Japan-Republic of China Relations under US Hegemony: A genealogy of ‘returning virtue for malice’

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Abstract

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Much of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ (yide baoyuan) postwar Japan policy remains to be examined. This thesis mainly shows how the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ facilitated Japan’s diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan during the Cold War era. More conceptually, this study re-conceptualizes foreign policy as discourse—that of moral reciprocity—as it sheds light on the question of recognition as well as the consensual aspect of hegemony. By adopting a genealogical approach, this discourse analysis thus traces the descent and emergence of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ trope while it examines its discursive effect on Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei under American hegemony.

After tracing the emergence of Chiang’s postwar Japan policy as discourse, this thesis first delves into the rise of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as it demonstrates how the discursive formation of Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei constituted US hegemony in East Asia at the inception of the Cold War. Second, this study then highlights the heyday of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as it shows how a powerful coalition formed around the discourse in the domain of Japanese politics, thereby reproducing the recognition of Nationalist China as well as consolidating American...
hegemony at the height of the Cold War. Third, this research sheds light on the decline of 'returning virtue for malice' as it depicts the erosion of the Japanese discourse coalition and US hegemony due to the lack of consent between Tokyo, Taipei, and Washington as the nature of the Cold War dramatically changed in East Asia.

In short, the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek's 'returning virtue for malice' postwar Japan policy represented Chiang as the benefactor to whom the Japanese should repay their 'debt of gratitude', thereby making Japan's recognition of the Republic of China on Taiwan possible. In effect, this thesis presents a way of reading bilateral relations as it mainly shows how recognition can be constructed by the political actors who draw on hegemonic practices from the past—such as moral reciprocity—under hegemony.
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# Abbreviations

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAPSG</td>
<td>Asian-African Problems Study Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACJ</td>
<td>American Council on Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSG</td>
<td>Asian Problems Study Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APU</td>
<td>Asian Parliamentary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINCOM</td>
<td>China Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee for Export to Communist Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSJC</td>
<td>Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Dual Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMD</td>
<td>Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party, also KMT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>Japan Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party, also GMD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIDG</td>
<td>Peace Issues Discussion Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>Peoples’ Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
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SC Security Council
SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
SDF Self-Defence Forces
UK United Kingdom
UKLIM United Kingdom Liaison Mission
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
US United States
VMI Virginia Military Institute

Note on Japanese and Chinese names

For Chinese names, Pinyin is used without tone/diacritical marks except for names of individuals living outside of mainland China and commonly used spellings, such as Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Taipei, which use the Wade-Giles system. Japanese names are represented, according to Japanese convention, with the family name first followed by the given name. Where the writings of Japanese authors appear in English, surnames are placed first.
1 Introduction

'Now, when we negotiate with Japan, we claim that we represent the traditional and legitimate government of China. The immediate reaction of the Japanese is, "Why do you need to make such a false claim that you represent China when you are obviously in Taiwan?" It is very difficult for the Japanese to understand and accept our claim. The only way we can persuade the Japanese is to remind them that they are indebted to Chiang Kai-shek for what he did for Japan in the wake of the war. We tell them that Chiang Kai-shek is the one who strongly campaigned for the restoration of the Japanese nation and economy and that he is the one who insisted China and Japan should peacefully cooperate with each other. In this way, we convince them that Chiang Kai-shek’s China therefore is the traditional and legitimate government of China to which Japan should repay its debt of gratitude. The Japanese are able to understand and accept this way of reasoning. That is why we only have one trump card to play when we negotiate with Japan. That trump card is President Chiang.'

(Chang Chun quoted by Huang 1995: 183-4)

1.1 Introduction

In the post-war world, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime on Taiwan had the need to compensate its lack of internal legitimacy with its ‘dependence on external legitimacy’ (Wakabayashi 1992: 12-14). The lack of internal legitimacy was largely due to the government’s bloody crackdown on the Taiwanese uprising of 28 February 1947 known as the 2-28 Incident (Ibid.; Wachman 1994; Hughes 1997; Rigger 1999; Hsiau 2000; Chu and Lin 2001). It also stemmed from the fact that the Taiwanese had been de-Sinicized by the Japanese colonial regime which lasted for half a century (ibid.; Wakabayashi 1992; Wachman 1994; Hughes 2000; Hsiau 2000). Despite this lack of internal legitimacy, it was still possible for the Chinese regime in exile to
legitimate its rule on Taiwan by depending on American military, economic and political resources—for the defense of the Taiwan Strait, financial aid, and the maintenance of the ‘China seat’ in the United Nations (UN) (Wakabayashi 1992: 13-14; Hughes 2000: 65-7).

In the meantime, the Chiang regime faced the challenge of ‘legitimation via diplomatic recognition’ in international society (Kim 1994: 149-57). Put differently, the ‘politics of competitive legitimation of divided China’ emerged as an extension of the Chinese civil war following the outbreak of the Korean War (Ibid.:149), in which Communist China militarily engaged with UN forces led by the United States. Consequently, the pursuit of legitimation became the central concern of two Chinas as they locked themselves into the competing ‘Cold War systems’ under the Soviet Union and the United States respectively (Ibid.). It can be best characterized as a zero-sum game in which the legitimation of one Chinese government depended on the de-legitimation of the other (Ibid.; Hughes 1997: 17). From this perspective, Beijing’s intervention in the Korean War was a ‘God-send’ not only for Taipei’s survival but also for an overwhelming edge in diplomatic recognition that Washington was able to provide for its frontline client in the ‘East Asian Cold War system’ (Kim 1994: 149).

Here, what is often overlooked is the significance of Japan’s diplomatic recognition that greatly facilitated the constitution of Chiang’s external legitimacy as well as US hegemony in East Asia at the dawn of the Cold War era. More specifically, it was Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition which enabled Chiang’s Nationalist China to take part in the ‘West’ in April 1952 as US hegemony had been based in Japan, rather than China, since the late 1940s (Kennan 1967: 368-96). In fact, by September 1951,
Washington had largely institutionalized its hegemony by signing the multilateral treaty of peace with Japan at San Francisco even in the absence of Chinese representation. Furthermore, Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition presented an opportunity for Chiang to symbolically observe the ‘retrocession’ (guangfu) of Taiwan despite the fact that the Japanese cunningly renounced their claim to the former colony without specifying to whom it was being given (Hughes 1997: 17; Tai 2001: Ch. 4; P’eng and Huang 1976). This policy of ‘clear ambiguity’ vis-à-vis the status of Taiwan concurrently enabled the United States to re-draw the line over the map of Imperial Japan. In short, Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Taipei was vital for the external legitimacy of the Chiang regime on Taiwan as well as the constitution of US hegemony during the making of the Cold War in East Asia.

How was it then possible, (1) and indeed commonsensical, for Japan to recognize the Chiang regime on Taiwan as the legitimate government of China under US hegemony? In spite of the impact the United States clearly had on its client states such as Japan, the answer this study provides is that the particular meaning Nationalist Chinese and Japanese elites attached to the leader of Nationalist China—through the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ (yide baoyuan) postwar Japan policy (2)—also helped to make Japan’s diplomatic recognition of Chiang’s Nationalist regime on Taiwan as ‘China’ possible and commonsensical between 1952 and 1972. In other words, this study sheds light on the role of client states or agents in the constitution of hegemony as it shows how Japan (re)produced its recognition of Nationalist China (and its own postwar identity), thereby constituting US hegemony in East Asia. Here, the production of hegemony, which is often narrowly used to mean
great-power domination over others, is more broadly conceived as a consensual and meaningful process between agents and the hegemon. Moreover, this study highlights that recognition between agents that constitute hegemony can be made intelligible by moral reciprocity drawn from past hegemonic practices.

More theoretically, in the name of intellectual pluralism, this study shows how the standard rationalist account of Japan’s international relations can be complemented by a critical constructivist approach (Katzenstein et al. 1998, 1999; Hoph 1998; Weldes et al. 1999; Campbell 1998: Epilogue). By adding a critical constructivist strand, this study lays bare the constructedness of Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei as the legitimate government of ‘China’ under US hegemony. While the standard work on Japanese diplomacy rationalistically searches for structural and external factors in its attempt to causally explain why Japan recognized Nationalist China, this study shows that the critical constructivist approach can help us understand how Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Taipei as well as US hegemony were constituted through meanings and practices in international relations (Keohane 1989: Ch. 7; Hollis and Smith 1990; Smith 1995: 26-8; Wendt 1999: 77-89).

In this introductory chapter, the author first locates critical constructivism in the field of international relations (IR) in general as well as IR in Japan. The author surveys the evolution of disciplinary debates in IR in the United States and Europe as well as equivalent foreign-policy debates in Japan in order to locate this critical constructivist study in terms of Japan’s international relations under US hegemony. Secondly, by empirically focusing on Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony, the author demonstrates that critical constructivism and the realist variant
of rationalism answer different types of questions. The author shows that critical constructivist ‘understanding’ complements standard realist/rationalist ‘explanation’ as he contrasts interpretive and causal analyses in terms of answering ‘how-possible’ and ‘why’ questions, both of which contribute to knowledge since reasons can also be causes (Davidson 1963; Smith 2000a; Wight 2002). Thirdly, the author mainly reviews the existing decision-making analyses on Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy in terms of his idiosyncratic beliefs as well as rational calculations. The author then points out that some of the precursors’ works suggest the directions in which studies on ‘returning virtue for malice’ can be extended beyond decision-making analysis. Fourthly, in terms of methodology, the author explicitly calls for the use of genealogy as discourse analysis in order to re-examine Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. The author introduces the genealogical method of discourse analysis by defining key concepts, assessing advantages and limitations, and discussing the selection of the cases and materials on which this study is based. Finally, the author concludes this introduction by sketching the chapter outline of this study as a whole.

1.2 Japan’s international relations under US hegemony: locating critical constructivism

‘American social science’ today: rationalism v. constructivism. In the field of international relations (IR), which has been referred to as an ‘American social science’ (Hoffmann 1977; Smith 2000b; Crawford and Jarvis 2001), rationalism stands for the ‘merging of the long-term rivalry between liberal and realist accounts’ of world
politics since the interwar period (Smith 2002a: 224). It came into being as a result of
the so-called 'neo-neo synthesis' as the two accounts of international relations
underwent re-identification under the labels of neo-realism and neo-liberal
institutionalism in the 1980s (Waever 1996: 163-4). Since then, the two approaches
have become 'indistinguishable on the basis of their shared commitment to a rationalist
research program' (Schmidt 2002: 15). More specifically, neo-liberal institutionalists
have agreed to accept the following neo-realist positions: 1) The state is the main unit
of analysis; 2) It is a rational actor; and 3) International anarchy shapes its behavior
(Smith 2000c: 36). Such _rapprochement_ was most importantly a product of the
dominance of rational choice theory within the 'US model of social science' (Smith
2002a: 224-7, 2002b: 33-5). By the 1990s, even though the traces of the 'neo-neo
debate'—on whether anarchy can be mitigated by international institutions and
whether state actors pursue relative or absolute gains—had remained (Ibid., 2002a:
224-7; Schmidt 2002: 15), neo-liberal institutionalism had been largely 'swallowed up'
by neo-realism under the rubric of rationalism in the United States (Mearsheimer 1995:

In the meantime, cultural and sociological perspectives known as
constructivism came to the fore as the 'neo-neo debate' was supplanted by the debate
between rationalism and constructivism in the 1990s (Katzenstein _et al._ 1998, 1999;
Fearon and Wendt 2002). The emergence of constructivism as a major approach
virtually coincided with the splintering of what was referred to as reflectivism in the
late 1980s (Keohane 1989). Before it splintered in the mid-1990s (Hansen 2006: 3-4),
reflectivism comprised constructivism as well as a variety of critical perspectives that
highlighted the significance of 'human reflection' in world politics. Reflectivists emphasized 'the importance of historical and textual interpretation and the limitations of scientific models in studying world politics' (Keohane 1989: 161). Since then, constructivists have attempted 'seizing the middle ground' between rationalism and reflectivism (Adler 1997). In other words, while constructivists have agreed with rationalists that the state is the unit of analysis and that social science is the method to study international relations, they have also agreed with reflectivists that ideas or collective understandings (as opposed to material conditions) matter more than rationalists have claimed (Smith 2002a: 228). Simply put, constructivists have argued that 'the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world' (Adler 1997: 322). In contrast to rationalism that constitutes mainstream IR in the US (Waever 1998, 1999; Smith 2000b, 2002b, Crawford and Jarvis 2001), constructivism has received a warm welcome in European IR communities (Waever 1998, 1999; Fierke and Jorgensen 2001).

This study adopts an approach that has been referred to as critical constructivism in IR (Katzenstein et al. 1998: 674-8, 1999: 34-8; Hoph 1998: 181-5; Campbell 1998: 222-5; Weldes et al. 1999). Critical constructivism is a variant of constructivism that came into being as a result of the subdivision of the constructivist approach that took place following the fracturing of the reflectivist camp in the 1990s (Hansen 2006: 3-4). Like aforementioned conventional constructivists, critical constructivists focus on identity issues and analyze how actors and systems are constituted and co-evolve (Katzenstein et al. 1998: 676, 1999: 36). However, unlike
conventional constructivists, critical constructivists are more pluralistic about research methodologies as they are more skeptical about formulating law-like generalizations that dogmatically privilege certain perspectives over others (Ibid.; Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 271-81). Critical constructivist research thus tends to be ideographic rather than nomothetic since it makes more contingent generalizations about particular phenomena at particular points in time based on particular evidence (Ibid.; Katzenstein et al. 1998: 677, 1999: 37). Put differently, the emphasis of critical constructivist research is placed on the ‘detailed study of texts to understand the symbolic systems that govern actors’ discourses, rather than on an analysis of a large number of cases’ (Ibid.). Such emphasis is critical constructivists’ attempt to translate the metatheoretical insights of poststructuralism into empirical analyses as they focus on discourse and work closely with texts (Ibid.: 37-8, 1998: 677-8; Campbell 1998: 222-5; Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 271, 280-1). Therefore, critical constructivism and poststructuralism are similar to the extent that they both critically analyze state discourses in their empirical studies (Campbell 1998: 222-3; Waever 2002: 23; Fierke 2001: 120, 135 n. 9). Nevertheless, critical constructivism is distinguished from the poststructuralist variant of reflectivism to the extent that it has not abandoned the possibility of social science and it is still willing to engage with mainstream rationalism in the United States (Katzenstein et al. 1998: 676-7, 1999: 36-7).

**Japanese IR: realism v. idealism.** While aforementioned disciplinary debates and labels have ensured the central position of American IR theorists and provoked critics in European IR communities (Waever 1998, 1999), they have largely failed to mobilize
the Japanese IR community beyond the classical realist-idealist debate (Kitaoka 1995, Fujiwara 1999). Such theoretical ‘immobilism’—the lack of dynamism and proactivity that has characterized postwar Japan (Stockwin et al. 1988; Stockwin 2003: xxxiv; Hook et al. 2001, 2005)—can be partially attributed to the fact that Japanese intellectuals have been inclined to debate international relations in terms of Japanese foreign policy rather than IR theory (Kitaoka 1995). Furthermore, the intellectual ‘immobilism’ can also be attributed to exogenous events in the realm of international relations such as the success of Japan’s ‘mercantile realism’ under US hegemony (Heginbotham and Samuels 1999). In any case, the miraculous growth of the postwar Japanese economy has justified the realist scholars who have advised conservative governments in Japan under the wings of the United States. Consequently, Japanese IR scholars have only needed to produce ‘very little theory in general and much less that is not based on American inspiration’ as demonstrated below (Waever 1998: 696; 1999: 56).

Postwar Japan’s international relations have been dominated by realism in both theory and practice (Kosaka 1963, 1995). The dominant position of realism in the literature of Japan’s international relations is an epitome of the ‘Americanization of the academic community’ in postwar Japan (Hook et al. 2001: 101, 2005: 115-6). Japanese realists, such as Kosaka Masataka who spent the first two years of the 1960s as a young visiting scholar at Harvard University (Kitaoka 1995: 22), began to provide ‘intellectual sustenance for the government’s policy of bilateralism and close political relations with the US’ after the controversial renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 (Hook et al. 2001: 101, 2005: 115-6). Over the years, the realist account of
Japan’s international relations—such as that of Tokyo’s recognition of ‘China’ after the war (Kosaka 1964, 1968, 2000)—has been embedded by other ‘American-educated’ scholars who have written canonical works on the foreign relations of Japan (Iriye 1966, 1991, 1997; Ikei 1973, 1982, 1992; Hosoya 1993; Iokibe 1999, 2006).

The prime example of such dominance is the realist construction of the ‘Yoshida doctrine’ (Nagai 1985)—or the ‘(d)ctrine placing high priority on Japan’s economic growth and position in the world and low spending and priority on the military’ (Hook et al. 2001: xxv, 2005: xxx)—that guided Japan’s foreign policy from the Yoshida cabinet of the 1940s to the Miyazawa cabinet of the 1990s (Edstrom 1999). More specifically, Kosaka’s (1964) seminal article on former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru not only definitively re-evaluated but also helped to ‘indoctri’

Yoshida’s diplomacy (Toyoshita 1999: 5-13; Kan et al. 2002: 95-102; Soeya 2005: 94-8; Nakajima 2006: 5-8), which had been given ‘terribly unfair’ assessments in Japan before 1964 (Kosaka 1964: 78). Thereafter, realist scholars like Kosaka not only intellectually supported Yoshida’s bid for the Nobel Peace Prize between 1965 and 1967 (Mikanagi 1991: 590-1; Hosaka 2000: 434-6), but also advised pupils of the ‘Yoshida school’ such as Prime Minister Sato Eisaku on international affairs during the postwar era (Noda 2000: 594; Kitaoka 1995: 25). In this way, the ‘Yoshida doctrine’ has functioned to rationalize Japan’s ‘subordinate independence’ from the United States during the Cold War (Dower 1979).

However, before realism gained dominance in the 1960s (Kitaoka 1995: 21-2; Hook et al. 2001: 101, 2005: 115-6; Inoguchi 2005: 35-6), it was idealism that first overwhelmingly influenced Japan’s intellectual circles in the postwar era (Kitaoka
1995: 13-14, 18). For instance, between March 1949 and December 1950, the Peace Issues Discussion Group (*Heiwa Mondai Danwakai*, hereafter PIDG) led by idealists such as Maruyama Masao sensationaly published three statements on principles of peace in *Sekai* (Igarashi 1995: 176-96; Hook 1996: Ch. 2), the most influential journal in Japan at the time (Kitaoka 1995: 13). Actually, the PIDG modeled these statements after ‘Social scientists appeal for peace’, a statement that had been issued in July 1948 by an international group of scholars in Paris at the request of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Ibid.; Hook 1996: 26-7; Igarashi 1995: 176-7). In these statements, the PIDG called for ‘peaceful coexistence’ and ‘unarmed neutrality’ in terms of signing a peace treaty with all former adversaries across the Cold War division, acquiring security through the UN, and opposing the use of Japanese bases by a third power such as the United States (Ibid.: 176-96; Hook 1996: 31-4; Kitaoka 1995: 13-14). These ‘idealistic’ proposals were made based on the ‘realistic’ understanding that nuclear weapons had made war an outdated means to achieve national goals (Hook 1996: 33-5; Igarashi 1995: 179-80, 190-2). Although they were not translated into the official policy adopted by the Yoshida cabinet, they did nonetheless reinforce the anti-militaristic foundations of the Japanese Constitution of 1946 and provided a basis for the Socialist opposition and peace movements in postwar Japan (Hook 1996: 38-40). Accordingly, these Japanese liberals diametrically opposed Prime Minister Yoshida’s policy to ‘invite’ US forces and make ‘separate peace’ with ‘one world’ under American hegemony.

More conceptually, Japanese idealists put forth multiple views of ‘reality’ in their attempt to construct an alternative possibility in which such ‘reality’ could be
transformed (Heiwa Mondai Danwakai 1950, 1995). According to these idealists, there are at least two subjective views of 'reality': one that is competitive; and the other that is cooperative (Hook 1996: 31-2, Heiwa Mondai Danwakai 1950, 1995). The competitive view of 'reality' centrally focuses on the 'Hobbesian analogy of international society as a war of "all-against-all", where security must be based on military preparations for the "worst-case scenario"' (Hook 1996: 31). According to this realist view of 'reality', it was inevitable for Japan to be under the American nuclear umbrella given the threat of a nuclear attack from the communist camp (Ibid.). On the other hand, the cooperative view of 'reality' creates the 'possibility of cooperation between states, where security can be based on trust' (Ibid.). According to this idealist view of 'reality', it was still possible for Japan to opt for peaceful coexistence with 'two worlds' as well as unarmed neutrality without the American nuclear umbrella (Ibid.). The PIDG recommended the latter option by appealing to the Japanese people's 'subjective choice in the form of autonomous action' rather than "objective reality" in the form of the communist threat' (Ibid.: 31-2). In spite of Japanese idealists' recommendation, the cooperative view consequently fell short of becoming the 'reality' that was adopted by the Yoshida government while it was embraced by the Socialist opposition as its 'ideal' in the 1950s.

However, while Japanese idealists claimed that such 'reality' was ultimately defined by power (Maruyama 1964: 175-7), they failed to define their own 'reality' when they came back into power in the 1990s for the first time in five decades. More specifically, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) agreed not to oppose Tokyo's military alliance with Washington when it formed a coalition government with the conservative
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Harbinger Party in 1994. It could very well be characterized as political suicide for pacifism or idealism in Japan (Soeya 2005: 20). Facing the need to ‘resuscitate’ idealism at this juncture, Murayama Tomi’ichi, the Socialist Prime Minister, began to promote Japan as a ‘global civilian power’ (Inoguchi 2005: 43). The idea of ‘global civilian power’ had been first introduced by a German IR scholar and further elaborated by a Japanese diplomatic correspondent in an influential American journal (Maull 1990; Funabashi 1991a). Subsequently, the ‘civilian manifesto’ as well as a ‘model of global civilian power’, which theoretically and empirically elaborated on the prototype of the concept, appeared in book-length works in Japanese and English (Funabashi 1991b, 1994; Hughes 1999). In the meantime, Murayama along with the proponents of the ‘global civilian power’ discourse called for Tokyo’s ‘supportive leadership’ under US hegemony in providing collective goods such as foreign aid, democracy promotion, peacekeeping forces, and human rights and environmental protection (Funabashi 1991a: 66-9). In this way, they argued Japan could ‘enhance its political power through economic strength’—but ‘not military might’—in an emergent ‘new world order’ (Ibid.: 65). Put differently, Japanese idealists called for a ‘more internationalist and actively engaged Japanese pacifism’ as they came to accept the American nuclear umbrella in the 1990s (Ibid.).

In addition to the liberal discourse of ‘global civilian power’, it was Ozawa Ichiro’s (1993, 1994, 1995) idea of Japan becoming a ‘normal nation’ that represented Japan’s international relations in the 1990s (Soeya 2005: 21; Inoguchi 2005: 40-6; Kitaoka 1995: 37-40). In contrast to the idealist image of Japan as a ‘global civilian power’, Japan as a ‘normal nation’ reflects the realist image of a great power (Soeya
While the former encourages Japan to be an economic power rather than a military one, the latter criticizes that such a mercantilist nation is *not* a 'normal nation' by international standards (Ozawa 1993: 104-5, 1994: 94-5, 1995: 463-4). More specifically, Ozawa—one of the political leaders who remarkably brought down the LDP government in 1993 for the first time in 38 years (Stockwin 2003: 199-201)—stresses the need to reconsider the ‘Yoshida doctrine’ under the new circumstances of the post-Cold War world (Ozawa 1993: 109-11, 1994: 98-100, 1995: 467-9). In the meantime, he also warns that becoming a ‘normal nation’ is *not* to become a great military power in the world, either (Ozawa 1993: 104-5, 1994: 94-5, 1995: 463-4). Rather, to be a ‘normal nation’, for Ozawa (1993: 112-26, 1994: 101-12, 1995: 469-81; 2006: 184-92) and his intellectual allies (Kitaoka 2000), is to promptly contribute to UN peacemaking operations by collaborating with the US in the making of the ‘new world order’. Accordingly, although it is still common sense that the ‘Yoshida doctrine’ represents postwar Japan’s international relations today (Inoguchi 2005: 33), the ‘doctrine’ has been increasingly called into question since the end of the Cold War (Ibid.; Hook et al. 2001: 66, 2005: 73; Nakajima 2006: 7-8). In fact, it has been argued that Japan has already been making rapid strides to be a ‘normal nation’ since 11 September 2001 (Hughes 2004; Inoguchi 2005: 44-6). In any case, while ‘mercantile realism’ may have been going through the process of emendation in Japan, the American ‘foundations’ of Japanese diplomacy nonetheless have remained unproblematized.

This critical constructivist study, drawing on early Japanese idealists’ claim that ‘reality’ is not only given but also reproduced everyday (Maruyama 1964: 172-3),
attempts to open additional space for the possibilities in which the ‘reality’ of US hegemony can be ‘re-imagined’. In other words, while it accepts the Japanese realist and idealist understanding of US hegemony as ‘reality’ that is given, this critical constructivist study also lays bare the constitution of US hegemony by highlighting otherwise marginalized East Asian constituents of US hegemony such as Japan. That is, if American hegemony in East Asia is already given and structuralized across time, then analysis of Japan’s choice of its own destiny in international affairs is largely dispensable. In fact, postwar Japan’s international relations have been typically explained by realists in terms of Washington’s pressure on Tokyo or Tokyo’s inevitable choice to follow in the footsteps of Washington. However, by shedding light on traditional practices the Japanese state adopted under Chinese hegemony (Brown 1955), this critical constructivist study multiplies what has been unified as or reduced to Japan’s passive reaction under American pressure. Such multiplicity brings out the cultural aspect of hegemony in East Asia as a field of possibilities (Walker 1984, 1990; Weldes et al. 1999)—the angle that has been largely overlooked by Japanese realists and idealists who have paid more attention to security and economic dimensions. Moreover, by bringing East Asian practices back in US hegemony, this critical constructivist study helps to bridge area studies and IR to a certain extent. In this sense, applying the critical constructivist approach to Japan’s international relations helps to overcome the theoretical ‘immobilism’ in Japan and bring Japanese IR face to face with the tide of the times as ‘a more regionalized post-Cold War order’ is likely to be reflected in ‘IR voices’ in the US, Europe, and Asia (Waever 1998: 688; 1999: 48).
1.3 Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony: explanation and understanding (3)

Unanticipated American pressure: causal explanation of recognition. Japan’s diplomatic recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan as the legitimate government of China is conventionally explained in terms of the price Japan paid for peace or regaining sovereignty in April 1952 (Kosaka 1964: 107-8, 1968: 59-64, 2000: 60-5). Put differently, Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Taipei is commonly explained as an unanticipated consequence (Ibid.) According to this authoritative account, due to the Anglo-American dispute on the ‘China question’, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru anticipated that Washington would give him a free hand to negotiate a peace settlement with China of his own choice (Ibid.). However, John Foster Dulles, special representative of President Harry S. Truman in charge of negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Pacific security treaties, so decisively influenced Yoshida that he lost his free hand over the ‘China question’ (Kosaka 1968: 61, 2000: 61). Dulles demanded Yoshida to recognize Nationalist China as he represented the powerful ‘China lobby’ and virulent anti-communism in Washington at the time (Ibid., 1964: 108, 1968: 61). More precisely, as Dulles reminded Yoshida that the Japanese Peace Treaty would not be ratified by the US Senate if Tokyo did not agree to recognize Taipei, Yoshida had no choice but to agree to recognize Nationalist China (Ibid., Kosaka 1964: 108, 2000: 61). As a result, according to this conventional rationalist explanation, such unanticipated American pressure ‘sealed’ postwar Japan’s China policy for the following two decades (Ibid.).
First, such a structural explanation deductively over-emphasizes the coercive aspect of US hegemony as it attempts to explain Tokyo's 'irrational' action which was not inductively driven by its utilitarian national interests—such as having access to the market of mainland China (Dower 1979: 414). In fact, client states like Japan had more room to maneuver under US hegemony than the structural explanation suggests. For example, only three days after committing Tokyo to negotiating a bilateral treaty with Taipei by signing the ‘Yoshida letter’ of 24 December 1951 which was addressed to and ghosted by Dulles, Yoshida sent another letter to Dulles as he played the US off against the UK in order to pursue his ‘two Chinas’ policy (Chen 2000). In the meantime, Yoshida used US pressure to swing the balance of domestic politics in favor of negotiating with Taipei first—the American initiative which was consistent with Yoshida's own intention (Yuan 2001: Ch. 5). Moreover, Yoshida not only requested economic aid from Washington in return but also, 'to Dulles's discomfort, argued that Japanese businessmen could play a role of “counterinfiltration of Communist China”' (Schaller 1997: 43; Kan et al. 2002). Accordingly, these findings indicate that the conventional rationalist explanation underrates the role of client states like Japan under American hegemony as it reduces the concept of hegemony to coercion.

Second, the structural explanation overlooks the influence of past hegemons, like China, on the emergent hegemony of the postwar United States insomuch as it fails to historicize hegemony in East Asia. As a result, the impact of Chinese hegemonic practices from the past is precluded from the ‘universal’ hegemony of the US at present. Nonetheless, US hegemony did not come in a vacuum as the ‘Chinese world order’ predates the American ‘Cold War order’ in East Asia (Hook et al. 2001,
2005). Therefore, when the United States took over the region from Imperial Japan, Chinese hegemonic practices had already been embedded over centuries including the era of Japanese hegemony. While Washington welcomed them as long as they served to legitimize its presence in the region, client states like Nationalist China capitalized on those practices to ‘revive’ its hegemonic identity vis-à-vis former subjects such as Japan. For example, even after the Japanese Peace Treaty was ratified by the US Senate on 20 March 1952, Nationalist China persistently engaged Japan in the traditional discourse of Chinese ‘magnanimity’ until it finally compelled Tokyo to sign the bilateral Peace Treaty with Taipei on 28 April (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b). The impact of such articulation (4) in terms of traditional practices was even inscribed in the Protocol of the Treaty as Chiang-Kai-shek voluntarily waived war reparations from Japan as ‘a sign of magnanimity’ (China Hand Book Editorial Board 1952; Yu 1970). Simply put, in order to adequately understand Japan’s recognition of Nationalist China under US hegemony, it is necessary to pluralize hegemony across time and lay bare the present significance of past hegemonic practices such as that of Chinese practices in East Asia.

Finally, although the conventional utilitarian explanation makes it seem impossible for the Japanese not to have recognized Nationalist China, such ex post facto economic rationalization lacks sufficient empirical evidence. More specifically, while it suggests that there was a gap between Yoshida’s intention (to recognize Beijing by following in the footsteps of Great Britain) and the outcome (granting recognition to Taipei as a result of American pressure), this utilitarian account nonetheless economically closes the gap by interpreting it as the ‘price’ Japan paid for
regaining sovereignty. However, detailed process-tracing analysis suggests otherwise. For instance, regarding the nature of a bilateral treaty with a Chinese regime on Taiwan, while Dulles demanded Yoshida to sign the peace treaty which was territorially limited, Yoshida on the other hand wished to avoid signing such a treaty until the ‘China question’ was territorially resolved (Nishimura 1971: 320). In the meantime, Yoshida agreed to negotiate an economic treaty or accord which was territorially limited exactly as Dulles defined in the ‘Yoshida letter’ of 24 December 1951 (Ibid.: 315; Yoshitsu 1982: 78; Yuan 2001: Ch.5). These pieces of evidence suggest that Tokyo attempted to exercise a ‘two Chinas’ economic policy hand in hand with a ‘no Chinas’ foreign policy, even though Japanese delegates in Taipei unexpectedly took the road to diplomatic recognition against the will of Yoshida in Tokyo in the spring of 1952 (Yoshitsu 1982: 81-2). In fact, Yoshida continued to regret the Japanese delegates’ concession to call the accord the treaty of peace for many years afterwards (Nishimura 1971: 371). As indicated above, the conventional ‘economic story’ of Japan’s recognition of Nationalist China in terms of the ‘price for peace’ is partial at best if it is not inaccurate empirically.

Use of traditional Chinese practices: constitutive understanding of recognition. Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under American hegemony was cultural (5) to the extent that it was made possible by the particular discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy that provided the category through which Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony was understood. A fundamental principle here is that states ‘act towards objects, including other actors, on
the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them' (Wendt 1992: 396-7). In concrete, as briefly mentioned above, during the bilateral treaty negotiations of 1952, the Nationalist Chinese engaged Japanese delegates in the discourse of *moral reciprocity* known as that of ‘returning virtue for malice’. By representing Chiang Kai-shek as the benefactor to whom the Japanese should repay their ‘debt of gratitude’ (*ongi*) for his ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy, the Nationalist Chinese successfully re-hierarchicalized ‘Sino’-Japanese relations as they obliged the Japanese delegates to restore the moral balance. As a result, the Japanese delegates agreed to sign the bilateral treaty of *peace*, thereby diplomatically recognizing Chiang’s regime on Taiwan as the legitimate government of ‘China’ under US hegemony. Accordingly, the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ helped to create the possibility of recognizing the Chiang regime on Taiwan as ‘China’ under US hegemony and preclude other possibilities for postwar Japan. Furthermore, such use of traditional practices continued to help reproducing Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei until it was undone by Taipei’s announcement of diplomatic severance with Tokyo two decades later.

First of all, hegemony, ‘an order in which most of the states (or at least those within reach of hegemony) could find compatible with their interests’ (Cox 1996: 65-6), is used here to stress the consent of client states such as Japan and Nationalist China that girds a leading state like the United States with power (Reus-Smit 2004: 65). While rationalists use hegemony to mean the world order in which ‘a single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in the system’ based materially on ‘military, economic and technological capabilities’ (Gilpin 1981: 13, 29), it is critically
used here to mean more than a euphemism for such dominance or coercion (Cox 1994: 366). Such critical use of hegemony restores ‘the integrity of cultural and other aspects of life in a constitutive rather than a deterministic manner’ (Walker 1984: 202). Nonetheless, hegemony is still predominantly reduced to mean dominance or coercion, neither one of which provides the full account of the concept from the critical point of view. Thus, in order to more fully understand the hegemonization of the US in East Asia, of which Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ was a critical part, it is essential to take into account the consent these client states gave to the hegemon. In other words, the concept of hegemony can be more usefully applied as the world order which consists of both coercion and consent (Cox 1996: 127; Halliday 2000: 60), and the neglected consensual aspect of hegemony is vital for understanding the constitution of US hegemony in East Asia.

Secondly, Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony can be illuminated by a focus on hegemonic practices of the past, the raw materials out of which such recognition was constructed. More specifically, from the seventh century to the 17th century (followed by more than two and a half centuries of isolation), Japan lay on the periphery of the ‘Chinese world order’ (Fairbank 1968; Garver 1993: 9-15; Zhao, S. 1997: Ch.7; Hook et al. 2001: 25-7, 2005: 27-9; Zhang 2001; Kang 2003). It was bound loosely together by the Chinese ‘civilization and virtue, particularly the virtue of China’s ruler’ (Zhao, S. 1997: 18). Japan was accordingly exposed to such Chinese hegemonic practices as moral obligation informed by Confucian values— including social harmony interpreted in terms of the emperor’s virtue (Ibid). In fact, as a major actor of the subsequent ‘imperial world order’ during the 19th and 20th
centuries (Hook et al. 2001: 27-9, 2005: 29-31), Japanese imperialists blended the Confucian image of the emperor as the ‘benevolent sovereign, father of his people, and moral preceptor of the nation’ with ‘Shinto notions of the divine origins of the imperial line’ (Collcutt 1991: 149-52). More strikingly, these traditional practices ‘survived’ even after the utilitarian style of US hegemony replaced the Japanese empire at the dawn of the ‘Cold War order’ (Hook et al. 2001: 29-32, 2005: 31-4). To be more precise, these hegemonic practices from the past were politically ‘revived’ by Nationalist Chinese elites in order to construct Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ during the hegemonization of the US in East Asia.

Thirdly, Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under American hegemony was consensual to the extent that the ‘incoming’ American hegemon collaborated with ‘outgoing’ Japanese imperialists in the wake of World War II. On the fatal day of Imperial Japan, 15 August 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced to the Japanese nation the acceptance of the Postdam declaration and the ‘beginning’ of postwar Japan as the following: ‘We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable’ (Nish 1968: 192). This famous phrase was inserted by Yasuoka Masahiro (Yomiuri Shinbun 14 September 2002), one of the most influential Confucian intellectuals who had associated with Pan Asianists in the prewar ultra-nationalist movement (Morris 1960: 451-2). Subsequently, the occupation of Japan led by American troops commenced after the surrender instrument was signed on 2 September 1945. General Douglas MacArthur then took over the ‘land of the rising sun’ to show the Japanese people his ‘magnanimity coupled with strength’ as he collaborated with Hirohito (Dulles 1952:
176). In return, as early as September 1947, Hirohito offered Washington Japanese military bases in exchange for Tokyo’s recovery of sovereignty at an early date (Shindo 1979: 45-50; Miura 1996a: 94-103). Moreover, in the fall of 1950, the US began ‘de-purging’ prewar Japanese imperialists just as the Emperor suggested to Washington immediately after the eruption of the Korean War (US Department of State 1976: 1236-7). Accordingly, as Washington maximized residual Japanese hegemonic apparatuses to promote consent, the prewar imperialists were ‘unleashed’ to find their way back into Japanese politics as the Cold War ‘watchdogs’ under US hegemony. More importantly, while Japanese elites consented to emergent US hegemony by ‘inviting’ American forces (Lundestand 1986, 1999: 208), the very prewar Japanese imperialists subsequently found their ‘postwar’ mission in (re)producing Tokyo’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony.

Finally, it was through the repeated articulation of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ to ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy that these prewar imperialists were ‘converted’ into his agents of Japanese recognition. For instance, as a result of ‘numbing repetition’ of such articulation, Japanese Plenipotentiary Kawada Isao, a de-purged cousin of Prime Minister Yoshida’s, agreed to negotiate the bilateral treaty of peace with Taipei under the condition that the contents of the treaty undoubtedly stand for a magnanimous peace treaty or President Chiang’s spirit of noble virtue (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Yanjiuhui 1966b: 25; Yuan 2001: 212; Ishi 1986: 308). After the conclusion of the treaty, Kawada then promised Chiang that he would inform the Japanese people of the magnanimous nature of the bilateral peace treaty (Chang 1980: 136). Subsequently, on behalf of Kawada, Prime Minister Yoshida (1957: 72-3; 1967: 23...
189) revealed that 'it was utterly impossible to ignore' Chiang Kai-shek's regime on Taiwan 'as the counterpart of the treaty of peace considering the friendship (jogi) it demonstrated in the peaceful repatriation of our troops and civilians from China at the end of the war'—which since then has been circulated by the Nationalist Chinese as part of Chiang's 'returning virtue for malice' postwar Japan policy. Moreover, Chang Chun (1980: 141-3), Chiang Kai-shek's special envoy to visit Japan following the conclusion of the bilateral treaty, even imbued Emperor Hirohito with Chiang's 'returning virtue for malice' postwar Japan policy. Chang Chun 'informed' Hirohito that Chiang had encouraged other leaders of the Allies to preserve the Japanese imperial institution at the Conference of Cairo in 1943. Hirohito then caught his breath and expressed his utmost gratitude for Chiang's kindness (Ibid). Hirohito additionally expressed his gratitude for Chiang's 'returning virtue for malice' address of 15 August 1945 as well as the very 'magnanimous attitude' that contributed to the conclusion of the bilateral peace treaty. Accordingly, the discourse of 'returning virtue for malice' not only had an impact on Japan's recognition of the Chiang regime on Taiwan as 'China' but also began diffusing into the Japanese elite—the result of which was the subsequent formation of a domestic coalition that reproduced its recognition of 'China' during the Cold War era.

*The Cold War 'structure' and 'agents' in East Asia: 'why' and 'how-possible' questions.* (6) To put the preceding discussions in a nutshell, while the former causal explanation of recognition (however incompletely) answers 'why' Japan diplomatically recognized Nationalist China under the given Cold War 'structure', the
latter constitutive understanding for recognition addresses ‘how’ Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei as ‘China’ was made ‘possible’ despite of Tokyo’s alternative ‘two Chinas’ policy in the making of US hegemony. More specifically, while addressing the ‘why’ question precludes the role of ‘agents’ like Japan as it reduces Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei to the consequence of the Cold War ‘structure’ or coercive hegemony of the US, answering the ‘how-possible’ question sheds light on the role of ‘agents’ by laying bare the constitutive processes of Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei in the making of hegemony which consists of both coercion and consent. Furthermore, while answering the ‘why’ question in effect (re)produces the ‘universal structure’ of the present or coercive nature of US hegemony, addressing the ‘how-possible’ question enables one to assess the impact of ‘agents’ with hegemonic pasts, like China and Japan, by historicizing hegemony in East Asia. Finally, while answers for the ‘why’ question, such as the ‘price for peace’ thesis, have a strong tendency to assume the utilitarian and unitary process of Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei without sufficient empirical grounds, addressing the ‘how-possible’ question necessitates one to empirically examine the process through which Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei was made possible by the particular meaning attached to the Chiang regime in terms of traditional Chinese practices. As indicates above, this study addresses the latter question in order to complement the explanation of the former question—that is, by examining how the Chiang regime on Taiwan and the legitimate government of ‘China’ in the eyes of the Japanese were ‘fixed’ by the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy for two decades under US hegemony.
1.4 Studies on ‘returning virtue for malice’ (*yide baoyuan or ongiron*): existing decision-making analyses (7) and beyond

Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘magnanimous’ decisions: beliefs. In contrast to a number of works which mention Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy in passing, Lin Chin-ching (1984: Ch.2, 1987: Ch.1, 1992a, 1992b, 1997) provides the most comprehensive account on the subject to date. According to the authoritative account provided by Lin who was once referred to as Nationalist China’s ‘Mr. Japan’ (*Riben Xiansheng*) for his extensive diplomatic career involving Japan, Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy consists of the following:

1) the preservation of the Japanese imperial institution;
2) the repatriation of Japanese soldiers and civilians from China;
3) the prevention of divisive occupation of Japan;
4) and the relinquishment of war reparations from Japan.

First, Lin argues that Chiang advised Franklin D. Roosevelt to preserve the Japanese imperial institution at the Cairo Conference of 1943. Lin further argues that Chiang’s view was adopted by pro-Japanese American officials like Joseph C. Grew and Henry L. Stimson who pushed for the preservation of the Japanese imperial institution. Otherwise, Lin suggests, Japan would have been divided just as Germany. Second, Lin argues that Chiang, unlike the Russians who detained Japanese nationals and forced them to labor in Siberia, not only swiftly repatriated more than two million Japanese
soldiers and civilians but also allowed each one of them 30 kilograms of luggage to take home. Lin emphasizes that it was the manifestation of Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ speech of 15 August 1945. Third, Lin argues that Chiang prevented the Soviet Union from dividing Japan by forfeiting to send Chinese occupation forces to the Kyushu region of Japan, which would have encouraged Moscow to send its occupation forces to Hokkaido after World War II. Fourth, according to Lin, Chiang not only relinquished war reparations from Japan but also dissuaded Philippino President Quirino from demanding eight-billion-dollar war reparations from the Japanese. As a result, Lin argues, Manila only demanded 550 million dollars from Japan while Taipei completely relinquished war reparations in the process of signing the bilateral treaty of peace with Tokyo in 1952. In terms of causation, Lin most obviously suggests that Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy was derived from Chiang’s beliefs such as Sunist Pan Asianism—which was based on Eastern humanism and morality rather than Western utilitarianism and coercion. More boldly, Lin even stretches the causal chain to the extent that Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ policy necessarily contributed to postwar Japan’s economic success.

Similar views are expressed by the elite and intelligentsia in both Japan and Taiwan, even though their causal mechanisms slightly differ from each other. For example, like Lin, Nationalist Chinese leaders such as Chang Chun (1980, 1988), Ho Ying-qin (1974), and Ku Cheng-kang (1971) mainly attribute Chiang’s policy to the influence of Sun Yat-sen in terms of Pan Asianism. On the other hand, Japanese conservative elites—such as Kaya Okinori (1976: 345-6), Nadao Hirokichi (1988), Okubo Denzo (1972), and conservative tycoon named Shikanai Nobutaka (1988)—
state Oriental morality or Confucianism as the cause of Chiang’s decisions. Kung Tetcheng (1988), a descendant of Confucius, also invokes Eastern morality based on Confucianism as the cause. More inclusively, Furuya Keiji (1975: 22-40, 1992: 357), editor of the ‘official’ biography of Chiang Kai-shek in Japanese, mentions anti-communism in addition to Confucianism and Pan Asianism. Wakamiya Yoshibuni (1995: 108-13, 1999: 125-31) also reaches similar conclusions in his work on postwar Japanese conservatives as he follows the works of Kaya (1976) and Furuya (1975). Chiang Wei-kuo (1991: 14-19), Generalissimo’s adopted half-Japanese son, also attributes his father’s behavior to his anti-communist belief. Interestingly, Kishi Nobusuke (1982: 142-3) and Ishii Mitsuiro (1976: 400-1), former prime minister and vice premier of Japan, reminisce their meetings with Chiang who accredited his own policy with such Oriental thought as the Way of Samurai that Chiang learned from Pan Asianists like Inukai Tsuyoshi and Toyama Mitsuru in prewar Japan. Yatsugi Kazuo (1973: 184), secretary general of the Commission for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation (Nikka Kyoryoku Iinkai), confirms the very similar accounts of Ishii and Kishi who also served the Commission as chair and vice chair respectively. Likewise, Shiozawa Minobu (1983: 65) reflects these views of the ‘Taiwan lobby’ in his biographical work on Chiang. Matsumoto Ayahiko (1996: 102-6) also mentions Chiang’s experience of receiving military training in Japan along with his beliefs like Oriental morality and Christian benevolence. In sum, according to these views of ‘returning virtue for malice’, Chiang’s postwar Japan policy can be attributed to his beliefs such as Confucianism, Pan Asianism, anti-communism, and Christianity.
To reiterate, the proponents of the 'returning virtue for malice' thesis commonly argue that Chiang Kai-shek's individual beliefs most robustly explain his foreign policy decision-making towards postwar Japan. Although they do not seem to agree on which particular set of beliefs influenced Chiang's decision-making, they nonetheless agree that his postwar Japan policy was 'magnanimous'. They tend to attribute Chiang's 'magnanimous' decision particularly to Eastern thought rather than universally to Western thought and religion—except for anti-communism and Christianity to which Chiang gave faith as a result of marrying a Methodist woman. Moreover, while Chinese elites tend to emphasize the role of Chiang's predecessor Sun Yat-sen, Japanese elites have a tendency to highlight the impact of Chiang's experience in prewar Japan. Nevertheless, the proponents of the 'returning virtue for malice' thesis highlight Chiang Kai-shek's humanistic beliefs rather than the situations in which Chiang arguably made the four decisions in a more utilitarian fashion as suggested below.

*Chiang's decisions under communist threats: rational calculations for survival.*

Among the scholars who explicitly challenge the 'returning virtue for malice' thesis, Zang Shijun (1997) provides the most comprehensive alternative explanations as he disputes all *four* issues of the thesis. First, in regard to the imperial institution of Japan, Zang argues that the United States most decisively influenced the preservation of the emperor system since it was Washington that single-handedly occupied Japan after the war (Ibid.: 35). Therefore, according to Zang, the Japanese imperial institution was ensured *not* because of Chiang Kai-shek, who could neither pay sufficient attention nor
have his say in the matter since he was preoccupied with the civil war in China (Ibid.).

Second, regarding the repatriation of Japanese soldiers and civilians from China, Zang argues that Chiang swiftly repatriated the Japanese in order to take over their arms and resources and to seek the possibility of jointly fighting against the Chinese Communists (Ibid.: 35-6). Third, as for preventing Moscow from dividing Japan after the war, Zang counter-argues that Chiang declined to send occupation forces to Japan because it was simply beyond his ability to do so (Ibid.: 37). Zang argues that Chiang was preoccupied with taking over Japanese troops in the midst of the civil war while his troops were remotely stationed in the heart of China, Chongqing (Ibid.). Fourth, on the relinquishing of reparations, Zang points out that Chiang actually demanded reparations, but his demand was turned down by the Japanese on the ground that the Nationalist regime did not represent all of China since the mainland was already under Communist rule (Ibid.: 36-7). Therefore, for Zang, Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy was his strategy to re-align with the Japanese and use their military resources against the Chinese Communists (Ibid.: 34-7). In other words, Zang suggests that Chiang’s postwar Japan policy was not a product of his beliefs but that of rational calculations under the Chinese Communist threat.

By limiting his discussion to the imperial institution, repatriation, and occupation issues, Eto Shinkishi (1967: 127-9) also explicitly challenges the ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis. Under the rubric of the ‘debt of gratitude thesis’ (ongiron), Eto challenges the thesis by arguing that Chiang’s decisions on these three issues were based on Chiang’s rational calculations in the context of the civil war in China. In order to defend his argument that Chiang made rational choices under the given
conditions, Eto highlights the environment in which Chiang revisited his 'returning virtue for malice' speech in May 1948 and June 1951 respectively. Eto suggests that communists threats reflected in the intensification of the Chinese civil war and the Korean War explain why Chiang repeatedly made 'magnanimous' announcements towards Japan. Eto then suggests that Chiang's decisions on the three issues were also situationally constrained. Moreover, Eto deconstructs the 'returning virtue for malice' thesis based on Chiang's beliefs by contrasting Chiang's attitude towards these three issues with his stance towards the issue of sovereignty over Okinawa—which Chiang never magnanimously renounced at Cairo in 1943 and thereafter. In short, Eto argues that Chiang's decisions—to support the Japanese imperial institution, repatriate the Japanese from mainland China, and refrain from sending occupation forces to Japan—were not results of his 'magnanimous' beliefs, but they were rational choices that Chiang made under communists threats.

Similarly, by focusing on the issues of the imperial institution, repatriation, and reparations, Otake Hideo (1992: 44-6) and Hatano Sumio (1995: 58-61) engage with the returning virtue for malice thesis. According to Otake's alternative explanation, Chiang had the need to avoid weakening or rubbing Japan the wrong way because he anticipated conflicts with both Russian and Chinese Communists in the foreseeable future. Otake points out that Chiang was neither able to spare a division for duty in Japan nor able to play a role as one of four world policemen as expected by Roosevelt. Otake then invokes the fact that the mere survival of Chiang's own regime heavily depended on the United States as his evidence for Chiang's lack of capabilities. Similarly, according to Hatano's alternative argument, Chiang made conciliatory
decisions because his regime needed the United States’ protection as well as Japan’s cooperation in order to survive and hedge against the Chinese Communists. As to secondary sources for his counter-argument on the reparations issue, Hatano cites the works of Ishii (1987), Song (1993), and Yin (1994) which reveal that the Chiang regime had aggressively demanded a huge amount of reparations earlier at Cairo in 1943 and at Taipei in 1952. Actually, for the reparations issue alone, Zhu (1992) and Kawashima (2000) also argue along the lines of these works. Nevertheless, for both Otake and Hatano, Chiang’s decisions on these three issues were not based on his beliefs but rational calculations to survive under the given circumstances of communist expansion.

Furthermore, in regard to the imperial institution and repatriation issues, the progressive Tokyo trial expert Awaya Kentaro (1994b, 1995) challenges the thesis of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. As to the Japanese imperial institution, Awaya (1994b: 60-72) argues that Chiang’s support for the emperor system was part of his effort to prevent the expansion of communism in Japan and the world at large by collaborating with Washington. In terms of repatriation, Awaya (1995:16-17) radically describes the notion of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as something ‘extremely bogus’. Awaya refers to the fact that General Okamura Yasuiji, Japanese Commander in Chief of the Expeditionary Forces in China, secretly served as Chiang’s military advisor after Okamura was found not guilty of any war crime in China. Thus, Awaya suggests that Chiang delivered his ‘returning virtue for malice’ speech and repatriated Japanese troops from China in order to assure that the Japanese give up their arms to the Chinese Nationalists rather than the
Communists. In exchange, as Awaya points out, Japanese military officers were acquitted of war crimes in China. Put differently, according to Awaya’s alternative explanation, Chiang adopted the measures to support the Japanese imperial institution and repatriate the Japanese from China not because of his altruistic beliefs but because of his selfish interests to survive under communist threats.

By the same token, referring to the issues of the imperial institution and occupation, Iokibe Makoto (1985: 165-7) invokes the communist threat posed by the Soviet Union as the alternative reason why Chiang adopted his postwar Japan policy. According to Iokibe, insomuch as Chiang feared Moscow’s connections with the Chinese Communists, it was not in the interests of Chiang to boost Soviet influences by excessively weakening Japan. Iokibe also suggests that Chiang was vigilant enough not to have Japan against him unnecessarily with the already imminent Soviet threat, against which Chiang obviously sought Washington’s support. Accordingly, like others, Iokibe challenges the ‘returning virtue for malice’ argument by providing his alternative explanation that Chiang’s decisions to support the Japanese imperial institution and not to send occupation forces to Japan were rationally calculated given the situation in which Chiang faced communist threats across the Sino-Soviet borders.

Finally, regarding the issues of repatriation and occupation, Uno Shigeaki (1982, 1995) challenges the ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis by drawing attention to communist threats in the Northeastern region of China where Japanese forces were in control for more than a decade. According to Uno (1982: 25-8; 1995: 405-8), although Chiang first agreed with Washington to send his occupation forces to Japan, he was later forced to cancel the plan as the civil war intensified in China. Instead, Chiang sent
the forces to the Northeastern region. In terms of repatriation, Uno (1982: 19-21, 1995: 339-401) suggests that Chiang’s decision was made in order to collaborate with the Japanese, thereby preventing the Chinese Communists from penetrating into the Northeastern region which was militarily beyond Chiang’s control. In fact, Uno’s situational logic for repatriation can be nicely complemented by Ishii Akira’s (1998: 167) finding that the Chinese Communists also repatriated the Japanese from the areas in which there were no military conflicts between them and the Nationalists. Moreover, Ishii further confirms Uno’s logic by adding that neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Mao Zedong was ‘magnanimous’ in the areas of confrontation where large numbers of Japanese casualties were ruthlessly piled up. In sum, Uno’s counter-arguments—supported by Ishii’s findings—indicate that Chiang’s decisions on the two issues were derived situationally from communist threats rather than his ‘magnanimous’ beliefs.

To sum up, these alternative explanations to the ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis commonly attribute Chiang Kai-shek’s Japan policy decision-making to the given Cold War environment in which Chiang faced communist threats and calculated his choice to survive. First, Chiang supported the Japanese imperial institution because it was vital for Chiang to align with the United States and Japan and fight against communist threats in and out of China. Nonetheless, his support was not decisive for the retention of the Japanese emperor system since it was the United States that had the final say in the destiny of the imperial institution. Second, Chiang repatriated Japanese soldiers and civilians from mainland China in order to take over Japanese military resources and use them against the communists. Third, Chiang could not dispatch occupation forces to Japan because he sent them to the Northeastern region of China.
where he raced with the communists to take over Japanese arms. Fourth, Chiang failed to receive Japanese reparations because Tokyo refused to compensate for mainland China which Chiang lost to the Chinese Communists. In the meantime, Chiang had to follow the US policy of abandoning Japanese reparations insomuch as Chiang needed Washington’s support to fight against communist threats. Simply put, according to these alternative accounts, the ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis attributes Chiang Kai-shek’s postwar Japan policy to his ‘magnanimous’ beliefs spuriously.

