THE MUSLIMS OF THE PUNJAB AND THEIR POLITICS,
1936-1947

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by

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ABSTRACT

The thesis is concerned mainly with the political development of the Muslims in the Punjab during the years 1936 to 1947, though it takes into account certain aspects of their socio-economic life, mainly as a background to the political study. For this purpose an examination has been conducted into the degree to which Muslims participated in the economic life of the Province in comparison to the other two major communities in the Punjab (Hindu and Sikh), with particular reference to the areas of land-ownership, finance and debt, industry, education and the public services.

The political analysis contained in this work is largely confined to the struggle for supremacy which occurred between the Unionist Party and the Muslim League from 1936 onwards. This period, for the purpose of the study, has been divided into four main sections - the election of 1937, the Ministries of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan and Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, and the election of 1946. During each phase the changing fortunes of the two contenders (the Unionist Party and the Muslim League) are recorded and discussed in the light of provincial and national developments. Thereby the thesis embraces the decline of Unionism, and the eventual triumph of the League at the polls in 1946, whilst analysing those factors which frustrated and fostered the growth of Muslim nationalism (as expressed in the demand for 'Pakistan') in the Punjab. The thesis concludes by considering the events which prevented the Muslim League from realising power following its election victory in 1946, and by examining the periods of coalition government and Governor's rule immediately prior to Partition.
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GLOSSARY

Bajra - A food-grain, being a species of millet.
Crore - 10,000,000.
Darbāra - A member of a Darbar, i.e. a court, audience or levee.
Doab - A tract of land lying between two rivers.
Fiqah - Islamic jurisprudence.
Gaddī - A throne or seat.
Ghee - Clarified butter.
Gram - The term usually referred to varieties of pulse, notably the chick-pea.
Gurdwara - Sikh temple.
Hadis - The traditional sayings and doings of the Prophet Mohammad.
Hakim - Physician.
Hartal - Strike.
Inamdar - The holder of a rent-free grant of land.
Jagirdar - Holder of a revenue-free grant of land. Usually the recipient received the award in recognition for service to the Government.
Jehad - Holy war.
Jirga - Council of elders.
Jowar - A species of millet, sown in July and reaped in November and December.
Kalima - Islamic creed.
Kanungo - Revenue official operating both at village and District level. This officer usually kept the records relating to the value, tenure, extent and transfers of holdings, and assisted in the measurement and survey of agricultural land.
Lakh - 100,000.
Lambardar - A village headman.
Mantras - Prayers.
Maulvi - A learned man or teacher (especially of Arabic), an expounder of Islamic law.
Maund - A weight equal to approximately 94 lbs.
Mian - A term of respect, similar to 'sir' or 'master' applied to an old or respected person.
'Muḥaqqaq' - Researcher.
Mullah - A religious teacher or learned man.
Munshi - A writer or secretary; the term was often applied by Europeans to teachers and interpreters of Persian.
Nawab - During Moghul rule this title was conferred on a Governor of a Province. Under British rule, however, it became merely a term applied to men of high social rank, no office being attached to it.
Pachotra - Village headman's fee.
Glossary (continued)

Patwari - Village accountant, whose duty it was to keep and produce, when required by government revenue officers, all accounts relating to lands, produce, cultivation, changes of ownership, and past assessments of the village.

Rais - Head of an old-established family, landed gentleman, Chief.

Rabi - The spring harvest; the grain was usually sown in October and November and harvested between March and May.

Sajjada Nashin - Successor to the Saint.

Sufedposh - Village dignitary.

Tahsildar - A Revenue Collector.

Thal - Grazing ground; area in a District.

Tumandar - A tribal chief.

Ulema - Religious leaders.

Zamindar - A landowner. In the Punjab the term specifically applied to a cultivating proprietor.
ABBREVIATIONS

A.G.G. Agent to the Governor-General (Punjab States).
A.I.M.L. All-India Muslim League.
AR. Assessment Report.
B. and R. Br. Bridges and Roads Branch (Public Works Department).
C.I.E. Commander, Order of the Indian Empire.
Comm. Commissioner.
D.C. District Commissioner.
DG. District Gazetteer.
Div. Division.
E.A.C. Extra Assistant Commissioner.
G. of I. Government of India.
GR. Governor's Reports.
H.M.G. His Majesty's Government.
I & B. Information and Broadcasting.
I.C.S. Indian Civil Service.
I.O. India Office.
IOL. India Office Library, London.
IOR. India Office Records, India Office Library, London.
M.L.A. Member of the Legislative Assembly.
M.L.C. Member of the Legislative Council.
N.L. Newspaper Library (British Library), Colindale.
N.W.F.P. The North-West Frontier Province.
N.W.P. North-West Provinces.
Offg. Sec. Officiating Secretary.
Parl. Board All-India Muslim League Parliamentary Board.
PBRL. Punjab Government Board of Revenue Library, Lahore.
PEF. Punjab Education Proceedings.
PER. Punjab Education Reports.
PGRC. Pakistan Government Research Centre, Lahore.
PGSL. Punjab Government Secretariat Library and Archives, Lahore.
PHCL. Punjab High Court Library, Lahore.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>PPL.</td>
<td>Punjab Public Library, Lahore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.W.D.</td>
<td>Public Works Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. and G. Dept.</td>
<td>Services and General Department.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sec.of State</td>
<td>Secretary of State for India.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SR.</td>
<td>Settlement Report.</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.P.</td>
<td>The United Provinces.</td>
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<td>U.Sec.</td>
<td>Under Secretary.</td>
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<td>U.Sec of State</td>
<td>Under Secretary of State for India.</td>
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<td>U.T.C.</td>
<td>University Officers Training Corps.</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Had the All-India Muslim League failed to secure the support of the political and religious leaders of the Punjab's thirteen and a half million Muslims Pakistan, in all probability, would never have been realised as an independent and sovereign nation. The vast majority of the Muslim political and religious élites, together with the Muslim electorate, however, drawn by the vision of a Muslim homeland, which seemed to promise not only an Islamic haven but also a state in which Muslims would prosper economically and socially, pledged their allegiance to the Muslim League, as was convincingly demonstrated by the 1946 elections. A variety of factors had influenced that outcome: an Islamic state as epitomised by 'Pakistan' appealed to the pious and God-fearing, whilst a nation in which Muslims were to be dominant held obvious attractions for the more materialistic and ambitious amongst the 'Believers', especially as in the future all political and economic power would reside in Muslim hands. Yet a decade earlier Muslim nationalism had failed to excite or attract the Muslim leadership of the day in the Punjab, the Province's political life having been dominated by provincial considerations as personified by the Unionist Party. In fact none of the Unionist Party's Muslim leaders - Fazl-i-Husain, Sikander Hyat Khan, Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana - believed in the desirability of communal politics or a Muslim state. Thus the Muslim League's success in the Punjab culminated only after nine years of struggle to undermine the influence of Unionism and to persuade the large landed Muslim magnates who dominated and led the Unionist Party to forsake it in favour of the Muslim League and 'Pakistan'. It is the aim of this thesis, therefore, to analyse the dramatic change which occurred in the political alliances and loyalties of Muslims in the Punjab in the period 1936 to 1947, whilst at the same time attempting to place the events of those years in social and economic perspective.

Before the British occupation in 1849 the Punjab lying in the north-west corner of India had for centuries provided the route whereby virtually every foreign invader of Hindustan had assailed the country. The most dramatic effect of this process had been the establishment of the political ascendancy of Islam in certain parts of the Province as early as the tenth century A.D.. By the nineteenth century Islam had emerged as the dominant religion in the region. The
spread of Islam and the continued existence of Hinduism, the dominance
of which it had broken, led to a coexistence of faiths which at times was
decidedly uneasy. This in turn prompted Guru Nanak (1469-1539), the
founder of Sikhism, to preach a new religion which sought to incorpo­
rate the most appealing elements of Islam and Hinduism. Whilst the
Sikh religion did attract a substantial following it never rivalled
in numbers either Islam or Hinduism, though for a while it did play a
dominant political rôle in the Punjab, and until the end of British
rule the Sikhs enjoyed an economic importance far in excess of their
population status. As a consequence of these religious developments
the twentieth century Punjab was largely inhabited by the members of
three main communities - Muslim, Hindu and Sikh - whose adherents
frequently shared a common racial or tribal ancestry and identity, as
in the case of the Rajputs and Jats. Despite past common ties, how­
ever, all three religious groups radically divided Punjabi society.
In the case of the Muslims the religious divisions or differences,
which identified them as a separate community, were made all the more
poignant by the fact that by the late nineteenth and twentieth cen­
turies a more marked degree of poverty and lack of opportunity also
distinguished the average Muslim from his non-Muslim neighbours in
the Province.

Thus in spite of the presence of a small class of extremely
wealthy Muslim zamindars who controlled vast tracts of land princi­
pally in the western portion of the Province, the Muslims as a whole
represented an economically depressed section of society in comparison
to Hindus and Sikhs. Their numerical superiority had not spawned a
similar dominance in such areas as land ownership, credit, commerce
and industry, or in the realms of education, the professions and gov­
ernment service. A number of factors had coalesced to mould the
Muslim condition. The collapse of Mughal power in India in the
eighteenth century removed the advantages the Muslim Empire had
afforded its Muslim subjects, whilst the political ascendency of the
Sikhs in the Punjab (1772-1849) resulted in substantial tracts of
land passing from Muslim to non-Muslim hands (see pp.21-22). The
advent of British rule in 1849 merely accelerated this trend, not
because of deliberate government policy, but as the inescapable con­
sequence of the laws and customs the British introduced concerning
land ownership, the payment of land revenue, and the repayment of
mortgage debts (see pp.22-29). The changes led to a considerable
rise in the value of land, which in turn made the money-lenders
extremely anxious to acquire control over it. British rule further
aided their designs in that law courts frequently forced peasant cultivators and large landowners alike to forfeit their land if they defaulted in the payment of interest, often compounded, on the loans they had secured. The money-lender, therefore, graduated from his traditional rôle as village accountant and financier, to become a major investor in land, his gains having been made largely at the expense of Muslim agriculturists. The overwhelming majority of money-lenders were Hindus drawn principally from the Bania, Khatri and Arora castes, though from the beginning of the twentieth century Sikh money-lenders also began to come into prominence particularly in the rural areas.¹ The Hindus and Sikhs, by the 1930's and 1940's, controlled approximately half of the agricultural resources of the Province. In addition the Hindus dominated the industrial and commercial spheres, and the civic, economic and educational life of the Punjab (see chapters I, II and III).

Education under British rule had taken on a western direction and flavour; the indigenous system of learning which had largely been under Muslim control had been denigrated and replaced. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Muslim attitude was lukewarm especially as western educational practices were often regarded as offensive to their religious and moral values. Also the greater degree of poverty which existed amongst Muslims as a whole restricted their entry into government schools and institutions. By contrast the Hindus and Sikhs were less affected by cultural and pecuniary considerations, and they responded to the new educational order with a far greater degree of vigour and enthusiasm. Though the British, in the closing years of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth, did attempt to make the learning process more economically accessible to Muslims no serious steps were taken to appease their cultural objections. The result was that throughout the British period Muslims lagged behind Hindus and Sikhs, most particularly at the higher stages of education, as was reflected by their low level of participation in the professions and government service generally.

Despite the comparative economic and educational backwardness of the community, however, the Muslim landed élite played a prominent rôle in the political life of the Punjab in the twentieth century. This resulted from a number of factors. To begin with the Paramount Power desired to ally itself firmly with the landed aristocracy and squirearchy of the Province as a means of entrenching its own position. That strategy found expression in the Land Alienation Act of 1901, whereby the British in effect protected all landowners, of whom the large Muslim magnates of the western Punjab were the most
influential, from losing land and thereby power to the traditional
money-lending castes. 2 Furthermore as the process of limited democrati-
sation accelerated during the course of the twentieth century the
influence of the large zamindars was translated into political power.
The Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 by recognising the pre-
dominant rural composition of the Punjab dictated that in future the
rural block and leadership, namely the large and powerful landowners,
should monopolise political power. Muslims as such, however, were
denied a statutory majority to which their population status would
otherwise have entitled them, a factor which prompted Fazl-i-Husain
in 1923 to found the Unionist Party (see pp.141, 143-145) - a
political structure which by promising to advance the interests of the
rural community and its leaders sought to attract sufficient non-
Muslim adherents to permit the rural Muslim leadership, in coalition
with their non-Muslim allies, to dominate the Legislature in the Pro-
vince. Its class interests, therefore, overrode any communal appeal,
as was apparent from the fact that the Party adopted and espoused a
non-communal philosophy. By the late 1930's and the early 1940's,
however, national politics began to intrude into the Punjab,
eventually eroding the Unionist Party's non-communal stance.

The imminence of the 1937 elections caused Jinnah, the President
of the All-India Muslim League to woo provincial Muslim leaders to
pledge their support to the League in order to improve League pros-
pects at the polls and to transform it into a truly national organi-
sation. Jinnah's overtures for cooperation were rejected by the
Unionist leadership which feared that any intrusion by the League into
Punjabi politics would encourage the growth of factionalism in Muslim
Unionist ranks. 3 Furthermore the Unionists, dependent as they were
upon non-Muslim cooperation, could not afford to subscribe to the
communal creed of the Muslim League. Consequently in 1937 the Muslim
Punjab following the dictates of its Unionist leaders forcibly rejected
Jinnah and the League. 4 Unionist ascendancy, however, did not pro-
hibit Sikander Hyat Khan, the Punjab Unionist Premier, from seeking a
rapprochement with Jinnah in October 1937 (Sikander-Jinnah Pact).
Recognising the potential of the Muslim League to ferment future
divisions amongst his Muslim supporters he sought to curtail that
threat by gaining control of any future League organisation in the
Province, whilst at the same time assisting the League to safeguard
wider Muslim interests in India as a whole (see pp.177-179). Ambition
also helped to spawn Sikander's actions, desirous as he was for a
national rôle for himself.
Sikander's national ambitions, however, were doomed to failure. Jinnah was determined that the Muslim League should not remain subordinate to the Unionist Party in the Punjab, and that he should continue at the helm of Muslim national affairs. A number of inter-related events greatly influenced the outcome of this contest, and ultimately favoured Jinnah. The outbreak of war in 1939 led the Indian National Congress to demand India's immediate independence as the price the British should pay to secure the country's cooperation in the prosecution of the war. Such a development was unwelcome to the Muslim League and the British; the League was totally opposed to majority rule as it would have placed the future of the Muslim community in the hands of the Hindu controlled Congress, whilst the British had no intention of forfeiting their great Asiatic reservoir of manpower and raw materials, at least for the duration of the war. As a result Jinnah and Linlithgow, the Viceroy (1936-1943), entered into a secret pact designed to protect their respective positions from the Congress challenge. The outcome was that both sought to establish that the Congress alone could not make constitutional demands in the name of India. In March 1940 the All-India Muslim League adopted the potentially popular demand for the establishment of an independent Muslim state or states, and in August 1940 the British insisted that any future constitutional advancement theoretically depended on its acceptance by the minorities - which in practice meant Jinnah's Muslim League. But for the Viceroy to continue to frustrate the Congress by stressing that it did not represent certain large and influential groups in India, whose interests could not be ignored, it was essential that the Muslim League should remain united and free from internal wrangling; Linlithgow refused therefore to countenance Sikander's claims for Muslim leadership, or to give the Punjab Premier the assistance he sought to outmanoeuvre Jinnah (see pp. 184-194).

Despite his eventual failure in the national orbit Sikander proved to be a formidable adversary to Jinnah in the Punjab, as did his Unionist successor as Premier (Dec. 1942) Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana. By the mid-1940's, however, Unionism was fast becoming an obsolete political philosophy which could not compete with the Muslim League's demand for an independent Muslim homeland, or satisfy Muslim aspirations constrained as it was by a non-communal creed. Also the Unionist Party was no longer in a position to guarantee to the large Muslim zamindars, who until that time had provided its most effective support, the power and privileges they demanded in return for their allegiance. Once it became clear that the British were sincere in their
determination to abandon their hold on India the powerful Muslim landlords realised that the Muslim League, as one of the probable successors to the British Raj, alone could provide for their interests in the future. The result was an exodus of landed support from Unionist ranks which heralded the final disintegration of the multi-communal party and its philosophy.

As the 1946 elections approached it became increasingly apparent that the Unionists were a spent force; its Muslim leadership had defected in large measure to the Muslim League, and it possessed little or no popular following, the Muslim masses and electorate having been intoxicated to a great extent by the League's promise of 'Pakistan'. The elections in fact were the prelude to disaster in the Punjab. The Unionist Party was decisively routed at the polls. The Muslim League extensively employed religious leaders to legitimate its cause and objectives, and to discredit the Unionists by persuading the Muslim electorate and populace in general that only the League could serve the interests of Muslims and Islam. Such tactics helped to secure a landslide victory for the League, the partition of the Province and India became inevitable and so too did the holocaust that accompanied that 'surgery'.

The division of the Punjab, together with that of Bengal, symbolised the birth-pangs of the infant nation of Pakistan. In the Punjab that process was particularly bloody as the Province was submerged in internecine warfare. Regardless of the horror and brutality which accompanied Partition, however, it is evident that without the inclusion of the western Muslim majority districts of the Punjab, Pakistan as has been stated previously, in all probability would have remained a politicians' dream, and would have failed to achieve a territorial reality. Despite the importance of the Punjab's role in that process the study of the Province's history in the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century has been a largely neglected field. Only a limited number of people, notably C. Baxter, D. Gilmartin, Imran Ali, and I. Talbot, have attempted to analyse some of the political developments which occurred in these years. Even so none of them have sought to examine Muslim society in depth with regard to their economic, educational and industrial backwardness as compared to the Hindu and Sikh communities. This is an omission which needs to be rectified for the comparatively retarded Muslim condition, or the realisation of it, seems to have played an important part in spurring Muslim separatism in the Punjab. Also in studying the relationships and rivalry which existed between the
Unionist Party and the Muslim League no adequate explanation has been given for Sikander's decision to join the Muslim League and to advise his fellow Muslim Unionists to do likewise (Sikander-Jinnah Pact). This is a serious defect considering the importance of that development and the momentous effect it was to have on the future fortunes of the League in the Province. Also Sikander Hyat Khan's national ambitions have been either ignored or neglected, together with the considerations which occasioned them, as has the special relationship which existed between the President of the All-India Muslim League and the Viceroy - a factor which seriously compromised the Unionists and which had a direct effect upon the events which led eventually to the division of the Province. Similarly although Sikander's resignation from the Viceroy's National Defence Council (August 1941) - an episode which emphasised Jinnah's undisputed control over Muslim national politics - has been recognised as an important development, the Punjab Premier's actions in this regard have not been adequately explained. In addition the rôle of Khizar Hayat Khan (Sikander's successor as Premier), who continued his predecessor's policy of attempting to thwart the League in the Punjab, has not been subjected to serious analysis. Again such an oversight merits attention, considering the fact that Khizar was influenced to a great extent by the British Governor of the Province, Sir B. Glancy (see Chapter VI), and that their close relationship was a major factor in frustrating Jinnah's Punjab policy. Furthermore although the vital 1946 elections have been scrutinised, and despite the fact that attention has been drawn to the economic factors which influenced the outcome, and to the support which the Muslim League enjoyed from the Province's Muslim landed and religious leaders, no in-depth study has been undertaken of the degree of official interference, bribery and intimidation which occurred, or of the great impact which the pro-League Firs' threats of divine displeasure and social ostracism had on the Muslim electorate.

Finally the period following the 1946 elections, when the League failed to form a Ministry in the Punjab, has been largely neglected, as has the rôle the British played in the saga of Pakistan. The attitude of the Imperial power was crucial to the prospects for the realisation of a Muslim homeland, and thereby to the survival of the Unionist Party. Linlithgow, who was personally opposed to the development, could have poured 'cold water' on the scheme at its conception and thus have seriously compromised the demand, but he failed to do so for fear of undermining his anti-Congress strategy.
Wavell (Linlithgow's successor) though anxious that the Pakistan issue should be publicly examined to demonstrate its impracticalities, was prevented from achieving that objective by the vacillating attitude of the Attlee government in Britain (see pp. 190-191, 246-250). 'Pakistan', therefore, was never fully exposed to the full glare of official and public scrutiny in India, and as such its shortcomings, such as the probable necessity for the division of the Punjab, were never publicly admitted by the League or commented upon by the British. Consequently 'Pakistan' was presented by pro-League Muslim politicians as the panacea for the problems of all sections of Punjabi Muslim society, and the reward for all their ambitions, a factor which contributed in no small measure to the success of its appeal in the Punjab and to the destruction of the Unionist Party.

It is the purpose of this thesis, therefore, to attempt to rectify the omissions which have been referred to above, and to produce a balanced, analytical history of Muslim political development in the Punjab from 1936 to 1947, whilst not neglecting to study and consider the socio-economic disadvantages and pressures which many Muslims were subject to. Such a study is essential for the understanding of the growth and spread of Muslim nationalism and the support for Pakistan which this generated - a process which in the past has been examined all too often with reference solely to the Muslim minority provinces and Bengal.


4. At the 1937 elections the Muslim League captured only two of the 84 Muslim seats as compared to 72 secured by the Unionist Party - Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp. 75-80, CMD.5589, IOR; Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 16 Feb. 1937.


11. For example Talbot merely states "The reasons for Sikander's climb down are still not fully clear...", I.A. Talbot, op.cit., p. 228.

12. Linlithgow to Zetland, telegram, 6 April 1940, MSS.EUR.F.125/19, IOR.
CHAPTER I

THE MUSLIMS OF THE PUNJAB — THE DEPRESSED MAJORITY

The Muslims of the Punjab owed their existence as a community to a common allegiance to Islam. Muslim society constituted a multi-layered structure ranging from a small extremely wealthy elite of very large zamindars or landowners, paying in excess of Rs.1000 per annum in land revenue charges, to landless labourers. Also included were artisans, industrialists, urban workers, and a literate, professional middle-class. Powerful magnates together with the other categories mentioned above, however, were untypical of Punjabi Muslim society, which was dominated by a peasant class of very small proprietors and tenant farmers: only 3.3% of all the agricultural holdings in the Punjab exceeded 50 acres, the majority were ten acres or less, 25% ranging from one to three acres. Viewed as a whole, and irrespective of the divisions which existed within it, the Muslim community appears to have been economically backward as compared to the Hindu and Sikh communities. It is the purpose of this chapter, therefore, to attempt to estimate the investment which Muslims possessed in the Punjab in comparison to the other major groups (Hindus and Sikhs), and to analyse their economic failings. As such the enquiry has not been limited to an examination of a few specific regions and their inhabitants, or of a cross-section of individuals, as either method could easily give rise to distortions, and prove unrepresentative of the picture as a whole.

Punjabi Muslims constituted the largest single community in the Province (excluding the Princely States), accounting for 56% of the population. In common with the other major communities (Hindu and Sikh), the overwhelming number of Muslims occupied the rural areas, where they contributed 59.2% of the rural populace. They formed the majority community in 17 districts in the western portion of the Province — Lahore (59%), Gurdaspur (51%), Sialkot (62%), Gujranwala (71%), Sheikhupura (66%), Gujrat (85%), Shahpur (85%), Jhelum (89%), Rawalpindi (83%), Attock (91%), Mianwali (87%), Montgomery (71.5%), Lyallpur (67%), Jhang (84%), Multan (81%), Muzaffargarh (87%), and Dera Ghazi Khan (89%) — whilst they were dominant in Jullundur (44%), Ferozepur (45%) and Amritsar (47%). The Hindus, in contrast, formed the majority in only six districts, all of which fell in the eastern part of the Province — Hissar (65%), Gurgaon (67%), Rohtak (81%), Karnal (66%),
Simla (78%) and Kangra (91%) — and constituted the most numerous group in two districts — Ambala (47%) and Hoshiarpur (40%). The Sikhs had no clear majority in any district, though they were the predominant communal group in Ludhiana (47%).

Despite the numerical superiority which the Muslim community enjoyed, they constituted in the main an economically depressed section of society, though this fact is not always apparent from the 1931 Census (Punjab) returns, viz. occupations. In attempting to conduct a survey based on this source, it should be pointed out that workers, earners, dependents, etc., were classified according to caste and religion, and no distinction was made between the British Punjab and the Punjab States. Thus in considering the position of the Muslims in relation to the Hindus and Sikhs it must be borne in mind that in Punjab as a whole Muslims accounted for 52% of the population, as compared to 30% for Hindus (including Depressed Classes), and 14% for Sikhs. For the purpose of this chapter 41 castes were examined, embracing 24,174,000 individuals, representing 85% of the population of the entire Punjab (British and Princely States). Even so in presenting the following findings it must be stressed that the Census provided a rough guide to society, rather than an absolutely accurate analysis; statistics were sometimes faulty, and thereby misleading. Nevertheless the 1931 Census is interesting in that it does provide a general indication of the comparative state of the Muslim community in the 1936-1947 period. As is evident from Appendix A Muslims were active in all the major spheres of provincial economic life, though their degree of participation was often inferior to that of non-Muslims in terms of their percentage of involvement, as compared to their status as the majority community.

Even though they appeared to account for the largest single earning group (52%), the economic demands made on them were much greater than for Hindus and Sikhs, in that Muslims supported the largest number of non-working dependents (see Appendix A). But the 1931 Census suggests that in all but one aspect Muslims dominated the agricultural life of the Province; 54% of all cultivators were drawn from the community, as were 61% of estate managers and agents, planters, forest officers and rent collectors, and 74% of all herdsmen. In the important area of persons living off the rent of land, Muslims were in the minority (49%), whilst at the menial level 55% of all field labourers and 60% of the hunting and fishing community were Muslims (see Appendix A). The comparative superiority which the Muslims exhibited in the majority of these spheres clearly reflected the fact that they were the most numerous
group in the rural areas, and that they were not subject to the socio-religious restrictions which caused many high caste Hindus to avoid direct cultivation, especially ploughing. Even so their position was not as healthy as suggested by the Census returns. In the vital area of land-ownership, which decided to a great extent the community's share of the gross agricultural production and thereby the wealth of the Punjab, Muslims did not control a percentage comparable to their status, either as the principal community in the Province, or the rural areas, as will be demonstrated later.

Turning to the spheres of mineral exploitation and industrial development, the Census is grossly misleading; it suggests that Muslims dominated both (see Appendix A). This misconception results from the fact that owners, managers, and clerks were included in the same category for the purpose of enumeration. In reality the industrial life of the Punjab was largely the reserve of the non-Muslims, particularly the Hindus, in terms of ownership, investment and profit (see pp. 44-49). In the professional field the Muslim position has also been misinterpreted. The Census records that 48% of all lawyers, doctors and teachers were Muslims (see Appendix A). Though this figure indicates that in comparison to Hindus and Sikhs, the Muslims had not achieved a percentage reflecting their majority status, in reality their representation fell far short of this. The Census returns had been greatly exaggerated by the inclusion of bazaar hakims, and the indigenous teachers who were attached to every mosque throughout the Province. The reality of the situation is truly revealed when one considers that of the 576 pleaders, drawn from the major communities, who were enrolled on the register of the Punjab High Court between January 1940 and July 1947 only 148 (26%) were Muslims; the remainder comprised 318 Hindus (55%) and 110 Sikhs (19%). In addition out of a total of 2,122 Indian doctors of medicine practising in the Province in 1943, whether they were registered under the British Medical Acts, or were graduates of the University of the Punjab, only 560 (26%) were Muslims.

With regard to the other categories of occupation included in Appendix A whilst they should be treated with caution, in view of the observations made above, they do appear to be more representative of the Muslim condition; less than 45% of those persons who enjoyed a private income were Muslims, 48% of all domestic servants were recruited from the community, as were 47% of the clerk-cashier group, 68% of the more menial labourers, and 76% of the most socially degraded group, consisting of beggars, prostitutes, criminals, and the inmates of jails.
and asylums. The fact that Muslims were in the minority as recipients of private incomes is consistent with the fact that they did not enjoy the same economic advantages as the non-Muslims, as will be demonstrated in due course. Their minority status as clerks and cashiers, and the predominance they experienced in the labouring ranks reflected that they comprised the most educationally backward group in the Province (see Chapter II). In respect of vagrants, etc., it is evident that the enumeration of beggars and prostitutes would prove a difficult, not to say delicate task, to allow for total accuracy, but in the case of criminals, prisoners and lunatics, court, prison and hospital records would facilitate an accurate estimation.

In order that a more realistic appreciation of the contribution made and benefits derived by the Muslim community in the economic life of the Punjab can be made, three specific areas have been chosen for detailed analysis. These consist of land-ownership, money-lending - as a source of both income and debt - and industry. In examining these avenues, particular consideration has been given to the fact that they made vital contributions to the exchequer of the Province, and exercised the greatest influence on the material well-being of the people.

In attempting to calculate the amount of land which the Muslim community owned in the year 1936 to 1947 it has proved necessary to draw on sources, in the form of Assessment Reports, which frequently pre-dated this period, as they contained the most up-to-date records of land-holdings in each district. Unfortunately the assessments were not conducted in sequence, but despite the lack of consistency, in terms of a fixed period of time, it has been possible to arrive at a realistic estimation. Also it should be borne in mind that land-ownership statistics recorded in Assessment Reports were expressed in terms of tribal, rather than religious groupings, though information available in these reports, supplemented by that provided by Settlement Reports and District Gazetteers facilitated a religious categorisation. Some inaccuracy, however, must be allowed for in respect of land held by Hindus and Sikhs, as at times the Assessment Reports exhibited a degree of confusion in distinguishing between the two. In respect of Muslim landowners, however, no such difficulties were encountered. The findings of the survey are detailed in Appendices Bi - Biv.

As will be seen each Appendix has been constructed with regard to the information contained in the various assessments, thus Appendix Bi deals with the division of land between Muslim and Sikh owners, as statements concerning the number of Hindu owners were omitted, though
it was possible to calculate the amount of land held, and land revenue which they paid; Appendix Bii contains details of the number of landowners and shareholders, the total area held and the land revenue paid for each community; Appendix Biii deals only with the number of owners and shareholders and total land held; Appendix Biv is restricted to the amount of land held by each community. The information so collated was drawn from every district of the Punjab, with the exception of Simla, and as such represents a near total appreciation of the Province.

Even so, as Clive Dewey has explained, throughout the period of British rule the "accuracy of the official agricultural statistics was directly related to the efficiency of the agency through which they were collected". In the Punjab the patwaris were responsible for maintaining the land revenue records of each village. Though technically village servants, in reality they emanated from the highest stratum of village society, belonging to rich peasant families, or those of influential traders and money-lenders. Though the work produced by patwaris was, in theory, scrutinised by their immediate superiors, the kanungoes and tahsildars (revenue assessment officials), errors did occur. As long as village revenues were paid punctually, the statistics prepared by the patwaris remained largely unchecked and unchallenged. Between 1880 and 1914 attempts were made to convert the patwaris into efficient civil servants, but those improvements which were achieved were piecemeal, and the capabilities of individual patwaris continued to vary enormously. The post, in fact, was largely hereditary, thus standards of literacy varied greatly and many of the older officers were unable to comprehend the collation of modern statistics. Efforts were made to improve standards through recruitment, but difficulties were frequently encountered. Members of the mainly Hindu commercial class, the great reservoir of literacy in the Province, were generally reluctant to serve in remote districts, and the British were wary of employing them in large numbers, as they were often absentees who neglected their work, or they used their position to further the expropriation of peasant debtors in favour of their money-lending caste-fellows. Although some improvements were made, they were spasmodic. In the inter-war years the entire land revenue system deteriorated, and the compilation of agricultural statistics was affected by this decline. Thus in considering the information which follows it is imperative that it should be regarded as an indication of the communal pattern of land ownership that existed in the Punjab, rather than an absolutely accurate statement of fact.

On the basis of the available information it seems that Muslims
owned over 50% of the land in 15 (Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Gujrat, Attock, Dera Ghazi Khan, Mianwali, Jhelum, Jhang, Shahpur, Rawalpindi, Multan, Muzzaffargarh) of the 28 districts examined. All of the former were Muslim majority districts, though in only six of them did the community possess a percentage of the land comparable with, or which exceeded their population ratio at the district level. In the remaining districts where they were numerically dominant - Lahore and Gurdaspur - they held only 31% and 35% of the land respectively, though in Jullundur where they constituted the predominant group, they held a percentage of the land (43%) almost equivalent to their population status (44%). In only three (Gurgaon, Ludhiana and Karnal) of the eight Muslim minority districts surveyed did Muslims hold a proportion of the land comparable to their population ratios in those areas (see Appendices Bi-Biv). Consequently in the Province as a whole, the Muslim share of land appears not to have been equivalent to their predominant status in the rural areas. At the time of the various assessments the total land farmed in the Punjab, whether cultivated or uncultivated, amounted to 40,850,983 acres exclusive of Shamilat (land held in common by proprietor body of a village), village abadi (village sites) and Government property. The Muslims representing 59.2% of the rural populace possessed 22,802,355 acres (56%), of which 18,456,209 acres (81% of the total Muslim land holding) were situated in the 15 Muslim majority districts and Jullundur; 10,938,112 acres (27%) was in Hindu hands, the latter accounting for 26.3% of all rural inhabitants; 5,968,920 acres (14.6%) was owned by the Sikh community, which comprised 14.5% of the rural population. Of the remaining land (2.4%) amounting to 1,141,596 acres, ownership was not specified in the district assessment reports in the case of 944,504 acres (2%), whilst 197,092 acres (0.4%) was owned by Christians. The Muslim position was even weaker than it appeared to be. By 1936 of all the land situated in Jullundur, and the 15 districts where Muslims possessed the major holding, 11% was subject to usufructuary mortgage (see Appendix C). Whilst it is impossible to discern exactly what percentage of the land so mortgaged was Muslim owned, there is little doubt that Muslim property accounted for most of it, considering that it occurred in those areas where agriculture was Muslim dominated, and that the Muslim community was the most indebted in the Province. If one assumes therefore that of the 11% of alienated land, at least 8% was Muslim owned, and translates that percentage to the findings recorded in Appendices Bi-Biv, it is found that 1,894,976 acres of the Muslim land
situated in the western districts and Jullundur was probably mortgaged with possession. Of the money-lenders who held this land, the majority were almost certainly non-Muslims. From information available in the Punjab Land Revenue Administration Report for 1936, it has been possible to calculate that of the 11% of territory mortgaged, 5% was to non-agriculturists and 6% to agriculturists (see Appendix C). Practically all of the former were non-Muslims; in the case of the latter it is not possible to be so specific, though the Punjab Banking Enquiry Committee of 1925 discovered that by and large the majority of agriculturist money-lenders were non-Muslims. For the purpose of this study it has been assumed that at least 70% of the mortgaged Muslim land would have been alienated in favour of non-Muslims, thus of the 1,894,976 acres involved, 1,326,483 in all probability would have been held by Hindu and Sikh money-lenders. Therefore out of the entire provincial Muslim holding of 22,802,355 acres, in reality the community was in possession of only approximately 21,475,872 acres, or 51.5% of the entire agricultural land. This figure does not take into account the amount of Muslim land subject to usufructuary mortgage in those districts where non-Muslims held the major portion of the land, as there it is not possible, given the information available, to arrive at an equitable estimation. Even so, given the fact that some Muslim land would have been mortgaged with possession in those areas, it is probable that the amount of land actually farmed by Muslims throughout the Province was even less than the percentage estimated above.

Another factor which detracted from the Muslim position was that despite the fact that the community owned the major portion of the rich canal-colony land (64%), in general Muslim land appears to have been less fertile than that in the possession of non-Muslims. On the basis of information available for 20 (Lahore, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Iyallpur, Montgomery, Gurgaon, Gujrat, Attock, Dera Ghazi Khan, Ambala, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Ferozepore, Ludhiana, Rohtak, Karnal and Mianwali) of the 28 districts surveyed, it can be seen that whilst Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs owned approximately 55%, 24% and 20% of the land respectively in those areas, the Muslim community accounted for only 48% of the assessed land revenue, as compared to 20% paid by Hindus, and 31% paid by Sikh landowners, indicating thereby the inferior productivity of the Muslim holdings. Also in respect of all owners paying land revenue charges of, and in excess of Rs.5 per annum, Muslims were in a minority in all but the lowest category, which suggests that comparatively more Muslims were found in the petty cultivating class than was the case for non-Muslims. Out of 1,398,000 landowners
assessed in 1932, Muslims accounted for 50% of the very small owners liable to charges of between Rs.5 and Rs.10, 46% of those small owners paying between Rs.10 and Rs.25, and 48% of those paying Rs.25 and above (see Appendix D) - a category including medium owners cultivating between 20 and 40 irrigated, or up to 200 unirrigated acres, and large owners who possessed at least 50 acres in a canal-colony or more than 200 acres of unirrigated land. Whistlet with regard to the wealthiest section of landowners, records compiled in 1909 demonstrate that despite the existence of vast Muslim owned estates in the western half of the Province, less than 50% of the great landed magnates were Muslims, in that of those wealthy zamindars subject to annual land revenue payments of, and in excess of Rs.1000 47% (173) were Muslims, 31% (115) were Hindus, 16% (58) were Sikhs and 6% (23) were Christians.

The overall pattern of Muslim land-ownership present in the Punjab by the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century was the result in the first place of conquest and conversion, and secondly of the ruthless alienation of land which occurred following the annexation of the Province by the British in 1849. The establishment of Islam began with the intrusion of Arab traders in Multan in the eighth century A.D., receiving impetus from the succession of Muslim invasions which took place from the twelfth to the sixteenth century, culminating in the establishment of the Mughal Empire (which included the Punjab, and stretched from Kabul to the borders of Bengal) by Babur, following his military victories over the Afghan Sultan of Delhi and the Rajput leader Rana Sanga in 1526 and 1527. Though the foundations of Muslim dominance in the western Punjab had already been laid through the activities of determined proselytizers in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, including Sheikh Baha-ud-Din Zakaria (b.1182) from Khwarizm and Baba Farid Shakarganj (b.1175). It was the zeal of these spiritual leaders, and those who followed them, which was largely responsible for the conversion of the Hindu agriculturists, rather than the sword of any conqueror. For although the Awan, Biloch, Mughal and Pathan tribes all claimed descent from Muslim invaders and colonisers, the Muslim Jat and Rajput tribes, which together formed the backbone of the Muslim community in the Punjab, in common with the Ghakars and Gujars had been converted to Islam.

By the time the Mughal Empire finally disintegrated (1761), and the Punjab first passed under the sway of Pathan, and then Sikh rulers, the Muslims had emerged as the major numerical group, being most numerous in the western districts, though the community lost both prestige and land during the Sikh period. The Sikhs oppressed those sections of Muslim society which they believed constituted a threat to their power. The
Ghakhar tribe in particular suffered from this policy; their leaders were reduced to the position of tenant cultivators. Many of the leading Muslim families and tribes occupying the Cis-Indus area in the Salt Range and in the northern table-land were driven into exile, or forced to accept tenant status. The Muslim Rajput aristocracy suffered similar treatment; they were over-taxed, oppressed by Sikh officials; their villages were frequently destroyed and their mosques desecrated. Temple (settlement officer) writing of their plight in Jullundur in the early 1850's concluded that as a result of Sikh persecution the Rajputs in that area had become a "bye-word" for "destitution", as there was hardly a Rajput estate in the district which was not in a state of decay. Also the policy and class sympathies of Diwan Sawan Mal, appointed by the Sikh government as governor of Multan, resulted in the acquisition by Hindus of large tracts of land by purchase and direct grant in Multan and Jhang. The accumulative effect of these policies resulted in the control of land passing from Muslim to non-Muslim hands.

With the advent of British rule this trend was accelerated, though not as a result of direct Government policy or persecution, but as an inevitable consequence of the introduction of British customs and laws in respect of land-ownership and debt. Indebtedness itself was not a consequence of British rule, the Indian Famine Commission of 1879 considered that the agricultural population of India had not at any known period of their history been generally free from debt. Prior to the arrival of the British, however, usurers had advanced credit on the security of the crops, not the actual land. Though proprietary rights, with the power to sell or mortgage, had existed in some parts of the Punjab under Sikh rule, the exercise of the right of transfer had been restricted by a number of considerations. Joint-ownership had been far more common in the pre-annexation period, and it was extremely difficult to effect a transfer of property held in common either by groups of individuals, or the village community. In addition a more potent impediment existed, land was not viewed as a desirable asset in the pre-British period. The crops were divided on a fifty-fifty basis between the cultivator and the State, thus if the cultivator and the proprietor were different persons, the latter received very little of the division of the harvest. The State, therefore, frequently absorbed the owners' rental, and they were restricted in making excessive demands on their cultivators because they needed to retain sufficient tenants to work the land, the result was that land itself "was not a commodity that the possessors of capital desired to purchase." Consequently it was exceedingly difficult to raise a mortgage on land, as was reflected in the low incidence of mortgages in the Province; immediately prior to British rule it was estimated that only
6% of the whole area of Gurdaspur district had been mortgaged, whilst in Amritsar district less than 1% of the cultivated area was subject to mortgage.

Under the British all this changed. Following annexation summary settlements were executed in the countryside, under which many of those found to be in cultivating possession of land were treated as proprietors, as a result proprietary rights spread through the Province. At the same time a fixed cash revenue demand was introduced, replacing the elastic assessment practised by the Sikhs, which had been decided annually on the size of the harvest and paid in kind. These changes had a dramatic effect on rural economics. The fixed assessment, which in good years meant that cultivators were left with a considerable portion of their crop, in that the average demand rarely exceeded 15% to 20% of the harvest, as compared to 50% levied by the Sikhs, combined with the settled conditions which prevailed in the Province after 1857, and the extension of transport facilities making markets more accessible, raised both the value of crops and land. Had the cultivators been experienced in money matters the lessening of the burden of assessed revenue could have worked to their benefit, but ignorance caused surplus money to be squandered, and the failure of a crop often resulted in heavy borrowing to meet the revenue demand.

Loans, however, were easily secured, for the introduction of property rights had "made an unconditional gift of a valuable estate to every peasant proprietor in the Punjab", raising his credit from the surplus of an occasional good crop, to the market value of his holding. Whilst in contrast to Sikh times, the money-lending classes appreciating the new value of land were anxious to make advances on the security of land. Wilson, who conducted the Shahpur settlement of 1887-94, was convinced that the "chief cause of the numerous transfers" in his district "undoubtedly is the great rise in the money value of land, which made the money-lending classes anxious to get hold upon it by advancing money on every opportunity to the improvident Musalmān landowners...". The result often proved disastrous for the peasant cultivators; ignorant of the real value of money, and unable to judge the future consequences of debt, they borrowed heavily.

To the money-lenders the situation offered a hitherto unknown opportunity for exploitation, and they seized it. Prior to 1865 only 23 mortgages with possession had been recorded in the Amritsar tahsil; between 1865 and 1880 that figure increased to 798, whilst by 1900 it stood at 9,645. Likewise in Gujranwala district prior to 1868 less than 1% of the land had been sold and approximately 1% was mortgaged. During the
succeeding 25 years no less than 16.5% of the total area, and 21% of the cultivated area, paying 25% of the revenue demand, had changed hands, either by sale or usufructuary mortgage. 53% of the land sold, and 69% of the land mortgaged had passed into the hands of money-lenders, who by 1894 held 60% of the alienated land, including 13.5% of the total cultivated acreage of the district.44

The money-lender had ceased to be merely the village accountant and financier, a role he had fulfilled for centuries45 to emerge as a major investor in land. The rewards such speculation offered were extremely lucrative, as is evident from the fact that between 1881 and 1911 the number of bankers, money-lenders and their dependants in the Province mushroomed from 90,793 to 193,890.46 Despite the presence of some Muslim money-lenders in the frontier districts,47 usury was opposed to the strict precepts of Islam, which discouraged greater involvement by the community. The overwhelming majority of money-lenders were Hindus, the 'profession' being dominated by three main castes, the Bania operating principally in the area south of the Sutlej, the Khatri in the central Punjab and the Arora or Kirar, predominating in the west of the province.48 In general Hindu money-lenders were referred to collectively as 'Banias' (or Bunnias) or 'Kirars'. These terms were synonymous with extortion and greed:

"Shylock was a gentleman by the side of Nand Lall Bunniah ...His greed for grain, the shameless effrontery with which he adds 50 per cent. to a debt, calls the total principal ...with interest at 36 per cent. per annum...and cajoles or wearies him [the debtor] into mortgaging...an ancestral plot of good land...have entirely alienated the sympathies of district officers from men of his calling."50 Yet it had been the establishment of British rule that had endowed the money-lending classes with the opportunity to profit from high interest charges, and the power to gain control over land which had been offered as security against a loan.

Under Hindu law, interest on money loans could not exceed the principal, though it did appear that a bond for the amount of the principal and interest not exceeding the principal could bear future interest. During the period of Sikh rule in the Province no creditor could recover as interest more than half the value of the principal in the case of money, or no more than an equivalent amount of principal in the case of produce.51 Conversely British law allowed interest to accumulate without limit. This practice frequently proved ruinous to the debtor. Darling has cited two cases which effectively demonstrate this point. In 1896 a blacksmith of Hisar mortgaged his small plot of land for Rs.26 at 37½% interest. By 1906 the debt, without further borrowing, had increased through compound interest to Rs.500, and in 1918 a court order was obtained whereby
the money-lender was to be paid in full. Similarly a Jat peasant over the course of twenty years borrowed Rs.350, repaying Rs.450, leaving a balance of Rs.1,000 outstanding, still to be paid.\textsuperscript{52} Also in the pre-British Punjab, the transfer of ancestral land had been forbidden, thus it could not be seized in lieu of debt.\textsuperscript{53} In contrast following annexation landowners were permitted both by sale and mortgage to transfer either acquired or ancestral property, on the condition that the near relatives of the proprietor, and after them other ancestral shareholders, had the right of pre-emption. If that right was not exercised, the proprietor could sell or mortgage at will.\textsuperscript{54} Furthermore in 1866 the Chief Court had been established in Lahore and a code of civil procedure was introduced whereby all property became liable to attachment and sale in execution of a civil decree. In theory both the civil court and the district officer could avert the compulsory sale of land to meet a debt, if sufficient money could be raised from the land in other ways. In practice, this afforded little protection to those proprietors who were hopelessly burdened by debt.\textsuperscript{55}

Punjabi landowners, though predisposed to mortgage land, were loath to lose their proprietary rights. In 1873 the number of voluntary sales recorded in the Province averaged less than 6,000 per annum, only one owner out of every 33 selling his land. The aggregate area of assessed land so transferred annually was less than one acre per square mile. The money-lender, therefore, could not purchase land easily, but the law gave him the opportunity to acquire it in default of debt. Under the circumstances many loans were advanced purely with the intention of eventually gaining the land: "Mortgage is often considered but one step from sale, and is almost as favourite a mode of investing money as buying outright." The transfer was frequently effected by charging very high interest rates, and by refusing further credit to borrowers in periods of economic distress, e.g. famine or drought.\textsuperscript{56}

British courts provided the vehicle whereby such manoeuvres could be realised, Mr. Justice Melvill, commenting in the early 1870's that civil courts were generally oppressive to debtors, and that it was common for decrees to be given for as much as four times the amount of the principal, land and immovable property being frequently alienated as a result.\textsuperscript{58} The money-lenders' position was strengthened further by the active sympathy of court officials. By 1884 the majority of money cases were decided by Indian judges or Munsifs. They were

"largely recruited from the Bunniah class, and are mostly men of town extraction and of good education. As a body they are ignorant of rural affairs, have no sympathy with agriculturists, and do not thoroughly understand their patois."
The Munsifs, therefore, were often partial:

"the chief function performed by this class of Judge
is to terrorize defendants into coming to terms with
their Bunniah-plaintiffs. Thus, out of 1,71,651 suits
decided by munsifs in 1884, in only 48,177, or 28 per
cent., were judgements delivered after contest", the remainder were not contested, either being disposed of by compromise, confession, withdrawal, or dismissal for default. 59

British law in effect gave money-lenders a charter to dispossess their debtors and acquire land, without offering adequate protection to the landowners, who at best were ill-educated, and at worst illiterate. As such they fell easy victims to the money-lenders' wiles. Bonds were frequently drawn up, and the agriculturist, having no knowledge of what they contained, had to rely on verbal assurances, but such bonds were inviolable in the eyes of the law. Also once in debt, cultivators were completely at the mercy of their creditors, because of the system whereby interest was charged and allowed to compound. Interest payments were frequently paid in kind and in following this custom, agriculturist borrowers often failed to receive the true value of their crops, whilst money-lenders through the manipulation of records, which were frequently falsified, received more than was their due. The opportunities, therefore, for debtors to clear their debts were rare, and as they were more often ignorant of such malpractices, injustices were committed, in effect, with the concurrence of the law. 60 The result was that the creditor class, overwhelmingly Hindu in composition, acquired vast tracts of land, either through mortgage with possession, or in default of debts. The victims of these proceedings were all too often Muslims, both in the western and eastern districts of the Province. Though it is not possible to be precise in calculating the effect which this had in reducing the total Muslim landholding in the Province, it was very substantial as is indicated in the early Settlement and Assessment Reports.

In the Ambala district (East Punjab) between 1855 and 1888 it was estimated that 82% of the cultivated area had been sold and approximately 14% mortgaged. Professional Hindu money-lenders held half of the mortgaged land in the Rupar and Kharar tahsils, one-third in Ambala and four-fifths in the Naraingarh tahsil, and either as mortgagees or vendors they had acquired practically all the land which had been forced onto the market. These two groups were so wealthy that in the Jagadahri tahsil they paid one-third of the total land revenue, and one-quarter in the Naraingarh and Ambala tahsils. Their economic advance
had occurred largely at the expense of the heavily indebted Rajputs, three-quarters of whom were Muslims. Similarly in Attock (N.W. Punjab) the Hindus (accounting for only 8.5% of the population by 1930), notably the Khatri, Arora and Brahman castes, who controlled trade and money-lending in the district, had gained possession of Muslim lands through purchase and mortgage: "A few acquired land in Sikh times... But the great proportion of Hindu interest in land has been acquired by sale or mortgage. More thrifty, patient and far-seeing than the Muhammadan peasant..." they succeeded "often as the result of accumulated interest on small original debts" in taking possession of substantial areas in the district. The same process was discernible in Dera Ghazi Khan (S.W. Punjab). Between 1869 and 1897 Hindu financiers gained control over 30% of the land in three of the four tahsils in the district, acquiring property rights to 10% and more of the land in those areas. The vast majority of the property, whether alienated or sold, was or had been Muslim owned. Muslim lands also passed to Hindu money-lenders in Gujrat district (central Punjab). In the twenty-year period following annexation the acreage owned by Brahmans and Khatri increased by 130%, and that of the Labanahs (Hindus and Sikhs) grew by 80%. These gains occurred largely at the expense of three Muslim tribes - the Syeds, Mughals and Pathans. In Gurgaon (S.E. Punjab) up until the 1880's the Muslim Meos had constituted the largest single land-holding tribe owning nearly the whole of the Firozepur tahsil and the greater part of the Nur tahsil, possessing 387 of the 1,270 villages in the district. They were notoriously thriftless, and extremely poor cultivators, however, and these failings combined with the severe drought of 1877-78 caused them to fall easy victims to the Hindu credit machine. By June 1877 it was believed that 7% of the entire cultivated acreage of the district was mortgaged, rising to 10% in 1883, at least 6% of which was held by Hindus of a non-agriculturist tradition. The gains of this class had occurred largely to the detriment of the Meos, reducing still further the total percentage of land owned by Muslims in the Punjab.

The Muslim community was to suffer an even more serious reversal in Jullundur (N.E. Punjab). In 1849 the Jats, the majority of whom were Muslims, held half the land, and paid half the revenue assessment. Large tracts had also been owned by Muslim Rajputs, Syeds, Mughals, Pathans and Sheikhs, making it primarily a Muslim district in terms of land-ownership. Temple, the Settlement Officer, however, foresaw in 1851 the effect which the combination of debt and British law would have on the land-owning pattern in the district and he was convinced that the
Hindu 'Khutrees' would emerge as the major beneficiaries.

"They are both the writers and the merchants of the Punjab. They are sure to thrive and multiply under British rule; as yet they possess but little land, and that little they have acquired by sale, mortgage and suchlike transactions ... many years hence it will be instructive to see whether Khutree proprietorship has, or has not, increased in this Doab."^56

Evidently Temple would not have been surprised to learn that by 1915-16 Hindus owned 34% of the land in the district, whilst the total Muslim holding had been reduced to 44% (see Appendix Bii). Multan and Muzaffargarh (S.W. Punjab) were two further areas where Muslims experienced serious losses to the Hindu money-lending classes. In Multan Muslim Jats were the principal victims. The land area mortgaged by the quinquennium 1897-98 was more than twice as large as in the quinquennium ending 1877-78, whilst the area sold was four times as large. The area under mortgage at the settlement of 1896-1901 was 272,574 acres, or 50% more than had been mortgaged at the settlement of 1873-80. The area sold in the twenty years between the first (1855-59) and second Settlement (1873-80) stood at 95,251 acres; that sold in the period between the second and third Settlement (1895-1901) was more than three times that amount. Of the land under mortgage by the third Settlement it was estimated that 89% was held by Hindu money-lenders, and of the land sold between 1880 and 1901 it was believed that 61% had been acquired by that class. The result was the steady accumulation of land by Hindus: at the first Settlement it had been calculated they had owned 17% of the proprietary area; this had risen to 20.3% at the second, and 26.8% at the third, so that by 1901 they owned half as much land again as they in the early 1870's.67 Similarly in Muzaffargarh between 1873 and 1908 14% of the cultivated area had been sold, the alienations being made largely in favour of Hindu money-lenders, who by 1908 possessed 20% of the total cultivated acreage in the district. Furthermore they held an additional 8% of the arable acreage on usufructuary mortgage, as compared to 0.8% at the Settlement of 1873-80.68

The alienation of land was not confined the examples quoted above, it was widespread throughout the Province, and increasing with each successive year.69 By 1877-78 it was estimated that 7% of the total agricultural acreage of the Punjab had been mortgaged; in 1874-75 alone 32,000 acres had been bought by money-lenders, and 119,000 taken on mortgage, and in 1892-93 money-lenders acquired 153,000 acres through sales, and 223,000 acres through mortgage.70 Whilst in the twelve month period 1899 to 1900, a total of 674,014 acres, which included 491,089
cultivated acres, had either been mortgaged with possession, or claimed by creditors in lieu of debts. The major feature of this accumulative alienation was that the total Hindu land holding in the Province expanded largely at the cost of the Muslim cultivating body. As such the process played a significant role in shaping the land-ownership pattern current in the Punjab in the first four and a half decades of the twentieth century.

The expropriation continued unabated in the Punjab for almost fifty years following annexation. Though it had been recognised as a feature of provincial life from the earliest years of British rule, official opinion had been divided over whether it constituted an acceptable or retrograde trend, and whether measures should be adopted to control it. Some officers like Melvill, the Deputy Commissioner of Ambala from 1858 believed that the takeover of land by capitalists should not be discouraged as it would lead to more efficient cultivation, thereby increasing its revenue potential. Others, however, including Arthur Brandreth, the Commissioner of the Multan Division warned that the unabated alienation of land could have grave political consequences for the British, in that it could cost them the traditional loyalty of the landed classes. The controversy was only finally resolved in 1901 with the passing of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act. The Government of India in enacting the measure had finally been convinced by the political argument, for although it hoped that it would improve the peasants' plight, the Act's primary purpose was to safeguard British interests and to cultivate the continuing support of the rural populace against the spread of Congress inspired nationalist agitation.

The most important provisions of the Act, which was designed to prevent proprietors being expropriated by money-lenders, divided the Punjabi tribes into agriculturist and non-agriculturist categories, the latter including Banias, Aroras and Khatris. Non-agriculturists were forbidden to buy land from agriculturists, nor could they take it on mortgage for a period in excess of twenty years, also an agriculturist's land could no longer be sold in execution of a money decree. These measures, though they led to a substantial decrease in the area being transferred annually through mortgages, did not entirely exclude non-agriculturist money-lenders from gaining land. The latter, operating through agriculturist agents, were still able to acquire land by sale and mortgage; such evasions were known as benami transactions. Following 1901, however, the position of the non-agriculturist, money-lending castes was generally eroded in the case of mortgage debt, and a class of
agriculturist creditors came to the fore. Thus the expropriation of land was not eradicated in the Punjab, as the disqualifications inherent in the Act did not apply to agriculturist usurers. It was to be almost forty years before further major legislation would be enacted ostensibly to further safeguard the position of agriculturist debtors.

In 1938 the zamindari Unionist Government, anxious to justify its claim to be the protector of the poor cultivators, adopted a series of measures designed, so it was claimed, to improve the position of the indebted cultivating community. The resultant legislation, emanating from a government dominated by wealthy zamindars, did nothing to restrict the privileges enjoyed by rural creditors. The Land Alienation Act was amended to prevent land being held on usufructuary mortgage from being exhausted by the mortgagee, and to outlaw benami transactions. The latter were declared to be illegal, and the alienor was entitled to repossess the land. Also no member of an agricultural tribe was allowed to make a permanent alienation of land in favour of an agriculturist creditor, and no transfer of land was permitted unless a five year period had elapsed since the full payment of the debt. These amendments, however, did not prevent the agriculturist money-lenders from taking land for a period in excess of twenty years. Also an agriculturist money-lender could purchase land from those indebted cultivators who were not his debtors. Thus the measures did not place the same restrictions on agriculturists, as on non-agriculturist money-lenders. By the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Bill, the Ministry determined to restore to agriculturists lands mortgaged by them to non-agriculturists before such transactions were forbidden by the Land Alienation Act. It stipulated that if interest derived by the mortgagee was found to equal or exceed the amount of the mortgage, then the latter would be liquidated and the creditor would receive no compensation. Whilst this legislation certainly benefited zamindars who were indebted to non-agriculturists prior to 1901, it placed no censure on agriculturist creditors who continued to receive interest in excess of the principal from mortgages enacted before 1901. In fact the Punjab Registration of Money-lenders Bill, constituted the only measure which discriminated equally against both classes of creditor. The central provision of the Bill determined that all money-lenders who were not registered, and who did not possess a valid licence would receive no assistance from the courts in recovering a loan. The Bill also stipulated that a money-lender's licence would be cancelled if he charged interest in excess of the maximum laid down by the Relief of Indebtedness Act of 1934; if he
failed to keep adequate accounts, or if he was found guilty of forgery or fraud.\footnote{79}

Despite these enactments indebtedness continued to be a dominant feature of rural life in the Province. The Unionist Ministry in common with preceding administrations failed to initiate a vigorous policy to eradicate the most fundamental cause of the problem - the vicious system of credit which ensured that once a cultivator fell into debt, he generally remained in that state.\footnote{80} Although co-operative societies had been formed in many villages in the Punjab following the passing of the Co-operative Societies Act of 1904,\footnote{81} as a means of providing a cheaper and safer source of credit, the movement never possessed sufficient capital to seriously challenge or undermine the established system: in 1917-18 those money-lenders who enjoyed annual incomes of Rs. 500 and over, and were liable to taxation, alone advanced Rs. 28,000,000 in loans;\footnote{82} by comparison the Co-operative Societies provided only Rs. 74 lakhs to borrowers in 1923,\footnote{83} this figure rising to Rs. 111.50 lakhs in 1938-39, and Rs. 112 lakhs by 1943-44.\footnote{84} Debt was to remain the major problem which confronted the cultivating classes of the Punjab, and the Muslim community in particular. As investors in the highly lucrative credit business Muslims never equalled the commanding position enjoyed by non-Muslims, whilst they accounted for the vast majority of the debtor class.

After agriculture, money-lending was the most important 'industry' in the Province.\footnote{85} In 1920 Calvert calculated that the net income of those money-lenders earning over Rs. 500 per annum was approximately Rs. 500 lakhs, and if allowance was made for those below that income bracket, the total was well in excess of that sum. When compared with the fact that the net income of the North-Western Railway in 1917-18 amounted to Rs. 764 lakhs, and the net revenue from the major irrigation works in the Punjab for the same year was Rs. 267 lakhs, the significance of the money-lender's business of the Province is apparent. Tax returns for the 1917-18 period emphasise this fact, out of a provincial total of Rs. 30.7 lakhs, Rs. 7.4 lakhs were paid by money-lenders. There were more tax payers amongst this group than for any other trading or professional class: 15,035 money-lenders were assessed on collective incomes amounting to Rs. 35,000,000 compared to a total provincial income which was subject to tax, of Rs. 750 lakhs. On the basis of these findings Calvert observed

"the province is dominated by the money-lender. He represents the richest single class. His profits probably exceed those of all the cultivators put together. Beside him, the professional class is inconsiderable; the industrial class is insignificant; even trade and commerce take second place."\footnote{86}
Though Calvert's figures emphasise the economic power of the money-lending community, it is not possible to gauge from them the total number of usurers in the Province, as they were concerned only with those subject to tax. As a result, calculations concerning the size of the community vary considerably. Calvert himself estimated in 1920 that the proportion of money-lenders, large and petty, to the total population was in the region of 1:100, as compared to 1:367 in the rest of India. In effect that meant that although the populace of the Punjab comprised only one-eleventh of the whole population of India, it supported one-fourth of all the money-lenders in the country. In 1930 the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee was of the opinion that between 55,000 and 59,000 usurers were operating in the Province, i.e. 1:340 persons. Though these findings vary tremendously, both indicate that an enormous number of individuals were connected with the advancement of credit.

As previously stated, the Land Alienation Act (1901) effectively divided the money-lending community into non-agriculturist and agriculturist categories. Though Muslims were to be found in both groups, the credit machine continued to be monopolised by non-Muslims, both Hindus and Sikhs, the Sikhs having come into prominence after 1901. There were two main classes of non-agriculturist money-lenders, the Sahukars advancing rural credit, and the urban usurers operating in the towns and cities. Together they controlled the majority of debt in the Province, despite the fact that three-quarters of mortgage debt was held by agriculturists. The Sahukars were the most important group, consisting almost entirely of Hindu Banias, Khatris and Aroras, though there was a small element of Muslim Khojas operating mainly in Chiniot and Shahpur. Despite the legislation of 1901, the Sahukar group had survived, primarily because there was no alternative source of credit, especially for unsecured loans, in certain parts of the Province, notably Karnal, Rohtak, Attock, Gurgaon and Mianwali: in 83% of 8,000 villages examined between 1926 and 1928 by the Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry there were no agriculturist money-lenders. The influence which the Sahukars continued to wield was apparent from the fact that in 1928-29 they accounted for nearly 20% of all the income-tax assesses in the Province.

In the case of urban money-lenders, they usually combined usury with some other form of business, generally advancing loans for private consumption, rather than for industry and commerce which were financed largely by indigenous bankers. This class of money-lender was overwhelmingly Hindu in composition, though two small Muslim groups were discernible—the Khojas and the Pathans. The Pathans operated mainly
in Lahore, the centre of their operations being the Landa Bazaar, thus although they belonged to a notified agriculturist tribe, their zone of activity resulted in them being classified in the urban category in this instance.93

Also in respect of agriculturist creditors the Muslims constituted a small minority. The Land Alienation Act of 1901 had strengthened the position of this class of creditor, and expanded their numbers.94 By 1928-29 it was estimated that there were approximately 19,000 such money-lenders operating in the Punjab, approximately 1,000 of whom were Muslims. These calculations were based on the findings of a survey of 8,000 villages (23% of the total number of settlements in the Province) conducted between 1926 and 1928, which revealed the presence of 4,340 agriculturist creditors, 49% of whom were Hindus, 45% Sikhs and 6% Muslims. The Sikhs predominated in the central Punjab, the Hindus in the Ambala division and Kangra, whilst the Muslims were most strongly represented in the districts of Rohtak and Jullundur, followed by Ambala, Hoshiarpur and Hissar.95 The comparatively low number of Muslim money-lenders, whether agriculturist or non-agriculturist, was also reflected in the number of suits instigated by Muslims for the recovery of debts in the periods January 1939 to December 1939, and January 1941 to August 1947. Of approximately 4,729 creditors involved, only 15% (694) were Muslims, as compared to 64% (3,056) from the Hindu community.96

There were two main reasons for the low level of Muslim participation - religion and lack of capital. The receipt of interest was contrary to the teachings of Islam.97 Even so some Muslims were prepared to sacrifice religious scruples in the pursuit of profit. The Arains of Multan had been openly engaged in the mortgage business since the turn of the century,98 though others sought to enjoy the benefits of money-lending without offending against Islam. The Arains of Attock who advanced credit did so in return for a share of the produce of the mortgaged property, rather than for cash interest payments. Similarly Muslim agriculturist creditors operating in the rural areas surrounding Lahore lent money in return for labour, and the supply of supposedly 'free' gifts of fodder and manure.99 Regardless, however, of whether individual Muslims sought to evade, or chose to ignore the teachings of their Faith in respect of usury, it is apparent that to an extent Islam did pose a barrier to greater Muslim participation. The main zones of operation for Muslim agriculturist usurers, with the exception of Jullundur, were those districts where the Hindu community was dominant. Many Muslims originating from these areas were not so orthodox
as their co-religionists in the western Punjab, and it appears that Muslim creditors were restrained from operating at a similar level in the more conservative Muslim majority districts. Thus whilst the Nawab of Mambot, one of the wealthiest zamindars in the Province, and the principal Muslim landowner in Ferozepore was enjoying an income from money-lending in 1915, as late as 1930 there were no known Muslim agriculturist money-lenders in eight of the 12 districts of the Rawalpindi and Multan divisions.

Nevertheless religion clearly did not present an absolute bar. By the 1930s there were groups of Muslims who were prepared to advance credit in return for cash interest payments. This caused the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee of 1929-30 to conclude that "the Muhammadan attitude towards the taking of interest is changing" as it was discovered that interest payments were received in Lyallpur and Okara, and even in so conservative a district as Multan. Also of the 55,582 Muslim depositors who had savings accounts with Post Office Banks in 1928-29, only 237 (0.4%) refused to receive interest payments. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that where religious observance did not pose a deterrent to Muslim participation in the credit business, lack of resources did, particularly as the Muslim community in general did not possess anything approaching the amount of accessible capital available to the non-Muslim communities. This is indicated by the fact that in 1906-07 out of a total of 17,815 persons paying income tax on earnings of, and in excess of Rs.1000 per annum, only 8% (1,438) were Muslims; of the remainder 79% (14,144) were Hindus, 8% (1,401) were Sikhs and 5% (832) were Christians, whilst of the 252,339 persons who had deposits amounting to Rs.395.85 lakhs in Post Office Savings Banks throughout the Punjab and the Punjab States in 1928, Muslims accounted for only 22% of the savers, commanding Rs. 61.47 lakhs, i.e. only 15.5% of the total capital invested. Similarly of the 97 banking offices situated in the city of Lahore by 1946, which between them possessed a working capital in excess of Rs. 100 crores, only seven which jointly controlled only half a crore of rupees were Muslim owned.

Furthermore in the same year in Lahore city Rs.924,358 were paid by non-Muslims in the form of Urban Immovable Property Tax, as compared to Rs. 396,189 (30%) paid by Muslims. Non-Muslims also paid Rs. 519,203/- in tax on the sale of goods, as compared to Rs.66,323/- (11%) paid by Muslims. This pattern seems to have been current throughout the province. As with Lahore, non-Muslims controlled the capital
of Amritsar. In 1945-46 there were 6,292 non-Muslims assessees paying Rs. 3,833,794 per annum in Urban Immovable Property Tax; Muslim assessees totalled 1,500 paying Rs. 71,800 (2%). Whilst the figures relating to the payment of the Sales Tax exhibited a similar disparity: Rs. 25,500 (2.4%) was paid by Muslims, as against Rs. 1,030,648 by non-Muslims. In respect of income tax Muslims paid only Rs. 33,922 (7%) as compared to Rs. 441,382 paid by non-Muslims. A similar trend was also apparent in the districts of Lyallpur, Gujranwala and Sialkot, as is demonstrated in Appendix E.

These statistics indicate the considerable extent to which non-Muslims controlled the capital, and in particular the urban wealth of the Province. Especially when one considers that in four of the areas cited above and in Appendix E Muslims accounted for over 50% of the population - 59% in the district of Lahore (58% in the city of Lahore), 63% in Lyallpur, 62% in Sialkot and 71% in Gujranwala; in Amritsar district the Muslim community was predominant, comprising 47% of the total populace. The pecuniary advantages so enjoyed by the non-Muslim communities further helps to explain their control of the credit machine in the Province, and the low level of Muslim participation.

By contrast the Muslims appear to have been the most indebted community in the Province. Various estimations arrived at during the last twenty-five years of British rule, and in the early post-independence period, suggest that Muslims were responsible for in excess of 60% of the Provincial debt. Darling calculated in the early 1920's that the total debt of the Punjab amounted to approximately Rs. 75 crores (mortgaged debt amounted to 45% of the whole), of which the Muslim community owed at least Rs. 50 crores, possibly as much as Rs. 60 crores, i.e. between 67% and 80% of the whole debt. By 1929 mortgaged debt alone accounted for an estimated Rs. 63 crores, 60% of which occurred in those districts where Muslims were in the majority, or predominated (Jullundur, Gurdaspur and Ambala.) Whilst research conducted in 1950 disclosed that in those districts ceded to Pakistan in 1947, Muslims had been responsible for 78% of the total debt in the years 1920 to 1950, though of that percentage 11% referred to the post-partition period.

It is not possible to explain the heavy rate of Muslim debt purely in terms of the fact that they were the largest group in the Province, as in percentage terms their liabilities surpassed their population ratio. One must consider other reasons in attempting to arrive at a balanced conclusion. Many causes of debt, in fact, were common to all
Punjabis, regardless of their religion. In the first place there was no stigma attached to indebtedness as it was considered prestigious to command credit, as is reflected in the Punjabi saying, "A man cannot be forgiven without priestly aid, or be respectable without a banker's aid". Also high interest rates, ranging from 12% to 50% by the 1930's, meant that once a cultivator was in debt he remained in that state. Repayment customs conspired to aggravate this; the majority of indebted zamindars paid their creditors in kind, usually parting with the bulk of their harvests each year to meet interest charges. The result was that they rarely received the full value of their crop, and thus were rarely in a position to redeem the principal. It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the main causes for borrowing was the repayment of previous loans. In 1923 the Punjab Co-operative Society allocated the largest portion of its budget to assist its members to redeem old debts; in 1925 an investigation in Ferozepur discovered that 64½% of all consideration money was utilised to repay previous debts. Whilst an enquiry conducted in the south-west of the Province in the late 1930's revealed that the repayment of existing loans resulted in further debts being incurred in over 40% of all cases examined.

Inheritance customs also increased the likelihood for debt. On the death of a landowner the holding was usually sub-divided amongst his heirs, a process which continued through each succeeding generation, until the properties were reduced to extremely small plots, which were uneconomic, and thereby vulnerable to debt. This problem was most acute in the more fertile areas of the Province, e.g. the densely populated districts of Hoshiarpur and the central Punjab, as exceptional fertility and large populations were synonymous, resulting in a high level of fragmentation. Though even in less productive tracts, heavy populations often caused the same result. In the mainly Muslim village of Bhambu Sandila in Muzaffargarh district 58% of the holdings were jointly held by more than five persons; 43% of the cultivators farmed 2 acres or under, and 63% 5 acres or less. The majority of owners, therefore, enjoyed a very small margin of profit, "indeed most of them had no margin at all", thus the smallest aberration in the form of cattle disease or drought posed a major crisis, resulting in heavy borrowing. Similar conditions prevailed throughout the district, by 1900 87.4% of the mainly Muslim proprietary body held on average only 2.5 acres per owner, at a time when it was estimated that a landed family required between 13 and 15 acres to subsist. The result was widespread debt involving 95% of all owners.
Even where land was plentiful and fertile the vicissitudes of nature could neutralize these advantages. The failure of the monsoon, water-logging, flooding, and the consequent destruction of crops, followed by famine, all resulted in the accumulation of debt. Drought was responsible for the "enormous increase" in transfers through mortgage in the Ambala district in the late 1860's, and in 1877-78 it resulted in 5% of the cultivated land in Rohtak being mortgaged. In the Hissar district between 1901 and 1916 a succession of poor harvests caused the mortgage rate to triple. Diseases amongst livestock also contributed to borrowing; draught animals were essential for cultivation, and the loss of cattle proved so serious between 1918 and 1923 that the Cooperative Society allocated 22.2% of its loan budget to provide borrowers with the means to replace stock. As the century progressed natural disasters continued to play a part in increasing indebtedness.

In the Punjab as a whole Darling observed that out of a five year cycle, the farmer generally experienced one good year, one bad year, and three "middling" years. In a bad year he would be forced to borrow for all his needs - domestic, professional and social - and though it was possible if he was thrifty to pay interest charges during the "middling" years, it was only in a good year that he could actually reduce his debt:

"Once in debt, therefore, it is almost impossible to escape. If he were thrifty and business-like he might succeed, but he is rarely either the one or the other, and the money-lender is always there to tempt him deeper into the mire.")

This lack of thrift, which was common amongst all the religious groups to varying degrees, compounded the 'natural' problems agriculturists faced. Local custom demanded lavish expenditure for social celebrations, which in turn often caused recourse to the money-lender. The average Punjabi preferred to incur debt for expenditure on a marriage or the ceremonies attendant upon births and deaths, rather than face the humiliating comments of his neighbours. Even poverty did not prohibit such unproductive extravagance. An enquiry conducted in 1940 into the affairs of poor artisans resident in Lahore revealed that in the case of 31 Muslim and 23 Sikh families examined, marriage expenses were a major cause of borrowing. The Muslim and Sikh families lavished 24% and 25% respectively of all the loans they incurred on marriages, which represented the largest single item in the Muslim, and the second largest in the Sikh case.

Borrowing to finance social observances was economically unproductive, and it appears that in general the Muslims were the worst offenders.
In 1888 Lyall, the Lieutenant Governor, noted that whilst debt in the eastern districts of the Punjab was largely a result of genuine shortages and poverty, in the Muslim majority western districts this was not always the case. There indebtedness was frequently spawned and aggravated by displays of extravagance totally out of proportion to the means of the owners, both large and small. Observations of this nature frequently recurred throughout the British period, and in the immediate post-independence years. In the 1870's Steedman, the Settlement Officer in Jhang, stated that there was hardly a Muslim zamindar in the district who was not in debt, largely as a result of extravagance. In Muzaffargarh in the early 1880's it was observed that in comparison to the Hindus, Muslims were "spendthrift and improvident", lavishing far more than their resources could bear on marriages, betrothals, circumcisions and funerals. Similarly the Gazetteer for Dera Ghazi Khan compiled in 1898, recorded that Muslim landowners, two-thirds of whom were in debt, preferred to squander resources on such celebrations, rather than exercise thrift. Such ostentation was judged to have contributed, to a large extent, to Muslim indebtedness in Multan and Mianwali in the pre-1920 period. A decade later Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners in the Province recognised that extravagance continued to contribute to the problem of debt, especially in the divisions of Jullundur, Lahore and Rawalpindi. In addition Muslims, particularly in the conservative western districts, often regarded themselves as the murids (disciples) of a particular Pir or spiritual leader. Offerings were made at the shrines frequented by these 'Divines', resulting only too frequently in borrowing by the devotees:

"They [murids] pay constant visits to shrines and places of pilgrimages, and make offerings there which they cannot afford ... the agriculturists make them [Pirs] presents out of all proportion to their incomes, and vie with one another in the largeness of their gifts." The volume of Muslim debt resulting from these practices, marriages in particular, can be assessed to some extent from the fact that by 1950 loans to finance social functions and observances accounted for the third largest single cause of debt amongst all classes of Muslims inhabiting those areas of the Punjab which were ceded to Pakistan. Litigation proved a further cause of unproductive debt. Sections of the Punjab peasantry, at least until the early 1920's, most particularly in the districts of Jullundur, Mianwali, Amritsar, Muzaffargarh, Lahore, Ferozepore, Hoshiarpur and Gurdaspur, seemed to possess an almost passionate obsession for litigation as a means of settling
disputes. As such an over-burdened people often dispersed limited
resources in this way. Calvert estimated that in the early 1920's
two and a half million people, approximately 40% of the adult popu­
lation, were involved in court cases, either as contesting parties or
witnesses; the result was the wasteful expenditure of between 3 or 4
crores of rupees per annum. 139 By the mid-1920's and 1930's, however,
the volume of litigation in the province appeared to be decreasing,
and Darling's research led him to conclude that it was only of secondary
importance vis-à-vis debt in the Province as a whole, though it continued
to pose a major problem in the districts mentioned above. 140 Also evi­
dence does exist to suggest that in the case of the Muslim community, it
was not a serious cause of debt. Following Partition it was discovered
that only 3% of Muslim debt resulted from expenditure on court cases. 142

Though the vagaries of nature and extravagance were clearly potent
causes of debt, ironically the problem was also aggravated by the wealth
potential of the land:

"It would be a mistake to suppose that...debt is in all
cases a sign of poverty. It is on the contrary often an
indication of easy credit and careless affluence; over
and over again the richest and best irrigated villages
will be found to be most heavily indebted." 143

Where owners possessed little credit, in the form of productive, and
therefore valuable land, debt was uncommon. Thus there was a lower
incidence of debt in the less fertile areas of the south west, where
in the 1920's land could be bought for Rs.50 an acre, than in highly
fertile central districts, where an acre of land could command Rs.500.
It is hardly surprising therefore that by the turn of the century, five
of the eight most heavily mortgaged districts (Lahore, Amritsar,
Ferozepore, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Ludhiana, Sialkot and Lyallpur) were
amongst the most productive in the Province. 144 Significantly it was
found thirty years later in the village of Bhadas in Gurgaon district,
that "the only zemindars free of debt are those who have no credit." 145

A further indication between credit and debt  is provided by the
fact that despite the presence of poor quality land in the south-west,
and in certain areas of Dera Ghazi Khan, Muzaffargarh and Multan, the
Province as a whole was very prosperous. From 1868 to 1920 the popu­
lation had increased by 20%, whilst in the same period cultivation ex­
panded by 50%, and the gross value of the produce rose from approximately
Rs.35 crores to Rs.100 crores. At the same time the pressure on the
land declined. The total population per 100 cultivated acres decreased
from 86 in 1868 to 76 in 1911, and the number of agriculturists per 100
acres declined from 46 to 43. Consequently the average value of gross produce per head of population rose from less than Rs.22 in 1868 to Rs.60 by 1920, indicating that the average income of an agricultural family had trebled. Increased productivity was responsible for this development. In 1872 the Punjab had received only 4 lakhs of rupees for its surplus grain, in 1913 the figure was 1,448 lakhs, and in 1918-19 approximately 2,437 lakhs. From 1890 to 1920 exports increased sevenfold in value, whilst imports increased only fourfold. The wealth of the Punjab was such that between 1911 and 1913 Rs.1,000 lakhs worth of gold and silver had been absorbed in the Province, and by the 1920's that figure had increased to Rs.2,169 lakhs, whilst the average amount deposited in Punjabi banks was double the average for the remainder of India. 146 Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that only the better-off could borrow. Even the small owner possessed a valuable commodity in land, but he was often poor in the sense that he did not have the necessary liquid assets to meet his everyday expenses, hence his recourse to the money-lender. Once indebted, despite the continuing value of his holding, he became in effect the tenant of his creditor who enjoyed the surpluses produced as interest. Thus in this sense poverty was both a cause and an effect of indebtedness. 147

So far this examination of the factors which contributed to debt were applicable to all the communities in the Province, irrespective of religion. The question remains, therefore, why were the Muslims so heavily indebted in comparison to the Hindus and Sikhs? The answer is partly given by comparing the characteristics of some of the major tribes which contributed to the composition of the various communities:

"As a general rule, whatever be the nature of the soil he cultivates...the caste of the agriculturist, which determines his habits and custom and natural disposition will determine his economic condition." 148

Evidence suggests that many Muslim cultivators were not as proficient as their non-Muslim neighbours, and therefore more vulnerable to borrowing. The classic example which demonstrates this point was the constant comparison made by British officials between the excellent husbandry of Hindu and Sikh Jats, and the inferior efforts of Muslim Jats and Rajputs, though the failings of the latter were frequently shared by the non-Muslim clan members. Purser and Fanshawe, the Settlement Officers in Rohtak in the 1870's, noted that the Hindu Jats in the district were very good cultivators, and the Muslim Mula Jats "though generally recent converts, are already far inferior to the Hindus", whilst the worst cultivators were the Muslim Rajputs. 149 This view, particularly of the
Rajput, persisted; the 1907 assessment report for Gohana tahsil stated, "Their houses are always inferior, their fields ill-weeded, the sound of the mill begins late, and the sun generally catches them a-bed." This condemnation of the Rajput, especially Muslim tribal members, was practically universal throughout the Punjab.

This dichotomy, between Jat and Rajput, is explained to a great extent by the divergence of socio-cultural tradition between the two tribes. The yeoman Jat was the backbone of the Punjab peasantry. Though they often exhibited extravagance in celebrating marriages and conducting funerals in all other respects they were generally "thrifty to the verge of parsimony" whilst being "unremitting in toil ...self-reliant in adversity, and enterprising in prosperity". By contrast the Rajput, who by tradition regarded himself as a warrior rather than a farmer regardless of his actual social and economic circumstances, was constrained by the inherent belief that he was the heir to his tribe's former aristocratic supremacy in the Province. Consequently a Mian (Rajput), to preserve his name and honour unsullied, attempted to observe four fundamental maxims: he should never marry a social inferior; he should not accept bridal payments; his female household were expected to observe strict purdah; he should refrain from ploughing. The last two observances were the most damaging. Some Rajputs shunned cultivation altogether, preferring to rent their lands to the more industrious Jats, and when they did farm in person, by retaining purdah they deprived themselves of a valuable source of labour, in that Rajput women, as opposed to those of the Jats, generally did not assist their menfolk in the fields. Such practices, combined with the Rajputs' delusions of social supremacy spawned indolence.

Purely Muslim tribes also came in for similar condemnation. The Muslim Meos of Gurgaon district were regarded as thriftless and poor cultivators, as were the Bilochis of Rohtak and Dera Ghazi Khan. Similarly the Muslim cultivators of Multan, regardless of their tribal affinity with the exception of the Arain market-gardeners were described as lazy and apathetic, whilst the Hindu farmers of Attock were proclaimed to be more thrifty, patient and far-seeing than the Muslim peasantry. This criticism was repeated in Gurgaon. There the Hindu Ahirs had sunk wells to avert the adverse effects of drought. The Muslim Meos, however, declined such labour, preferring to rely on the presence of surface water and risk the consequences should water shortages occur. In Muzaffargarh district, the comparison between Hindu and Muslim cultivation was very marked:
"On the holdings of the former [Hindus] are found good cattle, decent brick buildings, fruit trees and such intensive crops as cane, pepper and vegetables, while on the latter [Muslims], half-starved worn-out cattle, mud huts and no better crops than indifferent wheat"; remarks which strongly echoed those of Brandreth who effected the settlement of the Ferozepur district almost eighty years before. These comparisons between Muslim and non-Muslim cultivators were drawn from official reports covering the period 1851 to 1935, and therefore were indicative of the general state of Muslim husbandry.

Various explanations have been offered for the comparative inferiority of Muslim cultivation, and the resultant heavy indebtedness of the Muslim peasantry, and community in general. Ibbetson, the author of the Punjab's contribution to the 1881 Census, was convinced that Muslim inferiority emanated directly from their adherence to Islam. He believed conversion had resulted in their degeneration, causing conceit, extravagance, thriftlessness and indolence. This view, however, was disputed by Fenton, who compiled the Jullundur Gazetteer of 1904. He based his opinion on the fact that many Muslims were neglectful of their religion, citing the Muslim Rajputs as a prime example; he claimed that the latter were so wedded to Hindu ways that they frequently patronised Hindu priests, and maintained Hindu customs. In common with Ibbetson, however, he accepted that Muslims did exhibit a degree of character inferiority, in comparison to non-Muslims:

"Conversion from Hinduism was generally the result of persecution, thus one could expect the descendants of men who could not resist persecution to be inferior to those who could...the weakness of mind leading to conversion, would show itself in worldly affairs."

Though he qualified this statement by postulating that large portions of the Muslim community were less developed than Hindus because they were only just emerging from the pastoral stage, which had long been surmounted by the latter. Fenton's explanations echo the Darwinian theory of 'survival of the fittest', which was current in the mid- and late Victorian period. Though they do dispose of Ibbetson's claim to an extent, they prove no more satisfactory in providing a rational explanation for the Muslim predicament.

One factor appears evident. Muslims, the majority of whom shared a common ancestry with Hindu and Sikh Punjabis, were not congenitally inferior. Though it is apparent that the Muslim character had been shaped to an extent by Islam, but not in the way supposed by Ibbetson and Fenton. In this context Thor provides a far more plausible explanation:
"Sikhism and Hinduism do not interfere with a man's natural desire to better himself in the world by his own exertions. Mahomedanism teaches its disciples to accept every misfortune as the will of 'Allah'. It unfit him for the struggle of life. Accordingly, we find, whenever Sikhs, Hindus, and Musalmans cultivate side by side, that the last-named are the worst farmers.\

Though Thornburn's assessment is guilty of generalisation, it is relevant, in that fatalism, particularly in the more orthodox districts, did militate against the pursuit of enterprise. This was particularly evident in the Division of Multan, which was conspicuous for the lack of diversity exhibited by its Muslim inhabitants. Despite the fact that the area experienced the highest summer temperatures in the Province, which combined with a general scarcity of water, made agriculture uncertain, very few cultivators sought to implement their earnings through emigration or army service. The absence of enterprise was also apparent in Muzaffargarh. There Muslims outnumbered Hindus by eight to one, and of the Muslim proprietors by the 1880's 70% were in debt, as compared to only 30% in the case of Hindus, the reason being that Muslims were more improvident, and lacked their enterprising zeal:

"Muhammadans are mostly spendthrift and improvident. The Hindus are the reverse... Muhammadans have only one source of income, viz., agriculture. Hindus who own and cultivate land, almost always combine money-lending and trade with agriculture. Hindus acquire land as payment for debts, Muhammadans generally borrow money to buy land."

In the final analysis, however, the locations which many Muslims inhabited throughout the Province, probably exerted the most crucial influences on the level of Muslim industry and thereby indebtedness. It was a feature of the Province that the 'Bet' areas, or riverain tracts, were occupied primarily by Muslims. The possession of Bet lands was a mixed blessing. Though the soil was rich in alluvial muds, placing it amongst the most fertile in the Punjab, the localities were subject to frequent devastating flooding, and were the most unhealthy in the Province because of the high incidence of fever, particularly malaria. In 1924 the river Beas flooded a dozen times, devastating villages and crops over a twenty square mile area. Malaria was so prevalent in Ludhiana in the months of August to November that "one can scarcely find...an able-bodied man who is not suffering from it"; in the period 1891 to 1900 the annual average death toll was approximately 14,810, and in 1892 and 1900 epidemics were responsible for 20,653 and 26,861 deaths respectively. The heavy flooding and accompanying fever had a weakening effect on the population, resulting in broken constitutions,
apathy and poor cultivation. But the land was highly productive, and as such attracted heavy speculation on the part of money-lenders, who found a ready market where such precarious conditions prevailed.

Geography, therefore, often resulted in a high level of indebtedness. No one factor alone, however, could be held responsible for the greater involvement of the Muslims as compared to the Hindu and Sikh communities. That resulted from an amalgamation of causes. In the final analysis, it would appear that location, a comparatively higher degree of extravagance, a lower level of general productivity, and possibly a more entrenched belief in God's will as opposed to man's free will, all combined to make the Muslim community the most vulnerable to debt.

