TRIBE AND STATE IN WAZIRISTAN 1849-1883

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ABSTRACT

The thesis begins by describing the socio-political and economic organisation of the tribes of Waziristan in the mid-nineteenth century, as well as aspects of their culture, attention being drawn to their egalitarian ethos and the importance of *tarburwali*, rivalry between patrilateral parallel cousins. It goes on to examine relations between the tribes and the British authorities in the first thirty years after the annexation of the Punjab. Along the south Waziristan border, Mahsud raiding was increasingly regarded as a problem, and the ways in which the British tried to deal with this are explored; in the 1870s indirect subsidies, and the imposition of ‘tribal responsibility’ are seen to have improved the position, but divisions within the tribe and the tensions created by the Second Anglo-Afghan War led to a tribal army burning Tank in 1879.

The contrast is drawn with the relatively good relations which were established with many of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs, some of whom had begun to graze flocks and cultivate land in the Bannu district on the north Waziristan border. However, clumsy handling of the latter led to a serious crisis in 1870, and the resulting efforts to improve tribal management are described.

In conclusion, the nature of British frontier policy in Waziristan in this period is analysed, and the strategic, political, economic and cultural influences upon it examined; in particular ideas about how the tribes were organised and could be handled are investigated. Actual techniques of tribal management are described and their effectiveness assessed. Tribal reactions are briefly explored; the difficulties experienced with them are seen to have been due to factionalism and a general clash of cultures, as much as to their poverty. The relationship between the tribes and the government in Kabul in this period is also discussed. The implications for the general question of relations between ‘tribe’ and ‘state’ are briefly assessed, and the dialectical quality of the relationship emphasised.
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND -

Aims and scope -

There has been growing awareness in recent years that ‘tribe’ and ‘state’, at least in the Middle East and Central Asia, form a single system, and increasing interest in the complex interaction between them. Some of the forms this has taken in Iran and the Arab world have been explored, but although it lasted for nearly a hundred years, and for much of the period is relatively well-documented, there has been very little detailed analysis of the relationship between the Government of India (referred to below as the G.O.I.) and the Pashtun tribes on the north-west frontier.

As regards the published work on the frontier in this period, the various contemporary reports and histories, such as those by Temple, Paget and Wylly, tended to concentrate on the military aspects of the encounter, and focused on the raids, expeditions and often daring and dramatic ways in which the tribes tried to resist the growing British penetration of their territory. This is also true of most of the biographies of and autobiographies by men who actually served on the frontier, which rarely looked very far beneath the surface glamour and excitement. Nor has the relationship between tribe and state on this border been explored in much detail since. The standard English-language accounts of the Pashtuns give sketchy and anecdotal accounts of British relations with the tribes and superficial analyses of their organisation. The historical accounts of the British period on the frontier by Davies, Baha and Yapp are much more valuable, but they have been either like Davies’s very general, or confined to a limited period like Baha’s, and in the case of Yapp’s to one particular area as well. It should be noted that studies of the foreign relations of the G.O.I. with the countries to the north-west, for example those by Ghose and Chakravarty, also contain some brief references to tribal policy, just as histories

1 R. Temple, Report showing the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes on the North-West Frontier of the Punjab (Lahore, 1865), W.H. Paget, A Record of the Expeditions against the North-West Frontier Tribes (Calcutta, 1874), H.C. Wylly, From the Black Mountain to Waziristan (London, 1912)
of Afghanistan, such as those by Gregorian and Fraser-Tytler, mention the Kabul government’s relations with the frontier tribes.5

So far the unpublished academic work on the Sind and Punjab frontiers in the second half of the nineteenth century, like Heathcote’s account of British relations with Kalat in the mid-nineteenth century and Harris’s study of the Forward Policy, though it contains some relevant discussion, has tended to look at developments on the Frontier from the point of view of imperial strategy and defence.6 More recently, Christensen has combined historical and social anthropological approaches to produce an account of socio-economic and political change in Afridi society during the British period on the frontier as a whole. Dutta has done something similar for Baluchistan in the later nineteenth century, and a recent thesis by Noelle describes the relationships Dost Muhammad Khan was able to build up with the different groups within his territory, including some of the frontier tribes, and is a valuable addition to the literature.7 However, it remains the case that there has been little detailed examination of developments along the frontier in the British period as a whole, and very little indeed of the first thirty or forty years, when the wider strategic issues were less important. In particular, apart from Howell’s study of relations with the Mahsuds which does not deal in much depth with developments before about 1890, virtually nothing has been written specifically about Waziristan.8 Given that the tribes of Waziristan posed one of the principal challenges to British supremacy along the north-west frontier from 1848 to 1947, and that in military, political and economic terms a very considerable effort went into meeting that challenge, this is perhaps a surprising omission.

The greater part of this thesis therefore consists of a detailed account of relations between the G.O.I. and the tribes of Waziristan, in particular the Mahsuds and the Darwesh Khels, in the supposed heyday of the ‘close border’ policy, the period from the annexation of the Punjab in 1849 to the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80), based on the records of the British Indian government in the India Office section of the British Library in London, as well as ideas taken from social anthropological studies of Pashtun social organisation in

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8 *Mizh* (Karachi, 1979)
the second half of the twentieth century, in particular those by Barth and Ahmed. In the first chapter I describe the culture and socio-political organisation of the tribes, and the political situation along the frontier immediately before the establishment of British rule along it. In chapters two to four I examine the encounter with the Mahsuds and Bhittanis of south Waziristan. In chapters five to seven I look at the way the relationship with the Darwesh Khels developed in Bannu and along the Upper Miranzai border. In the final chapters the principal points which emerge from the foregoing narrative are explored.

The G.O.I.'s objectives regarding the tribes and the frontier in this period, the methods by which it hoped to achieve them, and the models of tribal organisation with which it operated, are reviewed and evaluated, and the implications for our understanding of the relationship between tribe and state in general are briefly assessed.

Methodology -

As noted above, the thesis is based predominantly on the reports of British administrators, and in particular those in the India Office section of the British Library. There are two difficulties here. In the first place the records in London are incomplete, and there are sources in South Asian archives which contain additional material and which it has not been possible to consult. However, it seems unlikely that these contain anything which

9 Although there have been only a few social anthropological studies of tribal society along the Frontier, the most famous, F. Barth’s Political Leadership among Swat Pathans (London, 1959), became one of the standard texts of post-war British social anthropology and generated its own secondary literature, including T. Asad, “Market model, class structure and consent: a reconsideration of Swat political organization”, Man (1972), N.S. Vol. 7, No. 1, and M.M. Meeker, “The Twilight of a South Asian heroic Age: a Rereading of Barth’s Study of Swat”, Man (1980), N.S. Vol. 15, No. 4, and A.S. Ahmed, Millennium and Charisma among Swat Pathans (London, 1976). In Millennium and Charisma Ahmed drew attention to certain points which he argued Barth had overlooked or misunderstood. Lindholm also carried out field research in Swat, and his Generosity and Jealousy: the Swat Pukhtuns of Northern Pakistan (New York, 1982) is a somewhat more detailed and less schematic analysis of Swat society than Barth’s. Based on fieldwork and on his experiences while Political Agent Orakzai Agency, Ahmed’s Pukhtun Economy and Society (London, 1980) is a comparative investigation of Mohmand society in the tribal areas and in Peshawar district. Similarly Ahmed drew on his background as Political Agent South Waziristan Agency for his Resistance and Control in Pakistan (London, 1991). I have been unable to consult Mahsud Monograph by another political officer, Omar Afridi. Political difficulties have made it impossible to produce any studies of the Frontier based on field research in recent years.

10 There is a glossary and a list of footnote abbreviations on pp. 296 to 299.


12 I have also looked at a few of the private manuscript collections in the I.O.L. archives, in particular John Lawrence’s frontier correspondence.
will cause us radically to alter our picture of developments in this period. Moreover, as the first detailed examination of relations between the G.O.I. and the tribes of Waziristan in this early period, this partial account should have some value, if only by indicating the sorts of questions which remain to be investigated more fully. However, it should be emphasised that the aim of the thesis is to describe and assess the way relations between the British Indian state and the tribes of Waziristan developed in the first thirty years after the annexation of the Punjab, rather than actually to write a history of the tribes themselves in this period.

There is a rather different problem which is epistemological and not archival. The administrative reports on which this study is based are inevitably partial, and it has to be accepted that the picture of the tribes they reveal is not a complete one. They were written by men of a particular cultural background at a particular time with a particular purpose in mind. It has been argued that therefore though they yield some objective facts about colonialism or imperialism itself records like these tell us nothing about society under imperialism. But this is debatable. To assert that the imperial records can only illustrate imperial attitudes would be to deny any reality to the object of study, in this case Pashtun culture and society. However much they may have been distorted by the bias of those writing them, these imperial accounts are descriptions of something which really existed. But it also goes without saying that they are not objective ones, and that a historical account based almost entirely on them is bound to be incomplete.

Definitions of 'tribe' and 'state' - historical and contemporary - and associated terms -

It was from the sixteenth century as Europe began to expand into the Americas and Africa that the word 'tribe' (from the Latin tribus which referred to the early political divisions or patrician orders of the Roman state) began to be used to indicate inferiority, and tribes came to be associated with a more primitive order of humanity. Those who remained grouped in tribes represented an earlier, lower form of life "left behind by the march of history and destined to be redeemed and refashioned by the intervention of"

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13 For example, the correspondence summarised in the Press Lists of the Lahore Secretariat, some of which is not available in the I.O.L., only contains a few references to events to which there is no reference at all in the I.O.L. material.
14 See for example T. Asad, ed., Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (Ithaca, 1973)
15 C. Lindholm, "Images of the Pathan: the Usefulness of Colonial Ethnography", Archives Européennes de Sociologie (1980), Tome XXI, No. 2
16 There is a useful discussion of some of the difficulties involved in 'extrapolating' from data derived from modern social anthropological research to try and build up a picture of how things were in the past in Tapper, Frontier Nomads of Iran. A Political and Social History of the Shahsevan (Cambridge, 1997).
superior forces". This view survives in the modern tendency loosely to equate tribe with 'primitive society', and apply it to the precolonial population of many parts of the world. As such it has little if any analytical utility. 'Tribe' is also used to indicate a particular kind of society, usually as part of an evolutionary scheme in which 'tribes' with their primitive economy and techniques and clan-based political organisation, develop in certain conditions from bands of hunters and evolve into more complex chiefdoms and states. Though this is a somewhat more rigorous notion, it relies on a model of unilineal social development which bears little relation to reality.

A third usage, common in British social anthropology, follows Evans-Pritchard's classic analysis of the Nuer of the southern Sudan as a "a collection of tribes, that is political groups defined by territory and by accepted mechanisms for settlement of disputes". Such tribes differed from chiefdoms and states in having no central authority, and the development or imposition of such authority marked their transformation or integration into more complex political forms. So British social anthropologists like Evans-Pritchard used 'tribe' and tribal division or 'section' as ways of referring to the political aspect or expression of 'clan' and 'lineage segments' respectively. From this point of view, genealogy was a way of thinking about political relations, and so tribes were "split into segments, primary, secondary and tertiary tribal sections" which were referred to by the names of the 'dominant' clans and lineages. In the Middle Eastern context social anthropologists have largely followed this usage, applying the term 'tribe' to groups numbering at most a few thousand individuals, which usually but not always combined territorial and political unity under a chief with an ideology of common descent.

However, as Richard Tapper reminds us, most of the terms that have been translated as 'tribe' are highly ambiguous, and attempts to give them, or tribe itself, precision as to either level, function or essence are misdirected. Even in the most apparently consistent segmentary terminology, individual terms are ambiguous, not merely
as far as level is concerned, but also in their implications for behaviour and identity. As with English words like ‘family’, ‘group’ and ‘community’, it is the ambiguity of the terms and the flexibility of the system which make them useful. As a result one cannot expect all groups labelled ‘tribes’ to be identical in scale or function or expect such usage to yield terms for an objective classification and comparison. Indeed the complexities and definitional difficulties are so great that Tapper has returned to the distinction Maine drew in the last century between societies organised in terms of kinship and those based on territory. In the last resort, he argues, tribe should be understood as a state of mind, a construction of reality, and a model for organisation and action, based on the belief that the use of ties of kinship and patrilineal descent should be primary. By contrast, while acknowledging that there is a tribe in every state and a state in every tribe, the ‘ideal-type’ state, Tapper suggests, is based on the belief that loyalty should be primarily based on residence within a defined territory. Broadly-speaking this is the approach taken here. Tribe is envisaged as a polity in which personal identity and kinship ties are basic to membership, and, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct (in terms of customs, dialect or language, and origins). In these terms it is accurate to describe the groups to which the Pashtuns of Waziristan belonged in the nineteenth century as tribes not only because kinship ties were emphasised in them, but also because in some contexts they demonstrated a degree of political unity and independence, and their members considered themselves culturally distinct not just from members of other tribes but from the state.

As far as the state is concerned, it scarcely needs to be said that there are many different kinds of states which behave in many different ways. So, for example, a distinction has been drawn between the ‘empire’ and the ‘nation-state’. Following Weber, the critical feature of the latter, it has been suggested, is its link with a particular territorial area, over which it exerts “the claim to monopolise the use of force”, whereas by

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23 Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople”, pp. 54-55, also “Introduction”, p. 67
24 In the Middle Eastern context in particular, as well as analytical categories used by scholars, Dale Eickelman has identified three other different notions of tribe; state administrative concepts, indigenous explicit ideologies, and indigenous practical notions (The Middle East an Anthropological Approach (Englewood Cliffs, 1981), pp. 87-90). See also Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople”, p. 53.
27 Tapper, “Introduction”, p. 73. A tribe is usually politically unified, he suggests, though not necessarily under a central leader, both features being commonly attributable to interaction with states (“Introduction”, p. 9).
28 For the sake of simplicity, I do not usually refer to ‘clans’ and ‘lineages’ even when it is the genealogical aspect which is more important.
contrast the empire is prepared to allow subordinate polities to survive within its domains.31 In these terms the British Indian state, and its Sikh, Afghan and Mughal predecessors were all empires, but it is useful to keep in mind some sort of distinction between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ states (including empires).32 At least until relatively late in the century, Afghanistan and Kalat remained largely ‘traditional’ states, whereas, although there were continuities between it and its predecessors, the British Indian state gradually became a much more ‘modern’ one in a number of important respects. It is also worth making the point that in the nineteenth century the Russian, French and British empires approached the tribal societies they encountered in rather different ways, both because they had different goals and because they had different ideas about how states should behave and different administrative traditions.

32 For example, although all traditional states have laid claim to the formalised monopoly over the means of violence within their territories, it is only within modern ‘nation-states’ that that this claim been more or less successfully realised (A. Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, Cambridge, 1985, p. 120). See also B. Tibi, “Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-States”, in Khoury and Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation, p. 144.
CHAPTER ONE WAZIRISTAN AND THE TRIBES, AND FIRST CONTACTS WITH THE BRITISH

WAZIRISTAN -

When a permanent British presence was established along its eastern border following the annexation of the Punjab early in 1849, Waziristan remained what it appears to have been for centuries, an independent 'land of insolence'. This was the case even though it had been encapsulated in various empires, most recently the one established by the Afghan mercenary leader Ahmed Shah Abdali (later Durrani) (1747-1772). Nor did the Sikhs, who began to challenge Durrani authority in the Punjab in the later eighteenth century, establish control of it.

Waziristan was not itself a political or administrative unit, and did not have particularly well-defined boundaries. About sixty miles across at its widest point, it may be envisaged as a rough parallelogram, extending from the Gumal river in the south about ninety miles north as far as the Kaitu river, and then across the river as far as Thal. It is bordered by the Bannu basin and the Derajat on the east, while to the west it extends through the Afghan district of Birmal to the Afghan plateau and the provinces of Paktia and Paktika (see maps - figure one). Described by Wylly as “the frontier Switzerland”, it is a predominantly mountainous area, the hills rising gradually from east to west, until in the Sulaiman mountains along the Afghan border they reach a height of over 3,000 metres: Preghal, 3513 metres high, to the south-west of Makin is the highest point. From north-east to south-west the most important rivers are the Kurram, Kaitu, Tochi, Khaisora, Shakhtu, Shuza, Tank Zam, Khaisara, and Wana Toi. Usually they contain little water, and their wide beds are full of rocks and boulders, but after monsoonal summer showers they can quickly turn into raging torrents. The rivers tend to run from east to west, so that at

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1 In local terms it was yaghistan (land of freedom or unrestraint) as opposed to hukumat (land of government) (J.W. Anderson, “Khan and Khel: Dialectics of Pakhtun Tribalism”, in Tapper, ed., The Conflict of Tribe and State, p. 125).
2 Ahmed Shah Durrani’s assessment of the lashkar strength of Waziristan in the late eighteenth century was as follows -
   - Ahmedzai Darwesh Khels: 30,000
   - Utmanzai Darwesh Khels: 30,000
   - Mahsuds: 18,000
   - Dhittanis: 12,000
   - Dawars: 12,000
   - Total: 102,000
(Caroe, The Pathans, pp. 258-259, also Ahmed, Resistance and Control, p. 18).
3 Caroe, The Pathans, pp. 257-258
4 For personal and place names I have used the spelling most commonly used in the sources consulted.
some places they meet the hills, which have a north-south alignment, more or less at right angles, passing through them by means of narrow gorges or *tangis*. In the mid-nineteenth century the western hills were still partly forested with holm oaks, pines and deodars. Other areas, like Sarwekai, where many Bahlolzai Mahsuds went in the winter, were mostly treeless, had limited water supplies and were suitable only for grazing. There is cultivable land, in particular along the Kurram and Tochi rivers, and in the Baddar Valley, but to the south of Wana is the desert area of Zarmelan. The climate is harsh with high temperatures in the summer and cold winters; most rain falls in early spring and late summer.

On the north-eastern edge of Waziristan is the fertile and well-watered Miranzai valley, which is about three miles across, and twenty miles long. To the south of Miranzai, on the other side of the Salt Range which runs more or less east-west between the Kurram and the Indus Rivers and rises to a maximum of about 1,200 metres, is the district of Bannu. This “lovely country of eastern Afghanistan” as Edwardes described it, is about thirty miles wide and hemmed in by mountains on three sides, opening up to the south into the plains of Marwat. In the mid-nineteenth century the inhabitants of Bannu itself comprised Pashtu-speaking Bannuchis, Punjabi-speaking Muslims referred to collectively as Jats, and a minority of Hindus (often shop-keepers and traders). On the whole fertile, especially when irrigated, the Bannu district is crossed by several rivers, the most important ones being the Kurram and the Tochi. Interrupted by a projecting spur of hills, the plains extend south through Marwat (inhabited principally by Lohani Pashtuns referred to simply as Marwats) some sixty miles towards the district of Tank. This also had some productive areas watered by the Gumal and Tank rivers. As well as Jats, Tank was inhabited by some Lohani Pashtuns, including Marwats and Kundis. In both Bannu and Tank trade and finance were mostly in the hands of Hindus or Sikhs.

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5 *From the Black Mountain*, Vol. 1, p. 418. Most of the features mentioned are indicated on the maps on pp. 279-281.
10 *Bannu Gazetteer* 1883-84 (Lahore, 1884), pp. 48, 72-73, Davies, *The Problem*, p. 67
11 According to Caroe, both Marwats and Kundis were Lohanis, and descended from Qais’s second son, Bitan (*The Pathans*, p. 15).
THE TRIBES -

The inhabitants of Waziristan were almost entirely Pashtuns, though there were small colonies of Hindu traders and a settlement of people known as Urmars, or, as they referred to themselves, Barakis, at Kaniguram. Most Pashtuns are supposedly descended from sons of the founding ancestor, Qais Abd al-Rashid, although opinions differ as to the origins of many of the north-west frontier tribes including the Afridis, Orakzais, Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds. Whichever version they accept, like other Pashtuns, the tribes of the frontier thought of themselves as having a place on a genealogical charter, which comprised ever more inclusive segments up to the level of the well-known 'tribes' like the Yusufzais, Durrani and so on, and began with Qais himself. The most important groups in Waziristan were the Mahsuds, Darwesh Khels, Bhittanis and Dawars.

The Mahsuds -

The Mahsuds lived in the centre and south of Waziristan (see maps - figure two). To the east their territory adjoined that of the Bhittanis, and to the south-west and to the north and north-west Darwesh Khels. Only at one point, at the western end of the Gumal valley, were Mahsud and British territory actually contiguous. When British travellers and officials first encountered the Mahsuds, they often referred to them as Mahsud Wazirs,

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14 Caroe, for example, says that these tribes are generally held to be descended from an adopted son of Karlanri, a member of the tribe of Urmar, himself an adopted son of Qais Abd al-Rashid’s son Sharkbun, the ancestor of those whom he calls the Western Afghans; Ahmed suggests that Karlanri was actually a son of Qais (*The Pathans*, pp. 12-21, Ahmed, *Resistance and Control*, p. 17).

15 Barth, *Political Leadership*, p. 27. See chart p. 294.

16 Ahmed classifies Pashtun tribes into two categories: nang (honour) or qalang (rent, tax). Nang tribes, he suggests, live in remote areas supporting only subsistence agriculture, do not have strong leaders and possess an acephalous segmentary lineage system, while qalang ones are found in areas which support irrigated agriculture and produce substantial surpluses, and are politically centralised with landlords extracting the surpluses from an oppressed, generally non-Pashtun, landless class (see, for example, *Millenium and Charisma*, pp. 73-83, *Pukhtun Economy*, pp. 111-125). In these terms the tribes of Waziristan obviously belong to the nang category. However, this classification may not adequately reflect the variety of forms Pashtun social organisation has taken (see, for example, Tapper, “Introduction”, pp. 55-56). Moreover, given that Ahmed says at one point that nang values may be of “equal importance in qalang societies” (*Pukhtun Economy*, p. 117), it is not always clear whether the distinction is meant to apply to values or to actual societies. Under the circumstances the opposition between nang and qalang appears to be a useful way of indicating contrasting models of behaviour analogous to some of the other oppositions which crop up in the Pashtun context, such as that between qam and gund, but it may not be so appropriate to think of nang and qalang as indicating actual types of Pashtun society.

17 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 392

18 D.I.K. Gazetteer, p. 164
or just Wazirs, because their genealogies linked them closely with other Wazir groups. However, during the nineteenth century the Mahsuds established a distinct identity of their own. Their three main branches, the Alizais, Bahlolzais and Shaman Khels, claimed descent from Ali, Bahlol and Shaman respectively, the three sons of Mahsud (the son of Mahmud, the brother of Musa Darwesh from whom the Darwesh Khels were supposedly descended).19

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to do more than make an informed guess at the tribe’s population in 1849 (indeed this remains the case today).20 The figures in the earlier British sources, almost without exception, refer only to the ‘fighting men’ of the tribe, and are highly unreliable, tending considerably to exaggerate the tribe’s numbers. Thus, for example, using the figures for ‘fighting men’ in MacGregor’s Gazetteer of Central Asia, published in the early 1870s, and a ratio of three women and children to one ‘fighting man’, we arrive at a total Mahsud population of 66,800, whereas sixty years later in the early 1930s the South Waziristan Deputy Commissioner, H.H. Johnson, estimated it at only 68,095.21 One British estimate, dating from the end of the century, put the total number of fighting men at about 8,000, which using the same multiplier gives a total population of some 32,000, which seems more reasonable.22 Ahmed suggests that Mahsud population began to rise rapidly in the twentieth century, from an estimated 88,046 in 1946 to 247,040 in 1972.23 If the population was also rising in the second half of the nineteenth century, albeit at a lower rate than in the twentieth, then the number of Mahsuds may not have been much more than 20,000 in 1849.

Although some sections occupied fairly discrete territories, by contrast with most other frontier tribes the members of other Mahsud sections did not on the whole do so, often living quite close to each other in the same areas, sometimes, it would appear, even in the same settlements, while in the Shakhtu valley in particular their settlements were

20 Ahmed, Resistance and Control, p. 169
21 Op. cit. p. 14. MacGregor distributed his total of 16,700 fighting men among the three main sections or branches as follows, Bahlolzai 8,100, Alizai, 5,600, and Shaman Khel 3,000 (C.A., I:2, pp. 305-307). The fact that elsewhere his Gazetteer states that the total number of fighting men is 14,500 (I:3, p. 263) suggests that these figures are very approximate. A report published in the early 1890s gives a figure of about 50,000 for the tribe as a whole, made up of 22,750 Alizais, 17,725 Bahlolzais, and 4,450 Shaman Khels (Mason, Report, pp. 14-18). Christensen similarly notes the difficulty of arriving at any reasonably accurate figures for Afridi population in and after 1849 (‘Conflict and Change’, pp. 246-247).
22 The Forward Policy, p. 170
23 Ahmed, Resistance and Control, pp. 11-14
interspersed with Darwesh Khel ones. A large proportion of the Bahlolzai and Shabi Khel Alizai Mahsuds were nomadic and mainly pastoral, moving from summer to winter quarters in the autumn and back again in the spring, and living for part of the year at least in caves, tents or grass huts. The Manzai Alizais and Shaman Khels were on the whole more sedentary, mostly living in dispersed settlements. Their houses often had defensive towers and high walls, and were sometimes built of stone. The main centres of population were around Kaniguram and Makin. Makin, which lies in a valley between the Preghal and Shuidar mountains, consisted at that time of twelve hamlets inhabited mainly by Bahlolzai Mahsuds, mostly Abdullais. Kaniguram, which was about ten miles to the south, was “pleasantly situated” between the Baddar and Tangi rivers, and surrounded by orchards and gardens, and terraced fields. It had as many as five hundred stone houses, and its main street was roofed over to keep out rain and snow. Most of its inhabitants were not in fact Mahsuds but Urmars. In 1881 they had six main sections, and were associated with the Shaman Khel Mahsuds, who therefore received an extra share in the genealogically-based charter for the distribution of profits and sharing of loss. There was also a small settlement containing members from the various Mahsud sections at Kaniguram. In 1850 few Mahsuds lived in the plains, though some of the Shabi Khels owned a little land in the Bannu district.

The Mahsuds’ chief occupations in the second half of the nineteenth century were agriculture, pastoralism, trade, mining and manufacturing in the area around Kaniguram and Makin, and raiding. Cultivable land was a scarce resource, and, where life was sufficiently secure, considerable skill and labour went into using every bit of available ground. In the wide river beds, which usually contained little water, patches of cultivable land known as kaches were created, using the silt brought down by the spring floods, and

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24 P.O./Mahsud Expedition to G.P., No. 120P, 8 Oct. 1881, in App./F.R., Feb. 1882 P1825. In his Mahsud Notes (p. 3), Johnson commented that “tribal responsibility ... is extremely difficult to enforce in many parts of the Mahsud country by means of the intermingling of tribes”.
25 For details see Appendix II, pp. 284-292, and chart p. 293.
26 For example in the Khaisara valley (P.O./M.E.-Diary, 1st May 1881, in A 34 May 1881 P1624, Dichter, The North-West Frontier, p. 157).
27 Caroe, The Pathans, p. 392
28 Mason, Report, pp. 19-20
30 They are supposedly descended from Urmar (Caroe, The Pathans, pp. 22-23, Khan, Warrior Race, p. 17).
32 Mason, Report, p. 19
surrounded by walls made of boulders and wood.\textsuperscript{35} Where possible, around Makin and Kaniguram for example, fields were carefully terraced with stone walls, and irrigation channels constructed to make the best possible use of water.\textsuperscript{36} Spring crops were wheat and barley, and autumn ones jowar (Indian millet) and rice. Landholdings appear to have been small, and the cultivation was mostly performed by the Mahsuds themselves. Trees were an important resource for fuel and construction; willows and silver-birches were planted along irrigation canals, and mulberries and apricots were grown in orchards.\textsuperscript{37} Iron was extracted and smelted around Makin and Kaniguram, and there were forty or fifty small factories in which it was made into cooking utensils, agricultural tools, and knives, swords and daggers.\textsuperscript{38} There are also some coal deposits to the east of Kotkai, but they do not appear to have been exploited.\textsuperscript{39}

Little is known about how Mahsud trade was organised in this period, but it is clear that although only some sections traded on any scale, their commerce with Tank, Bannu, and Kulachi in particular was on a reasonably large scale, being estimated at least Rs.20,000 a year in the early 1860s; there also appears to have been some trade with Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{40} The Alizais were the principal trading section, though some of them were farmers too, while men from other sections, such as the Nana Khel Bahlolzais and Galishahi Shaman Khels, were also traders, the latter mostly with Bannu.\textsuperscript{41} The main exports were iron and iron manufactures, timber (for roofing and bedsteads), matting made from the dwarf palm, rope and ghi. Imports included sugar, cloth and grain.\textsuperscript{42}

Regular raiding into the administered areas and plundering the Powindahs’ trading caravans in the Gumal Pass may have played some part in the economy of some sub-sections, in particular some of the Bahlolzai ones.\textsuperscript{43} Many of the Mahsuds living further away from British territory, at least in the mid-nineteenth century, appear to have enjoyed

\textsuperscript{36} P.O./M.E.-D., 1 May 1881, in App./F.R.-App. A. Feb. 1882 P1825
\textsuperscript{37} T.H. Holdich, The Indian Borderland 1880-1900 (London, 1901), p. 55
\textsuperscript{39} The Mahsud Waziri Expedition of 1881 (Simla, 1884), p. 77
\textsuperscript{40} Com. L.D. to G.P., No 55, 22 June 1860, No. 290 March 1862 IP P204/59. Edwardes referred to the “great trade (which) is carried on between the Vizeerees and the people of Tak ... the chief article is iron” (A Year on, Vol. I, p. 450). The value of the Rupee remained around 10p throughout the third quarter of the century but began to decline towards the end of it (D. Rothermund, An Economic History of India from Pre-Colonial Times to 1986 (London, 1988), p. 43).
\textsuperscript{42} P.O./M.E.-D., 10 May 1881, in App./F.R.-App. A. Feb. 1882 P1825
\textsuperscript{43} Similarly, among the Afridis, only among the Zakha Khels did raiding make a significant contribution to the local economy (Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, pp. 41-42).
an income from iron-working and trade as well as agriculture and the sale of timber from their forests. Some of the groups living nearer the British border, on the other hand, such as the Shingis and the Jalal Khels, inhabited less productive areas, and this may have helped to drive them to raiding. However, the economic disparities between the different groups should probably not be exaggerated, and it seems likely that some of the Mahsuds living to the west, like the Abdullai Bahlolzais, were also quite poor. In any case, it is difficult to say how far raiding was simply a response to poverty. Other factors were important too. The Mahsuds regarded fighting as an honourable activity, and raiding could be carried out for various reasons. Raids could be mounted at the request of factions living in British territory, for example. They could also be a way of expressing a grievance against the authorities in the administered areas, or trying to undermine opponents within the tribe. Moreover, even if some sections were sometimes driven to raiding by poverty, this poverty was partly the result of the prevailing climate of violence. Evelyn Howell, who served as Political Agent in Waziristan earlier in this century, thought the blood-feud was a powerful check not only on individual initiative but on all forms of collective enterprise. Throughout Waziristan, he pointed out, the traces of terraced fields showed that once there had been cultivation where now there was none.\textsuperscript{44} So money and time were spent on feuding, and the poverty of some tribal sections at least appears to have been due to cultural, political and social factors as well as to the fact that they lived in an area which was poor in resources.\textsuperscript{45}

Tribespeople like the Pashtuns tend to inhabit their own “moral world”, and the term Pashtunwali, often rendered as the ‘way of the Pashtuns’, has frequently been used to refer to the customs of Pashtun tribes, including those living in Waziristan.\textsuperscript{46} Elphinstone described Pashtunwali as “a rude system of customary law, founded on principles such as one would suppose to have prevailed before the institution of a civil government”. More recently Ahmed has argued that it should be envisaged primarily as a code of honour (\textit{nang} or \textit{izzat}), and it is true that the primary injunction it places on Pashtuns appears to be the obligation to maintain honour and avoid shame (\textit{sharm}).\textsuperscript{47} Others, however, argue that

\textsuperscript{44} Mizh, p. 97. Dichter suggests that the Mahsuds do not take well to farming, and remain pastoral, migratory and restless (The North-West Frontier, p. 157). See also, for example, Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, pp. 46, 344-355.

\textsuperscript{45} In this connection, it is worth pointing out that there has in recent years been a tendency to emphasise the importance of cultural factors such as tribal distinctiveness and egalitarianism in explaining political processes in tribal societies, and play down the importance of sociological ‘mechanisms’ such as ‘segmentation’ and ‘complementary opposition’ (see, for example, S. Caton, “Anthropological Theories of Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East: Ideology and the Semiotics of Power”, in Khoury and Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation, pp. 102-103).

\textsuperscript{46} Dresch, Tribes, Government and History (Oxford, 1993), p. 110

\textsuperscript{47} Elphinstone, Account of the Kingdom, Vol. 2, p. 100, Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy, p. 91. Ahmed suggests that the operative features of Pashtunwali are \textit{tarburwali} (rivalry between close agnates) and \textit{tor}
both aspects are important. Steul, for example, defines Pashtunwali as "the sum of all the values and the norms derived from them, which determine the specifically Pashtun way of life" (my translation). The subject is one which is too complex to explore in detail here, but in passing it should be noted that efforts have been made recently to relate Pashtunwali to social organisation, and to see it as an ideology which disguises and even reconciles the contradictions of a segmentary social order; by definition it reaches its fullest expression in areas outside state control.

Some aspects of Pashtunwali particularly concern us here because they affected the way the tribes reacted to the British. These included ways of treating guests and weaker parties, decision-making, reacting to insult and injury, and behaving towards close agnates. In the first place, the ideal of hospitable behaviour towards guests and supplicants (melmastia) encompassed the duty not to surrender anyone taking refuge with one. It was linked with the custom of nanawatai, which referred to the idea of an enemy 'coming in' to sue for peace. Usually the person seeking nanawatai was expected ritually to humiliate himself in some way, in Paktia for example tying a grass halter around his neck or gripping blades of straw between his teeth to express the fact that, like a domestic ox or cow, he was completely in the other's power. The act expressed supplication and was meant to elicit magnanimity in return.

Secondly, Pashtunwali stressed the autonomy of the adult male. He was supposed to be as independent as possible, and not subject to another’s will, and this was reflected in the emphasis given to arriving at decisions on matters of common concern by

(literally 'black', referring to cases in which women’s chastity is involved) (Pukhtun Economy, p. 91, Resistance and Control, p. 2; see also, for example, F. Barth, “Pathan Identity and its Maintenance”, in Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (London, 1969), pp. 119-120).

48 Janata and Hassas, for example, argue that Pashtunwali is as much tribal law as code of honour, encompassing the whole range of Pashtun custom (“Ghairatman - der giite Paschtune. Exkurs über die Grundlagen des Pashtunwali”, Afghanistan Journal (1975), No. 3, p. 84).


50 Christensen, for example, argues that by conflating the idea of honour as group integrity or wholeness with the idea of honour as individual self-esteem, Pashtunwali reconciles (though it does not resolve) the contradictions between individual and collectivity, perceptible inequalities and the egalitarian idea, and division and cohesion (‘Conflict and Change’, p. 81, see also Lindholm, Generosity and Jealousy, p. 222).


52 Janata and Hassas, A.J., 3, p. 93.


54 As Steul puts it, “the Pashtun is sovereign” (my transl.) (Paschtunwali, p. 178). See also, for example, Lindholm, Frontier Perspectives Essays in Comparative Anthropology (Karachi, 1996), pp. 193-194.
consensus in the jirga, or assembly of elders. At the same time a high value was placed on the political independence of the tribe as a whole. Although it does not directly concern us here, it should be noted that for Pashtuns correct behaviour towards women meant among other things maintaining the seclusion of the household. A man’s honour depended on the women for whom he was responsible living in purdah and behaving ‘modestly’. By the same token, the maintenance of the tribe’s honour depended on its ability to defend the seclusion of its homeland.

Thirdly, Pashtunwali demanded a violent reaction to death, injury and insult (including offences against the sexual purity of women). As Barth put it, “the only successful defence of honour is revenge, equal to or beyond the extent of the original insult, so as to re-establish parity or gain an advantage vis-a-vis one’s rivals”, so the injury inflicted in revenge should ideally be greater than that suffered. The term for revenge is *badal* (a word which has the implication of ‘exchange’); it was also the appropriate reaction to any injury inflicted in connection with an institutionalised relationship, usually referred to as *tarburwali*. *Tarbur* is a term for father’s brother’s son, and had the connotation of rival or enemy. Thus *tarburwali* denoted enmity in Pashtun custom and tradition, and referred to the tension and rivalry between agnatic collaterals which appears to have characterised Pashtun life along the frontier.

55 Jirga is a Mongolian loan-word meaning ‘circle’ (Janata and Hassas, A.J. 3, p. 93).
57 The term *namus* is used to refer to male honour derived from the behaviour of the women for whom he is responsible (see, for example, N. Tapper, *Bartered Brides Politics, Gender and Marriage in an Afghan Society* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 22-23). Fornication or adultery, or even the suspicion that it might have taken place, reflected on the honour of male relations of the woman concerned. She became *tor* (black) and she and her real or supposed seducer had to be put to death (see, for example, Janata and Hassas, A.J. 3, pp. 86, 95).
58 Op. cit. p. 86. For similar ideas among the tribes of northern Yemen, see Dresch, *Tribes, Government and History*, pp. 54-55.
59 These offences belong in the category referred to as *terai* (see, for example, Janata and Hassas, A.J. 3, p. 90, Steul, *Paschtunwali*, pp. 216-217, 311). Though various customary procedures for mediation and reconciliation, such as *munawat*, do exist (see, for example, Janata and Hassas, A.J. 3, pp. 92-93).
60 Barth, *Political Leadership*, pp. 83-85
62 Elphinstone, *Account of the Kingdom*, Vol. 1, p. 328, Barth, *Political Leadership*, p. 109, Steul, *Paschtunwali*, p. 37. Ahmed describes *tarburwali* as “rivalry revolving around two male collaterals, usually of the same generation, representing closely related but different lineages within the sub-section and often involving similar series of rivalries on similar depth of the clan genealogy” (Pukhtun Economy, p. 182). Christensen comments that among the Afridis *tarburwali* is the paradigm of conflict (‘Conflict and Change’, p. 117). Lindholm’s claim that the *tarbur* relation is not automatically antagonistic, and permits alliance in the face of an external threat is consistent with his attempt to argue that segmentary lineage organisation is after all the key to understanding political processes in Swat (see footnote 81 below) (*Generosity and Jealousy*, pp. 57, 80).
Professing Islam was an implicit feature of Pashtunwali. The Mahsuds were all Sunni Muslims, and, as elsewhere along the frontier, in Waziristan there appear to have been various kinds of ‘holy men’ who exerted some sort of religious influence. Some wrote charms, read incantations and enjoined alms, sacrifices and pilgrimages to shrines for the cure of disease. Others also played a more obviously political role. Five families of Sayyids who lived at Kaniguram were especially influential. Two were Gailanis, two Ansaris, and the fifth from Bukhara, according to one British report. They were wealthy, having important trading links with the Tank district, where they had been given grants of land in the earlier nineteenth century, and with Afghanistan. They were the Mahsuds’ “spiritual advisers or pirs”, and traditionally had links with a specific Mahsud section, so in the 1870s for example Nabat Shah had special influence with the Aimal Khel Bahlolzais. His father, one contemporary British official reported, “was much revered in his old age, and the vulgar believed he was cutting a new set of teeth, and that his white locks and beard were growing black again”. There were also many ziarats or shrines in Mahsud territory, for example that of Borak Nikka in Tiarza.

It is also worth making a few points about Mahsud social organisation. Firstly, they possessed some ‘segmentary’ characteristics. Patrilineal descent was critical, in that only those men whose names appeared in the tribal genealogies had rights to own land, and share in tribal loss and gain. Only male landowners could speak in the jirgas or councils, in which, as we have seen, rather than decisions being made by putting issues to vote, discussion and negotiation continued until there was no longer any open disagreement, so

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63 For example, in or on the edge of British territory to the north of the Gumal valley and at the mouth of the Chini Pass, and near the Girmi Post lived a Pashtun group with an hereditary reputation for sanctity and spiritual power known as the Minchin Khels (D.I.K. Gazetteer, p. 66).
64 Men with religious influence along the Frontier range from the Sayyids, Mians, and so on, whose position tends to be based on sacred descent, to the pirs and wandering mendicants or faqirs, Sufi-influenced figures, whose authority is based more on their spiritual attainments. Ordinary mullahs, who maintain local mosques and perform rites de passage, do not usually enjoy a very high status, but may also provide leadership in times of crisis (see, for example, Ahmed, Millenium and Charisma, pp. 54-55, Chs. 6 and 7. Resistance and Control, pp. 90-91, D. Edwardes, “Charismatic Leadership and Political Process in Afghanistan”, Central Asian Survey (1986), Vol. 5, 3/4, p. 278).
66 D.I.K. Gazetteer, p. 66, Edwardes, A Year On, Vol. 1, pp. 252, 257. The Gailanis were pirs of the Qadiriyya Sufi order, and were traditionally the leaders of this order in south-eastern Afghanistan (see, for example, Edwardes, C.A.S., Vol. 5, No. 3/4, 278. O. Roy, L’Afghanistan Islam et Modernite Politique (Paris, 1985), p. 59). The Shami Pir (from Damascus) who was induced to travel to Waziristan in the late 1930s to raise a rebellion but was bought off by the Government, was a Gailani (Caroe, The Pathans, pp. 408-409).
69 Tapper, “Introduction”, pp. 59-61
that no-one had to defer publicly to another’s opinion. In fact the jirga tradition appears to have been particularly well developed among them. Jirgas performed various functions among the frontier tribes at this time depending on the context, including representative, legislative, judicial, and mediatory ones. A group of men who negotiated on the tribe’s behalf with some external authority could also be referred to as a jirga. The representative function was evident among the Mahsuds, as there were different levels of jirga, culminating in grand tribal councils comprised of delegates chosen by lower-level jirgas to speak on their behalf. These councils met at Kaniguram, presumably because, being inhabited almost entirely by Urmars, it was not associated with any Mahsud section in particular and so was in a sense neutral territory. Mahsud jirgas traditionally had some sort of executive role as well. They could choose tribal representatives or officers (chaliweshits) (from the number forty), and empower them to act as a sort of temporary tribal police, who could be used to enforce jirga decisions (no retaliation being allowed for this), or call on each section to provide men for a campaign against an external enemy.

So in the later nineteenth century the Mahsuds do appear to have some sort of overall identity and community of interests. Another important expression of this was nikkat, the term for the genealogically-based charter mentioned above, which fixed the share of each section and sub-section in losses and gains. This was constantly evolving, and it appears that the shares have been modified since then, but in the nineteenth century any assets possessed by the tribe or acquired from outside, for example from the British, and similarly any penalties, were supposed to be shared equally between the three main sections. Membership of one of the three main sections, the Alizais, Bahlolzais and

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70 See, for example, Barth “Pathan Identity”, pp. 121-122, Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy, pp. 90-91. In theory there was a similar hierarchy of jirgas within the Afridi tribe following the progressive merging of lineage segments, but there is little evidence to show that jirgas were ever convened according to the principles of lineage segmentation (Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, p. 134).

71 For some discussion of the various functions of jirgas, see, for example, Spain, Pathan Borderland, p. 69, Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, pp. 132-133; see also Elphinstone, Account of the Kingdom, Vol. 1, p. 215.

72 Elphinstone, Account of the Kingdom, Vol. 2, pp. 60-61, Mason. Report, pp. 19-20. “Every family deputes their young men for the fight and send two or three sheep for the entertainment of guests and a woman to cook the bread and fetch wood and water”, said Macaulay (App./F.R.-App. G Feb. 1882 P1825). By the 1930s these tribal jirgas were no longer held, Johnson reported, having been replaced by smaller-scale ones held in different parts of Mahsud territory (Mahsud Notes, p. 22)

73 From the word nikka, ‘grandfather’ or ancestor’, the word means hereditaments, and the system is also known as the tribal sarishita, from the Persian ‘thread’ or ‘link’ (Caroe, The Pathans p. 402, Howell, Mizh, p. 97, Ahmed, Resistance and Control, p. 18).

Shaman Khels, therefore had some importance when it came to the allocation of benefits. Otherwise, however, it appears that it did not have much direct significance. One reason for this was that, as noted above, unlike most other Pashtun tribes, among which each section tended to have its own separate territory, members of each of the three Mahsud sections often lived close together in the same areas. Partly as a result, “sectional feuds” reportedly did not often occur among them, by contrast with the Afridis and Orakzais for instance, who, being “locally divided”, could prosecute them. Indeed this distribution of the population seems to have given local identity some importance in Mahsud organisation too, when it came to mobilising men both for aggression outside tribal territory and resisting external penetration.

Another very important feature of Mahsud society appears to have been its particularly egalitarian ethos (among the men at least), and the absence of institutionalised, hereditary leadership. By contrast with the Baluchi tribes to the south, among which there were recognised chiefs, and section and sub-section leaders, there was only the largely achieved status of Malik, which gave men some influence but not much power. Mahsud authority was fluid and had to be continually created and recreated by negotiation and power-brokering. The weakness of the Maliks may have been partly due to the fact that, as we have seen, the sections did not have their own territories, as this made it difficult for two rivals to emerge in each one and build up their own factional networks (as they did among the Afridis for example).

Nor did the genealogical segments often form actual political groups. The principal reason for this appears to have been the pervasiveness of tarburwali, the rivalry between patrilateral parallel male cousins mentioned above. The consensus of opinion has tended to be that unilinear descent affects the composition of political groups among frontier Pashtuns, as Barth put it, by “causing rivalry to develop between related persons (i.e.

7,000 and the Shaman Khel 2,000 with an extra 1,000 for the non-Mahsud Urmars (Resistance and Control, pp. 19-20).
75 For example they talked about mizh dre Mahsit, “we three Mahsuds” (Caroe, The Pathans, p. 396).
76 The Khaisara Valley, for example, was inhabited by Alizuis (Shabi Khels, and Salimi Khel and Machi Khel Manzais), and Bahlolzais (Abdullai Aimal Khels, Nekzan Khel, Umar Khel and Kokarai Nana Khels, and a few Umar Khel Shingis) (P.O./M.E. to G.P., No. 120P, 8 Oct. 1881, in App./F.R. Feb. 1882 P1825).
77 Ibid.
79 Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, pp. 126-128
80 Nor did complementary opposition occur among them (though whether it ever really did anywhere seems doubtful) (see, for example, P. Salzman, “Does Complementary Opposition Exist ?”, American Anthropologist (1978), Vol. 80, A. Kuper, “Lineage Theory: a Critical Retrospect”, Annual Review of
agnatic collaterals) (my bracket), not by defining bonds of solidarity and co-operation.\footnote{81} Blood feuding between close agnatic relatives was not disapproved of in the same way as in many other tribal groups, for example, the Cyrenaican Bedouin, the Somali, or indeed the neighbouring Baluchis.\footnote{82} In keeping with this, groups collectively responsible for injury or death caused or suffered by one of their members, were (and are) not generally found among frontier Pashtuns.\footnote{83}

The prevalence of *tarburwali* is one important reason why, although they did possess some important ‘segmentary’ features, segmentary lineage theory is not in itself sufficient to explain political processes among the Mahsuds.\footnote{84} In the nineteenth century, it seems likely that, as in contemporary Afridi society, alliances were formed between Mahsud households on the basis of cognatic as well as agnatic ties, and other types of relationship, particularly common enmity towards members of other similar networks. Within each Afridi clan there were usually two opposing factions organised around the ‘big men’, the Maliks, with the patchwork of clan factions tending to resolve itself into a binary system of opposing factional coalitions or blocs extending across the whole tribe, usually referred to as *gundis*.\footnote{85} It seems likely that something similar occurred among the

\footnotetext{81}{Barth, Political Leadership, p. 113. More recent studies of other Pashtun groups such as the Mohmands, Afridis and Ghilzais, which on the whole resemble the tribes of Waziristan rather more than they do the Yusufzais in Swat, have concluded that classical segmentary lineage theory does not explain political processes among them either. Among the Mohmands, for example, “agnatic rivalry is so acute that close kin seek alliances with outside lineages to score off each other” (Ahmed, *Pukhtun Economy*, pp. 126-127, see also Ahmed, *Millenium and Charisma*, p. 74, Resistence and Control, p. 24, Christensen, *Conflict and Change*, p. 93, Anderson, “Khan and Khel”, passim. Lindholm claims in his revisionist study of Swat that Barth was wrong, and that segmentary lineage theory is after all the key to understanding Pashtun social and political organisation. But he does not deal convincingly with Barth’s main point, which was that political organisation in Swat did not occur on segmentary lines (*Generosity and Jealousy*, pp. 80, 87).}


\footnotetext{83}{Among the Cyrenaican Bedouin acceptance of the responsibility to pay blood money expressed membership of what Peters called a ‘tertiary group’ (op. cit.). The Somalis likewise formed *dár* (blood-money)-paying groups composed of a few, small, closely-related lineages from four to eight generations in depth, and with a population of up to two or three thousand men, who agreed to be collectively responsible for injury and death (Lewis, op. cit.). For a not entirely convincing attempt to argue that Pashtuns do have revenge groups, see Lindholm, *Generosity and Jealousy*, pp. 80, 87.}

\footnotetext{84}{Ahmed argues that, although *tarburwali* and *nikkat* are manifestations of segmentary consciousness, segmentary lineage theory is not itself sufficient to explain political processes in modern Waziristan, both because it does not account for the emergence of charismatic religious leaders, and because modern political boundaries often do not coincide with traditional tribal ones (his ‘Islamic district paradigm’) (*Resistance and Control*, pp. 142-145).}

\footnotetext{85}{Christensen, *Conflict and Change*, pp. 115-125. In the academic literature, factions are usually envisaged as specialised groups formed for political competition, the members of which co-operate solely}
Mahsuds. However, bloc organisation was weaker among the Afridis than in Lower Swat (which appears to have contained the best example of such a system in frontier society), because the Afridi Maliks were weaker than those in Swat. By the same token it was probably even more fragile among the Mahsuds than the Afridis, because the Mahsud Maliks were weaker than the Afridi ones.

The Bhittanis -

The Bhittanis claimed descent from Bitan, the second (or according to some accounts, third) son of Qais Abd al-Rashid, and were divided into three main sections, the Dannas and Tattas, supposedly descended from Bitan’s son Kajain (or Kanjinh), and the Warshpun or Uraspun, supposedly descended from his son Warshpun. As with the Mahsuds, there are no really reliable figures for their population at the time of the annexation of the Punjab, but the Encyclopaedia Iranica suggests a total of from eight to nine thousand, of whom about two-thirds lived in the hills and one-third in the plains, and this seems reasonable.

In 1849 the Bhittanis occupied a tract of hilly country from twelve to sixteen miles deep and about forty miles long running along the eastern border of Waziristan from Marwat, which belonged to the Bannu district, in the north to the Gumal Pass in the south. Although they cultivated some land in British territory, like the Mahsuds they were mostly regarded as ‘independent’ by the British. “There is no regularity in their cultivation nor indeed in their visit to the plains”, the Peshawar D.C. noted in 1861; “a Kirri or encampment of Bhittanis who are cultivating in the Daman-i-Koh one year may not return to the same place for years to come”. To the south, the Tattas lived around Jandola and Kot Kirghi, and had seven or eight villages at the foot of the hills in British territory out of self-interest, and are recruited by a leader with whom they have a transactional relationship. G undis did usually have these characteristics, and Ghilzais, for example, contrast g und with qawm, a group formed on the basis of patrilineal descent (Anderson, “Khan and Khel”, p. 170, also R.W. Nicholas, “Factions a Comparative Analysis”, in M. Banton, ed., Political Systems and the Distribution of Power (London, 1965), F. Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils (Oxford, 1969), pp. 52-53).

Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, pp. 115-127. In Swat rivalry between landowning agnatic collaterals (tarburwali) led them to make alliances with men in neighbouring communities, and in turn alliances between these leaders resulted in the formation of two grand dispersed political divisions or blocs (which were referred to as dallas rather than gundis) spanning the whole of Swat (Barth, Political Leadership, p. 104, see also Lindholm, “Models of Segmentary Political Action: the Examples of Swat and Dir, NWFP, Pakistan”, in S. Pastner and L. Flam, eds., Anthropology in Pakistan, (Ithaca, 1982), p. 27). This fits reasonably well with the suggestion in the D.I.K. Gazetteer (p. 6), published in the mid-1880s, that the total population of the tribe was probably somewhat less than 15,000. See also Memo by Set. O., 12 March 1878, in A5 March 1879 P1298, D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 147P, 15 March 1879, in A5 March 1879 P1298.

between the Gumal and Tank rivers. To the north of them, the Uraspuns lived close to the border behind the first range of hills opposite Nasran and Mullazai, from the Shuza to the Larzan (near Peyzu) passes. Further north again, the Bobak Dannas lived in the hills opposite Tajori, and the Bobas in the Khaisora valley; their land in the hills was better than the Tattas or Uraspuns' trans-border land, but they did not have much in the plains.

The Bhittanis depended principally on pastoralism (they sometimes grazed their sheep and cattle in British territory), and agriculture, their main crops being wheat and other grains (bajra). Some traded on what seems to have been a fairly small scale, bringing down wood, goats' wool, ropes, mats, animals, rice, ghi and honey to exchange in the border villages for grain, sugar, molasses, salt, clothing and candles. Most lived in small settlements, their houses reportedly mud and brushwood hovels; others lived in caves, and some were semi-nomadic, moving back into their hills during the hot summer weather. They sometimes joined the Mahsuds in raiding, but although water was often a problem, not all their land was of poor quality, and as with the Mahsuds it appears that they were not simply driven to this by poverty. As we have seen, by contrast with the Mahsuds, their different sections did tend to occupy discrete territories, and their Malikis seem to have been somewhat more influential than the Mahsud ones. Like the Mahsuds they were Sunni Muslims.

Zilla Khel Darwesh Khels and other tribes in South Waziristan -

As we shall see below, most of the Darwesh Khels with whom the British had dealings in this early period either had land in the Bannu district or lived along the Bannu or Upper Miranzai borders. This meant that their relations with the British authorities were conducted mostly through the Bannu or Kohat authorities rather than Shah Nawaz Khan of Tank and the Dera Ismail Khan ones. The main exception was the Zilla Khels, who belonged to the Ahmedzai branch but lived around Wana to the south-west of the Mahsuds. The Zilla Khels were a relatively small group, mostly still nomadic and pastoral, though they did have some cultivable land around Wana, and between the Girni

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91 MacGregor, C.A., I:1, p. 222
93 MacGregor, C.A., I:1, p. 220
94 The Encyclopaedia Iranica (ed. E. Yarshater, Vol. IV, entry Betani) speculating that their name is linked with the Khowar and Burushaski word hitan, meaning 'shaman', suggests that because their ancestor Bitan had great religious standing, they had a status potentially like that of the marabout tribes in North Africa, though they did not expressly claim it.
hills and the Gumal and Gwaleri passes, which they had gradually begun to occupy since the mid-eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{96} Like the Bhittanis and Mahsuds, they were Sunni Muslims.

Some members of another group of tribes spent part of the year in the Dera Ismail Khan district and Bannu. Collectively referred to as Powindahs, they were pastoral nomads and long-distance traders, who moved in considerable numbers each spring from India through the Sulaiman mountains into Afghanistan returning in the autumn to the Derajat. Here their tents were pitched in groups (\textit{kirris}) in the same places year after year, some of the tribesmen going ‘down country’ to trade, the others remaining behind with the women and children and grazing their flocks. The principal groups were the Nasirs, Sulaiman Khels, Kharotis, and Miankhels.\textsuperscript{97} The Nasirs relied almost entirely on pastoralism (owning as many as 120,000 sheep and goats and 33,000 camels), while the Miankhels monopolised the valuable trade with Bukhara and were the wealthiest.\textsuperscript{98} The other tribes combined pastoralism and trade. The other semi-independent tribal groups on the Tank border were the Mianis and the Ghorezais, who moved into the hills in the hot season. In the later 1870s the total Miani population was estimated at 819, of the Ghorezais 341.\textsuperscript{99} To the south of Waziristan proper lived the Sheranis; they had relatively little to do with Tank and relations with them are not described here.\textsuperscript{100}

\textbf{Darwesh Khels along the Bannu and Upper Miranzai borders -}

The Darwesh Khels were one of the largest and most important tribal confederations the British were to encounter along the north-west frontier after the annexation of the Punjab in 1849 (see maps - figure three). They claimed descent via Musa Darwesh from Karlanri’s great-grandson, Wazir, from whom the Mahsud and Gurbaz Wazir tribes were also supposedly descended, and were divided into two main groupings, Ahmedzais and Utmanzais.\textsuperscript{101} The Gurbaz Wazirs, descended from another son of Wazir's, Mubarik, lived mostly to the west of Razmak and in Khost. Though there were a 

\textsuperscript{96} By the 1880s there were about seventy fortalices or fortified homestead in the valley. Thirty belonged to the Zilla Khels, seventeen to the Tazi Khels, eight to the Khojul Khels, three to the Gangi Khels, three to the Sirki Khels, and three to the Dotanis (Bruce, Memo on Waziristan, in V. to S. of S., No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59).

\textsuperscript{97} According to the D.I.K. Gazetteer (pp. 76-78, 80) in the cold weather of 1880-81, 14,063 Nasirs came down into British territory, 12,026 Sulaiman Khels, 6,427 Kharotis and 3,059 Miankhels. In addition there were smaller number of Andars, Dotanis, Niazis, Mianis, and Sayyids.

\textsuperscript{98} The Kharotis’ ‘homeland’ was to the west of the Sulaiman Khels’ territory in the hills to the east of Ghazni; for some years there had been a serious feud between them, the Kharotis having much the worst of it. The Nasirs and Miankhels do not appear to have had a specific territory of their own.


\textsuperscript{100} See, for example, MacGregor, C.A., 1:3, pp. 109-110.

\textsuperscript{101} See charts pp. 293, 295; also Caroe, The Pathans, p. 21, Memo M.S./G.P., 24 July 1872, in A12 Sep. 1872, P142, MacGregor, C.A., 1:3, p. 263
few living along the Tochi river, as a whole they had little to do with the British Government in this period.\footnote{102}

As is the case with the Mahsuds, it is virtually impossible to estimate the size of the Darwesh Khels’ population with much accuracy. Just after annexation Taylor put the number of Ahmedzai ‘fighting men’ at about three thousand one hundred and sixty, but in the late 1860s Thorburn thought that there were only two thousand of them. As happened with the Mahsuds, their numbers seem to have been consistently overestimated in the early years after annexation.\footnote{103} However, the Bannu Gazetteer, published in the mid-1880s, suggested that in 1849 in all about seven thousand Darwesh Khels came down regularly to winter in British territory, and this seems a reasonable estimate; the proportion of Ahmedzais was almost certainly rather larger than that of Utmanzais.\footnote{104} The number of Darwesh Khels in the hills is likely to have been considerably larger.

At this time many owned large flocks of sheep and goats, and moved down from higher summer pastures to lower winter ones in the autumn and back again into the hills in the spring, living for all or part of the year in kezdhis, black felt tents, or shelters of matting and grass; they usually had some cultivation as well.\footnote{105} As Edwardes put it, “a reed mat propped up in the middle by two sticks in the shape of a T, and with its four sides dragging on the ground, constituted the home of one of these hardy families. Under this, at night, men, women and children huddle together while the rough muzzle of a hill sheep dog peeps out at one corner, and keeps watch over the donkeys, cows, goats and fat-tailed sheep which are picketed and penned outside”.\footnote{106} They could be recognised by their long, tangled locks, he said, and a well-dressed Darwesh Khel was “a wonderful sight with his scarves and belts and daggers and pistols”.\footnote{107} Like the Powindahs, the Darwesh Khels usually camped in a cluster of tents, known as a kirri, which was referred to by the name of
its senior Malik, and appears to have been a fairly permanent grouping, and during migrations these clusters are likely to have joined together for protection.\textsuperscript{108}

The Darwesh Khels’ summer pastures and cultivation were in the Sulaiman mountains to the east and south-east of Bannu in the Shawal and Shakai valleys and the winter ones around Wana, and in Badder, Sheratullah, and the Kaitu valley.\textsuperscript{109} However, by the middle of the nineteenth century they had begun to use the hills to the north of Bannu for grazing as well, and some of them had started to bring their flocks down to the plains to graze in the cold season. The Jani Khel and Bakka Khel Utmanzais appear to have been the first, occupying the Miri grazing lands along the Tochi river in the third quarter of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{110} A little later the Muhammad Khels began to use the area around the mouth of the Kurram Pass, and then other Ahmedzais began to move their flocks in the cold season into the sheltered grazing grounds of the Thul. This was a wide, undulating and largely uninhabited area on the east bank of the Kurram river (not to be confused with the village of Thal at the western end of Upper Miranzai).\textsuperscript{111} Once they even crossed the Kurram and attacked the town of Lakki, but were driven back.\textsuperscript{112} In addition, thanks partly to the weakness of the Durrani and Sikh administrations, they managed to acquire, largely by force, some agricultural land, on which they planted a crop in the autumn on their arrival in the plains, reaping it before leaving for the hills in the spring. Some had begun to settle down and grow a summer crop there too, particularly those with irrigated land in the cultivated districts of Bannu proper (known as \textit{tappehs}). The most important crops were wheat and barley, and on irrigated land rice, cotton and sugar-cane.\textsuperscript{113} The main Ahmedzai tribes involved were the Hatti Khel, Sirki Khel, Sudan Khel, Muhammad Khel, Bizan Khel, Umarzai, Painda Khel and Bodin Khel. Several other Ahmedzai tribes were largely pastoral and nomadic; the ones with which the Bannu and Kohat administrations had most to do in this period were the Khunia Khels, Gangi Khels, Khojul Khels and Tazi Khels.\textsuperscript{114} The Khojul Khels and Tazi Khels grazed their flocks in winter in British territory, in Miranzai and the southern Khattak district, the others remained in independent territory all year round.

Other Utmanzais lived in the mountains to the west and north-west of Bannu from around Razmak in the west in an arc extending through Upper Dawar and as far as the Kurram; they included the Kabul Khels and Malikshahis, Tori Khels, Manzar Khels,
Mohmit Khels, Hassan Khels, and Madda Khels. Many of them appear to have combined nomadic pastoralism and agriculture, spending part of the year in tents or grass shelters, and the rest of it in proper houses. Some of the Kabul Khels, for example, possessed land and permanent settlements along the Kurram river above Zerwam, and others had acquired land to the north on the west bank around the Bangash settlement of Biland Khel. The Mohmit Khels, Manzar Khels and Tori Khels had some settlements around Razmak, and there were also Tori Khels in the Shakhtu and Lower Dawar. Upper Dawar contained villages belonging to various Utmanzai sections, including Mohmit Khels, Manzar Khels, Tori Khels, Hassan Khels and Madda Khels. In particular the Madda Khel settlement of Sheraniyya in Upper Dawar, was "a large village with numerous towers ... the capital of the Darwesh Khels beyond the border".

As well as being agriculturalists and pastoralists, some Darwesh Khels were traders or carriers, in particular carrying salt from the Bahadur Khel mine in the hills to the north-east of Bannu down to the Thul where they sold it to the merchants of the lower Derajat, and also much further afield as far as Kabul, Peshawar, and even Swat. The Manzar Khels living to the north of Razmak were iron-workers, manufacturing horse-shoes and nails. It appears that only a few Darwesh Khels, such as the Zilla Khels in southern Waziristan who joined the Mahsuds in preying on the Powindah caravans passing along the Gumal Pass, were regular raiders.

Like the Mahsuds the Darwesh Khels were Sunni Muslims, and religion also played an important part in their society in several ways. Associated with them were various 'holy lineages', like the Shondakas among the Ahmedzais and the Syadgis among the Utmanzais, who, though they do not appear to have been as influential as the Kaniguram Sayyids, could play the role of negotiators not just between the tribesmen themselves but between them and the authorities. The Darwesh Khels had shrines too, one of the most important being that of Musa Darwesh (also referred to as Musa Nikka), the supposed progenitor of both Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds, in Birmal very near the Afghan border. These shrines (there was usually a graveyard nearby) were sometimes

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114 Urmston, Notes, p. 15, MacGregor, C.A., 1:3, p. 256
116 D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 192, 15 April 1881, No. 165 Nov. 1881 IP P1744
118 In this respect at least they resembled the Mians in the Mohmand Agency described by Ahmed (Pukhtun Economy, p. 165).
119 Caroe, The Pathans, p. 393, Ahmed, Resistance and Control, pp. 108-116. It would be interesting to know whether, as happened in some other parts of the Islamic world, the different sub-groups had their own shrines (see, for example, E. Marx, "Communal and Individual Pilgrimages: The Region of Saints' Tombs in South Sinai", in R. Webber, ed., Regional Cults, London, 1977).
their only permanent structures. They were reported to be their “exclusive objects of veneration”, in which they “deposited their household stuff when absent from their camps, the boldest thief not venturing to lay sacrilegious hands upon it”.\textsuperscript{120} They were also places where oaths were sworn.

Descent and residence were linked somewhat more directly among the Darwesh Khels in Bannu than among the Mahsuds. The two Utmanzai Darwesh Khel groups occupied land next to one another to the west and south-west, while the Ahmedzai groups settled to the north-west and north. Generally segmentary principles appear to have been somewhat more important than among the Mahsuds, largely dictating membership of the groups in which they migrated, camped, cultivated, owned resources and paid revenue. Some sense of unity existed at higher levels of segmentation too, among the three sections of the Kabul Khel for example, the Utmanzais and Ahmedzais, and even the Darwesh Khels as a whole, but this appears to have been quite weak, and to have had little effect in practice. As was the case with the Mahsuds, groups did not join others in their respective segmentary order to oppose those on the next higher level of segmentation, or external enemies.\textsuperscript{121} Non-segmentary groupings or ‘alliance networks’ were important, though the Darwesh Khels were so dispersed that there does not seem to have been any sort of bloc organisation encompassing the whole tribe. Instead some Darwesh Khels at least belonged to local parties or factions which included members of other tribes, such as the Samil party in Upper Miranzai. I explain the significance of this below.

**Dawars**

To the west of Bannu, on the other side of the Slimkai pass, was the valley of Dawar, through which the Tochi river ran. For the first ten or twelve miles it was almost entirely inhabited by Dawars, mostly Hyder Khels, Idaks and Sokhels. They were Karlanri Pashtuns related to the Darwesh Khels, but, like the Pashtuns of Bannu, tracing descent from Shitak, brother of Wazir’s father, Sulaiman.\textsuperscript{122} Lower Dawar was described as one of the richest valleys on the Derajat border; the village of Idak, for example, was said to have as many as a hundred and twenty shops owned by Hindus and Sikhs. The valley supported many madrassahs or religious seminaries and a considerable population of religious students.\textsuperscript{123} At its western end, the hills closed in and the Tochi ran through a

\textsuperscript{120} Com. Pesh. D. to G.P., 28 Jan. 1860, in No. 7 in No. 4, L/P&S/5/256

\textsuperscript{121} According to Span, the Darwesh Khels “break up into at least four distinct levels of sub-groups, making for almost three hundred separate clans” (Pathan Borderland, p. 51).


gorge, before opening out into Upper Dawar which was more than thirty miles long, and
was inhabited by Darpa Khel, Amzani, and Nialakh Dawars, as well as Utmanzai Darwesh
Khels. The Dawars were also divided into two blocs or parties, referred to as tor (black)
and spin (white).  

Other tribes on the Bannu and Kohat borders -

Other tribes living in or on the edge of the Bannu and Kohat districts included the
Bangash, supposedly descended from Wazir’s brother Malikmir, who had had settled in
Miranzai and Kurram several hundred years ago. Since the seventeenth century the ones
in Miranzai had traditionally paid revenue to the rulers of the Punjab, while those in the
Upper Kurram valley had been subject to Kabul. They were Imami Shi’ite Muslims and
most of the Upper Miranzai ones belonged to the Gar faction. Miranzai was fertile and
well-watered, but the greater part was uncultivated in 1849 owing to feuds between the
villages, “the plough working as far as the rifle reaches”.

The Khattaks lived entirely in British territory, northwards from Bannu through
Kohat (where their land adjoined that of the Upper Miranzai Bangash) as far as Akora in
the Peshawar district. Because their territory was so accessible, they usually allied
themselves with whoever was in control of the western Punjab. They had two main
divisions, northern and southern, and were more politically centralised than the Mahsuds
and Darwesh Khels. Khwajah Muhammad Khan, the chief of the southern Khattaks, lived
at Teri, and became a strong supporter of the Government, and belonged to the Samil
faction.

The Turis lived in the Upper Kurram and were nominally subjects of Kabul; like the
Bangash they were Imami Shi’ites and belonged to the Gar faction. The Zaimukhts lived

124 The Hyder Khel Dawars belonged to the ‘black’ one and the Sokhel to the ‘white’ (D.C. Ban. to Com.
D.D., No. 7, 3 Jan. 1872, in No. 434 March 1872 P763, D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 139, 7 March
1872, in No. 169 May 1872 IP P764, MacGregor, Gazetteer, I:1, p. 402). This division into black and
white was also found in Upper Kurram, and was analogous to that between Gar and Samil (Memo on the
district of Kuram (Lahore, 1879)). The British tended to describe these groupings as factions, but they
appear to have been large, relatively permanent ‘parties’ (membership of which was inherited). They were
not really factions in the sense we use the term today (see Chapter Nine, footnote 64, and Tapper,
“Introduction”, p. 79, footnote 47).
125 Caroe, The Pathans, p. 21
126 D.C. Kohat to B.G.-P.F.F., 3 April 1855, in No. 9 in No. 59, L/P&S/S/5/225, Com. Pesh. D. to C.C.,
128 Caroe, The Pathans, pp. 211-212, Elphinstone, Account of the Kingdom, Vol. 2, pp. 48-49
129 Davies, The Problem, p. 66, D.C. Kohat to B.G.-P.F.F., 3 April 1855, in No. 9 in No. 59,
L/P&S/S/5/225
130 They were estimated by Coke to comprise about 5,500 fighting men, which was almost certainly far
in a valley leading from western Miranzai towards the crest of the Peywar Kotal. Although Kabul had a claim to this, they were usually regarded as being independent, and belonged to the Samil faction. The Orakzais (meaning “lost tribes”), were a congeries of heterogeneous, independent tribes, their territory consisting of the southern valleys of Tirah (in the hills between Peshawar and Khost), and extending around through the north-west corner of the Kohat district, and nearly as far south as the end of the Miranzai Valley. Some, like the Akhel and Ali Khel, were Imamis and belonged to the Gar party, while others, including the Rabeah Khel and Alisherzai, were Sunnis and belonged to the Samil one.

Samil and Gar were the names of two hereditary groupings into which the people of Kohat and the surrounding districts were divided; reportedly at least a hundred men were killed each year in fighting between them. The Khan of Hangu was the Samil leader in Miranzai; the Khattak chief Khwajah Muhammad Khan, and the Darwesh Khels and the Zaimukhts also belonged to this party. There seems to have been a sectarian aspect to membership in that, as we have seen, the Imami tribes, the Turis, Bangash, and some of the Orakzais, belonged to the Gar faction.
THE TRIBES AND THE ADMINISTERED AREAS BEFORE ANNEXATION -

Bannu was conquered by Ahmed Shah Durrani in 1748, and for the next seventy years or so he and his successors maintained a precarious hold on the district, periodically sending troops to collect revenue. But along with the rest of the Derajat, it fell into Sikh hands after the Sikh leader Ranjit Singh defeated the Afghans at Nowshera and took Peshawar in 1823, although it was not formally incorporated into the Dera Ismail Khan province until 1836.136 However, the Sikhs’ hold on Bannu was almost as weak as the Durranis had been, and like them they collected revenue by sending troops with the tax-collectors.

After the first Sikh War in 1846, the Sikh Darbar suggested to Sir Henry Lawrence, the newly-appointed British Resident at Lahore, that an attempt should be made to collect the district’s outstanding revenue.137 Lawrence agreed, and deputed his first assistant at Lahore, Lt. Herbert Edwardes, a young officer in the First Regiment Bengal Fusiliers, to accompany the expedition.138 The force reached Bannu in March 1847 but the troops were withdrawn at the beginning of May. Only about Rs.50,000 had been raised, and so two more expeditions were despatched towards the end of the year to collect the rest. Edwardes accompanied one, which rendezvoused at Karrak to the east of Bannu with the other, which came from Peshawar and was commanded by another of Henry Lawrence’s assistants, Lt. Reynell Taylor (2nd European Cavalry). Most of Henry Lawrence’s younger political assistants, it is worth noting, were recruited from the traditional source of British Political Agents, ambitious Indian army officers. As well as Edwardes and Taylor, these “soldier-politicians of the Lawrence school” included John Nicholson (27th N.I.), Harry Lumsden (59th N.I.), Frederick Pollock (49th N.I.), James Abbott (Royal Artillery), and John Becher (Royal Engineers), all of whom were to play important roles along the frontier after annexation.139

During this second visit, as well as collecting the revenue, Edwardes began construction of a fort and laid out a new town. He had a military road built from the hills below Dawar to Lakki, and forced the inhabitants to dismantle the fortifications around their settlements. With Henry Lawrence’s help, he also established the broad outlines of

137 This amounted to Rs.175,000 (Edwardes, A Year on, Vol. 1, p. 18). See also J.L. Morison, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence (London, 1934).
138 Canning condescendingly described Edwardes as “exactly what Mahomet would have been had he been born at Clapham instead of Mecca” (in T.R. Metcalfe, New Cambridge History of India, III:4, pp. 47-48).
139 Yapp, Strategies, pp. 546-550, Parry, Reynell Taylor, pp. 77-78. Wherever possible, the regiments to which the officials had originally belonged are given in brackets when they are first mentioned in the text (unless otherwise stated the references are to Bengal army regiments).
the policy which the G.O.I. subsequently followed towards the Darwesh Khels on the Bannu border, so it is worth looking briefly at some of the decisions he took in the winter of 1847-48. To begin with, he argued that the Sikh Government should not move beyond the existing limits, because “there would seem to be no stopping afterwards”. In particular, though they had never attempted to do so, the Sikhs would have been within their rights to extend their administration to Dawar, the eastern edge of which was only a few miles from Bannu, as it had been included in the territory transferred to them by the Afghan ruler Shah Shuja according to the Tripartite Treaty of 1838. But Edwardes thought it would be better to keep the status quo, as any attempt to extend control to the valley would upset the Dawars and the neighbouring tribes to no particular purpose.

Secondly, Edwardes was particularly anxious to conciliate the Darwesh Khels as far as possible. It would be all too easy, he said, to drive them out of the valley and seize their lands, but this would only lead them to harass the border “in that irregular mode which is so difficult for either regular military or civil power to meet”. If they owned property in the plains, he thought, they would be less likely to raid them. So provided they acknowledged the Government’s authority by paying some revenue, he argued, they should be encouraged to graze their flocks and cultivate in Bannu. Indeed the object should be, he thought, “to induce the Vizeerees, not merely to visit, but to settle all around Bunnoo; making them a kind of cactus-hedge. So long as they cultivate, they will obey. Every field is so much bail for keeping the peace.”

In order to help him manage the Darwesh Khels, Edwardes proposed to make use of the Sudan Khel Ahmedzai Malik, Swahn Khan. Edwardes met Swahn Khan during his first visit to Bannu, describing him in exaggerated terms as “the Mullick of twelve thousand Vizeerees who lead a half pastoral, half-predatory life on the north-east frontiers of Bunnoo”. He decided to try and make him the official representative of the Darwesh Khels with land in Bannu, using him for example to collect their revenue. Edwardes admitted that this would make the other tribesmen jealous, but thought it would help to make Swahn Khan dependent on the Government, and tie him more closely to it. Swahn Khan

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140 Edwardes, A Year on, Vol. 1, pp. 295-296
141 This was the treaty between the deposed Afghan ruler Shah Shuja, the Sikhs and the G.O.I. negotiated before the first British invasion of Afghanistan (see, for example, Yapp, “Tribes and States in the Khyber”, in Tapper, ed., The Conflict of Tribe and State, p. 158).
142 See also Taylor, D.M., p. 142
143 Edwardes, A Year on, Vol. 1, pp. 316
145 Political Diaries, pp. 97-98. There is a description of the meeting taken from the diaries in Caroe, The Pathans, p. 336
146 Edwardes, Political Diaries, pp. 97-98. Although they were so independent, he thought the Darwesh Khels would be “too unanimous not to act on his (Swahn Khan’s) sensible advice” (op. cit. p. 190, also
himself was well aware of the ambiguities of his position, and when Edwardes instructed
him to collect a fine of Rs.50 he had imposed on some of the Bakka Khels, he protested
and said his fellow-tribesmen would murder him. Edwardes promised "in that melancholy
event to build a fine tomb over him; and the old fellow went away chuckling".147

But, even with Swahn Khan's help, it was a delicate task to induce the Darwesh
Khels to pay their revenue, and not simply go off into the hills. In December 1847 Swahn
Khan persuaded an Ahmedzai jirga to discuss the position with Edwardes; they agreed
in principle to pay a quarter share of the produce on the land in the Bannu tappehs (the same
as the Bannuchis), and one-sixth on the Thul and Miri land, and early in 1848 the Utmanzai
sections also consented to this arrangement.148 Both Ahmedzais and Utmanzais were also
to pay a tribute of two hundred and fifty sheep for the right to graze their flocks on the Thul
and Miri lands.149 However, early in 1848 Edwardes left Bannu to survey the border
districts to the south, and Taylor was left with the difficult job of inducing the tribes
actually to pay the promised revenue.150 The first step was to persuade each section to give
at least one hostage to stay at Bannu until the revenue on the winter crop was paid, and by
mid-April they had all been persuaded to do so.151 But further difficulties were experienced
with the Hatti Khels in particular, who had given up their land in the Bannu tappehs, but
kept their Thul land. Late in April they tried to reap their crops and go off into the hills
before the revenue had actually been paid. Troops were sent to stop them doing so, and
there was a skirmish in which three soldiers were killed. The Hatti Khels (and the small
Sirki Khel section associated with them) did not return to Bannu until the following year.152

Some Muhammad Khels and Umarzais also went off into the hills without paying
their revenue.153 However, the Muhammad Khels were persuaded to come in and pay up,
and to help him deal with the Umarzais Taylor decided to make the Bannu Maliks
responsible for collecting the revenue on the land the tribesmen cultivated in the tappehs.
This seemed to work reasonably well, and most of the Umarzais' revenue was collected. A
Bannuchi Malik, Bazid Khan, was allowed to take over land belonging to the men who had

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147 A Year on, Vol. 1, pp. 197-198
137
149 Op. cit. pp. 128, 149, 352
151 At a particularly stormy meeting on the 1st of April Swahn Khan said that he thought the Darwesh
Khels would prefer to give up their land in Bannu than pay revenue. When he was asked if he would be
prepared to sign a paper to that effect, he quickly replied that he would have to consult the other sections
before he could do so, and the subject does not seem to have been raised again (Taylor, Political Diaries, pp.
137-138).
152 Op. cit. pp. 150, 155
153 D.C. D.I.K. to Com. L.D., 28 Feb. 1850, in No. 3 in No. 16, L/P&S/5/206
not paid their share. Finally, apart from that due from the Hatti Khels and Sirki Khels, Swahn Khan raised all the revenue owing on the Wazirs' Thul and Miri land and left for the hills himself. Taylor refunded him Rs.500 of his own revenue, gave him five gold pieces, and promised to recommend him to Government.155

In April 1848 a rising in Multan in the southern Punjab led to the murder of the two British officers sent to take over the administration there. Edwardes raised levies in the Derajat and besieged Multan, and Taylor joined him there in June.156 The Sikh rebellion began to spread to other areas, such as Bannu, where the Sikh troops in the fort mutinied, killing their commander. They also took over the fort at Lakki nearby. Returning to the Derajat, Taylor laid siege to this in October with a small number of badly-equipped troops, forcing it to surrender on the 10th January 1849.157 On the 11th one of the Kabul Amir Dost Muhammad Khan's sons, Sardar Muhammad Azem, invaded Bannu and occupied the town, but when he heard that Lakki had fallen, retreated. Ghulam Hussein Khan Alizai, was sent to take possession of Bannu on behalf of the British Government.158 Taylor himself occupied Kohat on April the 3rd, and in the meantime the Sikh territories in the Punjab were annexed by the British Government of India.159

As regards Upper Miranzai, the British officers had little to do with it before annexation. Extending from the village of Kahi on the east to the opposite bank of the Kurram river to the west, it had traditionally been managed by the Khans of Hangu, to whom the villagers paid their revenue. Like Bannu it had been part of the Durrani empire, and had fallen to the Sikhs in 1823, when as we have seen Ranjit Singh defeated the Afghans. In the 1830s the Sikhs gave the Kohat district as a whole, including Upper Miranzai and Hangu, as a jagir to Dost Muhammad Khan's elder brother, Sultan Muhammad Khan.160 Sultan Muhammad killed the Khan of Hangu, and drove out his son, Ghulam Hyder Khan. For much of the following decade, however, Sultan Muhammad Khan himself was kept in Lahore as a hostage, and Upper Miranzai was able to become more or less independent.161 It was, as noted above, mainly occupied by Bangash villages,
but Darwesh Khels and Zaimukhts appear to have taken advantage of the political instability in the region since the late eighteenth century to encroach on it. In 1848 when, as we have seen, Sardar Muhammad Azem briefly occupied Bannu, he persuaded the Darwesh Khels to overrun Upper Miranzai and lay siege to Kahi on the border with Lower Miranzai. However, the village held out for a time, and when the Sardar withdrew from Bannu, the Darwesh Khels also retreated.  

To the south of Bannu the situation was rather different. Here the Waziristan border ran along the western edge of Marwat and the Tank district. Early in the nineteenth century a Katti Khel Lohani Pashtun named Sarwar Khan established himself as its ruler. He experienced problems with Mahsud raiding, but kept them under some sort of control by various means. These included marrying a Mahsud woman, recruiting some levies from the tribe and maintaining a post at Kot Kirghi; he even persuaded the Tatta Bhittanis to let him build a fort in their territory at Jandola within the hills. This meant that Mahsud raiders could be intercepted before they reached the plains, and he several times pursued such parties into the hills. He submitted to the Sikh forces when they marched into the Derajat in 1823, and was allowed to remain in charge of Tank in return for paying tribute. After his death his son, Allahdad Khan, fell behind with this, and was driven out, and Tank was given to the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh’s grandson, Nao Nihal. Allahdad Khan was married to the daughter of an influential Alizai Mahsud, and on his behalf the Mahsuds carried out a number of raids on the Tank district. These incursions eventually became so destructive that Nao Nihal gave Tank up to three Multani Pathans (the so-called ‘Tank khans’). While they were in charge, Allahdad Khan and the Mahsuds attacked the town and burnt the bazaar, occupying it for three days. By the late 1840s much land in the district had fallen out of cultivation as a result of the raids and general misgovernment.

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162 D.C. Kohat to B.O.A., No. 20, 23 July 1851, in No. 8 in No. 44, L/P&S/5/207, D.C. Kohat to B.O.A., no number, 16 Aug. 1851, in No. 5 in No. 50, L/P&S/5/208
166 Payindah Khan Khajakkzai, Ashik Muhammad Khan Alizai and Hiyatullah Khan Saddozai. The Multani Pathans were descendants of a colony of Alizi Pashtuns (not to be confused with the Alizai Mahsuds) who supported the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan when he took Kandahar in 1637. Following its recapture by Shah Abbas in 1648, they fled to India and were settled at Multan (Edwardes, A Year on, Vol. II, pp. 16-17).
Allahdad Khan died in 1845, and in 1847, on Edwardes’ recommendation, his son Shah Nawaz Khan was given a year’s trial as the kardar or farmer of the government revenue for the Tank district, and the lease was renewed in 1848.\(^{169}\) He was to collect Rs.100,000 worth of revenue, keeping a quarter for his own maintenance and expenses, and the government was to pay for the garrison and upkeep of the Tank fort.\(^{170}\) His mother was, as we have seen, an Alizai Mahsud, and at the end of the 1840s Shah Nawaz himself married the sister of a leading Langar Khel Alizai Malik, Yarik Khan.\(^{171}\) But, as a result of the upheavals during the 1840s, the Multani Khans had also been able to establish links with the tribe, and in particular Foujdar Khan Alizai (who had taken part in the siege of Multan with Edwardes), lived in Tank for many years, and had connections with them.\(^{172}\) So by 1849 the two main factions or ‘parties’ in British territory had established links with the Mahsuds and Bhittanis, and this was to affect the way relations with them developed subsequently.\(^{173}\)
Consisting mostly of barren hills and valleys, Waziristan is inhabited by several tribes, the Mahsuds, Darwesh Khels, Dawars and Bhittanis being the most important. The Mahsuds occupied much of the centre and south, members of the different sections tending to live quite close to each other in the same areas. While some of them relied largely on agriculture and or trade, others combined cultivation with pastoralism, and moved with their flocks in the autumn and spring. Those living around Makin also mined iron ore which they sold or made into objects like plates, knives, nails, and horseshoes. Some raided the administered areas of the Derajar and the Powindahs’ caravans in the Gumal pass on a fairly regular basis. Poverty probably was one reason for this, but there appear to have been others, such as their martial ethos. To the west of the Mahsuds' territory, between them and the plains, lived the smaller Bhittani tribe. To the north was the Dawar valley, which was inhabited by Dawaris as well as members of the large Darwesh Khel confederation. Many of the Darwesh Khels were pastoral nomads, and some of them had begun to come down in the winter and graze their flocks and herds in the Bannu district. On the Upper Miranzai border to the north they came into contact with various other tribes including Turis, Zaimukhts and Khattaks, as well as the Bangash of the Upper Miranzai valley itself. All the tribespeople followed the distinctive code of customary law generally referred to as Pashtunwali, which laid great stress on the need for individual and tribe to preserve honour and avoid shame. From the point of view of social organisation, a critical feature of this, exemplified by the Mahsuds in particular, was the weakness or virtual absence of political authority. Although they all possessed the framework of a segmentary lineage organisation, they often did not organise themselves politically on segmentary lines. Instead the prevalence of *tarburwali* tended to lead to the emergence of small factional groupings or ‘alliance networks’, membership of which crossed agnatic boundaries.

In the years before the British annexation of the Punjab in 1849, Bannu and Tank were nominally at least ruled by the Sikhs, and the young British officer, Herbert Edwardes, visited Bannu with Sikh troops in 1847 and 1848 to collect revenue. His decisions not to extend Sikh rule into Dawar, and to encourage the Darwesh Khels to continue coming down to Bannu during the winter with their animals and to cultivate there (in return for paying a moderate revenue) were important because they provided a precedent for future British practice. The Upper Miranzai valley, which was mainly inhabited by Imami Shi’ite Bangash villagers, also belonged to the Sikhs, but had become more or less independent in the 1840s. British officials had little to do with it before annexation, and it remained to all intents and purposes independent during the 1840s. It was in a disordered state, as the villagers feuded amongst themselves, and (assisted by Turis from the Upper Kurram) with the Sunni Darwesh Khels who lived to the west and along the Kurram river.
to the south. To the south, Shah Nawaz Khan, the grandson of its last independent ruler, was appointed as tax-farmer of the Tank district in 1847. His mother was a Mahsud, and he had a Mahsud wife, but the other principal ‘faction’ in the district, comprised of Multani Pathans, had established their own contacts with the tribe in the 1840s, and this was to lead to problems after 1849.
CHAPTER TWO  THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND SOUTH WAZIRISTAN - 1849 - 1870

FRONTIER ADMINISTRATION AND TRIBAL MANAGEMENT - SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS -

As we saw in the last chapter, the Sikhs' administration along the Derajat border had really been non-existent, consisting of military expeditions to collect revenue and to repress the Pashtun tribes, and in 1849 the British inherited an anarchic situation. They were confronted with a lengthy frontier across which lived a number of large and independently-minded tribal groups accustomed to fighting with each other and to an adversarial relationship with whoever controlled the plains. The immediate task therefore was by the most economical means possible to prevent these tribes from raiding or feuding in British territory, bearing in mind the need to uphold British prestige and the conviction that certain traditional methods of keeping them in check were unworthy of a civilising imperial power. I say more about this aspect of frontier management in Chapter Eight.