Beyond Chiang’s decision-making?: Japan’s indebtedness to the Chiang regime. There are other forerunners whose works refer to the effects of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. On the one hand, they come short of centrally focusing on Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy or empirically showing how its effects were brought into ‘reality’ as they only mention them in passing. On the other hand, these works nonetheless suggest that the ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy did affect Japan’s China policy as well as the formation of a ‘pro-Taipei’ coalition in Japanese politics during the Cold War era. Put differently, in spite of their shortcomings, these precursors’ works as heuristic devices show the ways in which we can extend the existing studies on Chiang Kai-shek’s postwar Japan policy beyond decision-making analysis.

First, Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy contributed to blocking the possibility of normalizing relations between Tokyo and Beijing for two decades. For instance, as one of the reasons why Tokyo ‘failed to adopt a more independent China policy once sovereignty
had been restored’, John W. Dower (1979: 412-3) points out that the ‘conservative
Japanese governments professed a sense of obligation to the Kuomintang regime,
under which Chiang Kai-shek had adopted an exceptionally conciliatory policy toward
Japan on such critical issues as reparations, war criminals, and maintenance of
emperor’. More specifically, as Yoshitsu (1982: 68) mentions, Prime Minister Yoshida
Shigeru ‘felt grateful to Chiang for the early repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war’,
despite the fact that Yoshida feared ‘any commitment to Taiwan would be at the
expense of Japan’s future ties to the Mainland’. Similarly, Iguchi Sadao (1971: 110),
former Japanese ambassador to the Republic of China, attributes a ‘feeling among the
Japanese people of gratitude and closeness to Nationalist China’ to ‘Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of returning Japan’s “malice” with “virtue”’. Wolf Mendl
(1995: 78-9) also refers to ‘Chiang’s “magnanimity” over the issue of reparations’ as
one of the examples of the ‘Romantic sentiment’ that accompanied the calculations of
Realpolitik in the Japanese approach to China after World War II. In addition, Ikei
Masaru (1974: 46) and Kusano Atsushi (1980: 23, 25, 30) suggest that a sense of
‘moral obligation’ to Chiang’s postwar policy constrained Japan’s China policy during
the 1950s. Moreover, Ishii Akira (2002: 367-8) explicitly states that the Japanese ‘debt
of gratitude to Chiang Kai-shek’ prevented Tokyo from severing relations with Taipei
and normalizing relations with Beijing in the 1960s. Furthermore, Nathan N. White
(1971: 659) refers to the ‘sense of obligation felt by many conservative Japanese to
Chiang Kai-shek for his magnanimous (and shrewd) treatment of the defeated Japanese
army’ as one of the most valuable assets Taiwan had in order to wield influence on
Japan between 1955 and 1970. For White, it was Taipei’s asset to ‘ensure that Japan
does not take any step which might undermine the legitimacy of the Republic of China
or suggest an implicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Peking government’ (Ibid.: 81). Accordingly, Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ generated a ‘sense of moral obligation’ among the Japanese, thereby helping to make Tokyo’s recognition of Beijing virtually impossible for two decades.

Second, the formation of a ‘pro-Taipei’ political coalition in Japan as well as Tokyo’s favorabe policy towards Taipei can also be attributed to Japan’s ‘indebtedness’ to Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ policy after the war. For example, in examining Japanese conservative leaders’ attitudes towards Taiwan, Douglas Mendel (1970: 205) refers to Kaya Okinori, the ‘most pro-Nationalist leader’ in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and highlights that ‘Japan is under indebtedness to Generalissimo Chiang’. Mendel also presents his interview with Ishii Mitsuijiro, another influential pro-Nationalist conservative, in 1962 as the following: ‘The Nationalists do expect Japanese economic aid because of Nationalist leniency on the reparations issue, and Prime Minister Ikeda seems well-disposed toward granting them economic credits’ (Ibid.: 208). Fukui Haruhiro (1969: 314, 1970: 252), in his definitive account of the ‘pro-Taipei group’ within the LDP, refers to the group’s ‘emotional argument that, at the end of World War II, Chiang Kai-shek treated the Japanese in China, including prisoners of war, with unparalleled magnanimity, and that the Japanese are morally bound to repay his kindess’. Here, as a typical example, Fukui mentions the National Welcome Party that the Japanese government held for Chiang Kai-shek’s Special Envoy, Chang Chun, in September 1957 (Ibid.). He then points out that the official declaration of this mass rally referred to Chiang’s four decisions as
“magnanimous” acts’ towards postwar Japan (ibid.). Similarly, Chae-jin Lee’s (1976: 52) discussion on the Asian Problems Study Group (Ajia Mondai Kenkyukai), which was organized by pro-Taiwan LDP dietmen, refers to Kaya Okinori’s statement from 1966 and invokes Chiang’s postwar Japan policy as the ‘four basic reasons for Japan’s “indebtedness” to Nationalist China’. Following in Lee’s footsteps, Phil Deans (2002a: 90-1) refers to Kaya (1976) and lists the same contents of ‘returning malice with virtue’ as ‘four main reasons’ behind supporting Nationalist China. Deans (2002b: 166-7), again like Lee, also points out that ‘the legacy of Chiang Kai-shek’s “generosity” towards Japan at the end of the war’ contributed to membership of the pro-Nationalist group in the LDP (Ibid.: 166-7). Deans additionally states that these Taiwan supporters in Japan mobilized the ‘central myth of “returning malice with virtue” to promote relations between Japan and Taiwan’ (Ibid.: 167). Quansheg Zhao (1993: 140) also argues that the ‘support of Taiwan by many old hawks (leader of the Asian Studies Group such as Kishi and Kaya, and later the Sato-Fukuda leadership) partially came about as a result of their memory of the KMT’s treatment of Japanese soldiers in China after 1945, when Chiang declared that China would not retaliate against the Japanese for what they did to the Chinese and assured the safe return of most soldiers’. Finally, Wakamiya Yoshibumi (1995, 1999) discusses the ‘pro-Taiwan faction and “repaying violence with virtue”’ and refers to ‘repaying violence with virtue’ as factional ‘motto with an anti-communist motive’. In short, these works suggest that Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ policy had an impact on postwar Japan to the extent that the ‘memory’ of Chiang’s ‘magnanimous acts’ was
used by Japanese conservative politicians to form a ‘pro-Taipei group’ and wield influence on Japan’s China policy.

In sum, from reviewing these existing works that cursorily mention the effects of Chiang Kai-shek’s postwar Japan policy, one can get a glimpse of the ways in which studies on the policy of ‘returning virtue for malice’ can be extended beyond decision-making analysis. First, existing works on effects can be substantially expanded by the empirical examination of how Japan’s recognition of Beijing was made virtually impossible. Second, the existing literature on effects can be also extended further by empirically analyzing how the ‘pro-Taipei’ group came to use the ‘memory’ of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘magnanimous acts’ and influence Japan’s China policy. Nevertheless, while the existing literature on effects suggests the directions in which studies on Chiang Kai-shek’s postwar Japan policy can be extended beyond decision-making analysis, they fall far short of showing how it can be done methodologically.

1.5 Methodology: genealogy as discourse analysis (8)

This study adopts discourse analysis in order to address its research question. More precisely, the author of the present study draws on the genealogical method of discourse analysis in particular (Milliken 1999, 2001). By ‘genealogy’, the author means ‘a way of reading history through discourse to find out how power/knowledge circulates’ (Carabine 2001: 276). The author refers to ‘discourse’ as ‘a group of statements which provide a language for talking about—a way of representing the knowledge about—a particular topic at a particular historical moment’ (Hall 1992: 291; 1997: 44; 2001: 73). This study is a genealogy that highlights how a dominant
discourse involves the 'relations of power in which unity with the past is artificially conserved and order is created from conditions of disorder' (Milliken 1999: 243, 2001: 152-3).

This genealogical study focuses on one particular discourse diachronically while discourse analysis can also be conducted synchronically examining contending discourses (Waever 2002: 41). Generally, the synchronic variant of discourse analysis only specifies the multiple possibilities or options framed by contending discourses without indicating which possibility or option is more likely to be the final choice or 'reality' (Ibid.: 28). By the same token, the synchronic analysis falls short of showing how the choice or 'reality' persists or changes across time. Therefore, in order to better understand the emergence, persistence, and dislocation of discursive constructions (Fischer 2003: 85; Griggs and Howarth 2002: 110), this genealogical study mainly examines a single discourse across time rather than multiple discourses at the same time.

The point of departure: common sense. This genealogical study begins by critically examining how Chiang Kai-shek's regime was articulated in terms of his 'returning virtue for malice' postwar Japan policy. The author uses 'articulation' to mean 'the process through which meaning is produced out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources' (Weldes 1996: 284, 1999: 98; Laffey and Weldes 1997: 202-3, 2004: 28-9). The author first tackles the question of what works as 'cultural raw materials' and 'linguistic resources' in different societies or within a society such as Japan and China (Milliken 1999: 239, 2001: 149). More simply, the author addresses
where discourses—such as Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy—come from (Yee 1996: 100). Discourses are first constructed based on the logic that is already available in society, and these conceptual codes are subsequently reproduced and modified to set conditions for political struggles (Waever 2002: 30-1). Over time, dominant discourses reach the point of establishing themselves as common sense. That is why this study ‘retroduces’ what has been taken for granted as common sense through the empirical analysis of its realization in practices (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 28).

More specifically, this discourse analysis de-naturalizes the dominant representation of Chiang Kai-shek as the benefactor to whom the Japanese must repay their ‘debt of gratitude’ for his ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy (Weldes et al. 1999: 19-21). Put differently, it problematizes a particular dominant discursive construction by showing that it is contingent and political (Howarth 2000: 134-5). By denaturalizing or problematizing the dominant discourse across time, this study suggests the transformation of the dominant discursive construction as well as the re-imagining of the matter of concern such as Japan’s recognition of the ROC and US hegemony (Ibid.; Weldes et al. 1999: 21). In this way, this discourse analysis de-naturalizes what has been naturalized as common sense over time and ‘challenges taken-for-granted understandings and undermine the tendency to reify and solidify knowledge’ (Phillips and Hardy 2002: 84).

*Power and politics: agents and discourse coalitions.* Since discourse analysis is about power and politics (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 29-30), this study focuses on the role of
the political actors who ‘articulate’ or make the ‘fit’ between ‘the general ideological context, existing political institutions, and pressing political concerns’ (Hemmer and Katzenstein: 596). However, ‘the “fit” does not just happen’ but it is ‘actively constructed’ (Laffey and Weldes 1997: 203). Thus, discourse analysis needs to identify ‘who is doing the talking and where they are located in the network of social power’ (Hughes 2002: 2, 2005: 248). Put differently, discourse analysis such as this study identifies the ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ and how they politically ‘designate a world and “fill” it with certain dramas, subjects, histories and dilemmas’ (O’Tuathail and Agnew 1992: 194).

Moreover, this genealogical study adopts the concept of ‘discourse coalitions’ (Fischer 2003: Ch. 5)—whose members share particular ways of thinking about and discussing matters of their concern (Ibid.: 107)—in order to account for change over time. Many of existing genealogical studies are ‘quasi-structuralist’ to the extent that they are largely about how dominant discourses have been ‘continuous’ (Milliken 1999: 246-8, 2001: 155-7). For example, such ‘quasi-structuralist’ studies that retroduce dominant discourses do not help us understand how Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan was known to be ‘China’ until 1972—but not after that. It is mainly for this overlooked process of de-hegemonization, or dislocation (Howarth 2000; Howarth et al. 2000), that the present genealogical study adopts the concept of discourse coalitions. By identifying the decline of a certain discourse coalition in terms of the relationship between political actors and power in domestic politics, this genealogical study shows one of the ways in which such disempowerment of one particular discourse can take place.
Having said that, it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the shared beliefs of members of a particular coalition. Discourse coalitions are formed around ‘narrative storylines’ or discourses—rather than specific facts or cognitive beliefs—that attach meanings to events and courses of action in concrete social contexts (Fischer 2003: 102-3). Discourse coalitions tell us about ‘how individuals interact with other individuals to create webs of meaning with which they can make sense of a complex reality’ (Ibid.: 113). The members of discourse coalitions respond to simplified storylines or discourses—that are often ‘vague on particular points and, at times, contradictory on others’ such as the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’—to relate to each other symbolically (Ibid.: 102-3). By the same token, discourse coalitions are sustained not by a set of core beliefs but by the reliable and trusted members who institutionally arrange their coalitions (Ibid.: 108-9). In this sense, (re)producing discourse coalitions is not only about ‘what is said, it is also a matter of who said it’ (Ibid.). For that reason, instead of examining the beliefs actually held by the members of a particular discourse coalition, this study pays attention to the institutional aspect of the discourse coalition.

*Cultural code of intelligibility: moral reciprocity.* In terms of the ways in which the world is interpreted by different cultures or the other ways in which ‘people’s being-in-the world’ can be transformed (Milliken 1999: 243-4, 2001: 153), this genealogical study examines the power of traditional moral discourse—such as the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse. It does so by probing how political actors of client states use it to make sense of each other under hegemony they themselves constitute. The author
shows that the resonance of moral reciprocity, or a cultural ‘code of intelligibility’
(Weldes et al. 1999), can be attributed to hegemonic practices of the past—such as
those from the ‘Chinese world order’ based on moral governance, ‘Confucian-style’
Japanese hegemony, and the Sunist roots of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ during the
prewar era (Fairbank 1968; Collcutt 1991; Jansen 1954). By looking beneath the
hegemonic discourse of rational choice in terms of costs and benefits, this study sheds
light on the parasitic discourse of moral reciprocity—which compels the social debtor,
such as the Japanese, to repay the social creditor, like Chiang Kai-shek, in order to
restore moral balance (Lebra 1976).

Cases and materials. In terms of case studies (Chapters 3, 4, 5 of this study), the author
has selected ‘crucial cases’ (Eckstein 1975; George 1979a), in which Japan’s
recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek regime as the legitimate government of ‘China’
was called into question over three decades following the end of World War II (Ikei
1973, 1982, 1992; Hosoya 1993). Here, the author executes the ‘process tracing’
procedure to examine the possible ‘congruence’ between Tokyo’s diplomatic
recognition of Taipei and the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse (George 1979b;
George and McKeown 1985; Bennett and George 2001). In this way, as this
genepathological study reads the history of Japan–‘China’ relations through the traditional
discourse to find out how power/knowledge circulates as mentioned earlier, it
efficiently focuses on a small number of the ‘crucial cases’ involving Japan and ‘two
Chinas’ even though theoretical rigor may nevertheless be sacrificed for historical
richness to a certain degree (Jervis 1985, 1991).
As for materials, this study mainly refers to those that have already been published since it is beyond the ability of the author to conduct major archival work, for which he lacks proper training. Besides, official archives in Japan and the Republic of China on Taiwan have not been as accessible as those in Western liberal democracies in terms of the declassification of documents. In the meantime, this study nonetheless complements such shortcomings as it makes extensive use of official and semi-official publications as well as memoirs and oral history in Japanese, Mandarin, and English in addition to secondary sources in those three languages. The use of materials in Japanese and Mandarin in particular enables this critical constructivist study to understand Japan-China relations under US hegemony through meanings and practices in international relations from within East Asia.

### 1.6 Chapter Outline

In Chapter 2, the author critically introduces the notion of ‘returning virtue for malice’ by tracing its descent as well as its emergence. After presenting the common sense of ‘returning virtue for malice’, the author denaturalizes two components of the common sense—namely, Chiang’s ‘foundational’ speech of 15 August 1945 and his four decisions concerning postwar Japan. The author then challenges the ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis which attributes Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy to his beliefs such as Pan Asianism. Subsequently, the author suggests that Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy can be more usefully conceived as discourse—a variant of the ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ discourse. While the discourse of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ can at least be traced back to the 1870s, the author
emphasizes its ‘Sunist roots’ in the 1920s and 1930s—which provided raw resources for Chiang Kai-shek and the construction of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse after the war. Finally, the author delineates four points of emergence for the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ or ‘magnanimity’ in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The author points out that they were Nationalist Chinese attempts to participate in the signing of the multilateral peace treaty with Japan, thereby establishing its position as the legitimate government of ‘China’ under US hegemony. In conclusion, the author recapitulates his arguments on the descent and emergence of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and briefly previews the chapter that follows.

Chapter 3 discusses the rise of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and US hegemony in East Asia between 1948 and 1952. In this chapter, the author argues the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ facilitated Japan’s diplomatic recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan as ‘China’ under US hegemony in 1952, thereby constituting the so-called ‘San Francisco system’. More specifically, while the author admits that Washington’s pressure clearly constrained Tokyo, he nonetheless argues the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ still played an indispensable role since the American pressure did not determine Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Taipei. First, the author sheds light on the ‘reverse course’ in US occupation policy towards Japan by showing how American and Japanese elites collaborated to make Japan (rather than China) an American bastion of the Cold War in East Asia as they pursued hegemony and independence respectively. In the process, the author draws attention to the Anglo-American agreement not to invite ‘Chinese’ representatives to the signing of the multilateral peace treaty with Japan as well as the production of the
so-called ‘Yoshida letter’ in the making of the ‘San Francisco system’. Second, the author closely examines the rise of ‘returning virtue for malice’ by tracing the discursive formation of ‘China’ in the context of Japan-ROC bilateral negotiations that compensated for the absence of ‘China’ in the multilateral peace treaty signed in San Francisco. While the discourse provided the common language for both sides to settle various issues, the author highlights the discursive effect on the Japanese to call a bilateral treaty the treaty of peace during the negotiations in Taipei—against the will of their prime minister in Tokyo. The author also points out the subsequent diffusion of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse into the Japanese elite. He then concludes by summarizing his argument and briefly introducing the following chapter in the conclusion.

In Chapter 4, the author demonstrates the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as well as the construction of ‘China’ under US hegemony were most firmly embedded in Japan between 1952 and 1964, thanks to the formation of the hegemonic discourse coalition within Japanese conservative hegemony known as the ‘1955 system’. In arguing for the heyday of ‘returning virtue for malice’, the author first traces the gradual formation of the discourse coalition in terms of the resurrection of prewar Japanese imperialists in postwar Japan, especially those Sunists. Secondly, the author reveals how those prewar Japanese imperialists were ‘unleashed’ to represent American hegemony and construct Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ through the hegemonic discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’. Thirdly, the author demonstrates the dominance of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition in a crisis of recognition in the 1950s as he shows how they destroyed
Communist China's trade relations with Japan by blocking Beijing's attempt to politicize economic relations with Japan. Fourthly, the author examines the role played by the 'returning virtue for malice' discourse and its coalition in another crisis of recognition in the 1960s. The author sheds light on two versions of the so-called 'second Yoshida letter' of 1964, the production of which saved Tokyo's diplomatic relations with Taipei. Finally, the author concludes by summing up his argument and briefly discussing the following chapter.

Chapter 5 discusses the decline of 'returning virtue for malice' and US hegemony between 1964 and 1972. Put differently, the author traces the degeneration of the '1955 system' as well as that of the 'San Francisco system', which eventually led to Taipei's de-recognition of Tokyo in 1972. At the same time, in spite of such degeneration, the author also stresses the resilience of the 'returning virtue for malice' discourse and its coalition in terms of their ability to delimit what pro-Beijing Japanese elites could say and could not say about Japan-ROC relations. As for the process of analysis, the author first describes the gradual erosion of the '1955 system'—which the 'returning virtue for malice' discourse and its coalition constituted—and shows how it was bifurcated over the 'China question' during this period. Here, the author focuses on the emergent rivalry between two policy groups within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in terms of the pro-Taipei group and the pro-Beijing group. Second, the author demonstrates the de-legitimation of Chiang Kai-shek's 'China' in the international community—which indicated the erosion of the 'San Francisco system' as well as US hegemony in East Asia—and its impact on the discourse coalition of 'returning virtue for malice' in Japan. The author points out that the hegemonic
discourse coalition of 'returning virtue for malice' in Japanese politics were seriously undermined by the 'expulsion' of Taipei from the UN in 1971. The author attributes such decline to the lack of Tokyo and Taipei's clear and timely consent to Washington's 'two Chinas' policy at the UN. The author then argues that the severing of Japan-ROC relations could very well have been avoided in 1972 if Taipei had managed to remain in the UN in 1971. Third, the author highlights the final Japanese official visit to Taipei made by Special Envoy Shiina Etsusaburo in September 1972. Here, the author re-emphasizes the resilience of the 'returning virtue for malice' discourse and its coalition as he discusses Japan-ROC relations on the eve of Taipei's de-recognition of Tokyo in the fall of 1972. The author then concludes by stating that the discourse of 'returning virtue for malice' and its coalition lost their power to the extent that it was no longer possible for them to fix 'China' and Chiang Kai-shek's 'returning virtue for malice' postwar Japan policy.

In Chapter 6, the author first summarizes the main argument along with theoretical and methodological themes of this study in general terms. He intellectually locates the main argument of this critical constructivist work within the field of international relations (IR). At the same time, the author highlights the significance of this critical constructivist study in the literature of Japanese IR in the context of 'regionalization' that is said to be taking place in the discipline of IR. He also reiterates the methodological aspect of this critical constructivist research by referring to the literature on Chiang Kai-shek’s 'returning virtue for malice' postwar Japan policy. The second part of this final chapter more specifically discusses the implications of this genealogical study. One of the implications is on the possible transformation of US
hegemony as well as collaboration between client states like Japan and the ROC under American hegemony as this discourse analysis indicates that different groups and cultures attach different meanings to what constitutes the world. This genealogical investigation also has an implication in terms of a historical lesson vis-à-vis the principle of 'one China'—that a 'two Chinas' policy exercised by the legitimate government of China could have a deterring effect on the rival Chinese regime that seeks external legitimacy by adhering to the principle of 'one China'. Finally, this final chapter concludes by recommending one of the ways in which further study can be conducted.

Notes

1) For 'how-possible' questions, see von Wright (1971) and Doty (1993, 1996).

2) By the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek's 'returning virtue for malice' postwar Japan policy, the author means the way of representing Chiang Kai-shek as the benefactor to whom the Japanese must repay their 'debt of gratitude' for his 'magnanimous' Japan policy after the war.

3) For explanation and understanding, see von Wright (1971) and Hollis and Smith (1990).

4) The concept of articulation, according to Hall (1986: 53), 'has a nice double meaning because “articulate” means to utter, to speak forth, to be articulate....we also speak of an “articulated” lorry (truck): a lorry where the front (cab) and back (trailer) can, but need not necessarily, be connected to one another. The two parts are connected to each other, but through a specific linkage, that can be broken.' Thus, it refers to the
establishment of links between different linguistic elements, which in turn make up an identifiable whole (Weldes 1996: 284, 1999: 98). Through repetition, ‘these linguistic elements come to seem as though they are inherently or necessarily connected, and the meaning they produce come to seem natural, come to seem an accurate description of reality’ or commonsense (Ibid.: 98-9).

5) For the concept of culture in international relations, see Walker (1984, 1990) and Weldes et al. (1999). Culture, is used here to mean ‘the context within which people give meanings to their actions and experiences and make sense of their lives’ (Tomlinson 1991: 7). Thus, culture provides the ‘multiplicity of discourses’ or ‘codes of intelligibility’ for understanding the world (Weldes et al. 1999: 1-2, 13).

6) It is far beyond the scope of this study to fully engage with the so-called ‘agent-structure debate’ in IR (Adler 2002: 104-6), which is closely linked to ‘why’ and ‘how-possible’ questions discussed here (Smith 2000a; Wendt 1999, 2000). Rather, the author simply draws on the complementary view that there are always two stories to tell and that they are driven by two different types of questions in order to locate this study intellectually (Hollis and Smith: 1994; Wendt 2000).

7) For foreign policy decision-making, see Snyder et al. (1954, 1962, 2002) and Carlsnaes (2002).

2

The discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’

2.1 Introduction: ‘returning virtue for malice’ as common sense

Chiang Kai-shek died on 5 April 1975. (1) All the major Japanese newspapers published editorial comments on his death by referring to his ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy (Ikei 1988: 120-2). Even the most progressive one covered it in the following fashion (Asahi Shinbun 7 April 1975, author’s translation): ‘We’d also like to pray for the repose of his soul…. At the end of the war, President Chiang Kai-shek addressed his nation about “remembering not evil against others and returning virtue for malice” (kio wo togamezu, toku wo motte urami ni mukuïyo). As a result, the majority of more than two million Japanese soldiers and civilians were able to return home safely from the Continent. That is something many of us Japanese still cannot forget today.’ Others also regretfully discussed Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy in conjunction with the severing of diplomatic relations with Japan as well as the principle of ‘one China’ (Mainichi Shinbun 7 April 1975; Yomiuri Shinbun 7 April 1975).
Subsequently, Japanese people even built a Shinto shrine to deify Chiang Kai-shek. According to the ‘History of the Chiang Kai-shek Shrine’ (Chusei Jinja Yuisho) which is written on the signpost in front of the Shrine (author’s translation):

“This Shinto shrine is to deify the Late President of the Republic of China Chiang Kai-shek. His Excellency Chiang Kai-shek at the end of World War II announced that “returning virtue for malice (urami ni mukuiru ni toku wo motte seyo) is a tradition of the Chinese nation” and took the measures of “opposing the divisive occupation of Japan, relinquishing his demand for war reparations from Japan, preserving the imperial institution in Japan, and immediately repatriating more than two million Japanese soldiers and civilians from the Chinese mainland.” As a consequence of these measures, Japan is able to thrive today. In retrospect, there was no other head of state who took such magnanimous measures towards the defeated nation. We must “return gratitude for great kindness” (daion ni mukuiru ni rei wo motte subeki). Thus, we construct a Shinto shrine here in token of our sincere and everlasting gratitude. “Returning virtue for malice” as a principle of world peace will eternally honor His Excellency Chiang Kai-shek’s virtue and glorify his magisterial benevolence.”
More than 11 years after his death, nation-wide memorial meetings were still held in Japan to mark the centennial (3) of Chiang Kai-shek’s birth (Goldstein 1986). These meetings, in fact, were held in memory of his ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy (Ibid). On 4 September 1986, more than 5000 people—including 130 members of the Japanese National Diet—gathered in Tokyo. It was the first of the five meetings which were scheduled to take place in major Japanese cities such as Osaka, Fukuoka, Nagoya, and Sapporo in the period running up to Chiang’s birthday of 31 October. Former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, who made a toast under Chiang’s portrait for the occasion, addressed that ‘(t)he Japanese people should never forget the benevolence (Mr.) Chiang showed our nation’ (Ibid.). Sato Shinji, a dietman and son of former Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, similarly stated that President Chiang’s ‘virtue laid the foundation for today’s prosperity in Japan’ (Ibid.). By organizing these memorial meetings, the Japanese also meant to make an implicit apology for the abrupt manner in which diplomatic relations between their nation and Chiang’s ‘China’ were severed (Ibid.).

Furthermore, on 31 October 1986, the very day Chiang Kai-shek would have become a centenarian, Japanese people erected a monument to commemorate his ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. According to the ‘History’ (Yuisha) of the ‘Monument for Honoring His Excellency Chiang Kai-shek’s Virtue’ (Shoko Shotokuhi) (4) which is engraved on a piece of black granite placed on one side of the wall that surrounds
'Mr. Chiang Kai-shek was born in Zhejiang Province of China in 1887. He studied at the Shinbu Gakko of the Japanese Army. The Nationalist Revolution took place while he was serving in the Regiment of Takada after he had completed his preparatory training at the Shinbu Gakko. He immediately returned to China to participate in the revolution. Thereafter, he endeavored to establish and stabilize the Republic of China. He eventually became the paramount leader of China. Although he had been involved in an unwanted war with Japan since 1931, he not only immediately made an announcement calling for “returning virtue for malice” (yide baoyuan or urami ni mukiru ni toku wo motte seyo) as soon as the war ended in 1945 but also put it into practice himself. That is: He made efforts to preserve the imperial institution of our nation, thereby maintaining the national polity; He prevented us from becoming a divided nation by opposing the divisive occupation of our nation; He exempted us from paying an enormous amount of war reparations; He devoted his energies to safely and swiftly repatriating our soldiers and fellow-countrymen from China. As a result, Japan is able to thrive today. That is why, we, the Japanese nation, must never forget these
favors. Particularly, Mr. Chiang’s idea of ‘returning virtue for malice’, which is based on Chinese Confucian thought, constitutes the foundation of Oriental morality. Mr. Chiang’s great virtue for realizing this idea set the moral standard which we Japanese must honor and pass onto posterity as the precept. At this centennial of His Excellency Chiang Kai-shek’s birth...he has become a patron saint...we have been able to erect this Monument...where ancestors of the Emperor are enshrined. We herein honor His Excellency Chiang Kai-shek’s great virtue and eternally hand down to posterity our wish to repay a debt of gratitude.’

Accordingly, the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy has ‘outlived’ Chiang himself. In other words, the discourse has greatly resonated among the Japanese over the years that it has been accepted as common sense. As shown above, such common-sense status of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse among the Japanese has been reproduced through the media, cultural artifacts, political rituals, and so on. At the same time, it has been made commonsensical to many Japanese people because the Asian nation was already familiar with similar discourses on Confucian moral values and Sino-Japanese cooperation. In any case, over the years, Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy and Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang
have been made commonsensical and placed somewhat beyond question as a result.

It is the purpose of this chapter to call the discourse into question by critically examining what has been taken for granted (Weldes et al. 1999: 19-21). First, this chapter de-naturalizes Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘foundational’ announcement of 1945. It pluralizes what has been unified as the ‘foundation’ by tracing two other contending statements Chiang made in the 1920s and 1930s. Second, this chapter problematizes Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ decisions by deconstructing the ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis that is based on Chiang’s individual beliefs such as Sunist Pan Asianism. Third, this chapter re-conceptualizes Chiang’s postwar Japan policy as a variant of the ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ discourse. (5)

Here, it genealogically traces the Sunist roots of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ to the 1920s and 1930s in order to locate the ‘cultural raw materials’ and ‘linguistic resources’ (Weldes 1999: 98; Milliken 1999: 239, 2001: 148-9)—on which the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ was constructed after the war. Moreover, by tracing the rise and fall of the prewar Sunist coalition, the author identifies who the main actors were and where the coalition was located in the network of social power (Hughes 2002: 2, 2005: 248). Fourth, instead of erecting the unified foundation, this chapter delineates four points of emergence for Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ Japan policy as a postwar ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ discourse to gain Japan’s recognition. Here, again, it identifies the main proponents of the discourse and the site from which they circulated it (Ibid.; Hughes 2002:
Finally, this chapter concludes by recapitulating its main arguments regarding the descent and emergence of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as discourse. In short, it is the process of naturalization this chapter critically examines as it lays bare the constructedness of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy.

### 2.2 Denaturalizing the ‘returning virtue for malice’ announcement: prewar foundations of the postwar ‘foundation’?

kindness' (yibao baode). As shown below, these pieces of evidence problematize the commonsense-status of Chiang’s speech on 15 August 1945 as the ‘foundation’ of his ‘postwar’ Japan policy.

*Chiang Kai-shek’s statement of 6 March 1928: the Sunist foundation of the ‘foundation’?* It took place in Nanjing when Chiang Kai-shek invited a group of Japanese journalists to dinner roughly one month before he launched the second phase of the Northern Expedition. Chiang stated the following (Furuya 1979: 263, author’s translation):

‘The reason why our Premier Sun made his decision to ally with Russia in the past was that Russia demonstrated her willingness to assist our national revolution as she became the first power to advocate the cancellation of unfair treaties at the time. Thus, we saw her as a friend to collaborate with. However, from the time I launched the Northern Expedition until last year, the Russians never suited their action to their initial word. Moreover, they became even eager to destroy the foundations of the Nationalist revolution at any cost. Naturally, they, the Russians, became the enemies of our revolution. For that reason, I had no choice but to unflinchingly sever diplomatic relations with them (on 14 December 1927)....Nevertheless, the
severance of diplomatic relations with Russia this time does not necessarily mean eternal separation. If she repents her past mistakes and completely corrects her action today, obviously we can still resume our friendly relations. Confucian maxims such as "remember not evil against others" (bunian jiue) and "returning justice for malice" (yizhi baoyuan) represent the essence of our nation.'

At the same time, through these journalists just as he did through other channels, Chiang wooed the Japanese to support the Northern Expedition as follows (Furuya 1981: 239-40; Uno 1962: 217):

'...Japan and China have maintained very close relations...among the friendly powers only Japan is in a position to understand the real meaning of China's national revolution. And we are convinced that Japan, instead of trying to obstruct the progress of our revolution, wishes us well. We are about to resume the Northern Expedition. This is a struggle on which the very survival of the Chinese nation depends...We believe that the Japanese people want us to succeed...the success of our mission will enhance the happiness and prosperity of Asia and ensure the peace of the world. It is my
earnest hope that you will convey my sincere wishes to the Japanese people and government.'

As shown above, on this occasion, Chiang voluntarily characterized his own attitude towards Soviet Russia as 'returning justice for malice' (yizhi baoyuan)—which can also be translated as 'meet resentment with upright dealing' (Waley 1938: 189)—in front of a Japanese audience in mainland China (Furuya 1979: 263). Arguably, since Chiang Kai-shek himself never directly used the characterization of 'returning virtue for malice' as such in the 'foundational' speech (Huang 1996: 40-3, 2004: 224; Iechika 1998a: 20 n. 100, 1998b: 250, 2003: 131; Kobayashi 2000: 150), his direct reference to 'returning justice for malice' on that day was as close as he ever got to voluntarily spelling out the former notion in a public statement. At any rate, it was the complex and volatile context of the Northern Expedition and the need for 'Sino-Japanese cooperation', in which Chiang Kai-shek played the 'Russia card' to lure Tokyo as he spoke the traditional language of morality to Japanese journalists. Interestingly, in the following year, 'Sino-Japanese cooperation' was realized as Japan diplomatically recognized Chiang Kai-shek's regime.

*Chiang Kai-shek’s message of 7 July 1938: another foundation of the ‘foundation’?* It was six months after Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro made the infamous
announcement of ‘not to deal with the Nationalist government’ (Kokuminto wo aite to sezu) that Chiang Kai-shek delivered the following ‘message to Japanese people’ on 7 July 1938—the first anniversary of China’s war of resistance against the aggression of Japanese militarists (Woodhead 1939: 418; Chiang 1947: 10-11, 1967: 86-7):

‘China and Japan are brother nations closely bound with ethnological and cultural ties. Your country has absorbed much civilization in respect of philosophy, literature, religion and art, from ours ever since the Sui and Tang dynasties...you have preserved to the present much resemblance to the cultural mother country....As a result of the teachings of their sages, the Chinese people are peace-loving and regard all human beings within the four seas as brothers. Naturally, the Japanese, on both ethnological and historical considerations as mentioned above, are much closer to our bosoms. Militarists of your country, however, being driven on by their false ambitions, have chosen to return hatred for kindness (yibao haode). On the other hand, the Chinese people bore the outrages successively committed on them with the most magnanimous patience, hoping that the Japanese militarists would one day be brought to their better senses so that peace in the Far East could be maintained...Well, if we change our positions and let
us do to you what you have done to us, would you bear it? Just think of it
with remorse!'

It was Chiang Kai-shek's testimony to the relative decline of those who endeavored to
realize 'Sino-Japanese cooperation', which had gradually been taking place especially since
the Manchurian Incident of 18 September 1931 (Jiu-yi-ba Shibian or Manshu Jihen). More
specifically, it was his testimony against the Japanese military that had been subverting the
legitimacy of the Sunists in Japan as well as Chiang himself. While Chiang Kai-shek had
managed to stay on top of twists and turns over the years, some of the Japanese Sunists had
fallen before the militarists' 'rule of Might' (Badao or Hado) which the Sunist 'rule of Right'
or 'Kingly Way' (Wangdao or Odo) stood against (Jansen 1954: 211, 1970: 58; Wilbur 1976:
1993: 392-3; Takatsuna 1997: 59). Simply put, Chiang Kai-shek spoke the traditional moral
language of 'returning hatred for kindness' (yibao baode)—or 'returning violence for
virtue'—to describe his frustration towards Japanese militarism and the deterioration of
Sino-Japanese cooperative relations. In any case, Chiang Kai-shek again came closer to
spelling out 'returning virtue for malice' than he did in the 'foundational' announcement of
15 August 1945.

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In short, the common sense that Chiang Kai-shek’s announcement of 15 August 1945 was the ‘foundation’ of his ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy is problematic. First, Chiang never once alluded to the trope ‘returning virtue for malice’ (yide baoyuan) in the ‘foundational’ announcement. Second, Chiang’s other announcements—those of 6 March 1928 and 7 July 1938 in which Chiang identically or similarly used traditional phrases such as ‘remember not evil against others’ (bunian jiue), ‘returning justice for malice’ (yizhi baoyuan), and ‘returning violence for virtue’ (yibao baode)—predate the ‘foundational’ announcement of 15 August 1945. Third, Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ policy was also adopted for Russia. For these reasons, it is inappropriate to assume that Chiang’s announcement of 15 August 1945 was the ‘foundation’ of his ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy.

2.3 Denaturalizing ‘returning virtue for malice’ as decisions based on beliefs

Having denaturalized the 15 August 1945 ‘foundational’ announcement of Chiang Kai-shek’s postwar Japan policy, the author now problematizes the common sense of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as foreign-policy decisions that Chiang made based on his beliefs. More particularly, in this section, the author falsifies Lin Chin-ching’s causal analyses (1984: Chs. 1-2, 1987: Introduction and Ch. 1) that have helped standardize Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy as four decisions Chiang made based on Pan Asianism. By
falsifying Lin’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis which attributes the four decisions to Chiang’s Weltanschauung, the author implicitly calls for an additional approach to the conventional decision-making analysis of Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy.

Therefore, it is not the purpose of this section to provide alternative explanations to Chiang Kai-shek’s decision-making towards postwar Japan. As the literature review in Chapter 1 shows, many of predecessors’ works already provide convincing alternative explanations within the foreign policy decision-making framework despite the fact that they rarely cover the four decisions all at once. For that reason, instead of providing more alternative explanations in vain, the author critically examines Lin’s analyses on all of the four decisions in this section, thereby laying bare the constructedness of his ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis. More simply, it is the goal of this section to deconstruct the ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis by showing that postwar Japanese history would have remained unchanged even without Chiang’s Sunist belief in Pan Asianism.

Chiang Kai-shek’s belief in Pan Asianism and four ‘magnanimous’ decisions. One of the most comprehensive accounts of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis is authoritatively provided by Lin Chin-ching (Ibid.). The main components of Lin’s argument can be summarized as follows: 1) The Japanese nation would have disintegrated if Chiang Kai-shek
had not advised US President Franklin D. Roosevelt to preserve the Japanese imperial institution at the Cairo Conference in 1943 and if Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ view had not been adopted by such American policy-makers as Joseph C. Grew and Henry L. Stimson who pushed for the preservation of the emperor system after World War II; 2) Unlike the Russians who detained the Japanese and forced them to labor in Siberia after the war, Chiang ‘magnanimously’ repatriated more than two million Japanese soldiers and civilians and allowed each one of them 30 kilograms of luggage to take home; 3) Japan would have been divided by the Soviet Union if Moscow had not been discouraged by Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ decision not to send his occupation forces to Japan immediately after the war; and 4) Chiang ‘magnanimously’ relinquished war reparations from Japan and dissuaded Philippine President Quirino from demanding eight billion dollar war reparations from the Japanese, which consequently led Manila to demand only 550 million dollars from Tokyo.

Most importantly, Lin argues that all of these decisions can be attributed to Pan Asianism—the belief Chiang Kai-shek ‘inherited’ from Sun Yat-sen.

The imperial institution. Would the Japanese nation have disintegrated as Lin suggests if Chiang Kai-shek had not advised President Roosevelt to preserve the Japanese imperial institution and if Chiang’s view had not been adopted by pro-Japanese American officials like Under Secretary of State Grew and Secretary of War Stimson at the end of World War
II? Why did Chiang Kai-shek show his support for the preservation of the Japanese imperial institution after the war? How powerful is Lin’s explanation based on Pan-Asianism which Chiang ‘inherited’ from his predecessor Sun Yat-sen?

Before proceeding, a caveat is needed. Lin (1984: 44-5, 1987: 6) claims that Chiang indicated ‘the form of the Japanese government should be determined by the wishes of the Japanese people themselves after the war’ in response to Roosevelt’s inquiry regarding the postwar treatment of the Japanese imperial institution during a bilateral talk (without the presence of British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill) on the evening of 23 November 1943 in Cairo. However, according to Ishii (1987a: 39 n. 9) and Feis (1957: 247), there exists ‘no complete or orderly’ record of the talk other than that in the Chinese language. The record that exists in the United States, according to Ishii (1987a: 39 n. 9), is the English translation of the Chinese record that was sent to the State Department in 1956.

Nonetheless, Lin (1984: 45) attempts to provide evidence of Chiang’s support for the preservation of the Japanese monarchy by mentioning Chiang’s ‘New Year’s radio address to the Chinese people’ in 1944. In this statement, according to Lin, Chiang referred to his talk with Roosevelt in Cairo and reiterated his own position that ‘the future of Japan, the form of its government, including the problem of the emperor system, should be decided by the will of the Japanese people.’ Lin further argues that Chiang’s view on the ‘form of government’ in terms of the ‘will of the Japanese people’ was reflected in the Article 12 of
the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July 1945, which was promoted by Grew and Stimson (Ibid., 1987: 6). According to Lin (1984: 45), on 28 May 1945, Grew especially quoted ‘Chiang’s message to his own troops’ (rather than Chiang’s comments in Cairo) as he advised President Truman that assuring the Japanese the retention of the imperial institution would urge them to surrender at an early opportunity. Nevertheless, Lin admits that the Potsdam Declaration did not touch upon the Japanese imperial institution per se since the issue was omitted altogether in favor of Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s objection to Stimson’s idea of including it in the text of the Declaration (Ibid.: 46, 1987: 7). In the meantime, Lin suggests that the Japanese bargained with the Allied Powers by trading their acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration for the prerogatives of His Majesty as the Sovereign Ruler of Japan (Ibid., 1984: 46). Lin then concludes that the imperial institution was consequently retained as the Allied Powers settled with the Japanese condition by indicating that the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (Ibid., 1987: 7).

Obviously, Lin’s argument that the Japanese imperial institution was preserved as a result of Chiang’s advice to Roosevelt in Cairo, which was subsequently reinforced by pro-Japanese American policy-makers like Grew and Stimson, is flawed. Following Lin’s argument, one cannot find any definitive connection between Chiang’s comments to Roosevelt in Cairo and the retention of the Japanese emperor system after the Potsdam
Declaration. In addition to the disruption caused by the death of Roosevelt and insufficient evidence for Chiang's comments in Cairo, Lin further fails to show that Grew's pro-Japanese stance on the question of the Emperor was derived from Chiang's position in Cairo. In fact, even four months before the Cairo Conference, in the summer of 1943, Grew had already advocated that the United States should collaborate with 'liberal elements' in Japan and that it should keep the institution of the Throne to take advantage of it (Schonberger 1989: 21). Moreover, even before Chiang was quoted in May 1944, Grew had already publicly revealed his view on the Japanese imperial institution in December 1943 by quoting his friend Sir George Sansom—the Western authority on Japan, who later became the British representative to the Far Eastern Commission (Schonberger 1989: 23; Nakamura 1989: 42, 1992: 24). Besides, in contrast to Lin's (1984: 48; 1987: 9) claim that Chiang's 'continuous' support for the Japanese imperial institution was derived from Sunist Pan-Asianism, Nationalist China's anti-Japanese propaganda in the United States in 1944 was led by the then President of the Legislative Yuan, Sun Ke or Sun Fo (1944)—the son of Sun Yat-sen—who condemned Grew 'for advocating the preservation of the “Mikado” after Japan’s surrender' (Nakamura 1989: 55-60, 1992: 31-4). In addition, Lin defeats his own argument by stating that another pro-Japanese American official Stimson was outmaneuvered by Hull in regard to the question of the Emperor. Lin even indicates that the retention of the Japanese monarchy was ultimately a product of bargaining between Japan and the Allied Powers led
by the United States. As a matter of fact, records show that Chiang only passively agreed with US policy towards the Japanese condition for accepting the Potsdam Declaration (Lin 1984: 47, 1987: 8; Ishii 1987a: 27). Simply put, it was Chiang who followed US Japan policy rather than the other way around.

In short, postwar Japan would not have been thrown into chaos since the imperial institution of Japan would have been preserved even without Chiang's questionable advice to Roosevelt and the representation of his view by American policy-makers. First, in regard to pro-imperial advice to the American President, Sir George Sansom had already given Washington the same kind of input on the form of government in Japan as demonstrated above. Besides, due to close Anglo-Japanese ties from the past as well as strategic calculations, there were still other influential British (like Geoffrey Gorer, Sir Robert Craigie, John Morris, and Hugh Byas) 'wishing to see the emperor system maintained and used' anyway (Nakamura 1989: 118, 1992: 64; Ito 1995: 272-3). Secondly, as for Chiang's 'magnanimity' based on Sunist Pan Asianism, the claim that it positively influenced the American decision-makers to preserve the Japanese emperor system is seriously contradicted by the fact that Chiang's Nationalist China campaigned against Grew and the idea of preserving the Japanese imperial institution as mentioned above. In the final analysis, Chiang's 'magnanimous' beliefs such as Pan Asianism was not necessary for the Americans (and their allies) to preserve the Japanese imperial institution. In any case, records show that
Chiang was not prepared to deviate from any American initiative towards the Japanese emperor system—whether it was magnanimous or not.

*Repatriation.* Why did Chiang Kai-shek swiftly repatriate Japanese soldiers and civilians from mainland China after World War II unlike the Russians who detained the Japanese for forced labor in Siberia? Was it due to Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ attitude derived from Sun Yat-sen’s Pan-Asianism as Lin argues?

According to Furuya (1975: 17-18), disarming Japanese troops was one of the serious problems Chiang had to resolve in accepting Japanese surrender. It was a problem created by the ‘miraculous’ event of Japanese surrender (Tong 1952: 427). It was ‘miraculous’ because ‘undefeated’ Japanese troops still occupied a vast area of mainland China without any decisive damage (Tong 1952: 426; Furuya 1975: 18). As far as Chiang Kai-shek was concerned, accepting Japan’s surrender was a ‘problem’ at least in two respects. For one, the Japanese could refuse to disarm (especially within their own sphere of influence) and still make desperate resistance to the Nationalists (Tong 1952: 426; Furuya 1975: 18). For another, it was a great opportunity for the Chinese Communists to requisition the area occupied by the Japanese for their arms before the arrival of the Nationalists (Ibid.: 20). In fact, according to Ishii (1998: 144), the Communists—who were constantly marching away from Nationalist troops and attacking the rear of the Japanese who were going after
the Nationalists—had a geo-strategic advantage over the Nationalists based remotely in the Southwestern city of Chongqing. Accordingly, from the moment of Japanese surrender, the next act of the Chinese ‘race’ for Japanese arms had already begun with the Communists’ head-start from behind (Nomura 1997: 379-83).

Under such circumstances, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered General Albert Wedemeyer, commanding general of the American forces in China and chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to ‘assist the Central Government in the rapid transport of Chinese Central Government forces to key areas in China’ (Westad 1993: 100). In fact, ‘Jiang (Chiang) had asked for U.S. landings and for assistance with troop transports’ (Ibid.: 101; Kato 1995: 117, 123). From the American point of view, transporting ‘five Guomindang (GMD) or Nationalist armies by air and sea’ and ‘the landing of U.S. Marines on the coast of North China’ would “strengthen the position of the Nationalist Government” against both domestic and foreign adversaries” (Westad 1993: 103). Although ‘a speedy evacuation of the Japanese forces was to prevent them from supplying arms to the CCP (Chinese Communist Party)’, as Westad (Ibid.: 102) refers to American archives, ‘(p)ublicly Chinese and American officials explained the operation as an effort to speed up the disarming and repatriation of Japanese troops still in China’ (Ibid.: 103). Thus, the assistance to Chiang was ‘part of the general U.S. effort’ derived from the view that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was ‘an agent for Soviet policies’ (Ibid.: 117). More importantly,
'the repatriation of Japanese soldiers was a cover for their overriding preoccupation with finding a way to prevent Soviet aggression in China' (Ibid.: 117; Uno 1982: 23, 1995: 403).

Interestingly, under the same circumstances, the Chinese Communists also repatriated the Japanese from the area under their control as they propagated the protection of the Japanese through the production of labels and signs (Ishii 1998: 167). However, as Ishii (1998: 167) further points out, neither Communists nor Nationalists were 'magnanimous' enough to repatriate the Japanese from the areas of conflict where the number of Japanese casualties was great. In other words, neither Communists nor Nationalists were in control of China proper, however both of them were eager to repatriate the Japanese from the areas under their control.

Simply put, Lin’s (1984, 1987) 'magnanimity' argument is misleading for it implies that only the Nationalists under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek altruistically and single-handedly repatriated the Japanese from China. First of all, out of his own self-interest, Chiang was mainly concerned with the requisition of the area under Japanese control for their arms. Secondly, Chiang’s troops were not physically capable (geo-strategically and logistically) of repatriating (or detaining) the Japanese from China at the time of Japanese surrender. Thirdly, the repatriation of the Japanese from China was made possible by American assistance in accordance with American policy. Fourthly, under the same condition, the Communists led by Mao also repatriated the Japanese from China just as the
Nationalists led by Chiang. Accordingly, it can be argued that the Japanese would have been repatriated from China anyway even without Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ beliefs derived from Sun Yat-sen’s Pan-Asianism. Likewise, Lin’s ‘magnanimity’ argument should be treated with scholarly skepticism.

*Occupation.* Would Japan have been divided if Moscow was not discouraged by Chiang Kai-shek who declined to send his occupation forces to Japan after the war as Lin argues? Why didn’t Nationalist China occupy Japan after the war? Most of all, how powerful is Lin’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ thesis based on Chiang’s altruistic beliefs such as Pan Asianism?

Richard B. Finn (1992: 155), a former Foreign Service officer during the US occupation of Japan, points out that Chiang Kai-shek ‘decided in 1947 that because of the worsening situation in his war against the Chinese Communists, he could not spare a division for duty in Japan’, even though ‘the Republic of China (ROC) accepted Washington’s offer in late 1945 and made plans to send a Chinese division in early 1946’. Uno (1982: 28; 1995: 408) further points out that Chiang instead sent the division to the battle field of Northeastern China in the summer of 1946. In fact, according to Ishii (1987a: 29-30) who refers to George C. Marshall’s memorandum dated 19 October 1945, Chiang had already told his chief of staff General Wedemeyer that Chinese domestic affairs
involving the Communists have priority over the dispatch of his occupation forces to Japan.

Concurrently, Chiang told Wedemeyer that some delay in the dispatch of the occupation forces was to be expected. As for the Japanese side, as early as November 1945, Chiang’s assessment was somewhat confirmed by the postwar liaison officer Arisue Seizo (1987: 204-5) who recalls that Chiang canceled the mission of his powerful 19th Division to the Nagoya area of Japan conceivably due to the domestic instability of China. In short, although Chiang initially planned to occupy Japan, he was later forced to abandon his plans because of domestic instability in China (Takemae 1992: 41).

In regard to the possibility of sending Russian occupation forces to Japan, Harry S. Truman (1955: 440) recalls that Generalissimo Joseph Stalin requested the Northeastern half of Hokkaido (in addition to the Kurile Islands) to be surrendered to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces in August 1945. Truman agreed to the Soviet occupation of the Kuriles but insisted in the course of negotiations that General Douglas MacArthur would accept Japanese surrender on ‘all the islands of Japan proper’ including Hokkaido (Ibid.: 441). Truman already suspected that ‘Stalin was trying to bring to Japan the same kind of divided rule which the circumstances and necessities of the military situation had forced upon’ the United States and its allies ‘in Germany’ (Ibid.: 443). Likewise, in Tokyo, MacArthur ‘turned down “point blank”’ the Russian appeal for a zone of occupation in Hokkaido (Finn 1992: 69). Aforementioned Arisue’s (1987: 204-5) recollection again somewhat confirms it
as he quotes (MacArthur’s long-time intelligence officer) General Charles A. Willoughby that MacArthur turned down the Soviet Union’s alternative request to occupy a central area near Tokyo. Accordingly, in this context of Soviet-American rivalry, ‘the Truman administration acted to keep the Red Army out of Japan, and as far north on the Korean peninsula as possible’ because it was ‘(u)ppset over Soviet policy in Europe, and over Stalin’s unwillingness to accept the American position in Manchuria’ (Westad 1993: 99). As for the Russians, like Schaller (1985: 18), Finn (1992: 70) analyzes that Stalin ‘decided tacitly to recognize the American position in Japan in return for U.S. recognition of the Soviet-supported situations in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary’. Moreover, according to Wada (1999: 179), Stalin was willing to accept Truman’s rejection vis-à-vis the Soviet occupation of a part of Hokkaido proper in exchange for the Kurile Islands off the tip of Hokkaido. Nevertheless, Finn (1992: 69) argues that ‘(h)ad Truman agreed to Stalin’s proposal, Soviet forces or their communist agents would no doubt have controlled at least part of Hokkaido’.

In other words, as the bifurcation of the world began to unfold between the two global powers after the war, the Soviet occupation of Japan proper was traded off for Russian dominance in other parts of the world—the Kuriles, Eastern Europe, and Manchuria in addition to her share in a divided Germany.

However, according to Beloff (1953: 120), ‘the Soviet Military Mission existed’ and ‘it was considerably larger than any other mission, numbering about 500 persons as against
150, for instance, in the British mission’. He further points out that ‘although it did not get itself accredited to the headquarters of the Supreme Commander, its expenses were paid by the Japanese Treasury on orders form SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers)’ (Ibid.). The Mission was keen on mobilizing pro-Soviet propaganda—working in concert with the Soviet delegate to the Allied Council in Tokyo as well as the Japanese Communists—while they clashed with the occupation authorities (Ibid.: 119-21). Its size, according to Beloff, was not reduced until SCAP deferred payment to the Russians who refused to submit their accounts for the sums they spent (Ibid.: 120). Nonetheless, even in the absence of a Chinese military mission—although Chang Chun (1980: 96) seems to refer to it interchangeably with the Chinese mission to the Allied Council in Tokyo—the Russians did in fact dispatch their military mission to Japan.