Thus so far it is apparent that Muslims were economically depressed. This pattern was evident in the industrial sphere. Though the Punjab's economy was dominated by agriculture, industrial production by the 1930's and 1940's was not insignificant in terms of the contribution it made to the Province's wealth. By 1937-38 it was valued at Rs.157,407,500, as compared to Rs.586,699,000 representing the aggregate value of the principal agricultural crops, (a further 4 crores of rupees was contributed by dairy farming). Prior to the turn of the century the mass of artisans had worked, not in factories or for capitalists, but as individual craftsmen. Industry, such as existed, concentrated on small scale production. It was the expansion of communication routes, particularly roads and railways, which stimulated industrial growth. By 1911 3,750 miles of rail had been laid throughout the Punjab, linking the Province with the port of Karachi, in addition to which 2,000 miles of metalled and 20,000 miles of unmetalled roads had been constructed. Furthermore the river Indus and the lower reaches of the Jhelum, Chenab and Sutlej were navigable throughout the year, as were 387 miles of the immense canal system. Even so the Punjab was completely land-locked, and its distance from the sea, in spite of the link with Karachi, acted as a tariff barrier against competitive imports, which in turn stimulated production for local requirements, but checked the export of bulky commodities for consumption abroad. The advantages, however, far outweighed the disadvantages, especially since Swadeshi banking in the 1911-17 period had proved extremely successful in eliciting capital from private hoards, which combined with the inability of banks to secure adequate short term investments, had forced them to concentrate on industrial investments, which in turn led to the growth of new companies.
The Provincial Government, though conscious of this increased industrial activity, remained an interested bystander. Rather than giving encouragement to large scale production, which could have proved detrimental to Britain's export market, it concentrated on fostering cottage industries. Thus hand-weaving was encouraged through the founding of a model weavery; the production of raw silk was promoted through the establishment of Salvation Army owned cocoon farms at Changa Manga, Lahore, Chaua Pail and Ludhiana, and the Mayo School of Arts attempted to resuscitate cotton printing. But the Government refrained from giving any direct help to the cotton power industry. 

The attitude of the Government was reflected in the fact that 'Industries' formed a small sub-department of the Department of Agriculture. But the report of the Royal Commission on Indian Industries in 1918, and the demands of the 1914-18 war had the effect of stimulating interest in industrialisation, both for defence purposes and economic development. The Punjab Government responded by founding a separate Department for Industries in 1920. In theory it was charged with the control of Government educational institutions dealing with technology and industry, and the examination of the industrial potential of the Province. Also it was expected to provide an advisory service for factory owners and potential industrialists; to establish model factories; to organise marketing facilities, and to provide loans to those concerns in need of financial assistance. In practice, however, the Department concentrated on educational ventures, neglecting its other responsibilities.

In spite of these shortcomings, by the 1920's the process of industrialization, through private enterprise, was established in the Punjab:

"Large-scale production, a necessary consequence of the introduction of machinery, had been accompanied by [the] centralization and monopolization of control in the hands of a few." 

Of this 'few' the overwhelming majority were non-Muslims. In 1921 there were 763 factories in the Province in each of which at least ten persons had been employed between 14 March and 14 May. Hindus owned 455 (60%), Sikhs 45 (6%) and Muslims 96 (12.5%); of the remainder 102 (13%) were operated by the Government or local authorities, 38 (5%) were registered companies in the control of European, Anglo-Indian and Indian directors, 18 (2%) were owned by Europeans and Anglo-Indians, 8 (1%) by Parsees, and there were 2 (0.2%) listed as belonging to 'others'. In all the factories a total of 769 managers were employed - 513 (67%) Hindus, 54 (7%) Sikhs, 112 (14.5%) Muslims, 76 (10%) Europeans and Anglo-Indians, and 9 (1%) Parsees. This similarity between the two sets of statistics
suggests that managers were generally employed on communal grounds. This trend was also observed by Faiz Ilahi in 1941; many of the artisans he interviewed in Lahore, admitted that employers tended to patronize employees belonging to their own communities.

By 1921, therefore, the evidence available demonstrates that non-Muslims, particularly the Hindus, dominated the industrial life of the Province, both at the proprietor and managerial levels. The 1921-1931 decade witnessed considerable industrial advancement in the Punjab. This was encouraged by further expansion of the transport system, the provision of sidings to large mills and factories, and an improved electricity supply, as a result of the Mandi Hydro-Electric scheme. The resultant industrial growth can be judged from the fact that in 1921 there had been 297 factories registered under the provisions of the Indian Factories Act, employing 42,428 operatives, whilst by 1930 there were 526 such factories, with a combined work force of 49,549. In spite of the increase in the number of concerns, there had not been a corresponding growth in the number of employees. This was due, in part, to the fact that the larger factories, e.g. railway workshops, had introduced mechanization. Also many of the newer establishments represented small concerns, employing small labour forces, e.g. hosiery factories, rolling-mills, flour mills, etc.

This industrial growth did little to alter the communal status quo in respect of ownership and financial control. From factory lists contained in the District Gazetteers, it has been possible to assess from the names of the various concerns the community to which the proprietors belonged. 874 factories were listed as being in operation in 1931. This figure is much larger than that given in the Census of 1931, as it included 'factories' both within and outside the provisions of the Factories Act. Of the total number it was not possible in the case of 91 concerns (10%) to determine the ownership; of the remainder, 504 (58%) were owned by Hindus, 61 (7%) by Sikhs, 114 (13%) by Muslims, 6 (0.7%) by foreigners, 63 (7%) by Government, 23 (3%) by 'Others' and 12 (1.3%) were of mixed ownership. Not only did Hindus and Sikhs together control the majority of the factories, they appear to have employed more operatives than were found in Muslim concerns, suggesting a heavier economic investment. Of a total of 23,244 operatives who were engaged in the Hindu, Sikh and Muslim owned establishments, 17,958 (77%) worked for Hindu owners, 2,174 (9%) for Sikhs, and 3,112 (14%) for Muslims, representing an average work force of 36 and 29 for non-Muslim and Muslim owned factories respectively.
There were only two branches of industry in which Muslims played a dominant role - tanning and the production of iron at Batala. According to the 1931 Census, 13,322 persons were involved in the tanning and leatherwork industry, 11,312 of these following the profession as their principal occupation. There is some doubt, however, whether this figure is truly representative, as only one person was recorded as a tanner in the whole of the Multan district, whereas an enquiry conducted in 1938 revealed that more than 60 people were engaged in tanning in the city of Multan alone. In the absence of accurate returns it is impossible to state how many persons were involved, but it would seem to have been larger than indicated in the Census.

Despite the discrepancy recorded above it is clear that tanning and associated leather crafts made a substantial contribution to industrial output in the Punjab. After weaving, it was the second biggest employer of labour; at least 167,345 boot, shoe and sandal manufacturers depended on it as a source of raw material. The method of curing leather, however, was crude and wasteful, and the industry generally was the preserve of illiterate cottage tanneries. By 1939, only two tanneries were registered under the provisions of the Factories Act — one in Wazirabad, the other in Sialkot. Tanning in the villages was mostly done by Chamars, who were predominantly Muslim, though other groups involved included Muslim Khatiks and Chamrangs, the mainly Muslim Dabgars, and the Hindu Pasis. Hindu involvement, both at the labourer and financier levels was extremely small, owing to the caste prejudices against handling animal products. As a result the industry was almost exclusively financed by Muslims, the Khojas exercising a virtual monopoly.

The location of foundries at Batala, resulted mainly from the suitability of the local sand deposits, which proved very valuable in the construction of moulds, and the fact that the surrounding area was populated by large numbers of Lohars (blacksmiths). The origin of the industry dated back to the 1880’s when a local capitalist, Rai Sahib Ganda Mal, began manufacturing sugar cane presses in response to local demands. It was the sons of his Muslim mechanic, Mirani Bux, however, who expanded the industry by founding independent concerns, Mal having discontinued production when a boiler in his foundry exploded, killing three men.

By 1941 there were 26 foundries in Batala, 22 of which were owned by Muslim Lohars, most of whom were illiterate, and who relied on clerks
to carry out clerical work. The labour force was similarly dominated by Muslims; all of the 49 mould-contractors were Muslims, so were 78 of the 79 moulders. This Muslim dominance, however, occurred in an industry which made only a comparatively small contribution to the over-all industrial wealth of the Province. In 1932 the iron industry earned Rs.2,251,250, a figure which represented the entire iron production of the Province, which by 1939 had 46 foundries, including those at Batala. The Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry attempted in 1941 to discover the capital investment in the Batala concerns, but it proved to be a complicated task. Not only was there the problem of evaluating land, buildings and machinery, but the working capital fluctuated with the measure of industrial activity, the foundry owners taking short-term loans according to their immediate requirements. Even so it was established that of the 26 foundries, one, a limited company, had a paid up capital of Rs.107,250, of the others the largest investment was estimated to be Rs.80,000, and the smallest Rs.6,000. Thus on the whole they were small establishments, added to which at the outbreak of war in 1939 the industry was placed under strict Government control to conserve scrap iron, and output was confined to a limited number of articles, e.g. ploughing implements, etc., for which there was only a seasonal demand, as a result of which the foundries were idle for a number of months each year. The industry was further handicapped because it lacked adequate capital, and high interest rates demanded for that which was available inhibited growth. Also the industry was retarded, because the majority of the illiterate owners employed no trained business assistants, salesmen or qualified engineering staff; only one of the 26 foundries was under the supervision of a trained engineer.

The Muslim community, therefore, only exercised control over two spheres of the Punjab's industrial life. Of these, tanning, though important, was backward, ill-organised and wasteful, representing a cottage industry, rather than an intensive branch of production, whilst the enterprises at Batala were mainly petty concerns, operating on a small profit margin. Neither demanded large capital investments. Industry in general, however, received its greatest impetus from the availability of capital:

"As in the previous decade, the demand for industrialisation came from those seeking to employ capital and from the middle classes seeking employment outside the overcrowded literary professions." As in the case of money-lending, Muslims in general simply did not possess
comparable resources to match the degree of investment made by non-Muslims, Hindus in particular, whilst the professions were almost the preserve of the latter (see p. 16).

In many respects, therefore, the Punjab was a Muslim province in name only. Though the community dominated the Province numerically, it barely controlled 50% of the agricultural land, it was the most emburdened in respect of debt, and in the crucial economic spheres of usury and industry it constituted only a small minority amongst the investors. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the comparative backwardness which Muslims experienced was reflected in their low level of participation in the field of education, and that in turn had a retrograde effect on the number of Muslims who entered the 'professions', particularly the Provincial and Indian Civil Services. The fact that Muslims as compared to Hindus and Sikhs failed to achieve levels of participation and employment comparable with their majority population status did not, to begin with, influence the course of provincial politics. The political life of the Province was dominated by an extremely wealthy Muslim zamindar élite, which collectively felt neither socially nor economically threatened by the Hindu and Sikh industrialist, trading and administrative classes. Also although some Muslim politicians expressed concern over the general unsatisfactory state of their less fortunate co-religionists, the need in the late 1930's and early 1940's to maintain a multi-communal coalition in the Province, to enable the Muslim controlled Unionist Party to command a majority in the Provincial Assembly prevented any reforms being enacted to specifically benefit the Muslims. It was only with the growth of Muslim nationalism and the emergence of a Muslim League Opposition Party in the Punjab that the retarded economic condition of the Muslim community in general, as compared to that of non-Muslims, assumed a political dimension. Even so it represented, by and large, an offshoot of communalism, in that the resentment of the poorer and deprived sections of Muslim society was directed mainly against the Hindu economic élite, rather than against privileged sections of Muslim society.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I


2. Total population, 23,580,852: Muslims, 13,332,460 (56%); Hindus, 5,417,188 (23%); Depressed Classes (Hindus), 1,310,709 (6%); Sikhs, 3,064,144 (13%); Indian Christians, 414,788 (2%): Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Pt.I, pp. 2-7, IOR.


4. Percentages calculated from information contained in ibid., Pt.II, Table II, pp.324-331.


7. Figure calculated from information contained in Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Pt.I, pp. 366-367, IOR.

8. The population of the Punjab (British and Princely States) in 1931 was estimated to be 28,490,857: ibid., Pt.II, p. 2.

9. Calculated from information contained in Punjab High Court Pleaders Enrolment Register (1939-1957), Lahore, 1957, PHCL.

10. Of the remainder 1,111 (52%) were Hindus, 369 (17%) were Sikhs and 82 (42%) belonged to minority communities. Calculated from information contained in the Punjab Gazette, Part III, October 1943, pp.529-570, PCSL.

11. In the Rupar tahsil of the Ambala District, it was reported that the Hindu Jats who owned half the cultivated land in the area were orthodox Sikhs, whilst in the accompanying statement of land-ownership, the Jats were classified solely as Hindus. Similarly it was estimated that Sikh Jats held 86% of the land in the Moga tahsil of the Ferozepore district, but in the statistical tables they were listed as Hindus. See AR, Rupar Tahsil (Ambala District) 1917, pp. 7, 19-20, Statement No. V, p.vi, F/10264; AR, Moga Tahsil (Ferozepore District) 1912, pp. 12-13, Statement No. V, p.vii, F/1188, IOR.


13. That this figure represents a reasonable approximation of the amount of land being farmed in the Punjab in the 1936-47 period is clear from the fact that in 1936 it was estimated that 41,711,011 acres (exclusive of Shamaitat, village abadi and Government property) were privately owned: Punjab Land Revenue Administration Report, 1936, Statement No. III, p. vii, PBRL.

14. Calculated from the findings recorded in Appendices Bi to Biv.

15. Darling estimated that out of a total Provincial debt – secured and unsecured – of Rs. 75 crores, the Muslim community owed between .

(continued)

16. In the districts of Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Gujrat, Shahpur, Jhelum, Rawalpindi, Attock, Mianwali, Montgomery, Lyallpur, Jhang, Multan, Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan and Jullundur, Muslims appear to have owned 18,456,209 acres out of a total of 23,687,200 acres at the time of the various assessments recorded in Appendices Bi - Biv. Assuming that 8% of the Muslim land was mortgaged with possession, that would involve a total of 1,894,987 acres.

17. An enquiry conducted in 1926-27, concerning 3,526 villages (i.e. 10% of the total number in the Province), revealed that of the 1,988 agriculturists engaged in money-lending in them, 1,033 (52%) were Sikhs, 843 (42.5%) were Hindus, and only 110 (5.5%) were Muslims: Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol. I, Lahore, 1930, pp. 132 and 309.


19. | Muslims | Hindus | Sikhs | Not Specified |
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Owned (Acres)</td>
<td>15,444,469</td>
<td>6,745,015</td>
<td>5,595,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Paid (Rupees)</td>
<td>18,059,354</td>
<td>7,298,874</td>
<td>11,719,193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Figures and percentages calculated from information contained in Appendices Bi and Bii.


22. DG, Multan, 1901-02, pp. 24, 29-50.

23. Zahir-Ad-Din Muhammad Babur (1483-1530), first Mughal Emperor of India; following several unsuccessful attempts to seize Samarkand he turned his attention to India. Raids into the country had revealed the existence of growing discontent in the Afghan Sultanate of Delhi against Sultan Ibrahim, and encouraged by an invitation from the Governor of the Punjab, he staged an invasion, culminating in victory at Panipat on 21 April 1526.


27. S.S. Thorlkat, op.cit., p.10.


29. AR, Kabirwala Tashil (Multan District) 1898, pp.36-38, P/5609; SR, Jhang, 1874-80, p.131, V/27/314/546, IOR.


31. Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness in India, pp. 4-5, V/27/313/3, IOR.

32. SR, Jullundur, 1846-51, p.27, V/27/314/546, IOR.
33. Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness in India, pp.4-5, V/27/313/3, IOR.
34. SR, Gurdaspur, 1854, p.13, V/27/314/507, IOR.
35. SR, Amritsar, 1856, pp.13, 15, V/27/314/459, IOR.
37. By the early 1870's 400 miles of railway, 2,750 miles of canal and 1,000 miles of metalled roads had been constructed in the Punjab; M.L. Darling, op.cit., pp.206-209.
38. SR, Jullundur, 1880-86, p.71, V/27/314/547, IOR.
39. S.S. Thorburn, op.cit., pp. 73-75.
40. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
41. SR, Shahpur, 1887-94, pp.13-14, V/27/314/620, IOR.
42. SR, Jullundur, 1880-86, p.71, V/27/314/547, IOR.
43. AR, Amritsar Tahsil (Amritsar District), 1892, p.73, F/4081, IOR.
44. DG, Gujranwala, 1893-94, pp.83-84, IOR.
45. S.S. Thorburn, op.cit., p.50; SR, Panipat Tahsil and Karnal Parganah, 1872-80, pp.111-112, V/3382, IOR.
46. Census of India, 1881, Punjab, Pt.II, Table XII, p.2; Census of India, 1911, Punjab, Pt.1, p.514, IOR.
47. SR, Dera Ismail Khan, 1872-79, p.364, V/27/314/482, IOR.
48. DG, Multan, 1901-02, p.190, IOR.
53. Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness in India, pp.6-7, V/27/313/3, IOR.
54. SR, Gujrat, 1870, p.37, V/27/314/502, IOR.
56. Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness in India, pp.44-53, V/27/313/3, IOR.

61. AR, Naraingarh Tahsil (Ambala district), 1888, pp. 20-21, F/3160, IOR.

62. DG, Attock, 1930, pp. 115-116, IOR.

63. DG, Dera Ghazi Khan, 1898, p. 90, IOR.

64. SR, Gujrat, 1870, p. 21, V/27/314/502, IOR.


66. SR, Jullundur, 1846-51, pp. 13-14, V/27/314/546, IOR.

67. Punjab Land Revenue Administration Report, 1868-69, p. 53, V/24/2466; AR, Lodhran Tahsil (Multan district), 1878, pp. 2-3, 6-7; DG, Multan, 1901-02, p. 190, IOR.

68. DG, Muzaffargarh, 1908, p. 113, IOR.


70. Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness in India, p. 44, 249, V/27/313/3, IOR.

71. Government of India Administration Report (Punjab) 1899-1900, Appendix 9, p. xiii, V/10/357, IOR.


75. Government of India Administration Reports (Punjab), 1902-03, p. 23, V/10/358-396, IOR.

76. Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 12 April 1938; 22 July 1938; 26 July 1938.

77. Ibid., 24 June 1938; 10 July 1938.

78. In the case of secured loans this was 12% per annum simple interest or 9% per annum compound interest, and in the case of unsecured loans, 1.5% per annum simple interest and 14% per annum compound interest.

79. GR, Craik to Brabourne, 22 July 1938, P&J. 3596/38, IOR.

80. K. B. Sheikh Nur Mohammad (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), An Economic Survey of Bhambu Sandila, Muzaffargarh District, Lahore, 1935, p. xvii, PPL.


84. *Ibid.*, 1939-1944, V/24/600, IOR.
86. Calvert, *op.cit.*, p.130.
90. In 1928-29, 3,998 rural money-lenders were taxed on a net income of Rs. 169.70 lakhs, from a joint investment of Rs. 1,306½ lakhs. By comparison 2,292 urban money-lenders were taxed on a net income of Rs. 79.27 lakhs, from a joint investment of Rs. 923 lakhs: *ibid.*, pp.330, 332.
93. This is apparent from the fact that in 1889-90 in the Kot Kapura Uttar assessment circle of Ferozepore district, there had been only 8 agriculturist mortgagees advancing Rs.4,172 on loans with possession, by 1923 their number had expanded to 787, advancing Rs.1,311,709. Similarly in the Pothwan assessment circle of the Haveli-pindi district, the number of agriculturist mortgagees had increased from 6 in 1885-86 to 280 by 1925-26, whilst the amount of credit they supplied to mortgagors had expanded from Rs.2,212 to Rs.60,303: Sardar Balwant Singh (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), *An Inquiry into Mortgages of Agricultural Land in the Kot Kapura Uttar Assessment Circle of the Ferozepore District in the Punjab*, Lahore, 1929, p.22; Raja Hassan Akhtar, *op.cit.*, p.19, PLL.
95. SR, Dera Ghazi Khan, 1869-74, p.47, V/27/314/476, IOR.
96. DG, Multan, 1901-02, p.190, IOR.
97. DG, Ferozepore, 1915, p.110, IOR.
103. Ibid., p.334.
108. Calculated from information contained in the Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Pt.II, Table V, p.26, Table XIII, pp.238-240, 245, IOR.
111. By 1936 5,109,257 acres were held on usufructuary mortgage in the Punjab, of which 3,056,021 (60%) were located in those areas referred to in the text. Figures and percentages calculated from information contained in the Punjab Land Revenue Administration Report, 1936, Statement No. III, pp.ii-vii, PGSL.
112. Lahore, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Gujrat, Shahpur, Jhelum, Rawalpindi, Attock, Mianwali, Montgomery, Lyallpur, Jhang, Multan, Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan.
113. Hassan Ali Syed (Punjab Board of Economic Enquiry, Pakistan), Report on the Need and Supply of Credit in the Rural Areas of the Punjab, Lahore, 1951, p.54, PPL.
114. SR, Lahore, 1865-69, p.60, V/27/314/546, IOR.
115. Interest rates ranged from 12% to 24% in Multan for cash loans, and from 25% to 50% for grain advances; in Gurgaon 24% interest was charged on money loans from the date of advancement to the spring harvest, after which compound interest was levied, while on mortgages without possession 24% interest payments were demanded; in Amritsar interest rates on the various loans varied from 12% to 30%: Report of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30, Vol.I, Lahore, 1930, pp.227, 231, 234, PPL.
116. Ibid., pp.228-229; AR, Mamdot Jagir (Ferozepur District), 1913, pp.17-18, P/9189, IOR.
118. K.G. Sivaswamy, op.cit., p.57.
121. K.B. Nur Mohammad (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), An Economic Survey of Bhambu Sandila, Muzaffargarh District, Lahore, 1935, Preface, pp. v-vi, PPL.
122. AR, Sinanwan Tahsil (Muzaffargarh District), 1900, pp.89, 94-96, F/6077, IOR.
123. Extracts from the reports of local officials, p.20, enclosure, Punjab Land Revenue Administration Report, 1869-70, V/24/2466, IOR.
125. DG, Hissar, 1915, pp.167-168, IOR.
126. This percentage represented the second largest single item in their return: Punjab Co-operative Society Report, 1922-23, pp.23-24, V/24/596, IOR.
128. M.L.Darling, op.cit., p.27.
130. Percentages calculated from information quoted by Faiz Ilahi (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), Some Poorer Artisan Classes of Lahore, 1941, p.27, PPL.
131. Notes by J.Lyall, 17 July and 22 August 1888, Punjab Civil Secretariat Printed Files (Revenue), PBRL.
132. SR, Jhang, 1874-80, pp.131-132, V/27/314/537, IOR.
133. DG, Muzaffargarh, 1883-84, pp.83-84, IOR.
134. DG, Dera Ghazi Khan, 1883-84, p.69, IOR.
135. DG, Multan, 1901-02, p.189; DG, Mianwali, 1915, pp.112-113, IOR.
137. DG, Muzaffargarh, 1883-84, p.85, IOR.
138. 28.2% of all loans were for domestic purposes, 21.2% for the purchase of cattle, and 15.6% for social celebrations: Hassan Ali Syed, op.cit., pp. 22-24.
140. Report of the Unemployment Committee, 1937-38, Lahore, 1938, p.49, PPL.
143. AR, Gohana Tahsil (Rohtak District), 1907, p.12, P/7841, IOR.
146. H. Calvert, op.cit., pp. 68, 162.
147. F.L.Brayne and Shiv Dyal (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), An Economic Survey of Bhadas, A Village in the Gurgaon District of the Punjab, Lahore, 1938, p.81, PPL.
148. DG, Gurgaon, 1910, p.100, IOR.
149. SR, Rohtak, 1873-79, pp. 53-55, V/27/314/616, IOR.
150. AR, Gohana Tahsil (Rohtak District), 1907, p.10, P/7841, IOR.
152. AR, Rohtak Tahsil (Rohtak District), 1909, pp.12-13, P/8121, IOR.
153. AR, Samrala Tahsil (Ludhiana District), 1910, p.15, P/8672, IOR.
154. DG, Kangra, 1924-25, p.163, IOR.
155. AR, Samrala Tahsil (Ludhiana District) 1910, p.15, P/8672, IOR.
156. AR, Gohana Tahsil (Rohtak District), 1907, p.10, P/7841; AR, Rohtak Tahsil (Rohtak District), 1909, pp.12-13, P/8121, IOR.
157. AR, Samrala Tahsil (Ludhiana District), 1881, p.15, P/8401, IOR.
158. DG, Gurgaon, 1910, pp.100-101, IOR.
160. AR, Lodhran Tahsil (Multan District), 1878, p.3, P/1294, IOR.
161. DG, Attock, 1930, p.115, IOR.
162. DG, Gurgaon, 1910, p.101, IOR.
164. See SR, Ferozepur District, 1851-55, p.5, V/27/314/488, IOR.
165. Census of India, 1881, Punjab, Pt.I, pp.103-104, IOR.
166. DG, Jullundur and Kapurthala State, 1904, pp.129-130, IOR.
167. S.S. Thorburn, op.cit., p.15.
168. DG, Multan, 1901-1902, pp.106-107, IOR.
169. Word underlined in text in italics in the original, DG, Muzaffargarh, 1883-84, p.83, IOR.
170. Two main theories have been postulated to explain this phenomenon. One explanation is that the Muslim invaders, being pastoral farmers by nature, seized the rich pasture lands in the vicinity of the rivers, and once established, stimulated the process of conversion amongst the riverain dwellers, notably the Gujars and Dogars. The other argues that during the period of Sikh supremacy, the latter took possession of the upland areas, forcing the Muslims down into the Bet: M.L.Darling, op.cit., pp.70-71.
171. Ibid., pp.68-71.
172. DG, Ludhiana, 1904, p.44, IOR.
175. Rice, wheat, barley, jowar, bajra, maize, gram, rabi oil seeds, tobacco, sugar cane, cleaned and unginned cotton: K.T. Shah, Industrialisation of the Punjab, Lahore, 1941, pp. 35-38, 43.
177. Census of India, 1881, Punjab, Pt.I, p.376, IOR.
180. Ahmad Mukhtar, Factory Labour in the Punjab, Madras, 1929, pp. 4-5.
182. Ibid., pp. 2-3, 8-12, 18, 21.
183. The sub-department had been inaugurated in 1905 as a result of Curzon's re-organization programme: see Punjab Commerce and Industry Proceedings, April-Dec. 1905, Vol. 7022, IOR.

184. In 1921 the total budget of the Department amounted to Rs. 350,912, more than half of which was allocated for the construction of a college of engineering. In 1939 out of a budget of Rs. 2,190,150, two-thirds was spent on providing technical training: K.T. Shah, op. cit., pp. 184-185.


186. Census of India, 1921, Punjab and Delhi, Pt. I, p. 364, IOR.

187. Ibid., Pt. II, Table XXII, p. 412.


189. According to the Factories Act of 1911, as modified in 1926, a registered factory constituted those premises utilizing mechanical (steam or water) or electrical power, and employing not less than 20 persons simultaneously on any day in the year; or any premises used for manufacturing purposes, with or without the use of mechanical or electrical power, in which not less than 10 persons were simultaneously employed on a daily basis: India Acts Re-printed As Modified, 1926-28, Calcutta, 1928, p. 6, V/8/104, IOR.

190. Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Pt. I, p. 41, IOR.

191. It is possible that this figure is slightly exaggerated, as in some cases a number of factories were bracketed together, and unless it was definitely stated that they represented one concern, they were considered as separate entities. Had all the factories bracketed together been treated as single enterprises, the total number would have been 861.

192. Calculated from information contained in Punjab District Gazetteers, 1931, Industry sections - Amritsar, pp. xciv, xcvii, cii, cv, cxii; Montgomery, pp. lxxxvi-lxxvii; Karnal, pp. cviii-cix, cxii; Hoshiarpur, p. xcvii; Ambala, pp. xci, xciii; Kangra, pp. cvii, cx; Simla, p. lxxvii; Muzaffargarh, pp. lxxxviii, lxxvix; Hisar, pp. ci, cvii, cx-cri; Dera Ghazi Khan, pp. xcvi, cx; Rohtak, p. cxxii; Multan, pp. cxlvi-cxlvi, cii-cxii, cxiv, cxvii, clxv, clxvi, clxvii; Lyallpur, pp. xcvii, c, cv, cxxxiv, cv, cxxvi, cvii, cxxvi, cxxiii, cxxxiv, cxxvi, Gurdaspur, c, cxxxvii; Gujrat, pp. lxxxvii, lxxviii; Jhelum, pp. lxxx-1xxx; Gurgaon, pp. xcv, cxix; Rawalpindi, pp. xcvii-xcvii; Jhang, pp. lxxxv, lxxxvi, Sialkot, pp. cvi, cxvii, Gjranwala, pp. xcvii-xcvii, c-ci; Ferozepore, pp. cxxvi, cxxvii, cxxxv; Hisar, cii, cxxxv, Hisar, cii, cxvi, cxxvi, Mianwali, pp. lxxvii-lxxviii; Ludhiana, pp. xcv-xcv; Lahore, pp. cv-cxii; Attock, pp. lxxx-1xxx; Shahpur, pp. cii-cv; Jullundur, pp. cxiv, cxix, cxx, FBRL.

193. Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Pt. II, p. 170, IOR.

194. Roshan Lal Anand (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), Tanning Industry in the Punjab, Lahore, 1939, p. 15, FFL.

195. Ibid., Foreword, p. iii.

196. Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Pt. II, Table X, p. 179, IOR.

198. L.R. Dawar (Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry), Iron Foundry Industry at Batala, District Gurdarpur, Lahore, 1941, pp. 1, 11, 16-17, PPL.

199. Ibid., pp. 8-9, 44-45.


CHAPTER II

POLICY, PREJUDICE AND POVERTY -
THE MUSLIM RESPONSE TO WESTERN EDUCATION IN THE PUNJAB, 1849 to 1947

The spread of western education in the Punjab was a direct consequence of the annexation of the province by the British in 1849. Whilst Hindus and Sikhs exhibited a willingness to embrace the new learning, Muslims were far less enthusiastic. The roots of this phenomenon lay in the cultural confrontation born out of British paramountcy in India, and the general poverty which afflicted the Muslims to a greater degree than the other communities. For many Muslims the new educational order was a living reminder of lost political hegemony, and was regarded as constituting a dangerous challenge to their culture, society and religion. There were others, however, who though free from such prejudices were unable to bear the cost of western learning. Initially Muslim alienation and lack of opportunity was intensified by British refusals to compromise on the vital issues of religious teaching, which was forbidden in government schools, or to allow financial inducements to encourage greater Muslim participation. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, and during the first two decades of the twentieth century, however, a conciliatory approach was adopted to gain Muslim co-operation. Though it contributed to removing some of the economic barriers which inhibited greater Muslim enrolment, religious education was never sanctioned as part of the regular curriculum, as a result there remained in the community a strong seam of religio-cultural prejudice towards government learning and institutions.

To begin with British educational policy constituted a direct attack on traditional Muslim scholarship. As a result Muslims resented the new system. Up until 1849 the Muslims had controlled the indigenous education system: "As educators [Muslims] are in possession of the field; not only is the Koran taught in every mosque, but outside a great many mosques the standard Persian works are taught to all comers...." Consequently Muslim schools were recognised to be "the most genuine educational institutions in the country." In spite of these complimentary observations, however, the British clearly regarded the Muslim madrasas (schools) as an obstacle to the introduction of government sponsored western learning through the medium of government schools. Thus whilst the Director of Education in July 1857 noted that "the idea
of education is not new to the Panjabis. We find all the school phraseology ready made to our hand, and chiefly supplied by the Muhammadans", he made it clear that Muslim educationalists would not receive government support. "Certainly I find that the natural tendency of things, if left to themselves, is to throw the whole weight of Government in this matter of education on to the side of the Muhammadans - a tendency to be much resisted."  

The Director's concluding phrase revealed the official objective: the Muslim educational system was to be replaced. This development resulted from the Government's determination to establish a system in keeping with its traditions, culture and administrative needs, and which would reflect its political dominance. To achieve these ends the British were prepared to be ruthless in breaking the Muslim monopoly. The Deputy Commissioner of Jhujjar suggested in 1859 that "The evil may be gradually remedied by selecting Teachers from amongst the Hindu pupils of Tahsili school." The use of the word 'evil' to describe Muslim control demonstrated the strength of feeling behind the British strategy. The remedy seemed simple; if Muslim teachers were removed, then Islamic teaching practices would disappear with them. It was a proposal which the Director of Education supported and expanded:

"we cannot supercede them so long as they retain their popularity. District Officers, however, might prepare the way for a gradual change by encouraging more Hindus to qualify as teachers, and by appointing them to schools where the residents are not too strongly prejudiced in favour of Mahomedan instructors."  

District officials, however, employed more than persuasive measures to accomplish this goal. Government schoolmasters, zaildars, lambardars, and tahsildars, at times used intimidation to ensure that boys attended government schools rather than Muslim institutions. Furthermore occasionally persecution was directed against those who maintained indigenous and unaided schools in competition with government institutions. Leitner, the Orientalist and educationalist, quoted instances of teachers having been expelled from their ancestral villages, of a jagirdar being prevented from returning a muafi (rent-free grant of land) to an indigenous school, and of muafis being resumed on the death of teachers who left no heirs, instead of the grants being maintained for educational purposes.

Widespread resumption undoubtedly played a part in the destruction of the Muslim educational system. Leitner claimed that the majority of teachers and maulvis had been in possession of rent free grants of land. After annexation, the Province had been expected to provide revenue for
the imperial coffers; this was achieved in part by resuming rent-free lands. No distinction was made by the Government between land which had been awarded for service to the state and that granted for charitable educational purposes. The latter generally inalienable up to 1849, also had been resumed:

"it was a common custom in former times to give grants of rent-free land to persons who were bound in return to teach youth. Most of these grants...have been resumed..."

In only a few places was the continuance of such grants permitted (Sultanpur in Amritsar District, Badanath in Sialkot District, Jugraon in Ludhiana District and Lashari and Pakpattan in Gugaira District), on the condition that schools so endowed were subject to government inspection, and would "be gradually made to conform to the rules laid down." Thus loss of independence, and thereby their character, was the price demanded in exchange for their continuance.

As a result of the various measures taken by the government, there was a serious decline in pupil attendance at indigenous schools. Whereas in 1854 at least 333,550 pupils attended such schools, by 1883 their number had fallen to 135,385. This development, and especially the rôle which resumption was believed to have played in it, was counterproductive to securing Muslim participation in the government system. It was not the scale of resumption but its effect on the Muslim mind, which associated the general decline of Muslim society, especially the scholastic classes, with government policies: the National Muhammadan Association claiming in February 1882 "that these [resumption] proceedings entailed wholesale ruin on the Muhammadan community in general, and the scholastic classes in particular..."

British officialdom to justify its actions added insult to injury by denigrating the content of Muslim education. In 1881 Ibbetson, the Punjab Censor, declared "The primary education of the Musalman is confined to learning parts of the Qurán by rote, and perhaps being able to read, though never to understand it." It was an observation not confined to the Punjab; Griffith, the Director of Education for the North-Western Province, complained that in Muslim schools

"there is no mental training, nothing in fact which can be called education... The eye learns to recognise, and the hand to form the Persian characters. Words are then committed to memory; and this is nearly all the instruction that the teacher wishes to impart or the pupil to receive."

Griffith also objected to what he considered to be the highly immoral character of some of the works which were studied, referring to the "elaborate indecency of the Bahar-o-Danish...."
Only one 'Punjab' official championed the cause of Muslim learning, though he weakened his case to an extent by basing it solely on the achievements of an institution situated outside of the Punjab, and which was untypical of Muslim schools in general. Using the Deoband Perso-Arabic school as his example, Leitner described a course of education which entailed seven years of study, and included the use and consideration of works in Urdu dealing with Islam, a vocabulary in verse in Arabic, Persian and Hindi, verbal roots and conjunctions, admonitions in verse, an early letter writer with epistolary exercises, and a lexicon in Arabic and Persian. Literary pieces which were studied involved the works of famous poets, and the letters of Aurangzeb to his sons. In addition Leitner demonstrated that the sciences were not neglected, as both mathematics and medicine were studied at Deoband. Having established that Muslim schools could be genuine and efficient places of learning, he dismissed such official criticisms as voiced by Ibbetson and Griffith, attributing them to the possession of only "an elementary knowledge..." of Persian education.  

The contending arguments in this controversy appeared in part to echo the battle of an earlier age between Macaulay and the British Orientalists in Bengal, who in 1823 founded Sanskrit College, not as a bastion of Hindu conservatism or reaction, but as an educational experiment in cultural fusion. In the Punjab, however, the debate concerning the merits of Muslim education was purely academic because Muslim learning, having lost official patronage, had ceased to be of relevance. Persian had been abolished in 1837 as the language of the courts, whilst in 1864 the Central Government had ruled that only English would in future constitute the examination medium for the senior covenanted appointments. As early as 1854 the significance of the supercession of Persian by English had been apparent to the Directors of the East India Company:

"persons who possess a Knowledge of English are preferred to others in many employments, public as well as private, a very moderate proficiency in the English language is often looked upon by those who attend school instruction as the end and object of their education..."  

The introduction of English, and the importance of western education impressed a small body of Muslims. Sir Sayid Ahmed Khan (educational reformer, founder Aligarh Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College) and the British India Association of N.W.P. determined to encourage increased Muslim participation in the sphere of western education. In a letter to the Governor-General in August 1867, Sir Sayid outlined the Association's concern at the poor Muslim response to western learning, and its desire to reverse the trend:
"I would especially call their attention to the urgent necessity there is for the study of English. It is not only requisite on account of the many lucrative posts which it enables those who study it to fill, but on account of the manifold uses it confers in the daily routine of life."

Whilst Sir Sayid's advice was sound, and the rewards tempting, there were profound socio-religious considerations which discouraged the adoption of western education by many Punjabi Muslims. These were cited by Muslim critics to the Education Commissions of 1871 and 1882. Some of the commentators were of the opinion that government education was unpopular because it corrupted the manners and morals of Muslim pupils, and as a result the 'better classes' refused to subject their sons to such damaging contact. In this context they complained that western learning failed to devote sufficient attention to the cultivation of qualities inherent in traditional Islamic etiquette and culture: the reverence of God, and consideration for parents, teachers, and the aged. Consequently many of the wealthier families preferred to educate their children privately at home. This practice was also popular because the 'better-born' were usually unwilling to permit their heirs to associate at classroom level with pupils of a lower social status.

Muslim reluctance to acquire the new education, however, was not confined solely to the élite, and even in that category rejection did not always occur on account of apprehension concerning etiquette and social exclusiveness. In response to the 1871 Commission, Rahim Khan, Medical Fellow and Member of the Punjab University Senate, portrayed Muslim society as consisting broadly of three classes. These comprised the upper class including nawabs, jagirdars and rich zamindars; the middle class which included maulvis, munshis and respectable government servants; the lower class which consisted of tradesmen, e.g. carpenters, blacksmiths, etc. Rahim claimed that members of the upper and lower strata, as a rule were indifferent to the education of their children. The rich classes had no need to acquire western learning whereas the poor rejected it because they considered it essential for their heirs to acquire ancestral professions. It was only the 'middle class', Rahim contended, who "having no riches and no other profession than" that of the pen"devote their heart and soul to the education of their offspring."

Social considerations, and family and professional traditions did not pose the only obstructions to the adoption of western education. A further contributory factor was that certain means of instruction in use, namely picture books, were offensive to Muslim traditions. It was an obstacle which the Reverend Forman, "the Nestor of schoolmasters in the
Punjab", recognised and condemned. Forman had observed from Lahore to the Frontier districts the "strongest aversion among the lower classes of Muhammadans to our schools in consequence of the extent to which pictures of living objects were depicted in our books", as Islam forbade the portrayal of animate objects. As a result of Forman's criticism the Senate in June 1879 advised that such books should not be employed in Frontier schools, though their use continued throughout the remainder of the Province.

Of all the non-economic social factors, however, which contributed to limit the appeal of government education, the exclusion of religious instruction was the greatest. The Muslim members of the Punjab University Senate had bluntly stated in response to the 1871 Commission that western education would "never be thoroughly popular with the Muhammadans, as it ignores their religious teaching....". The Registrar of the University, however, refused to be drawn on the issue, stressing that the Senate "cannot advocate the introduction of religious teaching in Government Schools, as this would be infringing one of the fundamental principles of our educational system." This was in keeping with Imperial policy. The Viceroy, Mayo, in initiating the 1871 Commission had made it clear that whilst he supported the inclusion of classical subjects to broaden the appeal of government schools to Muslims, he would not permit the introduction of religious instruction. Provincial administrations in the Punjab rigidly subscribed to this view for the greater part of British rule, thereby maintaining the barriers its exclusion constituted, though by 1915 official attitudes had relaxed to the extent that religious teaching was allowed in school premises out of school hours and not as part of the official programme.

The refusal to provide for Muslim religious instruction was a symptom of the general lack of sympathy displayed by Punjab officials for the community as evinced by their reactions to the two Commissions of Inquiry of 1871 and 1882. The Provincial Government on both occasions even refused to admit that the community was educationally backward. In 1871 the Lt. Governor, Davies, claimed that "In the Punjab Proper...the Muhammadan population avail themselves of the educational opportunities offered to them to as great a degree in proportion to their numbers as the Hindu population." This statement was misleading and false as it ignored the evidence of the University Senate, which had been presented to the local government. The Senate had observed that Muslims, who accounted for 53% of the population, constituted only 38% of the total number of pupils in government village schools, 20% in government English schools, and only 5% in government colleges. It was
a state of affairs which had caused the University Registrar to con-
clude "it appears that Muhammadans do not avail themselves of the
education offered so readily as the Hindus...". Ten years later the
Provincial Government continued to display an unrealistic attitude. It
argued that "The Muhammadans are not backward in taking advantage of
the existing educational facilities", a deduction based on the fact
that total Muslim representation had increased from 35% in 1871-72 to
over 38% in 1881! This low increase, coupled with the fact that the
Muslim community had not achieved a position in education comparable to
its population ratio (51% in 1881) demonstrated that they were backward.

However inadequate the conclusions of the Punjab Government were,
the 1871 Commission which was devoted solely to examining the Muslim
position, and whose findings as far as the Punjab was concerned, drew
heavily on the views expressed by the Punjab University Senate member-
ship, revealed that the main factors behind Muslim reticence were
religious, social and pecuniary. In 1882 these views remained un-
challenged, and were incorporated in the Punjab's contribution to that
inquiry. Nevertheless the European Senate members had tended to dis-
regard the socio-religious sensitivities of the Muslim community,
whilst a majority of them opposed the provision of any financial
inducements to alleviate Muslim difficulties. The Registrar noted that
"the strongest reason alleged [for the low level of Muslim enrolment] is
the general poverty and unthrifty habits of the Muhammadan people,
owing to which they fail to secure for themselves advantages which they
would gladly accept." Although this view, as will be seen later, was
not entirely representative of the opinions of the Muslim members of
the Senate, the latter did acknowledge that poverty prevented many from
enjoying the educational facilities, and they urged that financial aid
in the form of scholarships be provided by the Local Government to
reduce the scale of the problem.

The adverse reactions of the European Senate members to the Muslim
recommendation revealed not only a lack of sympathy, but a degree of
prejudice which partly contributed to the perpetration of Muslim back-
wardness in education. Of the twelve European members, excluding the
Registrar, whose views were recorded, nine were currently serving as
civil servants, whose periods of service in India ranged from 12 to 27
years. Of the non-officials, Forman was one of the leading education-
alists in the Punjab. The majority, therefore, should have been capable
of balanced judgments. Of the total, however, only three demonstrated
any sympathy for the Muslims, six were strongly opposed to offering
financial assistance to the community, and only two questioned the
assertions of the Registrar and the Provincial Government that Muslims were not in need of any special consideration. In addition a strong current of anti-Muslim bias was apparent throughout their deliberations.\(^3^3\)

In opposing the provision for special scholarships for Muslims as requested by the Muslim Senate Members, Lindsay (Judge of the Chief Court of the Punjab) wrote, "I think such a system would give rise to much bitter feeling, and I doubt whether the result as regards Muhammadans would justify the measure."\(^3^4\) Whilst Maclagan (Chief Engineer, Public Works Department) interpreted their low attendance in Government schools as a character defect common to all:

"The Muhammadans as a rule, are more inert [than Hindus], - a smaller proportion of them rise to the higher efforts required for higher attainments, a larger proportion taking to employments which can be obtained with less learning or smaller exertion."\(^3^5\)

Griffin (Officiating Secretary to Punjab Government) even went so far as to deny that the Muslim community represented a backward class within Punjabi society, as they held a majority of 'good appointments' under the Government, and as such were not in need of any special consideration in the field of education: "They had far more than the share which, taking their numbers into consideration, might be thought their right...". Furthermore in opposing the giving of grant-in-aid to Muslim schools, Griffin revealed the depth of his contempt: "It is to throw the education of the masses into the hands of the priests, and those who advocate it should logically advocate the education of the youth of Europe being again entrusted to the Jesuits."\(^3^6\)

The tone these gentlemen adopted reflected an almost total lack of concern for the predicament of the Muslim community. In fact, Griffin's claim that the Muslims did not represent a depressed section of society, an assertion he based on their employment level in the bureaucracy was a blatant misrepresentation. Ten years after he made those remarks Muslims represented a majority in only one class of the services, accounting for 54 out of the Extra Assistant Commissioners posts, in comparison to 38 appointments held by the Hindus. Out of a total of 312 administrative and judicial appointments Muslims held only 141, whilst of the 440 positions which included executive and assistant engineers, assistant surgeons, professors and headmasters, and forest rangers, Muslims accounted for only 168.\(^3^7\) In addition to which in 1872 even Pearson, the Registrar, had openly admitted that Muslims constituted a minority in the services, particularly with regard to those appointments where a knowledge of English was required:

"When we come to departments where English is necessary,
the Hindu has the advantage, and consequently... if the average salary of the two were calculated, that of the Hindu would be found far the highest, because English work receives, as a rule, higher remuneration."

The absence of concern displayed by the European Senate members was also complemented by ignorance of which the following case is but one example. C. Boulnois (Judge of the Calcutta Court of Small Causes) offered a novel explanation for Muslim failures in English education. He stated that "For an Indian Muhammadan to acquire English really well would draw largely on an imitative faculty which their customs seem to me to discourage." Presumably it had not occurred to him that Muslim custom required prayers to be spoken in a foreign language (Arabic) which, to the vast majority, necessitated the exercise of considerable imitative ability! It seems almost inconceivable that Boulnois' point of view was conveyed unchallenged to the Provincial Government, but its inclusion is indicative of the superficial way in which Muslim difficulties were often treated in the Punjab.

In fact only two European Senate members were inclined to admit that Muslims were in need of special help, which they believed could be provided through scholarships. Melvill (Commissioner of Rawalpindi) believed that such a provision was desirable and just, but only in so far that it would equip Muslims for Government service. T.E. Brown, a Government surgeon, adopted a similar stance. He argued that by granting special scholarships specifically for the study of English, Muslims would be better equipped to compete in those areas of the service where a knowledge of the language was required. In advocating this approach Melvill and Brown were in a minority of two, and their views were not even considered by the Registrar who, in presenting his report, dismissed the idea of providing scholarships specifically for Muslims: "if a number of additional stipends were specifically given for their benefit, the holders would not do anything worth the outlay."

In making this comment the Registrar reflected the majority opinion of his European colleagues. The reasons for their general prejudice, especially regarding the Muslim character, had both political and social origins. It occurred in part, according to Leitner, from misconceptions concerning the Muslim role in the Mutiny, although by the 1870's and '80's it seems to have been engendered to a greater extent by the belief that Islam and degeneracy were synonymous. It was an opinion clearly expressed by Ibbetson in the Punjab Census of 1881:

"It is curious how markedly for evil is the influence which conversion to even the most impure form of
Mahomedanism has upon the character of the Panjab villager; how invariably it fills him with false pride and conceit, disinclines him from honest toil...when we move through a tract inhabited by Hindus and Musalmans belonging to the same tribe, descended from the same ancestor, and living under the same conditions...[we] find that as we pass each village, each field, each house, we can tell the religion of its owner by the greater idleness, poverty, and pretension, which mark the Musalman..."\(^4\)

Also the opposition to offering grants-in-aid, so forcibly expressed by Griffin, was in keeping with earlier British policy. As late as 1881, and in spite of the decline which had occurred in indigenous education, 40% of the total number of pupils in the Punjab were enrolled in private institutions, the vast majority of which were controlled and attended by Muslims.\(^4\) It is not surprising that the provincial administration, of which Griffin was a senior member, should be unenthusiastic about aiding a system which continued to command a formidable following in the Province, and whose monopoly it was the purpose of British policy to undermine. Thus although the University Senate on 27 January 1872, had approved the establishment of Muslim aided schools, the activity was limited to the Rawalpindi Division, and did not include the provision of such grants to established institutions.\(^4\) Political considerations of a communal nature were also voiced in opposition to the adoption of pecuniary measures to aid the community. Although only two European members of the Senate, Lindsay and Griffin, proffered this objection, Griffin's position as Secretary to the Government gave it weight. The latter contended, "I believe it is impolitic and certain to lead to after embarrassment...to stimulate the education of one class at the expense of any other."\(^4\)

In presenting the opinions of the European Senate members to the Imperial Government, both the Registrar and the Provincial Government were at pains to establish that Muslim education in the Province was being conducted along the lines suggested by the Viceroy at the time of the Commission's appointment, and as a result no further measures were necessary. In July 1872 the Registrar pointed out that in accordance with viceregal policy "the principle of promoting the cultivation of the vernaculars and of the study of oriental classics has from the first been maintained by the Senate...\(^4\) whilst the appointment of Muslim teachers in English schools had not been overlooked. As a result, the Lt. Governor could safely, if erroneously, claim in February 1873 that "The suggestions of these gentlemen \(^\text{Members of Senate}\) for the encouragement of Muhammadan education show that no special action is necessary on the part of the Government." Furthermore, in support of
these views Griffin assured the Imperial Government that the Hindu and Muslim members of the Senate were unanimous "as to the absence of all just complaint with the Government system of education" in the Punjab.49

Griffin's assertion, however, was spurious. The Registrar and the local government had conspired to engineer Muslim evidence to suit their purpose, and had rejected such Muslim recommendations which were at variance with their own point of view. Thus in presenting their case the Muslim Senate members on 8 July 1872 had pointed out that they had been compromised with regard to the scope of their criticism:

"As it is the desire of Government not to make any alterations in the subjects of education, but only to amend the mode of education, we therefore confine our remarks to the latter; otherwise, we would have expressed our opinion at more length on all points connected with the improvement of education."

In the event they recorded their approval of the British system's treatment of the English, Arabic and Persian languages, recognising the importance of English education in particular, but they tempered this with a strong plea to the Government to recognise the general poverty of the community, and to provide pecuniary assistance in the form of grants-in-aid and scholarships to encourage the recruitment of Muslim pupils.50

The validity of these observations was further reduced by the fact that they represented a second, and muted, appraisal. The original memorandum, presented in April 1872, had been decidedly critical. As previously stated, the Muslim Senate members deprecated the absence of religious instruction in government schools, and the government's reluctance to give financial aid for their co-religionists. In fact they had made a specific request for the appointment of teachers of all denominations to cater for the pupils' religious needs, and for the provision of stipends for Muslims in all government schools. In addition they regretted that the study of 'Oriental Classics' had been designated a subordinate position to western learning, claiming that it would not encourage the learned classes to support the British system. Defending Oriental studies they argued that to pass the lowest oriental examination at the Punjab University College required infinitely more study than to take the B.A. degree at Calcutta University. They laid stress on the high standards set by Indian scholars and added, "to consign native scholars, many of whom could teach the most eminent European Orientalists, to a position of inferiority is neither just nor expedient."51

Moreover the original memorandum had been accompanied by statements supporting to various degrees the criticisms and recommendations it contained, which had been contributed by representatives of three sections
of Muslim society - religious, academic, and journalistic. The Sunni Maulvis, whose views were recorded, and Muhammad Latif, the editor of the Anjuman-i-Punjab, recommended the immediate introduction of religious study, stressing that the government system would remain unpopular amongst Muslims so long as it was omitted. Latif even urged that special Muslim schools should be established in which instruction in the Koran would be permitted, and that the Fiqah and Hadis should form part of the curriculum in all government schools. Conversely Muhammad Khan, the academic, though he supported the demands for special pecuniary measures to aid Muslims, did not press for the introduction of religious study. Though he conceded that its exclusion was responsible for the rejection of government learning by "the lower order of the community", he was confident that the "enlightened members" would enrol their children if special stipends were available in government schools and colleges.

The Muslim members of the Senate and the other Muslim commentators therefore had two main complaints with the existing system - the exclusion of religion and the absence of financial assistance. Both were an anathema to the Government, whilst all the views expressed denied the official claim that Muslims supported and were satisfied with the education available. In addition Muslim pleas for financial aid constituted a serious challenge to the views of the majority of the European Senate members, that such consideration was unnecessary. In short the Muslim contribution to the proceedings constituted an embarrassing analysis which the administration preferred to ignore. Their evidence was therefore rejected on two specific counts. That of the Muslim Senate members was refused credence because the Lt. Governor regretted that it "has been submitted in such a form as to deprive it of much of the weight to which it would naturally be entitled...", i.e. it had not been signed by the individual commentators. Whilst the supporting statements were ignored because they represented "The anonymous production of certain gentlemen unconnected with the Senate...and, though they may contain some suggestions worthy of consideration...no weight can be attached to any such communications..." because "the request of the Government was merely for the opinion of the members of the Senate...".

These reasons proffered by Griffin on 26 April 1872 were far from satisfactory. In the first place the Registrar had assured him that the April memorandum of the Muslim Senate members did represent their genuine feelings, and had been compiled by Leitner from the reports of
"frequent discussions upon this subject in the Executive Committee of the Senate..."[^55]. In considering why it had been unsigned, Griffin had complained that the Lt. Governor was unable to understand why any 'native gentlemen' should be unwilling to append their signatures to views recorded by them. The reason, however, was obvious. To express opinions totally out of favour with the Government would court the displeasure of the Lt. Governor, whose prerogative it was to sanction privilege and forward opportunity. This was partly borne out by Leitner, who attributed the Muslim commentators' reluctance to sign to the fact that "so strongly, if erroneously, did the Muhammadan community believe itself under the disfavour of Government, that its most prominent members gave me their views...with the injunction not to mention their names."[^57] In dismissing the independent Muslim statements which had been submitted in support of the Muslim Senate members' views, one cannot deny that the Government was within its rights to reject opinions it had not sought. Nevertheless it was a short-sighted and unrealistic move in view of the fact that Griffin had admitted the possibility that they merited consideration. Also not all the statements had been anonymous as he claimed. Latif and Rahim Khan had signed theirs, and the latter was a member of the Senate, which Griffin evidently 'overlooked' when he stated that they were all unconnected with that institution.

It is evident that the opinions were rejected on account of their content and not their presentation. Griffin's plea that the memorandum of April 1872 would have received attention if signed[^58] cannot be accepted as the signed memorandum of July 1872 which succeeded it, had also been disregarded and largely misinterpreted. This lack of consideration was synonymous with the fact that the Provincial Government determined not to concede that the Muslim community was backward or in need of special consideration and assistance. This attitude continued to govern provincial educational policy throughout the following decade and a half. Thus in response to the Commission of 1882 the Punjab Government remained rigidly attached to the position it had adopted in 1872, refusing to consider the introduction of special measures to assist the Muslim community.[^59]

By the early 1880's, therefore, as a result of a combination of government policy, and Muslim conservatism and poverty, an impasse had been reached regarding Muslim participation in government education. The position was to alter within the following decade. This was the result of a change in Central Government policy and the social and political re-awakening within Muslim society. The former resulted largely from
the attitude of Dufferin, the new Viceroy, and the recommendations of the Hunter Commission (1882), both of which were out of sympathy with the Punjab's stance. The Government of India and the Viceroy in particular had begun to view with alarm those middle-class, Hindu dominated political organisations, such as the three Presidency Associations (Calcutta, Bombay, Madras) established in 1851-52, which coalesced in 1885 to form the Indian National Congress. Official opinion from the mid-1880's grew increasingly suspicious of their aims, believing that they were committed to undermine British rule in India. Hence Dufferin's willingness to appear sympathetic to the Muslims betrayed a desire to use that community as a counterweight to the Hindu controlled Congress. As for the movement for Muslim renewal, it was the result of a determined effort on the part of the Muslim educated elite to confront Government with the dilemma facing their co-religionists. This concern found expression at the national and provincial levels through the endeavours of the National Muhammadan Association and the Anjuman-i-Islamia.

Dufferin, at the outset of his viceroyalty, had assured the Muslim leaders of Western India that he would consider the representations which had been submitted to his predecessor by the National Muhammadan Association in February 1882. The Muslim leaders through the memorial had sought to impress upon the Government the deteriorating state of Muslim education. The serious decline in their opinion was the result of the resumption proceedings, the supersession of Persian by English, and the order of 1864 which ruled that English alone would constitute the examination medium for the more coveted government appointments. Whilst the 1882 Commission, which considered the memorial as part of its examination of education in general, did not admit the Association's charges, it adopted a conciliatory and constructive attitude towards Muslim education. In spite of the Punjab Government's assertion that no change was necessary, the Commission under the chairmanship of W.W. Hunter, made a number of recommendations designed to reconcile Islamic cultural needs with western education. Although it was adamant in its opposition to the introduction of religious instruction, it urged that provision be made for Persian to be taught in middle and high schools situated in Muslim majority areas. The Commission further recommended that indigenous Muslim schools should be liberally encouraged to introduce purely secular courses in their curricula; it advised an increased employment of Muslim inspecting officers, and the establishment of normal schools to train Muslim teachers. In addition it recommended that a graduated system of special scholarships for Muslims should be
established and that in all classes of maintained schools a proportion
of free studentships for Muslims should be reserved for the community.
Furthermore, to prevent Muslim claims for assistance being overlooked,
the Commission suggested that for the purpose of departmental reports
the community should be treated as a special class requiring assistance.

These provisos, which received full support from the Viceroy, made
it extremely difficult for the Punjab Government to maintain its
previous uncompromising attitude. Dufferin in 1885 declared that he
attached 'special importance' to the recommendations concerning the
treatment of Muslims as a special class. According to the Viceroy "a
liberal provision of scholarships..." was essential to attract Muslims
into the realms of higher education, and he cautioned that "their wants
must not be overlooked in the framing of any general scheme of scholar­
ships for any Province...". This directive completely rejected the
Punjab Government's position as enunciated by the Lt. Governor to the
Commission of 1882: "It is not for the Government to confer special
privileges upon any one class of its subjects when they have failed to
avail themselves of the opportunities freely offered to all.".

The publication of the Commission's findings and recommendations in
1883, together with the sympathetic attitude of the Viceroy, spurred
Muslim leaders in the Punjab to take positive steps. In 1885 the Anjuman
-i-Islamia was founded in the Province, to promote the dissemination of
western learning and religious instruction amongst Muslims, especially
the poorer classes. On 3 January 1887 the Anjuman submitted a
memorial to Aitcheson, the Lt. Governor. It was a skilful piece of work,
which refrained from recrimination and prejudice. It appealed for the
Lt. Governor's aid; the memorialists assured him that they had no
sympathy for those who blamed the Government for the Muslim plight,
claiming that it was due as much to their own apathy as to other causes.
They emphasised that they did not seek assistance as a special privilege,
but as a community which had erred and was in need of help. In spite of
some increase in Muslim attendance in English schools, the Anjuman
stressed that the community remained backward because of its general
poverty, which posed the main stumbling block to their further partici­
pation in education. Finally it astutely reminded Aitcheson of the
Commission's recommendations that "nothing short of special scholarships
would enable the Muhammadans to keep up with the wealthier sections of
the community." Whilst soliciting financial assistance for the community,
the memorialists pointed out that the Governments of Bombay, Bengal, and
Madras, in compliance with the Commission's advice, had already inaugu-
rated schemes to provide pecuniary aid for the Muslim community. The tactful presentation of the problems by the Anjuman had the desired effect. In February 1887 Aitcheson sanctioned the establishment of special awards, known as 'Jubilee Scholarships' for the encouragement of education amongst Muslims. Of these 14 were to be awarded annually on the results of the 'Entrance', 'Intermediate', and Bachelor of Arts examinations of the Punjab University. In addition 44 Jubilee Scholarships of Rs. 4 per mensem were to be awarded annually on the results of the middle school examinations, to be tenable in high schools. Half of these awards were to be given to those Muslim candidates who had been successful in the vernacular examination. The scholarships were of two years duration, though in the case of students desiring to study English they were extended to four years. District and municipal boards were also authorised to grant Jubilee scholarships to the value of Rs. 2 per mensem tenable in middle schools, to Muslim boys, on the result of upper primary school examinations in each district. In addition by 1890 one half of the free scholarships awarded in secondary schools, and one half of the half-fee places available in those institutions and colleges, were reserved for Muslims.

By the end of 1898, 264 Jubilee scholarships had been instituted, 20 in colleges and 244 in schools. The change that had occurred in provincial thinking on the subject of Muslim education and financial assistance was evident from the fact that inspecting officers held the unanimous opinion that the awards, together with fee concessions enjoyed by the community, were essential for its continued progress. Moreover other financial inducements were provided by the local government to encourage Muslim enrolment. These included Zamindari, Open, Victoria and College scholarships. By 1900, 44 high school Victoria scholarships were available to Muslims, though with the creation of the N.W.F.P. as a separate province in 1901, the number was reduced to 35. As from the beginning of the 1914-15 financial year the Provincial Government decided that Victoria, together with Open and Zamindari Scholarships would be paid from provincial revenues at the rate of Rs. 6 per mensem, the last two classes of awards being open to members of all communities. Zamindari scholarships, however, by virtue of the fact that they were reserved specifically for agriculturists, were of great benefit to Muslims who constituted the majority of that class.

Six Open scholarships were also assigned to each district, with the exception of Simla which received two. Also one Zamindari scholarship was allotted to each district, and by 1914 the distribution of Victoria scholarships followed the same pattern. In addition, by 1913 the
Local Government annually awarded 32 College scholarships on the results of the matriculation examination, 15 of which were reserved for Muslims. The value of each was Rs. 10, plus full payment of fees, and they were valid for a 21 month period.

The Anjuman-i-Islamia had played a prominent role in pleading the cause for such measures. Its activities, however, were not limited solely to lobbying the Local Government: it attempted to further Muslim educational activity through the founding of institutions of its own. The Education Report of 1889-90 recognised the part played by Muslim gentlemen and societies in promoting western education. Of these the Anjuman emerged as, and remained the most important Muslim organisation in the Punjab engaged in that work. Its philosophy was to promote western education, but not at the expense of Islamic learning, seeking to provide a programme to accommodate the two. Its main ambition in pursuing that objective was to promote educational parity between Muslims and non-Muslims, especially the Hindus, and thereby provide employment opportunities for the members of the Muslim community.

The Anjuman started by founding an upper primary school for boys in 1886, catering for 191 pupils. In 1888 'middle' classes were introduced, and in 1889 'high' classes were added. By 1912, the number of students numbered 2,149 which warranted the division of the school into two institutions. In addition the Anjuman maintained a number of primary and religious schools for girls, one Anglo-vernacular middle school for girls, and the Hamidia school, established with the object of spreading advanced Arabic learning and the training of Muslim missionaries. In keeping with the Anjuman's policy, these institutions adopted a course of study which, whilst imparting secular instruction in accordance with the official departmental curricula, also catered for the religious needs of the pupils. The institutions were highly efficient, as a result of which they were recognised by the Department of Education and the University, and District Board scholarships were made tenable to them. The Anjuman, however, neither applied for, nor accepted grants-in-aid until 1907, by which time it required financial assistance. The needs of the body had outgrown the funds which it collected privately, and which were no longer sufficient to finance its educational projects.

The Anjuman's most ambitious undertaking concerned the founding of Islamia College in 1892. To begin with it comprised Intermediate Arts (F.A.) classes. In 1900 B.A. and M.A. courses were started, the latter devoted solely to the study of Arabic. At that time the college had an attendance of 104 students. By 1912 it had been extended considerably: it possessed a hostel accommodating approximately 140 boarders,
library, a main block consisting of 16 lecture rooms, four science laboratories, and a hall. It was served by a staff of 11 (Principal, five professors, two readers and three maulvis) and had 200 scholars on its rolls. Despite these extensions it was not large enough to meet the increasing demands placed upon it. Between 1910 and 1914 the number of students had doubled, and it was estimated that by the 1920's the college would have to make provision for 1,000 places. Expansion on this scale was considered essential by the College Committee to enable Muslims to rectify the deficiency they experienced in the realms of higher education, for in 1912 the community accounted for only 527 of the 2,539 students enrolled in the Arts Colleges of the Punjab University.

The Committee's ambitions entailed an expenditure programme which could only be met by seeking government assistance, or to an extent by increasing fees dramatically. The latter was not feasible in view of the Anjuman's aims to provide education for the poorer sections of Muslim society. As Fazl-i-Husain (the Honorary Secretary, Islamia College Committee), pointed out, the general poverty of the community required that fees be kept as low as possible. Thus the Committee refused to increase the existing scale of charges which stood at Rs. 4 per month in Intermediate Arts classes and Rs. 5 per month in B.A. classes. Besides the cost involved in the basic expansion of the college, the Anjuman was also anxious to promote further enrolment through the provision of eight merit scholarships to the total value of Rs.98 per month, and to provide free scholarships for 15% of the total number of students in each class. Also it proposed to continue to provide the Rs.200 it paid each month in small stipends to poor students, "such stipends being generally only just sufficient to cover...college fees."51

In an attempt to realise these aims, the Committee, through Fazl-i-Husain, sought the assistance of the Provincial Government in April 1914. It requested a maintenance, as well as a building grant. The former was for Rs.18,000 a year to be increased after 1916 to Rs.40,000 per annum. In respect of the latter, Rs. 8 lakhs were solicited to be given in three instalments; 2 lakhs in 1914, and two equal sums of 3 lakhs in 1915 and 1916. In addition the Government was also asked for technical assistance in the surveying of the Shadara site and the construction of the buildings. In penning these requests Husain argued that it was the Government's duty "to help the Mussalmans to regain lost ground in the educational race", especially as the Anjuman's institutions had consistently maintained a high record of discipline, and "unflagging
loyalty to the Government." Also Husain suggested that the granting of aid would achieve a reciprocal end, in that it would benefit Muslims, and thereby assure the Government of their continuing support and loyalty: "it will prove a source of strength both to the Government and the Muhammadan community." \(^{82}\)

The Punjab Government's response was sympathetic. O'Dwyer the Lt. Governor agreed in April 1914 that the proposed expansion was necessary to meet the growing demand of Punjabi Muslims for higher education. But any pecuniary help from the Government was made contingent on the Muslim contribution towards meeting a reasonable proportion of the costs involved. In addition, more crucial conditions were stipulated. The College accounts were to be properly audited, and initially the recurring grant would be given for three years only; its periodic renewal being "subject to the working of the College being proved to be satisfactory not only as regard educational results, but in respect of the tone and discipline of the institution". The most significant condition the Government imposed, however, was that the College Committee would not be free in the matter of appointing staff: "new staff shall be subject to the approval of Government." \(^{83}\) If the Committee accepted these conditions, which amounted to a considerable degree of government control over the College, the Government of India was prepared to make a grant of Rs.25,800 towards the initial cost of the scheme, and an annual allocation of Rs.30,000 for the College. \(^{84}\)

The demands made by O'Dwyer represented a strategy in keeping with Imperial policy. In April 1911 the Viceroy, Hardinge, had directed Harcourt Butler (Education Member, Gov.General's Council) to maintain contact with those Muslim leaders, concerned to accept government control being exercised over the proposed institution. \(^{85}\) This was considered essential in order to prevent educational institutions causing the Government political embarrassment. Thus, when in 1900 the Secretary of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, Mohsin-ul-Mulk, had re-organised the Urdu Defence Association in retaliation against Macdonnel's (Lt. Governor N.W.P. 1895-1901) Hindi resolution, the latter had been able to force Mohsin-ul-Mulk to abandon his protest under threat of the withdrawal of the government grant from the College. \(^{86}\) For although theoretically Aligarh represented a private venture, in practice Government patronage assured its continuance. \(^{87}\)

Fazl-i-Husain was deeply suspicious of permitting any measure of government control, \(^{88}\) but financial considerations overrode his personal objections. In April 1915 the College Committee by seeking the Provincial Government's approval for the appointments of M.Hamid Khan as
Professor of Biology and M. Muhammad Shafi as Professor of Arabic and Persian, demonstrated its willingness to abide by the Government's stipulations. This pattern was thereby established for future College-Government relations.

Regardless of the Government's determination to limit the independence of the College Committee, the establishment of the College by the Anjuman represented the height of Muslim endeavours and achievement in the promotion of western education in the Punjab. In terms of simple numbers, however, the College could not hope to compete with those institutions which had been founded for the advancement of the Hindu and Sikh communities. By 1914 Islamia College had approximately 300 students in attendance, by comparison the D.A.V. College had an enrolment of 1,000 students, whilst the Dyal Singh College catered for 400 students, the Khalsa for between 200 and 400, and the Hindu College for approximately 100. In fact private Muslim enterprise never equalled that of the non-Muslim in the field of education. The Education Report for 1923 maintained that the general poverty of the Muslim community prevented it from exhibiting the same degree of enterprise in establishing communal schools as was displayed by the other communities. Thus out of a total of 311 private Anglo-vernacular middle and high schools for boys which had been established throughout the Province by 1933-34, only 58 (18.63%) were managed by Muslims. In comparison 134 (43.09%) and 74 (23.79%) were run by Hindus and Sikhs respectively. By 1946, excluding those institutions managed by the University and the Government, of the 16 colleges situated in Lahore, only three were controlled by the Muslim community. Similarly of the 40 privately managed high schools, only 13 were in Muslim hands.

The contribution which private Muslim institutions could make, therefore, was limited. The 1923 Education Report recorded that in that year the additional Muslim enrolment which had occurred had been almost entirely in government schools. This clearly represented the norm. In 1927-28, 45,003 Muslims were enrolled in government and private institutions in the Ambala Division, of whom only 7,557 attended the latter. Similarly in the Rawalpindi Division 147,650 Muslims were in receipt of both types of instruction, but only 3,525 of these were registered in private schools.

These figures demonstrate not only the comparatively low numbers which were involved in the private sector, but that the earlier prejudices and reservations which had posed a barrier to Muslim participation in government schools were breaking down. Progress had been gradual but constant, and seems to have begun in the early 1890's.
During the academic year 1891-92, the figures clearly show that the number of Muslims receiving English education had started to increase significantly. In secondary schools there had been an increase of 10%, mainly at the Anglo-vernacular level, whilst in arts colleges the improvement had been over 13%. In spite of this progression, however, Muslims remained backward in comparison to Hindus and Sikhs. In the case of government school attendance, only one in 17 Muslim boys and one in 88 Muslim girls of school-going age attended. By comparison one in nine Hindu boys and one in 22 Hindu girls were enrolled, whilst one in eight Sikh boys and one in 56 Sikh girls were receiving government instruction.  

During the first two decades of the twentieth century the number of Muslim pupils in government schools increased dramatically from 67,665 in 1900 to 164,982 by 1919-20. These developments reflected the community's awareness of the necessity for western education, and were in part also a response to the changed attitude of the Punjab Government, whose earlier hostility and contempt towards the community had under Central Government prompting given way to concern and encouragement. Even so, though scholarships reflected the Government's change of heart, and had played a part in making western education more accessible, their scope was limited by the relatively small numbers they affected. The significant factor in encouraging greater Muslim participation was the Government's determination to reduce the prohibitive economic barriers which continued to restrict Muslim involvement, through the revision of the fee system.

During the 1880's pupils in government English schools were charged fees in relation to their parental income. The lowest grade of charge being for an income of below Rs.25 per mensem, the highest for income in excess of Rs.200. Fees were prescribed accordingly in the various classes of primary, middle and high departments; the lowest being two annas, rising to six annas per month for pupils studying English, whilst the highest fee charged was Rs. 5 in high departments. In vernacular schools the rate varied according to locality, though the sons of agriculturists who contributed to the 1% agricultural cess received free education. In contrast non-agriculturists were generally charged one anna per month in primary schools and from one to two annas in middle schools. In the Ludhiana district, however, there was a fixed rate for each class rising from one to four annas in primary schools, and five to six annas in middle schools. In English schools run by missionaries, fees were charged, but there was no uniform rate, and in aided vernacular schools no charges were made.
The change in Local Government policy, which had resulted in the granting of scholarships to Muslims, prompted a re-assessment of the fee system. In February 1889 the Provincial Government sought the approval of the Government of India for the abolition of fees at the primary level, as an inducement to encourage greater agriculturist participation. The Viceroy, Lansdowne, responded by offering no more than tacit approval. He sanctioned only a temporary suspension, insisting that free education would not be appreciated. The local government, however, chose to ignore the Viceroy's caution, and the temporary measures became a permanent feature of provincial educational policy which preceded by 17 years a similar move by the Government of India.

The Central Government did not seriously consider following the Punjab's example until 1906, by which time it regarded it "both as a form of relief to certain classes of the community akin to the reduction of taxation, and as an educational measure intended to remove an obstacle to the spread of primary education." Not unnaturally the Punjab Government supported the move and the philosophy behind it. Despite this in March 1910, lack of funds forced the Government of India to shelve the scheme. This did not have an adverse effect in the Punjab where, as a result of the policy adopted in 1889, agriculturists' children, and those of village kamins (menials) continued to enjoy exemption from fees in all five vernacular primary classes. In addition, though similar concessions did not apply in the upper primary classes of Anglo-vernacular schools, there only half rates were levied in the case of agriculturists, and by 1911 50% of all places in all secondary classes were reserved free of charge for pupils whose parents were unable to meet educational expenses. This concession also applied to the children of teachers in recognised schools whose salaries did not exceed Rs.30 per mensem.

The introduction of the fee concession principle led officers at the district level in the Punjab to seek a wider application. In January 1914 the Deputy Commissioner for Jhelum urged the Provincial Government to extend similar benefits to Muslims studying in English schools in his district. In making this request he pointed out that although the community, which was mainly agriculturist, represented 88% of the local population, as a result of its general poverty it accounted for only 27% of the pupils in the high, 34% in the middle, and 40% in the upper primary departments of English schools. In order to rectify the position he suggested that though "No concession can be made to Muhammadans as such...concessions may be made to them as agriculturists."
The Provincial Government readily agreed. In March 1914 it sanctioned a fee reduction for agriculturists; in high departments half rates were to be levied, whilst in middle and upper schools the class would be required to meet only three-eighths of the charges. The following month the Mianwali district was included in the scheme, and Godley, the Director of Education, asked the Commissioner of the division, Popham Young, to give his views for an even wider application of the concession to include Attock and Shahpur: "these being also districts containing a large number of Muhammadans who are educationally backward." Popham Young agreed, but he proposed a more generous application of the concessions to include the entire tract between the Indus and Jhelum rivers, excluding urban areas, as "Poverty and all the causes which make for backwardness in education..." were manifest throughout the region. Godley responded favourably, sanctioning a uniform levy of fees at half the ordinary rate for agriculturists attending secondary and upper primary classes in all government and Anglo-vernacular schools, to take effect from 1 April 1914. As a consequence of this decision District Officers between 1914 and 1916 sought and obtained similar benefits for agriculturists in the districts of Gujrat, Dera Ghazi Khan and Muzaffargarh.

Though the scheme was aimed at agriculturists, it had been engineered by Godley and Popham Young specifically to benefit Muslims. By the 1930's it had been expanded to the extent that Muslims enjoyed 50% fee concessions in all Anglo-vernacular schools, and in the secondary departments of all the schools in the Province. There is no doubt that these fee reductions acted as a tremendous inducement in encouraging the enrolment of Muslims in government schools. The Education Reports for 1932-33 and 1933-34 bear testimony to this. Both claimed that without them there would have been a considerable decrease of pupils at the primary and middle stages of Anglo-vernacular schools.

In addition to fee concessions, the Provincial Government adopted other measures to increase Muslim participation. These included the employment of Muslim teachers in their home localities, by instituting training units in conjunction with high schools in remote parts of the Province (e.g. Kot Adu in Muzaffargarh, Taunsa in Dera Ghazi Khan, Pasrur in Sialkot and Dharamsala in Kangra), and by admitting Muslim students from backward areas on special terms to receive Anglo-vernacular training at the Central Training College, Lahore. Also in the 1920's, '30's and '40's efforts were made at co-ordinating the instruction in village schools with the actual needs of the rural population, thereby making education more relevant. Syllabuses were enlarged to cater for
gardening, rural pursuits and village account keeping. The Government, as well as offering inducements to promote participation, also employed a measure of compulsion, but it met with little success. The Primary Education Act of 1919 had established the principle of compulsory education for boys of all communities at the primary level. As applied in the Punjab, however, the Act represented a paradox, for it was admitted by the Education Report for 1924-25 that it could only succeed on a voluntary basis, with the villagers rather than local bodies enforcing the measures. In essence, its main purpose was to ensure that pupils who were enrolled at the primary level, completed that stage of their education, rather than securing the attendance of all boys of school-going age. The Government had baulked at employing it to achieve the latter, believing that it would not be worth the cost involved. In retrospect it proved largely unsuccessful in attaining even its limited aim, for although it met with success in urban areas such as Lahore and Amritsar where a measure of enforcement was possible, ensuring that 93% and 94% respectively of boys of school-going age were in attendance, in the Province as a whole its achievements were far less spectacular. By 1934-35, 2,982 areas were subject to compulsion, but in the majority of these, the leakage of pupils at the primary level was as bad as in non-compulsory areas, the reasons being that the process of law was too slow and contained too many loopholes to achieve enforcement; litigation was prohibitive; and punishments were ineffective.

Government action concerning provincialisation, however, certainly forwarded the cause of Anglo-vernacular education, and was of great benefit to Muslims in particular. It was adopted as official policy in 1922 thereby relieving District Boards, many of which were impoverished, of the expense of maintaining high schools, thus enabling a concentration of finance on expanding Anglo-vernacular middle schools. This in turn enabled the brighter pupils in the rural areas to complete high school courses, free from the handicap which had previously existed as a result of their ignorance of the English language. Grants were provided to aid the process, based on the needs and resources of each district, which was graded in accordance with this principle. Initially a rich district received 50% of its approved additional expenditure in the form of maintenance grants, whilst poor and backward districts received between 50% and 90% of the necessary expenditure. By 1936-37 the districts of Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Simla were graded at 100%; Kangra, Attock and Mianwali at 90%; Rohtak, Gurgaon, Sialkot, Muzaffargarh and Dera Ghazi Khan at 80%; Hissar, Ludhiana and Lahore at 70%; all the remaining districts had a grade of 60%, except Lyallpur which was graded at 50%.
As early as 1927, Leitch Wilson (Inspector of Schools, Rawalpindi) claimed that provincialisation and the subsequent encouragement of Anglo-vernacular education had conferred benefits especially on the Muslim population,\(^\text{125}\) by making Anglo-vernacular learning more accessible to them.

The granting of concessions, especially in respect of fees, whilst they went some way in alleviating the financial problems which faced Muslims, did not eliminate them. The absence of full fee concessions at the secondary and higher levels inevitably caused Muslim numbers to diminish. In an attempt to offset this disability and improve Muslim prospects Fazl-i-Husain introduced a limited scheme of reservation. Husain had been appointed the Province's first Minister of Education in 1921 under the system of dyarchy established by the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918, and the subsequent Reforms Act of 1919, whereby education in common with other subjects - public health, public works, local self-government and agriculture (but not land revenue) - were transferred from central control to Ministers responsible to the Provincial Legislatures.\(^\text{126}\) The Muslim Minister used his position to ensure that the small Muslim attendance at the highest levels of education would not be reduced still further through open competition. In November 1921 and in 1922, \(40\%\) of the admissions to Government College, Lahore, and the medical schools in Lahore and Amritsar, and the Central Training College for teachers in Lahore were reserved for Muslims.\(^\text{127}\)

The use of reservation, as a means of assisting Muslim education, was not widely applied in the Province, and thus the advantage which it offered the community was limited. It was bitterly resented by the vast majority of the non-Muslim members of the Legislative Council, who under the leadership of Raja Narendra Nath attempted unsuccessfully in March 1923 to move a censure motion against the Education Minister.\(^\text{128}\) Its lack of success did not diminish the Raja's opposition. He continued to oppose the reservation principle as a member of the Auxiliary Committee of the Indian Statutory Commission appointed in 1929 to consider the education question.\(^\text{129}\) Narendra Nath claimed that such a measure would result in class rivalries and jealousies, and would hinder the realisation of responsible government, as envisaged by the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.\(^\text{130}\) Despite this objection the Auxiliary Commission supported the reservation principle and advised the Provincial Government to consider carefully reserving places for Muslims in those publicly managed institutions in which it was not possible to admit all applicants. The Punjab Government, which was keenly aware of the dangers of
communal preferment, declined this advice, though it did so on other
grounds. It argued that the measure was not needed in any school in the
Province, as the number of Muslim pupils had risen from 159,791 in 1917
to 516,831 by 1927.131

This increase, however, had occurred primarily at the primary level
as a consequence of the provision of free education. The Punjab quin­
quennial report on education ending 1921-22 recorded that the Muslim
community was in the lead regarding the aggregate number of pupils under
instruction in all types of institutions, the Muslim total being 241,743
as compared to 212,005 for Hindus and 76,376 for Sikhs. This represented
an increase of 42.3% for Muslims, 19.6% for Hindus and 47.7% for Sikhs,
during the five years under review.132 By 1924-25 Muslims accounted for
50% of all primary school pupils, which represented an overall increase
of 7% from the 1919-20 period, when Muslim pupils in primary schools had
numbered 116,722 out of a total of 272,478. By 1935-36 the Muslim per­
centage at the primary level had dropped slightly to 48%, and from then
until 1945 it remained constant at 47%. At the middle and high levels
of secondary education, however, Muslim percentages, in comparison to
their primary position, dropped sharply. The Education Report for 1919-
20 demonstrated that only 34% of all pupils in middle schools were
Muslims. Their position had improved only slightly by 1944-45, when the
community contributed 39% of middle school participants, and although
they achieved 41% in 1930-31, and 39.5% in 1936-37, the figure remained
fairly constant at either 38% or 39% in the period up to 1945. With
regard to high schools, in 1919-20 Muslims comprised only 31% of the
total number of pupils on the rolls, dropping to 28% by 1924-25, though
Muslim enrolment had increased slightly by 1930-31 when it stood at 29%.
During the succeeding years up to 1945, there was only a minimal
improvement, Muslims representing 32% of pupils receiving high school
education in this period.133

In respect of those Muslims willing to enrol their children in
government schools, it is evident that poverty and not prejudice
prevented a similar level of participation at the higher, as at the
primary level. Also, this poverty explains to an extent why Muslim
enrolment was not even higher at the primary stage, despite the incent­
ives which were offered. Throughout the 1930's and '40's poverty
continued to be cited in provincial education reports as a crucial
factor in preventing greater Muslim involvement.134 In the 1939-40
Report, the Inspector of Schools for Rawalpindi wrote that the community's
backwardness was "mainly due to its appalling poverty in the countryside...", and he stressed that substantial relief was still required in the
form of fee remissions, and the provision of free books and writing materials. Even so, such methods could only help those Muslim families who were in a position to allow their children to attend schools. In many of the poorer agricultural families children constituted an integral part of the economic unit, and could not be spared. An economic inquiry conducted in the mainly Muslim village of Bhadas in Gurgaon District in 1936 observed that the offspring of tenants were employed, as soon as they were old enough, in tending cattle and with cultivation generally. This was especially important in those areas where the cost of hired labour could not be met. The survey concluded that whilst the tenants were often not in a position to pay school fees, the children in any case, because of the vital contribution they made to the family's finances, could not be allowed to attend school. These observations were applicable to all poor agriculturists throughout the Punjab, the majority of whom were Muslims.

Though poverty continued to be of paramount importance in limiting Muslim participation, other factors also contributed: Muslim conservatism, apathy, the prevailing economic depression and unemployment were all cited by the Education Report of 1937-38. Parental indifference, the scattered population in rural areas, and the fatalistic attitude of the community also played a part in limiting the Muslim response, as did the belief held by many cultivators that government education would make their sons unfit for agriculture. Although this prejudice was cited by Godley in 1912, as a reason for Muslim non-participation, its relevance in the 1930’s was recognised by Waheed who in a work on the evolution of Muslim education published in 1936, argued that Indian Muslims who were mainly agriculturists, had totally different educational needs from the urban intelligentsia for whom the English educational system had initially been devised. The Government was evidently aware of this problem, for in the 1930’s, as has been stated, it introduced an agricultural bias into rural education in the form of kitchen gardens and village and farm accounting.

Of all the social factors, as opposed to purely economic ones, which prevented a wider acceptance of the Government system, religious considerations remained the most obdurate. The Government of India for its part recognised that the issue had to be resolved, and showed a willingness to relax the views which it had held previously concerning purely secular education. Although Curzon in 1904 had re-affirmed the Central Government's commitment to maintaining an exclusively secular system, this philosophy was challenged by the findings of the Allahabad Educational Conference of 1911. Of the nine Directors of
Education whose views were recorded, five (Coverton - Burma; Hallward - E. Bengal and Assam; de la Fosse - U.P.; Kichler - Bengal; and Wright - Central Provinces) recognised the demand for religious instruction. Whilst practically all of the other commentators, both Muslim and non-Muslim, with the sole exception of R.N. Mudholkar, were favourably disposed to the introduction of religious learning. Mudholkar's reservation resulted from the fact that the establishment of a school at Amracti, combining instruction in the principles of Hinduism with education suitable for modern requirements, had subsequently contributed to religious reaction and political propagandism. None of the other speakers who contributed to the debate (Maulvi Syed Shams-ul-Huda, the Bishop of Lucknow, Masani, Gokhale, Pandit Sundar Lal, Mudhava Rao (previously Dewan, Mysore), Arundale (Central Hindu College), Subramani Aiyar, Nawab Abdul Majid, Zia-ud-din Ahmed, Rev. Golland, Rev. Dr. Ewing), however, supported this view or opposed religious education in government schools. Although de la Fosse recognised that problems did exist in limiting the use of religious learning:

"The public are of opinion that moral instruction must be based on religious sanctions. But religious instruction to be effective must be dogmatic, and this stood in the way of any general adoption of such teaching in public schools."

Against this, Maulvi Shams-ul-Huda stressed that the Muslim community "greatly felt the need of direct religious instruction though they also appreciated the difficulties of Government." Nevertheless he predicted "If religious instruction is insisted on English education will become more popular with Muhammadans."144

Godley's contribution to the proceedings was in part confusing. He stated that in secondary schools religious teaching was given by various bodies, Christian, Muslim and Hindu, whilst in Board primary schools, such instruction was absent, though moral instruction was given both by example and the study of set text books.145 In respect of his statement concerning secondary schools, religious instruction was not permitted in Government schools until 1915, and then only out of school hours.146 Presumably the Director of Education was referring to those secondary schools which were outside the Government fold. With regard to moral instruction, this type of learning, not based on any religious ideology, was an integral part of the Curzonian plan.147 It is clear that its conception was prompted by the desire to provide an acceptable substitute for religious instruction to meet the concern for the teaching of personal behaviour and responsibility, but free from theological conceptions.
The Allahabad Conference examined this medium and found it wanting. Richey (Director of Education, N.W.F.P.) declared that in his Province it was impossible to divorce moral from religious instruction, and Ewing (Principal, Forman Christian College, Lahore) observed that moral teaching by means of special textbooks was impossible. Both these opinions reflected the feelings of the majority of headmasters and school inspectors in the Punjab, who were highly sceptical of the value of this type of instruction, though this was not revealed by Godley to the Conference. Moral instruction in the Province was provided through the medium of a set of reading books prepared by Holroyd (Director of Public Instruction 1868-1891). These contained much information, which seemed to have little relevance to personal morality, e.g. the study of animals, their structure, habits, utility, etc. Only those in use in the upper primary and lower middle vernacular classes directly inculcated love of parents, loyalty to the Government, charity, punctuality, industry, honesty, etc. Moral readers in Anglo-vernacular high departments continued these themes under such headings as 'My Duties', 'Duties to Self', 'Others' and 'God'. Only in denominational schools were sacred books (the Bible, Quran, etc.) used to impart moral tuition, and the Anjuman-i-Islamia accepted the responsibility for the circulation of such literature in Muslim schools. In Christian Mission schools, teaching was denominational also, though such schools, so it was claimed, were usually "careful, while basing their instruction on the Bible, to teach only such principles as are generally acceptable" to all. Despite the official questioning of the value of moral instruction given in government schools, the Anjuman-i-Islamia favoured its continuance, though it stressed that it would be more effective if based on religious doctrines. It was a timid stance which the Anjuman adopted, but it clearly preferred to have half the cake than none at all!