As regards the legal status of the tribes, Dost Muhammad Khan, the Amir of Kabul, claimed sovereignty over the lands and peoples west of the old Sikh frontier, a claim which had some force because the Mahsuds, Bhittanis, Dawars, Darwesh Khels and other 'independent' tribes were more or less culturally 'Afghan'. However, his inability to assert this in practical terms made it easier for the British to treat them as legally independent. As we saw in the previous chapter, Edwardes and Henry Lawrence had argued in the late 1840s that there was nothing to be gained by extending Sikh rule along the north-west frontier beyond its existing limits. Thanks partly, it would appear, to their influence, after annexation it was accepted that the G.O.I. should not attempt to expand into the hills either. This became an axiom of British policy for the first thirty or forty years of British rule in the Punjab. Not only was there to be no intentional 'forward' policy, but in order to ensure that the government should not be drawn involuntarily into potentially dangerous and expensive involvement with the trans-border tribes, British officials were discouraged from going into the hills without permission. As a result British north-west

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1 Davies, The Problem, p. 22
2 See Caroe, The Pathans (p. 14), for some comments on this.
3 The legal position was not altogether clear. It was possible to argue, as did John Lawrence, for example, that according to the terms of the Tripartite Treaty Waziristan had been ceded to the Sikhs in 1838, and title to it had passed to the G.O.I. following the defeat of the Sikh state (C.C. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 278, 3 April 1855, in No. 15 in No. 28, L/P&S/5/223). But Fraser-Tytler suggests that Dost Muhammad's right to sovereignty over all the lands and people west of the old Sikh frontier could hardly have been disputed, had he possessed the power to establish his rule over the tribes (Afghanistan, p. 184).
4 The issues is obviously a complex one, but it may be that this was, as Whittaker puts it, the point at which the marginal costs of imperialism became great enough to impose a limit (Frontiers of the Roman Empire A Social and Economic Study (Baltimore, 1994), p. 85.
frontier management during this period is usually said to have been characterised by a 'close border' policy, and by a conscious effort to limit interference with the tribes. I look at the question of how far this is in fact an accurate description of it in Chapter Eight.

The tribes on the other hand were encouraged to come down and trade in British territory, and to facilitate this, frontier customs duties were abolished. Their integration into the economy of British India would, it was believed, help to civilise them, as they were from the British point of view savages, "noble savages perhaps and not without some tincture of virtue and generosity, but still approaching barbarians nevertheless". So, for example, in 1863 Sir Charles Trevelyan commented in this connection that if communications along the frontier could be improved the tribes could trade with British India more easily and profitably, and that this would be "the best pacifier of all".

Various forms of active interference with the tribes were also justified on the grounds that they helped to introduce them to the benefits of 'civilisation'. But there were different views about how much intervention was permissible and what forms it should take, and throughout virtually the whole period there was debate on these issues. In particular there was more or less continuous disagreement between proponents of the Punjab approach to frontier administration and those who favoured the line taken in Sind to the south. The origins of this lay in the pre-existing rivalry between the Bengal and Bombay governments, which was given a new lease of life with the annexation of Sind in 1843 (which became part of the Bombay Presidency in 1848), and the Punjab in 1849. Officers and officials associated with the Bombay presidency began to attack the tribal management policies inaugurated along the Punjab border by the Governor-General (1848-56), James Ramsay, the first marquis of Dalhousie, and his subordinates (who belonged to the Bengal service). Rivalry intensified because after the annexation of the Punjab some of the Baluch tribes, the Marris and Bugtis in particular, came into contact with officers from both governments. On one level much of the argument revolved around which the question of

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5 P.A.R. 1869-70, p. 21 (unless noted the references are to the reports themselves rather than the introductory summaries). See also Yapp, "Tribes and States", pp. 154-156  
6 Temple, Report, p. 62  
7 Minute by Sir C.E. Trevelyan, Member of G.G.'s Council, L/P&S/S/257, p. 651. Trevelyan, a noted liberal, was briefly Governor of Madras (1859-60) and then a member of the Council of India from 1863 to 1865 (C.E. Buckland, Dictionary of Indian Biography. (London, 1906).  
8 Until the Regulating Act (1773) Bombay had been a completely separate government.  
9 In November 1849, for example, the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Napier, condemned, among other things, the administrative arrangements adopted in the Punjab, "contrasting them unfavourably with Lord Ellenborough's military government of Sind as administered by himself" (Sir W. Lee-Warner, The Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie (London, 1904), Vol. 2, pp. 316-317). Napier did actually put forward a scheme for the military government of the Punjab (Memo by the C. in C., 27 Nov. 1849, in No. 3 in No. 12, L/P&S/S/203: for the Board's comments on this see Memo, 1 March 1850, in No. 10 in No. 12, L/P&S/S/203, also Edwardes, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence (London, 1872), Vol. 2, p. 141).
administration’s policy was the more ‘civilised’. So, for example, early in the 1850s, John Jacob (Bombay Artillery), whom Napier had appointed in 1848 to tackle the problem of tribal raiding along the Sind border, accused the Punjab authorities of encouraging retaliation and counter-raids by tribesmen living within British territory. He was unable to support his assertions with proof and was officially admonished.10

However, Charles Wood, President of the Board of Control (1852-1855) and Secretary of State for India (1858-1866), wrote to Dalhousie in 1853 expressing concern about the punitive expeditions which the Punjab authorities had begun to mount against the tribes as a way of controlling them.11 The Punjab argument was that the Sikhs had regularly mounted offensive operations into the hills, and that peace could not be secured by “a defensive attitude alone”.12 If the hill tribes were aggressive they should be punished by having their houses and cultivation destroyed, and their flocks and herds confiscated. “All must be made to feel that their persons are never secure from our vengeance”, the first Punjab Administration Report stated, “and that no retreat can protect them from ... our troops”.13 Wood, however, suggested that these expeditions did more harm than good. Could the tribes not be kept in order by a border police under their own chiefs, he asked, or settled in the plains?14 Dalhousie replied that the tribes on the Punjab frontier were quite unlike those encountered elsewhere in India. Every effort was being made to win them over, but sometimes they were so aggressive that there was simply no alternative to the use of force.15 The Bombay officials, especially Bartle Frere (Commissioner of Sind from 1851 to 1859, and Governor of Bombay from 1862 to 1867), continued to allege that their Punjab counterparts did not manage the tribes in ways appropriate to a great civilising empire, and I return to this question again below.16

As for the administration of the new province, Dalhousie had made the decision to annex it after the second Sikh war of 1848-49, and was principally responsible for organising this. At the head he placed a triumvirate (the Board of Administration), consisting of the former Resident at Lahore, Henry Lawrence, and two civil servants, Henry’s brother John, and Henry Mansell. Dalhousie found John Lawrence easier to deal with than his brother, and in 1853 Henry resigned, the Board was dissolved and John took over as Chief Commissioner. In 1859 the Punjab became a province in its own right with a Lieutenant-Governor; Sir Robert Montgomery, previously the Judicial Commissioner, was

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10 Heathcote, ‘British Policy and Baluchistan’, pp. 51-54, Davies, The Problem, p. 28
11 R.J. Moore, Sir Charles Wood’s Indian Policy (Manchester 1966), pp. 158-159
12 P.A.R., 1849-51, p. 28
13 Ibid.
15 Dalhousie to Wood, 9 Feb. 1854, MSS EUR F78 18-1A
16 Heathcote, ‘British Policy and Baluchistan’, pp. 55-70, Davies, The Problem, p. 20
the first to occupy the post. But even though Henry Lawrence had gone, many of his protégés continued to work in frontier districts. Besides Edwardes and Taylor, they included Becher, Pollock, Nicholson, Lumsden and Abbott. In co-operation with Dalhousie and John Lawrence, they played an important part in evolving what came to be known as the 'Punjab system' of frontier management.

As regards the chain of administrative authority, Tank (and Bannu) initially formed part of the Dera Ismail Khan district. This was administered by a Deputy Commissioner, who was responsible to the Commissioner of the Lia Division, who answered in turn to the government of the Punjab based in Lahore. As far as relations with the trans-border tribes were concerned, the Lahore government was under the direction of the Foreign Department of the G.O.I., which was directly under the authority of the Governor-General. At the other end of the chain was the man responsible for dealing with Indian affairs in the British cabinet (the President of the Board of Control, and after the India Act of 1858 the Secretary of State for India). In this period he generally reached policy decisions after correspondence and consultation with Governor-General. Similarly, the Governor-General usually consulted the Punjab administration and its local officers before he took decisions concerning the north-west frontier. But administratively as well as geographically-speaking it was a long way from the Derajat to Calcutta, let alone London, and the responsibilities of the different grades of official were not precisely fixed. As a result there was room for the men on the frontier to exercise some autonomy, and it was partly for this reason that there was, as we shall see, a tendency for the men at the higher levels to complain that their subordinates did not keep them properly informed and acted without proper authority.

One of the unusual features of Punjab administration was that it had its own military force, which was set up in 1849. This was the Punjab Irregular Force, renamed the Punjab Frontier Force in 1866. It comprised five regiments of cavalry and five of infantry, as
well as three batteries of light field artillery, two garrison artillery batteries, two companies of sappers, and the famous Corps of Guides, amounting to 8,896 men.\(^{22}\) Four regiments of Sikh Local Infantry which had been raised a year or two earlier, as well as the Sind Camel Corps, which was transferred from the Bombay establishment, were also incorporated into it.\(^{23}\) The first commander of the force was J.S. Hodgson (12th N.I.), and he was responsible for the decision to locate cantonments for the troops at Kohat, Bannu, Akalgurh, just outside Dera Ismail Khan, Asni and Dera Ghazi Khan. Usually three infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment were stationed at Kohat, and one cavalry regiment and one infantry regiment at Dera Ismail Khan, and at Bannu. There were also several ‘police’ regiments, as well irregular levies.\(^{24}\) Hodgson also fixed the location of some of the outposts, which were gradually built along the border at points commanding the principal passes into the hills, but the fact that he appears to have done so without visiting the area led to problems later.\(^{25}\) By the early 1850s there was one at Dubra on the Tank border, and another at Hurrund to the south with police posts in between; on Taylor’s recommendation others were sanctioned for Gumal and Zarkanni to the south. As elsewhere along the frontier, a military road was constructed to connect the military posts, and regularly patrolled.

SHAH NAWAZ KHAN, THE MAHSUDS AND THE 1860 RAID -

The first Deputy Commissioner of the Dera Ismail Khan district was Reynell Taylor, who, as we saw in the previous chapter, had been sent to Bannu by the Sikh Darbar in the spring of 1848 to raise revenue. After annexation the British border with South Waziristan ran along the western edge of the Tank district. Tank and the adjoining districts were, as we have seen, vulnerable to incursions by the Mahsud and Bhittani tribesmen, so that security was a high priority.\(^{26}\) Mainly for the sake of convenience, after annexation Shah Nawaz Khan, the tax-farmer of Tank since 1847, was left in charge of the district. His Mahsud connections were thought to give him influence with them, and

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\(^{23}\) They had been raised on the orders of Dalhousie’s predecessor, Lord Hardinge, as the Frontier Brigade (P.A.R. 1849-51, pp. 41-42). A fifth Sikh regiment appears to have been recruited subsequently (W. Haig, "The Armies of the East India Company", in H.H. Dodwell, ed., *The Cambridge History of India Vol. VI The Indian Empire 1858-1918* (Cambridge), p. 165)


\(^{25}\) P.A.R. 1849-51, pp. 48-49, also J. Nicholson to J. Lawrence, 14 Feb. 1853, and 23 Feb. 1853, MSS EUR F90/16B, and J. Lawrence to N. Chamberlain, 7 April 1855, MSS EUR F90/6-4A.

\(^{26}\) *D.I.K. Gazetteer*, p. 67
relations with the tribe were conducted mainly through him. It is difficult to find out very much about how he handled the Mahsuds in this early period. It appears that he worked through, among others, Jangi Khan Alizai, who was described as the tribe's best-known Malik, "a noted character, ... wise in counsel, and bold and business-like when the tribe is involved in war". In the very early days something like a real 'close border' policy was pursued along this part of the frontier, and Taylor himself had little to do with the Mahsuds. He reported that the "Kaniguram and Shingi Waziris" had made some sort of overtures to him, but he did not encourage these contacts, he said, in case they led people to wonder whether perhaps the government did after all intend to push its border forward, and provoked Kabul to intrigue with them. In November 1849 some Mahsuds joined the Umarzais and other Darwesh Khels in an attack on the border from the Gumutti Pass in the Bannu district; small parties of them occasionally plundered caravans travelling along the road from Peyzu to Tank. But these were regarded as trivial problems. When Taylor left the district in 1852, he said that the Mahsuds had given no trouble or annoyance on the Tank border, and were "more civilised than their neighbours in Bunnoo".

A man of great confidence, energy and courage, impatient of weakness in others, and "a first-rate guerrilla leader" as Dalhousie described him, Taylor's successor, John Nicholson, was also a competent administrator. However, his well-known aversion to "pen and ink work" means that we know little about his dealings with the tribes. It appears that the Mahsuds did begin to give more trouble at about this time, as in May 1853 he reported that the Wazirs (presumably Mahsuds) had come in and returned a year's plunder to him. Indeed border raiding was becoming sufficiently serious for him to suggest to John Lawrence that some reorganisation of the frontier defences was needed. The location of some of the frontier posts should be changed, he thought, and the cantonment at Dera Ismail Khan, which was two forced marches from the nearest post and useless in an emergency, moved forward and located at Zuffur ka Khan Kot, fifteen miles south of Tank. Lawrence agreed, but was unable to persuade Dalhousie to consent to the

27 D.C. D.I.K. to Com. L.D., No. 17, 18 Feb. 1850, in No. 3 in No. 16, L/P&S/5/206
28 Taylor, D.M., p. 141, Com. L.D. to G.P. M.D., No. 10, 23 March 1860, No. 10 in No 4, L/P&S/5/256
30 G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 444, 24 July 1861, in No. 217 March 1862 IP P204/59. It could have been Mahsuds or Sheranis who attacked the outpost at Zuffur ka Khan Kot in the Kulachi district to the south of Tank in October 1851, and killed a number of men posted there (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. L.D., No. 17, 18 Feb. 1850, in No. 3 in No. 16, L/P&S/5/206, D.C. D.I.K. to B.O.A., No. 101, 19 March 1851, in No. 11 in No. 23, L/P&S/5/207).
32 See, for example, Trotter, Life, pp. 160-161, Singer, Lords of the Khyber (London, 1984), pp. 102-107
Two years later, Neville Chamberlain (16th N.I.), who took command of the Punjab Irregular Force in 1854, also advocated moving the cantonment, and Lawrence recommended it to the new Governor-General (1856-62), Charles Canning, the first earl Canning, but still approval was not forthcoming.

It has been argued that the Tank border was generally well-managed by Shah Nawaz Khan until 1854 (when new arrangements for the administration of Tank were introduced), and that there was little raiding. But, as we have seen, it would appear that the Mahsuds were already beginning to cause problems; the impression that raids became more frequent in the second half of the decade may have arisen partly because of better reporting. It seems likely that from the very beginning Shah Nawaz Khan did not have enough money to keep the border as quiet as his masters wanted, while dealing with raiders in a way that was sufficiently 'civilised' for them. Out of the profits of the Tank lease he was expected to maintain his own armed retainers to help him keep the peace along the frontier, and to contribute to the costs of the police post which was established in the old fort at Tank itself. He also had to entertain Mahsud visitors and give them presents so as to keep their support, and prevent them falling under the influence of the opposite faction. Under the circumstances, even though in 1850 the sum he was allowed to keep back was increased by Rs.10,000 to Rs.35,000, it is not surprising that by the time the lease came up for renewal in 1852, he was Rs.55,000 in arrears.

Taylor, Nicholson and Captain Ross (51st N.I.), the Leia Commissioner, all argued that the government should not lose the benefit of Shah Nawaz Khan's supposed influence with the Mahsuds. Ross suggested that the tax-farm should be abolished; Nicholson should make a summary settlement, and Shah Nawaz Khan allowed a quarter of the revenue for his personal expenses and the costs of management.

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34 J. Lawrence to J. Nicholson, 4 Feb. 1854, MSS EUR F90/4-2A
35 J. Lawrence to N. Chamberlain, 15 Nov. 1855, MSS EUR F90/8-2, J. Lawrence to N. Chamberlain, 21 July 1856, MSS EUR F90/9-3, J. Lawrence to Canning, 21 July 1856, MSS EUR F90/9-3, J. Lawrence to H. Coxe, 16 Dec. 1856, F90/10-3B
36 For example by Bruce (Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59).
37 MacGregor notes only one Mahsud "outrage" for 1853 and 1854 respectively, but seven for 1855, 29 for 1856, 47 for 1858 and 14 for 1859 (C.A., I:2, p. 315). In fact, as well as the raid in January 1854 which MacGregor records, Zeman Khan attacked two parties of Mahsud raiders during the year, and as MacGregor himself admitted that it was not really possible to get an accurate picture (M.S./C.C. to G.O.I., No. 122, 2 April 1855, in No. 12 in No. 28, L/P&S/5/223, C.A., I:3, p. 309).
38 He was supposed to superintend, if not actually pay for, construction of some of the outposts, for example the post which was built at Gumal and the tower at Drukka (P.A.R. 1849-51, p. 43, J. Nicholson to J. Lawrence, 3 March 1852, MSS EUR F90-15A, D.C. D.I.K. to Com. L.D., No. 17, 18 Feb. 1850, in No. 3 in No. 16, L/P&S/5/206).
39 Without him, Ross wrote, "from having been hitherto the quietest, (Tank) ... would probably become the most disturbed portion of our whole frontier, while the cost of the regiment which Major Nicholson says would be required for its protection would exceed the total revenue of the district" (Com. L.D. to C.C., No. 3, 23 Feb. 1851, in A21 & 1/2, Feb. 1873 P143). Nicholson said that he did not like Shah Nawaz...
Lawrence agreed, and Nicholson carried out the summary settlement, and Shah Nawaz Khan was given an inam zamindari of an eighth of the revenue, of which he became the sub-collector. In addition, he retained control of the Tank police, had special powers as a magistrate in civil and criminal cases, and dealt with the Mahsuds, Bhittanis and other trans-border tribes. All these functions were discharged under the supervision, but not the control, of the D.C., so that administratively-speaking the position of Tank was “somewhat peculiar”.

But although his allowance was raised to a third of the settlement (Rs.63,869), this only amounted to only a little more than Rs. 21,000, which would appear to have left Shah Nawaz Khan, even with the inam zamindari of Rs.8,250, nearly Rs.5,000 a year worse off than before. Moreover, he still had to maintain forty horsemen at Rs.15 per month and 150 foot at Rs.5, in all Rs.16,200 a year. As a result, although the original arrangements had not really given him enough money for efficient Mahsud management, the available evidence suggests that the new ones made things worse. It appears that they did not improve his capacity to handle the Mahsuds, and were partly responsible for the fact that the situation continued to deteriorate after 1854.

Doubts about the frontier posts were raised again in March 1855. Some villagers who had been attacked by Mahsuds, instead of calling on the nearby P.I.F. frontier posts for help, went ten miles behind the lines to a police post manned by Jemadar Zeman Khan Gandapur. Although, as we saw above, the G.O.I. was determined to prevent major military movements across the border which might lead to difficulties “with other powers”, troops were permitted to pursue marauders or even attack bodies of men across the border without having to obtain prior sanction. Zeman Khan and twelve of his men pursued the raiders into the hills and were killed. Zeman Khan had been a favourite of Nicholson’s,
who complained bitterly to Lawrence that the frontier posts utterly failed to protect the border, and that quite apart from anything else this was damaging to British prestige. 44

The extent to which the Mahsuds were already causing problems is shown by John Lawrence’s willingness to request permission for a punitive expedition against them after Zeman Khan’s death. 45 This was given, but the expedition was postponed until the autumn as sufficient troops were not available. In the meantime the tribe was barred from British territory. 46 But on the 4th May a group of thirty or so Mahsuds, belonging to the group which had destroyed Zeman Khan’s detachment in the spring, came down to plunder in the Gumal. Shah Nawaz Khan and a party of sowars attacked them and drove them off, killing ten men and wounding several others. Shah Nawaz Khan seems to have given them some sort of undertaking that there would be no further retaliation, and under the circumstances, it was decided that the tribe had been adequately punished and no expedition took place in the autumn. 47 But the Mahsuds, especially the Bahlolzais, continued to prove troublesome. 48 In November 1855, for example, two or three hundred collected in force just across the Tank border. Troops were moved up to the frontier, and they dispersed. 49

In 1857 Lawrence and Chamberlain once more obtained permission for a punitive expedition, but again it did not take place, apparently because Chamberlain decided that the season was too far advanced and the weather too hot. 50 In the meantime Shah Nawaz Khan’s men were able to prevent some Mahsuds incursions, successfully attacking a raiding party in the Shuza Pass at about this time for example. 51

44 D.C. D.I.K. to M.S./C.C., No. 18, 25 March 1855, in No. 12 in No. 28, L/P&S/S/5/223
45 In January 1854 for example a party of Shingi, Aimal Khel, and Nana Khel Bahlolzais attacked Kot Azem Khan and were driven off by the Nawab. Although six Mahsuds were killed, the others got away with the property they had stolen (MacGregor, C.A., I:2, p. 310, J. Lawrence to N. Chamberlain, 1 April 1855, MSS EUR F90/6-4A).
46 “To make the punishment effective”, Lawrence wrote, “it must consist in our killing and wounding a good number of them. This without a picked force would be hopeless and even with one, by no means certain” (J. Lawrence to J. Nicholson, 5 April 1855, MSS EUR F90/6-4A, M.S./C.C. to D.C. Bannu, No. 947, 2 April 1855, in No. 12 in No. 28, L/P&S/S/5/223, M.S./C.C. to D.C. D.I.K., No. 1029, 11 April 1855, in No. 13 in No. 28, L/P&S/S/5/223; see also J. Lawrence to J. Nicholson, 1 April 1855, MSS EUR F90/6-4A, J. Lawrence to J. Nicholson, 23 May 1855, MSS EUR F90/6-4A.).
47 J. Lawrence to J. Nicholson, 11 June 1855, MSS EUR F90/6-4A, J. Lawrence to J. Nicholson, 21 June 1855, MSS EUR F90/6-4A

48 They included Mumia Khel Shingis, Abd al-Rahman Khel and Jalal Khel Nana Khels, and Abdullahi and Malikshahi Aimal Khels. In the summer of 1856 Lawrence wrote to Coxe that he wanted a punitive expedition against them, but could not get permission for it (J. Lawrence to H. Coxe, 15 July 1856, MSS EUR F90/10-3).
49 C.C. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 129, 18 Feb. 1857, in No. 15 in No. 14, L/P&S/S/5/230. By the time Mason described the incident, the number of Mahsuds had grown to three thousand (Report, p. 31).
51 Com. L.D. to C.C., No. 12, 14 April 1857, in No. 1871, Press Lists 1853-1858 Vol. 13
During the Mutiny there were fears that the Mahsuds might try and invade British territory, but no major incursions took place, though there were as many as forty more minor incidents. The Mahsuds may not have done more to disturb the border at this point because of the fighting between them and the Dawars which reportedly broke out in 1857. But during 1858 and 1859 they committed several murders and continued to rustle cattle. There was always the danger that they might gather in larger numbers and do more damage: in February 1859, for example, a large party gathered on the Tank border reportedly eager to plunder British territory.

In 1859 Chamberlain called again for a punitive expedition, but Canning refused to sanction one because the border was quiet at that point. At about this time, Shah Nawaz Khan requested that new frontier posts might be built in order to protect the Gumal Valley from Mahsud raids, and permission was given for the establishment of posts at Jatta, Murtaza and Manjhi, which were built in the early 1860s. In this connection, it is worth making the point that some of the raids were probably due to interference with the tribe by the Multani faction, though no specific examples are mentioned in the records. As we saw at the end of the previous chapter, “many years of immediate contact with the ... Multani Pathans” had brought “opposing influences ... to bear upon the Mahsuds”, and Shah Nawaz Khan had simply been left to cope with them as best he could. In 1859, it should be noted, he was created a Nawab (I refer to him from now on by that title).

As well as the Mahsuds, the Nawab was principally responsible for relations with the Tatta and Uraspun Bhittanis who lived on his border. But British officials did have some contact with the Dannas to the north. Just before he left the district in 1852 Taylor gave the Danna Malik Alaf Shah two appointments in the frontier Militia in return for his taking responsibility for some of the passes into the hills. The idea of making particular tribes responsible for the security of particular routes into the hills, known as Pass Responsibility, was an important frontier management device, and I discuss it at greater length below. In this case it did not stop Bhittanis joining Mahsuds in raids, and during
one of them early in 1853 the brother of one of their leading men was killed; in retaliation they plundered two border villages themselves. Nicholson seized a group of them in British territory, and threatened them with a punitive expedition. This was sufficient to bring them to terms in May; they returned their plunder, and caused few problems for the rest of the decade.60

Although, as we have seen, Canning refused to sanction an expedition in 1859 because the border was quiet, the state of relations with the Mahsuds was still causing concern. In February 1860 a darbar was held at Sialkot for the leading men of the frontier, and a meeting was held to discuss the position, attended by Canning, and among others, Taylor, who had recently been appointed Leia Commissioner, and the Nawab.61 A police infantry detachment had recently been withdrawn from Tank, and at Sialkot Taylor received a report that the Mahsuds were restless.62 During the meeting some officers called again for a punitive expedition, but Canning would not allow one because the case against the Mahsuds was "cumulative", and things were quiet at that point.63

However, while Taylor and the Nawab were on their way back to the Derajat, there occurred the most determined Mahsud attempt to raid the Tank border since annexation. As many as two thousand men, mainly Alizais, and Nana Khel, Shingi, and Abdullai Aimal Khel Bahlolzais, led by Jangi Khan Alizai, who, as noted above, was one of the best-known Maliks, assembled just within the hills near the town.64 The Nawab's Agent alerted the commander of the 5th Punjab Cavalry detachment stationed in Tank, Rissaldar Saadat Khan. The Rissaldar, by calling in the troops from the outposts and collecting some irregulars, was able to assemble some two hundred and ten men. They moved out towards the bed of the Zam where the Mahsuds had collected, and lured them out onto the plain by coming up to them and pretending to retreat in disarray. Then they turned round, cut off their retreat to the hills, and killed as many as two hundred of them, including Jangi Khan, as well as one of his sons and a nephew.65

60 J. Lawrence to Dalhousie, 31 March 1853, MSS EUR F90/3-1A, MacGregor, C.A., 1:1, p. 222. According to the Encyclopaedia Iranica the simple threat of an expedition was sufficient to bring them to terms (entry Betani). In July Nicholson reported that he had been able to purchase the surrender of a man who had committed an offence in British territory and sought asylum with the Bhittanis (J. Nicholson to J. Lawrence, 7 July 1853 MSS EUR F90-15A)
61 Forrest, Life, p. 395
63 G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 97, 7 March 1859, in No. 191, Press Lists 1869-1863 Vol. 20
65 MacGregor, C.A., 1:2, pp. 315-316, Com. L.D. to G.P. M.D., No. 10, 23 March, No. 10 in No 4, L/P&S/5/256
It is not immediately obvious why the Mahsuds tried to raid the border in such numbers just then. One possibility was that in some way the raid had been ‘got up’ by the Nawab or the rival faction. Henry Coxe (11th N.I.), who had taken over as D.C. in 1856, though it likely that the Nawab had organised the raid himself to show the authorities what could happen if he was not left in charge of the border. He pointed out that the Mahsuds had been led by Jangi Khan Alizai, who had been thought of as being an ally of the Nawab. Taylor found this improbable. Had the Mahsuds really been incited by the Nawab, Taylor argued, he could not possibly have been so stupid as to allow men associated with him to take part in the raid, an argument which does have some plausibility. In any case, Jangi Khan’s relationship with the Nawab may not have been as good as Coxe thought; his nephew had been killed by the Nawab’s horsemen a few years earlier. The Lt. Governor agreed with Taylor, though he pointed out that there had been complaints about the Nawab’s administration of Tank, and that it had been under review before the raid. In fact it does seem unlikely that the Nawab was involved. The other obvious possibility is that the rival faction led by Foujdar Khan instigated the raid, and it is curious that none of the contemporary reports suggest this, but some years later Munro did say they were implicated in it.

However, although the Multanis may have encouraged the Mahsuds to mount the raid, it was almost certainly due in the first place to their wish, after being bottled up in the hills for some years, “to enhance their name and obtain plunder”, as Taylor put it. As we have seen, they had several times raided Tank before 1849, and the recent withdrawal of the police infantry detachment and the Nawab’s absence at Sialkot, offered a good opportunity to try and do so again. There were other more immediate reasons as well. Firstly, the Mahsuds had been agitated by the Kabul Khel expedition at the end of 1859, and the fact that some of the men the British wanted in connection with Mecham’s murder, which is described in Chapter Five, had taken refuge with them. Secondly, a man linked

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66 Sometimes intermediaries between the authorities and the tribes did tamper with the latter for their own purposes, probably the most notorious case being that of Ajab Khan, who organised an invasion of Sudium by Buner tribesmen in 1877 (see, for instance, Caroe, The Pathans, pp. 358-359, Davies, The Problem, p. 181).
67 He admitted that not all government officers had approved of the Nawab’s management of Tank, but, he said, all the officers who had had dealings with him thought him honest and straightforward (Com. L.D. to G.P. M.D., No. 10, 23 March 1860, No. 10 in No. 4, L/P&S/S/5/256).
68 Ibid.
69 G.P. to Com. L.D., No. 368, 3 April 1860, No. 10 in No. 4, L/P&S/S/5/256
70 Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 216, 20 July 1876, A/9 Oct. 1876 P859, see also Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 174, 28 July 1873, in A34 Sep. 1873 P143. Captain, later Lt.-Colonel, Anthony Munro (50th N.I.) was to play a very influential role as the Derajat Commissioner from 1871 to 1880, being involved not only with Mahsud relations, but in the administrative infighting in the early 1870s which led to conduct of relations with Kalat being taken out of the hands of the Bombay government in 1876 and entrusted to the Punjab authorities (Heathcote, ‘British Policy and Baluchistan’, Chapter Nine).
with the Nawab had recently begun building a house for himself on the site of Sarwar Khan, the Nawab's grandfather's fort at Jandola, the Bhittanis' 'capital', about fourteen miles within the hills. The Mahsuds were apprehensive that the Nawab was about to try and re-establish a position there, and on their way down to Tank they destroyed the walls of the house.\textsuperscript{72} Thirdly, Jangi Khan may have been trying to take advantage of what he saw as a favourable opportunity to avenge the death of his nephew. It is interesting that of all the possible reasons for the attempted raid in 1860, the religious one is not mentioned at all, whereas in trying to account for the 1879 one, as we shall see, British officials made a number of references to it.

THE 1860 EXPEDITION -

The fact that a large number of Mahsuds had been killed might have been regarded as sufficient punishment for the raid, especially as they had not actually done any damage in British territory.\textsuperscript{73} But Canning, who had previously refused to sanction a military expedition, now insisted on one. The Mahsud tribe was the only one between Tank and Tarbela that had not so far been "humbled", he said, and no Mahsud overtures for peace were to be entertained, he instructed, until their settlements had been visited by British forces and their harvests destroyed.\textsuperscript{74} As we saw in the last chapter, protecting their territory from invasion, maintaining its \textit{pardah}, helped to maintain the honour of the tribe as a whole.\textsuperscript{75} So, although there was no question of attempting to occupy Mahsud territory outright, this would humiliate the tribe by demonstrating their incapacity to defend it.

On the 16th April 1860 therefore, Chamberlain, accompanied by Taylor and Coxe as political officers, led a force of 5,196 regulars and 1,600 irregulars, who included some of the Darwesh Khel chiefs from Bannu (among them Swahn Khan's son Mani Khan) out of Tank.\textsuperscript{76} The troops marched to Kaniguram and Makin along the Tank Zam, a detachment being sent down the Shahur Tangi, and then back into British territory via Razmak to the north. Descriptions of the expedition are given in a number of sources,

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{71} Com, L.D. to G.P. M.D., No. 10, 23 March, 1860, No. 10 in No. 4, L/P&S/5/256
\item \textsuperscript{72} Taylor gave no reason for this.
\item \textsuperscript{73} As Taylor pointed out "never has a tribe had such a severe handling by a small body of horse" (Com. L.D. to G.P. M.D., No. 10, 23 March, 1860, No. 10 in No. 4, L/P&S/5/256).
\item \textsuperscript{74} G.O.I. M.D. to G.P. M.D., No. 95-243, 22 March 1860, No. 12 in No. 4, L/P&S/5/256, G.P. to Com. L.D., No. 320, 24 March 1860, No. 9 in No. 4, L/P&S/5/256
\item \textsuperscript{75} There can be no doubt", Taylor said, "of the advantage to be gained by the destruction of this prestige of intangibility" (Com. L.D. to G.P. M.D., No. 10, 23 March, 1860, No. 10 in No. 4, L/P&S/5/256). "Nothing short of the unveiling of their country and punishment of some well-known offence" will check the Mahsuds' predatory habits", Coxe argued (quoted in ibid.).
\item \textsuperscript{76} Details of the force are in Mason, \textit{Report}, p. 34
\end{footnotes}
official and unofficial. Here I concentrate on three aspects of it in particular.  

The first is the extent of Mahsud opposition. In the Shahur Tangi they fired on the detachment heading for Jangi Khan's settlement, and at its western exit, Taylor, at the head of the column, encountered a holy man (an akhundzada) named Khindad, who with two companions attacked Taylor with suicidal bravery, and he only just escaped with his life. Particularly serious was a dawn attack on the main British camp at Palosin on the 23rd May which resulted in a number of casualties among the troops, and at least one hundred and fifty Mahsud deaths. The troops also had to force the Barari Tangi as they marched towards Kaniguram.

Secondly, it is worth emphasising that several attempts were made to come to terms with the Mahsuds, but that they all failed. Before the troops actually moved into the hills, Taylor had addressed a proclamation to “Omer (Umar) Khan, Ahmeddeen, Dooranee, and other Mullicks of the Muhsood Tribe”; Umar Khan was the son of the leading Alizai Malik, Jangi Khan, who had been killed leading the raid, and Ahmeddeen was an Abdullahi Bahlolzai Malik. In this Taylor explained the reasons for the expedition, and invited the Mahsuds to come in and negotiate, but there was no response. After the attack on the troops at Palosin, a deputation of eleven Mahsud Maliks, three Alizais, four Shaman Khels, and four Bahlolzais (three of them Shingis), did come in to negotiate. But the fact that neither Umar Khan nor Ahmeddeen were among them suggests that they only represented one faction within the tribe. Their spokesman was Nabi Khan Shingi whose subsequent association with Charles Macaulay, the D.C. at Dera Ismail Khan in the 1870s, is described in the next chapter. Commenting that his story was quite a remarkable one, Munro described Nabi Khan as “the most intelligent and capable man perhaps of the whole Bahlolzai tribe”.

Nabi, largely it would appear by force of personality, had managed to build up some influence among the tribesmen generally. He acquired property at Sam near Kaniguram, and by the late 1850s was regarded as the leader of one of the main Mahsud

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77 See Maps - Figure Two for the route taken by the troops. It was decided to make the advance from Tank, as it was the Mahsuds on this border who had given the most trouble since annexation, and whom in particular it was thought desirable to punish (Com. L.D. to G.P., No. 31, 12 April 1860, No. 3 in No. 5, L/P&S/S/256). For details of the expedition, see also Temple, Report, pp. 87-90, MacGregor, C.A., I:2, p. 317, Mason, Report, pp. 31-48, Parry, Reynell Taylor, pp. 223-254, Wylly, From the Black Mountain, Vol. 1, pp. 446-453.


80 Com. L.D. to G.P., No. 31, 12 April 1860, No. 3 in No. 5, L/P&S/S/256.

81 MacGregor, C.A., I:2, p. 319. For the names of the other Maliks see Com. L.D. to G.P., No. 55, 22 June 1860, in No. 290 March 1862 IP P204/59.

factional coalitions. This was the one opposed to the Nawab of Tank and his allies, in particular Yarik Khan and Umar Khan Alizai, and it appears to have had links with the Multani Khans.

When the Mahsud delegation came in to the British camp, the cost of the damage done by the tribe over the past seven years was added up, and the sum of Rs.43,000 was declared to be outstanding against it. The delegates were told that either they could pay that sum and give hostages for future good conduct, in which case the troops would be withdrawn, or they could allow the force to march to Kaniguram without opposition. The Maliks asked to be spared the disgrace of having their *pardah* lifted, but were told that the government required some screen for its honour too, a remark which suggests that tribal and British ideas about honour or ‘prestige’ were in some way comparable (I return to this question in Chapter Eight). The meeting with the Maliks seems to have ended with some sort of understanding that the Maliks would put these terms to the tribe. But although they were to come back with an answer the following day, they did not do so. Later, after the troops had destroyed Makin, the Mahsuds were told that they need no longer pay any fine but only give guarantees for their behaviour in the future, but they still refused to negotiate.

Thirdly, the expedition appears, not surprisingly, to have been bitterly resented by the Mahsuds, and this was probably the most important reason why they would not come to terms. Although Chamberlain and Taylor were anxious to avoid indiscriminate destruction, they were determined that the property of some men in particular should be destroyed. So the Shingi settlement of Kot Shingi, Jangi Khan’s settlement in the Shahur, and the Shingi village of Janjal in the Tank Zam, whose inhabitants had participated in a number of border raids, were demolished. But it was a vicious circle because Mahsud resentment grew with each act of destruction. Their attacks on the troops and refusal to negotiate led in turn to further destruction. Several Shabi Khel villages between Dwa Toi and Kaniguram were destroyed, as were the crops and settlements in the Shahur valley which had been spared as the troops made their way to Jangi Khan’s house. But the greatest damage was done at Makin, a “large, thriving and well-built mountain town”, which contained “excellent houses, some worth Rs.500 or 600 a piece” (and with good towers for defence), their total value being estimated at Rs.60,000. As the Mahsuds would not make peace, it was impossible, Taylor said, to hold off any longer. The expedition had to be made “a misfortune the memory of which would not easily die out”, so the troops spent a whole day gutting and burning the “Maliks’ towers” in Makin, three of which were blown up. “After nightfall the valley had the appearance of Bath or Bristol

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83 MacGregor, C., A., I:2, p. 328
84 Com. L.D. to G.P., No. 55, 22 June 1860, in No. 290 March 1862 IP P204/59
85 Parry, Reynell Taylor, p. 248, Mason, Report, p. 48
lighted up for some festive occasion”, Taylor said. “It was strange to think,” he commented, “that this was probably the first page in the chapter of Muhsood civilisation, but that such will prove to be the case, under Providence, I have not the slightest doubt in my own mind”. The total value of the property destroyed was reckoned at Rs.140,900, undoubtedly a substantial sum, the Abdullai, Shingi, Aimal Khel and Nana Khel Bahlolzais suffering by far the greatest losses. Another reason for the Mahsuds’ unwillingness to come to terms was the fact they were so divided amongst themselves. One grouping consisted of the Maliks who came in to the camp at Palosin. Malik Ahmeddeen assembled another, and the late Jangi Khan’s son Umar Khan a third. The fact that they were so disunited made a co-ordinated surrender virtually impossible, and though some wanted peace, no-one could face the humiliation of having to submit first.

What did the expedition achieve? Canning wrote privately to Taylor that he was “sorry that the tribe has not come distinctly to terms, but I think that perseverance against them was carried quite as far as was in the circumstances expedient … . The whole management of the expedition has been such as to confirm and raise our authority on the frontier”. In so far as the troops had at last ‘lifted the veil’ of south Waziristan, and entered the hitherto unexplored mountains of the proud Mahsud tribe, it was a tonic to British morale and upheld British prestige along the frontier. But the fact that it did not succeed in bringing the Mahsuds to terms must raise the question of how far it contributed to the effective management of the border in the longer term. Several officials doubted that it did. In particular Bartle Frere, who was by now the Governor of Bombay, wrote a very critical minute on it and the policy behind it. Destroying crops and houses, he thought, simply united the tribesmen against the government, and left behind a feeling of bitter hostility, which it would be hard to eradicate. He condemned the fact that during the expedition no demand had been made for the tribe to surrender any individuals in particular. “It would be better”, he said, “to go to any expense to secure the individual malefactor, rather than to be content with easy redress from the community”. Morally-speaking, no doubt, he was right, the problem was, as the Punjab authorities always argued, that it was

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86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 The Abdullais suffered two-thirds (Rs.60,400) of the Bahlolzai losses, which were reckoned at Rs.95,100 in all; the Alizais (Paridai, Sultanai) were estimated to have suffered Rs.26,300 worth of damage, and the Shaman Khels Rs.16,700 (App. 1 in Com. L.D. to G.P., 22 June 1860, in No. 290 March 1862 IP P204/59).
89 Com. L.D. to G.P., No. 55, 22 June 1860, in No. 290 March 1862 IP P204/59
91 While Commissioner of Sind, Frere had been very impressed with Jacob’s methods of frontier management (Heathcote, ‘British Policy and Baluchistan’, p. 59).
92 Martineau, Life, Vol. 2, p. 367
not always easy to establish who the guilty individuals were, let alone hold them responsible. This was one of a series of minutes and memoranda Frere wrote comparing the Punjab government’s frontier and tribal policies unfavourably with those pursued on the Sind border, and I look at his views again in Chapters Six and Seven.

Some of the Punjab officials were not convinced that the expedition had achieved very much either. For example, Henry Davies, Secretary to the Punjab government at the time and Lt.-Governor in the 1870s, thought that “fully successful as a brilliant military exploit, this expedition failed in a great measure in attaining the political results that had been anticipated.” Insofar as the expedition did not force the Mahsuds to surrender immediately, he was right. On the other hand, none of the subsequent expeditions ever induce the tribe to surrender straightaway either. Moreover this one does appear to have had the effect of reducing the number of Mahsud incursions in force. As we shall see, smaller scale robberies continued on some scale, but, as Taylor argued, “defeated men take to burglaries and petty thefts, and it may be taken as a sign of their spirit for more daring attempts being broken”. It may also have discouraged some groups from raiding at all. For example, there are several reference in the records to the Abdullais, who lived at Makin, which had been destroyed by the troops in 1860, participating in raids in the 1850s, but none at all for the 1860s. It is also worth noting, as we shall see in Chapter Four, that the Mahsuds whose houses or crops had been destroyed in the 1860 expedition tended to be the ones who were willing to comply with the British request for the surrender of six tribesmen after the 1879 Tank raid.

Before the Mahsuds were finally induced to negotiate, they tried to take advantage of their position on the border between India and Afghanistan by playing off the two governments. When British troops entered their territory, the Mahsuds sent a deputation to Dost Muhammad Khan asking for help, even undertaking to pay tribute if he would send troops to assist them. The Amir had been informed that the expedition was to take place, and does not himself appear to have been particularly concerned by it. It was probably as much to satisfy the anti-British party at his court as with any real hope of intervening effectively that he sent Ahmed Khan Ishakzai, Master of the Horse, to the Mahsuds. He also wrote to them telling them that if they had committed any aggression in British territory

93 G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 430, 6 March 1877, A2 March 1877 P869
94 Paget, Record, p. 398
95 G.P. to Com. L.D., No. 368, 3 April 1860, No. 10 in No. 4, L/P&S/5/256, C.D. to 27 May 1860, in No. 14 in No. 3, L/P&S/5/256. The P.A.R. 1860-61 (p. 55) states that though Dost Muhammad Khan twice received deputations from the Mahsud Wazirs, “he cautiously abstained from any intervention in their favour susceptible of offensive interpretation”.
they must take the consequences, remarking however that his Government considered "the Pathan unity as its own and you as its subjects".96

In the meantime the British Vakil in Kabul had assured the Amir that the British government did not intend permanently to occupy any territory in the hills. He was pleased to hear this, and, agreeing that the Mahsuds deserved punishment, told the Vakil that if they submitted to him he was prepared to negotiate on their behalf. In mid-June Ahmed Khan returned to Kabul with the Kaniguram Sayyids, Subhan Shah and Ahmed Shah, and several Mahsud Maliks. But in return for his intercession with the G.O.I., the Amir demanded that the Mahsuds allow him to set up a post at Kaniguram, and undertake to keep the Gumal open for caravans.97 This was a great deal to ask, and after a few weeks they went back to Waziristan to sound out tribal opinion.98

Should the question come up again, the Vakil was instructed, he should inform the Amir that his mediation was not acceptable.99 The Mahsuds returned in August, and the Amir did seem to be about to make some recommendation in their favour, but when the Vakil hinted that this would not be favourably received, he dropped the subject and did not refer to it again. When they realised that he was not going to help them, the Mahsuds went home.100 However, at this point the G.O.I. was not fully opposed to the idea of allowing Dost Muhammad Khan to extend his influence into Waziristan. Hugh James (44th N.I.), the Commissioner of Peshawar, had already pointed out that the intervention of the Amir's officer might in fact be helpful. After the Mahsuds had gone, James was instructed that if they should appeal to the Amir again, he should not actually reject any offer to mediate on their behalf the latter might make.101 So although it is usually argued that Canning expressly repudiated Dost Muhammad Khan's pretensions to the tribal territories, it was not quite that simple.102

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100 Ibid., Com. Pesh. D. to G.P., number not given, 8 Sep. 1860, No. 27 in No. 3, L/P&S/5/256
102 See, for example, G.J. Alder, British India's Northern Frontier 1865-95 (London, 1963), p. 116.
ENGLAND, SCOTLAND AND WALES -

In the longer-term the most important result of the attempted raid on Tank was that British officials began to involve themselves more directly in dealing with the Mahsuds, rather than, as they had tended to do until then, leaving things almost entirely in the Nawab's hands. In the short-term the Mahsuds remained under a reverse blockade and unable to trade with British territory. But thanks to a good kharif harvest and the fact that they were able to get food from Khost and Dawar, they did not actually starve, and they continued to carry out raids along the frontier. However, the trading sections were losing money by the blockade, while after the murder of an influential Dawar Malik by a Mahsud it became more difficult to get supplies from there, so that the tribe generally began to suffer "great inconvenience for want of the comforts and luxuries of life".103 Finally, after a party of Third Punjab Cavalry captured a group of Mahsuds early in 1861 near the Zerwannee Pass, it was decided to open negotiations with the government.104 On the 13th February forty-seven Maliks came into British territory to negotiate, among them Nabi Khan Shingi, Yarik Khan Langar Khel Alizai, and Kujul Khan, who represented Umar Khan and the Salimi Khel. It is significant that, as well as the Nawab, his rival Foujdar Khan was invited to take part in the negotiations.105

Because Canning thought it would enable a "tight and visible hold" to be kept on it, the British negotiators demanded that the tribe provide hostages. Taylor also wanted the Mahsuds to accept 'tribal responsibility'; in other words they should agree that in future any robbery or destruction in British territory would lead to seizure of their caravans, whichever section they belonged to. But they were "unused to the idea of being bound to control every member of the tribe and be answerable for his acts", and were most unwilling to accept this.106 Rather like the British critics of Punjab frontier management, they argued that it was unfair to confiscate the property of those who did not give any trouble to pay for the crimes of those who did. In the end they did accept that the property of other members of the sections to which men who gave trouble belonged should be liable to confiscation, but not that belonging to members of the other sections. Taylor, however, argued that this was unacceptable because goods belonging to men from sections against which liability was being enforced would be carried into and out of British territory by caravans belonging

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104 This does not appear on any of the maps consulted; it may be a mis-spelling for Zarkanni, which is to the south of Manjhi.
105 He was said to have an "intimate knowledge of the Mahsuds' character and proceedings" (G.P. to G.O.I. F.D. No. 444, 24 July 1861, in No. 217 March 1862 IP P204/59, Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 34, 22 March 1861, in No. 215 March IP P204/59).
106 G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 269-357, 7 May 1861, in No. 215 March 1862 IP P204/59
to men from other sections. It was on this point that the negotiations collapsed. The Maliks knew that tribal responsibility would be very unpopular, and left for the hills saying that they would have to consult the tribe as a whole. Taylor believed that every proper effort had been made to reach an agreement. Some means of controlling the Mahsuds in future was needed, he thought, and it was reasonable to insist that the tribe as a whole should be responsible for injuries committed by any member of it. Their reluctance to accept this condition showed in his opinion that it would be an effective one. However, their trading caravans had been waiting to cross the border, he said, and he was confident that the pressure of the blockade would eventually force them to accept it.

At this point, an interesting misunderstanding arose between Taylor and the Lt. Governor, Montgomery. If, Taylor said, we were to compare the Mahsuds with mainland Britain as a whole, the three main sections might be compared with England, Scotland and Wales, and the counties to the sub-sections. The Mahsuds had only been willing to accept that each sub-section, or in terms of the comparison ‘county’, should be responsible for its members. If the government accepted this, Taylor said, “we should have to discriminate between Shingees and Mullickshyes, Shahabee Khey], and so on”. However, Montgomery mistakenly formed the impression that the Mahsuds had in fact offered to make each of the three main sections responsible for its members, and so argued that Taylor had been wrong not to accept this. Tribal responsibility had not necessarily been insisted on in dealing with other tribes, Montgomery claimed. For instance, he maintained, the Kabul Khels, rather than what he called the “whole Miranzai division of the Wazirs” (by which he appears to have meant all the Utmanzai Darwesh Khels) had been held responsible on the Kohat border. Similarly, he pointed out, separate expeditions had been mounted against the Michni and Alumzai Mohmands respectively, and they had never been held responsible for the raids committed by the Pindiali Mohmands. As it would be far easier to punish an offending clan or sub-division than the whole Mahsud tribe, might “the separation of the interests of the large clans be not as advantageous for us as they appear to think it is for themselves ?”, he asked.

In reply Taylor argued, correctly it would appear, that the Mahsud sections were much more inclined to co-operate with each other than the Utmanzai or Mohmand ones. Because of this, he thought, it made more sense to envisage the Kabul Khels as a separate tribe, having several internal subdivisions corresponding to the sections of the Mahsuds,

107 Ibid.
109 Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 91, 11 July 1861, in No. 219 March 1862 IP P204/59
110 G.P. to Com. D.D., No. 213, 28 March 1861, in No. 215 March 1862 IP P204/59
111 Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 49, 22 April 1861, in No. 215 March 1862 IP P204/59
rather than as a section of the Utmanzais. They had as a whole been held responsible for the murder of Captain Mecham, he pointed out, although the crime had been committed by a member of one small section. Nor did the Mohmands have much of a sense of overall unity, he suggested; each section had its own territory, and the sections did not unite to defend each other. By contrast, he pointed out (rightly as we have seen), the association between a particular section and its territory was much weaker among the Mahsuds; “when they are at war, a tribe like the Mahsoods is as one man, and having been one in aggression and war, it is surely right that they should be one in making peace”.

Taylor was still under the impression that Montgomery wanted him to accept sub-sectional rather than sectional (let alone tribal) responsibility. The impact of tribal responsibility might be softened, he commented, by giving the tribe as a whole a month or two to make good any losses from the property of offending sections, before the authorities began to confiscate the others’ property. However, he did not think it appropriate for the government to reopen the negotiations, especially as several raids had occurred since. He remained confident that in due course they would be ready to accept the conditions previously offered. But Montgomery was not happy with this. The sense of unity shared by the several sections of the Mahsud tribe, of which he was, he said, well aware, was not an argument for extending responsibility to the tribe as a whole. On the contrary, it suggested that the sections should be dealt with individually in order to prevent the whole tribe from having an interest in “abetting the outrages of every section or individual”. To persuade “the mass of a tribe ... to repress the injurious acts of its lesser members”, he said, it was important to work at the most effective level of organisation. Each of the larger sections of a tribe was more likely to be able to take effective responsibility for members of its subdivisions than was the tribe as a whole, he thought. It would be unfair and unhelpful to insist on responsibility where there was no control. So he instructed Taylor to accept sectional responsibility should the tribe offer this.

Taylor now realised that Montgomery wanted him to accept sectional rather than sub-sectional responsibility, and raised no further objections. “Though dealing with England and Scotland etc, separately, is not perhaps as comprehensive as dealing with

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112 Ibid. Although the Lt. Governor did have a point when he argued that if the government insisted on tribal responsibility, this would not in itself strengthen “the interior control of the tribe over its members” (G.P. to Com. D.D., No. 213, 28 March 1861, in No. 215 March 1862 IP P204/59).
113 Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 49, 22 April 1861, in No. 215 March 1862 IP P204/59
114 G.P. to Com. D.D., No. 356, 7 May 1861, in No. 215 March 1862 IP P204/59
115 Ibid.
116 In a minute on the copy of Taylor’s letter in the India Proceedings, the Secretary to the Punjab government, Henry Davies, noted that the misunderstanding had arisen because Taylor had not said exactly what he meant by the terms ‘tribe’ and ‘section’ (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 91, 11 July 1861, No. 219 March 1862 IP P204/59).
Great Britain”, he said, “still it is, I hope, nearly as good”.\textsuperscript{117} It had advantages, he admitted: for example, the government could not be criticised for making the innocent suffer along with the guilty. The main disadvantage, he thought, was that it removed the possibility of using “the powerful engine of general blockade.”\textsuperscript{118} Thus began the practice of government officers dealing with the Mahsuds at the sectional and sub-sectional level, which lasted for some fifteen years. Given that earlier in the year Taylor had managed to obtain the surrender of Captain Mecham’s murderer by putting pressure on the Hatti Khel Maliks, it is surprising that Montgomery should have felt that he knew better than him how to deal with the Mahsuds, especially as Brigadier Chamberlain and Munro, who was then the Bannu D.C., supported Taylor. The fact that the introduction of ‘tribal responsibility’ by Macaulay and Munro in 1876 seems to have been quite successful certainly suggests that Taylor had judged the situation correctly in the early 1860s. One reason why Montgomery insisted on sectional responsibility was that James, the Peshawar Commissioner, advocated it, and appears to have convinced him of its desirability. James may have taken this line because the Afridis on the Peshawar border were managed through their individual ‘clans’ rather than as a whole.\textsuperscript{119}

Meanwhile Mahsud raiding continued with the object of bringing home to the authorities the consequences of having failed to reach an agreement with them. On the 16th April 1861, for example, about twenty Shingis, led by Ahmed Khan Kharmach Khel and Azmat Mamia Khel, two men who were to play an important part in the 1870s, attacked Shah Zeman near Tank, carrying off some property and wounding four villagers.\textsuperscript{120} However, the tribe was beginning to suffer from the effects of the blockade, and in May some of the leading men decided to see if it might be possible to reopen negotiations, this time through the Shabi Khels whose territory was nearest the Bannu district. Petitions were sent to Munro, the D.C., via the Tehsildar of Lakki, Sultan Mahmud Khan, and the tribe’s representatives were invited to come in to British territory. A jirga had already collected at Kokarai, and a larger one gathered some days later at Dwa Toi. The two assemblies sent in a joint delegation, composed of the leading Alizais, including Umar Khan, and some of the principal Bahlolzais and Shaman Khels, which reached Bannu on the 11th June. By going through the Lakki Tehsildar, the Mahsuds had made their

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., 3 May 1861, in No. 216 March 1862 IP P204/59. On the 30th April the 3rd Punjab Cavalry posted at Manjhi killed three Mahsuds and captured six more, and there were other incidents. For example, on the night of the 3rd April about sixty Shingis attacked a village in the Gumal valley and a Powindah and a Mahsud were killed, the Mahsuds escaping with six camels worth Rs.200. The D.C. complained that Shah Nawaz Khan was “terribly stingy of particulars and late with his report” (ibid.; see also G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 429, 17 July 1861, No. 220 March 1862 IP P204/59).
approach through Foujdar Khan's faction, but Taylor made sure that the Nawab took part in the negotiations as well.

Nabi Khan and some other leading Shingis were not part of the delegation, and Munro regretted that a few more Bahlolzais and Shaman Khels had not come in. However the Maliks of the other subdivisions undertook to be responsible for them, and the Nawab argued that Nabi Khan would have to yield to pressure from the rest of the tribe. Nevertheless discussion continued for some weeks until agreement was finally reached in July, and the blockade lifted. The Mahsuds undertook to keep the peace, not to shelter men who had committed crimes in British territory, and not to receive property stolen from it. They also agreed to give six hostages for one year, two from each of the three main branches of the tribe, all sons, brothers or nephews of Maliks, three to live at Tank and three at Bannu. This was the first treaty the G.O.I. ever negotiated with the Mahsuds, as well as being the first time that it took hostages from them. However, although the delegates appear to have been ready to concede the tribal responsibility Taylor had insisted on in the spring, in accordance with the Lt.-Governor's instructions, sectional responsibility was accepted instead. As far as the government was concerned, it was a lost opportunity.

As for the agreement itself, the failure to obtain the consent of all the influential men to it made it worthless. Nabi Khan in particular argued that he was not bound by its terms, and only a month after it had been signed, on the 13th August, men from the Bahlolzai and Alizai sections murdered five grass-cutters from the third Punjab Cavalry. The fact that the men were deliberately murdered rather than being killed in the course of a raid suggests that this was a spoiling operation carried out by Nabi Khan and other members of his faction. Taylor went to Tank to investigate, and in accordance with the terms of the treaty all the Alizais and Bahlolzais who could be found in British territory were seized and their property confiscated, and a blockade was imposed on these sections. Representatives of the tribe, this time including Nabi Kahn, came down to negotiate with the government

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121 D.C. Bannu to Com. D.D., No. 226, 5 July 1861, in No. 219 March 1862 IP P204/59
123 In particular they agreed not to give asylum to the men implicated in Mecham's murder (see Chapter Five); Paget claims that they almost certainly did so (Record, p. 358).
127 MacGregor, C.A., I:2, p. 328, Paget, Record, p. 391
again. The Bahlolzais themselves spoke of it as “the first time that the tribe had, as the established expression is, ‘come in’, as one man”, a comment which reveals the extent to which the British were trying to generate a new sense of corporate responsibility.\footnote{Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 195, 6 Dec. 1861, No. 109 Jan. 1862 IP P204/58.}

Another agreement, almost identical to last summer’s, was reached, and in November a deputation comprised of the principal men of each sub-division, described as “in every respect a full and complete representation of the whole tribe”, collected at Tank, and were escorted to Dera Ismail Khan to ‘ratify’ the treaty. The delegation included Umar Khan, and his brother Sayad Mahmad Khan, and Sarfaraz Khan, as well as Nabi Khan.\footnote{According to Bruce, Sarfaraz Khan was the principal Machi Khel Malik (The Forward Policy, p. 168). Other Maliks in the delegation were Sher Ali Khan and Pirzul Khan Shaman Khel, and Laisar, Syed Khan, Abdullai, and Hussein Khan Bahlolzai (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 195, 6 Dec. 1861, in No. 109 Jan. 1862 IP P204/58).}

“Nearly a hundred of them pleasant visitors at two interviews a day in Budget season”, commented Taylor, “they see Dera, the Indus and boats for the first time in their lives”.\footnote{Tel., Com. D.D. to G.P., 2 Nov. 1861, in No. 19 Dec. 1861 IP P204/55}

The fact that the delegation included all the important Mahsud Maliks meant, Taylor said, that their subdivisions could not plead that they had not been consulted, but it was impossible to say how long the “good fit” would last. He suggested that, to keep them occupied, some of the Shingi and Malikshahi Bahlolzais might be given land to cultivate in British territory.\footnote{With, as he said, “the Shingis and Malikshahis, whole bands of idle men, with the Powindah camels covering the plains before them” (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 195, 6 Dec. 1861, in No. 109 Jan. 1862 IP P204/58).}


It was recognised that it would be difficult to obtain the consent of the tribe as whole, Colonel John Becher, who had taken over as Commissioner in 1862, commenting that the Mahsuds “like all Afghans, are extremely jealous among themselves”, and that it would be necessary to “grant like favours to all the sections, or the hostilities of others would be kindled”.\footnote{Quoted in Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 69, 14 Nov. 1865, in Coll. 30, L/P&S/6/542.}

However, both the D.C., Major Nichol, and the Nawab opposed the plan, and as there was also concern about its cost, it was shelved.\footnote{For reasons which are not clear (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 169, 14 Nov. 1865, in Coll. 30, L/P&S/6/542).}

As regards the Nawab, we have seen that by the late 1850s the feeling that his administration of the Tank district was not proving very successful was becoming quite widespread among the British officials. Coxe was a particularly severe critic, reporting that many people hated him, his police were inefficient, and the revenue management
The attempted Mahsud raid in 1860 and its aftermath led to his handling of his tribal responsibilities coming under further scrutiny. Coxe argued that whether or not he was in any way responsible for the Mahsud incursion in 1860, it was "neither for our credit, nor for our comfort" that the government should be dependent on him for the safety of the border. Coxe's successor, Munro, was less critical, but did not find the Nawab easy to deal with either. He described him as "cool, calculating and ambitious; very careful as to the opinions he offers; seldom venturing to speak out fully on matters concerning himself or Tank." In 1861 the Nawab complained to Munro about the intrigues of Foujdar Khan's faction, and Munro agreed that the absence of direct contacts with the Mahsuds was responsible for many of the problems they caused. "Our views and objects had been so distorted" by the time they reached the tribes, he commented, "that ... they were calculated rather to excite and mislead them than to encourage the hill tribes to make advances towards more friendly intercourse". He recommended that the Nawab should be encouraged to act up to his responsibilities as "Warden of the Mahsud marches", but should also be protected from external interference. Although there are no details in the correspondence consulted, it does appear that some sort of attempt was made to stop the Multanis tampering with the Mahsuds.

Meanwhile in 1862 the Mahsud hostages petitioned to be allowed to return home. The Commissioner, Becher, wanted to keep them for another year, and was given permission to increase their allowances by a half in order to persuade them to remain voluntarily. By now Major S.F. Graham (5th E.R.) had taken over from Nichol as D.C. at Dera Ismail Khan. He tried to reduce the destructive impact of Mahsud raiding by requiring villages to keep watch at night and beat drums on the approach of raiders to warn the posts, and making each Powindah encampment responsible for the security of the pass nearest to it. But these measures by no means solved the problem, and in 1863 Mahsuds attacked the new outpost under construction at Jatta. At about this time, it should be

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135 He found himself, he said, devoting quite a lot of time to cases arising out of "the enmities and intrigues which exist in the Tank Division" (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. L.D., No. 99, 16 March 1860, No. 778G Dec. 1860 IP P204/33, see also D.I.K. Gazetteer, p. 43, Thorburn, Bannu, p. 56).
138 D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 226, 5 July 1861, in No. 219 March 1862 IP P204/59
141 See Paget (Record, p. 397) for statement of border offences committed in the Tank valley 1861-72.
142 MacGregor, C.A., I:2 p. 328
noted, another new outpost, known as Jani Khel, was established near the mouth of the Shakhtu pass which was one of the Mahsuds' main routes to the plains.\textsuperscript{143} In July 1863 the Mahsud hostages were finally allowed to return to the hills, and in August, because of their persistent raiding, various Nana Khel and Shingi Bahlolzai sections, were barred from trading in British territory.\textsuperscript{144} After all the discussions in 1861 between Taylor and Montgomery over the question of which would be the most appropriate tribal 'level' to focus on, the Mahsuds were still being dealt with sub-sectionally. In April 1864 the Nana Khels submitted to the Nawab, and were permitted to cross the border again, but no agreement was reached with the large Shingi jirga also came down to negotiate with the D.C. of Bannu at about the same time.\textsuperscript{145}

THE SETTLEMENT SCHEME AND THE LATER 1860s -

Because of the continuing problems, Graham suggested in the winter of 1864-65 that it would be worth looking again at Taylor's proposal to settle some Mahsuds in British territory. Montgomery gave his approval, and Graham was asked to produce an official report. In this he argued that something needed to be done about the Bahlolzai Mahsuds, in particular the Shingis and the Abd al-Rahman Khels, “the most noted marauders of the border”, the “shumsherees” ('swordsmen') of the tribe”, “restless and unsettled ... accustomed to seek excitement and a congenial means of subsistence by raiding into the plains".\textsuperscript{146} The best thing, he thought, would be to offer them service and land in British territory on which they could settle.\textsuperscript{147} To achieve this he proposed to save Rs.7,000 by abolishing the office of Superintendent of Police, and to use the money to settle twenty Mahsud families in British territory and give service in the Frontier Militia to twenty-five Mahsud horsemen.

The Commissioner, Major Frederick Pollock, approved of the idea, but thought that the whole tribe's consent should be obtained before any land was distributed or horsemen entertained, otherwise it would merely exacerbate intra-tribal jealousies.\textsuperscript{148} Although Montgomery was enthusiastic, the new Governor-General, the former Chief Commissioner

\textsuperscript{143} Thorburn, Bannu, p. 59
\textsuperscript{146} MacGregor, C.A., I:2, p. 329. In the meantime the Nawab was in trouble again, for using "unworthy methods" to entrap a Wazir, presumably Mahsud, robber named Zamana (G.P. to Com. D.D., No. 510, 8 July 1864, in No. 237, Press Lists 1864-68 Vol. 21).
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{148} Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 169, 14 Nov. 1865, in Coll. 30, L/P&S/6/542
John Lawrence, who had succeeded Canning in 1864, was “extremely doubtful” about it, though his letter does not explain why. However, he did sanction the scheme, partly no doubt to be able to show critics like Frere that Punjab policy consisting of more than simply repressing the tribes. Commenting on the expense and “unsatisfactory results” of the punitive expeditions, George Robinson, the first marquis of Ripon, who had just taken over from Wood as Secretary of State, suggested that “the pacification of border tribes by persevering in the exercise of humanizing influences is more likely to be permanent than their subjection by military force”. He would therefore, he continued, always welcome “such proposals as that that now before me, recommended by your officers on the spot, which afford a reasonable prospect of rendering the people on the frontier ... peaceful and friendly neighbours.”

So the scheme went ahead. It was decided to settle the Mahsuds on a tract of waste land to the south of the cultivated lands of the Gumal valley between Manjhi and the Sherani hills to the south. The fact that this was some distance from Mahsud territory was thought to be an advantage, because it would not be so easy for them to use it as a base for raids. They were to supply labour and materials, timber from the hills, and reeds and grass from the marsh close by. The land would be held rent-free for ten years, and then one-tenth of the produce would be payable as land revenue a year. For its part, the government was to spend Rs.5,000 on the scheme, feeding the Mahsuds while they built houses and irrigation channels, and paying for seed, bullocks, ploughs and so on, and also meeting the cost of employing twenty-five Mahsud horsemen. These were initially to be employed as mounted police under the Nawab’s immediate control, to be gradually transferred to the Frontier Militia as vacancies occurred (I say more about the militia in Chapters Six and Seven). In this way they would form valuable scouts and supports to the posts, being “employed in communication with the hills” till fit for more regular duty, and allowed to visit their homes, where, it was argued, they would be almost as valuable as at their posts.

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150 In Bruce, Memo, in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59. It is worth noting that not all the frontier officers were wholly in favour of the scheme. Captain Charles McLean (whose views on frontier policy are described in Chapter Seven), for example, argued that giving them land near the hills would be “like introducing wolves into a sheepfold”. In principal the idea was a good one, he thought, but they should be settled on the other side of the Indus (MacGregor, C.A., I:2, p. 308).
151 As Graham suggested, the money was to come from savings made by abolishing the post of Superintendent of Police, Dera Ismail Khan (D.C. D.I.K, to Com. D.D., No. 27, 24 Feb. 1866, in Coll. 2, L/P&S/6/544, MacGregor, C.A., I:2, p. 329).
152 At about the same time Robert Sandeman, who was appointed D.C. of the Derawar Khan district in 1866, began to introduce the system of paying tribal leaders for service on the Baluchistan border (Heathcote, ‘British Policy and Baluchistan’, pp. 198-199, Singer, Lords, pp. 126-128).
The Mahsuds were so eager to take advantage of the government’s generosity that a jirga of a hundred and twenty of them arrived uninvited in Tank in the summer of 1865, but had to be dismissed as the officials were not ready to receive them. Not until nearly a year later on the 5th May 1866 did a jirga summoned by government officers assemble at Tank and begin to thrash out the details of the settlement and the Militia service, Graham making much use of the Nawab of Tank in the negotiations.\(^{153}\) Sorting out who was to take part in the settlement scheme does not seem to have caused any particular problems, partly because the Mahsuds did not really want to live in the plains and grumbled about having to do any work on the project themselves. But the idea of being paid for militia service was much more popular, and there was vigorous and interminable debate regarding the allocation of the Militia appointments. As was to happen again and again in years to come, it was impossible to limit the numbers attending the jirga, and in spite of Graham’s effort by the end they had swelled to four or five hundred.

Enormous difficulties were caused by the fact that, as Becher and Pollock had pointed out, the strong sentiment of tribal equality meant that they all felt entitled to share the good things the government had to offer. In his report Graham explained that “the main consideration in carrying out a measure of this kind was to avoid all cause for jealousy amongst the tribes involved”, and that therefore he had to treat the three branches equally generously.\(^{154}\) As a result, although it was the Bahlolzais in whom the authorities were particularly interested, only a third of the twenty-five Militia places could be allocated to them. Not surprisingly they clamoured for more, and tried to get other concessions, the Shingis for example demanding footmen as well as horsemen. The representatives of the other sections secretly encouraged them, Graham said, as they knew that any additional favours granted to the latter would have to be given to them as well.\(^{155}\)

However, Graham and the Nawab of Tank persisted. On the Mahsud side, the Nawab of Tank’s brother-in-law Yarik Khan Langar Khel, Sarfaraz Khan Machi Khel, and Umar Khan Alizai were the chief representatives, and all played a prominent part in the negotiations.\(^{156}\) The Bahlolzais proved the most difficult to accommodate. However, though only the sketchiest details are given in the records, it appears that some more Bahlolzais had been captured recently, and Graham was given permission to hold on to them until a settlement had been reached. This gave him some leverage, and he was

\(^{153}\) In the meantime in December 1865 Mahsuds had raided an encampment of Sulaiman Khel Powindahs near Jatta and killed one man, carrying off about nine hundred sheep and sixty cows (about half the sheep were recovered) (P.A.R. 1866-67, p. 88).


\(^{155}\) Ibid.

\(^{156}\) Bruce, Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59. Howell says that Umar Khan “fully vindicated his position as ‘leading Khan of the tribe’” (Mizh, p. 2).
gradually able to win over most of the members of this section, until only the Shingis, who were divided into two large factions and one small one, were left. Only one of the large factions attended the jirga, and when it refused to accept Graham’s conditions, he got in touch with the representatives of the other. They immediately accepted what was on offer, and this induced the first faction to come to terms as well. It was a tortuous business. Feelings among the Shingis ran so high that members of the different factions would not sit down together, and at the end Graham had to speak to their delegates in three separate meetings, one for each faction.\textsuperscript{157}

Eventually however eight Alizais, eight Shaman Khels and nine Bahlolzais were selected for the militia (it appears that they were appointed to the Luni and Zarkanni posts to the south). They were nominated by the Maliks themselves, and included Umar Khan’s brother Sayad Mahmad, Yarik Khan’s nephew Muhammad Afzal, and Nabi Khan’s nephew Bilandi.\textsuperscript{158} The sections which the scheme was particularly supposed to benefit, the Shingi and the Nana Khel Bahlolzais, got very few horsemen, the former three and the latter two, which was less than they had been led to expect. Their poverty was one reason why some men from these groups were persistent border raiders, and under the circumstances, the appointment of a few militiamen, together with the settlement of a few families, could not have made much difference. Richard Bruce, himself D.C. and Commissioner towards the end of the century, in his Memorandum on the Mahsuds, commented that “paramount advantages of an imperial nature were to be secured, and to think they could possibly be attained by the distribution of the service of twenty-five sowars over a tribe of the strength and character of the Mahsuds was absurd”.\textsuperscript{159} This perhaps misses the point that Graham had initially intended the Shingis to have all the land and appointments, and was well aware that the number of appointments was too low (he did ask to be allowed to have another ten place for them in the Militia as vacancies occurred), but it is true that the scheme was a very modest one.\textsuperscript{160}

A settlement scheme was also devised at about this time for the Danna Bhittanis on the Bannu border. By the mid-sixties relations with them began to deteriorate after what seems to have been a relatively peaceful period. They may have hoped that by making

\textsuperscript{157} D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 27, 24 Feb., 1866, in Coll. 2, L/P&S/6/544  
\textsuperscript{158} Minute by Lt. Governor, 22 May 1872, in G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 690, 27 May 1872, in A30 May 1872 P142, Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 185, 23 Dec. 1865, in No. 966, Press Lists 1864-68 Vol. 21. Luni and Zarkanni are not shown on the maps but are to the south of Manjhi. Among the other militiamen were Sarfaraz Khan Machi Khel’s son Mir Khan, the Shaman Khel Syad Amin Khan Galishahi, and the Bahlolzais Niazi Khan Abdullai, Libas Khan Kharmach Khel, and Jana Khan Boi Khel’s nephew, Shah Alam (Howell, Mızh. pp. 1-2, 102-103).  
\textsuperscript{159} Bruce, Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59  
\textsuperscript{160} Com. D.D. to G.P., no number given, 12 March, 1866, in Coll. 2, L/P&S/6/544, see also P.A.R. 1867-68, General Summary, pp. 4-5.
trouble they could persuade the officials that they were worth cultivating too.\textsuperscript{161} Lt. H.B. Urmston (62nd N.I.), D.C. Bannu from 1862 to 1866, suggested that their headmen might be given some land rent free in British territory, and some militia appointments, and this proposal was sanctioned by the government. The Bobas and Bobaks would share equally a tract of about 2,500 acres of land north of the Gumbila river, distributing it among the minor sub-divisions according to “their own rights and customs”. The land was to be held rent free for ten years and subsequently at ordinary unirrigated revenue rates. In return for this they were to be responsible for the security of the passes leading into British territory from the Jani Khel boundary to the Bain. They were also granted four sowars each in the Frontier Militia. Although Rs.1,000 was to be advanced to them to meet the expenses of excavating a branch canal from one of the main canals, irrigating the land proved to be a problem, which was compounded by a drought at the end of the 1860s. However, for four or five years the Dannas caused few problems and the scheme was regarded as a success.\textsuperscript{162}

As for the Mahsud scheme, Rs.2,000 of the government grant was spent on buying land in the winter of 1866-67, and twenty or so Mahsud families settled on it, and brought about sixty acres under cultivation. But there was only the briefest respite from raids. The Mahsuds proved to be very reluctant actually to begin cultivating their land in the plains, and a year later Graham admitted that it did look as though they had only come to an agreement in 1866 in order to obtain the release of their prisoners. The problem was, he thought, that raiding, “a more congenial and profitable pastime than the sober pursuits of preserving the peace or of agriculture”, was still too easy for them.\textsuperscript{163}

One reason for the continuing difficulties was the way that, as we have seen, factions or cliques in British territory were able to intrigue with Mahsud factional groupings to upset the peace of the border. The Nawab found it very difficult to cope with this. Instead of trying to conciliate Nabi Khan’s faction, Munro commented, he limited himself to “fitful reprisals and the occasional capture of the more notorious raiders”.\textsuperscript{164} However, by then the government seems to have accepted that the Nawab, who was still heavily in debt, did not have enough money to pay for the tasks he was expected to perform. Donald Macleod, who became Lt.-Governor in 1865, agreed that, following the regular revenue settlement of the district which was expected to take place shortly, his income should be considerably increased. However, although the Nawab was informed of this, the

\textsuperscript{161} The recent granting of four sowars to the Bakka Khel Wazirs (see Chapter Six) was reportedly a particular grievance (MacGregor, C.A., I:1, pp. 222-227).
\textsuperscript{163} Com. D.D. to B.G.-P.F.F., No. 74, 11 April 1867, No. 78 Oct. 1870 IP P438/11
\textsuperscript{164} Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 216, 20 July 1876, in A19 Oct. 1876 P859
settlement was postponed.\textsuperscript{165} Towards the end of 1866 Shingis and Nana Khels murdered his Agent, and carried out some other serious raids and kidnappings.\textsuperscript{166} Graham still had some Shingi and Nana Khel hostages, and in February 1867 he tried to use the prospect of their release to tempt the Bahlolzais to come to an agreement.\textsuperscript{167} A jirga was summoned, and the prisoners were taken to Tank. However the Shingis and Nana Khels in particular were unwilling to pay the fine demanded, or even accept a quit settlement of Rs.2,000, so the hostages were returned to jail.\textsuperscript{168}

In order to deal with the raiding, the Officer Commanding Outposts, Lt.-Colonel W.T. Hughes (48th N.I.), recommended the establishment of posts nearer the frontier, at Girmi, the Tank Zam and Kot Kirghi, to cover the entrances of the passes between the Zam and Jatta, and they were sanctioned by the Punjab government in October 1867. I look at the problems which were experienced with these in the next chapter. Hughes also advocated that more Mahsuds, as well as some Bhittanis, should be drafted into the Frontier Militia. If enough men could be enlisted and accustomed to receiving a regular allowance, he thought that after a while the Mahsuds would be "clamouring for the lands which now we cannot coax them to cultivate even by the bestowal of large sums of money".\textsuperscript{169} Graham agreed, and suggested that some of the present horse and foot militia might be discharged and their places filled by Mahsuds and Bhittanis.\textsuperscript{170}

As he had threatened to do the year before, in 1868 Graham put the Bahlolzais as a whole under a reverse blockade. But other sections caused problems as well.\textsuperscript{171} Early in 1868 Shaman Khels, joined by some Zilla Khels, kidnapped sixty Hindus from Tank at a

\textsuperscript{165} G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 234-725, 19 June 1871, No. 160 Aug. 1871 IP P760
\textsuperscript{166} MacGregor, C.A., I:2, p. 331, D.I.K. Gazetteer, p. 56. Bruce drew attention to the frequent changes of D.C. in the Dera Ismail Khan district in the second half of the 1860s (Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan, 1890, L/P&S/7/59).
\textsuperscript{167} The prisoners were taken out of prison and allowed to live in a caravanseri, though still under guard, and were allowed to wear their own clothes and see their friends (Paget, Record, p. 393).
\textsuperscript{168} MacGregor, C.A., I:2, p. 329. Graham threatened to take away the Shingis and Nana Khels' quota of horsemen in the Militia, eject them from their lands in British territory and subject them to a reverse blockade (op. cit. p. 330).
\textsuperscript{170} Com. D.D. to B.G.-P.F.F., No. 74, 16 April 1867, No. 78 Oct. 1870 IP P438/11
\textsuperscript{171} In February 1868, for example, Haibat Khels attacked a party of Bhittanis near the Girmi Pass and carried off ten bullocks. They were pursued by a guard of the First Punjab Cavalry who rescued the animals and wounded one marauder. In April 1868 Shingis attacked the village of Dubra. Taking advantage of a dark, stormy night they reached the gateway of the village unobserved, and killed one man and wounded three others (P.A.R. 1867-68, p. 45).
shrine of Shiva near Murtaza in the Gumal pass. Three of their main sections, the Chahar Khels, Khali Khels and Badinzais, were barred from British territory, but the fourth, the Galishahi, was not (another example of the authorities dealing with the Mahsuds at the sub-sectional level). The Zilla Khels were also barred from British territory in 1868 as some of them had taken part in the attack on the Hindus. After a raid in the Bannu district during the same year, a blockade was imposed on the Shabi Khel Alizais as well, and six hostages were taken for a few months. In March 1869 a party of Nana Khel and Shingi Bahlolzais with some Shaman Khels killed the Gumal Thanadar. It is clear that as the decade drew to a close the government was no nearer to solving the problem of Mahsud raiding. Graham’s settlement scheme was abandoned. However, possibly in response to Graham’s appeal, eight Shingis were appointed at the Murtaza Post to replace a Miani garrison which had not proved satisfactory. They were led by Fatteh Roz, who was said to be “a man of much character”.

After Dost Muhammad Khan’s death in 1863, it is worth noting, the struggles between his sons and grandsons for possession of Kabul spilled over into Waziristan. In 1865 Sardar Azem Khan had retreated to Waziristan with his nephew, Abd al-Rahman Khan, after the failure of his attempt to raise a revolt against Sher Ali Khan in the Kurram. He was given shelter by Nabi Khan Shingi, and tried to raise levies for use against Sher Ali Khan. In return Nabi Khan was invited to Kabul when Azem Khan took power there in 1866. When Amir Sher Ali took over in 1868, Nabi Khan was imprisoned, but escaped and managed to return to Waziristan, where “his rivalries with Umar Khan for years reflected on a narrower stage the dynastic squabbles of the Barakzai sirdars”. Early in 1869 Sardar Muhammad Azem and Abd al-Rahman Khan fled to Dawar and applied for

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172 According to Howell (Mizh, p. 3) they actually killed them all, but the only reference I have been able to find is to the “capture of Banias by Waziris” (G.P. M.D. to G.P., No. 1914, 6 June 1868, in No. 2173, Press Lists 1864-68 Vol. 21).
173 Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 74, 27 March 1873, in A15 Nov. 1873 P143
175 Other incidents included an attack on the village of Fatteh Naring in April in which a woman was killed, and 400 cattle were carried off. In retaliation for the plunder of their cattle in independent territory by the Alizais, in March some Powindahs camped in British territory went up into Alizai territory near the Tank border and carried off cattle and hostages. Rather unfairly perhaps they were fined Rs.1,000 for this and made to pay compensation to the Alizais (P.A.R. 1867-68, p. 16, P.A.R. 1869-70, pp. 23-24, Paget, Record, p. 394, MacGregor, C.A., I, 2, p. 332, Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 110, 12 Aug. 1868, in No. 2309, Press Lists 1864-68 Vol. 21, Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 74, 27 March 1873, in A15 Nov. 1873 P143).
asylum in British territory. This was granted, but they decided not to accept the offer, and went to Kaniguram, from where they moved on to Iran.\(^{180}\)

**SUMMARY -**

Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century the northern Derajat border seems to have been vulnerable to raiding by the Mahsuds in particular. So the first problem for the new British administration was establishing some system of defense against tribal incursions. The Punjab Irregular Force was recruited to provide the necessary troops for the defence of the Dera Ismail Khan border and the Dera Ghazi Khan border to the south. Outposts were set up at particularly vulnerable points, and roads built to link them with each other and the cantonments at Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. However, Shah Nawaz Khan (after 1859 the Nawab of Tank) was left to conduct relations with the Mahsuds on the Tank border, partly because he had Mahsud connections and was thought to have influence with them. His management of the border did not prove very successful, but he had considerable difficulties to contend with. The resources at his disposal for dealing with one of the most difficult groups along the whole frontier very limited, and his rivals in British territory had links with the Mahsuds too, of which they were only too willing to take advantage. Some of the difficulties with the tribe which continued to be experienced throughout the 1850s appear to have been due to their manipulation of the tribesmen in an attempt to discredit him. The Bahlolzai Mahsuds were the most notorious raiders and plunderers, causing so many problems that on several occasions a punitive expedition was sanctioned but for one reason or another did not go ahead. However, early in 1860 a considerably larger number of Mahsuds than usual, led by an influential Alizai Malik, Jangi Khan, crossed the border and threatened Tank. Although they were successfully dispersed, the government retaliated by mounting its first military incursion into Mahsud territory, in the course of which a number of villages and the settlement of Makin were destroyed. This did not bring the tribe to terms, and it was not until they had been barred from British territory for another year that they sued for peace.

The negotiations collapsed because Taylor believed that the tribe as a whole should be responsible for the actions of all its members, no matter which section they belonged to. The Lt. Governor however insisted that ‘sectional’ responsibility would be sufficient. This was eventually accepted by a tribal jirga and an agreement was negotiated in June, but it came to nothing because the Shingi Bahlolzai Nabi Khan in particular had not been included in it. However in the autumn a fresh agreement was reached with tribal representatives

\(^{180}\) Azem Khan died at Shahr-i-Rud in northern Afghanistan in October, and Abd al-Rahman went on to Turkestan where he spent the next twelve years (P.A.R. 1868-69, G.S. pp. 15-16, Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 410).
who included Jangi Khan’s son Umar Khan as well as Nabi Khan. But tribal raiding continued, and in the mid-1860s an attempt was made to pacify the Shingi and Nana Khel Bahlolzais in particular by settling some families in British territory and giving some men service in the Frontier Militia. Tribal custom meant that they got only a small share of the land and five of the Militia appointments, which was not enough to achieve this object. Further attempts to deal with the tribe at the sub-sectional level also failed to achieve this goal, and raiding continued.
CHAPTER THREE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND SOUTH WAZIRISTAN -
1870 TO 1878

MILITARY POSTS AND MILITIA OUTPOSTS -

As noted in the previous chapter, the decision was taken in 1867 to create three new, more advanced posts on the Tank border, at Girni and Kot Kirghi, and in the Tank Zam. Particular difficulties were experienced with the one at Girni. For some reason no attempt was made to find out whether there was drinking water nearby before work on it began, and in the event it proved very difficult to find any. The fact that the new posts were well in advance of the existing ones, the Kot Kirghi one in particular being right on the edge of British territory, did not please the Mahsuds, and an attempt in the summer of 1868 to dig a well at Girni was abandoned because of “hostile indications” on their part. But towards the end of 1869 the Lt.-Governor, Donald MacLeod, arguing that the raid reports for September showed that the posts were still urgently needed, ordered work to be restarted. There were further delays owing to Mahsud hostility, and the difficulty of finding a suitable location, and the Girni post was not completed until 1872. However, the Kot Kirghi post, which the Girni post was supposed to support, was built early in 1870 and garrisoned with regular troops and Tatta Bhittanis. The Mahsuds responded aggressively. On the 13th April a party of thirty or so Shingis, pretending to be servants of the Nawab, approached a guard of five men from the 1st Sikh Infantry on their way from Kot Kirghi to Tank, and attacked them. Two of them were killed and the others badly wounded.

This drew the attention of the Governor-General, Richard Bourke, the 6th earl of Mayo (1869-72), to the new outposts. He wondered whether the Kot Kirghi post was too exposed for safety, and should be abandoned altogether. But Sir Henry Durand, who succeeded MacLeod as Lt. Governor in June 1870, thought that the Mahsuds’ reactions showed that they realised that the new posts would restrict their activities, and that they would consider it “an act of timidity” if the Kot Kirghi post were not retained and the Girni post left unfinished. His successor, Henry Davies, agreed, though he argued that the Kot Kirghi post should eventually be held solely by Bhittanis. Mayo accepted this, but ordered

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2 He had taken over from Robert Montgomery in 1865.
5 G.P. M.D. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 352-2651, 20 Aug. 1870, in No. 77 Oct. 1870 IP P438/11. Durand had had a long career in the Indian army and government, for example serving as the G.O.I.’s Foreign Secretary from 1861 to 1865 (see H.M. Durand, Life of Major-General Sir Henry Marion Durand, (London, 1883).
that in future the position of frontier outposts should not be changed without the G.O.I.'s permission. The Secretary of State (1868-1874), George Campbell, the 8th duke of Argyll, commented that he was not surprised that the Mahsuds objected to the construction of fortifications far in advance of those previously held. The Tank Zam post was also built in the early 1870s, and the Tittor post abandoned.

Though it is not possible to look at his policies in any detail, it should be noted that Mayo was critical of the traditional Punjab emphasis on maintenance of British 'prestige' along the frontier by means of punitive expeditions. He hoped to improve frontier defences sufficiently to repel all raiding and thus make "surprise, aggression and reprisal" unnecessary. It does not appear that this had much direct impact on relations with the tribes along the Waziristan border. However, Mayo's desire to exert more influence on frontier policy than his predecessor, Lawrence, had already led to some acrimonious exchanges with the Lt. Governor regarding the management of the Kohat frontier, and I look at these briefly in Chapter Six.

The Bahlolzais and Shaman Khels were barred from British territory (though they continued to visit it under cover of the Alizais' trading caravans) in 1871 when Colonel Munro became the Derajat Commissioner, and Captain Charles Macaulay took over as D.C. of the Dera Ismail Khan District. Macaulay, "a fine upstanding figure of a man, blue-eyed and fair-haired", had served in the Awadh campaign of 1858-59 and then with the 1st Sikh Cavalry in the China expedition of 1860, in which he took part in the occupation of Beijing, and been awarded medals for both. A relative of the great jurist, he proved to be one of the most energetic and creative frontier officers of this period.

As noted at the end of the previous chapter, in 1868 the Zilla Khels had been subjected to a reverse blockade as a punishment for their involvement in the kidnapping of the Hindus by the Shaman Khels. About a year after Macaulay's appointment, in August 1872, they were allowed back into British territory again after paying a small fine of

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6 G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 800P, 18 May 1870, No. 258 May IP P438/9, G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 1376P, 4 July 1871, A14 July 1871 P141. As the Kot Nasran post was now far behind the new frontier line, Munro recommended that it should be advanced to the mouth of the Shuza Pass in front; this was approved in July 1873 (G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 1609P, 19 July 1873, in A4 Aug. 1873 P143).
7 S. of S. to G.O.I., No. 120, 28 Nov. 1872, A21 Feb. 1873 P143
11 According to Caroe he was "perhaps the most influential of all frontier officers in the 'between' period" (The Pathans, pp. 375, 389). Elliott suggests that Macaulay was the greatest of all the political officers who dealt with Mahsud affairs, and he may well be right (The Frontier, pp. 225-226). But Macaulay was D.C. for twelve years not, as Caroe says, seventeen (op. cit. p. 389). He took over the post in 1871 and retired in 1882 (with a period of leave in 1875-76).
Rs.300. The extent to which frontier management in the 1860s had continued to be relatively informal is shown by the fact that nothing could be found in the files about the imposition of this blockade. Further investigation revealed that it had been left up to the local officers to decide whether to bar a tribe from coming into British territory. In future, Davies ordered, the Lt.-Governor’s permission should be obtained before a reverse blockade was imposed, unless the case was a particularly urgent one.

