EARLY BUDDHIST BALLADS AND THEIR RELATION

to the

OLDER UPAISHADIC LITERATURE.

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School of Oriental Studies,
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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Title of the Thesis: EARLY BUDDHIST BALLADS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE OLDER UPANISHADIC LITERATURE.

The Thesis is an attempt to study the early Buddhist ballads as they occur in the Pali Canon and their connection with the ancient Upanishads. In view of the vast extent of this material the SUTTANIPATA is taken as the main source of the enquiry from the Buddhist side; the Upanishads are those translated by Hume under the title: "The Thirteen Principal Upanishads."

The work is divided into four principal parts. The first part deals with the nature, growth and origin of the ballads, and the social conditions of that period; the second is devoted to the character of the parallel passages and the literature known to the ballads. In the third section the history of the fundamental ideas in the Upanishads and the ballads is given, and in the last a comparative table of the most important terms in both the literatures, supplemented by Asokan Inscriptions. The final chapter makes a brief survey of the whole work and gives a summary of the results.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

The following are the chief abbreviations used in the body of the ensuing work. The references to the Pāli texts are from the editions of the Pāli Text Society. In the case of the Upanishads Jacob's Concordance to the Principal Upanishads and the Bhagavad- Głā is taken as the standard authority. Any deviations from other editions are given in the footnotes where necessary.

A - Aṅguttara Nikāya.
Ait - Aitareya Upanishad.
As - Asōkan Inscriptions.
AV(A.V) - Atharva Veda.
Barua - A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy by Benimadhar Baruva.
Bṛh. - Bṛhadāranyaka Upanishad.
BSOS - Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies.
Chā - Chāndogya Upanishad.
D - Dīgha Nītāya.
Dh - Dhammapada.
G - Bhagavad-Gītā.
Geiger - Pāli Literatur und Sprache, von Wilhelm Geiger.
HOS - Harvard Oriental Series.
Hume - The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, Translated from the Sanskrit, by R.E. Hume.
IA - Indian Antiquary.
J - Jātaka, edited by Faurebōll.
Jacobi - Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indianen von Hermann Jacobi.
JA - Journal Asiatique.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>JDCL</td>
<td>Journal of the Department of Letters, Calcutta University.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPTS</td>
<td>Journal of the Pāli Text Society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRAS</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaṭh</td>
<td>Kaṭha Upanishad.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keith</td>
<td>The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads by A.B.Keith.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kauṣ(Ks)</td>
<td>Kauṣṭākā Upanishad.</td>
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<td>Maitri(M)</td>
<td>Maitri Upanishad.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mānd</td>
<td>Māndukya Upanishad.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mbh</td>
<td>Mahābhārata.</td>
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<td>Mūnd</td>
<td>Mūndaka Upanishad.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nd</td>
<td>Nīdāsa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pj</td>
<td>Paramattha-jotikā, Sn Commentary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Praś</td>
<td>Praśna Upanishad.</td>
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<td>RV(R.V.)</td>
<td>Rg Veda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Saṃyutta Nikāya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB(Sat.Br)</td>
<td>Satapatha Brāhmaṇa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBE</td>
<td>Sacred Books of the East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sn</td>
<td>Sutta-Nipāta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śv</td>
<td>Śvetāsvatara Upanishad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tait</td>
<td>Taittirīya Upanishad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thag</td>
<td>Thera-gāthā.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thig</td>
<td>Therī-gāthā.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V(Vin)</td>
<td>Vinaya Piṭaka edited by Oldenberg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winternitz</td>
<td>Geschichte der Indischen Literatur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WZKM</td>
<td>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZB</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Buddhismus und Verwandte Gebiete.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZDMG</td>
<td>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.</td>
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INTRODUCTION

In the intellectual history of India there is no period which is so absorbingly interesting or so rich in potentiality as the one which precedes and is later on concurrent with the rise and growth of what is known as Buddhism. It extends from the earliest philosophical hymns in the Rg Veda down almost to the reign of Asoka and covers about seven centuries. The interest in this period is of a twofold nature; from the historical point there is an absolute absence of definite chronological data which has inspired scholars to discover ingenious ways of establishing dates; from a philosophical and religious point it contains within itself the seeds from which on the one hand the different Brahmanical systems have sprung, and on the other the various schools of Buddhism have developed; either way it is rich in potentialities as the number of books written on this period prove. All the subsequent history of India, so far as philosophy and religion are concerned, is potentially contained within this period, "for all the later systems may be viewed as a more systematic carrying out of the general plan of a structure tacitly implied or imperfectly conceived during this period."

During these seven centuries, when writing was either

(1) See Barua, p. 7.
unknown or very imperfectly known, the old traditions were preserved solely through oral instruction, and this method, no doubt, was responsible for the subtle influences which the different schools exerted on one another. The nature of such influences of course depends upon the schools considered, but as to their existence itself no reasonable doubts can be entertained. Scholars have attempted to evaluate them at different times: Formichi considers the whole of Pre-Buddhistic philosophy in its entirety; Cltramare considers both Pre-and Post-Buddhistic philosophy; and considerable light has been thrown on the different systems of this time by the investigations of Keith, Oldenberg, Strauss, Jacobi and others. The only work which deals with the individual philosophers preceding the rise of Buddhism and their mutual relations is that of Barua. Most of these scholars have limited themselves to the Vedic and Brahmanic philosophies. Among those who have devoted themselves to the particular study of Buddhism in its various versions may be mentioned Kern, Mrs.Rhys Davids, Rosenberg, de la Vallée Poussin, Stcherbatsky and Walleser. Yet, the actual relations of early Buddhism with the preceding schools have not been systematically carried out, for most of these works consider the whole of the Buddhist Canon in its different versions, since the historical criticism of the Canon itself is in a fluid condition.

The attempts of scholars in establishing a definite interrelationship between Buddhism and Brahmanism have been few, and sometimes unsystematic, consequently the conclusions arrived at are for the greater part conjectural and doubtful, and at times even misleading. This is primarily due to the greater interest attaching to philosophy than to the history of the treatises concerned. The only important contribution in this field comes from Mrs.Rhys Davids who has
endeavoured to clear the outgrowth of ideas which have accumulated in
the Pali canon and to present the original doctrines of the Buddha, which
she calls Saŋga, in its purest form. Even so, the relation of this
doctrine, with the previously existing philosophy, has not been exhausted.
Remarks on this possible connection are very rare indeed.

As early as 1884, Kern [S.B.E. XXI. pp. xvii-xviii] suggested a
close relationship between Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa and the Gāthā dialect, in
their vocabularies through the occurrences of such words as sarvāvat, (Pali,
sabbāva)ekoti-, samāra, etc., which are peculiar to Pali and Buddhist
Sanskrit literature. Macdonnel (Sansk.Lit. p. 215) minding questions if
the words Arahant, śramaṇa and Prajñabuddha which occur in Sat.Br., for the
first time may not have some connection with Buddhism which first obtained
a firm footing in Kosala and Videha. Hume (pp. 6-7) clearly sees the
Buddhist influence on the Upanishads at Bh. III. 2.13, where it is stated
that after death the different parts of a person return to the different
parts of Nature from whence they came, and even his ātāman goes to ākāśa
(space or ether), and that only his Karman of effect of work remains.
Linguistically he contends, following Max Müller, that the second person
plural, imperative ending -tha for -ta in Mund (1.2.1; II.2.5) and Praśna
(1.2) looks suspiciously Buddhistic. Geiger (Pali Dhamma, p. 2) sees definite
connection in the use of dharma-in Kath(iv.14; I.21) and with the dharma
of the Buddhists, and this is cleverly commented upon by Stcherbatsky (p.
68 ff.). A further connection has also been suggested (Geiger, Dhamma und;
Brāhmaṇa, Keith, pp. 550.

between Pali dhamma and Upanishadic
brahmaṇa. These remarks are sufficient to show how spuriously the work

(1) Keith, p. 500 n.g. observes that this may be due to an error of
tradition rather than to Buddhist influence; if this be so it is possible
to derive these from the Subjunctive which is so often used exhortatively
in the second person, See Delbrück Altindische Syntax, pp. 308-310; Ved.Gr.
for Students, p. 353.
of comparison has proceeded.

In view of this state of affairs it is a matter of interest to investigate the relationship between the earlier phases of Buddhism and the older Upanishads anew. Attention has been paid too long to the mutual relationship between the various Buddhist sects and to the establishment of the original Buddhist Canon by a comparative study of its versions in Pali, Prākrit, mixed Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan and even Turfan languages. It is the object of the present investigation to study one early phase of Pali Buddhism and its connection with the older Upanishads. For this purpose the Buddhist side has been limited to the verse portion of the canon, since in general the verse represents the older phase of Pali literature (Geiger,pl 5); thus, for the following enquiry the material has been taken solely from the gāthās which appear scattered throughout the canon.

So far as connected verse collections are concerned, the most important texts are the Saṁyutta-Nikāya, I. called the Saṁghavagga, the Dhammapada, Theragāthā, Theri-gāthā, Sutta-Nipāta, Jātaka and the Itivuttaka. All these texts, with the single exception of the first, belong to the Khuddakanikāya of the Suttapiṭaka. The total number of verses amounts approximately to ten thousand of which seven thousand are due to the Jātaka books. They contain among them both early and late compositions; thus, the Vessantara Jātaka, the last one in the Jātaka books, contains more than seven hundred stanzas, and in its present form is a very late work; yet it contains elements which go back to the very beginning of Buddhism. In view of the vast extent of this material a further restriction has been placed on it, and from inner reasons our choice has fallen upon Sutta-Nipāta (Sn) as representing the oldest collection of ballads.

The antiquity of Sn. among the ballad texts was already
recognised by its first European editor, Fausböll, as early as 1880, in his translation of this book (S.B.E., vol. X, pp. xi-xi). He considered it as containing remnants of Primitive Buddhism, mainly on account of its depicting the life of hermits, not in monasteries, but in its first stage, and containing the germs of a system which became complicated in the later Buddhist Church; and secondarily on account of the archaisms in language. Among somewhat similar lines Winternitz (Geschichte II, pp. 71-77) asserts that at least some substantial parts of it belong to the earliest Buddhist Poetry we possess, and many of the Suttas go back to the very beginnings of Buddhism, to the immediate groups of the first disciples of the Buddha.

From the internal evidence of the Pāli Canon itself the early age of Sn. is assured. Beside Dh. it is the most frequently quoted text in the whole of the Buddhist literature; individual suttas and many gāthās are to be found in the other books of the Canon; and what is even more important is the fact that there exists a commentary or rather "Exposition" on the last two books and a single sutta of the first book, which is itself accepted as a canonical work and regarded as the eleventh book of the Khuddakanikāya under the title of Niddesa. This inclusion of the Niddesa within the Canon proves how old those sections are which are commented upon. Like other canonical works it has an Āṭṭhakatha called Saddhammapajjotikā, and this work is said to have been composed sometime during the reign of Aggabodhi I, who came to the throne in A.D. 554.

(2) See Winternitz, II., p. 72; Francke; Sn gathas und ihre Parallelen, where all the other texts which quote Sn are found under individual verses.
(3) Consists of Mahā and Culla-Niddesas.
(4) Edited by Buddha-datta, P.T.S. 1931 (Sdpj.)
The only external evidence so far known is found in Asoka's Inscriptions; it occurs in a Minor Rock Inscription called Bhābrū or Bāirāṭ, an epigraph discovered in the ruins of a hill monastery at Bāirāṭ in the northern part of the Jaipur State, Rajputana. It opens with a declaration of Asoka's faith in the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha, and recommends the following seven texts for particular study:

1) Vinaya-samukase
2) Aliyavasāni
3) Anāgalabhayāni
4) Muni-gāthā
5) Moneyya-suṭṭa
6) Upatisapasiṇa
7) Lāghulovāda.

Most of these texts have been more or less satisfactorily identified, and according to the generally accepted opinion the fourth and the fifth are respectively the Muni- and Nālaka-suttas of Sn. Dharmamandha Kosambi (I.A. 1912, p.40) identifies Upatisa-pasina with the Sāriputta-sutta, the last one in the Aṭṭhakavagga. On the other hand, Bhandarkar (Asoka p.86-87) proves the identity of Vinayasamukase with the Tuvaṭaka-sutta of Sn. It is clear from these discussions of various scholars that Asoka knew at least of some of the suttas of Sn when he recommended these seven texts for special study. On this ground the older parts of Sn must have been composed before the time of Asoka, probably by the fourth century B.C.

It is clear from such evidence why Sn has to be regarded as the oldest collection of Poetic ballads in the Pali literature. The present enquiry is therefore restricted mainly to Sn, but where the

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(6) Hultsch: p.172; it is called "The Calcutta-Bāirāṭ Rock Inscription."

(7) On general references on these identifications see Hultsch, p.174; Bhandarkar, p.331; The most recent attempt on the identification of Vinaya-samukase is by Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, J.D.L. , XX, pp.1-7; The consensus of opinion seems to favour three references to Sn, either 4-6 or 1,5,6.
need was felt for fuller references, Dh. Thag, Thig, S I and even Udāna have been consulted. It is, in this sense, a special study of the ballads occurring in Sn, and therefore, the term "Early Ballads" has been used to describe them. The term "early" has been advisedly used, since almost all the ballads are of very old origin. The three jewels of the law, the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha, occurring in Asokan Inscriptions and forming the fundamental formula by which one formally becomes a Buddhist, occur only once in the decidedly late Ratana-sutta of Sn; this fact alone is conclusive proof of such an early date for the rest of the suttas.

In its present form Sn has frequently undergone changes in editorial hands. In fact, the existence of the Niddesa on the last two books of Sn and the famous Khaggavisāṇasutta proves that the collation of Sn, as we have it now, is later than the Niddesa. The probable explanation seems to be that the Atthaka-vagga and the Pāryanavagga including the Khaggavisāṇa-sutta were two separate books having respectively the two expositions Maha- and Culla-Niddlesas, and that at some early period they fused together with other texts of a similar nature to form the present edition of Sn. Some of the interpolations are self-evident while connected episodes interpolated as such are called "Vatthugāthā". Thus the first 56 verses of the last book of Sn are not commented upon by the Culla-Niddesa, and they form the Vatthugāthā or "Introductory Episode". In spite of all these changes the major part of Sn preserves the old tradition and is sufficiently uncontaminated by later ideas to enable one to form an accurate idea of

(8) See Barua and Mitra, Prā.Dh., p.xviii, who take Culla-Niddesa to be older than Mahā-Niddesa, and both probably pre-Asokan, are of opinion that both of these are earlier than Sn.

the period.

By the term "Older Upanishads" is denoted that set of Upanishads which is connected with the various branches of the Vedic schools. Of these the most important are Brhadâranyaka, Chândogya, Taittirîya, Aitareya, Kaiksitaki, Kena, Katha, Isâ, Mundaka, Praûna, Mândûkya and Svetâsvatara. According to Hume this is probably the historical order of these texts. Deussen was the first to suggest their chronological order and he divided them into early prosaic, metrical and later prose Upanishads. The actual age of these texts is a much debated point as also the chronological classification, but their early date is a generally recognised fact; the lower limit, at any rate, has been placed at 300 B.C. (Hume, p.6).

On the general development of the Upanishads and their relationship to the different Vedic schools standard works have been written by Deussen, Keith, Oldenberg, Oltramare, Schader, Winternitz and others. From the purely linguistic point Furst, Kirfel and Wecker have made detailed studies on which they base their classification of the texts into age-groups. The style has been studied by Hillebrandt, Ruben and others. The general conclusion from these investigations points to a considerably old date for these texts, and to a period which must have commenced somewhere about 800 B.C. and extended to 400 B.C.

In the interpretation of the Upanishads scholars are generally agreed upon the philosophical method as the safest and surest guide. Yet in all the works from Deussen down to Keith, the influence of the later philosophical systems is visible, and the explanation, in general, is

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(2) For a different order, see Keith, p.498 ff.
not quite historical. Any such attempt at historical explanation has been either criticised as inadequate or else regarded as not possible. The single philological and historical attempt at such an interpretation is seen in Hume's translation—"The Thirteen Principal Upanishads," and the valuable introduction preceding it. Consequently for the purpose of the present thesis attention has been paid mostly to the history of ideas, since it is here that the Upanishads and the Ballads are on common ground.

4. For the systematic discussion of an inter-relationship between the early Buddhist Ballads and the older Upanishads the problem has been approached from four main points. The first one is the origin of the Ballads; the second the nature of the parallel passages; the third and the most important of them is the history of ideas, and the last the character of the comparative vocabulary. Consequently we divide our discussion into four parts: the first part is devoted to the nature, origin and growth of the Ballads and to the social background; the second deals with the literature known to the Ballads and the common passages; in the third section we shall give the history of ideas in the Ballads and the Upanishads; and in the last a comparative table of some important terms in the two literatures.

5. This enquiry has been caused by a suggestive remark of Oldenberg's. In his study of the beginnings of Buddhism, he says—"One needs to regard only the congruence of many expressions which are dogmatically important, between Brahmanism and Buddhism, or the identity of whole verses, in order to recognise at first sight, that many and

strong connecting threads must have run from one to the other".
The result of it confirms his view as to the difficulty of exactly
tracing the mutual relations between the Upanishads and the early
Buddhist Ballads. The positive outcome is small, but an endeavour
has been made to clear the fundamental position and to furnish some
new points of view.
CHAPTER I.

Nature, origin and growth of the Ballads.

1. The Oxford Dictionary defines a ballad as (i) a simple song, (ii) a sentimental song of several verses sung to the same melody, or (iii) a poem in short stanzas narrating popular story. In the present work it will further represent a class of composition consisting of prose mixed with verse; but for all practical purposes it will render the Pali word gāthā in general, and the gāthā occurring in the Sutta-Nipāta (Sn) in particular.

2. The Sutta-Nipāta is a collection of poetical pieces called suttas in five parts which are respectively named Uraga-, Cūla-, Mahā-, Aṭṭhaka-, and Pārāyana-vaggas. The first four parts contain 54 smaller poems while the fifth is an independent, long poem composed of 16 smaller pieces. Restricting the following analysis to the first four vaggas only the component suttas or poetical pieces may be roughly divided into two classes.

To the first class will belong those sections which are completely in verse; they shall be called the "Verse Ballads"; of these there are 37 (i.e. 8 in Uraga - 9 in Cūla- 4 in Mahā- and 16 in Aṭṭhaka-vaggas). The remaining seventeen are composed partly in verse and partly in prose and may be called the "Mixed Ballad"; (4 in Uraga - , 5 in Cūla - and 8 in Mahā-vaggas); this kind is particularly representative of the Sagāthavagga. It will be seen from the analysis shown above that the last two books of Sn consist only of verse ballads (except No. 18 of Pārāyanavagga, Sn.p. 218), whereas the Mixed type occurs freely in the first three.

The verse ballads are subject to further analysis. To
class (a) will belong all those in which a pure dialogue or narrative
element predominates; to class (b) will belong the rest which are
mainly didactic in purpose. The following table gives the classifica-
tion of the 54 poems:

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Verse Ballads.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Narrative or Dialogue.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Didactic.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Mixed Ballads.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The individual suttas vary in the number of verses. If the
Parayanavagga which contains 174 verses be excluded, the remaining 54
ballads vary from 4 (Uṭṭhāna-sutta) to 63 (Vāseṭṭhasutta) verses. There
are seven ballads each having eight verses of which five occur in the
Aṭṭakavagga. These five pieces belong to a type which is seen in
Thag. Thig and the Jātakas where poems consisting of the same number of
verses are grouped together under one section. 38 suttas have verses
ranging from 4 to 20, while there are only 7 which have more than
30 verses. The following table gives an analysis of the suttas in the
first four vaggas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No of verses</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No of Suttas</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No of verses</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>26</th>
<th>27</th>
<th>28</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>32</th>
<th>38</th>
<th>41</th>
<th>42</th>
<th>45</th>
<th>53</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No of Suttas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It appears from this that in frequency the number of verses is either eight, or twenty or seventeen; the others are less favoured.

In the following table an analysis is given of the sixteen smaller pieces constituting the Pārāyanavagga:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of verses</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of suttas, (i.e., questions forming each section)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we consider these sixteen with the preceding 54 sections, the principal order of frequency will be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of verses</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>7, 17, 20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of suttas,</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the fifteen dialogue or narrative ballads only three are of the narrative type and these are the Pabbajjā-, Padhāna- and Nālakasūtta of the Mahāvagga. The remaining twelve are the real dialogue ballads. The Pabbajja-sutta is a ballad of what may be called the "epic type" and corresponds to the Nala and Sāvitrī episodes in the Mahābhārata. It consists of 20 anuṣṭhbh stanzas and has a single theme. In the opening verse we are introduced to the theme which is the praise of the Pabbajjā or "Wandering life", and this is described as an open-air life (abhokāso) in verse 2. But the real story is the kindly meant attempt of King Bimbisāra to dissuade the Buddha from his strenuous course. Clearly enough he is mildly rebuked by the Buddha, who explains the reason for his leaving the world in the last verse. The ballad is in the third person and the narrative element predominates through the great number
of verbs in the past tense.

It is possible to conceive this ballad as composed of two elements, of which verses 4–20 form the major one. The natural connection between them is the fundamental idea that attachment to worldly life breeds all the evils that keep one bound; the only escape from such bondage is the Pabbajjā, which consequently forms the theme of the whole poem. The story is a popular one, such as would be known to all Buddhists from their earliest childhood. The Buddha leaves the world for a wandering life in search of peace and enlightenment. On his way he passes through Rājagaha, when Bimbisāra feels interested in him. He offers him worldly wealth and enjoyments which are sternly refused in preference for spiritual exertion (padhāna). The narrative runs smoothly from beginning to end, and there is neither a verse too much nor too little. It is uniform in character and the sequence of events follows naturally.

The second sutta is called the Padhāna-sutta "the sutta of Exertion" and is perhaps the most important ballad in the whole of the ballad literature. It is the story of Māra's temptation of the Buddha, and in fact, the earliest version of it, at least in Pali Buddhism. It is also of the "Epic" type, consisting of 25 anuṣṭubh stanzas, all running smoothly. It is interesting to note that verses 1 and 2 form a single unit or a logical stanza. As in the Pabbajjā-sutta the narrative goes on in the third person from verse 5 onwards, except in the dialogues between Māra and the Buddha. The whole interest, from the point of view of its construction lies in the use of the first person in the narrative in the opening verse.

(1) The use of "mam" here and the sudden shifting of the narrative to the third person in verse 5, suggest two possibilities; either the Buddha was

(1) Accepted and translated by Fausbøll as "me, to me".
himself narrating the story of his fight with Mara and reverted to the	hird person when the most interesting part of the narrative came, or
else the use of "mām" is due to a misreading; the first one is not at
all probable, since the first person in the narrative occurs but once
in the ballad. If we emend the reading of "mām" to "nam" we overcome
this difficulty and arrive at a new result. The opening line will now
read

Tam nam padhānapahitattam.

"To him, while engaged in spiritual exertion", and the antecedent of
this pronoun "nam" will then be found in verse 4 of the preceding sutta
(Sn. 4082).

Agamā Rājagahaṃ Buddhā.

Coupling this with the fact that the last line of that ballad reads

Pādhānāya gamissāmi attha me ranjā mano

"I will go and exert myself, for herein my heart takes pleasure", we
can conclude that this Padhānasutta is only a continuation of the
previous Pabbajjā-sutta. It appears from this that the two suttas
existed originally as a single ballad; the separation of a single ballad
in two in the present collation of Sn may partly be due to the feeling
of the early editors that it contained two principal themes, the one
being the glorification of Pabbajjā and the other showing the power of
Padhāna or determined concentration of mind; at any rate, it is in
the nature of 'liquid' or 'free' poetry ("Völkapolisie").

Dialogue predominates here and the dramatic element is seen
at its best. Mara approaches the Buddha who is making an energetic
effort to gain emancipation and is reduced to a skeleton. In vv. 2-5
Mara tells him to desist from this exertion and live in luxury and
happiness; in vv. 6-11, the Buddha refuses to accept his advice; in
vv. 12-15 he sees the armies of Mara arranged before him; in the next verse he accepts the challenge; all this while the Buddha is supposed to utter verses 6-21. It is probable that vv. 6-16 are addressed to Mara and the remaining seem to be a soliloquy. Verses 20-21 have a strange purport; they indicate the Buddha's resolution about his future work. We should assume here that at the end of v. 19 Mara has been defeated and that the two following verses are the victorious resolutions of the hero.

The four final verses form a special theme; the first three are supposed to be spoken by Mara; of these the parable of the crow (vv. 23-24) is again met with in the Māra-Samyutta (S.I.p.124). These seem to have been added later, since both in the Padhāna and Pabbajā-suttas no mention is made of the seven years during which Māra tried to conquer the Buddha. The occurrence of vv. 23-24 and 25 in S.I. at different places (p.122;124) favours this conclusion. Unlike the preceding ballad, the Padhāna-sutta is thus a patchwork of different units, and seems to have been more popular.

A different tendency is noticeable in the Nālakasutta. It consists of 45 stanzas of varying metres of which the first twenty form the Vatthugāthā. This is a composite ballad of which the two parts are Asita's visit to the child, the future Buddha and the dialogue between Nalaka and the Buddha; it is a fusion of two separate ballads, the connecting link being Asita and his nephew Nālaka. This conclusion is supported by the metre, the Vatthugāthā being in trimeter verses and in dimeter verses; a further proof is found in the Bhābru edict in Aśoka where these last verses are called Moneyya-suta. The first part is narrative in construction and the second is pure dialogue; the narrative is, further, of the same type as seen in the two preceding ballads, but there are later signs, as in the interpretation of
miraculous signs attending Asita's visit to the child.

The general lateness of the Vatthugāthā is more clearly seen in the case of the Pārayanavagga, of which the first 56 verses form the introductory frame story of Bāvari and his sixteen disciples. It has been mentioned in the Introduction that the Culla Niddesa does not comment upon these while commenting on the remaining parts of the book; it is clear from this that the story of Bāvari is later than the other sections of the Pārayanavagga, and that it must have been the work of some later poets. In its present form the latest parts indicate a knowledge of Southern India (Dakkhīṇapatha), places like Māhissati and Patitthāna being actually mentioned by name; mention is also made of the 32 signs of great men and their only two indications. That the subject is old cannot be doubted since we clearly have old material in the oath "sattame divase tuyham muddhā phalatu sattadhā" or in the name Bāvari, a form of which occurs in the ancient Persian inscriptions.

In all these four narrative pieces considered here, there is one common characteristic; the narrative always precedes in the third person except in the dialogue. The stories are usually brief and simple, containing popular elements or subjects known to everyone. In only two instances do we find the prose addition "tē-..." in the dialogue portions (a) (a) (Sn. 701; 716).

To the twelve pure dialogue ballads of the first four vaggas we may add the sixteen of the Pārayana-vagga, giving altogether twenty eight. Most of these are metrically irregular, and the prose formula

(2) See Keith, p. 395; Oldenberg, Rel. des Veda, p. 520. note 2; Chand. and Byh. mirdhā tē vipatīyēt.

"iti x......" or "ti x......" is appended in most cases. Frequently we have also an extended formula "x---ti x......" (e.g. Cunda ti Bhagavā). Only in two more rare instances the continuation of the pure dialogue form is interrupted by narrative verse, and these occur in Dhaniya- and Amagandha-suttas (Sn. 30; 251, 252;). The typical form of the dialogue is for some person to ask a question or questions of the Buddha to which he replies in his turn. Thus, dialogues beginning with "puschāmi munim" etc. or "atthi pañhena āgamaṃ" number eleven of which six occur in the Pārayana-vagga; those in which the form brūhi, pabrūhi, vyākarohi, akkhāhi or some other Imperative 2nd person sg. occurs, number nine. Those in which direct questions are asked and which do not come under the above categories are five in number. Of the remaining three the Dhaniya-sutta is pure dialogue - not question and answer; the Hemavata-sutta resembles it in its earlier parts, but later abounds in questions and answers. In the Māgandhiya-sutta it is the Buddha who speaks first, the only instance in Sn where such is the case.