Though Godley refrained from criticising the principle of moral teaching, the obvious disillusionment expressed by other speakers at Allahabad, notably Richey, de la Fosse, Gokhale and Ewing, impressed the Government of India with the need to re-examine its position regarding religious instruction. In September 1911 all the Provincial Governments were invited to consider the problem. In February 1913, the Viceroy, Hardinge, in referring to the Allahabad discussions, observed that the most thoughtful minds in India lamented the tendency of the existing system of education to develop the intellectual at the expense of the moral and religious faculties. Hardinge was sympathetic to their views, and urged a re-thinking of the secular doctrine declaring that he hoped that enlightened opinion and accumulated experience would provide a
practical solution to what was unquestionably "the most important educational problem of the time". That he did not go further in promoting this theme resulted from what he termed the necessity of the Government of India to maintain a position of complete neutrality in matters of religion. By openly recognizing the problem and the dissatisfaction with official religio-educational policy, however, Hardinge had revealed the willingness of the Central Government to reconsider its previous stance.

This development clearly influenced events in the Punjab. In 1915 the Local Government decided to allow religious instruction in government schools, on the understanding that it would be conducted out of school hours, and only if requested by parents. Also the cost involved was not to be met from public funds. The Government of India was satisfied with the Punjab's decision, and in 1921 it urged all local governments to adopt a similar policy, subject to the same conditions, arguing that it was of "the opinion that the embargo which hitherto had been placed on the introduction of religious instruction in publicly managed schools may be removed." In 1929 a Committee presided over by Sir Philip Hartog (Member of the Public Service Commission), which had been appointed by the Indian Statutory Commission to review the growth of education in British India, recommended that a more positive policy should be adopted regarding religion and education, particularly in the case of Muslims. It reasoned that the educational backwardness of that community was the result not only of its general poverty, but also reflected the Muslims' preference for religious instruction. It urged those provinces where Muslim educational progress was impeded by religious difficulties not to leave religious teaching solely to private institutions, as the latter generally had achieved very little in raising educational standards. Rather, the Committee advised that Provincial Governments should secure sounder education for Muslims by catering for their demand for combined religious and secular education. Thus the Hartog Committee advocated a more thorough integration than that proposed by the Government of India in 1921, or as employed in the Punjab from 1915 onwards. Only one member of the Committee, Raja Narendra Nath, objected to the proposal, complaining that it would yield to the sentimental conservatism of the Muslims. The Raja, however, had long been an opponent of any preferential treatment being given to Muslims in the field of education, and his stance reflected his continued communal pre-occupation.

The Punjab Government did not adopt the Committee's advice, preferring to continue the policy introduced in 1915. Its policy in educational
matters continued to be dictated by the fact, that throughout the 1920-46 period, education officials persistently viewed Muslim backwardness in economic terms, acknowledging the religious aspect mainly as being of only minor importance. Thus although in 1937 the official Punjabi attitude towards religious education relaxed slightly, this was confined only to one district in the Multan Division. In 1937 the District Board, encouraged by the Multan Inspector of Schools, sanctioned Rs.1,000 as payment to mullahs to give religious instruction in government schools after school hours. The innovation proved an unqualified success, in so much as the district alone was responsible for approximately two-thirds of the total increase of pupils which occurred throughout the entire Division in 1938-39.

This was proof indeed of the beneficial effect which could be produced by catering for Muslim religious sensibilities, and also of the constraining effect which the absence of religious instruction continued to exercise in the field of education. It is apparent from Education Reports compiled during the last ten years of British rule that this policy was never expanded to include the entire Province, and Muslim politicians and educationalists in the 1940's continued to stress the need for religious instruction in schools. In an address to the All-India Muslim Educational Conference held at Agra in December 1945, Liaquat Ali Khan (secretary, All-India Muslim League) claimed that any educational scheme which ignored religious teaching would fail to appeal to Muslims. Four years before this, Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf, in presenting a case for the need for religious instruction, had quoted Iqbal as saying that Muslim education must be grounded on the "rock of religious and moral principles..." Though Ashraf himself was of the opinion that both the Quran and Hadith should be interpreted in the light of modern knowledge. Similarly F.K. Durrani who, as a member of A.I.M.L.'s Education Committee, was clearly a spokesman for the League, appealed for religious teaching in conjunction with modern education. Though he cautioned that most religious instruction was a relic of the Muslim imperial age, "and not until it emancipates itself from that tradition will it be able to make any contribution to the revival of Islam." He desired that all Muslim pupils should be instructed in the basic tenets of their faith and religious duties, but without permitting any interference in scientific studies, claiming that there was no such thing as an Islamic viewpoint on the study of chemistry, physics, and the other sciences.

The ideas expressed by both Ashraf and Durrani were free from bigotry, both regarded the role of religion as complementing rather than
opposing the acquisition of secular knowledge. Yet their treatises (Al-Minhaz - The Evolution of Curriculum in the Muslim Educational Institutions of India and A Plan of Muslim Educational Reform), both of which were published in Lahore, failed to influence Government thinking on the matter. The majority Muslim Government in the Punjab, following the Unionist victory in 1937, failed to accommodate more fully Muslim sensibilities on the religious instruction issue, or expand the successful Multan experiment. Several reasons for these failures are apparent. The Unionist Party was a multi-communal coalition. Its continued existence depended on the pursuit of policies that the minority communities within it, who held the balance of power in the legislature, would not object to. The Government could not risk a repeat of the 1923 episode when Fazl-i-Husain had faced a censure motion, because it was believed he was favouring Muslims at the expense of the other communities. Secondly, and more significantly, the education question never developed into a major issue of contention in the Legislative Assembly. Because questions in the Assembly on the communal composition of the services, and the inferior position of Muslims, proved a grave embarrassment to the Unionist Government, Sikander Hyat Khan, the Premier, introduced a convention in 1938 whereby no Minister would answer any question likely to result in communal misunderstanding or embitter communal feelings. This resulted in the practical exclusion of communally orientated debates, a development which narrowed considerably the scope for the introduction of 'educational' and other disputes involving communal comparisons. Lastly, as has been stated previously, in spite of the Hartog Committee's recommendations, Muslim participation continued to be viewed by education officials in general in the light of economic, rather than religious, considerations. Thus no pressure was placed upon the Government, from Muslim M.L.A.s or officials to accept a change of emphasis, and introduce religious instruction in Government schools as part of the curriculum.

The cumulative effect of the Government's failure in this respect, and the persistent poverty of the community, was that Muslims remained the most educationally backward section of Punjabi society. In no sphere of education was this more apparent than at the university level, as is demonstrated in Appendix F. Of the students who graduated in 1938, 1939, 1941, 1943 and 1944, Muslims accounted for only 27%, 26%, 38%, 24% and 38% respectively. The comparatively high percentages recorded in 1941 and 1944, however, are misleading, as in both years the records were incomplete, and this tended to exaggerate the Muslim position. (If one compares the graduate percentages for the years under
review, with those for Muslims attending degree courses in Appendix F it is clear that performance and enrolment percentages correspond approximately for all the years other than 1941 and 1944.) In respect of the degrees taken, Muslims, on account of their cultural heritage, were more attracted to the Arts, particularly Arabic and Persian, than the Science disciplines. The Punjab Gazette for 1941 recorded that out of 2,499 successful B.A. candidates, 725 (29%) were Muslim. In the same year, of the 193 B.Sc. candidates who graduated in April and 44 who graduated in November, only 26 (13%) and three (6.8%) respectively, were Muslims. Similarly in 1944, of 2,731 B.A. and 366 B.Sc. graduates, Muslims accounted for only 678 (25%), and 50 (14%) in each class. Furthermore Muslims were backward in other scientific disciplines. In 1939 Muslims received only 42 (28%) of the 151 Medical, and eight (20%) of the 39 Agricultural Science degrees awarded in that year. The figures for 1941 revealed a similar low performance. Of the 117 Medical degrees, only 37 (32%) went to Muslim recipients, whilst in 1945 the Muslim share decreased further: Muslim students received 23% (45 out of 193) of the Medical, and 36% (38 out of 104) of the Agricultural Science degrees.

The Punjab University provided the most advanced form of education available in the Province, and potentially, the highest reward in employment terms. The failure of the Muslims to enjoy the former, or compete for the latter in greater numbers, reflected their backward position regarding post-secondary education in general. As all pupils, regardless of community, advanced from one stage of learning to the next, their numbers obviously diminished as a result of the selective process. With regard to Muslim pupils and aspiring scholars, however, their numerically inferior position at the secondary stage was depleted even further at the high school and particularly at college and university levels. Financial factors certainly influenced this process, particularly since the expense of education became more demanding at each successive stage of learning. But there is little doubt that lack of incentive also played a crucial part in limiting Muslim participation in the higher spheres of education. Advanced levels of instruction were largely the reserve of the economic élite, thus the lack of Muslim students cannot be explained purely in financial terms, as there existed in the Punjab - as in Bengal - a wealthy land-owning Muslim class capable of financing their offsprings' careers to the highest level. In general, however, this class remained indifferent to higher education. They were not subject to the same economic pressure which caused those of a professional background to seek education as a means of guaranteeing future
economic stability, having placed their reliance on the possession of land. Also they did not exhibit the desire to acquire knowledge for its own sake to the same degree as the members of other communities.

Nevertheless, it is remarkable, considering the social and economic disadvantages which Muslims were subjected to, that they participated to the extent to which they did. The indigenous system of learning which the community had developed and controlled prior to annexation, and which had catered specifically for their socio-religious needs, had been attacked, undermined and largely replaced. Furthermore it had been succeeded by a code of education which many sections of Muslim society found offensive, and which the vast majority could not afford. In addition its supersession had been perpetrated by rulers who, to begin with, not only displayed open contempt for Islamic learning, but who were unsympathetic towards the community's needs and difficulties. Muslim participation, limited though it was, had been prompted by various considerations. There was the economic pressure on the land, which caused some to seek alternative avenues of employment through education. In addition social pressures existed, resulting from the endeavours of Muslim societies concerned with the propagation of western education in drawing attention to the disadvantages the community experienced, as compared to other communal groups, by abstaining from government education. In the final analysis, however, the fact that Muslims participated at all owed as much to their realisation of the necessity of western education for the advancement both of the individual and the community as a whole, and the willingness of many Muslims to set aside religious and social objections to achieve those ends, as to the earnest endeavours of some British officials to remove and reduce some of the economic barriers which had previously prevented a very considerable number of the community from achieving their educational ambitions.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

2. Ibid., p. 59.
3. PER, 1859-60, pp. 27-28, L/P&J/3/1157, IOR.
4. PER, 1860-61, p.15, E2VII, IOR.
7. Ibid., p.145.
11. Griffith to Elliot, 30 Aug. 1871, Selections from the Records of the Govt. of India, Correspondence on the subject of the Education of the Muhammadan Community in British India and Their Employment in the Public Services, Calcutta, 1886, pp.192-193, H1(7), PGSL. (Hereafter referred to as Correspondence on Muhammadan Education)
13. The aim of the College's founder, H.H. Wilson, had been to preserve Hindu classical and scientific learning, whilst providing opportunities for scholars to study European disciplines. See D. Kopf, The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Muslim Mind, Princeton, 1979, p. 47.
16. Court of Directors (East India Company) to Governor-General, 19 July 1854, PEP, Oct. 1867, Vol.24, pp.39-40, IOR.
17. Memorandum by the British Indian Association (N.W.P.) to Governor-General, 1 Aug. 1867, PEP, Oct. 1867, Vol. 24, p.43, IOR.


32. C.R.Lindsay, Judge, Chief Court of the Punjab, entered service 1844; Col. R. Maclagan, Chief Engineer, Dept. of Public Works, entered service 1860; L. Griffin, U.Sec., Punjab Govt., entered service 1860; P.S. Melvill, Commissioner, Rawalpindi, entered service 1846; T.E.D. Brown, Surgeon, entered service 1858; J.W.Smyth, Deputy Commissioner, Lahore, entered service 1858; R.E. Egerton, Financial Commissioner, entered service 1849; J.G. Cordery, Deputy Commissioner, Lahore, entered service 1856; C. Boulois, Judge, Calcutta Court of small causes, n.d.: India Army and Civil List, July 1869, p.23; India Office and Civil Lists, July 1872, pp.2-4, 7, 82, 244; July 1873, p.5, IOL.

33. See Opinions of European Senate Members, Punjab University College, enclosure, Pearson to Offg.Sec., Punjab Govt., 8 July 1872, PEP, Feb. 1873, Vol.137, pp.86-88, 92-93, IOR.

34. Opinion of C.R. Lindsay, ibid., p.86.

35. Opinion of R. Maclagan, ibid., p.87.

36. Opinion of L. Griffin, ibid., p.87.

37. Young, Sec., Punjab Govt. to Sec., G. of I, Home Dept., 19 April 1883, Correspondence on Muhammadan Education, p.291, H(17), PGSL.


41. Opinion of T.E. Brown, ibid., p.86.

42. Registrar's Report to the Executive Committee, ibid., p.82.

43. G.W. Leitner, op.cit., p.53.

44. Census of India, 1881, Punjab, Pt.I, pp.103-104, IOR.


47. Opinions of C.R. Lindsay and L. Griffin, ibid., pp.86-87.
48. Registrar's Report to the Executive Committee, ibid., p.80.
52. Opinions of Sunni Maulvis on Education and Khazis, and Memorandum by Muhammad Latif, enclosure, Pearson to Offg.Sec. to Punjab Govt., 17 April 1872, PEF, April 1872, Vol.136, pp.284, 286, IOR.
54. Griffin to Pearson, 26 April 1872, PEF, April 1872, Vol.136, p.292, IOR.
55. Pearson to Griffin, 17 April 1872, PEF, April 1872, Vol.136, p.283, IOR.
56. Griffin to Pearson, 26 April 1872, PEF, April 1872, Vol.136, p.282, IOR.
57. G.W. Leitner, op.cit., p.53.
58. Griffin to Pearson, 26 April 1872, PEF, April 1872, Vol.136, p.292, IOR.
60. For information on formation of Congress see S.R. Mehrotra, Emergence of the Indian National Congress, Delhi, 1971, Ch. IV.
65. Ibid., pp.505-507.
68. Fazl-i-Husain, Hon.Sec. Islamia College Committee, to Godley, U. Sec., Punjab Govt., Education Dept., 4 March 1914, PEF, April 1919, Vol.9432, pp.3-4, IOR.
69. Memorial of the Anjuman-i-Islamia to Aitcheson, 3 Jan. 1887, PEF, Feb. 1887, Vol.2915, pp.4-7, IOR.

71. PER, 1899-1900, p.86, E2VI, IOR.

72. Ibid.

73. The allocation of these awards was based on the distribution of the Muslim population; the Divisions of Lahore, Multan and Rawalpindi received 14, 11 and 10 respectively: PEP, June 1902, Vol. 6311, p.54, IOR.

74. Godley to Divisional Commissioners, Punjab, 29 Aug. 1913, PEP, Oct. 1913, Vol.9180, p.33, IOR.

75. Godley to Registrar, Punjab University, 8 May 1913, PEP, Sept. 1913, Vol.9180, p.15, IOR.

76. Godley to Divisional Commissioners, Punjab, 29 Aug. 1913, PEP, Oct. 1913, Vol.9180, p.33, IOR.

77. Amendment to Articles 155 and 156, Punjab Education Code, Gazette Notification, 26 May 1913, PEP, May 1913, Vol.9180, pp.61-62, IOR.

78. PER, 1889-90, p.86, E2VI, IOR.


80. Fazl-i-Husain to Godley, 4 March 1914, PEP, April 1914, Vol.9432, p.3, IOR.

81. Ibid., p.3-4, 17.

82. Ibid., p.19.

83. Godley to Fazl-i-Husain, 6 April 1914, PEP, April 1914, Vol.9432, p.20; Godley to Sharp, Cffg. Joint Sec., G. of I, Education Dept., 10 July 1914, PEP, July 1914, Vol.9432, p.8, IOR.

84. Sharp to Godley, 18 Aug. 1914, PEP, Aug. 1914, Vol.9432, pp.8-9, IOR.

85. Hardinge to Harcourt-Butler, 9 April 1911, Butler Collection, EUR. MSS. F.116/65/68, IOR.

86. S.M. Iqram, Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan, Lahore, 1959, pp.65-66.


88. See Fazl-i-Husain to Godley, 4 Oct. 1914, PEP, Oct.1914, Vol.9432, p.28, IOR.

89. Fazl-i-Husain to Godley, 26 April 1915, PEP, May 1915, Vol.9695, pp.5-6, IOR.

90. Fazl-i-Husain to Godley, 4 March 1914, PEP, April 1914, Vol.9432, pp.4-5, IOR.

91. PER, 1922-23, p.74, E2VI, IOR.

92. PER, 1933-34, p.110, E2VI, IOR.


94. PER, 1922-23, p.74, E2VI, IOR.

95. PER, 1927-28, pp.118-119, E2VI, IOR.

96. PER, 1891-92, pp.92-93, E2VI, IOR.
97. PER, 1899-1900, pp.84-85, E2VI, IOR.
98. PER, 1919-20, p.49, E2VI, IOR.
100. MacDonnell, Sec. G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. to Governor, Punjab, 13 July 1889, PEP, Jan. 1891, Vol.3844, p.16, IOR.
104. Amendments to articles 203, 203-A and 204, Punjab Education Code, Gazette Notification, 30 Nov. 1911, PEP, Dec. 1911, Vol.8667, pp.5-6, IOR.
105. Wilson Johnston to Popham Young, Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division, 22 Jan. 1914, PEP, May 1914, Vol.9432, p.6, IOR.
106. Godley to Popham Young, 19 March 1914, PEP, May 1914, Vol.9432, p.8, IOR.
107. Godley to Popham Young, 18 April 1914, PEP, May 1914, Vol.9432, p.8, IOR.
108. Popham Young to Godley, 28 April 1914, PEP, May 1914, Vol.9432, pp.8-9, IOR.
109. Godley to Popham Young, 21 May 1914, PEP, May 1914, Vol.9432, p.9, IOR.
111. Godley to Inspector of Schools, Multan Division, 17 April 1916, PEP, April 1916, Vol.9919, p.13, IOR.
112. PER, 1935-36, p.87, E2VI, IOR.
113. PER, Quinquennium ending 1936-37, p.116, E2VI, IOR.
114. PER, 1933-34, pp.105-106, E2VI, IOR.
115. PER, 1927-28, p.11, E2VI, IOR.
116. PER, 1933-34, p.19; 1938-39, pp.101-102, E2VI, IOR.
117. PER, 1924-25, pp.14-15, E2VI, IOR.
118. PER, 1931-32, p.4, E2VI, IOR.
119. PER, 1929-30, pp.4-5, E2VI, IOR.
120. PER, 1927-28, pp.8-9, E2VI, IOR.
121. PER, 1933-34, p.19; 1938-39, pp.101-102, E2VI, IOR.
122. PER, 1925-26, pp.14-15, E2VI, IOR.
123. PER, 1926-27, p.100, E2VI, IOR.
124. PER, 1937-38, p.129, E2VI, IOR.
125. PER, 1926-27, p.104, E2VI, IOR.
127. Memorandum on the communal composition of the Services in the Punjab and other provinces, pp.6-7, S.&G.4003/1933, I/S&G/7/30, IOR.


130. In support of the last point Narendra Nath quoted from the Montagu-Chelmsford Report (para. 231), which stated that it had reluctantly acquiesced over the introduction of communal electorates, and it had condemned any further extension of the communal principles. Minute of dissent by Raja Narendra Nath, Review of the Growth of Education in British India by the Auxiliary Committee of the Indian Statutory Commission, Delhi, 1929, C.Vol. X, 1929-30, IOR (Hereafter referred to as the Hartog Commission.)


132. PER, Quinquennium ending 1921-22, p.138, E2VI, IOR.


135. PER, 1939-40, p.111, E2VI, IOR.

136. F.C. Brayne and Shiv Dyal, Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry, An Economic Survey of Bhadas: A village in the Gurgaon District of the Punjab, Lahore, 1936, p.67, PPL.

137. PER, 1937-38, pp.125-126, E2VI, IOR.

138. PER, 1935-36, p.87, E2VI, IOR.


140. A. Waheed, op.cit., p.78.

141. PER, 1933-34, p.19, E2VI, IOR.

142. G. of I., Indian Educational Policy, Calcutta, 1904, p.25, (1)2887/1, IOR.

143. The conference resulted from the desire of H.W. Orange (Director-General of Education, G. of I.) to encourage an exchange of views between provincial Directors of Education and other officials and non-officials interested in education. It convened at Allahabad under the chairmanship of Harcourt-Butler (Ordinary Member, Gov. Gen's Council) at the beginning of 1911, the proceedings being of an informal nature: Selections from the Records of the G. of I., Education Dept., No. ccxxlviii, Papers regarding the Educational Conference, Allahabad, Feb. 1911, Calcutta, 1911, Preface, SIVL 9457, S.O.A.S. Lib. (Hereafter referred to as the Allahabad Conference).


145. Ibid., p. 15.

147. See G. of I., Indian Educational Policy, Calcutta, 1904, p.25, (1) 2887/1, IOR.


149. PER, 1909-10, pp.23-26, E2VI, IOR.


151. G. of I., Indian Educational Policy, 1913, Calcutta, 1913, pp.4-5, (1)2287/2, IOR.


156. PER, 1937-38, p.126, E2VI, IOR.

157. PER, 1938-39, p.102, E2VI, ICR. Mohammad Ishaq claimed incorrectly that the district was responsible for two thirds of the total Muslim enrolment which occurred throughout the entire Province: M. Ishaq, 'Islamic Religious Instruction in the Schools of the Punjab and Bengal in the British Period', Ph.D. Thesis, London University, 1956.


161. Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 10 March 1938, p.668, V/9/3471, ICR.


166. Calculated from information contained in Punjab Government Gazette, Part III-A, 1941, pp.26, 102-104, 326, 348, PGSL.

CHAPTER III

THE STRUGGLE FOR MUSLIM EMPLOYMENT IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

The general educational backwardness of the Muslim community was reflected in the low level of appointments held by Muslims in the Provincial Public Services, which included the Provincial Civil Service (P.C.S.) and the Indian Civil Service (I.C.S.). It was a serious failing considering that government officials, as the administrators of British India, enjoyed more than a little power, influence and prestige, as well as significant financial rewards. Thus Muslim leaders, drawn mainly from the educated élite, determined to reduce the disadvantages their co-religionists experienced in securing posts for them in government service. They strove to persuade the Provincial and National Governments to adopt recruitment procedures whereby appointments would reflect the population status of the Muslim community as a whole (56% in the Punjab, 25% in British India) rather than the academic ability of the contesting candidates. In short they sought to increase the Muslim share of government appointments through nomination and reservation, rather than by the existing system of competition and selection, both of which reflected academic achievement. Their efforts began to achieve concrete results from the mid 1920's onwards. To begin with, however, the Punjab and Central Governments had adopted a cautious approach in attempting to accommodate Muslim demands, though gradually they conceded the validity of the Muslim argument. In the late 1930's and the 1940's, however, the situation in the Punjab was complicated by the necessity of the Muslim-dominated Unionist Government to maintain a multi-communal coalition in order to retain its majority in the Legislature. It was forced to refrain from overt communal acts, and although the Ministry did facilitate an improvement in the level of Muslim participation in the Provincial Services, it was not proportionate to their population status. Even so by the 1930's and 1940's the overall Muslim position in the Provincial Services and the I.C.S. had improved, largely as a result of the petitioning by the Muslim élite, and the responses of the Provincial and National Governments. In analysing the factors which controlled, and the measures which promoted Muslim employment, the enquiry cannot be limited solely to the 1936-47 period, especially as recruitment to the Provincial Services and the I.C.S. from all the communities, had been subject to practices and rules established prior to that period.
As early as 1867 Sayid Ahmed Khan (1817-98, educational reformer, founder of Aligarh Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College) had urged his co-religionists to equip themselves educationally to secure service under the British. Whilst in 1882 the National Muhammadan Association of Calcutta, in view of the paucity of Muslims enjoying government employment, had petitioned the Viceroy, Ripon, to introduce measures to increase Muslim representation. The views of the Provincial Administrations were sought in respect of this request. The Punjab Government responded by dismissing the plea, claiming that the Muslims, who numbered 12½ million as compared to 8½ million for Hindus and Sikhs in the Province, "have their full share of high uncovenanted appointments...." In support of this claim the Provincial Government produced the following figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appointments</th>
<th>Muhammadians</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extra Assistant Commissioners</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahsildars</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munsiffs</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents of Settlement</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Administrative and Judicial Appointments</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive and Assistant Engineers, Public Works Dept.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Surgeons</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professors and Headmasters, Education Dept.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Rangers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In effect the Local Government's assertion rested solely on the fact that Muslims accounted for 54 of the 92 Extra Assistant Commissioners. In every other branch of the services, however, Muslims had failed to achieve a percentage of posts to equal those held by Hindus, or proportionate to their population status. The Punjab Government was careful to absolve itself of responsibility. It placed the onus squarely on the educational backwardness of the community, commenting that in branches requiring special and technical knowledge (e.g. public works, medical and educational) Muslims lacked the necessary qualifications, and therefore they accounted for only an "insignificant minority" amongst government employees. Furthermore the Local Government insisted that the Muslim position of inferiority did not result from any anti-Muslim bias on its part. In order to substantiate its analysis, it pointed out that even in those professions which were independent of government control, Muslims because of their educational failings were in the minority: out of 154 pleaders registered in the Province only 27 were Muslims, the remainder being Hindus.

It was a convincing argument. Yet the view had persisted in Muslim circles that the community's initial low share of government appointments resulted not from an inferior educational standard, but because it
had been penalised for the rôle it played in the 'Mutiny' of 1857. "A Punjabee" claimed that Muslim numbers in the services started to decrease after 1857, though he qualified this statement by observing that "a few far-seeing British officers realised that the administration was passing rapidly into Hindu hands", as a result of which the Provincial Government attempted to increase the Muslim intake, compatible with educational requirements. At least one British official, writing in 1882, testified to the existence of British resentment towards the Muslims: Leitner cited the Education Department in the Punjab as exhibiting anti-Muslim "prejudice" in respect of appointments, but he insisted that the reaction represented only a temporary phase.

Thus though prejudice had undoubtedly played a part in limiting Muslim participation in government service, its effect had been short-lived. By the 1880's the crucial factor which persisted in aggravating the Muslim predicament was the fact that the majority of the Muslim elite had failed to acquire western learning, particularly a knowledge of English. This was affirmed by Holroyd (Director of Education 1869-91) in 1883:

"This [paucity] is due neither to favouritism of any kind, nor to want of intellectual power or of physical energy on the part of the Muhammadans...but simply to the fact that so few Muhammadans are available who have received an English University Education."

Holroyd's explanation appears justified in that although Muslims were in a minority in all but one branch of the Provincial Services, they had been admitted to those senior uncovenanted posts for which stringent educational qualifications were not required. Until the late 1870's the appointment of Extra Assistant Commissioners had occurred solely on the recommendations of High Court Judges and Financial Commissioners. Persons so appointed were required to pass examinations only after nomination. Also in respect of this rank, and that of Tahsildar and Munsiff, a knowledge of English was not required, though candidates for the last two posts had to pass the prescribed examinations.

Despite the barrier which the education factor posed to increased Muslim involvement the Central Government, in considering the representations of the National Muhammadan Association, refused to exempt Muslims from the examination process. In respect of appointments which occurred through patronage, however, it suggested that Muslims should enjoy preferential treatment in those provinces where they held only a small number of appointments, in order that they could gradually achieve their full share of state employment. In the communally charged atmosphere of the Punjab, however, such a suggestion was fraught with
problems. Communalism was endemic in the 1880's and by 1900 it had become the dominant feature in the Province. Even so the Lt.Governor, Lyall (1887-92), was sympathetic to the Muslim case and he desired to improve it. When therefore the Anjuman-i-Islamia in 1887 raised the matter of the under-employment of Muslims in government offices, Lyall conceded that appointments should reflect the respective proportions of Muslims and Hindus amongst the middle and upper classes (landowners, merchants, shopkeepers), from which recruitment mainly occurred. But he refused to introduce rules for proportional representation in the services. Sensible of the communal repercussions his actions could engender, he secretly requested all Departmental Heads, Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners to "assign a due proportion of appointments to Muhammadan candidates" so far as was compatible with the best interests of the service and the availability of qualified men. Also in 1888 the Punjab National Muhammadan Association was encouraged to prepare and circulate a list of qualified men amongst Departmental Heads, whilst the Rafiq-i-Hind undertook to publish vacancy notices free of charge. Lyall's initiative, however, and the actions of the Muhammadan Association and the Rafiq-i-Hind, achieved no dramatic results.

During the following ten years the situation remained unchanged. It was this stagnation coupled with continuing Muslim discontent which prompted Thorburn (Financial Commissioner) in 1899 to advocate Government action to secure a higher proportion of Muslim officers. Though he recognised that educational backwardness had militated against Muslim prospects, he suggested a formula whereby Muslims would be required to possess adequate qualifications to gain admission to the services, but would be free from open competition with candidates from other communities. This was to be achieved by reserving a percentage of ministerial and gazetted appointments for members of the community. The Provincial Government acted on Thorburn's advice. In 1900 it was decided that four (36%) out of every eleven appointments to the Judicial Branch would be conferred on Muslims, and the following year the Local Government decreed that in all the districts except Kangra and Simla "should less than 30 per cent. of the ministerial appointments be filled by Muhammadans or more than 70 per cent. by any one class." These directives, however, to prevent any sectarian repercussions remained confidential.

Even so by the turn of the century the reservation principle had been established in the Province. During the following 25 years it was extended, though largely as a means to protect rural or agricultural interests, especially those of the zamindar community, against
competition from urban Hindus. The Provincial Government, in common with the Government of India, regarded the rural classes, especially in the large zamindars as their principle source of political support. In order to strengthen this relationship the Punjab Government promoted a blatant paternalistic policy to promote zamindar rights; one of its objects being to drive a wedge between the rural masses on the one hand and the urban elite and the Congress Party on the other. In short, provincial policy was intended, in the words of W.R. Wilson (D.C.Jhelum), to create a "Junker" class for the protection of British interests. This principle was also applied to the public services, in that the Government intervened following the First World War to regulate recruitment to the advantage of the zamindar community, by limiting the need for them to compete against the more highly educated urban Hindu elite. The war provided the Local Government with the opportunity to initiate such a policy, in that in appointing a committee in 1918 to consider zamindar representation in the services it stressed that "The response of the rural classes throughout the province to the call for recruits during the war gave emphasis to their claims for greater representation in the civil services...."

Both the committee and the Provincial Government agreed that the zamindar's share of appointments should be increased. In justifying this decision O'Dwyer, the Lt. Governor, again cited the military contribution of the class, but he sought to strengthen even further their claim for greater employment by emphasising the important rôle it played in the affairs of the Province. He pointed out that 90% of the Punjab's population was rural, 54% of whom were zamindars, who contributed 66% of the total provincial and imperial revenue from the Province. In recognition of their importance, therefore, the Government ruled that in future in certain branches of the services appointment percentages would be reserved for zamindars:

- Provincial Civil Service (Executive and Judicial Branches) 50%
- Tahsildars and Naib-Tahsildars 66%
- Munsiffs 66%
- Excise Dept. 50%
- Agricultural Dept. - no percentage fixed, though preference to be given to zamindars
- Veterinary Dept. 66%
- Co-operative Dept. 80%
- Forest Dept. 66%
- Jail Dept. - no percentage fixed
- Medical Dept. - no percentage fixed, same as for Agricultural Dept.
- Sanitary Dept. 60%
- Public Works Dept. (Building and Roads) - no percentage, zamindars to be encouraged to avail themselves of technical training
Public Works Dept. (Technical Posts) - as for Buildings and Roads Branch
Revenue Branch
Clerical Establishments in all Departments - no percentage; where proportion of zamindars was unduly low, preference was to be given to zamindar candidates who possessed the necessary qualifications
Police - at least half of the direct appointments

No time limit, however, was fixed for their attainment. Such a provision would have been impracticable as the reforms were subject to the condition that a sufficient number of adequately qualified candidates were forthcoming. Thus although an attempt had been made to ensure improved zamindar employment, educational qualifications remained an important prerequisite for its achievement. Also the Provincial Government had been careful to avoid any communal complications by treating all zamindars as a backward class irrespective of religion. Nevertheless it was acknowledged in Government circles that the action would especially benefit Muslim agriculturists.

The Provincial Government's preoccupation with providing opportunities for Muslims in particular was further revealed in 1925. In that year instructions were issued to the effect that whilst it was not possible to stipulate rigid proportions, attempts were to be made to create a departmental structure in the Irrigation Branch of the Public Works Department, to allow for 40% Muslim participation, 20% Sikh and 40% Hindu and 'others'. Similar guidelines were also laid down in respect of recruitment to the Executive Branch of the Punjab Civil Service, where nominations were to be made in accordance with communal strength. In continuation of this policy, in 1932 40% of the student places in the Central Training College for government teachers were reserved for Muslims, applicants from that community being required to possess only the minimum educational qualifications. In the same year Muslims were also guaranteed 50% of all future appointments in the subordinate service of the Irrigation Branch (F.W.D.).

For all practical purposes, therefore, the Provincial Government had provided for reserved recruitment for Muslims, at least in certain departments. Its actions in promoting Muslim prospects, though not the method employed, were in keeping with the recommendations of the Public Service Commission of 1911, which had advised against permitting any one class to dominate the services, and the decision of the Central Government in 1923 to encourage a more representative participation through nomination, to achieve a balance between Hindus and non-Hindus. The surreptitious manner in which the Punjab Government had attempted to improve the Muslim position, coupled with the fact that the Government
of India had refrained from reserving definite percentages for Muslims, failed to satisfy Muslim leaders in the Punjab Legislature.

In July Feroz Khan Noon had requested the Local Government to submit detailed information on the composition of the Provincial Services. On 29 June 1926 the Government complied with the request (the statistics were not reproduced in the published proceedings of the debate). The circulation of the information demonstrated the respective strength and weakness of the non-Muslims and Muslims. The resulting debates which this evoked emphasised the existing conflict of communal interests. Whilst non-Muslims advocated the retention of the full competitive system, Muslim members demanded nomination and reservation programmes. Sardar Ujjal Singh on 19 July 1927 introduced a resolution into the Legislative Council advocating that all departmental posts should be filled by open competition, or failing that by the most highly qualified candidates irrespective of caste or creed. This demand was strongly supported by the urban Hindu members; the Muslim element opposed it, Sayid Muhammad Husain insisting that only a fairer sharing of the "loaves and fishes of appointments" would ease communal tension. These sentiments were echoed by Faiz Muhammad when on 22 July he proposed in resolution form, in retaliation to Ujjal Singh's measure, that the Council should recommend the Government to increase the number of Muslim officers in the Provincial Services to at least 55% of the total cadre in each branch.

These developments were an acute embarrassment to the Local Government. They threatened to undermine its declared urban-rural philosophy in respect of appointments, by forcing it either to rely solely on academic merit, or to adopt a blatantly communal approach to recruitment at a time when it was already in the process of attempting to achieve a communal balance in the services through reservation, though without declaring it to be official policy. Consequently the Government refused to be drawn in the matter, and it acted to de-fuse the situation in the Legislature by persuading Ujjal Singh and Faiz Muhammad to withdraw their resolutions. Furthermore it declined to acknowledge that definite percentages had been, or would be adopted in respect of Muslim appointments. Instead in order to satisfy Muslim leaders that the Government was conscious of the plight of their co-religionists, whilst not unduly alarming Hindus and Sikhs, the Governor, de Montmorency (1928-1933), defined official policy in the least inflammatory manner. He declared that recruitment would be conducted to avoid preponderance by any one class, whilst ensuring that competition would continue to be employed whenever the best interests of the services demanded it. Despite the fact that Muslims continued to represent a minority in the Provincial
Services the Local Government refused to deviate publicly from de Montmorency's policy statement, or admit to, or expand the limited measures of reservation which had been introduced. It decided, largely for politico-communal considerations, to abstain from further action until the leaders of the various communities themselves arrived at an acceptable solution concerning the vexed question of service percentages. It made this position clear in response to an enquiry by the Central Government in February 1934. The Punjab Government opposed the introduction of rigid percentage rules, arguing that though "Muslims are inadequately represented...process of readjustment must be gradual...". It emphasised that any attempt to "force the pace" would have the "most unfortunate results": "To introduce a drastic change in advance of consent of all communities could not fail to rouse strong communal feeling."  

Academic qualifications remained the crucial requisite for aspirants seeking entry into the Provincial Services, though competitive examinations were the exception rather than the rule. A B.A. degree constituted the minimum requirement necessary to permit appointments to the Provincial Civil Service and to the posts of Deputy Superintendent of Police, a condition which also applied to Tahsildar appointments from 1929 onwards. Appointees to the post of Forest Ranger, Naib-Tahsildar and Sub-Inspector of Police were required to have passed the Intermediate Examination in Arts and Sciences, whilst even the lowly clerk had out of necessity to be literate and pass qualifying tests.

Recruitment to the Provincial Services occurred mainly as the result of direct nomination or by promotion from the subordinate services. Only in the case of the Provincial Civil Service was open competition employed and that too only in the case of 25% of the appointments. Of the remainder, 37% were made through nominations from amongst Tahsildars, 12% resulted from nominations from the subordinate Ministerial service, and the remainder were nominated by the Governor. In the case of specialist posts (e.g. Engineering Branch of P.W.D., and Posts and Telegraph Dept.) officers were usually appointed on a selection basis, though with regard to the subordinate services, which accounted for the majority of Government servants ranging from Tahsildars to clerks, competitive tests were rarely used. The nomination process had been widely applied only after 1923, its aim being to facilitate a more equitable distribution of appointments. Recommendations for such appointments were submitted to the Governor by a Selection Board, which received proposals from Divisional Commissioners and Senior Departmental Heads. In making its recommendations the Board took into consideration the educational qualifications and personal suitability of the candidates.
as well as the record of service and loyalty of the candidates' families.\textsuperscript{40}

Even nomination, however, had failed to give a fair representation to Muslims, particularly with regard to senior appointments. Muslim educational backwardness was largely responsible for their continued low numbers. Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana (Punjab delegate, elected to Council of State 1920), speaking in the Council of State in March 1925, had alluded to this handicap and its causes. He pointed out that Muslims, the majority of whom were poor agriculturists occupying rural tracts, were not in a position to finance the education necessary for their sons to achieve qualifications of the standard required for government service.\textsuperscript{41} It was a luxury which only a small minority could afford (see Chapter II). Tiwana's assertions were borne out by the fact that in the period 1923 to 1928 Muslims accounted for only 94 out of the 355 pupils (26.5\%) attending the Maclagan Engineering College at Mughalpura. During the same period only 183 (27.2\%) of the 671 pupils studying at the Government School of Engineering at Rasul were Muslims.\textsuperscript{42} With regard to successful candidates who had passed the civil engineering course at the Thomson Civil Engineering College at Roorkee in the year 1925 to 1934, only 11 (7.3\%) out of a total of 150 were Muslims. Similarly of the 458 and 102 successful pupils in the overseer and draughtsman classes at the Government Institute at Rasul during the same period, Muslims had numbered 143 (31\%) and 17 (16.7\%) respectively.\textsuperscript{43} These low levels of participation and performance were reflected in the composition of departments requiring technical qualifications, e.g. only 10\% of the gazetted officers and 34.1\% of non-gazetted officers serving in the Irrigation Research Institute in 1938 were Muslims.\textsuperscript{44}

Muslim educational weakness was similarly apparent in a non-technical branch of the Provincial Service. In the subordinate judiciary four out of every 11 appointments had been reserved for Muslims. If the community failed to secure this proportion at the preliminary selection, non-Muslim candidates who had achieved higher marks were passed over to ensure the requisite number of Muslim appointments.\textsuperscript{45} An examination of the results of the qualifying examinations for Sub-Judge candidates held in 1930, 1931 and 1932 provides a clear indication of the competitive and academic failings of Muslim candidates, as well as the low performance which the Government was obliged to accept in order to maintain the reserved level of Muslim representation. This is apparent from the fact that in 1930 the selected Muslim candidates had stood 7th, 11th, 62nd, and 69th in order of merit, whilst in 1931 and 1932 they had stood 13th, 14th, 16th, and 33rd, and 11th, 24th, 25th, and 28th respectively.\textsuperscript{46}
In the light of this evidence 'Punjabee' in commenting on Muslim employment in the Provincial Services, was wrong to dismiss the education factor as being no longer applicable. In 1936 he wrote

"It is one of the fictions which have been proved to be fictions but are so perseveringly persisted in... Even among Hindus and Sikhs it is not merit that is the passport to Government offices, but favouritism and nepotism of the men round about the posts which fall vacant."\(^7\)

'Punjabee', however, was merely echoing a widespread belief. In February 1934 a special supplement to the Lahore based Weekly Mail had been printed in the form of an open letter to the Governor. It complained that there was widespread nepotism in the services, though it concentrated its exposure on the Hydro-Electric Branch of the P.W.D. It charged the Minister in charge of the Department, Gokul Chand Narang, of being a communalist, and of using his influence to promote the interests of non-Muslims and of undermining the Muslim position. In support of these allegations the article revealed that of the 48 gazetted officers in the Department, and 140 non-gazetted (technical) officers, Muslims numbered only nine and 43 respectively.

These accusations, though in the specific case of Gokul Chand they remained unproved, should not be totally dismissed, despite the fact that they ignored Muslim educational failings. The appointment system in the Punjab was open to abuse. The majority of appointments were made by Departmental Heads, who were only required to consult Ministers in the case of important subordinate posts.\(^9\) Though they were charged to ensure that no one class or community predominated in their departments, the Government did not prohibit the employment of relatives, which in itself encouraged suspicions of unfair practice.\(^1\) In the circumstances corrupt practices did occur as was admitted by Maynard (Finance Minister) in March 1923. He revealed that some candidates had been unfairly "overlooked because someone wished to put in a friend of his own or a member of his own community."\(^2\)

In the 1930's, however, the evidence suggests that nepotism was not widespread, as in the years 1930 to 1934, only one appointment resulting from communal partiality was detected.\(^3\) Furthermore, at least in theory, the Government of India Act (1935) had limited the scope for such corruption. It focused attention on the rights of the minority communities, especially regarding Government employment: Provincial Governors were invested with special responsibilities to protect minority interests and "to secure a due proportion of appointments to the several communities".\(^4\)

Thus whilst corrupt advancement did occur in the pre-1935 period,
it was not of the intensity to affect dramatically the Muslim position. The comparatively low number of Muslims in the Provincial Services resulted, in the final analysis, because of their educational backwardness and lack of appropriate educational qualifications, rather than from a concerted intrigue perpetrated by influential Hindu and Sikh officials. This is borne out by the fact that the Muslim share of appointments was highest in those areas of subordinate employment (see below), where the potential for unfair preferment, particularly by Heads of Departments, was greatest.

The extent to which Muslims had failed by the mid-1930's to secure an adequate percentage of Government appointments, comparable with their population status (Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communities accounted for approximately 56%, 23% and 13% of the population of the Punjab in 1931), was demonstrated by a Government survey on the composition of the services conducted in 1933 (see Appendices G and H). Out of 37,006 Government posts - ranging from District Officers to clerks - which were held by Indians, Muslims had secured only 17,737 (48%) of the total (Hindus and Sikhs held 40% and 10% of the appointments respectively, whilst members of other minorities had secured the remaining 2%). In addition the vast majority of Muslim appointments occurred in the subordinate and clerical branches of the services, as is evident from an analysis of fifteen branches of the Punjab service, accounting for 52% of the entire personnel employed in the Provincial Administration (see Appendix I). Here, Muslims held 53% of the subordinate and 46% of the clerical appointments, but only 34% of the superior positions. Thus Muslims only approached parity with the other communities in respect of positions not demanding high academic achievement, and where the element of nomination was strongest.

The relative paucity of Muslim officers in the services continued to be a point of contention in the pre-election (1937) period, and this was reinforced by the persisting belief among Muslims that the community continued to suffer as a result of communal bigotry on the part of non-Muslim officers. Such feelings gave birth to the Muslim Rights Protection Board in 1934, which included amongst its patrons Malik Barkat Ali (Advocate, Board's President) and Iqbal (Philosopher, President A.I.M.L. 1930). The body was organised to advance Muslim interests generally, and in particular to secure the rights of Muslims in the public services by bringing pressure to bear on the Government. The efforts of the organisation, however, were frustrated by the attitude of the Local Government and the political temper of the time. Even Fazl-i-Husain, the most influential Muslim leader in the Punjab, a man who had
previously achieved reservations for Muslims in the sphere of education (see pp. 84-85) could not afford to publicly support similar measures in respect of the services. Husain appreciated that the Muslim dominated Unionist Party, which he had founded (1923), would be unable to achieve a majority in the post-election Legislature unless it formed a multi-communal coalition (see p. 144). As such in 1935 he refused to accommodate Feroz Khan Noon's suggestion that a Muslim Zamindari Party be created to promote Muslim interests, and in particular "To secure a proper share of the Public Services for the Mussalmans."  

Husain's determination not to allow the service question to develop into a serious electoral issue, or to subscribe to any radical reform programme which would alienate non-Muslim Unionist supporters or possible allies, is apparent from the treatment it was afforded in Punjab Politics. This pamphlet was a pro-Unionist propaganda publication, written with the knowledge and support of Fazl-i-Husain, which he hoped would pave the way for inter-communal political co-operation. As such although the pamphlet referred in detail to the paucity of Muslims in the services, it did not advocate a radical solution to the problem. Instead it preached moderation, placing the onus for any future settlement on inter-communal agreement: "It is for the sister communities to decide whether they will let the Muslims have their legitimate share in the "shamilat" of the province or whether they will try to do them out of it and thus cause friction and trouble." A possible basis for agreement was proffered whereby Muslims and non-Muslims would receive a 41%/49% appointment allotment, but there was no suggestion that it should be achieved through legislation. Rather it was stressed that non-Muslim acceptance of the formula would prevent more extreme Muslim demands occurring in the future.

In spite of its conciliatory approach the sentiments expressed in the pamphlet were indicative of a desire to improve the Muslim lot in the services, and it recognised, though it did not openly approve or promote the Muslim desire "to obtain their rights on population basis." With the Unionist victory in the 1937 elections, it was inevitable that some of its Muslim supporters would not be satisfied by the prosecution of a socio-economic programme which did not relate specifically to Muslim needs. The community remained a minority in the services, and a number of Muslim M.L.A.s, notably Mian Abdul Rab (Jullundur South, Muhammadan Rural), determined to make an issue of the matter. This posed a particularly thorny problem for Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the Unionist Premier. The exclusion of questions leading to communal controversy remained essential for the continuance of the multi-communal
coalition, yet 24 out of the 28 questions relating to service percentages, which were raised by Muslim M.L.A.s in the period from 22 March 1938 to 20 April 1939, came from the Government benches.

In an attempt to prevent communally orientated debates damaging the Party, the Premier, Sikander Hyat Khan, announced in March 1938 that all questions likely to cause communal misunderstanding, including those pertaining to service percentages, would not be answered in the Assembly, though later he conceded that statements pertaining to communal topics would be allowed to unstarred questions. It was a shrewd tactic, for answers given to that class of question seldom caught the attention of the press. Also the right of posing supplementary questions did not exist, and as a result no opportunity existed for further examination of the Government's response. Thus the possibility for resultant acrimonious communal exchanges was prevented.

The Premier's action, born out of political necessity, belied a desire on his part to improve the Muslim position in the services. In 1933, in an attempt to achieve an inter-communal consensus on recruitment, Sikander had attempted, in concert with Hindu and Sikh leaders, to arrive at a solution beneficial to his co-religionists. He had suggested that whilst 20% of all service appointments ought to remain subject to competition, the remainder should be distributed on a population ratio basis. This did not appeal to the non-Muslim negotiators. Sir Jogendra Singh (Sikh leader, Minister of Agriculture) countered with a proposal that 50% of all appointments should be reserved for Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and 'others' receiving 28%, 17% and 5% respectively. Though this compromise favoured non-Muslims, who would receive proportions in excess of their population strength, Sikander was inclined to accept it. At the time those tentative discussions achieved no positive result, but they clearly contributed to moulding future Unionist policy.

To begin with, communal considerations caused Sikander's Ministry to adopt a cautious approach to the reservation question. Initially the Ministry based its policy on the British precedent, to prevent any one class monopolising the services, whilst securing an equitable share of appointments for agriculturists. The amount of Muslim dissatisfaction, especially from within the Unionist Party, forced Sikander to abandon this formula and introduce tenable reforms which would satisfy his Muslim supporters, whilst not causing a breach with his non-Muslim allies. On 11 April 1938 the Ministry undertook to correct 'inequitable' representation through future recruitment. In order to achieve this, the Premier directed in March 1939 that Muslims were to be guaranteed 50% of all appointments, whilst Sikhs would receive 20% and Hindus and
'others', the remaining 30%\(^{69}\). In order to ensure that the new recruitment rules were enforced, all departments were required to supply the Government with six-monthly statements recording communal employment ratios.\(^{70}\)

To achieve the adoption of the reservation principle regarding Muslim recruitment, the Premier, out of necessity, had to make concessions to the Sikh and Hindu communities. Thus they were guaranteed levels of recruitment in excess of their population percentages. In essence it was the price that had been solicited for co-operation in 1933, and this demand did not diminish once Sikh and Hindu elements had realised the position of virtually holding the balance of power in the Unionist Ministry.\(^{71}\) The introduction of a 50% reservation for Muslims was a compromise. Whilst it left some Muslim elements dissatisfied,\(^{72}\) and caused resentment among a number of non-Muslims, who regarded it as an infringement of their vested interests,\(^{73}\) it did nothing to disrupt the communal complexion of the Unionist Ministry.

The measures adopted by the Unionist Government to encourage Muslim recruitment, though restricted by political considerations, did achieve a small measure of success in the period up to 1946. It is apparent, however, that increased Muslim employment was more marked amongst officers of mainly 'Provincial' rank (see note 36) serving in the Civil Department at the District and Divisional levels\(^{74}\) than amongst the personnel of 'Provincial' and 'Subordinate' rank (see note 37) employed in the departments generally. Between 1936 and 1946 the number of Indian personnel in the Civil Establishment (Provincial Rank) in the Divisions increased from 774 to 1,057. In every Division Muslims benefitted from this expansion, their share of such appointments rising from 29% (38) to 31% (50) in the Ambala Division, 33% (47) to 38% (78) in the Jullander Division, 35% (70) to 45% (122) in the Lahore Division, 45% (63) to 55% (113) in the Rawalpindi Division, and 41% (66) to 51% (109) in the Multan Division. With regard to Muslims serving as Tahsildars (subordinate appointments) the percentage fell slightly from 57% (67) to 54% (60), whilst that for Naib-Tahsildars remained constant at 52% (85 in 1936 and 81 in 1946).\(^{75}\) This over-all increase in the percentages of Muslim officers resulted from the Ministry's policy of attempting to ensure that the ratio of officers, particularly in the offices of Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners and Revenue establishment, should reflect the communal composition of the local populations.\(^{76}\) As such it represented an important public relations exercise specifically intended to satisfy those Muslim critics who complained of the paucity of Muslim officers in Muslim majority areas.\(^{77}\)
In respect of the services as a whole the increase of Muslim officers of all grades (Provincial and Subordinate) was much smaller. This is evident from a survey conducted to include 20 of the 35 Departmental and Office Lists recorded in the Punjab Civil Lists for 1936 and 1946. In 1936 the combined cadre for the sections examined accounted for 2,089 'Provincial and Subordinate' positions held by Indians. Of these 778 (37%) were held by Muslims, 927 (44%) by Hindus, 369 (18%) by Sikhs and 15 (0.7%) by members of the minority communities, mainly Indian Christians. By 1946 the Indian element in these branches of the service had expanded to include 3,277 officers, of whom 1,351 (41%) were Muslims, 1,268 (39%) were Hindus and 645 (20%) were Sikhs; once again Indian Christians accounted for most of the remainder (13). Thus the overall Muslim improvement in these areas of service was a mere 4% (see Appendix J).

As a result of government measures the actual number of Muslim employees had increased in all but three of the branches, whilst in terms of the proportion of appointments held Muslims enjoyed an increase in 15 of them. This process had clearly been aided by the growth in manpower which had occurred in the majority of the departments and sections. Such expansion had been most dramatic in the Public Works Department and in the Canal Supervision and Maintenance Section. Even so in one branch which had enjoyed a significant increase in personnel Muslim representation had seriously declined. Although the number of Indian Secretaries, Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries to the Government had multiplied from seven to 52, Muslim appointments had risen from three to only 15 (see Appendix J). Educational factors no doubt were to an extent responsible for this, for as the posts were under ministerial control it is unlikely that unfair practices had occurred, considering that the Premier and the Ministers of Public Works (Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana) and Education (Abdul Haye) were Muslims, and were in a position to check any communal excesses on the part of their three non-Muslim cabinet colleagues. In the case of H.Q. Office Superintendents, the area of employment where Muslim representation had suffered the most serious decline (see Appendix J) the cause is not so apparent. Such appointments usually occurred as the result of promotion on the basis of seniority from the ranks of the head clerks - positions traditionally dominated by non-Muslims. Of approximately 222 Assistant Superintendents and head clerks serving in the transferred departments in 1933 only 65 (29%) were Muslims. This could help to explain the Muslim paucity amongst Office Superintendents in 1946, but not the fact that ten years earlier Muslims had held almost half of these posts (see
Appendix J). Two possible explanations for the Muslim decrease are that either qualified candidates were genuinely not available, or a degree of preferment in favor of Hindus in particular had occurred in spite of Government policy.

Despite this setback the Muslim position in the services had improved, but not dramatically. This gradual progression resulted from a number of factors. To begin with it was not possible for the Unionist Ministry to achieve a spectacular result in nine short years without its employing radical measures, which were precluded by political necessity. Thus the Ministry's decision that the percentage reservations should apply only to fresh recruitment dictated that the increase of Muslim officers in government service would be a slow and gradual process. In effect it could only occur in relation to the growth in service personnel, and as a result of vacancies caused through retirement. Also Muslims remained educationally handicapped, and this at times clearly negated the advantages which had been proffered by the reservation process.

The community's comparative educational backwardness was apparent from the low number of Muslims, as compared to Hindus, who applied for the posts of Statistical Officer, Physical Chemist and Physicist which were advertised by the Irrigation Research Institute in 1937 and 1938. Of the 106 applicants for the first post, only six were Muslims, five of whom held Masters' degrees. By comparison, there were 94 Hindus, all graduates, and 69 possessed Masters' degrees. Of the 22 applicants who competed for the appointment of Physical Chemist, 19 were Hindu graduates, including three Doctors of Philosophy, two Doctors of Science, seven Masters of Science, and one Master of Arts. Only one Muslim, an M.Sc., applied. In respect of the third post, of the 25 applicants, 23 were Hindus, 18 of whom held Masters' degrees, and one a Doctorate. There were only two Muslim applicants, holding the degree of Master of Science and Doctor of Science respectively. The paucity of Muslim candidates was further demonstrated by the number who appeared at the Joint Public Service Commission examinations from 1937 onwards. In 1937-38 and 1938-39 Muslims accounted for only 32% and 39% of those who qualified. Whilst with regard to the Ministerial Services (Junior Clerks) examinations conducted in 1939-40 and 1940-41, though Muslims represented 49% and 42% respectively of the candidates, they accounted for only 40% and 38% of those who qualified. Even in Departments where posts were specifically reserved, there were not enough qualified Muslims to fill various vacancies. For example, in the period 1937-41 and 1945-46 the Commission was unable to recommend any Muslim candidates.
for the following reserved posts - Lecturer in Surveying and Drawing at
the Punjab Engineering School, Rasul; Assistant Dental Surgeon, de
Montmorency College, Lahore; Superintendent of Industries, Assistant
Conservator of Forests, Lecturer in Civil Engineering, Rasul; Executive
Engineer, P.W.D., Bridges and Roads Branch; Deputy Warden of Fisheries;
Executive Engineer, P.W.D., Public Health Branch; Shift Engineer, P.W.D.,
Electricity Branch.

The increased involvement of Muslims in the Provincial Services in
the Punjab had only assumed real significance in the 1920's and 1930's.
The same period witnessed a Muslim campaign at the national level to
secure for the community a guaranteed percentage of appointments to the
Indian Civil Service. It involved two influential Punjabi Muslim
leaders, Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana and Fazl-i-Husain. Although both
promoted the All-India interests of their community, their efforts
could not fail but to enhance the prospects of Punjabi Muslims, who by
1924 had secured 25% of the appointments held by their co-religionists
in the I.C.S. Only one province, the U.P., had contributed more Muslim
officers to the service - six as compared to the Punjab's five. The
Indian Civil Service was the most important of all the services, and as
late as 1924 its personnel was overwhelmingly European. Of the 1,363
members of the service only 189 were Indians, 25 of whom were Muslims.

Muslim leaders in the Indian Legislative Assembly and the Council of
State were concerned that the Muslim proportion of appointments should
reflect more fully their population status in the country as a whole.
The logic behind this desire was expressed succinctly by Maulvi Abdul
Karim (Muhammadan Rural Division, Dacca) in the Indian Assembly in
March 1923: "a community in a country derives its importance, its
influence and its powers on various grounds, on population, on wealth,
on education, and I may add, on the share it has in the administration
of the country."

Two significant developments stimulated Muslim interest in the
question of I.C.S. recruitment - the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, as
embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919, and the acceptance by
the Central Government of the Lee Commission Report of March 1924. The
former had accepted the terms of the 'Lucknow Pact' which recognised the
right of Muslims to enjoy a consistent proportional representation in
the Provincial Assemblies, but the Lee Commission, which had begun
its enquiries in 1923, though it advocated expanding the Indian element
in the I.C.S. to a position of parity with the European officers, did
not recommend a fixed proportion of appointments for Muslims.

In fact leaders of the Indian minorities, in an effort to influence
the Lee Commission had launched their campaign to secure appointment reservations in the I.C.S. before the Commission published its findings. In January 1923 Sir H. Gidney (Anglo-Indian leader) had introduced a resolution in the Indian Assembly calling on the Government of India to modify the competitive system to allow for a greater intake of candidates from the minority communities into the I.C.S., to be achieved through nomination. Of the 19 Muslims who took part in the division, 18 voted for Gidney’s motion, which despite this support was defeated. This reversal did not end the matter. Two months later K. Muppil Nayar (W. Coast and Nilgris, Non-Muhammadan Rural) re-opened the question by recommending that the Central Government should adjust the recruitment procedure so as to discriminate in favour of candidates from those communities and classes which were poorly represented in the I.C.S., subject to the proviso that such persons should be adequately qualified to discharge their duties. This resulted in a heated and divisive debate demonstrating the passion with which the Hindu majority, whose co-religionists dominated the Indian membership of the I.C.S., and the minority members defended the respective positions of their communities. Hailey, the Home Member, alarmed by the acrimonious exchanges, intervened in an attempt to pacify both sides. He made it clear that whilst the Government of India had no intention of acting on Muppil Nayar’s proposal, it would endeavour to "prevent the preponderance in the Indian Civil Service of the representatives of any one community or any Province." 

This assurance failed to satisfy the Muslim leaders, who believed that the rights of their community could only be protected through a strict reservation policy. Consequently in February 1924 K. Ahmed (Rajshahi Division, Muhammadan Rural) introduced a resolution into the Indian Assembly to the effect that in the Muslim majority and minority provinces, Muslims should be guaranteed a representation of 52% and 25% respectively both in the provincial legislatures and the government services. He suggested that the I.C.S. percentage could be achieved by following the precedent of the Bengal Pact, whereby Muslims satisfying a basic academic test would continue to be appointed in preference to non-Muslims until the 25% appointment ratio had been achieved. 

Ahmed failed, however, to gain unanimous Muslim support. Maulvi Muhammad Yakub (Rohilkund and Kumaon Divisions, Muhammadan Rural) denounced the resolution because it adhered too closely to the Bengal agreement, which many Hindus and Muslims had refused to accept. Although this objection was valid, Yakub’s main concern in opposing Ahmed was to protect Muslim political interests in the U.P., his home
province. He feared that if adopted, Ahmed's proposal would undermine the terms of the Lucknow Pact which, as ratified by the Act of 1919, had guaranteed a Muslim representation of 33% in the Provincial Legislature. Motilal Nehru (U.P. Cities, Non-Muhammadan Urban) took advantage of this division of Muslim opinion to ensure that the motion was abandoned, by proposing that the question should be settled by a 'Round Table' conference as had previously been agreed by the Assembly members.

Muslim leaders in the Indian Legislative Assembly and the Council of State, notably Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, were not prepared to leave the matter to such arbitration, especially as the Lee Commission had failed to support the reservation principle. On 10 June 1924 Tiwana organised a meeting of Muslim representatives from both Houses; it was unanimously agreed to request the Government of India to reserve a fixed percentage of appointments for Muslims by conducting examinations "in such a manner as to ensure adequate representation of the Muslims in the Services." This demand was voiced in a petition to Sir Alexander Muddiman, the President of the Council of State, outlining Muslim grievances; it demonstrated that in some areas of government service there were no Muslim officers, whilst in others they did not account for 5% of the total, and that of the 2,000 officers employed by the Indian Railways, less than 50 were Muslims. This submission was accompanied by a series of notes compiled by Maulvi Abdul Karim (Bengal) detailing the paucity of Muslims in the I.C.S. and the other services. He succinctly portrayed their appalling position in the table reproduced on p. 120, observing "The figures speak for themselves and comment would we [sic] superfluous."

Karim emphasised that if the Lee Commission's recommendations resulted in the further domination of Indian appointments in the I.C.S. by Hindu officers, it would cause great resentment amongst Muslims. He argued that that outcome could be avoided as there was no shortage of suitable Muslim graduates for government service. But he contradicted this assertion by attacking the very criterion - university education - on which I.C.S. recruitment was based, by stating that it should not be considered the sole requisite for employment. In fact Karim's inconsistency revealed the essential weakness of Muslim candidates, which was their inability through competition to secure a percentage of appointments compatible with their population strength. Most important of all, however, Karim warned the Government of India that if it failed to rectify the existing disparity in the I.C.S. it would risk jeopardising the traditional Muslim loyalty it enjoyed.

Tiwana's petition supported by Muslim leaders from the Upper and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Europeans and Anglo-Indians</th>
<th>Non-Muslim Indians</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
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<tr>
<td>Railway</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finance and Accounts</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>257</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works Department</td>
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<td>355</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>966</td>
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<td>274</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>411</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>306</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>351</td>
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<td>730</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>805</td>
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<tr>
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<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>153</td>
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<td>79</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>143</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indian Civil Service</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,514</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,461</strong></td>
<td><strong>215</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,190</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Abdul Karim to Sir Alexander Muddiman, 15 June 1924, I/S&G/7/17, IOR.
Lower Chambers, combined with Harim's implied threat had a decisive impact on the Central Government. It accepted the Muslim claim that the competitive system contained inherent flaws: "The basic fact is that unrestricted competition will undoubtedly result in the preponderance of certain communities" to the exclusion of Muslims. In order to check this trend and satisfy Muslim demands, Haig (Officer on Special Duty with the Home Dept.) suggested that a more equitable communal balance could be achieved in the I.C.S. if the recruitment rules were modified to allow for one third of future appointments to be reserved from the competitive process, for distribution amongst the minority candidates. The Viceroy, Reading, acted on Haig's suggestion, and on 27 August 1924 he recommended to the Secretary of State (Birkenhead) that new recruitment rules should be formulated to satisfy legitimate communal claims. In support of this assertion he pointed out that of the 45 successful Indian candidates who had sat the I.C.S. examinations in London and Allahabad between 1922 and 1924, not one had been a Muslim. Whilst in the same period only three of the eight candidates (three Muslims, two Hindus, two Burmese, one Anglo-Indian) who had been nominated for the service were Muslims. In order, therefore, to prevent "absolute Hindu predominance..." Reading recommended that one third of all future vacancies should be exempt from direct competition to allow for an increased intake of entrants from the minority communities. The Viceroy, to ensure acceptance of the formula, emphasised that it would not result in a deterioration of the service, as only nominees possessing high academic qualifications would be admitted. In spite of some initial qualms that the proposal would upstage the Lee Commission's recommendations, the Secretary of State authorised its adoption.

The introduction of the new system, however, left some Muslim leaders dissatisfied. In March 1930 Muhammad Yakub complained that Muslim interests had been prejudiced by the fact that they were required to share the 33⅓ appointment reservation with other smaller communities. The time was propitious for a sympathetic hearing, for the Government of India was eager to reward the Muslim community for having remained aloof from Gandhi's civil disobedience movement. It therefore authorised a survey of I.C.S. personnel recruited since 1925, to be completed by 1932. The findings, which embraced all of the All-India Services (see Appendix K), proved the validity of Yakub's claim, the Government of India admitting that Muslims had failed to receive a fair share of appointments. It noted that although the community comprised approximately 25% of the population of British India, and was thus entitled to a major share of the 33⅓% reservation, they had received annually...
between 18% and 20% of the appointments, and at times even less. Of the 193 Indians, exclusive of Burmese, who had been selected for the I.C.S. by examination and nomination in the period only 39 had been Muslims, as compared to ten Indian Christians, six Sikhs, three Parsis and one Anglo-Indian. The result, as the Government of India pointed out, was that the smaller communities had gained at the Muslims' expense.

In order to rectify this anomaly the Government of India, in March 1933, advised the Secretary of State that out of the 33⅓% reservation 25% should be specifically reserved for Muslims, the remaining 8¾% to be distributed between the non-Muslim minority contenders. If, in any one year, no other minority candidates were forthcoming, the Central Government proposed that the Muslims should receive the full 33⅓% quota. These conditions were to apply only to initial recruitment; promotion was to continue to be decided solely on the basis of merit.

In an attempt to gain further concessions Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, who was serving on the Services and General Committee which had been appointed to consider the Government of India's proposals, and Fazl-i-Husain, who at the time was a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, appealed to the Central Government to be even more generous. Tiwana argued that on population grounds Muslims were entitled to a 29.3% reservation quota, Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians 2.35%, Sikhs 1.67% and Parsis 0.1% respectively. He conceded, however, that Anglo-Indians should be exempt from such a procedure to satisfy defence needs, but once the Anglo-Indian element had been appointed he insisted that the remainder of the 33⅓% quota should be distributed amongst the other candidates from the minority communities strictly on a population basis. Fazl-i-Husain was also of the opinion that the concessions postulated for the non-Muslim minorities were far greater than their population status warranted. He regarded the proposed 25% reservation quota as being totally inadequate to permit Muslims to recover lost ground, and he urged the Central Government to guarantee his community 35% of all fresh appointments until such time that Muslims occupied 25% of the administrative posts. Similarly the Muslim League criticised the Government of India's proposed programme; it advocated that the percentage reservation should reflect Muslim representation in the Indian Legislature (33⅓%).

These complaints and recommendations failed to influence the Central Government. Tiwana's plea for proportional representation had been rejected by the Service and General Committee on the grounds that its enforcement would have resulted in the practical exclusion of all minority candidates, other than Muslims and Anglo-Indians. The
Government of India, therefore, refused to consider permitting the Muslim quota (except when no other minority entrants were forthcoming) to exceed 25%.\(^{125}\)

Though the Indian Government's reform programme disappointed some Muslim leaders because it had not gone far enough, it was greeted with reservation at the India Office where it was believed in some circles that too much privilege had been conceded. Smith, the Secretary of the Services and General Department, viewed the package purely as a device to placate Muslim sentiment,\(^{126}\) and he feared that it would disrupt the 50:50 European-Indian I.C.S. recruitment ratio which had resulted from the Lee Commission recommendations. As such he believed that it was more important to abide rigidly to that ratio than "to concede one more place to the Muslims".\(^{127}\) Furthermore he questioned the wisdom of granting Muslims a further 8\(\frac{1}{2}\)% share of appointments in the event of there being no candidates from the other minorities, as he judged that the practice would lead to considerable resentment among non-Muslims.

Despite these misgivings, however, Smith offered his tacit agreement to the planned reforms on the condition that the Muslim quota should never exceed 25%, and should not be permitted to interfere with the balance of European-Indian recruitment.\(^{128}\) Similarly, Stewart, the Permanent Under-Secretary, disliked the changes. He believed that communal representation was essentially wrong, but he accepted that such a provision was necessary to correct the existing communal imbalance in the I.C.S. Nevertheless he considered that it should not be made a permanent recruitment feature because of the disability it inflicted on the Hindus. In spite of the obvious disquiet which existed amongst his senior colleagues the Secretary of State approved the scheme,\(^ {130}\) because it was feared that if the issue was not settled before the inauguration of the new constitution,\(^ {131}\) the subject of Muslim recruitment to the I.C.S. could result in serious political repercussions to the detriment of the planned constitutional advance.\(^ {132}\)

The recruitment procedure introduced in 1925 and amended in 1933 though it favoured the smaller minorities, in that they had been guaranteed a proportion of reserved appointments in excess of their population status, nevertheless led to a significant increase amongst Muslim personnel in the I.C.S., largely as a consequence of the nomination process (see Appendix L). Both competition and nomination were employed to recruit Muslims.\(^ {133}\) From 1925 onwards the Public Service Commission was obliged to recommend all nominees from amongst the candidates who had taken the examination in India.\(^ {134}\) In practical terms this meant that if the number of Muslim candidates selected by
competition, was not sufficient to satisfy the Muslim reservation quota, then other Muslim candidates whose performance at the Delhi I.C.S. examinations had not entitled them to direct entry, but whose academic standard was high, were nominated to the Service to complete the 25% quota reserved for their community. Two I.C.S. entrance examinations were held, one in London, the other in India. To begin with the Indian examinations were conducted at Allahabad, but from 1928 onwards they took place in Delhi. Recruitment in India was subsequent to that in London. At the London examination candidates were appointed in strict order of merit, and the number of appointments to be made on the results of the Delhi examination was decided by deducting the number of Indians recruited in London from the number of Europeans recruited there, in order to maintain the 50:50 balance between Europeans and Indians. At Delhi, however, selection did not always occur solely on the basis of merit, because in order to comply with the reservation rules for minorities it was often necessary to pass over Hindu candidates with higher marks, in order to nominate less successful minority candidates. For example, in 1930 five of the Muslims nominated to the I.C.S. had stood 10th, 11th, 14th, 16th and 20th respectively at the Delhi examination.

The result of this procedure was that the Indian examination provided a far more attractive option for Muslims than those held in London. The recruitment quotas, guaranteed to Muslims and other minority candidates, meant in effect that they did not have to compete with Hindu aspirants, as they were required only to achieve a standard of performance sufficient to enable nomination to take place. Also Hindus, because of the high level of success they attained through competition, were effectively barred from the nomination process. These considerations were largely responsible for the large number of Muslim candidates who sought appointments at the examinations in India. 1,063 Muslims competed at Allahabad and Delhi in the years 1924-40, representing 29.9% of the total candidate body. Of these Muslim candidates, 434 were from the Punjab, accounting for 50% of all the Punjabi candidates (Muslim and non-Muslim), and 41% of the total number of Muslim candidates from all the provinces and states (see Appendix L). This high level of Punjabi Muslim participation also seems to have been encouraged by the fact that with the change of examination centre from Allahabad to Delhi in 1928, the examination became more accessible to them, as is suggested by the significant increase that occurred after this date amongst Punjabi Muslims taking the Indian examinations (see Appendix L).

On the basis of a survey encompassing the 1924-40 period, it is possible to draw three basic conclusions. In the first place, Punjabi
Muslims did not perform as well in the competitive examinations as non-Muslims from their own province. Secondly, despite this failing, Muslims from the Punjab exhibited superior academic qualities in comparison to Muslims from other parts of India. Finally, Punjabi Muslims were major beneficiaries through nomination. Between 1924 and 1940, 13 Punjabi Muslims gained competitive appointments as compared to 27 non-Muslims from the Punjab. The majority of the non-Muslim successes (17) occurred in London, where only four Muslims were successful (see Appendices I and M). There the competition, on account of the European element, was far keener than in India. The performance of Punjabi Muslims at the Indian examinations, however, was more impressive, in that of the 19 candidates from the Province who were recruited as a result of competition, nine (47%) were Muslims. Even so when one considers that 50% (434) of the total number of candidates from the Punjab who sat the Indian examination in the 1924-40 period were Muslims and they gained 47% of the competitive appointments secured by the Province, as compared to 42% (eight) taken by Hindus, who represented only 35% (298) of the candidate body from the Punjab (see Appendix M ) it is clear that the latter possessed a decided advantage in terms of academic ability. Nevertheless of the 36 Indian Muslim candidates who gained entry to the I.C.S. through competition 13 (33%) were from the Punjab, as were 21 (43%) of the 49 Muslims who were nominated for the Service (see Appendices I and M). Both these last two results reflected the academic superiority of Punjabi Muslims as compared to Muslims from other parts of India.

Although competitive success at the examinations resulted from the highest academic achievement, nomination also depended on a high standard of ability on the nominee's part. The Civil Service Commission traditionally recommended only those candidates who had achieved a high mark at the 'viva voce' combined with a satisfactory performance in the written tests.\(^{139}\) In practice this meant that when Muslim candidates were nominated, their nomination occurred as a result of their examination results, i.e. those Muslim candidates who had achieved the highest marks at Delhi in relation to other Muslim competitors were nominated. Solely in terms of Muslim academic standards the prowess of Punjabi Muslims was reflected in the examiners' report compiled in 1942. It was a feature of the Indian examinations that the level of performance of the majority of candidates, from all communities, was poor.\(^{140}\) Consequently in 1942 it was decided to conduct a preliminary selection to eliminate the most unsuitable candidates in an attempt to raise the general standard.\(^{141}\) The I.C.S. Selection Committee reported that with
the single exception of the Punjab "where the general standard of the candidates was very good not only academically but also as regards sports and U.T.C. record..." the quality of candidates on the whole was disappointing. The majority of the candidates from every other province, according to the Commission, were unsuitable for the Service.\textsuperscript{142} This report did not differentiate between the different communities in the Punjab, which testifies to the fact that it embraced the potential of Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Furthermore the advantage enjoyed by Punjabi Muslim candidates was clear in that in the other Muslim majority provinces - Sind, N.W.F.P. and Bengal - the number of applicants, regardless of their suitability, had been so small that the Committee decided not to eliminate any of them.\textsuperscript{143}

Thus the high level of nominated appointments gained by Punjabi Muslims did not occur because the Punjab, as the premier Muslim province in British India, had been guaranteed the lion's share of the Muslim reservation. Such considerations did not influence the nomination process. In fact the Public Service Commission was not required to consider provincial factors when selecting nominees.\textsuperscript{144} Thus when Sir Horace Williamson (Indian Police - retired, appointed Adviser to Secretary of State 1937), out of consideration of the tremendous contribution the Punjab had made to the war effort, attempted to persuade the Government of India to allow an extra nomination to be made in 1941 to allow for the appointment of a Punjabi Muslim, as none had been recruited in that year, his action failed to elicit any official sympathy or support.\textsuperscript{145}

Whilst such a plea delivered on the Province's behalf did not result in a reciprocal gesture by the Central Government, it is apparent that neither the Government of India, nor the Provincial Government, were prepared to ignore the entreaties of powerful Indian families anxious to secure a nominated appointment for one of their members. Consequently both Governments were guilty at times of exerting unfair influence to procure the recruitment of candidates from the political elite, though such occurrences were rare. In the period 1924-40 two such attempts were made on behalf of Muslim candidates from the Punjab, one of which met with success.

In December 1932 Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State, drew the attention of the Viceroy to the fact that the son of the late Sir Muhammad Shafi (Punjab Muslim leader and Loyalist, nominated to the Provincial Legislative Council 1909 and 1912; Member of Imperial Legislative Council 1911, 1914, 1917; Vice-President Viceroy's Executive Council 1922-25) had taken the London examination that year. Although he had not been within 80 places in the order of merit of the last candidate to
have gained a competitive appointment, and was young enough to compete
the following year, the Secretary of State argued that he had a special
claim to nomination on account of his father's distinguished record of
service. It was a consideration which the candidate's mother and
sister exploited to the full. Amin N. Shafi solicited the assistance of
Hoare on her son's behalf, whilst Begum Shah Nawaz attempted
unsuccessfully to enrol the support of the Under-Secretary of State,
R.A. Butler, to advance her brother's case. The Viceroy, for his
part, agreed with Hoare that Shafi's son had "a somewhat special claim
to nomination to the I.C.S...". He refused, however, to commit himself
further, commenting that the Civil Service Commission, whose recommen-
dation the Government usually followed, would no doubt take into account
the career of Shafi's father. The Commission, however, did not
recommend Shafi Junior for nomination. Shafi's poor performance in
London precluded such consideration, especially as it had been agreed in
1925 that nominees were to be selected only from amongst those Delhi
candidates who had exhibited a high level of ability. Also it had
already been decided that only one nomination, and three competitive
appointments, were to be made following the results of the 1933 Delhi
examination. Anis Ahmad Rushdie, who had stood fourth in order of merit
at Delhi clearly had the strongest claim to be nominated. The Govern-
ment of India, however, was clearly embarrassed by the situation, and in
order to avoid giving offence to the Shafi family by nominating Rushdie
in preference to Shafi, it decided not to make any nominations that year.
Instead it persuaded the India Office to increase the number of Delhi
competitive places from three to four, thereby accommodating Anis
Ahmad through direct recruitment. The India Office agreed to the
stratagem, Anderson, the Principal of the Political Department (I.O.)
caustically observing that the only advantage the manoeuvre possessed
was that when Lady Shafi enquired why her son had not been chosen, the
Government of India could reply "Because there were no nominations this
year."

The episode demonstrated the degree of influence which the political
élite were capable of exerting, when, as in this case, they were able to
petition the Secretary of State, the highest British Indian authority,
and provoke a response which was not unsympathetic. Furthermore Hoare's
reaction was reprehensible in view of the nomination rules. These
stated that any attempt on the part of a candidate to enlist support for
his application through persons of influence would lead to immediate dis-
qualification. Also recommendations on behalf of candidates were to be
considered as invalid if presented by persons not associated with the
candidate's academic performance at school or university. 

In the case of Ata Muhammad Khan Leghari, however, both the Central and the Provincial Governments connived to achieve his appointment in a most unscrupulous manner. The Provincial Government took advantage of the fact that the ill-health of one of the successful candidates, Ali Ashgar, necessitated a further Muslim nomination to be made in 1936. The Punjab Government prevailed upon the Government of India to recommend Leghari, who had appeared at the London examination, a factor which usually precluded candidates from nomination. The Provincial Government reasoned that as the son of a leading Tumandar of Dera Ghazi Khan who had been recently knighted, and who represented Tumandars in the Legislative Council, Leghari was by birth and social position suited for nomination to the I.C.S. By acceding to the Punjab Government's request the Government of India passed over another Punjabi Muslim, Cheema, who had achieved the same marks in the 'viva voce' as Leghari but was 40 places higher in order of merit, and who had been recommended for nomination by the Civil Service Commission. In justifying this procedure the Central Government reasoned that Cheema, in spite of the fact that he had obtained higher marks than Leghari "seems to be a Punjabi Muhammadan of an ordinary type with merely Indian education." 

Considering that 'a mere Indian education' had enabled Cheema to surpass by a considerable margin the efforts of Leghari, 'blessed' as he was with the educational advantages provided by Aitchison College, Lahore, and Christ Church, Oxford, it is obvious that the Central Government had complied with the Punjab's request purely out of political considerations. The Leghari family was one of the largest landholding families in the Province. Sir Jemal Khan Leghari, a known supporter of the Government, possessed 150,000 acres, and a jagir which yielded an income of Rs. 50,500 annually. As Sir Jemal had considerable political influence in Dera Ghazi Khan, the Provincial Government clearly desired to associate the Leghari family with the Provincial administration. Initially, however, despite the concurrence of the Central Government, the endeavours of the Punjab Government on Leghari's behalf were frustrated temporarily by the recovery of Ali Ashgar. It was not until the following year that Leghari, who had stood 148th at the Delhi examination of 1937, an improvement of seven places on his efforts in London, was elevated to the ranks of the 'Heaven Born'! The desire of the Punjab Government to employ the sons of powerful individuals was further demonstrated by its treatment of Muhammad Azim Husain. As the son of Fazl-i-Husain, the most influential Muslim leader in the Province, Azim Husain was regarded as a potential asset. In
securing his posting to the Punjab in 1936, \textsuperscript{161} however, neither the Local nor Central Governments had been guilty of corrupt practice, for Husain, a Muslim nominee, had stood fifth in order of merit at the Delhi examination, \textsuperscript{162} thus he owed his appointment to personal effort rather than governmental intrigue.

But the vast majority of Punjabi candidates, successful or otherwise, were not the scions of politically influential men. Though, all enjoyed the necessary financial resources to enable them to acquire a university degree in order to compete at the I.C.S. examinations.\textsuperscript{163} A survey of the socio-economic backgrounds of the Punjabi candidates who appeared at the Delhi I.C.S. examinations between 1930 and 1940\textsuperscript{164} indicates that most of the Muslim candidates, in common with those from the other main communities, belonged to four main economic groups - government service, professional practice, agriculture, commerce and industry (the last two included as one category). The majority of Muslim candidates (57\%) in fact came from service families. Of the remainder 18\% had an agricultural heritage, and 9\% belonged to commercial and industrial families (see Appendix N).

In considering the parental background of the candidates, the most striking factor to emerge is that more Muslim candidates came from a service tradition than was the case for Hindus and Sikhs, despite the fact that Muslims were in the minority as compared to non-Muslims in this sphere of employment. Allowing for the overall educational backwardness of the Muslim community, however, the fact that the majority of Muslim candidates were from service families was not such an extraordinary development; in that that section of society, more than any other, reflected the height of Muslim academic achievement, limited though it was generally. The minority position of Muslim candidates from the professional classes (medicine, law, accounting, teaching), however, reflected in part the fact that in this sphere of employment the Muslim community was not well represented (see p. 16 ). Considering that the 'professions' were in themselves an expression of a literate heritage, it is significant that all the communal groups drew relatively small numbers of candidates from this tradition. This in part was a reflection of hereditary professional preference on the part of youths whose fathers belonged to professional vocations. In addition to which degree holders in professional and vocational subjects did not qualify for admission to the I.C.S.\textsuperscript{165} Finally, more Muslims came from agricultural, and less from a commercial and industrial tradition than was the case for Hindus. This was a trend which resulted to a large extent from the respective rôles which the two communities played in
these spheres of provincial life, in that Muslims were more greatly involved in agriculture than Hindus, whilst the Hindu community dominated the industry and commerce of the Province (see pp. 31-35, 44-49). Also agriculture, industry and commerce provided an hereditary source of income, which explains the comparatively low number of candidates from these backgrounds. The new generation from these groups were not as vulnerable to outside economic pressures as were their compatriots whose sole income would be based on their profession rather than inheritance.

In the case of those Punjabi Muslims who were recruited in the 1924-40 period it is not surprising that seven of the 13 examinees who gained competitive appointments emanated from a 'service' tradition, considering that contenders from that background dominated the field. Of the remainder four were from 'business' and two from 'professional' families (see Appendices O and P). With regard to the 21 Muslim nominees from the Punjab, although those from a 'service' heritage were not in the majority, they did comprise the largest single group: seven originated from that class; five were agriculturists; four were from a professional tradition; one was from a business family and one came from a mixed economic background, encompassing both 'service' and agriculture. There was no information available concerning the antecedents of the remaining three candidates (see Appendix Q).

Nomination had secured for Punjabi Muslims the majority of I.C.S. appointments from the Province in the post-1924 period. The numbers involved, however, were very small. The Provincial Services provided a far greater occupational outlet, and in that sphere, in spite of reservation, Muslims remained a minority. By the early 1930's the public services provided employment for 0.4% of the population of the Punjab, which was not insignificant considering that only approximately 3% of the population (representing the proportion of literate males - 20+) were eligible to seek appointments. Even so the Province was producing far more graduates than could be absorbed by the administration, and serious unemployment existed amongst this class. The Muslim position in this respect could have been improved if the community had been granted proportional reservation on the basis of its population percentage (i.e. 56%), but that had not been possible because of political considerations and the composition of the Unionist Party.

The failure of the Muslims as a community to secure a larger share of service appointments because of their under-achievement in education, and in spite of a favourable recruitment procedure, contributed in part to the eventual failure of the Unionist Party to withstand the political challenge of the Muslim League. In essence it demonstrated that the
Unionist Ministry, although dominated by Muslims, was unable to proceed beyond certain politically acceptable limits to promote Muslim advancement. The situation was clearly ripe for exploitation, especially as communalism intensified in the pre-1946 election period. The Punjab Provincial Muslim League in its election manifesto, published in 1944, undertook to secure the advancement of backward communities in the Provincial Services,\(^{169}\) which in effect meant improving Muslim prospects. Such a development was irrevocably linked with the establishment of a Muslim State,\(^{170}\) for as Hosain Imam (League leader, Bihar) bluntly stated to the Council of State in April 1944, Muslims could only be guaranteed their rightful share of service appointments by the division of the country into Hindustan and Pakistan.\(^{171}\) The belief that the creation of a Muslim homeland, in addition to safeguarding the integrity of Islam,\(^{172}\) would provide a panacea for the socio-economic problems of the Muslim community gained tremendous credence in the Punjab prior to the election.\(^{173}\) Thus as the electoral contest approached the Unionist Government could offer no attractive alternative to the prospects promised by the realisation of 'Pakistan', as Unionist unity and philosophy had fallen victim to an expression of militant communalism, as epitomised in the demand for an independent Muslim State (see Chapter VI below). 'Pakistan' was yet to become a reality; it was untried and undefined, and as such it promised all things to all men. Conversely, the Unionist Ministry had administered the Punjab for nine years; its policies and limitations were known, and as a result open to criticism. Its limited achievement in respect of the composition of the services could offer no substitution to the prospects embodied in the creation of a Muslim nation, unencumbered by communal considerations.

In the final analysis, whilst it would be incorrect to suggest that 'Pakistan' was conceived wholly with the purpose of providing 'jobs for the boys', it would be naive to ignore the attraction this proposition held for large numbers of Muslims, particularly those belonging to the educated élite. Unionist policies concerning service recruitment could only offer parity with the other communities, to be achieved gradually. Alternatively 'Pakistan' appeared to guarantee the prospect of total Muslim dominance of the 'loaves and fishes' of official patronage as Muslims were presented with the opportunity to control, and thereby to monopolise, the distribution of appointments.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. Prior to 1857 the public services had consisted of the covenanted and uncovenanted sections. The former comprised the senior administrative service recruited in England, whilst the latter represented a lower executive service recruited in India. In 1892 these two services were officially designated as the Indian Civil Service (I.C.S.) and the Provincial Services. Of the latter the Provincial Civil Service (P.C.S.) was the senior branch. As a result of the Lee Commission's recommendations of 1924 their respective roles were further modified and defined, a development which expanded and enhanced the importance of the provincial sector. The Commission divided the main services into three categories on the basis of whether the subjects in their charge were 'reserved' and thereby subject to the authority of the Central Government, and Secretary of State for India, or were 'transferred' and under the jurisdiction of the Provincial Governments. In effect, therefore, the administration was divided between the All-India Services (reserved) including the I.C.S., the Indian Police Service, and the Indian Service of Engineers; the Central Service (reserved) dealing with the Indian States, foreign affairs, the administration of government railways, posts and telegraphs, customs, audit and accounts and the scientific and technical departments; and the Provincial Services (Transferred) with authority over educational, agricultural, veterinary and medical services, and the Roads and Building Branch of the Indian Service of Engineers: see B.B. Misra, The Bureaucracy in India, Delhi, 1977, pp. 93, 247-248.

2. British India Association (N.W.P.) to Viceroy, 1 Aug. 1867, PEP, Oct. 1867, p.40, Vol.24, IOR.

3. Selections from the Records of the Govt. of India, Home Dept., No. CCV, Correspondence on the Subject of the Education of the Muhammadan Community in British India and Their Employment in the Public Services Generally, Calcutta, 1886, pp.237-244, 291-293, PGSL. (Hereafter referred to as Correspondence on the Subject of Muhammadan Education.)