In sum, in contrast to the implications of Lin’s ‘magnanimity’ argument, Chiang neither altruistically declined to occupy Japan because of Pan Asianism nor discouraged the Russian occupation of Japan as demonstrated above. Likewise, as history has it, Japan would not have been divided even without Chiang’s beliefs such as Pan Asianism. Therefore, unlike Lin’s ‘magnanimity’ argument, Chiang’s decision based on his beliefs such as Pan Asianism was neither necessary nor sufficient for the territorial integrity of postwar Japan.
Reparations. Why did Chiang Kai-shek forfeit war reparations from Japan? How potent is Lin's 'returning virtue for malice' explanation based on the Generalissimo's beliefs such as Pan Asianism? Since the answer to the former can be found in the negotiation process of the Japan-ROC Treaty of Peace, as examined in Chapter 3 of this study, it is the answer to the latter that is briefly and argumentatively presented here.

In the spring of 1952, in the course of signing the bilateral Treaty of Peace, the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan led by Chiang Kai-shek relinquished war reparations from Japan. Yet, what is not widely known is the fact that it was the relinquishment of Taipei's demand for war reparations. In other words, Chiang Kai-shek did not forego reparations from the very beginning. In fact, Taipei did not decline to demand reparations until the US ratification of the San Francisco Treaty of 1951—to which neither Beijing nor Taipei was invited—became imminent on 19 March 1952 (Ishii 1985: 75, 1986: 309-12, 1989: 85-90; Ku 1989: 305-8). More interestingly, Taipei had most anxiously demanded the largest portion—40 percent of the total amount available for the Allied Powers in May and August 1947—of war reparations among the members of the Far Eastern Commission, whose demand from Japan far exceeded the total of 100 percent as it reached 204.5 percent in May 1947 and 189 percent in August 1947 respectively (Records of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-1955; Blakeslee 1953: 138-51; Chang 1948: 513-4; Xingzhengyuan Xinwenju 1948: 9). Furthermore, the Chinese Nationalists had already received a half (15

However, one may still point out that the Nationalists’ Government Information Office subsequently made a statement expressing Taipei’s intention to relinquish war reparations on 15 October 1951 as argued by Hsu (1991: 205). In any case, one can hardly make any causal link between the continuity of Chiang’s beliefs such as Pan Asianism and change in his action—that is, demanding and partially receiving war reparations up to May 1949, dropping his demand for reparations between 1949 and 1951, demanding again in February and March of 1952, and dropping the demand again in April 1952. Moreover, another relinquishment of Japanese war reparations by India in the same year of 1952 further deconstructs the ‘returning virtue for malice’ argument just as Communist China’s relinquishment of reparations in 1972 (Nagano 1999: 3). These cases consequently emboss how decision-making over the foregoing of reparations was constrained by factors other than idiosyncratic elements such as Chiang Kai-shek’s individual beliefs.

In sum, Chiang’s beliefs did not have any causal link with his renunciation of war reparations from Japan. Put differently, as briefly demonstrated above, Lin’s causal explanation for Chiang’s decision based on Pan Asianism is spurious. In order to adequately
understand Chiang's decision on this issue, it is necessary to trace the process of bilateral negotiations for the Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan as conducted in Chapter 3.

2.4. 'Returning virtue for malice' beyond belief: the 'revival' of 'Sino-Japanese cooperation' and the Sunist coalition

'My fellow countrymen know that to “remember not evil against others” (bunian jiue) and “do good to all men” (yuren weishan) are the highest virtues taught by our own sages. We have always said that the violent militarism of Japan is our enemy, not the people of Japan. Although the armed forces of the enemy have been defeated and must be made to observe strictly all the terms of surrender, yet we should not for a moment think of revenge or heap abuses upon the innocent people of Japan....Permanent world peace can be established only upon the basis of democratic freedom and equality and the brotherly cooperation of all races and nations. We must march forward on the great road of democracy and unite and give our collective support to the ideals of lasting peace.' (6)

The notion of ‘returning virtue for malice’—which has been utilized to dub the original phrases of ‘remember not evil against others’ and ‘do good to all men’ in the speech—derives from philosophical and ethico-religious systems of China such as Confucianism and Daoism (Waley 1938: 189). In fact, Furuya Keiji (1975: 38) points out that it draws on Book XIV, 36 of Lunyu (the Analects of Confucius). Furthermore, Kishi Nobusuke (1982: 159 n. 4) and Okubo Denzo (1972: 116-19) additionally refer to Chapter 63 of Laozi’s Dao De Jing (The Way and its Power) as another classical foundation of Chiang Kai-shek’s speech. For instance, Book XIV, 36 of Lunyu refers to de as ‘inner power’ and yuan as ‘resentment’ in the following fashion (Waley 1938: 189): ‘Someone said, What about the saying “Meet resentment with inner power”? The Master said, In that case, how is one to meet inner power? Rather, meet resentment with upright dealing and meet inner
power with inner power.' The word *de* interpreted here as 'inner power' corresponds closely
to *virtus* in Latin, and it is of great importance to note that *de* distinctively implies 'moral
force' rather than 'physical force' or *li* (Ibid.: 33). The saying *yide boayuan* (8) translated
here as 'Meet resentment with inner power' thus connotes the nobility of governance with
moral virtue rather than physical violence (Ibid.: 189).

By the same token, the 'foundational' speech by Chiang Kai-shek can also be
interpreted as a manifestation of moral force rather than physical force. More specifically, by
resorting to the moral force of traditional practices, Chiang attempted to pave the way for the
Japanese troops in Manchuria to surrender their arms to his own Nationalists rather than
Mao Zedong’s Communists. It was thus intended to prevent Communist instigation in the
Northeastern region of China, which was physically beyond the control of Nationalist forces
in the summer of 1945 (Furuya 1977: 202). In other words, it was Chiang’s call for ‘Sino-
Japanese cooperation’ in order to morally engage Japanese troops and dissuade them from
giving up their arms to the Communists before the Nationalists arrived in the region (Zang
1997: 35-6). Accordingly, Chiang Kai-shek’s use of traditional resources on 15 August 1945
can be understood as the ‘revival’ of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ *discourse* drawn on the
moral governance of Chinese hegemony from the past.

In this section, the author thus re-examines Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’
postwar Japan policy as a variant of the ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ *discourse* rather than
‘magnanimous’ decisions based on beliefs such as Pan Asianism. In the process, the author genealogically traces the ‘Sunist roots’ of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy to the prewar period in terms of the ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ discourse and its coalition that sutured the ‘prewar’ and ‘postwar’ periods. The author shows that Chiang Kai-shek utilized the ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ discourse in order to gain Japan’s recognition of his regime as ‘China’ insomuch as he attempted to legitimate himself as the successor of Sun Yat-sen during the prewar era. Sun had famously called for ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ in his speech on ‘Pan Asianism’, which he delivered in Kobe, Japan in November 1924—less than four months before his death (Jansen 1954: 211, 1970: 58; Wilbur 1976: 272; Chen and Yasui 1989: 41-80; Fujii 1966: 226-71; Yu 1989: 367-71; Lee 1992; Chu 1993: 392-3; Takatsuna 1997: 59). Just as Sun’s Nationalist revolution was strongly supported by Japanese collaborators, Chiang Kai-shek subsequently struggled to gain Japan’s recognition by collaborating with Pan Asian ‘friends’ of Sun’s and their descendants in Japan—not only in the prewar period but also in the postwar era.

Put differently, it is the rise and fall of the prewar ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ discourse and the Sunist coalition—the ‘cultural raw materials and linguistic resources’ (Weldes 1999: 98; Milliken 1999: 239, 2001: 148-9), on which the Nationalist Chinese later grafted the image of Chiang Kai-shek as a benefactor in terms of his ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy—the author demonstrates in this section. Moreover, by tracing
the prewar Sunist coalition of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’, the author identifies who the
actors were and where they were located in terms of power relations (Hughes 2002: 2, 2005:
248). More particularly, the author first traces the prewar roots of the postwar discourse in
relation to the consolidation of Chiang Kai-shek’s internal legitimacy in China, his struggle
for external legitimacy through informal diplomacy with Japan, and Japan’s subsequent
recognition of the Chiang regime in June 1929. Secondly, the author shows how the Sunist
roots of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ eroded as their legitimacy was challenged in both
China and Japan following the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident of September 1931.
Thirdly and finally, the de-facto diplomatic severance initiated by Konoe’s ‘aite to sezu’
statement of January 1938 marked the fall of the tradition and discourse that had been
utilized by the Sunists in China and Japan respectively. In other words, although the
Sunists—like Sun Ke (Fo), Inukai Tsuyoshi, Inukai Takeru (Ken), Kayano Nagatomo
(Chochi), Miyazaki Ryusuke, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Chang Chun, and Chiang Kai-shek—
attempted to reproduce their project of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ in the 1930s, their
efforts were dispersed by the lack of internal legitimacy both in China and Japan.
Consequently, this gradual degeneration of the Sunist roots unfortunately led to the
severance of diplomatic relations between China and Japan in 1938—until they resumed as
the Sunist roots were ‘revived’ after the war.

As Chiang Kai-shek strove to unify China in the fall of 1927, he ‘privately’ visited Japan in order to legitimize himself as the successor of Sun Yat-sen and call for ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ in hopes of legitimating him as the paramount leader of China and preventing Imperial Japan from interfering with his Chinese revolutionary forces. Upon his arrival in Tokyo, Chiang Kai-shek made the following plea ‘To the Japanese people’ (Furuya 1981: 224):

“The late Dr. Sun Yat-sen was fond of calling China and Japan “fraternal countries.”...For this reason, I believe that the Japanese people should be more concerned about the independence of the Chinese nation than any other people in the world....There are those powers which...with little concern for the peace and security of East Asia, and attracted by short term profits to be obtained, do not hesitate to utilize the militarists to oppress the Chinese people; to stunt the growth of the new revolutionary forces; and to deepen and exacerbate the existing antagonism and animosity between our two peoples...I earnestly hope that the 70,000,000 Japanese people, who share with the Chinese people linguistic and racial affinities, will be able to have a thorough understanding of the Chinese revolutionary movement and
extend to it their moral and spiritual support.'

Chiang's visit to Japan was made possible by his first 'retirement' of August 1927, which was a product of factional politics within the Nationalist Party. More specifically, it was made possible because Chiang's prestige within his party was tarnished militarily by the allied forces of Northern warlords such as Sun Chuan-fang (9) and Chang Tsung-chang, which defeated Chiang's revolutionary forces (Eastman 1986: 117; Uno 1962: 203-5; Seki 1963: 291; Usui 1971: 89; Kamimura 1971a: 188). As a result, Chiang was forced to clear the way for such leaders of the Guangxi (or Guixi) faction as Li Tsung-ren and Pai Ch'ung-hsi to take over the Nanjing government (Ibid.: 189; Eastman 1986: 117). Furthermore, Chiang's retirement was expected to facilitate the re-unification of what used to be his regime at Nanjing now led by one of the Guangxi generals, Li Tsung-jen, and another leftist Nationalist regime at Wuhan (also known as Hankou) led by Wang Ching-wei. At any rate, in September 1927, Chiang Kai-shek took advantage of this adversity to visit Japan for 40 days and prepare for the second phase of the Northern expedition by reconstructing his power base.

In terms of internal legitimacy, the purpose of Chiang Kai-shek's visit to Japan was to reconstruct his political status as the successor of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the leader of the Nationalist revolution by marrying Sun's younger sister in law, Soong Mei-ling.
That was why Chiang Kai-shek, who was accompanied by T. V. (Tzu-wen) Soong, visited Soong’s mother at the Arima Hotsprings near Kobe in order to seek her consent to his marriage with T. V.’s sister (Furuya 1981: 222). This marriage, which was going to be Chiang’s ‘fourth’ (Nomura 1997: 59-60; Hosaka 2003: 209-13), had significance in terms of symbolic politics for Chiang and many other Chinese who attached importance to personal ties based on blood, birthplace, and brotherhood (Ibid.: 208; Nomura 1997: 59). More realistically, this marriage had the potential of tipping the balance of power within the Nationalist Party since Sun Yat-sen’s widow Soong Ching-ling, her capitalist brother T.V. Soong, and Sun Yat-sen’s son (from his marriage with Lu Mu-chen) Sun Fo had all sided with Wang Ching-wei’s regime at Wuhan. Eventually, as a successful result of Chiang’s visit to Japan, on 1 December 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, who was 40 years old, and Soong Mei-ling, who claimed to be 27 years old at the time despite the fact that she had already reached the age of 30 (Seagrave 1985: 268), had a Christian wedding in Shanghai (Chiang subsequently became a Methodist on 23 October 1930). Chiang consequently managed to engage the Soong clan along with the tycoon H. H. (Hsiang-hsi) Kung, who had been married to the eldest of the Soong sisters Soong Ai-ling, (10) as high officials of his regime after his political comeback. However, Chiang failed to win the political support of Soong Ching-ling, the second of the Soong sisters, who had rejected his proposal to marry her after her husband, Sun Yat-sen, passed
away in 1925 (Ibid.: 214-5). More privately, Chiang had to persuade his ‘third wife’, Chen Chieh-ju (1993: 239-40, 251-2), to go to the United States and ‘study’ for five years. Nevertheless, Chiang Kai-shek’s marriage with Soong Mei-ling after all meant that he had reconstructed his domestic power base by politically legitimating himself as Sun’s successor as well as financially allying with Chinese capitalists based in Shanghai and Zhejiang Province by the end of 1927 (Hosaka 1999: 133-4; Uno 1962: 208).

In terms of external legitimacy, the most important item on Chiang Kai-shek’s itinerary (11) for his trip to Japan was the meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi, which took place on 5 November 1927 (Furuya 1981: 222-5; Chang 1980: Ch. 3). There are at least two accounts of how this meeting came into being. According to one account (Seki 1963: 297), Tsukuda Nobuo—a China adventurer or *ronin* who had collaborated with Toyama Mitsuru, Uchida Ryohei, Miyazaki Toten (or Torazo), Kayano Nagatomo (or Chochi), and other ‘Pan Asianists’ to provide shelter for Sun Yat-sen as well as other Asian revolutionaries like Kim Ok-kyun, Ras Behari Bose, and Aguinaldo to name a few (Storry 1957: 313; Norman 1944, 1970; Jansen 1954; Eto and Jansen 1982; Takeuchi 1963; Hatsuse 1980; Yomiuri Shinbun Seibu Honsha 2002)—twisted Chiang’s arm and brought him from Kobe to see Tanaka in Tokyo. In addition to his friendship with Sun Yat-sen, Tsukuda was able to relate to Chiang Kai-shek since he was from Takada (currently known as Joetsu), Niigata Prefecture where Chiang had served in the 19th Field Artillery Regiment of the 13th
Division (of the Japanese Army) between 1910 and 1911 (Yoshizawa 1958: 94; Furuya 1975: 204-28, 249-53). Tsukuda was also reliable to the extent that he had been urging Japanese elites to support the Chiang regime as much as he had been expressing his opposition to Chiang’s retirement (Seki 1963: 297). However, according to another account (Tobe 1999: 83), it was Chiang’s former Chief Advisor Chang Chun who managed to set up the Chiang-Tanaka meeting. According to this version (Ibid.), Chang Chun, who along with Chiang Kai-shek had received military training in Japan and joined Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary movement there, followed Chiang’s instructions and contacted such Japanese military officers as Suzuki Teiichi and Matsui Iwane in order to arrange the meeting. In any case, thanks to Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary roots in Japan, Chiang Kai-shek was able to seize an opportunity to personally persuade the Japanese Prime Minister to support his leadership in China.

In this meeting with Tanaka Giichi, which was held in the presence of Chang Chun and Major General Sato Yasunosuke (12) who interpreted for Chiang and Tanaka respectively, Chiang appealed that Japan should cooperate with China by supporting his regime rather than Chang Tso-lin’s regime at Beijing. Chiang reasoned that Tokyo’s support for the Chang Tso-lin regime was the cause of anti-Japanese sentiments in China (Furuya 1981: 225-6). In addition to suggesting how anti-Japanese sentiments in China could be mitigated, Chiang advocated the ‘Manchurian-Mongolian problem’ (13) would be solved if
Tokyo chose to support his regime (Kamimura 1971a: 196-7; Iriye 1965: 158; Wilbur 1983: 161). In fact, Chang Chun, who stayed in Japan to continue informal talks after Chiang returned to China, eventually made a secret agreement with Tanaka in January 1928. According to this agreement, Tokyo would pressure Chang Tso-lin to leave Beijing for Fengtian (or Mukden which is presently known as Shenyang) if Chiang Kai-shek promised not to pursue Chang Tso-lin beyond the Great Wall (Seki 1963: 298; Morton 1980: 107; Wilbur 1983: 180; Tobe 1999: 83). In this way, Chiang Kai-shek boldly took the initiative to bring 'Sino-Japanese cooperation' into reality by offering Manchuria and the mitigation of anti-Japanese sentiments in exchange for Japan's support for his regime in China.

After getting 'Sino-Japanese cooperation' under way, Chiang subsequently severed diplomatic relations with Moscow in December 1927. As Chiang later took the time to discuss the severing of Russo-Chinese relations with Japanese journalists in terms of traditional morality (Furuya 1979: 263), he obviously intended to play Tokyo against Moscow as he endeavored to unify China. Domestically, Chiang had just been reactivated as Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army in the last preparatory conference (14) for the Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee. Chiang immediately held the Soviet Union responsible for the communist-led uprising in Guangdong (or Canton) and the establishment of the so-called 'Canton commune', which he destroyed after three 'bloody' days of crackdown (Furuya 1981: 232-5; Uno 1962: 213-4;
Eto 1968: 27-52; Wilbur 1983: 164-70). In connection with this uprising, Chiang Kai-shek’s leftist rival Wang Ching-wei—who had left the coalition government of the Nationalist Left and Communists at Wuhan to re-establish a Nationalist regime in Guangdong—was consequently forced to go back into exile in France since his political position was irreparably damaged by the loss of his power base (Ibid.: 163, 170; Uno 1962: 207). More interestingly, Chiang’s unilateral announcement of diplomatic severance (which Soviet consuls in North China ignored and continued to operate business as usual until the Chinese Eastern Railway dispute took place in 1929) was made when Soong Ching-ling, the pro-communist widow of Sun Yat-sen, was visiting Moscow. Subsequently, Soong Ching-ling decided to stay there and ‘protest’ against Chiang’s ‘faithless and suicidal policy’, which she claimed was against the will of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Soviet Union (Wu 1950: 197; Ding and Song 2000: 399). Nevertheless, Chiang chastised the Chinese Communists as well as their leftist allies within the Nationalist Party and steered clear of the Soviet Union. As a result, Chiang Kai-shek re-emerged more powerfully as an anti-communist candidate to assume the leadership of ‘a central government in China with a promise of stability, standing against the Soviet Union’—which nicely fit the picture of the ‘Washington Conference system’ at the time (Eto 1986: 112).

Among the ‘Washington powers’, it was Japan that had begun taking its initiative to take over Moscow’s dominant position in China (Iriye 1965: 123-223). For Japanese Prime
Minister Tanaka Giichi, who was against a unified China as long as it included the Manchuria-Mongolia region, there was nonetheless no contradiction between sponsoring an anti-communist regime led by Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria-Mongolia and supporting a central and anti-communist government ruled by Chiang Kai-shek for the rest of China (Baba 1983: 143, 162; Seki 1963: 288). In fact, Japan sought ‘a new era of Sino-Japanese coprosperity as a guarantee for protecting Japanese interests in China and Manchuria’ during this period (Iriye 1965: 3). For example, in the summer of 1927, it was Tanaka (Kamimura 1971a: 194), who dispatched Minister Plenipotentiary Yoshizawa Kenkichi (15) as the first Japanese minister ever to pay a visit to Chiang Kai-shek (Iriye 1965: 157). Interestingly enough, Yoshizawa (1958: 88-9)—who had just participated in the Tokyo meeting of the notorious Eastern Conference along with the hard-line ‘combination’ of Vice Foreign Minister Mori Tsutomu and Consul General of Fengtian Yoshida Shigeru—made a detour to see Chiang on his way to the Lushun (or Port Arthur) session of the Conference. In return, taking advantage of a brief period of ‘retirement’ in the fall of 1927, Chiang Kai-shek not only paid a visit to Tanaka and personally appealed for his support but also left Chang Chun behind in order to seek rapprochement with Tokyo as mentioned earlier. Notwithstanding such elite efforts toward ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ without contradicting the ‘unification’ of China and ‘separation’ of Manchuria-Mongolia, one could hardly rule out the possibility of military conflict between the two—especially considering Japan’s lack of a clearly
defined chain of command as well as the composite forces of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army at the time.

By 3 June 1929, Chiang’s plea for ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ was nonetheless realized to the extend that Tokyo authorized Minister Plenipotentiary Yoshizawa Kenkichi to diplomatically recognize the regime of Chiang Kai-shek who had successfully concluded the Northern Expedition. Tokyo’s recognition came after other ‘Washington powers’ such as the United States and the United Kingdom, which had recognized the Nanjing government in the winter of the previous year. It was a diplomatic victory not only for Chiang Kai-shek but also for Tokyo considering the two military crises—the Jinan Incident and assassination of Chang Tso-lin of 1928—by which the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between the two had been bogged down.

More specifically, the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek successfully managed to overcome the crises by rediscovering the ‘useful past’ of the Japanese and Sun Yat-sen. Most notably, they capitalized on the last rites for Sun Yat-sen—the ‘patron saint of Chinese nationalism’ (Jansen 1954: 1)—to create a convincing representation of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’. Among the thousands who assembled in procession over two miles (Ibid.), there were more than 70 foreign mourners most of whom were Japanese (Yomiuri Shinbun Seibu Honsha 2001: 62). The group of Sun’s Japanese ‘relatives’ included Toyama Misuru, Inukai Tsuyoshi, Inukai’s son Takeru (Ken), Inukai’s son-in-law and Special Envoy
Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Kayano Nagatomo (Chochi), Kojima Kazuo, and the surviving family of Miyazaki Toten (Torazo) along with others (Jansen 1954: 1-5; Chigono 1984: 125-6; Kamimura 1971a: 299-300; Yomiuri Shinbun Seibu Honsha 2001: 61-2). Toyama and Inukai were among the few who were allowed to enter the mausoleum (Yomiuri Shinbun Seibu Honsha 2001:62). Toyama, the protégé of legendary Saigo Takamori and doyen of Japanese ‘ultra-nationalists’, had extended hospitality to Sun Yat-sen in exchange for Sun’s ‘cooperation with Japan’ in ‘driving Western interest and influence out of Asia’ (Norman 1944: 274). Inukai, the ‘god of constitutional government’ (kensei no kamisama) who was a staunch supporter of Sun Yat-sen, had ‘sympathized with Sun’s position (in China) that was similar’ to the way ‘popular Parliamentarians were oppressed by power cliques and clans’ in Japan (Inukai 1988: 24). Inukai, who later became the Prime Minister of Japan in 1931, even held a place of honor next to Chiang Kai-shek inside the mausoleum (Jansen 1954: 2; Chigono 1984: 125). Accordingly, Chiang Kai-shek not only finished Sun’s ‘unfinished revolution’ but also picked up the Pan-Asian ‘Kingly Way’ of ‘benevolence, justice, and morality’ (Jansen 1954: 211, 1970: 58; Wilbur 1976: 272; Chen and Yasui 1989: 41-80; Fujii 1966: 226-71; Yu 1989: 367-71; Lee 1992; Chu 1993: 392-3; Takatsuna 1997: 59), where the Japanese and Sun Yat-sen had left off.

Thus, Chiang Kai-shek’s use of traditional discourse such as ‘remember not evil against others’ and ‘returning justice for malice’ in the late 1920s as mentioned earlier was
only the initial re-formulation of the Sunist ‘Kingly Way’ in which Chiang later got accustomed to demand Japan’s ‘cooperation’—that is, Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of his regime over others. Indeed, when Japan recognized the Chiang regime in June 1929, the Sunist coalition and their project of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ had reached their prewar peak that was unfortunately followed by frustrating events of the 1930s.

‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ following the Manchurian Incident of 1931: the erosion of the Sunist roots. The erosion of the Sunist ‘rule of Right’ was conspicuously marked by the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi on 15 May 1932. Over the years, Inukai had developed his own view on Manchuria. He believed that it was impossible to separate Manchuria from China proper in the long run because the Chinese nation had historically always recovered its integrity from temporary separation (Yoshizawa 1958: 141-2). Thus, Inukai’s initiative for the settlement of the Manchurian Incident was to economically integrate Japan and China on the premise that Tokyo recognized Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria (Tominomori 2000: 61; Inukai 1984: 183; Furuya 1976: 200-1). Conceivably, it was partly for this reason that Genro Saionji Kinmochi believed Inukai would settle the Manchurian Incident diplomatically rather than militarily (Tominomori 2000: 61). Accordingly, Inukai was recommended by Saionji to form a cabinet. On the contrary, Inukai was concurrently advised not to take office by Toyama Mitsuru (Storry 1957: 108, 121-2)—
whose close associates like his own son Hidezo, his secretary Honma Kenichiro, and the
guru of Pan Asianism Okawa Shumei were later arrested for funding and conspiring the so-
called May 15 Incident (Go-ichi-go-Jiken) (Ibid.: 120-3). In spite of Toyama’s warning,
Inukai courageously formed his cabinet on 13 December 1931. At the same time, Prime
Minister Inukai cunningly assumed the post of Foreign Ministership just for one month—
prior to appointing Yoshizawa Kenkichi, his son-in-law and the then Ambassador to France,
as his successor. It was Inukai’s move to prevent the militarists from accusing him of
‘stepping beyond his proper functions’ as he prepared to make his diplomatic overture to
China (Storry 1957: 109). Two days later, Inukai informally requested Kayano Nagatomo (or
Chochi)—the Japanese ‘relative’ to whom Sun Yat-sen had once given power of attorney for
raising funds, purchasing equipment, and obtaining supplies in Japan (Inukai 1988: 25)—to
go to China and discuss his diplomatic initiative with the Nationalists (Kayano 1946: 82;

On 24 December 1931, under the auspices of Chu Cheng, who was a senior
member of the Guangdong (or Canton) faction, Kayano (1946: 84) met with Sun Fo—Sun
Yat-sen’s son who was to become the Premier of the new Nationalist regime in five days. At
the time, Chiang Kai-shek was in his second ‘retirement’. It was Chiang’s move to deflect
domestic discontent against him—like massive student demonstrations and criticisms from
competitors including Mao Zedong’s ‘Chinese Soviet Republic’—for adopting the policy of
‘first internal pacification, then external resistance’ (*annai rangwai*) and not fighting the Japanese (Furuya 1976: 62-6, 128-31, 1981: 375-6; Nomura 1997: 148-60; Uno 1962: 278-82). Chiang’s ‘retirement’ in turn paved the way for the re-unification of his Nationalist regime and two Guangdong factions—one led by Wang Ching-wei who was back in Shanghai and the other under the leadership of Hu Han-min in Guangdong (Kayano 1946: 83; Nomura 1997: 152-3; Furuya 1981: 341-7; Tong 1952: 158-70; Hosaka 1999: 154-7). It was in the midst of this re-unification that Kayano (1946: 84) met with Sun Fo and passionately persuaded Sun in terms of ‘Pan-Asianism’ which his father Sun Yat-sen advocated seven years earlier in Kobe, Japan. As a result, Sun Fo expressed his support for the resolution of the Manchurian Incident and left the matter up to Chu Cheng (ibid.; Inukai 1984: 183). On the next day, Chu took the initiative in discussing the issue in the First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee which was in progress. In addition to appointing the new Chairman, Lin Sen, and the new Premier, Sun Fo, the Central Executive Committee approved Chu Cheng of being the Chair of the Political Affairs Committee in Northeast China. According to one of Kyano’s (1946: 85) cryptograms to Inukai, Chu’s new job was to take over the administration of the Northeast from Chang Hsueh-liang and to de-militarize the region by negotiating with the Japanese. Thus, thanks to Chu Cheng, on the day after Kayano’s meeting with Sun, Inukai’s initiative for ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ was already institutionalized within the ‘newly re-united’ Nationalist
administration.

Chu Cheng subsequently provided Kayano with an opportunity to see some 50 Chinese dignitaries. Kayano had known these 'old comrades', who by then were either 'bald-headed or gray-haired', for 26 years since he helped Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing found the Chungkuo T'ung-meng hui (Chinese Revolutionary Alliance) in 1905 (Ibid.). More specifically, it was the summer of 1905 that the Japanese—like Kayano himself, Miyazaki Toten (or Torazo), and Hirayama Shu—and Sun Yat-sen established the alliance of Chinese revolutionary organizations in Japan. This merger had been planned and prepared at the home of Uchida Ryohei (Jansen 1980: 370-1; Yu 1989: 101-2; Fujii 1966: 43)—Toyama Mitsuru's protégé and the head of the 'ultra nationalist' organization Kokuryukai (Amur River Society) which was founded to eliminate 'Russia from the sphere south of the Amur' (Jansen 1954: 110). In any case, present among the 'old comrades'—who enthusiastically expressed their concerns for Asia and showed their unanimous support for Sino-Japanese mutual cooperation and prosperity—were Chang Chun and other members of the Chiang Kai-shek faction (Kayano 1946: 85). On behalf of Chiang Kai-shek who had just left Nanjing and gone into 'retirement' 12 days earlier (on 15 December 1931), Chang Chun and others expressed their regret that the Incident consequently cost Chiang his leadership and bilateral relations with Japan. (Ibid.). They wished that Kayano had arrived earlier to inform Chiang of the cooperative intention of the Inukai cabinet (which came into power on 13
December) as well as Kayano’s own view with which they sympathized (ibid.). Nonetheless, many of these Chinese Nationalists celebrated what they thought was the ‘dawn of the peaceful settlement of the Manchurian problem’ (Ibid.).

Meanwhile, there were also those Nationalists who were unhappy with Kayano’s overtures. For instance, Wang Ching-wei, who later went down in history as a traitor of the Han Chinese (hanjian) for collaborating with the Japanese, surprisingly rejected the proposal for the diplomatic settlement of the Manchurian Incident (Kayano 1946: 87). When Chu Cheng orally presented it to him in person, Wang insisted that the Chinese Nationalists should fight the Japanese fairly and squarely (Ibid.). For another example, Chang Hsueh-liang—who had been seeking his revenge on the Japanese since the Kwangtung Army (or Kantogun) assassinated his father Chang Tso-lin in June 1928 (Wang Shujun 2001: 649, 692)—propagated against Kayano’s mission. It was evident in the editorial of his newspaper, which warned the Chinese not to be deceived by Kayano (Ibid.). Accordingly, from the very beginning, there was much formidable opposition to the diplomatic settlement of the Manchurian problem even within the Nationalist Party of China. These cases epitomized that the ‘Kayano mission’ was closely intertwined with intra-party politics and its ‘success’ consequently depended on the new administration of the Nationalist Party under Lin Sen and Sun Fo. Unfortunately, Lin and Sun ended up resigning less than a month later as the Shanghai Incident—in which the Japanese militarists attacked Shanghai to divert attention
from Manchuria—began to unfold in January 1932.

In the meantime, Kayano (1946: 88) had been recalled by Prime Minister Inukai in January 1932. It was largely due to the fact that Kayano’s cryptograms to Inukai had been intercepted by Mori Tsutomu (or Kaku), the hard line Chief Cabinet Secretary, and his militarist allies (Storry 1957: 114, 1960: 191; Inukai 1984: 183-5; Tominomori 2000: 61; Shimada 1962: 102; Kayano 1946: 86). Subsequently, Mori—the principal organizer of the infamous Eastern Conference of 1927, who nonetheless had been of financial service to Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary cause while he worked for Mitsui & Co. in Shanghai and Tokyo earlier—and leaders from three Ministries (of Foreign Affairs, the Army, and the Navy) met behind Prime Minister Inukai’s back (Ibid.). Although Inukai appointed Mori as his Chief Cabinet Secretary ‘to keep him close at hand since it was dangerous to keep him loose’ (Yoshizawa 1958: 145-6), Mori nonetheless was determined to eliminate the Prime Minister’s opposition to the interest of the Army in Manchuria (Kayano 1946: 86; Storry 1957: 114). In fact, Mori threatened Inukai’s son, Ken (or Takeru), by stating that the Army was highly indignant with the cryptograms which had been sent to the Prime Minister from Shanghai (Ibid.; Inukai 1984: 183-5). At any rate, Kayano (1946: 87) was notified of possible interception as he received a message from Inukai Ken on 4 January 1932. In this cryptogram he sent on behalf of his father, Inukai Ken also asked Kayano to change his code (Ibid.). Kayano immediately did so and notified Inukai Ken by sea mail on the next day.
Kayano then sent a telegram to Prime Minister Inukai using the new code. He disclosed his plan to go to Fengtian (or Mukden which is known as Shenyang today) and wait for the Prime Minister’s son-in-law, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, who was expected to arrive in Fengtian from Paris before assuming the post of Foreign Ministership in Tokyo (Ibid.). Kayano wanted Yoshizawa to accommodate Chu Cheng with the settlement of the Manchurian problem (Ibid.). However, on the same day or 5 January to be exact, Kayano unexpectedly received a code telegram in which Prime Minister Inukai urged him to return to Japan (Ibid.). Hence, Kayano requested Chu Cheng to postpone his trip to Manchuria while he prepared to go back to Tokyo (Ibid.).

According to Kayano, the fact that he was suddenly recalled was also due to the ‘jealousy’ of Japanese diplomats—most notably Minister Plenipotentiary Shigemitsu Mamoru (Ibid.). Shigemitsu had been furious ever since he found out about the mission on the day after Kayano arrived in Shanghai (Ibid.: 83). In fact, Shigemitsu soon advised a Vice Foreign Minister in Tokyo to confront the Prime Minister about the possibility of bypassing formal diplomatic channels (Ibid.: 87). However, since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident on 18 September 1931, there had not been any substantial diplomatic relations between China and Japan other than having multilateral debates in the League of Nations (Shigemitsu 1997: 121-9; Furuya 1976: 64-5; 1981: 443-4; Kayano 1946: 85). Even in terms of informal bilateral relations, more than three months had already passed since
Shigemitsu’s own effort on the day after the Incident—through his neighborhood connection with Chiang Kai-shek’s brother-in-law, Vice Premier T. V. Soong (or Sung Tzu-wen) (Shigemitsu 1997: 85)—unfortunately turned out to be ‘too late’ for the rapid escalation of the conflict (Gaimusho 1954: 104; Furuya 1976: 41-2; Shigemitsu 1997: 123-5). Notwithstanding this failure of its own informal diplomacy less than four months earlier, the Foreign Ministry interfered with the ‘Kayano mission’ by publicly denying the official capacity of the mission by 6 January 1932 (Kayano 1946: 88). As a result, Kayano was subsequently inundated with Japanese journalists in Shanghai (Ibid.). Kayano then grudgingly departed for Japan two days later on 8 January 1932 (Ibid.). Accordingly, Shigemitsu blocked the ‘Kayano mission’ as much as he thwarted the Guangdong faction’s scheme to use the Japanese—by capitalizing on the Manchurian problem and appealing to Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Pan-Asian’ connection with Inukai via Kayano—against Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang in their domestic power struggle (Uno 1962: 280-1).

In summary, the failure of the ‘Kayano mission’ was due to the following: 1) the ephemerality of the pro-Japanese Sun cabinet; 2) the pressure on Prime Minister Inukai exerted by the alliance of Mori Tsutomu and the military; and 3) Shigemitsu’s bureaucratic interruption as well as his propaganda against the ‘Kayano mission’. With hindsight, the second factor was most decisive since Inukai’s peace initiative was eternally terminated by the hands of young officers less than five months after this initial setback. The assassination
of Inukai also meant that Inukai fell short of keeping his promise with Emperor Hirohito and
the last Genro Saionji that he would discipline the military for its unwarranted intrusion into
politics (Inukai 1984: 182-3; Connors 1987: 105; Storry 1957: 109). Ironically, as mentioned
earlier, these young officers were instigated and funded by the associates of Toyama
Mitsuru—who not only participated in the People’s Right movement but also supported Sun
Yat-sen’s revolutionary cause along with Inukai. Coincidentally, Mori was Toyama’s favorite
to be the next prime minister (Storry 1957: 121). Moreover, Toyama knew that the ‘Kayano
mission’ was in progress since he had been informed by Kayano himself (Kayano 1946: 83).

As a matter of fact, Kayano was a member of Toyama’s Genyosha (Dark Ocean Society)
(Yomiuri Shinbun Seibu Honsha 2001: 61, 89)—‘the prototype of the right-wing nationalist
societies’ that ‘started out precisely as a gathering of ex-samurai who were disaffected to the
Meiji Government’ (Maruyama 1960: xxiv). At any rate, Inukai’s death was a great loss for
the project of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ including the settlement of the Manchurian
Incident. For Chiang Kai-shek, who had already come out of his six-week ‘retirement’, it
was an ironic consequence that his mentor’s Japanese ‘relatives’ resorted to mutual
destruction for the dangerously slippery ideal of ‘Pan Asianism’—wherein both solidarity
(reentai) and encroachment (shinryaku) inseparably lie on the same continuum (Takeuchi

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'Sino-Japanese cooperation' following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937: the further deterioration of the Sunist roots. More recently, immediately after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 7 July 1937, (Qi-qi Shinbian or Rokokyo Jiken), Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro—after his attempt to fly to Nanjing and see Chiang Kai-shek was interfered by the military (Inukai 1984: 335, 405; Matsumoto 2001: 74)—decided to send Miyazaki Toten’s son, Ryusuke, to arrange a meeting between Konoe and Chiang Kai-shek (Ibid.; Eto 1968: 254; Tobe 1983: 32). Konoe had been advised, indirectly by Ishiwara Kanji who belonged to the anti-expansionist faction (fukakudaiha) of the military (Ibid.: 254-5; Matsumoto 2001: 74; Inukai 1984: 335, 404-5), to meet Chiang in person before the Incident escalated any further. Ishiwara, the anti-Russian strategist and leading conspirator of the Manchurian Incident six years earlier, had come to believe that Tokyo’s only hope for fortifying her position in the Far East lay in cooperating with the Chinese and founding the East Asia Federation based on the principle of the Righteous or Kingly Way (Odo) (Morris 1960: 442). It was derived from Ishiwara’s calculation that the war with China would necessarily lead to the over-extension of Japan’s military power (Ibid.). In any case, on 24 July 1937, when Miyazaki went on board a ship bound for China from Kobe, he was unfortunately arrested by military policemen (Matsumoto 1988: 74). It was just an epitome of prewar Japan under militarism, the escalation of which had even been accelerating since the 26 February Incident (Ni-ni-roku Jiken) of 1936—in which key members of the Okada
cabinet such as two former Prime Ministers, Saito Makoto and Takahashi Korekiyo, were assassinated by young officers. The arrest of Miyazaki by Japanese militarists was regrettable especially because Chiang Kai-shek had already agreed to see Miyazaki in Nanjing (Ibid.: 74), despite the fact that Chiang had domestically been forced to reverse his own policy and adopt Chang Hsueh-liang’s policy of ‘first external resistance, then internal pacification’ (rangwai annai) as a result of the Xian (or Sian) Incident of 12 December 1936 (NIHK Shuzaihan and Usui 1995: 188-9; Wang Shujun 2001: 641, 657, 685; Hosoya et al. 1971: 295-9; Matsumoto 2001: Ch. 2). Accordingly, just as other civilian efforts to make peace with China in 1937—such as German Ambassador Oskar Trautmann’s mediation which was mutilated by the fall or ‘rape’ of Nanjing on 13 December—Miyazaki Ryuzo’s effort to carry out his father Miyazaki Toten’s (1967) ‘thirty-three years’ dream did not come true either.

During the same period, the Chiang regime was also anxious to make informal contact with Tokyo as the Japanese forces relentlessly continued to expand southward on the Chinese continent (Li et al. 1995: 67-71; Kamimura 1971b: 206-7). As early as 31 July 1937, Chiang Kai-shek had tacitly approved Kao Tsung-wu—Chief of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was born in the Province of Zhejiang (or Chekiang) and educated in Japan just as Chiang Kai-shek—to be the ‘representative to negotiate with Japan’ in the presence of Wang Ching-wei (Li et al. 1995: 69-70; Boyle 1972: 172; Chen
The meeting between the three was made possible by the recommendation of Hu Shih. Hu knew Kao very well from the 'Low Key Club' (Didiao Julebu) which used to meet informally for lunch and discussions of national affairs at the home of Chou Fo-hai—the Japanese educated Deputy Director of Propaganda (Boyle 1972: Ch. 9; Bunker 1972: 28-9, 90; Li et al. 1995: Ch. 7; Chen 1995: 142-8; Inukai 1984: 56, 384-5). On the very same day of the meeting with Chiang and Wang, Kao made his contact with Nishi Yoshiaki, former Japanese special service officer who was then attached to the Nanjing Branch Office of the South Manchurian Railroad (Boyle 1972: 172-3; Chen 1995: 152; Li et al. 1995: 69-70). Kao’s meeting with Nishi was arranged by another Japanese educated figure, Wu Chenchiu, who was the President of the Nanjing Bankers Association or ‘ambassador extraordinary of the Zhejiang bankers to the Nanjing government’ (Ibid.: 69; Boyle 1972: 172-3). By early August, thanks to informal efforts from the Japanese side involving Chief of the East Asia Bureau Isii Itaro (1960) and former Foreign Minister Yoshizawa Kenkichi (Liu 1995: 84-5), Kao’s peace-making initiative had come through the channel of Funatsu Shin’ichiro—former Consul General in Shanghai (Eto 1968: 257-60; Hata 1961: 146-7; Kamimura 1971b: 104-10; Tobe 1983: 32-3; Liu 1995: 80-91; Boyle 1972: 66; Chen 1995: 152). On 9 August 1937, after meeting with Funatsu, Kao negotiated the possibility of ‘peace’ with Japanese Ambassador Kawagoe Shigeru who met with Kao in his ‘official’ capacity. It was Kawagoe’s attempt to equalize Funatsu’s hitherto ‘unofficial’ effort as
Kawagoe ignored Tokyo’s official order not to intervene in its ‘unofficial’ operation (Eto 1968: 258; Hata 1961: 147; Kamimura 1971b: 110; Tobe 1983: 32-3). To make matters worse, the break-through between Funatsu and Kao was further interrupted by the fighting which broke out in Shanghai on the same day (Eto 1968: 258; Hata 1961: 147; Kamimura 1971b: 110; Boyle 1972: 173). Nonetheless, this ‘peace movement’ by Kao under the wings of Chiang Kai-shek and the Zhejiang financial clique—which converged with the ‘Funatsu operation’ (Funatsu kosaku) by Japanese sympathizers such as Sun Yat-sen’s ‘relative’ Yoshizawa Kenkichi—laid the foundations for informal ‘peace-feelers’ to seek ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ in the late 1930s and early 1940s (Tobe 1983, 1991).

Having said that, the fact that it subsequently led to other ‘peace-making operations’ (wahei kosaku) conversely attests the further degeneration of the Sunist roots at the time. Such degeneration of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ was marked by Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro’s ‘not dealing with the Nationalist government’ (Kokuminseifu wo aite to sezu) statement of 16 January 1938. Subsequently, as both Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors—Hsu Shih-ying and Kawagoe Shigeru—were recalled by their governments, formal diplomatic ties between ‘China’ and Japan were cut off. This ‘diplomatic severance’ was an ironic consequence of Konoe’s announcement because the ambiguous phrase of ‘not to deal with’ (aite to sezu) rather than de-recognizing (hinin) or bringing negotiations to a close (kosho wo uchikiru), was intentionally used in order to withstand foreseen pressure.
from the Japanese military and keep the possibility of ‘peace’ alive (Kamimura 1971b: 201-2). Nevertheless, the Japanese militarists ruthlessly continued to intensify their Southward expansion on the Chinese continent as they circulated the discourse of ‘forcing China to surrender with one more blow’ (tai-Shi ichigeki-ron) (Tobe 1999: 198-9; Hosaka 1999: 207-9). Such escalation of the ‘incident’ and unsuccessful ‘peace-making operations’ eventually led to Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning hatred for kindness’ message on 7 July 1938.

In sum, diplomatic relations between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ during the prewar era came full circle in 1938. As demonstrated above, just as Chiang’s use of traditional discourse was coupled with his plea for Tokyo’s ‘co-operation’—which eventually took the form of Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Chiang’s ‘China’ in June 1929—Chiang condemned Japan’s de-recognition of his regime as well as unsuccessful peace-making operations similarly in terms of Oriental morality in July 1938. However, in 1938, neither the Japanese nor Chiang Kai-shek knew that these eight and a half years of diplomatic relations only constituted the first act of another 20 and a half years after April 1952, during which Tokyo was again first wooed and later admonished by Chiang’s moral discourse.
2.5 The emergence of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as discourse

In this section, the author identifies four points of emergence for Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy as discourse: 1) Chiang Kai-shek’s inaugural address of 20 May 1948; 2) Chang Chun’s statement of 11 September 1948; 3) Ho Ying-chin’s speech of 19 January 1951; and 4) Chiang’s speech of 18 June 1951. These four points marked the renewal of the ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ discourse in the name of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime which struggled to gain Japan’s recognition under American hegemony during the Cold War era. These points of departure indicate that the Nationalist Chinese defined Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ in terms of his ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy. Such articulation of ‘China’, as the rest of this study shows, subsequently facilitated Japan’s diplomatic recognition of the Chiang regime as ‘China’ under US hegemony for two decades.


First, on 20 May 1948, in his inauguration address as the President of the Republic of China (ROC) under the new Constitution, Chiang himself referred to the aforementioned
speech of 15 August 1945 as his ‘policy of magnanimity’ (ibid.). The speech was delivered in the midst of the formation of US policy towards East Asia centering on Japan (rather than China). For instance, George F. Kennan had just visited Tokyo for the re-evaluation of Washington’s policy in February before materializing the National Security Council (NSC) document NSC 13/2 of October 1948 (Kennan 1967: Ch. 16; Hosoya 1993: 113-5).

Domestically, the newly elected Republican Chinese President, who was already militarily cornered by Mao Zedong’s Communist forces, made this inaugural statement rather disappointingly as his own candidate Sun Ke (the son of Sun Yat-sen, who is also known as Sun Fo) had been defeated by Li Tsung-jen in the vice presidential race (Furuya 1977b: 88-91). Under these unfavorable circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek nonetheless made reference to his own speech of 15 August 1945 as he discussed Nanjing’s foreign affairs in terms of peace treaties with Germany and Japan as the following (The China Handbook Editorial Board 1950: 284-5):

‘...concerning China’s attitude toward the conclusion of peace treaties. At the time of Japanese surrender, I declare that China would not seek revenge for what Japan had inflicted on the Chinese people. It has been my belief that, both toward Germany and Japan, members of the Untied Nations should one and all adopt a policy of magnanimity....reasonable magnanimity
points the road to the attainment of our lofty ideals...the Allied powers should do their best to foster the growth of truly democratic forces in Japan, so that there could be a genuine change in that nation’s political and social systems and in the thoughts of the Japanese people with a view to uprooting Japanese militarism. Whether our policy of magnanimity will prove fruitful depends on whether our efforts are realistic.... As Dr. Sun Yat-sen pointed out to us, the Chinese people should discharge their duties and enjoy their rights as befitting a civilized nation. This means that internationally we should seek to strengthen ourselves by our own efforts and externally to secure equality for China in the community of nations and at the same time to offer cooperation to the other nations. In this spirit, our country shall make its contributions toward upholding international righteousness and the preservation of world peace.’

Second, on 18 June 1951—the day before the Anglo-American compromise agreement to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty without Chinese representation was officially reached—Chiang Kai-shek again referred to his own address of 15 August 1945 as ‘generous policy’ (kanda zhence) towards Japan. In this speech, Chiang protested against the possibility of having no Chinese representation in the conclusion of the Japanese Peace
Treaty as the following (Office of the Government Spokesman 1952: 88; Zhonghua Minguo Xingzhengyuan Xinwenju 1952; Chang and Huang 1968: 346):

‘Only through the sincere cooperation of the two neighboring Asiatic countries, China and Japan, may the future security of Asia be assured. Since V-J Day I have repeatedly stated that China would not adopt an attitude of vengeance (bucaiqu baofu zhuyi) against Japan. On various occasions, I have, both directly and indirectly, stressed the necessity of the early conclusion of a treaty of peace with Japan on the basis of a reasonably generous policy (kuanda zhengce). The recent efforts of the U.S. Government, despite the obstructionist tactics of the USSR, in promoting the early conclusion of peace with Japan are timely and are in accord with the policy of Chinese Government. Should the Republic of China denied the right of equal participation in the conclusion of the treaty of peace with Japan, it would not only dishearten the people now living in Free China, but also dim the hopes of millions of mainlanders who await emancipation from Communist rule. The ultimate effect of such an unjust act will not be limited to the effectiveness of the peace treaty, but may seriously damage the traditional friendship between the Chinese and American peoples.’
Accordingly, on both occasions, Chiang Kai-shek stopped short of referring to the speech of 15 August 1945 as part of his ‘returning virtue for malice’ Japan policy. Moreover, there is no evidence that Chiang’s ‘policy of magnanimity’ towards postwar Japan produced any discursive effect at this early stage. Nonetheless, the articulation of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ to his ‘generous’ Japan policy had clearly emerged by then. As indicated above, such articulation was closely related to the issue of Chinese representation and the signing of the multilateral treaty of peace with Japan. Likewise, the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as such also emerged at the dawn of the Cold War as Chiang Kai-shek dispatched his Japan hands to Tokyo as indicated below.

Chiang Kai-shek’s Japan hands and the dissemination of ‘returning virtue for malice’. It was Chiang’s Japan hands—namely, Chang Chun and Ho Ying-chin—who marked two other points of emergence for the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse as Washington’s hegemonic project of the ‘Cold War’ unfolded in East Asia. Both Chang and Ho, like Chiang Kai-shek and many other followers of Sun Yat-sen whose revolutionary cause was strongly supported by many Japanese, received military training in Japan. They also had been involved in the Sunist project of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ during the prewar era. As for the timing of dissemination, both Chang and Ho visited Tokyo when an early peace with Japan came up on agenda in Washington in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Interestingly
enough, they linked their discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ or ‘magnanimity’ with the peace treaty with Japan.

First, from 21 August to 13 September 1948, Chang Chun (1980: Chs. 8 and 9)—the former Premier who had been handling Chiang Kai-shek’s relations with Tokyo since they served the 19th Artillery Regiment (or Takada Regiment for it was stationed in Takada which is presently known as Joetsu City, Niigata Prefecture) of the 13th Division of the Japanese Army together for the cause of Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist revolution—revisited Japan. During this visit, Chang Chun circulated Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy into the Japanese elite while he promoted the significance of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ for the regional economy and collective security of Asia in a radio broadcast to the Japanese nation (Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui 1991: 40, 122, 232; Ku 1968: 15). Furthermore, Chang Chun held a press conference to conclude his visit and express Nationalist China’s support for the conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty at an early date in terms of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy such as his announcement at the end of the war (Asahi Shinbun 12 September 1948). In this way, Chang Chun not only grafted the moral discourse on the prewar Sunist roots of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ but also linked it to the possibility of concluding the Peace Treaty with Japan as the legitimate government of China.

Second, in January 1951, General Ho Ying-chin made eight speeches to advocate
‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ (*Chu-Nichi Teikei-ron*) during his four-month stay in Japan (Zhao 1997: 332-40). Ho’s extensive visit to Japan interestingly coincided with the negotiation tour of John Foster Dulles who served as the Special Representative of US President Harry S. Truman in charge of negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Pacific security treaties at the time. During this visit, Ho delivered a speech entitled ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation and the collective security regime in the Far East’ (*Chu-Nichi gassaku to Kyokuto no shudan anzenhoshosei*) on 19 January 1951. In this speech, Ho paraphrased Chiang’s speech of 15 August 1945 by replacing the original phrase of ‘do good to all men’ with the idiom of ‘return(ing) virtue for malice’ as follows (Ho 1974: 187-9, author’s translation):

‘...we knew that war between China and Japan, from the beginning to the end, was “a quarrel between brothers”. We knew we would still make up for it and join hands to cooperate once the fight was over. That is why Chairman Chiang, at the Conference of Cairo, made every effort to advocate for the preservation of the national policy of Japan and the implementation of democracy. After the war was over, Chairman Chiang repeatedly ordered his nation to ‘remember not evil against others and *return virtue for malice*’ in dealing with the Japanese. Since then, my government’s policy towards

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Japan has unfailingly followed that principle. In regard to my own operations of receiving the surrender and repatriating Japanese prisoners of war, I also adhered to that guideline strictly as I carried out my duties at the time...my government did not even hesitate to instruct our own people to avoid taking trains and steamships so that they could be made available especially for Japanese expatriates who were anxious to get home. Speaking of the Japanese civilians, although there was a weight limit for the luggage they could take at the time of repatriation, I pragmatically instructed my men to allow them to carry as much luggage as possible. As for the Japanese prisoners of war...Once Shanghai was in the state of emergency as the Communists forced their way in the vicinity of the capital, I immediately obtained the consent of the Commander of the Allied Powers in China to repatriate some 250 principal Japanese prisoners of war remaining in Shanghai...from the Nationalist government’s point of view, as soon as the war was over, we regained the spirit of brotherhood with your nation. Now, we are prepared to do everything in our power to overcome difficulties and promote the early conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan...In the future...China and Japan could act closely in concert and sincerely cooperate with each other in order to solve minor difficulties between the
two nations and face the greater challenge of saving the whole world from
the current crisis through the establishment of peace in East Asia.'

It is important to note that, in addition to linking his own duty of repatriating Japanese
nationals from mainland China with Chiang’s original speech of 15 August 1945, Ho further
mentioned Chiang’s role at the Conference of Cairo for the preservation of the Japanese
emperor system after the war. Accordingly, Ho not only attempted to construct Japan’s
recognition through the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ but also built two new
components onto Chiang’s original address of 15 August 1945. These efforts eventually
amounted to the representation of Chiang Kai-shek—as the benefactor to whom the
Japanese must repay a ‘debt of gratitude’—that facilitated Japan’s recognition of the Chiang
regime as ‘China’ under US hegemony for two decades.

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, the author denaturalized Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’
postwar Japan policy which has long been taken for granted as common sense in Japan. First,
the author denaturalized Chiang’s ‘foundational’ announcement of 15 August 1945 by
providing two more ‘foundational’ speeches from 6 March 1928 and 7 July 1938. Second,
the author further denaturalized Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ decision-making towards Japan
based on his beliefs by counter-arguing that it did not have any decisive impact on the restoration of Japan after the war. Third, the author re-conceptualized Chiang’s postwar Japan policy as a variant of the prewar ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ discourse—a discourse which had served Chiang’s ‘China’ to gain Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition—as he traced the Sunist discourse coalition which sutured the ‘foundations’ of 6 March 1928 and 7 July 1938.