The Dhaniya and Hemavata suttas are real living dialogues. In the former the herdsman Dhaniya is converted by the Buddha by interpreting Dhaniya's own remarks; in this manner the set of physical and worldly ideas is transformed into the spiritual by means of half parables. A late addition is seen here in the last two verses which form a dialogue between Mara and Buddha, which has no direct connection with the principal story.

(1) Sn. 83, 241, 359, 915, 957, 1043, 1049, 1061, 1105, 1112, 1118.
(2) Sn. 814, 848, 862, 1069, 1085, 1092, 1096, 1102, 1120 (ācikkha).
(3) Sn. 335, 1032, 1069, 1077, 1088.
(4) Sagathavagga: p. 6, 107-108.
In the Hemavatasutta the opening verses introduce us to an interesting conversation between the two Yakkhas Sātāgira and Hemavata on the qualities of the Buddha. The dialogue proceeds till v.15 and is followed by 7 verses in the form of question and answer; the last five stanzas constitute a praise of the Buddha and the acceptance of his Dhamma or teaching.

The Māgandhiyasutta opens with a dramatic incident; in the first verse the Buddha refuses to accept the proffered hand of Māgandhiya, making a characteristically odious remark about the human body. From this stage the ballad proceeds by means of questions and answers, covering such a wide field as diṭṭhi (philosophy), bhava (existence) and so forth.

The prevailing form, then, in these dialogue ballads is one of speech and counterspeech, or question and answer. Moreover the question may be direct and simple as in Sn.836 ff; it may also occur in the form of riddles (Sn.168-169; 170-171, etc.)

Another characteristic which results immediately from their nature is the profusion of imperative forms. They occur either as brūhi, pabrūhi, akkhāhai, etc. or as bhava, bhagassu, hohi, parivaggehi, etc.

There is one interesting type here of Vatthugāthā and it is seen in the Kāhulasutta (Sn.335-336). The two introductory stanzas are in the form of question and answer, but the persons concerned are unknown except for the prose ending which concludes the ballad. The last six verses give a general advice which is in no way a direct outcome of the first two stanzas. The human relationship between these two units and the title of the ballad itself are supported only by an extraneous prose formula. From this it is seen that the Vatthugāthā
did not originally belong to this ballad; the only possibility is that
the introductory piece belonged to another Rāhula ballad; we can then
imagine a fusion of several verses from distinct ballads with a prose
ending to explain the personalities of the speakers.

5. There are twentytwo suttas belonging to the second group of
verse ballads which are neither narrative nor dialogue in construction.
Most of these deal with more moral topics; the usual form is one of
definition. Unlike the dialogue ballads, these abound to a greater extent
in verbs in the present, imperative and potential, third person. Refrains
are more common; for instance

So bhikkhu jahāti orapāram
urago jinṇam iva tacaṁ purāṇam
occurs 17 times throughout the Uraga-sutta; similarly
eko care khaggavisāṇakappo
occurs 41 times in the Khaggavisāṇasutta. We may call this the
"rhetoric" use of the refrain. A minor instance of a regular refrain is
tam vā pi dhīrā munim vedayanti
which occurs 9times in the Muni-sutta. An initial refrain is seen in
the Uragavagga-

Yo nācasaśi na paccasaśi

Individual verses remind one strongly of the later didactic
poetry in Sanskrit Literature, and especially of the Satakas of Bharty-
hari. As a class of literature they appear to be later than the real
narrative or dialogue ballads on account of their more artificial nature.
Archaisms in morphology are not so numerous as in the first group of

(8) For further kinds, see Stede, Index of Padas of Thera-Theri-g-
verse ballads. The subjects vary from reflections on the worthlessness of the human body (Vijayasutta) to peace and goodwill towards all beings (Mettasutta) (Sn. 143-152, 193-206). Practical advice is given on various subjects: on choosing a good and learned teacher, for example, in Nāvāsutta (Sn. 316-323); on how to obtain the highest good, uttamattha, in Kimsīla-sutta (Sn. 324-330). We have a description of disputing philosophers in Gūlavīyūhasutta (Sn. 878-894).

The main purpose of these ballads is to inculcate moral precepts. This is done either through plain and forceful advice or by a constructive criticism by ridiculing the bad and praising the good qualities.

The second main division of the ballad literature comprises the seventeen mixed ballads. All of them begin with a prose introduction and the formula "Evam me sutam" — "thus have I heard" — and the words — "Ekam samayam Bhagavā." The initial prose serves the purpose of introducing the main verse portion; it describes the circumstances in which the verse came into being. In eight cases we are introduced to the verse ballad by the expression "Bhagavantam gāthāya ajjhabhāsi — he addressed the Blessed One by means of verse" and in two we have the variant "gāthāhi" for gāthāya. Of these ten, nine verse parts begin with a question. In the tenth (Sn. p. 116) we are introduced to an ancient manner of approaching a respected teacher; in the first two verses the introducing ceremony is performed by Vaseṭṭha who propounds his question in verse 4. In six cases the Buddha is made the initial speaker; five of the verses here are didactic or narrative in character; in the sixth,

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(9) Sn. pp. 13, 18, 32, 46, 60, 87, 93.
(11) Sn. pp. 21, 50, 78, 80, 126, 140.
the Sundarikabhāradvāja-sutta (Sn.p.80) we have the dialogue form; these verses are introduced by the formula "Bhagavā etad avoca" or ajjhabhāsi. In the single instance where "Bhagavantam gāthāhi abhitthavi" occurs (Sn.p.108, Selasutta), the verse begins with a psalm in praise of the Buddha. The question is put in verse 4 ff, and the ballad proceeds its dialogue.

There are eight cases which end in a prose passage of which seven present great similarities, in fact the whole passage beginning with "abhikkantam bho Gośama" up to "Gotamam saranam gacchāmi dhammañca bhikkhu-saṅghañca is common to all the seven suttas. The passage "upāsaka(-am) no (mam) bhavam Gotamo dhāretu ajjatage pāhupe(-am)c saranam ete(-am)", which immediately follows the preceding one, is also equally shared by four suttas. The other three share the passage "labheyyāham bhoto.......................labheyyam upasampadām". The circumstances in all the cases are the same; the persons in question have by some manner come into spiritual contact with the Buddha; in the poetic version they either take an active part as in the case of dialogues or remain listeners to his discourse as in the Brahmāṇadhammikasutta; in both cases, willingly or otherwise, they are made to listen to the wise teacher. At the end of the discourse the new doctrines propounded by the Buddha enlighten them; as a result they praise him and beg him to accept them as his disciples. Naturally enough they are accepted, and they soon reach the desired goal, namely arahatship. These stock passages are to be found everywhere in the Pali Canon. This is a clear indication

(13) Sn. pp. 25, 55, 91, 123.
to the early activity of the editors who used them at every possible occasion, with the result that we cannot determine where they occurred originally and where they were super-imposed.

(14)

There are only five suttas where the verse part is divided by intervening prose. In the Kasibhāradvājasutta (Sn.p.14). vv.6-7 are separated from the first five by a short prose paragraph which fills the gap between these two sets of verses; its purpose seems to describe the events taking place before the second group of verses is introduced; this is also the case in the Subhāsita-sutta (Sn.p.79). In the first of the remaining three suttas (Sn.pp.94-99), the same prose passage occurs after every five stanzas beginning with verse 4; in the passage which occurs between the third and the fourth verses the last sentence is the same. They describe how Sabhiya was pleased with the Buddha's replies and proceeded to ask more questions. The case at p.110 is different; there is a fusion of two different ballads, the story of Keniya and the story of Sela, and the intervening prose is solely due to this fusion. In the last example (pp.141-148) we have a younger sutta dealing with the now famous theory of Paṭiccasamuppāda, and the manner of presentation is different from the others. The Buddha is throughout the sole speaker; he reasons aloud and advises the assembly of bhikkhus how to reply to the fundamental questions. The intervening passages are the same except for the terms "Upadhi, Avijjā, etc". Again, starting with verse Sn.731 these serve only as running commentaries to the verses which follow. The "if" clause preceding this comment is common to all the passages. This only points to the fact that the prose is a later addition. The whole

(16) See V.I. p.245 ff.
sutta, as mentioned above, is a very late composition, and it should be classed with the last additions to Sn.

The general form of the mixed ballads, then, is one where the prose part is secondary, but complementary to the verse part; the importance of the verses is fully brought out by their tone.

Having considered briefly the nature of the various types of ballads which occur in Sn, the next important question to be dealt with is the origin of these ballads. The main problem here is the determination of a primitive type of ballad. We shall first consider the mixed kind. None of these show unity of construction; in most cases the prose is not required for an understanding of the verse. In the Brahmanadhammika-sutta, for instance, we have a clear case of a narrative verse ballad on which the early redactors superimposed the prose part; it is neither necessary nor useful to the right understanding of the verse. The prose introduction only brings us to the main idea of the sutta, which is always in verse. The final prose belongs to the stereotyped class (see above, p. 24).

By reconstructing the original form of the mixed ballads by a comparison of the different versions we arrive at surer results. Taking the two versions of the Kasibhāradvājasutta in Sn and S.I. we observe that the verses and the prose introduction agree in both, the final prose differs in the two; in fact, in Sn we have an enlargement of the piece, and the common part is of the stereotyped class. Besides, the prose separating the last two verses varies in the two; Sn has, again, an enlarged piece; this shows that the version of S.I. is more primitive than that of Sn. The last two verses which are separated here occur again in the Sundarikabhāravāja (Sn. 480-481) and Aggika-suttas (S.I.p. 167) but under different circumstances. This leads us to the conclusion...
that the reconstructed ballad is, indeed, far from the primitive type; at the same time it indicates the existence of some verses which were made use of by those who were responsible for these different ballads.

The case of other mixed ballads is similar. It was pointed out earlier that the Sela-sutta is a fusion of two mixed ballads (see p. ) The story of Keniya occurs in the Vinayapiṭaka (I. p.245 ff) and has nearly the same prose introduction as the Selasutta; only Sela does not figure in this version. The version of Sn is, therefore, later than Keniya's story in the Vinaya, for besides the two verses of the Vinaya, it has 24 fresh stanzas, and this favours the theory of fusion rather than of interpolation. If comparison be made between the prose introduction here and at Ambatthasutta (D.I. p.87 ff) which is wholly in prose, we observe the identical nature of the two. We can only conclude from this that the poetic part existed long before the prose.

In the Subhāsitasutta (Sn.pp.78-79) we have a most interesting example; the same version occurs at S.I. (pp.188-189); the last four stanzas occur also at Thag (1227-1230). The verses are throughout ascribed to Vaṅgīsa; the first verse which is not found in Thag, is, however, definitely related to the last four. The Thag is only a collection of songs attributed to the theras, and is not an original literary work, and consequently it does not throw any light on the question whether the verses existed separately or not. The solution lies in the word "subhāsita" in the first verse; it seldom occurs in the earlier ballads; the stanza itself is nowhere quoted in the other canonical books. It appears from this that the last four verses existed separately before the prose or the first verse were composed. In its present form it may be and probably is nothing else than a later creation of the Buddhist bards.
In this manner, every mixed ballad found in Sn. is proved to have been derived from an earlier floating material of verses. This does not mean, however, that every verse ballad is older than every mixed one as they exist today; the theory advanced only asserts that the mixed type ultimately goes back to a verse type.

The existence of this floating material of verses is proved by the number of repetitions refrains and turns of expression which are common to many of the ten thousand gāthās which occur in the Pali Canon. The inter-relationship between the different verse ballads is shown by the existing indexes of the gāthā lines. Taking only the Thera-Therī-gāthās, we notice no less than 67 pādas occurring more than three times. The formula "Katāṃ Buddhassa sāsanam" alone occurs about forty times. We cannot accept all of these to have been stereotyped; for, the acceptance of such a possibility will not explain the existence of minor variations. We may accept the form "tisso vijjā anupattā kalāṃ Buddhassa sāsanam" which occurs twelve times in Thag and Thig, to have been stereotyped; but were the second pāda joined to a different expression we could only say that it was a variation due to faulty tradition; but in such a case, if the original expression had been stereotyped, the variation would not have been possible. So we reach the conclusion that even in the verse ballads we find later bards at work with the floating material existing before them.

Enough has been said on the refrain and repetition in verse ballads and lyrical poems by Dr. Stede in his introduction to the "Pādas of Thera-Therī-gāthās" (pp. 4-7). Allowing for the existence of such stock passages, we notice the long time which must have elapsed before they became common; in the course of this happening, it is easy to
imagine how plagiarism played its important part. As all the ballads were essentially meant for recitation and not for reading, we can follow in our mind the possible course by which they became a "type" class; in the course of traditional handling a new bard would give a new turn to what he had heard before, till at last different versions would be handed down. This brings us to the important question of the authors of the ballads, and consequently of their origin.

It is difficult to judge from Sn who the authors were. The names of the ballads are subject to grave doubts, since the commentator gives alternative titles to several suttas. All the didactic ballads are called after some particular phase, character or idea they describe, or by some important term which occurs in them. In the case of narrative and dialogue ballads we see several persons coming to life after whom most of them are called; but we know nothing of their history. If then we take recourse to the other works of the canon we reach no firmer ground.

From a personal and historical point we find much in Thag. and Thig. that is of interest. The personal note of the stanzas and the natural tone of the confessions are very refreshing. But we are sadly disillusioned when we seek to know the real persons responsible for these verses. The individual names seem to have been added to the long current and anonymous ballads. Evidence of this lies in the fact that the word "thera" or "theri" does not occur in the verses at all, and they are not theras who allow us to have a peep at their personal

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(17) Vijaysutta, Kāmavicchandananikāsutta; navāsutta, dhamma-sutta; see Bapat, Introduction to nāgarī edition of Sn. p.xviii. for further illustrations.
(18) e.g. Hatana, Muni- and Nāvā-suttas.
(19) e.g. Uraga, Khagavisāṇa-suttas.
convictions, but just simple bhikkhus. Or they call themselves sanañas (9m; 3f), tevijjas (11m; 3f), or bahussutas (7m; 4f). Further, when quoted in other texts, the authors' names are not always mentioned as the same, a fact which clearly shows their hybrid character; thus, Thag 17 belongs to Dāsaka, but at Dh 325 it belongs to Pāsenadi-Kosala, not to mention the same verse belonging to two different authors in Thag itself. (19a)

There are two possibilities here; either all the ballads are authorless, or else the authors are only partly responsible. The occurrence of such cases as Vaṅgīsa-thera-samāyutta in S I., Subhāsita-sutta in Sn and Thag 1227-1230 clearly suggest the second alternative; for these verses are attributed to the same persons in the three versions, (or rather two, since Sn=S I). We cannot, of course, assume that in such a case they were absolutely responsible for the verses attributed to them; rather, their names stood for a whole class or group of poetry with which they had no direct relationship. It is to this cause, more than to any other, that such confusion regarding real authorship exists; in fact, this explains how the traditional names in Thag appear so untrustworthy.

In this mass of names there may have been gifted poets who were responsible for many elating stanzas; but it is impossible to say what actually belongs to such personal creation. Even if that were possible we should fail in our task when we are faced with the floating mass which was incorporated by even gifted poets. With regard to this earliest group it were safest to say they belong to no one in particular. In fact we should definitely say that they belong to popular poetry, for do not the earliest utterances of a people belong to the whole community?

A word must be said regarding certain features which show the individual character of some parts of the ballads. Of this alliteration and innovation in rhythm are the most important. As examples of (19a) Examples of this are numerous in Thag; see Stede's index under section III, Synoptical Table; an example is found at v. 15 and v. 633 attributed respectively to Kundadhana and Sona Kolivisa
alliteration may be quoted Sn. 327
Dhammāramo dhammarato
dhamme thito dhammavinicchayaḥṇū
or Sn. 576
Phalānaṁ iva pakkānam pato papatanaṁ bhayaṁ
evaṁ jātānam maccaṇam hiṁcaṁ maraṇato bhayaṁ
Examples of highly cultivated rhythm are numerous, of which many are
found in the Kokāliyasutta (Sn. 657-678); one line will illustrate the
rhythm, namely
bhūnahu pūpaka dukkatakāri (Sn. 664)
of which a variation is found in
bhūhni ca duccaritāṇi caritvā (Sn. 665).
Without doubt these are later and more personal creations; in the earlier
ballads it is most difficult to discover such personal element. Repetition,
refrain, familiar subjects, dialogues and old linguistic formations, are all characteristics of popular poetry.

We will now see what the early Buddhists themselves thought
about the ballads. In all the cases where the verse part is introduced
by some prose passage we notice the following expressions:—instrumental
sg. or pl. of gāthā "ajjhabhāsatī (Vin. anumodati), codenti or
paṭicodenti (Vin. I. p. 43)"; meaning "to address with verses, to thank with
verses"; and "imāṁ gāthāṁ abhāśi" (D. I. p. 254). We have no evidence in
such phrase of real authorship; if it were so, indeed, we would be led
to the improbable conclusion that people conversed in verse.

A surer expression is at Vimāya I. p. 5:—"api'ssu bhagavantāṁ
imā anacchāriyā gāthāyo paṭībhamṣu pubbe assutapubba"—"And to the
blessed Lord these most wonderful gathas, never before heard in the
ancient times, revealed themselves" (paṭībhamṣu—"occurred, appeared in
the mind"). The Buddha is resting under the Ajapālanigrodha tree five weeks after his enlightenment and meditating on the materialistic tendencies of the people of the world. He is apprehensive about their present condition and feels that they are unable to understand the Dhamma, which is deep, difficult to see or instruct, and free from doubts, and which only the wise can realise. From such a meditation spring these verses, never before heard; indeed they reveal themselves. According to the authors of the Vinaya, these inspired verses/as a revelation when the mind was engaged in the deepest meditation, there was no voluntary action on the part of the person. Prophetic inspirations have always given birth to spontaneous verse; of these the Delphic oracle and the origin of the Rāmāyaṇa are classical illustrations.

A second example of this revelation occurs at Sn.pp.78-79. After the Buddha utters the verse on Subhāṣita or well-spoken words, the venerable Vāṅgīsa rises from his seat, makes obeisance to him and says-

"It has occurred to me, Lord" (paṭibhāti maṃ Sugata), to which the Buddha replies - "Let it occur to you, O Vāṅgīsa" (Paṭibhātu tam Vāṅgīsa). He then gives expression to the next four verses. In the canon he is called the best among Paṭibhānavantas. Thus far for the evidence of the prose, which certainly shows what the authors of the Vinaya and Samyutta I (where it occurs) thought concerning the origin of the gāthās.

Within the verse itself no mention is made about the origin; the word gāthā clearly stands for song in Sn.81, 251, 429 and 430; this sense is further made clear by the form gāyanti which occurs with seḷenti and vādayanti at Sn. 682. In the riddle on this word we are told that metre,

(20) A.I. p.24: - "Etad aggām bhikkhave mama sāvakānaṃ bhikkhu-nam manomayaṃ kāyam abhinimhitantanam...paṭibhānavantānam.

(21) S.I. p.38 "yadidam Vāṅgīsoti".
syllables, name and the bard are respectively the nidāma or source, viyamājana or expressive flow, sannissaya or base, and āsaya or support. The distinction between nissaya and āsaya should be emphasised in order to realise the true function of the bard; nissaya derives from Skt. ēri or ērī, meaning the base or ultimate constituent; āsaya, on the other hand, is related to ē, to sleep or lie down, and denotes a refuge. Thus, the bard alone is responsible for the preservation of the ballads; he is not said to be the creator of the gāthā, but only its support, and therefore the support of what is already created.

From the evidence we can draw the following conclusions:— (1) there was an early belief in the revealed character of certain verses which belong to the earliest period; this we may call the first period when the material was still in a floating condition; (2) the bards of the second period, in which the already existing floating verse material was set to a certain order, though not the authors of the verses, were responsible for their preservation; and this preservation was ensured by a more or less systematic presentation of the gāthās in groups; (3) the ballads also served the purpose of song, and people could earn their daily necessities by singing them.

That the singing of the ballads was accompanied by musical instruments is shown by Sn.449. Mara’s lute falls to pieces as he is singing his sad defeat at the hands of the Buddha; this lute appears to be an accompaniment of such songs in general. Whether dance was an essential factor in these circumstances is not possible to say; the occurrence of naccati with gāyati is considered generally late; at any rate, so far as Sn. is concerned, naccati does not occur.

After showing that all the mixed ballads ultimately go back to a

(22) e.g. gāthābhīgītām me abhojaneyyam: “not mine to enjoy (presents) for charming verses” Mrs. Rhys Davids’ Translation.
pure verse type, and that the verse ballads in a large measure derive from a floating mass of unconnected popular verses, it is easy to follow the general course of development from this primitive type during the passage of centuries, though it is impossible in the present state of our knowledge to do so in any individual example.

In the beginning of the ballad poetry the individual verses were probably of the inspired or revealed type. Once given expression spontaneously they would be repeated from person to person in that early community where literature could thrive only through oral instruction; a time must have soon arrived when such verses became numerous and disconnected, and fears were entertained concerning the preservation of the tradition. Bards of a less inspired type came to the rescue; they used their gifts in recasting this material in connected groups and thus helped their preservation through oral tradition. It should be mentioned here that to this age also belong many new verses and ballads. The belief in the revealed character of such verses could only be kept up by an authentic declaration of the circumstances which led to the inspired uttering. This declaration was generally in prose and was so handed down with the verse itself.

As this whole tradition was popular, it is easy to see how the simple statement of a small incident came later to be developed into different stories. This uninterrupted tendency of the early bards to explain the circumstances in which a particular gāthā came into being is still perceivable in Buddhaghosa. In the beginning of his commentary (Paramattha-jotikā) to Sn, he says

yena yattha yadā yasmā vuttā gāthā ayām imam
vidhiṃ pakāsayitvāna karissam' atthavaṇṇanam

"I will explain the meaning of this verse by first describing where,
for what reason, at which time and by whom it was (first) uttered. It is clear from this statement how the later Buddhists considered the origin of a gāthā. This tendency alone was responsible for the numerous incidents and stories in the Buddhist Canon which would never have found such a place otherwise.
PART I.  CHAPTER II.

THE SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF THE PERIOD.

In the Sutta-Nipāta we are dealing with an early stage of society long before the systematised Buddhist community came into being, for the word "Saṅgha" in the sense of an organised Buddhist Church occurs very seldom in the verse; in fact, it occurs but once in the Ratanasutta (Sn.222-238); in all other circumstances only the Buddha and the Dharma are praised (see e.g. Sn.180; 192 etc.), which shows in itself how late the Ratanasutta is when compared with the other ballads. This word occurs frequently in compounds meaning "group" as in nātisaṅgha or "assembly", as in devasaṅgha. Restricting ourselves to the verse material of Sn we thus get an accurate view of the general social background which must have prevailed in the early period of ballad poetry.

Society was divided into the four classes first mentioned in the famous Purna ś hymn of the ṚgVeda. In Sn 314-315 the four castes are mentioned together as suddavessika, Khattiya and brahmabandhus. Three of these are mentioned at Sn. 455, namely, brāhmaṇa, rājaputta and vessiyāna; at Sn 138 only the khattiyas and brāhmaṇas are referred to. Beside these four Vedic castes a fifth one is also mentioned in the Vasalasutta (Sn.137 ff). in the word caṇḍālaputta. The most important of these castes are naturally the brāhmaṇas and khattiyas, who played such an important part in the development of Vedic civilization.

(1) Brahmabandhus are khattiyas, but this term implies that they are related to the Brahmins; consequently the four castes are implied here, though no explicit statement to that effect is made.
The word "brāhmaṇa" occurs more than a hundred times in Sn, both by itself and in compound words, while "khattiya" or "brahmanabandhu" or "rājaputta" together occur less than forty times; the numbers indicate the relative importance of these two castes at that time. The general tone of Sn is that of respect and deep regard for the brāhmaṇas. In Sn. 284-315 a twofold division is made representing the ancient and the more modern brāhmaṇas, and the Buddha describes his doctrine as a going back to this ancient type, "who were ascetics, knowers of themselves, who wandered forth in the world, leaving behind the five fields of desire; they had neither cattle, nor gold, nor yet corn; their only wealth was self-study (Sajjhāya) which great treasure they protected (Sn. 284-285); they were unconquerable, protectors of dhamma, and were welcome at all houses (Sn. 288); for 48 years they practised brahmacariya (Sn. 289); when they married they were faithful to their wives (290); they practised morality (sīla), and cultivated straightforwardness (ājīvya), sotheartedness (maddava) and non-injury to living things (avīhiṃsa), (Sn. 292)."

Among the requirements of a true brahmaṇa are mentioned the three Vedas, viśakarana, pada, japa, nighandu and Ketubha, they are called mantabāndhavas (Sn. 140), friends of the hymns, or mantapāragus, well-versed in the hymns. In the definition of a muni we also note the expression mantabhāṁvin (Sn. 850) which may mean either a good advisor or a singer of hymns.

We have no indications, as yet, of the asrama theory in the ballads; the period of studentship and the householder's life are both

(2) i.e. period of studentship when one has to remain celibate, and live a simple life.

(3) Sn. 595; 1020, on the identification of these texts, see below, Chapter III. p. 49-50
mentioned in the description of the ancient brahmas, but there is
no reference to these four stages of a man's life.

The chief occupation of this caste appears to be connected with
ritual. We read of mahāyaṇas, or great sacrifices, which entailed
great expenses. Thus, Bāvari, after performing one of these, did not
possess even 500 gold coins to present to another brahmaṇa who came
begging to him (Sn. 976 ff). Unfortunately, we have no detailed informa-
tion concerning the mode of the sacrifices, and this, it may
incidentally be noted, favours the popular origin of the ballads. In
view of the mighty expenses involved in the mahāyaṇas, such incidents
must have been rare in their simple lives, since generally they were
poor. According to the Brāhmaṇadāmmikasutta, this poverty and the
greed for riches was the origin of a different kind of sacrifice. At
first they were poor but virtuous and well-honoured; the Kṣatūyas
were rich and powerful. In due course, through the greed for wealth,
they composed hymns (mante ganthetvā) and approached the rulers with
the request to perform sacrifices. Ordered by the brahmaṇas the rulers
performed the Assamedha, Purisamedha, Sāmmāpasā and Vaijapeya sacri-
fices and distributed immense wealth to the priests; this process led
to the ultimate downfall of the ancient brahmaṇa type. Passages of this
type show that at the time of the ballads the brahmaṇas were a priestly
caste, and that ritual played the central rôle in their daily life.

Among the commoner forms of sacrifice the Agghutta (Sk. Agnihotra)
is the most important, for at Sn. 568 it is said to be the "mukha" of
the Yaṇṇas, i.e. their best, greatest or most excellent part; but this
was not confined to the priestly caste alone; the herdsman Dhaniya
says (Sn. 18): "my house is well covered and the sacrificial fire is
lit" (āhito gini; cp. Sk. āhitagni). By performing such sacrifices one
attains the countless merit (Sn. 428).
The brāhmaṇas, in short, were held in a high esteem in this ancient community. Spiritually they represented the most advanced men and so, were in a position to benefit quickly by the doctrines of the Buddha. It is only when individual brāhmaṇas come into close contact with the Buddha that we realise some of their short-comings, and foolish theories. This is seen in Vasalasutta, for instance; the brāhmaṇa calls the Buddha a Vasala, but is unable to define the term. Similarly Sundarī-Kabhāradvāja calls the Buddha a non-brahmin, but is himself unable to define the Sāvatti (Sn. 457-458).

