p.2

(80) The ex-Katipunero Jose Turiano Santiago, for instance, was quoted in Tambuli as follows: "I am a socialist, my heart is red. From the first I have defended nobody but the working people. This is the reason why I don't want to be part of, or under, the government, because if I were I would be unable to do anything in your defence; my freedom would be restricted." Tambuli Yr.I no.17 November 1913 p.2

(81) Labor Conditions in the Philippines, as cited p.78


(84) Hermenegildo Cruz "Ang 'Pitong Wika' para sa Kabuhayan at Kapakanan ng mga Manggagawa" ("The 'Seven Sayings' Concerning the Workers' Livelihood and Interests") reproduced in Honorio op.cit. pp.69-74


(86) Evangelista (1913) op.cit. p.15

(87) Ibid. p.16
The unions with peak memberships between 2,000 and 3,000 were the Philippine Seamen's Union, the International Marine Union, the Filipino Sailors' Home Association and the Philippine Marine Union. The fifth new seafarers' union formed during this period was the Asociacion de Marinos Filipinos, which claimed 1,100 members. The Nuevo Gremio de Marinos Mercantes claimed in 1919 to have 5,000 members.

Labor vol.I no.4 December 1919 pp.80-91

Bureau of Labor figures on union memberships must unfortunately be viewed with circumspection. As soon as the Bureau learnt of a new labour organisation it sent the president or secretary a questionnaire to complete, and thereafter expected to be notified of any changes on a yearly basis. The statistics thus relied on the co-operation, diligence and integrity of union officers. A few officers, regrettably, simply did not complete their returns. Many more reported their memberships "rounded" to the nearest hundred - or even thousand - and left their returns unaltered from year to year.

In the four years 1921-4 the Bureau of Labor actually recorded an increase in total union membership from 61,935 to 89,826, but the bulk of this increase was attributable to the formation and rapid expansion of an agrarian union, the Kalipunanang Pangbansa ng mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KPMP), which will be discussed in the next chapter.

The early history of peasant associations in the Philippines is shadowy in the extreme. During the first wave of organisational activity in Manila it had fleetingly seemed that the union movement might spread quickly out from the city to the provinces beyond. The original Union Obrera of Isabelo de los Reyes reportedly counted a group of share tenants in Bulacan amongst its affiliates, and in the constitution adopted under the presidency of Dominador Gomez the federation declared its intention to establish associations throughout the archipelago. In 1903 the Union del Trabajo announced similarly ambitious plans to form a network of "provincial departments", and claimed that locally-based volunteer organisers were already at work in Negros, Cebu, Batangas, Cavite, Rizal and Pampanga. Within the Cavite department, and possibly in others, there was a specific section for "pescadores y peones". So scant and ephemeral was the impact made by these initiatives, however, that in every subsequent internal history of the peasant movement - even in one written in 1923 - they have passed entirely unmentioned.

After the associations that briefly blossomed in 1902-3 had withered away, it seems, there were no further attempts to organise barrio-dwellers on an occupational basis for over a decade. When the Congreso Obrero first met in 1913 with the aim of uniting every labour organisation in the country, there were only two peasants among the 157 delegates and neither of them came from associations with an expressly agrarian orientation. The larger nationalist societies affiliated with the Congreso, notably Dimas-Alang, did have several chapters in the provinces but again rural affairs were not their primary concern. Exactly why the labour movement in Manila initially failed to spawn a counterpart in the countryside remains a mystery.
Many city obreristas, ilustrados, professionals and workers alike, originally hailed from the surrounding agricultural provinces and maintained regular contact with the communities they had left. The need for action to assist the peasantry, as just noted, was well-recognised from the days of the Union Obrera onwards. Expressing its solidarity with "our peasant brothers", the Congreso Obrero pressed for legislation to curb landlord and moneylender abuses the very month it was formed. Yet like its predecessors the Congreso proved unable to translate its sympathy and goodwill into effective organisational assistance. Building unionism in the capital itself, perhaps, was a task that left working class activists with little time or energy for further assignments outside. Aspiring politicians, recognising that the franchise in the countryside was even more narrowly held than in the city, perhaps felt the dividends offered by nurturing rural unions were outweighed by the risks of antagonising the local landlord elites. It nevertheless seems strange that the challenge was not met by others who actually lived amongst the peasantry but who had acquired some knowledge of the urban movement - a city activist's relative, for example, or a city activist who had returned to his home barrio.

Whatever the reason, the virtual absence of peasant unions in the early American period confined agrarian protest to more traditional forms of expression, a spectrum ranging from common thievery and carabao rustling through social banditry to a whole host of militant religious sects headed by charismatic prophets, popes and messiahs. Throughout the Christian areas of the archipelago there were groups that had first fallen foul of the law under Spain and then prospered amidst the chaos, strife and pestilence of revolution and war. In Negros the hero of the disaffected sugar workers, Papa Isio, remained in the mountains until 1907. In the eastern Visayas, where rebellion was fuelled by back-country resentment of coastal retailers and abaca merchants, the red-trouserred pulajanes detained US regulars until 1907 and Otoy, the last "Pope" on Samar, eluded the Constabulary for four further years after the army had departed. Resistance likewise continued well into the 1900s in another hemp-growing region, the Bicol, where it was headed by nationalist die-hards.

The Luzon provinces where peasant unionism later became strongest were no exception to the general picture. To the south and east of Manila the main peace and order problem facing the government after the
surrender of the guerrilla leader Macario Sakay in 1906 was banditry,
especially prevalent in Cavite, Laguna and Tayabas. To the north, large
tracts of Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija formed the territory
of the millenarian Santa Iglesia, and further north still a sect known
as the Guardia de Honor exercised a lingering influence in and around
Pangasinan. The enduring appeal of these two movements in particular
revealed that the nascent agrarian unrest of pre-revolutionary Central
Luzon had in no way been soothed by Spain's defeat.

The Guardia de Honor had started life in 1872 as a respectable
Dominican-sponsored confraternity, but within ten years its Pangasinan
chapters had been disowned by their clerical mentors for spicing
Catholicism with animism and faith healing. Aside from an eschatolog-
ical commotion in 1886, the cult's evangelism attracted little outside
attention until the revolution, when the Guardia formed combat units to
resist interference by unbelievers. Spaniards and Katipuneros,
Americans and republicans were all regarded with impartial hostility.
The Santa Iglesia, founded in 1894, had in contrast been overtly
heretical and anti-colonial from the outset, and had fought on the
nationalist side against both Spain and the United States. Aguinaldo
had commissioned its leader Felipe Salvador as a major in the revolu-
tionary army. But beneath their religious and political differences
the two sects had much in common. Both foresaw an imminent final
reckoning "when the corrupt universe would be transformed and justice
would replace oppression."(6) The unbelieving rich, in Felipe
Salvador's prophecy, would be destroyed by fire and flood, and the
faithful poor be showered with gold and jewels. Haciendas would be
divided amongst their tenants and the landless given land from the
public domain.(7) Property redistribution also figured prominently
in the apocalyptic vision of the Guardia de Honor. Neither sect,
evertheless, was content merely to await events taking their course.
Guardia converts in Pangasinan appropriated their landlords' crops and
livestock and then hastened off to congregate in special communities,
sustained by raids on surrounding estates and poblaciones by the cult's
guerrillas, who called themselves los agraviados. Felipe Salvador's
armed partisans, Robin Hood-style, stole money and provisions not only
for their own sustenance but also for distribution to the needy.

Both theologies of protest won huge support. Prior to their
dispersal by American infantry in April 1901 the Guardia's pilgrim
settlements housed a combined population of over 35,000, and were still growing. The wider-ranging Santa Iglesia was at its height probably larger still. Inevitably both cults withered when their leaders were sent to the scaffold, the Guardia's prophets in 1901 and Felipe Salvador a decade's fugitive freedom later in 1911. But movements of such magnitude could not be quickly forgotten. Long after reports of cult remnants and offshoots had ceased to worry the Constabulary, their memories lived on in Central Luzon's folk tradition.(8)

Agrarian Problems and Colonial Response

American agrarian policy in the Philippines was thus formulated against an inherited background of endemic unrest. Although this unrest was commonly ascribed to "agitators" and "religious fanatics", the more enlightened legislators and administrators recognised the need to tackle its social mainsprings. The central problem, in their opinion, was summed up by the word "caciquism": the concentration of landownership, wealth and political power in the hands of local autocrats. Agrarian legislation they saw as a tool for social engineering, for shaping a more balanced and democratic rural society by curbing cacique abuses and fostering the growth of a smallholding agricultural middle class. Throughout the American education system, indeed, such goals were explicitly presented as part of the colonial mission. "If you want to be a farmer", grade school pupils were taught, "you ought to own your own farm; you will be richer and happier if the land is your own."(9) Suggested essay topics in an economics textbook for college students included "Why is the peasant proprietor the backbone of a country like the Philippines?" and "How can the number of peasant proprietors be increased?"(10)

In fact the number of peasant proprietors did increase during the American period, but their proportion in the farming community declined. Tenancy levels, conversely, maintained an insistent rise. Unfortunately the data on land tenure contained in the successive 1903, 1918 and 1939 censuses are not properly comparable, so these trends cannot be precisely measured. But as has been pointed out elsewhere the recorded increase in the countrywide percentage of tenant-operated farms - from 18 per cent in 1903 to 35 per cent in 1939 - "is sufficiently great to be true in general if not in detail."(11) Where rural unionism gained
its most solid support, tenancy levels were consistently much higher, climbing over the same period from 43 per cent to 64 per cent overall in the Central Luzon "core" provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija and Tarlac, and from 25 per cent to 38 per cent overall in the provinces immediately to the north and south: Pangasinan, Rizal, Cavite and Laguna.(12)

In some respects it could be argued not only that American agrarian policy failed to recast Philippine land tenure patterns in a more egalitarian mould, but that it actually contributed to the independent smallholder's plight. In 1901, for example, for the first time in the Islands, a tax was levied on agricultural land. Non-payment made the landowner liable to forfeit his personal property and ultimately the holding itself.(13) By 1922 it was reported that nearly 100,000 parcels of land had been confiscated by the insular government for tax default.(14) As in the Spanish period, attempts to encourage land title registration unwittingly intensified "landgrabbing", the dispossession of peasant proprietors by unscrupulous rival claimants who had superior financial and legal resources. More commonly, reform measures did not so much make smallholding more difficult as do little to make it easier. Well-intentioned legislation repeatedly foundered through uneven implementation, poor enforcement and the constant desire for budgetary economy. Whether failure or limited success, each intervention created new sources of rural tension. Peasant expectations were raised and then frustrated; the caciques at once threatened and given fresh opportunities for gain.

As post-revolutionary unrest played a part in shaping American agrarian policies, so these policies thus helped in turn to furnish the setting for the unrest of the 1920s and 1930s. Their impact therefore needs to be considered in some detail.

The most pressing agrarian question which the governing Philippine Commission had to tackle in the aftermath of occupation concerned the friar estates. Since 1898 the religious orders had been unable to exercise any control over these lands, and many tenants had come to consider their holdings as their own property. With the inauguration of civil government in 1901 the friars threatened court action to secure repossession.(15) Yet the friars' return, the Commission was convinced, would "lead to lawless violence and murder, and ... people will charge the course taken to the American government, thus turning
against it the resentment felt towards the friars." (16) In the interests of civil tranquillity and political expediency, it was accordingly decided that the estates in question should be purchased by the insular government. Once acquired, the lands were to be resold to their tenant occupiers. Due provision was made in the 1902 Organic Act and the Roosevelt administration instructed Governor Taft to travel to Rome to initiate negotiations. The Vatican struck a hard bargain. "We were compelled", the Commission's long-serving Secretary of the Interior, Dean Worcester, later recalled, "to purchase some vacant estates and to forego the purchase of several which were thickly occupied, for the reason that the friars insisted on selling the one and absolutely refused to sell the other." (17) In 1904-5, after much haggling, the insular government finally acquired twenty-three estates, covering about 159,000 hectares, on which there lived some 60,000 tenants. (18) In fact the transaction did encompass most lands owned by the religious orders as such, but other populous estates remained in the ownership of Church corporations, including some which were effectively friar-controlled. Ecclesiastical haciendas like Buenavista, Dinalupinan, Lian and San Pedro Tunasan continued to be principal centres of tenant unrest in later years.

Despite the Commission's desire to encourage owner-cultivation, tenancy problems also persisted on those estates which the government acquired. On most friar lands a two-tier tenancy system had existed, with the actual cultivators generally being the share tenants (kasama) of wealthier cash tenants or leaseholders (inquilinos). Instead of giving the cultivating tenants particular priority, the resale scheme made preferential purchase rights available to all "settlers and occupants", a definition which embraced kasama and inquilino alike. Economically and politically more powerful, the latter naturally held the upper hand if purchase rights were contested. Inquilino advantage was accentuated by the land payment arrangements. Managed by the Bureau of Lands, the resale programme sought to recover not only the initial acquisition costs, but also subsequent interest charges, legal fees and surveying expenses. For many kasama the total cost was too high to contemplate, even after the repayment period was extended from ten to twenty-five years. Others started paying the annual installments but found the burden too onerous and either sold their purchase rights to a third party or were evicted. (19)
The redistribution thus did less to develop a broad independent peasantry than to create a new class of landlords, mainly ex-inquilinos, merchants and artisans. Some lands were sold in large tracts and some even reverted to the Church. On the former friar estates at Naic in Cavite and Santa Rosa in Laguna, cultivating tenants were in 1910 calculated to be purchasing only 17 per cent and 19 per cent, respectively, of the land available for sale. An estimated 80 per cent or more of the holdings on both estates still remained under tenancy in the 1920s. Economically, indeed, the kasama would apparently have been better off had the resale programme never been instituted, for the inquilinos and others who were buying the holdings were exacting additional levies from their tenants to finance their instalment payments. The 1903 and 1918 census data for the three Luzon provinces where purchased friar estates were most extensive - Bulacan, Laguna and Cavite - indicate that the developments at Naic and Santa Rosa were not exceptional. In Bulacan, the number of tenant farms fell in the inter-census period by only 2,000, whereas there were probably at least 6,000 tenants on purchased friar lands in the province. In Cavite, with perhaps 20,000 tenants on purchased friar lands, the number of tenant-operated farms actually rose by 3,100. In Laguna, with some 10,000 former friar tenants, the number rose by 7,200. Overall, in other words, the resale programme had no discernible impact on tenure patterns whatsoever.

Potentially a more powerful instrument for democratising land ownership was public lands policy. Whilst the purchased friar estates occupied 159,000 hectares, the agricultural public domain was estimated to cover approximately 6,600,000 hectares. Pressure from American sugar growers and anti-imperialist groups had resulted in the 1902 Organic Act limiting the public land that could be acquired by an individual to 16 hectares, and that by a corporation to 1,024 hectares. The Philippine Commission was never happy administering these restrictions and consistently recommended their relaxation, arguing that capital investment in agriculture was discouraged and potentially productive land kept unnecessarily idle. Nevertheless even such a zealous advocate of relaxation as Secretary Worcester somehow reconciled his position with the Jeffersonian ideal. "Every opportunity", he wrote, "should be extended to each native of these Islands who desires to obtain land and cultivate it with his own hands."
opportunity was first extended through the 1903 Public Land Act, which provided that established cultivators of public lands could acquire free patents to tracts not exceeding 16 hectares, and that new settlers could acquire homestead patents to tracts of 16 hectares or less after five years of cultivation, two years of occupancy and the payment of 20 pesos.

Due to poor publicity and promotion, free patent applications came initially only in a trickle, and the homesteading programme was retarded at first by its pricing arrangements and the cultivation and residence requirements. With time and subsequent liberalisation measures these difficulties were eventually eased, but one administrative problem proved more intractable. "The undisputed sore spot", as a senior lands official recognised in 1918, was the "absence of a systematic survey of the public domain" prior to the 1903 Act.(26) A chronic and enduring shortage of qualified land surveyors meant that this deficiency could not be quickly remedied, and also seriously slowed down the processing of patent applications. To would-be settlers this situation presented obvious dangers, for the Bureau of Lands was generally unable to offer clear guidance as to which unoccupied land was available for entry and which was allocated for forestry or was subject to other claims.(27) Because applications took so long to process - eight years, the Bureau admitted in 1914 - homeseekers faced the awful possibility of dispossession after they had established a viable farm.(28)

Already a natural deterrent to prospective settlers, this uncertainty was deliberately compounded by the homeseekers' wealthy rivals. Even a groundless protest against a patent application, the caciques knew, could force a homeseeker to cancel his claim, for the alternative was a lengthy, frustrating wait for a legal decision. Such abuses had increased, the 1921 Wood-Forbes investigating mission noted, after jurisdiction over land cases was transferred, in 1914, from the specialised Court of Land Registration to the already overloaded courts of first instance.(29) Delays had lengthened and locally prominent landowners had been able to exert more influence over the verdicts. Aside from wishing to extend their own holdings, Secretary Worcester observed in 1912, some landlords had an additional reason for wishing to obstruct peasant pioneering:
"It is a regrettable fact that many "caciques" have actively interested themselves in preventing would-be homesteaders from acquiring public lands, preferring to have such persons remain without lands of their own, so that they themselves could be more certain of retaining them as laborers at a low wage.

Protests against homestead applications are growing more frequent. An investigation of some 250 contests showed that in 90 per cent of the cases there was no foundation for them."(30)

For all these reasons, patent applications suffered a very high failure rate. By 1926, twenty-two years after the Public Land Act had taken effect, 127,256 homestead applications had been received but only 10,150 titles issued.(31) Thereafter the situation slowly improved, yet even in 1935 only some 16 per cent of the 212,094 applications received had resulted in title.(32) By 1941 titles had been granted on 69,021 homesteads covering 852,967 hectares, and under the free patent provisions 31,603 titles had been issued on a further 127,667 hectares.(33) Together, the homesteads and free patent farms thus covered roughly 15 per cent of the public land area that had been available for disposition when the 1903 Act was passed.

In these terms, perhaps, the disposition programme had a reasonable if not distinguished record. In terms of its social objectives, however, the programme made little impression even at a provincial level, its modest achievements always being offset by stronger countervailing forces. This point may be illustrated by reference to Nueva Ecija, which until the 1930s was the country's leading homesteading province.(34) Settlers from the Ilocos region had been clearing savannah and forest to create smallholdings in the province since the early nineteenth century, and almost from the outset their farms had been threatened by the expansionist ambitions of Tagalog and Pampango hacenderos. As the Ilocano migration gathered fresh momentum after about 1915, land disputes became more frequent and more bitter. In many instances hacenderos appropriated adjacent lands by commissioning bogus surveys, which conveniently revealed their estates to be more extensive than hitherto believed.(35) Where ordinary manipulation and sharp practice proved ineffective, the caciques resorted to intimidation and outright force. In parts of Nueva Ecija, ex-Governor General Forbes noted during his 1921 mission, homesteaders were being "terrorised by lawless landgrabbers with whom the government seemed unable to cope."(36)
Crises caused by land seizures recurred intermittently throughout the American period. In Nueva Ecija as a whole, nevertheless, as many as 8,010 homestead and free patent titles had been granted prior to the Pacific War, and in a few eastern municipalities enough migrants had retained their farms to establish smallholding as the dominant form of land ownership. According to the 1939 Census the province-wide total of owner-operated farms was 18,118, so by an ownership yardstick the public lands policy had made a significant contribution. By the concomitant tenancy yardstick, however, the picture was far less rosy. Tenants outnumbered proprietors even on the frontier, indicating that many homesteaders had themselves become small landlords. The five municipalities adjoining Nueva Ecija's eastern border - Carranglan, Pantabangan, Bongabon, Laur and Papaya - had a combined tenancy level in 1939 of 57 per cent, only 9 per cent lower than the provincial average. Throughout the province the Census data showed that whereas the number of owner-operated farms had not even doubled since 1903, the number of tenant-operated farms had increased twenty-fold.

This increase, by far the sharpest in Central Luzon, reflected Nueva Ecija's distinctive demographic and agricultural development. Haciendas had been established in the province during the nineteenth century, but due to their relative isolation had specialised in horse, cattle and carabao ranching rather than the cash crop agriculture which was already predominant elsewhere in the region. Not until after the revolution, encouraged by improving communications and plagued by livestock epidemics, did the hacenderos convert their estates to large-scale rice cultivation, recruiting tenants to clear the rough grassland and establish two or three hectare farms. Although many peasant proprietors in Nueva Ecija did lose their holdings through landgrabbing and other causes, the province's soaring tenancy rate was thus principally due to cultivation being extended on existing estates.

Elsewhere in Central Luzon, conversely, agricultural extension under the tenancy system did contribute to the proportional decline in owner-cultivation, but was probably less important than various forms of dispossession. Losses through landgrabbing, tax default and title or survey disputes have already been mentioned, but perhaps commoner than all these was disinheritance through simple financial insolvency. Having only limited capital themselves, smallholders frequently relied upon moneylenders or larger proprietors for advances of cash or rice
prior to harvest time. Crop failures or market fluctuations could easily swell these high-interest debts to the point where they could only be discharged by the sale of land. Many creditors, as in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, actually demanded the peasant's land as security for their loan under the arrangement known as the pacto de retro. Here the debtor had a guaranteed right to repurchase his land upon successful repayment but forfeited his holding in the event of default. (40)

Losses of land through indebtedness could undoubtedly have been reduced through more concerted anti-usury and rural credit programmes, but here again the insular government found it easier to identify the smallholder's problem than to offer him effective assistance, easier to pass legislation than enforce it. The machinery for eliminating peasant dependence on caciques and loan merchants was set in motion in 1915 with the inauguration of a government-funded network of Rural Agricultural Credit Co-operative Associations. The following year usury was formally outlawed by an act which set a scale of maximum permissible interest rates - ranging from 6 to 14 per cent according to the type of loan - and declared null and void all debts where interest exceeded these limits. (41) To oversee the co-operatives and the anti-usury campaign a Rural Credit Division was created within the Bureau of Agriculture and a crusading Protestant lay preacher, A. W. "Deacon" Prautch, appointed as its Chief. (42) At no time, however, was the Division given the budget or staff necessary for its monumental task. Without proper supervision the co-operatives became infested with favouritism, nepotism and malpractice; their funds, as Prautch himself reported in 1925, came to be "borrowed by the leading people" instead of "those the system was created for." (43)

These irregularities apart, the credit associations were neither numerous nor wealthy enough to assist more than a fraction of the agricultural population. In 1928, for example, their combined membership was 89,000 - equivalent to roughly 5 per cent of the country's farm operators. (44) The vast majority of peasants, therefore, still had to obtain their advances from traditional sources. Worse yet, they still had to pay traditional rates of interest. Following investigations in Bulacan in 1920, Prautch informed Governor General Harrison that he had found the anti-usury law "was unknown and that no attempt has ever been made to apply it in any loan of produce made by anyone to anyone." (45)
Publicity was later improved, the legislation itself tightened and penalties for infringement stiffened, but enforcement remained minimal. As the loan sharks flatly refused to make advances at the legal rates, the peasant generally had no alternative other than to enter into verbal agreements which the usurer would clearly deny should an official complaint ever be filed. (46)

The rural union movement in the Philippines thus developed alongside diverse and continuing controversies between landowners large and small, between peasant proprietors and local caciques. Where these controversies were by nature individual rather than collective their immediate bearing on the union movement was obviously relatively slight. Their indirect significance was nevertheless considerable, for the acrimony they left in their wake - particularly where smallholders had been dispossessed and become tenants - inevitably embittered and deepened all subsequent struggles. Occasionally, as in the homesteading districts, smallholder-cacique conflicts could be the rural associations' central concern. More generally, however, such conflicts found direct expression in union campaigns where the issues involved affected not only peasant proprietors but tenants, farm labourers and other barrio folk as well. Large estate owners, for example, commonly deprived villagers of customary fishing rights by constructing dams across the rivers to create private fishponds, or stopped firewood, timber and food collections in the forests. Exorbitant levies for the use of threshing machines and warehouse facilities would again antagonise peasants and tenants alike, and above all unifying grievances there was the shared experience of usury.

Independent smallholders thus joined the rural unions readily and participated in them actively. In the peasant movement as a whole, however, as in the unionised communities themselves, peasants in the narrow, owner-cultivating sense of the term were heavily outnumbered by tenants. The movement's programmes and campaigns hence tended to be dominated by tenant concerns, in particular the terms of loans, the distribution of farming expenses, and the procedure and basis for dividing the crop.

For tenants no less than for peasant proprietors the quickening pace of change in agrarian society was profoundly unsettling. Whereas peasants found the increasing profitability of cash crop production
intensified competition for their land, tenants found that it accentuated commercial attitudes towards their labour. More than ever before, landlords were looking upon farming as a business, and were coming to regard an efficient workforce as more important than a loyal clientele.

Attempts by landowners to extract greater returns from their estates affected cash tenants and share tenants - inquilinos and kasama - in different ways. Cash tenancy, a more straightforwardly economic arrangement from the beginning, was commonest on Church and corporation owned estates and on haciendas being newly settled. Here the inquilinos leased their farms for a stipulated annual rent (canon) in money or kind, and managed their holdings themselves, providing their own seed, carabaos, implements and, on larger leaseholds, their own labour, usually kasama sub-tenants. Sometimes disputes arose when the inquilinos were required to make additional payments for irrigation works and other estate improvements, but inevitably the principal source of friction was the yearly rental. Where haciendas were being brought under cultivation for the first time, as in the former ranching territories of Nueva Ecija, the hacenderos' standard practice was to charge initially only a nominal sum, and then gradually but regularly to raise the canon as the productivity and market value of their land increased.

The inquilinos, instead of being rewarded for their hard work and good farm management, saw their growing surpluses siphoned away. If they resisted further rent rises the hacenderos would refuse to renew their leases and they would be evicted to make way for tenants who would pay the new rates. By the 1920s demand for land to farm in Central Luzon was such that the hacenderos enjoyed a sellers' market. Hacendero efforts to maximise their profits reached their logical conclusion when the leasehold arrangements were abruptly discontinued and the incensed inquilinos informed that if they wished to remain they would henceforth be share tenants, turning over to the owner fifty per cent or more of their crop. Aside from yielding a further immediate increase in returns, this switch had from the hacenderos' standpoint the added attractions of tighter control over farm management and greater scope for lucrative credit manipulation.

Between 1903 and 1939 the number of farms operated by cash tenants in Bulacan, Pampanga and Nueva Ecija fell from 7,294 to 2,695, and their ratio to share tenant-operated farms plunged from 1:2.3 to
1:32.9. As might be expected, the balance between the two systems tipped most dramatically in Nueva Ecija, where in 1918 inquilino farms outnumbered kasama farms by 2,796 to 1,798. By 1939, however, kasama farms outnumbered inquilino farms by 50,831 to 867. These latter statistics clearly show that most landlords bringing lands under cultivation employed cash tenancy only briefly; some no doubt used sharecropping from the start.

As the formation of new rice haciendas was itself a manifestation of growing commercialisation, the kasamahan system was in any event usually established in this context without its traditional social ramifications. Strains caused by the erosion of patron-client bonds were more evident where share tenancy was a long-established, customary arrangement. Virtually the only constant of share tenancy was that the landowner furnished the land - generally a parcel of between 2.5 and 3.5 hectares - and the tenant his labour. Beyond this the division of farming responsibilities and rewards was the subject of infinite local variations. Typically, however, the landowner also supplied the seed and the tenants their own carabaos and work implements. Expenses connected with transplanting, harvesting and milling the crop were normally shared equally. After harvest the landlord retrieved an amount equivalent to the original seed and then, in theory, the net product was split fifty-fifty. In practice the tenant normally received much less than half, for a large part of his share had to be surrendered in repayment for rice or cash borrowed from the landlord during the growing season at interest rates of 33, 50 or 100 per cent.

Beyond these fundamentals, both tenant and landlord had traditionally accepted extra duties and obligations. The tenant was expected not only to cultivate his own holding but also to work, for little or no remuneration, wherever the landlord directed him - on other holdings at transplanting and harvest times, on clearing new land, on cutting wood and on constructing or repairing buildings, roads, fences and dykes. In some places it was also customary for the tenant to give the landlord occasional gifts of farm produce or domestic handicrafts. The landlord in turn was expected to assist the tenant in his dealings with officialdom, to make contributions for baptisms, weddings and funerals, to provide food, music and entertainment for barrio festivities, and to be reasonably indulgent in the
granting and recovery of loans. Where these reciprocal obligations were properly honoured there often developed deep loyalties between landlord and tenant which could last a lifetime, and even be passed on to the succeeding generation. Frequently these ties were formalised through compadrazgo, a ritual kinship initiated by sponsorship at a baptism, confirmation or marriage.

It would be nevertheless wrong to suggest that the kasamahan relationship was everywhere suffused with sweetness and light even in the distant past. The support attracted by groups such as the Guardia de Honor and Santa Iglesia indicated that by the late nineteenth century the bonds between the classes in Central Luzon society had already been weakened substantially. Although by 1911 a deceptive peace had come to the region, American rule undoubtedly served to widen rather than heal the social breach. Technological progress, improving communications, expanding markets and wider educational and political opportunities all increased the economic and attitudinal distance between rich and poor and further diminished their day to day contact.

For many tenants the change was abrupt, coming with the passage of their farm from one owner to another. Within established landholding families the younger generation increasingly spent their youth either in Manila or abroad, and as a result did not develop close ties with their forefathers' clientele. Before inheriting estates in the provinces they were likely to have acquired alternative interests which would limit the time and attention they were willing or able to give to their new role as landlord. Although real estate transactions have never been studied on a regional scale, it is also evident that the higher returns accruing from cash crop agriculture stimulated investment and speculation in land and thus multiplied the chances that tenants would find themselves transferred, along with their farms, to an owner whom they did not know and would rarely see. Sometimes these transactions were between one local landowner and another, but city-based individuals and corporations were more regularly entering the land market as well, and when these outsiders took control the personal dimension of the landlord-tenant relationship was liable to disappear entirely.(55)

Though affected more gradually, tenants whose farms remained in the same hands also found their relationships with their landlords
inexorably battered and unbalanced by commercial currents. Diverted by developments beyond the barrio, the landlords seemed increasingly to neglect their traditional obligations, to contribute less to the socio-economic partnership, and yet at the same time to expect their kasama to contribute more. As where ownership had changed, responsibility for estate administration was being relinquished by the landlords themselves and passed to hired overseers - katiwala - who were instructed to carry out their duties on a business-like basis. This corollary of decreasing personalism removed many of the side-benefits and concessions to which the kasama had hitherto been accustomed. Advances in cash or kind, formerly granted fairly freely, either became difficult to obtain or their repayment with interest was demanded promptly and in full. Tenants who kept chickens and hogs, or grew fruit and vegetables for their own consumption, found the katiwala worrying about the animals damaging the rice crop and demanding, on the landlord's behalf, a fifty per cent share of whatever the kitchen gardens produced. The overseer's watchful eye curtailed such tenant perquisites and artifices as harvesting a portion of the rice prematurely for immediate use, gleaning fallen rice after the harvest, or planting lines of glutinous rice (for delicacies) alongside the main crop. Threshing and transportation, hitherto done by hand and carabao, was taken over by hacienda-owned machines and lorries, and the tenant was expected to share the new expense.

Tenants realised, meanwhile, that their ability to resist or counteract these unwelcome changes was being undermined by the shifting forces of supply and demand. The labour shortage which had so troubled planters and employers in the nineteenth century and during the early American years had by the 1920s been transformed by rapid population growth into a labour surplus. On the other hand the amount of land available to farm in Central Luzon - whether on estates or from the public domain - was equally rapidly shrinking. Landlords knew, in consequence, that they could demand more from their tenants with impunity. If anyone left the hacienda or had to be sacked for opposing stiffer terms, they could easily be replaced. Tenants who grew old or infirm, in the past an accepted burden, could likewise be dismissed, or their holdings be reduced in size. Landowners who wished to ease out recalcitrant and inefficient tenants, it has been suggested, were assisted by government survey and title programmes, which in effect strengthened legal ownership rights at the expense of the tenants'
customary occupancy rights. (59)

The Early Peasant Organisations

Rural unionism thus made its debut in Central Luzon against a background of manifold changes in agrarian society which peasants, and in particular tenants, saw as being to their detriment. As we noted earlier, the initial efforts to organise occupationally-based associations in the countryside left no lasting result, and the first such body to be established on anything like a secure basis did not appear until May 1917. This was the Pagkakaisa ng Magsasaka (Peasant Union), founded in the Bulacan barrio of Matungaw by Manuel Palomares. (60) Between 1917 and 1922, when the first peasant congress was held in Manila, more unions sprang up in Bulacan and others were founded in Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Tayabas, Nueva Ecija and Pampanga. Apparently these organisations were mostly more or less autonomous and confined to individual barrios or municipalities, but as early as 1919 one group was using the Spanish title Union de Aparceros de Filipinas, implying that it already aspired to national status. (61)

It is interesting to speculate as to why rural unionism should finally and quite suddenly have taken root at this precise time. First, it was during the post-war years that agricultural labour first became plentiful rather than scarce in relation to demand, a shift which inevitably weakened the bargaining position of tenants and other farm workers. Realising that as individuals they were increasingly vulnerable, barrio dwellers would therefore be more receptive to the idea that they should unite to assert their interests collectively. Differences in wealth and outlook between rich and poor, secondly, were accentuated by the war-induced boom, and existing economic tensions intensified both by the boom itself and by the deflation which followed. In particular, the unprecedented fluctuations in crop prices that occurred during this period greatly aggravated the vexed question of calculating debts. In mid-1920 the market price of palay (unhusked rice) in Central Luzon had hit the ceiling, ranging between P 7 and P 9 per cavan, a measure weighing about 44 kilograms. Unrest was reported from several localities because tenants who had borrowed cash from their landlords were having their harvested rice demanded in repayment at the much lower rates which had prevailed in previous years - a cavan
of palay for every P 2 or P 3 loaned. Tenants who grew sugar cane were given an equally raw deal. Further tensions were created when the situation was reversed with the slump in prices that came in 1921. A farmer in Tarlac, for instance, borrowed P 225 whilst palay was still fetching P 8 per cavan, and agreed to repay his debt with 45 cavans. Had prices remained stable, the creditor would thus have gained P 135 from the transaction. But by the time payment fell due, unfortunately for him, the price per cavan had slipped to P 2.50. By selling the 45 cavans he could therefore make only P 112.50. Standing to lose 50 per cent of his loan, the disgusted creditor then revoked the original agreement and insisted on a much higher repayment.

Also acting as catalysts in bringing rural unionism to life between 1917 and 1922 were two political developments: the 1916 extension of the franchise to adult males literate in the vernacular, and the formation the following year of a more vigorous opposition party, the Partido Democrata. Most barrio dwellers in Central Luzon, like most Manila workers, remained disenfranchised even after 1916, but undoubtedly the region’s electorate was greatly expanded. Very roughly, the proportion of adult males actually voting rose from 10 per cent in the 1916 elections to 20 per cent in 1919 and 30 per cent in 1922. This must have signalled to candidates for national, provincial and municipal office that they could no longer address themselves exclusively to the local elite, and that henceforth their campaign had to include at least the semblance of an appeal to the common tao. Involvement with peasant associations could provide evidence of such social concern and, potentially, furnish a useful organisational base.

What gave the competition for peasant support an added intensity and gave it a regional rather than merely a parochial dimension, was the challenge to Nacionalista hegemony presented by the Democratas. Of all the oppositions founded during the American period the Democrata party was in electoral terms by far the most successful, gaining at its peak eight of the twenty-four seats in the Philippine Senate and an almost equivalent proportion in the House of Representatives. Between the party’s establishment and its formal dissolution in 1933, Central Luzon (including Manila) was consistently a principal area of Democrata strength. At one time or another the party’s candidates occupied all the four senatorial seats for the region, seven of the ten lower house seats, and the Bulacan, Nueva Ecija and Pampanga governorships.
The Democrata party has been curiously neglected by historians and until further research has been carried out the reasons why Central Luzon and the capital proved particularly receptive to the party's appeals must remain a matter for conjecture. (67) It was more than coincidence, suggested one senior American official perturbed by the Nacionalista ascendancy, that Democrata gains were concentrated in the "more advanced and better educated districts where the common people were relatively free from coercion and other improper influence." (68) Certainly it would be simplistic to suggest that there was any consistent correlation between oppositionist successes and industrial and agrarian discontent. Nacionalista and Democrata ranks alike contained progressives and conservatives side by side, so the choice facing electors varied considerably from one constituency to another. Neither party, similarly, had a clearly defined national platform. Thus individual Democrats might declare themselves in favour of far-reaching social reforms but could offer little prospect of a Democrats administration actually implementing such measures. Those Democrats candidates who identified themselves closely with labour and peasant organisations, finally, were definitely in a minority, perhaps no greater than the number of Nacionalistas who did the same.

Yet even in the absence of distinct ideological battle lines the party of opposition was naturally better placed to exploit popular grievances for political purposes than was the party of government. One important agrarian issue inherited by the Democrats from earlier oppositions was the rinderpest quarantine, which severely restricted the transportation and sale of work animals. Although farmers recognised the pressing need to contain the rinderpest epidemic, there was a widespread feeling that quarantine and immunisation regulations were so stringent that they threatened the rural economy. (69) In Pampanga in 1919, Democrats campaigners alleged that the Nacionalista governor's overzealousness in this direction made him more of a "pest" to provincial agriculture than the disease itself. (70)

Democrats interest in issues specifically affecting tenants rather than the farming community as a whole was spearheaded by Teodoro Sandiko, the party's founding president. (71) For two consecutive six year terms, from 1919 to 1931, Sandiko occupied one of the two senatorial seats from the district which encompassed Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and Tarlac. Although his involvement with the nascent rural
union movement was unarguably intertwined with his desire to nurture peasant support for himself and his party in Central Luzon, the senator's concern was not motivated by opportunism alone. When Secretary of the Interior in the Revolutionary Government, Sandiko had stood out as a rare progressive amongst Aguinaldo's ilustrado advisers, and as a Nacionalista, prior to 1914, he is said to have headed the party's "left-wing". (72) Straightforward political expediency, moreover, would have demanded only token gestures towards the peasantry, outbalanced by more solid assurances to the caciques. Instead, Sandiko advanced the interests of his poorer constituents with both vigour and consistency, and backed up his anti-cacique rhetoric with practical action.

During his first two years as a senator, indeed, Sandiko was undoubtedly the peasantry's most prominent and vocal champion. He campaigned, for example, for the repeal of the so-called "peonage law", which provided that tenants who had accepted advances from their landlords could be prosecuted for moving elsewhere before the debt had been repaid. He represented five thousand inquilinos in Rizal who were resisting sharp rent increases, chivvied officialdom into clamping down on blatant usury law violations in Bulacan. (73) In direct opposition to the rice hacenderos, he lobbied against an embargo on rice imports which, it was feared, would enable large producers to keep prices artificially high by hoarding. (74) And, working together with four other lawyers, he helped a steady stream of individual tenants who would have otherwise fallen victim to the landlord-dominated local courts. (75)

In tactical terms, Sandiko generally regarded the representatives of the colonial power, from successive Governors General down to men like the Rural Credit Division's "Deacon" Prautch, as valuable allies in this many-sided campaign against agrarian injustice. But at a more fundamental level, he recognised, colonialism actually reinforced cacique domination. "The land problems in Central Luzon", he is reported as arguing

"(cannot) be settled as long as the Americans remain, but will soon be dealt with after they leave. The Americans have too much respect for property and property rights. Let the United States get'out, and the oppressed will soon right things with the bolo." (76)

Olimpio Guanzon, Democrata governor of Pampanga between 1922 and 1925, took the same view. American rule, he contended, had enabled the
common man to gain both courage and character. But not until America withdrew from the Islands would the tao be able "to rise in mobs and settle this thing...."(77) This was precisely the prospect, of course, which had persuaded the nineteenth century ilustrados that independence was best delayed. Now for the first time the expectation of popular revolution was being advanced as a reason why independence should be hastened. The argument was initially broached, it is worth noting, not by radical labourites in the city, but by provincial politicos committed to fighting class oppression in the countryside.

Although few were as militant as Sandiko or Guanzon, sufficient Democrats were showing an interest in peasant affairs by the early 1920s to cause the Nacionalista hierarchy considerable concern. From their viewpoint, growing agrarian discontent now not only posed a potential threat to peace and order but also seemed likely to provide the new opposition with valuable political capital. In an attempt to counteract this dual danger by redirecting the peasant movement along more acceptable channels, Senate President Quezon gave his weighty encouragement to the formation of a national confederation which would, it was hoped, unite the country's rural unions under a single, moderate and "apolitical" umbrella. In advocating this "depoliticisation", Quezon was naturally well aware that any political advantage to be gained by this venture would under the circumstances accrue to his own party.(78)

Known in Tagalog as the Kalipunan Pangbansa ng mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KPMP), the new confederation was launched at a specially arranged three-day Tenant Congress held in Manila in August 1922.(79) The organisational groundwork for this occasion was done mainly by Jacinto Manahan, an energetic young obrerista who had established himself second only to General Sandiko as the peasantry's most vocal spokesman. A Bulakeño by birth, Manahan had spent his working life in the city, mostly as a typographer with the Bureau of Printing. By 1919, aside from being secretary-treasurer of his own union - the Impresores - he headed a 600-strong union of bakers and confectioners and was president of the Congreso Obrero's busy committee on strikes.(80) Around the same time, still in close contact with family and friends in Bulacan, he had developed a keen interest in rural unionism. After urging his Congreso colleagues to take more interest in the countryside and give the early peasant organisers some positive assistance,
according to an internal history, Manahan accepted the responsibility for implementing his own recommendation. Coupled with his continuing commitments in Manila - in 1920 he was elected Congreso Obrero secretary - the time and effort Manahan devoted to this assignment suggest that he may have become the country's first full-time, "professional" labour leader.

The base from which Manahan launched the Kalipunan was the Union de Aparceros de Filipinas, of which he had become president in 1920. As noted earlier, this was the first peasant organisation to claim national status, and by 1922 several local unions, mostly in Bulacan and Cavite, had been amalgamated under its wing. The new confederation, both Manahan and Quezon intended, would extend this process of consolidation to embrace the unions that had remained independent, including those under Domocrata influence. Now it was, to say the least, extremely convenient from Quezon's viewpoint that the Tenant Congress organiser was like most COF leaders a committed Nacionalista. Nonetheless it was also convenient that in his union activities Manahan had publicly espoused the doctrine that "politics has no place in labour deliberations", and that under his presidency the Union de Aparceros de Filipinas had apparently avoided party entanglements.

To allay any suspicions entertained by the Domocrata-inclined associations, it had to be emphasised from the outset that the Kalipunan would follow the same apolitical line. An exhortation urging affiliates to put their interests as workers above their political loyalties was even printed on the KPMP membership cards.

At first it seemed as if these avowals of neutrality had had the desired effect, for the guest speakers at the Tenant Congress included luminaries from both major parties. Gregorio Perfecto, a Domocrata newly elected to the House of Representatives from Manila's north district, promised the audience that he would shortly be introducing a bill amending the "peonage law", and the conservative Domocrata labour leader Joaquin Balmori lectured the delegates on the civic virtues of acquiring homesteads. Other speakers included Union de Impresores president Pedro Cube and the indefatigable anti-usury campaigner, "Deacon" Prautch. Top-billing, however, was inevitably given to Manuel Quezon. Addressing the closing session, the Senate President assured the Congress that he too would never be contented until
legislation had been passed "to protect the poor from the rich and greedy". More significantly, his speech was designed to signpost the non-partisan, responsible direction which the peasant movement would henceforth be taking under the Kalipunan's guidance. Tenants, he urged, "should be given due encouragement, financial and otherwise, so that they may co-operate with the landowners and the government itself in the solution of land problems". (87)

Attending the Tenant Congress were some 160 delegates representing rural associations in at least seven provinces - Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva EciJa, Cavite, Laguna, Batangas and Tayabas. Between the numerous guest speeches, the proceedings were devoted mainly to elections for the KPMP executive board and to debates on a series of resolutions which together would constitute the confederation's programme. Elected as KPMP president, unsurprisingly, was Jacinto Manahan himself. A second Manila-based obrerista, the railwaymen's leader Fausto Carlos, was elected secretary, but the other board members were not well-known in the capital, and presumably were leaders of the Kalipunan's constituent associations. (88) Resolutions passed by the Congress covered subjects ranging from Philippine commerce (to be given greater protection) to cockfighting (to be abolished). On more immediately agrarian concerns, the delegates called for the annulment of the "peonage law"; a more effective anti-usury law; a measure compelling landlords to provide their tenants with written contracts in a language intelligible to both parties; the purchase by the government of the remaining Church-owned estates for resale in small lots to the tenants; and the withdrawal of the Constabulary's power to make arrests without a warrant. (89)

This last demand alone indicated any serious grievance against an agency of the government, and overall the Congress resolutions must have left Quezon well pleased. Their general tenor, far from envisaging militant confrontation, was that agrarian problems could best be approached as the Senate President had urged, through the tripartite co-operation of tenants, landlords and administration. Thus although the KPMP membership cards carried the dictum that "the emancipation of the workers shall be achieved by the workers themselves", the Tenant Congress endorsed Quezon's call for the confederation to be given government financial assistance. Another resolution thanked the landlord-dominated Agricultural Congress "for acts of courtesy during
its recent convention" and promised future "co-operation (in) bringing closer the two organisations and their members."(90)

Co-operation was also to be the watchword on the farms. "That labour and capital need to... help each other" was the first maxim in the confederation's six-point "Creed".(91) In the preamble to a "landlord-tenant covenant", signed by KPMP leaders to settle a wide-flung dispute in Cavite in 1923, the paean to class harmony became almost lyrical:

"Fraternity ... The union of the tenants and landlords to the extent of brotherhood ... made the success of our highest ideals and aspirations ... a reality. It is to the confraternity among tenants and landlords that the Philippine Revolution was brought to fruition and the freedom that we fervently desire is now enjoyed by Filipino citizens.

Mutual Co-operation ... Any relationship without mutual cooperation is a song without music or rhythm, the union of a man and woman bereft of love and tender affection".(92)

This brings to mind familiar themes. In line with the conservative strand of labour thinking in the city, the KPMP's stance assumed not that economic exploitation and social oppression were inevitable features of capitalism, but rather that they resulted from curable moral weaknesses and individual infractions of good fellowship. To promote harmonious and just relationships, in the official KPMP view, tenants no less than their landlords needed to strive to become better human beings. For its members' guidance the confederation again followed the precedent of urban labour conservatism and adopted a hortatory "Decalogue", devoted mainly to echoing advice earlier codified by the Katipuneros and, before that, sprinkled abundantly in the tracts of the ilustrado propagandists: love God, country and fellow-worker; avoid selfishness, over-indulgence and all forms of vice and evil; be thrifty; work hard and take pride in your calling. In addition, there was an injunction to "respect the capitalists as long as they are in the right, but never make them your absolute boss", and a further reminder that labour should be placed above politics.(93)

For an organisation that was so palpably moderate and enjoyed a measure of official backing, "politics" was of course a likelier source of disruption than landlord or government persecution. And so indeed it proved. When the KPMP was launched the político who had hitherto taken the keenest interest in the peasant movement, General Sandiko, had been away in the United States. Upon his return he reacted to the
new development with unconcealed annoyance. As we noted, Democrata speakers had addressed the Tenant Congress and thereby given the confederation their blessing. Nevertheless these individuals were city-based party leaders who had not previously been involved with rural unionism. Sandiko, on the other hand, a grand old man of Central Luzon politics, could better appreciate that Nacionalista involvement in establishing the confederation was not as disinterested as some might pretend. The ulterior motive behind the venture, he discerned, was to undercut the Democrata Party's growing peasant support. As a first move, Sandiko accordingly announced that the KPMP did not have his backing and instructed the members of the various unions under his influence to have nothing to do with the confederation. Then, in December 1922, he convened a meeting in Baliaug, Bulacan, at which he amalgamated these unions into a rival organisation, known most widely as the Kapatirang Magsasaka (Peasant Brotherhood).

At its height in the mid-1920s the Kapatiran reportedly claimed a phenomenal 120,000 members, a figure which even allowing for gross exaggeration made it much larger than the 20,000-strong KPMP. Given the organisation's size and significance, it is unfortunate that a scarcity of surviving evidence makes assessment of its standpoint somewhat speculative. To a degree the Kapatiran apparently had the same sense of social mission as Manahan's confederation. It inculcated in its members, according to one account, the principles of morality, honesty, thrift, mutual aid and civic responsibility, and thus "they became law-abiding citizens, giving due respect to the constituted authorities." But in contrast to the KPMP there was also a pronounced radical strain in the Kapatiran's outlook, reflecting General Sandiko's own inclinations and the militancy which oppositionism tended to foster. Rather than stressing landlord-tenant harmony, the KM focused squarely on the fundamental injustice of agrarian relationships. Applicants for membership, for instance, were required at their initiation to answer "Yes" to the following:

"Do you believe that although the peasants are most holy in the eyes of the Great Worker because of their great toil, they are also the most exploited at the hands of vicious capitalists who place them in a position of real oppression?"

Here the "Great Worker" (Dakilan Manggagawa) presumably signifies God, for at the summit of the Kapatiran's earthly hierarchy was the "Great Peasant" (Dakilan Magsasaka). Initially this title was held by
Sandiko himself but later, perhaps due to the General's advancing years or his heavy senatorial commitments, it passed to another Democrata campaigner, Vicente Almazar. Born to a landowning family in Baliaug in 1889, Almazar was a lawyer by training and for a time had served as Bulacan's assistant provincial fiscal. Through his involvement with the peasant movement - which had pre-dated the Kapatiran - he acquired a loyal personal following amongst the tenants and farm labourers in the countryside around his home town, most notably on the huge Church-owned Buenavista estate. However, his record as a Democrata candidate again indicates that peasant support, whilst undoubtedly a political asset, was by itself insufficient to ensure success. In 1922 he was defeated in a contest for Baliaug's mayorship by Don Emilio Rustia, a Nacionalista hacendero who had cultivated a rival clientele in the barrios by forming the "co-operationist" Samahan ng mga Nagpapasaka at Magsasaka (Society of Landowners and Peasants).(99) In 1926 Almazar was beaten by a fellow Democrata in a bid to take the vacant senatorial seat for Central Luzon alongside General Sandiko, and in 1928 and 1931 he lost closely contested races with Nacionalistas for Bulacan's second district seat in the House of Representatives.(100)

The formation of the Kapatirang Magsasaka as an overtly pro-Democrata association removed the principal cause for the non-partisan stance of the KPMP, and the confederation's Nacionalista affinities were accordingly unveiled. Competition between the two organisations in Central Luzon became for a time a significant facet of regional party skirmishing.(101) Some impression of the manner in which peasant affairs entered the political affray may be gained from events during the election year of 1925 in Nueva Ecija, where three years earlier the Democratas had captured the provincial governorship and all but a handful of the twenty-six municipal councils. In January 1925 there was a marked groundwell of unrest in the north and east of the province, occasioned by a combination of landgrabbing, harvest disputes and rice shortages, and the Constabulary took the precaution of stationing troopers in the most disturbed towns. At this point KPMP president Jacinto Manahan arrived to survey the situation and then sent word to the Manila press that the Constabulary presence was necessary "due to the fear that members of the 'Kapatirang Magsasaka' might break into (the rice bodegas)". This observation clearly implied that members of the more pacific and responsible KPMP would never even contemplate such
unlawful behaviour. Next to be smeared was the incumbent Democrata governor of Nueva Ecija, Aurelio Cecilio. In running for re-election, the Manila Times reported, Governor Cecilio was said to be so anxious not to upset "certain tenant organisations" that he was shirking his responsibility to ensure that agrarian controversies were settled before they threatened the provincial peace. He was thus "in a way responsible for the present situation." Evidently this allegation gained some credence at the very highest level, for early in March the Governor General himself summoned Cecilio to be admonished for his supposed "apathy."

Any action that was then taken, however, came too late to avert the outbreak that had been feared. The day after Cecilio's visit to Malacañang a Constabulary patrol in northern Nueva Ecija ambushed a meeting of two hundred dispossessed homesteaders and disaffected tenants who were plotting to attack the town of San Jose. Seven would-be insurrectos were killed in the clash and over the next few days more than a thousand peasants were detained, seventy-six subsequently being jailed for conspiracy or sedition. The conspirators belonged to a patriotic secret society founded in 1923 by Pedro Kabola, a charismatic Ilocano labourer turned mystic who had promised the redistribution of land once the Americans and caciques were overthrown. After the debacle, nevertheless, local Nacionalistas again contended that the real blame lay elsewhere. Their verdict, inculpating the provincial Democrata leadership and rank and file alike, was neatly summarised by Joaquin Valmonte, municipal president of Gapan. Valmonte, reported the Times "accused Governor Cecilio of being responsible for the recent uprising, stating that the Governor's frequent speeches in the province have instilled discontent in the farming classes, a majority of whom belong to the labor organisation known as the 'Kapatirang Magsasaka'. Many people who participated in the uprising, according to Mr. Valmonte, are members of this labor organisation and not (sectaries) at all in the accepted sense of the term."

Worries about the agitational effect of Democrata appeals to the peasantry similarly beset Nacionalistas in Pampanga. Here the Kapatirang Magsasaka had strong support amongst Tagalog-speaking barrio-dwellers in the municipalities bordering Bulacan, and another Democrata-inclined association was winning a disquieting influence throughout the province amongst the Capampangan-speaking majority. This was the Anak Pawas (Sons of Toil), which had been founded three
years before the Kapatiran in 1919. With its largest branches in San Simon, San Luis, Mexico, Candaba, Santa Ana, Arayat and the towns of southern Tarlac, the association was reported in 1925 to have a total membership of 10,000. Its founder and unchallenged head was Estanislao Garcia, a former law student who like Almazar proved unable to convert his sway as a Democrata líder into political success for himself. In 1928 he ran unsuccessfully for a place on Pampanga's provincial board. But as a peasant leader, again like Almazar, his popularity fringed on hero-worship, and anecdotes about him are still told in Central Luzon today. A favourite Garcia ploy, it is said, was to call Anak Pawas members to a meeting out in the ricefields late at night, ensuring meanwhile that the landlords also got wind of the gathering and thus despatched informers to attend. The meeting having assembled, the proceedings would be repeatedly delayed on some pretext and then finally abandoned with nothing having transpired. On being told that their tenants had spent a night in the fields for no purpose, the disbelieving landlords would suspect that their spies had become accomplices in a conspiracy of silence, and then approach Garcia with offers of money to avert the trouble they imagined was threatened.

Unscrupulousness, according to contemporary press accounts, was only the tame end of a scale that extended through insistent intimidation to the open advocacy of violence. For this reason landlords and the Constabulary regarded the Anak Pawas as an even greater, more sinister scourge than the Kapatiran. At their initiation, recruits were reportedly steeled for the struggles to come by "the most severe and barbarous ordeals" and were then branded on the arm with a red-hot iron and made to swear a solemn oath that they would defend their comrades with their lives. Society members in Concepcion, Tarlac, among them the town's "lowest elements", were alleged in January 1925 to be hoarding firearms and "spreading terror". Here and elsewhere those who had most reason to feel threatened were landlords who had refused to grant their tenants what the Anak Pawas had proposed were reasonable terms. If as often happened the landlords retaliated by evicting or refusing to employ tenants or labourers affiliated to the society, passions were inevitably inflamed still further. And, once again, there was the exacerbating contamination of politics. Early in 1925 senior Constabulary commanders told newsmen that the spate of
unrest then afflicting Concepcion and other Tarlac towns was due partly to the Anak Pawas but partly also to the pre-election gestures of "unscrupulous politicians" who used such societies as their instruments, and who stooped down "to the most despicable means of gaining popularity and the promise of a vote...." (114)

In Pampanga, we noted, the Democrata partisanship of the Capampangan Anak Pawas was complemented after 1922 by Kapatiran proselytism amongst the Tagalog minority. On the other side of the party divide there was the more moderate KPMP, also primarily a Tagalog association and much weaker in Pampanga than in Bulacan, Nueva Ecija and Cavite. In 1923, with a view to redressing this unequal balance, a group of local Nacionalistas launched a competing Capampangan mass organisation, the Katipunan Mipanampun (Self-Help Society). (115) The Katipunan's chief instigator and president, Don Zoilo Hilario, came from a family prominent as lawyers and political leaders in the province since the Spanish period; his uncle had served in the republican congress, his father as revolutionary governor. Himself a lawyer, Zoilo gained his own reputation as a vernacular poet and patriotic orator, travelling all over the Campampangan region to declaim at civic occasions and crown the queens at barrio fiestas. Throughout the 1920s he was a perennial Nacionalista candidate and eventually, in 1931, he was elected to the House of Representatives to sit for Pampanga's second district. (116) The Katipunan organisation naturally assisted Hilario in his various campaigns, and extended similar assistance to other Nacionalistas, selected - where two or more were contesting the same seat - by a ballot of the society's branches. (117)

In his 1924 annual report the Democrata provincial governor revealed his irritation at the Nacionalistas' emulation of his own party's tactics by wishfully dismissing Hilario's organisation as "already discredited". (118) This obituary was too premature by far, and in fact Katipunan membership was at this time growing by leaps and bounds, reaching a claimed 15,700 in less than two years. (119) Four out of every five members, according to the organisation's former general secretary, were fully literate. (120) This indicates that ordinary tenants and farm labourers were in a minority, and that most recruits came from the provincial middle class - from professionals, artisans and storekeepers in the poblaciones and from the less impoverished smallholders and tenants in the barrios. Nacionalista loyalties
aside, what distinguished the Katipunan from its pro-Democrata counterparts was the emphasis placed on peace and order. In other respects much was familiar. There were elaborate initiation rituals (said to last three days!), mutual benefit schemes, and drives to promote nationalism, Christian ethics and a belief in the dignity of labour. Another concern was the encouragement of local cottage industries, and whenever campaigning or attending town parades Katipuneros always wore native dress as their uniform: bamboo hats, barong Tagalog and abaca cloth trousers. But always paramount in the propaganda was the need to avoid turbulence and disorder. Augmenting the male leaders' efforts, a women's section known as the "Amazonas" had speakers also touring the countryside counselling barrio wives and daughters on how to exercise a placatory influence from the home.

This stress on stability, coupled with conspicuous elite backing, led provincial radicals to regard the Katipunan as a straightforward landlord front organisation. Conservative die-hards within provincial Nacionalista circles, on the other hand, charged Hilario and his associates with arousing unwarranted expectations, and when finally returned to the legislature Hilario did reportedly maintain a progressive stance. Perhaps the fairest assessment would thus be that the Katipunan Mipanampun tried to mediate between tenant militancy and landlord reaction by echoing the ilustrado contention that change was indeed necessary, but should be achieved on a gradual, moderate and above all orderly basis. If reforms were to be fruitful and secure, the Katipuneros would have agreed with the propagandists, they had to come from above.

Before concluding this discussion of the mass organisations active in Central Luzon during the early 1920s, though, it is worth remarking that judgements as to the militancy, moderation or political inclinations of a given grouping can only be generalisations, and that local branches sometimes strayed from the path the leadership had signalled. This was intrinsically more likely within radical associations such as the Anak Pawas, whose reported resort to occasional intimidation and violence was obviously not something which its leader could entirely control or condone. But similar embarrassment could also befall the more moderate associations. In 1923, to take one rather amazing instance, the Constabulary became uneasy about the activities of the Legionarios del Trabajo. This was a quasi-masonic patriotic fraternity whose Grand
Master was Domingo Ponce, a Nacionalista member of the Congreso Obrero executive, and whose Honorary President was none less than Manuel Quezon. Also indicating non-radical respectability, Legionarios lodges in Pampanga had affiliated en bloc with the Katipunan Mipanampun.(124) Like Hilario's organisation, the fraternity had a large proportion of middle class members, and in some towns these included the municipal president, councillors and members of the local police force. Unfortunately, Constabulary chief General Crame wrote to Quezon, this had seriously jeopardised judicial impartiality, for "should a member of the organisation fall within the clutches of the law he is aided by every official in a municipality and goes scot free." In certain localities, worse still, divisions between members and non-members had arisen along economic lines, bringing the threat of "bolshevism". "Prominent residents of the municipality of Victoria, Tarlac", continued the Constabulary chief, "recently called at my office and .... claimed that (Legionarios members) had intimated that ... soon ... they would possess themselves of all the property in Victoria." A Constabulary lieutenant who had visited the town had reported as follows:

"There are at present in the municipality of Victoria two local societies, namely Los Legionarios del Trabajo and Los Operarios de la Viña del Señor ... (the former) is also the one popularly known as the institution of the Bolsheviks since the last 4th of July when they had a whole day meeting at the town plaza and wherein they attacked the rich people, the Catholic priest and his believers which now compose Los Operarios de la Viña del Señor. Had it not been for the presence of two Constabulary soldiers ... a bloody affair would have occurred ...."

Such activities, General Crame assured Legionarios Honorary President Quezon, "I am certain you are ignorant of."(125)

Throughout the 1920s the epithet "Bolshevik" was used freely to signify virtually any popular movement regarded with distaste. The American-owned Manila Times even decided in retrospect that Bolshevism in the Islands dated back at least to the days of Bonifacio and Sakay, whose victory would have meant a "Filipino Soviet".(126) A red flag hoisted by militant tenants in Marilao, Bulacan in June 1920 was diagnosed by a Catholic paper as "an unmistakable symptom" of the coming plague, even though red had been a common choice for kapisanan colours since 1896.(127) In reality the Russian revolution initially had little impact on the labour and peasant movement, and early reactions to it, based on American and Catholic news reports, seem to have been almost
entirely negative. In 1920, for instance, when the Congreso Obrero went on record as being opposed to Bolshevism, the gist of the debate was recorded by Jacinto Manahan (in his capacity as federation secretary), as follows:

"The question of bolshevism was brought before the Congress for the purpose of sounding the opinion of members and it was completely rejected. The doctrine was rejected because it is against a democratic form of government, because it is in favour of and practising compulsory or forced labor, which is against the eight-hour demand of the Filipino laborers, and because bolshevism requires obligatory military service." (128)

In the following chapters we shall examine how many Filipino labour and peasant activists had by the late 1920s come to view Bolshevism much more sympathetically. Until that time, the peasant movement was scarcely touched by modern ideologies of radical social change at all. This was not, it is clear, because rural discontent was insufficiently intense to generate any revolutionary impulses. Utopian groups such as the Guardia de Honor, the Santa Iglesia and the secret society of Pedro Kabola demonstrated quite the contrary, and their protests could be seen merely as the preliminary rumblings of a volcano. The early peasant union leaders, however, whether politicos or obreristas, had little affinity with the traditional folk rebels. Like officialdom and the Manila press, indeed, they probably viewed the barrio millenarians and seditionists as an embarrassing anachronism, as "incredulous rustics", "fanatics" or "fuzzy-wuzzies". They saw themselves, by contrast, as rationalists, as agents of modernity.

Nor did they see themselves as revolutionaries. The major peasant association in which city trade unionists were involved, the KPMP, in fact reflected the more conservative strands of urban labour thinking, emphasising class co-operation and the achievement of change through moral enlightenment and orderly reform. General Sandiko and his fellow Democrata Olimpio Cuanzon, we noted, had an almost sanguine expectation that the oppressed would "right things with the bolo" once the Americans had departed. But they neither specified what should follow this convulsion nor even suggested that they would be personally involved, and in the meantime they remained within a political opposition which presented no coherent ideological alternative to the incumbent Nacionalistas.

Within Central Luzon, nevertheless, the pro-Democrata peasant
associations were generally felt to be more radical than their pro-
Nacionalista counterparts, and Democrata candidates and office-holders
were generally felt to be more responsive than their NP rivals to
barrio aspirations. By their successes in the region, the Democrata
party, the Kapatirang Magsasaka and the Anak Pawas at least served
notice that rural militancy was finding its voice in the modern world
and that the opposing voices of conservatism and moderation would
henceforth be on the defensive.
Notes to Chapter Two

(1) Gregorio Aglipay "Fiesta de los obreros filipinos (Historia instructiva de la Union Obrera de Filipinas)" in Iglesia Filipina Independiente Catedra (Sermonario) de la Iglesia Filipina Independiente n.pub., Manila 1932 p.104; Union Obrera Democrática de Filipinas Palatuntunan (Programme) n.pub., Manila 1902 p.22

(2) El Renacimiento October 24, 1903; La Redencion del Obrero Yr.I no.4 October 29, 1903; Victor S. Clark "Labor Conditions in the Philippines" Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor vol.X no.58 May 1905 p.848

(3) See, for example, Manila Times April 23, 1923 (which carries an account of the origins of rural unionism by Jacinto Manahan); Guillermo Capadocia "Philippine Labor Movement" Typescript c.1948 p.44 (Manila Court of First Instance); and "Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas" ("History of the Peasant Movement in the Philippines") Mimeograph c.1946 p.10 (Manila Court of First Instance)

(4) "Unang Kapulungan ng mga Manggagawa" ("First Workers' Congress") Tambuli Yr.I no.1 May 1, 1913 pp.1-2
The two peasant delegates were Nemesio Ayeras, a representative of the Kapisanang Manggagawa sa Mandaluyong (Mandaluyong Workers' Association) and Vicente L. Sauco of Talikdan ang Kahapon (Forget Yesterday). No record can be found of their further participation in Congreso affairs.

