Aspects of Diplomacy of
Assyria, Babylonia and Persia with their neighbours:
eighth to fourth centuries B.C.

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by

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the diplomacy of the middle first millennium B.C. Near East, a subject which has received less scholarly attention than the diplomacy of earlier periods of near eastern history. It falls into two parts: Part I is concerned with the diplomacy of the Assyrian Kings from c750 - 630 B.C. and, to a lesser extent, of the Neo-Babylonian dynasty c620 - 540 B.C. Cuneiform documents, in particular the royal inscriptions and administrative archives of Neo-Assyria furnish most of the evidence for this part. Part II investigates the diplomacy of the Persian Kings with the Greeks c550 - c360 B.C. and is based on almost exclusively classical sources.

The aim is to isolate and analyse significant aspects of diplomatic theory and practice in Assyria and then to study Persian diplomacy in the light of these findings. By this method it is possible to establish whether there were elements of continuity in diplomacy from the Assyrian to the Persian period and whether a more reliable view of Persian diplomacy, which has up to now been studied in the context of Greek rather than near eastern diplomacy, can be achieved.

Part I, by analysis of selected events in their historical context and by discussion of important diplomatic terminology, establishes for the first time some important aspects of Assyrian diplomacy including:

1) the emphasis on the subordination of foreign rulers to Assyria and the concomitant reluctance to concede parity-status,

2) the conflict between this political ideology and the exigencies of diplomacy,

3) the distinction between 'friendly' and 'hostile' states with no intermediate 'neutral' category.

In Part II Persian diplomacy is shown to reflect several features of Assyrian diplomacy, particularly the conflict between ideology and the requirements of practical diplomacy with the Greeks whose political ideas were markedly different.
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Introduction

In this thesis diplomacy is defined as the peaceful management of international affairs by contacts between formal organs of state, including heads of state and duly accredited representatives. Informal contacts, such as those between private individuals, the movement of nomadic groups and international trade are excluded except where they can be shown beyond question to reflect diplomatic theory or practice.

The thesis falls into two parts:
I) The diplomacy of the neo-Assyrian kings with their neighbours c750 - c630
II) The diplomacy of the Achaemenid kings of Persia with the Greeks c550 - c360.

For part I there is only one major source of evidence for diplomacy - the corpus of cuneiform Akkadian documents from the late neo-Assyrian period, especially the archives of Nimrud, Nineveh and Assur. These can be divided into two major types:
1) royal inscriptions
2) letters and administrative documents.

Non-cuneiform sources have not been studied in detail with the result that Assyria's relations with the West, and in particular, Israel and Judah, the evidence for which is derived largely from the Hebrew Old Testament, are not included in the thesis. This complex subject requires a separate study.

1. The interrelationship of these two types of source is discussed in chapter 1;
2. Assyria's relations with Israel and Judah have been studied by M. Cogan, Imperialism and Religion: Assyria, Judah and Israel in the 8th and 7th centuries B.C.E. (1974). Diplomatic terminology in the Old Testament is discussed with special reference to Assyrian diplomacy by D.J. Wiseman, VT (forthcoming); see also J.A. Thompson, VT 27 (1977) 475 - 481;
Diplomacy in the ancient near east has been studied less than international law and first millennium diplomacy far less than that of the second millennium. From the earlier period there are more diplomatic documents, both letters and treaties, principally from Mari, Amarna, Boghazkoy and Ugarit, than from the first millennium archives of Assyria. Even so apart from a few major studies and some investigations of individual topics, less research has been devoted to diplomacy than international law in the second millennium B.C. In addition research has been dominated by the study of treaty-form and particularly its relevance to the Biblical covenants. First millennium treaties have benefited from this interest and to that extent they have received more detailed research than diplomacy in the same period.

It is therefore apparent that first millennium diplomacy has been seriously neglected either because of or despite the emphasis on second millennium diplomacy and requires more detailed research. Because the treaties of this period have


5. e.g. V. Korosec, Hethitische Staatsverträge (Leipzig, 1931); G. Kestemont, DDIA0; J. Ziskind, Aspects of International Law in the Ancient Near East (Univ. Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1968); W. Prieser, Archiv des Volksrechts 4 (1954) 257 - 288; G. Furlani, I trattati internazionali dell'antichità Annuario di diritto comparato e di studi legislativi 31 (1955) 1 - 12;


7. See note 6 and V. Korosec, Romanitas 3 (1961) 261 - 277;
already been studied intensively reference to them is made only 
where it is relevant to the argument. Since, however, they form 
an important part of the diplomatic process - which could not 
be fully understood without some knowledge of the treaties - a 
short outline of them is given here.

From the first millennium there are four extant neo-
Assyrian treaties from this period under discussion, an 
earlier neo-Assyrian treaty (c825) and a treaty or series of 
treaties from west Syria written in Aramaic (c754). All are 
'vassal-treaties' i.e. terms drawn up by a suzerain and imposed 
on a vassal or subject with seemingly no reference to the 
vassal's opinions or wishes. The vassal swore to abide by the 
stipulations in perpetuity on pain of punishment by the gods 
named as guarantors of the treaty. The influence of religion on 
and its interdependence with diplomacy is best illustrated in 
this aspect of the treaties. The most significant features of 
the neo-Assyrian treaty were the unilateral imposition of its 
terms and the complete subordination of the vassal.

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8. 1) Aššur-nerāri V and Māti'ilu of Arpad; E.F. Weidner, 
AfO 8 (1932) 17 - 27; W. Schramm, EAK II 123f.;
ii) Esarhaddon and Ba'āl of Tyre; E.F. Weidner, AfO 8 
(1932) 29 - 34; Borger, Ash., 107 - 109;
iii) Esarhaddon and Zagros rulers; Wiseman, VTE; R. Borger, 
ZA 54 (1961) 173 - 196 and 57 (1964) 261; I.J. Gelb, Bi.Or. 
19 (1962) 159 - 162;
iv) Ashurbanipal and Qedar, K. Deller and S. Parpola, 
Or.NS 37 (1968) 464 - 466;

9. Šamši-Adad V with Marduk-zākîr-šumi I of Babylon: E.F. Weidner, 
AfO 8 (1932) 27 - 29; W. Schramm, EAK II 109; Brinkman, PKB 204;
on all the neo-Assyrian treaties see McCarthy, op. cit (n.6) 
106 - 121;

10. J.A. Fitzmyer, The Aramaic Inscriptions of Sefire (Rome, 1967);

11. Wiseman, VTE 27f.;

12. J.R. Ziskind, Aspects of International Law in the Ancient 
Near East (Ph.D. Diss., Columbia U.; University Microfilms, 
Ann Arbor, 1977) chap. 1;

13. McCarthy, op. cit. (n.6), 131 - 136;
In part II Persia's diplomatic contacts with the Greeks, which began with the Persian conquest of Lydia (c547), are considered. After this initial contact a bi-lateral relationship developed between Persia on the one hand and on the other the numerous Greek city-states but this modus operandi was radically altered by the emergence of a third power in the Aegean area, Philip of Macedon (c355). At the same time the attitude of the Greeks to Persia underwent an important change so that after c360 Persia's diplomacy was conducted in a political environment very different from that obtaining beforehand. In addition the lack of a detailed contemporary narrative history after 362, when Xenophon's history ends, is a serious obstacle to detailed analysis of Persian diplomacy.

There is no archive or corpus of evidence extant from the Achaemenid empire providing sufficient information for a study of diplomacy. It is therefore necessary to rely on the works of classical authors, principally Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon, and Greek inscriptions. Since none of these sources was written from a Persian viewpoint they require critical evaluation if they are to provide reliable evidence of Persia's diplomatic theory and of its underlying assumptions. On the other hand they are unlikely to reflect

a pro-Persian, propagandist view of diplomacy with Greece such as official Persian sources would presumably have adopted. In this respect the two parts of the thesis are in contrast: the first is derived almost exclusively from Assyrian sources of Assyrian diplomacy while in the second Persian diplomacy is studied on the basis of almost exclusively non-Persian sources.

The study of Greek diplomacy has recently benefited from intensive systematic research and a synthesis of extant material has been achieved\(^{15}\). However, this research has concentrated on diplomacy between the Greeks themselves and not on the less well recorded contacts with non-Greeks, especially Persia. This gap may be at least partially filled by Part II of the thesis.

In the light of the foregoing outline of the two parts, the thesis aims to investigate diplomacy and to analyse not only the most important elements in theory and practice but also the underlying political ideology of both Assyria and Persia. In addition to these two basic aims Persia's relations with Greece will be analysed with special reference to traditional near eastern patterns of diplomacy, as outlined in the first part of the thesis, in order to ascertain:

1) whether there was any continuity of diplomatic theory or practice from neo-Assyrian to Achaemenid times\(^{16}\),

\[\text{\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots}\]

\(^{15}\) Notably D.J. Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (Historia Einzelschrift, 22, 1973) and F.E. Adcock & D.J. Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (London, 1975); also D. Kienast in RE Suppl. 13 (1973) 499 - 628 Presbeia;

\(^{16}\) The lack of detailed historical texts from the neo-Babylonian period renders a consideration of diplomacy in this period difficult. From the inscriptions of Nabonidus, especially the Harran stelae (C.J. Gadd, An. St. 8 (1958) 35 - 93), there seems to be a close similarity between neo-Assyrian and neo-Babylonian diplomatic terminology and, given the inherent conservatism of diplomacy, it is unlikely that there should have been marked changes in either theory or practice;
ii) whether Persian diplomacy with Greece can be better understood when set against its near eastern background, and

iii) whether this approach is valuable for a study of Greek history.

In part I of the thesis each significant theme is discussed in the context of a particular event or series of events, a more comprehensive view being achieved by introducing relevant evidence from other diplomatic incidents. Certain terminological themes require separate treatment and are included in appendices. In part II Persian diplomacy with the Greeks is discussed in diachronic order, with particular reference to historical and geographic setting.

This method of working is particularly beneficial in the first part because of the obscurity of some of the incidents and the lack of previous research on them.

It must be emphasised that neither part attempts a comprehensive survey of diplomacy since this would require two separate theses. Incidents have therefore been selected for study on three criteria:

1) the availability of evidence,
2) the historical importance of the event,
3) the presence of a particular diplomatic theme.

Part I

Diplomatic contacts of Assyria and Babylonia with their neighbours, 8th - 6th centuries B.C.
Diplomatic Contacts of Assyria with Anatolia

(a) Muski

Direct diplomatic contacts between Sargon II of Assyria and Mitā of Muski are attested only between c711 and c709 B.C. in which time Mitā opened relations with Sargon and ultimately entered into a treaty-bound relationship with him. Prior to these manoeuvres Mitā had opposed Sargon either directly or indirectly since 718 B.C. and the settlement was a major diplomatic coup for Assyria. It is therefore instructive to set out the historical background to the Assyro-Muskian diplomacy before considering the manoeuvres in detail.¹

Sources for Sargon's dealings with Mita include not only royal inscriptions and foundation deposits but also a letter from Nimrud which supplies invaluable information on the preliminaries to the negotiations with Mitā.²

1) Tigrath-pileser III campaigned vigorously in north Syria and succeeded in diminishing Urartian influence there and in the central southern Anatolian states. From the lists of tributaries in his inscriptions it can be seen that the majority of Syro-Hittite states owed their allegiance to Assyria at least from 738 B.C. and possibly earlier in some cases since the defeat of an Urartian army near Arpad and/or Kummu in 743 B.C. altered

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1. Sargon's military career: H. Tadmor, JCS 12 (1958) 22-40, 77-100; his chronology is followed below; also Ph. H.J. Houwink Ten Cate, Luwian Population Groups (1965), 20-25;

the balance of power in this area. Subsequently these kingdoms became Assyrian provinces one by one as their rulers offended Assyria by revolting openly or treating with her enemies in secret.

Muski is mentioned in a text from the "reign" of Samši-ili, the turtan of Adad-nirari III, Salmaner IV, Assur-dan III and Assur-nirari V, but this is the only eighth century reference apart from those of the reign of Sargon. It is therefore unusual that a country which had previously made very little impact on Assyria should so suddenly attain such a position of influence over north Syria and southern Anatolia. The decline of Urartian power in this area must have left a vacuum into which Mitā was able to insinuate himself perhaps also at the expense of Assyria in Que (Cilicia).

The first clash in which Sargon names Mitā as a protagonist is the campaign against Kiakki of Sinuḫtu who had revolted from Assyria (718 B.C.). Mitā's involvement in this revolt is indicated by the inclusion of his name in the description of Kiakki's plot in the prisms but lacunae prevent further discussion of his exact role. Sinuḫtu lay in Tabal and Kiakki, who is once referred to as king of Tabal, was an obvious target for Muskian advances because of the proximity of the two lands.

6. Lie 22, 125f; Gadd, loc.cit. 183, 37; 199, 21; these references may suggest Muskian offensives in the reign of Salmaneser V or, less likely, late in Tigrath-pileser III's reign. On Que: E. Forrer, *Die Provinzenteilung des Assyrischen Reiches* (Leipzig, 1921) 70ff;
7. Lie, 10, 68ff; Winckler, 102, 28ff; 170, 11; Gadd, loc.cit.: 180, 50ff;
8. Winckler, 170, 11; Sinuḫtu: J. Lewy in *Halil Edhem Hatira Kitabi* (1947), 16;
In the year following Kiakki's defeat Pisiri of Carchemish revolted
and turned to Mitā for assistance: 9

... I Pisiri URU Gargamisayya ina adē ilāni rabūti ihtima ana I Mitā
yar KUR Muski zerāti KUR Assur ki īstappar (var: išpurma ilqā sētūtu)

"Pisiri of Carchemish transgressed the treaty of the great gods and
sent (messages) hostile to Assyria to Mitā of Muski (treating it with
contempt)."

Sargon uses zerāti šapāru to describe the sending of treasonable
and hostile messages by a vassal in an attempt to rally support from
neighbouring kings. 10 The coupling of this idiom with sētūtu leqū (to show
contempt) suggests that these were messages of an abusive nature which the
Assyrians found distasteful. 11 They were not messages giving warning of
hostilities - a declaration of war - but verbal attacks on Assyria. Similar
instances of insolent messages are found in the inscriptions of Esarhaddon
and Ashurbanipal where stress is laid on the rude effrontery of the content
of the messages. In one case an embassy from Elam was exhibited to Urartian
envoys and the insolent message itself was explicitly included in this
exhibition. 12 Although in the case of Pisiri an agreement (adū) with Assyria
was already in force, the sending of insolent messages was regarded with equal
displeasure even when sent by independent kings. 13 It is therefore likely
that Pisiri's breach of the treaty was his canvassing of neighbours for support
since if Assyria condemned such abuse in independent rulers she probably
attempted in treaties with her vassals to prevent similar actions. 14

9. Lie: 10, 72f & n.13;
10. Lie: 11, 73, 34, 208 & A.T. Olmstead, AJSL 47 (1931) 268; 40, 251;
Gadd, loc.cit: 183, 51;
11. Esarhaddon's usage of apālu zerāti conforms with this: Ash: 58, 27;
57, 3; 106, 30;
12. Further discussion p. 61f; ASS 62, 97; 72, 60; 64, 25; 78, 59; also
CAD M: mērehtu;
13. note 11;
14. Cf. VTE lines 73ff;
Pisiri's appeal to Mitā throws light on the loyalty of the south Anatolian states tributary to Assyria. Carchemish had no common border with Muski and communication between them had to cross two states allied to Assyria, either Que and Sam'al or Tabal and Gurgum. It can be inferred that the loyalty of those states to Assyria was not so strong as to prevent the passage through their territory of messages hostile to Sargon. Equally, if Mitā had sent military aid to Pisiri it would have had to cross these states and Pisiri's appeal shows that he believed that the sending of such aid would be practicable, an even stronger indication of the potential hostility of the states to Assyria. Pisiri's appeal is also an index of Mitā's prestige and the corresponding fall in status of Urartu. Sargon's campaign against Mitā in the next campaign supports the belief that Mitā was now Assyria's most powerful opponent in the north-west.

The account of the seventh campaign in the annals can be supplemented by the prisms from Nimrud and the Cylinder Inscription. The annals are broken at this point but it is clear that Sargon campaigned in Que and recovered two cities which Mitā had taken previously. There then follows an account of the defeat and submission of various tribes and rulers of southern Palestine and the Arabian desert before the annals resume the account of affairs in Anatolia.


16. Forrer: op.cit: 71f restored the name of a third city but no other text refers to another and URUŋalge would be more in accordance with their evidence. However the traces on this line do not justify the emendation (Lie: 20, 120).
"As for Mita king of Muski I accomplished his defeat twice in his wide territory. Harrua and Ušnaniš, forts of Que, which he had taken by force in distant days I restored to their place."

The lacuna may be filled confidently by referring to Winckler's and Botta's copy of this line and Gadd's parallel text in the Nimrud prism. Assyrian activity in Que during the seventh campaign was, therefore, in two phases: the first of these conquered the two cities and plundered them while the second was an offensive into Muskian territory in which Mita was defeated twice, thus consolidating Assyrian tenure of the recently recaptured cities. The two defeats Mita suffered in his own land were distinct from that which enabled the reconquest of the two cities and it may be doubted if Mita was the party vanquished in this latter victory because the object of the verb is plural. The two cities which he had captured in the past may therefore not have been in his hands when Sargon attacked them, or alternatively Mita was joined by allies in his defence. The major successes of this campaign and those most often referred to in inscriptions are the double victory over Mita and the regaining of the two cities which brought them back into Assyrian control. If the identification

18. P.E. Botta, Monument de Ninive (1849) IV. pl.75;
19. n. 15 above; ina nāgišu rapši adi 2-su /tahtažu aškunma;
20. Winckler: AOF I. 356-370, esp. 364ff suggested that Ionians should be supplied in this sentence, citing the Cylinder Inscription in support. This first part of the Que campaign would then be directed against Ionians not Mita.
21. So J.D. Bing: A History of Cilicia during the Assyrian Period (Ann Arbor, 1973) 74ff (also 189-212) who sees Sargon's enemies as a coalition of Ionians, Urartians and Muskians.
of one of these cities with later Seleucia is accepted, the first phase of the Assyrian campaign will have taken place in Cilicia Tracheia and have effectively sealed off Muskian access to the Mediterranean through the Calycadnus valley. The second penetrated into Muski itself through this valley and brought the double defeat of the Muskian army which may not have been involved directly in the earlier fighting around the two cities. These Assyrian victories ensured control over western Que and were a heavy blow to Assyria's enemies in southern Anatolia.

Military defeat did not prevent Mitā from remaining a threat to Assyrian domination of the south Anatolian states, witness the appeal made to him by Ambaris of Bit-Burutas. Even so Ambaris also approached Ursa of Urartu which implies that Mitā's reputation as an adversary of Assyria had diminished sufficiently for rebels to look elsewhere for aid. According to Sargon, Ambaris suggested an annexation of Assyrian territory in his message to the other kings:

\[
\text{ana } \text{Ursa KUR Urartayya u } \text{Mitā Sar KUR Muski } \text{Ya ekēmi mešriya ispura mār šipri }\]

"To Ursa the Urartaean and Mitā king of Muski he sent a messenger (to suggest) the annexation of my border."

This is a more serious revolt than that of Pisiri who had merely appealed for aid in his approach to Mitā but neither Mitā nor Ursa are said to have actually sent help to Ambaris. The defeat of Ambaris allowed the

22. Bing: op.cit: 75

23. Annals: Lie: 32, 194-204; prisms: Gadd: loc.cit: 182, 12-33; also Winckler: 102, 29-32; Peiser: loc.cit: 38ff, 23-24; the fragment K8536 (Winckler, I pl.46) may also refer to this campaign, Tadmor: loc.cit: 91 n. 295 but cf.Bing: op.cit: 77 & n.43; 206 & n.50; Bing admits he has not seen a copy of the fragment and is relying on second-hand sources. K8536 does mention Que and perhaps Ursa but is too broken to permit a definite ascription to one of Sargon's campaigns. The occurrence of ṣi-pir-tu might indicate the campaign against Ambaris which accords with Tadmor's suggestion.
Assyrians to turn Bit Burutas and Tabal into provinces, thus extending their direct control of territory to the borders of Muski itself. It is disputed whether Que was also made into a province at this time, or previously, Sargon's silence being taken by some to imply that Que was a province before his reign began, while others have argued that the major campaigns in Que in the seventh campaign are the best setting for the change in administration. Sargon's reference during the account of the thirteenth campaign to the governor of Que's three raids on Muski prove that Que was a province by 709 B.C. and if these three campaigns occurred in consecutive years, i.e. 712, 711 and 710 B.C., then 713 B.C. would be the most likely date for the annexation of Que.

Even after the imposition of a governor of Que and his campaign against Muski, disaffected Assyrian vassals still turned to Mita for support. Both Tarḫulara of Marqasi and Tarḫunazi of Melid sent messages of hostility against Assyria to Mita and thereby showed their contempt (zerāti assur iltapparū ilgu šētūtu). As in the cases of Pisiri, Kiakki and Ambaris, Sargon's records do not mention active Muskian support for the rebels and the Assyrians conquered and annexed their kingdoms without difficulty. This is the last occasion prior to Mitā's own settlement with Assyria when he is mentioned as her opponent or supporter of her rebels. Brief as the references to his influence on Assyrian vassals are, they

24. Tadmor, loc.cit: 95b; also Bing, op.cit: 81 n. 50;
25. Forrer, op.cit: 70ff;
26. Saggs, loc.cit: 205;
27. Lie: 66.445ff supplemented by Olmstead: loc.cit: 277; "my official the governor of Que whom I had established in ?? on the shore of the sea of the setting sun ... "suggests that Sargon had in fact established the province of Que or at least established the governor in a particular location.
nevertheless suggest that Mitā promoted hostility to Assyria amongst them without actually committing Muskian forces to intervene on their behalf. On the only occasion on which Assyrians are known to have fought Muskians - the campaign of 715 B.C. - the total victory of his opponent convinced Mitā that diplomacy was a more profitable way to entangle Assyria than by assault. The Assyrian reaction was to harass Muski directly through the campaigns of the governor of Que and that their policy bore fruit can be seen from Mitā’s acceptance of the desirability of alliance with Assyria.

ii) The most significant document for a study of Assyrian diplomacy to be discovered in the last thirty years is a Nimrud letter from Sargon to the governor of Que in which the recent conduct of Mitā of Muski is discussed at length.²⁹ It provides not only useful information on the terminology of diplomacy but also a valuable contrast to the bombast of the royal inscriptions. It illuminates the Assyrian approach to diplomatic relations from a new angle and throws certain aspects of Assyria’s attitude to Mita into high relief. It will, accordingly, be discussed at length.

The exact chronological setting of the letter is difficult to determine. From the revelation that Mitā of Muski had just opened friendly contacts with Assyria it seems likely that the letter antedates the treaty with Sargon (709 B.C.) but post-dates the three raids by the governor of Que on Muski.³⁰ The letter presumably follows the last of these raids and the


³⁰. Postgate: loc.cit: 32ff; Ph. H.J. Houwink Ten Cate in Fischer Weltgeschichte (ed. E. Cassin) IV. 122 & nn. 10, 18 prefers the reign of Tiglath-pileser III.
reference it contains to men of Babylonia (lines 68f) might suggest deportees from the campaign of 710 or 709, which would make a date of late 710 or early 709 B.C. for the letter probable. The historical background to the correspondence, of which this letter is the only surviving part, is outlined above, the immediate cause of Mitā's opening of friendly contacts with Assyria being the raids on his territory by the governor of Que. Pressure from the Cimmerians cannot, however, be disregarded as a possible motivation for the sudden friendliness of the Muskians toward Assyria.  

The letter contains, as far as is preserved, nine distinct sections, seven of which form replies to a previous letter from the governor of Que, in which various information was given and orders were requested. It is possible to reconstruct the governor's letter, at least in part, from the content of Sargon's letter: the major item of news was that the governor had received a messenger of Mitā who had brought with him an embassy sent by Urikki of Que to Urartu. Evidently the governor was uncertain as to how to respond to this friendly act by Mitā and had written to Sargon for instructions. Together with the messenger of Mitā had come an envoy of Urban'ā who wished to have an audience and this item too had been referred to Sargon. A request for more land by an Assyrian vassal (which does not seem to be connected with Mitā's mission) was also forwarded for royal approval in the governor's letter.

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31. above p.13
32. ABL 197 for Cimmerian pressure on Urartu at about this date; also R/E sub Midas 3; Ten Cate: loc.cit: 13f;
33. On Urikki: Postgate: loc.cit: 28; a more speculative reconstruction in Bing: op.cit: 85f;
It seems likely that the governor's letter was the first news Sargon had received of Mitā's volte face in his relations with Assyria because the joy of the Assyrian is evident in his answer. The pleasure he expresses is matched by the engaging tone he employs in his own message to Mitā and his encouragement of the governor to maintain close contacts with the Muskian court. This enthusiasm is only present in the sections directly relevant to Mitā; even in that concerned with Urbal'ā there is a noticeable constraint compared with the eagerness of the earlier sections.

After the greeting-formula the letter launches immediately into the most important subject: the newly-opened diplomatic contact with Mitā. Sargon notes that a messenger of Mitā had come to the governor conducting a delegation which Urikki of Que had sent to Urartu and praises the gods of Assyria as the instigators of this change in attitude of the Muskian:

... and in the midst of battle has our enemy? the Muskian given us his word and become our ally?"

The two actions which Mitā took to open relations with Assyria were:

i) to send a messenger (mar sipri) to the governor of Que.

ii) to send back the embassy of Urikki of Que which was hostile toward Assyria.

The second of these is obviously an unusual occurrence in itself and it is therefore the first which is the formal diplomatic move toward establishing good relations, although its sincerity is emphasised by the goodwill gesture of returning the hostile embassy. This conclusion is also suggested by the construction of the sentence in which the sending of the messenger is the main clause and the return of the embassy is a subordinate
clause. Since the turning back of this embassy was incidental to the mission of Mitā's messenger what was its immediate purpose? Sargon takes the whole episode as proof of Mitā's new attitude; thus Mitā's demonstration of friendship involved no direct communication with the king himself and yet qualified as a substantive act from which Sargon could assume that Mitā was prepared to come to terms with him.

Sargon's exclamations on Mitā's change of heart contain two expressions of interest for diplomacy: ānā nadānu and ānā salmi tāru. Ānā nadānu appears in only four texts, outside those of the Old Assyrian period, but, of these, three concern international relations, and it therefore merits a short excursus. Bel-ibni reports to Ashurbanipal that certain sheikhs on the borders of Elam were involved in a raid by Assyria:

... ki iplahū pīšunu ittannunu ade itti PN ... īgsabtū umma
ardāni sa sar KUR vy ki Assur anīni

"(As a result of the Assyrian action) they were afraid, gave their word and took the oath with PN (an Assyrian official) saying, "We are subjects of the king of Assyria".

This perfunctory declaration of allegiance to Assyria was later reinforced by a full ceremony in Nineveh for at least some of the sheikhs but the taking of the oath was certainly a valid and formal commitment to remain loyal to Assyria. It is not clear whether the "giving of one's word" and "taking the oath" were synonymous or mutually explicatory but

34. AHW 702; the fourth is a neo-Assyrian letter describing the improvement in health of a sick man in which, the writer says, the king's gods must have acquiesced (ānā nadānu); see A.L. Oppenheim JAOS 61 (1941) 261; Parpola: LASEA 254=ABL 393;
35. ABL 280; esp. 24 - rev. 4; A.L. Oppenheim, Letters from Mesopotamia (1967) p. 172;
36. CAD S 25a; VAB 7; 42, 116-123;
their parallelism suggests a close connection between pa nadānu and a formal recognition of a relationship.

This conclusion is supported by the second example of pa nadānu, in the records of Sargon II's third campaign. The people of three towns in the northern Zagros gave their word to Ursā of Urartu:

\[ \text{ana} \text{ I Ursā KUR Urarṭayya ana epēs ardūti iddinū piṣun} \]

"to Ursā of Urartu they gave their word to do (him) homage". 37

One version of this incident omits ana epēs ardūti but the meaning of the phrase must have remained somewhat the same. It is therefore legitimate to assume that pa nadānu connoted a definite commitment of allegiance - which is what, in this case, aggravated Sargon so much.

The third reference to pa nadānu is that contained in the letter about Mita and it can be seen that if the conclusions reached from the first two examples were extrapolated to this occurrence, then Mita would have in some way committed himself to friendly relations and possibly to a formal statement of this. The rest of the letter does not, however, mention any agreement on Mita's part nor even a message which was sent with the messenger, and Sargon's eagerness to please the Muskian might suggest that no formal relationship had as yet been mentioned. If, therefore, pa nadānu implies a clear commitment to friendly relations in a verbal form then Mita's declaration of his intent is not referred to at all in the text of the letter. If, however, the idiom does not imply a formal and explicit declaration but merely a commitment, either in word or deed, to be on good terms then Mita's

37. Lie: 10, 67 & n. 3;
sending back of the envoys of Urikki will have constituted the basis for Sargon's use of *pā nadānu.*

It must be doubted whether Mitā's messenger made a formal statement of his intentions toward Assyria, particularly because Sargon should have mentioned it in his reply to the governor, and the only evidence of Mitā's change in attitude is his sending back of Urikki's envoys. Even without a formal commitment to good relations Sargon was able to see Mitā's action as a hint to the Muskian's new policy and encouraged his governor to maintain the relations, however tenuous, between the two countries. The governor's hesitation in replying to Mitā's overtures (*balat sarri bēliya Lū mār sipriya ina UGU muskayya lâ āsappar:* "without the king('s permission) I shall not send my messenger before the Muskean") implies that major foreign policy decisions could not be made or implemented at local level but had to proceed from the central administration. The case of Mitā who had previously been hostile to Assyria and whose friendly contacts were a major change in the diplomatic sphere necessitated such a mandate from the king.

Thus Sargon's reassurance of his governor was the order to attend on the Muskian:

*assaprakka Lū mār-siprika issi pān KUR muskayya lū lâ ibernaq*

"I am writing to you (that) your messenger should not be separated from the Muskian." 41

38. The use of *pā nadānu* in ABL 392 suggests an informal agreement or commitment (see n. 33)

39. Postgate: loc.cit: 22, 1lf;

40. ABL 280 (see above p.23 ) shows how a military commander in the field was in a different position.

41. Postage, loc.cit: 22, 13f; K. Deller, OrNS 35 (1966) 310;
Sargon's insistence on close attendance on the king of Muski indicates his desire to reciprocate the gesture of friendliness and to expedite a more formal recognition of the new state of affairs. The explicit reference to one messenger of a country being in the entourage of another's king suggests the role of ambassador rather than that of envoy for this messenger, but there is little evidence that in the neo-Assyrian period envoys were despatched other than for particular missions or remained for longer than their specified mission required. Sargon's reference would imply that a semi-permanent diplomatic mission could be accredited to foreign courts. Alternatively Sargon's use of "your messenger" might be a synecdoche for a continuous communication by many messengers. In as much as references to messengers occur frequently both in royal inscriptions and letters of the period and that they are there described as performing various duties, this second explanation is more likely than that of a single resident ambassador.

Sargon's succeeding injunctions as to how to cultivate Mitā bear out the belief in close communication:

\[ \text{dibbi ūtabûte suprassu kayyamānu minu sa tēnsūnisim/} \]

"Send him messages of good-will and hear constantly what his counsel may be ...".

\[ \text{dibbi ūtabûte discussed further p. 104 ff;} \]

42. ABL 196; Postgate: Taxation: 261f;
43. Constant or at least regular communication is stressed as an essential feature of good relations between kings: Gyges and Ashurbanipal, for example: VAB 7, 20, 111;
44. Postgate: loc.cit: 22, 14-15; dibbi ūtabûte discussed further p. 104 ff;
The extension of dibbi tābûte to Mitā indicates Sargon's willingness to maintain friendly relations and thereby to consolidate them, perhaps with the intention of gaining a formalised relationship. Despite his sincere desire for good relations, Sargon was still suspicious of Mitā's intentions as is shown by his command to the governor to take note of Mitā's plans and their relevance for Assyria. Thus on the one hand Assyria was quick to follow up the move toward a settlement made by Mitā but, on the other hand, was not suspending its watchfulness toward a recent enemy. The governor of Que's messengers to the court of Muski had, therefore, a dual purpose: to expedite good relations but at the same time to gain knowledge of Muskian policy. This latter aspect need not be clandestine since Mitā's replies to the envoys must have revealed something of his intentions but even so the messengers were probably expected to glean what they could by unofficial methods.

Having ratified the necessary official actions in the reciprocation of Mitā's embassy, Sargon authorised a repatriation of all Muskians in the governor's custody as proof of his good-will. Furthermore he ordered his governor to inform Mitā that he (Sargon) had specifically ordered this move. Nowhere is it more apparent that Sargon was attempting by every device to assure Mitā of his personal interest in Muskian affairs and his willingness to entertain and further good relations between their two countries. Sargon was prompted to repatriate the Muskians by Mitā's sending

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45. Tēmu is more than a monarch's utterances. It implies his planning and intentions and, when formalised in orders, was referred to as ḫikīn tēme. Even then it retained the connotation of intent as well as action.

46. e.g. ARM: 2 no. 72; 6 no. 19, 17-21;

47. Postgate: loc.cit: 22, 16-25;
back of certain men of Que - presumably Uriikki's embassy - and it must be postulated that the Muskians were prisoners of war captured during the governor's raids on Muski. Sargon's insistence on the repatriation of every Muskian so that not even one remained with the governor is certainly an action calculated to display his wish for good relations, but behind it may lie the knowledge that repatriation was a major issue in diplomacy and that his reciprocal repatriation would have great influence on Mitā's future attitude to Assyria. 48 The necessity to discourage unlawful movement of individuals, slave or free, from one country to another was of prime importance in ancient Near Eastern treaties and prompt repatriation of hostile elements was a common feature of relations between friendly states. In the neo-Assyrian period repatriation was not automatic but was used - as in the case of Mitā and Sargon - to expedite relations between countries either seeking good relations or already in friendly contact. 49

The remainder of the letter to the governor of Que does not directly concern Mitā but it provides important insights for Assyrian conduct of diplomacy. Accompanying Mitā's messenger to the governor had come a messenger of Urbalā "for greeting" (ana sulme) 50 and the governor seems to have asked whether this representative should be entertained. Sargon's answer was in the affirmative and suggests that the messenger of Urbalā should come to him. 51 The ceremony of "greeting" a king was not

48. Repatriation in treaties: for second mill. see Kestemont: DDIA 405f; 420; 87f; first millennium e.g. Sefire 96, 4-8;
49. VAR 7, 34, 23-33; AS 5, 60ff; 87-98; 80, 77-92; Ash, 106, 28-34;
50. Postgate: loc.cit: 22, 26ff;
51. contra Postgate: loc.cit: 26, note to 1. 28;
merely an audience with him but conveyed the recognition (and, therefore, approval) of another king and was a formal gesture indicating the opening of relations between countries. The synchronisation of Urbal's mission with that of Mita seems unlikely to have been accidental and suggests that Urbal'o knew of Mita's impending rapprochement with Assyria and, as a former Assyrian vassal, Urbal'o decided to make his peace with Sargon for fear of being caught between Muski and her new ally. Whether Urbal'o's "greeting" of Sargon implied subservience is uncertain but Mita is unlikely to have allowed Urbal'o to make such a gesture if he was already subservient to Mita.

On the other hand, Sargon may have given the governor of Que permission to receive the "greeting" of Urbal'o (a theory favoured by Postgate) and his allusion to the kings of southern Anatolia "polishing the sandals" of the governor "with their beards" may corroborate this. This idiom is otherwise unknown and its closest parallel is Tammaritu of Elam's act of subservience to Ashurbanipal when he swept the ground with his beard. This is almost certainly a ceremony similar to the grasping or kissing of a king's feet, neither of which were greetings-gestures proper but rather acknowledgements of subordination and vassal-status. It would, therefore, have to be presumed that the governor was in some way acting as a proxy for Sargon in receiving the subservience of foreign kings just as Ummanigas of

52. See below: p. 50
53. Sargon does not mention Urbal'o's subservience to him in his inscriptions.
54. VAB 7, 34, 28f;
Elam kissed the ground before Ashurbanipal's messengers as a sign of his reverence for the Assyrian king. It would then have to be assumed that the ūlmu-ceremony automatically involved prostration or abasement indicating subordination. This does not accord with Ashurbanipal's assertion that he sent a messenger to a vassal-king "for greeting" (ṣa ṣulme). Accordingly it is uncertain whether Sargon's reference to the kings polishing the governor's sandals with their beards is an indication that they physically abased themselves or whether Sargon is using a metaphor to describe the dependence these kings will have on the governor in future. The implication is that the petty kings of the Taurus will have to conduct their negotiations with Assyria through the governor whose position will be greatly enhanced by their subordination to him.

Sargon's attitude to these petty princes can be discerned from his replies to two more of the governor's questions. He warns the governor not to give more land to a pro-Assyrian ruler and points out that now Mitā and he are on good terms there is no cause for the rulers to fear. Sargon is equally aware that Mitā's friendship with him will affect the status of the unaligned rulers between them, notably the kings of Tabal who will not be free to pursue their own ends any longer. The stimulus for these comments on Tabal may have been a letter from Urbalā about the activities

55. *ibid*: 34, 18-20;
56. *AS 5*: 54, 96;
58. *ibid*: 24, 43-51;
of certain townsmen who were, perhaps, under his control and his apology for their conduct demonstrates a conciliatory attitude toward Assyria.\(^{59}\)

This letter was presumably carried by the messenger who came to the governor at the same time as Mitā's messenger and Urbal'ā's act of conciliation parallels Mitā's earnest of good-will in the sending back of Urikki's embassy. These coincidences strongly suggest that Mitā's move to good-relations with Assyria was not decided hurriedly but was the result of prior planning of which Urbal'ā was aware and in which he may have taken part.

Having studied the most important elements in the diplomatic intercourse of Assyria with Mitā and the rulers of Tabal and its surrounding area, it remains to summarise the evidence to be derived from this letter. Most interesting is the eagerness with which Sargon greets the news of a possible rapprochement with Mitā and the measures he adopts to secure this relationship. Sargon's desire for friendly relations with Mitā seems genuine and sincere and he does not attempt to extract promises or commitments from Mitā or to force Assyrian demands upon him. Throughout he is at pains to demonstrate his willingness to entertain good-relations with Mitā and to match gestures of good-will offered by him. With the minor rulers of the area he is less generous but even so encourages Urbal'ā to "greet" him.

The diplomatic terminology used in the letter is exceptional in the frequent use of salāmu ("to be friendly"), or one of its cognates, to indicate the new relationship between Sargon and Mitā.\(^{60}\) The informal nature of the contacts between Mitā and the Assyrian authorities still allowed Sargon to aver that the Muskian had given his word (pā nadānu) and become

\(^{59}\) ibid: 28,

\(^{60}\) notably in lines 10, 38; 47;
Sargon’s friend (ana salmini tāru). This demonstrates - unless a formal gesture had been made which is not referred to in the letter - that a formalised relationship was not obligatory for friendly intercourse between countries. Sargon was, however, eager to consolidate the openings made by Mita with the aim, perhaps, of achieving a fully-ratified settlement. The subtlety he shows in his cultivation of Mita is far removed from the scheme of events set out in the royal inscriptions where Sargon is the victor and Mita his humbled opponent. The disparity between the "official" version of the treaty-making between Sargon and Mitā and the letter from Sargon to his governor is striking and its implications for the interpretation of evidence derived from the inscriptions are discussed below. The major conclusion to be drawn from this letter is the flexibility of Assyrian diplomacy and the emphasis placed upon it as the instrument of achieving the settlements with foreign rulers of which Assyrian kings enjoyed boasting.

iii) Detailed accounts of the settlement between Sargon and Mitā occur in both the Annals and the Display Inscription, the former being fuller but more fragmentary. It can, however, be restored from parallel texts. The three raids made by the governor of Que on Muski brought many prisoners of war, some of whom the governor forwarded to Sargon in southern Babylonia where he was campaigning. The messenger who accompanied them also carried a "favourable report" (amāt damiqti) of the fighting and Sargon rejoiced when he received the mission. Both sources immediately relate the embassy sent

62. zi ma pān (Lie: 68, 451; may be either prisoners or spoil stripped from them: CADZ 122a;
by Mitā to Sargon though the interval between the governor’s message
and Mitā’s embassy may have been considerable. 63

"But that man, Mitā the Muskean, who had not submitted to the kings
my predecessors, who had not changed his mind (or sent envoys to ask
their health), he heard of the accomplishment of my power over those I
had conquered whom the gods ... [and, of the onset of my weapons/ of the
destruction of his land, of the carrying-off of his people and of the
subjugation of Uperi ..., (consequently), in the midst of his distant land
he was terrified (lit: numbness came over him.). His messenger to do me
homage and to bring me tribute and gifts he sent before me to the sea of
the rising sun."

The subjection of a king who had previously been unsubmitting to
Assyria is a common motif in neo-Assyrian royal inscriptions because it
illustrates the power and prestige of the Assyrian king in comparison with
both his ancestors and also the king offering submission. 65 It confirms

63. What follows is a reconstruction of the annal’s version (see note 61)
64. Room V only;
65. e.g. VAB 7: 18, 64, 76; OIP 2: 30, 61; 31, 72;
the belief that Sargon and Mitā had not enjoyed previous good-relations which would have been referred to in both Sargon's inscriptions and the letter about Mitā. Mitā's embassy had two purposes:

i) the act of homage to Sargon.

ii) the bringing of tribute and gifts.

The expression of homage, usually by a symbolic gesture or act, i.e. kissing or grasping the suzerain's feet, was the standard method of acknowledging one's subordination to and dependence on another king. It was used by kings defeated by Assyria and anxious to regain whatever status they could, kings who requested the protection of Assyria, and rulers who wished to gain assistance for their own cause. The ceremony of homage was the formal rite which demonstrated the inferior status of the vassal to that of the king of Assyria and recognised the right of the overlord to make demands upon the vassal, i.e. the imposition of tribute. In Mitā's case Sargon does not say that he imposed tribute but merely that he received the contributions (bijti igisē) of the Muskian and it is therefore uncertain whether he expected periodic deliveries of tribute. Research on the nuances of the various terms for tribute would have to be undertaken

66. CAD E 203; TCL III: 48, 307-311 ff;

67. e.g. OIP II 34, 49;

68. e.g. Ash, 54, 32ff; VAB 7, 20, 103;

69. e.g. VAB 7; 68, 43; ibid : 34, 28-32;

70. J.N. Postgate: Taxation ... 119-130 for a short discussion of madattu; igisē may be comparable to Sulmanu, a "greeting-gift": W. von Soden: Die lexicalischen Tafelserien der Babylonier und Assyrer ... 2 (Berlin, 1933) 2: 275;
in order to illuminate this question.

A comparison of the annals version of Mitā's submission with the letter about him is instructive. On a most indulgent reading of the latter it could hardly be averred that Sargon was acting in the manner of a prospective overlord or that Mitā was precipitately rushing to embrace Assyrian domination. The Annals, on the other hand, do create this impression - as they were, no doubt, intended to do. External factors may have forced Mitā to submit to Sargon or, in the interval between the first contact and Mitā's submission, the Assyrians may have pressurised him to accept vassal-status but, given the reconstructed chronology, such acts would have had to be very swift. Disregarding these arguments e silentio, it cannot be denied that the background to the Muski-Assyria diplomacy is represented very differently in the letter about Mitā and the annals. An explanation of this disparity may lie in the style and purpose of the letter. It has long been recognised that the Assyrian royal inscriptions are written from a partisan and biased viewpoint, that their style of narration affects the substance of their account and that the process of redaction of the annals confuses incidents and chronology. In this incident it would be reckless to deny that Mitā's mission came to Sargon or that it did him homage. These acts are, however, interpreted by an annalistic Assyrian source and the consequent account is, therefore, favourable to Assyria and implies the total submission and capitulation of her enemy.