Fourth, the author delineated four points of emergence for the postwar discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as Chiang’s Nationalist China struggled to take part in the conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty—the apparatus of US hegemony in East Asia, which eventually took form in San Francisco in the fall of 1951.

In effect, this chapter called for the re-conceptualization of Chiang’s postwar Japan policy as discourse as it denaturalized the common sense of ‘returning virtue for malice’. In other words, this chapter showed that there are limits to studying Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy as decisions that he made based on his beliefs. This chapter thus additionally showed that re-conceptualizing ‘returning virtue for malice’ as discourse could help us shed new light on a range of possible foundations, networks of power, discursive practices, and points of emergence that have been precluded by the causal decision-making approach to Chiang Kai-shek’s postwar Japan policy.

Moreover, by analyzing the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ beyond Chiang’s individual belief, this chapter showed the representation of Chiang as a benefactor even
'outlived' Chiang himself as it resonated among the Japanese through the media, cultural artifacts, political rituals, and so on. In the chapters that follow, this study further traces the 'life' of 'returning virtue for malice' by analyzing the rise, heyday, and decline of the discourse in connection with Japan's recognition of 'China' under US hegemony between 1948 and 1972.

Notes

1) Chiang Kai-shek was born on 31 October 1887. Therefore, he was turning 88 in 1975. However, if one follows Chinese convention to count the year one was born, Chiang Kai-shek was 89 years old when he died.

2) The Shrine is located in a town called Koda, which is part of Nukata County, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. It stands on the premises of the headquarters of the Yamakage sect of Shinto called Kireigu.

3) Again, they are following the Chinese convention here. In other words, on Western calendar, Chiang would have been 99 years old.

4) The Monument stands on the premises of a Shinto shrine called the Iseyamako Daijingu of Miyazaki-cho, Nishi-ku, Yokohama, Japan.

5) The discourse of 'Sino-Japanese cooperation' originated from Japanese scholars of the late Tokugawa era (Oka 1970: 3). As the famous phrase 'the raging billows of Western
advance' (seiryoku tozen) indicates, those scholars had learned their ‘lesson that Western imperialism in neighboring China could spread and that it threatened great danger’ to Japanese national independence (Ibid.: 3-4). By the early Meiji period, many Japanese had begun to feel ‘some sense of solidarity with China’ (Ibid.: 4). These ‘(s)upporters of Sino-Japanese cooperation believed that together the two countries could defend their independence and resist the pressure of Western imperialism’ (Ibid.). For instance, in February 1875, Iwakura Tomomi, who was the principal advocate of the idea which was then known as the Nisshin teikei-ron (Kwan 1974: 10-18), argued that ‘Russia was the country to fear most among the various foreign powers. If China were annexed by Russia, the independence of Japan would be endangered’ (Oka 1970: 4). For another example, the direct influence of the argument for an ‘alliance’ against Western imperialists can be seen in Article 2 of the Treaty and Commercial Regulations between the Ching empire and Japan signed on 13 September 1871 (Ibid.; Sato 1974: 26; 1992: 37). It provided ‘mutual good offices in case of a conflict of either with a third power’ (Tsiang 1933: 11-12). Interestingly, it was the Chinese side—especially Li Hung-chang—that was more enthusiastic about putting the ‘good offices’ article on paper (Ibid.: 10-14). The Japanese—like Plenipotentiary Date Muneki who started official negotiations in July 1871 and Foreign Minister Soejima Taneomi who exchanged ratifications in April 1873—had been pressured by Western powers, especially the
United States, to get rid of the Article (Ibid.). Similarly, 'Sino-Japanese cooperation' was later tested again as Japan was approached by France for the possibility of forming a France-Japan alliance against the Ching empire during the Franco-Chinese conflict of 1883-5. In spite of 'very considerable temptation' (Sims 1998: 3), the Japanese Foreign Minister, Inoue Kaoru, rejected the French overtures (Ibid.: Ch.5; Sims 1995, 1973: 42).

In any case, apart from the fact that the Ching empire enjoyed military supremacy over Japan on paper (Sims 1998: 128), it can be argued that Japan's foreign policy in the Meiji period was (at least partially) constrained by the discourse of 'Sino-Japanese cooperation' until the eruption of war between the two empires in July 1894. In fact, Western powers, such as France in the 1890s (Ibid.: 179-81), remained suspicious of Japan's 'special relationship' with China—which was 'inspired by the fact that Japan had extensively inherited Chinese culture in the past centuries and that the two countries belong to one race as distinct from the white Western nations' (Kwan 1974: 10-11).

6) The Christian Century 39: 1803; for a slightly shorter English translation of the speech, see Furuya (1981: 830); for the official Chinese text of the speech, see Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui (1966a: Introduction); for semi-official Chinese and Japanese texts, see Chiang (1971a: 11-14, 1971b: 123-7, 1984: 3271-2; 1993: 126-30; 2005: 261-6); for an early Japanese translation entitled 'Do not return violence for violence' (Bo wo motte bo ni mukuyuru nakare), see Chiang (1947: 3-8); for a later
Japanese version with the title 'Returning malice with virtue' (Urami ni mukuvuru ni
toku wo motte seyo), see Inaba (1970: 10-12); for the Japanese versions misusing
‘returning virtue for malice’ in the place of ‘do good to all men’—very much like Ho’s
statement to the Japanese delegation (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1996b:
4; Chang and Huang 1968: 351), and Chang Chun’s (1980: 128-9) 24 February 1952
speech act towards the Japanese plenipotentiary—see Okubo (1972: 111-15), Lin (1984:

7) There have been mixed views on the question of who wrote this speech. On the one hand,
Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary that he had to take up his own pen on the late night
of 14 August 1945 due to his speech writer Chen Pu-lei’s sickness (Furuya 1975: 37-8;
Huang 1994: 429; Nomura 1997: 368). On the other hand, Chiang’s former chamberlain,
Zhang Lingao (1995: 35), later recalled that it was written by Chen Pu-lei, Director of
the Second Department of the Office of Chamberlains. According to Zhang (Ibid.), after
the speech, Chen Pu-lei commented that writing a speech had never been smoother in his
entire career than this time. At any rate, as Wang Dongfang (1992: 36) points out,
although Chen Pu-lei was the ‘organizer and processor of Chiang’s thoughts’, many of
important documents of the Nationalist Party nonetheless were written by Chiang
himself. Customarily, Chiang used to either orally bounce his ideas off Chen who then
processed them on paper or first draft his ideas on paper so that Chen could subsequently edit them for him (Ibid.). In any case, statements were never finalized without Chiang’s approval (Ibid.).

8) Here, the author translates ‘yide baoyuan’ as ‘returning virtue for malice’ rather than ‘meet(ing) resentment with inner power’ (Waley 1938: 189), ‘requiting injury with kindness’ (de Bary et. al. 1960: 26), ‘return(ing) good for evil’ (Hsu 1990: 48; Rose 2005: 44), ‘repaying violence with virtue’ (Wakamiya 1999: Ch. 7), or ‘returning malice with virtue’ (Iguchi 1971: 110; Deans 2002a: 91; 2002b: 167). He does so because of the following reasons: 1) The word ‘de’ is generally translated in English as ‘virtue’ rather than ‘inner power’ (which is Waley’s innovative translation), ‘kindness’ (which can be more reasonably translated as ‘ren’ or ‘en’ in one Chinese character), or ‘good’ (for which the character ‘shan’ is more suitable); 2) As for the interpretation of ‘yuan’, while the word ‘malice’ compensates the moral aspect which ‘resentment’, ‘injury’ (for which a more appropriate Chinese character would be ‘shang’), and ‘violence’ (the Chinese equivalent of which would be the character ‘bao’) lack, it still somewhat highlights the dialectical nature of the Chinese proverb without falling into the trap of using ‘evil’ or ‘vice’ (both of which can be better represented by the character ‘e’); 3) The use of the verb ‘return’ and the preposition ‘for’, instead of ‘repay’ and ‘with’, prevents one from reversing the original order of Chinese characters—that is, ‘de’ or ‘virtue’ followed by
In connection with proponents of ‘returning virtue for malice’, it is interesting to see that Okamura Yasuji at the time served as military advisor for Sun Chuan-fang who was Okamura’s student at the Japanese Military Academy (Inaba 1970: 2-3; Tobe 1999: 38). In other words, during the Northern Expedition, Okamura helped Sun defeat Chiang Kai-shek, for whom Okamura later not only inculcated the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ but also secretly organized a group of Japanese military advisors—the white group (baituan)—after the war (Nakamura 1995; Yang 2000). However, at an earlier stage of the Expedition, Okamura had attempted to bring rapprochement between Sun and Chiang (Hatano 1988: 230).

Soong Ai-ling had not only professionally served Sun Yat-sen as his aide but also personally dated him before she left the post for her younger sister Ching-ling who eventually married Sun by overcoming a generation gap between them (Seagrave 1985: 136; Chen 1993: 237; Kamimura 1971a: 55; Hosaka 2003: 208). Interestingly, it was also she who went between Chiang Kai-shek and her youngest sister Mei-ling (Seagrave 1985: 258; Hosaka 1999: 130; Chen 1993: 238).

In addition to those names mentioned in my main text, Chiang Kai-shek’s itinerary included meetings with his own contacts in Japan—such as his former superior General Nagaoka Gaishi—as well as Sun Yat-sen’s ‘old friends’—like Akiyama Teisuke, Umeya

12) For the minutes of the talk taken by Sato, see Kamimura (1971a: 192-7). For the Chinese translation of Sato’s minutes published in the May 1928 issue of the Japanese journal *Seikai Orai*, see Chang (1980: 26-33). For a much briefer Chinese version which slightly differs from the Japanese version both in emphasis and tone, also see Chang (Ibid.; 23-4) and Tong (1952: 117-8).

13) It is interesting to note that Chiang Kai-shek met with President of South Manchurian Railway Company Yamamoto Jotaro on more than one occasion during his stay in Japan—for example, on 6 November 1927, the day after Chiang met Tanaka to discuss issues related to Manchuria-Mongolia and Chang Tso-lin (Chang 1980: 25). Yamamoto was the one whom Tanaka had sent to Beijing a month earlier in order to negotiate the Manchuria-Mongolia issue privately with Chang Tso-lin. The so called ‘Yamamoto-Chang agreement’—on the construction of five new railroads and a purchasing plan for the railroads in the Three Eastern Provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning) which were then under Russian influence—had been secretly reached as a result in October 1927 (Kamimura 1971a: 224-30; Seki 1963: 294-6; Iriye 1965: 173-84; Morton 1980: 103-6). Interestingly enough, upon his return from Japan, Chiang Kai-shek, like Sun Yat-sen, stated that he would consider Japan’s special status in Manchuria (Seki 1963: 297).
14) The conference was held at the new home of Chiang Kai-shek and Soong Mei-ling. The site of this preparatory conference was just an epitome of the polarization of power around Chiang Kai-shek at the end of 1927.

15) In terms of those Japanese who eventually managed to survive in the postwar era as proponents of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ Japan policy, it is noteworthy that Minister Plenipotentiary Yoshizawa Kenkichi—Sun Yat-sen’s ‘old friend’ Inukai Tsuyoshi’s son-in-law and (later) foreign minister—played an important role in connection with this historical context. In the spring of 1928, it was the job of Yoshizawa—who paid a visit to Nanjing as the first minister ever to do so in August 1927 in the midst of the notorious Eastern Conferences of 1927 (Iriye 1965: 156-7; Kamimura 1971a: 194; Yoshizawa 1958: 88-9)—to persuade Chang Tso-lin to leave Beijing for Fengtian (Shenyang) before the second phase of Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition reached Beijing (Yoshizawa 1958: 89-91; Kamimura 1971a: 252-9; Seki 1963: 304-5; Iriye 1965: 210-11; Morton 1980: 123; Wilbur 1983: 182; Usui 1971: 127-8; Ikei 1982: 156; Gaimusho 1954: 99). Subsequently, in the spring of 1929, it was Yoshizawa who diplomatically settled the Jinan Incident of May 1928—a clash between Chiang’s Northern Expedition troops and Tanaka’s Second Shandong Expedition forces. Interestingly, as Yoshizawa prepared for negotiations, he was assisted by two other advocates of ‘returning virtue for malice’, namely, Okazaki Katsuo and Iguchi Sadao—
Foreign Minister and Vice Foreign Minister of the Yoshida cabinet, who were behind bilateral peace negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan in April 1952—at the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai (Yoshizawa 1958: 93). Moreover, it was through the good offices of the aforementioned *ronin* Tsukuda Nobuo—whose hometown, like Yoshizawa, was Takada (Jyoetsu), Niigata Prefecture where Chiang Kai-shek received his military training—that Yoshizawa’s (1958: 94-5) negotiations with Chiang’s regime accelerated. Soon after the settlement of the Jinan Incident Yoshizawa served as Japanese Plenipotentiary when Tokyo diplomatically recognized Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on 3 June 1929. Furthermore, one year after being depurged, Yoshizawa (Ibid.: 296-7) resumed his diplomatic career as the first Japanese Ambassador to Taipei in 1952 at the request of Foreign Minister Okazaki Kazuo, the former junior colleague of Yoshizawa’s as mentioned above.
3
The rise of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and US hegemony in East Asia 1948-52

3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the author argues that Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy as discourse made Nationalist China on Taiwan culturally intelligible for the Japanese (Walker 1984, 1990; Weldes et al. 1999), thereby facilitating Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Taipei as the legitimate government of China in 1952. In the process of making his argument, the author shows that Japan’s diplomatic recognition of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan as ‘China’ constituted a major component of the Cold War in East Asia under US hegemony. Put differently, this chapter traces the hegemonization of the United States in East Asia and the indispensable role the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse played at the inception of the Cold War.

However, it is not the intent of this chapter to suggest that the discourse constituted the necessary and sufficient condition for Japan’s recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) as the legitimate government of China in 1952. For instance, in addition to Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘prestige’, American influence such as John Foster
Dulles’ staunch anti-communism also played a crucial role in bringing the conclusion of the bilateral Treaty of Peace into reality (Chang 1980: 127; Chen 1999: 323). Similarly, in addition to President Chiang’s ‘magnanimous’ consideration (Yoshida 1957: 71-2, 1967: 136-8), such American pressure as the ratification process of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the US Senate constrained Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to make his ‘greatest sacrifice’ for regaining Japan’s independence—namely, the recognition of Nationalist China (Ibid.; Kosaka 1968: 60-1, 2000: 61-2). In fact, Taipei attempted to put pressure on Tokyo via Washington at every critical juncture of bilateral negotiations (Chen 2000), although such ‘external pressure’ from Washington was arguably used by Tokyo to achieve its own goal of choosing Taipei over Beijing in any case (Yuan 2001). Moreover, the controversial ‘Yoshida letter’ as ‘a product of American pressure’ also constrained Japan to negotiate peace with Taipei (Lee 1976: 26-28), even though Tokyo still could have pulled out of bilateral negotiations after having its independence confirmed by the ratification of the San Francisco peace treaty in the US Senate on 20 March 1952 (Eto 1980: 184, 2004: 243). Furthermore, American influence in terms of ‘the key to Japanese economic growth’ was most decisive for Japan’s recognition of Nationalist China while there were several other factors at work (Dower 1979: 413; Yin 1996). In short, although the American influence in the context of the Cold War clearly constrained Tokyo as the dominant interpretation suggests, it nonetheless did not determine Japan’s recognition of Nationalist China. Therefore, in this chapter, the author complements the dominant interpretation by claiming that it would have been more difficult for Tokyo to recognize Taipei without the discursive effect of ‘returning virtue for malice’.
In order to defend this argument, the author first describes the constitutive process of the making of the ‘San Francisco system’—‘the international posture Japan assumed formally when it signed a peace treaty with forty-eight nations in San Francisco in September 1951 and simultaneously aligned itself with the cold-war policy of the United States through the bilateral Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security’ (Dower 1993b: 4)—that subordinated the independence of Japan to US hegemony in East Asia (Ibid.: 11-12). The author highlights how American and Japanese elites collaborated to construct the Cold War in East Asia, through which Washington and Tokyo pursued hegemony and independence respectively. More specifically, the author describes how the ‘reverse course’—or the ‘(c)hange around 1948 in US Occupation policy from placing priority on the demilitarization and democratization of Japan to making Japan a bastion against communism in the Far East’ (Hook et al. 2001: xxv, 2005: xxix)—was interconnected with the ‘independence’/‘revival’ of Japan and the outbreak of the Korean War during the formation of the ‘Western bloc’ in East Asia. The author then points out ironic consequences of the Korean War in Japan before demonstrating how the subsequent acceleration of the ‘reverse course’ led to an Anglo-American agreement not to invite ‘China’ to the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the fall of 1951. The author then turns to the ‘Yoshida letter’ of 24 December 1951—which, much like the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’, was a by-product of the Anglo-American ‘agreement to disagree’ over ‘China’. The author subsequently sheds light on the ‘Yoshida letter’ as an American instrument to facilitate the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and to outmaneuver the British rival in influencing Tokyo’s selection of ‘China’ for a
complementary bilateral-peace treaty. Here, the author shows how the text mostly drafted by an American lawyer named John Foster Dulles territorially (re)defined ‘China’ in terms of modern or Western sovereignty and how it constrained Tokyo to negotiate with Taipei. Moreover, the author highlights how Prime Minister Yoshida himself took advantage of ‘his letter’ to meet domestic and international challenges he faced at the time. In short, the author focuses on the ‘reverse course’ and its implications for the multilateral segment of the ‘San Francisco system’ in the making, the ongoing process of which was followed by the bilateral arrangement between Tokyo and Taipei, at the inception of the Cold War in East Asia.

More importantly, the author subsequently shows how the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ facilitated Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony, thereby bridging the bilateral and multilateral processes of the ‘San Francisco system’ in the making. The author does so by closely examining the bilateral Treaty of Peace negotiations between the Republic of China and Japan in the spring of 1952. The author traces the rounds of talks between the two sides that utilized the representation of Chiang Kai-shek as the benefactor to whom the Japanese must repay ‘a debt of gratitude’ for his ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy. More specifically, the author demonstrates how the moral discourse provided a common language with which the two sides discussed issues such as the naming of the bilateral treaty, Japanese war reparations, and the scope of applicability in relation to the sovereignty of ‘China’. While the author shows the moral discourse played an indispensable role for settling these key issues, he particularly stresses the significance of its effect on naming the bilateral agreement ‘the Treaty of Peace’. Here, the author mainly draws
on former Chief of the Treaty Bureau Nishimura Kumao's account (1971: 320, 371) as well as Michael M. Yoshitsu’s work based on his interviews with Japanese officials including Nishimura (1982: 81-2). The author in turn shows how the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ helped to make the Japanese delegation agree to name the treaty that of *peace*—thereby virtually granting its recognition to the Nationalist regime as the legitimate government of China—against the will of Prime Minister Yoshida. In a sense, the author contrasts the aforementioned ‘Yoshida letter’ with the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse that articulated Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ in terms of traditional or Eastern morality. In this way, the author traces the process of ‘naturalizing’ Japan’s diplomatic recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan as ‘China’ in the making of the Cold War in East Asia. Finally, this main discussion is followed by the conclusion in which the author reiterates his argument and briefly previews the following chapter.

3.2 The ‘San Francisco system’ in the making: ‘Asianizing’ the Cold War

*The Cold War in East Asia: the ‘reverse course’ from China and NSC 13/2.* In March 1947, the United States began to delineate the ‘Cold War’ with the enunciation of the so-called Truman doctrine which was designed to ‘contain’ Soviet quest for world domination. Similarly, the National Security Council (NSC) on George F. Kennan’s advice issued NSC 13/2 for the Asia-Pacific in October 1948 (Kennan 1967: 368-96). NSC 13/2 set in motion the remilitarization of Japan as the bastion of US security policy in East Asia, rather than China, in order to fight against Moscow and
In terms of international relations in East Asia, the shift of emphasis in American security policy can be attributed to American frustration and pessimism towards China. It largely resulted from George C. Marshall's unsuccessful attempt to get Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong to a cease-fire and form a coalition government (Tsou 1963; Kubek 1963). Whether or not there was a 'lost chance' for Washington and Mao to reach an accommodation (Tucker 1996: 217-8; Cohen et al. 1997: 71-115), the frustration and pessimism eventually took the form of the so-called China White Paper which was announced by Washington in August 1949. In the meantime, Mao's Chinese Communist party (CCP) rose to power in mainland China as Chiang's Kuomintang (KMT) or Chinese Nationalist Party retreated to Taiwan. In October 1949, one month after Moscow destroyed Washington's monopoly on nuclear weapons as it set off its first atomic explosion, Mao finally proclaimed the birth of the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing. Furthermore, in February 1950, Beijing and Moscow signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance against the West—that is, 'the resumption of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan' (Goncharov et al. 1993: 260). By then, the aforementioned NSC 13/2 was well under way only to be accelerated by the Korean War.

In terms of the US occupation of Japan, NSC 13/2 can be characterized as a manifestation of the so-called 'reverse course' (1) (Welfield 1988: 71; Schonberger 1989: 150; Schaller 1997: 17; Aldous 1997: 215). The term 'reverse course' (gyaku
kosu) was first coined by the Japanese press in late 1951. Over the years of contestation (Ibid.: 5-6; Dower 1993b: 5 n. 2; Finn 1992: 348-9 n. 17), the ‘reverse course’ has been generally accepted as change in the emphasis of Washington’s occupation policy from promoting democracy to remilitarizing Japan as ‘a bastion against communism in the Far East’ (Hook et al. 2001: xxv, 2005: xxix). This change was ‘a gradual modification’—rather than ‘a sharp U-turn’—of US occupation policy towards Japan, which Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas MacArthur subtly adopted under increasing pressure from Washington (Sims 2001: 258). In this gradual process, conservative power elites in Japan ‘worked deftly through American individual and organizations pursuing compatible agendas to counter Occupation reform efforts they considered excessive or ill-advised’ (Angel 2001: 77). It was this ‘interconnection’ between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ (Dower 1993b), through which the Japanese elite and a powerful American organization like the American Council on Japan (ACJ) were able to influence Kennan and the production of NSC 13/2 (Welfield 1988: 71; Schonberger 1989: 150; Schaller 1997: 17).

In sum, the ‘reverse course’ form China was the path on which Washington constructed the ‘Cold War’, and it was interwoven with the Japanese project of ‘independence’. Therefore, NSC 13/2, which sketched the ‘Cold War’ in the Asia-Pacific, was the constitutive product of such interaction. By the same token, the outbreak of the Korean War—the first ‘hot’ war in Cold War history—on June 25, 1950 can also be interpreted in this light.
The 'reverse course' to the Korean War: the constitution of the 'independence' and 'revival' of Japan. The North Korean assault on the South—which had been planned since March 1949 (Goncharov et al., 1993: 213)—was partially motivated by the 'revival of Japan' and its economic and military relations with South Korea under American auspices (Cumings 1993:48). Similarly, the 'Japan problem' held high priority among the factors favoring Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War (Whiting 1960: 157). In fact, Premier of the CCP Zhou Enlai listed holding an international conference for a peace treaty with Japan as one of five conditions for a peaceful settlement of the Korean War (Chen 2001: 89). Furthermore, Washington’s 'decision to proceed independently to the conclusion of a separate Japanese peace settlement, involving the indefinite retention of an American military presence in Japan in the post-treaty period', in Kennan’s view (1967: 395), 'had an important bearing on the Soviet decision to unleash the attack in Korea'. Accordingly, Japan’s independence under American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific posed a serious threat to Pyongyang as well as Beijing and Moscow, which formed a Sino-Soviet alliance against Japan and its collaborators as mentioned earlier. Put differently, the 'revival of Japan' or 'reverse course' in the hands of the Americans was a 'problem' for the communist camp, and it was one of the reasons why the Cold War turned 'hot' for the first time in history.

With hindsight, the origins of the 'revival of Japan' can arguably be traced back to the key role Ashida Hitoshi played in the 1940s. First, in 1946, Ashida—the then chairman of the lower house committee reviewing the draft of the postwar Japanese Constitution (eventually promulgated in November 1946 and put into effect in May 1947)—played a significant role in altering the 'peace clause' or Article 9 on the
renunciation of war by dexterously inserting two phrases into the original draft of the Constitution (McNelly 1987; Sissons 1961; Stockwin 1999: Ch.10; Welfield 1988: 63-5; Drifte 1983: 40; Pyle 1996a: 8-11; Otake 1992: 93-7). The so-called ‘Ashida amendments’ were intended to make possible the interpretation that war and a resort to force are not forbidden for self-defense purposes (Ashida 1951: 21-3). Secondly, in September 1947, Ashida—who assumed the post of Foreign Minister in the Katayama coalition-government—‘invited’ Washington to keep its military bases in Japan in exchange for Japan’s recovery of sovereignty as stated in the so-called ‘Ashida memorandum’ (Shindo 1979, 1986b; Hata 1976; Drifte 1983; Miura 1996a; Tanaka 1997; Sakamoto 2000). Although it was a failed attempt by Ashida (2), who corresponded with General Eichelberger in the name of his liaison officer (Suzuki 1973), it in effect set terms for the US-Japan security arrangement four years later (Yoshida 1957: 114). In this sense, Ashida paved the way for the ‘reverse course’ by which Japan’s quest for independence and US hegemonic interest in the Asia-Pacific constituted the Korean War.

By January 1950, as Ashida intended, General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo publicly announced the ‘new interpretation’ of Article 9 of the Constitution (Ikei 1982: 240). In his Message for New Year’s Day, MacArthur reiterated that the renunciation of war does not negate the right of self-defense against unprovoked attack. Subsequently, following in the footsteps of Ashida, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru also pursued Japan’s ‘subordinated independence’ from the Allied occupation in May 1950 (Dower 1979: 369-414; Miura 1996b: 288-90). Yoshida instructed Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato (3), who was heading for Washington on an economic
mission—to secretly offer the United States ‘the possibility of post-treaty bases’ in Japan in exchange for the conclusion of an early peace treaty (Dower 1979: 374). On May 3, Ikeda had a confidential meeting with Joseph M. Dodge (4)—an architect of the ‘reverse course’—in Washington. In this meeting, held less than three weeks after Washington issued its famous NSC 68 of April 14, 1950 (5) Ikeda not only conveyed but also embellished Yoshida’s message as he even attempted to ‘pressure the United States into a peace treaty by veiled references to the possibility that the Soviets might offer a peace treaty in advance of the United States and include in that offer the return of Sakhalin and the Kuriles’ (Schonberger 1989: 244; Miyazawa 1991: 38). Accordingly, just as the communist leaders in East Asia constructed their insecurity in terms of a ‘resurgent’ Japan under the wings of American ‘imperialism’, Japan certainly had begun to link its ‘sovereignty’ to the American hegemonic project of the ‘reverse course’/‘containment’ in the Asia-Pacific.

At the same time, the United States was encouraged by the initiatives from Tokyo. From June 17 to 27 in 1950, Washington dispatched John Foster Dulles—Advisor to Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson—to Japan and South Korea. Dulles was accompanies by John M. Allison, Director of the Bureau of Northeast Asian Affairs, and Harry F. Kern who was the principal organizer of the influential American Council on Japan (ACJ). (6) His mission was ‘to get a first hand grasp of the complexities of security policy in the Pacific in order to proceed with the peace treaty’ with Japan (Schonberger 1989: 246). On June 22, ‘the most important development’ in US-Japan relations during the visit, as Dulles described to Kern who set it up (Cumings 1992: 48-9; Toyoshita 1995: 115, 1996: 166), began to unfold. It was on the same day
Dulles had a frustrating meeting with Yoshida, who was unrushed and reluctant to discuss security issues seriously. Yoshida had already begun to think that Tokyo had committed a rash act by playing the trump card of post-treaty bases (Watanabe 1999: 172-4). Nevertheless, Dulles was far from returning empty-handed. Through Kern’s arrangement in Tokyo, Dulles had an opportunity to informally discuss ‘Japan’s role in the Cold War structure of Asia’ with the ‘well-informed Japanese’ (Davis and Roberts 1996: 39-41), who represented a broad spectrum of the Japanese elite such as the Imperial Household, the National Rural Police, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (7) Concurrently, Dulles persuaded General MacArthur to give up his idea of maintaining American troops on a ‘temporary’ basis as the first step to create a neutral Japan and start facing the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s demand—that was ‘to use Japan as a primary base in case of a global war with the Soviet Union’ (Miyasato 1990: 197-8). Consequently, on June 23 or two days before the outbreak of war in Korea, MacArthur prepared a memorandum which stated that ‘(t)he entire area of Japan must be regarded as a potential base for defensive maneuver with unrestricted freedom reserved to the United States’ (US Department of State 1976: 1227). This memorandum laid the foundation of American strategy towards the Pacific during the Cold War (Schonberger 1989: 247). The subsequent outbreak of war in Korea embossed this reality of an already-divided Asia, which had been latent for some time. Therefore, in this sense, the Korean War integrated the Asia-Pacific into the Cold War that had first emerged in Europe (Yahuda 1996, 2004; Gaddis 1997: 54-84).
The Korean War reversed: the domestication of the Cold War in Japan. The irony of the Korean War was the fact that the communist camp paradoxically fostered the ‘revival of Japan’ which it attempted to contain by resorting to force. In other words, the ‘reverse course’ in US occupation policy towards Japan accelerated as a result of the Korean War. It was in this paradoxical sense that the international war was domesticated in Japan as shown by the following consequences of the Korean War (Igarashi 1985; Sakamoto 1987; Takemae 1992: Ch. 5).

First, Japanese Emperor Hirohito’s ‘oral message’ regarding the ‘purged’ was sent to Dulles in Tokyo on 26 June 1950—the second day of the Korean War. It was conveyed by Marquis Matsudaira Yasumasa, one of the ‘well-informed Japanese’ with whom Dulles had a meeting four days earlier (Schonberger 1989; Davis and Roberts 1996; Cumings 1993; Bix 2000; Hata 1994; Toyoshita 1995, 1996; Miura 1996a; Masuda 1999; Masumi 1998). In this message, Hirohito suggested Dulles utilize ‘the older people, the majority of whom have been purged’ for the ‘most valuable advice and assistance’ on ‘the detailed provisions of a peace treaty’ (US Department of State 1976: 1236-7). In fact, the de-purging of prewar Japanese elites by the American authorities in Tokyo started taking place in the fall of 1950. Interestingly, the de-purged, many of whom were well aware of their raison d’être as Cold War ‘watchdogs’, subsequently found their way back into Japanese politics to accommodate themselves to US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific for decades to come. The other side of the same coin was the so-called ‘Red purge’—the massive elimination of left-wing officials from government and labor unions, which coincided with the aforementioned ‘de-purge’ of militarists and ultra-nationalists. The ‘de-purge’ and ‘Red-purge’ of
Japanese elites following the outbreak of the Korean War was a vivid manifestation of the acceleration of the ‘reverse course’ that dictated US occupation policy in Japan at the time (Baerwald 1959: 99).

Secondly, violence on the Korean Peninsula—a security dilemma involving Japan—accelerated the ‘remilitarization’ of Japan under occupation. Most obviously, in August 1950, despite the ‘peace clause’ of the Constitution, Japan established a 75,000-man paramilitary force called the Police Reserve Corps that included many ‘de­purged’ Imperial Army officers (Wada 1995: 227-8). The Police Reserve Corps was later enlarged to become the Safety Force in 1952 and finally renamed the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954. Here, one of the ‘well-informed Japanese’ by the name of Kaihara Osamu, who had discussed security issues with Dulles a couple months earlier, interestingly played a key role in the process of forming the Police Reserve Corps (Davis and Roberts 1996: 42). Kaihara later assumed the post of Secretary-General of the National Defense Council. Accordingly, the Korean War triggered ‘the “reverse course” of police reform’ in Japan under occupation (Aldous 1997: 215).

Thirdly, the eruption of the Korean War also discredited communist sympathizers in Japan, who advocated that an ‘overall peace’ and trade with mainland China were indispensable for the independence of the Japanese economy (Sakata 1986). Mao’s entry into the War further reinforced this negative effect (Ibid.). As a result, the conflict in Korea weakened the position of influential opposition-groups such as the National Diet Members’ League of Sino-Japanese Trade Promotion (Chunichi Boeki Sokushin Giin Renmei) that had just passed a bill to promote trade with Communist China in April 1950 (Ibid.: 94). As mentioned earlier, pushing Japan to sign the
‘overall-peace’ treaty, which the Japanese opposition strongly supported, was one of reasons why the communist camp resorted to force in Korea (Cumings 1993: 48-51; Wada 1995: 230-3; Igarashi 1985: 48-50; Whiting 1960: 156, Chen 2001: 89; Kennan 1967: 395). However, the mobilization of the Korean War ironically tipped the balance of Japanese domestic politics towards signing the ‘separate peace’ treaty—that is, without the participation of the communist countries.

In short, the Korean War mobilized at least partially against the ‘revival of Japan’ brought ironic consequences in Japan. First, leftist officials were massively ‘purged’ while militarists and ultra-nationalists were ‘de-purged’ by the occupation authorities. Second, remilitarization was further carried out in the name of the Police Reserve Corps. Third, the communist sympathizers who called for an ‘overall’ peace were politically undermined while the political position of those who promoted a ‘separate peace’ was boosted. As a result, the ‘revival of Japan’ or the ‘reverse course’ in US occupation policy was accelerated to make a Japanese ‘bastion’ against communism in the Far East.

‘China’ on the ‘reverse course’ from San Francisco: the ‘Dulles-Morrison agreement’.

In the fall of 1950, Washington embarked on institutionalizing the ‘reverse course’/‘Cold War in the Far East’. In September, US President Harry S. Truman officially announced that he had authorized the State Department to open discussions with other nations regarding a peace treaty with Japan based on seven principles delineated by Dulles—including the waiver of reparations claims and omission of all restrictions on Japanese rearmament among others. In January 1951, Dulles, now
Special Representative of the President in charge of negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Pacific security treaties, left Washington on an extensive negotiation tour. His mission was ‘to secure the adherence of the Japanese nation to the free nations of the world, and to assure that it will play its full part in resisting the further expansion of communist imperialism’ (Welshfield 1988: 49-50). For instance, on 6 February 1951 in Tokyo, following Hirohito’s advice mentioned above, Dulles consulted three purgees (although Ishii had already been depurged)—Hatoyama Ichiro, Ishibashi Tanzan, and Ishii Mitsuiiro, the first two of whom later became Prime Minister except for Ishii who became Deputy Prime Minister—about Japan’s security under the auspices of the ACJ (Ishii 1976, 1998; Masuda 1993). However, it was in London that the ‘reverse course’ to San Francisco got bumpy for Dulles. It was at this juncture that the ‘reverse course’ from China seemed to come full circle as Washington once again grappled with the old ‘China question’. Fortunately, Washington had learned its lessons from its own experience in the 40s and it was prepared to tackle the ‘question’ much more cunningly this time.

Nevertheless, Washington and London could not reach any agreement as to which ‘China’—either the PRC in Beijing or the ROC in Taipei—should be invited to sign the multilateral peace treaty with Japan (Hosoya 1982, 1984; Lowe 2000, 2001). Unlike the majority of international society which recognized Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime in Taipei, Britain had already recognized Mao Zedong’s Communist regime in Beijing as the legitimate government of China in January 1950. On the other hand, the United States was the linchpin of Chiang Kai-shek’s legitimacy in international society, even though the utility of the Nationalist regime had declined
significantly in the eyes of the Americans since late 1947. More hazardous for Washington was the fact that Mao had already crossed the Yalu to fight the US-led United Nations (UN) forces. By the same token, Sino(PRC)-American relations had already been severely strained by Truman's earlier decision to 'neutralize' the Taiwan Strait on 27 June 1950. To Mao's surprise, Truman dispatched his Seventh Fleet to the Strait, thereby forestalling Mao's plan to 'liberate' Taiwan as early as July 1950 (Tucker 1983; Chen 2001). Accordingly, there still was a great distance to be covered between Washington and London, and Anglo-American negotiations over the old 'China question' inevitably came to a deadlock by June 1951.

It was on 19 June 1951 Prime Minister Clement Atlee and his cabinet finally approved the 'answer' for this 'question' which Dulles and British Foreign Secretary Herbert S. Morrison had agreed in London on 6 June (Schonberger 1986: 64-5; Yuan 2001: 146). In the so-called 'Dulles-Morrison agreement' (Hosoya 1982, 1984, 1986), it had been agreed to invite neither Beijing nor Taipei to sign a multilateral peace-treaty with Japan and to let Tokyo come up with its own answer for the 'China question'. According to this arrangement, the Chinese—who had fought the Japanese for eight years—were not to be included among the 52 nations invited to the San Francisco Peace Conference in the fall of 1951. Consequently, the fact that London could not push Beijing in the Peace Treaty Conference made the British 'realize that they must function within boundaries decided in Washington' (Lowe 2000: 182). In return, Washington had to ' placate' London by agreeing with Great Britain that neither the PRC nor the ROC be invited to the Peace Conference (Schaller 2001: 40). Due to the multilateral nature of the Treaty Conference, it was in the best interest of the
United States not to be excessively dictatorial with such an important ally as Great Britain (Lowe 2000: 182).

Nonetheless, in this agreement to disagree over ‘China’ so to speak, the United States still emerged with the upper hand over Great Britain. More specifically, rather than endowing the Allies’ Far Eastern Commission with the authority to decide the Chinese counterpart for Tokyo’s bilateral peace, London was outmaneuvered to make a concession to Washington’s position—giving Tokyo the ‘freedom’ to make peace with a Chinese government of its own choice (Dingman 1975: 124-6; Hosoya 1984: 73-5, 1986: 11-3; Yuan 2001: 146-7). In fact, it was exactly where Dulles wanted the negotiations to settle since he already had the Japanese agree to sign a treaty with Taipei prior to the Anglo-American negotiations (Schonberger 1986: 63; Chen 2000: 27). To this end, the ‘trump card’ Dulles played was to remind his British counterpart ‘that the peace treaty would not only have to be signed but also ratified by the U.S. Senate’ (Lowe 2001: 74). In effect, as indicated above, this ‘trump card’ helped Dulles shelve the ‘China question’ for the time being and pass the buck to Tokyo.

Thanks to Dulles’ successful separation of the Japanese peace treaty from the ‘China question’, the road to San Francisco was cleared. On 8 September 1951, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed between Japan and 49 countries. It was not an ‘overall peace’ since three nations—the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—refused to endorse the Peace Treaty without the presence of Communist China. However, in this ‘separate peace’ settlement, Nationalist China on Taiwan was informally involved as it was consulted by Washington in the process of drafting the Treaty (Rankin 1964: 116; Dower 1979: 402). Furthermore, on the same day the Peace Treaty
Treaty was signed, the Japanese delegation had to move hastily to the next location in the same city and sign the US-Japan Security Treaty with Washington. Due to the divided realities of Japanese domestic politics (Masumi 1988: 175, 1995: 21; Iwanaga 1985: 23; Igarashi 1985: 51), only Yoshida from the Japanese ‘supra-partisan’ delegation actually signed the Security Treaty along with the Americans at an American presidio. In the eyes of the British, such arrangement was merely the continuation of ‘the violent change in American policy, from preaching radical reform and disarmament to advocating rearmament and castigating all signs of weakness in combating communism’ (Lowe 2000: 187). For those Japanese who contributed to such violent change, on the other hand, sharing a ride on the ‘reverse course’ with the Americans meant a short cut for regaining their ‘sovereignty’ after six years of American occupation. Hence, Japan’s ‘independence’ was nimbly taking form and shape even though there still remained the burden of stopping the buck called the ‘China question’.

_The Dulles-Morrison ‘agreement’ reversed: Anglo-American rivalry Japanified._

Neither London nor Washington subsequently left Tokyo alone with the ‘China question’ as they had agreed. In fact, they both competed to influence Tokyo’s decision on which ‘China’ it should choose. Although Britain’s role in the process of peace-making with Japan was secondary to Washington’s, its significance can hardly be dismissed (Kibata 1986: 185). The British attitude towards the ‘China question’ was ‘the biggest factor’ which held Washington in check (Ibid.). More importantly, such
Anglo-American conflict over Sino-Japanese relations had a significant impact on Japan’s decision to recognize a Chinese government (Schonberger 1986).

For example, Ester Dening, Head of the United Kingdom Liaison Mission (UKLIM) in Tokyo, in October 1951, suggested to Yoshida that Japan ‘establish a modus vivendi both with the authorities in Formosa (Taiwan) and with China proper’ (Cortazzi 2001: 61). Later in the same month, Yoshida informed the National Diet that the Japanese government would consider setting up overseas agencies in Shanghai as well as in Taipei mainly for the purpose of trade (Dower 1979: 405-6; Schonberger 1986: 67; Yuan 2001: 148-9). This threw Washington into consternation. Under the pressure of Taipei’s immediate complaint and the pro-Taiwan members of the Senate (Yuan 2001: 190-1; Dower 1979: 406), the Truman administration sent Dulles on a mission to Japan again in December 1951. Dulles, accompanied by two influential Senators, forcefully ‘rolled back’ Tokyo’s earlier position in the form of the ‘Yoshida letter’ discussed below (Hosoya 1984: 291-294).

These attempts were derived from the different nature of British and American Asia policies. In terms of security, while the American ‘Cold War framework’ assumed that the Soviet Union and Communist China were inseparable, the more traditional British ‘power politics framework’ held that a coalition between Beijing and Tokyo could be played off against the ‘Russian threat’ (Hosoya 1982: 76-7; 1984: 288-9). As for economic considerations, on the one hand, the Americans facilitated the utilization of Japanese reparations as a means of gaining access to the resources and markets in Southeast Asia and compensating for Tokyo’s opportunity cost with mainland China (Yahuda 1996: 238-9, 2004: 195; Schaller 1985: 292-5). In contrast,
the British were anxious to get Tokyo involved with mainland China since London perceived renewed Japanese competition in Southeast Asia as a threat to its economic interests (Lowe 2000: 179-81, 2000: 68-9; Hosoya 1982: 77, 1984: 289). Simply put, Washington drew the line between Tokyo and Beijing while London wanted Japan and mainland China to be tied both strategically and economically.

Thus, the Dulles-Morrison agreement began to drag anchor soon after the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. While London hoped that rapprochement with Beijing would bring a peace-treaty with Japan and a truce in Korea, Washington perceived London as an element of instability for Sino-Japanese relations in the future (Dingman 1975: 134). It was this Anglo-American rivalry in East Asia which provoked the ‘China lobby’ in Washington and prompted Dulles to produce the ‘Yoshida letter’ of 24 December 1951 (Ibid.: 134-5).

*The ‘Yoshida letter’: the ‘cast-iron guarantee’ for ‘China’ on the ‘reverse course’.* The turning point for Japan’s bilateral peace treaty with ‘China’ on the ‘reverse course’ came with the so-called ‘Yoshida letter’ of 24 December 1951, which Dulles ghosted for Yoshida to sign and send back to him in Washington (Nishimura 1971; Hosoya 1982, 1984, 1986; Hoopes 1973; Dingman 1975; Dower 1979; Yoshitsu 1982; Lee 1976). It was handed to Yoshida when Dulles visited Japan with Senators John J. Sparkman and H. Alexander Smith of the Far Eastern subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, who had both arrived in Tokyo via Taipei. Although Dulles later accepted minor revisions requested by the Japanese (Finn 1992: 308; Yuan 2001: Ch. 5), the notorious letter nonetheless had much resemblance to Dulles’ draft
that was written in consultation with the Nationalist Chinese (Ishii 1986; Yin 1995, 1996; Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966a). The ‘Yoshida letter’ expressed Tokyo’s preparedness to conclude a bilateral treaty with Nationalist China, which occupied the ‘China seat’ in the United Nations, in conformity with the principles set out in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The letter also clarified that Japan had no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with Communist China, which was in the midst of military confrontation with the UN in Korea. Furthermore, the ‘Yoshida letter’ significantly set the terms of the bilateral treaty in the following fashion:

‘The terms of such bilateral treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China, be applicable to all territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of the Government of the Republic of China’ (US Department of State 1977: 1466; Nishimura 1971: 318-19; Yoshizawa 1973: 203-4).

The italicized phrase above consequently sowed the seeds of discord between Taipei and Tokyo during their bilateral-treaty negotiations in the spring of 1952, which nearly aborted because of the very wording regarding the scope of application. In any case, such a letter was necessary for Dulles to get himself out of the ‘sodden bog of McCarthyism and the “loss of China” frenzy’, which were mobilized by the ‘China lobby’ in Washington at the time (Dower 1979: 405).

It was such domestic pressure that prompted Dulles, a Republican ambassador appointed by the Democratic administration to represent ‘bipartisan’ politics in
Washington, to hold Japan in check (Hosoya 1984; Umemoto 1986; Dingman 1975; Dower 1979). For instance, the robustness of such domestic pressure was demonstrated by a letter drafted by ‘Senator for Formosa’ William F. Knowland, who vehemently requested President Truman to clarify that a bilateral treaty between Japan and Communist China would be adverse to the best interests of both Japan and the United States. It quickly resonated in the Senate and was signed by 56 senators within 24 hours. Moreover, such American agents of ‘Chinese’ influence as Senator H. Alexander Smith severely criticized the Truman administration from failing to coordinate Anglo-American policies toward the ‘China questions’, which allowed Yoshida to play them off against each other. In fact, Senator Sparkman, who had stopped over in Taipei before he joined Dulles in Tokyo to deliver the ‘Yoshida letter’, had already informed Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh of Washington’s plan to play its ‘ratification card’ to outmaneuver London and persuade Yoshida to commit himself to a peace treaty with Taipei (Ku 1989: 263-4). Similarly, as in the case of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Dulles consulted the Nationalist regime on Taiwan in the process of drafting the ‘Yoshida letter’ (Ishii 1986; Yin 1995, 1996; Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966a). In short, the ROC influences on American politics combined with the virulent anti-communism of the period were central to the production of the ‘Yoshida letter’.

As for its implications for the status of Taiwan, the ‘Yoshida letter’ reflected the United States’ own security interests and its intention to reign in the Asia-Pacific. The Sino(ROC)-Japanese dispute over the word or in the aforementioned text was triggered by Dulles who switched it from the original word and between Taipei and
Tokyo at the preparatory stage of bilateral negotiations sponsored by Washington (Chen 2000: 64-5). More specifically, although the United States had already agreed to the Nationalist Chinese use of the word and in the process of drafting the ‘Yoshida letter’ (Ibid.: 91; Yin 1995: 179-83, 1996: 232-43; US Department of State 1985: 1241), Washington presented the text with the word or when Dulles handed it to Yoshida (Yin 1995: 184, 1996: 300). In addition, unlike Vice Foreign Minister Iguchi Sadao’s recollections (Yuan 2001: 162-3; Sakamoto 2001), Tokyo never problematized the use of the word or with Dulles (Yuan 2001: 158-9). In the end, Taipei had to agree to disagree with Tokyo (and Washington) by producing Agreed Minutes stating that the expression ‘or which may hereafter be’ permits the interpretation ‘and which may hereafter be’. This was the epitome of Washington’s ‘clearly ambiguous’ position, that was to support Japan for renouncing its claim to Taiwan without specifying to whom it was being given (Hughes 1997: 17; Tai 2001: Ch. 4; P’eng and Huang 1976). In fact, in its preparatory talks with Taipei earlier in 1951, the United States had clearly rejected the Nationalists’ initiative of ‘reverting’ Taiwan to the ROC (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966a: 297; Ishii 1986: 29). At the same time, Washington had also rebuffed the British initiative of ‘reverting’ Taiwan to Communist China (Hosoya 1984, 1986; Chen 2000; Yuan 2001). At any rate, American policy of ‘renouncing without reverting’ enabled Washington to (re)draw the line over the map of Imperial Japan.

For Yoshida, however, the game of ‘dividing and ruling’ was not over with the letter of 24 December 1951. Only three days after he sent the letter to Dulles, on 27 December 1951, Yoshida quickly turned the issue over to General Matthew H.
Ridgway—who had taken over from MacArthur as Supreme Commander—by conveying a memorandum for Dulles without any signature as he had been accustomed to fly a kite before putting sensitive policy into practice since the MacArthur era (Chen 2000: 72-3; Yuan 2001: 159-60). It controversially expressed the dilemma posed to Tokyo by the lack of Anglo-American consensus on the ‘China question’ as well as the inevitability for an independent Japan to adopt its own China policy. (8) Yoshida purposely chose an informal path to evade taking formal responsibility for his action (Ibid.). In fact, when Sebald conveyed Dulles’ warning that grave consequences would follow if Yoshida deviated from the position stated in the letter of 24 December 1951, the Prime Minister casually dismissed it by playing dumb (ibid.). It was arguably Yoshida’s attempt to have more leeway for Japan’s ‘two Chinas’ policy or the ‘separation of politics and economics’ in the future (Deans 1997; Chen 2000; Yang 1992; Hosoya 1993; Soeya 2001).

At the same time, Yoshida utilized the letter of 24 December 1951 as a ‘double-edged’ instrument to simultaneously meet demands at the ‘two levels’ of domestic and international politics (Putnam 1988; Evans et al. 1993). Domestically, it was put to political use as gaiatsu (Yuan 2001: Ch. 5)—foreign pressure that provided support for Prime Minister in his struggle ‘to swing the balance in favor of controversial policy change’ (Schoppa 1997: 4). In other words, Yoshida used the letter, which was consistent with his own view (Yoshida 1957: 74), to realize his own China policy without taking any blame for it (Yuan 2001: Ch. 5). Like Washington, Tokyo desired to ‘carve’ East Asia so that Taiwan was separate from mainland China as demonstrated in the controversial wording regarding the scope of applicability mentioned earlier. In
fact, some Japanese elites felt that the aforementioned ‘renouncing without reverting’ approach would give Tokyo the casting vote on the status of Taiwan once Washington and London come to an agreement on the ‘China question’ (Chen 2000: 101). However, in the wake of domestic turmoil over the nature of Tokyo’s peace treaty—that was whether to make peace with ‘one world’ or ‘two worlds’ (Watanabe 1985)—it was in the best interests of the Yoshida cabinet to prevent further domestic instability. In terms of the ‘China question’, it enabled Yoshida to avert domestic opposition which was constructing the ‘fear that Japan could not prosper without close relations with China’ proper (Dower 1979: 414; Sakata 1986). That is why Yoshida used the letter to blame the American hegemon for choosing to negotiate a bilateral treaty with Nationalist China, which nonetheless had been his own choice at the time (Yuan 2001: Ch. 5). More cunningly, Yoshida reversed this domestic fear for his own advantage in international negotiations with Washington. He demanded and successfully attained alternative economic benefits such as preferential access to the US-led global market for Japan’s opportunity cost in mainland China (Ibid.: 156; Dower 1979: 413-4). Accordingly, Yoshida took full advantage of ‘his letter’ to meet both domestic and international challenges he faced at the time.

In any case, the ‘Yoshida letter’—Japan’s ‘cast-iron guarantee’ to negotiate a bilateral treaty with Taipei rather than Beijing (Buckley 1992: 45)—was sent to Washington and received by Dulles on 7 January 1952. However, as he promised Yoshida (Ku 1989: 264; Schonberger 1986: 68-9), Dulles kept it private until the day after new British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and Foreign Minister Anthony Eden left Washington where they had held talks regarding the ‘China question’. The
letter was thus dexterously made public on 16 January 1952. In the eyes of Dulles, the new British Conservative regime ‘would not press the UK position strongly on Japan or expect it to prevail or feel aggrieved at the Japanese Government if it did not follow the UK line’ (Dulles Papers 1952), even though Eden afterwards complained that the publication of the ‘Yoshida letter’ immediately after their visit to Washington gave the wrong impression that they had agreed to its contents (Eden 1960: 22). The letter was revealed just in time for committee hearings on the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty at the US Senate. Eventually, the Treaty was ratified on 20 March 1952. As a result, the ‘Yoshida letter’ greatly lost its credibility as Tokyo’s ‘cast-iron guarantee’ to negotiate a bilateral treaty with Taipei more than one month before the conclusion of the bilateral treaty. Henceforth, it was the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy that helped to engage Tokyo in negotiation with Taipei. Put differently, the moral discourse helped to bridge the multilateral San Francisco Peace Treaty and the bilateral treaty between the Republic of China and Japan, the negotiations of which took place between 20 February and 28 April 1952, as demonstrated below.

3.3 The discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’: bridging San Francisco and Taipei

On 20 February 1952, the first day of Japan-ROC treaty negotiations in Taipei, Nationalist Chinese Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh made his opening statement by referring to Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy as
follows (Chang and Huang 1968: 351-2; Zhonghua Minguo Wajiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 4-5, author’s translation):

‘In the past, my government explicitly pronounced its wish to make early peace with Japan on a number of occasions. Back on 15 August 1945, in a radio broadcast to national and international audiences, President Chiang urged the Chinese nation to remember not evil against others (bunian jiue) and return virtue for malice (yide baoyuan) as he foresaw the necessity of Sino-Japanese friendship after the war. In a speech delivered on 18 June 1951, President Chiang also reiterated the policy advocated by Mr. Sun Yat-sen that stability in Asia would only be achieved if China and Japan—the two great neighboring powers of Asia—sincerely cooperate with each other. President Chiang said: “Since V-J Day I have repeatedly stated that China would not adopt an attitude of vengeance against Japan. On various occasions, I have, both directly and indirectly, stress the necessity of the early conclusion of a treaty of peace with Japan on the basis of a reasonably generous policy.” The fact that we have a conference today is a clear indication of how we share the wish to restore peace between the two nations. We consider Far Eastern peace to be an indispensable part of world peace....The bilateral peace treaty that we hope to sign in the spirit of the San Francisco Peace Treaty would lay the foundation for future cooperation between the two nations.’
Subsequently, it was also through the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ that Plenipotentiary of Japan, Kawada Isao, replied to Foreign Minister Yeh (Ibid.: 5-6; Chang and Huang 1968: 352, author’s translation):

‘In the past, unfortunate incidents successively took place between Japan and China. We certainly regret that they escalated into war against the will of the two peoples who sincerely wished for peace. Nonetheless, when the war finally ended, President Chiang nationally and internationally called for treating the enemy nation with a magnanimous attitude exactly as Plenipotentiary Yeh has just mentioned. Since then, the people of my country have been deeply moved and soberly reflective. On behalf of my government and people, I’d like to take this opportunity to express sincere appreciation to the Chinese officials and people who genuinely responded to President Chiang’s call and treated Japanese expatriates with magnanimity and kindness. We firmly believe that making every effort to bring stability in Asia—especially through our contribution to the full economic recovery and prosperity of East Asia—is the best way of returning President Chiang’s noble virtue. While the contents of this treaty will be in conformity with the principles set out in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, we strongly hope to keep them as concise as possible...The San Francisco Peace Treaty is expected to have great political repercussions on peace and stability in East Asia.
once it comes into effect. Therefore, a speedy settlement of the bilateral treaty concerned is highly desirable.’