About the Khattiyas we get even less informed than about the brāhmaṇas; from the little that is mentioned of them we learn that they formed the ruling class. The equation Khattiya-rājaputta (Sn. 455) and the use of Khattiya to describe kings like Bimbisāra suggest that this term was specially restricted to the reigning aristocracy. They were masters of the chariot, victorious in their fights, and lords of the people (Sn. 552-53); they had armies led by a general (Sn. 556) but we are not told of how these armies were composed. They were supposed to perform sacrifices, like the brāhmaṇas; perhaps the two castes helped each other in these sacrifices, so that in course of time the ruling caste was called "brahmabandhus" or relatives of the brāhmaṇas; but the great sacrifice like Assamedha were performed by the brāhmaṇas (4) for the kings.

Nothing is said about the private and public life of the Khattiyas. From the general tone of the ballads it appears that we are still in the first stages of an established society. We do not find here the constant fights which are so frequently referred to in the Rg Veda;

(4) See Sn. 303; the form yajityēna has a causal signification as shown by the preceding instrumental brāhmaṇehi and means "having caused the performance of the sacrifice".
the pioneering days are over, and a quieter atmosphere prevails; it is
the same as in the Upanishads.

The two remaining Vedic castes occur together but once, at Sn.314; they are mentioned only in a special case. When the ancient sacrifices had been contaminated by the killing of innocent animals the performers of the sacrifice fell short of their duties and failed in Dhamma, and the different castes, forgetting the rightful barriers, disgraced the women with consequent caste confusion. This passage is thus suggestive of the endogamic nature of the caste system.

Concerning modes of settlement we notice the following words:

janapada, raṭṭha, nagara, nigama, gāma, pura and rājadhānī and assama.

The exact difference between raṭṭha and janapada is not very clear, but where janapada is used by itself without any qualification it stands merely for a country in general, whereas raṭṭha everywhere denotes a kingdom. The term "raṭṭha raṭṭham" suggests the existence of many kingdoms in which the disciples of Gotama wandered to dispense the enlightened message of the master (Sn.444). Rājadhānī, a royal city, is not to be found in the ballads; its place is occupied by "nagara" which stands for the principal town in the country or kingdom, and is actually used for Rājagaha, the capital of Bimbisāra's kingdom Magadha (Sn.414); gāma denotes a village. The term nigama is not so easy; in Sn 995 it appears between gāma and janapada, and if this fact be any indication as to the meaning, we can only conclude that nigama stands midway between gāma and janapada in point of size. It may represent a big town other than the capital, being different from nagara. Pura is a fortress, and thus every well protected city is denoted by pura. Assamas are isolated groves situated on the banks of rivers in the vicinity of small villages.

From this it would appear that the then known country was
divided into kingdoms of which the capitals were called nagara (later rājadānī), having smaller towns called nīgamas and villages called gāmas; these last constituted the fundamental units. The king ruled over these villages, but the precise mode of government is not treated in the ballads. People seeking solitude resorted to the quiet assamas, the beautiful hermitages in the middle of wild and gorgeous nature, within easy reach of civilisation. The villagers supplied them with articles of food and sometimes paid tribute in the form of money (ā-yaś). When a new assama was inhabited by a famous man his fame attracted the people to the spot and a new and prosperous village would soon spring up. It was specially in such cases that tribute would be paid to the sage (Sn. 976-79)

The expression brāhmaṇa-gāma occurs only in the prose introduction to the Kasibharadvajasutta (Sn.p.13). If we confine ourselves to the verses, we may safely assume that each village was inhabited by all the castes. Thus, a village community was more extensive than mere castes, for it contained all the elements. Communal villages must be of later date, as a result of a stiffening of the caste system and the introduction of endogamy.

The hetaera system seems to have existed, for at Sn.108, the word vesīya occurs. Drinking was known as proved by one of the conditions of the "Aṭṭhaṅgika-Uposatha" (Sn. 398) and gambling appears to have been popular.

The burning social problem of the day centered in the division of castes; people incessantly asked whether it was birth (jāti) or trade (Kamma) which determined caste. In both the Vasala- and Vāsetṭha-suttas Gotama tries to prove that the sphere of action alone determines one's caste. The existence of such a problem points to the strengthening
and almost stifling hold the system had on the general life of the community. In the story of Mātanga we see the fine example of a Čandāla, an outcaste, who rose to such eminence that brāhmaṇas and khaṭṭiyas came to honour him (Sn. 137 ff). The moral pointed out is

\[
\text{na jaccā vasāla hoti na jaccā hoti brāhmaṇo} \\
\text{kammanā vasāla hoti kammanā hoti brāhmaṇa.}
\]

Reading this with the Vāsasūrīsutta, Sn. 650, we conclude that the problem really centred round the brāhmaṇa. This community must have reached to great power and influence, causing jealousy and anxiety in the bosoms of the less favoured castes. In fact, the social ascendency of the brāhmaṇas should have been unquestionable at this time, and they must have already created a hierarchy of priests, based solely on the qualification of birth.

Beside the Vedic castes discussed above, we already notice the existence of other groups of religious communities. The words sāmaṇa, paribbājaka, bhikkhu, and a host of others are met with with different frequencies. We may conclude from this that the old order of caste division was undergoing imperceptible change and a new order of ascetics was coming to reform it.

The most important among this group of terms is the word bhikkhu, which occurs more than eighty times in the verse ballads. In frequency of appearance it is a worthy rival to the word brāhmaṇa, and together with sāmaṇa it is more numerous.

Bhikkhus, in the later technical sense, are those who have entered the Buddhist Church; since no such order is mentioned in Sn, it indicates in general one who has accepted the teachings of the Buddha. That this

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(5) Sn. 142.

(6) First noticed by Pāṇini: - "Pārāṣāryaśīlālībhīyam bhikṣu-naṭa-sūtrayoh; IV. 3. 110; see also III.2. 168:Sanāśāmsabhikṣa uḥ."
had nothing to do with the caste division of society is shown clearly at Sn. 343-44 where Nigrodhakappa is called both a bhikkhu and a brāhmaṇa. At Sn 514 he is defined as one who has attained parinibbāna, overcome doubts, and left behind both becoming (bhava) and decay (vibhava), and has crossed over rebirth. These bhikkhus are contrasted to the Upāsakas (Sn. 376 ff).

The former are supposed to have left the world for the wandering life, and the latter are still leading a worldly life; but both have accepted the teachings of the Buddha. Just as the early division into the four castes had created a brahmical hierarchy, this division of the community into laymen and bhikkhus led to the creation of an organised church.

"Samaṇa" appears to be used in the incipient sense of bhikkhu though the general meaning is recluse or wanderer. It is also an expression used to describe the Buddha; it is important to note here that while he is called a samaṇa, in the whole Sāha the term bhikkhu is never applied to him. The combination samaṇa-brāhmaṇa occurs several times, but not bhikkhu-brāhmaṇa. In Sn. 520 a samaṇa is said to be one who has realised the worthlessness of this and the other world, crossed over birth and death, leaving both good and evil behind. Four classes of these are mentioned in the Cundasutta (Sn. 83-90); they are called Maggajinas, Maggadesakas, Maggajivins and Maggadūsins, and this is the order of their greatness and accomplishments; this division is not a real classification into sects; the names suggest only the attainments of the samaṇas.

It is clear from the above discussion that the institution of the samaṇas is older than that of bhikkhus and this latter is the outgrowth of Buddhism. The Buddha, himself a samaṇa or a wandering

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(7) See Faqini II. 170.
(8) Sn. 100, 129, 130, 515, 518, 520, 529, 828, 890, 932.
(9) Sn. 714, 866, 888.
mendicant, was responsible for this institution of bhikkhus, since only his disciples who have accepted the homeless life are called by this name.

The words "samaṇasaṅgha" (Sn.556) and "bhikkhu-saṅgha" (Sn.1015) occur only once in the description of the Buddha. Of these, "bhikkhu-saṅgha" is certainly later, for it occurs in the legend of Bāvari, where the Buddha is represented as being surrounded by an assembly of bhikkhus; at Sn.550 he is said to shine like the sun among the samaṇas.

The last word Paribbājaka, a wanderer, occurs only twice in S. It is more frequently met with in the prose works of the canon. The connection between paribbājakas and samaṇas is not clear from the ballad literature.

In the general outward behaviour of the samaṇas, paribbājakas or bhikkhus no great difference is noticeable. They left home to wander in the world and this act was called "Pabbajjā." This was the chief point in the career of a bhikkhu; this homeless life was called "Anagāriyam". The essential feature was a marvellous moral control combined with a distaste for all worldly possessions. The mode of living was called bhikkhācariya (Sn.700); they wandered from place to place and depended on the householders for the necessities of life. The duration of their stay must have been very short indeed, since in the Dhāniyasutta the Buddha is supposed to have stayed only one night on the banks of the river Mahi(ekarattivāso). They never seem to have wandered in groups since the main factor which decided for this life was solitude and quiet; such suttas as the Uraga and Khaggavisāṇa are wholly devoted to this aspect.

In the Sabhiyasutta (Sn.538) it is mentioned that the Buddha crossed the stream of existence after rejecting the sixty three philosophical systems professed by the samaṇas. We cannot see much truth
in this figure; for it reflects a very general number; in the Brahmajālasuttanta, of the Dīgha we notice similar figures; but the most important seem to be five or six, which are mentioned by the name of the famous teachers who adopted them: it proves the existence of different views which were prevalent among the wandering monks, which paved the way for later schisms in the Buddhist order. These different views often led to discussions, which, according to the Buddha were fruitless efforts (Sn. 828) and caused only ultimate sorrow.

Such disputations and discussions were called variously as Kathā, vivāda, vāda and pavāda, and they took place in assemblies (parisā, Sn. 826). They seem to resemble the assemblies mentioned in the Brāhmaṇa literature, in which the brāhmaṇas used to meet and discuss the highest truths; these earlier ones were called "brahmodyā". Corresponding to this we notice the term "Kathojjā" (Sn. 825, 828) which the commentary Pj (II.p.541) rendered as "Kalaha", the original meaning appears to be nearer "brahmodyā" i.e. a gathering in which important questions were freely debated upon; the debate, while ensuring the advance of knowledge by the exchange of views, was itself liable to become uncontrollable and productive of the opposite results. It is in consequence of such a possibility that the Buddha strongly advises against these debates and the commentary regards Kathojjā as a synonym of Kalaha or quarrel, dispute, etc. In these debates the samānas took part, and manifested the same feelings of jealousy, pride and a deep hankering for truth as in the Upanishadic debates.

In the word "Uposatha" we see the first germ from which the whole of the Vinaya literature sprang up. It is found only four times in Sn; the most simple definition is given at Sn. 153. The Yakkha

Hemavata:— "Tonight is the fifteenth, the Uposatha; the night is beautiful; let us go and see the wonderful teacher Gotama". From this we may gather that certain days in the month were kept apart for holy communion and people were in the habit of visiting renowned teachers for spiritual enlightenment; such meetings took place in the night. These observances were not limited to the disciples of the Buddha, for in this case the Yakkhas Sātāgira and Hemavata were not disciples yet; this was a practice which existed from the earlier Brāhmaṇa period.

At Sn. 400-401 the Uposatha is said to consist of eight parts, "atthaṅga Uposatha", viz. (1) not to destroy life; (2) not to take what is not given; (3) not to speak untruth; (4) not to use intoxicating drinks; (5) to desist from unchaste sexual intercourse; (6) not to eat in the night; (7) not to adorn oneself with garlands and scented paints, and finally (8) to sleep either on cots or the earth on a rug. This uposatha is to be observed on the eighth, fourteenth and fifteenth of the Pakkha or half-lunar month. We may be sure that this is a late outgrowth of Buddhism and did not form a part of the Buddha's teachings; for, the eight rules which constitute the ceremony represent the highest moral qualities necessary to the spiritual growth of a man; they correspond to the ten commandments of the Christian Church; as such the Buddha would have been the last man to limit their observance to certain days only in the half-lunar month.

Originally in the Brāhmaṇas the Upavasatha was the day preceding the one on which the new - and full-moon sacrifices took place, that is, the fourteenth of the half-lunar month; "it was a fast day and was

(12) It is called vikalabhojana.
chiefly taken up with preparatory rites, such as the sweeping and trimming of the fireplaces and lighting of the fires; the personal restrictions involved in the householders' entering the vrata included chiefly the abstention from certain kinds of food, especially meat, and from other carnal pleasures... and the sleeping on the ground in one of the chief fire houses". In course of time the sacrificial significance of the term came to be replaced by a more general sense of a holy day kept for religious communion and meditation. The fasting continued to be its chief feature, but was further combined with spiritual instruction. There are no literary remains which trace the gradual shifting of the original significance, but the course seems to be fairly clear. The fortnightly observances soon came to be replaced by the weekly observances and the restrictions were more clearly enumerated; this, then, formed the Āṭṭhaṅgika Upasatha, since the restrictions were eight in number.

The use of the Upasatha in the Vinaya for the meeting in which the recitation of the Pātimokkha was a chief event is not met with in the ballads of Sn. At this period it was the common characteristic of all the religions, and its special significance as in the Brāhmaṇas or the Vinaya books was held in abeyance.


(14) Fast days in modern Indo-Aryan are still called "Upavāsa" or "upāsa" days, and depend on the phases of the moon. See also As. (Toptā, IV. 18): Hultsch. p.123.
PART II. CHAPTER III.

Literature known to the Ballads.

The word "veda" and its compounds occur many times in the ballads, and in the same sense as in the Upanishads. Besides standing for the whole group of the Samhitā texts, it denotes knowledge, and religious or holy thrill equal to samvaga.

So far as Sn is concerned none of the Vedas are mentioned actually by name, reference is made to three in the description of Bāvari (Sn. 1019) as

"tiṇṇam vedāna pāragū".

- one who has gone beyond the three Vedas. This is a direct reference to the Samhitā texts, since in the previous stanza Bāvari's disciples question the Buddha on his birth, gotra, and acquaintance with the Mantras. These three must be identified with the Rg. Yajuṣ and Sāman collections, for in those parts of the Upanishads where the three Vedas are mentioned together only these three are actually named. These collections are also called "Chandas", for at Sn. 568 we are told that the Sāvittī hymn is the mukha, "mouth" of the Chandas, i.e. the best, greatest or most excellent part. Under the term "gāyatrī" it represents a definite metre, consisting of three quarters and 24 syllables; and the term "chandas" is equally used for metre. But in the present case the definite use of Savitā instead of gāyatrī suggests


(2) i.e. mastered.

(3) e.g. Chān. I. 4.2; I. 3.7; etc. (for all four Vedas, see Chān. III. 1-4, 2-4; VII. 1.4, etc). Gītā: IX. 17.

(4) R.V. III. 62; the most sacred hymn, sung to this day by all Hindus.

that Chandas is used without doubt for the Vedas in general and the Rg Veda in particular.

The word vedagu occurs sixteen times in Sn, meaning either a learned man or a student of the Vedas; vedântagu also occurs in the same sense at Sn 463 in the phrase "vedântagu vusita-brahmacāriyo" but the occurrence of words such as havya, yajetha and brahmaṇa in the same verse suggests that the second sense is intended. The expression "tevijja" in Pāli corresponds to the Upanishadic "trayī vidyā", and occurs only once in Sn in the description of the brahmaṇas Vāsetṭha and Bhāradvāja (Sn 594-595). In the present case the reference is clearly to the threefold Vedas. In the later Buddhist interpretation it represents the threefold knowledge of the Buddha and the Arahats defined as remembrance of former births (pubbenivasaṭṭha), insight into the future destiny of all beings (cuta-ūpattiṇāṇa) and the knowledge of the destruction of the āsavas (āsavānam khayaṇāṇa). The possibility of its representing the three baskets or "tipiṭaka" should be recognised, but the word "piṭaka" does not occur in the early ballads. These are facts sufficient to show that the ballad poets knew of the three Vedas in their Samhita texts and considered their knowledge as a qualification in their spiritual life.

Reference to the Atharva Veda is clearly meant in the word "Athabbāṇa" which only once in Sn 927, followed by supina and

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(6) Sn 472, 479, 529, 733, 749, 890, 1049.
(7) Sn 322, 458, 459, 503, 528, 846, 947, 1059, 1060.
(8) Chân I.4.2ff.
(8a) Al. p. 164 ff.; see PD under "tevijja" and "vijja". This knowledge of the destruction of the āsavas is ultimately the same as the recognition of the origin of dukkha and the Path leading to its removal.
lakkhana. Together with words like viruta, and gabbhakarana it bears a meaning of secret or black magic, which is not far different from what scholars attribute to the fourth Veda. This is a clear indication of its nature, a science of charms, incantations and spells. At this time it was clearly on the same level as prognostication by means of signs, stars and the cries of birds; and it was never called by the term Veda, possibly because it was a forbidden science which had not gained recognition as the last Veda.

The Brāhmaṇa texts are never mentioned by name; but this is also true in the case of the Upanishads, and therefore this fact does not prove anything. The actual mention of the Mantras suggests that the Brāhmaṇa texts were known, and these were perhaps included in the term Veda. The Upanishadic literature, like the Brāhmaṇas, is not directly referred to. But the word "upanisā" occurs once in Sn with a meaning which is not far from that denoting the texts. In the example occurring in Sn 322.

"sotāvadhanūpanisūpapanne"

Fausbøll translates upanisā as assiduity. Phonetically the word represents Sanskrit Upanishad. The suggestion to derive it from upa + ni + erti meets with the phonetic difficulty of the single s. The general meaning as given in P.D. is cause or means (Kāraṇa, payojana), or likeness, counterfeit, and this use is extensively seen in the prose works of the canon. In the present instance none of these give a correct explanation of the phrase given above. In the preceding verse

(9) Cp. mantrabrāhmaṇayor vedaṁmadhyeyam.
(10) Cp. parisa from Sk. paridad.
(11) P.D.q.v. as a contracted form of upanissaya.
we are given the simile of a boatman who not only crosses the stream himself, but also carries others beyond it in his boat; in this verse a vedagu is compared to the boatman; he has the power of taking others to the final goal, that is, he is capable of making others realise this goal; to continued the simile, the people in the boat are compared to those who are full of attention (sotavadhānūpapanna) and full of Upānisā (upaniśūpapanna). Only in such a state of affairs can a Vedagu lead the others to their goal. It appears from this context that the meaning is nearer secret doctrines or holy knowledge than to assiduity or cause or likewise. In such a case they probably represent vaguely the earlier Upanishadic literature.

Verse 595 reads "We are adept in all that which is said to belong to the threefold knowledge (i.e. the three Vedas); we are padakas, veyyā-karanaś and in japa we are equal to the best teachers". The meaning of "Padaka" is not very clear; the word pada is used only once in the sense of "word, expression" (Sn. 252), four times in the sense of "goal" and once as "step" in the expression "padā-padaṃ". In compounds like dhamma-pada it stands word or expression, janapada, place of the people, land or country; catuppada, foot, and in nibbana-pada for the state of nibbana. We are perhaps not far from the truth if we infer that padaka means one who is well versed in the Pada text of the Vedas. The next term "Veyyākarana" denotes one who is master of the science of grammar or exposition (Sk. nirukti, Pāli-niddesa). It is thus possible from this to conclude the existence of the Pada text and the science of grammar.

Mention is further made of Itiḥāṣa, Nighanda, and Keṭubha in Sn. 1020;-

"lakkhaṇe itiḥāṣe ca sanighanaṇḍasaketoṣe."
These three are certainly among the accomplishments of a true brahma. Itihāsa refers to epic lore, as embodied, for example in the Mahābhārata;

The second word nighāṇḍu is derived from a prakritised Sanskrit form nighaṇṭu (nir-grantha) meaning vocabularily, and more especially "Vedic glossary"; five of these glossaries have been commented upon by Yāska in his famous Nirukta.

The last word is most difficult to explain. Buddhaghosa explains it as "the science which assists the officiating priests by laying down rules for the rites, or by leaving them to their discretion". P.D. thus explains it as ritual or Kalpa. It is possible to identify it with any of the existing Kalpa-sūtras.

According to Barua, "the Buddhist Kāmasutta (i.e. Sn.76-77) presupposes treatises on Erotic or Eugenic Morals, latterly systematised in the Kāmasūtra ascribed to Vātsyāyana". This is very ingenious suggestion substantiated by some material from the earliest Upanishads, for the names of Śvetaketu, the son of Uddālaka, and Bāhravya are mentioned among the earliest eugenic philosophers. The views of these philosophers are described as "pañca-Kāma-guṇa-dīṭṭha-dhamma-nibbāna-vāda.

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(12) Tradition, legend, story; See S.B. 11. 1.6.9; 13. 4. 3.12; 14. 5.4.10; occurs with purāṇa, Chān. VII. 1.2.4; 3.4, 1;


(14) Barua, p.337.

(15) Barua, p.337. 341; D.I. p.34.
PART II. CHAPTER IV.

Some Parallel Passages.

On the question of the interrelationship between the epic and Upanishadic literature, Hopkins remarks: "Sporadic parallels between the epic (Mahābhārata:MBh), generally the Gītā, AnuGītā and Śānti and various Upanishads have often been noticed. As illustrative material all these passages are valuable, but they give no evidence that the epic has copied, if the mutual resemblance is only of general content or is given by similar or even identical verses, when these are not connected as in the supposed model". This remark is particularly true of the ballads, for there are no connected passages found here which are either identical or similar in content with those of the Upanishads. In fact, the number of identical verses is very negligible, and the terms of expression which are common to both, though considerable, are not beyond count. It has, therefore, been found necessary to consider, beside the older Upanishads, texts like the Gītā from MBh, for instituting comparison. The parallelism may roughly be said to run in two directions, viz. similarity in content and similarity in expression, i.e. identity of word groups; but they are often indistinguishable. Accordingly no attempt is made to separate them into different sections.

1. The first passage to be noted here is Sn. 440:

"Esa muñjam parihare (dhir atthu idha jīvitaṃ saṅgāme me matam seyyo yau ce jive parājito)"

The expression muñjam parihare occurs only in the Jātaka so far as

(1) The Great Epic of India, by E. Washburn, Hopkins, 2nd impression 1920, p.27.
(2) See J.RAS. 1930, pp.107-109, F.Otto Schrader on "Esa MUŅJAM PARIHARE"
the Nikayas are concerned. Oldenberg has collected five passages, from Vedic literature where mūñjamekhalā appears in connection with pari-

of these one may be mentioned here: S.B. III. 2.1.10:

atha mekhalām parisārāte

Schrader takes it to mean the same as "vratam badhnāmi"—"the special kind of vow being understood".

2. At S.I. p.184 we have a very interesting passage on the true nature of an assembly, the elders who constitute it and truth:-

n'esā sabbā yattha na santi santo
santo na te ye na vaddanti dharmam,
rāgañcadosañ ca pahāya mohan
dharmam vaddantā va bhavanti santo.

With this should be compared MBh., Udyogaparvan, v.1239:

na sā sabbā yatra na santi vṛddhā
na te vṛddha ye na vaddanti dharmam
nā sau dharmo yatra na satyam asti
na tat satyam yac-chalenābhy-uptvam.

3. The famous simile of the chariot is a common theme of the ballads and the Upahishads; Kath.III.3-4

ātmānam rathinām viddhi sarīram ratham evatu;

buddhi tu sārathim viddhi manāḥ pragraham eva tu;

indriyāni hayān āhur viṣayām-śteṣu gocarān:

Compare S.I. p.33:-

(3) Z.D.M.G. 1908, pp.593-594; the other passages are Gobhila, II. 10.37: trih pradakṣinām mūñjamekhalām parihaṇān;

Kasyāsana Srauti: II. 7.1: mūñjayoktrenā trivṛtā parihaṇaḥ

S.B. III. 2.1.13-14;

(4) This parallelism has already been noticed by Przyluski in his article on Brahmā Sahāmpati which he equates to Sabhāpati; See J.A. 205, 1924. Cf. Hitopadesa, III. 59;
Ujuko nāma so maggo abhayā nāma sa dīsa
rathe ahuja so nāma dhamma akkehi sammuto
hiri tassa apalaṁbho saty-assa parivāraṇam
dhammāham sāraṭṭhaṃ brūmi sammā-diṭṭhi-pure javāḥ.

4. A very prominent idea is found in the exhortation to the way of liberation from death at Kaṭh, 3.14:

Utthiṣṭhata jāgrata prāpya varān nibodhata
(Kṣurasya dhārā nisitā duratyayā
durgam panthas tat kavayo vadanti);
this is beautifully reflected in the whole of the Utthāna-sutta (Sn. 331-334) of which one verse should be noted:-

Utthahatha nisīdatha dalham sikkhattha santiyā
tattā udātho supiṭṭa vo.

5. The Katha passage quoted above uses the simile of a razor to illustrate the difficulty of the path which leads to immortality. This simile recurs in the description of such a path according to the Buddhist conception; it is called "Moneyya" and finds particular favour with Asoka. The passage is at Sn. 716:-

Moneyyam te upāṇīssam khuradharūpamo bhave.

6. There are many passages which are connected with the single idea of Death as he is personified. Taking one word, Maccupasa (share of death), for instance, we observe the following passages.

(5) Sn. 332: Cp. 331. "uṭṭhāhatha nisīdatha ko attho supiṭṭa vo".
(6) Moneyyasutta:— See above, p.
parācaññ kāman anuyanti bālaññ
te mṛtyur yanti vitatasya pāsām; Kath IV. 2;
ha mṛtyupāsān purataññ prapodya
sokatigo modeñte svarga-loke: Kath. I. 16;
and Śv. IV. 15:
tam evam jñātvā mṛtyupāsāmā chinatti

This getting beyond the snares of Death is the same as the positive
attainment of nibbāna. Sn.166.

Sīhañ vēkataram nāgañ kāmesu anapekhiñañ
upasamkamma pucchāña maccupāsa pamoçanam.
A similar imagery is seen in the phrase Maccu-mukha of which two cases
are found at Katha:-
(sukhan rātriñta sāyita vitamanyuñh
tvām dadṛśivān) mṛtyumukhāt pramuktam: I.11; and III. 15
where deliverance from death results from a knowledge of Brahman:-
(Aśabdamasparśam arūpañ avayaya
 tathārasañ nityañ agandhavac ca
 anādyanantañ mahatañ pareñ dhruvañ)
nicāyya tan mṛtyumukhāt pramucyate.
Here it should be observed that the idea of pamoçana or deliverance
is in connection with maccumukha, whereas in the ballads it is used
with maccupāsa.

Compare Sn. 776:-
(passämi loke pariphandamāñañ
pajam imañ tanhāgatam bhavesu)

(7) Cp. J.V. 367:-
Mājā c'esañ mariclea soko rogo c'upaddavo
kharā ca bandhanā c'etā maccupāsa guhāsayo
tāsu ca vissasese poso so naresu narādhamo.
7. A second group of parallel ideas is connected with death and old age, or jāra and mṛtyu:- "Over that bridge (i.e., ātmān), there cross neither day or old age etc".

Chā. VIII. 4.1:-

na jāra na mṛtyuh

Similar passages are


and Sū. 2.12:-

(na tasya rogo) na jāra na mṛtyuh.