(5) "Kalingain ang mga Magbubukid: Sakal na Sakal sa Liig" ("The Peasants Need Protection: Strangled by the Neck") Tambuli Yr.I no.5 May 31, 1913 p.5


(8) Sturtevant op.cit. p.272; Conversation with Luis Taruc, Quezon City, December 4, 1971


The incidence of tenancy was undoubtedly higher than any of the three censuses suggest. Many farms included in the surveys were too small to give yields that could support an agricultural family, and the holders of such small plots would in many cases derive the bulk of their income by working other land as tenants. Conversely, other farms listed in the censuses would be too large to be worked by a single occupant or family.


Manila Times August 13, 1922


Worcester op.cit. p.592

Wurfel op.cit. p.56

Ibid. pp.75-9


Calculations based on data cited in Wurfel op.cit. p.67

Evett D. Hester, Pablo Mabbun et al. "Some Economic and Social Aspects of Philippine Rice Tenancies" Philippine Agriculturalist vol.XII no.9 February 1924 p.383

Census of the Philippine Islands 1903 vol.IV, as cited pp.255-7; Philippine Islands, Census Office Census of the Philippine Islands 1918 vol.III Bureau of Printing, Manila 1921 pp.72-83

Agapito O. Gaa (Chief, Public Lands Division) "Public Lands" in Census of the Philippine Islands 1918 vol.III, as cited p.873
(25) Worcester op.cit. p.595
(26) Gaa op.cit. p.879
(27) Karl J. Pelzer Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics
(28) Sister Mary Elizabeth "Agricultural Credit and Banking in the
(29) Quoted in Worcester op.cit. p.749
(30) United States, War Department Annual Reports for the F.Y. ended
June 30, 1911 vol.IV (Report of the Philippine Commission)
(31) W. Cameron Forbes The Philippine Islands Vol.I Houghton
Mifflin Co., Boston and New York 1928 p.322
(32) Pelzer op.cit. p.Ill
(33) Republic of the Philippines, Office of the President, Bureau of
the Census and Statistics Yearbook of Philippine Statistics
1946 Bureau of Printing, Manila 1947 p.126
(34) Of 15,591 homestead applications actually patented throughout the
Islands by the end of 1930, over a fifth related to holdings in
Nueva Ecija. Second in the provincial league table at this time
was Tayabas, with 2,632 applications patented. By the Pacific
War, however, the province of Isabela had the highest number of
patented homesteads.
Philippine Islands, Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Annual Report (1930) Bureau of Printing, Manila 1931
pp.763-4; Yearbook of Philippine Statistics 1946 loc.cit.
(35) Marshall S. McLennan "Peasant and Hacendero in Nueva Ecija:
The Socio-Economic Origins of a Philippine Commercial Rice-
Growing Region" Ph.D. thesis, University of California,
Berkeley 1973 p.357
(36) Forbes op.cit. p.326
(37) McLennan op.cit. p.160
(38) Census 1903 vol.IV, as cited p.257; Census 1939 vol.IV, as cited
p.1308
(39) McLennan op.cit. p.8
(40) Philippines Herald September 24, 1932; Larkin op.cit. pp.74-6
(41) Wurfel op.cit. p.145
(42) For an affectionate obituary tribute to Prautch see Walter J.
Robb "Old Deacon Prautch" in Filipinos Carmelo and Bauermann,
Manila 1939 pp.375-82
Some landlords wished to exercise tight control not only over their tenants' farming operations, but over their personal lives as well. Around 1920, for example, a landlord in Hagonoy, Bulacan drew up a lengthy list of "ordinances" which he required every tenant to sign, and which included the following:

"Article XII ... I strictly prohibit my tenants and those not my tenants who live in a house built on my land to organise or join any secret society prohibited by the government or house such people as may endanger the community. I do not want to see any one of my tenants go to the cockpit, or gamble. The violator of this article will lose the privilege of being my tenant."
"Article IX" of the ordinances mentioned above (Note 56) provided that "Any tenant found handicapped shows his incapacity to handle his work, in which case the landlord may either dismiss him from his holding or lessen the area of his holding."

Hester, Mabbun et al. op.cit. p.384

Palomares remained active in the peasant movement at least until the mid-1920s, when his organisation was known as the Union de Aparceros de Bulacan. This claimed a membership of 2,000, and was still confined mainly to the area around Matungaw. Palomares also headed a sawmill workers' union in Manila (the Union de Aserradores de Filipinas) which claimed 1,000 members, but he was apparently never a member of the Congreso Obrero "inner circle", and no further biographical information is known.

Philippine Islands, Department of Commerce and Communications, Bureau of Labor "Sixteenth Annual Report (1924)" Typescript p.170 (Bureau of Labor, Manila)

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Philippine Islands, Department of Commerce and Communications, Bureau of Labor "Sixteenth Annual Report (1924)" Typescript p.170 (Bureau of Labor, Manila)


Jose Alejandrino The Price of Freedom M. Colcol and Co., Manila 1949 pp.207-8
Sandiko's fascinating life awaits a good biographer. Born in the Manila district of Pandacan in 1860, he was like Isabelo de los Reyes and Dominador Gomez a political survivor from the generation of the propagandists. After a standard ilustrado education at the Ateneo Municipal and the University of Santo Tomas, he had begun his career as a private schoolteacher in Malolos, Bulacan. Around 1888, suspected of using his position to spread subversive ideas, he fled to Spain, where he studied law at the University of Madrid and became an active member of the Filipino exile community. Travelling widely elsewhere in Europe, he reportedly worked for a time as a labourer in German factories, and wherever he went took a particular interest in the working class movement. Through his experiences, according to his lifelong confrère Jose Alejandrino, he became converted "al socialismo sano y progresivo", thereby winning a few years ahead of Isabelo de los Reyes the right to be called the "first Filipino socialist".

Returning to the Islands following Dewey's victory in Manila Bay, he immediately offered his services to Aguinaldo and in early 1899 was appointed Secretary of the Interior in the Revolutionary Government. Later he was commissioned as a brigadier-general in the revolutionary army.

After the war, Sandiko served two terms as Nacionalista governor of Bulacan during Felipe Salvador's fractious heyday. Aside from acquiring lands in Bulacan, he became manager of two Manila tobacco factories, one of which, the Katubusan, was established as a pioneering profit-sharing co-operative, incorporating in its constitution the dictum that "the whole product of labour is for the benefit of the workers".

In 1914, attacking the Nacionalista leadership for becoming an oligarchy subservient to American imperialism, Sandiko headed a breakaway from the party and together with secessionists from the Partido Progresista (the successor to the Partido Federal) formed the third party grouping commonly known as the Terceristas. Three years later the Terceristas united with the remaining Progresistas to form the Partido Democrata, of which Sandiko became the first president. Between 1919 and 1922 he was the party's sole representative in the upper chamber.

S. B. Santiago "Off the Cuff" Labor Digest vol.V nos.3-4 April-May 1960 p.16; Cornejo op.cit. p.2108; Manila Times February 21, 1920; Jose Alejandrino "Sandiko: el primer socialista filipino" Union Yr.VIII no.307 November 1, 1939 p.3


Manila Times February 9, 1920; Philippines Herald September 24, 1920; Mayo op.cit. p.35; Charles B. Yeater (Acting Governor General) to Quintin Paredes (Attorney General), June 11, 1920; Quintin Paredes Letter to Charles B. Yeater, June 11, 1920; L. Irvin (Secretary to the Governor General) to the Director of Agriculture, November 20, 1920; A. W. Prautsch to Governor General Francis B. Harrison, December 4, 1920

Manila Times February 23 and 27, 1921
The year 1922 saw the height of a factional schism within the Nacionalista party between "Colectivistas" - a faction headed by Senate President Quezon - and "old-line" Nacionalistas who followed Sergio Osmeña, the Speaker of the House of Representatives. It is thus also possible that Quezon saw an appreciative tenants' federation as being beneficial to his wing of the NP rather than to the party as a whole.

For some time after its formation the confederation was in fact known most commonly by its Spanish title - Confederacion Nacional de Aparceros y Obreros Agricolas de Filipinas - or by the English translation of this title - National Confederation of Tenants and Farm Laborers of the Philippines. The Tagalog form, however, which translates simply as National Confederation of Peasants of the Philippines, later superseded the foreign alternatives, and is used here from the beginning for the sake of simplicity.

According to the Manila Times those elected as officers of the congress were as follows: President - Jacinto Manahan; Vice-Presidents - Felipe Caluminar, Pedro Villarin, M. Concepcion and Bernardino Gonzaga; Treasurer - Narciso Manlapas; Secretary - Fausto Carlos. Manila Times August 27, 1922

Unfortunately there seems to be no contemporary account of who was elected to the executive of the confederation. Capadocia lists the KPMP's first "National Committee" members as being Juan de Castro, Florencio Bambao (from Batangas) Pablo Katibayan (Cavite), Manuel Palomares (Bulacan), P. Icasiano and G. Marquez. Capadocia op.cit. p.45; "Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas" as cited pp.10-11
Manila Times August 28, 1922

Ibid.

Quoted in Belamide op.cit. p.17

Quoted in Philippine Islands, Department of Commerce and Communications, Bureau of Labor Labor Conditions in the Philippines Bureau of Printing, Manila 1927 p.84; Manila Times May 11, 1923

Quoted in Belamide op.cit. p.15

Manila Times April 23, 1923

"Maikling Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas", as cited p.11


"Fact-Finding Survey", as cited p.90

Union ng Magsasaka sa Pilipinas Ang 'Ritual' sa Pagtanggap (The Initiation Ritual) n.pub. n.p. c.1923 pp.7-8

In its early years the organisation apparently used the titles "Union ng Magsasaka" and "Kapatirang Magsasaka" interchangeably, and was also frequently known as the "Kapatirang Magbubukid".

Rolando E. Villacorte Ballaug: Then and Now Philippine Graphic Arts, Quezon City 1970 pp.232-4

Two other landlord-sponsored associations are recorded as operating in Bulacan at about the same time - the "Malayan Organisation" and the "Independiente". Most probably there were similar local groups in other Central Luzon provinces.

Manila Times April 22, 1923

Tribune June 6, 1928; Philippines Herald June 5, 1931

"Maikling Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas", as cited p.11; Philippines Herald September 25, 1924

Manila Times January 16, 1925

Manila Times February 5, 1925

Manila Times March 1, 1925

(105) A large proportion of the hundred detained reportedly surrendered willingly. "The stern purpose of the law has degenerated into a farce", the Manila Times noted. "Many of those who have surrendered to the Constabulary and other authorities, it is said, are not even members of secret labor organisations or religious sects, but they allow themselves to be jailed in order to have 'free chow'."

Manila Times March 10, 1925

(106) Manila Times March 10, 1925

(107) Manila Times December 18, 1925

(108) Tribune June 6, 1928

(109) Conversation with Casto Alejandrino, Quezon City September 24, 1971

(110) Manila Times January 16, 1925

(111) Manila Times January 20, 1925

(112) Manila Times January 12, 1925

(113) Manila Times December 18, 1925; Mayo op. cit. p.46

(114) Manila Times January 16, 1925

(115) Among the Katipunan's most prominent campaigners and backers, aside from Zolilo Hilario, were Monico Mercado (member of the Philippine Assembly 1907-12), Gonzalo Puyat (a self-made millionaire, elected President of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippine Islands in 1932), Servillano Ibañez (member, Pampanga provincial board 1925-8), Serafin Tecson (member, Bulacan provincial board 1913- ?), Arcadio de Ocera (Methodist Minister), Sergio Navarro Jr., Joaquin B. Galang, Dr. Felino Simpao, Dr. Mallari, Pedro G. Tan and Aurellano Magat. "Fact-Finding Survey", as cited pp.86-7; Eduardo Lachica Huk: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt Solidaridad Publishing House, Manila 1971 pp.80-2

(116) Lachica loc. cit.

(117) Conversation with Sergio Navarro Jr., San Fernando, Pampanga January 16, 1972

(118) Philippine Islands, Provincial Government of Pampanga, Office of the Governor "Annual Report 1924" Typescript p.42 (The governor at this time was Olimpio Guanzon.)

(119) Bureau of Labor "Sixteenth Annual Report (1924)", as cited p.170

(120) Conversation with Sergio Navarro Jr., as cited

(121) "Fact-Finding Survey", as cited pp.86-7

(122) Capadocia op. cit. p.47; "Maikling Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas", as cited p.11
Victoria, Tarlac was a town with a strong tradition of Aglipayanism. Aglipay himself had been appointed coadjutor there in December 1896 and his brother had been appointed municipal president in 1901. Domingo Ponce was described by Supreme Bishop Aglipay as a "good supporter" of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, and Legionarios lodges were often associated with the church. It thus seems probable that the appearance of the Legionarios organisation in Victoria only aggravated longer-standing tensions between local Aglipayans and their "Romanist" foes. Legionarios del Trabajo Blue Book Los Filipinos, Manila 1941 p.10; Pedro S. de Achutegui and Miguel A. Bernad Religious Revolution in the Philippines vol.I Ateneo de Manila, Quezon City 1960 p.22

(126) Manila Times July 23, 1920

(127) Quoted in Manila Times June 30, 1920

(128) Quoted in Belamide op.cit. p.30
CHAPTER THREE

THE PARTIDO OBRERO

During the first two decades of the twentieth century radical tendencies within the Manila labour movement had remained muted, overshadowed both by the countervailing precepts of class collaborationism and by largely non-ideological party factionalism. This chapter and the next examine how in the 1920s the radical current was quickened by the fresh influences of the October Revolution and the Third International. Initially discussed in relatively general terms, communism appeared to a growing number of obreristas to uphold their two most cherished ideals—indeed and social justice. Demands for the liberation of colonial peoples offered militant independistas their first prospect of international support against an apparently immovable imperialist power, and the promise of a "new dawn" for labour echoed the familiar notion of working class "redemption". At this very basic level the Comintern's appeals touched responsive chords, and consequently won widespread support. Some labour activists, integrating these appeals selectively into their traditional outlook, came to consider themselves as "bolsheviks" whilst remaining completely loyal to the Nacionalista party.

As a small number of unionists came to understand communist principles more fully and to advocate their adoption by the labour movement as a whole, however, opinions began to polarise. For whereas independence and greater social justice were scarcely contentious goals in themselves, the means by which these radicals now suggested they should be attained represented a sharp break with past conventions and aroused heated controversy. One key question was whether the Nacionalista leadership, whose failings in the campaign for independence and in passing progressive legislation had hitherto been borne by organised labour with remarkable indulgence, should at last be
repudiated in favour of the Partido Obrero, a specifically worker and peasant based party originally founded in 1922. Gradually gaining in both strength and militancy, the Partido Obrero was by November 1925 calling upon Filipino toilers to seize leadership of the nationalist movement and to overthrow imperialism and capitalism alike. By late 1928, guided by the sectarianism and ultra-leftism of the Comintern's "third period", the party's stance had become more aggressive still, and the labour movement headed towards open schism. Those obreristas who had preferred to adopt a syncretic approach, and had tried to reconcile selected aspects of bolshevism with continued allegiance to the Nacionalista party became, in contemporary press parlance, "conservatives" who now wished to halt any further penetration of "red" influences.

Industry and Labour in the Twenties

After the dramatic upswing and downturn induced by the World War and its aftermath, the Philippine economy returned quickly to a more even keel. As in the pre-war years, primary export crop production was by far the most dynamic sector, with sugar, abaca, coconut and tobacco products invariably comprising at least three quarters of the total export value. (1) Stimulated by the recovery of the American market, which now absorbed over 70 per cent of Philippine exports, the annual value of goods shipped overseas climbed steadily from the 1921 post-war low of P 176 million, and from 1927 onward was consistently higher than the P 302 million it had reached during the peak boom year of 1920. Imports picked up rather less evenly, but by 1929 were only some P 45 million short of matching their 1920 peak of P 299 million. (2) Due largely to the growth in direct exports from the Visayas, the proportion of foreign trade passing through Manila declined somewhat as the decade progressed, but not sufficiently to threaten the port's overwhelming primacy. Of a national export and import total assessed at P 579 million in 1928, for example, the value loaded and unloaded at the city's piers amounted to P 389 million. These cargoes were carried in 745 vessels with a combined registered net weight of 3,040,000 tons, some thirty per cent higher than the weight being cleared annually at the waterfront earlier in the decade. (3)
Growth in the manufacturing sector was much slower, probably being around the 4.6 per cent per annum that it averaged during the inter-war period as a whole. (4) The preferred outlets for local capital were still land and export agriculture, and long-term foreign investment was discouraged, as American retentionists were forever complaining, by the Islands' uncertain future. No investment "along permanent, fixed and frozen lines" could be recommended, the American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines advised the Governor General in 1921, until there were "conditions of permanent stability". These conditions could only be achieved, in the Chamber's view, when a "fixed status of government" had been effected "under the sovereignty of the United States". (5) An equally basic deterrent to both local and foreign investment in non-agriculture based industries, needless to say, was the competitive superiority of manufactured goods from overseas. American importers, enjoying the free trade advantage, inevitably had the edge over their rivals and captured between 55 and 65 per cent of the market share. (6)

Such expansion as did occur in manufacturing was mainly in existing industries producing for domestic consumption - clothing (using imported textiles), footwear, food and beverages, furniture and public utilities. Output in Manila's largest enterprises - the tobacco factories - remained well below wartime levels, and even after 1923 the value of cigars and other tobacco products exported fell a further 20 per cent before the decade's close. (7) The only other manufactured items exported in quantities of any significance were embroideries, hats made from palm leaf fibre, and pearl buttons. None showed any marked advance, though, and even combined these three items never accounted for more than five per cent of total export receipts. (8) The manufacturing sector's general sluggishness meant that the traditionally fragmented and dispersed character of the workforce remained basically unchanged, and probably even became slightly more pronounced. For whereas the city's population grew by some 46 per cent between 1918 and 1928 (from 285,000 to an estimated 415,000), the number broadly defined as "industrial" workers rose by only 28 per cent, from 34,952 to 44,820. (9) Assuming that three in every five Manileños were in gainful employment (the ratio pertaining in 1903), the total working population in 1928 would be approximately 249,000. (10) At least four out of every five workers, therefore - maids, cooks, laundrywomen, drivers, hawkers, shop assistants, clerks, professionals etc. - were still in scattered,
non-industrial types of employment.

Wage statistics for the 1920s, although quite plentiful, are unfortunately of doubtful consistency, and often record maximum and minimum rates for given occupations rather than the prevailing norms. (11) Nevertheless, it is safe to conclude that the post-war slump resulted in significant wage reductions virtually across the board. Seamstresses, near the foot of the incomes ladder, had their wage range of P 0.80 - 3.00 daily in 1920 cut to P 0.63 - 1.17 by 1923. Chauffeurs' wages, which were close to the city average, fell in the same period from P 2.43 to P 1.94. Carpenters, whose skills had been in such demand during the war boom that their daily rates had reached P 5.00, saw their earnings fall by exactly half within five years. Reductions still predominated in 1926, when cigar makers struck unsuccessfully against cuts which slashed the regular daily rate from P 2.00 to P 1.40 or below. (12) From 1927 onward the picture becomes more complex, with rates moving individually rather than in unison, reflecting the situation in a particular trade or industry rather than overall economic conditions. Tabaqueros' wages continued to fall, to an average P 1.28 daily in 1927 and P 1.17 in 1928. Stevedores, on the other hand, negotiated a settlement in 1927 which increased the daily rate for established men from P 2.00 to P 2.25, thereby recouping half a mid-decade reduction. (13) Blacksmiths and chauffeurs fared better still, their 1928 incomes of P 2.30 and P 2.54 respectively exceeding even their 1920 rates.

Price levels in the 1920s fluctuated to an ever greater extent on an individual basis, but very broadly followed a similar trend to wage rates. Food costs, which reportedly absorbed three fifths of workers' budgets, dropped sharply in 1921 and in general continued to fall, albeit more slowly, for the next three years. (14) A minor upturn around mid-decade proved to be only temporary, and thereafter prices flattened out at roughly 1922-23 levels, though beef, pork and chicken became cheaper than at any time since the war. Rice exemplified the overall pattern. Having hit P 14 per cavan in 1920, the yearly average wholesale price of the staple plunged to P 7.56 in 1921, rose above P 9.30 in the three mid-decade years, and then fell back to exactly the 1921 mark in 1927. Even when reaching P 9.67 per cavan in 1924, it may be noted, the price was still 30 per cent down on its peak. (15) In the same year, fish was down 36 per cent on its 1920 retail index, fowls
were down 25 per cent, other meats down 28 per cent and vegetables down 34 per cent. (16)

Aside from rice, which was then a peso above its 1921-29 average, these 1924 prices may very roughly be taken as representative for the decade as a whole, and judging from the limited information available it appears that non-food prices also were around 25-40 per cent down on 1920 rates. In most occupations, as we have seen, wage reductions were on a similar scale. Only two significant groups of wage-earners had their 1920 incomes cut by 50 per cent or more - construction workers, who had enjoyed a brief war boom bonanza, and the hard-pressed tabaqueros. If pre-war wages and prices are taken as the basis for comparison, however, real incomes appear to have been higher in the 1920s for virtually all trades, construction and tobacco workers included. Despite the downward trend in wage rates, in other words, the gains made by labour during the period of relative prosperity were at least partially preserved.

Nevertheless, any expectations that living standards would continue improving were undoubtedly disappointed. Confronted first with the post-war slump and then with a sluggish recovery, organised labour was obliged to become more defensive, to be concerned more with consolidation than with continued expansion and advance. When the recession was biting hardest, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, there was a rash of strikes against wage reductions, and the numbers involved in industrial disputes reached an all-time high - 34,738 during the two years 1921-22. Most stoppages in these years - 35 out of 56 - ended in failure. In the remainder of the decade strike activity lessened, with the number of workers involved averaging only around 7,200 annually, but until 1929 every year saw the balance between disputes won and disputes lost come to rest in labour's favour. (17) Official statistics on unions and their membership must as usual be treated with caution, but assuming the figures to be consistent in their inconsistency they indicate that over the decade as a whole, and on a countrywide basis, there was neither growth nor decline: in 1920 eighty-seven labour organisations were listed with a combined membership of 63,652, and nine years later one hundred and fourteen organisations with 62,366 members were listed. (18) Whereas union membership in the provinces was reportedly rising, however, the number of workers affiliated to Manila-based unions was correspondingly shown to fall, from 43,298 in 1921 to
34,453 in 1928.(19)

Using data gathered in 1925, which placed the membership total in Manila at 39,703, the Bureau of Labor compiled a breakdown of city-based unions by occupational categories. Almost half the overall membership was accounted for by the tobacco industry, with 17,000 in the Union de Tabaqueros de Filipinas and 1,829 in eight other unions. The second largest group were the seamen, with 10,756 members in six unions. Otherwise, there were only four trades in which the number of organised workers exceeded five hundred - 2,000 in the Union de Chauffeurs, 1,300 in two sawyers' unions, 1,008 in the Union de Impresores de Filipinas, and 911 in two slippermakers' unions.(20)

Reflecting the stagnation of manufacturing and the trading sector's relative vitality, the only sizeable new unions to be formed in Manila between 1922 and 1929, with the exception of a Union de Tabaqueros offshoot, were all for seafarers. Augmenting other marine unions formed previously, these were the International Union of Filipinos and Chinese Marine (which claimed a peak membership of 2,600), the semi-mutualist Kapatiran Magdaragat (Seamen's Brotherhood - 2,000) and the International Marine Union Inc.(800)

A substantial number of workers in non-unionised occupations or enterprises were linked to the labour movement through mutual benefit associations, whose Manila membership in 1928 was officially put at 13,883.(21) In total, the membership of city-based organisations that year was approximately 48,000, equivalent roughly to one in five of the workforce.(22) Organisationally, the country's labour societies were divided between "independents" and those affiliated with two federations, the Congreso Obrero de Filipinas (COF) and the much smaller Federacion del Trabajo de Filipinas (FTF). The following table, drawn from a report prepared by the COF secretary, gives at least a crude indication of the relative size and distribution of the three groups:-
Congreso Obrero de Filipinas

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Membership</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manila-based unions</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial unions</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutualist societies</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Federacion del Trabajo de Filipinas

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial unions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
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Independent unions

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</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This tabulation, which was based on 1926 data, must be treated with the same circumspection as the government's statistics, with which it regrettably cannot be equated.(23) Whereas the Bureau of Labor directory showed the Kapatiran Magdaragat as having 1,000 members in 1926, for example, that organisation is included above as a COF-affiliated mutualist society with no less than 15,000 members! Fifteen thousand members are also claimed for the National Confederation of Peasants (KPMP), which was then officially shown as having only 5,150. Mutualist societies not affiliated with the COF - which had some 30,000 members between them - are omitted altogether, and the membership total for independent Manila-based unions appears far too low. Even allowing for all these discrepancies, however, the Congreso Obrero was indisputably the labour movement's main focal point. Its affiliates included nearly all the largest unions - the huge Union de Tabaqueros, five sizeable seamen's organisations and the leading chauffeurs', printers' and slippermakers' unions - and the most solidly established smaller unions, notably the Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (460
members in 1926), the Union de Litografos de Filipinas (326) and the Union de Aserradores Mecanicos de Filipinas (300). And, unlike the rival Federacion, the Congreso had through its ties with the KPMP a link with the increasingly significant peasant movement.

The Congreso had since its formation in 1913 been so dominated by Nacionalista labourites that, despite its oft-avowed political neutrality, the organisation as such was generally regarded as being aligned with the government party. Minority politicos such as Vicente Sotto (an independent) and Joaquin Balmori (a Democrata) had withdrawn from the COF partly for this reason, and of course their secession had in itself further accentuated the Nacionalista ascendancy. Nevertheless a sprinkling of assorted oppositionists had always remained in the federation, and the Nacionalista ranks themselves had been regularly disarrayed by internecine factionalism. Ideological differences within the Congreso, meanwhile, had largely cut across these party and factional divisions, and in 1916 and 1919 self-professed radicals and socialists associated with the federation had stood for election to the Manila municipal board under a variety of banners.

The First Working Class Party

In the new decade the first fresh political initiative by a Congreso activist came in September 1922, when Antonino D. Ora founded the Partido Obrero. Ora, then in his mid-thirties, was already a well-known figure on the labour scene and had apparently served a year's term as Congreso president. His spacious home on P. Rada Street, Tondo, was used as a union meeting place and eventually became the COF's own headquarters. Ora was evidently a wealthy man, his assets being said to include real estate in the Manila districts of Quiapo, Sampaloc and San Miguel, a hacienda in Laguna and a transport business. He also held a well-paid supervisory position at Norton and Harrison, an American-owned furniture company. His involvement in obrerista circles - which he clearly entered more through choice than circumstance - dated back at least to 1916, when he was election campaign manager for the ephemeral, labour-oriented Grupo Rojo Nacionalista. Three years later he was on the stump again, on this occasion for Jose Turiano Santiago's equally short-lived Radical Party. At about the same time, presumably through his contact with furniture workers, Ora
became president of the Union de Aserradores Mecanicos, a position he held throughout the 1920s." Like so many labourites, he was also an ardent independista, and headed a small Tondo-based patriotic society called Ang Araw ng Bayani (The Day of the Hero).

Named as Partido Obrero secretary in 1922 was Lorenzo Manipulo, a publishing company book-keeper with no documented union connections; otherwise the party's original officers and members are unknown. The party's thirty aims, as printed in the Manila press, were individually unremarkable. Several had previously been embodied in resolutions passed at the COF's annual conventions, and at least three - an 8-hour day law, child labour legislation and the establishment of a national insurance scheme - had even been recommended to the Philippine legislature by the Islands' previous Governor General, the liberal Democrat Francis Burton Harrison. Collectively, however, the aims listed by the Partido Obrero constituted the most comprehensive programme of concrete reform measures that had yet been formulated. "The working masses... the solid element of the people", the party demanded, should be granted easier access to education, and special schools should be opened for agricultural and industrial training and for the disabled. More hospitals and dispensaries ought to be established, and asylums and orphanages opened with government funds. Labour barrios should be created to provide ordinary working families with cheap and decent housing. Existing rents, and food prices, needed regulation to prevent unjust increases, and a minimum wage should be fixed on the basis of the cost of living. In the countryside an aparceria law was required to protect tenants from landlord abuses, anti-usury legislation needed to be strengthened, and the government should make small farms available to the poor through the purchase and redistribution of big haciendas. A national language should be adopted in place of English and Spanish, and the poor and weak should be afforded the same respect and protection by the courts as were the strong and wealthy.

Despite the serious grievances implied by these demands, the Partido Obrero programme was presented with a marked lack of radical rhetoric. Whereas nearly all the proposals listed called for greater governmental intervention in national affairs, the political system itself was apparently to be left virtually unchanged. Following Lincoln rather than Marx, the party simply advocated "government of, for and by the people"; there was no call for direct worker and peasant
participation in government, and not even a demand for the suffrage to be extended. Nor was there any explicit criticism of the Nacionalista and Democrata parties, either with regard to social issues or to the struggle for independence.

Although it might be expected that the post-war recession would have provided a favourable climate for a party which advocated the protection and advancement of working class interests, the Partido Obrero had little immediate impact. It seems, indeed, to have practically disappeared from the public view for almost two years. This was probably in part because it was launched when the triennial flurry of election excitement had just subsided, and its debut was thus not opportunely timed to generate the maximum popular interest. But perhaps more important was the long-standing belief that the campaign for independence demanded national unity. This was one reason, it was suggested earlier, why a labour party had not been formed previously. Now such a party had been formed, and it must have hoped to win its first adherents primarily from amongst Manila's unions and kapisanan. In the months after the party's formation, however, the majority Nacionalista element in these societies was once again closing ranks behind its leaders for the sake of the national cause, this time seen to be under attack by the recently appointed Republican Governor General.

The Independence Question

During Woodrow Wilson's two terms (1913-1920) nationalist aspirations had been partially assuaged; Filipino participation in government had been considerably extended and independence itself had always seemed just over the horizon. In 1912 the Democratic platform had proposed independence should be granted "as soon as stable government can be established", and the following year Wilson had despatched Francis Burton Harrison to Manila as Governor General with a message hoping that this goal could be attained "as rapidly as the safety and permanent interests of the Islands will permit." The President's message also announced that "the native citizens" would immediately be granted "a majority in the appointive commission, and thus in the upper as well as the lower house of the legislature". Under the so-called Jones Act, passed by the US Congress in 1916, the
Democrat's election pledge on eventual independence became a formal declaration of intent and the Philippine Commission was abolished in favour of an elective, wholly Filipino, Senate. The lower chamber, the Philippine Assembly, was then restyled as the House of Representatives. In 1918, to improve co-operation between the executive and the legislature, a Council of State was created, composed of the Governor General, the Speaker of the House, the Senate President and the cabinet secretaries, with the Speaker in effect becoming prime minister. A Board of Control was established, likewise with a Filipino majority, to oversee the government's growing involvement in banking, utilities and economic development projects. In parallel with these developments, and against strong opposition from the "Manila Americans", Harrison expedited the Filipinisation of the civil service.

When the United States became involved in the World War the independence campaign was temporarily put on ice, but even before the armistice Filipino expectations were rekindled by Wilson's declared support for national self-determination. Early in 1919 Quezon led a 40-strong independence mission (in which Crisanto Evangelista represented Philippine labour) to Washington to put the case that the stable government called for under the Jones Act had now been established, and that independence could thus be granted at last. President Wilson, then in France, assuringly sent word to the missioners that independence was "an end almost in sight". By this time, however, the Republican Party had already regained control of the US Congress, and Wilson's authority was on the wane.

With the Republican victory in the 1920 elections the optimism that the Wilson years had fostered in nationalist circles was quashed, and Governor General Harrison's proclaimed "New Era" in the Islands was brought to a close. President Warren G. Harding's chosen successor to Harrison was Major-General Leonard Wood, a prickly law and order conservative and former US Army Chief of Staff. Wood had been defeated by Harding for the Republican presidential nomination, and was initially churlish about accepting the appointment, suspecting the president intended it as a convenient exile. At first, therefore, Wood agreed to go to the Philippines merely as chairman of a fact finding mission, assisted by W. Cameron Forbes, the Republican-appointed Governor General whom Harrison had replaced back in 1913. In autumn 1921, after a five month investigation, the Wood-Forbes mission submitted a report which
as anticipated severely criticised the previous regime. "Lack of competent supervision and inspection" and "too rapid transfer of control" (i.e. Filipinisation), it alleged, had resulted in "a deterioration of the quality of public service" and in politically inspired partiality. Legislation which had involved the government in banking and commerce was deemed "radical and unwise". By sanctioning the Council of State and Board of Control, the missioners believed, Harrison had allowed the executive powers granted the Governor General to be undermined, opening the prospect that the United States would be left in a position of "responsibility without authority". And for the future, the report concluded, "the present general status of the Philippine Islands (should) continue until the people have had time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their hands."(35) In keeping with Harding's promise that there would be no "backward step" in Philippine-American relations, this formulation did not in its letter conflict with the Jones Act, but the emphasis had clearly now changed.

Whilst still in the Islands, Leonard Wood finally agreed to accept the post of Governor General and in October 1921 he was duly inaugurated. Filipinisation, he realised, was irreversible, but otherwise his policies naturally reflected his mission's conclusions. He wanted the government to relinquish its newly-acquired holdings in banking and business; to encourage instead private American investment, for example by liberalising the land laws; and to make government more efficient and impartial. As a means to these ends, above all, he was resolved to re-assert executive authority. Cabinet secretaries, he affirmed, would be responsible to him, and he would not tolerate their considering themselves responsible to the legislature. Until the situation had been "cleaned-up", he told Quezon and Osmeña bluntly, talk of further autonomy was "folly".(36) Under these circumstances friction between the Governor General and the Nacionalista leaders was inevitable. Whether it was also inevitable that this friction would culminate in the head-on confrontation that eventually occurred in mid-1923 is more open to question, with historians differing over the extent to which Quezon provoked the crisis for his personal political ends.(37) Without entering this debate, it should be borne in mind in the current context that Nacionalista labourites would generally view events in the partisan manner that Quezon presented them.
The incident which precipitated the crisis was a dispute between Wood and Jose P. Laurel, the Secretary of the Interior, over the suspension of an American member of the Manila city police force, a matter whose very triviality was held to illustrate the extent of the Governor's unwelcome intervention in domestic administration. Alleging that Wood wanted to "control, even to the smallest details, the affairs of our government", the Filipino members of the cabinet and Council of State resigned en masse, joined by the appointed Mayor of Manila, Ramon Fernandez. Accepting the resignations, Wood emphatically denied the charges of excessive interference and in turn accused Quezon and his colleagues of hatching a deliberate, premeditated plot to usurp executive authority. Their action, he said, was "unnecessary, unwise and wholly uncalled for."(38)

From this point until Wood's sudden death in August 1927, relations between the Governor and the Nacionalista leaders were permanently strained, the tension episodically heightened by fresh irritants such as Wood's extensive use of his veto powers, his embargo on the legislature's "independence fund", his "cavalry cabinet" of military advisers and his abolition of the Board of Control.(39) It was in the immediate aftermath of the cabinet resignations, however, that popular excitement about the confrontation was most intense. Telegrams, letters and resolutions of support flooded into Quezon's office from all over the archipelago, and "freedom versus autocracy" provided the Nacionalistas with the issue they had wanted to engage the ascendant Democratas in an overdue senatorial by-election. The Nacionalista campaign, according to one account, "became a veritable carnival with bands, parades and huge rallies" at which Quezon and his fellow orators proclaimed that the Democratas were Wood's stooges and that only the Nacionalistas dare stand defiant.(40) Already predisposed to a contest fought on these patriotic grounds, many independistas in the Congreso Obrero had an added interest in the campaign because the chosen Nacionalista candidate was Ramon Fernandez, the recently resigned Mayor of Manila. A prominent businessman, newspaper proprietor and generous contributor to NP funds, Fernandez was known to several obreristas - printers, journalists and others - as an employer and benefactor to whom they owed a personal debt of gratitude.

Early in October 1923 the election was held and Fernandez won a comfortable victory over a strong Democrata candidate in a senatorial
district (comprising Manila, Bataan, Laguna and Rizal) that was regarded as Democrata territory. In a victory speech the Nacionalista Speaker of the House, Manuel Roxas, then appealed to Filipinos to unite to "overthrow the autocracy of Governor General Wood" and gain the "earliest possible independence". In November a mission led by Roxas sailed to the United States to petition the newly-installed President Coolidge for Wood's recall and to press once again the demand that independence be granted.

To labour radicals, therefore, the Nacionalista independence campaign appeared in late 1923 to have gained renewed vigour, and consequently their criticism over its conduct was muted. Independence seemed at this time to be both particularly desirable - because of Wood's alleged encroachment on the autonomy previously enjoyed under Harrison - and particularly remote, because the Republican administration in Washington had consistently declared its opposition to "hauling down the flag". The key question confronting fervent independistas was whether to retain their faith in the Nacionalista leadership and its legalistic, supplicatory approach to the struggle for freedom, or whether the time had come to consider more militant alternatives. In this context it is now possible to examine two developments on the labour front that occurred in mid-1924: the first contacts with the Comintern and the re-emergence of the Partido Obrero.

If decisions taken by the Communist International and the closely associated Red Trade Union International (Profintern) had been acted upon promptly, their first links with the Philippines would in fact have been forged a year or two earlier. In March 1922 the Comintern's Executive Committee had resolved that affiliated parties in countries with colonies should establish regular and practical contact with the "revolutionary organisations" in those colonies, an instruction which in relation to the Philippines accorded such responsibility to the Workers' Party of America. Seven months later the Second Congress of the Profintern had agreed that a meeting should be arranged to bring together transport workers from countries bordering the Pacific. So far as the Philippines was concerned these decisions were eventually implemented simultaneously, for the two initial visits to the Islands by Workers' Party emissaries were both associated with the Pacific Transport Workers' Conference, finally convened in the Chinese port of Canton in June 1924.
The first arrival in Manila, in April that year, was Harrison George, an ex-Wobbly who had just served five years in Leavenworth prison. George's main assignment was to invite the Philippine labour movement to send a small delegation to the Canton gathering. Armed with a letter of introduction from a Filipino diplomat in Washington and adopting the alias George H. Girunas, he presented himself to Director of Labor Hermenegildo Cruz as "a representative of American workers" and asked whether arrangements could be made for him to deliver his invitation without delay. Cruz obligingly agreed, and nine of the country's most prominent obreristas - including the COF and FTF presidents - were rounded up to meet "Girunas" in a government office the very next morning. All those present at this meeting reportedly welcomed the Canton initiative and offered their support in sponsoring a Filipino delegation.

Although the invitation arrived at short notice - which was obviously the reason for George's urgency - five delegates were able to make the trip: Domingo Ponce and Jose Hilario from the Legionarios del Trabajo, Jacinto Salazar from the International Marine Union, Eugenio Enorme from the Nuevo Gremio de Marinors Mercantes and Eliseo Alampay from the Gremio de Obreros Ferrocarril. These last three unions were presumably selected because they specifically represented transport workers; the Legionarios, which had no particular occupational base, was a labour fraternity known for its militant patriotism. The fraternity's Supreme Head, Domingo Ponce, was nominated as chairman of the Philippine contingent and was authorised to represent the two labour federations as well as his own organisation. Ponce, a government employee, had been at the forefront of the Congreso Obrero since its foundation, and had served three terms as the federation's president. Like many Congreso activists, he had regarded himself as a socialist for some years and yet at the same time was a staunch Nacionalista, personally close to both Ramon Fernandez and Manuel Quezon. Most probably his four fellow delegates were Nacionalistas also, and there is no indication that any had notably radical leanings. At least one went to China just for the ride.

The senior Comintern representative at the Canton Conference scarcely concealed his suspicion that Harrison George's mission had gathered a rather unpromising bunch. The delegates from the Philippines, he wrote, understood the united front principle "chiefly in the sense
of the 'moral' struggle against the imperialists, extending the united
front to all elements of the oppressed nationalities and ignoring the
social and class differences within these nationalities" - a verdict
which indeed fairly summarised mainstream obrerista opinion.(50) Neve­
theless the Filipinos did enter into the radical spirit of the occasion
sufficiently for the Comintern to commend the Workers' Party of
America for securing their attendance.(51) On the day when the
Philippine situation was discussed - Rizal's birth anniversary, Ponce
noted with pleasure - the delegates unanimously approved a resolution
on independence which called upon Filipino unionists "to strive for the
improvement and perfection of their organisations so that they could... 
advance their struggle for independence and their ambition that the
government of the Philippines should be completely in the hands of the
workers and peasants."(52) Most probably the Filipino contingent also
voiced no objection to the manifesto issued by the Conference, which
called for "organised struggles against world imperialism, against
native feudalists, militarists and capitalists who compromise with the
imperialists." Such struggles, the manifesto declared, necessitated
"the formation of militant people's parties in the colonies, consisting
of workers, peasants, intellectuals and non-propertied classes in the
cities."(53) Primarily a Profintern-sponsored gathering, the Conference
as such did not take any steps towards the formation of such parties,
but within its own trade union ambit resolved to establish a Red
Eastern Labor Secretariat, to be based in Canton with organisers and
affiliated seamen's clubs in the principal Asian ports.(54) Domingo
Ponce volunteered to be the Secretariat's representative in Manila.

After the Conference had finished the Filipino delegates remained
in China for a few days more, during which time they paid a call on the
Chinese nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen. According to an account of this
meeting by Alfred Wagenknecht, an American communist who accompanied
the five Filipinos, Dr. Sun surprised his visitors by asking them "How
large is your army?", implying he felt the peaceful Nacionalista-led
campaign for independence was doomed to failure. After the Filipinos
had "very forcefully" defended the existing strategy, Wagenknecht
related, the conversation ranged widely over

"(the) development of people's revolutionary parties in all
the colonies and semi-colonies of the Orient, their mass
composition and discipline, the need for an alliance
between such liberation parties so that all suppressed
peoples of the Far East might make common cause against
international imperialism, close co-operation with revolutionary workers' and peasants' parties of the occident, one mighty organisation of the proletariat of the world, all the oppressed in a victorious battle against the oppressors..."(55)

This is significant less in relation to the encounter with Sun Yat-sen per se than as an indication of the subjects which Wagenknecht believed were most crucial for his Filipino companions to consider. This in turn is significant because Wagenknecht himself visited the Philippines at around this time, and quite likely sailed to the Islands together with the returning Canton delegation.(56) Whether his visit was made under Comintern or Profintern auspices is not known, and nor is his precise assignment. Very probably it was to assist Domingo Ponce in establishing the Philippine section of the Red Eastern Labour Secretariat; conceivably it extended to examining whether conditions were yet ripe for a revolutionary people's party to be formed.(57)

Domingo Ponce later said that the Secretariat - which he called a "Bolshevik" Secretariat - had been launched at a meeting of labourers held in the Olympic Stadium, and it appears the proposed seamen's club was also set up, although no contemporary accounts of these bodies seem to have survived.(58) Both organisations, it can be assumed, proved ephemeral and had little impact. Interviewed in the 1960s, Ponce stated he had backed the Secretariat initiative because "I sincerely believed that the Americans would never grant independence unless we took very radical measures .... We were pro-Russian only to the extent that if America would not grant independence to the Philippines, Russia's help would be sought."(59) Nevertheless the Red Eastern Labour Secretariat's publication, Dawn, which was distributed to "a select few" in the Philippines by Ponce's Legionarios, did carry articles which re-iterated the radical stance of the Transport Workers' Conference, calling again for revolutionary people's parties to lead the struggle against "imperialism and the compromising native bourgeoisie".(60) It might be suspected, then that Ponce's later recollections were edited for the sake of respectability. But the same emphasis on the independence issue may be found in two brief memoirs he wrote nearer the time.(61) There is moreover no evidence that Ponce ever left the Nacionalista party. Very shortly after his return from Canton, indeed, he was seeking nomination as an NP candidate in the 1925 Manila board elections.(62) Despite his assistance in circulating Dawn, it therefore appears highly unlikely that he ever tried to implement the people's party proposal.
The Canton Conference thus made little lasting impression in the Philippines, and from the Comintern and Profintern viewpoint this was obviously disappointing. Yet the occasion had at least provided the opportunity to establish communications with the Islands through two channels - the Canton-based Secretariat and the Workers' Party of America. The Secretariat, like its Philippine section, proved short-lived, but the Workers' Party - which in 1929 changed its name to the Communist Party of the USA - was hereafter to remain in touch with Filipino radicals until the Pacific War and beyond.

Like the exhortations in Dawn, the new American contact did not bring any sudden ideological re-orientation in obrerista circles. In late July 1924 - possibly whilst Wagenknecht was in Manila - the Partido Obrero was re-activated, but manifestly not as the revolutionary people's party the Comintern wanted to see. The Partido's original formation in September 1922, as was noted earlier, had not been opportunistically timed, and the body had temporarily fallen from sight. So much so, in fact, that two years later its president, Antonino Ora, felt it necessary to launch the party all over again. This was reportedly done "with the approval of fifty delegates from various labor organisations in Manila and the surrounding provinces" gathered together at a meeting in Tondo, but unfortunately the identity of the delegates and organisations concerned is not recorded. Most likely the party's aims were not substantially different from those announced in 1922, though in the press they were simply described as being "to work for better legislation affecting the laboring classes and to have a part in the more important movements of the country". The mood of the inaugural gathering was clearly no more militant than these broad generalities implied. During the meeting, it was reported, a resolution was passed "expressing full confidence in the leaders of the country for their untiring efforts in fighting for the liberty of the Philippines."(63)

Less than four months later an episode occurred that cast serious doubt as to whether this faith was well-founded. In April 1924, to backtrack briefly, Quezon, Osmeña and the Democrata Claro M. Recto had left for Washington to reinforce the independence mission originally led by Speaker Roxas. (The Democrata Party had at this time heeded Nacionalista appeals for a display of unity.) Their visit coincided with a brief period when the US Congress again seemed favourably disposed to independence being granted. To forestall any "extreme"
legislative proposals, the Coolidge administration then signified its willingness to endorse a bill sponsored by Representative Fairfield of Indiana which provided for a twenty year "commonwealth" period to precede full independence. Whilst the bipartite NP-DP mission was discussing the Fairfield Bill in the US capital, nationalist opinion in the Islands came out strongly against accepting such a compromise measure. The twenty year transition period, it was argued, was far too long, and during this time the control still to be exercised by the United States - over foreign relations, defence and indebtedness - was far too great. Also objectionable were the proposed retention of English as the medium of instruction, and a provision for tariff relations that would perpetuate economic dependency. (64) What the Filipino public did not know was the attitude being taken by the independence mission, and it was in this state of ignorance that the Partido Obrero had extended the missioners its appreciation.

Realising the strength of opposition to the Fairfield Bill, Quezon and Osmena reported when they finally returned to Manila in November 1924 that, as mandated, they had pressed for "immediate, absolute and complete" independence or nothing. They had also emphatically demanded Governor Wood's recall. Recto, the lone Democrata missioner, then dropped a bombshell. The Nacionalista leaders, he disclosed, had in reality told Coolidge administration officials that if an assurance could be given that the Fairfield Bill would be approved they would work actively for its acceptance in the Philippines. Far from demanding Wood's replacement, moreover, they had expressed their willingness to resume co-operation with the Governor in the hope of gaining further autonomy. Although not present at the conversations where these pledges had been given, Recto had acquired documentary evidence which firmly corroborated his allegations, notably a "very confidential" briefing letter sent from Washington to Wood. Despite this damning evidence, Quezon and Osmena vehemently denied any double-dealing and through sheer party discipline and voting power they managed to get the legislature to endorse their version of events. (65) Nevertheless, Recto's revelations struck home hard; they made the headlines for days, even for months. (66) Another Democrata, Gregorio Perfecto, heightened the public indignation by disclosing that each missioner had received a $900 clothing allowance and an expense allowance (not including travel) of $90 per day for Quezon and Roxas and $45 per day for Recto and Osmena.
Altogether, the mission had spent $150,000 in six months. (67)

Turning Leftwards

For some militant independistas the Fairfield episode was a rude awakening, their confidence that the Nacionalista hierarchy was truly dedicated to "immediate, absolute and complete" independence had been irrevocably shattered. In discrediting the majority party, however, the Democratas brought no corresponding credit to themselves. Rightly or wrongly, the party had been considered "weak" on independence ever since leading Federalistas had been involved in its foundation, and more recently it had been seen as "close to Wood". Now the party's attacks on Quezon and his colleagues had focused on their deceitfulness and extravagance, not on their readiness to abandon the immediatist ideal. Indeed Recto himself admitted he thought the Fairfield Bill was the best measure that could then be obtained. (68) The practical choice facing uncompromising nationalists was thus either to forgive the country's leaders their lapse and trust there would be no similar transgressions in the future, or to renounce their Nacionalista allegiance and move away to the political fringe.

Disaffected Nacionalistas in Manila who chose the second option swelled the ranks of two parties, the Partido Obrero and the Partido Liberal. For the 1925 election campaign, which was just beginning when the Fairfield controversy was at its height, these two parties agreed to join forces and field a single slate of municipal board candidates. The Liberals presented themselves as independista intransigents in the traditional mould, "impelled by the national sentiment that inspired the Heroes and Martyrs of the past". The Nacionalistas' "scarcely edifying" stance on the Fairfield Bill, charged the Liberal manifesto, revealed they had become bankrupt in spirit, more interested in their own power and privilege than the national cause. Also disturbing was the protection being afforded by the majority party to clerical interests who were still using the pulpit and classroom to undermine the people's desire to be free. (69) This nineteenth century tinge in the Partido Liberal's appeals was neither accident nor affectation, for a number of the party's officers had begun their political lives in the pre-revolutionary masonic lodges or the Katipunan. (70) Yet the party's manifesto also voiced a more contemporary concern - "imperialist
commercial expansion". Under the pretext of fostering economic development, the Liberals stated, foreign capital was striving to appropriate the Islands' natural riches for itself, and in order to protect these spoils it would eternally oppose independence being granted.(71)

Aside from a shared anti-imperialism, the Obrero-Liberal alliance of 1925 was rooted in a common intimate involvement in Manila's unions and kapisanan. Prudencio Remigio, for example, the Liberals' sole congressional candidate, had been a delegate to the first Congreso Obrero convention, and had subsequently headed the small but firmly established Union de Litografos. Jose Turiano Santiago, a Liberal municipal board candidate, was another founder member of the COF and had earlier inherited the old Union Obrera presidency from Dominador Gomez. As noted before, Santiago and Partido Obrero president Antonino Ora had in addition a previous political association, in the unsuccessful Radical Party campaign of 1919.

That campaign had also censured the Nacionalista leaders for pursuing the struggle for independence with insufficient resolve. Where the Obrero-Liberal challenge broke new ground was in combining orthodox nationalist belligerency with appeals directed specifically to the Filipino working class. The majority party now stood accused not only of compromising with American imperialism, but also of direct complicity in perpetuating social injustice, of "always siding with capital" and ultimately killing any legislation designed to improve labour conditions.(72) The specific demands raised in the Partido Obrero's original 1922 platform were now re-iterated and elaborated into a thoroughgoing critique of the Philippine status quo. Whereas the 1922 platform implied reform was possible within existing frameworks, the Obrero-Liberal campaigners were arguing in 1925 that both government and society had to be radically transformed.

Such labour legislation as had reached the statute books, they contended, was rarely enforced because the courts considered it as "clasista", contrary to the principle that the worker-employer relationship was solely a matter for free agreement between the individuals concerned. Legislation which protected capital, on the other hand, was defended as being in the national interest. Ordinary Filipinos who fell victim to this biased conception of justice found the odds stacked heavily against them. The language of the law and courts, in the first place, was English or Spanish, not their own. Partly for this reason,
and partly because of the mystifying intricacies of the judicial process, their education was inadequate for them to present their case without expensive legal assistance, and this they could not afford. Even if they could, the alignment of judges with the elite made it unlikely that they would receive a fair hearing. Whilst better, more accessible education and the official use of native languages might bring a slight improvement, therefore, the ultimate solution lay in "removing bourgeois judges" and placing the courts in the hands of the people. So long as the nation remained so deeply divided between rich and poor, between the educated and ignorant, the Obrero-Liberals likewise argued, a truly democratic government would be just a distant dream. In the bureaucracy as in the courts, the compulsory use of English or Spanish was a device for sustaining domination by the privileged minority and for camouflaging dishonesty and injustice. Like the judges, the country's leaders heeded only the elite. More and more, the government was becoming "imperialist, capitalist (and) autocratic." Neither the Nacionalistas nor the Democratas offered any hope; the only way forward was for Filipino toilers to free themselves from their lowly and subordinate position and establish a government of their own.(73)

Although the Obrero-Liberal candidates were all defeated by a wide margin, some at least probably fared better than they expected. Prudencio Remigio, running for the Manila South seat in the House of Representatives, gained thirteen per cent of the total poll, and Jose Turiano Santiago, the leading Obrero-Liberal in the municipal board contest, won the support of one city voter in six.(74) Considering that the Partido Obrero was making its debut in the electoral fray, that less than a year previously both it and the Partido Liberal had been virtually inactive, that many potential supporters remained disenfranchised, and that there were no labour newspapers in Manila to back the campaign, this was not a discreditable performance.(75)

More significantly in the long run, the 1925 campaign attracted to the Partido Obrero a handful of important labourite recruits, most notably Crisanto Evangelista and Jacinto Manahan. Evangelista, the Union de Impresores president, reportedly joined after failing to gain a place on the Nacionalista slate of municipal board candidates, the final straw in a burden of disenchantment that had been growing over many years. Jacinto Manahan, it seems, was disillusioned by the
Fairfield episode and resentful that the support given to the Nacionalista Party by the peasants' confederation which he headed—the KPMP—had brought no dividends in terms of agrarian reforms. The Partido Obrero, he hoped, would "call a halt on the business of the political leaders who apparently find pleasure in using the labouring class as an instrument to serve their own interests." (76) As UIF and KPMP presidents, Evangelista and Manahan headed what were respectively considered to be the most solidly organised worker and peasant unions in the country, and both had for some years been leading figures in the COF. The Partido Obrero could scarcely have hoped for two more valuable converts.

When the Partido Liberal faded from view again shortly after the 1925 elections, never to re-appear, the Partido Obrero received a further influx of fresh blood, a number of ex-Liberals deciding to join their former coalition partner. Greatly invigorated by its new adherents, the Partido Obrero now had a real prospect of becoming a meaningful political force. In late July 1925 the party confidently announced that it was re-organising its Manila committees and would shortly begin forming branches in the surrounding provinces. Already several recent recruits had been assigned key positions. Evangelista was named as party secretary and effectively became Ora's principal deputy. Manahan was designated organiser for his home province of Bulacan, where rural unionism had originated, and also given overall responsibility for the party's development in Manila. Two other KPMP leaders, Catalino Cruz and Julian de Castro, were respectively assigned as organisers in Rizal and Cavite, both provinces where their confederation had widespread support. Cirilo Bognot, a newspaperman and COF activist who like Evangelista had joined the party after failing to gain a place on the NP ticket, was given assignments in North Manila and in his native Pampanga. (77)

When announcing its new officers and organisational plans the Partido Obrero also declared it was preparing a statement "giving its labour and political views", and some three months later this was duly published. Signed on behalf of the party's Executive Council by Ora and Evangelista and dated November 30, 1925—Bonifacio Day—the manifesto reflected a desire, as Cirilo Bognot later delicately put it, to make the party platform "more in consonance with the trend of events in Europe at that time." (78) Continuing on the leftward course that was
already evident during the election campaign, put more plainly, the Partido Obrero was now augmenting its attack on the status quo with ideas derived more or less directly from the Comintern.

One immediately noticeable element in the Bonifacio Day manifesto, hitherto almost completely absent in Philippine radicalism, was an internationalist perspective. The toiling masses in the Philippines, the party declared, had witnessed how the capitalist class had dragged humanity "into a world massacre under the cloak of so-called democracy and the principle of self-determination for small peoples ... how this bloody and criminal World War was launched by and profited a greedy few ... how these social parasites made the downtrodden masses shoulder the heavy burden of this World War .... And yet, having effected such plunder and still not satisfied their insatiable greed, these same imperialists, realising the necessity of strengthening their commercial and military outposts in the Orient, are striving to make America, Japan, Great Britain, France etc. ready for the next war in the Pacific, another world massacre ... which means the death blow to every independence movement ...."(79)

By clear implication, if not unequivocally, the manifesto suggested that in the Philippines the Nacionalista and Democrata hierarchies had become the imperialists' allies. Their tactics in the fight for emancipation, it alleged, had merely been "shameful manoeuvres, staged solely to capture public sympathy and to conceal their utter failure." Their passivity had proved they could never lead the nation to freedom. Unless the people resorted to "mass action" the government would "always remain as at present trusted into the hands of the privileged few, under the influence of the capitalist class and under the yoke of imperialism and its tools." "On these facts", the preamble to the manifesto concluded, the Partido Obrero had been created,

"a party of those who work and produce for the upliftment of human kind .... It is not a party of social parasites .... It urges the workers - those who work with brawn and brain - to take economic and political powers away from the capitalist class, and to abolish all class divisions and class rule."(80)

At a theoretical level the demise of capitalism had been debated by Filipino radicals ever since socialist literature had become available in the early 1900s, but never before had the system's overthrow been advocated in a political programme. Having so unambiguously
stated its ultimate goal, the Partido Obrero set forth its main "immediate demands", which were also much wider in scope than hitherto. Alongside many familiar appeals - immediate independence, a national language, free education, judicial, financial and agrarian reforms - the party now introduced calls for the nationalisation of all lands and the redistribution of haciendas on lease to poor peasants and tenants; for the nationalisation of banks and the major transportation companies; and for the government-directed electrification of agriculture and establishment of new industries. The existing bicameral legislature, charged the manifesto, allowed the imperialists to maintain their supremacy by playing one chamber off against the other. Under existing constitutional and electoral arrangements, in any event, only the "bourgeoisie ... or its tools" could become legislators. In place of this "class political system" a unicameral People's Assembly should be created, its members to be elected by all men and women over 18 years old. As the courts had become an "instrument of the bourgeoisie", so there was a danger that "in time of conflict between the ruling class and the people" the bourgeois-officered "imperialistic army" would be used against the masses, and therefore a "People's Army" should be formed in its stead, with officers elected by the soldiers. (81)

Why should the Partido Obrero have adopted a more revolutionary stance and incorporated these additional demands in its platform at this particular time, between June and November 1925? The economy was in neither crisis nor boom, wages and prices were both fairly stable, and industrial unrest was relatively muted. Politically, the year's only major event had been the June elections. Whilst not a disaster for the party, these had provided another reminder of how firmly the "bourgeois" parties were entrenched and of the obstacles the existing system presented for a working class based opposition, and to this extent could well have inclined the party's leadership to a more militant posture. There is no doubt, however, that in its precise form the revised programme set out in the Bonifacio Day manifesto reflected not so much a new radicalising experience on the home front as some fresh guidance from overseas.

Just possibly, the animating spirit behind the innovations in the party programme could have been the controversial Indonesian communist, Tan Malaka. By his own account Malaka had been appointed the Comintern's principal representative in South East Asia in mid-1923. The
following year he was put in charge of the Profintern-sponsored Red Eastern Labour Secretariat, which we noted was set up following the Pacific Transport Workers' Conference, and for some months thereafter he remained in Canton attempting to breathe life into the Secretariat's branches and to publish its journal, Dawn. This had not proved a happy experience. Unaccustomed to the food and climate, beset by language problems, plagued by ill-health and without any full-time assistants, Malaka had been unable to operate effectively; partly for this reason, perhaps, the Secretariat's national sections, like that in the Philippines, had failed to prosper. In these trying circumstances Malaka decided in mid-1925 to abandon his Canton assignment and journey south. Over the next two years he travelled widely in South East Asia and on at least three occasions he stayed in the Philippines, visits which may be approximately dated as being from July to September 1925, from January to May 1926, and in August 1927.

The details of the final visit are relatively well-known, for on this occasion Malaka was arrested two days after his arrival and charged with entering the country illegally in 1925 - the intelligence services apparently being unaware of his comings and goings in the intervening period. As a "refugee from Dutch imperialism" he then briefly became a cause célèbre, with several prominent lawyers, educators, journalists and Nacionalista politicians campaigning vigorously to prevent his deportation. Probably these "respectable" sympathisers - many of whom claimed the Indonesian as a personal friend - sincerely believed that Malaka was first and foremost a militant nationalist. This was how he described himself when fighting deportation and also no doubt how he had generally presented himself when previously circulating in Manila society. Nevertheless, the Constabulary insisted that Malaka was a "Bolshevik agent" whose travels in the Philippines had been for "Bolshevik purposes". Apparently accepting this version, the Acting Governor General remained impervious to the protest campaign and eleven days after his arrest Malaka was placed on a boat to Amoy.

Although some press stories at the time referred to Malaka's editorship of Dawn and his deep involvement with the communist party in his own country, the authorities did not make public any hard evidence to support their charge that he had spread subversion within the Islands themselves. Their only specific allegation to this effect - that he had been inciting unrest among sugar cane workers in Negros -
has the clear ring of an intelligence agent's fantasy. How much the authorities knew about Malaka's contacts with labour circles in Manila, and whether they regarded these liaisons as dangerous, are still unanswered questions. Had the investigation been politically acute, one might speculate, it would have followed two main lines of enquiry: first, the extent to which Malaka had renewed his acquaintance with the delegates to the 1924 Canton Conference and, secondly, his connections with the most conspicuous obrerista radicals, namely the leaders of the Partido Obrero. In both cases it is evident that the investigators could have established good cause for suspicion.

Domingo Ponce, the designated Manila representative of the Red Eastern Labour Secretariat, stated in 1954 that it was he who had invited Malaka to come to the Philippines. Antonio Paguia, a Nacionalista lawyer who was one of Ponce's leading lieutenants in the Legionarios del Trabajo, later described how, when Malaka and other Indonesian "revolutionaries" arrived in Manila without residence certificates, he arranged for them to be issued with the necessary papers in the names of labourers who had recently died. After Malaka's arrest in 1927 it was again the Legionarios that began organising a mass demonstration to demand that he be granted asylum and, when Malaka was forced to leave, Domingo Ponce was one of five close friends photographed making their shipboard farewells. As regards the Partido Obrero, Cirilo Bognot testified under oath in 1948 that he and other party leaders had at one stage helped Malaka hide from the authorities, first in Antonino Ora's house and later in the home, also in Tondo, of Jose Turiano Santiago. Party secretary Crisanto Evangelista was another of those pictured bidding the deportee a safe voyage. It appears, moreover, that Partido Obrero leaders were already in contact with Malaka during his 1925 visit, because in September that year Malaka wrote to an Indonesian comrade enclosing a "photo of brother Manahan ... and the agricultural labourers", a memento he was unlikely to have obtained without having met the Filipino peasant leader in person.

In addition to Malaka being in the right place at the right time to have assisted in revising the Partido Obrero programme, the November 1925 manifesto contains internal evidence which could be construed as suggesting an Indonesian connection. For many of the manifesto's "immediate demands" were virtually identical to points included in a model programme which was recommended to the Communist Party of
Indonesia (PKI) following the Fifth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), held in Moscow in March-April 1925. (92)

Certain demands common to the two programmes - independence, land redistribution, an 8-hour day, better educational provision, a national language, had of course been raised before, but five other objectives contained in the ECCI model were now incorporated in the Partido Obrero platform for the first time. Three of these - universal suffrage (a surprising omission from the 1922 programme), a minimum wage law and tax reform - could possibly have appeared in both documents by coincidence. More strikingly, the two programmes both called for a "People's Assembly" and for the disbandment of the existing army. Neither objective had previously been articulated by Filipino radicals in any form. On the military question, moreover, the Partido Obrero manifesto is worded rather oddly. Like the ECCI model it calls for the existing army's "withdrawal", a logical term to use in the Indonesian context where Dutch troops were involved, but less so in the Philippines where the US Army's Philippine Scouts Division was officered mainly by Filipinos. The agency called upon to deal with worker and peasant unrest in the Islands was in any case not the army but the Constabulary, and this force, strangely, receives no mention in the manifesto.