The letter about Mitā provides an invaluable corrective to such an interpretation because it is the record of the official reaction to Mitā's

71. See above p. 20f.;
72. A.T.E. Olmstead: Assyrian Historiography ... (Columbia, 1916);
overtures of friendship and not a rhetorical display of Assyrian prowess. It is, therefore, more likely to present an accurate reflection of the Assyrian attitude to Mitā than the highly-stylised annals. Sargon is portrayed as sincerely desiring Mitā as a friend and that Assyria and Muski should enjoy a peaceful and friendly relationship. He was eager to demonstrate goodwill and nowhere implied that the relationship was to be one of unilateral domination. It might be argued that Sargon was baiting the trap by cultivating Mitā assiduously but, if so, he concealed this tactic from his own governor to whom he was quite capable of revealing the more cynical aspects of Assyrian diplomacy, i.e. the treatment of minor rulers of the Taurus (lines 28-30 of the Midas letter in particular).

The informal relationship of friendship which pertained after Mitā's initial contact with the governor of Que was accepted by Sargon as evidence of an unchanging commitment to good-relations. Even though no formal ceremonies of agreement are said to have occurred, the Assyrian's words betray his belief in a continuing relationship. This permanence automatically demanded a formal statement, hence the submission-ceremony, and it is in the formalisation of a diplomatic relationship that an important feature of Assyrian diplomacy can be observed. It was necessary for states to know whether they were on friendly or hostile terms with their neighbours and the only method of achieving this was by official action: the recognition of a king by "greeting" him and by performing ceremonies of obeisance if applicable. Failure to make this recognition or to discontinue to do so was tantamount to declaring oneself hostile. Thus it was necessary for Mitā to confirm his relationship with Sargon with the appropriate ceremonies. The existence of

73. See below p. [44];
a relationship (not necessarily suzerain-vassal) implied good-relations between states but for it to be effective it had to be formally acknowledged.\textsuperscript{74}

The drawback with this conception of formalised relationships was that it favoured the party with superior power in that she could dictate in an almost unilateral manner the course of the relationship. Too rigid an application of this principle was likely to cause disaffection amongst vassal-states and was not amenable to alteration in the face of changing circumstances. It was also likely to mask behind the facade of unilateral domination relationships of varying degrees of subserviance. Thus the rhetoric of the annals, which proclaimed the principle of Assyrian-ordered diplomacy, concealed under the heading of \textit{ardūtu} ("vassalage") a wide range of relationships. In the case of Mitā - whose gesture of capitulation, as recorded by the annals, is to some extent contradicted by the letter about him - the inflexibility of diplomatic theory as opposed to practice is particularly relevant. It may be concluded that the ideological concepts of Assyrian diplomacy affected not only the diplomacy itself but also the recording of this diplomacy in royal inscriptions so that "vassalage" describes a wide range of relationships between suzerain and vassal and therefore that the vassal-motif common in neo-Assyrian inscriptions is not a sure guide to the true nature of the relationships.

The diplomatic contacts of Mitā and Sargon reveal a fundamental principle of neo-Assyrian diplomacy: that the inflexibility of the theory, based on an ideology of unilateral dictation of the relationships, was tempered in practice by a willingness to come to terms with states whom

\textsuperscript{74} Ashurbanipal and Urtaku of Elam enjoyed \textit{ibrūtu} ("equal relations"): \textit{AS} 5, 56, 20ff;
Assyria thought it better to cultivate. However when it was possible the Assyrians preferred to revert to a suzerain-vassal relationship in which they could take control. It may also be concluded that informal friendly relations, though welcome, were pursued as far as possible to a formalised statement of the relationship. However the formal act of subordination which a vassal had to make was not a true index of the real relationship between the Assyrian king and the vassal. The importance of the sulmu-ceremony which registered the recognition of one king by another but did not imply subordination by one party to the other is further discussed in the discussion of the diplomacy of Gyges and Ashurbanipal.
Diplomatic Contacts of Assyria with Anatolia

(b) Gyges of Lydia

The only sources for the relations between Gyges of Lydia and Ashurbanipal of Assyria are several of the latter's royal inscriptions, notably editions A, B and E of the annals and also the "Harran Tablets". It has been long recognized that later editions of the annals of Assyrian kings often compress, abridge, omit or displace incidents from their correct chronological setting and that the earlier editions usually present a more accurate account of events. In this case, edition E of the annals and the "Harran Tablets" are the earliest sources and their account will be preferred to that of the later inscriptions where they diverge.

Edition E is the earliest and fullest record of Gyges' first contact with Assyria but it is fragmentary. It can, however, be seen that the antecedents to Gyges' mission - the attacks of the Cimmerians and the dream of Gyges - were described in greater detail and that the arrival and conduct of Gyges' mission at Nineveh received a different, less prosaic treatment than in

1. VAB 7, 20ff, 95-124;
2. AS 5, 43.93 - 48.4;
3. M. Cogan & H. Tadmor, Or. NS 46(1978) 65-85;
4. VAB 7, 166ff, 13-21;
5. A.T. Olmstead: Assyrian Historiography (1916); as propaganda, J.E. Reade: Iraq 34 (1972) 87;
6. Cogan and Tadmor, loc. cit. (hereinafter: Cogan and Tadmor) 83; this study is valuable for both the literary and historical background to the contacts with Gyges.
later inscriptions: rak/busu it/ ana sa'al sul/me/ya itha ana misir
matiya nise matiya imurusuma mannume atta ahu igbusu sa matema rakkun
daraggu la iskuna ana kisurri ana Ninua al belutiya w/biluniissu ina
mahriya lisan/e sami ereb sami sa Assur umallu qatua bel lisanisu ul
ibsima lisan/su/ nakratma la isemmu atmisu ultu misir matisu / ittisu
ubila/ ... (K1821/A7920; Cogan and Tadmor, 68).

"... [he sent] his envoy to enquire of my well-being. He reached
the border of my country. My men saw him and asked him, "Who are you, stranger,
whose (country's) envoy never travelled the road to the frontier?" They brought
him to Nineveh, my royal city, into my presence. (Of) all the languages
of East and West, over which the god Ashur has given me control, there was no
interpreter of his tongue. His language was foreign, so that his words were
not understood. From his territory ... he brought with him ...

From this narrative it emerges that Ashurbanipal's subjects' first
duty, on encountering the envoy, was to ascertain his country of origin. This
may be a reflection of a diplomatic protocol whereby envoys were obliged to
establish their identity and that of their sender. In this case the envoy's
language was unknown and the fragment breaks off before the means of communi-
cation was provided. However in other E fragments the envoy is made to transmit
a long message, in the first person, from Gyges which suggests that these two
recensions of E contained differing accounts of the mission or that the envoy's
message was eventually understood. Both recensions, however, make it clear
that Gyges' dream overawed him so much that he undertook to submit to Assyria
and pay annual tribute.  

9. Cogan and Tadmor, 71-74; BM 13445, 121018, 127823, 134455;
10. Ibid. BM 127923, 134455;
After edition E, the Harran Tablet is the earliest version of the Gyges-incident and its form was adopted in all subsequent editions:

a) Gyges' and his predecessors' contacts with Assyria and the location of Lydia

b) The dream of Gyges (abbreviated in later versions)

c) The despatch of a messenger to Ashurbanipal

d) Gyges' victory over the Cimmerians

e) The despatch of Cimmerian prisoners and heavy tamartu to Nineveh.

Sections b) and c) are of interest for a study of diplomacy and particularly for the terminology of servitude. The text of Gyges' dream is (after edition E) longest in the Harran Tablet which may be compared with the abbreviated version of edition A:

\[
\text{HT.}
\]
\[\text{umma ša assurbanapli šar}
\]
\[\text{KUR.}
\]
\[\text{ki hishti d šur sar ilani}
\]
\[\text{bel gimri šept rubûtišu šapatma}
\]
\[\text{šarrusu pîtuḫma šullâ belûtsu ša epes}
\]
\[\text{ardût u nadin mandattililikuš suppuka.}
\]

\[
\text{A.}
\]
\[\text{umma šep II šur assurbanapli}
\]
\[\text{KURd.}
\]
\[\text{ki šar šur sabatma ina šikir}
\]
\[\text{šumisu kusud Lû nakrutika.}
\]

..."Lay hold of the feet of (lit. the foot of the greatness of) Ashurbanipal, the king of Assyria, beloved of Ashur (the king of the gods,) the lord of the totality, and in his name conquer your enemies."

11. \text{VAB 7, 166, 16; also n.9 above.}

12. \text{VAB 7, 20, 98f;
revere him as (your) sovereign and
beseach him as (your) master. Let your
message of prayer offering homage and
tribute come to him."

Common to these two exhortations to submit to Ashurbanipal is the
idiom ṣēpā sabātu, "to lay hold of (another's) feet." This is certainly a
gesture of submission as is proved by the references in HT to ēpesū ardūti
("to make an acknowledgement of subjection")14. Similarly belūti sullū ("to
beseech/beg a person to be one's master") is commonly used in Neo-Assyrian
inscriptions to indicate the recognition of subordination to Assyria by a
vassal-king.15

These characteristically neo-Assyrian expressions of submission in
a dream of a king of Lydia may demonstrate the universality of such expressions
or alternatively are the Assyrian interpretation of the Lydian's embassy. Thus
the dream would reflect customary ceremonies of subservience to Assyria which
the Lydian envoy undertook, or was expected to undertake, in Nineveh.16

Gyges' response to these exhortations in his dream was to send an
envoy to ask after the well-being of Ashurbanipal:

Ūmu šutta annita ēmuru rakbūsū ispura ana šašāl sulmeya.17

"On the day he had this dream he sent his envoy to enquire of my
well-being."

13. CAD § 17a for examples;
14. CAD E 203;
15. e.g. VAB 7, 24.16f; ibid, 36, 33;
16. It is interesting to note that only edition A explicitly states that
Gyges' envoy repeated his dream to Ashurbanipal, all other editions either
omitting it or taking for granted the envoy's narration of the dream.
17. VAB 7, 20, 100f; on the rakbū see 210ff below;
The sending by foreign kings of envoys to enquire about the Assyrian king's health is a common motif in neo-Assyrian inscriptions, being used not only by Ashurbanipal but also Esarhaddon and Sargon. The actions of sending and of asking may be placed in parallel (e.g. ... la išpurū la išālū šulum ... ) or the phrase may be abbreviated (rabkūsu ša šulme išpurū ...). In the majority of cases the Assyrian king remarks that previously the foreign king had not "asked his well-being" or that of his predecessors but that now his own might overawed the foreigner and made him send a mission to Assyria. It might be thought that these enquiries about another ruler's health were a tacit gesture of submission by the king sending the envoy but Ashurbanipal himself sends an envoy ša šulme to a king, Ualli of Mannai, who was certainly subordinate to him. It seems, therefore, that ša'al šulme was a ceremony of recognition of another king, whether of inferior or superior status. However in the case of outright vassals - as Gyges acknowledged himself to be - there was an obligation to keep up the enquiries of the overlord's health and if

18. VAB 7, 593 for refs.;
19. E.g. Ash. 47, 49;
20. TCL III, 48, 309f; Lie, 70, 2;
22. R.C. Thompson: AAA 20 (1933) 87; VAB 7, 24, 21;
23. E.g. VAB 7, 70, 60ff;
24. AS 5, 54, 95;
25. On ša'al šulme below 50 - 51;
this process were interrupted, good-relations might be endangered. When, therefore, Gyges allowed his embassies to the Assyrian court to lapse he was condemned by the Assyrians:

\[ \text{LU rakbūṣu ṣa ana ṣaʾāl ṣulmeya kayyan ʾistanappa ṣa usarsa batiltu} \]

"He caused an interruption (in the missions) of his envoys whom he sent constantly to ask my health."

It emerges that the ceremony of asking the king's health was not a single act undertaken at the start of a diplomatic relationship but rather an act which had to be frequently repeated. It was clearly the customary method of maintaining formal relations with another king, thus - in the case of vassals - ensuring loyalty, and implied mutual recognition. A discontinuation of the embassies would indicate a cessation of good-relations and possible hostility but as long as missions between kings continued, hostility was theoretically out of the question. This emphasis on the importance of constant communication as the expression of good-relations, with its corollary of implied hostility if communication were interrupted, finds expression in Ashurbanipal's attitude to Urtaku of Elam who invaded Babylonia but maintained communication with Ashurbanipal. The Assyrian complains of the unexpectedness of the attack and that Elamite envoys were still in constant attendance on him in Nineveh, an activity not consonant with diplomatic practice if Urtaku were attacking (ṣut šerānīṣu ṣa sulumme ʾistanappa ina māḥriya: "His envoys of friendly-relations he kept sending to me...").

Thus Gyges sent his envoy to Ashurbanipal in order to open diplomatic relations with him and to acknowledge his submission to Assyria. The envoy

\[ \text{26. VA J, 20, 11ff;} \]
\[ \text{27. AS 3, 56ff, 18-48.} \]
repeated in detail Gyges' dream, prefacing it with an account of the background to the mission, and concluded by making the formal gestures of grasping Ashurbanipal's feet and beseeching him to be Gyges' overlord. Subsequently, however, Gyges failed to maintain diplomatic relations with Ashurbanipal and exacerbated his crime by sending aid to Psammetichos II of Egypt who was in revolt from Assyria.28 Ashurbanipal called down the wrath of the gods on the Lydian and exulted in the latter's death at the hands of the Cimmerians who re-invaded Lydia.29 The death of Gyges brought his son Ardys to the throne of Lydia and he again acknowledged Assyrian suzerainty:

... ina qat mar siprisu ispuramma isbata sepe sarrutiya umma sarru sa ilu idusu atta abu'a tarurma lemuttu issakin ina panisu iati ardu palijka kurbanima lasuta absanka  

"(News of Gyges' death) he sent to me by the hand of his messenger. He grasped my royal feet saying, 'You are the king recognised by god. You cursed my father and misfortune befell him. Acknowledge me, your obedient subject, and I shall pull your yoke'."

The use of karābu in this context is unusual because it is more commonly used of gestures of adoration, of gods or political superiors, and praise.31 However it does seem that it was used on some occasions as a gesture purely of greeting without any overtones of hierarchy32 and it is this gesture of recognition for which the Lydian was petitioning. By greeting him Ashurbanipal would be renewing Assyria's relationship with Lydia and accepting her submission

28. VAB 7, 22, 114f;
29. ibid., 117ff;
30. ibid., 125;
31. VAD K 194bf, cf. 197b;
32. OIP 2, 43, 55;
again. This motif of greeting a king and thereby recognizing him as on good terms is also observed in Ashurbanipal's attitude toward Ualli, king of Mannai, to whom he sent his messenger "of greeting" (Lúmar sipriya sa šulme uma'ir sorussu). 33

The importance of opening relations with foreign kings by sending envoys ana sa'al šulme ("to ask the health of ...") and of thereafter continuing to communicate frequently is best expressed in Gyges' relations with Assyria. Equally the responsibility of the overlord, in cases of unequal relationships, to acknowledge his vassal is also expressed. The accounts of Assyrian relations with Lydia do not clarify the manner in which a king acknowledged subservience but this gap may be filled from a study of Ashurbanipal's relations with two kings of Urartu.

33. AS 5, 54.96;
Two embassies from kings of Urartu, Rusā II and Sarduris III, are recorded in the inscriptions of Ashurbanipal, only that from Sarduris, however, being related in the annals. Both are of interest because they exhibit diplomatic techniques more clearly than elsewhere in Assyrian inscriptions.

The sources for the embassy of Rusā II to Ashurbanipal are (i) a superscription on a relief and (ii) a tablet listing these superscriptions, but not verbatim:

I - KUR LU V V V V V
Rusa sar urartu ... MAH.MES-su ana sa'al sulmeya ispura
"Rusā the king of Urartu, ... sent his envoys to enquire of my health."

Despite the prominence in the superscription of the reference to the Urartian envoys, two of whom are shown on the relief being presented to Ashurbanipal, the focal points of the relief are the exhibition of two Elamite envoys who had delivered insolent messages from their king, Teumman, and the execution of two rebels. The superscription states that the Urartian envoys were shown both these scenes, the implication being that breaches of diplomatic etiquette and breaches of faith with Assyria were severely punished. These public spectacles were no doubt intended to impress the Urartian delegation but the annals do not refer to the embassy whereas there are two references to the Elamite envoys and one to the punishment of the rebels. The exclusion of the Urartian mission from the annals of Ashurbanipal suggests that it did not bring

1. (i) VAB 7, 316, (and cf. ibid., 332, 28f); this text is given above.
   (ii) ibid., 430. Sm 1350, 9ff, also in E.F. Weidner: AfO 8 (1932)180, 12 which edits all these lists and superscriptions.

2. J.E. Reade, AMI NF9 (1976) 100 and Tf. 22,2; also A. Paterson: Assyrian Sculptures: Palace of Sennacherib (1915) nos. 65-66 where the Urartians are portrayed watching the executions on the left of the relief and on the right being presented to Ashurbanipal.

3. AS S 60ff, 94-98; 72ff, 57-65; 74, 83-86;
Ashurbanipal any material success or prestige and was therefore not a fit subject for inclusion in a document specifically intended to glorify the king of Assyria and his gods.

Ashurbanipal writes, in the superscription, that Rusâ of Urartu had sent his envoys to enquire of his health when he heard of the prowess of Ashur, i.e. Ashurbanipal's victories (Rusâ sar KUR Urartu danân dAssur beliya ismêma puluhtu šarrūtiya ishupsu-ma). This implies that previously Rusâ had not corresponded with Ashurbanipal and that it was only Assyrian military success which led him to open relations with Ashurbanipal. However it is known that Rusâ had enjoyed a treaty-relationship with Esarhaddon, probably on terms of equality. It would be unusual for a king to refuse to recognise the legitimate successor of an ally for fifteen years and the Assyrians might therefore be expected to have commemorated Rusâ's embassy in the annals as an event of diplomatic significance. It must be postulated either i) that Rusâ's embassy was not his first diplomatic contact and, therefore, that Ashurbanipal's reference to the Urartian's hearing of his victories did not imply this or (ii) the Urartian embassy did not merit inclusion in the annals. It was noted that the ceremony of asking the king's health is not evidence of the first contact of two countries and Ashurbanipal's insertion of the clause describing Rusâ's awe on hearing of the Assyrian victories may be no more than rhetorical exaggeration in order to extract the maximum political prestige from the incident. Had Rusâ been acknowledging Assyrian suzerainty the annals would have been almost certain to record the event but their silence, the evidence of his relations with Urartu which Ashurbanipal gives elsewhere and the likelihood that ša'al šulme does not

4. VAB 7, 316, 3-5;  
5. Ash. 106, iii, 29, 32ff;  
6. The date of the Assyrian campaign against Teumman: AS 5, 62, 5-8; ibid., 105-108;  
7. above p. 44;
indicate an act of subservience all contradict this view.\(^8\)

The second diplomatic contact between Ashurbanipal and Urartu occurred in c644 B.C. when Sarduris III sent an embassy to Assyria, recorded in two texts.\(^9\) The annals contain a fuller version than the Ishtar slabs but both agree on the principal features:\(^{10}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ištar-dūr} & \text{ ū sar } \text{KUR Urartī ū šarrani abēšu ana abēya ištanapparūnī} \\
& \text{ābihūtū enenna (Ištar-dūri) Ḫaranu epētu ū šā ilāni rabūtī išimūinni išmēma} \\
& \text{(kīma ša māru ana abīṣu ištanappara belūtu u šū kī pi annimma) ištanappara} \\
& \text{umma lušulmu ana šarri belīya (palḥīs kanṣīs tamartasu kabittu uṣēbāla adi} \\
& \text{māḏriya)}
\end{align*}
\]

"Sarduris, king of Urartu, whose ancestors had always sent brotherhood to my ancestors, now heard of the might of the deeds which the great gods had decreed for me and (as a son sends sovereignty to his father, so he in that manner) kept sending saying, 'May it be well with the king my lord'. (In reverence and obedience he sent his heavy tribute before me.)"

The omission of the reference to tribute in the later text may indicate that at this later date Sarduris had ceased to send tribute. Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, it was omitted for the purpose of abbreviation just as the phrase about father and son was replaced by the more standard motif "fear overcame him".\(^{11}\)

In terms of contemporary politics Ashurbanipal was exulting in the acknowledgement by Sarduris of his subordinate position vis-à-vis Ashurbanipal.

\[\text{........} \]

8. A.T. Olmstead: History of Assyria (1923), 4 most clearly expresses the belief that ša'āl Sulme indicated submission; also VAB 7, 20 n.6; Ashurbanipal and Rusā VAB 7 84, 40-50 and below p. 50ff.

9. R.C. Thompson: AAA 20 (1932) 87, 121ff; written in c639 B.C.; VAB 7, 84, 40ff; the date of the embassy rests on the dating of Prism A in which the last historical event recorded is this embassy. It may therefore be assumed that the embassy occurred shortly before the writing of the prism. On the date of A: H. Tadmor, 25th International Congress of Orientalists vol.I (Moscow, 1962) 240f;

10. The annal passage (VAB 7, 84, 40ff;) is given here, bracketing those phrases not found in the slabs which, however, have the phrase ḫattu ellenu iṣimutina ("fear fell upon him") instead of kīma ša māru ... kī pi annimma.

11. e.g. VAB 7, 120, 85; other refs.: CAD H, 150bf.
This recognition was all the more pleasing to Ashurbanipal because previously Urartian kings had corresponded with Assyria on equal terms. Before discussing Assyrian concepts of sovereignty, vassalage and equality, it is necessary to analyse the phrase ṣa'āl ṣulme whose meaning is in this passage clarified as nowhere else in Assyrian texts.

The frequent references in neo-Assyrian records to diplomatic missions being sent ana ṣa'āl ṣulme ("to ask the health of") another king demonstrate the importance of this motif for diplomatic communication. As suggested above, the enquiry did not indicate submission but rather the recognition of another king by the opening of diplomatic relations. The standard method of communication was by letter in which the greeting formula at the beginning established or re-established the relationship between sender and addressee. These greetings invoked the gods to bless or protect the addressee, often using the word sulmu; e.g.: lū sulmu ana ṣarrī bēliya ("May it be well with the king, my lord."). It might, therefore, be supposed that the enquiry about a king's health mentioned in records of diplomacy corresponded to the greeting in the letters which the diplomatic envoys carried. This supposition is corroborated by the occurrence in late Babylonian letters of the greeting-formula PN₁ ṣulμu ṣa PN₂ ... ṣa PN₂ ... išāl ("PN₁ enquires the health of PN₂ ... "). No neo-Assyrian instances of this phrase are known but their absence might be due to literary fashion particularly when the stereotyped nature of the greeting-formulae in the letters is considered. It can be shown from the occurrences of the formula: PN₁ ṣulμu ṣa PN₂ ... išāl that it was not used solely as an introductory greeting at the head of a letter but also appears in the body of a letter when

12. e.g. VAB 7, 42, 134; ibid., 204, v.36; ibid., 64, 89; AS 5, 86, 56;
13. p. 1; 3;
14. e.g. ABL 144, 145 and passim in greetings.
15. E. Salonen: St.Or. 38 (1967), 78-114 esp. 86ff;
the writer wishes to send a message to a person or persons not named in the introductory address. The phrase is also used outside the heading of a letter when the writer wishes to pay his respects to a person other than the addressee even though he has no message for that person. In these cases the formula is purely a formal gesture of politeness and respect, and is best exemplified in a letter which "greets" sixteen people and ends: Nadna šulum sa Mīd tašmētum-tabni, Mī Ina-Esagila-bēlit, Išrku, Išiblu, IšBurku, Nana-etirat biši gabbi ıšalu, ("Nadna enquires of the health of Tašmētum-tabni, Ina-Esagila-bēlit, Sirku, Liblu, Burku, Nana-etirat [and] of the whole house.").

The similarity of the greeting-formulae in neo-Assyrian letters to those of the late-Babylonian period is clear and it is reasonable to assume that though neo-Assyrian did not use the particular formula PN šulum sa PN as a greeting nevertheless the ša'āl šulme motif in royal inscriptions corresponds to the greeting-element in the diplomatic correspondence. It may further be postulated that this greeting was a formal gesture of politeness and respect, indicating recognition.

The act of greeting itself did not constitute an admission of either inferior or superior status and such a hierarchial distinction was made by appending a word or phrase to the greeting. Thus in most neo-Assyrian letters - no matter what the exact greeting was - the inclusion of the word beliya by the sender indicated his subordinate relationship to the addressee; e.g. lū šulmu ana sarri beliya ("May it be well with the king, my lord.") In this respect the embassy of Sarduris is particularly significant because the Assyrians describe the manner in which his greeting was made:

kīna ıšu māru ana abisu ıstānappara belutu u ıšu ıšu annimma ıstānappara umma lū šulmu ana sarri beliya.

............

17. ibid. nos. 39, 224, 254, 301;
18. ibid. no. 6; also no. 301;
19. e.g. ABL 384; belu was not confined to the king: e.g. ABL 382, 500, 505;
"... just as a son always sends (messages acknowledging) sovereignty to his father, so he in that way kept sending (messages) saying, 'May it be well with the king, my lord'." 20

The editors of this text were clearly at pains to explain Sarduris' action as one of submission because they included the phrase about a son's relationship to his father in order to clarify Sarduris' act of homage. 21 As further reinforcement of the change in status which Sarduris was making, the text specifically states that previous Urartian kings had written as "brothers" to Assyria (šarrani abēšu ana abēya ʾistannaparrūni aḫūtu. "His ancestors had always sent (messages of) brotherhood to my ancestors." 22 Such a greeting of "brotherhood" is given in a letter from Esarhaddon to Urtaku, king of Elam in which the Assyrian greets the Elamite as his brother and wishes health on his family, land and nobles. 23 In Assyrian sources a clear statement of the implications of recognising another king as one's brother is lacking but from the embassy of Sarduris it can be seen that the Assyrians conceived of those rulers in communication with them as either "brothers" or subjects who acknowledged their sovereignty. In the sense that a "brother" was not subject to the Assyrian king and was recognised as such he may be said to have been on equal terms with him. 24

Although the use of belu was the only true indication of submission to another ruler, in some cases sarru ("king") also indicated an acknowledgement of vassalage. This may be inferred from the expression ana šaʾāl šulme šarrūti ("to ask my kingly health", i.e. to ask my health as king.) which is used in the inscriptions of Ashurbanipal to describe missions coming to make submission. 25

20. VAB 7, 84, 40ff;
21. This elucidation is omitted from the Ishtar slabs (above p. 49 n. 9 ;) version of this incident but without loss of meaning. This confirms the explanatory nature of the phrase.
22. VAB 7, 84, 40ff;
23. ABL 918, obv. 1-8; similar "fraternal" greetings in ABL 879, 1151;
24. further discussion of parity in diplomacy, below p. 60 ff;
25. var 7 42. 134. ibid.: 204, v.36; 64, 89; AS 5 86, 56;
One of these missions was sent specifically to greet Ashurbanipal (ana šulme) but then put before him requests to be recognised as an Assyrian vassal.\(^{26}\) These were two distinct phases of the diplomacy: first the greeting then the requests for Assyrian patronage, but both were subsumed under ša'āl šulme šarrūti.

Kings used each others' titles in the address and greeting-section of their letters,\(^{27}\) but vassals and subjects usually addressed their sovereign merely as šarru.\(^{28}\) This is probably the distinction to be made on the greeting of a king as monarch (ša'āl šulme šarrūti) and the greeting of him as an equal, whether using aḫu or just putting the king's full title.\(^{29}\) Thus independent rulers could address a king using his title (e.g. šar KUR Amūr) but if they denoted him as šarru alone then they were tacitly acknowledging him as overlord.

The status of the correspondents in international communication was established in the headings of the letters by the use of aḫu to indicate nominal equality, belu or, less common, šarru alone for relationships of vassal and suzerain but it may be significant that only in letters between equals reciprocal wishes of good-will are included while a suzerain writing to his subject writes only šulmu iāši ("it is well with me").\(^{30}\) It was therefore incumbent upon a subject to enquire of his lord's health but not vice versa. If such patterns of greeting are comparable with diplomatic custom then the paucity of references to Assyrian missions ana šulme may be explained because, as senior partner in most of its diplomatic relationships, Assyria would not have taken the initiative but would have awaited the greetings of its vassals. Even the two occasions

\(--\ldots\ldots\ldots--\


\(^{27}\) e.g. ABL 918, 1151;

\(^{28}\) e.g. ABL 338 and passim in neo-Assyrian letters.

\(^{29}\) Winckler: AOF. I, 394, n.1 is a succinct discussion of ša'āl šulme but misinterpreted by Streck: VAB 7 20 n.6, 85 n.5;

\(^{30}\) e.g. ABL 287, 1ff; ABL 288 et seq.
on which it is recorded that an embassy "for greeting" was sent to a foreign
ruler can be seen as reciprocal gestures or recognition of a king who was
already known to Assyria. In the first, Ashurbanipal responded to the mission
of Ualli of Mannai, which had come to express submission to Assyria, by sending
his messenger ṣa ᵗulme ("of greeting"), 31 and in the second Ashurbanipal
complained that even when he protected Elamite princes and nobles and returned
them to Elam they rewarded him by making captives of the messengers which he
had sent ana ᵗulme. 32 These cases show conclusively that the enquiry about a
king's health did not imply subservience and they also support the supposition
that Assyria undertook reciprocal gestures of good-will but did not formally
initiate a relationship since to do so might have been considered an act of
weakness.

It has been shown 33 that the Assyrians required a vassal to maintain
relations with them by a constant flow of messages. Interruption of this inter-
course by the vassal might result in Assyrian hostility, as in Gyges' case. 34
The use of the iterative form of Šaparu (to send), indicating repeated, constant
or uninterrupted correspondence, in descriptions of diplomatic missions underlines
the importance of this aspect of the relationship between rulers, whether on
equal or unequal terms. 35

The most significant facet of Sarduris' embassy to Ashurbanipal is
the change in diplomatic status which he undertakes by recognising Ashurbanipal

31. AS 5, 54, 86-96;
32. ABL 1260, obv. 8-15; the presence of the Elamites at the court of Assyria
may have placed them under an obligation which allowed Ashurbanipal to treat
them differently from other independent rulers.
33. above, p|lij3ff.;
34. VAB 7, 20, 111ff;
35. n.34, Gyges; VAB 7, 84, 40-48, Sarduris; cf. AS 5 58, 41 Urtaku; VAB 7
314, E, 2 and 328, 32 , Teumman (see below);
as his overlord. The historical background to his mission is unknown and therefore the cause of his submission to Assyria remains uncertain but the depredations of the Cimmerians and/or Scythians may have been a major factor in his willingness to submit. It has also been suggested that Sarduris' accession or soon after it would be the most suitable occasion on which to undertake such a mission. In support of this view it may be noted that both Gyges' son Ardys and Ahseri of Mannai's son, Ualli, sent missions to Assyria when they succeeded their fathers. This suggests that it was desirable to re-open relations with other rulers as soon as possible after the death of a king and that the opportunity might be taken to re-establish previous good relations or change the status of the relationship.

The practical outcome of submission to Assyria is not immediately apparent in the cases of Gyges and Sarduris. The texts do not make it clear whether they were soliciting active Assyrian support or military aid and it is difficult to see how Ashurbanipal could have satisfied their pleas in any effective manner. Moreover if Ashurbanipal had sent forces to Gyges then an explicit reference to it in the annals would be expected. Closer co-operation between Sarduris and Ashurbanipal, if such existed, may have been directed against the Scythians whom Ashurbanipal claimed to have defeated but there is no proof of Assyrian collaboration with Urartu. On the other hand, Gyges and Sarduris must have hoped to gain something from submission to Assyria, especially if their motive was fear of invasion by the nomads. Esarhaddon had accepted the vassalage of some rulers of the Zagros and on their behalf defeated their enemies but the text of this incident states quite explicitly that they requested

36. R. Labat in Fischer-Weltgeschichte (ed. E. Cassin) 4 (1967), 90; CAH III, 118;
37. C. Lehmann-Haupt, ZA 9 (1894) 342ff., VAB 7, CCLXXXVI, n.3;
38. VAB 7 22, 120ff; AS 5 54, 86ff;
39. R.C. Thompson: AAA 20 (1933) 88f;
It is, therefore, obscure what advantage Sarduris and Gyges hoped to gain from their submission to Assyria.

It was observed that the stereotyped formulae of the Assyrian annals conceal, with or without intent, the reality of relationships between Assyrian and foreign rulers. The ideological necessity to promote the king of Assyria and his power prevented a completely accurate representation of the varying statuses of foreign rulers in relation to Assyria, all of whom were ardu (vassals) who were overwhelmed by Assyrian might. As was seen with Mita, the "submission" of foreign kings was not necessarily as abject as the Assyrians portrayed or would have liked to believe, and Gyges' opposition to Assyria shows how in practice the Assyrians were powerless to punish their more distant vassals. It may, therefore, be proposed that the diplomacy practised by the Assyrians was circumscribed by ideological concepts which insisted, in formal terms, on a highly-stratified order of international relations in which the king of Assyria was pre-eminent and conceded no equals. Their practical diplomacy, which strove to maintain this ideology but which had to recognise its limitations, can best be observed in the letter about Mita in which the exigencies of practice prevailed over the ideology. Similarly the "submission" of Gyges and Sarduris may have counted for little in practical terms but were significant for the ideology of Assyria, especially that of Sarduris who was — as Ashurbanipal exultantly proclaims — forfeiting the privileged relationship with Assyria which his ancestors had enjoyed.

40. Ash., 54f; 32-45;
41. above p. 37;
42. VAB 7, 20f, 111-120;
Diplomatic Contacts of Assyria with the East

(a) Elam, c670 - c640 B.C.

From Ashurbanipal's royal inscriptions and the correspondence in the Nineveh archive it is possible to study in detail some of the diplomatic encounters between Elam and Assyria. Attention is concentrated on three incidents or relationships which are of particular interest for diplomatic history. The background to the history of Assyria's contacts with Elam at this period is better known than her dealings with Phrygia, Lydia or Urartu because not only were those contacts spread over a longer period and achieved greater prominence in the annals but also many letters relating to the relationship between Assyria and Elam are extant.  

i) Urtaku

In c664 B.C. Urtaku, king of Elam, attacked Babylonia while Ashurbanipal was occupied with the second campaign against Egypt. Previously he had been on good terms with Assyria, being addressed in a letter by Esarhaddon as aḫiya ("my brother") and with full diplomatic punctilio. Moreover Ashurbanipal had provided him with relief when there was a famine in Elam which demonstrates that friendly relations between Urtaku and Ashurbanipal had continued the relationship begun under Esarhaddon. Ashurbanipal castigates the Elamites' conduct on several grounds:

1. Studies of the history of Elam: G.G. Cameron, History of Early Iran (1936) 185-211; W. Hinz, The Lost World of Elam (1972) 152-161; recent studies of the period in greater depth: S.S. Ahmed, Southern Mesopotamia in the time of Ashurbanipal (1968) and F. Malbrun-Labat, JA 263 (1975) 7-37;

2. IWA. p.56, Rm. 261 vs. 1-7;

3. ABL 918, 1-8; see also Ash., 58, 26-33 on Elamite relations with Esarhaddon.

4. AS 5, 56ff, 18-26; ABL 295 obv. 4-12;
Urtaki ... șa țăbti abī bāniya là ġassu là iṣṣuru ibrūtè ... șa tebussu itti libbiya là dabbaku là ġassaku șilitṣù ... șa là agrusu

"Urtaku ... who was not mindful of my father's beneficence, who did not keep faith with the parity-agreement ... whose onslaught and attack I had never considered or imagined ... with whom I was not in conflict ..."

These indignant and self-righteous remarks indicate that the unexpectedness of the attack was a breach of diplomatic propriety between kings in friendly communication with each other. Ashurbanipal did not account himself "at war" with Urtaku and was therefore shocked when he was attacked. Urtaku's subterfuge was carefully planned and involved a ruse to delay Ashurbanipal's reaction to the invasion of Babylonia:

"As for his envoys of good-relations he kept sending before me ..."

First reports of the Elamite invasions of Babylonia had already reached Assyria but the presence in Nineveh of Elamite envoys affirming the good-relations with Assyria caused Ashurbanipal to despatch his own messenger to establish the truth about the invasion before launching his counter-attack. This deliberate attempt to conceal hostilities by maintaining diplomatic contacts combined with the unexpectedness of the attack to hamper Assyria both diplomatically and militarily. Ashurbanipal emphasises, by his use of the iterative form of the verb șaparu ("to send"), that this was not a single embassy which chanced to be in Assyria when fighting broke out but rather a normal, regular flow of envoys designed to create the illusion that good-relations were still in force.

5. AS 5, 56ff 18-33 (Cyl. B which is the most detailed account of Urtaku's mission).

6. AS 5, 58, 40f;
Ashurbanipal's anger at the uncalled for and unforeseen invasion suggests that there may have been customary diplomatic gestures preceding a foreign attack, i.e. a declaration of war. There are no references to such a formal declaration in neo-Assyrian texts apart from the alleged message of Teumman of Elam:

\[ \text{ul umassir adi allaku ittišu ippusū mithusūtu} \]

"I shall not give up until I go and fight a battle with him (Ashurbanipal)."

This statement was the culmination of a diplomatic campaign which, the Assyrian sources imply, was aimed to provoke a conflict, and it followed the refusal by Ashurbanipal of Teumman's demand for the return of Elamite refugees. In this respect it is interesting to note a message which Ashurbanipal sent to Indabigas of Elam about the failure to repatriate Assyrians captive in Elam. The Assyrian threatened to invade Elam and dethrone Indabigas because Nabû-bēl-sumātē, the Assyrian rebel, and his family had not been sent back to Assyria. The threatening and abusive tone of the message and its subject - the refusal to repatriate exiles - is similar to Teumman's vow to attack Ashurbanipal and these similarities suggest that such messages were the standard response to a refusal to repatriate. They may, therefore, be a type of declaration of war.

Apart from these communications giving warning of belligerence, Assyrian texts do not refer to specific declarations of war. However the misconduct of vassals either by not communicating with Assyria, by omitting to send tribute, or by sending to other kings messages of hostility to

\[ \ldots \ldots \]

7. \( AS\), 64, 23f; cf. \( VAB\) 7, 190, 9;
8. \( AS\), 62, iv 96-v 3; see below p. 63f;
9. \( VAB\) 7, 142f., viii cf. \( IWA\), 17 ix and 23; also \( IWA\) 19, K.3073; see below p. 87;
10. An instance of a herald prior to a battle: \( TCL\) III, line 111;
11. \( AS\), 62, 3; \( TCL\) III, line 312;
12. \( AS\), 62, 3.
Assyria, each of which was, in Assyrian eyes, just cause for regarding the vassal as hostile was frequent. The regular fulfillment of these statutory obligations by vassals was therefore a convenient method of ascertaining their loyalty, showing that sins of omission were of equal weight with those of commission. Independent kings, however, were not subject to such impositions and their attitude toward Assyria could not be measured in the same way. Regular correspondence was a partial substitute because by maintaining mutual friendly communication with a ruler one could presume that he wished to remain on friendly terms. The suspension of diplomatic intercourse was, therefore, a signal of possible hostility. Urtaku broke this important dictum by opening hostilities while at the same time maintaining a flow of envoys to the Assyrian court.

Ashurbanipal's censure of Urtaku includes the phrase "lā issurū ibrūte ("... he did not keep faith with the parity agreement..."). The use of ibrū ("colleague/equal") in neo-Assyrian historical texts is confined to three incidents apart from this one: i) Esarhaddon's description of the revolt of Ba'al of Tyre who relied on Taharkah of Nubia (... ana I Tarqu sar Kūsī ibrīšu ittaklūma); ii) Ashurbanipal's comment on some Assyrians captured by the treacherous Nabu-bēl-sumāte with whom they had been on guard (... ša kīma ibrū tappe našar mātisū ittanallaku ittisū); iii) an account of Teumman of Elam's outrageous conduct toward the family of his predecessor, Urtaku, and his relationship with Assyria (... ibrū lā kēnu tappu lā naṣir tābti ...).  

The use of ibrū, especially when linked with tappu, to describe

13. above, p. 16; also VAB 7, 12, 129f; ibid. 64, 91 for examples of anti-Assyrian plots.
14. Ash. 8 76, vs. 12 cf. ibid. 8 57 vs. 71;
15. Aš. 40, 83f;
16. IWA, 11; K2672 vs. 20; ibid. pl. 28;
comrades or colleagues is well attested in Akkadian literature. In social or economic contexts it denoted companionship and community of interest as well as collegiality but its transposition into diplomacy and international politics creates interpretative problems. The association between Ba'al of Tyre and Taharkah of Nubia was one of association or alliance against Assyria but it cannot be proved to be a formal relationship bounded by a treaty or sworn agreement. Similarly Ashurbanipal's charge that Teumman of Elam was a disloyal ally who did not keep faith with Ashurbanipal's beneficence does not imply that a formal relationship was in force. The use of nāṣāru ("to guard, keep faith with") might suggest a formal agreement since nāṣāru is frequently used of treaties and oaths, but also of royal orders, justice and, as in Teumman's case, of beneficence. On the other hand, it can be argued that if a sworn treaty between Elam and Assyria had been in force Ashurbanipal could have used either adû or māmītu which he employs elsewhere for formal treaties. Ibrūtu itself would, therefore, have to imply a sworn agreement embodying oaths if a formal alliance were postulated. This seems unlikely not only because ibrūtu describes a particular relationship, not the instrument by which it is brought into being, but also because of the consistent use in neo-Assyrian historical texts of māmītu and adû, both of which refer to the instrument not the relationship, for a sworn agreement.

If ibrūtu was only an informal association between rulers their mutual obligations must have been formally undefined. Such a relationship would not have been conceded to an obviously subject or inferior ruler and ibrūtu could therefore only exist between independent powers. It may be significant that

17. Notably in the Gilgames epic but also in the Old Assyrian economic texts: CAD I šb-Na for examples.
18. e.g. Ash. 46, 41; VAB 7, 12, 118f;
19. e.g. VAB 7, 12, 118f; ibid. 70, 67 and 76, 54;
Assyria's only concession of ibrūtu was, as far as is known, to Elam with whom she had had an unstable but long-standing relationship. Urartu is the only other power likely to have been on terms of ibrūtu with Assyria but it is likely that Esarhaddon had a formal treaty with Rusa II which makes ibrūtu - if it only denoted an informal agreement - unlikely.\textsuperscript{20}

It is known that correspondence between Urartu and Assyria was conducted on terms of ahūtu ("brotherhood")\textsuperscript{21} and that Urtaku wrote to Esarhaddon as aḫiya ("my brother").\textsuperscript{22} It is not clear, however, how addressing a fellow-ruler in letters as aḫu related to ibrūtu. An explanation may lie in the terminology of diplomacy used in neo-Assyrian inscriptions. Previously no concessions to the equality of foreign rulers with the king of Assyria had been granted by the editors of these texts, from ideological reasons, but the relationship with Elam required the use of a term implying equality of status. However the use of aḫu was confined to correspondence and to use ahūtu in inscriptions would have been anachronistic in the extreme. Therefore ibrūtu may well have been coined to denote the relationship of Assyria with Elam. It also emphasised the element of friendly association which the more technical and formulaic ahūtu did not.