Compare Sū. 581

Evam abbhāhato loke maccunā ca jara'yaca

Sū. 1094:-

Nibbānam iti nam brūmi jārāmacca-parikkhayam

and Sū. 1092:-

Jārā-maccu-paṛīqyam dīpam pabhūhi mārīsa.

8. There is only one passage in the Upanishads where the end of dukkha is mentioned; in the ballads it is one of the most commonly used expressions; Svet. VI. 20:-

(Yadā carmuvard ākāsam veṣṭayisyanti mānavaḥ

tadā devam avijñāya) duḥkha-yānantam bhaviṣyati

Compare the innumerable passages

Dukkha's antakaraṇa bhavāmase (Sū. 32),

and Dukkha's antam karissati (or bhavissati).

9. The words gantha - and saṁsaya together contribute another set of passages. Compare

yadā sarve prabhidyante hṛdayasyeṣa granthayah - Kaṭh VI. 15.
bhidyate hṛdayagranthis chidyante sarvasaṃśayāḥ - Mund. II, 2, 8;

with "tam chinnagantham asitam anāsavam" Sn.219.

Sn. 1112: - Yo atitam ādisati anejo chinnasaṃsayo

Compare Gṛtā.

IV. 42: - chītvaināṃ saṃśayam

VI 39: - Etam me saṃśayam Kṛṣṇa chettum arhasy aṣeṣataḥ
tvad anyāḥ saṃsasyaḥ chettā naḥy upapadaye.

10. The most important passage in this respect is certainly
connected with the final goal as conceived in the Upanishads and the
ballads, the Brahma-Ātman and Nibbāna. The transcendental Brahma-Ātman is described as follows:-

Na tatra sūrya bhāti na candratārakaṃ
n'ema vidyute bhānti kato'yam agniḥ
tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvāṃ
tasyabhāsā sarvāṃ idam vibhāti - Kaṭh V. 15; Mund. II, 2, 10;
Śvet. 6.14.

"The sun shines not there, nor the moon and stars,
These lightnings shine not, much less this (earthy)fire!
After Him, as he shines, doth everything shine,
This whole world is illuminated with His Light".

In the Udāna we find a similar description of Nibbāna with the same
imagery and almost the same words:--

(8) Hume, pp.358, 373, 410.
(Yattha āyo ca paṭhavī tejo vāyo na gādhati)
na tattha sukkā jotanti ādioco na-ppakāsati
na tattha candimā bhāti tame tattha na vijjati
(yadā ca attanā vedi muni monena brahmaṇo
atha rūpa arūpāca sukhadukkha pammocati)". - Ud.1,10 (p.9).

11. This final goal is not to be reached through thought, speech nor
listening to: Kaṭṭha II.23.

nāyam ātmā pravacanena labhyah
na medhayā bahunā śrutena.

Compare Sn. 639:-
na diṭṭhiyā na sutiyā na nāṇena
silabbatenaḥviśuddhim āha.

A very suggestive form occurs in the beginning of the Kena-Upani-
shad which reminds one strongly of the questions occurring in the ballads.

The passage in question is Kena 1:

Kenesitam patati preṣitam manah:
Kena prāṇah prathamaḥ praiti yuktaḥ?
kenesitām vācam imām vadanti
caṣuḥ śrotram ka u devo yunakti

with this should be compared Sn. 1032:-
Kena'ssu nivuto loko kena'ssu nappakāsati
kiss'ābhilepanam brūsi kim su tassa mahabhhyam.

13. S.I. p.5:-

(Araññe viharantānam santānam brahmaḍārimañ
śakabhattach bhunjamānam) Kena Vāṇṇo pasidati. (12)

(9) First noticed by Seidenstücker, Udāna, pp.98-99; Barna, p.424.

(10) Barna (p.260, m.3) observes that the Kenopanishad is representative
of the Keniya Jatilas one of whom appears at Vin I,245 ff and Sn.,pp.102-111
(Sela-sutta). The suggestion, ingenious as it is, has no firmer basis than
the identity of names, and therefore premature, since the views of Keniya
are not sufficiently well known to justify the identification.

(11) Cp. Mbh. III.312. 81-82; See WZKM,1906.pp.317-372 on other identifi-
cations.

(12) Kindred Sayings, I.p.7:- "Tell me how look they so serene of hue?"
The phrase "raṇṇo paśīdati" is identical with "varṇa-prāśāda" at Sv. II. 13:—
laghutvam ārogayam alolupatvam
Varṇapraśādām āvara-saṃśāthavām ca etc.

Nabham phaleyya udadhī pi susse
saṃvaṭṭhayam bhutadharā vasundhara
siluccayo Meru samīlam ubbahe
na tv'ev'aham rāja musā bhaneyyaṃ

is strongly reminiscent of Brh. III. 9.28.

yat samīlam āvṛⓡer vṛksam etc.

15. Of quite a different nature are the two following passages: Sn. 762:—
yam pare sukhatō āhu tad ariyā āhu dukkhato
Yam pare dukkhato āhu tad ariyā dukkhato vidū

Gītā II. 69:—
yā niśā sarvabhūtānām tasyām jagarti samāyami.
Yasyām jagrati bhūtānā sā niśā padaēato munēh.

Both illustrate the same principle, but in a different phraseology; what
is sukha or dukkha on the one hand is the same as day or night on the other;
absence of one is the presence of the other, and the true seers are the
ariyas or the munis, for they see things as they are, which is a difficult
thing, indeed, for ordinary people.

16. A more powerful expression concerning the final principle which
remains at the death of a being is found at Sn. 808:—

Ditṭhāpi sutāpi te jāmā
Yesam nāmām idam paścāceti
nāmām evaśāsissati (15)
akkheyyam pāṭassa jantuno.

(13) Hume, p. 398:— "Cleanness of countenance".
(14) Bühlingk’s edn. III. p. 34:— Yat samīlam udvēheyuḥ.
(15) This word has been normally derived from Skāḥkyeya by P.D. and
C.P.D. to denote "to be told, what may be expressed...hence and empirical
object", or "to be pronounced". But the sense does not fit the context
continued on next page.
At the death of a person only the name remains, for by the uttering of a name the persons, who are long since dead, are conjured up on one's memory. This is beautifully said at Brh. III. 2, 12:-

Yājñavalkyeta hovāca, yatrāyam puruṣo mriyate
kim enam na jaḥāṭiti, nāmety- anantaḥ nāme" etc.

"Yājñavalkya", said he, "When a man dies what does not leave him?". 'The name; endless, verily, is the name". Yet, it is a stranger coincidence that in both these texts, this thought did not develop to its logical conclusion.

These examples show how close the relationship is between the ballads and the Upanishads, but they are not of a nature which proves borrowing on either side. The safest conclusion that can be based on this evidence lies more in the direction of a common tradition than on direct borrowing from each other.

Below is a list of some parallels between the ballads and the epic (Mbh. in particular) already noticed by scholars.

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Note 15. continued from previous page.

if we take it as a gerund from Kṣaya. Through the parallelism with the Brh passage, it seems to be derived from Sk. akṣaya, an adjective qualifying nama in the previous line. Phonetically we have no difficulty, and the sense becomes clearer; it will mean "only the undecaying name of the dead creature survives". The identity of the two passages suggests the equation akkhayya = ananta and this is borne out by two passages in Maitri: 2, 4, 6, 28:- "ananto' kṣayyaḥ".

(16) On the Mbh. Jātaka parallels in general, see R. Otto Franke, Jātaka-Mahābhārata-Parallelen, WZKM, 1906, pp. 317-372; for Vinaya and Majjhima, see WZKM, 1910, 1912 respectively. These examples are quoted also from "Die Sutta-nipāta-Gāthās mit ihren Parallelen" Sonderabdruck aus Band 63 (1909), 64, (1910) and 66 (1912) der ZDMG. 1912 (Leipzig).

(a) According to Pāṇini vi.1.81, two gerunds kṣeya and kṣayya are mentioned; it is possible that Pali akkhayya is due to contamination of the two forms akṣeya and aksayya; on this analogy is based Pali seyyā from Sk. sayyā
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Compare also Sn. 568 f with Gītā IX. 18; X. 30; Anugītā 28. 2;
(17) 29. 1.

(17) See Winternitz, Geschichte, p. 7.

for this parallelism.
PART III. CHAPTER V.

Some Fundamental Problems in the Upanishads and the Ballads.

Section A. Atman.

Human thought finds expression in words chosen by spontaneous intuition as vehicles of the thought for which the image contained in the word shows an inner affinity. The more indefinite a thought, the wider its range, i.e., its psychological connection in the system of human sense impression and expression, the more shades of meaning will be expressed by the one and the same image of the word suggesting itself to man as conveying an adequate representation (i.e., figuration, incorporation) of that thought. Therefore in popular language or in poetry one word may express many shades of thought and convey many different notions. This is not so with speculative thought, where the imagery of the word has already been discarded and one shade of meaning has been fixed by the mind as representing this abstract notion and no other. But where speculative thought is a direct result of a popular movement, as in the case of the Upanishads and the Ballads, there is a constant friction between suggestive and technical expressions; as a result there develops a confusion during the gradual evolution of the thought regarding the real notion conveyed by the word, which is lost sight of when the meaning becomes fixed at a later stage. This is specially true of the Upanishads which exhibit a great variety of meanings than the Ballads. To take one example, the Upanishads describe the ultimate world ground by the three different terms Puruṣa or Cosmic Person, Brahma and Atman or Universal Soul; this last word is also used for the individual, soul or particular parts of the
of the body in the same passages. This liquid nature of the notion underlying the word ātmān brings it into conflict with the notions specifically belonging to words like puruṣa, brahman or prāṇa. It is probably on this account that Vāmīhi says - "it sometimes rivals and opposes brahman, sometimes eliminates it through silence, and sometimes lets it live on as its own synonym".

In order, therefore to understand the historical development of the ideas which constitute Upanishadic or Ballad philosophy, it is necessary to study the semantic history of some of the most important terms used. Accordingly, in the present chapter, four principal words have been chosen, namely, puruṣa, brahman, ātmān, and kārman; occurring first in the earliest Indo-Aryan document, the Rg Veda, they form the central concepts of a younger age. This gradual unfolding of the human intellect in the solution of the final problems of life is seen both in the Upanishads and the Ballads, and the two terms ātmān and Kārman, expressive of these solutions, are common to both; the remaining two are necessary for the proper understanding of the development of Upanishadic ideas.

In the dawn of the Vedic age the philosophical spirit had not yet awakened, and the search for the final reality lay dormant within those breasts which were giving expression to the first joys of life. This beautiful literature resulted in the creation of a simple, yet wonderful scheme of the universe, which has been amply described by scholars under the names of mythology, cosmology or cosmogony, and where the principal elemental forces were transformed into god and demons through anthropomorf-

(1) e.g. Tait, II. 1. 1.
(2) "The Upanishads as the landmark in the History of Indian Thought", J.D.L.C., xv. 1927, p.103.
phism. The forces which shaped this Vedic mythology have been variously called by anthropomorphism, theriomorphism, animatism, animism and fetishism. Some of the deities like Dyans, Mitra or the Aśvins were probably of Indo-European origin, while gods like Indra were purely of Indian origin. For most of this early period the elemental nature of these divinities was preserved in a varying degree, but it was less manifest in the principal gods like Indra who resembled men. These personal deities, when they had completely lost their elemental significance, came to be regarded as the highest gods for the time being. Since, logically, there could be but one "highest", the general tendency arose of calling all that exists as one, which is called by various names. These individual gods are but the names of that one god. In this manner the individual deities like Indra, Yama, Mātarisvāna, etc. merged into the One, which at R.V. X. 90, is called the Cosmic Person, the Puruṣa. Thus, the culmination of the period of a host of personal deities is found in the Puruṣa as the ultimate world-ground; he is the creator and sustainer of the world, the be- and end-all of existence. The anthropomorphic nature of this conception is proved by the word puruṣa which is used for man as well; these two uses of the same word are easily distinguishable in the Upanishads. Corresponding to this Cosmic Person are mentioned the shining immortal Persons in the body, eye and so forth.

Side by side with this idea brahmān was slowly coming to the forefront. It occurs in two accented forms in the Rg.Veda, the neuter brahmān and the masculine brahmān. Of these two the neuter plays the more

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1) Keith, pp. 58-75.
2) Ibid., p. 58.
3) "ekam sad vīpra bahudhā vadanti" RV. I. 164, 46.
4) Brh. II. 5.1 ff.
5) Grassmann, p. 916 ff.
6) ibid. p. 917.
7) OrasSmahn, p. 916 ff.
8) ibid. p. 917.
important role, and is nearly twice as frequent as the masculine. It means here the holy word of the Veda, the hymn or (prayer) song of praise; "in the Brāhmaṇas it indicates the liturgy", and then the power of the ritual or the power of praise. This change is consonant with the beliefs of the Vedic Indian in the efficacy of prayer for the fulfilment of his heart's desires. In the earliest period the gods formed the centre of Vedic poetry and prayers were addressed to them for protection and blessings; in the Brāhmaṇa period the interest shifted from the gods themselves and focussed round the sacrifice in the mode of fulfilling desires. This power of the ritual represented the world ground in the concept of brāhman, since the sacrifice was the fundamental doctrine of this period; and it was limited to the priestly caste.

The doctrine of Puruṣa was a product of the activity of a larger community which was responsible for the hymns of the Vedas; that of brāhmaṇ was the unique property of the priests. But inevitably the time must have soon arrived when a conflict between the popular Puruṣa theory and the priestly Brāhmaṇ doctrine was unavoidable, and most likely, the compromise was made at a period when the idea of brāhmaṇ, like that of puruṣa, must have transcended the sacrificial rites. The result was a fusion as in Brh.II.1.13: "ya evāyam ātmapi puruṣa etam evāham brahmopāsa iti, this person who is just in this body (ātmāṇ), him, indeed, I worship as brāhmaṇ". That this fusion preceded the fusion of ātmāṇ with puruṣa is clearly pointed out by the expression "ātmapi puruṣah".

The third term ātmāṇ (P.āta, ātuma, tuma) is for us the most important in that it replaces all the others and represents the culminating point in Upanishadic philosophy. Its origin is clearly of later date

(1) Jacobi, p.4.
than that of brahman though the two ideas may have developed in the same
age. Its development is first seen in the Atharva Veda, and finds its
fulfilment in the Ātman-Brahman doctrine of the Older Upanishads. In these
works the Rg Vedic equation ātman- vāta has no application; the word has,
on the other hand, four new and distinct meanings of body (later heart
and other organs of the body, then essence, embodiment), reflexive pronoun,
individual soul and World Soul, and this is probably the historic develop-
ment.

In Rg Vedic it is primarily used in the sense of breath and second-
arily of the principle of life. This was probably the result of associating
breath with life, since in the animal kingdom breathing is an essential
factor of life. Once this step was accomplished it was easy to extend the
sense from the principle of life to the living organism, this wonderful
complexity we call body. This meaning is clear in expressions like
ātmadūṣī tanūdūṣī (A.V.xvi.1.3) or ātmasad (A.V.v.98). When we come down
to, the Upanishads we note that this usage is restricted to Brh., Chā., Tait,
Kṣ., Kaṭh (6.5) and Śvet (.1.15). Thus in the cosmic interpretation of the
Āsvamedha sacrifice the sun is described as the eye and the year as the
body (ātman) of the sacrificial horse. In the expression adhyātma

(Hume, p.25.
(12) This change is partially seen in the story of the Battle of the Senses
Brh.I. 5.21 ff. where breath is considered the most living thing in the body.
Whitney translates this as soul-contaminating and body-contaminating,
but it is more probable that the two terms are synonyms.
(13) The expressions annamaya, prāṇamaya, ānandamaya, etc. applied to
atman, at Tait I. 195, have been translated as "the self consisting
of food" and so forth. That ātman here is not the self, but the body
or sheath is proved by later Vedānta terminology which used the word
Kosa instead.
(15) Brh.I. 1.1.ff. sūrya's caksuh.....samyatsara ātman'śvasya medhyasya.
"concerning the body" as opposed to cosmic counterparts (adhi-bhūta), the sense of body is clear; similarly ātmanvin, possessed of body, is beyond doubt. The clearest expression is seen at Kaṭh, 4.1.

"parān paśyati nāntarātman"

"looks outside, and not within the body". Brāhmaṇa is described as ākāśātma (Cha, III, 14,2) where ākāśātma certainly means one who has ākāsa or space for his body. The phrase ātmani puruṣah has already been alluded to.

From this sense of body in general it was an easy step to restrict it to one's own body, and thus came its use as a reflexive pronoun. In Brh, I,2,3 we read: "sa tredhā'ṭmanam vyakuruta, he divided himself threefold"; Nrh. I, 3,28: Udgātā ātmane vā yajamānāya vā yaṃ kāmān kāmayeta tam āgayati."the udgātṛ priest obtains by singing whatever desire he desires, either for himself or for the sacrificer." This use of ātman is seen mostly in the earliest prose Upanishads, the remaining just preserve the remnants of a once common use. The later Upanishads do not preserve this sense, and it is interesting to note that āp - in modern Indo-Aryan is a survival of this reflexive pronoun. This is probably a classical illustration of how common dialects preserve the general sense of a word when it is sometimes completely lost in the more literary speech forms, owing perhaps in this case to the high technical meaning which already attached itself to ātman in the early Upanishads.

The later development of ātman is very complicated. From its application to the living body and one's own body as a reflexive pronoun a new analysis comes into being. In Tait,II, 1,1, we read:"sa vā ṣa puruṣo' nnarasamayah: tasyed eva,śirah; ayam dakṣiṇah pakṣah; ayam uttarāḥ pakṣah;

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(16) Psychologically it is the body which represents the soul. See also spiritually the person referring to himself must refer to his body to express it, cp. nobody, or anybody.

(17) Other instances are at Brh, I, 3,2-6; 3,7,17,18; 4,1,3; 4,10; 5,1,3; 15; III, 3,2; IV,4,3; VI,4,2,6; Chā, II. 22,2. Tait 11,9,1; Kṣ, II,11; Pras. 2,3; 3,1; Śvet 1,6;
ayam ātmā; idam pucoham. This passage clearly indicates by the words ātman, ātma; idam, pucoham that ātmā is used not for the whole body, but only for the trunk; ātmā designates the trunk here as opposed to the head, sides and feet (tail or base).

The wonderful nature of life first drew its attention to the living organism and in the quest of solving the seat of life, and consequently of the riddle of life, the living body was subjected to introspective analysis. In the Puruṣa and Brāhmaṇ doctrines the solution was looked forward to in the outside world; here, for the first time, the living body itself became the subject of analysis. The attention paid to the living body in this analysis is a factor pointing to the origin of this theory among the kṣatriyas, since they were the only people who knew the horror of death in battle and thought about the twofold problem of life and death. It is remarkable in this connection that the word ātmā is preferred to brāhmaṇ by the Kṣatriyas.

The process by which the Rg Vedic sense of vātā and life shifted to the living body seems to be reversed here; or else the traditions of the Veda were still preserved and continued a development which is taken completely hodily in the Upanishads. We observe here a tendency to identify the ātmā with a particular part of the living body, first noticed in Tait; unfortunately this analytic process is not fully worked out in the texts; we get only occasional glimpses at it. Thus, in Brh.II.1.17, "ya eso' ntarhrdaya ākāsas tasmin sete - he sleeps within that space which is within the heart", and II.3.4.5, "yas cāyam antarātmann ākāsah....", i.e. the space which is within ātmā together with prāṇa is identified with the formless brāhmaṇ. Both these expressions give us the equation

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(18) See: King Aśvapati in Chāṇ. V. ii.1; Ajātasatru in Brh. II.1.1. ff.
of ātman - ṛṣa. This is proved also at Kāth. 4.12.

"āngusāthamātraḥ puruṣo madhya ātmani tiṣṭhati"
i.e. the person of the measure of a thumb stands in the midst of one's heart. This appears to be the culmination of this process of finding out the most living thing in the bodily organism, for of all organs the heart alone represents the living condition of the body; it is, thus, no wonder that for a time ātman came to be regarded as heart or ṛṣa.

A second step is taken, when on the results of further analysis, its organic nature disappears and a less materialistic conception comes forth. In this stage we find the ātman mentioned with the ten praṇas as forming the eleven Rudras (Brh. III. 9.4), among the praṇas ātman is made of knowledge (Brh. IV. 3. 7 Katama ātmeti yo'yan praṇesu vijnānamayah).

This classification of ātman with the praṇas marks the beginning of a later philosophy; it is now something less materialistic than the bodily organs, and yet has not transcended the ten senses or bodily activities. As such an activity it is dependent on praṇa (III. 9.26 Brh), or on ākāśa (Brh. III. 2.13). In this beautiful dialogue between Jārtkāravā Ārtabhāga and Yājñavalkya, the question is asked regarding what remains of the dead man when his voice enters fire, mind enters the moon, ātman enters ākāśa and sarīra enters the prthivī; ātman is here mentioned with vāc, praṇa (breath), caṅsa, manas, śrotā, sarīra, loman, kesa, lohita and retas; its position is between sarīra and loman rather than with the activities. This is the transition stage from "heart" to "active principle of life", or the psychic principles called "I". With this passage "ākāśam ātmā'pyeti" should be compared antarātmanākasa.

In the next stage in its development ātman becomes the psychic principle. The legend of Indra and Virocana (Chānd. viii. 7.1 ff) represents a phase of this historic development. Through various equations the conception of ātman becomes more transcendental. Once this meaning of the
psychic principle developed, the theory advanced by rapid stages. When we remember that the other two theories of Puruṣa and Brāhmaṇ were flourishing and developing about the same period, it is possible to trace the mutual influences.

On the analogy of puruṣa and Puruṣa the individual and Cosmic Persons, we notice the ātmān and the Vaiśvānara ātmān, the individual and the universal souls. I am inclined to see in this the prior influence of Puruṣa than of Brāhmaṇ. (See Brh. I.4.1 atmaivedam agra āsīt purusavidhah"). Other texts where this identity is carried out are at Brh. IV. 3.7; Tait II. 1-8.1. As mentioned before, this fusion of ātmān with puruṣa followed the conception of brāhmaṇ as puruṣa; but whether this had any effect on ātmān-brāhmaṇ is not so certain. It is possible that this equation was arrived at independently. As Vaiśvānara Ātmān, ātmān is partially identified with dyauṁ, āditya, vāyu, ākāsa, prthivī and so on (Chānd.V.11-17). This passage is suggestive in that it opens with the question - "Konu ātmā kim brahmēti, "what, indeed, is ātmān, and what brāhmaṇ?". It justifies the inference that at this time the two theories were coming into contact. The two passages "atmaivedam agra āsīt purusavidhah. (Brh. I. 4.1) and "brahma va idam agra āsīt (Brh. I.4.11) also prove the rivalry that existed between the two.

When the ātmān came to be regarded as a psychic principle, transcending all bodily activities, (see,Brh.I.4.1.ff; IV.4.7-25; 5-6 ff.) the time was ripe for a compromise between the concepts of ātmān and brāhmaṇ, and as a result we find the shining immortal persons in cosmic and personal or bodily activities identified with ātmān and brāhmaṇ. (Brh. II.5.1ff "tejomayo'mṛtamayah puruşah ayam eva sa yo'yan ātmā; idam amṛtam, idam brāhma, idam satyam"). The following texts more or less directly state the identity of brāhmaṇ and ātmān: - Brh. IV. 4.25; Ait 5.3; Mund 2.2.5 (For
further references See Hume, p. 29 ff).

This represents briefly, so far as the earliest Upanishads are concerned, the general history of the three terms. When this threefold identity was once established, the terms were frequently convertible. The separation of these three ideas in the later Upanishads and the epics and minutely the distinctions drawn freely between them do not concern us here; it belongs to the subsequent history of Indian thought and the development of the different philosophical schools.

The characteristics of this newly developed sense of ātmān are manifold. As the equivalent of brahman and purusa it is the first existent (19) or the Universal principle from which the universe is created. When it becomes embodied it is called 'sārīra ātmān or jīva ātmān.

The following are some of the adjectives which qualify this spiritual atman:

Prajñāna, intelligent self (Brh. IV. 3. 35).

Viśvakṛma, creator of all; pratibuddha, awakened; jyotiṣām jyotiṣ, the light of all lights; mṛtyor mṛtyu, the death of Death; aja, unborn; mahān, great; (Brh. IV. 4. 7-25)

Antaryāmin, inner controller (Brh. III. 4. 1);

Apūrva, without an earlier (20); anapara, without a later; (ibid) anantarā, without inside; abāhyya, without outside; Kṛṣṇa, entire; prajñānaghana, a mass of knowledge; avināśin, indestructible; amochottidharman of indestructible quality; (Brh. IV. 5, 13, 14).

Samprasāda, full of grace;
amṛta, immortal; abhaya, fearless; satya, Real.

(19) Brh. I. 4.1;
(20) Brh. IV. 2.3; 3.35; Tait. II. 3-6.1;
(21) Chā. VI. 3.2, 3;
Vijara, without decay; vimṛtyu, without death; visōka, sorrowless, 
vijīghatsu, hungerless; apipāsa, thirstless; satyakāma, whose desire is 
real; asarīra, without body.

(Chānd. VIII. 1.5; 7.1; 12.1;)

ānanda, bliss; (Kṣ. 3.3;)

ananta, endless; viśvarūpa, of Universal form; (SV.1.9)

They indicate the real nature of this soul, as conceived to be the ultimate reality from which all creation has sprung. It is the world ground replacing the older conceptions of Purusa and Brāhmaṇa, and emphasising the divinity within man.

In connection with the three terms purusa, brāhmaṇa and ātman the Vedic neuter yakṣa, should be noted. A fine study of this word has been made by Hillebrandt so far as Vedic literature is concerned. After criticising Geldner's view of yakṣa—as "a wonderful being, a being full of secret", and Hertel's view as "light, fire", he arrives at the following results:-

(1) bewitching creature (R.V); sinister being (Kan'ṣ).  
(2) Supernatural being of a higher kind (A V)  
(3) Yakṣa A V xi.6.10; Gobh. 3.4.28 (i.e. masculine).

So far as the Upanishads are concerned none of these are appropriate; two passages from A.V and Gopatha Brāhmaṇa are important. A.V.x.8.43 describes the body as a lotus having nine openings in which this yakṣa resides in embodied form; this is called brāhmaṇa; G.B.(1.1) makes Brāhma say—"mahad vai yakṣam tad ekam evaśmi". Clearly yakṣa stands for purusa or

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(24) Die Arische Feuerlehre I. p.43.  
sattva in the body as identified with brahmā.

In Brh V.5.1 we have yakṣa directly identified with brahmā:—"Sa yo haitam mahad yakṣam prathamajam veda satyam brahmaṇि—'He who knows that yakṣa as the first born, namely, that it is Brahmā, the real'. The only other use of it is seen in Kena (15,16,19,20,23,24,25) as describing brahmā or as its equivalent. In these passages brahmā is the highest unknowable, difficult to be understood even by the gods.

ĀTMA IN THE BALLADS.

At the very outset it may be mentioned that the conception of atma which is so central in the Upanishads does not play such a rôle in the ballads. The word ātmān has three forms in Pāli,atta,ātuma and tuma, the last one corresponding to Vedic tman; it appears most frequently as atta in compounds, as in anatta or bhāvitatta. The exact connotation is difficult to ascertain. The occurrence of anatta only in two passages suggests a comparatively early period for the ballads; the doctrine of the non-self is a product of later Buddhism when it came to fight with the corrupt theories of ātmān that had come down to the common people from the early Upanishadic period.