The similarities between the ECCI's suggested programme for the PKI and the Bonifacio Day manifesto, of course, only indicate that Tan Malaka might have been the connecting link, they by no means prove the case. Malaka's own memoirs, scarcely modest in tone, provide a kind of negative evidence to the contrary, for they make no such claims. A stronger reason to doubt that Malaka acted as a Comintern courier in this instance is that the International, as mentioned before, had already assigned prime responsibility for fostering contacts with the Philippines to the Workers' Party of America. The ECCI reminded American communists of this duty at the same March-April 1925 Plenum which discussed the PKI's future programme, calling upon them "to assist most actively the national-revolutionary movements" in all US colonies and semi-colonies and, in the Philippines specifically, "to consolidate the revolutionary trade union movement" and to help establish a Communist Party. (93) The Workers' Party was represented on the ECCI and it was in fact an American who reported to the Plenum on
proposed tactics in Indonesia. (94) The Plenum having endorsed the
demands compiled for the PKI, it seems likely that the Workers' Party
similarly decided to commend the model - perhaps slightly amended -
to the Partido Obrero.

Whoever was responsible for transmitting the suggested programme
changes, the Partido Obrero's obvious willingness to accept the guidance
offered marks the Bonifacio Day manifesto as a major milestone. Hence-
forwards until the Pacific War the policies and appeals of the principal
left-wing organisations in the Philippines would be formulated with
regard not only to domestic circumstances and concerns but also to the
world situation as interpreted by the Communist International. More
immediately, the Comintern's wish to see a Communist Party established
in the Philippines was now shared by the key figures in the Partido
Obrero leadership. It was recognised, however, that it would be ill-
advised to take this step overnight. Even in obrerista circles the
principles of class consciousness and class struggle still had to con­
tend with the entrenched belief in "labour-capital harmony", and the
dominant image of communism, filtered through the American news media
and the Church, remained unreservedly negative. Before a Communist
Party could be launched effectively, it was concluded, the positive
features of communism had to be gradually, patiently explained and the
labour and peasant movements had to be invigorated and redirected. The
next five years would be devoted to these preparatory tasks.
Notes to Chapter Three

(1) For a useful overview of the Philippine economy during the American period see Vicente B. Valdepeñas Jr. and Gemelino M. Bautista The Emergence of the Philippine Economy Papyrus Press, Manila 1977 Chapter V "The American Economic Colonisation"

(2) Zoilo M. Galang (ed.) Encyclopaedia of the Philippines vol.V Exequiel Floro, Manila 1951 p.323

(3) Philippine Islands, Department of Commerce and Communications, Bureau of Commerce and Industry Statistical Bulletin 1924 Bureau of Printing, Manila 1925 p.122; and Statistical Bulletin 1928 Bureau of Printing, Manila 1929 p.189


(5) "Memorandum to General Wood from the President of the American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippine Islands" dated October 24, 1921 quoted in Jack C. Lane Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood Presidio Press, San Rafael, Calif. 1978 p.264


(7) Statistical Bulletin 1924, as cited p.52; Statistical Bulletin 1928, as cited p.83; Harrington (1926) op.cit. p.10; Harrington (1930) op.cit. p.15

(8) Harrington (1930) op.cit. p.15

(9) The contemporary estimate of Manila's population in 1928, based on a projection of the growth rate between the 1903 and 1918 censuses, was only around 363,000. This was revised to 415,000 following the 1939 census, which revealed a marked acceleration in the city's growth rate. Precisely when this acceleration occurred cannot be determined, but almost certainly the war-induced boom would have resulted in particularly rapid growth in 1919 and 1920; the later, higher estimate for the capital's 1928 population is thus probably closer to the truth. Philippine Islands, Department of Commerce and Communications, Bureau of Commerce and Industry Statistical Bulletin 1929 Bureau of Printing, Manila 1930 p.4; Commonwealth of the Philippines, Office of the President, Bureau of the Census and Statistics Yearbook of Philippine Statistics 1940 Bureau of Printing, Manila 1941 pp.8-12
(10) The ratio between the working and total populations pertaining in 1903 is used as a basis for calculation in this instance because the 1918 census deemed the working population to consist of all Manileños over the age of ten, and thus gave an unrealistically high ratio of 3:4. Those not in "gainful" employment - including eighty-four people over the age of 101 - were apparently regarded as being engaged in "personal and domestic service".

 Philippine Islands, Census Office, Census of the Philippine Islands 1918, vol. II, Bureau of Printing, Manila, 1921, p. 75

(11) Wage statistics were published annually in the Statistical Bulletin; see also Philippine Islands, Department of Commerce and Communications, Bureau of Labor, Labor Conditions in the Philippines, Bureau of Printing, Manila, 1927, pp. 56-67

(12) Manila Times, August 15, 1926; September 3, 1926; and September 5, 1926; see also "Labour in the Philippines", The Pan Pacific Worker, vol. I, no. 3, August 1, 1927, pp. 11-12

(13) Aurelio Intertas, "Ilang Mahahalagang Bahagi sa Kasaysayan ng 'Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas'" ("Some Important Episodes in the History of the UOEF"), Taliba, April 30, 1932

(14) The average yearly retail prices of the principal foodstuffs on sale in Manila markets for each year between 1918 and 1930 are tabulated in Philippine Islands, Department of Commerce and Communications, Bureau of Labor, "Twenty-second Annual Report (1930)" Typescript, pp. 195-7 (Library of Congress); see also Labor Conditions in the Philippines, pp. 92-93

(15) Statistical Bulletin 1928, p. 173; Philippine Islands, Department of Commerce and Communications, Bureau of Labor, Activities of the Bureau of Labor by Hermenegildo Cruz, Bureau of Printing, Manila, 1930, p. 145

These two sources differ with regard to the yearly average wholesale prices for rice in 1927 and 1928. Cruz lists these as P 9.75 and P 9.25 respectively, the Statistical Bulletin as P 7.56 and P 7.86. The latter prices, however, are much more consistent with the retail prices listed in the tabulation referred to in the previous footnote.

(16) Statistical Bulletin 1924, as cited, p. 108

(17) Yearbook of Philippine Statistics 1940, as cited, p. 122


The Bureau of Labor's statistics on unions, as mentioned before, were compiled from returns filled in by union presidents and secretaries, and thus depended largely on the diligence and integrity of these officials in forwarding regular and accurate information. It is likely that some officials exaggerated their memberships to try and boost their influence, but others apparently failed, either sometimes or always, to make any return at all, and their organisations were thus omitted from the annual listings altogether. To some degree these two shortcomings
(18) compensated for one another, but on balance the omissions probably exceeded the paddings, and the Bureau of Labor's figures were therefore too low. In the years between 1920 and 1929 the officially recorded union membership varied between 61,000 and 71,000 except in 1924 and 1925, when respective totals of 89,826 and 83,544 were registered. These latter totals, however, were inflated by one or two unions submitting membership returns which were more than normally ambitious. One culprit was the National Confederation of Peasants (KPMP), headed by Jacinto Manahan. In 1924 the KPMP reported it had 20,150 members, but by 1926 the number claimed had fallen abruptly to 5,150. In the absence of any evident crisis within the confederation during these years, this sudden change might be attributed to a stricter definition of "membership" being adopted, so that only dues-paying unionists were included in the return rather than all followers. Philippine Islands, Department of Commerce and Communications, Bureau of Labor "Sixteenth Annual Report (1924)" Typescript p.170 (Bureau of Labor, Manila); Labor Conditions in the Philippines, as cited p.76

(19) Quarterly Labor Bulletin vol.IV no.11 March, 1922 p.3; Activities of the Bureau of Labor, as cited, p.153

(20) Labor Conditions in the Philippines, as cited pp.73-74

(21) Activities of the Bureau of Labor, as cited p.152

(22) Although the National Confederation of Peasants actually had its headquarters in Manila it was understandably regarded as a "provincial" union for the purposes of official statistics. A significant minority of the seafaring unionists probably maintained their homes in the Visayas, but this group aside the members of the other Manila-based organisations almost all lived either in the capital itself or in the towns within its immediate orbit.

Minor changes have been made to the tabulation given in Evangelista's article in order to make the data mathematically consistent.

The Federacion del Trabajo de Filipinas was founded by Joaquin Balmori in 1917 as the successor to the Asamblea Obrera, a group he and others had formed as a breakaway from the Congreso Obrero in 1915. Balmori was a somewhat exceptional figure in labour circles, a devoutly Catholic, culturally Hispanophile ilustrado who between 1909 and 1912 had represented the fourth district of Pangasinan in the Philippine Assembly. Though his breakaway was primarily an opposition party protest against Nacionalista dominance and bias within the COF, it was also his intention to construct a trade union centre that was more uniformly conservative than the Congreso. The FT above had as its emblem two hands representing "Labour" and "Capital" clasped in fraternity, and its annual May Day celebrations were highlighted by a sumptuous banquet at which guest orators personifying "Labour" and "Capital" would stress their mutual
interdependence and goodwill. Its core formed by company
unions at such leading Spanish-owned enterprises as the
Soriano brewery, the Ayala distillery and the Ynchausti ship­
ping company, the FTF survived as a rare constant on the
changing labour scene until its founder's death just prior to
the Pacific War.

Ora's name is included in a list of past presidents of the
Congreso compiled in 1931, but unfortunately this list does
not indicate the years in which each president served.
(Elections were held at the annual convention, which normally
took place immediately after the May Day celebrations.) It
seems most likely that Ora's term was around 1917-18, but
possibly it was not until 1922-23.
"Lista de Lideres Obrero" (compiled by Domingo Ponce in 1931 at
the request of Senate President Quezon) (Quezon Papers Box 143)

Domingo Ponce "Las actividades 'rojas' en Filipinas" (a
"strictly personal and confidential" memorandum to Senate
President Quezon, dated January 21, 1929) (Quezon Papers
Box 143); Rosenstock's Manila Directory 1921 Yangco,
Rosenstock and Co., Manila 1921 p.933

"Boletin Electoral del Grupo Rojo Nacionalista" Handbill c.1916
(Jose Turiano Santiago Papers)

Radical Party "Proclamation - Programme" Handbill in English,
Spanish and Tagalog, c.June 1919 (Jose Turiano Santiago Papers)

The Union de Aserradores Mecanicos was founded in 1918. That
year the Bureau of Labor listed its president as A. D. Datto,
but the union headquarters was already located at Ora's home
in P. Rada street.
Philippine Islands, Department of Commerce and Communications,
Bureau of Labor "Tenth Annual Report (1919)" Typescript p.42
/Library of Congress

The Independent vol.X no.464 February 23, 1924 p.9

Rosenstock's Manila Directory 1921, as cited p.896

United States, Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
Monthly Labor Review vol.XII no.5 May 1921 p.179

Manila Times September 7, 1922

Peter W. Stanley A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and
the United States 1899-1921 Cambridge, Mass. 1974 p.179; Cornejo's Commonwealth Directory of the
Philippines 1939 Encyclopaedic edition Miguel R. Cornejo,
Manila 1939 p.166

Teodoro A. Agoncillo and Milagros C. Guerrero History of the
Filipino People R. P. Garcia Publishing Co., Quezon City 1977
p.371

W. Cameron Forbes The Philippine Islands vol.II Houghton
Mifflin Co., Boston and New York 1928 pp.520-44

(37) Michael Onorato, who has done the most detailed research on this episode, asserts flatly that "The cabinet crisis was not the result of any usurpation of the Jones Act by Wood; neither was it the outcome of any dislike or distrust of him by Filipino leadership; nor was it the end-product of any temperamental action on his part. The cabinet affair was caused by the political exigencies of the moment."
Michael Onorato "Manuel L. Quezon, Governor General Leonard Wood and the Cabinet Crisis of July 17, 1923" in A Brief Review of American Interest in Philippine Development and Other Essays MCS Enterprises, Manila 1972 p.82; see also Onorato's Leonard Wood as Governor General: A Calendar of Selected Correspondence MCS Enterprises, Manila 1969

(38) Hagedorn op.cit. pp.433-34

(39) Aside from the studies by Hagedorn and Onorato, the Wood administration is described from various viewpoints in Lane op.cit. pp.257-67; Garett A. Quinlivan and William E. Livsey The Philippines and the United States University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 1951 pp.162-83; Vicente Albano Pacis President Sergio Osmeña vol.I Philippine Constitution Association et al., Quezon City 1971 pp.320-55; Carlos Quiño Quezon: Paladin of Philippine Freedom Filipiniana Book Guild, Manila 1971 pp.154-188

(40) Onorato "Manuel L. Quezon", as cited p.81

(41) Ibid.

In January 1924 the Roxas-led mission presented a memorial to President Coolidge and to the US Congress stating that "The freedom and happiness of the Filipino people to which the honor of America and the patriotism of the Filipinos are equally committed are too sacred to be the plaything of one-man power. A reactionary and militaristic rule is a flagrant violation of the time-honored policy of the American government towards the Philippines."
Zoilo Galang (ed.) Encyclopaedia of the Philippines vol.XI Exequiel Floro, Manila 1953 p.549

(43) Charles B. McLane Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1966 p.29


Richmond met Harrison George when the two were working together on a communist newspaper called the Western Worker around 1937, and recalls his former colleague with affection -
"He was ... one of the 165 (Wobblies), among them Bill Haywood and other major figures of the IWW, who were tried under the World War I Espionage Act before Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis in 1918. I remembered a line in John Reed's account of the Chicago trial - 'There goes ... Harrison George, whose forehead is lined with hard thinking.' He was the author of 'Red Dawn', the first American pamphlet on the Russian Revolution, written in jail and published under the IWW imprint in February 1918, on the eve of the Chicago trial.... Harrison turned out to be a perky, somewhat eccentric fellow.... In a description of him at the time I noted 'His face is weatherbeaten and his complexion looks like the side of an old barn which has undergone many coats of paint.' In harmony with his facial hide were the strong traces in his speech of his native Kansas prairie, a corncob pipe, his taste in clothes (which may have dated back to his youthful vocation of tailor in Cody, Wyoming) - he could easily have been taken for a Kansas farmer.... He had several eccentricities, or so they seemed to me, such as a zeal for health food and colonic irrigation.... Other staff members (of the Western Worker) detected in a grievous fall from dietetic grace, such as eating hamburger or pie, were in for a lecture."

Domingo Ponce "Ang Suliraning Manggagawa sa Harap ng Iba't Ibang Bansa" ("The Workers' Plight Brought to the Attention of Other Countries") Pagkakaisa May 1, 1929
A photograph of the meeting shows "Girunas" flanked by Jose C. Hilario, Potenciano Salita, Eliseo Alampay, Jacinto Manahan, Pedro Decena, Domingo Ponce, Francisco Varona, Joaquin Balmori and Crisanto Evangelista.
Director of Labor Cruz reportedly told the press - and perhaps had himself been led to believe - that the labour conference was to be held in Canton, Ohio! Manila Times April 16, 1924

Ponce "Ang Suliraning Manggagawa", as cited.

In 1919 Ponce had been a publishing clerk in the Bureau of Labor, but by 1924 he had been promoted to the position of "Executive Secretary" to the Commission for Independence, which was how the Senate and House of Representatives styled themselves when acting jointly on the independence question. The Independent, a weekly which attacked Ponce for running the Legionarios as a personal racket, characterised this post as "P 250 (per month) from the Senate for doing nothing."

Araneta op.cit. p.125
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(50) G. Voitinsky "First Conference of Transport Workers of the Pacific" International Press Correspondence vol.4 no.65 September 11, 1924 p.705
(52) Ponce "Ang Suliraning Manggagawa", as cited
(53) Voitinsky loc.cit.
(54) McVey op.cit. p.208
(55) Alfred Wagenknecht "A Visit with Sun Yat Sen" Workers' Monthly vol.IV no.2 December 1924 p.55
(56) The Fourth National Convention..., as cited p.19 Formerly state secretary of the Socialist Party in Ohio, Wagenknecht ranked above Harrison George in the Workers' Party, being elected to the Central Executive Committee at both the Second (December 1922) and Fourth (August 1925) Party Conventions. Described as an "unreconstructed Left-Winger" and as "competent, businesslike and cheerful", he later headed Workers' International Relief, the US labour defence organisation. Theodore Draper The Roots of American Communism The Viking Press, New York 1957 pp.158;457; Vera Buch Weisbord A Radical Life Indiana University Press, Bloomington and London 1977 pp.211;284
(57) According to the Manila Times, the Executive Committee of the Workers' Party of America described the party it wished to see established in the Philippines not as a "revolutionary people's party" but as a "Farmer-Labor Party". This idea presumably originated in the WPA's own campaign to establish a mass party of this type in the United States, a campaign which ironically had just suffered a virtual collapse. At the same time the Executive Committee reportedly urged that Filipino members of the WPA should be organised into a Filipino Communist League as a preliminary to the organisation of a communist league in the Islands. In neither connection, apparently, was any reference made to the Partido Obrero. Manila Times August 7, 1924; Recent History of the Labor Movement in the United States 1918-39 Progress Publishers, Moscow 1977 pp.105-18
(58) Araneta op.cit. pp.124-25; McVey op.cit. p.217
(59) Araneta loc.cit.
(60) Quoted in "Tan Malacca, alias Hassan, Exposed" Philippines Free Press August 27, 1927
(61) Ponce "Las actividades 'rojas' en Filipinas", as cited; and idem "Ang Suliraning Manggagawa", as cited
"Interview with Antonio D. Paguia, May 23, 1954" Typescript n.pp. (Institute of Social Order, Manila) Although unsigned, it is evident from the date of this interview that it was conducted by Renze L. Hoeksema in the course of research for his "Communism in the Philippines: A Historical and Analytical Study of Communism and the Communist Party in the Philippines and its Relation to Communist Movements Abroad" Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University 1956.

Manila Times July 29, 1924


Onorato "Independence Rejected", as cited pp.93-95; Pacis op.cit. pp.352-53; Quirino op.cit. pp.176-77

The most protracted and detailed coverage of the controversy is to be found in The Independent; see for example Jose T. Nueno "The Dilemma of the Fairfield Bill" The Independent Yr.XI no.172 June 13, 1925 pp.16-17; "Osmeña Endorsed the Fairfield Bill while in the United States says Norbert Lyons in Current History" The Independent Yr.XI no.162 April 4, 1925 pp.24-25.

Constantino op.cit. p.332

Ibid.

"Los liberales se separan de la Consolidacion" The Independent Yr.XI no.150 January 10, 1925 p.23

Timoteo Paez, for example, had been a member of the first Filipino lodge - Lodge Nilad - and had joined Rizal in founding the Liga Filipina. Jose Turiano Santiago had served briefly as the Katipunan's secretary. Prudencio Remigio, though too young to participate in the revolution himself, was the son of famous Katipunero parents.

"Los liberales", as cited p.23

Manila Daily Bulletin July 30, 1925

This summary of Obrero-Liberal campaign themes is based on five articles by Crisanto Evangelista, one of the party's municipal board candidates. Written under the pseudonym C. Encarnacion, these describe the speeches and debates at Obrero-Liberal election meetings from the standpoint of an ordinary onlooker. The articles appeared in Ang Watawat between March 26, 1925 and May 4, 1925, and are cited in full in the bibliography.

For congressional elections Manila was divided into two districts; First (north) and Second (south). Municipal board members, however, were elected across the city as a whole. The complete Obrero-Liberal slate, in descending order of votes received, was Jose Turiano Santiago, Crisanto Evangelista, Tomas Arguelles, Joaquin Galang, Valentin Alcid, Marcelo Caringal, Gil Domingo, Ildefonso K. Romey, Cirilo Bognot and
Francisco Cabral. Some candidates were nominated to the slate by both parties in the coalition, others by only one. Nationally the 1925 elections resulted in yet another convincing Nacionalista victory, but in Manila the Democrats repeated their 1922 success, capturing both House of Representatives seats and seven of the ten places on the municipal board.

The Independent Yr.XI no.156 February 21, 1925 p.26; and Yr.XI no.158 March 7, 1925 pp.24-5; El Debate June 7, 1925

The Partido Liberal had originally been founded in 1921, mainly it seems to support Prudencio Remigio's bid for the Manila south House of Representatives seat in the June 1922 elections. After this bid had failed - by a wider margin than in 1925 - the Liberals re-aligned themselves with the Nacionalista mainstream until the Fairfield affair and/or electoral ambitions prompted another break.

Quoted in Serafin Macaraig "Underlying Causes of Agrarian Unrest" Philippines Herald April 26, 1925

Manila Daily Bulletin July 30, 1925
The full roster of party officials announced at this time was as follows:

President Antonino D. Ora
Secretary Crisanto Evangelista
General Treasurer Tomas Arguelles
Vice Treasurer Jose Estrella
General Campaign Manager Antonino D. Ora
Organisers for:
Manila south Crisanto Evangelista
           Joaquin Galang
Manila north Cirilo Bognot
           Bernabe Garcia
           Jose Turiano Santiago
Bulacan Jacinto Manahan
Rizal Catalino Cruz
Cavite Julian de Castro
Ilocos and Nueva Vizcaya Juan Manzano
Pampanga Cirilo Bognot
           Joaquin Galang
Legal Advisers Valentin Alcid
           Marcelo Caringal
           Pedro Cube
Provincial Committee in Manila Jacinto Manahan
           Luis Foz
           Ildefonso K. Romey

Despite the relative moderation of the party's stance at this time, two rather surprising inclusions in the list are Joaquin Galang, a leader of Zoilo Hilario's Pampanga-based Katipunan Mipanampun, and Bernabe Garcia, who headed the FTF-affiliated company union at the San Miguel Brewery.

"Transcript of Stenographic Notes Taken During the Hearing Conducted by the Committee on Un-Filipino Activities on November 17, 1948" Typescript n.pp. (Institute of Social Order, Manila)
The manifesto is printed like a parallel text, with Tagalog and English side by side. The extracts quoted here are generally taken directly from the English version, but minor grammatical and stylistic changes have been made.

(80) Ibid. p.7

(81) Ibid. p.9

(82) McVey op.cit. pp.208-09

(83) Harry A. Poeze to the author, June 25, 1980


(85) Manila Daily Bulletin August 23, 1927

(86) See, for example "Tan Malacca, alias Hassan, Exposed", as cited; and "Tan Malacca's Two-Faced Views" Philippines Free Press September 10, 1927

(87) "Interview with Domingo Ponce, July 9, 1954" Typescript n.pp. (Institute of Social Order, Manila) Like the interview with Antonio Paguia cited earlier this is unsigned, but was evidently conducted by Renze L. Hoeksema.

(88) "Interview with Antonio Paguia", as cited.

(89) Originally printed in Taliba August 23, 1927, this photograph is reproduced in Poeze (1976) op.cit. p.381

(90) " Transcript of Stenographic Notes", as cited

(91) Tan Malaka to Budisutjitro, September 24, 1925 reproduced in Poeze (1976) op.cit. p.302

(92) McVey op.cit. pp.281-82

(93) Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the CPSU Outline History of the Communist International Progress Publishers, Moscow 1971 p.231

(94) "Meeting of the Enlarged Executive of the Communist International: 14th Session, Moscow, April 6th, 1925: Report of Comrade Dorsey on the Work of the Colonial Commission" International Press Correspondence vol.5 no.39 April 28, 1925 pp.513-14
CHAPTER FOUR

RADICAL ADVANCES

When presenting its revised, more leftist programme in November 1925 the Partido Obrero announced its intention to constitute three national organisations to mobilise support for its demands - a confederation of industrial workers, a confederation of peasants, and a civico-educational league for young men and students. This plan never progressed beyond the drawing board, and even before it had finally been shelved the party was pursuing the alternative strategy of winning over two leading labour and peasant centres already in existence - the Congreso Obrero and the Kalipunang Pangbansa ng mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas. This chapter focuses on how that strategy fared in relation to the Congreso Obrero during 1926, 1927 and 1928. Throughout these three years, it may be safely assumed, the party itself remained very small, counting its active members in tens rather than in hundreds. In men like Ora, Evangelista and Manahan, however, the party had an energetic, articulate and cohesive nucleus of well-placed and widely respected cadres within the Congreso who were able to give the radical current in the Philippine labour movement the definite focus and sense of direction it had hitherto lacked. Avoiding sectarian cliquishness, they attracted broad support for many of their initiatives from Nacionalista and Democrata labourites as well as from their own co-partisans, and thereby gained an influence in the federation well beyond their small number.

Sympathy and Goodwill

Now more commonly known by the Tagalog title Lapiang Manggagawa (LM), the party launched its campaign to win the Congreso's backing with a "grand picnic" held at the Olympia Cabaret in Makati on May Day 1926. Besides enjoying the music and dancing, it promised, those
attending the celebration would learn about matters that the writings of "government and capitalist agents" never mentioned: about trade unions in other countries, about the failings of MacDonald, Herriot and Gandhi, and about the true situation in Russia. They would hear also how the labour movement at home should be made more vigorous and effective, and how the working masses should wrest control of the independence movement from the vacillating politicos. Notwithstanding its strongly partisan flavour, the event was successfully promoted by the Lapiang Manggagawa not as a fringe gathering for its own supporters but as the centrepiece of the May Day festivities. Prevailed upon to act as master of ceremonies was Hilario Barroga, the Democrata president of the Union de Tabaqueros, and also persuaded to commend the occasion with his presence was Francisco Varona, the Nacionalista president of the Congreso itself, who delivered a speech on the place of May Day in history. Probably the most influential representatives of the two mainstream parties in the federation, their participation signalled that the LM already commanded an interest and respect that cut right across party lines.

Seeking to translate that interest and respect into something more substantive, the Lapiang Manggagawa put forward its case for formal debate at the Congreso's XIVth annual convention the following week. Judging from the rather confused press accounts of the proceedings, the delegates discussed two separate motions, one calling upon them to endorse the platform of "immediate demands" set out in the LM's November 1925 manifesto, the other committing the Congreso to support the party as such. The first motion was reportedly carried unopposed, a unanimity that seems surprising even though the platform section of the manifesto directly criticised the Nacionalista and Democrata parties only for their "passive attitude" over the native language question. Aside from re-iterating traditional obrerista concerns, the LM programme did after all demand extensive nationalisation and the formation of a people's army and people's assembly. That the Congreso should back this last proposal the Manila Daily Bulletin considered particularly outrageous. "Unions Vote to Abolish Legislature", it headlined in alarm.

What aroused greater controversy inside the convention hall was the question of giving the Lapiang Manggagawa active organisational backing in the party political arena. A verdict on this issue, it was
agreed, should be deferred to enable a specially constituted committee to examine the LM's objectives in greater detail and report on their findings. This may have been an attempt by Nacionalista and Democrata loyalists to kill the proposal at birth, for the special committee made little pretence at approaching their task with an open mind. Within a few days their spokesman was telling the press that recalling the convention for further debate might be a waste of time, because the committee were "determined" not to recommend the passage of the motion supporting the LM. The committee were prepared, he added disingenuously, "to congratulate the organisers of the labor party and nothing more". (7)

The Bulletin's editoralist refused even empty congratulations:

"When any organisation comes out in its platform and advocates the overthrow of the government to give way for a Communistic people's assembly it is putting itself in that category of parties which are nothing more than trouble-makers throughout the world .... The platform drafted by the labor party is sufficiently radical to render it dangerous, sufficiently Bolshevik to recommend it for rejection by any deserving labor body." (8)

The Nacionalista hierarchy also began to signify its disquiet, one unnamed government leader deprecating the Lapiang Manggagawa as a "small and irresponsible group with neither means nor organisation". (9) But despite these animadversions the Congreso executive over-rided the prejudices of the special committee and decided that the Lapiang Manggagawa's case at least deserved another hearing. In early June the convention delegates were duly recalled. Speakers against the motion of support argued that adhesion to the LM would violate the COF's constitution, which had been framed in the hope of keeping the federation free from political divisions, and would at the same time destroy the existing friendly relations that the labour body enjoyed with the legislature. Many of the LM's declared aims, they contended, were in any case simply pie in the sky. LM partisans countered that any benefits accruing from links with the legislature had been so minimal that the masses had now lost confidence in the nation's leaders, seeing them merely as opportunists who had betrayed the independence movement and used the workers as footstools for their own ambitions. It was true, Evangelista conceded, that many labour parties overseas had not yet been able to carry through programmes as ambitious as that adopted by the LM, but in Russia the workers had "succeeded in asserting their rights and in directing the government". (10) Though something similar must have been said at the May Day picnic, this is the first recorded
instance yet located, incidentally, of the Soviet Union being mentioned in Philippine labour circles as an example to be emulated.

When eventually put to the vote, the motion proposing formal support for the LM was defeated, but the margin was so narrow - one vote - that Evangelista and his colleagues might well have considered the victory theirs. Only six months after their revised programme had appeared, and at the very first opportunity, given that the Congreso only held full sessions once a year, they had won positive backing from virtually half the federation's delegates. And, as a subsequent consolatory motion attested, they had the "sympathy and goodwill" of many more.(11)

A Link with the Profintern

The growing strength of the radical current within the Congreso was dramatically confirmed at its XVth annual convention in June 1927. Still under the presidency of the Nacionalista Francisco Varona, and with LM activists occupying only four of the ten seats on its executive council, the federation resolved unanimously to affiliate with the Profintern-sponsored Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS), founded the previous month at a conference in the Chinese port of Hankow.(12)

Formed to build a "fraternal and militant alliance" of workers in the Pacific region, the PPTUS was conceived as a more ambitious successor to the ill-fated Red Eastern Labour Secretariat, which had effectively collapsed in mid-1925 after its despairing co-ordinator, Tan Malaka, had abandoned his office in Canton.(13) Originally it had been intended that the new Secretariat should be launched in Canton also, but just as delegates to the inaugural conference began arriving in that city in mid-April 1927 a coup d'etat by the rightist general Li Chi-shen forced a hasty switch of venue. The Filipinos who were expected to attend the conference, according to the senior American delegate, had "insufficiently close connections" with the organisers to adjust to this last minute change, and consequently cancelled their plans.(14)

Invitations had clearly not been sent only to organisations that the Profintern would regard as ideologically promising, for among the
recipients were Joaquin Balmori's conservative Federacion del Trabajo and Jacinto Salazar's International Marine Union, which it seems was basically a labour contracting outfit. (15) Both presidents sent telegrams expressing their apologies for absence for reasons unconnected with the Canton events, Balmori because the date initially fixed for the conference clashed with the FTF's own annual convention, Salazar because he received the invitation too late, having been away "in the province". Lapiang Manggagawa president Antonino Ora also cabled the conference organisers, conveying his party's fraternal greetings but giving no indication as to why it would be unrepresented. (16)

In the absence of any Filipino delegates, responsibility for bringing the Philippines to the conference's attention was proudly accepted by Harrison George, the American communist who had visited Manila briefly prior to the Canton transport workers meeting in 1924. Introducing himself as one of "the revolutionary workers of the United States, who regard the struggle of the Filipino people as our struggle", George briefly sketched the history of resistance to Spanish and American imperialism and presented a resolution, passed unanimously, which sent the Filipino toiling masses the conference's warmest greetings and pledged its "solidarity with them in their struggles for national freedom and emancipation". (17) There was no discussion, however, on the tactics the Philippine labour movement should adopt in pursuit of these goals.

After the Hankow sessions, at which he was elected to represent the United States on the new Secretariat, George travelled to Manila again, and on this occasion stayed in the city for three or four months. (18) Time enough, according to anecdote, for him to indulge his fetish for health cures and set up a colonic irrigation dispensary - surely one of the most peculiar "covers" ever devised. (19) George's political assignment was to compensate for the lack of Philippine representation at Hankow by reporting the conference's proceedings and resolutions to Manila's labourites and persuading them that the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat merited their support. (20) As the Secretariat was envisaged essentially as an alliance of national trade union centres, the Congreso Obrero would be his main focus of attention, and the federation's unanimous vote to affiliate to the PPTUS and support its programme marked his mission as an undoubted success.
A previous study implies the Congreso found the PPTUS programme so readily acceptable because it emphasised trade union demands and had only "limited political aims", but this was not in fact the case.

The Congreso announced it had reached the decision "from consideration of the manifesto" issued when the Hankow conference closed, a manifesto which actually mentioned basic industrial demands only in passing and dwelt rather on the global themes then being stressed by the Profintern and Comintern: the liberation of oppressed peoples from imperialism; defence of the Chinese revolution; the danger of a new imperialist world war; the struggle against racial and national prejudices; and the formation of a single united trade union international. In conclusion, moreover, the manifesto called upon Pacific area trade unions "to carry on a joint struggle to overthrow capitalism and to establish the rule of labour."(22)

Nevertheless it would obviously be mistaken to suppose that all the devotees of "labour-capital harmony" within the Congreso had suddenly renounced their creed. Moderate and conservative delegates, in other words, must have favoured affiliation to the PPTUS despite being opposed to its revolutionary aims. Some were probably swayed by its uncompromising anti-imperialism, but above all, perhaps, the PPTUS was welcomed by non-radicals simply as a link with the outside world. Filipino unionists had shown a thirst for knowledge about labour movements in other countries ever since the early 1900s, and any sign that interest was being reciprocated would have been welcomed keenly. All that had materialised, however, were some gestures of goodwill from the American Federation of Labor when the COF had first been founded and the Profintern's previous approaches at the time of the 1924 Canton conference. Otherwise, as General Secretary of the Profintern A. Losovsky put it - tactlessly but with only slight exaggeration - "no one was aware that any trade union movement existed in the Philippines". (23) Now, the COF executive suggested, this "extreme" isolation could finally be broken, and Filipino workers and peasants could at last ally themselves "with the cause of labour throughout the world".

By establishing such links, the executive further intimated, "we may hope not just for fellowship but also for financial support from the entire international labour movement".(24) Finance remained a critical problem for the Congreso because its constituent associations had still not been persuaded to contribute to a central fund. Some had
virtually nothing to give, others were cautious because from their own bitter experience they knew that union coffers could too easily be drained by mismanagement, extravagance or embezzlement. In these circumstances the prospect of monetary backing from the PPTUS may well have helped counter conservative doubts, and conceivably the COF executive's optimism that such assistance would be forthcoming was affected for precisely this reason. Quite possibly, though, a modest grant had already been received, delivered by Harrison George.

Neither the manifesto nor the resolutions approved by the Hankow conference contained any strictures or prescriptions regarding trade unions as such, a reticence perhaps inspired by a desire to avoid causing the Secretariat's potential adherents any premature offence. Like its Profintern parent, however, the PPTUS was scarcely less concerned about the leadership and structure of its affiliates than about their ideological orientation. A labour movement that was not militantly led, or was small and divided, it was argued, could fight effectively neither for the immediate interests of its members nor for their ultimate liberation from exploitation and oppression. A Soviet delegate at Hankow named Budnik, for example, noted how the conference had "passed a whole series of resolutions". "But in order to carry these resolutions into life", he insisted, "it is absolutely necessary to have well-organised and well-constructed trade union organisations", based on an entire industry rather than a single craft or trade, divided into active factory and shop nuclei and headed by leaders elected by the rank and file. (25) On these and other grounds the Philippine labour movement clearly left much to be desired, but at least there was a promising awareness within the Congreso Obrero that change was required. The letter that Crisanto Evangelista wrote as COF secretary when forwarding the federation's resolution of affiliation to the PPTUS, Losovsky himself noted approvingly, showed that he "thoroughly understood" the weakness of the organisation he represented. (26)

What Losovsky did not know was that many Congreso activists, and Evangelista above all, had been striving to correct this weakness ever since the federation had been founded in May 1913. One dissenting voice had even suggested at the very outset it was mistaken to establish such a federation until more potential affiliates had been founded on an occupational basis. (27) Organisation by occupation, another anonymous
obrerista had argued in June 1913, was the first lesson that Filipino unionists should learn from studying labour movements overseas, and ideally all the workers within a given industry should be united in a single union. The union in the printing industry, for example, should embrace compositors, binders, "minerva" operators, stereotypists, lithographers and mechanics; that in the tobacco industry should represent shredders, packers and machinists as well as cigar and cigarette makers. Labour associations in the Philippines lacked strength, the writer concluded, because they were sectionalised, separating workers rather than bringing them together.

"Some have formed societies in the factories where they work, others belong to nationalist associations, some are in mutual benefit societies, some in sports clubs, some in entertainment groups, some in co-operatives etc., all possessing good aims but nevertheless contrary to the real kind of socialism ...."(28)

Evangelista likewise urged re-organisation along industrial lines and, as a printer, took great pride in the fact that his own Union de Impresores had moved towards this goal sooner and further than any other union in the country. Throughout the archipelago, he lamented in 1913, the most widespread form of workmen's association was the samahang abuluyan (mutual benefit society), and mutualist functions tended to be dominant even in some unions.(29) Belonging to various mutualist societies himself, Evangelista did not oppose such groups in principle, but he saw them only as an adjunct to proper occupational unions, not as the substitute he feared they had become. Most seriously, in his eyes, the horizons of such societies were far too restricted. Labour organisations in Europe and America, he observed, addressed themselves both to their members' wages, hours and conditions inside the workplace and to the rights of the working class as a whole within the wider community - to health, education, freedom and respect. The samahang abuluyan, by contrast, generally attempted neither to improve their adherents' livelihood nor to raise their consciousness, being concerned solely with collecting contributions and dispensing comfort and assistance to the afflicted and bereaved. And, however laudable, visiting the sick or attending a funeral did nothing to liberate the world "from the stranglehold of government upon the citizenry and of capitalists upon the workers."(30)

In 1914, taking his criticism a step further, Evangelista commented that even the delegates sent by mutualist societies to the
COF's inaugural convention had shown "no direct interest in bettering the situation or livelihood of the workers" and, since such delegates had gone on to dominate the Congreso's committees, "little was achieved". (31) Such basic tasks as organising the unorganised, training more leaders, devising workers' education programmes and publishing handbills and newspapers were being almost entirely neglected. The narrowness of purpose and inadequate commitment of the samahang abuluyan, he believed, were linked inextricably with the character of their leaders, described by another writer as "gentlemen, lawyers and doctors, clever politicos and nationalists and labour sympathisers". (32) These "politicos and puppets of politicos", Evangelista complained in 1915, were by their intrigues and machinations turning the COF into a "plaything and object of disdain". Unless the hegemony of the mutualist societies was ended, he argued with heavy irony, the Congreso Obrero would have to be restyled the "Congreso Politico". (33)

This sorry state of affairs was sustained, in Evangelista's view, by the popular belief that labour leaders should be selected for their prominence and education. Worse than being mistaken, he insisted, this belief served to perpetuate the very conditions of ignorance, subservience and subjection that a true workers' movement should be battling to overcome. Reliance upon outsiders negated the movement's value as a school of struggle wherein workers could learn how to face their own difficulties, defend their own interests, and shape their own destinies. The unions which should supplant the mutualist societies within the COF, Evangelista urged, should select leaders who actually worked in the particular trade or industry involved, men with an intimate day to day understanding of their members' conditions, problems and aspirations. Until this happened, he never tired of repeating, Philippine labour would be contravening to its own cost the principle that "the emancipation of the working class must be achieved by the working class itself". (34)

In some respects Evangelista no doubt tailored his characterisation of the early Congreso for polemical effect. Neither the samahang abuluyan nor "non-workers" held quite as much sway as he suggested, and nor was the correlation between the mutualist groups and middle class leadership quite so clear cut. His fears that the federation was becoming a "Congreso Politico", moreover, probably subsided somewhat after the infighting and schisms which pre-occupied the 1914 and 1915
conventions gave way to a decisive Nacionalista pre-eminence. Later years also witnessed changes in the Congreso's composition which Evangelista would have generally welcomed, the smaller samahang abuluyan represented at the inaugural convention having dissolved or drifted away and many newly-founded occupational associations affiliating in their place.

Even so, the deficiencies he and other critics had highlighted around 1913-15 had mostly endured. Although reduced to four, the mutualist societies remaining within the COF still accounted for over a quarter of the federation's total membership and, as before, some occupational unions also concentrated on mutualist functions. Even more than in 1913, arguably, "non-workers" wielded an influence beyond their number, with the COF presidency being held for four consecutive terms by Francisco Varona, the urbane editor of the Spanish language daily El Debate. (35) Since Tambuli's demise in 1914 no regular journal had been published by the Congreso itself, let alone by its individual constituents. (36) Systematic organisation drives, cadre training schemes and workers' education programmes continued to be merely ideas in the wind, and there were still no unions organised along comprehensively industrial lines.

Spearheaded by Evangelista and his Lapiang Manggagawa colleagues, the drive to modernise and invigorate the Congreso was nevertheless gathering momentum in the mid-1920s. Re-organisation proposals - unfortunately not detailed in the press accounts - were formally endorsed by COF delegates at the same 1926 session which saw the motion of support for the LM defeated by only one vote, and it was also agreed that the federation should open a central office, start charging its affiliated organisations regular fees and if possible publish a monthly bulletin. (37) As Evangelista had long since realised, however, it was much easier to persuade the Congreso to pass a resolution than to ensure its subsequent implementation, and in this instance so little was achieved that the same initiatives had to be placed on the agenda again at the 1927 convention. (38)

The organisational advice which the Profintern and PPTUS began offering in 1927 thus pointed to deficiencies which the Congreso had at least in principle already resolved to tackle itself. Rather than resenting this advice as unwanted interference, the proponents of progressive trade unionism would consequently welcome it as an
authoritative endorsement of their own views, and hope that it could supply the extra impetus needed to translate paper resolutions into practical action.

In the months following affiliation there were indeed significant signs of progress. A central office was at last established in Tondo, supervised by Evangelista as COF secretary.(39) Also in this capacity, Evangelista issued a series of messages designed to keep labour leaders in touch with Congreso policies and campaigns until such time as the federation was able to publish its own paper or magazine.(40) This latter venture never got off the ground, but in November 1927 a new independently produced monthly entitled Ang Manggagawa (The Worker) started publication which made its columns freely available to the Congreso's activists and so gave them the regular outlet they sought. (41) In September 1927, perhaps guided or inspired by Harrison George, the COF executive council issued a manifesto calling for drives to organise the unorganised and to "centralise and systematise" the entire labour movement. The ideal framework for this expansion and restructuring, it was affirmed, should be that which Evangelista and other LM leaders had long advocated. "Whenever possible", the executive specified, all unions should be built or rebuilt on an industrial basis.(42)

No less heartening, from the radical viewpoint, this newfound organisational vitality was accompanied by unprecedented political militancy. The manifesto just cited, for example, voiced its support for "one powerful trade union international", in other words for the Profintern. It announced the COF's intention to "mobilise and inspire the working masses in the struggle for Philippine independence" and to revise its own constitution and by-laws "to conform more to the needs of proletarian unity". And an educational campaign would be launched, it stated, to give the masses "correct ideas and interpretations on class struggle and class consciousness".(43) Whilst omitting any reference to party politics, this was a manifesto which Evangelista and his Lapiang Manggagawa colleagues might almost have written themselves. Issued just three months after the vote to join the PPTUS, it signalled that the ideological balance within the Congreso had at last been tipped. Hitherto always a minority voice in the federation, the left was now most decidedly setting the pace.
When persuading the Congreso to affiliate to the PPTUS and adopt its programme, Harrison George would obviously have had solid backing from the Lapiang Manggagawa and would have co-operated closely with the four party activists who sat on the COF executive - Ora, Evangelista, Manahan and Bognot. In private, their discussions would undoubtedly have ranged beyond the labour movement to the broader political tasks facing Filipino radicals and, most specifically, to how the Lapiang Manggagawa might be transformed into a communist party. As noted earlier, the Comintern had asked American communists to help establish a Philippine party back in April 1925, and in the intervening two years it had become increasingly apparent that the formation of a communist cadre within the LM would be the logical first step towards this goal. In the persons of Ora and Evangelista at least, the nucleus of such a cadre was indeed already there. To build on this beginning, George probably concluded, it was now essential to bring the LM into closer touch with the international movement - by the exchange of literature and correspondence, by more visits like his own, and by arranging for selected Filipinos to attend conferences abroad and go to the Soviet Union.

In the months following George's departure in October 1927 the Filipino left's overseas contacts were extended through all these channels. The LM leaders started receiving letters, pamphlets and magazines from communist-oriented labour, peasant and anti-imperialist groups on four continents. (44) The Comintern reminded American communists of their responsibilities in the Philippines, and after some delay a Workers' Party member named Sam Darcy was apparently sent to Manila to offer the Lapiang Manggagawa fraternal assistance. (45) Earl Browder, a more senior Workers' Party member elected at the Hankow conference as PPTUS general secretary, is also said to have visited the Islands in 1927 or 1928. (46)

In these same two years several Filipino radicals accepted invitations to travel overseas. First, the Philippines was reportedly represented at the November 1927 Congress of the Friends of the Soviet Union, held in Moscow as part of the celebrations marking the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution. Five weeks later, a Filipino identified as "Alminiano" addressed the Second Conference of the Anti-Imperialist League in Brussels. (47) In February 1928 Evangelista, Manahan and Bognot attended a PPTUS Plenum in Shanghai, and then
proceeded to Moscow for the Fourth Congress of the Profintern. (48) Staying in the USSR for two months, the Filipinos also toured Soviet farms and factories and visited Leningrad and Kiev. (49) After the main Profintern congress closed in early April, they presumably attended the special regional conference organised for delegates from countries bordering the Pacific, and here and elsewhere took the opportunity to have detailed talks with senior Comintern and Profintern staff. During these discussions it was agreed that a handful of Filipino unionists should be invited to Moscow for cadre training at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, and upon his return to Manila in mid-May Evangelista quickly selected three young volunteers to make the trip. Leaving around June 1928, they are said to have returned to the Islands separately between 1930 and 1932. (50)

The XVIth COF Convention

Just before Evangelista, Manahan and Bognen returned from their travels the Congreso Obrero held its XVIth convention, and as customary elected its officers for the forthcoming year. The outcome of these elections has been portrayed by some observers as a "coup" staged by conservative elements whilst the three LM activists were conveniently overseas. (51) On closer examination, however, it appears that this was not the case. The real backlash against the left was still some months away.

Acting as chairman at the 1928 convention was Francisco Varona, COF president for the past four years. Varona had now decided to relinquish the office in order to concentrate on winning the Manila north seat in the House of Representatives, which indeed he did in the June 1928 elections. A consummate politico, he was loathe to antagonise anyone and had the ability, like Quezon, to convince both parties to an argument that they had his sincere support. Questioned about working class attitudes in 1928, he remarked simultaneously that "Philippine labour is very conservative" and that "Soviet Russia is a source of inspiration to Philippine labour". (52) To some extent, of course, both statements were true, and Varona himself mirrored the same dichotomy. As COF president, nevertheless, he had generally swum with rather than against the radical current. Whilst remaining a loyal Nacionalista he was not afraid to attack the government for its
indifference to labour's plight nor to consort publicly with the Lapian Manggagawa, as at the 1926 May Day picnic. He had been a staunch friend and defender of the fugitive Tan Malaka, carrying his articles in El Debate and accommodating him on occasion on the newspaper office floor.(53) Without Varona's personal backing, moreover, the move to affiliate the Congreso to the PPTUS could never have won such universal assent.

When he presided over the XVIth convention and supervised the executive council elections, therefore, it seems unlikely that Varona would have used his considerable influence to abet an anti-radical plot. More pertinent still, the principal officers elected in 1928 were scarcely arch-conservative themselves. Elected COF president was Hilario Barroga, who as president of the Union de Tabaqueros had led a prolonged and bitter strike in 1926 against wage cuts in the tobacco factories. "The real fight between capital and labour has just begun", he was quoted as saying at the time, "and the latter is out to win".(54) As noted earlier, he too had been on the platform at the LM's 1926 picnic. Domingo Ponce, elected COF secretary, was still proud to claim the credit for planting "the first 'red' seedling" in the Islands back in 1924 after leading the Filipino delegation to the Canton conference. The recent burgeoning of overseas contacts, he liked to believe, represented the "sweet and ripened fruits" of that endeavour.(55) His enthusiasm for labour internationalism, indeed, remained such that in October 1927 the Legionarios del Trabajo - over which he presided as "Supremo" - passed a special resolution of adherence to the PPTUS quite separate to that of the Congreso, declaring that the Secretariat's aims and purposes were "entirely identical" to their own.(56) Even less indicative of a right-wing conspiracy, the newly elected COF treasurer was none other than the LM president, Antonino Ora.

In the convention proceedings which followed the elections there was no sign whatsoever that the federation had just been swung to a more conservative course. The previous year's vote to affiliate to the PPTUS was unanimously re-affirmed, and the Secretariat was formally thanked for its "help and co-operation in the cause of the Filipino working class". Far from proclaiming a regained confidence in the established parties, the convention pronounced that "the working class must lead the independence movement!" Another defiant slogan was "Defeat the suppression efforts of the reactionary bourgeoisie!"
prompted mainly by the predicament of Ponce's Legionarios del Trabajo, which on the basis of alleged financial irregularities had been barred from using the postal service.\(57\) Some COF delegates had in fact opposed Ponce's election as secretary for this reason, arguing that the office should be held by someone entirely above suspicion and expressing concern lest the ban be extended to the Congreso itself.\(58\)

Very shortly after the convention these fears were largely realised, for although the federation as such was not beset, the prohibition order was amended to cover all Ponce's correspondence and communications on its behalf. With this move, anti-establishment feelings naturally became even more inflamed, and in June the Congreso delegates met in a special session termed a "Plenum" and called for officialdom's "mania of suppression" to be resisted with a determined fight. "Against this autocratic evil", they declared, "class solidarity is the only remedy".\(59\)

A more refined conspiracy theory might argue that the May convention witnessed a move not against radicals in general, but specifically against the Lapiang Manggagawa. Notwithstanding Ora's election as treasurer, the elevation to the two senior posts of Barroga and Ponce - respectively a Democrat and a Nacionalista - might in other words be construed as signifying that obreristas belonging to the mainstream parties were closing ranks to prevent any further LM advance. Even this theory, though, is unsupported by any contemporary evidence. The new COF president and secretary as yet showed no inclination either to isolate the LM leaders or to fight a party political battle. Far from trying to play down the arrival of Evangelista, Manahan and Bognot from the Soviet Union, they urged the Congreso's delegates to make a particular effort to attend the special "Plenum" in June because "important reports will be presented by our comrades ... who have returned from across the sea". "The eyes of workers throughout the world are focused upon us and waiting to see how we will act", Barroga and Ponce affirmed in the circular summoning the session, "we will make the first shot heard around the world". The problems confronting Philippine labour, they emphasised

"are many and serious ... above all the desire of the imperialists, of the conscienceless capitalists and their allies in power to destroy our solidarity, smash the nationalist movement and frustrate the aspirations and activities of the poor and lowly; all this shows that we must be united, that amongst us understanding must be
paramount, and no Nacionalista, no Democrata, no
Independent, we are all workers.... "(60)

In mid-1928, therefore, the Lapiang Manggagawa leaders had good
reason to be satisfied with the headway they had made. Since their
party had adopted a radical socialist programme just three years
earlier, their success in steering the country's premier labour
federation on a parallel course had indeed been nothing less than
remarkable. "Labour-capital harmony" had been replaced as the dominant
watchword by "class struggle", international isolation had been ended
by affiliation to a subsidiary of the Profintern, and organisational
stagnation had been broken by encouraging signs of vitality and a
commitment in principle to restructuring the trade union movement along
industrial lines. The only major disappointment had lain in failing to
persuade the Congreso to declare its support for the Lapiang Manggagawa
as a political party. Even here, though, some comfort could be drawn
from the clear signs that the federation was becoming increasingly dis­
affected with the hierarchies of the two established parties.
Notes to Chapter Four

(1) Pahayag ng Lapiang Manggagawa sa Pilipinas (Manifesto of the Labor Party of the Philippines) Manila, November 30, 1925 p.13

(2) Taliba April 28, 1926

(3) Music at the picnic was provided by the "Orkestra Adora", a group of musicians gathered together by LM president Antonino D. Ora and christened after his own name. Taliba April 27, 1926 and May 3, 1926

(4) Listed as speaking on "The Position of Union Movements and Workers' Parties in Other Countries", intriguingly, was one M. Gomez. As this name does not appear in any other accounts of the Philippine labour scene, and as it is doubtful that the subject would be tackled by a worker from the Lapiang Manggagawa's rank and file, it seems likely that the speaker came from overseas. If this was the case, the visitor was presumably the American communist who had adopted the name Manuel Gomez for use in party circles. Gomez was indeed eminently qualified for selection as an emissary to the Philippines. Around 1924-25 he had been on assignment assisting the Communist Party of Mexico and later, after returning to the States, had conducted propaganda and organisational work amongst Filipino migrants in his capacity as secretary of the Chicago-based All-American Anti-Imperialist League. It is also worth noting that in October 1926 Gomez had an article on the Philippines published in the Workers' Party monthly magazine, although this could probably have been written without first-hand experience of the country and did not refer to labour matters. Taliba April 27, 1926; Stephen J. Whitfield Scott Nearing: Apostle of American Radicalism Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1974 p.162; Theodore Draper American Communism and Soviet Russia The Viking Press, New York, 1960 p.170; Manuel Gomez "The Crisis in Philippine Independence" Workers' Monthly vol.5 no.12 October 1926, pp.539-42

(5) Pahayag ng Lapiang Manggagawa, as cited p.10; Manila Daily Bulletin May 8, 1926; El Mercantil May 8, 1926

(6) Manila Daily Bulletin May 8, 1926

(7) Manila Daily Bulletin May 17, 1926

(8) Quoted in Sunday Tribune May 16, 1926

(9) Quoted in Crisanto Evangelista "Mga Matuwid Laban sa Lapian ng Bisig na Iniulat Ngayon" ("Arguments now Being Presented Against the Party of Labour") Taliba May 13, 1926

(10) Manila Daily Bulletin June 8, 1926; Manila Times June 8, 1926

(11) Manila Daily Bulletin June 8, 1926
(12) Congreso Obrero de Filipinas (Philippine Section, Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat) "To the Philippine Proletariat" Handbill in Tagalog, English and Spanish c.July 1927 p.1 This leaflet announced the Congreso's unanimous decision to affiliate to the PPTUS and reproduced the manifesto issued at the conclusion of the Hankow conference, which may also be found in Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference Bulletin of Proceedings No.5 May 25/26, 1927 pp.12-13 The four LM members on the Congreso's executive council at this time were Evangelista (secretary), Manahan, Ora and Bognot. The other six members were Varona (president), Gregorio Pineda (treasurer), Mariano Ubald, Domingo Ponce, Isabelo Tejada and Jacinto Salazar. Congreso Obrero de Filipinas (Balangay sa Pilipinas ng PPTUS) "Mga Manggagawa sa Pilipinas, Pagkakaisa!" ("Workers of the Philippines, Unite!") Ang Manggagawa Yr.I no.1 November 30, 1927 p.17

(13) The 1924- Canton conference eventually had a direct successor in the "Second Pan-Pacific Conference of Transport Workers", which was held at the International Seamen's Club in Vladivostok in conjunction with a congress convened by the PPTUS in August 1929. Here it was maintained that the first gathering "constituted an organisation which has since extended a number of threads to the general trade union movement of the Pacific". This could be taken to imply that the Secretariat established in Canton had continued to function, but the PPTUS General Secretary himself noted that the 1924 conference had not resulted in any permanent organisation, and the Vladivostok meeting in effect confirmed this view by resolving to create an entirely new organisation for transport workers in the Pacific region. Like its predecessor, this body seems to have acquired little real substance. Against Imperialism on the Pacific: Second Pan-Pacific Conference of Transport Workers Pan-Pacific Secretariat of Transport Workers, n.p. c.1929 pp.3-4;36; Earl Browder "Report on the Work of the PPTUS since the First Conference" Pan-Pacific Monthly no.32 November 1929 p.26

(14) Browder op.cit. p.27

(15) Although there is no record to the effect, the Congreso Obrero would presumably have been invited to send delegates also. At this time the Profintern cherished the hope that the COF and FTF could be amalgamated in a single radical trade union centre, and the FTF's invitation perhaps stemmed from a desire to discover whether this proposal had any practical chance of success. The invitation to the International Marine Union perhaps reflected the particular importance the Profintern attached to seamen's unions as a potential vehicle for disseminating radical literature and ideas. In 1924, it may be recalled, Jacinto Salazar had attended the Profintern's previous Pacific region conference in Canton, but at no stage was he identified with the Congreso left wing. Until about 1930 the International Marine Union reportedly controlled the placement of seamen onto vessels owned by the Madrigal shipping company, but the company then severed this arrangement due to Salazar's "dirty procedures". Salazar was also alleged to be a "dedicated strikebreaker".
(15) "Lista de Líderes Obrero" (compiled by Domingo Ponce in 1931 at the request of Senate President Quezon) (Quezon Papers Box 143)

(16) Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference Bulletin of Proceedings No. 1 May 20, 1927 p. 3


(18) Accredited at Hankow by the Trade Union Educational League, the principal labour organisation in which the Workers' Party of America was then active, George was strictly speaking elected only as substitute US delegate to Earl Browder, but he nevertheless seems to have been attached to the PPTUS in the late twenties on a more or less permanent basis. By virtue of his visits to Manila he was regarded as the Secretariat's leading non-Filipino specialist on the Philippines, and he regularly wrote about the country for the PPTUS monthly organ. Appearing variously as The Pan-Pacific Worker, Far Eastern Monthly and The Pan-Pacific Monthly, editions of this journal were published at one time or another between 1927 and 1931 in Australia and the United States as well as in China. In 1930 George was based in San Francisco as editor of the American edition. "PPTUS" Pan-Pacific Worker vol.1 no.1 July 1, 1927 p. 5; A1 Richmond A Long View from the Left; Memoirs of an American Revolutionary Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1973 p. 277

(19) Whether the intelligence services discovered George's real identity and purpose is not known. If they did, they may briefly have gained the impression that foreign communists were converging on Manila from all directions. At the beginning of July 1927 two "Chinese bolsheviks" were intercepted at Manila pier and placed firmly back on their boat. Later in the month, Tan Malaka steamed in from Thailand, slipping through customs as one Hasan Gozali. No sooner had he been trailed, arrested and deported (at the end of August) than an even better known "bolshevist" arrived quite openly from the States and started to give public lectures. This was Scott Nearing, for most of his life an independent radical but at that time, like Harrison George, a member of the Workers' Party of America. An academic by training, Nearing had been a key figure in the American intellectual left since the World War, associated particularly with Charles Garland's Fund for Public Service, the Department of Labor Research and, since 1925, the communist Workers' School in New York. A prolific propagandist, his most widely read work (written with Joseph Freeman) was Dollar Diplomacy (1925), an overview of US imperialism which includes a brief chapter on the Philippines. A third American leftist who was in Manila around September-October 1927 was Bill Prohme, a former West coast newspaperman who had just escaped from China after working with the Soviet
(19) adviser Borodin for the ill-fated Left Kuomintang government in Wuhan. 
Whilst it is known that Harrison George, Tan Malaka, Scott Nearing and Bill Prohme were all in contact with Crisanto Evangelista and other Filipino radicals in 1927, there is no reason to suppose that their visits were in any way connected.


(20) Browder op.cit. p.27


(22) Congreso Obrero de Filipinas "To the Philippine Proletariat", as cited p.1

(23) A. Losovsky "The Coming Pacific Trade Union Congress" International Press Correspondence vol.9 no.30 June 28, 1929 p.669

(24) Congreso Obrero de Filipinas "Mga Manggagawa sa Pilipinas, Pagkakaisa!", as cited p.17
This manifesto was first issued on September 30, 1927, but was apparently drafted in part at a meeting of the Congreso executive in mid-August.


(26) A. Losovsky The Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference: Hankow, May 20-26, 1927 RILU, Moscow, 1927 p.48
(27) Crisanto Evangelista "Kung Alin-Alin ang mga Paraang Lalong Mabisa sa Ikalalaganap ng Unionism sa Pilipinas" ("Ways in which Unionism could be Established More Effectively in the Philippines") Tambuli special edition Ang Unang Araw ng Mayo 1915 (May Day 1915) p.22 (This article is dated April 18, 1914. Evangelista does not indicate who the dissenter was.)

(28) "Ang Paglalakiplakip - 'Comunismo'" ("Communism") Tambuli Yr.I no.6 June 7, 1913 p.2 (Emphasis in original)

(29) Crisanto Evangelista "Kung Ano ang mga Pangunang Tungkulin ng Isang Manggagawa" ("The Principal Duties of a Worker") Tambuli Yr.I no.16 October 1913 pp.3-4

(30) Crisanto Evangelista "Kung sa Paanong Paraan Dapat Itaguyod ang mga 'Uniones de Oficios'" ("How 'Trade Unions' Should be Organised") Tambuli Yr.I no.18 December, 1913 p.13

Attitudes towards mutualism at this time are discussed more fully in Melinda Tria Kerkvliet "Mutual Aid and Manila Unions", a paper presented at the First International Conference on Philippine Studies, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo May 1980

(31) Evangelista "Kung Alin-Alin ....", as cited p.22

(32) "Ang Paglalakiplakip...." as cited p.2

(33) Crisostomo Encarnacion "Ang Sala ng Ating 'Congreso Obrero'" ("The Faults of our 'Congreso Obrero'") Typescript copied from Tambuli special edition, Ang Unang Araw ng Mayo 1915 p.2


(35) Born in Arevalo, Iloilo in 1891, Varona had first gone to Manila to study Law, Philosophy and Letters at the University of Santo Tomas. Around 1911 he abandoned his course to become a journalist, and for a time worked on the celebrated nationalist paper El Renacimiento Filipino. El Debate, owned by the business magnate and Nacionalista benefactor Ramon Fernandez, was similarly in its time the foremost Spanish language champion of the independence campaign. How Varona first became involved in the labour movement is not known. It seems likely he entered the Congreso as a delegate from one of the affiliated nationalist or mutualist societies, for he is never described in the contemporary accounts as the leader of any particular occupation-based union. In 1920 he was on the May Day celebrations committee, and in the same year he accepted a temporary government appointment as Labor Commissioner in Hawaii, looking after the interests of Filipino plantation workers. Whilst heading the Congreso, Varona also served as president of Manila's exclusive Bachelors' Club. He professed socialism, he would say "based on love for the lowly and not on hatred against the powerful". His rapid rise to the COF presidency appears to confirm Evangelista's comments
about continuing obrerista deference to the prominent and educated, though also working in his favour was a warm, even magnetic personality. He was, it is said, "the sort of person to have as a compadre".


The most enduring labour periodical of the American period was the Trabajo of Joaquin Balmori's FTF, which came out regularly from 1919 until the eve of the Pacific war. The only individual union known to have published even an ephemeral paper in the years following Tambuli's demise in 1914 was the Union de Sastres (headed by Domingo Ponce), which issued a weekly called Ora Na (Now is the Time) in 1916.


Manila Daily Bulletin June 8, 1926

Losovsky (1927) op.cit. p.49; Crisanto Evangelista "Report on the Growth and Development of the Labor Movement of the Philippine Islands" Far Eastern Monthly no.18 August 1928 p.41

At first situated in Plaza Moraga at the foot of the Jones Bridge, the Congreso office was soon transferred to the premises owned by Antonino Ora in P. Rada Street.

These messages were signed by Evangelista and addressed "To all leaders of workers' associations in the Philippines" All the messages that can be traced are dated between September 16 and September 24, 1927, and are cited fully in the bibliography.

The first editor of Ang Manggagawa was Pio Gaudier, about whom nothing is known. The journal's publisher, who later took over the editorship as well, was Santiago Flores, a tobacco company official and probably a member of the Union de Tabaqueros. In May 1928 Flores was elected to the COF executive council, most likely in appreciation of the service that Ang Manggagawa performed.

Congreso Obrero de Filipinas "Mga Manggagawa sa Pilipinas, Pagkakaisa!", as cited p.17

Ibid.

"Foreign Correspondence of Manahan and Evangelista" (List furnished by the Philippine Constabulary and enclosed with Henry L. Stimson (P.I. Governor General) to the Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, January 17, 1929 (BIA 28432-10)

At the Sixth Comintern Congress in August 1928, US delegate Manuel Gomez criticised his party's Political Committee for making "absolutely no effort" to send representatives to the
Philippines to help build a communist cadre "despite specific instructions from the Comintern" to do so. This criticism, though, does not preclude the possibility that Gomez himself had previously visited the Islands on a mission of a different nature. (See note (4))

"Thirty-third Session: Moscow, August 16, 1928" International Press Correspondence vol.8 no.72 October 17, 1928 p.1319; Draper op.cit. p.171

"Interview with Domingo Ponce, July 9, 1954" Typescript n.pp. (Institute of Social Order, Manila) Although unsigned, it is evident from the date of this interview that it was conducted by Renze L. Hoeksema in the course of research for the doctoral dissertation cited previously.