Members of the faction opposed to the Nawab still had positions of importance on the border in the 1870s; in particular, they commanded the Frontier Militia, and it appears that they did turn a blind eye to Mahsud robberies because they helped to discredit the Nawab. With their tacit consent, if not active encouragement, Bahlolzais, Shingis in particular, continued to rob and murder in the border villages. Partly, it would appear, because he was an opponent of the Nawab, Fatteh Roz Shingi and the men he commanded at the Murtaza post were discharged in 1872, as were the remaining Shingis attached to the Luni and Zarkanni posts to the south. Following this, in July 1872 a party of about thirty Mahsuds wounded six men in an attack on a village in the Gumal valley. This might have been instigated by Fatteh Roz in revenge, Macaulay thought, but he could not be certain. On the night of the 1st November twelve Shingis and a Bhittani attacked the village of Pirorana, some twelve miles within the border, killing one man and getting way with some property. The Nawab claimed that one of his opponents (whom he refused to name) had arranged this, but Macaulay was not sure. It was difficult to get at the truth, he complained, because he had “no means at his disposal to correctly fathom and test the undercurrent of political events in the valley”. Munro agreed that the Nawab always tried to reveal as little as possible about such events.

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15 Minute by Lt. Governor, 22 May 1872, in A30 May 1872 P142
REMOVAL OF THE NAWAB'S POLITICAL AND POLICE DUTIES -

As we have seen, pressure from some of the local officials to take the administration of the Tank district in general, and in particular relations with the Mahsuds, out of the Nawab's hands, had been growing since the late 1850s. Durand was persuaded that something should be done to improve the position there, and it was on a visit to Tank that he died on New Year's Day 1871 after a fall from an elephant.\(^{19}\) His successor, Henry Davies, was equally convinced of the need to reform the administration, and visited Tank himself in February 1871 and again in January 1872.\(^{20}\)

There were three main criticisms of the Nawab, the first two of which were directly linked. To begin with, it was asserted that his influence with the Mahsuds was on the wane, and that as a result relations with them were deteriorating and raids increasing in number.\(^{21}\) So from 1861 to 1872, along the Tank border, there had been, it was claimed, two hundred and thirty one raids and only thirty-nine elsewhere, and one hundred and twenty-seven robberies compared to eighteen, which had led to twenty two murders and fifty seven woundings. "From Peshawar to Sind there is no part of the North-West Frontier so insecure, so exposed to raids and violent crime, as the forty miles which are nominally under the management of the Nawab of Tank", Davies argued.\(^{22}\) Secondly, the Nawab was accused of always revealing as little as possible about his relations with the Mahsuds and other independent tribes, and never having co-operated willingly with the British officials. Indeed it was alleged that his connections with the tribe had taught him to intrigue with and shelter criminals from it. Finally, it was argued that the Tank district itself was very badly administered. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Nawab was also heavily in debt, and this was regarded as an additional problem; among other things because it made him vulnerable to his enemies' intrigues.\(^{23}\)

British officials accepted that the Nawab had had to contend with considerable difficulties. As we have seen, it was recognised that, as well as having to contend with the

\(^{19}\) The elephant on which he was riding through the town panicked when it could not get through a narrow gateway, and he was thrown off. The Nawab, who was with him, also fell to the ground; he was concussed but not badly hurt (Durand, Life, pp. 446-447, P.A.R. 1870-71. p. 137).

\(^{20}\) Davies had a long career in the Indian administration; he was for example, secretary to the Punjab government in the early 1860s, and a member of the Council of India from 1885 to 1895 (Buckland, Dictionary).

\(^{21}\) So, for example, Macaulay asserted that in the ten years from 1861 to 1871 in spite of carrying out a large number of raids in British territory, the Mahsuds at no point made any redress for them (in App./F.R.-App. E, Feb. 1882 P1825).


Multanis' tampering with the Mahsuds, he was chronically short of money. So, to begin with, the Lt. Governor seems to have thought that he should be given a chance to show whether with adequate funding he could manage relations with the tribes better. But when Davies visited Tank in January 1872 he had a meeting with the local officers, who persuaded him that there was no alternative but to take away many of the Nawab's responsibilities.

But we should ask how fair this assessment of the Nawab's administration really was. Was he really so uncooperative and given to intriguing with the Mahsuds, and were relations with them really deteriorating so badly? With regard to the first question, there is little doubt that he did try to keep as much power in his own hands as possible and did not co-operate willingly with the British officials. Although there is no proof that at this stage he had ever worked actively against the government, he did allow Mahsuds from other sections to smuggle in members of blockaded sections and their property in their caravans. As regards the second, it is not clear that the Mahsuds were really becoming more aggressive and difficult to control. We have seen that before annexation they had habitually raided the settled districts, and they began to give trouble again soon after it. As we saw in the previous chapter, Taylor argued that that the petty raids and robberies committed by the Mahsuds in the 1860s and early 1870s were on the whole less serious than the raids in the 1850s. Since 1860, he said, there had only been something over twenty-one "heinous offences" a year, whereas in each of the five years before it there had been more than thirty-six.

It is really impossible to say how accurate the figures to which Taylor and the Lt. Governor appealed were, but Taylor's point deserves serious consideration. Whereas, as we have seen, in the 1850s the Mahsuds had on a number of occasions assembled in quite large numbers to plunder along the border, and in 1860 had attempted to attack Tank itself, it does appear that, after the 1860 expedition, the Mahsuds did increasingly take to smaller-scale robberies. Although there were one or two more serious incidents, from 1861 until New Year's Day 1879 it appears that they did not once gather in any force. Moreover, the criticisms of the Nawab for his apparent inability to manage his finances may have been unfair. As we saw in the last chapter, from the outset his income was insufficient to meet the substantial expenses he incurred in administering a particularly vulnerable section of a

24 G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 234-725, 19 June 1871, No. 160 Aug. 1871 IP P760
26 In the whole twelve years after the expedition, he noted, the Mahsuds had never committed more than four murders in British territory in any one year, which was not much in such a locality when faced with men "habituated to this kind of petty warfare from their childhood" (quoted in Paget, Record, p. 398). For an alternative view see Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 28, 8 Feb. 1873, in A21 & 1/2 Feb. 1873 P143.
highly volatile border. As well as maintaining the revenue and police establishments, he had to meet the costs of conducting relations with the Mahsuds, and occasionally incurred larger expenses on their behalf, for example, as we shall see below, in 1874 paying the Bahlolzais' fine of Rs.5,000. It may be that the decision to remove the Nawab's political responsibilities was taken not just because of his apparent incompetence and the Mahsuds' intractability, but also because attitudes were changing within the British administration. Captain A.S. Roberts, who stood in while Macaulay was on leave in 1875-76, said that the Nawab ruled his country according to "oriental notions". It appears that by the 1870s, when men like James Stephens were demanding higher standards of administration, this was no longer acceptable.

In fact, Davies was still proposing to wait until the long-awaited revenue settlement of the Dera Ismail Khan district had been completed before making any changes to the Tank administration. But Mayo was sufficiently convinced by the reports of the local officials to suggest late in 1872 that action should be taken immediately. After some discussion of precisely how far this should go, it was decided to abolish the Nawab's police powers and take the conduct of relations with the Mahsuds out of his hands. The decision was also taken at about the same time to set up a new border police. I explain the background to this in Chapter Six, suffice it to say here that this meant that the D.C. would have a coercive force under his direct authority, and no longer be entirely dependent on the military. A special Powindah Police was also to be set up, and grazing regulations introduced to try and ensure that flocks and herds were not left unguarded near the border and vulnerable to rustling by the Mahsuds. However, administratively the district was still not incorporated fully into British India, as Shah Nawaz Khan remained in possession.

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27 Com. Pesh. D. to S. to F. Com. Punjab, No. 74, 26 June 1865, in A21 & 1/2 Feb. 1873 P143
29 An expert on criminal law and a member of the Viceroy's council from 1869 to 1872, Stephens was a noted exponent of the more authoritarian liberalism which became popular in the later nineteenth century (see, for example, Metcalfe, New Cambridge History of India III:4 (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 56-59). The possibility that the local officials may also have highlighted the deficiencies of the Nawab's administration because they wanted to exercise greater responsibilities themselves cannot be ruled out.
of the title of Nawab, and continued to collect revenue and administer justice. Not until January 1875 did Davies visit Tank to notify him formally of the changes, and to inaugurate the new arrangements, although in the meantime Macaulay does seem increasingly to have taken over responsibility for the Mahsuds.\textsuperscript{33}

**AGREEMENTS WITH THE SHAMAN KHELS AND BAHLOLZAIS**

Late in 1872 Macaulay had discussed the position with regard to the Mahsuds with the Nawab. He told him that he knew that Shaman Khels and Bahlolzais regularly visited Tank, even though they were supposedly barred from British territory. Since he had become D.C., Macaulay complained, the Nawab's men had not intercepted a single Mahsud raiding party. The Nawab seems to have taken the hint, because on the 25th January 1873, thanks to information supplied by him, twenty-seven Mahsuds, mostly Aimal Khel, Malikshahi and Nana Khel Bahlolzais, as well as some Shaman Khels, who had come down under cover of a friendly Alizai and Urmar convoy, were seized in Tank with property worth about Rs.1,200.\textsuperscript{34} But it was too late to save the Nawab's reputation, Munro, for example, observing that it showed that he could easily have made such seizures before.\textsuperscript{35} Two parties of Shingi raiders were also captured in British territory at about this time, one by Bhittanis and the other by the Nawab's men.\textsuperscript{36}

As we as saw in the previous chapter, three of the four main Shaman Khel sections, the Chahar Khels, Khali Khels, and Badinzaís, had been barred from British territory since 1868 because of the kidnapping of the Hindu pilgrims in that year. They several times asked for the blockade to be lifted, but not until March 1873 were they allowed to send in

\textsuperscript{33} G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 121, 25 Jan. 1875, in A38 Jan. 1875 P145. According to Howell, responsibility for the Mahsuds was taken out of the Nawab's hands in 1873 (Mizh, p. 2). In 1875 Mullazai and a few other villages nearby, as well as the Bain Pass, which belonged to the Bannu district, were transferred to Dera Ismail Khan. This made sense, not only because Mullazai was separated from Bannu by the Peyzu hills, but also because although it belonged to Bannu administratively-speaking, it was under the military control of D.I.K. (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 698, 14 Dec. 1875, in A19 Oct. 1876 P859). It was also decided that once an efficient police had been set up, tribesmen entering British territory should no longer be allowed to carry arms, and by 1878 this appears to have been largely achieved (G.P. to Com. D.D., No. 130, 25 Jan. 1875, A40 Jan. 1875 P145, D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 333, 25 April 1878, in A26 June 1878 P1147).

\textsuperscript{34} D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., no number, 31 Jan. 1873, in A40 Feb. 1873 P143


“a complete and representative” jirga, bringing, as Macaulay had requested, thirty-six hostages. During the negotiations which followed it was agreed that Rs.3,000 would be an acceptable fine, and that this might be paid in timber delivered at Tank and from tolls on Shaman Khel caravans entering British territory. The Shaman Khels undertook to restore any property stolen by members of their section in future, and pay fines for murder or wounding in British territory.

Macaulay wanted to keep all thirty-six hostages, but to save money, Munro persuaded him that, provided half were Maliks or their sons, and the other half “well-connected and influential men”, twenty would be enough. There was also the question of where they should stay. They did not want to be live away from the hills at Dera Ismail Khan, and Macaulay thought that negotiations might actually break down over this question. But he insisted on Dera for several reasons. The most important was that he wanted to establish a precedent which could be followed when it came to taking hostages from the Bahlolzais. At Tank there was also the danger that the hostages would still be exposed to “sinister influences” (he did not explain what these were), and it would be easier for them to escape, whereas at Dera they would be “brought into daily contact with peaceful and settled habits”, and learn from the local officers what the government’s “real intentions towards them and the better order of the frontier were”. So the hostages were made to live there. After much haggling it was decided that they would all receive a basic allowance of Rs.10 per month, and that the ten more influential men would receive an extra Rs.5 to pay their servants. If the tribe failed to honour the agreement, the hostages would be liable to imprisonment and deportation.

As we have seen, partly thanks to the Nawab, a number of Bahlolzais and their property had been seized in 1873. Among them were some influential men and valuable goods, and this seems to have encouraged members of the section to think about making peace with the government. In the late spring of 1873 a very large jirga, consisting of

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38 D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 152, 26 March 1873, in A15 Nov. 1873 P143. Munro thought that this would not be enough to compensate fully for the damage caused by the Shaman Khels, but that it was all that was likely to be realised (Com. D.D. to D.C. D.I.K., No. 124C, 15 March, in A15 Nov. 1873 P143, Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 74, 27 March 1873, in A15 Nov. 1873 P143, transl. of agreement with Shaman Khels, dated 28 April 1873, in A15 Nov. 1873 P143).
about three hundred Bahlolzais, mainly Aimal Khels, Nana Khels, and Shingis, came down to Tank. Negotiations broke down after only three days because the Shingis demanded that all their prisoners be released immediately. The Nana Khels and Aimal Khels each offered to conclude a separate agreement with the government, but Macaulay did not respond, as he thought that dealing with the tribe at the sub-sectional level was not very effective.\(^4\) During the rest of 1873 there were fewer raids than usual along the Tank border, and in January 1874 a Bahlolzai jirga returned to resume the negotiations.\(^4\) This time it was agreed that the Bahlolzais should pay Rs.5,500 compensation, and a fine of Rs.3,000. In addition Macaulay insisted that they should provide thirty-two hostages.\(^5\) But the jirga consisted mostly of men belonging to Umar Khan’s faction; members of Nabi Khan’s faction, as well as a large minority of Jalal Khel and Haibat Khel Nana Khels, had refused to participate in it. Munro did wonder whether it had been sufficiently representative, and his caution was justified.\(^6\) On the morning of the 31st March. led by Bhatti and Imam Shah Haibat Khel Nana Khel, about fifty men, nearly all Mahsuds and Bhittanis (mostly Ali Khel Bobas from the Bannu border) robbed a party of twenty-five travellers passing under escort through the Bain Pass, wounding four men and stealing Rs.40. It seems likely that, as in 1861, Nabi Khan had arranged this, quite possibly in concert with Azem Khan Kundi, the proprietor of the village of Gul Imam near Tank, to discredit an agreement other Mahsuds had negotiated with the government.\(^7\)

Macaulay refused to see the Bahlolzai jirga which had been on its way to meet him at Dera until they paid a fine of Rs.1,500 and brought in the men who had led the raid. These conditions were met, and what does seem to have been a more representative jirga came in and agreed to the proposed terms.\(^8\) As well as Nabi Khan, the Shingi Maliks signing the agreement included his rivals Ahmed Khan and Kajir Kharmach Khel, Azmat

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\(^4\) Ibid.
\(^3\) For example, he said, blockades and seizures had less effect when applied at the sub-sectional level (D.C. to Com. D.D., No. 246, 17 May 1873, in A15 Nov. 1873 P143).
\(^4\) Among other things, Macaulay said, they hoped that the government would mediate in the feud between themselves and the Ahmedzai Darwesh Khels, as this had led to considerable loss of life and property on both sides (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 105, 23 Feb. 1874, in A7 Aug. 1874 P144). In fact the Darwesh Khels appear to have been the losers overall - see Chapter Six.
\(^5\) From the Aimal Khel sub-section there were three Malikshahi hostages, three Nazar Khels, and two Abdullais; from the Nana Khel sub-section two Jalal Khels, two Haibat Khels, two Abd al-Rahman Khels, two Kokarais, two Gujar Khels, and two Haji Khels, as well as one Umar Khel and one Nekzan Khel, and from the Shingi sub-section two Mamia Khels, two Kharmach Khels, two Azbokais, and two Mamazais, and one Boji Khel, and one from the Bahlolzai sub-section (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 105, 23 Feb. 1874, in A7 Aug. P144 1874).
\(^7\) The attackers included thirty Haibat Khels, two Jalal Khels, seven Abdullais, seven Shabi Khels, and five Ali Khel Bhittanis and one Turan Khel (Off. Com. O. & M. to Ass. A.G.-P.F.F., No. 29, 5 April 1874, in A8 Aug. 1874 P144).
Mamia Khel, and Jana Boi Khel (whose nephew had been one of the bargirs in 1866).\textsuperscript{49} The agreement provided for the D.C. to call a sectional jirga to sort things out should members of the tribe commit robbery, wounding or murder in British territory. As with the Shaman Khels, the hostages were to be liable to imprisonment or deportation should restitution not be made. The fact that some Shaman Khels were given a higher allowance than others had caused resentment, so Macaulay suggested that all the Bahlolzai hostages should receive the same amount, Rs.12 p.m. But, presumably because the jirga objected, it was decided instead that nineteen should receive Rs.15 p.m. and the other fourteen Rs.10.\textsuperscript{50} In addition the Bahlolzais were to pay Rs.5,500 in compensation for losses caused to British subjects since January 1873, and a fine of Rs.3,000.\textsuperscript{51} Munro did not recommend the agreement for approval until August 1874, when he expressed cautious optimism. No sub-division of the Mahsuds, he pointed out, had ever before paid a fine of Rs.7,000 and undertaken to pay Rs.3,000 more within a year. Nor had the Mahsuds ever before been able to have “such free intercourse with Dera Ismail Khan and civilisation”, and express their wishes directly to the local officers.\textsuperscript{52}

It was a considerable achievement to have persuaded the Shaman Khels and Bahlolzais to come to terms at last. There seem to have been two main reasons for their willingness to do so. In the first place, they had been seriously inconvenienced by the way the Nawab had begun to co-operate in enforcing the reverse blockade which had been imposed on them for some years. Secondly, they were tempted by the new hostage arrangements which Macaulay had introduced. A third of the hostages were to be replaced by new ones every four months, and this meant that a relatively large number of men were able to spend some time as hostages (and receive an allowance). Macaulay himself claimed that “the educative effects of living in British India were much appreciated by the tribe, and what was originally viewed as a penalty began to be contested for as a prize”, to be divided according to recognised tribal shares.\textsuperscript{53} In fact it looks as though it was the allowance.

\textsuperscript{49} Jana Khan Boi Khel was one of the men who had been awarded a bargir in 1866, and Niazi Abdullah had been one of the bargirs himself (Howell, Mizh p. 103). Others taking part included Fattah Roz Boi Khel, Zabar Dost Malikshahi, Push Nazar Khel, Laisar Haibat Khel, Sayyid Amin and Kargai Jalal Khel, and Sher Ali Kokarai. Fattah Roz had attended the first set of negotiations in 1861, at which Niazi had been Zabar Dost’s representative, and Push had also sent a representative to them (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D. No. 220, 25 April 1874, in A7 Aug. 1874 P144).

\textsuperscript{50} G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 1071, 4 June 1875, No. 171 June 1875 IP P772

\textsuperscript{51} The fine was to be raised from their caravans at a fixed rate on each camel and bullock entering British territory over the next year (D.C. D.I.K., to Com. D.D., No. 220, 25 April 1874, in A7 Aug. 1874 P144).

\textsuperscript{52} Having previously had to use “channels really as unfriendly to them as opposed to our efforts at improved border administration” (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 174-2799, 15 July 1874, in A7 Aug. 1874 P144).

\textsuperscript{53} Macaulay quoted by Howell, Mizh, p. 9. “No man failed to be present on the day his turn came to be a hostage at Dera”, he commented, and “while the first batch on being relieved left everything in their quarters
which appealed to the tribesmen. They saved as much of it as they could, depositing what was left after they had paid for their board and lodging with moneylenders. Macaulay’s hostage arrangements amounted to an indirect tribal subsidy.

Another interesting feature of the agreement was that Azem Khan Kundi, and the other Kundi landowners, were so discontented with the Nawab that they actually paid the fine for the Bain Pass raid themselves. As a result, as Munro put it, “the recalcitrant faction had so far obtained its object of being rendered conspicuous but at a cost of Rs.1,500”. But, surprisingly perhaps, presumably in an attempt to maintain his own influence among the Bahrolzais, it appears that the Nawab himself actually paid most of the Rs.5,500 compensation. In spite of this, however, the failure of the initial settlement with the Bahrolzais seems to have persuaded Macaulay to make more use of Azem Khan Kundi and Nabi Khan over the next few years. To a considerable extent, Azem Khan supplanted the Nawab as his principal contact with the Mahsuds, and Nabi Khan rather than Umar Khan was treated as the tribe’s main representative. Over the next few years Nabi Khan was given presents, introduced to senior officials and even attended the Delhi darbar in 1877. He aspired to play the same sort of role among the Mahsuds that, as we shall see in Chapter Seven, Mani Khan tried to play among the Darwesh Khels in Bannu. In fact, he became a friend of Mani Khan’s, and two of his daughters were married to two of the latter’s sons.

Bruce subsequently argued that allowing Azem Khan, an ordinary landowner, to take the Nawab’s place, and Nabi Khan, “a petty faction leader”, to supplant Umar Khan, the Mahsuds’ “legitimate chief”, was a serious mistake on Macaulay’s part. Insofar as, as we shall see in the following chapter, Nabi Khan and Azem Khan did ultimately prove incapable of managing the Mahsuds, Bruce had a point. But Macaulay’s strategy failed partly for reasons beyond his control, and in any case the previous approach, which was based on trying to control the Mahsuds through the Nawab and his allies in the tribe, had not been very successful either. Moreover, for all the use he made of him, Macaulay was aware of the limited extent of Nabi’s direct influence, specifically making the point that it did not extend much beyond his own sub-section. It should be born in mind that Bruce was a protégé of Robert Sandeman, who had achieved a considerable degree of control in the wildest confusion, the last made them over with the neatness and precision of a relieved guard” (D.C. D.I.K. to G.P., No. 99P, 18 Sep. 1881, in App. Feb. 1882 P1825).

55 Com. to G.P., No. 174-2799, 15 July 1874, in A7 Aug. 1874 P144
56 Bruce, Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, G.O.I. to S. of S., L/P&S/7/59
57 Ibid.
59 In Howell, Mizh, p. 3.
over some of the most difficult Baluch tribes, such as the Marris and Bugtis, by working through their chiefs. As we shall see in the next chapter, towards the end of the century Bruce helped to implement a much more interventionist policy towards the Mahsuds, one which relied heavily on the Mahsuds' supposed chiefs. His criticisms of Macaulay were intended to justify this.61 Another intermediary who continued to play an important role in the 1870s was the Kaniguram Sayyid, Subhan Shah, who, Macaulay said, had for the past two years "worked straight in the interests of Government".62

Reference has been made to the feud between the Mahsuds and the Ahmedzai Darwesh Khels. Macaulay wanted to intervene in this, arguing that any long-drawn feud between tribes just across the border in the end tended to lead to disturbances within it.63 But Major James Johnstone (18th N.I.), the D.C. at Bannu, objected on the grounds that the feud had prevented the Bahlolzais raiding on the Bannu border as they had done in the past, and that peace would enable them to do so again. Munro agreed with him, and Macaulay was told that he should not interfere with relations between the two groups.64

THE BHITTANIS -

We saw at the end of the previous chapter that the difficulty of obtaining water for the lands which the Dannas had been allotted in the Bannu district in 1866 had been exacerbated by the drought experienced at the end of the decade. As a result, apart from a few small plots, it was not until the early 1870s that they began seriously to cultivate the land.65 A minor difficulty arose with the trans-border Danna village of Shadman early in 1872 when a British officer, Lt. Charles Norman (1st Punjab Cavalry), who was carrying out a survey for the Quartermaster-General's Department, crossed the border and men from the village fired on and threw stones at his party. They were punished by being made to pay a fine, and burn down their own houses (mostly huts of reed and thatch).66

61 It is fair to say that Sandeman did have some success with Pashtun groups like the Achakzai by working through the Maliks or heads of sections (Dutta, 'Strategy and Structure', Chapter Four).
64 Moreover, Johnstone said, the Darwesh Khels themselves did not want the authorities to intervene, which is curious given that according to other reports Mani Khan several times requested them to do so (see Chapter Seven) (Memo by D.C. D.G.K., in A7 Aug. 1874 P144, Com. D.D. to D.C. D.I.K., No. 231-1073, 19 March 1874, in A7 Aug. 1874 P144).
65 They were given permission to dig a canal to take water directly from the Kurram, which it was thought would solve the problem, although the division of the land between the different sections caused difficulties, and some Dannas went back into the hills (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 179, 1 March 1872, in A44 April 1872 P142).
Otherwise, the Dannas gave no particular problems until 1874 when, as we have just seen, some Ali Khel Bobaks joined the Bahlolzais in attacking the caravan in the Bain Pass. The Bobaks lived to the north of the Peyzu range, and relations with them were handled by the Bannu D.C. As we saw in the last chapter, an attempt had been made in the 1860s to persuade them to be responsible for the security of the passes running through their territory into the hills. It was customary in the Bannu district to persuade tribesmen who lived along or near a particular pass to undertake what was called Pass Responsibility (P.R.). This was feasible because the land in the plains in front of and around the mouths of the passes into the higher valleys, like Dawar and Kurram, was usually occupied by a single tribe, so that members of that tribe usually knew when anyone went up or down the pass. When a tribe or section accepted P.R., it meant that they became responsible for use of that particular pass by men committing any 'criminal' activity in British territory. If, for example, stolen property was proved to have been taken off into independent territory through the pass, they were held responsible for recovering the property, making good its value, or producing the thieves. The authorities recognised that P.R. involved quite a heavy responsibility, and in return for undertaking it the lands of the tribes on the Bannu border were lightly assessed, and their Maliks given the right to nominate recruits to the Frontier Militia, their number depending on the extent of the tribe’s responsibility.

The attempt in the later 1860s to persuade the Dannas as a whole to take on P.R. in return for land in British territory had not been very successful, and Macaulay was keen to try again. So, after the attack on the caravan in the Bain pass, they were persuaded to accept responsibility for the passes along the section of the border from Jani Khel to Peyzu in return for a lighter fine. Macaulay wanted the Tattas and Uraspuns, who lived to the south of the Peyzu along the Tank border, and were managed by the Nawab of Tank, to take on P.R. too. Generally they had given few problems since annexation. In September 1871, apparently in revenge for injuries suffered at the hands of the Shingis, a large party

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67 Septimus Thorburn, who occupied various posts along the border in this period (he was, for example, acting A.C. Bannu when the Muhammad Khels attacked the Kurram relief in 1870 - see Chapter Six), dated P.R. from about 1857 (Bannu, p. 71, A.C. Ban. to D.C., no number, 18 June 1870, in No. 38 Jan. IP P758). Urmston said he thought he remembered seeing purwannahs (permits) dating from the late 1840s and early 1850s permitting the Darwesh Khels to occupy such and such lands in Bannu, with a clause added that they were to be responsible for the good conduct of their tribe in that neighbourhood (Memo on P.R., in No. 43 Nov. 1870 IP P438/10). Munro quoted a letter of Captain Minchin’s according to which the Boba and Bobak Bhittans’ P.R. had in fact been enforced ever since 1849 (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 175-2801, 16 July 1874, in A8 Aug. 1874 P144).


of them did attack a caravan of Alizai Mahsud traders carrying Shingi property in the Tank Zam, killing two men, and wounding thirteen, but this was untypical.\textsuperscript{70} However, their links with the Nawab complicated relations with them, and their Maliks refused to accept P.R. in 1873 because, Macaulay argued (possibly with some justification), the Nawab used his influence with them to induce them not to do so.\textsuperscript{71} Not until 1876 did Macaulay succeed in winning them over; they were only willing to change their minds, it appears, because the Nawab had gone to Murree.\textsuperscript{72} In return for accepting P.R., twenty-seven Bhittani horsemen and sixty-two footmen were given service in the militia and assigned to seven posts. The largest contingents were two horse and twenty foot at the Bain post, and twelve horse and forty foot at Kot Kirghi, for which they received Rs.11,220 a year. Their land in the Tank valley was also to have a lighter assessment in return for this.

The service was divided more or less equally between the three main sections of the tribe, so that Dannas living to the north had appointments as well as Tattas and Uraspuns. To ensure that as many men as possible benefited from the arrangements, it was arranged that the horsemen would be changed every year and the footmen every six months. Because Macaulay thought it would give him more influence over them, the tribe itself would meet to nominate the men who were to form the next relief. The horsemen would be its nominees (bargirs) rather than the Maliks', and the portion of their pay due to the person nominating them would be distributed to the tribe as a whole.\textsuperscript{73}

In this connection, we should also note that in 1876 the small Miani and Ghorezai tribes undertook responsibility for the passes along their section of the border, and were given service in the Militia at the Girni, Murtaza and Manjhi posts. The Zilla Khel Ahmedzais also agreed to be responsible for their passes when they were down with their flocks in the winter. As a result, P.R. was formally established along practically the whole length of the Tank and Mullazai borders, and the Shaman Khels informally agreed to be responsible for the only point where Mahsud territory touched that of the G.O.I., to the south of the Shahur Tangi.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{70} MacGregor, C.A., I:1, p. 231
\textsuperscript{74} D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 214, 11 April 1876, in A5 June 1876 P859. Munro was sceptical about the value of this (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 143, 16 May 1876, in A5 June 1876 P859).
OPENING THE GUMAL AND MAHSUD LINKS WITH KABUL -

During his visit to Tank to inaugurate the new administrative arrangements for the district in January 1875, representatives from the whole Mahsud tribe came in to see the Lt.-Governor. Macaulay thought it would be a good opportunity to raise the question of making the Gumal route more secure.\(^{75}\) In fact his predecessor, Graham, had already put forward a scheme for improving it in 1870.\(^{76}\) The principal problem was the Powindahs' vulnerability to attack by Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds. Graham proposed to deal with this by building eight posts or towers in independent territory, which would be garrisoned by Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels living nearby.\(^{77}\) In return their Maliks would be paid an allowance, and as security the tribes would each provide three hostages who would live in British territory on a fixed allowance. The whole arrangement would be supervised by a government officer, and the cost of Rs.20,000 would be met from the grazing taxes and Indus ferry tolls paid by the Powindahs in British territory.\(^{78}\) However, Davies had rejected the plan because it was too dangerous. The government would have no control over the garrisons of the towers, the hostages would of little practical use, and sending a British officer to superintend arrangements would be very risky.\(^{79}\)

Nevertheless Macaulay was keen to see such a scheme put into operation. There was much free land which could be brought under cultivation, he said, arguing with characteristic optimism that the Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels would "recognise the benefits they would gain by steady employment along the route and the peaceful occupations they would have time to pursue".\(^{80}\) When their representatives gathered at Tank in January 1875, he raised the question of whether they would be prepared to undertake to protect the route in return for an annual subsidy.\(^{81}\) The Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels as a whole might be "tribally and jointly" responsible for the route, he thought, suggesting it might be divided into twelve stages rather than eight as Graham had recommended. Rather than having towers built for them, they should make arrangements themselves for the protection of each stage, in return for which they would receive Rs.2,000 p.a. (the scheme to be

\(^{76}\) This may have been linked with Mayo's wish to improve trade between India and C.A. (Chakravarty, From Khyber to Oxus, pp. 33, 105). A 'mercantile fair' was instituted at Dera Ismail Khan in the late 1860s; new caravanserais had already been built there and at Dera Ghazi Khan earlier in the decade (Memo by T.H. Thornton, Sec. G.P., in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 28, 14 Feb. 1868, L/P&S/S/261).
\(^{77}\) They had to join forces to make the passage through the Gumal, appointing a chief who arranged for mounted men to go ahead and behind the caravan, posted pickets, and selected guards for the flocks and herds, and for the camp at night (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 186, 28 Nov. 1870, in A4 April 1872 P142).
\(^{78}\) Ibid.
\(^{79}\) G.P. to Com. D.D., No. 390, 2 April 1872, in A4 April 1872 P142
\(^{80}\) D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 159, 24 March 1877, in A17 1877 P860
financed from tolls paid by the Powindahs). But Munro was still not enthusiastic: relations with the Mahsuds were still in a delicate state, and much of the route lay in Afghan territory. Macaulay’s proposals were rejected at this point, partly at least to avoid upsetting Amir Sher Ali Khan.\(^{82}\)

However, by this time relations between Afghanistan and the G.O.I. had already begun to deteriorate. Largely it would appear because the Secretary of State, Argyll, would only let him give the Amir the most guarded assurances of support, Mayo’s successor, Thomas Baring, the earl of Northbrook (Viceroy 1872-1875), had lost Sher Ali Khan’s confidence, and the influence of the pro-Russian party in Kabul began to increase.\(^{83}\) When Robert Cecil, the 3rd marquis of Salisbury, succeeded the duke of Argyll as Secretary of State for India in 1874, he was anxious to secure an Afghan alliance by making the definite commitment to Afghan security which Argyll had avoided. However, in return for financial assistance, he wanted the Amir to accept British agencies at Kabul and Herat, which would have entailed a much more intrusive British presence.\(^{84}\) Northbrook thought this unwise and resigned in November 1875, and Salisbury appointed Edward Lytton, the first earl of Lytton, as Viceroy (1876-1880) with instructions to establish British influence in Afghanistan.\(^{85}\) Both men, it should be noted, were anxious to introduce modifications to Punjab border management, but as this does not appear to have had much impact if any in Waziristan, I return to the question in Chapter Seven rather than looking at it here.

As a result of these developments, by 1875 the Amir was concerned about the direction British policy seemed to be taking, and ready to respond to overtures from the independent tribes. He had actually appointed a special officer, Mufti Shah Muhammad, who was “entrusted with the entertainment of border people” when they came to Kabul, and they were paid a subsistence allowance when they were there.\(^{86}\) In April 1875 men from the main Mahsud sections sent a petition to him complaining that the British government proposed to construct posts in the Gumal to make the route secure for traders, and asking him to intervene.\(^{87}\) The government’s refusal to mediate in the continuing war

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\(^{82}\) Howell, Mizh, p. 5. Nor did Munro approve of Macaulay’s suggestion that the Powindahs should be told they would not be allowed to enter British territory if they did not stop feuding with the Kharotis. Davies agreed with this, but thought that the Amir might be consulted about the problem of the Powindah feuds. Northbrook approved of this idea, but it seems unlikely that an approach to the Amir was ever actually made (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 65-958, 27 Feb. 1875, in A29 March 1875 P145, G.P. to Com. D.D., No. 506, 16 March 1875, in A29 March 1875 P145, G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 1702P, 11 June 1875, A55 June 1875 P145).

\(^{83}\) See, for example, Khan, England, Russia and Central Asia, p. 242, A.H. Bilgrami, Afghanistan and British India (Delhi, 1972), pp. 159-160

\(^{84}\) See, for example, Chakravarty, From Khyber to Oxus, p. 30

\(^{85}\) See, for example, Singhal, India and Afghanistan, p. 12, Bilgrami, op. cit. pp. 167-168

\(^{86}\) C.D. 26-28 Sep. 1876, No. 7 in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 55, 9 Nov. 1876, L/P&S/7/11

\(^{87}\) C.D. 30 April-3 May 1875, in A24 May 1875 P145, Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 158-2347, 22 May 1875,
between the Mahsuds and the Darwesh Khels also gave the Amir an entrée with them, and in August Mahsud representatives requested his help in settling their feud with the Darwesh Khels. The Amir sent Mufti Shah Muhammad to Birmal with Sirbiland Khan Achakzai and, as we shall see in Chapter Seven, they persuaded some of the Darwesh Khels to visit Kabul as well.88

In this period the Khan of Kalat, a vast area extending from south of Kandahar to the Indian Ocean, and comprising much of the contemporary province of Baluchistan, was still nominally subject to Sher Ali Khan.89 The fact that in 1876 the G.O.I. negotiated a treaty with the Khan providing for British troops to be stationed there, and that a cantonment was established at the main town, Quetta, in November, made the Amir even more mistrustful of British intentions.90 In that year Malik Adam Khan Madda Khel, the Amir's most important go-between with the Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds, persuaded a large number of Mahsuds, including Umar Khan and Yarik Khan Alizai, and Boyak Bahlolzai, to visit Kabul.91 These links with Kabul were to become more important in the later 1870s, and I look at them again towards the end of this chapter. In the following section I return to the question of relations with the British authorities.

THE NAWAB AND THE ‘NAWAB’S PARTY’ -

Taking relations with the Mahsuds out of the hands of the Nawab did not solve the problems that had been experienced with them. The drawback of trying to deal with the Bahlolzais, let alone the Mahsuds as a whole, through Nabi Khan was that he was only the leader of one factional nucleus. The other was led by another Shingi, Ahmed Khan Kharmach Khel, and consisted of a "small but somewhat influential body of leading Maliks", almost all Bahlolzais.92 They were referred to as the 'Nawab’s party', and included Ahmed Khan’s close friend and adviser, Azmat Mamia Khel, whom Macaulay described as a courageous and intelligent man, as well as various relatives including Ahmed’s brother Kala, and Barra, Tibas and Fatteh Kharmach Khel, Badin Azbokai, Dadin Boji Khel, Fatteh Roz Boi Khel, Taj and Mashak Abd al-Rahman Khel Nana Khel,

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89 Heathcote, ‘British Policy and Baluchistan’, p. 7
90 Caroe, The Pathans, pp. 372-374, Singhal, India and Afghanistan, p. 20
and Boyak Abdullai Aimal Khel (who, as we have just seen, visited Kabul in 1876). Macaulay was convinced that the Nawab began actively to intrigue with Ahmed Khan, whom he had specially recommended to Macaulay on one of the latter's visits to Tank, to undermine his efforts to conduct relations with the tribe through Nabi Khan and Azem Khan Kundi. The Nawab, he thought, indirectly responsible for many of the difficulties with which he had to deal during the next two or three years. As we saw in Chapter One, an important aspect of Pashtunwali was the rivalry between patrilateral parallel cousins referred to as tarburwali. The fact that Azmat came from the same lineage as Nabi, and that Ahmed and several others came from a closely-related one, suggests that this played a part in the rivalry which helped to create the 'Nawab's party'. At the same time, some of its other members belonged to other subsections; Mashak and Taj, for example, were Abd al-Rahman Khels from Asplitoi, and Boyak an Abdullai from Makin. Presumably their own personal links with the Nawab brought the more distantly-related members of the 'Nawab's party' together, though tarburwali probably encouraged them to look for allies outside the circle of their own close relatives in the first place.

After Davies' visit to Tank in 1875, Macaulay went on leave to England for nearly a year, and, as noted above, his place was taken by Captain Roberts. To begin with the border was peaceful, and Mahsud trade with British territory flourishing. However, during the year some of the Bahlolzais began to cause problems, and in two separate robberies Jalal Khels and Abd al-Rahman Khels carried off some fifty camels belonging to Aka Khel and Nasir Powindahs. The Nawab's involvement was suspected when Ahmed Khan, Barra and Tibas were reported to have received some of the camels. The situation became more complicated when on the 2nd May a Hindu boy was kidnapped from Kot Turan, a village near Tank, by a group which included Kala, Dadin, Badin and Fatteh, and was taken to Fatteh Roz's house near Kaniguram. Roberts imprisoned the Bahlolzai hostages at Dera Ismail Khan, rode out to Tank and on the 5th May seized fifty Bahlolzais, the same number as the stolen camels. He told the Nawab that he was making him responsible for recovering the boy, but the latter protested that he had no influence with

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93 Probably this was not the same Fatteh Roz who had been jemadar at Murtaza, who appears to have been an opponent of the Nawab (see above p. 77).
the Mahsuds, and blamed Nabi Khan for the raids and the kidnapping. One can appreciate that he may not have been very inclined to co-operate, given that he had only recently been deprived of much of his authority. He did send his Mahsud allies Yarik Khan Alizai and Saadat Mir Malikshahi Bahlolzai into the hills, but after a few days Roberts concluded that they were procrastinating, and despatched Nabi Khan as well.96

Freeing the Hindu boy became tangled up with the problem of recovering the camels. Nezam Abd al-Rahman Khel, who had been responsible for the theft of some of the camels, and Fatteh Roz invoked Umar Khan’s protection. The latter’s supporters gathered in large numbers in the hills to protect them, and it looked at one point as though there might be actual fighting between them and Nabi Khan’s partisans. However, Fatteh Roz was eventually persuaded to hand over the boy, and on the 22nd May the Shingi and Alizai jirgas brought him in with five of the Nasir Powindahs’ camels.97 Later in May, “the faithful Nabbi”, as Roberts described him, brought in the thirty-three Aka Khel camels himself, with the representatives of the Nana Khels.98 At the beginning of June more of the Nasir Powindahs’ camels were surrendered by Alizais and Shingis, who had taken them from the Abd al-Rahman Khels. However, no more of the camels had been produced by early July, so Roberts returned to Dera on the 12th, taking the fifty Bahlolzai hostages with him and imprisoning them in the jail there. Sending them to Lahore would have been the next step.99

In the meantime the Nawab had become so discontented with the new arrangements that he left for Murree in August to offer his resignation to the Lt. Governor. From then on Nabi Khan was able to exert his influence more effectively. In September he brought in twenty-two more camels, promising to bring in seven more, and accusing the Alizais of having the remaining ten. It seemed more and more likely that the Alizais were implicated, so they were subjected to a reverse blockade for the first time since the early 1860s. In October ten Alizais and twenty-one camels were seized by the Tank Thanadar and the men were sent to Dera. In November Nabi Khan brought in the seven camels he had promised, and the Bahlolzai prisoners were released. The blockade began to inconvenience the Alizais, and they persuaded Umar Khan to undertake to bring in the ten remaining camels by the beginning of January, when it was lifted.100 The fact that Umar Khan was involved in these events suggests that recent changes had made him less inclined to co-operate with

98 Ibid.
the government. Indeed it may have been the first time that he joined forces with Ahmed Khan and the other members of the ‘Nawab’s party’.  

It was also after the Nawab had gone to Murree that, as we have seen, early in 1876 the Bhittanis, Ghorezais and Mianis agreed to undertake P.R. During the year he returned to Tank for some months, and Macaulay claimed that he tried to persuade the tribes to renege on their agreement. The most serious problem at this point was a succession of killings along the border. On January 23rd, incited it would appear by Ahmad Khan and the ‘Nawab’s party’, some Nana Khels murdered a shepherd and drove off a flock of several hundred goats belonging to a Powindah kirri, the first robbery accompanied by murder since the Bahlolzais had submitted in April 1874. On April the 1st the Nana Khels killed a man from Garra Sheikh, and later in the month a fakir at Gumal. Members of the ‘Nawab’s party’ themselves murdered a man outside the village of Gumal on the evening of the 2nd August 1876.  

Macaulay’s suspicions of the Nawab seemed to be substantiated when in the summer his ‘chief of spies’, a man called Daulat Khan, was arrested. Daulat made a series of statements which implicated the Nawab in many of the incidents which had recently occurred on the border, in particular the kidnapping in May 1875. Daulat also alleged that he had been sending Rs.20,000 a year, a substantial sum, to various Mahsuds, naming thirty-five men in particular as the beneficiaries, including Umar Khan and his brother Sayad Mahmud, Yarik Khan’s nephew Muhammad Afzal, and Sarfaraz Machi Khel, as well as various Bahlolzais associated with the ‘Nawab’s party’ including Kala, Azmat, and Boyak. Although Macaulay believed most of Daulat’s allegations, Munro did not. But he agreed that the fact that some of it supported Roberts’ and Macaulay’s allegations about the Nawab’s links with Ahmed Khan and his group did place the former’s conduct in a “very suspicious light, to say the least of it”. Davies wrote to the Nawab warning him that intrigue against the local authorities could not be permitted. The Nawab responded by

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101 It was at about this time Munro called for a cavalry regiment to be stationed there, as he said it was “unmilitary in the extreme” for the troops on this section of the border to be separated from their British officers (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 698, 14 Dec. 1875, in A19 Oct. 1876 P859).
103 Eleven Nana Khel hostages had been in prison since April 1875, and following the theft of the sheep another thirty-three were seized and jailed, and this finally induced them to sue for peace in the summer of 1876, when they agreed to pay Rs.1,250 compensation (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 109, 5 April 1876, in A6 June 1876 P859).
105 Daulat also claimed that the Nawab had given him money with instructions to use it either to arrange Nabi Khan’s murder, or to pay the Nana Khels not to make peace with the government (State*t, 28 April 1876, in No. 216, Com. D.D. to G.P., 20 July 1876, in A19 Oct. 1876 P859).
offering to hand over the management of Tank to his son, but this was not accepted for the time being.\textsuperscript{107}

In fact the Nawab did not deny sending money to some of the Mahsuds, but he rejected all the other accusations, claiming that Daulat Khan had been induced to make them by his enemies. It is very hard to get at the truth here. Sending money to supporters in a trans-border tribe was a customary means of maintaining influence over them, and it did not necessarily follow that the Nawab had tried to use them against the government. But he had definitely been upset by the changes that had been made to his position, and there is quite a lot of circumstantial evidence to link him with some at least of the difficulties caused by the ‘Nawab’s party’.\textsuperscript{108} He probably was responsible for some of the difficulties experienced with it.

Macaulay took the opportunity of reporting Daulat’s allegations to propose that, because it would make it easier to deal with the ‘Nawab’s party’, the three Mahsud sections should be dealt with together and not individually. Once they understood that they would be held responsible for the conduct of their fellow-tribesmen, Macaulay thought, the Mahsuds as a whole would combine to sort out the problem themselves.\textsuperscript{109} Munro seconded this, agreeing that the policy followed since 1861 of dealing with them separately had not been very successful.\textsuperscript{110} In fact, as we have seen, even this approach had not been applied consistently, and at times there had been negotiations with sub-sectional representatives.\textsuperscript{111} So, following the line Taylor had taken in the early 1860s, Macaulay and Munro maintained that the Mahsuds had a strong sense of tribal identity, and that sectional responsibility simply allowed the tribesmen to trade with and raid in British territory at the same time.\textsuperscript{112}

Macaulay was given permission to introduce the new policy, which not surprisingly was resented by the Alizais in particular. Opposition to it seems to have become associated with support for the ‘Nawab’s party’, and may have been partly responsible for Umar Khan and some of the other influential Alizais’ growing hostility towards the government in the later 1870s. Another reason for this was the fact that they had not been included in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[108] Quite apart from Daulat’s accusations, there is, for example, the fact that Yarik Khan told Macaulay that he had often advised the Nawab to cut his links with Ahmed Khan and Azmat, but that he had always refused to do so (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 276, 7 May 1878, in A4C July 1878 P1147).
\item[109] Ibid.
\item[110] Mason, Report, p. 20
\end{footnotes}
the hostage arrangements Macaulay had introduced as part of the settlements reached with the Shaman Khels and Bahlolzais. In practice, as we have see, these were an indirect subsidy to the tribe, and the Alizais may well felt that exclusion from them was a poor reward for their relatively peaceful behaviour. It does look as though Macaulay would have been wise to have extended his hostage arrangements to the Alizais at the same time as he introduced 'tribal responsibility'.

In the meantime the 'Nawab's party' remained to be dealt with. In the summer of 1876 special efforts were made to intercept Mahsud marauders, and a watch was kept on all the passes they might use to gain access to the plains.\textsuperscript{113} There was a breakthrough on the night of the 13th September, when, hearing that a gang of Mahsuds was in the neighbourhood, Bhittanis on the Tank border went to look for them and surprised five armed men near Chashm Katch. They tried to resist, but when the Bhittanis shot one of them in the leg, they surrendered. The gang consisted of Said and Gulmah (two cousins of Yarik Khan), two Abd al-Rahman Khel Bahlolzais (relatives of Taj and Mashak), and Paomir Shabi Khel Alizai.\textsuperscript{114} Said and Gulmah's capture in particular certainly suggests, as Macaulay argued, that leading Alizais were involved. In accordance with the new rules, the tribe as a whole was made responsible for paying blood-money for the murders that had been carried out earlier in the year. "For the first time", Macaulay claimed, "the Mahsuds as a tribe began to realise the fact that they would no longer able to plunder and trade in British territory at the same time, without their traders being held responsible for their plunder".\textsuperscript{115}

At the end of 1876 the Nawab went to Lahore to complain about the way the local officials had treated him, and was given permission to stay there.\textsuperscript{116} As soon as news of his retirement reached them, some members of the 'Nawab's party' came down to see Macaulay. They told him that the Nawab's influence had hitherto deterred them from doing

\textsuperscript{112} D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 475, 4 July 1876, in A19 Oct. 1876 P859
\textsuperscript{113} In August 1876 a party of four Mahsuds - two Nana Khel men and one Haibat Khel, led by Imam Shah Shabi Khel, who had been employed as an intermediary by the Nawab in 1876 - was surprised by some Takhti Khel Bakka Khels on the Bannu border. Imam Shah was badly wounded, and the Mahsuds were all captured. There were eleven "cases of heavy crime" on record against Imam Shah, and two against Sherai and Jemadar. The Bannu D.C. thought that they had come down simply for plunder, but there may have been more to it (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No 505, 27 July 1876, in A18 Aug. 1876 P859).
\textsuperscript{114} Paomir was a close relative of Imam Shah, who had been captured the month before (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 658, 17 Sep. 1876, in A5 Oct. 1876 P859).
\textsuperscript{115} From that point on, Macaulay said, serious crime began to decline, and blood-money was recovered from the tribe for each murder and paid to the families of the slain (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 276, 7 May 1878, in A4C July 1878 P1147).
\textsuperscript{116} He alleged for example that the police had brought false charges against members of his family (Bruce, Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59, Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 152, 16 April 1877, in A5 May 1877 P860).
so, but that they would co-operate with him in future. Others, however, remained unreconciled, and in March 1877 they sent Amir Shah (one of the Kaniguram Sayyids) and two Alizais to offer their support to Amir Sher Ali Khan in Kabul, hoping that he might be able to do something for them in return. In June Umar Khan, Yarik Khan and other leading Alizais came down to British territory to discuss the recent imposition of tribal responsibility with Macaulay. Arguing that members of their section had not been to blame for any of the recent difficulties, they tried to persuade him to withdraw this, but without success. Shortly afterwards they went off to Kabul again with some other Maliks. In August four Bhittanis from Jandola followed with the Kaniguram Sayyid, Ahmed Shah, as did another party of Mahsuds in September. The Amir treated them extremely hospitably; the tribesmen were reported to like him because he paid them personal attention and gave them dresses of honour and cash gifts.

On the night of the 12th August 1877 Mashak Abd al-Rahman Khel’s son, Gulzar, and Sirdari, a hill Bhittani who had relations in the village, kidnapped a three year old Hindu boy, sleeping on the roof of his house, from Kot Nasran. Not surprisingly, Macaulay was convinced that, as in the case of the earlier kidnapping in 1875, members of the ‘Nawab’s party’ were responsible. It could be that the child was simply kidnapped in order to realise a ransom, but if so it is curious that a man from a sub-section which had recently caused a number of problems for the government, and whose father had recently been to Kabul, was responsible for it. In fact the kidnappers almost certainly hoped to make a political point as well as some money. In retaliation, on the 26th August 1877 a thousand bullocks and fifty camels (value Rs.15,000), many of them belonging to Alizais, were seized in British territory. Their owners were allowed to return to the hills to bring back the child, and the Mahsuds as a whole were barred from British territory. The boy was taken to Mashak’s cave in Asplitoi, and Mashak demanded a ransom of Rs.3,000.

The blockade was maintained through the autumn, and the Alizai traders, and the supporters of the government in the tribe as a whole, became increasingly angry with...
Mashak. But Nabi Khan was reported to be willing to pay a ransom, so Mashak held on to the boy, and when Umar Khan returned from Kabul, offered him a share if he would help.\textsuperscript{124} Umar Khan therefore came down to British territory again to meet Nabi Khan, who told him that the government had forbidden him to pay a ransom.\textsuperscript{125} As it was clear that no money would be forthcoming, Umar Khan persuaded Mashak to give the child up, and on March 18th 1878 he brought him in to British territory, accompanied by a delegation of Alizais and Shaman Khels. Macaulay had ordered that only thirty members of each section should be allowed into British territory at first, and as they appeared in much larger numbers, the Gumal Thanadar forbade them to cross the border. They begged him at least to accept the boy: “for God’s sake take this curse away from us”, Umar Khan said as he handed him over.\textsuperscript{126}

After a few days they were given permission to enter British territory, and all the leading Maliks submitted with several hundred followers. “The way they accepted the grain allowance given them showed how they appreciated getting sufficient to eat”, Macaulay said.\textsuperscript{127} They were “decidedly more submissive” than he had ever seen them before. He thought that the restoration by Alizais and Shaman Khels of the boy kidnapped by Bahlolzais showed that the tribe had fully accepted the principle of collective responsibility.\textsuperscript{128} Ahmed Khan also quietly submitted at about the same time and died shortly afterwards. Azmat, however, could not settle down, and visited Kabul again.\textsuperscript{129}

\textbf{BHITTANIS AND THE FRONTIER MILITIA ON THE SOUTH WAZIRISTAN BORDER—}

After the Bhittanis had accepted P.R. in 1876, Macaulay was able to complete the reorganisation of the Frontier Militia in the Tank district. As elsewhere along this border, men with no tribal or local connections were discharged or absorbed into the police, so that the garrisons of the posts consisted wholly or partly of men belonging to the tribes

\textsuperscript{124} In the meantime, among others, Jana Khan Boi Khel, Ahmeddeen and Boyak Abdullah and two Band Khel Maliks also went to Kabul in November 1877, they received gifts of clothing (choghas and lungis) and cash and did not return until January 1878 (News. G.A. D.I.K., 18 Nov. 1877, No. 11 in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 48, 21 Dec. 1877, L/P&S/7/16, News. G.A. D.I.K., 3 Jan. 1878, No. 5 in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 17, 8 Feb. 1878, L/P&S/7/17).
\textsuperscript{125} News. G.A. D.I.K., 3 Jan. 1878, No. 5 in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 17, 8 Feb. 1878, L/P&S/7/17
\textsuperscript{127} D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 276, 7 May 1878, in A4C July 1878 P1147
responsible for preventing robberies in the locality. After the reorganisation, men from the Frontier Militia were attached to the regular garrisons of the Draband, Tank Zam, Girni, and Manjhi posts, and formed the sole garrisons of the Bain, Mullazai, Kot Nasran, Tank, Murtaza, Luni and Zarkanni posts, and ultimately the Kot Kirghi one as well. As noted above, a Tank border police was formed in the mid-1870s, and police posts established at Gumal, Tank and Mullazai. This appears to have consisted of sixty-eight men, recruited mostly from residents of British territory, though it included four Bhittanis (two Tattas, one Danna and one Uraspun), and twenty-four Mahsuds.

Once they had accepted P.R., the Bhittanis had moved some of their camps down to the mouths of the passes for which they were responsible. They several times pursued Mahsud marauders into the hills, recovering plundered cattle and restoring them to their owners. As the new arrangements seemed to be working well, in 1877 Bhittanis and a few Katti Khels (the Nawab’s clan) took over the post of Kot Kirghi, and the regular troops were finally withdrawn, as Davies had proposed earlier in the decade. No raiders had used their passes since they had accepted P.R., so Macaulay proposed to reward the Bhittanis by introducing a rather complicated arrangement by means of which a quarter of their land revenue would be treated as an inam fund to be distributed among all the leading men, whether living in British territory or not. The money would be divided among the representative men of the sub-sections, and each section would get an equal share, although the D.C. would retain the right to withhold or transfer the allowances of men who were uncooperative. He suggested this for two reasons. Firstly, he thought it would be fairer because many influential Bhittanis who did not cultivate any land in British territory and would therefore not benefit from a reduction in revenue, had accepted P.R. Secondly, the Bhittanis as a whole still felt that the land some of them cultivated in the plains was their common property, and he thought that the tribe as a whole had a claim to enjoy any remission of revenue on it. However, Munro objected on the grounds that the same sort

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131 For details see Encl. to Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 185, 10 May 1877, in A26 May 1877 P860.
132 D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 50, 22 Jan. 1876, in A3 May, 1876 P859, G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 2, 3 Jan. 1881, A1 Jan. 1881 P1624. There were five Shaman Khel sowars and four footmen, three Bahlolzai sowars and nine foot, one Alizai sowar, and two sowars nominated by the Kaniguram Sayyid Subhan Shah (it is interesting that there was only one Alizai). Though this police was still in an experimental state, it was working well, and had already reduced Mahsud crime considerably, Macaulay claimed (Statement of Border Police in D.I.K. district, in A26 May 1877 P860).
135 The Settlement Officer, Septimus Thorburn, agreed that the political effect would be greater if the whole tribe benefited from the revenue reduction. But he thought that what Macaulay was proposing was “a cash grant for frontier service entirely disassociated from payment of land revenue and rights in land” (Set. O.
of arrangement had not worked well in the Kohat District when he had been D.C. there in the early 1860s. So Robert Egerton, who had succeeded Davies as Lt. Governor in 1877, decided that the revenue paid by the Bhittanis in British territory should simply be reduced to a quarter and that no payments should be made to the hill-Bhittanis, a decision which does seem to have rankled with them.

Nevertheless Macaulay made a short journey across the border into the Bhittani hills in autumn 1877. After briefly visiting their settlements opposite Mullazai and Kot Nasran to the north, he returned to Tank, and on November 28th, accompanied by the Tatta and Uraspun Maliks, he visited Jandola, where they showed him the arrangements they had made to prevent Mahsud marauders from using their passes to cross into British territory. On the 30th November he continued his trans-border visits by going up the Urman Pass to the Zilla Khel settlements and returning by the Gumal pass to Manjhi.

THE SETTLEMENT SCHEME AND THE GUMAL PASS -

By the summer of 1878 Egerton and Munro were very pleased with the state of Tank and relations with the Mahsuds, the former commenting that direct communication with the district officer was gradually removing one of the main sources of misunderstanding and mistrust between the government and the tribe. The security of the border had undoubtedly improved; in 1877 there was only one case of ‘dacoity’ and in

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D.I.K. to Set. Com. Multan & D.D., No. X, 10 Dec. 1877, in A9 June 1878 P1147, D.C. D.D. to Com. D.D., No. 147P, 15 March 1878, in A5 March 1879 P1298). 136 “Heart-burnings, ill-feelings and suspicion” often resulted, he said, because “the so-called secret service money was in reality no secret, as the uncouth recipients but too often made a boast of their victory over their neighbours, to the discontent rather than satisfaction of hot-headed and irritable tribes”. Moreover, he thought that the D.C.’s position in “doling out these sums secretly seemed to be the reverse of dignified” (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 211, 6 July 1878, in A5 March 1879 P1298).
137 G.P. to F. Com. P., No. 586, 6 March 1879, in A5 March 1879 P1298. Egerton was a distinguished civil servant, who had been Punjab Financial Commissioner in 1871, and a member of the Governor General’s council from 1871 to 1874 (Buckland, Dictionary).
139 On the 1st December he left Manjhi and with Tucker, the Settlement Officer, and escorted by a body of Spin Nasir Powindahs under their leader Tor Khan, rode into the hills via the Sherwana Pass (to the south of the Gumal river), and camped at Mijhin in independent territory. Next day they rode to the Zao pass, which was about 20 miles from British territory, and formed part of a route into the Zhob valley, returning the next day to Zarkanni in British territory via the Sheikh Khizar pass to the south (ibid.).
140 G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 261C, 9 July, in A4C July 1878 P1147. In April 1878 Macaulay proposed that an inam of Rs.500 p.a. for life should be granted to Azem Khan Kundi, as well as one of Rs.50 for the Tatta Malik Bangi Khan, whom he described as the most influential Bhittani in the Tank valley. The Settlement Commissioner thought that the inam of Rs.500 should be given Azem Khan on this occasion only, and reduced to Rs.250 in subsequent years (State’t in Set. Com. Multan & D.D. to Set. Com. G.P., No. 87, 20 April 1878, in A3 Sep. 1878 P1147).
In the meantime, early in 1877 Macaulay had written to Munro arguing that it would be worth thinking again about the pacification of the Gumal route, though he commented that it would be more difficult than two years ago because the Amir of Kabul had been building up his influence among the Mahsuds, and a number of them had been to see him in Kabul. “Their Maliks come to me not infrequently dressed in robes presented to them at that court”, he complained. As before, he suggested that caravans using the Gumal route should pay tolls. Some of the money raised should be paid to the Mahsuds and Zilla Khels, who should be told that offences committed along the road would be treated as if they had taken place in British territory. In due course, he thought, Mahsud hamlets would spring up on the large tracts of cultivable land in and near the Gumal Pass, the residents of which would be responsible for its security. Munro still would not endorse this proposal, commenting that nothing had happened since 1875 to make him change his mind. However, the Lt. Governor liked the idea in principle. But treating the route as though it were British territory would lead to serious complications, he thought; in his view persuading the tribes to take action themselves would be more effective than direct government intervention, and he instructed Macaulay to find out whether they would really be willing to agree to co-operate in doing so.

At about the same time Macaulay had also suggested that Graham’s settlement scheme might be revived, and the “needy and destitute of the Mahsuds” drawn down to

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141 Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 153, 13 May 1878, in A4C July 1878 P1147
142 The Mahsud-Waziri Expedition, p. 84
146 “The sections of the tribe who live adjacent to the pass, and on whom will fall the chief portion of the task, will have to be dealt with tribally”, he commented (ibid.).
cultivate in British territory.\textsuperscript{148} Davies had approved of the idea, and the G.O.I. sanctioned the expenditure of Rs.2,000 p.a. on the purchase of land for the next five years.\textsuperscript{149} In return for the right to cultivate it, the Mahsuds were to be responsible for the security of that part of the Gumal route which passed by their hills.\textsuperscript{150} Macaulay and Amir Sher Ali Khan now began to compete directly for influence over the Mahsuds, to whom the Amir wrote two letters in June. One was addressed to Umar Khan and some of the other Alizais, as well as some Shaman Khel Maliks, the other to the Bahlolzais, including Boyak, Azmat, Mashak, and Bhatti and Laisar Haibat Khel. Both requested the addressees to come to Kabul to receive their allowances.\textsuperscript{151} In fact the Amir encouraged representatives of all the tribes in south Waziristan to visit him. Among those who responded were various Bhittani Maliks, including Pir Khan and Wazir (Aba Khel Tattas), from Jandola, two Zilla Khel headmen, and some Kharoti Maliks.\textsuperscript{152}

In the meantime the G.O.I.'s relations with Kabul began to deteriorate seriously, and in September 1878 Sher Ali Khan refused to allow the mission which Lytton despatched under Chamberlain to cross the border.\textsuperscript{153} In the same month the G.O.I. issued urgent instructions to frontier officials to detach independent tribes whom it was desired to bring under British influence from all connections with the Amir. In October Macaulay and Munro submitted plans for the settlement scheme and Gumal Pass pacification plan, and Macaulay went to Tank to put them into operation.\textsuperscript{154} While this was happening, Umar Khan went to Kabul, this time accompanied by Mashak, Azmat, and some others.\textsuperscript{155}

As we have seen, Macaulay's plan was to settle as many of the leading Mahsuds with their families as possible on land purchased in the Tank Valley. In return for this, they (with the Zilla Khels) would be responsible for the security of the Gumal pass, and provide fifty horse and one hundred foot for the purpose.\textsuperscript{156} The money to pay these levies

\textsuperscript{149} G.P. to Com. D.D. No. 470, 9 March 1877, in A21 March 1877 P860
\textsuperscript{150} G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 954P, 5 May 1877, in A17 May 1877 P860
\textsuperscript{151} News. G.A. D.I.K., 21 June 1878, No. 3 in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 47, 22 July 1878, L/P&S/7/18
\textsuperscript{153} See, for example, Singhal, India and Afghanistan, pp. 36-39
\textsuperscript{154} Howell, Mizh., p. 5, see also Bruce, Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59.
\textsuperscript{155} Reportedly Umar Khan, Azmat and the others send word to their fellow tribesmen that the Amir was treating them very kindly, and had offered to fix allowances for all the Maliks if they went to Kabul (News. G.A. D.I.K., 16 Nov. 1878, No. 8 in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 137, 28 Nov. 1878, L/P&S/7/20).
Johnstone reported, probably with some exaggeration, that as many as a hundred of them had gone (D.C. Ban to Com. D.D., No. 479, 18 Aug. 1877, No. 208 Sep. 1877 IP P1037).
was to be raised by imposing tolls on the Powindahs' caravans. An inam of Rs.10 per month was to be paid to each of the ten leading Maliks in the three main branches of the Mahsud tribe. This appears to have been the first time that the payment of allowances to the Mahsuds was suggested, other than in connection with the maintenance of hostages, or service payments.\textsuperscript{157}

The records are not sufficiently comprehensive for a really full description and analysis of the scheme, so it is not clear exactly how Macaulay decided who should participate in it, and we cannot be certain how he thought it would affect Mahsud political organisation. However, it is possible to give some details of it, and to hazard a guess at what he had in mind. The first point to make is that the scheme was on a much grander scale than the one Graham had initiated thirteen years ago. As we saw in the last chapter, that had only involved the settlement of some twenty-five families, but nearly two hundred Mahsud families undertook to join Macaulay's scheme (one hundred and ninety-one in all - seventy-four Bahlolzais, sixty-two Alizais and fifty-five Shaman Khels).\textsuperscript{158} The second important feature was that the different sections and sub-sections were not all equally represented. There were fewer Alizais and Shaman Khels than Bahlolzais, and of the Alizai settlers more than a third (twenty-four) were Shabi Khels, though they comprised less than a third of the section's population.\textsuperscript{159} As regards the Shaman Khel settlers, more were from the smaller Khali Khel and Badinzai sections than the larger Chahar Khel and Galishahi ones. Similarly in the Bahlolzai case there were more settlers from the Shingi section than the larger Aimal Khel and Nana Khel ones, twenty-seven in all (eleven more than the Aimal Khels and nine more than the Nana Khels). There were also more Shingis than Abdullais, although the latter was one of the largest Bahlolzai sections (making up about one sixth of the total Bahlolzai population).\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{157} Howell, Mizh. pp. 4-5
\textsuperscript{158} State't of men present at Tank with families December 1878 for settlement (in App. Feb. 1879 P1298). The figures in the appendix to the final report are slightly but not significantly different (in App. F.R./App.-B.1 Feb. 1882 P1825).
\textsuperscript{159} Using the population figures in Mason, Report, p. 15, and State't in App. Feb. 1879 P1298. Another statement records that Nabi Khan with twenty followers, and Fatteh and Awalli Shah (also Mamia Khel Shingis), were present, as well as five other Bahlolzais including Bhatti Haibat Khel (who had been involved in the Bain Pass raid), Taj, Khaisar, Abizar and Murad Abd al-Rahman Khel with two followers. If Nabi and his followers and the other Shingis were going to take part in the scheme and we add them to the list, the total of Bahlolzais rises to 102, in which case there would have been nearly twice as many Bahlolzais as Shaman Khels, which would have amounted to quite a dramatic deviation from tribal \textit{nikkat} (List of Mahsuds who had come down to Tank on 27-28 Dec., and List of other Maliks present in British territory at time of Mahsud raid on 1 Jan. 1879, in App. Feb. 1879 P1298).
\textsuperscript{160} State't in App. Feb. 1879 P1298, State't of Darogha, 10 Jan. 1879, in App. Feb. 1879 P1298, Mason, Report, p. 16
This appears to have been intentional. It looks as though Macaulay tried to avoid the problems adherence to tribal *nikkat* had created for Graham, and deliberately allocated a larger share of land and service to those Mahsuds living nearer British territory. These were on the whole the ones who had given most trouble over the years; as well as Shingis, they included Shabi Khel Alizais.\(^\text{161}\) Nevertheless, Macaulay claimed that ‘the houses’ of most of the leading Bahlolzais, Shaman Khel and Alizai Maliks joined the scheme. It is true that the leading Alizai, Yarik Khan, who had recently detached himself from the ‘Nawab’s party’, sent his nephew Badruddin to take part on his behalf, and that a few other former members, such as Taj, also participated in it.\(^\text{162}\) But the majority, including Azmat and Kala, did not, even though it appears that efforts were made to persuade them to do so.\(^\text{163}\) Nor did Umar Khan, although he was invited to take part as well. As a result the distribution of land and service reflected factional stresses as well as place of residence.\(^\text{164}\)

Nevertheless, whatever the latent tensions, by late November 1878 a large number of Mahsuds had gathered at Tank, “animated by a lively sense of favours to come.”\(^\text{165}\) Land had been purchased and houses were being built for them, and Macaulay spent three weeks there completing arrangements for the service allowances and the division of land. The Mahsuds carried letters for him, and an escort consisting of Mahsuds and Zilla Khels, as well as a Tazi Khel Darwesh Khel Malik, accompanied him on a three-day trip he undertook at the end of November through the Gumal Pass to decide where their posts should be located.\(^\text{166}\)

As we saw above, ever since the agreements had been made with the Shaman Khels and Bahlolzais in 1873 and 1874, the government had kept a number of men from each branch as hostages in Dera Ismail Khan. Early in 1878, as he had done in previous years, Macaulay recommended that they should be retained for another year, as “their residence in British territory is one of the means through which control over the whole tribe is...
exercised”, and this was sanctioned as usual. However, in this letter he pointed out that if the settlement and Gumal Pass pacification schemes proved successful there would be no further need for hostages. In the autumn of 1878, apparently without consulting his superiors, he had the hostages brought up from Dera Ismail Khan; they were allowed to come and go freely, visiting the hills if they wished. There was no point in keeping them, Macaulay said, because so many leading Mahsuds were now living with their families in British territory. The fact that the government had recently sanctioned “the absorption of the pay of the hostages into the allowances granted the tribe for undertaking the responsibility of the Gumal Pass” implied, he asserted, that he was to dismiss them. When the news reached Lahore, this caused some alarm, Egerton commenting that no such sanction had been granted. But, sanguine as ever, Macaulay was convinced that there was nothing to worry about. He went back to Dera early in December, leaving Azem Khan Kundi and Nabi Khan in charge at Tank, and to all appearances up to the middle of or even late December everything continued to go according to plan.

SUMMARY -

Both Bahlolzai and Shaman Khel Mahsuds remained barred from British territory in the early 1870s. In spite of the British decision to construct advanced posts on the Tank border in the late 1860s, their raiding continued to disturb the border villages. Growing dissatisfaction with the Nawab’s administration of Tank and his conduct of relations with the Mahsuds led to Charles Macaulay, who had taken over as D.C. in 1871, increasingly assuming responsibility for this. The Shaman Khels wanted access to British territory, and in 1873 they reached an agreement with him. They gave twenty hostages, who were to be paid an allowance and live at Dera Ismail Khan, and be subject to imprisonment should their fellow-tribesmen in the hills give trouble. The Bahlolzais had also been blockaded in the hills for some years, and the fact that some of them were seized in Tank in 1873 and 1874, finally induced them to negotiate an agreement with Macaulay too. As in 1861 Nabi Khan demonstrated its ineffectiveness by arranging a raid, and a fresh agreement had to be negotiated later in the year, according to which the Bahlolzais were to supply thirty-three hostages. After the raid the Bhittanis were made responsible for the passes which led into their territory from the Bannu district, and in 1876 it was agreed that they would be

responsible for the passes to the south along their part of the Dera Ismail Khan border (which the Mahsuds used to gain access to British territory).

Negotiations with the Bahlolzais brought Nabi Khan and Azem Khan Kundi, a wealthy landowner, to Macaulay’s notice, and he began to use them in negotiations with the Mahsuds. Ever since annexation the Nawab and his supporters among the Mahsuds and Bhittanis had been in the dominant position, and the removal of his political powers was a serious defeat for both. After 1874 a small group of Mahsuds, referred to as the ‘Nawab’s party’, carried out a series of raids, murders and kidnappings in an attempt to discredit the new arrangements and persuade the government to restore the Nawab’s responsibility for tribal relations. How far the Nawab himself was involved is difficult to establish, but there is some evidence to suggest that he was.

Things became more complicated when in 1875 Macaulay raised with the Mahsuds and Zilla Khels the question of whether they might police the Gumal Pass in return for allowances. This seems to have encouraged some of them to appeal to Amir Sher Ali Khan for help. At the same time, because Macaulay’s hostage arrangements were in practice a way of paying the Bahlolzais and Shaman Khels an indirect subsidy, it would appear that many of the Alizais resented their exclusion from it. Their dissatisfaction increased when in 1876 Macaulay imposed full ‘tribal responsibility’, as this meant they would suffer for problems caused by Bahlolzais and Shaman Khels. It encouraged some of their leading men, among them Umar Khan, to make common cause with Nabi Khan’s opponents among the Bahlolzais. Macaulay achieved some striking successes in his efforts to control this anti-government alliance, but the nucleus of the ‘Nawab’s party’ remained in existence. Nevertheless, towards the end of the decade, the number of Mahsud raids dropped practically to zero. With a view to pacifying the tribe permanently, Macaulay prepared a scheme for settling nearly two hundred Mahsud families on land in the Tank district, linked with a plan for the pacification of the Gumal route to Ghazni. But the political position among the Mahsuds remained unstable, and important members of the tribe did not take part in the scheme. Umar Khan, Yarik Khan, Boyak and Mashak among others visited Kabul in the later 1870s.
THE 1879 TANK RAID -

As we saw at the end of the previous chapter, late in 1878 Macaulay’s scheme for settling as many as two hundred Mahsud families in British territory and improving the security of the Gumal Pass seemed to be progressing well. However, the influential Alizai Malik Umar Khan, who had gone to Kabul in October, returned to Waziristan early in December, and sent out a call for a jirga to meet at Kaniguram. When this had assembled on the 21st December, Umar Khan announced that Amir Sher Ali Khan and the Mullah Adakar of Khost had deputed him to raise a holy war against the British, and called on the Mahsuds to support him. The Mullah Adakar was one of the religious leaders who, like the Mullah Mushik-i-Alam, helped to stimulate opposition to the British invasion during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Little is known about him, but he lived at Kadawar in Khost, and he may well have been the Mullah Najibullah who had previously been given a jagir in Khost by Dost Muhammad Khan (see Chapter Five). Described as a ‘disciple’ of the Akhund of Swat, but “not such a respectable character”, the Mullah Adakar was reported to exercise considerable influence over all the Wazirs from Kurram to Makin. He visited the Amir in Kabul in 1877 and 1878, and was an inspirational figure: when he preached jihad to the Afghan soldiers at Ali Masjid in November 1878, the men reportedly wept with excitement.

At this stage most of Umar Khan’s support came from former members of the ‘Nawab’s party’, in particular Azmat, Ahmed Khan’s brother Kala, Kajir, Fatteh Roz, Boyak and Mashak. Yarik Khan Langar Khel had recently dissociated himself from it, but his nephew Badruddin (who had taken part in the settlement scheme), persuaded him to take part, and they were joined by another influential Langar Khel Alizai, named Matin.

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3 G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 2, 3 Jan. 1881, A1 Jan. 1881 P1624, Com. Pesh.D. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 2373, 11 May 1880, No. 505 April 1881 IP P1741. The Akhund of Swat was one of the most influential religious leaders along the whole frontier during the third quarter of the nineteenth century; before he died in 1877 he had become the virtual ruler of Swat (as well as being the subject of a poem by Edward Lear) (see, for example, Ahmed, Millennium and Charisma, pp. 93-99).
The jirga broke up on the 25th December, Umar Khan and his supporters agreeing to assemble two days later.6

On Christmas Eve a report of the meeting reached Azem Khan Kundi, who passed it on to Macaulay, the message reaching him at Dera on Christmas Day. Macaulay's reaction was that it was unlikely that anything could really go wrong, but because he thought Umar Khan was an "ill-disposed, fanatical" man, he did call on the military to treble the strength of all the posts on the Tank border. By the 28th December there were two hundred and ten rifles and one hundred and fifty sabres in the Manjhi, Girni and Zam posts (nearly half the available troops in the district). Three hundred local levies were placed at Kot Nasran, which was regarded as the weakest point, and the Bhittanis sent parties of one hundred and fifty men to the Kot Kirghi and to the Shuza outposts. All the villages were put on the alert. However, although according to standing orders he should have informed Munro of the situation, Macaulay did not do so.

Meanwhile Umar Khan went to Nana Khel Kot in the Khaisara Valley to assemble his lashkar. Here he was joined by Shabi Khel and Machi Khel Alizais living nearby, and men from his sub-section, the Salimi Khel, as well as by some Nekzan Khel Nana Khels, Abdullais and Shingis, and a Mullah from Nana Khel Kot named Abbas, who was in touch with the Mullah Adakar. Mullah Abbas accompanied the lashkar, and helped to inspire the Mahsuds by preaching jihad.7 Umar Khan went on to Shingi Kot, and reached Jandola on the 29th December, where the Mahsuds assembled on the 30th and 31st.8 In the end the force seems to have amounted to about two thousand men. Although the Alizais were in the majority, there were several hundred Nana Khel, Aimal Khel and Shingi Bahlolzais, mostly from the Khaisara valley, and a smaller number of Shaman Khels.9

Macaulay was still confident that nothing very serious was likely to happen. On the 28th December some of the leading men from the north-east of Mahsud territory, including Imam Shah Shabi Khel, came in to Tank to take part in the settlement scheme, and Mahsud trading caravans continued to pass down the Zam.10 In fact, almost until the last moment

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6 Boyak, however, was recalled by his fellow-clansmen before he crossed the border, Macaulay said, because they remembered how much damage the troops had done in 1860, and did not want to give the government any excuse to attack them again (D.C. D.I.K. to G.P., No. 99P, 18 Sep. 1881, in App./F.R. Feb. 1882 P1825).


8 Ibid.


Macaulay continued to be in touch with trans-border tribesmen, who continued to assure him that Umar Khan’s attempt to stir up the tribe had failed. However, in Tank itself the atmosphere was becoming very tense. The Mahsuds in the town were carrying arms, although they were not supposed to do so in British territory, and telling the Hindu shopkeepers that they would soon be sorry if they overcharged them. On the 30th December the lashkar moved down to the border. On the 31st Azem Khan Kundi and Malik Shahbaz, the Deputy-Inspector of Police, went to the Kot Kirghi post with some of the former Mahsud hostages. They spoke to Umar Khan and Yarik Khan and tried to persuade them to withdraw, but failed. So they went back to the Zam post, and tried to get the men to move out against the Mahsuds, but the officers refused. In the meantime the inhabitants of Tank took refuge in the massive fort, and the Mahsuds in Tank helped them to store property worth Rs.200,000 there.

On New Year’s Day 1879 the Mahsuds passed the Kot Kirghi post without meeting any resistance from its Bhittani garrison, and appeared outside the Zam post. However, although the troops were outnumbered they were much better-armed than the Mahsuds, most of whom had only flintlocks and swords: besides, to reach Tank the Mahsuds would have to cross open ground where a cavalry charge would have been, as it had in 1860, most destructive. During the morning the Zam post was reinforced by the cavalry from the Girni post, further increasing the odds in the troops’ favour. Thirty infantry and ninety cavalry did make a sortie and kill four Mahsuds, and the lashkar began to retreat. But instead of allowing the troops to follow up this advantage, the Subahdar ordered them to withdraw into the post. Here they remained, enabling the Mahsuds to cross the plain unopposed, and reach Tank in the early evening, the Mahsuds in the town opening the gates to them. They burned the bazaar, and Yarik Khan’s nephew, Badruddin, tried to persuade the men in the fort to surrender the Hindus and Jats and their property. Some
Mahsuds tried to get in by the south towers, but were driven back. After about three hours the lashkar withdrew, and the Mahsuds who had collected in Tank to take part in the settlement scheme and their families went with it. It was hardly surprising, Macaulay later pointed out, that they should have done so, because they had been compromised by the raid.

Although some of the Mahsuds went back to their homes after the raid, others, including Umar Khan, remained near the border and continued to harass it. In fact the lack of spirit exhibited by the outposts demoralised the inhabitants of the district generally. The plunder and burning of Tank triggered an outbreak of lawlessness which spread throughout the district, and for more than a week the government’s authority more or less collapsed. As soon as they saw that Umar Khan had been successful, many of the tribesmen, in Macaulay’s words, “madly (as they admit now) believed that there was no ‘Sarkar’ and that ‘Islam’ was in the ascendancy”. Almost before the Mahsuds reached Tank, the people in the nearby villages abandoned their houses, so there were plenty of opportunities for looting. Many people appear to have been possessed by the belief that the British grip on the frontier was about to be released, and proclaiming that British rule was at an end, the Kharoti and Sulaiman Khel Powindahs, joined by some Ghorezai, Miani and Bhittani tribesmen who were actually British subjects, attacked a number of villages around Tank. Eleven were plundered, houses in at least seven were burned, and two were totally destroyed.

During the afternoon of New Year’s Day 1879, the first reports of the Mahsud gathering at Jandola reached Macaulay. He requested the Officer Commanding Outposts, Lt.-Colonel F.M. Boisragon (1st E.R.), to move to Tank at once with the remaining troops (about one hundred cavalry and one hundred and eighty rifles), and telegraphed the Commissioner to have any available troops sent from Bannu. Then he set out there himself, arriving with the cavalry on the morning of the 2nd January. Because disorder was spreading he pushed on towards the outposts, and about four miles beyond the town came across a Sulaiman Khel kirri which, after plundering some of the villages, was moving off to the hills. The leading men were taken prisoner, and their property seized, and the kirri was ordered back away from the border. On the same day the cavalry from

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16 State’t of Darogha, 10 Jan. 1879, in App. Feb. 1879 P1298
19 State’t of St. G. Tucker on Burning of Villages in Tank, 13 Jan. 1879, No. 410 April 1881 IP P1741
20 State’t of Extra A.C., 10 Jan. 1879, No. 398 April 1879 IP P1741
the Zam post were summoned to Tank. On the way there they encountered a party of marauding Kharotis and killed ten men, taking six prisoners.\textsuperscript{22}

Macaulay returned to Tank, but disorder continued. In particular, joined by some Mianis, several hundred Zilla Khels besieged the Jatta post, the men at the nearby Girni post making no attempt to stop them. There were only nineteen men in the Jatta post, all but two of them Muslims. The Maulavi of the neighbouring village had issued a fatwah to the effect that British rule was at an end and that “the reign of Islam” had commenced. Convinced that this had rendered their bullets harmless, the men in the Jatta post were persuaded to surrender on the 4th January.\textsuperscript{23} The Zilla Khels burned the building and went on to the Gumal bazaar, and, with some Ghorezais and Nasirs, they plundered the shops, almost all of which which were owned by Hindus. The officer in command of the nearby Manjhi post made no attempt to interfere with them.\textsuperscript{24}

Indeed British authority was really beginning to crumble, so on the 5th January Macaulay set out for Jatta with a detachment of cavalry and infantry. On the way his party attacked a Sulaiman Khel Powindah kirri which had been plundering British villages, and as many as seventy men were killed or wounded. When he reached Manjhi he had the officer in charge put under arrest for not having made any effort to stop the plundering. His arrival emboldened the men at the Girni outpost to seize forty Zilla Khels on their way to join the plundering parties.\textsuperscript{25} This vigorous response was largely successful in restoring order, dampening the enthusiasm for plunder, and quelling the panic which was spreading in British territory. On the 8th January Munro went to Tank to look into the causes of the raid.\textsuperscript{26} However, the Bhittanis and Mahsuds continued to harass the border. It took some weeks for things to settle down completely; on January the 17th for example Bhittanis from kirris in the plains tried to plunder the village of Tittor and killed one of the inhabitants.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{22} Mason, Report, p. 58
\textsuperscript{27} D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., Memo on Bhittanis, in No. 12a March 1879 P1298. On the same day Mahsuds and Bhittanis living in the hills collected at Jandola, and moved rapidly down towards British territory by the Shuza pass, and on the night of the 18th sent out three strong marauding parties. Two were driven off; the third succeeded in plundering the village of Tajori, but in the morning encountered a detachment of troops, and had to abandon its booty and retreat into the hills. On the 19th January Mahsuds attacked the Sheikhs of Michin Khel, near the mouth of the Chinai pass to the north of the Tank Zam, seizing property worth Rs.900. On the night of the 20th February about two hundred Mahsuds and Bhittanis tried to carry off a flock of sheep from a Powindah kirri near Mullazai, but were pursued into the Larzan Pass by troops and seven of them were killed (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 38, 21 Jan. 1879, in App.
ASSESSMENT OF THE 1879 DISTURBANCES

The Tank raid had a number of quite complex causes. In the first place, Umar Khan’s role in raising the lashkar was obviously a pivotal one. He may have wanted to take revenge for the fact that his father, Jangi Khan, had been killed by government forces during the 1860 raid. It also appears that he was sympathetic to the Afghan Amir Sher Ali Khan because his rival Nabi Khan was linked with the latter’s enemy, Abd al-Rahman Khan; as we have seen Umar Khan had several times visited Kabul in the later 1870s.28 Probably most important, however, was the resentment he felt because of the way that, as we saw in the previous chapter, Macaulay had replaced him with Nabi Khan as his main channel of communication with the Mahsuds.29

But Umar Khan was not the only Mahsud who was dissatisfied with the way things had developed in the later 1870s, and to understand the Tank raid, we also need to take into account the fact that a number of other Mahsuds continued to be hostile towards Nabi Khan and Macaulay. Howell commented that the attack on Tank was really a move in Mahsud party politics directed against Nabi Khan’s faction and position, and to some extent he was right.30 As we saw in the previous chapter, the ‘Nawab’s party’ had emerged in the mid-1870s in opposition to the one led by Nabi Khan, and seems to have been responsible for many of the difficulties faced by Macaulay. Indeed, as we saw in the previous chapter, Umar Khan himself seems to have been sufficiently upset by the changes to Tank administration introduced in the mid-1870s to have allowed himself to be drawn into this factional struggle.31 Although Macaulay persuaded one or two of its members, Taj for example, to take part in the settlement scheme, most of them remained unreconciled. They were, as we saw above, among the first to join Umar Khan in December. So it was partly in order to show Macaulay that they had influence within the tribe and should not be

29 Bruce thought it would have been impossible to have done Umar Khan “greater injury or to have degraded him more in the eyes of his clansmen, equals and rivals than by thus supplanting him in his hereditary and acknowledged position by allowing Nabi Khan to exercise interference and control in the general affairs of the tribe quite contrary to their usage”, and this was why he was willing to support the Amir (Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59). See also State’t of Darogha, 10 Jan. 1879, in App. Feb. 1879 P1298.
ignored, that Umar Khan and the remaining members of the ‘Nawab’s party’ resorted to the traditional means of making a political point along the border.\textsuperscript{32}

Thirdly, hostility towards the government made the Alizais as a whole more willing to support Umar Khan. The 1879 raid, as well as the earlier attempt to attack Tank by two thousand tribesmen in 1860, were, it should be emphasised, disturbances of a different order of magnitude from the small-scale robbery, murder and kidnapping which went on along the border almost throughout the whole period. Whereas this smaller-scale raiding was mostly carried out by Bahlolzais, the majority of those who joined the large lashkars were Alizais. As we saw in the last chapter, in the late 1870s they had several causes for dissatisfaction. In particular, when the Nawab ceased to be responsible for relations with the Mahsuds, they lost the advantage the fact that his mother was a Langar Khel and that Yarik Khan was his brother-in-law, had given them.\textsuperscript{33} They were also upset by the way Macaulay was able to substitute tribal for sectional responsibility in 1876, because it meant that in 1877 they were subject to \textit{baramta} and blockaded for the first time since 1861. Moreover, they had no hostages in British territory, and so had not been receiving the indirect subsidy the other sections were getting; they were being penalised because they usually gave relatively little trouble. Nor, although they appear to have been the larger section, were as many Alizais as Bahlolzais involved in Macaulay’s settlement scheme. So it appears that a majority of the Alizais, not just Umar Khan, Yarik Khan and a few other influential men, resented the fact that they were not enjoying an equal share of the benefits Macaulay was distributing.\textsuperscript{34}

At the same time, the importance of sectional rivalry in generating the raid should not be exaggerated. By no means all the Alizais supported Umar Khan; eight men from the Palli Khel sub-section, to which Umar Khan belonged, took part in the settlement scheme, while, as we have seen, some leading Shabi Khels, including Imam Shah, had come down to take part in it just before the raid. The Bahlolzais were similarly divided; some were leading members of the ‘Nawab’s party’ which supported Umar Khan, but others had agreed to take part in the settlement scheme. To take another example, though Boyak initially joined the lashkar, another Abdullai from the same sub-section (Khammi Khel Lalia Khel), Paio Shah, had come down to Tank only a few days earlier, and had no connection with it at all.\textsuperscript{35}

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\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{34} Howell, \textit{Mizh.}, pp. 5-6, Mason, \textit{Report}, p. 59, Bruce, Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/159

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Fourthly, the state of relations between the G.O.I. and the Kabul government was critical. As we have seen, the deterioration in his relationship with the G.O.I. had encouraged Amir Sher Ali Khan to invite Mahsud, Bhittani, Zilla Khel and Kharoti representatives to Kabul on various occasions in the late 1870s. Had the G.O.I. not been at war with Afghanistan, it seems unlikely that Umar Khan and his allies would have been able to persuade so many Mahsuds to take part in the raid at a time when the tribe’s relations with the G.O.I. were as good as if not better than they had ever been. Munro and Macaulay thought that the Amir’s support for the raid was the most important factor, and they were probably correct. To some extent therefore, Umar Khan’s raid was an extension of the campaigns of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, one of Sher Ali Khan’s only military successes. But the raid also seems to have reflected a fear among some Mahsuds at least that Macaulay’s various schemes were a stalking horse for the extension of British influence over them. The Lt. Governor thought the Mahsuds were keen to see the Gumal pass plan put into operation, “in the hope of benefiting from increased allowances and larger traffic”. But Munro argued that the Mahsuds generally were anxious “to retain their ancient independence”, and hence were motivated by “feelings of intense hatred of us and of our government”. In fact the tribesmen were always suspicious of anything which seemed likely to undermine their independence, and even Macaulay’s supporters may have had reservations about the plan to open the Gumal Pass. Among the motives for the 1879 raid therefore would appear to have been the wish to register a protest against growing British interference.