4. Ibid., pp.291-293.


8. W.M. Young, Sec., Punjab Govt, to Sec., G.of I., Home Dept., 19 April 1883, Correspondence on the Subject of Muhammadan Education, p.301.

9. Ibid., pp.292-293.

10. Memorandum on the Communal Composition of the Services in the Punjab and Other Provinces, p.3, L/S&G/7/30, IOR. (Hereafter referred to as Memorandum on Punjab Services.)


13. Memorandum on Punjab Services, p. 4, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

14. Note by Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, 11 Oct. 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

15. Judicial and General Sec., Punjab Govt., to all Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners, 28 May 1901, enclosure, C.C. Garbett, Chief Sec., Punjab Govt., to Under Sec. of State, 31 Aug. 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.


18. Memorandum on Punjab Services, p. 4, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

19. Ibid., p. 5.

20. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

21. Ibid., p. 4.

22. Ibid., p. 9.

23. C.C. Garbett, to Under Sec. of State, 31 Aug. 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.


31. C.C. Garbett, to Under Sec. of State, 31 Aug. 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

32. G.of I. to Sec. of State, telegram, 26 Feb. 1934, L/S&G/7/32, IOR.

33. Memorandum on Punjab Services, p. 2, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.


35. Memorandum on Punjab Services, p. 2, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

36. All senior officers belonged to the Provincial Services. These included all the members of the Provincial Civil Service (District and Sessions Judges, District and Assistant Commissioners, Sub-Judges and Extra Assistant Commissioners), also Superintendents of Police, Postal Superintendents, Superintendents of Jails, District School Inspectors, Engineers, Civil Surgeons, District Medical Officers, Directors of Public Health, Veterinary Superintendents, Forest Conservators, Registrars, Directors of Agriculture, Deputy Collectors, etc., and assistant and deputy officers in each class.

37. The Subordinate Services included the majority of Government servants ranging from officers holding responsible charges (Tahsildars, Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors of Police, Head Constables, Subordinate Engineers, Superintendents of offices and Head Clerks) to clerks on lowly salaries.

38. Punjab Govt. to G.of I., Home Dept., 15 May 1933, L/S&G/6/313; Memorandum on Punjab Services, p. 1, L/S&G/30, IOR.
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<td>40</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>Memorandum on Punjab Services, p.15, L/S&amp;G/7/30, IOR.</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>Appendix H, enclosure, ibid.</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>A. Punjabanee, op.cit., p. 2.</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>Supplement to Weekly Mail, 19 Feb. 1934, L/S&amp;G/7/32, IOR.</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>Memorandum on Punjab Services, p.15; C.M. Trivedi, Dept.Sec., Gov. of I., to Under Sec. of State, 11 Dec. 1933, L/S&amp;G/7/30, IOR.</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>Ibid., 16 March 1934, Vol. XXIV, p. 920, V/9/3446, IOR.</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>Ibid., 15 March 1923, Vol. IV, p. 1,298, V/9/3419, IOR.</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>Ibid., 2 March 1934, Vol. XXIV, pp. 415-416, V/9/3446, IOR.</td>
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<td>Linlithgow to Woodhead, Governor of Bengal, 22 June 1939, enclosure, Linlithgow to Provincial Governors, 22 June 1939, L/S&amp;G/7/31, IOR.</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>Census of India 1931, Punjab, Pt.I, pp. 11, 317, IOR.</td>
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<td>Supplement to the Weekly Mail, 19 Feb. 1934, L/S&amp;G/7/32, IOR.</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>Fazl-i-Husain to Azim Hussein, 3 April 1936, Waheed Ahmad, op.cit., p. 508.</td>
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<td>59</td>
<td>Fazl-i-Husain to Bhai Parmanand, 21 Feb. 1936, ibid., pp. 496-497.</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>A. Punjabanee, op.cit., pp. 15-16.</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>Ibid., p. 21.</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>By March 1938 the Unionist coalition commanded the support of 119 M.L.As. in an Assembly of 175. Of the Ministry's supporters 41 were non-Muslims.</td>
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<td>64</td>
<td>Ibid., 10 March 1938, Vol. III, p. 668, V/9/3471, IOR.</td>
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<td>65</td>
<td>Ibid., 5 April 1938, Vol. IV, p. 685, V/9/3487, IOR.</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 1 May 1933, Fazl-i-Husain Papers, MSS. EUR.352/16, IOR.</td>
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68. Ibid., 11 April 1938, Vol. IV, p. 854, V/9/3487, IOR.

69. Ibid., 13 March 1939, Vol. VIII, p. 70, V/9/3540. It was subsequently decided that 5% of the 30% allotment would be specifically reserved for the Scheduled Castes, Indian Christians, etc., ibid., 10 Dec. 1940, Vol. XIV, p. 921, V/9/3674, IOR.

70. Ibid., 13 March 1939, Vol. VIII, p. 72, V/9/3540, IOR.

71. See n. 62 above.


73. See ibid., 13 March 1939, Vol. VIII, pp. 72-73, V/9/3540, IOR.

74. This Department was served by District, Sessions, and Sub-Judges, Extra Assistant Commissioners, Superintendents of Police, District School Inspectors, Civil Surgeons, Executive Engineers, Forest Conservators, and their deputies, as well as by Tahsildars and Naib Tahsildars, the last two categories being of subordinate rank.

75. In collecting this information the religion of each officer was decided on the basis of the individual's name. Figures and percentages calculated from information contained in Punjab Civil List, Jan. 1936, Lahore, 1936, Part XXXIX, pp. 219-223; Punjab Civil List, Nov. 1936, Lahore, 1946, Part XXXIX, pp. 273-287a, PGSL.


77. Ibid.

78. Statement Showing the Proportionate Representation of the Various Communities Serving in the Different Departments of the Punjab Govt., Jan. 1933, p. 1-20, enclosure, C.C. Garbett to U.S.of S., 31 Aug. 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

79. Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 5 March 1940, Vol. XII, p. 74, V/9/3624, IOR.


82. Ibid., 1939-40, Appendix B, p. xix; 1940-41, Appendix B, p. xvi; 1945-46, Appendix A, pp. x-xii, xix, PGSL.

83. Note by Abdul Karim, 14 June 1924, L/S&G/6/17, IOR. (Karim's note was based on the Combined Civil List for India, March 1924.)

84. Ibid.


86. The Lucknow Pact (Dec. 1916) represented an agreement between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League. Congress accepted the principle of separate elections for Muslims and agreed that in the Muslim minority provinces of the U.P., Bihar, Bombay and Madras, Muslims should have 30%, 25%, 33% and 15% of the elected Indian membership in the Legislatures. In the Muslim majority provinces of the Punjab and Bengal, Muslims were to receive only 50% and 40% respectively. The reforms of 1919 accepted the
86. (contd.) 'Pact', though by including special constituencies in the Assemblies they slightly altered the communal composition of the elected element, e.g. in the Punjab as a result of the Act of 1919 Muslims were guaranteed only 45% of the seats. See P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 186-187.

87. The task of the Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India, which functioned under the chairmanship of Lord Lee, was to find a way of meeting demands for more rapid Indianization and of solving the problems posed by the falling-off in British recruitment and the premature retirement of officials disgruntled by the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms.

88. India Office Memorandum on Recruitment for the I.C.S., 27 April 1936, S. & G. 1539/37, L/S&G/7/173, IOR.


90. Ibid., 10 March 1923, Vol. III, p. 3,192, V/9/56, IOR.

91. Ibid., pp. 3,211, 3,227.

92. The Bengal Pact (1923) represented an attempt by the Congress leader C.R. Das to achieve a Hindu-Muslim electoral alliance in Bengal by promising Muslims separate electorates on the basis of population and a generous allocation of public service appointments. The agreement, however, was not endorsed by the Indian National Congress. See R.J. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, Oxford, 1974, p. 23.


94. Ibid., pp. 777-778.

95. Ibid., p. 776.

96. Ibid., p. 783.

97. S.M.V. Oosman (Madras), Abdul Karim (Bengal), Abdul Qaiywn (N.W.F.P.), Ajab Khan (Punjab), Abdul Kasem (Bengal), Wajiduddin (U.P.), M.D. Yakus (U.P.), K. Ahmad (Bengal), Ahmad Ali Khan (Assam), Mohammad Shamsh-uz-Zoha (Bengal), Mohammad Ismail Khan (Bihar), Alimuz Zamand Chaudhry (Bengal), S.A.K. Jeeiani (Madras), G. Murtaza (Madras).

98. Memorandum by H.G. Haig (Home Dept., G.of I.), 1 Aug. 1924 S.&G. 2226/24, L/S&G/6/17, IOR.

99. Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana and Others to Muddiman, 10 June 1924, S.&G. 1670/24, L/S&G/6/17, IOR.

100. Note by Abdul Karim, 15 June 1924, L/S&G/6/17, IOR.

101. Ibid., 1 June 1924, L/S&G/6/17, IOR.

102. Ibid., 8 June 1924, L/S&G/6/17, IOR.

103. Ibid., 1 June 1924, L/S&G/6/17, IOR.

104. Memorandum by H.G. Haig, 1 Aug. 1924, L/S&G/6/17, IOR.

105. Ibid.

106. Viceroy to Sec. of State, telegram, 27 Aug. 1924, L/S&G/7/235, IOR.

107. Viceroy to Sec.of State, 5 Feb. 1925, L/S&G/7/236, IOR.

108. Viceroy to Sec.of State, 23 Feb. 1925, L/S&G/7/236, IOR.

109. Minute by P.H. Bumbell, 5 Dec. 1924, L/S&G/7/235, IOR.

110. The original acceptance was not recorded, but it is referred to in letter, Sec.of State to Viceroy, 20 Aug. 1925, L/S&G/7/236, IOR.

112. G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 22 Oct, 1930, L/S&G/7/241, IOR.

113. G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 26 March 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

114. G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 27 March 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

115. G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 26 March 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

116. G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 27 March 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

117. G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 28 Sept. 1933, L/S&G/7/32, IOR.

118. Services and General Committee note, Oct. 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

119. Anglo-Indians were traditionally regarded by the British as being trustworthy and as such were entrusted with positions in vital service areas, such as the Railways and Telegraph Departments, in the belief that their loyalty would not be subverted in times of civil unrest.

120. Services and General Committee note (n.d.), L/S&G/7/32, IOR.

121. It was officially estimated that it would take between 25 and 30 years before Muslims achieved a 25% representation in the I.C.S.; Note by Sir F. Stewart on Communal Representation in the Services, 9 Nov. 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

122. G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 11 Oct 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

123. Minutes of Evidence taken before the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, p. 1,238, 1 Aug 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

124. Services and General Committee note (n.d.), L/S&G/7/32, IOR.

125. G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 28 Sept. 1933, L/S&G/7/32, IOR.

126. Minute by F.W.H. Smith, 12 April 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

127. Ibid., 28 April 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

128. Ibid., 12 April 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

129. Note by Sir F. Stewart, 9 Nov. 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

130. Sec. of State to G. of I., Home Dept., 27 Oct. 1933, L/S&G/7/32, IOR.

131. By 1930 the British Government had specifically pledged itself to grant Dominion Status for India, to be achieved through the establishment of responsible governments in the provinces, an extension of the franchise to 30 million voters, and the inauguration of a Federal Government to include representatives of the provinces and States. Diarchy was to be abolished in the provinces, and introduced at the Centre. The Governor-General was to be responsible for the portfolios of Defence and External Affairs; all remaining posts were to be held by Ministers responsible to the Legislature. Both the Viceroy and the provincial Governors were to have special powers for the protection of minorities, and to enable them to assume control of the administration in the event of a constitutional breakdown. See J. Glendevon, *The Viceroy at Bay*, London, 1971, pp. 18-19.
132. Note by Sir F. Stewart, 9 Nov. 1933, L/S&G/7/30, IOR.

133. G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 27 March 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

134. Rules for Appointment to the I.C.S., otherwise than by Competitive Examination of Persons Domiciled in India, L/S&G/7/237, IOR.

135. India Office Memorandum on Recruitment for the I.C.S. 27 April 1936, L/S&G/7/240, IOR.

136. Statement, enclosure 'draft letter' by F.W.H. Smith, 3 June 1930, L/S&G/7/240, IOR.

137. F.W.H. Smith to Sec., Civil Service Commission, 19 June 1933, L/S&G/7/245, IOR.

138. The survey was limited to the 1924-40 period because information was not complete for the years prior to 1924. Also recruitment for the I.C.S. was suspended in 1942 as a result of the war, and information for the years 1941 and 1942 is not available.

139. Federal Public Service Commission to G. of I., 29 April 1940, enclosure, P.A. Menon, U.Sec. to G. of I., to Sec., S.& G.Dept., 6 May 1940, L/S&G/7/250, IOR.

140. I.C.S. Examiners' Report, 1938, L/S&G/7/248; ibid., 1939, enclosure, P. A. Menon to Under. Sec. of State, 28 Sept., 1939, L/S&G/7/249, IOR.

141. Ibid., 1942, enclosure, Minute by G.C.M. Lewis, 24 March 1943, L/S&G/7/252, IOR.

142. Reports of the I.C.S. and Indian Police Selection Committees constituted for different selection areas in 1941, enclosure, Minute by G.C.M. Lewis, 20 Nov. 1941, L/S&G/7/252, IOR.

143. Ibid.


145. Note by Sir Horace Williamson and Hasan Suhrawardy, 4 July 1941, L/S&G/7/251, IOR.

146. Hoare to Willingdon, 15 Dec. 1932, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

147. Amir N. Shafi to Hoare, 22 Aug. 1932, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.


149. Willingdon to Hoare, 3 Feb. 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

150. G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 31 May 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

151. Note by Anderson, 1 June 1933, L/S&G/7/243, IOR.

152. Rules for Appointment to the I.C.S. otherwise than by Competitive Examination of Persons Domiciled in India, L/S&G/7/237, IOR.

153. G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 3 July 1936, L/S&G/7/246, IOR.

154. Minute by F.W.H. Smith, 6 July 1936, L/S&G/7/246, IOR.

155. G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 3 July 1936, L/S&G/7/246, IOR.

156. Ibid.
Sir Mohammad Jemal Khan Leghari had rendered valuable service to the Punjab Government during the serious inter-tribal disturbances which occurred in Dera Ghazi Khan from 1915 to 1919, Civil and Military Gazette, 14 May 1944.

Ibid.

G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 21 July 1936, L/S&G/7/246, IOR.

I.C.S. Nominations List, 1937, enclosure, D.M. Cleary to Sir Zafrullah Khan, 22 June 1937, L/S&G/7/247, IOR.

G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 10 Oct. 1936, L/S&G/7/246, IOR.

G. of I., Home Dept., to Sec. of State, telegram, 16 June 1936, L/S&G/7/246, IOR.


In conducting a survey of the socio-economic backgrounds of Punjabi candidates information was obtained from I.C.S. admission forms and examiners' statements. It proved necessary to limit the enquiry to the 1930-40 period, because of the lack of information for most of the earlier years. Nevertheless this limited analysis accounts for 76% of the total number of Punjabi, and approximately 81% of Muslim candidates from the Province who appeared at the Indian examinations between 1924 and 1940.


Calculated from information contained in Census of India, 1931, Punjab, pt.I, pp.11, 256, IOR. Total Population of British Punjab, 23,580,852; literate male population of 20 years and over, 768,475; percentage of literate males of 20 years and over to total population, 3%. Although some women were employed in the Provincial Services, e.g. the Education Department, their number was so insignificant that their presence does not detract from the main hypothesis.

Punjab University Enquiry Committee Report, 1932-33, Lahore, 1933, p. 83, PPL.

Manifesto of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, Delhi, 1944, p.8, Copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

Ibid., p. 1.


Muslim League propagandists in the Punjab propagated the belief that Islamic law would be established with the creation of Pakistan (Viceroy to Sec. of State, 22 Oct. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR). The manifesto of the Provincial Muslim League certainly encouraged this belief in that it quoted the Working Committee's resolution passed at the Lucknow session (Oct.1937) of the All India Muslim League "To abolish and remove un-Islamic customs and usages from Muslim society": Manifesto
172. (contd.) of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, Delhi, 1944, Appendix II, Copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

173. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of Aug. 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.
CHAPTER IV

MUSLIM POLITICS AND THE ELECTION OF 1937 -
FACTIONALISM AND FEUDALISM

The political life of the Punjab and of the Muslim community had been dominated by the Unionist Party since the early 1920's. The absence of basic democratic practices, combined with a leadership representing the most powerful socio-economic faction in the Province guaranteed the party's victory in 1937. As the vehicle of the powerful landed feudal elite, its success reflected the ability of that social group to influence and control the electorate. Manifestoes, the hallmark of western electioneering practice, were employed, but they amounted to little more than a superfluous nicety, indulged in to create the atmosphere of a democratic contest, but in reality offering no real challenge to the traditional autocracy of the country areas. To the contesting candidates in the rural constituencies which dominated the Provincial Assembly, it was the support of influential landlords, rather than the enunciation of party dogma which provided the key to success, and as such patrons and not policies largely decided the outcome. The fact that the majority of Punjabi Muslims constituted a backward section of society in many areas crucial to provincial life - e.g. education, the public services, commerce and industry - did not constitute a significant issue in the 1937 elections.

The actual electoral contest was influenced by two major pieces of legislation - the Alienation of Land Act, 1900 and the Government of India Act, 1935. The former had divided the Province's populace into land-owning and non-land-owning tribes, creating an economic hegemony based on land-owning traditions and not religious allegiance; the latter as applied to the Punjab effectively prevented the dominant Muslim community from forming a workable majority in the Provincial Legislature. The creation of a coalition, therefore, was essential to enable any Muslim dominated party to form a stable government. Thus whilst the Act of 1901 (Alienation of Land) had helped to precipitate the emergence of non-religious based economic alliances, that of 1935 (Government of India) deemed such alliances to be a necessary prerequisite to enable any one political group to govern the Province. This political reality reaffirmed the traditional non-communal role of the rural elite's Unionist Party (founded 1923). Because of the absence of any serious
contender, its championship of rural interests and, most important of all, its monopoly of landed gentry support, assured the Party's success at the polls. Jinnah (President, All-India Muslim League), realising the dominant rôle the Unionist Party played in the politics of the Punjab, attempted unsuccessfully to persuade its Muslim membership to accept League control, a failure which caused him to seek allies from amongst the two Muslim urban parties (Ittihad-i-Millat and Majlis-i-Ahrar), neither of which were capable of challenging Unionist supremacy in the rural tracts. The Unionist Party, though unimpeded by a strong opposition, nevertheless possessed an 'Achilles heel' - factionalism. Events in the pre-election period, however, prevented the development of serious schism in the party, thereby denying Jinnah and other anti-Unionists the opportunity to create a split amongst, or encourage desertions by Muslim Unionists.

The political supremacy enjoyed by the landed élite resulted from the economic power they exercised in the constituencies, and the feudal ties of loyalty which bound the peasantry and tenantry to them. The Punjab was predominately a province of small owners and cultivators: by the late 1930's, of the 3,470,248 persons eligible to pay land revenue, over half (1,759,260) paid only Rs.5 per annum or less, whilst those who could be termed 'large landlords' numbered just 6,277. The continual division of holdings, as a result of death and inheritance customs, had forced many small cultivators to seek additional land as tenants, thereby placing them firmly under the control of the large landlords, whose dominance was exemplified by the fact that they could claim from between a quarter and a half of the crop produced on the tenanted land as rent.

Professor Narain, in commenting in 1938 on landlord-tenant economic relations, emphasised the exploitation inherent in the relationship:

"The ... landlord is able to exploit the tenant because of the constantly growing pressure of population on the soil. Land is scarce relatively to demand, and there are no alternative means of earning a livelihood for the tenant class. Under such conditions it is not surprising that the landlord's share should contain a large element of loot."6

Also the small cultivator and landowner had no means to protect himself from existing feudal exploitation. In the western Punjab where the majority of the great landed estates, and the overwhelming bulk of the Muslim population were situated, the cultivating class was thinly scattered throughout the rural tracts and therefore highly vulnerable; large settlements were few and far between, thereby denying most individuals the opportunity to present a united front to counter landlord oppression.
Crude economic exploitation alone, however, did not solely account for the political supremacy of the agrarian élite, for it was bolstered by strong feelings of feudal loyalty on the part of the smaller cultivators for the local gentry, often emanating from their membership of the same clan group or biraderi. This was clearly demonstrated in the case of a water dispute which occurred in the village of Durrana Langana (Multan District) in 1925. Despite the construction of a tail-cluster in 1916 the distribution of water from the Kassi canal to owners in Durrana Langana and to the Sikhs and Bappis in Kirpalpur led to dangerous friction:

"The Dehars in Durrana Langana, and the Sikhs and Bappis in Kirpalpur are equally influential, and represent the typical "Squires" common in the District. The two sides had gathered a large number of followers who were ready to lay down even their lives for their masters. There can be no complaint of general injustice to the village in the distribution of the water of this Branch as all the land falling in the Chakbandi belongs to one family."

Thus the 'forces' of the conflicting landowners were not offended parties, merely loyal devotees prepared to make the supreme sacrifice in the cause of their feudal superiors (bloodshed was only avoided by the timely intervention of the police).

The iron grip which the landed élite exercised over the political life of the Province is evident from a scrutiny of Muslim representatives who sat in the Provincial Legislative Council following the inauguration of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919). In the four elections held in 1920, 1923, 1926 and 1930, only 31 different persons had been elected to the Legislative Council, from the 21 Muslim seats situated in the Muslim majority districts of the western Punjab. All of them belonged to the landed gentry, 13 were listed as Punjabi chiefs and many were provincial and divisional durbaris. As Craig Baxter has observed, "The names form a listing of the squirearchy of Punjab." Of the successful candidates many were returned more than once: Nawab Choudhry Fazl Ali of Gujrat, Malik Sir Muhammad Firoz Khan Noon of Shahpur, Syed Raza Shah Gilani of Multan and Nawab Sir Muhammad Jamal Khan Leghari of Dera Ghazi Khan were successful in each of the four elections, seven were returned three times, and a further 13 were elected twice. The measure of influence which this 'squirearchy' wielded is further exemplified by the fact that in the 21 constituencies referred to above, only two of the seats (Lyallpur South and Gujranwala) were captured by different candidates at each election, though in Gujranwala two of the representatives belonged to the same family.

The importance of the landed élite in the politics of the Province
was fully appreciated by Fazl-i-Husain who by 1918, as a result of his ability and force of personality, had emerged as the most important Muslim leader in the Province. Husain himself did not belong to the large landlord class; by profession he was a lawyer, whose father and forbears had sought government service, both under the Sikhs and the British, their family having lost its ancestral estate in Gurdaspur with the collapse of Mughal power. With the Government of India Act of 1919, and the granting of limited responsibility to elected Indian representatives, the growth of political parties, which previously had not existed in the Punjab, became inevitable: "Fazl-i-Husain was the first to grasp the fact that ultimately political power in the new Council must rest mainly with rural Muslim members, and he, therefore, immediately set himself to weld them into a united party." In order to identify himself fully with the interests of the landed elite he contested and won a landholders' seat in the election of 1920.

Also the Muslim community though numerically in a majority in the Province had been denied a similar status in the Legislature, as they were allowed only 45.5% of the total membership, elected and nominated. Fazl-i-Husain accepted, therefore, that if the Muslims were to play a major role in the reformed Council they could do so only with non-Muslim support. It was this realism prompted by a perceptive understanding of the political situation in the Province which led him to form a broad-based party to attract non-Muslim adherents. The party he formed was known as the Rural Party, and by promoting agrarian interests it gained the co-operation of non-Muslim agriculturist Council members, whose participation was essential for Fazl-i-Husain's aims to sustain a majority in the Legislature. Having gained a pre-eminent position, the Rural Party attempted to emphasise its non-communal rural appeal by adopting and proclaiming a strong pro-rural, anti-urban philosophy:

"The basic principle was to assist and encourage backward areas, backward classes, and backward communities. This principle included protection of the peasantry, particularly against the hated Hindu moneylender, and the extension of beneficent activities by Government to hitherto neglected rural areas...it means the multiplication of rural dispensaries, primary schools, high schools, intermediate colleges, co-operative societies [and] rural veterinary dispensaries..."

In 1923 the Rural Party was transformed by Fazl-i-Husain into the Punjab National Unionist Party. The use of the word 'Unionist' was clearly intended to signify the multi-communal character of the organisation, the importance of which needed special emphasis in the post-1923 election Council, in that a new party had emerged, opposed to the rural
grouping. This was the Punjab Swaraj Party, which was a decidedly communal (pro-Hindu) consortium reflecting professional and commercial interests. The combination of this urban faction, however, with the other non-Unionist elements in the Legislature (Khilafists, Hindus and Sikhs) was insufficient to challenge the dominance of the Unionist Party, which had captured all the Muslim seats with the exception of three taken by Khilafists, and had been joined by seven rural Hindus and Sikhs, giving it 39 seats out of a total of 71. Throughout the pre-1937 period the Unionists maintained control over provincial politics, although at the last election held under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in 1930 its combined strength had decreased to 36, of whom only three were non-Muslims, thereby depriving the Party of much of its non-communal character.17

With the passage of the 1935 Government of India Act, the Punjab, in common with the other provinces of British India, began to prepare for the provincial elections scheduled for the opening months of 1937. Fazl-i-Husain, who had been absent from the Punjab for five years (April 1930 - April 1935) serving as a member of the Viceroy's Council, returned to the Province to reorganise the Unionist camp in preparation for the polling. In view of the fact that the new legislation (1935 Act) had followed the precedent of the Act of 1919 in denying Muslims a statutory majority, Fazl-i-Husain laid the greatest possible emphasis on attracting multi-communal support. At a press conference, which marked the public launching of his campaign in January 1936, the Unionist leader appealed for communal harmony. In an attempt to further promote communal unity Husain convened a meeting of the All-India Muslim Conference (February 1936) which was addressed by the Aga Khan, whose speech clearly identified with Unionist philosophy as conceived by Fazl-i-Husain, in that whilst it recognised the backwardness of the Muslims, it stressed that they belonged to the larger Indian community, and as such should work in unison with non-Muslims to achieve common political objectives and to alleviate social ills:

"India is now entering a new phase of political life. Indian Muslims are ready to take their due share in developing political life in the best interests of the country. Their political goal is dominion status... At home Indians must have economic reorganization - there is a wide gulf between different sections of Indians - extreme poverty, hunger and nakedness, emaciated enfeebled bodies and ignorance is the lot of a vast majority of them... The whole economic, social and religious fabric calls for immediate relief - uplift of the weak - economically, intellectually and culturally - so that there may be no one left to be called depressed..."
The Conference further summarised these sentiments in resolution form, stressing the desire of the Muslim community to play its part in Indian life: "the Conference should make a declaration that the Muslims put India first, being as much their motherland as of other races who inhabit India."  

As far as the landed aristocracy of the Punjab was concerned, the Conference's statements contained useful but empty rhetoric. Power was what mattered, not the social upliftment of the masses, nevertheless the sentiments provided a bridge for inter-communal co-operation, as Fazl-i-Husain intended. It is evident that the Unionist leader initially directed the message primarily at 'Congress ears', for he remained preoccupied with the realisation that Muslims in the Punjab would be unable to form a ministry without non-Muslim support, and consequently he was anxious to secure a pre-election agreement with the Congress. Negotiations, which were opened with the Congress Party immediately following the conclusion of the Muslim Conference, were destined to achieve nothing. Despite the heady sentiments expressed at the Conference, Fazl-i-Husain had long been regarded as a communalist in Hindu circles, particularly in the Punjab, where his actions as Provincial Education Minister had been interpreted as an infringement on Hindu rights (see p.84 above). Consequently the Hindu press in the Punjab denounced him; the Tribune accusing him of desiring to trick non-Muslims into acquiescing in the Muslim domination of the Province, whilst the Daily Herald declared that "Muslim leaders propose to administer the cup of poison with sweet mantras of unity...."  

Also Fazl-i-Husain's championing of communal co-operation, in spite of the political necessity which inspired it, was not universally accepted within Muslim Unionist ranks. In August 1935 Firoz Khan Noon (Minister of Education, Punjab) had urged that the Party should assume a positive communal complexion, whilst retaining its agrarian appeal, believing that only by such means could it capture the imagination and support of the Muslim masses. In so doing he proposed that a Muslim Zamindara Party should be constituted to contest the elections. Fazl-i-Husain, however, refused to abandon his non-communal stance, realising that to have done so would have seriously jeopardised Unionist prospects of forming a majority, which could not be achieved without non-Muslim support.  

Forces outside of the Unionist Party had been anxious also to encourage Fazl-i-Husain to adopt a communal stance in respect of the elections. M.A. Jinnah, the President of the All-India Muslim League, fully realised that his organisation, solely dependent on the support of
a section of the urban intelligentsia, was totally incapable of challenging and defeating the Unionist forces. He knew that the Unionist Party controlled the rural Muslim constituencies, and he hoped to be able to establish the League in the Province by persuading Fazl-i-Husain to contest the election in concert with, and not in opposition to the League. His confidence in the Unionist Party's ability to emerge victorious from the elections was revealed in a denouncement of the Party made only after he had failed to reach agreement with it: "I fear that there is a caucus that is likely to be effective because it depends on pocket boroughs...of this caucus the spear-head is the Unionist party."

In an attempt to utilise the influence of the 'caucus', he was later to condemn, Jinnah invited Fazl-i-Husain in January 1936 to preside over the forthcoming session of the All-India Muslim League, in a message which betrayed the depth of his recognition that Husain's support was desperately necessary for the League to succeed in the Punjab:

"I along with many others feel that at this moment no one can give a better lead to the Mussalmans of India than yourself...it will be a great honour to the League to have you to preside over our deliberations... I trust that you will accept the call at this moment. I think that you can render the greatest service at this moment and add to your laurels... We want a man of your calibre and experience, and nobody can well, at this critical moment as far as I can see, perform that duty and render that service to the community as you would be able to...your presence is necessary mainly and solely in the interests of the community... Your refusal will be the greatest misfortune and a terrible disappointment to me personally."

This flattering invitation failed to achieve its objective; Fazl-i-Husain refused to associate either himself or his party with the League. The latter was a purely communal body, which under Jinnah's direction sought to attract and control non-League provincial Muslim parties by persuading them to contest the forthcoming elections under the aegis of the League's Central Parliamentary Board. The Unionist leader reasoned that such a political marriage between the Unionists and the League would be impractical. In an attempt to dissuade other Muslim parties, outside the Punjab, from aligning themselves with the League, Fazl-i-Husain in a letter published in the Civil and Military Gazette of 7 June 1936 publicly rejected Jinnah's Parliamentary Board proposal. Fazl-i-Husain pointed out that provincial autonomy as conceived by the 1935 Act was synonymous with decentralisation, and as such it would be wrong to centralise provincial elections. Also as conditions varied in each province, especially in Muslim minority as compared to Muslim
majority provinces, it would be impossible to devise a uniform principle applicable to all. Furthermore Fazl-i-Husain emphasised that in many provinces Muslims, out of necessity, needed to promote non-communal organisations, because as was the case in the Punjab, the Muslim majority was nominal, and it would be "almost impossible to secure a Muslim majority through a separate control of elections." Fazl-i-Husain concluded that in the circumstances a communal central Muslim agency was ill-suited to conduct provincial Muslim elections. In addition he attempted to undermine the League initiative by suggesting that its primary objective was not to further Muslim interests, so much as Jinnah's ambitions: "The initiative and elasticity needed for such purpose [the need for non-communal organisations to secure Muslim coalition ministries] for each province should not be sacrificed for the sake of an All-India leader's aspirations."27

There were other considerations which had contributed to fashion Fazl-i-Husain's reaction. He feared that Jinnah's move would damage Muslim solidarity in the Punjab to the detriment of the Unionist Party, as well as in the other Muslim majority provinces where he had already encouraged the growth of political organisations similar to the Unionist Party.28 In adopting this tactic he had been supported by the Aga Khan who approved of the move, and was prepared to offer financial assistance to the tune of Rs. 20,000 to popularise it through the press, and facilitate its success.29 There seems little doubt that Husain desired the growth of 'quasi Unionist' political bodies in all the Muslim majority provinces and the U.P., to provide the platform of a national organisation willing to promote Muslim interests through economic and political co-operation with non-Muslims, and thereby bypass the League which he believed would harm, rather than benefit Muslim prospects by its prosecution of a communal approach.30 It is evident therefore that Fazl-i-Husain regarded Jinnah as an adversary in both the provincial and national spheres, as is evident from the sentiments he expressed to the Aga Khan on 22 June 1936:

"Since last April the Unionist Party has been re-organised and a Unionist political organisation of a non-communal type has been set going throughout the Punjab... Jinnah has blundered into this arena very much to our prejudice. He has not been able to obtain any support from any section of the Unionists... You know perfectly well that the Punjab is the key of the Indian Muslim politics because of the strong attitude we have taken. Sind is following in our footsteps, North-West Frontier Province is doing the same and to a minor extent Bengal and U.P. are also coming into line. Thus Jinnah's Parliamentary Board is already broken up."31
Considering the 'national' ambitions which Fazl-i-Husain nurtured, it is clear that by July 1936 he believed that they were in the process of attaining fruition: "N.W.F. Province and Sind have definitely decided to constitute Unionist Parties after the pattern of the Punjab Unionist Party and Bengal, specially [sic] Eastern Bengal, has also decided to follow them."\(^32\)

In the event, however, Fazl-i-Husain's hopes failed to reach fruition. His death in July 1936 removed the main inspiration for, and driving force whereby such a development might have been achieved. Even had he lived, however, such a development was unlikely. His assessment concerning the growth of Unionist-type parties in the provinces mentioned above was incorrect. Muslim politics at the provincial level were dominated by fierce personal rivalries, whilst communalism militated against co-operation with non-Muslim organisations. Consequently Muslim leaders such as Fazlul Huq in Bengal and the Nawab of Chhatar in U.P. were more concerned with maintaining their respective positions in the provincial spheres, rather than working in unison in pursuit of a non-communal national strategy. In fact Abdoola Haroon in Sind was the only influential Muslim to organise a party along Unionist lines – the Sind United Party. It failed to command a united Muslim following, however, being opposed by the Azad Party of Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, and Ghulam Hussain's Muslim Political Party.\(^33\)

In opposing Jinnah in the Punjab, Fazl-i-Husain had been aided by the attitude of his troublesome lieutenant, and eventual successor, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, who was equally determined to prevent the League leader from intruding into the Unionist preserve, or undermining provincial autonomy. Consequently he supported Fazl-i-Husain's rejection of the Parliamentary Board, having informed the Unionist leader in May 1936 that

"I have...asked Ahmad Yar [Daultana] to strongly press on him [Jinnah] the advisability of keeping his finger out of the Punjab pie. If he meddles he would only be encouraging fissiparous tendencies already palpably discernible in a section of Punjab Muslims, & might burn his fingers; & in any case we cannot possibly allow 'provincial autonomy' to be tampered with...by anybody, be he a nominee of the powers who have given us this autonomy or a President of the Muslim League..."\(^34\)

Thus Jinnah, as a result of Sikander's stand, was unable to manipulate to his advantage the rivalry which existed between Fazl-i-Husain and Sikander in the pre-election period.

Whilst Jinnah's proposal regarding a Parliamentary Board failed to precipitate disunity amongst Muslim Unionists, factionalism continued to pose the gravest threat which the Party had to face in 1936. It was a
condition which had bedevilled the Party from its earliest days, resulting to a great extent from the presence of three powerful cliques, the continued affiliation of each being essential to party unity. These three groups centred around Sir Sikander Hyat Khan representing the Hyats of Wah, Sir Firoz Khan Noon of the Noon-Tiwana family group of Sargodha, and a loose alliance between Choudhury Sir Shahab-ud-Din of Sialkot and his more influential brother-in-law Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana of Mailsi in Multan District. As a result of the antipathy which existed between the Daultanas and Noons, Daultana supported Sikander in opposition to Firoz Khan Noon, whom Sikander regarded as his main political rival. The British were not unaware of the existence of these opposing factions, which could have undermined their own political standing. Under 'Dyarchy' the provincial British Government had constantly relied on the loyalist Unionist bloc to maintain its majority in the Legislature and it is apparent that it was clearly in British interests that a united pro-British organisation should administer the Punjab following the 1937 elections. There can be little doubt, therefore, that the Vir Bharat and Daily Herald (Lahore based newspapers) were in part correct in cynically suggesting in May 1936 that both Firoz Khan Noon and Sikander Hyat Khan had been found employment outside the Province, as High Commissioner in London (1936) and Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India in Bombay (1935) respectively, to prevent either of them challenging Fazl-i-Husain's leadership of the Unionists; a tactic which helped to preserve the stability of the Unionist Party.

Initially Sikander had not been averse to accepting the appointment. Although he belonged to a substantial land-owning family, heavy financial liabilities had encouraged his involvement with commercial enterprises, whilst a salary of Rs. 5,500 per mensem provided an added inducement for him to join the Reserve Bank. Events soon proved, however, that Sikander was not to be content with a non-political career, particularly as Fazl-i-Husain's ill-health brought the leadership question to the fore. Also Sikander's supporters in the Punjab, notably Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, Nawab Muzaffar Khan, and Mir Maqbul Mahmud were not prepared to allow Sikander's claim to lead the Unionist Party to perish by default, particularly as it was evident by the Autumn of 1935 that Fazl-i-Husain's poor health would ultimately force his withdrawal from political life. This particular factor was to prove critical in causing Sikander to decide whether or not he should challenge Husain in the immediate pre-election period, as is evident from the fact that Nawab Muzaffar Khan, Sikander's brother-in-law and cousin, attempted to
discover from Fazl-i-Husain's physician (Col. Harper-Nelson) how long his patient was expected to live. Although Sikander denied having initiated the distasteful enquiry, and whilst he repeatedly assured Husain of his personal loyalty and support, his actions belied his words.

Sikander in fact set out on a tortuous and confused path aimed at securing recognition for himself as the leader designate, and although he conducted negotiations with possible non-Muslim allies, causing Husain to suspect that he was endeavouring to supplant him, he never directly challenged the incumbent. In April 1936 the Tribune reported that Sikander had "expressed his readiness to his non-Muslim friends to take a leading part in the formation of the future provincial cabinet," though when confronted by Fazl-i-Husain, Sikander had publicly pledged him his support. Implicit in this declaration, which was issued by Husain on Sikander's behalf, was the assertion that the move had been orchestrated by Hindu and Sikh leaders, and not Sikander:

"Leading Hindu and Sikh politicians approached Sir Sikander Hyat with an offer of full and strong support in case he decided to offer himself for Chief Ministership under the Reforms. Sir Sikander Hyat is said to have expressed his thanks and gratitude to the Hindu-Sikh leaders...but Sikander expressed his inability to accede to their request as he was now of the same views which he entertained before...that the nature of the new reforms and condition of the existing atmosphere were such that the experience and knowledge and the political gifts of the leader of the Unionists, Mian Fazl-i-Husain, should be utilized..."

Despite this conciliatory statement, however, Sikander continued to hold discussions with leading non-Muslim politicians, in particular Raja Narendra Nath, the leader of the urban Hindus, with whom he maintained constant contact. It was an association which Sikander refused to abandon, in spite of Fazl-i-Husain's protest that he alone should conduct talks concerning possible political alliances. On 23 June 1936 the pro-Unionist Civil and Military Gazette reported that talks between the Raja and Sikander had been re-opened in respect of "the formation of a new political party which would rally the various elements in the province that would keep in check the communal activities of certain Muslim leaders...." The inference clearly constituted an attack on Husain's position, obliquely referring to his communalist tendencies, but Sikander again retreated, refusing to identify himself with so apparent a challenge, and through Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana a denial was published to the effect that no such plans had been discussed and that there had only been social, and not political, contact between...
the two men. 47

His refusal to confront Fazl-i-Husain openly was consistent with his desire to secure the succession, without having to risk the dangers inherent in any overt leadership confrontation. If he had openly contested for it, he would have risked splitting the Muslim Unionist supporters, thereby jeopardising the prospects for the formation of a future Unionist ministry, and his own position as its possible leader and future Premier of the Province. His determination not to precipitate such a split, and his anxiety to succeed to the leadership of a united party, are apparent from correspondence he conducted with Fazl-i-Husain in May 1936, at a time when he had made his ambitions perfectly clear. On 1 May he had guilefully enquired,

"Do you apprehend that the defections from Muslims for personal motives - I do not anticipate many desertions on questions of principle or policy - would be on such a scale as to endanger the solidarity of the party & jeopardise [sic] the almost certain prospect (at present) of it being the majority party? If the answer is in the affirmative would it be worth-while for you to tax your already scanty physical resources, & for me to sacrifice my prospects & a comfortable & if I may say so, from the wider point of view, a useful & important post for what? a mess of pottage?" 48

Whilst on 13 May he had attempted to assure Husain that he would not campaign to oust him and lead the Party, for fear of destroying Muslim unity, and out of his personal regard for the present leader:

"I can assure you that my not resorting to any of these alternatives [claiming the leadership from Husain, or forming his own party] was deliberate, and was due to my earnest desire to serve the best interests of the Province, to avoid split among muslim [sic] and others and to my personal regard for you." 49

The last assurance could have offered small comfort to Fazl-i-Husain. From early February 1936, Sikander constantly disregarded his leader's feelings in pursuit of his goal to manoeuvre Husain into publicly acknowledging his position in terms which would demonstrate that Sikander was deputy leader, and heir apparent. In pursuit of this aim in February 1936 Sikander had attempted unsuccessfully to induce Husain to issue a statement asserting

"It has been stated...that I [Fazl-i-Husain] was instrumental in arranging for translation of Sikander Hyat from provincial politics to the Reserve Bank. This is a palpably false allegation. Equally incorrect is the assertion that I am opposed to his return to the Punjab. I shall be only too glad to have him back, and if I find that my health does not permit me to undertake the task [of re-organising and leading the Unionist Party] single-handed, I could have no better helper to assist me. I will, in that event, do my best to persuade
him, in the interests of the province, to relinquish his present important and lucrative job... There has never been any question of rivalry between us and I can speak both for Sikander and myself that there can be none in future either."

Fazl-i-Husain refused to accommodate Sikander: "I have never claimed to be in the exalted position of the leader who has any wonderful claim to the allegiance of all those associated with his work." This explanation was a mere subterfuge, however, for in reality Husain did not wish to commit himself positively to Sikander at this stage for to have done so would have compromised his own standing within the Party, had the statement, suggested and composed by Sikander, been interpreted as a surrender on Husain's part in the face of pressure from his ambitious lieutenant. Sikander persisted in his endeavour, however, and in May he confronted Fazl-i-Husain with a strongly worded communique on the pretext that he intended to release it to the press. Ostensibly this exercise was to secure Husain's approval for its publication, in reality it was meant to convey the definite warning that if his position was not recognised, Sikander, supported by some Muslim and non-Muslim allies, would force Fazl-i-Husain to accept a subordinate position:

"His [Sikander's] friends however continued to press him; Sikh, Hindu and some Muslim friends on the ground that communal tension, mistrust and bitterness was likely to be accentuated with the approach and advent of the new Reforms and would seriously hamper the smooth working of the new constitutional machinery, unless somebody who enjoyed the confidence of all communities and interests was forthcoming to bridge the gulf and to restore harmony and re-establish mutual confidence."

Furthermore

"It was suggested that Sir Sikander should come back to assist in, and if necessary to undertake the whole responsibility for, organising the party - which was to be non-communal and free from sectarian or class restrictions or prejudices - and that pending his return Sir Fazli should start and carry on the work with the assistance of Sir Sikander's friends."52

Husain's reaction was swift, and calculated to undermine Sikander's stance. On 15 May 1936 he offered to resign the leadership, thereby confronting Sikander with an open breach with the creator of the Unionist Party, caused by his enforced retirement, and the possibility of a bitter and uncertain campaign for the leadership, likely to damage the solidarity of the organisation, and thereby frustrate Sikander's manoeuvre to succeed to a united, strong party. Once again Sikander withdrew, pretending that he neither wished to lead the Unionist Party nor return to the political life of the Punjab, though he offered his continued support for Husain if the latter desired it:
"you are at liberty to utilise my name again if it will help you, and on my part I can assure that I will, as before, not say a word against it. I would, however, request you to make it clear that I never had nor evinced any ambition or pretentions to assuming the leadership of the party and (in view of what has transpired during the past fortnight) I have no intention of returning to the province."54

Subsequent events were to demonstrate the falsity of Sikander's assertions. The intriguing continued. In June 1936 Sikander returned to the Province and held meetings with Narendra Nath,55 which he informed Fazl-i-Husain were intended to gain support of the Hindu leader and his followers, numbering between 30 and 35, for the Unionist cause, and were not in pursuit of his own personal political ends.56 It was a ludicrous and false explanation considering Sikander's obvious ambition, the antagonism which the Punjab's Hindu press had confronted Husain, emphasising his communalist tendencies,57 and the fact that Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana revealed unintentionally that a conspiracy was in progress, by dismissing the Sikander-Narendra Nath meeting as being of a purely social nature, whilst Sikander had provided Husain with a totally different interpretation (see above).

Thus by June 1936 the stage had been reached in the relationship between Sikander and Fazl-i-Husain which parodied Shakespeare's impatient Prince Hal trying the Crown whilst the resentful King Henry IV lay on his death-bed - a parody made all the more poignant by the fact that Fazl-i-Husain was a dying man. From 20 June 1936 Husain's health, which had never been robust, deteriorated rapidly, and on 9 July he died.58 The death of this veteran Muslim politician, combined with the absence of Firoz Khan Noon in London, preserved the Unionist Party, in the vital period immediately prior to the election, from an internecine scramble for power. Had Fazl-i-Husain lived, Sikander and his supporters would have continued to intrigue against him, and should Noon have still been actively involved in Punjab affairs, he would certainly have challenged Sikander's claim to lead the Party.

Even so it was not the removal of these powerful contenders, important though this factor was, which was primarily responsible for Sikander's succession to the leadership which he was offered and accepted the day following Husain's demise.59 His appeal lay largely in the fact that he was acceptable to the major participants in the Punjab political scene - the Muslim leadership, powerful Hindu and Sikh elements,60 and not least the British. As a result of ties of blood and marriage, Sikander was related to a large number of extremely influential Punjabi Muslim political figures. These included amongst others Sardar Barkat...
Hayat Khan, Nawab Sir Liaquat Hayat Khan (brothers), Nawab Muzaffar Khan (cousin and brother-in-law), Ahmad Bakhsh Khan, Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq, Sheikh Sadiq Hassan, Mir Maqbool Mahmud, Murid Hussain, Pir Aishq Hussain, Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz, Begum Jahanara Shah Nawaz and Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din. In addition, the strong personal tie which existed between himself and Ahmad Yar Khan Daultama assured him the support of a man whose family connections were as extensive as his own.  

Complementing the Muslim support which these relationships assured him, Sikander was a popular figure amongst the non-Muslims in the Punjab, largely because he was widely regarded as being far less communal than Fazl-i-Husain. Of all the Muslim leaders it was believed that he was the most likely to command Hindu and Sikh confidence, which was essential if a Muslim majority Ministry was to function in the Province. In considering his standing both with the Muslim and non-Muslim communities, The People correctly assessed that his popularity and succession to the Unionist leadership reflected his social contacts with all groups and communities. Though this newspaper clearly referred to Indian associations, his succession to Fazl-i-Husain was clearly welcome to the British, and it was essential for any leader aspiring to the premiership to have their sanction and continuing support, as it was the prerogative of the British Governor to invite that person to form a ministry who commanded not only a majority in the Legislature, but who also enjoyed the confidence of the minority communities. There was no doubt that Sikander would enjoy British support, for he was considered to be "a pillar of strength" to the British Raj. His loyalty had been publicly and dramatically acknowledged on two occasions: when he had been invited to officiate as Governor during the illness of Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency in 1932, and the absence of Sir Herbert Emerson in England in 1935.

The fact that the succession of Sikander Hyat Khan did not disrupt the stability of the Unionist Party, or lead to the development of embittered feuding factions, assured its victory in the majority of the Muslim constituencies in 1937, because as a united force, none of the other Muslim parties possessed either the means or membership to successfully challenge it. These organisations - the Majlis-i-Ahrar, the Ittihad-i-Millat, and the Muslim League - were urban based, and there was no real common ground between them, the Ahrar and Ittihad-i-Millat groups being fierce rivals, and although the League having been rebuffed by Fazl-i-Husain, attempted to induce both to join it as an anti-Unionist alliance, the move was unsuccessful.
Where the Muslim League had failed in part to gain the support of the Unionists because of its rigidity concerning communal politics, and central control, it failed to reach an understanding with the Ittihad-i-Millet because it was not sufficiently sectarian. Jinnah, in an attempt to reach a compromise with the Unionists, had declared that despite the fact that the League would contest the elections as a purely Muslim body it would be free to form non-communal coalitions following the election. This statement was bound to alienate the extremely communally orientated Ittihad-i-Millat, whilst Jinnah's role as a peacemaker in the Muslim-Sikh controversy over ownership of the Shahidganj mosque in the opening months of 1936, was totally opposed to the violent methods advocated by the Ittihad-i-Millat, which was bereft of any political aim or programme, other than securing the return of Shahidganj to Muslim hands. It decided to contest the election on that platform independent of the League.

Although an entente between the Muslim League and the Ahrar Party did occur it was short-lived. The alliance did not result from a genuine desire for political co-operation, but necessity. The Ahrars needed financial support which they believed the League could provide, as by January 1936 they were bereft of funds, whilst the Muslim League was desperately in need of allies to enable it to constitute a realistic political force in the Province. Despite a refusal by the Majlis-i-Ahrar in May 1936 to accommodate the League because it anticipated that the latter would not include anti-Ahmadi propaganda in its programme, the inclusion by the League of a pledge to separate the Ahmadis from the Muslim community led to a temporary alliance.

This political honeymoon, however, was destined to failure. The Ahrars, despite their financial insecurity attempted to exploit the weakness of the League and dominate it by putting up their own members in practically every constituency to be contested, a move which nearly precipitated the resignation of the Provincial League President, Sir Muhammad Iqbal. The Provincial League attempted to counter the Ahrar manoeuvre; a sub-committee consisting of six members was appointed, including two Ahrars, to formulate a pledge which the Parliamentary Board's candidates would be required to take, and to recommend conditions governing the choice of candidates and the dissemination of propaganda. Despite the fact that the sub-committee was unanimous concerning the draft pledge requiring all candidates to follow in the Legislative Assembly the directions of the Muslim League, disagreement arose over the amount an adopted candidate should donate to the Parliamentary Board's funds. The Ahrar members favoured a payment of Rs.100, while
the rest of the committee insisted on a donation of Rs. 500. In reality the provincial Muslim League had manoeuvred to prevent Ahrar domination. Whilst it had been successful in ensuring that League policy would be carried out in the Assembly, its attempt to restrict and control the Ahrar membership, was recognised by that body as a ploy to prevent it dominating the provincial League. In consequence the Majlis-i-Ahrar broke its alliance with the Muslim League on 30 August 1936, and established an independent Ahrar Election Board.

By the autumn of 1936, therefore, Muslim opposition to the Unionist Party was fragmented and weak. Although all the parties produced remarkably similar manifestoes promising social and economic reconstruction, in reality the appeal of the Majlis-i-Ahrar and Ittihad-i-Millat was directed solely to extreme religious urban elements, the Ahrars being fanatically anti-Ahmadi, and the Ittihad-i-Millat being totally obsessed with the return of the Shahidganj mosque to the Muslim community. Neither possessed the resources necessary to launch a province-wide campaign to either popularise, or capitalise on their respective brands of fanaticism. Furthermore the Muslim League, which both Fazl-i-Husain and Sikander Hyat Khan had believed posed the greatest threat to Muslim solidarity and thereby the unity of the Unionist Party, had been rejected by all the existing Muslim parties, including the exceedingly influential Unionist group. In addition it failed miserably to capture the imagination of the Muslim people. This was reflected in the reaction of the Muslim media to Jinnah's negotiations with Fazl-i-Husain, and his subsequent attitude to the Unionist Party. Two of the most influential Muslim daily newspapers in the Province, the Eastern Times (English language) and Inqilab (Urdu), with a daily circulation of 4,000 and 7,000 respectively, opposed Jinnah's Parliamentary Board, and deprecated his attacks on the Unionist leadership, and what they considered to be the League's determination to subjugate the provincial sphere to its will.

Throughout the latter half of 1936 the Eastern Times criticised the League leader, claiming that his communal strategy was misplaced in the Punjab, and injurious to Muslims, provincially and nationally. It deplored the League's reference to the domination of provincial politics "by reactionary conservative elements in combination with a clique of men whose sole aim is to secure offices and places for themselves", claiming that the real issue was whether provincial politics should be subject to the arbitrary control of a central caucus, organised on communal lines. The Inqilab issued similar criticisms, emphasising that in contrast to the Muslim League the Unionist Party was a non-communal...
organisation, which the League wished to manipulate to enable it to enter the Legislative Assembly. The stand taken by these two large newspapers was also reflected by the much smaller Siyasat (Urdu daily, circulation 1,600), which warned its readers that Jinnah had been unable to attract the united confidence of Punjabi Muslims, and as a result he was determined to destroy the Unionist Party, on the false pretext that it consisted of henchmen of the Government.

In answer to these damming attacks, Jinnah and the League were supported by a less influential section of the press. The Ihsan and Nairang Urdu dailies (circulation 3,000 and 1,000 respectively), advised their subscribers to support League membership; the Nairang interpreted Jinnah's Parliamentary Board as an attempt to establish Muslim League parties in all of the provinces, to promote the protection of the political and religious rights of Indian Muslims. This argument was repeated by the Ihsan, which cautioned that if Muslims desired the continued existence of their community, they should support the League, and shun Unionist politicians whose main interests were geared to securing Ministries, and appointments for themselves and their friends. The reference to nepotism revealed a pro-urban and anti-rural stance on the part of the Ihsan, explaining in part this newspaper's opposition to the Unionist Party, and its support for the League, in that it accused Unionist politicians of being responsible for crushing the intelligentsia so as to enable the employment by Government of less able and poorly educated zamindars.

Championing the cause of urban as opposed to rural interests, or attempting to raise the issue of the future political security of the Muslim community, or the survival of Islam, had no real appeal to the vast majority of Punjabi Muslims. As such these themes failed to win sympathy for the League. The overwhelming majority of Muslims were rural dwellers, and their natural sympathies were rural biased. Out of a total Muslim electorate of 1,336,311, 1,152,487 (86%) voted in the Muslim rural constituencies. Also the Muslim community constituted a majority in the Punjab, and the Unionist Party was dominated by Muslims, thus arguments maintaining that Muslim political and religious life was threatened, appeared as unreal and irrelevant. Just as the premises of the pro-Jinnah press failed to excite support for the League, its provincial leadership was equally unable to inspire or influence the electorate. With the exception of Khan Bahadur Zaman Mehdi Khan and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the only two influential landlords to support the League, its membership was drawn from the urban elite and it possessed no influence in the crucial rural constituencies. Consequently
the bulk of the Muslim seats were closed to the League, which because it had failed to gain Unionist co-operation, could field only seven candidates in the provincial election. As a party therefore, it had conceded the election before it was fought.

The absence of a vigorous and united Muslim opposition assured the Unionist Party victory in the forthcoming provincial elections, particularly as the Congress Party had failed to win either the confidence or support of the Muslim masses or voters. In the Punjab the Congress was an urban capitalist and largely communal organisation. It consistently adopted a neutral stance in the Legislature with reference to measures designed to benefit agriculturists, for fear of alienating its urban following. Also Nehru's denouncement of the Communal Award during a tour of the Punjab in June 1936, further prejudiced Congress chances of attracting Muslim support: the Eastern Times, whilst it appreciated the National Congress' socio-political aims to relieve the masses from poverty and debt as outlined in its manifesto, accused the Congress of descending to the extremist level of the Hindu Mahasabha in regard to its attitude to the 'Award', a view which was reiterated by the Inqilab. The Zamindar was the only important Muslim organ (Urdu daily, circulation 6,700) to plead the National Congress cause, and advocate Muslim support for it, but its efforts were in vain, as was demonstrated by the fact that the Congress captured only two of the reserved Muslim seats (rural constituencies of Ludhiana and Kasur).

In essence, however, the Unionist Party was strong, and the other Muslim political groups and the Congress were weak because the Unionists enjoyed the monopoly of landlord support. It effectively preserved the advantage during the electioneering by curbing personal rivalries and thereby ensuring that faction would be contained to prevent it prejudicing Unionist prospects of forming a majority Ministry in combination with non-Muslim allies. To this end no official list of adopted Unionist candidates was published, and in the majority of cases the successful contender was declared to be the official Unionist candidate only after the contest had been decided. Thus the elections were largely personal combats, and not party conflicts which could have reduced the Unionist majority, consequently the outcome of the election in the rural areas was decided before the polls were conducted, the victors acceding to the Unionist camp. This practice however, on occasion, gave rise to farcical confusion, as in the case of the elected member for Ludhiana (Muhammad Hassan), who was variously described as a Congressite, Independent and Unionist.

The Unionist's electoral tactic made a farce of electioneering.
through manifestoes, as did the fact that all the parties, including the Unionist, the League and the Congress, issued very similar socio-economic propaganda, promising in the main to improve the condition of the rural masses. Though unlike the Unionist Party and the League, the Congress did propose a re-structuring of society, in that the zamindari system was to be abolished, and the feudal power of the princes restricted, these pledges made little impact in the Punjab. The Unionist Party promised that if elected it would give relief to the masses and poorest sections amongst taxpayers by cutting the cost of the administration. It claimed that industry, particularly cottage industries, would be developed, and that measures would be implemented to protect the agricultural and labouring classes from the crushing burden of debt. This declaration was meant to epitomise in the minds of rural voters a party determined to protect them from the urban credit machine, and to demonstrate that the Unionists were as concerned as the Congress with the pursuit of social reform. In the event, however, the manifesto's import in securing votes was secondary to the advantage it enjoyed through its landed membership. David Taylor has asserted that the eventual success of the Unionists resulted from the exploitation of the rural elite of feudal loyalty. Despite the undoubted existence of such loyalty, however, it would be more realistic to describe the electoral triumph which the Party experienced in 1937 as resulting from the exploitation of the large-small zamindar relationship, i.e. a combination of loyalty and feudal economic power and pressure.

In reality, the Unionist pledges were merely a 'window dressing', and were unlikely to convince any but the most gullible. Though the Unionist Party wished to pose as the protector of the poor agriculturists, it had forcibly demonstrated where its true interests lay. In the pre-election Legislative Council 23 of the 31 Unionist supporters had been large landlords, and whilst it was true that the Unionists had initially sponsored two resolutions to aid poor agriculturists - one for the exemption of uneconomic agricultural holdings from taxation, and the other recommending that land revenue should be charged on a sliding scale on the same basis as income tax - both had been defeated because the Revenue Member, the founder of the Unionist Party, did not favour them. Similarly, debt legislation initiated and supported by the Unionist group, ostensibly to safeguard the interests of the masses had been designed in fact to benefit large zamindars, who received benefits as debtors, and as creditors continued to enjoy the freedom to exploit, as the disabilities which attached to non-agriculturists did not apply to agriculturist moneylenders. Thus the Mujahid had solid grounds in asserting that
despite its proclaimed economic programme, the Unionist Party would only protect the peasants' rights, so long as they did not encroach upon the interests of the large zamindars who controlled the Party.113

Finally in considering the impact of Unionist electoral propaganda, it must be borne in mind that the electorate was chiefly confined to the landed and property-owning groups, with the rural bloc predominating. They were not as susceptible to the Unionist economic package, as the unenfranchised and depressed tenantry and labouring classes would have been. Universal adult suffrage did not exist in British India. In the Punjab only persons who fulfilled the following requirements had the right to vote under the terms of the Government of India Act, 1935: anyone who owned, or was an occupancy tenant of land assessed at not less than Rs. 5 per annum; any holder of a muafî, assessed at not less than Rs.10 per annum; any tenant of agricultural land encompassing not less than six acres of irrigated, or 12 acres of unirrigated land. In the case of landholders' constituencies, voters were restricted to those paying a minimum of Rs.500 per annum in land revenue. In addition any owner or tenant of immovable property, which included a building valued at not less than Rs. 2,000 or which had a rental value in excess of Rs.60 per annum, was entitled to vote. This privilege was also extended to any person who during the preceding financial year had been assessed for any direct municipal or direct cantonment tax of not less than Rs.50, or paid income tax, or any other direct tax levied by the District Boards. Also certain office-holders - Zaildar, Inamdar, Safed-oosâ, LâmbarDar (but not Naib or Sarbrah), and retired, pensioned and discharged officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers and men of the regular army, the British Indian Police Force, the Auxiliary Force, and the Indian Territorial Forces - were qualified to vote, provided they had accomplished a minimum of four years service. The vote was also extended to those persons who had passed the primary, or any equivalent or higher standard of education. In respect of women voters who were not qualified in their own right as property owners, tenants, etc., the franchise was restricted to the widows or wives of landed or property men, and of those office holders who were eligible to vote. Where a voter had more than one wife, only the senior wife was enfranchised.114

The result was that the entire provincial electorate was restricted to 2,686,094 persons, 80% of whom voted in the rural constituencies. It was predominantly male in composition,116 thus although in the Province as a whole only 11.4% of the entire population was enfranchised, approximately 34% of all men over the age of 20 enjoyed the vote.
Within these two categories economic qualifications prevailed (see above), thus in comparison to their fellow Punjabis, 66% of whom in the over 20 age group were unenfranchised, the vast majority of voters represented an economically privileged class. Of these the more prosperous landowners, better off tenants and urban capitalists were not conspicuous for philanthropy, thus they were not as susceptible to the Unionist socio-economic manifesto package, as the unenfranchised depressed tenantry, landless labourers, and labouring classes would have been. Also within the electoral élite there were vast differences between the personal wealth and influence of each voter. Small landowners, regardless of the fact that they had the power to vote, could not afford to ignore the views and wishes of their wealthier brethren. This was a political fact of life, unimpeded by manifesto promises.

The feudal response to demonstrating and perpetuating existing power through an alien semi-democratic machinery, was further exemplified in the irregularities which occurred, especially as in some cases the votes of influential sections of the electorate could be secured more effectively by offering immediate cash gains or preferment, rather than pledging future reform programmes. Complaints, alleging corruption of this nature were reported to the Election Commission in the case of the Muslim rural constituencies of Dera Ghazi Khan North, Bhalwal, Sheikhargarh and Karnal (all captured by Unionist adherents), amongst others. Such allegations, however, were exceedingly difficult to substantiate. Nevertheless, in the case of Dera Ghazi Khan North, the Election Commission was satisfied that Khwaja Ghulam Murtaza (successful candidate - respondent) had gained the support of an exceedingly influential bloc - the Chiefs of the Khetran tribe - and of important individuals in the constituency by offering bribes. As a result a by-election was ordered.

The only force in the Punjab which could have seriously undermined the landlords' political control, were the Pirs, the Province's spiritual élite, but in 1937, in contrast to 1946, the Unionist Party did not face any dangerous religious opposition. The Pirs, many of whom were large landlords themselves and had spiritual and family ties with the landed élite, were content that a Unionist Ministry should govern. Because of its defence of the Alienation of Land Act, and the fact that the Unionist Party was an expression of the existing power structure in the rural areas to which many of the religious élite belonged, it was not opposed by any powerful, dynamic or fanatically orientated religious party.

Fazl-i-Husain, appreciating the influence which the Pirs possessed,
was anxious to induce the more important Pirs in the Punjab to issue a statement supporting the Unionist Party. Other elements in the Unionist organisation, however, were wary of actively involving Pirs in the election campaign and thereby exciting religious sentiment in the countryside, fearing that it could prove counter-productive if some of the religious leaders chose to oppose, rather than support, the Party:

"The Ahrars have begun with an awfully vigorous propaganda... Still we don't fear if they do not begin with the villages. Villagers, you know, follow these 'Pirs' blindly... Take care of the 'Pirs'. Ask them only to keep silent on the matter of the elections. We don't require their help but they should not oppose us."

In the event, although the Pir class undoubtedly favoured the Unionist Party, the exploitation of religion did not occur on the vast scale as witnessed in 1946 (see Chapter VII below) and it was not a decisive factor in influencing the outcome of the 1937 election. Talbot has argued, however, that "The unionist victory in the 1937 elections owed much to the support it had gained from the leading pirs of the province ...". This is a misconception, which confuses the understanding of the nature of the method whereby the Party conducted its electoral campaign. In the rural areas, where admittedly the influence of the Pirs was enormous (as demonstrated in 1946), there was no viable opposition to the Unionist Party. By and large candidates fought each other on clan or family considerations, claiming Unionist membership only after the contest had been decided. Thus the active allegiance of the Pirs was not as significant as it would have been had the Unionist Party faced a serious threat to its position, as it was 'Pir support' merely bolstered the already impressive and decisive Unionist landed armoury. This hypothesis does not detract from the control which the Pirs were capable of wielding but it is apparent that when these religious leaders did intervene, it was on the side of personality, rather than party. This was dramatically demonstrated in the case of the Muslim constituency of Pind Dadan Khan. It was one of the only five rural Muslim seats which the Unionist Party failed to gain and the successful candidate, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, who stood on the Muslim League ticket, though he joined the Unionist Party almost immediately after the elections, owed his success in a large measure to the support he received from his nephew, Pir Fazl Shah of Jalalpur.

Finally in analysing the Unionist success, the role of government officials as unofficial canvassers for the Party, should not be overlooked. The official class in the rural areas enjoyed wide powers of persuasion, as assessors of land revenue, dispensers of justice,
arbitrators in property disputes, and advocates of official recognition for individual merit, through coveted honours. Sikander Hyat Khan blatantly and unashamedly conceded that "the Unionists believe that the officials of the Government [are] working for them in the districts and villages", though the Ihsan was guilty of exaggeration when it attributed the Unionist success solely to the manipulation of official influence. In reality 'official' backing merely strengthened the appeal which the Unionist Party commanded as a result of its monopoly of zamindar support, reinforced by the absence of any serious and popular religious opposition. The combination of such vital assets resulted in a Unionist landslide in the Muslim constituencies, and the acquisition of a majority of seats in the Province as a whole. Of the 84 Muslim seats in the Province the Unionist Party captured 72, 70 of which were rural constituencies. The other Muslim parties - the Muslim League, the Ittihad-i-Millat, and the Majlis-i-Ahrar - secured only two seats each, the Muslim League losing one of these when Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan defected to the Unionists, lured by a Party secretaryship. In the Punjab as a whole the Unionist Party gained 95 of the 175 seats in the Provincial Legislature, 71 of which (including Ghazanfar Ali's seat) were Muslim rural, two Muslim urban, 13 General rural and nine Special Interest seats, of which three were landholders' constituencies (the remainder representing Anglo-Indian, European, Indian Christian - two seats - and University interests). A survey of the Unionist elected membership following the 1937 election, however, emphasised that this decisive victory would not have been possible had the Party not been the vehicle of large Zamindar interests. Forty-eight of the Muslim Unionist M.L.A.s were big landlords. Moreover all the most important landed factions were represented on the Government (Unionist) benches, including the Hayats of Wah - Sikander Hyat Khan (Premier, West Punjab Landholders), Nawab Muzaffar Khan (Mianwali South); the Noon-Tiwana family group of Sargodha - Nawabzada Major Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana (Minister of Public Works, Khushab), Nawab Sir Allah Baksh Khan (Shahpur), Nawabzada Malik Muhammad Habibullah Khan (Sargodha), Nawab Malik Sir Muhammad Hayat Khan Noon (North Punjab Landholders); the Daultanas of Multan District - Nawab Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana (Parl. Secretary, Maila), Mir Maqbool Mahmood (Amritsar); the Pirs of Shah Jiwana - Syed Mubarik Ali Shah (Jhang Central); the Qizilbash clan of Lahore District - Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash (Lahore); the Kot Ghebas of Attock - Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan (Attock Central); the Mians of Baghbanpura - Mian Iftikharud-Din (Kasur), Begum Jahanara Shah Nawaz (Outer Lahore - Women); the
Qureshis of Multan - Captain Pir Ashiq Hussain (Multan); the Legharis of Muzaffargarh - Nawab Sir Muhammad Jamal Khan Leghari (Tumandars); the Khokhars of Attock - Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan (Pind Dadan Khan); the Wanbachran family of Mianwali - Captain Malik Muzaffar Khan (Mianwali South); the Gurmanis of Muzaffargarh - Mian Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani (Muzaffargarh North); the Chathas of Gujranwala - Chaudhri Nasir-ud-Din (Gujranwala North), the Gilanis of Multan - Makhdumzada Haji Sayed Muhammad Raza Shah Gilani (Shusabad) and the Mamdots of Ferozepore - Nawab Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot (Ferozepore Central). As such Peter Hardy's contention that in 1937 "Both in the general and in Muslim constituencies, the day of the old conservative and oligarchic landlord politics was, except in the new province of Sind, nearly done," is incorrect. In the Punjab landed oligarchic power remained as viable as ever, and retained the capacity to bend the Province to its political will.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. Out of a legislature of 175, 157 seats were for separate electorate constituencies. Of the latter 138 were rural constituencies, whilst of the 18 special interest seats in the Assembly, 5 were reserved for landholders, which resulted in a total rural representation of 143. See Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp.73-81, CMD.5589, IOR.

2. Although the Muslims represented 56% of the provincial population in 1931, the community under the terms of the 1935 Act had been guaranteed by separate elections only 84 seats out of a total of 175, though Muslims possessed a majority in 7 (2 women, 3 landholders, 2 labour) of the special interest constituencies. Theoretically, therefore, it was possible for a Muslim party, which captured all the reserved, and seven special interest seats, to command a small majority in the legislature. In practice, however, a development of that nature, as a result of urban-rural rivalry and factionalism was highly unlikely, as the 1937 elections demonstrated. Times of India (Bombay), 13 March 1946.


4. In the Punjab, because of the great variation in the productivity of the soil, it would have been deceptive to differentiate between large and small owners purely in acreage terms, as an owner of 500 acres of colony land was much better off than one who farmed 5,000 acres in the desert Thal. Thus the amount of land revenue paid per owner offered a much surer guide to a zamindar's status, the Land Revenue Committee decreeing in 1938 that those cultivators who paid in excess of Rs.230 per annum could be deemed to be large landlords, i.e. any owner who held at least 50 acres in a canal-colony, or more than 200 acres in an unirrigated tract. The Report of the Land Revenue Committee, 1938, Lahore 1938, p.80, Appendix I, p.1, IOR.


6. The Report of the Land Revenue Committee, 1938, Lahore, 1938, p.32 (Calvert recorded similar views in this report, see pp. 205-215), IOR.


9. Under the terms of the G.of I. Act (1919) the majority of the members (71 out of 94) of the Punjab's Legislative Council were to be elected, but the electorate was severely restricted (3.4% of population). The seventy-one elected seats were divided between special constituencies representing particular interests (i.e. University, Labour, Women, Landholders, Anglo-Indian, European) and separate communal seats, subdivided into urban and rural categories for the Muslims (5 urban, 27 rural), Hindus (7 urban, 13 rural) and Sikhs (1 urban, 11 rural). Ministers who were appointed from the elected element were given responsibility for transferred subjects, e.g. Education and Agriculture, but Finance, Law and Order remained directly under the Governor's control.

10. C. Baxter, "The People's Party vs. the Punjab "Feudalists"", Journal of Asian and African Studies, VIII, (1973), pp.167-169. (For a list of those Muslim families who dominated the political life of the Province see Appendix R.)


13. The Punjab was politically undeveloped and immature. The absence of political parties in the pre-reform period reflected the fact that the Province lacked an accredited leader. Lajpat Rai was in enforced exile in America, whilst Harkishan Lal was too preoccupied with his industrial and financial concerns to indulge in politics. Also, there was little popular support for political activity; the Punjab was the only province in British India lacking a Congress-organized Provincial Conference. Furthermore the British, by identifying their policy so closely with the interest of the landed elite, had done nothing to encourage the politicization of that traditionally pro-Government loyalist class. See *ibid.*, pp. 150-151.


20. See Tribune (Lahore), 21 April 1936; Daily Herald (Lahore) 22 April 1936; Pratap (Lahore), 22 April 1936; Sher-i-Punjab (Lahore), 7 June 1936, PPA.

21. Tribune, 18 Feb. 1936, PPA.

22. Daily Herald, 19 Feb. 1936, PPA.

23. Firoz Khan Noon to Fazl-i-Husain, 9 Aug. 1935, Fazl-i-Husain Papers, Mss. EUR.E.352/12, IOR.


25. Tribune, 14 Oct. 1936, PPA.


27. Civil and Military Gazette, 7 June 1936.

28. As Azim Husain, Fazl-i-Husain's son and biographer has explained, his father "was apprehensive that they [members of the Central Parliamentary Board] would disrupt Muslim unity in the Punjab, U.P. and Bengal, and also prevent Muslims in N.W.F.P. and Sind from standing in combination with non-Muslims to give non-communal organizations to their provinces": Azim Husain, *op.cit.*, p. 308.

29. Aga Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, telegram, 24 June 1936, Fazl-i-Husain Papers, Mss. EUR.E.352/19, IOR.

30. Fazl-i-Husain to Sikander Hyat Khan, 6 May 1936, Waheed Ahmad (Ed.), *op.cit.*, pp. 533-535.

31. Fazl-i-Husain to Aga Khan, 22 June 1936, Fazl-i-Husain Papers, Mss. EUR.E.352/19, IOR.


34. Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 1 May 1936, Copy with Z.H. Zaidi.

35. During the 1926-30 period there had been no real cohesion in the Unionist Party. There was a pronounced restiveness amongst the Muslim membership; party whips were disregarded by various feuding groups, and on one occasion a Unionist Minister was openly opposed by his party members in the Assembly. Serious personal rivalries contributed to aggravate the situation. Azim Husain, op.cit., pp. 162-271.

36. On 29 Oct. 1930 Fazl-i-Husain despondently confided to his diary, "The weak position of Muslims in the Punjab is due to their mutual jealousies. Firoz [Khan Noon] on our side, Shahabuddin supported in part by Ahmadyar [Daultana] on the other side, and Sikander Hyat supported by Ahmadyar on the third. Shahab-ud-Din is at war with both Firoz and Sikander", Waheed Ahmad (Ed.), Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-i-Husain, Lahore, 1977, p. 135; see also C. Baxter, op.cit., pp. 175-177.


38. Vir Bharat (Lahore), 13 May 1936; Daily Herald, 27 May 1936, PPA.

39. Sikander was on the Board of Directors of eleven different companies; he was Managing Director of the Wah Stone and Lime Company, and was a managing partner of a mining syndicate: Report of the Institute of Current Affairs, 1943, Lahore, 1943, p. 9, PPL.

40. Azim Husain, op.cit., p. 278.

41. Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 27 Nov. 1935, Fazl-i-Husain Papers, Mss. EUR.E.358/16, IOR.

42. Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 13 Feb. 1936; 13 May 1936; 22 May 1936, copies with Z.H. Zaidi.

43. Tribune, 5 April 1936, PPA.

44. Ibid., 2 April 1936, PPA.

45. Fazl-i-Husain to Sikander Hyat Khan, 28 May 1936, Azim Husain, op.cit., p. 332.

46. Civil and Military Gazette, 23 June 1936.

47. Ibid.


49. Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 13 May 1936, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.


52. Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 13 May 1936, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.


54. Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 22 May 1936, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.


57. Tajar (Lyallpur), 15 Feb. 1936, 21 Feb. 1936; Milap (Lahore), 16 Feb. 1936; Ihsan (Lahore), 23 Feb. 1936; Sher-i-Punjab (Lahore), 23 Feb. 1936, 7 June 1936; Tribune, 2 April 1936; Daily Herald, 22 April 1936; Pratap, 22 April 1936, PPA.


59. Civil and Military Gazette, 10 July 1936.

60. These included Chhotu Ram, the co-founder of the Unionist Party, and his rural Hindu Jat supporters, Raja Narendra Nath and his urban Hindu followers, and Sir Sunder Singh Majithia, a scion of the old Sikh landed aristocracy, and the leader of the Sikh Khalsa Party.


62. Tribune, 23 July 1936; People (Lahore) 24 July 1936; Milap (Lahore), 1 Oct. 1936, PPA.


64. People, 24 July 1936, PPA.

65. Note by Clauson, 21 Jan. 1946, L/P&J/8/470, IOR.


68. This was reflected in the election results, in that the Ahrars and the Ittihad-i-Millat, captured only two seats respectively, all urban, whilst one of the two constituencies gained by the Muslim League was urban; Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp. 75-78, Cmd. 5589, IOR.

69. Truth (Lahore), 29 June 1936, PPA.

70. Civil and Military Gazette, 6 Nov. 1936.

71. The mosque had been dedicated in 1762, but with the establishment of Sikh rule in 1772, it was confiscated and converted into a Sikh temple. Two unsuccessful attempts were made to restore the mosque to Muslims in 1854 and 1855. In 1925 with the passing of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act the question of ownership was again disputed, the Anjuman Islamia claiming ownership. A tribunal of investigation refuted the Anjuman's claim, but on 7 July 1935 the Sikhs demolished the building, and refused access to Muslims to worship on the site. Violent unrest resulted; in February 1936 Jinnah during a visit to Lahore attempted to de-fuse the situation, advising Muslims to abandon civil disobedience and violence as means of protest, and by persuading the Provincial Government to extend a general amnesty to the non-violent agitators. Jinnah's intervention lessened the tension, but no solution acceptable to both Sikhs and Muslims was found. The dispute continued until 1940, when Sikh ownership was confirmed: Eastern Times, 23 Feb. 1936, 1 March 1936, PPA; Civil and Military Gazette, 30 Jan. 1938. For detailed description of agitation see Azim Husain, op.cit., pp. 286-296.

72. Truth, 29 June 1936, PPA.

73. Civil and Military Gazette, 23 June 1936.

74. Ibid., 19 Jan. 1936.

75. Ibid., 13 May 1936.
Ibid., 12 Aug. 1936.
Chaudhri Afzal Huq and Maulvi Mazhar Ali Azhar.
Civil and Military Gazette, 21 Aug. 1937.
Ibid., 1 Sept. 1936.
Ibid., 18 Oct. 1936; Eastern Times, 13 June 1936, PPA.
Azim Hussain, op.cit., p. 308; Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Hussain, 1 May 1936, Copy with Z.H. Zaidi.
Eastern Times, 14 June 1936, 13 Oct. 1936, PPA.
Ibid., 13 June 1936, 18 Aug. 1936.
Inqilab (Lahore), 13 June 1936, 15 June 1936, 15 Oct. 1936, PPA.
Siyasat (Lahore), 16 Oct. 1936, PPA.
Nairang (Lahore), 17 June 1936, PPA.
Ihsan, 14 June 1936, 15 Oct. 1936, PPA.
Ibid., 15 Oct. 1936.
Figures and percentages calculated from Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp. 75-78, Cmd. 5589, IOR.
Zamindar (Lahore), 19 Feb. 1937, PPA.
The Communal Award of August 1932 represented a determined effort by Hoare (Secretary of State) and Willingdon (Viceroy) to appease the Muslims, and to reward them for not joining the Congress civil disobedience campaign. Consequently they agreed that separate elections would not be abandoned without the consent of the minority community, and that Muslim weightage in Hindu majority provinces would be preserved.
For Bengal and the Punjab Hoare adopted the principle laid down in the G. of I.'s reforms dispatch of 20 September 1930: separate electorates should not be capable of yielding (continued)
99. (continued) Muslim majorities, which should depend on Muslims winning some of the 'special constituency' seats. In taking this decision Hoare was supported by the Punjab Government and the Vice-roy. The Congress, however, opposed the Award as separate elections linked with the prospect of provincial autonomy, would wreck its aims to attract a substantial Muslim membership, and to dominate the proposed Federation, if the Punjab and Bengal refused to join it; R.J. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity 1917-1940, Oxford, 1974, pp. 239, 262-263.

100. Eastern Times, 6 June 1936; 26 Aug. 1936, PPA.
101. Inqilab, 28 Aug. 1936, PPA.
103. Zamindar, 25 Aug. 1936, PPA.
105. Azim Husain, op.cit., p. 318; 48 of the 75 Muslim Unionist M.L.A.s elected in 1937 were large zamindars: Civil and Military Gazette, 1 July 1938.
106. The support of Chhotu Ram, the Hindu Jat leader, assured that any future Unionist Ministry would enjoy non-Muslim support. To emphasise Chhotu Ram's commitment to Unionism, and its non-communal creed, the Party engineered his election as President of the Legislative Council in October 1936. As a result of the Jat leader's co-operation, the Unionists were able to capture 13 General rural seats in 1937: Tribune, 17 Oct. 1936, PPA; Civil and Military Gazette, 23 Oct. 1936; Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp. 73-74, Cmd. 5589, IOR.
110. Manifesto of the Punjab Unionist Party, Lahore, 1936, Fazl-i-Husain Papers, MSS. EUR.E.352, Box 3, IOR.
113. Mujahid (Lahore), 24 March 1936, PPA.
114. The Punjab Government Gazette (Extraordinary Issue), 27 Sept. 1945, I/P8/472, IOR.
115. Total Provincial Electorate - 2,686,094. Total Rural Electorate (including landholders listed in the 'special interest' group) - 2,150,055. Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp. 75-81, IOR.
116. David Taylor has demonstrated that male voters predominated throughout British India as a whole, accounting for 85.1% of the entire electorate. Thus although only 11.5% of the national population was enfranchised, 36% of males over the age of 20 had the vote. David Taylor, 'The Reconstruction and Use of the Statistics of the Provincial Elections of 1937', Bulletin of Quantitative and Computer Methods in South Asian Studies, 2, March 1974, p. 20.

117. Total Population of the Punjab (1931) - 23,580,852
Male Population (20+) of the Punjab (1931) - 7,906,336
- Census of India 1931, Punjab Pt. I, pp. 2-7, Part II, Table VII, p. 70, IOL.


119. Corroborating evidence was found in the form of signed contracts or agreements between Ghulam Murtaza and those he had sought to influence: ibid., p. 778.

120. The Pirs of Jalalpur (Jhelum); of Makhad (Attock); of Jahanian Shah (Shahpur); of Rajoan (Jhang); of Shah Jiwana (Jhang); of Taunsa Sharif (Derawaz Khan); Pir Aqiq Hussain of Multan, and Pir Budhan Shah of Multan; see C. Baxter, op.cit., pp. 168-169.

121. The Hayats of Wah were related to the Qureshis of Multan (Pir Aqiq Hussain), while the maternal grandfather of Pir Fazl Shah of Jalalpur was the leading Rajput chief of the district, and the Pir's uncle was Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, a member of the influential Khokar family of Jhelum. Also Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, the father of Khizar Hayat, was the murid (disciple) of Pir Mehr Ali Shah: Ibid., p. 172; D. Gilmartin, 'Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab', Modern Asian Studies, 13, 1979, pp. 497, 509.

122. The two Muslim religious parties in the Province - the Itthid-i-Millat and the Majlis-i-Ahrar were urban based; both failed to appeal to the rural peasantry, or exploit their religious sentiments. Also both organisations had alienated the Pirs, the former as a result of the anti-pir, anti-sufi mentality of its leader Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, and the latter on account of its pro-Congress stand in the period preceding its abortive union with the Muslim League: Truth, 29 June 1936, PPA; D. Gilmartin, op.cit., pp. 499-501.

123. Gurmani, in a letter to Fazl-i-Husain, agreed to the latter's suggestion that the important Pirs of the Province should be induced to issue a statement in support of the Unionist Party: Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani to Fazl-i-Husain, 19 June 1936; Waheed Ahmad (Ed.), op.cit., (Letters) pp. 592-594.


125. Instances of religious persuasion being used in 1936-37 to influence voters were rare, and where such manifestations did occur, it was usually at the instigation of persons other than Pirs, often members of the local ulema - as was the case in the constituencies of Amritsar City, Ambala and Simla; Abdul Hameed, op.cit., pp. 464-471, 550-554, 564, 656-664, 685-692.

130. Ihsan, 18 Feb. 1937, PPA.
131. In the Official 'Return' the Unionists were attributed with 73 Muslim seats. One of these, however, (Pind Dadan Khan), had been captured by Ghazanfar Ali Khan on the Muslim League ticket, though he subsequently joined the Unionist Party: Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp. 75-80; Civil and Military Gazette, 16 Feb. 1937.
132. Civil and Military Gazette, 1 July 1938.
CHAPTER V

SIKANDER HYAT KHAN, JINNAH AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE -
THE UNEASY ALLIANCE, 1937-1942

The elections of 1937 had placed the Unionist Party in power in the Punjab and secured the Premiership for Sikander Hyat Khan the Unionist leader. Sikander realised, however, that in order to maintain his own position and Unionist control over provincial affairs, the Party had to be safeguarded against factionalism, a condition which was ever present amongst Muslim Unionists. Accordingly he sought to bolster the stability of his Ministry through the distribution of offices and honours, and to strengthen its following in the Assembly by creating a coalition embracing other political parties. In pursuit of this objective Sikander in October 1937 concluded a pact with Jinnah, the President of the A.I.M.L. Despite the humiliating defeat which the League had experienced at the all-India polls and in the Punjab, Sikander believed, that if it was permitted to function unchecked in the Punjab, Jinnah would eventually seek to enhance League prospects by exploiting any differences which existed amongst Muslim Unionists to the detriment of party unity. His agreement with Jinnah effectively thwarted this possibility as it placed the Punjab Muslim League firmly under Unionist control. The national League, however, remained independent of Unionist direction, and in order to restrain it from pursuing policies detrimental to Unionism Sikander sought a national rôle to limit Jinnah's influence, and to effect a dominant measure of control over all-India Muslim politics. This quest inevitably brought him into conflict with the League President, and though Sikander remained the undisputed master of the Punjab until his death in December 1942, he did not achieve any measure of success in respect of his national ambitions. In attempting to undermine Jinnah's leadership he opposed a man whose political dexterity and tactical skills far outshone his own, and he was further handicapped by the fact that the Viceroy, Linlithgow, was committed for strategical reasons to Jinnah's continued domination of the A.I.M.L., and who as a result refused to countenance Sikander's intrusions in the national sphere.

In fact the Unionist election victory was not sufficient in itself to maintain the Unionists in power. The Muslim wing of the Party constit-
tuated a loose structure of family and landed alliances rather than a
dynamic political force, united by a strong ideology. Nor was there a
tradition of collective responsibility and strict adherence to party
discipline. Its history had been marked by factionalism even in the pre-
election period, when Sikander and his associates had challenged Fazl-
i-Husain. Sikander, who was only too aware of such rivalries, feared
that they could precipitate a ministerial crisis, or even cost the Party
its majority in the Legislature.

That Sikander was determined to reduce this danger, and weld the
existing rival factions, such as the Noon-Tiwana clan of Sargodha and
the Daultanas of Mailsi, into a moderately cohesive whole is apparent
from his judicious distribution of cabinet and parliamentary posts.
They were clearly intended to achieve a balance between the Muslim
groups in his party, and to secure a commitment from the most influ­
ential politicians in each, and thereby their followers, to the survival
of his administrations; hence the appointments of Khizar Hayat Khan
Tiwana as Minister of Public Works and Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana as the
Unionist Chief Whip (Feb. 1957). Sikander also supported and secured the election
of Chaudhri Sir Shahab-ud-Din, a former rival as Speaker of the Punjab
Assembly. Similarly Parliamentary Secretaryships were conferred on
Sheikh Faiz Muhammad, Begum Shah Nawaz and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan,
whilst Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, Syed Amjad Ali Shah and Nawabzada Muhammad
Faiyaz Ali Khan were installed as Parliamentary Private Secretaries. By
these means Sikander secured the co-operation of a cross-section of the
most influential Muslim political factions including the Noons and
Tiwanas, the Daultanas, the Arain Mians of Baghbanpura, the Gurmanis of
Muzaffargarh and the Khokars of Jhelum. In addition the appointment
given to Ghazanfar Ali, who abandoned the Muslim League as a result,
deprived that organisation of the only landed support it possessed in
the Assembly.