By the tone of the passages where the word atta occurs, it seems clear that this is not the central conception of the ballads; at the same time, by the lack of definition, we are led to believe that it was a common concept. There are instances, undoubtedly, where neither the sense of body nor the reflexive pronoun helps to elucidate the meaning of a verse, and we have to seek the explanation in the sense of Upanishadic ātmān or individual soul.

Corresponding to the various senses in the Upanishads we have various meanings of atta in the ballads; that of body is clear in such an expression as ajjhatta, "within the body", Sk. adhyatma;

Sn 919: ajjhattam eva upasame
nānātāt bhikkhu santim eseyya
"The bhikkhu should find peace inwardly (i.e., within his being or body) he should not seek it from others".

The group ajjhata - with bahiddhā occurs eleven times in the Sutta-Nipāta (i.e., 203, 516, 521, 526, 527, 530, 532, 738, 917, 1111, 1113;), where atta, body, is differentiated from surrounding space. In Sn. 585 we have "Kiso vivanno bhavati himsam attānap attaṃ" 

"he becomes lean and pale by himself doing violence to his body". This interpretation is justified by the preceding verse which explains the cause of this paleness and wasting, the last hemistich reading 

 bhīyya'ass' uppajjate dukkhamārīram upahaññati

"to him arise innumerable ills; his body is sore troubled". This persistent use of ātman, through the reflexive - self applied to "body" despite the definite use of sarīra is interesting to note.

The reflexive use of atta is only certain when it is contrasted by one of the pronouns anya -, or para; thus, as instances of reflexive pronoun with para- may be mentioned Sn.132, 438; 451; 782; 888; Thag. 139, 1227; Dh. 50, 84, 160, 166, 291; with anya -, Sn. 888; Dh. 158, 159, 252.

Among other cases where the reflexive use is more or less clear are Sn. 799, 275 etc.

The distinction between the body of the bodily parts as represented by atta - and its use as a reflexive pronoun are not well marked, for the reflexive - self sometimes refers to the body and sometimes to the whole personality including the body. Just as in the Upanishads we notice here certain identifications of atta with the bodily parts, both organic and non-organic (i.e., mental, spiritual etc.), though no systematic process is observed in this. We will take only two obvious equations here, namely

(26) Sn. 583, sammulho himsam attanam; cp. Sn. 585 supra; Thag. 408, dhamanīm chettum attand.
(27) Sn. 659, 799, etc.
atta-hadaya and atta-cetas. Sn. 938 reads

"ath'āthha sallam addakkhiṃ duddasam hadayanissitam"

'and here I beheld this dart, most difficult to see, lying within the heart'. Sn. 592 has

(28)

"attano sukham esāno abbahe sallam attano.

"seeking his own happiness he should pull out the dart of the heart'.

In Sn. 709 we get a similar passage:-

"jhāyetha rukkhamūlasmiṃ attānaṃ abhitosayan"

"he should enter into rapturous meditation, making glad his heart". The heart as the seat of mind is already known to RV (29) and the Upanishads. The expression attadanta has been variously explained.

A.J. Edmonds (Hymns of the Faith, Chicago, 1902, pp. 25-6) interprets this as the man-self-tamed from attana-danto, E.W. Burlingame (Buddhist Legends, H.O.S. 29; p. 233) takes it to mean one who conquers self without exactly indicating what this self stands for; no doubt its reflexive use is clear through itara – in the previous hemistich, and is emphasized in the Dhammapada-commentary. Max Müller (S.B.E.X, p. 32) takes it also as "a man who has vanquished himself". What this term "himself" means is left to the readers' imagination. This explanation is to be sought for in the beautiful dialogue between Dhaniya and the Buddha. In verse 6 (Sn. 23) the Buddha remarks

Cittam mama assavam vimuttam
dīgharattam paribhāvitam sudantam


(29) Keith, p. 437.

(30) Dh. 104-105: - attā have jītam seyyo yā cāyaṃ itarā pajā, attadan-tassa posassa nissam saṃgatacārito, n'eva devo na gandhabbo na mārā saha Brahmunā, jītam apajītam kayirā tathārūpassa jantuno.
where it is the citta which is tamed or restrained. The identity of citta with atta seems to be clear by this passage and cetas which is the same as citta as proved by the expressions cetovimutti (Sn 725, 727) and suvimutta-citta (Sn 975) is thus identical with atta; according to PD, citta is the organ of thought; and this is confused with manas or mind is identified with the heart, as in RV VIII.89.5. We have one passage in Thag where this meaning has to be considered (525):

**Yadā vitakke uparundhiy' attano**

which Mrs. Rhye Davide aptly translates as "When he hath checked the mind's discursive restlessness." (Psalms of the Brethren, p.247).

We now come to a deeper meaning, which though not directly expressed with the convincing tone of the Upanishads, yet yeilds to a careful gleaning, viz. as equivalent with ātmān, the principle of personality. In Sn 508 we read:

**Ko sujjhati muccati bajjhi ca ken' attana gacchati brahma-lokam?**

"Who is it that is purified, is released and bound? By what self (body-mind complex, subtle form) does he go to the abode of Brahmā?" We have here not a definite psychic principle transcending all matter, but the first glimpse of undefined principle of personality which survives the death of the body complex. A more important passage is Sn 705:

**Yathā aham tathā ete yathā ete tathā aham**

**attanam upamam katvā na hanyya na ghataye**

(31) A fine study of this has been made by Mrs. Rhye Davide in Sakya or Buddhist Origins, pp.186-213; also Chap. XI. She remarks: - "We find the word atta (self) used to describe what is evidently not the man as complex of body and mind only, but the very "Man-in-man" - the"soul" or "spirit " to use Western Diction". (p.189).

(32) Cp. Dh 129(od), 130(od).
"Just as I am, so are these; just as they are, so am I; (thus) having taken the Soul as standard, one should neither kill or cause to kill″. In this passage the unity of this atta, the principle of personality is clearly brought to our notice; it is reminiscent of the Upanishadic vaiśvānara ātman, the universal soul and the identity of all living beings. A further passage is found at Sn. 368:

Sāruppaṃ attano viditvā
na ca bhikkhu himseyya kañci loke

"Knowing the sameness (or uniformity) of the soul the bhikkhu should not injure anyone", where this idea of unity is emphasised. The word sāruppa, derived from sa-rūpa has the two meanings, "of the same form" and "of the same nature"; in this case the second is preferable, for rūpa is here used in the same way as - ātmaka "of such nature".

For a more exact definition of this sense we have to refer to Sn. 937.

Samantaṃ asare loko diśā sabbā sameritā
iccchaṃ bhavanāṃ attano nādassāsim anositaṃ

"The world is everywhere without substance; all the quarters, in a state of flux. Wishing for shelter for the atta, I found no place fit for it". Here the condition of atta is in opposition to adara "without substance", samerita, "condition of motion, state of flux", thereby representing sara or substance and anerita or "absence of flux" that is, "unchanging". This is perhaps the only passage where the meaning is so clear. It is of this self that Thag. 653 says one should guard it like a city which is protected well at every corner, or Thag. 412: Karohi sudīpam attano"

(33) Cp.Bhagavad-Geitrā, 6.32; ātmaupaṇēva sarvatra samam, pasyati yo'ṛjuna.
(34) This important idea should be compared with the Upanishadic equation ātman = bhāmān.
"make the atta your guiding light". A somewhat similar idea is expressed in S.l. p.75.

Sabbā disānaparigammas cetasā
n-ev-ajjhagā piyataram attano kvacī
evaṃ pīyo puthi atta paresām
tasmā na himse param atta-kāmo.

which Mrs Rhys Davids translates as follows:

The whole wide world we traverse with out thought, And nothing find to man more dear than Soul, Since aye so dear the Soul to others 'is, Let the Soul-lover harm no other man.

Here also we see atta used in the universal sense, as is reflected in the famous discourse of Yājñavalkya to his wife Maitreyī, where Ātmān is described as the dearest on account of which all else becomes dear.

Expressions of this nature are numerous, and the only meaning which fits the context is that of the "principle of personality", or the Upanishad ātman.

Two of the oldest passages in Sn preserve the peculiar use of the Vedic neuter yakṣa - (478,875-876), it occurs three times, but always in the same form "yakkahassa suddhi", i.e. the purity (or purification) of the Yakkha; in the whole of the ballad literature, as in other works of

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(35) Kindred Sayings I p.102;
(36) Brāh. II. 4-5.ff; IV. 5.6 ff.
(37) Īp. "at tadīpa" one who has the atta or his (guiding) "Light" Sn, 501; Brāh.IV.3.6: Ātmaivāsa jyotir bhavati.
(38) The existence of the neuter yakṣa-in the sense of atta has not been suspected till now. Faurebœl translates it merely as "purification of the yakṣa" - "without however saying anything as to what is intended by it". See I A, 1928,p.148. In his recent translation of Sn. in Zeitschrift für Buddhismus und Verwandte Gebiete (March-April 1931), Prof. Seidenstücker has the following remark on this word, occurring in the Hāmañata-sutta:- "yakṣa - demon. This word is used in the canonical work in a two-fold meaning. In a narrower sense, it denotes a class of demons under the reign of Kuvera or Vessavana; in a broader sense it denotes something similar to our "Geist"(spirit), and so stands for a
the Pāli canon, we find the word as a masculine denoting a class of
demigods or spirits; in this sense the masculine yakṣa- is found in
Gṛhyasūtras, Manu and Mahābhārata, and classical Sanskrit poetry. But
in the three cases mentioned here the probability is that it is neuter
having the same meaning as atta. Sn. 478 reads

Mohantara yassa na santi keci
sabbesu dhammesu ca ṅāṇadassī
sarirā ca antimam dhāreti
patto ca sambodhi anuttaram sivām-
ettāvatā yakkhassa suddhi-

"Thus far is the purification of the yakkha (i.e. soul, atta) namely,
absence of moha (delusion), vision in all dhammas, experiencing the last
bodily existence, and the attainment of the highest blessed emancipation".
The commentary Pj explains yakkha as nara, it is probable that the
commentator equals the two from the expression "narassa suddhi" (Sn. 789)
which is the only other case of suddhi with a genetive object. The
remaining two occurrences of Yakkha do not throw greater light, but it
is clear, even to the commentator, that the "man-in-man" is meant here.
These passages cannot be over valued and their importance to the early
Buddhist philosophy cannot be denied, for they are clues to the inter-
pretation of the earliest ideas current among the first disciples of the
Buddha.

The word Yakkha is important in another respect; in Brh. and

Continued from previous page (Note 38).
"deva" (p. 116). It is surprising that the difficulty occurring in these
stanzas has not drawn serious attention. Dr. Venkatasubbiah (I.A. 1928,
p. 148) doubtfully suggests a Tantric influence through the expression
bhūta-suddhi, but is inclined to regard it as more akin to Sauvita-
suddhi occurring in Cha. VII. 26.2, and therefore to our view of atta, soul.
Kena it was used for brahmaṇa, whereas here it means atta; thus it points to a continuity which is lost in the case of the Upanishads, for nowhere in them do we find yakṣa used for atman. This use must have been popular rather than technical, subsequent to the equation of atman with brahmaṇa, and was consequently preserved only in the popular ballads.

There are several other words which are used sometimes in the sense of atman, of which the chief are ṣara, satta (cp. Sk. sattva), jantu and atta. The triple identity of atta, yakkha and nara has been already alluded to. A second instance is seen at Sh. 772:

Satto guhāyaṁ bahunābhichannḥo
tīṭṭham nare mohanasmim pagālho

"The satta (soul) in the heart(guhā) is variously covered (by sin or illusion); staying there the nara (soul) is sunk into delusion". The commentary Pj, following the Niddesa takes satta as the past passive participle of sac, to accompany or sañj, to be attached to, and interprets accordingly, the subject of the sentence being nara in the second line which it explains as "satta" (sk. Sattva-ātmān); in this, as in other cases, Faussboll is in agreement with, and follows the commentary. Since the finite verb is understood participially, the better explanation appears to be in accepting satta as Sattva, the subject of the first sentence and line. This passage is old, especially in the use of guhā to the heart, or according to Nd, to the body.

Thag 781 reads

Dāyādakā tassa dhanam hāranti
Satto pana gacchati yenakammam.

(39) In the Upanishads it is used generally of a secret place within the body, and probably denotes the heart; Hume translates it as "secret place (of the heart)". Charpentier uses the three different expressions- "secrecy, cave and concealed one". In any case the reference to some part of the body is clear. The passages are Tait, II.11. Kath{1} 14; {2} 12. 20; {3} 1;{4}5; Ṛṇḍ. II. 1.8, 10; 2.1; III.1.7;
"His wealth is annexed by his heirs, but the being (satta) goes to the place where all his past actions are". Here satta or "being" expressly stands for this personality i.e. soul.

In Sn. 775 we notice the phrase idh'eva jantu, where jantu expresses the same sense as satta and nara in Sn. 772. The last word is the most important and suggestive of this group; attha stands for atta in a host of passages, and the manuscripts many times show an indefiniteness of use that makes a reading extremely doubtful. The most decisive passage occurs however at Thag 4:

Sabbhireva samāsetha paṇḍiteh' atthadassibhi:
attham mahantam gambhirāṃ duddasam nipuṇaṃ anumāṃ.
dhīrā samadhigacchanti appamattā vicakkhaṇā.

Most of the adjectives qualifying attha may well be found in Upanishadic passages dealing with ātmā. As the final goal, of the path leading to this goal, it is representative of the immortal truth which lies at the basis of all creation.

Concerning this principle of personality, atta or ātmā, the passages are all of a non-informing kind; any results to be obtained are due to deduction rather than to clear statements. This is particularly true of those passages which deal with the survival of the atta in the dissolution of the body. Here, the condition of the atta has to be inferred. Confining ourselves for the moment to Sn, we note that the subject of rebirth is not any action, of a fresh ego, but a personality

--- (41) Bṛh. IV. 4.20; aja ātma mahān dhruvah; Kath 2.12; tam durdarṣaṃ gūḍham anupraviṣṭam, Kath. 2.20, añor aniyan, etc. ---
which is not directly mentioned as changeable. In all expressions such as "gabbhaseyyam punar eti" (Sn. 152) or "asma loka param lokam kathan peoc na socati" (Sn. 182) or "vinipatam samapanno gabbha gabbham tamam tamam" (Sn. 278) the subject is a being whose personality appears to abide in all these physical or mental changes, and therefore corresponds to the Upanishadic idea of atman. A very suggestive passage is Thag. 258.

In spite of the series of experiences of all these transmigratory lives, the subject says - "not once have I lived long in these", it is clear, therefore, that this "I", the real atta, is unchanged in all the changes mentioned in the words samsara, niraya and punappa. The only escape from such changes to an eternal abode is mentioned as attasambhava santi (Thag. 260), the peace that is born of the atm or soul. No further passage is required to bring out this meaning with such clearness.

There are passages of a different type which resemble the Asokan Inscriptions. These are limited to the ideas of Heaven and Earth, expressed by the groups idha-pura, or esa loko-para loko-. The survival of the personality after death is on a simple popular basis here. Evil people go to miraya and undergo different punishments, and

(42) Other passages of a similar nature at Sn. 333, 339, 343-358, 499. etc. The subject undergoing such experiences is nowhere mentioned as in a state of flux.

(43) Psalms of the Brethren, p. 172:-
Lo! as I fared through being, I came to the kingdom infernal,
So to the dolorous realm of the Petas, times without number,
Evil befell me again in manifold shapes of the beast world.
Nekadhā is here taken as anekadhā; above it is interpreted as na ekadhā, not once.
good people go to Heaven. Thus the mother of the Buddha goes to Heaven and lives with the gods (Thag. 535).

The belief in the survival of some abiding personality is not restricted to the popular ballads alone; even in the later philosophical passages of the Canon there are admissions of a man or bhikkhu undergoing different experiences, while he is all the while identified with the same name and personality. Such statements mostly represent the popular ideas current at this period and reflect the general tendencies of the time. They all show how common the idea of a soul or principle of personality was, although it did not form the central doctrine of the Ballad poets. One of the direct results of this knowledge is the production of the Jātaka where the personality of the Buddha is identified with the heroes of the different stories.

The final sense of ātmān as baffling all descriptions is only seen in those passages where the subject is a perfected being, it cannot be counted or measured, "na upeti maṅkham" (Sn. 911); it has neither shifting nor fall (Sn. 902); There are no standards, says the Buddha, by which we can say "it is so and so", for it transcends all measures.

B. Kārman.

We now come to the second important term in the Upanishads which had its culmination in the practical ethical philosophy of early Buddhism, namely the word Kārman. Attempts have made to trace the

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(44). Cp. the expression "Kāyassa bheda param maraṇā……
nirayam uppajjanti (or saggām lokaṃ)" etc. at D. III. pp. 235-236.

(45) Sn. 1076. Cp. Sn. 209, 749, 1074;
"atthangatassa na pamanam atthi"
notion underlying this word back to Vedic literature, and particularly the Rg Veda, among which may be mentioned that of Betty Heimann who tries to evolve the idea of Karman through the concepts of Varna and Rta. On the other hand Formichi remarks - "Atman had its birth in the Atharvaveda and cannot be considered as a new discovery of the seers of the Upanishads. The distinctive conquest of the latter is a notion of Karman". A fresh attempt is made here to describe the history of Karman from another point of view.

Within the Upanishads themselves the word Karman signifies three things, namely sacrifice or sacrificial act, bodily activities or functions and general acts. This last notice develops further into the doctrine of action or Karman. The earliest meaning appears to be sacrifice or sacrificial rite; (in this sense we find it used in R.V. and V.S.) e.g. Brh. I. 5.16- manusyalokah putreñeva jayyo ...pitrlokah Karmanah." to the world of men is/be gained through the son, that of the fathers through sacrifice". The second sense is that of act in general, also seen in R V; thus, in Brh. iv. 2.8: hastabhyam hi Karma Karoti." he performs acts


(47) J.D.L.C., xv. 1927, pp.127 ff. See also La Pensée, p.191.

(48) R.V. vi. 69. 1; VII. 32.3; viii. 36. 7; ix. 96. 11;

(49) V S 3. 47; 34. 2.3;

(50) For other passages see Brh. I. 4.17; iv. 4.24; Cha. V. 2.8-9, VII. 4.12; 14.1; 26.1; Tait I. 11. 2-3.

(51) R.V. I. 55. 3; 61.13; III. 12.6; 30.13; 36.1; X. 55.7; 131-4.
by his two hands"; Chā. I. 3.5. Yānanyiyāni vīryavanti karmāṇi yathāghner manthanam, etc. "whatever other actions than these there are that require strength, like the kindling of fire by friction, etc". The third sense of bodily activities seems to be a special development of the Brāhmaṇas, for (52) the Brh. passage - Prajāpatir hi karmāṇi saṣāja - "Prajāpati created the senses"/of the Brāhmaṇa style where Prajāpati is primarily the Supreme Being and Creator. This is one instance where Karman is used in the sense of an active function, the prāṇa; this last term usurps its place in the famous parable of the Battle of the Senses. In Brh. I. 6.1. we read - trayāṃ vā idaṃ nāma rūpaṃ kārma - "three indeed are these, name, form and activities". Hume renders the last word by "acts", but it is hardly appropriate; both name and form are meaningless if Karman does not signify those activities through which they are to be grasped. ato hi Karmāṇy uttiṣṭhanti - "from this (ātmā=body) arise the activities (or functions) again at Brh. I. 4.7 we read - tāny āsyaītāni karmā-nāmāny eva -" these are indeed the names of His (Ātmā's) bodily functions".

For the purpose of the doctrine of Karman the first two meanings are of greater importance. We have already noticed how the meaning of "sacrifice" was primary in the Vedic period. During the Brāhmaṇa period this was the central conception on which the whole universe depended; consequently we note that it is in the Brāhmaṇa portions of the older Upanishads that we observe this use; here the sacrifice is still supreme, but there is a growing tendency to explain it cosmically. The power of the sacrifice is in evidence in all these passages. Coming to the doctrine of transmigration the first passage we notice is Brh. I. 5.16:-

(52) Brh. I. 5.21.
(53) Brh. VI. 1.7 ff; Chā.V. 1.6 ff; Kaus. 2.14 ff.
(54) Brh. I. 5.16; Chā.V. 2. 8-9.
"the human world is to be gained through the son only, and not by any other sacrifice; the world of the fathers is to be gained through sacrifice". Texts of this nature are seen in the cosmic interpretation of the Agnihotra. This pitṛloka or the sphere where the deceased ancestors live is to be attained through sacrifice; in other words the sacrifice is an act which results in admission to this sphere; but no sacrifice can assure a future life in this world, for life here can be continued only through progeny. In this connection we may notice the two customs requiring the dying father to place all his functions in his son so that the continuity of life may not be broken. Thus this passage is conclusive proof that life in this world continues through the offspring and one's own life in the sphere of the deceased ancestors if the sacrifices are done. It is a pity, however, that we are not told what happens if such sacrifices are not offered.

A different conception is seen at Cha.V. 2-10 where the doctrine of the "five fires" is taught. These fires are respectively yonder world (asan lokaḥ), Parjanya, Pṛthivī, Puruṣa and yosan in which are sacrificed in order, śraddha, Somorāja, Varsa,anna, and retaś; each one of these is produced when the preceding one is sacrificed, the last retaś gives birth to the embryo, garbha; this, when born, lives so long as it has its length of life and then dying, goes back to the fire whence it came. It appears that this process continues ever and thus gives

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(56) Cp".......and those who would have been, their sons, they gave, their immortality". - Rupert Brook in "The Dead".

(57) Hume, 89-90. 318-320: Brh. I.5.17-20; Kaus. 2.15;


(59) Cha. V. p.2.
us a germ of the theory of transmigration. In the next section there is the doctrine of the three paths, one leading to the gods and another to the deceased ancestors, and the last one meant for those who are ignorant of the first two. Those who know the philosophy of the five fires go to Devayāna, the abode of the Gods, from which there is no return; those ignorant of this, but performing sacrifices go to Pitṛyāna from which a fall is inevitable in the course of time. The third path is incessant dying and rebirths, the seed from which the idea of samsāra develops. In connection with this return to earthly existence Chā. V. 10.7 is very important for, here, for the first time, we meet the two words, ramaṇīya-saraṇa, "one who conduct is good", Kapūya-carana, "one whose conduct is evil (lit. stinking), which supply the clues to the theory of Karman. Good conduct leads to good rebirth and evil conduct results in bad rebirth.

The application of "Carana" for Karman is a result of the gradual loss of faith in the actual sacrifices. We see this, for example in Muṇḍ. I.2.7:-

plavā by ete adṛṇhā yajña-rupā-
"Unsafe boats are these sacrificial forms". From such an attitude it was easy to conceive of one's bodily actions as sacrifices, corresponding to their cosmic conceptions. The full development of this process, where Karman stands only for action, deed or conduct in general is carried out at Brh. III. 2.13. This is a conversation between Yājñavalkya and Jātakārava Ārtabhāga in the court of Janaka; the latter asks about the final principle which remains when a man dies and his different organic and functional parts go back to their cosmic counterparts. This passage has already been discussed in connection with Ātmān, which is here to be taken as heart and not as soul (see above p...). When this question is
— so —

asked Yājñā-valkya replies - "Take my hand, good friend, we two only shall know this". They go out and speak - "tāu ha yad ucatuh Karma haiva tad ucatuh; atha yat Praśāsanaṁsatuh Karma haiva tat Praśāsanaṁsatuh, punyo vai punyena karmāṇa bhavati, pāpah, pāpena" - "What they spoke, that, indeed was Kārman; and what they praised, that, indeed was Kārman; one becomes good by good action, bad by bad action". For the first time we get here the full view of Kārman as a cosmic law.

We have one fundamental difficulty in this passage. Is Kārman a substitute for the principle of personality or/it merely a cosmic law on which bodily existence depends? Yājñāvalkya, who speaks so fluently on the question of ātmā as the highest principle, goes out with Ārtabhāga to speak secretly of Kārman and allows the phrase "ātmā ākāśam āypeti" of the latter to stand uncommented. If we observe the whole chapter we notice various conflicting views in Yājñāvalkya. In the first section he speaks about the ritual through which the sacrificer passes above death; in the present section he advocates the doctrine of Kārman; in the fourth he speaks to Uṣasti Cākrāyana about the all-pervading ātmān. The only possible conclusion points to a difference of age in these passages, since the identity of the speaker is maintained everywhere. It also represents the historical development of the ideas of Kārman and Ātmān. We have here a theory of Kārman, which was an offshoot of the theory of Brahmān, before the full development of the doctrine of Ātmān.

The next stage is the full independent development of Ātmān.

(60) Both these conceptions originated in the doctrine of the sacrifice; brahmān represented the energy or the power of the sacrifice and thus became an abstract concept; Kārman first denoted the concrete sacrifice itself and then developed into an abstract principle. In this way we may say that Kārman is a by-product of the doctrine of brahmān.
When this is reached we find the action of Karman determining its bodily existence. Thus, at death the ātmān is accompanied by vidyā and kārman (BrhIV.4.2). Further in the same passage we are told - "according as one acts, according as one conducts, so does one become". Two factors, one of which (kāma) is already seen in RV, emerge; desire or kāma, act or deed, kārman, as in - "yathākāmo bhavati tat kratur bhavati, yat kratur bhavati tat karma kurute, yat karma kurute tad abhisampadyate" - 'as is his desire such is his resolve; as is his resolve such is the action he performs; what action he performs, that he procures for himself (i.e. into that does he become changed)." Desire breeds action and action determines the course of life.

The actual process of the doctrine of Karman belongs properly to the nature of life and death. For our purpose it is enough to see how the deed or kārman has become a cosmic law in the Upanishads.

**Kārman or Kāmma in the Ballads.**

The ballads use the word Kāmma both for conduct and the law of Kāmma; in the first sense we see it used at Sn 136 (-142)

Kāmmanā vasalo hoti kāmmanā hoti brāhmaṇo
"by conduct (or action) one becomes a vasala, by conduct a brāhmaṇa."

The doctrine of Kārman is fully accepted in the ballads, and in fact more openly declared. The whole ethical system depends upon a belief in this unalterable law. At Sn 666 we read:-

Na hi nassati kassaci kāmman
"one's kāmma never dies." It is by kāmma that the whole world moves on;

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(61) Brh IV.4.5: Yathākārī yathācārī tathā bhavati.
it is kamma that is responsible for the existence of the people; all beings are attached to kamma as to the centre of the axle of a constantly moving chariot.

In the Kimsila-sutta (Sn. 324-330) the opening question puts sīla, samācāra and kamma together as necessary for the attainment of the highest good. Essentially there is no difference in the meanings of the three words, sīla, ācāra and kamma, but the point to be emphasised is the necessity of kamma for reaching the highest goal. Sn 587 is a most suggestive passage:

\begin{quote}
aṇīne pī passa gamine yathākammūpage nare
maiccuno vasam āgamam phandate v’idha pānine
\end{quote}

"Behold! how other passing men, too, subject to their kamma, having come into the domain of death, suffer here, the (poor) creatures". All beings are subject to kamma, and therefore to suffering and death.