Araneta op.cit. p.138

"Alminiano" was probably Anacleto Almenana, who later became a Communist Party cadre in the Philippines. In 1927, however, he was living and working in the United States, and his visit to Brussels might have been arranged by the All-American Anti-Imperialist League, of which Manuel Gomez was secretary. Gomez had represented the Workers' Party at the AIL's first Brussels conference in February 1927, where the "national revolutionary movement" in the Philippines was reportedly discussed by a special commission.

Almenana may also have been the Philippine representative at the tenth anniversary celebrations in Moscow, which took place only a month before the Brussels conference. If he was not the representative, though, the person most likely to have been invited to the Soviet capital at this juncture would be the LM's founding president, Antonino Ora.

Iso "The Significance of the Brussels Conference" International Press Correspondence vol.7 no.16 February 25, 1927 p.324; "The International Congress Against Colonial Oppression in Brussels" Ibid. p.328; A. Losovsky "International Congress of Friends of the Soviet Union" International Press Correspondence vol.7 no.68 December 1, 1927 p.1540; "The Brussels Conference of the League Against Imperialism" International Press Correspondence vol.7 no.72 December 22, 1927 p.1634

Charles B. McLane Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1966 p.120

Araneta notes that Domingo Ponce - whom he interviewed in the mid-sixties - claimed that he also attended the February 1928 PPTUS Second Plenum "In the company of Manahan", but almost certainly the meeting recalled by the Legionarios Supremo was the PPTUS Third Plenum held in Shanghai some eight months later. On that occasion he and Manahan were listed among the signatories to a proclamation announcing that the second Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference would be convened in Vladivostok the following year.

Bognot's memory apparently suffered a much worse lapse, for he later claimed that he remained in the Soviet Union for over a year, studying at Moscow University. In fact, contemporary accounts attest to Bognot's presence in Manila during the months in question. When Evangelista returned to the Islands in May
1928, indeed, Bognot was already there, and went to the pier to greet him.

Araneta was requested by the three former students not to disclose their identities.
Araneta op.cit. p.153

See, for example, Araneta op.cit. p.158; Hoeksema op.cit. pp.69-70; and Alfredo B. Saulo Communist in the Philippines: an Introduction Ateneo Publications Office, Manila 1969 pp.18-9

If the Soviet Union had been in existence in 1896, Varona suggested, Bonifacio too would have turned to Moscow for support in the fight for his country's independence.

Barroga was born in the Ermita district of Manila around 1891. In 1913 he was included in the Union de Tabaqueros delegation to the COF's inaugural convention, and in the roster of delegates "tabaquero" is listed as his own occupation. By 1928 he was the Union's vice-president, the presidency having passed to Isabelo Tejada.

Domingo Ponce "Las actividades 'rojas' en Filipinas" (a "strictly personal and confidential" memorandum to Senate President Quezon, dated January 21, 1929) (Quezon Papers Box 143); Domingo Ponce "Ang Suliraning Manggagawa sa Harap ng Iba't Ibang Bansa" ("The Workers' Plight Brought to the Attention of Other Countries") Pagkakaisa May 1, 1929

Allegations that Ponce and other "Supreme Fraternal Chamber" members ran the Legionarios for personal profit had been circulating almost since the decade began, but apparently no official investigations were instituted until February 1926. Then the authorities were prompted into taking action after the fraternity's account books were destroyed by a "fire of unknown origin" the day before they were due to be audited. The Calle Soler office where they were kept, reports implied, had been conveniently quiet on the afternoon in question because it was "National Prayer Day", and most of the Legionarios in town had gone to pray for independence in the Mehan Gardens.

Manila Times February 25, 1926
(57) For a spirited denial of the charges against the Legionarios see Domingo Ponce Fiat Lux ... En defensa de la institucion 'Legionarios del Trabajo' Imprenta 'El Retono', Manila 1928

(58) Tribune May 3, 1928


(60) Congreso Obrero de Filipinas "Ang Unang Putok ay Maririnig ng Buong Daigdig sa ika-10 ng Hunyo ng 1928" ("The First Shot will be Heard Round the World on June 10, 1928") Mimeograph circular to COF delegates signed by Hilario Barroga and Domingo Ponce, c.June 1928
CHAPTER FIVE

POLARISATION AND SCHISM

The leaders of the Lapiang Manggagawa most likely remained confident that the Congreso Obrero was evolving in the manner they desired right up until its XVIIth annual convention in May 1929. Outwardly their colleagues on the executive continued in general to back their various initiatives and to share their combative attitude towards employers and government. Evangelista's influence in particular seemed as strong as ever. Upon his return from Moscow he threw himself with his customary energy into a new assignment as head of the COF's Committee on Organisation and Federation. Given the emphasis the Congreso had recently placed on re-organisation and trade union unity, this was clearly a key position, and it entrusted Evangelista with an area of responsibility close to his heart. It was he, rather than COF president Barroga or secretary Ponce, who still shouldered the day-to-day work of publishing pamphlets and circulars, arranging meetings and running the Tondo office. When Ponce for some reason resigned in about February 1929 Evangelista was the natural choice to fill the breach, and he again became secretary in name as well as in practice. The following month the left's continuing advance was seemingly confirmed by the approval by the COF executive of a lengthy "Thesis" bearing the hallmark of Evangelista's authorship for presentation to the impending convention. Analysing the labour movement's weaknesses and offering "pointers to the way forward", the "Thesis" in effect recommended that the Congreso should give the Lapiang Manggagawa its unreserved support.

With historical hindsight, nevertheless, it is evident that the LM's continuing attempts to shape the Congreso's organisational structure and political outlook were meeting with growing resistance. The radical consensus which the party had been building so successfully over
the past three years was breaking down, giving way to the divisions which at the XVIIth convention culminated in open schism. Prior to that convention the gradual polarisation of opinion was largely concealed, partly because the federation's activities and statements still reflected Evangelista's imprint above all others, and partly because the LM's opponents played a canny game, not fully declaring themselves until the rift occurred. Even then, when the degree of discord became self-evident, the precise issues and principles at dispute were half-submerged amid a welter of mud-slinging. For these reasons the etiology of the schism cannot be uncovered as easily as might be expected. With direct evidence at a premium, the question is best approached by examining exactly what Evangelista and his LM comrades did and said during the critical months of late 1928 and early 1929 that was likely to turn the other Congreso leaders against them. As will be seen, the problem here is not that there was a dearth of potential sources of friction, but that there were so many. Which irritants finally proved decisive must remain a matter of conjecture, but probably each was less important in isolation than in its cumulative effect.

Issues of Leadership and Organisation

A convenient point of departure is provided by Evangelista's strictures on the nature of labour leadership itself. As noted in the previous chapter, the Union de Impresores president had long been urging Philippine unions to draw their cadres primarily from their own rank and file. Continued dependence on outsiders, he had contended, discouraged workers from becoming self-reliant as individuals and as a class, and also circumscribed the labour movement's horizons. Most detrimental of all, he had argued in the Congreso's early days, were the politicos who used labour as a footstool for their ambitions and embroiled the organisations they led in divisive party factionalism. In taking this view Evangelista had echoed the Congreso's avowed though much ignored maxim that "labour and politics should not mix", but after he left the Nacionalista party in 1924 his objections to politicos underwent a significant change. Worse than their opportunism and the internecine squabbling they provoked, he came to believe, was the fact that they represented parties which in the final analysis served the interests of the class enemy, the bourgeoisie. Renouncing the view that
organised labour should stand aloof from the political arena, Evangelista now wanted to see the union movement committed to building the Lapiang Manggagawa as the party of the working class.

Evangelista's views on labour leadership were further re-enforced and developed by his contacts with the communist movement overseas, which were established on a close and regular basis in mid-1927. Around this time the climate of opinion in the Comintern and its associated organisations was beginning to take a leftward, more sectarian turn, and communists throughout the world were being called upon to escalate their attacks not just upon the bourgeoisie but upon all leaders and parties who wittingly or unwittingly diverted the working class from its ordained revolutionary path. Such thinking was already strongly reflected at the May 1927 conference in Hankow which launched the PPTUS. "Reformism", Profintern general secretary Losovsky told the gathering, "is closely linked on an international scale with the bourgeoisie". Should the Social Democrats ever abandon the theory of class harmony, he jibed, they would "have to cease being Social Democrats". The leaders of the American Federation of Labor stood condemned as "loyal advocates of American imperialism". It was essential, Losovsky summed up, "to combat those within our ranks who act as agents of capitalism". (2) In conformity with this line, the Hankow conference called for an unequivocally militant stance of "No class peace; no class collaboration - but consistent class war against all exploiters!" (3)

The extent to which unions in the Philippines were disfigured by reformist faults had already been examined by Evangelista in an article written a few weeks earlier. Bureaucracies like those which dominated conservative associations overseas, he admitted, scarcely existed in the Islands. Nonetheless the "spirit of bureaucracy" was well-entrenched, manifesting itself in the habit of establishing organisation "from above and not from below, from the masses". Many leading obreristas, he charged, became "queasy" or "afraid" when faced with putting their professed beliefs into practice; their fire and brimstone oratory was but a camouflage for their reformist acts. Filipino workers should learn from the experience of their brothers in Britain and France, who had put such timid leaders into government and found they then acted like conservatives. The Russian workers, on the other hand, had recognised the mensheviks and their like as conservatives soon enough, and had cast them aside. (4)
When Evangelista, Manahan and Bognot took their seats at the Fourth Profintern Congress in March 1928 the fight against labour reformism in all its manifestations was being given even greater emphasis. Whilst the world's masses were moving left, speakers at the Congress argued, their leaders were moving right. The moment was thus opportune for revolutionary trade unionists to appeal directly to their fellow workers in the shops and factories and, by "patient, comradely explanation", to persuade them that all liberal, Christian, fascist, yellow and nationalist unions were either misguided or pernicious.(5) In the Philippines, the Profintern Congress specified, the union movement should struggle in particular against "craft unionism and mutualism" and strive to substitute "proletarian for bourgeois leadership".(6)

These recommendations underscored Evangelista's own perennial prescriptions for the labour movement, and may well have been drafted upon his advice. Since he saw the confining influence of non-worker leaders as partially responsible for the survival of "outmoded" organisational forms, he regarded the struggle against "bourgeois leadership" and the drive to restructure the trade union movement along industrial lines as two battles in a single campaign. In the months following his return from the Soviet Union, the LM tried to intensify its efforts on both fronts.

As we noted, the Congreso executive had itself decreed in August 1927 that industrial unions should be built "whenever possible". In most industries, inevitably, a new all-embracing union could not be constructed without the extinction of existing craft unions and localised unions, and many leaders who drew their authority and prestige from such unions would naturally tend to be rather unenthusiastic about the whole idea. "Whenever possible", they might argue, merely alluded to some appropriate time in the distant and unforeseeable future. The LM leaders, on the other hand, who interpreted the phrase to mean "without delay", were now more and more determined to overcome any further procrastination.

In July 1928, in his capacity as head of the COF's Committee on Organisation and Federation, Evangelista issued a booklet which put forward a blueprint for remodelling the entire labour movement. The COF executive, he reminded his readers, had approved industrial unionism in principle nearly a year before. Now that decision should
be acted upon and the Congreso transformed into a truly comprehensive national trade union centre. All existing unions, he proposed, should be subsumed into twenty-three industrial unions, established to cover each of the following: agriculture and fisheries; foodstuffs; clothing; hotel and catering; domestic service; land transportation; marine transportation; communications, graphics (printing, etc.); tobacco; leather; wood; metal; sugar refining; rice milling; vegetable oil manufacture; abaca processing; mining; commerce; government; education; health; and a residual category listed obscurely as "artists, barbers, etc."(7)

In a postscript to his booklet, Evangelista requested anyone who wished to help in establishing a union or in writing a union programme to contact him directly, either at his home in Malate or at the COF's Tondo office.(8) This invitation apparently received a disappointing response, for in the next five months the re-organisation moves seem to have made no further headway. In December 1928 the Lapiang Manggagawa leaders started trying to force the pace. Together with an LM cigar-maker, Balbino Navarro, Evangelista himself took the lead by making preparations for a convention which it was hoped would resolve to amalgamate the different unions in the tobacco industry.(9) Soon there followed an appeal to seamstresses and embroiderers, wherein Evangelista asked to be put in touch with workers who would be interested in launching a consolidated union to cater for those trades.(10) Another LM member of the COF executive, Jose Hilario, made corresponding overtures to the workers in Manila's beauty parlours and barbershops.(11)

By February 1929 the campaign had hastened beyond the planning stage and the first new unions were being publicly proclaimed. The start was made, for obvious reasons, in those industries where the LM's leaders already had a significant following. Antonino Ora, for several years president of the Union de Aserradores Mecanicos, was named to head the industrial union for woodworkers. Evangelista, many times Union de Impresores president, took direction of the graphical workers' union. Urbano Arcega and Cirilo Honorio, respectively president and secretary of the Union de Chineleros, assumed identical positions in the new union for leather and footwear workers.(12) Almost certainly the two latter bodies initially existed only on paper, for when the Congreso's radical wing tallied its strength after the May schism the printers' and slippermakers' organisations were still listed under their old names. The woodworkers, however, claimed by that time
to have built up a membership of over 2,600, and the barbers to have
attracted a respectable 800 members. The only other "industrial"
associations then actually in existence were a single tabaqueros' local
with 800 members and an embryonic, 50-strong union of government
employees.(13)

Even if the envisaged industrial unions mostly remained on the
drawing board, though, the intent was plain enough, and those obrer-
isas who felt their positions and associations threatened by the LH's
organisational zealotry were predictably aggrieved. A good impression
of the antagonism this issue provoked may be gained by reference to the
tobacco industry. Here the preparations for a "unity convention"
foundered in the face of opposition from the Union de Tabaqueros, which
with 12,000 members was by far the industry's largest union and hence
crucial to any unification scheme. In its annoyance, the Lapiang
Manggagawa began denouncing the UTF leadership, and in particular the
union's president, Isabelo Tejada. Angry UTF activists then jumped to
their leaders' defence. Since Evangelista was a printer and had con­
fessed that his experience of the tobacco industry was limited, a UTF
executive member demanded to know, why did he wish to meddle in the																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
tabaqueros' internal affairs? Since he was avowedly committed to labour
unity, why did he advance plans that created only discord and division?
This, the writer, charged, simply played into the capitalists' hands.
(14) What prompted the challenge to Tejada's authority, a second
irate tabaquero asked rhetorically

"If the wish (of the Lapiang Manggagawa) is to place Comrade
Crisanto Evangelista on a pedestal so he can be exalted and
proclaimed DICTATOR or KAISER of the Filipino workers, why
doesn't it say so openly and frankly? Why is it necessary
to destroy the good name of others; is it so that he alone
will be recognised as a great and skilful leader?"(15)

Unfortunately the attack that prompted these hostile responses
cannot be traced, but evidently it inferred that Tejada was suspect
because he worked as a buying agent for the Katubusan factory, whose
manager was president of the industry's employers' group, the Manila
Tobacco Association.(16) The left's castigations of alleged reformists,
in other words, were no longer being couched solely in non-specific and
impersonal terms. The time had come, one radical wrote in July 1928,
"for the people to know which leaders are honest to the proletariat and
which are two-faced".(17) At first, however, the selected victims had
been figures safely beyond the mainstream, most notably FTF president Joaquin Balmori. In 1927 and early 1928 the Congreso had been making friendly overtures to the FTF with a view to eventual unification, and the two federations had briefly co-operated in a joint educational and propaganda campaign. When Balmori finally blocked the fusion proposal, though, daggers were drawn and the FTF leader was condemned for being pro-capitalist and anti-strike. Whereas the COF had formerly been regarded as Nacionalista and the FTF as Democrata, Evangelista declared, the crucial division now was between the "COF - Radical-Revolutionist" and the "FTF - Conservative-Co-operationist".

In turning against the Union de Tabaqueros leadership, the Lapian Manggagawa partisans signalled their readiness to extend their denunciations to targets within the Congreso itself, and not just to peripheral personalities either. Tejada sat with Ora and Evangelista on the COF executive and his UTF deputy, Hilario Barroga, was actually the federation's president. The next stage in the radical campaign, likewise related to the struggle for industrial unionism, was to suggest that certain leaders and organisations should be excluded from full membership in the Congreso. Formalised in a resolution passed by the Union de Impresores in March 1929, this proposal can be seen as the culmination of Evangelista's long-held misgivings about mutualism. When in past years the Congreso's trade union affiliates had appealed for assistance during strikes, the UIF resolution recalled, the representatives from the mutualist societies, the savings clubs and the fraternities had simply stood by with their arms folded, pretending to be deaf. Since they felt no obligation to the working class as a whole, it was time to recognise that their influence debilitated the Congreso and would be a serious impediment to its future progress. When the XVIIth convention opened in May, the Impresores urged, it should only give accreditation to delegates from trade or industrial unions. If other delegates were to be admitted, they should not be accorded the right to vote.

The "Thesis" drafted for presentation to the convention, furthermore, made it clear that Evangelista and his associates wished before long to see this exclusionist policy carried a step further. Sketching a new constitution for the federation, the "Thesis" proposed that affiliation should be open to "industrial unions (formed) in accordance with the COF resolution of August 1927... These workers' associations..."
are the ones that will elect delegates to the Annual Convention". (22) Though not stated explicitly, the obvious corollary to this proposal was that those occupationally-based unions that refused to convert or dissolve into industrial unions would soon find themselves joining the mutualist societies out in the cold.

Whilst the Lapiang Manggagawa leaders probably considered the fight for industrial unions to be their most important organisational task in the months preceding the May 1929 convention, their energies were by no means confined in this direction alone. Fresh attention was paid to agrarian questions, to worker-peasant unity, and to the COF-affiliated peasant body, the KPMP. Anti-imperialist work was likewise re-appraised and intensified. An organisation was founded to mobilise young workers and peasants. In conjunction with an association recently formed by left-wing Chinese in Manila, an inter-ethnic "united front" was proclaimed and plans drawn up for a workers' defence group. Aside from publicising these several enterprises individually, moreover, the LM was able from November 1928 onwards to give an overall picture of party policies and campaigns in its own monthly paper, edited by Evangelista under the title Tinig-Manggagawa ("Workers' Voice"). Though not threatening to disrupt the Congreso's individual affiliates as directly as the drive for industrial unionism, we shall see that each of these initiatives had a significant bearing on the balance of forces within the federation as a whole. Witnessing this unprecedented surge of activity, moderate and conservative labourites would have become increasingly convinced that if they failed to resist the leftist tide they would shortly be overwhelmed.

The Peasant Movement

Information on the political evolution of the KPMP is regrettably sketchy. In the years immediately following its foundation in August 1922, it may be recalled, the confederation had been identified with the Nacionalista party and had been regarded as markedly less militant than the principal pro-Democrata peasant organisations, the Anak Pawas and the Kapatirang Magsasaka. The notion of labour-capital co-operation had been enshrined as the first tenet in the KPMP "Creed". (23) The defection of KPMP president Jacinto Manahan and a few other cadres to the Lapiang Manggagawa in mid-1925, whilst signifying that the drift
away from moderation and respectability had begun, did not bring about any abruptly conspicuous changes. Since the LM still had only a skeletal presence in the provinces, even those KPMP sections that shared their president's disillusion with the NP hierarchy probably saw no harm or inconsistency in continuing to support selected Nacionalista candidates at a local level. Gradually, though, the LM nucleus within the KPMP leadership expanded, and after Manahan returned from the Soviet Union in mid-1928 it became clearly dominant.

Like Evangelista, Manahan was greatly impressed by his visit and arrived back determined to promote his party's cause more forcefully and urgently. In August 1928, three months before the LM's Tinig appeared, the confederation started publishing a monthly paper entitled Anak-Pawis ("Sons of Toil"), warmly praised in the PPTUS magazine as having "a policy of struggle against the incredible extortions of the landlords, of intense interest in the Soviet Union, of unity with the Philippine proletariat and with the world revolutionary workers' movement against imperialism". What Manahan described as the KPMP's "transformation into a militant organisation" was ratified formally at its Third Convention, held at the beginning of December. In contrast to its 1922 launching - addressed by Quezon and other dignitaries in Manila - the 1928 convention was celebrated in Manahan's home barrio of Pitpitan, Bulacan under the watchful eyes of the local police and Constabulary. Their militancy uninhibited by these uninvited guests, the assembled delegates approved a radically redrafted "Creed" which substituted the pledge to labour-capital co-operation with the affirmations "We believe in mass action.... We believe in a real peasants' and workers' government". The once-favoured Nacionalista party was now dismissed together with its Democrata rival as representing "the rich and landowning class of the bourgeoisie". In conformity with the internationalist outlook of the Lapiang Manggagawa, instead, resolutions were passed in support of the Krestintern, PPTUS and Anti-Imperialist League, protesting against the "white terror" in China and congratulating the USSR "for the successful construction of socialism, which is the inspiration of all workers and peasants throughout the world".

Indubitably this fundamental and rather swift re-orientation must have been resisted at some stage by Nacionalista loyalists within the KPMP, but no record of their protests has survived. To a degree,
perhaps, their dissent was muted by the prospect that the confederation's scattered branches would continue to enjoy a large degree of autonomy. Many NP supporters, in any event, decided to remain in the organisation, presumably accepting the need for a belligerent stance against rural injustice whilst not wishing to isolate themselves from the excitement and occasional reward offered by orthodox electoral politics.

In the NP's higher echelons the apostasy of the principal peasant organisation sympathetic to the party would nevertheless have caused much consternation, and it appears an attempt was promptly made to entice the KPMP rank and file back into an acceptable fold. The support forfeited by the KPMP, party chieftains seemingly decided, should be transferred to the Workers' and Peasants' Association, a group that hitherto was either obscure or, as radicals claimed, non-existent.(27) This was led by an ambitious Nacionalista from Nueva Ecija named Felipe Jose, an ex-newspaperman in his mid-forties who at this time was training to become an optometrist. More significantly, perhaps, he was also a government employee, just as Jacinto Manahan had been when the NP's blessing had first been bestowed on the organisation he led back in 1922. Whereas Manahan had then worked for the Bureau of Printing, Jose was placed more conveniently in the Rural Credit Division of the Bureau of Agriculture, holding a supervisory position which would entail regular visits to the countryside and furnish the opportunity for official and union business to be happily combined.

These developments in the realm of peasant politics carried important implications for the labour movement in Manila. With 15,000 members, the KPMP accounted for nearly a fifth of the Congreso Obrero's total affiliates, and its delegates could consequently form a powerful bloc at the annual COF convention. To those within the Congreso who wished to halt or reverse the left's advance, the unequivocally militant stance adopted by the KPMP at Pitpitan was therefore not a propitious sign.

Filipino-Chinese Solidarity

Similar forebodings must have been aroused when the Lapiang Manggagawa began advocating that the equally militant, 1,500 strong Philippine Chinese Laborers' Association (PCLA) should be granted admission to the Congreso. In this instance, though, ideological
misapprehensions were compounded by the issue of race.

The traditional and deeply ingrained view in obrerista circles was that Chinese workers were a serious curb on Filipino labour's struggle for a better life. Employers favoured them, it was observed, because they were prepared to toil long hours for low wages in abysmal environments, and ineluctably their acceptance of these sweatshop conditions depressed standards throughout industry. Resentments rooted in economic friction were made more refractory by the fact that most Chinese in Manila remained residentially, culturally and linguistically segregated from the wider community. Prior to 1928, indeed, there is no record of any contact between associations of Filipino and Chinese workers whatsoever. Certainly no Chinese societies had ever been admitted to the Congreso Obrero, and nor had any individual Chinese been elected to its executive. The federation's only real concern about the immigrant community, in truth, was that it should not grow any larger, the existing controls on the entry of "Asiatic labour" being supported with ardour at convention after convention.

In its early years the Lapiang Manggagawa had also opposed any relaxation to the immigration law, protesting to the Governor General in July 1925, for example, that due to its lax enforcement Filipinos were facing competition in the labour market from more "foreigners" than ever.(28) Speaking at a "Double Ten" celebration organised by the PCLA in 1928, however, Evangelista acknowledged that this stance had been a "great blunder", a capitulation to imperialist divide and rule. Filipino and Chinese workers, he urged, should henceforth strive to overcome past misunderstandings and join hands in their common class cause, the "final emancipation of labour".(29) Undoubtedly the major catalyst in this re-orientation was the LM's maturing internationalism. Both the Profintern and the PPTUS had identified the fight against racial and national prejudices as a priority task, and had expressly enjoined their Pacific region adherents to integrate Chinese immigrants into the indigenous union movements.(30) Evangelista had raised these questions himself, he told his PCLA audience, "when I met your leaders in China", by whom he meant the PPTUS delegates of the Communist-linked All-China Labour Federation he had met in Shanghai when on route to Moscow in February 1928.(31)
Another Profintern and PPTUS priority in the late twenties was defence of the Chinese revolution, at first against imperialist interference and then, after the national united front had collapsed, against the Kuomintang as well. Probably developing their contacts with local Chinese activists through following events on the mainland, the LM leaders would be aware that the Communist-Kuomintang rift had created a parallel division of loyalties in the Philippines. (32)

Whilst the local towkays cabled their congratulations to Chiang Kai-shek for his "energetic efforts to rid China of Bolshevism", the sympathies of many working class Chinese rested with the CCP. (33) Chinese communists in Manila had reportedly established a clandestine nucleus as early as 1926, but there was apparently no open organisational focus for pro-CCP sentiments until after the schism with the KMT had occurred, and almost certainly it was to fill this need that the Philippine Chinese Laborers' Association was formed. (34)

Even though the PCLA was not strictly a labour union, its working class base and communist leadership would from the LM's viewpoint make it a potentially valuable ally. Speaking at the "Double Ten" celebration, Evangelista thus intimated that he personally would like to see the Association affiliated to the Congreso "as an entity". But, he added, this might be "impracticable for the time being" - presumably a recognition that such a move would encounter strong opposition. A second alternative, he suggested, might be to form PCLA members into industrial sections, to be linked eventually with the COF's proposed industrial constituents. If this too proved impossible, "because of language problems", some less formalised means of collaboration should be devised. Whatever methods were adopted, PCLA and COF members should then work in concert towards fixing a uniform standard of wages and hours for each trade and towards concluding agreements of mutual support and defence in the event of strikes. (35)

In his speech Evangelista also suggested that the COF and PCLA should set up a special Joint Committee to discuss this "united class front" in greater detail, and around December 1928 such a Committee was duly created with three representatives from each side. The three Congreso participants, it can hardly have been accidental, were all from the Lapiang Manggagawa - Evangelista himself, Ora and Jose Hilario. But this was seemingly one area where hostility to LM initiatives was being kept deliberately veiled, and when a manifesto was
issued by the Committee proclaiming the Filipino-Chinese united front as an accomplished fact, the LM trio felt able to sign their names on the COF's behalf. When the front was publicly inaugurated with a "Class Solidarity Night" in February 1929, moreover, the festivities were attended by the COF president and secretary, Hilario Barroga and Domingo Ponce. Even so, the presiding spirit at the celebration was one of uncompromising leftism. Interspersed with choruses of the Internationale and other inspirational songs, LM and PCLA speakers vied with each other to condemn the twin evils of capitalism and imperialism with the most vehemence. "Our duty", Evangelista exhorted, "is to revolutionise everything in this world".

Putting the united front into practice was similarly in the hands of the left. In what was heralded as the first joint Filipino-Chinese strike ever held, Union de Chinleros members led by LM activist Urbano Arcega joined with the PCLA slippermakers' section to demand enhanced and standardised wage scales. Four hundred workers maintained the stoppage for nearly five months and eventually, after a boycott campaign against the low-paying Chinese employers, achieved at least a partial victory. Together with its PCLA counterpart, the mechanical sawyers' union headed by Antonino Ora reportedly gained a complete victory in a strike over victimisation and sawmill conditions. LM and PCLA leaders also co-operated in the formation of a Samahan sa Pagtatanggol ng Manggagawa (Workers' Defence Association) to assist workers persecuted or arrested as a result of union activities, but this organisation apparently failed to acquire any real substance.

Even though the conservatives within the Congreso did not participate in these activities, they might have found such limited ad hoc liaisons with the PCLA to be relatively unobjectionable. What they could not countenance was the PCLA becoming a COF affiliate, as was advocated again by the LM at the May 1929 convention. This, some delegates argued, was simply "illegal", presumably meaning that in their view the COF constitution confined admission to associations of Filipino workers. After the Congreso had split, the conservative faction re-affirmed the importance they attached to the Chinese issue by stipulating the continued exclusion of the PCLA as a precondition for any reconciliation. At their own convention, meanwhile, they
promptly reverted to tradition and passed a resolution calling for tighter immigration controls.\(^{(42)}\)

Another left organisation which the Lapiang Manggagawa wished to see given representation in the Congreso was the Katipunan ng mga Kabataang Anak-Pawis (KKAP - Young Workers' Organisation), a group launched by the party in November 1928. Headed by Gregorio Umagat and Felix Caguin, respectively a tabaquero and a printer, the KKAP was designed to provide a proletarian counterpoint to bodies such as the YMCA, Young Catholics and Boy Scouts. Whilst these indoctrinated their members in subservience to the imperialists and the bourgeoisie, the KKAP proclaimed, it would stand four square with the revolutionary workers and peasants. Besides addressing the particular problems faced by working class youth, such as college fees and exploitative apprenticeship schemes, it would thus rally support for labour's broader struggles.\(^{(43)}\)

If this support was to be effective, the LM argued, the adult workers represented in the Congreso had a duty in return to give their younger comrades proper organisational and theoretical guidance. To provide a channel for this fraternal collaboration, the party proposed, the KKAP should be granted a seat on the Congreso's executive council.\(^{(44)}\)

The Issue of Patriotism

In reality, of course, the disagreements within the Congreso were not as compartmentalised as the foregoing discussion might suggest. Each spoken and unspoken controversy overlapped with and fuelled the next to create a generalised ideological polarisation. The initiatives and proposals championed by the left were judged not on their individual merits but collectively in conjunction with their common source, the Lapiang Manggagawa itself. Either through over-confidence or through an unwillingness to settle any longer for partial, often lip-service support, Evangelista and his colleagues may indeed have wanted the debate to be conducted on this basis. The "Thesis" which they drafted for the XVIIth COF convention not only drew together all their prescriptions for the union movement for endorsement as a single package, but called upon the delegates in addition to affirm their backing for the LM as such. The Congreso, advised the "Thesis", should resolve "to
give every assistance (to the Lapiang Manggagawa) in order that it may become the vanguard of our struggle". (45)

This, as the "Thesis" made clear, meant that besides seeking ratification of its labour strategies the LM wanted the Congreso to subscribe to its analysis of the broader political scene, and in particular to its views on the established parties and the campaign for independence. As when the party's previous move to gain endorsement had met with a narrow defeat in 1926, therefore, many Nacionalista and Democrata loyalists in the federation would presumably have felt unable to align themselves with the LM even if they sympathised with its militancy in the industrial sphere. Between 1926 and mid-1928, we have seen, the Congreso's disaffection with mainstream politics appeared to deepen, and perhaps this helped persuade the LM leaders that the time was ripe for a second attempt. For reasons we shall now examine, however, it is likely that the resistance the party encountered on the grounds of Nacionalista and Democrata partisanship in 1929 was actually stiffer than it had been three years earlier.

The first point to make is that the Lapiang Manggagawa's attitude towards the major parties had already been unambiguously dismissive at the time of the 1926 debate. The disillusionment with Nacionalista conduct of the independence campaign which arose from the Fairfield Bill controversy of 1924 had indeed played a crucial role in bringing the LM properly to life. The manifesto issued by the party in November 1925, around which the 1926 debate largely revolved, stated flatly that the Nacionalistas and Democrata could "never lead the people on to a successful fight for freedom" because their stance was too passive. (46) When he had been a member of the Nacionalista party, Evangelista recalled in 1926, he had tried to influence its policy by "boring from within". But his voice had been drowned, and he had realised the tactic was futile. (47) Convinced that the NP hierarchy remained wedded to vacillation and compromise, the LM was equally disinclined to pursue the alternative tactic of party-to-party collaboration. Appeals for unity behind the nation's leaders, to which in pre-Fairfield days the LM had once acceded, were now rejected as mere sham.

Early in 1926, when still jousting with the obdurate Governor Wood, Quezon had issued a fresh call to Filipinos to set aside their
sectional differences for the sake of the national cause. Lured by patronage and reluctant to appear unpatriotic, the Democrata leadership responded positively, agreeing to join the most influential Nacionalistas in a new ten-man National Supreme Council, whose declared purpose was the "high direction" of Philippine policy in general and the independence campaign in particular. With great fanfare the Council announced ambitious plans for a vigorous pro-independence propaganda drive in the United States, and to raise funds for this enterprise municipal and provincial officials were encouraged to constitute a network of Supreme Council "solidarity committees" extending throughout the Islands.(48) On Washington's birthday, proclaimed as National Prayer Day, Supreme Council members headed the congregation at a huge open-air mass on the Luneta and beseeched the Lord "to stay the hand that would smite our liberties".(49)

Within three years the National Supreme Council and its bandwagon trappings were to be dead and forgotten, but initially they succeeded in evoking the enthusiastic popular response which Quezon had sought. Against the general tide, however, the Lapiang Manggagawa stood steadfastly unimpressed. Washington and Wall Street, wrote Antonino Ora in January 1926, had recognised long ago that the Philippine independence movement was "sated with words and starved of deeds". To its many "bluffs" they were by now well-accustomed. Buying space in American newspapers or sending speakers on coast-to-coast tours would exhaust the money solicited from the people to no good effect, for at most the imperialists might replace Wood with a man like Harrison who would mollify the politicos with wealth and positions. When Harrison had been Governor General, Ora recalled, the Democratas had attacked the Nacionalistas for accepting such pickings. Yet in accepting patronage as a reward for joining the National Supreme Council the Democratas had shown they would succumb to the same temptation. If the nation continued to sanction such charades, Ora concluded, it was frankly unworthy of the freedom it desired.(50)

In rejecting the nationalist campaign of what it termed "the bourgeoisie class and its tools" in 1925 and 1926 the Lapiang Manggagawa was tactically at variance with the line that the Comintern was then generally prescribing for its adherents in Asia. This held that the primary task in colonial countries was to unite all "national revolutionary" elements - proletarian, peasant and bourgeois alike -
in the broadest possible anti-imperialist bloc. Where the most popular nationalist organisations were led by the bourgeoisie - as was the Kuomintang, for example, or the National Congress in India - communists should not isolate themselves from the masses by establishing a rival liberation movement, but rather participate in those organisations and seek to stiffen their anti-imperialist resolve. Theoretically this advice was qualified by a rider to the effect that there should nevertheless be an absolute break with reformist bourgeois elements that either hindered the revolutionary organisation of the masses or sought compromise and reconciliation with the imperialist power. The point at which a bourgeois-led movement should be deemed insufficiently "national revolutionary" to merit support was however never precisely defined, and in practice the Comintern in the mid-twenties normally counselled its member parties against interpreting the term too fastidiously.(51)

There is little doubt that at first the Comintern was inclined to believe the Nacionalista party could pass muster. Taking its cue from the ECCI's Fifth Plenum, the Workers' Party of America resolved in August 1925 to support the Filipino people actively in a struggle it saw as becoming "sharper and more nationalist revolutionary in tendency" day by day.(52) This viewpoint was amplified in an article published in Inprecorr in October 1925, believed to have been written by Harrison George. The Nacionalista party, the author mistakenly but significantly claimed, had when it was first founded taken the name "Nationalist Revolutionary Party". Under its "indefatigable" leadership, he recalled, the Filipinos had in 1916 won the promise of eventual independence. Thereafter the anti-imperialist movement had temporarily relaxed, but now, faced with a retentionist Republican administration in Washington and the "reaction" of Governor Wood in Manila, a new "revolutionary movement" was gaining strength. Especially active in this movement, the author noted, were the Filipino workers and tenant farmers. But there was no imputation that the Nacionalista party had become passive or had forfeited its former leading role.(53)

Before such an assessment had taken firm root in Comintern circles, however, the Lapiang Manggagawa's November 1925 manifesto and early 1926 appraisal of the National Supreme Council delivered a verdict that was sharply contrary. Far from criticising the LM for committing a left-sectarian mistake, communist discourses then swung abruptly and
with some zeal over to the same stance. The Philippine independence
movement, berated one Workers' Party of America observer in March 1926,
was led by "timid politicians". (54) Its tactics, another wrote some
months later, which it failed to recognise were increasingly hopeless,
were those of "exaggerated diplomatic subservience and pleading respec-
tability". (55) Even more damming was an article published the same
year in Moscow, said to have set the tone for subsequent Soviet comment-
taries. "The Filipino bourgeoisie", this stated flatly
"is not capable of decisive struggle because it is tied to
the American bourgeoisie. The Islands will gain full
independence only when the growing working class and the
farmers take the matter of independence into their own
hands." (56)

By the time the Sixth Comintern Congress met in 1928 the two
themes encapsulated in this judgement - that the bourgeoisie was bound
to betray the nationalist movement and that hegemony over the movement
should therefore be assumed by the proletariat - were no longer excep-
tional in communist analyses of colonial countries. They had, in fact,
become the rule. This was a manifestation of the same leftward shift
in Comintern thinking mentioned earlier in the context of intensified
attacks on labour reformism, a shift related in part to political
alignments in the Soviet Union and in part to the belief that the
temporary stabilisation of capitalism which had occurred in the mid-
twenties was drawing to a close, heralding a "third period" of renewed
revolutionary upsurge. As regards the colonial question, the tendency
to deny any positive anti-imperialist role to the national bourgeoisie
was in part also a reaction to the disastrous collapse in 1927 of the
united front between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang.
Whilst understanding the circumstances that prompted the Comintern's
change of line on this issue, orthodox communists were in retrospect to
acknowledge that the pendulum was swung back too far, and that the
position endorsed by the Sixth Congress was "a serious concession to
the left-sectarian deviation". (57)

Whilst in 1926 the Lapiang Manggagawa had seemingly helped
persuade overseas communists to adopt a less rosy view of the Filipino
bourgeoisie, in 1928 the party in turn responded to the ultra-leftist
current in the International by adopting a view that was more negative
still. Obviously the change was not as conspicuous or fundamental as
in countries where a united front policy was abandoned, but it was
appreciable nevertheless. Whereas the LM had earlier focused on the passivity and tactical ineptitude of the bourgeois-led independence campaign, it now accused the Nacionalistas of outright opposition to independence. The "so-called Nacionalistas", charged Evangelista, well recognised that "under the guns of America" their monopoly of power and their capacity to exploit the Filipino people were safely guaranteed. Should their American protectors withdraw, on the other hand, they would be faced with the dread prospect of a class revolution.(58)

The accusation that the Nacionalistas had abandoned the national cause was fleshed out in attacks on the congenial relationship the party hierarchy had struck with Henry Stimson, the newly-installed Governor General. After Governor Wood had died in office in August 1927, the LM observed, Quezon and Osmeña had travelled to Washington, supposedly to press once again for immediate independence. What they had in fact asked for, and obtained, was the appointment of Stimson, lately assigned by President Coolidge to supervise American suppression of the Sandinista liberation movement in Nicaragua. Having flailed for years against Wood, the "imperialists' faithful lackeys" had thus deliberately secured an equally militarist, retentionist and reactionary successor. Seeking only autonomy, the LM concluded, their real quarrel with Wood had been his attempts to curb their power and patronage. Now they had found a chief executive who promised to be more accommodating, their agitation had suddenly subsided, precisely as Ora had predicted when commenting on the National Supreme Council in January 1926.(59)

When Stimson arrived in Manila in early 1928 calling for a new era of "co-operation", the LM observed further, the Nacionalistas had responded so fulsomely they had even begun parroting "co-operation" as a catchword themselves. Compliantly they pushed through the legislature the "shameful" Belo Bill, which appropriated P 250,000 to the Governor's office for the employment of American advisers. Again at his behest, they approved an amendment to the Corporation Law in order to ease the restrictions on corporate land purchases.(60) Facilitating the entry of fresh American capital through such measures, Stimson had promised, would bring the Islands "inestimable benefits".(61) In reality, Jacinto Manahan demurred, it would turn Filipino peasants and agricultural workers into "plantation slaves".(62) What Stimson and his Nacionalista friends truly meant by their slogan "economic development", affirmed the
COF-PCLA manifesto, was that the American dollar should help the native capitalists to "suck the blood of the broad masses" yet more voraciously than before. (63)

Rather than being an isolated aberration, the LM emphasised, Nacionalista "co-operation" with Stimson was but the latest in a long succession of bourgeois betrayals. In 1897 bourgeois elements had assassinated the "proletarian" patriot Bonifacio, eliminated other workers from the revolutionary leadership and then literally sold out to Spain at Biak-na-bato. Two years later, many bourgeois leaders who had accepted high office in the Philippine Republic treacherously switched their allegiance to the American invaders, going on to form the Federal party with its "poisonous programme of annexation". After casting the Federalistas aside at the earliest electoral opportunity the people had entrusted the cause of independence to the Nacionalistas, but the compromises and deceits had continued: friendly consensus during Harrison's "New Era"; vacillation over the Jones Bills; plain lies over the Fairfield Bill; now "co-operation". (64) And this experience, the LM pointed out, had its parallels in other colonial and semi-colonial countries, most tragically and proximately just across the South China Sea.

The lesson to be drawn from this record of bourgeois perfidy, the Lapiang Manggagawa had deduced even before the Comintern, was that the struggle against imperialism could be waged effectively only by the working class. Here again, though, the left turn in the International fortified the party's stance and gave the call for working class hegemony an added weight and urgency. "Working people", a flysheet circulated by the party in October 1928 proclaimed

"The days of the 'big shots' and the 'high-ups' are over. Times have changed. Now is the time of the proletariat.... protest against the duplicity of the Nacionalistas, the duplicity of the 'pretend independistas' who are in truth enemies of the nation's freedom. ....Let us overthrow the traitors to the nation, like we overthrew the Federalista and Progresista traitors!" (65)

Two months later the COF-PCLA manifesto sounded a yet more aggressive note. After dwelling on the mounting threat of imperialist war - another theme being given greater prominence by the Comintern at this time - the manifesto asked workers to recognise

"that our first duty is to fight the danger of this imperialist world war and, in case we are unable to prevent
it, to transform it into a civil war and seize political power from the imperialists, forming with this power our own government - a Workers' and Peasants' Government!
The brave attempt to achieve this objective made by our beloved co-workers in Canton in late 1927 offers a valuable example of why we must act in this way!(66)

Workers reading these lines might be forgiven for doubting whether it would be altogether wise to emulate an uprising which had ended in a wave of brutal suppression. But there was another element in the manifesto which perhaps caused even greater puzzlement and consternation. One moment the manifesto's LM and PCLA authors were advancing their usual case for the working class wresting the independence movement away from the treacherous bourgeoisie, the next moment they were calling the whole concept of nationalism into question. "'Nationalism' and 'Patriotism', they advised, "are merely the deceiving words of the exploiters".(67)

This statement had been foreshadowed by Evangelista back in May 1926, when he had placed disparaging quotation marks around the words "nationalism" and "patriotism" in an observation about the 1914-18 "imperialist war". On that occasion, however, his comments were clearly directed at the countries of the West, and no offence would have been caused.(68) "The nationalism of an (oppressed) people which strives for independence", Congreso members would readily have agreed with a speaker at the 1927 Hankow conference,

"constitutes a historically progressive factor and must therefore be supported by every proletarian, while the nationalism of those countries which oppress other nations is a historically reactionary factor against which we must carry on a ruthless struggle."(69)

Now, it seemed, the left had forgotten this crucial distinction and had begun to stigmatise nationalism as a pernicious delusion even for Filipinos. Reiterated in subsequent statements, the LM's strictures encompassed three main strands of argument. First, they were designed to warn workers and peasants in the Philippines against succumbing to jingoism in the event of another imperialist war, repeating the mistake their counterparts in Europe had made in 1914. The term "nationalism", secondly, was held to carry the unfortunate, erroneous connotation of a people united. In reality, it was argued, the allegiance sought by the Nacionalistas and their kind was to a "nation" in the grip of the imperialists, hacenderos and capitalists, a "nation" in which the workers
and peasants would forever be impoverished and oppressed. (70) In the context of its drive for a Filipino-Chinese united front, thirdly, the left wished to highlight the ethnic and national prejudices allegedly fanned by the bourgeoisie as obstacles to a truly internationalist class unity.

Whatever the merits of these arguments, the Lapiang Manggagawa must have recognised that here it was treading on very sensitive ground, for "nationalism" and "patriotism" were after all notions which occupied a hallowed and previously unchallenged place in the obrerista world-view. The party cannot have been entirely surprised, therefore, when its opponents seized upon its fulminations as evidence of serious heresy. Congreso members antagonised by the LM's increasingly strident assaults on the major parties had indeed been presented with valuable ammunition for a counter-attack. However many shortcomings the Nacionalista and Democrata leaders had as nationalists, they could argue, they at least never renounced nationalism as their guiding principle.

Backlash

How the stance adopted by the LM on nationalist issues in late 1928 and early 1929 affected its support amongst rank and file unionists is simply not known, but in the Congreso's upper echelons it undoubtedly lost the party more sympathy than it gained. Activists who had remained within the major parties but had nevertheless shared the LM's restiveness and scepticism about progress towards independence now drew back closer to their orthodox folds. Domingo Ponce probably spoke for many when in January 1929 he confided to Quezon his concern that "the campaign headed by Sr. Evangelista has in these last months taken a partisan and anti-patriotic trend". Though now determined to resist the campaign, Ponce continued, he as COF secretary and Hilario Barroga as COF president "stumbled on two serious inconveniences:

(a) That the masses or the majority of them are being placed on the side of Sr. Evangelista by his "red" theories.

(b) The economic means on which the said Sr. Evangelista relies, furnished by Sr. Ora".

If Evangelista and Ora were allowed to win control of "our only labour organisation", Ponce warned the Senate President, their attacks on the Nacionalista party and its leaders would grow still stronger.
The US Congress, moreover, might well conclude that a "red danger" had arisen in the Philippines, and hence become more resolutely opposed than ever to "our national cause"(71).

All this was preaching to the converted, for Quezon had already begun making his own moves to counteract the "red" campaign some months earlier - particularly, it seems, after Evangelista, Manahan and Bognot returned to Manila with enthusiastic accounts of the Soviet Union and the Fourth Profintern Congress. Around this time, Ponce himself recalled in the 1960s, the Congreso leadership had been summoned en masse to be given a pep-talk by Quezon in which he urged them to have no further links with the International or its offshoots.(72) The Senate President also made public statements to the same effect, and prevailed upon pro-government newspapers to carry features and editorials on the evils of Bolshevism in theory and practice.(73) Soundings from the COF about the feasibility of holding the Second PPTU Conference in Manila were smothered at birth.(74) A series of guest lectures on the Soviet Union which Evangelista started to give at the University of the Philippines was abruptly curtailed after the first had given rise to fears that the student body might be indoctrinated. (75) All these moves, it may be noted, were directed at the internationalist and pro-Soviet dimension of left-wing activities, the dimension which Quezon perhaps recognised was of greatest immediate concern to the colonial power. Intelligence reports on the growing fraternisation between Filipino labourites and the international communist movement, he may well have been told by Governor Stimson, had begun to cause disquiet even in distant Washington.(76)

More vexing to Quezon himself, most likely, was the Lapiang Manggagawa's presumption in claiming to be the authentic voice of the Filipino working class. Not alone among national leaders, Quezon liked to regard himself and his party as embodying the interests and aspirations of the entire country. Opposition he considered to be superfluous, and took as a personal affront. Whilst not given to cultivating an artificial "common man" image, he appreciated that his acceptance by the masses as their particular champion was a vital element in his political appeal. A party which tried to persuade the masses otherwise he would thus find acutely irritating. In electoral terms the LM obviously posed no imminent threat, but in the ranks of organised labour it had rapidly and alarmingly assumed the proportions of a major nuisance.
The KPMP, once the leading pro-Nacionalista peasant organisation, had already been lost. Now there was a serious danger that the Congreso Obrero, "our only labour organisation" as Ponce had put it, was going to suffer the same fate. In the KPMP's case, we suggested earlier, the Nacionalista hierarchy had been obliged to cut its losses and start afresh with the Workers' and Peasants' Association of Felipe Jose. It would be much better, Quezon must have felt, if the situation within the Congreso could be retrieved before this point was reached.

Ponce's signal that he and others in the federation had ended their flirtation with the militant left would therefore be received as welcome news. The prime purpose of the COF secretary's memorandum, Quezon would see between the lines, was that those wanting to save the Congreso from the LM's clutches be given some tangible assistance. Through Ora's munificence, Ponce wrote, the "reds" could "print pamphlets and propaganda notes, make trips, give travel expenses to workers and leaders from the provinces, and offer feasts". Their opponents, he hinted heavily, could do none of this because "neither the funds of the Congreso nor our own pockets can stand such expenses". How Quezon responded to this thinly-veiled request is not known, but it seems improbable that he left it completely unheeded. Even if funds were not made available, though, the Nacionalista hierarchy clearly did its best to assist its beleaguered obrerista supporters in other ways.

In the first place, NP leaders were in a position to intimate that services rendered the party would not go unrecognised or unrewarded. The party, they might say, had often shown its gratitude to labourites who had promoted its cause in the past, and it would continue to do so in the future. A number of those who worked most actively against the LM were duly favoured over the next few years with permanent or temporary positions in assorted government departments and agencies. In Domingo Ponce's case a favour of a different type was granted almost straight away. Both he and the Legionarios del Trabajo, it may be recalled, had been barred from using the postal service following investigations into the malversation of fraternity funds. Yet in March 1929 the Director of Posts suddenly relented. Since Ponce and others under suspicion had resigned as Legionario directors, he now reasoned, and since the present board of directors had not been implicated in the alleged frauds, both parties could have their mail restored. Strangely enough, though, the resignations had already taken effect when the banning order had...
first been imposed. Why sceptics might ask, had the Director of Posts not been possessed of the same logic then, and why when Ponce resumed his place as Legionarios Supremo in 1930 was the penalty not re-instated?

Complementing such benign forgiveness there was obviously an implied threat, for had Ponce and the Legionarios declined to throw their weight in the Congreso behind the party of government their troubles would surely have continued. Other obreristas who had inclined to the left were subjected to more straightforward social pressures. Cirilo Bognot, for example, had once been given to believe that his defection from the Nacionalista party to the LM had caused no hard feelings. Don Ramon Fernandez, his employer and a leading NP financier, had even contributed towards his passage to the Soviet Union.(79) Upon his return from Moscow, however, Bognot found the atmosphere appreciably less indulgent, Quezon's own appeal to the Congreso leadership to "break with communism" being restated to him personally both by Fernandez and by a prominent "province mate" from Pampanga, Secretary of the Interior Honorio Ventura.(80) Though not reconverted immediately, Bognot began to waver. Unconvincingly insisting his radicalism was firmer than ever, he eventually severed his connections with the LM a few weeks after the Congreso had split.(81)

Fearing that the number of wayward labourites who could be coaxed back into the nest might prove insufficient to prevent a LM takeover at the XVIIth convention, the NP also lent its supporters in the Congreso its considerable expertise in political manoeuvring and skulduggery. Charged with co-ordinating the pre-convention plotting, it seems, was the federation's renowned past president, Manila north congressman Francisco Varona. In an official capacity, perhaps fortuitously, Varona headed the organising committee for the year's May Day celebrations. Though no longer holding any position in the COF, he had kept his influence there very much alive, still being labelled in the press as the Congreso's "dad". When presiding over the federation between 1924 and 1928, we noted, Varona had been generally sympathetic to the LM's various initiatives, and there is no evidence to suggest that his elevation to the House of Representatives had fundamentally altered his views. What could not be countenanced, he would nevertheless agree with his Nacionalista peers, was the LM partisans gaining such a majority in the country's premier labour centre that they could
turn it into a focus for anti-government agitation.

The elections due to be held at the XVIIth convention thus had to be arranged in advance, and the first requirement was to settle a slate of approved candidates. To fill the position of secretary, Varona turned for some unaccountable reason outside the Congreso to a fellow employee of his on the Fernandez newspaper chain, Ruperto Cristobal. As assistant editor (to Lope K. Santos) of Pagkakaisa, Cristobal had been engaged in the press campaign against Bolshevism kindled by Quezon, and was now eager to enter the fray more directly. More conservative than most Nacionalista labourites, his only previous experience in the union movement had been with Joaquin Balmori's Federacion del Trabajo, but he was entitled to become a Congreso delegate by virtue of his active membership in Dimas-Alang, one of the affiliated patriotic societies. If he cared to stand, Varona promised him, his election as secretary would be virtually guaranteed.

The similarly favoured candidate for the COF presidency, subsequent LM complaints inferred, was the Democrata tabaqueros' leader Isabelo Tejada - an indication, as the LM pointed out, that the two major parties had agreed to conspire together in common cause.

The second requirement for a smooth pre-emptive strike was that the left-wingers should remain largely unaware of the marshalling of forces against them. Nacionalista and Democrata members of the Congreso executive accordingly pretended right up to the May convention that the LM's proposals for restructuring and radicalising the federation still had their broad assent. In March the executive gave its collective imprimatur to the "Thesis" in which the proposals had been consolidated, and in early April it was intimated that "final adoption" of the proposals at the forthcoming convention was a foregone conclusion. A further impression of continuing goodwill and concord was given when the executive entrusted the LM faction with a decisive 4-1 majority on a newly-constituted propaganda sub-committee. Formally heralding the convention in his capacity as COF secretary, Evangelista thus proclaimed with some confidence that May Day 1929 would prove to be an occasion of "historic" and "priceless" significance.

As the day drew closer there was a flurry of final preparations, not just for the opening session of the convention in the morning but also for the parade in the afternoon. Representative Varona, the parade grand marshal, announced that he expected the crowd to reach 30,000,
the largest for years. (S7) Both sides, he probably knew, were aiming to demonstrate their strength. The Nacionalista forces made arrangements to supplement their city-based following with provincial contingents from Felipe Jose's Workers' and Peasants' Association and from the Palihan ng Bayan (Anvil of the Nation), a patriotic society then flourishing in Rizal and Laguna. Jacinto Manahan similarly called upon KPMP branches to send delegations to swell the ranks of the left. Banners and placards were got ready, inscribed by one side with loyal sentiments such as "Long Live Quezon" and "Long Live the Country", and by the other with combative maxims like "Down with Capitalism". (S8)

Manahan and Evangelista drafted a special leaflet for the day entitled "Tumututol Kami!" ("We Protest!"), primarily attacking recent evictions of homesteaders and other landlord abuses in the countryside. (S9) Red and white paper tags also bearing the message "Tumututol Kami!" were printed for marchers to pin on their shirts or jackets. Floats for the parade too were designed to carry partisan motifs as well as the customary garlands and pretty girls. The sawyers' union headed by Antonino Ora fashioned their float as a wooden boat, to be pulled with ropes by workers dressed in coarse blue tunics singing "The Song of the Volga Boatmen". (S0)

As it turned out, the sawyers' float scored a small victory, being acclaimed as the most striking and artistic entry in the procession. Inside the convention hall, however, the LM faction witnessed the victory they really wanted and expected snatched from their grasp. That something was amiss was obvious even before the session started. Assembled in the meeting room at Ora's premises on P. Rada Street (now christened the "Templo del Trabajo"), the gathering seemed abnormally crowded, and to include an unusually high proportion of unfamiliar faces. The "communists", Ruperto Cristobal later wrote, found themselves "badly outnumbered and outmanouevred". (91) Having laid their plans so carefully, in plainer terms, the left's opponents had made sure they would not fall at the final hurdle. The convention had been packed.

The chief villain of the piece in radical eyes was Isabelo Tejada, who due to the ill-health of Hilario Barroga had become the Congreso's acting president and consequently had taken the convention chair. As president of one of the COF's largest constituents - the Union de Tabaqueros - he was also entitled to head a sizeable convention delegation. But whereas the modified system of proportional
representation employed by the Congreso permitted the UTF to send a bloc of 54 delegates, the number that Tejada actually brought along was 188 - a transgression presumably prompted in part by resentment at the LM's persistent efforts to subsume the UTF in a new industrial union. (92) Equally blatant was the foul perpetrated by Mariano Ubaldo, Nacionalista president of the Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas. His contingent numbered 65, more than a quarter of the UOEF's entire officially listed membership. (93) A third leading conspirator was Felipe Jose, whose Workers' and Peasants' Association the LM had good reason to suspect was being actively sponsored by the Nacionalista party as a counterweight to the KPMP. Hatched only recently, the LM alleged, the Association did not as yet even have an officially registered membership, but it nevertheless sent along a 10-man delegation. (94)

Also artfully vague about its strength was the older pro-Nacionalista organisation Dimas-Alang, in whose 8-man delegation Ruperto Cristobal had his place. Opinion in societies like Dimas-Alang, it may be surmised, had hardened against the LM not only because the party now condemned "patriotism" but also because it wanted to relegate the nationalist and mutualist groups within the Congreso to second class status. To tip the balance further against the left, Evangelista charged, a number of mutualist societies were even concocted on the spot, their initiators being seen hastily forging their own credentials just before the convention opened. (95) One of those caught at this dirty deed, it was claimed, was Antonio Paguia, who like his close associate Domingo Ponce had once shown considerable sympathy with the LM faction. (96) Though less conspicuously involved, Ponce himself was predictably party to the plot also, as was another veteran of the 1924 Canton conference, Jacinto Salazar. (97)

As soon as the meeting was called to order, the LM partisans demanded an adjournment so that each delegation could have its credentials checked and verified. Though granted, the adjournment served only to make passions more inflamed, the left's litany of complaints apparently being answered by objections to the accreditation of any Chinese representatives. (98) After acrimony and confusion had reigned for some ten minutes, Tejada ruled from the chair that the convention should move on to its first business, which was to determine its own governance. In the "Thesis" the left had advocated that convention sessions should be chaired in rotation by members of a
specially elected "presidium", and in his confidence that this suggestion had general assent Evangelista had placed "Election of Presidium" at the head of the agenda. (99) It was now self-evident, however, that this and virtually every other proposal for change contained in the "Thesis" would be voted to defeat. Incensed, Evangelista jumped on a table and tried to insist that the meeting should not continue. Realising his protest was to no avail, he shouted that he and his comrades refused to participate in such corrupted proceedings and intended to walk out. Amidst a chorus of jeers, he and about 150 other delegates then swept from the hall. (100)

Those remaining, around 340 in number, pressed on without further delay to elect the Congreso's executive for the forthcoming year. Despite Representative Varona's diplomatic absence from the scene "due to a slight indisposition", the two principal posts were filled as he was said to have ordained, Isabelo Tejada being elected as president and Ruperto Cristobal as secretary. More mysteriously, given the circumstances, Antonino Ora was again elected as treasurer, the position he had held for the past year. The LM president, it seems, had not joined the walk-out - perhaps feeling it ridiculous to march away from his own property - and his decision to remain may have been misinterpreted by the Nacionalista and Democrata forces as indicating a division in the left's ranks which it would be judicious to exploit. More likely, though, Ora's re-election was intended to smooth the left's feathers and open the way to a possible reconciliation. Despite the jeers that accompanied Evangelista's departure, in other words, the more reflective conspirators did not wish to oust the LM faction from the Congreso, simply to prevent it gaining control. Unimpressed with the favour bestowed upon him, Ora refused to accept his appointment and asked that the rump convention find accommodation for its subsequent sessions elsewhere. (101)

These events naturally made for a somewhat less than harmonious atmosphere at the afternoon parade. Supporters of the rival factions reportedly almost came to blows right at the start in Plaza Moriones, each wanting to move off ahead of the other. When the marchers reached their destination in Plaza Quipit trouble flared again, and would have escalated into a riot, one newsmen scribbled, had it not been nipped in the bud by one of the Police Chief's "most trusted sleuths". (102) Other police personnel, unfortunately, created more resentment than
they calmed, snatching the red "Tumututol Kami!" tags from many radical marchers' chests. At least four Filipinos and two Chinese who had been distributing the tags were arrested and carted away to the Luneta jail.

Protests against these acts of harassment were voiced by LM and Nacionalista labourites alike, Representative Varona even filing a formal complaint with the Police Chief and reflecting that there was "more danger in such arbitrary arrests than in the so-called red movement". (103) Reluctant as always to cause offence, Varona also informed the press that he neither approved nor condemned the convention walk-out, and now simply wanted to see the breach healed. (104) On May 2 it was announced that a "Conciliation Committee" had begun meeting to see if this was feasible, composed of Evangelista and Bognot on the LM side and Felipe Jose and Ildefonso K. Romey on what the papers were now calling the "conservative" side. (105) Neither pair, though, was prepared to give ground. Jose and Romey were adamant that the elections held on May Day had to stand. The spirit in which the two LM representatives approached the negotiating table, meanwhile, was graphically described by Evangelista himself. To regard the conservatives' peace moves as "otherwise than an offensive measure", he wrote,

"would be a tactical mistake. But the (militants) will accept the overtures, and lay down their conditions: there cannot be any unity unless the unions remaining in with the old COF controlled by the capitalist agents agree to abide by the constitution and rules, elect new delegates to attend an Extraordinary Congress, proceed to deal with all proposals submitted in the ("Thesis") and agree to new elections. In this way the (militants) will expose the hollowness of the proposals of these reactionary tools who resorted to dishonest and unconstitutional action." (106)

Each side thus professed a desire for peace but sought it only on terms that amounted to a complete capitulation of the other, and not surprisingly the discussions got nowhere.

The Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas

On May 5 the radicals convened to discuss forming a separate federation, and issued an open invitation to unionists to join in formally launching this body at the Templo del Trabajo on May 12. (107) Now, the radicals claimed, the "worms and parasites" in the womb of the labour movement had been forced to discard their camouflage and expose themselves in their true yellow colours. The victory they had won through their
obscene trickery would soon prove hollow, for their prize was not a true Congreso Obrero but a "Congreso Obrero of Capitalists' Agents and Politicians' Lackeys" which the masses would quickly renounce. (108) Since Tejada and his cohorts had conspired against the proposals to restructure and radicalise the COF, they evidently wanted the federation to continue in its former disorderly and ineffective fashion. For from wanting to advance labour's militancy, unity and strength, their real ambition was to protect their bourgeois and imperialist masters by restraining labour in its old organisational and political shackles. They were like reincarnations of Judas, selling the workers and peasants for a bag of gold to "new Herods". (109) The time had therefore come, the radicals concluded, for the labour movement to purge itself of such pests and make a fresh start, to constitute a Congreso Obrero that would be clean, independent, and truly proletarian.

This last attribute was highlighted in the new federation's name, which in English was "Proletarian Labor Congress" and in Tagalog was Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas (KAP), the literal translation of which would be "Association of the Sons of Sweat". Estimating what proportion of the Congreso's membership the radicals carried into the KAP must be largely conjectural, since the surviving statistics on union strengths as always leave much to be desired. Represented at the inaugural convention on May 12, according to a roster published in the LM paper Tinig-Manggagawa, were 21 organisations with a combined membership of 33,000. Though this might have been optimistic, the roster did show a refreshing degree of realism in conceding that 40 per cent of those members were in fact inactive. (110) For their part, Tejada and Cristobal claimed that the COF held the allegiance of some 26 organisations with a combined membership of over 63,000. (111) This figure was more patently optimistic - the Union de Tabaqueros component was certainly inflated - and might fairly be adjusted to around 52,000. That the aggregate of the memberships claimed by the two groups - 96,000 - far exceeded that of the pre-schism Congreso is explained by the fact that each added to its roster organisations which were not hitherto affiliated - notably the 5,000-strong Philippine Chinese Laborers' Federation on the KAP side and the Palihan ng Bayan, with a purported 23,000 members, on the COF side. If such additions are discounted it seems just to conclude that the membership of the old Congreso had been divided more or less evenly down the middle. The
split was also roughly even if appraised in terms of the most securely established trade unions, the principal organisations of printers, sawyers and slipper-makers joining the KAP and those of tabaqueros, stevedores and seamen remaining with the COF.