Also in selecting office bearers Sikander shrewdly rewarded his
non-Muslim supporters. Thus whilst the appointments of Chhotu Ram as
Minister for Development, and of Tikka Ram and Sardar Gopal Singh as
Parliamentary Secretary and Parliamentary Private Secretary emphasised
the non-communal character of the Ministry, they also acknowledged the
substantial contribution which the Hindu Jat contingent led by Chhotu
Ram had made to the initial Unionist majority of 15 seats, in that they
had captured 13 constituencies for the Unionist Party.

Despite the presence of these Hindu Jats, and of four Unionist repre­
sentatives from the minor communities (one Anglo-Indian, one European,
two Indian Christians), the Party was dominated by the Muslim element,
as 78 of the original 95 Unionist M.L.As. were Muslims. Consequently it remained highly vulnerable to the possible development of factionalism. In order to combat this the Premier sought to increase the strength of the Ministry in the Legislature through the inclusion of non-Muslim, non-Unionist parties, to reduce the risk of the Party losing its majority should a split occur in the Muslim wing. In pursuing this objective Sikander was aided by the fact that two influential minority leaders - Sir Sunder Singh Majithia and Raja Narendra Nath - were anxious to reach an understanding with the Unionists. Majithia, the leader of the Sikh Khalsa National Board Party, had been instructed by his followers to take whatever action he considered necessary to ensure that their party shared in the formation of the Ministry. It was a natural desire considering that the Khalsa in common with the Unionist Party was rural based, and therefore anxious to pursue in partnership with the Unionist Government an economic programme reflecting the interests of the majority of its members. Sikander welcomed this development for not only were the Sikhs the only important minority community which remained unrepresented on the Unionist benches, but the Khalsa Party was the major Sikh organisation in the Assembly, and it was considered to be far less communal than its main political contender, the Sikh Akali Party. Accordingly on 1 March 1937 Khalsa support for the Unionist Government was assured by the appointment of Majithia as Minister of Revenue and the accommodation of two of his Khalsa associates, Sardar Ujjal Singh and Sardar Jagjit Singh as Parliamentary Secretary and Parliamentary Private Secretary respectively.

The resulting coalition represented, apart from the Premier's tactical motives an alliance of rural economic interests. The merger which took place between the Unionists and Raja Narendra Nath's supporters, however, occurred for completely different reasons. Although the Raja was a wealthy landlord, he controlled a contingent of ten urban Hindu politicians who had formed themselves into the Punjab Nationalist Progressive Party (P.N.P.P.) in February 1937. This group desired to work with the Unionist majority in the hope that it would be able to exercise a restraining influence over future Unionist legislation, which was generally expected to favour rural at the expense of urban interests. Sikander for his part was anxious to placate Narendra Nath as he had previously threatened to invoke the special responsibilities of the Governor to protect minority affairs if the Ministry exhibited any anti-urban bias. Thus this political marriage between the pro-rural Unionist-Khalsa coalition and the P.N.P.P., resulting as it did from conflicting motives, was doomed to failure. Although an alliance was
concluded in April 1937\textsuperscript{21} it was short-lived. The eventual rupture was precipitated in October 1938 by the Government's Registration of Money-lenders Bill.\textsuperscript{22} In spite of an appeal by Narendra Nath to the Governor the bill became law, consequently the P.N.P.P. joined the opposition benches.\textsuperscript{23}

Despite the fact that the association of the P.N.P.P. with the Administration proved to be an uneasy alliance, the inclusion of that Party and the Khalsa group in the Unionist coalition was an achievement on Sikander's part, in that it increased the initial Unionist majority of 15 to 65, as by April 1937 the Premier commanded the allegiance of 120 M.L.A.s in a House of 175. Thus the Ministry had been substantially bolstered against the possibility of it losing its over-all majority should any Muslim defections occur. The eventual withdrawal of the P.N.P.P. did nothing to damage this stability, because by the time it occurred, the Premier had neutralised the Muslim League in the Province, preventing it from becoming a serious focus for Muslim opposition to the Ministry, or the vehicle for disaffected Muslim Unionists.

Sikander had acted at the Lucknow session of the A.I.M.L. held in October 1937 to contain any future League threat, by concluding a formal agreement with Jinnah, known as the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. Under the terms of the 'Pact' Sikander undertook to advise all the Muslim Unionists to join the A.I.M.L.; the Provincial League Parliamentary Board was to be reconstituted to function under Unionist control; Muslim Unionist candidates were to contest all future elections on the A.I.M.L. ticket, on the understanding that following such elections they would remain members of the Unionist Party.\textsuperscript{24} The most important commitment, however, from the point of view of Sikander's League strategy, concerned his pledge that Muslim Unionists would support Jinnah in all-India politics, in return for which the A.I.M.L. would refrain from interfering in the provincial sphere - there the position and ascendancy of the Unionist Party would remain unchanged.\textsuperscript{25}

Penderel Moon, a former I.C.S. officer in the Punjab cadre, has attributed another motive for Sikander seeking a pact with Jinnah. Though he recognised correctly that the Premier was concerned to prevent the A.I.M.L. from fermenting factionalism and resultant fragmentation amongst Muslim Unionists, he has suggested that there already existed a strong desire on the part of the Muslim membership of the Party for a political accommodation with the League which pressurised the Premier into coming to terms with Jinnah.\textsuperscript{26} This interpretation, however, suggests that both Jinnah and the A.I.M.L. enjoyed a much greater degree of support in 1937 amongst Muslim Unionist M.L.A.s than was actually the
case. This is apparent from the fact that by December 1937 no Muslim Unionist had formally joined the League in protest over the Provincial League's claim that as a consequence of Sikander's agreement with Jinnah the Unionist Party was subordinate to the A.I.M.L. Even those Muslim Unionists who eventually signed League membership forms in February 1938 added the proviso that their affiliation was to remain subject to the terms of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. Thus it was Sikander and not Jinnah who commanded the loyalty of the Muslim Unionists. In fact Jinnah did not possess any real power in the Punjab, his supporters were limited to a small group of urban Muslim politicians, only one of whom - Barkat Ali - held a seat in the Legislature. Consequently Sikander had not been forced to accommodate Jinnah, rather he had exploited the weakness of the A.I.M.L. in the Punjab to ensure that he could dictate the course Unionist - League relations would follow rather than leave the process to the arbitration of time.

Even so other considerations had shaped Sikander's League policy. He was opposed to the idea of Federation as envisaged by the 1935 Act because he believed that it would lead to the complete domination of the Subcontinent and thereby the Muslims by the Hindu-controlled Congress: the Act had guaranteed to Muslims only 33 1/3% of the seats in the Council of State and the Federal Assembly, relegating the community to the position of a permanent minority. The Premier's conviction had been shaped to a great extent by the Congress's treatment of the A.I.M.L. in the immediate post-election period. No Congress - League electoral pact had existed, but the A.M.I.L. leaders had produced a manifesto which was in broad accord with the Congress programme. Through this tactic the League leadership hoped to share in government in the Hindu majority provinces, but the Congress Party which enjoyed overwhelming majorities in seven of the 11 provinces in British India was under no political pressure to accommodate Muslim Leaguers, and as such it was prepared to include in its administrations only those Muslims who were Congressites. The Premier's apprehension, concerning Congress, was further aggravated by Nehru's (Congress President, 1936-37) attitude during his visit to the Punjab during the autumn of 1937. Emerson, the Governor of the Punjab, noted that the outstanding impression created by Nehru had been one of domination and arrogance:

"It is this domineering and arrogant spirit which is causing most bitter resentment and which affected the Muslims most at Lucknow. I think it strongly influenced Sikander in taking the step which he has taken." Sikander re-affirmed this view when he informed Craik, Emerson's successor, in October 1940 that one of the reasons he and his Muslim supporters
joined the A.I.M.L. was to consolidate Muslim opinion vis-à-vis the Congress, and to impress upon the British that Muslim claims could not be ignored in the framing of any new constitution for India.\(^{34}\)

M.A.H. Ispahani (M.L.A. Bengal; Member, A.I.M.L. Working Committee, 1941-47) an ardent Jinnliite, though aware of Sikander's national concern regarding the Congress, has attempted to interpret the Sikander-Jinnah Pact in the most favourable light for the A.I.M.L., which according to Ispahani had attracted a wide following in the Punjab by October 1937. In fact Ispahani has claimed that Sikander urgently needed League support to counter the mass-contact programme which the Congress had launched in all the provinces.\(^{35}\) Such an explanation, however, is naive and inaccurate; in fact it was Jinnah who was extremely anxious to gain the support of the Muslim Unionist group.\(^{36}\) The 1937 elections had emphasised that the Muslim League was 'all-Indian' in name only. Neither Jinnah nor his organisation enjoyed any substantial popularity nor could they seriously claim to represent the Indian Muslims in future negotiations of a national character.\(^{37}\) Its poor performance at the polls clearly revealed that it possessed no real power to challenge the Congress at the all-India level, while in the provincial sphere the Unionist Party had already established its ascendancy over the Congress which had captured only 15 of the seats in the Provincial Assembly.\(^{38}\) Moreover following the election the Congress did not pose any threat to the Unionists as it remained firmly identified with minority urban interests,\(^{39}\) and had failed to wean any non-Muslim, pro-Unionist leaders such as Chhotu Ram or Sunder Singh Majithia to its side. Consequently Sikander did not need the A.I.M.L. to shore up the Unionist political fortress.

In reality the Pact gave substance to the A.I.M.L.'s claim to be a national organisation; thus the League, and not the Unionist Party, was the main beneficiary. As Choudhry Khaliquzzaman (M.L.A., U.P. 1936-45, Member of A.I.M.L., Working Committee) has conceded. "No one can deny that without this action on the part of Sir Sikander the Muslim League fight would have been confined to minority provinces alone...".\(^{40}\) The Punjab Premier's support for the League precipitated similar declarations by the Muslim Premiers of Bengal and Assam (Fazlul Huq and Sadullah Khan) and as Professor Coupland recorded "The League had thus suddenly acquired a prestige among Moslems throughout India such as it had never enjoyed before...".\(^{41}\)

Sikander had been central to the process of rejuvenating the League at the national level, and as such this gave him tremendous power over the organisation in the Punjab, which helps to explain why his rapprochement with Jinnah did not unduly alarm his non-Muslim supporters, whom he had prepared for the move through discussions with Chhotu Ram,\(^{42}\) and
through the columns of the Civil and Military Gazette.\(^43\) Having con-
cluded the understanding with Jinnah, Sikander used the tremendous advan-
tage he had gained by being instrumental in repairing the fortunes of 
the A.I.M.L. to achieve his objective of preventing the League from be-
coming a focus of Muslim anti-Unionist opposition. Jinnah seems to have 
appreciated and accepted Sikander's strategy, and the provincial impli-
cations for the League as a result of the Pact. Subsequent events proved 
that he was prepared to sacrifice the existing loyal local League, and 
abdicate control over it in favour of Sikander, in order to sustain the 
ilusion of a united, national Muslim League, the presence of which was 
esential to substantiate his claims to be the leader of the Indian 
Muslims. When for instance Barkat Ali, the Secretary of the Punjab 
Muslim League, issued a statement in October 1937 to the effect that the 
'Pact' represented a complete surrender on the part of the Unionist 
Party to the A.I.M.L., Jinnah was not prepared to substantiate the 
claim. Sikander, in a letter of protest over Barkat Ali's assertion, 
seized the opportunity to impress on Jinnah and thereby the local League, 
the total dominance of the Unionist Party over League affairs:

"I hope you would kindly inform Sir Mohammad Iqbal 
[President, Punjab Muslim League] that one of the con-
ditions on which I agreed to advise the Muslim Unionists 
to join the League was that we should have a controlling 
voice in the provincial League organisations. Another 
thing which you might mention ... is that the present 
Unionist Party will continue and function as at present 
and that the only change contemplated by us was that the 
Muslim Unionist members will become members of the Muslim 
League and Malik Barkat Ali will join the Unionist Party."\(^45\)

Jinnah's failure to refute Sikander's claim, or offer any support 
to Barkat Ali caused Ghulam Rasul (Financial Secretary, Provincial 
Muslim League) to complain bitterly to the A.I.M.L. President that the 
'Pact' was tantamount to a sell-out of his loyal supporters in the 
Punjab. He criticised the fact that seven of the 11 seats reserved for 
Punjab Leaguers on the Central Parliamentary Board had been allotted to 
Unionists, whilst only three had been given to members of the Provincial 
League. Neither K.B. Malik Zaman Mehdi Khan, the Deputy President of 
the Punjab Muslim League, nor Rasul himself figured in the list. \(^46\) Iqbal 
also wrote to Jinnah in similar vein, stressing that if the 'Pact' was 
allowed to proceed it would place the local League completely at the 
mercy of the Unionists. Whilst Iqbal was not unduly concerned by the 
fact that the 'Pact' had permitted the establishment of Unionist control 
over the Provincial League's Parliamentary Board, he thoroughly depre-
cated Sikander's desire to orchestrate "a complete change in the office 
holders of the League..." and to place "the finances of the League..."
under the control of "his men":

"All this to my mind amounts to capturing the League and then killing it ....... I cannot take the responsibility of handing over the League to Sir Sikandar and his friends."\(^{47}\)

Iqbal, however, had no choice in the matter; his pleas failed to move Jinnah, or persuade him to protect the 'Old Guard' of the Provincial Muslim League. Jinnah was not in a strong enough position to challenge the Unionists, nor was he prepared to sacrifice his alliance with them. In replying to Iqbal's and Ghulam Rasul's complaints, whilst Jinnah avoided any detailed discussion of the terms of the Pact, he made it perfectly clear that he was prepared to accept Unionist dominance of League affairs in the Punjab, and he virtually ordered Iqbal and his colleagues to resign themselves to it:

"Once the Muslim members of the Unionist Party or any Mussalman who becomes a leaguer [sic] and pledges himself to the creed, Policy and Programme, he is no longer any thing else but a leaguer ... After that there is no such thing as this group or that group, or that party or this party, because then it really means various cliques."\(^{48}\)

Abandoned by Jinnah, the Punjab League was isolated, and completely at the mercy of Sikander. One gesture of defiance remained to it but that proved ineffective. In order to re-organise the Provincial Leagues, and to affiliate them with the central body the A.I.M.L. asked the Local Leagues to furnish by 15 March 1938 the names of all office-bearers and details of their various branches to a sub-committee consisting of Ismail Khan (prominent Muslim Leaguer from U.P.) and Liaquat Ali Khan (Secretary, A.I.M.L.). The Provincial Leagues were also asked to nominate representatives for the Council of the A.I.M.L.. Accordingly the Punjab Muslim League recommended 19 nominees, none of whom were Unionists, as none of the latter had so far accepted League membership.\(^{49}\) In bypassing the Unionists in this way the Punjab League had hoped to outmanoeuvre Sikander and establish its independence by placing its own stalwarts on the A.I.M.L. Council. Jinnah, however, could not permit the ruse to succeed, and the local League's recommendations were rejected on the grounds that its constitution was not in accord with that of the Central League.\(^{50}\) Furthermore in April 1938 the A.I.M.L. refused affiliation to the existing Punjab Muslim League, and a committee of 30 members, 22 of whom were to be appointed by Sikander, was empowered by Jinnah to organise a new Provincial League.

Batalwi in recalling these events in his work 'Iqbal ke Akiri do sal' has claimed that Liaquat Ali Khan, who was very sympathetic to Sikander, was instrumental in engineering this rebuttal,\(^{52}\) but it could
not have been executed without Jinnah's approval. It is certainly true
that as a large landholder in the U.P. and the Karnal District of the
Eastern Punjab, and the brother of a Unionist M.L.A., Liaquat did possess
a vested interest in the Unionist Party, but Jinnah had a greater invest­
ment; his credibility as an all-India leader would have suffered immeas­
urably if he had supported the 'Old Guard' in the Punjab, and thereby
forfeited the Unionist alliance. Consequently the Punjab Muslim League
ultimately fell victim to Jinnah's ambition and appreciation of political
necessities and realities, and Sikander's determination to manipulate
the hold he had over Jinnah to thwart Muslim League interference in the
Punjab.

Sikander's ascendancy over the Punjab League was established. Dedi­
cated 'old leaguers' were removed from office to be replaced by Unionist
sympathisers; Iqbal had been superseded in March 1938 by Nawab Shahnawaz
Khan of Mamdot, an extremely influential Unionist landlord. The removal
of Iqbal, who at the time was critically ill, was reputedly achieved by
Mamdot's promise to Barkat Ali of fiscal support for the Provincial
League, the finances of which were exhausted. By June 1939 Unionist
adherents had also been appointed to the posts of Secretary (Mian Ramzan
Ali), Organising Secretary (Mahammad Ali Jaafari) and Financial Secret­
ary (Mian Amir-ud-Din). Under Sikander's 'patronage' the local League
was allowed to stagnate to the point of disintegration; nearly two years
after the conclusion of the Sikander - Jinnah Pact there were only six
district and city Muslim Leagues in the Province, as compared to 27
district Leagues, and 104 primary branches which had functioned pre­
viously.

Despite Sikander's victory Barkat Ali continued to strive to free
the League from the Unionist morass. His criticisms of Sikander's neg­
lect of League affairs helped to give birth, in June 1939, to the Punjab
Muslim League Radical Party. This organisation publicly declared its
intent to "combat the rising influence of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan with
the Punjab Muslim League", insisting that

"Neither the Congress nor British Imperialism is the
real enemy of the Muslim League movement in the Punjab.
The real danger ... is from those who are now dominating
it ... under the cloak of friendship."

The emergence of this group, combined with Barkat Ali's continued
voluble dissatisfaction, compelled the A.I.M.L. to take note of the un­
satisfactory state of the Punjab League, but its impotence in the Prov­
ince dictated that it adopt a cautious, reconciliatory, and in the final
analysis, ineffectual approach to the problem. Especially as urban
politicians and movements, as epitomised by Barkat Ali and the 'Radicals'
could not intimidate Sikander, because the rural areas, the power-base of provincial politics, remained firmly in the Unionists' grip. Thus although in August 1939 the A.I.M.L. Council considered a resolution calling for the dissolution of the Unionist controlled Punjab League Organising Committee on account of its incompetence, Liaquat Ali Khan ensured that it would not be carried. He was determined to prevent any action which would cost the A.I.M.L. its Unionist support, consequently at his suggestion Sikander was given until 15 November 1939 to establish a viable League in the Punjab, after which time a sub-committee consisting of the Raja of Mahmudabad (M.L.A., U.P., Member Working Committee, A.I.M.L.), Nawab Ismail Khan and Khaliquzzaman would decide whether the new provincial body would be affiliated to the Central League. The Punjab Premier, confident that Jinnah was unable to act against him, did nothing to repair the fortunes of the Provincial League, an omission which caused Barkat Ali to attempt to launch an organisation independent of Unionist control, which he hoped would be recognised by the A.I.M.L. as the official League in the Punjab. Sikander, however, defeated Barkat Ali's manoeuvre; he informed Khaliquzzaman that he had no intention of recognising Barkat Ali's association, and he alleged that the majority of the branches which the latter had claimed to have founded did not exist. The investigations of the Mahmudabad Committee corroborated the Premier's allegation, as it was discovered that many of the branches cited by Barkat Ali were "totally bogus". The Committee had no option, therefore, but to accept and endorse Sikander's continuing control over the Punjab Muslim League. The result was the strangulation of that body; no wonder that it was not until November 1942 that the first annual session of the Provincial League was convened, and that almost two years after Sikander's death it remained an ineffective body, Mumtaz Daultana (General Secretary, Punjab Muslim League) ruefully admitting in July 1944 that most of the district leagues in the Province "had existence only on paper."

Jinnah was totally unable to reverse this trend. The power which Sikander enjoyed over the League President in the provincial sphere was further demonstrated in March 1940. League opinion had been outraged by Sikander's harsh treatment of the Khaksar movement in the Punjab: in March 1940 the Khaksars ('humble ones') - a militant Muslim organisation founded by Allama Mashriqi in 1931 - had been banned on Sikander's orders following clashes with the police which had resulted in the deaths of 36 Khaksars. No less than six resolutions condemning the Punjab Premier's action had been tabled for discussion by the annual session of the A.I.M.L. scheduled to convene in Lahore at the end of March. Consequently Sikander
warned Jinnah that if as a result any steps were taken to censure either his Government or himself then he and his Muslim followers would resign from the League. Jinnah bowed to Sikander's threat. At the Lahore session of the A.I.M.L. he directed the delegates to accept Sikander's statement, in which the latter claimed that malign forces had attempted to exploit the Khaksar incident in order to discredit him and disrupt League unity, after which Jinnah ruled that no further discussion was necessary on the subject. Jinnah's compliance in the matter caused the Punjab Governor to observe correctly,

"His primary objective was, of course, to preserve unity in the League, and I do not suppose that he was actuated by any particular consideration for Sikander or his Ministry."

By the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, therefore, Sikander had expanded the strength of his Ministry in the Assembly, subjugated the Provincial Muslim League and compromised Jinnah. In order to maintain his own pre-eminence, however, he had been careful also to appeal to and satisfy the personal vanities of many of his Unionist supporters; by the time the New Year's Honours List was announced in January 1939, over one-third of the Unionist M.L.As. had been 'rewarded' with titles. The importance which Sikander attached to this exercise can be gauged from the fact that two years after first taking office he was forced to work a fourteen-hour day because, as Craik revealed, in addition to conducting the administration, he was obliged to consider requests for patronage from M.L.As. who regarded the acquisition of honours and honorary appointments as legitimate recompense for the expenses they had incurred in contesting the elections.

In spite of the undoubted ascendancy which Sikander enjoyed in the Punjab as a consequence of his policies and actions, some British commentators have propagated the erroneous view that he exhibited a degree of weakness in his relationship with Jinnah, tantamount to surrender. In reality Sikander conducted a concerted, though largely unsuccessful campaign against Jinnah at the national level, concurrent with his provincial strategy. Essentially he sought to diminish the A.I.M.L. President's influence to further safeguard his own standing in the Punjab by promoting his own prospects as a contender for the mantle of national Muslim leadership. Broadly speaking the battle Sikander and Jinnah waged centred around two issues - the attitude which the Muslim League should adopt regarding the assistance, if any, it should offer to the British during the Second World War, and their respective concepts of a national policy to protect and promote Muslim interests regarding future constitutional developments. Their views on these matters were irreconcilably
opposed, as both advanced conflicting programmes which each believed
would strengthen their respective position against the other. Also to
begin with Sikander was encouraged in pursuing this quest by the belief
that Jinnah's control within the A.I.M.L. was diminishing.\(^66\) Jinnah,
however, was far from being a spent force, and whilst political necessity
dictated that he should resign himself for the time being to a subservient rôle in the Punjab, he could not, and did not, permit Sikander to
erode his dominance or damage his prestige in the national sphere.

In resisting Sikander's intrusion at the all-India level Jinnah
possessed the tremendous advantage of having concluded a secret understand­ing with the Viceroy, Linlithgow, a factor which dissuaded the
latter from encouraging Sikander's extra-Punjab ambitions at Jinnah's
expense. In fact the Viceroy and League President were collaborators,
united by their common fear of the Indian National Congress. From the
latter half of 1939 Jinnah and the Viceroy sought to protect their res­
pective positions. Linlithgow wished to deny mounting Congress pressure
for radical political reforms, which crystallised in October 1939 in a
demand for immediate independence for India as the basis for securing
the country's willing participation in the war.\(^67\) Conversely Jinnah
needed to destroy the Congress claim to represent all the Indian com­
nunities, the Muslims included, in order to maintain an independent iden­
tity for the A.I.M.L. The League President was also motivated by his
desire to reinforce his position against the intrigues of Sikander.

The foundations for his relationship with the Viceroy had been laid
in August 1938 when Jinnah had secretly advocated British - League col­
laboration to prevent the Congress from embarrassing either party; he
suggested to Brabourne (Governor of Bengal, acting Governor-General)
that the British 'should make friends with the Muslims by "protecting"
them in the Congress Provinces and that, if we did that the Muslims
would "protect" us at the Centre.'\(^68\) In March 1939 in a further attempt
to solicit the Viceroy's support Jinnah had confided to Linlithgow that
he was not averse to the continuation of British rule. He stated that
it was uncertain whether or not the British would leave India, and, in
such circumstances, though the Muslims had to show themselves to be as
nationalistic as any other community by abusing the rulers loudly and
publicly, they might co-operate with the British behind the scenes as
long as the latter did not abdicate power.\(^69\) This expressed preference
for British, as opposed to Congress, rule was expanded by Jinnah in May
1939, when he stressed to Linlithgow India's dependence on the British,
and his conviction that those who had pressed for political reform had
not considered the matter carefully, but had been swept along by a
"natural desire for home rule" and an "equally natural objection ... to
government by aliens". Jinnah also intimated to the Viceroy his belief
that India was not "competent to run a democracy...", and that he could
see no solution to the problems facing the country "should the British
depart." 70

When, therefore, in September 1939 Jinnah sought Linlithgow's aid
to contain Sikander, and prevent him from disrupting League unity over
the contentious issue of Muslim support for the war, the Viceroy already
regarded the League President as a potentially useful ally. Sikander in
fact had pledged that the Punjab would assist the war effort before the
A.I.M.L. had made its views known. Jinnah had hoped to use the issue to
exact concessions from the Government of India, having publicly declared
in September 1939 that A.I.M.L. assistance would only be forthcoming if
Britain took "Muslim India into its confidence through their accredited
organisation - the All-India Muslim League...", and would agree not to
permit any constitutional advance without the consent of the League. 71

Sikander's pledge, therefore, threatened to undermine Jinnah's strategy.
In discussing this conflict with the Viceroy, however, Jinnah was careful
not to depreciate Sikander's loyalty, but he pointed out that whilst he
privately shared the Punjab leader's sentiments, as a public figure he
could not emulate them. 72 It was a valid argument for if Jinnah had
endorsed Sikander's pledge he would have exposed himself to an immediate
Congress charge that he had betrayed the nationalist cause in support of
an imperialistic war. 73 In spite of the inconsistency between his
private utterances and public declaration, Jinnah had attempted to re-
assure the Viceroy sufficiently to dissuade him from sponsoring Sikander
as a rival spokesman for Muslim India - a rôle which Jinnah emphasised
was beyond the Punjab Premier's capabilities:

"Sikander alone could not, he [Jinnah] assured me
[Linlithgow], deliver the goods.... Mr. Jinnah again
pressed me to help him with Sikander." 74

Linlithgow's desire to cultivate a united League as a counter to
the Congress caused the Viceroy to meet Jinnah's request concerning
Sikander, and to sustain his contention that the A.I.M.L. should be solely
responsible for expressing the Muslim point of view. The degree of
understanding which as a result existed between the British and League
leaders was apparent from Linlithgow's report of a meeting he had with
Jinnah on 5 October 1939:

"he thanked me ... for what I had done to assist him
in keeping his party [A.I.M.L.] together and expressed
great gratitude for this. I said that it was clearly
unsatisfactory that while one of the two great parties
was well-organised and well-equipped to pursue its objectives ... that the other, equally of great importance, should be masked ... by any failure to secure an adequate mouthpiece. It was in the public interest that the Muslim point of view should be fully and completely expressed."

Political necessity had driven the Viceroy and Jinnah into each others' arms. Linlithgow was an ardent imperialist in spite of his championing of the 1935 Act, whilst Jinnah despite his emergence as a nationalist leader, preferred the continuation of British rule to the prospect of an independent Hindu-dominated India. In urging Indian leaders to accept Federation and Dominion status as the only possible constitutional goal, Linlithgow sought to harness the deadlock which he knew would persist from the Congress refusal to abandon its quest for complete independence, and its failure to placate Muslim fears of future subjugation. He believed that the inability of the two major nationalist parties to settle their differences would thus ensure the future of the Raj "for many years". This stratagem contained one flaw, however, the remote possibility that eventually the Congress might agree to the proposed constitution (1935 Act). To prepare for that eventuality, and thereby prevent Congress from accelerating home rule, Linlithgow ensured that no political progress would be possible without the consent of the A.I.M.L. - a development virtually precluded by the latter's opposition to majority rule. In order to secure this objective the Viceroy on 17 October 1939 refused to consider the Congress demand for immediate independence; he reiterated that Dominion Status remained the sole ambition of the British Government, and that that would only be considered following the conclusion of the war, when full weight would be given to the opinions of the minorities. In inducing the British Government to approve the minority principle Linlithgow drew the attention of Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, to the political advantage it would confer by giving Britain considerable room to manoeuvre:

"I would see advantage in drawing pointed attention in debate to the assurances to the minorities ... that full weight would be given to their views and their interests ... and to the fact that ... agreement between Indians themselves ... must be the precondition of constitutional progress." Zetland, for his part, agreed to the Viceroy's strategy because he believed that any attempt to force a constitution on the Muslims without their consent would lead to civil war. Assured of the Secretary of State's support Linlithgow proceeded to present Jinnah with a veto on any future constitutional progress; on 1 November 1939 he informed Gandhi and Rajendra Prasad (Congress leader from Bihar) in Jinnah's presence that the return
to democratic government in the provinces, and any expansion of the Executive Council would only be contemplated if the Congress and the A.I.M.L. reached agreement.

Jinnah fully appreciated the tremendous service which the Viceroy had rendered to him and the League and he proved amenable to repaying the debt by refusing a request from Gandhi for the Congress and the A.I.M.L. "to get together ... to present a joint claim for the declaration [of immediate independence] that Congress wanted...". He effectively ensured that there would be no future co-operation between his organisation and the Congress by insisting on a series of conditions to cement a rapprochement between the two parties which were totally unacceptable to Congress leaders: the establishment of coalition Ministries in the provinces subject to the proviso that the respective Assemblies would refuse to sanction any legislation which provoked the disapproval of two-thirds of the Muslim M.L.As.; the singing of Bande Matram (the Congress anthem) and the flying of Congress flags on public holidays was to be terminated, and the Congress mass-contact programme, in respect of Muslims, was to be suspended. This outcome clearly satisfied the Viceroy who candidly admitted to Zetland in November 1939 that Jinnah "had given me very valuable help by standing firm against Congress claims and I was duly grateful. It was clear that if he ... had supported the Congress ... and confronted me with a joint demand [for independence], the strain upon me and upon His Majesty's Government would have been very great indeed." Linlithgow had good cause, therefore, to value his understanding with Jinnah: "it is ... of real value that at this moment a body representing some 90,000,000 people should offer us co-operation". For thus assured of Jinnah's help, in whose position he admitted to have "a vested interest" Linlithgow could brush aside Congress insistence for complete independence.

Sikander, unaware that Linlithgow's 'vested interest' in Jinnah had seriously prejudiced his hopes of success, determined to achieve a national rôle to resist the League President. In August 1939 in a step towards achieving this goal he published his recommendations for the creation of an Indian Federation. In launching this initiative he hoped to prevent the formulation of extreme demands by the A.I.M.L. As a member of the League committee which had been appointed in March 1936 to consider the question of constitutional reform he was acutely aware of the growing support within the A.I.M.L. for the creation of one or more Muslim States in India. It was a development which Sikander was determined to thwart having confided to Penderel Moon (Secretary to Governor,
Sikander was opposed to the concept of a Muslim State on two counts; he believed 'Pakistan' would precipitate a communal war in the Punjab, and he knew that if created it would lead to the political ascendancy of Jinnah at his own expense.

Nevertheless one other consideration had moulded his scheme - his determination to protect his co-religionists, particularly those in the majority Muslim provinces, from the prospect of Congress, and thereby Hindu domination. In order to guard against this eventuality he proposed the creation of a federal structure in which the power of the Central Government would be limited to a few specific subjects - Defence, External Affairs, Communications, Customs - and in which the provinces would enjoy the maximum autonomy, having virtual control over their own finances. He argued that such a structure would ensure the co-operation of both the Muslim majority provinces and the Princely States, as their integrity and authority would not be diminished.

Though he had attempted to gain official approval for his proposition by providing for the continuation, through Dominion status, of the British connection on "a firm and permanent footing" and by arguing that his proposals would strengthen the British presence at the expense of the nationalist parties by broadening the political spectrum, his ideas failed to impress the British. The Government of India and the India Office deprecated Sikander's blatant attempt to cripple central activities. Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, condemned the proposals as "a nightmare", whilst Linlithgow dismissed them because he believed that Sikander in striving "to prevent a Hindu majority in the all-India Legislature" really intended to "put off Federation", as conceived by the 1935 Act, altogether. As such its purpose appeared to threaten the Viceroy's concept of the stratagem necessary to prolong British rule: "The moment we weaken in our resolution to push Federation through we shall find ourselves without a policy and without a future."

Similarly Sikander's suggestions neither excited nor won Indian approval or support. Although Congress spokesmen refrained from publicly criticising them in the hope that they might provide a basis for negotiation with moderate League leaders, they were clearly unacceptable to the Congress because they denied strong central authority. Conversely Muslim League opinion remained highly suspicious of any form of Feder-
ation in concert with the Hindu majority. The A.I.M.L. fulfilling 
Sikander's fears was in fact moving rapidly towards a formal call for an 
independent State. On 18 September 1939 it formally resolved to abandon 
Federation as a political goal and review the situation, and in the 
following month Jinnah in an interview with the Manchester Guardian, 
which was widely circulated in the Indian press, categorically stated 
that Sikander's proposition neither emanated from, nor had any binding 
effect on the A.I.M.L. It was in March 1940, however, that Jinnah by 
demanding the division of India delivered the final coup de grace to 
Sikander's federal plan thereby completely destroying his attempt to pose 
as an architect of Muslim national policy: the A.I.M.L. at its Lahore 
session (23 March) insisted that:

"no constitutional plan would be workable ... or 
acceptable to the Muslims unless ... the areas in 
which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as 
in the north-western and eastern zones of India ... 
be grouped to constitute 'independent States' in 
which the constituent units shall be autonomous and 
sovereign...." 100

In proclaiming this programme the actions of the A.I.M.L., though 
not the content of the Lahore resolution, seem to have been strongly in­
fluenced by Linlithgow. Throughout January and February 1940 the Viceroy 
had counselled Jinnah that it was essential for the A.I.M.L. to formulate 
positive proposals to enable it to sustain its opposition to the Congress, 
and to appeal for public and parliamentary support in Britain. A point 
of view which was shared by Zetland. Jinnah appreciated the force of 
Linlithgow's argument:

"I [Viceroy] again put to him [Jinnah] the familiar 
arguments for formulating and publishing a constructive 
policy: and in the light of our discussion he said that 
he was disposed to think that it would probably be wise 
for his friends and himself to make public ... the out­ 
lines of their position in good time." 103

Not only did Jinnah indicate that he would act on the Viceroy's advice, 
but according to Khaliquzzaman Jinnah, on 5 February 1940, 

"informed the Viceroy that the Muslim League in its 
open session at Lahore on 23 March was going to ask 
for the partition of the country...." 104

Linlithgow who personally did not agree with the Lahore demand, 
nevertheless welcomed it as a further means of thwarting the Congress: 
"There is much that could be said in criticism of Jinnah's partition 
ideas and we clearly could not accept or endorse them", but he refused to 
condemn the Lahore resolution because "I think ... it preferable to quote 
it as illustrating the extent to which the gulf has widened between the 
parties..." 105 His whole purpose in spurring Jinnah into defining a
political goal had been engineered to undermine the Congress, and now that he had achieved that end he refused to abandon the advantage he believed it afforded him:

"I think it important to bring out ... that with the best will in the world to reach Dominion Status as early as possible His Majesty's Government cannot ... override the views ... of the minorities, particularly the Muslims ... these ... recent developments have brought out more clearly than ever the lack of any substance for the Congress claim to be ... the mouth-piece of India...." 106

The Lahore development, though clearly welcome to the Viceroy, was completely unacceptable to Sikander. The resolution had greatly added to Jinnah's prestige, increasing his standing as the accredited national Muslim leader.107 Furthermore it had seriously compromised Sikander, not only as a provincial Muslim leader whose political philosophy was firmly wedded to inter-communal co-operation,108 but as a contestant to Jinnah in the national orbit. Evidently that had been one of Jinnah's intentions, for he had been careful to associate Sikander with the drafting of the Lahore resolution, though the latter's suggestions which closely mirrored his federal scheme, had been drastically amended.109 Thus by association if not by deed Sikander had been seen to lend his support to the proceedings, especially as he had not criticised the partition demand: he admitted to Malcolm Darling (former Financial Commissioner, Punjab, retired 1939) that had he done so he would have forfeited his Muslim following, if not in the Punjab Assembly, certainly outside it.110

Ever sensible of the dangers of openly opposing the creation of a Muslim homeland, he attempted to resolve the issue by publicly calling on the leaders of the major political parties to meet and devise a common programme for constitutional advance. He urged Linlithgow to assist the process through the appointment of a small representative body, to meet under the chairmanship of the Viceroy; Sikander suggested that 30 people representing all sections of Indian life and including all the provincial Premiers should serve on it.111 Sikander in fact had sought to broaden the political spectrum to enable him, in concert with his fellow Muslim Premiers, to formulate a solution to the constitutional impasse independent of Jinnah and the A.I.M.L. In an attempt to gain Congress acceptance of, and participation with the enterprise Sikander met with the Congress President, Abul Kalam Azad, on 13 June 1940 to discuss his proposals.112 Jinnah, realising that Sikander was attempting to out-maneouvre him, acted decisively to frustrate the move. On 16 June 1940, Jinnah censured the Punjab Premier for seeing Azad without his authority, and he ensured that no future discussions would occur between Sikander or
any other prominent Leaguer and the Congress, without his sanction. Accordingly the A.I.M.L. Working Committee resolved that in order to avoid any misunderstanding:

"no member of the Working Committee should enter into any negotiations ... with the Congress leaders regarding the question of [a] Hindu [-] Muslim settlement ... without the permission of the President."

It was also resolved that Jinnah alone was entitled to conduct negotiations with the Viceroy on behalf of the A.I.M.L. By these actions Jinnah established and demonstrated his dominance over Muslim national politics; Sikander had been effectively isolated, and his political initiative disposed of.

In an attempt to retrieve the situation Sikander counter-attacked to erode Jinnah's position from within the League, by fermenting unrest over the League President's attitude to the War. Jinnah had offered co-operation with the war effort on condition that the British Government would not make any declaration concerning the constitutional future of India "without the previous approval of Muslim India"; that Muslims would be guaranteed "an equal share in the authority and control..." of any governments which were established in the provinces and at the Centre, and that the A.I.M.L. would be invited to serve in such administrations even if the Congress refused to. In order to ensure unanimity amongst Leaguers concerning these demands the A.I.M.L. Working Committee on 16 June 1940 forbade any of its members to serve on the war committees which were being established in the provinces. This order was opposed by Sikander; he had already pledged the support of the Punjab for the war effort and he would have suffered considerable loss of face had he obeyed the League's directive, especially as he was the leader of the major recruiting province in India. Consequently he deliberately misinterpreted the League's ruling, claiming that it had exempted Muslim Ministers from the Punjab and Bengal. It was a blatantly false proposition, for Jinnah had unequivocally stated both to Mamdot and Nazimuddin (Bengal member A.I.M.L. Working Committee) that the ban included all Leaguers, Ministers included. Despite Jinnah's denial Sikander refused to comply, confident that the overwhelming support he enjoyed in the Punjab on the issue would restrain Jinnah from moving against him: of the 38 Muslim Unionist M.L.As. who had formally joined the Provincial War Board (established 16 June 1940) only one - Mamdot - reluctantly resigned in response to the A.I.M.L. 's June resolution.

Having openly flouted Jinnah's authority in the Punjab Sikander attempted to solicit similar defiance in Bengal. There he found a ready ally, in that the Premier, Fazlul Huq, was equally concerned to limit
Jinnah's influence. A Unionist propagandist, Amjad Ali, was despatched to Bengal in July 1940 to court support for Sikander's stance, and to gain acceptance of the principle that Muslim Ministers were free to serve on war committees. In spite of the fact that a section of Bengal Leaguers, led by Huq were "only too happy to join hands with Sikander..." the move failed, because Nazimuddin and Ispahani were able to convince the majority that it would have been suicidal for national Muslim interests if Bengal encouraged a rift between the Punjab and Central League leadership.\(^{121}\)

Angered by Sikander's revolt both Barkal Ali\(^{122}\) and Ispahani requested Jinnah to bring Sikander to heel. The latter warning that "If a halt is not called ... it is best that Sikandar and his counterpart in Bengal are made the dictators of the Muslim League."\(^{123}\) Jinnah, however, could do nothing. Though Jinnah claimed Sikander and Huq had given him written undertakings to resign as Premier if requested to do so,\(^{124}\) he doubted whether either would honour their promises, and thus he felt unable to use the resignations to compromise the two Premiers, and force them to acknowledge the validity of the League's June directive.\(^{125}\) Also he was restrained from confronting Sikander by the knowledge that such action would cost him the affiliation of the Unionist controlled Punjab League: Sikander had threatened that Jinnah's attitude, if not modified, would precipitate such a split.\(^{126}\)

Secure in his knowledge that his opposition to Jinnah over the war committee issue would not endanger his standing in the Punjab, and aware of a core of dissatisfaction in Bengal, Sikander appealed to the Viceroy to assist him to overthrow Jinnah. Through the mediation of the Punjab Governor, Sikander informed Linlithgow on 6 August 1940 that he was confident of being able to attract an all-Indian Muslim following if the Viceroy broke off negotiations with Jinnah, and recognised him as "the representative of Muslim opinion generally". In return for viceregal recognition Sikander undertook to rally Muslim support for the war effort and to negotiate a Muslim settlement with the Viceroy on the basis that Muslims would be invited to join governments at the Centre and in the provinces even if the Congress refused to participate.\(^{127}\)

The Viceroy ignored this overture. Two days after receiving it he announced the 'August Offer', which further entrenched Jinnah in power by insisting that the A.I.M.L. had a de facto veto on any future constitutional reform:

\[\text{The British Government} \] "could not contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities ... to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large..."
Linlithgow's continuing commitment to Jinnah was further revealed on 8 October 1940 when he deliberately concealed from Amery (Zetland's successor) that there were elements in the A.I.M.L. - notably Sikander and Huq - who were dissatisfied with Jinnah's leadership. He informed the Secretary of State that the solidarity of the League combined with the unanimous loyalty which Jinnah enjoyed, precluded any split occurring in League ranks which the Government of India could exploit. In addition Linlithgow made it perfectly clear that even if it had been possible to orchestrate such a rupture, to do so would have been prejudicial to British interests as it was essential to continue to counter the Congress by preserving

"some authoritative mouth-piece of general Muslim opinion ... particularly in view of possible post-war constitutional discussions. Nor do we want, at a time when we may have to take the Congress on... to antagonise the main organisation of [the] second largest party and community in this country."

The 'August Offer' combined with the Viceroy's failure to respond positively to Sikander's advance led to a brief rapprochement between the Punjab Premier and Jinnah. The primary object of the British announcement (8 Aug.) had been to define future reforms: Dominion Status was to be granted at the conclusion of the war subject to the approval of the major Indian political parties; the composition of the Viceroy's Executive Council was to be expanded to allow for greater Indian participation, and a body was to be established to associate the Indian public more closely with the conduct of the war. Thus a critical juncture had been reached in the constitutional history of India. It was imperative, therefore, for the A.I.M.L. to present a united response to the British proposals, especially as the Congress in rejecting them (22 Aug. 1940) whilst deprecating the British refusal to grant immediate full independence, had laid special emphasis on the fact that the "issue of the minorities..." had been employed as "an insuperable barrier to India's progress...." To ensure League solidarity, therefore, the League Working Committee on 31 August 1940 bowed to Sikander's demand concerning the war effort by reversing its decision of 16 June and allowing "those Musalmans who might think that they could serve any useful purpose by associating themselves with the War Committees free to do so."

Having thus fortified the A.I.M.L. Jinnah proceeded on 28 Sept.1940 to denounce the 'August Offer', because it had failed to meet his claim
for an equal share of power for Muslims at the Centre and in the provinces, and had not offered them a position of parity on the War Advisory Committee which the Viceroy hoped to organise. Jinnah judiciously associated Sikander with this action, thus ensuring that he could not capitalise from it by attempting to reach a compromise with the Congress or the British independent of the League. A sub-committee including Jinnah, Sikander, Nazimuddin, Nawab Ismail Khan, Khaliquzzaman and Barkat Ali was authorised to draft the formal rejection. To ensure Sikander's collaboration Jinnah privately assured him that the action would not prohibit Leaguers from assisting the war effort. In accepting this undertaking Sikander was guilty of considerable naivety, especially considering Jinnah's refusal to co-operate with the proposed War Advisory Council. Later events proved that he had been duped.

Initially the Punjab Premier failed to grasp this fact. The extent of his error was soon realised. In February 1941, despite the fact that the A.I.M.L. had supposedly revised its position concerning War Committee membership, it expelled three prominent Unionist supporters - Nawab Muzaffar Khan (Sikander's cousin), Nawabzada Khurshid Khan and Sir Muhammad Nawaz of Kot - for disobeying its mandate of June 1940 forbidding such association. In the same month Jinnah requested Sikander to deny reports that had appeared in the Bombay Chronicle and the Times of India that he was opposed to the Lahore resolution, and in a move to commit the Punjab League to the 'Pakistan' ideal, the A.I.M.L. resolved that 23 March would be observed annually by all local Leagues to canvass the support of the Muslim masses. In addition a 'Muslim League Week' was to be organised at three-monthly intervals to disseminate League propaganda, and to enrol new members.

Realising the enormity of his mistake by being a party to the League's rejection of the 'August Offer', which appeared to infer his commitment to an independent Muslim State, Sikander acted decisively to restore the situation, and to frustrate any further attempts by Jinnah to impose his authority in the Punjab. In a speech to the Punjab Legislative Assembly on 11 March 1941 Sikander stated that no Pakistan scheme had been passed at Lahore, in that the term had not been used, but that politicians, Jinnah included, realising the appeal it had for the Muslim masses had adopted the "catch-phrase". In spite of that development, however, Sikander declared in unequivocal terms "If Pakistan means unalloyed Muslim Raj in the Punjab, then I will have nothing to do with it." He re-affirmed his own commitment to the creation of a loose Federation in which the provinces would enjoy the maximum autonomy as the surest means of protecting all the communities in the Punjab. In developing this
theme Sikander demonstrated considerable skill, for he claimed that if his ideas were given substance whilst the Muslim community would enjoy a predominant position in provincial affairs free from the dictates of a powerful Congress-dominated central government, the Hindus and Sikhs would continue to receive a fair share in government independent of communal disabilities, or the authority of a Muslim State. In this respect he made a special appeal to the Sikhs, reminding them that as a small all-Indian minority they could not expect to achieve any more than a two per cent. representation at the Centre, whilst in the Punjab they would continue to possess "a 20 per cent. share as equal partners in a purely Punjabi concern". In order to gain support and approval for his stance Sikander concluded his speech with a powerful exhortation for provincial loyalty and communal unity:

"I visualise for the Punjab - freedom for Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, Christians and others as Punjabis ... let us ... show the rest of India that we in the Punjab stand united and will not brook any interference from whatever quarter ... Then and then only will we be able to tell meddling busybodies from outside; 'Hands off the Punjab'."  

Despite these strong words Sikander knew that he could only prevent Jinnah from exploiting the 'Pakistan' theme to gain Muslim support in the Punjab, if he could induce the British, the Congress and moderate Leaguers to lend their support to a national settlement which would lay to rest Muslim fears of Hindu domination, and thereby obviate the demand for a separate Muslim State. Thus in May 1941 he attempted to launch a fresh initiative to solve the constitutional deadlock. He urged the Viceroy to adopt a bold programme of reform, and in order to attract Congress co-operation with it, he suggested that the Viceroy's Executive Council should be radically reconstructed to allow all portfolios to be held by Indians, the British presence being limited to that of the Viceroy and one other official to allow for the continuity of the administration. This Executive would then be treated as an independent Dominion Government, responsible solely to the Legislature. Also coalition Ministries would be established in the provinces, whereupon the Viceroy would invite the Provincial Premiers and Executive members to join a committee to formulate a new constitution. In an attempt to attract Muslim acceptance of his ideas, he counselled Congress leaders to pledge that maximum autonomy would be granted to the provinces, compatible with the country's defence needs.

Sikander's recommendations, which were endorsed by Fazlul Huq, posed a grave embarrassment to Jinnah; in effect the leaders of the two major Muslim majority provinces had rejected the League's demand for partition.
as the only solution to the constitutional deadlock. It was the intervention of Linlithgow, however, which prevented any serious repercussions developing in the League: he refused to consider Sikander's proposals on the grounds that they envisaged changes in the character of the Executive beyond those contemplated by the 'August Offer'. There can be little doubt that his action was also intended to frustrate any possibility of a rapprochement between the Congress and moderate Leaguers and to ensure the continuing unity of the A.I.M.L. having previously informed Craik in March 1941 that although

"I have myself strong views as to the arguments against Pakistan ... there seems a good deal to be said against any unavoidable split in the Muslim League ... any such split would be a great encouragement to the Congress..."

It was for this very reason that in May 1941 he declined Amery's advice to invite Sikander to join his Executive Council.

In spite of Sikander's lack of success his sortie into the all-India sphere had seriously compromised Jinnah. The latter had candidly admitted in March 1941 the key importance of the Punjab for the realisation of the Lahore resolution, thus he could not permit Sikander to continue to deviate unchecked from the Lahore principle, especially as in April 1941 the demand for a Muslim State had been formally incorporated into the A.I.M.L.'s constitution. Jinnah awaited an appropriate occasion to publicly discipline Sikander and demonstrate his authority over him. The formation of a National Defence Council (N.D.C.) by Linlithgow gave Jinnah the opportunity he sought.

In July 1941 Linlithgow, as a consequence of the 'August Offer', had enlarged his Executive Council to include eight Indians, but he had failed to recruit any active members from the Congress and the A.I.M.L. In an attempt to offset this disability, Linlithgow proposed to employ the N.D.C. as a ploy to involve some important leaders, including the Muslim Premiers of the Punjab, Bengal (Fazlul Huq), Sind (Allah Baksh Muhammad Umar Soomro) and Assam (Muhammad Saadulla), in a demi-official capacity with the war effort; it was a propaganda exercise to demonstrate India's support for the war. But the Secretary of State approved of the manoeuvre principally because he hoped that it would provide a means of undermining the two main nationalist parties. Linlithgow, however, did not share this ambition in respect of the A.I.M.L.:

"I made it clear ... that one must ... avoid starting a campaign against Jinnah, or allowing it to be thought that we were taking sides in the internal political affairs of the League."

The Viceroy wanted the presence of the Muslim Premiers on the N.D.C.
mainly to illustrate that Muslims were aiding the prosecution of the War, and hence he calculated that Jinnah would be forced to accept the situation: "there seems a general feeling that if we can get these four to play they would represent something too substantial for Jinnah to take on." Furthermore Linlithgow hoped that once Jinnah was confronted with the fact that the Premiers were willing to serve, he would be tempted to officially nominate League representatives to the body.\textsuperscript{153}

Sikander was the 'main piece' in Linlithgow's game. The Viceroy believed that once Sikander agreed to serve the other Muslim Premiers would follow his example.\textsuperscript{154} In July 1941 Sikander accepted the Viceroy's invitation, thereby fulfilling his expectations. In taking this step Sikander was probably influenced by a number of motives. As a constant advocate for Muslim co-operation with the war effort, and as the head of the premier recruiting province in India (see note 118), the N.D.C. gave him the opportunity to publicly associate himself at the Centre with the conduct of the War. Membership of the body also allowed him to pursue the rôle which he continued to court in the national sphere. But he hoped to achieve the last objective without a clash with Jinnah. In order to minimise the possibility of such an occurrence he counselled the Viceroy to invite the Premiers to participate in their capacity as heads of government, rather than as Muslim leaders.\textsuperscript{155}

Linlithgow raised no objection to this proposal,\textsuperscript{156} assuring Sikander that he would be asked to co-operate as Premier of the Punjab,\textsuperscript{157} but in order to pressurise Jinnah he caused the latter to believe that the Premiers' presence on the N.D.C. would be as Muslims, and not provincial representatives. Accordingly he instructed Lumley (Governor of Bombay) to inform Jinnah that the Viceroy "regarded it as essential that the great Muslim community should be represented on that council by persons of the highest prominence and capacity."\textsuperscript{158} Lumley conveyed this message to Jinnah in writing on 20 July 1941, and in accordance with Linlithgow's instructions he advised Jinnah that the Viceroy would have asked him to offer suggestions as to possible Muslim personnel for the Council, if Jinnah's unsympathetic attitude had prevented such action.\textsuperscript{159} Even so this communication implied that if Jinnah changed his mind, any suggestions he made would be sympathetically received.

Jinnah, however, refused to be complaisant. The episode gave him the opportunity to confront Sikander and crush his national ambitions, and he exploited it to the full. He accused the Viceroy of attempting to destroy the unity of the A.I.M.L. by ignoring its ruling of 16 June 1940 forbidding participation with war committees.\textsuperscript{160} Although he
stated his opposition to the scheme, however, he did nothing to dissuade the Premiers from joining the N.D.C. He waited until the third week of July, by which time all of the Premiers had accepted nomination to the Council before he acted; he publicly announced that the A.I.M.L. Working Committee would convene at Bombay on 24 August to take disciplinary action against those Muslim Leaguers who had joined the N.D.C. By allowing a month to elapse before Sikander and company were to be brought to book, Jinnah had hoped that during the interval Muslim opinion throughout India would crystallise in condemning the Premiers' action. He was not to be disappointed. Abdoola Haroon, the President of the Sind Muslim League, noted a growing antipathy throughout India towards the Premiers. An observation which was corroborated by Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim (prominent Muslim Leaguer) in Bombay. Even Mamdot ruefully conceded that Muslim opinion was divided over the activities of Sikander and the other Premiers, and he feared that if the issue was not resolved it would jeopardise Muslim solidarity.

In order to avoid such an eventuality Mamdot secured the assistance of Haroon to attempt to settle the matter amicably. Haroon in effect became an intermediary between the Punjab Muslim leadership and Jinnah, though he faithfully reflected the stance of the A.I.M.L. President. Haroon's attitude, therefore, was uncompromising and in order to avoid a confrontation he insisted that Sikander and the other Premiers should publicly announce that they had joined the N.D.C. as a result of "a bonafide mistake in the interpretation of the Bombay Resolution [31 Aug. 1940]..." which allowed individual co-operation in the war effort. Also the Premiers were required to issue a statement to the effect that their action did not reflect any dissatisfaction with the A.I.M.L.'s policy regarding the War, or with "the latest Creed of the League...or...Pakistan". Once these conditions had been met they were to inform the Viceroy that they would resign from the N.D.C. if Jinnah ordered them to and "that he [Linlithgow] must enter into negotiation with Mr. Jinnah and come to some...settlement with him."

Haroon in effect had demanded the total surrender of Sikander, and at the time it appeared that his harsh mediation would not succeed. In fact Sikander's position in the Punjab seemed to be unassailable in that 60 of the 76 Muslim Unionists had given the Premier their written pledges to resign from the A.I.M.L. if Jinnah forced a confrontation, and as a sign of their approval for Sikander's continued presence on the N.D.C. Outside the Province Sikander's principal ally, Fazlul Huq, remained similarly defiant. On 8 August 1941 he informed Haroon that he did not even intend attending the scheduled meeting of the Working Committee, and he denied that he and the other Premiers had flouted the
The stage seemed set for a disastrous rupture of League unity, but in the event Sikander capitulated, and the other Premiers followed suit. Khaliquzzaman who witnessed the proceedings, has provided, to an extent, an understanding of the debacle. He has recalled that when Sikander was told either to resign from the N.D.C. or face expulsion from the A.I.M.L. he (Khaliquzzaman) attempted to assist the Punjab Premier by reminding the Working Committee that as a result of the A.I.M.L.'s resolution of 31 August 1940 Leaguers had been granted the freedom to serve on war committees. Before any discussion could ensue, however, Jinnah intervened stating "Let us hear what Sir Sikander has to say...", whereupon Sikander replied "I am in the hands of this Committee and will abide by its decision...". As a result when ordered by the Working Committee to resign from the N.D.C. he agreed to comply.

It seems evident that Jinnah had prevailed upon Sikander to abandon the N.D.C. before the Working Committee met on 24 August, hence his invitation to Sikander to explain his position, thereby preventing Khaliquzzaman's relevant observation from being discussed. It is also significant that Sikander declined to use the August 1940 compromise as a basis for his defence. Jinnah, always a superb tactician, would only have invited Sikander to state his case at such a juncture had he been assured of a reconciliatory response. In explaining his climb-down to Glancy, Governor of the Punjab, Sikander claimed that he had been forced to submit to Jinnah on account of Lumley's letter which referred to his presence on the N.D.C. as a Muslim representative. Despite the fact that Fazlul Huq corroborated this exposition, it is not convincing. Sikander had known in advance that at Bombay Jinnah would challenge his association with the N.D.C. on the grounds that he had been nominated as a Muslim and not a provincial representative. It was to frustrate such a move that Sikander had obtained written resignations from his Muslim supporters, believing that they would dissuade Jinnah from threatening to expel him. In fact by the time of the A.I.M.L. meeting convened at Bombay Sikander had collected 73 such undertakings. It is apparent, therefore, that when he failed to intimidate Jinnah by threatening to end the association of his Unionist followers with the A.I.M.L. Sikander lost his nerve. Though he continued to enjoy the unquestioned support of the vast majority of Muslim M.L.As. in the Province, when faced with the stark choice of an open break with Jinnah and the League, he capitulated because he appreciated that, in demanding 'Pakistan', a movement had been conceived which in time would overwhelm all...
Muslim opposition to it. Hence his admission to Penderel Moon in August 1941 that

"unless he [Sikander] walked warily and kept on the right side of Jinnah he would be swept away by a wave of fanaticism and, wherever he went, would be greeted by the Muslims with black flags."^{173}

Sikander's surrender over the N.D.C. issue effectively and publicly proclaimed Jinnah's dominance in the national orbit, but it did not herald a League take-over in the Punjab. There the large Unionist landlords, who controlled the Muslim politics of the Province, remained loyal to Sikander, many of them deeply resenting Jinnah's victory, and the publicity campaign which they believed the League had orchestrated against the Punjab Premier.^{174} The latter as a realist, however, feared that despite the fidelity which he continued to enjoy in the Assembly Jinnah's championing of 'Pakistan' could eventually cost him the allegiance of his Muslim colleagues and the Muslim populace in the Punjab. In order to insure against either eventuality he sought to broaden still further the non-communal appeal of the Unionist Party and to discredit 'Pakistan'. The first objective was achieved in June 1942 when he concluded an alliance with the Sikh Akali Party. Under the terms of the agreement, known as the Sikander - Baldev Singh Pact, Baldev Singh was admitted to the Cabinet as Minister for Development in succession to Sunder Singh Majithia who had died in April 1941, and the Akalis undertook to support the Ministry.^{175} Though both the Premier and the new Minister issued press statements to the effect that their agreement emanated from a mutual desire to promote communal harmony, and present a united front in support of the war effort,^{176} in reality both had acted to strengthen their respective position against Jinnah.^{177} Sikander remained determined to resist Jinnah, whilst the Akali Party, which had emerged as the dominant Sikh organisation in the Province,^{178} was eager to bolster the Premier against Jinnah; they in common with their fellow Sikhs were vehemently opposed to Jinnah's demand for a Muslim State which threatened to engulf the whole of the Punjab - viewed by the Sikhs as their homeland, and which encompassed their lands, properties and religious shrines.^{179}

Having expanded his Ministry, Sikander sought to limit the appeal of 'Pakistan' amongst his fellow Punjabi Muslims. 'Pakistan' remained undefined, and as such it augured all things to all shades of Muslim opinion: to the pious it promised an Islamic State, to the entrepreneur, civil servant and professional classes the curtailment of Hindu and Sikh competition, to the rampant communalist the opportunity to humiliate, if not brutalise non-Muslims, and to the Muslim masses the allure of belonging to the ruling race.^{180} In an effort to confront Punjabi Muslims with
reality, therefore, Sikander determined to impress upon them that 'Pakistan' would certainly result in the partition of their Province. In order that Muslims should be left in no doubt of this fact he requested the Viceroy to establish a convention whereby if no less than 75% of the membership of the Punjab Legislative Assembly passed a resolution in favour or against joining the Indian Union, the Muslim and non-Muslim populations would not be forced into submission to any State - Hindu or Muslim - against their will. In short he asked that both groups should be assured that ultimately they would be free to express their views through separate plebiscites. If the results determined that non-Muslims were not prepared to accept Pakistani rule or the Muslims Indian rule, then the Province would be divided to accommodate their wishes. Sikander, who was as opposed to the possibility of partition as he was to the idea of 'Pakistan', hoped that his proposal would not result in the division of the Punjab. On the contrary he calculated that by acknowledging the fact that failure to reconcile Muslim and non-Muslim views on the question of a Muslim State would precipitate the break-up of the Province, and by making constitutional provision for it, that the 'Pakistan' idea would lose its attraction for Muslims. Linlithgow who had been appraised of Sikander's real intentions, refused to sanction the Premier's formula. He rejected it on the grounds that it closely resembled the Cripps offer which had failed to appease the Indian parties, and because he was "profoundly sceptical as to the probability of its showing up effectively the impossibility of Pakistan". Also though Linlithgow continued to refuse to discredit the Lahore resolution for tactical reasons, when Stafford Cripps (Leader of the House of Commons, leader of Cripps' Mission) revealed in March 1942 that the British Government accepted the right of any province to stand out of the constitution to be framed after the war Linlithgow was horrified. The Viceroy was opposed to the provincial option clause because it represented a tacit acceptance of 'Pakistan' with regard to the Muslim majority provinces, and as such he feared that it would have had a disruptive effect in the Punjab, particularly amongst the Sikhs, thereby disrupting the war effort. Therefore Linlithgow who had been greatly relieved when the Cripps initiative failed, had no intention of helping Sikander to resuscitate it by pleading the right of a province not only to decide its future national status, but also to agree on partition if a consensus did not exist concerning the matter.

Sikander's formula also failed to engender the response he had hoped for in the Punjab. On 9 November 1942 the partition proposal was rejected by a joint meeting of the non-Muslim M.L.As. Thus for the time
being the spectre of the division of the Punjab was buried, consequently the Punjabi Muslims were not confronted with the immediate threat of their Province's division. Even so non-Muslim opinion remained firmly opposed to the creation of Pakistan* and Sikander had made it perfectly clear that he would not be a party to imposing a Muslim State on the whole of the Punjab against their will. Also, as Glancy* informed the Viceroy, Sikander had demonstrated the weakness of the Lahore resolution in that in demanding self-determination for the Muslims in India, Jinnah could not logically deny that right to the non-Muslim majority areas in the Punjab. Consequently the Premier had issued a challenge to the League President which the latter could not afford to deny. Glancy's appreciation proved correct. During a tour of the Punjab in mid-November 1942 Jinnah attempted to dispose of Sikander's partition ideas by pouring ridicule on them; he avoided any discussion concerning the effect which the creation of Pakistan* would have on the future unity of the Province, merely insisting that its realisation remained the A.I.M.L.*'s principal objective, and that therefore Sikander's proposed formula was irrelevant:

"Who is the author of this formula?... Either it is colossal ignorance or a case of those who see it, know it and understand it, but will not see it and don't want to understand it. All these slogans about dividing mother India and the scheme being against the interests of the Mussalmans themselves have now ceased to have any value for us. If the Pakistan scheme is against our interests, let us stew [in] our own juice, but this nonsensical propaganda must cease."

Sikander, however, refused to abandon the premise that ultimately non-Muslim Punjabis would have to decide their own future, but further resistance to Jinnah was prevented by the Premier's sudden death from a heart-attack on 26 December 1942. He had died attempting to develop a theme which possessed the potential to seriously compromise the League President. Also, although Jinnah had up until that time decisively outmanoeuvred him in the national sphere, Sikander had remained the undisputed master of the Punjab, in spite of his fears for the future as a result of the effect he believed 'Pakistan' would have in winning the allegiance of the Muslim masses for the A.I.M.L. Jinnah could only have engineered Sikander's total destruction if he had been able to destabilise his provincial power-base. That posed an impossible task, and though Jinnah had been compelled to gamble the unity of the League in order to force Sikander to comply with the League's mandate concerning the N.D.C., and to establish his own unquestioned ascendancy in national Muslim affairs, once he had achieved those aims he was unable to press home his advantage because he lacked the necessary support in the Punjab.  

*Governor of the Punjab, 1941-46.
As Ispahani has conceded Jinnah was unwilling to further risk the solidarity of the A.I.M.L. by seeking total domination over the Punjab Premier. Thus when confronted by angry Muslim Unionists concerning his disparaging remarks concerning Sikander's views on the possible partition of the Province Jinnah, out of deference to the unquestioned loyalty Sikander continued to command, denied that he had been referring to him. The battle for the Punjab was to be fought with the new Premier, Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, and it took Jinnah four years to achieve a successful outcome - such was the legacy which Sikander bequeathed to his Unionist successor!
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V.


2. Sikander to Fazl-i-Husain, 1 May 1936, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.


4. Punjab Civil List (Jan. 1938), pp.1-8, V/13/1040, IOR.

5. See Azim Husain, Fazl-i-Husain, Bombay, 1946, p. 271.


7. Punjab Civil List (Jan. 1938), pp.1-8, V/13/1040, IOR.


10. Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp. 73-81, CMD.5589, IOR.

11. Ibid., pp.80-81.

12. Seventy-one rural, two urban and five 'special interest' representatives, ibid., pp.73-81.


14. Twelve of the fourteen seats captured by the Khalsa Party were rural constituencies, Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp. 78-81; CMD.5589, IOR.

15. The Khalsa Party had won 13 of the 31 seats reserved for Sikhs, and it had captured one special interest seat - Central Punjab Landholders. Of the remaining Sikh constituencies the Akalis had taken ten seats, the Congress party four seats, Independent candidates three seats and the Socialist Party one seat, ibid., pp.78-81.


17. See Punjab Civil List (Jan. 1938), pp.3-8, V/13/1040, IOR.

18. He enjoyed an annual income of Rs.70,000 from his land. See Azim Husain, op.cit., p.126.


20. Ibid., 14 April 1936.

21. Ibid., 14 April 1937.

22. The central provision of the Bill determined that only those moneylenders who were registered and licensed would receive help from the law courts in recovering loans. Also any moneylender who charged interest in excess of the legal maximum, or who did not keep accounts, or who falsified documents would forfeit his licence, ibid., 16 Oct. 1938.

23. GR, Craik to Brabourne, 22 July 1938, L/P&J/5/240, IOR.


25. GR, Emerson to Linlithgow, 21 Oct. 1937, L/P&J/5/238, IOR.

27. GR, Emerson to Linlithgow, 3 Dec. 1937, L/P&J/5/238, IOR.
29. GR, Emerson to Linlithgow, 12 Feb. 1938, L/P&J/5/239, IOR.
32. F. Moon, op. cit., p.15.
33. GR, Emerson to Linlithgow, 21 Oct. 1937, L/P&J/5/238, IOR.
34. Craik to Linlithgow, 16 Oct. 1940, I/P&J/8/507, IOR.
36. GR, Emerson to Linlithgow, 21 Oct. 1937, L/P&J/5/238, IOR.
37. Civil and Military Gazette, 28 April 1944.
38. Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937, London, 1937, pp.73-81, CMD.5589, IOR.
42. GR, Emerson to Linlithgow, 21 Oct. 1937, L/P&J/5/238, IOR.
44. Ibid., 20 Oct. 1937.
45. Sikander to Jinnah, 3 Nov. 1937, copy with Z.H. Zaidi.
47. Iqbal to Jinnah, 10 Nov. 1937, quoted by M.A.H. Ispahani, op. cit., p.51.
50. Ibid., p.28.
51. Civil and Military Gazette, 19 April 1938.
55. Ibid., 17 June 1939.
58. Civil and Military Gazette, 19 Nov. 1942.

60. Craik to Linlithgow, 20 March 1940, Mss. EUR.F.125/89, IOR.

61. Craik to Linlithgow, 21 March 1940; 24 March 1940, Mss.EUR.F.125/89, IOR.

62. Craik to Linlithgow, 25 March 1940, Mss. EUR.F.125/89, IOR.

63. Tribune (Lahore), 5 Jan. 1939, PPA.

64. GR, Craik to Linlithgow, 27 Jan. 1939, L/P&J/5/241, IOR.


66. Craik to Linlithgow, 10 July 1939, Mss. EUR.F.125/88, IOR.

67. H.V. Hodson, op. cit., p.77.

68. Brabourne to Zetland, 19 Aug. 1938, Mss. EUR.F.125/6, IOR.

69. Linlithgow to Zetland, 28 Feb./1 March 1939, Mss.EUR.F.125/7, IOR.

70. Linlithgow to Zetland, 26 May 1939, Mss. EUR.F.125/7, IOR.

71. Civil and Military Gazette, 9 Sept. 1939; H.V.Hodson, op. cit., p.77.

72. Note of interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah held on 4 Sept. 1939, enclosure, Linlithgow to Zetland, 5 Sept. 1939, Mss. EUR.F.125/8, IOR.

73. Hostility towards 'imperialistic wars', i.e. conflicts involving Britain and the Empire against foreign powers, had been current in Congress circles from 1936 onwards. See H.V. Hodson, op. cit., pp. 77-79.

74. Note of an interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah held on 4 Sept. 1939, enclosure, Linlithgow to Zetland, 5 Sept. 1939, Mss. EUR.F.125/81, IOR.

75. Note of an interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah held on 5 Oct. 1939, enclosure, Linlithgow to Zetland, 7 Oct. 1939, Mss. EUR.F.125/8, IOR.

76. Linlithgow to Zetland, telegram, 18 Dec. 1939, Mss. EUR.D.609/18, IOR.

77. H.V. Hodson, op. cit., p. 78.

78. Linlithgow to Zetland, telegram, 22 Oct. 1939, Mss. EUR.F.125/18, IOR.


80. In October 1939 the Congress Ministries in the provinces had resigned in protest at the Viceroy's action in declaring war on India's behalf without first consulting the nationalist organisations. H.V. Hodson, op. cit., p.78.


82. Note of an interview between the Viceroy and Jinnah held on 4 Nov. 1939, enclosure, Linlithgow to Zetland, 6 Nov. 1939, Mss. EUR.F.125/8, IOR.

83. Secret Quarterly Survey of Political and Constitutional Development in India, for the period 1 Nov. 1939 to 31 Jan. 1940, pp.25-26, 32, Mss. EUR. F.125/143, IOR.
84. Linlithgow to Zetland, 22/23 Oct. 1939, Mss. EUR.F.125/8, IOR.
85. Note of an interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah held on 4 Nov. 1939, L/P&J/8/506A, IOR.
86. Ibid.
87. As early as December 1930 Iqbal, in his Presidential Address to the A.I.M.I. session at Allahabad, had revealed his conception of a self-governing Muslim State to comprise the Punjab, the N.W.F.P., Sind, and Baluchistan. In January 1933 Rahmat Ali, the originator of the term 'Pakistan' had proposed the creation of two Muslim States in the north-east and north-west of India, to be known as Pakistan and Bang-i-Islam (comprising Bengal and Assam) respectively. Similar schemes were also framed by Abdoola Haroon President, Sind Muslim League) and Abdul Latif (author of The Pakistan Issue, Lahore, 1943) in 1938 and 1939. See K.B. Sayeed, Pakistan The Formative Phase, 1857-1948, London, 1968, pp. 104-106, 108-111.
89. Ibid., p. 20.
90. Linlithgow to Zetland, 2 June 1938, Mss. EUR.F.125/5, IOR. (Sikander had revealed the details of his scheme to Linlithgow more than a year before he published them.)
91. Sikander Hyat Khan, Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation, Lahore, 1939, copy with letter, Sikander to Sir F. Stewart, 26 July 1939, L/P&J/8/689; Note, Muslem Schemes for Federation - Sir Sikander Hyat Khan's Plan, enclosure, Sikander to Laithwaite, 29 June 1939, L/P&J/8/689, IOR.
92. Sikander to Laithwaite, 29 June 1939, L/P&J/8/689, IOR.
93. Note by Sir V. Dawson, 25 July 1939, L/P&J/8/689; Lewis to Laithwaite, 21 July 1939, L/P&J/8/689, IOR.
94. Minute Paper by Zetland, 28 July 1939, L/P&J/8/689, IOR.
95. Linlithgow to Zetland, 2 June 1938, Mss. EUR.F.125/5, IOR.
96. Linlithgow to Zetland, 19 May 1939, Mss. EUR.F.125/7, IOR.
98. Civil and Military Gazette, 19 Sept. 1939.
99. Linlithgow to Zetland, telegram, 26 Oct. 1939, Mss. EUR.F.125/18, IOR.
100. H.V. Hodson, op.cit., p. 79.
101. Note of an interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah held on 6 Feb. 1940, Mss. EUR.F.125/135, IOR.
102. Zetland to Linlithgow, telegram, 16 Jan. 1940, Mss. EUR.F.125/19, IOR.
103. Linlithgow to Zetland, telegram, 6 Feb. 1940, Mss. EUR.F.125/19, IOR.
105. Linlithgow to Zetland, telegram, 6 April 1940, Mss. EUR.F.125/19, IOR.
106. Ibid.
107. Craik to Linlithgow, 25 March 1940, Mss. EUR.F.125/89, IOR.
108. Sikander, having frequently expressed his commitment to inter-communal co-operation, was widely regarded as being non-communal, Civil and Military Gazette, 13 Jan. 1937.

110. Darling to Leithwaite, 25 April 1940, L/P&J/8/506B, IOR.

111. Linlithgow to Amery, telegram, 27 May 1940, L/P&J/8/507, IOR.

112. Note of interview between G. Leithwaite and Sikander Hyat Khan held on 26 June 1940, L/P&J/8/507, IOR.

113. India News Agency telegram No. 35(S), 17 June 1940, L/P&J/8/507, IOR; P. Hardy, op.cit., p.233.

114. H.V. Hodson, op.cit., p. 84.

115. Craik to Linlithgow, 6 Aug. 1940, L/P&J/8/507, IOR.


118. By 1 January 1941 the Indian Army consisted of 418,000 persons, of whom 155,000 (37%) were Muslims. Of the total the Punjab contributed 201,000 men (48%) of whom 96,000 (48%) were Muslims, 51,000 (25%) were Sikhs, and the remainder Hindu Dogras and Jats. Note by Major-General Lockhart, 25 Feb. 1942, I/P&B/6/106B, IOR.


120. Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot to Jinnah, 24 June 1940, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, Islamabad, File No. 353, p.8; Craik to Linlithgow, 24 Sept. 1940, Mss. EUR.F.125/89, IOR.


124. This claim concerning Sikander's written resignation has been corroborated by a report of the Central Intelligence Officer, Lahore, dated 30 September 1939, Craik to Linlithgow, 7 Oct. 1939, Mss. EUR.F.125/88, IOR.


127. Craik to Linlithgow, 6 Aug. 1940, L/P&J/8/507; Craik to Linlithgow, telegram, 12 Aug. 1940, Mss. EUR.F.125/89, IOR.

128. India and the War: Statement issued with the authority of His Majesty's Government by the Governor-General on 8 August 1940, CMD. 6219 (Vol.X, 1940), IOR.

129. Reference to the threatened Congress civil disobedience campaign.

130. Linlithgow to Amery, telegram, 8 Oct. 1940, L/P&J/8/507, IOR.


132. Ibid., p. 87.


135. Linlithgow to Amery, telegram, 30 Sept. 1940, L/P&J/8/507, IOR.
136. Craik to Linlithgow, 16 Oct. 1940, Mss. EUR. F.125/89, IOR.
137. Craik to Linlithgow, 10 Feb. 1941, Mss. EUR.F.125/90, IOR.
139. Text of A.I.M.I. Working Committee Resolution of 22 Feb. 1941, L/P&J/8/690, IOR.
143. Ibid., 15 May 1941; 23 May 1941.
145. Linlithgow to Craik, telegram, 1 March 1941, Mss.EUR.F.125/90, IOR.
146. Linlithgow to Amery, 7 May 1941, Mss. EUR.F.125/10, IOR.
147. Civil and Military Gazette, 2 March 1941.
149. Linlithgow to Amery, 9 July 1941, Mss. EUR.F.125/10, IOR.
150. Amery to Linlithgow, 16 May 1941, Mss. EUR.F.125/10, IOR.
151. Linlithgow to Amery, 31 July/1 Aug. 1941, Mss.EUR.F.125/10, IOR.
152. Linlithgow to Amery, 25 June 1941, Mss. EUR.F.125/10, IOR.
153. Linlithgow to Glancy, 20 June 1941, Mss. EUR.F.125/90, IOR.
154. Linlithgow to Amery, telegram, 27 June 1941, Mss.EUR.F.125/20, IOR.
155. Linlithgow to Amery, telegram, 2 July 1941, Mss.EUR.F.125/21, IOR.
156. Ibid.
157. Sikander to Glancy, 24 Aug. 1941, Mss. EUR.F.125/90, IOR.
158. Linlithgow to Lumley, telegram, 11 July 1941, Mss.EUR.F.125/55, IOR.
159. Lumley to Jinnah, 20 July 1941, enclosure, Irwin to Laithwaite, 22 July 1941, Mss. EUR.F.125/55, IOR.
160. Jinnah to Lumley, 21 July 1941, enclosure, Ibid.
167. Sikander to Laithwaite, 16 Aug. 1941, L/P&J/8/541B, IOR.


170. Sikander to Glancy, 24 Aug. 1941, Mss. EUR.F.125/90, IOR.

171. Fazlul Huq to Governor of Bengal, 25 Aug. 1941, L/P&J/8/541B, IOR.


173. Moon recalls that Sikander made this statement just before he was posted to Amritsar. Moon was appointed Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar on 21 August 1941: P. Moon, op. cit., p. 38; History of Services: Punjab, 1943, p. 77, V/12/347, IOR.


177. Linlithgow to Amery, 15 June 1942, Mss. EUR.F.125/11, IOR.

178. This had been demonstrated by the Akalis' capture of the majority of the seats on the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandak Committee, Civil and Military Gazette, 26 Jan. 1941.


180. See ibid., pp. 20, 22.

181. Glancy to Linlithgow, 10 July 1942, L/P&J/8/510, IOR.

182. Ibid.

183. The Cripps' Offer (March 1942) had given the right to any province to refuse to join the proposed Indian Union. The Congress rejected it, strongly objecting to the option clause, and the fact that it proposed to grant the Princes' representation at the Centre, whilst refusing to establish the democratic principle in the Princely States. Conversely Jinnah condemned it as being unfair to Muslims in that it obliged them to participate in a constitution-making body, the main object of which was the creation of an Indian Union, even though the provinces were at liberty to stand out of it if they so wished. H.V. Hodson, op. cit., pp. 98, 102.

184. Linlithgow to Glancy, 17 July 1942, L/P&J/8/510, IOR.

185. H.V. Hodson, op. cit., p. 94.

186. Civil and Military Gazette, 10 Nov. 1942.

187. Glancy to Linlithgow, 10 July 1942, L/P&J/8/510, IOR.

188. Civil and Military Gazette, 17 Nov. 1942.

189. Ibid., 13 Dec. 1942.

190. Ibid., 27 Dec. 1942.


192. Civil and Military Gazette, 18 Nov. 1942.
CHAPTER VI
THE PREMIERSHIP OF KHIZAR HAYAT KHAN TIWANA AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE:
THE YEARS OF CONFRONTATION, DECEMBER 1942 TO DECEMBER 1945

The demise of Sikander Hyat Khan ushered in a new phase in the politics of the Punjab. The late Premier's passing, combined with the deaths of Fazl-i-Husain (July 1936), Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana (August 1940), Sunder Singh Majithia (April 1941) and Nawab Shahnawaz Khan of Mamdot (March 1942), had deprived the Unionist Party of an extremely influential section of its senior members, and the Ministerial coalition of an important non-Muslim ally (Majithia). Also a second generation of Muslim Unionists had emerged including Shaukat Hyat, Nawab Iftikhar Husain of Mamdot and Mumtaz Daultana, who were young, untried, and hungry for power. Consequently they were determined to use the Muslim League, the political potential of which had increased dramatically as a consequence of the Lahore Resolution (March 1940), as a vehicle to achieve their provincial ambitions. Fate appeared to have presented them with an excellent opportunity for Sikander, a seasoned and experienced champion of the Unionist cause, had been succeeded by a comparatively inexperienced politician - Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana - as a result of which Jinnah and his provincial allies believed that they were in a much stronger position to establish the League as the repository of Muslim political power in the Punjab. In conducting their campaign to subject the Unionist Ministry to League control, they underestimated the tenacity of the new Premier, and the degree of support which he would receive from the majority of his Muslim Unionist Colleagues. As a result the League failed to achieve its principal objective, but it did entice a number of very powerful landlord-politicians from the Unionist benches, which gave it access to the rural constituencies, thereby enabling it to court the support of the Muslim voters in the countryside. The Tiwana Ministry, therefore, was engaged in a continual rearguard action to resist the League's attempts to undermine it, and destroy its majority in the Assembly.

Although Jinnah had outmanoeuvred Sikander in the national orbit, the latter had prevented him from establishing an effective Muslim League organisation in the Punjab. Furthermore British determination not to permit elections to be held in India for the duration of the War had deprived him of the opportunity to appeal to the Muslim electorate on
the issue of 'Pakistan', and to attempt to defeat the Unionist Government through the ballot-box. Jinnah's national ambitions, however, could not tolerate the continuation of a Muslim dominated Ministry in the Punjab independent of League control. He desperately needed to gain ascendancy over the Provincial Government to enable him to execute the plan he had conceived to resuscitate the League at the provincial level, and to strengthen his national position in order to extract the maximum concessions from the British. Jinnah confidentially outlined the tactics he hoped to adopt to his Working Committee, which included Mamdot, in April 1943. Jinnah's stratagem envisaged the A.I.M.L. confronting the British Government with the Pakistan demand immediately the War ended. He calculated that then would be the most opportune time; he had a vision of a post-war Britain, exhausted by the conflict, whose imperial presence would be challenged throughout the Islamic world, particularly in Palestine, Iran, Egypt and Iraq, and who as a result would be unable to ignore Indian Muslim aspirations. But for the A.I.M.L. to secure the advantage he envisaged he emphasised that it was vital that it should establish its authority over the Ministries in the Muslim-majority provinces (Punjab, Bengal, Sind, and the N.W.F.P.), so that they could be used as platforms to disseminate League propaganda and to popularise the organisation and its creed. Also Jinnah calculated that once the A.I.M.L. had realised its provincial goals, he would hold the destinies of the local governments in his hands, giving him the means to compromise the Government of India, and to dramatically demonstrate the power of the A.I.M.L., in that he would be able to order the Ministries to resign, or cause them to fall by withdrawing League support. Hence his exhortation to his Working Committee colleagues:

"Let us use this opportunity to consolidate our position in the Provinces. Let the Ministries function in such a manner that...they popularise the League among the masses... Collect funds. Consolidate the National Guards... Let us exploit these Ministries so that when we attack, the very fact that we are giving up our seats in the Government...to launch such an attack will add to our prestige... In December [1943] we meet in Sind. In April [1944] we meet in the Punjab. There we decide when to strike, where to strike and how to strike." 6

Thus it was essential for Jinnah that the Unionist Ministry should be under League domination before April 1944, especially as control of the Punjab, the premier recruiting province in India, would greatly increase his bargaining powers whilst the War lasted, in that any threat to disrupt the Government there would have posed a serious problem for the Central Government, preoccupied as it was with maintaining recruitment and the war effort in general.
There is evidence to suggest that Jinnah had already attempted to prepare the ground for a League take-over in the Punjab. Within days of Sikander's death, Mamdot, the President of the Punjab Muslim League, sought "an urgent interview" with Glancy, the Governor of the Province, to discuss the succession to the Premiership. Glancy, convinced that the request had been made on Jinnah's orders, suspected the existence of a plot to engineer a pro-League successor to Sikander. As a result he delayed seeing Mamdot until after 30 December 1942, the day on which Khizar was formally invited, and accepted, to serve as Premier, fearing that "the solidarity of the Unionist party might have been seriously undermined if any suggestion of the necessity for Muslim League approval had been allowed to come to the fore."7

It was the prerogative of the Governor to invite the person he believed would be capable of commanding the confidence of the Ministry to lead it.8 In Glancy's opinion there was only one suitable candidate - Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana. Khizar's claim was strengthened by the fact that all his Cabinet colleagues were willing to serve under him. Also he did not face any serious opposition from Muslim contenders. The only politician who could seriously challenge him - Firoz Khan Noon - had declined to seek the office, as he already held a responsible position as Defence Member on the Viceroy's Executive Council, and because he realised that it would have been impracticable for a Noon and a Tiwana to serve in the same Cabinet as the two families were closely connected,9 without disrupting the balance between the various Muslim factions. Also although the influential Hayats of Wah were anxious to retain the Premiership for one of their number, having campaigned for the appointment of either Liaqat Hyat Khan or Nawab Muzaffar Khan (Sikander's brother and cousin), Glancy considered both to be unsuitable: Liaqat had been absent from the Punjab for twenty years and was not an M.L.A., whilst Muzaffar Khan was not acceptable to many Unionists.10

There can be little doubt that Glancy had other reasons for wishing Khizar to succeed Sikander. The Empire was still at war, Rangoon had fallen to the Japanese on 8 March 1942 and India was threatened with invasion.11 It was imperative, therefore, that the Punjab should be entrusted to a leader whose loyalty was beyond question, and who would endeavour to ensure that the Unionist Ministry remained committed to total and unconditional support for the war effort, and who commanded the necessary following in the Provincial Assembly to prevent the Government from being deviated from that objective. Events proved that Khizar satisfied these requirements. He was personally determined to aid the prosecution
of the War, and his succession as Premier was supported by an overwhelming majority of Unionist M.L.A.s: on 23 January 1943 69 Muslim Unionists passed a vote of confidence in his leadership, which was endorsed by the Unionist controlled Provincial Muslim League, and on the same day 86 Unionist M.L.A.s., including Muslims and non-Muslims, recorded their approval of the new Premier.

Confident that he possessed united Unionist allegiance, and that the local League remained nothing more than a Unionist mouthpiece, Khizar seized the initiative to attempt to ensure that the A.I.M.L. President would continue to honour the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, and would refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the Province. In March 1943 Khizar met Jinnah at the A.I.M.L. Council meeting at Delhi to discuss future Unionist-League relations. Jinnah sensible of the fact that Khizar's position was secure in the Punjab for the moment, agreed to ratify the 'Pact' on the condition that the Punjab Premier undertook to re-organise the League in the Province. This was no compromise on Jinnah's part, however, for although he opposed Maulana Abdul Hamid Badauni's resolution calling on Punjabi Muslim M.L.A.s to form a League Assembly Party independent of the Unionists, he impressed upon Khizar that he was no longer prepared to endure the mismanagement of League affairs in the Punjab as had occurred in Sikander's time:

"The main object of the resolution [Badauni's] is that a Muslim League party in the Punjab Legislature should be set up. As explained by Malik Khizar Hayat Khan, a party already exists. It is a different question whether it has been functioning efficiently or not. But now a definite assurance has been given that efforts will be made to make the party worthy of the prestige and honour of the...Muslim League. Therefore, might we not wait and see what efforts are really made?"

In effect Jinnah had issued Khizar with a guarded ultimatum - the Punjab Muslim League had to be transformed into a viable organisation. Khizar who was anxious to avoid an open breach with Jinnah and prevent him from manipulating factionalism in the Unionist structure, attempted to placate him by promising reforms, whilst at the same time ensuring that the Provincial League would remain in reality an impotent appendage of the Unionist Party. Accordingly following his return from Delhi the Premier convened a meeting of the Punjab Muslim League Assembly Party, which in reality meant the Muslim membership of the Unionist Ministry. They undertook to improve the efficiency of the local League, but by a majority of 51 votes to seven they adopted the Sikander-Jinnah Pact as their guiding principle, proclaiming thereby the doctrine of non-
interference on the part of Jinnah and the A.I.M.L. in the internal political affairs of the Province.