Kawada’s reply mainly reflected Tokyo’s apprehension about signing a bilateral treaty on the same terms as the San Francisco Peace Treaty. From the viewpoint of Tokyo, such a bilateral treaty as stated in Article 26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, was not yet feasible in the absence of international consensus on the issue of Chinese representation (Nishimura 1971: 315). Thus, what the Japanese had in mind instead was to sign a ‘concise’ trade accord with the authorities of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Penghu) by settling ‘the disposition of property of Japan and of its nationals in the areas’ and its connection to ‘reparations’ as stated in Articles 4(a) and 21 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (Ibid.; Yoshida 1957: 76). Accordingly, there was a considerable gap between what Tokyo intended to return for Chiang Kai-shek’s virtue and what the Nationalist Chinese benefactor expected from the Japanese debtor.

It was for this gap that Japanese and Nationalist Chinese delegations spent more than two months of their time to fill in before they finally concluded the bilateral treaty on 28 April 1952. In fact, such a ‘Rashomon effect’—that ‘different states see the same situation very differently’ (Jervis 1996: 228)—was even reflected in the naming of the negotiations. While the meeting was referred to as the Sino-Japanese Peace Conference (Zhong-Ri Heping Huiyi) in Mandarin and English, it was called the Japan-ROC Treaty Conference (Nikka Joyaku Kaigi) in Japanese (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 2; Ishii 1986: 308; Chen 2000: 79; Yuan 2001: 206-7). Even though such an interpretive gap made the following negotiations thorny, a
common language was fortunately provided by the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ which in turn helped to bring an amicable settlement in the end. The mitigation of differences was informally carried out by former Premier Chang Chun, (10) Chiang Kai-shek’s Japan hand who was the de facto negotiator behind the scenes (Fu 1993: 150; Chang 1980: 128; Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui 1991: 128; Chen 1999: 323; Ishii 1989: 79). More specifically, it was Chang Chun’s narration of ‘returning virtue for malice’ with the Japanese that got the negotiations under way in February—by critically helping to define the bilateral treaty of peace—and put them back on the right track again in March. Put differently, it was the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ through which both parties modified their differences and ultimately agreed to disagree as shown on the pages that follow.

The first round: an overall peace treaty v. a limited treaty. In late February 1952, as was the case with the naming of the conference, the two sides disputed whether or not they should use the word peace in the title of the bilateral treaty they were about to negotiate. On the one hand, Taipei wished to sign an ‘overall peace treaty’ with Japan and gain Tokyo’s recognition as the legitimate government of China proper with the same privileges as had been granted to the Allied Powers in the San Francisco Peace Treaty (Yuan 2001: 206-9). On the other hand, Tokyo insisted on a ‘limited treaty’ so that it could keep alive the possibility of normalizing relations with Beijing in the future while it attempted to ensure the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty at the US Senate by going into negotiation with Taipei (Yoshitsu 1983: 77-8). Thus, the Japanese delegation entered the bilateral treaty negotiations with a six-article trade
document roughly ‘patched together’ in less than a week (Yoshitsu 1983: 80; Ishii 1988). In stark contrast with the ‘limited’ Japanese draft, Taipei drafted 22 articles for an ‘overall’ peace treaty (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 8-22). While the Japanese draft did not necessarily contradict such contents of the ‘Yoshida letter’ as ‘the principles set out in the multilateral Treaty of Peace’, the Chinese draft closely followed the provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (Yuan 2001: 211). Accordingly, the negotiations between the two governments stagnated from the very beginning over the title of the bilateral treaty. Obviously, they needed more than the ‘standard’ language of English for the bilateral treaty to be constructively negotiated.

At this juncture, on 24 February 1952, Plenipotentiary Kawada consulted Chang Chun for a possible way out of the stalemate (Yuan 2001: 253 n. 34). In return, Chang Chun attempted to naturalize the bilateral treaty of peace for Kawada through the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ in the following way (Chang 1980: 128-32, author’s translation):

‘China and Japan are brother nations....Father of China Mr. Sun Yat-sen along with President Chiang has led the Chinese Nationalist revolution and laid the foundation for long-term friendly cooperation between China and Japan. They have sought coexistence and mutual prosperity of the Asian peoples and pursued further to contribute to the idea of world peace....President Chiang, in a radio broadcast, called for returning virtue for malice instead of acting in retaliation towards the Japanese. This kind of policy...was based on the traditional values of humaneness
and righteousness held by the peoples of the Orient...The Sino-Japanese bilateral peace-treaty negotiations taking place this time are presenting us with an opportunity to reconstruct long-term cooperative relations between our nations by closing the wrong historical path from the past. It can be achieved in a dignified manner—that is, through the traditional value of grand righteousness held by the peoples of the Orient. The authorities from both sides should be grateful for this invaluable opportunity. At the same time, we should be well aware of our great responsibility.

Furthermore, Chang Chun took this opportunity to express Taipei’s indignation towards Prime Minister Yoshida’s provocative comment about setting up overseas agencies both in Taipei and Beijing from the previous year (Dower 1979: 405-6; Yuan 2001: 148-9)—which had resulted in Dulles’ visit to Tokyo with two influential members of the US Senate and the production of the ‘Yoshida letter’. Chang Chun strongly criticized Prime Minister Yoshida’s comment that had challenged Taipei’s legitimacy by referring to Oriental moral values as follows (Chang 1980: 128-32, author’s translation):

‘...Prime Minister Yoshida’s incoherent reply in the National Diet and his letter to Mr. Dulles seemed to come from two different individuals. This kind of diplomatic quibbling by the Japanese authorities gave my government and people no choice but to hold your sincerity in deep

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suspicion...From the viewpoint of Oriental moral values, it is certainly
difficult to understand how the Japanese authorities could inflict wounds
on the most friendly state in need—the Government of the Republic of
China—by making a contemptuous comment accusing it of being a
province, thereby rejecting its status as the sovereign state of China
proper.’

Chang Chun then set the following conditions for the bilateral treaty negotiations on
behalf of his government (Chang 1980: 131, author’s translation):

‘During the bilateral treaty negotiations, the Japanese government must
respect the following two points: 1) The Republic of China is the
sovereign state of China proper, a member of the Allies which defeated
Japan, and its international status must not be taken lightly as it has been
incorrectly regarded as a provincial government by Japan; 2) The Treaty
of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan must be based on the
text of the San Francisco Peace Treaty both in name and reality, and it
must be an overall peace treaty as the Republic of China sees fit rather
than a limited treaty as Japan has insisted.’

Kawada expressed no objection to Chang Chun (1980: 132). Two days later, when the
formal negotiations resumed on 26 February, Kawada secretly agreed to use the word
peace if the contents of the treaty as a result of negotiation doubtlessly constituted a

In Tokyo, despite the pressure Taipei attempted to exert on Yoshida via Washington (Chen 2000: 80-1), the Prime Minister was furious about the concession Kawada made without prior consultation (Yoshitsu 1983: 81). While Yoshida’s anger might have been about losing a ‘trump card’ to get concessions from Taipei (Chen 2000: 80; Yuan 2001: 212), such discontent could also have been a manifestation of Tokyo’s effort to follow the terms set by the ‘Yoshida letter’ of 24 December 1951 (Ibid.: 215; Ishii 1989: 82). The letter had only specified Tokyo’s preparedness to negotiate a bilateral treaty with Taipei, but not necessarily the bilateral treaty of peace between Japan and ‘China’ (Yoshitsu 1983: 78; Ishii 1988: 206; 1989: 80-1). In fact, the possibility of negotiating the ‘bilateral peace treaty’ had been discussed between John Foster Dulles and Yoshida in December 1951 (Yoshitsu 1982: 77), but Yoshida had not completely agreed with Dulles (Ishii 1989: 80-5). While Yoshida had agreed with Dulles that Tokyo would negotiate a bilateral treaty with Taipei, Yoshida had only wished to sign a ‘concise’ treaty to resume economic relations with Nationalist China (Nishimura 1971: 315; Yoshitsu 1982: 78; Yuan 2001: Ch. 5). For that reason, Tokyo had only conditionally authorized Plenipotentiary Kawada to negotiate the bilateral treaty of peace. More specifically, although the Japanese delegation in Taipei was authorized to negotiate the treaty of peace, it nonetheless had been instructed to request Tokyo’s prior consent (Ishii 1989: 85; Yuan 2001: 216).
More significantly, Plenipotentiary Kawada’s concession to negotiate the bilateral treaty of peace in Taipei—without Prime Minister Yoshida’s approval in Tokyo (Yoshitsu 1982: 81-2)—had long-term consequences on Japan’s China policy. The discursive formation of the Japanese Plenipotentiary’s concession to negotiate the bilateral treaty of peace made it practically impossible for Tokyo to settle with a bilateral treaty that is ‘limited’ to economic issues between Japan and ‘the authorities of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Penghu)’. Put differently, while Prime Minister Yoshida wished to avoid signing the treaty of peace until the ‘China question’ was territorially resolved (Nishimura 1971: 320), Plenipotentiary Kawada’s concession to repay a ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek made it more difficult for Tokyo to conclude the treaty of peace with ‘one total China’ in the future (Lee 1976: 28; Yoshida 1957: 76; Yoshitsu 1982: 82-3). That is why, for many years, Yoshida regretted that Kawada had made such a critical concession without his approval (Nishimura 1971: 371). Accordingly, the Japanese Plenipotentiary’s concession in Taipei—to which the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ contributed—played a critical role for making Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei possible as it closed off Tokyo’s option to enjoy trade relations with both Taipei and Beijing without having diplomatic relations for the time being.

The second round: ‘reparations’ v. ‘China’ as an ‘Allied Power’. The Chinese Nationalists’ successful use of ‘returning virtue for malice’ also taught the Japanese to conversely mobilize the discourse for their own advantage. In fact, the Chinese Nationalists were hoist by their own petard to the extent that they themselves were
forced to practice what they rhetorically disseminated in the first place. More specifically, as demonstrated in the following texts, Tokyo’s repetitious reference to Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘magnanimous’ Japan policy facilitated Taipei’s renunciation of its claim to war reparations in exchange for Tokyo’s legitimation of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan. Put differently, the diffusion of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse in forming ‘China’ under American hegemony was not linear and unidirectional, but curvilinear and multi-directional.

In concrete, such reverse diffusion of the discourse during the negotiations can be traced back to 7 March 1952. On the grounds of the ‘magnanimous attitude towards the Japanese’ and the necessity of future Sino-Japanese cooperation, Chief Delegate Kimura Shiroshichi demanded that Taipei delete the whole article on war reparations from (the ROC draft of) the Treaty as the following (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 90-1; Yuan 2001: 226; Yin 1996: 260-1, author’s translation):

‘...not because we deny our responsibility to pay reparations, but because the application of this Article (12 of the ROC draft) is problematic. Most of the issues concern the (Chinese) Continent. Time is not yet ripe for us to discuss these matters. Prime Minister Yoshida, in his letter to Dulles, has already indicated the difficulty involved in immediately applying the Treaty of Peace under negotiation to the Continent....It does not, however, call into question the status of your government as the sovereign state of China proper and the legitimate government of China. Besides, Article 21 (rather than 26) of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty especially provides that China is entitled to the benefits of Articles 10 and 14(a)2 (on Japan’s renunciation of special rights and interests in China and Japanese reparations to the Allied Powers). We feel that Chinese interests are already appropriately treated by the San Francisco Treaty. Thus, it is unnecessary for us to re-prescribe them here....Article 14(a)2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty already clearly prescribes that Japan renounce most of its property, rights, and interests in the territories of your nation. The burden thrown upon Japan by this Article (14(a)2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty), from the Japanese people’s point of view, is already more than they can bear. If the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan re-prescribes such an Article, it would be more than enough to disturb the Japanese people. Therefore, on the ground of your magnanimous attitude towards the Japanese and in consideration of the necessity of future Sino-Japanese cooperation, we request you to delete this Article (12 of the ROC draft).

Subsequently, on 14 March, Kimura’s effort to reverse the circulation of the ‘magnanimity’ discourse was followed by Chief of the Asia Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Chief, Wajima Eiji, had just arrived in Taipei a few days earlier. He had brought with him Tokyo’s second draft of the Treaty composed of 13 articles that accompanied the original six trade-related articles of the first draft (Chen 2000: 81-2; Yin 1996: 257-73; Ishii 1988, 1993: 84-6; Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti
Yanjiuhui 1966b: 113-4; Yuan 2001: 212-5). As in the case of the ‘Yoshida letter’, his delivery of the new draft can be interpreted as a product of American pressure on Tokyo originating from Taiwan (Chen 2000: 80-2). It is especially plausible considering the fact that the new draft was conspicuously inclined towards Taipei’s position compared to other Japanese drafts, even though the Japanese dexterously managed to submit another pressure-free draft by the time they resumed negotiations in Taipei (Yuan 2001: 215). Nonetheless, Wajima, dispatched as a ‘trouble-shooter’ to speed up the hitherto sluggish negotiations, paid a visit to Chang Chun and expressed his view on the issue of reparations. In this meeting (Ishii 1989: 86), Chang narrowed the agenda down to the two remaining issues in dispute: 1) Japanese war reparations; and 2) Article 21 of (the ROC draft of) the Treaty, which Taipei drafted after Article 26 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty to attain the same advantages granted for the Allied Powers. In return, Wajima demanded that Taipei delete the provisions concerning war reparations and offered to give economic aid in exchange as follows (Ishii 1989: 86-7; 1993: 85; Yin 1996: 275, author’s translation):

‘The formula of Article 14 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty is not workable in reality. Therefore, we would like China to judge from 
President’s magnanimous mind unveiled at the end of the war. It would deeply move our people. At the same time, it would enable the Nationalist government not to necessarily dwell on the concept of reparations and consider the intention behind Article 2 of our original
However, on this occasion, Chang Chun not only brushed it off by pointing out the stubborn character of the Chinese people from the Continent but also counter-argued that Taipei could not waive its claim for reparations when none of the other Allied powers had done so (ibid.).

Nevertheless, by 17 March, the ‘magnanimity’ discourse slowly began to take effect on the Chinese Nationalists. In concrete terms, Plenipotentiary Yeh this time offered to shelve the reparations issue by deleting (not the whole clause as requested by the Japanese but) the word *promptly* from Article 12, thereby preserving the right to demand the reparations in the future (Zhonghua Minguou Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 117-8; Yin 1996: 268). In return, Kawada, like his colleagues, attempted to reverse the diffusion of the ‘magnanimity’ discourse in the following fashion (ibid.: 119-20; Ishii 1987: 167, 1989: 88; Yin 1996: 269, author’s translation):

‘...We have always thought that a huge amount of the property we left behind on the continental part of your country, which was worth tens of billions of US dollars, would sufficiently cover the reparations. If you now demand that we compensate for the cost of repairing the damage done by making available the services of our people in production, salvaging, and other work for your nation, then it is certainly not
consistent with the *magnanimous intention* towards Japan that you
publically claim time after time.'

Yeh subsequently replied that his government’s *magnanimous intention* towards Japan
was manifested by the very fact that his government was only demanding as much
reparations as other Allied Powers even though the war against Japan cost his nation
more than any other Allied Power in terms of damage and suffering (Zhonghua
Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 120; Yin 1996: 269). Kawada then proposed
the following ‘face saving’ solution to the reparations problem, as suggested by Chang
Chun on 15 March (Ishii 1989: 87, Yin 1996: 279), in terms of the ‘magnanimity’
discourse (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 121, author’s
translation):

‘If you now demand that we fulfill the obligation to compensate for the
cost of repairing the damage done by making available the services of
our people in production, salvaging, and other work for your nation, then
it would be difficult for our people to believe that you are *magnanimous*.
This would obviously have tremendous influence on Sino-Japanese
relations in the future...*It would still be possible for us to first
acknowledge that we are under obligation to pay reparations to your
nation. You could then, in a separate statement, voluntarily declare that
you have the right to demand reparations. However, you could also
voluntarily waive the benefit of the service compensation in the same
statement.'

For the time being, Yeh sarcastically replied that the service compensation essentially meant no reparations in the first place (ibid.). On the same day, Yeh demanded American Ambassador Karl L. Rankin to put pressure on Tokyo via Washington (Chen 2000: 83-4; Yuan 2001: 220, 227-8; Yin 1996: 273-4). Unfortunately, Taipei could not convince Washington to press Tokyo because the United States did not want to be held responsible for the reparations issue by those states still preparing to negotiate bilateral treaties with Japan (Chen 2000: 84). Besides, very much like Tokyo, Washington never intended to support Taipei on the provisions that might benefit Communist China in the future (Yuan 2001: 251). Nevertheless, there remained only three days before the US Senate was to ratify the San Francisco Peace Treaty. More simply, Japan’s ‘cast-iron guarantee’ to negotiate a bilateral treaty with Taipei as expressed in the ‘Yoshida letter’ was about to become null and void. As an influential ‘constituent’ in Washington in its own right, Nationalist China readily realized that Japan’s postwar ‘independence’ was just around the corner with or without ‘free China’. For that reason, Chang Chun urgently contacted Kawada on the late evening of 18 March in order to see him on the next morning (Yin 1996: 276). Especially after the unsuccessful attempt to resort to American pressure, the informal role Chang Chun played in contacting Kawada proved to be critical in jump-starting the negotiations on the next day.

On 19 March 1952, as the result of Chang Chun’s input from his meeting with Kawada earlier on the same day (Chen 2000: 83-4; Ishii 1989: 88; Yin 1996: 276-7;
Yuan 2001: 228), Plenipotentiary Yeh ‘magnanimously’ offered to make the ‘utmost concession’ to the Japanese. He did it by ‘surreptitiously’ bargaining with his Japanese counterpart Kawada as follows (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1996b: 131; Yin 1996: 277-8, author’s translation):

'The purpose of my proposal is to break the deadlock so that we can expect to conclude the Treaty at an early date. I have not yet requested instructions from my government regarding this proposal. Therefore, I hope you will strictly keep this secret by all means. Ever since we started negotiating the Treaty of Peace, you have repeatedly asked us to sympathize with the Yoshida cabinet in having to deal with domestic difficulties. We have also wanted to express magnanimity and friendship to the Japanese people. Nonetheless, the difficult situation in which my government has had to cope with various domestic affairs has been no different from yours....This is to express our greatest sincerity towards the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace. Moreover, it arises from the sense of responsibility that I have as a man entrusted with a mission to negotiate the Treaty. I thus solemnly propose the following to Plenipotentiary Kawada: 1) We are willing to voluntarily forfeit our demand for the “service compensation” under the condition that you accept our claims on the rest of the unsettled matters in the draft of the Treaty; 2) If you accept the above proposal, it must be phrased in such way that you first acknowledge you are under obligation to pay
reparations as well as the "service compensation", the benefit of which we will voluntarily waive afterwards. I must re-emphasize that the foregoing formula is yet to be suggested to my government. However, I firmly believe that it would not be difficult for my government to agree to each item of such a formula if you can unconditionally accept it. As Plenipotentiary Kawada is well informed, the aforementioned formula by which we waive the benefit of the service compensation is the utmost concession that we could ever make.'

In contrast to his indifferent reaction to the same initiative taken by Kawada two days earlier, Yeh this time turned around and took a ride on the common Confucian language of 'magnanimity' in order to conclude the Treaty of Peace. Yeh did it by practically repeating Kawada's initiative, which consequently obliged Kawada to meet Yeh's conditions in exchange. More specifically, on the day before the San Francisco Peace Treaty was to be ratified by the US Senate, Taipei was so anxious to close the deal with Tokyo that it offered the 'utmost' trade-off between such unsettled issues as Tokyo's war reparations and Taipei's status as the legitimate government of China as well as an Allied Power (Gaimusho Hyakunenshi Hensan Iikai 1969: 813; Ishii 1985: 75, 1986: 309-10; 1989: 88; Yin 1996: 276-9; Yuan 2001: 228-9; Chen 2000: 84; Zhu 1992: 29; Lo 1999: 159-60). It was clear to Taipei that Japan was coming off the hook of the 'Yoshida letter', the 'cast-iron guarantee' to negotiate a bilateral treaty with the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, once the San Francisco Treaty was ratified in Washington. Therefore, for Taipei, the renunciation of war reparations was the
‘utmost’ strategy to gain recognition as ‘China’ in the international community. For Tokyo, it was an opportunity to favorably settle the reparations issue once and for all by taking advantage of divided realities between Taipei and Beijing (Yuan 2001: 233; Yin 1996: 297-8). It was, however, the discourse of ‘magnanimity’ or ‘returning virtue for malice’ that provided the common language for both sides to negotiate constructively and come to an agreement with the 25 March 1952 communique.

The third round: Taiwan ‘and’ China v. Taiwan ‘or’ China. Unfortunately, the Japanese authorities in Tokyo turned the tables on the agreement reached between the two parties in Taipei. With hindsight, the authorities in Tokyo were most intransigent vis-à-vis the ‘limited’ scope of applicability as stated in the ‘Yoshida letter’ of 24 December 1951. More particularly, on the evening of 27 March 1952, Tokyo ordered its delegation in Taipei to demand the deletion of the following italicized phrase in the ‘Note from the Japanese Plenipotentiary to the Chinese Plenipotentary’ (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 174-5; Yu 1970: 56):

‘In regard to the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China signed to-day, I have the honor to refer to the understanding reached between us that the terms of the present Treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China, be applicable to all the territories which are now, and which may hereafter be, under the control of its Government, and the understanding shall not in any way prejudice the sovereignty of the Republic of China over all its territories.’
Tokyo’s disapproval of the agreement reached in Taipei demonstrated that the bargaining position of Nationalist China had been greatly undercut after Washington ratified the San Francisco Peace Treaty on 20 March 1952 (Dower 1979: 411; Yan 1996: 305). More specifically, Washington’s guarantee for Japan to regain its ‘sovereignty’ gave Tokyo a free hand to opt for granting only ‘limited’ recognition to the Nationalist regime on Taiwan (Ibid.; Dower 1979). At the same time, such disapproval by the Japanese authorities revealed a perceptual gap over the reparations issue between Tokyo and its delegates in Taipei (Yin 1996: 285). In sum, Tokyo’s disapproval reflected its ambition to achieve both the waiver of reparations and ‘limited’ recognition of the ROC (Yuan 2001: 235), rather than trading the latter for the former as had been agreed in Taipei. In a sense, it was Tokyo’s comeback to untie what had been tied by the discourse of ‘magnanimity’ or ‘returning virtue for malice’ in Taipei.

Thus, when Plenipotentiary Kawada visited Chang Chun to explain the situation on 28 March 1952, Chang (1980: 133-5) again attempted to make a knot through the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’. As usual, he first framed the context in which the moral discourse could be circulated to have preferred effects. This time, Chang first made an objection to the Japanese officials’ provocative behavior that had been taking place in Tokyo such as the following (Ibid., author’s translation):

‘A few days ago, after he returned to Tokyo, Bureau Chief Wajima held a talk with Chen Yan-tong, Advisor to the Chinese Mission in Japan. Bureau Chief Wajima said, “There are many Japanese who are against
signing a bilateral treaty with the Nationalist government. They think that the Nationalist government has already been forced to leave the Continent and cornered in Taiwan. They think that the international status of Taiwan is still unclear. Besides, there are no grounds that the Taiwanese are the people (nation) of the Nationalist government (state). There are also quite a few members of the National Diet who think that it is not really a good idea, at this time, to sign a bilateral treaty with the Nationalist government. At the same time, internationally speaking, there are also quite a few countries that do not recognize the Nationalist government. Great Britain, which has close relations with Japan, is a prime example. Prime Minister Yoshida has dispatched Mr. Kawada Isao to Taipei to negotiate a bilateral treaty for he wished to express sympathy and friendship, but the Chinese side has not responded sympathetically to the Japanese side. If that is the case, Japan can also follow in the footsteps of Great Britain, and so on.” He then asked Advisor Chen to convey the contents of this talk to our government. As far as we’re concerned, all these statements were made to threaten us so to speak....’

Subsequently, Chang played the ‘history card’ by quantifying the damage and suffering the Chinese experienced during the war as follows (Ibid., author’s translation):
‘In retrospect, China and Japan have had two wars in the (last) century. The last war lasted for 14 years. Between 18 September (1931) and the end of the war (15 August 1945), the losses China suffered—speaking of just material losses for it is always difficult to estimate the immaterial—reached 30 million in terms of direct and indirect casualties among the Chinese people. The Legislative Yuan has already set up a committee to investigate property losses. According to its initial statistics, the figure has reached 80 billion US dollars. In addition, the deep involvement of Japanese troops made it possible for the Communist International to expand on the Continent. China was always the first to bear the brunt of all these influences of the war. It certainly is unbearable not only for China but any nation to meet with such calamity.’

Chang then put the collar of ROC-Japan cooperation on Kawada by emphasizing Chiang Kai-shek’s long-term vision and spinning specific points of dispute onto the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ in the following fashion (Ibid., author’s translation):

‘...the traditional policy of Mr. Sun Yat-sen and President Chiang—who led the Chinese Nationalist revolution for several decades—was intended to end historical animosity between China and Japan and restore a hundred years of friendly and cooperative relations. President Chiang, on the ground of this national policy, unhesitatingly took the
magnanimous line of 'returning virtue for malice' (yide baoyuan zhi kuanda fangzhen) towards Japan at the dawn of victory. How could he have made such an exceptional decision if he had not considered the long-term future and centennial interests of the two nations? His grand wishes should obviously be realized by our joint effort to conclude the bilateral Treaty of Peace this time. The Chinese side has already made a significant concession in order to reach an agreement. It can no longer make any concession. What it demands from the Treaty of Peace absolutely does not exceed the principles set out in San Francisco. On the other hand, the Japanese side not only wants to cancel or reduce the effects of the articles provided by the San Francisco Peace Treaty which the Chinese side is following, but also wishes to change their nature by inserting provisions that are not even provided by the multilateral Treaty. Prime Minister Yoshida’s behavior has been ambiguous to say the least and the Japanese Foreign Ministry has been trifling with the contention of technical wording....To make the long story short, my government’s position on the bilateral Treaty of Peace has always been to make the following three points: 1) It must be the treaty of peace both in name and reality; 2) It must respect the status of full sovereignty that my government claims; and 3) It must provide for my nation the same terms as those provided for the Allied Powers, which are signatories of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Ever since the end of the war, our President Chiang has always wished that the Treaty of Peace between China and
Japan would make a good start for cooperative relations between the two nations and serve their long-term interests. However, President Chiang has been surely and deeply disappointed by the attitude of the Japanese government thus far....’

Accordingly, through the discourse of moral reciprocity, Chang Chun once again attempted to persuade Kawada to repay Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek’s virtue and restore the moral balance between Nationalist China and Japan. More specifically, Chang Chun effectively mobilized the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’—which is reciprocal but ‘asymmetric by design’—by going back to a particular point in history that put Chiang Kai-shek on the creditor’s side of the moral balance. In this way, Chang Chun morally ‘hierarchicalized’ ROC-Japan relations with Chiang Kai-shek as the creditor and the Japanese as the debtor. Apparently, Chang Chun’s narration of the discourse had an impact on the Japanese Plenipotentiary as he was deeply moved by it (Chang 1980: 136).

In fact, when Tokyo subsequently dispatched Wajima Eiji to Taipei again to reinforce its position in early April, Kawada did not fully conform to instructions from Tokyo. Here, Kawada stopped short of demanding Taipei delete all the provisions referring to the Continent and an article (Article 12) granting the ROC advantages provided by the provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (Yuan 2001: 223-4). Instead, Kawada attempted to persuade Wajima and the authorities in Tokyo to modify their new (third) draft (ibid.). In the meantime, on 5 April, Taipei ‘threatened’ to oppose the American initiative to disband the Allied Council for Japan unless the
Treaty of Peace was signed (Chen 2000: 86-7; Yuan 2001: 248; Yin 1996: 285). By 8 April, the Japanese side took the initiative to kick-start bilateral talks by setting the agenda in terms of major and minor points to be negotiated (Yin 1996: 287). By 16 April, both parties had already resolved all three major points that had been in dispute: 1) Article 12 regarding the ROC’s Allied-Power status; 2) Protocol on the treatment of Japanese war reparations; and 3) Exchange of Notes in regard to the scope of the applicability of the bilateral Treaty of Peace (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuihui 1966b: 207-9). For the first point, Kawada agreed to refer to the relevant provisions (rather than principles) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in exchange for re-phrasing the article in a more passive tone (Yuan 2001: 224; Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuihui 1966b: 168, 214-5). As for the second and third points, without Tokyo’s instructions (Ibid.: 256; Ishii 1986: 311; Yin 1995: 184, 1996: 301), Kawada accepted Taipei’s insistence to use the word and in the phrase of ‘be applicable to all the territories which are now, and which may hereafter be’ in exchange for Taipei’s concession to waive ‘all’ claims for reparations (Chen 2000: 91-2; Yuan 2001: 231; Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuihui 1966b: 243-7). Additionally, Taipei made the concession of dropping the aforementioned phrase of ‘and the understanding shall not in any way prejudice the sovereignty of the Republic of China over all its territories’ from the same paragraph stating the scope of applicability (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuihui 1966b: 218-20; Ishii 1986: 311). Kawada then requested the authorities in Tokyo to approve the trade-off he had single-handedly made with Taipei (Ibid.: 285; Yuan 2001: 239; Yin 1996: 301-2). Nevertheless, on the following day—11 days before the San Francisco Peace Treaty
was to come into effect, the Japanese authorities in Tokyo disapproved Kawada’s request. Kawada tenaciously attempted to persuade his government again on the following day (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 288), but Tokyo insisted on the precise terms set by the ‘Yoshida letter’ and prepared to dispute the scope of applicability with Taipei (Yuan 2001: 239-40).

At this moment of crisis, on 22 April, Prime Minister Yoshida—who was concurrently serving as Foreign Minister at the time—and Cabinet Secretary Okazaki Kazuo decided to send an ‘ultimatum’ to the Nationalist government while some high officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended them to recall the whole Japanese delegation from Taipei (Ibid.: 240). More specifically, Yoshida and Okazaki, in consultation with Chief of the Treaties Bureau Nishimura Kumao, decided to permit Taipei’s interpretation of the scope of application using the word *and* in the Agreed Minutes while leaving the word *or* unchanged for the Exchange of Notes (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 295-6). Such an iridescent (*tamamushiiro*) arrangement was engineered so that the Yoshida cabinet could escape any deliberation on the use of the word *and* in the National Diet (Chen 2000: 92). Accordingly, Tokyo’s ‘ultimatum’ was designed to duck Japanese domestic scrutiny regarding the sensitive issue of the scope of application.

At the same time, the production of the ‘ultimatum’—for continuing rather than terminating the bilateral negotiations—was indirectly enforced by the pressure Taipei put on Tokyo *via* Washington once again (Ibid.). It is plausible especially considering the conciliatory nature of the ‘ultimatum’ as discussed above. More precisely, although Washington was hesitant to pressure Tokyo (Yuan 2001: 247-51), Tokyo was still
sensitive to any possibility of exacerbating US-Japan relations in the future (Chen 2000: 92). In fact, Washington was very much interested in seeing the early conclusion of the bilateral treaty between Taipei and Tokyo even though it did not directly express it to Tokyo until 24 April (Ibid.; Yuan 2001: 248-50). However, such American influence on Tokyo after the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty should not be overrated for it merely produced the Japanese ultimatum, which the Chinese Nationalists found extremely distasteful and unacceptable.

Thus, when Plenipotentiary Kawada visited Chang Chun on 24 April 1952, Chang complained about the jingoistic style of Japanese diplomacy and took a gloomy view of further negotiations. According to the following excerpt from Kawada's telegram to Tokyo (Yin 1995: 184-5; 1996: 302, author's translation), Chang Chun deplored the fact that:

‘... the Japanese government does not even authorize you to revise any wording (of the text). Moreover, you (Plenipotentiary Kawada) cannot even agree to any revision at all by the other side....Now, the Japanese government expects us to reply to the ultimatum in terms of “all or nothing”. This kind of approach forces the Chinese side to lose face, and it reminds me of Japan’s China policy from the prewar era...unless the Japanese side changes its attitude, China must reconsider whether it is appropriate to continue negotiating with Japan. By the same token, I am extremely pessimistic about the conclusion of the treaty.’
Subsequently, on 26 April, Kawada sent a telegram to Yoshida and advised him to make the following concession to meet Taipei’s demand (Yin 1995: 185; 1996: 302-3, author’s translation):

‘...in regard to finding a way out of the present deadlock by giving face to the Chinese side, the Nationalists government is anxious to have an arrangement that would allow it to make an announcement regarding the materialization of an overall compromise by the 28th (of April, 1952). In view of this arrangement, Japan would have to compensate for the ROC’s political loss if the signing of the treaty does not take place by the above date. As for the Nationalist government’s counterproposal (for the scope of applicability), the Nationalist government wishes it to be relayed to the Japanese government. At the same time, the Nationalist government welcomes our comments as well as further negotiations on the matter of concern. The Nationalist government is confident as it has implied that it could easily have the support of the United States on the issue of the present dispute.’

On 27 April, following Kawada’s telegram, Tokyo sent its final compromise to its delegation in Taipei. On the one hand, Tokyo rejected Taipei’s counterproposal—which required Kawada to make a statement (regarding the scope of applicability using neither and nor or) rather than merely answering a question posed by the Chinese side (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 313; Yuan 2001: 241; Chen
2000: 93). On the other hand, it nonetheless accepted Taipei’s demand to delete such words as concern and no foundation from the ‘ultimatum’ which Kawada had presented to Yeh just four days earlier (Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuihui 1966b: 314; Yuan 2001: 211-2). The ‘ultimatum’ had proposed that the following statement be made:

‘Chinese Delegate:

It is my understanding that the expression “or which may hereafter be” in the Note concerning the scope of application of the Treaty permits the interpretation “and which may here after be”.

Japanese Delegate:

I assure you that the concern expressed by you with regard to the expression in question has no foundation. It is my understanding that the Treaty is applicable to all the territories under the control of the Government of the Republic of China.’

On the same day—that is, one day before the deadline which Taipei set for Tokyo to save Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘face’—Japan finally agreed to the following revised version of its ‘ultimatum’ (The China Handbook Editorial Board 1952: 159; Yu 1970: 105-6; Takeuchi 1993: 170; Takeuchi et al. 2005: 305):
Chinese Delegate:

It is my understanding that the expression “or which may hereafter be” in the Notes No. 1 exchanged today can be taken to mean “and which may hereafter be”. Is it so?

Japanese Delegate:

Yes, it is so. I assure you that the Treaty is applicable to all the territories under the control of the Government of the Republic of China.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Taipei had already agreed to show its ‘magnanimity’ and waive ‘all’ claims to reparations in paragraph 1(b) of the Protocol of the Treaty and Agreed Minutes No. 4 as follows (The China Handbook Editorial Board 1952: 156, 159-60; Yu 1970: 98, 106-7; Takeuchi 1993: 161, 171-2; Takeuchi et al. 2005: 302, 307):

‘As a sign of magnanimity and good will towards the Japanese people, the Republic of China voluntarily waives the benefit of the services to be made available by Japan pursuant to Article 14(a)1 of the San Francisco Treaty.’

Japanese Delegate:

It is my understanding that since the Republic of China has voluntarily waived the service compensation as stated in paragraph 1(b) of the Protocol of the present Treaty, the only benefit that remains to be extended to her under Article
14(a) of the San Francisco Treaty is Japan's external assets as stipulated in Article 14(a)2 of the same Treaty. Is it so?

Chinese Delegate: Yes, it is so.

Accordingly, the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan, which was composed of 14 articles in the end, was signed on 28 April 1952. It was 7 hours before the San Francisco Peace Treaty took effect. As a result, Japan became the 47th state to recognize Nationalist China on Taiwan (as opposed to 26 countries that recognized Communist China on the mainland). Moreover, it precisely fell on the deadline Chiang Kai-shek had set for the conclusion of the bilateral treaty just as he wrote down his instructions on his translated-copy of the 'Yoshida letter' (Ishii 1986: 312; Yin 1995: 182). The conclusion of the Treaty of Peace was the product of more than two months of turbulent negotiations in the Conference Room on the Second Floor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taipei—which ironically happened to be the very room Plenipotentiary Kawada had used as his office during the Imperial era (Fu 1993: 142). In any case, Chiang Kai-shek's face as the benefactor was saved by the moral debtor—the Japanese who returned Chiang's virtue with virtue. Put differently, in return for Chiang Kai-shek's 'magnanimous' policy towards Japan after World War II (now including the waiver of all claims to reparations), Tokyo 'legitimated' Chiang's Nationalist regime on Taiwan by 'iridescently' recognizing it as 'China' under US hegemony.
The end/beginning: the naturalization of returning recognition for virtue. The conclusion of the Treaty of Peace was ritualized again in terms of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘magnanimous’ policy towards postwar Japan by Plenipotentiary Yeh in the following fashion (Zhunghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui 1966b: 331-2; Chang and Huang 1968: 354-5, author’s translation):

‘Mr. Sun Yat-sen, Father of the Republic of China, advocated that stability in Asia could only be achieved by means of sincere cooperation between China and Japan—the two great neighboring powers of Asia. On 18 June 1951, by following this policy, President Chiang stated: “Since V-J Day I have repeatedly stated that China would not adopt an attitude of vengeance against Japan. On various occasions, I have, both directly and indirectly, stress the necessity of the early conclusion of a treaty of peace with Japan on the basis of a reasonably generous policy.” Over the course of the negotiations which led to the signing of the Treaty of Peace today, I also followed their examples and approached the Japanese delegation with the same magnanimous spirit.’

Kawada replied as follows (Ibid.: 355-6, author’s translation):

‘...most importantly, the magnanimous manner of President of the Republic of China, His Excellency, is already well expressed in the provisions with which we have especially been concerned. I would be delighted to assure His Excellency that the Japanese people will be
extremely grateful for such a _magnanimous_ gesture, which they will never forget.’

Two days later, on 30 April 1952, Kawada paid a visit to Chiang Kai-shek, the benefactor, and ‘showed his respect for President’s great character and _noble virtue_’ (Chang 1980: 136). Subsequently, Kawada told Chiang that the provisions of the Treaty of Peace had been stated so _magnanimous_ that not only he was deeply moved but the Japanese people would be similarly grateful (Ibid.). Chiang Kai-shek replied by demonstrating his ‘magnanimity’ to Kawada once again as the following (Ibid., author’s translation):

‘You deserve this. The relations between China and Japan are different from those between other states. China never wanted to impose a harsh treaty on Japan.’

In return, Kawada thanked Chiang and told him that he would publicly inform his fellow-countrymen of this intention as soon as he returned to Japan (Ibid.). Chiang then re-emphasized the ‘special’ relationship between China and Japan as follows (Ibid.: 136-7, author’s translation):

‘Sino-Japanese relations are special and much different from those between other Allied Powers and Japan. For that reason, it was all the more significant that we signed a peace treaty separate from the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in which China could not participate. Thanks to Mr. Kawada’s effort, we have been able to lay good foundations. The relationship between the two nations is extremely close...China and
Japan must co-prosper without being self-complacent. We can enjoy peaceful stability in East Asia as a whole only if the two nations embrace liberty and prosperity.'

Kawada then repeatedly expressed admiration for Chiang Kai-shek's 'virtue' and his long-term vision for Japan-ROC relations before moving on to discuss the issue of bilateral economic cooperation in the future (Ibid.: 137).

After the conclusion of the Treaty, Kawada faithfully kept his promise and informed his countrymen of Chiang's 'virtue'. For instance, Prime Minister Yoshida (1957: 72-3; 1967: 189) reflected on the signing of the bilateral Treaty of Peace with 'China' by revealing that 'it was utterly impossible to ignore' Nationalist China on Taiwan 'as the counterpart of the peace treaty considering the friendship it demonstrated in the peaceful repatriation of our troops and civilians from China at the end of the war'. Similarly, Okazaki Katsuo, Yoshida's Chief Cabinet Secretary and spokesperson for the Japanese government at the time, justified the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace with the Nationalist regime on the ground of appreciation for Chiang Kai-shek's 'magnanimous' announcement towards Japan at the end of the war (Yuan 2001: 161). Furthermore, Iguchi Sadao (1971: 109-110), former Ambassador to the ROC who served as Vice Foreign Minister in Tokyo in 1952, celebrated the 'special' relationship between Japan and the ROC and attributed it to 'Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's policy of returning Japan's "malice" with "virtue"'. Accordingly, the discourse of 'returning virtue for malice' began to diffuse into Japan following the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace with Nationalist China and to form a Japanese 'regime of truth' about 'China' for decades to come.
3.4 Conclusion

This chapter shed light on the discursive aspect of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. It demonstrated that the ‘magnanimity’ discourse made Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan culturally intelligible for the Japanese, thereby facilitating Japan’s recognition of the Chiang regime as ‘China’ under US hegemony in East Asia. Put differently, this chapter showed that the Cold War meant different things in different parts of the world (Westad 2000: 19), and Sino-Japanese relation in the making of the ‘Cold War order’ were interestingly understood in terms of practices from the ‘Chinese World order’ (Fairbank 1968; Garver 1993: 9-15; Zhao, S. 1997: Ch. 7; Zhang 2001; Hook et al. 2001: 25-7, 2005: 27-9; Zhang 2001, Kang 2003).

More specifically, while the ‘Yoshida letter’ territorially defined ‘China’ and legally constrained Japan to legitimate Nationalist China in terms of the Western state-system, the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse on the other hand morally obliged Tokyo to recognize Taipei by articulating Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ in terms of the old East Asian order. Here, it is noteworthy that both the ‘Yoshida letter’ and the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse were responses to the same Anglo-American discord on the ‘China question’ during the making of US hegemony in East Asia or the ‘San Francisco system’. Both of them are obviously vital for one to understand Sino-Japanese relations under American hegemony during the Cold War era. In this chapter, the author particularly emphasized the discursive effect of ‘returning virtue for malice’ on Japan’s recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’—such as making a bilateral treaty *the treaty of peace* which the ‘Yoshida letter’ did not specify—by demonstrating
how it bridged the multilateral San Francisco Peace Treaty and the bilateral Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan.

Finally, this chapter emphasized the consensual aspect of US hegemony by tracing how East Asian constituents like Japan and Nationalist China gave their consent to the ‘San Francisco system’ at the dawn of the Cold War. While Tokyo gave its consent in order to re-gain its ‘independence’ by taking advantage of the ‘reverse course’ in US occupation policy, Taipei gave its consent so that it could take part in the ‘San Francisco system’ as ‘China’ and compensate the lack of its internal legitimacy in Taiwan. As for Japan, ruling elites even ‘invited’ Washington to keep its military bases on their own soil (Lundestad 1986, 1999). In this way, after China was ‘lost’, the United States found its major collaborator in East Asia as Japan made itself available as a ‘bastion’ of the Cold War in East Asia. Such consent was essential for the rise of US hegemony in East Asia in the early 1950s as indicated conversely by the absence of consent and the decline of US hegemony in the early 1970s, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. In the meantime, the following chapter will first show how the constitution of US hegemony was consolidated by the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’—formed by those ‘watch dogs’ the American authorities ‘de-purged’—in the domain of Japanese politics in the 1950s and 1960s.
Notes


2) It has been pointed out that Ashida consulted Emperor Hirohito regarding the memorandum that was conveyed to Eichelberger (Miura 1996a: 94-103). In fact, by following Shindo’s work (1979), Miura revealed that Hirohito subsequently produced a memorandum identical with Ashida’s and transmitted the message to Washington through more reliable channels—from Sebald to MacArthur, then from MacArthur to Marshall, and finally from Marshall to Kennan. Ashida’s consultation with Hirohito and Hirohito’s message following up on Ashida make sense if one follows Drifte’s (1983) argument, which has been confirmed by McNelly (1987), that Article 9 of the Constitution was designed to protect the imperial institution.

3) Yoshida’s ‘one man’ role in the so-called ‘Ikeda mission’ has recently been called into question by Toyoshita’s ‘dual diplomacy’ thesis (1995, 1996). He conjectures that the message Ikeda conveyed was not from Yoshida but from Hirohito. Toyoshita bases his account on ‘two background factors’ (Bix 2000: 640): 1) In February 1950, the Soviet Union had reopened the issue of Hirohito’s war criminality by demanding that he be brought to trial; 2) In April 1950, John Foster Dulles was appointed to be a special advisor to Secretary of State Dean Achenson, fueling speculation in Tokyo and Washington that the peace treaty negotiations would start moving forward again. In other words,
Hirohito took advantage of the latter in order to overcome the threat posed by the former. More simply, for his own survival, Hirohito pushed Japan’s de-facto peace with the ‘Western bloc’ excluding the ‘Communist bloc’. That is why, (following Toyoshita’s logic) Hirohito ‘bypassed’ MacArthur—who was conceivably still dwelling on Japan’s unarmed neutrality when he met with Hirohito on 18 April 1950—and directly contacted Washington through the ‘Ikeda mission’.


5) Although NSC 68—which ‘argued that by the mid 1950s the United States “must have substantially increased general air, ground and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives”’ (May 1992: 222)—was composed by Paul H. Nitze after Kennan’s resignation, Kennan was nonetheless consulted in the drafting process as well as on the final document (Gaddis 1982: 89-126).
Therefore, it was an elaboration of, rather than a deviation from, Kennan's earlier policy such as NSC 13/2.


7) Namely: Marquis Matsudaira Yasumasa—the then Grand Master of Ceremonies in the Imperial Court and a member of the Mitsui family, who had served as secretary to Count Kido Koichi, Lord Keeper of Privy Seal; Sawada Renzo—former Vice Foreign Minister and a member of the Mitsubishi family, who later served as Japan’s Ambassador to the United Nations; Kaihara Osamu—the then Chief of Planning for the National Defense Council; and Watanabe Takeshi—a Finance Ministry official handling liaison with SCAP and working under Fukuda Takeo who later became Prime Minister. Watanabe, the grandson of a former Finance Minister and son of a member of the Privy Council later assumed various influential posts in international finance such as the Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Director of the World Bank, President of the Asian Development Bank, and Chairman of the Trilateral Commission.
8) Recent declassifications of diplomatic archives in Japan have spawned mixed views on Yoshida’s ‘two Chinas’ policy. For instance, in the 29 May 2000 edition of The Mainichi Shinbun, Eto Shinkichi confirmed the ‘two Chinas’ policy by referring to his own interview with Yoshida in 1967. In this interview with Eto, Yoshida apparently admitted that he operated such a policy and took one issue at a time under the given circumstances. On another occasion of declassification, as reported by The Asahi Shinbun on 15 November 2001, Tanaka Akihiko along with Sakamoto Kazuya and Kan Hideaki was dumbfounded by Yoshida’s apparent anti-communist beliefs that had been overshadowed by his realistic approach to diplomacy. Consequently, they called for the reconsideration of the ‘two Chinas’ thesis that other scholars had argued in regard to Yoshida’s China policy. For the full text of this discussion, see Kan et al. (2002).

9) Plenipotentiary Kawada, Prime Minister Yoshida’s relative, had served as the Minister of Finance as well as President of Taiwan Takushoku Incorporated during the prewar era (Ishii 1989).

10) Chang Chun (1980: 127-8) had a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek earlier and declined to be Plenipotentiary of the ROC in spite of Tokyo’s request. It was plausibly due to Tokyo’s failure to meet Taipci’s request for Inukai Takeru (or Ken) (Ishii 1989: 78-80), former President of the Democratic Party and son of former Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi—one of the Japanese supporters of Sun Yat-sen and his Nationalist revolution in the early days. Yoshida instead appointed his own relative Kawada Isao as Plenipotentiary of Japan. This
appointment was conceivably the extension of an earlier Japanese plan to
dispatch Kawada to Taipei as Chiang Kai-shek’s financial advisor once he was
de-purged (Chen 2000: 35). In any case, Inukai still played a supervisory role in
Tokyo.
4
The heyday of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and US hegemony in East Asia 1952-64

4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the author argues that the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy made Nationalist China on Taiwan culturally intelligible for Japanese elites, thereby helping to reproduce Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony between 1952 and 1964. The author refers to this period as the heyday of such construction of ‘China’ in Japan thanks to the so-called ‘reverse course’ (1) in Washington’s postwar Japan policy—which ‘required the resurrection of the civilian old guard’ as much as ‘the old guard required the cold war to enlist U.S. support against domestic opponents’ (Dower 1993b: 15). More specifically, the hegemonic position of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse was mainly derived from Japanese conservative hegemony known as the ‘1955 system’. The ‘1955 system’—or ‘a concatenation of political and socioeconomic developments in 1955, including the establishment of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which governed Japan uninterruptedly over the ensuing decades’ (Ibid.: 4)—was a product of the ‘reverse course’ just as the ‘San Francisco system’ (Dower 1993b). Put differently, it
was through the discourse of 'returning virtue for malice' and its discourse coalition (2) among ruling Japanese elites—which constituted the '1955 system'—that Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei as ‘China’ was made commonsensical and reproduced during this period.

Nonetheless, it is not the intent of this chapter to deny other factors at work such as Washington’s pressure on Tokyo under the circumstances that Communist China fought against the UN in Korea and both Taipei and Beijing adhered to the principle of ‘one China’. In fact, after regaining ‘independence’ in the midst of the Korean War, Japan was locked into Washington’s economic containment of Beijing (Dower 1993a: 192). A major element of Washington’s basic policy towards Tokyo at the time was ‘to prevent Japan from becoming dependent on China and other communist-dominated areas for essential food and raw material supplies (and to) encourage Japanese contribution to the economic development of countries of South and Southeast Asia’ (US Department of State 1985: 1300-8). By September 1952, Japan had agreed to an embargo prescribed by the China Committee (CHINCOM), an adjunct of Coordinating Committee for Export to Communist Areas (COCOM), which Washington designed to control the exportation of strategic items to Communist China (Hosoya 1989: 22). Accordingly, Tokyo was undeniably constrained by Washington’s containment policy towards Beijing.

Notwithstanding such American pressure, Tokyo still maneuvered to ameliorate the situation by adopting a policy of ‘separating economy from politics (seikei bunri)’ (Hosoya 1989: 22), the idea of which originated from Beijing (Kishi et al. 1981: 213; Matsumura 1999: 304). For example, the Japanese desire to open trade with mainland
China had materialized in the conclusion of the first private trade agreement with Beijing as early as June 1952 (Ibid.). This semi-official agreement was signed between Nan Hanchen, chair of the China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade (Zhongguo Guojimaoyi Cujin Weiyuanhui), and Kora Tomi, Hoashi Kei, and Miyakoshi Kisuke, progressive members of the Japanese National Diet. Hoashi and Miyakoshi, in particular, were influential members of the Dietmen’s League for the Promotion of Japan-China Trade (Nitchu Boeki Sokushin Giin Renmei) (Nitchu Yuko Kyokai 2000: 40-2; Shimada and Tian 1997: 113-5). In any case, they were the first three Japanese politicians to visit mainland China after the war (Ibid.: 115; Furukawa 1988: 2), and the private trade agreement they signed laid the foundation for subsequent trade agreements Japan and Communist China semi-officially reached in the 1950s and 1960s (Soeya 1995, 1998). As shown in this chapter, these ‘private’ trade agreements triggered diplomatic crises between Taipei and Tokyo as Beijing began to politicize economic relations. Hence, American pressure alone was not sufficient for completely blocking Tokyo’s economic relations with Beijing, nor was it sufficient for preventing diplomatic crises from taking place between Taipei and Tokyo in the 1950s and 1960s. For that reason, in addition to the American pressure which obviously constrained Japan to a certain extent, it is necessary to look for another factor that also helped to reproduce Japan’s recognition of the Chiang regime on Taiwan as ‘China’ during this period.

Thus, in this chapter, the author additionally shows how the reproduction of Japan’s recognition of Nationalist China on Taiwan as ‘China’ was facilitated by the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition in Japanese domestic politics. First, in pursuit of identifying who was doing the talking and where they were located in
the network of social power (Hughes 2002: 2, 2005: 248), this chapter traces the prewar imperial channels of the discourse and demonstrates the consolidation of US hegemony in terms of the ‘resurrection’ of prewar Japanese imperialists. Second, this chapter continues to identify and locate the discourse coalition by further tracing the diffusion of the discourse into the core of Japanese power or the ‘1955 system’. It highlights how it was disseminated among the leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party as well as the powerful Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation. Third, this chapter examines the dominance of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition as it shows how the prewar imperialists overcame the first crisis of recognition in 1958—which broke out of the fourth private trade agreement and the Nagasaki flag incident over Beijing’s right to fly its national flag in Japan. It demonstrates how powerfully they deconstructed Beijing’s attempt to gain Tokyo’s recognition of the national flag of ‘China’. Fourth, this chapter probes how the discourse and its coalition helped overcome the second crisis of recognition that was triggered by the sale of the Kurashiki Rayon Company’s vinylon plant to Communist China in the summer of 1963 and the Zhou Hongqing incident of October 1963. Here, in conjunction with the discourse and its coalition, this chapter analyzes not only the so-called ‘second Yoshida letter’ of 7 May 1964 but also another ‘second Yoshida letter’ of 4 April 1964 which has been overlooked by the existing literature in the English language. Finally, this chapter concludes by recapitulating the main argument and briefly going over the next chapter.
4.2 US hegemony Japanified 1952: prewar imperialists and postwar gratitude

American hegemony was Japanified to the extent that prewar Japanese imperialists—including Sunists—were allowed to go back into politics as 'watchdogs' and sustain Tokyo's recognition of the Chiang regime as the legitimate government of 'China' at the height of the Cold War. Just as Plenipotentiary Kawada promised Chiang Kai-shek that he would inform the Japanese of Chiang's 'virtue' following the conclusion of the bilateral peace treaty (Chang 1980: 136), the discourse of 'returning virtue for malice' began to diffuse into postwar Japan through prewar imperial channels. The diffusion of the discourse was significant as it laid the foundation for the subsequent formation of the discourse coalition of 'returning virtue for malice' in postwar Japan. The following section sheds light on the aforementioned imperial points of contact as Ogata Taketora, Nemoto Hiroshi, Emperor Hirohito, and Yoshizawa Kenkichi and trace how the discourse diffused into the Japanese elite as Japan regained 'independence' in 1952 as a result of the conclusion of the bilateral Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan.

Nine days after the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, on 7 May 1952, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru dispatched his special envoy, Ogata Taketora, to Taipei. Ogata had served Imperial Japan as Minister of State (Kokumu Daijin). Thus, after the end of the war, Ogata was purged from public office for more than five years. At the time of his visit to Taiwan, Ogata had only been de-purged for nine months. Interestingly, it was one of Sun Yat-sen's old Japanese friends (Jansen 1954), Kojima Kazuo, who recommended Ogata to Prime Minister Yoshida (Kobayashi 1991: 79). Ogata also had a long relationship with another Japanese 'relative' of Sun's, Toyama
Mitsuru, who had served as matchmaker of Ogata’s marriage in 1915 (Ogata Taketora Denki Kankokai 1963). In any case, Ogata and his entourage (3) were warmly received by Ho Ying-ching, Chang Chun, and Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei (Ogata Taketora Denki Kankokai 1963: 180-1). During this six-day visit to Taiwan, Ogata held two rounds of talks with President Chiang who began to inculcate one of the future founding fathers of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with his moral discourse (Ibid.). In fact, by the time Ogata later became one of four acting presidents of the newly formed LDP just before he suddenly died in January 1956, he had already become a proponent of Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy (Ono 1962: 178-9).