The primary task facing the delegates at the Templo del Trabajo on May 12 was clearly to determine the organisational framework around which the KAP would be built. The day to day business of the federation, it was resolved, should be handled by the general secretary. He would be responsible to a seven man executive committee which would meet at least once a month, and they in turn would be responsible to (and be elected by) a central committee which would convene every three months and include representatives from each affiliated organisation. Elections to the central committee would be held at the annual congress, and this gathering would also appoint members to fourteen or more sub-committees, dealing with such subjects as finance, organisation and propaganda, the peasant movement, the independence question, and relations with the PPTUS and other labour bodies overseas. Chosen as general secretary was Evangelista, and he together with Ora, Manahan, Hilarlo, H. C. Hsu, Bognot and Patricio Dionisio were elected to the first executive committee. At least five and quite possibly all seven members of the KAP's highest organ, this meant, came from the Lapiang Manggagawa.(112)

The KAP flag, it was agreed, should be revolutionary red embossed in gold with an emblem of clustered rice stalks and tobacco leaves enclosing a hammer and anvil. To finance the federation, individual members of an affiliated organisation would be required to subscribe one centavo a month, and the organisation itself to subscribe ten pesos a year. Following the line the "Thesis" had proposed for the Congreso, the convention decided that although patriotic and mutualist societies might be admitted as affiliates they could be accorded only a second class, "fraternal" status which carried no voting rights. Full status would be reserved for "trade unions". Ultimately, the KAP's declaration of principles affirmed, these full affiliates would be organised as industrial unions like those the LM leaders had been trying to construct before the split. Since these efforts had as yet made little headway, however, the term "trade union" was interpreted initially to mean any association that was occupationally based.(113)
There were in fact only four fledgling industrial unions amongst
the KAP's original affiliates, catering respectively for woodworkers
(2,600 members), tabaqueros (800), barbers (800), and government
employees (50). The other seventeen affiliates were an odd miscellany:
the KPMP (15,000), the PCLF (5,000), the UIF (1,000), the Union de
Chineleros (1,300 in two sections), five tabaqueros' groups not yet
integrated into the industrial union (3,100), three waterfront unions
(2,300), an oil factory union (300), a table-makers' union (120) and
two general unions based in small towns in Tayabas (300) and Laguna
(250).(114) Apart from the virtual absence of patriotic and mutualist
societies, in other words, the KAP had inherited the organisational
fragmentation that its leaders had recognised as one of the primary
weaknesses of the Congreso. Since each KAP affiliate was avowedly
committed to industrial unionism, the federation's founders might
nevertheless feel confident that this internal disarray could soon be
overcome. The real challenge, they would realise, was not to create
industrial unions but to build them into organisations truly worthy of
their name.

This task had obviously been rendered doubly difficult by the
events of the past year. Up until mid-1928 the left had made steady
progress within the Congreso, and in practice, if not by predetermined
tactical design, this progress has been attained by the creation of a
"united front from above". The Lapiang Manggagawa, that is to say, had
gained widespread support for its views - particularly on the bourgeois-
led independence campaign and the internal deficiencies of the labour
movement - among the presidents and officials who constituted the
federation's hierarchy. Despite this professed support, however, most
COF leaders appeared reluctant to take the practical steps that the
LM's analysis logically demanded - the mobilisation of an alternative
independence campaign under working class leadership and the fundamental
re-organisation of their own associations. At this point the LM was
caught in a classic radical dilemma. Should it proceed slowly and
cautiously, moderating and compromising its positions in an attempt to
consolidate and expand the ground it had already gained, or was it better
to press ahead faster, attack the faint-hearts whose purpose and commit­
ment failed to match its own, and try to gain new allies in their place?
Perhaps the Lapiang Manggagawa leaders would have inclined towards the latter option regardless of external influences, but the manner in which they did so was plainly inspired by the communist movement overseas, which was already dominated by the ultra-leftist and narrowly sectarian tendencies of the "third period". Whilst still stressing the goal of trade union unity, the Comintern and Profintern were exhorting their adherents to denounce a large proportion of the labour leaders upon whom unity in the short run depended, and like parties elsewhere in the world the LM found the contradiction impossible to resolve. The rank and file of the reformist, mutualist and nationalist organisations, the Profintern counselled, were to be weaned away from their leaders by "patient, comradely explanation", and a united front then constructed "from below". Yet the black and white cosmology propagated during the "third period" generated a stridency and dogmatism that were altogether inapposite to good-natured fraternal debate. In several spheres, moreover, it also generated attitudes and demands which ran counter to obrerista traditions. Evangelista and his comrades, many workers must have felt, had developed an irritating inclination to preach as if they alone had access to the revealed truth and had incorporated in their doctrine some highly dubious tenets. When the moderate and conservative leaders whom the LM had variously offended conspired against the party in May 1929, therefore, their earlier fears that their followers might desert them en masse would have evaporated. Their own hostility to the belligerent, intolerant direction the left had taken, they could now be confident, was widely shared on the shop and factory floor. The recriminations that followed the schism, they probably recognised also, were less likely to win the Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis hosts of new members than to rub more salt into the wound. The LM might have gained a substantial base in the labour movement, but expanding that base was likely to prove an arduous uphill struggle.
Notes to Chapter Five

(1) Sangguniang Tagapapaganap ng COF "Ang Tesis ng ika-XVII Kongreso Obrero" Tinig-Manggagawa Yr.I no.5 March 1929 pp.1-5

(2) A. Losovsky "The Chinese Revolution and the International Labour Movement" Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference Bulletin of Proceedings no.2 May 21, 1927 p.7; and no.3 May 22, 1927 p.9

(3) "The International Labour Bureau of Geneva" Resolutions and Decisions of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference Hankow, May 1927 p.12

(4) Crisanto Evangelista "Ang Aming Diwa" ("Our Spirit") in Dahong Ala-ala sa UIF sa ika-23 taon ng Kanyang Pagkakatatag (Souvenir of the 25th Anniversary of the UIF's Foundation) n.pub., Manila, 1927 pp.23-7


(6) "The Trade Union Movement in the Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries" (Theses adopted on reports by Comrades Heller and Su) Ibid. pp.40-1

(7) Congreso Obrero de Filipinas, Lupon sa Pagtatagat ng mga Kapisanan at Kalipunan Ang Tumpak na Organisasyon at Pagtataquyod sa mga Kapisanan Manggagawa (The Correct Organisation and Structure of Workers' Associations) n.pub., Manila, July 30, 1928 pp.16-18

(8) Ibid. p.32

(9) Crisanto Evangelista and Balbino Navarro "Mga Manggagawa sa mga Pagawaan ng Tabako at Sigarilyo: Magkaisa Tayong Lahat!" ("Workers in the Tobacco and Cigarette Factories: Let us All Unite!") Typescript copied from manifesto dated December 12, 1928

(10) Crisanto Evangelista "Mga Mananahi at Bordadora at mga Kawani sa mga Patahan at Paburdahan: Magkaisa Kayo!" ("Seamstresses and Embroiderers and Employees in the Sewing and Embroidery Shops: Unite!") Typescript copied from manifesto dated January 10, 1929

(11) "Natatag na ang Kalipunan ng mga Barbero sa Pilipinas" ("Philippine Barbers' Confederation Established") Tinig-Manggagawa Yr.I no.5 March 1929 p.1

Jose Hilario was born in Tondo in 1887. For most of his working life he held positions in various branches of the government, but whether he was thus employed during his rather transitory "radical phase" is not clear. After attending the 1924 Canton conference as secretary of the Legionarios del Trabajo he like his Supremo Domingo Ponce
had moved to the left. Unlike Ponce, he then became a
member of the Laplang Manggagawa and for a time was the
business associate and close friend of Antonino Ora and
his wife. Hilario enjoyed a modest reputation as a
vernacular poet and short-story writer.

(12) "Ang Hudyat ng Bagong Buhay!" ("The Signal of New Life!")
Tinig-Manggagawa Yr.I no.4 February 1929 p.2

(13) "Natatag na ang Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis" ("Proletarian
Labour Congress Established") Tinig-Manggagawa Yr.I no.7
May 1929 pp.1-2

(14) Nicolas Garcia "Pagtatanggol kay G. Isabelo Tejada: Pangulo
ng Tabakero" ("In Defence of Isabelo Tejada: President of
the Tobacco Workers") Typescript copied from unknown source,
c.January 1929

(15) Gregorio de Luna "Ang Tuligsa't Pag-alipusta ng Tinig-
Manggagawa ay Tinutugon ng Tabakero" ("The Criticism and
Abuse of Tinig-Manggagawa is Answered by a Tobacco Worker")
Ang Manggagawa Yr.II no.2 January 30, 1929 pp.19-20
(Emphasis in original)

(16) This is clear from the defence of Tejada by Garcia loc.cit.;
the same inference can be found in a pamphlet written by
Evangelista after the May 1929 schism - Nasyonalismo-
Proteksyonismo vs. Internasyonalismo-Radikalismo n.pub.,
Manila 1929 p.5

(17) "Ang Pangulo ng 'Federacion' ay Makapuhunan" ("The President
of the 'Federacion' is pro-Capital") Ang Manggagawa Yr.I
no.9 July 31, 1928 p.9

(18) Evangelista "Ang Aming Diwa", as cited p.27; G. Aguila
"Philippines: Towards Trade Union Unity" Pan-Pacific Worker
vol.I no.3 May 1, 1928 p.15

(19) "Ang Pangulo ng 'Federacion'...", as cited

(20) Congreso Obrero de Filipinas, Lupon sa Pagtatagtag ng mga
Kapisanan at Kalipunan op.cit. pp.10-11

(21) "Ang Union de Impresores ay Humingi ng Pagbabago ng COF"
("The UIF Calls for the COF to be Reformed") Tinig-Manggagawa
Yr.I no.6 April 1929 p.4

(22) "Ang Tesis ng ika-XVII Kongreso Obrero", as cited p.5

(23) Alfredo V. Belamide "Report on Agrarian Problems in the
Philippines" Typescript c.1925 p.17

(24) "Brief Notes on Current Events" Pan-Pacific Monthly No.25
April 1929 p.6; Jacinto G. Manahan "Peasant Movement in
the Philippines" Far Eastern Monthly No.21 December 1928
p.39
(25) Jacinto G. Manahan "Our Struggle for Philippine Independence" Typescript c.1929 p.16
This paper was written by Manahan as the basis for his address to the Second World Congress of the Anti-Imperialist League, which he anticipated he would be delivering in "this beautiful city of Paris". Probably to his regret, the venue of the meeting was switched to Frankfurt.

At some point in 1928 or 1929 the KPMP was formally affiliated to the Krestintern (the peasant equivalent of the Profintern), but the exact date is not known. At the Sixth Comintern Congress a senior Krestintern official reported that the organisation already had a section in the Philippines then - in July 1928.
"Thirteenth Session: Moscow, July 27, 1928" International Press Correspondence vol.8 no.52 August 22, 1928 p.923

(27) According to a biographical sketch which he probably drafted himself, Jose founded the Workers' and Peasants' Association in 1927: Cornejo's Commonwealth Directory of the Philippines 1939 Encyclopaedic edition Miguel R. Cornejo, Manila, 1939 p.1834
The view that the Association was only created some two years later is expressed in Kongreso Obrero (ng mga Anak-Pawis) sa Pilipinas "Ang 'Tumututol Kami!' ng mga Anak-Pawis na Dinaya ng mga Bataan ng Kapitalista at Politiko" ("'We Protest!' say the Proletarians who were Cheated by the Lackeys of the Capitalists and Politicos") Tinig-Manggagawa Yr.I no.7 May 1929 p.1

(28) Manila Times September 7, 1928; La Vanguardia July 28, 1925


(31) Evangelista "Solidarity Between Filipino and Chinese Working classes", as cited p.45

(32) Evangelista had taken an interest in the Chinese revolution and the support it received from the Soviet Union at least as far back as mid-1926. See Crisostomo Encarnacion "Ang Panayaan Ukol sa Pagbabawas ng Sandata ng mga Bansa at ang Kalayaan ng mga Bayan sa Kasilangan" ("The International Disarmament Conference and the Liberation of the Countries of the East") Pagkakaisa May 22, 1926
(33) Manila Times April 26, 1927; quoted in Antonio S. Tan

(34) Armed Forces of the Philippines Handbook on the Communist Party of the Philippines n.pub., Quezon City, 1961 p.5

(35) Evangelista "Solidarity Between Filipino and Chinese Working Classes", as cited pp.47-8

(36) "Joint Manifesto of the Philippine Labor Congress and the Philippine Chinese Laborers' Association" December 31, 1928
Pan-Pacific Monthly No.29 August 1929 pp.27-8
The three PCLA signatories were Chua Pen-lam, Chu Ling-hio and H. C. Hsu.

(37) "Class Solidarity Night - Alonso Theatre, February 5, 1929" (Programme); "Class Solidarity in the Philippines" Pan-Pacific Monthly No.28 July 1929 pp.21-5 (Speeches of Crisanto Evangelista, L. H. Chu (Chu Ling-hio), Antonino Ora and Jacinto Manahan); "Youth Labor of the Far East" Pan-Pacific Monthly No.29 August 1929 p.34 (Speech of Felix Caguin)

(38) "Ang mga Sinelerong Giting na Makikilaban Hangga Ngayon" ("The Heroic Struggle of the Slippermakers Carries on") Tiniq-Manggagawa Yr.I no.3 January 1929 p.1; Filipino-Chinese Strike Committee "Do Not Patronise Chinese Slipper Manufacturers They are Unfair to Workers!" Handbill dated February 16, 1929; "Natapos na ang Aklasan ng mga Sinelerong Pilipino at Insik" ("The Strike of Filipino and Chinese Slippermakers is Over") Tiniq-Manggagawa Yr.I no.5 March 1929 p.1; "Victory Through Unity" Pan-Pacific Monthly No.29 August 1929 p.35

(39) "Ang Tesis ng ika-XVII Kongreso Obrero", as cited p.5


(41) "Proletarian Advance in the Philippines" Pan-Pacific Monthly No.33 December 1929-January 1930 p.34

(42) Tribune July 16, 1929

(43) Lapiang Manggagawa sa Pilipinas, Pangkat ng Kabataang Anak-Pawis "Kabataang Manggagawa: Ano ang Dapat Gawin sa Linggong mga Bata?" ("Working Youth: What Should be Done in Boys' Week?") Handbill dated November 24, 1928; Katipunan ng mga Kabataang Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas "Sa Tanang Kabataan sa Pilipinas" ("To All Philippine Youth") Tiniq-Manggagawa Yr.I no.2 December 1928 p.2; "Youth Labor of the Far East", as cited p.34

(44) "Ang Tesis ng ika-XVII Kongreso Obrero", as cited p.3
A more potent strategy for persuading the imperialists to relinquish the Philippines, the LM was arguing at this time, would be to organise a nationwide boycott of their goods and businesses. The party announced that it would itself launch a Kalipunan ng mga Taong-Bayang Maliliit (Confederation of the Common People) to set a boycott movement in motion, but whether this venture was pursued is not known.

Lapiang Manggagawa sa Pilipinas Untitled statement printed in Pagkakaisa January 21, 1926


(53) G. Sp. "The National Movement in the Philippines" International Press Correspondence vol.5 no.74 October 15, 1925 pp.1104-5

(54) Harry Gannes "The Raisins in the Filipino Cake" Workers' Monthly vol.5 no.5 March 1926 p.213

(55) Manual Gomez "The Crisis in Philippine Independence" Workers' Monthly vol.5 no.12 October 1926 p.541
(56) M. Galkovich "Filippiny v bor'be za svoiu nezavisimost" Mirovoe khoziastvo i mirovaja politika February 1926 quoted in Charles B. McLane Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1966 p.124


(58) Evangelista "Solidarity Between Filipino and Chinese Working Classes", as cited pp.45-6

(59) Lapiang Manggagawa sa Pilipinas "Bayang Manggagawa: Tutulan mo ang Pamahayag ng mga Nasyonalista" ("Working People: Protest Against the Proclamation of the Nacionalistas") Handbill dated October 16, 1928

(60) Ibid.; "Ang Tesis ng ika-XVII Kongreso Obrero", as cited p.3 For an academic account of Stimson's "co-operation" policy and the consequential measures which nettled the LM at this time see Michael J. J. Smith "Henry L. Stimson and the Philippines" Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University 1969

(61) "Inaugural Address of Henry L. Stimson" (March 1, 1928) in Cornejo's Commonwealth Directory of the Philippines, as cited p.171

(62) Manahan "Our Struggle for Philippine Independence", as cited p.14

(63) "Joint Manifesto of the Philippine Labor Congress and the Philippine Chinese Laborers' Association", as cited p.28

(64) The most comprehensive historical overview was that prepared by Jacinto Manahan for the Second World Congress of the Anti-Imperialist League - "Our Struggle for Philippine Independence", as cited.

(65) Lapiang Manggagawa "Bayang Manggagawa ...", as cited

(66) At this point the Tagalog and English versions of the COF-PCLA joint manifesto differ, the latter for some reason concluding even more enigmatically that the 1927 Canton uprising "crystallised such a significance!" "Joint Manifesto of the Philippine Labor Congress and the Philippine Chinese Laborers' Association", as cited p.28; "Pahayag ng COF at PCLA" Typescript copied from handbill dated December 31, 1928

(67) Ibid.

(68) Crisostomo Encarnacion "Ang Panayam Ukol sa Pagbabawas ng Sandata ng mga Bansa...", as cited

(69) Losovsky "The Chinese Revolution and the International Labor Movement", as cited p.9
(70) Balbino Navarro "Huwag Iasa sa mga Burges ang Lunas" ("Don't Rely on the Bourgeoisie for a Remedy") Tinig-Manggagawa Yr.I no.4 February 1929 p.7

(71) Domingo Ponce "Las actividades 'rojas' en Filipinas" (a "strictly personal and confidential" memorandum to Senate President Quezon dated January 21, 1929) (Quezon Papers Box 143)


(73) Armed Forces of the Philippines op.cit. p.14

(74) "Third Plenum of the Pan-Pacific T.U. Secretariat" Far Eastern Monthly No.21 December 1928 p.1

(75) Extracts from Evangelista's first lecture, which was delivered on September 8, 1928, are reproduced as "Soviet Union Proves Workers' Constructive Powers" Far Eastern Monthly No.20 November 1928 pp.12-18

(76) One rather amusing illustration of Washington's concern is preserved in the records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. In November 1928 the BIA Chief wrote to Governor Stimson transmitting an enquiry from the State Department concerning a Manila resident called Roman de la Cruz. This gentleman had aroused suspicion, it seems, by entering into correspondence with people in Russia. Upon receiving the enquiry, Governor Stimson promptly instructed the Chief of Police and the Chief of Constabulary to investigate and report back. The subject under probe, the Police found, was almost a model citizen - clean record, good character, no contacts with known reds. When the Constabulary report arrived the riddle was solved. De la Cruz was an amateur philatelist who had written to the Soviet Union seeking stamps. The State Department's interest, Governor Stimson speculated in his reply, was probably due to the coincidence that Jacinto Manahan has assumed the name Roman de la Cruz as an alias whilst in Moscow. Henry L. Stimson to the Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, January 17, 1929 (BIA 28432-10)

(77) Ponce "Las actividades 'rojas' en Filipinas", as cited

(78) Manila Times March 13, 1929

(79) "Transcript of Stenographic Notes Taken During the Hearing Conducted by the Committee on Un-Filipino Activities on November 17, 1948" Typescript n.pp., (Institute of Social Order, Manila)

(80) "Interview with Antonio D. Paguia, May 23, 1954" Typescript n.pp. (Institute of Social Order, Manila) Although unsigned, it is evident from the date of this interview that it was conducted by Renze L. Hoeksema.
The reasons that Bognot gave for breaking with his LM colleagues changed substantially with the passage of time. At first he inferred that he had become disillusioned because their radicalism failed to match his own. "There are many leaders", he wrote, "whose radicalism is only in their mouths and not in their deeds". Nineteen years later, however, he gave testimony that was almost directly contrary. The point of disagreement, he then recalled, was that Evangelista wanted to campaign openly against the government whereas he felt it more prudent to work underground until the left's forces were stronger. A more prosaic factor behind his disaffection, the contemporary press reported, was his pique that Manahan rather than himself was chosen to represent the Philippines at the Second World Congress of the Anti-Imperialist League. "Transcript of Stenographic Notes...", as cited; Cirilo Bognot "Ilang Paliwanag ng K. Bognot" ("A Few Explanations from Com. Bognot") Ang Manggagawa Yr.II no.9 August 30, 1929 p.9; Manila Times July 22, 1929

Conversation with Ruperto Cristobal, Makati, November 12, 1971

Evangelista Nasyonalismo-Proteksiyonismo vs Internasyonalismo-Radikalismo as cited, p.5

Manila Times April 4, 1929

Ibid. The four LM members on the sub-committee were Evangelista, Manahan, Bognot and Hilario; the fifth member was Isabelo Tejada.

Crisanto Evangelista "Invitation to the XVIIth Congress" April 3, 1929 Typescript copied from the original, of which there was also a Tagalog version.

Manila Times April 9, 1929

Unidentified and undated newspaper clipping, c.May 2, 1929

Lupong Pambansa sa Pagtutol ng mga Manggagawa at Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (Philippine Workers' and Peasants' National Protest Committee) "Tumututol Kami" ("We Protest!") Handbill dated May 1, 1929

The decision to emphasise rural abuses in this manifesto may have been prompted partly by the PPTUS, whose secretary M. Apletin had called upon the COF and KPMP to organise a "gigantic national protest" against the evictions and other injustices.

M. Apletin "Tutulan Natin ang Pagpapalayas sa Magbubukid" ("Let us Protest Against the Evictions of Peasants") Tinig-Manggagawa Yr.I no.4 February 1929 pp.5-6 A slightly amended version of this communication was later published under the name of Harrison George, who had most likely drafted it in the first place for Apletin to sign. Harrison George "The Robbery of the Philippine Peasantry" Pan-Pacific Monthly No.26 May 1929 pp.43-4

Tribune May 2, 1929
(91) Ruperto S. Cristobal "Labour leader writes on Saulo's account"
Manila Times February 19, 1969

(92) Evangelista "The Split in the Philippine Labour Congress", as cited p.300
Other left-wing accounts give slightly different figures, the whole issue of "legitimate" representation being clouded by fluctuating estimates of membership and by a proposal - not as then officially adopted - that the quotas of delegates assigned to affiliates should be increased. In the list issued by the Department of Labor for 1928, the Union de Tabaqueros was shown as having only 7,000 members. Even the LN, though, appears to have been willing to concede the union 12,000 members, which Tejada had claimed in early 1929. Now he was boasting that the UTF was 20,000-strong. Not even this membership and the expanded system of representation, however, would have entitled the union to 188 delegates.

(93) Ibid. The remarks in the previous footnote apply here also.
Around this time the UOEF was re-organising itself into different "committees", and the 256 members shown in the official listings only represented one of these. Whether the other committees also sent delegations is not known. Even the aggregate membership of the different committees, however, which was probably in the region of 1,500, was still far too small to warrant a delegation of 65.

(94) Kongreso Obrero (ng mga Anak-Pawis) sa Pilipinas "Ang 'Tumututol Kami'...", as cited pp.5-6
Aside from being founding president of the Workers' and Peasants' Association, Jose was a prominent figure in the Legionarios del Trabajo. In 1923 he was prosecuted for libel after making a vehemently anti-clerical speech at a May Day celebration organised by the Legionarios in Cebu. According to a brief official history of the Legionarios, the Bishop of Cebu subsequently pronounced local members of the fraternity to be "excommunicated", a step later made binding throughout the Islands by a Catholic bishops' conference.
Legionarios del Trabajo Blue Book Los Filipinos, Manila, 1941 p.43

(95) Pagkakaisa May 3, 1929

(96) A compadre of Francisco Varona, Paguia was a lawyer-cum-journalist - he worked on the Fernandez paper La Opinion with Bognot - who had served a term as COF president around 1923. In 1925 he had succeeded - where Evangelista and Bognot had failed - in gaining a place on the official Nacionalista party slate of candidates for the Manila municipal board. Though returned with over 13,000 votes - the highest received by any NP candidate that year - Paguia was denied his seat due to allegations of sedition. His tirades against Governor Wood, it seems, included talk of "balos" and "1896", and were consequently adjudged to have overstepped the bounds of acceptable campaign rhetoric. Eventually, in 1927, he served almost a year in prison for his misdemeanour. At the XIVth COF convention in 1926, whilst his case was still dragging
through the courts, he had proposed the motion of "sympathy and goodwill" for the LM which had been passed after the motion giving the party a more substantive endorsement had been narrowly defeated.

El Debate June 7, 1925; Manila Daily Bulletin June 8, 1926; Manila Times December 31, 1926; "Interview with Antonio D. Pagua", as cited

Evangelista Nasyonalismo-Proteksiyonismo vs. Internasyonalismo-Radikalismo, as cited pp.4-5; Kongreso Obrero (ng mga Anak-Pawis) sa Pilipinas "Ang 'Tumututol Kami'...", as cited

Manila Times May 1, 1929

"Ang Tesis ng ika-XVII Kongreso Obrero", as cited p.5; "Palatuntunan ng ika-XVII Taunang Kapulungan ng COF" (Programme of the XVIIth Annual Convention of the COF") May 1-4, 1929

"Kung Bakit Nagulo ang Pulong ng Kongreso Obrero" ("Why the Kongreso Obrero Meeting was Disorderly") Ang Manggagawa Yr.II no.6 May 30, 1929 p.11

The alternative venue found for the convention was the hall of the Rizal Bowling Club.
Philippines Herald May 7, 1929

Among the speakers at Plaza Guipit were Representative Arsenio Bonifacio of Laguna, who attacked Sovietism as a "colossal failure", and warned that local red activities might jeopardise the independence campaign, and Crisanto Evangelista, who made a "fiery" call for the overthrow of capitalism. Representative Varona, however, miraculously recovered from the "slight indisposition" that had kept him away from the morning's unpleasantness, characteristically side-stepped such controversy and spoke on the uncontentious issue of the Filipino exclusion campaign in the United States.

Unidentified and undated newspaper clipping in English, c. May 2, 1929.

Philippines Herald May 3, 1929

Ildefonso K. Romey, like Isabelo Tejada, was a white-collar employee of the Katubusan tobacco factory, a workplace, incidentally, which at this time supplied a significant proportion of the Union de Tabaqueros' top leadership. He was also a noted vernacular writer and orator. Around 1924-5 he had been a member of the Lapiang Manggagawa and had served briefly on its Manila committee. After the party's initial left-turn in November 1925, however, he must have deserted to one of the two mainstream parties, for in 1928 he was elected as a municipal councillor in the Manila satellite town of Pasay.

Manila Daily Bulletin July 30, 1925; "Lista de Liders Obrero" (compiled by Domingo Ponce in 1931 at the request of Senate President Quezon) (Quezon Papers Box 143)
The organisations represented at the COF's first post-split convention (in July 1929) are listed in Ang Manggagawa Yr.II no.8 July 30, 1929 p.7, but unfortunately their membership figures are not given.

Aside from the seven executive committee members, the KAP's first central committee comprised Juan Feleo, Alejandro Española, Julian de Castro, Augusto David, Eustaquio Santos, Gregorio Umagat, Jose Ilagan, Babino Navarro, Venancio Serrano, Sun Ping, Urbano Arcega, Fernando Cabrera, Cirilo Honorio, Arturo Soriano, Pablo Hilario, Hugo Retaga, Valeriano Makahilig, Luis Foz, Emilio San Juan and Mariano Pingol. David R. Sturtevant Popular Uprisings in the Philippines 1840-1940 Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1976 p.205; "Hinati ng mga Kapitalista-Pulitiko ang COF", as cited

"Patakaran ng Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas" ("Regulations of the KAP") Tinig-Manggagawa Yr.I no.7 May 1929 pp.2-3

"Hinati ng mga Kapitalista-Pulitiko ang COF", as cited
CHAPTER SIX

THE PKP: INTERNATIONALIST, PROLETARIAN AND REVOLUTIONARY

Pivotal to the many issues which split the Congreso Obrero in May 1929 was the left's insistent demand that the federation should actively support the Lapiang Manggagawa. Yet within the Lapiang Manggagawa, paradoxically, there was a growing feeling that the party was in some respects unprepared or ill-fitted for the historic vanguard role it should play. A "real workers' political party", Evangelista averred, had still to be formed.(1) The decision to establish a new party on the foundations laid by the LM was taken at an early leadership meeting of the trade union centre constituted by Congreso radicals when the split occurred, the Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis, and Evangelista, Ora, Manahan and other LM stalwarts were thereupon commissioned to prepare a draft party programme and constitution.(2) This initiative was plainly not designed to bring about any major ideological shift. The Lapiang Manggagawa had indeed recently been praised by the CPUSA specialist on the Philippines, Harrison George, for following a "generally clear class line", and the preparatory commission are said to have concluded that the LM programme could with only minor modifications be commended for re-adoption by the new party.(3) Where it was felt serious deficiencies did need correction was in party organisation, a realm in which the Lapiang Manggagawa had been pronounced by Harrison George to be "somewhat weak and confused".(4)

On May Day 1930 the Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis issued a manifesto designating the formation of a "mass political party" as an immediate task, and Evangelista started paving the way with a series of articles in the vernacular press.(5) Later in the month the preparatory commission reported to the Second KAP Congress, and discussion ensued on what the party should be called. The name "Communist Party", one newsman noted, appeared to have the backing of the majority, but it was
finally agreed that the question should be deferred until the founding convention.(6) This hesitation seems rather curious, for the Lapiang Manggagawa had after all been championing the USSR, supporting the communist movement in China and otherwise conforming closely to Comintern policies for the past two or three years. And adoption of the title "Communist", it was presumably known, was an essential requirement for formal admission to the Comintern. Yet some activists favoured alternative labels such as "Socialist" or "Proletarian Labor", perhaps contending that these might invite less government persecution and might cause less apprehension amongst potential recruits and sympathisers. Such circumspection can however scarcely have inspired another of the suggestions said to have been proffered - "Bolshevik Party"!(7) These differences of opinion were not in any event sufficiently deep to prompt any leading cadres to withdraw from the scene when the majority view prevailed at the founding convention and the new party came into being as the Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas (PKP).(8)

Attended by sixty delegates from the labour and peasant unions affiliated to the KAP, the founding convention was held in the Templo del Trabajo on August 26, a date chosen to symbolise continuity with the liberation struggle launched by Andres Bonifacio thirty-four years earlier. Aside from resolving the naming issue, the convention's main business was the election of a Central Committee and Politburo, whose membership will be discussed presently.(9) In subsequent weeks the Central Committee put the finishing touches to the programme and constitution (which in accordance with communist custom gave the Party a capitalised initial); went on speaking forays around Central and Southern Luzon; and made preparations for the PKP to be launched publicly with a mass rally in Plaza Moriones, Tondo on another date selected for its historic associations - November 7, the thirteenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Flysheets announcing the rally, issued in the name of the KAP, promised speeches outlining how the Philippines could gain her independence and how the oppressors and exploiters could be overthrown.(10) At eight o'clock on a Friday evening a crowd 6,000 strong assembled in Plaza Moriones and acclaimed the PKP and its programme with rousing shouts and cheers: "Down with Imperialism!", "Down with Capitalism!", "Long Live the Communist Party!"(11)
The Depression and the City

The Party was born in the very year that the Philippine economy began to suffer from the impact of the Great Depression, and the dislocation engendered by the crisis furnished a constant backdrop to its early life. The exact course and depth of the recession in the Islands have regrettably never been seriously studied. The contemporary view in official circles was that things could have been much worse. Secretary of Finance Miguel Unson, for example, noted in both his 1930 and 1931 annual reports that the Philippines had not been hit as badly as other countries. (12) When a gradual recovery was already underway, the British Consul-General in Manila echoed this view and concluded that the archipelago had been shielded from the full force of the slump by the free trade relationship with the colonial power. Despite its own travails, he observed, the United States had remained throughout a good market for Philippine products. (13)

Measured by volume, the export trade actually expanded. Taking 1929 and 1933 as a basis for comparison, shipments of the colony's "big four" exports grew in tonnage terms by almost 40 per cent, with moderate falls in hemp and coconut oil loadings being greatly outweighed by increases in copra and sugar cargoes. Exports of sugar, by far the most important member of the quartet, rose from 696,000 metric tons to 1,079,000 metric tons. As a consequence of the collapse in world commodity prices, however, total export earnings declined in three successive years - by 19 per cent in 1930, 22 per cent in 1931 and 8 per cent in 1932 - and only rallied diffidently in 1933. Overall export receipts dropped between 1929 and 1933 by more than a third. Whereas the sugar exported in 1929 fetched on average P 153 per ton, in 1933 it fetched P119. Returns from the other three commodities shrunk even more disastrously - coconut oil from P 310 to P 112 per ton, copra from P 181 to P 57 per ton, and hemp from P 303 to P 88 per ton. (14) Most sugar planters were seemingly able to contain the damage by improving their yields, for their per hectare income diminished on average by only 9 per cent. But abaca producers and coconut growers were unable to soften the blow, and their respective incomes fell by a crippling 84 per cent and 71 per cent. (15) Palay, the principal item of domestic trade, likewise plummeted in price - from P 3.88 per cavan wholesale in 1929 to P 1.81 per cavan in 1933 - and rice farmers
witnessed their per hectare income tumble by 57 per cent.\(^{(16)}\)

The disruption thus caused to social and economic relations in the countryside will be discussed at a later stage, but as this chapter deals mainly with events in Manila it is pertinent here to consider the impact the depression had in the city. Those sectors of the urban economy linked with the export trade seem to have escaped relatively lightly and been simply sluggish. Although the proportion of trade passing through the port was declining - due chiefly to the continued growth in sugar shipments from Iloilo - the number and tonnage of foreign vessels cleared annually at the capital's piers scarcely changed. Pre-export activities such as processing and packaging most probably remained fairly static also. Reflecting the fall in purchasing power caused by the collapse in crop prices, on the other hand, the import trade and ancillary activities like wholesaling and distribution would appear to have sagged significantly, albeit by nothing like the 54 per cent that imports slumped in total value. The only data at hand recording volumes that are strictly comparable relate to the importation of cotton goods and iron and steel sheets between 1929 and 1931, during which time the value of both categories fell by 39 per cent. Measured by the square metre and metric ton the falls were more modest, but appreciable nonetheless - 6½ and 4½ per cent respectively.\(^{(17)}\) The contraction in domestic demand also had a clear impact on the tobacco industry, which supplied the only data being collected at this time from the manufacturing sector. The industry had been on the wane ever since its 1917-20 boom, and the overall decline in cigar production during the depression - from 298 million in 1929 to 261 million in 1933 - was not markedly steeper than in preceding years. Within these totals, however, the number of cigars exported increased from 188 to 196 million, indicating that the home market shrank by around 40 per cent.\(^{(18)}\) Building construction slipped even more sharply, an official index which took the average for 1924-28 as its 100 baseline descending by 1934 to 48.\(^{(19)}\)

Depressed conditions in the countryside had two other serious consequences for Manila workers besides producing a general downturn in demand. First, rural poverty quickened the stream of migrants coming to the city and created a plentiful reservoir of cheap labour. Noting this development, a resolution passed by the First Plenum of the PKP Central Committee in January 1932 lamented that the peasants were
becoming the "hopeless rivals" of the workers in factory and town. In the context of building a revolutionary worker-peasant alliance, the Party later acknowledged upon Comintern prompting, this formulation was less than diplomatic. But its substance could hardly be denied. Because rice was the key element in workers' household budgets, secondly, many employers used its price as a rough benchmark for setting wage scales, and could argue throughout the slump that the rates paid in the late twenties were no longer justified.

The exact extent to which wages fell due to this combination of circumstances is regrettably impossible to determine. A resolution approved by the KAP in June 1932 asserted that working class incomes had been halved, and such specific information as can be found suggests this generalisation was not far from the truth. In 1928, the last year in which a median rate for each occupation was recorded, the Manila average was roughly P 2.20 per day. Apart from the ailing tobacco industry, where the daily norm had already slumped to P 1.17, the only trades which paid less than P 1.50 were those where the workforce was predominantly female - embroidery, catering and the like. But a survey of 40,000 employees conducted by the Bureau of Labor in 1932 found that 34 per cent of the men questioned and 82 per cent of the women were receiving less than P 1.00 daily, with a further 35 per cent and 17 per cent respectively earning between P 1.00 and P 1.50. Within the cigar factories the average wage had dropped to about 70 centavos. An income under a peso a day, Evangelista observed bitterly, was less than American businessmen in Manila allowed for their dogs, and dogs had no families to support, rent to pay or clothes to buy. The impression that incomes did commonly fall to half their former levels is reinforced by a survey on household expenditure undertaken by the Bureau of Labor in 1933. The average single labourer, it was found, spent 56 centavos daily, and an unskilled labourer with a wife and three children spent 94 centavos - amounts which were down 52 and 46 percent respectively on comparable figures collected in 1925. Even skilled workers, whose incomes weathered the recession better than most, were obliged to limit their family budgets to P 1.54 daily, 36 per cent less than in 1925.
Relating these reductions in money wages and daily expenses to actual living standards has to be somewhat conjectural, for the fall in consumer prices was never measured in a single consolidated index. The prices of food items, which absorbed more than half the average family's income, were however monitored closely. Rice, as already noted, became much cheaper. Retail prices of the staple, whilst not fully reflecting the decline in wholesale prices, fell between 1929 and 1933 by 45 per cent, from 42 to 23 centavos per ganta. Coffee, corn, sugar, coconuts and other internationally traded articles registered roughly similar falls. But reductions on items relatively immune from world fluctuations were more moderate. Kanduli (catfish), for example, dropped in price by 27 per cent, bangus (milkfish) by 12, duck by 29, chicken by 15, pork by 37, mongo by 35 and eggplants by 33. Nor is it probable that there were declines approaching fifty per cent in the major non-food constituents of household budgets - rents, clothing and fuel. In contrast to Europe and America, where real wages generally held steady or even improved during the depression years, it therefore appears that the purchasing power and living standards of most workers in Manila were perceptibly eroded.

Like their counterparts elsewhere, Philippine employers faced with falling demand and shrinking profit margins could obviously find other means of reducing labour costs besides cutting wages. Workers retained on the payroll could be compelled to work faster and for even longer than the nine or ten hour day that was already customary. Others, the most hapless victims of the depression, were tossed out on to the streets. As in the United States, the government had no welfare or insurance schemes for the jobless, and for those without friends or relatives to lend support the situation was truly desperate. Representative, perhaps, were the unemployed men and women who marched under the KAP's banner to the Legislative Building in September 1932, vividly described by one reporter as

"uncouth motley legions ... young and old, robust youths and decrepit greybeards, all bedraggled in attire, hag-looking mothers their dirty brats at their breasts, faces from which the last spark of hope has vanished."

Prior to the slump the government apparently considered that unemployment was insufficiently important to warrant collecting information about. In 1932 a global estimate for the whole country was
produced - 610,000 - and the following year this was revised sharply upwards to 854,000. (30) Assuming that the working population of the Islands was 8.16 million - three fifths of the total population of 13.6 million - the 1933 figure suggests that the nationwide unemployment rate reached just over 10 per cent. Thousands or maybe millions more would have only part-time or seasonal work. In Manila, whose total population was now approximately 450,000, an unemployment rate of 10 per cent would indicate around 27,000 were out of work. The arrival of job-seekers from the countryside, it might be supposed, would make the real figure much higher than the national average, but contemporary observers of the labour scene surprisingly placed it lower, at 15,000 to 20,000. (31) In truth nobody knew.

Partly in response to the agitation led by the KAP, the authorities belatedly started to take serious note of the problem, and in 1933 the Manila Police Department was instructed to assist the Bureau of Labor conduct a house-to-house survey aimed at measuring unemployment in the city more accurately. But the figure produced by this exercise - 7,554 - was acknowledged to be unrealistically low. Some jobless, the Bureau reported glumly, had regarded the survey with "total indifference"; others had been unwilling to be registered as unemployed due to a "ridiculous fear" that the Police Department might mark them down as vagrants or criminals, or even ship them to Mindanao. Rather than offering work or welfare to the unfortunates it had unearthed, officialdom devoted its efforts in the weeks following the survey to persuading the Manila Railroad Company and a number of steamship lines to transport those who wished back to their provinces free of charge. Between August and December 1933, 848 persons availed themselves of this opportunity and accepted tickets home. Although the remedy admittedly failed to cure unemployment in the capital, the Bureau of Labor concluded on a note of self-congratulation, it nevertheless "did materially relieve the tenseness of the situation". (32)

A Party of the "Third Period"

The manner in which the Philippine communists analysed and reacted to the depression was modelled in all basic respects upon the stance of the Comintern. At its Sixth Congress in 1928, we noted previously, the International had predicted that the period when
capitalism had partially and precariously stabilised was coming to an end, giving way to a "third period" of renewed and profound crisis. The worldwide collapse which followed the October 1929 Wall Street crash was naturally taken as dramatic and conclusive proof that this forecast had been correct. Throughout the depression years successive Plenums of the Executive Committee of the Communist International accordingly reaffirmed not just the diagnosis of the global situation made by the Sixth Congress but also, with only minor refinements, the tactics of uncompromising revolutionary offensive which the Congress had considered that diagnosis to warrant.

As a result of the deepening crisis, the Comintern repeatedly asserted, existing contradictions between nations and classes were becoming ever more acute. The capitalist states, attempting to bolster their shaky economies by intensifying their exploitation of the colonies and semi-colonies, were provoking an upsurge in movements of national liberation. As rivalries over markets, raw materials and zones of influence became more intense there was a growing danger of new imperialist wars, and an even greater danger that the imperialist powers would join forces in a counter-revolutionary war against the Soviet Union. Within the capitalist states the impact of wage cuts and unemployment was polarising the burgeoning forces of proletarian revolution and the increasingly repressive forces of bourgeois dictatorship. This dictatorship, the Comintern contended, could take either a parliamentary form or an openly fascist form, but it would be a "liberal" mistake to suppose that the two were fundamentally distinct. Even social democratic governments, experience showed, did not hesitate to use the machinery of the capitalist state against the revolutionary movement, and in thereby defending the class enemy they betrayed a political identity best classified as "social-fascist". Since the social democrats fostered the illusion that capitalism could be reformed, and since they constituted the main impediment to communist leadership of the proletariat, indeed, they acted as the chief mainstay of the bourgeois order and thus objectively assumed a "social-fascist" character whether in power or not. Especially harmful, in the International's view, were the "left" social democrats who retarded the disintegration of their parties by seeming to offer an alternative to the more transparently traitorous "right". It was against the social democrats, therefore, and against their left wing in particular,
that communists in capitalist countries should direct their "main blow".

Communists in countries like the Philippines were also urged to combat social democratic tendencies, but the International obviously recognised that the foremost priorities of revolutionary struggle in colonial and predominantly agrarian conditions lay elsewhere. Before advancing towards a proletarian dictatorship, it was believed, parties in the colonies should work for a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry". (35) Though they should strive to establish proletarian hegemony in the revolution, the nature of that revolution should in the first instance be anti-imperialist and agrarian, aimed at securing complete independence and abolishing feudalism. In these circumstances, advised the Comintern, a role directly parallel to that performed by the social democrats in the West was played by the "national reformist" elements of the native bourgeoisie. (36) Whilst in reality inseparably bound to the imperialists, the national reformists created a constant smokescreen of demagogic phrasemongering and "oppositional" manoeuvres in an effort to persuade the masses that they desired independence. Sustaining this deceit, they hoped, would quell the development of a genuine "national revolutionary" movement of workers and peasants. Just as the social democrats should be regarded as the chief mainstay of capitalism, therefore, so the national reformists should be seen as the chief bulwark of imperialism. And since this barrier obviously had to be destroyed before the struggle could proceed, the International likewise concluded, the national reformists and their "left" factions in particular should be the target of the "main blow". (37)

Almost certainly it was the desire to identify the Philippine Party formally and publicly with the Comintern that proved decisive in the initial debates about taking the Communist name. So strong was this desire, indeed, that membership of the International was proudly affirmed in the PKP constitution before an application to be admitted had even been made. (38) This oversight was corrected in May 1931 when the Party resolved at its First Congress that it accepted the Comintern's programme and statutes "fully and unconditionally" and wished to seek affiliation as a "regular section". (39) Four months later the ECCI approved the request and promised to present it to the next World Congress of the International for final confirmation. Due
to delays in the convocation of another Congress this pledge could not be honoured until August 1935, so by the time the Party was at last welcomed into the Comintern's ranks it was almost five years old.(40)

In all but the letter, however, the PKP was a section of the International from birth, and a highly enthusiastic and diligent section at that. To underline its affinity with the world communist movement it elected Joseph Stalin and three other foreign Party leaders - William Z. Foster (USA), Ernst Thälmann (Germany) and Hsiang Chung-fa (China) - as honorary members of its First Congress presidium.(41) It marked, with manifestos or demonstrations, the many days of observance in the Comintern calendar - Women's Day, Unemployment Day, the "Day of Protest Against Imperialist War".(42) It participated, within its capabilities, in international campaigns such as those against the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and for the release of the PPTUS secretary and his wife, Paul and Gertrud Noulens, from imprisonment by the Kuomintang.(43) And messages of solidarity and goodwill were despatched with a conscientiousness that was exemplary. A conference of black workers which met under Profintern auspices in Hamburg was allowed by most fraternal organisations to pass unheralded, its chief organiser complained. The only greetings received by the conference from outside Germany had come from "the Philippine workers in far-away Manila".(44)

Lines of communication with the Comintern and its associated organisations had, we noted, already been firmly established before the PKP was founded. The KPMP was affiliated to the Krestintern, the KAP was connected through the PPTUS to the Profintern, and in April 1929 a Philippine section of the Anti-Imperialist League had been constituted. After his own return from Moscow in mid-1928, we also noted, Evangelista had selected three young cadres to travel to the Russian capital and take courses at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV). In 1929 this trio was joined by two more scholarship students, or "pensionados" as they were called - Emilio Maclang, a Bulakeño barrio-mate and protege of Jacinto Manahan, and Pascual Bambao, a KAP activist who came originally from Batangas.(45) Manahan himself travelled extensively in 1929. In July he addressed the Second World Congress of the Anti-Imperialist League in Frankfurt (where he and Evangelista were elected to the AIL executive committee) and in late August he attended the Second Pan-Pacific Trade Union
Conference in Vladivostok. Another KPMP leader bound for the latter event, Tomas Rodriguez, was arrested by the Japanese in Manchuria and deported back south, but other Filipino representatives evidently did reach Vladivostok, and still more attended a so-called "second section" of the Conference held shortly afterwards in Shanghai. In August 1930, when the senior KAP leaders were presumably wishing to concentrate their energies on getting the PKP off the ground, three middle-ranking cadres - Saturnino Brioso (a seaman), Catalino Monroy (a tabaquero) and Remigio Tolentino (a printer) - were given the honour of representing the Philippines at the Fifth Profintern Congress in Moscow.

Then the departures seem to have abruptly ceased, not to resume until 1934. Partly this was due to government duress. At the apparent behest of US Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley (a "known official agent of the Wall Street exploiters"), the PKP protested in 1931, the "national bourgeoisie" had "altogether prohibited our delegates to go outside the Philippines and attend international congresses". But presumably this ban would not have been impossible to evade. More importantly, perhaps, external factors such as the enforced closure of PPTUS headquarters in Shanghai meant that opportunities for travel were curtailed. First-hand reports about events and trends in the international movement could nonetheless have been obtained fairly regularly between 1931 and 1933 as the five KUTV pensionados made their separate ways home. Additional information, of course, could be gleaned from the pamphlets and periodicals that continued to arrive, despite occasional losses to the customs authorities, from a variety of overseas sources. Articles and manifestos considered especially useful or relevant were translated into Tagalog for publication in the labour press.

A number of American visitors to the Islands also helped to ensure that the early Filipino communists would not feel isolated or abandoned. In 1931 a brief call was made by Agnes Smedley, a leading publicist and champion of the revolutionary movement in China and a stalwart of Comintern-sponsored groups such as the Anti-Imperialist League and the Friends of the Soviet Union. The police special branch in Shanghai, where she lived, considered her to be in the "direct service" of the Comintern's Far Eastern Bureau, but this cannot be verified. A journalist by profession, Smedley wrote a short article about her Philippine encounters - including one with
Evangelista - for the CPUSA monthly New Masses. (51) When the PKP leaders faced prosecution in the lower courts a visiting professor at the Union Theological Seminary in Manila apparently acted as a conduit for defence funds sent by the American Civil Liberties Union, and when their cases reached the Philippine Supreme Court the CPUSA sent moral if not financial support in the person of a West Coast cadre named Paul Levin. (52)

The most important visitor, though, was an American communist in his mid-twenties known at the time as Tim Ryan. A railroad worker's son from Seattle, Ryan had become active in the CPUSA in 1928-29 after moving to California. In San Francisco he had been assigned as assistant editor (to Harrison George) of The Pan Pacific Monthly, the PPTUS organ exiled from Shanghai, and in Imperial Valley he had worked as an organiser amongst the Filipinos and other migrants who toiled in the fruit and vegetable fields. To evade imprisonment for crimes such as "conspiracy to foment revolution during the cantaloupe season", Ryan then went underground and headed for Chicago, where the CPUSA leadership decided that his youthful promise should be developed with a posting to the International in Moscow. Arriving in the Soviet capital in the latter part of 1930, he turned down positions in the Lenin School and the Anglo-American section and at his own request was attached instead to the Far Eastern Section. Within a matter of months, during which time he taught at the KUTV, he was commissioned to go to the Philippines as Comintern representative. He reached Manila in mid-1931, possibly in time to assist in preparing for the PKP's First Congress in May, and he reportedly stayed in the Islands for the best part of a year, travelling widely and living for many weeks with Evangelista. (53) His analysis of the Philippine situation and the tasks and tactics this imposed upon the PKP were summarised in a series of articles published in International Press Correspondence, the Comintern weekly; very likely he wrote not only those appearing under his customary pseudonym but also those printed more or less contemporaneously under the by-line S. Carpio. (54) Beyond question the recommendations and criticisms he imparted would be regarded as carrying the authority of the Comintern itself, and several were later clearly echoed in the PKP's own pronouncements.
Comintern guidance was welcomed and respected because the PKP saw it as being founded on the rich experience and accumulated wisdom of the entire world revolutionary movement. Central to this belief, needless to say, was an intense admiration for the Soviet Union, whose own victorious Communist Party the PKP looked upon as the "model Bolshevik section" at the International's heart. Whilst the International was hailed in the idiom of the times as the "general staff" of world revolution, so the USSR was gloried as the "buttress" or "citadel" of revolution, the "only motherland of the international proletariat and all oppressed peoples". There, it was said, the capitalists, feudal lords and bureaucratic parasites had been swept away, and labour ruled. In Moscow factories the standard working day was only six or seven hours long, and every fifth day was a rest day. Wages were equivalent to at least P 73 per month, and there was a paid vacation every year. Education and medical treatment were free, sickness and pension schemes were automatic. In the evenings the ordinary Russian could get a good cheap meal at a public dining hall and then go to a workers' club to see a film or read in the library. Racial discrimination was unknown, and women were the equals of men, subjected neither to household drudgery nor to the decadence of cabarets, jazz cellars and the foxtrot. Even prisoners, one visitor reported, were given wages, holidays and radios in their cells.

Soviet workers, in short, had won for themselves the basic comforts, rights and security that their shackled brothers elsewhere were still denied. Since the capitalist and colonial economies had been afflicted by the Great Depression, PKP writers and orators argued, the Soviet achievement and example had become more striking than ever. Capitalist production, organised for private profit, could be witnessed in headlong decline. Socialist production, rationally organised in accordance with the people's needs, was expanding triumphantly. Output targets were being met ahead of schedule. Wages were not being cut as in other countries but were rising under the First Five Year Plan by 12-15 per cent each year. And unemployment, the worst scourge of capitalist recession, had ceased to be a problem long ago. On the contrary, to achieve the next phase of its development plans the USSR required 3½ million more workers than it currently had.
This glowing depiction aroused such enthusiasm for Soviet ways that some PKP and KAP adherents are said to have started greeting each other with expansive Russian-style bear hugs.\(^{(62)}\) Many unemployed workers not surprisingly decided they would like to emigrate to the Soviet Union in search of a better life, and called at the KAP office in Calle Misericordia to seek assistance with their passage.\(^{(63)}\) Obviously lacking the resources to oblige, the KAP deftly turned the disappointment of these would-be emigrants into another grievance against the authorities. If the government was unable to provide sufficient jobs of adequate relief, a memorial to the Governor General declared roundly,

"we demand that those unemployed who wish to work and live peacefully and comfortably under the aid and protection of the workers' and peasants' Soviet State should be given at least free passports and transportation to the Soviet Union."\(^{(64)}\)

This demand, Carpio quickly pointed out, was politically incorrect, for whilst it was undeniably important to publicise the unparalleled advances made by the USSR, it was mistaken to divert the attention of unemployed Filipinos from the necessity of fighting the root causes of their predicament in their own country.\(^{(65)}\)

Some impression of the personalities who founded the Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas and constituted its early leadership will already be apparent from previous chapters. Two characteristics which they shared as a group are obvious immediately. First, a fact acknowledged as a weakness, they were all men. The participation of women, Evangelista once wrote privately, was more essential than anything else "to strengthen our movement and make it more lively". The problem was "just how to interest the Filipino women to co-operate with us", for most were captive to the "so-called 'time-honoured' tradition" that a woman's place is in the home. "Mrs Evangelista", he added, "is no exception".\(^{(66)}\) Despite the creation of a separate Youth and Women Department within the PKP this problem was never overcome, and although several women became active cadres in the KAP and KPMP it seems that none were elected to the higher organs of the Party as such until 1938. Even then, only two were chosen to sit on a National Committee whose total membership was twenty-five.\(^{(67)}\)
In background and livelihood, secondly, the early PKP leadership was overwhelmingly working class. Of the thirty or so cadres who comprised the original Central Committee it would appear that less than half a dozen were not manual workers themselves, and even these exceptions had come to the Party through their association with the labour and peasant movements. In this respect homogeneity was regarded as a positive strength, honouring the maxim long cherished by obrerista radicals that "the emancipation of the working class must be achieved by the working class itself". It was also highly acceptable internationally, where throughout the "third period" working class leadership was being promoted vigorously as a healthy counterpoint to leadership by intellectuals, professionals and other petty-bourgeois elements. In the Philippines the few such individuals who had once allied themselves with the left had nearly all drifted away before the PKP was formed, so no corrective action was required. Though the PKP was a young Party, a joint message of solidarity from the American, Chinese and Japanese CPs noted complimentarily, it was "virile and truly proletarian".

More precisely, the PKP leadership was composed almost exclusively of proletarians who lived and worked in the capital city. The peasants, tenants and for that matter the rural proletarians who formed the great bulk of the Filipino working population had only three or four specific spokesmen on the Central Committee, none of whom seem to have been actively engaged in farmwork themselves. This marked under-representation was nevertheless fully in accord with the Comintern view that "proletarian hegemony" should be clearly established even when the revolutionary movement was still primarily anti-imperialist and agrarian in direction. Much more disturbing, no doubt, was the recognition that the heavy metropolitan bias in the leadership reflected the weakness or quite often the total absence of Party influence, even in urban centres, in regions beyond Central and Southern Luzon. Of the twelve Central Committee members known to have been born outside Manila, as many as ten came from the Tagalog provinces nearby, and six of these issued from the single province of Bulacan. The other two were both Visayans - a Leyteño and a Negrense.

Elected as the PKP's first general secretary, and serving also as organisation department secretary, was Crisanto Evangelista.
1930 he was forty-two years old, living with his wife and five children in a "microscopic" nipa house on Calle Remedios and still working, it seems, as a linotypist in a newspaper print room.\(^{(72)}\) His appearance and style were described by Agnes Smedley, who watched him addressing a meeting at a barrio on Manila Bay:

"The slender white (-suited) figure under the electric light was speaking in a voice broken by an occasional tubercular cough... Evangelista's face is very dark and thin, with high cheek bones. He could be either Malayan or Cantonese... In his voice, his bearing, his manner is a gentleness and wistfulness that inspires devotion and love in the hearts of the workers.... He stood this evening before two thousand fishermen, and taught. He is no agitator, no demagogue. He would read from a book, a document, a pamphlet; lay it down and talk... For three hours he taught, earnestly and without any demonstrativeness - and the only movement in the audience was when some man would arise from the hard earth to rest his legs for a moment."\(^{(73)}\)

Apart from Arturo Soriano, a fellow printer whose activism dated back to pre-revolutionary days, Evangelista was the Central Committee member with the longest experience in the labour movement, and as a one-time president of the Congreso Obrero could be said to have reached the movement's peak. His great personal strengths were sincerity, integrity and tireless dedication; an impressive contrast, one contemporary recalled, to the many obreristas who came and went like a "flash in the pan", accepted "grease money" or paraded themselves as heroes after winning a single strike.\(^{(74)}\) Admiration for Evangelista as an individual extended well beyond the labour left. In 1919, we noted, Quezon had selected him to represent the working man on the first Independence Mission to Washington; later he had secured his appointment to fill a temporary vacancy on the Manila municipal board and is very credibly reported to have offered him senior posts in the government service.\(^{(75)}\) When co-option was resisted in favour of militant opposition, the Senate President's respect naturally became tinged with irritation, but it never really faded.

With the Party, respect for "Anto's" personal qualities and experience was augmented by deference to his unrivalled understanding of communist theory. Alone amongst the PKP founders he was competent not just in Spanish but also in English and Russian, and over the years had accumulated what Agnes Smedley was probably right to describe as the only Marxist-Leninist library in the Islands\(^{(76)}\) Keenly anxious to
improve theoretical awareness, Evangelista as general secretary attached great importance to propagating the fundamentals of Marxism through Party literature and cadre education programmes. But despite occasional strictures against "left-sectarianism", "right-opportunism" and other contemporary deviations he was never prone to initiate a heresy hunt or purge in Party ranks, and was more likely to value a fellow comrade for his organisational achievements than for his grasp of the prevailing Comintern orthodoxy. This approach may have contributed to a looser internal discipline than would have been tolerated in communist parties elsewhere, but on the other hand it effectively quelled the dangers of ideological factionalism and schism. Those familiar with Philippine formal organisations in general and political parties in particular will appreciate that it is also to Evangelista's everlasting credit that during his stewardship of the Party there were no serious factional problems arising from clashes of personality or individual ambition.

Sitting together with Evangelista as full members on the original Politburo were the secretaries of the Party's four other departments. Second in rank, as labour department secretary, was the man who had founded the Partido Obrero back in 1922, KAP president Antonino Ora. As already noted, Ora worked as a superintendent at a lumber and hardware company, but he also had substantial property holdings and was clearly the wealthiest amongst the early PKP leaders. As the president of a sawyers' union he had been prominent in labour circles for over a decade, and like Evangelista had once presided over the Congreso Obrero itself. Supervising the propaganda department was Jacinto Manahan, formerly a printer and Union de Impresores activist but much better known as the founding president of what had now become the Party's mass peasant organisation, the KPMP. To allow Manahan to concentrate on speechmaking and writing broadsheets and pamphlets, the secretaryship of the peasant department was assigned to his principal deputy in the KPMP, Juan Feleo. A native of Nueva Ecija, Feleo had first become active in rural unionism as a young schoolteacher and Nacionalista lider in his home town of Santa Rosa, but by 1930 he and his family had moved to Manila, where they ran a small laundry. The fifth and final Party department, which had responsibility for youth and women, was headed by another printer, Felix Caguin from Paete in Laguna. In youth work at least, Caguin was on familiar ground, for he had previously served as
secretary of the KKAP, the young workers' organisation established by the Laplang Manggagawa.

According to the PKP constitution there were also three substitute or advisory Polîburo members, but the Party history written in 1950 recalled only two - Urbano Arcega and a Chinese representative remembered simply as "Comrade C". (78) Arcega hailed from Marilao, Bulacan, a town that bred many of the capital's slippermakers, and for a decade or more he had headed the Union de Chineleros. "Comrade C", presumably, was a prominent cadre in the Philippine Chinese Laborers' Federation.

In January 1931, just two months after the Party was launched, Antonino Ora was tragically killed in an automobile accident, and his labour department responsibilities seem then to have been divided between two Central Committee members who were respectively the KAP general secretary and treasurer, Guillermo Capadocia and Mariano Balgos. Capadocia was at twenty-three the youngest of the PKP inner circle, and aside from "Comrade C" was the only non-Tagalog, his boyhood having been spent in Negros Occidental. By profession a cook, he had nevertheless become so proficient in the language of Manila and its region that he was regarded as one of the Party's most eloquent and dynamic public speakers. So too was Mariano Balgos, whose oratorical reputation had long since been established on the platforms of Tagalog literary groups and kapisanan makabayan. A Caviteño by birth, Balgos was a printer who like Manahan and Caguin had served his apprenticeship in the labour movement under Evangelista on the executive of the Union de Impresores. (79)

Looking back on the period many years later, Balgos acknowledged that his effectiveness as a senior Party leader had been undermined by the sheer weight of his duties. "I was exhausted from endless work", he recollected, "yet many tasks were still neglected". (80) Balgos attributed his predicament, in which he was certainly not alone, simply to a chronic shortage of cadres. But this deficiency was greatly compounded by two other facts of early Party life. First, the exercise of leadership through organisational channels was unfamiliar to Filipinos, and many members and sympathisers still identified primarily with the Party's leading personalities rather than with the Party as such. Fearing that the authority of lower-ranking cadres might not be respected, top leaders like Balgos consequently felt compelled to undertake as many
assignments as possible themselves. (81) Secondly, the Party manifestly overstretched its limited resources by attempting to accomplish too much too soon. Despite its youth and smallness - in the first three years the membership never exceeded 2,000 - it aspired to an intensity and range of organisational life that would have taxed even its well-established counterparts in the West. (82)

To begin with there was the Party itself, to be built on a nationwide framework of workplace and residential bdklod (nucleii), municipal groups and provincial assemblies, and to be complemented by parallel sections of a Young Communist League, the Katipunan ng Kabataang Komunista (KKK). (83) Then there were the two principal mass organisations, the KAP and KPMP, again with hierarchies to be extended throughout the archipelago, in which the Party was supposed to have "fractions" at every level. Within the KAP, specialist departments were constituted to foster separate youth sections and women's groups, and another - the Department for the Upliftment of Body and Mind - was charged with promoting workers' clubs, study circles, literary classes and sports events. (84) As a result of these efforts there was some meeting or other for diligent KAP members in Manila to attend "almost every night", and at weekends there were well-supported inter-branch softball games. (85) Another multitude of tasks had to be tackled in the branch, national and executive committees of the individual unions affiliated to the KAP, and when strikes were declared still more committees blossomed and beckoned - co-ordinating committees, fund-raising committees and committees to extend the stoppage to other shops or factories. (86)

Complementing the KAP and KPMP were two specialist mass organisations - the Katipunan ng mga Walang Hanapbuhay sa Pilipinas (KWHBP - Philippine Unemployed Organisation) and the Samahan sa Pagtatanggol ng mga Manggagawa at Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (SPMMP - Philippine Workers' and Peasants' Defence Association), created as their names indicate to campaign for work and welfare for the jobless and to support activists faced with persecution or imprisonment. (87) A Civil Liberties Union was formed to crusade for a legal and political climate in which the SPMMP would become superfluous. (88) To express solidarity with the communist cause elsewhere in the world, a Philippine section of International Red Aid (MOPR) and Committees to Defend the Soviet Union...
were established.\(^{(89)}\) And last but not least there was an Anti-
Imperialist League, ideally to have a branch and committee in every
barrio and neighbourhood in the Islands.\(^{(90)}\)

Besides organisations to organise there were offices to run and,
whenever circumstances permitted, papers to print.\(^{(91)}\) The PKP organ,
named Titas (Spark) after Lenin's Iskra and intended to be a weekly,
began publication in April 1931 with a reported circulation of 10,000
copies.\(^{(92)}\) The KAP and KPMP still issued the papers launched in
1928, Tinig-Manggagawa (Workers' Voice) and Anak-Pawis (Sons of Sweat),
when possible once a month, and several more newsheets appeared on a
more occasional basis. The Young Communist League, for example, came
out with Kabataan (Youth), the defence association with Manananngol
(Defender) and the unemployed organisation with the aptly titled Gutom
(Hungry).\(^{(93)}\)

Ultra-Leftism and "White Terror"

Convinced that economic and political conditions were objectively
favourable for revolution, PKP leaders were optimistic that this
relentless organisational and propaganda drive would rapidly transform
worker and peasant discontent into an irresistible mass movement. The
"wonderful emergence" of the PKP, one wrote, was comparable to the
birth of Christ, for it brought the toiling millions "a beautiful hope".\(^{(94)}\) Evangelista, preferring a secular analogy, likened the Party
nuclei to electric light bulbs and the Party centre to the power
station which by the flick of a switch would be able to illuminate the
entire archipelago.\(^{(95)}\) The imperialists and their national bourgeois
allies would be overthrown and the proletariat would govern in their
stead, he predicted, before the decade closed.\(^{(96)}\) Less cautious souls
were said to be fully confident that the revolution would triumph
within a single year.\(^{(97)}\)

Whatever illusions existed that victory would be swift, there
were none that it would be easy. Faced with mounting attacks upon
their wealth and power, the PKP programme foresaw, the imperialists and
capitalists would retaliate with all the might at their disposal.\(^{(98)}\) In recognising this fact, Evangelista argued, the Party was not actively
advocating the use of force but merely bowing to the immutable laws of
This was not an interpretation that government prosecutors were inclined to share. Even in print, they could argue, the Party perpetually exhorted the masses to "fight" their exploiters, to "overthrow" the government and to wish "death" upon all enemies of freedom and independence. At its First Congress, they might observe, the Party had declared its guiding principle to be "irreconcilable, unyielding and unceasing class warfare". Then there were the constant references to the examples set by the workers and peasants in Russia in 1917 and more recently in China, and to the Comintern, whose own programme declared that "communists ... proclaim openly that their designs can only be realised by the violent overthrow of the traditional social order". At street meetings and rallies, the prosecution could further attest, statements were often to be heard yet more apocalyptic in tone. Some cadres, the 1950 Party history confirmed, looked upon violence as a vital catharsis. "Blood, blood and only blood", they avowed, "can wash away the corruption in our country". "The hammer in our emblem", audiences were told, "is for smashing the skulls of the bourgeoisie and the sickle is for slitting their throats".