The enunciation of the Pact, and the support which it engendered in Unionist ranks did not deflect Jinnah from his aim of gaining control of the Ministry, though it caused him initially to employ caution rather than confrontation. Also to begin with Jinnah was content to allow the situation to develop and to observe the outcome. This relatively passive attitude was encouraged by the fact that for the first time there existed a small nucleus of important Unionist M.L.As., centred around Mammad and Daultana, who were anxious to promote the interests of the League, and to harness its political potential to challenge Khizar's leadership.17

In addition the 'old Guard' of the pre-Pact Punjab League, personified by Barkat Ali remained equally determined to frustrate the Premier, and destroy the Unionist hegemony. The pro-Jinnah elements in the local League, under the direction of Mammad, seized the opportunity afforded to them by the holding of a 'League Week' from 12 to 18 April 1943, to try to extricate the organisation from the political morass of Unionist domination. A campaign was launched in the provincial press advocating the creation of an independent Muslim League Party in the Assembly. Also League propagandists sought to embarrass the Ministry and enlist public support by focussing attention on the socio-economic backwardness of the Muslim community in general, and the trading classes in particular; special reference being made to the low number of Muslims engaged in the sugar and ata (wholemeal flour) trade,18 which were subject to Government licence. The inference being that the Unionist Ministry should actively protect and promote Muslim interests in these areas; it was a programme which the multi-communal coalition could not undertake and survive.

In the same month Jinnah, encouraged by these developments, added to the Unionists' discomfiture. During a speech to the A.I.M.L. Working Committee he referred to the Punjab Government as a Muslim League Ministry. He based the observation on the fact that under the terms of his pact with Sikander the Muslim majority in the administration had joined the A.I.M.L. Though the claim elicited a strong denial from Chhotu Ram, devout Leaguers, including Sheikh Karamat Ali (Punjabi delegate to A.I.M.L. Working Committee) and Barkat Ali applauded the A.I.M.L. President's stand. The latter going so far as to state that if Khizar opposed Jinnah's interpretation he would be committing political suicide: "No Muslim Premier can ever dream of having a clash with the Quaid-i-Azam."19 Mr. Huq's end [in Bengal]20 is a clear lesson."21 This inference was not lost on Khizar, who fully appreciated that the battle for League control had begun.
The opening shots, however, had been muted. Jinnah, cheered by the
knowledge that a pro-League faction had emerged on the Unionist benches,
had succoured their disaffection to test the political temperature in the
Province, in order to engineer a take-over from within the Ministry,
rather than launching an outright assault against it.

In pursuit of these tactics Jinnah had acquired the covert alleg­
iance of a member of the Unionist Cabinet, in that he had extracted a
secret undertaking from Shaukat Hyat Khan, who had replaced Khizar as
Minister for Public Works on 13 February 1943,22 to the effect that he
would resign his office whenever Jinnah ordered him to.23 Thus Jinnah
possessed the means to promote League interests at Ministerial level, or
even to disrupt the Cabinet, and seriously compromise the Premier if he
chose to. Ironically Khizar had unwittingly assisted Jinnah's designs,
in that he had supported Shaukat Hyat's appointment. Khizar's elevation
to the Premiership had necessitated the appointment of a further Muslim
Minister. Political considerations dictated that the appointment should
come either from the Multan Division or the late Premier's family in order
to maintain the balance between the various powerful Muslim factions on
the Unionist benches.24 Three contenders had put themselves forward for
consideration - Muhammad Jamal Khan Leghari, an extremely wealthy Tumandar
(tribal chief) from Dera Ghazi Khan, Major Ashiq Hussain, a Pir and scion
of the influential Quershi family of Multan, and Shaukat Hyat, the eldest
son of the late Premier. Khizar strongly favoured the last candidate,
and he was able to achieve Glancy's compliance in the matter. Although
the Governor acknowledged that Shaukat's appointment would be open to
criticism in that he was a serving army officer and was neither on the
electoral roll nor an M.L.A., he believed it would be politicallyadvan­
tageous to acquire his services in that it would ensure the allegiance of
the Hayats of Wah, and Sikander's former supporters (the Khattar faction)
for the Ministry. Also Glancy reasoned that Shaukat's war record would
prove useful in promoting the Punjab's war effort. Having committed him­
tself to the Premier's choice Glancy dismissed the other candidates as un­
suitable: Leghari on account of the fact that he enjoyed only an insig­
nificant following amongst Muslim M.L.A.s., and had been disloyal to
Sikander, and Ashiq Hussain because the support he commanded in the
Assembly had been effectively neutralised by party faction.25

Unknown to either the Premier or the Governor, their preference had
established a 'viper' in the Unionist 'bosom'. As Shaukat was not an
M.L.A. he had to seek election to the Assembly within six months of being
appointed.26 Under the terms of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact he was
required to contest the election as a Muslim League candidate. Jinnah used this condition to gain control over the new Minister; he stipulated that Shaukat would only be awarded the League ticket if he placed his written resignation from the Unionist Government in his (Jinnah's) hands. Shaukat agreed to the demand, but on account of his late father's association with the British and his own with the army he asked to be released from the obligation if the A.I.M.L. engaged in open rebellion against the Government of India. In complying with Jinnah's terms Shaukat had not been motivated by the fact that he was a convinced 'Jinnhite', 'Leaguer' or 'Pakistanist', or considering his request regarding the British, a true nationalist. Rather Shaukat appreciated that Jinnah's ascendancy over Muslim national politics had been established - his father's experience bore testimony to that - and he sought to secure his own political future against the day when the A.I.M.L. should finally emerge as one of the principal successors to the Raj.

Khizar at the time was ignorant of Shaukat's duplicity; the latter had been able to mislead the Governor, and thereby the Premier, into believing that Jinnah had opposed his secondment to the Cabinet, and had been reluctant to offer him League support. Nevertheless Khizar appreciated that the A.I.M.L. President's claim concerning the status of his Ministry combined with the actions and statements of Mamdot and Barkat Ali (see above) proclaimed the determination of the Central League to seize control over the Unionist Government. Also despite the fact that Jinnah possessed only a small number of committed supporters, the Premier realised that he faced a dangerous adversary, whose real power lay in the popular appeal generated by the Pakistan demand. In an effort, therefore, to prevent Jinnah using the slogan to encroach into the provincial sphere, and in order to destroy the attraction 'Pakistan' held for the Muslim masses, Khizar appealed to the Viceroy for assistance. He asked Linlithgow to use his influence to persuade the British Government to compel Jinnah to define exactly what the Pakistan scheme entailed so that if it proved unacceptable, as Khizar clearly hoped it would, it could be formally rejected. In making this request the Premier warned that if such steps were not take to contain the enthusiasm which the Muslim populace felt for 'Pakistan', he feared that he would be unable to maintain his position in the Punjab. The Viceroy, however, though he appreciated "that Pakistan, that simple slogan which the meanest intelligence can understand, is taking very deep root among Muslimes", refused Khizar's supplication. Linlithgow remained preoccupied with the need to counter the Congress through the presence of a united A.I.M.L., and as such he remained
committed to preserving the doctrine that the British should remain aloof from the Pakistan controversy, insisting that it was a matter for the League and the Congress to settle between themselves.\textsuperscript{29}

Denied British assistance to debunk the Pakistan idea, Khizar's only line of defence lay in promoting the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, and maintaining a pretence of support for the A.I.M.L., which he did by pledging a donation of Rs. 7,000 to the League funds, on condition that his gift was not publicised.\textsuperscript{30} The Premier's stance and largesse failed to satisfy either Jinnah or his lieutenants in the Province. At the beginning of June 1943 Mamdot announced that the Pact had ceased to have any significance, in that it had achieved its purpose — the formation of a Muslim League Party in the Assembly. Furthermore, the Nawab pronounced that the League Party consisted of all the Muslim Unionists, and was subject to the discipline and control of the Punjab League Parliamentary Board, of which he was the President. This statement drew immediate objections and denials from staunch Muslim Unionists. Shaikh Faiz Mahomed (Parliamentary Secretary) pointed out that if the Pact had indeed ceased to exist, then those Muslim M.L.As. who had become Leaguers as a result of it would cease to belong to the A.I.M.L.\textsuperscript{31} 'Muhhaqqaq', a Unionist propagandist, writing to the Civil and Military Gazette on 20 June 1943, further reasoned that Mamdot's assertions, which amounted to a claim that the Muslim League enjoyed the dominant position in the Unionist coalition, could not be substantiated:

"The simple fact is that the only primary creed of a ministerial party is the creed which commands the confidence of the House... It goes without saying that till now such a creed in the Punjab Assembly is the Unionist creed and not the creed of the League. Hence if any parliamentary party can claim to be primary it is the Unionist Party and not the Muslim League group."

Also 'Muhhaqqaq' refuted \textit{Dawn}'s\textsuperscript{32} allegation that Khizar had been invited as the leader of the Muslim League Assembly Party to form a Ministry, by testifying correctly that the Governor had asked him to serve as Premier in the knowledge that he commanded the support and confidence of his Cabinet colleagues and the Unionist Party.\textsuperscript{33}

Throughout the acrimonious debate which followed, the validity of 'Muhhaqqaq's' observations could not be denied. Mamdot, however, was not concerned with constitutional niceties but with the acquisition of power. As a member of the A.I.M.L. Working Committee he was aware of Jinnah's stratagem to establish the authority of the Muslim League in all the Muslim majority provinces, and as such he determined to further those ends. Nevertheless Imran Ali, in his work \textit{Punjab Politics In The Decade}
Before Partition, has suggested that it was Mamdot who orchestrated the conflict concerning the status of the Ministry in the Punjab in order to use the A.I.M.L. as a "vehicle in what was essentially a factional struggle within the Unionist Party..." This interpretation, however, is too limited, for it was Jinnah who had urged such action on his confederates in the Province, and who had declared in April 1943, prior to Mamdot's campaign, that the Unionist Government constituted a League Ministry (see p. 216). There can be little doubt, therefore, that Jinnah had inspired Mamdot's actions. Even so during June 1943 Jinnah refused to be drawn on the issue, and he refrained from endorsing Mamdot's assertion, which led 'Critic', in his column in the Civil and Military Gazette, to shrewdly comment that the Pact controversy would continue to rage until there was "an edict from the League President [Jinnah] one way or the other...", and that Jinnah would not commit himself openly to opposing the Unionists until he was certain of success.

Subsequent events proved the validity of 'Critic's' judgement. Mamdot, embarrassed by the absence of any public encouragement from Jinnah, had been forced to issue a press statement on 15 June 1943 to the effect that it resulted because the A.I.M.L. President "did not find it necessary to correct me in my interpretation of the situation" and not because Jinnah disagreed with him. This claim, though just, did not reveal the reality of the situation. In fact Jinnah's silence occurred for tactical reasons; he was merely waiting for the most propitious moment to strike. Jinnah knew that the Punjab League remained largely under Unionist domination; that even his own followers in the Province were divided, and that the influence of the League in the Assembly was minimal. From the opening months of 1943 the Provincial League had been subjected to an internal power contest. The League 'Old Guard' resenting the influence of Mamdot, Daultana and their adherents, had attempted to oust the new League leadership in the Punjab. On 24 January 1943 a Muslim League Workers Board had been established in Lahore with Maulana Zafar Ali Khan as President, and Barkat Ali and Rashid Ali as Vice-President and General Secretary respectively. Mamdot who had not been consulted about its formation, and recognising that the move constituted an attempt to isolate and bypass him, opposed the development. Jinnah, not wishing to forfeit the allegiance of such influential landlords as Mamdot and Daultana, blocked the attempted coup by refusing to recognise the Muslim League Workers Board; on 15 May 1943, in a strongly worded letter to Rashid Ali, he censured the latter for interfering in Mamdot's sphere of work, and advised him to change his attitude.
Mamdot, anxious to justify Jinnah's confidence in his leadership of the local League assured the A.I.M.L. President on 19 May 1943 that "nobody has the guts to say anything against the League", and he insinuated that the Muslim Ministers in the Unionist Cabinet would not oppose League policies: "none of them will [sic] the courage to say 'no'."\(^{39}\)

It was an exaggerated assessment which did not fool Jinnah, the latter observing on 23 June 1943 "that the position of the Muslim League in the Punjab is very sad indeed".\(^{40}\) Consequently Jinnah, who by nature was a cautious man, and in the knowledge that the Punjab League could not effect the takeover of the Unionist Ministry which he desired, bided his time so that he could judge the reaction of the Muslim public concerning the Unionist - League controversy. Only when it had been established that Muslim public opinion, and important sections of the Muslim media were rallying to the League's standard did he openly declare his support for Mamdot. Two inter-connected events influenced Jinnah in this respect. On 13 July 1943 Shaukat Hyat, who was anxious to fortify the position of the League within the Unionist Party, and because he believed that "complete subservience to Jinnah" would guarantee "him the best chance of a successful career",\(^{41}\) stated in a speech to the Sheikhupura District Muslim League that there could be no conflict between the League and the Unionist Ministry. He claimed that all those Muslim M.L.A.s. who owed allegiance to the A.I.M.L., were required to obey its mandate, and support the call for 'Pakistan' even if it meant withdrawing from office and boycotting the Legislature.\(^{42}\) Mamdot naturally applauded the Minister's stand, and in an interview to the press on 19 July he claimed quite erroneously that all the Muslim Ministers agreed with Shaukat's interpretation.\(^{43}\) Khizar, driven by the necessity to disprove this claim, forced Shaukat to capitulate.\(^{44}\) The latter, fearing no doubt that resistance to the Premier would cost him his Cabinet appointment, issued a retraction in the press on 20 July 1943; he emphasised his support for the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, and the provincial policy pursued by his late father, claiming that his Sheikhupura speech had been mis-interpreted.\(^{45}\)

The damage, however, had been done. Whilst the Hindu press delighted in the Minister's apparent confusion, the Milap observing "The young Minister in his enthusiasm for the League went up like a rocket but came down like a stone", pro-League Muslim newspapers eagerly sought to exploit the situation. The Zamindar called for the rejection of the 'Pact' "lock, stock and barrel". It was an important development, the significance of which would not have been lost on Jinnah, for this Muslim
daily had traditionally been opposed to him and Mamdot. The deliberations of the Shahbaz, however, posed a far more ominous sign for the Unionists, considering that it was owned by Syed Amjad Ali, the Premier’s Parliamentary Secretary. The Shahbaz had reported that Muslim public opinion was rallying around Mamdot’s demand for giving the 'Pact' a decent burial, a development which it welcomed, believing that it would lead to the abandonment of the Unionist nomenclature, and thereby remove any misunderstanding which existed concerning the true complexion of the Ministry, which in its opinion was Muslim League and not Unionist.

These events appear to have convinced Jinnah, who avidly followed the provincial press, of the existence of disenchanted elements within the Unionist Party, and of the sympathy and support of influential sections of the Muslim media. The situation was clearly ripe for exploitation, and on 27 July 1943 Jinnah sanctioned Mamdot’s stand, in the full realisation that confrontation was required to bend the Unionist Party to the League’s will. In an open letter to Sir Muhammad Nawaz Khan (Unionist M.L.A., Attock Central Muhammadan Rural) dated 27 July 1943, Jinnah declared "There is not the slightest doubt that immediately after the Sikander – Jinnah Pact the Unionist Party in the Punjab was no more."

Weak though the Punjab League undoubtedly was in the Assembly Jinnah’s intrusion disturbed Khizar. In order to dissuade the A.I.M.L. President from intensifying his efforts to subvert the Ministry, the Premier determined to publicly demonstrate that the majority of Muslim Unionists would not tolerate the abandonment of the 'Pact' or the loss of Unionist independence to the League. In pursuit of this objective Khizar on 8 November 1943 convened and chaired a full meeting of the Unionist controlled Muslim League Assembly Party, including Mamdot, which unanimously ratified the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. It was also decided by a majority vote to incorporate the 'Pact' in the constitution of the League Party. Having thus ensured recognition for, and acceptance of Sikander's original agreement with Jinnah, the League Party unanimously accepted an amendment proposed by Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, whereby the League Assembly Party was to be subject to the control and discipline of the Central and Provincial Muslim League Parliamentary Boards. Khizar’s acquiescence in the matter was clearly intended to pacify Jinnah, but it was a ludicrous compromise, as the 'Pact' motion and the Raja's amendment were diametrically opposed. Nevertheless the fact that the 'Pact' had been re-adopted underlined the impotency of the 'Jinnahites' in the Unionist – League consortium.

The proceedings did not satisfy Jinnah, they merely stiffened his
resolve to destroy the hold which the Unionist Party continued to exercise over Muslim politics in the Province. Until the Autumn of 1943 Jinnah, in keeping with the tactics he had outlined to his Working Committee the previous April (see p.213), had hoped to capture the Provincial Government from within, and use it as a tool to further the policy of the A.I.M.L. in the Punjab. Once it became clear that Khizar would not accommodate his wishes, Jinnah modified his tactics. He still hoped to be able to engineer a takeover by wooing Muslim M.L.As. to his side, but if that proved to be impossible he had ordered Mamdot in September 1943 to create an independent Muslim League Party in the Legislature, independent of the Unionists:

"I hope that a satisfactory solution may be found by agreement between you [Mamdot and Khizar]. But one thing is certain that the Muslim League Party in the Assembly must be established on a sound and proper footing..." 51

Jinnah appreciated that the creation of a genuine League Assembly Party committed to the programme of the A.I.M.L. would deprive him of the pretence of a united Muslim following in the Punjab Legislature, as it would force the League into opposition. Even so he calculated that in the long run such an occurrence could work to his advantage, for if the League Party attracted sufficient Muslim adherents from the Unionist benches it would cause the fall of the Ministry and precipitate a constitutional crisis, in that it was unlikely that any other Party or coalition would be able to command a stable majority, particularly as the Sikh and Hindu groups in the Assembly, because of their opposition to 'Pakistan' and distrust of the A.I.M.L.'s interference in the Punjab's affairs, had rejected League overtures in May and June 1943 which had aimed at securing their co-operation to oust the Unionists. 52 Also it was improbable that the Congress would lend its support to a Unionist rump. The result would be the imposition of Governor's rule, which in Jinnah's opinion would rally Punjabi Muslims to the A.I.M.L., as it would no longer be restricted by the presence of a Muslim dominated Government in the Province. 53

In considering such a course of action and its possible repercussions Jinnah was probably encouraged by the cracks which had appeared in the Muslim wing of the Unionist Party. Mamdot and Daultana had openly declared in his favour; Shaukat Hyat had also pledged his allegiance, though by somewhat tortuous means, and for dubious reasons. Also a further influential Unionist landed politician, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, had joined the Jinnah camp in August 1943. 54 The support which the Raja gave to the A.I.M.L., however, was suspect. Elected on the League ticket
in 1937, the allure of a Parliamentary Secretaryship had been sufficient to attract him to the Unionist benches (see p. 164). Having abandoned the Muslim League he posed as a staunch supporter of Sikander, stoutly proclaiming the supremacy of the Unionist Party in provincial matters following the inception of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact:

"There is no doubt that the position of the parties in the Legislature remains entirely unaffected. The alliance with the League will not influence in any way the understanding which exists between the Unionist Party and the other groups which...from [sic] the Ministerial Party".

Six years later he had again changed his position, claiming for the League the primary position in the Unionist coalition. Like all 'political weather-vanes' Ghazanfar Ali had judged the way the prevailing 'winds of power' were blowing.

Despite the questionable personal motives which had caused these members of the landed élite to offer their allegiance to Jinnah, the latter had gained powerful allies, who in time would spearhead the destruction of the Unionist Party. As early as July 1943 the Government of India appreciated that the 'writing was on the wall' for the Unionist Government, in that it predicted that if Khizar continued "to insist that his is a Unionist Ministry opposition from Moslem Leaguers in Punjab (will) in course of time overwhelm him." Khizar shared this apprehension, and consequently he was reluctant to continue to oppose Jinnah. Thus in September 1943 he had bluntly asked the Viceroy to reveal to him what course future British policy was likely to follow, so that he could act accordingly. In short he wanted to know if 'Pakistan' was likely to be conceded. Linlithgow, however, dismissed the Premier's request as naive, observing to Amery that for a Provincial Premier to imagine that he would be privy to such confidential information was "rather a depressing reflection on the political capacity and on the imagination of even the best meaning of these people." Had Linlithgow not been so condescending he might have recognised that such a question revealed the terrible plight of the Punjab Premier, for the latter was obstinately resisting Jinnah out of a sense of duty to the British, at a time when it was recognised that the A.I.M.L. would eventually dominate Muslim politics in the Province.

Refused the advice he sought, Khizar informed Glancy in April 1944 that he was seriously considering capitulating to Jinnah. He pointed out that the Unionist Party existed in name only, it possessed no finances and little organisation in the Province, and that its disappearance would cause little regret. Also he explained that though he did not believe
in 'Pakistan', he knew that the slogan would gain momentum and would prove to be a decisive factor in the next elections, particularly as he expected Jinnah to employ Maulvis and Mullahs to harness Muslim fanaticism. In view of the significance of the religious factor Khizar concluded that many of his Muslim allies would be drawn into the A.I.M.L. camp. Finally Khizar opined to the Governor that he believed that there would only be two parties of any importance in the near future, the A.I.M.L. and the Congress, and that

"if he defies Jinnah and persuades his staunch adherents to adopt this course, he fears that in a comparatively short time they will all be relegated to political oblivion. He anticipates that the landlord class or "loyalists", as he often calls them, though in any case ultimately doomed, may be sacrificed before their time if he decides to hold out." 

Unable to reconcile his fears for the future, Khizar, who by his own admission was an Empire loyalist, agreed to maintain his opposition to Jinnah if the Governor gave him an informal order to do so as "his duty as a loyal subject...". Although Glancy was anxious to manipulate Khizar's undoubted loyalty, he balked at ordering it, informing Wavell (succeeded Linlithgow as Viceroy, October 1943), that

"I have told Khizr that I am not in a position to give him any kind of an order in this regard. I can only tell him as a friend what I would do in his place and it is my considered opinion that he will have no peace hereafter, nor will he be serving the interests of the Province or of India or of Muslims or of the Empire if he gives way to Jinnah and places himself in his power." 

This argument convinced Khizar of the need to frustrate Jinnah's Punjab designs. In proffering his counsel, Glancy's main aim was to prevent the disruption of the Unionist Ministry, which he believed would weaken the solidarity of the Province, and thereby undermine its war effort. Wavell, who shared Glancy's concern in this respect, applauded the Governor's action, informing the latter that,

"It is of the greatest importance that until the end of the war against Japan there should be stable administration in the Punjab, and the dissolution of the Unionist Ministry and the substitution for it of a Muslim League Ministry, such as Jinnah wants, would be a disaster." 

Jinnah's initial attempted coup in the Punjab, therefore, very nearly succeeded. That it failed ultimately was not the result of a weak Punjab League, or because the Punjab Premier was ardently anti-League or anti-Pakistan, or possessed any hope of ultimate success in opposing Jinnah, but because in safeguarding British interests Glancy, with viceroyal approval, was able to exploit the Premier's imperial sentiments
and sense of duty. Jinnah had already put Khizar's fidelity to the test. On 18 March 1944 Jinnah had arrived in the Punjab to continue his anti-Unionist campaign in person; two days later he claimed that the Sikander-Jinnah Pact was a misnomer, that neither the A.I.M.L. nor himself had been a party to it, and that Sikander had conceived it purely to demonstrate Punjab support for the League. Though it was an untruthful exposition, Khizar, in an attempt to contain the situation, responded by posing as a determined 'Pakistanist' and Unionist. Speaking for the first time from a Muslim League platform, the Premier declared on 23 March 1944 that the Pakistan demand was just, and stood for the freedom of Muslims, but he judiciously added that the minority communities would be treated generously in the Muslim State, particularly in the Punjab. The fact that Khizar was opposed to the notion of 'Pakistan', demonstrates the unease he felt, and the lengths he was prepared to go to publicly to appease Jinnah and prevent him from isolating him by mustering popular Muslim feeling against his Ministry, for it was becoming increasingly apparent that if Muslim Unionists persisted in their opposition to Jinnah they would be labelled as traitors to Islam.

Jinnah, sensing Khizar's dilemma and encouraged by his reconciliatory remarks concerning 'Pakistan', increased the pressure on the Premier to force him to submit his Government to League control. On 4 April 1944 Jinnah publicly announced that the Muslim League Assembly Party was now subject to the control of the A.I.M.L., and that Muslim M.L.As. owed no obligation to the Unionist Party, and were not bound by its programme. Also he declared that as the League Party constituted the largest group supporting the Ministry, in that all Unionist Muslims belonged to the A.I.M.L., then the name of the Coalition Government would have to be changed to reflect that fact. He proposed, therefore, the adoption of the title Muslim League Coalition Party: "A change of label cannot, and does not, affect the continuance of the present coalition, so long as the parties concerned desire to maintain it." Khizar, however, refused to comply; on 21 April 1944 the Premier during a meeting with Jinnah insisted on the continuation of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, and the retention of the Unionist name. In explaining his motives to the Pakistani Foreign Minister almost twenty-five years later, Khizar claimed that two considerations had moulded his response. The first being that his non-Muslim colleagues refused to accept the change in the Ministry's title as advocated by Jinnah, and secondly that even if he had sanctioned it, the result would have been the collapse of the Government and the imposition of Governor's rule: "But for these reasons, I would have had
no objection at all personally to calling the Ministry by whatever nomenclature the Quaid-i-Azam wanted." Though this explanation was valid to an extent it concealed the Premier's overriding consideration, which as he admitted to Glancy was to sustain the British war effort in the Province:

"Khizr has told me many times that he would much prefer to resign rather than expose himself to attacks from his fellow-Muslims, and that he is only resisting Jinnah...because he is ready to carry on the war effort...".  

In fact Glancy had again been instrumental in harnessing Khizar's pro-British sentiments, thereby encouraging his continued resistance to Jinnah, as is evident from the entry Wavell made in his journal on 10 June 1944:

"I had a talk with Glancy this morning, he seemed a bit harassed, he had a very difficult time putting enough backbone into Khizar and his Muslims Ministers to stand up to Jinnah. Although Jinnah is a most unorthodox Moslem (to say the least of it) he seems to be able to wave the banner of religion and frighten them all to heel with it." 

Not only did the Governor fire Khizar's recalcitrance, he also conceived the strategy with which the Premier finally confronted Jinnah. On 24 April 1944, Glancy informed Wavell that it had been decided that Khizar should accommodate Jinnah's insistence that he and his Muslim Unionist colleagues should owe direct allegiance to the A.I.M.L., but in return Jinnah would have to agree to the retention of the Unionist label by the Punjab Government, and give a written undertaking endorsing the compromise, and pledging not to interfere further with the working and programme of the Ministry. Glancy believed that this formula would be rejected by Jinnah, but he thought that it was essential that Khizar should pursue the tactic to prevent his followers from assuming that he had been intimidated by Jinnah's demands, and thus dissuade them from defecting to what would appear to be the winning side: "Khizar has come to realize that this effect is being brought about to an increasing extent and that the time has arrived for him to make a firm stand." 

On 25 April 1944 Khizar put the proposal to Jinnah, and in an attempt to induce his acceptance of it he pointed out that it would be impossible to form a League coalition under any other circumstances as the rural Hindus, the Mahasabha, the Akali Party and the Congress would refuse to support it. He conceded that the League could engineer a small majority with the assistance of a few Sikh, Hindu and Depressed Class M.L.As, but he cautioned Jinnah that the Governor would probably refuse to sanction such a government as it would certainly prove to be unstable, and would thus adversely affect the war effort. If on the other hand Jinnah accepted the formula Khizar proposed, the Premier assured him that he
would possess a united League Ministry, in all but name, offering full support for 'Pakistan'. Whilst, Khizar concluded, if the League went into opposition, it would function as a small minority, and the all-India front for 'Pakistan' would be broken.\(^{74}\)

Jinnah, however, was neither convinced nor intimidated by Khizar's prognosis, and he rejected Khizar's offer. As stated previously Jinnah considered the creation of a genuine Muslim League Party accountable to himself and the A.I.M.L. preferable to the continuation of Unionist control over the Punjab League, and he was not averse to the imposition of Governor's rule. Also had Jinnah accepted the Premier's proposition he would in effect have submitted himself to an agreement far more binding than the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, which would have ensured that the Punjab Muslim League remained ineffectual as Khizar intended, his real purpose being "to curb intrigues and factions manoeuvring within the Muslim League Party".\(^{75}\) Also in refusing to meet Khizar's conditions there is evidence to suggest that Jinnah had been persuaded to disregard the Premier's claim that influential non-Muslim M.L.A.s would refuse to co-operate with a League Ministry. Whilst amassing biographical material in 1967 Khizar recalled that "some of the clever men in the Party" had assured Jinnah that the non-Muslim Ministers in the Unionist coalition would, in order to retain their offices, agree to serve in a Muslim League Government, and that the Premier had exaggerated their supposed reluctance as a ploy to frustrate the A.I.M.L. President's designs.\(^{76}\) Though Khizar did not identify these "clever men" it is evident that he was referring to the Mamdot-Daultana-Shaukat Hyat caucus whom Sheikh Faiz Ahmed (Unionist Parliamentary Secretary) had openly criticised in May 1944 for misleading Jinnah regarding the true state of political affairs in the Punjab.\(^{77}\)

Acting on the assurances of his cohorts Jinnah persisted in his demands concerning the status and title of the Ministry, and on 26 April 1944 he met with Chhotu Ram and Baldev Singh to solicit their compliance in the matter, having been promised by Khizar that if they agreed to the changes Jinnah wanted, then he would follow their example.\(^{78}\) The two non-Muslim Ministers, however, had no intention of accommodating Jinnah. They merely used the meeting to attempt to compromise him on the Pakistan issue. The Hindu Jat and Sikh leaders offered to consider co-operating with a Muslim League coalition if the creation of such an administration represented part of an all-Indian agreement, and on condition that the Pakistan idea was abandoned for the duration of the War. Also in order that the merits of 'Pakistan' could be judged, Chhotu Ram and Baldev Singh
demanded from Jinnah a precise definition of its political, constitutional and geographical implications. In addition they insisted that the A.I.M.L. should pledge unconditional support for the war effort. They were impossible demands; Jinnah could not reverse the attitude of the A.I.M.L. concerning the war without suffering considerable loss of face, and more importantly he could not risk subjecting his conception of a Muslim State to close public scrutiny, particularly if it became apparent that its territory in all probability would be limited solely to Muslim majority areas, and would not include the Punjab in its entirety. As a result he refused to meet the conditions sought by the two Ministers, though in doing so he judiciously avoided any discussion of 'Pakistan', rather he rejected them on the following grounds - the creation of a Muslim League Ministry in the Punjab could not be considered from a national point of view; 'Pakistan' was an all-Indian question, and as such irrelevant for the purpose of forming a coalition in the Punjab; the A.I.M.L. war policy had already been defined and was not a subject for discussion with groups in the Punjab Assembly. This summary dismissal ended any hope of a reconciliation, and on 27 April 1944 in a joint press communique Chhotu Ram and Baldev Singh criticised Jinnah's response, implying that his attitude concerning 'Pakistan' was totally unrealistic and irresponsible:

"Mr. Jinnah's comments can offer no comfort or satisfaction to anybody. In fact they seem to be visibly evasive and suggest a complete reluctance to face the issues inherent in Pakistan."

Jinnah refused to permit the Ministers' condemnation to deflect him from his course, and on 27 April 1944, he reiterated his objectives to Khizar in writing: the Muslim League Assembly Party was to declare sole allegiance to the A.I.M.L., the Unionist nomenclature was to be abandoned whereupon the coalition would adopt the Muslim League title. Khizar refused to acquiesce, claiming that Jinnah's repudiation of his 'Pact' with the late Premier was a breach of faith, and as such he was not prepared to condone any action "involving interference in provincial affairs and the inner workings of the Ministerial Party formed under the Sikander -Jinnah Pact. This would be contrary to the accepted democratic principle that the wishes of the electorate and the legislature should prevail!" Jinnah, however, dismissed Khizar's argument, by insisting that the A.I.M.L. had never given an assurance of non-interference in the provincial sphere.

Thus deadlock reigned, but Jinnah possessed a 'trump card' of immense political value, which had he been able to play it would have intensified
the pressure on Khizar. This concerned the commitment Jinnah had
extracted from Shaukat Hyat to resign from the Unionist Cabinet when
ordered to. The time was clearly ripe for such a development, for had
Shaukat relinquished his office at this time, ostensibly in support of
Jinnah, his action would have had a significant impact on the Muslim
public. Shaukat's secret promise to Jinnah, however, had been dis-
covered by a secret service agent in May 1943, and was thus known to
the Viceroy and the Punjab Governor. When it became apparent, therefore,
that Jinnah was determined to capture the Unionist Ministry, Glancy acted
decisively to prevent the A.I.M.L. President from manipulating Shaukat to
make political capital at Khizar's expense. In the last week of April
1944 the Governor decided to dismiss Shaukat for ministerial misconduct.
In seeking the Viceroy's approval for such a course, Glancy frankly
admitted that the Minister's disloyalty to Khizar necessitated his dis-
missal from office, and that Khizar and his staunch Unionist stalwarts
believed that it would dissuade other Unionists, particularly the influen-
tial Khan of Kot, from deserting the Party and joining Jinnah. Never-
theless in Glancy's opinion it was imperative that in disposing of
Shaukat "it would be better to avoid removing him on political grounds
and there are other reasons which entitle him to dismissal." The "other
reasons" concerned Shaukat's unfair treatment of Durga Parshad, an
Indian-Christian Inspectress of Schools, who had been sacked on the
Minister's orders in April 1943 on an unproven charge of corruption.
Shaukat had in fact arranged the removal of Parshad to prevent her from
holding an enquiry into the conduct of Ruqiyah Begum, a teacher who had
been suspended by the Chief Officer of the Lahore Corporation for refus-
ing to obey a transfer order. Even so, despite the undoubted illegal-
ity of the Minister's action, the incident was used as an excuse for
going rid of Shaukat, and did not occasion it. Glancy, in commending
the manoeuvre to the Viceroy, admitted the subterfuge, but he argued that
it was necessary to employ such tactics to protect Khizar and his Govern-
ment as "larger issues are at stake - the tranquility of the Province and
the continuance of the War effort". Also Glancy reminded the Viceroy
that Khizar's continued resistance to Jinnah had been spawned out of his
loyalty to the British, consequently the Governor considered that it was
incumbent on him to protect the Premier in this instance:
"I shall come in for a certain amount of criticism in the
Press... it will no doubt be represented that the reason
for Shaukat's dismissal is his political activities and
that the Governor has acted in an improper manner. All the
same it seems to me that, unless Your Excellency sees any
objection, I should be prepared to face this development."
Khizr...is only resisting Jinnah...because he is ready to carry on the war-effort at the risk of his political extinction... I cannot deny that he is taking...risks. This being so, it is not going to have a good effect if I decline to take any...risk myself."

Wavell, who was as anxious as Glancy that Khizar should continue to thwart any encroachment by the A.I.M.L. in the Punjab, approved the Governor's plan.

There is no doubt, however, that Shaukat Hyat was thoroughly corrupt. In addition to the Durga Parshad affair it was later established that he had misused his position as the Minister responsible for the Lahore Improvement Trust to acquire land for himself by dubious means and at less than its full market value from Muslim agriculturists. He had borrowed money from a Hindu capitalist to finance the venture, in appreciation for which he had conferred on his benefactor a commanding position in the formation and control of a transport combine in Lahore. But his removal from the Cabinet had been engineered because his continued presence was unacceptable to the interests of the Unionist Ministry and the British - a fact which the Statesman pertinently appreciated:

"If Mr. Jinnah had not happened to be striving to subvert the Ministry's Party structure, would the alleged injustice ever have been righted? Alternatively, would Shaukat Hyat at this particular time have been brusquely deprived of office because of it?"

Glancy, who had anticipated the exposure of his ploy, did not allow such observations to dissuade him from rendering further assistance to the Unionist Ministry. Having arranged the departure of Shaukat he presented the Premier with a suggestion which he believed would strengthen and stabilise the Government in the wake of the sacking. He reasoned that the ex-Minister's expulsion necessitated the appointment of two new Muslim Ministers, as such a manoeuvre would secure the allegiance of their combined followings in the Assembly. Accordingly Sir Muhammad Jamal Khan Leghari of Dera Ghazi Khan district and Nawab Ashiq Hussain from the Multan district were duly elevated to cabinet rank in the second week of May 1944. This exercise certainly achieved the Governor's purpose, for until that time Leghari had been posing as an enthusiastic Jinnhite, and Wavell estimated that his inclusion in the Cabinet, together with that of Hussain had reduced the number of probable desertions from the Unionist benches from 30 to 18. Moreover both men were extremely wealthy landlords who exercised a considerable degree of power in the Multan Division, which traditionally had been the Unionist stronghold. Whilst Ashiq Hussain possessed the additional advantage of being...
Mamdoot and Daultana, alarmed that the Unionist Ministry had retained the allegiance of these important Muslim leaders, sought to neutralise the beneficial effect their support would have on Unionist fortunes in the Multan Division by attempting to recruit other important members of the landed aristocracy - Raza Shah, Wilayat Hussain and Mian Yar Daultana - for the League. They failed, however, either to destabilise the Ministry, or to achieve a crippling defection of Muslim M.L.A.s. from the Unionist fold. As a result the League leadership, both at the provincial and national levels, concentrated their attacks on the Premier, determining to isolate him and to break his hold over the Muslim Unionist membership. The Punjab Muslim League had prepared the ground for such an assault at its second annual session held from 28 to 30 April 1944. It had reiterated Jinnah's demands respecting the Ministry, and had censured Khizar for refusing to accommodate them. Subsequently in May 1944 Liaquat Ali Khan (General Sec., A.I.M.L.) accused the Premier of betraying the aims and objects of the A.I.M.L., in that the latter refused to acknowledge the right of the League to involve itself in provincial affairs. The Premier was given until 12 May 1944 either to explain his actions to the A.I.M.L. Committee of Action, or face probable expulsion. Khizar refused to be intimidated, replying that he had not violated the League's mandate, as he had always acted in accordance with the terms of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact.

The Committee of Action refused to accept the relevance of the Premier's response. On 27 May 1944 it ruled that the Pact was "nothing more than a statement which the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan made at a meeting of the All India Muslim League Council at Lucknow in October 1937", and as such it was decided to expel Khizar from the A.I.M.L. as he had "contravened the policy and programme of the Muslim League and violated its constitution, rules, aims and objects". In reaching this decision, the Committee had been influenced by the actions and declarations of Jinnah, rather than by the terms of the 'Pact' which had clearly provided for "the continuance of the present Coalition Unionist Party". No objection had been raised to this clause at the 1937 Lucknow meeting at which the agreement had been concluded between Sikander and Jinnah. Furthermore the Committee of Action in conducting its 'enquiry' did not reject the membership forms of those Unionist...
Muslim M.L.As. who had joined the A.I.M.L. under the 'Pact' proviso that their affiliation was to be "subject to the Sikander-Jinnah Pact". Khizar in a rejoinder to his expulsion offered to refer the issue of the 'Pact's' validity for arbitration by a Muslim judge of either the Federal Court or any High Court in India, on condition that such an adjudicator was mutually acceptable to himself and the A.I.M.L. But the A.I.M.L. declined, insisting that the issue had been adjudged already by the Muslim "nation". Evidently the League was not as confident concerning the decision an unbiased judge might have delivered.

The A.I.M.L.'s tactics, inspired by Jinnah, in arbitrarily redefining, and eventually denying the 'Pact's' existence was crude, and lacked conviction. Though the stratagem eventually proved effective, its immediate effect was not dramatic. Khizar's Muslim cabinet colleagues (Mian Abdul Haye, Mohammad Jamal Khan Leghari, and Ashiq Hussain) resigned from the A.I.M.L. in his support, and only eighteen Muslim M.L.As. left the Unionist benches to join the Muslim League Assembly Party. The vast majority of Muslim Unionists, therefore, continued to support the Ministry, thereby automatically, if not formally, abdicating from the A.I.M.L., as its creed prohibited membership to any persons owing allegiance to political parties other than the League.

Confronted by an undefeated and unrepentant Ministerial Party, the Punjab League under the direction of Mamdot, Daultana and Shaukat Hyat, changed the emphasis of its attack. Although the Provincial League leadership did not entirely abandon their objective of undermining Unionist Muslim solidarity, they decided to concentrate their efforts on revitalising the Muslim League outside of the Assembly, by appealing for the support of the Muslim populace at large - tactics which they believed would pave the way for their eventual acquisition of political power in the Province. In keeping with this strategy it was decided on 28 May 1944 to appoint two Punjab League committees, one of which would continue to pressurise those Muslim M.L.As. who had failed to enter the A.I.M.L. fold, and the other to supervise the dissemination of the League's creed and policies. To facilitate the spread of such propaganda the Provincial League divided the Punjab into five zones, in each of which divisional Supervisors and Convenors were appointed to supervise the operation, which was to be executed by paid League workers, and a sum of Rs. 60,000 was sanctioned to finance the operation. To augment the strength of the local organisation, all League branches in the Punjab were instructed to recruit five per cent...
of their members to serve as Muslim National Guards. The latter were to be exempt from parading and wearing para-military uniforms, but were to engage in performing acts of social service.\textsuperscript{107}

On 17 June 1944 Mamdot revealed these intentions to the provincial press. It was a manoeuvre aimed at unsettling the Ministry, particularly as Mamdot also disclosed that the A.I.M.L. Committee of Action had been invited to transfer its offices to Lahore for a six month period, and that in response to the preliminary efforts of the Provincial League 90 Punjab Leaguers, including the 18 M.L.As. who constituted the Punjab League Assembly Party, had been elected to serve on the A.I.M.L. Council. In reality, however, the local League did not possess the resources to realise its grandiose programme, and as such it was anxious to draw on the aid and expertise of the parent body, which was requested to furnish Muslim leaders from other provinces to recruit and train Muslim League activists in the Punjab.\textsuperscript{108} To begin with therefore the Punjab League's campaign achieved few positive results. Although Daultana claimed that as a result of their endeavours public opinion was steadily uniting behind the League,\textsuperscript{109} in that by the end of July its policies and aims had been conveyed to over 1,000,000 Muslims during the course of 50 conferences held in 19 districts,\textsuperscript{110} Government reports for the June-July (1944) period indicate a much lower level of activity. The Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government observed that during June the Provincial League had organised several propaganda tours; the meetings had not elicited any great displays of enthusiasm and audiences had been comparatively small. The most significant gathering, organised by the Muslim Students' Federation in Rawalpindi, had failed to attract more than 1,500 persons in spite of the fact that it had been attended by prominent Leaguers from the N.W.F.P., Baluchistan and Sind.\textsuperscript{111} In reality League activity had been confined largely to urban areas, where it had achieved some success in creating the impression amongst members of the Muslim intelligentsia that the rights of their co-religionists would be best protected by a Muslim League Government. By comparison League efforts to penetrate the villages were confined mainly to distorted tours by "peripatetic members of the Muslim Students' Federation", who confined their energies to distributing pamphlets and contacting village officials. Their activities, however, in spite of the Islamic appeal behind them - in some places mosques were used to transmit the Pakistan slogan on the grounds that politics and religion according to Islam were indivisible - made little impact to begin with on the Muslim
peasantry. For the most part Muslims in the rural areas were initially more concerned with economic issues, whilst the fact that Khizar had publicly pledged his support for 'Pakistan' the previous March (see above, p.226), initially prevented League propagandists from exploiting the demand to the detriment of the Premier.

Daultana in spite of his exaggerated claim that "Big demonstrations, huge meetings and boundless enthusiasm have greeted us everywhere", was aware of the reality of the situation. In July 1944 he candidly admitted that in the rural districts the Muslim League was moribund. He believed that in order to reverse this trend it was essential for the organisation to adopt and promote radical economic policies, to enable it to court Muslim allegiance in the Province, and to break the stranglehold which the landed politicians, who continued to sustain the Unionist Party, enjoyed in the rural constituencies: "It is now becoming clear that in view of the determined Government opposition our basic strength must come not from the landlords or the zaildar-lumberdar class but from the broad masses of the Muslim people." To achieve that objective Daultana stressed that "Apart from the appeal of Pakistan, the League must formulate a more concrete and immediate programme which is suited to the local needs of the Province...".

Jinnah responded positively to this advice. Up until this time, although he had acknowledged in vague terms that Punjabi Muslims should organise themselves in every sphere of provincial life - social, economic, educational and political - his main argument had been gauged to religious sentiment. Thus in June 1944 he had emphasised that the Punjab was the "cornerstone" of Pakistan, and as such the future of Muslim India lay in the hands of Punjabi Muslims "who are the custodians of the honour, prestige and reputation of Islam." During a visit to the Punjab in August, however, he advocated far more forcibly the socio-economic uplift of the Muslim community, particularly in the rural areas. Later in November 1944 Jinnah proclaimed that the purpose of the A.I.M.L. was to raise the general standard of living enjoyed by the Muslim masses, rather than encouraging the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few privileged individuals. The League's ideal, he stated, was not to be capitalistic but Islamic, in that it sought to serve the interests and welfare of the Muslim people. Thus whilst Jinnah had projected an economic appeal, he shrewdly explained it in a religious context.

Daultana and Mamdot heartened by Jinnah's stance, circulated at
the beginning of November 1944 a list of the reforms which the Pro-
vincial League proposed to augment when 'Pakistan' was realised.
Broadly speaking these contemplated the nationalisation of key
industries, banks and all utility services. Private enterprise,
subject to State supervision, would be encouraged to develop the wealth
of the Province, and to provide for the progressive employment of the
surplus population. Unemployment would be reduced; agriculture was to
be improved to benefit the small zamindars in particular, and debt
eliminated through the provision of cheap credit facilities financed
by the State. The Punjab Alienation of Land Act was to be further
amended to prevent the acquisition of land by rural moneylenders.
Medical facilities were to be extended to the rural areas, and the
burden of taxation was to be transferred from the poorer to the wealthi­
er sections of society. The entire educational system was to be over­
hauled, to facilitate the introduction of compulsory religious learning,
though the rights of the minority communities were to be safeguarded
to allow for their own religio-cultural traditions. The Punjab League
also undertook to abolish forced labour and to provide for security
of tenure, the levying of fair rents, and decent housing conditions.
Minimum wages, shorter working hours for industrial labourers, the
strict enforcement of factory legislation, the right of collective bar­
gaining through trade unionist activity, and unemployment and sickness
benefits through insurance, were also promised. 120

In essence this package consisted of a conglomeration of ambitious
and deliberately inflated promises, the realization of which was beyond
the capacity of any future government. An empty sham, directed at a
largely ignorant and unsophisticated populace, conceived by two members
of the landed gentry, the privileges of which it supposedly sought to
curtail. Its sole purpose was to secure eventual power for its authors.
Also the emphasis which Mamdot and Daultana had placed on social and
economic reform did not eradicate the cruder religious appeal of the
League, nor was it intended to. Despite the fact that both men had
publicly pledged that the customs of the minorities would be respected
in a Muslim State, 121 during the latter half of 1944 League spokesmen,
including Daultana, continued to exploit religious fears and prejudices
through the slogan 'Islam in Danger'. 122 Similarly towards the close
of the year, Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi, the leader of a group of
Muslim zealots, toured the western Punjab on behalf of the A.I.M.L.
inciting Muslim fanaticism against the Unionist Ministry. He placed
no reliance on economic indoctrination, his favourite theme being the
revival of the Caliphate, which possessed a special appeal for the conservative Muslim peasantry in the rural areas. Significantly, the Muslim response to League propaganda, whilst appreciating the promised economic advantages, constituted a typical communal reaction, as was noted by the Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government in August 1944:

"Ordinary Muslims believe that with Pakistan they will get the best jobs, the best houses, most of which are owned by rich Hindus, and most of the business now in the hands of the Hindus. This anti-Hindu feeling is probably partly responsible for the unexpressed but undoubted sympathy felt by a majority of Muslim officials for the League."  

Of all the League's propaganda - social, economic and religious - Khizar realized correctly, as later events were to prove, that its religious appeal was the most potent, and therefore posed the greatest threat to the Unionist position. Thus in June 1944 he had asked the Viceroy to bar maulvis (religious teachers) from the U.P. from entering the Punjab. The latter were doing so under Jinnah's direction to agitate against the Ministry. Wavell, however, refused the request, on the grounds that the Provincial Government "have all the powers they need but...Khizar does not feel strong enough to use them." This evaluation, however, was not entirely correct. The Punjab Premier, despite the fact that he retained the support of the majority of the Muslim M.L.As., knew that he was fighting a losing battle against Jinnah. In spite of this realisation he had grimly consented to frustrate Jinnah's Punjab ambitions out of regard for the British war effort. For him to have restricted the entry of the maulvis on his own authority would have given rise to the charge that he was anti-Muslim, thereby further strengthening Jinnah's position. Also such action would probably have undermined the resolve of his followers in the Assembly to continue to resist League advances. Wavell's assessment of the situation was further limited by his failure to appreciate fully the change which was occurring in the Punjab. Though feudal landlord politics were destined to survive in the post-independence Punjab, the 1940's witnessed the re-emergence of an ever more potent force - religion - against which the landed gentry who opposed the A.I.M.L. could not stand fast. Provincial politics no longer constituted in the main a series of contests between influential personalities, with the landed élite commanding the arena as Wavell imagined: "Odd that these big Punjab landlords should be so dominated by a down-country lawyer like Jinnah."
Refused viceregal assistance to combat religious propagandists, and unable to employ similar tactics because of the multi-communal composition of the Ministry, the Premier's opposition to the League was restricted to socio-economic issues. In the Autumn of 1944 Khizar, in a move to emphasize that the Unionist Party was as socially conscious as the Punjab Muslim League, committed the Ministry to a programme of reconstruction. The various schemes, which it was calculated would cost Rs. 150 crores, included the expansion of public health and educational facilities, the construction of roads in rural areas, the electrification of the villages, and the increased industrialisation of the Province. Furthermore, the Government undertook to sink 3,000 additional tube-wells, and to reserve 70,000 acres of agricultural land, and practically all the permanent vacancies which occurred in the Government service for ex-servicemen. In order to promote this propaganda, and check League activities in the rural areas, Khizar also resurrected the Zamindara League. Its new creed was designed to appeal to all sections of the population, in that non-zamindars were not precluded from membership. Although it claimed to stand for complete independence and strong provincial autonomy, on the basis of inter-communal co-operation to be achieved through the pursuit of common economic goals, it lacked a constructive programme to combat communalism. Zamindara League members remained free to join any other political or communal organisation, with the right to support such bodies whenever the communal rights and interests of their communities were involved. As Wavell noted, it was an impracticable compromise, as Muslim and non-Muslim interests concerning 'Pakistan' were diametrically opposed. As such the Zamindara League could never constitute a realistic ideological alternative to the A.I.M.L., being nothing more, with the exception of the independence clause, than a re-affirmation of Unionism.

As 1944 drew to a close, therefore, the battle for the control of the Punjab had been carried from the confines of the Legislative Assembly to the districts of the Province. The reins of government, however, remained firmly in Khizar's hands, though the number of Muslim M.L.As. supporting the Muslim League Assembly Party had increased from 18 to 22. But with the death of Chhotu Ram in January 1945 the Unionist cause sustained a severe blow which in the long run proved to be a disaster. The veteran politician had held the eastern Jat dominated districts of the Punjab against Congress incursions for many years. His successor, Tikka Ram, whose selection as leader had
deeply divided the Jat community, was unable to continue the task as he enjoyed neither the confidence nor the loyalty which his predecessor had inspired. Thus as the 1946 election approached he failed to sustain either Jat solidarity, or their united support for the Unionist Party. The Congress exploited the situation, eventually capturing 20 of the 26 eastern constituencies, including the late leader's former seat of Jhajjar. The loss of Chhotu Ram, however, was by itself not solely responsible for this outcome. The elections of 1946 witnessed a polarisation of communal sentiment on the part of all the communities which worked to the advantage of the principal all-India parties. Even so there can be little doubt that had Chhotu Ram lived, considering the widespread popularity he enjoyed, the Congress would have faced a more daunting task in the eastern Punjab, and the Unionist Party would have been served by a sounder champion.

In the short term, however, the Unionist Party appeared to have suffered no ill-effects, in that it maintained its supremacy in the Legislature by a comfortable majority during the March (1945) Assembly session, and it suffered no further defections to the Muslim League. One reason for the Ministry's stability was the inability of the Punjab League to function effectively as an opposition party in the Assembly, largely because it had been severely weakened by the development of factionalism. In November 1944 the ever ambitious Shaukat Hyat had attempted to seize the leadership of the League Assembly Party from Mamdot. The latter together with Daultana had been alarmed and intimidated by the challenge, because Shaukat's supporters, led by Abu Saeed Anwar, had threatened to disrupt the League Party if Shaukat's aim was not realised. Consequently on 27 November Daultana had informed Jinnah of the necessity for a change of leadership, a recommendation he repeated on 1 December 1944. Jinnah, in response, refused to permit such a move, because he did not trust Shaukat. The ex-Minister's ambitions, however, were not to be easily thwarted, and in February 1945 despite Jinnah's continued disapproval, he secured the leadership of the Assembly Party through blackmail, in that he stated that if his wishes were not accommodated he would withdraw his support from the League. In order to consolidate his victory, however, it was essential for him and his followers, who included Ghazanfar Ali Khan, to capture the Punjab Muslim League Council. This proved to be an impossible task for them, for at the Council elections conducted in May 1945 both Mamdot and Daultana retained their positions as President and General Secretary respectively. Shaukat's failure in this area
resulted from a number of causes. It was known that he did not enjoy Jinnah's confidence. Whilst in March 1945 the Premier had publicly humiliated him in the Assembly by furnishing details of his misdeeds as a Minister, thereby exposing him as a man devoid of integrity and honesty, a factor which made a significant contribution in preventing him from mobilising support in his favour in the district League organisations to unseat Mamdot and Daultana. The Provincial League thus plagued by internal divisions was unable to pose any real threat to the Ministry during the first half of 1945. This combined with the fact that the Premier, deprived of the allegiance and counsel of Chhotu Ram, had proved equal to the task of leading the Government alone, had had an adverse effect on the morale of League supporters in the Assembly, three of whom (Rai Faiz Khan, Talib Hussain, Rai Shahadat Khan) returned to the Unionist benches.

The disruptive effect of the Provincial League's internecine struggle, combined with the majority which the Ministry continued to command in the Legislature, did not cause Khizar to be either complacent or over-confident. The Premier, in common with Firoz Khan Noon and Baldev Singh, appreciated that the political situation in the Province remained extremely fluid. Consequently they each sought to impress upon Wavell that if any national agreement was concluded which resulted in the A.I.M.L. sharing power at the centre, such a development would place the Unionist Ministry in jeopardy, in that it would encourage Muslim Unionists to switch their allegiance to the League in the belief that by so doing they would be protecting their future interests. Wavell, convinced that Glancy had inspired their collective nervousness, rejected their prognosis in the mistaken belief that "a strong common feeling..." existed amongst all Punjabis, and that given strong leadership, the Unionist Government would survive irrespective of political events at the all-India level. Thus in attempting to promote a national settlement in the summer of 1945 to encourage co-operation between the A.I.M.L. and the Congress, Wavell in effect confronted Khizar with the possibility of political ruin.

The Viceroy considered that it was essential for Britain to achieve an understanding with the major political parties before the end of hostilities with Japan, in order to contain extremist nationalist elements, and to retain India in the British Commonwealth: "if we want India as a Dominion after the war, we must begin treating her much more like a Dominion now." As a step towards achieving this Wavell launched an initiative on 14 June 1945 to solicit the participation of
the Congress and the A.I.M.L. in a provisional national government, in which Muslims and Caste Hindus would enjoy parity, and which would include some minority representatives drawn from the Sikh and Scheduled Caste communities. This administration was to be created through the re-organisation and Indianisation of the Viceroy's Executive Council. All portfolios, including 'Defence', 'Home', 'Finance' and 'Foreign Affairs' were to be held by Indians, only the posts of Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief being reserved for British personnel. Once inaugurated the provisional government was to commit itself to promote the war effort, and to devising a new and permanent constitution for India. To facilitate the creation of such a government the Viceroy invited nominees of the A.I.M.L. and the Congress, and other prominent Indian leaders to attend a conference to convene in Simla in June 1945 to discuss his proposals, in the hope that they would prove acceptable to the major nationalist organisations. Wavell's ideas, however, had offended the imperialistic sentiments of the British Prime Minister, and it was only after protracted negotiations with the British Cabinet in April and May 1945 that the Viceroy had secured Churchill's reluctant permission to proceed, which the latter gave only because he had been assured by his Cabinet's India Committee that the Viceroy's initiative would not succeed.

In the event the prediction proved to be correct. The Simla Conference failed to achieve a positive result, largely because Jinnah and the Congress failed to agree on the question of Muslim representation in the provisional government. Jinnah demanded that all the Muslim members should be appointees of the A.I.M.L. Conversely the Congress claimed the right to nominate two Muslims out of the Muslim quota (5). The situation was further complicated by Khizar's insistence that the provisional government should also include a Unionist Muslim out of deference to the traditional loyalty of the Punjab, and the fact that there had been a Punjabi Muslim on the Viceroy's Executive Council since 1919. The Premier's arguments, however, belied the true motive behind them, this was revealed by Glancy who strongly supported Khizar in the matter. The Governor bluntly told the Viceroy that if a Unionist Muslim was not offered a seat then the Ministry in the Punjab would fall. The Viceroy, however, in agreeing to such an inclusion was not swayed by Glancy's prediction; Wavell believed that the enormous contribution the Province made to the agricultural production and defence of India merited it. Despite Wavell's compliance in the matter, Jinnah refused to concede Khizar's claim on the grounds that the "Unionist
Party were traitors to the interests of the Muslims...\textsuperscript{158} and did not truly represent Muslim opinion in the Punjab which, according to him, was firmly behind the A.I.M.L.\textsuperscript{159} In opposing the involvement of non-League Muslims, whether Unionist or Congressite, Jinnah had other more urgent motives. He believed that unless all the Muslim nominees were Leaguers it would undermine the A.I.M.L.'s claim to be the only legitimate representative organisation of the Indian Muslims. So anxious was he to prevent such an occurrence, that on 9 July 1945 he had implored the Viceroy not to disrupt League unity over the issue with the words "I ask you not to wreck the League."\textsuperscript{160} Also the A.I.M.L. President realised that even though Muslims had been offered parity with Caste Hindus in the proposed government, because of the presence of Sikh and Scheduled Caste representatives they would be relegated to the position of a permanent minority and that for the League to make any impact it was essential that it should control all the Muslim votes.\textsuperscript{161} In order to further offset the disadvantages Muslims would experience, Jinnah also stipulated that any measure which the Muslim group in the government opposed should be rejected if it failed to secure a two-thirds majority. This condition was totally unacceptable to the Viceroy, but in an attempt to placate Jinnah's fears to an extent Wavell on 11 July offered to permit a Muslim quota consisting of four Leaguers and one Unionist. Jinnah, however, rejected the compromise, refusing to abandon his original stance. As a consequence Wavell realised that the Simla effort to negotiate a meaningful settlement had failed.\textsuperscript{162}

Considering Jinnah's strong objection to a place being given to a Unionist Muslim it could be argued that Khizar, in making the claim, had played a major part in wrecking the talks, and that that had been his main purpose, for he had opposed the Conference from the outset, having accused the Viceroy on 23 June of "handing over power to the enemy...", stating that his "approach to [the] Congress and the League was a slap in the face for all co-operators."\textsuperscript{163} It is certainly true that the Punjab Premier concerned that the presence of the A.I.M.L. at the Centre would place his government in jeopardy, had been openly relieved when the Conference failed,\textsuperscript{164} but he was not the cause of the breakdown. Also, although Jinnah's attitude had contributed in large measure to the negative outcome, it was not solely responsible for it. Even if he had been content to accept Wavell's formula for Muslim representation (see above), the Vicerecy knew that the Congress would have been unlikely to agree to it, as that organisation had determined to achieve complete domination at the Centre.\textsuperscript{165} In the final analysis, therefore, the
Simla Conference fell victim to the diametrically opposed philosophies of the A.I.M.L. and the Congress, neither of which totally reflected reality; the former insisting that it had the sole right to speak for the Indian Muslim community, the latter posing as the political arbitrator of all India's peoples.

Jinnah, however, had no intention of admitting this fact. He was anxious to avoid any condemnation for the Conference's collapse, and he shrewdly turned the episode to his own advantage by publicly berating Khizar for torpedoing the Viceroy's initiative, and by portraying his stance on the Unionist Muslim issue as being detrimental to Muslim interests. Whilst at the same time he successfully cultivated his own image as the champion of Islam. Jinnah's propaganda, despite the inaccurate nature of the allegations, had an adverse effect on the fortunes of the Unionist Party. The previous June the Provincial Muslim League had penetrated the Premier's home district of Sargodha. A meeting of the District Muslim League had been convened presided over by the Sajjadanashin Sahib of the 'gadi' of Sial Sharif, and attended by Nawabzada Azizullah Khan, the son of the largest Tiwana landowner, Nawab Major Mumtaz Khan. The proceedings, patronized by two such influential members of the district's religio-social order, had been a great success in that it had attracted crowds of between 12,000 and 20,000 at each of its three sittings. The theme of the meetings had been set by Shaukat Hyat who had raised the emotive slogan of 'Islam in Danger' and had pledged himself "to shed his last drop of blood in the defence of Islam". The emotional appeal of the League portrayed so visibly on the Premier's 'back door' had an unsettling effect on the senior Tiwanas. To begin with Khizar had been able to contain the situation and retain the allegiance of his kinsmen by assuring the leading members of his tribe that he would formulate future policy towards the A.I.M.L. in consultation with them. In the wake of the Simla Conference, however, Khizar's efforts faltered. Viewed by many as a traitor to the Muslim cause, he could no longer command the united loyalty of the Tiwana tribe. At the beginning of October 1945, Nawab Mumtaz Khan, a former pillar of the Unionists, announced his decision to quit the Party and support the League, claiming that the attitude of the Premier and the Congress at Simla had demonstrated that the Hindus were committed to keep the Muslims in perpetual servitude, and that the Unionists were aiding their design. During the Autumn of 1945 other influential Muslim leaders had also joined the A.I.M.L. at the expense of the Unionist Party, although
it was the surrender of Japan on 14 August 1945 coupled with the Viceroy's policy statement of 19 September 1945 which made the most significant contribution in encouraging their actions. In his announcement Wavell re-affirmed the British Government's commitment to "full self-government in India", and he confirmed that the elections, delayed by the war, would be held during the coming cold weather (December 1945 - February 1946). Once the results were known, Wavell revealed that he would hold talks with representatives from the provinces, and invite members drawn from "the main Indian parties" to serve on the Viceroy's Executive Council, as preliminary steps to encouraging the Indian leaders to formulate an agreed constitution for India.\(^{72}\)

It was evident therefore that the A.I.M.L. would play a major role in deciding the future of India, and that the Pakistan issue would dictate the outcome of the electoral contest in the Punjab.\(^{73}\) The more astute Muslim politicians in the Province sensing that the A.I.M.L. would emerge victorious, sought to guarantee their own political fortunes by aligning themselves with it. On 22 September 1945 Chaudhry Ata Ullah, the only elected member from the Punjab on the Council of State embraced the League, declaring Pakistan to be the "sheet-anchor" of the Muslim nation.\(^{74}\) Two days later Major Mubarik Ali Shah, a member of the Pir family of Shah Jiwana (Jhang District) and Malik Sardar Khan Noon, who belonged to the extremely powerful Noon family, deserted the Unionist benches in the Punjab Assembly, the former stating that as the future constitution of India depended on the outcome of the forthcoming elections no honest Muslim should withhold support from the League.\(^{75}\) The following month four more ex-Unionists followed their example.\(^{76}\)

Also in August and October 1945 Firoz Khan Noon (Khizar's cousin) and Begum Shah Nawaz, both former prominent Unionists, publicized their intentions of contending the elections on behalf of the A.I.M.L.\(^{77}\) This development was a severe setback for Khizar on account of the influence their respective families (the Noons of Shahpur and the Arain Mians of Baghbanpura) commanded in the Province. Ironically neither of these politicians had previously exhibited any great enthusiasm for Jinnah or his cause - political realities and necessities had driven them into the League camp. Until the prospect of an election forced his hand, Noon had carefully avoided offending either Jinnah or Khizar, as Wavell had observed: "Firoz Khan Noon...has really very few political principles... He tries to trim between Jinnah and Khizar,
and is I think trusted by neither." Privately Noon actually disagreed with the Pakistan demand, confiding to Glancy in October 1945 that he regretted that the term "Pakistan" had ever been invented. Yet driven by the desire to preserve his political future Noon in November 1945 resigned from the Viceroy's Executive Council and publicly and enthusiastically championed the Pakistan cause. His conversion to Muslim nationalism appeared all the more suspect in view of the fact that only the previous April he had assured the British and Commonwealth Premiers that the peoples of India were united in their desire to remain in the Empire. Similarly the Begum's realignment with the League occurred not from conviction but political motivation. She had been expelled from the A.I.M.L. in 1941 for refusing to obey Jinnah and resign from the National Defence Council. Though she had resigned from the Unionist Party in May 1944, she remained in the Provincial Assembly as an independent member; significantly it was not until October 1945 following the election announcement that she rehabilitated herself with Jinnah and the A.I.M.L., by resigning from the Defence Council. Both Noon and the Begum had been creatures of the British, but their appreciation that the 'old order' was changing caused them to attach themselves to the 'rising star' of Muslim nationalism, as personified by the A.I.M.L., abandoning British Imperialism and the Unionist Party both of which were clearly in the descent. Noon even admitted as much. In a press interview given in September 1945 he claimed that the Unionist Party had outlived its usefulness, as at its conception the possibility of the end of British paramountcy had not existed, but as that process was now imminent the continuation of the Unionist Party independent of the A.I.M.L. was harmful to Muslim interests.

The defections of these former stalwarts of the Unionist Party reinforced Glancy's conviction that the Ministry could not survive the forthcoming elections if the outcome was to be decided by the call for 'Pakistan'. Previously the Governor had desired the survival of the Unionist Government to protect the British war effort in the Province, but even though the War had been won Glancy remained committed to Unionism, and he determined to use his influence to bolster it against the A.I.M.L. The Governor's motives in pursuing such a course arose from two main convictions. In the first place he feared that if the League emerged triumphant from the imminent electoral contest, it would be practically impossible for Britain to find a satisfactory solution to the constitutional problems, as the A.I.M.L. would be in
an even stronger position to demand 'Pakistan' - the very concept of which was an anathema to the Congress. Secondly he believed that once "Pakistan becomes an imminent reality" the Punjab would be submerged in civil war: 'we shall be heading straight for blood-shed on a wide scale; non-Muslims, especially Sikhs, are not bluffing, they will not submit peacefully to a Government that is labelled "Muhammadan Raj".'

Thus Glancy considered that the Government of India should do all in its power to prevent the defeat of the Unionist Government in the Punjab not only to protect British interests but to save the Province from an internecine struggle. Aware that the Ministry was incapable of successfully contesting the League's demand for 'Pakistan', and its manipulation of religious sentiment, the Governor had already urged the Viceroy in August 1945 to "deflate the theory of Pakistan...", by impressing Muslim voters with the fact that if a Muslim homeland was conceded it would involve the partition of the Punjab, resulting in all probability in the loss of the Divisions of Jullundur and Ambala and the District of Amritsar - all of which were non-Muslim majority areas:

"Action on these lines would at least provide the Unionist Party with a rallying cry against Pakistan - something on which the elector could definitely bite. No Punjabi, however uninformed, would contemplate with equanimity so shattering a dismemberment of the Province..."

In confronting the Viceroy with this analysis Glancy failed to achieve his main objective, the destruction of the Pakistan appeal prior to the elections. There was much in the Governor's prognosis which Wavell agreed with, but he refused to jeopardise what he considered to be the principal British and all-Indian interests merely to attempt to resolve the Unionist dilemma. In forwarding Glancy's views to Pethick-Lawrence (Amery's successor as Secretary of State for India) the Viceroy recorded the following observations and recommendations. Whilst he accepted that "there is much to be said for the Governor's view that the crudity of Jinnah's ideas should be exposed..." and that "it seems to follow that some enquiry into the possibilities of Pakistan is a necessary preliminary to any further constitutional discussion..." he insisted that it was imperative for the British Government to formulate concrete counter-proposals before taking such a step. He cautioned that the Muslim community was determined to resist Congress control, thus it was incumbent upon the British to present them with a plausible and acceptable alternative. He urged, therefore, that the Home Government should consider either the creation of a loose form of Federation...
consisting of all the provinces and Princely states "in which Central powers would be reduced to a minimum, and Muslims would be given equality with all other communities in the Central Executive", or "a Federation of a tighter kind...with provision for Provinces and States to come in or stay out...if they so desired." The last suggestion, therefore, did not preclude Pakistan, but Wavell insisted that in order to avoid civil strife in the Punjab the British Government should deny Jinnah's insistence that a solely Muslim plebiscite would decide the future of the Muslim majority provinces: "I am clear...that the Punjab cannot be included in Pakistan as it stands...on a Muslim plebiscite. Jinnah's plan is unjust...and its acceptance would lead to something like civil war." Wavell realised, however, the grave dangers inherent in any attempt to modify the Pakistan demand on account of its "wide popularity...among Muslims" resting as it did on "its Islamic appeal" and "a genuine dread of Hindu domination...", and he impressed on the Secretary of State that Government action would, out of necessity, have to be cautionary and extremely well planned: "The Muslims are too numerous and too influential in India as a whole to be disregarded, and our handling of them is vital to a settlement of the Indian problem."

Wavell's interpretation of the situation and the remedies necessary to resolve the constitutional deadlock precluded the immediate action prescribed by Glancy. Also the Viceroy did not share the Punjab Governor's fears of a Muslim League victory at the polls. Wavell was convinced that a League triumph was inevitable, and that if the Government of India attempted to discredit 'Pakistan' such action would strengthen rather than weaken Jinnah's appeal to the Muslim electorate. In addition the Viceroy considered that if the League was victorious in the Punjab it would eventually work to Jinnah's disadvantage as it would demonstrate the impracticability of 'Pakistan', in that a Muslim League Government, bereft of non-Muslim support on account of its championing of a Muslim State, would be unable to sustain a stable administration in the Province:

"In the Punjab, successive Muslim leaders...have realised that stable government is possible only if there is a genuine partnership between considerable sections of the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. The Muslims inevitably dominate the Cabinet, and have much to gain by such a partnership. On the other hand, they have much, perhaps everything, to lose by advertising their strength, for a united Hindu-Sikh opposition aided by a few Muslim renegades could make orderly government impossible."
Thus:

"educated Muslim opinion may gradually appreciate the impracticability of Pakistan in its crude form.... In this matter time is on the side of common sense, and if there is an interval during which the Muslim League are in office in the Punjab...I think the experience might be valuable."\(^9^2\)

In presenting this synopsis and proposals for the formulation of policy in respect of 'Pakistan' the Viceroy had attempted to persuade the British Government to adopt a constructive approach to the problem. His advice, however, fell on deaf ears. The British Cabinet, influenced primarily by Stafford Cripps (President of the Board of Trade) refused to abandon or modify the Cripps Offer of 1942, despite Wavell's warning that it would not satisfy either the Congress or the A.I.M.L.. Cripps, supported by Attlee (British Labour Prime Minister following Churchill's defeat in the General Election of July 1945) refused the Viceroy's counsel, claiming that he had been assured by Birla, Gandhi's 'unofficial spokesman', and Shiva Rao, the Delhi correspondent of the Hindu and the Manchester Guardian, that the Congress would agree to his original offer, insisting that it remained the official policy of the British Government.\(^9^4\) Muslim aspirations and the obstacles and dangers they held for future constitutional advance were disregarded. Against such opposition, Wavell made little headway, ruefully reflecting in his journal that Cripps and Attlee, who were in constant communication with Congress propagandists "are taking all they say as gospel",\(^9^5\) and "are obviously bent on handing over India to their Congress friends as soon as possible".\(^9^6\)

Unable to initiate any positive planning in respect of the Pakistan issue Wavell attempted to persuade the Cabinet to combat the A.I.M.L.'s plebiscite claim. Here too he failed to obtain a satisfactory response. Although the Cabinet's India Committee agreed on 11 September 1945 that the decision of a province to vote itself out of any future Indian Union would not be based on the votes of a single community, but on the collective voting of all the communities,\(^9^7\) no directive was issued in this regard. Wavell insisted that a statement to that effect should be announced on his own authority if misunderstanding persisted in India concerning the Muslim plebiscite.\(^9^8\) But as a result of the Cabinet's reluctance to face the issue, and Menon's (Reforms Commissioner, G.of I.) fears that such action by the Viceroy would give rise to allegations that the British Government was attempting to exploit the communal wrangle,\(^9^9\) no pronouncement was made as to the rôle which the various
communities would play in deciding the geographical boundaries of the proposed Muslim State. In defining British policy in a speech on 19 September 1945, Wavell merely reiterated that it was the intention of the British Government to convene a Constitution-making Body following the conclusion of the elections, and to encourage inter-party cooperation in a new Executive Council, which was to be appointed to govern India during the interval preceding the implementation of the new constitution.

Glancy, frustrated that his original request had not been met, repeated his plea in October 1945 for an official statement indicating that the Divisions of Ambala and Jullundur would not be forced to accede to Pakistan against the will of the majority of their inhabitants:

"I still think very strongly that an authoritative statement of this kind would provide a most timely, and surely an entirely unexceptionable, corrective to the fanatical and highly dangerous doctrine of "Islam in danger" that is now being preached by advocates of the League...to prevent the coming elections being fought blindly on a false issue."

This request was supported by Evan Jenkins, the Viceroy's Private Secretary. Jenkins, who did not regard the creation of a "Muslim homeland" to be a viable possibility, was as anxious as the Punjab Governor to limit its appeal. As a result he drew Wavell's attention to the fact that whilst

"The Muslim League assertion that Pakistan is to consist of certain Provinces as they stand is not contrary to the terms of the [1942 Cripps] Declaration.... On the other hand, the claim for a Muslim plebiscite is ridiculous, and...it is fairer to Jinnah to deny it now than let him assume its validity throughout the elections and tell him afterwards that we are quite unable to accept it."

Influenced by Jenkins, Wavell once again advised the Secretary of State of the necessity for the British Government to dismiss the idea that provinces would be permitted to enter any new constitution on the vote of a single community. He suggested that such an announcement could take the form of an answer to "an arranged question in Parliament", as "A reply of this kind does not commit us...to any definition of the boundaries of Pakistan. It merely states that we do not intend that the constitutional future of any Province should be determined by any one of the communities."

Pethick-Lawrence refused totally to concede the Viceroy's point. He was concerned that if a question and answer syndrome was initiated in Parliament, it would lead to embarrassing questions being posed which were beyond the control of the Government. He was also of the
opinion that Jinnah would be unable to legitimately accuse the British of permitting him to propagate a false assertion regarding the plebiscite issue, as the Cripps Offer had not provided for a solely Muslim referendum, an omission which had caused Jinnah to reject it. Furthermore the Secretary of State claimed that it would be a fundamental mistake for the British Government, having made provision for future discussions to ascertain how the 1942 proposals could be modified to produce an agreed constitution, to make any pronouncement on the plebiscite provision of that offer which would further alienate the A.I.M.L. In addition Pethick-Lawrence believed that any announcement which implied that the provincial option remained a British intention, despite the fact that the Cripps formula guaranteed it "will greatly increase the difficulties of discussing any alternative to it which might be more acceptable to the Congress, such as an option exercisable by smaller areas."205

Pethick-Lawrence's response epitomised the total confusion of the Attlee Government in respect of future Indian policy. The Cripps Offer remained the basis for future talks, therefore nothing could be said to increase League prejudice against it. At the same time no action was permissible which would bind the British Government to realising the terms of the Offer in respect of the provinces' option clause, for fear of offending the Congress. What is ironic, in view of Glancy's wishes, was the fact that the Westminster Government had clearly decided that if 'Pakistan' was to be sanctioned, its frontiers were to be determined to placate Congress objections, and not to meet League aspirations, but the Secretary of State refused to admit this publicly!

Wavell realised that further discussion on the subject was futile, and events in India caused him to drop the matter. In November 1945 Jinnah officially defined his conception of 'Pakistan', laying claim to all the Muslim majority provinces and Assam. Up until that time the Congress had been reticent in its handling of the Pakistan demand.206 Once Jinnah had broadcast his objective, however, Nehru and Patel (Chairman of Congress parliamentary sub-committee appointed to conduct the 1946 election campaign) formally denounced it. This caused Menon to persuade the Viceroy to refrain from pursuing the plebiscite issue on the grounds that the stance adopted by the Congress leaders had reassured the Sikh minority in the Punjab, and that in view of the continued intransigence of the Congress towards Britain, it would have been foolhardy for the Viceroy to persist in a course which would also turn the A.I.M.L. against the British.207 In accepting this advice,
Wavell was also influenced by his own assessment that the Government of India would face serious difficulties in conducting any future discussions with the Congress and the A.I.M.L. if it now became a party to the dispute by attempting to delimit 'Pakistan'. He sensed that such action could precipitate civil strife, particularly as it was apparent that the Congress would only accept a demarcation which would render partition worthless to the A.I.M.L., whilst Jinnah would reject any proposition which detracted from the existing provincial boundaries. 208

In spite of Wavell's change of heart, in the final analysis it was the unrealistic attitude of the Attlee Government, and its virtual abdication of responsibility which caused the 1946 elections in the Punjab being contested in part on a totally erroneous issue, thereby reducing still further the already tentative appeal of the Unionist Ministry. 'Pakistan' as epitomised by League propagandists, constituted a powerful exhortation to Muslim provincial and communal pride, as well as provoking their religious fears and prejudices. The Muslim electorate was presented with a vision of the Punjab in which they would be the masters, not only of their own destiny, but also of that of the non-Muslims. They were led to believe that in future all Punjabis, irrespective of their faith, would be subject to Islamic law, thereby symbolising the promised Muslim supremacy. It was a total rejection of the Unionist philosophy dedicated to its destruction. The fact the A.I.M.L. refused to consider or admit the likelihood of the partition of the Province, increased its popular appeal. Jinnah and the League, sensing victory, presented a vision of a united Punjab as the 'cornerstone' of Pakistan, in which Muslims would dominate, whilst the indolence of the British Government fostered rather than discouraged the hallucinatory socio-political intoxication of Punjabi Muslims, and in so doing contributed to the subsequent political annihilation of the Unionist Party.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI


2. These were the sons of Sikander Hyat Khan, Shahnawaz Khan of Mamdot, and Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana.

3. Civil and Military Gazette, 9 March 1943; Secret Agent's Report, enclosure, Private Sec. to the Viceroy, to the Private Sec. to the Secretary of State, 11 May 1943, L/P&J/8/692, IOR.


5. At the 1937 session of the A.I.M.L. it had been decided to raise a volunteer corps to perform acts of social service. Its members known as Muslim League National Guards were required to wear uniforms and participate in regular drilling. It was claimed that the purpose of their activity was not to create a para-military organisation but "to create in them [Guards] a spirit of service and sacrifice and to make them a disciplined body of enthusiastic selfless workers for the social, economic and political uplift of the masses." Z.H. Zaidi, 'Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-47', in C. M. Philips and M. D. Wainwright (Eds) The Partition of India, London, 1970, pp. 259, 269-271.

6. Secret Agent's Report, enclosure, Private Sec. to the Viceroy, to the Private Sec. to the Secretary of State, 11 May 1943, L/P&J/8/692, IOR.


9. In fact Firoz Khan Noon and Khizar were cousins.


12. See Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.


15. Glancy to Linlithgow, 17 April 1943, MSS. EUR. F. 125/92, IOR.


18. Ibid., 21 March 1943.

19. The title Quaid-i-Azam, or Great Leader, was conferred on Jinnah by his followers.

20. Following the 1937 election Fazl-ul-Huq, the leader of the Bengal Proja (Peasant) Party formed a coalition Ministry in the Province with the support of the Bengal Muslim League, the Scheduled Caste Party, and a small number of non-Congress Hindus. His resistance to Jinnah's interference in Bengal led to his expulsion from the A.I.M.L. in 1941. Consequently the Provincial League withdrew...
20. (contd.) its support from Huq's Government, and the latter was forced to conclude a settlement with the followers of Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, one of the leaders of the Bengal Hindu Mahsabha, to maintain his majority. The resulting coalition proved unstable, and in March 1943 it fell. Whereupon Khwaja Nazimuddin, the leader of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party was invited by the Governor to form a Ministry. See K.B. Sayeed, Pakistan the Formative Phase 1857-1948, London, 1968, pp. 213-214.

22. GR, Glancy to Linlithgow, 13 Feb. 1943, L/P&J/5/246, IOR.
23. Secret Agent's Report, enclosure, Private Sec. to Viceroy, to Private Sec. to the Sec. of State, 11 May 1943, L/P&J/8/692, IOR.
27. Secret Agent's Report, enclosure, Private Sec. to Viceroy, to Private Sec. to Sec. of State, 11 May 1943, L/P&J/8/692, IOR.
28. Glancy to Linlithgow, 17 April 1943, MSS. EUR.F.125/92, IOR.
29. Linlithgow to Amery, 2/4 May 1943, MSS.EUR.F.125/12, IOR.
30. Secret Agent's Report, enclosure, Private Sec. to Viceroy, to Private Sec. to Sec. of State, 11 May 1943, L/P&J/8/692, IOR.
31. Civil and Military Gazette, 4 June 1943.
32. English-language daily newspaper founded (1938) by Jinnah in Delhi to give expression to Muslim League interests.
35. Civil and Military Gazette, 15 June 1943.
36. Ibid., 15 June 1943.
41. Glancy to Linlithgow, 21 July 1943, MSS.EUR.F.125/92, IOR.
42. Civil and Military Gazette, 16 July 1943; Glancy to Linlithgow, 20 July 1943, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.
43. Civil and Military Gazette, 20 July 1943.
44. Glancy to Linlithgow, 20 July 1943, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.
45. Civil and Military Gazette, 21 July 1943.

47. This was evident from the following correspondence: Jinnah to Barkat Ali, 23 June 1940; Jinnah to Daultana, 23 May 1944; Jinnah to Mamdot, 12 July 1944; Jinnah to Daultana, 10 Oct. 1944, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, Islamabad, File nos. 215, p.38; 297, p. 4; 372, p.18; 1102, p.569.


49. By April 1943 Jinnah commanded the support of only 12 Unionist Muslim M.L.As., Glancy to Linlithgow, 17 April 1943, MSS.EUR. F.125/92, IOR.

50. Civil and Military Gazette, 9 Nov. 1943.


52. Civil and Military Gazette, 2 May 1943; 7 May 1943; 3 July 1943; Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of July 1943, L/P&J/5/246, IOR.

53. Glancy to Linlithgow, 16 Sept. 1943, MSS.EUR.F.125/92, IOR.


55. Ibid., 22 Aug. 1943.

56. Ibid., 20 Aug. 1943.

57. G. of I. to Sec. of State, telegram, 29 July 1943, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

58. Linlithgow to Amery, 10 Oct. 1943, MSS.EUR.F.125/12, IOR.

59. See Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

60. Glancy to Wavell, 14 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

61. Ibid.

62. Wavell to Glancy, 15 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

63. Civil and Military Gazette, 21 March 1944.

64. Ibid., 24 March 1944.


66. Civil and Military Gazette, 7 April 1944.

67. Ibid., 2 April 1944.

68. Ibid., 22 April 1944; Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.


70. Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.


72. Note by P.J. Patrick, 12 May 1943, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

73. Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

75. Ibid., pp.63-65.

76. Ibid., p.65.

77. Civil and Military Gazette, 3 May 1944.


79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Jinnah to Khizar, 27 April 1944, Khizar Tiwana Papers, copy with author.

82. Press statement by Khizar, 27 April 1944, Khizar Tiwana Papers, copy with author.

83. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of April 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

84. Secret Agent's Report, enclosure, Private Sec. to Viceroy, to the Private Sec. to Sec. of State, 11 May 1943, L/P&J/8/692, IOR.

85. Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

86. Shaukat had taken this action following an appeal from Ruqiyah Begum’s husband, the latter having asked the Minister to use his position to protect his wife. Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 8 March 1945, Vol.24, pp.419-422, V/9/3821, IOR.

87. Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

88. Wavell to Amery, 26 April 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

89. GR, Glancy to Wavell, 25 May 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

90. New Delhi Bureau of Public Information to India Office, telegram, 3 May 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

91. Glancy to Wavell, 8 May 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

92. Civil and Military Gazette, 14 May 1944.

93. Wavell to Amery, 16 May 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.

94. Mamdot to Jinnah, 7 June 1944, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, Islamabad, File no.372, p.15.

95. Civil and Military Gazette, 14 May 1944.

96. Daultana to Jinnah, 31 May 1944, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, Islamabad, File no.257, pp. 5-8.

97. Resolutions I - V, passed at the Second Annual Session of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, 28-30 April 1944, enclosure, Daultana to Private Sec. to Sec. of State, 2 May 1944, L/P&J/8/5292, IOR.

98. Civil and Military Gazette, 9 May 1944.

99. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of May 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

100. Civil and Military Gazette, 30 May 1944.

101. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of June 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.
102. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of July 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

103. Civil and Military Gazette, 10 June 1944.

104. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of May 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

105. Civil and Military Gazette, 2 April 1944.

106. Ibid., 17 June 1944.

107. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of May 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

108. Ibid.


111. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of June 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

112. Ibid.; Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of July 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

113. Civil and Military Gazette, 22 June 1944.


115. Lambardars were village headmen, whilst Zaildars were revenue and administrative officials in charge of a zail or group of villages. See DG, Ludhiana, 1904, pp.170-173, IOR.


117. Civil and Military Gazette, 20 June 1944.

118. Ibid., 5 Aug. 1944.

119. Ibid., 10 Nov. 1944.

120. Ibid., 8 Nov. 1944; Manchester Guardian, 15 Nov. 1944.

121. Civil and Military Gazette, 8 Nov. 1944.

122. Ibid., 24 June 1944.

123. Ibid., 2 Dec. 1944.

124. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of Aug-1944. L/P&J/5/247, IOR.

125. Wavell to Amery, 20 June 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.


129. Ibid., 26 Sept. 1944.

130. Ibid., 13 Oct. 1944.

131. The Zamindara League had been founded by Unionist leaders, notably Chhotu Ram and Sikander Hyat Khan to popularise Unionism amongst the zamindar community in the Province. As such it had functioned as a propaganda and fund-gathering agency for the Unionist Party.
132. Civil and Military Gazette, 26 Sept. 1944.
133. Ibid., 3 Nov. 1944.
134. Ibid., 3 Nov. 1944.
135. Wavell to Glancy, 3 Oct. 1944, R/3/1/105, IOR.
137. Civil and Military Gazette, 24 Nov. 1944; 28 Nov. 1944.
138. Ibid., 28 Nov. 1944; 3 Dec. 1944.
139. Of the remaining six seats, the Unionists retained only three, the others being captured by Independent candidates, Govt. of India Press Information Bureau, The General Elections 1945-46, Delhi, 1946, L/P&J/8/472, IOR.
140. Civil and Military Gazette, 16 March 1945; 21 March 1945; GR, Glancy to Wavell, 7 April 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.
141. Civil and Military Gazette, 24 Nov. 1944; 28 Nov. 1944.
142. Ibid., 28 Nov. 1944; 3 Dec. 1944.
143. GR, Glancy to Wavell, 20 Feb. 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.
144. Ghazanfar Ali, who had been elected as deputy leader of the League Assembly Party, acted as Shaukat's chief defender following the dismissal scandal. See Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 8 March 1945, Vol.24, pp.433-438; 9 March 1945, Vol.24, p. 465; V/9/3821 and V/9/3822, IOR.
145. See ibid., 8 March 1945, pp.419-422, 424-431, V/9/3821, IOR.
146. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of May 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.
147. Civil and Military Gazette, 21 March 1945; Punjab Chief Sec.'s Report Punjab, second half of March 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.
149. Wavell to Amery, 5 Feb. 1945, L/P&J/8/622, IOR.
150. Ibid.
152. Ibid., pp.141-142.
153. These included Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Congress President; P.N. Banerjee, Leader of the Nationalist Party in the Central Assembly; Bhuabhai Desai, Leader of the Congress Party in the Central Assembly; Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, Premier of Sind; Hossain Imam, Leader of the A.I.M.L. in the Council of State; M.A.Jinnah; Dr. Khan Sahib, Premier of the N.W.F.P.; B.G.Kher, ex-Premier, Bombay; Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana; Liaquat Ali Khan, Deputy Leader of the A.I.M.L. in the Central Assembly; G.S.Motilal, Leader of the Congress in the Council of State; Nazimuddin, ex-Premier, Bengal; Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, ex-Premier, U.P.; Maharaja of Parlakimedi, ex-Premier, Orissa; C.Rajagopalchari, ex-Premier, Madras; Sir Henry Richardson, Leader of European Group in the Central Assembly; Sir Muhammad Saadulla, Premier of Assam; Rao Bahadur Siva Raj, Scheduled Caste representative; Sri Krishna Sinha, ex-Premier, Bihar; Master Tara Singh, Sikh representative. Though Gandhi refrained from formally attending the conference on the
153. (contd.) grounds that he was not a member of the Congress Party, he remained in Simla to be available for consultation. P. Moon (Ed.), op. cit., pp. 147-148.