Nor should the role of religious loyalties should be neglected. British officials differed amongst themselves as to the extent to which religious enthusiasm was directly responsible for the raid. Like Munro and Macaulay, Egerton blamed intrigue by the Kabul government, but was inclined to lay more emphasis than them on the role of “a spirit of religious fanaticism, excited by agents specially deputed from Kabul for that purpose”. Only this, he thought, could explain why the Mahsuds and hill Bhittanis, who had behaved

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38 G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 661, 15 March 1879, in A12a March 1879 P1298. In the same letter the Lt. Governor referred to “the fanatical spirit of a savage population; easily worked upon by designing priests or intriguers”. Munro did admit that “the excitement caused by itinerating Muhammadan preachers” had also been a factor (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 31A, 18th Jan. 1879, in App. Feb. 1879, P1298).
so well during the past three years, had so quickly changed their tune. \(^{40}\) In fact, as we have seen, the Mahsuds had something of a tradition of descending on the plains on plundering expeditions, both large and small, and it is possible to account quite convincingly for the raid and the subsequent disturbances in economic and political terms. But this may be to neglect an important dimension of it. It may well be that religious loyalties did help to persuade some at least of the Mahsuds to join Umar Khan. As we have seen, Mullah Abbas accompanied Umar Khan and preached jihad, and his appeals may well have helped to sway the Bahlolzais who lived in the west of the Mahsud homeland, such as the Nekzan Khel Nana Khels, and who, unlike the Alizais, had no particular grievances against Macaulay or the government. \(^{41}\) In any case, if the Mahsuds were serving God and Mammon this is not really so unusual.

Another interesting question is why Bhittanis, Sulaiman Khel and Kharoti Powindahs, Mianis and Ghorezais took part in the raiding and plundering that followed. The Bhittanis may well have had their own particular reasons for doing so. In the first place, as we saw in the previous chapter, some of the hill Bhittanis resented the fact that government had not compensated them for their loss of rights in the plains land; like Umar Khan himself, they may have hoped that by taking part in the raid they might force some concessions out of it. \(^{42}\) They may also have wanted to continue benefiting from the fact that they too were located on a frontier, the one between the Mahsuds and British India. Macaulay thought that they were anxious that if the Mahsuds did settle down peacefully, they would lose their border service and other privileges. It may well be that they calculated that, if they allowed Umar Khan and his lashkar to proceed down the Zam without challenge, the troops in the outposts would stop them getting any further, but the Mahsud settlement arrangements would be disrupted. \(^{43}\)

As for the Powindahs, some of their headmen had also gone to Kabul in 1878, and Macaulay argued that they had carried out their plundering and looting at the behest of the Amir. \(^{44}\) Possibly this played some part. During the previous autumn, it is also worth noting, the local officials had requisitioned their camels for the army commissariat in a heavy-handed way, which may have upset some of them. However, as Macaulay pointed out, no camels had been taken from the Kharotis who were responsible for much of the

\(^{40}\) Ibid.

\(^{41}\) As Robinson reminds us, it may be a mistake to view religion simply as a language in which material interests are expressed (foreword to Ahmed, Resistance and Control, p. xvi).


\(^{43}\) Memo by D.C. of conversation with the Bhittani maliks, 24 Feb. 1879, in A12a March 1879 P1298
looting. In fact it seems most likely that the Powindahs had simply been attracted by the opportunity for plunder the raid seemed to offer. Similarly, the smaller tribes on the Tank border, the Zilla Khels, Mianis and Ghorezais, appear to have acted largely on the spur of the moment. As a result, as we saw above, after disturbances broke out, a Zilla Khel caravan proceeding from Bannu with grain fell into the authorities' hands as it neared the Gumal border, its value being greater than the cost of the damage caused by the tribe in British territory.

But the disturbances appear to have been more than simply a breakdown of law and order. According to Macaulay, the Bhittanis and others acknowledged it to be "beyond the power of reason to account for the madness of their acts at that time. I heard one of their faith exclaim but a short time ago in the midst of other Muhammadans:- 'Well if those days were Islam, then I never wish to see Islam again ...'." The invocation of Islamic ideals and symbols by religious leaders, in response to the British invasion of Afghanistan, unsettled the whole north-west frontier. But on the Tank border in particular the fact that, against all expectations, the Mahsuds had got through to the town contributed to a sense that great things were happening, and that British authority was collapsing. The excitement this generated helps to explain why the Bhittanis, Mianis, Ghorezais, and Zilla Khels, as well as Powindahs, became involved in the disturbances which followed.

There are some interesting parallels with developments in the Malakand Agency in southern Swat, after the Sartor Fakir had proclaimed a jihad against British rule in July 1897 (one of a series of risings along the frontier in the summer of that year). It was noted at the time that the Swat rising was "an astounding business and the people seem to have lost their heads and all view of their own interests in a blind belief that we should be turned out of the country". As in the Malakand in 1897, so in Tank in 1879 religious leaders claimed that British weapons had lost their power to harm their followers. In both places it seems briefly to have been believed that the British were about to be turned out of the country and that in some way Islam would come into its own again. Both districts had

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45. G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 661, 15 March 1879, in A12a March 1879 P1298
46. D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 16P, 24 Feb. 1879, in A17 Feb. 1879 P1298, App. - Notes on Mahsud Maliks who signed agreement with Amir, in A4 June 1881 P1625. Macaulay claimed that one of the Zilla Khels had received Rs.1,000 from the Amir to instigate his tribe to invade British territory. As we saw in the last chapter, one of the Zilla Khel Maliks had visited Kabul in 1878, and the Amir may have come to some sort of arrangement with him, as he appears to have done with Umar Khan and two of the Bhittani Maliks (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 57, 6 Feb. 1879, in A17 Feb. 1879 P1298).
recently become subject to tighter British control, and both risings had a millenarian aspect, insofar as they both envisaged the creation of a new community and a new social order.51

The point was made above that it probably seemed to many almost miraculous that Umar Khan was able to reach Tank so easily. He was certainly lucky that the local officials made so many mistakes. In the first place, Macaulay himself was overconfident. Presumably it was because he thought nothing could go wrong that he decided to allow the Bahlolzai and Shaman Khel hostages to live at Tank or return to the hills before the settlement had been completed. This does seem to have been an error of judgement, because it made it easier for Umar Khan to persuade Bahlolzais and Shaman Khels to join him.52 However, given that the majority of the members of the lashkar had been Alizais, and there had been no Alizai hostages, it was probably not critical. Disingenuously perhaps, in his defense, Macaulay claimed that experience had shown that keeping the hostages had "never at any period exercised any direct and practical effect on curbing the criminal tastes and habits of their tribes". Rather, the principal reason for having them was he said, "to bring many of the tribe into direct contact with British officers and with a higher state of civilisation than is known to them in their hills".53

However, Macaulay's failure to assess the extent of the Mahsud threat and respond more quickly was more serious. Had British officers been present in the outposts when the raid took place, it would probably have been successfully repelled.54 It is worth recalling here that the anomaly from the military point of view of stationing a cavalry regiment at Dera Ismail Khan, nearly fifty miles away from Tank, had been regularly pointed out since 1849 (Munro himself had drawn attention to it in 1871 and again in 1875).55

53 D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 4P, 12 Jan. 1879, in App. Feb. 1879 P1298. He repeated this in his No. 99P to G.P., 18 Sep. 1881, in App./F.R. Feb. 1882 P1825. As Egerton pointed out, Macaulay had never stated that the only benefit to be derived from retaining the hostages was "the introduction of the Mahsuds to the benefits of civilisation", and had always advocated their retention on political grounds (G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 661, 15 March 1879, in A12a March 1879 P1298, see also Howell, Mizh. p. 9).
54 This was Munro and the Lt. Governor’s opinion (ibid., Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 31A, 18 Jan. 1879, in App. Feb. 1879 P1298). The artillery had been withdrawn from Dera Ismail Khan at the beginning of the Kabul campaign, and Munro also argued that this was a serious mistake, as the tribes were well-informed about the government’s plans and the extent of its military resources and “but too ready to take advantage of any show of weakness” (ibid.).
The local Indian officials were heavily criticised for having failed to seize the Mahsuds who had come down to take part in the settlement scheme when it began to seem that a raid in force might really take place. Reinforcements arrived three days before the raid, so there were sufficient troops to have seized some of the Mahsuds and taken them to Dera. However, in their defense, Macaulay pointed out that these Mahsuds were not hostages. In any case, had he been in Tank himself at the time, he said, he would not have taken them prisoner, because he would not have thought it possible for Umar Khan to reach the town.

The most critical error was the failure of the cavalry in the Zam post to engage the Mahsuds as they moved across the plain towards Tank. Had they imitated their predecessors in 1860, the lashkar would have been repulsed, and not only would the town have been saved, but there would have none of the subsequent looting and plundering. Macaulay had been perfectly justified, Munro thought, in anticipating that the outposts would behave differently, and especially after being reinforced would at least try to repel the raid. It is difficult to understand why they did not. Possibly they were also affected by the atmosphere of religious excitement which descended on the district.

Indeed the frontier defences had crumbled so quickly that Munro and Macaulay had to consider the possibility that Azem Khan Kundi and the Deputy Inspector of Police, Malik Shahbaz, had actually connived with the Mahsuds. Munro pointed out that, when he interviewed them after the raid, both men gave their evidence very reluctantly, and tried to avoid having to answer many important questions. However, he concluded that there had been no collusion, and Egerton agreed with him that Azem Khan’s conduct exhibited only “the overweening and foolish confidence which is equally conspicuous in the action of the D.C. himself”. In fact it seems unlikely that either Azem Khan or Nabi Khan would have intrigued with the Mahsuds, as it was plans they had helped to make and on which they had staked their reputations which were disrupted by the raid.

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58 Munro commented bitterly on the enormous care which had gone into the siting of the outposts, and the fact that their main object was always said to be the prevention of raids in force, and “yet on this last occasion, the holding of the posts themselves was all that the native commandants considered to be incumbent upon them” (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 31A, 18 Jan. 1879, in App. Feb. 1879 P1298, also D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., no number, 11 Jan. 1879, in A15 Jan. 1879 P1298 1879.
60 Munro thought that it had nevertheless been a serious mistake to have relied so heavily on an unofficial agent like Azem Khan Kundi (ibid.).
61 As Macaulay pointed out, the raid had been organised by men known to belong to another party in the tribe, and no-one could have wanted the settlement scheme to succeed more than Nabi Khan (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 9P, 21 Jan. 1879, in App. Feb. 1879 P1298).
In February 1879 Egerton travelled to Dera Ismail Khan to meet Munro and Macaulay, and decide what response should be made to the recent disturbances. Both Macaulay and Munro wanted to take firm action against the Mahsuds. In spite of his evident sympathy for them, Macaulay thought that only a military expedition would be sufficient satisfaction in the "eyes of the people". Arguing that blockades had repeatedly been found ineffective and expensive to maintain in the past, Munro agreed that this would be the only effective measure in the longer term. But there were no troops to spare from the Afghan campaign (by the middle of January 1878 Upper Kurram, Kandahar, and Jalalabad had been occupied), and Egerton was anxious to avoid a military expedition against them at that point. He pointed out that, although Tank was part of British India, it was also the hereditary domain of Nawab Shah Nawaz Khan, so it was not British territory in the same strict sense as the rest of the Derajat frontier. The raid had therefore "in the eyes of the native population, a less decided appearance of studied insult to the British Government than if made on any other part of the border". In the end, it was agreed that the Mahsuds should be asked to surrender Umar Khan, Yarik Khan, and another four of the men principally responsible for instigating the disturbances, and pay a fine. If they accepted, it would sufficiently humiliate them, Egerton thought, and if they refused, a military expedition could be undertaken in due course. As we saw in Chapter Two, the Punjab government had been criticised for not calling for the surrender of specific individuals before the 1860 Mahsud expedition, and it would appear that the Lt. Governor wanted to make sure this accusation could not be made again.

Munro recommended a fine of Rs.50,000 which, with compensation of Rs.67,000, would mean that they would have to pay Rs.117,000 in all. The Alizais were regarded as being the principal offenders (as well as being the most wealthy section), and their Maliks, in particular Umar Khan and Yarik Khan, had been responsible for organising the raid. They should therefore pay half the fine (i.e. Rs.50,000), Munro thought, the other two sections paying Rs.12,500 each, and they should also pay a double share of the Rs.67,000 compensation. It should be noted in passing that the decision to impose separate terms on the Alizais amounted to a modification of the principle of tribal responsibility which Munro and Macaulay had only recently succeeded in introducing. However, Egerton decided to

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64 G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 661, 15 March 1879, in A12a March 1879 P1298
66 G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 661, 15 March 1879, in A12a March P1298
reduce the amount of the actual fine to Rs.30,000 (leaving the compensation at Rs.67,000), because he thought the Mahsuds would find it hard enough to raise this much, let alone the Rs.50,000 Munro had suggested. Otherwise he accepted Munro’s suggestions, and the Punjab government’s proposals were sanctioned by the Viceroy, Lytton, who confirmed that, provided the whole tribe “without any sectional exceptions” expressed a wish to submit, peace might be offered on the terms proposed. So the Mahsuds were informed that, in addition to Umar Khan and Yarik Khan, they should surrender Matin, Mashak, Boyak and Azmat, and that they should not enter British territory until they had done so.67

As for the Bhittanis, Macaulay argued that all the sections had deliberately broken their agreements and should suffer for it.68 Although the Dannas had not taken part in the looting which took place after the raid, some of the men in the Kot Kirghi garrison who had failed to oppose the Mahsuds came from this section.69 Nor should the plains and hill Bhittanis be treated differently. Bhittanis from the hills had joined the Mahsuds in the forays which followed which followed the attack on Tank, and Bhittani kirris in the plains had been spared from attack (and men from these kirris had tried to plunder Tittor on the 17th January). In the past, Macaulay argued, the plains Bhittanis had brought in the hill men when required, and they should not be allowed to separate themselves off now. “The tribe is of little use to us except as a united body, and therefore the tribe ... must be dealt with as a whole, and any punishment awarded so imposed as to fall as far as possible on all alike”, he emphasised.70 He thought that they should pay a fine of Rs.10,000, and lose their militia service worth Rs.12,000 and the proposed remission of revenue for Pass Responsibility. Egerton accepted this, but rejected Munro’s suggestion that the Bhittani settlement of Jandola, just inside the hills, should also be immediately surprised by troops and occupied.71

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67 G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 1288, 26 April 1879, in A4 May 1879 P1298
In March a group of Aimal Khel Mahsuds sent a petition to Macaulay in which they pointed out that they had taken no part in the raid, and asked to be exempted from the blockade. They included some influential men, in particular Arsala Shahmak Khel Abdullai, and Madamir (Muhammad Amir) Nekzan Khel Nana Khel from the Tangi Valley near Kaniguram, who had been living in Tank when the raid took place. They were informed that there could be no negotiations with one section of the tribe alone. A similar petition was made at about the same time by another group, consisting of Shaman Khel, Shabi Khel Alizai, and Shingi Bahlolzai Malik. They said they were willing to return to British territory with their families and stay there, and help the authorities deal with Umar Khan. On the 11th April seventy families did indeed arrive on the border. Macaulay told them that he could only negotiate with a full jirga, and that they must return to the hills at once. They tried to surrender themselves as “political prisoners”, but the D.C. only accepted twelve of the leading Shaman Khels and five of the Shabi Khels with their families. The remainder were sent back into the hills to try and obtain the surrender of the wanted men. Munro approved of this; the government, he thought, could not allow the tribesmen to escape the blockade, or pressure it into making peace with them, by moving into British territory in large numbers. Indeed it seemed likely that the Mahsuds might try to cross the border en masse, as at about the same time one hundred and eighty-seven Mahsuds, mostly Shaman Khels with some Bahlolzais and a few Alizais, were seized on the Bannu border, the blockade having apparently driven them down to look for food or work. Twenty-six were boys and were sent back, but several of the others were influential men. Surprisingly perhaps, Macaulay decided to keep them all as prisoners. They were made to live at Dera, and occasionally to make short visits into the hills to obtain information.

Aware that they did not have much support in the tribe as a whole, later in April a group of Maliks, including Umar Khan, Yarik Khan and Matin Alizai, and Azmat, Kala, Mashak, Boyak, Madamir and Arsala Bahlolzai sent the Kaniguram Sayyid, Akbar Shah,
to sue for peace on their behalf.\textsuperscript{77} Apart from Arsala and Madamir, they belonged to the pro-Kabul group in the tribe which had developed out of the ‘Nawab’s party’; as we have seen, several of them had visited Kabul in the past year or two. They were reminded that until the six men had been surrendered there could be no negotiations. Even at this relatively early stage, some of the Mahsuds, mostly from villages nearer the British border which had suffered during the 1860 expedition, were in favour of surrendering the wanted men. Those who lived further to the west, in the Khaisara Valley, and in the centre, in Karama and Shinkai, which the troops had not visited in 1860, argued that the tribe’s “traditional, unconquerable character” should be upheld and that the government’s demands should not be complied with. The Mullah Adakar’s continuing appeals for a jihad against the government may also have made them more determined to resist the British demands.\textsuperscript{78}

So for the rest of 1879 the tribe remained in the hills and unable to visit British territory. In the meantime Amir Sher Ali Khan had died at Balkh in February. His son, Yakub Khan succeeded him, and Umar, Azmat, Juma and Gulbagh Khans visited him in Kabul, accompanied by several Bhittanis from Jandola, including Pir Khan, returning to Waziristan in October.\textsuperscript{79} The blockade continued through the following winter, and at the end of March 1880 the Mullah Adakar himself went to Kaniguram to try and inspire them to continue their resistance. There had been a drought during the winter, and the Mullah promised them that if they attacked British territory again they would get the rain they needed to save their crops. The results of his visit might have been more dramatic had he not been so badly injured by falling from a roof that he had to return to Dawar on a litter.\textsuperscript{80} However, he left some of his followers behind, and distributed money to the Mahsud leaders to induce them to join in an attack on British territory. A brief flurry of raids did follow. On the 6th April for example a hundred or so men led by Umar Khan broke into Gumal village, but were only able to steal a few camels and donkeys belonging to some Powindahs camped in the village.\textsuperscript{81}

In the meantime the local officers were determined not to remain entirely passive in the face of this new provocation. In January 1880 a small party of troops had seized Rs.9,000 worth of cattle belong to the Zilla Khels. This went some way towards paying

\textsuperscript{77} D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 58P, 2 April 1879, in A32 April 1879 P1298


\textsuperscript{79} Juma Khan was a Nana Khel (D.I. of P.-Gumal/Report, 21 Oct. 1879, No. a Nov. 1879 P1299, Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 409).

\textsuperscript{80} They did kill a little girl who tried to save her father’s camel while he hid behind a wall (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., no number, 11 April 1880, No. 498 April 1880 IP P1741).

for the damage they had caused in British territory a year earlier.\textsuperscript{82} After Umar Khan's latest descent on Gumal, the local officers decided to punish the Bhittanis for not having given any warning, and on the night of the 11th April a force of seven hundred men marched towards Jandola. The Bhittanis had blocked the Hinis Tangi, and the troops had to force it, killing nine men and wounding four. They destroyed Jandola before returning to Tank. On the 18th Pir Khan and four other leading Bhittanis surrendered, laying at the D.C.'s feet their weapons and turbans "as a Pathan token of unconditional surrender".\textsuperscript{83}

The issue of how much freedom of action the local officers should be allowed was still a live one. Both the attack on the Zilla Khels and the destruction of Jandola took place before the new Viceroy Ripon's permission had been obtained. He commented that, had he been consulted, he would probably not have given it because "the tactics of petty guerrilla warfare, of harassing small tribes of marauders by retaliatory acts of burning villages and destroying property are completely unsuitable to the border policy of a powerful Government, and are calculated to reduce the Government and its officers to the level of their barbarous antagonists".\textsuperscript{84} He also disapproved of the earlier seizure of the Zilla Khels cattle, he said, suggesting quite wrongly that it might have been partly responsible for the subsequent Mahsud raid on Gumal.\textsuperscript{85}

Meanwhile Nabi Khan, who had been seriously discredited by the raid, had been disgraced. In April 1880 it was discovered that he had habitually received stolen property, concealing it at his house in Dera Ismail Khan. Arrested while trying to remove the evidence, he was sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of Rs.100. On his release from prison early in 1882 he petitioned Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan, who had taken control in Kabul in July 1880, to ask the British government to give him permission to go there. This was granted, but it appears that he died soon afterwards.\textsuperscript{86} However, Macaulay's other main intermediary in dealing with the Mahsuds, Azem Khan Kundi, about whose conduct before the raid serious doubts had been raised, was rehabilitated. Bruce referred to Azem Khan in very disparaging terms in the Memorandum he wrote before becoming D.C. of Dera Ismail Khan, but when he became D.C., he allowed him to

\textsuperscript{82} D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 59, 3 Feb. 1880, No. 480 April 1881 IP P1741
\textsuperscript{83} State't of Mir Khan, son of Mardan, Malik of Jandola, No. 521 April 1881 IP P1741, Memo by Com. D.D., in A19 Sep. 1881 P1625, Mason, Report, p. 66
\textsuperscript{84} G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 1772E, 21 May 1880, No. 503 April 1881 IP P1741
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86} Munro commented that after his fall from grace in January 1879, Nabi Khan "fell back upon those pristine habits which were engrained in him from his childhood, viz. those of the thief and burglar and the encourager of all such, 'as all his fathers were'". It appears that he did not die in prison as Bruce reports (Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59, see also No.s 281-287, Aug. 1882 IP P1919).
play an important role again.\textsuperscript{87}

THE 1881 EXPEDITION -

The Mahsuds had been barred from British territory for nearly two years when, in November 1880, Sayyid Akbar Shah brought another petition for a lifting of the blockade signed by a number of Maliks from all three branches. Like all the previous ones it was rejected. In February 1881 the Shingis from Shingi Kot offered to surrender Azmat if they could be released from the blockade.\textsuperscript{88} But the British authorities were not going to let the Mahsuds escape now; hostilities in Afghanistan had ended and troops were at last available for a punitive expedition. In March a proclamation was issued offering the Mahsuds a last chance to comply with the government’s conditions, and orders were given for assembling a force at Tank under Brigadier-General J.G. Kennedy, and a reserve brigade at Bannu commanded by Brigadier-General J.J.H. Gordon.\textsuperscript{89} Macaulay was to accompany Kennedy’s column as Political Officer, and Richard Udny, the D.C. at Bannu, was to perform the same office for Gordon. In the meantime the new Amir, Abd al-Rahman Khan, had been urging a Mahsud jirga to visit him. Some leading Maliks asked him to intercede on their behalf and he wrote to the Peshawar Commissioner requesting that they should not be invaded, but no reply appears to have been made.\textsuperscript{90}

In the second week of April 1881 a force just over five thousand strong was assembled at Tank.\textsuperscript{91} The Mahsuds held a tribal jirga at Kaniguram (of which Macaulay gave a dramatic description in his final report).\textsuperscript{92} Some of the Maliks whose wives and children were at Dera attended. They, and the six men whose surrender had been demanded, sat apart from the rest of the participants, as both groups were thought to be “too prejudicial and decided to be able to arrive at a sound opinion at so critical a moment in

\textsuperscript{87} He became, as Howell put it, Bruce’s alter ego (\textit{Mizh}, p. 3). This is one of several examples of Bruce criticising some aspect of his predecessor’s policies in his memorandum, and later adopting the same policy himself. To take another, having condemned the policy of giving trans-border tribesmen land in British India to settle on, in 1896 allocated 5,500 acres of land in the Tank tehsil to the Mahsuds (Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59, Baha, N.-W.F.P. Administration, p. 36, footnote 5). In 1880 Munro was succeeded as Commissioner by Major Edward Ommaney (59th N.I).

\textsuperscript{88} Azmat had lately lost the full use of a foot thanks to an assault, Macaulay reported. Either a rival in some love-affair had failed to lop it off entirely, he said, or the attack was intended as a warning that his clan could no longer bear the sufferings they were enduring for his sake (D.C. D.I.K. to G.P., No. 99P, 18 Sep. 1881, in App./F.R. Feb. 1882 P1825).

\textsuperscript{89} Mason, \textit{Report}, pp. 66-67


\textsuperscript{91} For details of this and Gordon’s force see, for example, Wylly, \textit{From the Black Mountain}, Vol. 1, p. 455.

the fortune of the tribe”.

Adam Khan Madda Khel Darwesh Khel’s son was also present: he advocated resistance to the British demands, and offered the Mahsuds help. It appears to have been mostly men from the western hills who continued to advocate rejection of the British demand. They were not suffering noticeably from the blockade, and calculated that they lived so far from British territory that they would be safe from attack. One small group in particular, led by Madamir Nana Khel, a man of “fiery temper and fanatical spirit”, was in favour of the six ringleaders surrendering voluntarily, but was not prepared to let the troops through without resistance.

But this seems to have been a minority opinion. Those living nearer British territory, particularly some of the Shingis, were worried that they would be the first to suffer from any British reprisals. Kala, a prominent Shingi, who, as we have seen, had been involved in the ‘Nawab’s party’, was in favour of the wanted men giving themselves up. He announced that the Shingis would not oppose the troops unless the whole tribe agreed to join them in doing so. Arsala Abdullah also advocated giving in to the British demands. After his speech a large majority voted for peace, and the six wanted men were told that they should either voluntarily surrender or leave tribal territory.

On 18th April Azmat and Boyak did surrender at the Tank Zam post. The troops left Tank on the same day, but were not pushed forward very quickly, in order to give the other wanted men time to submit. On the 19th Umar Khan and Matin did so, with Yarik Khan’s son Hashim, Yarik himself being ill. But the last man, Mashak, would not give himself up, and inspired by the preaching of the Mullah Adakar’s disciples, members of the Nana Khel section to which he belonged put no special pressure on him to do so. Nor did they send any representatives in to British territory to negotiate.

The troops did not reach Jandola until the 22nd, and they remained there until the 24th to give the authorities time to decide whether as five of the six wanted men had been handed over, the expedition should continue. Macaulay and Munro continued to argue that it should. As we have seen, Macaulay had had considerable problems with the Nana Khels in previous years, describing them in 1876 as “the most prone to plunder and the

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93 Ibid.: see also P.O./M.E. to G.P., No. 3P-M, 6 April 1881, in A20 April 1881 P1624.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Petition presented to P.O./M.E., in App./F.R.-App. H Feb. 1882 P1825
98 Some people were unhappy with this delay, the correspondent of the Pioneer (a newspaper based in Allahabad for which Rudyard Kipling later worked) attributing it to the influence of the ‘politicals’ (10 June 1881, Mahsud-Waziri Expedition, p. 91).
most difficult to control, as they have hitherto lived more by spoliation than by trade".\textsuperscript{99} A potentially dangerous spirit of resistance was, he claimed, now developing among them, of which some other members of the tribe were ready to take advantage.\textsuperscript{100} It should be crushed as soon as possible; if not, the Nana Khels would provide “an admirable loop-hole for endless mischief hereafter”.\textsuperscript{101} The expedition should go ahead with the object, he argued, not only of obtaining Mashak’s surrender, but also of humbling the Nana Khels. Egerton agreed that all sections of the tribe should submit before there could be any negotiations, and so on the 24th the troops moved into Mahsud territory.\textsuperscript{102} Among those who had intrigued with the Nana Khels were, Macaulay thought, the Sayyids of Kaniguram, in particular Subhan Shah and his son Akbar Shah, who had acted as the Mahsuds’ representative on at least two occasions during the blockade. Macaulay had been on good terms with Subhan Shah in the mid-1870s; in 1874, as we saw in the previous chapter, he acknowledged his role in helping him to reach agreement with the Bahlolzais, and gave him two sowars in the tribal police set up a year or two later. Subsequently, however, he decided that Subhan Shah and Akbar Shah were actively intriguing with the Kabul government, with which they were in communication through the Urmars settled in the nearby Logar Valley.\textsuperscript{103} In general, he said, these Sayyids were “great intriguers and schemers”, who did not confine themselves to religious matters but “dipped deeply into tribal politics.”\textsuperscript{104} He did not give any further details, but the possibility that the Sayyids did sometimes try to manipulate the Mahsuds to suit their own purposes (or those of the Amir) cannot be ruled out.\textsuperscript{105}

As with the 1860 expedition, the military aspects of the 1881 one have been fully covered elsewhere, so they are not discussed in any detail here, but it is worth making a few comments. Firstly, the Mahsuds offered far less resistance to the troops than they had done in 1860, only eight soldiers being killed and twenty-four wounded.\textsuperscript{106} One reason was that there were good crops standing everywhere, and as there had been several bad harvests, the tribe wanted to save them.\textsuperscript{107} Another was that there was little support for Mashak in the tribe generally. What opposition there was came largely from Nana Khels

\textsuperscript{100} Mason, Report, p. 68  
\textsuperscript{103} Akbar Shah had visited Kabul in 1878, so one can understand why Macaulay was suspicious of him (D.C. D.I.K. to G.P., No. 99P, 18 Sep. 1881, in App./F.R. Feb. 1882 P1825).  
\textsuperscript{105} See, for example, Mason, Report, p. 19.  
\textsuperscript{106} See, for example, Wylly, From the Black Mountain, Vol. 1, pp. 455-458, Mason, Report, pp. 66-73.
living in remoter areas, and the Haibat Khel and Imar Khel Nana Khels, who lived at Sora Rogha and Makin respectively, offered no resistance.

Near the entrance to the Khaisara valley, the Nekzan Khel Nana Khels who lived in it, joined, it would appear, by Nekzan Khels from the Baddar valley, as well as Giga Khels and Abd al-Rahman Khels, did oppose Kennedy’s column, but they were quickly driven back.\(^{108}\) The only serious opposition was offered on the 3rd May at Shah Alam, when a number of Bahlolzais charged the troops. They were led by Madamir, who had called on the tribe to resist the British demands at the last jirga at Kaniguram, and urged on by the Mullah Adakar’s nephew, Ali Muhammad.\(^{109}\) Belief in Ali Muhammad and the other mullahs’ supernatural powers appears to have been very strong, but “the idea that they could render ... bullets innocuous was abruptly dispelled yesterday when it was found that within half an hour of sharp fighting the Mahsuds had to leave twenty killed behind them and speedily retire before the advance of a single regiment”.\(^{110}\) Madamir was killed; Ali Muhammad and a number of other Mullahs narrowly escaped, and the Mahsuds dispersed to their homes. Mashak took part in this clash, and afterwards he made his way to his cave in the Asplotoi ravine, and then on to Shingi Kot, with the intention of surrendering to the troops as they passed back down the Tank Zam into British territory.\(^{111}\)

Secondly, the troops did much less damage than in 1860, and there was nothing comparable to the destruction of Makin. They visited Mashak’s cave at Sarmashi in the Asplotoi ravine; this had an entrance big enough for a horse and rider, and a whole suite of side caves. They tried to destroy it with explosives, but “the only results were the blowing out of the blocked-up entrance, and the slaughter of the fleas with which these caves were so infested that they covered all intruders from head to foot” !\(^{112}\) However, Mashak’s crops were used as fodder for the animals or burned. In the Khaisara valley, although Umar Khan’s home, “a rude but strong fort of boulders and mud with timbered roofs and thriving crops”, was spared, the towers and crops of the Nekzan Khel Nana Khel Maliks Juma, Jori and Ali Muhammad, who had not surrendered, were destroyed.\(^{113}\) The home and crops of several Giga Nana Khel Maliks in the Baddar valley, who refused to surrender, were also destroyed.\(^{114}\) Meanwhile Gordon’s troops visited the Nana Khels’

\(^{107}\) P.O./M.E.-D., 9 May 1881, in App./F.R.- App. A. Feb. 1882 P1825


\(^{111}\) Mason, Report, p. 70.

\(^{112}\) B.G. Co’ing W.F.F. to A.G., 20 June 1881, No. 185 Nov. 1881 IP P1744

\(^{113}\) B.G. Co’ing W.F.F. to A.G., 20 June 1881, No. 185 Nov. 1881 IP P1744. Juma, it is worth noting, had been to Kabul with Umar Khan in 1881.

\(^{114}\) P.O./M.E.-D., 26 April 1881, and P.O./M.E.-D., 30 April 1881, both in App./F.R.- App. A. Feb.
settlements in the Shakhtu valley. An attempt was made to waylay a survey party sent to
the summit of the Shuidar range, but otherwise the troops encountered virtually no
resistance. Most of the Nana Khel Maliks submitted except for Nuqarrab Kokarai, a well-
known robber, so his village was burned. Nor did the Jalal Khels submit either, but it was
decided not to attack them. They were saved by the fact that they lived in difficult country,
and that, being largely nomadic, they had little cultivation and no houses which could be
destroyed.\textsuperscript{115}

Macaulay was confident that Mashak and the Nana Khels would soon submit, but
before the troops had even left the hills, some of the anti-government Maliks made another
appeal to Kabul for help, and this delayed a settlement. The Amir quickly despatched
Sardar Mazullah to liaise with the Mahsuds. The Sardar arrived at Kaniguram on the 18th
May, and a message was sent to Mashak, who went back to Kaniguram.\textsuperscript{116} In fact the
Sardar was not made particularly welcome by the tribe, and soon afterwards he left,
reportedly rather suddenly, for Kabul, accompanied by Mashak and Yarik Khan. About
forty other Mahsuds and Zilla Khels went with them, including Yarik Khan’s nephew
Badruddin, Umar Khan’s son Badshah, Ali Jan and Mir Akbar Shaman Khel, and Karim
Khan Abdullah.\textsuperscript{117} Apart from Yarik Khan, Mashak, Badshah and Badruddin, they appear
to have been men of little importance. Several were sons or brothers of influential men,
who had little influence themselves. Ali Jan’s brother Sarmast, for example, was a leading
Shaman Khel Malik in the Shahur valley, and Mir Akbar and Karim Khan’s fathers had
been Maliks, but they were not recognised as Maliks themselves.\textsuperscript{118} For them the attempt
to involve the Amir appears to have been partly a move in the game of intra-family politics
(and was influenced by \textit{tarburwali}).

Macaulay thought that Amir Abd al-Rahman was re-establishing “under the cloak of
friendship towards us, his influence over the same party in the tribe which Sher Ali created
for hostile purposes on the instigation of Russia in 1877 and 1878”.\textsuperscript{119} No doubt he
exaggerated the Russian role, but the fact that the tribesmen could go to Kabul whenever
they wanted did obviously complicate the task of managing them. On the 13th June 1881
the Mahsuds who had gone to Kabul with Sardar Mazullah did actually tender their
allegiance to Abd al-Rahman Khan, who informed the G.O.I. and requested the release of

\textsuperscript{115} D.C. Ban. to G.P., No. 195 & 1/2, 9 March 1882, No. 27 July 1882 IP P1919
\textsuperscript{116} Mason, \textit{Report}, p. 73. The pro-government Maliks, including the Shaman Khels Nazim and Ghazi, and
Kala Shingi Bahlolzai, held a separate meeting of their own in which they voiced their suspicions as to the
No. 61-317, 23 Feb. 1882, A8 Feb. 1882 P1825
the Mahsud prisoners. A Shingi named Daulat tried to recruit a number of the tribesmen for service under the Amir.

This was not appreciated by the majority of Mahsuds, who valued their independence from Kabul almost as much as from the G.O.I., and strengthened the hand of those who wanted Mashak and Yarik Khan to surrender. They sent a letter to the Amir disclaiming all connection with any offers of allegiance made in the tribe's name, and Daulat was taken prisoner by fellow-tribesmen and surrendered to the British authorities. On the 3rd of July, as security for Mashak's surrender, his son and four leading Nana Khel Malik were handed over. Meanwhile the Amir was not very pleased to discover that most of those who had accompanied Sardar Mazullah to Kabul were not very influential men, and Yarik Khan and most of the others returned home in July.120

Mashak himself returned to Waziristan at the beginning of September. At another tribal meeting some leading Bahlolzais took him prisoner, and he was brought bound hand and foot to Tank on September the 7th. On the 10th September the blockade was finally lifted. Yarik Khan, the last of the six men whose surrender had been demanded after the 1879 raid, returned from Kabul, and finally gave himself up voluntarily in November.121 It was, as Howell put it, the "most complete act of submission that the Mahsuds have ever done, before or since".122 During the subsequent negotiations Macaulay and the Mahsud representatives agreed that the fine, which after offences committed since January 1879 were taken into account, amounted to Rs.104,948, should be paid by the imposition of a special toll of a quarter of their value on the Mahsuds' trading caravans entering British territory. The Mahsuds also agreed to leave hostages in British territory again, and to accept responsibility for the Gumal route.123

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EARLY 1880s AND BRIEF RESUME OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS -

Although after the Tank raid he had argued that keeping hostages did not produce any political results, following the expedition Macaulay decided to keep eighty Mahsuds at Dera Ismail Khan at a monthly cost of Rs.1,000. This time they included men from all three sections. The Alizais and the Shaman Khels were to provide twenty-three hostages

120 Howell, Mizh, p. 8, Mason, Report, p. 73. Macaulay asked for permission to lift the blockade and release the one hundred and thirty men who had been detained for breaking it (Tel., D.C. D.I.K. to G.P., 3 July 1881, A3 July 1881 P1624).
122 Mizh, p. 8; see also P.A.R. 1880-81, G.S., p. 10
and the Bahlolzais thirty-four (so again Macaulay did not keep to tribal *nikkat*). However, pointing out that it was the Mahsuds themselves who had suggested the idea, this time Macaulay hoped to use them in a different way. In an ingenious effort to make use of tribal custom they were to be regarded as *chalweshtis*, men deputed by the tribal jirga to take action against other tribesmen on its behalf. They would themselves deal with any tribesman causing problems in British territory, and no retaliation would be permitted against them because of the “sacred character which they hold as executors of the judgements of the jirgas or assemblies of elders”. Presumably in this way Macaulay hoped to create a permanent source of political authority in a society which lacked any. The settlement scheme was also revived. Already, it should be noted in passing, the cost of Mahsud management was growing. Whereas in the 1870s Rs.7,212 p.a. was spent on the hostages, in the early 1880s the figure rose to Rs.12,000 p.a.

It is difficult to get much of a picture of economic developments in the tribe in this period. As we have seen, some sections, the Alizais in particular, continued to trade with Tank, Bannu and other towns along the border. The sale of timber from trees felled in the forests in the higher mountains to the west in British territory became more important. It may have helped to take the place of the exports of iron to the plains, demand for which appears to have gradually slumped, thanks to competition from other sources. As they are not mentioned in later reports, it also seems likely that the small foundries in the hills producing knives, nails, horseshoes, plates and so on, suffered severe competition and were largely wiped out. If this was the case, it probably destroyed the livelihood of some of the Mahsuds, and may help to explain some of the difficulties experienced with them.

As for the men whose surrender had been demanded by the government, Yarik Khan died at Lahore in 1882, while in January 1884 Umar Khan, Matin, Boyak, and Azmat were released. This was because the tribe had given no problems since their surrender, and in particular because they allowed a survey party into the Gumal pass at the

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124 Bruce, Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59. Bruce also noted that the Bahlolzais had had a larger share in the Border Police (D.C. to Com. D.D., No. 237, 3 July 1889, in A24 Oct. 1889 P3396; see also Howell, Mizh, pp. 8-9).


127 Johnson reports that the Abdullais and Haibat Khels, for example, sold wood from the western hills, and that in 1933 its transport by lorry out of Waziristan was forbidden, presumably in an effort to prevent the forests being destroyed (Mahsud Notes, pp. 5, 8; see also Ahmed, Resistance and Control, 18-19, 61-62).

128 Mason, Report, p. 75
end of 1883.\textsuperscript{129} Mashak was kept under surveillance until April 1884.\textsuperscript{130} At the end of the decade both he and Boyak were recognised as representative Maliks by Bruce and allowed to nominate men for service.\textsuperscript{131} The Bhittanis' frontier service was restored to them in 1883, as was that of the Mianis and Ghorezais.

Macaulay himself resigned as D.C. in 1882, and was succeeded by Thorburn. Though about sixty Mahsud families moved onto the land allocated them in the winter of 1882-83 (living in sheds prepared for them by Macaulay), it was difficult to get them to do any cultivation themselves. Thorburn was unhappy with the whole scheme. He thought that developments during the last few years had largely succeeded in winning over their leading men, but that "little impression (was) ... being made on the masses".\textsuperscript{132} In any case, Thorburn did not think it would ever be possible to settle Mahsuds in sufficient numbers to bring about a change in the behaviour of the tribe as a whole. Nor did he think the attempt to create chalweshtis had been successful; they had completely failed to detect or redress 'crime' in the few cases in which he had tried to use their services.\textsuperscript{133} Something needed to be done, he argued, and put forward two alternatives, which were both rejected by the Punjab government.\textsuperscript{134} Even though in 1883 Amir Abd al-Rahman laid claim to Waziristan, the Mahsuds were relatively quiet, and it was not felt that there was any need to alter the existing arrangements.\textsuperscript{135} However, Thorburn's proposals may have helped to prepare the ground for the new policy Bruce introduced at the end of the decade. It is also true that, although the Mahsuds had agreed to be responsible for it in 1881, the Gumal Pass remained insecure. In February 1888 George Ogilvie, who had taken over from Thorburn as D.C. in 1886, tried to survey it with a tribal escort. It turned out to be a fiasco. The

\textsuperscript{129} P.A.R. 1883-84, p. 14
\textsuperscript{130} Bruce appears to have been mistaken when he said that Mashak was not released until late in the decade (Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59).
\textsuperscript{132} D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 84, 1 Feb. 1885, quoted in Bruce's Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59. Possibly some sort of division between mashars and kashars, comparable to that which, Christensen suggests, began to emerge among the Afridis at about this time, was already becoming important ('Conflict and Change', pp. 400-404).
\textsuperscript{133} According to Bruce, Macaulay himself condemned the experiment with the chalweshtis as a failure, but I have not been able to find anything he wrote on the subject (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D. No. 46, 15 Feb. 1889, in A19 Oct. 1889 P3396).
\textsuperscript{134} He suggested that either the number of chalweshtis should be reduced to forty, the surplus of Rs. 600 being distributed each month to the three sectional jirgas of the tribe, or they should be dispensed with altogether, and the money paid to the few hundred leading men who comprised the tribe's sectional and tribal jirgas in return for service in the border police (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 84, 1 Feb. 1885, in Bruce's Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59).
\textsuperscript{135} See, for example, the table in Mizh, p. 113, Bruce, Memo in No. 13, 23rd Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59. Christensen suggests that the Second Anglo-Afghan War brought to an end to the self-imposed restraints of the so-called 'close border system', but as we have seen, this was not really true in the Derajat (Conflict and
Mahsuds gathered in far larger numbers than had been expected, and were very demanding and difficult. Shots were fired at the camp one night, one actually passing through Ogilvie's tent, though he was not hurt, and the expedition simply had to be withdrawn.\textsuperscript{136} In any case when Lord Lansdowne took over as Viceroy in the same year, the G.O.I. began to move towards a policy involving much greater trans-border interference. The new Viceroy's aims included the 'opening' of the Gumal route, and it was with his encouragement that at the end of 1889, Robert Sandeman, by now the Agent for Baluchistan, held a great jirga with the tribes living near it, the Mahsuds, Darwesh Khels, Sheranis, and Mando Khel. In January 1890 it was agreed that they would guarantee its security in return for service payments.\textsuperscript{137}

In the meantime, in 1888 Ogilvie became Derajat Commissioner, and Richard Bruce succeeded him as D.C., hoping to apply the successful methods of indirect rule Sandeman had used in Baluchistan to South Waziristan.\textsuperscript{138} Whereas Macaulay had used hostages and settlement schemes, and emphasised the responsibility of the tribe as a whole, Bruce wanted to focus on the Maliks. In fact, he argued, the main difficulty was undoing the ill effects of previous policies. "By ignoring the headmen and working through go-betweens", he claimed, "we have raised up a multitude of nobodies in the tribe until their jirgas have become a perfect rabble".\textsuperscript{139} So he tried to find out who the 'representative' Maliks were, and use the money that had been spent on the chalweshtis to pay them allowances in return for supplying men for militia service.\textsuperscript{140} In 1889 he made a new settlement with the tribe which provided for the payment of the allowances of Rs.15,168 p.a. (1,264 p.m.) to sixty-one Maliks - twenty seven Bahlolzais, and seventeen Alizais and Shaman Khels respectively - in return for service on a sillahdari basis, among them Mashak, Boyak, and Umar Khan's son, Badshah Khan.\textsuperscript{141}

The sequence of events in the 1890s is too complex to follow in detail here. The main point to note is that given the growing British concern about Russian expansion in

\textsuperscript{136} Bruce, Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59, Howell, Mizh, p. 10, Mason, Report, pp. 76-77
\textsuperscript{137} Howell, Mizh, pp. 12-13, Mason, Report, p. 78, Harris, 'British Policy on the N.-W. Frontier', p. 163
\textsuperscript{138} Howell, Mizh, p. 99, Datta, 'Strategy and Structure', Chapter Three in particular
\textsuperscript{139} Bruce, Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., Harris, 'British Policy on the N.-W. Frontier', Chapter Four
\textsuperscript{141} D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 237, 29 June 1889, in A24 Oct. 1889, P3396. The Maliks do not appear to have been very representative of the tribe as a whole (Davies, The Problem, pp. 125-126). Bruce himself admitted that normally the three main sections went "share and share alike", and his explanation that he had not kept to tribal nikkat because his arrangements were based on those made by Macaulay, and he had not wanted to disturb them too far, is not very convincing (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 46, 15 Feb. 1889, in A19 Oct. 1889 P3396, D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 237, 29 June 1889, in A24 Oct. 1889 P3396). If he was really going to follow a new policy, perhaps he should not have been afraid to start afresh?
Central Asia and consequent anxiety about the security of the north-west frontier, the status quo on the Tank border, such as it was, could not last. Mahsud management became more and more mixed up with imperial strategy, and this seriously undermined Bruce’s policy of Sandeman-style ‘peaceful penetration’.\textsuperscript{142} Earlier in the decade he had some successes; in particular he obtained the surrender of the five Mahsuds who murdered a Public Works Department officer in Zhob in 1893, and five soldiers near the Gwaleri Kotal at about this time.\textsuperscript{143} But this was only achieved at a price. Of the Malikis who were responsible for the surrender, three were subsequently murdered, at the behest of a religious leader known as the Mullah Powindah, a Sultanai Shabi Khel Alizai.\textsuperscript{144} Two of the others had to leave Waziristan, while the remainder went in fear of their lives.\textsuperscript{145} There appear to be parallels here with the way ten Afridi Malikis were murdered by discontented fellow-tribesmen in the 1880s and 1890s.\textsuperscript{146}

In the mid-1890s the G.O.I.’s desire to establish a ‘scientific frontier’, and eliminate Afghan claims to Waziristan, led to the demarcation of the Durand line between British India and Afghanistan. This was accompanied by the creation of the North and South Waziristan Agencies, and the location of British garrisons at Wana and Miram Shah and the establishment of a post in the Shahur. The Malik’s allowances were increased at the same time.\textsuperscript{147} Not surprisingly, Bruce’s attempt to work through the Malikis in Waziristan greatly stimulated the growth of the anti-government faction among the Mahsuds, of which the Mullah Powindah increasingly assumed leadership. As we have seen, religious leaders had played a part in stimulating resistance to the G.O.I. earlier in the century, but the Mullah Powindah appears to have been the first Mahsud to claim religious authority who was also a political leader in his own right. Skillfully playing on his frontier

\textsuperscript{142} By this time, the ‘Sandeman system’ of friendly but authoritative intervention was being contrasted with the ‘Khyber system’, as practised by Robert Warburton (Political Agent to the Khyber from 1882 to 1896). The idea behind the latter was that there should be no interference with the tribesmen as long as the peace of the road through the pass, or any other essential interest, was not affected (see, for example, Papers Regarding British Relations with the Neighbouring Tribes, p. 159, Harris, ‘British Policy on the N.-W. Frontier’, p. 174, Davies, The Problem, pp. 34-35, Elliot, The Frontier, pp. 191-193). One of the essentials of the Sandeman system was the use of military force when the tribesmen caused problems, but when the Punjab government requested a punitive expedition against the Mahsuds to deal with offenders in 1893, the G.O.I. would not allow one. “So perished the application of the Sandeman policy to Waziristan”, comments Howell (Mizh. p. 15, also pp. 9-10, Harris, ‘British Policy on the N.-W. Frontier’, p. 35, Mason, Report, p. 75).

\textsuperscript{143} Bruce also succeeded in winning Umar Khan’s co-operation, and it appears that the latter was killed trying to recover two government carbines which had been stolen by relatives. His son, Badshah Khan, succeeded in retrieving them (Bruce, The Forward Policy, p. 173). Howell gives a different account of his death (Mizh. p. 105, Note 6).

\textsuperscript{144} He was not, as Caroe states, an Astonai (The Pathans, p. 400, Howell, Mizh. p. 14).

\textsuperscript{145} Howell, Mizh. p. 14, Baha, N.-W.F.P. Administration, p. 35, Singer, Lords, p. 170

\textsuperscript{146} Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, pp. 217-218

\textsuperscript{147} Baha, N.-W.F.P. Administration, p. 36, Harris, ‘British Policy on the N.-W. Frontier’, Chapter Six
location, he became the G.O.I.'s main opponent, while at one stage receiving an allowance of Rs.100 per month (more than twice that received by any of the Maliks).148 Something rather similar seems to have happened with the Afridis after the Second Anglo-Afghan War, it is worth noting. Here too an attempt was made to control a tribe through Maliks, though among the Afridis they were nominated by the tribesmen rather than simply being selected by the local officer as happened with the Mahsuds. In any case, it also appears to have had the effect of increasing the influence of religious leaders like Sayyid Akbar, to which the British responded partly by paying allowances to a category of Afridi tribesmen known as 'elders' as well.149

There would appear to be a parallel with developments in Waziristan insofar as British dissatisfaction with the Maliki system led to attempts to win over the tribe by paying allowances to a much large number of them. After another blockade and further military operations, “the great jirga of the Mahsuds”, or “a disorderly mob never less than 1,500 strong”, depending how one looked at it, was persuaded to meet at Tank in 1902.150 Rs.54,000 were distributed, and a balance of Rs.7,000 was reserved for distribution among the old Maliks, so that Rs.61,000 a year was now being spent on Mahsud management. Only Rs.12,000 had been spent on this (including the settlement scheme) in the early 1880s, so the cost of managing them had risen dramatically.151 These new arrangements did not last more than a few months. Johnston, who took over the South Waziristan Agency, announced that they were unworkable, and suggested a compromise between them and Bruce’s Maliki system. He proposed to raise the total amount distributed to the Mahsuds to Rs.70,000 p.a., and increase the number of men (Maliks and Motabars) receiving allowances to one and a half thousand. They would receive Rs.16,000 on their own account as it were, and the remaining Rs.54,000 as representatives of their sections. This “conglomerate scheme”, as it was described, was sanctioned, but, hardly surprisingly, proved to be no more successful than Bruce’s and Merk’s.152

Given the nature of tribal organisation and values, and the proximity of Afghan territory, juggling with allowances could not reconcile the tribe as a whole to the British presence.153 They were always ready to take advantage of any inducements the government might offer to try and persuade them to keep the peace, but enough of them remained sufficiently hostile to continue attacking on British officers and administrators and

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148 Howell, Mizh. pp. 15, 27-28
149 Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, pp. 212-229, 360, 382-384
151 S. Thorburn to E. Ommaney, d.o., No. 84, 1 Feb. 1885, in Bruce’s Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59
152 Howell, Mizh. pp. 35-36
even raiding into the plains. To cut a long story short, Tank was attacked and burned by Mahsud tribesmen in 1947, so nothing had really changed when British troops were finally withdrawn.

SUMMARY -

There were various reasons for the dissatisfaction which helped to make it possible for Umar Khan Langar Khel Alizai to raise a tribal army at the end of 1878. Umar Khan himself resented the way Macaulay had treated him, while the Alizais as a whole were frustrated at the way they had been handled in recent years. There was also factional rivalry within the tribe, and although many tribesmen welcomed Macaulay’s settlement scheme, there was concern that his plan for opening the Gomal was a stalking-horse for further British intervention. The Second Anglo-Afghan War also helped to generate anti-British feeling, and contributed to a feeling of uncertainty regarding the stability of British rule along the border. As a result, on New Year’s Day 1879, contrary to all expectations, Umar Khan’s lashkar succeeded in passing the military outposts and reaching Tank and burning the bazaar. For several days this part of the frontier was in uproar (and trans-border raiding continued for some weeks), and vigorous measures had to be taken to restore order and crush the millenarian effervescence which overtook it. The government demanded that as well as paying a fine, the Mahsuds should surrender Umar Khan and five other ringleaders. Although four of the men eventually surrendered in the spring of 1881, the other two did not. A military expedition was therefore mounted in the early summer, but it was not until the autumn that one of the wanted men was made prisoner by his fellow-tribesmen and handed over, and the other gave himself up.

Soon afterwards the settlement scheme was restarted, and an attempt made to create a sort of tribal police by extending the hostage arrangements which had seemed to work well in the 1870s. However, Macaulay left the district in 1882, and little was achieved under his successor Thorburn, though the Mahsuds remained quiet. Against a background of growing concern regarding imperial security, Bruce introduced the Maliki system to

154 A “modified forward policy” was reintroduced in the 1920s, and reliance was increasingly placed on military force with, for example, the establishment of the large base at Razmak, but it appears that there were changes of emphasis in Mahsud policy even at this relatively late date, about which it would be interesting to know more (see, for example, C.E. Bruce, Waziristan 1936-1937, p. v, also C.E. Bruce, The Tribes of Waziristan Notes on Mahsuds, Wazirs, Daus etc (London, 1929), pp. vi-vii.

155 Anti-Hindu agitation initiated by local Muslim League leaders led to a breakdown of law and order in Dera Ismail Khan itself as well as Tank, of which the Mahsuds and Bhittanis were able to take advantage (S.A. Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Pakhtuns The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province (Durham N.C., 1988), pp. 228-229, E. Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan (Uppsala, 1981), p. 194, Spain, Pathan Borderland, pp. 182-186.
South Waziristan, and an attempt was made to extend British influence up to the border between India and Afghanistan which was demarcated in 1894-95. The vacillations of British policy, as well as religious loyalties, and under certain circumstances a susceptibility to Afghan manipulation, all played a part in making the Mahsuds virtually impossible to manage. However, the desire to maintain their independence appears to have been the principal reason for the resistance of the Mahsuds to British efforts to maintain their influence over them which continued until 1947.
CHAPTER FIVE THE G.O.I. AND THE TRIBES ON THE NORTH WAZIRISTAN BORDER 1847-1860

THE DARWESH KHELS IN BANNU -

In this and the following two chapters I look at relations with the Darwesh Khels on the Bannu and Upper Miranzai borders. As we saw in Chapter Two, early in 1849 Reynell Taylor, who before annexation had been in Bannu collecting revenue on behalf of the Sikh Darbar, was appointed D.C. of the Dera Ismail Khan district of the new Leia Division. As well as Tank this included Bannu, where, as we saw in Chapter One, Taylor’s assistant, Ghulam Hussein Khan, initially took charge.1 As on the Tank border, the principal aim of British frontier and tribal policy in Bannu was to maintain good relations with the tribes living for all or part of the year in the hills, and ensure that they did not interfere with the people of the plains. In many ways it was an easier task. The Darwesh Khel tribes living along this border did not have the same tradition of border raiding as the Mahsuds to the south, and some of them spent part of the year within British territory. In the Bannu district, as we have seen, they had actually begun to cultivate as well as graze flocks and herds, and had been persuaded by Edwardes and Taylor to pay some revenue to the Sikh government.

The Board of Administration’s view was that the Darwesh Khels were “amiable or otherwise subject to the civil powers in proportion to the extent and richness of their lands”.2 Maintaining friendly relations with them by encouraging them to cultivate in Bannu would, Taylor was informed, be regarded as “the great touchstone of a district officer’s influence there.” He was instructed to confirm their right to land they had held in Bannu for more than five years before the autumn of 1847 (when Edwardes made his second visit).3 At the same time, more as a sign that they acknowledged British authority than because significant amounts of money were involved, it was thought important that the tribes should continue to pay revenue on this land. So one of the frontier officers’ first tasks after annexation was to persuade the Darwesh Khels to start paying this again, and when Ghulam Hussein Khan arrived in Bannu, he called on them to give hostages as security.4

As we saw in Chapter One, the Hatti Khels and Sirki Khels, who had refused to pay their revenue in 1848, had taken advantage of the confusion caused by the Sikh rebellion to return to their lands in Bannu. When they were asked to provide hostages, they went off into the hills again. But shortage of grazing for their flocks, and the loss of

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1 D.C. D.I.K. to Com. L.D., No. 19, 28 Feb. 1850, in No. 3 in No. 16, L/P&S/S/206
2 MacGregor, C.A., I:3, p. 264
3 Ibid.
4 For details of Ghulam Hussein Khan see Chapter One, footnote 158.
employment as a result of the closure of the Bahadur Khel salt-mine, which is discussed below, persuaded most of them to come in to Bannu later in the year, paying Rs.600 blood money for the murder of the soldiers in 1848. A few, however, led by Manzur Khan, did not do so, and gave trouble for some time to come. Manzur Khan abandoned the land he occupied on the Thul and remained in the hills to the north of Bannu, from which he carried out occasional robberies in British territory. The other Hatti Khel Maliks, led by Azem Khan, paid his share of the revenue, and appear to have taken over his lands in the Thul.5

Acting on the Board’s instructions, Taylor did pursue a conciliatory policy towards the Darwesh Khels. In particular he continued with a land reclamation project, which Edwardes had initiated in an area known as the Nar, and made some large grants of reclaimed land to the tribesmen.6 To try and persuade the Hatti Khels to settle down, he made a grant of seven and a half thousand acres to Azem Khan and some of his relatives. Azem Khan was, he said, a “sensible and well-disposed” man, who had been helpful in collecting revenue and settling disputes.7 So the Hatti Khels, or some of them at least, benefited greatly from this policy of encouraging the Darwesh Khels to cultivate and settle in Bannu. In return they supported the administration on several occasions.8

As we have seen, apart from the settlement schemes, relatively little effort was made to expose the tribes living along the Tank border to ‘civilising’ influences. In the early years after annexation not very much was done in the Bannu district either, although Hindu merchants were encouraged to settle in the new town Edwardes had established, and the Friday market he had instituted was continued.9 As far as defence was concerned, Taylor completed the measures he and Edwardes had initiated before annexation. Fortified posts, garrisoned by regular troops and irregular police levies, were established at the entrance to the Kurram and the Tochi passes. Roads were constructed to connect the posts with the cantonment at Bannu, and to link the cantonment itself with those at Kohat in the north and Dera Ismail Khan to the south.10

However, Taylor was quite unable to complete another of Edwardes’ projects, his plan to make the Sudan Khel Malik, Swahn Khan, the Bannu Darwesh Khels’ paramount

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5 D.C. D.I.K. to Com. L.D., No. 19, 28 Feb. 1850, in No. 3 in No. 16, L/P&S/S/206
6 Taylor, D.M., p. 170
8 Urmston (Bannu D.C. 1862-1866), claimed that Taylor had not actually meant Azem Khan and his family to have such a large share of the land, but had intended to distribute it more widely among the Hatti Khels. This may well have been the case, as Azem Khan did later give some of it away to other members of the tribe (Notes, pp. 5-6, Bannu Gazetteer, p. 67). On Azem Khan and the Hatti Khel Maliks, see Taylor, D.M., pp. 136-137.
9 Thorburn, Bannu, p. 49
10 Parry, Reynell Taylor, p. 200, Thorburn, Bannu, p. 49
chief. Swahn Khan was quite willing to profit from his relationship with Taylor, but did not want to become his agent. After the summer of 1848, he tried to evade any responsibilities beyond the limited ones he might be expected to shoulder as a Malik of the Sudan Khel section. As a result Taylor gave up trying to collect the Darwesh Khels’ Thul revenue through him, and used the Maliks of the individual tribes instead.\(^1\) Taylor also abandoned any attempt to use him and the other Maliks to seize wanted men, as he soon found that he could not depend on them. They knew that handing over members of their own tribe to the government would make them very unpopular, and rather than do so, they procrastinated, and, if pushed too far, simply went off into the hills.\(^2\) Nevertheless Taylor thought it was important to keep Swahn Khan happy, and he was granted an allowance of Rs.600 a year.\(^3\)

The difficulties Taylor faced in trying to create a chief who could deal with the Bannu Darwesh Khels on the government’s behalf show how diffuse authority among the Darwesh Khels was at this point. The position of Malik was only an informal one, and the tribesmen were under no obligation to obey him; as Taylor said, most of the Bannu Darwesh Khels deferred to Swahn Khan’s opinion and example but would not be ruled by him.\(^4\) Moreover, a man who let himself be seen to serve the interests of the government too openly put himself in a difficult position. Even if he managed to avoid incurring the active hostility of his fellow tribesmen, he still ran the risk of alienating and losing his influence over them, and thereby his usefulness to it.\(^5\) It was this which made some of the most pro-British Maliks talk in such defiant terms in the jirgas, Taylor commented, admitting that he found it impossible to hold his own with the Darwesh Khels in these assemblies, “sharpened as they were by long practice in such discussions”.\(^6\) On these occasions, he said, men like Swahn Khan, who were normally prepared to co-operate with him, “always sided ostentatiously with their countrymen ... , and lived in a perfect halo of applause from them for the truly noble and Waziri sentiments of which they delivered themselves”. These were in fact, he thought, “entirely in opposition to their everyday language, to the interests of Government and to the real interests of their tribesmen.”\(^7\)

\(^1\) D.C. D.I.K. to Com. L.D., No. 19, 28 Feb. 1850, in No. 3 in No. 16, L/P&S/5/206, also Taylor, D.M., p. 168
\(^2\) D.M., pp. 123-124
\(^4\) D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 19, 28 Feb. 1850, in No. 3 in No. 16, L/P&S/5/206
\(^5\) Christensen, “Conflict and Change”, p. 221
\(^6\) D.M., p. 133
\(^7\) Ibid.
Some fairly minor problems were experienced at the beginning of the British period with the Muhammad Khels and the Jani Khels. In the spring of 1849 one of the Muhammad Khel Maliks, Ulmur Khan, harvested his crops and went off into the hills without paying his revenue, and most of the rest of the tribe went with him. Later in the year a large number of their cattle were seized and some were sold to pay the outstanding revenue. Ulmur Khan joined the Umarzais in the attack on Bazid Khan's village which is described below, and though only a few Muhammad Khels were involved in this, most of them stayed out of British territory during the winter of 1849-50. The sub-section led by Khani Khan was the only one to cultivate in British territory. However, during the next year or two Taylor was able to persuade most of them to come down and start cultivating regularly again, and Khani Khan became the tribe’s chief intermediary with the government. In 1849 the Jani Khel Utmanzais also refused to pay their revenue, harvested their grain and began to take it into the hills. The seizure of some of their Maliks and their flocks seems to have persuaded them to pay up, and no further difficulties were reported with them.

In fact the only serious opposition the British authorities encountered in Bannu in the early years came primarily from the small Umarzai tribe. This arose from a dispute between the Umarzais and the Bannu Malik Bazid Khan, through whom the revenue on their land in the Sherani tappeh was paid. Shortly after annexation, in the spring of 1849, some of the Umarzais harvested their grain and went off into the hills without paying their revenue. In response Ghulam Hussein Khan seized and imprisoned twelve fellow-tribesmen. The B.O.A. deprecated this “harsh” treatment, stipulating that “the seizure of one party for the fault of another must always create dissatisfaction and ought never to be resorted to”, but this ruling was not followed in the years to come. Seizing men and their property from a tribe to put pressure on other members of it (for which the term was baramta) was a traditional tool of frontier management. To have abandoned it would have been to have thrown away a most useful weapon, and as we shall see in Chapter Seven, it was incorporated into the Frontier Crimes Regulations, introduced in 1872. But it did not work on this occasion. The Umarzais blamed Bazid Khan for what had happened, and

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19 Taylor opposed the payment of allowances on principle, turning down several requests from the Thul Darwesh Khels to be given one in return for being responsible for the security of the road from Bannu to Latambar (D.M., p. 138).
21 B.O.A. to Com. L.D., No. 61, 23 May 1850, in No. 3 in No. 16, L/P&S/5/206
their resentment grew when, as he was entitled to do, he took over some of the land belonging to the revenue defaulters. At the beginning of December they came in to Bannu, but at that point there was no government official there with the authority to negotiate with them. They tried to sort things out with Bazid Khan themselves but failed to do so, and went away in an angry mood.\textsuperscript{22}

On the night after this unsatisfactory interview, several hundred Umarzais attacked Bazid Khan’s village, killing six people, and destroying between Rs.3,000 and 4,000 worth of property.\textsuperscript{23} The authorities responded by barring them from entering British territory; Bannu men and irregular cavalry were detailed to protect Bazid Khan’s village and his cultivation, and a temporary post was set up at the mouth of the Gumutti pass to make that section of the border more secure.\textsuperscript{24} Dalhousie was reported to be “much bothered” at hearing of the raid, and Taylor was criticised for having left Bannu without a European officer.\textsuperscript{25} But it had come as a complete surprise. Until then the Darwesh Khels had not attempted anything more serious than the occasional night-time firing on the outposts, highway robbery or murder of camp followers.

Several further attempts by Umarzais to carry out raids along the border followed, in which members of other tribes took part. For example, at the beginning of January 1850 a party several hundred strong, comprising most of the Umarzai fighting men, some Muhammad Khels under Ulmur Khan, and some Hatti Khels led by Manzur Khan, as well as some Bahlolzai Mahsuds, came down into the Sherani \textit{tappeh}, and skirmished with the men posted there. One of Bazid Khan’s sons was killed before irregular troops were brought up and the invaders driven back into the hills, and several of them killed.\textsuperscript{26} Further defensive measures were taken. The villages on the outer edge of Bannu were allowed to rebuild the walls which had been pulled down on Edwardes’ orders only two years ago, and men were given permission to carry arms again. The construction of an additional post at Chashmai (later moved to Dhummai) on the Thul was also sanctioned.\textsuperscript{27}

\footnotetext[22]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[23]{D.M., p. 134}
\footnotetext[24]{The Board complained that there had been a long delay in reporting the raid. This seems to have been mainly due to the fact that the Commissioner, Major Ross, was on tour in the Dera Ghazi Khan district (B.O.A. to Com. L.D., No. 13, 18 Jan. 1850, in No. 7, L/P&S/S/203).}
\footnotetext[27]{Permission was also given for one to the south at Drukka in Marwat. Day and night patrols were instituted, and rockets distributed at the outposts to be fired at the first sign of danger, and the custom of beating a drum at a threatened post, from where it was taken up by neighbouring villages in succession was revived (Taylor, D.M., p. 156, Parry, \textit{Reynell Taylor}, p. 200, D.C. D.I.K. to Com. L.D., No. 17, 18 Feb. 1850, in No. 3 in No. 16, L/P&S/S/206).}
Reference has already been made to the closure of the Bahadur Khel salt mine. Salt from this and other mines in the hills between Bannu and Kohat was carried by Miamai Kabul Khels (and men from other tribes including Turis and Afridis) some distance to a number of different markets, including Peshawar, and Matun in Khost. Because it was so easy to extract, it was much cheaper than the salt produced on the other side of the Indus, and to protect the latter, in 1849 the Board decided to close all the trans-Indus mines. This was a curious decision, apparently motivated by purely financial considerations, which upset many of the Darwesh Khels, and induced some of them to support the Umarzais.

The territory in which the Jatta and Bahadur Khel mines lay had been allocated to the Peshawar district. As soon as news of the Umarzai raid on Bannu reached him, the Peshawar D.C., Henry Lawrence’s brother George (2nd Light Cavalry), ordered them to be reopened, but imposed such a high duty that the salt trade did not revive properly. Dalhousie commented that any revenue from these mines would be small, and “of far less consequence than the maintenance of quietness in these wild and difficult districts”. He instructed the Board to give Taylor the job of sorting things out. Taylor was to conciliate the people, and induce “the influential classes ... as much as possible to side with the authorities”. After visiting the mines, Taylor recommended that the duty should be considerably lowered at all of them. This was done and the tribes resumed the salt trade. It should be noted that although the hills between Bannu and Upper Miranzai in which the mines were located were British territory, little attempt was made in this period to bring the area as whole under control. But Taylor did also recommend that a fort should be built at Bahadur Khel (which had the most productive salt mine), and was on the road from Bannu to Kohat.

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28 The salt was “chiselled out of the earth’s surface in square blocks, each block being carefully piled and watched by its owner, and ... generally sold as fast as prepared” (D.C. D.I.K. to B.O.A. No. 151, 7 Sep. 1850, in No. 5 in No. 34, L/P&S/5/205, see also Dichter, The North-West Frontier, p. 117).
29 This step was strongly urged by Carne, the Collector of Salt Revenue in the Punjab (B.O.A. to G.O.I., No. 141, 27 March 1850, in No. 13 in No. 8, L/P&S/204).
31 B.O.A. to Com. Pesh. D., No. 69, 18 Jan. 1850, in No. 13 in No. 8, L/P&S/5/204, Kohat Gazetteer, p. 39. The Indian imperial maund was 82 and two-seventh pounds avoirdupois (S.O.E.D.).
32 G.O.I. to B.O.A., No. 62, 13 April 1850, in No. 14 in No. 8, L/P&S/5/204
33 Ibid., B.O.A. to D.C. Ban., 28 March 1850, No. 474, in No. 15 in No. 8, L/P&S/5/204. In particular the duty was lowered to two annas per maund at Bahadur Khel (D.C. D.I.K. to Com. Pesh. D., No. 58, 6 May 1850, in No. 11 in No. 10, L/P&S/5/204).
35 D.C. D.I.K. to B.O.A., No. 51, 7 Sep. 1850, in No. 5 in No. 34, L/P&S/5/205. Responsibility for the mines was transferred to the Dera Ismail Khan authorities.
In order to prevent any recurrence of the problem which had led to the difficulties with the Umarzais, Taylor decided early in 1850 to stop using the Bannu Maliks to collect the Darwesh Khels' tappeh revenue. Instead he entrusted the collection to their own Maliks, and gave them a percentage of the revenue as a reward. However, the Umarzais themselves remained unreconciled, and a second attack on the Bannu border was repelled in February 1850. Taylor was reluctant to use force against them, as this would involve "expeditions into rugged passes and defiles, with which we have merely hearsay acquaintance." Moreover, he thought, it would be difficult to distinguish the Umarzais' encampments from those of pro-government tribesmen; "the confusion and difficulty of such a style of warfare might be imagined". So he decided that the Umarzais should be readmitted to their lands in Bannu provided they paid a fine of Rs.700. As they were too disunited to pay the fine all at once, he even allowed the hostages to be released separately on payment of an eleventh share for each one.

But this still did not pacify the tribe. Although by then all but one of the hostages had been released, in November 1850 and again in March 1851 Umarzais, joined by men from other tribes including Kabul Khels, Khojul Khels, Gangi Khels and Hatti Khels, assembled in the Gumutti Pass, and tried to attack villages to the north of Bannu. Henry Lawrence's irritation with them seems to have been getting on top of him at this point, as he wrote to Dalhousie proposing that in future any captured tribesmen should as quickly possible be tried before the D.C. or some other official not actually involved in their arrest and hung at the scene of their crime. Dalhousie rejected this lest it encourage the tribesmen to retaliate.

The Umarzais were still barred from British territory when in May 1852 John Nicholson took over from Taylor as D.C. In June some of them contacted him, asking to

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36 D.C. D.I.K. to Com. L.D., No. 19, 28 Feb. 1850, in No. 3 in No. 16, L/P&S/5/206. At about this time Henry Coxe was appointed Assistant Commissioner at Bannu.
37 Ibid.
38 D.C. D.I.K. to Com. L.D., No. 16, 16 Feb. 1850, in No. 3 in No. 16, L/P&S/5/206. The Board authorised him to allow the Umarzais to return to their lands on such terms as he saw fit, the only proviso being that satisfaction must be given to Bazid Khan for the death of his son in the January raid (B.O.A. to G.O.I., 12 June 1850, No. 249, in No. 3 in No. 16, L/P&S/5/206).
39 D.M., pp. 134-135
40 On the 14th December, for example, they attacked a village near Bannu and killed one man and seriously wounded two others, but retreated after a picket near the village fired rockets to alert the nearby outpost (D.C. D.I.K. to B.O.A., No. 264, 18 Dec. 1850, in No. 16 in No. 3, L/P&S/5/206).
41 B.O.A. to G.O.I., No. 517, 29 Dec. 1850, in No. 14 in No. 3, L/P&S/5/206, G.O.I. to B.O.A., 11 Jan. 1851, in No. 15 in No. 13, L/P&S/5/206). In the margin of the I.O.L. copy of this letter is the scribbled minute, by whom it is not clear, "if murderers and robbers are not to be executed for fear of retaliation, what is to become of public justice?"
42 Pointing out that their exclusion from British territory had so far cost them about Rs.3,000, and that many of them had been killed or wounded, Taylor recommended in his final report that they should be
be allowed to cultivate their land in Bannu again. Nicholson told them that should do so provided they pay a small fine, but there was no response. Much more of a soldier than Taylor, Nicholson had no qualms about taking troops into the hills, and in September he wrote to the B.O.A. recommending prompt action against the Umarzais. The fact that nothing had been done for so long was, he argued, unsettling the other tribes in Bannu, such as the Jani Khels and Bakka Khels. They had, he said, begun to talk about going off into the hills themselves if their wishes were not met.43

He was given permission to attack the Umarzais at a time of his own choosing. The moment arrived when on the 12th December a ‘holy man’ named Asber Shah persuaded some Umarzais camped to the south of Bannu to make a hostile movement towards the Kurram. They were joined by fellow-tribesmen from the encampments to the north of Bannu, but defensive preparations had been made, and they dispersed.44 Before looking at Nicholson’s reaction, it is worth noting that this is one of very few references in the records for this early period to a religious leader exciting tribal hostility along this part of the frontier. This is a little curious when we consider that a number of individual assassinations of British officers by shahids did occur at this time, suggesting that religiously-motivated opposition to British rule along the north-west frontier was fairly widespread.45 Presumably at this time the great majority of trans-border tribesmen did not feel sufficiently threatened for religiously-based appeals to have much effect.

Nicholson judged this the right moment for retaliation. Early on the 21st December troops burned three Umarzai encampments in the low hills near the mouths of the Khaisora pass, and carried off their cattle.46 On the previous night two detachments, one led by Nicholson, the other by Captain TP. Walsh (52nd N.I.), had marched from different directions into the hills to the north of Bannu. Early next day they surprised the Umarzais’ encampments at Tsapparai, Girang and Derobeena, capturing several hundred animals.47 There were no British casualties, and the two columns marched back together. But night fell before they reached Bannu, and twenty-three men fell behind the others in the dark, and

44 Major J. Nicholson to Major J. Chamberlain, d.o., 19 Dec. 1852, in No. 9 in No. 5, L/P&S/5/213
45 In October 1853, for example, the Peshawar Commissioner, Frederick Mackeson, was hearing petitions on his verandah when a man he supposed to be a petitioner approached him and ran a knife into his chest. He died a few days later from the wound (Lady Edwardes, Memorials of the Life and Letters of Major-General Sir Herbert Edwardes (London, 1886), Vol. I, pp. 226-227) (on this topic see, for example, S.F. Dale, Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier: The Mappilas of Malabar (Oxford, 1980)).
46 C. of P. D.D. to M.S./B.O.A., no number, 22 Dec. 1852, in No. 9 in No 5, L/P&S/5/213. Previously John Youngusband had been Captain of Police in Sind.
were killed by the Umarzais. However, as Nicholson said, “the Omerzyes were defeated in their own retreats on the strongest ground in these hills (and I think more difficult than any I have seen in Afghanistan)”, and they petitioned to be allowed to return to Bannu. Nicholson refused to allow this immediately because of the butchery of the stragglers, but eventually readmitted them to British territory in November 1853. After this they gave no particular problems, though they remained more pastoral than some of the other Darwesh Khel tribes. In the late 1870s they still owned only two square miles of cultivated land in Bannu; only one other Darwesh Khel tribe, the Bizan Khel, cultivated an equally small area.

Nicholson continued the land reclamation schemes begun by Edwardes and Taylor, and as we saw in Chapter Two, carried out a summary settlement. But his approach was much more rigorous than theirs. He had little sympathy with Swahn Khan Sudan Khel, for example, and threatened at one point to give half his allowance to Azem Khan Hatti Khel, who was becoming his greatest rival among the Bannu Darwesh Khels. But if he was not a sympathetic man, Nicholson commanded respect, and was a successful administrator, and the district became unusually peaceful. In 1856 he was appointed to Peshawar, and the A.C., Henry Coxe, succeeded him at Bannu. The scarcity of references to the district in the records until the late 1860s suggests that relations with the Bannu Darwesh Khels proceeded relatively smoothly for the rest of the 1850s and for much of the following decade. Swahn Khan died in 1854, and his pension of Rs.600 p.a. lapsed on his death, but his son Najib inherited his unofficial position as one of the Bannu Darwesh Khels' chief representatives, and was given a grant of land in the Nar. There seem to have been no particular problems during the Mutiny partly because the Darwesh Khels (as well as the Mahsuds) were fighting the Dawars.

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49 It could not possibly “have been more perfect”, Younghusband commented. “The plan was necessarily a complicated one and it was also that required no ordinary self-confidence to mature and carry out” (J. Younghusband to J.D. MacPherson, d.o., 25 Dec. 1852, in No. 7 in No. 10, L/P&S/5/213).
50 Bannu Gazetteer, pp. 67, 169
52 H. Edwardes to Swahn Khan, d.o., 20 June 1853, in A9 July 1872 P142
53 Trotter, Life, p. 178. As Edwardes said, whereas he had knocked down the walls of the Bannu forts in 1848, Nicholson actually reduced the people (Thorburn, Bannu, pp. 52-53). Indeed in 1856 Nicholson was able to write that there had been no highway robberies or murders, nor even an attempt at one, during the last year in Bannu (D.C. D.I.K. to M.S./C.C., No. 5, 21 Jan. 1856, in No. 4 in No. 10, L/P&S/5/226).
54 His approach to the tribes was more like Taylor’s, and he seems to have been a more popular figure (Thorburn, Bannu, pp. 55-56).
Unlike the Darwesh Khel tribes which had started to cultivate land in Bannu in winter, the large Kabul Khel tribe seems to have remained in secure possession of its territory in the hills throughout this period. Problems were experienced with them from the outset. Although they carried salt from Bahadur Khel, they were not dependent on British territory in the same way as the Bannu Darwesh Khels. Some joined the Umarzais and Khojul Khels in the unsuccessful attack on the Bannu outposts in March 1850. In November 1851 a party of four hundred Kabul Khels and Tazi Khels attacked the village inhabited by Khattaks next to the Bahadur Khel mine, and carried off some cattle and property. They were pursued into the hills by a cavalry detachment, and eleven were killed. Late in December 1851 a band of two or three hundred Darwesh Khels, mostly Kabul Khels, attacked a party of thirty-three soldiers returning to the mine, and the Jemadar and four tribesmen were killed. As Taylor had recommended, a fort was built at Bahadur Khel early in 1852 and a detachment of regular troops posted there. This made it more difficult for the Kabul Khels to make trouble at the mine, but they continued to cause problems elsewhere.

In 1852 and 1853 they carried out twenty recorded raids in the hills to the north of Bannu, in some of which Gangi Khels apparently took part as well. In November 1853 the Kohat D.C., Captain John Coke (10th N.I.), barred them from Bahadur Khel, and seized ten tribesmen and more than a hundred of the animals they used to transport the salt. In February 1854 ten more men and some more pack-animals were confiscated. Rs.800 was raised by auctioning the animals, and the remaining compensation was eventually paid by the Khojul Khel Malik Mohmit who came forward as security for the tribe’s future good conduct. The Kabul Khels were allowed access to the mine again, and it appears that there were no more serious difficulties with them in connection with the salt trade. Malik Mohmit, who lived at Zerwam on the Kurram, was, it should be noted, an important intermediary, whose name crops up on several occasions in this period.

Upper Miranzai was the other border on which difficulties were experienced with the Darwesh Khels in general, and the Kabul Khels in particular. In 1849 Kohat was

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57 The Bahadur Khels had surrendered three Darwesh Khels who had been stealing salt to the authorities, and in response other Darwesh Khels attacked the village on the 11th November (D.C. D.I.K. to B.O.A., No 515, 29 Nov. 1851, in No. 7 in No. 4, L/P&S/S/209, Taylor, D.M., p. 142, Kohat Gazetteer, p. 39).
59 MacGregor, C.A., I:1, pp. 135-136
60 The fact that the Kabul Khels were willing to come to terms suggests that possession of the mines gave the Government some influence over the surrounding tribes (P.A.R. 1854-56, p. 38). See also MacGregor, C.A., I:2, pp. 44-45, D.C. Koh. to Com. Pesh. D., no number, 1st June 1854, in No. 10 in No. 39.
attached to the Peshawar district (which became a division in charge of a Commissioner in 1850). Lt. Frederick Pollock was Assistant Commissioner of Kohat until 1851, when it became a district in its own right; Captain John Coke became the first D.C. He also commanded the 1st Punjab Infantry Regiment, and was, it should be noted, one of only two officers on the frontier who combined civil and military duties (the other was James Abbott in Hazara). John Lawrence commented that “from temperament it is scarcely possible for Major Coke to carry out any plan but his own”, and, as we shall see, he was a man of very decided opinions. The son of the former Khan of Hangu, Ghulam Hyder Khan, was appointed Tehsildar of the district, and the tribes on the Upper Miranazai border were largely managed through him and his family.

As part of Hangu, Upper Miranazai was included in the territories ceded to the Sikhs by the Tripartite Treaty of 1838. Title to it passed to the G.O.I. when the Punjab was annexed in 1849, but “owing to an oversight”, apparently on Pollock’s part, it was not formally brought under British rule. More or less independent in the 1840s as we have seen, it was in a disturbed state, thanks in particular to conflict between the sedentary Bangash villagers on the one hand, and the Kabul Khels and the still largely pastoral and nomadic Tazi Khels and Khojul Khels on the other. The villages had defensive walls, but “the stream is irresistible”, Edwardes reported; “if any village has injured them (the Darwesh Khels), they drive their whole herds into the cultivation and destroy it in a few hours”. In particular, although the trans-Kurram settlement of Biland Khel was a large village of about three hundred houses, its inhabitants were in a “miserable condition of dependence” on the Miamai Kabul Khels, who had taken as much as half the village’s land. Edwardes also pointed out that Thal, an extended settlement, almost a group of villages, which had land on both banks of the Kurram, had been an open village until the Darwesh Khels began to attack it fifty years ago. Now three-quarters of its fields lay uncultivated, he said, and the Bangash village of Darsamand to the east was coming under similar pressure.

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61 C.C. to G.O.I., No. 776, 18 Oct. 1855, in No. 22 in No. 3, L/P&S/S/226
62 Coke described him as “an active useful man”, who had much influence with the hill-tribes and was well-disposed to the British Government (D.C. Koh. to G.P., no number, 16 Aug. 1851, in No. 5 in No. 50, L/P&S/S/208, D.C. Koh. to G.P., No. 47, 11 Oct. 1851, in No. 16 in No. 60, L/P&S/S/208).
65 Ibid.
66 D.C. Koh. to Com. Pesh. D., 13 April 1869, in No. 119 May 1869 IP 438/6
In the summer of 1849, because they thought there was a danger that they might be made subject to the Kabul government, the Maliks of these Bangash villages petitioned George Lawrence in Peshawar to be taken under British rule, offering to pay Rs.7,500 p.a. revenue. The B.O.A.'s view was that this was likely to lead to all sorts of difficulties, and rejected the petition. This encouraged the Afghan Governor of Khost, Sardar Muhammad Azem, to try and take over Upper Miranzai himself, and he instigated Darwesh Khels and Zaïmukhts to attack some of the villages. The Bangash sent another petition to Captain Coke, requesting once again to be brought under British rule. Coke thought that it would be "highly unignified" and convey the wrong message to the surrounding tribes if this was refused. By this time Lt. Henry Lumsden (59th N.I.) had taken over from George Lawrence at Peshawar, and he agreed with Coke, commenting that if British rule were extended to Upper Miranzai, it would be a "severe hit in the mouth of the Wuzeeres who come for salt via Thull and Bilund Khel". The Board was still opposed to the proposal; it did not think that "this wild people have that reverence for law, order and the blessings of British rule that they would purchase them at a price of Rs.7,500 a year". But Dalhousie argued that if the government gave up any territory to which it had a clear right, it "would unquestionably be attributed not to a want of will, but to a want of power, and would be detrimental accordingly", and ordered that the petition should be accepted. Coke issued a proclamation to the Upper Miranzai villages announcing this, and wrote to Sardar Muhammad Azem, whose troops had crossed the Kurram, asking him to remove his men.

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68 Their district produced Rs.10,000 revenue a year, they said, of which they proposed to retain Rs.2,500 as expenses (B.O.A. to G.O.I., No. 764, 11 July 1851, in No. 4 in No. 40, L/P&S/5/207).
69 They doubted that "this wild people have that reverence for law, order and the blessings of British rule that they would purchase them at a price of Rs.7,500 a year" (B.O.A. to D.C. Pesh., No. 880, 18 Oct. 1849, in No. 4 in No. 40, L/P&S/5/207).
72 B.O.A. to G.O.I., No. 764, 11 July 1851, in No. 4 in No. 40, L/P&S/5/207.
73 G.O.I. to B.O.A., No. 2380, 24 July 1851, in No. 5 in No. 40, L/P&S/5/207.
74 D.C. Koh. to B.O.A., No. 20, 23 July 1851, in No. 8 in No. 44, L/P&S/5/207, D.C. Koh. to B.O.A., no number, 16 Aug. 1851, in No. 5 in No. 50, L/P&S/5/208, Com. Pesh. D. to C.C., No. 776, 6 Oct. 1855, No. 22 in No. 3, L/P&S/5/226. Dalhousie thought the Sardar's sending his troops to Biland Khel was an aggressive action, and approved the Board's order for Coke to eject them by force if they would not go voluntarily (G.O.I. to B.O.A., No. 2482, 6 Aug. 1851, in No. 9 in No. 44, L/P&S/5/207, C.C. to D.C. Koh., 31 July 1851, in No. 8 in No. 44, L/P&S/5/207).
Although the Afghans did withdraw, the district remained unsettled. In retaliation for the abduction of some of their cattle, the Darwesh Khels were reported to be collecting to attack Darsamand, so Coke asked for permission to take some troops into the valley. This would restrain the Darwesh Khels, and, he confidently predicted, the district would be subdued without a shot being fired.\footnote{D.C. Koh. to Com. Pesh. D., no number, 14 Sep. 1851, in No. 22 in No. 3, L/P&S/5/226} Henry Lawrence disagreed. He could see no need for immediate action to prevent the Darwesh Khel and Zaimukht gatherings; “if the tribes can combine next month they can equally do so next year” he commented.\footnote{Minute, in B.O.A. to G.O.I., No. 1006, 30 Sep. 1851, in No 14 in No. 60, L/P&S/5/208} Dalhousie overruled him, judging that the sooner such a movement could be carried out, the more effective it would be.\footnote{G.O.I. to B.O.A., No. 3233, 18 Oct. 1851, in No. 15 in No. 60, L/P&S/5/208}

It is interesting to note that Dalhousie did not follow Lawrence’s recommendation here; nor, as we have seen, had he done so regarding the Upper Miranzai villages’ petition. The historian Morison suggested that “during the entire period of his connection with the Panjab, 1846-53, Henry Lawrence’s was the dominating mind and will in everything which concerned border politics”.\footnote{“From Alexander Burnes to Frederick Roberts”, pp. 10-11} These and other incidents show that in practice this was not always the case, and that although Henry Lawrence was the member of the B.O.A. who had most to do with the frontier tribes, Dalhousie took some if not all of the critical decisions.