The use of ibru and ibrūtu in Ashurbanipal's inscriptions shows that he was prepared to concede that Assyria could and did participate in diplomatic relationships in which the state did not claim to be recognised as master. Even so this did not indicate that Assyria was willing to acknowledge true parity-status, defined in formal terms ratified by a treaty. Ibrūtu, as argued above, was not a formalised treaty-bound alliance but a relationship of close-

\textsuperscript{20} Ash. 106, 32;
\textsuperscript{21} see above p. 119 f; VAB 7, 84, 40ff;
\textsuperscript{22} above, p. 157 f; ABL 918, 1-8;
association and amity based on peaceful communication. It did not impose obligations of a defined nature on either party but demanded continuing peaceful co-existence which in this case was shattered by Urtaku's invasion of Babylonia.

ii) Teumman

The diplomatic contacts of Ashurbanipal and Teumman of Elam, as preserved in Assyrian records, aroused great rancour on both sides perhaps because their relationship prior to the dispute had been amicable. The Assyrians claimed that Teumman had sent aggressive demands (mēreṣtû) for the extradition of some Elamite princes and nobles who had fled to Assyria when Teumman came to the throne. It seems that it was not only the request itself but also the insolent form the message took and, perhaps more significantly, Teumman's arrogant behaviour within Elam which annoyed the Assyrians.

The request for extradition of exiles was not unreasonable especially since Esarhaddon is known to have repatriated Urartians whom he encountered in one of his campaigns, though he explicitly mentions a treaty (adû) which may have stipulated repatriation in one of its clauses. Teumman, on the other hand, was acknowledged as an ibru by Ashurbanipal but this did not necessarily obligate the Assyrian to return Elamite exiles to their home-land. It may be in the interpretation of the duties of ibrûtu that the dispute between Ashurbanipal and Teumman arose since the Elamite could argue that such close association was prejudiced by the harbouring of influential Elamite exiles by Assyria; it was, therefore, within the spirit of ibrûtu for Ashurbanipal to return the exiles.

23. AS 5, 60ff, iv.87 - v.3; IWA, K2672, obv. 20; ibid, pl.28;
25. IWA 71, K2672, vs. 20;
The Assyrians would have stressed that no such obligation was implied by *ibrūtu* and that the Elamites had, by grasping Ashurbanipal’s feet, put themselves under his protection.  

This difference of interpretation may have been the underlying cause of the dispute between Teumman and Ashurbanipal but it was exacerbated by the persistence and insouciance of the Elamite messages to Assyria:

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... mērehēte ina qata Umbadāra u Id Nabū-dāmiq istanappara arhīsam
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"... the insolent/aggressive (messages) he kept sending month by month in the hands of Umbadara and Nabu-damiq."

It is possible to suggest the way in which Teumman’s message was said to be mērentu: after the refusal of the extradition-request Teumman called out his forces and vowed to fight with Ashurbanipal which utterance is also called mērentu. This vow is similar in style to a message sent by Ashurbanipal to Indabigas of Elam about the Elamite’s failure to repatriate some Assyrian subjects, and it may be that Teumman’s mērehētu consisted of threats if his extradition-request were not granted. Threatening messages would also explain the strength of Assyrian hostility to Teumman and his request. 

The conduct of the Elamite missions to Ashurbanipal was in the hands of two envoys, Umbadāra (Hūmban-tahraḥ) and Nabū-dāmiq. It is unusual for envoys to be named and the prominence given to these Elamites, both in inscriptions and reliefs, demonstrates the strength of feeling their mission aroused in Assyria. Ashurbanipal made an exhibition of them to visiting Urartian

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26. Assyrian reluctance to surrender the exiles may also have been based on their usefulness as potential allies of Assyria if they came to power in Elam. A similar situation which states this more explicitly: *VAB* 7, 34ff, 23-41;

27. *AS* 5, 62, 97ff;

28. *AS* 5, 64, 20-25

29. *VAB* 142f, viii; cf. above p. 59 f; a message very similar to Ashurbanipal’s: *VAB* 69, Sm. 252, 2 ff, which is called mērehētu;

30. *AS* 5, 97; 72, 60;

31. J.F. Radde: *AMN* 9 (1976) 100 and Tt. 22, epigraphs on these reliefs: *VAB* 7, 98 ff; cf. *ibid.* 419f Sm. 1450 vs 11, Rs. 9ff;
envoys, stressing the mārentu of the messages they had brought, and, later, made them look on Teumman's severed head when it was brought to Nineveh.

Ashurbanipal also states that he had held the Elamite envoys in Assyria and from his complaint about Elamite detention of his own envoys it may be concluded that diplomatic envoys were not inviolate. The status of foreign envoys is not made clear in Assyrian records but these detentions, though arousing Ashurbanipal's indignation when his own envoys were seized, are not represented as illegal. It may be that no distinction was made between envoys and other royal officials since Ashurbanipal refers to one Elamite envoy as the šut-rēšī ("official") of Teumman and elsewhere seems to refer to one of his own mar-šipreṭī as šut-rēšīya. This is the only evidence from neo-Assyria on the position of envoys in the administration and it suggests that diplomats were not a separate corps within the Assyrian bureaucracy but rather individual members of the administration, commissioned to fulfil a specified diplomatic mission.

(iii) Indabigas

After the death of Teumman Elam was ruled by the pro-Assyrian Ummaniqas but two civil wars within four years resulted in the accession of Indabigas. The sequence of events in the relationship between Ashurbanipal and Indabigas is uncertain but the initial contact seems to have been made by Indabigas who sent his messenger sa tūbi u sulumme ("for good-relations and friendliness") with a request to Ashurbanipal to act favourably toward Elam and not to invade her. As an earnest of his good-will Indabigas returned some

32. AS 5, 72ff; 57-61; ABL 1260, 15; perhaps also AS 5, 76, 38f
33. VAB 7, 314, E, 1ff. cf. 328, 31ff; this Elamite envoy is also named and his mission too is described as ērjanīš, "insolently", conducted.
34. AS 5, 76, 37ff;
35. on the status of envoys see below p. 117ff;
37. AS 80, 77-92;
Assyrians who had been captured in earlier clashes by Nabū-bēl-šumuṭe. 38

This gesture is reminiscent of Mitāt of Muski’s initial contact with Sargon II when he returned Assyrian subjects as part of his diplomatic mission. The desirability of such gestures of good-will, particularly when opening diplomatic relations, is demonstrated by these two incidents.

Indabigas’ appeal to Ashurbanipal to support him and not to invade Elam reflects his concern as a usurper about possible Assyrian aid for the previous king of Elam, Tammaritu, who had been received at the Assyrian court and who was urging the Assyrians to restore him. 39 Indabigas specifically asked Ashurbanipal not to invade Elam (lā ḫatē mišir màtīṣu) just as Esarhaddon claims Elamite messengers had done in his reign. 40 By making concessions and adopting a deferential tone toward Ashurbanipal, Indabigas hoped to prevent Assyrian involvement in Elam and he may have been temporarily successful, because Ashurbanipal did send him a letter with cordial greetings, though not as fulsome as those between Esarhaddon and Urtaku: 41

"Tablet of Ashurbanipal the king, king of Assyria, to Indabigas, king of Elam, his brother. It is well with me, with my palace ... / .... / may it be well with you, with your palace .../ ...

Ashurbanipal in this greeting recognized Indabigas as a legitimate and friendly king and as a political equal. The rest of the letter is broken and its contents cannot be restored but from the greeting alone it may be

39. AS 5, 78ff 58-76; VAB 7, 34ff, 23-36;
40. Ash., 58f, 26-33; the author of this request was presumably Urtaku.
Assyrian concern about Scythian invasions is similarly phrased in the Large Ishtar Slabs: R.C. Thompson: AAA 20 (1933) 89, 156f;
41. ABL 918
42. ABL 1151. cf. M. Dietrich: Die Aramaer Suidbabyloniens in der .argonizeit (100-646) (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1970) 106f and 110 n. 4;
assumed that the import of the message was essentially friendly. Ashurbanipal's account of his contacts with Indabigas in edition B ends with the Elamite mission to Assyria which might also be taken as proof of Ashurbanipal's acceptance of Indabigas' overtures. However in edition C there is a fragmentary account of later dealings with Indabigas which reveals a change in the relationship. Edition C recounted Indabigas' mission in the same words as B but followed it immediately by an account of Ashurbanipal's reply in which the Assyrian claimed that Indabigas had not restored all the Assyrians captured by Nabû-bēl-šumâ— nor the rebel himself; Ashurbanipal gave warning of his intention to invade Elam and dethrone Indabigas because of these lapses.

Edition C has telescoped the chronology of these events in order to give the impression that Ashurbanipal's reaction to Indabigas was one of unqualified hostility. However, both the evidence of edition B, which suggests that Indabigas' mission was successful, and the letter from Ashurbanipal to Indabigas prove that good-relations were in force between Ashurbanipal and Indabigas for at least a limited period.

It has been necessary to reconstruct the relationship between Ashurbanipal and Indabigas in detail in order to show the importance of diplomatic recognition as a formal act and also the subordination of such formal gestures to the dictates of political expediency. Ashurbanipal aimed to nullify possible Elamite aggression by supporting those rulers of Elam who were pro-Assyrian and maintaining good relations with others. After the faithlessness of Ummamigaš, the Assyrian nominee, and the equally hostile attitude of Tammaritu, Ashurbanipal was probably unsure of Indabigas' policy toward Assyria. He was

43. AS HO, 80, 77-92;
44. VAB /, 142ff, viii 47-74, to be supplemented by IWA 13ff;
45. IWA I, ix (65)-(76) + IWA 20, 81-2-4, 172 col. (b) 1-12 makes it clear that Indabigas' mission and the Assyrian reply were related consecutively. Additional confirmation: E.E. Knudsen, Iraq 29 (1967) p.68, tablet 5533; and pl. XXV
able, however, to reciprocate the friendship requested by Indabigas while simultaneously supporting Tammaritu in Assyria as a possible rival to Indabigas as he had supported the sons of Urtaku as rivals to Teumman. His threat to dethrone Indabigas and the resulting orders to the Assyrian army were sufficient to cause an internal rebellion in Elam which overthrew Indabigas and replaced him with Ummanaldas.

It can be seen that though Ashurbanipal certainly opened friendly relations with Indabigas, but probably refused to give a guarantee of non-intervention in Elam, this did not prevent him from later threatening to attack Elam. Indabigas' messengers are specifically said to have been sent ša ṭubī u sulummu ("for good-will and friendly relations") and if this was the relationship implemented by Ashurbanipal then it does not seem to have implied close links of a particularly friendly nature. Ashurbanipal attempted in edition C to disguise his recognition of Indabigas and subsequent hostility by maintaining that his immediate reaction to the Elamite's mission was unfavourable but this assertion is contradicted by his letter to Indabigas. It may be concluded that Ashurbanipal realised that he had committed a breach of diplomatic conduct by first receiving and later rejecting Indabigas with whom he was probably on terms of sulummu u tūbtu. Ashurbanipal may also have been aware that his threatening message to Indabigas was reminiscent of a similar message sent to Assyria by Teumman which was regarded by the Assyrians as merqatu ("insolent"). Though neither of these messages were such serious breaches of diplomatic propriety as Urtaku's unannounced invasion of Babylonia, nevertheless they certainly promoted stress on an international level, as they were

46. see above p. 63
47. VAB 7, 144, 67ff;
48. As., 90, 91;
49. sulummu u tūbtu below p.93 ff; it may be significant that later versions of Ashurbanipal's dealings with Indabigas seem to omit the references to friendly relations: K3073, 11ff (IWA, 19) and also K1749 ix 4 81-2-4, 172 (IWA 17, 20).
50. see above p. 61 ff;
probably intended to. It is, therefore, not surprising that later recensions of Ashurbanipal's annals were edited so as to contain no references to his abortive friendship with Indabigaš.

The tensions between the formality of diplomatic practice and political or military advantage can best be seen in the relationship of the letters between monarchs with their historical background as presented in the Assyrian inscriptions. Indabigaš' precarious position within Elam is illustrated by his request to Ashurbanipal not to invade his land but even so Ashurbanipal extended to him a greeting on equal terms. Similar Ashurbanipal wrote to Tammaritu of Elam in cordial terms though the most likely date for the letter is after the Elamite's restoration as king of Elam by the Assyrians. Both these kings were nominally independent but their position was dominated by Assyrian interference and influence. Nevertheless they were still acknowledged as equals and independent princes in official documents.

Whereas both Indabigaš and Tammaritu might have still claimed some stature as kings, Ummanaldas III was ruler of only part of Elam which in his reign had been devastated by repeated Assyrian invasions. Even so Ummanaldas still addressed Ashurbanipal in a greeting-formula as abiya ("my brother"), though his deference to the king of Assyria is clearer in the body of the letter where he agrees to the extradition of Nabu-bel-sumate. Diplomatic protocol dictated that he maintain formal greeting with Ashurbanipal on equal terms despite his lack of any political or military strength.

The formality of diplomatic greeting and recognition in neo-Assyria

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51. see above p. 64; and 65; AS 5, 80, 90; ABL 1151;

52. ABL 1022, S.S. Ahmed, Southern Mesopotamia ... p. 180; ABL 1260, obv.5-15 may refer to Ummanigaš who was another Assyrian nominee who received Ashurbanipal's recogni.

53. Most conveniently in G.G. Cameron: History of Early Iran (1936) pp.195ff; on the date see M. Falkner, Afo 17 (1957) 113f;
can be seen to be artificial when the effective political status of the various rulers is considered. Kings of Elam were nominally the equals of the kings of Assyria as were the kings of Urartu. Assyrian jubilation on Sarduris III of Urartu's surrender of his equal status can therefore be explained.\(^{54}\)

Ummanaldas of Elam did not, however, disavow any of his rights although his political position vis-à-vis Assyria was far worse than that of Sarduris.

The artificiality of diplomatic etiquette is a corollary of the formalised approach toward international relations as a whole. This has been noted in the discussion of the contacts of Sargon with Mitā of Muski where their relationship, as revealed in the letter about Mitā,\(^{55}\) was seen to be different from that implied by the formalised diplomatic language of the historical inscriptions. The weaknesses of such a rigid artificiality were apparently noted in the reign of Ashurbanipal when the king of Elam was accorded a relationship (ibrūtu) previously unknown to neo-Assyria in order to attempt to introduce flexibility into diplomatic relationships with equals. However the failure of ibrūtu with both Teumman and Urtaku and the instability of Elam thereafter put an end to this experiment. The tensions between, on the one hand, formalised diplomacy, the ideology of Assyrian superiority and the enshrinement of these concepts in official records and, on the other, the dictates of practical diplomacy remained unresolved.

\(^{54}\) see above p. 159 ff;

\(^{55}\) above, p. 55 ff;
(b) Zagros tribes: Medes, Persians and Mannea

References to Assyrian contacts with the tribes of the Zagros, the Medes and Persians in particular, occur in the records of Shalmaneser III and his successors but only from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III onwards is sufficient evidence available on diplomacy to permit a detailed study. Important aspects of Assyrian diplomatic practice are, however, revealed in accounts of her dealings with Medes, Persians and Mannea from the reigns of Sargon II, Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal.

Tiglath-pileser III claimed in a stela to have received mandattu from all the city-rulers (bēl-ālāni) of the lands as far as Mount Biknī and from the annals it is known that he organised the conquered lands into provinces with governors. It seems therefore that Tiglath-pileser preferred to annex these territories and add them to the provincial system rather than to allow them to remain tributaries. This policy may have been influenced by the political fragmentation of the tribes of the Zagros who did not acknowledge an overlord, preferring to follow several leaders, the "city-rulers" (bēl-ālāni). This is particularly true of the Medes whose bēl ālāni seem to have been their highest political authority. Such a multiplicity of petty rulers would have been difficult to control as independent tributaries and it was, therefore, more advantageous to incorporate their lands into the Assyrian provincial system.

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1. E. Michel, WO 1 (1949) 472, 3f; WO 2 (1954) 36, 35; 228, 172f; 230, 185; also 156, 120 for a reference to tribute (mandattu); R.C. Thompson, AAA 19 (1932) 113 Q 11; P. Hulin, Iraq 28 (1966) 84f. ND 5571, 4; J.V. Kinneir-Wilson, Iraq 24 (1962) 94, 19; E.F. Weidner, AF 9 (1934) 102, 32; R 30 ii 40, iii 27, 3; ibid., 35, 7ff; RIA 2 (1933) 428ff C b 1, 8, 17f, 24-31 and rev.4; cf. SST 348, 24;


3. P. Rost, Die Keilschrifttexte Tiglat-pileser III (1893) (hereinafter, Rost) vol.II pl. XXX, 3ff, pl. XXXII, 18 - pl. XXXIII, 1, pl. XXVI 29-38.
It is possible to study in detail several aspects of Assyria's relationship with Mannea from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III to that of Ashurbanipal, a longer period than any other international liaison considered above. Most instructive are the detailed accounts of Sargon II's dealings with Ullusunu of Mannea.

Tiglath-pileser III did not include Mannea in the territories he annexed but received its ruler Iranzu as a tributary. Sargon later supported Iranzu when some Mannean territory revolted and it may be assumed that Iranzu had remained loyal to Assyria from the date of his reception by Tiglath-pileser. Sargon's intervention was followed soon after by the death of Iranzu but when his son Azā was put on the throne of Mannea by Sargon some Manneans were suborned by Rusa of Urartu to attack and kill Azā. Another son of Iranzu, Ullusunu, became king of Mannea but, probably influenced by Urartian pressure and his brother's death, he did not renew contact with Sargon, preferring to approach Rusa. Sargon undertook a campaign (his sixth) to restore Mannea to its former allegiance but was forced to burn Izirtu its capital before Ullusunu came to beg forgiveness. Ullusunu was reinstated as king and he acknowledged himself an Assyrian vassal, remaining loyal to Assyria thereafter. In the seventh campaign Sargon again restored territory which had been appropriated by Rusa of Urartu to Mannea and commemorated his conquests by setting up a stela in Izirtu.

4. (from previous page) TCL 3, 12, 66;
5. Levine, Two neo-Assyrian Stelae ... 18, 24ff;
6. Lie, M, 58ff;
7. Winckler, 104, 36-38; Lie, 12ff, 78ff; Levine, Two neo-Assyrian Stelae ... 36ff, 23-32;
8. Winckler, 104, 38ff an account which conflates at least two campaigns; Lie, 14, 83-89; Levine, op.cit., 36ff, 23-30; ABL 1058, obv. 7ff may relate to Ullusunu's hostility.
9. Lie, 16ff, 101-109; cf. Winckler, 104ff, 39-53; these accounts conflict on details and interpretation of the territory lost to Urartu and subsequently restored.
Sargon's most forceful campaign in this area was his eighth, best known from the "Gottesbrief".\textsuperscript{10} From this detailed account several important features of Assyrian diplomatic relations with their vassals emerge, principally in the description of Ullusunu's conduct toward Sargon. Their first encounter during the eighth campaign was at the fortress of Sinihini where Ullusunu presented his tribute (mandattu) and kissed Sargon's feet.\textsuperscript{11} Since Ullusunu was already an Assyrian vassal and was not attempting to apologize for some misdeed it can be seen that kissing the feet of one's overlord was a normal act upon meeting him, not a gesture reserved for extraordinary occasions. Grasping or kissing a king's feet was an overt gesture of subservience to him and of recognition of his sovereignty (epēš ardūti).\textsuperscript{12}

Sargon's campaign then turned away from Mannea but when he returned Ullusunu awaited him with stores of wine and flour for the army.\textsuperscript{13} This was one of the duties of an Assyrian provincial governor, as Sargon himself states, and Ullusunu's obedience in this respect is stressed in order to emphasise his loyalty.\textsuperscript{14} Explicit demands for provisions are not well attested in treaties and Ullusunu's action, therefore, shows a remarkable degree of loyalty.\textsuperscript{15} Apart from stressing Ullusunu's obedience in action Sargon remarks upon the commitment he and his people showed to being vassals of Assyria:

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\textsuperscript{10} TCL III; annals in Lie, 22-28;
\textsuperscript{11} TCL III 8, 32-36;
\textsuperscript{12} above p. 29; E.G. Klauber, Politisch-religiöse Texte ... (1913) 105, 13;
\textsuperscript{13} TCL III, 10, 51ff;
\textsuperscript{14} The translation of Luckenbill (ARAB II § 148) is misleading.
\textsuperscript{15} Sefîre, 18, 37ff and 71ff notes ad loc.; cf. E. Lipinski, Studies in Aramaic Inscriptions and Onomastics (Leuven, 1975) 42-44 and 52;
"... wholeheartedly disposed to being my subjects".

This phrase is reminiscent of some clauses in treaties where true loyalty - as opposed to lip-service - is demanded.17

Ullusunu made two other significant gestures, apart from providing the supplies, on the arrival of Sargon's army:

"... he presented to me his eldest son with greeting-gifts and entrusted his stela to me in order to safeguard his rule."

The passage presents two interpretative problems: first, it is not clear to whom the suffix -su ("his") on šarrūti and nara refers, second, the meaning of nara pagadu is dubious. The proximity of the son's presentation to šarrūtu could suggest that Ullusunu was ensuring the succession of his son but there may be no significance in the juxtaposition of the two events. The phrases recording them are joined by -ma but similarly -ma joins the phrase describing Ullusunu's provisioning of the troops with his presentation to Sargon of his son. The use of enclitic -ma in linking these phrases is, therefore, not a sure indication of any causal link between each of the actions described.

The use of sutlumu ("to make a present of, to hand over") is unusual here since it is employed most commonly at this date in royal epithets to describe the gods' bestowal of qualities on the king.19 It is also used of

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16. TEL III 10, 52.

17. TEL, lines 51, 53, 98, 152, 169, 310, 386; R. Frankena, OTS 14 (1965) 140f; Sefire, 80 B.5; E.F. Weidner, AfO 8 (1933) 25.iv.3;

18. TEL III, 10, 54;

19. M.J. Seux, Epithètes royales ... (1967) 334f;
Assur granting a king the capture of a town and the giving of offerings to the gods. It seems that *sutumnu* indicates an act of outright gift-giving, not a presentation in the sense of appearance before a king. Ullusunu was, therefore, handing over to Sargon his eldest son.

*Narā paqādu* is an idiom otherwise unattested. It is more common for *narā* to indicate the stela itself, not its written contents and had Sargon wished to commemorate the inscription he could have used *ṣatāru ina nari* which is found elsewhere in neo-Assyrian inscriptions. It is possible that *nara* here is a hapax but such an explanation affords no solution to the problem of interpretation.

The phrase *kunnu šarrūti* ("to safeguard the kingship ") is more commonly used by kings protecting or confirming their own kingship, but one example of the establishment of dominion by a king on behalf of his sons is known. This phrase cannot, therefore, provide an unequivocal answer on whether Ullusunu was safeguarding his own or his son's succession.

The historical context of Ullusunu's gestures provides some evidence with which to interpret them. Ullusunu is not known to have feared deposition either by Sargon or hostile rulers such as Rusā of Urartu, although the uncertainty of his neighbours' intentions may have influenced him to make a formal gesture to Sargon. The sending of the eldest son to the Assyrian court as a pledge of good-relations is attested in neo-Assyria but it is not certain whether they were always retained as hostages or were allowed to return as a sign of Assyrian good-will. In Ullusunu's case there may have been another

20. VAV 7, 198, 29ff; OIP 2, 116, 70; 125, 50;
21. see AHw 749a sub *nara* 2a; a possible parallel to *narā paqādu* is suggested by W.F. Albright; JASS 36 (1917) 228;
22. for example, CAD K 167a, *kanu* 3k;
23. AHL 7, rev. 4, 6 (=LAS no. 143);
24. see below p. 82 - 83.
cause for the surrender of his son to Sargon. When they first met at Sinihini Sargon comments that Ullusunu came bālū liṭīt ("without hostages"), an indication that Assyria did not require such pledges from a loyal vassal. Ullusunu may have realised that Assyrian confidence in Mannea was now so strong that he could entrust his heir to Sargon in the knowledge that if he himself were to be deposed Assyria would promote his son in his place. To this end he made his son a voluntary hostage of Assyria but at the same time gave Sargon the document on which he nominated his son as heir.

It cannot be concluded with certainty that Ullusunu by presenting his eldest son to Sargon was protecting his son's future exercise of kingship and not his own nor can the significance of the entrusting of the stela to Sargon be fully explained. The bond of loyalty between Ullusunu and his overlord can however be asserted with confidence and Ullusunu's subsequent courting of Sargon confirms this.

The elaborate preparations made by Ullusunu for Sargon's arrival were not altruistic. He intended to make specific requests of Sargon in order to make sure that the Assyrian subdued the enemies of Mannea. Apart from providing the supplies for the army, the gifts and his own son Ullusunu gave mandattu to Sargon in addition to that which he had presented on their first meeting at Sinihini. However, while Sargon was receiving these contributions Ullusunu supplicated him ûşû turrû gimiššû ("to return an act of kindness for him"). Turru gimiššû is used of avenging dead ancestors or vassals but it is also found in contexts where vengeance is inappropriate. For instance Sargon supported Is̄ harassment as a claimant to the throne of Ellipi, an action described as turrû gimiššû. Similarly Marduk-apla-iddina II of Babylon gained the

25. TCL III, 8, 33ff;
26. cf. VAB 7, 18ff, 81-94;
27. TCL III, 10, 55;
28. Winckler, 118, 118-120;
support of Sutruk-naḥhunte of Elam by bribing him. He thereby put the Elamite under an obligation and the Assyrians called him his bol gimillisu ("benefactor"). Ashurbanipal proclaimed his own sterling qualities as a king who returned kindnesses to a loyal subject (ana paliṭi нная ar amat šarrūtišu utirru gimilli dumqi) and Ullusunu himself is said to have benefited from Sargon's annual campaigns (assu ana turri gimillišu sattisam la <ap> parakku: "because I (Sargon) had not ceased to return kindnesses upon him every year.").

In all these cases there is an element of obligation or reciprocity but not of vengeance. Sutruk-naḥhunte and Ashurbanipal were under an obligation to return the acts of good-will done them by their adherents and it may be significant that the party repaying the debt is always the superior. This suggests that there were certain obligations on a king to support his loyal vassals and that by their loyalty they ensured this support.

Ullusunu enumerated the ways in which he wanted Sargon to "repay his kindness" and though these requests are framed in a rhetorical manner their veracity should not be doubted:

1) to exclude the Kakmeans from Ullusunu's territory,
2) to defeat Rusa of Urartu in open battle,
3) to return the scattered people of Mannea to Ullusunu,
4) to triumph over Ullusunu's enemies,
5) to attain all his (i.e. Sargon's) desires.

29. Lie, 54, 369; cf. CAD G, 75a;
30. NRG D nos. 9-12 lines 9, 10;
31. TCL III, 8, 32;
33. TCL III, 12, 56;
It is important to notice that Sargon made a commitment to these aims and fulfilled them all either wholly or in part during the rest of his campaign. is paralleled directly in the description of the aftermath of the defeat of Urartu: The fulfillment of Ullusunu's requests is even clearer in the case of iii): ... "I gladdened the heart of Ullusunu their lord by liberating his harassed people (lit.: letting light go out to his harassed people)."

The explicit reference to Ullusunu makes it clear that Sargon was aware of the fulfillment of his vassal's requests and his commitment to do so. The second request, to defeat Urartu, is implicitly fulfilled in the success of the campaign as a whole, as are iv) and v). Ullusunu's petition to Sargon was couched in the proper subservient language but it contained genuine grievances which Sargon was expected to put right. The expulsion of the hostile Kakmeans from Mannea could only be effected if Ullusunu's principal opponent, Rusa of Urartu, were conclusively defeated. Sargon could then restore those Manneans who had been lost by depredations to their homeland. Ullusunu may not have meant by this request that Sargon should send back to Mannea those Manneans who were outside its borders but rather that Sargon should restore lost territory to Mannea. This is supported by Sargon's answer to Ullusunu's request: turri miqrisun ((I promised) to re-establish their (the Manneans') borders). Further

34. TCL III, 12, 61;
35. TCL III, 26, 155;
36. ibid. cf. 12, 61; also Winckler, 148, 21; F. Weissbach, ZDMG 72 (1918) 170, 85; D.G. Lyon, Keilschrifttexte Sargon's ... (Leipzig, 1883) 5, 31;
37. TCL III 24, 142ff; the fulfillment of a king's desires is explicitly connected with the defeat of his enemies in E.F. Neidner: AfO 8 (1932) 184, 54; 186, 11; 200, 74;
38. TCL III, 12, 61;
confirmation is provided by the restitution to Mannea of the province of Uušdis which had fallen away some years earlier.

Sargon agreed to Ullusunu's requests and further confirmed his trust in his vassal by preparing an honorific banquet for the Manneans and the Assyrians together. This banquet served to affirm and consolidate the relationship between Sargon and Ullusunu and their respective lands. It was perhaps followed by a ceremony in which the two contingents solemnly acknowledged Sargon as their king (maḫar Aššur u ilāni mātisunu ikrūḇū šarrūti). 40

Sargon's relationship with Ullusunu is illuminated more clearly from these incidents in the eighth campaign than any similar relationship from the neo-Assyrian period. It may be concluded that although the vassal was in an avowedly subservient position he nevertheless had the right to appeal to his overlord for the redress of grievances. By remaining loyal the vassal both obliged the suzerain to continue to support him and expected to receive favourable treatment. Ullusunu was not a vassal of long standing and had been anti-Assyrian on his accession so the responsibilities of the suzerain can be seen to apply to all vassals, not merely the traditional or wholeheartedly faithful. However the historical circumstances must have affected each relationship of vassals with Assyria and in Ullusunu's case Assyria needed an ally in the central Zagros to offset the hostility of Urartu and her satellites. Assyrian treatment of him may therefore have been more lavish and have received longer description in the eighth campaign but the underlying implication of the Assyrian treatment of Ullusunu remains the same: loyalty on the part of subjects or vassals bound the king to respond in a similar manner.

39. TCL III 16, 91; 28, 163; Lie, 24, 163f and 12, 78ff;
40. TCL III, 12, 63;
Assyrian diplomacy with the tribes of the Zagros is also attested in the correspondence of the archives of Nineveh and Nimrud. A coherent reconstruction of Assyrian policy cannot, however, be made from the disjointed references of the letters. Nevertheless the recurrence of Assyrian diplomatic terminology, e.g. dibbi ṭabûte ("words of good-will"), sulmu ("greeting"), and the attested intervention of Assyria in the diplomacy and politics of the area show that Assyrian diplomacy was active. Of particular importance was the desirability of maintaining good relations with tribes and of formalising these relations by a sworn agreement. In some cases Assyria resorted to threats if her plans were not fulfilled by local rulers. Behind this open manipulation of the tribes lay a highly-organised information-service which reported on all activities of interest to the central authorities in Nineveh who co-ordinated policy.

ii) Esarhaddon’s relations with the tribes of the Zagros are dominated by the documents known as the Vassal-Treaties of Esarhaddon. These agreements, whose sole concern was the succession of Esarhaddon’s sons, Ashurbanipal and Samas-sumu-ukin, to the thrones of Assyria and Babylonia respectively, were concluded with a number of rulers of the Zagros in 672 B.C. It is not intended to discuss the treaties here but rather to concentrate on the historical background which reveals several features of interest for diplomacy.

41. ABL 208; 1046; 1454; 126; 129;
42. ABL 174; 713;
43. On the workings of this "Deuxième Bureau", with reference to Urartu in particular, R. Follet, RSO 32 (1957) 61-81; also H.W.F. Saggs, Iraq 20 (1958) 182ff;
44. D.J. Wiseman, Iraq 20 (1958) 1-100;
45. ibid., 9-13;
Esarhaddon's control of the central Zagros was not as complete as that of Sargon and Mannea was almost certainly hostile to Assyria. However, it is likely that Assyrian influence was still prevalent because three city-rulers (bel-āli) of Media appealed to Esarhaddon when they were threatened by other local rulers.47

"... they kissed my feet. On account of the city-rulers who had threatened them they begged me to be their overlord and appealed to me for aid."

Esarhaddon responded to these requests for military support by despatching the nearest Assyrian officers to subdue the enemies and, having fulfilled his obligations, made the three rulers Assyrian tributaries.48

One of these three, Ramataia of Urakazabarna, was a party to the treaties of 672 and he is likely, therefore, to have remained an Assyrian vassal in the interim.49 His formal contractual obligation dates from the earlier incident when he certainly acknowledged Assyrian sovereignty and the Vassal-Treaties must therefore be seen as a supplement, not the full record, of the relationship of Esarhaddon with Ramataia or any of the other signatories.

Parallels to the mission of the three Zagros chieftains are found in incidents from the reigns of Tiglath-pileser III and Sargon II. In the former a ruler, almost certainly of an area in the Zagros, came before Tiglath-pileser with tribute and kissed his feet. An Assyrian official was then dispatched to

46. Assyrian hostilities against Mannea, A. Heidel, Sumer 12 (1956) 16, 16-19;
47. Ash. 55, 39-41;
48. ibid. 55, 41-45;
49. At least three years - the prism published by Heidel (p. 81 n. 16) is dated to 676 B.C.
the land of the Medes, perhaps to undertake some action requested by the suppliant king. The inclusion of this mission separately from the submission of other areas of the Zagros suggests that it was an unusual event not felt to cohere with their submission. The despatch of the Assyrian official might also indicate a situation very similar to that of the three Zagros rulers in Esarhaddon's reign.

The second incident concerns the dispute over the throne of Elam on the death of the loyal Assyrian vassal Talta. His two sons Išpabara and Nibe appealed to Assyria and Elam respectively for assistance (kitru) in much the same manner as in the later incident from Esarhaddon's reign.

These three incidents all seem to have embodied requests to Assyria for military assistance from rulers who were not Assyrian vassals but who offered to become subjects of Assyria in return for aid. Two of them were certainly motivated by fears of intervention by a third party and preferred to acknowledge Assyrian sovereignty. This suggests that the overlord in a vassal-relationship had responsibilities and obligations toward his subjects even though no clause guaranteeing these rights is known to exist in first-millennium treaties. In acknowledging himself a subject of Assyria a king was automatically making his enemies the enemies of his overlord and thereby placing the responsibility for defeating them on the overlord.

iii) Ashurbanipal is known to have conducted only one campaign into the Zagros but he was successful in making the new king of Mannea, Ualli, recognize

............

50. The text is badly preserved: P. Rost, Die Keilschrifttexte Tiglat-pilesers III (Leipzig, 1893) II pl. XXXVI lines 38-42. A translation in ARAB I 8 795. A similar but shorter text does not mention this mission, Rost, op.cit. XXX 3f;
51. Winckler, 118, 119-120;
Assyrian authority. The previous king, Aḫšeri, had not acknowledged Assyrian sovereignty but the campaign caused his downfall and murder at the hands of his people. Ualli sought to improve his position by submitting to Assyria:

"To save his life he spread forth his hands and besought me to be his lord. He sent his heir, Erisinni, to Nineveh to kiss my feet."

The use of the sons of a vassal as envoys in missions to Assyria is attested also for Ba' al of Tyre, Kuras of Parsumas and Mugallu of Tabal. Ba' al's son may have been sent to Assyria as a possible hostage but Ashurbanipal returned him to his father. Kuras' embassy is described in two slightly differing accounts: in the first a fuller version is given including the reference to his son as a member of the embassy whereas in the second the embassy is merely described as "envoys". The most conclusive evidence that a son acted as his father's envoy is contained in the description of the embassy of Mugallu of Tabal who not only sent his daughter with tribute but also his son:

"... his son he sent yearly without ceasing to bring his heavy tribute and kissed my feet."

52. AS 5, 50-56;
53. ibid., 54, 91-94;
54. VAB 7, 18, 58-62;
55. E.F. Weidner: AFO 7 (1931-32), 4, 7-13;
56. R.C. Thompson, AAA, 20 (1933) 86, 115-118;
57. Thompson, loc.cit. 88, 141;
Since Mugallu sent his son every year the latter cannot have been retained in Assyria as a hostage. In this case at least Ashurbanipal wished to verify his vassal's loyalty by receiving the heir to the throne of Tabal every year. Similarly in Ba'al's case Ashurbanipal made the sending of his heir a test of loyalty. Ualli's son, Erisinni, may have acted as a possible hostage but he also undertook the requisite gesture of homage to Ashurbanipal.

Similarly both Kuras' son and Mugallu's son are said to have implored Ashurbanipal to be their overlord (gullu belüti). These actions are those of envoys, not necessarily a member of a royal family. From Assyria's point of view, the regular sending of the heir to a foreign kingdom as an envoy was likely to inhibit revolt by his father and the performance of the submission-ceremonies by a high-status individual was desirable because it gave a stronger guarantee of the vassal's willingness to remain loyal. This can also be seen in the use of other high-status envoys (şerâni) in neo-Assyria, even though their exact identity is not known.

The frequent sending of the daughters of vassals to the Assyrian court was a more permanent means of guaranteeing the loyalty of a vassal. Ualli's sending of his son to Ashurbanipal received a favourable response from the Assyrian and subsequently Ualli sent his daughter to the Assyrian court. Just as the value in diplomatic contacts of the eldest son was as a proxy for his father, the daughter was esteemed as a permanent sign of the relationship between the Assyrian king and his neighbours. It is difficult to be certain

58. ibid. and p. 83 n. 55
59. e.g. VAB 7, 144, ix, 41-49; Thompson, loc.cit., 86, 117f
60. see below, p. 117ff
61. VAB 7, 16, 55 - 18,80
62. AS 5, 54, 96f
whether there was any element of status-defining in the sending, as opposed to the receiving, of a daughter.  

The mission of Kuras of Parsumas, the grandfather of Cyrus the Great, to Ashurbanipal provides one final interesting diplomatic feature. It arrived in Assyria with the embassy of Pislume of Hudimert and both embassies are described, in the fuller account, as having implored Ashurbanipal to be their lord (uṣallā belūti). In addition Kuras' mission was sent ana epēs ardūtu ("to acknowledge my sovereignty") while Pislume's envoys are described as  

However the abbreviated account states that the envoys were  

The gestures of kissing a king's feet and requesting him to be overlord can be seen to be part of the same ceremony of the acknowledgement of subservience. Similarly the messengers "for greeting" were recognising Ashurbanipal and implicitly asking for his recognition of their sovereign. This greeting did not, however, of itself confirm a particular status. The expression which seems out of place is  

The clear identification in this text of the recognition of vassalage with tubu u sulummā contradicts this interpretation, but on some occasions it was used of alliances of equality. It therefore seems not to have carried an implication of either inferior or superior status.

63. some discussion in PKB 142, n.856 and ABC, 209 Ashur-bel-kala; 
64. E.F. Weidner, AFO 7 (1931-32) 4, 13 and 25; 
65. ibid.; 
66. Thompson, loc.cit. 86, 117f; 
67. Grayson's translation "entente cordiale" avoids this error but seems obscure: ABC 162 ii 1 and note. 
68. e.g. Nabopolassar and Cyaxares: ABC 93, 29. 
69. Further discussion of sulummā u tubu below p. 111 ff;
Assyrian diplomatic activity with the tribes of the Zagros can be seen to have been intensive. The same diplomatic techniques employed in areas with more sophisticated forms of government are in evidence but the Assyrians were clearly uneasy with tribes who recognised no overlord and who neglected oaths and agreements. By the reign of Tiglath-pileser III rulers such as Ullusunu were fully capable of fitting into the Assyrian diplomatic and political stereotype as the evidence of his manipulation of the eighth campaign shows. The same can be said of many of the other tribes in the Zagros, the Medes in particular, but only in the reign of Ashurbanipal does a clearly identifiable native king, Kuraš of Parsumaš, appear in the Assyrian records as a suppliant to the Assyrians. By this date the Zagros tribes were certainly aware of and able to comprehend Assyrian diplomacy.

The requests of Ullusunu and of the other Zagros rulers from the reign of Esarhaddon show that an overlord did have certain obligations to defend and protect his vassal in return for loyalty. Ashurbanipal's records demonstrate that this loyalty was continually being tested by embassies to Assyria, often including members of the royal family.

70. TCL III, 12, 66; ABL 1237, 16;
Terminology of diplomacy

(a) *sulummu*

The only analysis of this word and its semantic range to date is by von Soden.\(^1\) His study concentrated on the *gutulla*\(^3\) form of the noun, not on the meaning of *sulummu* itself. His conclusion on the meaning of this nominal form\(^2\) will, however, be seen to apply to *sulummu* although whether the use of *sulummu* automatically implied a formal agreement will be disputed.\(^3\) Occurrences of *sulummu*, including those not directly associated with international relations, will be analysed in order to establish its significance in the diplomatic language of the ancient near east.

In an Old Babylonian hymnic-epic text Adad is said to have somehow encouraged warfare at the expense of *sulummu*:\(^4\)

> ... *yaššam ilqēma e sulumma*

"... he (Adad) took conflict as against (?) friendliness ..."

This translation is problematic since the idiom is otherwise unknown. However the phrase *salimu leqū* is attested in two Old Babylonian letters where the context demands a translation of accepting or initiating friendly relations.\(^5\) This suggests that *sulummu* was not only contrasted with hostilities (*sasmu*) but also connoted a state of friendly relations. This is confirmed by two Amarna

\(...\)...\n
1. Festschrift Koschaker, 199-207, esp. 205;

2. *ibid.,* 200 "... die Form *gutullā*... nie ein zufälliges Ausuben der durch das zugehörige Verbum ausgedrückten Handlung bezeichnet wird, sondern stets ein planmässiges, an bestimmte Gelegenheiten und oft wohl auch Verfahrensweisen gebundenes Tun."

3. *ibid.* 205 "... *sulummu* ... den formlichen Eintritt in der Zustand der Freundschaft durch ein 'Bundnisvertrag' bezeichnet."

4. HSAO 1 (1967) 186, i, 9 and 193;

5. J. Laessöe, The Shemshara Tablets, a preliminary report (Copenhagen, 1959) 80, 29; *id.*, AS16, 193, 25;
letters in one of which the friendly mutual recognition of Tuṣratta of Mitanni and Amenophis IV of Egypt is shown by the use of aḫu ("brother"). Tuṣratta, however, wished to elicit a more definite statement of Amenophis' friendship and hinted that Amenophis might now communicate with him on terms of sulummû, although Amenophis' father had only been on terms of rāmu ("love") with Tuṣratta. It seems, therefore, that rulers could enjoy rāmu, which probably implies good relations, without sulummû. Hence sulummû is a more explicit statement of friendly relations, perhaps a formal treaty - as suggested by von Soden's definitions of it.

In the treaty between Ramses II of Egypt and Hattusili III of Hatti sulummû is shown to be an integral part of a properly formalised international relationship:

"(Ramses ... with Hattusili ..., his brother) to establish favourable sulummû and good brotherhood between us from that day forever ..."

This is the only occurrence of sulummû in a text which contains many examples of other cognates of salāmu and it is important to note that it occurs in the section describing the conclusion of the treaty: While both sulummû and aḥhuta are promulgated and affirmed in the treaty, they are not synonyms for it nor do they describe it. This bi-lateral concept of friendly relations may be compared with that implied by sulmu elsewhere in the same text where Ramses is said to have seized (accepted?) the treaty ana epesi sulmi ("to accomplish

6. EA 29, 6f and 42, 18f; a new edition of the first in H-P Adler, Das Akkadische des Königs Tuṣratta von Mitanni (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1976), 230;

7. PDK 114, 15f; trans. in ANET, 201ff.;

8. The editors of this text consciously chose sulummû in this context whereas elsewhere they preferred salāmu. This subtle distinction of the two terms recurs in later documents.
This seems to be a universal claim and to go beyond the strictly lateral nature of the treaty.

Another important feature of this treaty is the antithesis drawn between, on the one hand, friends and brothers (salmu anhu) and, on the other, enemies (nakru). The principal aim of the treaty was to establish the friendship and brotherhood (salamu u aḥhūtu) of the partners, thereby automatically obviating hostility.