155. Ibid., journal entry 27 June 1945, p. 149.

156. Ibid., journal entry 23 June 1945, p. 144.

157. Ibid., journal entry 27 June 1945, p. 149.

158. Ibid., journal entry 24 June 1945, p. 146.

159. Ibid., journal entry 27 June 1945, p. 146.


161. Ibid., journal entry 27 June 1945, p. 149.

162. Ibid., journal entry 11 July 1945, p. 154.

163. Ibid., journal entry 23 June 1945, p. 144.

164. Ibid., journal entry 12 July 1945, p. 154.

165. Ibid., journal entry 14 July 1945, p. 155.

166. Ibid., journal entry 9 July 1945, p. 153.


168. Glancy to Wavell, 16 Aug. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.


173. Glancy to Wavell, 16 Aug. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.


175. Ibid., 25 Sept. 1945.


179. GR, Glancy to Wavell, 27 Oct. 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.

180. Civil and Military Gazette, 10 Nov. 1945.


183. Wavell to Amery, 9 May 1944, L/P&J/8/662, IOR.


185. Ibid., 16 Sept. 1945.

186. GR, Glancy to Wavell, 16 Aug. 1945, L/P&J/5/248, IOR.

187. Ibid.

188. Ibid.
189. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 21 Aug. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.
190. Viceroy's Memorandum, enclosure, Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 21 Aug. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.
191. Ibid.
192. Ibid. See also letter Viceroy to Sec. of State, 20 Aug. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.
193. Viceroy's Memorandum, enclosure, Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 21 Aug. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.
195. Ibid., journal entry 3 Sept. 1945, p. 169.
197. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 25 Oct. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.
198. Menon to Jenkins, 20 Oct. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.
199. Abell to Jenkins, 22 Sept. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.
201. GR, Glancy to Wavell, 27 Oct. 1945, I/P&J/5/248, IOR.
203. Jenkins to Wavell, 22 Oct. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.
204. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 25 Oct. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.
205. Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, 9 Nov. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.
206. It was the opinion of Clow, the Governor of Assam, that this reticence resulted from the Congress realization that the Nationalist Muslims did not possess sufficient influence to effectively oppose 'Pakistan', and its fear that total opposition to a Muslim State would weaken its own claim to represent all the communities, Muslims included. Twynham, Governor of the Central Province, to Wavell, 25 Sept. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.
207. Menon to Abell, 20 Nov. 1945; Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 22 Nov. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.
208. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 20 Nov. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.
CHAPTER VII

PUNJABI MUSLIMS AND THE ELECTIONS OF 1946
- A TRIUMPH FOR FEUDALISM AND THE PIRS

The elections of 1946 witnessed a resounding win for the Muslim League in the Punjab. This result, however, was not solely a victory for the League and thereby 'Pakistan', but it also reflected the triumph of the Muslim landed and religious élites in the Province. The majority of the most influential Muslim zamindari families, and an overwhelming number of the Pirs had allied themselves with the League and the Pakistan demand, though in many cases such action had not occurred for ideological reasons, but had been dictated by the desire to protect and enhance their political and economic interests. Thus by 1946 the Muslim League had replaced the Unionist Party as the repository of feudal power and privilege; it was a significant development for it contributed greatly to ensuring that the League would enjoy the support of the mass of the rural dominated Muslim electorate (75 of the 84 Muslim constituencies were in rural areas), whose actions were greatly influenced, if not determined, by the large landlords and Pirs. Even so other factors also helped to shape the response of the Muslim voters - the communally charged atmosphere which had enveloped both Punjabi and national politics in the pre-election period; widespread corruption and bribery which were employed by Unionists and Leaguers alike to enhance their respective prospects; the prevailing economic depression which caused widespread dissatisfaction with the Unionist Ministry, and the propagandising activities of student activists on behalf of the League. In the final analysis, however, the decisive victory which the League gained resulted primarily from the fact that it commanded the allegiance of the extremely powerful religio-feudal élite who controlled the political life of the Province.

The composition of the electorate in the Punjab in 1946 was governed by the same rules which had been in force in 1937 (see pp.161-162). Though the number of those entitled to vote had increased from 2,686,094 in 1937 to 3,514,749 by 1946. Thus approximately 12.6% of the entire population was enfranchised. As at the previous election males accounted for the majority of voters (see p.161); approximately 46% of all men over the age of twenty enjoyed the vote. In respect of the communal
franchise there were 1,619,691 voters in the Muslim constituencies, 848,744 in the General (Hindu) and 659,396 in the Sikh; the remaining voters belonging to the special constituencies (Women, Anglo-Indian, Labour, University, European, Indian Christian, Commerce and Industry and Landholders). In terms of male voters over the age of twenty, approximately 38% of adult Muslim males, 40% of adult Hindu males, and 63% of adult Sikh males were enfranchised (see Appendix S).

Thus a relatively small electorate was involved in the election. That factor, however, did not detract from the League's performance. Out of a total of 84 seats reserved for Muslims, the League gained 72, in addition to which it captured three special constituencies - two Women and one Labour. By contrast the Unionist Party forfeited its commanding position. It retained only 12 Muslim, five General, three Landholders and one Indian Christian seat. Its majority had been decimated, as it commanded only 21 seats in an Assembly of 175. Conversely the Congress, though it failed to take any Muslim seats, emerged as the second largest party in the Legislature as a result of successes in 51 constituencies - 36 General (including six Scheduled Caste), nine Sikh, two Women (one Hindu and one Sikh), one Commerce and Industry, one Landholder, one Labour and one University. Of the remainder the Panthic Sikhs gained 23 seats (22 Sikh and one Landholder), and five (one Scheduled Caste, one Indian Christian, one Labour, one Anglo-Indian and one European) were captured by independent candidates.

The majority of the 18 special constituencies in theory had joint electorates, but the four seats allotted to women were divided between the communities - two Muslim, one General and one Sikh. Also the five landholders constituencies were in practice communal seats, in that Muslim voters predominated in three of them (N. Punjab, W. Punjab and Tumandars), and Hindus and Sikhs respectively in the remaining two (E. Punjab and Central Punjab). Similarly Muslim voters were in a majority in one of the Labour seats (N. Punjab) and non-Muslims in the other two (Trade Union and E. Punjab). These communal divisions had been clearly evident in the voting pattern. Also the Congress capture of the Commerce and Industry and University seats reflected the fact that Hindus controlled both these spheres of Provincial life. Conversely the retention by the Unionist Party of three of the four landholders constituencies resulted from the fact that the successful Unionist candidates - Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana and Jamal Khan Leghari (Unionist Minister) - were able to use their personal influence, and in Khizar's case official interference, to ensure that they did not forfeit the
support of the relatively small number of votes included. Khizar captured both the North Punjab and West Punjab Landholders seats, possessing electorates of 886 and 1,066 respectively, whilst the Tumandar seat held by Leghari consisted of only nine voters.\(^7\)

Personal influences aside, the vital issues confronting the Punjab at the time of the elections regarding its future rôle in the post-independence period resulted in the manifestation of a greater degree of political awareness than had been the case in 1937. There were no contests in only 14 constituencies with an aggregate electorate of 348,816. The effective voters therefore numbered 3,165,933 of whom 2,076,207 exercised their franchise.\(^8\) A relatively larger proportion of Hindus voted (69%) than was the case for either Muslims (64.5%) or Sikhs (64%).\(^9\) Whilst it could be argued that this demonstrated a greater degree of political consciousness on the part of the Hindu electorate, it probably occurred because a larger proportion of Hindu voters were located in urban areas than was the case for either Muslims or Sikhs,\(^10\) which made the franchise marginally more accessible to Hindu voters. Most significant of all, however, the Hindus were under tremendous psychological pressure to register their votes. As a minority community dominating the professional and commercial spheres of provincial life, and possessing a vast investment in the Province, they stood to bear the greatest loss from a League victory heralding 'Pakistan'. Similarly the Sikh land holdings in the central Punjab were also threatened, which suggests that the comparatively low Sikh turnout at the polls in contrast to that of the Hindus, resulted from the fact that all but two of the Sikh constituencies were in the more inaccessible rural areas.

In respect of Muslim voters, of the 1,044,158 who exercised their vote, 679,796 (65.10%) voted for the League, though this in reality meant that only 42% of all enfranchised Muslims (i.e. all who were entitled to vote, irrespective of whether they voted or not) had in fact supported the League. Even so this did not detract from the League victory, because the Unionist Party, which had posed the greatest threat to the Muslim League in the Punjab secured only 26.81% (279,967) of the Muslim votes cast, representing only 17.28% of the entire Muslim electorate. An analysis of the total Muslim vote is given in Table I below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>League</td>
<td>679,796</td>
<td>65.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>279,967</td>
<td>26.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahrar</td>
<td>41,608</td>
<td>3.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>6,480</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>30,180</td>
<td>2.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid</td>
<td>6,127</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(From information contained in the Times of India, 13 March 1946)
In the rural areas the League gained 50% and more of the votes polled in 55 constituencies, but it is interesting to note that it received the support of 50%, and over, of the entire Muslim electorate in only 8 constituencies (Karnal, Ambala and Simla, Chunian, Gurdaspur East, Shahdara, Montgomery, Okara and Jhang Central - see Appendix T). Three of these seats - Karnal, Ambala and Simla, and Gurdaspur East - were situated in the eastern part of the Province where Muslims were in a minority. The high polls, and large measure of League support, recorded in each, were symptomatic of the unease and vulnerability the Muslim community experienced in Hindu majority areas. A similar phenomenon was evident in respect of the eastern urban constituencies. The heaviest polling, and the League's most convincing urban victories occurred in the North East Towns and South East Towns seats (see Appendix T). With regard to those constituencies where the League experienced its greatest successes - Chunian, Shahdara, Montgomery, Okara, and Jhang Central - all were in majority Muslim areas. The fact that each of them contained canal colony lands influenced the high turnout and the eventual result. There was a widespread belief amongst Muslim voters that a League victory would materially benefit their community at the expense of the non-Muslims. Student propagandists acting on behalf of the Muslim League fostered the belief that colony lands held by Hindus and Sikhs would be redistributed amongst Muslim tenants and demobilised soldiers. Three of the constituencies (Montgomery, Okara and Jhang Central) were situated in the Multan Division, which had traditionally been the Unionists' most important stronghold. The Unionist monopoly had been destroyed, however, by the defection to the League of the powerful Multan based Hayat and Daultana families, and the power which these groups commanded in the Division was reflected in the degree of success the League experienced there.

It had been essential for the League to achieve a convincing victory in the Province as a whole, however, in order to establish the credibility of its Pakistan claim. This it had done. The inclusion of the Punjab was vital to the concept of an independent Muslim State. The provincial elections therefore assumed national significance. Woodrow Wyatt (M.P., Aston Division, Birmingham, Member, Parliamentary Delegation to India, 1946) emphasised this when he declared to the House of Commons on 6 December 1945,

"It is in the Punjab that the issue of whether or not the Moslem League can press their claim to Pakistan is to be decided. If the Moslem League can obtain the greater
majority of the Moslem seats, they have got a clear case to go forward in India... It is in that Province that we will have the issue of whether there are to be one or two Indias."^13

It was understandable therefore that the League leaders had sought to impress the Punjabi Muslim electorate with the fact that 'Pakistan' constituted the most vital issue in the elections. In January 1946 Jinnah had emphasised

"We must realise the stakes for which we are fighting. This is a question of life and death for Mussalmans. Failure to achieve Pakistan would mean our national extinction."^14

It was a theme which Provincial League leaders had exploited to the full. On 9 November 1945, at an election rally at Jhelum Firoz Khan Noon had warned his audience that

"No religion can survive without State protection and patronage. If you want to follow freely the true creed of Islam, you shall have to struggle for an independent State of your own, otherwise under Hindu domination Islam will be finished as a religious force in India."^15

The championing of Muslim nationalism and Islam by the League leadership gave them an immediate advantage over the Unionist Party. This was enhanced by the fact that to many Muslims 'Pakistan' appeared as a panacea to their worldly problems, in addition to preserving and asserting their religious rights. As early as August 1944, it had been evident to Glancy that the promise of a Muslim state was proving to be a highly attractive inducement to Punjabi Muslims:

"the attraction of Pakistan to the uninformed Muslim lies largely in the belief that within a given area it will place him at an advantage as against his non-Muslim neighbour in the matter of personal preferment and material wealth."^16

The Muslim League, aware of the potency of its Pakistan creed, was careful not to commit itself to any definition of it which could have detracted from its appeal. Consequently League leaders purposely projected 'Pakistan' in a vague and nebulous form. The hesitancy of Jinnah and the League to define 'Pakistan' could have provided the Unionist Party with an opportunity to neutralise the popularity of the scheme by forcing the Muslim electorate to consider all the practicalities involved in augmenting a Muslim State, including the partition of the Province. The British Government, however, by refusing to grasp the nettle, and issue any authoritative statement on the Muslim League's objective for a sovereign state, deprived the Unionist Ministry of the opportunity to discredit the Pakistan demand (see pp. 245-251). As a
result the Unionists, realising the potency of 'Pakistan' as an election issue, strove to reassure the Muslim electorate that if they were successful at the polls they too would support the demand for a Muslim homeland. Khizar in April 1944, following the breakdown of his talks with Jinnah, had emphasised that the Lahore Resolution of 1940, "popularly known as the Pakistan Resolution, is the sheet anchor of Muslims in the Punjab as elsewhere," and he claimed that "I have on countless occasions declared my faith in it and I propose to stand by it." As the 1946 elections approached, Khizar continued to emphasise Unionist support for Pakistan. He appealed to the electorate on the basis that there was no difference between the Unionist Party and the League on constitutional matters. He constantly reiterated Unionist approval for Pakistan, but he cautioned the Muslim electorate to remember that it was unfeasible to imagine that a purely Muslim Government could hold power in the Punjab, therefore inter-communal co-operation would continue to be essential to allow for the pursuit of common economic interests.

Khizar's strategy in supporting the 'Pakistan' idea proved to be a grave political blunder. By following such a course he destroyed the credibility of the Unionist Party as a non-communal organization, whilst at the same time his plea for inter-communal co-operation alienated Muslim opinion which viewed 'Pakistan' as a symbol of Muslim supremacy, and not as a venture to be launched in equal partnership with non-Muslims. Furthermore the Premier's stance was totally unrealistic given the political climate of the time, and the Muslim League had no difficulty in discrediting it. Ghazanfar Ali, through the medium of the press, questioned in October 1945 whether the Premier and his Muslim followers in the Assembly would, in view of their approval of 'Pakistan', vote in accordance with the decisions of the A.I.M.L. when questions arose in the Legislature concerning the framing of the new constitution. Also he queried how the Premier and his fellow Muslim Unionists, if they decided to obey the League mandate, would retain the allegiance of the non-Muslim members of the Unionist Party, for the latter had constantly repeated that they were opposed to the creation of 'Pakistan'.

In fact Ghazanfar Ali had demonstrated succinctly the awkwardness of Khizar's position by pointing out that it was inconceivable for Muslim Unionists to support 'Pakistan' in an alliance with non-Muslim Unionists who were opposed to it. Glancy, however, believed that Unionist support for 'Pakistan' would not disturb its Hindu and Sikh adherents, as it was widely accepted that the Unionist view of 'Pakistan' was not the crude
variety advocated by the League, but the Governor's confidence was misplaced. Tika Ram, the Unionist Hindu leader, in an election speech at Sanipat in November 1945, refuted the suggestion that 'Pakistan' constituted an electoral issue at all. He stated that the question did not arise so far as the Punjab was concerned, as the Divisions of Ambala and Jullundur, and half of the Lahore Division, had Hindu and Sikh majorities, which meant that it would be impossible to constrain such a large population in a State based on a purely communal concept. The incident revealed the invidious position of the Unionists; in order to placate the Muslims the Premier had given lip service to the concept of Pakistan, whilst at the same time a senior Hindu cabinet colleague had declared that the development of an independent Muslim State including the Punjab in its entirety was not feasible.

A clash of this nature, underlining the inevitable incompatibility of communal interests within the Unionist ranks exemplified the unrealistic course which the Premier had adopted. Khizar's naivety was further exemplified when he publicly acknowledged the divergence of opinion which existed between Muslims and non-Muslims in his ministerial coalition, claiming that it would not disrupt the sound administration of the Province, as each group was to be permitted to support the communal organisation of their choice at the national level. Such a compromise was untenable, particularly as the League's concept of an independent Muslim homeland was irreconcilable with the Congress's determination to achieve an independent and united India. By attempting to accommodate the Pakistan ideal to retain Muslim support, the Premier adopted a course of action which was doomed to fail. 'Pakistan' was the political creation of the Muslim League, which conducted an unabashed communal and fanatical campaign to achieve its objective. In contrast Khizar's somewhat confused stance of support for the same cause, constrained as it was by the complexities of maintaining and promoting an inter-communal coalition, appeared as lukewarm and unrealistic. Whilst the adoption by the Unionist Party of a banner identical to that of the Muslim League - green, bearing the Muslim legend of a crescent - which was flown at Unionist election rallies, failed to benefit the party, or convince the Muslim electorate that it was as 'Islamic' as its Muslim League rivals!

The adoption of Islamic symbolism by the Muslim parties, and in particular by the Muslim League, together with the Congress exploitation of Hindu values and signs intensified communal feeling in the Punjab and throughout India. Yet the utilization of religion for political
ends was as much a symptom of, as a cause for the communal orientation of the electoral struggle, for the reaction of the entire Indian electorate demonstrated a near total communal polarization. In the Central Legislative Assembly all of the 30 Muslim seats went to the League, which had attracted 86.6% of the votes cast in Muslim constituencies. The Punjab clearly identified with this national pattern. The Province's response to the election had been inevitable, almost in spite of the politicians' manipulation of religious sentiment, for by 1900 communalism was clearly recognised to be the dominant form of identity in the Province, commanding greater loyalty than any form of secular social stratification. The elections proved to be an extension of the existing communal conflict. In August 1947 the retiring British Governor, Evan Jenkins (succeeded Glancy 8 April 1946) reflected:

"the General Election of 1945-46 ... was fought on the most bitter communal lines ... in which practically all Muslims were on one side of the fence and practically all non-Muslims on the other ... A country with thirty million inhabitants was sucked into the vortex of all-India politics; Punjabis ceased to be Punjabis and became Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs." Once the British had decided to leave India, however, this outcome became unavoidable. The severing of the imperial connection linked with the demand for 'Pakistan', forced the majority community in the Punjab to assert its political dominance in its own right, unencumbered by those communal considerations which had restricted the Unionist Party. In turn this Muslim assertion, which assumed an aggressive and fanatical form, triggered a counter-reaction, which was equally determined on the part of the minority communities, and the actions of each drew support from and depended on the existing communal sensibilities of the religious groups. The success of the Unionist Party at the polls in 1937 had occurred in spite of communalism, and did not mark its demise. The Assembly remained divided on largely communal lines, though a ministerial majority, including Hindus and Sikhs, had been secured through the pursuit of a pro-rural economic programme at the expense of urban interests. Despite its long years in office, however, the Unionist Ministry proved to be a fragile structure, because crude communalism exercised a far greater influence on politician and
peasant alike, than contrived economic alliances.

The intense communal atmosphere in which the election was conducted in the Punjab, although it did not result in outbreaks of communal violence, was bound to favour a communally orientated party such as the Muslim League. The Unionist Party in an effort to strengthen its campaign, and neutralise the religious appeal of the League, attempted to enhance its election prospects through the unconstitutional use of Government officials. The strategy was a failure, however, because the League attracted far more support from this class than the Ministry. Nevertheless, the adoption of these tactics by the Unionist Party initially alarmed Provincial League leaders, because they were aware of the tremendous influence Government servants possessed, particularly in the rural areas. Both Ghazanfar Ali and Feroz Khan Noon condemned the practice, and the accusation that the Unionists were promoting their electoral chances through the manipulation of Government servants had emerged by the close of 1945 as a major issue in the League's campaign.

In December 1945 League leaders in the Province contacted Woodrow Wyatt in order that their complaints should be aired in the British Parliament, and ostensibly to achieve an impartial enquiry into Unionist malpractices and parliamentary supervision of the elections. Wyatt, who was sympathetic to the League, raised the matter in the House of Commons, and suggested that in order to combat official interference, instructions should be issued to the effect that provincial officials should refrain from taking sides. Also he asked the India Office to consider importing Government servants into the Punjab from other Indian provinces to supervise the election. In pressing these demands the M.P. received unsolicited support from two British army officers serving in India, who, on learning of his efforts through the press, sought to confirm that the League's accusations were sound. On 12 December 1945 Captain Banning Richardson, residing in New Delhi (he had stood as a Labour candidate in Britain, was on the staff of the Weekly Commentary pending his demobilisation from the Army) alleged in a letter to Wyatt that

"Glancy, the Governor is actively participating to try and defeat the Muslim League and Government officials throughout the province are being made use of for the same purpose."

He claimed that his information was common knowledge, referring to it as "an open secret." Similarly Major E.C.F. Stocker (serving with 25/2 Punjab Regiment stationed at Allahabad) had informed Wyatt that

"A friend of mine had a letter from his brother stating that Khiyar [sic] Hyat Khan (Unionist P.M.) had asked
him to stand as a Unionist candidate and had offered him (a) as much money as he needed (is there no legal limit?) (b) the co-operation of the police, district magistrate and deputy commissioner!"

Stocker concluded,

"If the results in the Punjab go against the League we can be quite certain that it will have been due to unionist malpractices."

Both the India Office and the Under Secretary for State, Henderson, in spite of these corroborative statements, refused to sanction Wyatt's suggestions, or treat the Muslim League's complaints seriously. The India Office took refuge behind the Punjab Premier's statement to the effect that it would be improper for Government officials to involve themselves in the electioneering. Also, it refused to consider the deployment of Government servants from other provinces on the grounds that it would dislocate the administration of the provinces concerned, and would cause strong resentment in the Punjab. With regard to the allegation levelled by Richardson concerning the conduct of the Governor, Henderson dismissed it on the grounds that it was unthinkable that Glancy would involve himself improperly in the electioneering. In essence the India Office was convinced that the complaints in reality represented an intricate part of the Muslim League's campaign strategy against the Unionists, and as such did not merit serious investigation. The dismissal by the India Office of these complaints was unmerited as a serious accusation had been made by a serving British army officer, against the most senior servant of the Crown in the Punjab, and it deserved further examination. Glancy was certainly pro-Unionist, in that he had a very close personal relationship with the Premier, but in the light of available evidence it appears that his friendship with Khizar did not cause him to commit unconstitutional acts as suggested by Richardson. Even so, Glancy adopted a dubious attitude towards the question of official preferment, which was known to occur, and he certainly turned a 'blind eye' to it. When questioned by the Viceroy on the seriousness of the League's allegations in October 1945, he replied by arguing that as the elections were not due to begin until January 1946 any accusations made before that date could be discounted as nothing more than threats, or as preparations to excuse defeats. It was a totally unsatisfactory response, because electioneering was in progress and officials were involved. Also he refused to agree to the Provincial League's request to issue a communiqué assuring voters that the elections would be free from official interference, on the grounds that his own non-partisan attitude was already well known. In reality Glancy was determined to avoid making any
statement which could have been construed as a recognition of the League's complaints. Finally in January 1946 Glancy categorically refused to discuss the matter further with the Provincial League, even though such a meeting had been advised by Professor Richards, the leader of the Parliamentary Delegation which visited the Punjab in that month.\textsuperscript{45}

Despite the denials of the Premier and his Muslim supporters, the recalcitrant attitude of the Governor, and the refusal of the India Office to involve itself in the controversy, there can be no doubt that many officials were deeply involved in the campaigning, both on behalf of the Unionist Party and the Muslim League. It had already been recognised in the highest British Indian quarters that official interference would be a feature of the electoral contest. In a letter to Pethick-Lawrence, written in September 1945, the Viceroy had informed the Secretary of State that the attitude of the average Indian politician to the elections was similar to that which had prevailed in Britain in the eighteenth century. It was generally accepted that the Government in power possessed influence, and would exploit it. Whilst Wavell believed that the majority of officials were honest, he acknowledged that Ministers would undoubtedly put pressure on their subordinates which would result in corrupt practices, as it was much more difficult for Indian than for British officials to remain unaffected by such advances. Also the Viceroy confirmed that the employment of officials for electioneering purposes was not confined solely to the Ministerial party, as the opposition was equally guilty of the practice. He admitted that the Unionist Government had attempted to combat the League manipulation of officials by arranging postings so as to keep officers with known Muslim League affinities out of the key districts. The Unionist Government, the Viceroy reasoned, could defend its actions by claiming that such moves in personnel occurred as a matter of routine, and that if the League objected, then they would risk the allegation that their interest in particular officials was improper.\textsuperscript{46} Also at least one I.C.S. officer who served in the Punjab has admitted that some Government servants were involved in the campaign. Azim Husain, the son of Fazl-i-Husain, has recalled,

"Though I avoided political topics, nevertheless, I found myself making speeches all over the province in support of the Government...".

Husain asserted, however, that although some individuals acted differently, generally British and Indian I.C.S. officers did not involve themselves with politics, and they made strenuous efforts to act impartially between the different parties and communities.\textsuperscript{*}

\* Azim Husain, I.C.S.Papers, p.21. Mss.EUR.F.180/68, IOR.
Though the corrupt involvement of I.C.S. officials in the 1946 campaign was, according to Husain, negligible, the same could not be said of Muslim officers serving in the Provincial Civil Service, and their activities were directed chiefly against the Unionist Party, and in support of the Muslim League. The Punjab administration had suspected as early as August 1944 that most Muslim officials supported the League. As the election campaign drew to its climax many Muslim officials openly demonstrated pro-League sympathies. The Muslim Deputy Commissioner for Lyallpur in an appreciation of the situation in his district written towards the close of 1945 reported:

"nearly 80 per cent. of the subordinate Muslim staff, both revenue and District Board, has active League sympathies and a large number of them have been used as instruments by the League for submitting false and forged applications [for voting rights]... It may truly be said that official support in spite of Government instructions regarding neutrality on the matter is largely on the side of the League rather than of the Unionist Party.""48

The Deputy Commissioner's assessment was certainly applicable in respect of the degree of official support which the League received in the majority of Muslim districts and constituencies in the Province. This is evident from the findings of a survey encompassing 56 Muslim seats: preferment on the part of officials, often resulting in illicit voting, was reported to the Election Commission in 39 of these constituencies, and the League was the principal beneficiary, as the respondent in 29 of the cases was the Muslim League candidate (see Appendix U).

A number of factors had contributed to ensure that the Muslim League should be the major beneficiary from corrupt communal preferment. In essence the actions of those Government officials, who used their influence in support of the League represented a response to the Islamic appeal of that organisation, coupled with the fear that failure to support it would court social ostracism and divine retribution. Also Muslim civil servants faced the prospect of serving under a Muslim League Government in the near future, and any official who backed the Unionist Party would be in an unenviable position once the elections were over. Firoz Khan Noon had made it clear that the Muslim League would deal severely with those who had used their positions in support of Unionist candidates, threatening to "bring them to book when we come into power in the Punjab." Though this threat was couched as a warning to all officials to avoid interfering in the elections on the side of any party, its real message was clear - those who opposed the League would have to be prepared to
face the consequences, for no one could have taken Noon's non-partisan posture seriously. It was common knowledge amongst those who subscribed to the Press that the League was making extensive use of Government servants: the civil service in Sind was deeply involved in canvassing for the Muslim League, whilst when the Governor of Bengal had ordered all officials to refrain from party politics, Sir Khawaja Nazimuddin, the ex-Premier and leader of the League Party in the Province had criticised the Governor's action. Also when in October 1945 Noon had been confronted with the accusation that the League was employing officials in its campaign, he had not disputed it, but had merely responded rather unconvincingly that two wrongs did not make a right! In addition in analysing the causes for official corruption preceding and during the 1946 elections, it is evident that some officials were influenced by their personal relationships with the candidate. This was the case in Muzaffargarh North, where Nawab Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani (Director of Resettlement, Govt. of India) and Captain Mahboob Ali Gurmani (Asst. Recruiting Officer, Multan) were accused of using their official positions to aid their nephew, Mian Muhammad Ghulam Gilani, the Muslim League candidate. Finally, bribery also featured as a strong inducement for official corruption. The Muslim League claimed that Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Burq, who was returned as the Unionist member for Alipur owed his success to the fact that he had misused his position as an Honorary Magistrate, and had won the support of local officials, including the returning officers, members of the police force, zaildars and lumbardars, by promising that the Unionist Government would reward them with land in return for their services.

The involvement of Government officials, primarily as supporters of the League, was a feature of the elections. The question arises, therefore, as to the motives of the Provincial League in turning the subject of official interference into an election issue in the Punjab, and by confronting the British authorities (both in India and Great Britain) with complaints of preferment by Government servants. These tactics appear to have resulted from two distinct strategies. Initially the League, which had been consistently suspicious of the influence exercised by Government officials, and the support which they would proffer to the Ministry, genuinely regarded pro-Unionist activity on their part as being likely to prejudice the prospects of the League in the rural constituencies. Later, as the campaign advanced, and the true strength of the League became apparent, continued criticism of Unionist malpractice regarding civil servants, provided a crude, but nevertheless useful, smoke-
screen for similar indiscretions by pro-League officers.

In fact corruption, both on the part of officials and non-officials, including candidates and party workers, was one of the dominant characteristics of the election in the Punjab. It was a 'dirty', and most undemocratic contest from which few successful League or Unionist candidates emerged with 'clean hands'. In addition to the interference by officials, candidates and their party workers resorted to bribery, violent intimidation and coercion to secure votes. In an article which began "Mammon apparently smiles his golden smile at electors to the Punjab Legislative Assembly", the Civil and Military Gazette revealed that in some constituencies voters were richer by practically half a year's income for having exercised their franchise in favour of the highest bidder. It reported that during the first week of polling the price of a vote in a number of seats (not named) had risen twenty times, whilst in some cases entire villages had bartered their aggregate vote through their headmen, such communities receiving Rs. 1,000 or Rs. 2,000 according to the number of votes each commanded. Votes were also pledged in return for gifts of food and medical supplies. The Provincial Muslim League Working Committee, in October 1945, had alleged that the Unionist Ministry was preparing to distribute 20,000 acres of land in return for support at the polls, but the League more than countered the threat which this posed by resorting to similar malpractices. In 24 of the 56 constituencies previously surveyed (see Appendix U) complaints relating to bribery were brought to the attention of the Election Commission, 19 of which implicated Muslim League candidates and their supporters, and in the remaining five Unionist were accused (see Appendix V).

Amongst those who were incriminated was M. Ghulam Muhammad, who had been elected unopposed on the Muslim League ticket for the East Jhang Muslim constituency. It was reported that Ghulam Muhammad had procured the withdrawal of the three opposing candidates - M. Ghulam Abbas, M. Allahyar Khan and N. Nawazish Ali - by offering them financial and other inducements. Ghulam Muhammad and his father were accused of having promised to withdraw a Civil appeal - K.B. Sarad Hussain Shah versus Roshnai Bibi and M. Ghulam Abbas - pending in the Lahore High Court. The dispute involved immovable property of very great value; M. Ghulam Abbas was the Defendant Respondant in the case, whilst A. Allahyar Khan was the second Defendant Respondant, and Ghulam Muhammad's father was the Appellant. As the result of the withdrawal both M. Ghulam Abbas and M. Allahyar Khan agreed not to contest the election. Similarly N. Nawazish Ali had been persuaded to 'retire' from the hustings in return
for a grant of land. 59

Coercion and intimidation also proved to be valuable assets in gaining success at the polls. Out of the 56 constituencies examined (listed in Appendix U), forceful persuasion of this nature occurred in 18 of them; of these the League was cited in 11 instances and the Unionist Party in the remaining seven (see Appendix W). Coercion and intimidation had long been two of the most potent weapons in the landlords' political armoury, and it was no coincidence that two of the Punjab's leading Zamindars, Aasha Hussain (Unionist Minister) and the Nawab of Mamdot (President of the Punjab Muslim League) were numbered amongst the offenders. One zamindar, Sayed Ghulam Qasim Shah of Sher Shah, who had refused to support the Unionist cause in Aasha Hussain's constituency (Multan), was removed from the Debt Conciliation Board as a result. 60

No doubt this served as a poignant example to others who might have considered resisting ministerial advances. In Mamdot's case, the treatment afforded opponents was even cruder, for in Ferozepore Central, the Nawab's seat, the politics of the 'big stick' truly prevailed. The Election Commission was informed that the Nawab had threatened important supporters of the Unionist candidate (M. Mohammad Sarwar) 61, who were his lessees with eviction, and that he had served notices of ejection on six of them - S. Wali Muhammad (Chak Hameed Saideke), Bagh Ali (Chak Rumwala), Muhammad Shafee (Chak Sotaria), Julal Din (Bhidipura–Jalalabad), Muhammad Hussain (Chak Fannawali) and Bader-ud-Din Khan (Jalalabad) - all of whom were from the Muktsar Tahsil. It was also reported that beatings were inflicted on electors to ensure their support. In fact so much terror and panic was caused in Basti Tankanwali by Mamdot's agents that the District Magistrate, in an attempt to restore order, placed the area under section 144. 62 Also complaints of assault were lodged against Mamdot's agents at the Ferozepore cantonment Police Station. 63 Even the Premier was not above resorting to coercion. Abdul Ghafur Khan, a member of the Tiwana tribe, complained that Muslim League agents and supporters were forcibly prevented from canvassing, and that officials played a leading role in inciting mobs to disrupt, and prevent League meetings from being held. 64

The reason that intimidation, either through direct acts of violence, threats of the same, eviction or official pressure, was rife and practicable in the Punjab, was largely the result of the method of voting employed there which was unique in British India, and which afforded the elector no protection. An official sat behind a table in the voting booth, surrounded by representatives of the various parties. The voter,
often illiterate, entered the booth, and an official indicated the names of the candidates on the voting-paper before him. Thus both the returning officer and the party workers witnessed the choice the voter made, which placed the latter in an exceedingly vulnerable position, and meant in effect that a free election was impossible. In all other provinces each party was represented by differently coloured ballot-boxes; the voter cast his vote behind a screen, and could not be viewed by anyone. Woodrow Wyatt, fearful that the method of voting practised in the Punjab would invite widespread intimidation attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the British Parliament of the necessity for making the system in the Punjab more private. The Punjab Government, however, was opposed to any change, ostensibly because the existing practice had operated satisfactorily in 1937, and for earlier elections to the Legislative Council (voting by these means had been used in the Punjab for fifteen years), and was understood and appreciated by the electorate. Consequently Henderson (Under Sec. of State, India) refused to challenge the Provincial Government's stance, or support Wyatt, claiming that it would be impractical to alter the existing system.

The refusal of the Provincial Government to contemplate operating a secret ballot certainly arose from the belief that the existing indiscreet and public practice would favour the Ministry. The League clearly shared this opinion, for it was anxious to eliminate the supposed Unionist advantage, through the inauguration of a more discreet procedure incorporating coloured ballot boxes, which would reduce the risk of corrupt official interference and intimidation. Despite its fears, however, the retention of the old system, far from prejudicing its prospects, clearly benefited the League far more than the Unionist Party.

In addition to the widespread corruption and intimidation which occurred, the prevailing economic depression which had gripped the Province following the outbreak of war, contributed to the Unionist Party's loss of support. It had caused deep dissatisfaction with the Ministry, which was increasingly portrayed by its opponents as being devoid of any feeling of responsibility towards the Province's poor. It was a charge which the Unionist Party's record supported rather than refuted. It had never possessed the inclination to introduce a programme for social welfare based on a planned economy. 'Critic' in commenting on these failings in the Civil and Military Gazette in July 1943, observed that the Party had never been over-burdened with "constructive vision" or "reformist zeal". He further condemned Unionism over its neglect of the urban poor and the peasantry: except for two pieces of legis-
lation - the Rent Act and the Trade Employees Act - the Unionist Government had done practically nothing for the urban poor, whose wages and standard of living had not improved during Unionist rule, and who had experienced tremendous hardships, as a result of the Government's refusal to introduce price controls and rationing to combat the effects of the War upon the economic life of the Province. In similar vein, 'Critic' exposed as a "travesty" the Unionists' claim to be a peasant party: it had ignored the needs of that group; neither land-revenue nor water-rates had been reduced, and all that Unionist agrarian legislation had achieved was the deliverance of the peasants from the clutches of the bania and to put them at the mercy of the large landlords. The Unionist Party, 'Critic' concluded, thrived on professional antagonism. It had showed feverish legislative activity as long as the urban rich had constituted its target, but it had done nothing to restrict the power and privileges of the rural rich, or protect the small exploited tenants and farmers. 'Critic's' description of the Party was accurate. When in December 1938 there had been an attempt to afford some protection to the tenantry of the Province through legislation to establish their right to hold land for a minimum of four years, Ghazanfar Ali (a faithful Unionist at the time) had secured the rejection of the measure, claiming that it was "obnoxious", "thoroughly bad" and "highly unfair". Thus in the words of Sardar Sohan Singh Josh (Communist M.L.A.), the Punjab possessed "a Government of the landlord, by the landlord and for the landlord". It was an observation, the validity of which was beyond dispute.

The Provincial Muslim League added its voice to the chorus of discontent. In November 1944 it issued its election manifesto in which it accused the Unionist Ministry of blatantly neglecting the rural peasantry:

"It is in the poverty and degradation of the peasantry that we see the most poignant failure of the present administration and a criminal betrayal of the grandiose promise [to protect the peasants] which had to come to nought because it emanated from a party which had nothing in common with the people and which flourished on their exploitation."

Also whilst the manifesto embraced the national campaign of the A.I.M.L. and pledged itself to establish "free Muslim States in a free and fully independent India", in which the "legitimate claims" of non-Muslims would be respected, it sought to project the League as being dedicated to the material betterment of the Muslims. It undertook to transport the community from "poverty, degradation and darkness into a new world of plenty..." in that it pledged "that the relative backwardness and poverty
of our own nation [the Muslims] shall form the foremost concern of all our efforts." To these ends the administration was to be reformed into "a genuine instrument of service to the people..." the salaries of the lower paid government servants would be increased; backward areas and communities would be developed; industries would be encouraged; industrial labour was to be protected, and the welfare and standard of living of the rural populace enhanced. To achieve the latter, the Muslim League promised to eliminate debt and its causes; the Land Alienation Act was to be further amended to protect rural debtors from the rapacity of large-landlords and agriculturist money-lenders; maternity centres were to be provided within easy access of all villages; drinking-water supplies and irrigation were to be improved; roads and communal granaries would be constructed; a large proportion of Crown lands would be set aside for the use of small cultivators and demobilised soldiers, and not leased to the highest bidder; and waste land would be distributed free of charge to the "poorest peasants". Taxation was to be "progressively placed" on those most able to bear it, and opportunities in industry, "nationalised" transport and on State collective farms would be created to secure employment for demobilised soldiers.

The signatories of the manifesto, Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot and Mumtaz Daultana (respectively the President and Secretary of the Punjab Muslim League) claimed that the schemes outlined in it amounted to a "radical national reconstruction...". In reality it consisted of extravagant, largely impossible, promises, which could only have been construed as truly radical had they envisaged a dramatic reconstruction of society. The large landlord, and all the economic and social powers he commanded, was to remain inviolate. Ghazanfar Ali had been careful to reassure the Province's landed, political elite on this issue; in June 1944 whilst he had emphasised the Muslim League's commitment to the peasants of the Punjab, he had been careful to emphasise that the League had no intention to abolish landlordism. The post-independence period, during which the League landlords ruled West Punjab, exposed the hollowness of the manifesto's claims, as the peasantry remained an exploited and disregarded section of Pakistan society.

Future failings, however, had no relevance in the three years immediately preceding the election, and the criticisms which had been current in those years, combined with the publication of the League's promised reforms constituted an unpleasant embarrassment for the Ministry. Prior to the circulation of the Muslim League's manifesto, however, Chhotu Ram had initiated a propaganda campaign in the press to refute the
damaging charges. He had focussed attention on the fact that in 1937 a land revenue committee had been appointed to examine various methods of providing relief to poor farmers. On the advice of the committee Rs. 55 lakhs had been set aside in every normal year to provide for a 'Peasant's-Welfare Fund', which by the close of 1943 was expected to have amassed Rs. 150 lakhs.\(^78\) It was planned, the Minister claimed, to use the Fund to finance cheap credit, promote cottage industries, co-operative marketing, land reclamation and improve village communications, with the view of improving the living conditions of the small farmers and peasants.\(^79\) Unfortunately a capital of Rs. 150 lakhs was insufficient to finance Chhotu Ram's schemes, or provide any lasting solution to the problems facing the peasants.\(^80\) By November 1945 the Fund had grown to Rs. 210 lakhs,\(^81\) but the sum remained pitifully inadequate in respect of the grandiose schemes it was expected to achieve. In reality Muslim League leaders, to enhance their leadership claims and prospects at the forthcoming elections, had adopted a false and hypocritical concern for peasant welfare, which the Unionist Party attempted to counter with equally questionable sentiments, and redundant policies. To the poor of the Province, however, promises, regardless of whether they were to prove genuine or not, were far more appealing at the time than a programme which had been seen to fail.

Concurrent with the pretence of anxiety which both Leaguers and Unionists exhibited for the peasantry, the Province, particularly from 1944 onwards, began to experience the full rigours of the economic depression. Up until 1943 a succession of good harvests, the receipt of a large income from military service, and the increases in the price of grain had afforded agricultural proprietors and tenants adequate protection from the rise in the cost of consumer goods. The relative prosperity of the rural population was reflected in the fact that there had been a large increase in the number of mortgages which had been redeemed, and that many agriculturists were engaged in the purchase of bullion. Initially, therefore, it was the urban poor and persons on fixed incomes (e.g. Government servants) who were the hardest hit by the price rises.\(^82\) Instead of implementing measures to alleviate their deprivation the Government appeared to aggravate the problem. In a speech, which epitomised the motivating force behind the Unionist political philosophy, the Minister of Revenue (Chhotu Ram), during a tour of the Province in December 1942, had exhorted wheat producers to withhold their produce from the markets to enable them to capitalise on further price increases. This irresponsible and partisan behaviour
directly contributed to "the tendency to blame Government for failure to check inflation and profiteering".

Resentment against the Ministry was aggravated rather than mollified, particularly as prices at the end of 1942 had risen even further as a consequence of the shortages of goods which the Province was subjected to. There was a scarcity of salt in four districts, sugar in six, fuel in ten and foodgrains in thirteen, and the chief sufferers were the poor. Inflation was rampant: by January 1943 rice had risen from Rs.6 a maund in 1939 to Rs.15 a maund, and from a pre-war index of 100, by 1944 ghee had risen to 329, bajra to 262, gram to 281, maize to 273 and wheat to 368. Furthermore as from September 1944 cereal producers and agriculturists in general were no longer cushioned against inflation because the value of agriculture produce fell, and as a consequence was unable to keep pace with prices demanded for consumer goods. The situation in the rural areas, by the opening months of 1946, had deteriorated even further as a result of the poor quality of the Rabi crop, which Anderson (Financial Commissioner, Revenue) described as the worst which he had encountered in thirty-five years of service in the Punjab.

The inevitable outcome of the hardships and suffering caused by the recession, aggravated as it was by high prices and shortages, was a feeling of resentment and disillusionment with the Government, particularly amongst the most deprived sections of society. This in itself, however, did not cause the Unionist Government to lose valuable support. The setbacks which the Ministry suffered as a consequence of the economic situation, resulted not from its failure to safeguard the poor from the recession, but because it was unable to maintain the high prices which the comparatively rich zamindars and tenants had been able to demand for their stocks until the end of 1943. The vast majority of the urban and rural poor possessed no means whereby they could register their dissatisfaction with Government through the ballot-box, for they were not enfranchised. The vote was restricted primarily to the property-owners and in particular the landed classes (see p. 158) who were far less vulnerable to the austerity caused by the economic depression than the landless. It was only when the Unionist Party was forced to abdicate its traditional role of safeguarding the interests of the exploiting, land-owning, grain selling class that it suffered a serious decline in popularity, which could be translated in vote form, and which in turn enhanced the election prospects of the League.

In response to the terrible suffering in Bengal caused by the famine of 1943, the Government of India decided that it was essential
to control the supply and price of wheat from the Punjab, the 'granary of India', to prevent it reaching more profitable markets, notably in the U.P., at the expense of the starving Bengalis. The move was fiercely resisted by the Zamindari Ministry in the Punjab. It was denounced by Chhotu Ram who had not only encouraged hoarding but who had also assured the zamindars in June 1943 that it was unlikely that wheat would be subjected to any form of price control. In October 1943 fifty members of the Ministerial Party moved a resolution in the Legislative Assembly expressing the deep resentment of the Province's cereal producers at the Government of India's proposal to impose price restrictions on grain. It was carried without a division. The opposition parties in the Assembly, in spite of previous League and Congress pretensions of sympathy for the poor, and pledges to support them, in recognition of the importance of the 'landed vote', joined the Government in opposing the Central Government. The Unionist Ministry was placed in the most unenviable position, for it was clear that the Government of India would force it to concur with its wishes, at a time when Unionist supporters were demanding that the Provincial Government should resist Imperial pressure. The Viceroy (Linlithgow), however, was adamant that the Punjab's desire for profit would not increase the suffering in Bengal. Despite the fact that Glancy had pointed out that the Unionist Ministry would lose valuable agriculturist support, and that it would probably resign if the price control measures were enforced, Linlithgow refused to relinquish the position which he had adopted in August 1943. He had informed the Governor then that "the procurement of the necessary surplus wheat from the Punjab is more important than any political considerations, any interests of the Ministers, and even, in the last resort, the continuance of Provincial Autonomy in the Punjab." The following month he emphasised in the strongest terms that it would be impossible for him to defend the Punjabi cultivators from the inevitable charge that would be levelled at them, that they were prepared to blackmail starving Bengalis in order to maintain their profits.

Consequently in December 1943 the Government of India imposed restrictions on the price of wheat in the Punjab, to be followed by similar controls on other grains, rice, bajra, etc., and the introduction of rationing by 1 March 1944. The failure of the Unionist Government to save the zamindars from the consequences of the Government of India's actions, led the former to take matters into their own hands, by resorting to the 'black market', where high prices could be demanded.
This in turn caused further friction between the Ministry and its traditional supporters, as it fought to combat the illegal marketeering. By the end of 1945 food grains, including wheat, maize and gram, had as a result of the growers' actions, all but disappeared from the open market.\textsuperscript{98} The Provincial Government responded by seizing and requisitioning stocks whenever it could locate them. More than any other action, this marked the complete reversal of all previous Unionist policies and sentiments. The once munificent Unionist Party, the 'bulwark' of landed privilege and vested interest had been forced to turn on the 'exploiters', the very class it had represented, and which had guaranteed it power. In February 1946, at the very time Unionism was fighting for its political survival, anti-Government resentment spilled over, and agitation against its requisitioning tactics broke out in the districts of Ludhiana, Ferozepore and Hoshiarpur.\textsuperscript{99}

The prevailing economic climate and the unpopular measures which the Ministry had been forced to adopt, provided the Muslim League with the opportunity to capitalise on the situation. In opposing the fixing of price control for grain (see above) the League had avoided offering any offence to the most important section of the electorate, whilst by distributing medical supplies and cloth in rural areas, and by championing the need to increase ration allowances to the villagers,\textsuperscript{100} the League was able to project the image of a humanitarian and caring party eager to serve the poor and needy of the Province. In analysing the League victory in the Punjab, Talbot has drawn the conclusion that it resulted primarily from its manipulation of the economic grievances of the peasantry, and the promise of solutions to solve the crisis:

"The League's ability to provide answers to the economic dislocation of the countryside caused by the War was the key to its success in winning over the Punjabi villagers. Votes were traded off for immediate material benefits and for the promise that Pakistan's creation would solve their social and economic difficulties."

He has concluded,

"The League's demand for Pakistan was certainly legitimized in the minds of the Muslim voters by its religious appeal ... But its potency lay in the fact that it was a systematic expression of the Muslim peasants' interests."

In support of this hypothesis, that the importance of interests outweighed ideas in mobilising peasant societies in Asia, he has used as an example Jeffrey Race's argument that the Communist Party's successful takeover of Long An Province in Vietnam was not the outcome of the Communists' ideological appeal but the pragmatic way in which it developed bonds of loyalty between the individual and itself on the
basis of its ability to realise concrete local issues of importance in the peasants' lives.\textsuperscript{101}

There can be no doubt that the recession and the shortages current in the Province made the peasant and villager alike very susceptible to the League's arguments and pledges, but the evidence does not support Talbot's sweeping conclusions. To begin with only a very few individuals, comparatively speaking, could have benefitted from the League's distribution of commodities tactics. The Punjab League was virtually bankrupt by 1946, and had been forced to borrow heavily in order to conduct its campaign. In January 1946 alone it sought and received a loan of Rs. 350,000 from the All-India body.\textsuperscript{102} It was in no position to finance action on a scale sufficient to offer "immediate material benefits" to even a small proportion of the electorate. Also economic factors, though important, could only be truly decisive, in the way suggested by Talbot, in an election based on adult suffrage, encompassing all economic strata of society, and which had been conducted along free democratic lines. The elections of 1946, as held in the Punjab, fulfilled none of these requirements. Even so Talbot's argument that Punjabi villagers and peasants were attracted to the League on account of the material benefits it promised them is sound, but it was not the decisive factor in ensuring a League victory, because the villagers and peasants \textit{in toto} did not decide the election. As pointed out previously, only 38% of all Muslim adult males, representing the bulk of the enfranchised Muslim populace, possessed the vote. The resulting electorate was principally confined to those who had a vested property interest in the Province. Thus it was not the vision of a 'welfare State' to be established principally to serve the needs of the peasantry, which swung the landed proprietors and tenantry to the League, but the fact that the Unionist Party had failed, over the issue of price controls and rationing, to safeguard their economic interests. Furthermore there was the knowledge that the landlord \textit{élite} who controlled the League would do nothing to prejudice those interests, as its opposition to the imposition of a price ceiling on grain had proved.

The League's election victory was not primarily the result of its economic appeal; it was achieved because the League had the support of the majority of the Province's Muslim feudal and religious leaders. The rural Punjab in 1946 constituted a reactionary, paternalistic and feudal world, in which 81% of the land was owned by only 19% of the population.\textsuperscript{103} The monopolisation of the land resources of the Province by this relatively small group, combined with the almost slavish obedience which the
Muslim peasantry offered their religious leaders, meant that the squirearchy and the Pirs reigned supreme. Consequently the electoral contest between the Muslim League and the Unionist Party was a thinly disguised battle for power between feudal forces, conducted in an imposed, totally unrealistic, and broken 'democratic' arena. The rural voters were little more than pawns in a game which was decided by their masters, as votes were, more often than not, cast in accordance with the wishes of the landed and religious élites. The great majority of the Muslim seats were situated in the rural areas of the western Punjab, where the landlord and Pir enjoyed tremendous power. In describing the authority which these two groups exercised Malcolm Darling included in his study on the Punjab Peasant a description of feudalism in the Alipur Tahsil of Muzaffargarh, which was applicable to the majority of the western districts of the Punjab, and also those areas of the eastern Punjab where large estates, such as those enjoyed by the Mamdot family, existed:

"Every five miles or so is the house of a tribal or religious leader, who maintains a band of retainers to enforce his influence on his poorer neighbours, and to conduct his feuds with his equals. The poor man pays blackmail for his cattle to these local chieftains and for his soul to his pir, who may or may not live in the neighbourhood, but visits his followers yearly to receive his dues. As would be expected, the bulk of the land is held by the rich men, who are increasing their possessions. Peasant proprietors exist on the outskirts of the small towns: elsewhere the small lordless man cannot hold his own. If he attempted to do so, his cattle would be driven, his women folk carried off, himself chalan-ed (prosecuted) before an honorary magistrate on a charge of cattle theft, and in a short time he would be glad to hand over his land and secure protection on any terms. Society then in the main consists of the land-holding squires, whose local authority is only limited by their mutual jealousies, and of their retainers and tenants, who, holding no share in the land which they till, and knowing that an appearance of wealth will lead to exaction from their feudal or spiritual masters, are content to lead a hand-to-mouth existence."105

Whilst Darling has provided an excellent account of the means landlords employed to maintain their hold over the peasantry and the impotence of the latter in resisting exploitation, the passage is misleading in one respect. The Punjab in spite of the prominent position of the large landlords, was a Province where the small peasant proprietor predominated. The holdings of this group, however, were very small, the majority (58%) being under five acres. Many of these cultivators
were obliged to acquire additional land as tenants in order to supple-
ment their incomes. Also in the western part of the Province, the
small proprietors were scattered, there were few large communities, and
this factor, together with the small acreage, and consequent lack of
viability of the average holding, afforded this group no real protection
from the rapacity of the large, powerful landholders. Even in the
prosperous canal colonies the power of the landlord class was evident,
as the Government had effectively protected its interests. This resulted
from the implementation of a policy designed to create a socio-political
élite in the colony areas, on the model of the western Punjab; in order
to achieve its object the Provincial Government had ensured that the
landlord class was well represented in colony areas. 107

The grip which the leading Muslim feudal families, particularly of
the western Punjab, had on the politics of the province, and their
ability to maintain their dominance has been effectively demonstrated
by Craig Baxter. He has revealed that from the inception of the Montagu
-Chelmsford Reforms (1919) up to Partition (1947) the Muslim politics
of the Punjab was controlled by approximately 34 landed families, five
of whom enjoyed additional 'Pir' status. In the period 1919 to 1947
these families held no fewer than half the seats allotted to all the
communities in the Legislative Council (84 seats) \(^{108}\) and over 50 in the
Legislative Assembly (116 seats) at each election. Following the 1937
election, and until 1944-45 the political affiliation of this élitist
party was Unionist. By the time of the 1946 elections, however, their
corporate allegiance to the Unionist Party had been shattered. This was
reflected by the number of Muslim M.L.As. who withdrew from politics in
1946, or campaigned for the League. Of the 79 Muslim Unionists who had
been elected in 1937 (or those who had been elected at subsequent bye-
elections) only 45 contested the elections - 17 for the League, 26 as
Unionists and two as Independents. Whereas all the League candidates
were successful, as were the two Independents, only eight of the original
Muslim Unionists were returned. 109

The single major contributory factor in causing the desertion of
Muslim M.L.As. from the Unionist ranks, and the change of allegiance
from the Unionist Party to the Muslim League on the part of the rural
aristocracy and landed élite was the decision of the British to leave
India. In effect that development rendered the Unionist Party redundant
as the effective means of guaranteeing political authority to the Muslim
élite in the Punjab; individuals from that class, Firoz Khan Noon amongst
them realised that with British withdrawal and the likelihood of Pakistan
inter-communal co-operation, as personified by Unionism, was no longer a prerequisite for power in the Province (see p. 245). Similarly with the termination of British rule the Unionist Party would cease to be the repository of patronage, and the guardian of the rural élite's economic interest. Muslim leaders had to decide therefore how best to protect those political and economic areas vital to ensure their continuing dominance. The Muslim League proved the most attractive alternative, for it was evident that in the post-independence era that Party would assume the rôle previously held by the Unionist Party. These considerations, together with the desire to further personal ambitions had led to the defection of members of the most important feudal families, in political terms - Mamdot, Daultana, Shaukat Hyat, Firoz Khan Noon - to the League in the pre-election period. These families had traditionally provided the Muslim leadership of the Unionist cause, and their exodus precipitated similar action on the part of their personal adherents and political followers, many of whom had blood ties with them. For example those M.L.As. who belonged to the Khattar clan - Mian Nurullah, Allah Yar Khan Daultana, Sheikh Mohammad Amin Khan, Mian Abdul Aziz, Sheikh Sadiq Hassan and Mian Amir-ud-Din followed Shaukat Hyat to embrace the League. 

The change of allegiance which occurred at this élitist level was not as a consequence of current economic factors, though as has been argued they were in part responsible for the decline in popularity which the Unionist Party suffered amongst the rural proprietors and tenantry generally. The Unionist hold over the Muslim leadership of the western Punjab had begun to disintegrate prior to the rural areas being badly affected by the economic depression. By December 1944 approximately 30 Muslim M.L.As. had left the Unionist benches to sit with the Muslim League Assembly Party. The real significance of this development was not that it gave the League opposition a voice in the Legislature, but that it guaranteed it access, via these leaders and their followers, into the rural areas of the Punjab. Whilst the Unionist Party had remained united it had effectively prevented the League from penetrating the countryside. Up until June 1944 most District Leagues had existed on paper only. The capacity of the rural gentry to effectively prevent the establishment of Muslim League centres outside of the urban areas was, ironically enough, demonstrated by Mamdot. Although he was President of the Provincial League he refused to permit primary League branches to function on his Ferozepore estates. Once the Unionist monopoly on the loyalties of the land-owning élite had been broken,
however, and a significant number of Muslim League leaders had entered the League's ranks the countryside was thrown open to Muslim League overtures, and even Sargodha, as a result of the change of political allegiance on the part of senior members of the Tiwana clan, did not remain immune from such advances (see p. 243). In this context, whilst Muslim students, particularly from Aligarh, played an important rôle in conducting propaganda on behalf of the League, their activities would have been seriously impaired if they had not had the consent and protection of the large landlords in whose districts they operated. Thus it is evident that the support which the feudal aristocracy gave to the League was of the greatest significance in securing for it the landslide victory of 1946. If the rural élite had opposed the League in large numbers there is no doubt that it would not have achieved the spectacular result which their support had guaranteed it, for as the Civil and Military Gazette had predicted in September 1945:

"The party which chooses a better set of candidates, keeping in view the local alliances and clannish feelings, will, of course, have a tremendous advantage."116

The 'local alliances' and 'clannish feelings' referred to in the article, were symptoms of the landed élite's power to manipulate their followers, dependents and the local peasantry. The League, in addition to the advantage it possessed through the allegiance of this class had the support of the religious leaders of the Province. The combination of landlord and Pir amounted to an irresistible force, against which it was totally impossible for Unionism to succeed, or even survive as a major political entity. Whilst the landlords possessed the resources to influence the electorate through physical and economic intimidation, and by exploiting the loyalties of their clan members and tenants, the Pirs held a potentially more potent weapon - jurisdiction over their followers' souls. Almost all Punjabi Muslims, aristocrat and peasant, particularly in the western Muslim majority areas of the Province, were the murids (disciples) of a Pir, the Multan District Gazetteer, 1923-24, recording that "Practically every Muhammadan in the district has his pir".117 The murids made their devotions at the tombs or shrines of the original saints, whose religious leadership was provided by a Sajjada Nashin, the saint's successor. The Pirs and Sajjada Nashins owed their awesome authority to the belief that as the descendants of Muslim saints - the Sufi divines whose endeavours from the eleventh century had made a major contribution to the proliferation of Islam in the Punjab - they had inherited baraka (religious charisma) from their holy ancestors, and were intermediaries who could intercede on behalf of the 'faithful' for God's
favour. The bond which existed between Pir and murid did not require the latter to adhere to any rigid spiritual discipline, but merely to acknowledge the authority of the Pir, and to seek baraka in return for payments or offerings. In practical terms, the sanctity with which the Pirs were supposed to be blessed was often debased, but their power to command the obedience of their murids remained undiminished. In recalling the Pirs (not named) who had influence in Dera Ghazi Khan, Slater (I.C.S., Punjab Commission 1938-47) has written:

"As a wilderness the district had in the past attracted holy men intent on mortifying the flesh, and though their successors were mostly scoundrels, an aura of Islamic purity remained. This, coupled with the gullibility of a generally backward people, made the district a worthwhile target.

Irrespective of the personal failings or attributes of the individual Pirs, the hereditary devotion and respect which they attracted made them figures of great influence in the political as well as the religious sphere of provincial life. Both the Mughals and the British, as well as the Unionist and League Parties, recognised that it was essential to accommodate and reconcile the religious leadership of the Province with their administrations and political ambitions. The Gilani Syeds of Multan had been appointed as Governors of Multan during the Mughal period. The British also were careful to associate Pirs with their rule. Sajjada Nashins were given appointments as honorary magistrates, zaildars, and members of District Boards, whilst the custodians of the shrine of Baba Farid Shakarganj at Pakpattan (Montgomery District) were honoured as dabaris. In order to bolster their electoral prospects in 1937 the Unionist Party had contemplated seeking the support of the Province's leading Pirs, but as the 1946 elections approached, however, it was the Muslim League which captured and capitalised from the allegiance of the Punjab's religious leaders.

The Provincial Muslim League's determination to utilise the influence of the Pirs and Sajjada Nashins emerged as one of the dominant and most rewarding tactics of the election. In November 1945 the Chief Secretary's Report to the Viceroy commented on the continuing success which the League was experiencing in attracting religious leaders to its ranks. In fact by September of that year practically all the important Pirs in the Province, including the Sajjada Nashins of the famous shrines of Tonsa, Golra, Alipur, Sialsharif and Jalalpur, had allied themselves with the League, and were actively involved in conducting propaganda in favour of Pakistan. A number of contributory factors had combined to ensure the almost total support of the Punjab's religious leadership for the
League. Some Pirs were large landholders, and as a consequence were already involved in the political sphere - the Pirs of Jahanian Shah (Shahpur), Jalalpur (Jhelum), Rajoa (Jhang), Shah Jiwana (Jhang) and Taunsa Sharif belonged to this category. There were others also who, on account of the substantial grants of land which had been awarded to their shrines by the Government, enjoyed the status of powerful landlords. The shrine of Baba Farid Shakarganj (Pakpattan) possessed an estate comprising 43,000 acres, whilst that of Sheikh Baha-ud-Din Zakariya in Multan enjoyed a jagir of nine villages worth Rs. 1,780 annually, eight wells and a garden worth Rs. 150 per annum. Similarly the Sajjada Nashins of the shrines at Hassu Bale, Sultan Bahu and Sharkot (Makdum Nazar Husain, Mian Habib Sultan, Mian Ghulam Jilani and Faqir Ghulam Yasin), in Jhang District, were all large landlords. As with the landed elite in general, the imminence of the British departure, heralding as it did a redistribution of the power balance, acted as a decisive incentive to cause many of the Pirs controlling large estates to seek a continuance of the patronage and privileges they enjoyed by openly aligning themselves with the party which appeared to be the most likely successor to the British - the Muslim League. Also some of the Pirs were doubtless encouraged to adopt a similar course out of family considerations. In this respect, Hazrat pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur, the nephew of Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, was extremely active in furthering his uncle's campaign in the Pind Dadan Khan constituency.

So far as the mainstream of the Chisti revivalist Pirs were concerned, Talbot has argued that their pro-League activity was a direct result of the fact that during the 1940's the shrine of India's premier Sufi saint - the Dargah of Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti of Ajmer - had become closely connected with the Muslim League. Mirza Abdul Qadir Beg, the Vice-President of the Dargah Committee, which administered the shrine's affairs, was President of the Ajmer Muslim League. Unfortunately Talbot has not revealed the motives which induced Mirza Abdul Qadir Beg to promote the cause of the League. Surely it is evident that in addition to wishing to secure the landed grants and possessions which many Pirs held in the Punjab, the religious leaders of the Province, of all orders, were excited by, and attracted to the prospect of an Islamic State in which they expected to exercise influence and power, and that provided the principal motivating cause for their support for the League. The Provincial Muslim League, through such spokesmen as Firoz Khan Noon, had pledged that a League victory and the birth of 'Pakistan' would achieve such a state, which would be
organised according to the tenets of the Quran and the Shariat. The creation of a nation based on these principles was the unique vision of the Muslim League. The Unionist Party despite its 'lip service' to 'Pakistan' remained wedded to an inter-communal philosophy, and it was thus unable to counter the League's 'hot gospelling'. The mythology of an Islamic State presented the Pirs and Sajjada Nashins with practically unlimited scope for the extension of their religious and secular authority, and this guaranteed to the League an almost total commitment from the Province's religious hierarchy. This phenomenon was recognised by Doctor Mahommed Alam, the defeated Unionist candidate who had contested the Rawalpindi Division Towns constituency (urban) in opposition to Feroz Khan Noon:

"The Pirs, Sajjada Nashins and Mushaikhs and Ulemas of Islam in the Punjab and outside Punjab seeing in the achievement of their goal by the Muslim League, an opportunity of the revival of their temporal [sic] power besides the extension of their spiritual or sharai power upon an unprecedented [sic] scale, were exhorted by the All-India Jamiat-ul-ulema-I-Islam ... to mobilize all the forces of Islam in support of the muslim [sic] League." 133

It would be extremely cynical, however, to interpret the collective actions of those Pirs, who were sympathetic to the League, solely in terms of the desire to protect their existing vested interests, or to increase their religious and political authority. As Gilmartin has commented in respect of the Chisti Pirs of Taunsa, Sial, Golra and Jalalpur,

"The thrust of their concern had always been to influence the political leaders and their followers to regulate their lives according to religious injunctions... The idea of a state in the hands of such leaders was for them perfectly natural, for in the establishment of such a state based on the Shariat, they could see the projection of their local religious work into a larger political arena." 134

Also there were religious leaders who were inspired by the concept of Muslim nationalism, as epitomised by the Muslim League, and who considered it to be their patriotic duty to campaign for 'Pakistan'. Maulana Shabir Ahmad Usmani, the President of the Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Islam, interpreted his pro-League sentiments as an extension of his personal patriotism:

"I shall prefer to be called a communalist, but it shall be tragic for me in this world and the life hereafter if my own nation calls me a traitor." 135

Irrespective of the various motives and impulses which led the Pirs of the Punjab to support the League, the outcome of their action was the massive, unprecedented and almost total involvement of the religious
hierarchy as propagandists for the Muslim League. Out of 57 constituencies which have been surveyed (see Appendix U), pro-League Pirs were active in 36 of them (see Appendix X). By comparison the Unionist Party could claim the co-operation of religious leaders in only two of the seats. In Shahpur, which the Unionists retained, Sultan Ali Mian (successful Unionist candidate) was able to gain the support of Pir Ghulam Qasim, the Rais of the Multan District. This Pir's family possessed a great deal of land in the Shahpur Tahsil, and he had numerous murids there. In the pre-election period Ghulam Qasim had supported the League, but on the eve of the elections his step-mother died, and he became involved in a mutation dispute. It was alleged on behalf of the defeated League candidate, Nur Hussain, that Sultan Ali Mian had secured the Pir's collaboration as a consequence of Manzoor Ali, the Tahsildar of Shahpur, exerting his influence on the Pir's behalf in the pending inheritance case, and that the intervention of the religious leader had been decisive in realising a Unionist victory. Similarly in the Attock South ward, it was reported by Miran Bakhsh, a League supporter, that the prospects of that Party had been adversely affected by the fraudulent claims of the successful Unionist candidate, M. Mohi-u-Din Lal Badshah Mukhad, that he was the official League candidate, and that his candidacy had been sanctioned by influential spiritual leaders. A publication, allegedly written by Faqir Maulvi Abdullah, the Sajjada Nashin of Maira Sharif, had been circulated to this effect, and despite the fact that the Faqir subsequently denied authorship of the pamphlet, the confusion caused amongst his numerous murids in the constituency, resulted in a Unionist victory.

The overwhelming majority of Pirs who entered the political arena, however, did so as advocates for the Muslim League (see Appendix X). They preached the politics of the 'Old Testament', and not of the new socialism. Men and women were exhorted to vote for the League, not to secure a better standard of living, but to escape damnation. They spoke a language which the Muslim electorate understood and feared, thereby transforming the election into a 'Holy Crescentade', a battle for Islam, waged by the true followers of the Prophet against the Unionist Kafirs. It was the religious sentiments which the Pirs evoked, and the ignorant fears which they manipulated so effectively, which helped to secure the massive League electoral triumph, not the 'bread and butter' politics emphasised by Talbot. The Civil and Military Gazette correctly portrayed the true atmosphere of the election when it acknowledged in January 1945 that religion remained the League's most potent weapon, in spite of the
efforts of 'leftists' within its ranks who stressed the socio-economic problems experienced by the masses.\(^{138}\)

Religious intimidation was widespread throughout the Province, and fatwas threatening excommunication from Islam were issued by, amongst others, Pir Mohammad Fazal Shah of Jalalpur Sharif,\(^ {139}\) and Pir Jamaat Ali Shah of Alipur.\(^ {140}\) In the Muslim constituency of Jhang West the Sajjada Nashins of the shrines of Hassu Bale, Sultan Bahu and Shorkot informed their murids that whosoever amongst them voted against the League would by that act acquire Kafir status, and that Divine wrath would descend upon them. Similarly in Lyallpur a convention of Maulvis under the presidency of Ali Muhammad warned that,

"It is the commandment of God and the prophet that like the sepoys of Imam Hussain you should join the file of the Muslim League. If you do not vote for the League candidate you will be held Kafirs for all time. The wrath of God will fall upon you and the curses of all saints and Pirs..."\(^ {142}\)

Also Muslim voters were confronted with other awesome inducements. Towards the end of October 1945 Pir Sayed Jamaat Ali Shah, who claimed to have over one million followers in the Punjab, instructed his murids and Muslims in general to withhold the right of Muslim burial from those who did not support the League.

"If a Muslim does not vote for the Muslim League do not say his funeral prayer and do not bury him in the graveyard of the Muslims."\(^ {143}\)

By comparison the Sajjada Nashin of Darbar Ghausia, Japranwali cautioned that any of his disciples who failed to vote for the League would cease to be his murids.\(^ {144}\) Whilst Muslim electors in Lyallpur and the Rawalpindi Division Towns wards were told that if they abdicated their responsibility towards the League their marriages would no longer be considered as sanctioned or valid.\(^ {145}\)

The Zamindar, in reporting warnings and threats of this nature, emphasised that failure to respond positively to them would render the offenders liable to social and religious ostracism.\(^ {146}\) The Pirs, however, exceeded mere threats of social boycott in their fervour to support the Muslim League. They vowed that refusal to adopt the League's cause in this world, would lead to the culprits' eternal damnation in the next. Again Pir Jamaat Ali Shah was prominent in spreading this particular 'incentive'.\(^ {147}\) Khizar Hayat, as the chief villain opposed to the Muslim League, was singled out for particular condemnation. Jamaat Ali Shah predicted that Khizar's opposition to the League would be punished by his descent into Hell, and he counselled the Unionist leader to seek salvation through reconciliation with the League.\(^ {148}\)
Religious leaders outside of the mainstream of Islam, also induced their followers in the name of religion to assist the League. His Holiness the Khalifa of Qadian ordered the Ahmadia community to vote for the League, and Ahmadia spiritual leaders in the constituency of S.W. Gujrat, where there was a large concentration of their co-religionists, proclaimed that those who failed to obey the order would become Kafirs. This sect was regarded by orthodox Muslim opinion as heretical. The Ahmadia leadership in championing the League had attempted to ensure the sect's future by joining rather than opposing the demand for 'Pakistan' for not only would opposition to the movement have been futile, it could have proved fatal for so small and vulnerable a minority.

Not all the Pirs, however, were content merely to rely on their own authority in directing the orthodox Muslims to embrace the League. At least one, Pir Walayat Shah, the Sajjada Nashin of Darbar Sharif (Pind Dadan Khan) claimed to have received instruction on the matter through mystical communion with the Prophet:

"My followers from the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan, etc., have been inquiring about which of the present Political Parties is on the right path, so as to deserve their support. I took to meditation for a considerable time, during which I experienced visitations of the Prophet. He told me that only the Muslim League was on the right path, and was a Muslim party in the real sense. He also said that whoever did not want Pakistan, was not a Muslim. I am ready to say all this before a crowd of millions and under the oath of the Quran - about whatever I have seen and heard from the Prophet... I have arranged a deputation, which will tour the villages and inform them."  

A similar supernatural experience, which favoured the League, was widely circulated in the Southern Towns constituency. Syed Mahmud Shah, who had stood unsuccessfully as an Independent candidate related to the Election Commission that,

"At a meeting of the Muslim [League] held at Kathal during the election days, a dream was related in which it was said, that Mr. Jinnah was seen sitting by the side of the Holy Prophet and the Holy Prophet said, pointing out to Mr. Jinnah 'be [sic] is my representative on earth now. Those who will not follow him will not be of me.'"  

The exploitation of Islam as an electioneering tactic, naturally aggravated communal divisions, enhancing still further the cause of the League, and its claim to be the sole protector of the Muslim faith. In Gujranwala North, the successful League candidate, Chaudhri Salah-ud-Din, described the Unionist Party not only as the enemy of Islam, but he asserted that it had accepted Gandhi in the Prophet's place as its spiritual and religious guide. Similarly, Firoz Khan Noon through
the auspices of the Zamindar declared:

"In the coming elections your vote is for the prophet [sic]. On one side are khiziri Muslims. Votes for Khizar are votes for Gandhi, they are not for Muhammad the Holy prophet [sic]." 154.

Whilst the Muslim voters of Muzaffargarh North were encouraged, by League agents to believe that if the Unionists won the election the Quran would be re-written in Hindi. 155

Crude indoctrination along these lines, together with the fatwas and directives of the Pirs, was intended to alienate the Unionist Party completely, and there can be no doubt that the measure succeeded. The Nawa-i-Waqt, Ehsan and Zamindar newspapers each played a prominent rôle in ensuring that the Muslim electorate of the Punjab was acquainted with the religious aspect of the election, and the fate that would befall those who ignored their spiritual guides. 156 In order that illiteracy should not prove a barrier to the dissemination of this propaganda, League agents were employed to read the respective fatwas and newspaper articles at League election rallies throughout the Province 157, (for an example of a typical League election poster see Appendix Y).

The Unionist Party, unable to muster any influential religious leaders to defend it, or to sanction its opposition to the Muslim League, attempted to combat the latter's manipulation of religious sentiment by scurrilously hinting at improper and un-Islamic behaviour on the part of prominent Leaguers, and by attempting to ban religious appeals. With regard to the first tactic, a two-leaf folder containing two photographs was widely circulated. One picture was of Jinnah, taking the salute from a squad of Muslim girl volunteers, and the other featured Lady Noon (the European wife of Firoz Khan Noon) watching a cricket match in the company of a number of Sikh chiefs. In view of the importance of purdah in Islam, the publication was intended as a rebuke for the League, which represented itself as the champion of Islamic tenets. The pamphlets were sold by hawkers outside the election booths, to the cry of "Pakistan for four annas". 158 In respect of the Ministry's attempt to prevent religious orientated electioneering, the Premier, in a press statement issued in January 1946, emphasised that it was a criminal offence to influence the electorate through threats of divine displeasure. 159 Despite this warning the Government had not been enthusiastic in accepting responsibility for a direct ban, and it suggested that the Governor should issue the necessary ordinance to achieve the objective. Glancy, however, realising that such action would inflame the situation refused to meet the request. The Ministry, therefore, was forced to resort to its own resources, and orders were issued authorising sub-Divisional
Magistrates to register all complaints relating to religious intimidation.

As Glancy had foreseen, the Unionist attempt to muzzle the Pirs, and prohibit the use of religion as an inducement for support, was a tactical mistake, for it reinforced, rather than reduced the religious appeal of the Muslim League. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam conference held in Lahore in January 1946, which had attracted an attendance of 20,000, including Pirs and ulema from the Punjab, Delhi, U.P. and N.W.F.P., condemned the Unionist measure, and urged Muslims to oppose it by resorting to individual civil disobedience.  

Pir and politician alike responded to the appeal for defiance. Chan Pir, the son of the leading Sajjada Nashin of Montgomery District, declared:

"If it is against the law to invoke divine displeasure for the Holy cause of Islam and Pakistan, I defy the law. I asked my followers to vote only for the League Candidates and to defend Islam and Pakistan... Those voting for Unionists are blacksheep and hypocrites. I give my fatwa and openly say that posterity will curse them...".  

In similar vein Firoz Khan Noon condemned the Ministry:

"This action is mainly aimed at Muslim League workers including the Pirs, our spiritual leaders who have served selflessly in awakening the Muslim masses... The present Government make it a crime for us to mention the name of God and Islam to the electorate. How can we divorce the Muslim League from Islam. Islam is inherent in what we preach from the Muslim League platform."  

Begum Shah Nawaz also announced her intention to defy the bar on invoking divine displeasure.  

Thus the Ministry’s manoeuvre was interpreted as an attack, not only upon the League, but on Islam, and the rights of the Pirs to direct the actions of their murids. Whilst it is evident that the Unionist Ministry had acted from desperation, the course it chose to follow did nothing to alleviate its difficulties, for it was represented to the Muslim community by the League as a sign of the Unionist Government's contempt for their religion, and its intention to destroy it. The Nawa-i-Waqt in particular fabricated and encouraged these misconceptions: "Under Malik Khizar Hayat's rule, it will be considered a crime to mention the name of God and his Prophet".  

Nevertheless, the futile attempt to neutralise the religious impact which the League had enjoyed emphasised the Unionist Party's recognition of the acute danger it posed to its continuing political survival. In fact as the defection of the landlords had foreshadowed the disintegration of the Party's majority, the condemnation heaped upon it by the Pirs, ensured its total destruction as a political force in the Province. Glancy had, in part, recognised the consequences for Unionism posed by
the intrusion of religious fanaticism into the election campaign, when he predicted to the Viceroy in February 1946,

"there seems little doubt that the Muslim Leaguers, thanks to the ruthless methods by which they have pursued their campaign of "Islam in danger", will considerably increase the number of their seats and that Unionist representatives will correspondingly decline."

The Governor's prediction proved to be correct, though its tone suggests that Glancy had failed to realise fully the dramatic and sweeping results which the exploitation of religion, particularly by the Pirs, would achieve. The verdict, recorded by Dawn in March 1946, however, fully appreciated and formally recognised, the crucial impact which the religious leadership had had in deciding the election in the Punjab:

"What are the factors that have brought about the Revolution in Pakistani Lands? What has made the great change possible? ...the greatest praise must be lavished as far as the Punjab is concerned on the Pirs and Mashaiks, who when they saw the Pakistani nation in mortal danger, emerged from their cells, and enjoined upon their followers the duty to resist evil and vote for the League and Pakistan... Among the Pirs the most creditable work has been done by the Pir of Siyal, the Pir of Golra, Pir Jamat Ali Shah, the Gilani Pirs of Multan, Chan Pir of Montgomery and scores of others who deserve equal praise."

Dawn, in expressing its recognition of the rôle played by the spiritual leaders, attributed the massive victory the League had achieved in the Punjab to their intervention. There is no doubt that this appreciation was sound, for had the religious leadership of the Punjab refrained from committing themselves to the contest with such intensity and in such strength, the election would have been decided largely by the feudal landed factions. The evidence suggests, because of the defections which had occurred from the Unionist to the League ranks by powerful elitist feudal groups that the Muslim League would have captured a majority of Muslim seats, but the combination of landlord and Pir gave it an almost total victory, resulting in the annihilation of the Unionist Party.

Peter Hardy, in commenting on the 1946 elections, has concluded that,

"In the Panjab ... the Muslim League gained its electoral victory by making a religious appeal over the heads of the professional politicians."

This analysis, though it has stressed the importance of the League's manipulation of religion, is clearly open to question. Muslim politics in the Punjab remained the almost exclusive reserve of a powerful landed
oligarchy, and it was this class which furnished the Province's 'professional politicians', as personified by Mamdot, Daultana, Shaukat Hyat and Noon. In reality these political representatives of landed interest, in unison with the religious hierarchy of the Punjab, ensured the continuation of landed dominance in the political sphere. In effect they harnessed religious fears and fanaticism to ensure the victory of their chosen vehicle, the Muslim League, which they had fashioned as a repository of feudal power to challenge, and eventually to destroy, the Unionist Party. Their successful manipulation of that potent force was recognised and condemned by Khizar, when following the election he bitterly declared,

"Call me whatever names you like. I can say that I have not duped people in the name of religion nor have I exploited the name of religion for my personal ends." 169

His inability to do so, in conjunction with the desertion of powerful landed elements, had cost the Unionist Party the election, but the feudal élite to which Tiwana belonged had been the beneficiaries, not the victims of the Unionist reversal. Intimidation, coercion, corruption and bribery, in themselves the hallmarks of feudal politics had each contributed to the eventual result, as had the prevailing economic situation, but essentially it was feudalism which had triumphed, ensuring that the League success represented a victory for the landlord and the Pir.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VII


2. Times of India (Bombay), 13 March 1946. It should be noted that there was some discrepancy over the actual number of electors in the Punjab. Menon calculated the number to be 3,398,419. Menon to Sec., Political Dept., India Office, 24 Jan. 1946, L/P&J/8/472, IOR.

3. Times of India, 13 March, 1946.


5. Viceroy to Secretary of State, telegram, 5 March 1946, L/P&J/8/472. Following the election there was some initial confusion concerning the respective strengths of the Parties in the Punjab, as is apparent from the Table below, produced in the Times of India, 13 March 1946.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nominations</th>
<th>Unopposed</th>
<th>Won</th>
<th>Total Returned</th>
<th>Lost</th>
<th>Forfeited Deposit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panthic Sikhs</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahrars</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>225</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionists</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>563</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Times of India, 13 March 1946.

7. Ibid. Khizar stood for three constituencies in all, a practice which was not prohibited by the election rules in the Punjab. The third seat which he successfully contested was the Muslim rural constituency of Khushab. He was accused of misusing his position as Premier to ensure the victory through the employment of Government officials to intimidate the electorate. Punjab Government Gazette, 4 October 1946, pp. 917-919, PGSL.

8. Times of India, 13 March 1946.

9. Effective Voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituencies</th>
<th>Total Polled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Constituencies</td>
<td>848,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Constituencies</td>
<td>1,619,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh Constituencies</td>
<td>659,396</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Times of India, 13 March 1946.

10. Of the 34 General Constituencies, 8 were in urban areas. By comparison there were 9 urban and 75 rural Muslim constituencies, and 2 urban and 29 rural Sikh constituencies. Ibid.


12. The students' promises were recalled by villagers during a series of interviews conducted by the author (March - April 1977) in the countryside around Lahore, Lyallpur, Chiniot and Okara.
Khizar constantly argued that even if the League captured 90 seats in the Legislature, including all the 86 Muslim reserved seats and some special interest constituencies, that number would be reduced to 89 on the appointment of the Speaker, and it would be impossible for the League to form a stable Ministry without non-Muslim cooperation, and none of the non-Muslim groups in the Legislature were prepared to work with the League. Thus a Muslim League victory would result in a weak, unstable Ministry, which would lead inevitably to the imposition of Governor's rule. 

Ibid., 3 Jan. 1946.
38. Stocker to Wyatt, 9 Dec. 1945, I/P&J/8/472, IOR.
39. India Office Note (undated), I/P&J/8/470; Henderson to Wyatt, 29 Dec. 1945, I/P&J/8/472, IOR.
40. Henderson to Wyatt, 29 Dec. 1945, I/P&J/8/472, IOR.
41. Ibid.
42. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 21 Sept. 1945, I/P&J/8/472; GR, Glancy to Wavell, 1 Dec. 1945, I/P&J/5/248, IOR.
43. Glancy to Wavell, 5 Oct. 1945, I/P&J/8/472, IOR.
44. Civil and Military Gazette, 9 Dec. 1945.
45. Ibid., 15 Jan. 1946. In November 1945 the British Government decided to despatch a Parliamentary Delegation to India to assess the situation through meetings with Indian leaders, and to impress upon the latter that the British were sincere in wishing to confer independence on India. The Delegation arrived in the country on 5 January 1946; educative though it was for its members it had no measurable effect on the subsequent course of events. See P. Moon (Ed.), Wavell the Viceroy’s Journal, London, 1973, journal entries 23 Nov. 1945, 5 Jan. 1946, 1 Feb. 1946, pp. 186, 202-203, 208. See also H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide, London, 1969, p. 130.
46. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 21 Sept. 1945, I/P&J/8/472, IOR.
47. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of Aug. 1944, I/P&J/5/247, IOR.
48. GR, Glancy to Wavell, 1 Dec. 1945, I/P&J/5/248, IOR.
49. Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 26 March 1946, vol. XXV, p. 127, IOR.
50. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 13 Nov. 1945, I/P&J/8/472, IOR.
52. Ibid., 13 Jan. 1945.
57. Civil and Military Gazette, 7 Feb. 1946.
60. Ibid., pp. 347-348.
61. Times of India, 13 March 1946.
63. District Magistrates were charged to maintain law and order during elections, and if necessary they were empowered to invoke section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code or section 30 of the Police Act. These measures were intended primarily to be a safeguard against outbreaks of communal rioting. Homein to all Provincial Governors and Chief Commissioners, 12 Oct. 1945, I/P&J/8/470, IOR.
The Urban Rent Restriction Act (1941), applied only to urban areas. It provided for the establishment of a standard rent rate, and it also decreed that if the landlord carried out any improvements to his property, the rent he received could not be increased by more than 5% per annum. Furthermore no landlord could recover from his tenants the amount of any tax he was required to pay on the buildings he owned. In addition no court order would be granted ordering an eviction for the recovery of property if the tenant paid, or was willing to pay the agreed rent, or had not been found guilty of causing annoyance to his neighbours. When a court issued an order to vacate, six months' notice had to be given to the tenant.

The Trade Employees Act (1940). The central provisions of this Act forbade the employment of children under 14 years of age in any business or commercial establishment; no person (adult) could be employed in such establishments for more than ten hours each day, or fifty-four hours each week. Any employee working overtime was to receive remuneration at double the normal rate, all salaries were to be paid at least once a fortnight, and all employees were to enjoy rest intervals of not less than an hour per day. Any person who had been in continuous employment for not less than one year was entitled to fourteen days' leave with full pay. No employee could be dismissed without sufficient cause, and until one month's notice had been given, or one month's pay in lieu thereof. See Punjab Acts 1939-1942, V/8/210, IOR.
85. R.S. Nakra, Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry, Punjab Villages During the War, Lahore, 1946, p.15, PPL.
86. GR, Glancy to Wavell, 20 Sept. 1944, L/P&J/5/247, IOR.
87. Ibid., 2 Feb. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.
89. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of June 1943, L/P&J/5/246, IOR.
90. Civil and Military Gazette, 10 Oct. 1943.
91. Ibid., 20 Oct. 1943.
92. GR, Glancy to Linlithgow, 30 Oct. 1943, L/P&J/5/246, IOR.
93. Ibid., 30 Sept. 1943, MSS EUR. F.125/92, IOR.
95. Linlithgow to Glancy, 17 Aug. 1943, MSS. EUR. F.125/92, IOR.
96. Linlithgow to Glancy, 27 Sept. 1943, MSS. EUR. F.125/92, IOR.
98. D.M. Malhotra (Ed.), Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry, Annual Review of Economic Conditions in the Punjab, 1945-46, Lahore 1946, pp. 6-7, PBRL.
99. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of Feb, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.
101. Ibid., p.90.
103. Civil and Military Gazette, 28 Nov. 1943.
104. The Mamdot estate in Ferozepore comprised 54,381 acres, of which 48,079 acres were cultivated - Report on the Administration of Estates under the Court of Wards in the Punjab, for the year ending 30 Sept. 1907, Lahore, 1908, Statement No.1, p.ii, L 5 VI, IOR.
106. K.T. Shah, Industrialisation of the Punjab, Lahore, 1941, p.33. In 1928 Calvert had estimated that 56% of the holdings in the Province were under five acres - H. Calvert, Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry, The Size and Distribution of Cultivators' Holdings in the Punjab, Lahore, 1928, pp.14-17, PPL.
108. These families included the Awans of Attock, the Chathas of Gujranwala, the Dastis of Muzaffargarh, the Drishaks of Dera Ghazi Khan, the Dahas, Daultanas, Gardezis and Gilanis of Multan, the Gurmanis of Muzaffargarh, the Hyats of Wah, the Deranpur Janjuas, the Kalabagh family of Mianwali, the Khaggars of Multan, the Khokars of Jhelum, the Kot Ghebas of Attock, the Legharis and Mazaris of Dera Ghazi Khan, the Bhagbanpura Mians and the Mokuls of

(continued on next page)
108. (continued) Lahore, the Noons and Pirachas of Shahpur, the Qizilbash family of Lahore, the Qureshis of Multan, the Qureshis of Shahpur, the Sials of Jhang, the Tiwanas of Shahpur, and the Wabachran family of Mianwali. The Pir families included the Pirs of Jahanian Shah (Shahpur), the Pirs of Jalalpur (Jhelum), the Pirs of Rajoa (Jhang), the Pirs of Shah Jiwana (Jhang), and the Pirs of Taunsa Sharif (Dera Ghazi Khan). See C. Baxter, op.cit., pp.168-169.