At no stage, however, were PKP members accused of moving beyond this virulent rhetoric and making actual preparations for insurrection, not even after January 1933, when the Party implicitly acknowledged that it viewed force as something more than an historical inevitability. The "only way" independence could be gained, it then declared, is "by armed uprising of the toiling masses in revolutionary war against foreign oppressors and native traitors". Apart from omitting to prepare for armed struggle, moreover, the PKP never clearly defined the manner in which it expected such a struggle to develop, or the strategy by which it could succeed. The peasant leader Juan Feleo entertained hopes that the Constabulary and Scouts might hold the key. "Imagine your meagre salaries", he asked a Constabulary detachment watching over a meeting he was addressing in Nueva Ecija, "and compare them against those of your chiefs, who sit comfortably in their offices scratching their bellies whilst you sweat and starve". "When the time comes", he bid the troopers, "you should desert and aim your rifles not at the communists but at your chiefs and the imperialists". For this advice Feleo was promptly arrested and eventually received a six month prison sentence.
More commonly proposed as the means for gaining power were workers' and peasants' soviets. Here the Party was criticised in the Comintern press for being overzealous, for calling (at the First Central Committee Plenum in January 1932) for the immediate formation of soviets "in every town and rural district" instead of being content merely to popularise the idea of soviets as bodies to be created when conditions were ripe. Since the Party was still weak, Carpio argued, and since the level of class struggle still fell short of a revolutionary situation, such a stance meant "simply to play with the slogan of establishing soviets" and called into question whether the Filipino comrades properly understood what the term meant. (105) At its Second Plenum in March 1933 the PKP Central Committee heeded this rebuke and acknowledged that its earlier position had been a leftist deviation. (106) There is no evidence, however, that there were any soviets yet in existence to disband.

That rebellion neither materialised nor was seriously planned was not accepted by the government as an adequate defence. Sedition, it was held, was a crime not just of direct commission but of future intent, and in the PKP's case this had been loudly and publicly proclaimed. Compared with the repression that confronted other communist parties at the time, the persecution which resulted from this view was fairly limited and restrained. No prominent cadres were killed, and the slow process of the law permitted the majority to continue their Party work for almost three years before they were jailed. In the Philippine context the persecution was however without precedent since the early years of the American occupation. To the PKP, in the contemporary parlance, it was a campaign of reactionary "white terror".

There had been clear forewarnings, it may be recalled, ever since 1928, and there were more in the months immediately prior to the Party being formed. A Chinese cadre prominent during a lumberyard strike was deported to the mercy of the Kuomintang as an "undesirable alien", and there were hints that other activists in the KAP-affiliated Philippine Chinese Laborers' Federation might suffer the same fate. (107) In February 1930 the Manila police confiscated the plates of "seditious" leaflets being printed by the Anti-Imperialist League. (108) The following month Evangelista, Ora and Manahan were sub-poenaed by the city fiscal's office in connection with the seizure of "red propaganda" from...
abroad, and in an obviously related move the Director of Posts issued an order banning the KAP and its leaders from the mail service - the same penalty he had imposed on the old Congreso Obrero two years earlier. Correspondence to or from the miscreants, it was announced, would henceforth be consigned to the dead letter section.(109) In reality, the KAP later complained, literature from overseas was consigned instead to Constabulary bonfires.(110)

Nevertheless, the PKP's inaugural rally and several subsequent street meetings were allowed to pass virtually undisturbed, although secret service agents were always present to take copious notes of what was said. More concerted attempts to curtail communist activity were prompted by two episodes that occurred in January 1931. On the eleventh there was the most violent agrarian disturbance in Central Luzon since post-revolutionary days, a short-lived uprising in the town of Tayug, Pangasinan which left six rebels and five Constabularymen dead. Neither the PKP nor the KPMP played any part in the revolt, but inevitably there were rumours to the contrary and a more general fear that red agitators would soon capitalise on the discontent that the tragedy had revealed.(111) Then on the twenty-fifth there was an event that provoked further unease - the funeral of Antonino Ora, which attracted the largest and most refractory demonstration of support for the communist cause yet seen. Flanked by platoons of patrolmen, a procession estimated at between ten and thirty thousand strong followed the cortège through the streets of Manila to the Cemeterio del Norte. Affronted by persistent press reports that the authorities would prevent the unfurling of red flags, many marchers came armed with heavy sticks, determined if necessary to defend their banners. At the cemetery Evangelista, Manahan and others harangued the crowd with fiery denunciations of the proletariat's enemies, and with clenched fists the mourners pledged to honour Ora's memory by redoubling the fight.(112) Some days later Governor General Dwight F. Davis despatched a succinct cable to Washington:

"As Red leaders are going beyond limits and making incendiary speeches it was decided to prosecute leaders in order to stop abuses. While not menace here, may cause trouble if combined with ignorant religious fanatics and unemployed during existing depression."(113)

Over the next few weeks almost all the top-ranking PKP leaders were arrested and charged with sedition - some more than once - but in
each instance were released on bail pending trial. (114) Adding insult to injury, the Attorney General gave a formal opinion to the effect that red flags should be banned as prejudicial to public order. When the PKP sought permission to protest against these outrages with a mammoth parade to Malacanang—complete with red flags, the Party stipulated wilfully—the Manila mayor decreed that the request be denied, and Acting Governor General Butte told newsmen that he would not have received the demonstrators in any case, for they would have "come not as citizens petitioning but as revolutionary reds". (115) Pointing to the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly embodied in the 1916 "Jones Law", the PKP then submitted applications for permits to hold meetings at the Grand Opera House and the Olympic Stadium. These too were denied. Henceforth, the mayor announced, there would be a blanket ban on communist meetings anywhere in the city, even on private premises. (116)

Though scarcely the "Death Blow to Reds" predicted by the Herald, this ruling did upset plans for the forthcoming May Day, the first since the Party's formation. Determined not to let the annual celebrations be monopolised by the "yellow" Congreso Obrero and Federacion del Trabajo, the KAP sought and obtained a permit to hold a rally just outside Manila in the main square at Caloocan. From there, it was announced—making a virtue out of necessity—the gathering would proceed to nearby Balintawak to pay homage at the spot where in 1896 Bonifacio's Katipuneros were believed to have sworn to win the Philippines her freedom. (117) On April 30, however, the municipal president of Caloocan abruptly revoked the permit, stating that he had been "forced to do so by higher authorities". (118) This was the final straw. Previously having bowed to official restraints, the KAP now defiantly decided to press ahead. Despite newspaper reports that the rally had been outlawed, over ten thousand people packed into the Caloocan plaza on May Day afternoon, and orders from a waiting Constabulary detachment to disperse were impassively ignored. Evangelista then arrived on the scene, and in the hope that he would ask the crowd to go home was allowed by the Constabulary commander to mount the platform. Saluting the crowd with a clenched fist, the PKP general secretary attempted instead to launch into a speech. Quickly, the Constabulary pulled him down and placed him under arrest. Amidst a great uproar of protest one demonstrator cried out "Let us die
But the crowd was unarmed, Manahan later recounted, whilst the Constabulary had revolvers, rifles with bayonets fixed, and tear-gas bombs. In the face of several arrests and a drenching from fire-hoses, the workers reluctantly conceded the day, vowing that before long another would dawn when the victory would be theirs.

In the evening a smaller demonstration in Manila itself was broken up with further arrests, bringing the total for the day to over sixty. For most the prospect was a cautionary fine or a brief spell in jail, but for the fourteen Chinese militants amongst those detained there was the more serious danger of deportation. Constabulary Chief Charles E. Nathorst lost little time in formally recommending this course of action to the Governor General, and was zealously supported by what the PPTUS not unfairly labelled the "imperialist press". Indigenous reds were bad enough; "alien reds" were simply intolerable. "Public execution is the remedy in Indo-China", the Bulletin clamoured, "the same is in Java and in China ... Deportation is the thing!" A "mailed fist" policy was essential, agreed the Tribune, "nothing would serve public interests better than summary deportation". Nor did the threat only hang over those directly involved, for as many as five hundred members of the Philippine Chinese Laborers' Federation were reportedly given an ultimatum to sever their connections with "communist societies" or be sent packing on the earliest available boat. How often this threat was implemented is not known, but the KAP later claimed that Chinese cadres had been delivered to "the executioner Chiang Kai-shek" on a "mass scale".

Whilst the hullabaloo over the May Day events was at its height the PKP held its First Congress in conditions of secrecy, and the wisdom of shifting in part to underground activity was confirmed by a series of bans and raids on meetings of Party-linked labour and peasant groups. These actions culminated on May 31 in what the New York Times called "the largest raid in the history of the Philippines", the storming by police of the KAP's Third National Congress in the "El Retono" Building. The secret service chief who led the raid, Captain Frank Krueger, later testified that when he entered the meeting hall he recognised Evangelista and Manahan on the platform and, without even listening to what was being said, concluded at once that it was indeed a communist
gathering. Bearing in mind the ruling that communists should not be allowed to meet anywhere in Manila, he ordered his men to break up the proceedings, arrest all the 319 delegates present and whisk them away in a convoy for a night in the cells.\(^{(128)}\)

Also causing headaches for officiodom at this time was the Party's decision, as the local phraseology had it, "to enter politics", in other words to field candidates in the June 1931 elections. Apparently relaxing the overall ban on communist gatherings, the Secretary of the Interior announced that PKP candidates would be allowed to campaign freely. But, he stipulated, they must say nothing seditious. Whilst their candidacies would be formally accepted and registered, moreover, those who were elected would not be permitted to take office.\(^{(129)}\) Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos then questioned whether this would always be constitutionally feasible. If the communists were elected to municipal or provincial posts, he pointed out, the Administrative Code clearly empowered the Governor General to unseat them. If however they were elected to the Senate or House of Representatives their future could only be determined by their fellow legislators.\(^{(130)}\) On the streets the debate was considerably less academic, with the police tearing down PKP posters, seizing red flags and arresting anyone they deemed to have overstepped the bounds of sedition.\(^{(131)}\) Immediately after polling, according to the Herald, the Constabulary began checking out citizens who were supposed to have voted for the PKP "in order to prepare a blacklist of communists" to be barred from public office "and deprived of other civil rights and privileges".\(^{(132)}\)

Four weeks later, when the four most important "communist cases" came to be jointly heard before the Manila Court of First Instance, participation in the elections on the communist ticket was chosen by the prosecution as convenient, virtually conclusive evidence of PKP affiliation.\(^{(133)}\) And when in September 1931 the judge delivered his verdicts on the various charges of sedition and illegal association, rather ironically, involvement in this least seditious and illegal facet of Party activity duly turned out to be the prime determinant of guilt and sentence. Of thirty-two senior cadres brought to trial, seven were acquitted - including five the only evidence against whom was their presence at the raided KAP congress - and five who had kept a low profile during the election were given prison terms ranging from four to sixteen
months. The remaining twenty-eighteen candidates and two campaigners were sentenced to eight years and one day closely supervised internal exile in different provinces of Luzon, to be preceded for many by prison terms of between six months and two years. (134)

Granted leave to appeal, the PKP leaders were then released on recognizances of between two and five hundred pesos. (135) In July 1932 the cases reached the Philippine Supreme Court. Appreciating that there was faint hope of getting their verdicts reversed, the appellants decided to dispense with counsel and let Evangelista use the entire time allotted to the defence to instruct the four American and four Filipino justices on the basics of imperialism, class struggle and revolution. (136) So incensed was one American judge by this long didactic discourse, it was reported, that he stomped out the courtroom in protest. (137) As anticipated, the convictions and sentences imposed by the lower court were all unanimously affirmed. (138) Then the accused served notice that they would carry their appeal a stage further, to the Supreme Court of the United States. By this point Constabulary Chief Nathorst was losing his patience. In Java and the Federated Malay States, he complained, proven communists were "convicted without much ado". (139) To assist with the appeal in Washington the support of the American Civil Liberties Union was enlisted, but due to communications and other difficulties the necessary briefs were never filed. (140) The efforts of the ACLU's lawyers did nevertheless gain the accused almost fourteen months' additional freedom. Not until December 1933 were the PKP leaders originally sentenced in September 1931 finally obliged to return to the Supreme Court for their formal committal to jail and exile. More than a thousand supporters turned out to bid them a heroes' farewell. (141)

Throughout this protracted prosecution there remained considerable scope for the PKP and its mass organisations to function openly. Newspapers and other literature could still be published, offices could still be maintained, and strikes and demonstrations could still be organised. Though official harassment was more or less constant it was also selective and startlingly inconsistent. What was prohibited on one occasion might well be permitted the next. We noted, for example, that in May 1931 the KAP's Third Congress had been forcibly dissolved and all its delegates detained overnight. Yet in June 1932 the KAP's
Sectarianism

The PKP could have used the remaining opportunities for open activity to better effect, it was later recognised, had its theory and tactics not been distorted by the ultra-leftist and sectarian tendencies that were prevalent in the early 1930s throughout the Comintern. In particular, these tendencies limited the application and undermined the effectiveness of united front work. The need for single-issue or multi-issue alliances, to begin with, was obscured by the Party's starkly uncomplicated analysis of Philippine society. Class conflict was seen as a simple polarisation between workers and capitalists and peasants and landlords. Exactly the same battlelines existed in the independence struggle, it was contended, because the capitalists and landlords had treacherously wedded themselves to the imperialists. The interests, aspirations and even the existence of the different strata within these basic social categories were generally left unremarked. Intermediate strata were either similarly disregarded or actively disparaged. Bureaucrats and merchants were both classified as parasites. Intellectuals were seen as mostly having made common cause with the exploiters; they were, Evangelista wrote in 1931, "the modern Joshuas of the bible fiction", trying to stop the sun from setting on class rule. But where Joshua had succeeded, they were doomed to fail. As Evangelista's remark indicates, there was also a strongly anti-clerical, occasionally anti-religious element in the PKP's outlook which effectively ruled out any joint activities with organisations linked to the Church. Together with merchants, capitalists and landlords, the PKP programme specified, priests should be disenfranchised and barred from public office. This disinclination to accept that the workers and peasants needed or might be able to gain assistance from other social groups in pursuing their revolutionary mission was complemented by an equally exclusive view of the role of the Party. Membership in the PKP, resolved the First Congress, "is absolutely incompatible" with "membership or activities or organisational connections with or in any secret society, masonic lodge, or any other political party or quasi-
political organisation". It was necessary to expose such organisations "for what they are - the tools and weapons of our class enemies for disorganising, disarming and misleading the workers and peasants from the path of revolutionary class action". (146)

On many subjects the Party had in fact similar attitudes and aims to the organisations it so comprehensively condemned. The most recurrent common denominator amongst the groups which burgeoned on the political fringe was a desire for immediate and absolute independence and an accompanying conviction that the Nacionalista hierarchy had abandoned this sacred cause to devote themselves to corruption and the pleasures of the flesh. There was broad agreement also on other fundamental nationalist issues - the promotion of a native language, the Filipinisation of the education system and the ending of racial discrimination. In the labour movement the KAP obviously shared with its competitors an immediate interest in improving wages and conditions, and in the countryside the KPMP's struggles against usury, landgrabbing and oppressive tenancy conditions often overlapped with those of rival peasant organisations. Another focus of common censure was the cedula, an annual two peso poll tax. And together with other militant oppositionists, finally, the communists had a certain fellowship in the adversity of persecution, which created a mutual desire for wider civil liberties.

Just occasionally the PKP and its mass organisations did co-operate with their rivals. There was a major strike in the tobacco industry in mid-1931, for instance, during which KAP adherents joined forces with the COF-affiliated Union de Tabaqueros. (147) But for the most part such co-operation was regarded as something to be avoided whenever possible, tantamount almost to a rightist deviation. (148) This sectarian stance plainly emanated from the contemporary Comintern notion that "reformism" in both its "social" and "national" guises was the chief impediment to the development of the revolutionary movement and therefore the primary target of revolutionary attack. Since the term "revolutionary" was narrowly interpreted in practice to mean "communist", every labour, peasant or patriotic organisation beyond the Party's sphere was seen as reformist virtually by definition. Around mid-1932, again in conformity with Comintern fashion, the organisations hitherto condemned as reformist began to be commonly reviled even more vehemently as "fascist". (149)
So wide and indiscriminate were the PKP's attacks that relatively sympathetic groups and individuals were berated just as bitterly as inveterate foes. Among the Nacionalista leadership, for example, the closest the Party had to a friend was Representative Francisco Varona, who between 1924 and 1928 had been president of the Congreso Obrero. Alone in government circles, Varona spoke out consistently against the official "white terror", criticising the Constabulary for its efforts to get all "alien reds" summarily deported and describing attempts to ban the red flag as "the height of bigotry and presumption". But despite this much-needed support the PKP classified the NP politico as just another "labour traitor".

In Democrata ranks the Party had an even stauncher helpmate in the person of Vicente Sotto, a radical publicist and lawyer who along with Evangelista had been one of the Congreso Obrero's founding fathers back in 1913. When the communist leaders appeared in a succession of courtrooms during 1931 on charges of sedition and unlawful association it was normally Sotto who acted as their principal defence counsel, and his assistance went well beyond routine professional bounds. He enabled his clients to circumvent the order prohibiting them from using the postal service by letting them use his own address as a mail box for communications and literature from overseas. He acted as one of their main guarantors - risking a considerable sum - when they were released pending appeal to the Supreme Court. And in his capacity as a Democrata politician he tried to make the "white terror" an anti-Nacionalista issue in the 1931 election campaign.

In the PKP's undiscerning view the two mainstream parties were both pernicious tools of the "traitorous national bourgeoisie". Being a Democrata would thus be sufficient reason alone for Sotto to be consigned outside the revolutionary pale, but in November 1931 he committed another heinous political crime. Together with fervent independistas from a variety of backgrounds - "the powerful rich and the most humble labourers" - he launched the Union Civica Filipina, a non-partisan association which under the slogan "Independence or Nothing" sought to promote a boycott of American goods and to popularise Gandhiist tactics of peaceful civil disobedience. In addition to presiding over the Union Civica "supreme junta", Sotto renamed a weekly paper he had published since 1915 as **Union** to serve as the association's mouthpiece. Although this paper alloyed its Gandhiism with extracts
from Marxist writings and on one occasion carried a seemingly genuine message of salutations from Stalin, the PKP hailed the Union Civica as a manifestation of "social and national fascism", as another under­hand attempt by the increasingly frightened capitalists and imperialists to divert the masses from proper and effective revolutionary action. (157) Not everyone in the Party agreed with this damnatory assessment, however, and at least one senior cadre took a place on the association's supreme junta. (158) Slightly softening its judgment in this light, the PKP later grudgingly conceded that within the Union Civica there were "some honest, but confused anti-imperialists". But, it insisted, "Sotto is not among them". (159)

Another oppositionist figure with whom the PKP briefly had a useful modus vivendi was Benigno Ramos, the editor of a vitriolic anti-Nacionalista weekly called Sakdal. Until around 1928 Ramos had been a Nacionalista activist himself, and had been rewarded for his literary and oratorical contributions to party campaigns with a flourishing career in the offices of the Senate. In common with many militant patriots, however, he found the NP hierarchy's resumption of "co-operation" with the American occupiers too bitter an anti-climax after the heady days of battling against Governor Wood. Accusing the "oligarchy" of capitulation and betrayal, Ramos started to argue like the left that the only hope of salvaging national pride and identity rested with the working class. (160) In 1930 his expression of such sentiments led to his dismissal from the government service, and with time on his hands he launched Sakdal, the title meaning "to accuse". (161)

Besides providing Ramos with a launching pad for his own populist-style movement, Sakdal initially acted as a forum for several shades of oppositionist opinion, and PKP writers like many others were able to use its well-circulated columns to reach beyond their normal audience. On a number of issues Ramos saw them as fellow spirits fighting the same fight - against the extravagance, corruption and treachery of the political elite, against the Americanisation of Philippine culture and education, against the cedula, against government persecution of dissenters and against labourite sycophancy and reformism. Above the sorry ranks of Filipino obreristas, Sakdal noted in an early issue, Evangelista stood as a firm, strong and honourable figure who remained true to his principles. Aside from his sympathy for the Soviet Union and his dalliance with electoral politics, the unsigned tribute concluded, "we
believe we are in accord with this comrade ... and we hope that eventually we will be able to defend the welfare and ideals of our nation side by side". (162) And when Antonino Ora was killed in January 1931, Sakdal mourned the "sad end of a revolutionary life". (163) Yet instead of attempting to build on Sakdal's goodwill, the PKP added the embryonic movement that was beginning to grow around Ramos and his paper to its lengthy list of "fascist" pariahs. (164)

Inevitably such blanket accusations provoked a vigorous response in kind. Under a headline dubbing the communists as "Agents of Russia", Sakdal pointedly described the scene at the Fourth KAP Congress - no Philippine flags but everywhere the red banner of the Soviet Union; no native music but the strains of the Internationale; no representations of Rizal or Bonifacio on stage but the bust of Lenin. (165) Apart from serving Russia, Sakdal alleged, the PKP's primary purpose was simply to further the personal ambitions of Evangelista and Manahan, leaders who in reality were far less militant than their fiery rhetoric pretended. (166) Similar charges were made by a contributor to the moderate labour paper Ang Manggagawa. If the communists were so brave, he asked, why did they always seek permits from the authorities before holding demonstrations, and after all their talk about fighting the government why when they were prosecuted did they crawl shamefully to seek clemency from the Governor General, the chief representative of the very imperialists they were sworn to overthrow? (167)

As their repeated setbacks showed, the same writer argued, the communists were in any case patently deluded when they talked about imminent revolution. Counter-criticisms from a slightly different perspective were made by Union Civica leaders, who had clearly been offended deeply by being branded as pro-imperialist. This allegation, protested one supreme junta member, "is an injustice and a lie, for we too are fighting stoutly against the Yankees". (168) When Evangelista and his comrades presumed to attack their own "DEFENDER and BONDSMAN" in such terms, thundered Vicente Sotto, they revealed themselves to be both misguided in their politics and deficient in their character. They were ingrates. The Party, in his view, was not merely unrealistic in contemplating political violence but morally wrong. The dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, he suggested, was no more attractive a prospect than any other kind of dictatorship. And the communist denigration of "patriotism" he saw as an "aberration", for without that
quality the struggle against imperialism would surely perish. (169)

The Anti-Imperialist League

Whoever got the better of these exchanges, it is clear that the
PKP's attempts to "expose and isolate" the personalities it deemed to
be "fake" nationalists did not yield any tangible reward. The hope
that there would be a mass rank and file exodus from the "bogus"
patriotic organisations was not fulfilled, and the goal of constructing
a truly revolutionary anti-imperialist united front "from below" remained
only a vision. The sectarian and leftist tendencies which inspired these
vain expectations, in the meanwhile, seriously curtailed other, poten­
tially more productive forms of united front activity in the nationalist
sphere, and contributed in particular to the ineffectiveness and
eventual demise of the Anti-Imperialist League.

As an international organisation the AIL had been launched at a
conference held in Brussels in February 1927, a time when Comintern
attitudes towards tactical co-operation with socialists, liberals and
bourgeois nationalists had been far less jaundiced and doctrinaire. (170)
The original executive committee included representatives from the
British Labour Party, the Indian Congress Party and the Kuomintang, with
communists in a definite minority. (171) Notwithstanding a claim that
the League already had an "important section" in the Philippines by late
1927, it appears that the first concerted attempt to establish a branch
in the Islands was not made until April 1929, by which point the
Comintern's thinking on inter-party alliances had radically changed. (172)
Within the Lapiang Manggagawa, the driving force behind the initiative,
there would in any case have been little inclination to work in con­
junction with the Nacionalista and Democrata leaderships, for as we saw
in an earlier chapter the LM had been accusing the two "bourgeois"
parties of having abandoned the nationalist cause even before the
Comintern took the same view. Nor, for that matter, would figures like
Quezon, Osmeña or the Democrata leader Sumulong be likely to want to
associate themselves with an enterprise sponsored by a small party of
pro-Bolshevik labourites.

Even when the Philippine section of the Anti-Imperialist League
was first founded, therefore, it was scarcely a manifestation of the
classic "united front from above". Of the seventeen members of the
original executive, at least twelve were either members or close allies of the Lapiang Manggagawa and only three had significant political followings elsewhere - Francisco Varona in the Nacionalista Party, Isabelo Tejada in the Democrata Party and Patricio Dionisio in a patriotic society then known as the Katipunan Anak ng Bayan (Association of The Sons of the People). Before the League had made any public impact its activists were diverted by the split in the Congreso Obrero, and Isabelo Tejada, reviled by the LM as the leading "capitalist-agent" villain of that episode, appears to have resigned or been jettisoned from the executive almost immediately. In July 1929 the AIL suffered another setback with the testy departure of its president, Cirilo Bognot, disaffected with the LM in general but reportedly resentful in particular that Jacinto Manahan and not he had been selected to represent the Philippines at the League's Second World Congress.

Manahan's address to the World Congress betrays a further lack of interest in broadening the Philippine AIL to embrace more diverse personalities, organisations of social strata. Having witnessed the successive betrayals of the native bourgeoisie, he proclaimed, Filipino workers and peasants were beginning to mobilise their strength to take over leadership of the independence struggle themselves, and the AIL section had been formed to advance this aim. Labour, peasant and patriotic associations other than the KAP, KPMP and AIL, he told the Congress, were formed or backed by the native bourgeoisie for the purpose of counteracting the revolutionary movement. And the objective of "our struggle", Manahan affirmed, was not independence alone but a "Philippine Republic under the dictatorship of the proletariat".

The same reluctance to moderate sectarian attitudes or revolutionary aims for the sake of a broader appeal was evident in the AIL's pronouncements back in Manila. A manifesto issued in reaction to the killing and wounding of Filipino labourers in California contended that the violence was precipitated by the "puppets and tools" of capitalism in the American Federation of Labor in order to break the international proletarian united front. Should the workers and peasants join the Filipino bourgeoisie in asking God to forgive those responsible, the manifesto asked; should we follow the biblical advice to turn the other cheek? "No! ... these things are nothing but opium that poisons the mind!" In February 1930, to cite another example, the AIL lent its support to a mass boycott of classes staged by Manila high school
students in protest against racist remarks made by an American teacher named Mabel Brummitt. Miss Brummitt, it seems, was prone to call her pupils "monkeys" and to voice the opinion that most Filipinos were fit only to serve as rig-drivers. Along with other nationalists the AIL naturally encouraged the striking students to see their indignation in a wider perspective, as part of the friction and cultural estrangement that was inevitable in an educational system whose form, content and sometimes personnel were foreign importations. Yet for the AIL this was not enough. "Side by side with the broad mass of Filipino workers and peasants", it urged, the students should carry their protest a long way further, to "stop not only all insults" but also to "fight effectively against imperialism and exploitation and set the Philippines ... absolutely free and independent!" Bombarded with warnings about being led astray by professional agitators and red propaganda, the leaders of the boycott felt it prudent to repudiate any connection with the League. AIL flysheets posted in school corridors, they told the press, had been promptly torn down.

Through its involvement in the pro-boycott agitation the League was nevertheless able to win at least a few recruits - notably three Manila city councillors - from amongst fellow campaigners not previously associated with the left, and in April 1930 a new membership drive was launched which stressed that the AIL welcomed groups and individuals regardless of party allegiance provided that they "sincerely and steadfastly desired the liberation of exploited peoples and oppressed nations". But on the executive committee the left retained a large majority, and as the hostility of the LM and its PKP successor towards nationalists of different persuasions hardened, the prospect of transforming the AIL into a broadly-based mass organisation became more remote than ever. The handful of "petty-bourgeois" nationalists who had given the League what limited diversity it possessed rapidly drifted away and were not replaced. The communist cadres who remained, meanwhile, had too many other pressing demands on their time. To make matters still worse the PKP Central Committee member principally responsible for AIL work, Jose Quirante, was among those cowed into passivity by the arrests and prosecutions of early 1931. By mid-1932 the League was effectively defunct, and subsequent efforts to revive it proved fruitless. In composition and outlook it had in any event become identified so closely with the PKP that it could
serve little purpose.

The Red Labour Unions

In its trade union work, by contrast, the Communist Party never even contemplated the formation of durable alliances "from above" in the early thirties. The Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis, we noted, had been created expressly as a "red" trade union centre, as a direct revolutionary challenge to the "politico-capitalist" Congreso Obrero and the "class collaborationist" Federacion del Trabajo. Whilst it theoretically welcomed workers of any political persuasion, its constitution dedicated its members to the "prompt establishment of a workers' and peasants' government" and its manifestos and resolutions consistently echoed major PKP concerns.(182) Chronologically, it may be remembered, the KAP was indeed parent to the Party rather than vice versa. So intimately were KAP and PKP policies and activities intertwined, veterans recall, that the keener KAP activists commonly believed themselves to be Party members before they actually were. But the KAP was not conceived solely as a counterpoint to the ideological ills of obrerista reformism. In addition, as we also noted, it sought to provide a remedy for the organisational fragmentation and disunity endemic in labour circles. Its ambition was nothing less than to restructure the union movement throughout the Islands on a new industrial basis.

When the federation came into being in May 1929 four industrial unions were already in embryo, but these modest beginnings aside the only bridgehead the KAP possessed for its daunting endeavour lay in a motley collection of craft, local and general unions. Otherwise, the twenty or more industrial unions envisaged by Evangelista and his comrades had to be constructed from scratch, partly through efforts to organise the unorganised, and partly by persuading workers in other unions to repudiate their "reformist" or "Fascist" leaders and "outmoded" structures in favour of organisations that were truly modern, proletarian and revolutionary. In its first year the KAP made steady if unspectacular progress. Excluding the 15,000-strong KPMP - which remained within the KAP until 1932 - total membership was increased from 18,000 to an estimated 30,000, and sufficient inroads were made into "reformist" support for the federation to be cited by the
Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat as an example to other national sections. "Our affiliated unions" in the Philippines, the PPTUS affirmed, have shown that with "careful application" the tactics of calling conferences of delegates from the factories and reformist unions "to build a united front from the bottom upwards" will cause the masses to leave "the reactionary agents of the bourgeoisie and the imperialists". (183)

Most likely the particular success which prompted this praise was that gained in the tobacco industry, where a delegate conference called in October 1929 attracted representatives from thirty-two factories and resulted in the Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Industriya Tabako sa Pilipinas (KMITP) - effectively confined to a single factory when the KAP was formed - emerging as a real force. (184) Tobacco was of course a key sector. It had been Manila's biggest single employer ever since Spanish days and in its leading enterprises - the Alhambra, Helena, Oriente, Germinal, Minerva, Flor de Intal, Insular, Yebana, Katubusan and others - were to be found the largest concentrations of unionised workers in the country. Since the post-war boom, however, the industry had been troubled by declining export orders that reflected increased American production and a growing international preference for cigarettes rather than cigars and for mild rather than strong tobacco. In the mid-twenties the Manila factories had witnessed a succession of strikes, invariably bitter and sometimes violent, against wage cuts that hit the skilled cigarmakers and the unskilled sorters, strippers and packers alike. During these strikes Lapiang Manggagawa activists had co-operated closely and for the most part harmoniously with the Union de Tabaqueros leadership. Politically and on the issue of union restructuring, Isabelo Tejada and other UTF principals nevertheless figured amongst the LM's chief antagonists, and in May 1929 they had naturally opted to keep the union's 12,000 or so members within the Congreso camp. In the four years following the schism, however, the UTF's officially registered membership fell dramatically - to 10,000 in 1930, 7,500 in 1931 and a mere 2,300 in 1933 - and although the KMITP was not the sole cause or beneficiary of this decline it did eventually replace the UTF as the largest union in the industry. Attaining a peak membership of over 5,000, it also became the largest urban constituent of the KAP. (185)
The only entirely new industrial union created by the KAP in its first year was the Kapisanang Pambansa ng mga Manggagawa sa Industriya Grapika sa Pilipinas (KPMIGP), the bulk of whose 1,000 members was furnished by the old Union de Impresores. Outside the tobacco industry the real growth of the federation at this time thus occurred within what were regarded as lesser organisational forms. The most rapid expansion - from 800 to 3,000 members - was achieved by the Oriental Labor Union, a general union headed by a Visayan mechanic named Hugo Retaga which represented workers on the waterfront and in the newer industries associated with oil and gasoline.

Further recruits were attracted not through unions at all but through committees based upon a particular street or district. By mid-1930 there were at least seven such locals functioning in Manila - two in Tondo and one each in Trozo, Santa Cruz, Paco, Pandacan and Sampaloc - and six in the nearby provinces. Besides serving as a focus for self-employed and small enterprise workers who could not be reached by workplace branches, these bodies sought to absorb the activities of neighbourhood mutual benefit societies and "to enlarge the scope of the class struggle in every locality".

Throughout 1929 and 1930 the federation thus grew in size but in structural terms remained very much a miscellany. During the next two years this situation was broadly reversed, with intense re-organisational efforts being accompanied by membership losses. Following calls from both the Profintern and the PKP for greater "organisational consolidation", the KAP pressed ahead rapidly with the formation of the industrial union network for which Evangelista had first prepared a blueprint back in 1928. By mid-1932 comprehensive unions had been created for workers in twenty industries - hotels and catering, railways, shipping and docks, communications, gas, water, lime, charcoal, construction, marble and sculpture, woodworking, iron, printing, clothing, button-making, footwear, tobacco, coconut, sugar and abaca. In the severely critical and honest manner expected of communists during this period, the KAP nevertheless acknowledged that the majority of these organisations existed "virtually in name only". The union for the abaca industry, for example, consisted of a single branch at the Johnson-Pickett rope factory in Paco. The coconut workers' union had just two branches, at oil plants in Pandacan and San Pablo, Laguna. By very rough estimates the largest unions were those for tabaqueros
(with 5,000 members), printworkers (1,000), seamen and dockworkers (700), slipper and shoemakers (600), hotel and catering workers (500), woodworkers (400) and railroad employees (400). Overall, the membership of the KAP would seem to have fallen below 15,000 - a loss of at least fifty per cent in two years. (191)

This is not to suggest that the re-organisation drive and the decline in membership were casually linked, for beyond doubt the reverse was primarily a consequence of repression. Particularly vulnerable to government persecution, we noted, were the activists of the Philippine Chinese Laborers' Federation. In 1930 the PCLF had officially claimed 4,500 members, a total which made it second in size within the KAP only to the tabaqueros' union. (192) After mid-1931, however, when the May Day disturbances and a police raid on the PCLF congress brought the threat of mass deportations, the Federation practically disappeared from sight. Some members may have been absorbed into the industrial unions, but many more became prudently passive. Another source of substantial shrinkage was the KAP's third largest constituent, the 3,000-strong Oriental Labor Union. OLU president Hugo Retaga, who described himself as "a radical but no communist" reportedly turned government witness whilst being prosecuted for sedition. (193) In gratitude for his acquittal, or to avoid further harassment, he then withdrew his organisation from the KAP and volunteered his services to a Bureau of Labor campaign to promote landlord-tenant goodwill in Central Luzon. (194) Militants in the Oriental Labor Union disenchanted by their leader's conversion transferred to the KAP-affiliated seamen's and dockworkers' union, but the bulk of the OLU membership was lost. Also persuaded by the "white terror" to quit the KAP was Jose Hilario, who took with him a significant personal following amongst barbershop and beauty parlour workers.

Many less prominent cadres must have left for the same reason. When the Third KAP Congress was broken up in May 1931, it will be recalled, no fewer than 319 delegates had been meted a brief cautionary detention. The repeated arrests and prosecutions of top-ranking leaders like Evangelista, Balgos and Capadocia must also have frightened or demoralised many into departure. Hitting the rank and file more directly, however, and inevitably causing further heavy losses, was widespread intimidation and victimisation by employers. Workers who formed a KAP branch at a sugar central, for instance, were summarily dismissed en
masse immediately after their inaugural meeting. (195) Thirty workers at Standard Oil suffered the same fate after revealing their connection with the KAP by taking part on a Sunday in memorial services for Antonino Ora. (196) "Stoolpigeons and spies" were reportedly placed in workplace branches to act as informers for employers and police alike. Thugs and gangsters were hired to terrorise pickets. And once a picket line had been neutralised or dispersed, of course, the high level of unemployment made it relatively easy for employers to replace striking workers either with non-unionised labour or with members of unions known to be less troublesome. Especially guilty of aiding and abetting the capitalists by strike-breaking, the KAP claimed, were the Federacion del Trabajo, the International Marine Union and the Union de Tabagueros. (197) On the waterfront, where unions traditionally acted as job-brokers, seamen and stevedores found that membership in the KAP affiliate was on the contrary a positive obstacle to obtaining employment, and it seems that certain tobacco factories also kept blacklists of KAP adherents. (198)

Besides driving away existing members, of course, the combined impact of government persecution and employer victimisation discouraged potential recruits. Even some who did join were so fearful of being branded as "reds" that they urged KAP cadres to contact them only in secret or under some suitable "cover". In this situation the organisational life of the federation inevitably became progressively debilitated. Tinig-Manggagawa, the central organ, ceased publication. (199) Following the raid on the May 1931 congress not a single open meeting was held for almost a year. "Is it possible", the Comintern observer Carpio asked in dismay, "that the KAP was not functioning all this while?" How in such circumstances, he inquired further, could the subsequent 1932 congress have been "properly prepared and organised?" (200) Certainly with regard to preparation Carpio's fears were well placed. Ideally, delegates to the congress would presumably have been chosen by the respective workplace and neighbourhood branches, where there could have been preliminary discussions on the agenda and draft resolutions. The KAP executive must have recognised, though, that this would leave too many seats in the auditorium unfilled, for just a week before the event it addressed an appeal "to all workers" regardless of union affiliation to send delegates from their factories, shops and offices. Anyone who wished to attend as a plain observer, the appeal indicated, would be welcome too. (201) The federation similarly found
it increasingly difficult to mobilise its members and sympathisers in sufficient numbers to create an impressive show of strength on the streets. In 1931 the funeral procession of Antonino Ora and the prohibited May Day demonstration in Caloocan had both attracted 10,000 people or more; by 1933 the May Day turn-out had shrunk to an estimated 2,000. (202)

But whereas the decline in KAP membership and influence may be attributed directly to government and employer repression, it would be fanciful to suggest that in the absence of such hostility the federation could have rapidly expanded from its original base to become everything that its founders wished. Quite apart from the limiting factors acknowledged at the time - the shortage of cadres, the excessive concentration in and around Manila, the continued strength of the reformist unions - it is clear with hindsight that the economic climate was less than propitious for militant trade unionism. To justify their optimism about short-term prospects the KAP leadership continually searched for signs of the "strike waves" or "revolutionary upsurge" which according to Comintern theory the capitalist crisis would provoke, but as elsewhere in the world the recession tended in reality not to arouse but to curb the organised labour movement. Whilst the number of strikes officially recorded between 1930 and 1933 did show an increase over the preceding four-year period, the number of workers involved in the stoppages was almost exactly the same, and the aggregate of working days lost fell by 40 per cent. As during the slump which followed the First World War, moreover, most strikes were strictly defensive actions called to resist wage cuts, and a substantial majority ended in failure. (203) Outside the tobacco industry the only major strikes took place in the sugar mills and docks of Negros Occidental and Iloilo, where both the KAP and its Manila-based reformist rivals were eclipsed by the locally-led Federacion Obrera de Filipinas. (204) Here in the Visayas the KAP perhaps had legitimate reason to chastise itself for opportunities missed, but more generally the federation took a blacker view of its inadequacies and mistakes than was deserved. Deficiencies were magnified because they were gauged against a false measure, against expectations set unrealistically high. Any true potential for the creation of a mass revolutionary movement, by virtue of plain demography if nothing else, lay in the Philippine countryside, and in the next chapter we shall examine the successes and failures that the PKP and
its allied organisations encountered there.
Notes to Chapter Six

(1) Crisanto Evangelista "The Split in the Philippine Labour Congress" The Red International of Labour Unions vol.1 nos.6-7 August 1929 p.301

(2) According to some sources, the other members of the preparatory commission were Arturo Soriano and Jose Quirante. Some credence should however also be given to a claim made by Cirilo Bognot that he had authored a draft constitution for the new party shortly before breaking with his KAP colleagues (in June or July 1929) and moving to Cebu. Crisanto Evangelista: Kasaysayan ng Isang Dakilang Lider ng Uring Anakpawis (Crisanto Evangelista: History of a Great Leader of the Working Class) Union de Impresores de Filipinas, Katipunan, Manila 1982 p.39; Armed Forces of the Philippines Handbook on the Communist Party of the Philippines n.pub., Quezon City 1961 p.15; Transcript of Stenographic Notes Taken During the Hearing Conducted by the Committee on Un-Filipino Activities on November 17, 1948" Typescript, n.pp. (Institute of Social Order, Manila)

(3) Harrison George "The Philippine Islands" Pan-Pacific Monthly no.27 June 1929 p.45 (Although published in June, this article was clearly written before the split in the Congreso occurred.); Armed Forces of the Philippines loc.cit.

(4) George loc.cit.

(5) Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas "Labor Day Manifesto" May 1, 1930 p.20; Crisanto Evangelista "Ang 'Paggawa' at 'Puhunan' sa Ilalim ng Pamaraang Malakapitalista" ("Labour and 'Capital' Under the Capitalist System") Typescript copied from Tinig-Hanggagawa May 1, 1930; "Iniaaral ni C. Evangelista ang Labanan ng mga Uri" ("C. Evangelista Gives an Exposition on Class Struggle") Pagkakaisa May 1, 1930; Crisanto Evangelista "Hindi Mahahadlangan ang Paglagpak ng Kapitalismo at Kapangyarihan Naman ng Bolsibikismo ang Iiral Dito" ("Capitalism will Crash and the Rule of Bolshevism will be Established here") Taliba May 13 and May 17, 1930; Crisanto Evangelista "Paglagpak ng Kapitalismo at Kapangyarihan Naman ng Bolsibikismo ang Iiral Dito" ("Capitalism will Crash and the Rule of Bolshevism will be Established here") Taliba May 16, 1930

(6) Philippines Herald May 30, 1930

Based mainly on the personal recollections of Party veterans, this work was written by Jose Lava, whose chosen pseudonym alluded to his position as the then PKP general secretary

(8) At some time in the 1940s the preposition "sa" in the Party's title was replaced by "ng". Of no consequence in translation, this amendment was presumably prompted simply by a change in customary Tagalog usage.
(9) In the PKP constitution the Party's highest committee is described as the "presidium", a word more commonly denoting the governing body of a congress. It is unlikely that this arises from a mistranslation, as "presidium" was either being rendered in Tagalog unchanged or as "panguluhan" - a logical derivation from the word "pangulo" (president). Before long, however, the senior committee was known by the term generally adopted by communist parties elsewhere - "politburo" - and to avoid confusion this term will be used here from the outset. Communist Party of the Philippines "Constitution and By-Laws" reproduced as Appendix "B" in Armed Forces of the Philippines op. cit. p.252

(10) Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas "Malaking Miting Pambayan" ("Big Mass Meeting") Handbill c. November 1930


(13) United Kingdom, Department of Overseas Trade Economic Conditions in the Philippine Islands 1933-34 by T. J. Harrington HMSO, London 1935 pp.7-9

(14) The statistics in this section have been extracted from Economic Conditions in the Philippine Islands 1927-1930 by Thomas Harrington HMSO, London 1930; Trade Conditions in the Philippine Islands by G. B. Sansom HMSO, London 1932; Harrington (1935) op. cit.; and Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in the Philippine Islands, June 1938 by Stanley Wyatt-Smith HMSO, London 1938. (All these reports were compiled under the auspices of the United Kingdom Department of Overseas Trade.)

(15) Bulletin of Philippine Statistics vol.6 nos.1-2 First and Second Quarters 1939 pp.14-7

(16) Ibid. p.14; Philippine Statistical Review vol.1 no.1 First Quarter 1934 p.25

(17) Calculations based on data in Sansom op. cit. pp.15-9

(18) Harrington (1935) op. cit. p.16; Philippine Islands, Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Division of Statistics Statistical Handbook of the Philippine Islands 1932 Bureau of Printing, Manila 1933 p.171; The Philippine Statistical Review vol.II no.1 First Quarter 1935 p.33

(20) S. Carpio "The Situation in the Philippines and the Tasks of the C.P.P.I. (i)" International Press Correspondence vol.12 no.51 November 17, 1932 p.1111; Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas, Lupong Tagapatnugot (PKP Central Committee) Ang Tahasan Pagbaka sa Opurtunismo - Ang Tumpak na Organisasyon (The Resolute Struggle against Opportunism - Correct Organisation) Resolutions of the Second Plenum, March 11-12, 1933, Second Part n.pub., Manila 1933 p.9

(21) Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas "Kapasyahang Ukol sa mga Walang Hanapbuhay" (Resolution on the Unemployed) Approved by the Fourth KAP Congress, June 28, 1932 Typescript p.3

(22) Philippine Islands, Department of Commerce and Communications, Bureau of Commerce and Industry Statistical Bulletin 1928 Bureau of Printing, Manila 1929 pp.77-9

(23) Statistical Handbook (1932), as cited p.183

(24) "Filipino Immigration to Hawaii and Other Countries will Strengthen Struggle for Economic and Political Emancipation of the Philippines" Typescript c.1932 p.4

(25) Evangelista "Hindi Mahahadlangan ang Paglaganap...." May 17, 1930, as cited


(28) KAP "Kapasyahang Ukol sa mga Walang Hanapbuhay", as cited p.3

(29) Philippines Herald September 15, 1932

(30) The Philippine Statistical Review vol.I no.1 First Quarter 1934 p.21

(31) Manila Times June 29, 1933; "Filipino Immigration...", as cited p.3

(32) Philippine Islands, Department of the Interior and Labor, Bureau of Labor "Twenty-fifth Annual Report (1933)" Typescript pp.3-4; 41-3 (National Archives, Washington)

(34) "Theses of the Tenth ECCI Plenum on the International Situation and the Tasks of the Communist International" (July 1929) in Degras op.cit. vol. III p. 47

(35) "Programme of the Communist International" (August 1928) in Degras op.cit. vol. II p. 507

(36) "Theses of the Agitprop Department of the ECCI on the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Foundation of the Communist International" (March 1934) in Degras op.cit. vol. III p. 319


(38) CPP "Constitution and By-Laws", as cited p. 247

(39) S. Carpio "First Congress of the Communist Party of the Philippines" International Press Correspondence vol. I1 no. 33 June 25, 1931 p. 603

(40) "Closing Session, Moscow, August 20, 1935" International Press Correspondence vol. 15 no. 42 September 14, 1935 p. 1097 The PKP was therefore admitted to the International at the very last opportunity, at the closing session of what turned out to be the final World Congress.

(41) S. Carpio "First Congress....", as cited p. 603

(42) Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas "Bayang Manggagawa: Sumapi ka sa KAP! Bakahin mo ang kanyang mga kaaway nang ikaw ay Lumaya at Matubos!" (Working People: Join the KAP: Fight your Enemies to be Liberated and Free!) Handbill dated March 26, 1930; G. D. Capadocia "Pagsalungat sa Digmaang Impeyralista" ("Against Imperialist War") Ang Manggagawa Yr. 4 no. 10 September 30, 1931 p. 15; Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas "Pahayag Laban sa Digmaang Pandaigdig ng mga Imperialista" ("Manifesto Against Imperialist World War") Handbill dated August 1, 1932; Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas "Ang Ika-XV Taong Kaarawan ng Himagsikang Bolsebik" ("The Fifteenth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution") Handbill dated November 7, 1932

(43) William Simons "The Philippine Islands in the War Area" The Communist vol. 11 no. 7 July 1932 pp. 642-3; The Delegation of the Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas to the National Government of China's Consul General in Manila, August 1, 1932
J. W. Ford "First International Conference of Negro Workers" The Red International of Labour Unions vol.2 nos.6-7 August-September 1930 p.216


Jacinto Manahan "Ang Suliranin sa Pagsasarili ng Pilipinas" ("The Problem of Philippine Independence") Ang Manggagawa Yr.II no.10 September 30, 1929 p.3; Jacinto Manahan "Maningning na Naidaos ang Kongreso ng Pan-Pacific Trade Unions" ("Congress of Pan-Pacific Trade Unions Successfully Held") Ang Manggagawa Yr.II no.11 October 30, 1929 p.5; Jacinto Manahan "Ang Bagong Lupong Pamunuan ng Liga Anti-Imperialista" ("The New Executive Committee of the Anti-Imperialist League") Ang Manggagawa Yr.II no.12 November 30, 1929 p.14

"The Second Section" Pan-Pacific Monthly no.33 December 1929 - January 1930 p.19

Araneta op.cit. p.7

"Solidarity for the Emancipation Struggle of the Philippine Proletariat!", as cited p.407 (Open letter from the PKP Central Committee to the CPUSA)


Agnes Smedley "Philippine Sketches" New Masses vol.7 no.11 June 1931 pp.13-4

Philippines Herald September 17, 1931; "Extract from BIA Radio No.664, December 3, 1931, to the Governor General of the Philippine Islands" (BIA 28342-16); Paul Levin "The Trial of the Members of the CC of the CP of the Philippine Islands" International Press Correspondence vol.12 no.42 September 22, 1932 p.893


Ryan's real name was Frank Waldron. After, using a legion of pseudonyms whilst working for the Comintern - he also carried out assignments in South Africa and China - he eventually became known as Eugene Dennis, and as such served between 1946 and 1959 as CPUSA general secretary. According to his widow's memoir he arrived in Manila "at the end of the summer rains" in 1931, which would imply October or thereabouts, but the
chronology she suggests is not consistent and his commentaries on Philippine events indicate his visit began a few months earlier.

Articles appearing under the name Tim Ryan are "The Revolutionary Upsurge in the Philippines" International Press Correspondence vol.11 no.14 March 12, 1931 pp.272-3; "New Imperialist Offensive in the Philippines" International Press Correspondence vol.11 no.24 May 7, 1931 p.446; "Social-Fascist Reformers Head Attacks of American Imperialists and Native Bourgeoisie Against Militant Workers" Pan-Pacific Worker (Australian edition) vol.IV no.7 July 10, 1931 p.13; "The Imperialist Offensive Against the Revolutionary Movement in the Philippines and the Tasks of the C.P.P.I." International Press Correspondence (i) vol.11 no.58 November 12, 1931 pp.1051-2; (ii) vol.11 no.59 November 19, 1931 pp.1064-5; (iii) vol.11 no.62 December 3, 1931 p.1123; (iv) vol.11 no.63 December 10, 1931 p.1143; and (v) vol.11 no.64 December 17, 1931 p.1157

Articles appearing under the name S. Carpio - the first two datelined Manila - are "May First in the Philippines" International Press Correspondence vol.11 no.31 June 11, 1931 pp.565-6; "First Congress of the Communist Party of the Philippines" International Press Correspondence vol.11 no.33 June 25, 1931 p.603; "The Situation in the Philippines and the Tasks of the C.P.P.I." International Press Correspondence (i) vol.12 no.51 November 17, 1932 pp.1109-1112; and (ii) vol.12 no.52 November 24, 1932 pp.1126-7

Carpio (June 25, 1931) loc.cit.

Resolution of the First PKP Congress quoted in Ibid.; Communist Party of the Philippines "Platform" (1930) reproduced as Appendix "A" in Armed Forces of the Philippines op.cit. p.235

Crisanto Evangelista "Ang Dalawang Daigdig: Daigdig ng Kapitalismo at Daigdig ng Sosyalismo" ("The Two Worlds: World of Capitalism and World of Socialism") Pagkakaisa May 1, 1932

Crisanto Evangelista "Ang Babae sa Rusyang Sobyet ay Malaya at May Kapanagutan na Kahalintulad ng Lalaki" ("Women in Soviet Russia are Free and have Responsibilities Similar to the Men") Typescript dated January 17, 1930 p.5

Jacinto G. Manahan "Ang mga Bilangguan sa Rusya ay Kalba sa mga Bilangguan sa Pamahalaang Kapitalista" ("The Prisons in Russia are Different from the Prisons in Capitalist States") Ang Manggagawa Yr.III no.1 December 30, 1929 p.18

Manahan also wrote the fullest description of Soviet life by a Filipino visitor - Ang mga Anak-Pawis sa Ilalim ng Pamahalaang Sobyet (The Working Class Under Soviet Government) n.pub., Manila, 1932

Other pieces written specifically to celebrate the October Revolution and the USSR include: Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas "Pahayag Ukol sa ika-XII Taong Buhay ng Unyon ng mga Sobyet ng mga Sosyalista" ("Manifesto on the Twelfth
Anniversary of the USSR") Handbill dated November 7, 1929; Crisanto Evangelista "Ang Rusya ng Manggagawa at Magbubukid" ("Workers' and Peasants' Russia") Tinig-Manggagawa Yr.I no.4 February 1929 p.3; Crisanto Evangelista "Ang Rusyang Sobyet at ang kanyang mga Institusyon" ("Soviet Russia and its Institutions") Tinig-Manggagawa Yr.I no.6 April 1929 pp.3-4; Jacinto G. Manahan "Walang Masasabing Tunay na Alila sa Sobyet Union" ("One Cannot Say There are True Slaves in the Soviet Union") Ang Manggagawa Yr.III no.2 February 28, 1930 p.2; and PKP "Ang ika-15 Taong Kaarawan ng Himagsikang Bolsebik", as cited

Kalipunang Pangbansa ng mga Mabgubukid sa Pilipinas Lupong Tagapagbagong-tatag, "Sa Bayang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas" ("To the Peasants of the Philippines") Handbill dated April 7, 1933

Evangelista "Ang Dalawang Daigdig....", as cited

Conversation with Ramon Espiritu, Quezon City, January 19, 1982


Quoted in Carpio (November 17, 1932) op.cit. p.1112

Ibid.

Crisanto Evangelista to Gertrude Binder, October 3, 1927

James S. Allen "Report on the Philippines" February 13, 1939 Typescript p.7 (Author's collection)

The frequently cited Central Committee roster given in the official Party history written by Jose Lava in 1950 cannot be regarded as wholly reliable as it was reconstructed from memory by surviving members. The inclusion of Cirilo Bognot, for example, is certainly erroneous, for as we noted he had publicly and conclusively severed his connections with his erstwhile comrades more than a year before the Party was launched. One or two other names on the list - Hugo Retaga and Patricio Dionisio, for instance - also seem rather dubious, and though closely associated with the KAP, Anti-Imperialist League or other PKP-linked organisations may not have been in the Party itself. Another point to be made is that the occupations assigned to the cadres listed are in some cases those that they represented in the union movement rather than their own. In reproducing the roster below, actual occupations known to be different from those given by Lava have therefore been added in parentheses:-

Printers
Crisanto Evangelista, Felix Caguin, Arturo Soriano and Mariano P. Balgos

Cigar-makers
Jose Ventura, Balbino Navarro, Angel Mesina, Cenon Lacanienta, Andres Santiago, Teofilo Espiritu and Andres Fabian
(68) **Employees** Jose Quirante (clerk) and Silvino Tablan

Lumbermen Antonino D. Ora (furniture factory supervisor), Mariano Pingol, Sotero Senson and Andres Padua

Seamen Hugo Retaga (mechanic) and Saturnino Brioso

Electricians Norberto Nabong (electrical company office worker) and Enrique Torrente

Peasants Jacinto Manahan (printer), Juan Feleo (laundry manager) and Alejandro Española

Newspapermen Cirilo Bognat and Patricio Dionisio (also a lawyer)

Slippermakers Urbano Arcega and Cirilo Honorio (government employee)

Cooks Guillermo Capadocia and Maximo Macatangay

Plumber Nicolas de Guia

Railwayman Juan Lagman

Chinese Co Sing-liat, Co Keng-seng and Ping

Santayana op.cit. p.9; Conversation with Jose Lava, Quezon City, January 16, 1982

(69) Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas, Lupong Tagapatnugot (PKP Central Committee) Ang Kasalukuyang Kalagayan at ang Tungkilin Dapat Gampanan ng PKP (The Current Situation and the Tasks the PKP Must Fulfill) Resolutions of the Second Plenum, March 11-12, 1933 First Part n.pub., Manila 1933 p.26

(70) Communist Parties of USA, China and Japan "Workers of the World Unite! We Demand Freedom of the Philippines." Handbill in Tagalog and English dated December 21, 1932

(71) Besides the three "peasant" representatives listed in note 68 above, Silvino Tablan was reportedly assigned mostly to work with the KPMP.

(72) Domingo Ponce "Tendencias radicales del Congreso Proletario Filipino" La Opinion y El Comercio Combinados April 30, 1930

(73) Smedley op.cit. p.14

(74) Jose F. Lacaba "Felixberto S. Olalia: Grand Old Man of Philippine Labor" Mr and Ms January 12, 1982

(75) Ildefonso T. Runes and Cipriano Cid "A History of Philippine Labor" Pre-publication proof c.1960 p.94 (Ildefonso T. Runes collection)

(76) Smedley loc.cit.
(77) Conversation with Rosendo Feleo (son), Manila, October 27, 1971

(78) Santayana _loc.cit._

(79) Luis Taruc _Born of the People_ People's Publishing House, Bombay 1953 pp.74-5

(80) H. M. Bonifacio (Mariano Balgos) "Ang Pagtaya sa Aking Sarili" ("Self-Appraisal") Typescript c.1947 p.4 (Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Aguinaldo)

(81) Santayana _op.cit._ p.20; "Ang Suliranin ng mga Kapisanan Manggagawa: Kapasyahan ng Unang Kongreso ng Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas" ("The Problem of the Trade Unions: Resolution of the First PKP Congress") Unidentified newspaper clipping dated May 30, 1931

(82) Carpio (November 17, 1932) _op.cit._ p.1110

(83) CPP "Constitution and By-laws", as cited pp.249-51; PKP, Lupong Tagapatnugot Ang Tahasang Pagbaka sa Opurtunismo..., as cited pp.1-i

(84) Besides those mentioned in the text the KAP also had specialist departments - each run by a five-member committee - to cover organisation, agitation and propaganda, strikes and lock-outs, unemployment, defence and mutual aid, and accounts. The Department for the Upliftment of Body and Mind, the only one whose membership is known, was headed by Evangelista himself. Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas "Palatuntunan" ("Programme") (Approved by the Fourth National Congress, Manila, June 26, 1932) Typescript p.17; Mariano Balgos to Crisanto Evangelista, August 3, 1932

(85) Primitivo Arrogante "Biography of an ex-Communist" Typescript c.1950 p.6 (Institute of Social Order, Manila); Conversation with Ramon Espiritu, Manila, November 22, 1971

(86) Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas "Nagsipagwelga ang mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy" ("Woodworkers go on Strike") Handbill dated January 5, 1933

(87) The KWHBP was headed by Dominador Galvez, a recently returned Moscow pensionado who had previously been a Union de Chineleros activist; the SPMMP by Tomas Rodriguez, a KPMP cadre from Rizal. If reports are true that Rodriguez had once served as a Nacionalista mayor in the municipality of Jala-jala, Rizal, he could be said to have progressed further in mainstream politics than any other PKP leader. The only others known to have held public office are Evangelista (temporary Manila councillor), Juan Feleo (councillor in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija) and Norberto Nabong (justice of the peace). Conversation with Dominador Galvez, Manila, October 26, 1971; Conversation with Cirilo S. Honorio, Marilao, October 22, 1971
Whether or not this was definitely a Party initiative cannot be ascertained, but certainly the Civil Liberties Union was headed by a Party cadre - Rufino C. Robles. With headquarters in Tondo, the organisation was officially listed in 1933 as having just twenty members. 

Bureau of Labor "Twenty-fifth Annual Report (1933)", as cited p.152

Carpio (November 24, 1932) op.cit. p.1127; "Memo for Records" c.June 1931 (BIA 28432-10); PKP, Lupong Tagapatnugot Ang Kasulukuyang Kalagayan ..., as cited p.38

Liga Anti-Imperialista, Balangay Pambansa ng Pilipinas "Palatuntunan" ("Programme") Pamphlet c.1930 p.3

The PKP's office was located at different times at 8 Basa, Quiapo and 1384 Juan Luna, Binondo; that of the KAP was based at 536 Misericordia, Santa Cruz and 622 Evangelista, Santa Cruz.

Carpio (June 25, 1931) loc.cit.

The first editorial board of Titis was formed by Evangelista, Caguin, Capadocia, Arturo Soriano and Enrique Torrente. Kabataan was edited by Capadocia and Manananggol by the SPMMP president, Tomas Rodriguez. Sadly, no copies of any of these papers seem to have survived.

Santayana op.cit. p.11; Hoeksema op.cit. p.128

Mateo del Castillo "Ang Lakas ay Nasa Pagkakalsa" ("Unity is Strength") Katubusan Yr.III no.3 March 1931 p.3

Crisanto Evangelista et al. and Guillermo Capadocia et al., Petitioners, vs. The People of the Philippine Islands, Respondents Transcript of Record n.pub., Manila c.1933 p.35 (reporting a speech made by Evangelista at Calle Tioko, Tondo on December 14, 1930)

"Will the P.I. Turn Red?" Graphic July 2, 1929 (interview with Evangelista)

Victor Victoriano "Isinailalim ng Imperialismo ang Komunismo" ("Communism in the Shadow of Imperialism") Ang Manggagawa Yr.IV no.5 April 30, 1931 p.13

CPP "Platform", as cited p.239

Crisanto Evangelista "Ang Komunismo't Kapitalismo sa Harap ng Ktt. Hukuman sa Pilipinas" ("Communism and Capitalism Before the Philippine Supreme Court") Typescript p.32 (speech delivered before the Supreme Court on July 21, 1932)

"Decision of the Manila Court of First Instance, September 14, 1931", as cited p.35

Santayana, op. cit., p.13

Communist Party of the Philippines "Workers of the World Unite! Fight for Unconditional Independence! Against the Hawes-Cutting Bill!" Handbill dated January 13, 1933

The incident described occurred in San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija on December 7, 1930. Feleo's reported remarks have been compressed slightly for the sake of brevity.