Teachings of a similar nature are found in other books, but there they appear in a more popular form, though worked out in greater detail. This of the seven passages where kamma occurs by itself in Dh. four are devoted to pāpaka or evil, two to sādhu-asādhu and the remaining to sīthila or loose actions. The principle that good action brings good reward and evil deeds being retribution is fully accepted, and distinguishes most of the gathas which occur in Dh. Good reward is termed sugati or suggati and perhaps connected with saggā; retribu-

\begin{itemize}
  \item[(62)] Sn. 654:- Kammanā vattatī loko Kammanā vattatī paja
  Kammanūbandhanā satta ratassāṇīva yāyato.
  \item[(63)] Sn. 324:- kimsīlo kimsamācāro Kāni Kammāni bruḥhayam
  nāro sammānivīṭṭh' asa uttamatthan ca pāpuṇe.
  \item[(64)] Dh. 66, 71, 136, 173.
  \item[(65)] Dh. 67, 68.
  \item[(66)] Dh. 312.
\end{itemize}
tion is called duggati and is identical with niraya (Dh. 316-319). In the very opening verse of Dh. dukkha is declared to be an inevitable result of an evil mind manifesting itself in speech or action:

(67)

"manasā ce padutṭhena bhāsatī vā ṭaroti vā;

in a similar way sukha is the reward of a good mind showing itself in speech and deeds. One important doctrine is developed here; in the Upanishads kārman represented action in general, any deed whatever; in this stanza it is not only an actual deed, but also evil speech or good speech which brings appropriate results with it. In this connection the tongue is compared to an axe by which one may cut oneself by improper speech:— Sn. 657.

Purisassa hi jātassa kuṭhāri jayaṁ mukhe
yāya chindati attānam bālo dubbhāsitam bhanan.

A still further development is seen; in the above quoted Dhammapada passage the act consisted of either speech or deed of an evil mind, i.e., mind manifesting itself as speech and deed. In the later stage we read of Kammaphatha, or the way of action, which is divided into three distinct parts, as in Dh. 281; these three are called vac or speech; manas, mind or thought and kāya, body or action. Instead of the mind manifesting itself in the form of speech and action we have the mind, speech and body representing the three paths of Kamma. Thought, word and deed, and not deed alone, are the corner stones of the doctrine, When

(67) Cp. Kath. 3.5: ayuktena manasā manasā sādā.

(68) In the Upanishads kāya, vāc, and manas seldom come together. In fact, the word kāya itself is met with only in G. where it is mentioned with manas, buddhi and indriyas. The combination of vāc with manas by itself occurs at Cha. IV. 16.1; Brh. I. 2.4 and Kena 2. (Tait II. 4.9; Kaṭh 6.12).
these are pure one attains to blessedness; impurity, however, leads to niraya.

The development mentioned above is more of an ethical nature than philosophical. This ethical spirit permeates the whole of the ballad literature and lays great stress on the good qualities one should develop in order to attain nibbāna. On the other hand, great pains are taken to elaborate a system of punishment according to the evil deeds one performs, through the mind, speech and body. Examples of this are found especially in those passages which speak of Niraya; thus at Dh 309 four places are mentioned to which those who are fond of other men's wives resort on death. Horrid descriptions of these places and the punishments are found at Sn 657-678; iron poles on which sinners are impaled, burning coal, total darkness or red hot boiling pots are equally the retribution visiting evil speech. These stanzas are fit to take their place in any late Purāṇa text, and the fondness of the popular mind for these urges to salvation has found its most characteristic expression in the Peta Vatthu. The abundance of such material shows how deep-rooted the doctrine of Kamma was among the ballad poets. But at the same time there was no definite philosophical explanation of how Kamma works. There are no means of judging whether Kamma acted in any particular way; this explanation is found only in the later schools of Buddhism. It is due to the practical interests of the popular poets that the philosophical aspect of Kamma was not developed. Only two points are emphasised, viz. the unalterability and universality of Kamma, and the Way which offers an escape from, or a determination of the working of Kamma according to the behaviour and the will of the maker of Kamma, i.e. of man himself.
PART III.  CHAPTER VI.
The Problem of Existence and Emancipation.

A. In the Upanishads.

The doctrines of Atman and Karman which we have discussed above lead us on to the question of the nature of life and death in the further doctrine of Emancipation. So far, Atman and Karman belonged to the concepts of pure philosophy, which is truly speculative in character. The other phase of philosophy is its practical side, which may be said to constitute what is generally called religion. In the earliest period religion predominates over philosophy but in the course of time speculative philosophy presses itself into the centre and influences religion. Pure philosophy moreover, is an appeal to reason; in consequence the speculations of primitive tribes carry the names of magic, animism or animatism, and are grouped under the one term of religion. The general outlook of the Vedas has therefore been called religion, and it is only towards the end of the Vedic period that anything like a philosophical hymn appears. By nature the Upanishads are speculative in thought, and derive much from the late Rg.Vedic and the early Atharvana philosophical hymns. The result of this is naturally seen in so important a subject as the nature of life and death and the meaning of existence. In solving these questions a blind religious belief was not sufficient, but speculation tempered with mystical experience sufficed to create a workable scheme which satisfied both reason and heart.

In order to explain the existence of this universe, the Upanishads fall back upon the Vedic creation hymns, but not in the same form. In RV (x.129) we are told how in the beginning there was neither being
nor not-being; and how subsequently tapas, (Keith, p. 436:— might of fervour) and then Kâma, desire, the first seed of mind, arose. In the final verses of this hymn a doubt is expressed as to the possibility of knowing the ultimate creation of the world. In the Upanishads a different atmosphere prevails; the doubts are on the point of vanishing, and more precise statements are to be met with. In Brh. I. 4.1ff we are told that Ātman in the form of a person is the primeval being; the creation of the world then follows through fear of loneliness and resulting lack of happiness. The physiological aspect is insisted upon throughout the creation. In Ait I, i. i. no mention is made of how the world is created or the motive for such creation; as in Brh. Ātman is the first existent, but is not in the form of a person. Following the Rg Vedic hymn (x.129) we have a discussion in Chând vi.2.1ff; in the beginning we are told that being alone existed primarily, one without a second; then follows a discussion on the possibility of not-being as the first existence from which being arose. In VI. 2.2, this view is rejected by taking being as the first existence, the one without a second. In the following passages we are told how it creates tejas, heat, whence arose the primeval waters, then food, after which this divinity (Sat-being) enters into the three as the individual self. (See, Keith p. 525). From this fact arises the distinction made in Praśna (iv.8) between the subtle and gross elements, five in number, namely earth (prthivî) āpas (waters) tejas (fire), vāyu(wind) and ākāsa (ether or space); these subtle elements are called after the gross elements with an additional - mātra. In Tait. III.1 we find a more developed doctrine of deriving space or ether from ātman, wind from space and so on. Thus the two streams, namely the living beings and the non-intelligent elements, derive ultimately from the same source, sat or being, or ātman. So far we have limited ourselves to the theory of
the creation of the universe, subsequent to the development of the idea of ātman.

A more interesting theory is seen in Brh. I, 2.1ff. "In the beginning there was nothing whatsoever here; this was covered only by Death (mṛtyu) and Hunger (āśānāyā) for Hunger indeed is Death". Then we are told how he moved (acarat) shining (arcan) and created the primeval waters; from this atose earth; in this he exerted himself (aśrāmyat); Then he created the year, the speech, and the vedas and all the living things. "The moment he created them he started eating them. Then he desired to sacrifice himself in order to sacrifice greatly". What follows does not concern us here; it is merely a glorification and justification of the cosmic. Āśvamedha. The whole of this passage is suggestive and fresh, and its influence on the subsequent philosophy is great. Only two points need be noted here; Death who is Hunger cover up all that exists, he creates the universe and in the very moment of creating he sets going the process of destruction.

We have, then, two theories of the creation of the world, and consequently of existence. The older one appears to be that which in the beginning there is sat, (being), Puruṣa or Ātman. This was natural since from the earliest time the theory of Puruṣa-Brahman-Ātman was in course of developing in order to explain the basic ground of all life. Yet, the second one appears more primitive, for ātman here is not recognised in the sense of soul or spirit. Even so, both theories explain the problem of life and death.

Mṛtyu, or Death plays a great part in the development of early Indian thought. Besides being the creator and destroyer of the world, he pervades and overcomes it (Brh. III.1.3); it is his food (Brh. III.2.10); he is asat, not existent or not-being, and tamas, darkness (Brh. I.3.28) he is even feared by the gods (Chā I.4.2). When the concepts of brahman
and ātmān were sufficiently well advanced, the position of Mṛtyu became lower. In this stage we find him mentioned with Indra, Varuṇa, Soma, Rudra, Yama and Āśāna as created by braḥman; he, with Vātā, Sūrya, Agni and Indra, is active through the fear of ātmān; he is the sauce of ātmān (Kāṭh.2.26)(Tait II.8.1; Kāṭh iv.10); he cannot cross the bridge of ātmān (Chā viii. 4.1). In the last stage he is called pārman, the evil one, and the verbs governing him are apāxhan (Brh.1.3.10,11;) vi with anu and ati (Brh.1.3.115.1;); vaḥ muc. kkrham, with ati(Brh.1.3.11,16;1.3.12-16;) all having the general sense of crossing over, overcoming or getting beyond. Preceding this stage he is the great eye-opener and teacher as immortalized in Kāṭhopanishad. In the later literature Yama occupies his place, just as he does in the Rg Veda. The word marana, though occurring in Cha, and Kath; stands only for the act of dying.

The two phases of existence, namely birth and death are typified by the ātmān and Mṛtyu theories of creation. Two facts emerge from them; viz the primeval being consists of intelligence and desire is the motive of creation. Here, however, we meet with several difficulties. How are we to reconcile the doctrine of Kārman, ātmān and Mṛtyu into one consistent whole with the theory of existence? This is absolutely an impossible task, since these are merely the first expressions of different philosophers, and indeed, the first attempts at philosophical expressions and so, quite unsystematic, and divergent. If we consider the previous history these points become clear. In the Vedic times the whole spirit of the people was centred round hymnology through which they hoped to satisfy their physical and spiritual wants, and these wants were merely physical well-being and heroic progeny. Later, when the fact that life on earth was exceedingly limited came to be noticed, the desire for personal immortality resulted in the ātmān doctrine. At the same time the love for
rational explanation created the Kárman theory; by the very nature of these doctrines they were designed to serve different cravings of the human personality; consequently we cannot weld them together into one consistent whole. This difficulty is multiplied when the Upanishad seems to mix the doctrines.

According to these theories, the universal soul enters the material universe, created by itself, in the form of individual souls and differentiates it through name and form. Now, the older belief in the immortal personal soul, in combination with the Kárman-law gives us the doctrine of transmigration. The facts of birth and death being recognized, it is necessary to find out what happens to the dead person. This curiosity is already visible in R.V.; in the Upanishads this theory is completed. At the time of death ātmán draws to itself the different prānas (activities) and goes within the heart; at this moment the highest point in the heart becomes diffused with light and the ātmán escapes from the body through one of the upper exits, and then the body dies. This escaping soul is accompanied by knowledge and its acts and a knowledge of its former lives (pūrvaprajñā). It then assumes a new body. More important in this connection is the doctrine of rebirth. We are first taught here doctrine of punishment in the next world, and then of rebirth on earth for those persons who were not to receive full enlightenment. This path is called Pitṛyāna; a third one is the lot of the wicked who appear in the world as animals, the lower insect orders, worms or flies. Even in the case of those who go to the world of the fathers, some are of good and some of abominable conduct; the former are reborn as Kṣattriyas.

(1) Bṛh. iv. 4.1,2;  
(2) Ait. II.1,1ff. Chā V. 3-10; Bṛh. VI. 2.1ff.
Brāhmans or Vaiśyas, the latter as dogs, pigs or Cāndālas. This theory of rebirth is later developed into the mire of samsāra from which the wise should seek escape.

In all these speculations the Upanishadic seers had the one constant aim of perfecting themselves. In the Brāhmaṇas it was the companionship, community of being and fellowship with the gods which was promised as a reward to performers of various rites. It was the craving to be more and more perfect which goaded them to philosophical speculation. By a happy combination of theories the doctrine of transmigration was arrived at to explain the nature of existence in the world. The earlier doctrine of creation disposed of both conscious and unconscious life in the same way: here we have a definite attempt to explain conscious or living existence. Once this point was reached, the next thing to do was to find a means by which one could perfect oneself.

In the discussion of the two paths, Devayāna is said to be the path leading to the world of Brāhmaṇ from which there is no return. This is the first germ of the idea of emancipation, a complete freedom from rebirth. Nowhere in the older Upanishads do we find the pessimistic spirit which seeks escape from existence. On the other hand, the craving for immortality is everywhere expressed when the Ātmān is described. The idea of pain is not conspicuous, the word duḥkha occurring but once in Brh. (IV.4.14) and Chā (VII 26.2). The passage in Brh. is especially suggestive:

ye tad vidur amṛtās te bhavanti athetare duḥkham evāpiyanti—

They who know this (Ātmān) become immortal, but others only go to

(3) Chā.V. 10. 7; Keith, p.576.

(4) S.B.II. 6.4.8; xi.4.4.21 etc; Keith, p.581. n.5.
duṣṭaṃ; where duṣṭaṃ is contrasted to amṛtatva, immortality, and consequently represents mortality, death, or possibly saṃsāra (which occurs at Kath. 3.7; Śvet. 6.16). The only words which represent pain are soka (Brh. IV.3.22; III. 5.1; Chā. VII. 1.3; viii.4.1; Kath 2.12; 1.12; Tsá.7; etc) which in combination with rudayaṣya seems to be the synonym of granthi; maraṇa (Chā.III. 17.5; Kath.1.25;) mṛtyu, jara and moha (Brh. III. 5.1; Chā. VIII. 4.1).

In order to discover the final aim of the Upanishads one of the most effective methods is to study the direct objects of the roots tar or tṝ, to cross and of ati-√, to go beyond. We get the following words:- pāpman (Brh. IV.4.23; Mund. III. 2.9;); hṛdaya-soka (Brh. IV.3.22); ahorātre (Chā.VIII 4.1; ) asānāyā-pipāse (Brh. III. 5.1; Kath 1.12; ) jāna, mṛtyu, soka (Chā.IV.4.1; Brh. III. 5.1); janma-mṛtyu (Kath 1.17; ) sōkasya pāram (Pras. 6.8;). If we confine ourselves to the earliest Upanishads the following conclusions are obvious:- (1) the main factors which constituted the dark side of existence are summed up in the words pāpman, evil or death; jara, old age; janma, birth; mṛtyu, death, sāka, pain or sorrow; ahorātre, day and night; asānāyā-pipāse, hunger and thirst; (2) emphasis is laid however, on death which occurs more than others, (3) emancipation is getting beyond death and sorrow, i.e. gaining of immortality.

So far we have considered the negative aspect of the final goal; this gives us only a partial view. We shall first consider the word sukhā, happiness, as it is used in the Upanishads. In Chā.VII. 23.1 we are told - "When one gets happiness one acts, not when one gets unhappiness; having got happiness alone does one act; therefore should one realise happiness". Sukha is here described as the cause of all next activity. In the section great stress is laid on the fact that sukhā
exists as bhūman, Plenum, and cannot be found in the smaller things; hence the Plenum ought to be realised. Accordingly to the ātmān-brāhman doctrine such a realization is possible only when one perceives the Universal Soul in oneself. So, we read in Katha 5.12; tam ātmasātham ye' nu paśyanti dhīrāh teṣām sukham sāśvatam netaraṣām—"the wise who perceive Him as standing in oneself, they, and no others, have eternal happiness". In verse 15 this Universal soul is called anirdeśyam paramam sukham—"highest, indescribable happiness". In Maitri (4.4); it is described as aksayya sukha, - undecaying or inexhaustible happiness; this sukha is further called ātmasāksika (6.24) - born of the realization of the ātmān.

A second positive aspect of the goal is to be found in the idea of peace or tranquility - sānti, and the adjective sānta-, which occurs only in compounds. Though sānti occurs only in Katha and Svet, it is an old concept, though decidedly later than sukha, for the form sāntahrdaya occurs at Chā.(VIII. 9.2; 10.1,3; 11.1,2;). This idea is not so important as the earlier one of sukha. In Kath. 5.13, eternal tranquility sāsvati sāntih, is the reward of a knowledge of ātmān within oneself. Both in Kath 1.17 and Svet 4.14 tranquility for eternal time is promised to those who have this mystic knowledge (sāntim atyantam eti).

The other aspects of this goal, both positive and negative, occur as adjectives of ātmān and brāhman. Among the positive characteristics may be mentioned dhruva, steadfast (Brh.IV.4.7-25+ ) ānanda bliss(Kaṣa III.8); the negative side by vijara, vimṛtyun, viśoka, apipasa (Chā.VIII.1.5; 7.1;) abhaya (Chā.VIII.3.4); etc. Noteworthy among these terms are abhaya and ānanda, two prime motives for the creation of the world, in the creation legend in Brh.1.4.1ff the unitary ātmān first becomes afraid (abhībhet) of its loneliness and secondly does not take pleasure in it (sa naiva
This connection between rāma and ananda is suggested by Kauśika which takes ānanda = rati (1.7; 2.15; 3.5-8). Thus it is strange how the prime motives of creation come to be regarded as motives also for emancipation. In the theory of creation bhaya arises through loneliness, but in the problem of life and death it is caused through diversity; this fear is put an end to by realizing the bliss of brahman - ānandam brahmaḥ ātme vidvān na bibheti Kadācana (Tait. II. 4.1).

Lastly we have the craving of the human soul for complete knowledge of all the problems which surround it, physical mental and spiritual; this point is brought to notice by the word vijñāna, knowledge or discriminating knowledge; "in the old Upanishads it occurs not rarely with a distinct implication of a superior form of knowledge to the mere action of mind". It is in this sense that we find it used in Brh. II. 4.5 or IV. 3.6 - ātmane vā are darśanena śraveneṇa matyā vijñānena idam sarvam viditam - "it is indeed through the seeing of, listening to, thinking of and meditation of the ātman that all this becomes known".

This ātman is also described as vijñānātman (Brh. IV. 3.6.7) prajñānaghaṇa (Brh. IV. 5.13.14); brahman is both vijñāna and ānanda (Brh. III. 9.28).

It appears from the above survey that the goal of the Upanishadic seers consists of immortality or freedom from rebirth, old age and death and from fear, of eternal happiness, bliss and tranquillity and complete knowledge. There is no definite doctrine regarding the nature of immortality; we have no means of determining whether a personal or impersonal immortality is meant here, for both ideas seem to mingle. Only in the later Vedanta schools these statements were twisted so as to yield definite personal or impersonal doctrines.

(1) See Keith, p. 555.
We now come to the actual question of emancipation or salvation which results in the attainment of the goal defined above. It should be remembered at this point that the way of salvation is subsequent to the actual doctrine or theory of the universe, and in fact depends on it. We have seen how in the earliest versions the universal ātman created the world and entered it in the form of individual souls; this identity of the individual and supreme souls supplies the fundamental way of salvation in the Upanishads. Personal immortality is the desire in the last portions of the Brāhmaṇas, where the gods Indra, Prajāpati and Agni, Varuṇa, etc. are "reduced to the position of being no more than means by which entry to the Brāhmaṇ can be obtained."

But when Prof. Keith says: "When the Brāhmaṇ is also regarded as the Ātmā, the end becomes unity with the Ātmā, and this was the saving mode of emancipation, before transmigration was believed in" (p. 581), he fails to demonstrate that such is the case. In fact, the doctrine of Ātman appears to have developed earlier than atman, and the doctrine of transmigration has been traced by himself to the Vedic idea of devayāna and pitrīyāna (pp. 570-581); further, without a belief in transmigration and the law of Karman definite view of emancipation is not possible.

The first problem is the one dealing with immortality and eternal happiness. So long as man exists as an individual soul he is subject to the law of Karman and of rebirth. Ignorance of the true nature of the soul is the cause of his seeming mortality. In Brh. IV. 4.10 we read - andham tamah pravisati ye avidyāṁ upāsate - "those that worship ignorance enter into dark blindness", i.e. regarding the true nature of life; and in order to attain happiness one has to realize the Plenum,

(6) Keith, p. 581.
bhūman. The solution lies in getting across Kármāṇ and death; for this purpose the knowledge of the Ātmáṇ is essential. When once this unity of the individual and universal souls is recognised, then there is no fear of death to the seer; the finder of the Ātmáṇ ceases to be stained by action. In the Brh. passage of the two paths and in other passages dealing with this theme, this union appears to take place after death. "In all these passages it is necessary to recognise that the knowledge of the atman leads only to unity with the atman after death, and that the unity is conceived on the old model of community with a deity": The second statement in this quotation is not directly proved by the Upanishadic texts; in fact, the manner in which this union itself takes place is left out in the existing texts.

A further development of the doctrine of salvation recognises the possibility of this union of Ātmáṇ with brahman during one's lifetime. Brh. I.4.10- ya evam vedam ahám brahmāsmi iti sa idam sarvam bhavati, he who knows 'I am the brahman', he becomes all this (universe, brahman)" Mund III. 2.9 sa yo havai tat paramam brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati -"he who knows this highest brahman becomes brahman". About this union itself we are told in Mund. III. 2.8- just as rivers flowing towards the ocean lose their identity when they join it, so does the wise one when he gets beyond name and form". It is the use of nāma and rūpa which is the most suggestive here; these are the two forces which differentiate the undifferentiated (Brh. I. 4.7) and so create. Logically speaking, though this realization is possible in actual lifetime, one gets

(7) A.V.X. 8.44; see Keith, p.581, n.6.
(8) T.B. III. 12.9.8; Keith, p.581, n.7.
(9) Keith, p.582.
beyond name and form at the end of one's life. But one point is clear in this statement; when the union takes place it is complete, and is not, as Prof. Keith remarks, on the old model of community with the deity; for, where differentiation does not exist there can be neither a deity nor community with it.

That knowing (vid) is the same as becoming (bhū) is proved by many texts. Chānd.V. i. i. yo ha vai jyeṣṭham ca ēresṭham ca veda jyeṣṭhaścaṁma vai ēresṭhaśca bhavati - "he who knows the greatest and the best becomes, indeed, the greatest and the best". Thus a knowing of brahman or ātmān is the same as becoming it; it is not a mere intellectual grasp of this that constitutes the becoming; it is a complete practical and mystical realization, a superior knowledge, vijnāna, which is the essential factor of this becoming.

Salvation then, is the winning of immortality and eternal peace and happiness, through the realization of the unity of the individual and the universal souls. It is possible, as contested by Prof. Keith, that in earliest conceptions some sort of community with a personal deity was meant by it. The later texts, as we have seen, do not justify this view; they recognise a complete union in which there is no differentiation. So far we have studied only the theoretical side of these questions. Granting that the aim of salvation is the realization of this unity, what is the practical side of the problem? This is a very big question, and part of it has already been studied in the historic development of the pūrūsa, ātmān and brahman concepts. In Brh.II. 4.5 and IV. 5.6, emphasis is laid on dārsana ēravāna, māti and vijnāna, i.e., seeing, hearkening, thinking and reflecting on ātmān - ātmā vā are drstavgaḥṣerotaṁyo mantavyo nidhidhyāsītavyah. (It is interesting to observe that whereas the first three roots in this passage survive in dārsana, ēravāna, māti or drṣṭa, āṣuṭa

(10) Vijnātavyah.
and mata, the fourth one appears in the substantive form vijñāna or vijñāta; it is later in the Vedānta schools that the word nidhidhyāsana occurs.). In Chā. VIII. 5.1 we read brahmacaryenaḥ haiva īśvara-ātmānam anuvindate - "it is only through sacrificing with brahmacarya i.e. living in brahmacarya that one attains the atman.

The more important and developed theories are to be found in Kath, Muṇḍ and Śvet. First we have a contradiction of the Brh. passage requiring śravaṇa as one of the conditions for the realisation of the atman. Thus Kath. II. 7: śravaṇayāpi bahubhir yo na labhyah śṛṇyanto pi bahavo yaṁ na vidyuh - "he who is not obtained by many even through listening, and who is now known by many who hearken to him". Brahmacarya is recognised as essential (II.15); In verse 22 of this section we are told that the ātmān cannot be realized through pravacana, discourse, medhā, intellect; or listening to, (bahunā śrūtena), but it depends on revelation by the universal ātmān. This idea of revelation or better called grace, is seen also in verse 20, where the revelation is due to the grace of the creator.

In addition to these teachings of Kath, Muṇḍaka (III,123) lays emphasis on ātya, truth, tapas, austerity, samyag-jñāna—"true knowledge" and brahmacarya or chastity, and on bala, strength; ātmān is to be realised through jñānaprasāda, "peace (or grace) of knowledge. This fine ātmān is to be realised through cetas, heart, for it is not grasped by eye or speech, by other activities.

In these developments of Kath, Muṇḍ and Śvet we have an utter disregard of the earlier teachings, the doctrine of Kārman which is weak even in the most conspicuous passage in Brh. is completely neglected here; further the tacit acceptance of the human will for perfection which together with Kārman attempts to secure salvation, is disowned
by the theory that the ātman reveals itself through its own choice; the
effect of such a teaching, however, is a lowering of the purely
intellectual nature to enhance the emotional. This disregard of Karman
is seen in the causative form of tr, to cross. Cha. VII. 1.3- mā bhag-
svānśokasya pāraṁ tārayatu - "do you, Sir, cause me to cross to the
other side of sorrow"; Prās. 6.8- avidyāyāḥ pāraṁ pāraṁ tārayasi -
"you lead us across to the further shore of beyond ignorance".

This change from the purely intellectual to the more emotional
philosophy appears to have resulted partly from the influence exerted
by a growing community of seers coming into a greater contact with each
other, and partly from the necessity of feeding the half-starved emo-
tional nature. These three Upanishads mark a new phase in this
literature, a going back to earlier emotionalism tempered by the pure
and sober intellectualism of the earliest texts of this class.

B. In the Ballads.

Having considered the problems of existence and salvation in the
older Upanishads we now come to the early Buddhist ballads. It was
mentioned before that these ballads were of popular origin; when we
consider the philosophical parts we observe that they bear testimony
to the highly developed interests of the ancient community where they
were created. But, as in the case of all popular creations, we have
no sustained passages of philosophical interest in this literature.
Even more than in the case of the Upanishads it becomes exceedingly
difficult to subject them to a synthetic process. The interests are
varied, and for the most part they deal with the ethical aspect of a
religious life. Accordingly, we shall analyse here the various tenden-
cies of the ballads bearing on the nature of existence and the doctrine of salvation.

Corresponding to the doctrines of creation as given in the Upanishads we have practically nothing mentioned in the ballad literature. The general tone of the songs discourage speculations of this sort, although in the later parts we have fresh speculations which result, for instance, in the doctrine of Paṭṭicoasaṅguttāda. This contradiction is to be explained by the fact that the view of the world which resulted from a prohibition of pure speculation failed to satisfy the intellectual element of the period, and it became itself the starting point of this later speculation. This is why, for instance, the word anatta, found only once in Sn and once again in Dhammapada, later formed the basis of the radical non-self theory. Instances of this kind are numerous, and it is enough to recognise here the outstanding tendency of the ballads to discourage speculations of this nature, which go under the names of diṭṭhi, and Ṋathā. On the other hand we observe here a pronounced characteristic for facing facts as they exist, and to treat them practically. In the discussion of the terms atta- and Kamma- we have already seen how common the ideas were for which these terms stood. These were understood by all the community, and needed no explanation; Kamma especially was a rationalistic doctrine.

Owing to the popular origin of the ballads we find elements here of popular beliefs and superstitions, such as for instance the idea of niraya, which have come down to us in a highly polished condition. Thus in the Kokāliyasutta (Sn. 657-675) of the Mahāvagga we have a complete

(1) See Sn. 724-365.
scheme of the nirayas and the punishments one suffers in them, with the times of duration. This is secondary speculation which need not detain us, as of inconsequence to serious philosophy.