In the historical introductions to the treaty between Suppiluliumas and Mattiwaṣā of Mitanni sulummū again appears:

*Takuwa šar URUNiya sulummā ana māt URUMukišna ana pâniya ittalka*

"Takuwa, king of Niya, (for) sulummū came before me to the land of Mukis."

Suppiluliumas had not conducted hostilities against Takuwa and it was presumably to forestall any such attack that Takuwa waited on the Hittite king. It is possible therefore that sulummū here refers to the relationship defined in the treaty.

Two fragmentary references to sulummū occur in the historical introduction to another Hittite treaty; in the first of these the citizens of a city seem to have requested sulummū from Suppiluliumas after seeing his opponents defeated; in the second the inhabitants of Wāṣukkanni are said not to have agreed to sulummū and subsequently the Hittites entered Wāṣukkanni. Two conclusions may be drawn: 1) not only rulers but also the inhabitants of a town could request...

1. ibid., 116, 26;
2. On the reading of this name: C. Zaccagnini, Or.Ant. 13 (1974) 25-34;
3. PDK 10, 30f;
5. Weidner (see note 13) translates sulummū as "Frieden" explicitly dismissing "Bundsgenossenschaft". Goetze (ANET3, 318b) has "to sue for peace" and Laroche (Ugaritica 6 (1969) 371f) uses "paix".
16. PDX 46, 45 and 49;

17. The context of this second reference is so fragmentary that the identity of the other party to this sulumμd is obscure.
sułummu from a foreign monarch, and ii) sułummu may have been offered or requested as an alternative to hostile treatment by an enemy army. This second point corroborates the conclusion drawn from the incident involving Takuwa and suggests that sułummu was not necessarily a fully formalised treaty but could be a settlement concluded in more informal circumstances. The first point shows that sułummu was not confined to an interpersonal relationship between monarchs. However the bilateral structure of the relationship is still apparent though functioning in a more sophisticated way.

That sułummu continued to be used for the intercourse of individual monarchs can be observed in a letter — perhaps from Tukulti-Ninurta I of Assyria — found in the archives at Boghazkoi. The letter calls the writer's father a bēl nukurti ("enemy") of the Hittite king but claims that the writer is bēl sułummu ša aḫiya ("the friend of my brother"). Both the connection between sułummu and ahu and their antithesis to nukurtu ("hostility") are reminiscent of the treaty between Ramses and Hattusilis. It is again apparent that sułummu implies friendship between rulers and their states, a relationship which implicitly forbade any hostile actions or ill-feeling (nukurtu). However the writer was apparently at pains to emphasise the juridical overtones of sułummu by calling himself bēl sułummu where salmu ("friend") would have had a nearly identical meaning.

Even if the letter from Boghazkoi is only doubtfully attributed to Tukulti-Ninurta I, his own inscriptions provide a significant reference to sułummu. The Assyrian king despoiled and plundered five cities of Kadmuḫu

18. ITN 40 no. 36 and cf. A.K. Grayson, ARI 1, 132f., 42;
19. See above p.88;
20. ITN, 1, 24; cf. ARI 1, 103, 692;
which had attacked Assyria ... ina sulumma u sarartu ... ("... through friendship and trickery"). If sulummu refers to a state of friendly relations between rulers then here it must denote a relationship which Tukulti-Ninurta had with the cities of Kadmuḫu and despite which they attacked him. This treachery (sarartu) may be compared with that of Urtaku of Elam who attacked Assyria though being in correspondence on terms of sulummu. 21

The Assyrian indictment of the Kadmuḫean cities' conduct rests on their enjoyment of a positive relationship of good-will (sulummu) with Assyria at the time of the attack. This association was not merely a passive co-existence, as might be implied by a translation of sulummu as "peace", 22 but rather a friendly co-operation of the two parties. This use of sulummu shows that it denoted the state of friendly relations existing between rulers who were on good terms.

The earliest references to sulummu in first millennium sources appear in the Synchronistic History 23 where sulumma forms part of a stereotyped phrase repeated in several different places:

\[\text{tūbta sulumma gamra itti aḫāmes iškunū}\]

"Good relations and complete unity they established with each other."

The combination of tūbta ("good relations") with sulummu confirms the proposal that sulummu was a state of genuine good relations and co-operation and not merely a lack of hostility. It can also be concluded from at least one incident that tūbta sulummu could be concluded after the victory of one party over the other, which makes it unlikely that this phrase was an indication of some sort of parity settlement. 25 The use of tūbta sulummu in the Synchronistic History suggests a purposeful determining of international relationships but

21. above, p. 177, and below p. 94;

22. Weidner (ITN 3, 24) translates the phrase, "...die im Frieden und mit Heimstucke"; Grayson (ARI 1, 103) "... during a deceitful peace ...";

23. ABC 53 a-b;

24. ABK, 166 ii 27; 162 ii 1; 166 iii 18; 167 iii 24 and 7; also 184,6 where tūbta is rendered ideographically (DUG-tu) not syllabically.

25. ABK, 166 iii 10-19;
not necessarily the settlement itself. Rather it indicates the good-will and friendship created by the agreement between the two parties.

Later Assyrian use of sulummu is confined to the inscriptions of Sargon II and Ashurbanipal. In 720 B.C. Sargon defeated Iaubi'di of Hamath who had instigated a revolt in the western Assyrian provinces. The rebel was flayed alive, Hamath incorporated into the provincial system but Sargon's only comment on the other rebels is: 26

ina qereb ālānišunūti bēl ḫitti adûk sulummu ušaskin

"I executed the evildoers in those cities and caused sulummu to be established."

Sargon cannot be employing sulummu as a formally agreed relationship since he names no partner and it can be concluded that at least in this case sulummu connoted a friendly and peaceful state rather than a ratified relationship. Furthermore Sargon is speaking of a relationship with his provinces, not independent or semi-independent rulers. This makes a reference to diplomatic agreements proper less likely. Whereas earlier references to sulummu had implied a state of good-relations arising from a bi-lateral diplomatic settlement, Sargon seems to be using sulummu in a less specific manner, to denote normal, peaceful conditions not necessarily arising as a result of diplomacy.

Sulummu was still, however, closely linked with formal diplomacy as is shown by a reference in the annals of Ashurbanipal: 28

ēli tarqu šar KUR Küsi ana šakān aδe u salīme umā'erū Lū rakbēsun umma sulummu ina birinni liššakinma nindaggara aḥāmes mātu aḥennā nizūzma ai ibbāši

ina birinni šanumma bēlēm

26. Winckler, 102, 35; see RLA sub Hamath, Jau-bi'di;

27. Tukultinurta's use of sulummu (above p. 91) is the closest to Sargon's in that he too seems to imply a state of good-relations rather than a relationship.

28. VAB 7, 12, 23ff; cf. ibid., 160, 38;
"To Taharkah, king of Kush, they (the Egyptian princes) sent envoys to establish a treaty and friendship (saying), 'Let us forge friendly relations between us and come to a mutual agreement. We shall divide the land between us (so that) no other man shall become lord among us.'"

The most important feature of this letter for a study of diplomatic terminology is the clear differentiation between sašimu ("friendship") and sulummû ("friendly relations"): the envoys were instructed to seek a treaty (adû) and friendship (salîmu) but the text of their message requested sulummû. This implies that sulummû combined both adû and salîmu, thus supporting the hypothesis that sulummû was the practical expression of a formal - i.e. treaty-bound - relationship which ensured friendly relations between two states. The letter also establishes that sulummû was closely connected with salîmu but that the two terms were subtly distinguished.

Sulummû appears several times elsewhere in Ashurbanipal's annals, in most cases being associated with diplomatic missions. Urtaku of Elam used a ruse to delay Ashurbanipal's reaction to the Elamite invasion of Babylonia:

Lú šērānišu ša sulummê ištanappara ina maḫriya

"He kept sending before me his envoys of good-relations..."

In view of Urtaku's known friendship with Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal's support of him it seems more likely that these envoys were part of the customary diplomacy between friendly states. The continuing missions of Elamite envoys led Ashurbanipal to believe that friendly relations were still in force even when he had earlier been informed of the Elamite attack. Urtaku's relationship with Ashurbanipal was one of sulummû but was probably not bounded by a treaty.

29. AS 5, 58, 40; 30. Esarhaddon and Urtaku: ABL 918 see also above p. 128; 31. above p. 60ff.
This shows that monarchs corresponding on equal terms could enjoy sulummû. Similarly sulummû could be established with political inferiors: Natnu of Wabâyûtu is explicitly stated to have gained sulummû from Ashurbanipal when he acknowledged Assyrian sovereignty:

\[ \text{ana šakān adē sulummē epēs ardūti ušanallā bēlūti} \]

"(he sent his messenger) to bring about a treaty and friendly relations, to do me homage and he begged me to be his overlord."

The connection of sulummû with a formal agreement (adû) is here emphasised and it can also be observed that it was compatible with vassalage (ardūtu). However if sulummû were automatically the outcome of a treaty it is difficult to see why it is explicitly mentioned in addition to adû but it may be that sulummû was conceived of as separable from a formal agreement.

The juxtaposition of sulummû and tûbtu in the Synchronistic History is repeated in texts from the later years of the reign of Ashurbanipal, all of which record missions to Assyria by foreign rulers. In the first, Indabigaš of Elam attempted to gain Ashurbanipal's good-will by repatriating Assyrians who had been carried off to Elam and by sending a message to the Assyrian court:

\[ \text{Lūmār šiprišu ša tūbi u sulummē ušebila adi māpriya} \]

"... he sent before me (the Assyrians by the hand of) his messenger of good-will and friendliness."

Indabigaš, who had recently come to the throne, could not have opened good-relations with Ashurbanipal prior to this mission and the envoy is therefore probably attempting to bring about tûbu u sulummû between Elam and Assyria. 

32. AS 5, 86, 57ff; VAB 7, 144, 42ff; M. Weippert, WO 7 (1973/4) 78 iii 7;
33. AS 5, 80, 89ff; Borger, Bi.Or. 16 (1959) 139;
34. above p. 65;
There is, however, no evidence that Indabiqas sought to become an Assyrian vassal.

However, when Dugdamme, the Scythian chieftain sent "envoys of good-will and friendly relations" (šērānī ša tūbi u sulummē) to Assyria Ashurbanipal imposed a settlement upon him in which the Assyrians tried to ensure the Scythians' loyalty. Here tūbi u sulummē were compatible with vassalage. In the settlement imposed upon Dugdamme there is no reference to tūbi or sulummē though this had been the mission with which his envoys had been entrusted. The implication should be drawn that there was no necessity for such terms to be explicitly included in the formal settlement.

Envoys of good-will and friendly relations (šērānī ša tūbi u sulummē) are said to have been sent to Ashurbanipal by some unnamed rulers and also by Kuraš of Parsumaš and Pislume of Hudimēri. All these rulers requested Ashurbanipal to be their overlord and acknowledged their subordination to him. The missions of Kuraš and Pislume are recorded in two texts which give parallel versions and it is clear that the abbreviated version chose to use tūbi u sulummē in preference to longer descriptions of acts of submission to Assyria. Sulummē was, therefore, a relationship not necessarily confined to equal partners.

The arbitrary and seemingly capricious manner in which sulummē is included in or omitted from Assyrian records of diplomacy suggests that it was not reserved for a narrow category of actions but was a fundamental postulate of all friendly relationships. It could, therefore, be omitted without loss of meaning to the text or included if a rhetorical or more explicit statement of the

35. R.C. Thompson, AAA 20 (1933) 89, 153ff. restored by A. Millard, Iraq 30 (1968) 109, 17ff;

36. E.F. Weidner, AfO 7 (1931/2) 4, 2ff; cf. R.C. Thompson, AAA 20 (1933) 86, 115ff; The identity of the first group of rulers is lost in a gap at the start of Weidner's text; this group of envoys is said to be ana tūbi u sulummē;

37. Thompson, loc.cit.;
relationship was required by the editors of the text. Whereas sulummû alone still retained some association with the means of achieving a settlement, i.e. the treaty, its combination with tûbu seems to have given it a less specific interpretation which could be applied to any friendly international relationship. It might even be suggested that tûbu u sulummû was the normal state of healthy relations between friendly countries and, therefore, not a type of special relationship.

Some scholars have maintained that sulummû was an archaic term confined to diplomatic contexts but it appears in a report sent by Assyrian astronomers to the king:

rubti ša šarri bêlini niltadad u sulummû ša šarru nitamar

"We have brought the anger of our lord the king (on ourselves) but we now see the friendliness of the king."

This letter does not mention diplomacy or international relations and sulummû here cannot refer to the friendly relationship of rulers. It was being used to describe the friendly attitude of the king (as compared with his anger) and it may be significant that sulummû - the expression of friendship - was employed in preference to salûmu which tends to have more abstract, theoretical connotations.

In an omen text from the library at Nineveh sulummû is contrasted with nukurtu:

... ina egel nukurti sulummû issakkan

"... friendly relations will be established with a hostile region."

38. Similar indiscriminate use of phrases denoting subservience, e.g. šepê šabatu, belûti sollû, etc. can also be observed.

39. B. Landsberger and T. Bauer, ZA N.F. 3 (1927) 86f;

40. R.C. Thompson, The Reports of the Magicians and Astrologers of Nineveh and Babylon ... (London, 1900) no. 170 v.5; cf. AHW 1122a, šadadu 14a;

41. E.F. Weidner, OLZ 15 (1912) 319, 16 (1913) 205; the letter concerns the observations of the planet Jupiter whose appearance is transferred to the actions of the king.

42. CT 31, 50, 13;
Sulummu, whether explicitly denoting a friendly relationship with a foreign ruler or the friendly intercourse proceeding from such a relationship, requires an expression of association. Even when Sargon established sulummu in his western provinces a bi-lateral connotation is present. Thus to translate *ina egei nukurti sulummu issakkan* as "in an enemy region there will be peace", is to pervert the meaning of sulummu because it presents no partners between whom sulummu can exist. It is more likely that the omen should be read from an Assyrian point of view, implying the institution of friendly contacts with a previously hostile land.

The antithesis between nukurtu and sulummu is reminiscent of that of sasu and sulummu in the Old Babylonian hymnic-epic text and also the references from the second millennium treaties. This pairing of the derivatives of salamu ("to be friendly") and nakaru ("to be hostile") indicates an important conceptual antithesis which is of particular significance in diplomacy. Perhaps its clearest expression is found in the account of Nabonidus' diplomatic contacts when he was in Taima:

\[ \text{yal. KUR mišir URU KUR } \text{sar migir madayya arabi u naphar šarrani nakirūtu ana sulummu u tūbbāti išapparūni ana māpriya} \]

"... the king of Egypt, the city of the Medes, the land of Arabia and all the kings hostile to me sent (envoys) for friendly-relations and goodwill to me."

These kings were attempting to gain good-relations with Nabonidus; though previously they had been nakirūti ("hostile"). It is not, however, clear

\[ 43. \text{CAD E 25la;} \]
\[ 44. \text{above p. 87f and also below p. 101;} \]
\[ 45. \text{C.J. Gadd, An. St. 8 (1958) 58, 93ff;} \]
what nakirūti implies since actual hostilities with Egypt and the "cities of
the Medes" (presumably referring to the Persians) are unknown. Both Nabonidus
and Amasis of Egypt were allies of Croesus of Lydia which suggests that they
were or came to be on good terms and it is often assumed that Nabonidus and
Cyrus the Great were in agreement against their mutual enemy, Astyages of Media.
Even if neither Cyrus nor Amasis had previously been in contact with Nabonidus
there is no evidence that they had been openly hostile to him. Nakru in this
case may therefore imply no more than an absence of previously friendly contacts.

This conclusion implies that in diplomatic terms kings were either

friendly (salmu), having had friendly contacts but not necessarily a binding
relationship, or hostile (nakru), having no previous friendly relations.

Nabonidus confirms this by invoking Istar, the goddess of battle, "without whom
hostility and friendly relations do not exist in the land" (Ištar bēlīt taḫāzi
ša nukurti u sulummū ina bālīšu ina māti la ibbassu). The stress laid by
Nabonidus on nukurtu u sulummū in this invocation and in his description of
the foreign kings' missions shows that such contrasts were not only an effective
literary motif but also a dominant concept in international relations.

The only other reference to sulummū in neo-Babylonian records is the
agreement between Nabopolassar of Babylon and Cyaxares of Media after the fall
of Ashur in 714 B.C.: 49

46. Hdt.; I 77 ii-iv;
47. Gadd, loc.cit., 76-78 but cf. W. Rollig: ZA NF 22, 250-252 and 229;
48. Gadd, loc.cit., 58, 39f.;
49. ABC 93, 29;
sar Akkadi kū  ṭumakištar ina mubbi āli aḥāmes ḫtamru ṭūbtu  ē

sulummû itti aḥāmes iškunû

"The king of Babylon and Cyaxares met near the city. They established good-relations and friendliness between them."

This incident is recorded in a chronicle and the phraseology conforms with that of other references from chronicles. It seems therefore that ṣakānu ṭūbtu  u sulummû was a stereotyped literary formula in the chronicles for the establishment of friendly relations between countries. Nabapolassar and Cyaxares are not known to have been hostile previous to this encounter so a "peace"-treaty is unlikely.

This review of the extant occurrences of sulummû in Akkadian has established several points of interest for diplomatic terminology:

i) there was a fundamental antithesis of sulummû and nukurtu as the two conditions of international relationships.

ii) sulummû was connected with formal agreements, i.e. treaties, in many cases and originally seems to have been used only for the friendly relations consequent upon such an agreement.

iii) sulummû was not used as a synonym for treaty.

iv) In neo-Assyrian references sulummû seems to have been employed with a less specific meaning, indicating a friendly state of affairs not necessarily a result of a treaty.

v) A distinction was made between sulummû as the active expression of a friendly relationship and salīmu, its conceptual counterpart.

The most important of these conclusions for diplomacy is i). Formal international relations were not conducted in terms of the diametrically opposed states of peace and war, as in the modern world, but in terms of relationships, friendship and hostility. Thus states, represented by their rulers, were said to be "friendly" (salmu) when a relationship, whether formal or informal, was in force and hostile (nakru) when good relations were lacking.
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(b) salmu

Previous studies of this word in neo-Assyrian texts have assigned to it the meaning of both "friend" and "foe". Landsberger and Bauer argued that originally salmu was understood as "friend" alone and, as such, was included in the merism salmu u nakru ("friend and foe"). They also suggested that this close association led to a conflation of the two terms and their subsequent misunderstanding as synonyms for foe or enemy. These hypotheses rest on the postulate that salmu meaning "friend" was no longer current in the neo-Assyrian period.

It seems unlikely that close cognates of salmu such as sulummu and salamu should have been used in neo-Assyrian texts to indicate friendship while salmu alone gained the transferred meaning of "foe". Furthermore Landsberger and Bauer's arguments are refuted by the use of salmu in a Nimrud letter from Sargon II to the governor of Que in which the former expressed his joy over the impending good relations with Mita of Muski and claimed that the gods of Assyria had effected the change whereby Mita had given his word and become Sargon's salmu (pišu ittannanāši ana salmini ittūmar). The context demands that salmu mean "friend" or "ally" and this is confirmed by the references to good-relations elsewhere in the letter.

Having established that salmu was current in neo-Assyrian for "friend" it is necessary to examine its other occurrences in neo-Assyrian documents.

1. Most explicitly B. Landsberger and T. Bauer, ZA NF 3 (1927) 86;
3. Postgate, loc.cit., 22.10; on Mita and Sargon see above p.20 - 28;
4. ibid., 22, 38; 23, 47;
Tukulti-Ninurta II claimed that he had imposed on Ammeba'li, the ruler of Bit Zamānī, an oath which included the clause:

\[\text{summa attunu sīse ana nakrūtiya (Kūr.Mes-ia) salmeya tādnūni}\]

\[\text{̄Adad xxxxxx / ... }\]

"If you give horses to my enemies (or) friends then Adad / ... "

On the analogy of other Assyrian treaties it is more likely that the lacuna conceals a penalty than a blessing and therefore the stipulation prohibits horse-dealing with anyone (except, presumably, the king of Assyria).

Nakru salmu here stands as a merism, a usage not uncommon in neo-Assyrian texts.

A similar phrase occurs in the Vassal-Treaties of Esarhaddon, where vassals are forbidden to entertain any evil reports about Ashurbanipal whether from members of his family, courtiers, priests or anyone else:

\[\text{... lu ina pi ḫakrīṣu(Kūr.-ṣu) lu ina pi salīmesu}\]

"... whether from the mouth of his enemy or from the mouth of his friend ..."

This line stands at the head of the list of specified individuals who might speak against Ashurbanipal and it acts as a merism subsuming the following categories. Its use is deliberately rhetorical, relying on the diplomatic connotations of nakru and salmu and it is, therefore, particularly suitable in treaties.

The clearest use of salmu u nakru as a merism appears in the inscriptions of Sargon II:

5. V. Scheil, Annales de Tukulti-Ninip II (Paris, 1909) 10, 24f.; re-edited by W. Schramm, Bi.Or. 27 (1970) 147-160; Scheil's suggestion that PAP/Kūr be read nāgiru is not now accepted.

6. VTE, 37, 111ff;

7. variant: salmesu.

8. TCL III, 22, 132;
... sa asar nakri u salmi la ipparku

"(the troops who go at my side and) who do not leave (me) in hostile and friendly country."

A similar expression occurs several times in some of Sargon's inscriptions:

... Šar asar salme idāya la ipparku\(^9\)

"(the troops) who do not leave my side in friendly country ..."

The contexts of these phrases all concern special detachments of troops, an elite corps distinct from the rest of the Assyrian army, who were on hand when needed and not part of the call-up system.\(^10\) The exclusiveness of this group reinforces the merism of the first phrase from which it is clear that this special detachment never left Sargon's side, whatever the country. The second phrase requires the translation "the troops who do not leave my side even in friendly country"\(^11\) and it then conforms with the first. Both phrases are rhetorical figures to demonstrate the inseparability of Sargon's personal detachment and they make a greater impact if salmu means friend than enemy since to state that this elite corps did not leave Sargon in hostile country is to state the obvious.

It may be concluded that salmu meaning "friend" was current in neo-Assyrian texts and that it most commonly occurred in the merism nakru u salmu meaning "anyone". It did not have a separate meaning "enemy" derived from conflation with nakru in this merism.

\(^9\) Winckler, 112, 85; 114, 99; 118, 114; restored in Lie, 40, 256f;

\(^10\) Winckler, 114, 97ff; TCL III, 22, 127-132; the elite corps is contrasted with the rest of the army.

\(^11\) So A.L. Oppenheim, ANET\(^3\) 286a;
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(c) ṭābu and its derivatives

The technical use of ṭābu and its derivatives in descriptions of the international relations of the neo-Assyrian and neo-Babylonian periods necessitates a discussion of the concepts they imply. In particular their use in conjunction with salāmu and its derivatives makes them significant diplomatic terms. This discussion does not attempt to survey occurrences of ṭābu earlier than the first millennium B.C. but its use in documents of the second millennium is recognised.¹

Ṭābu was written either syllabically or with the ideogram ḏUG.(GA). However the ideogram MUN was commonly used for ṭābtu but for no other form of ṭābu.² This alternative writing of ṭābtu may have originated in the phonetic identity of the words for "salt" and "goodness, kindness, favour", ṭābtu. Hence MUN, which originally represented "salt" alone, became the more common orthography of "goodness" to the virtual exclusion of ḏUG.GA which was, however, retained for all other forms of ṭābu.³

It is convenient to discuss separately the relationship connoted by ṭābu between (a) monarchs of different states,

(b) a monarch and his subjects - either as individuals or en masse

(c) private individuals within a state.

Though (a) is of most interest because it is most closely connected with diplomacy it should not be assumed that it differs markedly from either

1. W.L. Moran, JNES 22 (1963) 173-176 on ṭābu in the second millennium; also Sefire, 74;

2. M. Weippert, WO 7 (1973) 41 n.8; also VAB 7, 70, 66;

3. Exceptionally ABL 358, 26-29 and Iraq 37 (1975) 14, 19;
(b) or (c).

(a) Tābu in international relationships.

The importance of opening or maintaining friendly communication with a foreign ruler is stressed in several neo-Assyrian letters. In one of these Sargon II urges his governor in Que to expedite communication with Mitā of Muski, who had only recently opened friendly relations with Assyria:

\[\text{dibbi tābūte (DUG.GA.MES) šūprassu}\]

"Send him messages of good-will . . . ."

It was very important for Sargon to capitalise on this breakthrough by sending such messages to his former adversary and by keeping in touch with the Muskean's attitude toward Assyria. This incident occurred before the formal settlement of the dispute between Assyria and Muski and, though paving the way for a formal agreement, these messages of good-will should not be regarded as part of or directly heralding the later treaty.

The concern shown by Sargon II over Assyrian relations with the city of Kuluman in the Zagros emphasises the advantages of friendly intercourse between Assyrian local officials and native populations. He urges his subordinate to "speak words of good-will" (dibbi tābūte (DUG.GA.MES) isšēšunu dubba) with the people of Kuluman and is told that constant affirmations of good-will are being given. It is known that the Kulumeans entered into a formal relationship with Assyria but it is uncertain whether this letter was written before or after the settlement. Sargon's eagerness to communicate on friendly terms is more easily understood if the Kulumeans were still independent -

5. On Mita and Sargon see pp. 14 - 38;
6. *ABL* 129, esp. rev. 21ff; *Iraq* 20 (1958) 191, 10; *ABL* 1454;
7. *ABL* 1046, 8-12;
a parallel with his attitude with Mita would then be observable - but messages of good-will are known to have passed between a king and his subjects so this supposition is not capable of proof.

Another instance of "messages of good-will" being conveyed to a presumably foreign population occurs in a letter from an Assyrian official to his king in which the former writes: 8

šarru bēlī dibbi ṭābūti issešunu lidbubu šarru bēlī lušarḥissu bāsi lillika dibbi ṭābūte (DŪG.GA.MES) ana niṣe mātiṣu u ana aḫēṣu liškun

"May the king, my lord, speak words of good-will to him and encourage him so that he will come and establish the message of good-will with the people of his land and with his brothers."

The third party is most plausibly a subject-ruler or prospective ally of Assyria whose support was necessary if a good relationship were to be achieved with his country. The concern of the Assyrian authorities to establish good-relations with prospective or substantive allies or subjects can be seen most clearly in these three examples.

Having gained a relationship on good terms the Assyrians were anxious to protect their own interests if they felt that the other party was making extravagant claims or presuming upon Assyrian good-will. This appears frequently in the description of foreign "crimes" prior to an Assyrian retaliatory campaign. 9

In some cases the nature of the Assyrian kindness is specified: the reception of refugees from Elam in time of famine or the installation of a king on the throne in Elam. It is clear that these acts were regarded as ṭābūtu - a kindness or favour - and as such should have been remembered by the foreign king whose

............

8. ABL 608, 7-11;

9. VAB 7, 70, 66; 126, 93ff. (cf. 28, 78); AS 5, 56, 18f; ABL 1380, 9ff.; the most common form of describing the sin of the foreign ruler is la ḫassu ṭābṭi/ ḫeqṭi, "he was not mindful of the good (I did him)". The interchangeableness of ṭābṭu and ḫeqṭu can be observed in several texts but the former is more common at this period.
behaviour in returning evil for good was, therefore, particularly wicked in Assyrian eyes.

Ashurbanipal emphasises the crime of returning evil for good in a letter to the Rasheans:

\[ \text{ana gabbi ūtabtu (MUN) ēpuṣu šunū lemutti ētepšuni} \]

"I did good to everyone and yet they (the Elamites) have done me wrong."

Although Ashurbanipal goes on to specify only the famine in Elam which he had helped to alleviate, he is recounting the numerous acts of kindness which he had bestowed on various kings of Elam.

Just as this letter was a warning to the Rasheans to remain faithful to the Assyrian-imposed king of Elam so Assyrian kings urged their vassals to be loyal and have no truck with those who were not similarly loyal. This extended not only to deed but also to word as Ashurbanipal emphasised in his description of Šamaš-šumu-ukin's faithlessness:

\[ \text{ēlis ina šaptēsu itammā ūtabbatu šaplānu libbasu kāgir nīrtu} \]

"Outwardly with his lips he swore good-relations (but) deep in his heart he plotted murder."

Castigation of opponents of Assyria was not confined to those who plotted in secret but applied equally to open enemies. Iaubidi of Hamath sought to bring evil on Assyria, an action described as "not good" (la ūtabtu). Commendation of subjects for their good-will toward the king was, however, extended on occasion but pointed enquiries about wavering loyalties were not unknown.

10. ABL 295, 4ff.;
11. ABL 571, rev. 9-12;
12. VAB 7, 28, 80;
13. H.W.F. Saggs, Iraq 37 (1975) 14, 19: Iau-bi'di ... ana Assur mātīsu nišešu lemuttu la ūtabtu (DÔG,GA,-tu) ubauma, "Iau-bi'di ... sought evil not good against Assur, his land and his people".; cf. VTE, lines 197, 232; ABL 1105, 35;
14. ABL 287, rev. 14f.; ABL 289, rev. 8f. + Dietrich, Aramaer, 186ff.;
(b) Tabu between king and subject.

The acts of beneficence of the Assyrian monarch to his own subjects - as opposed to independent or semi-independent rulers or groups - are frequently attested in cuneiform sources. The tabu of the king is mentioned as a specific act - the appointment of a tutor for the crown prince,\(^{15}\) royal patronage for the family of the beneficiary,\(^ {16}\) the installation of Esarhaddon's sons as heirs to the thrones of Assyria and Babylonia,\(^ {17}\) the release of a detainee (perhaps on the request of the beneficiary).\(^ {18}\)

These individual acts are subsumed in the overall quality of benevolence and kindness which the king manifested to his subjects and which he himself proclaimed in his royal titles as a kingly quality. Ashurbanipal uses the epithet ṣēpes tabti ("the one who does good") in three grants of land to royal beneficiaries and once to introduce an act of kindness to the rebellious vassal Necho of Egypt.\(^ {19}\) These are the only instances of this epithet in royal inscriptions and it is probably significant that they occur in contexts where the king is being beneficent.

The king's dibbi ṭābūte ("kind words") to his subjects are often linked to specific acts of beneficence,\(^ {20}\) in contrast to the dibbi ṭābūte spoken to foreigners which cannot be proved to accompany such acts. It may be, however, that dibbi ṭābūte did not refer solely to favours bestowed by the king

\(^{15}\) ABL 604 (=LAS 34) rev. 4-11;

\(^{16}\) ABL 358 (=LAS 122) passim;

\(^{17}\) ABL 870; cf. LAS 129 for a complete text;

\(^{18}\) ABL 6 (=LAS 125) rev. 11ff.;

\(^{19}\) NRGD, nos. 9-12, line 5; \textit{VAB} 7, 162, 51 + IWA, 33 n.3;

\(^{20}\) see nn. 15, 16;
but also to his benevolence as a whole because in the second millennium officials praised the king's **dibbi tābāte** in general terms when being received in audience.¹¹

The importance of hearing favourable responses from superiors is demonstrated in neo-Assyrian times by Nabu's reassurance of Ashurbanipal:²²

> anāku dabābu tābu (DUG.GA) attanaddanakka
> "I shall give you unceasing kind words."

Just as the nature of the "kind words" is not always stated explicitly so subjects could refer to their lord's favours to them in general. This frequently occurs when they wished to express their gratitude for previous beneficence but it also automatically reminded the king of his responsibility to them as loyal subjects.²³ That the king had such obligations to his subjects is shown by a letter from an Assyrian king (possibly Esarhaddon) to a pro-Assyrian in (perhaps) Babylon. After several references to the recipient's loyalty to and work on behalf of Assyria the king concludes:²⁴

> tābāte (MUN.MES-te) ša umandū luḫāzib gimiltum ittika usallimka
> "... (your) good deeds which I acknowledge (?) let me repay and I shall make it good to you with a reward ..."

This reciprocity in personal obligation has been observed already in the sphere of international relations and is also reflected in the attitude of Ashurbanipal to the recipients of land mentioned above. He is at pains to list in each document the loyal actions of the beneficiary and then establishes his recognition of this loyalty:²⁵

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¹¹. H. Radau, Letters to Cassite Kings from the temple archives of Nippur (Philadelphia, 1908) no. 38, 9; no. 89, 11; H.F. Lutz, Selected Sumerian and Babylonian Texts (Philadelphia, 1919) no. 36, 8;

²². ABRT no. 5, 11 (=VAB 7, p. 342 ff.;);

²³. ABL 52', 4, 9; cf. ABL 283, ABL 793;

²⁴. ABL 539, rev. 22; translation is problematic; see Hartmann, Or.N.S. 7, 372f., CAD G, 75b and CAD I, 32b;

²⁵. NRGD nos. 9-12, line 21f.; Postgate translates "... I planned to do him good ..." but tābta hasāsu, in historical inscriptions at least, is not concerned with planning but rather considering and respecting another's kindness (see n.9 above).
Ashurbanipal was honouring an obligation to reward the loyalty of his subjects, a loyalty expressed in actions of "kindness" (ṭābtu) toward the king. It is therefore established that a king could receive as well as bestow ṭābtu and confirmation of this is found in a letter from a scholar to Esarhaddon when he thanks the king for a favour:

\[ \text{ajū bēl tābtu (EN DUG.GA) ša aki anni ana bēl tābtisu (EN DUG.GA-šu)} \]

\[ \text{ṭābtu utērruni} \]

"... what friend has returned a favour in such a manner to his friend ...

Though the writer may not have meant that he was the king's bēl tābtu or vice versa he was enunciating a principle of mutual obligation between individuals on good terms with each other.

(c) ṭābtu between private individuals.

The ṭābtu of private individuals occurred in both personal and business contexts and was regarded as an integral part of friendly dealings. The complaint of one who believed his partner to have failed him was:

\[ \text{agā kī apūtu u bēl tābtūtu} \]

"Now is this brotherhood and friendship?"

which corresponds with the mutual obligations expressed by subjects to the king.

The obligations of partners extended to the suppression of hostile rumours - a case of a "favour" rather than an explicitly stipulated mutual responsibility.

\[ \text{...........} \]

26. ABL 358 (=LAS 122), 26ff; cf. ABL 291 rev. 3 for turru ṭābtu;
27. YOS 3, 26, 6; this may have been a formula since it was copied on a school-text: BRM 4, 34;
28. note 26 and ABL 2 (=LAS 121) rev. 16;
29. CT 22, 155, 20;
Similar beneficence was relied on by suppliants to more influential members of the community\textsuperscript{30} or business partners.\textsuperscript{31} It was common for private individuals to address each other as \textit{bēl ṭābti} or to refer to their relationship as one of \textit{bēl tābtūtu} but since these categories are also used for all types of relationship it is more convenient to discuss \textit{bēl ṭābti} and its implications separately.

\((d)\) \textit{bēl ṭābti}

\textit{Tābti} has been shown to have existed between individuals in personal, business, diplomatic and religious contexts and its impact on relationships in these spheres must now be considered. The clearest example of \textit{ṭābti} being directly allied to a personal relationship is in Adad-ṣumu-uṣur's paean to Esarhaddon's beneficence where \textit{ṭābti} is explicitly linked with the relationship between \textit{bēl ṭābtē}.\textsuperscript{32} This relationship was called \textit{bēl tābtūtu} and if one partner defaulted then the other might invoke their \textit{bēl tābtūtu} in reproach.\textsuperscript{33} Third parties could refer to \textit{bēl tābtūtu} when such a breach occurred which suggests that it was not a completely informal understanding.\textsuperscript{34} A well-placed \textit{bēl ṭābti} could expedite one's grievance at court if one offered him a present and, similarly, recommendation of one's \textit{bēl ṭābti} to higher officials was customary even to the extent of emphasising that one such was a particular "friend" (\textit{bēl ṭābtiya ša adannī}).\textsuperscript{35}

At this personal level \textit{bēl tābtūtu} seems not to represent friendship

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{CT} 22, 43, 23;
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{CT} 22, 182, 12;
\textsuperscript{32} see \textit{n.26} and \textit{ABL} 295, 4ff + \textit{Dietrich, Aramaer,} 170ff.;
\textsuperscript{33} see \textit{n.27};
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{BIN} 1, 34, 10f (\textit{NBr} 234', a difficult letter in which one party seems to have abandoned the other.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{ABL} 2 (\textit{=LAS} 121) rev. 16; \textit{ABL} 221, 8;
as much as mutual aid and, when extended to relationships between individuals of different social status, it may have resembled clienthood. Thus Bel-ibni wrote to the king that he, his brothers, his sons and his Bel-tebîte would come and render the king service and it was reported that Ummanaldas, king of Elam, assembled all his Bel-tebîte. Similarly an Elamite noble had such "friends" and Nabû-bel-sumate was said to have become the adherent of another Elamite.

At international level there are only two references to kings having a Bel-tabit. The first is in a letter, possibly from Tukulti-Ninurta I to a Hittite king, in which a third party is described as the Bel-tabit of the Hittite but the letter is too fragmentary to allow of further conclusions. The second occurs in the description of the perfidious attack of Urtaku of Elam on Ashurbanipal:

I Urtaki šar KUR Elamti kî Bel-tebiya (EN.MUN-ia/) ul umaššar ittišu šiktuna šad(tu) šul salīmu

"Urtaku king of Elam my friend I did not forsake (because) with him  a treaty (?) and friendship were in force."

Another version of this incident does not refer to Urtaku as a Bel-tabit of Ashurbanipal but invokes his failure to remember the favours of Esarhaddon (... tabit(MUN) abl-banîya la ḫasu). Both of these passages, but particularly the first, emphasise the importance of loyalty to a Bel-tabit, a

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36. ABL 281, ABL 793, ABL 281, 24;
37. ABL 281, 1ff, rev. 13f. + CAD S, 25b; cf. AF 19 (1959) 117, 28;
38. ITN, no. 36, 5f. (cf. AHI 1, 132 no. 42) ... ša ahiya Bel-tabitika šut, "of my brother he is your friend."
39. E. Nassouhi, AF 2 (1924/5) 102, 10f.;
40. AS 5, 56ff., 18;
concept as binding at international as at interpersonal level. Ashurbanipal was incensed by Urtaku's faithlessness and even quoted his misconduct in a letter written approximately ten years after Urtaku's attack.\(^{41}\) Had  مجلةٍ and the relationship it implied been of negligible significance it is unlikely to have aroused such indignation.

 مجلةٍ may have had overt characteristics since a man could be accused of being the بيل مجلةٍ of a rebel\(^{42}\) but the extent of the formalisation of the relationship bounded by مجلةٍ is as yet vague.

(e) The nature of مجلةٍ

References to sworn agreements in close proximity to مجلةٍ do occur, both in interpersonal and international relationships, and this suggests that مجلةٍ could be linked with a formal acknowledgement of a relationship. Sargon II attempted to gain support in Babylonia by offering favourable terms and he encouraged his supporters to speak kindly with those who spoke kindly (دبب اجلت مجلةٍ دبب) but to answer hostility with hostility.\(^{43}\) Similarly Esarhaddon encouraged a pro-Assyrian in Babylon by commending his loyalty:

\[\text{ana مجلةٍ(MUN-ia) u ana ممتيya ul tahث} \]

"You do not sin against my beneficence or against the oath with me."

The close connection between the oath and the king's favour are indicated by their juxtaposition. The مجلةٍ of the king seems also to have punished those who plotted against it just as treaty-oaths were effective against those who

\[\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\]

\(^{41}\) ABL 295, 4ff., بيل مجلةٍ(EN MUN-ia) u بيل ملتياٍ اول ubاقر, "I do not differentiate between my friend and my adversary." Dietrich, Aramaer, 170f.; a contrast was also drawn between بيل مجلةٍ and بيل دابيبٍ, ABL 326 rev. 10;

\(^{42}\) ABL 896, 5f., ... مل شي اتيم Nabu-جبيب بيل مجلةٍ(EN.MUN) ات شار Babili tukultišunu ... , "(They slandered me) saying, 'He with PN is a friend of the king of Babylon, their helper'."

\(^{43}\) ABL 571, rev. 3-12;

\(^{44}\) ABL 539, 6f.;
broke the treaty. In the "treaty" of Zakutu la ṭabu and la damgu are used consistently of speech or plots against Ashurbanipal and bēl ṭabatekunu ("your friends/adherents") appears in the list of people whose seditious words must be reported. Moreover the occurrence of references to ṭabtu alongside treaties in descriptions of international relations strengthens belief in the juridical nuance of ṭabtu.

The combination of ṭāb(t)u u sulummu in chronicles and neo-Assyrian royal inscriptions to indicate an international agreement bears out the close connection between goodness/good relations and formal settlements. However it has been argued that sulummu was not a synonym for treaty but rather denoted the relationship arising from a formal agreement. In as much as ṭāb(t)u is closely linked with sulummu it probably shares the same implication and this is supported by the fact that it too is never used as a synonym for treaty. Hence ṭāb(t)u u sulummu indicates the state of formal good relations but not the instrument of formalisation.

A relationship of ṭāb(t)u u sulummu between rulers probably implied ṭāb(t)u, manifested both in overt acts of good-will and respect for and loyalty to the partner. Ashurbanipal complained that his acts of ṭāb(t)u toward Elam had been disregarded and repaid with hostility, a reference to Urtaku's deceit when, though a bēl ṭābi of Ashurbanipal, he invaded Babylonia. This incident suggests that an individual was expected to keep in mind the ṭāb(t)u done him by his bēl ṭābti, but it cannot be proved conclusively that at an international level this

45. LAS 247, 19 - rev. 4; cf. ABL 350, rev. 5; also Ash., 103, 23; see W. von Soden, ZA 44 (1938) 182 n.7 and K. Deller, Or.NS 30 (1961) 251;
46. ABL 1239, passim esp. rev. 22;
47. VAB 7, 70, 66f.; 126, 93-96; AfK 2 (1924/5) 102, 10f.;
48. For sulummu see 92-97 above; examples of this phrase ABC 162 1 ; also A.R. Millard, Iraq 30 (1968) 109, 17; E.F. Weidner, AfO 7 (1931) 4, 3f.; R.C. Thompson, AAA 20 (1933) 86, 117;
49. see n.47;
50. see n.10 above and n.39;
51. cf. ABL 358 (=LAS 122) 26ff.;
relationship was called $\text{tûbtu u sulummû}$. There is evidence, however, that such
good-relations between kings were called $\text{tûbbâti}$; Ashurbanipal complains that
$\text{Šamaš-Šumu-ukīn}$ continued to swear "good-relations" ($\text{itammû tûbbâti}$) while
secretly plotting against him and Nabonidus refers to the missions of foreign
kings coming to him, "for friendship and good-relations" ($\text{ana sulummû u tûbbâti}$).

**Conclusions**

The implications of $\text{tâbtu}$ varied with its social and political context
but common to all settings was the notion of $\text{tâbtu}$ as an aspect of a friendly
relationship, usually implying material acts of good-will, but also respect for
and consideration of the other partner. This respect which, in political
relationships, amounted to loyalty was a mutual responsibility, not an imposition
by a superior or an inferior. The $\text{tâbtu}$ ("beneficence") of a king toward his
subjects or other rulers obliged them to respect him and remain loyal, which in
turn obliged the king to continue to show his favour to them. $\text{tâbtu}$ was used for
both an act of kindness and for the loyalty and acknowledgement of mutual obli-
gation which lay behind such acts. It did not indicate the relationship itself
for which, in international contexts, $\text{tûb(t)u}$ and, in personal or business
relationships, $\text{bēl tâbtûtu}$ were reserved. The meaning of $\text{bēl tâbt}i$
varied from business partner to client depending on context.