On 25 June 1952, former Lieutenant General Nemoto Hiroshi, who served as the Commander of the Japanese North China Army and the Japanese Army in Mongolia, returned to Japan after training Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces for more than three years (Nakamura 1995). Nemoto was the leader of the first group of Chiang Kai-shek’s Japanese military advisors known as the White Group (Baituan)—as many as 83 members of which clandestinely served Chiang between 1949 and 1969 (Ibid.; Yang 2000; Ogasawara 1971). Nemoto was one of the Imperial Japanese Army’s China hands known as the shinatsu who sympathized with the Chinese Nationalist Revolution and dreamed of collaborating with China in the struggle against Western imperialism (Tobe 1999: 5). In fact, Nemoto took command of pro-Nationalist campaigns against the Soviet Union in Mongolia and the Chinese Communists in North China as he waited for the arrival of the Nationalist and American forces from the South immediately after the war (Nakamura 1995: 32). At the same time, Nemoto helped Chiang Kai-shek to repatriate 350,000 Japanese soldiers and 450,000 Japanese civilians from the Chinese
mainland (Ibid.; Yang 2000: 8). By collaborating with Chiang whom he had met in the late 1920s, Nemoto acquainted himself with other Nationalists leaders like Li Tsung-jen, Ho Ying-chin, Shang Chen, and Fu Tso-i (Ibid.). Consequently, Nemoto was set free from war criminal charges and given the privilege of returning to Japan in August 1946 (Ibid.). Thus, it is not surprising that Nemoto took action when Commander Fu Tso-i sent a messenger and a letter in the name of Chiang Kai-shek to request for Nemoto's assistance in the spring of 1949 (Ibid.). Nevertheless, when he returned to Tokyo three years later, Nemoto described his 'debt of gratitude' in the following fashion (Nakamura 1995: 46, author's translation): ‘The reason why I went to Taiwan is that President Chiang Kai-shek defended the polity of Japan (kokutai) when it was called into question at the Conference of Cairo during World War II. The phrase in the Potsdam Declaration “in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people” was the reflection of his defense. In other words, the Japanese imperial institution was saved because of President Chiang. Repaying a debt of gratitude (go-ongaeshi) to him for that was always on my mind. That is why I could not leave Mr. Chiang in the lurch when he was forced to resign as President (in January 1949). I decided to put my life on the line to go to Taiwan because I thought the moment to repay the debt of gratitude had come.’ Accordingly, former Imperial Japanese military elites like Nemoto became proponents of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and constituted a major force behind the ‘Taiwan lobby’ in postwar Japan (Tai 1988: 149-53).

On 18 September 1952, Japanese Emperor Hirohito received Special Envoy Chang Chun (1980: Ch. 11) whom Chiang Kai-shek dispatched in order to return Ogata Taketora’s earlier official visit to Taiwan in May. On this occasion, Hirohito expressed
his appreciation for Chiang Kai-shek’s address of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and the very ‘magnanimous attitude’ that Hirohito believed contributed to the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace on 28 April 1952 (Ibid.: 142). In reply, Chang Chun additionally pointed out how Chiang Kai-shek had also encouraged other leaders of the Allies to preserve the Japanese imperial institution at the Conference of Cairo (Ibid.). It is interesting to see how Chang Chun mentioned the issue of the postwar Japanese emperor system just as Nemoto Hiroshi—whom Chang Chun had welcomed in Taiwan (Nakamura 1995: 31)—did less than three months earlier. In any case, Hirohito caught his breath and expressed his utmost gratitude for Chiang Kai-shek’s kindess (Chang 1980: 143). As shown above, even Hirohito himself began to understand the ‘reincarnation’ of the Japanese emperor system in terms of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy as the discourse diffused through the core of the Japanese nation.

On 1 October 1952, the first Japanese ambassador to the Republic of China on Taiwan, Yoshizawa Kenkichi (1958: Ch. 11), arrived in Taipei. Yoshizawa was former Foreign Minister of Imperial Japan and Sun Yat-sen’s staunch supporter former Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi’s son-in-law, who had attended Sun’s last rites in the 1920s. Yoshizawa was from Takada (currently known as Jyoetsu), Japan—where Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Chun received military training more than four decades earlier (Ibid.: 300). More importantly, Yoshizawa was the first Japanese minister ever to pay a visit to Chiang Kai-shek in the late 1920s even before Tokyo officially recognized his regime (Iriye 1965: 157). After the war, Yoshizawa was purged from public office for more than five years like Ogata. In addition to Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo’s request, (4)
it was Ogata Taketora’s encouragement that convinced Yoshizawa to become the first Japanese ambassador to the Republic of China on Taiwan after the war (Yoshizawa 1958: 296-7). Prior to Yoshizawa’s departure for Taipei, on 26 September 1952, Emperor Hirohito gave him the following message for Chiang Kai-shek: ‘I can never forget the fact that tens of thousands of our soldiers and civilians were able to return safely from China because President Chiang ordered his subordinates to “return good for evil” (ada ni mukuyuru ni on wo motte seyo) when the Japanese army was defeated on the Chinese continent. When you have a meeting with President Chiang, I would like you to tell him that I am deeply thankful to him for that’ (Ibid.: 299-300, author’s translation). On 6 October, Yoshizawa faithfully conveyed Hirohito’s message to Chiang who expressed his appreciation for the message (Ibid.: 300). Henceforth, Yoshizawa resumed his public life of promoting ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ and made a practice of repaying a ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek during the Cold War (Huang 1995: 189-90).

Accordingly, prewar Japanese elites ‘resurrected’ in postwar Japan with a ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek—the benefactor who took ‘magnanimous’ measures towards postwar Japan in spite of its ‘malign’ acts during the war. More specifically, following the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace in 1952, the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ immediately began penetrating the prewar Japanese elites—like Ogata, Nemoto, Hirohito, and Yoshizawa—many of whom were ‘unleashed’ to consolidate the Japanese bastion of US hegemony in East Asia during the Cold War era. Their endeavor to reproduce postwar Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony, thereby reflexively reproducing themselves as Cold War ‘watchdogs’, can
be traced by the further dissemination of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and
the formation of its discourse coalition in the ‘1955 system’ as shown below.

4.3 The ‘1955 system’ and the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’
The diffusion of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse into the ‘1955 system’
consolidated the Japanese bastion of US hegemony in East Asia. The Nationalist
Chinese discourse was disseminated among some of the most influential Japanese
political actors who re-entered active politics and founded the LDP—the core of the
‘1955 system’. At the same time, these prewar elites formed what can be referred to as
the discourse coalition—‘whose members share a particular way of thinking about and
discussing’ matters of concern (Fischer 2003: 107)—of ‘returning virtue for malice’,
which greatly overlaps with the ‘1955 system’. The formation of such a discourse
coalition can be traced by the following events that largely coincided with the formation
of the hegemonic apparatus in the mid 1950s.

In August 1955, Ono Banboku (1955: 52-3), the Liberal Party’s Chairman of the
Executive Board, visited Taiwan with 11 other members of the National Diet. Ono, who
went on to become one of four Acting Presidents (along with Hatoyama Ichiro, Ogata
Taketora, Miki Bukichi) of the newly formed LDP three months later, took this
opportunity to report to Chiang Kai-shek that the Japanese people deeply respected him
for addressing ‘returning love for malice’ (uramini mukuyuruni aiwo motteseyo) after
the war (Ibid.). In addition, Ono, who represented the interests of the World War II
Veterans War Bereavement Association or Izokukai (Kobayashi 1991: 53), wished that
Chiang would recover mainland China at an early date (Ono 1955: 52). Interestingly,
many of the veterans that Ono represented had ‘allied’ with the US and Nationalist China to battle against Chinese Communist forces on the mainland immediately after the war (Schaller 1990: 112; Pepper 1999: 9-16). In reply to Ono’s thanks and encouragement, Chiang Kai-shek tapped on his knee in excitement and stressed the importance of a trilateral anti-communist alliance between Japan, South Korea, and Nationalist China (Ono 1955: 52). Chiang was conceivably gratified by Ono’s support especially because Chiang had just survived a coup attempt Washington had plotted with a Virginia Military Institute (VMI) educated general named Sun Li-jen in the same month following the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954-5 (Yang 2000: 88-91; Hoon 1988). Moreover, whether or not Chiang knew Ono’s prewar affiliation with the Seiyukai and Pan Asianism (Welfield 1988: 130-1; Kobayashi 1991: 51-68; Tominomori 2000: 192-4), Chiang expressed his wish to visit the graves of such Pan Asianists affiliated with the Seiyukai as Toyama Mitsuru and Inukai Tsuyoshi who had strongly supported Sun Yat-sen’s nationalist revolution (Jansen 1954, 1980; Fujii 1966; Yu 1989; Chigono 1984; Chen 1999: Ch. 1; Lee 1968: 63-89). At any rate, despite the fact that Ono incorrectly referred to the discourse as that of ‘returning love for malice’, Ono’s exchange with Chiang indicated that the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’ had already begun forming in postwar Japan and it was built on prewar Sunist roots.

In August 1956, Ishii Mitsuijiro, the ruling LDP’s Chairman of the Executive Board, paid a visit to Chiang Kai-shek with a letter from Prime Minister Hatoyama. On this occasion, Ishii, who had spent five years in Taiwan as a civilian secretary to Governor-General Ando Sadami between 1916 and 1921, led a 26-member delegation of Japanese politicians, businessmen, and cultural figures. The former purgee had
greatly contributed to the birth of the LDP, the core of the ‘1955 system’, as Ogata’s surrogate and one of four main negotiators—along with Ono Banboku from the Liberal Party and Miki Bukichi and Kishi Nobusuke from the Democratic Party (Masumi 1988: 206-9). In his meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, Ishii (1976: 400-1) expressed his gratitude to Chiang for three (5) counts of ‘indebtedness’ (ongi): 1) Chiang’s strong support for the preservation of the Japanese imperial institution at the Conference of Cairo; 2) Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ address and the repatriation of Japanese soldiers and civilians from mainland China after the war in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration; and 3) Chiang’s objection to the partition of Japan as a plan for occupation after the war. Furthermore, it was during this trip that the idea of establishing the Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation (CPSJC, Nikka Kyoryoku linkai, or Zhong-Ri Hezuo Cejin Weiyuanhui) (6) was discussed and agreed (Ishii 1976: 402-3; Yatsugi 1973: Ch. 2; Chang 1980: Ch. 17; Ku 1968; Ikei 1980: 3-7; Takemi 1984: 81-91; Welfield 1988: 126-7). Like Ono and Kishi who subsequently took part in the CPSJC and became the counterparts of Chang Chun and Ho Ying-chin as advisors (Yatsugi 1973: 38; Ikei 1980: 5), Ishii later contributed his share to the CPSJC as chair of the general meeting as well as chief of the Japanese delegation (Ibid.: 15-6; Yatsugi 1973: 38). Accordingly, Ishii took the lead in Japan’s relations with Taiwan as requested earlier by former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (Ishii 1976: 402-3), who suggested Ishii to take the lead in Japan-ROC relations with Kishi’s help while Kishi takes charge of Japan-Korea relations with Ishii’s assistance. (7) Most importantly, the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ described here as Japan’s ‘indebtedness’ provided the
common ground on which pro-Taipei (rather than Beijing) Japanese elites like Ishii could form the ‘conservative establishment’s pro-ROC coalition’ (Takemi 1994: 2-3).

In the spring of 1957, the CPSJC was formerly established in March and its first four-day general meeting was successfully concluded in Tokyo in April (Yatsugi 1973: Ch. 3; Ikei 1980; Horikoshi 1957). According to one of the participants, Secretary General of Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) Horikoshi Teizo (Ibid.: 17, author’s translation), the first general meeting used the following storylines: 1) ‘We, the Japanese, must not forget that we owe President Chiang Kai-shek a “debt of gratitude” (ongi) for his “magnanimous treatment” (kandaina shochi) of our fellow countrymen immediately after the war’; 2) ‘Similarly, we must not forget that there are seven million people on Taiwan, who miss us the Japanese.’ Moreover, Horikoshi’s (Ibid.: 14-5) report disclosed that one of the reasons why the CPSJC was founded had a great deal to do with the latter. In concrete, the CPSJC was originally contrived to make Japanese newspapers and magazines available for the Taiwanese since some of them had earlier complained to members of the ‘Ishii mission’ about the shortage of information as well as great difficulties involved in learning the new language of Mandarin after half a century of Japanese colonial rule (Ibid.: 14; Yatsugi 1973: 16). Therefore, it turned out to be a nice surprise for the Japanese delegation led by Fujiyama Aiichiro—Head of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Prime Minister Kishi’s major financial supporter at the time, who became Kishi’s Foreign Minister three months later—when it was informed that the Nationalist government had already conditionally approved the importation of Japanese newspapers and magazines at this general meeting in Tokyo (Horikoshi 1957: 14-5). On the other hand, the first storyline was reinforced
by the Chinese delegates’ deed that matched Chiang Kai-shek’s word—to Ono Banboku
who had thanked Chiang for his ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy—
expressing his wish to visit the graves of Toyama Mitsuru and Inukai Tsuyoshi less than
two years earlier. On the morning of 3 April 1957, following their visit to the Yasukuni
Shrine, the Chinese delegation ‘revived’ the sense of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ by
(re)paying Chiang’s debt of gratitude to the graves of the Japanese collaborators of the
Nationalist revolution as well as the grave of another ‘old friend’ Ogata Taketora who
Accordingly, the discourse coalition was founded on prewar roots and postwar
storylines were put into practice. Henceforth, the CPSJC began to reign as the Japanese
domestic political foundation that firmly maintained and regularly gave priority to
relations with Taipei over those with Beijing between 1957 and 1971 (Takemi 1994: 3).

In June 1957, the new prime minister of Japan, Kishi Nobusuke, (8) further
consolidated the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’ by paying a historic
visit to Taipei. On this occasion, Kishi became the first Japanese prime minister ever to
pay an official visit to ‘China’—that is, Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan (Mendl
1978: 19; Kishi 1982: 141-2). For Kishi, the 61-year-old Pan-Asianist who was a major
force behind the establishment of the CPSJC three months earlier, it was part of his first
overseas tour to South East Asia, by which he attempted to raise his value as an Asian
leader before visiting his patron, the United States (Hara 1995: 189-90, 2003: 131-5).
Kishi, former Minister of Commerce and Industry of the Tojo cabinet, had been indicted
as a Class A war criminal by the American occupation authorities immediately after the
war and interned in Sugamo Prison for more than three years before making his way
back into politics. In any case, on 2 June, Kishi (1982: 141) met President Chiang Kai-
shek for the first time at the President’s residence in Taipei. In this meeting, Kishi
immediately thanked the 70-year-old President for adopting a ‘returning virtue for
malice’ policy and safely repatriating two million Japanese soldiers and civilians from
mainland China at the end of the war (Ibid.: 142). In reply, Chiang customarily referred
to the prewar Sunist roots of his special relationship with Japan as follows (Ibid.,
author’s translation): ‘As a young Chinese student and revolutionary in Japan, I was
trained by Mr. Toyama Mitsuru and Mr. Inukai Tsuyoshi. My “returning virtue for
malice” policy was the manifestation of the way of Japanese knighthood (Bushido).
Since these Japanese predecessors were the ones who impressively taught me the way,
you should express your appreciation to their graves rather than me.’ While Kishi later
admitted that Washington wielded more influence on the preservation of the Japanese
imperial institution and the prevention of the divisive occupation of Japan than Chiang
Kai-shek, he still stuck with the storyline that it was Chiang’s decision to repatriate two
million Japanese safely from mainland China (Ibid.: 148-9). Nevertheless, this historic
state visit by Kishi—the peak of the ‘Taiwan lobby’ in Japan (Honzawa 1998: 112-6)—
symbolized the hegemonization of the discourse coalition which constructed the
representation of Chiang Kai-shek as the ‘benefactor’ to whom the Japanese nation must
repay a ‘debt of gratitude’ (Kishi 1982: 155).

On 19 September 1957, the hegemonic position of the ‘returning virtue for
malice’ discourse in Japan was demonstrated by the National Welcome Party (Kokumin
Kangeikai) for Special Envoy Chang Chun who was dispatched to Tokyo in order to
return Kishi’s state visit to Taipei. It was impressively attended by many of the most
powerful Japanese elites such as Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Speaker of the House of Representatives Masutani Shuji, President of the House of Council Matsuno Tsuruhei, Chairman of Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) Ishizaka Taizo, and former Ambassador to the Republic of China Yoshizawa Kenkichi among others (Chang 1980: 159). On behalf of the Japanese nation, they announced an official statement in token of gratitude for Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘understanding and sympathy’ (rikai to dojo) towards postwar Japan (Ibid.: 159-60, 164-5; Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui 1978: 148-9; Horikoshi 1959: 32-3; Fukui 1969: 314-5, 1970: 252-3; Chen 1971: 272-3, 282-4): 1) When the Japan problem was discussed at the Conference of Cairo in November 1943, President Chiang helped us Japanese to overcome our national crisis by firmly insisting against Western leaders that the future of the Japanese national polity should be decided by the will of the Japanese people; 2) As the Japanese Emperor announced his acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation on 15 August 1945, President Chiang shared with us Japanese the ultimate expression of his political philosophy and the essence of Oriental morality—‘benevolence’ (jin)—by immediately calling on the Chinese people by radio to return (Chinese) virtue for (Japanese) malice; 3) In stark contrast to retaliation by some government after the war, President Chiang swiftly repatriated millions of Japanese civilians and prisoners of war and promptly released Japanese war criminals; 4) Despite the enormous damage Japan did to China that was the main battlefield of the war, President Chiang continued to show ‘great benevolence’ and announced that he would decline to demand war reparations from Japan in June 1951, thereby making the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty possible in 1952. The Japanese government concluded by stating that these ‘words and
deeds' (genko) of President Chiang should set the moral standard for every country in the world as international 'morality and friendship' (dogi to yujo) and that they should not be forgotten for a moment regardless of the rise and fall of national destiny (Ibid.; Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui 1978: 149; Horikoshi 1959: 32-3). The audience responded enthusiastically and chanted incessantly, 'Long live President Chiang, long live the Republic of China!' (Chang 1980: 159). Some participants, like Matsuno, were moved to tears in the meantime (Ibid.; Chen 1971: 273, 283). In return, Chang Chun suggested that such manifestations of Oriental morality as Chiang Kai-shek's 'returning virtue for malice' postwar Japan policy and Japan's repayment of a 'debt of gratitude' to Chiang Kai-shek would be indispensable for 'Sino-Japanese cooperation' for many years to come (Zhong-Ri Guanxi Yanjiuhui 1978: 99-101). As depicted above, by the fall of 1957, the discourse coalition of 'returning virtue for malice' to facilitate Tokyo's recognition of Taipei had gained such a dominant position that it could largely be equated with the Japanese state despite the fact that details of the discourse remained inconsistent as the issue of occupation was left out of the official statement.

In sum, the aforementioned series of events show that the formation of the discourse coalition of 'returning virtue for malice' greatly coincided with the formation of the '1955 system'. The discourse coalition significantly sutured the political, financial, and bureaucratic bases of power in postwar Japan—the 'iron triangle'. Politically, the discourse coalition consolidated as its members established the LDP in 1955 and formed the CPSJC and the Kishi cabinet in 1957. The Kishi cabinet ultimately hegemonized the discourse of 'returning virtue for malice' and its coalition by announcing the statement of September 1957. As a result, the storyline that Chiang Kai-
shek is the benefactor to whom the Japanese must repay a ‘debt of gratitude’ became official in spite of inconsistency in factual details. Hence, the discourse coalition occupied the hegemonic position to help reproduce Japan’s diplomatic recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony by making it culturally intelligible for the Japanese nation. Nevertheless, as shown below, the hegemonic position of the discourse coalition was subsequently challenged by the crises of recognition over the ‘China question’ in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

4.4 The heyday of ‘returning virtue for malice’ I: deconstructing ‘China’ in the 1950s

The fourth private trade agreement and Nagasaki flag incident 1958. The first recognition crisis took place in the spring of 1958 as the fourth private trade agreement was reached between Tokyo and Beijing on 5 March and all business dealings between the two nations were subsequently canceled as a result of the so-called Nagasaki flag incident of 2 May. While these events set prime examples of Beijing’s ‘use of trade as a political tool’ in persuading and pressurizing Tokyo to recognize Beijing (Rose 1998: 44-5; Jain 1982: 39), they also exemplified the powerful coalition of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse in Japan at the time. In fact, the power of the discourse and its coalition was demonstrated by the fact that the two events ended in the suspension of economic relations between mainland China and Japan, which had been informally under way since the first private trade agreement of June 1952 (Besshi 1983). Communist China’s unilateral cancellation of all trade contacts with Japan was due to the fact that the Japanese government did not take any legal action against two Japanese
youths who desecrated the five-star flag of the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) at a
Chinese exhibition hosted by the Japan-China Friendship Association (Nitchu Yuko
Kyokai) in Nagasaki, Japan (Furukawa 1988: 153-59; Nitchu Yuko Kyokai 2000: 119-
unilateral severance was Beijing’s retaliation against the ‘Tokyo-Taipei “plot”’ (Zhao
1993: 26), in which the Chiang Kai-shek regime ‘hired’ the Japanese right wingers to
set a precedent for Kishi’s rejection of the part of the fourth private trade agreement that
had allowed the Communist Chinese trade mission to fly its national flag in Japan
(Chen 2000: 32). In any case, the Nagasaki flag incident merely reiterated the
deterioration of trade relations that had already taken place—over such issues as
Beijing’s right to hoist its national flag at its trade representative office in Japan—as
Beijing had canceled the fourth private trade agreement as early as 13 April (Ikei 1974:
84; Kusano 1980: 21; Furukawa 1988: 150). Therefore, this section puts more emphasis
on the fourth private trade agreement than the Nagasaki flag incident as it highlights
how Kishi’s de-recognition of Beijing’s five-star flag was made possible—or how
‘China’ was deconstructed—by the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its
coalition in the spring of 1958.

Conventionally, Kishi’s decision not to recognize the Communist Chinese flag is
explained in terms of the pressure that Washington and Taipei exerted on Kishi’s policy
of the ‘separation of politics and economics’ (seikei bunri) towards Beijing (Zhao 1993:
26; Ikei 1982: 299; Shimada and Tian 1997: 155; Lin 1997: 116-7). By such separation,
Kishi meant to promote his nation’s trade with mainland China without establishing
diplomatic relations between the two (Hara 2003: 159). Nevertheless, the United States
was displeased with the informal trade that had been developing across the ideological border in the midst of the Cold War (Zhao 1993: 26). By the same token, the Chiang regime was also dissatisfied with Japan’s promotion of economic relations with the Mao regime (Ibid.). Taipei’s dissatisfaction even escalated to the unilateral severance of economic relations with Tokyo at one point. Therefore, it was under the pressure of Washington and Taipei that Prime Minister Kishi and his Cabinet Secretary Aichi Kiichi officially responded to the fourth private trade agreement by presenting a letter to the three signatory organizations on the Japanese side (9) and making a supplementary announcement in Tokyo on 9 April (Ikei 1974: 68; Furukawa 1988: 151; Lin 1997: 116-7; Azuma 2002: 94-5). For instance, Kishi’s letter expressed his cabinet’s preparedness to approve the fourth private trade agreement ‘within the scope of our national laws and on the basis of the non-recognition of the (Chinese) government’ (Soeya 1998: 38). As for the official announcement, Aichi clarified that Tokyo had ‘no intention to recognize Communist China’ and reiterated that the Japanese government would cautiously support the fourth private trade agreement within the scope of national laws ‘so that the establishment of the trade representative would not be misunderstood as de facto recognition’ (Ibid.). More importantly, in this statement, Aichi alluded to the treatment of the Communist Chinese flag in Japan as follows: ‘By the way, as far as the Government of Japan is concerned, since we do not recognize Communist China, we naturally cannot invest the private trade representative with the right to fly the national flag of Communist China’ (Ikei 1974: 76-7, author’s translation). These were the ‘face-saving’ arrangements that were devised for Chiang Kai-shek by the good offices of Washington (Cohen 1989: 52; Azuma 2002: 94). In any case, these ‘snap shots’ of
external pressure on the Kishi cabinet do not provide the sufficient condition for Kishi’s de-recognition of the Communist Chinese flag since they greatly overlook the domestic process of ‘how’ Kishi’s decision was made ‘possible’ in Japan.

By focusing on the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition, the domestic aspect of Kishi’s de-recognition can be better illuminated. Here, Horinouchi Kensuke, the Japanese Ambassador to the Republic of China, played a crucial role as he articulated Japan’s de-recognition of the Communist Chinese flag in terms of Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek (Kusano 1980: 23-6, 30). Horinouchi, who had succeeded Yoshizawa Kenkichi as the Japanese ambassador to Taipei in November 1955, was back in Japan for his official duty to attend an international conference in March. Horinouchi had established a special relationship with Prime Minister Kishi over the years. During the late 1930s and early 1940s, Horinouchi and Kishi had been acquainted with each other as Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Commerce respectively (Ibid.: 30). In addition, when Prime Minister Kishi visited Taiwan in June 1957 as the first prime minister ever to do so, it was Ambassador Horinouchi who had accompanied the Prime Minister (Ibid.). As a result, Ambassador Horinouchi had gained the unique position in which he could directly communicate with the Prime Minister (Ibid.). The following paragraphs show how Ambassador Horinouchi discursively created the possibility of de-recognizing the national flag of the Peoples’ Republic of China, thereby enabling Kishi to abandon the initial arrangement of acquiescing in the hoisting of the flag over Beijing’s trade mission in Japan.

As of 12 March, when the joint meeting of Prime Minister, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Industry, and Justice took place, the possibility of de-
recognizing the Communist Chinese flag had not existed as an option in the decision-making process of the Japanese government. In this meeting, they agreed to take the following position that made no mention of the flag issue (Nikkei Shimbun 13 March 1958 quoted by Kusano 1980: 22, author’s translation): ‘The Government does not recognize Communist China. Nor do we give diplomatic privileges to the private trade representative. However, under the principle of expanding trade with Communist China, we will do our utmost for the establishment of the private trade representative.’ The tone of the agreement was still lenient towards Beijing, and it was due to the fact that four out of five ministers did not anticipate the escalation of Taipei’s objection while all five ministers agreed on the positive impact of trade with Beijing on the Japanese economy (Kusano 1980: 22-3).

It was on 15 March that Ambassador Horinouchi took the initiative and drew attention to the national flag issue in a meeting with the Chief of the First Section of the Asia Bureau, Okada Akira, and the Chief of the Asia Bureau, Sakagaki Osamu. The dilemma surrounding the issue, in their eyes, was that the complete deprivation of Communist China’s right to fly its national flag in Japan would provoke the Mao regime while granting that right would surely lead to the severing of relations with the Chiang regime (Ibid.: 24). It was at this critical juncture that Ambassador Horinouchi, a highly respected senior diplomat, persuaded his colleagues to pay heed to Taipei by repeatedly emphasizing the ‘debt of gratitude’ the Japanese must repay for Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘magnanimous’ postwar Japan policy (Ibid.: 23). As a result, they agreed to actively reject Communist China’s legal right to fly its national flag while keeping the hitherto existing practice of acquiescing in the actual hoisting of the five-star flag in Japan (Ibid.:
24). Consequently, the three Japanese officials agreed to provide the following explanation to Taipei regarding the Communist Chinese flag: 'Japan-China trade never binds Japan to recognize Communist China. It is not meant to give diplomatic privileges to the representative of Communist China, either. Nor does it oblige us to grant Communist China the right to fly its national flag in Japan' (Ibid.: 23, author's translation). Although this explanation still could not satisfy Nationalist China that unilaterally severed trade relations with Japan on 18 March (Ibid.: 24), Horikoshi successfully constructed the initial formulation of de-recognizing the Communist Chinese flag through the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek's 'returning virtue for malice' postwar Japan policy. It was Horinouchi's problematization of the five-star flag in terms of Japan's repayment of its 'debt of gratitude' to Chiang Kai-shek that enabled Japan to take preventive action towards Beijing's economic attempt to promote political relations with Tokyo.

By 29 March, despite of twists and turns between Japan and 'China', Prime Minister Kishi, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, Chief Cabinet Secretary Aichi Kiichi, Ambassador Horiuchi had agreed on the following five points (Ibid.: 25): 1) To maintain friendly relations between Japan and the ROC since the Japanese have the 'sense of gratitude' for President Chiang's 'momentous' measures towards postwar Japan; 2) To express Japan's hope that Taipei understands Tokyo's economic need to have trade relations with the PRC; 3) To calmly resume trade relations with Communist China rather than risking to make them excessively attractive by restricting such trade; 4) To maintain hitherto relations with Communist China—that is, continuing to abide by the principle of non-recognition; 5) To request the Nationalist Chinese government to
fully understand Japan's trade with mainland China including the issue of flying the Communist Chinese flag in Japan. In addition, the Japanese leaders had decided to give Taipei the following oral message regarding the national flag issue: 'While Communist China will establish its private trade representative here only in the distant future, we will do our utmost to take measures against the hoisting of the national flag in the meantime' (Ibid.: 25, author's translation). As shown above, this shift—that Japan will no longer acquiesce in the hoisting of the Communist Chinese flag (Ibid.: 25)—was articulated by the Japanese 'sense of gratitude' for Chiang Kai-shek's 'momentous' measures. In other words, as Kishi later recalled agreeing with Horinouchi that seeking Taipei's understanding should be Japan's top priority (Ibid.: 30), it was a victory for the discourse coalition of 'returning virtue for malice' in Japan—not only because it deconstructed Beijing's version of 'China' but also because it was the repayment of a 'debt of gratitude' Chiang Kai-shek accepted (Ibid.: 25).

Finally, Kishi's policy change was also facilitated by the Japanese public opinion that was sympathetic towards Chiang Kai-shek's regime (Ibid.: 33). In fact, Communist China's subsequent cancellation of the fourth private trade agreement in April as well as its unilateral suspension of all business dealings with Japan following the Nagasaki flag incident in May failed to arouse a public outcry in Japan against Kishi's China policy (Jain 1982: 39). Communist China, which was in the initial stage of the 'Great Leap Forward' at the time, used the Nagasaki flag incident as a pretext to influence Japan's public opinion right in the middle of the first national election since the formation of the '1955 system' (Rose 1998: 45; Soeya 1998: 39). Notwithstanding such 'intervention' in the election of May 1958, the ruling LDP comfortably defeated the main opposition, the
Japan Socialist Party (JSP), by more than 120 votes. The LDP victory, in a sense, confirmed popular support for Kishi’s pro-Taiwan policy or the repayment of a ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek (Hara 2003: 162). Thus, it was another indication of how deeply the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse resonated among the Japanese at the time.

In short, the fourth private trade agreement and the subsequent Nagasaki flag incident demonstrated the hegemonic position of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition following the formation of the ‘1955 system’. Such dominance consequently devastated the delicate ‘separation of politics and economics’ as well as Japan’s informal trade relations with mainland China. By the same token, Beijing’s construction of ‘China’ was destroyed by the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition as they helped ‘re-unify’ politics and economics as well as China in the eyes of the Japanese. It was not until the years of the Ikeda cabinet in the early 1960s that Beijing once again challenged the hegemonic coalition of the discourse over another crisis of recognition.

4.5 The heyday of ‘returning virtue for malice’ II: reconstructing ‘China’ in the 1960s

Kurashiki Rayon Company, Zhou Hongqing, and the ‘second Yoshida letters’ 1963-4. The sale of the Kurashiki Rayon Company’s vinylon plant to Communist China in August 1963 and the so-called Zhou Hongqing incident of October 1963 brought another crisis of recognition to Japan. In August 1963, the Japanese government approved the export of a vinylon plant to mainland China by the Kurashiki Rayon
Company with a five year deferred payment plan provided by the Export-Import Bank of Japan (Nippon Yushutsunyu Ginko). Taipei objected strongly as it considered the use of a quasi-governmental credit agency to finance sales amounted to Tokyo’s ‘economic aid’ to Beijing based on de facto recognition (Mendel 1969: 515-6, 1970: 199; Jain 1982: 70; Mendl 1978: 22; Lin 1984: 171-2; Soeya 1995: 169, 1998: 96; Shimizu 2001: 177). In September, tension was raised as Taipei recalled Ambassador Chang Li-sheng from Tokyo after Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato commented to American journalists that he had not taken seriously the prospect of Nationalist China’s recovery of the mainland even though he had heard the ‘rumor’. In October, the diplomatic crisis further escalated as Nationalist China disputed Japan’s handling of the Zhou Hongqing incident, in which a member of a technical mission from mainland China sought political asylum at the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo but ended up returning to mainland China three months later.

In order to manage the precipitation of diplomatic crisis with the Chiang Kai-shek regime, Prime Minister Ikeda dispatched two major proponents of ‘returning virtue for malice’—Ono Banboku and Yoshida Shigeru—to Taipei in October 1963 and February 1964 respectively. Ultimately, it took Tokyo two versions of the so-called ‘second Yoshida letter’—the ‘official’ documents economically precluding Japan’s subsequent plant sales to Communist China (in the publicized version of the letter dated 7 May 1964) as well as politically expressing Tokyo’s moral support for Chiang Kai-shek’s recovery of mainland China (in the hitherto secret document dated 4 April 1964)—to restore its diplomatic relations with Taipei (Furuya 1977b: 162-7; Lin 1984: 202-8, 1987: 83-4; Tanaka 1991: 216-7; Shimizu 2001). The production of the ‘second Yoshida letters’, as the following paragraphs show, was facilitated by the discourse of
‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition. It is the intent of this section to show the resilience of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition as the author explicates the successful reconstruction of ‘China’ in the face of recognition crisis in the early 1960s.

In the meantime, the production of the ‘second Yoshida letters’ can be internationally attributed to Washington’s intervention to settle the diplomatic crisis between the two client states while Taipei threatened to sever relations with Tokyo (Cohen 1989: 53-4). For instance, in December 1963, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman put pressure on the Nationalist Chinese side by warning that Taipei’s strong action against Tokyo would make it difficult for Washington to win Tokyo’s support for ‘free China’ in the UN (Ibid.: 53). Furthermore, the American ambassador to the ROC, Admiral Jerauld Wright, warned Chiang Kai-shek that the severing of Taipei’s diplomatic relations with Tokyo would have a ‘serious if not disastrous effect’ on Taipei’s international position and result in the advancement of Beijing’s relations with Tokyo (Ibid.: 53-4). In the meantime, the international environment surrounding Taipei deteriorated as France diplomatically recognized Communist China in January 1964. Consequently, Chiang Kai-shek restrained himself and Tokyo concurrently did what it could to bring the diplomatic crisis to an end (Ibid.)—that is, by issuing the ‘second Yoshida letters’ in the spring of 1964. In other words, while such an external factor as Washington’s pressure on its clients constitute a necessary condition for the resolution of the diplomatic crisis, it still does not sufficiently explain how the crisis was overcome since it largely neglects to interpret how the production of the ‘second Yoshida letters’ was made possible.
Domestically, the 'second Yoshida letters' were the products of Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi, who drafted them in close consultation with Yoshida (Sato et al. 1990: 215-6; Yatsugi 1973: 238; Besshi 1983: 107; Tanaka 1991: 57), in order to appease the discourse coalition of 'returning virtue for malice'. More specifically, Ohira's policy of appeasement was designed to bridge his mentor Prime Minister Ikeda's China policy and its opposition within the ranks of the LDP and the cabinet—constituted by such influential figures as former Prime Ministers Yoshida Shigeru and Kishi Nobusuke, Minister of Justice Kaya Okinori, and former Deputy Prime Minister Ishii Mitsuijiro (Furukawa 1988: 222; Besshi 1983: 106-7; Lin 1997: 173-4). Ohira was also under the pressure of other supporters of the CPSJC like Vice President of the LDP Ono Banboku and former Director of the Defense Agency Funada Naka. In fact, Ono and Funada (1970: 58-63) are the ones the Ikeda government dispatched to Taipei (10) at the inception of the crisis after Chang Chun (1980: Ch. 14) expressed Taipei's objection to Ono and Kishi regarding the sale of Kurashiki Rayon's vinylon plant. Furthermore, over the course of the Zhou Hongqing incident, it was Kaya, Ohira's former superior in the Ministry of Finance during the prewar era (Sato et al. 1990), who made Ohira's job difficult. Kaya prolonged the incident by attempting to persuade Zhou—the 'defector' who had repeatedly changed his mind and finally expressed his wish to return to mainland China—to defect to Taiwan (Furukawa 1988: 221-2; Lin 1984: Ch. 7). Moreover, Ohira could hardly ignore Ishii, Chair of the CPSJC, who first formally raised the issue of Yoshida's visit (11) to Taiwan as he paid a visit to Prime Minister Ikeda in January 1964 (Soeya 1995: 170, 1998: 97). As a result, the Ikeda government began calling for re-establishing friendly relations with Nationalist China.
through the discourse of Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek (Eto 1967: 150). Such an attempt to re-construct Japan’s diplomatic recognition of ‘China’ soon materialized as Yoshida’s visit to Taiwan and the two letters which Yoshida sent to Chang Chun after the trip. Accordingly, for the Ikeda government, the two letters were meant to give a “‘cooling-off’ period” not only to Taipei (Soeya 1995: 119, 172, 1998: 58, 98-9), but also the discourse coalition that represented Chiang Kai-shek in the domestic politics of Japan.

More transnationally, the making of the ‘second Yoshida letters’ was facilitated by the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’—through which Yoshida, a retired premier, ‘privately’ communicated with Chiang Kai-shek. For instance, as soon as the Japanese government approved the sale of the Kurashiki vinylon plant, Chiang contacted Yoshida—former Prime Minister at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace in April 1952—and engaged him in the familiar discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’. In his telegram to Yoshida—who was expected to wield influence on his protégé, Prime Minister Ikeda (Chang 1980: 184, 198)—Chiang framed his message with the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’. In this telegram, Chiang stated as follows (Yatsugi 1973: 238, author’s translation):

‘China adopted the policy of “returning virtue for malice” immediately after the war. However, what Japan recently did to China was derived from that of “returning malice for virtue”. If Japan continues to have such an attitude, China has no choice but to remember Japan’s malice from the past.’
Yoshida’s reply, as it requested Chiang to understand the sale of the vinylon plant to Communist China based on the ‘separation of politics and economics’, repeatedly stated (Ibid., author’s translation):

‘We have not forgotten about our “debt of gratitude” to Mr. President.’

Moreover, when Yoshida ‘privately’ visited Chiang with a letter from Prime Minister Ikeda (12) in February 1964, Yoshida gave Emperor Hirohito’s best regards and expressed his gratitude for Chiang’s virtue (Chang 1980: 204). After Chiang asked Yoshida to give his best regards to Hirohito, he continued to engage Yoshida in the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ by making the following remark (Ibid.: 204-6, author’s translation):

‘Repatriating three million Japanese soldiers from China was the manifestation of the friendly spirit that China traditionally has had for Japan....It would not only be fruitless but dangerous if one only cared about Japan’s economic development without paying heed to the restoration of China. That is why China and Japan must cooperate closely. We must co-exist and co-prosper. Otherwise, we could not expect stability in Asia....if we do not solve the problem of mainland China by exterminating communist bandits and recovering the freedom of the people, then it would be extremely difficult for Japan to secure
present prosperity...Prime Minister Ikeda’s claim that there are “two Chinas” led to the low tide of Sino-Japanese relations last year....This claim that there are “two Chinas” enabled Ikeda to collaborate with the communist bandits. The problem regarding the sale of the Kurashiki plant occurred as a result....Then, there came the Zhou Hongqing case....Frankly speaking, I am deeply disappointed with these outcomes of my Japan policy from the past.’

Chiang then drew Yoshida’s attention to the Sunist roots of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ as follows (Ibid.: 207, author’s translation):

‘In *The Destiny of China (Zhongguo zhi Cunwang Wenti)* that Mr. Sun Yat-sen wrote in 1917, he called for defending the Pacific through Sino-American-Japanese collaboration. In other words, he meant to tell us that we must unite and guard against the Russian empire. That traditional spirit is still with us.’

Chiang then concluded by briefly demanding Yoshida to repay ‘a debt of gratitude’ in the following fashion (Ibid., author’s translation):

‘I hope Your Excellency will encourage the Japanese government to give moral and spiritual support to the Chinese government.’
As shown above, the discourse of 'returning virtue for malice' provided the moral foundation on which Chiang demanded Yoshida to politically consolidate Tokyo's recognition of Taipei as the legitimate government of China. More importantly, the Chiang-Yoshida talks that were morally framed by the 'returning virtue for malice' discourse eventually culminated in the production of the two 'second Yoshida letters' of 4 April and 7 May 1964—which were sent to the Secretary General of the Office of the President, Chang Chun, who had closely accompanied Yoshida during his trip to Taiwan (Ibid.: 208-9).


"The Yoshida letter and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan) are interrelated. At the time, Mr. Yoshida and I mutually understood that the Yoshida letter was a supplementary document to the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. This letter was produced because both the Japanese Government—that Mr. Yoshida represented—and the Government of the Republic of China—under my rule—felt the need to supplement the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, which we felt was still insufficient several years after the conclusion of the Treaty. Therefore, repealing this Yoshida letter today..."
would necessarily result in the abrogation of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty.

However, this supplementary document, the existence of which the Japanese government still denies to this date (Shimizu 2001: 179), remained secret until it was "re-discovered" by the Japanese journalists who were putting together a 15-volume biography of Chiang Kai-shek in 1976 (Chang 1980: 211; Furuya 1977b: 162-7; Tanaka 1991: 216-7). Nonetheless, in this short secret letter, Yoshida acknowledged the receipt of the "outline of Communist China policy" (Zhonggong dulice yaogang or Chukyo taisaku yoko) as the following (Furuya 1977b: 165; Lin 1984: 204-5; Shimizu 2001: 179, author's translation):

'Dear Yueh-chun (Chang Chun): I am sure that you have read the letter I sent to you the other day. I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 4 March along with the minutes of the talks and the outline of Communist China policy. In the third round of the talks, my remark was about Indonesia rather than India. Please correct it. I am writing to inform you that there is no other error.'

Now, in order to adequately understand the significance of this letter, it is necessary to examine it in conjunction with the "outline of Communist China policy"—the existence
of which has recently been confirmed by the de-classification of Japanese diplomatic archives (Mainichi Shinbun 29 May 2000; Shimizu 2001: 179-80; Ishii 2002: 18-20).

The ‘outline of Communist China policy’, which Yoshida jointly drafted with Chang Chun (1980: 208-10) during his visit to Taiwan, was composed of the following five points (Furuya 1977b: 164; Chang 1980: 209-10; Lin 1984: 203-4; Shimizu 2001: 178-9, author’s translation):

‘1) In order for 600 million Chinese people to peacefully co-exist and trade with free nations, thereby contributing to world peace and prosperity, it is vital for us to bring those people into the free world by liberating them from communist rule; 2) In order to achieve that goal, Japan and the Republic of China must cooperate substantively to realize mutual peace and prosperity and to set a concrete example of liberalism for the people of mainland China, thereby inducing them to forsake the communist regime and expel communism out of the continent; 3) If circumstances surrounding mainland China and the world permit the Republic of China to have a successful counterattack on the mainland, Japan must give spiritual and moral support to the counterattack policy of 70% politics and 30% military; 4) Japan must oppose the so-called ‘two Chinas’ plan; 5) The Japanese government must strictly refrain from taking such measures as giving economic aid to mainland China while restricting its trade with the continent to that on a purely private basis.’
Accordingly, Yoshida (on behalf of the Ikeda government) agreed to the principle of ‘one China’—before ‘switching back’ to that of ‘two Chinas’ in the letter of 7 May (Mainichi Shinbun 29 May 2000; Ijiri 2001).

The ‘second Yoshida letter’ of 7 May was initially known to be the ‘second Yoshida letter’ of 1964—second after the Yoshida letter of 24 December 1951—in Japan until the existence of the letter of 4 April was revealed in the mid 1970s (Chang 1980: 211; Furuya 1977b: 162-7; Tanaka 1991: 216-7; Shimizu 2001: 179; Nakajima 2002: 145). The letter of 7 May was written in reply to Chan Chun’s letter of 10 April 1964, in which Chang made the following request (Shimizu 2001: 181, author’s translation):

‘We would once again like you to advise Prime Minister Ikeda to guarantee us that the Japanese government will not give credit to Communist China through any governmental bank again and that it will henceforth abide by the principle of non-intervention in regard to its private trade with Communist China.’

In the reply letter of 7 May, Yoshida—with Prime Minister Ikeda’s tacit approval (Soeya 1995: 171; 1998: 98)—made the following two promises according to the Mainichi Shinbun on 5 August 1965 (Ibid.):
'1) Concerning the matter of restricting the financing of plant exports to Communist China on a purely private basis, study will be made so as to reflect your (Nationalist government’s) intention; 2) Within this year (Showa 39 [1964]), Nichibo’s chemical fiber plant export to Communist China through the Export-Import Bank shall not be approved.'

It has been argued that the phrase ‘within this year’ indicated that the Ikeda government—in the name of Yoshida—intended to resume its ‘two Chinas’ policy (13) and approve Export-Import Bank credits in the following year even though Prime Minister Ikeda fell ill and resigned before the ‘cooling-off year’ was over (Soeya 1995: 172, 1998: 98-9; Mainichi Shinbum 29 May 2000). In any case, in this letter, Yoshida also requested Taipei to speed up the process of re-normalizing diplomatic relations with Tokyo—such as dispatching an ambassador to Japan immediately (Lin 1984: 205-6). Subsequently, in the following month of June, Taipei dispatched its new ambassador, Wei Tao-ming, to Tokyo. As a result, the diplomatic crisis finally came to an end.

In sum, although the re-normalization of relations between Taipei and Tokyo through the production of the ‘second Yoshida letters’ can be partially attributed to Washington’s pressure on Taipei, the resolution of the diplomatic crisis was also partially facilitated by the re-construction of ‘China’ through the hegemonic discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition. More specifically, following the sale of the Kurashiki vinylon plant and the Zhou Hongqing incident in the fall of 1963, domestic pressure from the hegemonic discourse coalition contributed to Prime Minister
Ikeda’s decision to dispatch a representative of the discourse coalition—Ikeda’s mentor, former Prime Minister Yoshida—to Taiwan in early 1964. In addition to the pressure from the discourse coalition, it was the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ that provided the moral foundation for the Chiang-Yoshida talks which eventually led to the production of two ‘second Yoshida letters’ in the spring of 1964. Accordingly, the hegemonic discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition facilitated the production of the ‘second Yoshida letters’, thereby re-constructing Japan’s diplomatic recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ and making the Ikeda government’s attempt to exercise its ‘two Chinas’ policy ‘impossible’.

4.6 Conclusion

Between 1952 and 1964, the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ diffused into Japan and formed a coalition that eventually gained and maintained the hegemonic position in Japanese politics. Interestingly, the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ initially diffused through the prewar Japanese imperialists whom the American occupation authorities had ‘depurged’ or ‘unleashed’ as ‘watch dogs’ at the inception of the Cold War. Subsequently, the diffusion of the discourse as well as the formation of the discourse coalition coincided with the making of the ‘1955 system’—especially the establishment of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, many influential members of which later participated in the Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation—by suturing the ‘iron triangle’ of Japan. As a result, the storyline that Chiang Kai-shek is the benefactor to whom the Japanese must repay a ‘debt of
gratitude' became official and facilitated Japan's diplomatic recognition of the Chiang regime as 'China' under US hegemony during this period.

In the meantime, two diplomatic crises critically tested the hegemonic position of 'returning virtue for malice' and its coalition in Japan. They were brought by the development of Communist China's 'private' trade with Japan as well as the outbreak of 'incidents' in the late 1950s and early 1960s respectively. First, the discourse coalition of 'returning virtue for malice' devastated Communist China's challenge through the fourth private trade agreement and the Nagasaki flag incident in the spring of 1958. In this first diplomatic crisis, Beijing's attempt to gain Japan's recognition of its national flag was destroyed by Prime Minister Kishi and other members of the discourse coalition in Japan. Consequently, as the discourse of 'returning virtue for malice' and its coalition helped to bring the 're-unification' of politics and economics into Japan's China policy, Communist China's use of economic means to achieve political ends resulted in the severing of (economic) relations with Japan. Second, the next diplomatic crisis was triggered by the sale of the Kurashiki vinylon plant to Communist China and the Zhou Hongqing incident, both of which took place in the fall of 1963. Eventually, this second diplomatic crisis was successfully managed by the production of the two 'second Yoshida letters' of 1964, which was facilitated by the discourse of 'returning virtue for malice' and its coalition in Japan. As a result, the Ikeda government was forced to keep its 'private' trade with Beijing strictly private and to show support for Chiang Kai-shek's recovery of the mainland based on the principle of 'one China'. In short, these crucial cases of the de-construction and re-construction of 'China'
demonstrated the hegemonic position of the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition in the 1950s and the early 1960s.

Accordingly, the dominance of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition in Japan during this period overshadowed the possibility of recognizing Communist China, which actually took place only eight years afterwards. In the next chapter, the author thus shows the realization of that possibility in terms of the decline of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition in Japan between 1964 and 1972. Simply put, the next chapter demonstrates how the ‘1955 system’ and the ‘San Francisco system’ degenerated over the ‘China question’ in the following eight years.

Notes

1) For the ‘reverse course’, see Chapter 3.

2) For the concept of ‘discourse coalitions’, see Ch. 1.

3) Ogata’s entourage included his former colleague, Kaji Ryuichi of the Asahi Shinbun, who later became a proponent of ‘returning virtue for malice’ (Chen 1988: 48-9).

4) Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo was Yoshizawa’s junior colleague who had assisted Yoshizawa at the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai in the 1920s when Yoshizawa served as Minister Plenipotentiary (Yoshizawa 1958: 93).

5) However, there were four according to another account by a member of the ‘Ishii mission’, Yatsugi Kazuo (1973: 184) of the National Policy Research Association (Kokusaku Kenkyukai), who persuaded Ishii to lead a mission to Taipei in order to
counter-balance informal relations between Tokyo and Beijing (Ibid.: 12-14). Yatsugi recalls that Ishii expressed his words of appreciation to Chiang for the following four decisions (Ibid.: 184): 1) Chiang’s objection to the abrogation of the Japanese imperial institution at the Conference of Cairo; 2) Chiang’s declaration of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and the safe repatriation of the Japanese soldiers and civilians from China immediately after the war; 3) Chiang’s enunciation to renounce the right to demand war reparations from Japan; 4) Chiang’s arrangement to repatriate Japanese prisoners of war before any other country. Yatsugi further points out that Ishii failed to thank Chiang for the ‘fifth virtue’—that Chiang turned down Douglas MacArthur’s offer for Nationalist China to dispatch its occupation forces to Kyushu, Japan—because he had not been informed of it at the time of the meeting (Ibid.).

6) Yatsugi Kazuo (1973: 17-18), Secretary General of the CPSJC, recalls that he was the one who proposed the idea of establishing the CPSJC to Chiang Kai-shek. Yatsugi persuaded Chiang by referring to Sun Yat-sen’s relationships with Toyama Mitsuru and other prewar Japanese activists known as ‘China adventurers’ (Tairiku ronin) (Ibid.)—for whom ‘the struggle to build a new East Asia was a cause that transcended personal or national boundaries’ (Jansen 1980: 374). Chiang then gleefully reacted and patted on his knee even before his interpreter began translating Yatsugi’s (1973: 18) comment. Chiang Kai-shek immediately consulted his Japan hand, Chang Chun, who volunteered to take charge of the Chinese side on the spot (Ibid.).
7) According to Yatsugi Kazuo (1973), Chiang Kai-shek also expressed his desire to see Tokyo normalize its diplomatic relations with Seoul when the ‘Ishii mission’ paid a visit to Taipei in the summer of 1956 just as Chiang had discussed the significance of Japan’s anti-communist alliance with South Korea when the ‘Ono mission’ visited him in the summer of 1955. In his meeting with Yatsugi (Ibid.: 21-2), Chiang expressed his desire to see Tokyo normalize its diplomatic relations with Seoul in the presence of Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh who had just come back from South Korea on the day before the meeting. Interestingly, Yatsugi’s subsequent consultation with Kishi Nobusuke and Ishii Mitsuiro eventually led to the formation of the Committee for the Promotion of Korean-Japanese Cooperation (Nikkan Kyoryoku Iinkai) in the late 1960s. The Committee sent observers to the CPSJC (Nikka Kyoryoku Iinkai) in 1970 (Ikei 1980).

8) On this trip, Kishi reportedly encouraged Chiang Kai-shek to re-conquer mainland China (Eto 1967: 139; Ikei 1974: 59; Mendl 1978: 19), even though he later denied the allegation (Hara 2003: 160).

9) The signatory organizations are as follows (Soeya 1998: 38): 1) The Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (Nippon Kokusai Boeki Sokushin Kyokai); 2) The Diet Members’ League for the Promotion of Japan-China Trade (Nitchu Boeki Sokushin Giin Renmei); 3) The Japan-China Import-Export Union (Nitchu Yushutsunyu Kumiai).

10) Incidentally, there were anti-Japanese demonstrations in the capital inspired by the Nationalist government (Mendel 1969: 517, 1970: 200).
11) Yoshida had promised Chen Chien-chung, Chief of the Sixth Section of the Central Committee, that he would visit Taiwan on behalf of Prime Minister Ikeda if Yoshida failed persuading the Prime Minister to pay a visit to Taipei (Chang 1980: 199-200).

12) On this occasion, Yoshida also explained to Chiang why the Prime Minister was unable to pay a visit (Ibid.: 208).

13) Yoshida has admitted to Eto Shinkichi, the Sinologist, that he had attempted to operate a ‘two Chinas’ policy by taking one issue at a time under the given circumstances (Mainichi Shinbun 29 May 2000)—that both Taipei and Beijing adhered to the ‘one China’ principle.
5
The decline of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and US hegemony in East Asia
1964-72

‘When I became Prime Minister...the Japan-China problem was also a domestic problem that had to be solved...President Nixon suddenly visited China over the heads of the Japanese...it presented a great opportunity for Japan, and I just seized that opportunity.’

(Tanaka Kakuei quoted by Hayasaka 1987: 223)

‘Chiang Kai-shek will not accept “two Chinas”. He will announce the severing of diplomatic relations with the Japanese government as soon as Japan and the People’s Republic of China normalize relations.’

(Zhou Enlai quoted by Wang 2003: 273)

‘We didn’t think that our diplomatic relations with Japan would be severed...we didn’t think that Communist China would agree to normalize relations with Japan while Japan maintained its diplomatic relations with Taiwan.’