Coke had already moved out of Kohat towards Upper Miranzai on the 4th October with the 1st Punjab Cavalry, his own regiment (the 1st Punjab Infantry), and three guns.\footnote{D.C. Koh. to B.O.A., No. 47, 4 Oct. 1851, in No. 16 in No. 60, L/P&S/5/208. Subsequently Dalhousie said that the G.O.I. was “entirely misled by the representations which were made to it regarding Upper Meeranzye on the statements submitted by the D.C. Captain Coke” (G.O.I. to C.C., No. 234, 12 Aug. 1853, in No. 5 in No. 58, L/P&S/5/216). For details of the force see, for example, Nevill, Campaigns, p. 33.} After his optimistic prediction, he was surprised when the Thal and Biland Khel men and some Kabul Khels fired on his pickets when the force camped near their villages. Coke later claimed that Mullah Najibullah of Biland Khel had incited them to do so.\footnote{Two camp followers and one of Khwajah Muhammad Khan’s irregulars were killed (D.C. Koh. to B.O.A., No. 51, 7 Nov. 1851, in No. 16 in No. 4, L/P&S/5/209, D.C. Koh. to B.O.A., No. 30, 8 April 1855, in No. 22 in No. 3, L/P&S/5/226).} Sometimes referred to as Qazi or Akhund, the Mullah was the Darwesh Khels’ “religious leader or Pir, whose prayers and nostrums were sought by the sick”.\footnote{Com. Pesh. D. to M.S./G.P., No. 6, 26 Jan. 1860, in No. 7 in No. 4, L/P&S/5/256} His name crops up several times in the reports in the 1850s. He appears to have been a man of some influence, who
travelled among the tribes receiving offerings until Dost Muhammad Khan gave him a jagir in Khost.\textsuperscript{82}

However, it was hoped that the policy of encouraging the Darwesh Khels to continue coming down to the plains each winter and to expand their cultivation there, which seemed to be working in Bannu, would also work on the Kohat border. Coke’s instructions were to “conciliate without unduly conceding to these border tribes”\textsuperscript{83} So he assembled some of the Miamai Kabul Khel Maliks who cultivated around Biland Khel, and told them that they should continue to hold their land free of revenue on condition they refrained from raiding (though they would have to pay revenue on any land they acquired there in future), to which they agreed.\textsuperscript{84} But Coke’s force had really been too small to intimidate Upper Miranzai sufficiently; the villagers did not pay their revenue in 1852, and in April 1853 their Maliks refused to obey an order to wait on him at Kohat.\textsuperscript{85}

Instead of mounting another expedition into the valley, which would only lead to conflict with the Darwesh Khels, Coke thought the government should construct a fort at Stoorozai.\textsuperscript{86} But this proposal was rejected, partly on the grounds of cost, but also because such a fort would be dangerously isolated.\textsuperscript{87} In any case, John Lawrence, who by now had taken over as Chief Commissioner, thought it would be helpful if the Darwesh Khels did try and resist the troops, commenting that “until the Frontier Tribes thoroughly learn to fear our power, it will be vain to expect good faith on their part”.\textsuperscript{88} So another expedition was sanctioned, but it was postponed until the following spring on the grounds that the weather would be easier, when it was put off again.\textsuperscript{89}

In the meantime the feud between Thal and the Kabul Khels and Tazi Khels continued. In May 1854 the latter destroyed the Thal spring crop as they returned into the hills with their flocks. By November the whole of Upper Miranzai (as well as the Lower

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\textsuperscript{82} Worth as much as Rs.1,000 p.a., it was according to Edwardes a reward for having helped the Amir establish his control over the district (D.C. Koh. to B.O.A., No. 30, 8 April 1855, in No. 22 in No. 3, L/P&S/S/226, Com. Pesh. D. to M.S./G.P., No. 6, 28 Jan. 1860, in No. 7 in No. 4, L/P&S/S/256).

\textsuperscript{83} B.O.A. to D.C. Koh., No 2259, 17 Nov. 1851, in No. 13 in No. 5, L/P&S/S/209

\textsuperscript{84} D.C. Koh. to B.O.A., No. 51, 7 Nov. 1851, in No. 16 in No. 4, L/P&S/S/209

\textsuperscript{85} D.C. Koh. to Com. Pesh. D., No. 259, 24 April 1853, in No. 10 in No. 42, L/P&S/S/215


\textsuperscript{87} C.C. to G.O.I., No. 461, 8 July 1853, in No. 3 in No. 58, L/P&S/S/216. Coke’s assertion that the only alternative to building a fort at Stoorozai was to do nothing was, Dalhousie commented, “quite inconsequential” (G.O.I. to C.C., No. 234, 12 Aug. 1853, in No. 5 in No. 58, L/P&S/S/216).

\textsuperscript{88} C.C. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 461, 8 July 1853, in No. 3 in No. 58, L/P&S/S/216, G.O.I. to C.C., No. 234, 12 Aug. 1853, in No. 5 in No. 58, L/P&S/S/216

Miranzai villages of Kahi and Muhammad Khwajah) was reported to be in a state of virtual insurrection. Assisted by Turis and men from some of the other villages, Thai was holding off as many as a thousand Darwesh Khels, who had assembled to attack it on their way down to their winter pastures. This conflict had a sectarian aspect in that the Bangash villagers and the Turis, who belonged to the Gar faction, were Imami Shi‘ite Muslims, whereas the Darwesh Khels, who belonged to the Samil one, were Sunnis.

In 1853 Herbert Edwardes succeeded Frederick Mackeson as Commissioner of Peshawar. Although both he and Lawrence thought troops should be sent into Upper Miranzai as soon as possible, nothing happened immediately. This may well have been because relations with the Afghan ruler, Dost Muhammad Khan, were improving. It was agreed in 1854 that his favourite son, Ghulam Hyder Khan, should come down to Peshawar to negotiate a treaty in March 1855. Edwardes, who was principally responsible for arranging this, wanted to avoid doing anything which could spoil the atmosphere.

This also affected the approach taken to the Turis, who, as we saw in Chapter One, were nominally the Amir’s subjects. During the early 1850s they carried out a number of raids in Upper Miranzai, and in 1854 Coke seized one of their caravans on its way to the Kohat salt mines. To obtain its release, they undertook to refrain from raiding in British territory and gave five hostages. But within a month they carried out another serious raid on a village in British territory, and the hostages were imprisoned in the Lahore jail. When the possibility of a military expedition into Upper Miranzai was raised again, the question of dealing with the Turis also arose. Edwardes suggested that the Amir might be pleased if British troops did level a few Turi towers and leave them less able to resist his son’s demands for revenue in future. But Dalhousie thought the Amir should be given the opportunity to restrain them first. He asked Lawrence to reach some arrangement for their pacification, and during the negotiations Ghulam Hyder Khan was persuaded to give

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91 Davies, The Problem, p. 51
92 C.C. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 939, 3 Dec. 1854, in No. 15 in No. 58, L/P&S/S/221, see also, for example, Lady Edwardes, Memorials, Vol. I, p. 252.
94 In March 1855, while the negotiations were going on at Peshawar, the Turis attacked the Khattak village of Dullund. Coke thought that Muhammad Azem had deliberately tried to embarrass Ghulam Hyder Khan, by instigating the raid, but Edwardes and Lawrence disagreed (D.C. Koh. to Com. Pesh. D., No. 31, 14 April 1855, in No. 5 in No. 34, L/P&S/S/223, C.C. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 236, 21 March 1855, in No. 7 in No. 23, L/P&S/S/223).
95 Com. Pesh. D. to C.C., No. 1080, 18 Oct. 1854, in No. 15 in No. 58, L/P&S/S/221
some sort of undertaking to keep them in check. The Afghan prince was also advised that an expedition to Upper Miranzai would take place shortly, and invited to send a representative to accompany it in order so that there should be no misunderstanding as to its purpose, but it is not clear whether or not the offer was taken up.

As we have seen, even though it was on the west bank of the Kurram, Biland Khel, which was largely inhabited by Bangashes, had customarily paid revenue to Hangu, and was one of the villages which had come under British rule in 1851. However, the Biland Khel villagers' unwillingness to pay their revenue made Lawrence and Dalhousie think that it might be simpler for the government to disclaim any responsibility for the village and leave it to fend for itself. So, during the Peshawar negotiations, Ghulam Hyder Khan was informed that it renounced all claims to the trans-Kurram part of Upper Miranzai, and had no objection to the Afghan government asserting its claim to it. He was also told that there was no objection to his father asserting his claim to Dawar.

Some of the British frontier officials bitterly opposed this renunciation of territory to which, they argued, the government had a claim. Coke, for example, thought it a mistake to let Biland Khel go, while Nicholson particularly objected to the Amir's being allowed to claim sovereignty over Dawar. In this connection, Lawrence put forward an interesting counter-argument. The tribes which were at least nominally subject to the Amir, he pointed out, such as the Mohmands, and the Turis and Bangash of Upper Kurram, had been no more difficult that those which were 'independent', such as the Afridis and Wazirs. The establishment of good relations with the Amir should, he thought, facilitate good border management generally. "A government, however weak and objectionable, must prove more capable of controlling its subjects, than communities of controlling their members", he argued, "communities in which there is no law and order, and in which every man acts for himself". In any case, he pointed out correctly, Dost Muhammad Khan was not in practice in a position to be able to exert any sort of authority over Dawar. His
administration of neighbouring Khost and Upper Kurram was very weak; an attempt to
collect revenue led to quite a serious uprising in 1856-57 in Khost, when several thousand
tribesmen besieged the government fort there, and the revenue officials were driven out.102

Finally, in April 1855, a force about four thousand strong left Kohat, accompanied
by Edwardes as Political Officer, and Muhammad Amin Khan, cousin of the Khan of
Hangu. Muhammad Amin Khan was principally responsible for handling relations with the
Darwesh Khels, Zaimukhts and eastern Orakzaïs on the Kohat border, and had “an
excellent understanding with the Darwesh Khels”.103 When the force reached the Kurram,
Edwardes crossed the river with one cavalry and two infantry regiments. As the troops
moved downstream along the far bank, they passed the Darwesh Khels' spring harvest
spread out, as Edwardes put it, “in waving sheets of ripening corn as far as the eye could
reach, dotted here and there with sheesham trees and profusely watered by the passing
river’. “A more peaceful or beautiful landscape could scarcely be imagined’, he
commented.104 One of the objects of the expedition was to try and stop the feuding
between the Darwesh Khels and Thal, and some of the Pipalai, Saifali and Miamai Kabul
Khel Malikis were persuaded to come in to his camp. The losses of men and cattle suffered
by them and the villagers of Thal were calculated. These turned out to be roughly equal,
and after three days of negotiations, the representatives swore on the Koran to abandon
their feud and signed an agreement to that effect.105 The Thal men undertook not to help
the Turis to attack the Darwesh Khels in future, and the Kabul Khels undertook to restrain
the other Darwesh Khels from attacking Thal. The agreement did have some effect, as the
Darwesh Khels did not carry out any serious raids for a year or two.

Not long after the 1855 expedition, Coke resigned as D.C. Kohat, and was
succeeded by Captain Henderson (48th N.I.), who had formerly commanded the 3rd
Punjab Infantry Regiment.106 Although the Turis had been quicker to submit than the

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101 The Amir might even accept Dawar as a consolation prize for the permanent of loss of Peshawar,
Lawrence speculated (C.C. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 278, 3 April 1855, in No. 15 in No. 28, L/P&S/S/223; see
also Noelle, ‘The Interaction between State and Tribe’, p. 299).
102 Com. Pesh. D. to C.C., No. 88C, 24 June 1856, in No. 3 in No. 32, L/P&S/S/228, Noelle, ‘The
interaction of State and Tribe’, pp. 293-298
103 D.C. Koh. to Com. Pesh. D., No. 86-484, 4 May 1874, in A7 July 1874 P144. For details of the
force see, for example, H.L. Nevill, Campaigns on the North-West Frontier (London, 1912), p. 34. On the
way they were attacked by several hundred Orakzaïs and Zaimukhts, described by Edwardes as ghazis, near
Darsamand (Com. Pesh. D. to C.C., no number, 1 May 1855, in No. 3 in No. 40, L/P&S/S/224).
105 The agreement was signed by three Pipalai Kabul Khel Malikis, twelve Miamai ones and two Saifalis
and by ten representatives from one of the two Thal gundis, and three from the other (names in No. C192
above).
106 Coke fell out with Edwardes over the question of whether the G.O.I. should maintain its claim to the
trans-Kurram part of Upper Miranzai or not (at that point Edwardes thought it should not). This was
followed by a more serious disagreement between them over who should succeed Ghulam Hyder Khan,
Darwesh Khels in 1855, they continued to be troublesome and to raid the Upper Miranzai villages, including their former allies at Thal. In 1856 a list of their raids was forwarded to the Amir with a request that he should make them pay compensation. But he was too weak to do so, so the British officials decided to take troops up to the Kurram again the autumn to cow the Turis into submission themselves. The Amir gave permission for Edwardes and Henderson to enter Afghan territory, and meet the Afghan governor of the Kurram, who was to summon the Turi Maliks to his headquarters.

In October a force of four and a half thousand men commanded by Brigadier Chamberlain, and accompanied by Edwardes and Henderson as Political Officers, moved through the Upper Miranzai valley and across the Kurram. On the way they destroyed a number of houses in the Zaimukht village of Torawarai, where several robbers had taken refuge. The Turi Maliks came in to the Afghan governor’s headquarters in the Upper Kurram, and Edwardes and Henderson held a meeting there with the interested parties. Among other things, the Darwesh Khels asked to be recompensed for five hundred sheep which the Turis had carried off within the last two months. Although the Turis objected that the Darwesh Khels were not British subjects, the animals had been seized in British territory, and Edwardes was anxious to establish the principle that the Turis should not carry out raids within it. “A settled Government”, he commented, “cannot permit one tribe of independent barbarians to exercise irresponsible rights within its own borders, and another tribe to follow them up and commit deeds of violence for which its own subjects would be hanged or imprisoned”. So the Turis were made to pay half the amount claimed by the Darwesh Khels for this robbery, in all Rs.1,639.8


In 1857 Com. Pesh. D. to C.C., No. 88C, 24 June 1856, in No. 3 in No. 32, L/P&S/S/228

Ibid., D.C. Koh. to Com. Pesh. D., No. 9, 12 June 1856, in No. 3 in No. 32, L/P&S/S/228. There is a parallel here with the way that in the later 1850s the Russian government tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Iranian government to control the Shahsevan tribes on the Azerbijan border (Tapper, “Nomads and Commissars in Mughan”, in Tapper, ed., Tribe and State, p. 413).

For details of the troops see, for example, Frontier and Overseas, Vol. 2, p. 317

These included a man named Mir who specialised in “catching Hindoo traders in by-paths and hanging them up by the heels till they were suffocated into delivery of their money” (Com. Pesh. D. to C.C., No. 167, 5 Feb. 1857, in No. 3 in No. 19, L/P&S/S/243).

Ibid.

Rs.911 were realised straightaway, the Afghan Deputy-Governor himself standing security for the rest. It is not certain that the money was actually ever paid; the C.C.’s letter merely states that “it is to be hoped that the money will be collected and remitted by the Cabool Government; and the C.C. suggests that the Ameer be addressed on the subject” (C.C. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 152-140, 26 Feb. 1857, in No. 3 in No. 32, L/P&S/S/243, Bannu Gazetteer, p. 169, Kohat Gazetteer, p. 48).
Traditionally, the Tazi Khels, who used winter pastures in the Khattak district, paid a small tax called *chehel-o-yak* (literally 'one in forty') to the Khattak chief, but the Khojul Khels and Kabul Khels whose pastures were in Miranzai paid nothing. Edwardes decided that it would be a good idea to show them that they were admitted to British territory by favour and not by right by making them pay the same tax. The decision was also taken to build a militia post at Gundiour, rather than the fort Coke had called for at Stoorozai, to help repel Turi raids. It was to be manned by some of the Khattak chief Khwajah Muhammad Khan's men and twenty-five sowars from Miranzai itself. The Jemadar was to be Muhammad Amin Khan, who, as we have seen, was in charge of relations with the Darwesh Khels on this border.

The point was made that in 1855 Coke had protested about the decision to waive the government's claim to the trans-Kurram village of Biland Khel. At the time Edwardes himself had raised no objection, but after the 1856 expedition he changed his mind. What no-one had previously realised, he pointed out, was that the village of Thai also owned land on the west bank of the Kurram, so that by renouncing the trans-Kurram portion of Upper Miranzai, the government had not only given up Biland Khel but dismembered Thai as well. In view of this, he thought, the G.O.I. should restate its claim to Thai's trans-Kurram lands, in which case it might just as well reassert its claim to Biland Khel. If it did not, the Thal people would have to pay revenue to both British and Afghan governments. The latter would squeeze as much revenue out of them as it could, and they would be ruined.

Lawrence disagreed. If the government reasserted a claim to Thai's trans-Kurram land and Biland Khel, it would have to be prepared to oust the Darwesh Khels who had encroached on their land, whereas the latter's continued possession of this land was "a material guarantee of which we can without difficulty take possession should they at any time render that step necessary". Nor, given that the G.O.I. was on friendly terms with the Afghan government, could it object if the latter decided to collect revenue from the

113 Edwardes' attention was drawn to this anomaly, he said, by a conversation he overheard between a Darsamand Malik and a Kabul Khel Malik. The former had suggested that, as Darsamand and the other Upper Miranzai villages were now going to have to pay taxes regularly, the Darwesh Khels, who were the principal users of the pasture land, should pay the revenue on it. "There are two crops on the earth and two kinds of men", the Darwesh Khel Malik replied grandly, "you Bungushes have seen many governments and you have paid to them all. You are accustomed to it. Now, we Vizeerees have seen Chiefs coming and Kings going, but we never saw the King that took revenue from us" (Com. Pesh. D. to C.C., No. 167, 5 Feb. 1857, in No. 3 in No. 19, L/P&S/S/243).


116 C.C. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 152-140, 26 Feb. 1857, in No. 3 in No. 19, L/P&S/S/243
trans-Kurram lands of Biland Khel and Thai.\textsuperscript{117} Dalhousie’s successor, Canning agreed, and the frontier remained at the Kurram until 1879, when by the Treaty of Gandamak the Afghan government ceded the Upper Kurram valley to the G.O.I.\textsuperscript{118} It was arranged that the revenue the Thal men owed the Kabul government on their trans-Kurram land (Rs.277 p.a.), should be paid to the agents of the Kurram governor through the “Gandiour officials” (presumably Muhammad Amin Khan).\textsuperscript{119} For a year or two the arrangements Henderson and Edwardes had made seemed to work reasonably well. In January 1857, to reduce the opportunities for conflict between them and the Upper Miranzai villages an attempt was made to fix specific camping places for the Tazi Khels and Khojul Khels on their spring and autumn migrations. But in spite of this they continued to harass each other, and in 1859 Darwesh Khels, probably Kabul Khels, raided Thal’s lands on the west bank of the Kurram.\textsuperscript{120}

Moreover, bands of robbers were operating in the district, many of them from the Hatti Khel group which had abandoned its land in Bannu in 1849.\textsuperscript{121} On the night of the 5th November 1859, near Latambar five or six Hatti Khels intercepted a palanquin conveying Captain Mecham, a British officer (7th Foot Artillery), from Bannu to Kohat. Mecham, who was ill, climbed out of the doolie, and drew his pistol, but a man named Mohubut struck him from behind with a knife and killed him.\textsuperscript{122} They took his personal effects and made off into the hills, where they took refuge with the Kabul Khels, who, in accordance with Pashtunwali, refused all demands for the surrender of those involved in the murder.\textsuperscript{123}

The leader of the band to which they belonged was a Kabul Khel named Zungi. In order to put pressure on the tribe as a whole to surrender him and the actual murderers, a military expedition was mounted surprisingly quickly given that, as we have seen, such

\textsuperscript{117} He also pointed out that there was nothing wrong in itself in the same village holding land under two governments on different sides of a river, and that it was a common occurrence throughout India (ibid.). Not until the later nineteenth century, it would appear, did it come to be assumed that a river was a sort of ‘natural’ boundary (see, for example, Whittaker, \textit{Frontiers}, p. 8).

\textsuperscript{118} Caroe, \textit{The Pathans}, p. 380. In fact though nominally under British protection after 1879, Upper Kurram was left unoccupied after the war, and was not formally incorporated into British territory until 1892 when an agency was created for it. (Harris, ‘British Policy on the N.-W. Frontier’, pp. 86-88, Davies, \textit{The Problem}, p. 79).


\textsuperscript{120} Set. O. Kohat to Com. Pesh. D., No. 192, 1 Aug. 1877, in A3 Oct. 1879 P1299

\textsuperscript{121} Com. Pesh. D. to M.S./G.P., No. 6, 28 Jan. 1860, in No. 7 in No. 4, L/P&S/S/256, Parry, \textit{Reynell Taylor}, p. 231


\textsuperscript{123} Com. Pesh. D. to M.S./G.P., No. 6, 28 Jan. 1860, in No. 7 in No. 4, L/P&S/S/256
expeditions were often postponed for years. On the 14th December, little more than six weeks after Mecham's death, just over three thousand three hundred regulars with thirteen guns, accompanied by more than a thousand Khattak and Bangash levies, left Kohat. Brigadier Chamberlain was in command of the force, accompanied by Major James (who had taken over from Edwardes as Peshawar Commissioner in May) and Henderson as Political Officers. The troops crossed the Kurram on the 20th, and on the 22nd attacked the Kabul Khels, who, with some of the wanted men, had collected in the Maidani Valley, about ten miles to the west of the river, and destroyed three of their camps and seized their winter stores of grain and a large number of sheep and goats. The Kabul Khels retreated into the next valley, Durinami, which was occupied by Hassan Khels. On the following day Henderson followed them there with some of the irregulars, and captured as many as five thousand sheep, three hundred bullocks and sixty camels. The fact that these were only some of the tribe's flocks shows that their pastoral wealth was substantial.

Another Kabul Khel camp was destroyed in the Zakka gorge, and the troops moved on to Shewa, where on the 26th December representatives from the Kabul Khels, Tori Khels and Hassan Khels came in to negotiate. The Kabul Khel men were sent away, but the others were told the troops would withdraw if they handed over Zangi or two of the actual murderers, and some men set off to try and seize him. On the 29th December part of the force marched to Spinwam on the Kaitu river to try and keep up the pressure. While he was there, James received a congratulatory letter from the acting Governor of Khost. "Why not follow up these throat-cutting dogs even to the hills of Dawar?" he asked, "and now I think of it", he added, "the illustrious Sardar, Muhammad Azem Khan, has for three years been contemplating the collection of his Dawar revenue, from which he was diverted by these unfortunate wars in Torkistan. By advancing, you will secure the men you are in search of, and I accompanying you in a friendly way, will secure the three years' revenue for my master".

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124 James, the Peshawar Commissioner, and the P.I.F. commander, Brigadier Chamberlain, decided that the advantages of acting quickly outweighed the possible risks. Permission was obtained from the Amir for the troops to pass through what was now Afghan territory at Biland Khel, and the Governor of Kurram, his grandson Sardar Muhammad Sarwar Khan, was instructed to warn the inhabitants that troops were on their way (Com. Pesh. D. to M.S./G.P., No. 6, 28 Jan. 1860, in No. 7 in No. 4, L/P&S/S/5/256).

125 For details of the force and the expedition see, for example, Wylly, From the Black Mountain, Vol. 1, pp. 438-440.

126 The remaining animals seized from the Kabul Khels were distributed among the soldiers and auxiliaries, and Christmas Day was spent on the Kurram feasting - "the rapidity with which thousands of sheep disappeared may not have had an unwholesome effect on the Wuzeeree mind, rendering the prospect of a return of such insatiable guests as anything but pleasing", James commented (Com. Pesh. D. to M.S./G.P., No. 6, 28 Jan. 1860, in No. 7 in No. 4, L/P&S/S/5/256).

127 On the 27th troops attacked some Kabul Khels hiding in the hills, and six were killed and another 300 sheep seized (ibid.).

128 Ibid. According to Paget, the deputy-governor of Kurram did actually accompany Chamberlain for part
While the troops were at Spinwara, the Gangi Khels surrendered Nursher Shah, who had sheltered Mohubut’s gang after Mecham’s murder and displayed his effects at his house. On New Year’s Day 1860 the Hassan Khel and Tori Khel Maliks brought in twenty-eight Kabul Khel men and women. Zungi, however, had managed to escape. Next day the detachment moved back down to the Kurram, and Reynell Taylor, now Commissioner of the Leia Division, rode up from Bannu through independent territory to meet them. The force marched to Tsapparai in the hills to the north of Bannu (which British troops had visited during the Umarzai expedition in 1852). The Ahmedzai Maliks were summoned, and Taylor had a meeting with them. He insisted that as Mohubut’s relatives the Hatti Khels in particular were responsible for him. As we have seen they owned a great deal of land in Bannu, which made them vulnerable to pressure from the government, and they agreed to produce three of the wanted men in a month and a half’s time. Next day the troops returned to British territory.

So the expedition itself failed to obtain the surrender of any of the men implicated in Mecham’s murder, but James still managed to put an optimistic gloss on it. Not only had the Kabul Khels lost twenty or thirty of their bravest men and Rs.25,000 worth of animals and stores of grain, he said, but some of them had been surrendered to the government, and the troops had been right through their territory. Moreover, punishment had been inflicted “with that promptitude which, in the eyes of such people, is indicative of real power”. Chamberlain also argued that the tribes would have been impressed by the government’s ability to act whenever and wherever it needed to do so. It is true that the fact that the expedition had been mounted at a few weeks’ notice at a season when weather conditions were unfavourable did demonstrate the government’s ability to project its power beyond the border, and considerably strengthened Taylor’s hand when he began to put pressure on the Ahmedzai Maliks to capture Mohubut. In general the expedition must have had a good effect on the morale of the frontier administration as a whole. The fact that it was the largest force sent across the Derajat or Kohat borders since annexation, and that it spent longer in tribal territory than any other had done so far, gave the government the confidence to react vigorously when shortly afterwards the Mahsuds attempted to raid Tank.
As for the Kabul Khels and the neighbouring Darwesh Khel tribes, they had been shamed by having the *pardah* of their country lifted. Twenty or thirty men had been killed, and the loss of many animals and the stores of grain must have caused hardship. But it created ill-will among the Kabul Khels in particular, and the fact that, as we shall see, only a year or two of relative calm followed, suggests that neither they nor their neighbours were sufficiently crushed to make them anxious to placate the government in future.

In the meantime a party of over a thousand Ahmedzais, mostly Hatti Khels, set out from Bannu in mid-January to seize Mohubut.\(^{134}\) He had taken refuge with Manzur Khan Hatti Khel’s sons at a large encampment at Dhonegurh (over towards Birmal), and they betrayed him to his pursuers. He was captured, and brought into Bannu on the 22nd January, “escorted by the wild and picturesque group of his captors, lashed hand and foot to a charpoy, his eye swelled and closed by the blow of a stone and his head and wrist wounded by sword cuts”.\(^{135}\) He confessed to the murder. Taylor was given permission to hang him at once and exhibit his body for two days, and he was executed on the spot where he had killed MechaM.\(^{136}\)

James thought that the pressure on the Kabul Khels in particular should be maintained, and Henderson went up to meet the Kabul Khel Maliks in April.\(^{137}\) By then Zungi had taken refuge at with Abdullai Mahsuds at Makin, and the other wanted men had invoked the protection of the pro-Afghan Malik Adam Khan Madda Khel, who lived at Sheraniyya in Upper Dawar. The Kabul Khels actually approached the Afghan governor in Khost, who had held out hopes to them that he could intercede with the British on their behalf. Henderson thought this had made them less willing to obey the government’s orders. However, he said, that when they finally realised that in return for the Amir’s mediation they would have to accept his authority, they broke off the negotiations. He still thought that the Kabul Khels could perfectly well capture all the wanted men if they tried, and he persuaded a jirga to promise that by autumn they would capture some of them and hand them over to him. However, he and James were instructed to take no further action.

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\(^{136}\) Montgomery wanted a regular trial and the submission of papers to him for orders, but was overruled. Canning said that, “assuming that the guilt of the murderer is proved”, he could see no reason why Mohubut should not be executed immediately (G.O.I. to G.P., Tel., 26 Jan. 1860, in No. 5 in No. 4, L/P&S/5/256, Parry, *Reynell Taylor*, p. 232). James was elated by Mohubut’s surrender. “The great object” had been accomplished, he said, “of forcing the proudest tribe on the border to give up a criminal who had trusted to the security imparted by Pathan usage, which hitherto has withstood all our efforts to break through” (Com. Pesh. D. to M.S./G.P., No. 6, 28 Jan. 1860, in No. 5 in No. 4, L/P&S/5/256).

\(^{137}\) Ibid.
and leave matters up to Taylor. It is not clear whether any of Mohubut's comrades, or Zungi himself, were ever captured, or whether in the end Mohubut's capture was regarded as sufficient and things were taken no further. The latter seems more likely.

SUMMARY -

After annexation, Taylor became D.C. of the new Bannu district and resumed the task of persuading the Darwesh Khels to settle down and pay their revenue. He continued Edwardes' policy of encouraging the Darwesh Khels to acquire land in Bannu, and the Hatti Khels in particular were given a large grant of newly-reclaimed land and most of them became consistent supporters of government. However, Taylor was unable to put into practice Edwardes' plan to make the Sudan Khel Malik, Swahn Khan, 'chief' of all the Darwesh Khels in Bannu. Some minor problems were experienced with the Muhammad Khels Jani Khels, and some of the Hatti Khels, but the Umarzais were the most difficult tribe in the early days, carrying out several raids on outposts and villages. They were joined in some of these by Kabul Khels and members of other tribes which customarily carried salt from the mines in the hills to the north-west of Bannu, in particular the one at Bahadur Khel. These had been closed late in 1849 to protect the revenue on salt from mines on the other side of the Indus. Although the frontier officers quickly protested, the sale of salt from the Kohat mines was not resumed on anything like the old terms until April 1850, by which time considerable discontent had arisen among the trans-border tribes. In 1852 John Nicholson took over as D.C., and resolved the Umarzai problem in the autumn by taking troops into the hills north of Bannu and destroying several of their camps. After this no problems were experienced with the Umarzais or the other Bannu Darwesh Khels until the late 1860s.

Relations with the large, mostly Utmanzai, tribes which lived across the Kurram, and were on bad terms with the Bangash villages of Upper Miranzai, in particular the Kabul Khels, were more difficult. The G.O.I. had failed to assert its title to Upper Miranzai after annexation, and in 1850 Sardar Muhammad Azem Khan tried to establish his authority there. His attempt to use the Darwesh Khels to put pressure on the Bangash villagers twice prompted them to ask to be brought under British rule. The second petition was accepted by Dalhousie on the grounds that failure to assert its claim would be regarded as a sign of British weakness, and the Afghans withdrew. However, the villagers of Upper Miranzai had had no intention of paying any revenue if it could be avoided, and in 1855 to encourage them to do so, and to put a stop to inter-tribal feuding, Edwardes and Coke took troops

along the valley. They crossed the Kurram and induced the Kabul Khels and the Thal people to come to an agreement. Because the Turis in particular remained troublesome, Edwardes and Henderson accompanied another force across the Kurram in 1856. This time, with the co-operation of the Afghan local authorities, they settled the differences between the Kabul Khels and the other Darwesh Khels and the Turis. For the following two or three years the only real problems were the relatively minor ones caused by one or two small bands of semi-professional robbers consisting mainly of Hatti Khels and Kabul Khels.

It came as all the more of a shock to the government when in November 1860 a British officer, Captain Mecham, was murdered by a group of Hatti Khels from one of these bands, while travelling at night along the road from Bannu to Latambar. Mecham's murderers took refuge with the Kabul Khels, who refused to surrender them, or the leader of their band, to the British authorities. Some weeks later a force of nearly four thousand regular troops and a thousand auxiliaries crossed the Kurram and destroyed some of the Kabul Khels' camps and seized thousands of their animals, but the wanted men were not surrendered. However, although the expedition failed to achieve its immediate object, it was a boost to the government's morale and strengthened its hand when it came to putting pressure on the Hatti Khels living in Bannu to go into the hills and capture the wanted men themselves. They did secure Mecham's murderer, though it appears that the others were never caught.
CHAPTER SIX THE G.O.I. AND THE TRIBES ON THE NORTH WAZIRISTAN BORDER 1861-1872

THE POLICE AND FRONTIER MILLITIA -

As we saw in Chapter Two, during the early years of British rule civil rather than military officers were in charge of the military police and irregular militias which helped to defend the border. However, Canning’s efforts to reduce government expenditure in the early 1860s led to changes in the way the police and military were organised in India as a whole. It was decided that in future all armed bodies should either form part of the military and be included in the army estimates, or be classed as police and included in the general police system. A decision therefore had to be taken regarding the police and the militias on the Punjab frontier. Most of the Punjab officials wanted to keep them under civil control, and the Lt.-Governor, Robert Montgomery, supported Taylor’s proposal that they should be absorbed into a “Derajat political contingent” of 850 horse and 465 foot, which would remain under civil authority and be paid for by the Political Department.

However, the P.I.F. commander, Brigadier Chamberlain, put forward a scheme for maintaining the security of the border with a smaller militia placed under military command. Canning decided on this option, presumably because it was the cheaper one. So the military police and levies maintained in the Derajat since annexation were abolished, and a new force of 403 horsemen and 217 foot was raised, assigned to the Brigadier and designated the Frontier Militia. As a result the civil officers had to carry out any operation which required the use of force, such as making a sudden reprisal or enforcing a blockade, in co-operation with the military authorities. They were not very happy with this.

Urmston, Bannu D.C. from 1862 to 1866, for example, argued that the new system made the enforcement of P.R. more difficult; Macaulay agreed that as a result of its introduction the district officer was “less able to enforce responsibility or induce people to act up to their obligations”. In fact the militia’s principal function was now envisaged as being to

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1 H.S. Cunningham, Earl Canning (Oxford, 1891), pp. 204-205
3 Com. D.D. to D.C.s D.D., Circular No. 233, 9 Nov. 1869, in A37 Jan. 1873 F143
4 Extract from B.G.-P.I.F.F. to G.P. M.D., No. 2055, 31 Dec. 1861, in A37 Jan. 1873 F143. In order that they should retain some powers of patronage the Civil Officers kept the right to make appointments to the militias, but it appears that they did not often bother to use this (Com. D.D. to D.C.s, Circular No. 233, 9 Nov. 1869, in A37 Jan. 1873 F143).
5 P.A.R. 1862-63, p. 72
6 Notes, p. 10, D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No. 207, 8 June 1872, in A37 Jan. 1873 F143. Macaulay also thought that as a result “the district officer had been deprived of his best weapon in dealing with the crime of the border and its political management. The work has had to be done with inferior tools, or left undone” (ibid).
support the regular troops by acting as guides and supplying information, so that it became more directly a military one. However, influential men among the tribes living near the border were given the right to nominate sowars and footmen for military service in it, with the aim of “enlisting their sympathies on the side of Government and of order, and thus preventing them from leaguing with marauders in raids upon British territory”. To some extent therefore it continued to have a political function. It should also be noted that in 1861 the Leia Division was replaced by a new administrative district based on Dera Ismail Khan, known as the Derajat Division. The long strip of frontier territory which had formed the D.I.K. district was bisected, the northern part, together with a slice of cis-Indus territory, being formed into a new district based on Bannu.

KABUL KHELS, TAZI KHELS, KHOJUL KHELS AND TURIS IN THE 1860s -

For a year or two after the Kabul Khel expedition in 1860, there seem to have been no particular problems on the Upper Miranzai border. However, in 1863 a party of Kabul Khels carried off some cattle grazing across the Kurram which belonged to the British village of Thai. A punitive expedition was sanctioned, but never took place (it is not clear why), and problems continued to be experienced with the tribes along this part of the border. In particular, the Turis who, as we have seen, were nominally at least subjects of Kabul, continued to be difficult. Early in March 1866 the nomadic Tazi Khels collected, as they usually did, at a place called Palosin between the Gundiour outpost and the village of Thal before returning to the hills for the summer. A party of Turi horsemen from Upper Kurram lured some of them out of their camp and into an ambush, killing twelve of them and wounding six. The Tazi Khels claimed that the Thal villagers were involved too. To forestall a revenge attack on Thal, the Kohat D.C., Captain Short (7th Bombay N.I.), called in a Darwesh Khel jirga. A truce was arranged, and it was agreed that there would be another meeting later in the year when the Tazi Khels returned from the hills.

In the meantime some other new officials had been appointed in the Peshawar Division. James died in 1864 and was succeeded by Colonel Becher, and in turn in 1866 Major Pollock took over from him. In the same year Louis Cavagnari (1st E.R.) replaced

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7 P.A.R. 1862-63, p. 72
8 Report of Committee to consider Reorganisation of Frontier Militia, in A37 Jan. 1873 P143
9 To provide the necessary troops, plans were made for part of the force which had taken part in the expedition mounted against the followers of the late Sayyid Ahmed Barelwi (the Mujahidin), based at Malka to the north of Peshawar (the Ambela expedition), to return to Kohat (C.P. to F.S., Service Message, 23 Dec. 1863, No. 267 Dec. 1863 IP P204/68) (for details of the Mujahidin, see, for example, Q. Ahmad, The Wahabi Movement in India (Calcutta, 1960)).
10 Major Henderson died in 1861.
11 D.C. Koh. to Com. Pesh. D., No. 124, 22 June 1867, in No. 3 in No. 136, L/P&S/5/260
Short as D.C. The son of one of Napoleon Bonaparte’s generals, Cavagnari had a very successful career as a frontier administrator before becoming the British Resident in Kabul in July 1879 (he was killed six weeks later when the Residency was overrun by mutinous soldiers). But after his appointment at Kohat, he was unable to give his full attention to Upper Miranzai, mainly because of the problems which developed in 1865 with the Bassi Khel and Hassan Khel Afridis who lived around the Kohat Pass. Not until March 1867 did he finally go up to Thal to meet the Turi jirga. He decided that it was too late in the season to sort things out then, proposing to do so in the autumn. He was aware, he said, that the civil war in Afghanistan which had broken out after Dost Muhammad Khan’s death in 1863 made things difficult, but he still thought it would be helpful if the co-operation of the Kabul authorities could be enlisted. Could not the Amir - at this point Afzal Khan - be informed of the claims outstanding against the Turis, and asked to order the Governor of Kurram to send the Turis to him when requested? By now John Lawrence was Governor-General. His view was that the government should do nothing which could be interpreted as favouring one party or another in the civil war, and he instructed that no approach should be made to the Kabul authorities.

However, there was no meeting with the Turis in the autumn because problems had arisen with the Orakzais; for another three years truces were arranged between the Turis and Thal on one side, and the Darwesh Khels on the other, to keep them from attacking each other. But in the spring of 1869 men from Thal caught a Kabul Khel man lifting some of their cattle and killed him, and the feud flared up again. The Kabul Khels collected quickly, and, joined by some Tazi Khels, on the 4th April divided into two parties. One of them attacked Thal and was beaten off by the irregulars from the Gundiour post with the loss of three men, but the other was able to drive away more than seven hundred cattle.

Rs.2,000 worth of property belonging to the Tazi Khels was seized in retaliation. As the Miamai Kabul Khels’ crops near Biland Khel (estimated to be worth more than Rs.20,000) were now ripening and could easily be destroyed, Cavagnari thought this

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12 See, for example, P. De Kaliprasanna, The Life and Career of Major Louis Cavagnari (1885), Caroe, The Pathans, p. 389, Singer, Lords, p. 117.
13 On the Kohat Pass disturbances see, for example, P.A.R. 1866-67, pp. 100-101, 321
14 Ibid. One of Khwajah Muhammad Khan’s sons was sent with 25 horsemen to protect the village in the meantime.
18 D.C. Koh. to Com. Pesh. D., no number given, 13 April 1869, in No. 119 May 1869 IP P438/6, also Lt. Gov. to F.S., Tel., 21 April 1869, No. 114 May 1869 IP P438/6
would be a good moment to negotiate for the return of the stolen cattle with military support. The Commissioner, Pollock, gave permission for the troops to move out immediately, and instructed Cavagnari to demand a fine of Rs.2,000 from the Kabul Khels. By now Sher Ali Khan had established himself in Kabul. The new Viceroy, Mayo, wanted to pursue a more active Afghan policy than his predecessor, and had no objection to co-operating with him. So the Amir was asked for permission for the troops to pass through Afghan territory at Biland Khel to reach the Miamais' crops should this be necessary, which he duly gave. In fact he “behaved very well”, Pollock commented, “and has sent us letters: first, to the Governor of Kurram, second, to the governor of Khost, third, to Ursula Khan, the powerful Ghilzai chief, who has recently been employed in the Khost direction, in pursuit of Azem Khan and Abdul Rahman Khan” (his defeated rivals). The force of one thousand and thirty-five regulars left Kohat on the 18th April commanded by Lt.-Colonel Charles Keyes (30th Madras N.I.).

The troops reached Thai on the morning of 22nd April where they were joined by two and a half thousand levies. The Kabul Khels had already been summoned by Muhammad Amin Khan and Shahzadeh Jumboor, the extra A.C. Aware of just how vulnerable their crops were, all their principal representatives (six Miamais, two Pipalais, two Saifalis, as well as two Malikshahis) came in to Cavagnari’s camp on the 23rd and submitted to him, and the Tazi Khel representatives came in too. The Kabul Khels agreed to pay the fine of Rs.2,000, and to return or pay compensation for the stolen cattle. They also undertook to give hostages to live at Kohat, the Pipalai and Malikshahis two each, the Saifalis three, and the Miamais, as the largest section, eleven. The Tazi Khels also agreed to pay a fine of Rs.2,000 on their return to British territory in the autumn.

The Kabul Khels had still not received any redress for the murder of the Kabul Khel cattle-thief in 1869, so they were pleased when Cavagnari decided to fine Thai Rs.500 for this, and took three hostages from the village. They were also pleased

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Cavagnari also drew attention to the fact that the Kabul Khels had also not made any redress for a number of offences they had also committed on the Bannu border (I have been unable to find any reference to these).
20 F.R. Pollock to D. MacLeod, d.o., 15 April 1869, No. 118 May 1869 IP P438/6, G.P. to Com. Pesh.
D., Tel., 17 April 1869, in No. 119 May 1869 IP P438/6
21 For details of the troops see Station Orders, Off.s Co'ing Koh., No. 270, 16 April 1869, in No. 62 June
IP P438/6
22 No information about Shahzadeh Jumboor has turned up in any of the records consulted, though he is mentioned in a number of them.
23 Com. Pesh. D. to F.S., Tel., 26 April 1869, in No. 120 May 1869 IP P438/6
24 Presumably they were paid an allowance - it would be interesting to know more about the arrangements
25 The troops returned to Kohat on the 26 April (Off. Co'ing Koh. to S. Off.- P.F.F., No. 1, 24 April
1869, in No. 62 June 1869 IP P438/6).
because the Amir ordered Abbas Khan, the Afghan governor Arsala Khan’s agent, to collect Rs.2,000 from the villagers of Biland Khel, who had participated in the raids, and received some of the stolen property. Pollock emphasised how useful the orders issued by the Amir to his officials in Kurram and Khost had been, showing the tribes that from now the G.O.I. and the Kabul government would act together. He thought that this sort of co-operation would have been impossible before Mayo’s meeting with Sher Ali Khan at Amballa in March 1869, at which a successful effort had been made to established a better relationship with him. “Had our troops moved in the spring of 1868 instead of 1869”, Pollock commented, “the then Amir would have publicly addressed unmeaning replies to our letters and privately have done all in his power to thwart us.”

Although Cavagnari’s intervention had been successful, Mayo complained that he had not been consulted before the troops left for Thal, and drew MacLeod’s attention to the delay in reporting the Darwesh Khel raids. As we saw in Chapter Three, Mayo was determined to play a more active role in frontier affairs than his predecessor, Lawrence. Particularly opposed to punitive military expeditions against the tribes, he wanted to make it more difficult for the Punjab government to conduct them without obtaining his permission. In future, he ordered, it should observe “the greatest promptitude ... in acquainting the Supreme government with all particulars, or with facts as soon as they are reported, as without such information, it is impossible for His Excellency in Council to determine upon the policy which should be pursued by the G.O.I.”

MacLeod defended his conduct vigorously; he had not reported the Darwesh Khel raid on Thal earlier because he had not received the Commissioner’s report. As for the question of responsibility for frontier management, the Supreme Government could not “at a distance ... feel the pulse of the tribes, as those on the spot are bound to do”. Even after the introduction of the telegraph, he said, the local authorities had used their own initiative when prompt action was needed, as it had been in this case. He trusted, he said, that he might still take action in emergencies without having to wait for the Governor-General’s permission. Mayo replied that his aim was not to stop him taking prompt action should it

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26 For details see, for example, Heathcote, ‘British Policy and Baluchistan’, p. 223, Chakravarty, From Khyber to Oxus, Chapter Three, Khan, England, Russia and Central Asia, pp. 139-144. In a letter to the Secretary of State (Argyll), Mayo quoted Pollock’s letter of May 1st, in which he said that there had already been “some excellent results” from the Amballa meeting (G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 213, 1 July 1869, L/P&S/5/263).

27 Quoted in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 213, 1 July 1869, L/P&S/5/263

28 See, for example, Chakravarty, From Khyber to Oxus, p. 115, Hunter, The Earl of Mayo, p. 113


30 G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 165-515, 25 May 1869, No. 149 June 1869 IP P438/6

31 Ibid.
be required, but to make sure that details of important events were transmitted quickly to him in future.\(^{32}\)

Cavagnari went up to Thal again in November with a detachment of the Fourth Punjab Cavalry and a hundred irregular sowars under Khwajah Muhammad Khan and some foot levies from the Miranzai villages, to try and sort out relations between the Darwesh Khels and the Turis.\(^{33}\) But there was another breakdown in communications, the Viceroy complaining that again he had not been informed of a trans-border military movement. He telegraphed the Commissioner on the 8th December ordering that if the troops had not moved they should not do so, and that any further action should be postponed until he had received a full report.\(^{34}\) But he was too late. Cavagnari had reached Thal on the 18th November, and next day the Darwesh Khel jirgas came in. The Amir had been requested to order the new Governor of Kurram, his son Sardar Wali Muhammad Khan, to send in the Turis, and they arrived on the 25th.\(^{35}\)

Assisted by Khwajah Muhammad Khan Khattak, and Muhammad Amin Khan, Thanadar of Gundiour, Cavagnari arranged another settlement. As Edwardes had done in 1856, Cavagnari insisted that even though they were not British subjects, the Turis should compensate the Tazi Khels for the 1866 raid because it had taken place on British territory. It was agreed that they should pay the Tazi Khel Rs.360 (the standard blood-price at this time), for each of the twelve men killed at Palosin in 1866, and Rs.50 for each of the six wounded. They should also pay compensation for stolen property, making a total, after Rs.1,080 had been deducted for three Turis killed by Darwesh Khels, of Rs.3,872. But to punish them for the part they had played in the Thal raid in 1869, Cavagnari decided that the Tazi Khels should not receive the money for one year. Through the Afghan authorities, the Turis were also to pay the Khojul Khels blood-money (Rs.1,080) for the three men killed in 1868 and 1869. The jirgas also gave an undertaking that the tribes would not attack each other in British territory again, and agreed that in future they would report any injury inflicted by one party on the other to the government within one month.\(^{36}\) Pollock

\(^{32}\) G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 775, 5 June 1869, No. 150 June 1869 IP P438/6
\(^{34}\) Mayo's attention was finally drawn to it by a letter from the Military Department and a reference in the Cabul Diary to the correspondence with the Amir on the subject (G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 1842P, 10 Dec. 1869, No. 311 Feb. 1870 IP P438/9, G.P. M.D. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 1176, 30 Nov. 1869, in No. 308 Feb. 1870 IP P438/9).
praised Cavagnari for his customary “tact and patience” in reaching this settlement. However, Mayo did not accept the Punjab government’s explanation for what he saw as its failure to keep him properly informed regarding developments on the frontier, and repeated his instruction that “in all matters of importance, more especially those in which it may appear necessary to move troops, it is desirable that early report may be made to the G.O.I.”

PASS RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DARWESH KHELS IN BANNU IN THE LATER 1860s -

As we saw in Chapter Three, a system of Pass Responsibility (P.R.) was in operation in the Bannu district. Particular passes were assigned to particular tribes, who were responsible for their security. In return these tribes’ lands were lightly assessed, and their Maliks were given the right to nominate recruits to the Frontier Militia, the number depending on the extent of their responsibility. By the mid-1860s the Maliks of most of the Darwesh Khel tribes which wintered in Bannu had appointments in it. The Jani Khel Maliks were responsible for the Shakhtu and Karaishta passes opposite their villages, and with the Bakka Khels for the Khaisora and Khisor passes to the north, in return for which they had four horsemen; the Bakka Khel Maliks were also solely responsible for the Tochi Pass, and had four horsemen. All the Bannu Ahmedzai tribes, except for the Muhammad Khels, had some sowars attached to the Gumutti, Kurram and Dhummai posts. The trans-border Khojul Khels also had two men in the militia at one point, but lost them.

Until the later 1860s these P.R. duties do not appear to have been very well-defined, and though the Darwesh Khels in Bannu did not like them, they were not greatly resented. This was partly at least because they were not excessively onerous. The

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38 G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 217P, 10 Dec. 1869, No. 319 Feb. 1870 IP P438/9. MacLeod argued that the Commissioner of Peshawar’s letter (No. 458, 15 May 1869) had made it quite clear that it was intended to settle disputes between Darwesh Khels and Turis in the autumn, and that some sort of military demonstration would be necessary (G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 398-166, 24 Dec. 1869, No. 318 Feb. 1870 IP P438/9). It appears that it was partly because he felt he was not kept properly informed of frontier developments, that in July 1870 Mayo ordered that officers in the Punjab were to submit certain types of political information directly to him (Papers Regarding British Relations, p. 88).
39 Urmston, Notes, p. 7
40 Urmston, Memo on P.R., 4 Aug. 1870, No. 43 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11, Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 80, 23 June 1870, in No. 277 Aug. 1870 IP P438/10. At the Dhummai post on the Thul, for example, there was one Hatti Khel, one Bodin Khel (Malik Reza Khan), two Bizan Khels (Malik Zurwur, son of Malik Mir Akbar, and Kaisur, bargir of Mir Akbar), and four Spirkais (two bargirs of Malik Mani Khan, and one of Najib Khan, and one other). The militiamen did not actually live inside the posts nor were they subject to regular military discipline (Urmston, Notes, p. 7).
41 Again the source does not explain why (MacGregor, C.A., I:3, p. 259).
Darwesh Khels were supposed to co-operate in preventing large scale raids and robberies, but were not answerable every time stolen property was taken through their passes, or some minor crime was committed by one of their members within British borders. Urmston commented that if a large party of raiders were known to be coming down by a particular pass, he would have expected the tribe responsible for that pass to inform him. But “I should certainly not have called them to account for petty acts of robbery, even of their clan”, he said, “for this would have involved a watch day and night and proved most harassing to them.”

In fact no particular problems developed with the Bannu Darwesh Khels while Urmston was in charge. He kept himself reasonably well-informed of developments along the border, commenting in 1866, for example, that fighting was likely to break out between the Bakka Khels and the trans-border Mohmit Khels because an influential Mohmit Khel Malik named Kipat had enticed away a Bakka Khel girl into the hills. “The case having occurred beyond the border is not one for any direct interference”, he pointed out, but “I have urged a general ‘jeerga’ of heads of other tribes as the only means of bringing about an amicable settlement”. The outcome is not recorded. It also appears to have been while Urmston was in Bannu that the hospital and dispensary were set up there, which the tribesmen were encouraged to use.

As was pointed out in Chapter Two, there was serious rivalry between the Punjab and Sind officials throughout this whole period. Space does not permit a full discussion of this here, but it is worth making a few points. The most consistent and vocal critic of Punjab policy was Bartle Frere, who, as we saw in Chapter Two, wrote a critical minute on the 1860 Mahsud expedition. In 1863 he wrote another in which he compared Punjab frontier management very unfavourably with that followed in Sind, claiming that it was expensive, inefficient and uncivilised. There were two main reasons, he argued. One was that in the Punjab military and civil responsibility were divided. The other, in his view more important, reason, was that the Punjab authorities relied too much on military force (in dealing with the Mahsuds for example). As a result, he claimed, Punjab frontier

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42 So, too,” he continued, “if large herds and flocks had been carried off and traced through a particular pass, I should have called upon the head-men of that pass to assist in recovering them, but in the case of a single camel or a few sheep it would have been unjust to make them answerable” (Urmston, Memo, 4 Aug. 1870, No. 43 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11).
43 Notes, pp. 20-21
44 Thorburn, Bannu, p. 60. A hospital was also set up at Kohat and a dispensary at Hangu (Memo by T.H. Thornton, S. to G.P., in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 28, 14 Feb. 1868, L/P&S/5/261).
management resembled the system adopted by the French in Algeria more than it did what he called the "English type".45

By now John Lawrence, one of the architects of the Punjab system, was Governor-General, and was in a position to comment on Frere's views in a minute of his own.46 As regards the issue of divided responsibility, he argued that the experiment of combining civil and military responsibility had been tried on the Punjab frontier and failed. We saw in Chapter Four that in the early 1850s John Coke commanded P.I.F. troops as well as being D.C. in Kohat, and that James Abbott had similarly combined military and civil powers in the Hazara district. But neither officer had been a very successful administrator, and Lawrence argued that it simply was not possible to find men sufficiently qualified to undertake military, political and civil duties along the frontier.47 As regards the second point, Lawrence pointed out, quite correctly, that the problems of frontier management were more complex along the Punjab border than in Sind, for various reasons. These included the proximity of the Punjab to Afghanistan, and through it to other states, as well as the nature of tribal organisation. The methods used in Sind would not, he insisted, work in the Punjab. Nevertheless, implicitly rejecting the comparison with the French policy in Algeria, the Punjab government had struck the right balance, he thought, between conciliating and punishing the "peculiarly fierce, warlike, and aggressive" tribes along its frontier. Recourse to punitive expeditions was, he said, becoming gradually rarer, and military expenditure had been reduced.48 All in all exposure to British rule was gradually exerting a 'civilising' effect upon the tribes.49

The Punjab authorities continued to argue subsequently that slowly but surely the frontier tribes were coming to accept British rule along the border, and recognise that they could not continue to raid and plunder as they had done. So, in the late 1860s, for example, the Secretary to the Punjab government, Thornton, noted that "we have not yet

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47 Ibid. For a brief if partial account of the events leading up to Abbott's resignation see Elliott, The Frontier, pp. 90-91.
48 The C. in C., Sir Hugh Rose, visited the Frontier in 1862, and wrote a report arguing that tribal policy had not been sufficiently based on "quick and certain retribution" when British rights were outraged. At the same time, he thought, greater efforts could be made to conciliate the tribes by granting them land in British territory (C. in C.'s Report of his Visit to the Frontier, in MSS EUR F90-23).
49 Minute by the Viceroy, L/P&S/S/5/257, pp. 623-647. Lawrence referred to an earlier minute by Robert Montgomery in which he had argued that "the various articles presented for sale in our bazaars are becoming necessaries of life for these men, and it is sign of amelioration in their condition that the Hill Chief, when summoned to attend a friendly "jirgir" or Council in the presence of a British Officer considers it necessary
succeeded in making the leopard change his spots.” Although “the Pathan in his native hills ... (was) still fickle and treacherous”, he claimed, not unreasonably, that “the constant and deadly hate of the days of Sikh rule is a thing of the past.”  

Similarly, the Punjab Administration Report (1869-70) claimed that as a result of the Punjab government’s policy of “conciliation backed by power”, “relations with the frontier tribes have improved, the border is more peaceable and there are signs of greater confidence in the power and justice of the British government”. In particular, the Punjab authorities were convinced that the policy of encouraging those who had begun to winter in Bannu to continue doing so, and to acquire more land and even stay the whole year round, was working. It was used as a model for dealing with other less amenable tribes like the Mahsuds, Bhittanis and the Bozdars.

In this connection, it is worth noting that what appears to have been a long-running war between the Mahsuds and the Darwesh Khels continued in the 1860s. Rather like the Punjab government, the Darwesh Khels tended to wait until their grievances against the Mahsuds had built up, and then undertake a large-scale expedition against them, usually it would appear without much success. Throughout the 1860s several skirmishes took place annually. Though lives were often lost on both sides, the Darwesh Khels appear to have the worst of these, and to have lost ground to the Mahsuds. The Jani Khels and the Bakka Khels seem to have been suffered most at this stage. They were gradually driven off their remaining land in the hills, becoming as a result more and more dependent on their property in Bannu.

In 1866 Najib Khan Sudan Khel died, leaving a son, Jalandar Shah, who was too young to succeed him, so Najib’s brother, Mani Khan, became the new head of the family and the section. Mani Khan was six and a half feet tall with “hands and feet like hams”.

His ambitions were in proportion, as he had pretensions to represent all the Ahmedzais (if for his own dignity to appear in a tolerably clean dress and equipment; in fact he has begun to respect himself and feel he is capable of a higher state of civilisation” (ibid.).

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51 P.A.R. 1869-70, G.S. pp. 20, 22
52 “Under this wise policy”, said Graham, “(they) have thriven and flourished, and become a real strength instead of weakness to the Government” (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 80, 23 June 1870, in No. 277 Aug. 1870 P438/10).
53 Harris, ‘British Policy on the N.-W. Frontier’, p. 333
54 Urmston, Notes, pp. 19-20
55 Bannu Gazetteer, pp. 69, 124. Since the mid-nineteenth century the Mahsuds have gradually driven the Darwesh Khels out of some of their best land in the hills, such as the Upper Baddar Valley and Chalweshiti, and moved onto the Umanzai lands overlooking Razmak (see, for example, Howell, Mizh, p. 32). Fighting flared up again in the 1920s, and there is still rivalry between them. Ahmed’s Resistance and Control deals with a recent crisis linked with it.
56 Caroe, The Pathans, p. 453
not all the Darwesh Khels) in Bannu. However, he faced considerable competition. There were other men of influence in his own tribe, such as Khowas Khan, who was described as its “chief fighting man”, and in the others, the Hatti Khels in particular. 57 In 1868 Azem Khan Hatti Khel, who, as we saw in the last chapter, had become one of the principal landowners in the Bannu Thal and an ally of the government, died. His son, Nizam Khan, took over from him, and became Mani Khan’s greatest rival among the Bannu Darwesh Khels.

In the later 1860s, however, the fact that the policy pursued towards the Darwesh Khels seemed to be working so well led to complacency, and the local authorities in Bannu seem to have forgotten that they still needed careful handling. Following Urmston’s departure in 1866, a number of different officers were in charge successively for short terms; in 1869 there was no British civil officer in Bannu while the court was in session at all. Towards the end of the year, the Assistant Commissioner, Septimus Thorburn, took charge because the D.C. was ill. 58 At the same time, the authorities began to impose more fines on the tribes. From 1858 to 1864 the Bannu Ahmedzais had been fined a total of Rs.821 in connection with obligations arising from their P.R. (an average of little more than Rs.117 p.a.). But during the next five and a half years, from 1865 to 1870, the total sum raised in P.R. fines was more than six times as much, Rs.4,069 or just under Rs.740 p.a. 59

The Muhammad Khels were the tribe most affected by this. They were a fairly small group with a total population of five or six hundred at the most, comprising seven ‘sections’, the Fatma Khel, Girani Khel, Lolia Khel, Mirza Khel, Ghazi Khel, Gulab (Khulal) Khel, and Koda Khel. 60 Having been fined once in 1860, 1866 and 1867, in 1869 they were fined five times because stolen property had been carried through their lands. In 1870 P.R. was enforced against them four times in the first five months of the

58 Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 80, 23 June 1870, in No. 277 Aug. 1870 IP P438/10. Thorburn eventually became the Financial Commissioner for the Punjab, and one of the principal advocates of the policy of rural protection pursued in the province which culminated in the 1901 Punjab Alienation of Land Act (see, for example, L. Wurgaft, The Imperial Imagination Magic and Myth in Kipling’s India (Middleton CT, 1983), pp. 40-41). He achieved some notoriety in 1897 when he bitterly denounced the ‘forward policy’ which the Viceroy, Elgin, had helped to introduce, in the latter’s presence (Harris, ‘British Policy on the N.-W. Frontier’, p. 277).
60 Four hundred and fifty two men, women and children surrendered to the government in September 1871 (see below), but some Muhammad Khels had stayed in British territory, and a few surrendered later, so they probably numbered about 500 in all. The Shondakas, a ‘holy lineage’, were associated with them, and formed an eighth section (MacGregor, C.A., I:3, p. 255, also D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 238, 16 June, 1870, in No. 277 Aug. 1870 IP P438/10, and D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., no number, in No. 41 Nov. 1870 IP P486/11).
year (though in one case the decision was reversed on appeal), and in the early summer court action was pending in the case of a robbery which had taken place across the border. In all they paid Rs.662 in fines in connection with P.R. in 1869-70 (out of a total of P.R. fines of Rs.906), more than any other tribe during the same period.

While Thorburn was acting A.C., Graham, the Commissioner, received two appeals from individual Ahmedzais living in Bannu in connection with P.R. which directly or indirectly involved Muhammad Khels, and a third which concerned Hatti Khels. But although he reversed Thorburn’s decisions in one of the Muhammad Khel cases as well as the Hatti Khel one, he does not appear to have made any effort to find out why these appeals, the first for many years, should have been made at this point.61 One of them was particularly important because a Muhammad Khel Malik, Fazl Shah Girani Khel, was involved. He had accused two other Muhammad Khels of killing his horse, and going against the opinion of a jirga, Thorburn had fined them Rs.100 and the money had been paid to Fazl Shah.

This rise in the number and size of the fines imposed on the Muhammad Khels under the P.R. rules reflected the fact that, after the death of Khani Khan in the early 1860s, the tribe had become less easy to handle. Khani Khan had been quite an active government supporter, and while he was alive the tribe did not allow robbers from other tribes to use their passes. After his death the Muhammad Khels fell to some degree under the influence of two men in particular, Fazl Shah Girani Khel and Madaman Fatma Khel. Madaman was a difficult man of “turbulent character”, while Fazl Shah “affected sanctity” as well as taking drugs.62 As we saw above, the Muhammad Khels were the only Darwesh Khel group in Bannu not to have any appointments in the Frontier Militia. This may have been because they were already more difficult than the others, but it meant that they had no incentive to co-operate with the authorities. By the late 1860s a gang of twenty or thirty Muhammad Khels, sometimes assisted by Bannuchis and Mahsuds, were rustling animals and robbing houses all along that part of the border. Normally the other tribesmen, who were greatly in the majority, would have checked them, or at least prevented them using their passes, but they had no incentive to do so.63

So the nature of the offences for which the Muhammad Khels’ P.R. was invoked did become more serious at the end of the decade. For example, the case for which they had been fined in 1867 involved the theft of two ponies and a mule (for which they paid

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62 D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 304, 6 Aug. 1870, in No. 42 Nov. 1870 P438/11, Thorburn, Bannu, pp. 71-72
63 Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 80, 23 June 1870, in No. 277 Aug. 1870 IP P438/10
Rs. 70), and the 1869 cases also involved thefts of small numbers of animals. But in January 1870 Muhammad Khels kidnapped Ganga, the son of a wealthy Hindu, who had been to one of their hamlets near the Kurram post to arrange the transport of grain he had purchased, and left him with some Abd al-Rahman Khel Mahsuds. The Muhammad Khel jirga admitted responsibility, but did not try to secure his release. They had, Thorburn thought, decided to make this a test case for the whole P.R. system, and “all the other sections of the Ahmedzai, being interested parties themselves, awaited the result with deep concern and secretly applauded the action taken by the Muhammad Khel jirga”. So, early in February, he imprisoned four prominent Muhammad Khels, Fazl Shah Girani Khel, Gulabdin Ghazi Khel, Bari Lolia Khel, and Madaman’s brother, announcing that they would not be released until Ganga was returned, and raised Rs. 500 as security from the Maliks. This appears to have been the first time that any of the Darwesh Khels Maliks had been treated in this way, and it was much resented. However, early in March Madaman’s brother was released and he went into the hills, paid Rs. 180 ransom and returned with Ganga two weeks later. The other hostages were released, and Rs. 180 and a fine of Rs. 50 were collected from the rest of the tribe and paid to him. As this appears to have been the first time that members of a Darwesh Khel section with land in Bannu carried out a kidnapping of this kind, it is perhaps not surprising that Thorburn reacted by detaining the Maliks, but by doing so he upset the men who should have been government’s supporters. The fine which was imposed on the whole tribe caused further dissatisfaction, especially as Thorburn himself later admitted that only a small number of Muhammad Khels had been involved.

The harsh treatment of the Muhammad Khels reflected a general tendency to less sensitive and more impersonal tribal management in Bannu, as well as the fact that the tribe was becoming more difficult to deal with. However, there was another serious incident in February when a gang of Muhammad Khels (reportedly assisted by some Mahsuds) attacked a caravan travelling from Bannu to Dawar. The caravan was being escorted by other Muhammad Khels and Hassan Khels, but the Muhammad Khel escort made no attempt to repel the attack, and though the Hassan Khels fought back, Rs. 600 or Rs. 700 worth of property was looted. Some of it later turned up in the houses of Muhammad

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64 State't of Border Offences in which Muhammad Khels were concerned (late Acting D.C. Ban., in G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 272-1006, 27 Aug. 1870, in No. 29 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11). State't of cases showing fines inflicted on Ahmedzais settled in British territory on account of P.R., in ibid.

65 Thorburn, Bannu, p. 73

66 “The circumstances of the case, I consider, demanded the strong measures I resorted to”, Thorburn said subsequently (State’t of Border Offences, in G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 272-1006, 27 Aug. 1870, in No. 29 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11).

Khels in British territory. In March Muhammad Khels robbed another caravan on its way to Dawar which was also supposedly under Muhammad Khel escort.\footnote{68}

While these and earlier cases had been under investigation, the Indian officials, in particular the Tehsildar and the Kotwal (mayor), treated some of the Muhammad Khels very insensitively.\footnote{69} The Kotwal, Foujdar Khan Alizai’s brother, Ghulam Muhammad Khan, had made himself “generally obnoxious to the Wuzeerees by using harsh and abusive language in his dealings with them”.\footnote{70} But the Tehsildar, Attaullah Khan, who was responsible for allocating pass responsibility, and for carrying out the D.C.’s orders for its enforcement, behaved particularly tactlessly. Most provokingly, during the investigation into the Ganga case, he threatened to have Fazl Shah and Madaman’s beards shaved if they did not do what he wanted. This threat achieved great notoriety, and the story spread throughout the Derajat. Not surprisingly the Muhammad Khels were outraged, and they were further provoked, for example, when the attendant pushed Fazl Shah, who had been waiting on the verandah to see the D.C., to the ground because he did not move quickly enough when summoned. He is said to have cried with vexation at the indignity.\footnote{71}

In fact, as a result of the increase in P.R. fines and insensitive treatment by the local officials, by the early summer of 1870 most of the Bannu Darwesh Khels were unhappy with the way things were developing.\footnote{72} A drought towards the end of the decade probably caused some hardship as well; there is no doubt that it added to the Muhammad Khels’ grievances. Towards the end of May 1870 the water in the Kurram was lower than it been

\footnote{68} They stole Rs.180 of merchandise. Five Muhammad Khels were arrested and were later released. Thorburn later pointed out that he had decided not to seek redress in several other cases including the theft of Rs.150 worth of property in March by Muhammad Khels assisted by Mahsuds from a Hindu trader, in the Baran pass which led into Dawar, a mile or two from the border (A.C. Ban. to D.C. Ban., no number, 18 June 1870, in No. 38 Jan. 1871 IP P738).


\footnote{70} D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 304, 6 Aug. 1870, in No. 42 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11. For details of Foujdar Khan Alizai see Chapter One, footnote 172); their father, Hafiz Ahmed Khan, had been Tehsildar of Bannu, and was killed during the Mahsud expedition in 1860 (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 92, 12 July 1870, in No. 34 Nov. 1870 P438/11, D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 290, 13 May 1872, in A11 July 1872 P142).

\footnote{71} On another occasion the Tehsildar ordered the court officials to catch hold of and pull the tongue of a man who had a case in court - State’t of Grievances by Ahmedzai Malik’s, in G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 274-1002, 30 Aug. 1870, in No. 48 Nov. 1870 P438/11. See also Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 115, 11 Aug. 1870, in No. 42 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11

\footnote{72} Although Thorburn went fishing in the hills with some of the leading men of the tribe towards the end of March, and found them perfectly friendly, he was aware, he said, that the Muhammad Khels were not pleased with the way that P.R. had been enforced recently. He later admitted that he had been expecting them to send in a petition asking either to be made exempt from it or to be given some sowars in the Frontier Militia (S.S. Thorburn to F. Graham, d.o., 10 June 1870, in No. 38 Jan. 1871 IP P758, Com.
for many years. Those living upstream customarily had the first right to water, one which was always jealously guarded. However, when the Muhammad Khels and Daud Shah Bannuchis, whose lands were highest upstream, were found to be using all the available water on their own fields, the local authorities instructed them not to do so. Madaman, an excitable man who had been closely involved in the kidnapping case, was not the only Muhammad Khel to be affected by this decision.73 As a result, by the early summer many of them were very seriously aggrieved at the way they had been treated by the local officials, and the other Darwesh Khels in Bannu were sufficiently discontented as well to encourage them to make some sort of protest at the way the district was being administered.74

THE ATTACK ON THE DETACHMENT -

Like most of the other Darwesh Khels with land in Bannu, customarily in early summer the majority of the Muhammad Khels left British territory and moved into the hills. Early in June 1870, however, the Kotwal reported that they were planning to go off into the hills in unusually large numbers, and the Tehsildar sent them a message requesting them to come in and talk things over. Thorburn, who was at the government rest station at Sheikh Budin near Peyzu, spotted the note in the diary. Aware that the Muhammad Khels were discontented, he began to make enquiries when he returned to Bannu on the 8th.75 In the meantime, the Muhammad Khel Maliks had not replied to the Tehsildar’s request, but had gone off on the 8th without paying their respects to the local officials as was customary. They collected not far away in Dawar, which, as we saw in the last chapter, was claimed by Kabul but was in practice independent.76

On the 10th Thorburn spoke to the Muhammad Khels who had stayed behind. They explained that the others had gone off into the hills very suddenly and in larger numbers than usual because of the threat from the Mahsuds.77 In 1869 the Langar Khel

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75 The Muhammad Khels had sold some of their personal property at a loss, according to an entry in the Kotwal’s diary (S.S. Thorburn to R.T. Hare, d.o., 10 June 1870, in No. 38 Jan 1871 IP P758). Thorburn also advised the Officer Commanding Outposts, Captain Charles Smith McLean, who in turn alerted the posts.
76 S.S. Thorburn to R.T. Hare, d.o., 10 June 1870, in No. 38 Jan. 1871 IP P758
77 At least three-quarters of the Muhammad Khels, Thorburn commented, went into the hills each summer. They had 127 houses in British territory; he found only twenty still occupied when he paid his visit (A.C.
Alizais had defeated the Spirkai Darwesh Khels in the hills, and Mani Khan was reportedly trying to organise them to prevent it happening again, so this was a plausible reason for the Muhammad Khels' unusual behaviour, and there were others. However, Graham did think that something out of the ordinary was happening, and that the Muhammad Khels' "recent rudeness" was their way of making a petition and registering a protest. But, he told the new D.C., Captain Richard Hare (Artillery), "the great thing (was) ... not to let these savages get out of control". The Muhammad Khels should be given no encouragement until they expressed their grievances in a proper way, and, unless actually unjust, Thorburn's decisions should be upheld. So messages were sent to them requesting the leading men to come in and state their grievances.

After leaving Bannu, the Muhammad Khels had assembled on the Lower Dawar plain a little to the north of Ipi village. On the evening of the 12th June about one hundred and fifty men from all the different sections gathered to decide how they should respond to the government's request for them to go in and state their grievances. They agreed that P.R. had become an intolerable burden for all the Bannu Darwesh Khels, and that it was up to them to bring this to the attention of the government. Most of them felt that it would be sufficient to send a petition or deputation. But Madaman. Fazl Shah and Joomaraz (also a Girani Khel) stirred them up with some impassioned oratory, and they set off for British territory determined to make some violent protest. Men from all sections did take part, albeit only a few in some cases. Whereas, for instance, thirty-seven Mirza Khels took part, only two men from the Ghazi Khel did so. Nor was the Ghazi Malik Gulabdin involved either, even though he had been detained by Thorburn earlier in the year. In all, only about half the ‘fighting men’ joined the protest.

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78 They had prepared their land for the summer sowing and sown some of it, as well as paying some of their rabi tax, and left household goods and grain in sanctuary at a shrine just inside the border, close to the mouth of the Kurram, hardly a safe place had they really intended to "do badi", as Thorburn put it (A.C. to D.C. Ban., no number, 18 June 1870, in No. 38 Jan. 1871 IP P758). It subsequently turned out that they had also left much of their property with their Bannu friends or with Hindu traders (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 291, 1 Aug. 1870, in No. 38 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11).

79 F. Graham to R.T. Hare, d.o., 11 June 1870, in No. 38 Jan. 1871 IP P758

80 Thorburn, Bannu, pp. 75-76

81 This was the village from which the Faqir of Ipi came (see below p. 216).

82 They also drew up a petition to the authorities asserting that they were too poor to carry the burden of P.R., and that they had been unjustly deprived of water and abused by certain native officials (D.C. Ban. to Com., D.D., No. 238, 16 June 1870, in No. 38 Jan. 1871 IP P758). It subsequently turned out that they had also left much of their property with their Bannu friends or with Hindu traders (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 291, 1 Aug. 1870, in No. 38 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11).

During the small hours of the 13th June about one hundred and twenty Muhammad Khels (and some men from the Dawar villages of Musakki and Hyder Khel), using the river bank as cover, came down behind the low hills in front of the Kurram post. This had been constructed fairly recently, replacing an older building. The Muhammad Khels were able to hide behind the walls of the latter, and just before daylight the relief of ten men from the Fourth Sikh infantry marched by. The Muhammad Khels fired on them from about fifteen yards range, taking them completely by surprise, and shouting as they did so “Tehsildar Sahib, will you shave our beards now?” A Naik and five sepoys were killed immediately and the Havildar was wounded. The ten cavalrymen who formed the other half of the detachment and were a little way behind when the Muhammad Khels began firing, rode towards them as fast as they could. The cavalrymen from the post galloped out as well, but the Muhammad Khels were able to retreat up the river bed. The cavalry could not approach them, although they fired on them, killing one and wounding three, before they got away into the hills.

Thirty Muhammad Khels in British territory were taken hostage, the goods the other tribesmen had left in British territory were seized, and a reverse blockade was imposed on them. Defensive precautions were belatedly taken by the Military. In the meantime Mani Khan and the other Maliks submitted a petition to the officer commanding outposts, Captain Charles McLean (3rd E.R.). In this they alleged that the Kotwal and the Tehsildar had treated them disrespectfully, and had taken advantage of the frequent turnover of the British officers to fine them for crimes they had not committed. In fact all the Darwesh Khels in Bannu appeared to be dangerously discontented; for a few days the position seemed critical, and the authorities were very anxious. The real danger was, Graham said, that the other Ahmedzai settlers might join the Muhammad Khels; “the least

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86 These included the issue of arms to the Bannu villages which were vulnerable to attack, strengthening the garrison of the Kurram post, and sending twenty cavalry sent to support the Bannu and Tochi Frontier Militia posts (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 291, 1 Aug. 1870, in No. 38 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11, extract from Punjab Gazette, in No. 389 Jan. 1872 IP P763).
87 McLean, who commanded the 1st Punjab Cavalry from 1862 to 1882, took part in the 1881 Mahsud expedition, and after being stationed on the Perso-Afghan border in the mid-1880s, was consul-general in Meshed from 1888 to 1891 (R. Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India 1884-1892, p. 260, I.O.L. Biographical File 9).
88 State’t of Grievances submitted to Captain McLean, in No. 48 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11
89 McLean suggested that unless their grievances were listened to by a European officer, they would become “declared enemies” (Off. Co’ing O.s Ban. to D.C. Ban., No. 31F, 18 June 1870, in No. 38 Jan. 1871 IP P758).
frightening them, at this juncture, would have this effect, and a powerful combination would at once be formed".90

Reaching Bannu on the 15th June, Hare summoned Mani Khan and the other Maliks, and held several meetings with them over the next fortnight.91 They asserted that the Muhammad Khels had left Bannu because the burden of P.R. had been too rigorously enforced in recent years, and the native officials had been harsh and insulting. They all shared the Muhammad Khels' grievances, Mani Khan said, and could no longer be held responsible for the passes as before.92 They also demanded that the Muhammad Khels who had not taken part in the attack on the troops should be pardoned, and those seized in British territory released. Hare promised that there would be an enquiry into the P.R. system, but insisted that the Muhammad Khels would have to be punished, and no exceptions could be made for those who had not taken part in the attack.93

On the 18th the Bakka Khel and Jani Khel Utmanzai Maliks came in to announce that they too could no longer be held responsible for their passes, and for a few days the position seemed critical.94 However, by playing on rivalries among the Ahmedzais, and making it clear to them just how much they had to lose, Hare was able to win over the Hatti Khel, Sirki Khel and Painda Khel maliks, who belonged to the faction opposed to Mani Khan. The danger that all the Bannu Darwesh Khels might combine against the government passed. The Bizan Khel maliks followed, and then the Umarzai maliks still in Bannu agreed to co-operate in their turn.95 Mani Khan had been outmanoeuvred, and he responded by withdrawing to the sidelines.96

As for the Muhammad Khels themselves, Graham thought, the fact that they had no villages and very little cultivation in the hills, and that their camps were widely scattered

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92 Mani Khan's tone, "although perfectly respectful, showed ... that the different clans wished to take advantage of what they fancied was a time of pressure, in order to (obtain) concessions which would benefit the whole tribe, and that they wished us to believe that they would all combine with a view to force us to grant them" (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 253, 27 June 1870, in No. 38 Jan. 1871 IP P758).
93 Ibid.
94 Hare thought that "the work of twenty years might be undone in a moment and several thousand British subjects converted into hostile robbers" (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 253, 27 June 1870, in No. 38 Jan. 1871 IP P758).
95 Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 114, 10 Aug. 1870, in No. 41 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11
96 The authorities were suspicious of him because his section's summer quarters were at the same place as the Muhammad Khels and they were close to each other in genealogical terms (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 253, 27 June 1870, in No. 38 Jan. 1871 IP P758, D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 663, 28 Nov. 1871, in No. 344 March 1872 IP P763).
and too far away for surprise, meant that a punitive expedition was out of the question.\textsuperscript{97} Their surrender could best be achieved, he thought, by depriving them of access to their land in British territory (which produced crops worth Rs.9,000 per year).\textsuperscript{98} This policy of starving the Muhammad Khels into submission was also recommended by Sir Henry Durand, who had replaced MacLeod as Lt. Governor at the beginning of June 1870.\textsuperscript{99} The responsibility of the Muhammad Khels as a whole was upheld, and although in the first few weeks after the attack several Maliks did offer to come in with their followers, Graham refused to allow this. Those who were well-disposed towards the government would have no incentive to put pressure on the others to surrender if they were allowed to cultivate, he said. They might send food to their fellow-tribesmen in the hills, and in any case, he said, all the Muhammad Khels were “guilty as principals or abettors”.\textsuperscript{100}

Durand censured both Graham and Lt.-Colonel P.F. Gardiner (29th N.I.), the Officer commanding at Bannu, for taking too long to report the attack on the troops in the first place, and for doing so in insufficient detail.\textsuperscript{101} But he was particularly critical of the Military authorities because he thought that it was their carelessness and complacency which had made it possible for the attack on the troops to take place, and Mayo agreed with him. Indeed they do seem to have been negligent. Not only had they failed to demolish the old Kurram post, behind which the Muhammad Khels had been able to hide as the troops approached, when the new one was built, but they had allowed a small body of men to move up to the border when a large body of disaffected tribesmen were known to have gathered just across it.\textsuperscript{102} To begin with, Thorburn, the acting A.C., was also blamed for not having given any warning of the Muhammad Khels’ unusual behaviour, but it subsequently became clear that he had drawn the attention of the military authorities and his superiors to it, and had investigated it himself. “Conscious of rectitude of purpose himself, and only slowly able to bring himself to suspect the reverse in those with whom he is dealing”, his error consisted, it was decided, in taking a more favourable view of the character and temper of the Muhammad Khels than they deserved.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{97} They had a small amount of cultivation at Tauda China (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 114, 10 Aug. 1870, in No. 41 Nov. 1870 IPP438/11).
\textsuperscript{98} Not that they would get much help from the other tribes, he thought; the Mahsuds, for example, were too preoccupied with the new post at Kot Kirghi to do much (see Chapter Three) (ibid.).
\textsuperscript{100} Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 85, 7 July 1870, in No. 32 Nov. 1870 IPP438/11
\textsuperscript{101} In fact the Lt. Governor first heard about the attack on the troops in a private letter on the 18th June, but Graham did not send an official report until the 23rd June, ten days after it had taken place (G.P. to Com. D.D., No. 787, 6 July 1870, in No. 277 Aug. 1870 IPP438/10). Not until the 21st June did a report from Gardiner reach the Punjab government (G.P. M.D. to B.G.-P.F.F., No. 2087, 1 July 1870, in No. 283 Aug. 1870 IPP438/10).
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} It was “a failure of experience; which the events themselves will have helped to remedy” (G.P. to Com.
Durand and Graham debated the reasons for the Muhammad Khels' discontent and the attack on the troops for some months. There were two principal points at issue. The first was the extent to which the fact that a number of different men had been in charge at Bannu in the later 1860s had contributed to the more rigorous and insensitive enforcement of P.R. by Thorburn and the Indian officials, and to the way the latter had abused and insulted the latter. How far had it contributed to the breakdown of communications with the Bannu Ahmedzais as a whole? Graham argued that it had played an important part, because none of the Deputy Commissioners had been left at Bannu long enough for them to supervise the native officials properly.\textsuperscript{104}

The second issue was the extent to which the abolition of the Judicial Commissioner and the introduction of the jurisdiction of the new Chief Court in 1866 in the Punjab had contributed to a deterioration in law and order in the Bannu district as a whole. Graham maintained that the insistence on the production of strict legal evidence had made it very difficult to obtain convictions in cases in which the identity of criminals was known to the local authorities, but witnesses were reluctant to testify against them.\textsuperscript{105} The problems with the Darwesh Khels' P.R. should be seen, he said, in the context of the increasingly lawless climate which had developed in the district as a result.\textsuperscript{106} To begin with, Durand rejected these arguments, but, as we shall see in the next chapter, eventually he and his successor, Davies, did come round to accepting them, and some important modifications were made to frontier administration.\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{104} Although they had not actually been treated unjustly or severely, the Ahmedzais' P.R. had been "too indiscriminately and summarily enforced" in recent years, he commented. In particular, he thought that the Ganga case in which Rs.230 had been imposed in fines, taken with the water problem, had been "calculated to exasperate" the Muhammad Khels (Com. D.D., to G.P., No. 106, 1 Aug. 1870, in No. 37 Nov. 1870 IP P348/11, State't former acting D.C., 16 June 1870, in No. 38 Jan. 1871 IP P758).

\textsuperscript{105} He argued that it was partly thanks to this that from 1865 to 1869, there had been seventy-eight murders in Bannu, whereas in the previous five years there had been only forty-eight (Com. D.D. to G.P. to Registrar/Chief Court, Punjab, No. 111, 8 Aug. 1870, in No. 37 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11; see also Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 80, 23 June 1870, in No. 277 Aug. 1870, IP P438/10, Com. D.D. to Reg./Ch.Ct., No. 69, 28 July 1870, in No. 37 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11).


\textsuperscript{107} G.P. to Com. D.D., No. 865, 21 July 1870, in No. 38 Jan. 1871 IP P758
THE MUHAMMAD KHELS OUTLAWED -

Over the next fourteen months the Muhammad Khels carried out a series of raids and robberies, in which men who had not participated in the attack on the troops, such as Malik Gulabdin Ghazi Khel, also joined.108 One of their main targets was the Kurram outpost, because this covered the approach to the land they owned in Bannu, and on the 30th August they actually managed to destroy the dam which collected water for the post.109 The government responded by sanctioning the construction of two new towers, one to protect the dam itself, the other to make it more difficult for them to reach their land unobserved.110

The Muhammad Khels were accustomed to spending the summer in the hills, but to survive there during the winter they needed help. This they mostly obtained from Dawar (as we have seen some Dawars were reported to have joined them in the attack on the Kurram relief).111 Without the Dawars' help the Muhammad Khels would probably not have been able to survive in the hills for as long as they did. The Dawars distributed them in their different villages and gave them land to till, and often accompanied them in their raids. In particular, the people of Hyder Khel sheltered the Ghazi Khel section led by Malik Gulabdin, and Mir Khan, the village's principal Malik, appears to have helped other Muhammad Khels in various ways.112

The Dawars could afford to help them because they did not rely on access to British territory. They may have been willing to support the Muhammad Khels partly because they saw their struggle against the British authorities as a kind of jihad against Christian rule along the frontier. As we saw above, Fazl Shah Girani Khel was a religious man, and Lower Dawar in particular contained a number of mosques and madrassahs, and attracted students from a wide area. In a comment which reveals a great deal about British attitudes, Munro later said contemptuously that it was "only thanks to the dictation of the Talib-ilms and the priests that the Dawaris ever displayed any martial spirit at all, the result of a dark, unquestioning fanaticism rather than of patriotic feeling".113

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108 Gulabdin's section, the Ghazi Khel, appear to have been less dependent on land in British territory than the others (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 672, 1 Dec. 1871, in No. 353 March 1872 IP P763, Thorburn, Bannu, p. 79).
110 An old tower which covered the nullah leading into the Kurram which the Muhammad Khels had used to gain access to the dam unobserved was also rebuilt (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 17, 16 Jan. 1872, in A16 Feb. 1872 P142).
111 Com. D.D. to G.P., No 114, 10 Aug. 1870, in No. 41 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11
112 For example, he looked after thirty-four camels stolen from the Bannu Thul until they could be disposed of (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 35C, 10 Feb. 1872, in No. 456 March 1872 IP P763).
113 Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 35C, 10 Feb. 1872, in No. 456 March 1872 IP P438/11. The importance of Dawar as a religious centre in this period would probably reward further investigation.
In August the Muhammad Khels were reported to be receiving some help from Khost as well. Graham suggested that Amir Sher Ali Khan might be requested to issue instructions to the Governor to put a stop to this, but Durand thought this would give an impression of government weakness. In the meantime the Muhammad Khels continued to harass the border, and received some assistance from other Ahmedzais as well as the Dawars. For example, during the night of the 1st January 1871 about fifty of them, with some Umarzais, attacked a village a few miles away from the cantonments and carried off a Hindu and some cattle. As the raiders’ tracks led into a branch of the Gumutti Pass for which the Umarzais were partly responsible, an Umarzai Malik and a Bizan Khel Malik from another settlement nearby were arrested. On the 30th January four or five Muhammad Khels broke into the house of a Hindu family in the village of Mani Khan’s rival, the leading Bannuchi Malik, Assad Khan, in the Daudshah tappeh, killing one man and carrying off another.