The "kind words" ($\text{dibbi tâbûte}$) of a king or official could be addressed
to subjects, vassals, independent rulers or groups and do not seem to imply an
already formalised relationship. However the references to $\text{tâbtu/tûbtu}$ in
international relations strongly suggest a close connection between formalised
international relationships and "good relations" ($\text{tûbtu/tûbbâti}$). The invocation
of $\text{tâbtu}$ in such relationships, with its implications of overt acts of good-will,
differs from $\text{sulummû}$, in that the latter describes merely the state of the

52. *VAB* 7, 28, 80;
relationship and not its outcome in concrete terms. The combination of ṭūbtu and sulummû, which are best translated as a hendiadys, indicated both the state of friendly relations (sulummû) and its outward manifestation (ṭūbtu). Thus formalised good-relations in the ancient near east automatically involved the implementation of ṭūbtu but it should not be assumed that every occurrence of ṭābu or one of its derivatives must imply a formal relationship. The combination ṭūbtu u sulummû was not a special kind of relationship but the fullest expression of friendly relations between ancient near eastern states of this period.

54. J.S. Croatto, A.I.O.N. NS 18 (1968) 385-389 whose discussion, though useful in establishing Hebrew parallels for ṭūbtu u sulummû, makes this error.
Foreign Diplomats in late neo-Assyria

In the texts of the neo-Assyrian period mar šipri is the most common term for a messenger or envoy. It is used of both Assyrian and foreign envoys and of diplomatic and non-diplomatic personnel. The Assyrians also employed specialised messengers or couriers, the lašimu 1 ('runner') and the allaku 2 ('courier'), but these seem to have been engaged in non-diplomatic communication. Assyrian envoys to foreign rulers are mentioned infrequently but are referred to as mar šipri 3. Foreign envoys to Assyria are accorded two specific terms in the royal inscriptions, sēru and rakbb though not to the exclusion of mar šipri 4.

a) sēru 5

Sēru is written either syllabically 6 or, far more commonly, with the ideogram Lu.Mah. In some contexts, notably lists of witnesses appended to legal documents where no further aid to identification is available, it is uncertain whether Lu.Mah denotes the sēru or the lumahhu-priest 7.

Sēru is used exclusively of non-Assyrians from the provinces or from countries beyond the Assyrian frontier 8 and, from its

1. ABL 154 passim (see J.N. Postgate, Taxation, 258 ff.), ABL 382 ff., ABL 1382 r. 22; H.W.F. Saggs, Iraq 20 (1958) 193 no. 41; 8;

2. YAB 7, 8 62; 138 16, 158 9; cf. 142 7; see also J.V. Kinnier-Wilson, Wine Lists (1972) 57 - 62;

3. AS 5, 54 96; YAB 7, 34 19 9; J.N. Postgate, Iraq 35 (1973), 22 13;

4. e.g. AS 5, 80 91; YAB 7, 20 102;

5. The most recent study of the sēru is in Postgate, Taxation; 124 - 128; he concentrates on their function as tribute-bearers;

6. e.g. ABL 1117 6; ABL 1385 7; S. Langdon, Tammuz and Ishtar (1914) pl. III, 113 6;

7. So ADD 492 2 (=ARU 432); ADD 192 rev. 4 cf. 258 rev. 3 (=ARU 65 + 65a); on the lumahhu see J. Renger, ZA 59 (1969) 127 n. 644, CAD L, 244b and H. Wohlt, JANES 3 (1970 - 71) 112 - 118;

8. ABL 1385 7 is a possible exception;
etymology, seems to designate a high-ranking official or noble, perhaps of comparable status with Assyrian rabi (LU.GAL)⁹. In some texts seru is likely to retain its meaning of noble¹⁰ and there are others where the meaning is equivocal¹¹ but in many texts the seru appears in the context of diplomacy and particularly of the delivery of tribute to Assyria¹². The ceremonial delivery of tribute was, in particular, an occasion for a demonstration of Assyrian power vis-à-vis its tributaries:

\[
\text{ki ya ûmu ananiu Û.MAH MEŠ-ni ûmatâte gabbu ina pân abika}
\text{êtiqûnû ki annimma ina pân mar sarri re'u 1-lim ûmatê lêtiqû}
\]

'Just as today the ambassadors of all lands passed before your father, so may they pass before the king's son for a thousand years'.

It would be incorrect, however, to assume that tribute-delivery was the only duty of the seru since several royal inscriptions refer to sérâni of not only tributary but also independent rulers¹⁴.

Teumman of Elam and his predecessor Urtaku, neither of whom were Assyrian vassals, sent sérâni to Assyria¹⁵. In one text

\[\ldots\ldots\ldots\]

9. W.F. Martin, St. Or 8/1 (1936)26; LTBA 2, 2 32;
11. ABL 252 4ff; 306 14, 205 passim; ADD 1102 4, r 3;
187, ND. 2656 4ff; Iraq 21 (1959) 159ff. ND 2762 9ff; 169f. ND
2783 5ff; ABL 196 8ff, 252 4ff.;
13. ABL 948 rev. 5 - 10; CAD E, 386b; Postgate, Taxation. 126;
14. R.C. Thompson, AAA 20 (1933) 85 97, 86 117, 89 153; VAB 7,
316ff, § 5, 7; VAB 7, 419f. (Sm. 1350) vs. 11, rev. 9ff;
15. AS 5, 58 40f.; 60 94f.; 72 58ff.; also infra pp. 58ff;
Urtaku's seræn are described as ša sulumme ('of friendly relations') which is paralleled by the reference to the seræn ša tūbi u sulumme of Dugdamme, the Cimmerian. Since messengers (mar șipāri) are elsewhere described identically it is very likely that seræn means envoys or messengers in these contexts. Confirmation that the seru is an envoy is provided by two texts with parallel descriptions of the mission of Kuras of Parsumas and Pislume of Hudimeri to Ashurbanipal:

LÚ.RA 3A S-šurru șana tūbi u sulumme ... uṣubilûn!
'Their rakbu for good relations and friendliness they sent.'
LÚ.MAH MES šuru ša tūbi u sulumme ... ubûlûnûma
'Their seræn of good relations and friendliness they sent.'

The interchangeability of rakbu, which certainly describes a foreign envoy, with seru shows that the latter should be regarded as a word for foreign envoy and not solely for foreign noble.

This conclusion does not imply that seræn were not nobles but rather that the original connotation of high status had been submerged by their function as diplomats and that Assyrians usually applied the meaning 'envoy' to seru.

In the earliest reference to seræn, in Ḡūṣurnaṣirpal II's 'Banquet-Stela', it appears that the meaning 'noble' was current:

5-im LÚ MAH MES šuru ša tūbi u sulumme ... 22
'5,000 nobles, the envoys of Suhl, ...'

16. AS 5, 58 40f.
18. AS 5, 80 91f.; cf. AS 5, 54 96;
19. E.F. Weidner, Afo. 7 (1931) 4 3;
21. See below p. 121;
22. D. Wiseman, Iraq 14 (1952) 44 143; 35 39;
Saprātu is used by Assurnaširpal in other inscriptions to indicate a mission or embassy and since in the Banquet Stele it would be tautologous to use two words with the same meaning sērānī here probably retains the meaning 'nobles'. Confirmation of this can be derived from several later texts where sērānī has the meaning nobles. It therefore seems possible that originally Assyrians referred to foreign envoys as sērānī, i.e. nobles, but that by the seventh century, when foreign embassies to the Assyrian court were very common, though they kept the same word, the original meaning was obsolescent and sērānī usually designated an envoy.

The high status as diplomats of the sērānī can be inferred from the missions which they undertook. Apart from representing their rulers at special ceremonies, such as the opening of a new palace, sērānī were despatched on missions of good will or to do homage to the Assyrian king, or to demand the extradition of exiles. This last mission angered Ashurbanipal and he detained the envoys, exhibiting them to the sērānī of Rusa of Urartu who had come to greet him.

b) Rakbu

The rakbu is attested in the royal Inscriptions of Shalmaneser III and every king of the Sargonid dynasty, being most common in the inscriptions of Ashurbanipal. The meaning of

23. AKA 1, 231 16 and 332 99; a parallel text has ῥῇ śaprūte;

24. Sapratu therefore means 'envoys' contra A.K. Grayson, AR 2, 131 and 160 who translates Sapratu as 'officials'. This translation does not accord with J.N. Postgate, Iraq 35 (1973) 22 5f. where 'envoys' is preferable;

25. Urtaku; AS 5, 58 40f.;

26. Dugdamme; Thompson, AAA 20 (1933) 99 153ff.;

27. Teumman; AS 5, 62 94f.;

28. 1šulme: VAB 7, 316 0 and 420 (Sm. 1350) 9ff.; this exhibition was portrayed on a relief: A. Paterson, Assyrian Sculptures of Sinacherib (1915) no. 66; also in J.E. Reade, AMI nr. 9 (1976) 100 and nr. 22, 2; and Reade in Power and Propaganda (ed. M.T. Larsen, Copenhagen 1979) 333 and fig. 5 (after p. 366);

29. This discussion is based on neo-Assyrian attestations of rakbu, most of which are cited in AHW sub. loc.; the rakbu of the OB period was also an envoy;
rakbu is elucidated in a lexical text where it is synonymous with arad ekall (lit. 'slave of the palace')\textsuperscript{30}. In the royal inscriptions rakbu occurs in fifteen different incidents, in all but two of which he acts as the envoy of a foreign ruler\textsuperscript{31}. His most frequent duty was to 'greet' (šalal šulme) the Assyrian king\textsuperscript{32}, sometimes coupled with the delivery of tribute\textsuperscript{33}. The ceremony of 'greeting' another king was a most important diplomatic protocol of recognition and, implicitly, of a desire for friendly peaceful relations. It was undertaken not only by independent rulers initiating relations with Assyria but also by vassals who were duty-bound to demonstrate their continuing loyalty through missions to 'greet' the king. Failure to do so was tantamount to a disavowal of the relationship with Assyria\textsuperscript{34}.

Apart from missions of 'greeting', the rakbu conveyed diplomatic documents including terms of alliance between rulers\textsuperscript{35}, undertook to establish good-will and friendly relations (tübü u sulummu)\textsuperscript{36} sought aid from Assyria to put down revolts and, in contrast\textsuperscript{37}, suborned Assyrian vassals to revolt from their master\textsuperscript{38}.

These activities are all diplomatic in character and, in the majority of cases, seem to have been important missions. The

\textsuperscript{30} O.R. Gurney and P. Hulin, \textit{The Sultantepe Tablets II} (1964) 394 121;

\textsuperscript{31} The exceptions are in fragmentary texts and may refer to foreign envoys: T. Bauer, \textit{Istab.} 71 (K2672) obv. 22; \textit{Istab.} 78 (K7673) 20;

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{VAB} 7, 20 100, 111; paralleled in \textit{AS} 5, 46 97; \textit{VAB} 7, 156ff 19; J-M Aynard, \textit{Le prisme du Louvre AO 12} 97 (1957) 36 75; cf. R.C. Thompson, \textit{AAA} 20 (1933) 86 89f; R. Borger, \textit{Ash} 47 49; Winckler, 116 110; E.F. Weidner, \textit{AfO} 7 (1932) 22 76, 17 25;

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{TCL} 3, 48 30ff.; \textit{Lie}, 70 2; Thompson, \textit{loc. cit.}, 87 133ff. ;

\textsuperscript{34} See also above pp.44f;

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{VAB} 7, 12 123ff.; 150 38ff. ;

\textsuperscript{36} Note 3 and E.F. Weidner, \textit{AfO} 7 (1932) 22 6; R.C. Thompson, \textit{AAA} 20 (1938) 37 132ff.;


\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Lie}, 72 78ff. ;
rakbu was not a mere messenger (mār šipri), though his duties included the delivery of diplomatic letters, nor are there any references in neo-Assyrian letters to the rakbu accompanying deliveries of tribute, as there are for the šaru. That there was a similarity between the rakbu and the šaru can be seen from the parallel use of the two terms for the same mission (see above) which suggests that they were not necessarily distinguished from each other, at least in neo-Assyrian royal inscriptions.

The possible etymologically-based connection of rakbu with riding is not illuminated by the texts. There is no suggestion that he was a mounted messenger or that he was employed only on urgent missions requiring swift communication. Moreover, there are specific terms for express-messenger in the royal inscriptions. The various duties of the rakbu suggest that he was, like the šaru, employed on missions of importance and it is possible, therefore, that rakbu was a term indicating an envoy of higher status. The choice of rakbu in the following passage to epitomise the foreign envoy may be significant:

mannuma atta aṣu iqbušu șa mätēma LU,RA,ŠAB-šukan daraggu
lā škuna Ana kisurri41.

'Who are you stranger' they said to him, 'the envoy of whose country has never blazed a trail to the frontier?'

The rakbu is here characterised as the foreign envoy par excellence.

The final occurrence of rakbu in first millennium texts is from the inscriptions of Nabonidus:

39. Note, however, in Sennacherib's annals the delivery of tribute by Hezekiah of Judah's rakbu: D. D. Luekenbill, OIP II, 34 49ff.;
40. See above p. 117;
41. AS 5, 16 v. 4 - 6; see now M. Cogan and H. Tadmor, Or. 38
46 (1977) 65 - 85;
A 'rider' from the west came and repeated the intelligence thus ...

The context is too fragmentary to establish whether another king sent this man or whether it refers to a Babylonian scout or spy. Nevertheless the similarity of terminology, and perhaps function, with the rakû of neo-Assyria is indicative of the continuity of diplomatic conduct and of the official reports of that conduct.

c) Conclusions

Foreign envoys to Assyria during the late eighth and seventh centuries B.C. undertook the diplomatic duties of communication between rulers. The manner in which they conducted these duties is not referred to in the texts and it is therefore unknown to what extent they undertook negotiations or whether they merely repeated messages given them by their masters. The detention of Teumman's envoys by Ashurbanipal shows that they were not inviolate but it is possible that this incident was an exception to customary diplomatic behaviour because Ashurbanipal had been severely provoked by the missions of Teumman. The fact that Ashurbanipal recorded in a relief the humiliating exhibition of these envoys to visiting Urartians suggests that the whole incident was unusual.

It is in Ashurbanipal's inscriptions that a large proportion of the references to šarāni, rakû and mār šipri of foreign lands occur and it may be suggested that he was more concerned to record his diplomatic encounters with foreign rulers than his predecessors. This is probably due in large measure to Assyria's continuing dominance of most of the civilised ancient near east and the pressures resulting from this domination of subjects, vassals and allies, not to mention independent lands. Whether this greater awareness of the significance of diplomacy bespeaks a greater sensitivity on matters of diplomacy and international law is a moot point.

42. W. J. Lambert, AfO 22 (1968/69) 5 50f.;
43. AS 5, 72ff. 57 - 65;
Part II

Diplomatic contacts of Persia with Greece,
6th - 4th centuries B.C.
Diplomatic Contacts before 651

The rulers of Assyria and Babylonia, Persia's imperial predecessors, are not known to have engaged in formal diplomatic contacts with either the Greeks of Asia Minor or of the mainland though it is possible that the Cypriot Greek cities had a formalised relationship with Sargon II of Assyria. This is not to deny the presence of individual Greeks in the ancient near east, evidence of which is found in both classical and near eastern sources.

The Greeks of Asia Minor, however, were in close proximity to the kingdoms of Phrygia and Lydia which successively controlled western and central Asia Minor from the late eighth to the middle sixth centuries. It is not surprising, therefore, that the first known formal contacts between oriental monarchs and Greeks were in this area. Midas of Phrygia married the daughter of Agamemnon, king of Cyme, in the late eighth or early seventh century, thereby establishing a diplomatic relationship between the two lands.

If Midas is to be identified with Mitakhe, who was in close diplomatic contact with Assyria at this time, the proximity of Greeks to traditional oriental patterns of diplomacy is significant. It can only be a matter for speculation whether Agamemnon's daughter was Midas' sole wife or merely one of a harem, as would be consistent with Oriental practice.

1. Winckler, 126 145 - 9;


3. Pollux, Onomasticon IX 83; cf. Aristotle Fragmenta (ed. V. Rose, 1883) Frag. 617, 37; see also Huxley, The Early Ionians, 52;

4. e.g. Ashurbanipal's diplomatic marriages: see above pp. 83f.;
The Cimmerian invasions of the seventh century severely disrupted the political geography of Asia Minor, destroying the power of Phrygia and allowing the Mermnad dynasty of Lydia to become the dominant political force in the west. The first king of this dynasty, Gyges was active politically and diplomatically, repelling the Cimmerians, attacking the Greek cities of Asia Minor and cultivating good relations with Assyria. Gyges' attempts to control the Greek cities on the Aegean coast were both military and diplomatic and though his immediate successes were few his policy was continued by his successors. His impact on mainland Greece was through his gifts to the oracle at Delphi which had confirmed his usurpation of the throne of Lydia.

After Gyges' death in another Cimmerian invasion detailed records of Lydia's contacts with both the monarchies of Assyria, Babylonia and Media to the east and the Greeks of Asia Minor to the west are lacking. Alyattes, Gyges' great grandson, continued the war against Miletus which his father, Sadyattes, had begun but eventually concluded an agreement with the city by which they became friends and allies. It is uncertain to what extent these terms imply parity between Miletus and Lydia though they certainly embody concessions from the position Alyattes would have taken if he had captured Miletus.

Alyattes was more successful against Smyrna and Colophon, both of which he captured. Colophon fell after Alyattes had

5. Gyges, the Cimmerian and Assyria; see above pp. 39 - 46;
6. Talamo, La Lidia arcaica (Bologna 1979);
7. Pausanias, 9 29 iv; Mimnermus (ed. Diehl) F13 Xenophanes (ed. Diehl) F3; Hdt. 1 14.4; 2 152.5; Strabo, 13 1.22 (590); 14 1.28 (643); Diodorus, 1 66.12 FGrH 90 Frag. 62.1;
8. Callisthenes (FGrH 124) F. 29;
9. Hdt., 1 16 - 22;
10. ibid. 1 22.4; Bengtson 4 - 5;
11. Nic. Dam. (FGrH 90) F 64 i - 11; Hdt. 1 16.2; Polyainus, 7 2.2; also Strabo, 14 1.28 (643);
made an alliance (συμμαχία) with it and had lured its cavalry away to Sardis, presumably in accordance with the alliance, where he massacred them. If this tale is correct it might imply that συμμαχία gave one or both parties the right to call on the other's forces, a situation not necessarily of advantage to the weaker partner. It should not be assumed that συμμαχία implied parity of status in treaties.

Alyattes maintained his dynasty's good relations with Delphi by consulting it and dedicating a large bronze bowl to the god in recognition of the good advice he received. His attitude toward his eastern neighbours was, however, hostile. After the fall of Assyria in 612 the Medes led by Cyaxares had extended their territory to include eastern Anatolia while Alyattes consolidated his hold on western Asia Minor and attempted to expand east of the Halys. The inevitable conflict was resolved through the mediation of Syennes of Cilicia and Labyretus of Babylon, according to Herodotus, and sealed by a marriage between the daughter of Alyattes and the son of Cyaxares. This treaty should be seen in the context of the ancient near east, not the Hellenic world, and it shows the continuing influence of near eastern diplomatic tradition on the kingdom of Lydia.

Alyattes' successor, Croesus, is the best known of the Mermnad kings. Herodotus devotes considerable space to his relations with the Greeks of both Asia Minor and the mainland and his ambitions to expand the Lydian kingdom eastwards.

12. Polyaenus, 7 2.2;
13. Hdt. 1 19.2, 25; Pausamæs, 10 16.1 - 2;
14. 1 73f; the treatment of this treaty by J.D. Bing, A History of Cilicia in the Assyrian Period (Ann Arbor, 1969; Diss.) 147f. should be rejected;
15. Hdt., 1 26 - 58, 69 - 92;
Croesus maintained his family's connection with Delphi and received the advice that he should make the most powerful Greeks his friends (φίλοι), if he intended to attack Persia, by this time the successor to the Median Empire. Croesus, therefore, offered ἕλπις and συμμαχία to the Spartans:

... ἐποίηκαντο (Δασεδαμόνιοι) ὀρθαὶ ἔξεινης πέρι καὶ συμμαχίης.

"... they took oaths of friendship and alliance."

The details of this treaty are not stated but from Croesus' subsequent appeal to the Spartans it seems that he called on them only when he was attacked, implying a defensive alliance. Xenophon does not mention Spartan contingents in the army which Croesus led against Cyrus, a possible corroboration of the alliance as purely defensive. Xenophon's silence on this point cannot however be conclusive since with his partiality toward the Spartans he might have omitted references to them on Croesus' side as out of keeping with the story of his hero Cyrus. It is also possible that Croesus did not choose to call on Sparta for support before his campaign against Cyrus.

Croesus' pact with Sparta was one element in a complex network of alliances between Lydia, Babylon and Egypt, all of whom had reason to fear the burgeoning power of Persia. There were Egyptian and Babylonian contingents in Croesus' army which

16. Hdt. 1 53.2, also 1 6.2, 56. 1 - 2, 69. 1 - 3; Xenophon, Cyrop. 6 2.10; Pausanias, 4 5.3; the historicity of this treaty has been questioned; F. Jacoby, R.E. Suppl II (1913) 383, L. Moretti, Riv. Fil. NS 24 (1942) 273ff.; contra E. Meyer, GdA III2, (1937) 183 and N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece. (1959) 168;

17. Hdt. 1 69.3;

18. Hdt. 1 77.4;

19. Xen. Cyrop 2 1.5; 6 2.10;

20. Hdt. 1 77.1 - 2;
fought Cyrus, but the Egyptians may have been mercenaries. The Egyptian king, Amasis is said by Herodotus to have sent a gift to Sparta, which indicates his friendly attitude if not a formal relationship. Similarly, the Arabians were allied with, or at least friendly toward, Croesus, a connection which might be explained by the alliance between Nabonidus of Babylon, Croesus' ally, and the Arabs. Thus Croesus had allied himself with all the major powers of his day against Cyrus.

In western Asia Minor Croesus had gained control of almost all the Greek cities, either by outright assaults or negotiated settlements. Ephesus was alleged by later writers to have secured concessions so that its freedom was protected although it probably still paid tribute to Croesus. The implication of in this case must be of local independence and autonomy while still acknowledging the sovereignty of Lydia. All the cities of the Ionians, Aeolians and Darians were subject to tribute, with the possible exception of Miletus and, less likely, Ephesus. Croesus' relations with Miletus are not explicitly mentioned in the sources but it is possible that the settlement, made by Alyattes with the Milesians whereby they became and was still in force. After Cyrus' conquest of Lydia Miletus was the only city with which he made a treaty on the same terms as had the king of Lydia, but the reasons for this favoured treatment are not stated. Herodotus may imply that Miletus had offered its allegiance to Cyrus before his conquest of Lydia but this seems unlikely. Alternately, it

21. Cyrop 7 1.41ff.; Croesus' mercenaries, Hdt. 1 77.4; Xen.Cyrop. 7 1.41ff.;
22. Hdt. 3 47.1;
23. Xen.Cyrop. 6 2.10; 7 4.16; 5.14;
25. Hdt. 1 26.3ff.; 6, 2 - 3;
26. Bengtson, 7; Polyaeus, 6 50; Aelian, Var. Hist. 3 26;
27. Hdt. 1 6.2, also Paus. 4 5.3;
28. Hdt. 1 22.4;
29. Hdt. 1 141.4.
may be suggested that Miletus had not agreed to a renewal of its treaty with Alyattes when Croesus came to the throne of Lydia and, therefore, being independent of Lydia it was not in the same position as all the other Greek cities. If this is accepted it seems unusual that Cyrus should make a treaty 'on the same terms as the Lydian' \( \varepsilon\iota\zeta\iota\iota \varepsilon\iota\rho \delta \Lambda\nu\delta\delta\varepsilon \) when this would be a renewal of a treaty at least forty years old and with Alyattes, not with Croesus.

It seems more probably that Miletus' status vis-a-vis Lydia was somewhat different from that of the other Asiatic Greeks in view of its treaty with Alyattes by which it was not only a \( \phi\lambda\sigma \) but also a \( \zeta\uomicron\mu\alpha\xi\sigma \), unlike the other cities which were said to be \( \iota\chi\omicron\sigma\iota\rho\iota\omicron\iota \). If \( \zeta\uomicron\mu\alpha\xi\sigma \) here implies a defensive alliance Miletus' failure to answer Croesus' appeal to his \( \zeta\uomicron\mu\alpha\xi\sigma\), notably Sparta, Egypt and Babylonia, would be a favourable act in Persian eyes. Thus Cyrus' attitude toward Miletus would be understandable and he might be prepared to renew its special status.

This explanation demands that Cyrus' attempt to induce the Ionians to revolt from Croesus \( \delta\omicron\kappa\omicron \ \pi\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \ \lambda\iota\iota\omicron \) before the battle of Pteria did not include Miletus, and he therefore had no quarrel with the city after his victory. Whereas the other Ionian cities, as subjects of the Lydian king, chose not to desert him, Miletus was an ally and therefore of a completely different status. Thus Cyrus was by right of conquest lord of

30. Diog. Laert. I 25; F. Hiller von Gaertringen, RE XV (1932);


32. Neither would it explain why Croesus subdued the other Greeks of Asia but left Miletus completely independent;

33. Aelian, Var. Hist. 3 26;

34. Hdt. 1 77;

35. Hdt. 1 76.3;
all the Ionian cities - hence his unfavourable reply to their request for the same terms as they had enjoyed from Croesus\textsuperscript{36} - but not of Miletus which had not been a subject of Lydia.

Acceptance of this view requires the supposition that Cyrus was not only aware of the different statuses of the Ionian cities, but also, as overlord, was prepared to make agreement with them on the same terms as his predecessor. It is not, however, clear what privileges Miletus had enjoyed as a \textsuperscript{36} cuppaxios of Lydia. If the other Asiatic Greeks all paid tribute then one of Miletus' privileges may have been exemption from tribute and, in addition, since Ephesus seems to have gained concessions on freedom (δευτεροπλοί) it is likely that Miletus also enjoyed this freedom, though whether this implies total political independence from Lydia is unknown.

It should be noted that in Diodorus' account of the abortive negotiations between Cyrus' representative Harpagus and the Ionians after Croesus' defeat\textsuperscript{37} the Ionians sought to achieve φιλία with Cyrus as \textsuperscript{36} cuppaxios but were rebuffed and told that they could only gain φιλία by offering themselves as δευτεροπλοί. Herodotus' narrative of the same incident, where he says that the Ionians knew that they would be \textsuperscript{38} θεσσαλοι (subject) to Cyrus but were hoping to gain some concessions\textsuperscript{38}, shows that Diodorus' use of \textsuperscript{36} cuppaxía cannot imply independence but merely privileged status within Persian sovereignty. It is possible therefore that Miletus' special status, if it was \textsuperscript{36} cuppaxía, did not embody outright independence from Cyrus but merely certain privileges within the framework of Persian sovereignty\textsuperscript{39}.

If Cyrus renewed without amendment the treaty between Miletus and Lydia he will have granted an uniquely privileged position to a small state on the western boundary of his kingdom but this seems unlikely unless Miletus' privileges were restricted.

\textsuperscript{36} Hdt., 1 14:1 1 - 3; a similar story in Diodorus 9 35. 1 - 3;
\textsuperscript{37} Diod., 9 35;
\textsuperscript{38} 1 14:1.1;
\textsuperscript{39} This might also be true of Miletus' relationship with Alyattes and, possibly, Croesus;
Although the history of Miletus in the later sixth century is only recorded fragmentarily and its relationship with Persia is hard to define it seems to have been treated as any other Ionian city and, like the others, had a Persian-sponsored tyrant after c 520B.C. The conduct of Aristagoras during the expedition against Naxos in 499 and his dealings with Megabates, the Persian commander, suggest that as tyrant of Miletus he had a different status from the tyrants of the other Ionian cities. This may be a reflection of continued privileges as a kouXEw which Miletus in contrast to the rest of the Ionians, enjoyed through its treaty with Cyrus. This is, however, the only evidence that Miletus did gain concessions from Cyrus and that these concessions were honoured by his successors.

Miletus was honoured by Cyrus with an acknowledgement of its good sense in coming to terms with him but the other Ionians were forced to accept unconditional servitude (souLeta) as a result of their failure to respond to his overtures before the battle of Pteria. The King of Persia had no reason to negotiate with cities which were his by right of conquest and which had done nothing to merit special treatment. They were already his souXw and their refusal to accept this status was a rebellious act destined to end in all Ionia being subjected (touXew to souXw)..


41. Hdt. 5 31 - 34;

42. H. Berve, op. cit., II 579;

43. cf. Hdt. 2 1.2; where Cambyses is said to have regarded the Ionians and Aeolians as souXw and their internal government and some evidence that they still fought amongst each other (Hdt. 3 39.4). La Bua (MGR 4 (1975) 70 - 80) has argued that the policy of imposing tyrants in Ionia can only be traced back to Darius, not Cyrus; for contrary views see ibid., 72 nn. 4,5;
After the Persian conquest of Ionia the dealings of Greeks and Persians are scantily recorded. Polycrates of Samos appears to have held unrivalled naval power in the Aegean around 530 B.C. and was also an ally of Amasis of Egypt. By 525 he was, however, an ally of Cambyses of Persia in his invasion of Egypt but his career was cut short in 522 when he was murdered by the Persian satraps of Sardis Oroetes. The chaos surrounding the death of Cambyses and the struggle for the Persian throne was eventually resolved in favour of Darius but he was not recognised by Oroetes who had not only removed Polycrates but also the satrap of Dascylion and his son. In order to nullify this threat in the west Darius had Oroetes murdered and to ensure that the Samian navy, now no longer allied to Persia, did not fall into the wrong hands Darius supported the attempt of Syloson, Polycrates' brother, to gain control of Samos. There can be no doubt that Syloson was a vassal of Persia.

Within a few years most Ionian cities had Persian-sponsored tyrants and it is possible that Darius had instituted this policy in order to attach the troublesome Greek cities to him directly and thereby increase his control over them, a policy in accordance with his known administrative reforms.

In the Ionian cities where there was no current tradition of a ruling family it was in Darius' interests to promote a man who owed allegiance to him alone and who depended on him for support.

46. On Polycrates and particularly Herodotus' account of him: V. la Bua, loc. cit., 1 - 40 and 41 - 102; id., MGR 6 (1978) 1 - 88; also B.M. Mitchell, JHS 95 (1975) 75 - 97; Hdt., 2 182.2; 3 39.2;

47. Hdt., 3 120 - 125.4; La Bua, MGR 4 (1975) 83 n.1;

48. Hdt., 3 126;

49. Hdt., 3 128;

50. Hdt., 3 139 - 147;

51. Hdt., 4 133; date of the Scythian expedition is disputed; see J.M. Balcer, HSCP 76 (1972) 97 - 132 and esp. 103 for previous studies;

52. V. la Bua, MGR 4 (1975) 79 and n. 2; M.A. Dandamayev, Historia Einzelschrift 18 (1972) 19 and R.N. Frye, ibid., 85;
against revolt from within the city. Where the established rulers of a country were willing to acknowledge Persian sovereignty, as in Macedon, the Persians did not hesitate to retain them as Persian vassals. By c510 B.C. the Persians were on the borders of Greece and yet had had no formal diplomatic contact with any mainland Greek state except for Sparta in c 545 when Cyrus had been warned not to harm the Greeks of Asia Minor. Even if Cyrus' jibe about Greek faithlessness was misdirected in the case of the Spartans the lack of any action to reinforce the warning will not have increased the Persians' appreciation of Greek diplomacy.

53. Hdt. 5 17f;
54. Hdt. 1 141;
Of all the Greek states Athens' relationship with the Achaemenid kings is the best documented and most complex. Prior to 510 B.C. only Sparta had established formal diplomatic contact with Persia but thereafter Athens became the focus of Persian interest in Greece and remained as such for nearly a century. Within this time there are two distinct phases whose boundary is the Athenian victory of Eurymedon and the immediately subsequent campaigns of aggression in Cyprus and Egypt in 465-464. The character of the diplomatic contacts in the first phase is determined by Persia's military superiority which, however, received such a blow in the failure of the invasion of Greece in 479 that diplomacy was discontinued. Between c510 and 479 it is possible therefore to observe Persian diplomacy in its normal context of a stronger, imperialist state attempting to overcome a smaller and, seemingly, less powerful political unit. Four episodes are of especial interest in establishing the Persian diplomatic approach to Athens and other Greek states in this period.

1) A recent study has drawn attention to the diplomacy of Athens and Persia in the last decade of the sixth century B.C., stressing the Persian viewpoint on these contacts. It was argued there that the cosmic element in ancient Near-Eastern treaties and the sanctity of the contract in Zoroastrian belief were the background to the relationship between Persia and Athens at this time and that the Persians accordingly believed that they had

1. This may be the result of the sources. Herodotus' view of the Persian Wars puts Athens at the centre and Thucydides' references to Greek contacts with Persia prior to 415 are mainly of Athenian dealings. Sparta's relationship with Persia is fully discussed in Lewis, Sparta and Persia;

2. See below pp. 158f.;

gained in Athens a permanent vassal. The importance of the traditions of ancient near eastern diplomacy as a powerful influence on Persian diplomacy can be observed in these diplomatic contacts.

Herodotus is the only source for the first incident in the diplomatic relationship and his account is, perhaps intentionally, silent about some aspects. The political disorder after the expulsion of the Peisistratid tyrant Hippias from Athens in 510 led to an intervention by Cleomenes of Sparta on behalf of the party led by Isagoras. When Cleomenes too was forced to leave Athens by a popular demonstration the Athenians realised that he was likely to retaliate by interfering forcibly in their affairs and that they needed the support of strong allies. No Greek state was willing or able to assist them to resist Sparta and the only other possible ally was the king of Persia. An embassy was therefore despatched to the Persian satrap at Sardis, Artaphrenes, in the hope of gaining an alliance with Persia. The satrap asked the identity of the envoys and agreed to the alliance on the condition that they submit to Darius; if they refused then they should leave forthwith. The envoys agreed to his demand but were severely censured on their return to Athens.

Artaphrenes' high-handed response to the request for alliance is characteristic of traditional near-eastern diplomatic behaviour toward inferior powers. His answer was in effect an ultimatum since to fail to submit to Persia was to forfeit Persian good-will. Moreover, it made an important assumption:

4. Hdt. 5 73, 96; no opinion is here expressed on the Zoroastrian element in Persian diplomacy but Orlin's exposition of it is supported by the arguments presented below; on the immutability of Persian laws, O. Bucci, RIDA 25 (1978) esp. 17ff.;


6. The knowledge that Sparta and Persia had been hostile since the conquest of Lydia may have influenced the Athenians: Hdt. 1 141, 152f; W.G. Forrest: A History of Sparta 1950 - 192 B.C. (1968) 30f.

7. It seems unlikely that Artaphrenes was ignorant of Athens, cf. Hdt. 1 153.1 and 5 105 for similar Persian 'ignorance';
that the envoys were competent to answer such a proposal immediately and with full authority, an assumption counter to normal Greek diplomatic practice. Artaphrenes' insistence that the envoys should not depart before either accepting or tacitly rejecting Persian goodwill forced them to reply without consulting their sovereign body, the Athenian assembly.

Artaphrenes was perhaps aware that he was pressurising the envoys to make a decision beyond their competence as diplomats, but, without discounting this as one element in his attitude, there is a more compelling factor. From Artaphrenes' point of view, the Athenians were a minor power from beyond the borders of the Persian Empire who were appealing through him for an alliance with the King. If he was informed of the circumstances surrounding this embassy he would have realised that its prime motive was an urgent need for allies against a local threat. Even if he were unaware of this, the nature of the envoys' mission would encourage him to assume a superior role in negotiations and dictate as far as possible the type of relationship resulting therefrom.

The manner in which appeals from inferior powers to their superiors were made in the ancient near east, best demonstrated from the late neo-Assyrian documents, throws a great deal of light on Artaphrenes' behaviour toward the Athenian envoys. Neo-Assyrian treaties were based on the supposition that Assyria was the superior partner in the relationship, dictating the terms of the agreement in accordance with its own interests and, seemingly, giving little thought to the welfare of the vassal. Assyrian political ideology demanded the total submission of its inferiors and, in theory at least, did not countenance an inferior power gaining concessions by a negotiated settlement.

8. D.J. Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (1973) 68 - 72;

9. e.g. E.F. Weidner, AFO 8 (1932/33) 17 - 27; R. Borger, Ash 107 - 109; D.J. Wiseman, VTE 1 - 100;

10. F.C. Fensham, VT 13 (1963) 133 - 143, esp. 141; see also above p. 8.
This authoritarian attitude toward subordinate rulers was one of the fundamental concepts of Assyrian diplomacy. In practice a ruler who appealed for help to Assyria was obliged to subordinate himself and accept the consequences of vassaldom. Thus when three chieftains from the Zagros mountains requested Assyrian aid, they were obliged to submit and accept the imposition of tribute in order that the Assyrians would supply the required military support.\textsuperscript{11}

This incident may be compared with Athens' appeal to Persia in that a minor power appealed to a political superior and was granted a formal link but only on condition of accepting vassaldom. Artaphrenes' reply to the envoys should be seen in the Near Eastern context in which as representative of the superior power he was expected to dictate terms and enforce them as best he could. In this case it would have been innovative for him to have bargained with the envoys or to have allowed them to remit his proposals to their sovereign body.

It is in this second aspect that the more serious discontinuity between Greek and Persian diplomacy occurs. The Athenians may have known that the King demanded vassaldom of those states appealing to him but they may not have realised how unilateral an ultimatum it was. It seems unlikely that they would have thought it necessary to permit the envoys complete freedom of action in negotiating with Persia and they may have expected more extended negotiation than occurred. Artaphrenes' ultimatum conflicted with the Greek concept of limited competence of diplomatic envoys whereby envoys who felt a proposal was beyond their competence referred it to their sovereign body. Even when proposals were agreed completely it was necessary to return in order to ratify the agreement.\textsuperscript{12} In this case, therefore, the envoys should have wished to return to Athens and to put the proposals before the assembly.

\textsuperscript{11} Borger: Ash 54 - 55;
\textsuperscript{12} p. 137 n.8;
It can be argued that the envoys, aware of the implications of offering submission to Persia but desirous of the alliance, took it upon themselves to submit even though they knew that the Athenians might not recognise their action. Herodotus could have condemned the envoys outright but by portraying them as on the horns of a dilemma caused by Artaphrenes' ultimatum he attempts at least a veiled exoneration. The envoys could have claimed and perhaps did claim that by refusing to accept Artaphrenes' terms they were prejudicing Athens' prospect of gaining Persian support and were unable to seek guidance from the assembly because of the ultimatum.

Artaphrenes' treatment of the envoys in a manner which conflicted with the tenets of Greek diplomacy caused friction between Athens and Persia in subsequent years. Immediately on their return to Athens the envoys were attacked for their act of submission, were accused of acting on their own responsibility (ἐπὶ χρήσεως αὐτῶν βαλόμενοι)\textsuperscript{14}, and, implicitly, of not consulting with the only body competent to deal with such severe proposals, the Athenian assembly. It is not however explicitly stated that the relationship brought back by the envoys was itself disowned or rejected. The effects of submission to Persia may not have been immediately apparent: no tribute was sent or periodic compulsory attendance on the Persian court stipulated. This should not detract from the possible future implications of the envoys' act since, as Orlin has argued, both the tradition of near eastern treaties and Zoroastrian belief confirmed the

\textsuperscript{13}. D.J. Mosley: op.cit. is right to emphasise that the envoys had no explicit instruction for their action but their failure to consult the Athenians was due not to pressures of distance from Athens, as he opines, but rather necessity in the face of the ultimatum.

\textsuperscript{14}. The force of this idiom is to delimit a decision or those responsible for a decision or action; Histiaios disclaimed Aristagoras' revolt (Hdt. 5 106. iv; Zopyrus justified his decision to keep secret his plan to capture Babylon (Id: 3. 155, iv) other refs: Hdt. 3 71.5; 4 106.1; 3 109.1;
solemnity and perpetuity of an international agreement. Neither is it convincing to argue that the relationship between Persia and Athens was informal, implying impermanence and lack of definition. The international agreement, particularly in the neo-Assyrian period, corresponded largely with a commitment by one side to be loyal and obedient to the other. In course of campaigning it might be necessary to accept submission merely by oath without a formal setting or accompanying written commemoration but the agreements thus affected were no less binding for being peremptory ceremonies. Similarly the Athenian envoys in Sardis made an act of submission valid in the eyes of the Persians.

ii) There is other evidence that the relationship between Persia and Athens was of a formal nature. It has been argued that Athens and Persia were on good terms during the last decade of the sixth century B.C. and that the Athenians were eager to maintain this situation. The basis for this argument is another Athenian mission to Artaphernes at a later date than that of the submission. This mission's aim was to counter the influence of Hippias, who had arrived in Sardis and was pressing Artaphernes to support him as the legitimate ruler of Athens, and its main argument was that the Persians should not be swayed by Athenian exiles. If Athens had openly repudiated the first mission and the relationship with Persia it is unlikely that Artaphernes would

15. Orlin: loc. cit.: 258, 263f; the failure of the Persians to exploit the submission of the envoys, i.e. by demanding a more formal ceremony of giving earth and water on Athenian soil, may have affected their view of the envoys' submission. see below pp. 147ff.

16. so V. Ehrenberg: From Solon to Socrates (1968) 102 & n. 54;


18. ABL 280, 19 - rev. 3;


20. Hdt. 5 96;
have received the Athenian envoys and even more improbable that he should have been convinced by such an argument. Only if Athens and Persia regarded themselves as having some form of defined relationship can the mission and its argument be explained. Finally it must be noted that it was only after the failure of the mission that the Athenians concluded that they should be on terms of clear hostility with Persia, suggesting that prior to it they were at least neutral but certainly not hostile (σόν ἔνδειξεν εὐτεχεις δὲ σφ ἑδεδοκτό ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τοῦ Ἱέρων κολομίου εἶναι. 

_Hdt._ 5 96;)

This later incident elicited another ultimatum from Artaphernes: that the Athenians should take back Hippias if they wished to be safe (σὲ βουλεύτα τὸν εἶναι, καταδέξεσθαι ἄκισω Ἰππίν. 

_Hdt._ 5 96). It is instructive to compare the two ultimatums and their settings. In both, Athenian envoys went to Sardis on the instructions of their state and not in answer to a Persian summons; in both they presented a request – in the first for alliance with Persia and in the second for an undertaking by the Persians not to heed disaffected Athenian exiles. The ultimatums which were given in reply to those requests also form part of a consistent pattern: in the first Persian enmity was threatened, though not explicitly, while in the second Artaphernes' sanction was actual violence. At this point the similarities between the two incidents seem to end because the second mission was allowed to return to Athens without responding to the Persian demand. The circumstances of the two missions account for the change in Persian attitude. Whereas in the first Athens was an independent power still possessing autonomy and the right to reject Persian demands, in the second she was a Persian vassal – or so the Persians believed – and, though allowed to make requests to her overlord, was expected to obey orders from the Great King or his ministers. From the Persian point of view, therefore, this was not a question of putting proposals – even

21. E.M. Walker, _CAH IV_ (1926) 168 realised this problem but did not conclude that the earlier mission had not been repudiated.
in such a loaded manner as in the first mission - it was one of command and obedience, characteristic of near eastern diplomacy.