Carpio, (November 17, 1932) op. cit., p.1111

PKP, Lupong Tagapatnugot Ang Tahasang Pagbaka sa Oportunismo..., as cited p.5

KAP, (May 1, 1930) op. cit., p.5

Manila Times, February 28, 1930

Philippines Herald, March 22, 1930 and March 26, 1930; Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas "Down with the Despotic Order of the Director of Posts! Down with Juan Ruiz, the Puppet of Reaction and Imperialism!" Handbill dated March 29, 1930

Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas "Kapasyahang Ukol sa Pagbaka sa Pananakot Puti" ("Resolution on the Struggle Against the White Terror") Approved by the Fourth KAP Congress, June 28, 1932 Typescript p.1


A monument to Antonino Ora was erected at the scene of his fatal accident on the old road between Santa Rosa and Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The top-piece of this monument was destroyed during the Japanese occupation, and by 1971 only an untended plinth remained.
Governor General, Philippine Islands Cable dated February 6, 1931 (BIA 4865-176)

Philippines Herald February 17, 1931, February 21, 1931 and April 4, 1931

Philippines Herald March 5, 1931

Philippines Herald March 11, 1931

Union de Chineleros de Filipinas, et al. "Kanino ka Pipiling - sa Iyong mga Panginoong Manlulupig o sa Iyong Kauring Hinuhuthot at Nilulupig?" ("With Whom Will You Side - With Your Oppressive Masters or With Your Fellow Exploited and Oppressed?") Handbill dated April 27, 1931

Philippines Herald April 30, 1931

"Decision of the Manila Court of First Instance, September 14, 1931", as cited pp.36-7

Jacinto Manahan Kaarawan ng Paggawa (Labour Day) n.pub., Manila 1932 p.58

Philippines Herald May 4, 1931; PPTUS "Save the Chinese Workers Threatened with Deportation from the Philippines!" International Press Correspondence vol.11 no.31 June 11, 1931 p.564

Manila Daily Bulletin May 5, 1931

Tribune May 17, 1931

Tribune May 3, 1931

Apparently two of the most prominent PCLF leaders, Chua Pen-lam and Chu Ling-hio, were indeed killed by Kuomintang forces on the mainland at about this time. The pair had been served with deportation orders after being implicated in the murder of a KMT leader in Manila, but had jumped bail and made their own way to China, presumably hoping that an unannounced arrival would improve their chances of staying alive.

"Thesis of the General Secretary to the Fourth Congress of the KAP" Typescript c.June 1932 p.1; KAP "Kapasyahang Ukol sa Pagbaka sa Pananakot Puti", as cited p.4; Armed Forces of the Philippines op.cit. pp.5-6

Carpio (June 25, 1931) loc.cit.

New York Times June 1, 1931

Philippines Herald June 1, 1931 and July 23, 1931

Philippines Herald April 7, 1931

Ibid.
In its 1930 platform the PKP stated plainly that electoral activity should be regarded as "only a disguise to cover propaganda activities for the achievement of (the Party's) true aims". The notion of gaining power through parliamentary means, Evangelista argued after the experiences of the 1931 campaign, had in any case been revealed as a "mere illusion". Certainly the harassment and persecution must have weakened the Party's chances of making a creditable showing. So far as is known, the PKP candidates in 1931 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fourth District</th>
<th>Third District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>for Senator</td>
<td>Crisanto Evangelista</td>
<td>Silvino Tablan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Representative</td>
<td>Manila North</td>
<td>Jacinto Manahan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manila South</td>
<td>Guillermo Capadocia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rizal First</td>
<td>Juan Lagman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Governor</td>
<td>Laguna</td>
<td>Maximo M. Gutierrez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rizal</td>
<td>Tomas Rodriguez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bulacan</td>
<td>Rufino Robles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nueva Ecija</td>
<td>Juan Feleo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Manila city councillor</td>
<td>Urbano Arcega</td>
<td>Francisco Rafael</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Francisco Rafael</td>
<td>Remigio Tolentino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emilio San Juan</td>
<td>Enrique Torrente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catalino Monroy</td>
<td>Sotero Senon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominador Reyes</td>
<td>Alberto Santos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Rizal provincial board</td>
<td>Andres Santiago</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Malabon, Rizal town council</td>
<td>Angel Mesina</td>
<td>Felipe Cruz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Santa Rosa, Laguna municipal president</td>
<td>Dominador Ambrosio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(136) Evangelista's address, delivered in English, was translated into Tagalog for wider circulation as "Ang Komunismo't Kapitalismo....", as cited

(137) Levin loc.cit.

(138) "Decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, October 26, 1932" in Republic of the Philippines, House of Representatives, Special Committee on Un-Filipino Activities op.cit. pp.52-6

(139) Philippines Herald September 8, 1932
Although the Supreme Court verdict had not been delivered at this juncture, the PKP leaders had already declared their intention to make a further appeal in the likely event that it went against them.

(140) Lucille B. Milner (on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union) to Jacinto Manahan, May 25, 1933
(Quezon Papers Box 140); United States, War Department, Office of the Judge Advocate General to the Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, c.November 1933 (BIA C. Evangelista Personnel File)

(141) Philippines Herald December 21, 1933
In the period between September 1931 and December 1933 some cadres did however serve brief jail terms arising from other prosecutions. In November 1932, for example, Evangelista and Capadocia entered the Rizal provincial jail in Pasig to begin a two-month sentence for sedition.

(142) Sakdal July 2, 1932

(143) CPP "Platform", as cited pp.242;245

(144) Crisanto Evangelista "An Open Letter to the Capitalist Press" Sakdal January 2, 1932

(145) CPP "Platform", as cited p.242

(146) Quoted in Carpio (June 25, 1931) loc.cit.

(147) Philippines Herald August 5, 1931

(148) Simons op.cit. p.642

(149) E.g. Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas "Kapasyahang Ukol sa Patakaran Pangkalahatan" ("Resolution on the General Situation") Approved by the Fourth KAP Congress, June 28, 1932 Typescript p.9

(150) Philippines Herald March 20, 1930 and January 20, 1931

(151) CPP (January 13, 1933), as cited p.3

(152) Jay Lovestone (New York) to Vicente Sotto, April 8, 1931; M. A. Herclet (Paris) to Vicente Sotto, June 11, 1931
Altogether no fewer than seventeen diverse groups were stigmatised directly or by inference as "fascist" - the Congreso Obrero; the Union Socialista (an expressly anti-communist body created by the COF in 1931); the Congreso Obrero Inc. (the product of a 1932 schism); the Legionarios del Trabajo; the Federacion del Trabajo; the Kapatirang Magsasaka; Sakdal; Tanggulan (another peasant-based populist movement); Ang Bagong Katipunan and the Palihan ng Bayan (patriotic-protectionist movements headed by prominent Nacionalistas); the Union Civica Filipina; the Accion Catolica; the Cruzados del Cristo Rey and the Caballeros de Santa Cruz (Catholic groups); the Voluntarios Nacionales (a civil defence auxiliary); and finally the miniscule Partido Pasista.
(165) Sakdal July 2, 1932

(166) Sakdal October 8, 1932

(167) Victoriano loc.cit.

(168) Sakdal July 2, 1932

(169) Sotto loc.cit.

(170) Willi Munzenberg "The First International Congress Against Imperialistic Colonisation" International Press Correspondence vol.7 no.12 February 4, 1927 pp.246-7; Iso "The Significance of the Brussels Conference" International Press Correspondence vol.7 no.16 February 25, 1927 pp.323-4

The official title of the organisation founded in Brussels was the "League against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression", but very soon this was superseded in common usage by the shorthand alternative.

(171) "The International Congress Against Colonial Oppression in Brussels" International Press Correspondence vol.7 no.16 February 25, 1927 p.331

(172) Willy Munzenberg "Growing Revolutionary Militancy Among the Colonial Peoples" International Press Correspondence vol.7 no.72 December 22, 1927 p.1634

(173) The first national committee of the Anti-Imperialist League was as follows:

President Cirilo Bognot
Secretary Jacinto Manahan
Members Antonino D. Ora
Cirilo S. Honorio
Jose Hilario
Tomas Rodriguez
P. L. Chua
Eduardo Gregorio
Patricio Dionisio
Vice-President Crisanto Evangelista
Isabelo Tejada
Juan Feleo
L. H. Chu
Francisco Varona
Adriano de Guzman
Doroteo Trinidad

"Natatatag na ang Balangay sa Pilipinas ng Liga Anti-Imperialista" ("Philippine Branch of the Anti-Imperialist League is Formed") Tinig-Manggagawa Yr.1 no.6 April 1929 p.1

(174) Manila Times July 22, 1929

(175) Jacinto G. Manahan "Our Struggle for Philippine Independence" Typescript c.1929 pp.15-6

(176) Proletarian Labor Congress and League Against Imperialism "Philippine Workers and Peasants, Fight the Imperialists and Exploiters!" Handbill dated January 1930

After Cirilo Bognot's departure the presidency of the AIL was held by Jacinto Manahan, but it was Jose Quirante as general secretary who shouldered the main burden of work. Listed on Santayana's Central Committee roster as representing "employees" (presumably meaning clerical or administrative workers), Quirante was also active as a polemicist and in translating extracts from the works of Marx into Tagalog.
(189) Congreso Obrero sa Pilipinas, Lupon sa Pagtatagat ng mga Kapisahan at Katipunan Ang Tumpak na Organisasyon at Pagtataguayod sa mga Kapisanang Manggagawa (The Correct Organisation and Structure of Workers' Associations) n.pub., Manila July 30, 1928 pp.16-18; RILU, Fifth World Congress Resolutions on the Minority Movement of Great Britain and the Colonial Question State Publishers, Moscow and Leningrad 1931 pp.41-4; PKP "Ang Suliranin ng mga Kapisanang Manggagawa", as cited

(190) Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas "Kapasyahang Ukol sa Pagpapakilos at Pagpapalaganap" ("Resolution on Agitation and Expansion") Approved by the Fourth KAP Congress, June 28, 1932 Typescript pp.4-6

(191) For 1932 such membership statistics as exist are unfortunately even less reliable and comprehensive than usual. In 1933 the KAP notified the Bureau of Labor that it had 10,156 members, but this figure may have excluded workers belonging to four affiliates that lodged separate returns - the KMITP (registering 3,432 members), the KPMIGP (1,002), the footwear workers (620) and a union at the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (300) Towards the end of the same year, apparently after gaining some new affiliations from non-industrial unions, the KAP claimed a total membership of 20,000.

Bureau of Labor "Twenty-fifth Annual Report (1933)", as cited pp.150-67; Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas Radiogram to the Bureau of Insular Affairs, December 22, 1933 (BIA 28432-10); PPTUS "The 'New Deal' in Philippine Independence" International Press Correspondence vol.13 no.57 December 22, 1933 p.1293; Pedro G. "Progress in the Philippines" International Press Correspondence vol.14 no.13 June 8, 1934 p.892


(193) Philippines Free Press April 9, 1938; Santayana op.cit. p.12

(194) Philippines Herald August 3, 1932

(195) KAP (May 1, 1930), as cited p.23

(196) Philippines Herald January 28, 1931

(197) Guillermo Capadocia "The Philippine Labor Movement" Typescript c.1948 p.32; KAP "Kapasyahang Ukol sa Pagbaka sa Pananakot Puti", as cited p.5; KAP "Kapasyahang Ukol sa Pagpapakilos at Pagpapalaganap", as cited p.8

(198) The industrial union for seamen and dockworkers was called the Kalsahan ng mga Marino at Manggagawa sa Pantalan sa Pilipinas. Primitivo Arrogante, one of its early organisers, gives a brief memoir of the union in his "Biography of an ex-Communist", as cited pp.6-8

(199) Simons op.cit. p.644
Despite their numbers the demonstrators who joined the May Day parade in 1933 were certainly not lacking in spirit. As on previous occasions the authorities had prohibited the display of the red flag, and again as on previous occasions the prohibition was contemptuously ignored. Initially the marchers carried standards of fairly modest proportions, and to these the police were prepared to turn a blind eye. However at the conclusion of the parade in Plaza Guipit a KAP seamen's leader, Jose Refre, unfurled a red flag enormous enough to be criminal beyond doubt. Three motorcycle cops then seized the offending banner from Refre's hands and sped off through the crowd and away towards the Meisic police station, hotly pursued by a carload of communists trying vainly to shunt them off the road. Other policemen armed with riot guns and nightsticks were left to quell a minor riot which resulted in at least nine demonstrators being prosecuted for assault and physical injuries on persons in authority. Given the stiffest sentence - 2 years 4 months - was Jose Refre, who whilst being deprived of the flag had managed to grab a motorcycle cop's truncheon. With this he had battered two patrolmen before being clubbed into submission himself.

Philippines Herald May 2, 1933 and June 28, 1933; Manila Daily Bulletin May 2, 1933; Philippines Free Press May 6, 1933


CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PKP AND PEASANT UNREST

In countries like the Philippines, the Comintern maintained during the early 1930s, the two primary tasks confronting the communist movement were to secure complete independence and to sweep away feudalism. Further progress towards socialism would be possible only when this initial "anti-imperialist and agrarian" revolution had been accomplished. Advice to the PKP on the necessary groundwork for such a revolution was offered by Tim Ryan, the emissary sent by the Comintern to the Islands in 1931:

"the Party independently and through organising peasant committees, committees of action, committees of agricultural workers should organise and lead the struggles of the peasantry and the land workers: mass struggles for the basic reduction of rent and taxes leading up to the complete refusal to pay them; mass resistance to evictions and to the confiscation of cattle, crops and land; mass resistance to police violence; mass struggles for immediate relief to the starving peasantry leading up to the organised seizure of the food and seed supplies of the landlords and wealthy merchants; mass refusal to carry out compulsory labour services for the landlords or to perform any work without cash payment; strikes of the agricultural labourers for higher wages, for the reduction of the 10-14 hour working day, for the payment of wages weekly in cash etc. In every instance the Party should intimately connect the struggle for the burning needs of the peasants and land workers with the struggle for national liberation ... and show the peasant masses that the only correct and practical solution of the agrarian question is the revolutionary seizure of the landlords' land."(1)

That there was a real potential for an escalating struggle of this kind the PKP never had any doubt. Unrest on the haciendas and the peasants' "mood to fight the landlords and the Constabulary", the Party noted in its founding platform, were "the rumblings of a vast movement which if organised will overthrow the American imperialists and free the Philippines."(2) As the countryside increasingly felt the impact
of the worldwide economic depression the prospects for revolution were seen as becoming brighter still. The hardship created by falling farm incomes, Crisanto Evangelista observed, coupled with landlord attempts to shift the main burden of the crisis onto the backs of peasant smallholders, tenants and agricultural labourers, was provoking a tide of protest that was unprecedented both in its scale and its militancy. (3)

Beyond question this observation contained a substantial kernel of truth. Whilst never culminating in any full-blown "depression rebellion" akin to those that occurred in Burma and Indo-China, rural discontent did increase markedly in the early 1930s in various regions of the archipelago. Unrest in the principal export crop areas, particularly on the sugar plantations of Negros Occidental and in the Southern Luzon coconut growing districts, has been sadly neglected by historians and warrants separate research. Here, however, we shall focus once again on events in the rice-bowl region of Central Luzon. This was the region where the discontent was deepest and most sustained, and where by virtue of population and proximity to Manila the situation generated the greatest public concern. And it was in the rice provinces, of course, especially in Bulacan, Pampanga and Nueva Ecija, that the KPMP and other peasant organisations had their strongest roots.

The Depression and the Countryside

The socio-economic background against which peasant unions first emerged in Central Luzon was outlined in an earlier chapter, and the basic configurations of discontent and protest had not fundamentally altered by the time the depression struck. Union campaigns continued to revolve around three basic issues: the dispossession of independent smallholders; the rates of interest demanded on advances of cash and rice; and the division between landlord and tenant of farming expenses and rewards. Amidst the dislocation and privation bred by the depression, all these controversies inevitably became more urgent and inflamed.

The central bane of the crisis, falling crop prices, is starkly charted in official statistics on the gross income received from each hectare planted to the staple. From P 102 in 1930 this sum plummeted to P 72 in 1931 and to P 50 in 1932. Ricefield returns shrank by more than a half, in other words, within the space of just two years. Even then the trough had not quite reached its nadir, for there was a further
P 3 fall in 1933.(4) Measured by the cavan - a 44 kilogram sackful - palay dropped in price between 1930 and 1933 from P 3.60 wholesale to P 1.81.(5) Meanwhile the degree to which smallholders and tenants could supplement their farm incomes by wage labour was also drastically diminished. Statistics on rural wages are regrettably not to hand, but in all probability rates followed the same trend as in the city and were roughly halved. Opportunities for casual and off-season work, moreover, became progressively restricted due to the general downturn in commercial activity and to cut-backs in public works projects imposed by austerity-minded administrations in Manila and the provincial capitols.(6)

The essential expenses of the peasant household, on the other hand, would have declined much less sharply. Price reductions on the fish, meat, fruit and vegetables needed to add variety to the diet mostly ranged between 15 and 35 per cent, and most probably savings on clothing and fuel were of a similar order. Farming costs commonly met in cash - the repair or replacement of implements, the purchase or hire of carabao, transportation fees and the like - perhaps shrank even less. Most constant of all was the burden of taxes. The land tax, assessed by the provincial governments, was a particularly serious problem for independent smallholders, but it could also be a worry for tenants, who in some localities were obliged to contribute towards the impost by their landlords.(7) The poll tax, or cedula, was levied at a standard rate of P 2 per annum, which in absolute terms might not seem too onerous. Yet so close to the margin of subsistence were many rice farmers that it aroused deep popular resentment, and its abolition was amongst the foremost demands of all the major radical organisations.

For most peasant households the overall reduction in the cost of living during the depression years might be reckoned at around 25 per cent, or just about half the amount by which incomes fell. An illustration of what this meant in practice may be extrapolated from the data collected by Benedict Kerkvliet on the budgets of share tenants in a barrio of Talavera, Nueva Ecija.(8) In the 1930s, Kerkvliet estimates, a typical 3 hectare farm yielded 135 cavans of palay, and the net product after subtracting expenses for planting and harvesting was 116 cavans. Under the customary 50-50 crop sharing arrangements the tenant was accordingly entitled to 58 cavans. In an average family of six the bulk of this - around 36 cavans - would be needed for home
consumption, leaving a final surplus of 22 cavans that could be sold to obtain cash. Since annual cash expenses were recalled by Kerkvliet's informants to have been around P 200, most households would have been in deficit even in 1930, when palay was fetching P 3.60 per cavan. But the size of the deficit, equivalent to around 34 cavans of palay, was in a sense manageable, for such an amount the local hacendero was prepared to loan, sometimes without any real expectation of repayment. (9) Three years later the same 22 cavans share would fetch only P 40. Assuming that expenses for the year could be restricted to P 150 - the lowest recollected by the Talavera tenants - this would leave a deficit of P 110, equivalent to 61 cavans. Advances of this magnitude would be difficult to procure even from relatively benevolent landlords, especially when they too might be feeling the pinch of hard times.

The predicament of independent smallholders must have been similarly acute. Again taking as an illustration a family of six dependent on a 3-hectare holding, the proportion of the yearly harvest which could be marketed for cash - 80 cavans - seems at first sight to put the smallholder in a much more secure position than his tenant counterpart. His farming expenses and taxes would however be significantly higher also, perhaps raising total outgoings in a normal year to around P 250. With the prices prevailing in 1930 the farmer would be left with a relatively comfortable P 38 surplus. When palay prices dropped to only P 1.81 per cavan in 1933, though, the sale of 80 cavans would yield only P 145. Even allowing for a 25 per cent fall in outgoings, this would tip the household budget into a P 43 deficit.

Fortunately the effects of the slump were not appreciably worsened by natural disasters. The only year in which the Central Luzon rice crop appears to have been below average was 1931, and even then there was no question of an overall food shortage. (10) Imports of the staple, a crude barometer of domestic underproduction, remained low throughout the depression. (11) Official confidence about the ability of existing production levels to meet demand was firm enough, indeed, for the Governor General to advise the Philippine legislature in 1932 that in the prevailing economic climate the construction of new irrigation projects had to be regarded as an unnecessary extravagance. (12) Yet amidst this providential self-sufficiency the most vulnerable amongst the Central Luzon peasantry were on the brink of starvation. Whilst
the rice bodegas owned by local landlords and merchants held ample stocks, the Philippines Free Press reported in May 1932, hundreds of families in the Nueva Ecija municipalities of Talavera, Cabanatuan, Gapan and Santa Rosa were subsisting on wild root plants and river snails. Others had been driven to begging for food. (13)

Whether the plight of the peasantry was aggravated as the PKP alleged by landlords, merchants and moneylenders consciously trying to transfer the brunt of the crisis onto the rural poor might be difficult to establish conclusively after this length of time even through local field studies. It may be significant, for instance, that it was in the early 1930s that the principal hacendero in the Talavera barrio studied by Kerkvliet stopped granting his tenants loans, most crucially the 20-40 cavan rasyon loans upon which most households had come to depend every year. (14) On the other hand this decision might merely have been a manifestation of the wider trend towards more commercial, less paternalistic tenancy practices that existed throughout the inter-war period. On a regional scale, almost certainly, the depression did accelerate that underlying trend and make its impact more acute. Similarly the unemployment which stemmed from the depression must have further weakened the overall bargaining position of tenants, a position that was already deteriorating over the longer run due to population growth and the settlement of the region's last farming frontiers.

The specific nature of the additional pressures which the slump placed on barrio folk obviously varied in accordance with local tenure patterns and elite practices. Homesteaders and other smallholders, their fragile profit margins wiped out by the price collapse, were more prone than usual to lose their lands through indebtedness or through title litigation which they lacked the means to contest. Cash tenants, notably on the expensive Church-owned haciendas, were troubled not only by the refusal of estate administrators to reduce farm rentals in line with falling prices but also in some cases by fresh demands that they pay rent on the plots where they had their houses and yards. (15) For share tenants the key problem was debt. Either landlords ceased making loans of cash and palay altogether, or they demanded interest rates of 33, 50 or 100 per cent (known respectively as tercian, talindua and takipan) on advances often repayable in a matter of only months or weeks. When a creditor found the interest due on a palay loan was being reduced
in cash terms by falling prices, he was liable to insist that the debt be recalculated at the new rates, a procedure known as baligtaran. Such practices, though "in vogue during the times of plenty", the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources observed in 1932, were now in harder times "fleecing the ignorant farmers and leaving them just a very small proportion of their crops enough to lead a hand-to-mouth existence".(16)

The Secretary made these remarks in his capacity as chairman of a special Anti-Usury Committee created by Governor General Theodore Roosevelt to "study and act" on the usury problem.(17) The previous year a similar commission had been appointed to examine the related issue of rural credit provision.(18) Also at executive prompting, the House of Representatives instructed its Committee on Labor and Immigration to undertake a first hand investigation into landlord-tenant relations in Central Luzon, and in late 1932 the Governor General himself was out in the barrios promising that the government would do "everything that lies in our power to improve conditions".(19) This unprecedented flurry of official concern about rural injustices presumably sprang to some degree from a genuine humanitarian compassion for those whose plight the depression had thrown into starker relief. Much more plainly, however, it stemmed from an urgent desire to calm the groundswell of peasant unrest and pre-empt the outbreak of open rebellion.

Rural stability had long been predicated by American policymakers upon the sustainment and extension of owner-cultivation, and throughout the early 1930s this goal was restated with added urgency. "An independent middle class", Governor General Dwight F. Davis averred in his annual report for 1931, "is the greatest safeguard of a country, an oppressed peasantry is the greatest danger."(20) The following year Governor Roosevelt lectured the legislature on the same theme:

"...an equitable distribution of the good things in life among all is the stoutest bulwark a nation can have against disorders and impractical radicalism. If a man has a stake in the community, a small farm or home of his own, he wishes to be sure that the changes that may come will not deprive him of the property on which his livelihood and that of his children depends. When some wild-eyed dreamer comes to him advocating disruption of the existing order he does not accept it quickly ... On the other hand, where a man has no property, or where through injustice or carelessness on the part of the government he has been robbed of his holding, he
is fertile soil for any doctrine no matter how chimerical." (21)

Even as the most lauded member of the rural community, however, the peasant smallholder received little tangible support from the government during the depression era. It was widely acknowledged, for example, that the land tax fell unduly heavily on smallholders, and that for many the collapse in farm incomes had made the burden insupportable. Between 1930 and 1931 provincial tax collections dropped on average by a tenth, and in some cases by almost a third. (22) Yet whilst Governor Roosevelt pointed out that assessments could be reduced if expenditure was cut correspondingly, his main advice to worried provincial administrations was to wage "vigorous" and "far-reaching" campaigns to combat evasion and default. As a result of such campaigns, he later reported with satisfaction, collections in 1932 had been maintained at 1931 levels even though economic conditions had become "much worse". (23) The only crumbs of relief offered to land tax payers were short-term postponements of deadlines, the introduction of an instalments system, and a slightly less punitive scale of penalties for delinquency.

Attempts to improve rural credit provision also had only a marginal impact. Recognising that the vast majority of the credit associations formed under an act passed in 1915 had become moribund, the legislature approved measures in 1931 providing for associations to be constituted on a revised basis and for the formation of rural banks. Perhaps because of heavy losses in the associations established after 1915, however, the government was unprepared to provide either type of institution with any financial backing. The capital for the associations had to come solely from the members, each of whom was required to purchase at least one P 50 share in order to join. Aside from the fact that many smallholders would be unable to afford this outlay, the obvious drawback here was that the associations could only lend whatever amount the members had subscribed, and given the straightened circumstances of the farming community as a whole the demand for loans would be far greater than the accumulated reserves could meet. Initial capital for the rural banks was to be furnished on a more straightforward basis by individuals or corporations. But the regulations governing the banks did not make them an attractive entrepreneurial proposition, and by January 1933 only two had come into existence in the entire country. From the borrower's viewpoint, in any case, the appeal of the banks would have been limited by a requirement in the
enabling legislation that interest on short-term loans had to be paid in advance!(24)

Progress was similarly modest in the complementary field of usury control. To a degree this was due to resistance to reform within the legislature. When the recommendations of the Anti-Usury Committee created by Governor Roosevelt were considered, the more radical proposals were rejected, most notably the outlawing of the pacto de retro contracts under which smallholders unable to meet interest payments forfeited their land.(25) The legislature did not however dismiss the Committee's report entirely, for measures were enacted extending the definition of usury and raising the penalties for the crime, thereby transferring original jurisdiction in usury cases from the usually landlord-controlled justices of the peace to the courts of first instance.(26) But on paper there had in fact been fairly stringent laws against high-interest lending since 1916: the main failing during the depression years was due less to legislative conservatism than to the administration's reluctance to provide the funding necessary to improve enforcement. Instead of assigning many more investigating agents and attorneys to the provinces, the government relied mainly on the less costly strategy of persuasion. An official Anti-Usury Bulletin was circulated and a propaganda campaign launched against the moral inequity of usury. Since usurers are rarely sensitive to moral blandishments, however, and since official rural credit provision was so rudimentary, most peasants still had no alternative but to accept the customary rates even though they knew them to be illegal.(27)

The corollary of the belief that rural stability was best guaranteed by a sturdy middle class of independent smallholders was that the greatest danger to peace and order came from an oppressed tenantry. Landlord-tenant friction in the rice-growing provinces, Governor Roosevelt went so far as to say, was responsible for "practically all the disturbances of recent years ... and such communism as exists in the Philippine Islands is due to this problem."(28) Yet the relief extended by the government to tenants during the depression years was even more minimal than that extended to smallholders.

Here the fault did lie squarely with conservative elements in the legislature. In 1932 a number of tenancy bills were introduced in the lower house which had the backing in general terms of both Governor
Roosevelt and the Filipino cabinet secretaries most closely concerned with agrarian matters. The drafting of a reform measure was eventually encharged to the House Committee on Labor and Immigration, which after a fact-finding tour in Central Luzon prepared a bill that was potentially a significant step forward. It provided, amongst other things, for written contracts between landlord and tenant in a language understood by both; for an equal division of the crop where the expenses had also been equally shared; for a maximum annual interest rate of 10 per cent on loans; and for the tenant to receive a guaranteed 15 per cent share of the harvest whatever the extent of his indebtedness. But before this bill was passed as the Rice Share Tenancy Law (Act No. 4054) an amendment was inserted declaring that it should come into effect "only in provinces where the majority of municipal councils shall, by resolution, petition for its application to the Governor General". Since the municipal councils in the provinces concerned were almost invariably dominated by landlord interests, this amendment killed stone dead any immediate prospect of the Act being implemented.

Whilst regularly expressing sympathy for the peasantry and promising them a better deal in the future, American officials and Filipino politicos thus proved collectively unable or unwilling to honour their rhetoric with substantive reforms. Each ineffectual or diluted initiative and its attendant publicity served merely to arouse expectations in the countryside that could not be fulfilled. And though acknowledging the validity of many rural grievances, of course, the administration was in no way prepared to countenance the activities of the "religious fanatics", "unscrupulous demagogues" and "professional agitators" whom it saw as seeking to exploit the situation "for their own ends". "Old bad laws will be changed", Governor Roosevelt promised a barrio gathering in Bulacan. "On the other hand, the government in the interests of the people will not stand for disorder or disobedience of the laws of any kind. We will check any subversive action promptly and firmly."(31) Rather than soothing agrarian conflicts, official intervention leant them an added dimension.

Although it was the communists who were most persistently cast as the chief villains of the piece by officialdom and the English language press, there were periods in the early part of the depression when two more transient dissident groups briefly held centre stage. These were the so-called "Colorums" who attacked the Pangasinan town
of Tayug in January 1931, and the Tanggulan, a populist fraternity which in late 1931 was feared to be plotting a co-ordinated uprising right across the Luzon plains. These episodes merit discussion at some length, for aside from their intrinsic significance they help to illuminate the milieu of protest in which the communist-led KPMP operated and the character of the groups with which it had to compete. It is also interesting to note that the intelligence services were anxious in each case to reveal a hidden communist hand in the conspiracies. In reality the PKP was just a spectator on the sidelines, acknowledging that the events showed its own peasant organisation to be letting opportunities for revolutionary mass action pass by.

Revolt in Tayug

Among the rebels who attacked Tayug on the night of January 10-11, 1931 were some who had previously belonged to the Ilocano kapisanan which had been caught preparing for an uprising in the nearby town of San Jose, Nueva Ecija back in 1925. Tranquillity had never returned to the Pangasinan-Nueva Ecija border region since that time. Here the polarisation between classes was abnormally sharp. Compounding the usual tenancy disputes were bitter tussles for land between hacenderos and homesteaders, contests in which the courts and municipal officials were seen by barrio folk to side invariably with the rich and powerful. Equally resented as an instrument of the elite was the Constabulary, whose troopers carried out the physical eviction of unwanted tenants and dispossessed homesteaders and kept a tight, sometimes brutal rein on suspected dissenters.

In Tayug virtually all the land had been accumulated by fair means or foul by two families. One hacienda alone, El Porvenir, embraced eleven barrios. In 1930 the Porvenir tenants presented a list of grievances about rentals, debts and obligatory labour services to the hacienda manager, who responded first by having the authors of the complaint arrested and secondly, after their release, by having them ejected from their farms and homes. Since the landlords had formed an association to maintain a united front in their dealings with tenants, this action effectively precluded those evicted from farming anywhere in the district. The choices remaining were penury, migration or revolt.
On the Saturday night ordained for the uprising some seventy peasants armed with bolos and a few antiquated rifles converged on Tayug poblacion from the surrounding barrios. Their first target was the Constabulary post, whose thirteen-man garrison was taken completely unawares. Three troopers were killed and the remainder put to flight, leaving their attackers to plunder the armoury and set the barracks ablaze. Awakened by the commotion and panic-stricken at seeing their defenders routed, the mayor, local police, Chinese merchants and other citizens fled along the roads out of town. Finding themselves in unchallenged control of the poblacion, the rebels next ransacked the municipal offices, bringing out bundles of land and tax records to burn ceremoniously in the plaza before putting their torches to the buildings themselves. Also looted and set afire were the post office, a warehouse and thirty-five residences, including many belonging to the Tayug elite.

Instead of dispersing to their homes when the Sabbath dawned, the now weary band retired to the church to ask the startled priest for breakfast. After being granted this request, they settled down in the church and its adjoining convento to await developments. By this time news of the uprising had long since reached the neighbouring towns, and Constabularymen soon began arriving to take up positions surrounding the insurgents' refuge. After a sporadic gunfight lasting throughout the day the rebels ran out of ammunition and finally bowed to the inevitable, some surrendering, others managing to slip away. Six had been shot dead and twenty injured; forty-four were captured.

In the post-mortems the rebels were branded by officialdom and the press as "Colorums", a term which had been widely used to denote religiously-inspired dissidents since Spanish times and was said to derive from the Latin prayer-ending "per omnia saecula saeculorum" ("world without end"). Certainly their beliefs did contain a strong element of folk mysticism. Their leader, an Ilocano fieldhand named Pedro Calosa, claimed to be in touch with the "personalities" of dead heroes. He professed to have been appointed to lead his secret society (which went under various names) by Rizal, Bonifacio, Ricarte and others, and also to have encountered the celebrated turn of the century prophet Felipe Salvador. Another respected figure in the rebel tradition whom he contacted for advice was still alive in the flesh: María de la Cruz, thirty years earlier the "Virgin Mary" of the Guardia de Honor in
nearby Urdaneta. Members of Calosa's society devised elaborate rituals and codes, wore embroidered talismans and carried stones imbued with special powers. Nevertheless, all this was not a substitute for orthodox religious observances, rather a segregated adjunct. The primary spiritual loyalties of the rebels lay with the schismatic Iglesia Filipina Independiente, which they wished to see officially recognised as the national church. It may be remembered that the IFI had been founded by Isabela de los Reyes in 1902, and very shortly afterwards had elected another Ilocano, Gregorio Aglipay, as its Obispo Maximo. Within the Ilocos region and amongst Ilocano migrants like Calosa and his confederates it had become the majority religion. But together with Protestantism, particularly Methodism, it had also become a faith which throughout Central Luzon attracted adherents who were dissatisfied with the social status quo and identified Roman Catholicism with the hated elite.

More clearly still, the IFI had been conceived and evangelised as a fundamentally nationalist faith, as a reaction against a Roman Catholicism whose rites and upper hierarchy were foreign. Like most labour and peasant groups during the American period, Calosa's kapisanan was fervently dedicated to immediate independence. When in uniform its members sported red sashes across their chests bearing the inscription "We want the Filipino flag to fly alone", and they carried a modified version of the national ensign as their own banner. If their example in Tayug sparked similar revolts throughout the country, they hoped, the liberty of the Philippines could be won. Then the land would be divided equally amongst those who tilled it, landlords would have to work like everybody else, and landgrabbers would be driven from the Islands. The title "Colorum" the rebels indignantly rejected; their central concern, one insisted, had been "to secure a redistribution of wealth in order to help poor people free themselves from oppression".(33)

Government intelligence agents quickly sniffed the scent of Bolshevism. When the Tayug insurrectos had made their bonfire of land and tax records in the town plaza, the Constabulary noted, they had carried out precisely the kind of destruction that "local red leaders" in Central Luzon had recently been advocating.(34) A stranger unfortunate enough to be in Tayug on the fateful night was charged with masterminding the uprising as an "agent on the payroll of the Soviet government" and was held incommunicado for two days before he could
convince his inquisitors that he had just returned to the Philippines from the United States to look for his wife, whom he had married in Tayug back in 1913. Pedro Calosa himself, the Constabulary intelligence chief told pressmen, had been "definitely identified" as a communist. Rather more plausibly it was claimed that Calosa had on at least three occasions been observed meeting with PKP politburo member Antonino Ora in Nueva Ecija. Ora was in Nueva Ecija immediately after the uprising, and had almost certainly travelled with Evangelista both in that province and in Pangasinan on previous occasions, so such encounters were well within the bounds of possibility. Many years later, surviving Tayug participants recollected that their leader had been associating with well-known communist cadres in Nueva Ecija as early as 1929.

But whatever the extent of Calosa's communist contacts, their relevance to the Tayug revolt was negligible. The rebels, the Comintern observer S. Carpio regretted, "lacked a definite and clearly defined revolutionary programme and leadership (and were) completely isolated and out of touch with the revolutionary movement of the proletariat." The First PKP Congress, held four months after the incident, acknowledged that this lack of involvement had been a "serious fault" and criticised both the Party and the KPMP for their passivity. Exactly what form of assistance it was felt should or could have been extended is unclear. Two years later, when the episode was still on the minds of Party leaders, the Central Committee diagnosed the failure to support the insurgents as a manifestation of excessive "legalism" and of "right opportunist neglect" hiding behind a screen of "leftist reasoning". This leftist reasoning, it seems, was that the Tayug rebels were unworthy of comradely assistance because the establishment consensus about them was correct - they were religious fanatics.

The Tanggulan

Taken more seriously still as evidence of the Party's shortcomings in leading the revolutionary movement in the countryside was the support attracted by the society known as the Tanggulan. The kapisanan led by Pedro Calosa, after all, was practically confined to Tayug and the neighbouring municipalities in eastern Pangasinan, an area where the KPMP had never gained much influence. By the same token Calosa had
drawn his following mostly from amongst his fellow Ilocanos, whereas the KPMP had always been a predominantly Tagalog organisation. And their members were in any event relatively few - only seventy participating in the raid and probably less than 1,500 overall. Tanggulan membership, on the other hand, reached at its 1931 peak around 40-50,000, and thereby outstripped that of the KPMP itself, which in the same year officially claimed 35,500 members. A substantial proportion of Tanggulan adherents, moreover, were recruited in those Tagalog-speaking areas of Central and Southern Luzon that the KPMP liked to regard as its own heartland and preserve.

In view of its size and significance the Tanggulan has been curiously neglected by historians, and until more detailed studies have been undertaken the observations that follow on its convoluted and shadowy saga must be regarded as strictly tentative. The founder and supremo of the Tanggulan was Patricio Dionisio. Born to a middle class family in Hagonoy, Bulacan in 1890, Dionisio had made his career as a newspaperman and lawyer in Manila, and like many others from those professions had become an active labourite and kapisanista. His principal allegiance was to that brand of intransigent republicanism that looked for inspiration and leadership to the exiled Artemio Ricarte, the only surviving general of the revolution who had refused to pledge loyalty to the American flag. Dionisio launched the direct forerunner to the Tanggulan in 1927 under the name Katipunan Anak ng Bayan (Association of the Sons of the People). The society was conceived, he wrote, by three "disciples of liberty, equality and fraternity" at a place on Manila's outskirts where the original Katipuneros had often met. Their objective was to propagate the same radical ideas of Andres Bonifacio when he organised his KKK among the laboring classes, especially among the small farmers and farm hands who have for many years been the prey of selfish landgrabbers and loan sharks."

Along with fraternities like the Legionarios del Trabajo (to which Dionisio had previously belonged), the society thus claimed to be the legitimate heir and custodian of working class nationalism. More than most Manila-based kapisanan, though, it was keenly attuned to the problems and aspirations of the peasantry, and almost from the outset the membership was over eighty per cent provincial.
its inveterate hostility to the Nacionalista party. Quezon and his cohorts in the party hierarchy, it alleged, had betrayed the sacred cause of independence and reached a cosy accommodation with the imperialists to safeguard their personal wealth and power. Both at a national level and locally, the Nacionalistas were lambasted as extravagant, immoral and corrupt, and were accused of invariably siding with the rich against the poor.

Though expressed in a more traditionalist and populist idiom than the radical left employed, these views obviously had much in common with those being propagated contemporaneously by the Lapiang Manggagawa, and for a time the two organisations were quite closely aligned. In April 1929 Dionisio took a place on the national committee of the LM-sponsored Anti-Imperialist League, and when the Congreso Obrero split the following month he virtually alone amongst "makabayan" delegates sided with the radicals against the moderates and conservatives. \(^{(47)}\) Immediately thereafter, indeed, he was elected to the executive committee of the Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis.\(^{(48)}\) In the authorised Communist Party history produced in 1950 Dionisio is even listed as a member of the original PKP Central Committee, but this is not corroborated by any contemporary evidence and appears unlikely.\(^{(49)}\) After his appearance on the first KAP executive, in fact, there is no further record linking his name to any radical left organisation.

Certainly his energies were devoted primarily to his own association, which early in 1930 he rechristened the Tanggulan (Defence). Around the same time the society absorbed a smaller kapisanan makabayan called Alitaptap Cubat (Forest Firefly), one of whose leaders - Teodoro Alcantara - was another Anti-Imperialist League member. More important, though, were the alliances that Dionisio struck with two better known radicals not associated with the left, Vicente Almazar and Benigno Ramos.

Almazar, it may be recalled, headed the Kapatirang Magsasaka, which later became more commonly known as the Kapatirang Magbubukid (Peasant Brotherhood). In its mid-twenties heyday the KM had been the largest labour organisation in the country. Then its membership probably reached at least 65,000, and has been put as high as 120,000.\(^{(50)}\) By the beginning of the thirties the number had fallen sharply, perhaps to around 30,000. Partly this decline paralleled
that of the Democrata party, to which the Kapatiran was closely linked. Although still the leading opposition party in the Islands, the
Democratas had been losing ground nationally since the 1925 elections. Their challenge lost credibility, it has been argued, when they agreed
to join the Nacionalistas in the 1926 Supreme National Council to demon-
strate "national unity" during the confrontation with Governor Wood.(51)
More crucially, the DP simply could not compete with the government party
in dispensing patronage and funds from the pork barrel; it was slowly
dying from "malnutrition".(52) Meanwhile Almazar and the Kapatiran had
further troubles of their own. There was squabbling and disenchantment
over the supposed malversation or misuse of brotherhood funds.(53)
Almazar, by profession a lawyer, had himself been financially ruined by
successive ill-fated election campaigns. In the course of his most
recent campaign in 1928 Almazar's Nacionalista opponents had instituted
legal proceedings against him and five others for causing grievous
bodily harm to a Kapatiran initiate who had scabbed during a tenants' strike, and around October 1928 he was convicted as charged and sentenced
to a stretch in Bilibid. To celebrate his release in July 1929 his
predecessor as the KM's "Great Peasant" - General Teodoro Sandiko -
planned a demonstration at the prison gates, but was refused the requi-
site permit on the grounds of possible disturbances.(54) Instead a
mammoth crowd of peasants travelled to meet their hero outside the city
limits.(55) In Bulacan and Nueva Ecija at least, the solid core of
Almazar's following had remained loyal, and though now in poor health
he soon decided to run for election once again in 1931.

Around 1930, according to Dionisio, the Tanggulan and the
Kapatirang Magbubukid were "fused".(56) In fact both groups appear to
have retained their own identity but to have had an increasingly over-
lapping membership. Peasants in San Miguel, Bulacan recall that entry
into the Tanggulan was through an "inner initiation" within the
Kapatiran, and this practice may well have been the norm.(57) "I do
solemnly swear before God and on my honour", the principal oath ran,
"that I will serve my country by working for its emancipation even at the
cost of my life".(58) Publicly, the aims of the Tanggulan were depicted
by Dionisio in unremarkable generalities: independence, social reform,
Filipino protectionism, mutual aid.(59) Out in the barrios, recruits
were attracted by a more daring and defiant vision, to what extent with
the supremo's sanction will probably never be known. The real aim of the
society, it was divulged, was

"to rise against the United States and the Nacionalista collaborators in the towns because it would be impossible to gain true kalayaan, liberty in the sense of national independence, equality and brotherhood for all citizens, to improve conditions for tenants, or get justice for the common people against the powerful, as long as the rich and foreigners worked together to oppress them and the political system was closed to peaceful reform. (To aid the uprising) Japan would land guns on the east coast." (60)

The second radical with whom Dionisio formed a partnership, Benigno Ramos, was the editor-publisher of the vituperative anti-Nacionalista weekly Sakdal. As we noted in the previous chapter, Ramos opened the columns of his paper to writers of several oppositionist hues - PKP leaders included - but in Dionisio he recognised a virtually kindred spirit. The two men became compadres, and from the start Sakdal awarded the Tanggulan extensive coverage.

To a degree, Dionisio, Almazar and Ramos thus forged a symbiotic alliance. Almazar had an established popular base in Central Luzon but had lost his physical vitality. Dionisio claimed to have thousands of supporters in Manila and the Southern Luzon provinces, and with Ramos had the energy and polemical skills necessary to sustain the movement. And Ramos also had Sakdal, which gave generous space and publicity to the Tanggulan and in return gained a healthy circulation amongst Tanggulan members.

There were nevertheless various political differences between the three Bulakeño radicals. Most notably, Almazar still wanted to gain a seat in the House of Representatives, whereas Sakdal was editorially opposed to any election held under colonial rule. On this issue Ramos was evidently shouting against the wind, and Tanggulan members in Bulacan's second district supported Almazar's 1931 candidacy with great enthusiasm. Two months before the election the Bulacan governor determined that Tanggulan campaigning posed a threat to public order, and instructed the municipal presidents to deny the society any further permits for public meetings. Significantly, the governor in question, Jose Padilla, was himself a Democrata like Almazar, and was running for the Senate in the same elections. Possibly there had been a growing divergence between conservative and radical elements in the Democrata party even before Almazar had aligned his supporters with the Tanggulan, but now there was an open rift. Any association in the public mind
between respectable Democrata candidates and Almazar's militant peasant following, Padilla had seemingly concluded, was henceforth likely to prove a political liability. Banned from meeting legally, the Tanggulan started to hold clandestine meetings in the ricefields at night, which made the atmosphere still more uneasy. In early May, presumably at Padilla's request, extra Constabulary detachments were assigned to the second district to "keep the peace", a move the Almazar camp naturally construed as intimidation. Nacionalista landlords increased the pressure by warning tenants that involvement with the Tanggulan would be considered as grounds for expulsion. When election day came, Almazar polled 8,178 votes, slightly more than his total in 1928, but lost to the single Nacionalista candidate by a margin of around 3,000. The peasant leader and his supporters were convinced that any chance of victory had been denied by the pre-election persecution.

Intelligence agents soon reported that the embittered Tanggulans were plotting their revenge, preparing to attack the town of Ballaug and compiling a blacklist of landlords and local officials that they intended to liquidate. Constabulary troopers started searching the houses of known Tanggulan members for weapons, and Almazar and several other activists were taken into custody until post-election tensions had safely subsided without major incident.

Following his release Almazar reportedly continued working with the Tanggulan but now took a back seat to Dionisio and Ramos. In September and October 1931 the two compadres made a joint speaking tour in the Central and Southern Luzon provinces attacking the Nacionalista oligarchy and denouncing local officials. Dionisio promoted the Tanggulan and Ramos promoted Sakdal, but so far as their public was concerned their purpose was identical. Some Tanggulans began calling themselves "Sakdals" because they desired the kind of populist reforms and independence that Ramos's paper envisaged. The speaking tour won thousands of new adherents. In June, intelligence sources placed membership in the society at around 15,000. By October the official estimate had risen to 40,000, and Dionisio himself claimed ten thousand more.

As the Tanggulan mushroomed, persistent rumours again began to circulate that an insurrection was being plotted. In early December the
Manila press published a letter from Constabulary Chief Nathorst to
the governor of Nueva Ecija warning specifically that an uprising was
planned for Christmas Eve, the anniversary of another Ricartista
sedition seventeen years earlier. Constabulary detachments throughout
the region were mobilised to pre-empt a "massacre of landowners and
government officials". (64) Tanggulan members working in the Meralco
power station, it was reported, would signal the revolt by plunging
the entire metropolitan area into darkness. (65) Copies were found of a
letter purportedly signed by General Ricarte promising the insurgents
support from overseas. The P 10,000 collected in his name, it said, had
been safely received and

"turned over to the Emperor of Japan for the purchase of arms
and ammunition for our uprising. I have also conferred with
the high officials of the Japanese government, the ambassadors
of Belgium, Germany and other European countries, and also
with Mahatma Gandhi regarding our plans for an uprising
against the American government." (66)

More alarmed than anyone by these developments, by his own entirely
credible accounts, was the Tanggulan supremo himself, Patricio Dionisio.
He had been fighting to restrain extremist elements in the society for
some months, he later claimed, and not until the "Christmas Eve
uprising" was unveiled in the press had he grasped how disastrously he
had failed. To his horror, hasty checks with provincial branches con­
firmed that many were indeed preparing for action. His own calls for
moderation, he discovered, had been countermanded by government agents
provocateurs, who themselves had propagated the notion of a Christmas
revolt as a pretext for discrediting and destroying the society. (67)
Also to blame was the Constabulary, whose detachments had deliberately
inflamed Tanggulan members in the barrios by constant harassment and
persecution. He and his associates had been framed, Dionisio concluded
bitterly, by "RICH POLITICIANS" and "COWARDLY LEADERS" who were deter­
mined to stifle any challenge to their oppressive rule. (68) Close to
panic, Dionisio rushed out a special newsheet to his members affirming
emphatically that the Tanggulan was not contemplating nor had ever con­
templated attacking the authorities. To suppose an uprising could be
staged without arms, he insisted with much logic, was nothing short of
ridiculous. (69)

In mid-December, despite these protestations of purely pacific
intent, Dionisio and over a hundred others were rounded up and charged
with conspiracy. None seriously resisted arrest, and so quickly was it evident that they posed no real threat that most were released on bail even before the supposed uprising was due to take place. For all the militant rhetoric in the barrios, the Tanggulans had as Dionisio claimed made no more actual preparations for armed struggle than had the PKP. A supposed Tanggulan weapons cache, Quezon himself later recounted, consisted in reality of "a revolver without ammunition and a bolo". The whole incident, the Senate President reckoned, had been a "fiasco, nothing short of a comedy", and should have earned Dionisio no more than two or three days in a municipal jail. In fact the Tanggulan chief received a six-year sentence, but through Quezon's intercession served only a matter of months. For the more extreme elements amongst his erstwhile following, Dionisio's image as a fearless foe of the oligarchy had of course already been shattered when he had openly repudiated any notion of rebellion. What vestiges remained of his radical reputation were forfeited when upon his release he accepted positions first on Quezon's personal staff and later in the Department of Labor. Some ex-associates were so incensed by this betrayal, Dionisio later recalled, that they wanted to have him assassinated.

Vicente Almazar was also arrested in the December 1931 crackdown, but whilst on bail awaiting trial he died at the early age of forty-two. Under his successors the Kapatirang Magbubukid became a palpably more respectable organisation, pledged, in the words of the new "Great Peasant", to "fight for more concessions from landowners and to counteract the communistic activities in these provinces". Strikes, members were advised, should be called only after government agencies had been invited to mediate and had exhausted all efforts to reach an amicable settlement. The decline of the brotherhood continued apace, and by December 1932 the number of active members was placed at only 18,000. The radical elements who had aligned themselves with the Tanggulan would feel that the Kapatiran had gone soft, the moderates that the disintegration and in 1933 the final dissolution of the Democrata party had removed its political raison d'être.

Initially many of the militants who turned away from the post-Almazar Kapatiran retained their allegiance to autonomous branches of the Tanggulan which survived the December debacle. Reports that "another uprising" was being hatched appeared periodically for at least
another two years. In April 1932, to cite one instance, the Constabulary in Nueva Ecija claimed to have forestalled a rebellion planned for May Day, due to commence when a Tanggulan leader from Talavera was seen driving along the country roads in a car with three headlights. The following June a fire which destroyed the commercial district of Cabanatuan, the Nueva Ecija provincial capital, was wrongly interpreted as another signal to revolt. Rather than helping extinguish the blaze, the local Constabulary commander consequently ordered his men to stand guard around the burning buildings ready to repulse an attack. He was determined, he stated, not to be taken by "the enemy" unawares like his luckless counterparts in Tayug.

In the longer term, most Tanggulan members seem either to have joined the KPMP or to have kept their faith in Benigno Ramos. During the uprising scare Ramos had like Dionisio publicly repudiated the idea of seizing power by force, but subsequently he showed no inclination whatsoever to follow the supremo's example in making a personal peace with the Nacionalista hierarchy, and for the most part his credentials as a radical were un tarnished. Somehow he also managed to escape relatively unscathed from the government crackdown. Sakdal was temporarily classified as banned material by the postal authorities on the grounds that it was "libelous and inspiring of sedition", but no prosecution was brought against Ramos himself. In October 1933, reversing his earlier stand on electoral politics, he launched the Partido Sakdalista on the base that Sakdal had developed. Here the amalgam of patriotism, populism and plotting that had characterised the Tanggulan was to be given a new lease of life.

Throughout the Tanggulan affair, as in the case of the Tayug incident, there were periodic references in the press to bolshevik influences at work behind the scenes. Due presumably to Dionisio's prior connections with the left, specific rumours circulated that the society was receiving support from the Berlin headquarters of the Anti-Imperialist League and even from the Soviet government in Moscow - an eventuality scarcely more credible than assistance from Mahatma Gandhi. In reality, the PKP's involvement was again limited to making post-facto observations on the periphery. After Quezon had made an attack on "professional agitators" who irresponsibly led the "ignorant masses" astray, for example, Evangelista dashed off a letter to the Senate President berating him for not recognising that the blame
properly rested with his own administration:

"If you continue in your way of reactionary reasoning and demagogy, we are sure you are the one who will precipitate the social upheaval, and consequently you are digging the grave of your capitalist imperialist regime .... We remind you that we are living in the twentieth century. We cannot go back to the middle ages."(81)

But criticism also had to be directed inwardly, at the Communist Party itself. Whilst it belittled and denigrated the "so-called Tanggulans" with their "confused and reactionary" and "chauvinist" leadership, the Party was forced to acknowledge that the society had presented a major challenge.(82) However inglorious the climax of its brief efflorescence, it had aroused a "revolutionary upsurge of the toiling masses" of a scale that the communists themselves had yet to match.(83) More humiliating still, the PKP Central Committee admitted, the Tanggulan had indeed flourished partly at communist expense, "attracting thousands of workers and peasants who were PKP members and sympathisers".(84)

The Kalipunan ng mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas

Since the heaviest losses had been in the countryside, the setback reflected particularly badly upon the KPMP. In trying to understand why the peasant confederation proved susceptible to Tanggulan encroachments it is necessary to look back briefly to the previous decade. Launched in 1922, the KPMP had in its early years been a moderate reformist organisation identified with the Nacionalista party. Its metamorphosis into a much more militant body aligned with the radical left, begun around 1925 but not formally heralded until December 1928, had been effected almost exclusively from the top downwards, and in substantial measure by just two men - Jacinto Manahan, the KPMP founding president, and Juan Feleo, the first vice-president. Even with the publication of the monthly Anak-Pawis and frequent speaking engagements, the political re-orientation of the scattered membership had inevitably been a slow and patchy process, limited by sheer logistics. Individual branches had often remained largely autonomous and, as the Laplang Manggagawa had only an embryonic presence in the provinces, some had continued to align themselves electorally with the Nacionalista party.
This was still the case when the PKP was launched in November 1930 and Manahan proclaimed publicly that the KPMP was the Party's "right arm". In truth there was not even a proper PKP "fraction" within the confederation, and the number of KPMP cadres with more than a rudimentary grasp of communist theory can scarcely have reached double figures. The main burden of political work amongst the membership rested as before with Manahan and Feleo. Manahan, however, had now acquired additional responsibilities outside the KPMP, firstly as president of the Anti-Imperialist League and secondly as head of the PKP propaganda department. In this latter capacity, it appears, he devoted much of his time to writing a series of lengthy pamphlets on subjects such as the history of May Day and the "Secrets and Mysteries of the Catholic Church". These endeavours were most commendable, Carpio suggested in a barbed compliment, "but it would have been very timely to publish at least one pamphlet on the peasants' question." (85,86,87,88)

Manahan's other obligations inevitably shifted a still greater share of KPMP work onto Feleo, who in 1930 became head of the PKP peasant department. The following year, perhaps in consequence, Feleo assumed the newly created position of KPMP general secretary and Manahan took the more elevated but less active post of chairman. As an orator with a highly uncompromising and stirring platform manner - or, in press parlance, a "notorious agitator" - Feleo's main problem was staying out of jail. In December 1930, it may be remembered, he was arrested for exhorting the Constabulary troopers standing guard at one of his meetings to aim their rifles, "when the time comes", not at the communists but at their own chiefs and at the imperialists. The next month he was seized in his home town of Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija whilst addressing a rally in memory of Antonino Ora. Later he was prosecuted for leading a 10,000 strong demonstration in the nearby town of San Antonio, which the Constabulary felt it necessary to disperse with tear gas. In September 1932 he was detained after speaking at protest rallies organised to greet the House Committee on Labor and Immigration, then journeying around Central Luzon on their rural fact-finding tour. Questioned by the authorities why he was "preaching Lenin ideas", the Philippines Herald reported, "Feleo readily answered that he was a communist". In all these and probably yet more instances, Feleo was charged with sedition and put behind bars. Even before beginning his longest sentence - 4½ years - in October 1933, his
labours were thus practically confined to periods when he was free on bail pending a succession of trials and appeals. (94)

This was a lifestyle that very few senior cadres were prepared to share. Manahan and Feleo apart, not a single member of the ten-man executive elected at the KPMP Third Congress in December 1928 is recorded as remaining active beyond 1930. Two others who seem to have soon become virtually passive were Alejandro Españaola and Silvino Tablan, who aside from Manahan and Feleo were the only KPMP cadres on the original PKP Central Committee. Not even lesser known activists could feel secure, because government hostility plainly extended beyond identified agitators to the confederation as such. In April 1931 the Constabulary was ordered to disband the KPMP Sixth Congress being held in Naic, Cavite, and two months later the insular treasurer revoked the confederation's license to operate as a "mutual aid and labour society", in effect rendering it illegal. (95) At this point the KPMP was organisationally at a very low ebb. Following the raid on the Sixth Congress the executive did not convene for over a year. Anak-Pawis ceased to appear, and it seems not even occasional broadsheets were circulated in its stead. (96) Cadre activity in general was restricted by a shortage of funds. Throughout the latter part of 1931, consequently, many rank and file members must have felt neglected or forgotten by the national leadership and have been particularly receptive to competing claims for their allegiance. Boosted by Sakdalan and the extensive Dionisio-Ramos speaking tour, the Tanggulan seemed at this juncture to present rural militants with a more visible and vigorous alternative. In the few months before it was decapitated by government persecution, it was able briefly to step into the breach.

The extent of the losses suffered by the KPMP due to the "white terror" and defections to the Tanggulan cannot be accurately gauged. According to the official returns made by the confederation to the Bureau of Labor, the shrinkage was catastrophic. Between 1931 and 1932, these returns indicate, the membership plummeted from 35,500 to just 5,000, at which level it remained a year later. (97) But clearly all these figures were rough estimates, and from 1932 onwards membership may have been defined less liberally - including, perhaps only those believed to be paying their dues. Whilst the KPMP may have had only 5,000 hard-core members, however, it undoubtedly had a vastly
greater number of supporters and sympathisers. For rural militants could be divided at this time into three categories. Firstly there were those who confined their loyalty to a single organisation, some so fervently that they had the symbol of that organisation tattooed or even branded by red-hot iron on their arms.(98) The second category comprised those who shifted from one group to another according to whichever currently seemed most active or effective. And finally there were many who joined or supported two or three organisations simultaneously, even organisations which at the national leadership level were mutually hostile, such as the KPMP and Tanggulan.(99)

In late 1931 the fickleness and lack of ideological discrimination shown by erstwhile members and supporters must have been a source of despair for the KPMP leadership, but in subsequent years precisely the same traits helped the confederation to recover the ground it had lost. In some areas this did not happen until after the Sakdalista movement had passed its peak in mid-decade, but even by mid-1932 there were sufficient signs to establish that the KPMP's powers of recuperation were far greater than those of its by then fading Tanggulan rival. In large measure this was due to the excessive dependence of the Tanggulan on one individual, Patricio Dionisio. With the arrest and capitulation of its supremo, the society fell apart. Similarly the Kapatirang Magbubukid can be seen in retrospect to have gone into terminal decline following the death of the charismatic Vicente Almazar.

The pre-eminence of Manahan and Feleo notwithstanding, the KPMP by contrast avoided the pitfall of over-reliance on particular individuals and was consequently better equipped to survive. Even in its darkest days, the confederation found within its ranks a number of leaders capable of taking the places of those who were imprisoned or became passive. Third in seniority, and the most widely known around the Luzon rice provinces, was Mateo del Castillo. Lanky, bespectacled and studious-looking, del Castillo had joined the peasant movement not through personal circumstance but by predilection. The son of a Spanish landowner, del Castillo had in his early adult life been a landlord himself in Batangas. Around 1926, however, when he was aged thirty, he sold his lands and moved to Manila to give his children a better schooling. There he opened a cafeteria in Tondo which became a popular meeting place for the leaders of the Lapiang Manggagawa. Drawn and then converted by his customers' arguments, he developed a particular interest
in the KPMP and by the early thirties had become its treasurer.\(\text{\(^{100}\)}\)
During his travels as a union organiser he like Feleo was arrested repeatedly, sometimes for sedition, sometimes for "vagrancy")(\(\text{\(^{101}\)}\)
He was apparently more fortunate than Feleo, though, in his verdicts and sentences, for he seems never to have been removed from circulation for more than a few months.

Other organisers concentrated on a single province or district. In Nueva Ecija the most active was Jose de Leon, who came from a middle-class landowning family in the town of Aliaga. "Even as a child and before I understood about class struggle", he wrote, "I was by nature radical in my thoughts and ready to defend the rights of the oppressed".\(\text{\(^{102}\)}\) Prior to joining the KPMP and PKP in his early twenties he had been a member of the Kapatirang Magbubukid and a supporter of the Democrata party.\(\text{\(^{103}\)}\) Another who had served his apprenticeship in the peasant movement with the Kapatiran was Sergio Cayanan, a river fisherman and agricultural labourer from San Luis, Pampanga.\(\text{\(^{104}\)}\) East of San Luis, in the Candaba Swamps area along the Pampanga-Bulacan border, there was Lope de la Rosa, a peasant cadre in his mid-forties who in 1932 became a fugitive to avoid arrest and with his sons formed a group that managed to evade capture by the Constabulary for nearly four years.\(\text{\(^{105}\)}\) In southern Bulacan there were Emilio and Federico Maclang, two brothers from a tenant farming family who had been tutored politically by their neighbour in the barrio of Pitpitan, Jacinto Manahan. Emilio, four years the elder, had been selected in 1929 to go to study in the Soviet Union, and had stayed there until October 1931.\(\text{\(^{106}\)}\) After arriving back in the Islands he became an organiser for the PKP and KPMP full time. So from 1932 onwards did Federico, although then aged only eighteen.\(\text{\(^{107}\)}\) Pascual Bambao, another Moscow pensionado, undertook assignments with the KPMP upon his return in Cavite, Nueva Ecija and his home province of Batangas.\(\text{\(^{108}\)}\) And in addition to the "professional" cadres, of course, there were scores of organisers who still had farms or regular jobs and hence confined their KPMP work to their own locality.

Given the paucity of KPMP literature it is impossible to verify whether the communists within the confederation significantly differed in their collective outlook from their comrades in the city. According to the 1950 Party history, a controversy arose between Manahan and Feleo on the one hand and Evangelista and Capadocia on the other concerning
proletarian leadership of the revolution. The two KPMP leaders reportedly argued that poor peasants should be considered part of the proletariat because they greatly outnumbered industrial workers and historically had a superior revolutionary tradition. Evangelista and Capadocia took the more orthodox view that the proletariat should be defined by its relationship to modes of production that were fully capitalist and by its consequently more advanced class consciousness. (109) What might well be a contemporary allusion to this controversy is found in the resolutions passed by the PKP First Congress in May 1931. Up to this point, it may be recalled, the KPMP had been affiliated to the KAP, just as prior to 1929 it had been affiliated with the Congreso Obrero. This organic link was unsatisfactory, the PKP felt, because it tended to "entangle" two complementary but essentially distinct forms of struggle, of proletarians against capitalists and of peasants against hacenderos, usurers and landgrabbers. (111) A decision to separate the two mass organisations had been taken at the Second KAP Congress in 1930, but had yet to be implemented. (112) This delay was not due to any intrinsic difficulties, the PKP Congress noted with regret, but to the fact that the reasons for separation were not well understood, "even by the leading comrades in the organisations involved". (113)

The upswing in KPMP activity that occurred in mid-1932 began and was most pronounced in former strongholds such as Candaba and Cabiao, but there were signs too that efforts were being made to expand to fresh terrain. Red flags flying in the mountains of eastern Pangasinan were attributed to the influence of communist agitators from Nueva Ecija, who spoke to rural folk about the abortive uprising in nearby Tayug and lauded its fallen and imprisoned leaders as "martyrs of the common cause". (114) Growing support for the KPMP in the Pampangan towns of Masantol and Arayat was ascribed to the work of the fugitive Bulakeño cadre Lope de la Rosa. (115) In San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, a concerned citizen noted that the "disorder" afflicting the municipality "began in Candaba", some twenty miles away. "The communist activity here", he wrote

"is the same as in Manila, with speeches on oppression and imperialism ... from last night the people in the fields were restless, dogs were barking because they saw people going here and there in the darkness .... the constables are roaming around looking for a high (KPMP) official and for red flags that have been flying in some of the barrios." (116)
The most successful KPMP-led action in mid-1932 was a strike that started in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, and quickly spread to haciendas in the neighbouring municipalities of Jaen, Santa Rosa and Guimba. Altogether more than 1,000 tenants took part, displaying what a CPUSA observer described approvingly as "tremendous fighting enthusiasm". In order to maximise its impact the stoppage had been called in the middle of the transplanting season, and after three weeks the landlords gave ground. Through the mediation of the provincial governor, representatives of the two sides signed a "covenant" which promised the strikers and other tenants in the affected municipalities significant improvements in their terms and conditions. Notably, the landlords agreed to contribute towards planting costs (hitherto solely the tenants' responsibility), to pay the expenses involved in transporting their own half share of the harvest to the rice mills in Cabanatuan (again previously borne by the tenants) and, perhaps the biggest concession, to set the interest rates on loans at not more than 14 per cent.