However, Henry Davies, who, as we saw in Chapter Three, took over as Lt.-Governor early in 1871, visited Bannu in March, and talked to many of the Darwesh Khel Maliks, including Mani Khan. They spoke bitterly about the oppressive and unjust conduct of some of the native officers. “The crimes of others are attributed to us”, they complained, and “the British officers listen to what is told them by their Moonshees and never to us. Every peon with a badge is our master”. Davies continued to insist that the government would not settle for anything less than the surrender of the men who had carried out the attack on the detachment, but the Maliks were pleased that he had taken the trouble to listen to their grievances. Mani Khan was especially gratified to be taken into confidence again, and began to use his influence to persuade the Muhammad Khels to surrender. Graham was also authorised to send for the Dawar jirga and warn them to

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115 For example, on the 10th December 1870 they plundered a caravan on its way to Kohat under Hassan Khel escort of four laden animals, worth Rs.800 (Off. Co’ing O.s Ban. to S.S. Off., No. 103, 11 Dec. 1870, in No. 131 May 1871 IP P759).
116 A.C. to D.C. Ban., no number, 2 Jan. 1871, in No. 118 May 1871 IP P759. Another serious incident occurred on the 12th February when a party of some seventy Muhammad Khels attacked the village of Lakhi, only eight or nine hundred yards from the Gumutti post. They killed two people, but were pursued by the pickets and forced to retreat leaving their booty behind them (P.A.R. 1870-71, p. 55). Mayo commented unfavourably on the fact that the Muhammad Khels were able to carry out these raids (there were six between December 8th 1870 and the 12th February 1871), and nearly always got away scot-free (G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 674P, 1 April 1871, No. 138 May 1871 IP P759).
117 D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 64, 1 Feb. 1871, in No. 130 May 1871 IP P759
118 P.A.R. 1870-71, p. 137
119 Punjab Gazette, 28 Dec. 1871, extract in No. 389 Jan. 1872 IP P763
120 G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 674P, 1 April 1871, in A9 July 1872 P142
stop helping the Muhammad Khels.\textsuperscript{121} Davies thought that men who knew something about the tribes should have charge of relations with them, and early in 1871 Hare, who did not speak Pashtu, was replaced by Captain James Johnstone, who did. Muhammad Hyat Khan, who had considerable local experience, was appointed to assist him, and a month or two later Munro, who as we have seen had previously held several frontier appointments, took over as Commissioner.\textsuperscript{122} Davies also held a meeting with the frontier officers at Peyzu on the 5th March 1871, to explore ways of improving the frontier administration, and it was agreed that the Frontier Militia should be remodelled.\textsuperscript{123} I look at these developments in more detail in the next chapter.

In the meantime the border continued to be disturbed. On the 24th March, for example, a party consisting of Muhammad Khels, with some Umarzais, Kabul Khels, Tori Khels and Mahsuds, skirmished with the garrison of the Kurram outpost, and an Umarzai was killed.\textsuperscript{124} In April three Muhammad Khels tried to steal some barley (one of them was killed), which suggests that they may have begun to starve by then. They appear to have been getting less support from the Dawars than before, and in May the first reports of their willingness to surrender began to be received.\textsuperscript{125} But they were still unwilling to do so unconditionally, and the raids continued. On the 1st of May for instance, Malik Gulabdin Ghazi Khel led a raid on a village not far from the Gumutti post, in which Sudan Khels from the village of Gumutti were reportedly involved.\textsuperscript{126} However, the Muhammad Khels

\textsuperscript{121} G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 913, 11 July 1872, in A9 July 1872 P142
\textsuperscript{122} G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 206S, 2 Oct. 1871, in No. 709 Oct. 1871 IP P761. Muhammad Hyat Khan belonged to a family of "some standing distinguished for its loyalty to the British Government in the Rawalpindi District". He was Nicholson's aide-de-camp on his last campaign, and after the Mutiny he entered the Civil Department and distinguished himself in Settlement work and political duties on the frontier, in particular serving as Extra A.C. in Bannu for some years in the mid-1860s (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 267, 1 May 1872, in A12 Sep. 1872 P142, Urmston, Notes, p. 8). An expert on the Pashtun tribes, he was the author of the \textit{Havat-i-Afghan}, an examination of Darwesh Khel customary law (transl. by H. Priestley as \textit{Afghanistan and its Inhabitants} (Lahore, 1981) (Janata and Hassas, A.L., 3, p. 83).
\textsuperscript{125} Madaman got in touch with the Umarzai Maliks and the Bannuchi Malik Assad Khan (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D. No. 222, 17 April 1871, in No. 166 May 1871 IP P759, D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 330, 22 May 1871, No. 374 June 1871 IP P759). In April Muhammad Khels, led by Madaman's nephew, Khan Shah, also murdered the mail runner from Bannu to Kohat, and stole the mailbag. They had been sheltered before the attack in the Sudan Khel village of Gumutti, and the empty bag was left there afterwards (D.C. Ban. to G.P., No. 448, 24 July 1871, in A18 Aug. 1871 P141, D.C. Ban. to D.C. Kohat, No. 10, 22 May 1871, in A30 Aug. 1871 P141).
went deeper into the hills during the summer and no raids were reported in June, July or August.

Meanwhile government officers continued to be in touch with them informally through, it would appear, Mani Khan in particular. Later in August Munro went to Bannu, and two friendly Maliks (probably Mani Khan and Mir Akbar Bizan Khel) brought him a petition signed by various leading Muhammad Khels including Madaman, Fazl Shah, and Gulabdin. In it they requested permission to come in a body to Bannu to surrender and throw themselves on the mercy of government (to carry out nanawatai, as they put it).\textsuperscript{127} Munro agreed that if they were prepared to make a complete surrender, they should be allowed to cross the border. On the morning of the 20th a large number of the tribesmen came into to Bannu in a body, “with their families, cattle and all their property, one hundred and sixty-eight men, one hundred and twenty-four women, one hundred and sixty children”. “When all had assembled, the leaders ... came forward and made obeisance, depositing their arms at my feet”, reported Munro, “they filed past, some with heads bare and turban cloths stretched over their bended heads in token of entire submission”.\textsuperscript{128} Many of them were literally starving. Some of the women and children sat huddling together in the background, but others “spread themselves like locusts over the garden and devoured greedily every edible green thing they could find”.\textsuperscript{129} Initially, fourteen of the Maliks were taken into custody, and the rest of the tribe was located on the Thul on the security of Mani Khan and other leading Darwesh Khel Maliks.

As far as their punishment was concerned, Johnstone thought that the fact that the Muhammad Khels had surrendered meant that the government’s honour had been upheld. He pointed out that, although according to Pashtun ideas such a surrender was supposed to release the wrong-doer from having to pay any penalty, the Muhammad Khels knew that the government could not go as far as this, and were in any case accustomed to the idea of paying bloodprice in murder cases.\textsuperscript{130} He and Munro eventually decided that the eighty

\textsuperscript{127} Com. D.D. to G.P., Tel., 9 Sep. 1871, No. 307 Sep. 1871 IP P760. In the petition the Muhammad Khels said that “instigated by wrongheadedness and satanic pride, we committed offences against the British Government, and as a punishment for these offences, we have for a lengthened period, been in a miserable and unsettled state. We see no hope of a livelihood or of any security, except through the favour of Government”. “We repent of our past misdeeds, and promise amendment for the future. We are ashamed of our acts and implore mercy”, it concluded. Other signatories included Zasseen Fatma Khel, Joomaraz Girani Khel, and Bari Mirza Khel (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 261, 22 Sep. 1871, in No. 710 Oct. 1871 IP P761).

\textsuperscript{128} All the leading Maliks and able-bodied fighting men surrendered unconditionally, apart from Fazl Shah, who did so later (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{129} As Munro put it “the scene was a remarkable one in every respect, and without a precedent in my frontier experience of sixteen years” (ibid., Thorburn, Bannu, p. 81).

\textsuperscript{130} “A whole tribe coming down thus, and throwing down its arms, making an unconditional surrender, is a thing unprecedented amongst the Afghans”, Johnstone said, “and a proud race like the Wazirs’ having done so, is still to be wondered at. What a blow it must have been to their pride, and how they have been
men who had actually taken part in the attack on the troops should each pay Rs.50 compensation, and the other forty who had remained in reserve Rs.30 each, while the tribe as a whole should also pay an additional fine of Rs.1,000. They also recommended that six ‘ringleaders’ should be sentenced to terms of imprisonment in the Lahore jail, and eight others should each pay a fine of Rs.100, making a total of Rs.7,000.131 Commenting that the tribe had been deeply humiliated and the government’s power convincingly asserted, and that to impose severer penalties would look like revenge, and would “fail to produce the desired effect upon the border tribes”, Davies supported these proposals, which were sanctioned by the Viceroy.132 By the end of October the tribe had borrowed money from Hindu moneylenders and friendly Bannuchi Maliks and paid the fine in full, and was permitted to take over its lands again.133

It was decided that Madaman Fatma Khel, Shah Jahan Girani Khel and Bari Lolia Khel should each be imprisoned for five years, and Zahid Gulab Khel, Doulat Mirza Khel and Jabul Koda Khel for three.134 When it came to choosing the men who should pay the extra fine or be imprisoned, the principal aim seems to have been not so much to punish those who had actually been responsible for inciting and leading the attack on the troops or the subsequent raids. Rather, in keeping with the principle of ‘tribal responsibility’, it was not only to make sure that someone from each of the sections was made to suffer, even if they had not all been equally culpable, but also to ensure that a hold was kept over the tribe in the future. In other words, although as British subjects the Muhammad Khels could not be hostages, they were to be used for all intents and purposes as such, and so influential men, or their close relatives, chosen from as wide a spread of sections as possible were sent to Lahore.135


131 Johnstone originally requested that they be treated as hostages, but Munro pointed out that because they were British subjects this was not possible. They would have to be imprisoned for specific periods (ibid., Com. to G.P., No. 267, 22 Sep. 1871, in No. 710 Oct. 1871 IP P761).
134 Com. to G.P., No. 267, 22 Sep. 1871, in No. 710 Oct. 1871 IP P761. Johnstone and Munro did not think that they should be treated as ordinary prisoners, and Davies agreed that they might be allowed certain privileges, for example wearing their own clothes, and should subject only to such labour as was necessary to preserve their health or prison discipline (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 602, 31 Oct. 1871, in No. 383 Jan. 1872 IP P763, G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 1310, 27 Nov. 1871, No. 384 Jan. 1872 IP P763).
135 As Munro said, the object was “partly to deter the tribe from further illegal acts and partly to mark the leaders in those which have been committed” (Com. D.D., No. 267, 22 Sep. 1871, in No. 710 Oct. 1871 IP P761). The original list of “ringleaders” included six men from the Fatma Khel and five from the Girani Khel, and did not mention any Shondakas at all. It probably did reflect actual responsibility for the attack on the troops (see D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., no number, 30 July 1870, in No. 41 Nov. 1870 P486/11).
This also helps to explain why, three months later, Johnstone asked for permission to substitute Gulabdin Ghazi Khel, Jung Bahadur Gulab Khel and Inam Koda Khel, none of whom had been described as ‘ringleaders’ in 1870 for Zahid, Doulat and Jabul. However, Jung Bahadur, the son of Lal, the leading man of the Gulab Khel section, and Inam, were said to be more influential men than Zahid and Jabul. Gulabdin, who had not even taken part in the attack on the troops, was chosen because he had taken part in various raids and used “unbecoming language”, and as a representative of his section, the Ghazi Khels. Mayo commented that this change revived “that feeling of apprehension as to the unfamiliarity of the local officers with the feelings and wants of the people which ... had been happily dispelled by Captain Johnstone’s proceedings”. Two of the Muhammad Khel prisoners subsequently died of cholera in autumn 1872. Mayo’s successor, Northbrook, visited Lahore soon afterwards, and Davies decided that this would be a suitable moment to free the others. In dealing with frontier tribes, he commented, it was “especially desirable to impress them with a conviction of the benevolence of Government, as well as of its power”, and he thought this act of clemency would have a beneficial effect on the whole frontier.

Meanwhile the authorities had turned their attention to punishing the tribes which had helped the Muhammad Khels while they were barred from British territory. Twenty Umarzais were fined a total of Rs.535. This was because they had either failed to join the pursuit of the Muhammad Khels in January when thirty four camels were carried off from the Thul, or who had taken part in the attack on Lakhi in February, or in the skirmish at the Kurram Post towards the end of April. The Bizan Khels were fined Rs.200, for having failed to make any attempt to prevent the Muhammad Khels crossing their lands during raids. However, the Bizan Khel Malik Mir Akbar’s two bargirs in the Frontier Militia, of whom he had been deprived at the beginning of the crisis, were restored because he had helped Mani Khan to persuade the Muhammad Khels to surrender.

The most dramatic punishment was reserved for the Sudan Khels who lived in the village of Gumutti. They were accused of having sheltered and fed the Muhammad Khels,

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136 D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 672, 1 Dec. 1871, in No. 353 March 1872 IP P763. Madaman’s nephew, Khan Shah, who played a leading role in all their raids in 1870-71 (for example the mail-bag robbery), was also sentenced to seven years, but was released in 1874 (G.P. to Com. D.D., No. 177, 1 Feb. 1875, in A1 Feb. 1875 P145).
given them information, and even of having taken part in some of their raids. Watched by Muhammad Hyat Khan, the Extra A.C. and Malik Mani Khan, himself a Sudan Khel, they were made to burn down their own village. It was one thing to have troops set fire to a village, but to force its inhabitants to destroy their own houses was particularly humiliating. “No village on the frontier has ever been burnt except by force”, Johnstone said, so it should “have the most lasting effect, and show the prestige of the British Government without seriously impoverishing the tribe”.141 In fact it was only thanks to the influence of Muhammad Hyat Khan, with whom he was very friendly, that Mani Khan was persuaded to accept it at all. However, he passed through “the severest test of his real loyalty to the British Government that he could probably be put to”, as Johnstone put it, recommending that he be restored to his former position.142 Davies agreed that he was “an excellent specimen of a frontier chief” who had performed many conspicuous services, and he was rewarded with an inam of Rs.600 p.a.143 Johnstone also recommended Muhammad Hyat Khan for the Companionship of the Star of India for his part in all this (which he eventually received), and in the meantime he was promoted to Extra A.C.144 As for the Tehsildar and the Kotwal of Bannu who had insulted the Bannu Darwesh Khels, it was eventually decided that the Tehsildar was the one who was particularly at fault, and that the Kotwal was less to blame.145 Graham had already recommended that they should both be transferred to another district, and permission for this was given.

Lastly, the British authorities felt that something had to be done to punish the Dawar people for the support they had given the Muhammad Khels, and for their participation in the attack on the troops in June 1870. In January 1872 six Bannuchi Maliks were sent to Lower Dawar, and two Darwesh Khel Maliks to Upper Dawar, to summon their respective jirgas to Bannu. As we have seen, the British officials tended to despise the Dawars, and it was not anticipated that there would be any difficulty. But when the Maliks arrived in Lower Dawar and delivered the message, a crowd of teachers and students from the madrassahs gathered and began to stone them. They were only saved

141 In 1898 an attempt was made to seize twenty outlaws sheltering in the village. Thanks to faulty intelligence the initial assault was botched and six soldiers killed (Harris, 'British policy on the N.-W. Frontier', pp. 336-337).
142 "The credit of this bloodless victory - for it is nothing else" belonged, Johnstone said, to Muhammad Hyat Khan (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 663, 22 Nov. 1871, No. 344 March 1872 IP P763).
143 Moreover, unlike most Darwesh Khels, Davies commented, Mani Khan “has never been known to break his pledged word” (G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 913, 11 July 1872, in A9 July 1872 P142).
because some of the Maliks intervened. When this happened, the Upper Dawar Maliks, who were on their way to Bannu to meet the D.C., turned back, and a highly ‘insulting’ letter was sent to Johnstone and Muhammad Hyat Khan. Thirty-seven Dawars were seized in British territory, and Johnstone called on the Dawar Maliks to apologise and pay a fine for this “studied affront”. But although later in January the Upper Dawar jirga did pay a fine of Rs. 1,500, the Lower Dawar Jirga refused to do so.

The question was complicated by the fact that, as we saw in the previous chapter, the G.O.I. had renounced any claim to the valley, and the Afghans wanted to establish control of it. At about this time it was reported that the Dawar Maliks had been summoned to the Amir, and agreed to pay a tenth of their produce to him if he would protect them from the British. However, Johnstone attributed the Maliks’ truculence not to Kabul’s interference, but to the intrigues of some of the officials in the administration in Bannu, in particular a clique comprised principally of Multani Pathans from the D.I.K. district. During the later 1860s they had managed to gain considerable influence over the local administration, and were resentful because it had diminished lately, he suggested. They were, he claimed, particularly annoyed by the success he and Muhammad Hyat Khan had achieved with the Darwesh Khels. The Dawars were not a warlike people and the Lower Dawar jirga would have come to terms in January, he said, if they had not been persuaded by some influential person that the government would never attack their valley.

With some justification Mayo thought the initial approach to the Dawars had been badly handled, and called on the local officials to try and reach a peaceful solution; “Viceroy cannot believe it to be impossible”, a telegram to the Lt. Governor concluded. However, the local officials appear to have been determined to make some sort of military demonstration. Munro went to Bannu on the 1st March 1872, but the Hyder Khels and the Sokhels of Lower Dawar refused to meet him except on certain conditions which included the release of their hostages. By this time Brigadier Keyes (30th Madras N.I.),

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146 D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 66, 29 Jan. 1872, in No. 456 March 1872 IP P763, Mullah Shahboodin to Governor of Khost, in G.P. to Com. D.D., No. 249, 28 Feb. 1872, A31 Feb. 1872 P142. The Maliks of Hyder Khel (in which some of the Muhammad Khels had been sheltered) and Ipi, who belonged to the ‘black’ faction, were initially willing to go to Bannu, but those from Hassu Khel and Musakki, who belonged to the ‘white’ one, were not, and the Mullahs persuaded the former to change their minds (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., no number, 29 July 1878, A8 Aug. 1878 P1147, D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 16, 7th Jan. 1872, A7 March P142 1872).

147 D.C. to G.P., No. 35C, 10 Feb. 1872, in No. 456 March 1872 IP P763


149 D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 172, 28 March 1872, in A38 April 1872 P142


the officer commanding the P.F.F., had also reached Bannu, and it was decided to send in
the troops the next day as “delay would be undignified”. It would also be risky, Munro
claimed, as “the Dauris had sent messengers into Khost and the neighbouring hills for aid,
and ... certain priests and Syuds had been instigating them to resist”.153 Moreover, he
said, when he arrived at Bannu he found that many people were saying that the agreements
made after the Muhammad Khels had surrendered could not last. A show of force against
Dawar would effectively dispel this impression, he argued.154

It was thought desirable that the Shinkai pass into Dawar should be in government
hands before the main force went through. So it was arranged that, with Mani Khan’s
help, Muhammad Hyat Khan would occupy it with a force of irregulars recruited from
some of the Darwesh Khel tribes with land in Bannu, in particular the Hatti Khel, Bizan
Khel and Sudan Khel Ahmedzais, and the Bakka Khel and Jani Khel Utmanzais. On the
night of the 5th the two men went up to the pass with four or five hundred Darwesh Khels
and some Bannuchis, and occupied it at daybreak on the 6th. But in the early morning a
much smaller party of about one hundred and fifty Sokhels from Dawar came up to
challenge them, and they withdrew as quickly as possible. “It almost seemed as if the
flight had been part of some preconcerted plan”, Munro commented.155 Although Mani
Khan himself did not withdraw until the Sokhels were almost upon him, some officers
suspected collusion between him and the Dawars.156 In fact it is much more likely the
Darwesh Khels had only volunteered to hold the pass because they assumed there would
no fighting, and had no intention of risking their lives for Mani Khan or the government.157
As we have seen, Mani Khan had ambitions to be recognised as the leading Malik in
Bannu, but the incident showed how limited his influence was and damaged his standing in
the district.158

The Darwesh Khels’ desertion made little difference to the troops, who moved out
early on the 6th and reached the entrance to the Dawar valley without incident. After an
attempt to negotiate failed, troops moved forward to blow up one of the Hyder Khel

153 D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 139, 7 March 1872, in No. 169 May 1872 IP P764
154 A message was sent on the 5th March to Amir Sher Ali Khan announcing that a British force would
proceed to Dawar the next day (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 35C, 10 Feb. 1872, in No. 456 March 1872 IP
P763).
156 D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 139, 7 March 1872, in No. 169 May 1872 IP P764
157 Ibid., G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 913, 11 July 1872, A9 July 1872 P142
158 His ambition was to achieve a position like that of Nawab Muhammad Khwajah Khan (who ruled the
southern Khattak district, on behalf of the government), the D.C. said (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 744,
8 Nov. 1876, in A17 Jan. 1877 P869). Munro commented that the incident showed that Muhammad Hyat
Khan’s successes during the last six months had led him to place too much trust in men who were not to be
relied on, and that “the lesson gained was a most instructive one” (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 35C. 10 Feb.
1872, in No. 546 March 1872 IP P763).
towers. They were fired on, and responded by driving the defenders back into the village. They killed forty-three men, and burned the village to the ground, before withdrawing in time to be out of the valley before sunset. A few days later both Hyder Khels and Sokhels paid their fines, and their hostages were released. Representatives from Upper Dawar and from both the Lower Dawar factions signed a treaty similar to that signed by the Kabul Khels in 1871.

As we have seen, Johnstone had alleged that the problems with Lower Dawar had arisen because some of the Indian officials had encouraged them to resist the government's demands. Many of the officials in Bannu had been there many years, had acquired land and become involved in local politics, he thought, and the clique should be broken up by transferring some of its members to other districts. Not surprisingly perhaps, he was unable to produce any concrete evidence of their machinations. However, Munro agreed that such groupings had been formed in the early years after annexation, when men from the better families of the district had been appointed Tehsildars, and Rissaldars of frontier levies. Many of the Bannu officials had come from families living in the D.I.K. district, and this had made it possible for the Multani faction to spread to Bannu. When he had been D.C. in the early 1860s, he said, he had had to cope with their intrigues. Rather than actually punishing them he proposed to break the clique up by gradually transferring some of the officials in all districts of the division. As we have seen, the man who appeared to be its head in Bannu, the Kotwal, Ghulam Muhammad Khan, had already been transferred.

THE SAIFALI KABUL KHELS -

Since the 1859-60 expedition, the Saifali Kabul Khels and Malikshahis had continued to shelter wanted men from British territory and receive stolen property, selling it as far afield as Khost, Gardez and even Ghazni. They had been under reverse blockade for some time, but this had had little effect as they did not need access to British territory.

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159 For details of the troops see, for example, Wylly, From the Black Mountain, Vol. 1, pp. 428-429
160 D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 139, 7 March 1872, in No. 169 May 1872 IP P764. With the re-establishment of good relations with the British authorities, the Dawars' enthusiasm for Afghan rule evaporated (C.D. 19-21 March, in A21 April 1872 P142).
162 Com. to G.P., No. 35C, 10 Feb. 1872, in No. 456 March 1872 IP P763
163 Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 120, 20 May 1872, in A11 June 1872 P142
164 Though he condemned Johnstone's failure to produce any evidence, Davies accepted that the "strong party feeling" he and Munro reported did actually exist (G.P. to G.O.I., No. 749, 8 June 1872, in A11 June 1872 P142, G.P. to Com. D.D., No. 750, 8 June 1872, in A11 June 1872 P142).
They had not openly visited Bannu for the last ten years, and neither there nor in Kohat had the authorities been able to seize any of them or their property. Describing them as "our only open enemy on this border", in the late summer of 1871 the Extra A.C., Muhammad Hyat Khan, suggested he might visit their country to show them just how accessible to government it really was. Permission was given, and on the 10th October he set out from Bannu accompanied by Maliks Mani Khan Sudan Khel, Mir Akbar Bizan Khel, and Barak Khan Bakka Khel, and nearly seventy other Darwesh Khels from the sections with land in Bannu. They went up the Kurram some way beyond Zerwam, and past the village of the “most noted criminal”, the Saifali Malik Razadin Musa Khan Khel, before turning back to spend the night at Malik Saleh’s encampment. Their appearance caused some alarm, and Razadin and some other Saifali Maliks including Shairdil and Momeet, came in with presents of sheep for Muhammad Hyat Khan and asked to be pardoned. Razadin insisted on slaughtering the sheep and feeding the visitors. Afterwards Muhammad Hyat Khan addressed the tribesmen, pointing out just how vulnerable they were to invasion and emphasising the government’s ability to defend its subjects wherever it wanted. Next day he travelled to Tsapparai, where he adjudicated the double murder of a wife and her suspected lover “according to Waziri custom”, spending the night at the Bizan Khel village of Ping not far away, and returned to Bannu the following day.

Towards the end of December a Saifali Jirga came in to Bannu, bringing ten camels worth Rs.800 to restore to their owners, and Rs.100 and sixteen sheep as a token of submission. “Five of the sheep were slain in my compound as a further such mark”, Johnstone noted. They signed an agreement according to which they would commit no offence on British territory, not receive any goods stolen from it, nor shelter criminals guilty of serious offences such as murder or robbery. The Saifalis as a whole were to be liable to a fine if they did not keep the agreement, and British subjects free to go into their country to recover stolen property or pursue criminals. Thirty nine men (including Razadin) from each of three main sections signed the agreement; as well as Mani Khan and

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166 D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 710, 27 Dec. 1872, in No. 221 April 1872 IP P764
167 Extra A.C. Ban. to D.C. Ban., 29 Nov. 1871, in No. 348 March 1872 IP P763
168 The party comprised sixteen Sudan Khels, twelve Hatti Khels, ten Bizan Khels, ten Umarzais, two Muhammad Khels, one Bodin Khel, fifteen Bakka Khels and four Jani Khels (ibid.).
169 Muhammad Hyat Khan says Malik Saleh was a Saifali; according to Udny he was a Malikshahi (ibid., D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 698 & 1/2, 27 Nov. 1878, in App. Feb. 1879 P1298)
170 Mani Khan, Mir Akbar Khan and Barak Khan also spoke, proclaiming that they had elected Muhammad Hyat a “Khan of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs”, and that it would pay the Saifalis and Malikshahis to be on good terms with them (Extra A.C. Ban. to D.C. Ban., 29 Nov. 1871, in No. 348 March 1872 IP P763).
171 Ibid.
172 D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 710, 27 Dec. 1871, in No. 221 April 1872 IP P764
Barak Khan, the British securities included Joomaraz Muhammad Khel, Nipal Khan Jani Khel, Powindah Khan Malikshahi, and the Khojul Khel Malik Mohmit from Zerwam.173

It was the first time the Saifalis had reached an agreement with the Bannu authorities, and it had been achieved without the use of force. Munro drew particular attention to that part of the agreement which stipulated that British subjects and officials might pursue marauders into Saifali territory to recover stolen property without fear of harassment, describing this as "a decided advance upon the old engagements of the Ghilzai and Afreedee tribes on the Kohat border, who were, and possibly still are, very jealous of any such incursion".174 But in practice it seems to have had little effect, and there are no reports of British subjects or officials going into Saifali country to recover stolen property, though they continued to receive it, and shelter wanted men.

SUMMARY -

During the 1860s the Kabul Khels and the other Darwesh Khel tribes on the Upper Miranzai border continued to feud with the Turis and the Upper Miranzai villages of Thal and Biland Khel. Towards the end of the decade the Kohat D.C., Louis Cavagnari, went up to Thal twice and successfully negotiated a settlement between them. By contrast the Bannu district remained fairly tranquil until late in the decade. The system of Pass Responsibility by which the tribe whose lands inside the border lay nearest to a particular pass were held responsible for 'misuse' of it in return for light assessment of their lands, and the right to nominate recruits to the Frontier Militia, seemed to be working well. This led to complacency on the part of the authorities, and as the decade wore on, less and less effort was made to treat the Darwesh Khels with the consideration to which they felt they were entitled.

Because Muhammad Khels carried out some robberies and a kidnapping, several fines were imposed on the tribe, and the local officials began to treat their leading men in a most disrespectful way. Insensitive treatment seems to have made all the Darwesh Khels in Bannu discontented by this point, but it was the humiliation of the Muhammad Khels in particular which led to most of them decamping en masse in June 1870, and gathering just across the border in Dawar. Their original intention was to send a written protest to the authorities, but they were incited by some impassioned oratory to attack the relief marching to the Kurram outpost, killing four men. The government responded by barring the Muhammad Khels from British territory, but it emerged that the other Bannu Darwesh Khels had encouraged them to make some sort of protest and were seriously discontented.

173 See ibid. for the Maliks' names and the text of agreement.
For a week or two there was a real possibility that they might refuse to co-operate with the government, and even join them.

However, by playing on rivalries amongst the Darwesh Khels themselves, particularly between Mani Khan, and the leading Hatti Khel Malik, Nizam Khan, the government was able to break up the opposition, and the danger that all the Bannu Darwesh Khels might become disaffected evaporated. The Muhammad Khels remained in the hills for fourteen months, getting some help from Dawar, but not very much from the other Darwesh Khels. They managed to carry out a number of irritating raids in British territory, but were gradually reduced to starvation and had to surrender most ignominiously in September 1870. They were made to pay a fine of Rs.7,000, and six men, selected for their representativeness rather than because they had themselves played a particularly prominent role in the attack on the troops, were chosen to serve terms of imprisonment in the Lahore prison.

Fines were also imposed on the tribes which had helped the Muhammad Khels, and the Sudan Khels of Gumutti were made to burn their own village. The Lower Dawar jirgas were called on to pay a fine for the help they had given the Muhammad Khels. They declined to do so, and a brief foray was made into their territory; forty-three men were killed in the village of Hyder Khel. Their intransigence may have been partly religious in inspiration, but the local officials attributed it principally to the negative influence of the Multani clique in the British administration, and an effort was made to reduce this by gradually transferring its prominent members to other districts. Finally, as part of the effort generally to reassert the government’s authority, the Extra A.C., Muhammad Hyat Khan, visited the Saifali Kabul Khel country on the west bank of the Kurram to show them that they were not invulnerable. A few weeks later the section’s representatives came in to Bannu, and for the first time signed an agreement with the government.

174 Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 6, 6 Jan. 1872, in No. 221 April 1872 IP P764
CHAPTER SEVEN  TRIBAL MANAGEMENT IN BANNU AND ON THE UPPER MIRANZAI BORDER IN THE 1870s

CHANGES TO FRONTIER ADMINISTRATION -

The problems experienced with the Muhammad Khels and the other Darwesh Khels in Bannu, which we looked at in the last chapter, led to some important modifications to Punjab frontier administration. In the first place Mayo agreed with Graham that “the enforcement of a judicial system, ill-adapted in its requirements to so wild a country” had been a mistake.¹ As a result, in 1872 various special regulations, known as the Frontier Crimes Regulations, were introduced in the Frontier districts.² An attempt to “recognise existing facts and acknowledge the tribal constitution of society”, they legalised the use of several traditional methods of tribal management, such as the arrest and the seizure of property of men from offending tribes.³ It is difficult to be sure what effect they had in Bannu. Christensen suggests that the Afridis living along the Peshawar border disliked the courts and appreciated the flexibility of the new rules.⁴ Insofar as their introduction made legal administration less impersonal, it is likely that they were also well received by the Darwesh Khels.

Secondly, Durand commented that he had been struck by the extent to which the district officers were unaware of what was going in their districts. He, Mayo and the Secretary of State, Argyll, all accepted Graham’s argument that the frequent changes of District Officer and the pressure of work had had adversely affected the local administration. It was, they accepted, the absence of proper supervision which had made it possible for the native officials to abuse and insult the tribesmen, and led to the “uncertain and fitful application of the important principle of tribal responsibility”.⁵ In future, Mayo ordered, the Commissioner and the D.C. should personally supervise the running of the P.R. system, and leave as little as possible to the native officials. In general frontier

¹ G.O.I. to G.P., No. 1887P, 7 Nov. 1870, No. 56 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11
³ Among other things they also provided for the trial of alleged offenders (and the imposition of a fine if found guilty) by a jirga selected by the local government officer, in cases in which the difficulty of producing evidence of the standard required by an ordinary court would make it impossible to obtain a conviction (Griffin, Frontier Memorandum, No. 150 Feb. 1878 IP P1216).
⁴ ‘Conflict and Change’, pp. 317-319. Though Caroe claims that in practice the Frontier Crimes Regulations satisfied neither Anglo-Indian law nor Pashtun custom (The Pathans, p. 355, see also Spain, Pathan Borderland, pp. 145-147).
⁵ G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 401-1319, 30 Nov. 1870, in No. 38 Jan. 1871 IP P758; see also G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 1887P, 7 Nov. 1870, No. 56 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11, and S. of S. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 120, 28 Nov. 1872, No. 415 Jan. 1873 IP P768
officers should get to know their districts well, learn the languages of the people, cultivate a
good relationship with the influential men, and make every effort to win their confidence.⁶

To make this easier, younger officers serving on the Frontier were required to learn
Pashtu; a special payment of Rs.1,000 was offered to Assistant Commissioners serving
elsewhere in the Punjab who learned the language. Deputy Commissioners were to be
provided with additional staff so they could devote more time to cultivating personal
relationships with men from the frontier tribes, and an effort was to be made to leave them
in their posts for longer.⁷ This may be seen as an attempt in Weberian terms to move from
bureaucratic to charismatic authority along the Frontier, and to return to the early days of
British rule when the district officers had had more time to spend meeting and talking
things over with the tribesmen.⁸

Thirdly, the difficulties that had arisen with the Bannu Darwesh Khels at the
beginning of the 1870s encouraged the government to make some changes to frontier
defence arrangements and the system of P.R. itself. Several meetings were held at which
the frontier officers reviewed the position. As we saw in the last chapter, Davies presided
over the first of these at Peyzu on the 5th March 1871, at which it was decided to remodel
the Frontier Militia.⁹ Many of the militiamen had been given their posts as a reward for
joining the levies raised in 1857, and had no links with the frontier on which they were
stationed.¹⁰ In future, it was decided, men appointed to the militias should be nominated
by headmen of border villages or Maliks of tribes which were actually responsible for the
passes leading out of British territory, so they would live locally and know the area.¹¹ We
also saw that the civil officers had tended to argued that the abolition of the military police
and levies in the early 1860s had been a mistake. These criticisms were accepted, and as
mentioned in Chapter Three, it was also decided that a separate border police, under civilian
control and distinct from the Frontier Militia, should be set up.¹²

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⁶ G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 1887P, 7 Nov. 1870, No. 56 Nov. 1870 IP P438/11
⁹ It was attended by Mr. Justice Campbell, Brig.-Gen. Keyes, Co'ing the P.F.F., T.H. Thornton, S. to
G.P., L. Griffin, the under-secretary, Lt.-Col. Black, the Military Secretary, Lt.-Col. Graham, the Derajat
Commissioner, Captain Hare the Bannu D.C., and Major Munro, the Dera Ismail Khan D.C. (Report of
¹⁰ Others, though nominees of local chiefs, were not physically fit for active service. The government had
been aware of the problem for some time, it was reported, but vested interests had made it difficult to deal
¹² Ibid., G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No 283A, 28 Feb. 1873, in A41 Feb. 1873 P143
As regards the actual arrangements for the security of the passes, in April 1872 Johnstone was asked to establish as exactly as possible the responsibilities of the different Darwesh Khel tribes in the Bannu district. He and Muhammad Hyat Khan prepared a map showing all the passes opening onto the plains from the hills, and invited the Bannu Darwesh Khel Maliks to come in and define their boundaries on it. They also discussed the procedures by means of which responsibility would be established and enforced should the need arise.\(^\text{13}\) Their report was passed on to Captain Charles McLean, previously commanding Outposts at Bannu and now the Lt. Governor’s Military Secretary, for his comments. In turn Munro was asked to comment on these, and his observations were passed back to McLean for him to have the final word.\(^\text{14}\) This exchange of views brought up some interesting differences of opinion regarding frontier and tribal policy.

To begin with, there was the question of how much active British interference there should be across the border. McLean thought that tribes living wholly outside British limits should be encouraged or even compelled to enter into P.R. agreements (indeed it should be a condition for being allowed to trade with Bannu), and in return they should be given places in the Frontier Militia. So the Kabul Khels and Khojul Khels, for instance, should be responsible for the important portions of the Kurram they occupied.\(^\text{15}\) Munro disagreed. He argued that direct interference with trans-border tribes was unwise, and that it was preferable to try to control them indirectly by putting pressure on men who had land in British territory; the Khojul Khels, for example, could be controlled through their Malik, Mohmit.\(^\text{16}\) If P.R. were extended to tribes and sections living outside British territory, the government would, Munro thought, have to adopt “a much more vigorous line of policy necessitating more frequent recourse to military force than has hitherto prevailed”.\(^\text{17}\) Secondly, Mclean called for British patrols to be allowed to cross the first low range of hills marking the border, and deal with Darwesh Khels who held land in British territory wherever they might be.\(^\text{18}\) Again Munro disagreed. In his view, controlling trans-border tribes by putting pressure on their relatives in British territory removed any need for “any

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\(^\text{13}\) P.R. Agreement in D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 267, 1 May 1872, in A12 Sep. 1872 P142
\(^\text{14}\) Memo by Capt. McLean, M.S./G.P., 24 July 1872, in A12 Sep. 1872 P142
\(^\text{15}\) In particular the Khojul Khel Malik, Mohmit, who lived at Zerwam and had land in Bannu, should sign a P.R. agreement (ibid.).
\(^\text{16}\) Lytton’s military secretary, George Pomeroy-Colley, noted some of the advantages and disadvantages of having members of the same tribe living within and across the border in the letter he wrote to Lytton after his visit to Peshawar (M.S. to V., 30 Oct. 1877, A10 Oct. 1878 P1147, W.F. Butler, Life of Sir George Pomeroy-Colley (London, 1899), p. 189).
\(^\text{18}\) The Darwesh Khels, McLean argued, “should understand that having received land and pay at our hands, we consider them our friends and subjects, wherever their temporary locations are, whether on the Thull, or in the nallahs in the hills” (Memo M.S./G.P., 24 July 1872, in A12 Sep. 1872 P142).
such dangerous action” as McLean appeared to be advocating.\textsuperscript{19} In any case there was nothing in the existing rules to prevent the leader of a party in pursuit of hill robbers from the plains following the marauders a “safe distance” into the hills. Nor was the frontier line as well-defined as McLean seemed to think, he pointed out, because it had never been definitely laid down that the border ran along the first line of hills.

Thirdly, McLean suggested, the D.C. had so many duties to perform in frontier districts that the officer commanding outposts should be entrusted with the administration of P.R. instead.\textsuperscript{20} This would have taken the handling of relations with the tribes almost entirely out of the civil officers’ hands, and not surprisingly, Munro was opposed to it. He thought that it would amount to “a radical change of system, intended perhaps to approximate as nearly as possible to that of the French on the frontiers of Algeria, which is generally believed to be vigorous, indeed, with less consideration for the interests of the governed and their neighbours than it has ever been the object of the British Government to show on the Trans-Indus border”.\textsuperscript{21} As he and Munro must have been aware, McLean’s proposals amounted to a call for the transformation of Derajat frontier management by the introduction of techniques similar to those used along the Upper Sind border to the south. Here, as we have seen, military, civil and judicial powers were held by the Political Superintendent, and there were no restrictions on troops crossing the border to deal with the tribes.\textsuperscript{22} The Lt. Governor did not think this approach was appropriate on the Punjab frontier, and there was in fact little prospect of it being introduced.\textsuperscript{23} Finally, McLean also made some detailed criticisms of Johnstone’s P.R. scheme, arguing, for example, that the Gumutti Sudan Khels and the Sirki Khels should take on responsibility for the Gumutti Pass.\textsuperscript{24}

On the 26th December 1872, a second meeting, chaired by Lepel Griffin, Secretary to the Punjab government, was held to produce detailed proposals for the improvement of the system of border defence, including the reorganisation of the Frontier Militia.\textsuperscript{25}

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\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Heathcote, ‘British Policy and Baluchistan’, pp. 59-60
\textsuperscript{23} G.P. to Com. D.D., No 1155, 10 Sep. 1872, in A12 Sep. 1872 P142
\textsuperscript{24} McLean also suggested that the government should occupy Zerwam on the Kurram. If the British government did not occupy it, as the Amir had already said he would like to establish a post at Biland Khel to help him control the Darwesh Khels there, would there be “any objection to his establishing another at Zerwan(m) in the Kabul Khel territory, or at Gumutti ?” he asked rhetorically. Again this proposal was not taken very seriously, and the Lt. Governor did not comment on it (McLean’s Remarks on Munro’s reply, A10 Dec. 1872 P142).
\textsuperscript{25} The other members were Major McLean, the M.S., Lt.-Col. Munro, now the Derajat Commissioner, Major Johnstone, the D.C. Bannu, Captain Macaulay, the D.C. Dera Ismail Khan, Captain Sandeman, D.C. Dera Ghazi Khan, Lt.-Col. Paget, Co’ing O.s Bannu, Captain Lance, Co’ing O.s D.I.K., and Lt.-Col.
Although Davies commented that its report amounted to a compromise, it reflected Munro’s views more than it did McLean’s. However, there seems to have been little disagreement about the changes which should be made to the militia. With going into details, it is worth noting that it was also proposed actually to replace militia posts with police ones on some parts of the southern Dera Ismail Khan, and the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier. To help pay for the new police, at nine outposts the number of militiamen was to be reduced.26

As for P.R. itself, the Committee recommended a change in the way this was allocated. Rather than, as at present, particular passes being assigned to particular tribes, it suggested that it would be simpler if a strip of country between two passes, including the various passes in between, were assigned to a particular tribe, and this was accepted.27 McLean’s recommendation that Mani Khan and the Sudan Khel should be responsible for the Gumutti pass was also incorporated into the final recommendations.

As we have seen, McLean argued that trans-border tribes should be persuaded to undertake P.R. agreements. At the meeting in December he continued to claim that dealing with ‘sections’ was less effective than dealing with ‘tribes’, and that responsibility should be extended to them; though it is not clear whether by tribe he meant the Ahmedzais and Utmanzais respectively, or the Darwesh Khels as a whole.28 However, the majority view was that it would be difficult to enforce P.R. against sections or tribes living at the heads of passes and entirely outside British territory unless the government was prepared constantly to resort to military force, blockade or reprisals. The assumption was that it was not. ‘Sections’ (by which the lower level of grouping, represented in Bannu by the Muhammad Khels, Hatti Khels and so on, seems to have been intended) were the relevant units when it came to collecting revenue, it was pointed out, and they should continue to be the relevant ones with regard to P.R. The report therefore recommended that only tribes or sections living in British territory, which the government could directly control, should be compelled to enter into P.R. agreements. If tribes wanted to enter into such agreements on their own initiative there was no reason why they should not be allowed to do so, but the Committee “strongly held that it is inexpedient to encourage” this.29 If one section of a tribe lived in British territory and another across the border, the whole tribe or section might become voluntarily responsible, the report stated, but the section in British territory

26Ibid.
27 It is not very clear whether this really made much difference in practice.
28 He continued to argue that the tribes should be dealt with “as a whole” in the years to come (see, for example, Memo by Off. Co’ing O.s-Rajanpur, in A5 April 1877 P860).
29 Ibid.
would have to warned that responsibility would be enforced against them in the first place.\textsuperscript{30}

Forwarding the Committee’s report to Northbrook, who sanctioned the proposed reorganisation, Davies endorsed most if not all of the committee’s conclusions.\textsuperscript{31} He commented that there could be no question of imposing P.R. upon tribes living wholly or partly in the hills. Any attempt to “govern the tribes beyond the boundary might lead to embarrassments the results of which cannot be foreseen”, he thought.\textsuperscript{32} Instead they should be controlled by enforcing the P.R. of sections actually living in British territory. But he thought that if they were willing to undertake P.R., there was no reason why they should not be encouraged to do so.\textsuperscript{33} The agreements the Darwesh Khels had entered into on the Kohat border had had good results, and it was desirable “to attach these tribes to the Government in any way possible, and if they can be so bound by engagements voluntarily entered into”, there could be no objection.\textsuperscript{34}

It should also be noted that the P.F.F. commander, Brigadier Keyes, who had been unable to attend the conference, argued that the border should be under either military or civil management, not both as at present. Like McLean, he preferred the former. If it was not possible, he thought, regular troops should be withdrawn altogether from all forward positions and the border managed entirely by police under civil management. Davies commented that he did not think it was feasible at present, but that it should eventually become so.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} G.P. to Com. D.D., No. 1155, 10 Sep. 1872, in A12 Sep. 1872 P142.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Rather than being an actual treaty, agreements of this kind should be in the form of a statement (\textit{titbar nama}), listing the obligations the tribesmen undertook (G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 283A, 28 Feb. 1873, in A41 Feb. 1873 P143). On the 13th January 1873, a third meeting was held to look again at defensive arrangements, and make final recommendations for the Frontier Militia. Captain McLean, and Colonel Paget proposed to move two outposts and to amalgamate a third and fourth, but because negotiations were still going on with the Bhittanis, the Committee decided to recommend for the time being only moving the Mullazai post (to the south of Bain) towards the hills (Proceedings of Reorganisation of Derajat Militia Comm., in A26 Jan. 1873 P143). The final distribution of Darwesh Khel Frontier Militia appointments appears to have been as follows -

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Wali Post} - two Takhti Khel Bakka Khels, \textbf{Jani Khel Post} - two Jani Khels, \textbf{Burji Post} - three Jani Khels, \textbf{Tochi} - three Bakka Khels, \textbf{Baran Post} - one Bakka Khel, four Muhammad Khels (\textit{bargirs} of Gulabdin, Madaman and Janruz), \textbf{Gumutti Post} - five Umarzais, one Sudan Khel (\textit{bargir} of Mani Khan), \textbf{Gumutti Tower} - five Umarzais, \textbf{Dhummai Post} (which was moved nearer the hills and renamed the Barghanattu Post later in the decade) - three Sudan Khels, one Sirki Khel, four Hatti Khels, four Bizan Khels (Report of Comm., in Jan. A26 1873 P143, Bannu District Militia State't, in A26 May 1877 P860).
\end{itemize}

It is clear from these debates that military and civil officers often had rather different views on frontier policy, which may have been partly responsible for a curious incident which occurred early in 1872. A number of Maliks from the border districts, including Darwesh Khels from the Bannu district (among them Mani Khan), were invited to attend a Camp of Exercise held at Hassan Abdal on the Indus, so they should see the troops drilling and be impressed with the might of the government. But at Hassan Abdal some of the Darwesh Khel Maliks took offence because others were shown greater favour, and a quarrel broke out. They split into two groups, the Bannu Utmanzai and Hatti Khel Ahmedzai Maliks on the one hand, and the other Ahmedzai ones on the other, and they refused to talk to each other on the return journey, let alone camp together. The row blew up because McLean, who as Military Secretary was in charge of arrangements, had altered the original list of men entitled to enter the darbar (drawn up by the D.C., Major Johnstone), of which the invitees had been informed beforehand. As a result, some Sudan Khels and two Bannuchi men, who had been told they would not be allowed to enter the darbar, were allowed to do so, while others, who had been told they would be able to do so, were not.36

The 1872 F.M.R. Committee’s recommendations on the whole reflected the cautious attitude to trans-border interference which characterised Punjab frontier management. This caution continued to be reflected in the policies followed along the frontier in the 1870s, and the relatively peaceful state of the border for much of the decade seemed to vindicate it. By 1876 the Punjab government could point out that during the previous year, with the exception of a small part of the Kohat district, the north-western frontier of India had been more peaceable and orderly than at any time since annexation.37 It is true that there had been only one punitive expedition since 1869, the incursion into Dawar described in the previous chapter. One reason was a succession of good harvests in the mid-1870s. Another was the low revenue assessment of the Darwesh Khels’ land in Bannu. In the 1870s the first regular assessment of the Bannu district was carried out, and it was decided that they should pay more revenue, but still less than would be paid normally.38

36 Thorburn, Bannu, p. 94, P.A.R. 1872-73, pp. 33-34, 170. Further offence was given because the Maliks were not all treated equally in the Darbar. When Thorburn asked MacLean why Darwesh Khels who were not on the original list were being allowed into the Darbar, he was told that it was nothing to do with him (Thorburn, Bannu, p. 94, Set. O. Bannu, to D.C. Koh., No. 165, 18 March 1873, in A18 May 1873 P143, G.P. to Com. D.D., No. 654, 14 May 1873, in A18 May 1873 P143).
37 Though some Afridi and Orakzai sections were under blockade for having refused to permit the repair of the military road through the Kohat Pass (P.A.R. 1875-76, G.S. p. 4).
38 Thorburn described the new schedule for the Hatti Khels, for example, as “as near a nominal one as can well be imposed” (Ass. Report, Bannu Tehsil, in Set. S. to G.P., No. 743, 24 July 1877, A16 Aug. 1877 P860).
The low-key war between the Darwesh Khels and the Mahsuds, which, as we saw in the last chapter, went on intermittently throughout the 1860s continued in the 1870s, and also helped to absorb the tribes' energies.\footnote{Thorburn, \textit{Bannu}, pp. 86, 95} The failure of Mani Khan's attempt to make himself the undisputed leader of the Darwesh Khels in Bannu handicapped his efforts to oppose the Mahsuds, and he was unable to prevent them making further inroads on the Darwesh Khels' territory in the hills.\footnote{D.C. Ban. to Corn. D.D., No. 744, 8 Nov. 1876, in A17 Jan. 1877 P860, \textit{Bannu Gazetteer}, p. 124, P.A.R. 1876-77, p. 15} By 1873 he had lost access to his \textit{kach} in the Makin Algad; it was reported to be falling into disrepair by Macauley who passed it in 1881.\footnote{P.O./M.E.-D., 9 May 1881, in App. Feb. 1882 P1825} As we saw in Chapter Three, the Mahsuds had tried to enlist British support, and the Darwesh Khels did the same, but the British authorities consistently refused to intervene, and Munro instructed the Bannu D.C. to ensure that British subjects did not become involved in it.\footnote{Com. D.D. to D.C. Ban., No. 584-3590, 8 Sep. 1874, in A31 Sep. 1874 P174.}

FRERE, LYTTON AND PUNJAB FRONTIER MANAGEMENT -

However, not everyone shared the Punjab government's positive assessment of developments along the north-west frontier. The point was made in the previous section that some of the tribal management techniques advocated by McLean had already been in use for many years on the Sind border. As we saw in Chapter Six, Bartle Frere had been greatly impressed with these, and in 1863 had written a minute comparing Punjab tribal management very unfavourably with Sind practice. He returned to the attack in another minute written in 1876.\footnote{Memo Sind and Punjab Frontier Systems, 22 March 1876, L/P&S/18 A12. Frere was chairman of the India Office Political Committee in 1875, and had some influence on the new Afghan policy introduced by the Conservative government in the mid-1870s (see, for example, Ghose, \textit{England and Afghanistan}, pp. 11-13, Heathcote, 'British Policy and Baluchistan', pp. 326-327, 418-419).} In 1877 the new Viceroy, Lytton, produced his own lengthy minute on frontier reorganisation; many, though by no means all, of his ideas were similar to Frere's.\footnote{Reorganisation of Frontier - V.'s Minute, No. 158 Feb. 1877 IP P1216. This and Frere’s minute, as well as Griffin’s Frontier Memo, are reproduced in P.P.s, Vol. LVIII (13) 1878 (c.1898). Betty Balfour suggests that Lytton had already reached views regarding Frontier issues quite similar to Frere’s independently (\textit{Lord Lytton’s Indian Administration} (London, 1899), p. 45).} Space does not permit a full examination of the issues here, but a brief review of the main points may not be out of place.

In the first place, both Frere and Lytton condemned the 'close border' policy because they argued that it prevented the government from exerting an effective 'civilising' influence on the former. Frere thought that instead of being forbidden to cross the border
and establish relationships with the independent tribes, officials should be allowed to be “actively good neighbours” (as he claimed they were in Sind), and to intervene in their affairs in a friendly but authoritative way. Likewise Lytton thought that contact with British officers was so beneficial that every effort should be made to do away with Arbabs and middlemen, and cultivate personal contact between the tribes and British officials.45

Secondly, as he had done in his minute on the 1860 Mahsud expedition, Frere condemned the attempt to impose and use ‘tribal responsibility’, and the associated practice of holding tribes as a whole responsible for the crimes of individuals.46 Rather than resorting to tribal seizures, blockades and punitive expeditions, which affected all the tribespeople, guilty or not, he thought it would be “better to go to any expense to secure the individual malefactor”.47 Lytton too castigated the existing system as “barbarous”, and argued that, however long it might take, an effort should be made to replace tribal with individual responsibility.48 He admitted that it was probably not possible to dispense with the punitive expeditions altogether, but suggested that when they were required, they should lead to the occupation of tribal territory for some months. It was inconsistent with the maintenance of the government’s prestige, he thought, for troops to move into tribal territory, do as much damage as they could, and withdraw as quickly as possible, the tribesmen sniping at them as they went. Thirdly, Frere drew attention again to what he regarded as the deleterious effect of having responsibility for the frontier divided between civil and military officials. Lytton agreed that this was a genuine difficulty, but proposed almost the opposite solution. Rather than handing the frontier over to the military, he wanted to increase the number of police, place them under civilian control, and make them responsible in the first place for frontier security.49

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45 Memo Sind and Punjab Frontier Systems, 22 Dec. 1876, Reorganisation of Frontier - V.’s Minute, No. 158 Feb. 1877 IP P1216
47 Martineau, Life, p. 367
48 G.O.I. to S. of S., 1 July 1878, No. 44, L/P&S/7/18
49 Reorganisation of Frontier - V.’s Minute, No. 158 Feb. 1877 IP P1216, G.O.I. to S. of State, No. 44, 1 July 1878, L/P&S/7/18, G.P. to G.O.I., No. 701A, 22 April 1878, in ibid.). In fact Lytton intended entirely to recast frontier administrative arrangements, combining the Punjab and Sind Frontier districts to form a separate Trans-Indus administrative division. Mayo had hoped to do something similar at the beginning of the decade, but his successor Northbrook was not in favour of the idea (Heathcote, ‘British Policy and Baluchistan’, p. 334). Lytton’s plan was rejected by a majority of the members of the Council of India, as was a modified proposal put forward in 1878 (G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 86, 17 May 1877, No. 157 Feb. 1878 IP P1216, G.O.I. F.D. to S. of S., No. 203, 26 Sep. 1878, L/P&S/7/19, Heathcote, ‘British Policy and Baluchistan’, pp. 428-431). At the end of the century the Viceroy, Curzon, put forward a somewhat similar scheme (though it omitted Sind), which resulted in the creation of the North-West Frontier Province (see, for example, Harris, ‘British Policy on the N.-W. Frontier’, Chapter Nine).
As far as the Punjab authorities' reactions are concerned, they answered the first and third points by continuing to argue, not unreasonably as we have seen, that in general Punjab tribal policies were working. Punitive expeditions, for example, were an increasingly infrequent necessity.\footnote{No. 150 Feb. IP P1216. Every effort had been made to encourage “free and friendly communication between influential men of the Frontier and British officers” since he had been Lt. Governor, Davies commented (G.P. to G.O.I., No. 640, 22 April 1877, A3 April 1877 P860).} Under the circumstances no radical change to the existing system was required. As regards the question of tribal as opposed to individual responsibility, the argument that the difference between Pashtun organisation and values and those of the Baluch tribes meant that it was not possible to deal with Pashtuns through their chiefs was repeated. Only by emphasising ‘tribal responsibility’, and making concessions to tribal custom, could any sort of control be exercised over the Pashtun tribes, Punjab officials argued.\footnote{Frontier Memo, No. 150 Feb. IP P1216} “Against the individual offender the British Government is powerless. The hills, on every side, afford a sacred and secure asylum”, Egerton asserted.\footnote{G.P. to G.O.I., No. 774P, 21 April 1877, No. 78 July 1877 IP P1035}

The point was made in Chapter Two that Lytton’s ideas did not have much impact along the Waziristan border, but they did have some influence in the Peshawar division. In particular, Lytton initially declined to sanction two military expeditions recommended by the authorities in Peshawar (against the Utman Khels and the Jowaki Afridis).\footnote{For details see, for example, PAR 1877-78, pp. 10, 15-21.} Although he did finally authorise the use of force in both cases, he stipulated that an effort should be made to avoid undignified ‘butcher and bolt’ tactics, and insisted that an attempt be made to avoid innocent people being made to suffer along with the guilty through the indiscriminate application of ‘tribal responsibility’.\footnote{Ibid., G.O.I. F.D. to G.P., No. 138P, 25 Jan. 1877, A2 March 1877 P860, V. to S. of S., No. 44, 1 July 1878, L/P&S/S/18. Lytton thought the new approach had been successfully applied in operations against the Jowakis in the winter of 1877-1878, but the Punjab authorities did not entirely agree (V. to S. of S., No. 44, 1 July 1878, L/P&S/S/18, F.A.R. 1877-78, G.S. pp. 12-14, Pioneer, 10 June 1881, in The Mahsud-Waziri Expedition, p. 89, Morison, “From Alexander Burnes to Frederick Roberts”, p. 23).} Secondly, Lytton’s criticisms appear to have prompted Egerton to appoint a committee to look into the possibility of improving frontier management on the Peshawar border by applying the methods which appeared to have been so successful in the Derajat. The committee concluded that the introduction of some form of Pass Responsibility along the Kohat and Peshawar border probably would be effective. It also recommended that a border police, and a frontier militia partly recruited from trans-border tribesmen, be set up. The border police would substitute for the military as the first line of defence, thus putting the immediate defence of the frontier entirely in civil hands, as
Lytton had advocated. The creation of a border police in Upper Miranzai began in 1878, but both in Kohat and Peshawar full implementation of these proposals was delayed by the outbreak of war with Afghanistan.

RELATIONS WITH THE KABUL KHEL IN THE 1870s -

Following Cavagnari's settlement in 1869, the Upper Miranzai border remained relatively peaceful for some years. However, on the 10th January 1874 a gang of about twenty Miamais plundered a caravan of Ghilzai traders proceeding to Kurram of property worth Rs.400. Baramta was ordered and six men and eighty sheep were seized. Cavagnari imposed a fine of Rs.500, and the stolen property was restored or compensation paid by the end of January. During the past two years a number of small claims against the various Kabul Khel groups on this border had accumulated. Cavagnari proposed that these should be settled before the tribe reaped its spring crop and retreated to the hills, and that he should go up to Thal with whatever troops could be spared from the Kohat garrison to do so.

Approval was given. The Miamais paid the fine, and their jirga, as well as the Pipalai and Malikshahi ones assembled at Biland Khel early in March ready to meet Cavagnari. But the Saifali one did not arrive until the 11th, and then only in response to the threat that the claims against them would be examined anyway and regarded as proven in their absence, and that the other sections would be held responsible for them. Not surprisingly, the largest number of claims were outstanding against the Saifalis, two hundred and ninety-seven in all (to the value of Rs.4,885), for which they only accepted responsibility when the Miamais threatened to use force. Claims to the value of nearly Rs.2,000 were also found against the Miamais, but only a few against the Malikshahis and the Pipalai. Cavagnari reported that he had not given the Maliks the small presents which they usually received for their services on such occasions. Instead he told them that they must control troublesome members of their sections, and make them obey the authorities' orders, before they received any in future. In the longer-term, he said, his aim was to make

55 In Peshawar, by contrast with the Derajat, the troops were drawn from the Indian army as a whole and were under the authority of the C. in C. This meant, the committee concluded, that they did not have the kind of local knowledge needed effectively to supervise a local militia, and that therefore it would not be possible to adopt the Derajat system of control by military officers of frontier defensive arrangements (Report of Committee to consider Police and Border Defence, in A1 March 1878 P1147).
the Maliks more formal intermediaries between the government and the tribes, through whom claims against the tribe could be dealt with promptly.  

As we saw in the previous chapter, an attempt was made in the later 1850s to regulate the grazing of the Tazi Khel and Khojul Khel flocks as they passed through Upper Miranzai on their way to and from their winter pastures. By the 1870s a set of rules had been worked out. In order to allow the Upper Miranzai villagers to harvest their kharif crops without harassment, the Darwesh Khels were not supposed to enter the district before November, and they had to spend the first ten days in the Palosin jangal between Thai and Gundiour. The Tazi Khels were then supposed to go on to the Teri Tehsil, and the Khojul Khels were allowed to graze in any village west of Hangu except Kahi. Similarly, in March members of both the Darwesh Khels groups were supposed to collect again at Palosin, and to leave by the end of the month to avoid them damaging the rabi crops. However, not only were their movements largely dictated by the weather, but they could not wait too long near the Kurram because they were vulnerable to Turi raids there. In practice it was difficult for them to keep to these rules, and they usually entered British territory by the middle of October. It does appear that by the 1870s pastoral nomadism was becoming more difficult on this border. The Khan of Hangu took various unofficial dues from the Darwesh Khels, and they often had to make presents to influential Maliks, and pay fines when their cattle damaged cultivation. Every year, the Kohat Gazetteer commented in the early 1880s, “the difficulties of these nomads increase, and some of the Khujjal Khel sections have of late years ceased to visit the district and have permanently settled down in their own country”.  

As we saw in Chapter Five, after the G.O.I. renounced its claim to Biland Khel and Thal’s trans-Kurram land in the 1850s, the revenue Thal owed on this was paid each year through the Gundiour officials to the Afghan Governor of Kurram. In 1874 the Afghans built an outpost at Ahmadi Shah in the Upper Kurram. In 1875 a dispute broke out between the Afghan governor, Sardar Wali Muhammad Khan, and the people of Thal over payment of the revenue on some trans-Kurram land cultivated by the latter. In 1876, after he had built a post at Khapiyang opposite Thal, the Sardar announced that he would give this land to the Kabul Khels to cultivate, in return for their assuming responsibility for the security of the Kurram route. In May the Kabul Khels began to make preparations to cultivate the land, and the Thal men gathered to stop them. Some of them were arrested by

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58 Ten claims against the Khojul Khels and five against the Tazi Khels were also adjusted (D.C. Kohat to Com. Pesh. D., No. 86-484, 4 May 1874, in A7 July 1874 P144).
60 Kohat Gazetteer, p. 180
61 It appears to have been garrisoned by Zaimukhts (Memo on District of Kurram, Part V).
the Sardar’s men, and they responded by attacking the Khapiyang post. On May 10th Cavagnari negotiated a truce, and suggested he should meet the Sardar as soon as possible to try and arrange a permanent settlement. The Punjab government was given permission to address the Amir on the subject, but it is not clear that anything was actually done.62

In fact the Amir’s hold on Kurram was still very weak, and later in 1876 the district was reported to be in active rebellion due to Sardar Wali Muhammad Khan’s exactions. The Amir replaced him as Governor for a time with Shahbaz Khan, but the Kurram people continued to be difficult.63 The deterioration in Anglo-Afghan relations affected this border too: in June 1877 the commandant of the Khapiyang post sent men across the river into British territory to harass a patwari who was measuring the Thal men’s crops.64 Describing this as an intentional provocation, Cavagnari called for a vigorous response, but the G.O.I. simply ordered him to hold back the revenue on Thal’s trans-Kurram land.65 At the end of the year Wali Muhammad Khan returned to the Kurram, but there were further difficulties in April 1878 when two-thirds of the residents of Biland Khel temporarily abandoned the village in protest at the behaviour of the Afghan authorities.66

THE DARWESH KHELS IN BANNU, THE MAHSUDS AND KABUL -

As we have seen, few problems were experienced with the Bannu Darwesh Khels during the 1870s; in 1884 the Bannu Gazetteer pointed out that “happily the record of the thirteen years from 1871 is one of almost undisturbed peace for this part of the frontier”.67 But, as we have just seen, the state of relations with Afghanistan did complicate matters. The point was made in Chapter Three that, as relations with the G.O.I. deteriorated, the Amir began to work actively to increase his influence in the tribal areas.68 As he was doing with the Mahsuds, Bhittanis and other tribes on the Tank border, he tried to build up support among the Darwesh Khels by inviting them to Kabul, giving them gifts of cash and

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63 C.D. 23-25 May 1876. in A31 June 1876 P859, C.D. 8-10 Aug. 1876, No. 8 in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 37, 11 Sep. 1876, L/P&S/7/10
67 Bannu Gazetteer 1883-84, p. 170
68 The Amir himself told the munshi of the British Agency in Kabul that he intended to arm the Frontier tribesmen, who would do whatever he ordered (“A Brief Account of the Unfriendly Acts of the Amir”, No. 21 in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 147, 12 Dec. 1878, L/P&S/7/20).
ceremonial items of clothing, and promising them allowances. As we saw in Chapter Three, in September 1875 he sent representatives to Birmal. They returned to Kabul with some Darwesh Khels, among them the influential Malik Adam Khan Madda Khel, who was described as “an inveterate foe” of the G.O.I., and the leader of the Darwesh Khels who lived beyond the British border. Adam Khan had been barred from British territory because he sheltered Captain Mecham’s murderers in 1860, and the Amir made increasing use of him as a go-between with the Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds. When the tribesmen reached Kabul, Sher Ali Khan, appealing to Islamic values, exhorted them to give him their allegiance and stop killing fellow-Muslims, and granted them allowances worth Rs.6,000 in all.

The Amir also invited Mani Khan to visit him, and offered to settle his differences with the other Darwesh Khel faction and the Mahsuds. Mani Khan’s stock in British territory had continued to fall, and he was described as “a disappointed, though ambitious man”. He was implicated in at least two serious murders in the middle of the decade. The first was that of his enemy, the prominent Bannuchi Malik, Assad Khan; Munro personally warned him not to allow such a thing to happen again. The second was of one of his Darwesh Khel rivals during the expedition against the Mahsuds in 1875. This was severely condemned by his fellow tribesmen, because during such expeditions personal rivalries were supposed to be put aside.

Mani Khan was keen to accept the Amir’s invitation. On the face of it, this seems a little odd. He must have known that, even if they did not actually prevent him from doing

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70 C.D. 24-27 Sep. 1875, in A12 Oct. 1875 P145
74 Ibid.
76 Munro wondered whether in view of the fact that he lived in British territory and received a pension of
so, the British authorities would not be very happy about it. Presumably he thought that he could not afford not to see the Amir if his rivals had done so. Moreover, he and some of the other Darwesh Khels living in Bannu did resent the fact that, as we have seen, they were not allowed to use British territory as a base from which to mount resistance to resist the Mahsuds' advances in the hills. They welcomed Sher Ali Khan's offer to mediate between them and the Mahsuds, something the British authorities had always declined to do.77

So in November 1875, with as many as eighty followers, Mani Khan went to Kabul, it would appear for the first time. He was accompanied by a number of other Maliks of his faction, including Barak Khan Takhti Khel Bakka Khel, who was the leader of Mani Khan’s faction among the Bannu Utmanzais, and the rival of the dominant Utmanzai Malik in Bannu, the Bakka Khel Malik, Hassan Shah.78 When they arrived, the Amir gave them khilla'is and promised to pay them allowances. Mani Khan’s allowance was fixed at Rs.1200, which was twice as much as his inam from the G.O.I. It was second only to Adam Khan’s, and much larger than the allowances received by any of the other Darwesh Khels from Bannu; Barak Khan, for example, was only given Rs.180.79 The Amir told Mani Khan that the Darwesh Khels and Mahsuds should patch up their quarrel.80

This advice was ignored, and in 1876 Mani Khan attempted to mount another expedition against the Mahsuds, but it was a failure.81 Nevertheless, he visited Kabul again with other Darwesh Khels from British territory and was kindly received by the Amir. Becket, the acting D.C., was unhappy about this, and thought that Mani and Barak Khans

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77 It was not always possible wholly to insulate British territory from the effects of the feud. At the end of August 1875, for example, some Bakka Khels in British territory sent a party into the hills and attacked a group of Kokarai Nana Khel Mahsuds, who had tried to raid a Tori Khel encampment at Sheratullah and rustle some Bakka Khel cattle. They captured nine of the Mahsuds and handed them over to the Militia as prisoners. The local officers told them that they should not bring men captured over the border back into British territory, and the Mahsuds were released (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 590, 3 Sep. 1875, in A29 Sep. 1875 P145).

78 Both Hassan Shah and Barak Khan belonged to the Khan Khel, the leading Takhti Khel family (D.C. Ban. to G.P., No. 744, 8 Nov. 1876, in A17 Jan. 1877 P860).

79 The total value of the allowances was Rs.3,065. It would be interesting to know whether they were ever actually paid (D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 744, 8 Nov. 1876, in A17 Jan. 1877 P860, C.D. 16-18 Nov. 1875, in A1 Dec. 1875 P145).

80 C.D. 26-29 Nov. 1875, No. 8 in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 4, 14 Jan. 1876, L/P&S/7/7.

81 The Darwesh Khels in Bannu would not support him, and the expedition went badly. He became so desperate that he even tried to make an alliance with Adam Khan (D.C. Ban. to G.P., No. 744, 8 Nov. 1876, in A17 Jan. 1877 P860).
and the others of their faction should be forbidden to go to Kabul again.\textsuperscript{82} It was not advisable, he argued, that Mani Khan should draw his allowance from the G.O.I., and “also be in the pay of another Government, and so be in a position to serve whichever in the end may bid the highest, should complications arise”.\textsuperscript{83} Becket even alleged that after this visit Mani Khan kept in regular contact with the Amir’s court, and that through him intrigues were carried on with all the Darwesh Khels living around Bannu, to induce them to support the Amir.\textsuperscript{84}

It seems unlikely that there was much if any substance to the D.C.’s allegations, but the increasing pressure the G.O.I. was exerting on the Amir by this stage was putting all its supporters among the frontier tribes in a difficult position. If they did not respond to his overtures, there was the risk that he might approach their rivals within their tribes instead, and that this might give them some advantage. In any case, it was dangerous for them not to support the Muslim ruler of Kabul. Mani Khan attended the Dera Ismail Khan divisional darbar on New Year’s Day 1877, and Munro asked him about his last meeting with the Amir. Mani Khan reported that Sher Ali Khan had told him that his kingdom was threatened on both sides by Christian powers, and that he expected all good Muslims and loyal Afghans to support him should he be attacked. He admitted that the Amir had given him an allowance, but maintained that his loyalty to the G.O.I. was unshakeable.\textsuperscript{85}

In the autumn of 1877 Mani Khan went to Kabul again. Johnstone, who had resumed his post as D.C. by this time, was unhappy that Mani Khan had been allowed to accept an allowance from Kabul. He thought it upset those Darwesh Khels in Bannu who, like Nizam Khan and most of the other Hatti Khel Maliks, had not responded to the Amir’s invitation. As a number of others Darwesh Khels were also beginning to live more or less permanently in British territory, it was, he said, “a pity to see their minds unsettled by an annual visit to Kabul or Kurram”.\textsuperscript{86} But although he recommended that Mani Khan should lose his allowance from the government, and that all the Maliks who went to Kabul should lose their nominees in the Frontier Militia, Egerton did not think this appropriate.\textsuperscript{87} In the summer of 1877, it should be noted, other tribal jirgas visited Kabul at the invitation of the Amir, including those of the Zaimukhts, Afridis, and Sunni Orakzais. They went partly

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid. Munro also thought that Mani Khan and the others’ position was “novel and anomalous” (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 354, 15 Nov. 1876, in A17 Jan. 1877 P860).
\textsuperscript{83} D.C. Ban. to G.P., No. 744, 8 Nov. 1876, in A17 Jan. 1877 P860
\textsuperscript{84} D.C. Ban. to G.P., No. 12A, 29 Dec. 1876, in A17 Jan. 1877 P860
\textsuperscript{85} Com. D.D. to G.P., No 2, 8 Jan. 1877, in A17 Jan. 1877 P860
\textsuperscript{86} D.C. Ban. to G.P., No. 744, 8 Nov. 1877, in A17 Jan. 1877 P860
“because they were afraid to be called Wahhabis by the mullahs”, and partly because they hoped that the Amir would give them money, rifles, and allowances.88

The growing tensions along the border may have been partly responsible for the fact that the Lower Dawar villages refused to hand over a gang of robbers who killed three policemen in Bannu in August 1877.89 In retaliation a number of Dawars and their property were seized in British territory in October, and a blockade imposed. Though by then the robbers appear to have moved on, in December it was decided to demand a fine of Rs.3,500, which the Dawars refused to pay. However, early in 1878 two British officers made a reconnaissance to the eastern edge of the valley, which seems to have made the Dawars think they were about to be attacked, and in April they decided to pay the fine and come to terms with the government.90

In 1878 the first regular revenue settlement of the Bannu district was completed, and in June, partly to bolster the morale of the British supporters among the tribes, lungi inams were distributed to various Darwesh Khel Maliks.91 In addition to Mani Khan and Barak Khan, they included a number of men who had been to Kabul and been promised allowances by the Amir.92 Only a few Hatti Khels seemed pleased with the inams, the Settlement Officer said, commenting that such a thing as “a grateful Darwesh Khel chief” had not yet been discovered.93

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88 Cabul News for May 1878, No. 24 in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 147, 12 Dec. 1878, L/P&S/7/20, P.A.R., 1877-78, p. 27. It is unlikely that the tribes elsewhere on the Frontier had much to do with the colony of Sayyid Ahmed Bareliw’s followers at Sittana north of Peshawar, whose members were sometimes referred to as Wahhabis (see Chapter Six, footnote 9). It appears that the term was used to smear opponents, whether or not they had any connections with this group (see C. Noelle, “The Anti-Wahhabi Reaction in 19th century Afghanistan”, The Muslim World (1995), Vol. Lxxxv, No. 1-2, Jan.-April).
91 Among them were Madaman and Fazl Shah who had played a prominent role in organising the attack on the Kurram relief in June 1870.
92 In all there were six Hatti Khel recipients, two Sirki Khels, two Spirkais, four Umarzais, two Bizan Khels, ten Muhammad Khels, ten Jani Khels, and fifteen Bakka Khels (Set. O. Ban. to Set. Com. Multan and Derajat, No. 27, 15 May 1878, in A12 June 1878 P1147). As well as Mani Khan and Barak Khan, eight others had visited Kabul at the Amir’s invitation (Kohat Gazetteer, p. 177).
93 Set. O. Ban. to Set. Com., No. 27, 15 May 1878, in A12 June 1878 P1147
THE BANNU AND UPPER MIRANZAI BORDERS DURING THE SECOND ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR

In November the British invasion of Afghanistan began, and General Roberts' column entered the Upper Kurram valley. The Kabul government lost control of the district altogether: Biland Khel and Thal trans-Kurram were temporarily transferred to the Punjab government, and the rest was placed under a separate administration. However, the invasion put a heavy strain on British tribal management. In September 1878 the Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels finally agreed to a truce, and, as we saw in Chapter Four, on the 1st of January 1879 the Mahsuds erupted onto British territory and burned the bazaar of Tank. In March Musa Khels, Kakars and Sheranis carried out a raid on the Vehowa border to the south. To the north the Zaimukhts, with whom no particular problems had been experienced since the mid-1860s, raided and looted around the British camp at Thal, and carried out robberies along the road. In March 1879 they attacked the Gundiour caravanserai, causing several casualties, and in retaliation towards the end of the year some of their villages were burned. Muhammad Amin Khan, the Thanadar of Upper Miranzai, accompanied the troops and persuaded the Zaimukhts to surrender.

Although Mani Khan had been invited to Kabul again in 1878, he did not go. The British authorities' relatively relaxed attitude to his contacts with the Amir paid off, and in spite of the latter's efforts, Mani Khan and the other Darwesh Khels with land in Bannu did little if anything to support him. Nevertheless, after the Mahsuds attacked Tank on New Year's Day 1879, it was feared that something similar might be attempted in the Bannu district. The D.C. called for reinforcements, but the frontier remained fairly quiet. One interesting development was the way that the British were able to send supplies and troops from Bannu to the camps at Thal and Upper Kurram through the Kurram valley, thereby avoiding a very lengthy detour via Kohat. Although this was in practice independent territory, a series of complex badragga arrangements were made with the different Darwesh

94 By the late 1870s several districts of eastern Afghanistan including Khost, Zurmat, and Gardez and Kurram, were in a state of revolt owing to increased taxation and demands for recruits for the Amir's army (P.A.R. 1877-78. p. 28).
95 Kohat Gazetteer, p. 140
96 It was only a temporary truce, and, as was noted in Chapter Three, the feud continued after the war. In the late 1890s, for example, Curzon instructed that the local officers should not allow the Darwesh Khels to use British territory as a base for retaliatory expeditions against the Mahsuds (Harris, 'British Policy on the N.-W. Frontier', p. 333).
97 P.A.R. 1878-79. p. 108
98 He was able to induce the Mamazai and Alisherzai Orakzais, who had also been troublesome, to surrender as well (Op. cit. pp. 13-14, 37-38, G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 177, 2 Feb. 1880, in G.O.I. F.D. to S. of S., No. 79, 31 March 1880, L/P&S/7/24). The Orakzais were supposedly stirred up by Mullah Wali Khan.
99 G.P. to F.S., Tel., 5 Jan. 1879, in G.O.I. F.D. to S. of S., No. 11, 10 Jan. 1879, L/P&S/7/21
Khel tribes living in or along the route including the Umarzais, Sudan Khels, and Muhammad Khels, according to which they provided escorts for the caravans.\textsuperscript{100}

It was pointed out in the previous chapter that Dawar contained various religious seminaries and a population of religious students (\textit{talibul-ilm(s) or taliban}). It made a good base from which to harass the British camps during the Second Anglo-Afghan War, and the Mullah Adakar moved to Deghan in Upper Dawar after British troops visited Khost in January 1879. He and his disciple, Mullah Wali Khan of Chapri, encouraged the \textit{taliban}, assisted by men from various Darwesh Khel tribes, including Hassan Khels, Mohmit Khels and Tori Khels, as well as some Mahsuds, to carry out a number of raids around Thal.\textsuperscript{101} Attempts were also made to ambush convoys proceeding to or from Bannu via the Kurram. On the 3rd March, for example, Malikshahis attacked one in Kabul Khel territory, looting property worth Rs.1,250.\textsuperscript{102} Problems increased as the excitement among the surrounding tribes caused by the Mullah Adakar’s preaching and events in Afghanistan grew, and on the 21st March 1880 caravans stopped using the route.\textsuperscript{103}

However, the most serious incident on the Bannu border occurred during the night of the 22nd April 1880, when a band of Dawars, Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels, led by Adam Khan Madda Khel’s son Ghulam Khan, attacked the Baran post. The troops held the tower, but the raiders were able to steal the garrison’s horses.\textsuperscript{104} This occurred within a few days of the attempt by Umar Khan to attack Gumal mentioned in Chapter Four, and the two raids may well have been loosely co-ordinated.\textsuperscript{105} The Mullah Adakar’s preaching also inspired Mahsuds, Dawars and Darwesh Khels several times to threaten the military camp at Thal.\textsuperscript{106} Led by a follower of the Mullah Adakar named Wazir, a band of tribesmen launched a night attack on the military post at Chapri on the 1st May 1880, and Lt. Wood of the Transport Department was killed.\textsuperscript{107}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{101} One was led by his brother, others by a man named Gulab Pir who lived with the Madda Khels at Gor (D.C. Koh. to Com. Pesh. D., No. 216, 24 April 1880, No. 506 April 1881 IP P1741).
\bibitem{102} On the 9th February 1879, Tori Khels had looted one of property worth Rs.1,000, and a number of men, and property to this value, were seized in Bannu in retaliation (D.C. Koh. to Com. Pesh. D., No. 226-2598, 14 July 1879, in A9C Aug. 1879 P1299).
\bibitem{103} D.C. Koh. to Com. Pesh. D., No. 391-3386, 8 Aug. 1880, in A4 Feb. 1881 P1624. In all some 23,500 camel loads and 64,500 maunds of supplies had passed along it, and it had also been used by several detachments of British cavalry (D.C. Koh. to Com. Pesh. D., No. 226-2598, 14 July 1879, in A9C Aug. 1879 P1299).
\bibitem{104} G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 933, 27 April 1881, No. 164 Nov. 1881 IP P1741
\bibitem{105} D.C. Ban. to Com. D.D., No. 192, 15 April 1881, No. 165 Nov. 1881 IP P1741
\bibitem{107} G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 933, 27 April 1881, No. 164 Nov. 1881 IP P1744
\end{thebibliography}
To punish them for the attack on the convoy, in October 1880 troops commanded by Brigadier John Gordon attacked the small Malikshahi tribe. One hundred and twenty-eight men and two thousand head of cattle were captured, and to obtain their release the tribe paid a fine of Rs.13,200 in December. However, Egerton’s subsequent proposal that troops should be sent into Dawar to punish the Dawars and the Madda Khels for their activities during the war was turned down by the Viceroy, Ripon. All but one of the offences had been committed in independent territory in wartime, he pointed out, and he did not think they afforded grounds for military operations which “for general reasons of policy, it (was) ... very desirable not to prolong”.

THE DARWESH KHELS IN THE EARLY 1880s AND POSTSCRIPT -

One important feature of developments in this period was the considerable growth in the numbers of Darwesh Khels living in Bannu (arising presumably both from immigration and natural increase), but is difficult to be very precise about this. The Assessment Report suggests that it more than doubled from 1855 to 1868, rising from around seven thousand to fourteen thousand, and presumably it continued to grow in the 1870s. One thing we can be sure of is that the amount of land the Darwesh Khels cultivated in Bannu increased dramatically in this period; to the west and north-west of Bannu it doubled, and it rose by four or five times on the Thul.

Another important development was a marked tendency towards sedentarisation among the Darwesh Khels both in Bannu and along the Upper Miranzai border. The practically continuous loss of summer grazing and patches of cultivable land in the hills to the Mahsuds gave those who had started to winter in Bannu a strong incentive to stay there the whole year round. The majority of the Hatti Khels in particular seem to have stopped going into the hills in the hot weather altogether. The trend towards sedentarisation in Bannu was accompanied by an extension of their agricultural activities, whether they tilled the land themselves or paid others to do it for them. The Hatti Khels in particular benefited greatly from the British policy of encouraging the Darwesh Khels to cultivate there. Whereas in the 1840s they had less land in Bannu than most of the other tribes, by the late 1870s they had far more cultivated land than any of the others. Their holding was nearly

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109 G.O.I. to G.P., No. 941P, 7 May 1881, No. 170 Nov. 1881 IP P1744
110 Ass. Report of Bannu District, A16 Aug. 1877 P860. The Bannu Gazetteer gives a figure of 13,523 for the resident Darwesh Khel population. By 1879 the number of Khojul Khel men was estimated at 1,000 and of the Tazi Khels at 1,200 (Kohat Gazetteer, p. 179).
111 Ass. Report of Bannu District, in A16 Aug. 1877 P860
three times as large as the Bakka Khels', the next largest (forty-one square miles compared to fourteen). The third largest holding was that of the Spirkai (Sudan Khel and Sada Khel) with thirteen square miles, followed by the Jani Khels with eleven. The Sirki Khel and the Muhammad Khels each had four square miles, and the Umarzais and the Bizan Khels two. On the Kohat border, as we have seen, pastoral nomadism became more difficult, partly thanks to the attempts to regulate the movements of the nomads and their flocks as they passed through Upper Miranzai on their way to and from their winter pastures. Nevertheless, the pastoral wealth of these tribes remained considerable; in the early 1880s the Khojul Khels reportedly owned three hundred camels and fifteen thousand sheep, and the Tazi Khels four hundred camels and twenty thousand sheep.

No figures are easily accessible (if indeed they exist at all) for the end of the period let alone the beginning, but the increase in the population of Bannu, as well as the more peaceful conditions which were established in the district, makes it likely that trade increased considerably in this period. It appears that both the trans-border Darwesh Khels and the ones living in British territory benefited from this. By the late 1870s a number of the Darwesh Khel tribes were trading regularly and on some scale in the Bannu bazaar. For example, the Umarzais, who did not have much land, sold firewood and a local product used for washing and dying cloth called tamman. By the 1870s they had also become the most important dealers in sheep, which they bought from the pastoral tribes living further away from Bannu, like the Mohmit Khels and Gurbaz. The Painda Khels and Muhammad Khels dealt in sheep too. The Bizan Khels and Sudan Khels sold tamman, and the Muhammad Khels, Khunia Khels and Gangi Khels firewood, and the Tori Khels wood, matting, rope made from the dwarf palm, iron, charcoal, sheep and ghi. Some tribes acted as carriers, the Umarzais for example conveying goods from Bannu to both Khost and Thal via the Gumutti pass, while the Muhammad Khels were the principal carriers from Bannu to Dawar and Khost, and the Pipalai and Saifali Kabul Khels carried goods west from Idak in Dawar. They also provided armed escorts (badragga) for other caravans using these routes.

There seems to have been a tendency for a minority of men to acquire quite large landholdings, and their economic strength must have given them some political influence.

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112 By the 1880s the only Hatti Khel section living in the hills was the Patolkhels, a branch of the Alikhels (Bannu Gazetteer, p. 67).
113 Ibid.
114 Kohat Gazetteer, p. 179
115 An impure compound of sodium carbonate obtained from a bush found in the hills east of the Kurram river (R. Udny, Report on the Trans-Border Trade of the Bannu District (Selections from the Records of the Punjab Govt., N.S. 18, 1882), pp. 19-20.
117 Op. cit. passim
These were men like Mani Khan Sudan Khel and Nizam Khan Hatti Khel, who though they held no official position of authority within their tribes, were used as go-betweens by the authorities. Indeed Mani Khan and Nizam Khan became leaders of factions which seem to have included more or less all the Darwesh Khels in the district, and linked up with the Bannu people’s own factions. As we have seen they became important enough to be cultivated by Amir Sher Ali Khan too.

In the 1880s the increasing integration of the Darwesh Khels into the economy of the plains seemed to be paying political dividends. Some difficulties were experienced with the Kabul Khels in the Kohat district in the early 1880s, but otherwise it appears that there were no particular problems with them during the rest of the decade. However, the British penetration of Dawar and the establishment of a North Waziristan Political Agency and a cantonment at Miram Shah in 1895 did upset the Madda Khels, Tori Khels and other trans-border Darwesh Khels. In 1897 the Political Officer, Gee, and his escort were attacked at Maizar in Lower Dawar on the 10th June 1897. This sparked off the first of the serious risings which occurred along much of the frontier during that year. After these had been dealt with, the Bannu and Kurram frontiers remained relatively peaceful until W.W.I, but during the Third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919 Thal was overrun by Afghan forces. In 1922 it was decided to establish a cantonment at Razmak, and, as in South Waziristan, the army began to play an increasingly important role in tribal management. In the 1930s a religious leader, the Faqir of Ipi, was able to play on emotions aroused by, among other things, the Islam Bibi affair, to stir up resistance to the British, and there were some serious military clashes with considerable loss of life, for example at Majka in the Khaisora valley in 1936. For the first time since the annexation of the Punjab, Bannu itself was attacked by a tribal lashkar in 1938, and, as happened in South Waziristan, relations with the tribes remained hostile until British troops were withdrawn in 1947.

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118 With Hatti Khels living in the hills to the north of Bannu, they carried out a number of raids into the Teri district of Kohat (Polit. Admin. Report, in A1 April 1883 P2012). Most of the stolen cattle found their way to the Saifalis, who, as they had been doing throughout this period, probably sold them on to others (P.A.R. 1881-82, G.S. pp. 18-19). After this things settled down, and it was claimed in the mid-1890s that “since 1880 the Waziris have given us no trouble worth recording” (“Afghan Affairs and Waziristan” by an ex-Panjab official, Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly (1895), N.S., vol. IX, Jan.-April 1895, p. 31).


120 The authorities returned a Hindu girl who had eloped with and married a young Tori Khel man to her parents (see, example, Singer, Lords, p. 173).

121 Driven out of the Tochi valley, the Faqir moved to Mahsud country and then to a cave at Gorwekht to the west of Razmak almost on the Afghan border, where he lived for many years, dying in 1960. For details see, for example, Caroe, The Pathans, p. 406, Elliott, The Frontier, p. 262, Singer, Lords, pp. 173-177, A. Swinson, The North-West Frontier People and Events 1839-1947 (London, 1967), p. 331, Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan, p. 59.
SUMMARY -

The Muhammad Khel episode encouraged the Punjab government to subject its system of frontier management along the whole Derajat border to considerable scrutiny in the early 1870s. The Frontier Crimes Regulations were introduced, the P.R. and Frontier Militia arrangements were overhauled, and an effort was made to keep frontier officers in their posts for long enough to establish personal relationships with the tribesmen. But although some of the military officers argued that they should have control of relations with the trans-border tribes, and called for a much more interventionist policy, which would have resembled the one pursued on the Sind frontier by Jacob and his successors, the system was not fundamentally altered. Frere continued to criticised Punjab frontier management policies, and when Lytton became Viceroy, he tried to make some substantial changes to frontier administration, but this had little impact on the Waziristan border.