(Lin Chin-ching quoted by Sankei Shinbun Sengoshi Kaifu Shuzaihan 1999: 295)

5.1 Introduction

On 29 September 1972, immediately after normalizing relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the east wing of the Great Hall of the People, Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi held a press conference at the Nationalities Culture
Palace and stated the following (Sato et al. 1990: 305; Jain 1982: 263-4; Takeuchi 1993: 202-8):

'As a result of the normalization of Japan-China relations, the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty has lost its raison d'être, and in the Japanese government's view it is recognized that this treaty has come to an end.'

This statement—in which Ohira never once alluded to the 'severing of relations' (danko) with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan (Ishii 2003b: 374)—initially sent a confusing message to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taipei. In fact, Taipei immediately instructed its embassy in Tokyo to inquire the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs whether or not Tokyo really meant to sever diplomatic relations with Taipei (Huang 1995: 208). It was after Kaya Okinori, a senior pro-Taipei member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), confirmed with Hogen Shinsaku, a vice foreign minister, on Taipei's behalf that the Nationalist government declared its decision to sever diplomatic relations with Japan—finally and more clearly (Ibid.).

In this 'farewell' statement of 29 September, Nationalist China held the Japanese government responsible for the severing of diplomatic relations as it concurrently maneuvered to maintain 'friendship' (economic relations) with Japanese people. It did so by separating the Japanese state and society through the moral discourse of 'returning virtue for malice' as follows (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
The Government of the Republic of China...declares its decision to sever diplomatic relations with the Japanese Government, and wishes to point out that the Japanese Government shall assume full responsibility for the rupture...President Chiang Kai-shek, in the interest of peace and stability for China and Japan...adopted the policy of returning kindness for malevolence (yide baoyuan) after Japan's surrender...the Tanaka Government has unilaterally nullified the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, recognized the Chinese Communist regime...these actions not only demonstrate ungratefulness and perfidy (wangen fuyi), bringing shame to the Japanese nation, but also run counter to the wishes of the great majority of the Japanese people...the Tanaka Government can not affect the gratitude and respect of the Japanese people toward the great kindness (deyi) of President Chiang Kai-shek. With all those Japanese people...the Government of the Republic of China will continue to maintain friendship.'

In a sense, this statement was a reply to the following request of the Japanese government, which Vice Foreign Minister Hogen had made to Ambassador P’eng

‘Given the fact that both the Nationalist government and the Communist government adhere to the principle of one China, we deeply regret that it is now impossible to maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC after having normalized relations with the PRC. However, the Japanese Government still wishes to maintain pragmatic relations (jitsumu kankei) such as trade and economic relations on the private level...That is why we are requesting the Nationalist government to take all the necessary measures for the security of Japanese expatriates and their assets in Taiwan...’

Accordingly, while Nationalist China morally held Japan and its ‘ungratefulness and perfidy’ responsible for the severing of diplomatic relations, Tokyo logically held Taipei and its adherence to the principle of ‘one China’ responsible for their diplomatic break-up. As a result, economic relations between the two nations were pragmatically maintained as diplomatic relations were severed in spite of the fact that Tokyo never (clearly) de-recognized Taipei.

How was such ‘severing of relations’ possible in September 1972 if the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition were so robust that Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei was facilitated as this study argues? The conventional approach
highlights the significance of the ‘international environment’ such as the impact of the United States on Japan by grossly reducing the severing of Japan-ROC relations to the normalization of Japan-PRC relations (Kosaka 2000: 524, 528; Iriye 1997: 164-5; Ikei 1982: 302; Hosoya 1993: 156; Tanaka 1991: 61). It mainly argues that Japan dutifully followed the United States that reversed its policy towards ‘China’ as Washington shockingly announced President Nixon’s forthcoming visit to Beijing in July 1971. However, while such change as the American initiative to play the ‘China card’ may partially explain why Japanese leaders decided to visit Beijing, it is empirically inaccurate to state that Tokyo dutifully followed Washington in finding a secure basis for its China policy. In fact, it was Washington that followed in the footsteps of Tokyo as Japan-ROC relations were severed more than six years ahead of US-ROC relations which were finally terminated in January 1979—nearly seven years after Nixon’s visit to Beijing. Therefore, in order to more fully understand the severing of diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Taipei, it is necessary for us to look beyond the coercive impact of the American hegemon on the Japanese client.

This chapter sheds light on the consensual aspect of American hegemony in East Asia by focusing on the severing of diplomatic relations between such client states as Japan and Nationalist China that constituted US hegemony. By doing so, this chapter provides the following answer for the aforementioned question: The hegemonic position of the pro-Taipei coalition formed around the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ in the domain of Japanese domestic politics—which sustained Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Taipei—declined relatively between 1964 and 1971, and the
eventual loss of its hegemonic position in 1972 contributed to the 'severing of relations' between Tokyo and Taipei. Furthermore, notwithstanding such decline and loss of the hegemonic position triggered by the lack of clear and timely consent between Tokyo, Taipei, and Washington, this chapter also shows that the discourse of 'returning virtue for malice' and its coalition still helped to make Japan's support for the ROC in the UN possible and Tokyo's (clear) de-recognition of Taipei im-possible in the critical years of 1971 and 1972. Having said that, this chapter also counterfactually argues that it would have been more difficult for the 'severing of relations' between Tokyo and Taipei to take place in 1972 if there was clear and timely consent between Tokyo, Taipei, and Washington and Nationalist China had managed to remain in the UN in 1971 as a result.

Put differently, this chapter analyzes the process of the de-generation of American hegemonic apparatuses in East Asia such as the 'San Francisco system' and the '1955 system' (Dower 1993b)—the generation of which the author discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively—as well as the resilience of the 'returning virtue for malice' discourse in spite of its decline. First, this chapter probes the degeneration of the '1955 system' by highlighting the relative decline of the discourse coalition of 'returning virtue for malice' in terms of the bifurcation of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party over the 'China question' during this period. Second, this chapter then examines the limits of the 'returning virtue for malice' discourse and the 'San Francisco system' by drawing on recent findings and materials as it sheds light on how Washington and Tokyo were defeated over the Chinese representation issue at the UN in 1971. Third, in
spite of its decline, this chapter stresses the resilience of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse as it shows how the discourse made it impossible for Tokyo to allude to the ‘severing of relations’, which nonetheless led to Taipei’s de-recognition of Tokyo in 1972. Finally, this chapter reiterates that the erosion of American hegemony in terms of the ‘1955 system’ as well as the ‘San Francisco system’, which the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition constituted, accelerated over the Chinese representation issue in the UN in 1971.

5.2 The bifurcation of the ‘1955 system’: ‘China’ in the LDP 1964-72

On the eve of the normalization of Japan-China relations in September 1972, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan—whose dominance in Japanese politics constituted the so-called ‘1955 system’—sent a mission to Beijing. Its mission was to lay the groundwork for the forthcoming visit of the new president of the LDP, Tanaka Kakuei. While this mission to Beijing epitomized the erosion of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition within the ruling party, it also demonstrated their resilience as the ‘inter-party’ talks between the LDP and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were surprisingly conducted in the same discourse that had helped to block Tokyo’s recognition of Beijing for two decades.

The mission was led by Kosaka Zentaro, former Foreign Minister, who had chaired the LDP Council for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations (*Nitchu Kokko Seijoka Kyogikai*) the scene of which pro-Taipei hawks dominated over the ‘very long’ summer of 1972 (Kosaka 1981: 172, 1994: 86). The mission was composed
of 24 members including pro-Taipei elements of the Party (Ibid.: 87). During the first round of talks with CCP leaders, conceivably under the pressure of the pro-Taipei representatives, Kosaka (1981: 176, 1994: 87) unwisely pointed out the existence of the strong intra-party coalition that advocated Japan's 'debt of gratitude' to 'President Chiang Kai-shek' and his 'returning virtue for malice' postwar Japan policy. In the end, Kosaka desperately followed up his remark by indicating that an agreement on the principle of 'one China' nonetheless had been reached within the ruling party (Ibid.).

On the following day, Liao Chengzhi, the Communist Chinese official who acted as the 'personal representative' of Premier Zhou Enlai (Radtke 1990: 4-5), furiously replied to Kosaka’s remark in the following fashion (Tagawa 1973: 372-6, author’s translation):

'During the 15 September 1972 meeting...Mr. Kosaka introduced the debate that took place on the Council for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations for us. In this introduction, he particularly emphasized the opinion of a minority group within the Council, which opposed the Tanaka cabinet's policy to normalize relations with the People’s Republic of China at an early date. In other words, it was the view of the so-called “pro-Taiwan group” which was against the majority of the Council as Mr. Kosaka pointed out...Introducing such a view however does not contribute to Prime Minister Tanaka’s forthcoming visit to China. Furthermore, it could even subvert his visit to promote the normalization
of relations between China and Japan...Is it an attempt to create ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’?...According to Mr. Kosaka’s introduction, those who advocated the maintenance of hitherto existing relations with Taiwan referred to *Japan’s debt of gratitude to Chiang Kai-shek for returning virtue for malice*—that is, preventing Japan from becoming a divided nation as Chiang refrained from sending occupation forces to Japan after the war. I must say that their reference is groundless and they are ignorant of history...The view of the minority group on the Council that the Japanese are indebted to the Chiang Kai-shek clique, whose hands are soaked with Chinese blood, just is not acceptable for the Chinese people.’

Furthermore, on the late night of 19 September, Premier Zhou Enlai requested Kosaka to see him immediately in the Great Hall of the People. The subject of this unexpected meeting was another LDP mission that was visiting Taipei at the time. Earlier on the same day, Shiina Etsusaburo, head of the mission in Taipei, had just held a talk with Premier Chiang Ching-kuo and discussed the future of diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Taipei—through the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ (*Ishii et al.* 2003: 133-43). Here, Zhou complained indignantly about Shiina’s remark as the following (Kosaka 1981: 186-7, author’s translation):

‘In Taiwan, Special Envoy Shiina said that diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan would continue even after the normalization of relations
between Japan and China...It is a completely differently story from the one you told us. We are troubled by these divergent views on such a fundamental issue.'

Zhou then drew attention to Shiina's earlier comment, which had called the principle of 'one China' into question in the following fashion (Wang 2003: 277, author's translation):

'There is not a single state that continues to recognize the Nationalist government after normalizing relations with (Communist) China...It makes sense logically (given the principle of one China), but it doesn't have to be that way politically.'

The Premier of the PRC then challenged Shiina's argument by showing the following support for the new Japanese cabinet which had embraced the 'one China' discourse (Ibid.: 277-8, author's translation):

'What kind of logic is the separation of logic and politics?...Both Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira have said that it is impossible for Japan to simultaneously maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan if Japan and China establish diplomatic relations...This is a logical consequence as well as a political consequence. It is based on this
standpoint (the inseparability of logic and politics) that we will welcome Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to China and negotiate the normalization of relations between China and Japan.’

In reply, Kosaka strongly (but wrongly) denied that Shiina would make such a comment as he had been informed that Prime Minister Tanaka’s letter Shiina conveyed did not even mention diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Taipei (Kosaka 1981: 186-7, 1994: 87-88, author’s translation):

‘He couldn’t have possibly made such a comment. We have exhaustively exchanged our views within the LDP just as we introduced them to you. The exchange of views reflected the process of discussion in our party. What we told you (about the normalization of relations with the PRC based on the principle of one China) is the conclusion of that discussion.’

However, unlike Kosaka’s attempt to justify his position, the ‘conclusion’ reached within the LDP was not so conclusive especially regarding the status of Tokyo’s diplomatic relations with Taipei. Rather, the Executive Council (Somukai) of the LDP had only passed a compromise platform called the Basic Policy on the Normalization of Japan-China Relations (Nitchu Kokko Seijoka Kihon Hoshin) on 8 September 1972 (Takemi 1981: 63, 1993: 5; Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku Kankokai 1982: 147; Lee 1976: 116). It was drafted by the Council for the Normalization of
Japan-China Relations, which Kosaka had been appointed to chair following the July 1972 presidential election of the LDP. The inconclusive nature of the platform was epitomized in the following preamble of the Policy (Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku Kankokai 1982: 145-54; Takemi 1981: 62-3, author’s translation):

‘Our government should take the following points into consideration when it negotiates the normalization of relations with China. Particularly, in view of the close relations between our nation and the Republic of China, negotiations should be conducted giving due consideration to the continuation of hitherto existing relations (Tokuni, wagakuni to Chuka Minkoku to no fukai kankei ni kangami, jurai no kankei ga keizoku sareruyo jubun hairyo no ue kosho subeki dearu).’

It is important to note that there was no agreed interpretation on ‘hitherto existing relations’ (jurai no kankei)—whether or not they included diplomatic relations—within the LDP. (1) In other words, the interpretation of the phrase was iridescently left in the eyes of the beholder. As a result, while ‘hitherto existing relations’ did not include diplomatic relations in the eyes of pro-Beijing conservatives, they did include diplomatic relations in the eyes of pro-Taipei members of the ruling party (Besshi 1980: 16 n. 36).

As demonstrated above, despite the fact that a general agreement on the normalization of relations with Beijing had been reached within the LDP, the ruling
party of Japan nonetheless remained deeply divided over what to do about Tokyo’s relations with Taipei. The cleavage within the ruling party was so serious that it spilled over internationally and astonished the leaders of Communist China as mentioned above. As a result, the Communist Chinese leaders had to engage with the domestic politics of Japan in China and even form a ‘coalition’ with the new leaders of the LDP in Japan. More discursively, the CCP leaders went along with the new Tanaka administration that advocated the inevitability of severing relations with Taipei by blaming the logic (or anticipated consequence) of the ‘one China’ principle on both sides of the Taiwan Strait—despite the fact that it was, first of all, logically impossible for Beijing to negotiate with Tokyo given that Tokyo had maintained diplomatic relations with Taipei since 1952. (2) In the meantime, the Japanese conservatives who were against severing relations with Nationalist China ceaselessly invoked Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. The depth of such division between the two discourse coalitions cannot be adequately understood unless one traces it back to the 1960s.

In this section, the author thus examines the ‘China question’ in the LDP between 1964 and 1972. During this period, the ‘1955 system’ gradually eroded as the ruling party increasingly bifurcated over ‘China’. Such bifurcation of the hegemonic apparatus was manifested by the rivalry between two groups representing ‘China’ within the LDP—the pro-Taipei group and the pro-Beijing group (Fukui 1969, 1970; Soeya 1995, 1998; Uchida 1965; Ogata 1965; Lee 1976; Takemi 1981). This study attaches more importance to the former since the composition of the pro-Taipei group

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largely overlapped with that of the Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation, participants of which circulated the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as mentioned in the previous chapter. In effect, this section sheds light on the relative and gradual decline of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition within the ruling party of Japan by tracing this rivalry that culminated in the serious division over the Chinese representation issue at the UN in 1971 and the emergence of a pro-Beijing administration in 1972.

Pro-Taipei and pro-Beijing groups: discourses and intra-party politics 1964. After Ikeda fell ill in November 1964, it was Sato Eisaku, former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s younger brother and a major proponent of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse (Eto 2003), who assumed the post of premiership in Japan. The first Sato cabinet was nearly identical with the previous cabinet as Sato kept all the ministers of the last Ikeda cabinet except for Chief Cabinet Secretary Hashimoto Tomisaburo and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeshita Noboru (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986: 312; Takeshita 1991: 31-2). In fact, the new Prime Minister initially announced that he planned on running the nation along the lines of the Ikeda cabinet (Uchida 1965: 266). By the same token, Prime Minister Sato indicated that he would adopt a China policy along the lines of Ikeda’s as follows (Ibid.; Eto 1967: 152; Furukawa 1988: 232): 1) Japan must not interfere with the domestic affairs of ‘China’ when each of ‘two Chinas’ claims that there is only ‘one China’; 2) Although Japan has concluded the Treaty of Peace with the Nationalist government, the Japanese nation should not be overly
obligated to the kindness Chiang Kai-shek showed at the end of the war. Sato’s odd precaution against the hegemonic position of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition reflected his modest stance as the successor of Ikeda who had attempted to exercise a ‘two Chinas’ policy in the name of the ‘separation of politics and economics’. In fact, recently declassified Japanese diplomatic archives indicate that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the final year of the Ikeda government had conducted a study on a ‘one China, one Taiwan’ formula for the ‘China question’ in the UN as well as that on how to promote relations with Beijing by overcoming the powerful discourse of postwar Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek (Sho Kai-seki ongiron) (Ishii et al. 2003: 366-8). While Sato humbly took over Ikeda and his China policy by de-mobilizing the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’, he nonetheless provoked other members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to take action before the new Japanese Prime Minister paid a customary visit to Washington.

The Asian Problems Study Group (APSG or Ajia Mondai Kenkyukai) (3) was formed in December 1964—under the leadership of Kaya Okinori, a staunch supporter of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition—with an initial membership of 98 LDP Diet members (Fukui 1969: 313-7, 1970: 251-4). On 22 December, after only two meetings, the Group presented the following advice in its interim report to Prime Minister Sato and other leaders of the LDP (Uchida 1965: 267-8; Fukui 1969: 316, 1970: 253): ‘1) The People’s Republic of China must not be admitted to the United Nations so long as it persists in its “aggressive” intentions; 2) For reasons of Japan’s own security, among other things, Taiwan must be kept from
communist take-over; 3) The problem of China's representation in the United Nations must continue to be regarded as an "important" question, requiring a two-thirds majority vote for adoption; 4) Trade with mainland China must be conducted on the basis of the separation of politics and economics without involving the use of Export-Import Bank credits or terms more favorable than those applicable to Japan's trade with South Korea, Taiwan or other "Free World" nations.' While some of these issues had been discussed between Tokyo and Washington when Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited Japan earlier that year, these multilateral as well as bilateral issues simply reflected what concerned Japan at the time. For example, issues regarding Communist China's aggression and Japan's own security were drawn from the first atomic explosion set off by Beijing in October 1964 and two Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s. As for those related to the 'China seat' in the UN and bilateral trade relations, they were derived from an explosive increase in the number of member states in the UN as a result of decolonization as well as two bilateral diplomatic crises in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In any case, the APSG strove to influence the leaders of the LDP so that they would make decisions to defend the status quo on the China issue and prevent Taiwan from falling into the hands of Beijing (Fukui 1969: 316, 1970: 254).

Pro-Beijing members of the LDP led by Utsunomiya Tokuma and others announced that they also intended to organize a study group on the day after the APSG presented its interim report (Uchida 1965: 268). The Asian-African Problems Study Group (AAPSG or Ajia Afurika Mondai Kenkyukai) was formed by 104 members (4) on 28 January 1965, and it nominated two prominent pro-Beijing members of the LDP—
Matsumura Kenzo and former Foreign Minister Fujiiyama Aiichiro (5)—as its advisors (Ibid.: 270; Fukui 1969: 311, 1970: 250; Soeya 1995: 116, 1998: 55). Interestingly, the basic points of reference for the AAPSG vis-à-vis ‘China’ and Japan’s China policy were completely opposite of those of the APSG as follows (Uchida 1965: 268; Soeya 1998: 55-6): ‘1) China must become a member of the United Nations, which would ease tensions in Asia; 2) Therefore, Japan must not support the “important question” formula of the China issue at the United Nations; 3) Governmental contacts with China must be pursued through such channels as ambassadorial talks (in a third country); 4) Japan-China trade must be expanded though governmental contacts.’ In addition, pro-Beijing leaders of the AAPSG—like Matsumura and Tokuma—mobilized the Group through a ‘sense of guilt’ as they drew on the history in which Japan betrayed and mistreated mainland China and Asian nations in the process of modernization (Ogata 1965: 392, 394-6). Furthermore, the pro-Beijing group also shared the narrative storyline that ‘the United States has failed to appreciate Asian nationalism, that the situation in Asia calls for solutions by Asians, and that Japan can play a greater role in international society by obtaining a freer hand’ from American control (Ibid.: 396). At any rate, although the AAPSG was not a dominant force in the LDP under Sato’s leadership, its pro-Beijing stance nonetheless had emerged as the force that could not be disregarded as it sought Beijing’s entry into the UN as well as Japan’s diplomatic recognition of Communist China (Fukui 1969: 311-3).

The relative distribution of these groups’ capabilities within the ruling party is difficult to assess since members of both groups cut across the factional divisions of
intra-party politics (Fukui 1969: 319, 1970: 256; Soeya 1995: 116; 1998: 56), but it can still be largely categorized in terms of the mainstream and anti-mainstream factions of the LDP (Ogata 1965; Fukui 1969, 1970; Soeya 1995, 1998; Takemi 1981). For instance, according to Ogata (1965: 395), the pro-Taiwan APSG comprised the mainstream Sato, Kishi, and Ishii factions while the pro-Beijing AAPSG was composed of younger House of Representatives from the anti-mainstream Miki and Kono factions (Ogata 1965: 395). For another example, according to Fukui (1969: 326, 1970: 261), while the APSG mainly consisted of the four mainstream factions—the Sato, Fukuda (formerly Kishi), Miki, and Ishii factions—of the LDP under Sato’s presidency, the AAPSG largely comprised the anti-mainstream factions—the former Kono faction (succeeded by Nakasone) and the Matsumura (formerly Matsumura-Miki) faction—of the ruling party. Furthermore, according to Soeya (1995: 117, 1998: 56), the APSG members came from the five mainstream factions—the Sato, Kishi-Fukuda, Ishii, Kawashima (formerly Kishi), and Miki factions—of the Sato government, while the AAPSG members were from the anti-mainstream factions. More extremely, while the APSG had no members from the anti-mainstream Matsumura faction (Fukui 1969: 319, 1970: 257; Uchida 1965: 275), the AAPSG had no members from the mainstream Kishi-Fukuda and Ishii factions—two major backers of the Sato cabinet (Ibid.; Soeya 1995: 116-7; 1998: 56). As a result, the APSG—an intra-party element of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse coalition, which closely associated with the Committee of the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation, an inter-elite variant—still had an edge in influencing the Sato cabinet.
The ‘second Yoshida letter’ and a ‘new conservative party’ 1965-8. As a matter of fact, under the pressure of the APSG (Uchida 1965: 272-4), Prime Minister Sato indicated that the Japanese government was morally bound by the ‘second Yoshida letter’ of 7 May 1964 (Eto 1967: 155-6; Besshi 1995: 50; Lin 1997: 184)—whose production was facilitated by the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition as mentioned in the previous chapter. It was on 8 February 1965 that Sato made his statement before the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives following his government’s refusal to provide Export-Import Bank funds for the export of Nichibo’s plant to Communist China. Sato also denied the use of Export-Import credits for the export of Hitachi Shipbuilding Company’s freighter to mainland China on 11 February. These decisions Sato made under the pressure of the APSG were in accordance with the ‘second Yoshida letter’ of 7 May 1964, in which Yoshida ‘privately’ agreed ‘restricting the financing of plant exports to Communist China to a purely private basis’ (Soeya 1998: 98). The Hitachi case, in particular, was a ‘testing ground for Sato’s China policy’ since he could have approved the use of governmental funds on the ground that the ‘second Yoshida letter’ applied to plant exports only (Soeya 1995: 173; 1998: 99). Nevertheless, in return, Beijing not only cancelled contracts with Hitachi and Nichibo (Uchida 1964: 273-4), but also terminated negotiations for 40 other plant imports from Japan (Soeya 1995: 173, 1998: 99). Henceforth, the Sato government antagonized Beijing and the AAPSG which in turn began harshly criticizing Sato’s foreign policy—such as giving a 150 million-dollar loan to Taipei in April 1965. In any case, the APSG successfully blocked the expansion of Japan’s ‘private’ trade with mainland China by
pressurizing Prime Minister Sato to recognize and abide by the ‘second Yoshida letter’ of 7 May 1964—which remained ‘effective’ until the eve of Tokyo’s normalization of relations with Beijing in 1972 (Zhao 1993: 140; Besshi 1995: 50; Shimizu 2001: 184).

In the meantime, as the cleavage between the two groups deepened, members of the AAPSG seriously considered defecting from the LDP at one point (Welfield 1988: 213; Furukawa 1988: 250-3). Prior to the presidential election of the LDP in 1966, leaders of the AAPSG—like Matsumura—began openly discussing the possibility of forming a new conservative party (Welfield 1988: 213). The deterioration of the relationship between the two groups could be seen in the fact that their political debates—over such issues as the co-sponsoring of the ‘important question’ resolution to keep Taipei in the UN (Fukui 1972: 21)—often got heated to the extent that their ‘voices were raised, fists brandished, bottles of beer and soft drink upset in unseemly scuffles, pieces of sushi hurled across rooms’ (Welfield 1988: 213). Meanwhile, members of the AAPSG started secret negotiations with the Democratic Socialist Party (Ibid.). They also set up the Consultative Group on the Promotion of Party Rectification (Shukuto Suishin Kyogikai) in order to challenge Sato and the pro-Taipei group in the presidential election and ‘purify’ the party (Ibid.; Furukawa 1988: 249-50). Nonetheless, the pro-Beijing group gave up its ‘dream’ and decided to remain in the LDP after its candidate, Fujiyama Aiichiro, was defeated by Sato—supported by the pro-Taiwan group—in the presidential election of the party in December 1966 and the ruling party managed to maintain its conservative representation in the lower house elections of January 1967 (Ibid.: 250-3; Welfield 1988: 213).
Although it gave up the 'dream' of forming a new conservative party, the anti-mainstream pro-Beijing group did not cease to challenge the pro-Taiwan Sato government. For instance, in the LDP presidential election year of 1968, the pro-Beijing Consultative Group on the Promotion of Party Rectification formed itself into the New Policy Council (Shinseisaku Konwakai) in February. In the second general meeting in March, the Council criticized the foreign policy of the Sato administration that had clearly leaned to the right (Furukawa 1988: 270-1). The Prime Minister had not only decided to give a 200 million-dollar loan to South Korea in the summer of 1967, but also visited Taiwan, South Vietnam, and the United States (6) in the midst of the Vietnam War in the fall of the same year. At any rate, in this general meeting, the Council unanimously agreed to advise Sato to make the following revisions in regard to his China policy (Ibid.: 271): 1) The administration must invalidate the ‘Yoshida letter’ (of 7 May 1964) and approve the use of Export-Import Bank funds for trade with mainland China; 2) The Japanese government must not co-sponsor the ‘important question’ resolution regarding the Chinese representation issue in the UN. However, Sato was able to ignore the New Policy Council’s policy advice as the Prime Minister was re-elected as the president of the ruling party with the support of the mainstream pro-Taipei group. The pro-Beijing group’s challenge against the pro-Taipei Sato administration was again unsuccessful because it failed to come up with a single unified candidate who could make a strong case against Sato’s China policy (Furukawa 1988: 271-3).
Despite such a setback, the pro-Beijing group boldly attempted to reassert its position as it issued the joint communique on ‘private’ trade with mainland China where the Cultural Revolution had come to an end (Lee 1976: 83-4). The communique that Dietman Furui Yoshimi jointly declared with his Chinese counterpart, Liu Xiwen, in April 1969 denounced the pro-Taipei Sato government ‘for stepping up its effort to follow US imperialism, for participating in the conspiracy to create “two Chinas” and for barefacedly adopting a policy of hostility toward China’ (Ibid.: 84). On this occasion, Furui further acknowledge the following (Ibid.): ‘1) The Japanese government was responsible for the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations; 2) The Japan-Taiwan peace treaty was illegal; and 3) The US-Japan security treaty constituted a threat to China and thus an important obstacle to Sino-Japanese cooperation.’ Moreover, Furui agreed to state ‘that the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government representing the Chinese people, that Taiwan Province is an inseparable part of China’s territory, that this must be the basis for understanding the promotion of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, and that it opposes the conspiracy of creating “two Chinas” in any form’ (Ibid.). This joint communique naturally created a controversy in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. For instance, leaders of the pro-Taipei APSG such as Kaya Okinori harshly criticized Furui for promoting ‘subservient trade’ (dogeza boeki) and doing Taipei and Washington injustice against the will of the Japanese government (Ibid.; Furukawa 1988: 285). Moreover, like Kaya, Funada Naka—another exponent of the ‘returning virtue for
malice' discourse and its coalition—criticized Furui's attack on the US-Japan Security Treaty (Lee 1976: 84). Accordingly, the intra-party cleavage within the LDP continued to intensify and even spilled into the international arena, and it forebode the escalation of such a trend.

In fact, the pro-Taipei group's retaliation took the form of a joint communiqué issued by Prime Minister Sato and President Richard M. Nixon of the United States in the same year. In November 1969, Sato, who visited Washington mainly to discuss the 'reversion' of Okinawa (or Liuqiu) to Japan with Nixon, strategically committed Japan to the stability of Asia under US hegemony by alluding to Korea and Taiwan. More specifically, in this joint communiqué, Sato agreed to include the following 'Korea clause' and the 'Taiwan clause' (US Department of State 1969: 555-8): 'The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted that the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. The President and the Prime Minister shared the hope that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations. The President referred to the treaty obligations of his country to the Republic of China which the United States would uphold. The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan.' Furthermore, during this visit, Sato declared that Japan would regard an armed attack on Taiwan or South Korea as a threat to the security of the Far East and it would take prompt and positive action so that Washington could use
its military bases in Japan to meet the threat (Lee 1976: 85). Additionally, Sato criticized Communist China that it was Beijing’s responsibility to revise its rigid posture in international society (Ibid.). In reply, Zhou Enlai, (7) Premier of Communist China, condemned the Sato government that it was promoting the ‘revival of militarism’ in Japan as well as ‘its old dream of a “Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere”’ (Ibid.: 86; Furukawa 1988: 291-2). Henceforth, Beijing’s anti-Sato campaign intensified and escalated to the extent that Furui Yoshimi, a prominent figure of the pro-Beijing group, was even overtly accused of being a Sato apologist and forced to make a ‘self-criticism’ by his Chinese counterpart during their ‘trade’ talks in the spring of 1970 (Ibid.: 294-7; Lee 1976: 90-1). Thus, the Sato-Nixon communique triggered the deterioration of relations between the pro-Beijing group and Communist China. Consequently, it presented the pro-Taipei group with an opportunity to capitalize on Beijing’s criticisms and ‘hang’ the pro-Beijing group in terms of intra-party politics (Furukawa 1988: 299-301).

**The transformation of ‘China’ in the LDP 1970-2.** Nevertheless, the pro-Beijing group continued to revolt against Sato’s China policy from both inside and outside of the LDP. In October 1970, leaders of the pro-Beijing group like Utsunomiya Tokuma and Tagawa Seiichi planned to organize a new supra-partisan dietmen’s league to promote the normalization of diplomatic relations with Beijing (Furukawa 1988: 307). More specifically, they planned to transform the Diet Members’ League for the Promotion of Japan-China Trade (*Nitchu Boeki Sokushin Giin Renmei*)—which had been inactive
since the Nagasaki flag incident of 1958—into the Diet Members’ League for Promoting the Normalization of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations (*Nitchu Kokko Kaifuku Sokushin Giin Renmei*) (Ibid.). In December, the new Diet Members’ League was established with Fujiyama Aichihiro of the ruling LDP as its chairman and four leaders of opposition parties as vice-chairmen (Lee 1976: 94). Its membership consisted of 255 representatives and 124 councillors—including 95 from the LDP—surpassed a simple majority of the National Diet (Ibid.). As Western nations such as Canada and Italy recognized Beijing in the fall of 1970, it deplored the Japanese government’s ‘anachronistic’ relations with Taipei and urgently called for Japan’s diplomatic normalization with Beijing (Ibid.: 94-5). It was certainly ironic that one fifth of the LDP dietmen cooperated with opposition parities against Sato, the president of their own party (Ibid.: 95). In the meantime, within the ruling party, the AAPSG had set up a consultative group on China and had got 55 Diet members to sign the petition requesting the Sato government not to cosponsor the ‘important question’ resolution against Beijing’s entry into the UN (Ibid.: 95). In order to appease the pro-Beijing group, the Sato administration appointed Noda Takeo as the Chair of a 45-member Subcommittee on the China Question (*Chugoku Mondai Shoinkai*) under the Investigation Committee on Foreign Affairs (*Gaiko Chosakai*) (Ibid.; Furukawa 1988: 310-1; Takemi 1981: 35). In hindsight, considering the fact that the Subcommittee was later upgraded to be a full-fledged committee in March 1971 and further reorganized to form the Council for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations (*Nitchu Kokko Seijoka Kyogikai*) in July 1972 under Tanaka Kakui’s presidency (Furukawa 1988: 311, 375;
Lee 1976: 97; Takemi 1981: 36), the formation of the Subcommittee on the China Question can be seen as the first sign of a major shift in the LDP’s China policy (Ibid.: 35).

It was over the Chinese representation issue in the UN that Sato, Japan’s longest-serving Prime Minister, and the pro-Taipei group finally suffered irreparable damage as their policy to keep Taipei alive in the UN failed in October 1971 (Lee 1976: 104; Ogata 1988: 43; Hosoya 1993: 157). It slapped Sato and the pro-Taipei group in their faces by showing that the tide was turning against them in international society. For example, in the previous year, more than half of UN member states had supported Beijing’s entry at the cost of Taipei’s exit in contrast to Tokyo’s pro-Nationalist stance. More conspicuously, President Nixon of the United States had also announced his plan to visit Beijing in July 1971 ‘over the heads of the Japanese’. Meanwhile, within the ruling party of Japan, the Chinese representation issue continued to be debated fervently between the pro-Taipei and pro-Beijing groups. For instance, in September 1971, in an attempt to counterbalance the pro-Beijing group, the pro-Taipei group held two meetings via the Consultative Group on Diplomatic Problems (Gaiko Mondai Kondankai) (Takemi 1981: 38-9). The Group had been organized by 49 LDP dietmen under the leadership of Ishii Mitsuiro six months earlier (Ibid.: 38). In these meetings, which were attended by as many as 70 LDP members of the National Diet, influential members of the mainstream pro-Taipei group—such as Kishi Nobusuke, Kaya Okinori, and Nadao Hirokichi—advocated that Japan should collaborate with Washington and co-sponsor US-drafted resolutions to keep Taipei’s seat in the UN (Ibid.: 38-9). In any
case, it was in the meetings of the Committee on the China Question (Chugoku Mondai Chosakai)—which had just been upgraded from the subcommittee status—the pro-Taipei and pro-Beijing groups clashed hardest (Ibid.: 39; Fukui 1972: 24; Furukawa 1988: 345). Between late August and early September 1971, Noda Takeo, the Chair of the Committee, and anti-mainstream factional leaders such as Miki Takeo and Ohira Masayoshi, strongly opposed the idea of co-sponsoring the so-called ‘reverse important question’ resolution—which required a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly to expel Taipei (while the original ‘important question’ resolution required the same two-thirds majority to admit Beijing) (Ibid.: 344-5; Fukui 1972: 24-5). Furthermore, in a Committee meeting in September 1971, leaders of the pro-Beijing group like Fujiyama Aichiro and Tagawa Seiichi objected to co-sponsoring the ‘reverse important question’ resolution by criticizing it as an attempt to create ‘two Chinas’ (Furukawa 1988: 345-7). On the other hand, in the same meeting, leading members of the pro-Taipei group such as Kaya Okinori and Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo emphasized that Japan should keep its ‘international faith’ (kokusai shingi) with Nationalist China and opposed the idea of expelling Taipei from the UN while they declined to object to Beijing’s entry (Ibid.). As a result of these fierce and inconclusive debates between the two groups over the Chinese representation issue, the matter was left up to Sato, the LDP president who advocated that Japan must faithfully repay its ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ Japan policy after the war (Eto 2003: 191). Therefore, when Sato decided to co-sponsor two UN resolutions based on the ‘reverse important question’ and ‘complex’ dual representation formulas, (8) he virtually held himself
accountable for making the decision against the pro-Beijing group (Takeshita 1991: 65). In the end, Sato and his pro-Taipei supporters lost ground to the anti-mainstream pro-Beijing leaders who subsequently formed a new ruling coalition. By then, the majority of Sato’s own faction had even been taken over by Tanaka Kakuei who succeeded Sato as the president of the ruling party and prime minister of Japan. Tanaka took over from Sato as he promised the anti-mainstream pro-Beijing leaders that he would normalize relations with Beijing if they helped him defeat Fukuda Takeo, Tanaka’s biggest rival and Sato’s favorite, in the presidential election of the LDP in July 1972 (Nakasone 1992: 294-6, 2004: 98-100; Miki 1989: 216-21).

In short, the hegemonic position of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition—which herein took the form of the pro-Taipei group within the ruling party—was seriously undermined by Taipei’s exit from the UN in the fall of 1971 before losing ground further a year later. Interestingly, in the process of this relative decline, the pro-Taipei group—composed of members of the mainstream factions or proponents of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse—shifted their ‘one China’ policy to a ‘two Chinas’ policy as the debates over the Chinese representation issue showed. Conceivably, the adoption of the ‘two Chinas’ policy was preventive to the extent that the pro-Taipei group anticipated the consequence of ‘one (Nationalist) China’ in that Beijing’s own principle of ‘one China’ would theoretically make normalization with Tokyo impossible as long as Tokyo maintained diplomatic relations with Taipei. Furthermore, such a shift concurrently indicated that Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ and Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ could no longer be authoritatively ‘fixed’ by the
‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse coalition in Japanese politics. Arguably, such erosion of the ‘1955 system’—which led to the severing of Japan-ROC diplomatic relations—could have been avoided if there was clear and timely consent between Tokyo, Taipei, and Washington as the following section shows.

5.3 Japan and the fall of ‘China’ under US hegemony: the impact of the UN 1971-2

On the eve of his official announcement to co-sponsor the ‘reverse important question’ and ‘complex’ dual representation resolutions on 22 September 1971, Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku cited the following ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek in making his decision vis-à-vis the Chinese representation question at the UN (Takeshita 1991: 65, author’s translation):

‘At the end of the war, the Soviet Union detained 600,000 Japanese soldiers in Siberia. On the contrary, Chiang Kai-shek made the announcement of “returning virtue for malice” (uramini mukuiruni tokuwo motte suru) and repatriated all the Japanese troops from China. Additionally, unlike the Soviet Union that advocated for the divisive occupation of Japan at the time, Nationalist China, along with the United States and Great Britain, opposed that idea. We must not forget this debt of gratitude to Chiang Kai-shek for preventing us from sadly becoming a divided nation like Germany and Korea. In the next General Assembly meeting of the UN, the “reverse important question resolution” will
probably be defeated, and Nationalist China could well be expelled from
the UN as a result. Nonetheless, Japan will keep its faith with Nationalist
China as long as I'm in power. The next prime minister could proceed
with his China policy based on what the UN will decide."

Therefore, while there were other factors at work (Ikeda 2004: 298-314, Nakanishi
1999: 149, 2006: 151; Ito 2003: 82), the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning
virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy certainly facilitated Tokyo’s co-sponsorship for
the two US-drafted resolutions to save Taipei’s General Assembly seat in the UN.
Although the dual representation resolution ironically never came up for a vote as
Taipei walked out of the UN after the defeat of the ‘reverse important question’
resolution, it was nonetheless the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ that enabled
Sato to legitimize his decision to co-sponsor and vote for the latter.

In the meantime, the legitimacy of the Sato cabinet was put to a test as anti-
mainstream leaders, such as Ohira Masayoshi, Miki Takeo, and Nakasone Yasuhiro,
opposed the idea of co-sponsoring the ‘reverse important question’ and dual
Most conspicuously, Ohira, who went on to negotiate normalization with Beijing as
Japan’s Foreign Minister one year later, linked the UN issue with the normalization of
Japan-PRC relations as he announced his candidacy for the president of the ruling party
on 1 September 1971 as follows (Sato et al. 1990: 281; Furukawa 1988: 344-5):
‘...if Beijing should receive the world’s blessing and become a member of the United Nations, Japan, too, should work for a normalization of relations with Beijing....the majority opinion at the United Nations has rapidly inclined toward recognizing the right of Beijing to represent China....I judge that the time is now ripe for the government to correctly assess this situation and make, as it were, an ultimate decision on the China issue....I should ask the government to refrain from actions, such as supporting the scheme for inverse substantive issue designation in the United Nations...’

Ohira’s warning against the Sato cabinet and co-sponsoring of the ‘reverse important question’ resolution was but an indication of how the ruling party was divided over the Chinese representation issue at the UN, even though the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition still constituted the hegemonic position in Japanese conservative politics. As a result, Prime Minister Sato had to assume the political responsibility for making his decision to support the ‘reverse important question’ resolution (and the dual representation resolution) against his intra-party opposition. In effect, Sato’s decision to repay a ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek presented an opportunity for anti-mainstream faction leaders like Ohira, Miki, and Nakasone as they prepared to form a new hegemonic coalition around the shared goal of normalizing relations with Beijing and the principle of ‘one China’.

As a matter of fact, the legitimacy of the Sato cabinet was decisively undermined by the defeat of the ‘reverse important question’ resolution at the UN in
October 1971 (Lee 1976: 104; Ogata 1988: 42-3; Hosoya 1993: 157). The resolution, that was tactically drafted to prevent the rival Albanian resolution from passing with the simple majority it had already won in the previous year, was defeated by the narrow margin of four votes (55 to 59, with 15 abstentions and 2 absent) in the General Assembly. In the meantime, the Albanian resolution—designed to admit Beijing to the UN at the expense of the expulsion of Taipei—passed by an overwhelming majority (76 to 35, with 17 abstentions and 3 absent) of the General Assembly. Consequently, Beijing replaced Taipei as the representative of ‘China’ in the General Assembly and a permanent member of the Security Council. In the ruling party of Japan, the defeat of the ‘reverse important question’ resolution accelerated the anti-mainstream leaders’ pursuit for a new hegemonic coalition around the issue of normalization with Beijing and the discourse of ‘one China’. Eventually, such rejuvenation of the pro-Beijing group led to the ‘fall’ of the Sato administration and the pro-Taipei group that had formed the hegemonic coalition around the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’.

Nevertheless, given the resilience of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition mentioned earlier, it can be argued that the proponents of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse could have held onto their hegemonic position in Japanese conservative politics even after 1972 if Taipei had managed to remain in the UN in 1971. On the one hand, one could argue that Tanaka Kakuei and the anti-mainstream faction leaders—such as Ohira, Miki Takeo, and Nakasone Yasuhiro—of the LDP would have found one way or another to form a coalition in order to defeat Fukuda Takeo, the leader of the largest faction, in the presidential election of July 1972. On the
other hand, it nonetheless would have been more difficult for Tanaka and the anti-mainstream faction leaders to form a new pro-Beijing coalition against Fukuda, a major proponent of ‘returning virtue for malice’, around the issue of normalization if Taipei had remained in the UN. Besides, even after the new pro-Beijing coalition came into power in July 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira still feared the pro-Taipei elements of their own party, ‘who were in a position to seriously embarrass, if not overthrow, Tanaka and his cabinet’ (Fukui 1977: 97). In fact, the new Prime Minister was still timid about visiting Beijing immediately after forming his cabinet even though he had promised his political allies to do so (Takeiri 1972: 140, 2003: 199). Thus, although it no longer occupied the hegemonic position, the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’ was still formidable within the ruling party of Japan (Nikaido 1992: 67; Baba 1998: 114; Gotoda 1998: 299-300). In sum, if the ROC had managed to remain in the UN in 1971, it would have been more difficult for Japan to normalize relations with the PRC and the severance of Japan-ROC diplomatic relations could very well have been avoided in 1972 as a result.

In this section, the author thus examines how Taipei failed to remain in the UN in 1971 by drawing on the recent finding that Taipei had actually acquiesced in Washington’s ‘complex’ dual representation formula—by which Beijing would enter the UN as one of two representatives of ‘China’ and replace Taipei as a permanent member of the Security Council (Wang 2000; Ishii 2003a: 27; Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a, 2003b; US Department of State 2004). First, the author shows how Chiang Kai-shek initially refused to give his consent to Washington’s ‘complex’ dual
representation formula that was not designed to protect Taipei's Security Council seat while he agreed to acquiesce in another 'simple' version in which the Security Council seat was guaranteed. Second, this section demonstrates how Tokyo also hesitated to grant its consent to Washington's secret diplomacy without grasping where Chiang Kai-shek stood on dual representation. Third, the author sheds light on pragmatic diplomacy through which Washington informally collaborated with 'flexible' Nationalist Chinese diplomats in spite of Chiang Kai-shek's rigid attitude towards the 'complex' dual representation formula. Finally, in addition to Washington's half-hearted commitment, this section suggests that Chiang's consent to the 'complex' dual representation resolution was nonetheless so ambiguous and belated that it not only delayed the process of obtaining co-sponsorship from countries like Japan, but also suspended the lobbying campaign to keep Taipei in the UN. In short, this section shows such lack of clear and timely consent between Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei led to the deformation or decline of US hegemony, which in turn had a negative impact on the hegemonic position of the 'returning virtue for malice' and its coalition in the domain of Japanese politics.

Without Taipei's consent: Washington's 'two Chinas' policy at the UN, part I. From 1945 until 1971, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime on Taiwan occupied the so-called 'China seat' as an original member and one of the five permanent members of the Security Council in the United Nations. Between 1951 and 1960, Taipei represented 'China' under the auspices of the 'Western bloc' led by the United States. During that
period, Washington and its allies managed to rally a majority of member states in support of a ‘moratorium’ against Beijing’s admission to the UN. In the meantime, the political clout of the ‘West’ over the ‘rest’ was nonetheless chipped away as the number of UN member states increased from 60 to 104 in the same decade. It was a result of decolonization and the admission of numerous ‘Third World’ states to the General Assembly. The ‘Western’ nations then realized that the ‘moratorium’ procedure could no longer be sustained. Thus, in 1961, the Kennedy administration adopted the ingenuity of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and proposed that the Chinese representation issue be considered an ‘important question’ which required a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly for any resolution on seating to pass (Kosaka 1981: 161-4, 1994: 68-9; Omura 1971: 21). For the following decade, the US-led ‘important question’ resolution kept Taipei in and Beijing out of the UN. Nevertheless, during this decade, Washington and its allies further lost their relative edge in the parliamentary politics of the UN as the number of General Assembly membership increased by nearly two dozens. Consequently, in 1970, the rival Albanian resolution, which was designed to expel Taipei and admit Beijing, gained momentum and received over half of the vote (51 to 49 with 25 abstentions) in the General Assembly for the first time. Moreover, in the summer of 1971, the international tide further turned against Taipei when US President Richard M. Nixon’s abrupt announcement of his forthcoming visit to Beijing ‘shocked’ the members of the ‘free world’. It was at this critical juncture that Washington and Tokyo along with others co-sponsored the ‘reverse important question’ resolution (10) and the dual representation resolution at the United Nations.
The US position on Chinese representation at the UN in 1971 was ‘intimately connected with the process of rapprochement’ between Washington and Beijing (Ross 1995: 42). In April 1971, President Nixon dispatched his personal representative, Robert D. Murphy, to inform Chiang Kai-shek of a new dual-representation formula—which ‘would not involve ROC’s seat in the Security Council’ (US Department of State 2004: 670)—to keep Taipei in the UN (Ibid.: 666-74; Shen 1982: 52). Nixon appointed a personal envoy to bypass the State Department for the ‘need of secrecy’ (US Department of State 2004: 659 n. 2). However, after ascertaining from Chiang Kai-shek his opinion on the new formula, Nixon ducked the issue until his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger came back from his secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 (Ibid.: 64-5; Chien 2005: 148-50). It was after Nixon learned from Kissinger that the Chinese representation issue would not jeopardize the upcoming presidential visit to Beijing that Washington seriously embarked on campaigning for the ‘simple’ dual representation formula—by which Beijing could come in the General Assembly simply as another representative of ‘China’ but not as a permanent member of the Security Council (Kissinger 1979: 773-4). More precisely, it was Nixon’s announcement on 15 July 1971 of his plan to visit Beijing that ‘freed the Department (of State) to move forward with the dual representation initiative’ (US Department of State 2004: 915-6). Accordingly, Washington’s formal diplomacy to keep Taipei in the UN was interrupted and delayed by its own informal diplomacy with Beijing in 1971.

In Taipei, Chiang Kai-shek insisted that Washington’s dual representation formula ‘must by all means protect the ROC’s seat in the Security Council’ while he still hoped the important question resolution to be the principle instrument to bar
Beijing’s admission to the UN (Chien 2005: 147; US Department of State 2004: 671). On 23 April 1971, Chiang had a ‘face-to-face exchange of views’ with Nixon’s personal representative, Robert Murphy, at Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall ‘without arousing too much attention’ (Ibid.: 667). In this exchange, Chiang agreed with Murphy’s view that the ‘simple’ dual representation formula would in effect prevent Beijing from joining the UN because the PRC would adhere to its own principle of ‘one China’ and refuse to enter the world body as long as the ROC was a member of the UN (Ibid.: 671). At the same time, Chiang expressed his concern to Murphy that Beijing might enter the UN if the Security Council seat should be given to Communist China (Ibid.). Chiang warned Murphy that Beijing’s admission to the UN would render Taipei’s continued presence in the UN untenable because ‘yielding of the ROC’s seat in the Security Council to the Peiping (Beijing) regime would undermine the legal foundation of the ROC’s very existence’ (Ibid.: 670). Chiang further warned Murphy that Taipei would therefore have to vote against a UN resolution based on the ‘simple’ dual representation formula (Ibid.). The best he could do, Chiang told Murphy, was not to request Taipei’s allies to vote against it (Shen 1982: 52). In this way, Chiang reluctantly agreed to acquiesce in the ‘simple’ dual representation formula on the condition that Washington did not support Beijing’s admission to the UN (Ibid.). Over the course of the meeting with Murphy, Chiang nonetheless stressed that the important question resolution should be introduced again in addition to the new formula since the Beijing regime stood condemned as an ‘enemy of the UN’ and ‘any attempt to admit it into the organization must be considered as an important question’ (US Department of State 2004: 669). At
the end of the meeting, Chiang and Murphy designated the future channels of communication on this matter (Ibid.: 674; Chien 2005: 148). Notwithstanding such an arrangement, Taipei was virtually left uninformed by Washington for nearly three months after this meeting (Ibid.: 148-50; Shen 1982: 67; US Department of State 2004: 739).

Therefore, Taipei had already held Washington in suspicion by the time it found out that the ‘three-month delay’ was due to Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing as it was revealed by Nixon’s announcement of 15 July 1971. Such suspicion only multiplied as the ROC Ambassador, James Chien-hung Shen (1982: 65-7) had a meeting with Secretary of State William P. Rogers on 19 July. In this meeting, Rogers not only came short of offering an apology for Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing (Shen 1982: 66), but also boldly proposed the ‘complex’ dual representation formula by which Beijing takes over Taipei as a permanent member of the Security Council while it shares Chinese representation with Taipei in the General Assembly (Ibid.: 67; US Department of State 2004: 735 n. 2; Chien 2005: 150). Furthermore, in order to amplify Secretary Rogers’ proposal to Ambassador Shen in Washington, Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy subsequently met with Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, President’s son, in Taipei (US Department of State 2004: 736). In this meeting on 23 July, while Chiang complained to the American Ambassador that ‘there had been no reply since Amb. Murphy returned to the US’, he also re-emphasized ‘the paramount importance which his government attached to the Security Council issue’ (Ibid.: 739). Much like his father with Murphy three months earlier, the Vice Premier warned his American counterpart that the
People’s Republic of China’s entry into the UN Security Council would ‘negate the legal existence of the Republic of China’ as he referred to ‘the specific provision of the Charter that the “Republic of China” is to occupy the permanent seat of China on the SC’ (Ibid.). However, McConaughy was unable to give Chiang anything definite in response as the US Ambassador was ‘not fully posted’ on Murphy’s secret talks with his father three months earlier (Ibid.: 741). Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek’s son assented that Taipei could reluctantly live with the ‘simple’ dual representation formula (Ibid.). Accordingly, following the ‘three-month delay’, Taipei refused to give its consent to Washington’s secret diplomacy and its ‘complex’ dual representation formula for the Chinese representation issue at the UN, even though Nationalist China once again reluctantly agreed to acquiesce in the ‘simple’ dual representation formula.

In addition to Taipei’s distrust in Washington’s clumsy ‘two Chinas’ policy, the lack of consent across the Pacific was due to Chiang Kai-shek’s authoritarian style of decision-making. According to Fang Chin-yen, who was long responsible for Taipei’s activities regarding the issue of Chinese representation at the UN, Chiang Kai-shek was ‘visibly upset’ when the ‘complex’ dual representation formula was set forth (Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 64, 2003b: 30). Moreover, according to Fang’s recollection, Chiang was ‘very formal and slow’ in dealing with the issue (Ibid.). The problem, in Fang’s view, was Chiang’s authoritarian style of decision-making that made it difficult for Nationalist Chinese diplomats like him to put forward any alternative proposal (Ibid.). In fact, it was ‘extremely difficult’, according to Yang Hsi-k’un who served Chiang as Vice Foreign Minister, because ‘the motives behind such a proposal could
easily be misunderstood' by the President (US Department of State 2004: 585). In the case of the Chinese representation issue, it was especially so since Chiang had taken ‘a direct personal interest’ in it and would ‘not leave it to others’ according to Liu Chieh, Chiang’s Permanent Representative to the UN (US Department of State 2004: 580). Consequently, as Yang Hsi-k’un ‘most confidentially’ disclosed, ‘there was little imagination “at higher levels” of the Nationalist government vis-à-vis the Chinese representation issue (US Department of State 2004: 585). Thus, the process of reaching consent between Taipei and Washington for taking action at the UN was further delayed (Shen 1982: 53).

*Without Tokyo's consent: Washington's 'two Chinas' policy at the UN, part II.* In Tokyo, Japanese leaders also hesitated to give their consent to the Nixon administration’s covert diplomacy regarding the ‘China question’ at the UN. For instance, on 31 July 1971, Prime Minister Sato (1997: 388) complained to US Ambassador Armin Meyer that the Prime Minister could only trust formal diplomatic channels as Sato felt that Nixon was dispatching too many secret emissaries and special envoys. Moreover, on 1 September, Sato was further puzzled by Washington’s wavering UN strategy as Ambassador Meyer informed him that the United States would now submit the ‘simple’ dual representation formula ahead of the ‘reverse important question’ resolution rather than the other way around (Ibid.; US Department of State 2004: 797-8; Kusuda 2001: 637). On the previous day, by referring to DR—which stood for ‘dual representation’—as the ‘direct resolution’, Myer had just confused
Foreign Minister Fukuda who thought it was Washington’s new initiative (Ibid.: 638-9). The incident had left the impression on the Japanese side that Myer, who whispered to one of the Japanese officials to make an appointment to see Prime Minister Sato on the following day, was not fully informed of the Chinese representation issue at the UN (Ibid.). Accordingly, the Japanese leaders were very skeptical about giving their consent to the Nixon administration’s UN policy, which appeared to be uncoordinated and confusing to them in Tokyo, as the White House prematurely carried it out without fully informing its own State Department.