Artaphrenes' willingness to entertain and pay attention to Hippias - a known exile from Athens - shows how the sovereign power's obligations toward its vassal were limited, even to the extent of a complete reverse in sympathies. Relations between Artaphrenes and Hippias prior to this mission are very obscure and the assumption commonly held by scholars that relations between Persia and Hippias were favourable during the whole of the last decade of the sixth century is untenable. In its favour there can be called only Hippias' refuge at Sigeum and his exile there and at Lampsácus, where the Persians were probably aware of him but not necessarily supporting him. Apart from this, prior to 510 Hippias had no known connection with the Persian authorities and if he were relying on Persian support at that time the Persian acceptance of Athens' submission independent of him would be unusual. Furthermore if Hippias were known to be in league with Persia or to be receiving Persian support it is unlikely that the Athenians would have approached Artaphrenes for help and if such a connection did exist why did not Artaphrenes demand Hippias' restitution during the first Athenian mission. Even were Hippias' attachment to Persia proved, it cannot have been so close or rewarding as to prevent him from

22. e.g. E.M. Walker, CAH IV (1926) 167 - 172 and C.J. Robinson Jnr., AJP 66 (1945) 243 - 254; more recently F.J. Frost, CSCA 1 (1968) 105 - 124 and E.S. Green, CSCA 3 (1970) 91 - 98 have noted the intractability of Athenian politics at this period; see also P. Leveque and P. Vidal-Naquet, Clisthene l'Athenien (1964) 113 n.2;

23. Hdt. 5 65, 91, 94ff; Thuc: 6 59; M.F. McGregor: HSCP Suppl. 1. (1940) 73 n.16; Hippias' preparation of a place of exile and the marriage of his daughter which brought him influence with the king are not sufficient indication that he and the Persians were in alliance or even working together. Thucydides' compressed narrative of events should not be preferred to Herodotus' clearer synopsis.

24. Macan (Herodotus, 4th, 5th, and 6th Books, vol. 1 (1895) 218) noted that Artaphrenes' 'ignorance' of Athens (Hdt. 5 73), if genuine, would indicate that Hippias had not already fled to Sardis.
accepting aid from Sparta when the latter offered to restore Hippias as ruler of Athens (c506/6)\(^2\). Hippias' acceptance of Spartan aid suggests that any connection he may have had with Persia in 507/6 was not offering material help in his campaign to return to Athens.

Persian may have had no official policy in Hippias' favour but equally she found no difficulty in allowing him to take refuge in cities under her control. This might suggest that she had no formal relationship with Athens since to harbour an ally's enemies was to contravene concepts of alliance. This argument, however, supposes that the two parties in this relationship had mutual obligations of repatriation of exiles to each other and that Persia's responsibilities under their formalised relationship were undefined is confirmed by the Athenian actions after the second embassy. They did not claim that Artaphrenes had broken the agreement by demanding the restitution of Hippias but rather that their refusal to comply with this demand brought about hostile relations\(^2\). Persia's insistence on dictating the terms by which her relationship with Athens should function is another reflection of the traditional near-eastern view of diplomatic relations between suzerain and vassal.

It seems, therefore, that Herodotus was correct in stating that Hippias did not attempt to gain Persian support before the failure of Cleomenes' scheme. When he did resort to Persian aid he promised to be a loyal vassal doing everything in his power to subject Athens to him and to Darius\(^2\). Athens was already a Persian vassal, in name at least - as a result of the first mission - and Persia's support for Hippias probably derived from three causes: 1) Hippias' influence through his daughter's

\[\begin{align*}
25. & \text{Hdt. 5 91ff.;} \\
26. & \text{Hdt. 5 96.2;} \\
27. & \text{Hdt. 5 96;}
\end{align*}\]
marriage may have gained powerful support with Darius for him, it is likely that the Persians knew that Athens was divided over the desirability of alliance with Persia at the cost of independence since Athenian failure to keep in contact after the first mission will have been suspicious, iii) at this time Persia was only comfortable with tyrants in Greek states.

Persian support for Hippias was a threat to Athens and the mission to Artaphrenes was an attempt to counteract Hippias' influence. Artaphrenes' ultimatum aimed to force Athens to comply with Persia or face hostility but its effect in Athens was to overturn the policy of maintaining good relations with Persia. A reaction from this pro-Persian line can be seen in the Athenian awareness that in future they should be on terms of hostility with their former ally.

For internal Athenian politics in the decade after the expulsion of Hippias the relationship with Persia was of crucial importance. Those who favoured the return of Hippias and those who looked to Sparta for support will have been discredited by the flight of the Peisistratids and Cleomenes' abortive coup in Athens. Those who promoted alliance with Persia as an alternative to the policies of other groups gained their objective perforce, despite the act of submission and the criticism it aroused, because in the face of Spartan enmity there was no alternative. Hippias' compact with Sparta called into question the motives of both and did nothing to increase the popularity of either in Athens, thus

28. p. 142 n. 23;
29. Hdt. 5 73;
30. The use here of \textit{...\textgreek{e}}\textgreek{d}\textgreek{o}x\textgreek{t}o \textit{...} (Hdt. 5 96.2) may not imply a resolution of the assembly since it would then be a declaration of war. Rather it embodies the sentiments of the Athenians in general that their rejection of the Persian demand led inevitably to open hostility. Several passages in Thucydis throw light on Hdt.'s use of \textit{\textgreek{e}v\textgreek{e}r\textgreek{o}y} in conjunction with \textit{\textgreek{x}o\textgreek{e}\textgreek{m}o}\textgreek{y} but none are conclusive on this particular passage's meaning: Thuc. 1 42.2, 125.2, 22.3, 4 74.2, 79.2;
enhancing the policy of friendship with Persia. However the news of Hippias' understanding with Artaphrenes would have dismayed the supporters of Persia especially if the Alcmaeonidae were among them since they least of all desired the return of Hippias. The failure to maintain good relations with Persia without accepting the return of Hippias undermined the independent pro-Persian line to such an extent that the only alternative was to oppose Persia.

In Persian eyes, however, the relationship with Athens was still in force. One of the most striking features of near eastern diplomacy was the emphasis laid on the permanence of the bonds between treaty-signatories. This was expressed either by the use of words to denote permanence or eternal validity or by stipulating that the bond extended to the descendants of the signatories, the latter particularly in the first millennium. Clauses guaranteeing a limited period of peace or good-relations were seemingly unknown. It seems likely that Persian views on the solemnity of the contract combined with the traditions of diplomacy inherited from the near-eastern states to produce a concept of the international agreement as a permanent bond. This Athenian submission will have involved her in a relationship the consequences of which she may have chosen to ignore or did not understand, and her decision to sever the bond with Persia was regarded by the Persians as a breach not only of contract but also of a religious oath.

The Athenians may have understood that by refusing to accept the return of Hippias they were disobeying an order from Sardis and therefore realised the imminence of Persian hostility but even

31. Fitzmyer, Sefire (1967) 12 1 - 6; 16 1 - 6; Wiseman, VTE, 30 1 - 12; also G. Kestemont, Diplomatique et Droit International (1974) 214; expressions of everlasting friendship between rulers E.F. Weidner, PDK II (1923) no. 8, 8f.; G. Dossin, ARM 4, no. 20, 26; J. Nougayrol, PRU 3, 43 RS. 16. 270, 32;

32. Orlin, loc.cit.: 263;
had Artaphernes maintained good relations with Athens the revolt of Ionia and Athens' support of the revolts would have condemned her. The Persians saw Athens' hostility as that of a recalcitrant vassal aiding other rebel vassals and Darius' anger at such conduct is therefore understandable.

33. Hdt.: 5 97;

34. id: 5 105; it is reminiscent of Assyrian reactions to the faithlessness of their vassals and allies: VAB 7, 20ff. 95 - 125; 64 82 - 106; 78 68 - 74; AS 5, 56ff. 18 - 34; 64ff. 25, 46;
iii) In preparation for the campaign of 490 B.C. Darius despatched heralds to the Greek mainland and island states to ask for earth and water. From its frequent occurrences in Herodotus' work it is clear that earth and water was the sign of unconditional submission to Persia but its origins and symbolic significance cannot be elucidated from near-eastern or Greek texts. There is no parallel in either Assyrian or Babylonian diplomacy nor does it seem to be a Greek or Lydian mechanism. It is likely, therefore, that it is a traditional Persian symbol whose meaning was sufficiently clear for it to need no explanation by Greek authors.

Earth and water were usually requested but could be given unsolicited by a ruler who wished to make certain of Persian friendship. Darius demanded earth and water while on campaign against the Scythians but both he and Xerxes made the same request of the Greeks before their invasions of Greece. Megabyzos' Thracian campaign concluded with the Macedonians giving earth and water and Artaphernes granted Athens alliance with Darius only if this gesture were made. It never appears in conjunction with a negotiated settlement and appears to be a unilateral demand by the Persians. In this sense it must function as a symbol of complete submission.

The giving of earth and water seems to have been a binding, permanent, once for all act which was not repeated even when a city regained its independence and subsequently returned or was forced to return to Persian allegiance. Thus in the Ionian Revolt no demand for earth and water was made on the defeated rebels. Where earth and water were not given and the Persians

35. Hdt. 6.48; Ed. Meyer, GDA IV 1 (1939), 299f. + n.1 is followed by H. Berve, Miltiades ... (Hermes Einzelschrift 2, 1937) 69 n.1, in believing that the heralds were sent before Mardonios' expedition of 492; for other modern discussions see below p. 149 n. 47;

36. Gelon of Syracuse in 480, Hdt. 7.163.2;

37. Hdt. 4.126f.;

38. Hdt. 6.48.2 49.1; 7.32, 137;

39. Hdt. 5.17f.;

40. Hdt. 5.73.2;
emerged victorious the vanquished were presumably adjudged to have forfeited their claim to their land and therefore no ceremony of earth and water was necessary.  

Darius' demand for earth and water from Athens in 491 is an exception to the rule of earth and water being sought only once since in 507 Athenians envoys had made submission to Persia by this gesture.

Persia had not, however, been able to confirm this submission either by occupation of the territory or by a repetition of the ceremony on the vassal's soil, the more customary location for such gestures. The Persians may not, therefore, have regarded the Athenian commitment, binding though it was, as fully ratified. In 491 they were taking the opportunity to confirm Athen's vassal-status.

A similar exception is Xerxes' repetition in 481 of Darius' request for earth and water from the Greek states, many of whom had complied with the earlier request. As in the case of Athens, the Persians may have felt that their failure to confirm the submission by occupation of the territory required a repetition of the demand. An additional cause is Xerxes' accession between the date of Darius' request and his own invasion. The emphasis on each king performing important diplomatic functions may have necessitated a repeated demand.

From the standpoint of Persian diplomacy, therefore, both

41. Cyrus and the Ionians in 546, Hdt. 6 48.1;
42. Hdt. 5 73; see above pp 136 - 140;
43. It might also be an expression of Persian magnanimity, Hdt. 7 136.2; 6 9.3f.; 8 140 and ff.; an Assyrian parallel, Borger, Ash. 103f. 29 - 31;
44. Hdt. 7 32, 131 - 133; Athens and Sparta were excluded;
45. Hdt. 6 48f.;
46. Just as loyalty was demanded of each vassal on a king's accession, see below pp. 154f.;
Darius' and Xerxes' missions of 491 and 481, respectively, are intelligible. The historicity of Darius' request for earth and water has, however, been doubted by some scholars who believe that it is a doublet of Xerxes' embassy in 481. In particular the maltreatment of the Persian envoys to Athens and Sparta, which Herodotus unequivocally ascribes to Darius' reign, is said to fit the context of 481 better than that of 491. Herodotus' clear statement that Xerxes did not send envoys to Athens and Sparta in 481 because the heralds sent by Darius in 491 had been maltreated is difficult to refute despite the clearly later traditions confusing several incidents of this nature. Even if one believes that heralds were sent to Athens and Sparta in 481 there is no justification for a denial of a similar mission in 491. Moreover, Xerxes' mission of 481 is more easily understandable in the context of a diplomacy which usually despatched such missions before a campaign, the best other example of which is Darius' mission of 491. If the latter is doubted the former becomes less intelligible. The objections to the mission of the envoys in 491 are not convincing.

iv) Prior to 479 diplomatic agreements between Persia and Greek states had been dictated by Persia alone. In that year, however, Mardonios, the Persian general in Greece, attempted to gain Athenian loyalty to Persia by offering terms: Athens was forgiven her crimes against the King, she was allowed to retain her territory and to appropriate any other Greek land she wished, her

47. notably K.J.Beloch, G.G.II² (1914) I, 40 + n.6; G. de Sanctis, Riv. Fil. NS 8 (1930), 292 - 299; H. Bengtson, G.G.5 (1977), 163; C. Hignett, XIG, 87; R. Sealey, CJ 72 (1976) 13 - 20, argues that the mission of 491 should be accepted.

48. Hdt. 7 133.1;

49. Diod. 11 2f.; Aelius, Aristides, Panath., 97 - 99, 125; Pausanias 12.17; Plut. Them., 6.3f. discussed by R.J. Lenardon, Historia 5 (1956) 410f.; see also Busolt, G.G.II² (1895) 571f.n.5;
Autonomy was guaranteed and her temples would be rebuilt with Persian aid. The Athenians were urged to come to terms in order to become 'friends' of Xerxes but Herodotus does not make explicit what the Persian were to gain in return for these concessions. When the Athenians were subsequently using the spectre of an agreement with Persia to threaten the Spartans they claimed that once they had become allies of the king they would attack any state against which they were led. This suggests that Athens was to become a vassal of Persia, since participation in royal campaigns was a customary requirement of vassals, but that she should also enjoy the privilege of autonomy, as some of the Ionian cities had in the sixth century.

During the same speech the Athenians had claimed before the Spartans that Xerxes had offered to make an alliance with them on fair and equal terms, sentiments which are not explicitly expressed in the Persian offer. It is, therefore, possible that the Athenians exaggerated both the extent to which Xerxes was willing to make concessions on status and also, in contrast, his ability to call upon their obedience. It is unlikely in the light of the outcome of an alliance between Persia and Athens - the probable collapse of Greek resistance to the Persian invasion - that Athens would have been granted full independent status.

51. Hdt., 8.140. 2 - 4;
52. Hdt., 8.140 4;
53. Hdt., 9.11.2;
54. Xen. Cyrop. 7.4.2, 4.9, 8.6.8; Isocrates 4123;
55. See above pp 129 - 132;
56. Hdt., 9.7.1;
57. The account of the Athenian embassy to Sparta is discussed by Munro, CAH IV (1930) 321 and Hignett, XII, 281 - 285;
whereas all other Persian 'friends' in Greece were vassals. Moreover the terms offered by Mardonios to the Athenians are similar to those enjoyed by some Ionian cities in the sixth century and, more noticeably, to those proposed in the late fifth and early fourth century for the Greeks of Asia Minor 58, none of whom were independent.

Mardonios' embassy to Athens in 479 marks a change in Persia's relations not only with Athens but also with the rest of the mainland Greeks. By offering terms the Persians acknowledged that they could more easily gain their own ends through concessions to Greek independence, a conclusion they had already reached with the Greeks of Asia Minor. However these concessions were not submitted for negotiation or discussion; they remained a unilaterally-proposed settlement 59 which implied submission to Persia. In this respect - the presentation of an international agreement - Persian diplomacy is consistent from the sixth century into the fifth and, as will be seen, from the later fifth century into the fourth. Between c465 and c413, however, the political balance in Greece and the Aegean was markedly different from that obtaining in previous or later periods. The relationship of Athens with Persia in particular was conducted on an entirely different footing.

58. See below, chs.4,5; the settlement after the Ionian Revolt also has similarities, namely internal autonomy but external submission to Persia, Hdt. 6.43.3;

59. So also the 'reforms' after the Ionian Revolt: Hdt. 6.42 and 43;
Persia's Diplomatic contacts with Greece

Ancient sources record several embassies from Persia to various Greek states, and vice versa, in the period between the death of Xerxes and the Persian intervention in the Peloponnesian war. Two are of particular significance for a study of diplomacy: first the simultaneous Argive and Athenian embassies to Susa, and second the mission on which Epilykos, the uncle of Andocides, served. There are two noteworthy similarities between the incidents: they occurred toward the start of the reign of Artaxerxes I and Darius II respectively and they both involved a formal statement of the relationship between Persia and a Greek state. It will be argued that these are not coincidences and that they demonstrate the influence of near-eastern diplomatic tradition on the relations between Persia and the Greeks. The date of each incident is crucial to the argument and will be discussed first in both sections.

1) Herodotus provides no secure chronological setting for the simultaneous Argive and Athenian embassies to Susa except that they occurred many years after \( \text{ἀρκετὴ τὸ κεῖσαρ} \) 481 B.C. Greater certainty about their date can be achieved by studying the possible contexts for the two embassies separately.

The purpose of Herodotus' narrative at this point is to corroborate rumors of Argive pro-Persian sympathies manifested by her neutrality during the Persian wars, when Xerxes had promised Persian good-will if she stood aside from the conflict.

1. R. Meiggs, AE 508 - 512; Thuc. 1 109, 2ff.; Strabo, 1 3.1.47; Plato, Charm, 158a; Aristophanes, ACH. 61 - 122, 645 - 654 may reflect contemporary diplomatic activity;
2. Hdt. 7 151; the latter led by Kallias son of Hipponikos;
3. Andocides, 3 29;
4. Hdt. 7 150ff.; R.W. Macan, Herodotus Books VII, VIII, IX, vol. I part I (1908) 206f. argues that this expression suits a date in the 460's better than the 460's. The expression is, however, vague, cf. Hdt. 6 140.1; 7 16 .2; 7 137.3;
The Argive mission to Susa was intended to ascertain whether Artaxerxes still considered them as friends or as enemies and the incident was, therefore, cited by Herodotus as possibly corroborative evidence of Argos' medism. Artaxerxes' favourable response to the mission must have confirmed Greek suspicions of Argos' sympathies.

The importance of this incident is two-fold: why did Argos consider it necessary to ascertain Artaxerxes' attitude toward her and what does this imply for relations between Persia and a Greek state? The Argive enquiry implies a breach or hiatus in the relationship with Persia caused by either Argive or Persian action and calling for a restatement of Persian policy. The only known Argive action which might have been construed as hostile to Persia during the period from 480 to 430 was the alliance with Athens (462 - 451). Athens was at war with the king for at least part of this time and if their hostilities had already begun prior to the alliance with Argos it seems unlikely that the king would have given the Argives a favourable reply. Moreover if Argos was at the time of the embassy in alliance with Athens and therefore indirectly anti-Persian the force of Herodotus' story, whose implication is that Argos was still friendly toward Persia some twenty years after the failure of Xerxes' invasion, would be nullified. Alternatively the Argives might have sent an embassy to the king after the lapse of the alliance with Athens, i.e. after 451, in order to re-establish their former good relations.

A close inspection of Herodotus' text of the Argive question shows, however, that the breach of the relationship was not as a result of Argive action but can be definitely ascribed to the

5. Thuc. 1 102.4; 5 28.2; the chronology of the Pentekontaetia is notoriously difficult to establish; see Gomme, HCT 1 (1959), 408 - 413;

6. As suggested by How & Wells, II 191;
death in 465 of Xerxes and the accession of his son Artaxerxes I.  

...εἶρων Ἄρταξέρξην τὸν Ξέρξην εἰ ἐστὶ ἐμένη ἔθελουσιν 
τὴν πρὸς Ξέρξην σιλιτην εὐπεράσαντο, ἡ νομιζόμενο πρὸς αὐτὸν εἶναι 
κολέμιοι.

'... to ask Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, if the friendship 
which they had formed with Xerxes still held good (as they 
desired), or whether he would consider them to be enemies'.

As noticed by Stein this enquiry has no sense unless it 
follows closely the death of Xerxes. The emphasis of the 
question is on the continuation of the previous friendship and 
only in the second place on possible hostility. If this question 
were asked after not only would fifteen years have elapsed since 
his accession so that Artaxerxes might find it somewhat belated 
but also the intervening Argive alliance with Athens would make 
the question insolent especially as the Argives indicated their 
own desire to reaffirm the friendship (ἔθελουσι).

It can be seen that Herodotus' text favours an historical 
setting for the Argive mission to Susa soon after the death of 
Xerxes. The near-eastern background confirms this since the 
death of a monarch and the accession of his successor was a period 
of uncertainty when all royal relationships were in flux. This 
was a direct consequence of the personalisation of both 
international relations and internal administration. The loyalty 
of subjects and vassals was to their lord and, if discontented, 
they might revolt against a new master before he could impose 
his authority. Similarly foreign states might seek to alter 
their relationship, relying on the uncertainty surrounding a change

7. R.A. Parker and W.H. Dubberstein, Babylonian Chronology, 
626 B.C. - A.D. 75, (Providence, R.I., 1956) 17: BM 32234;
8. Hdt. 7 151;
9. H. Stein, Herodotus, IV* (1881) 143; Walker, CAH V (1927) 470 
also came to this conclusion.
10. This may be reflected in Herodotus' choice of the indicative 
for the first clause and the optative for the second, see Hdt., 
5 13, 97 but cf. Macan, ad. loc.
in ruler. Thus, for example, the deaths of Sargon II, Sennacherib and Esarhaddon all gave rise to revolt by vassals and/or internal strife within Assyria. It was to inhibit disputes over the succession such as had occurred on his own accession that Esarhaddon bound his subjects to protect his legitimate successor, Ashurbanipal, and to expedite his accession on Esarhaddon's death. The care taken in formulating these oaths demonstrates the concern of the neo-Assyrian monarchs to effect a smooth transmission of power which would render the dislocation of government as innocuous as possible.

The accession was also the time when the ruler was best able to change his status vis-a-vis other rulers and institute new policies or relationships. A good example of a major change in diplomacy is the belligerent attitude of Samsi-Adad V of Assyria toward Marduk-Balatsu-Iqbi of Babylon although the former's immediate predecessor had been a nominal vassal of Babylon. Similarly Ashurbanipal's annals record a foreign king voluntarily accepting the protection of Assyria, and thereby acknowledging his own inferior status, soon after his accession.

It became customary for rulers who wished to maintain good relations to acknowledge a new king soon after his accession and to delay doing so might indicate hostility. Vassals were expected to declare their allegiance as soon as possible and were regarded as rebels if they refused to make this gesture. In this way the accession became a test of other nations' recognition of the new king, those failing to acknowledge him becoming potential enemies. Equally, the new ruler, if a vassal, might

11. Luckenbill, OIP 2, 24ff. 48 - 62; Borger, Ash. 40 - 45; VAB 7, 6 - 14;
12. Wiseman, VTE, 3f.;
13. Earlier relations, E.F. Weidner, AtQ 8 (1932/33) 27ff.; also Brinkman, PKB, 207 - 210;
14. VAB 7, 84 40 - 50; see above pp. 49 - 56;
receive good treatment from his lord if he confirmed his loyalty even when previous relations between the two countries had been strained. The Achaemenid rulers probably experienced similar pressures to their predecessors and they no doubt recognised the need to impose their authority on vassals and to obtain the recognition of friendly independent states without delay after accession. Artaxerxes may, therefore, have expected to receive recognition from states such as Argos who had previously been on good terms with Persia though what status the Argives enjoyed in Persian eyes is obscure. They were φίλοι ('friends') but this need not imply that the Persians did not consider them vassals. Athens in 479 was offered φίλοι on very favourable terms but would nevertheless have been a vassal. If the Argives wished to maintain friendship with Artaxerxes it was clearly in their interest to recognise his assumption of power as soon as possible since long delay might have jeopardised their mission's reception in Susa.

The final factors which may help to determine the date of the Argive embassy are the alliance with Athens and the Athenian hostilities against Persia. If Athens and Persia were not, at the time of the Athenian alliance with Argos, engaged in active warfare it is possible that the embassy falls after the alliance or during the negotiations leading up to it. If, on the other hand, Athens were continuously at war with Persia in the late 460's the embassy is more likely to have occurred before the alliance, since Artaxerxes is unlikely to have given a favourable reply to the Argives if they were already allied to his enemies.

15. AS 5, 50 - 54 esp. 54 86ff.; see above pp. 46, 83;

16. The confusion on Cambyses' death demonstrated these problems: Hdt., 3 61 - 88, 126ff.; Artaxerxes' own accession: Ctesias 61ff.; Diod. 11 69, 71;

17. Hdt. 8 140; see above pp. 150f;
The coincidence of the Athenian and Argive embassies in Susa suggests a common stimulus for their presence - the accession of the new king. It may be inferred that both states realised that

1) the new king might introduce new policies
2) this was a time when diplomatic relationships might be redefined.

The Argives, as Persia's major (if covert) sympathisers in mainland Greece, were anxious to preserve their privileged status while Athens, as active leader of the struggle against Persia, was bound to discover any change in Persian attitudes. An added incentive to the Athenian presence in Susa was their recent success against the Persian forces at the Eurymedon and on Cyprus. They might have believed that these victories and Artaxerxes' accession would make the Persians more amenable to negotiation. There is no reason to suppose that Artaxerxes was committed to an anti-Athenian policy and, even if he were not concerned about recent Persian defeats, the revolt of Bactria (and possibly the revolt of Egypt) will have distracted him from an enforcement of his own will over the Greeks. In view of these distractions within the Empire the timing of the Athenians mission was fortunate.

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18. S.K. Eddy, CP 65 (1970) 11 also reached this conclusion, Herodotus' statement that the Athenians were there 'on other business' (εις νησις εις ο εις διότι) may be an admission of ignorance but is more likely intended to conceal his knowledge of the purpose of Kallias' mission - a purpose at variance with his own work; so Macan, ad Hdt. 7 151;


20. Diodorus, 12 4.4 states that the Persian initiative over the Peace of Kallias (sic) was motivated by the defeats in Cyprus. I would date this, with Sordi RSA 1 (1971) 34 - 48; to c165 not c150. The tradition is not confirmed by other sources. The revolts in Bactria and Egypt Ctesias, 61ff.; Diod. 11 69, 71;
It has been established that the Athenians sent an embassy led by Kallias to Artaxerxes I soon after his accession. Could this be the occasion of the treaty later known as the 'Peace of Kallias'? Its dating was disputed even by ancient authors; Diodorus assigns the Peace unequivocally to 449/8, after the Cyprus expedition of Kimon, but Kallisthenes, quoted by Plutarch, believed that if there were a Peace (which he doubted) then it was concluded before the death of Ephialtes, i.e. c462/1, and Isocrates clearly believed that the Peace dated from the period before the radical reforms which curtailed the power of the Areopagus, c462.

Diodorus' chronology has been criticised by Sordi who argues convincingly that his source, Ephorus, dated the Peace to the period immediately after the Eurymedon and the first campaign in Cyprus but Diodorus confused this first expedition in c464 and Kimon's later campaign in Cyprus, c450. Thus Diodorus' date for the Peace of Kallias can no longer be asserted with any confidence as the most likely one. Kallias' expedition to Susa in c464, as mentioned by Herodotus, becomes the probably setting for the negotiations leading to the settlement later known as the Peace of Kallias.

Evidence of the outcome of Kallias' negotiations in Persia is

21. Diod., 12 4.4;
22. Plut., Cim. 13.4 (= FGrH 124, F16);
23. Aristotle, Athp., 25.4;
24. Isoc. Areop. 80;
25. Aristotle, Athp., 25.3f., 26;
27. The date of the Peace of Kallias does not materially affect the conclusions of this section and I have not attempted to give a comprehensive review of the case for and against the date of 449/8. Some of the arguments of the authors of the ATL (vol. III 275 - 300, esp. 277ff.) most recently set out by Meiggs, AE 129 - 151, 487 - 495; are still persuasive but not wholly convincing. Bibliography of the subject in Bengtson, 64 - 69 and Meiggs, op. cit.; add de Ste Croix, OPW 310 - 314 and a very idiosyncratic treatment by J.H. Schreiner, SO 52 (1977) 19 - 38;
contradictory. Demosthenes\textsuperscript{28} claimed that Kallias was prosecuted and found guilty of receiving bribes while concluding the famous treaty whereas Plutarch\textsuperscript{29} transmits the testimony of some (unidentified) authors that Kallias was highly honoured for his services to Athens in concluding the treaty named after him. These conflicting stories might refer to two separate incidents\textsuperscript{30} and Demosthenes may have confused the two, resulting in the seemingly unthinkable, prosecution of Kallias after his most successful mission\textsuperscript{31}.

The terms of the Peace differ greatly from the treaties between Persia and a Greek state both before c470 and after c420. In outline the terms were:

i) the Greeks of Asia Minor to be autonomous,

ii) Persian forces not to come within three days march of the west coast of Asia Minor,

iii) no Persian warships to sail westwards of the Chelidonian Isles on the southern coast of Asia Minor nor the Kyanean rocks on the northern coast,

iv) the Athenians not to attack the territory of the King.

If these stipulations are not part of an elaborate fourth century forgery\textsuperscript{32} but reflect the terms of a genuine mid-fifth century treaty they demonstrate the weakness of the Persian bargaining position. No previous formal agreement made by Persia had countenanced the partial loss of its subjects in western Asia Minor, or elsewhere, nor had its freedom of action within its

\textsuperscript{28} Dem., 19 273;

\textsuperscript{29} Plut., Cim. 13.5; Paus., 1 8.2; C.L. Murison, Phoenix 25 (1971) 27n. 60;

\textsuperscript{30} S.K. Eddy, CP 65 (1970) 10f.;

\textsuperscript{31} D.J. Mosley, Mnem., 26 (1973) 57f.;

\textsuperscript{32} For this opinion see M. Sordi et al., RSA (1971) 205 - 211; C.L. Murison, Phoenix 25 (1971) 12 - 31; C.L. Habicht, Hermes 89 (1961) esp. 12ff., 19,25f.; contra S.K. Eddy, CP 65 (1970) 9f.;
own territory been curtailed by another state. Such restrictions are likely to have been distasteful not only in their practical application but also in the affront which they represented to the Persian imperial ideology. The only Persian gain was the Athenian undertaking not to attack the territory of the King, presumably including Cyprus. On these grounds it is possible to see how the Persians might have rejected the Athenian proposals but if this were so it is difficult to understand why rejected proposals were remembered and how they were transformed into a glittering success.

The most important clause for a study of later settlements between Persia and the Greeks is that guaranteeing the autonomy of the Asiatic Greeks. Early in the fourth century Persia was willing to make a similar concession when faced with the invasion of Agesilaus, a prospect as menacing as the Athenian naval supremacy after Eurymedon. The reference to the autonomy clause in the Peace of Kallias occurs in Diodorus, presumably drawing on Ephorus, and also Lycurgus, who may also have known Ephorus' work but not in the other fourth century sources for the Peace. It is possible therefore to trace the autonomy clause to Ephorus whose supposition it could have been, based on his knowledge of Persia's dealings with the Greeks of Asia in the late fifth and early fourth centuries and from the boundaries of Persian influence which the Peace of Kallias allegedly imposed. If the clause is not an invention by Ephorus or others then it shows that already in the middle fifth century Persia was capable of distinguishing between outright independence (ελευθερία) and local freedom (αυτονομία), a distinction she was certainly making later in the century.

This point is strengthened if the king did not, in the Peace of Kallias, disclaim his right to tribute from the Asiatic Greeks but rather acknowledged his intention not to collect it.

..............

33. cf. A.W. Gomme, JHS 50 (1930) 105f.;
34. see below pp. 176f;
35. Diod. 12 4.4, 26.2;
36. Lycurg., Leoc. 73;
37. C.L. Murison, Phoenix 25 (1971) 19f.;
The renewal of the Persian claim to this tribute in c. 415 is further corroborative evidence but one must then accept that the Peace of Kallias remained valid – at least in theory – from the date of its conclusion to c.415.38

If the autonomy-clause of the Peace of Kallias is genuine, and if it was acceptance of this principle which prevented the King from claiming the tribute of the Greeks of Asia Minor after the Peace of Kallias then the Persian attitude to autonomy had changed by the last decade of the fifth century, since there seems to have been no conflict for the Persians between autonomy and their right to tribute at this later date. It can be suggested that the different historical settings altered their perception of autonomy: in the later fifth and early fourth century Persia was able to enforce her claim to tribute whereas she had no such will or capability after her defeats some fifty years earlier.

If the autonomy-clause is rejected as a later interpolated invention then it is possible that the Persians recognised no limit on their right to tribute from the Asiatic Greeks but merely neglected to enforce this right because of their military weakness. The Persian renewal of claims on their tribute in c.415 might, therefore, be of no relevance to the Peace of Kallias particularly as it seems likely that Athens had entered into a less well-defined relationship with Darius II, Artaxerxes' successor.39

The Argive mission to Susa in c.465 has been shown to conform to a traditional pattern of near eastern diplomacy, the early acknowledgement of a new king and a redefinition of the relationship with him. Athens too attempted, perhaps successfully, to obtain a formal relationship with Artaxerxes at this time. Whether or not either or both states were aware of the near eastern tradition they both realised the political advantages of opening relations with the new king as soon as possible.

38. Thuc. 8 5.4; O. Murray, Historia 15 (1966) 142;
39. See below pp 164ff.;
11) The expedition on which Epilykos served has been dated from circumstantial evidence to the year 424/3 and was almost certainly the first Athenian contact with Darius II, who was acknowledged king in some parts of Babylonia at least as early as August 424. The basic similarity between this embassy and that led by Kallias some forty years earlier is their occurrence very early in the reigns of Darius II and Artaxerxes I respectively. As in the earlier case it can be postulated that the Athenians were eager to discover the attitude of the new Persian King toward them and were aware of the opportunity for diplomatic manoeuvre consequent on his accession. In any case Athens was concerned to forestall Spartan attempts to win the King over to their side, attempts which had been made since at least the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. In this respect the Athenians were successful according to Andocides since they elicited a favourable response from Darius:

... βασιλεί τῷ μεγάλῳ ... επινοούσαν καὶ ευνόοντον... 43

40. Andocides, 3.29; and the comments of U. Albini, Andocides, de Pace (Firenze 1964); H.T. Wade - Gery, HSCP Suppl. 1 (1940) 127 - 132 (= Essays in Greek History (Oxford 1958) 207 - 211); the date of the embassy is disputed by A.E. Raubitschek, GRBS 5 (1964) 156ff. who prefers 415, W.E. Thompson, Klio 53 (1977) 124 who suggests soon after the Peace of Nicias and A. Blamire Phoenix 29 (1975) 25 whose proposal of 422/1 is founded on a belief that Wade-Gery's chronology is too tight. D. Stockton, Historia 8 (1959) 68ff. and 74-79 attacks Wade-Gery's arguments in support of the embassy, rejecting it outright; contra Stockton see A. Andrewes, Historia 10 (1961) 3ff.; see now M.B. Walbank, Athenian Proxenies of the fifth century B.C. (Toronto 1978) 258 - 260;

41. Lewis, Sparta and Persia 71f. quoting BM 33342 for the date.

42. Thuc., 4 65.4; Thuc., I 82.1; Aristophanes, Ach., 616 - 51 and see Lewis, S&P, 2 - 3, 63 - 65, 69f.;

43. Andoc., 3.29;
'... we (the Athenians) made a treaty with the Great King establishing friendship for all time,...'

If there were additional terms or stipulations these have not been perpetuated in the sources but near-eastern parallels assist in interpreting this treaty.

i) the statement of friendship is characteristic of the ancient near-eastern treaty even in cases of settlements which terminated bitter warfare.

ii) the concept of eternal validity is found explicitly in some near-eastern treaties and is assumed in others.

On these grounds at least the truth of Andocides' reference to a formal statement of Persia's relationship with Athens early in Darius' reign is not unlikely.

The relationship between the settlements of 464 and 424 is complicated, not the least difficulty being Thucydides' failure to mention either. Other ancient authors pass over the 'Peace of Epilykos' in silence, Demosthenes explicitly stating that there were only two treaties with the Great King, namely the Peace of Kallias and the Peace of Antalkidas. Theopompos' derogatory reference to an Athenian treaty with the Persians includes the name Darius and it is possible that he was attacking the Peace of Epilykos but other ancient sources believed him to be referring to the Peace of Kallias.

Given the absence of ancient confirmation of Andocides' reference to Epilykos' mission there are two possible lines of enquiry:

\[\text{\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots}\]

44. see above pp. 87 - 100; M. Weinfeld, \\textit{UF} 8 (1976), 390f., 383f.; 45. M. Weinfeld, \\textit{loc. cit.}, 402; above n. 8; the importance of the inclusion of \textit{κρεμάσα} to indicate a cessation of hostilities is argued by M. Amit, \\textit{RSA} 4 (1974) 55 - 63; Persian views of treaty-validity are outlined by L.L. Orlin, \\textit{Michigan Oriental Studies ... G.G. Cameron,} (ed. Orlin, 1976, Ann Arbor) 255 - 266;

46. Gomme, \\textit{HCT} 1, 333 and 3, 499 accepted both but with some reservations in the case of the latter;

47. Dem., 15 29 though the text at this point is not agreed by all editors;

48. FGrH 115 F 153, 154; W.R. Connor, \\textit{Theopompos and Fifth Century Athens} (1968) 78 - 86;
i) the Peace of Epilykos reaffirmed the Peace of Kallias in so many details that it was not regarded as a distinct settlement, hence later silence.

ii) The Peace of Epilykos was a simple declaration of friendship between Athens and Persia, containing no clauses of a geographical or military nature and accordingly having little practical effect. In this respect it resembled the assurance of Persian friendship given by Artaxerxes I to the Argives. Darius may have given the Athenians verbal undertakings but a treaty proper, in the Greek sense, is less likely. Thus Epilykos' mission's settlement did not invite commemoration by any of the later authors whose main concern was to contrast the terms of the Peace of Kallias with those of the Peace of Antalkidas and who - if they knew of Epilykos' mission - would have thought it superfluous to their argument.

The first hypothesis rests on the belief that the Peace of Kallias was a formal and fully ratified treaty of containing explicit reference to certain topics of disagreement between Athens and Persia. It was argued above that the Peace of Kallias is better dated to and the subsequent hostilities between Athens and Persia in Egypt and elsewhere are surely evidence of the breakdown of any relationship the Peace may have instituted. It was, therefore, inoperative for over thirty years and although - as the most recent settlement between Athens and Persia - it could have formed the basis for negotiation, it seems unlikely that Persia would have agreed a second time to such humiliating terms.

The second hypothesis regards the results of Epilykos' mission as completely distinct from the Peace of Kallias and, if Andocides' reference to is accurate, perhaps partial

49. H.T. Wade-Gery, HSCP Suppl 1 (1940) 132; ATL III, 277; U. Kohler, Hermes 27 (1892) 68 - 73;

50. Hdt., 7 151;

51. I do not think that... has to imply a formalised written settlement;

52. Thuc. 1 109f., 112, 115.4 - 5, 116.1, 3; Diod. 12 27.3 - 5; it is also possible that the Peace may never have come into effect despite the agreement of terms;
proof that the Peace of Kallias was defunct since \( \text{παξ ἐλάτε} \) would not be necessary between two states already formally at peace.\(^53\) Thucydides' silence on the mission could be explained if Epilykos' mission did not achieve a formal agreement with Darius but merely a verbal understanding, a result which Thucydides might not have considered important when writing of this period. Even so Epilykos' embassy was the most significant diplomatic contact between Persia and Greece during the Peloponnesian War prior to Athens' support of Amorgos' revolt. It also seems an unlikely coincidence that Thucydides' revision of the earlier books of his work\(^54\) should have broken off at the point where the Athenian embassy to Artaxerxes I turned back hearing of his death,\(^55\) an event which must have antedated the sending of Epilykos' mission by at most a few months.\(^56\) If one is prepared to reject Andocides' reference to Epilykos' mission as unhistorical,\(^57\) it is possible to preserve Thucydides' narrative as it stands but this solution is not accepted here.

The settlement brought back by Epilykos was not as explicit as the Peace of Kallias in its definition of the relationship between Persia and Athens. This may be due to the different political backgrounds - in the earlier case Athens had been at the pinnacle of success and Persia at the nadir while in the later agreement Athens was engaged in a taxing war while Persia had no immediate distraction - or to a reluctance by both parties to commit themselves to anything more than a statement of friendship. If Andocides is to be believed, the Persians were still willing in c.424 to remain on friendly terms with Athens despite the Athenian involvement in the Peloponnesian War which might have been the occasion for renewed Persian aggression.

\( \cdots \cdots \cdots \)


\(^{54}\) A. Andrewes, \textit{Historia} 10 (1961) 1 - 18, esp. 5ff., 15;

\(^{55}\) Thuc., 4 50;

\(^{56}\) Andrewes, \textit{loc. cit.}, 15 seems to imply a connection between Thucydides' silence over both the Peace of Kallias and that of Epilykos;

\(^{57}\) C.L. Murison, \textit{Phoenix}, 25 (1971) 24 - 26, esp. n.54;
The King may also have been wary of detailed commitments to a Greek state in view of the failure of the Peace of Kallias and of the negotiations with Athens in the late sixth century. Greater acquaintance with Greek diplomacy and politics had convinced the Persians that unless they were in a position to dictate a settlement and see it fulfilled they were at the mercy of Greek political life and its effects on diplomacy. They achieved this position in the years between c.415 and c.385 B.C.

From a study of these two incidents it has emerged that Persia continued the near-eastern tradition both of confirming loyal allies in their former status and of negotiating agreements of friendship with previous enemies. Persian attitudes to the Greek notion of autonomy have also appeared and it is the history of Persia's attempts to reconcile autonomy to imperial ideology which form the core of the next chapter.
Between 413 and 386 B.C. the Achaemenid rulers of Persia and several Greek states, notably Athens and Sparta, were involved in complex diplomatic intercourse. During this period ten agreements, either full settlements between the supreme political authorities of each state or temporary truces to enable further negotiations to take place, were negotiated. Each of these will be considered for the light it may throw on the Persian approach to diplomacy with the Greeks before conclusions on broader issues are drawn.

In 413 the Athenian expedition to Sicily was completely defeated by the Syracusans and their allies while in Greece Sparta took the initiative against Athens by fortifying Decelea in Attica. The other significant event of the year was the reappearance of Persia as an enemy of Athens, with the avowed intention of regaining the tribute of the Greek cities of Asia Minor which Athens was preventing her from collecting. It is uncertain why Persia should have chosen this time to interfere directly in Greek affairs but the anti-Persian revolt of Amorges - who may have received Athenian support - is a possible cause. If Athens already had an agreement of friendship with the Persian king then his wrath at Athenian support of a rebel and his desire to strike back would correspond with a common near-eastern


2. Thuc. 7.84 - 87 and 7.19;

3. Thuc. 8.5.5; 8.6.1; see O. Murray, Historia 15 (1966) 142 - 156;

4. Andocides, III. 29;

5. see above pp 164 - 166;
diplomatic motif. It has, however, been suggested that Persia took advantage of Athens' weakened condition after the Sicilian disaster to try to regain the Asiatic Greeks and that Athens' support of Amorges was a counter to this policy. Hostilities would, on this argument, have been initiated by the Persians. Against this view it may be argued that the time-span between the Athenian disaster in Sicily (Autumn 413) and the Persian embassies to Sparta (Spring 412) is hardly long enough to accommodate the communication of the news of the disaster to Persia, the formulation of the new Persian policy toward Ionia, the transmission of this directive to the satraps and their own subsequent embassies to Sparta. It is possible that the King knowing of Athenian difficulties in Sicily had begun to demand the tribute of the Asiatic Greeks prior to the Sicilian disaster but Thucydides' assertions that Tissaphernes had only recently (vewc) been approached by the King for his tribute should, it it has any force, refer to 413 and not previous years.

Whatever the Persian King's reasons for intervening in the affairs of the Greeks his satraps in the west, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos, both aimed to overthrow Athens' control of the Greeks of Asia. The easiest way to achieve this was to support Athens' enemies in campaigns in the eastern Aegean and Hellespont areas. Tissaphernes induced the Spartans to intervene in Chios and Ionia without concluding a formal agreement, either an alliance or and undertaking to supply money or supplies, though he had made promises on these last two points.