A similar strike took place in the Bulacan municipality of San Miguel, but ended in failure. Trying a different tactic, the KPMP then called for a mass demonstration in San Miguel poblacion to protest against landlord recalcitrance. This the municipal authorities would not tolerate, and KPMP requests for the necessary permit were flatly refused. After unsuccessfully appealing against this decision to the Bulacan governor, Juan Feleo announced that the demonstration would go ahead as planned, and the scene was set for a major confrontation. The provincial Constabulary commander ordered all the forces at his disposal to the town and deployed road blocks around the perimeter. To lend support to the local tenants, meanwhile, KPMP supporters converged on San Miguel not just from other parts of Bulacan but from Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, and even as far afield as Pangasinan. By the appointed hour a crowd some 10,000 strong had assembled near the main bridge leading into town across the San Miguel river. Standing on the bridge was a tightly packed cordon of bayoneted Constabularymen. Inside the poblacion there was an atmosphere of siege; most of the houses were barricaded or deserted. After spending the entire afternoon vainly trying to penetrate the Constabulary lines, the demonstrators resolved not to return to their homes but to camp overnight in the surrounding fields and then resume their efforts in the morning. On the second day, following further skirmishes around the bridge, the Constabulary took
the offensive, snatching the most belligerent protesters into custody and forcing the remainder to disperse at bayonet point.(119)

The Case of Jacinto Manahan

The scale of the upturn in KPMP activity denoted by actions such as the strike in Nueva Ecija and the demonstration in San Miguel was nevertheless far too modest to persuade the Comintern observer Carpio that there was any cause for satisfaction. Writing in late 1932, he lamented that the confederation "seems to be extremely inactive and out of touch with the peasant masses". Moreover there appeared, in his uncharitable view, to be "very little effort" to improve its "extremely bad condition". Carpio then added cryptically that in his opinion this parlous state of affairs was "not a matter that concerns any one single comrade alone".(120) The unstated reason for this remark, in all probability, was that certain PKP leaders had argued to the contrary. If this was the case, the subject of their aspersions was undoubtedly Jacinto Manahan.

The estrangement between Manahan and his Party colleagues did not surface publicly until March 1933, when the KPMP founder was ousted from the PKP Politburo and Central Committee for the crime of "opportunism". Given a chance to acknowledge his faults and reform, Manahan was defiantly unrepentant, issuing a succession of polemical attacks on his former comrades which resulted in April 1933 in his expulsion from the Party itself. His attacks were answered by the PKP leadership robustly and in kind. From the charges and counter-charges recited in this exchange it seems that the rift had already reached serious proportions several months previously, but the precise chronology of events is not clear. So wide-ranging were the accusations and grievances aired during the propaganda battle, moreover, that the substantive differences between the two sides are partially obscured beneath a welter of trivia and post-facto rationalisation. Even in its embellishments, though, the dispute offers an interesting insight into the personal and political tensions existing within the PKP during its early years.

With regard to the peasant movement, as Carpio had apparently divined, the Party did tend to cast Manahan as a convenient scapegoat for the failings and "organisational chaos" of the KPMP. Specifically,
it alleged that ever since the "white terror" had begun he had been "cold and evasive" whenever asked to carry out assignments which he considered might put him in danger. On several occasions he had refused requests to travel to strife-ridden haciendas, once giving only the lame excuse that he had to attend a fiesta instead. He had been unable to account for P 1,500 received in KPMP membership dues, and had been discovered soliciting funds for his private use. That the Kapatirang Magbubukid had fallen into the hands of "fascists" after the death of Vicente Almazar and had resolved to wage an anti-communist crusade was attributed by the PKP to Manahan's negligence in not forming an "oppositional fraction" within the KM which might have guided it in a less undesirable direction. He was to blame also for there being no formal PKP fraction within the KPMP, a step he had resisted, it was intimated, through fear that such a group would expose his own misconduct. As a result of his opportunist leadership, the PKP concluded, the KPMP had functioned not as a gateway between the Party and the peasant masses but as a barrier.(121)

The main thrust of Manahan's response was to shift the blame for his alleged deficiencies onto Evangelista and Juan Feleo, whom he dubbed as "Evangelista's manok" ("pet") inside the KPMP.(122) The "organisational chaos" within the confederation was not his fault but the fruit of their cliquish intrigues. Feleo had harboured a personal grudge against him, he claimed, ever since 1930. In answer to the charge that he had failed to visit particular agrarian troublespots, Manahan contended that in some instances he had been deliberately kept in the dark about Party Initiatives in the countryside and in other instances "Evangelista's people" had volunteered to make the journey from Manila in his stead. The anomaly concerning KPMP membership fees, he pointed out, had arisen after he had been elevated to the position of KPMP chairman and the day-to-day running of the confederation had been taken over by Feleo. It was true that he had solicited contributions from his supporters in Bulacan, but this was for bail money and legal expenses, and had been necessary because no money had been set aside for him from the PKP defence fund.(123) In their speeches, Manahan wrote bitterly, Evangelista's group professed that all men were equal. But they acted like autocratic caciques.

Amidst this mudslinging, the issue closest to the root of Manahan's separation from the PKP was his reaction to the "white terror".
Even after making allowance for the time he devoted to writing pamphlets, it does appear that the KPMP chairman maintained a surprisingly low profile during most of 1931 and 1932. We noted that Juan Feleo and Mateo del Castillo, his two most senior KPMP colleagues, were both prosecuted repeatedly during these years. By contrast it seems that after his initial arrest along with Evangelista and others in February 1931 Manahan kept his record completely clean. It is also striking that his breach with the Party closely followed the October 1932 decision of the Philippine Supreme Court upholding the convictions and sentences handed down in the "communist cases" by the Manila Court of First Instance. Barring the unlikely prospect of salvation from the United States Supreme Court, Manahan now faced the imminent ordeal of a one year stretch in Bilibid and eight further years in internal exile. A veteran Nacionalista politico from Nueva Ecija who had first known Manahan as a party helpmate in the early 1920s recalled how he had encountered the peasant leader in Manila soon after the Supreme Court verdict was known. Manahan, riding along in a Meralco streetcar, spotted his old friend on the sidewalk. Abruptly he jumped up, leapt off the tram and in a state of great agitation implored the politico to intercede on his behalf with Quezon. Shortly thereafter the two men went together to visit the Senate President at his office in the Intendencia building in Intramuros. Here the great man characteristically greeted Manahan with a torrent of profanities and then agreed to help in whatever way he could provided the miscreant showed willing to return to the political straight and narrow. The bargain was struck. (124)

In the ensuing months Manahan deviated from PKP policy in at least three important respects. First, he embroiled himself in the wrangle then dividing the Nacionalista party over the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, a measure passed by the US Congress which offered to grant formal independence to the Philippines after a ten year transition period. Those who favoured rejection of the terms offered, headed by Quezon, became known as the "Antis", whilst the supporters of Osmeña and Roxas (who led the mission to Washington credited with securing the measure) favoured acceptance and were hence known as the "Pros". Manahan lent his services enthusiastically to the "Anti" campaign. The PKP, on the other hand, although also vigorously opposed to the Act, was anxious to differentiate its stance from that of the Quezonistas.
and to maintain the attacks on the Nacionalista party as a whole that Manahan had now dropped. The Hare-Hawes-Cutting controversy, the Party argued, was in essence just a power struggle between competing factions of the ruling class. The "Antis" represented the large corporations and the elite of Luzon; the "Pros" the Visayan sugar planters.(125) True independence was favoured by neither faction. The Filipino masses, affirmed the PKP, could "hope for nothing in the split in the ... party of their exploiters".(126)

Manahan's second aberration was what the PKP termed "legalism", an undue concern for operating strictly within the bounds of the law. This issue was linked in a roundabout manner with the "Anti"-"Pro" battle. Taking advantage of the lengthy absence of Osmeña and Roxas in Washington, Quezon replaced a number of actual or potential opponents in the government with members of his own faction. One of those removed was Honorio Ventura, Secretary of the Interior since 1925 and the man whom many radicals held largely responsible for their persecution. His successor, Teofilo Sison, was generally believed to be less of a hardliner. Worried that reports to this effect had gone too far in creating the impression of a new liberal era, Secretary Sison stated firmly that meetings of communists and other subversive groups would still not be tolerated.(127) Manahan nevertheless felt that it would be worthwhile to seek further clarification, and after receiving a woolly assurance from Sison that "constitutional" freedoms would not be abridged he issued a leaflet hailing the supposed liberalisation as a great victory for the labour and peasant movements.(128) By early March 1933 he was so confident that his own public activities had official sanction that he filed a formal complaint against a "Pro" provincial governor for prohibiting an "Anti" rally he had organised.(129) The PKP, meanwhile, regarded this pre-occupation with what the government would or would not countenance as irrelevant and demeaning. Free speech and free assembly, it was affirmed, were "natural rights" which would be exercised with or without the say-so of Quezon, Manahan or anyone else.(130)

Thirdly, again in complete contrast to the PKP, Manahan began to co-operate with the government's various agrarian fact-finding exercises and to express at least qualified approval for proposed reforms, in particular for the bill which was to become the Rice Share Tenancy Law (Act No. 4054). Even before this bill was emasculated by the amendment which made its implementation dependent upon municipal council
resolutions, PKP supporters within the KPMP had dismissed it as a "bluff". How, they asked, could any hope or trust be placed in a legislature which was dominated by landlords and where the peasants had not a single representative? Dividing both the farming expenses and the harvest equally between landlord and tenant as the measure stipulated, they argued, in practice left the tenant with virtually nothing. By praising the bill, Manahan revealed still more plainly that he had now been "bought by Quezon and the landlords".(131)

For a brief period Manahan insisted that it was not he but the PKP that had departed from the "beautiful principles of communism".(132) He even expressed concern that the strife between himself and "Evangelista's people" was detracting from the fight against "our real enemies, the capitalists, imperialists and hacenderos".(133) Within seven weeks of his expulsion from the Party, however, he was already rehearsing the standard accusations of moderate and conservative labourites that the PKP denigrated patriotism and was "godless". In September 1933, following his expulsion from the KPMP, he launched a rival confederation purposely christened with a highly similar name - the Kalipunang Pangbansa ng mga Manggagawa at Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KPMMP) - which he later frankly described as an "anti-communist organisation".(134) Over the next few months, Manahan worked feverishly organising public meetings for the dual purpose of promoting the KPMMP and rallying opposition to the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. A grateful Quezon sent messages of salutation to the meetings, and in all probability helped cover the expenses.(135) When the KPMP had conclusively repudiated establishment politics in 1928, it was suggested earlier, the Nacionalista party had transferred its patronage to the Workers' and Peasants' Association, an organisation headed by a reliably moderate and loyal labourite named Felipe Jose. This organisation had failed to prosper, and from the Nacionalista viewpoint a more effective antidote to subversive influences in the countryside was sorely needed. KPMMP rallies were accordingly blessed not only with Quezon's greetings but with the presence on the platform of a veritable battery of Bureau of Labor officials and NP activists - among them, incidentally, Felipe Jose.(136) This return to the welcoming Nacionalista fold did not entirely save Manahan from his sedition sentence, but after serving just ten weeks in Bilibid - between January and April 1934 - he was granted
executive clemency and was able to resume his campaigning without further ado.(137)

Yet the question remains: why should Manahan have capitulated when the other top-ranking PKP leaders did not? To some degree, perhaps, his commitment to the Party had been weakened by his clashes with Evangelista and Feleo over the running of the KPMP. Given his enthusiasm for Philippine revolutionary history and his attachment to the Aglipayan Church, it is also likely that he had as he claimed always had misgivings about the Party's negative attitudes towards patriotism and religion. His ardent desire to save himself from official retribution, furthermore, was alloyed with genuine concern at the dangers a strategy of extreme militancy created for the rank and file. The upsurge in KPMP activity that occurred in mid-1932, in particular, resulted in a wave of arrests and Constabulary persecution that troubled him deeply.(138) Just as it was perverse to sow seed on parched earth, he wrote, so it was "suicidal" to seek constant confrontation with forces superior to your own. To recognise this fact was not "opportunism" but plain common sense. "Evangelista's people", he continued in agrarian metaphor, did not understand that each task had to be done at the right time and season; they were leading the peasantry towards disaster.(139)

In the final analysis, therefore, Manahan may be seen as a belated casualty of ultra-leftism and sectarianism, the last and most prominent in a succession of lost leaders dating back to the time of the Lapiang Manggagawa. Like the others before him, Manahan did not attempt to form a more moderate left-wing opposition grouping in competition with the PKP but returned instead to the Nacionalista ranks from whence he came. From its inception, indeed, his new peasant confederation served in large measure as a propaganda instrument of the government party. Whatever reservations or grievances rural militants may have entertained about the leadership of "Evangelista's people" within the KPMP, therefore, they were unlikely to regard the KPMMP as an appealing alternative. It seemed to cater for a different clientele. Such support as Manahan was able to carry over from the KPMP, it appears, came from areas where the original radicalisation of the organisation had been superficial and from individuals who had resisted that radicalisation from the outset. Like the Workers' and Peasants' Association before it, the KPMMP did not flourish.(140) By 1935 another ex-radical
who had made his peace with the administration was already writing about Manahan as a figure of the past. "During the popularity of Jacinto Manahan", former Tanggulan supremo Patricio Dionisio observed astutely, "most of the landowners (in the rice provinces) considered him a menace to public peace and order". A peasant leader who failed to win landlord opprobrium, Dionisio knew, had scant appeal.

From the KPMP viewpoint, the separation of Manahan thus represented no more than a temporary inconvenience. At this juncture, in fact, the confederation's claim to the allegiance of Luzon's peasant militants was virtually unrivalled: the insurrectionary kapisanan in Tayug and the Tanggulan had both disintegrated; the Kapatirang Magbubukid had turned respectable; the Sakdalista movement had yet to gather momentum. The extent to which the KPMP was able in mid-1933 to capitalise on the absence of major competitors was however seriously limited. Internally, as Carpio had commented, its condition was "extremely bad"; the PKP recognised it as being in a state of "organisational chaos". With Manahan's departure, indeed, it was decided to return to basics. A "KPMP Re-organisation Committee" was established to revitalise the political and social life of the branches and to promote closer contact and co-operation with non-members through the formation of "peasant action committees" open to all. But the vigour with which these initiatives could be pursued was circumscribed by the past and still continuing effects of government persecution. The confederation had in effect been rendered illegal and was now obliged for the most part to operate clandestinely. Under these conditions, the process of recovery, expansion and advance would inevitably be slow, and the ultimate goal of escalating and combining localised peasant struggles into a nationwide "revolution for rice, land and liberty" remained as far distant as ever.
Notes to Chapter Seven

(1) Tim Ryan "The Imperialist Offensive Against the Revolutionary Movement in the Philippines and the Tasks of the C.P.P.I. (iii)" International Press Correspondence vol.11 no.62 December 3, 1931 p.1124

(2) Communist Party of the Philippines "Platform" (1930) reproduced as "Appendix A" in Armed Forces of the Philippines Handbook on the Communist Party of the Philippines n.pub., Quezon City 1961 p.236

(3) Crisanto Evangelista "Ang Komunismo't Kapitalismo sa Harap ng Ktt. Hukuman sa Pilipinas" ("Communism and Capitalism Before the Philippine Supreme Court") Typescript pp.46-7 (Speech delivered before the Supreme Court on July 21, 1932)

(4) Bulletin of Philippine Statistics vol.VI nos. 1 and 2 First and Second Quarters 1939 p.14

(5) Philippine Statistical Review vol.I no.1 First Quarter 1934 p.25

(6) Message of Governor General Theodore Roosevelt to the Ninth Philippine Legislature (July 16, 1932) Bureau of Printing, Manila 1932 pp.7-8

(7) Kalipunang Pangbubansang mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas Memorandum to the House Committee on Labor and Immigration, October 14, 1932 p.3 (in Tagalog)


(9) Ibid. p.11

(10) Governor General of the Philippine Islands (Dwight F. Davis) to the Secretary of War (Patrick J. Hurley), January 20, 1931 (DIA 4865-177); Philippines Herald January 19, 1931


(12) Second Message of Governor General Theodore Roosevelt to the Ninth Philippine Legislature (October 18, 1932) Bureau of Printing, Manila 1932 p.33

(13) Philippines Free Press May 28, 1932

(14) Kerkvliet (1977) op.cit. p.11

(16) Rafael R. Alunan "Report of the Anti-Usury Committee" (October 13, 1932) reproduced as an appendix to Second Message of Governor General Theodore Roosevelt, as cited p.39


(19) Philippines Herald October 1, 1932

(20) Annual Report (1931) as cited, pp.2-3

(21) Message of Governor General Theodore Roosevelt, as cited pp.13-4

(22) Annual Report (1931) as cited, p.12

(23) Annual Report (1932) as cited, p.7

(24) Philippines Free Press January 7, 1933

(25) Alunan op.cit. p.40

(26) Annual Report (1932) as cited, p.9

(27) Wurfel op.cit. pp.145-9

(28) Annual Report (1932) as cited, p.11


(31) Philippines Herald October 1, 1932


(33) Philippines Free Press January 17, 1931
"Tayug P.C. Soldiers Face Court Martial" in *The Independent* vol. XVII no. 14 January 31, 1931 p. 20

*The Tribune* January 17, 1931

"Tayug P.C. Soldiers Face Court Martial", as cited.

Ibid.

Urgena *op.cit.* p. 18

S. Carpio "First Congress of the Communist Party of the Philippines" *International Press Correspondence* vol. 11 no. 32 June 25, 1931 p. 603

Ibid.

Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas, Lupong Tagapatnugot (PKP Central Committee) *Ang Tahasang Pagbaka sa Opurtunismo - Ang Tumpak na Organisasyon* (The Resolute Struggle Against Opportunism - Correct Organisation) Resolutions of the Second Plenum, March 11-12, 1933 Second Part n.pub., Manila 1933 pp. 8-9


The only works which deal with the Tanggulan at any length, neither of them wholly reliable, are Stubbs *op.cit.* pp. 94-125 and Sturtevant *op.cit.* pp. 205-214


Dionisio left the Legionarios del Trabajo in 1927 after being defeated in the annual elections to the "Supreme Fraternal Chamber". *Legionarios del Trabajo Blue Book* Los Filipinos, Manila 1941 p. 43

Sturtevant *op.cit.* p. 207f.

"Natatatag na ang Balangay sa Pilipinas ng Liga Anti-Imperialista" ("Philippine Section of Anti-Imperialist League Founded") *Tinig-Manggagawa* Yr. I no. 6 April 1929 p. 1
"Hinati ng mga Kapitalista-Pulitiko ang COF" ("The COF is Split by the Capitalist-Politicos") Tinig-Manggagawa
Yr.I no.7 May 1929 pp.1-2

Gregorio Santayana "Milestones in the History of the Communist Party of the Philippines" Typescript 1950 pp.9-11 (Ateneo de Manila) According to this source, Dionisio left the PKP soon after its formation as a result of the initial wave of government persecution.

Gerardo Ocampo (Acting Chief, Bureau of Labor Inspection Section) to the Director of Labor, December 28, 1932 (regarding a Kapalirang Magbubukid congress held at the brotherhood's headquarters in Baliaug on December 26, 1932) (Quezon Papers Box 143); Patricio Dionisio "Kapatirang Magbubukid" in "Fact-Finding Survey", as cited p.90


This was the diagnosis of Emiliano Tria Tirona, a one time Democrat senator.
Renato Constantino The Making of a Filipino Malaya Books, Quezon City 1969 p.52

Ocampo op.cit. p.2; Isang Kapatid (A Brother) "Nasaan ang Salapi ng Kapatirang Magbubukid?" ("Where is the Money of the Kapatirang Magbubukid") Sakdal August 1, 1931

Manila Times June 28, 1929


Dionisio "The Tanggulan", as cited p.95


Philippines Herald December 7, 1931

Sakdal March 28, 1931

Fegan loc.cit.

Tribune June 5, 1931

Philippines Herald December 10, 1931

Dionisio"Walang Kinalaman ...", as cited

Philippines Herald December 7, 1931
The following day it was reported that this plan had been abandoned, and that the uprising was now to be heralded by the less ambitious burning of an unoccupied nipa shack in Tondo.

Dionisio "The Tanggulan", as cited p.95; Sturtevant op.cit. p.210 (Sturtevant's account is based partly on conversations held with Dionisio in 1966.)

Dionisio "Walang Kinalaman ...", as cited

One of Dionisio's first assignments with the Department of Labor was to write brief reports on the country's peasant organisations for the 1936 "Fact Finding Survey", including the report on his own society cited above.

Among those who delivered eulogies at Almazar's graveside were ex-Bulacan governor Jose Padilla, who had prohibited Tanggulan meetings in support of Almazar during the 1931 election campaign; Jose de Leon, his Nacionalista opponent in that bitter campaign; the conservative Democrata labourite Joaquin Balmori; and the ubiquitous Francisco Varona. Five months earlier, de Leon had sponsored a mass picnic in Baguio to counteract Tanggulan influence. Characteristically, Varona had also been a key speaker on that occasion.

The Tanggulan leader in question was Patricio del Rosario, born in San Miguel, Bulacan in 1881 and subsequently a tenant of many different landlords in the Talavera area. Later in the 1930s he joined the KPMP.
(81) Crisanto Evangelista to Manuel L. Quezon, December 14, 1931, quoted in Guerrero op. cit. p.77

(82) Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas, Lupong Tagapatnugot (PKP Central Committee) Ang Kasalukuyang Kalagayan at ang Tungkulin Dapat Gampanan ng PKP (The Current Situation and the Tasks the PKP Must Fulfill) Resolutions of the Second Plenum, March 11-12, 1933 First Part n.pub., Manila 1933 p.35; Crisanto Evangelista "Ang Dalawang Daigdig: Daigdig ng Kapitalismo at Daigdig ng Sosyalismo" ("The Two Worlds: World of Capitalism and World of Socialism") Pagkakaisa May 1, 1932; Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas "Kapasyahang Ukol sa Pagpapakilos at Pagpapalaganap" ("Resolution on Agitation and Expansion") Approved by the Fourth KAP Congress, June 28, 1932 Typescript p.3

(83) Crisanto Evangelista "An Open Letter to the Capitalist Press" Sakdal December 26, 1931

(84) PKP, Lupong Tagapatnugot Ang Tahasang Pagbaka sa Opurtunismo ... as cited p.10
The Central Committee made this observation at its First Plenum in January 1932, just six weeks after the Tanggulan leadership had been arrested. At its Second Plenum in March 1933 the Central Committee lamented that the statement had been "mere complaining".

(85) Santayana op. cit. p.11

(86) PKP, Lupong Tagapatnugot Ang Tahasang Pagbaka sa Opurtunismo... as cited p.4


(88) S. Carpio "The Situation in the Philippines and the Tasks of the C.P.P.I. (ii)" International Press Correspondence vol.12 no.52 November 24, 1932 p.1126

(89) Jacinto G. Manahan "Ipabibilanggo at Ipabibitay nina Crisanto Evangelista Kahit Walang Kasalan at Walang Paglilititis ang sino mang sa kanila'y Tumutol at Sumuway, kung sila'y Magtagumpay" ("If Crisanto Evangelista's People Take Power They Will Imprison and Hang Whoever Opposes Them, Whether They are Guilty or not, and without any Trial") Handbill c. April 1933
The KPMP symbol was the humped line of a carabao yoke; the Kapatiran symbol a triangle representing the draw-bar of a plough.

Manila Times January 20, 1925; Kerkvliet (1977) op.cit. p.32; Fegan op.cit. p.52

Luis Taruc, a distant relative, recounts that Lope de la Rosa and his small band were "mostly semi-literate men who could hardly read. They had one copy of Marx's Capital but none of them could read it, so they had buried it." A keen PKP as well as KPMP proselytiser, de la Rosa named one of his younger sons
Like Manahan and indeed like almost all the inhabitants of Pitpitan, the Maclang brothers were members of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente. Another PKP cadre active with the KPMP in Bulacan, Rufino Robles, was a Methodist lay preacher and distributor of religious pamphlets.

Conversation with Federico Maclang, Pitpitan, Bulacan October 20, 1971

In pre-Party days, it might be noted, Manahan had habitually inverted the phrase "workers and peasants" into the less customary "peasants and workers".

See, for example, Jacinto G. Manahan "Peasant Movement in the Philippines" Far Eastern Monthly no. 21 December 1928 pp.35-40; and "Speech of Jacinto G. Manahan" Pan-Pacific Monthly no.29 July 1929 p.25

Manahan to the Insular Treasurer, as cited p.79

"Ang Suliranin...", as cited

Philippines Herald September 1, 1932

Philippines Herald June 8, 1932


Paul Levin "The Anti-Imperialist Struggle of the Filipino Peasants" International Press Correspondence vol.12 no.45 October 13, 1932 p.963

Philippines Herald July 22, 1932
(119) Paul Levin "Anti-Imperialist Demonstrations in the Philippine Islands" International Press Correspondence vol.12 no.58 December 29, 1932 p.1254; Philippines Herald September 5 and 6, 1932

(120) Carpio (November 24, 1932) loc.cit.

(121) PKP, Lupong Tagapatnugot Ang Tahasang Pagbaka sa Opurtunismo... as cited pp.4-5 and Ang Kasalukuyang Kalagayan..., as cited pp.35-7; Kalipunan n mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas, Lupong Tagapagbagong-tatag (KPMP Re-organisation Committee) "Sa Bayang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas" ("To the Peasants of the Philippines") Handbill dated April 7, 1933

(122) Manahan's side of the case is extracted here from three of his salvoes: "Ipabilanggo at Ipabibitay....", as cited; "Ang Pangkat nina Crisanto Evangelista ay Lubhang Mapanganib na Dapat Pakalayuan ng mga Manggagawa at Magbubukid" ("The Crisanto Evangelista Faction is a Serious Danger which the Workers and Peasants Must Avoid") Handbill dated April 15, 1933; and "Ang mga Kataksilan nina Crisanto Evangelista sa Bayan at sa Anak Pawis" ("The Treacheries of Crisanto Evangelista's People to the Country and the Working Class") Handbill dated June 4, 1933

(123) A further charge of financial impropriety levelled against Manahan was that he had kept for his own use P 1,200 entrusted to him for sending Patry cadres to the Soviet Union. In 1933 Manahan left this allegation unanswered, but eight years later admitted that he had retained part of this money until it was spent printing the leaflets in which he refuted the "false accusations" against him. Jacinto G. Manahan Tumatanggap ng Salapi sa Rusia (Receiving Money from Russia) n.pub., Manila 1941 p.5

(124) Conversation with Joaquin Valmonte, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, February 17, 1972

(125) This analysis was mistaken. With some reason, the sugar interests looked upon the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act as a measure primarily designed to curb their exports to the US market. Most planters and millers consequently backed the "Anti" campaign. PKP, Lupong Tagapatnugot Ang Kasalukuyang Kalagayan..., as cited pp.10-13; KPMP, Lupong Tagapagbagong-tatag loc. cit.; Theodore Friend "The Philippine Sugar Industry and the Politics of Independence 1929-1935" Journal of Asian Studies vol.22 no.2 February 1963 pp.179-92

(126) Communist Party of the Philippines "Workers of the World Unite! Fight for Unconditional Independence! Against the Hawes-Cutting Bill!" Handbill dated January 13, 1933

(127) Philippines Herald February 4, 1933
(128) Jacinto G. Manahan "Kung Paano Natin Natamo ang mga Kalayaan sa Pagpupulong, Pamamahayag at Pagpasapisapi" ("How we won the Freedoms of Assembly, Publication and Association") Handbill dated March 21, 1933

(129) Philippines Herald March 15, 1933

(130) KPMP, Lupong Tagapagbagong-tatag loc. cit.

(131) Ibid.

(132) Manahan "Ipabibilanggo at Ipabibitay....", as cited

(133) Manahan "Ang mga Kataksilan....", as cited


(135) Guillermo Capadocia later claimed that the PKP discovered Manahan was receiving P 300 per month to act as a "confidential agent" and P 200 per month to publish the KPMPM organ Liwanag (Light). This cannot be verified, but circumstantial evidence of financial support may be found in the Quezon Papers, where there is a sizeable folio of correspondence and publicity material relating to Manahan's meetings.(Box143) Guillermo Capadocia "Philippine Labor Movement" Typescript c.1948 p.48 (Manila Court of First Instance)

(136) Philippines Herald October 12, 1933

(137) The terms of Manahan's release remain unclear. At least two of his imprisoned former PKP colleagues were also offered parole, but they declined on the grounds that the conditions - involving severe restrictions on personal and political freedom - were too onerous. It is possible that all the PKP leaders were made a similar offer at this time (they certainly were later) but collectively decided that acceptance would amount to an act of surrender.

Philippines Herald April 11, 12 and 13, 1934

(138) "Ang 'Pananakot-Puti' sa Magbubukid" ("The 'White Terror' Against the Peasants") (Delegates elected by Peasants' Clubs to the Governor General, June 25, 1932), reproduced as "Appendix B" to Evangelista "Ang Komunismo't Kapitalismo....", as cited pp.82-88

(139) Manahan "Ipabibilanggo at Ipabibitay....", as cited

(140) Kerkvliet (1977) op.cit. p.47f.

(141) Patricio Dionisio "Katipunan ng mga Manggagawa at Magsasaka sa Pilipinas" (sic) in "Fact Finding Survey", as cited p.87
(142) KPMP, Lupong Tagapagbagong-tatag loc. cit.: Santos to the Nueva Ecija Provincial Committee of the KPMP, May 31, 1933 (Spanish translation from an original in Tagalog) (Quezon Papers Box 140) ("Santos" was reportedly the Party name then being used by Emilio Maclang.)

(143) American Bureau, Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat "To the Toiling Masses of the Philippine Islands" International Press Correspondence vol.14 no.11 February 23, 1934 p.292; Pedro C. "Progress in the Philippines" International Press Correspondence vol.14 no.33 June 8, 1934 p.892
At its Second Plenum in March 1933 the PKP Central Committee directed Party members to rid themselves of "pessimism". The Twelfth Plenum of the ECCI, the Central Committee noted, had only just recently re-affirmed that the conditions for communist advance were objectively favourable throughout the world. The still-deepening economic depression and the consequent sharpening of antagonisms between classes and nations offered testimony daily that the temporary post-war stabilisation of capitalism had come to an end. In the Philippines as elsewhere the final collapse of the capitalist system had already begun. Overseas trade, the lynchpin of the insular economy, had slumped disastrously. In industry the wage cuts occasioned by the recession had provoked a "rising tide" of strikes and worker militancy. And in the countryside the mounting discontent of the peasantry had been dramatically signalled by the Tayug and Tanggulan episodes. It was therefore entirely misguided, the Central Committee, submitted, for comrades to conclude dejectedly that the Filipino masses were somehow deficient in fighting spirit as a result of their "colonial enslavement" or "Asiatic timidity", or to imagine that the Philippines was somehow exceptional or exempt from the revolutionary upsurge sweeping the rest of the globe.

The grounds for the pessimism that had descended on certain comrades were nevertheless plain enough. Far from advancing from strength to strength as "objective conditions" supposedly warranted, the communist cause had suffered serious reverses in every sphere. The "red" trade union centre, the Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas, had only about half as many members in its affiliates as it had counted three years earlier. Membership in its peasant counterpart, the Kalipunan Pangbansa ng mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas, was estimated to have fallen by an even more disastrous 85 per cent. The Young Communist League and the organisation for the unemployed both remained rudimentary. The defence association had collapsed after being declared illegal. The Anti-Imperialist League was either dying or already dead.
The debilitated condition of the Party itself was chronicled in the March 1933 Plenum's own resolutions. PKP membership, which in 1931 had ranged between 1,500 and 2,000, was now tallied at just 845. But the true number was acknowledged to have fallen even lower, for some of those on the roster were known to be no longer active. When re-registering the listed members, the Central Committee suggested, the aim should be to retain at least 760. Similarly, the number of workplace and neighbourhood nuclei (buklod) was nominally placed at 136, but these too required "re-registration and re-establishment". Between the buklod and the Party centre there were no municipal groups, provincial assemblies or other intermediate bodies functioning at all. "Nothing is moving", the Second Plenum's resolution on organisation lamented, "except the Central Committee, or to be more precise the Politburo". The Central Committee had not functioned satisfactorily, it was suggested, because several of its original members had proven to be sadly unworthy of their high position. After the May 1931 First Congress and the January 1932 First Plenum they had returned to their homes and fallen "soundly asleep". They lacked enthusiasm for their various assignments, and were too prone to mutter the well-worn excuses for inaction "bahala na" and "bukas na". Henceforth, it was resolved, the honour of selection to the Central Committee would be accorded only to cadres who had been fully tried and tested.

The gravity of the leadership problem facing the Party may be illustrated by reference to the original Central Committee roster printed in the history written by Jose Lava in 1950. This contains the names of 35 individuals, but at least three are believed to have been included in error. By mid-1933 fourteen of the remaining 32 cadres were awaiting committal to prison or internal exile, Jacinto Manahan and one other had become outright renegades, and two had died. Of the fourteen thus left, only three are definitely known to have remained active after the 1931 campaign of suppression: Felix Caguin, Norberto Nabong and Andres Fabian. Nabong, moreover, was a maverick, having departed from Party policy by joining Vicente Sotto's Union Civica, an organisation officially anathematised as "Gandhiist" and "social fascist". Caguin was in poor health and had marital problems. The Central Committee that was to take the helm whilst the principal Party leaders were in prison or exile had perforce to be constituted virtually from scratch. Symptomatic of the dearth of seasoned cadres available to move
into the front rank was the unanimous election as general secretary of Emilio Maclang, then aged just twenty-three. Between 1929 and 1931, it may be remembered, Maclang had been away in Moscow studying at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, and it was presumably the theoretical training gained there rather than practical experience at home that determined his selection. (9)

In seeking to identify the causes of the Party's plight, the Second Plenum would have considered it improper to attribute any blame to external factors. Economically and politically, as we have just noted, the "objective conditions" for revolutionary activity were deemed to be extremely favourable. Nor was the "white terror" to be admitted as a valid reason for weakness. Previous remarks about the demoralising effects of persecution had provoked the Comintern observer S. Carpio to respond haughtily that "difficulties of this nature are there precisely for us to overcome them". The attention of the Philippine comrades, he further remarked, had been drawn to the probable wave of persecution before it struck. Appropriate "organisational measures and methods of work" to cope with the situation should consequently have been adopted in advance. (10)

Explanations for the predicament of the Party had therefore to be found by looking inwardly for failings of theory and practice. This introspection did not result in any doubts being expressed publicly as to the correctness of the overall political line that the PKP had derived from the Comintern, and there is no evidence to suggest that such doubts were voiced by Party leaders even in private. The Second Plenum took its keynotes, in fact, directly from the pronouncements of the most recent Plenum of the Comintern Executive. Responsibility for the disappointments and setbacks of the past two years was thus perceived as resting squarely with the Party itself. Criticism had to be directed not at the "third period" line as such, but at deficiencies in its application, arising in turn from inadequate theoretical understanding and faulty organisation.

In the manner then encouraged in Comintern circles, the members of the PKP Central Committee accordingly reproached themselves and their fellow-comrades for having fallen prey to a host of damaging deviations. The impending detention of men like Evangelista, Balgos and Capadocia, it was implicitly acknowledged, threatened to have unduly severe consequences because of the persistent "personalism" within Party ranks
and the failure to evolve a properly collective form of leadership. Many members and sympathisers, in other words, still tended to follow leading Party personalities rather than the Party as a corporate entity. Comrades too often accepted instructions only from leaders they knew, and greater importance was attached to who had taken a given decision than to the substance and Leninist rectitude of that decision. (11) Besides "personalism", there was a plethora of other "-isms" to be recognised and overcome. There was "formalism", a tendency to approve grandiose plans and resolutions without specifying how they should be put into practical effect. There was "legalism", an excessive regard for capitalist laws. "Centralism" existed without the vital concomitant of internal democracy. Elements of "provincialism" or Tagalog regionalism were evident. There remained within Party ranks strong traces of "reformism" and of personal and political "opportunism". "Rightism" had been manifest in a neglect of the revolutionary movement in the countryside and in failing to support adequately the "national rights" of the Moros. (12)

Much more pertinently, the Central Committee recognised that the Party had also been guilty in some respects of "leftism" and "sectarianism". But as in similar warnings then emanating from the Comintern Executive, these two tendencies were depicted merely as errors of political conduct and tactics, not as basic distortions of political analysis and strategy. As illustrations of leftism, just two specific examples were cited: the call made by the First Plenum for the "immediate formation" of soviets; and the argument that the Tayug rebels were unworthy of comradely assistance because they were "religious fanatics". (13) Sectarianism was specifically pinpointed as a serious fault in the realm of defence work; the defence association, it was said, had over-concentrated its attention on the major "communist cases" and had neglected to support the countless persecuted workers, peasants and "national revolutionary Moros" who were outside the Party. (14)

In a wider context, sectarian attitudes and approaches were seen to have severely limited the Party's popular appeal. Although the PKP was "completely proletarian" in origin, outlook and leadership, the Central Committee acknowledged, it had failed to win mass support even amongst the proletariat. It had demanded a higher level of revolutionary commitment than the masses were yet prepared to give. It had deluged the masses with words, neglecting to root its propaganda in the
immediate injustices of their daily lives. Then it had compounded these errors by actually berating the masses for their lack of response. (15) Overtures to workers who followed "social fascist" or "national reformist" leaders had tended to be arrogant, abrasive and consequently counter-productive, inhibiting the formation of the "united front from below". (16)

Sectarian tendencies were further seen by the Second Plenum to have led the PKP to address its appeals too exclusively to the workers and peasants and to ignore potential allies amongst other sectors of the population. Tentative steps towards correcting this fault had in fact already been taken in the months before the Plenum met. In a manifesto issued in January 1933, for example, the Party asserted that in the struggle for independence the "alliance of workers and peasants" should be "aided by the intellectuals and others such as the small traders and artisans who suffer under imperialist rule". Alongside customary industrial and agrarian demands were calls for rent and tax reductions for city traders and artisans, and for education and science to be freed from "bureaucratic control". (17) Re-iterating these points, the Second Plenum attributed the previous disregard of "poor intellectuals and students" to an inadequate theoretical grasp of "proletarian leadership during the phase of bourgeois democratic revolution". (18) In some of its formulations the Party also seemed to be qualifying the blanket, undifferentiated hostility which had marked past assessments of the bourgeoisie itself. The economic recession, it discerned, was creating new tensions between the national bourgeoisie and their American masters, and could thereby hasten the development of an anti-imperialist united front. (19) Philippine communists, it was affirmed, recognised the need for a "wide independence movement" embracing all those ready to struggle for national liberation "regardless of what economic class they belong to or their present political or religious affiliation". (20)

These modifications to the Party line were not however projected with much force or consistency. More commonly, the native "bourgeois-landlord class" was still condemned in its entirety for its continued subservience to American imperialism. As they witnessed the "rising revolutionary tide" of mass discontent, the PKP observed, the exploiting classes became more acutely conscious than ever that their wealth and power rested upon the protection of American guns and bayonets. For
their part, the imperialists relied on some "native traitors" to act as open accomplices in their robbery of the Filipino people and on others to obstruct the emergence of a genuine independence struggle by acting as bogus foes. (21) Despite detecting a heightened friction between the imperialists and the national bourgeoisie, in other words, the Party maintained that the discord was heavily outbalanced by the centripetal forces that bound the two partners in crime together.

Evidence of greater moderation and pragmatism was no less slender on other fronts. Despite calling for a "wide" independence movement, the Party still specified that this should be under communist leadership and should lead to a Workers' and Peasants' Government organised on the basis of soviets. The "only way" that independence could be gained, it was affirmed, was "by armed uprising of the toiling masses in revolutionary war against foreign oppressors and native traitors". (22) The main slogan put forward by the Second Plenum for the peasant movement was "Death to the Caciques!". (23) Notwithstanding the occasional references to the "phase of bourgeois democratic revolution", the very notion of democracy was dismissed as "a dream". (24) Notwithstanding occasional nods in the direction of intellectuals and students, a warning was sounded against the "dirty and confused" ideas endemic amongst such individuals being allowed to contaminate the Party line. (25) In every sphere, the "united front from below" was as before projected as schematically opposed to the tactic of unity from above.

The true tap-root of the Party's predicament was therefore left virtually undetected and untouched; the essence of the "third period" line was kept intact. Few in number and weak in influence, Philippine communists continued to talk as if the revolution they aspired to lead was nearly at hand, and to denounce those who begged to differ as enemies of the masses. In later years it was to be widely acknowledged within the international communist movement that the guidelines set by the Comintern between 1928 and 1935 had in many respects been fundamentally ill-conceived; that the chronic over-optimism, extreme belligerency and narrow sectarianism promoted by the International had retarded rather than assisted the work of its member sections. Injudicious under any circumstances, the theory and practice of "third period" communism was for a section as tiny, inexperienced and unprepared for illegal work as the PKP nothing less than a disaster.
In the first place there can be little doubt that the vituperative, sometimes almost apocalyptic rhetoric employed by early PKP orators sharpened the severity of the "white terror". Before the Party was formed, the gamut of official responses to the radical left had with few exceptions merely ranged from dismissive scorn to bureaucratic harassment. And in the latter part of the 1930s, when the Party moderated its stance in accordance with the guidelines of the popular front era, it was permitted to operate virtually without restraint. Even at its height, moreover, the repression was by international standards relatively merciful. Filipino communists did not yet have to live with the fear of murder or execution, only with the grim and unhealthy prospect of jail. Had their speeches been less inflammatory, even this fate might well have been avoided. In the event, the sedition charges, court hearings and pronouncements of illegality that formed the backdrop to the Party's first three years created an atmosphere which persuaded many cadres to become irrevocably passive, and which made it difficult to recruit and train fresh cadres to take their place.

The second direct consequence of ultra-leftism was the alienation of erstwhile and potential supporters within the primary constituencies of the left; the labour, peasant and nationalist movements. This estrangement had begun, we noted, back in the days of the PKP's immediate forebear, the Lapiang Manggagawa. Between 1925 and 1928 the LM had succeeded in attracting broad support for its programmes and initiatives from influential labourites and kapisanistas outside its own ranks, and had hence been able to exert an influence well beyond its own size. As the party's stance had increasingly reflected the perspectives of the "third period", however, much of this broad support had been lost. The denigration of "patriotism", derogatory remarks about religion, and progressively more strident and personal attacks on labour "reformists" helped to convert hitherto sympathetic outsiders into determined opponents. Some party cadres seem to have become similarly disaffected. After the PKP was formed the condemnations of "patriotism" and religion became more muted and sporadic, and by 1933 had practically ceased altogether. Whilst this may have been a gesture towards the sensibilities of the Filipino masses, however, it was certainly not an attempt to effect a reconciliation with their non-communist leaders. Attacks on prominent labourites and nationalists outside the Party orbit had on the contrary become more virulent as
time went by, those once excoriated simply as "reformists" being transmogrified by 1932 into "social fascists". This not only provoked bitter verbal retaliation but also manifestly failed to achieve the desired purpose of driving a wedge between the reviled leaders and their rank and file. The strength and durability of the "reformist" and "social fascist" organisations, the March 1933 Plenum warned, had been seriously underestimated; the widespread tendency to dismiss them as "existing only on paper" or as being "already dead" was a dangerous self-delusion. (26) Far from isolating its declared enemies, the Central Committee came close to admitting, the Party had in reality isolated itself.

Ultra-leftism, in sum, provoked persecution; sectarianism brought about isolation. Persecution and isolation together left the PKP as an enfeebled force on the political margin. Carpio, writing in late 1932, went so far as to admonish the Party for having gone "so deeply underground" after the initial wave of arrests and prosecutions "that it could not be said to have functioned as a C.P. at all". (27) This judgment was both insensitive and unduly harsh. In its anxiety to combat feelings of pessimism and defeatism in the ranks, the PKP Central Committee's own assessment was by contrast too congratulatory. Despite its manifold theoretical and organisational deficiencies, the Second Plenum proudly affirmed, the Party had already established itself as "the foremost leader of the toiling masses". (28) In a position of strength somewhere between these two extremes, the Party was assured of more than mere survival when its senior cadres began their terms of imprisonment and exile, but had little immediate prospect of significant growth.

Whilst it might be convenient to argue in conclusion that the PKP had between 1930 and 1933 laid the foundations for its future advances, such an argument would thus be difficult to sustain. A more accurate judgment would be that the Party had as yet failed to build upon foundations which were already in place. For the major innovatory achievements of the left during the period we have reviewed were attained during the 1920s under the auspices of the Laplang Manggagawa. As the pioneer party of the working class in the Islands, it was the LM that first sought to explain the irresolution and incompleteness of the elite-led nationalist movement in class terms, thereby staking the left's claim to be the authentic standard-bearer of the independence struggle. By aligning its policies increasingly with those of the Comintern, the
Party gave a definite Marxist-Leninist and internationalist orientation to currents of obrerista radicalism that had hitherto been insular, amorphous and dilute. Through a small but extremely well-placed, well-respected and energetic corps of cadres, it took direction of a key peasant organisation and looked poised to win control of the country's principal labour federation. And by promoting political co-operation between urban and rural unionists it cemented the basis of an enduring worker-peasant alliance.

Although the distortions of "third period" theory and practice were plainly the immediate cause of the failure to expand on these beginnings, the longer-term, more intractable constraints on expansion were external, stemming from the wider environment. In the late 1930s, when the communists in the Philippines as elsewhere tempered their revolutionary rhetoric to emphasise the need for "democratic national unity" against the dangers of fascism and war, there were indeed significant advances in every sphere. Restored to a partial legality, the PKP and its principal mass organisations all attained roughly double the membership they had registered prior to their persecution: by 1940 there were 3,000 dues-payers in the PKP; a reported 80,000 members in KAP affiliates; and 60,000 in the KPMP. A further 50,000 workers and peasants belonged to a separate union under Party leadership centered on the province of Pampanga. Attracted by its broader appeals, a number of journalists, educators and other city-based professionals entered the Party and a few assumed positions of leadership; many more joined newly-formed progressive and anti-fascist organisations. But aside from the gains made in Pampanga and amongst sections of Manila's middle class, the advances of the popular front era took place within social and geographical bounds that had been set in the decades before.

To begin with, the Party remained rooted first and foremost in the working class movement from which it had directly and exclusively emerged. Although this mode of origin accorded with the Comintern's "third period" advocacy of proletarian leadership, we have seen that it sprang much more fundamentally from the fact that socialist and communist ideas had been virtually confined to labour circles from the outset. The Filipino elite, and by extension the mainstream nationalist movement, stood singularly untouched by Marxism in any shape or form.
The reasons why the Philippines differed in this respect from other South East Asian countries seem to lie mainly in the nature of the colonial experience, and above all in the unique substitution of colonial regimes at the turn of the twentieth century. The most severe cultural trauma resulting from the European impact had been suffered during the initial Spanish conquest, which unlike any other in the region occasioned the conversion of the majority of the population to the faith of the metropolitan power. Again in sharp contrast to neighbouring colonies, the prime beneficiaries of the nineteenth century expansion in cash crop agriculture and trade were not Europeans but Asians: Chinese, indigenized mestizos and Filipinos. Consequently the propaganda campaign waged by spokesmen for the mestizo and Filipino sections of this rising elite in the 1880s and 1890s was relatively unmarked by the bitter religious and economic antagonisms that permeated emergent nationalisms elsewhere. Whilst lauding the richness and sophistication of the societies the Spanish conquest had destroyed, the propagandists drew their primary inspiration not from the native past but from the ideals of the European enlightenment. Coming themselves from the most highly Hispanicised social strata, their central grievance was not the strength of Spain but her weakness. They resented not so much the fact of Spanish rule as its peculiar immobility: the archaic and close-minded clericalism, commercial languor, and repression of native talent.

When Spain was supplanted by the United States in 1898, a substantial section of the elite opted unhesitatingly for collaboration rather than resistance. Many went so far as to espouse the annexation of the Islands as a state of the Union. Even amongst those loyal to the doomed republic, the bloodshed and misery of the Philippine-American War left remarkably little perduring rancour. The new imperialists, from the elite's perspective, carried with them the invigorating breeze of modernity, the promise that the backwardness and insularity that had cocooned the colony under Spain would be blown away. Their policies and programmes seemed set to meet a number of the key objectives of the revolution they had defeated: secularisation, liberalisation, economic development, and national integration. American cultural influences, seen in this light, were generally not assailed as a threat to Filipino customs and virtues, but were selectively and sometimes eagerly embraced. An influx of schoolteachers from the States,
no less ardent an independista than Isabelo de los Reyes was prepared to enthuse in 1901, would benefit the Islands "by giving to the Filipinos those qualities peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon race ... which have lifted them into the vanguard of civilisation." (30)

The domestic economy of the United States was seen as offering a far larger and more lucrative market for Philippine products than Spain's ever had, and yet at the same time the landholding, mining and franchise restrictions incorporated by the US Congress in the Organic Act foretokened that the fruits of the anticipated prosperity would be reaped mainly by Filipinos. The Americans, thankfully, seemed no more predisposed to ensconce themselves as a colonial super-caste than their Iberian predecessors. Aside from enhanced commercial prospects, the well-situated heirs of the propagandist legacy were given unprecedented opportunities for educational and professional advancement. More importantly still, they were given a rapidly expanding share of political power. The first municipal governments were established as early as 1899; provincial governments from 1902 onwards; a national legislative assembly in 1907; an elective upper house in 1916. By the latter date, long before any other Asian colony, a formal pledge had been received that independence itself would sooner or later be granted.

As the Lapiang Manggagawa and PKP well-recognised, the relationship between colonisers and colonial elite was therefore uncommonly harmonious. Their social and economic primacy already established under Spain, the elite found the United States willing to consolidate and ultimately to complete their hegemony by handing over the reins of government. Rather than destroying an indigenous power structure and leaving a political vacuum as other colonisers often had, the Americans actually created a power structure to fill a vacuum. (31) Mainstream nationalism, in consequence, was even more limited in scope than under Spain, focusing almost entirely on just two concerns: the extension of autonomy and the terms and timing of independence itself. Neither the United States nor, more broadly, the West and the capitalist system came under concerted attack as agencies of economic subjugation, racial indignity and cultural alienation. (32) The antagonisms which elsewhere in South East Asia radicalised elite nationalism and laid the foundations for a synthesis or alliance of nationalist and Marxist currents, in other words, were peculiarly muted. (33) As a species, the Filipino politicos of the American period were not just hostile to the particular
appeals of the Communist Party but also unreceptive to the broader, more diffuse visions of communist ideology: the downfall of capitalism, social equity, and national liberation in the fullest sense.

The degree to which these considerations diminished the appeal of communism or other forms of radicalism beyond the working class was magnified by the relative absence from Philippine life of a well-defined intelligentsia or intellectual tradition. Under the Spanish regime the extension even of primary education throughout the archipelago had not begun in earnest until the 1860s, and in the friar-controlled colleges and single university the spirit of free scholarly enquiry had been positively discouraged. After 1898 both the public schools system and tertiary education were expanded swiftly, but as in America itself the curricula were geared far more to dutiful citizenship and a practical career than to philosophy or the social sciences. Those Filipinos who went to complete their education in the United States, by the same token, would be scarcely likely to encounter there the kind of leftist academic milieu that played a role in radicalising some of their counterparts from British and French colonies in London and Paris.

Such ideological awareness as did exist amongst the educated middle class tended moreover to be neutralised by the overshadowing centrality of the independence issue and the flexible, accommodating character of the major parties. The campaign for independence, widely believed to demand a display of national unity, tended temporarily to obscure sectional divisions within the polity and to relegate discussion on the economic and social injustices of Philippine life to the sidelines. Radicals and progressives, we have seen, could as individuals gain acceptance and even prominence in both the Nacionalista party and its successive oppositions. However minimal the changes they could effect from within the political establishment, most were persuaded, the prospects on the political fringe were bleaker still.

Yet more striking than the difficulties the PKP faced in broadening the social spread of its support was the continued confinement of its working class core to Manila and the provinces of Central Luzon. Beyond this region, the March 1933 Second Plenum had acknowledged, the Party was practically unknown: in the Visayas there were five buklod in existence "but not under our leadership and doing as they please"; in Northern Luzon, the Bicol region and Mindanao there were none.
Impatient to correct this shortcoming, the Plenum resolved that within less than a year a network of twelve regional organisations should be established to cover the entire archipelago - a plan which under the circumstances was so wildly ambitious as to smack of the impractical "formalism" which the Central Committee had itself condemned. (35) It is most unlikely, in fact, that the proposed regional bodies were established even on Luzon, for when the Party resurfaced from the underground in mid-1938 its largest units of organisation were provincial in scale. Of the eight such units then functioning, seven were in the arc of provinces around the capital: Tarlac, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bataan, Bulacan, Manila-Rizal and Laguna. Though this area encompassed only about a fifth of the total Philippine population, these seven units together embraced over 96 per cent of the Party members then registered, the small remainder coming under the single provincial unit operating outside Luzon in Iloilo. (36) Some more isolated Party sections had still to be registered at this point, but their inclusion would scarcely alter the overall pattern. Remaining fundamentally unchanged until the outbreak of the Pacific War, this pattern was moreover plainly paralleled by the distribution of support in the mass organisations under Party leadership.

It is clear that the concentration on communist strength in Central Luzon stemmed not from one factor alone but from the conjunction of many. The region had already become deeply infused with the spirit of dissent in previous decades; it was the hotbed of the 1896 revolution against Spain, and a fertile habitat for rebel millenarian sects like the Santa Iglesia of Felipe Salvador. It was one of the most densely populated agricultural regions, marked by a growing surplus of labour and intensifying competition for cultivable land. It was marked also by high and insistently climbing tenancy levels, containing by 1939 six of the seven most heavily tenanted provinces in the country. (37) And the predominant form of tenancy - the kasamahan system - proved in both rice and sugar districts to be especially vulnerable to dislocation by the processes of modernisation and the mounting primary of market forces. The erosion of patron-client relations, we have seen, threatened the tenant's security - "security from unexpected want and security from the dangers of things new and strange" - at precisely the time when the tenant's situation was becoming more precarious. (38) Increasingly estranged from the caciques,
tenants and other barrio-dwellers turned as an alternative means of protecting their interests to the solidarity and collective action of rural unions. Conditions in the central plains were moreover particularly conducive to the growth of such organisations due to the prevalence of large estates, the relative ease of communication and the basic similarity of peasant grievances across the region.

Finally there was the multi-faceted importance, both intrinsic and diffusive, of the nation's capital. Four times as populous as the next biggest city, Manila in the American period as now was the unrivalled hub of Philippine life: the seat of government, the principal base of learning, the chief port and the leading commercial and industrial centre. It was the natural birthplace of the working class movement, and the natural point of entry for Marxist ideas. Relatively high literacy levels and educational standards in the city and the nearby Tagalog and Pampango provinces fostered a greater measure of political maturity and independence than elsewhere. Newspapers, magazines and movies circulated more widely, raising popular aspirations and expectations by revealing modern comforts and broader horizons. The prosperity, politics and pleasure of the city were a more powerful magnet to the elite of the central plains than to their more distant counterparts, and contributed to the growth of absentee landlordism. Agrarian disputes in Central Luzon more readily excited official concern, and politicos and government agents were more readily at hand to intervene, often exacerbating the tensions they sought to soothe. And the mode, tactics and direction of peasant militancy in the region, last but not least, were shaped as nowhere else by the proximate example and assistance of the city-based labour movement. For all these reasons, Central Luzon continued to be the primary locus of PKP support throughout the Japanese occupation and the post-war Huk rebellion. The toughest challenge confronting the Party, then as in the 1930s, was the substantive expansion of its influence to the regions beyond.
Notes to Epilogue

(1) Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas, Lupong Tagapatnugot (PKP Central Committee) Ang Tahasan sa Pagbaka sa Oportunismo - Ang Tumpak na Organisasyon (The Resolute Struggle Against Opportunism - Correct Organisation) Resolutions of the Second Plenum, March 11-12, 1933 Second Part n.pub., Manila 1933 p.34

(2) In support of this observation the Central Committee quoted the Bureau of Labor's statistics on industrial disputes between 1929 and 1931, which in isolation showed steady increases in both the number of strikes and the number of workers involved. The statistics for 1932, however, yet to be issued when the Second Plenum met, indicated a distinct downturn. Taking the period 1930-33 as a whole, the number of officially recorded strikes was 171 - only 27 more than in the preceding four years.


(3) PKP, Lupong Tagapatnugot op.cit. p.7

Fears voiced by "the comrades of the C.P.P.I." that colonialism had cowed the Filipino people into submissiveness had been publicly criticised a few months prior to the Second Plenum by the Comintern observer S. Carpio.

S. Carpio "The Situation in the Philippines and the Tasks of the C.P.P.I. (1)" International Press Correspondence vol.12 no.51 November 17, 1932 p.1110

(4) PKP, Lupong Tagapatnugot op.cit. pp.13;26

(5) Ibid. p.13

(6) Ibid. p.22

(7) Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas, Lupong Tagapatnugot (PKP Central Committee) Ang Kasalukuyang Kalagayan at ang mga Tungkulan Dapat Gampanan ng PKP (The Current Situation and the Tasks the PKP Must Fulfil) Resolutions of the Second Plenum, March 11-12, 1933 First Part n.pub., Manila 1933 p.38

"Bahala na" may be roughly translated as "Let's not worry about that until we must"; "bukas na" is the Tagalog equivalent of "mañana".

(8) "Ang Pamahayag ng 'Union Civica Filipina'" ("The Manifesto of the 'Philippine Civic Union'") Kaisahan Yr.I no.1 March 4, 1932 p.3

(9) Conversation with Federico Maclang, Pitpitan, Bulacan, October 20, 1971; Conversation with Ramon Espiritu, Tondo, Manila, November 18, 1971

(10) Carpio loc.cit.
(11) PKP, Central Committee  *Ang Tahasang Pagbaka sa Opurtunismo...*, as cited p.10


(13) *Ibid.* p.8

(14) *Ibid.* p.28

(15) PKP, Central Committee  *Ang Kasalukuyang Kalagayan...*, as cited p.26

(16) PKP, Central Committee  *Ang Tahasang Pagbaka sa Opurtunismo...*, as cited p.27

(17) Communist Party of the Philippines "Workers of the World Unite! Fight for Unconditional Independence! Against the Hawes-Cutting Bill!" Handbill dated January 13, 1933

(18) PKP, Central Committee  *Ang Kasalukuyang Kalagayan...*, as cited p.38

(19) *Ibid.* pp.8-10

(20) CPP *loc.cit.*


(23) PKP, Central Committee  *Ang Kasalukuyang Kalagayan...*, as cited p.36


(27) Carpio *loc.cit.*

(28) PKP, Central Committee  *Ang Kasalukuyang Kalagayan...*, as cited p.39


(30) *Manila Times* October 19, 1901


(32) Obviously there were exceptions to this generalisation. A distinct radical tinge was for instance occasionally discernible in Nacionalista statements during the initial debates on free trade with the United States, particularly around 1910. Aside from making independence more distant, Nacionalista spokesmen argued, a sudden inrush of American investment would carry economic exploitation and abuse. Quezon himself, addressing the US House of Representatives, anticipated "the heavy yoke of great corporate capital" descending upon the Islands, and the pro-Nacionalista paper *La Vanguardia* saw the Filipinos as condemned to become "a proletarian people". In the main, however, such statements were an echo of the anti-trust sentiments then prevalent in the United States rather than an attack upon capitalism itself. After about 1912 the Nacionalista agitation about the consequences of reciprocal free trade seems to have abruptly ceased.
Stanley *op.cit.* pp.141-53


(35) PKP, Central Committee *Ang Tahasang Pagbaka sa Oportunismo...*, as cited pp.25-6

(36) James S. Allen "Report on the Philippines" February 13, 1919 Typescript p.6 (Author's collection)

(37) Commonwealth of the Philippines, Census Office of the Philippine Islands *Census of the Philippine Islands 1939* vol.II Bureau of Printing, Manila 1940 p.970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLU</td>
<td>American Civil Liberties Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor</td>
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<td>AIL</td>
<td>Anti-Imperialist League</td>
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<td>BIA</td>
<td>Bureau of Insular Affairs</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>COF</td>
<td>Congreso Obrero de Filipinas</td>
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<td>CPP(I)</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Philippines (Philippine Islands)</td>
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<td>CPUSA</td>
<td>Communist Party of the United States of America</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Democrata Party</td>
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<td>ECCI</td>
<td>Executive Committee of the Communist International</td>
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<td>FTF</td>
<td>Federacion del Trabajo de Filipinas</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>Iglesia Filipina Independiente</td>
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<td>KAP</td>
<td>Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas (Proletarian Labour Congress)</td>
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<td>KKK</td>
<td>Kataastaasan Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (Highest and Most Honourable Association of the Sons of the People)</td>
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<td>KKK</td>
<td>Katipunan ng Kabataang Komunista (Young Communist League)</td>
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<td>KM</td>
<td>Kapatirang Magasaka (Magbubukid) (Peasant Brotherhood)</td>
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<td>KMITP</td>
<td>Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Industriya Tabako sa Pilipinas (Philippine Tobacco Industry Workers' Union)</td>
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<td>KUTV</td>
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<td>LM</td>
<td>Lapiang Manggagawa (Workers' Party)</td>
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<td>NP</td>
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OLU    Oriental Labor Union
PCLA(F) Philippine Chinese Laborers' Association (Federation)
PKI    Indonesian Communist Party
PKP    Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas
       (Philippine Communist Party)
PPTUS  Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat
RILU   Red International of Labour Unions
SPMMP  Samahan sa Pagtatanggol ng mga Manggagawa at Magbubukid
       sa Pilipinas
       (Philippine Workers' and Peasants' Defence Association)
UIF    Union de Impresores de Filipinas
UOD    Union Obrera Democratica
UODF   Union Obrera Democratica de Filipinas
UOEF   Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas
UTF    Union del Trabajo de Filipinas
UTF    Union de Tabaqueros de Filipinas
GLOSSARY

aparcero Share tenant
barong Tagalog Native shirt
barrio Village, sometimes including outlying hamlets
bloque Ad hoc election campaign grouping
bolo Machete-like knife
buklod Nucleus or cell
cabeccilla "Boss"; labour recruiting agent
cacique Large landholder, local autocrat
canon Annual rent paid by a leasehold tenant
carabao Water buffalo
cavan Dry measure of grain equivalent to 2.18 bushels. A cavan of palay weighs about 44 kilograms; a cavan of husked rice roughly 57 kilograms
cedula Annual poll-tax
compadrazgo Relationship between ritual kin
compadre Male sponsor in baptism, confirmation or wedding; ritual kinsman
convento Rectory
ganta Grain measure equal to one twenty-fifth of a cavan
ilustrado "Enlightened one"; educated member of the elite
inquilino Leasehold tenant
kapisanan Association
kapisanista Kapisanan activist
kapisanan makabayan Nationalist association
kasama Share tenant
kasamahan Share tenancy system
katiwala Hacienda overseer
kawani Employee
lider Political lieutenant; ward heeler; campaigner
mestiza; mestizo Person of mixed blood; Chinese-Filipino or Spanish-Filipino
nipa Type of palm whose leaves are used as a roofing material
obrerista Labour activist
pacificado Advocate of peace, of ending armed resistance to the American occupation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pacto de retro (vendendo)</td>
<td>Arrangement whereby a moneylender secured his loan against the land of his debtor. Should the debtor default, ownership of the land passed to the creditor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>palay</td>
<td>Unhusked rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pensionado</td>
<td>Scholarship student, cadre sent for training in Moscow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>periodista</td>
<td>Newspaper or magazine writer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peso</td>
<td>Unit of currency, equivalent throughout the American period to 50 cents US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>principalia</td>
<td>Holders of municipal office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rasyon</td>
<td>Loan of rice requiring no interest payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samahang abuluyan</td>
<td>Mutual aid society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tagalista</td>
<td>Advocate or exponent of Tagalog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tao</td>
<td>Person; the &quot;common man&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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