The most important single passage in the entire ballad literature bearing on the question of life and death, and especially on human existence, occurs in Sn. (574-593) as Sallasutta. A part of this ballad occurs also in the Jātaka (Fausbøll; vol. iv. p.127) but for clearness of expression and depth of feeling it can be rarely excelled. "Without cause (animitta) unknowable (lit. anāññāta, unknown) is the life of the mortal in this world; it is both contemptible and empty, and is filled with pain. There is no way (for remedy) by which those who are born will not die; having attained old age they also reach death, this is the very nature of living things". (Sn.574, 575). So far from explaining the cause of the origin of life and speculating on its nature, we find here a characteristic statement that life has no cause or origin; having no cause it cannot be known, so that life is also unknown. We have to take life for what it is worth; mere speculation is of no value. This is the most practical view taken about life, and it is certainly the most original in the whole group of Vedio and Buddhist literatures; it determines the whole tone of the ballad philosophy.

Before we discuss the philosophical consequences of such a view it is necessary to discard the popular element in the ballads which derives ultimately from the Vedio, namely the scheme of the universe as this world (asa lokaḥ, eso loko) and the other world (paro loko) sarga, niraya and brahma loka. Though the ballads borrowed these ideas from Vedio literature they refrained from accepting the theories concerning the ultimate aims and objects of life. It is of secondary value so far as the actual outlook on existence and salvation is concerned, and
is only a help to the popular mind to understand and appreciate the more serious doctrines.

When speculation concerning the origin of existence is barred by such a direct statement that a cause does not exist, it is no wonder that the mind turns to the actual process of life. Life here consists of birth, jātī, growth or becoming leading to decay and old age, jara, and finally to maraṇa, maccu or death; thus existence consists of birth, old age and death, the whole process being characterised by becoming, "bhava" or gradual change. "Just as for ripe fruit there is a constant fear of falling down, so for all mortal beings that are born there is the imminent fear of death. The life of man lasts only till its breakdown just like the earthen vessels of the Potmaker. Both the great and the low, both the wise and the foolish are subject to death, all are subjects of death". (Sn.576-578). There is a pathetic spirit in this song which becomes deeper in Sn.580 where it is said

ekameko va maccānaṃ go vajjho viya niyyati.

"one by one, men are carried away (by death) just as the cow which is to be killed". There is an utter helplessness in this statement; just as the cow which is about to be killed is incapable of altering its fate, so is man helpless in the hands of death.

The predominating theory concerning the nature of life in this world, and in fact existence itself is summed up beautifully in the following verse (Sn. 581):

evaṃ abhāhato loko maccuṇā ca jaraṇā ca

"thus is the world afflicted by Death and Decay (jara from jātī - to grow old, to decay)". With this should be compared the doctrine of Brh. concerning the origin of the world already mentioned. Death is the prime factor which attracts the philosophical mind, and is certainly the
greatest moving force in the world; and decay is the cause of it. We thus come to the role of Maccu in the ballads.

The three words Maccu, Marana and Mara all derive from the same root \textit{mr.} to die, and both on this ground and from the occurrence of compounds like maccudheyya and maccuvasa etc. Oldenberg (Buddha, his life and work, p. 61 ff) has suggested that they denote the same idea. Whatever may be the origin and development of Mara, he has a personality distinct from that of Maccu; his principal role is that of drawing one away from doing the right thing and corresponds exactly with the Christian idea of the devil and Satan. Mara never occurs in the sense of death; on the other hand, in the Padhānasutta he remonstrates with the Buddha about his extreme physical exercises which have almost led him to death, and begs him to live in order to do good things (Sn. 426-27). The two remaining words represent the abstract and concrete ideas about death; maccu, stands generally for the personification of death while marana stands for the actual dying process.

In the case of the Upanishads Mṛtyu is more favoured than marana which occurs only in Chāḷ(III.17.5) and Kāṭha (1.25; 5.6;); but the ballads are more acquainted with marana. As the personification of death Maccu is called Mācchurājan (Sn.332, 1118, 1119) who rules over deluded people; all living things are subject to him (587); he is the deluder (māyāvin) and he spreads his net, jāla, to catch the mortals (357); mention is made of his snare or pāsa (166); low persons wail in the mouth of Death (776). It occurs in the sense of marana only three times, (581, 1092, 1094,) with jāra. This picture of Death seems to be derived from the Vedic and Upanishadic conceptions; pāsa and jāla suggested the ruling power of Varuṇa while rajan invests him with kingship over mortals and particularly over the dead.

Marana is the natural law of existence; all that exists must die.
(575; 743); it destroys everything that one holds as one's own (806)
nāyam ajjatane dhammo n'acchero na pi abbhuto:
yattha jāyetha mīyetha tattha kim viya abbhutam.
(Thag.552) - "This is not the doctrine of today; neither is it marvellous
nor supernatural; where one comes to birth and death, what is supernatural
in that?". "After one is born, death is more certain than life; all
beings who are born here are dying, for this is the very nature of life"
(Thag.553); Of these two passages Thag. 552 is the more important; in the
first place the nature of existence is placed on the basis of birth
and death; secondly this law is eternal, and not one newly created; it has
existed for all time and it will continue to exist; finally any marvellous
or supernatural element governing this doctrine is not admitted. Death
is the leveller, for he does not care either for kings or for the common
people (Thag.778).

Passages of this nature lead one to the obvious conclusion that
death plays a very important role in the ballads. It not only supplies the
motive for philosophical speculation, but it is also a clue to the pro-
blem of salvation. The interest is centred more around the tragic aspect
of death than on the marvel of birth and the origin of life, and this fact
explains why speculation concerning the origin of life to be expressed
in creation legends did not find a place in the ballads.

The next important factors governing this view of existence are
jāti -, or birth, and jarā or decay. Of these jāti- occurs more often
than jarā- either by itself or in compounds, especially with marana,
Everything that has birth undergoes constant change resulting in decay
and finally in death. This process is embodied in the word vinābhāva
(Sn,805), becoming different or void, or bhava, becoming. This last word
is used both in the singular (Sn.742; 361; 367; 514; 839; 869; etc) and
in the plural (Sn. 5, 69,776,777 etc); it does not occur in the Upanishads and is first met with only in the early Buddhist literature. It is sometimes contrasted with vibhava, becoming less, or void, probably the same as vinābhāva, and is used particularly with the word rūpa, form (Sn. 867). These two words jāti and jara together form a concept which goes with maraṇa and typifies this single and eternal process of change. This vinābhāva is explained at Sn. 588.

\[ \text{yena yena hi maññanti tato tam hoti aññathā} \]

- by whatever measure they ponder over it, it becomes different from that (measure)".  

If it were only a change of this type having its final extinction in death, the bards would have no need of either philosophy or religion. We have already noticed in the discussion regarding atta- the old belief in the survival of a personality on death, or theoretically of an immortal personality undergoing these changes. It is mostly with regard to this belief that the idea of samsāra has developed. This samsāra is the cycle of births which a personality undergoes owing to certain circumstances termed kamma or action. Nowhere in the ballads is it mentioned that it is the Kamma which gets embodied and not a distinct personality, whereas in the study of the terms atta and Kamma we have found explicit statements concerning an actual personality experiencing these changes through the agency of Kamma. It is therefore necessary to keep this surviving personality which is subject to these changes, in the background of our study with respect to the ultimate nature of existence, for this leads immediately to the important doctrine of salvation.

This samsāra, which in essence is the same as bhava, consists of birth and death (729) repeatedly experienced; it is ātītabhavāaññathabhāva, existence here and elsewhere (740). Only in one passage it is called
jātisāṃsāra (746), but jāti and marana are inseparably connected in the other passages. Thus it is a long cycle of births and rebirths full of pain, most difficult to cross (Sn. 638). This rebirth is called punabhava; the first stage is called gabbhaseyya, or lying within the womb; both of these characterise this sāṃsāra. Again, poetically it is compared to a stream, saras ogha or annava, which sometimes have their natural meanings (See Sn. 1092). This idea of a stream or ocean is already familiar to the Upanishads where the further shore, param pāram is mentioned. This process is further called dubhaya, double, consisting of utupapāta, fall and rise, corresponding to birth and death.

Briefly, then, the view of existence is that it is a continuous process of life and death or rise and fall with a personality undergoing these changes. Its origin cannot be known and existence has no meaning, the force governing this sāṃsāra is kamma or action. However meaningless this process may be the one certain fact about it is that it is full of pain.

Here we come to the important subject of the aims and ideals of the ballad poets. At this point it is necessary to deal with the prominent idea of dukkha which replaces the Upanishadic idea of ātmān and sukha. Within the earliest ballads dukkha never occurs as an adjective, and as a substantive it has three distinct applications as (1) the opposite pole or the negative aspect of sukha, (2) a transition to the more positive aspect and finally, (3) the centralized positive dukkha. The first application is particularly evident where the terms sukha and dukkha go together as in Sn. 61:

sāngo eso parittam ettha sokhyā upassādō dukkham ettho bhiyyo
- "this is attachment; there is little happiness in it, little satisfaction, there is much unhappiness here". The second application is clear in those passages where it occurs by itself and is governed by verbs

(2) Cp.KauT.1.7; 2.15; 3.8-8; Sn.61,67,738 762,973.
The last application is the most popular one; here it is the great terror of the world (mahabbhaya, Sn.1033;) mortal life, which is without cause, unknown, empty, is filled with it (Sn. 574); those who are blinded by desire and afflicted by dukkha lament, saying 'kim su bhavissama ito cutāse', "what shall we become when we fall from here?" (Sn.774) It is the fear of this constant change which afflicts one as dukkha or "Ill". (Mrs. Rhys David's translation in Sakya). It symbolises the whole of existence, bhava and samsāra, death and old age, rise and fall. It is only the fool who regards dukkha as afflicting him in the other world (Sn 666); for in truth it represents the whole process of actual existence in this world together with the cycles of existence in all conceivable worlds.

These three applications of dukkha do not represent the stages by which it has come to be regarded as the central conception of Buddhism. It was a natural consequence of not accepting the Upanishadic theories concerning the origin of life and its aims. When the mind concentrated on decay and death as the symbol of life or existence, it was inevitable that existence itself, including samsāra, in its larger sense, should be considered an "Ill", an evil. So dukkha represented the dark side of existence, and in some parts of the ballads formed the central conception. But the popular mind at first refused to believe that all was so dark as thus painted; as a result we find dukkha not as the prime factor in existence, but as something consequential to it, and therefore governed by verbs of motion and direction. A further tempering is seen when dukkha is augmented by a positive idea of sukha whose absence constitutes dukkha. In one passage in the Dhammapada (331d) we are expressly told that of all evils (or total evil; note sing, sabbaya dukkhasa) the
cessation is sukhā, bliss, joy or happiness. If dukkha is not the be-all of existence, but is only a consequence of it, it must have both an origin and a growth; Sn. 728 speaks in this connection of the birth and growth of dukkha in the compound "dukkhassa jātippabhavāṇupassi", and it is precisely in this connection that the doctrine of Paṭiccasamuppāda is developed.

Apart from this philosophical signification dukkha also stands for ordinary physical and mental pain. It is usually connected with vyādhi or byādhi.

To sum up, existence which is without cause or meaning and therefore empty, and consisting of a stream of births, and deaths called bhava and saṃsāra is symbolised by this single word dukkha.

As in the case of the Upanishads, when we collect the direct objects of the verbs jātar and atēdi, we get the following words:—jātijārā (Sn.1045 -1048,1060;) jātimaraṇa (Sn.355). ogha (Sn.173,174,184, 273,495,771,779,1052,1059,1069,1079), annava (Sn.183; 184), naraka (706), visattika (333,857,1053, 1054, 1066,1067,1085) saṃsāra (519); to this collection we should add the ablatives governed by pāmic, namely saṃbuddhakha (Sn.80), dukkha (170,171); maccupāsa (166) and Saṅga (212); the passages dealing with dukkha are numerous, but the most important in this connection is dukkhassantam ākṛ, or bhav (bhu). From these collections we gather the really negative aspect of the final goal; but so far as our ballads are concerned this assumes the positive side of the goal, at least in importance. The whole object is the getting rid of jātijāra, birth and decay; jāti-maraṇa, birth and death, these two typifying the process

(3) Thag. 73; Cp.Chap. vii. 26.2, na rogāṇa note dukkhatām; and occurs by itself in many places (Thig, as dukkhita, 461, 461, 484;).
of change termed ogha, stream or annava, ocean of existence, or samdāra
the cycle of rebirths. While in the Upanishads the goal was shown to be
the positive attainment of immortality, we find in the ballads only the
freedom from mortality as the proclaimed goal. The negative feature
of this goal is embodied in the very word which signifies it, nibbāna,
extinction; in this sense the root nibbai or nivvai survives in Modern
Indo-Aryan; it means either extinguishing or cooling down, and in this
second implication the use of danta and santi is to be noted.

It is in connection with this negative definition of the goal and
the apparently negative meaning of nibbāna that we arrive at the most
interesting and intriguing point of ballad philosophy. We have had the
surviving personality, the atta- in the background of our discussions;
if the bards believed in this personality, how is it possible that they
proclaimed only a negative goal, and left the poor personality almost
out of count?. We should have expected at least some measure of positive
declaration concerning the condition of this experiencer. Such a
positive declaration is potential in the word nibbāna itself, for it is
the definite goal of the bards. This leads us, then, directly to the
study of the term nibbāna.

The group of words, nibbāna, nibbuti and nibbuta, barring atta,
is the most discussed in the whole range of Buddhist terms, and is
etymologically connected with vr, to blow and vr, to cover or revolve
as in vṛt. In P.D. vr is connected with I.E. uel and uer giving both
the meanings of covering and revolving. An attempt is made below to
study the real meaning underlying these words, as understood by the
ballad poets themselves.

In Sn. nibbāna is described as amosadhamma, "whose nature is
truth", to be obtained by the Ariyas through saccābhisamaya, "observance
of Truth" (758). As nibbānapada, the state of nibbāna, it is accuta, "without fall" (Sn.204, 1086), amata, "immortal" and santi, "peace" (Sn.204). It is the highest island in the ocean of existence, having nothing, without attachment, wherein death and decay exist not:—

\[
\text{akññanam anādānām etam āpam anāparām}
\]

nibbānam iti nam brūmi jāramacuparikkhayam (Sn.1094). In Thag. it is praised as full of happiness (susukha), asoka, "without sorrow", without impurity (virāja) full of wellbeing (khema) where all ills (dukkha) are ended. It is called yogakkhema "security and weal" (Thag 989-990), anūthara, the "highest"; it is the freedom of the heart, cetaso vimokkha (Thag.906; Thig.116). As nibbānapada, it is asankhata (Thag.725), immeasurable from a-samkhya.

In the Dhammapada it is said to be the greatest happiness, paramām sukham (203, 204); it is the path leading to santi, peace or tranquillity (285); To this the Sagāthavagga adds only one epithet, (p.210) sabbagantha-ppamocana, the releasing of all knots, where gantha may represent either doubts or suka, sorrow.

Only in one passage (Sn.Thag.906) this emancipation of the heart is compared to the extinguishing of a lamp. But it should be remembered that the thing which is extinguished is not the personality, but only the cetas, the heart.

At Sn.933 we are told that santi, or "tranquillity, peace" is to be understood as nibbuti. From this survey the positive ideas which emerge are sukha, happiness, amata, "immortality, accuta, changelessness and santi, peace. This evidence favours the interpretation of nibbāna as santi, already hinted at in connection with nivvai, and consequently

\[\text{(4) Čp. aparata tesam amañassa dvārā:- "the doors of Immortality are opened to them" - V.I. p.7; S I p.138; Thag. D II. p.39}\]
all that santi stands for denotes the real positive aspect of the ultimate goal.

In fine this goal, termed nibbāna, is an escape from dukkha which signifies samsāra and all that it stands for, and the positive attainment of peace, happiness, immortality and security (accuta) as implied in the adjectives which qualify nibbāna. Just as in the Upanishads some of the ideals which constituted the goal formed adjectives of ātman or brāhmaṇa, even so we find the ballads applying these aspects of their goal to the term nibbāna.

Once the goal is clearly defined the next problem is to devise a method by which it may be reached. This problem has a two-fold aspect, as we have already noticed in the case of the Upanishads, the theoretical and the practical, which may perhaps be better called the philosophical and the religious sides of the doctrine of salvation. The ballads show more development on the religious side; in fact the philosophical aspect of salvation is of later growth. In picturing salvation as the getting beyond mortality and change we are not informed about what happens when it is reached. In the Upanishads this immortality resulted from a union with the world spirit and constituted salvation. The ballads find salvation through ethical principles.

In the first place it was demonstrated that though there was no ultimate origin of existence the single force which determined the course of existence was Kamma; secondly the one who experienced these changes was a distinct personality and not this Kamma. These ideas now play an important part. Kamma, which guides the course of existence, is now the means of freeing oneself from the clutches of existence, and thereby explains the stress Buddhism laid on ethical principles. And by whatever name this principle or personality was called, it had the power of
guiding or determining Kamma itself. Good action leads to good results, bad action to bad results, Kamma is responsible for everything we are and we will be; it is in this future that the real function of atta- comes; atta determines the domain of Kamma while itself experiencing the results of past kamma. According to this view salvation consists of getting rid of samsāra and the positive attainment of happiness and immortality through the action of Kamma, that mysterious force which pervades the whole universe.

The philosophical view of salvation focusses around the idea of dukkha; if salvation is the getting beyond dukkha, then dukkha must have limits; it was found above that dukkha had both origin and growth. For the purposes of salvation it must have both decay and ultimate cessation. This view resulted in the doctrines of the "way of salvation" and the later Paṭiccasamuppāda. This way is characterised by the recognition of the existence of dukkha, its origin, the possibility of its cessation and the path leading to this cessation; together these facts are called the four noble truths (Dh. 100). It is in connection with these four truths that we find the formation of the doctrine of Dependent Origination. For our purpose this doctrine is of no great value, for it occurs only in the Dhammatānupassanāsutta which is clearly a very late composition; the word paṭiccasamuppāda itself occurs but once in Sn. (653); this is also clear evidence of a later date for so important a doctrine. According to this philosophic view, salvation consists in recognising the existence of dukkha, its origin, its youth, and the existence of the path leading to its complete cessation, which recognition leads to the desired goal.

(5) On this personality as the Willer, Mrs. Rhys Davids has made a complete study (See B.S.O.S 1926, pp.29-47; Sakya or Buddhist Origins, Chap.V. pp.75-89.
So far as the practical side of salvation is concerned both these views have combined to form the grand conception of a way leading to the final goal. The words which designate this path are pantha-, patha-, pada-, and more particularly magga-; it is the way leading to immortality, and to the cessation of dukkha. In this conception of the path we have both views contributing to its formation with a predominance for the first one; this is due more likely to the popular origin of the ballads rather than to different age grades. A study of this path as symbolising man's continuous process of becoming more and more perfect has been minutely worked out by Mrs. Rhys Davids, the stress being laid on becoming as contrasted to being, or on the dynamic nature of the growth of the man rather than on the static.

With this we approach the important question of the actual means of salvation. Two distant phases are to be distinguished here. On the one hand we have the doctrine of Kamma which gives rise to one way of salvation, which we may, for convenience, call the ethical way of salvation. This is the earlier way, as may be seen from the nature of the vocabulary used; there are no technical terms freshly introduced here. On the other hand, the doctrine of dukkha has given birth to a host of new technical terms, of which we may cite āsava, upadhi, and upādāna as typical examples. A further process is visible in Dvatānupassanā-sutta where dukkha is said to arise, grow and develop on account of Upadhi, avijjā, saṁkhāra, viññāna, phassa, vedana, tathā, upādāna, ārambha, āhara and injita. This is an inevitable development resulting from

(6) Thag. 21, 35, 69, 168, 947, 980, 1110, 1115; Thig. 149, 222, 309;
(7) Sn. 724, 726;
(8) See Sakya or Buddhist Origins, pp. 89-115.
fresh speculative philosophy, and is the special thesis of the Buddhists.

The great advance of the notion of salvation in the ballads over
that of the Upanishads is clearly seen in that the ballads preach of a
salvation which is to be realized in one's lifetime. Thus at Sn. 626 a
true Brahmana is one who realizes the freedom from dukkha in this very
life. It is also proved by the more ethical character of the path.

Coming to the actual path of salvation we find the earliest
passages dealing with brahmaariya and sravana (in opds like assava, etc)
Thus, when Dhaniya has been converted by the Buddha by a lively dialogue,
he exclaims in his ecstasy (Sn. 32) "Both the gopi (cowherdess, i.e. his
wife) and I are full of attention; we will practice brahmaariya under
the Sugata in order to cross birth with and death and end (all) ills (Lit.
ILL)". This brahmaariya is the same as dhammacariya, and is considered
the best of wealth even for one who has accepted the homeless life. As
taught personally by the Buddha it is both sanhițṭhika (actual, of ad-
vantage to this life; ) and akālika (immediate, in this world,
present, not temporal) where the wandering life becomes amogha, priceless
(Sn. 567). At this point the innovation introduced by early Buddhism
becomes clear. In order to practice this brahmaariya it is necessary
to accept pabbajjā, for it has only to be practised under the Buddha or
his wandering disciples. The whole of Sn speaks with one voice on this
homeless life, and therefore this appears to be one of the essential
conditions of salvation.

A second factor constituting this method of salvation is the
listening to the doctrine of the Buddha. We have already noticed the
word assava, full of attention; savana ("śravaṇa") occurs at Sn. 345,
where Vangīsa tells the Buddha, "our ears are ready to listen" - sama-

(9) See also Thag. 79.
The good disciples of the Buddha, who are attempting to obtain salvation, are called savakas, listeners to (Sn 357 376 etc). At Sn 202 we read "having listened to the word of the Buddha the bhikkhu becomes full of enlightenment; he understands everything and see things as they are". Examples of this nature are numerous.

About the nature of this Dhamma, which is another of those difficult words, much has been written. Prof. and Mrs. Geiger have studied it in "Pali Dhamma" (München, 1921) principally from a philological point, which is contested by Stcherbasky in his brochure - "The Central conception of Buddhism." So far as the ballads are concerned, it stands for Truth and general ethical conduct leading to emancipation (Sn.453, 383,ff, 461ff etc). The principal features are satya, truth, dhati, will, resolution, or cāga, renunciation, regularity in daily habits, freedom from the bad qualities such as rāga, (attachment) kāma, (desire) and so on. This emphasis on conduct is further pointed out by the titles Dkammika-sutta (Sn.376-404) and Brāhmaṇadhammika-sutta Sn.284-316) or sections dealing with conduct (in general) and the conduct of the Brahmans.

In the Kasihāradvājasutta (Sn.76-82) the act of cultivating the land is symbolised into the act of attaining immortality leading to cessation of dukkha, and the following factors are its constituents. Saddhā, faith, determination or longing, tapas, or austere determination, pañña, intelligence, hiri or modesty, mind and recollectedness (Sātā), truth and power exertion (viriya). Each of these virtues is capable of being later centralised into a highly technical concept, but here we find them in their pristine meaning.

A more important quality which has to be developed is universal piety or friendship (Sn.150). It has to be mentally realised, without any

(10). See also Festschrift Jacobi, on Brahman and Dharma by F.O. Schrader.
limit, whether one is lying or moving or standing still, one should always have this conscious recognition or recollectedness (sati) for such a mode is called Brahma-vihāra (Sn.157). We have alluded to this quality of recognising the unity and sameness (sāruppa) in connection with atta-; A direct result of this knowledge is the absence of desire (chanda) and attachment (rāga) which ultimately leads to immortality, peace and security (Sn.204).

From this brief study of the main points in the way of salvation it is obvious that the way is purely ethical. Behind all this lies the firm belief that Kamma is the guiding principle of existence, and an escape from it is only possible through its own action. So the will of man to perfect himself combines with that doctrine to form the ethical system which marks his journey to his goal, viz. Immortality and peace. This conduct, as proclaimed by the Buddha, and well practised ends all the ills and enables one to cross both birth and death.

In this section, certain tendencies which are noticeable in the ballads, and form advanced theories later in the prose suttas, will be briefly sketched. This sketch is necessary to show how similar these tendencies are to those of the Upanishads. We have noticed above that great stress is laid upon the actual observance of ethical conduct to reach emancipation, and how thorough the acceptance of the doctrine of Kamma is. But this last is by no means true everywhere, we observe its disregard, for example, in the Nāvā-sutta. Here the teacher is compared to a boat which not only crosses the stream, but carries also other people across it. (Sn.321). and the causative form of to cross, meaning "to cause to cross, to lead across" occurs nearly six times (Sn.319, 321, 539, 540, 545, 571, etc). This is the doctrine of Grace in the ballads, where the Buddha or some other great teacher is capable of emancipating other beings.
Mention was made of savana as a necessary adjunct to realize the Dhamma, and so of salvation. At 471 parama diṭṭhi is a means of knowing dhamma; diṭṭhi here should be taken to mean vision and not view or speculation; parama diṭṭhi, then denotes highest vision, for the highest vision is necessary to reach salvation. Again knowledge is essential since anāsavimokkha is spoken of (Sn.1105, 1107); thus deliverance is also to be attained through knowledge which consists in getting over both desire and attachment.

But in the course of time a gradual change appeared in the application of diṭṭha or diṭṭhi; from vision it came to mean a view, a similar change affected muta (from rapt attention to mere listening), muta and viññāta (from actual experience to theoretical knowledge, cf. a blindman's sight). These four words do not always appear together; we have diṭṭha, suta and muta in a single group (Sn. 812, 813; diṭṭha and suta (250,778) diṭṭha-suta-muta-viññāta (1086). In these groups two meanings are determinable; at 250, 778, diṭṭha-suta, and at 1086 diṭṭha-suta-muta-viññāta denotes the sum total of existence; in the other sense given above, we find it used with the mode of salvation; there neither diṭṭhi, suti nor ānā can bring salvation; it is obtained only through actual realization of unity of the world, or rather, through the absence of the sense of differentiation (Sn. 839-842).

It is obvious from the occurrence of these passages in the Atthanakavagga that this change happened rather early in the ballad literature, but it was not sufficiently early to dim the importance of savana which still played an important role.
PART IV.  CHAPTER VII.

A Comparative Table of Terms.

In the following pages a few important terms have been selected from the Upanishads and the Ballads and their meanings and frequencies noted. Exact references are given at every place, and where possible, they are also given from the Asokan Inscriptions.

The direct result of such a table justifies us in accepting the ballads as slightly later than the older Upanishads, but continuing the same tradition before it was contaminated by the doctrines which we find in the canonical prose work. Individual examples, both in their application and their frequencies supply a clue to the general development of the two literatures, and a few cases will be noted here.

The word *Ahimsā* occurs just at Cha with tapas, austerity, dana, gift, and ārjava, straightforwardness and satyavacana, truthful

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(1) For this purpose the following abbreviations are used; all references are to Woolner's text and glossary:

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speech. These qualities are considered as the daksinā or sacrificial gifts in the particular interpretation of man's whole life as a symbolic sacrifice. In the Gītā it is one of the constituents of jñāna or true knowledge. It occurs twice at Dh and once at J, but is more frequent in Asoka. On account of the old age of the Chā passage, we are led to the conclusion that such an important concept is an old one with a continuous tradition finding its fulfilment in the later growth of Buddhism and Jainism; it assumes a positive aspect in the word "Bhūta-dayā", compassion for all beings, of the Epic.

Another word which shows the unbroken character of the older tradition is Upavasatha; not occurring once in the Upanishads, it is met with in the ballads in the non-sectarian sense of a holy day of which the chief characteristics are fasting and spiritual communion.

As in the case of ahimsā, the concept of dayā is found once at Brh, once at Gītā, and once again at Sn as compared to seven times in Asoka; it is found in many stories of Mbh of which that of Śibi may be cited as an example.