The more modest improvements introduced by the Punjab government itself in the early 1870s had good results. In Bannu itself there were no problems with the Darwesh Khels throughout the 1870s, although the local officers seem to have begun to rely rather more on the Hatti Khel Malik Nizam Khan, and rather less on Mani Khan Sudan Khel. Mani Khan and some of the other Maliks several times visited Kabul in the later 1870s in response to invitations from the Amir. Among other reasons, this was because he hoped the Amir might help to settle his differences with the Mahsuds, but when the Second Anglo-Afghan War broke out, he and the other Darwesh Khel Maliks in Bannu supported the British government. However, neighbouring Dawar was used as a base by the Mullah Adakar and there were a number of incidents on the Upper Miranzai border, and in the Bannu district the Baran post was attacked in 1880. As in South Waziristan the introduction of a forward policy in the 1890s was very unpopular, and difficulties continued to be experienced with the Darwesh Khels until 1947.
CHAPTER EIGHT TRIBE AND STATE IN WAZIRISTAN 1849-1883

RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRITISH FRONTIER POLICY -

In this and the following chapter I look at the conclusions regarding British tribal policy, and tribal culture and organisation, and the relationship between them which can be drawn from the preceding narrative. To begin with, although space does not permit a full examination of the question, it is worth emphasising the extent to which in this period the decisions regarding tribal management were left almost entirely in the hands of the G.O.I. At least until the completion of the telegraphic links in 1870, the chain of command was too convoluted, and communications too slow, for the President of the Board of Control in London, and after 1858 the Secretary of State for India, to have very much influence on specific decisions.¹ They did sometimes comment in general terms, but it appears that this had little direct impact. So, for example, although Wood and Ripon criticised the Punjab government’s apparent dependence on punitive expeditions, and suggested that more ‘civilised’ methods of managing the tribes should be adopted, this had little effect.²

By contrast the Governor-General was usually directly interested in frontier management, and anxious to influence it as far as he could, given the constraints of distance and the state of communications.³ In particular, except in emergencies, his permission was required for any substantial military movement across the border. Dalhousie was particularly closely involved, and usually took the important decisions, sometimes against the advice of Henry Lawrence and his brother John. His successors continued to intervene in frontier policy, even after the Punjab became a Lt.-Governorate in the late 1850s. Canning, for example, ruled out an expedition against the Mahsuds in 1859 against the advice of the local officials, but after the attempt to raid Tank in 1860 insisted that one should be undertaken. Mayo and Lytton also tried to exert their authority along the frontier and modify tribal management policies, apparently without much success it must be said. Nor were they able to introduce new administrative arrangements as they hoped.

After the Punjab became a Lt.-Governorate, its governors also played a role in dealing with the tribes, and sometimes overruled the local officers. In the early 1860s, for example, Montgomery insisted that Taylor accept Mahsud responsibility on a ‘sectional’ rather than ‘tribal’ basis. After the attack on the troops by the Muhammad Khels in 1870, both Henry Durand and his successor Henry Davies visited Bannu to review the position;

¹ Though after this things began to change (see, for example, Dodwell, A Sketch, p. 33).
² See above Chapter Two.
³ Telegraphic communication was introduced between Lahore and Calcutta in the 1850s, though it appears that it did not reach the Derajat frontier until the 1870s. It increased the tendency for the senior officials to try and interfere with local government.
Davies visited Tank again in 1872 and 1875, and seems to have been particularly interested in frontier issues. However, provided some broad principles were not compromised, the local officers enjoyed considerable freedom, and there were often opportunities for them to suggest longer-term initiatives for dealing with the tribes, to which the senior officials were sometimes willing to respond. Thus the initial impetus for the Mahsud settlement scheme in the 1860s, the imposition of tribal responsibility in 1875, and the attempt to introduce the Maliki system at the end of the 1880s, all came from the local officers. Tribal relationships were also considerably affected by the personalities and attitudes of the different officers involved. So, for example, whereas Taylor was very reluctant to take troops into the hills to seize the Umarzais’ flocks and herds in the early 1850s, Nicholson was quite willing to do so.

INFLUENCES ON BRITISH FRONTIER POLICY

The tribes were dispersed across such a vast and difficult terrain that to control them solely by military means would probably have required far greater resources than are possessed even by contemporary governments. This meant that, by contrast with the Sind border, along which John Jacob had been able to mount frequent strong patrols and attack bands of robbers regularly and effectively, the tribes on the Punjab border had to a greater or lesser extent to be ‘managed’ rather than repressed. Apart from the desirability from the point of view of good administration of preventing the tribes causing disruption in British territory, there would appear to have been four major influences on their management. Firstly, there were the strategic considerations arising from the fact that they were located along a critical frontier; these were closely linked with policy decisions about how far it was desirable to extend British rule. Secondly, there were decisions about how much could be spared in terms of administrative, military and financial resources. Thirdly, frontier policy had an ideological dimension, which meant that policies were also influenced by beliefs about ways in which it was or was not appropriate for an empire to handle tribes. Finally, it had a sociological one too. Ideas about how the tribes were organised, how the tribe ‘worked’ so to speak, were important. Whether it was a matter of responding to particular incidents, or influencing the behaviour of the tribe as a whole in the longer term, British officials had to try and establish, in the absence of any formal tribal political structures, where authority lay and how decisions were made, and what values underpinned tribal organisation. I look at each of these major influences in turn.

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Strategic Considerations

As we saw in Chapter One, in 1849 the British inherited an anarchic situation on the Punjab frontier, which meant that their immediate object was to establish and maintain peace along a border inhabited by a number of large and independently-minded tribal groups accustomed to an antagonistic relationship with the plains. However, the fact that the tribes were located along a strategic border meant that the implications of frontier policies for imperial defence, and vice versa, also had to be taken into consideration. If they were hostile to an invading force they could, it was believed, significantly impede its progress (just as they could obstruct the passage of an army marching in the opposite direction). Indeed there was the possibility that they might be induced to invade the plains themselves, on their own or in combination with another power. However, conventional wisdom has tended to be that because no immediate threat was perceived to the security of India from the north-west during the first quarter century of British rule along the frontier, Britain’s primary concerns in this period were administrative ones. Hence, it is usually argued, policy towards the tribes was largely unaffected by the considerations of imperial defence which came to the fore with Lytton’s viceroyalty in the later 1870s and again with Lansdowne’s at the end of the 1880s. There is some truth in this, but to dismiss British concerns in this early period as merely administrative is to overlook some interesting aspects of the problems they faced. These definitely had a wider strategic dimension for three main reasons.

In the first place, in practice policy towards the tribes and the frontier could not be entirely divorced from considerations of imperial defence. Tribal territory adjoined that of the Kabul government (and until 1853 when it was absorbed by Kabul, Kandahar), with whose rulers the tribes shared a religious and, to some extent at least, cultural identity and political tradition. This meant that there was always the possibility that if they were pushed too far, the independent tribes might play the Kabul card and seek help from the Amir in return for recognition of his sovereignty over them. Though it was a remote one until the 1870s, there was also the more worrying prospect that the Amir might play the tribal card and encourage the tribes to invade British territory themselves. So the state of the tribes’ relationship with Kabul had to be taken into consideration even in the early days. The fact

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5 See, for example, Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, p. 153
6 Harris, ‘British Policy on the N.-W. Frontier’, p. 26
7 So, as Lytton, for example, pointed out, the tendency of the Russian advance in Central Asia and the British movement into Kalat had been, was, more and more “to merge minor tribal politics into the larger general question of our relations with the great independent States beyond our border” (Reorganisation of the Frontier - V.’s Minute, A158 Feb. 1878 IP P1216).
8 Christensen, for example. argues that British policy was mainly concerned with the creation of stability in their territory, and that no attempt was made to extend political influence beyond the administrative border (‘Conflict and Change’, p. 145). See also Harris, ‘British Policy on the N.-W. Frontier’, p. 17.
that several trade routes ran through tribal territory, the most important ones from Peshawar
to Jalalabad through the Khyber Pass or Mullagori territory to the north, and Kohat to
Kabul via the Kurram, and Dera Ismail Khan to Ghazni via the Gumal pass, also
complicated the issue. Mayo seems to have been particularly anxious to see trade with
Afghanistan expand as a means of increasing British influence, and the question of how the
Gumal and the Kurram routes, particularly the former, might be made more secure began to
be raised during his viceroyalty.9

Tribal management was also linked with wider strategic considerations because the
British tended to assume that the Kabul government ought to be able to influence the
behaviour of some of the tribes at least. Punjab tribal policy, it is usually argued, consisted
in among other things “direct dealings with the frontier tribes over the head of the Amir of
Kabul”.10 In fact it was not as simple as that. Dalhousie did initially argue that “if we were
even hand in glove with the Dost it would not make any difference to our relations with the
border tribes”, but he changed his mind, and, as we saw in connection with the 1855
negotiations, became more willing to allow Dost Muhammad Khan to play some sort of
frontier role.11 As a result the Amir’s sovereignty over the Turis was affirmed, and an
attempt was made to deal with their raiding through him. During the negotiations in
Peshawar which led to the 1855 treaty, John Lawrence and Edwardes invited his son,
Ghulam Hyder Khan, to send a representative with the expedition that was to be sent into
Upper Miranzai. He was also told that the British government renounced its claim to trans-
Kurram Upper Miranzai, as well as to Dawar. Lawrence even speculated that this might
make it easier to manage the border districts. Nor did his successor, Canning, entirely rule
out the possibility of trying to control the tribes through the Amir. While he was Viceroy,
Lawrence was more reluctant to allow the Kabul ruler to play a frontier role, but this was
principally because for much of this period there was civil war in Afghanistan. It is mainly
because he was so reluctant to do anything which might imply a preference for one party or
the other in the Afghan civil war, that his successor Mayo’s willingness to co-operate with
Sher Ali Khan over tribal questions looks like a break with the past. As a result, the extent
to which the latter pursued new policies has been exaggerated.12 In fact Mayo’s efforts to
deal with the Amir directly on tribal questions were a reversion to Dalhousie’s and

9 Chakravarty, From Khyber to Oxus, p. 105.
10 Chakravarty, From Khyber to Oxus, p. 11, Lady Balfour, Lord Lytton’s Indian Administration, p. 165,
11 Dalhousie to C. Wood, 9 Feb. 1854, MSS EUR F78/18-1A. Edwardes, for example, thought that the
Amir was “in a position to annoy us very greatly if he chooses, by setting up border blackguards, and
encouraging the misconduct of tribes” (H. Edwardes to Dalhousie, 20 March 1854, L/P&S/20 B.107A).
12 By, for example, Chakravarty (From Khyber to Oxus, pp. 92, 98).
Canning’s policies, rather than any very dramatic new departure, and there does not appear to have been any very significant change under Northbrook.13

Thirdly, imperial and administrative aspects were interrelated because, as we have seen, a number of punitive expeditions were undertaken across the border in the belief that they helped to keep the independent tribes under control. Unlikely though it usually was, there was always the possibility that one of these expeditions might be defeated or suffer some serious loss. A reverse for British arms on one part of the frontier affected British prestige on another, and could even have an effect on the morale of the G.O.I. as a whole, and of its friends and enemies. Partly in reaction to the humiliations of the First Anglo-Afghan War, during the early years especially there was considerable anxiety about the possibility of British troops being defeated in the hills and the loss of prestige that would follow. In 1855, for example, John Lawrence commented to Nicholson that “in the hearts of the Government and the Commander in Chief there is a mortal dread of going into the hills, and should any misfortune occur, a fine howl they would open on us. We cannot insure that Government will act promptly and vigorously against the hill tribes”.14 Probably the nearest British troops actually came to suffering such humiliation was in 1863 when the expedition which had set out to destroy the Mujahidin base at Malka to the north of Peshawar was pinned down in the hills by the tribesmen for several months. As order had only quite recently been restored after the Mutiny, the repercussions in India itself might well have been serious had they actually been defeated.15

In order to avoid the possibility of the G.O.I. being drawn inadvertently into trans-border complications, officers posted along the border were usually severely discouraged from crossing it. Although the border was rather vaguely defined in this period, and the ‘hot pursuit’ of raiders a short distance into the hills was permitted, except in the gravest emergencies the Governor-General’s sanction was required before full-scale military expeditions into tribal territory could take place. Lawrence’s warning to Nicholson in 1853 that “the Governor General will not hear of you going into the hills to anticipate the attack of any tribe without orders from Lahore” was entirely typical.16 As we have seen, this

13 Heathcote, ‘British Policy and Baluchistan’, p. 223. Chakravarty suggests that under Northbrook direct communication with the tribes was re-opened, and the principle by which the tribe as a whole was to be held responsible for individual crimes introduced, but this is difficult to reconcile with his assertion that, until Lytton’s viceroyalty, the G.O.I. recognised the Amir’s sovereignty over the Frontier tribes (From Khyber to Oxus, pp. 116, 182). In fact there were no major changes on the Derajat frontier, and probably few on the Peshawar one, after Northbrook succeeded Mayo. Direct communication with the tribes had never ceased, nor had some form of tribal responsibility not been adhered to.
14 J. Lawrence to J. Nicholson, 23 May 1855, MSS EUR F90/6-4A, J. Lawrence to Dalhousie, 31 August 1853, MSS EUR F90/3-1A
15 Ahmad, The Wahabi Movement, pp. 194-208
policy contrasted with that pursued on the Upper Sind frontier where government officers were able to cross the border into Kalat and move about freely there.\textsuperscript{17} Nor, with the exception of Upper Miranzai, was British rule extended anywhere beyond the border inherited in 1849. As we saw in Chapter Five, Upper Miranzai had been subject to the Sikhs, and Dalhousie specifically made the point that it was British territory by right. Failure to take it would be interpreted as weakness, and the government's prestige would suffer.

\textbf{Limited Resources -}

Although the tribes on the Punjab frontier had to a greater or lesser extent to be 'managed' rather than simply repressed, there were still decisions to be made about the extent to which the government should rely on management rather than force. There is considerable evidence that lack of resources constrained frontier administration in various ways, and encouraged the use of less intrusive approaches. One of the grounds on which Frere attacked Punjab frontier management was that of expense, and the Lt.-Governors were under constant pressure to keep costs as low as possible.\textsuperscript{18} Not only were punitive expeditions frequently postponed or cancelled because of troop shortages, but the tribal settlement schemes also tended to be on a modest scale, and the Frontier Militia appointments limited in number. Just to take one example, it was decided to control Upper Miranzai by building a post for irregulars at Gundiour rather than stationing regular troops in a new fort, as Coke advocated, partly because it was much the cheaper option. Limited resources were also at least partly responsible for the tendency in the early years to rely on local middlemen as intermediaries between the administration and the tribes. It was simply impossible at the outset for the administration to open direct relations with all the tribes, and local border chiefs were used to manage them. So Nawab Shah Nawaz Khan played the dominant role in managing relations with the Mahsuds and Bhittanis on the Dera Ismail Khan border until the early 1870s. On the Upper Miranzai border the Khan of Hangu's cousin, Muhammad Amin Khan, was responsible for the day-to-day management of relations with the Darwesh Khels throughout much of the period.\textsuperscript{19}

So although the sheer scale of the problem means that even if more resources had been available it is unlikely that the policies pursued by the Punjab government would have been very different, there might well have been changes of emphasis. Had there been more

\textsuperscript{1} p. 349
\textsuperscript{17} Heathcote, 'British Policy and Baluchistan', p. 60
\textsuperscript{18} See, for example, Minute by the Viceroy, 12 Dec. 1863, L/P&S/5/257, pp. 623-647.
\textsuperscript{19} He also played an important part in managing the tribes during General Roberts' Kurram campaign during the winter of 1878-79 (see, for example, G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 177, 2 Feb. 1880, in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 79, 31 March 1880, L/P&S/7/24).
troops, a punitive expedition would almost certainly have been mounted against the Mahsuds by the mid-1850s, for example. As I explain below, it was in the first place a policy decision rather than shortage of resources which dictated that the tribes should not be paid allowances to keep the peace. Nevertheless, had the financial climate been more favourable, the government might have been more willing to consider the possibility of subsidising them in various indirect ways. For example, the settlement schemes could have been on a larger scale, and more of the tribesmen could have been enlisted in the Frontier Militia.

The Nature of British Tribal Policy -

Limited resources, and the perception that no particular threat was to be feared from the other side of the frontier, combined to generate what came to be referred to as the 'close border' policy, which was associated with the Stationary School of frontier strategy.  

It is usually argued that from 1849 until 1876, when Lytton arrived in India, north-west frontier policy was dictated by men who were opposed to any military intervention beyond the trans-Indus foothills, either because they thought there was no real threat from the north-west, or because even if there was, that any advance would bring no military or strategic advantage. This tends to be contrasted with the views of the Forward School, consisting of those who argued for such intervention. But this is too simple. There were different interpretations of what a Forward policy might mean in practice, and in any case, although in theory the two opposed poles of policy may have been the close border' or Curzon's 'military steamroller', in practice neither was really feasible. On the one hand lack of resources ruled out the military option. On the other, complete non-interference would have created a political vacuum which would have left the initiative too much to the tribes, and positively invited Kabul and other governments to intervene.

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20 The earliest use of the term 'close border' I have seen is in a letter from the Derajat Commissioner, George Ogilvie, to the Punjab government in 1889 (No. 598, 7 June 1889, in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 13, 28th Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/59).

21 They included administrators like Canning, Lawrence, Mayo and Northbrook, and military experts like Sir William Mansfield, Sir Henry Durand, and Sir Henry Norman (see, for example, Ghose, England and Afghanistan, pp. 2-4).

22 For the quotation in which Curzon used this phrase, see, for example, Howell, M!zh, p. 95. See also Davies, The Problem, p. 3, Spain, The Pathan Borderland, pp. 115-119, Harris, 'British Policy on the N.-W. Frontier', p. 36.

23 Recognising this, Sir Alfred Lyall (1835-1911) (Foreign Secretary of the G.O.I. from 1878 to 1882, and then Lt. Governor of the North West Provinces until 1887), pointed out that the true frontier was not coterminous with the limits of territory actually administered by the G.O.I. Beyond this were areas that were vital for security but over which it did not attempt to exercise administrative control ("Frontiers and Protectorates", The Nineteenth Century, Vol. 30, 1891, p. 315).
It is true that the Punjab government was anxious not to take on trans-border commitments. So, for example, it consistently refused to become involved in the fighting between the Mahsuds and the Darwesh Khels which continued throughout most of this period, even though some of them appealed to it to do so. It also opposed the payment of anything like allowances or ‘blackmail’ to the tribes to try and persuade them not to carry out raids in British territory.  

But, as we have seen, this did not mean that there were no contacts with the tribesmen, or that, apart from punitive expeditions, there was no trans-border intervention at all. The sort of military intervention across the border which might lead to the permanent occupation of tribal territory was discouraged, but in practice after the first few years some sort of political relationship was maintained with most of the Waziristan tribes.  

As Thorburn commented in connection with the fines he imposed on the Muhammad Khels in the spring of 1870 for robberies carried out across the border, “if for the future a policy of non-intervention be pursued with reference to all trans-border offences, the trade, which is considerable, with Dour and Khost, will suffer”.  

Even John Lawrence, who was particularly anxious to avoid trans-border commitments, sanctioned Graham’s Mahsud settlement scheme, and the employment of trans-border tribesmen in the Frontier Militia. This attempt to persuade the Mahsuds to settle on land in British territory is a good example of the sort of intervention which was permitted at this stage. Moreover, the fact that during this period the local middlemen were gradually dispensed with, and that British officials played an increasingly greater part in managing relations with the tribes, also tended to increase British interference with them.

As we saw in Chapter Seven, there was some discussion among the Punjab officials in the early 1870s of the form the relationship with the trans-border tribes should take. In particular, Captain McLean called for full military control over the frontier and the extension of the area under British rule, which in some ways anticipated the policies pursued in the 1890s. However, official reaction was on the whole negative; apart from other army officers, no-one seems to have taken his suggestion that the military should oversee Pass Responsibility seriously. Nevertheless, although Munro argued that as a general rule P.R. agreements should not be made with tribes living wholly in independent territory, Davies was prepared to sanction them provided that the tribes concerned entered into them willingly. He did not think that the government should try and ‘govern’ any of

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24 Taylor, for example, commented that nothing would be so damaging to British interests as to pay subsidies to “men who have no immediate connection with the soil” (D.M.L., p. 121).
25 As Morison points out, even in the years immediately after annexation there was no attempt to pursue a real ‘close frontier’ policy (“From Alexander Burnes to Frederick Roberts”, p. 11).
26 Former acting D.C. to D.C., Ban., no number, 18 June 1870, in No. 38 Jan. 1871 IP P758
27 See, for example, Heathcote, 'British Policy and Baluchistan', p. 79
28 In view of episodes like this one, it is curious that Chakravarty should suggest that “the militarists virtually held both military and political responsibility for the frontier region” (From Khvber to Oxus, p.
the tribes beyond the border, but he was not opposed to intervention of any kind. All in all, there was sufficient intervention in trans-border affairs to make it clear that increasingly the 'close border' meant limited intervention rather than none at all. As far as the Derajat frontier at least is concerned, it is fair to say that British policy towards the tribes before Lytton's arrival as Viceroy in 1876 consisted of more than simply "non-intervention varied by expeditions".29

Ideology and British Tribal Policy -

If resources and imperial strategy were the principal determinants of tribal policy, ideology and sociology affected the way this policy was implemented. As Yapp reminds us, the way a state tries to control a tribe depends upon its self-image as well as its purposes (defensive or aggressive), and its power and resources, and there were several ways in which British ideas about how states ought to behave impinged on frontier policy.30 In the first place, although the border was not to be crossed except in exceptional circumstances, it was felt to be important that the government maintain confidence by upholding British prestige along it.31 Though they were not of course the same thing, there are some interesting points of resemblance between the Pashtun concept of 'honour' and British ideas about 'prestige'. Government 'prestige' and Pashtun nang ('honour'), were both intangible qualities, which were maintained principally by an appropriate reaction to insult as well as injury. By defending his honour the Pashtun proved his worth and demonstrated his ability to defend his own interests. Similarly, by upholding its prestige the government demonstrated to its friends and enemies that it was strong and stable. Therefore, rather as the Pashtuns believed that they should revenge themselves on anyone who shamed or insulted them, the British believed that the government should make a visible and effective response to any tribal challenge to its prestige, a response befitting a great imperial power. However, prestige was maintained by administering 'punishment', whereas Pashtunwali demanded 'revenge' for an insult (which might well be in excess of the injury received).32 For the British the idea of revenge evoked images of

29 Davies, The Problem, p. 28.
30 "Tribes and States in the Khyber", pp. 159-160, 183
31 Yapp suggests that because it was thought to be inappropriate for an imperial power to do so, the British did not take advantage of the opportunities the anarchic political system of the Pashtuns offered for manoeuvre, but this may not always have been the case ("Tribes and States in the Khyber", p. 183). In the early 1850s, for example, it does appear that British officials tried to play the Orakzais and then the Bangash off against the Kohat Pass Afridis to ensure the security of the Pass (Spain, The Pathan Borderland, p. 107).
32 Ahmed has suggested that the Frontier was a male world whose masculine symbols were analogous to those of life in the public schools attended by many imperial administrators (in which the infliction of and ability to bear physical 'punishment' were important) ("The Colonial Encounter on the North-West Frontier Province: Myth and Mystification", Journal of the Anthropology Society of Oxford (1978), Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 172). It is true that in Newbolt's poem "Clifton Chapel", for example, the connection between public
unrestrained and lawless savagery, whereas punishment suggested the measured administration of justice by legitimate authority. In practice both could involve the use of considerable violence.

So after disturbances had broken out in the Kohat Pass in 1849, Dalhousie was willing to consider paying subsidies to the Afridis, but not until they had submitted. "We must show them we are masters first" he argued, "which naturally they do not now believe". The need to maintain prestige was the reason why such an uncharacteristically prompt response was made to the murder of Captain Mecham late in 1859, and several thousand troops were sent into tribal territory to put pressure on the groups with which his murderers had taken refuge. But the precise nature of the response depended on the degree of insult offered to the government. So, for example, because Tank was still nominally at least the possession of the Nawab rather than being part of British India, the raid on it in 1879 by the Mahsuds was thought to be less insulting than one made on British territory itself would have been.

Pashtunwali, it may be recalled, possessed a dramatic language of ritual submission. To some extent, the British were able to operate in this idiom. They appreciated that, as well as causing physical damage, the punitive expedition ‘shamed’ the tribes by demonstrating their inability to defend their territory. Indeed the British liked to add insult to injury, regarding it as even more humiliating if the tribesmen could be made to destroy their property themselves, and I return to this topic in the next chapter. At the same time, it should be noted here, it was believed that when the opportunity offered, the G.O.I. should demonstrate magnanimity towards its opponents. The release of some of the Muhammad Khel prisoners early in 1872 to mark the Viceroy’s visit to Lahore was a typical example. Partly this was in the hope that the tribes would be grateful, and respond appropriately, but principally it was a piece of imperial theatre, intended to demonstrate that the G.O.I. was so powerful that such gestures could not damage it. However, if there are some interesting resemblances between government prestige and tribal nang, it appears that at the individual level the differences between British and Pashtun concepts of ‘honour’

Indeed there could be something to Wurgaft’s suggestion that “whatever its sexual connotation, the attraction of a pure and strong masculine life style, rationalized and reinforced by the ascetic male society of the Victorian public school, promised a saving refuge from the highly charged female sensuality associated with native India’s plains and cities” (Imperial Imagination, p. 50).

33 Baird, ed., Private Letters, p. 115
34 On the 1877 imperial assemblage, for example, see B.S. Cohn, “Representing authority in Victorian
differed considerably.⁵ For example, whereas for the individual Briton an important aspect of honour was keeping one’s word, no matter to whom it was given, it would appear that this did not have the same significance for Pashtuns.⁶ Hence the British constantly accused them of being treacherous and unreliable.

We saw above that one influence on British tribal management was the desirability on administrative grounds of preventing the trans-border tribes causing problems in British territory. In fact, these administrative considerations had an important ideological dimension too. Sikh administrators did not consider border raiding a serious problem, but the British emphasis on prestige also meant that it was inappropriate and undignified for a great imperial power to permit its territory to be invaded by men from outside it, even if the practical consequences of their doing so were trivial ones.⁷ This was why Edwardes, for example, was keen to establish the principle that the Turis should not attack the Darwesh Khels in British territory, even though neither were British subjects. Likewise, he thought it was important for the pastoral nomadic Darwesh Khels who grazed their flocks and herds in winter in British territory to acknowledge that this was at the discretion of the government by paying at least a token tribute. Similar considerations also meant that by the late 1870s British officials’ willingness to accept that trans-border tribesmen could make adequate recompense for the murder of British subjects by paying ‘blood money’ was being challenged on the grounds that “any derogation from the standard of punishment in heinous offences fixed by law” undermined British prestige.⁸ In the early days it was usually accepted that it was unreasonable to expect complete freedom from raids. Dalhousie argued this very strongly; likewise Charles Trevelyan suggested in an interesting minute that the north-west frontier was “a ‘Highland’ and ‘Border’ line, and (that) we must lay our account for the occurrence of occasional outrages”.⁹ But British administrators increasingly began to claim that it was humiliating that the tribes periodically invaded British territory and that British officials and troops were not able to cross the border freely.

India”, in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1983).

⁵ Although, as noted above, Ahmed has rightly drawn our attention to some of the similarities in British and Pashtun attitudes (I.A.S.O., Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 170), the differences between them were probably more profound. There does seem to have been a real clash of cultural perspectives, which also occurred, for example, in the different understandings of the phrase ‘lifting the veil’ (see, for example, the interesting discussion in Edwardes, C.S. in S. and H., Vol. 31, pp. 666-669, also Dutta, ‘Strategy and Structure’, p. 211). In this context it is interesting to note that in another ‘tribal’ society, that of the Yemeni highlands, ideas of honour are based on representations of the person rather different from western ones (Dresch, Tribes, Government and History, p. 40).

⁶ There was a sad illustration of this in 1946 when Major Donald, the South Waziristan Political Agent, was kidnapped by Shabi Khels. He promised his captors there would be no retaliation, but after his release the Shabi Khels were bombed, and Donald shot himself (Ahmed, Resistance and Control, pp. 177-178).

⁷ Elliott, The Frontier, pp. 92-93


⁹ Lee-Warner, Vol. 2, Life, p. 392, Minute by Sir Charles Trevelyan on the G.B.’s minute, L/P&S/S/5/257,
as they did in Sind. By the 1870s there was a growing demand for a more interventionist frontier policy, not just because of changing conceptions of imperial strategy, but also because the existing state of affairs seemed not to reflect British imperial might.40

Secondly, as we have seen, the Sikh government had been mainly concerned with the amount of revenue it could raise along the border. By contrast the British view was that the G.O.I. should work actively to improve the lot of its subjects.41 Moreover, especially during the first two or three decades of British rule along the frontier, just as much as their French counterparts in the Bureaux Arabes in Algeria for example, most officers firmly believed in the empire’s mission civilisatrice.42 Civilising and controlling the tribes were thought to be two sides of the same coin. By exposing the tribes to the influence of the market place, a proper legal system, and even the punitive expedition, and by refraining from the use of the barbarous methods of management practised by their predecessors, most of them believed that the tribes both within and across the border would gradually abandon their violent ways and become industrious herdsmen, farmers and traders. This affected frontier management in several ways.43

In the first place, whereas the Sikhs had been quite prepared to allow the border villages to defend themselves against raiders, after 1849 the villagers were disarmed, and the British administration tried to take over responsibility for frontier defence because it was felt that this was the government’s duty.44 As Taylor commented, "(we) have not the philosophy of our predecessors to keep never-minding when outrages are occurring on the border, but on the contrary feel it incumbent on us to render our protection when it is afforded as complete as possible, making ourselves answerable for every cow that is lifted,

p. 651.
40 Such feelings lay, for example, behind Lytton’s remark that he knew of nowhere else in the world where “after 25 years of peaceful occupation, a great civilised Power has obtained so little influence over its semi-savage neighbours, and acquired so little knowledge of them, that the country within a day’s ride of its most important garrison, is an absolute terra incognita; and ... there is absolutely no security for British life a mile or two beyond our border” (Re-organisation of Frontier, V.’s Minute, No. 158 Feb. 1878 IP P1216). See also, for example, Memo on Reorganisation of N.W. Frontier of India by Sir Henry Rawlinson, in L/P&S/7/322, pp. 1409-15.
41 Many Frontier officers, Edwardes and Taylor for example, were strongly influenced by Evangelical ideas, which, it scarcely needs saying, were an important influence on the Indian government generally in the first half of the century (see, for example, Spear, History of India 2, pp. 122-123).
42 Relations with many of the Algerian tribes were conducted through the Bureaux Arabes in the middle and late nineteenth century (V. Confer, France and Algeria The Problem of Civil and Political Reform 1870-1920 (Syracuse, 1966), p. 5).
43 For a brief discussion of how far British Indian Frontier policy differed from its predecessors’, see, for example, Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, pp. 311-312.
44 See, for example, Lee-Warner, Life, Vol. 1, pp. 390-391. Taylor explored some of the implications in his D.M., p. 112.
and distressing ourselves about accidents and offences which would be received with little emotion by a native Government".45

Another axiom of British tribal management was that the methods used had to be consistent with British ideas about how a great civilising imperial power should behave, and so some tactics were ruled out as degrading and immoral. Under Sikh rule, in some areas the border villages had held their lands under the system known as the ‘tenure of blood’ according to which they had to hand over one hundred Pashtun heads as a yearly rent.46 After annexation, the desirability of fairness and consistency in tribal management, and the need to abandon cruel and arbitrary punishments, were emphasised. Taylor explained that “our known wish to do justice to all, and our known enmity to tyranny, exaction, and oppression in any shape” was one reason why the government could not adopt “the native mode” of holding a border district.47 Among the other traditional techniques of frontier management which were ruled out for this reason were the torture and execution of hostages, and the use of assassins who for a fee would track down and kill men who had escaped across the border. Indeed Macaulay’s conduct came under the minutest examination in the early 1870s because he was suspected of having encouraged the assassination of a Sherani outlaw.48 When in 1877 Lytton called for the punishment of individual offenders rather than the imposition of collective, ‘tribal’ responsibility, Davies replied that it would easy to procure their deaths by offering rewards for them; “yet this form of disposing of criminal cases has been most rightly denounced and forbidden by the Government”.49

A related point was that it was felt to be important that the tribes should not simply be paid ‘blackmail’ to persuade them to stop raiding along the border or disrupting traffic along the routes through the hills. Taylor, for example, argued that “above all a frontier official should turn a studiously deaf ear to all hints or suggestions of the necessity or expediency of providing by money allowances or otherwise for individuals or classes on the border, on the score that they may otherwise give trouble”. The principle that tribal allowances should be granted only in return for service (however nominal in practice) was fairly consistently upheld until late in the century.50

45 D.M., p. 114
46 Davies, The Problem, p. 187, Yapp, “Tribes and States in the Khyber”, p. 184
47 D.M., p. 117, Elliott, The Frontier, p. 93
49 G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 744P, 21 April 1877, No. 78 July 1877 IP P1035
50 D.M., p. 120; see also G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 701A, 22 April 1878, with G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 44, 1 July 1878, L/P&S/7/18.
The extent to which during the nineteenth century the British Indian state was ceasing to be a traditional state and was becoming an increasingly modern one in some crucial respects, with all that that implied in terms of the introduction of codified laws, also affected frontier management. It was increasingly accepted that rather than relying on manipulation of the tribes as circumstances demanded, good administration required the creation and application of standardised procedures with which anyone could easily become familiar. So, for example, in the early 1870s Johnstone commented with some satisfaction that the P.R. rules he and Muhammad Hyat Khan had drawn up were clear enough for anyone to use.

MODELS OF THE TRIBES -

Insofar as tribal management involved the use of various techniques, which were underpinned by ideas and assumptions about tribes, implicit or explicit, it had three main aspects. To begin with, there was the question of finding out what made the tribesmen 'tick', as it were, to which negative or positive sanctions they would respond, and it was possible to account for their behaviour in rather different terms. Secondly, resources were limited and it was important to make the best use of them, so there was the question of where and how these sanctions could most effectively be applied; in other words where authority lay and how decisions were made in the tribe. Because the tribes did not have a formal political structure, it was possible to envisage their organisation in rather different ways, and there were no simple answers. Thirdly, there were the actual techniques of tribal management themselves, the various approaches implicitly or explicitly derived from these models which were used to try and influence tribal behaviour. I look at the first two in the rest of this chapter, going on to explore actual management in the next.

The point has already been made that, to begin with, the British took it for granted that, as tribal groups in India itself (like the Bhils) had done, the Pashtuns would want to take advantage of the various inducements they had to offer, and could be persuaded to settle down to agricultural and commercial pursuits. Underlying this faith in the civilising effect of contact with the administered areas was the conviction that the people who lived across the border were like everyone else responsive to economic pressures and incentives. So one way in which British officials accounted for Mahsud raiding, for example, was poverty, and the "image of hungry mountaineers drawn irresistibly towards the wealth of the cultivated plains" was one many found it hard to resist.

51 Yapp, "Tribes and States", pp. 154-155
52 See, for example, Davies, The Problem, p. 179, also Yapp, "Tribes and States in the Khyber", p. 178. However, Bruce changed his mind after serving in Waziristan. In the Memorandum he wrote before he had much experience of the country, he argued that sheer poverty drove its inhabitants to plundering the
However, in spite of the emphasis in the literature on the military aspects of the relationship, as Christensen has pointed out, the main areas of conflict between Britain and the frontier tribes were often legal and cultural rather than military. By the 1870s British awareness of the extent to which Pashtun behaviour was the product of their distinctive and resilient tribal culture, rather than simply poverty, began to have an impact on policy. In particular, as we saw in Chapter Seven, in 1872 the Frontier Crimes Regulations were introduced, which among other things gave magistrates the power to withdraw certain types of case from the ordinary courts and submit them for arbitration by a jirga. This growing awareness of the distinctiveness of tribal culture was accompanied by the gradual realisation of the extent to which the tribes valued their independence and were not willingly going to be brought under British influence. But it took some time for this to sink in, and it is interesting that Munro’s suggestion that the Mahsuds had attacked Tank in 1879 partly because they hated the thought of losing their independence was rejected by Egerton, who thought that they could not possibly oppose the extension of British influence to the Gumal because it would benefit them economically. At the same time this gradual loss of confidence in the British ability to ‘civilise’ the Pashtuns may be linked not just with the continuing resistance of the tribes themselves, but also with wider developments, in particular the way that in the later nineteenth century the conviction that Indian and Briton were essentially similar was increasingly replaced by an emphasis on their differences.

In any case, attempts to account for, if not exactly explain, tribal behaviour in terms of social psychology appear to have become more prominent later in the century. In particular there was a growing emphasis on religious fanaticism. As regards Waziristan, from the beginning British officials did perceive that some men with religious credentials, like the Kaniguram Sayyids, were important, and used them as mediators, and sometimes gave them financial rewards. But they did not on the whole regard religious leadership as being a major influence on the tribes. However, this began to change in the 1870s. In 1872 Munro scathingly condemned the “dark, unquestioning fanaticism” of the Dawars, and in the Frontier Memorandum he wrote in 1876, Griffin suggested that one of the

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53 See, for example, Conflict and Change’, p. 315
54 See also, for example, Lindholm, A.E. de S., Vol. XXI, No. 22, p. 359, Caroe, The Pathans, p. 353, Khan, Warrior Race, pp. 28-29
55 Metcalfe, New Cambridge History III-4, p. 59
56 Metcalfe argues that in the later nineteenth century British distaste for ‘fanaticism’ of all sorts grew (op. cit. pp. 47-48).
57 Sayyid Subhan Shah received a khilla’t of Rs.500 after the negotiation of the agreement with the
reasons why Pashtuns generally were difficult to manage was that, by contrast with the Baluch, they were “blindly subservient to their priests”. This tendency to argue that the tribes were prone to unthinking religious fanaticism was reinforced by the 1879 raid on Tank. From this perspective they were open to manipulation by religious leaders, who preyed on their superstitious natures by acquiring spurious reputations for sanctity and supernatural powers.

But this tendency to argue that Pashtuns were innately different from Britons could also lead to a more positive valuation. From the early days they had been respected for their bravery and independent spirit, while men from some tribes in particular, such as the Darwesh Khels, were admired for their height and physical strength. Nevertheless, in 1860 Taylor could comment without irony that, however destructive in the short term, burning Makin would be in the Mahsuds’ long-term interests because it was part of the necessary task of introducing them to ‘civilisation’. But the original British view of the tribes as savages who needed to be ‘civilised’ was gradually inverted. As Yapp explains, a neo-Rousseauesque perspective developed, according to which the tribesman was the bearer of many noble virtues. As such he was to be insulated from contact with the corruption of Indian civil society, and kept in a state of childlike innocence. Just so, in 1929 Howell observed that “a civilisation has no other end than to produce a fine type of man”. “Judged by this standard the social system in which the Mahsuds has been evolved must be allowed immeasurably to surpass all others”, he thought, and should be left alone.

This tendency to romanticise the frontier was also reflected in the habit of talking about the encounter with the tribes in sporting terms, even if the penalties for the losers were unusually harsh. From the British viewpoint at least, frontier management was

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58 This was he thought, the chief reason that European life was so insecure in their hills, while it was safe among the Baluchis (Frontier Memorandum. No. 150 Feb. 1878 IP 1216). Munro’s remark is on p. 182. From the contemporary point of view there does seem to have been a ‘racist’ element in this. Hugh James, for example, compared the Turis unfavourably with the Darwesh Khels. The latter were “tall, courageous and muscular” whereas “with coarse sensual features”, there was, he said, “much of the savage about the former. On scenting prey their eyes dilate and they evince all the greed and ferocity of wild beasts” (Com. Pesh. D. to M.S./G.P., No. 6, 28 Jan. 1860, in No. 7 in No. 4, L/P&S/S/5/256). According to the Bannu Gazetteer (p. 66), the Darwesh Khels were tall and robust, united amongst themselves, and “possessed of many manly virtues”; unlike the Bannuchis, they had “a true regard for honour”, and were “comparatively truthful”.

60 “Tribes and States in the Khyber”, p. 154. Wurgaft suggests that by contrast with the Bengali, the ‘spoiled child’ of British India, the Pathan came to be regarded as the ‘natural child’, who embodied a fierce and admirable independence of spirit (The Imperial Imagination, p. 48). See also, for example, Lindholm, A.E. de S., Tome XXI, Noelle, ‘The Interaction between Tribe and State’, p. 222, also Ahmed, J.A.S.Q., Vol. 9, p. 169.

61 Mizh, p. xii
governed by strict rules, which prohibited, for example, aggression against women and children; hence, among other things, the use of leaflets to give advanced warning of air raids after W.W.I. But the sporting aspect was probably not greatly appreciated by the tribes themselves. Although they sometimes formed good relationships with individual officers, it appears that they did not particularly admire the model of civilisation the British offered with its emphasis on status, hierarchy and obedience to authority. On the whole, it seems that they grew to hate them because of the destruction of life and property they brought, and took revenge for example by mutilating captured soldiers. Metcalfe’s comment that “apart from the two deadly Afghan Wars ... there was never desperate combat on the frontier” seems wide of the mark.

**collective responsibility** -

Tribal management also had to be based on some model of how tribal society worked, or could be made to work, because when it came to giving the tribesmen land to settle on or appointments in the militia, or negotiating P.R. agreements, decisions had to be made about who should be the beneficiaries of or the parties to the agreements. Writing in the early nineteenth century, Elphinstone, perceiving that the Pashtun tribe, or, as he called it, ooloos (ulus), was not quite like the Highland clan because people’s loyalty was to the group rather than as among the Highlanders to the chief, described it as “clannish community”. It must be partly thanks to him that most Punjab officials came to envisage the Pashtun tribes of the frontier as corporate groups, “moral communities”, all the members of which were in some respects and to some extent at least responsible for each other. So, for example, at the end of our period, Ibbetson explained that the Pathan ‘nation’ was divided into a few great sections which had no corporate existence. The ‘tribe’ was the “the practical unit”, he said, having “a very distinct corporate existence”, and being in turn split up into clans and septs, each tribe and clan occupying a clearly defined tract of country. Tribe, clan, and sept were, he continued, distinguished by “patronymics formed from the name of the common ancestor by the addition of the word Zai, or Khel”.

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62 See, for example, Khan, Warrior Race, p. 69, Ahmed, I.A.S.O., Vol. 9, p. 173, also Lindholm, A.E. de S., Tome XXI, p. 360
63 New Cambridge History III-4, p. 147. In this period, there was, for example, bitter fighting during the first Mahsud expedition in 1860, and during the Ambela expedition in 1863. Lawrence James’s brief comments are also worth noting in this context (The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (London, 1994), p. 234).
64 Elphinstone, Account of the Kingdom, Vol. I, pp. 210-211. The word is actually of Turkic origin and means “people, nation or tribe” (F. Steingass, A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary (London, 1930). It would be interesting to know why Elphinstone referred to them as ‘clans’ rather than ‘tribes’. Was it simply the Scottish influence?
65 Zai is from the Pashtu zae meaning ‘son’, and Khel was originally an Arabic word meaning ‘association’ or ‘company’ (D.C.J. Ibbetson, Report on the Census of the Panjab (Calcutta 1883), Vol. 1, p. 199). “Both terms are used indifferently for both the larger and smaller divisions”, Ibbetson pointed out, and some
In practice, however, British officials were not very precise or consistent in their use of terms like ‘tribe’, ‘clan’, and ‘section’, and used them almost interchangeably, so that on different occasions the Muhammad Khels, for example, were referred to by all three (and their ‘sections’ were even referred to on one occasion as ‘castes’). Sometimes as we have seen this gave rise to problems. Taylor fairly consistently used ‘tribe’ to refer to the Mahsuds as a whole, and ‘section’ for the Alizais, Bahlolzais and Shaman Khels, and the smaller divisions, but his ambiguous use of these terms led to a misunderstanding between him and Montgomery in 1861. Later in the century some officials did begin to try and evolve a consistent terminology. The Kohat D.C., T.J.C. Plowden, for instance, argued that “practically, large communities, like the Afridis, Orakzais, and Wazirs, have been regarded as tribes, which are divided into more or less main divisions, as the Adam Khel, Lashkarzai and Ahmedzai; these again being sub-divided into clans, as the Jowaki, Alisherzai, and Kabul Khel. The clans ramify into numerous small ‘sections’ and smaller ‘sub-sections’, till the ultimate unit, the family, is reached.” In practice it was never that simple, but it is true that, whatever terms they used, the British tended to think of ‘clans’ and ‘lineages’ as corporate groups, which persisted over time.

As regards their own terminology, it is worth making the point that there are few references in the records to the terms the tribes themselves used, and it is impossible to be sure how they applied them. As well as Elphinstone, some later observers, like Collin Davies, also reported that among other north-west frontier tribes (for example the Mohmands) the tribe as a whole was sometimes referred to as ulus. However, from modern anthropological studies, it appears that nowadays the tribespeople most often use the terms qoum and gabila, not ulus, to refer to both ‘clan’ and ‘tribe’.

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66 D.C. Bannu to Com. D.D., no number, 30 July 1870, in No. 41 Nov. 1870 IP P486/11. In the 1930s, Johnson, South Waziristan Political Agent, referred to what Taylor called ‘sections’ and ‘sub-sections’ as ‘tribes’ (Mahsud Notes).


68 Gilmartin refers to “the extremely fuzzy efforts of British administrators to define indigenous Punjabi kinship categories”, while admitting that in practice it probably was very difficult to pin them down and assign them definite functions (Empire and Islam Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (London, 1988), p. 18).

69 The Problem, p. 34

70 The Problem, p. 34

The perception that the tribe was a corporate group meant that Punjab officials tended to argue that pressure could effectively and legitimately be applied to some of its members so as to influence the behaviour of others. Edwardes, for example, accounted for the fact that it was both just and effective to retaliate upon a tribe as a whole for a crime committed by an individual member of it in sociological terms. In the east, he explained, society was not yet “broken up as it were into individuals”, and people were “held together in masses, by tribes and brotherhoods”, and among Afghans in particular the tribe is “a moving conspiracy; the whole profiting by the forays of the individual”. From this point of view, even if the tribes did not have leaders or chiefs, they were bound together by some sentiment of mutual obligation, and could be given definite responsibilities of various kinds. There was something in this. Among the Mahsuds, for example, the insistence that, as we have seen, resources be divided among their patrilineal segments according to nikkat meant that clan and lineage membership did have some importance. Moreover, it is true that devices like baramta (seizure of men and property) and bandish (reverse blockade), which were based on some sort of corporate identity, were often used quite successfully along the frontier. For example, Taylor was able to pressure the Hatti Khels in Bannu into capturing the man who had murdered Captain Mecham late in 1859. Indeed Spain suggests that this collective responsibility, which the British made the keystone of tribal policy until 1947, worked because “the various Pathan clans without exception thought and felt as a unit.”

In fact, it may not have been quite as simple as that. Eickelmann has pointed out that colonial administrators often attached greater importance to patrilineal descent than tribespeople themselves. As they saw it, tribespeople were divided into groups on the basis of different degrees of agnatic kinship, and it was through these groups that society was or could be organised. “Segmentary ideology was administratively convenient”, so that, for example, French administrators in Morocco used genealogical charts to indicate social

79, 31 March 1881, L/P&S/7/24).
72 Some British administrators, like Caroe, continued to argue this until 1947 (The Pathans, p. 350).
73 A Year on, Vol. 1, p. 324. He also compared the tribe to the ‘nation’, with all that implied in terms of mutual responsibility between its members, commenting, for example, that in the case of the theft of some camels by a party of Mahsuds, that it was justifiable to “retaliate on the injurers nationally, i.e. by reprisal of any goods of any member of the Vizeeree tribe. This at least is the principle on which we take the merchant ships of private individuals of a country with which we are at war” (Political Diaries, p. 231)
74 As they did in 1948 when they fought in Kashmir, for example (Ahmed, Resistance and Control, pp. 33-34).
75 Gilmartin argues that in the later nineteenth century the British increasingly tried to manage Punjab rural society as a whole by emphasising ‘tribal’ linkages based on patrilineal descent, but, in so far as this was based on creating local chiefly elites, it was rather different from the sort of ‘tribal responsibility’ officials were attempting to generate along the frontier (Empire and Islam, Chapter One).
76 Spain, Pathan Borderland, p. 108. On the later British attempt to apply tribal responsibility among the Afridis, see Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, pp. 185-188.
relations among the Bni Bataw of western Morocco, even though political alignments depended on residence, herding and land ownership as well as kinship.\textsuperscript{77}

To some extent a similar process can be observed on the north-west frontier. Taylor commented after negotiations with a tribal jirga in 1861, that the Mahsuds were "unused to the idea of being bound to control every member of the tribe and be answerable for his acts."\textsuperscript{78} It would appear that, rather than finding a fully-fledged ‘tribal’ system of corporate groups based on agnatic kinship, Punjab officials often worked quite hard to try and create one because it appeared to offer a convenient method of management, sometimes indeed the only one.\textsuperscript{79} Along the frontier, they argued, there was scarcely any tribal cohesion, and their aim was "to create this, or a substitute for it", by making "judicious concession to tribal claims and even tribal prejudices". for example the Frontier Crimes Regulations.\textsuperscript{80} It was this attempt to control the frontier Pashtuns through ‘tribal responsibility’ to which, as we have seen, Frere and Lytton objected.

There were two main problems with this. In the first place, as the difficulty the British experienced in evolving a coherent and consistent terminology suggests, it was rarely if ever obvious which level of tribal organisation was, or should be regarded as, the most important one. The point was made in the introduction that attempts to give the terms which have been translated as tribe, or tribe itself, precision as to level, function or essence have usually been misdirected. On the north-west frontier, as elsewhere, in practice there were seldom simple or easy answers to the question of how far ‘tribal responsibility’ extended, or could be made to do so. On the whole the Punjab officials wanted to extend responsibility, so as to increase the range of men on whom pressure could be exerted when necessary, and to make it more difficult for them to help each other to evade government sanctions. So, for example, treating the Kabul Khels as one tribe rather than several meant that the threat of destroying the Miamais’ crops at Biland Khel could be used to induce them to persuade the other sections to send representatives to negotiate.

In the Mahsud case in particular it was often difficult to generate much of a sense of identity below the ‘tribal’ level, because members of different sections and sub-sections lived together in the same area. So in the early 1860s Taylor tried unsuccessfully to persuade Montgomery to allow him to impose tribal rather than sectional or sub-sectional

\textsuperscript{78} Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 34, 22 March 1861, in No. 215 March 1862 IP P204/59
\textsuperscript{79} Yapp, “Tribes and States in the Khyber”, p. 186
\textsuperscript{80} First quotation - E.C. Bayley, Minute - 22 May 1877, No. 159 Feb. 1878 IP P1216, second quotation - L. Griffin, Frontier Memo, No. 150 Feb. 1878 IP P1216
responsibility. However, in 1876 Macaulay was able to convince the Lt.-Governor that dealing with Mahsud sections blunted the impact of reverse blockades because members of a section barred from British territory could join the caravans of one which was still free to trade in it, and he was given permission to deal with the tribe as a whole. The extent to which frontier administrators tried to extend tribal responsibility so as to include larger numbers of people became more marked in the 1870s. So, for example, Macaulay also tried to manage the Bhittanis on a tribal basis as far as possible. As a result the eighty-nine militia posts allocated to them in 1876 were distributed almost equally between Tattas, Uraspuns and Dannas, even though fifty-two of them were at the Kot Kirghi outpost which was on the edge of the Tattas' territory. To take another example, when the Muhammad Khels went off into the hills after the attack on the Kurram relief in 1870, Graham refused to accept the surrender of individual members of the tribe, because this would have reduced the pressure on the others.

The idea of extending tribal responsibility also lay behind Munro’s preference for controlling trans-border sections of tribes by putting pressure on their relatives living in British territory, rather than making direct agreements with them. It was also the reason why Macaulay was so anxious to maintain the responsibility of the Bhittanis living in the plains for those in the hills. In 1879, for example, he argued that the former should share responsibility with the latter for the part they played in the Tank raid and subsequent plundering. He also thought that the Danna Bhittanis, who had not taken part in this, should share the punishment imposed on the other two sections. Egerton agreed, commenting that the Dannas had jointly accepted P.R. with the other Bhittanis sections, and “it is a matter of paramount importance to assert the homogeneity of an Afghan tribe wherever it is possible to do so, and its liability to punishment”. Similarly, it was possible to influence the Khojul Khels who lived across the Bannu border through their Malik Mohmit, who lived at Zerwam but had some land in British territory. At the same time though, it was important to prevent the sense of community spreading too far up the segmentary tree, as it were, and actively to discourage any sentiment of unity between different ‘tribes’. So after the Muhammad Khel outbreak the authorities in Bannu worked

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81 At the end of the 1870s, for example, Egerton, Lt. Governor in the late 1870s, criticised Plowden, the Kohat D.C., for dealing with the Zaimukhts and the Orakzais at the ‘sectional’ rather than ‘tribal’ level, arguing (unfairly it would appear) that he had failed to follow a “principle which should be carefully followed in dealing with a border tribe, i.e. to deal not with sections, but with the tribe collectively, or with the largest unit possible” (G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 177, 2 Feb. 1880, in G.O.I. F.D. to S. of S., No. 79, 31 March 1880, L/P&S/7/24).
83 Egerton explained to Lytton that when tribal sections had acted independently and separated themselves “from the tribe as a united body”, the government had refused to negotiate with them (G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 774, 21 April 1877, No. 78 July 1877 IP P1035).
hard to prevent the Darwesh Khels combining, and there was great relief when the Hatti Khel, Sirki Khel and Painda Khel Maliks announced that they would support the government.

The other major problem with collective responsibility was that it was very difficult, if not impossible, to sustain it for very long, because of the marked tendency to local-level factionalism associated with tarburwali. As we have seen, tarburwali helped to divide the Darwesh Khels in Bannu, and to create factional nuclei among the Mahsuds, and, in the case of the latter in particular, greatly increased the difficulty of finding representative jirgas.85 Because any arrangement with the tribe or section had to be supported by all the factional groupings, simply obtaining the agreement of one group of tribal representatives was bound to fail. The officials were well aware of the existence of groupings of this kind in the tribes. Munro, for instance, argued that “Pathan administration, wherever it exists independently, must be regulated in great measure with reference to the Gundis or factions which prevail in all Afghan communities”.86 But they did not, or could not, always take this factionalism sufficiently into account. It was because British officials were dealing with only one factional nucleus that the first settlement with the Mahsuds broke down in 1862, and the initial agreement with the Bahlolzais collapsed in 1874. Similarly Macaulay’s failure to persuade Umar Khan to participate in the new arrangements he tried to introduce in the autumn of 1878 was disastrous.

At the same time the importance of these factions should not be exaggerated. They appear to have consisted of small nuclei of committed supporters, who could generate wider but temporary followings at times of crisis. Nabi Khan, who was, as we have seen, the leader of one of them in the 1860s and 1870s, does not appear to have had all that many permanent followers. The fact that in December 1878 Umar Khan had to work quite hard to assemble the lashkar which attacked Tank on New Year’s Day 1879, suggests that, although he was a Malik and an influential man, he did not have very many committed supporters either. The limited extent of Nabi Khan and Umar Khan’s influence, and the fact that the coalitions they were able to construct were so fluid, shows that, even by the 1870s Mahsud factional organisation bore little resemblance to the bloc organisation which existed in Swat. In this period, we should note, factionalism also became an increasing problem among the Bannu Darwesh Khels, because as we have seen, some men acquired quite large landholdings in the British period, which meant that they had more in the way of resources with which to build up followings. Though it is difficult to know just how

85 So Barfield’s suggestion that kinship tends to provide the basic ‘building-blocks’ of tribes, with ‘political’ factors becoming more important at the higher levels, may need to be qualified in the case of the Mahsuds (“Tribe and State Relations: the Inner Asian Perspective”, in Khoury and Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation, p. 156)
important it was, a division between the supporters of Mani Khan Spirkai and Nizam Khan Hatti Khel did emerge in the 1870s.\textsuperscript{87}

However it was not really possible to manage the tribes very successfully by working through these factional alliances either. Because they were in competition with the other, any attempt to work through one rather than another created immediate and destabilising resentment, provoking the opposing faction to undermine its rival by disrupting any arrangements it might have made with the government, in the Mahsud case by raiding in British territory for example. For this reason, as well as the difficulty of deciding which tribal ‘level’ to focus on, the attempt to control the tribes by treating clans and lineages as corporate groups, and persuading them to agree to give up raiding, prevent raiders crossing their land, and not to shelter men carrying out ‘crimes’ in British territory, was unlikely ever to be entirely successful. Mahsud society in particular was highly individualistic; groups of this kind did not exist, and could not easily be manufactured.

In this connection, it should also be pointed out that the idea of making the tribes take on Pass Responsibility, for example, involved the idea of some sort of territorial responsibility as well as a ‘tribal’ one. This was not entirely consistent with the attempts to generate ‘tribal responsibility’, which was in theory based on agnatic descent. However, it was to some extent feasible with the Darwesh Khels and Bhittanis.\textsuperscript{88} Assigning territorial responsibility to particular Mahsud sections was much more difficult because, as we have seen, distantly-related tribesmen often lived in the same area, if not actually in the same settlements, in adjacent ones.

\textbf{tribal authority -}

For the first twenty or thirty years after the annexation of the Punjab, the local officials usually contrasted the Baluch tribes, which had chiefs through whom they could be controlled, with the chiefless Pashtuns, “constantly indulging in internecine war, hating each other with the hatred begotten of generations of blood feuds; with interests ever in collision, and only uniting under the most exceptional circumstances against a common enemy”\textsuperscript{89}. Among the latter, it was argued, the chief’s place was filled by the headmen of all the tribe’s sub-sections, who formed a jirga or “tribal parliament”, and when a problem arose, this was dealt with as the tribe’s representative, and summoned to British territory.

\textsuperscript{86} Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 216, 20 July 1876, in A 19 Oct. 1876 P859
\textsuperscript{87} Some kind of division between richer and poorer tribesmen (\textit{mashars} and \textit{kashars}) may well have been beginning to emerge there (see above Chapter Four, p. 131).
\textsuperscript{88} On the attempt to impose this kind of territorial responsibility on the Afridis, see Christensen, pp. 187, 190-192.
\textsuperscript{89} G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 774P, 21 April 1877, No. 78 July 1877 IP P1035
It was "accepted by the tribe as its representative and its decision (was) ... ratified by the common consent of all."\textsuperscript{90}

To a limited extent this did happen with Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels. In this early period it was usually accepted that in Waziristan only "a rough tribal custom" restricted the freedom of the individual tribesman, and that the Mahsuds in particular were "extremely democratic in their ways. If ten men are wanted to do a bit of business, a hundred will come".\textsuperscript{91} Maliks were thought not to possess much if any authority, and so, as we have seen, from the beginning there was a tendency to try and deal with them through jirgas. Macaulay's attempt in the early 1880s to give his eighty Mahsud hostages the status of chalweshtis, men who were appointed by the tribal jirga to act as a kind of temporary police, was a development of this. It was an attempt to create some permanent authority in a society which really lacked any beyond the family. It is a pity that we do not know more about why it failed.\textsuperscript{92}

Like parliaments jirgas did provide fora for debate, and sometimes were able temporarily to focus and express the general will of the tribe, and, for example, appoint chalweshtis to carry this out.\textsuperscript{93} But in other ways, in Waziristan at least, Griffin's comparison did not really hold for several reasons.\textsuperscript{94} In the first place, as Spain has argued, among the frontier tribes in general a man taking part in a jirga was a delegate representing the views of others, and, unlike Burke's ideal Member of Parliament, had no independent powers of judgement.\textsuperscript{95} Secondly, in Waziristan in particular, the fluidity of tribal organisation meant that it was difficult to limit the numbers taking part in a jirga, so that rather than being in some sense at least a body representing tribal opinion, it could become a gathering of almost all the tribesmen.\textsuperscript{96} Taylor's negotiations after the 1860 expedition were conducted with a modest jirga of forty-seven men, but when Graham initiated his settlement and frontier militia schemes in the middle of the decade, he dealt with the tribe through a jirga four or five hundred strong. As we have seen, at the assemblies held by Merk in 1902, allowances were distributed to almost all the male members of the

\textsuperscript{90}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{92}Howell, Mizr, p. 97
\textsuperscript{93}See, for example, Spain, Pathan Borderland, p. 71
\textsuperscript{94}See Christensen, 'Conflict and Change', pp. 132-133.
\textsuperscript{95}Pathan Borderland, p. 71
\textsuperscript{96}"The difficulty hitherto found practically insurmountable", commented Ogilvie, the Derajat Commissioner, in 1889, "has been to put a limit on the members of the jirga" (Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 598, 7 June 1889, in Bruce, Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/259).
tribe in person. Another difficulty was that it seems to have been possible for almost any
group of men to get together and try and persuade the officials that they were a
representative jirga worth negotiating with. Different groups of Mahsuds could choose
different men to form different jirgas to negotiate on their behalf with the British, and
during the negotiations in 1866, for example, Graham had to deal with three separate
Shingi jirgas. As a result the extent to which jirgas really represented tribal opinion varied
widely, and so therefore did the extent to which they were able to exercise some sort of
legitimate authority.

The other way of trying to control the tribes was to try and work through headmen
or Maliks. Although they were aware of the weakness of institutional authority in
Waziristan, most British officials did try to strengthen the position of the tribal leaders.
Appointments in the Frontier Militia were usually made through them, and when hostages
were first taken from the Mahsuds in 1861, the agreement specified that they should be
sons, brothers or nephews of Maliks. An important part of Macaulay’s settlement and
Gumal Pass scheme seems to have been the payment of an inam to each of the ten leading
Maliks in each of the three main branches of the tribe. But he was not always consistent.
In connection with the Bhittanis, he commented that contact with the G.O.I. had increased
the authority of their ‘headmen’, and that this was a beneficial development. At the same
time, however, because he thought it would give the tribe as a whole an incentive to make
the P.R. agreements work properly, he made their Frontier Militia appointments the
responsibility of each of the three main sections as a whole rather than of their Maliks. At
the other end of Waziristan, on the Kohat border, Cavagnari aimed to try and strengthen the
position of the Kabul Khel Darwesh Khel Maliks by making them responsible for handling
claims against the tribe.

Some officials went much further than this, and throughout almost the entire British
period a different model of tribal organisation had its advocates. From this point of view,
in every tribe however apparently democratic, there were “responsible headmen who are
capable of maintaining order if they are properly supported”. Edwardes, who planned to
turn Swahn Khan Sudan Khel into such a chief to help him deal more easily with the
Darwesh Khels in Bannu, was an early proponent of this approach. However, the most
influential advocate of tribal management through the Maliks in Waziristan was Richard
Bruce, D.C. and later Commissioner at Dera Ismail Khan in the later 1880s and 1890s.
Jangi Khan Alizai and his son Umar Khan had been the tribe’s legitimate chiefs, he later
claimed, and it was only because his predecessors had failed to recognise this, and

97 See, for example, Opinion recorded by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, Member of the Council of India, Papers
Regarding British Relations, p. 156.
98 See Ahmed, Resistance and Control, pp. 90-94
undermined their position by dealing with other men, that the Mahsuds had become so apparently democratic.\textsuperscript{99} In fact this seriously misrepresented the position. There is little if anything to suggest that, even if some Mahsud families were more influential than others, Jangi Khan, or his son Umar Khan, were ever more than \textit{primi inter pares}. Nor is there any evidence that British policy towards the Mahsuds after 1849 was responsible for the almost total absence of institutionalised political authority among them.

In any case, it was just as difficult to work through the Maliks as through the tribe as a whole. One major problem was the way that the closer they came to the British the more unpopular they became and the less influence they had. If they were unlucky, they incurred their fellow tribesmen’s active hostility.\textsuperscript{100} Swahn Khan recognised this when he said that the other Darwesh Khels would kill him if he collected the revenue for the government, and this fate did actually befall some of Bruce’s Maliks.\textsuperscript{101} Bruce could choose Maliks and pay them allowances, but he could not endow them with real authority, or protect them when they did something unpopular on the government’s behalf. The fact that his attempt to apply the Sandeman system in Waziristan ended in failure vindicates those who argued that Mahsud society had a markedly egalitarian character.\textsuperscript{102} Though this ethos does not seem to have been quite as strong among the Afridis, it is worth making the point that the officers who dealt with them also debated the extent to which they were really ‘oligarchic’ or ‘democratic’.\textsuperscript{103} Some argued that it made more sense to try and create leaders, others wanted to work through jirgas.\textsuperscript{104} In the end, although the segmentary tribal organisation provided a notional framework for controlling the Afridis, in practice the Maliks and elders were used.\textsuperscript{105}

Finally, it should be noted that a different, often supplementary, way of looking at the problem was to attribute the tribesmen’s intransigence to external interference of one kind or another. An important feature of the Punjab frontier management which followed

\textsuperscript{99} The \textit{Forward Policy}, p. 188
\textsuperscript{100} Op. cit. p. 221
\textsuperscript{101} Which tends to support Anderson’s suggestion that outside sponsorship is less decisive in creating a khan than in confirming one (“Khan and Khel”, p. 141).
\textsuperscript{102} Bruce’s son was the Dera Ismail Khan D.C. in the 1920s, and later wrote a booklet in which he rehashed many of the arguments used by his father and Sandeman about the need to intervene in a friendly but authoritative way with the tribes by supporting their headmen (C.E. Bruce, \textit{Waziristan 1936-1937} (Aldershot, 1938), p. 7).
\textsuperscript{103} Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, p. 175
\textsuperscript{104} So perhaps it was not always the case that, as Yapp suggests, the British preferred to deal with tribes through a hierarchical structure of authority which they were anxious to identify and even to create (“Tribes and States in the Khyber”, p. 183).
\textsuperscript{105} This was ultimately self-defeating because the Maliks tended to become wealthy pro-British \textit{kashars}, gobetweens rather than clan and faction leaders, who were opposed by and could not control the poorer \textit{mashars} (Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, pp. 187-188, 212-213). Dutta describes an analogous process among the Marri Baluchis (‘Strategy and Structure’, p. 255).
from the shortage of resources, and in some cases from the reluctance of the tribesmen to have any dealings with government at all, was a distinct tendency in the early years to rely on local middlemen of one kind or another as intermediaries between the administration and the tribes.106 Sometimes, it appears that these intermediaries did try and manipulate the tribes for their own purposes. One possibility, therefore, was to attribute the blame for the difficulties experienced with the tribes to the fact that these middlemen were mishandling the tribes, or deliberately manipulating them for their own ends. So more and more often it began to be argued, with considerable exaggeration, that "intrigues are constantly being hatched and fostered by our own Khans and Maliks for the purpose of getting the hills tribes into hot water with the government and of keeping up a state of unrest on the frontier, as they think that if everything were to settle down quietly, their own importance would decrease and their occupation be gone."107 Apart from these middlemen, the Indian officials were sometimes blamed for tribal intransigence, but it was more likely to be attributed to the Kabul government and religious leaders, or both.

SUMMARY -

Although the broad outlines of frontier and tribal policy were the responsibility of the Governor General, and ultimately the Secretary of State and the cabinet, the local officials as well as the more senior officers of the Punjab government had some influence on the way policy towards the tribes was actually implemented. Policy itself was the result of four main influences. In the first place there were the considerations of imperial strategy arising from the fact that the tribes were located on a critically important border. Although the main objective of British frontier policy in this period was peace and stability along the border, for various reasons the attainment of these goals had imperial as well as merely local implications, the most important being the way that the success or failure of military operations on this frontier had an effect on British prestige both within and outside India. Secondly, decisions had to be made about resources. The fact that these were generally limited in the first thirty or forty years of British rule along the frontier was a significant constraint on tribal policies. The fact that strategic concerns were not as prominent as they later became, as well as the need to concentrate energies and resources on the administration of the Punjab itself, were the principal reasons for the adoption of the so-called 'close border' policy. However, as contacts with the tribes became more frequent and relations with them more complicated during this period, 'close border' became a misnomer. An alternative, sometimes supplementary, approach was to give the Kabul government more scope to increase its influence among the tribes, in the hope that it would be easier for it to

106 See, for example, G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 835, 27 April 1877, in A 32 April 1877 P860
107 Bruce, Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/259
maintain good relations with them, and tentative use was made of this strategy at several points.

Thirdly there were the ideological influences. The belief that British prestige had to be maintained meant that if the tribes did not respect its territory this was regarded not just as a local problem but as an insult to which a fitting response had to be made. At the same time beliefs about how tribes ought to be handled by a great civilising imperial power dictated that the more barbaric devices used by previous Punjab governments should be abandoned. Finally, ideas about tribal culture and social organisation were important, because these tended to dictate the choice of the negative and positive sanctions applied by the government. To begin with at least, it was thought that it would be possible to 'civilise' the tribes by encouraging them to have as much contact as possible with the areas under British rule, and to enlist in the army and police. But although there was some attempt to understand the Pashtun mentalité, the apparent failure of most of these early initiatives encouraged the officials to fall back on stereotyped perceptions of the Pashtuns. Increasingly the British began to think of the Frontier Pashtuns as unpredictable, and liable to act in ways which were apparently quite opposed to their own best interests. There seems to have been a growing conviction that, whether untrustworthy fanatic or worthy opponent, the Pashtun was not 'civilisable' in British terms (accompanied by increasing doubts as to how far this was really desirable).

Ideas about social organisation were important too. The dominant British model of the Mahsuds in particular envisaged them as lacking effective chiefs, but capable of being organised into corporate groups on a genealogical basis, on some members of which it was possible to put pressure in various ways so as to influence the behaviour of others. One problem was that it was never clear which was the most effective level to work at (let alone whether there really was one at all). Another was the fact that the tribesmen did not recognise any authority except that of their own jirgas, and until the late nineteenth century British officials tended to accept that it was necessary to work through these. The problem here was that these easily became so large as to be unmanageable, and that different 'factional' groupings within the tribes could form their own jirgas. In addition, tarburwali stimulated rivalry between closely-related men, and encouraged a tendency to 'factionalism', of which the officials often did not, or could not, take sufficient account.
It is helpful to think of British tribal management as involving shorter-term responses to crisis, and longer-term attempts to solve the tribal problem altogether. As we saw in the previous chapter, the short-term responses were derived from the negative sanctions which had traditionally been used by rulers of the areas adjacent to the Frontier to control the tribes. These tended to be based on some sort of collective ‘tribal responsibility’. The first was taking hostages who could be made to suffer in various ways should other members of their tribe cause difficulties. Edwardes argued that unless the government were prepared to treat them as ruthlessly as the Sikhs had done, hostage-taking was not likely to prove very effective. It is true that the British authorities’ sense of what was proper did mean that they could not go as far as had the Sikhs in punishing hostages for the activities of their fellow-tribesmen.\(^1\) But it was possible to make things unpleasant for hostages without actually torturing or killing them, for instance by removing any privileges they enjoyed, or moving them away from the frontier to Lahore, which the tribesmen very much disliked. Hostages were taken from the tribes of Waziristan on a number of occasions in this period. For example, six hostages were taken from the Mahsuds for the first time in 1861, and by the early 1870s Macaulay was making arrangements for the Shaman Khels and Bahlolzais to supply as many as fifty-two of them. However, the system changed somewhat, and by the later 1870s Macaulay’s Shaman Khel and Bahlolzai Mahsud hostages had become more like paid guests. Indeed, after the Tank raid in 1879 Macaulay claimed that keeping the hostages had never directly increased British control over the tribe, and that it was “the indirect effects of the measure as a civilising agency” which were important.\(^2\) To the extent that it really did succeed in modifying the tribesmen’s attitudes, this was really a method of longer-term management.

Sometimes hostages were acquired by means of another traditional practice, referred to as *baranta*, which, as we have seen, involved seizing men, animals or property belonging to a tribe upon which it was desired to exert pressure.\(^3\) Initially there seem to have been some doubts about the morality of this, but as a recognised tribal management technique (and one used by the tribesmen themselves), it was frequently resorted to by the

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\(^3\) The word is of Turkic origin (Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 350, see also Spain, *Pathan Borderland*, p. 73). As Macaulay pointed out, “the seizing of property of members of the tribe to whom the thief belongs, or with whom the stolen property is, up to the value of that property is quite in accord with Afghan rules, and is always done on the frontier” (D.C. Bannu to Com. D.D., No 267, 1 May 1872, in A 1 2 Sep. 1872 P142).
British authorities (and the Frontier Crimes Regulations formally recognised its use). It was usually effective in proportion to the number and influence of the men, and especially the amount of property, seized. For example, Coke was able to bring the Kabul Khels to terms in 1854 by seizing some tribesmen, and more than a hundred of their pack animals. As the latter were used to carry salt from Biland Khel, it seems to have been their capture in particular which induced the tribe to surrender. Baramta was also imposed on the Mahsuds on a number of occasions, for example in 1873 when a group of Bahlolzais who had come down to British territory pretending to be Alizais were seized, thanks to information received from Shah Nawaz Khan.

A third, very important technique of tribal management was bandish, which was a sort of reverse blockade. It meant confining a tribe within the hills and refusing it access to British territory. Provided it needed such access, bandish was the most effective means of controlling a tribe, and had the advantage that it did not provoke the tribesmen or lead to a desire for revenge in the same way as a punitive expedition. There are a number of examples of the successful use of what Taylor called this “powerful engine” in Waziristan in this period. Indeed Macaulay thought that “the only real deterrent that restrains them (the Mahsuds) from committing border crimes in British territory is the dread of the coercive power involved in a blockade”. They would, he said, “sooner see a hundred of their nearest brethren imprisoned for a year in the Dehra jail than have a hundred of their beasts of burden seized for a day or their way barred to British territory for a week”. It was thanks to the blockade imposed in 1860 that the Mahsud Maliks came down to negotiate a settlement early the following year. Similarly, a blockade forced the Muhammad Khels to surrender in 1871, and brought about the return of the Hindu boy kidnapped by members of the ‘Nawab’s party’ in 1877. Conversely though, reverse blockades did not work when a tribe did not need access to British territory. So the Saifali Kabul Khels and Malikshahis, for example, were barred from it for some years in the 1860s without any noticeable effect; they continued to harbour men who had escaped from British territory and receive stolen property. It is also worth noting that some British officers found “the defensive attitude” behind the blockades humiliating, and thought that ‘prestige’ demanded a more vigorous response to tribal aggression.

Usually, as we have seen, when a tribe had been forced to surrender, it was made to pay compensation for property seized, injuries received and lives lost in its raids,

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4 Caroe, The Pathans, p. 350
5 Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 91, 11 July 1861, in No. 219, March 1862 IP P204/59. Lytton’s Military Secretary, Pomeroy-Colley, reported that the Peshawar officers thought that a blockade was “the severest and most effective chastisement for a tribe” (M.S. to V., 30 Oct. 1878, A10 Oct. 1878 P1147).
computed by adding the value of the property stolen to the sum that according to tribal custom should be paid for physical injuries or deaths inflicted. It was also expected to pay an extra sum as a fine. This was usually more than the tribesmen could easily raise, but the imposition of a fine was to some extent a face-saving device for the British; quite often, it would appear, powerful tribes like the Mahsuds managed to avoid paying them. After the amount of compensation and fine had been settled, an agreement would then be drawn up between the officials and the tribe’s representatives. Typically, the latter undertook to maintain good relations with the government, and not allow members of the tribe to commit crimes in British territory, nor harbour wanted men or receive stolen property. During the first twenty years of British rule along the border signed agreements were negotiated with supposed representatives of every tribe along the frontier. Often associated with such an agreement was an arrangement by which an influential man living near the border who had good contacts among the tribes, or even one or more of the tribe’s Maliks, would act as surety for the tribe’s good behaviour. However, it is worth noting, there was nothing as formal as the agreement with the Afridis in 1908 which made specific Afridi clans responsible for controlling specific Bazar Valley Zakha Khel sections. As we have seen, these agreements were not on the whole very effective in the longer-term. In the Mahsud case, in particular, peace did not usually last very long. Sometimes this was because the men who negotiated the agreements had done so grudgingly and unwillingly, and had little intention of keeping them. More important was, as we saw in the last chapter, the decentralised nature of tribal organisation. Usually the men who signed the agreements were not really representative of tribal opinion, and could not force the others to keep to their terms.

In its traditional form the punitive expedition tended to be a shorter-term response to crisis, and the Sikhs, for example, appear to have mounted several such forays into the

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7 M.S. to V., 30 Oct. 1878, A10 1878 P1147
8 In this period the amount of compensation payable for a life along this part of the Frontier was Rs.360.
9 Caroe, The Pathans, p. 349. For example, agreements were negotiated with the Khyber Afridis in 1856-61, but these proved ineffective because the government really had no leverage over the tribe until allowances began to be paid in 1878-81 (Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, p. 187). Sometimes, as with the Saifali Kabul Khel one in 1872, for example, the agreements included the stipulation that British subjects were free to go into tribal territory to recover stolen property or pursue criminals, but there is little evidence that they ever did so. The authorities were usually reluctant to allow British subjects to pursue grievances in the hills because they feared it could lead to retaliatory raids on them in British territory. Most of the agreements are collected in C. Aitchison, Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries (Delhi, 1933).
10 Christensen, ‘Conflict and Change’, p. 188
11 During the Kohat Pass disturbances in 1849, for example, the Adam Khel Afridi chiefs signed all the submissions and conditions, but the “lower rascals”, as Dalhousie described the other tribesmen, repudiated them (Baird, ed., The Private Letters, p. 131).
hills. However the Punjab government argued that such expeditions could also be an effective tribal management device in the longer term, and that generally a tribe needed to experience the impact of British arms before it would settle down. Occasionally the threat alone was sufficient, as when Edwardes took troops across the Kurram in 1855 and persuaded the Kabul Khel Maliks to come down and meet him. Usually though, willingness to use force had to be demonstrated. John Lawrence was particularly insistent that the tribes had to be made to fear British power before they would keep to their agreements. As we have seen, the only way to do this, he maintained, was to send troops into their territories and inflict some tangible loss upon some of them, even if they were not the ones who had given trouble in the first place. So, for example, when the question of mounting an expedition against the Mahsuds was raised in 1855 he said that it could only be justified if there was a good chance of killing or wounding “a good number of them”.

As we have seen, punitive expeditions also had a strong symbolic aspect. Even though the government could not occupy tribal territory permanently, it was important to show that if need be its troops could go anywhere in it, and that nowhere was beyond its reach. By trespassing on tribal territory, and enabling outsiders to observe it, the expeditions were acts of symbolic domination, which lifted the ‘veil’ of the tribe. Moreover, punishing one tribe showed the others what could happen to them. British officials regarded it as even more humiliating if the tribesmen could be made to do the work of destruction themselves. So, for example, because they had given the Muhammad Khels some help while they were outlaws in 1870-71, the Sudan Khel Darwesh Khels from Gumutti (which lay just outside British territory) were made to burn down their own village. Similarly, in 1872 to atone for the insult they had offered to a British officer when they had fired on Lt. Norman, the Danna Bhittanis were given a choice of punishments. Either they could hand over the men who had shot at Norman or burn down their own houses, and they chose the latter.

As we have seen, these expeditions were often condemned by contemporaries as barbarous and unworthy of a great civilising power. Later critics include Caroe, who talked about an “appalling tally of expeditions” in the twenty years after the Mutiny, the result, he claimed, of keeping too rigidly to the ‘close border’ policy. The expeditions

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12 P.A.R. 1849-51, p. 30
13 J. Lawrence to J. Nicholson, 5 April 1855, MSS EUR F90/6-14A.
15 At the end of the Ambela campaign in 1863 the Buner, Amazai, and Khudikhel tribesmen who had held up the British column for so long were persuaded to burn down the Mujahidin settlement at Malka (Ahmad, The Wahabi Movement, pp. 207-210).
16 The Pathans, pp. 348-349. Ghose is another historian who denies that the expeditions ever had any positive results (England and Afghanistan, p. 15).
were also condemned on the grounds that they were ineffective. The historian Collin Davies, for example, argued that they could not succeed with the tribes between the Khyber and the Gumal because it was impossible for the tribe as a whole to restrain its unruly members and make them keep the peace. It is true that, as we have seen, expeditions against the larger tribes in Waziristan were often not apparently very successful. The deaths of some Kabul Khels and the destruction of their camps at Maidani during the 1859 expedition, for example, did not induce them to surrender Captain Mecham’s murderers, nor did it bring stability to the border. Nor did the 1860 expedition force the Mahsuds to come to terms, or bring about any very striking changes in the behaviour of the tribe as a whole. Those critics who, like Frere, argued that punitive expeditions merely perpetuated animosity without increasing control had a point.

However, the principal argument used by the Punjab officials to defend these expeditions was, as we have seen, that in spite of their obvious drawbacks, they exerted a ‘civilising’ influence in the long run. The destruction wrought and shame inflicted was justified because it showed large numbers of tribesmen that violence did not pay, and thereby induced them to turn to more peaceful pursuits, which in the end would be of greater benefit to them. The comment made by James regarding the Kabul Khel expedition was a typical one; “if, however, we were merely contemplating an act of just vengeance, the picture of so much misery among a people possessing many noble qualities, would not be one to dwell upon ... but when we look to the past, and see how peace and security have followed in the steps of such enterprises, and how gradually but surely our rude neighbours are falling under our influence for good, we must look beyond the present scenes hopefully to the future”. This was not entirely humbug. Expeditions against the smaller tribes especially did quite often achieve their objects without causing much loss of life or destruction of property (whether these objects might have been achieved in some less aggressive way is another question). So for example, following Nicholson’s surprise attack on the Umarzais in 1852, the tribe submitted, was allowed to use its lands in Bannu again and appear to have given no problems at all for eighteen years. A blockaded tribe was sometimes reported to be anxious for troops to be sent against it, both “as a sort of salve to its honour and an excuse for submitting”, and it may well be that ‘honour’ had prevented the Umarzais from surrendering until then.

17 Davies, The Problem, p. 27.
18 See for example Heathcote, ‘British Policy and Baluchistan’, pp. 76-77.
19 Com. Pesh. D. to M.S./G.P., No. 6, 28 Jan. 1860, in No. 7 in No. 4, L/P&S/5/256
20 Pomeroy-Colley pointed out that “expeditions, which in a Military sense might almost be considered failures, have sometimes produced the most remarkable and durable good effect” (30 Oct. 1877, M.S. to Viceroy, in A10 Oct. 1878 P1147).
21 M.S. to V., 30 Oct. 1878, A10 1878 P1147
Moreover, from the imperial point of view both the Kabul Khel and the Mahsud expeditions were probably more productive in the longer-term than may at first appear. By penetrating the hitherto unexplored hills, and for the first time 'lifting the veil' of the obstreperous Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels with their reputation for savage bravery, the reputation of British arms was sustained. British prestige was upheld, and morale maintained. In spite of all the problems experienced in 1857-58, the G.O.I. was able to show that it was still in control. Moreover, the 1860 expedition probably did discourage Mahsud raiding in force, particularly by the Abdullais and Shingis. It also seems to have made members of these groups in particular more wary about taking part in the 1879 raid and more inclined to submit to the British demands after it.

The fact that, as Harris shows, these punitive expeditions were resorted to on fewer and fewer occasions shows that, however offensive it may have been to civilised sensibilities, the policy was an effective one. As the expeditions were one of the most controversial features of Punjab Frontier management, a final comment on the debates they helped to generate may be appropriate here. Although on a number of occasions Frere claimed that the Sind approach was more 'civilised' than the Punjab one, it is worth emphasising that the issue was as much a political as a moral one, if not more so. Because civilising and controlling the tribes were thought of as two sides of the same coin, it was possible to talk about the second in terms of the first, and to disguise the extent to which the issues were political and economic. Both Frere and Munro contrasted British approaches to the tribes on the north-west frontier with French policy in Algeria. As we have seen, Frere argued that because it relied on force rather than on moral example the Punjab system resembled that followed by the French in Algeria (and was not authentically 'English' at all). Munro, however, reached virtually the opposite conclusion. He maintained that, on the contrary, introducing the methods used in Sind would transform Punjab management into something resembling the approach the French had adopted in Algeria. He was probably right. Until the 1870s the military did dominate French administration and policy.

22 For details see Harris ('British policy on the N.-W. Frontier', pp. 21-22, Appendix G). As Harris argues "the tribes were apparently realising that they could not raid and plunder with impunity. The border was being made secure" (op. cit. p. 22, see also p. 35). Christensen similarly makes the point that military force was not used against the Afridis as often as is commonly supposed ('Change and Conflict', p. 315). A look through the first two volumes of Frontier and Overseas Expeditions, for example, will confirm this. It is simply not true to say, as does Spain, that during practically every year from 1849 to 1947 the British had to mount an expedition against the tribes ('Political Problems of a Borderland', in Embree (ed.), Pakistan's Western Borderlands The Transformation of a Political Order, (New Delhi, 1977), p. 4).
23 As Yapp has pointed out, there was a peculiar ambivalence about the British Indian state deriving from the fact that it wanted to display itself in two different lights. In India it wished to emphasise its power and strength, but to the British public it wanted to show itself a state of justice, benevolence, reason and Christian principle ("Tribes and States", pp. 185-186).
on the Algerian border, and there was no separation of military and civil responsibilities such as characterised the Punjab administration.24

As far as concerns this separation of civil and military powers, a case can be made for Frere’s assertion that this made frontier management less efficient than it might have been. For some time in the 1850s Chamberlain, Brigadier of the P.I.F., refused to listen to Nicholson, the D.C. at Dera Ismail Khan, when he argued, quite correctly, that partly because the frontier posts had not been located in the most suitable places, they were failing to deal with raiders. As a result the frontier villages were for some years more vulnerable to attack from the hills than need have been the case. On the other hand, divided responsibility increased the control the Punjab government and the G.O.I. were able to exercise over the local officials, and made it less likely that they could pursue initiatives of their own.25

Moreover, the Bombay and Sind officials argued that the frontier should be entrusted to the military partly because they wanted a much more interventionist tribal policy, so that the debates between them and the Punjab officials also raised questions about how far British influence should be extended across the frontier. If the ‘close border’ is something of a myth, it remains the case that the Punjab government did pursue a policy of relatively limited and cautious trans-border intervention. Frere maintained that it was British reluctance to allow officials and troops play an active role across the border which perpetuated tribal hostility and necessitated punitive expeditions.26 The reactions of the tribes to the Forward Policy of the 1890s, to say nothing of events along the frontier between 1918 and 1947, suggest that he was wrong. Had troops had been allowed to intervene actively across the north-west frontier at all times, as Frere wanted, there would almost certainly have been more fighting and destruction of tribal life and property rather than less. It may be worth remembering that when he became Governor and High Commissioner of the Cape Province in 1876, Frere was induced to pursue an extremely

24 See, for example, Confer, France and Algeria, p. 4, P. Lorcen, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, prejudice and race in colonial Algeria (London, 1995), pp. 6-7. Marshal Lyautey similarly used soldier-administrators to try and pacify the Moroccan tribes before and after W.W.I (W.A. Hoisington Jr., Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco (Basingstoke, 1995), p. 50); though Hoisington does not mention this, C.E. Bruce suggested that Lyautey’s policy was influenced by Sandeman’s policy of ‘peaceful penetration’ (Waziristan 1936-37, p. 1). Russian border regions in Central Asia were usually run by the military too (see, for example, M. Holdsworth Turkestan in the Nineteenth Century: A Brief History of the Khanates of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva (Oxford, 1959), p. 49).

25 This limitation of jurisdiction, which meant that the same man could not be both magistrate and chief of police, was a principle which had been applied throughout most of British India (see, for example, Report of Committee, in G.P. to G.O.I. F.D., No. 447, 13 March 1878, in All a March 1878 P1147).

26 So, for example, in 1863, he asserted that “our neighbours on the Punjab Frontier are in no way more formidable or aggressive than our neighbours on some of our other frontiers” (Minute by the G.B., 12 Dec. 1863, L/P&S/S/257, pp. 615-621).
‘forward’ policy against the Zulus, which culminated in the disastrous defeat at Isandlwana.27

TRIBAL MANAGEMENT IN THE LONGER-TERM

Although some of the techniques we have been looking at were also intended to modify tribal behaviour in the longer term, they were in the first place ways of responding to a particular crisis and designed to restore the status quo. It was not expected that, at least in their traditional form, they would solve the ‘tribal problem’. However, British ambitions to achieve this goal led to the employment of various other strategies in the longer-term. These included offering the tribes various positive incentives such as Pass Responsibility, settlement on land in British territory, and service in the Frontier Militia.