Within a few months of the Spartan expedition to Ionia Tissaphernes did conclude an agreement with the leader of the

6. see above pp 57 - 59 ; It can be paralleled in Darius' I reaction to Athens' support of the Ionian Revolt.
7. H.D. Westlake, Phoenix 31 (1977) 319 - 329;
8. Lewis S&P 87 n. 25;
9. Thuc. 8 5.5;
10. Further discussion of Athens and Amorges in Lewis, S&P 85 - 87;
11. Thuc. 8 5.5 and 8 6.1;
Spartan forces, Chalcideus. According to its heading it was an alliance made by the Spartans and their allies with the King and Tissaphernes (...

The provisions of this alliance fell into three sections:

1) the King's right to the territory which he and his predecessors had ruled was affirmed and the allies undertook to prevent Athenian exactions from the cities therein.

2) the war was to be conducted by the allies in co-operation. Hostilities were not to be terminated without the agreement of both sides.

3) Rebels of either side were to be enemies of the other.

The second agreement was sworn at Miletus in Autumn 412 by the retiring Spartan admiral Therimenes and Tissaphernes though the latter is not mentioned explicitly. Its heading described it as a compact (\textit{\textit{\textit{Συνθέκαι}}}) between the Spartans and their allies on the one hand and the King, the King's sons and Tissaphernes on the other. ("\textit{\textit{\textit{Συνθέκαι Λαχεδαμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς βασιλέα Ἀρείων καὶ πολέως πρὸς βασιλέως καὶ Τισσαφέρνη}}..."

establishing a truce and friendship on certain conditions ("...

These conditions embody the three sections of the first treaty with some clarifications: the King's right to his territory was understood as settled and the Spartans and their allies were forbidden to attack it or to exact tribute from it. In return the King undertook not to attack nor allow any of his subjects to attack the Spartans or their allies. The King was also to provide upkeep (\textit{δαμάνη}) for any forces in his territory which he had sent for. The guarantee clauses against aggression by either side are obscure but seem to envisage

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12. Thuc. 8 17.4;
13. Thuc. 8 18.1;
14. Thuc. 8 36.2;
15. Thuc. 8 37.1; on the possible significance of \textit{\textit{κονδαί}} see M. Amit, RSA 4 (1974) 55 – 63;
attacks by individual members of either group on the other.\footnote{16}

The third agreement sworn in \textit{411} and again called \textit{Συνθήκη} in its heading, differs markedly from the previous two treaties in that a formal introduction giving date, place and a list of participants, appears. ("Τρίτη, χάλ παρεκλήσιμα βασιλείων, εν ταύτῃ, ο διεργασθείσα, περὶ ἄλλην Σαμηναίων, \textit{Συνθήκη}, \textit{Συνθήκη} ἐν τῷ Μικρόν, \textit{Συνθήκη} ἐν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν Σαμηναίων πρὸς Τιτταρείμνη καὶ Ἱεράμενή καὶ τοῦ σαμηναίου πατρίδος...\textit{17}.

Terms again included the first two sections of the first treaty, somewhat modified, but the non-aggression clauses of the second treaty were altered. The King's territory was defined as Asia but his right to do with it as he wished was affirmed. The King's obligation to supply the Spartan forces was interpreted more carefully, but again not in cash terms, and the limits of his responsibilities once his own fleet arrived were stated.

These three treaties have attracted much critical attention, and their form and content have been subjected to rigorous examination. It is commonly conceded that form, vocabulary and style reveal no significant Persian influence and it is, therefore, content alone which will be studied below.\footnote{19}

An important feature which the three agreements have in

\footnote{16. The peculiarity of this section might imply that in an agreement embodying \textit{φιλία}, outright war between the two parties could not be envisaged formally so a measure of circumlocution had to be introduced.}

\footnote{17. Thuc. 8 58.1;}


\footnote{19. Kirchhoff, \textit{op.cit.} 143; Lewis, \textit{S&P} 14 and 95 n. 57. A possible near-eastern feature may be seen in Thuc. 8 37.1 where the phrase \textit{τὸ βασιλείως} may refer not only to sons but also descendants (cf. \textit{VTE} 29 1 - 12) and might be paralleled in \textit{τὸ βασιλείως} or Thuc. 8 58.1;}
common is the claim of the king to territory which he and his ancestors held, further defined as Asia in the third treaty. This claim is foremost in all three documents but whereas the first explicitly asserts the king's right to the territory, the second takes it for granted while the third does not put forward the grounds for the king's claim (i.e. it was his or his ancestors), as had the previous two, but merely asserts that it belongs to him. This is a progressive toughening of the Persian attitude on the claim itself, modified though the territorial extent may be 20.

Increasing Persian assurance is also reflected in their attitude to the tribute of the Greek cities. As part of the Persian Empire these cities would be liable to taxation and the Persians, once their right to exact these dues was conceded and political conditions allowed, would have reasserted this right. In as much as there are specific references in the first two treaties to tribute 21 and a clause in the third which might reasonably be taken to refer to it 22, the Persians were concerned to define their right to the Greek cities' tribute even though as part of their territory it should have been automatic. This bespeaks Persian awareness that the payment of such taxes was likely to be a disputed point. Similarly, a clause of the first agreement explicitly refers only to preventing Athenian collection of the tribute, but it implies that tribute was now due to Persia, by virtue of the reassertion of Persia's claim to the cities. The first treaty obscures this claim, perhaps purposely since it would have been in Persia's interest to ensure Spartan support while not relinquishing a formal claim.

In the second agreement where the King's right to his land is

20. Lewis S&P 90 suggested that the king's broad claim in the first two treaties only referred to Asia Minor. This is not capable of proof.

21. Thuc. 8 18.1; 8 37.2;

22. Thuc. 8 58.1; M.S. Goldstein, CSCA 7 (1974) 162ff;
taken for granted, the Spartans were forbidden to harm it or to exact tribute from the cities. Again the recipient of the tribute was left undefined but it should be Persia, merely by right of possession. This is another assumption of rights by implication which although natural in Persian eyes may not have been immediately apparent to the Greeks, especially when no explicit claim was made.

In the third agreement, tribute was not mentioned at all but in addition to an absolute right to Asia the king secured his prerogative to do with it as he wished. This clause may refer to tribute because in both previous agreements care had been taken to establish the king's right on this point and the third agreement contains no other clause which could refer to tribute. However, the king's assertion of his rights is couched in very broad terms and it may have been drafted purposely as a catch-all whereby he could justify any action he pleased, including the exaction of tribute.

It is apparent that none of the three treaties explicitly asserted Persia's right to collect tribute from the Asiatic Greeks nor her intention to do so, though the third treaty gave her considerable scope for action. However, in conceding the king's absolute right to Asia the Spartans were - in theory at least - allowing him to make the tribute of the Greek cities of Asia a legitimate demand.

The next diplomatic contact of a significant nature between Spartans and Persians, in Spring 407, is recorded somewhat obscurely by Xenophon:

23. M.S. Goldstein, loc. cit.;
24. Thuc. 8 58.2;
25. Whether the background to this clause is a previous Athenian treaty with Persia or the immediately preceding Athenian negotiations with Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8 56;) is not of importance here. See Lewis S&P 105f + n.91, and Goldstein, loc. cit.;
Nothing is known of the antecedents of this embassy nor are the contents of the Spartan demands ever made clear. However, the embassy's return in company with Cyrus, the king's son, who was to assume overall command of Persian forces in western Asia Minor, shows that conduct of the war is likely to be closely connected with the Persian concessions to Spartan demands. This conclusion is borne out by the subsequent collaboration between Cyrus and Lysander which was instrumental in the final defeat of Athens.

Lewis has recently argued that Boitios' mission succeeded in establishing a treaty with the king, the major components of which were assurances on Persian subventions for the Spartan fleet and commitments by the king that he would respect the autonomy of the Greek cities of Asia on condition that they paid him the ancient tribute. His most cogent argument in favour of this second point is the continued enthusiasm of the Asiatic Greeks for a war after which, on conventional readings of their position, they would be handed over to the Persians as subjects. He also stresses that in later negotiations with the Spartans the Persians did not exclude the granting of autonomy to the Asiatic Greeks and argues that if the Spartans had previously abandoned claims for the autonomy of the Greeks of Asia, the Persians could have regarded it as a prima facie unreasonable claim. In

26. Xen. Hell. 1 4.2;
27. cf. Xen. Hell. 1 1.6; 2 2.18; 2 4.9;
28. S&P 124ff;
29. Xen. Hell. 1 5.5;
30. Lewis, S&P 123, "... the cities were, after a fashion, autonomous, though they were going to have financial obligations on the Persian side"
31. Lewis, S&P 114 - 117;
32. S&P 117;
support of this contention he adduces much evidence, particularly on the status of the cities as part of the administrative districts of the Empire and on their relationships to Cyrus and Tissaphernes as imperial officials and private individuals. His conclusion, as he admits,

'... cannot be more than tentative. It is that, from 407, the cities of Ionia were not part of the Persian empire in the sense that they were part of administrative satraps and that their relationship, first to Cyrus and then to Tissaphernes, was to them as persons and not as satraps. They could therefore be described as autonomous in relation to the king.'

Although Lewis' arguments are important for an understanding of Persian theories of administration they do not seem necessary to explain Persian concession of autonomy to the Greeks of Asia. They postulate a judicial fiction whereby the Persians could maintain final rights over the Asiatic Greeks while conceding their autonomy on paper. This theory is consistent with much of what is being argued here but it seems an unnecessary complication of the issue.

Lewis' 'Treaty of Boiotios' depends upon two arguments

1a) the Greeks of Asia Minor fought valiantly for a cause which did not guarantee their autonomy unless it were laid down in the Treaty of Boiotios,

1b) Persia would have rejected out of hand Spartan attempts in the 390's to ensure the autonomy of the Asiatic Greeks if autonomy had previously been a dead letter,

2) there is evidence of a clause governing the finance of the Spartan fleet which cannot come from any of the known settlements between Sparta and Persia and is likely therefore to come from the Treaty of Boiotios.

This last point is not immediately relevant to the argument

33. ibid. 122;
34. Xen. Hell. 1 5.5;
of this chapter but it must be admitted that there does seem to be a new financial clause. Previous agreements had not been so generous or explicit in dealing with the financing of the fleet. Nevertheless this clause alone does not necessitate acceptance of Lewis' 'Treaty of Boiotios'.

On point 1a) Lewis emphasises the belief that the Asiatic Greeks strove for autonomy and were resolutely opposed to Persian sovereignty during this period. He does concede that there is very little evidence that the Greeks of Asia Minor were opposed on principle to Persian sovereignty, and he also notes that some groups within the cities might have preferred the Persians to either the Athenians or Spartans. The complex changes of allegiance of several cities during this period indicate that loyalties were not governed solely by a quest for autonomy and independence, desirable as these may have been. In practical terms the Greeks of Asia were very likely to become the clients or adherents of Athens, Sparta or Persia and some may have chosen the last as being the most likely victor in Asia Minor itself.

Lewis' remaining argument is also open to objection. Later negotiations between Persian and Spartan leaders took place on three separate occasions in 397, 396 and 395 and all three resulted in truces which, in two cases, the Persians exploited to reinforce their troops. In the first Dercyllidas, the Spartan general in Asia, made the autonomy of the Asiatic Greeks a precondition for negotiations about a peace while the Persian satraps demanded the withdrawal of the Spartan army and garrisons from Asia Minor. The Persians were in addition probably motivated to make a truce by the knowledge that reinforcements for the fleet were being prepared in Phoenicia.

In the following year Agesilaus made a truce with Tissaphernes to enable the Spartan demands for the autonomy of the Asiatic

35. S&P 115 - 117;
37. Xen. Hell. 3 2.20; 3 4.5; 3 4.25; Xen. Ages. 1.10; Plut. Ages 9.1; Polyaeus, 2 1.8 on the second meeting;
38. Xen. Hell. 3 4.1; Diod. 14 39; Xen. Ages. 1.6; Plut. Ages. 6.1;
Greeks to be put to the king but Xenophon shows that Tissaphernes had no intention of respecting the terms of the truce because he proceeded to request the king for reinforcements without pressing the Spartan demand as he had promised to do. Lewis does not believe that this duplicity affects his argument because, he argues, the king was aware of the Spartan demands and would have refused them outright if they had been excessive or unreasonable. This is to view Persian diplomacy as hide-bound and legalistic, a system unresponsive to the vagaries of military or political change. The king was enough of a diplomat to be able to conceal long-term objectives if an advantage could thus be gained in the immediate future. The same may be said for the conduct of Persian diplomacy by the satraps whose immediate concern was to protect their territory from Spartan attack, not to precipitate hostilities unnecessarily. Hence the truces of 397 and 396 should not be taken as an index of Persia's willingness to compromise. These may have been genuine Persian attempts to reach a settlement but it is equally possible that they were tactical delays. It was not in Persia's diplomatic interest to reject out of hand Spartan demands that the autonomy of the Asiatic Greeks should be respected.

The third set of negotiations which included a similar Spartan demand was the meeting in 395 between Agesilaus, who had recently defeated Tissaphernes and thereby caused his disgrace and execution by the Persians, and Tithraustes, Tissaphernes' successor. Persia's fortunes in Asia Minor were at this time at their lowest ebb and Tithraustes did not offer a truce but

39. S&P 117 n. 65;
40. For discussion of the authority and latitude given to satraps to negotiate settlements, see next chapter;
41. Ed. Meyer GdA V 188;
42. Xen. Hell. 3 4.25; on the magnitude of the Persian defeat see Pausanias III, 9.6;
substantive terms which guaranteed autonomy for the Greek cities of Asia as long as they paid the ancient tribute and Agesilaos and his forces returned home. The manner in which these terms are presented (...: βασιλεὺς δὲ ἀδίοτι καὶ μὲν ἀποκλεῖτων οἴκους, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ Ἀχίλλεισ πόλεις αὐτονόμους ἐπεισόδος τῶν ἄρχατον δομοῦν ἀδίοτο ἀποφέρειν.) shows that the king was directly involved and proves that the Persians were willing to concede autonomy at least in this case. Even so there are several reasons why Lewis' interpretation of this concession should not be accepted without question. As he concedes⁴³, the Persians still maintained their claim to tribute which indicates that they considered the cities as remaining a part of their domain⁴⁴. Moreover, the victory of Agesilaos had severely jeopardised not only their claim to the Greeks of Asia but also their hold on the whole of Asia Minor and they may have feared another anabasis by a Spartan force⁴⁵. It could also be argued that Tithraustes was buying valuable time in which to divert Agesilaos by fomenting civil war in Greece. This would then be another example of a Persian satrap exploiting a truce for his own ends⁴⁶.

Lewis' argument on the Persian attitude toward Spartan demands for the autonomy of the Asiatic Greeks can be seen to depend upon the belief that the king would have rejected such claims on purely theoretical and legalistic grounds. It has been shown, however, that Persian concessions could be dictated by considerations of military or diplomatic expediency and that such considerations were present on each of the occasions when autonomy was discussed. Even under the most compelling circumstances the king relinquished neither final claims to the

⁴³ S&P, 117;
⁴⁴ The use of αὐτονόμια may also suggest a limited self-determination as opposed to outright independence (ἐλευθερία): E.J. Bickermann, RIDA 5 (1958) 313 – 34, esp. 328ff. and see below pp. 188ff;
⁴⁵ Xen. Ages. 1.33ff.; Plut. Ages. 14 - 15.1; Xen. Hell. 3.5.1; 4.4; also G.L. Cawkwell, CQ ns 26 (1976) 56f.; Hell. Oxy. 22.4;
⁴⁶ Timocrates' mission connected with Tithraustes Xen. Hell. 3.5.1; but cf. Hell. Oxy. 6 - 8 and I.A.F. Bruce, An Historical Commentary on the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia' (1967) 58ff.;
Greeks of Asia nor their tribute. Thus Lewis' argument 1b) cannot be thought convincing.

Three known sets of negotiations between Persians and Greeks remain to be considered. In 409 B.C. the Athenian forces in the Hellespont attacked Chalcedon and succeeded in defeating the garrison, led by a Spartan, and driving off a relief-force under the satraps Pharnabazos. While Alcibiades went to campaign against Selymbria the other Athenian generals at Chalcedon came to terms with Pharnabazos about the city and succeeded in persuading him to aid them in an embassy to the King about a treaty between Athens and Persia. The commonly-held view that Chalcedon now reverted to her alliance with Athens and ceased to form part of Pharnabazos' satrap has been challenged convincingly by Amit. He argues that Pharnabazos had no authority to concede absolute rights over territory in a formal settlement, that Chalcedon therefore remained Persian territory in theory (and in practice since the Athenians did not capture it) and that Pharnabazos merely granted to the Athenians the revenues from the city, hence giving the impression that it was once more an Athenian tributary.

These arguments are plausible and attractive; Pharnabazos could not sign away royal territory de jure (though of course it might be lost de facto) but he could assign the revenues of a city to Athens. In addition, these concessions were only a temporary measure while the Athenian embassy to the king was in progress and, since it is not impossible that Pharnabazos knew of the Spartan embassy led by Boiotios, he may have been using

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47. Xen. Hell. 1 3.1 - 7; cf. Plut. Alc. 29.6 - 30.2; Diod. 13 66.1f.;
48. Xen. Hell. 1 3.8 - 12; Plut. Alc. 31.1 - 2; Diod. 13 66.3;
49. AC 42 (1973) 436 - 457;
50. Discussed further below pp. 206 - 212;
51. Presumably his satrap's tribute would have remained constant in exchequer terms and he must therefore have made up the loss himself.
the truce as a tactical device to protect himself from further Athenian attacks. Amit's supposition that only the king could withdraw royal claim to territory coincides with the evidence, considered above, from the other settlements since in them no satraps had abrogated Persian claims to territory, instead referring them to the king for judgement.

The last two sets of negotiations between Greeks and Persians, the conference at Sardis in 392 and the King's Peace of 387/6, differ markedly from those discussed above. They did not aim to create a bi-lateral agreement between Sparta and Persia but rather a settlement involving all participants in the Corinthian War and, in the case of the King's Peace, any others who cared to participate. The negotiations at Sardis were followed within a few months by a conference at Sparta but the role which Persia played in the negotiations there, if she was represented at all, is obscure and discussion seems to have been focused on resolving the differences of the various Greek states without reference to Persia. It is assumed here that Sparta's concessions to Persia made in Sardis would have been the basis for Persian involvement in an agreement arising from the Sparta conference. These Spartan concessions show how Sparta had abandoned the Greeks of Asia Minor in the face of military reverses.

52. The three treaties of 412 - 411 do not deny Persian claims to territory while the negotiations conducted by Boiotios, which may have conceded certain rights, were with the king. The peace-terms of 397 - 395 all depended upon the king's agreement or had already received it;

53. In 392 Sparta clearly intended to negotiate a bi-lateral treaty with Persia but was forestalled by the arrival of her opponents' envoys in Sardis; Xen. Hell. 4 8.12;

54. Xen. Hell. 4 8.13 - 15;

55. Andocides 3 and Philochoros (FGrH 328) Frag. 149;

56. Discussion of the Sparta conference in Ryder, Koine Eirene 25 - 33; 165 - 169; also Lewis S&P 146 and G.L. Cawkwell Q7 No 26 (1976) 271f. n.13, 276f. n. 25;
... τὸν ἐν γὰρ ἐν τῷ Ἀχίλλῃ Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων Δαυεδαμονίους βασιλεὺς ὁ οὖν ἀντικοινοεῖται, τὸς τε νῆσους ἀπᾶσας καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς πόλεις ἄρχειν εφίσιν αὐτονόμους εἶναι.

57.

'The Spartans are putting forward no claim against the king for the Greek cities in Asia; all the islands and the other cities should be governed according to their own laws'.

The king was being offered the undisputed title to the Greeks of Asia in return for a commitment to the principle of autonomy amongst the other Greeks, a principle which, the Spartans urged, would benefit Persian security by ensuring that no Greek state gained too much power through interference in other states. It is doubtful that the king's rejection of these terms, when they were announced to him by Tiribazus, was on the grounds that they were inadequate - the King's Peace differs from them only on minor details and Tiribazus might be expected to have known whether the Spartan concessions were sufficient. The king's response should be traced to his perception of the state of the war and the possibility of making greater gains, not quibbles over diplomatic niceties. The fact that Sparta was willing to come to terms may have convinced the king that continuing support for Sparta's enemies could only be beneficial to Persia's interests in the Aegean area.

The king's calculation of the political and military situation was shown to be incorrect over the next five years when Sparta was not defeated and Athens' sea-power again became a menace to Persia. Therefore the king and Sparta were reconciled and terms were agreed whereby the king would support Sparta if the latter's opponents did not accept the settlement proposed by the king:

57. Xen. Hell. 4.8.14;

58. ibid.

59. Tiribazus' competence to accept the terms and support Sparta is discussed pp. 206 - 212;

60. Perhaps also his hatred of the Spartans, Lewis, S&P 146;
'Artaxerxes basileus nómozei dikaiou tás mèn en tōi 'Achífi polleis
kátoj eīnai kai tōn nhkwn Klazomená̂s kai Kúkrōn, tás dé állass 'Ellinidás
polleis kai mikrås kai megálas autónomoûs òqueinai plhν Lēmνou kai Iμbrou
kai Sxúron' taútasa dé eiskei tō dhrkhsen eīnai 'Athenaiō̂n, ὁκοτεροὶ dé
taútēn tīn eirhνhν mē déchontaí, toûtoï̂s eγw pòleisì̂s metà tōn taútōn boul-
omέ̂nωn kai pezz kai kata thlattan kai naustī kai χρήματι̂. 61

'King Artaxerxes considers it just that the cities in Asia
should be his and also, among the islands, Klazomenai and Cyprus;
that the other Greek cities both great and small should be free
to govern themselves except for Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros which as
of old should belong to Athens. I shall make war, together with
those who want the same objectives by land and by sea, with ships
and with money against whichever of the two parties rejects this
peace'.

These terms differ from those of 392 only in the specification
of Klazomenai and Cyprus as the king's and the inclusion of the
three Aegean islands in Athens' sphere of influence. These
changes resulted either from disputes in the intervening years -
Athens' support of Evagoras of Salamis 62 and her interference in
Klazomenai 63 - or were modifications of the autonomy principle
which were conceded by Sparta as early as the conference at
Sparta in 391 64.

The enforcement clause has, however, no parallel in the
earlier terms and is particularly interesting because it seems
to imply that the king was settling a bi-lateral war ( ὁκοτεροι ) 65.
In theory therefore the king was standing outside the settlement
as its guarantor, offering Persian friendship to those who accepted
it and threatening enmity to those who did not.

61. Xen. Hell. 5 1.31; other texts in Bengtson, no. 242;
62. Diod. 14 98; Xen. Hell. 4 8.24; 5 1.10ff;
63. Tod II 114;
64. Andoc. 3 12, 14;
65. So Lewis, S&P 147 + n. 79;
It can be suggested that if autonomy meant to the Persians a restricted freedom within the context of an external authority (as the Greeks of Asia Minor), then the king may have considered that the signatories of the King’s Peace were tacitly acknowledging his claim to theoretical sovereignty over them. He would then – as their suzerain – have had every right to settle disputes between them.

This reassertion, however, remained theoretical since, as far as is known, Persia did not attempt to impose tribute on or interfere directly in any Greek mainland state. There is no reference in any source to a realisation by the Greeks that the king regarded them as his subjects after the King’s Peace.66

The major Persian gain in this treaty was the explicit recognition not only by Sparta (who had conceded it in 392) but also by all Greek signatories that the Greeks of Asia were the King’s. Sparta’s gain was the autonomy clause which allowed her to interpret the terms to her advantage, forcing Thebes to renounce her hegemony of Boeotia and splitting the recent synoecism of Corinth and Argos.

**Persia and the implications of autonomy**

Having considered the negotiations between Persia and the Greeks from 412 to 386 it is necessary to isolate those features most significant for Persian diplomacy. A theme which appears in all these settlements is the king’s claim to the Greeks of Asia and as a corollary their quest for autonomy. Those two interlinked claims seem to have been the most disputed points in every negotiation between Persians and Greeks. It is therefore

66. cf. Isoc. *Paneg.* esp. 121, 137;
pertinent to ask whether Greek definitions of autonomy were compatible with Persian ideology and whether the two sides always understood each other's views on autonomy. What did the king's claim entail?

Thucydides states that the objective of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos was to regain the tribute of the Greek cities in their territory which the Athenians were preventing them from collecting. The first formal indications of the tribute obligations of the Greeks of Asia, the three treaties of 412 - 411, are not explicit but it has been argued that recognition of Persian sovereignty automatically subsumed rights to tribute, at least in Persian eyes, and there was therefore no necessity to legislate about it formally. Thus the tribute-clause of the first treaty merely strove to prevent the Athenians depriving Persia of her rightful tribute while in the second the Persians sought to safeguard themselves from possible Spartan interference in the tribute. In the third treaty such safeguards were no longer necessary and Persia could assert her right to the Greeks of Asia tout court, knowing that her right to tribute was acknowledged.

In 408 Pharnabazos conceded to the Athenians for a limited time the tribute from Chalcedon but only as a gift not a right, thus maintaining Persian claims to it. If Sparta did make a formal treaty with Persia in 407 (the Treaty of Boiotios) it is extremely likely that it embodied Persian rights to the tribute of the Greek cities. In the agreements of 397 and 396 tribute is not mentioned specifically, though the Spartans demanded the autonomy of the Greeks of Asia and in 396 this autonomy was to

67. Thuc. 8 5.5; 8 6.1;
68. Lichas and his delegation seem to have realised this; Thuc. 8 8.4.5;
69. In the abortive negotiations between Tissaphernes and the Athenian envoys before the third treaty with Sparta, the first two Persian demands had been the right to the whole of Ionia and in addition the adjacent islands, Thuc. 8 56.4;
70. Xen. Hell. 1 3.1 - 7; M. Amit, AC 42 (1973) 436 - 457;
71. Xen. Hell. 1 4.2; Lewis S&I 123;
be ὅσπερ καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ παρ' ἤμιν Ἑλλάδι 72 ('as it is in the cities of mainland Greece') which may deny the Persian right to tribute. In 395 Tithraustes offered autonomy to the Greeks of Asia provided that they pay the ancient tribute. In 392/1, however, as in 387/6 the Greeks of Asia were once again conceded to the king unconditionally.

On the question of tribute, therefore, the Persian attitude was unchanging. Even after the victory of Agesilaos and its possible effect on Persia's control of Asia Minor the right to tribute was not relinquished. This policy is in accordance with the Persian objectives in 412 but Persia aimed not only at tribute. Underlying the payment of tribute lay the recognition of Persian sovereignty which was an important feature of Persian and near eastern political and diplomatic ideology. A state which paid tribute acknowledged Persia as its master. Hence tribute-payment was not merely an economic process but also a matter of diplomatic prestige. Thus Pharnabazos in 409 could not and did not concede the Athenian right to tribute from Chalcedon but merely the privilege of collecting it for a limited period. Persian rights to Chalcedon were not being infringed.

Though tribute-payment was the sine qua non of Persian participation in agreements with the Greeks her claims over the Greeks of Asia were not limited to it, as the third treaty of 411, the proposals of 392 and the King's Peace indicate. By maintaining claims to ultimate sovereignty over the Greeks of Asia the king could demand, if he wished, the imposition of 

72. Xen. Hell. 3.4.5f.;
73. Xen. Hell. 3.4.25;
74. Xen. Hell. 4.8.14f.; 5.1.31;
75. E.g above p., 34; the Persian reliefs of tribute-bearers from the palace at Persepolis and the lists of the peoples under Persian control attest the continuing importance of such beliefs.
76. The status of the Ionian cities as a personal fief of Tissaphernes and later Cyrus, as suggested by Lewis, may be similar but in as much as their ruler and recipient of tribute was a Persian their privileged status was a sham in real terms. Lewis, S&P 122f.;
Persian garrisons in their cities\textsuperscript{77} and the supply of troops for the royal armies\textsuperscript{78}. The question of garrisons arose soon after the conclusion of the treaties of 412 - 411 and was, without doubt, a contentious issue between on the one hand Persia and on the other Sparta, her allies and the Ionian cities. The Milesians expelled a garrison from the fort which Tissaphernes had built in their city and received moral support from the Greeks who were there, particularly the Syracusans\textsuperscript{79}. Soon afterwards the Antandrians expelled the garrison of Arsaces, a Persian commander, with the help of Peloponnesians from Abydos and at about the same time Knidos expelled its garrison. Tissaphernes believed that the Spartans were accomplices in all these risings\textsuperscript{80}.

The Spartan attitude toward the garrisons was not unanimous for at Miletus Lichas - who had led the delegation which negotiated the third treaty\textsuperscript{81} - advised the Milesians and the other Greeks in the king's territory to submit to Tissaphernes and to pay court to him until the war should be concluded successfully\textsuperscript{82}. The Milesians were outraged at this response and sent a delegation to Sparta to inveigh against Tissaphernes but they may also have been motivated by the knowledge that Tissaphernes was himself sending an envoy to accuse them about the expulsion of his garrison and to explain his own actions\textsuperscript{83}. These counter-claims strongly suggest a difference of opinion about the legality of the garrisons, a dispute which both sides believed was worth

\textsuperscript{77} Thuc. 8 84.4; 8 108.4 - 109; Diod. 13 42.4; Xen. Hell. 4 8.1 - 2; Isoc. Paneg. 123;

\textsuperscript{78} In general, Xen. Cyrop. 7 4.2; 7 4.9; 8 6.8; of the Greeks after the King's Peace, Isoc. Paneg. 123;

\textsuperscript{79} Thuc. 8 84.4;

\textsuperscript{80} Thuc. 8 109.1;

\textsuperscript{81} ibid. 8 57f.;

\textsuperscript{82} ibid. 8 84.5;

\textsuperscript{83} ibid. 8 85.2;
pursuing in Sparta.

Tissaphernes believed that he had grounds for bringing not merely a complaint but also a charge (καταγορεύω) against the Milesians and his legal foundation for this must have been the third agreement of a few months earlier. This contains no reference to garrisons and Tissaphernes may have been relying on the general right of the king to do as he wished (βουλεύομαι βασιλεύει δως βολεία). Lichas was aware of Tissaphernes' justifiable claim to judge from his advice to the Milesians but they were unwilling to concede the right of the king to such unrestricted freedom of action. The third agreement can here be seen to be capable of wide interpretation, a fact perhaps purposely obscured by both sides when it was made.

After this dispute, the outcome of which is unknown there are very few references to garrisons for the period between 410 and 386. Cyrus had garrisons in the Ionian cities after the end of the Peloponnesian War but since these cities technically belonged to Tissaphernes who was hostile to Cyrus the garrisons might have been protection against Tissaphernes. They are not, therefore, good evidence of the Persian or Ionian attitude to garrisons as part of Persian imperial administration. In Pharnabazos' satrapy some Aeolian cities were occupied by one of his dependent rulers, Mania who imposed garrisons of Greeks, not of Persians. Lewis treats the ethnic composition of garrisons as a significant issue but his most persuasive evidence is a passage from the Cyropaideia in which the Greeks of the

84. Thuc. 8 53.2;
85. It is possible that the Milesians were not appealing against the third agreement but were relying on undertakings Tissaphernes may have made to them and other Greek cities about their status within the Persian Empire. See Lewis, S&P 94 n.54; this argument cannot be pursued until it is more fully set out.
86. Xen. Anab. 1 1.6;
87. Cyrus still paid the tribute of these cities to the king, Xen. Anab. 1 1.6; on the status of the Ionian cities, see Lewis, S&P 179ff.;
88. Xen. Hell. 3 1.16;
Hellespont secure concessions from a general of Cyrus the Great:

...εἰς μὲν τὰ τείχη βαρβάρους μὴ δέχεσθαι, δαμὸν δὲ ἀποφέρειν καὶ στρατεύσειν ὦ πον ἐπαγγέλλω. 90

'...they should not receive barbaroi within their walls but should pay the tribute and serve in the army wherever Cyrus might command.'

This has been taken to reflect the situation of the fourth century Greek cities in the empire but no support for this suggestion has been adduced. It might be argued from the evidence on garrisons in the late fifth and early fourth centuries that Persian administrators were aware of Greek resentment of garrisons and therefore made them as palatable as possible by using Greek soldiers but there is no reason to think that there was ever a formal Persian ruling on the composition of garrisons.

The significance of garrisons lies not in their composition but rather the fact of their imposition. To the Greeks garrisons were the most hated symbol of foreign domination, whether by other Greeks or barbaroi. After the battle of Cnidus Pharnabazos adopted, on Conon's advice, a policy of proclaiming to the islanders that Persia would not fortify their acropolises (i.e. impose a garrison) and would grant them autonomy. At the same time the islanders themselves expelled the garrisons imposed on them by Sparta. Similarly in 399 when Meidias, the ruler of Scepsis, asked Dercyclidas, the Spartan commander, on what terms he could be an ally of Sparta, the latter stipulated that the

89. S&P 123 nn. 101, 102;
90. Xen. Cyrop. 7 4.9;
91. Ed. Meyer, GGA IV 1.53 – 54 n.1, followed by Lewis, ibid.;
92. Xen. Hell. 4 8.1 – 2;
93. Diod. 14 84.4;
citizens be free and independent (ελευθήρως τε καὶ ἀνεπώμονος) and proceeded, once he had entered the city, to expel its garrison, for which the citizens honoured him. It seems from these examples that the absence of garrisons and, if once imposed, their removal were regarded as benevolent and friendly gestures toward the principle of autonomy with which garrisons were at this time incompatible.

Persia's minimum demands during this period consisted of sovereignty over the Greeks of Asia Minor as represented by payment of tribute to the king. This implied the king's ultimate rights over the city, allowing him to impose garrisons, requisition troops or interfere directly in local politics.

In opposition to these Persian objectives were the Greeks claims for autonomy, both theoretical and practical. In purely theoretical terms the Greek concept of autonomy was of a limited freedom as opposed to unfettered independence (ελευθερία). 'Autonomy meant a city's right to determine its internal affairs without interference from third parties although it was still possible that the city might have obligations to another power.

For the Greeks the major controversy over the application of autonomy in practical terms lay in its relationship with tribute. Thucydides, speaking of the Delian League, seems to use autonomous to describe those allies who did not make cash-payments to Athens but the Peace of Nicias recognised some states which were guaranteed autonomy but nevertheless paid tribute. In the same Peace it was thought necessary to define more closely the guaranteed autonomy of the Delphians.

94. Xen. Hell. 3 1.20f.;
96. E.J. Bickermann, RIDA 5 (1958) 313 - 344, esp. 327f., 335f.;
97. Thuc. 5 18.5;
98. Thuc. 2 9.4; 3 10.5;
99. Thuc. 5 18.5;
who were to be self-taxing and self-judging (αὐτοταξιατικὸς καὶ
αὐτοδίκαιος)100, a clarification unnecessary if autonomy
automatically implied freedom from tribute-imposition by a third
party.

The Persian response to the Greek desire for autonomy is
attested early in the fifth century101 when Artaphernes' reforms
after the Ionian Revolt and the albeit enforced 'democratisation'
of the Ionians in 492102 indicate that Persia had begun to
appreciate the desirability of allowing the Greeks some internal
freedom103. This policy, if such it was, seems to have continued
throughout the fifth century with only minor modifications
dependent on contemporary military and political circumstances104.
After Persia's re-emergence in 413 as a significant force in
Greek history her attitude to autonomy became crucial in the role
she played in Greek affairs. There is, significantly, no
reference to autonomy in any of the three agreements between the
Persians and Spartans of 412 - 411105. Tissaphernes' subsequent
abortive installation of garrisons at Miletus, Antandrus and
Cnidus were, it could be argued, necessary defences against Athens
and do not provide good evidence of the satraps' attitude toward
the autonomy of Ionia106.

The first evidence of Persian official recognition of
autonomy is contained in Tithraustes' terms to Agesilaos in
395107, (though Lewis would argue that the negotiations of

100. Thuc. 5.18.2;
101. And possibly before, see above pp. 129 ff.;
102. Hdt. 6.42f.; I Calabi, Ricerche sui Rapporti tra le Poleis
(1953) 33 - 36;
103. Herodotus clearly believed that democracies were imposed
(6.43.3) and if this were true it would throw interesting light on
Persian political thought; see A.T.E. Olmstead, Hist. of the
Persian Empire (1948) 158;
104. See above pp 149 - 151, 160; lack of evidence prevents a more
detailed analysis of Persia's attitude to autonomy during this
period.
105. Thuc. 8.13, 37, 58;
106. Thuc. 8.84.4, 109.1;
107. Xen. Hell. 3.4.25;
Boiotios saw a formal concession of autonomy by the Persians. In 395 the king evidently saw no conflict between Persian tribute and autonomy and, given the Greek ambiguity over this subject, it is unlikely that the Greeks found his attitude difficult to understand or to accept. It can be suggested that by 395 the Persians realised that the Asiatic Greeks might be reconciled to their rule by concessions of autonomy which consisted in not interfering directly in their internal politics, especially through garrisons. These concessions did not, however, exclude payment of tribute since had they done so the king could not have claimed the continuing presentation of formal gestures of loyalty and servitude. Thus whereas in the case of garrisons the Persians were willing to make concessions to local feelings and political pressure, tribute-payment was not a negotiable issue. Even the concessions on garrisons were de facto not de jure settlements and could have been withdrawn at any time.

Under severe military pressure the Persians were willing to make de facto concessions on the application of autonomy, as they had done earlier in the fifth century. Their attitude to autonomy as a political principle was, however, different. Near eastern theories of political sovereignty were rigid in their insistence on a dichotomy between the overlord and his subject. The normal Akkadian word for subject (ardu) also and more commonly meant slave (a concept, so the Greeks believed, still current in the Persian empire and stigmatised by them as σωματια and its frequent use in neo-Assyrian royal...

108. Lewis, S&P, 122;
109. See above pp. 177 n. 44, 188f.;
110. It is not clear whether they would also have been exempt from military service.
111. And were, see Isoc. Paneg. 123;
112. e.g. Euripides, Helen 276; Isoc. Paneg. 150f.;
inscriptions and letters to indicate the inferior status of vassal or subject accurately reflects the oriental idea of sovereignty. In theory there was no greater gulf than that between the king and his subjects, and his theoretical rights over them were unlimited.

Persian reluctance to concede the principle of autonomy is a natural result of similar Persian theories of sovereignty. To the king autonomy was a concept which limited his theoretical jurisdiction, and indirectly his sovereignty, and as such was not only a major affront to his own dignity and position but also was potentially dangerous because such a limitation could be regarded as a sign of weakness. Hence the Persian insistence on retaining ultimate rights on what they regarded as their territory. Pharnabazos' promise to allow the autonomy of the Aegean islanders (specifically referring to garrisons) was made on the advice of Conón that such a promise would be beneficial to the Persian cause. Immediate political considerations were here allowed to modify a diplomatic dogma, but only in de facto terms.

In practical terms the Persians were willing to concede de facto autonomy and to allow cities to govern themselves provided they continued to be loyal to the king and to pay tribute. In the later 390's - after the Greeks of Asia had been abandoned by the Spartans - the Persians sponsored the settlement of

113. See also pp. 47 - 56;
114. The status of the Cilician dynasts and the Arabians was of long standing and consequent on friendliness toward Persia: Hdt. 3 86 - 91, 97; 5 49; Xen. Cyrop. 7 4.2, 4.9; 8 6.8;
115. The treaties of 412 - 411 and the King's Peace defined the rights of the king over Asia Minor either implicitly or explicitly. The principle of autonomy was conceded only under severe duress: Xen. Hell. 3 4.25;
116. Xen. Hell. 4 8.1 - 2;
Ionian inter-city disputes by arbitration, the satrap merely authorising the settlement\textsuperscript{117}. At this time their effective control of Asia Minor was uncontested and, had they so wished, they could have dominated the Greek cities without making this gesture toward the principle of autonomy\textsuperscript{118}.

These measures were, however, motivated by a willingness to adapt to political pressures and were never de jure curtailments of royal authority. The three agreements of 412 - 411 should be seen in this light since the first two could have been interpreted to allow the king to reassert his claims to all of Xerxes' conquests as far as the Isthmus of Corinth and the third did not deny such a claim, merely affirming his uncontested right to Asia. In practical terms the king was seeking to gain as much as possible without endangering his dominance over the Greeks. Theoretically none of the settlements which he or his satraps concluded with the Greeks abjured any of his rights, save that of 395 when though the king seems to have been prepared to concede autonomy while still insisting on tribute, the agreement was never ratified\textsuperscript{119}.

\textsuperscript{117} Tod II, 113; this is highly reminiscent of the reforms of 492, Hdt. 6.42;

\textsuperscript{118} cf. Isocrates' characteristically black portrayal of the Ionians plight, Paneg. 123 and passim;

\textsuperscript{119} Xen. Hell. 3.4.25ff.;
Persia's Diplomatic contacts with Greece
c392 - c362 B.C.

After the King's Peace of 386 B.C. Persia seems to have played a less prominent role in Greek affairs than she had in the period after 413 B.C. This relative withdrawal may be an illusion created by the lacunae in the two major historical sources for this period: Xenophon, whose treatment of Persia's relations with Greece after 386 is far less comprehensive than in previous years, and Diodorus, whose account of the contacts between Greece and Persia becomes spasmodic, focusing in most cases on the common Peaces of the period. From 386 to at least 371 Sparta was acting as Persia's agent in Greece, a relationship abhorrent to Xenophon, which may account for his silence on these matters.

Isocrates and later fourth-century orators provide supplementary information on Persia's relations with Greece but they do not contradict the impression that Persia's active participation in the affairs of the mainland Greeks had diminished. Isocrates, in the Panegyricus, stressed Persia's interference in and influence on Greek affairs but it was in his interest to do so. More substantial evidence that the Greeks believed the Persian king was still involved in their affairs is the care taken in decrees of the period to ensure that the King's Peace of 386 was not broken by new alliances within Greece. Such precautions would have been unnecessary if the Greeks were aware that the king had disengaged himself completely from Greek affairs.

1. G.L. Cawkwell, intro to Xenophon A History of My Times (Penguin 1978) 39f.;
2. Isoc. Paneg. 117, 120f.; 127, 134, 136f.;
3. Tod. II 118 and 123;
The Effect of the Common Peaces on Persia

Persia's withdrawal from direct participation in Greek affairs between 386 and 368\(^1\) does not extend to diplomacy. On several occasions between 392 and 362 Persia took part in negotiations which would have involved or did involve her directly in Greek affairs as the guarantor of or partner in Greek internal peace\(^5\). In these settlements there were two cardinal issues:

1) recognition by the Greek states of the king's right to the Greeks of Asia Minor

2) the principle of autonomy within mainland Greece and those areas not awarded to the king.

Persia's insistence on the first clause is consistent with her policy from 413 onwards of recovering control of the whole of Asia Minor and its revenues from the Athenians and later from the Spartans, without prejudicing possible future gains elsewhere\(^6\). With the achievement of this objective in the King's Peace of 386 it might be thought that Persia could retire from Greece. It is however likely that the experience of Sparta's support of Cyrus' revolt in 401 and the Spartan incursions into Asia Minor in the 390's had made the king wary of leaving a potentially powerful enemy in Greece\(^7\). When in 392 Sparta negotiated with the satrap Tiribazus, Antalcidas pointed out that the autonomy clause he was proposing would prevent any city, explicitly Athens and Sparta, from becoming too powerful and therefore a danger to Persia. Tiribazus seems to have been particularly impressed by this suggestion. The other Greek

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4. Funds made available to Sparta by Philiscus, Ariobarzanes' envoy: Xen. Hell. 7 1.27; Diod. 15 70.2;

5. T.T.B. Ryder, Koine Eirene (1965) passim;

6. See previous chapter;

7. Xen. Hell. 3 1.1f; and passim in books 3 and 4;

8. Xen. Hell. 4 8.14f.; the king rejected the proposals;
cities involved in these negotiations objected to the clause because they saw that it would harm them far more than Sparta. By 386, however, when a similar settlement was introduced they were forced to agree to the principle of autonomy.