In the meantime, pro-Taipei conservatives in Tokyo feared possible domestic consequences of supporting Taipei in the UN General Assembly as they urged the Nationalist Chinese *not* to walk out of the world body even if a ‘two Chinas’ arrangement was adopted. For example, by July 1971, former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, the doyen of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse coalition in Japan, and his colleagues had reached the consensus that Taipei must be first persuaded not to walk out of the UN before they could politically commit themselves to supporting Nationalist China (Wang 2000: 354). Furthermore, Prime Minister Sato, Kishi’s younger brother, also attempted to persuade Taipei not to walk out of the UN when he met with Chiang Kai-shek’s Japan hand, Chang Chun (Ibid.: 367; Chang 1980: 249). Chang, who had been circulating the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ with the Japanese for more than two decades, was visiting Tokyo from late July until early August for a Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation (CPSJC, *Nikka Kyoryoku Linkai*, or *Zhong-Ri Hezuo Cejin Weiyuanhui*) meeting. Here, Sato attempted to appease
Chang Chun by suggesting that Japan would cooperate with Nationalist China in the UN and do what it could to help Taipei preserve the Security Council seat (Ibid.; Sato 1997: 388). In this way, the Sato cabinet was straining every nerve to avoid the worst scenario or ‘political suicide’ in which Taipei voluntarily walks out of the UN to demonstrate its discontent with a ‘two Chinas’ formula in spite of Tokyo’s effort to help Taipei remain in the UN (Wang 2000: 362).

However, the Sato cabinet could not quite grasp how Taipei would react to the possibility of creating ‘two Chinas’ in the UN because the Chiang Kai-shek regime persistently refused to consider such a possibility that would challenge its status as ‘the legitimate government of China’. For instance, Prime Minister Sato discussed the Chinese representation issue with Chang Chun, who was visiting Tokyo for a CPSJC meeting in the summer of 1971 as mentioned earlier (Sato 1997: 388; Chang 1980: 248-9). Nevertheless, Sato (1997: 388) could only guess that Taipei would oppose the idea of giving its Security Council seat to Beijing, even though it might acquiesce in the admission of the PRC into the General Assembly as long as the ROC’s permanent membership in the Security Council was kept intact. Moreover, on 30 August, Sato attempted to gather further information from Matsuno Raizo, the dietman who had just returned from Taipei where he had discussed the Chinese representation issue with Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Chun (Ibid.: 410). Matsuno, son of Tsuruhei who had helped former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke to formalize postwar Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek in the 1950s, could only speculate that Taipei would most likely accept the ‘simple’ dual representation formula that would not involve its
Security Council seat (Ibid.). Furthermore, in September, Hori Shigeru, the Secretary General of the LDP, wrote a letter to Chiang Kai-shek and dispatched a Japanese dietman to Taipei to find out how Chiang would cope with the ‘reverse important question’ resolution—the passage of which could create ‘two Chinas’ in the UN (Hori 1972: 89-90). Chiang, nonetheless, declined to comment hypothetically on such a situation and kept the Japanese guessing on his stance towards creating ‘two Chinas’ at the UN (Ibid.: 90). As shown above, in spite of their attempts to feel Taipei out, the Japanese leaders had to keep on guessing where Chiang Kai-shek stood on the Chinese representation issue. For that reason, Tokyo still had reservations about actively supporting Taipei at the UN.

In search of consent: ‘flexible’ mandarins and Uncle Sam. Interestingly, while Taipei kept Tokyo guessing, Nationalist Chinese diplomats used Japan as a trump card to persuade the United States and kick-start their lobbying campaign at the UN. For example, on 7 July 1971, Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai told Ambassador Walter McConaughy that Tokyo had apparently decided to support the ‘simple’ dual representation formula and the ‘reverse important question’ resolution ahead of the United States (Wang 2000: 346). At the same time, the Nationalist Chinese Foreign Minister urged the US government to make its decision and join Tokyo’s lobbying campaign at the UN, which Taipei intended to support behind the scenes (Ibid.). Furthermore, on 13 July, Ambassador James Shen told Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green that the Japanese ‘strongly opposed to including reference to the SC
seat in a dual representation (DR) resolution' as Tokyo was said to be 'more optimistic about passage' of the 'simple' dual representation resolution than Washington (US Department of State 2004: 729). Shen also expressed his 'hope that the US would not feel it absolutely necessary to include the SC in order to pass a DR resolution' since the Japanese do not think so' (Ibid.). Additionally, on 26 July, Liu Chieh, Nationalist China's Permanent Representative to the UN, requested Secretary of State Rogers to prepare draft resolutions in consultation with Taipei and suggested that they could consider the 'reverse important question' and 'simple' dual representation resolutions proposed by the Japanese (Ibid.: 752). Moreover, on 30 July, Foreign Minister Chou once again attempted to wield influence on Washington by stating to Ambassador McConaughy that Tokyo had already agreed with Taipei to support the 'reverse important question' resolution and 'simple' dual representation formula (Wang 2000: 362). Accordingly, the Nationalist Chinese urged Washington to adopt the 'simple' dual representation formula—that would not affect Taipei's Security Council seat—and start lobbying for Taipei at the UN. Nevertheless, their strategy to play Tokyo off against Washington unfortunately fell short of influencing the US to adopt the policy of their preference and take action at the UN accordingly.

Meanwhile, the Nationalist Chinese diplomats also used 'domestic pressure' in order to dissuade Washington from adopting the 'complex' dual representation formula as its final policy. For instance, in his meeting with Ambassador McConaughy on 30 July 1971, Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai, confidentially requested Washington not to make any official statement against Taipei's permanent membership on the Security
Council since such a statement would make it domestically impossible for Taipei to even participate in the UN General Assembly in the fall (Wang 2000: 362). The Foreign Minister herein mentioned that he had already been heavily criticized by the Foreign Relations Committee of the Legislative Yuan and pessimistically speculated that his government would not be able to concede its Security Council (SC) seat to Beijing (Ibid.). On the following day, when Chou met with McConaughy again, the Foreign Minister further requested Washington to ‘adopt (the) most passive possible public position on (the) SC issue’ (US Department of State 2004: 764 n. 3; Wang 2000: 366). Foreign Minister Chou also warned the American Ambassador that any implication of Washington’s position against Taipei’s permanent membership on the Security Council would create a major controversy in Taiwan and his government would immediately come under the attack of the Legislative Yuan, the Control Yuan, and the media along with others (Ibid.). Then, as Chou continued, his government would be forced to take radical action regarding the Chinese representation issue at the UN (Ibid.). Furthermore, in late August, when Frederick F. Chien, Director of North American Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met with William H. Gleysteen of the US Embassy in Taipei, Chien requested the American government to begin with the ‘simple’ dual representation formula despite the fact that Washington’s allies were said to insist on giving Taipei’s Security Council seat to Beijing as a condition for their support at the UN (Ibid.: 372). Here, Chien reasoned that it would bring grave domestic consequences to the Nationalist government if Washington and its allies co-sponsored the ‘complex’ dual representation resolution including the Security Council seat (Ibid.). Nonetheless,
like their strategy to play the 'Japan card', the Nationalist Chinese diplomats' tactics to play the 'two-level games' of domestic and international politics still came short of convincing Washington to promote the 'simple' dual representation formula at the UN.

On the contrary, while they played the 'Japan card' and 'two-level games' in their official capacities, these Nationalist Chinese diplomats were 'flexible' enough to collaborate with Washington by separating their informal diplomacy from Chiang Kai-shek's formal foreign policy. On 13 July 1971, Ambassador James Shen informally told Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green not to listen to his official hard-line objection against Washington's 'complex' dual representation formula because it was 'just for the record' (US Department of State 2004: 730; Wang 2000: 348-9). Moreover, on the same day, Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-k'un confidentially informed US Ambassador Walter McConaughy that Yang had been internally trying to persuade those at higher levels, including Chiang Kai-shek, of the importance of 'flexibility and pragmatism' in dealing with the Chinese representation issue at the UN (Ibid.: 351). The Vice Foreign Minister also revealed that he had personally told Chiang Kai-shek that walking out of the UN would mean 'political suicide' for Taipei since such an action would only lead to the isolation of itself in the international community (Ibid.; US Department of State 2004: 586). Vice Foreign Minister Yang then strongly requested Ambassador McConaughy to keep their conversation secret because any revelation of 'extremely sensitive' contents would bring 'unfavorable consequences' to the prospects of informal diplomacy as well as Yang's personal position (Wang 2000: 351-2). Furthermore, on 26 July, Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai privately informed
Ambassador McConaughy that Chiang Kai-shek might take the Foreign Minister’s advice and agree to Washington’s ‘complex’ dual representation formula by gambling on the chance that Beijing might not even take the Security Council seat if Taipei retained membership in the General Assembly (Ibid.: 357; US Department of State 2004: 748 n. 3). More conspicuously, on 10 September, in response to Washington’s official decision to recommend seating Beijing in the Security Council (Ibid.: 805-6), Foreign Minister Chou orally made several statements to show that his informal position was more ‘flexible and pragmatic’ than his formal written response (Ibid.: 808; Wang 2000: 378). The “‘hard line’ written response’ of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) Chou read ‘called the decision “particularly regrettable” and reiterated the traditional position of the GRC: to admit the Chinese Communists to the UN would violate the Charter’ of the United Nations (Ibid.; US Department of State 2004: 808). Chou’s formal reply also indicated that ‘(t)he moment such a resolution was tabled, his government would have to issue a public statement to it in the strongest terms’ (Ibid.; Wang 2000: 378). In the meantime, the Nationalist Chinese Foreign Minister informally indicated that he did want Washington’s ‘complex’ dual representation resolution to succeed (Ibid.; US Department of State 2004: 808). Chou also implied that ‘if the margin of support for the resolution should appear dangerously narrow, Taipei might adopt a more positive role in working for it off stage’ (Ibid.; Wang 2000: 378). Accordingly, while Taipei formally made a strong objection to Washington’s ‘complex’ dual representation formula, these ‘flexible’ diplomats informally consented to the US and gambled on the possibility that Beijing just might
not come in the UN even as a permanent member of the Security Council as long as Taipei remained in the General Assembly. Nevertheless, there were still limits to what these Nationalist Chinese officials could accomplish informally insofar as their authoritarian leader was against their project formally (Ibid.: 353; Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 64, 2003b: 30).

In fact, the Americans had to accommodate the Nationalist Chinese collaborators with their informal project as Washington was ‘careful not to overreact’ whenever Taipei formally objected to the ‘complex’ dual representation formula (US Department of State 2004: 808; Wang 2000: 378). For example, in September 1971, Washington began to view its own public announcements on the Chinese representation issue at the UN ‘in terms of the difficulties they might create for Taipei’ (Ibid.: 378-9; US Department of State 2004: 808). Washington even prepared to give the Nationalist Chinese ‘adequate advance notification’ of its public announcements and ‘coordinate the exact wording’ of such announcements with the Government of the Republic China (Ibid.). For Washington, the most important thing then was ‘to make it as easy as possible for the GRC’ to collaborate with the United States ‘behind the scenes’ for the passage of the ‘complex’ dual representation resolution at the UN (Ibid.; Wang 2000: 378). As a matter of fact, Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai agreed to ‘personally work actively in New York’ by making himself available to UN ambassadors in order to obtain co-sponsorships and voting support (US Department of State 2004: 809-10; Wang 2000: 381). However, the Nationalist Chinese Foreign Minister also expressed ‘great concern’ for the possibility of explicitly instructing ROC Ambassadors to support
the ‘complex’ dual representation resolution ‘for reasons of internal politics’ (Ibid.: 380-1; US Department of State 2004: 809). As a result, in spite of Washington’s effort to work with the ‘flexible’ diplomats, the informal nature of their collaboration still prevented them from sending clear signals to friendly countries at the UN (Wang 2000: 380-1).

_Ambiguous consent at the last minute: the defeat of ambivalent hegemony._ It was at this juncture that Washington publicly shifted its position from promoting the ‘simple’ dual representation formula to revising it into the ‘complex’ version recommending that Taipei’s Security Council seat go to Beijing (US Department of State 2004: 916; Kissinger 1979: 774). On 16 September 1971, President Nixon held a press conference and addressed his administration’s position to sponsor the ‘complex’ dual representation and ‘reverse important question’ resolutions at the UN as the following: ‘To put...our policy in clear perspective, we favor the admission of the People’s Republic to the United Nations and that will mean, of course, obtaining a Security Council seat. We will vote against the expulsion of the Republic of China, and we will work as effectively as we can to accomplish that goal’ (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1971: 950). During this press conference, Nixon received a question regarding a statement made by Dr. Walter Judd on the previous day (Ibid.). Judd, Chairman of the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations, had argued that ‘the expulsion of the Nationalist Government would not be legal under the Charter without a vote of the Security
Council making such a recommendation to the General Assembly’ (Ibid.). In reply, Nixon desperately stated that there were ‘different legal opinions’ with regard to the expulsion procedure (Ibid.). Nixon’s evasive response manifested his administration’s apprehension about having to veto the expulsion of Taipei in the Security Council (US Department of State 2004: 755-6). Washington feared that exercising a veto in such a manner could dangerously kindle the debate on the Charter revision—the escalation of which could lead to the abrogation of veto power or the enlargement of the Security Council by the addition of new permanent members such as Japan, India, and West Germany with or without the right of veto (US Department of State 2004: 679-80). Accordingly, by publicly conceding to recommend the ‘complex’ dual representation formula, Washington not only unveiled its ambivalent commitment to the Chinese representation issue at the UN but also exposed the limits to which it would venture to prevent the expulsion of Taipei from the UN.

In spite of Washington’s ambivalent and half-hearted commitment, Taipei gave its consent to the ‘complex’ dual representation formula—finally yet only tacitly. In fact, according to the following testimony by Fang Chin-yan, Taipei’s consent was so overdue and ambiguous that it subsequently caused confusion in the chain of command, thereby distracting its directives from adequately reaching its diplomatic posts around the world (Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 64, 2003b: 30):

‘At the time, we sent out two directives to our overseas diplomatic posts.
First we sent one saying that we would aim to “shoot down” the Albanian
draft, just as in previous years. Then, after the United States came out with its ("complex") dual-representation proposal, we hurriedly sent out a second directive saying that the ROC itself opposed this proposal but that our friends were free to decide on their own positions. But in the meantime our diplomatic posts around the world had already gone ahead with operations in line with the first directive. This confusion contributed to the passage of the Albanian resolution.

Here, the second directive was 'extremely significant' (Ibid.). It indicated that 'Chiang Kai-shek effectively abandoned his own version of the one-China policy by tacitly accepting the idea of ("complex") dual representation' at this final juncture (Ibid.; Ishii 2003a: 27). More precisely, although Chiang Kai-shek had already 'abandoned' his 'one China' policy by agreeing to acquiesce in the 'simple' dual representation formula in April 1971, Chiang's tacit acceptance of the 'complex' dual representation resolution was remarkable to the extent that he decided to take more risk to remain in the UN. For Chiang, consenting to the 'complex' dual representation formula was highly risky because Beijing was more likely to come in the UN if the Security Council seat was given while Washington was unlikely to veto the expulsion of Taipei in the Security Council. Nevertheless, Taipei's chance of remaining in the international community unfortunately did not improve dramatically if it did at all since Chiang's consent not only came at the last minute but remained ambiguous (Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 64, 2003b: 30).
As for Japan, Prime Minister Sato finally announced his decision to co-sponsor the ‘complex’ dual representation and ‘reverse important question’ resolutions with Washington on 22 September as mentioned above. Earlier in the same month, former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Sato’s older brother and the peak Taiwan lobby, had strongly pushed his younger brother to co-sponsor both resolutions while Japan’s ruling party remained deeply divided over the Chinese representation issue at the UN (Ikeda 2004: 310). At the same time, Kishi had lobbied the American Embassy in order to prevent the United States from making further concession to Communist China (Ibid.: 309-11). He feared that such concession would politically damage the pro-Taipei group in Japan as well as the prospects of his protégé, Fukuda Takeo, as a candidate to succeed Prime Minister Sato (Ibid.). Furthermore, in his meeting with Nixon just before the UN voting, Kishi emphasized the political risk Sato was taking and requested the American President, for whom he had provided political and financial resources as early as 1960 (Ito 2003: 103 n.18), to exert the ‘maximum influence’ on wavering UN member states (Ibid.: 83). Kishi also shared with Nixon his view on Chiang’s attitude towards the Chinese representation issue at the UN (Ibid.). Accordingly, leaders of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse coalition such as Kishi helped to obtain mutual consent between Tokyo, Taipei, and Washington. However, the ambivalent and ambiguous traces of such consent at the last minute were just not enough to convince UN delegates to support Taipei’s seat in the world body—especially in the face of the following challenges from both inside and outside.

In contrast to ambivalent and ambiguous attitudes in Washington, Taipei, and Tokyo, Communist China publicly reiterated its principle of ‘one China’ by announcing
that Beijing would not join the UN unless Taipei was first expelled from the world body (Kissinger 1979: 774; Wang 2000: 371; Roy 2003: 134; Ito 2003: 83). On the one hand, Nationalist Chinese officials were subsequently encouraged to believe that Beijing would not enter the UN even if the dual-representation proposal was approved by the General Assembly (Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 64, 2003b: 30). On the other hand, the appeal that Washington’s ‘complex’ dual representation formula had for UN member states was effectively offset by Beijing’s ‘one China’ discourse (US Department of State 2004: 916). In any case, lobbying efforts by the supporters of the Albanian resolution to expel Taipei and admit Beijing consequently gained momentum as Washington’s conciliatory posture towards Beijing and the ‘one China’ discourse made Taipei more dispensable at the UN.

Furthermore, in October 1971, the White House announced National Security Advisor Kissinger’s second visit to Beijing without notifying its own UN mission that was strenuously making lobbying efforts in the General Assembly (Tucker 2001: 263-4). This announcement as well as the actual visit took place in the midst of last minute lobbying at the UN, even though Kissinger had been correctly informed by the State Department regarding the period in which the General Assembly vote on Chinese representation would take place (Ross 1995: 43). In the meantime, Secretary of State Rogers strongly objected that Kissinger’s October visit to Beijing would interfere with American diplomacy to keep Taipei in the UN (Ibid.; US Department of State 2004: 844-5). Whether it was deliberate or not, the timing of Kissinger’s second visit to
Beijing seriously undercut lobbying efforts to preserve Taipei’s seat in the UN (Ibid.; Tucker 2001: 264).

In the end, on 25 October 1971, the ‘reverse important question’ resolution, a ‘two Chinas’ formula which preventively required a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly to expel Taipei, was defeated by only four votes before the Albanian resolution based on Beijing’s ‘one China’ principle gained more than a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. As a result, the ‘complex’ dual representation resolution, for which Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei spent most of their time to prepare, ironically did not even come up for a vote as the passage of the Albanian resolution made it unnecessary. In this way, the Chinese Communists finally entered the UN as Beijing’s discourse of ‘one China’ defeated Washington’s discourse of ‘two Chinas’ in international society. In the meantime, the Chinese Nationalists, sensing that their expulsion was imminent, walked out of the UN General Assembly before the Albanian resolution came to a vote. Although Beijing’s entry might not have represented the loss of US power in a ‘structural’ sense for it was not unwelcome by the United States (Foot 1995: 23-4), Washington’s failure to prevent Taipei’s exit for the first time since the end of the war certainly meant the decline of American hegemony in a consensual sense. In other words, the Chinese representation issue at the UN in 1971 manifested how the constitution of US hegemony began to wane at the end of the ‘first’ Cold War (Hook et al. 2001: 30, 2005: 32). Needless to say, such de-legitimation of ‘China’ under US hegemony, due to the lack of clear and timely consent between
Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei, subsequently had a major impact on Japan’s recognition of ‘China’.

5.4 ‘Returning virtue for malice’ and the ‘end’ of the ‘San Francisco system’:

Making Tokyo’s de-recognition of Taipei impossible 1972

After the crushing defeat of the United States and Japan over the Chinese representation issue at the UN, the ‘San Francisco system’—which had kept Communist China isolated and contained for two decades—came to an ‘end’ as the ‘Shanghai communique was jointly issued by President Richard M. Nixon of the United States and Premier Zhou Enlai of the People’s Republic of China on 28 February 1972 (Iriye 1992: 355-6). It was an ‘end’ in the sense that the communique marked ‘a complete shift away from the self imposed policy of mutual exclusion that the two governments had pursued since the Korean War’ (Ibid: 356). By the same token, the communique brought an ‘end’ to the extent that this shift in Washington’s Cold War strategy known as ‘détente’ significantly reversed NSC 13/2 of October 1948—which George F. Kennan had definitively set in motion for the US to fight against the communists from its Japanese bastion since the ‘loss’ of China had become imminent. Consequently, although the US-Japan Security Treaty was kept intact, the significance of Japan as the linchpin of US hegemony in East Asia was transformed as Washington played the ‘China card’ in order to end the Vietnam War in an honorable fashion (Iriye 1992: 351; Ross 1995: 40; Burr 1999: 30).
In the process, very much like the communist camp that circulated the ‘revival of Japanese militarism’ discourse as they embarked on the Korean War in the 1950s, it was now the United States that used the same discourse to achieve rapprochement with Communist China ‘over the heads of the Japanese’ two decades later. In Beijing, President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Kissinger articulated the US-Japan Security Treaty in terms of the need to deter Japanese military expansion and nuclear weapons development (Ito 2003: Chs. 3 and 5; Schaller 2001a: 55-6, 2001b: 383-9; Curtis 2002: 138-43; Goh 2005: 176-9). The Communist Chinese leaders were persuaded by the discourse, and Beijing’s view on the US-Japan Security Treaty and the security of East Asia as a whole was deeply influenced as a result (Tucker 2001: 253). Accordingly, Washington and Beijing found a common ground for maintaining the US-Japan Security Treaty (Ito 2003: 50), thereby keeping a ‘lid’ on Japanese militarism (Curtis 2002: 141; Soeya 1997: 11, 2003: 333-4, 339-43, 2005: 107-12; Ito 1998: 121-2).

Interestingly, it was also through the ‘revival of Japanese militarism’ discourse that Washington obtained its space for maintaining its relations with Taipei (Ito 2003: 93). While Kissinger linked the withdrawal of all American forces from Taiwan to the peaceful resolution of the conflict across the Taiwan Strait, Zhou Enlai demanded that Washington acknowledge the ‘one China’ principle and reassure that Japan does not replace the United States after its withdrawal from Taiwan (Ibid.; Ogata 1988: 33-4). In the final form of the Shanghai communique, in which the two sides uniquely expressed their differences (Tucker 2001: 255-7), the Chinese side stated ‘the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere’ while the
US side declared that ‘(i)t affirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves’ (Ross: 1995: 268-9). The latter premise created a basis for Washington’s possible military intervention in the Taiwan Strait if Beijing uses force to ‘liberate’ Taiwan (Roy 2003: 131-2). In other words, Washington is not obliged to respect the Communist Chinese claim that Taiwan is an internal matter if Beijing does not respect the American premise that the ‘Taiwan question’ must be resolved peacefully (Ibid.). It has been argued that it is the delicate balance between the former ‘Chinese civil war principle’ (Chugoku naisen gensoku) and the latter ‘peaceful settlement principle’ (heiwa kaiketsu gensoku)—or the ‘1972 system’—that has stabilized the tension in the Taiwan Strait since February 1972 (Wakabayashi 1997, 2000, 2002). Put differently, Washington’s discourse of nuclear Japan’s military expansion to Taiwan and Beijing’s discourse of ‘one China’ have constituted that balance or the ‘1972 system’.

In this section, given such transformation of the situation in East Asia, the author examines the severing of diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Taipei in September 1972 by focusing on the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. The author emphasizes the resilience of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse in spite of its loss of the hegemonic position in Japanese politics. Notwithstanding such decline of the discourse coalition that had helped to sustain Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Taipei, the author stresses how the discourse still played an indispensable role in making Tokyo’s de-recognition of Taipei impossible. By drawing on the recent finding that Tokyo never once alluded to the

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‘severing of relations’ (*danko*) with Taipei in 1972 (Ishii 2003a: 27; Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a, 2003b), this section highlights how the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ still delimited what could or could not be said about Japan-ROC relations. Moreover, the author’s analysis in this section shows that the discourse even subverted Japan-PRC relations as it was combined with the possibility of creating ‘two Chinas’. In the process, the author focuses on the last Japanese official visit to Taipei before the normalization of Japan-PRC relations in September 1972. Given the resilience of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse, this section suggests that there was a ‘lost opportunity’ for Taipei to further deter the normalization of relations between Tokyo and Beijing—against which Taipei severed diplomatic relations with Tokyo in September 1972.

*The resilience of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and a ‘lost opportunity’: the Shiina mission to Taipei 1972.* A Japanese delegation led by Shiina Etsusaburo was dispatched to Taipei on the eve of normalization just as the Kosaka mission was sent to Beijing as mentioned earlier. On 19 September 1972, only ten days before normalization, Special Envoy Shiina paid a visit to Premier Chiang Ching-kuo and informed him of the LDP platform that Tokyo’s negotiations with Beijing would be conducted in such a way that it could maintain ‘hitherto existing relations’ (*jurai no kankei*) with Taipei ‘including diplomatic relations’ (Sato *et al.* 1992: 299; Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 66-7, 2003b: 31-2; Ishii *et al.* 2003: 136). Shiina, a major proponent of Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek (Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku Kankokai 1982: 137-40,
144), also carried a letter from Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, which made absolutely no mention of ‘severing relations’ (danko) because it had been completely deleted at the final stage of drafting (Ogura 2003: 231-2). Even after the normalization of relations with Beijing, the Japanese government merely announced that the bilateral treaty of peace between Tokyo and Taipei came to an ‘end’ without alluding to the ‘severing of relations’ as mentioned earlier (Ishii 2003b: 372-5; Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 69, 2003b: 33).

This ‘unexpected aspect of the break’ has been attributed to the following two reasons (Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 68, 2003b: 32). First, Tokyo wanted the break to be initiated by Taipei. It has been argued that ‘(c)ircumstances on Japan’s side kept it from abrogating the 1952 Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan’ (Ibid). In other words, for the purpose of ‘normalizing’ relations with Beijing advantageously, Tokyo tactically maintained that the Treaty of Peace with Taipei had already ended the state of war and settled the issue of reparations between Japan and ‘China’ in 1952 (Ibid.). According to this logic, Tokyo could not de-recognize Taipei for it strove to achieve ‘normalization’ with Beijing while it concurrently maintained the validity of peace with Taipei (Ibid.). By doing so, Japan attempted to preclude the issue of reparations which it claimed Chiang Kai-shek had already foregone 20 years earlier (Zhu 2003: 413-6). Second, it has been suggested that Tokyo refrained from abrogating the Treaty of Peace with Taipei because it feared that Taipei might declare a return to the state of war and retaliate against Japan (Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 69, 2003b: 33). As a matter of fact, according to the recent publication of the minutes of
the peace negotiations between Prime Minister Tanaka and Premier Zhou Enlai in
Beijing, Japan expressed its concern and Tokyo’s fear was taken into consideration for
using the expression (ending) the ‘abnormal state of affairs’—rather than (ending) the
‘state of war’—between Japan and ‘China’ prior to 1972 (Ishii et al. 2003: 72).
However, it can also be argued that these are discursive effects of ‘returning virtue for
malice’ as it played an indispensable role for the settlement of war reparations as well
as the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan in
1952 as demonstrated in Chapter 3 of this study.

As a matter of fact, in spite of its decline, the discourse of ‘returning virtue for
malice’ not only helped to prevent the Japanese from referring to the ‘severing of
relations’ with Taipei, but also helped creating an opportunity for pro-Taipei actors to
subvert the normalization of relations with Beijing in 1972. For instance, when Shiina
met with Premier Chiang Ching-kuo—who had begun to take over power from his
ailing father—on 19 September, the Special Envoy never once alluded to the ‘severing
of relations’ between Tokyo and Taipei while the meeting was conducted in the
discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ (Ibid.: 138-9; Takahashi and Wakayama
2003b: 32). According to former Ambassador Nakae Yosuke’s notes—the only set of
minutes available on the Japanese side, which has recently been made public (Ishii et.
al. 2003: 133-43), Chiang Ching-kuo made the following remark just six days before
the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to Beijing (Ibid.: 138-9, author’s translation):

‘...the relationship between China and Japan is special. President Chiang
Kai-shek is very interested in issues related to Japan. He has been so
interested in Sino-Japanese relations that he has once drawn attention to the question of whether Japan should see China as a friend or an enemy. It was before the Japanese militarists instigated your nation to go to war against China. He supported the Japanese imperial institution and opposed the divisive occupation of Japan by four Allied powers. Subsequently, he approved the signing of the “Peace Treaty between the Republic of China and Japan”. These facts are unfailing results of the historical vision with which he approached issues related to Japan. The underlying assumption of his vision is that we cannot mutually secure prosperity in Japan and peace in Asia as a whole unless the Japanese government takes pro-“Republic of China” and anti-“communist” positions. Recently, Chiang Kai-shek has re-emphasized that the issues related to Japan must be viewed not only from Japan but also from Asia as a whole.

Accordingly, Chiang Ching-kuo expected the pro-Taiwan group of the LDP to reproduce Japan’s recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’ through the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ in spite of the fact that the discourse coalition had already lost the hegemonic position in Japanese politics. On the other hand, Shiina was much more careful as he made the following reply to Chiang Kai-shek’s son (Ibid.; Takahashi and Wakayama 2003b: 32):
‘I have listened keenly to what you have said about overcoming various difficulties. I feel even more strongly that we are at a critical juncture. Looking at all the situations in Asia and around the world, I believe it will be difficult to eliminate every contradiction in connection with the Japan-ROC issue, but we will exert our utmost efforts to avoid missteps’

Considering the fact that Shiina highlighted the LDP policy of maintaining ‘hitherto existing relations’ with Taipei ‘including diplomatic relations’ in the same meeting, Shiina’s notions of ‘contradiction’ and ‘missteps’ can be interpreted as the implications of his delicate strategy to reproduce Japan’s recognition of ‘one (Nationalist) China’ by paradoxically promoting a ‘two Chinas’ policy. In other words, Shiina not only avoided the ‘immoral’ act of mentioning the ‘severing of relations’ with Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘China’, but also attempted to subvert the normalization of Japan-PRC relations based on the ‘one China’ principle.

In fact, the Shiina mission did have a subversive effect on the normalization of Japan-PRC relations. Immediately after the Shiina-Chiang meeting in Taipei, Zhou Enlai held an emergency meeting with Kosaka Zentaro in Beijing, in which Zhou strongly complained about Tokyo’s ambivalent Chinas policy as mentioned earlier. Moreover, when Prime Minister Tanaka visited Beijing later in the same month, he personally expressed his concern to Premier Zhou that he could be accused of violating the platform of his own party if he agreed to normalize relations based on the principle of ‘one China’ (Ishii et al. 2003: 72). As a matter of fact, after Tanaka arrived at
Tokyo, the Prime Minister had to report to the LDP headquarters directly from the airport to explain his ‘violation’ of the party platform. The pro-Taipei dietmen of the LDP, like Special Envoy Shiina whom Taipei fully trusted (Sankei Shinbun Sengoshi Kaifu Shuzaihan 1999: 293-5), were disturbed by the fact that Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira normalized Japan-PRC relations at the cost of Japan-ROC diplomatic relations (Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku Kankokai 1982: 193). In any case, the Shiina-Chiang meeting conducted in the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ had a considerable impact on the normalization of relations between Tokyo and Beijing.

Having said that, the Shiina-Chiang meeting also presented an opportunity for Taipei to help prevent ‘one (Communist) China’ from emerging in 1972. As former Ambassador Nakae who sat in the meeting recalls: ‘Breaking off ties (with the ROC) was not Japan’s original intention. The root cause of this outcome was the unyielding “one China” policy’ (Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 61, 2003b: 28; Koeda 2000: 230). Thus, if Chiang Ching-kuo who later identified with Taiwan in the 1980s addressed the ‘idea of stressing Taiwan’ (Takahashi and Wakayama 2003a: 65, 2003b: 31)—or paradoxically abandoning the discourse of ‘one China’ in order to realize it—in 1972, then it would have been more difficult for Tokyo to accept Beijing’s principle of ‘one China’. For instance, if Chiang Ching-kuo made an announcement then to clearly delimit the scope of the Japan-ROC peace treaty to Taiwan in terms of ‘all territories which are now under the control of the Government of the Republic of China’ as the Japanese side attempted in 1952, the Tanaka cabinet would have been
seriously held back by the possibility of having to compensate Beijing for the cost of repairing the damage done on the Chinese mainland during the war. Moreover, if Taipei delimited the scope of the Japan-ROC peace treaty of 1952 to Taiwan, it would have been more difficult for Tokyo to recognize that the treaty would come to an ‘end’ as a result of the normalization of relations between Japan and mainland China in 1972. In addition, the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse still helped to make Tokyo’s de-recognition of Taipei morally impossible in spite of its decline. Of course, if Taipei tactically abandoned the principle of ‘one China’, then there would have been no reason for it to sever diplomatic relations with Tokyo. In this way, Taipei’s adoption of ‘two Chinas’ tactics during Shiina’s visit in 1972 could have helped to avoid the severing of relations with Tokyo while Beijing’s own ‘one China’ principle would have made it more difficult for itself to normalize relations with Tokyo in 1972.

By doing so, Taipei could have helped Shiina and his colleagues further deter Japan’s normalization of relations with the PRC based on Beijing’s ‘one China’ principle, that was secretly planned by a very small group of Japanese elites—namely, Prime Minister Tanaka, Foreign Minister Ohira, and Hashimoto Hiroshi of the Foreign Ministry—against the wishes of many at the Foreign Ministry as well as the LDP (Hashimoto 2003). Nevertheless, in reality, Taipei’s adherence to its own version of the ‘one China’ principle unfortunately necessitated itself to clearly de-recognize Tokyo in the end. Given that the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ resiliently helped to make Tokyo’s de-recognition of Taipei impossible and Beijing’s discourse of ‘one China’ helped to make the creation of ‘two Chinas’ impossible, there was a ‘lost
opportunity’ for Taipei to unilaterally abandon its own ‘one China’ discourse and yet trilaterally re-emerge as the legitimate government of ‘China’ that Japan could not de-recognize in 1972.

5.5 Conclusion
This chapter attributed the severing of Japan-ROC relations in 1972 to the decline of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and its coalition within the ruling party of Japan, that had constituted the core of the ‘1955 system’. It traced how the LDP was increasingly divided—between the mainstream pro-Taipei group and the anti-mainstream pro-Beijing group—over Japan’s China policy between 1964 and 1972. Importantly, such bifurcation manifested the gradual erosion of the ‘1955 system’ through which the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and the coalition of Japanese conservatives—with the imperial past—maintained their hegemonic position and reproduced Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony. The pro-Taipei group—a major derivative of the discourse coalition of ‘returning virtue for malice’—eventually lost ground to the pro-Beijing group as a result of its unsuccessful support for Taipei to remain in the UN in 1971. Consequently, the pro-Taipei coalition within the ruling party of Japan could no longer authoritatively define ‘China’ in terms of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy.

Having said that, this chapter argued that it would have been more difficult for the severing of Japan-ROC relations to take place in 1972 if Taipei had managed to
remain in the UN in the fall 1971. Drawing on recent findings and materials, this chapter examined the Chinese representation issue at the UN in 1971 by highlighting the constitution of US hegemony in terms of consent between Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei. It showed that the constitution of US hegemony waned as Taipei and Tokyo failed to give clear and timely consent to Washington’s ‘complex’ dual representation formula for the ‘China question’ at the UN. In this way, this chapter attributed the loss of Taipei’s seat in the UN to the lack of consent that had constituted US hegemony while it stressed the tremendous impact it had on the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse coalition in the domain of Japanese domestic politics.

Finally, while such lack of consent also indicated the decline of the ‘San Francisco system’, the present chapter nonetheless emphasized the resilience of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as the discourse still delimited what could and could not be said about Japan-ROC relations. In fact, in 1972, the Japanese government never once alluded to the ‘severing of relations’ with Taipei. This chapter stressed that the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse helped to make it impossible for Tokyo to make any mention of ‘severing relations’. Furthermore, by focusing on the last Japanese official trip to Taipei in September 1972, it argued that there was a ‘lost opportunity’ for Taipei to make the normalization of Japan-RRC relations more difficult by adopting a ‘two Chinas’ strategy, thereby dialectically helping to reproduce Japan-ROC relations against Beijing’s ‘one China’ policy. Nevertheless, Taipei’s preoccupation with its own ‘one China’ discourse made such an outcome impossible. In short, while this chapter demonstrated that there were limits to the discursive power of ‘returning virtue for
malice’ without the hegemonic position of its coalition in the domestic politics of Japan, the discourse and its coalition were still resilient enough to help reproduce Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei if it was supported by Taipei’s preventive ‘two Chinas’ policy.

Notes

1) In the closing segment of the final meeting of the Council for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations on 8 September 1972, Nakagawa Ichiro and Ishihara Shintaro, proponents of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse, demanded the Council make the following amendments to the draft of the platform (Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku Kankokai 1982: 153-4): 1) Changing ‘negotiations could preferably be conducted’ (kosho saretai) to ‘negotiations should be conducted’ (kosho subeki dearu); 2) Changing ‘hitherto existing relations’ (jurai no kankei) to ‘hitherto existing relations of all kinds including diplomatic relations’ (gaiko wo fukumeta jurai no subete no kankei). However, the Council under the chairmanship of Kosaka, whose position had earlier been threatened by the pro-Taipei members’ no-confidence motion (Takemi 1981: 61), hastily passed the former without making any reference to the latter as Kosaka was extremely anxious to bring the Council to a close (Shiina Etsusaburo Tsuitoroku Kankokai 1982: 153-4).

2) In contrast to the logic of the ‘one China’ principle, Beijing officially began its negotiations with Tokyo on 25 September 1972 even though Tokyo maintained its diplomatic relations with Taipei until 29 September 1972. Furthermore, in
the summit meeting of 28 September 1972, Beijing agreed with Tokyo’s plan to continue its economic relations with Taipei even after normalization (Ishii et al. 2003: 69-74). Here, Premier Zhou even actively recommended the Japanese to take the initiative of opening trade offices in Taiwan first (Ibid.; Ishii 2003b: 373). Accordingly, Communist Chinese leaders had to loosen their ‘one China’ principle or temporarily accept the ‘two Chinas’ policy of the LDP over the course of normalization in the fall of 1972. Consequently, as Foreign Minister Ohira’s statement in the 29 September press conference shows, Japan-ROC diplomatic relations came to an ‘end’ only after the normalization of Japan-PRC diplomatic relations.

3) The Asian Problems Study Group subsequently contributed to the establishment of the ‘Asian Parliamentary Union’ (APU) in February 1965 and the organization of the first APU conference in Tokyo ten months later (Fukui 1969: 316, 1970: 253). Interestingly, the second APU conference, which took place in South Korea in September 1966, coincided with the rival Asia-African Problems Study Group’s visit to Communist China and North Korea (Ibid.). A delegation of the Asian Problems Study Group—led by former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke—attended the APU conference in South Korea (Ibid.). The APU closely collaborated with the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League, which was founded by Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee in 1954 (Ibid.).

4) This number for the AAPSG is somewhat deceiving because many participants did not completely share the Group’s view on Japan’s China policy while the
mainstream APSG had the capacity to assemble 140 to 150 participants at any time (Uchida 1965: 274-5).

5) Fujiyama had earlier patronized the Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation, a pro-Taiwan forum, as head of the Chamber of Commerce. He used to have a very close relationship with former Prime Minister Kishi, the *doyen* of the Taiwan lobby, whom he not only financially supported but also politically served as Foreign Minister (Furukawa 1988: 254). Fujiyama later began to keep his distance from Kishi who failed to keep his promise that he would help Fujiyama become the prime minister once he stepped down (Ibid).

6) In Washington, Sato had signed the joint communique of 15 November 1967, in which the Prime Minister and President Lyndon B. Johnson referred to the ‘China threat’ that they felt required closer US-Japan cooperation. They emphasized the fact that Communist China was developing its nuclear arsenal and agreed to create favorable conditions in Asia so that the ‘China threat’ could be managed (Soeya 1995: 114, 1998: 54; Lin 1984: 218).

7) In retaliation to the Sato-Nixon communiqué (Furukawa 1988: 302), Zhou also enunciated that Beijing would not trade with those Japanese firms that met the following ‘four conditions’ in April 1970 (Soeya 1998: 113): ‘1) Trading firms and manufacturers supporting aggression by Taiwan and South Korea; 2) Trading firms and manufacturers with large investments in Taiwan and Korea; 3) Enterprises supplying arms and ammunition to US imperialism for
aggression against Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; and 4) US-Japan joint enterprises and subsidiaries of US firms in Japan.’ As a result, especially after Nixon’s announcement of his intention to visit China in July 1971, business circles began to distance themselves from the pro-Taipei conservative coalition including the Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation (Ikei 1980: 22-6; Takemi 1984: 87-8, 1994: 4).

8) The dual representation formula was designed for admitting Beijing as another representative of ‘China’ in the UN General Assembly along with Taipei. While the ‘simple’ version of the formula did not touch upon Taipei’s permanent membership in the Security Council, the ‘complex’ version Tokyo decided to co-sponsor recommended that Taipei’s Security Council seat go to Beijing.

9) Fukuda, the then foreign minister, had supported Prime Minister Sato’s attempt to save Taipei’s General Assembly seat in the UN as a way of repaying a ‘debt of gratitude’ to Chiang Kai-shek (Fukuda 1995: 176-7). Nevertheless, he later adopted ‘duck diplomacy’ (ahiru gaiko)—the making of behind-the-scene overtures despite its calm appearance ‘just as a duck may outwardly look serene while it busily uses its feet under water’ (Lee 1976: 106)—towards Beijing after Taipei was ‘expelled’ from the UN in October 1971 (Fukuda 1995: 177-8). The best-known example is the so-called ‘Hori letter’ that was drafted by the Sinologist, Nakajima Mineo (2002: 83-99), and Prime Minister Sato’s secretary, Kusuda Minoru (2001: 657-8), and signed by LDP Secretary General Hori Shigeru. This letter Tokyo Governor Minobe Ryokichi conveyed expressed

10) Just as the earlier 'important question' resolution was conceived by a group of Japanese diplomats, the 'reverse important question'—declaring the expulsion of Taipei, rather than the admission of Beijing, was an important question which was subject to a two-thirds majority vote in the UN General Assembly—was also suggested by the Japanese government apparently (US Department of State 2004: 634, 688).
6

Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

This final chapter first summarizes the main argument along with theoretical and methodological themes of this study in general terms. It intellectually locates the main argument of this critical constructivist work—that is, Japan’s recognition of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan as ‘China’ under US hegemony was culturally shaped by the moral discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ (*yide baoyuan*) postwar Japan policy—within the field of international relations (IR). At the same time, it highlights the significance of this critical constructivist study in the literature of Japanese IR in the context of ‘regionalization’ that is said to be taking place in the discipline of IR. It also reiterates the methodological aspect of this critical constructivist research by referring to the literature on Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy before moving onto the following specific implications of this study.

By way of a conclusion, the second part of this final chapter more specifically discusses the implications of this genealogical study. One of the implications is on the possible transformation of hegemony as well as collaboration between client states under hegemony as this study indicated that different groups and cultures attach different meanings to what constitutes the world. Another implication of this research is on the potentialities of change for common sense as this diachronic analysis de-
naturalized the unity and continuity of common sense such as the discourse of 'returning virtue for malice'. There are also implications of this genealogical study on the empowerment and disempowerment of discourse across time as it drew on the concept of 'discourse coalitions' to analyze the rise and fall of the 'returning virtue for malice' discourse during the Cold War era. This genealogical investigation as a way of reading the history of bilateral relations between Tokyo and Taipei has an additional implication in terms of a historical lesson vis-à-vis the principle of 'one China'—that is, a 'two Chinas' policy exercised by the legitimate government of China could have a deterring effect on the rival Chinese regime that seeks external legitimacy by adhering to the principle of 'one China'. Finally, this final chapter concludes by recommending one of the ways in which further study can be conducted.

6.2 General summary

This study addressed how Japan’s diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China on Taiwan was made possible under US hegemony in East Asia. In order to complement the realist variant of rationalist research that attempts to explain why Tokyo diplomatically recognized Taipei in terms of American pressure and the Cold War structure, this critical constructivist study sought to understand how the diplomatic recognition was shaped by the Nationalist Chinese discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s 'returning virtue for malice' postwar Japan policy. It demonstrated that the moral discourse represented Chiang Kai-shek as the benefactor to whom the Japanese should repay their 'debt of gratitude', thereby culturally attaching a particular meaning to the Chiang Kai-shek regime and enabling Japan to recognize Taiwan as 'China' under US
hegemony. Put differently, by complementing realist explanation—rather than abandoning the accumulation of knowledge based on such explanation (Wendt 2000: 171-2)—the critical constructivist study pragmatically treated that reasons can also be causes following the dominant position in the philosophy of social science (Davidson 1963; Smith 2000a; Wight 2002).

In terms of Japanese IR, this critical constructivist study drew on the early Japanese idealist conception of ‘reality’—that it is not only given but also reproduced on an everyday basis (Maruyama 1964: 172-3)—to push Japanese IR beyond the classical realist-idealist debate. As the evolution of the debate over the years shows that US hegemony has increasingly been taken for granted by Japanese IR scholars as well as decision-makers. The prime example of such intellectual ‘immobilism’—drawing on the concept that has been applied to the domestic and international politics of Japan (Stockwin et al. 1988; Stockwin 2003; Hook et al. 2001, 2005)—is the domination of realism (Kosaka 1963, 1995). Over the years, Japanese realists have successfully ‘normalized’ Japan’s mercantilist diplomacy under the American nuclear umbrella known as the ‘Yoshida doctrine’ (Nagai 1985), based on which Japan’s international relations have been conducted and explained since the ‘Yoshida cabinet’ of the 1940s (Edstrom 1999). This critical constructivist study attempted to help overcome such intellectual ‘immobilism’ by laying bare the constitution of hegemony (Walker 1984; Cox 1996; Halliday 2000; Reus-Smit 2004)—such as that of US hegemony in East Asia. By shedding light on the discursive use of traditional practices the Japanese adopted under Chinese hegemony (Brown 1955), this critical constructivist study culturally created the possibility of intellectual ‘mobilism’ in Japanese IR by
particularizing US hegemony in East Asia. In this sense, by bringing critical constructivism in, this study presented one of the ways in which Japanese IR can be mobilized to meet the challenge of ‘regionalization’ in the discipline of IR in a new era (Waever 1998, 1999).

In terms of methodology and the literature on Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy, this study has provided an additional angle to the literature by adopting discourse analysis (Milliken 1999, 2001). In contrast to the traditional decision-making approach that brought the debate between those arguing for Chiang’s beliefs and those arguing for his calculations given the international environment he faced, this genealogical study has been empirically trace the link between Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ under US hegemony and Chiang’s postwar Japan policy. By re-conceptualizing Chiang’s postwar Japan policy as discourse across time, this genealogical study has been able to additionally contribute a way of reading the history of Japan’s recognition of the Republic of China through the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy. As far as case studies are concerned, this discourse analysis selected the so-called ‘crucial cases’ (Eckstein 1975; George 1979a), in which Japan’s recognition of the ROC on Taiwan as ‘China’ was discursively (re)produced in times of diplomatic crises during the Cold War (Ikei 1973, 1982, 1992; Hosoya 1993). By executing the ‘process tracing’ procedure to examine the possible ‘congruence’ between Tokyo’s recognition of Taipei and the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ (George 1979b; George and McKeown 1985; Bennett and George 2001), this discourse analysis revealed how Japan’s recognition of ‘China’ and US hegemony in East Asia were constituted. Such
'inside-out' empirical examination complemented the 'outside-in' rationalist approach that largely sacrificed such historical richness for parsimony by assuming the unitary process through which the actor took rational action depending on the situation it faced.

6.3 By way of a conclusion: specific implications

First, this genealogical study on relations between non-Western client states has presented one of the cases in which the world has been and is being interpreted differently by different groups and cultures (Milliken 1999: 243-4, 2001: 153). In effect, this genealogical study has also contributed to concretizing one of the possible ways in which the world can be transformed as mentioned earlier (Ibid.). On the other hand, this study can be seen as a lesson the hegemon can learn to achieve stability as well as durability by relying less on coercion (Ikenberry 2001; Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003). In other words, while the 'Westphalian system' has not been the only form of hierarchy and stability in the world, international relations in East Asia have historically been more cooperative than those in the West (Fairbank 1968; Garver 1993: 9-15; Zhao, S. 1997: Ch. 7; Hook et al. 2001: 25-7, 2005: 27-9; Zhang 2001; Kang 2003). From this perspective, the present study has shown one of the ways in which discourses, or cultural 'codes of intelligibility' (Weldes et al. 1999), based on traditional practices in East Asia—such as Japan’s ‘debt of gratitude’ for Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy drawing on moral reciprocity (Lebra 1976)—can be put to use in order to promote cooperation between client states under hegemony.
Second, this genealogical study addressed key questions such as what works as common sense for different societies and where discourse comes from (Milliken 1999, 2001; Yee 1996). By retroducing common sense or the hegemonic discourse over time (Weldes et al. 1999; Laffey and Weldes 2004), this genealogical study showed how Chinese and Japanese political actors drew on hegemonic practices from the past such as those from the ‘Chinese world order’ based on moral governance to construct their discourse. More immediately, this genealogical study suggested that the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ was modified from the classical discourse of ‘Sino-Japanese cooperation’ and practiced through the prewar Sunist roots of Japan–‘China’ relations. On the other hand, in addition to providing evidence that a nearly identical discourse was used vis-à-vis Russia during the prewar era, this genealogical study also delineated multiple points of emergence for the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ as such in the postwar era. In other words, this genealogical investigation not only delineated the decent and emergence of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse but also de-naturalized the unity and continuity of the common sense, thereby suggesting potentialities for contemporary change.

Third, by taking advantage of the genealogical method, this discourse analysis showed how the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ involved the power relations in which unity with the past and order was artificially created (Milliken 1999: 243; 2001: 152-3). From such an instrumentalist point of view, this study on the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ attempted to identify the proponents of the discourse as well as their locations in terms of the network of social power (Hughes 2002: 2, 2005: 248). Such an attempt necessitated this study to search for the political actors—namely,
Nationalist Chinese and Japanese conservative elites—who deliberately constructed the 'fit' between the discourse of the present and hegemonic practices of the past as mentioned above (Laffey and Weldes 1997: 203; Neumann 2002: 630; Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002: 596). As a result, the attempt to identify the political actors and their locations across time revealed that the discourse diffused to form its own 'discourse coalition' (Fischer 2003). It was embedded in the apparatus called the '1955 system'—which was interconnected with the 'San Francisco system' under US hegemony (Dower 1993b). Consequently, the discourse gained the hegemonic position and took on its own force. Accordingly, this genealogical study has presented a case in which ruling elites of the state authoritatively spoke for the state, thereby hegemonizing their discourse over others (Weldes 2003: 17). More specifically, as a leading discourse analyst calls for more research to be conducted on the aspect of institutionalization (Ibid.), this genealogical study has traced the institutional location of a particular discourse and its rivalry with others—in terms of the bifurcation of the '1955 system' for instance. As a result, this study has extended the understanding of the 'politics of discourses'—that is about 'which discourses are likely (although not predetermined) to win in contests of meaning and identity construction' (Ibid.).

Fourth, by the same token, the concept of 'discourse coalitions' enabled this study to account for change over time such as the decline of the hegemonic discourse that has been overlooked by many genealogists (Howarth 2000; Howarth et al. 2000). In contrast to many of 'quasi-structuralist' genealogies that focus on the continuity of the hegemonic discourse in IR (Milliken 1999: 246-8, 2001: 155-7), this genealogical study highlighted the de-hegemonization or dislocation of the hegemonic discourse.
(Howarth 2000; Howarth et al. 2000). For instance, this diachronic discourse analysis showed how Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime on Taiwan ceased to be ‘China’ after 1972 by demonstrating the dislocation of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse coalition within the domain of Japanese conservative politics. In this way, this genealogical analysis shed light on the overlooked process of disempowerment and how it could be identified in terms of the relationship between the proponents of the hegemonic discourse and the configuration of power within the domain of domestic politics.

Fifth, historical lessons can also be learned from this study—especially regarding the severing of relations in 1972. Insomuch as the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ and its coalition helped to make Tokyo’s unilateral announcement of the ‘severing of relations’ impossible by delimiting what can be said about Japan-ROC relations, Taipei had a better chance of maintaining diplomatic relations with Tokyo by abandoning its own ‘one China’ principle or avoiding the unilateral severing of relations itself (Huang 1998). Similarly, if Taipei had managed to remain in the UN in 1971 (solely or jointly with Beijing) as a result of giving clear and timely consent to the possibility of creating ‘two Chinas’, it would have been more difficult for any presidential hopeful of the ruling party of Japan to make an issue out of the ‘China question’ or the pro-Beijing group to come into power in 1972. Nevertheless, the paradox of one of the lessons we can learn from the case of diplomatic severance in 1972 is that the ‘two Chinas’ policy of the legitimate government of China could have a deterring effect on another Chinese regime that seeks legitimacy by adhering to the principle of ‘one China’.
Finally, despite the fact that it lost the hegemonic position, the discourse of ‘returning virtue for malice’ still awaits future research as it continues to live today. In Japan, there are physical representations of Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy such as the Chiang Kai-shek Shrine and the Monument for Honoring His Excellency Chiang Kai-shek’s Virtue as mentioned earlier in this study. The former was erected to deify the Late President following his death in 1975. The latter was built to mark the centennial of Chiang Kai-shek’s birth in 1986. Moreover, descendants of the pro-Taipei group like Abe Shinzo and Funada Hajime have ‘inherited’ not only their seats in the National Diet (Stockwin 2003: 148-9), but also their ‘debt of gratitude’ to Taipei (Lin et al. 1996). However, in the wake of ‘Taiwanization’ or the democratization of Taiwan, which was accelerated by the Chiang regime’s ‘loss of external legitimacy’ in the early 1970s (Wakabayashi 1992: 182, 274-6, 2002: 90-2; Rigger 1999: 111, 179), the successors of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse in Japanese politics have been put into a dilemma because ruling Taiwanese elites themselves have already begun ‘de-recognizing’ Chiang Kai-shek’s place in history. For instance, Lee Teng-hui (2003: 178), former President of Taiwanese origin, has publicly rebuffed Chiang’s ‘returning virtue for malice’ postwar Japan policy in order to call for Japan’s recognition of Taiwan as ‘Taiwan’ rather than ‘China’. Therefore, further study is needed to analyze the rivalry between the proponents of the ‘returning virtue for malice’ discourse and others in the context of Taiwanization as well as its impact on Japan in the contest for the hegemonic position in Japanese politics and the struggle for Tokyo’s diplomatic recognition of Taipei.
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