Of a different nature is the word skandha - P.Khandha; in the Chā and Maitri passages it indicates "divisions" and "branches" respectively. In the only two cases where it occurs at Sn, the meaning is either a branch, or the shoulders. In the Buddhist terminology an individual is analysed into five groups called Khandhas: "the body (rupa) feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), the aggregates (sañkhāra), and consciousness (viññāṇa)". This is clearly an indication of the

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non-specialised ideas of the ballads, which therefore preserve the Upanishad tradition.

The occurrence of single words like Pratibuddha or śrāvyapāṇa in the Upanishads has been suggested as due to Buddhist influence; such examples should be compared to dayā and ahimsā and the vocabulary of the Asokan Inscriptions. We are at once led to believe that these cases do not in any way suggest such an influence; on the other hand the ballads preserve and continue a tradition which is augmented and altered in succeeding literary and philosophical activities.

The general lateness of the ballads is suggested by those words which are used here for the first time and are not to be found in the older Upanishads. Of these, ālaya, āsava, upadhi, taṇhā, kāya, sīla, and sambodhi may be selected as the more important examples.
ANĀTMAN: P. Anatta: - not a soul, without a soul, unsubstantial; G. 6.6; Sn. 756; Dh. 279

ANĀTMYA: bodiless; Tait II. 7.1

APACITI: honour, awe, reverence; Brh. I. 5.14; Chā I. 1.9; Thag 589; J.I. 220; II. 435; III. 82; IV. 308; VI. 88; (Apacita Sn. 335-336; Thag.186; J. II. 169; IV. 75;)
As. S IX. 19, M. IX. 4, G. IX. 4, K. IX. 25, Dh. IX. 9, J. IX. 16

ĀHAṆKĀRA: Egoism. (Ahaṅkarādesa: doctrine of the Ego; Chā VII 25.1); Praś 4.8; Svet. 5.8; M. 6.5; G. 3.27; 7.4; 13.5; 16.18; 17.5; 18.55, 59.
(Cp. P. mamāyita, Sn. 119, 446, 777, 805, 809; 950, 1056. Dh. 367;); (f occurs in prose. See PD)

AHIṂŚĀ: non-injuring, harmless; Chā III. 17.4;
G. 10.5; 13.7; 16.2; 17.4.
Dh. 261, 270; J. IV. 71;
As.:- Avihisa, S IV. 8, M IV 14; Avihisa: K. IV. 10, D. IV. 15, J. IV. 17; Avihisa: G. IV. 6; Avihīṃśā: I. VII. 30. "prevention of cruelty, good treatment".

ĀYATANA: foothold, support, seat, abode; esp. fireplace, sanctuary; Brh. III. 9.10-14, 16,17, 26; IV. 1.2-7; VI. 1.5, 14; 3.2; Chā: V. 1.5, 15; 2.5; VI. 8.2; VII. 24.2; Ait 2.1; Ka.1.3; Kena 33; Kath 1.3; region, sphere, (exertion, performance); sphere of perception; Sn. 375, 399, 406; J.I. 80, 173, V. 121;

ĀLAYA: attachment, lust, desire; Sn. 177, 535, 635; Dh. 411;

ĀŚĀ: hope, prospect; Brh. I. 3.28; II. 4.2; IV. 5.3; Chā II. 22. 2; VII. 14. 1-2; 15.1; 25.1; Kath 1.8; G. 16.12; expectation, longing, wish; Sn. 474, 634, 794; Dh. 410 J. I. 267, 285; V. 401; VI. 452.

ĀSRĀVA: P. Āsava, Intoxicants of the mind; Sn. 82, 162, 163, 178, 472, 535, 546, 572, 913, 1100; Dh. 93, 226, 253, 292, 293, Thag 92, 98, 337, 364, 526, 528, 596, 629, 636.
UTSĀHA: P.Usăha: energy, endeavour, good will:
G 18, 28;
(in prose only; See P D p. 158)

UPAVASATHA P. Uposatha. As Posatha.
Sn. 401-403; (special holy days of the half lunar month for spiritual communion and fasting).

UPAVĀSA: same as Upavasatha, a fast day.
J VI. 508. (Used extensively in BSK).
Aś. T. IV 18, Mi IV 13, Kṣb IV 18, Rdh IV 22, Mth IV 26, R̄p IV 19.

UPĀSAṆĀ: seat, attendance; worship; reverence; adoration
Chā I, 1.1; Kṣ 2, 7;
Sn 718, Thag 239;

UPADHI U. Upadhi; substratum (of births); clinging to rebirth.
Sn. 33, 34, 364, 374, 546, 572, 728, 789, 1050, 1051, 1057;

UPEKṢĀ P. Upek(k)hā: indifference; equanimity;
Sn. 67, 73, 972;

KARUṆĀ: pity, compassion.
G. 12, 13.
Sn. 73, 244, 426 1065.

KRODHĀ P. Kodha; anger; (ā maya, Brh. IV. 4, 5;); M. I, 3; 3, 5;
6, 38; G 2, 62, 63; 3, 37; 16, 4, 18, 21; 18, 53;
Sn 245, 362, 469, 537, 566, 568, 928; Dh. 221, 222, 223.
Thig 293;

KLESĀ P. Kilesa; distress, affliction; Śv 1, 11; G. 12, 5; 18, 8;
depravity, lust; Sn. 348; Thag 1115; Thig 78;
Kṣetra - P. Khetta:
field, land; Cha VII 24.2; G. 13.1-3, 6.18, 26, 33, 34; (Kṣetrajña, spirit, soul; Sv 6.16; M. 2.5; 5.2; G. 13. 12, 26, 34; Kṣetrin: soul, G. 13.33)

Sn. 82, 473, 481, 486, 523, 524, 769, 858, Dh. 356-59;

Kṣema - P. Khema:
preservation; Tait III. 10.2; (kṣema-tara, safer, more agreeable, G. 1.46);
tranquil, calm, peace: Sn. 424, 425, 454, 896, 953, 1098; Dh. 189, 192; Thag 456; Thig 226;

Ghānti - P. Gontha:
knot, tangle, bond, fetter;
Cha VII. 26.2; Kar 6.15; Mun 2 II. 2.8;
Sn. 219, 794, 798, 847, 957; Dh. 90,211;

Cittā:
attention, understanding; reason, thought;
Cha VII. 5. 1-3; 6.1; 26.1; Pras 4.8; Mun 2 III. 19; M. 6.19,20,27,34; G. 6.18,20; 12.9;

heart, thought; Sn. 23,37,50,65,68,160,161, 164, 434, 435, 483, 689, 746, 975, 988 1149;
Dh. 33-37, 40,42,45,89, 116,154, 171,371;

Gyātana:
intelligence; Kar 5.13; Sv 6.13; M. 2.3-6; G. 10.22; 13.6;
(Intention, purpose, will; in canonical prose),

Jantu:
man; creature, Kar 2.20; 6.8; Sv. 3.20; M. 6.34; G. 5.15; person (sattta);
Sn. 588, 771, 775, 782, 792, 796, 867, 894, 1103; Dh. 107;

Tapas:
heat, penance, asceticism; Brah. I. 2.6; 5.1.2; III. 8.10; IV. 4.22; V. 11, I; IV. 2.16; Cha II 23.2; III. 17.4; Tait I. 9.1; II. 6.1;
III. 1-5.1; Ka. I.2; Kena 33; Kar 2.15; 4.6; Mun 2 I.1,8; 2.11; II. 1.7;10; III. 1.5, 8; 2.4; Pras 1.2,10;15; 5.3; 6.4; Sv.1.15, 18; M.1.2; 4.3,4; 6.6; G.5.29; 7.9; 8.28;
10.5; 11.48,53; 16.1; 17.5, 7.14-19,24,25, 27,28; 18.3,5,42;

Penance, austerity, mental devotion; Sn. 77, 249, 292, 655, 901
Dh. 184, 194:

self restraint; Brh. V. 2.3; Tait I.9.1; Kena 33; G.10.4; 16.1; 18.42;

self-control, moderation. Sn. 189, 463, 542, 685; S.I.P.4; Dh. 9, 10, 26, 261; Thag 631.

Compassion. Brh. V. 2.3; G.16.2;

Sympathy, kindness: Sn. 117; J I.23; VI.495;

As. Daya, "compassion" Rdh II 7, Mth II 9, Ep. II 10; Daya: T II 12, VII 28, Mi II 4, Ksb II 5.

giving, liberality; Brh IV. 4.22; V.2.3; VI:2.16; Chā II. 33.1; III. 17.4; G.8.28; 10.5; 11.48, 53; 16.1; 17.7, 20-22, 24, 25, 27; 18. 5, 5.43;

almsgiving, charitable gifts; Sn. 244, 487-489, 731; Dh. 177;

As, Dana and Dāna; G, S, M, K, T, J, D; Ksb, Rdh, Mth, Ep, Mi, etc. (See Woolner pp. 92-93)

body; Math 5.4, 7; Sv. 13; G.2, 13, 18, 30; 4.9; 6.2.4, 13; 11.7, 5; 13. 22, 32, 14.5, 11; 15. 14.

body; Sn. 471, Thag. 7, 10;

fault, defect; Cha VIII. 10.1; M 6.12; G. 1. 29, 38, 43; 2.7; 13.8; 18.48;

wickedness; ill-will etc; Sn 12, 66, 74, 270, 271, 360, 371, 476, 493, 506, 507; Dh. 20, 202, 369, 377, 407; Thag 48, 603, 645.

As: "fault, evil", doṣa:- M I.2, S I.1; doṣa:- G I 4, J I 2, K I 2, VI 19.

thought, religious meditation;

Cha VII 5.1, 2; 7.1; 26.1; Ka. 3. 2-4; 6; 4.20; Sv. 1.14; M 6.9, 18, 24; G 12.2; 13. 24.

Sn. 69, 156, 157, 212, 503, 709, 972, 985, 1009; Dh. 161, 372;
NAMARUPA: name and form; Brh. I. 4.7; 6.3; Chā VI 3.2, 3; Mund I. 1.9; III. 2, 8; Praś 6.5;
Sn. 355, 530; 537, 756, 909, 960, 1036, 1100; (cp. māmākaya, Sn. 1075; ) Dh. 22, 367;

NAISKARMA: P. Nekkhamma: renunciation; freedom from acts and their consequences; self-abnegation; G.3.4; 18.49;
Sn. 424, 1096; Dh. 181, 267, 272; Thag 691; Thig. 403; J. I. 16, 137.

PARAKRAMA: P. Parakkama: exertion, endeavour, effort; Sn. 293; Dh. 313; J. IV. 383;
As. "exertion"; Para = : S.VI. 16, X.12; M.VII. 32, X.11, G.VI. 14; Pala- D VI 1, X 15, J VI 21, X 28;

PARI VRAJ: to travel forth or around: Brh. III. 3.1; Kṣ. 2.15;
to wander about: Sn. 359, 375, 659, 640, 741, 751, 753, 1039; Dh. 346, 415, 416;

PRATIBUDDHA: awakened, enlightened; Brh. IV. 4.13;
Sn. 807;

PRADHĀNA: Primary Matter, Matter, (Sānkhya-term)
Sn. 1.10; 6.16; M 6.10;
Exertion, energetic effort; concentration of mind;
Sn. 424, 425; 428, 429; Dh. 141; J I. 90.

PRA MàDA: heedlessness; Mund III. 2.4; M 3.5; G. 11. 41; 14. 8, 9, 13, 17; 18.39;
carelessness, indolence, remissness; Sn. 156, 157, 184, 215, 234, 942, 1033; Dh. 21, 27, 28, 30-32, 167, 241, 371;
Thag 1245; (Appamāda: earnestness, zeal, vigilance;
Sn. 184, 334; Dh. 21, 22, 26, 27, 29-32, 57);

PRA+VRAJ: go forth, wander. Brh. IV 14.22; 5.2; Chā VIII 8.3; 9.2; 10.1.3; 11.1.2; Kṣ. 4.19; Praś 6.11;
M. 7.8; (Praśājina, wanderer) Brh. IV. 4.2; Praśājina, "setting forth" M 6.23);
Sn 405-407, 564, 565, 1003; Dh. 74, 174, 383; J I. 56;

PṚTI: Joy, love, amity, G 1.36; 10.10; 17.8;
emotion of joy, delight, zest; Sn. 257, 687, 695, 766, 969, 994, 1143; Dh. 200, 374; J I. 53;
As: "joy", Pṛti: K XIII 13 (2t) 14; Pṛti G XIII 10.
BUDDHI:
intellect: Kath 3, 3, 10, 12; Praś 4, 8; Sv 3, 4; 4, 1, 12; M 6, 5, 7, 10, 30, 31; G 2, 39, 41, 49, 52, 55, 56, 66; Z 1, 2, 30, 42, 43; 5, 11; 6, 25; 7, 4, 10; 10, 4; 12, 8; 13, 5; 18, 17, 29-32, 51;
wisdom, intelligence: J III, 369; V, 257;

BHĀVĀNA:
reflection, contemplation: G 2, 66;
cultivation of mind developing by means of thought or meditation; J I, 196;

MADA:
intoxication; pride, conceit; G 16, 10, 17; 18, 35.
(madāmada rejoicing and not rejoicing, Kath 2, 21);
Sn 218, 245, 328, 399; Thig 435;

MĀNA:
conceit; Ks.1, 1; G 14-25; 16, 10, 17; 17, 18; (māna-vat, mindful, possessed of mindfulness, Tait III, 10, 3);
arrogance, pride; Sn 4, 132, 345, 328, 370, 469, 494, 537, 631, 756, 830, 846, 862, 863, 889, 943; Thag 375, Dh. 74, 150, 407;
As: "pride"; T III 20, Mi III 14, Rdh III 12, Mth III, 11;

MĀRGA:
path, M 6, 10;
path; way leading to nibbāna, qualified as ariya:
Sn 55, 84-89, 273, 277, 285, 289, 403, 429, 441, 724, 736, 1130; Dh. 57, 123, 191, 273-275, 277-281/289;
As: "road; path of Dhamma"; M II 8, K II 6, D II 8, J II 9, I VII 23.

MĀYA:
magic powers; Brh. II, 5, 19; G 7, 14, 15; 18, 61;
(mayīn - illusion maker, Sv 4, 9, 10; māyāmaya - consisting of illusion, M 4, 2);
deceptive appearance: magic; Sn 245, 328, 469, 494, 537, 786, 926, 941; Thig 74;

MĀRDAVA: P Maddava; gentle, mild, soft; Sn 250, 292; Dh 377;
As: "mildness, gentleness"; G XIII 7, K XIII 4, T VII 28

MOKSHA:
liberation; Sv 5, 16; M 6, 30, 34; G 7, 29; 13, 34; 18, 30;
release deliverance: Sn 773;
As: "release"; Mokkha - "for release"; K V 15, D V 24, J V 27; Mokkha, S V 13, M V 23.
MOHA: bewilderment, delusion: Brh II.4,14; III 5.1; IV.6.14; Isā 7; M 1.3; 6.10; G.4.35; II.1; 14,13,17,22; 16.10; 18.7,25,60,73; (Mohānta end of bewilderment, Brh. II. 4.14);
Mohin, deluded G.9.12; Mohana, -allurement, enticement; G 14.8; 18.39);
infatuation, dulness of mind and soul;
Sn 13, 56, 74; 131,160,161,276,347,478,493,638,730,847, 1132; Dh. 20,251,358,414; Thag 79, 653, 784;

YOGA: contemplation; yoking i.e. union with the Supreme spirit" Tait II.4.1; Kaṭh 6.11; Sv.2.11; 6.3,13; M. 6.18,22,25,28,36; 7.11; G 2.39,46,50,53; 4.1-3 42; 5.1,4,5; 6. 2,3,12,16,17,19,23,33,36,37,44,7.1; 9.5; 10.7,18; 11.8; 12.6.11; 13.24; 16.1; 18.33,75.
"yoke" association}; attachment; effort; concentration
Sn. 641, 1046; Dh.209,282, 417; Thag 69, 413, 588;

YOGAŚEEMA: acquisition and preservation; Tait III. 10.2; = śreyas (see I.A. 1926; Charpentier's translation of Kaṭh) - the better; Kaṭh 2.2; G 9.22. equivalent to nibbāna Sn.79, 425; Dh.23;

RĀGA: passion; Mund I. 2.9; M 3.5; G.2.64; 3.34; M.11; 17.5; 18.51.

VIVEKA: separation, proof, insight; discrimination Chā VI 9.2;
detachment, singleness of heart. Sn 474, 772, 814, 822,851, 915, 1065; Dh 75,87; J I. 79,III 31;

VĪRYA: manliness, might; vigour; power (to know) virility;
Brh. I. 2,6; Chā III. 1,3; 2-5.2; IV.17.4-6,8;
Kena 12,18; Praś 6.4; (Virayavat, strong,effective;
Chā I.3.5; G 1.5.6; Virayattara, stronger Chā I.1.10
exertion, energy; Sn 68, 79, 184, 353, 422, 432, 528 531, 548 966, 1026; Dh. 112,144; J I 178;

VRATA: will, decree, rule of life, duty; activity (= Karman);
Brh. I. 5.21,25; Chā II. 11-20,2; 21.4; Tait III. 7-10,1; Sv.4.9; M.4.3;
Vata; observance, practice, custom; Sn.89,624,782,792, 796, 839; Dh.41,159,197,198, 208; 312,400; Thag 473, Thig 88;
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SĀŚVATA:  eternal; Brh. V 10¹, Kath 2, 18; 5, 12, 13; Ísá 8;  M 2, 4; 6, 28; G 1, 43; 2, 20; 6, 4¹; 8, 26; 10, 12;  14, 27; 18, 56, 6².

eternal, perpetual; Sn 1075; Dh 255;

As: "ever"; sasvata: D I 20, J I 10, II 14;

ŚĪLA:  nature, behaviour; moral practice, good character;

Sn 244, 246, 247, 292, 294, 324, 381, 763, 839, 848; Dh. 10,  55, 56, 84, 110, 144, 289, 333; Thag 611, 612, 1077; Thig 274;

As: "virtuous conduct"; G IV 9, D IV 17, K IV 12;  
  (Dhrama-śīlā, "study of morality" S XIII 2).

SUŚRŪṢĀ:  obedience attendance;

Sn 186; Thag 588; J III 526;

As, SUŚRŪṢĀ:  S III 6, IV 9, XI 23, XIII 4(3) M III 10,  IV 15 (2), XI 12, XIII 4(2); SUŚRŪṢĀ K XI 29;

SUŚSĀ:  K III 8, IV 11, J III, II; susūnsā: G XIII 3; susūsa: D III 10; susrusa: G IV 7, XI 2; susūsa:  G III 4;

ŚRADDHĀ:  trusting; faith, trust; longing (see I.A. 1928, Charpentier on Kath); Brh. I 5.3; III 9, 21; VI 2, 9, 15;  Cha I, 1.10; V. 4.2; VII 19.1; Tait I, 11.1; II, 4.1;  Kath I, 1; Mānd I, 2, 2, 11; II, 1.7; Pāś 1, 2, 10; 5.3; 6.4; G 5.37; 7, 21, 22; p. 23; 12.2; 17.1-3, 17;

faith; Sn 77, 90, 182, 184, 286, 337, 432, 1026, 1143, 1146; Dh 8, 144, 330; Thag 204, 311, 507, 509;  Thig. 90;

ŚRAMAṆĀ:  mendicant; Brh. IV. 3.22.

wanderer, recluse: Sn, 100, 129, 130, 302, 515, 518, 520, 722,  866, 868, 890; ( o brāhmaṇa-

Sn, 411, 859, 1079-1082, etc).

As:  G XIII 3;  o brāhmaṇa: K. IV 9, VIII 23, IX 5, 25,  XI 12, 23, 29; S IV 7, VIII 6, XI 23; M IV 12; D IV 12;

ŚRUTI:  hearing, revelation; Brh. III, 4.2; IV 3, 27;  
  Cha III, 13, 8; G 2, 53; (usually with dṛṣṭi, mati and vijnāna).

tradition; inspiration (usually suta, with diṭṭha, muta  and vijnāna; otherwise with diṭṭhi and muti); Sn 839, 840, 1078;
SRU: Desiderative, desire to listen, attend, serve;
Bṛh VI. 4.18; Cha VII 5.2;

wish to hear, to listen, attend; Sn 383;

As: S X 21, XII 7, M X 9, XII 6, D X 14, J X 21, G X 2, XII 7, K X 27, XII 33;

SAMYANA: self-restraint Ks 2.5; (samyamin, one who is self-restrained. G.2.69)

RestRAINT, self control; abstinence; Sn.326,655,898;


SAMYOGA: combination, union; Śv 1.2; 5.12; 6.5; G 6.23; 13, 26; 18.38;

bond fetter; union, association; (cp. samyojana);
Sn. 522, 733; J III 12;

SAMSĀRA: transmigration; Kath 3.7; Śv.6.16; M.1.4; G 9.3; 12.7; 16.19;

Sn. 517,638,729,740,746; Dh 60,95,414; J I 115;
Thag 785;

SAMSKRĀPTA P. Sankhāma: as origin of Dukkha.
disposition"

Sn 731-732, 751; Dh 203,255,277,278,368,381,383;
Thag 716,1161; Thig 177, 208;

SATTVA P. Satta: nature, soul; being.
Cha VII 26.2 (sattvaśuddhi,"pure nature")
Kath 6.7; Śv 3.12; M 4.3; 5.2; 6.39; G 10.36, 41;
13, 26; 14.6,9-11, 14,17; 17.1,8; 18.40.

= atta; person, creature: Sn. 248,378,387,435, 643, 654, 683, 684, 730, 754; Dh.327.

SAMĀDHI: absorption: concentration; M, 6, 18; G 2,44,
53, 54;
concentration of mind; Sn. 329, 330, 434.

SAMBODHI: Highest enlightenment - nibbāna.

Sn.478, 503, 693, 696,968; Thag 750;

As: Sambodhi: M.VIII. 35, Su VIII 5, K VIII 22, G.VIII 2, D VIII, 4; sabodhi S VIII 6;
SKANDHA: P Khandha: division; branch;
Chā II, 23.1 (dharma-skandha, division of Dharma)
M 7,11;
branch; Sn. 272; back, shoulder (op.mod. Indo-Aryan ḍhaḍ), Sn. 53;

SMRĪTI
P. Sati, good memory; recollectedness; Chā VII 26.2; Ait 5.2; M 6,31; G 2.83; 10,34; 15,15; 18.73;
recognition; mindfulness; self-possession:
Sn. 77, 340, 434, 444, 1026, 1035, 1036, 1107, 1143;
Dh 24, 91, 146, 293, 296-298, 328, 329; Thag 98, 99, 260, 446, 981, 1035, 1049, 1098; Thig 35, 280, 281, 388;

HṛĪ
P Hirī, shame, shyness, modesty; Brh. I. 5.3; Tait I.11,3;
M 6,30; G 16,2;
sense of shame; bashfulness; Sn. 77, 133, 253, 463, 719; Dh. 143, 245; J I 129, 207;
CHAPTER VIII.

CONCLUSION.

We have observed in the study of the Sutta-Nipāta ballads that the earliest of them go back to a period in which the verse material is still in a floating condition. Of the different kinds the narrative type in the third person singular takes precedence in point of time, for the first person, as seen in the Therā-Therī-gāthās is a later and more developed characteristic. The mixed variety has developed out of the pure type owing to exegetic comments which accumulated in the course of traditional handling. A further development of this, not seen in Sn, is noticeable in the Canonical prose, where the verse ballad is incorporated in the body of the prose, but still retains its rhythm and poetic peculiarities. This growth must have taken about three centuries. The history of this development may roughly be said to have taken the following course:

- Inspired Verses (Individual)
- Narrative (3rd person)
- Didactic
- Narrative (1st person)
- Mixed
- Prose, as incorporated.

(1) D. p.16:— for language; the actual metrical form is seen, for instance, on p.22:—

" jīpāma gopānasi-vankām
bhoggām dāndaparāyanām
pavedhamānaṃ gacchantām"
If we accept the inscriptive evidence of Asoka, we may assume the date 500-200 B.C. as the probable one for the majority of the ballads.

This period was rich in the production of ballad and epic literature; the number of passages which are common to Mbh and the Jatakas allows of no other interpretation. Preceding this period there was afoot an activity which was responsible for ballads in the Vedic literature. As in Homeric Greece, this activity continued from the beginning of ballad literature up to the final composition of the great epics. This literary continuity was also unbroken in the development of thought.

The popular nature of the ballads on the one hand has to be contrasted with the secret development of the Upanishads on the other; these latter treatises owe their existence to three factors, viz., the popular Vedic tradition, the priestly doctrine of the sacrifice or Brāhmaṇa theology and the mystic doctrines developing in select circles. The growth of those ideas which constitute the greater portions of these texts may be illustrated as follows:

Vedic Mythology

\[ \text{Vedic Pantheon} \quad \downarrow \quad \text{Brahmaṇa Theology} \quad \downarrow \quad \text{Sacrifice} \]

\[ \text{Pūruṣa} \quad \downarrow \quad \text{Brahman} \quad \downarrow \quad \text{Kārman} \]

\[ \text{Atmān} \quad \downarrow \quad \text{Atmān = Pūruṣa} \quad \downarrow \quad \text{Atmān = Brahman} \]

\[ \text{Brahman = Pūruṣa} \]

\[ \text{Atmān = Brahman,} \]

Note (1) continued from previous page:

"atusram gata-yobbanam."

already noticed by Rhys Davids and Carpenter, the editors of DII
This gradual growth is not completely preserved in the Upanishads; owing to the secret nature of these circles which developed such doctrines such a continuity could not be maintained; adding to this the difference of age grades between the several passages, it is no wonder, that single doctrines like Karman did not find their logical development in our texts. This does not mean, however, that the continuity was altogether broken. On the other hand it was kept up by different schools which elaborated philosophical doctrines out of imperfect material thus handed down. The preservation of Yakka in the ballads in the sense of Atman is a good example of this.

The philosophy of the ballads is of a two-fold nature; on the one side it preserves and continues the doctrines and terminology of the Upanishads; to this group belong the concepts of yakka, atta, and kamma; and the positive side of nibbana; on the other, it introduces a new viewpoint, which later becomes the specific Buddhist point; to this class belong the concepts of dukkha and the negative aspect of nibbana. Of the first type we may say that they were not Buddhist in any sense of the term; they belong to no specific doctrines and may as well find a fitting place in Mbh or Purana texts, for they are mostly of a didactic character.

On the actual relationship between the older Upanishads and the early ballads only two points are clear: the Upanishads do not mention the name of the Buddha, and both in thought and expression the majority of them are earlier than the ballads. Previous attempts at tracing Buddhist influence in the Upanishads have been hastily made, as in the case of Brh. Ill. 2,13. A more detailed examination of the problem suggests that such conclusions are ill-judged, and points to a more plausible solution in a common tradition which without influencing either of the two literatures, preserved a continuity from the
earliest Vedic hymns and shaped the course of a later day philosophy.

The influence of Upanishadic thought on the ballads can be distinguished in the vocabulary and expressions. The technical terms in Śvetāsvatara and Maitri which are introduced from Sānkhya terminology were not found in the ballads with the same implication; thus Pradhāna or Primary Mather occurs only in the sense of spiritual exertion for the gaining of emancipation. It is possible that these passages are later than the ballads, but there is no positive evidence.

The greater number of common words between the ballads and Mbh (Gītā) suggests that they developed in the same period. We may expect a mutual influence in the case of these two literatures, but Buddhist so far as the older Upanishads are concerned, the early/ballads as embodied in Sn are later compositions.

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