But to begin with, it was thought that a reasonable degree of tolerance towards the tribes, coupled with the encouragement of their trade, would gain their goodwill and maintain peace on the border. Taylor, for example, spoke of the advantages of contact with “a more advanced state of civilisation”, declaring himself a declared advocate for “allowing the men of the hills to mix freely with all classes in the plains”.28 The more the trans-border tribes came down into the administered areas for peaceful purposes, it was anticipated, the more would this change their attitudes. In this sense, in this early period the frontier was a typical pre-modern one in that it was envisaged as being more of a zone than a line.29 So roads were built from the mouths of the passes to the nearest bazaar, markets were held to encourage commerce, and many local tolls and revenue duties abolished. The trans-border tribes were encouraged to visit the settled areas and use the facilities created there, such as the dispensaries or hospitals set up at Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Bannu, and Kohat.30 They were allowed to enlist in the army and police, and their Maliks were encouraged to visit British territory, and invited to darbars, for example the one held at Hassan Abdal in 1872, which was attended by a number of Darwesh Khels.31 In so far as this policy did encourage the tribes to trade and have contact with British territory it was a success. But this was not in itself sufficient, at least in the shorter-term, to persuade those sections which raided regularly in British territory, like the Shingi Mahsuds, to give up the practice.32

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27 See, for example, Pakenham, The Scramble, pp. 43, 57-61.
28 P.M., p. 125
29 See, for example, Whittaker, Frontiers, pp. 62, 71.
31 P.A.R. 1869-70, pp. 33-34
32 Howell, Mizh, p. xii
Another longer-term strategy was to substitute direct management by British officials for the use of intermediaries of one kind or another. The most important intermediary on this part of the frontier was the Nawab of Tank, Shah Nawaz Khan, who handled relations with the Mahsuds on the Tank border. As we saw at the end of the previous chapter, one way of explaining problems that arose with the tribes was to argue that they had been tampered with by these intermediaries for their own purposes. On several occasions Shah Nawaz Khan was accused of colluding with the Mahsuds, and although nothing was ever definitely proved against him, his reluctance to co-operate with the local officials played into their hands. By the early 1870s they had been able to persuade the Governor-General that he should no longer conduct relations with the Mahsuds on the Dera Ismail Khan border, and Macaulay took on responsibility for them.33

Yapp has suggested that in this early period at least British tribal management was envisaged as essentially a programme of moral redemption, and that its essential feature was the constant, guiding hand of a British officer, who was in close, personal contact with the tribes.34 It is true that as the advanced guard of the British civilising mission, the British officers sometimes displayed a combination of courage, sympathy, and insight into their culture to which the tribesmen responded. Thus another reason for trying to do away with middlemen was the belief that it was possible to gain influence over the tribes by encouraging these personal relationships. Taylor, for example, recommended that the officer in charge of relations with the border tribes should “waste some time in receiving them and talking over their affairs, and apparently interesting himself in matters of merely ephemeral importance, but which his having been a party to may on some other more important occasion greatly increase his influence”.35 The belief that the lack of personal contact with the tribesmen in the late 1860s had contributed to the Muhammad Khel outbreak in 1870 was one reason why the Punjab government made an effort to encourage this in the 1870s and to keep officers in their posts for longer.36

The Frontier Militia and Pass Responsibility -

Although it broke down for a time, at the beginning of the 1870s, the Pass Responsibility system, which was based on the idea of making particular tribes responsible...
for the security of particular routes into the hills in return for positions in the Frontier Militia (and reduced revenue demands) was revived, and for a time was quite successful.\textsuperscript{37} As the reference to reduced revenue demands suggests, P.R. was mostly undertaken by tribes living for at least part of the year and owning land in British territory. In the mid-1870s, however, the Bhittanis, many of whom lived across the border and had no land in British territory, as well as the Mianis and Ghorezais, were persuaded to take over responsibility for their passes in return for positions in the Militia. But the fact that these arrangements broke down in 1879 (as well as the earlier difficulties in Bannu), suggests that the system was inherently fragile and could only cope with minor border incursions. Quite apart from any scruples they may have felt about acting as border guards for the British, the tribes which undertook it were neither cohesive\ or powerful enough to repel an invasion of their territory on any scale, or to deal with anything more than the most minor infringements by their own members.

The perception that the tribes would respond to financial incentives was partly responsible for the way that in Waziristan trans-border tribesmen were offered posts in the Frontier Militia.\textsuperscript{38} In the later 1860s Sandeman began the practice of paying Baluch tribal leaders living across the Dera Ghazi Khan border to employ horsemen as despatch rider and messengers, in return for giving up border raids.\textsuperscript{39} Macaulay’s plan to pay Darwesh Khel and Mahsud levies for policing the Gumal Pass appears to be an adaptation of this to the Mahsud context. It is worth noting here that, until its reorganisation in the early 1870s, men were often given appointments in the Frontier Militia to reward them for their loyalty. This ‘political’ function seems to have been more important than its military one. Even after these changes, service in the Frontier Militia continued to be offered as a reward, generally in return for undertaking Pass Responsibility, so that there was still a potential conflict between the two purposes for which the government was trying to use it, and it never seems to have been an effective military force.

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Settlement schemes -}
\end{quote}

The belief that giving the tribesmen something to lose would make them easier to manage also explains why, along the Upper Miranzai border the officials allowed the Miamai Kabul Khels’ to acquire much of the farmland formerly belonging to the Bangash villages of Biland Khel and Thal. It was on the whole a successful strategy, and on two or

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{37} In his Frontier Memo Griffin made the point that the Frontier Militia and P.R. were “so intermingled as to form but portions of one uniform system” (No. 150 Feb. 1878 IP P1216).
\textsuperscript{38} Though this was on a relatively small scale, and the majority of the militiamen were British subjects.
\end{footnotes}
three occasions the Miamais were pressured into coercing the other sections by being threatened with the destruction of their crops if they did not do so.

However, British officials regarded the policy of giving the tribesmen inducements to keep the peace as having been most successfully applied in Bannu, where the Darwesh Khels, who had been coming down to graze their flocks and had begun to acquire cultivable land before annexation, were encouraged to continue doing so. The belief that the tribes were troublesome mainly because they lived in a barren, hostile environment and could only survive by raiding, encouraged the officials to devise settlement programmes in Yusufzai to the north and among the Bugtis and Bozdars to the south. Similar efforts were made with the Mahsuds and Bhittanis. Because it was believed that the Shingi and Nana Khel Mahsuds in particular were driven to raiding by poverty, two attempts were made in this period to pacify them by giving them land to settle on in British territory. The first failed for several reasons, among them the fact that it was such a small one. Macaulay’s scheme in the later 1870s was on a much grander scale, and he aimed to settle as many as two hundred families rather than twenty-five.

The whole strategy did have some serious flaws. For one thing, it was expensive to settle even a relatively small number of tribespeople, although presumably Graham and Macaulay hoped that by paying some to do so, others would follow without any financial inducement. More important, it would appear, was the fact that poverty was not the only reason why the Mahsuds carried out raids and robberies. Raiding was an activity which suited their ideas about how Pashtuns ought to behave and their generally martial ethos, and in some sections a tradition and sub-culture of raiding was built up which they were unlikely to be persuaded easily to give up. Besides, some raiding was carried out primarily for ‘political’ reasons, to discredit opponents, for example, or express dissatisfaction with government. This was the case with, for example, the murder of the grass-cutters in 1861, and the attack on the caravan in the Bain Pass in 1874.

41 D.C. D.I.K. to Com. D.D., No 84, 1 Feb. 1885, in Bruce, Memo in No. 13, 28 Jan. 1890, L/P&S/7/259. Bruce claimed that a settlement scheme very like the Mahsud one had had very bad effects on the Bugtis on the Dera Ghazi Khan border. Not only had those given land refused to cultivate it, but removed from the control of their own jirga, he said, they brought down fellow-tribesmen from the hills to plunder in the plains (ibid.). See also Elliott, The Frontier, p. 71, Yapp, “Tribes and States in the Khyber”, p. 178.
42 It fits in well with other aspects of Pashtunwali too (see, for example, Howell, Mizh, p. 97).
43 Christensen points out that similarly Afridi raiding was by no means always primarily motivated by economic concerns; many raids were acts of warfare or ways of expressing grievances (‘Conflict and Change’, pp. 336, 341).
However, it would appear that the sections from which the most persistent raiders in this early period came, like the Shingis, Abd al-Rahman Khels, Haibat Khels, and Nana Khels, were generally among the poorer ones. This suggests that the policy of encouraging the tribesmen to come down and use markets and hospitals in British territory was ultimately the right one, and that the 'settlement strategy' was a sensible development of it. The effort made to pacify the Shingis, who were responsible for much of the raiding in the 1850s and 1860s, with grants of land and appointments in the militia, appears to have worked in the longer term. Indeed, by the 1930s it was possible to describe them as a "very well-behaved tribe" which gave little trouble. Since 1947 the Government of Pakistan appears quite successfully to have followed a similar policy, making land in administered territory available to the Mahsuds on easy terms; many have moved down to the Dera Ismail Khan district, and they have successfully entered the truck and bus business, and some even live in Karachi. On the whole relations between them and the Government of Pakistan have been good.

BRITISH TRIBAL MANAGEMENT 1849-1882 -

There is no doubt that British management of the tribes on the Bannu border in particular in this period was quite successful. After some initial difficulties (for example the Umarzai raiding which led to Nicholson's expedition in 1852), in the thirty years from annexation to the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 1878, there was really only one serious problem with any of the Darwesh Khel sections in Bannu, even though most of them continued to move into the hills during the hot weather, so that they were still not permanently settled in British territory. That it was relatively successful was largely due to the careful way the tribes were handled by Taylor and Nicholson in the early years after annexation, and the encouragement given to them to continue and expand their winter cultivation in Bannu. As we have seen, this policy was judged to have worked so well that it was used as a model for experiments with other tribes including the Mahsuds and Bhittanis.

The Miranzai border by contrast was more unstable. The difficulties experienced with the largely pastoral Tazi Khels and some of the Khojul Khels were, as we have seen, partly due to the hostility which often arises between settled and nomadic peoples. This was exacerbated by their involvement in the factional politics of the Upper Miranzai villages and Hangu, and their proximity to other trans-border tribes, especially the Turis and Zaimukhts. The Turis in particular sometimes joined the villagers of Thal in fighting the Darwesh Khels. But the continuing reluctance of some of the Kabul Khels, in particular

44 Johnson, Mahsud Notes, p. 10
the Saifalis, to co-operate with the British authorities was probably due both to the fact that they were a large and therefore powerful tribe, and also that most of them were not directly dependent on access to British territory for their livelihood. In spite of this, they were never regarded as being sufficiently troublesome to require any special initiatives to pacify them such as were undertaken towards the Mahsuds and Bhittanis in the 1860s and 1870s.

It is true that there was nothing on the Kohat border like the skirmishing and raiding by the Mahsuds on the Tank border, which went on for much of the period and sometimes affected Bannu too, not to mention the two attempts to attack Tank itself. The Mahsuds were undoubtedly much more difficult to manage than the Darwesh Khels, although the latter also had an independent ethos and were susceptible to the appeal from Kabul. The reasons for this were political and economic, as well as social. Predominantly pastoral people whose grazing in the hills was coming under severe pressure from the Mahsuds, the Bannu Darwesh Khels were becoming more and more dependent on their land holdings in British territory. They had every reason to try and fit in with the demands of the administration provided these were not too unreasonable. Similarly, most of the pastoral nomadic Darwesh Khels on the Kohat border could not afford to be too awkward because many of them also needed access to British territory, or areas within easy reach of British troops. By contrast, although some of them were pastoral nomads too, the Mahsuds, and to some extent the Kabul Khels, were relatively secure in their homelands, and could afford to try and maintain their independence and the values which underpinned it. Indeed the Mahsuds, and some of the Darwesh Khels, were usually ready not just to defend themselves but under the right circumstances to fight outside their territory.

Another reason for the difficulty of controlling the Mahsuds in particular was that their social organisation was dictated rather less by ‘segmentary’ principles than that of most of the Darwesh Khels. Because their summer and winter quarters were usually further apart than those of their Mahsud counterparts, the Darwesh Khels appear to have migrated for longer-distances than them. To do so successfully, they needed to be somewhat more organised, and it seems likely that agnatic links helped them to achieve this. When they began to occupy land in Bannu each of the principal groups tended to settle in one area, and the fact that the government mostly dealt with them on a ‘tribal’ basis reinforced this. So, for example, each tribe was treated as a unit for revenue purposes and the allocation of Pass Responsibility, and as their Maliks became stronger after 1849, it was possible for the authorities to exert some control through them. By contrast, among the Mahsuds, the sections were more dispersed and less corporate, and it was virtually impossible to find men who could control the body of the tribesmen or representative

45 Ahmed, Resistance and Control, p. 34
jirgas. But given their relatively successful handling of the Bannu Darwesh Khels, it took some time for the British officials to appreciate just how autarchic the Mahsuds were.

In spite of this, as Howell said, “with very little encouragement or support and less guidance, working so to speak with nothing but his bare hands, Major Macaulay during his long tenure showed how much against all the odds a great personality could achieve”. Although he did reduce the government’s dependence on the Nawab and his Alizai connections, Macaulay did not introduce any very dramatic changes of policy, preferring to exploit devices which had only previously been used on a very small scale. So his settlement scheme was much bigger than the first one, and the number of hostages paid to live in British territory was larger than before, and amounted to a system of indirect tribal subsidy. Probably the most important innovation was the introduction of ‘tribal responsibility’ for the first time, and it seems to have been a missed opportunity not to have extended the hostage arrangements to the Alizais at the same time.

However, it was due largely to his sympathetic handling of the Mahsuds that by the late 1870s the government’s objective of establishing peaceful conditions along the Tank border was briefly achieved. Indeed the official view was that management of the tribes on the Derajat border since the early 1870s had been so successful that some of the methods used might be applied along the Peshawar one. Umar Khan’s raid on Tank in 1879 showed how unstable the relationship with the Mahsuds really was. But this invasion was quite different from the small-scale robbery, kidnapping and murder which went on throughout much of the previous decade; almost certainly it would not have taken place without the stimulus of the Second Anglo-Afghan War. It is easy to assume that the British relationship with the Mahsuds was bound to be a confrontational one, but it might have taken a different turn had the Second Anglo-Afghan War not broken out. If the tribe’s sense of independence had not been too obviously threatened, Umar Khan and his supporters might have been marginalised as Mahsuds in increasing numbers settled around Tank, and traffic through the Gumal Pass increased thanks to the increased security provided by Mahsud patrols. But the Tank raid and the second invasion of Mahsud territory, as well as international developments, ensured that it did not happen, and although the 1880s were relatively peaceful, Mahsud attitudes to the government remained at best ambivalent.

Nevertheless, by the later 1870s the border was reasonably peaceful, and by later standards this was achieved with remarkably little expenditure. In spite of this, for a long time the consensus of opinion was that the Punjab government’s frontier and tribal management policies were unsuccessful. There was a pronounced tendency to argue, like

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46 Mizh, p. 98
Sir William Barton, that “even before the Afghan War of 1878 it had become obvious that the policy of the close border had been a hopeless failure”\(^{47}\). But comments like this were usually been made to justify the introduction of the Forward Policy in the 1890s, and have little basis in reality.

THE KABUL GOVERNMENT AND THE TRIBES -

Though it is only possible to discuss it very briefly here, Dost Muhammad Khan (de facto ruler of Kabul 1826-1839 and 1843-1863), and his son Sher Ali Khan (1868-1878), needed a fairly active tribal policy. Their own frontier territories were vulnerable to tribal raiding, and Kabul itself was only fifty miles away from Waziristan. It was easily reached by the tribes, as events in the late 1920s, when Mahsud and Darwesh Khel contingents helped Nadir Khan to power there, show.\(^{48}\)

The British tended to argue that Waziristan and most of the rest of the frontier were legally-speaking independent. However, Dost Muhammad Khan claimed sovereignty over the tribes partly on the ground that the frontier had been part of the Durrani empire in the previous century, and partly on the ground of shared language and religion. Indeed the historian Gregorian suggests that Dost Muhammad Khan carried on “a diplomatic war with Britain” over the question of the extension and recognition of his sovereignty over the frontier tribes, pressing the British not to deal with his subjects except through him.\(^{49}\) It would appear that the Amir did want to extend his influence over the frontier tribes, partly to make himself more secure. Though he generally demanded some concession from them in return, he did usually respond positively when the tribes appealed to him to intercede with the G.O.I. At the same time, he did not want to pursue such a forward policy that he jeopardised his relationship, which began to improve in the mid-1850s, with it.\(^{50}\) He does seem to have hoped that if good relations could be maintained, the British might actually be persuaded to recognise his sovereignty over most, if not all, of the tribes.\(^{51}\) When it came to trying to increase his influence over them, it should be noted, he had some advantages which the G.O.I. did not possess, including a shared cultural identity, the possibility of using marriage ties, and the appeal to religious loyalties.\(^{52}\) On the other hand, his resources

\(^{47}\) _India’s North-West Frontier_, p. 61


\(^{49}\) _The Emergence_, p. 68, Caroe, _The Pathans_, p. 347

\(^{50}\) Singhal, _India and Afghanistan_, p. 7

\(^{51}\) For a discussion of his and Sher Ali Khan’s relations with the Shinwaris, Afridis, and Mohmands, see Noelle, ‘The Interaction between State and Tribe’, pp. 289-291, 303-322.

\(^{52}\) Muhammad Azem, for example, tried to strengthen his position by marrying the daughter of a local chief in Khost (Noelle, ‘The Interaction between State and Tribe’, p. 294).
were much more limited. He was never strong enough to extend his control to Dawar, and his authority over Khost and the Kurram remained tenuous.\(^{53}\)

In the disordered period between Dost Muhammad Khan’s death in 1863 and Sher Ali Khan’s accession in 1868, there was not much opportunity for the rulers in Kabul to pursue an active tribal policy. But after he established himself in Kabul, Sher Ali Khan was able among other things to obtain a somewhat firmer hold on Khost than had his father, and during the 1870s military posts were established at Ahmadi Shah and Khapiyang in the Upper Kurram. But his grip was still very shaky, and like his father he made no attempt to exert any authority over Dawar. However, he did make quite a considerable effort to win the confidence of the tribes, and to reassert the “moral authority of the Afghan monarchy” in the tribal belt.\(^{54}\) For example, when his son Sardar Abdullah Jan was designated heir to the throne, he issued a proclamation assuring the frontier tribes that he had no designs on their territory, but that as fellow-Afghans he was sincerely anxious to promote their welfare.\(^{55}\) As relations with the G.O.I. began to deteriorate in the early 1870s, he began to pursue a more active tribal policy. As we have seen, he established links with a number of the Darwesh Khel Maliks of Bannu, and subsidised the anti-British faction among the Mahsuds. Insofar as he was able to respond to the British invasion by persuading Umar Khan to descend on Tank, this policy was successful. It is worth making the point that his attempt, for example, to try and persuade the Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels to abandon their feud by appealing to shared religious values, anticipated the use of them made by his successor, Abd al-Rahman Khan.\(^{56}\) As soon as he established himself in Kabul in 1880, the latter also began to try and build up support among the Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels.\(^{57}\)

So throughout this period the rulers in Kabul did maintain links with the frontier tribes. But this was not so much a deliberate ‘forward’ policy as the result of a wish to ensure their own security, and to accommodate the anti-British faction which existed at the court, as well a tendency to react in an opportunistic way to the tribes’ desire to play off Kabul against the G.O.I. At least until the reign of Amir Abd al-Rahman, it appears that the Kabul rulers were not anxious to get involved with frontier politics beyond a certain point, and had only a few limited objectives, such as the establishment of control over

\(^{53}\) See, for example, MacGregor, C.A., I-3, p. 268

\(^{54}\) Gregorian, The Emergence, p. 88


\(^{56}\) See, for example, A. Olesen, “The political use of Islam in Afghanistan during the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901), Contributions to Islamic Studies, Iran Afghanistan Pakistan (Danish Council for the Humanities, 1987), pp. 93-94.

\(^{57}\) Chakravarty, From Khyber to Oxus, pp. 121-123, Singhal, India and Afghanistan, pp. 11-12
frontier districts like Khost and Upper Kurram.

TRIBES AND STATES -

In some cases a state may be strong enough to move tribes from one part of its territory to another, appoint chiefs, and construct confederacies. It may even encourage tribalism and nomadism, as the Qajar rulers of Iran did earlier in the nineteenth century on their Ottoman and Russian frontiers, as a defence against possible incursions. At the other extreme a state may be unable to follow even indirect methods of rule, and have to recognise what has been described as a 'tribal situation', in which its claims to the allegiance of certain tribes are purely nominal and territorial if indeed it maintains them at all.58 By and large this was the position in Waziristan in the mid-nineteenth century.

But, as we have seen, the G.O.I. began to exert an increasingly powerful influence on the tribes, which responded in various ways. Sometimes they followed the tactic of 'dividing so as not to be ruled', and narrowed the circle of tribal responsibility in order to reduce the number of men on whom the state could bring pressure to bear.59 Thus the Mahsuds were successfully able to resist the imposition of tribal responsibility until the 1870s. Similarly, attempts by the G.O.I. and Kabul to enhance the power of the Maliks so as to be able to use them to influence the tribes were usually resisted by the tribesmen who simply refused to follow or obey them.60 But what have been described as 'jellyfish' tactics were not the only response.61 The Mahsuds could unite to oppose invaders, as they did during the 1860 expedition, and join forces for aggressive purposes as they did to invade Tank in 1860 and 1879. They also emphasised more inclusive identities when government had something to offer them, particularly service in the militia or land in British territory, so as to enable as many men as possible to claim that genealogically-speaking they were entitled to a share in it.62 Under these circumstances they coalesced remarkably quickly, using 'hive' tactics and swarming like bees.

Usually when a state actually succeeds in establishing some control over a tribe, different processes begin to take place; the importance of what have been described as 'state principles', such as territoriality and hierarchy grows, and factionalism and patronage

58 Tapper, "Introduction", p. 53.
59 See Yapp, "Tribes and States in the Khyber" p. 172, Tapper, "Introduction", p. 54.
60 Noelle suggests that, by contrast, intermittent intervention by the Afghan government encouraged the emergence of leading lineages among the Ghilzais and Mohmands ('The Interaction between State and Tribe', pp. 380-381).
61 Yapp, "Tribes and States in the Khyber" p. 186, Tapper, "Introduction", p. 60
62 As Anderson puts it, "tribes seem to be there and not there" ("Khan and Khel", p. 123). See also, for example, E. Gellner, "The Tribal Society and its Enemies", in Tapper, ed., The Conflict of Tribe and State.
become more important. To some extent this did begin to happen in Waziristan in this period. In the first place, the attempt by the British officials to pin down a particular level of tribal identity was associated with the efforts to widen tribal responsibility, and attach specific obligations to specific groups occupying particular territories. Secondly, the existing links between the Mahsuds and the parties or cliques in British territory appear to have grown stronger. Thirdly, as a result of increasing contact with the G.O.I. and the settled areas, the factional divisions among the Mahsuds, as well as the Darwesh Khels, deepened. Even though factions remained relatively weak among the Mahsuds in particular, the effect was to undermine the tribal corporateness which the British officers were trying to create.

So the tribes of Waziristan organised themselves in different ways in different circumstances; the difficulty for the government officer was that both the segmentary lineage model and the factional model (and sometimes even the chiefly one) to some extent corresponded to reality. Each reflected a different aspect or potentiality of tribal organisation. Sometimes tribal politics were shaped by clan and lineage membership, at other times they revolved around factional nuclei, even Malik; occasionally they reflected some kind of territorial identity. Usually all these influences played some part, and as a result the Mahsuds especially demonstrated an ability to coalesce and dissolve in a highly unpredictable way.

Tribal reactions, it should be noted in passing, affect the way states develop too, encouraging them to create new agencies and introduce new procedures as the original ones prove ineffective. So in Waziristan, for example, Mahsud intransigence encouraged the

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63 Tapper, "Introduction", p. 70, Tapper, "Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople", p. 70
64 These 'parties' were sometimes referred to as factions, but they were not of course the same as those identified in the tribal context. The ones in British territory comprised men related to each other, and employed directly or indirectly by the government, who over time attempted to manipulate the administration to the advantage of their kin. However, these connections may be an example of the sort of "push" factors which, it has been suggested, tend to develop on frontiers and tend to undermine them (Whittaker, Frontiers, pp. 212-222, O. Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History (London, 1962), p. 107).
65 Similarly, among the Afridis the balance of British policy was upset by, among other things, the tension between tribal egalitarianism and socio-political hierarchy (Christensen, 'Conflict and Change', pp. 421-422).
66 There was also that "complex of mental attributes" which, as Howell put it, at times resulted in utter recklessness of individual action and consequent complete lack of tribal cohesion" (Mizh. p. 96).
67 There may be something analogous here to the way the Yarahmadzai Baluchis retained a segmentary lineage organisation as a sort of reserve model should the wider political environment change (Salzman, "Does Complementary Opposition Exist ?", A.A. (1978), Vol. 80). In Iran, it may be worth noting, tribal groups may form on the basis of residence in a common territory, kinship, and political allegiance (L. Beck, "Tribes and the State in 19th and 20th Century Iran", in Khoury and Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation, p. 194).
68 So Khoury and Kostiner have described the relationship between tribe and state as being one of "dialectical symbiosis" ("Introduction", p. 7). For a modern example, see Ahmed, Resistance and Control.
government to take responsibility for the conduct of relations with them away from the Nawab of Tank, and give it to its own officers. When, twenty years later, as a result of the introduction of the Maliki system as well as the British attempt to pursue a more forward policy, the Mullah Powindah became increasingly influential, the British scrapped the Maliki system. Allowances were paid to much larger numbers of tribesmen, and an attempt was even made to buy off the Mullah himself.69

The resistance of 'tribal' peoples like Pashtuns, the Atlas Berbers or the pre-1745 Scots Highlanders, to the state is usually associated with possession of a distinctive culture, one which differs in important respects from that of the representatives of the state. It is no coincidence that, as we have seen, the Mahsuds, more than any other frontier tribe, even the almost equally independent Afridis, have been renowned for following the dictates of Pashtunwali, and for rejecting not just the British model of 'civilisation' but those of states of local origin as well.70 But as with groups like the Kurds and Turkmen, the independence of these Pashtuns was the product of their location on the border between different states. Although there is little to suggest that in this period the Waziristan tribes received anything more than moral support and the occasional gift from the Kabul government, the possibility that if it behaved too aggressively towards the tribes, the G.O.I. might drive them into the hands of the Amir was usually a factor in its calculations. In this period their location along a strategic border did help the Mahsuds and Bhittanis and some of the Darwesh Khel groups like the Kabul Khels to remain free of government control. Towards the end of the century, as British pressure increased, the Waziristan tribes began to play off the Afghan government and the G.O.I. against each other in earnest. So the fact that the frontier Pashtuns were sometimes able to put their 'democratic' ideals into practice was the result of cultural as well as military confrontations with states, and was not in itself evidence of a 'pure', untouched tribal society.71 Although the British may sometimes have had a tendency to regard the tribes as 'noble savages', this reflected their own preconceptions as much as the realities of the situation. Some Mahsuds probably did have very little, if any contact, with the administered areas to the east and west, but this was not by any means true of all of them. In particular, Yarik Khan Langar Khel's brother-in-law was the Nawab of Tank, and many of the tribesmen had links with factions in British territory, with which the Alizais in particular traded on some scale. Moreover, the Sayyids of the Urmar settlement of Kaniguram owned land in British territory, and had links with Logar and Kabul.

p. 64. See also Tapper, "Introduction", pp. 61-62, 69-70.
69 Christensen, 'Conflict and Change', pp. 194, 360, 368.
70 Howell thought that Mehr Dad Abdullai (Bahlolzai) or any other intelligent Mahsud Malik would say to any representative of the government that he wanted "none of your 'qanun' and your other institutions", but preferred to stick to his own tribal 'riwaj' and to be a man like his father before him (Mizh, xii).
The traditional view of ‘tribes’ was predicated on a perception of them as “historically inveterate opponents of the state”, and of the relationship as by definition an antagonistic one. From this perspective tribes were primordial groups, qualitatively different from states, and bound to come into conflict with them. In recent years, inspired it would appear by Fried’s ideas in particular, this simplistic view has been increasingly challenged, by, among others, Richard Tapper, as well as Paul Dresch and Richard Bradburd. It has been increasingly accepted that the relationship between tribes and states is a more complex one, and that it makes more sense to envisage them as forming a single system. It has become clear that tribe and state are the opposite poles of a continuum, forms of political organisation which, though tending to stress different principles (kinship or territoriality), are not different in kind, and that it is the relationship between them which is critical. Only by appreciating the extent to which, as was pointed out in the introduction, there is a state in every tribe and a tribe in every state, can we make sense of the way that tribally-organised groups have formed states in various parts of the world, in Africa and Western Europe as well as the Middle East for example. Equally it is only in these terms that we can understand how the reverse process can take place and state-like formations devolve into less organised groupings.

Hobsbawm has pointed out in this connection that, although the Pashtuns, like the Nuer and Dinka of the Sudan, the Kurds or the Atlas Berbers, had a sense of ‘tribal ethnicity’ which often bound together even widely dispersed and fragmented populations lacking political unity into what have been called ‘proto-nations’, this ‘proto-nationalism’ has little historic relation to state formation. People with the most powerful and lasting sense of ‘tribal’ ethnicity, he argues, usually not only resisted the imposition of the modern state, national or otherwise, but very commonly any state. But this may not necessarily always be the case. It is true that it is those very aspects of their culture and social organisation which enable them to resist states which make it so difficult for these peoples to form their own. On the other hand it should be emphasised that under the right

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71 Tapper, “Introduction”, pp. 59-61, 70
72 Op. cit. p. 4
74 Objections to the idea that tribes and states form a single system on the grounds that relations between tribe and state are often so hostile miss the point that it is in opposition to the other that the values of each tend to develop (see, for example, Crone, J. of the R.A.S, 3rd series, Vol. 3, p. 371).
75 See, for example, Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians and Tribespeople”, p. 61.
76 E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, 1992), p. 64
77 See, for instance, Gellner, “Tribalism and the State in the Middle East”, in Khoury and Kostiner, Tribes
conditions Pashtuns and Kurds have quite often formed states. The inability of these ‘tribal’ peoples to form nation-states appears to reflect their political weakness as much as a rejection of the state as such.78

The interdependence of tribe and state is apparent in the Iranian context for instance. In Afghanistan, and along the frontier with Pakistan, the relationship looks rather different because the tribes appear to have been much more independent and the association with states is less immediately obvious. But even here the state has played a critical part. For example, although we know little about their understanding of tribes, it is apparent that the Mughals and Durranis helped to solidify a particular pattern of tribal organisation by paying subsidies to some of the tribes, the Khyber Afridis for example, and drawing up inventories of their military strength.79 In particular, it has been argued, the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (1658-1707), by encouraging inter-tribal hostilities and cutting off the tribal areas from the plains “did much to destroy whatever chance there might have been of national spirit among the tribesmen”.80 Similarly in various ways the British contributed enormously to the creation of frontier tribalism. They attempted to increase tribal solidarity, they introduced special tribal laws, and eventually developed competing theories about how tribes worked and should be handled.81

As regards the state, it is worth emphasising that the frontier tribes encountered several varieties of it. The point has been made that there were important differences between the approach of the British Indian government and those of the Mughals, Durranis
and Sikhs. The latter were content if through repression and manipulation they could exert some sort of control over the tribes and ensure that they did not make too much of a nuisance of themselves. To begin with at least, the British, by contrast, hoped that by exposing them to 'civilising' influences they could pacify the tribes and solve the 'tribal problem' for once and for all, and this affected the policy they pursued towards them. Moreover, the nature of the British Indian state which confronted the tribes along the frontier changed during the century. As it became more like a 'modern' state and less like a traditional empire, it became increasingly unwilling to tolerate intermediate jurisdictions. This helps to explain why, as we saw in Chapter Three, the Nawab of Tank was condemned for ruling the district according to "oriental notions", and conduct of relations with the Mahsuds was taken out of his hands in the early 1870s. At the same time, British administrators were aware that modernisation tended automatically to generate conflict with the tribes; on this border the introduction of the Frontier Crimes Regulations and the emphasis placed on encouraging more personal contacts between British officers and the tribesmen in the 1870s amounted in Weberian terms to an attempt to substitute charismatic for bureaucratic authority.

Additional complications arose because, like most if not all states, the G.O.I. was not a monolithic institution; partly as a result it was never really able to devise and follow a co-ordinated, consistent approach towards the tribes. Policies actually pursued towards them were shaped by many different processes within the structures of imperial administration. They were the product of an extremely complex interaction between on the one hand the reactions of the tribes themselves, and on the other wider economic, political and strategic influences, such as the changes of policy which could follow changes of government in Britain. Lower-level administrative rivalries of various kinds, and the ideas, personalities and ambitions of the officials charged with putting these policies into practice, also played a part. So north-west frontier management was affected not only by the long-running war between the advocates of the Sind and Punjab systems, but by the rivalries of cliques of Indian officials in the Derajat administration, who were trying to promote their interests by utilising their links with tribal 'factions'. The legal-rational character of the state which the Pashtuns of the frontier confronted in the second half of the nineteenth century can be exaggerated; indeed it might almost be envisaged as a congeries of 'tribes' itself. British policy towards the Khyber tribes during the First Anglo-Afghan war was, it has been suggested, the outcome of "innumerable disputes and compromises", and the

82 While the British Indian government tended to be far less 'liberal' and more interventionist than the Home government (see, for example, M.S. Anderson, The Ascendancy of Europe, 2nd ed., Longman, 1985, p. 364).
83 Yapp, "Tribes and States in the Khyber", pp. 159, 184-187.
same may be said of British rule generally along this border from 1849 until 1947.8

SUMMARY -

Various more or less short-term methods of tribal management were based on collective tribal responsibility, including seizure of related men and their property, reverse blockades, and the negotiation of agreements by which the tribes undertook to keep the peace, and punitive expeditions. Reverse blockades were probably the most effective means of forcing a tribe that had refused to do so to come to terms, but punitive expeditions could also be effective as well, particularly against the weaker tribes. Hostage-taking was also in the first place a traditional short-term method of management, but in Macaulay’s hands it became a longer-term one too. Other longer-term approaches included encouraging the tribes to come down and trade and use hospitals, dispensaries and markets in British territory, and increasing the direct contacts between the tribes and British officers in the belief that middlemen were a disruptive influence. Use began to be made of Pass Responsibility agreements and appointments in the Frontier Militia. In addition, the Darwesh Khels were encouraged to continue cultivating in Bannu during the winter, and land settlement schemes linked with appointments in the Militia were devised to give the Mahsuds and Bhittanis a similar incentive to keep the peace along the frontier and to alleviate the poverty which was regarded as the main reason for the intransigence of the Bahlolzai Mahsuds in particular.

On the whole the management of the tribes on the Bannu and Kohat border was reasonably successful in both the short and longer terms, and in spite of the problem with the Muhammad Khels at the end of the 1860s, the policy of encouraging the Darwesh Khels to acquire more land in Bannu seemed to make them more amenable and peaceable. Relations with the Mahsuds were more difficult, and as well as the two attempts to reach Tank, raiding by the Bahlolzai Mahsuds in particular was a problem for much of this period. The difficulty of controlling this was exacerbated by the highly individualistic nature of Mahsud social and political organisation. Nevertheless it was fair to say that although the tribes did not all respond as had been hoped to the civilising presence of the G.O.I. along the border, by the late 1870s and 1880s British objectives regarding them had been achieved in so far as the border was largely peaceful. The raid on Tank in 1879 would not have taken place without the stimulus of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, and tribal robberies and raids even on this border were far less frequent than in the late 1840s.

84 Op. cit. p. 185. Howell made the point that one of the Mahsud Maliks had remarked to him that “you are a cemented wall, we are like a ‘danga’ (a dry stone wall)”, but that the comparison ought to have been much truer than it really was (Mizh, xi).
Because it was itself vulnerable to the tribes in various ways, the Kabul government had to have a frontier policy too. Dost Muhammad Khan and Sher Ali Khan were always keen to take advantage of opportunities to increase their influence among them, but for much of the period there was no real effort to use the tribes against the British. It was only in the 1870s that Sher Ali Khan really began to try and build up influence among them so as to be in a position to do so. As for the tribes themselves, they wanted to maintain their independence, and so, externally, the Mahsuds, for example responded to the growing British pressure by trying to play off the governments of India and Afghanistan. Internally, both Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels at times segmented and narrowed the circle of responsibility and refused to recognise leaders, but at others emphasised wider identities. In conclusion, attention was drawn to the extent to which the British Indian state found it difficult to pursue a consistent policy towards the tribes. thanks to its own departmental rivalries, the influence of party politics in Britain, and the personal ambitions of individual officers.
CHAPTER TEN  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION -

Among the principal themes of the discussion has been the extent to which the confrontation between 'state' and 'tribe' on the north-west frontier in this period was a cultural as well as a politico-military one. The Sikhs had had no ambition to do more than stop the tribes becoming too much of a nuisance, leaving the local population to defend themselves from trans-border raids, and collecting as much revenue from them as cheaply as possible, with few scruples about the means they used to do so. The G.O.I. by contrast hoped to solve the 'tribal problem' by exerting a 'civilising' influence on the tribes. It was hoped that by encouraging the tribes to come down and trade in British territory, enlist in the army and militia, and use the hospitals and dispensaries which were set up there, that they would gradually become more peaceful and productive. There was a pronounced clash of cultures here. The British offered the Pashtuns a model of civilisation very different from their own, although the conviction with which they did so began to wane towards the end of the century, and their attitudes to the tribes became more ambivalent. From one point of view the Pashtuns were treacherous, vengeful fanatics, but from the other they were brave, resourceful characters who stood and spoke up for themselves in a way the British found rather admirable. From the point of view of the tribes, while poverty may have played a part in generating the sort of Mahsud raiding that occurred along the Tank border, for example, the political and cultural roots of their opposition to the British were in the longer-term more important. As we have seen, the Pashtuns of Waziristan may not have conformed to stereotyped perceptions of the frontier tribes as 'noble savages' living in their own 'splendid isolation', but they did fairly consistently uphold the values of Pashtunwali against those of British 'civilisation'.

As regards the influences upon British tribal policy, even in this early period these had an imperial dimension. This was the case even though, apart from the short-lived change of policy during the later 1870s which led to the Second Anglo-Afghan War, strategic considerations were less important than they were to become towards the end of the century, and were not regarded as requiring the establishment of control of the frontier zone, and hence an interventionist tribal policy. Perhaps the most obvious example was the way that the success or failure of military operations on the frontier had an effect on British prestige both within and outside India. But the imperial aspect was not the only important one, and tribal policy was also shaped by the availability of resources, as well as by ideas about the ways in which it was appropriate for an imperial government to handle the tribes. This meant that although some of the more barbarous tactics used by the Sikhs were ruled out, at the same the government's 'prestige' or 'honour' had to be upheld, and a vigorous response made to any 'insult'. Finally, models of tribal culture and socio-economic
organisation were also important, because they influenced the ways officials tried to manage the tribes.

Another major theme has been the extent to which, until the late nineteenth century, rather than an iron curtain, the border of north-western India was a typical pre-modern frontier, a zone across which political as well as economic relationships were maintained in both directions. This had two important consequences. In the first place, British tribal management in this period involved considerable contact, and even interference, with the 'independent' tribes. So, as far as the Mahsuds are concerned, although in 1849 Shah Nawaz Khan, later the Nawab of Tank, had been entrusted with day-to-day responsibility for them, British officials gradually began to play a more important part when it came to dealing with more important issues. The first formal British agreement with the Mahsuds was negotiated in 1861 after the military expedition into their territory in 1860 failed to bring peace along the border. Continuing problems failure encouraged the D.C., Frederick Graham, in the mid-1860s to try and pacify the troublesome Shingi and Nana Khel Bahlolzais in particular, by settling some families in British territory and giving some men service in the frontier militia. By 1873 Macaulay had been able to persuade the Government to take responsibility for the Mahsuds out of the Nawab's hands altogether, and give it to him. He inaugurated a policy of keeping hostages from the Bahlolzai and Shaman Khel sections at Dera Ismail Khan, which meant that both sections began in effect to receive an indirect subsidy from the Government.

Secondly, it meant that the difficulties which were experienced with the Mahsuds in particular were due not just to poverty, or to their martial values, but to manipulation by influential men in British territory. Virtually throughout the whole period factional leaders in British territory maintained links with groups of Mahsuds, whom they encouraged to carry out raids to discredit their opponents. In the 1850s and 1860s, for example, the Multanis in British territory encouraged Mahsud raiding to undermine the Nawab. In the 1870s Charles Macaulay began to use Nabi Khan Shingi and a local landowner, Azem Khan Kundi, rather than the Nawab as his intermediaries with the Mahsuds, so that the balance of power on the Tank border, and to some extent amongst the Mahsuds themselves, was considerably altered. After this, although it is difficult to be absolutely certain, it appears that the Nawab himself began to encourage a small group of Mahsuds, known as the 'Nawab's party', to carry out a series of raids, murders and kidnappings in an attempt to discredit the new arrangements. In this connection, attention was drawn to the fact that, thanks partly at least it would appear to the strength of tarburwali among the Mahsuds, some members of the 'Nawab's party' were fairly closely related to Nabi Khan. This is a good illustration of the way that, in spite of their segmentary ideology, political alignments among the Mahsuds often did not follow segmentary divisions.
However, in 1876 Macaulay persuaded the Bhittanis, some of whom lived in British territory and some across the border, to be responsible for all the passes along their part of the Dera Ismail Khan border. Over the next two years the number of Mahsud raids dropped practically to zero. To pacify the tribe further, he devised a scheme for settling as many as two hundred Mahsud families on land in the Tank district, linking this with a plan to make them responsible for the security of the Gumal route to Ghazni. However, although he had first raised the possibility of this with them in 1875, it does not seem to have been very popular with the tribe as a whole. It seems to have encouraged some of the members of the ‘Nawab’s party’ to visit Kabul and make contact with Amir Sher Ali Khan, who by this time was anxious to try and build up support among the frontier tribes in case relations with the G.O.I. should deteriorate further. Partly for this reason the political position among the Mahsuds remained unstable. When the Second Anglo-Afghan War broke out, Amir Sher Ali Khan was able to play on personal resentment, as well as sectional and factional rivalry, and religious loyalties, to persuade Umar Khan, and other leading tribesmen, to raise a tribal army at the end of 1878. On New Year’s Day 1879, contrary to all expectations, it succeeded in passing the military outposts and reaching Tank and burning the bazaar, and a number of villages were plundered and burned, though not by Mahsuds.

The Government responded by demanding that as well as paying a fine, the Mahsuds should surrender Umar Khan and five other ‘ringleaders’. Four of them were handed over early in 1881 but this was not regarded as sufficient, and later in the year the second British expedition into Mahsud territory was mounted. Afterwards the settlement scheme was restarted, and an attempt was made to create a sort of tribal police by extending the hostage arrangements which had seemed to work well in the 1870s. The experiment was a failure, and Macaulay himself retired in 1882. But although the Mahsuds remained reasonably quiet, towards the end of the decade, Bruce began to introduce a much more active policy based on subsidising the Maliks.

Relations with the tribes on the Bannu and Kohat borders similarly involved more intervention than has hitherto been supposed. Most of the Darwesh Khels who had already begun to do so were successfully persuaded to continue visiting British territory with their flocks every winter and to cultivate and pay revenue. The Hatti Khels in particular were given a large grant of newly-reclaimed land and most of them became consistent supporters of Government. The spirit of resistance shown by the Umarzais in particular was crushed by John Nicholson, who in 1852 took troops into the hills north of Bannu in the autumn and destroyed several of their camps. A system of Pass Responsibility according to which, in return for light assessment of their lands and the right to nominate recruits to the Frontier Militia, the tribesmen whose lands lay round the mouth of a particular pass were held
responsible for the security of that pass, was established and seemed to work well. However, P.R. had to be used carefully as it ultimately depended on persuasion rather than coercion. Its heavy-handed application, coupled with insulting behaviour by the local officials, led to the growth of serious resentment among all the Darwesh Khels in Bannu at the end of the 1860s. Insensitive handling of the Muhammad Khels in particular led to most of them decamping en masse in June 1870, gathering just across the border in Dawar, and coming down again the next morning to attack the relief marching to the Kurram outpost, killing four men. They remained in the hills for fourteen months, but, after carrying out a number of irritating but not very serious raids in British territory, they were reduced to starvation and had to surrender ignominiously in September 1871. Early in 1872 there was a brief military foray into Dawar to punish the Dawars for sheltering the Muhammad Khels, and for sending ‘insulting’ messages to the British officials. The British officials argued that they had been incited to do so by members of the Multani faction in the local administration in order to discredit the new arrangements, and efforts were made to reduce its influence.

Various other changes were also made to frontier administration. The Frontier Crimes Regulations were introduced, the P.R. and Frontier Militia arrangements were overhauled, and an effort was made to keep frontier officers in their posts long enough for them to get to know the people and establish personal relationships with the tribesmen. However the system was not fundamentally altered, even though some of the military officers argued that they should have control of relations with the trans-border tribes. They called for a much more interventionist policy, one which would have resembled that pursued on the Sind frontier by Jacob and his successors. At the same time, rather as on the Tank border Macaulay had begun to make less use of Umar Khan and more of Nabi Khan Shingi, so in Bannu the local officers seem to have started relying more on the Hatti Khel Malik Nizam Khan, and rather less on Mani Khan Sudan Khel. Mani Khan had failed to establish himself as the leading Darwesh Khel Malik in the district, and it may be partly for this reason that, like some of the other Maliks, he several times visited Kabul in the later 1870s in response to invitations from the Amir. Nevertheless, when the Second Anglo-Afghan War broke out, all the influential Bannu Darwesh Khels decided to support the British Government.

We saw that relations with the large, mostly Utmanzai, Darwesh Khel tribes who lived across the Kurram were more difficult. They were on bad terms with the Bangash villages of Upper Miranzai, and other groups, particularly the Turis, became involved in the feud. This may have had a sectarian dimension as the Bangash and Turis were Imamis, whereas the Darwesh Khels were Sunnis. In 1855 British troops were taken up the valley to overawe the villagers, and then across the Kurram to induce the Kabul Khels and the
Thai people to undertake to end their feud. In the following year, with the co-operation of the Afghan local authorities, British troops crossed the river again to impose a settlement on the Darwesh Khels and the Turis. But gangs of outlaws continued to operate in the hills, and Captain Mecham’s murder in November 1859 by a group of Hatti Khels who took refuge with the Kabul Khels, led to a punitive expedition being mounted against them with uncharacteristic speed. It failed to obtain their surrender, but Reynell Taylor, the Derajat Commissioner, was able to pressure the Darwesh Khels with land in Bannu, especially the Hatti Khels, to go into the hills themselves, and Mecham’s murderer was captured.

In the 1860s an outpost was established on the Upper Miranzai border at Gundiour, but relations between the Kabul Khels and the other Darwesh Khel tribes and the Turis and the villages of Thai continued to be difficult. The Kohat D.C., Louis Cavagnari, twice visited Thai towards the end of the decade and negotiated a settlement between them. In 1871, as part of the effort generally to reassert the government’s authority after the Muhammad Khel difficulties, the Extra A.C., Muhammad Hyat Khan, visited the Saifali Kabul Khel country in independent territory on the west bank of the Kurram. A few weeks later the section’s representatives came in to Bannu and for the first time signed an agreement with the government. Some of the trans-border Utmanzais continued to cause difficulties, but even during the Second Anglo-Afghan War these continued to be fairly minor, although the Baran post was attacked, and there was considerable interference with supply convoys and communications. A brief military expedition was mounted against the Malikshahis in 1881.

So the accepted view that British frontier management in this period was dominated by the doctrine of the ‘close border’ is a mistaken one; relations with the trans-border tribes on the Upper Miranzai, Bannu and Tank borders in this period amounted to much more than a system of non-intervention punctuated by expeditions. It seems likely that further research will also show that there was more to developments along other parts of the frontier in this period than the implementation of a simple ‘close border’ policy. It is also clear that the stereotyped perception of Punjab tribal policy as involving direct dealings with tribes over Kabul’s head needs to be revised. On several occasions the G.O.I. did actually co-operate with the Amir of Kabul to deal with tribal problems. In 1855, for example, Dost Muhammad Khan’s son, the heir-apparent, Ghulam Hyder Khan, was invited to send a representative with the expedition that was to be sent into Upper Miranzai in 1855. His father’s sovereignty over the Turis and Dawar was recognised, and attempts made to deal with the Turis’ raiding through him. While it is true that John Lawrence, who was Viceroy from 1864 to 1869, was reluctant to allow Kabul to play a frontier role, this was partly due to the fact that for much of this period there was civil war in Afghanistan, and when Mayo became Viceroy he began to co-operate with the Amir again.
As regards the Kabul government's approach to the tribes, the point was made that it also needed some sort of frontier policy, on the one hand because it was itself vulnerable to the tribes in various ways, and on the other because the tribes themselves sometimes tried to enlist its help against the G.O.I. In 1860, for example, Mahsud representatives appealed to Dost Muhammad Khan to intercede for them. Dost Muhammad Khan, and his successor, Sher Ali Khan, were always keen to take advantage of opportunities to increase their influence among the tribes, and extended a rather fragile authority over Khost and the Kurram. However, for most of the period there was no real effort to use them against the British, and it was only in the 1870s that the latter really began to try and build up influence among them so as to be in a position to do so. Insofar as there was quite a serious breakdown of law and order in the Tank district after the Mahsud raid in 1879, this policy was quite a successful one. Attention was drawn to an important feature of this raid which has not so far been explored, namely its millenarian aspect. It was not just that the Mahsuds, for example, believed that the Mullah Adakar's spiritual power would make British bullets harmless, but rather that the whole border seems to have been overtaken by a belief that British rule was about to end, so that men actually living in British territory took part in looting and burning villages. From this point of view, the 1879 raid anticipates and has much in common with the great risings of 1897.

The actual business of British tribal management was seen to involve both shorter-term responses to crisis and longer-term efforts to try and solve the 'tribal problem' altogether. The former included hostage-taking, seizure of men and property in British territory, reverse blockades, punitive expeditions, and the negotiation of agreements accompanied by the imposition of fines. The latter involved throwing open British territory to the tribesmen, and efforts to give the tribes something which could be taken away if they misbehaved. Encouraging men to enlist in the Frontier Militia was one way of making the tribesmen more dependent on government; it was even better if some of them could be persuaded to settle in British territory for all or part of the year. So, as well as encouraging the Darwesh Khels to continue coming down to Bannu during the winter with their animals and to cultivate there, efforts were made to persuade the Mahsuds to settle in British territory too. The Kabul Khels were also encouraged to settle on land just across the Kurram river at the western end of Upper Miranzai because it was thought this would make it easier to control them. However, the attempts to persuade the tribes to be responsible for their passes in return for appointments in the Frontier Militia and a lower revenue assessment were only successful up to a point. The tribesmen were able to intercept small raiding parties, but usually lacked the means and the will to interfere with larger groups.
As also occurred in connection with the Afridis, towards the end of the century there was some disagreement among British officials as to the extent to which the Waziristan tribes, in particular the Mahsuds, had leaders through whom it was possible to work. Bruce thought they had, and later in the century succeeded for a time in modifying policy towards the Mahsuds accordingly, ultimately without much success. However, although it was appreciated that they were perfectly capable of uniting under certain circumstances, for example when there was some benefit to be distributed, the Mahsuds in particular were usually regarded as fundamentally 'democratic' and leaderless. As a result, the crux of Punjab tribal management in this early period was the attempt to use, and if necessary generate, collective 'tribal' responsibility.

There were two main problems with this. Firstly, there was the question of which segmentary 'level' the authorities should focus on, compounded by the difficulty British officials experienced in evolving a consistent terminology to refer to the different levels. We saw that for example in the early 1860s Taylor wanted to impose responsibility on the Mahsud tribe as a whole, but Montgomery, the Lt. Governor, insisted that he accept 'sectional' responsibility instead. Secondly, there was the difficulty of dealing with the disunity and factionalism which arose from the pervasiveness of tarbwwali, and which as we have seen could be exploited by outside parties. While it appears that factional nuclei existed within the tribe before the British arrived, growing British influence almost certainly increased their importance. The extent to which members of different 'sections' lived in the same area, by contrast with the Afridi 'clans' for example, further complicated matters.

Attention was also drawn to the extent to which the attempt to control the tribes by means of 'tribal responsibility' was questioned by many British administrators, especially Frere. In particular it was condemned as uncivilised, but it is hard to escape the suspicion that this was often a round about way of saying that 'tribal responsibility' was simply not effective enough. In fact, critics like Frere failed sufficiently to take into account the autarchic nature of Pashtun tribal organisation, which made the tribes on the Punjab border so much more difficult to control than those in Sind. Nor were they willing to acknowledge the implications of the fact that before the annexation of the Punjab the relationship between the tribes and the state along this frontier had been an antagonistic one, and that this was the point from which the Punjab government had had to start. In fact, even the much criticised resort to punitive expeditions appears to have been more effective than is usually allowed.

All in all, it is fair to say that management of the tribes on the Bannu and Upper Miranzai borders was reasonably successful in this period. Although there were problems at the beginning of the 1870s, generally the policy of encouraging the Darwesh Khels to
cultivate land in or adjacent to British territory did help to make them more amenable and peaceable. Relations with the Mahsuds were much more difficult, but even they responded to financial inducements when they were carefully applied, and Macaulay was able to handle the tribe relatively successfully in the 1870s. By the early 1880s the Shingis in particular were much less troublesome than they had been in the early 1870s, let alone at the beginning of the period. However, the ‘Macaulay system’, rather than being based on any new approaches, relied on the full use of devices with which his predecessors had only experimented rather tentatively, so that the number of hostages taken from the tribe and paid to live in British territory was much larger than ever before and amounted to a way of paying the tribe an indirect subsidy. Similarly an attempt had already been made to settle some Mahsuds in British territory, and the introduction of tribal responsibility, for practical purposes for the first time, had been advocated in the early 1860s by Taylor.

Largely because they wanted to justify the changes of policy which were introduced towards the end of the century, many British commentators have argued that in some way the Punjab system of frontier management was a failure. The evidence from Waziristan suggests the contrary. If what was wanted was the maintenance of a reasonable degree of stability along the Border and the attainment of a measure of influence over the tribes with as little expenditure as possible, these goals were largely attained. The frontier was generally peaceful, and even on the Tank border, tribal robberies and raids were far less frequent than in the late 1840s, and this was achieved at very little cost. The amount spent on Mahsud management in the 1870s for example was tiny compared with the sums disbursed when the Forward Policy was inaugurated towards the end of the century, and subsequent attempts to extend British influence more directly into Waziristan appear to have been expensive failures.

The implications for our understanding of the range of possible relationships between tribes and states were also briefly examined. The extreme fissiparousness of Mahsud society in particular illustrated the tendency of tribes to respond to state pressure by pursuing ‘jellyfish’ tactics, which has been highlighted in recent studies. But attention was also drawn to the way that even this highly ‘segmented’ tribe responded to changes in the way the state presented itself. The Mahsuds pursued ‘hive’ tactics, and swarmed with great rapidity, when for example Government had something to offer, when tribal territory needed to be defended, or when, as in 1860 and 1879, an opportunity seemed to offer itself for offensive action outside it.

The major variable in the state/tribe dynamic may indeed be the state, but it was shown that tribal reactions to state pressure may force the latter to devise new approaches. The extent to which it makes sense to envisage tribe and state as a single system was emphasised. Attention was drawn to an important consequence of this, namely the extent
to which, because it seemed to offer a solution to the problem of controlling an otherwise wholly anarchic society, the state did a great deal actually to try and create 'tribes' along the frontier. In particular the British developed a whole discourse of tribalism, but were ultimately defeated by frontier culture and values, especially *tarburwali*, as well as by a combination of factors including the frontier situation and the wider geopolitical setting, difficult terrain, and religious loyalties. The importance of the fact that the G.O.I. itself was unable to present a united front to the tribes because of wider imperial considerations of various kinds, rivalries between different departments, bureaucratic inertia, and personal factors, was also emphasised. Far from conforming to the Weberian legal-rational ideal, the G.O.I. tended to present itself to the tribe in this period in the form of a tangle of overlapping jurisdictions and often pursued a bewilderingly inconsistent policy.

Two final points should be made in conclusion. In the first place, it has been shown that anthropological models of socio-cultural organisation and cautious extrapolation from anthropological studies can contribute a great deal to our understanding of the tribe/state encounter in the colonial period. By identifying features of tribal culture, such as in this case the importance of *tarburwali*, and focusing attention on the clash between tribal and imperial values it is possible to appreciate the full complexity of the interaction, and the processes involved in it. Secondly, some areas for further investigation have been identified. These include comparison of British policy and tribal reactions in Waziristan with those in other areas along the frontier, and in other parts of the British empire such as the Sudan, as well as the French and Russian empires.
Figure 1. Waziristan in relation to neighbouring countries
Figure 2. South Waziristan and Mahsud Territory
Figure 3. North Waziristan, Bannu and Upper Miranzai
APPENDIX I - COMMISSIONERS AND DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS - BANNU, DERAI ISMAIL KHAN AND KOHAT1 -

Commissioners of Leja/Derajat Division -
Major Ross - 1849 to 1857
Major F.R. Pollock - 1857
Major Browne - 1857 to 1860
Major H.R. James - 1860
Major R.G. Taylor - 1860 to 1862
Col. J.R. Becher - 1862 to 1864
Col. F.R. Pollock - 1864 to 1866
Major S. F. Graham - 1866 to 1871
Col. A.A. Munro - 1871 to 1880
Col. E.L. Ommaney - 1881 to 1889.

D.C.s. of original Bannu/Dera Ismail Khan district -
Major R.G. Taylor - 1850 to 1852
Major J. Nicholson - 1852 to 1855
Captain Busk- 1855 to 1856
Capt. H. Coxe - 1856 to 1860
Capt. A.A. Munro - 1860 to 1861.

D.C.s. of D.I.K. district -
Capt. Smyly - (2 months officiating) 1861
Capt. Mackenzie - 1861 to 1862
Capt. Ferris - 1861 (2 months)
Major Nichols - 1862 (died 31st August)
Capt. Ommaney officiating until December 1862
Major S. F. Graham - 1862 to 1866
Capt. Minchin - 1866 (3 months)
Lt. Grey - 1866 to 1868
Major A.A. Munro - 1868 to 1871
Major C.E. Macaulay - 1871 to 1882
Mr. H.B. Becket - (3 months officiating) 1874
Capt. A.S. Roberts - (8 months officiating) 1875
Mr. S.S. Thorburn - 1882 to 1885
Mr. G. Ogilvie - 1885 to 1889

D.C.s. of Bannu district -
Capt. A.A. Munro - January to December 1861
Capt. Smyly - December 1861 to November 1862
Major H.B. Urmston - November 1862 to January 1866
Captain R. Sandeman - January to April 1866
Major Minchin - April to August 1866
Major Birch - August 1866 to November 1867
Major A.A. Munro - January to June 1868
Major C.V. Jenkins - August 1868 to December 1869
Mr. S.S. Thorburn - December 1869 to May 1870
Capt. R.T. Hare - May 1870 to March 1871
Major J.W.H. Johnstone - March 1871 to December 1874
Mr. H.B. Becket - February 1875 to February 1877

1 From D.I.K., Bannu, and Kohat Gazetteers 1883-84
Major J.W.H. Johnstone - 1877 to March 1878
Mr. R. Udny - March 1878 to August 1882.

Commissioners of Peshawar Division -
Lt.-Col. F. Mackeson - March 1852 to September 1853
Capt. H.R. James - September 1853 to November 1853
Lt.-Col. H.B. Edwardes - November 1853 to February 1857
Lt.-Col. H.B. Edwardes - May 1857 to April 1859
Capt. H.R. James - May 1859 to February 1862
Major R. Taylor - March 1862 to September 1863
Capt. H.R. James - November 1863 to October 1864
Col. J.R. Becher - November 1864 to June 1866
Mr. D.C. Macnabb - June 1866 to July 1866
Major F.R. Pollock - July 1866 to November 1866
Mr. D.C. Macnabb - November 1866 to January 1867
Major F.R. Pollock - February 1867 to March 1871
Major F.R. Pollock - March 1871 to March 1874
Major F.R. Pollock - March 1874 to October 1876
Mr. D.C. Macnabb - October 1876 to December 1876
Major F.R. Pollock - January 1876 to March 1878
Lt.-Col. W.G. Waterfield - April 1 to November 1878
Mr. D.C. Macnabb - November 1878 to June 1879
Lt.-Col. W.G. Waterfield - June 1879 to April 1880
Col. J.W.H. Johnstone - April 1880 to August 1880
Lt.-Col. W.G. Waterfield - August 1880 to March 1881
Mr. J.G. Cordery - April 1881 to April 1883.

D.C.s of Kohat District -
Lt. F.R. Pollock - June 1849 to May 1851 (Assistant Commissioner)
Capt. J. Coke - June 1851 to October 1855
Capt. B. Henderson - October 1855 to April 1858
Capt. S.F. Graham - April to February 1859
Capt. A.A. Munro - February 1859 to December 1859
Capt. B. Henderson - December 1859 to August 1861
Capt. J.R.G.G. Short - August 1861 to December 1861
Capt. A.A. Munro - December 1861 to February 1863
Capt. J.R.G.G. Short - March 1863 to April 1866
Lt. P.L.N. Cavagnari - April 1866 to April 1870
Capt. C.E. Macaulay - April 1870 to July 1870
Lt. P.L.N. Cavagnari - July 1870 to February 1871
Capt. T.J.C. Plowden - March 1871 to January 1873
Lt. P.L.N. Cavagnari - January 1873 to May 1877
Capt. T.J.C. Plowden - May 1877 to May 1881
Mr. H. St. G. Tucker - May 1881 to September 1881
Maj. T.J.C. Plowden - September 1881 to October 1881.

Lt.-Governors of the Punjab -
John Lawrence - 1853-1859 - Chief Commissioner
Robert Montgomery - 1859-1865
Donald MacLeod - 1865-1870
Henry Durand - 1870-1871
Henry Davies - 1871-1878
Robert Egerton - 1878-1882.
APPENDIX II - SOME NOTES ON THE TRIBES OF WAZIRISTAN^2

PRINCIPAL MAHSUD SECTIONS and territories^3 -

ALIZAI -
I. SHABI KHEL -
1. Astonai - lived between Piazha and the Shakhtu river. They were almost certainly the largest Shabi Khel section, and had three larger sub-sections - the Khiddar Khel, Bromi Khel and Imar Khel, and one smaller one - the Dodia Khel.
2. Baromai - Piazha and Zeriwam (between Sora Rogha and Kotkai).
3. Bibizai - Torwam, Darra, and between Janjal and Dwa Toi.
4. Khaisara Shabi Khel - in the Khaisara valley between Torwam and Kundiwam, away from the other Shabi Khels.
5. Khon Khel - Khaisara and Bobar (between Sora Rogha and the Shakhtu).
6. Patonai - Dwa Toi, Zeriwam, and Tangi.
7. Sultanai - Bobar and Marobi (not far to the north of Makin). The Mullah Powindah came from this section.

II. MANZAI -
(a) Pali Khel -
1. Darakai - a small sub-section between the Shinkai and Potwela Algads.
2. Garerai - Potwela Algad and Ahmadwam.
3. Guri Khel - Ahmadwam and Zazhi Oba to the west of Ahmadwam, and the Potwela Algad.
4. Kanjirai - like the Darakai, a small sub-section between the Shinkai and Potwela Algads.
5. Machi Khel - Tangi Algad, Gurgura Algad and Khaisara. Their territory was more or less in one block; reportedly they were more united than most of the other groups.
7. Salimi Khel - Khaisara - Umar Khan came from this sub-section.

^2 Figures for the number of ‘fighting men’ in many of these tribes are found in Edwardes, A Year on, Vol. I p. 348, Taylor, D.M., pp. 135-142, D.C. D.I.K. to Com. Lein Div., 28 Feb. 1850, No. 3 in No. 16, L/P&S/5/206, MacGregor, C.A., Urmston, Notes, and the Bannu Gazetteer. As noted in Chapter One, the population figures given in the early records are very unreliable. Just to take one example, as we saw in Chapter Six, in 1871 452 Muhammad Khels (men, women and children) surrendered to the Government and were described as constituting “a large part” of the tribe, whereas Urmston reported that in the early 1860s that they had 600 fighting men (Notes, p.5). I have given Urmston and MacGregor’s figures below for want of anything more reliable.

^3 In compiling this list I have relied principally on the entry in MacGregor’s Gazetteer, and the reports on the Mahsuds by Macaulay (App. F.R. Feb. 1882 P1825), Mason, Report, Bruce (Appendices A and B in Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 177C, in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 58, 18 March 1896, L/P&S/7/85), and Johnson, Mahsud Notes.
8. **Shamirai** - Karama, Ladda (near Maidan), Sora Rogha, Gurgura.

(b) **Gedi Khel** -
1. and 2. **Bromi Khel and Kai Khel** - Shinkai.
3. **Dreplarai** - Shinkai and Malik Mela.
4. **Langar Khel** - the second most important Manzai section, living around Kot Langar Khel in the Maidan Algad, near Sam, and in the KHaisara. The Nawab’s brother-in-law, Yarik Khan, came from this section.
5. **Malikdinai** - Abdul Widana and Shinkai. ⁴
6. **Paridai** - west of Ahmadwam.
7. **Wazirgai** - Karama and Malik Mela.

**SHAMAN KHEL** -
1. **CHAHAR KHEL** - Maidan, Tank Zam between Bangiwal and the junction with the Shuzha Algad, and the Shahur.
2. **KHALI KHEL** - Maidan, Barari, along the Tank Zam, Piazha, Sora Rogha, and Asplitoi.
3. **GALISHAHI** - mostly around Janata in the Barari Algad. Much the largest Shaman Khel section, but predominantly pastoral with little cultivable land.
4. **BADINZAI** - Badinzai Tangi.
5. **SHAHUR SHAMAN KHEL** - comprising Chahar Khels and Khali Khels, a prosperous group later treated as a separate unit by the British.

**BAHLOLZAI** -
I. **AIMAL KHEL** -
1. **Abdullai** - the largest single Bahlolzai section (principal sub-divisions were Lalia Khel, Panjplarai and Shahmak) - mostly around Makin and to the west, but also in the Khaisara and the Shakhtu valleys.
2. **Malikshahi** - nomadic, spending summer around Kotkai and winter in Upper Baddar and Trikhun.
3. **Nazar Khel** - another large section with two main sub-sections, Aziz Khel and Kharmach Khel, living mostly in Upper Baddar and Trikhun where they had some good cultivable land. Madamir, who led resistance to the troops in 1881, came from this section. In winter some migrated to the Sarwekai area.

II. **NANA KHEL** -
1. **Abd al-Rahman Khel** - lived in caves and grass huts in Asplitoi, and Upper Baddar where they had houses.

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⁴ Earlier observers, among them Macaulay and Bruce, make Malikdinai and Shahmirai structurally equivalent to Pali Khel and Gedi Khel, whereas Johnson does not.
2. **Giga Khel** - a poor, pastoral section, wintering in Upper Baddar and spending the summer in Barwand Raghza where they lived in caves.

3. **Haibat Khel** - largely pastoral, wintering in Sora Rogha and spending the summer in the Darra Algad.

4. **Imar Khel** - poor, mostly at Makin, also in Piazha.

5. **Jalal Khel** - almost entirely pastoral, spending the winter in the Girni area and the summer in the hills between Sora Rogha and the Shakhtu.

6. **Kokarai** - one branch in the Shakhtu (where they had some good land), the other in Khaisara, and a small colony at Kaniguram.

7. **Nekzan Khel** - mostly in the Khaisara, some in Upper Baddar; fairly well-off.

8. **Umar Khel** - Khaisara.

III. **SHING** - widely-scattered -

1. **Azbokai** - Margaband between Shingi Kot and Palosin.

2. **Boji Khel** - between Kaniguram and Karama

3. **Bobalai** - Janjal

4/6. **Kharmach Khel, Mamia Khel, Wuji Khel** - at or near Shingi Kot

7. **Urmar Khel** - Khaisara and near Karama

8. **Boi Khel** - Murdar Algad


Many of the Azbokai, Kharmach Khel, Mamia Khel and Wuji Khel planted rice and jowar in the spring, went up to Main Toi for the summer, and returned to Shingi Kot to harvest their crops in the autumn. They were among the most persistent border raiders in the first twenty or thirty years after annexation.

IV. **BAND KHEL** - a smaller section - lived near Makin and in Piazha.

**BHITTANIS** -

I. **Dannas** -

1. Bobas - lived in the hills west of Tajori

2. Bobaks - Khaisora valley.

II. **Urasnuns** - the hills west of Nasran and Mullazai.

III. **Tattas** - lived around Kot Kirghi, Jandola and Siragar. In 1849 they had seven or eight villages in British territory between Gumal and the Tank Zam.\(^5\)

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DARWESH KHELS -

AHMEDZAI WITH LAND IN BANNU -

1. Bizan (Bizund) Khel⁶ - came originally from Baddar, and some of them still lived in the Wana valley. They had four main sections, only one of which, the Moghul Khels, did not come down to British territory on a regular basis. The others cultivated some land in the hills to the north of Bannu (between the Gumutti and the Barghanattu passes at Ping), as well as having land on the Bannu Thul (two square miles).⁷

2. Bodin Khel⁸ - a small group, which, like the Painda Khels, had land on the Thul and links with the Sudan Khel and Muhammad Khel. In 1849 some of them still went to Shakai in the summer.⁹

3. Hatti Khel¹⁰ - the largest of the Ahmedzai tribes wintering in British territory. Previously they had spent the cold season with their flocks at Shakai and in the Wana valley, moving up to Shawal in the hot weather. Some of them were still doing so in 1849, though by then many of them had begun to winter in the Bannu district, spending the summer in the Salt Range where their main camp was at Tsapparai. At that point they had larger flocks and herds than any other Ahmedzai tribe, grazing them in the cold season on the Bannu Thul, but had little cultivable land.¹¹ By the 1870s they owned more land than any other Darwesh Khel group in Bannu (forty-one square miles of cultivated land and forty of pasture); Nizam Khan was one of the leading Darwesh Khel Maliks in Bannu and Mani Khan Sudan Khel’s principal rival. In the mid-1880s they were described as the “most loyal, orderly and wealthy Waziri clan settled ... in the district” (though about a third of them reportedly still went to Shawal in the hot season).¹²

4. Muhammad Khel¹³ - owned land along the Kurram river to the north of the Sudan Khels in independent territory, and had managed to acquire some highly fertile land to the west of the Kurram in Bannu itself.¹⁴ Relations with them deteriorated seriously towards the end

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⁶ 800 fighting men (Urmston, Notes, p. 5).
⁸ 50 fighting men (Urmston, Notes, p. 5).
¹⁰ 1,200 fighting men (Urmston, Notes, p. 5).
¹² Bannu Gazetteer, p. 18.
¹³ 600 fighting men (Urmston, Notes, p. 5).
of the 1860s, and after attacking the Kurram relief in 1870 they went off into the hills, and carried out a number of minor raids into British territory. They were forced to surrender ignominiously the following year.

5. Painda Khel\textsuperscript{15} - had land on the Thul, and were usually associated with the Sudan Khel and Muhammad Khel.\textsuperscript{16}

6. Sirki Khel\textsuperscript{17} - were described as the ‘followers’ of the Hatti Khels. Originally they occupied land around Wana, but by 1849 about half the tribe were spending the winter on the Thul, moving into the hills to the north of Bannu in the summer. They had four square miles of cultivated land in British territory.\textsuperscript{18}

7. Sudan Khel\textsuperscript{19} - the Sudan Khel (with the small Sada Khel tribe) had thirteen square miles of cultivated land in Bannu and twenty-six of pasture, as well as owning the land along the Kurram for several miles to the north of the Gumutti tower in independent territory. They also had land in the hills at Tauda China, Baddar, Shakai and Shawal, and some of them still lived there permanently, the rest moving there each spring, but throughout this period the Mahsuds were steadily encroaching on this.\textsuperscript{20} One of their Malik, Swahn Khan Baghban Khel, was an influential man, and his son Mani Khan aspired to be the leader of the Darwesh Khels in Bannu.

8. Umarzai\textsuperscript{21} - one of the smaller tribes, they had previously lived at the head of the Shakhtu river in the hills. By 1849 they spent the summer on the Bannu Thul and in the Sherani 
\textit{tappeh} of Bannu proper, moving in the hot weather up into the hills to the north of Bannu where they camped with the Hatti Khels at Tsapparai.\textsuperscript{22} After annexation they fell out with the Bannu Malik, Bazid Khan, and remained in the hills, carrying out a number of raids into British territory. Nicholson destroyed some of their encampments in 1853. By the late 1870s they had became important sheep-dealers, but still owned little cultivated land in Bannu (only two square miles), though they owned twenty-three square miles of pasture.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{15} 200 fighting men (Urmston, \textit{Notes}, p. 5).
\textsuperscript{16} Taylor said that the Paindah Khel and Bodin Khel had always acted implicitly under Swahn Khan’s orders, \textit{D.M.}, p. 138. See also Edwardes, \textit{A Year on}, Vol. I, pp. 136, 601-603.
\textsuperscript{17} 800 fighting men (Urmston, \textit{Notes}, p. 15).
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Bannu Gazetteer}, p. 67. According to MacGregor they were not recognised as true Wazirs but were Fakirs who gradually became incorporated into the Shin Khel (\textit{C.A.}, I:3, pp. 256-257). See also Taylor, \textit{D.M.}, p. 138, Edwardes, \textit{A Year on}, Vol. I, pp. 136, 601-603.
\textsuperscript{19} 600 fighting men according to Urmston, \textit{Notes}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{21} 800 fighting men (Urmston, \textit{Notes}, p. 5).
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Bannu Gazetteer}, p. 67.
UTMANZAIS WITH WINTER GRAZING AND CULTIVATION IN BANNU -

1. Bakka Khel\textsuperscript{24} - one of the larger groups, they had three main sections, and fourteen square miles of cultivated land in British territory (as well as a considerable amount of pasture); they still owned some land in Shawal, where some still went in the summer.\textsuperscript{25}

(a) Takhti Khel - the largest section, having land on both sides of the Tochi River (around the Tochi outpost). In the 1870s Hassan Shah Khan Khel was the leading man among the Jani Khels as well as the Bakka Khels, but his rival, Barak Khan (also Khan Khel) was an influential man, who belonged to Mani Khan’s faction, and was among those invited to Kabul by Amir Sher Ali Khan.\textsuperscript{26}

(b) Surdi Khel - the smallest section, their land lay between the Tochi outpost and the Jani Khels’ land to the south.

(c) Narmi Khel - lived next to the Surdi Khels.

2. Jani Khel\textsuperscript{27} - another large section, they had eleven square miles of cultivable land and a considerable amount of grazing to the south of the Bakka Khels, and around the mouth of the Shakhlu Pass; they also had land in Shawal where in 1849 they still went in the summer.\textsuperscript{28}

AHMEDZAIS LIVING IN INDEPENDENT TERRITORY -

1. Gangi Khel\textsuperscript{29} - occupied land in the hills to the north of Bannu to the east of the Kurram, and also in Wana. They were among the most important carriers of salt from Bahadur Khel to Khost.\textsuperscript{30}

2. Khojul Khel - owned land in Wana and along the banks of the Kurram River at Zerwam.\textsuperscript{31} Largely pastoral, the majority wintered in the Kohat district in territory

\textsuperscript{24} 1,500 fighting men according to Urmston - 600 Takhti Khels, 500 Narmi Khels, and 400 Surdi Khels (\textit{Notes}, p. 8).
\textsuperscript{26} D.C. Bannu to Com. D.D., 8 Nov. 1876, in A17 Jan. 1877 P860
\textsuperscript{27} About 1000 fighting men (\textit{Urmston, Notes}, p. 8). See also MacGregor (\textit{C.A.}, I:3, p. 252).
\textsuperscript{29} 500 fighting men (MacGregor, \textit{C.A.}, I:3, p. 256)
belonging to the Khattaks. They were also salt-carriers, and some of them owned a little land in the Bannu district. One of their Maliks, Mohmit Khan, was an influential intermediary between the authorities and the trans-border Darwesh Khels generally.

3. Khunia Khel - owned land in Wana and along the Kurram to the south of the Khojul Khel.

4. Tazi Khel - a section of the Bumi Khel to which the Gangi Khel, Kaka Khel, and Zilla Khel also belonged. Like the Khojul Khels they were mostly pastoral nomads and brought their flocks to graze in the Teri tehsil in the territory of the southern Khattaks during the cold season.

5. Zilla Khel - were predominantly pastoralists, occupying land around Wana in the summer and bringing their flocks and herds down to British territory on the Gumal border in the D.I.K. district in the cold weather.

UTMANZAIS LIVING IN THE HILLS -

1. Bora/Barak Khel - were predominantly pastoralists, moving to the hills west of Razmak in the summer, and wintering to the north of the Tochi in Upper Dawar.

2. Hassan Khel - grazed their flocks and cultivated in the Kaitu valley, moving in the hot weather to Upper Dawar, where the Khidr Khel section had some settlements.

3. Kabul Khel - one of the largest Utmanzai tribes, having three main sections, Miamai, Saifali and Pipalai, which all combined nomadic pastoralism and agriculture in varying degrees. They also carried salt from the Bahadur Khel salt mine in the Khattak hills.

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32 Kohat Gazetteer, p. 177
33 400 fighting men (Urmston, Notes, p. 15)
34 MacGregor, C.A., I:3, pp. 256, 260
35 They had 1,200 men in 1879 according to the Kohat Gazetteer, p. 179, see also pp. 176-177.
37 With the Kaka Khels they comprised 1,400 fighting men according to MacGregor, C.A., I:3, p. 256.
38 MacGregor, C.A., I:3, p. 260: Ahmed describes them as the most populous and powerful of the Ahmedzai groups (Resistance and Control, p. 19).
41 4,000 fighting men (Urmston, Notes, p. 14); see also MacGregor, C.A., I:3, p. 252. In 1880 the Kohat D.C., Major T.J.C. Plowden, estimated their total population at 7,500 (including 2,000 fighting men) (D.C. Koh. to Com. P. D., No. 413-3557/App. K, 18 Aug. 1880, in A16 April 1881 P1624). The principal Miamai sections were the Madda Khel (not to be confused with the Ibrahim Khel Madda Khels - see below), the Khuja Khel and the Dari Khel, the Pipalai ones the Pira Khel and Mira Khel, and the Saifali ones the Isla Khel, Badda Khel and Musa Khan Khel (ibid.).
(a) the Saifalis were the largest section, grazing their flocks in the summer in Upper Shakai and in winter in Birmal, the Maidani hills on the west bank of the Kurram, around Tsapparai, Dalland and some other places in the hills between Bannu and Kohat, and in Lower Miranzai. Some lived all year round in temporary dwellings (referred to as ‘chappars’, thatched roofs supported on low props formed of rough branches), others lived along the Kurram, from north of Zerwam up to Shewa in stone houses, mostly, it would appear on the east bank.43

(b) the Miamais’ summer pastures were in Shawal, and their winter grazing grounds in the hills along the Khattak border, but they also owned some of the land around Biland Khel and opposite Thul, and to the south.

(c) the Pipalai, a smaller group, had summer grazing in Upper Shakai, and access in winter to land in Birmal. Some lived on the west bank of the Kurram, and took their flocks to the Maidani hills in the winter.

4. Madda Khel - another large Utmanzai tribe; though they had an outlying settlement by the Kurram between Zerwam and Biland Khel, most of their land was in Upper Dawar, and the G.O.I. did not have much to do with them in the early days.44 In the 1870s their Malik, Adam Khan, who lived at Sheraniyya, was described as the principal man among the Utmanzais as a whole. Hostile to the G.O.I., he was Amir Sher Ali Khan’s main intermediary with the Waziristan tribes.45

5. Malikshahi46 - about half spent the summer in British territory on land next to the Jani Khels, the remainder being mixed up with the Kabul Khels and occupying land near the Kurram in that season. The spent the winter in the hills to the north and west along the Khattak border.47

6. Manzar Khel - were one of the smaller tribes, living at the head of the Khaisora to the north of Razmak.48

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44 3,000 fighting men (MacGregor, C.A., 1:3, pp. 252).
46 400 fighting men (Urmston, Notes, p. 14). See also D.C. Koh. to Com. P.D., No. 413-3557/App. K, 18th Aug. 1880, in No. 16 April 1881 P1624.
7. Tori Khel - were the other principal Utmanzai tribe besides the Kabul Khels.\textsuperscript{49} They had some settlements around Sheratullah and Razmak, in the Shakhtu and Dawar, and between the Khaisora and Kaitu Rivers to the west of the Kurram. They had a long-standing feud with the Mahsuds.\textsuperscript{50}

8. Wuzi Khel - lived along the Khaisora to the west of the Tori Khels between Obosar and Razoni.\textsuperscript{51}

9. Sayyids - there were various groups of Sayyids in the hills, such as the Shondakas or Shudiakas (population about one and a half thousand) who were attached to the Ahmedzais; a Shondaka village to the north of Shewa, for instance, was linked with the Muhammad Khels. Similarly the Syadgis lived in the Tochi valley, and were associated in particular with the Bakka Khels.\textsuperscript{52} “As holy men they are useful in negotiations” commented Becket in 1875.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{49} 3,500 fighting men according to MacGregor, C.A., I:3, p. 252.
\textsuperscript{52} MacGregor, C.A., I:3, p. 255, Com. P.D. to G.P./M.S., No. 6, 26 Jan. 1860, in No. 112-77, G.P. to G.O.I., F.D., 3 Feb. 1860, in No. 7 in No. 4, L/P&S/5/256.
\textsuperscript{53} D.C. Ban. to Com. D. D., No. 184, 28 March 1875, in Com. to G.P., No. 113-1532, 8 April 1875, A28 April 1875 P145.
CHART TO INDICATE SUPPOSED GENEALOGICAL RELATIONSHIPS OF GROUPS MENTIONED IN TEXT

KARLANRI

WAZIR

Musa Darwesh

Mahmud

Mubarak (Gurbaz)

MAHSUDS

ALIZAI

SHAMAN KHEL

BAHLOLZAI

Manzai

Shabi Khel

Astonai\(^2\) Baromai Bibizai

Khaisara

Shabi Khel

Khon Patonai

Khel

Pali Khel\(^3\)

Darakai Garera Guri

Khel

Kanjirai Machi

Mal(la) Salimi\(^4\) Shamirai

Khel

Khel

Khel

Khel

Gedi Khel

Bromi Dreplarai Malikdinai

Kai Langar\(^5\) Paridai Wazirgai

Khel

Khel

Khel

Khel

SHAMAN KHEL

Badinzai Chahar Khel Galishahi Khali Khel Shahur Shaman Khel

\(^1\) These charts are not comprehensive, though I have noted most of the more important sections.

\(^2\) The Mullah Powindah’s sub-section

\(^3\) Some sources insert Shumi Khal and Dasi Khel here and make Shahmirai a separate sub-section (see, for example, Bruce, Appendices A and B in Com. D.D. to G.P., No. 177C, in G.O.I. to S. of S., No. 58, 18th March 1896, L/P&S/7/85, Ahmed, Resistance and Control, pp. 18-20.).

\(^4\) Umar Khan belonged to this sub-section

\(^5\) Yarik Khan’s sub-section
GLOSSARY

akhund (Persian - P.) - theologian, preacher
akhundzada (P.) - descendant of an akhund
algad (Pashtu - Pa.) - valley, ravine
arbab (Arabic - A.) - chief
badal (Pa.) - revenge
badi (P.) - wrong, evil
badrag(q)ah (P.) - tribal escort, guide
bajra - name in Indian vernaculars for certain kinds of grain
bandish (P.) - blockade
bania(n) (Gujarati) - a Hindu trader
bargir (P.) - a trooper of irregular cavalry who did not supply his horse and arms (as was normal practice), but was put in by someone else
baram(p)ta (Turkish - T.) - a raid to seize persons or property as indemnity for injury
chalweshti (Pa.) - tribal fighting unit
chappar (P.) - temporary shelter of wattle or reed matting
charpoy (U.) - light Indian bedstead
chogha - a long-sleeved Afghan coat, usually of woollen material and embroidered on the sleeves and shoulders
daffadar (P./Urdu - U.) - non-commissioned officer in regiments of irregular cavalry
darbar (P.) - court, public audience, levee
fatwah (A.) - judgement
ghazi (A.) - fighter for the faith
gund (Pa.) - party, faction
havildar (P./U.) - a sepoy non-commissioned officer corresponding to a sergeant
ilaqa - district
inam (A./U.) - allowance, gift
inam zamindari - a grant of land revenue
itbar nama (P.) - written guarantee, surety
jagir (U.) - an assignment of the government's share of the produce of a district
jangal (P.) - forest, wood
jemadar (P./U.) - a native officer in a sepoy regiment, corresponding to a lieutenant
jihad (A.) - religious struggle, 'holy war'
jirga (T.) - council of elders
jowari - Indian millet
kach (Pa.) - a cultivable area of alluvium in a river bed
kardar - tax-farmer
kashar (Pa.) - young man, 'have not'
kezdhi (Pa.) - felt tent
kirri (Pa.) - an encampment, cluster of tents
kharif - summer cultivation
khel (Pa.) - lineage
khilla’t (A.) - a robe of honour
kotal (P.) - crest of pass
kotwal - mayor
lambardar (U.) - landowner
lashkar (P./U.) - army, camp
lungi (P./Hindi) - cloth used as a wrap, loin-cloth
lungi inam - ceremonial gift
madrasseh (A.) - religious school
malik (A.) - chief, leading man
marabout (A.) - a Muslim hermit or holy man (especially in N. Africa)
mashar (Pa.) - elder

1 I have not attempted to transcribe words with phonetic accuracy.
maulavi (A.) - religious leader or scholar
maund (P.) - a unit of weight
melmastia (Pa.) - hospitality
mullah (A.)- religious functionary
naik (H.) - corporal of native infantry
nanawatai (Pa.) - supplication, suing for peace
nang (P.) - honour
nikka (Pa.) - grandfather, ancestor
nikkat (Pa.) - hereditaments
nullah (Anglo-Indian) - water-course, ravine
panda (P.) - screen, veil, seclusion
parwannah (P.) - permit
Pashtunwali (Pa.) - the way of the Pashtuns
patwari (H.) - crop-estimator (for revenue purposes)
peghor (Pa.) - invocation of shame, reminder not to deviate from Pashtun ideals
pir (P.) - Sufi master, holy man
qabila (A.) - tribe, family
qalang (P.) - tax, rent, revenue
qoum (A.) - tribe, family, kindred
rabi - winter crop
raghza (Pa.) - table -land, plateau
rissaldar (U.) - commander of a troop in a regiment of irregular horse
sangar (Pa.) - stone breastwork
sardar (P./U.) - chief, commander
sarkar (P./H.) - supreme authority, government
sarshita (P.) - thread or link
sayyid (A.) - a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad
sepoy (P./U.) - a native of India employed as a soldier in a British regiment
shahid (A.) - martyr
sharm (P./Pa.) - shame
sillahdar (P.) - an irregular cavalryman who (unlike a bargir) provided his own arms and horse
sowar (P.) - horseman, cavalryman
spin (Pa.) - white
subahdar (Anglo-Indian) - the chief native officer of a company of sepoys
talib-‘u’l-ilm (A.) - student, searcher after religious knowledge
tappeh (H.) - a small tract of country
tarbur (Pa.) - patrilateral parallel cousin, father’s brother’s son
tarburwali (Pa.) - rivalry with tarbur
teean (T.) - the ordinary people of the tribe
tehsil (U.) - revenue sub-division
tehsildar (U.) - revenue-officer of a sub-division
terai (Pa.) - serious deviation from Pashtun norms
thana (H.)- police post
thanadar (P./H.) - commandant of a military station or police post
toi (Pa.) - stream
tor (Pa.) - black
ulus (T.) - people
vakil (A.) - representative
zam (Pa.) - a perennial stream
zenana (P.) - harem
ziarat (P.) - shrine.

FOOTNOTE ABBREVIATIONS -

A.C. - Assistant Commissioner
A.G. - Adjutant-General
App. - Appendix
Ass. - Assistant
Ban. - Bannu
B.G.-P.I/F.F. - Brigadier-General Commanding Punjab Irregular/Frontier Force
B.O.A. - Board of Administration
C.A. - Central Asia
C.C. - Chief Commissioner
C.D. - Kabul Diary
Ch. Ct. - Chief Court
C. in C. - Commander in Chief
C. of P. - Captain of Police
Coll. - Collection
Co’ing - Commanding
Com. - Commissioner
Comm. - Committee
D. - Diary
D.C. - Deputy Commissioner
D.D. - Derajat Division
D.I.K. - Dera Ismail Khan
D.I. of P. - Deputy Inspector of Police
D.M. - District Memorandum
d.o. - demi-official
E.R. - European Regiment
F. Com. - Financial Commissioner
F.D. - Foreign Department
F.R. - Final Report
F.S.- Foreign Secretary
G.A. - Government Agent
G.B. - Governor of Bombay
G.G. - Governor-General
G.O.I. - Government of India
G.P. - Punjab Government
G.S. - General Summary
IP - India Proceedings
Koh. - Kohat
L.D. - Leia Division
M.D. - Military Department
M.E. - Mahsud Expedition
M.S. - Military Secretary
N.I. - Native Infantry
News. - Newsletter
Off. Co’ing - Officer Commanding
Off. Co’ing O.s and M. - Officer Commanding Outposts and Militia
O.s - Outposts
P.A.R. - Punjab Administration Report
Pesh. D. - Peshawar Division
P.I. - Punjab Infantry
P.O. - Political Officer
P.O./D. - Political Officer’s Diary
P.P.s - Parliamentary Papers
Reg./Ch. Ct. - Registrar, Chief Court, Punjab
Set. - Settlement
S. - Secretary
S. Off. - P.I.F.F. - Staff Officer Punjab Irregular/Frontier Force
Set. Com. - Settlement Commissioner
Set. O. - Settlement Officer
S.S. Off. - Station Staff Officer
State't - Statement
Tel. - telegram
V. - Viceroy.
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