Persia was loath to concede autonomy to the Greek cities of Asia Minor because such a concession infringed on the sovereignty of the Persian king. However, the proposed settlement of 392 and the King's Peace of 386 explicitly excluded these cities from their autonomy-clauses and the king's rights were not therefore being undermined. Any deleterious effects which the autonomy-clause might have could only be indirect. It seems unlikely therefore that the king would have objected on principle to the autonomy-clause of the Common Peace from 386 to 366.

Even so, Persia's acceptance of Antalcidas' assurance that the autonomy-clause would prevent any Greek state from becoming too powerful seems naive, particularly in the light of Sparta's exploitation of autonomy to her own advantage after 386. The problem can be tackled in two ways:

1) The Persians realised the effect of the autonomy-clause - namely that Sparta would be able to increase her power in Greece at the expense of the other Greek states - and calculated that even so their policy of preventing any Greek state from becoming pre-eminent would not be seriously threatened,

2) Persia did not understand the implications of the autonomy-clause and believed that it would prevent the domination of any Greek state, as the Spartans had indicated.

Persia's attitude toward the autonomy-clause - which was Sparta's price for participation in the proposed settlement -

9. Xen. Hell. 5 1.25ff.; Diod. 14 110.2 - 4;
10. See previous chapter p. 191;
11. Xen. Hell. 4 8.14; 5 1.31; Diod. 14 110.2 - 4;
12. e.g. Xen. Hell. 5 2 - 3;
was affected by her military commitments outside the Aegean. Both Evagoras of Salamis and Achoris of Egypt were in revolt and a settlement of the war in the Aegean would release Persian forces for campaigning elsewhere. Diodorus explicitly connects the King's Peace with the king's wish to concentrate on Evagoras. It is likely therefore that the king took this into consideration when considering the settlement with Sparta and concluded that a resolution of the war in the Aegean was worth the risk of Sparta exploiting the autonomy-clause.

The king's desire to settle his war in Greece affects both options outlined above but since even before 387 the other Greek states had foreseen the Spartan dominance consequent upon the enforcement of autonomy, they would have informed the king if he himself had not realised the dangers. The second option, therefore, seems less plausible than the first.

The king calculated that the Spartans would increase their power within Greece but that were they to become aggressive toward him he could repeat his strategy of the 390's and support the other Greek states against them. The king believed that his support was the key to the balance of power in Greece and that the Spartans would therefore be deterred from attacking him.

After 386 Sparta's growing domination of Greece would have alerted Persia to the indirect dangers of autonomy but no action was taken to curb Sparta. The king did not, however, interfere when the Second Athenian Confederacy, an explicitly anti-Spartan organisation, was founded. This acceptance may be a passive move against Sparta to counter her gains of the previous years. The Confederacy had the advantage of not involving Persia at all while still keeping to the terms of the King's Peace. It could

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14. Diod. 14 110.5; the principal reason for the Peace of 375/4 was the king's desire for Greek mercenaries to fight against Egypt. Diod. 15 38.1 - 2;
15. Xen. Hell. 4 8.15;
16. Tod. II, 123 9 - 11;
17. Perhaps also motivated by the alliance offered by Glos, the rebel Persian admiral, to Sparta, Diod. 15 38.1 - 2; T.T.B. Ryder, CQ ns 13 (1963) 105 - 109;
18. Tod. II, 123 12 - 15;
also be argued that before 379 Persia was still involved in the
protracted struggle against Evagoras and that she therefore felt
unable to intervene in Greece herself. When in 378 a counter
to Sparta appeared in the shape of the Confederacy the king was
able to use it for his own ends.

A further twist in Persian diplomatic strategy might be
inferred if one postulates that the king knew that the autonomy-
clause, though in the short-term advantage to Sparta, was a
potential source of contention between the various Greek states.
He was probably aware of the Theban and Argive resistance to it
in 392\textsuperscript{19} and from his own experience in the 390's realised that
the interpretation of autonomy gave much scope for disagreement\textsuperscript{20}. Thus the enforcer of autonomy was likely to encounter as many
problems as successes in the long run. Isocrates saw that
autonomy could split the Greeks into warring factions and that
the king would use it for this purpose\textsuperscript{21}.

If these arguments make it more likely that Persia supported
autonomy in Greece from a calculation of its direct effects on
the Greek balance of power, there is still some truth in the Spartan
assertion that the autonomy-clause would by its implications
prevent any Greek state from attacking Persia, as can be seen from
the docility of the Greek states toward Persia for twenty years
after 386. Moreover the principle of autonomy itself, once
conceded by the major Greek powers, was likely to weaken in the
long run the domination of Greek affairs by one or two states\textsuperscript{22}. The Persians may have realised this also.

In 386 the king correctly calculated the effect of his
support of Sparta; the other Greek states at war were forced to

19. Xen. \textit{Hell.} 4 8.15;
20. See previous chapter;
21. \textit{Paneg.} 17, 120f., 134;
22. Ryder, \textit{KE}, 120f.;
agree to the terms arranged by him and Antalcidas. Furthermore
the King's Peace threatened a continuation of Sparta-Persian
collaboration against any state not abiding by the terms.
From the king's point of view, however, continuing involvement
in Greece was undesirable and enforcement of the settlement
would devolve on his partner.\textsuperscript{23} Even so the king did not
specify Sparta as the enforcer of the terms, allowing himself the
possibility of abandoning Sparta should the need arise. When
in 367 it became apparent that to continue to support Sparta
would involve him in Greek affairs more than to support Thebes
the king switched his allegiance.\textsuperscript{24} In this volte-face may be
seen the clearest evidence of Persia's attitude toward the
King's Peaces: they were no more than a device by which the king
could secure his own objectives while playing as little part as
possible. Hence the almost unanimous rejection of the terms of
the Peace announced at Thebes in 367 when the Greeks were made
aware of the king's cynicism.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Persia's role in the Common Peaces 386 - 362}

If it is conceded that after 386 Persia played a less
frequent role in Greek affairs, those occasions on which she did
intervene or become involved may be significant. The first clear
Persian action toward Greece after 386 was the instigation of a
Common Peace in 375/4\textsuperscript{26} but the sources supply meagre information
on the reasons for this intervention and on the form it took.\textsuperscript{27}
Diodorus is more convincing on the reason for the king's
initiative - namely that he needed mercenaries for his campaign
against Egypt\textsuperscript{28} - than on the details of the terms.

\textbf{\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots}

\textsuperscript{23} Antalcidas may also have realised this when negotiating
the settlement;
\textsuperscript{24} Xen. \textit{Hell.}, 7 1.27, 33ff.;
\textsuperscript{25} Xen. \textit{Hell.}, 7 1.39ff.;
\textsuperscript{26} Diod. 15 38, 1 - 2; \textit{FGrH} 328 (Philochoros) F 151, and Jacoby's
commentary; cf. Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6 2.1; Nepos, \textit{Timotheus}, 2.2;
\textsuperscript{27} S. Lauffer, \textit{Historia} 8 (1959) 315 - 348; Ryder, \textit{KE} 124ff.;
\textsuperscript{28} Diod. 15 38.1;
The stipulation of the autonomy of the cities was a restatement of the King's Peace and the clause on the absence of garrisons was merely an extension of the same principle. It seems unlikely that the king would of his own accord have initiated this clarification or the alleged splitting of the hegemony between Sparta and Athens. This division does however affect Persia because by accepting it she conceded to Athens a formal position as hegemon by sea in Greece. This was not necessarily against Persian interests since the Athenian Confederacy was sworn to abide by the King's Peace of 386\(^2^9\) and by allowing Athens a measure of power in Greece alongside Sparta the King would be ensuring Athenian support of the settlements of 386 and 375. The king therefore had no reason to believe that Athens intended to use her sea-power against him\(^3^0\).

The provisions of this Common Peace can be seen to be acceptable to Persia but this does not prove that they were drafted by the Persian king. Diodorus' emphasis in his report of the Peace is on the king's wish that the Greeks should cease fighting so that he could recruit mercenaries, not on the king's participation in the negotiation of the provisions\(^3^1\). It therefore remains obscure what role Persia played in the formulation of the Peace. On the analogy of the King's Peace of 386 it might be argued that the king 'sent down' a rescript restating the earlier Peace or alternatively invited the Greek cities to re-affirm their allegiance to the King's Peace. It seems unlikely that this rescript should have contained the clauses about the expulsion of garrisons or the division of the hegemony so it must be postulated that these were added to the settlement after negotiations between the Greek states. Would the king of Persia

29. Tod. II 123;
30. The king continued to use Athenian admirals after 375:
Ps-Dem XLIX 25ff. ;
31. Diod. 15 38.1 - 2;
have sworn to these clauses? If so, were the additions to his proposed settlement forwarded to Susa for approval before he assented to them?

There are only two sources which attest to the king swearing a treaty: the inscription of the alliance between Athens and Chios in 384:

... τὴν εἰρηνὴν καὶ τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τοῦ σφραγίου καὶ τὴν εὔχαριστίαν καὶ τὸ μόνον βασιλεῖα [καὶ τῶν Αθηναίων καὶ] Σαμοθρακιῶν καὶ οἱ οὖσαν παράκλησις καὶ οἱ φίλοι τῆς ἐλεονίας καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς τῶν Θεσπρωτίων καὶ οἱ οὖσαν τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸν σφραγίδα καὶ τὴν εὔχαριστίαν καὶ τὸ μόνον βασιλεῖα ... 32

'... the peace-treaty, the assurances of friendship, the oaths and the existing treaties which were sworn to by the king, the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians and the other Greeks ...'

and Dionysius of Halicarnassus' allegation that the king swore to the Peace of 371:

... τὴν εἰρήνην 'Αθηναίων καὶ τῶν Σαμοθρακιῶν καὶ τῶν Αθηναίων καὶ τῶν Σαμοθρακιῶν καὶ τῶν Πρωτομάκων τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν φιλίαν τὸν σφραγίδα τὴν εὔχαριστίαν καὶ τὸ μόνον βασιλεῖα ... 33

'... The Athenians, Spartans and the king swore the Peace ...'

Whatever the value of the second passage, the evidence of the inscription seems to indicate that the king actually swore to the treaty of 386. Whether the king swore by proxy through envoys or personally in Susa, either before or after the Greeks, is unknown.

After 375 the king may have participated in the Peace made at Sparta in 371, but Diodorus' narrative is at this point suspect and Xenophon does not mention Persian participation.

32. Tod II, 118 9 - 12; also Tod II, 123 12 - 15; cf. Xen. Hell. 7 1.39; 33. Dion. Hal., Lysias, 12;
34. Ryder (KE 127 n.2) rejects it out of hand. It is not unlikely that Dionysius should either have been in error or to have been slipshod in his use of 'swearing' to indicate participation.
35. See below pp 206 - 212 for discussion of royal negotiations;
36. Diod. 15 50.4; cf. Xen. Hell. 6 3; Ryder, KE 127f.;
37. S. Lauffer, Historia 8 (1959) 315 - 348; Diodorus' reason for the king's interference (15 50.4) 'he observed that Greece was again disturbed' is unhelpful and unconvincing;
(though Xenophon was also silent about the king's part in the Peace of 375/4). Dionysius of Halicarnassus (in the passage quoted above) clearly believed that the king did swear to this Peace and if his information derived from Philochoros then it should confirm Persian participation. However Persia had nothing to gain from a Peace in 371 and it would have to be assumed that if Persia were involved it was at the request of a Greek state, presumably Sparta. Against this view it may be averred that Antalcidas was in Persia at the time of the negotiation of the terms of the Peace, which makes Persian involvement in the treaty unlikely. Moreover, Callistratus, in arguing Athens' support of a Peace, refers to allegations that the Athenians were afraid of possible Persian interference which is improbable if the king were already participating in the negotiations.

The outcome of this Peace was shortlived since it was nullified almost immediately by the battle of Leuctra and it is generally agreed that Persia was not a partner in the Peace made at Athens after Leuctra. The restatement of the principles of the King's Peace in this settlement shows that the Greek states still found it a useful framework for agreement even when the king himself was not a sponsor.

In 368 Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Dascylium, sent Philiscus of Abydos to try to effect a Common Peace in Greece, the first known occasion after the battle of Leuctra on which the king's attitude to Greece was tested. Despite Thebes' recent success

38. so, with confidence, Jacoby, FGrH IIIb (supp.) I, 522, 14 - 17; also Cawkwell's note to Xen. Hell. 6 3.18 in the Penguin translation (1978) p. 322;

39. Xen. Hell. 6 3.12;

40. Ryder, KE 70 - 74; 131 - 133;

41. Xen. Hell. 6 5.2; probably referring to the Peace of either 386 or 375/4; Ryder, KE, 127;

42. Xen. Hell. 7 1.27; Diod. 15 70.2; Dom. 23.141;
Philicus supported Sparta in her attempts to retain Messene which Thebes wished to make autonomous. Thebes therefore refused to co-operate in the Peace and was made to appear the obstacle to a settlement, allowing Philiscus to give Sparta military and financial aid.

It has been suggested that Philiscus' mission was prompted by the Spartans who still relied on their special relationship with Persia dating from the King's Peace of 386. This suggestion has the merit of explaining why the king should have intervened of his own accord when there was no pressing reason to do so unless he was already troubled by the revolt of some of his western satraps. It has also been suggested that it was not the king but Ariobarzanes himself who ordered the mission in order to ascertain possible Greek support if he revolted. Against this it can be argued that Diodorus ascribes the mission to the king - though this may be merely a less complete version than Xenophon's - and that if Ariobarzanes were responsible for the mission it seems unlikely that he would have tried to promote a Peace.

If Sparta did request the king to interfere in 368 the initiative proved to be to her ultimate disadvantage because the Thebans sent a mission, led by Pelopidas, to Susa and were able to convince the king of the desirability of supporting them and abandoning the Spartans. Pelopidas could point not only to the

43. Ibid.
44. See Ryder, KE 135 n.1;
46. Osborne, Historia 22 (1973) 539 n.111;
47. Diod. 15 70.2; Xen. Hell. 7 1.27; or that the Greeks would have respected it unless he were making it in the king's name;
48. Xen. Hell. 7 1.33 - 37; Diod. 15 81.3; Plut. Pel. 30f.; Artax. 22 3 - 5; Dem. 19 137;
Thebans' past pro-Persian sympathies and her opposition to Agesilaus' invasion of Asia Minor in 396 but also her present pre-eminence in Greece as a result of the victory over Sparta at Leuctra\textsuperscript{49}. It is hardly conceivable that the king was not aware before 367 of the Theban victory or of its effect on Greek politics and yet Philiscus still supported Sparta in 363. This suggests that the king saw no reason to commit himself to a new Greek hegemon although his partner, Sparta, was now less influential. Had the king been concerned solely to support the strongest military power in Greece, he would have changed allegiance previously. In itself this shows that Greece was per se only of peripheral concern to the king and that it was only under the influence of the Satraps' Revolt or the obligations of the King's Peace that the king interfered in Greece.

Thus despite the greatly-altered balance of power in Greece the king continued to implement the twenty year old King's Peace. Only when deputations from many Greek states had travelled to Susa and put their cases to him directly did he choose to take account of Thebes' newly-won hegemony. The consequent change in royal policy was simply to replace Sparta with Thebes as Persia's agent in Greece. This drastic transfer of allegiance was followed by a new Common Peace whose terms, drawn up by the king on Theban advance, included not only the usual autonomy-clause but also an explicit recognition of Messene's independence. This blow at Sparta was matched by the inscription of Amphipolis amongst the king's allies and a command to Athens to beach her navy, thus effectively denying Athens' rights to her former colony\textsuperscript{50}. These provisions show that Thebes intended to pursue her local political objectives through the Peace she was sponsoring just as Sparta had done from 386 to 371\textsuperscript{51}.

When the terms of the new Common Peace were proclaimed at Thebes they were rejected by nearly all Greek states\textsuperscript{52}. The

\textsuperscript{49} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 7 1.34f.; Plut. \textit{Pel.} 30;

\textsuperscript{50} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 7 1.36; Dem. 19 137; also Xen. \textit{Hell.} 7 4.11;

\textsuperscript{51} Hence Spartan bitterness, G.L. Cawkwell, \textit{CQ} ns 26 (1976) 62 - 84 esp. 71;

\textsuperscript{52} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 7 1.39f.;
Thebans persevered in imposing their will on the other Greeks and in 366 terms were proposed which embodied the principal features of the previous settlement except that Athens was now favoured with recognition of her claims to Amphipolis and the Chersonese. It is not clear whether this Peace of 366 was a revival of the previous year's terms or a renegotiation involving a new royal letter. In any case the Spartans were now isolated and the Peace enjoyed a brief period of acceptance by most Greek states.

Persian conduct during the period from 371 to 366 shows the lack of interest the king felt in Greek affairs. When after Leuctra he might have been expected to at least negotiate a new Common Peace taking account of recent developments he did nothing and even persisted in his now outmoded policy of supporting Sparta. Even more reprehensible in the eyes of the other Greeks was the change of allegiance to Thebes and the support of her policies despite the injustice and hostility this caused. The king's policy was revealed as a cynical protection of his own interests with no thought for Peace in Greece.

The antipathy of most Greek states toward the Persian attitude on the Common Peace - as revealed by the cynical transfer of allegiance to Thebes in 367 - persisted even though in 366 at least some Greek states were forced by circumstances to acquiesce in a form of Common Peace. Greek anger was shown in 362 when the Greek states made a Common Peace without referring to Persia and without Persian participation. This purely

53. Xen. Hell. 7 4.6 - 10; Diod. 15 76.3;
54. Ryder, KE 137ff.;
55. G.L. Cawkwell, CQ ns 11 (1961) 80 - 86;
56. Isoc. Archidamus, 26ff.;
57. Xen. Hell. 7 4.6 - 10; see Cawkwell, CQ ns 11 (1961) 80 - 86 for the Peace of 366;
58. Diod. 15 89.1; Plut. Ages 35.3f.; Polybius, 4 33.8f.; cf. Diod. 15 90.2 and Ryder's comment, KE 144;
internal Common Peace may, however, have alerted not only the king but also the rebel satraps to the new feeling in Greece at this time. The so-called 'Satraps' Decree' records the answer of the Greeks to an envoy 'from the satraps' and has been dated to soon after the Peace of 362. Whether these are loyal satraps working on the king's behalf or rebels hoping to gain Greek support is disputed but the inscription clearly states that the Greeks had no wish to be involved either for or against the king and would only act in self-defence. If the decree was an answer to overtures from the king it is ironic that the Greeks who had courted the king's favour for 25 years should now be spurning his attentions while he, who had involved himself in Greek affairs as little as possible, should be courting their support.

It has been seen that between 386 and c362 the king of Persia initiated negotiations with the Greek states on only one occasion - the Peace of 375/4 when he needed to recruit mercenaries from the warring Greeks. On only three other occasions did he allow himself to be formally involved in Greek settlements or negotiations toward a settlement: in the Peace at Sparta in 371 (possibly), in Philiscus' mission (perhaps promoted by Spartan overtures) and in 367 and the following year when he was responding to intense pressure from several Greek states. The king showed no inclination to interfere in Greece either after 380 when he might have feared the growth of Spartan power or after Leuctra when the balance of power was altered. He had no interest in securing peace between the Greek states nor in expending funds on supporting one state or another. In these respects Persian policy toward Greece over this period was highly successful; Persian rights in Asia Minor were not challenged, the Greek states paid heed to the King's Peace and


60. Isocrates, Paneg. 121, 134, 175f.; also Xen. Hell. 1 5.9;

61. Xen. Hell. 6 3.12;
to the king's wishes\textsuperscript{62}, there was debilitating warfare between many Greek states for much of the period and all this was achieved with the minimum of Persian involvement\textsuperscript{63}.

After the change of Persian allegiance from Sparta to Thebes in 367 Persian motives were revealed to be entirely cynical. By 362 the Greek states had abandoned the king as a useful partner in or guarantor of Common Peace and did not therefore protect his interests in the Peace of that year\textsuperscript{64}. Even so they did not oppose him openly, preferring to remain neutral\textsuperscript{65}. The king, however, had forfeited the advantages of the King's Peace and its renewals; no longer had he a commitment that the Greeks regarded Asia as his nor did he possess the special status which the King's Peace had conferred on him and which he had utilised to such good effect for over twenty years.

**Persia's negotiations with Greece**

The conference at Susa in 367 saw the important change of allegiance from Sparta to Thebes\textsuperscript{66}. It highlights an important feature of Persian diplomacy: the role of the king and his central authority in negotiations and policy-making.

Walser has argued that the audience was the concrete expression of the king's participation in administration and diplomacy\textsuperscript{67}. As such it was an important ceremony demonstrating the personal power of the king and emphasising his ultimate control

\textsuperscript{62} e.g. the recall of Chabrias from Egypt: Diod. 15 29.3; Nepos, Chabr. 3.1;

\textsuperscript{63} Ryder, KE 41f.;

\textsuperscript{64} Ryder, KE 86 and 144;

\textsuperscript{65} Tod II 145;

\textsuperscript{66} Xen. Hell. 7.1.33 - 37; Diod. 15 8.3; Plut. Pal. 30f., Artax. 22.3 - 5; Dem. 19.137;

of affairs in contrast to the highly bureaucratic royal administration. Audience with the king was a carefully guarded privilege for foreign envoys or refugees and indicated the importance of the mission. Envoys who found favour with the king were lavishly entertained, a result of not only their personal impact on the king but also the political importance of their state, witness Antalcidas' disgrace after Leuctra and the corresponding success of Pelopidas.

As a corollary of the king's ultimate authority his subordinates' exercise of power was restricted. The king's decision was final and could not be opposed without grave consequences, even by satraps. Accordingly satraps were, on occasions, nervous of overstepping their authority and preferred to refer decisions to the king even though delay might prejudice the achievement of their objectives. Sometimes, however, it was to a satrap's advantage to invoke the necessity of referring problems to his master. If a satrap took a decision, acted on it and later found that he was out of step with the king he was severely disciplined.

When on the strength of Antalcidas' proposals Tiribazus supported Sparta, with whom Persia was at war, he was relieved of his command. According to Xenophon Tiribazus could not act openly on Sparta's behalf without the authority of the King.

68. e.g. Themistokles: Plut. Them. 27; Conon: Nepos, Con. 3 2 - 4; Justin 6 2.12ff.; cf. RE sub Conon 1326;
69. Athenaeus 14 D - E, 229F, 251B; Plut. Pel. 30, Artax 22; Diod. 14 79.4 - 6;
70. Plut. Artax 22;
71. Polaenus, Strat. 7 21.5;
72. Diod. 15 41.2, 5;
73. Thuc. 8 29.1; Xen. Hell. 3 2.20, 3 4.5f.;
74. Xen. Hell. 4 8.16f.;
75. Ibid.;
paciōnpevta Aαξεδαμονίων γενέσθαι σοι ἀμφότερον ἀντι-sync so he gave money to Antalcidas in secret and then went to the king to refer the matter to him. Even so he was not allowed to return to his satrapy and was replaced. His error cannot have been to give money to the Spartans for Tithraustes had bribed Agesilaus to leave Lydia in 395. It is possible that Xenophon is not being wholly honest about the extent of Tiribazus' support for Sparta since Philochoros records a royal rescript which is probably to be associated with the events of this year and Tiribazus may, therefore, have issued a rescript in the king's name without consulting him first. The circumspection which both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus had shown between 410 and 395 about making formal commitments on behalf of the king suggests that Tiribazus' sending of the rescript was unusual.

The freedom with which Tissaphernes negotiated the three agreements with the Spartans in 412 to 411 may indicate that Tiribazus' action was not unparalleled but whereas Tissaphernes and Sparta were not at war in 412, Tiribazus and Sparta were in 392. Even so there is no hint in Thucydides that any of Tissaphernes' settlements required ratification by the king whereas it is clear that Tiribazus knew he had to obtain the king's approval before taking any overt steps to aid Sparta. It has been suggested that the king may have been indirectly involved in the third treaty between Tissaphernes and the Spartans but

76. Xen. Hell. 3 4.26;

77. Suggested by G.L. Cawkwell, CQ ns 26 (1976) 270 - 277, nn. 13,25 and his discussion of Philochoros' evidence therein; also Jacoby's commentary to the Philochoros fragment (FGrH 328 F149); Xenophon's silence about royal rescripts is well known, e.g. Xen. Hell. 6 2.1;

78. See previous chapter 167 - 172, 178 - 182;

79. Thuc. 8 18, 37, 54;
even this suggestion requires the dangerous assumption that a royal envoy could act as proxy for his master in negotiations, unless the third treaty was in effect dictated by the king and was not negotiated, just like the King's Peace of 386. If this last suggestion is correct it would mean that Tissaphernes' two earlier treaties were merely drafts which were sent to the king along with recommendations from the satrap and, perhaps, representation from the Spartans. The hypothesis that settlements were either dictated by the king and implemented by his representative or, when initiated by subordinates, had to be referred to him for ratification, fits both the situation in 397 when Dercyllidas and Tissaphernes referred their proposals for a peace to their respective home authorities and also Tithraustes' proposals to Agesilaus in 395 which almost certainly emanate from the king.

From these two cases it can be argued that a representative of the king might bring down with him an agreement formulated and approved by the king which was not capable of revision by his subordinates and that proposals made to satraps had to be passed on for approval by the king. Tissaphernes' first two 'treaties' would then be working drafts for the use of the Spartans and not final settlements. Perhaps in the same way Tiribazus accepted Antalcidas' proposals in 392 as the basis of an agreement and in order to help Sparta make the other Greeks accept them issued a 'royal rescript' in which they were embodied.

80. Lewis, S&P 104f.; 107;
81. Lewis, S&P 101ff. believes the king was aware of the Spartans' grievances over the first two treaties;
82. Xen. Hell. 3.2.20; 3.4.25f, and Lewis, S&P 142;
83. G. de Sanctis, Studi di Storia della Storiografica Greca (1951) 84 - 93;
84. Philochoros' statement about a royal rescript might be misleading but I prefer to believe, with Cawkwell CQ ns 26 (1976) 276f. n.25, that Philochoros does refer to the negotiations of 392 which were in effect a King's Peace manque;
The reason for his fall from favour would not then be a breach of satrapal authority so much as a miscalculation of the king's desire to defeat the Spartans.\(^85\)

With such uncertainties attending settlements negotiated through satraps and the possibility that they might also be playing a double game, it is understandable that Greek envoys tried to gain audience with the king himself. It is also significant that important policy decisions were almost always taken in conferences with the king. Thus the embassy of Boiotios which finally determined Persian strategy toward Greece\(^86\), the negotiations in 387 leading to the King's Peace\(^87\) and the conference at Susa in 367\(^88\) were all turning points in Persian strategy and all were with the king himself. Similar direct interventions by the king were the Peace of 375/4\(^89\), the decision in 397 to build a fleet with which to challenge the Spartans in the Aegean and the promotion of Tissaphernes to commander-in-chief in the west at the same time\(^90\).

The intervention of the king in 397 may also help to define further a satrap's freedom of action. In 401 on his return to the west Tissaphernes was hostile toward the Ionian cities - whom he perhaps regarded as rebels - and in defence they called in the Spartans.\(^91\) Between 401 and 398 there is no indication that the king became involved in this provincial dispute, not even when in

\[\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\]

\(^85\) so Lewis, S&P 146;
\(^86\) Xen. Hell. 1 4.1ff.;
\(^87\) Xen. Hell. 5 1.25ff.;
\(^88\) Xen. Hell. 7 1.33 - 37;
\(^89\) Diod. 15 38.1 - 2;
\(^90\) Xen. Hell. 3 2.13; Diod. 14 39.1; Plut. Artax. 21; Justin 6 1.7 - 9; Beloch, GG III 2 § 84;
\(^91\) Xen. Hell. 3 1.3ff.;
398 Dercyllidas left Tissaphernes' satrapy and invaded Pharnabazus' province. However in 397 following representations from Pharnabazus, perhaps concerned because his satrapy was now involved in what had been Tissaphernes' dispute - the king intervened to take in hand the problem on his western borders. An assertion made by the Ionians at Sparta in c398 - and certainly before they knew of the royal intervention - supports the hypothesis that the quarrel between Tissaphernes and the Ionian cities was not a matter for the central administration:

''\ldots\text{it was} in Tissaphernes' hands, if he wished, to allow the Greek cities autonomy...''

Thus Tissaphernes in his role as satrap could have granted autonomy but, after 397, presumably, he was not free to do so. Further support may be found in Tithraustes' condemnation in 395 of Tissaphernes as the cause of the trouble between Persia and Sparta - an implicit accusation that he had mishandled the Ionian cities and thereby involved Sparta. Despite the understandable inclination of the king to place all the blame on Tissaphernes it is unlikely that Tithraustes could have made his comment if Tissaphernes had been known to be acting in accordance with previously-dictated policy emanating from the king.

92. Xen. Hell. 3 1.9;

93. It seems odd that if Pharnabazus instigated the change of policy in 397 Tissaphernes should have been given the supreme command (Xen. Hell. 3 2.13); perhaps Diodorus (14 39) has confused Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; cf. Polyaeus 1 48.3 and I.A.F. Bruce, Hist. Comm. on Hell. Oxy. 58 - 60 with Hell. Oxy. VII 5;

94. Diod. 14.39.1; and note 90 above;

95. Xen. Hell. 3 2.12; it is not clear whether autonomy is here thought of as de jure or de facto;

96. Xen. Hell. 3 4.25; cf. Lewis, S&P 121f. who believes that these remarks concern Tissaphernes' jurisdiction as a private landowner not in his office of satrap;
The dichotomy between satrapal and royal jurisdiction is not clear but it seems that purely provincial problems could be dealt with by the satrap on his own. When, however, the central authority was invoked the satrap's freedom of action was subject to scrutiny and limitation. It is significant that in none of the substantive treaties or truces arranged by satraps with the Greeks from 412 to 386 did they revoke or limit any claim the king had on territory or commit him to any action. Even when in 408 Pharnabazus was constrained to come to terms with the Athenians attacking Chalcedon he avoided prejudicing the king's rights over the city, merely allowing the Athenians to exact tribute on a temporary basis as a personal gift from himself.  

These examples lead to the conclusion that while satraps had considerable de facto authority - in their own administration just as in diplomacy - they were not allowed to make any de jure commitments on behalf of the king. This dichotomy between the practical and the theoretical conduct of diplomacy is a constant theme running through from the Assyrian period. Similarly, as was seen above, though the king was unwilling to concede autonomy de jure by a treaty he was not unwilling to give a certain amount of self-government to the Asiatic Greeks. In effect the king reserved for himself the right to commit his administration to any major foreign policy decision and consultation with him was far more likely to produce results that negotiations with satraps.

97. See previous chapter and M. Amit, AC (1973) 436 - 457;
98. See previous chapter and Tod. II 113;
CONCLUSIONS
Assyrian Diplomacy

Despite the inconsistency of the two major types of source, i.e. royal inscriptions and letters, a problem most clearly demonstrated in the relations of Mitā with Sargon (13 - 38), the examination of diplomatic relationships and terminology has revealed several significant aspects hitherto not studied in detail. Diplomacy has been shown to be essentially communication between rulers, effected on most occasions by the transmission of letters in the hands of envoys but sometimes, in important instances, accomplished personally (80 - 82). The recognition of one ruler by another, expressed by the Assyrians in the ceremony of Šalāl Šulme (43f., 50f.), was an accepted diplomatic protocol and essential to continuing friendly relations, whether between vassal and suzerain or independent rulers (47, 53). Failure by a vassal to maintain communication with his overlord was a breach of their relationship, as the case of Gyges shows (39 - 46), and similarly the passage of envoys between independent rulers was essential for friendly intercourse (47, 58). Within the overlord/vassal relationships the loyalty of the vassal was rewarded by the overlord with beneficence and protection from hostile forces (76 - 80). It seems likely that considerations of practical diplomacy and the Assyrian concept of Šabtu as a reciprocal benefit (104 - 116) obliged the Assyrian king to respond in this way although he neither would nor could have committed himself in treaty-obligations.

The two studies of foreign diplomats (117 - 123) show that the Assyrians were unfamiliar with the concept of a professional diplomatic corps. Envoys seem to have been high administrative officials deputed to fulfill particular missions, on completion of which they returned to their home. Permanent diplomatic missions were unknown (117 - 123).

The Assyrian concept of 'friendly relations' with another power, usually expressed by a derivative of Salāmu, embraced both associations between independent rulers and the formal ties of overlord and vassal (87 - 109). Sulummū Štūtu was a particularly emphatic expression of such a relationship (97). Failure to be on friendly terms (Salāmu) automatically implied
hostility (nakāru), but not necessarily a state of war (98 - 103). In legalistic terms there seems to have been no formal intermediate status between the two.

Two major themes have been traced throughout the study. The first, the Assyrian will to establish political supremacy wherever possible, led to the second, the problem of reconciling this political ideology with the exigencies of diplomacy. (The relations of Mitā and Sargon 13 - 38 are a good example). Independent powers, notably Urartu and Elam, were not incorporated into the system of political dependence on Assyria and therefore possessed a different diplomatic status. (47ff., 57ff.,). A measure of parity was grudgingly accorded both Elam and Urartu (49, 51, 57) but it is significant that Assyria developed no formalised vocabulary for parity-status until the use of ibrü by Ashurbanipal (60 - 63). Even so Assyria aimed to reduce these powers to dependent status as the jubilation over the submission of Urartu shows (49, 51, 54ff.). From her relationships with these independent powers it is clear that Assyria preferred to dictate the course of diplomatic relations and sought to do so whenever possible.

Persian Diplomacy

Several significant features of Persia's formal contacts with the Greeks have been established:

1) Persian diplomacy was underpinned by the premise that in any diplomatic relationship the Persian king was the superior party and that he dictated the terms of agreements with other nations (e.e. 135 - 146).

2) A corollary of this ideologically-conditioned theory was a distinction between on the one had de iure international agreements and on the other de facto solutions of international problems. The former were in theory dictated by the king alone and were not negotiated. In reality diplomatic intercourse often brought about a negotiated agreement but even then Persia did not acknowledge the role of the other
partner (King's Peace: 180 - 182, 193 - 206).

3) Major changes of policy emanated from the king alone and when subordinates undertook the resolution of international problems their actions had to be ratified by him. (206 - 212, 178 - 180).

4) Persian diplomacy was, notwithstanding these conflicts between ideology and practical diplomacy, flexible and responsive to changing circumstances.

It is also important to note the phases of Persian diplomacy because they demonstrate not only the evolution of Persian policy toward the Greeks but also the underlying insistence on Persian supremacy. Down to 480 Persia attempted to impose unconditional settlements on all Greeks. During the campaign of 480/479 concessions to some cities, notably Athens, were made in the hope of achieving a swift end to the war. However, the king dictated these conditions without consulting the Greeks themselves. From 478 to 413 Persia could not impose her terms on the Greeks and it may be significant that only two vague statements of Persian policy toward Greek states and a (disputed) treaty[1] are known from this period. Persia was loath to enter into agreements which she did not dictate and her attitude may have been conditioned just as much by ideology as by sound political sense. After 413 Persia regained the initiative in diplomacy with the Greeks and held it down to the middle 360's. It was only once in serious danger and that was in the 390's when Agesilaus was a threat in Asia Minor.

It is more difficult to distinguish the influence of Greek on Persian diplomacy or vice versa but it is of interest that on no occasion does there seem to have been a failure to understand, at a simple level, diplomatic messages[2]. The points of similarity between the conduct of diplomacy by both sides

1. The Peace of Kallias

2. Persia's complaint about Sparta's diplomatic messages in c430 was concerned with their inconsistency, not their incomprehensibility, Thuc. 4 50;
make this unsurprising: neither had evolved the institution of the professional diplomat and therefore envoys were administrators, politicians or important figures in government. Similarly there was no concept of permanent representation and envoys undertook individual missions as special commissions. The authority of envoys and administrators was circumscribed by both Persia and Greece. Just as the Athenian assembly did not normally allow its envoys to make agreements without ratification by the assembly so the satraps of the king had to obtain his approval of any terms they negotiated. Even in the case of a seemingly non-Greek symbol, the giving of earth and water, the meaning was sufficiently clear for it to have been accepted without difficulty.

At the level of diplomatic theory, however, the Persian refusal to subscribe to agreements between equals was an important source of division between the two parties. Moreover the Persians never seem to have taken note of contemporary Greek theories of alliance. It has been shown that despite the almost wholly Greek drafting and phraseology of agreements with Persia the content of the document reveals an approach to diplomacy far different from that of the Greeks. The King's Peace and its renewals are, in a modified form, just as much expressions of the paramount position of the king as Artaphrenes' ultimatum to the Athenians in c570.

The positive influence of Persia on Greece or vice versa in the field of diplomacy is difficult to isolate. If there is influence then it is more likely to be visible in the period between 413 and 386 since Persia's involvement with the Greeks as more intensive then than at any other time. The necessity

3. Proxenoi in the Greek world are not true diplomats.

4. The Athenian submission at Sardis in c510 can now be seen in a different light. Even if Artaphrenes understood that the competence of the envoys was limited he may not have realised that the assembly could disown or ignore their actions.

5. The Peace of Kallias would be an important exception if it were accepted as a formal treaty.
of reaching an agreement involving the King on the one hand and the Greeks as a group on the other brought to fruition the concept of the 'Common Peace' although the Greeks had been approaching the idea before 386. The use of ἐπιφύλακτη to indicate the formal instrument of bringing into existence the state of peace might be connected with Persian influence since it seems unlikely that the near eastern tradition of treaties in perpetuity could have been reconciled with the normal Greek method of ending hostilities by means of a truce. Moreover it can be added that the prevailing near eastern pattern was for an alliance or agreement of friendship to terminate a period of hostilities. Thus on two grounds the Persians may have found the concept of ἐπιφύλακτη easier both to understand and to accept. The Greeks themselves were attempting to foster greater cohesion in the Aegean in this new type of settlement and may have been more willing to take note of Persian suggestions or demands in this area.

The fundamental difference in attitude to international relations between Persia and the Greeks finds its clearest expression in the dispute over autonomy. Persia's attitude remained unchanged from the middle of the sixth to the middle of the fourth century: formal limits on the king's authority over his subjects were completely denied but a measure of de facto local freedom was tolerated and even supported. At the very most the Greeks would have gained the semblance of autonomy but would still have paid tribute. Persian insistence on tribute-payment may have been misunderstood by the Greeks but the symbolism of tribute as an acknowledgement of dependence on another power can hardly have been alien to the Greeks of Thucydides' day.

It is a measure not only of Persian persistence and diplomatic skill but also of Greek weakness and division that from 413 to 386 the Persians pursued openly the aim of regaining Asia Minor and of forcing the Greeks to subscribe to this policy.

6. Persian examples of this: Andoc. 3.29; L.L. Orlin, loc. cit.
Even more to Persia's diplomatic credit is the achievement of these objectives and the maintenance of Persian influence over Greece for a further twenty years with a minimum of intervention.

Comparison of the conclusions on Assyrian and Persian diplomacy reveals important similarities. These are particularly significant because they illuminate the theory of diplomacy in the near east and the attitude toward foreign states of Assyria and Persia.

Whereas certain key features of Assyrian diplomatic practice have been established it has proved possible to isolate only a bare outline of the practice of Persian diplomacy. There are recognizable similarities, e.g. diplomacy as a branch of administration, lack of professional diplomats or permanent foreign representation, but even with a greater understanding of Persian diplomacy and the ability to make more comparisons with Assyria the importance of such comparisons for a study of diplomacy as a system of ideas would be limited. Similarities in the theory of diplomacy, most notably the assumption of superiority and therefore sovereignty over all other nations, are striking. This vital element in diplomatic ideology could have led to severe problems in the conduct of diplomacy if enforced rigorously. Both Assyria and Persia achieved a resolution of this awkward conflict between theory and practice by making a clear distinction between de iure and de facto diplomatic acts. Thus it was possible for Assyria to accord both Urartu and Elam equality in terms of diplomatic protocol but the relationship does not seem to have been ratified in a treaty. Similarly the Persian kings may have given Athens and Argos an impression of equality but there is no evidence that such a status received formal endorsement.

Wherever possible the policy of preeminence was introduced at the beginning of a diplomatic relationship and was reinforced...
by the institution of tribute-payment and the ceremonies surrounding its delivery. In Assyria these ceremonies were symbols of supremacy over the other states and of the dependence of the tribute-bringer. Persia's stress on the tribute of the Greeks of Asia Minor is almost certainly a reflection of its importance in diplomatic as well as financial terms.

It seems more likely that these similarities in ideology are the result of Persian borrowings from, or imitation of, the tradition of near eastern diplomacy exemplified by Assyria than that they are an uniform response to similar circumstances. The perpetuation of traditional diplomatic theory and practice from Assyria to Persia, either directly or via Babylonia, suggests that they formed a vital and useful way of ordering international relations but whether it also implies a common ideology of empire is open to question. In the past the concept of empire in the ancient near east has been taken for granted but recently interest in the identification of the characteristics of empire has revived. Significant new evidence has been added in this study to the debate on empires and greater insight could be gained by a more detailed and systematic analysis based on the conclusions presented above. It can be seen, however, that in so far as Assyrian and Persian diplomacy is an 'imperial' diplomacy it represents a tradition different from and at variance with the Greek concept of international relations.

A comparative study of the kind undertaken above and based on widely differing types of evidence, leads of necessity to less than precise conclusions in terms of synthesis. It is not at present possible to prove an indisputable connection between Assyrian and Persian diplomacy but valuable insight into both have been gained. The substantiation of important

7. Power and Propaganda (Mesopotamia 7, ed. M.T. Larsen, Copenhagen 1979); see also Imperialism in the ancient world (edd. P.D.A. Garnsey and C.R. Whittaker, Cambridge 1979)
aspects of Assyrian diplomacy allows a more reliable perspective on Assyria's international relations. Similarly in setting Persian diplomacy in the context of the near eastern traditions which it inherited most clearly from Assyria new and valid evidence has been introduced into the consideration of a key issue in the interaction of east and west between the sixth and fourth centuries B.C. Further study of, for example, Persian treaties in the light of Assyrian international agreements and of the connection between Assyrian and earlier patterns of diplomacy will make more intelligible both the sophisticated inter-relations of near eastern states and their contacts with the classical world.
Abbreviations

Abbreviations follow those in R. Borger, Handbuch der Keilschriftliteratur Band II (Berlin 1975), for literature on the ancient near east, and those in L'Annee Philologique, for literature on classical history, except for the following:

ABC
A.K. Grayson, Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles (Locust Valley 1975)

ANET

AOF

ARI

AS 5
A.C. Piepkorn, Historical Prism Inscriptions of Ashurbanipal vol. I (Chicago, 1933)

Ash.
R. Borger, Die Inschriften Asarhaddons, Königs von Assyrien (AfO Beiheft, Goraz, 1956)

ATL

Bengtson
H. Bengtson, Die Verträge der griechisch-romischen Welt von 700 bis 338 v. Chr. (2nd Ed., Munich, 1975) (= Die Staatsverträge des Altertums vol. 2)
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| Melanges Dussaud | Melanges Syriens offerts a M. Rene Dussaud par ses amis et eleves (Paris, 1939) |
| OIP 2 | D.D. Luckenbill, *The Annals of Sennacherib* (Chicago, 1924) |
| PDK | E.F. Weidner, *Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasien, die Staatsvertrage in akkadischen Sprache aus dem Archiv von Boghazkoï* (Boghazkoi-Studien 8 and 9, Leipzig 1923) |
| Riv. Fil. | *Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica. Torino* |


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