109. Ibid., p.179.

110. Mumtaz Daultana also belonged to this group, though he had declared his allegiance to the League before Shaukat's defection - Civil and Military Gazette, 20 April 1944; 3 Dec. 1944.

111. Mamdot and Daultana had demonstrated their support for the League by March 1943, Civil and Military Gazette, 9 March 1943. Whilst Shaukat Hyat had secretly declared his allegiance to Jinnah in February 1943, and Ghazanfar Ali had joined the League camp the following August, see pp. 217-218, 223.


114. I.A. Talbot, op.cit., p.68.

115. Talbot has recounted that during the peak of student activity (the 1945 Christmas vacation), there were 1,550 members of the Punjab Muslim Students' Federation and 250 Aligarh students conducting propaganda in the Province on behalf of the League - Ibid., p.78.


117. DG, Multan, 1923-24, p.120, IOR.


120. Nawab Sayyad Yahiya and Nawab Sayad Musa Pak Din were Governors during the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan respectively. This family provided the custodians for the shrine of Musa Pak Shahid - L.Griffin and C.F.Massey, Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab, Vol.II, Lahore, 1910, p.324.

121. Khan Bahadur Makhdum Pir Sadr-ud-din Shah (Syed family of Musa Pak Shahid, Multan District) - Provincial Dabari: Ghulam Yasin Shah and Syad Ghulam Mustafa Shah (sons of the above) - Honorary Magistrate and Extra Assistant Commissioner respectively: Diwan Muhammad Ghaus (Syed family of Jalalpur Pirwala, Multan District) - Provincial Dabari: Khan Bahadur Makhdum Hussain (Koreshi Pir, Multan District) had precedence over all other unofficial viceregal Dabaris in the district, "and is thus the premier peer of Multan" - Senior Vice-President, Multan Municipal Committee, Honorary Magistrate: - DG, Multan, 1923-24; pp.105-106, 109, IOR.

Khan Sahib Makhdum Muhammad Hassan (Sayyid family of the Makhdum of Sitpur, Muzaffargarh District) - Provincial Dabari, Honorary Magistrate: Ghulam Haidar Shah (Syed family Kot Adu Tansil, Muzaffargarh District) - Zaildar of Alidaha: - DG, Muzaffargarh, 1929, pp.75-76, IOR. (continued on next page)
Muhammad Ghaus and Bahadar Shah (Sayyids of Rajoa, Jhang District) - Zaildars:
Gul Muhammad (Sayyid of Uch, Jhang District) - Zaildar:
Muhammad Shah of Shah Jiwana and Allayar Shah of Kot Isa Shah (Shah Jiwana Sayyids, Jhang District) - Zaildars:
- DG, Jhang, 1908, pp.59-60, IOR.

Dewan Said Mohammad (son of Fateh Mohammad Chisti, Sajjada Nashin of Baba Farid Shakar Ganj Shrine at Pakpattan) - Provincial Dabari:
- DG, Montgomery, 1933, pp.108-109, IOR.

122. Fazl-i-Husain had been anxious to court the support of the following:
the Diwan Sahib of Pak Pattan, the Sajjada Nashin of Mahar Sharif (Bahawalpur State), the Sajjada Nashin of Taunsa Sharif (Dera Ghazi Khan), the Sajjada Nashin of Sial Sharif (Shahpur), Khawaja Ghulam Nizam-ud-Din of Taunsa Sharif, the Pir of Golra Sharif (Rawalpindi), Pir Fazl Shah of Jalalpur (Jhelum), Pir Lai Badshah of Mukhad (Attock), the Sajjada Nashin of Sultan Bahu (Jhang), the Pir of Pir Kot, Muhkdam Murid Hussain Qureshi of Multan, Makhdum Saddar-ud-Din Shah Gilani of Multan, Pir Mohammad Husain Shah of Sher Garh, Pir Jamaat Ali Shah Sahib of Alipur Sharif (Sialkot) and the Pir of Maira Sharif (Rawalpindi): Mushtaq Gurmani to Fazl-i-Husain, 19 June 1936, Waheed Ahmad (Ed.), Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain, Lahore, 1976, pp.592-594.

123. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, first half of Nov. 1945, I/F&J/5/248, IOR.


125. Glancy to Wavell, 13 Sept. 1945, R/3/1/105, IOR.

126. The Pirs of Jahanian Shah held an estate of approximately 7,000 acres, see C.S. Chopra, Chiefs And Families Of Note In The Punjab, Lahore, 1910, pp. 306-307.

127. AR, Pakpattan Tahsil (Montgomery District), 1921, pp.5, 17-18, P/11372, IOR.


130. Ibid., 26 July 1946, pp.512-515.


137. Ibid., 28 June 1946, pp.343-346, PGSL.


142. Ibid., 13 Sept. 1946, p.843, PGSL.


148. 'Nawa-i-Waqt', 5 Jan. 1946, quoted in ibid., 2 Aug. 1946, p.590. PGSL.


150. Over 95% of the Muslim population in the Punjab were Sunni (14,276,642) and more than half the remainder were Shia (338,779). The 'Reformers' sects accounted for only 1.6% (241,418) of the total, the Ahmadis numbering 55,908 (0.4% of total Muslim population). Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Part I, p.313, IOR.


153. Ibid., 26 July 1946, pp.548-553, PGSL.


156. Ibid., 21 June 1946, pp.286-287, PGSL.

157. Ibid., 26 July 1946, pp.537-538, PGSL.


159. Ibid., 22 Jan. 1946.

160. GR, Glancy to Wavell, 2 February 1946, I/P&J/5/249, IOR.

161. Chief Secretary's Report Punjab, second half of Jan. 1946, I/P&J/5/249, IOR.


166. GR, Glancy to Wavell, 2 Feb. 1946, I/P&J/5/249, IOR.

167. Dawn, 6 March 1946.


169. Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 28 March 1946, Vol. XXV, p.211, V/9/3836, IOR.
CHAPTER VIII

A HOUSE DIVIDED - PUNJAB NEMESIS,

MARCH 1946 to AUGUST 1947

The election of 1946 had conclusively endorsed the Muslim League's claim to represent Indian Muslims. Despite its capture of the majority of the Muslim constituencies, however (see pp.260-261), it was able to form ministries in only two provinces - Bengal and Sind. In the Punjab its attempts to create a government were frustrated. As in the pre-election period no single communal party could control the Legislature, or hope to form a stable Ministry. Whilst the Muslim League had emerged as the largest single party following the election, its exploitation of religious fanaticism, and its determination to realise its national goal had alienated the minority parties, who consequently refused to coalesce with it in the Assembly. Their opposition to the League was aided by the continued alienation of Khizar and the Muslim Unionist 'rump', and the unwillingness of the British Governors (Glancy and Jenkins) to commit the administration of the Province to the League. Unable to assume power in the Punjab, the Provincial Muslim League initiated a campaign of civil disobedience to overthrow the Congress-Sikh-Unionist Government which was formed under the premiership of Khizar Hayat in March 1946. As a direct consequence of the League's strategy communal tension in the Province mushroomed, forcing the Punjab to the precipice of internecine warfare, and precipitating the imposition of Governor's rule. The suspension of provincial autonomy, and the failure of the political parties, and the British, to resolve the situation, combined with the acceptance of the major national leaders, including Jinnah, that Pakistan could only emerge as a consequence of territorial division, made the partition of the Punjab inevitable.

The attempt of the Provincial Muslim League to form a Ministry following its election victory was doomed to failure as it was unable to endorse any compromise over the vital issues of 'Pakistan', its claim to be the sole representative of the Muslim community, and the Sikh demand for an independent State. The inability of the League to make vital concessions was a direct consequence of the election campaign it had conducted, and the expectations it had nourished amongst the Muslim
electorate. Wavell, in an appreciation of the situation recorded on 3 December 1946, referred to this dilemma:

"The Muslim League leaders raised the cries of Pakistan and Islam in danger originally to enhance their prestige and power and thus their bargaining values as a political party. They have now so inflamed their ignorant and impressionable followers with the idea of Pakistan as a new Prophet's Paradise on earth and as their only means of protection against Hindu domination, that it will be very difficult to satisfy them with anything else."

The League, however, was not only constrained by the necessity of not appearing to betray the expectations of its supporters, but also by the fears which its religiously orientated electioneering, especially its pledge to found a Quranic State, had aroused amongst the non-Muslim minorities. An unnamed 'Unionist' gleefully portrayed the invidious position of the League in an article published in the Civil and Military Gazette, commenting that, "by resorting to Hitlerian and Fascist methods and by invoking the threat of divine displeasure..."the League having once worked up communal hatred and contempt, was unable to create a coalition Ministry."

This was particularly true in the case of the Sikhs, whom the League approached in February 1946 in an attempt to gain their support. Although the Provincial Muslim League leadership had agreed to the Panthic Sikh group's demand of a 25 per cent share of all Ministerial and Service appointments, negotiations had collapsed over the Provincial League's blunt refusal to define the position which Sikhs would occupy in a Muslim State. Denied Sikh co-operation the League approached the Congress Party, through Azad (Congress President) and Bhim Sen Sachar (Congress Provincial leader) on 2 March 1946. Azad tacitly agreed to permit the Provincial Congress Party to form an alliance with the League, and the Akali Party, subject to the League's acceptance of three conditions. Firstly, a programme acceptable to the three parties in the proposed coalition had to be formulated; secondly, the scope of the coalition would be limited to administration, and not involve itself with all-India issues; thirdly, there would have to be parity in the Cabinet between the Muslim League on one side, and the Congress and Akali parties on the other. Although the second condition was completely unrealistic, as the Punjab could not be divorced from a national settlement, the Congress-League talks were disrupted over the issue of Cabinet appointments. Azad refused to undertake not to nominate a Congress Muslim for a Ministerial post, and Jinnah fearing that such an appointment would disrupt Muslim solidarity in the Punjab Legislature and would endorse Congress claims to represent all communities, rejected Azad's terms.
In view of Azad's insistence on having the right to include a nationalist Muslim (i.e. Congress Muslim) Minister, when the issue had previously caused the breakdown of Wavell's Simla initiative (see pp. 242-243) it is evident that the Congress had no genuine desire to accommodate the League for the purpose of forming a provincial Ministry. In fact the Congress had been exploring the possibility for the formation of a combined opposition to the League from the beginning of January 1946; the failure of the nationalist Muslim and Ahrar candidates, and the virtual elimination of the Unionist Party, had intensified rather than lessened its resolve in this respect.

The attitude of Khizar was vital to Congress ambitions, especially as following the election, and the failure of the League to coalesce with either of the other major parties (Congress and Akali), the Unionist 'rump' held the balance of power in the Assembly between the Muslim and non-Muslim groups. The Congress Party, through Azad, had contacted the Premier in February 1946 to seek his support. By mid-February Khizar had informed the Governor that he was considering a political alliance with the Congress to oppose the League, and despite the denial of Gopichand Bhargava (leading Congressite in Punjab, M.L.A., and Member of Partition Committee), in response to a Civil and Military Gazette article (24 Feb. 1946) which named him as the Premier's intermediary with the Congress High Command, that he had played such a role, Khizar admitted at the end of the month that he had been holding talks with Azad. Khizar maintained, however, that he had sought the Maulana's influence to restrain students sympathetic to the Congress from committing disturbances. This explanation, however, was completely erroneous, the real reason for the discussions had been to prevent the Muslim League from taking office.

In his report to the Punjab Boundary Commission, Mr. Justice Muhammad Munir claimed that Khizar had been tempted by Azad to join forces with the Congress on being assured the Premiership. This assessment, however, born out of the utter contempt with which the Muslim community in general regarded Khizar's actions, was incorrect. It was not the love of office which had secured the Premier's continued opposition to the League, but his determination to continue Fazl-i-Husain's policy of inter-communal co-operation: "I had the foolishness or die-hardness not to have changed colour. I was a Unionist and I am a Unionist." Also it is evident that Khizar hoped that 'Unionism', despite the crushing defeat it had suffered at the polls, would still have a part to play in Punjabi affairs, and that in spite of the League victory 'Pakistan' might not materialise. In November 1946 he told Wavell that he believed that the
British would be compelled to remain in India, and that,
in fact he did not see how they could leave, that Pakistan was nonsense... that Jinnah's policy was all wrong; and that the Punjab would get on perfectly well by itself if only it was left alone. "

In this context he urged that the Province should be granted Dominion status under the Crown. Khizar's confidence that the Punjab could survive independently of 'Pakistan' had received encouragement from Attlee in August 1946, when the latter had assured him that he would not permit the 'Balkanistan' of India, or the break-up of the Punjab. Following the end of British rule and Partition, Khizar ruefully admitted that "I believed as long as Attlee was there, there would be no partition of Punjab or India."

Thus Khizar's continued opposition to the League, in concert with the Congress Party, reflected his complete inability to interpret or appreciate the course which Indian history was pursuing. In spite of the overwhelming League electoral victory in the Punjab, and in India generally, he stubbornly maintained a provincial, as opposed to a nationalistic outlook, fired by the totally misplaced optimism that the British could ignore the verdict of the Muslim electorate, and that they retained the power to deny 'Pakistan'. Even so he had no illusions concerning the Congress Party, he regarded co-operation with it as a necessary evil, bluntly informing the Cabinet Delegation that Britain should not consider withdrawing from India until they could transfer power to something much better than the Congress.

The Unionist-Congress alliance, as such, was a 'political marriage of convenience', born of their mutual opposition to the League, but the manoeuvre could not have succeeded without Sikh aid. The failure of the League to reassure the Sikh leadership (see p. 306) propelled it to join the opposition which was forming around the Congress Party. Nevertheless the Sikh Akali leaders, particularly Master Tara Singh and Gilani Katar Singh, were suspicious of the Congress, which they regarded primarily as a Hindu organisation which could not be trusted to safeguard Sikh interests. In March 1946 Azad was able to gain their support, however, by virtually conceding the Panthic claim to be the sole representative of the Sikh community, in so far as the practical business of Cabinet-making was concerned. Out of a proposed Cabinet of six the Panthic Party was allotted the seat reserved for Sikhs, though the office of Deputy Speaker and two Parliamentary Secretaryships were awarded to nationalist (i.e. Congress) Sikhs. Azad's refusal to offer a similar concession to the League, concerning the composition of the Cabinet, emphasised the true
purpose of the Congress strategy, which was to prevent the League assuming responsibility in the Punjab. The Unionist-Congress-Akali coalition, therefore, coalesced simply to deprive the Muslim League of Ministerial power, as was emphasised by the mutual undertaking to limit their co-operation solely to provincial administration, each group retaining its individual identity outside the Legislative Assembly.  

Despite the accord which existed amongst the coalitionists, Mamdot requested the Governor on 6 March 1946 to invite him to form a Ministry, on the grounds that the Muslim League Party was the largest single party in the Legislature, in that he commanded the support of 87 Muslim and non-Muslim M.L.As. (78 Muslims, 2 Hindus, 4 Scheduled Caste, and 2 Indian Christians, 1 Sikh). The Governor, however, refuted his claim as intelligence reports indicated that only one Scheduled Caste and one Indian Christian was prepared to support the League, giving it an Assembly strength of 80. By comparison Glancy estimated that the Coalition controlled 90 M.L.As. (15 Unionist, 50 Congress, 23 Panthic, 1 Independent and 1 Indian-Christian), and whilst he recognised that it was an "ill-assorted conglomeration and there is no saying how long it will last", the fact that it commanded a majority compelled the Governor to request Khizar, as the leader of the group, to form a Ministry.

Glancy's decision was bitterly resented by Provincial League leaders, despite the fact that the Governor believed that Mamdot was not over anxious to assume responsibility for the Ministry:

"I was left with the impression, though I cannot vouch for its correctness, that the Nawab was personally not particularly anxious to form a Ministry in the circumstances in which he was placed."  

Provincial League leaders interpreted the Governor's reluctance as symptomatic of anti-League bias on his part; Mamdot alleged that as the leader of the largest Party commanding a majority in the Assembly, it had been incumbent upon Glancy to ask him to form a Ministry, but he had failed to do so because he was determined to install Khizar as Premier.

There is no doubt that the Governor possessed a high personal regard for the Unionist leader, but there is no evidence to suggest that he had been a party to a Congress-Unionist-Akali intrigue to frustrate the League, or that he had acted unconstitutionally. In February 1946, at a time when he believed that the League and the Congress would control 60 and 50 seats respectively in a House of 175, which made it imperative for either side to seek political allies, he had been opposed to the creation of a Unionist-Congress coalition, considering such a move to be unwise as it could have prevented the League from adopting a moderate
approach. But once the tripartite alliance had assumed form, the Governor could not ignore it, or deny it the right of assuming the administration of the Province if it enjoyed a majority. In the original talks which Mamdot had with Glancy on 6 March, the former had been unable to substantiate his claim concerning the support he professed to enjoy. In the course of the interview the Governor established to the satisfaction of Mamdot that the two Hindu Unionists whose adherence he claimed had decided to remain in the Unionist Party, and Mamdot finally admitted that he was confident of the support of only one of the two Indian Christian M.L.As. he had listed. Also when questioned by Glancy on the true political affiliation of the Scheduled Caste members Mamdot had cited, the Nawab replied that it was impossible to verify their support for the League "as they had left Lahore either of their own account or under persuasion...". Thus Mamdot's allegation that the Governor had blatantly disregarded his claim to possess a majority was totally false. Also the Nawab's contention that the Governor was required to invite him as the leader of the largest single party to form a Ministry was incorrect. The only statutory obligation imposed on a Governor was "to appoint in consultation with the person who in his judgement is most likely to command a suitable majority in the Legislature those persons ... who will best be in a position collectively to command the confidence of the Legislature." The Provincial Muslim League, having failed to reach an agreement with either the Congress or the Akali Party, or to provide concrete proof of its ability to command a majority in the Legislature, was in no position to enjoy such consideration.

The exclusion of the Muslim League and the installation of the Coalition Government, relegated the Muslim community, as represented in the Assembly, to a position of permanent opposition. The Unionist-Congress-Akali alliance, in spite of the inclusion of the small number of Muslim Unionists (11) was a Government of the minority communities. This development, following an election campaign which had been conducted on fanatical religio-communal lines, was fraught with danger, and destined to contribute to a further deterioration of the communal situation. In an attempt to justify the existence of the Ministry, and demonstrate to the Muslim public in particular, that its complexion was the result of Muslim League intransigence, and that the only possible alternative to it would be the imposition of Governor's Rule (under section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935), Khizar publicly invited Mamdot to join the coalition on 8 March 1946. The Premier knew that it would be
impossible for the Punjab League leader to accept the invitation, for the
issues which had prevented co-operation between the Muslim League and
the Hindu and Sikh parties remained unresolved. Also Jinnah, in a
speech in Calcutta on 8 March had decreed that he would brook no
compromise with the Punjab Coalition, declaring,

"we have already won the battle of Pakistan in the ...
Punjab by carrying away 90 per cent of the Muslim
seats ... If the Congress wishes to work the Constitu­
tions of 1919 and 1935, it is welcome to do so. We
want to put a speedy end to the present Constitution and
establish Pakistan."36

Nevertheless in pursuing the propaganda exercise, Khizar attempted to
project the sincerity of the offer by stressing that it was essential
for all the political parties in the Punjab to work together to combat
the grave economic problems facing the Province, and in order to facili­
tate the political rehabilitation of the League the Premier offered to
retire from public life:

"I should like to make it clear that if the offer I am
making to you is accepted, I would personally be prepared
to stand aside and to seek no office. I trust that this
will clear the way for you to recommend to your Party the
acceptance of the invitation..."37

This gesture, however, was insincere and intended purely for public
consumption. Khizar had no intention of relinquishing the influence he
enjoyed at this juncture, as the proposed settlement with the League was
subject to certain secret conditions: in the event of the Premier's
resignation and the formation of a Muslim League Government, the latter
would include a nominee of Khizar's in the Cabinet, whereupon the Unionist
leader would advise his Muslim followers to join the League.38 Had
Khizar intended honouring this undertaking it would have represented a
total volte-face on his part. It represented nothing more than a measure
of insurance to protect his position in the unlikely event of the Muslim
League agreeing to join the Coalition, and as the largest single party,
consequently gaining control of the Government.

Having attempted to establish the legitimacy of the Coalition, Khizar
planned to popularise it through the inauguration of a socio-economic
reform programme. In June 1946 the Government committed itself to
achieving an extension of the electricity supply, the introduction of
industrial planning, the improvement of village life, and urban working
conditions, and to combatting corruption amongst officials.39 As a
public relations exercise, however, it was a failure as the Government
did not possess the resources to finance the various schemes, in addition
to which materialism was no substitute for the religious euphoria which
had seized the mind of the Muslim masses. Also the failure of the
Ministry to meet the expectations of demobilised soldiers in respect
of land grants, completely negated any advantage which the Coalition
might have enjoyed through the dispensation of largesse. The Unionist
Party, in an attempt to gain the service men's votes during the election,
had promised that as a class they would be amongst the major beneficiaries
of post-war economic reconstruction. The result was that of the
600,000 Punjabis who had seen war service, the majority who were agri-
culturists, expected to be rewarded with land. The Coalition Ministry,
however, possessed the resources to satisfy no more than 8,000 men.\textsuperscript{41}

The almost total Muslim resentment against the Coalition, however,
was the result of its communal composition, rather than its economic
policy. It was regarded as a highly artificial structure, which through
the 'Quisling'-like behaviour of an unrepresentative minority of Muslims,
had usurped the rightful position of the Muslim League to govern the
Province.\textsuperscript{42} As a Government, it was a total disaster, its only raison
d'être being the mutual detestation each of the coalition groupings felt
for the League. Bereft of any social ideology or policy, it was con-
trolled by a cabinet of largely incompetent, and incompatible elements.
The Premier's influence on the Muslim community did not extend beyond the
boundaries of his estates,\textsuperscript{43} whilst the years of confrontation with the
League had taken their toll, leaving him mentally exhausted.\textsuperscript{44} Quizilbash
(Muslim Minister of Revenue) although experienced in local administration,
was a person of low reputation who lived in constant fear of assassination,
relying on constant police protection.\textsuperscript{45} Muhammad Ibrahim Buriq (Muslim
Minister of Education) originated from the remote district of Muzaffargarh,
and he possessed little worthwhile experience. Bhim Sen Sachar (Minister
of Finance) and Chaudhri Lahri Singh (Minister of Public Works), the
Congress contingent retained a deep-seated dislike for Unionism, and both
lacked any administrative knowledge.\textsuperscript{46} Baldev Singh (Minister of Develop-
ment), the Akali nominee, had been brought up largely outside of the
Punjab, and as an industrialist with large investments in Bihar he had
very little in common with his rural co-religionists, and practically no
influence over them.\textsuperscript{48} In addition, the Congress, which was the largest
single party in the Coalition could not claim to represent any substantial
Muslim opinion,\textsuperscript{49} and it was split by internal divisions. Overlapping
the orthodox Congress Party was the Congress Socialist Party, which was
closely connected with the Congress High Command. Its leaders, notably
Jai Parkash Narain, were political extremists, committed to a programme of
violent revolution - Narain toured the Punjab advocating the seizure
and burning of police stations and public buildings, and the murder of government officials. In the face of such blatant provocation, Congress coalitionists refused to act responsibly or prosecute the offenders to the chagrin of the Muslim community and the Governor:

"if they fail to deal with Congressmen who defy the law, they cannot decently treat members of the Opposition differently. Muslims in the Rawalpindi district are already saying that if having tolerated Jai Parkash Narain and his like, the Ministers prosecute the more violent Muslim speakers, it will be quite clear that their motives are communal."

The Congress Party, however, consistently refused to support the introduction of firm and impartial measures necessary to maintain law and order, and their coalition partners were unable and unwilling to implement strong government. Congress intransigence, however, was a symptom of, as much as a cause for the inherent weakness of the Ministry. The three parties formed an uneasy alliance, co-existing in the knowledge that any political re-alignment on the part of any one of the coalition partners would cause the fall of the Government, and their mutual timidity to control excesses resulted from a collective desire to retain power, even at the cost of abdicating responsibility. By August 1946, as a result of Ministerial inertia, the provincial press was openly and bitterly communal, private armies existed free from restriction, and the administration of the Province had all but collapsed. The Governor, highly alarmed by the existing state of affairs, informed the Viceroy that "Authority in the Punjab has never been at a lower ebb." The total decay of Government incentive was reflected in the fact that Ministers lacked either the confidence or the will to combat the inevitable corruption which flourished in the absence of firm central control. Despite irrefutable evidence that Abdur Rahim (I.C.S.), the Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur had misappropriated large sums of money from the Pacotra of village headman, Qizilbash refused to agree to the Governor's demand that the officer should be suspended pending a formal departmental enquiry.

The most dangerous failing the Ministry was guilty of, however, concerned its refusal to face the Muslim League in the Legislature, for it caused the practical suspension of the constitutional process, eventually forcing its League protagonists to adopt unconstitutional methods to express their opposition to the Government. The Coalition's reluctance to allow Assembly debates reflected the insecurity of its Muslim membership which had started to diminish once the Unionist 'rump' entered the Government. In April 1946 two Unionist Muslim Ministers -
Jamal Khan Leghari and Nawab Ashiq Hussain, joined the League; Leghari's defection having been prompted by Azad's refusal to admit his claim to the Premiership. By July 1946 only five Unionist Muslims, including Khizar and Qizilbash, remained in the Coalition, the others having fallen victim to the Muslim League's far from subtle coercion and victimisation tactics: March had witnessed the celebration of 'traitors' day' in Lahore during which the mock funeral of the Premier had been conducted. Veiled threats of this nature eroded the resolve of those Muslim M.L.As. who remained outside the League, but it was the awareness that Unionism as a political force was dead, and that no real alternative existed to the Muslim League as the arbitrator for Muslim interests, which caused the final disintegration of the Unionist Muslim element. Under the circumstances, the Government was reluctant to expose its dwindling Muslim supporters to the vitriolic attacks which the League mounted against them in the Assembly. In commenting on the Ministry's failure to accommodate the League in the Legislature, whilst Jenkins (succeeded Glancy as Governor, 8 April 1946) stressed the timidity of the Ministers, he failed to give the underlying cause for it, but nevertheless he accurately described the effect which the Coalition's manœuvre achieved:

"The Ministers were terrified of the Legislature, and when, in July 1946, a Session became inevitable for the elections to the Constituent Assembly, they used their small majority to secure the adjournment as soon as the obligatory business was over. They were most ingenious in avoiding legislation, thus depriving the Opposition of opportunities of constitutional combat ... the tactics and conduct of the Coalition Ministry were intensely annoying to the Muslim League, and with some reason. The largest single party had been shut out of office, and might have to wait indefinitely for its turn."

The League, however, was not prepared to wait indefinitely, though initially two factors combined to prevent it launching a programme of agitation against the Unionist-Congress-Akali 'cabal'. In the first place attempts to subvert the Muslim-controlled police force (70 per cent of cadre were Muslims) had failed, and the majority of the Muslim elitist families were reluctant to adopt any course of action which could ultimately bring them into conflict with the British. Jenkins firmly believed that, but for the stabilising effect of the traditional Muslim rural leadership, the Punjab would have been subjected to serious political disturbances:

"We must not forget that the Muslim leaders are on the whole people who for generations have been friendly with
the Government of the day and with British officials. If they had been professional agitators of the Congress type, we should have had trouble before now." The reluctance of the landed class to endorse unconstitutional activity could offer only a temporary respite from the inevitable conflagration. The knowledge that the British were determined to relinquish their dual role of ruler and 'fountain head' of patronage caused the largely 'loyalist' landed elite to associate with the League, which remained the only viable successor to the Raj in the Punjab. Also the continued spectacle of a non-Muslim Government at the helm of provincial affairs exerted a greater influence on the Muslim masses in general, than the memories of old loyalties, and the League was quick to respond to and exploit the resulting Muslim resentment. In reporting this development to the Viceroy, the Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government noted: "It has...come to notice that in certain rural areas the message is being passed from mouth to mouth that the Hindus are in power, that Muslims have been betrayed, that Islam is in danger and that Muslims must fight. The result of all this is an increase in Muslim determination and disregard of consequences." League propagandists operating through newspapers (notably Dawn), public meetings and mosques sought to sanction the conflict it sought by proclaiming 'jehad'; that this was not an exercise in empty rhetoric was emphasised by the fact that the League made strenuous efforts to recruit the services of Muslim army personnel who were on leave in the Punjab.

The Muslim League was not the only community preparing for an armed struggle, for although the strength of the Muslim National Guards had been estimated at over 10,000 in December 1945, that of the militant Hindu Rashtriya Swayyam Sewak Sangh had passed 28,000 by July 1946. The expansion of these organisations reflected the serious deterioration which had occurred in communal relations in the Province, but it was political activity at the national, rather than at the provincial, level which led to a worsening of the situation, and the growth of a 'civil war' atmosphere in the Province. In August 1946, in spite of Jinnah's refusal to participate, the British inaugurated an Interim National Government, and installed the Congress in office. The Muslim community in the Punjab were alarmed and angered by the move, which they regarded as an unconditional surrender of power to the Hindus. Muslim resentment was further fired by the knowledge that when the situation had been reversed during the War, and Congress had proved unco-operative, the Muslim League had been refused the opportunity to govern. In many Muslim quarters, the apparent eagerness of the British to accommodate the Congress at this juncture was interpreted as proof of a plot.
between the two to frustrate the League. Such fears were intensified in
the Punjab as a direct consequence of the impolitic and irresponsible
attitude of Nehru and the provincial Congress leaders. The former, in
answer to Jinnah’s call for ‘direct action’ to demonstrate Muslim oppo-
sition to the Interim administration, had warned that such activity would
be forcibly suppressed, whilst in the Punjab, as Jenkins reported to the
Viceroy on 31 August 1946, there was unconcealed Hindu jubilation at the
exclusion of the League at the Centre:

"The Hindus are jubilant - they are bad winners, and
will do all they can to taunt and humiliate the Muslims.
They are foolish enough to believe that here in the
Punjab they will be able to suppress the Muslims once
and for all with British aid, and loose talk to this
effect is going on amongst Congress leaders ... nothing
is more likely to bring about a physical conflict..."73

Furthermore Jenkins impressed upon the Viceroy his belief that such
conflict could not be avoided:

"We have here the material for a vast communal upheaval.
The hard core of the Muslim case - that the stage is set
for the suppression of the Muslim community - is so
nearly true that it cannot be answered with sincerity
or conviction. The Muslims are ill-organised, but they
will fight sooner than submit to dictations from the
Congress High Command."74

In spite of the inflammatory conditions prevailing in the Province,
the manifestation of Muslim solidarity, organised by the Provincial
League as ‘Direct Action Day’ (16 August 1946) was "conducted with
moderation and an apparent absence of mischievous intention to disturb
the communal situation".75 In deference to Jinnah’s instructions that
the observations were to be peaceful,74 the Provincial League Committee
had appealed to its members "to avoid all unlawful activity and communal
incitement", but Muslims were left in no doubt that its purpose was to
prepare them for the coming struggle:75

"In mosques, the righteousness of the Muslim League
cause is undoubtedly being increasingly proclaimed
and Muslims are being exhorted to be prepared, not
for a political campaign, constitutional or otherwise,
but for a Jehad."76

Also although Jinnah had appealed for moderate behaviour, previous
statements made by him and other League leaders had left the Muslim
community throughout India in no doubt that if Congress rule was forced
upon them they would resort to violence. At the Muslim League Legis-
lators Convention held in New Delhi from 7 to 9 April 1946, Jinnah had
declared that "Muslim India would never ... accept the constitution of
an interim Government before the principle of Pakistan was accepted..."
and that,

"If any attempt is made to force a decision against the wishes of Muslims, Muslim India will resist it by all means and at all costs. We are prepared to sacrifice anything and everything, but we shall not submit to any scheme of Government prepared without our consent."

Other speakers echoed Jinnah's sentiments; Begum Shah Nawaz opining that "Muslim women would call upon their husbands and sons to take up arms for Pakistan, if the British tried to establish Akhand Hindustan...", and Shaukat Hyat threatening that the Punjab Muslim martial class in its determination to establish Pakistan would resort to rebellion if necessary:

"We shall show you a rehearsal now when the British army is still there [in the Punjab]. You will see the reactionary Government which is... in the Punjab with the help of the Hindus and Muslim Quislings thrown overboard."

Whilst Khan Abdul Qayum Khan (Muslim League leader, N.W.F.P.) threatened that if any attempt were made to frustrate the emergence of 'Pakistan' "Muslims will have no other alternative but to take out the sword and rebel..."77 Jinnah had made no effort to restrain his cohorts, and in July 1946 he endorsed their threats when he publicly cautioned the British and the Congress that if 'Pakistan' was denied the Muslims would take up arms: "If you seek peace, we do not want war. If you want war we accept it unhesitatingly."78 This was the atmosphere in which Direct Action Day was held, and as such it was remarkable that no dangerous disturbances erupted in the Punjab, but other parts of India were not so fortunate. In East Bengal and Bihar widespread slaughter resulted.79

The decision of the A.I.M.L. to join the Interim Government in October 1946 did little to diffuse the situation in the Punjab, where communal hatred had intensified greatly in response to the communal butchery which had been unleashed in Bengal and Bihar in the wake of Direct Action Day. Considering that Jinnah's purpose, despite his call for peaceful observation, had been to establish once and for all that Muslims in India were determined to achieve an independent homeland free from Hindu domination, in the final analysis it is apparent that he could not have failed to realise that such demonstrations would run the risk of erupting into inter-communal warfare. Thus it would seem that Jenkins was unduly harsh in principally condemning the Congress leaders of the Punjab and the provincial Hindu press for the intensification of ill-feeling between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities:

"The prominence given by the Hindu Press to what appears to be one-sided and exaggerated accounts of the disturbances in East Bengal is wicked, and I am afraid that..."
Congress and Mahasabha leaders are largely responsible for it.\textsuperscript{80}

In reality spokesmen for both the Punjabi Hindus and Muslims gave vent to their feelings by attempting to portray the opposite community in the worst possible light. The Hindus accused the Muslims of Calcutta of being entirely responsible for the killings which occurred there, whilst Muslim opinion retaliated by attempting to implicate the Congress and the Mahasabha in the massacre of Muslims in Bihar, claiming that it had been organised by the Prime Minister of Bihar. The lesson, they declared, was clear - Muslims would be annihilated in a Hindu controlled India.\textsuperscript{81}

The prevailing atmosphere succoured both the Muslim League National Guards and the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh in the Punjab, the size of each force had grown to 22,000 and 46,000 respectively by the close of 1946.\textsuperscript{82} As well as becoming stronger, both organisations increased in popularity, and they were more active and far more belligerent. A further symptom of the collapse of reason as an alternative to violence in the Province, was the increasingly militant student activity in the towns and cities, particularly Lahore, and the fact that their extreme behaviour was encouraged by their teachers "to whom age has given no wisdom". Student plans to organise 'Bihar Days' and 'Noakhali Days' were made without restraint in the full knowledge that their execution would provoke excitement and possible violence.\textsuperscript{83} Only one spark was required to ignite the 'communal powder keg'. In his appreciation of the situation written in mid-November, Jenkins warned the Viceroy that the slightest incident would provoke serious disorders in the cities, and that the grave danger existed of the trouble spreading to the villages.\textsuperscript{84}

As the religious communities in the Punjab approached the abyss of internecine warfare the Governor determined to induce the Coalition Government to face the situation responsibly. It proved a difficult task, and was not accomplished without a certain amount of guile. Jenkins was under no illusions that the Ministry was sorely inadequate to face the challenge of communal violence. At the end of August he wrote to the Viceroy that there was nothing in the Ministry's record to suggest that it was capable of firmness,

"and unless it is determined (and appears) to be both firm and impartial, the administrative machine may well crumple up ... the Congress Ministers are still more interested in securing the release of law breakers of their own party ... and in sniping at officials generally, than in dealing with the very serious situation which now confronts them ... and my power to insist upon the action I believe to be necessary is limited."\textsuperscript{85}
Jenkins' concluding remark was borne out the following month when he failed to persuade his Ministers to declare both the Muslim League National Guards, and the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh to be unlawful associations, and to attempt to disperse them. His efforts were largely frustrated by Qizilbash, who claimed that the two "private armies" were too poorly organised to invite effective radical action being taken against them. Faced with a weak and vacillating Cabinet, and anxious to prevent the Punjab's decline into chaos, Jenkins, without the knowledge of his Ministers, drafted the Punjab Public Safety Ordinance of 1946. Although he informed the Premier of his action, he refrained from discussing it with him in detail. By informing Khizar of the Ordinance's existence, Jenkins, by implication, revealed his intention to invoke it should the situation require it. It proved an astute manoeuvre, for as the prospect for communal disturbances increased, the Premier, supported by his ministerial colleagues, requested the Governor to promulgate the measure, in exercise of his special powers under the Government of India Act of 1935 (sec. 89), in order to bypass the necessity of placing the measure before the Legislature. Jenkins was only too anxious to comply, as he believed that it would have been impossible to convert the Ordinance into an Act in the face of opposition from the Muslim League and extreme elements on the Government benches: "I had always intended to use section 89, and it was fortunate that the Premier and his colleagues agreed with me." The Ordinance, which came into force on 19 November 1946, initially had a sobering effect, in that it endowed the Ministry with drastic powers to combat communal disturbances. In effect the Government could order arrests without warrant, detain persons on suspicion, enforce its control on educational institutions, control the press, prohibit drilling, public meetings and processions, and order the banning of quasi-military organisations, and the wearing, or display of military uniforms and emblems. In relating the measure to the 'Press', MacDonald (Home Sec., Punjab Govt.) emphasised that all District Magistrates had been ordered to use the special powers without hesitation or regard for the status of the offenders concerned. As if to emphasise that no one would be immune from the measure, the Governor personally interviewed Shaukat Hyat, and warned him to desist from making speeches which appeared to advocate the murder of the Premier. Jenkins cautioned the ex-Minister that the authorities would deal firmly with all leaders, Muslim and Hindu, who advocated violence, though he attempted to reassure him that
the Ordinance would not be used to suppress any political party. 91

In spite of the Governor's assurance, and the insistence of the Ministry voiced by Swaran Singh (succeeded Baldev Singh as Minister of Development on the latter's appointment to the Interim Government) that "The emergency Ordinance is honestly meant to ensure civil liberties by maintaining peace and communal harmony, essential for the orderly national progress of the country at this critical juncture", and that it did not represent an anti-League manouevre, 92 the Ministry foolishly used its new powers to intimidate League members. As a result a fresh wave of Muslim resentment was engendered against the Coalition, and as Jenkins observed, allegations of unfairness, amounting at times to persecution, were common, "and I fear that some of them are true." 93 One of the most glaring examples of the Ministry's misuse of the Ordinance for purely political ends occurred in Dera Ghazi Khan in January 1947. Both the Muslim League and the Unionist Party were contesting a by-election in the district (Dera Ghazi Khan North). Khizar, acting against the advice of the local Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate, ordered a ban on all political meetings. The order was not, in the opinion of the local officers, necessary for the maintenance of order, 94 and was clearly intended to intimidate League supporters and prevent visiting League speakers, including Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, from appealing for Muslim support. 95 In addition, local dignitaries, who were known League supporters, were placed under arrest. Both the sons of Nawab Jemal Khan Leghari (ex-Unionist Minister) were detained in this manner, one of whom, Mohammad Khan, was an Honorary Magistrate. In executing the Premier's orders, Slater (District Officer, DGK) admitted that the latter "may have been more active in the cause than was proper for an Honorary Magistrate and a recipient, as his father's deputy, of Government monies", but nevertheless he found the task distasteful, particularly as he and the Nawab's son were on good terms:

"He was not surprised and may indeed have welcomed the opportunity to acquire political merit. We drank a glass of whisky together and off he went." 96

The interference and resultant intimidation ironically cost the Unionist candidate much support, 97 and certainly contributed to the League victory. The defeat of the Unionist Party incensed the Premier, and caused him to further abuse his power, punishing his opponents through the abolition of the jirga system and the withdrawal of magisterial powers from all the tumandars and their relatives. 98

It was totally unrealistic to expect honorary office holders, and recipients of Government grants to adopt a non-political posture,
especially as that class had traditionally been involved in politics as Unionist supporters, and as Khizar had refused to adopt a non-partisan attitude in distributing land, jagirs and other rewards; the Premier having consistently refused to award those who opposed him politically. Furthermore, the entire administrative sub-structure had been designed to operate under an irremovable Government of the Imperial model. Below the Legislature, the Ministry, and the Secretariat, there was no effective organisation of independent local authorities which reflected broadly the political opinion of the day. Local authorities, as such, were relatively unimportant, and Government really operated at the district level through permanent officials, and non-official assistants (e.g. members of the National Home Front, Honorary Magistrates, Zaildars), many of whom held honorary positions. This non-official element in particular had largely failed to appreciate their position in light of the changed political conditions wrought by democratisation, and they resented the interference of the Premier that as a class they should refrain from criticising the Ministry, or supporting the Opposition.

The misuse of the Public Safety Ordinance, coupled with the refusal of the Ministry to face the Assembly contributed to the widespread belief amongst Muslims that the Ministry was determined to persecute Leaguers, and deny them their democratic rights. When, therefore, the Government ordered the banning of the Muslim League National Guards on 24 January 1947, the Muslim leadership interpreted the action as proof of the Coalition's intention to crush the Muslim League in the Province. The ban, which also applied to the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, had long been urged by Jenkins, and the Government ostensibly took the action because, in the light of the continued growth of communal tension which had been intensified by the reports of Muslim brutality against Sikhs in the Hazara district of N.W.F.P., the existence of private armies posed a grave threat to the peace of the Province.

There is no doubt at all that both militant organisations were preparing for armed conflict, intelligence reports revealed that they had both initiated training programmes for combat with knives and lathis, and approximately 2,000 steel helmets were subsequently found in the Muslim League National Guards headquarters in Lahore. The situation clearly warranted firm handling, but the previous conduct of the Ministry did not lend credence to the Premier's claim that it did not intend to attack the Muslim League: "Nothing is further from the thought of my Government ... and I wish to do everything I can to remove any such misunderstanding." Whilst the evidence does suggest that the Premier had ordered the banning out of what he considered to be the Province's
best interests, as both Jenkins and P.J. Patrick (Asst. Under-Secretary, India Office) at the India Office testified, such firm resolve of following months of inactivity, and petty sniping at League supporters, failed to reassure, or appeal to the Muslim public. In addition the League leadership in the Province, determined to create the impression that the Government's real purpose was the destruction of the League, provoked the Ministry to take action against them. The issuing of the ban had been accompanied by a police search of the Muslim League National Guards' offices, which the provincial League leaders attempted to obstruct, thereby courting arrest. Amongst those taken into custody were Feroz Khan Noon, Mian Iftikhar ud Din (former President of the Punjab Congress), Begum Shah Nawaz, the Nawab of Mamdot (President - Provincial Muslim League), Mumtaz Daultana (Sec., Provincial Muslim League), Syed Amir Hussain Shah (Provincial leader of the Muslim League National Guards) and Shaukat Hyat Khan. These detentions, though made unavoidable by the leaders' actions, appeared to substantiate the allegation, voiced by Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (Muslim League, Minister of Communications, Interim Government) and Amir Hussain Shah (man of private means, M.A. Punjab University, first general manager Pakistan Times), that the Coalition was determined to crush Muslim nationalism and constrain the civil liberties of the Muslim community.

In an effort to combat this propaganda, and to remove the impression amongst the Muslim community that the Ordinance was aimed specifically against the League, the Premier, following consultation with his cabinet colleagues, withdrew the declaration against the Muslim League National Guards and the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, and ordered the release of the imprisoned Muslim Leaguers. In view of the prevailing communal tension, however, the Government declared its intention to retain the powers guaranteed to it under the Ordinance, particularly with regard to public meetings and demonstrations. The withdrawal of the ban, however, was interpreted by the Provincial League leadership as a sign of Government weakness, and they determined to press their supposed advantage by demanding the cancellation of all restrictions, and the abrogation of the Ordinance, and by initiating a civil disobedience campaign to achieve these objectives, and thereby force a confrontation with the Government. Although the stance which the Provincial League leaders adopted was in keeping with the objectives of the All-India Muslim League Working Committee, passed in resolution form at Karachi on 31 January 1947, the decision to defy the Provincial Government had not occurred at Jinnah's instigation, though he approved of the action.
The claims of Mamdot and Jinnah that the movement was not intended to cause the fall of the Ministry by unconstitutional means, and was designed purely to defend Muslim civil liberties was a total fabrication. Jinnah regarded it as an essential manoeuvre to deprive the Coalition of the powers it received from the Ordinance, and to force it to seek alternative safeguards from the Legislature, thereby giving the Provincial League the opportunity to meet and possibly defeat the Government in the Assembly. The League clearly had abandoned, under extreme provocation, constitutional opposition in the Punjab, as Liaquat Ali Khan (General Sec., A.I.M.L., Finance Member - Interim Govt.) admitted in New Delhi on 13 March 1947, when he observed that the civil disobedience campaign against the Punjab Ministry was "something new in India; the Muslim League has never done anything before by unconstitutional means." The question of 'civil liberties' merely provided a convenient pretext to rouse Muslim opinion against the Government. At the same time the campaign represented the climax of Muslim resentment which had been forming from the moment the Ministry took office. This was confirmed by the admission of Nazim-ud-Din (ex-Premier, Bengal) to the Governor in February 1947, when he admitted that the 'civil liberties' issue was not the real 'casus belli', the underlying grievance being the conduct of the Coalition Ministry since assuming power.

Even so, for the Ministry to have complied with the Provincial League's demand would have amounted to its unconditional surrender, as it would have deprived it of the power to act swiftly and effectively in an emergency, thereby increasing the danger for communal strife. The intervention of the Governor, acting as an intermediary between Khizar and Mamdot failed to persuade the Provincial League leadership to desist from making the demand, or directing civil disobedience against the Coalition. The Ministry correctly interpreted the refusal as marking the beginning of a League campaign to secure its overthrow by exploiting the 'civil liberty' question, and by possible recourse to violence, as was indicated by the anti-Government, pro-League agitation which broke out in Lahore on 28 January 1947. Khizar, who had anticipated the challenge, delivered a 'premeditated' counter attack on the night of the 28-29 January; all the important League leaders in Lahore, including Mamdot, Iftikar ud Din, Noon and Daultana, were seized and committed to detention centres outside the city, and a press stoppage was imposed on all news relating to the agitation. From the 29 to 31 January, widespread disorders and demonstrations occurred, though there was no general recourse to violence, and no loss of control by the forces of Government.
The removal of the Muslim League leaders and organisers, who had also been arrested, combined with the concessions which had been granted in respect of the Muslim League National Guards, acted initially to diffuse the situation and contain a possible widespread Muslim revolt. But in the long run the Government's tactics worked to its disadvantage, as they appeared to confirm the claims of the Central League - which had been widely circulated through the national press - that the Coalition was determined to smash the League organisation in the Punjab.

Thus the imprisonment of the League leaders did not mark the end of the troubles, it heralded the beginning of a fairly widespread, though at times despondent, Muslim movement. Although the great majority of the Muslim middle class refrained from participating in the anti-government demonstrations, the portrayal of the agitation by Congress Socialists as "a suburban circus performance staged by ex-knights, their wives, sons and nephews" was far from accurate. Even so the agitation was not as successful as represented by the Muslim League, serious disturbances were confined to only half-a-dozen districts - notably Lahore, Gujrat, Amritsar and Jullundur. "Dawn" published a great many lies, and one American correspondent from Delhi was under the impression that at least half the police had mutinied and been arrested - a story which had no foundation at all! In fact, in Jenkins' opinion, it had been the "exemplary conduct" of the police which had contributed to containing the situation.

The myth has persisted, however, that the movement by itself forced Khizar to meet the League's demands. Imran Ali has claimed, "The movement succeeded in having the Public Safety Ordinance repealed to a large extent, and even in bringing down the Khizr Ministry." Neither of these assertions is correct. Khizar's settlement with the League was precipitated by the British decision (announced on 20 February, 1947) to leave India in June 1948 and not as a result of intimidation by the League! In fact by mid-February 1947 the Provincial League leadership was divided over the question of maintaining the anti-government movement. Jenkins believed, with some justification, that they had over-estimated their own strength, and underrated that of the Ministry, by assuming incorrectly that the British, and especially Muslim officials and police, would not support a government which was opposed by the Muslim community. Noon and Mamdot, in particular, were anxious for a settlement on the terms offered by the Ministry. The latter had agreed to cancel certain of the bans in force relating to public meetings if the agitation were abandoned, though he had refused to consider the League's request that he should submit the Ordinance for approval by the
Legislature. In an attempt to precipitate a League acceptance, Firoz Khan Noon wrote to the Deputy Inspector General of Police (14th or 15th February) intimating that he and Mamdot were ready to accept the compromise. Acting on this correspondence Jenkins, in the role of intermediary, visited the League leaders in Kasur gāāl, only to discover that Mamdot and Noon did not have the unanimous support of their Provincial League colleagues, and that they were powerless therefore to act without Jinnah's sanction. It is apparent from Jenkins' account of the meeting that it was the intervention of Daultana which prevented Mamdot and Noon from committing themselves to an agreement. Daultana had demanded a meeting of the complete Council of Action, which had been formed in January 1946 to direct the opposition to the Government, and following the Premier's permission that it could meet at the gāāl, the Council had decided to seek the guidance of Jinnah. Mamdot, in pursuit of his original intention, attempted to cajole the A.I.M.I.L. leader into acquiescing to a truce. On 22 February he informed Jinnah of Noon's approach to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, stating that it had occurred without his consent or knowledge. Whilst he half-heartedly assured Jinnah that the Provincial League would continue the struggle should the latter order it, he clearly wished Jinnah to agree to its suspension. Using Noon's letter as a pretext, he argued that it had weakened the Provincial League position, and would certainly be used by the Premier to embarrass the organisation should the negotiations fail: "We could carry on but for this unfortunate incident." Also as a further inducement he opined to Jinnah that the Premier would not agree to meet the Assembly, preferring a continuation of the confrontation.

Jinnah, however, was not moved by Mamdot's arguments, which he suspected arose from the sobering effects of detention:

"We must be firm and determined and take consequences, but we should not be a party to any compromise which is discreditable, in order to avoid further suffering, once having gone in for them."

He insisted, tactfully but firmly, that the Provincial League should adhere to its original demands - the removal of the ban imposed on public meetings and processions, the withdrawal of all restrictive measures on political activities, the release of all detainees - supplemented with the insistence that the Ordinance should be placed before the Legislative Assembly:

"You and the prominent leaders of the Punjab started this movement and I think, rightly as it was becoming intolerable, especially when the Muslim National Guards organisation was declared unlawful ... it is for you now to come to a settlement
which should be as honourable and as creditable not only so far as the Mussalmans of the Punjab are concerned but the All-India Muslim League. . . . Honourable defeat, if it is to be, is better than a compromise which is discreditable. . . ."

In addition Jinnah pointedly countered Mamdot's assertion that Khizar would not agree to submit the Ordinance to the Legislature, stating,

"It is a matter of very great principle and I cannot advise you to give it up because, now that you have raised this point, if you give it up, then it can only mean your acceptance on acquiescence in the present Ordinance rule continuing indefinitely." 131

This interchange of views between Mamdot and Jinnah which occurred on 22 and 23 February 1947, clearly demonstrated that neither expected Khizar to submit. Their opinion was also shared by the Viceroy, who only the day before the announcement of British intentions on 20 February (see above) had informed the Secretary of State that: "I do not think the Punjab Government have any intention of capitulating." 132 Furthermore Jinnah had clearly decided to accept defeat in the matter, preferring it to compromise. In arriving at their personal estimations and conclusions, Jinnah, Mamdot and Wavell had been influenced by the situation prevailing in the Province, and had not allowed for the impact of the British declaration (to transfer power by June 1948) on the Punjab Premier. Even though the violence of the demonstrations had increased towards the end of February, 133 the Provincial Government had never been in danger of losing control. The largely Muslim police force had remained loyal; the men, with very few exceptions, had stood up to the agitation, and as Jenkins recorded, they had never failed to obey orders, or to follow their officers when drastic action was required. The conduct of the force had never been in question, and the Inspector General of Police had assured the Premier that if he would sanction 'drastic action' the agitation could be crushed within the space of approximately three weeks. It was the British announcement of 20 February which restrained the Premier from acting on the advice of his Chief of Police. Initially Khizar had been inclined to regard the statement as nothing more than a "threat", but on being assured by Jenkins that it represented the British Government's firm intention, and that "it would be most unsafe for him to act or plan on any assumption other than H.M.G. meant what they so clearly said", 134 the Premier realised that further opposition to the League would be futile and dangerous. Even though he and the Governor believed that repressive measures could be successfully undertaken, though Jenkins personally favoured a negotiated settlement, the Premier decided against repression, informing the Governor that it
would not have facilitated the peaceful transfer of power at the end of the allotted sixteen month period.\textsuperscript{136} In essence the British had appeared to the 'loyalist' Premier as both a buffer and protector, as their presence had enabled him to resist and frustrate the League in the Punjab and to foster ambitions for an independent Punjabi Dominion, administered on the Unionist principle of multi-communal co-operation (see pp. 307-308). The prospect of imminent national independence, however, forced him to face reality, and accept the inevitable, that it was no longer practicable or wise to exclude the League from Provincial affairs. Having been thus persuaded to bring to an end the political isolation of the League, Khizar agreed to its terms, including the crucial demand that the Assembly should meet to consider the legislation necessary to replace the Ordinance and to maintain the peace of the Province.\textsuperscript{137}

The resignation of Khizar and the Coalition Ministry (3 March 1947) followed the Premier's decision to end the confrontation with the League. Once again Khizar's action was a direct consequence of the 20 February announcement, and was not as a result of the Muslim agitation. The Muslim League, however, anxious to portray the collapse of the Coalition as the successful conclusion to their anti-Government movement, deliberately nurtured the belief that their action was solely responsible for the event.\textsuperscript{138} Contemporary and recent commentators have been guilty of perpetuating this misconception. Justice Muhammad Munir, in his report to the Punjab Boundary Commission, claimed:

"Unable to cope with the agitation but on the pretext that in the intended transfer of power, the Muslim League Party ... should receive its share Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana resigned."\textsuperscript{139}

Similarly, Sardar Bahadur Mohan Singh, a former adviser to the Secretary of State, informed P.J. Patrick in March 1947 that the Premier had been frightened out of office.\textsuperscript{140} In recent years, both Imran Ali (see above) and Penderel Moon have recorded similar conclusions; the latter stating, "The impotence of the Punjab Government in the face of a Muslim League challenge was thus starkly revealed and on 3 March Khizar submitted his Cabinet's resignation."\textsuperscript{141}

The Punjab Government, prompted by Jenkins' willingness to promulgate the Ordinance, did not exhibit impotence in meeting the League's challenge (see pp. 319-324). Khizar's decision to leave office, as Jenkins informed the Secretary of State and the Viceroy, on 2 March 1947, and as Khizar later admitted, resulted from his appreciation of the post-20 February situation. He accepted that the formation of a coalition
Government, including the Muslim League, was essential for the safety and peace of the Punjab, and he believed that it could not be achieved if the Unionist bloc continued to act as a buffer between the League and the minority parties. Before his resignation he had continually warned the Government that in the Punjab parliamentary majorities were of little importance, and that what really mattered was the strength of the "sanctions" behind a Ministry, and that no Government could be stable unless it commanded the allegiance of a majority in each of the major communities. In spite of this appreciation, however, up until 20 February Khizar had been prepared to carry on. The British decision to quit India demolished that resolve and totally disillusioned the Premier. The "bombshell" as he called it, had caught him totally unawares, and he bitterly resented the decision, which he considered to be the "work of lunatics". Khizar, by breeding and inclination, was essentially an Empire loyalist, and he could not conceive of playing a rôle in any situation in which the British did not hold the balance of power. Those who knew him recognised these sentiments, and attempted to exploit them in order to induce his resignation in order to pave the way for the League's assumption of power.

On 24 February 1947 Maqbool Mahmud (former Unionist M.L.A.), claiming the privilege of an old friend, exhorted the Premier to resign:

"there are occasions when you must force circumstances. Such a situation has now hatched. This is the zero hour. Attlees statement gives you the opportunity. Seize it. Smaller persons might hesitate. You are big enough, I know ... Settlement of Punjab League tangle is a step in the right direction. Turn it to a bigger account. ... A big gesture is needed ... Do not hesitate. Help to bring in the League in office with Congress or otherwise ... Attlees statement adds to your responsibility to Muslims & to Punjab..."  

The Congress High Command were naturally dismayed by Khizar's decision, for it spelt the end of Congress participation in the administration of the Province, and they attempted to exploit the situation to their own advantage, by denying that the retirement of the Premier had been precipitated by his acceptance of the urgent necessity to include the League in the Government of the Punjab, by blaming the Governor for his actions. Dewan Chaman Lall (Congress leader, M.L.A. 1937-1944), informed Nehru that Jenkins had attempted to persuade the Premier to join the League, in order to form a more stable Ministry in the Province, and that Khizar, rather than follow the advice, had preferred to resign. Whilst it is a fact that Jenkins considered that "The situation might have been saved by a genuine coalition between the Muslim League on the one hand and the Congress or the Panthic party on the other", there
is no evidence to support Chaman Lall's accusation. The allegation was strongly denied by Abell (Private Secretary to the Viceroy) and the Viceroy, who stated "that he knows it to be quite untrue that the Governor brought any pressure on Malik Khizar Hyat Khan to join the Muslim League." Despite this denial, which was conveyed to Nehru by Abell, the Hindustan Times echoed Chaman Lall's claim, stating that the situation had not merited the resignation of the Cabinet, and therefore by inference that Muslim League participation in the Provincial administration was not essential. The Statesman, in particular, emphasised this theme when it opined that it was an extraordinary event that an administration "supported by a Nationalist Coalition which is still in a majority should be dissolved and attempts should be made to set up an administration of a purely communal character which by itself does not commend (sic) a majority." The real anxiety behind the Congress objections was that if the League succeeded in forming a Ministry, it would use the advantage afforded to it to seize the whole of the Punjab for 'Pakistan'. This was revealed by Nehru who explaining to the Viceroy the basis of Hindu and Sikh fears noted, "This apprehension and conflict are obviously due to the fact that the Muslim League openly want to make the whole of the Punjab a Pakistan area and wish to use a League Ministry to that end."

Jenkins had charged Mamdot on 3 March 1947 with the responsibility of forming a Ministry, having advised him to seek an understanding with the Hindus and Sikhs, as any administration which did not have the support of those communities could not survive. In spite of this advice, however, the Governor initially was prepared to accept a League Government regardless of its composition in the hope that it would prompt the League to seek a rapprochement with the other major parties, particularly the Sikhs. Consequently he advised the Viceroy that even if the League was able to secure the support of only the Scheduled Caste and Anglo-Indian representatives in the Assembly, it should be allowed to assume responsibility, though failing a Hindu and Sikh inclusion, he recognised that a situation in which 'Governor's Rule' (section 93) would have to be imposed would not be long delayed, as there would be an immediate and possibly violent reaction by the Sikhs.

Jenkins proposal concurred with the views of both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. Wavell instructed Jenkins to proceed along the lines which he had indicated; Turnbull (Asst. Secretary Political Department) at the India Office noting that if the League could form a Ministry which:
"commands or has a chance of commanding a majority, they must surely be put into office and kept there until voted out by the Legislature or until an impossible law and order situation has arisen." 157

These sentiments had been conveyed to the Viceroy by Pethick-Lawrence (Secretary of State for India) on 5 March. 158 The collective decision to support the Governor and permit the League to assume control in the Punjab, reflected the British determination to avoid any accusations of partiality being levelled at them by the League, 159 for as Abell noted, if the League was denied the opportunity to govern in the Punjab, "They will claim that they are being robbed by a British-Congress alliance of the power to which they are entitled as the majority community." 160 Both Abell and Turnbull in reaching their conclusions agreed with Jenkins, that if the League assumed control with only the support of insignificant minority elements, a declaration of section 93 would be inevitable. 161 Thus the British clearly desired that any League failure to hold office in the Punjab should reflect the League's inability to secure the co-operation of the other major communities, rather than appearing to be the consequence of British designs to frustrate Muslim ambitions.

On the same day (5 March) that the Secretary of State had informed the Viceroy of his approval for a League Government, Jenkins abandoned his original posture, insisting that the League should only be permitted to assume office if it could provide proof that it would command a stable Ministry, which from necessity would have to include Sikh and Hindu support. 162 In arriving at this 'volte face' Jenkins had reacted to the degree of anti-League feeling which greeted the prospects of a Muslim government, and the implications it posed for the paramount power should civil strife occur. On the evening of 3 March both the Congress and the Panthic Sikhs had held a large meeting in Lahore, at which extremely violent anti-League speeches had been delivered, whilst on 4 March rioting had broken out in the city. 163 Jenkins, as a consequence of these developments, believed that if the League was installed it would precipitate a communal war spearheaded by a Sikh rising supported by the Hindus, and that if that situation arose, then he as the Governor, together with the police and the army would be compelled to support the Muslim League, as the current Government, in what would amount to a 'civil war' for possession of the Punjab. In order to prevent such an occurrence the Governor now urged the Viceroy to sanction the imposition of Section 93. 164 In soliciting Wavell's approval for 'Governor's Rule', Jenkins revealed that Mamdot had failed to substantiate his claim to possess a parliamentary majority as all but one of the Muslim Unionists
whose support he had cited were unlikely to join the League, and that as a result it appeared that only one non-League Muslim and two Scheduled Caste members would support the League.  

Jenkins' revised appreciation of the situation, particularly his repudiation of Mamdot's profession of control in the Assembly, persuaded Wavell to reluctantly agree to 'Governor's Rule', on the understanding that every endeavour would be made to secure a coalition in the Province. The Government of India was clearly dismayed at the declaration of Section 93 in the Province, and the belief still persisted in some quarters that if the League had been, or was given the opportunity to govern the Punjab, it would be conducive to a Muslim - non-Muslim rapprochement. Abell argued that the League should still be given the responsibility of forming a Government, though it would be necessary to temper the invitation with the warning that the Province would not be allowed to dissolve into disorder, and that to prevent such an occurrence the Governor would assume control if necessary. Such a proviso according to Abell would tempt the League to form a multi-communal coalition, as it clearly needed non-Muslim support in order to rule the whole of the Punjab, failing which it would face the alternative of controlling only the Muslim majority districts. In the face of Jenkins' warning, however, and the effect which it had on India Office policy, Abell's theory was never put into practice. Turnbull, who had previously supported the idea of allowing the League to assume office, even if it lacked Hindu and Sikh support (see above), completely revised his stand. As a result he considered that to promote the type of compromise envisaged by Abell would involve too great a risk as it would court a Sikh-Hindu rebellion, and thereby create a crisis at the centre, should the League seek military assistance to crush the revolt. The Secretary of State, acting on Jenkins and Turnbull's interpretation of the situation, echoed the latter's sentiments, when on 7 March he informed the Viceroy that he considered Governor's Rule preferable to a League Ministry possessing a majority, but which failed to include a genuine representative of at least one of the important minority parties, for if the British became involved in supporting the Muslim League in the suppression of a Hindu-Sikh revolt "is it not likely that serious situation would arise at once between yourself and your Government over use of troops for this purpose."  

Thus as a result of Jenkins' apprehension, and the misgivings which it fostered, particularly at the India Office, the door was firmly closed on the possibility of the League assuming office, even if it had enjoyed a small majority exclusive of Hindus and Sikhs. Though Jenkins continued
to maintain that the League had never possessed a majority.\textsuperscript{170} League leaders interpreted the Governor's action as partial, and encouraged the belief that its purpose was to deliberately deprive the organisation of power in the Punjab.\textsuperscript{171} There is no doubt that Jenkins personally was opposed to the idea of 'Pakistan', and the possible partition of the Punjab.\textsuperscript{172} In addition he believed, following discussions with Noon and Daultana, that the League's determination to assume control originated not from the local Muslim leaders, who were extremely apprehensive about the Sikh reaction to such a move, but resulted from Jinnah's strategy to use a League Government to lay claim to the entire Province for 'Pakistan',\textsuperscript{173} and his total control over his provincial minions who "will act under instructions from Jinnah who knows little and cares less about the real interests of the Punjab."\textsuperscript{174} Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the Governor's decision to oppose a League Government, though it may have reflected these views, arose primarily from his desire to prevent a civil war between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities, which would have necessitated British intervention. Also the League in conducting an extreme religiously orientated election campaign, and by resorting to agitation to oppose the Coalition Ministry, had seriously prejudiced its own prospects for assuming power in the Punjab.

Whilst the League's movement had not precipitated violence between the communities,\textsuperscript{175} it had been decidedly communal in character as both Muslims and non-Muslims believed that its objective was the establishment of a 'Muslim Raj'; the latter had not relished boasts about the impending establishment of Muslim rule, nor had they appreciated having their cars forcibly decorated with Muslim League flags.\textsuperscript{176} Hindu and Sikh sentiments had been further outraged by the celebration of 'Victory Day' by the League to mark the settlement with the Coalition, for as the Chief Secretary (Punjab Govt.) remarked,

"in affording evidence of Muslim solidarity and arrogance, they [Muslims] intensified the fears and hatred of the other communities and increased their determination not to be subjected to unwanted domination."\textsuperscript{177}

In view of the total commitment by the League to 'Pakistan', and the reaction which it evoked from Hindu and Sikh alike, no real basis existed for compromise between the communities. Even so the Provincial League in maintaining its quest to form a provincial administration attempted to entice Sikh co-operation through an offer of near parity in an envisaged Muslim-Sikh Cabinet (five Sikh seats in a Cabinet of 11). The initiative, however, was rejected by the Sikh leadership, as it remained convinced that the League was intent on seizing the whole of the
Province, thereby placing the rights of the minority communities in jeopardy. The fears and suspicions held by the Akali leaders, including Master Tara Singh and Swaraj Singh, were fully shared by the Congress leadership. Their total abhorrence to the prospect of League control had been expressed by Gopi Chand Bhargava in February 1947, when he had urged Khizar to use all the force at his command to crush the anti-Government movement:

"The events of the past few months show that the League is trying to overawe the minorities by adopting Fascist methods ... Pakistan has not been defined by Qaid-i-azam. If this what we see is foretaste of it, it shall be resisted even at cost of life. Therefore 2 courses are open to you. Either suppress this with all force at your command ... Or allow us to take law into our hands and protect ourselves."\(^{179}\)

Furthermore on 9 March the Working Committee of the All India Congress Committee expressed its total opposition to Muslim designs on the Punjab, and thereby the notion of League-Congress collaboration in the Province, by demanding, in resolution form, the partition of the territory. The resolution was accompanied by a joint Congress-Akali statement, which effectively voiced the mutual determination of both parties to shun the League and oppose its national goal:

"In no circumstances are we willing to give the slightest assurance or support to the Muslim League in the formation of a Ministry, as we are opposed to Pakistan in any shape or form.\(^{180}\)

The entry of the All-India National Congress into the provincial arena in this way was symbolic of the fact that there could be no settlement of the provincial situation, unless accompanied by agreement at the national level.\(^{181}\) The prospects for such an occurrence were remote, as Jinnah continued to demand a 'Pakistan' which remained undefined,\(^{182}\) but which was accepted to envisage the absorption of the Punjab, a Province which the Congress refused to concede in its entirety. The dispute could not fail to have serious communal repercussions in the Punjab. The stage was set, the birth or abortion of 'Pakistan' would necessitate the rupture of the Punjab womb, and Muslim and non-Muslim alike, intoxicated with communal fears, prejudices and jealousies, were prepared to spill blood to achieve their respective ends.

The riots and communal clashes, which began on 4 March 1947 and continued until the following August, began as an anti-League protest by Hindus and Sikhs determined that there should be no League Government in the Province. The Muslim community retaliated, determined to plunge the Punjab into civil war if necessary, to secure domination.\(^{183}\) Thus the disturbances were initiated by the communities against each other in the
presence of an administration which was to transfer power to an undeclared successor not later than June 1948, the object of each group being to secure a more favourable position for their community when Britain surrendered responsibility. This was apparent from the fact that in the Rawalpindi Division the underlying idea was to eliminate the non-Muslim 'fifth column', whilst in Lahore Muslims desired to purge the district of the non-Muslim element in the population. As Jenkins reflected in analysing the conflict in August 1947,

“We are faced not with an ordinary exhibition of political or communal violence, but with a struggle between the communities for the power which we are shortly to abandon. Normal standards cannot be applied to this communal war of succession….”

The battle for the Punjab served the purpose of the national politicians of every major complexion, even though all were unanimous in their condemnation of violence, but their actions encouraged, rather than dissuaded, its continuance. Broadly speaking the League interpreted the Hindu and Sikh atrocities as a movement designed to prevent their democratic right to rule the Province, whilst the Congress and the Sikh parties regarded Muslim excesses as conclusive proof that non-Muslims could not tolerate Pakistani rule. Whilst the internecine conflict was waged, Nehru, Patel (leading national Congress figure, regarded as the 'strong man' of the movement), and Baldev Singh visited the Punjab as members of the Central Government. In reality, of the three only Nehru behaved responsibly, though to the best of Jenkins' knowledge not one of them made any contact of importance with Muslims:

“Nehru was balanced and sensible; but Baldev Singh on at least two occasions went in for most violent communal publicity, and Patel's visit to Gurgaon was used to make it appear that the Hindus in that district were the victims of Muslim aggression, whereas broadly the contrary was the case. Similarly when Liaqat Ali Khan or Ghazanfar Ali Khan visited the Punjab, they did so not to assist the administration, but to assist the Muslims.”

Whilst it is apparent that these national figures, and Mamdot and Sachar did not personally publicly incite murder and arson, certain local leaders encouraged violence. The Sikh leaders, particularly Master Tara Singh, whipped Sikh feeling to a fever pitch and Akali regiments were raised in preparation for a defensive attack upon Muslims, and Shaukat Hyat, in order to curry favour with the Muslim farmers of Lyallpur, actively encouraged them to take revenge on those Sikh farmers who remained in their midst. Also the actual campaigns of violence were directed and controlled by men connected with the major party organisations, and were in receipt of funds to pursue their respective
The Governor was convinced that, "there is very little doubt that the disturbances have in some degree been organised and paid for by persons or bodies directly or indirectly under the control of the Muslim League, the Congress, and the Akali party." In addition recruitment to the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, the Muslim League National Guards, and the Akal Sena had been maintained, and although by May 1947 none of the organisations had been equipped with modern weapons, their continued existence did not suggest that they were merely expected to fulfil a spectator role; there was strong evidence implicating the Swayam Sewak Sangh as the instigator behind the Hindu excesses.

Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that the joint appeal issued by Gandhi and Jinnah in April 1947 for a cessation of the internece strife, was discounted as being insincere, for as Akhter Hussain (Chief Sec., Punjab Govt.) reported:

"The joint appeal ... has not brought about the improvement for which so many fervently hoped. This is due to the unfortunate fact that many felt that one or both had been persuaded to a line of combined action which neither individually would have prompted ... [these doubts] might have been overcome if the provincial followers of the principals had acted in a way which provided practical acceptance of the published wishes of the leaders." It was not until the following June that the Province's communal leaders - Mamdot, Sachar and Swaram Singh - agreed under pressure from the Governor, to co-operate in stopping the troubles, but none of them went further than uttering pious statements, and no real effort was made, either through private pressure, or the withholding of funds, to end the conflagration.

Moreover the Punjabi leaders' attitude was really an extension of the political temper which had gripped the respective communities - reason having been submerged in a wave of communal hatred. Compromise was neither genuinely sought nor desired, as was reflected by the provincial press. The entire Hindu press, including the People, Hindu and Milap, was clamouring for partition, whilst extremist Hindu and Sikh publications (notably Ranjit, Khalsa Sewak and Sakh Jiwan) openly preached violent opposition to Pakistan. In retaliation the Muslim press (notably Dawn and the Eastern Times) united in its condemnation of the proposed division of the Punjab, and neither the Muslim or non-Muslim media was prepared to endorse Gandhi and Jinnah's plea for moderation, and forego the inherent urge of sniping at their opposite numbers, or to
make political capital from the move. Hindu and Sikh newspapers rejected Jinnah's stance as insincere, arguing that he had refrained from abandoning similar agitation in Assam and N.W.F.P., and the League press which received the appeal with some favour, could nevertheless resist using it as a propaganda lever for the two-nation theory.

In such an atmosphere the protagonists of all persuasions reached for knives, rather than reason. Terrible atrocities were committed by all communities. The massacre by Muslims of non-Muslims in the districts of Attock, Jhelum and Multan in March 1947 was answered by the retaliatory slaughter of Muslims in Gurgaon in May. The plight of refugees seeking sanctuary amongst their co-religionists, helped to spread the tales of horror, increasing the anger, and the desire for revenge on the opposite communities. Whole villages entered the carnage, which as Williams (I.C.S. officer, served in Punjab 1932-47) recalled was made all the more effective, and thereby terrible, due to the sporadic involvement of serving army officers (Indian) who responding to their inherent communal instincts, directed the slaughter:

"In the countryside the entire religious community of one village would take part in the wholesale slaughter of those of an opposite religion, and cases were known of Indian army officers on leave organising mass attacks of this kind."

By August 1947, following six months of communal warfare, the Governor estimated that 5,000 persons had been killed and 3,000 seriously injured, of the latter 1,200 and 1,500 respectively were Muslims and non-Muslims. In respect of the damage done to property no accurate estimate was made, but in Lahore the Deputy Commissioner assessed that up to 28 July 1947, of the 20,256 houses, 1,120 (5.5%) had been destroyed, whilst outside the walled city, of the 50,519 dwellings, 225 (0.4%) had been levelled.

When national and provincial leaders did intervene, it was purely to attempt to secure political advantage. On 10 March Nehru suggested to Wavell that tranquility in the Punjab might be restored by the inauguration of two Ministries - one for the western, the other for the eastern part of the Province. The Congress leader claimed, quite unconvincingly, that the measure was not intended to prejudice the partition issue, but merely to facilitate the continuance of the administration. The shallowness of the ploy was immediately recognised by Wavell's advisors, Abell cautioned that the Muslim League would strongly object to such a proposal "which is based on the Congress claim that the non-Muslim areas of the Punjab (and of Bengal) must be kept from Muslim domination." Nehru's advice was rejected on these grounds, and because the scheme was not practicable, as it was not considered appropriate at the time.
to divide the police force into two separate groups with allegiances to two governments, and as the work of Central Departments, e.g. Irrigation, Buildings and Roads, and Agriculture could not be re-organised quickly on a regional basis. 203

In contrast to Nehru's initiative, Raja Ghazanfar Ali, determined that the partition of the Punjab should not occur, requested a fresh general election to establish beyond doubt the League's claim to the entire Province, in the belief that a majority League Ministry would emerge. His views, however, were not received with enthusiasm by some of his provincial colleagues or the Governor. Both Daultana and Mamdot appeared to be resigned to acceptance of the fact that a League Government would be unable to function in the face of non-Muslim agitation, especially on the part of the Sikhs. 204 Although it was accepted by the Governor's staff that there was little doubt that an election would result in the League capturing approximately ninety seats, and thereby control of the Assembly, 205 Jenkins rejected Ghazanfar Ali's plea on the grounds that it would precipitate further bloodshed, and that following the outbreak of the disorders and atrocities "neither I nor any other British officer..." would have anything to do with a purely communal Ministry. 206 The new Viceroy (Mountbatten succeeded Wavell on 24 March 1947) whom the Raja had also petitioned, endorsed the Governor's decision. Mountbatten regarded the Province, with its large minority populations, as a microcosm of the Indian problem, and he informed Ghazanfar Ali that he had no intention of prejudicing the issue of India as a whole, by giving a precipitate decision over the Punjab. 207

The rebuttal which the League received intensified rather than diminished Jinnah's determination to install a League Ministry in the Province. Mamdot, acting under the latter's instructions, and against his own apparent convictions (see above), persistently petitioned the Governor in April and May to be allowed to form an administration on the grounds that the League possessed a parliamentary majority. The move was intended to establish League domination in the Province on a constitutional and democratic basis to use the forces which would be at its command to combat the non-Muslim opposition and so strengthen the negotiating power of Jinnah at the national level. 208 Jenkins remained determined that the League should be deprived of the opportunity to establish its will in the Province believing that it would cause an escalation of the violence. In expressing his views to Mountbatten, Jenkins again emphasised the implications the installation of a League Ministry would have for British personnel. He reported that the non-Muslims were
concerned, with some justification, that not only would Mamdot use the police and armed troops, which would be at his disposal, to crush them, but that he would withdraw the criminal proceedings which were pending against Muslims accused of committing atrocities in the Rawalpindi Division and Multan. Consequently the civil services would divide along communal lines, and the task of British officials operating in civil war conditions would become impossible, which the Governor considered would result in a number of them, including several senior police officers, resigning. In seeking Mountbatten's approval to refuse the League's request, Jenkins further urged the Viceroy to consider the effect which internecine strife between a League Ministry and non-Muslim opponents would have on the national negotiations pending between himself and the national leaders. If the Viceroy agreed, Jenkins proposed opposing Mamdot's claim on the grounds that a multi-communal administration was necessary to meet the Provisions of the 1935 Government of India Act (that the major communities should be represented in the Ministry).

Though Jenkins continued to doubt Mamdot's ability to control a majority in the Assembly, he considered that it would be tactically wrong to oppose him on that point, as by so doing he would automatically commit himself to accepting a communal Ministry if the existence of a majority was proved. Also Jenkins further requested Mountbatten to attempt to secure Jinnah's concurrence, in order to diffuse the tension in the Province. 209

Mountbatten agreed completely with the Governor's suggested strategy, and on 26 April, during a meeting with Jinnah, the Viceroy informed the Muslim leader that Mamdot's request would be rejected. 210 Mountbatten reiterated Jenkins' argument that the immediate outcome of the League assuming office would be further civil strife, and he reinforced the warning by revealing that both Tara Singh and Kartar Singh had given him the impression that a League Ministry would face armed opposition from the Sikhs. Furthermore the Viceroy counselled that it would be irresponsible to precipitate further violence in the Punjab at a time when official discussions were in progress concerning the transfer of power, particularly in view of "the great probability that Pakistan would emerge with a partition of the Punjab", and as such it would be pointless to impose a government on the Province, which would be resisted at the cost of bloodshed, merely to permit a Muslim League Ministry to operate for only a brief period. In seeking, without success, Jinnah's acceptance of the argument, Mountbatten concluded:

"One day you will be thankful to me for saving you from getting into this mess that you would like to get into
in the Punjab; it is mainly in the interests of
the Muslim League that I am making this decision,
and I am sorry not to have your agreement."^212

It was a naive and deceptive explanation with which to confront
Jinnah. Mountbatten possessed an antipathy towards the Muslim leader,
whom he considered to be mentally deranged:

"I regard Jinnah as a psychopathic case; in fact
until I had met him I would not have thought it
possible that a man with such a complete lack of
administrative knowledge or sense of responsibility
could achieve or hold down so powerful a position."^213

Also the Viceroy's concern for the League was minimal, if it existed at
all, his primary motivation not unnaturally was to commit no act which
would involve British troops in a confrontation between a majority League
Ministry and non-Muslim Punjabis, and to avoid a further escalation of
the violence, which could have destroyed the possibility of a peaceful
British withdrawal from India. If Jinnah had endorsed the Viceroy's
declared intentions in opposing a League Ministry in the Punjab, he would
have given, in effect, his tacit approval for the division of the
Province, having publicly determined to oppose it. As a result the
Provincial League, acting in accordance with Jinnah's wishes, refused to
abandon its ministerial ambitions and continued to seek office, though
in view of what Mountbatten had told him, Jinnah could have been in no
doubt that Mamdot would not be successful. Nevertheless a united Punjab
remained a vital bargaining counter, not to be lightly discarded. In
the Province the apparent British reluctance to permit the League to
enjoy its democratic rights, combined with the insistence of the League
leadership to be granted office, maintained the tempo of the agitation
by increasing Muslim frustration and bitterness, as it was widely though
incorrectly believed that British policy reflected the anti-Muslim bias
of Jenkins, who desired, in the words of Liaquat Ali Khan, to "suppress",
"intimidate" and "coerce" Muslims.^214 It was an unfair and groundless
denunciation of the Governor, for Jenkins had responded to the situation
out of concern for the Punjab and British interests, in that he desired
to contain the violence and loss of life, and prevent if possible British
personnel abandoning their non-partisan stance, as they would have been
forced to do, had a League administration faced rebellion (see pp.329-332)
In order to achieve his objectives, however, it had been necessary to
frustrate the League's political ambitions, and in the tense and violent
atmosphere which prevailed in the Punjab from March 1947 onwards, the
Governor's stance was seen as partisan and anti-Muslim, and as such
appeared to merit extreme resistance.
The Muslim desire to rule the Punjab as a prerequisite to its total absorption into 'Pakistan', and the non-Muslim determination, intensified by the Rawalpindi massacres which had occurred in March 1947, to resist such domination at all costs presented the British (now desperately and sincerely attempting to extricate themselves from India) with a potentially explosive dilemma. In view of the highly inflammable atmosphere prevailing in the Province, the continued existence of a united Punjab had become a liability which the British were no longer prepared to countenance, as any settlement conceding the whole of the Province to 'Pakistan' would have plunged the territory, and possibly India, into civil war, thereby preventing a peaceful British withdrawal from the subcontinent. Both Nehru and Gandhi had accepted early in 1946 that 'Pakistan' would become a reality, but both insisted that its birth would not be at the expense of Hindu dominated areas. Nehru had admitted to Woodrow Wyatt on 10 January 1946 that he believed that the British Government would be forced to concede 'Pakistan', but that there would have to be territorial readjustments to prevent the absorption of Hindu districts by the Muslim State. If such a concession was not granted, then Nehru warned that the Government of India would face a Congress mass movement which would eclipse all of its predecessors. Similarly, Gandhi, in a conversation with Abell in March 1946, had opined that 'Pakistan's' boundaries could include only genuine Muslim areas. Even Jinnah accepted that in view of Congress opposition, 'Pakistan' would never include the whole of Bengal or the Punjab, but he was careful not to publicise his opinions. In a private meeting with Wyatt in early February 1946, he told the M.P. that he was resigned to the exclusion of the Burdwan Division of Bengal, but that he was determined to secure Calcutta, and in the same month the Aga Khan confided to Wavell that the League leader was prepared to concede Amritsar and Ambala in the Punjab.

Jinnah's public attitude, however, hardened considerably following the League's sweeping victories at the polls, and the British declaration that independence would be granted in June 1948. The Muslim electorate had been encouraged to believe that 'Pakistan' would include large non-Muslim areas, and it became incumbent upon Jinnah to attempt to realise their expectations, even though they differed from his own. Jinnah, who was a superb negotiator, knew that it would be sheer folly to concede too much too soon, if he was to achieve any measure of success in countering Congress objections. Nevertheless his private utterances proved a grave error, for they created the impression amongst
the British that he would accept far less than his public posturing suggested.221 This belief was further enhanced by an unguarded plea which Jinnah made to Wavell in November 1946: "He thought we should give them their own bit of country, let it be as small as we liked, but it must be their own, and they would live on one meal a day."222

Thus it was Jinnah's apparent willingness to make concessions, combined with Congress and Sikh opposition to the inclusion of non-Muslim areas, and their determination to violently oppose absorption by 'Pakistan', which helped to spawn Partition. Nevertheless great bitterness still exists among many Pakistanis who insist that the division of the Punjab and Bengal resulted from a concentrated Congress-British intrigue to cripple the new nation at birth. Unfortunately this belief has received great impetus from the pro-Congress sentiments of the last Viceroy, and the fact that as a private citizen following his retirement from public affairs, he did not attempt to conceal the contempt he felt towards Jinnah. Also it is a view which Campbell-Johnson's sycophantic exercise of glorification, Mission with Mountbatten, has encouraged. The author's portrayal of Jinnah's coldness and aloofness in his relationship with Mountbatten, is in marked contrast to the warmth and affection which Campbell-Johnson stresses existed between the Viceroy and Gandhi. In addition, the narrative contains scornful references designed to belittle the Muslim leader.223

Jenkins, in the belief that the division of the Punjab would be a social and economic disaster, had hoped to elicit support for an initiative to produce a truly representative multi-communal Government for the Province, in order to replace Section 93, and to avoid the Province's break-up,224 but his endeavours were doomed to failure. His conception of the Punjab's political requirements was totally out of step with the communal temper of the times, the declared wishes of the Sikhs and the Congress, the expectations of the Viceroy, at least one of his senior advisors, and of the senior officials at the India Office. On 11 March 1947 Baldev Singh had impressed upon Wavell the necessity of dividing the Punjab in order to create a new province "embracing the contiguous area where non-Muslims form a clear majority as a whole and have larger property interests".225 Following meetings between Sikh leaders and Nehru in Lahore in the second week of March 1947, the Congress adopted the Sikh demand in resolution form, though as is evident from the opinions expressed by Nehru and Gandhi in the opening months of 1946 (see above) Mountbatten was wrong to conclude in June 1947 that the Congress action had been precipitated "mainly at the request of the Sikh
In fact the actions of both the Congress and the Sikhs represented a response to the overwhelming Provincial League victory at the polls, and its insistence that 'Pakistan' should include the whole territory. The League success also convinced Menon (Reforms Secretary, Govt. of India) that partition was inevitable, and it was a view with which Wavell concurred. Similarly, the consensus of opinion at the India Office favoured partition, in that it afforded Britain the least dangerous option. Turnbull, whilst he considered Jenkins' desire to maintain the unity of the Province was no doubt right for the Punjab, nevertheless refused to support it as

"this matter is a crucial issue in the all-India situation and ought to be viewed in that light and in the light of H.K.G.'s policy. So viewed I think that partition is the only way." Turnbull was broadly supported by Patrick (Asst. Under Sec. of State), and Monteath (Permanent Under Sec. of State); the latter strongly recommended the formulation of a scheme for the separation of the Punjab on the supposition that it was an 'inevitable feature' of the all-India problem of handing responsibility to more than one authority. Only one of their senior colleagues dissented. Croft (Deputy Under Sec. of State) regarded the move as premature, favouring the preservation of a united Punjab.

Croft's desire to preserve the unity of the Province, however, failed to dissuade his associates, or influence the Secretary of State, who agreed with the majority view. Pethick-Lawrence was obsessed with realising one over-riding objective - a peaceful British withdrawal, and consequently he deprecated any developments which might prejudice that aim. On 3 April he conveyed his views to the new Viceroy. He stressed that whilst he appreciated the motives behind Jenkins' move, he considered that the creation of a multi-communal coalition would achieve nothing in the long run, and might cause serious problems for the British Government. He argued that as it was probable that Britain would be obliged to transfer power to more than one recipient, a local coalition government in the Punjab would be bound to disintegrate as the Punjab Muslim League would wish to join with Sind and N.W.F.P. to create 'Pakistan', whilst the non-Muslims would support union with India. If the government collapsed following the British departure, Pethick-Lawrence realised that it would be disastrous for India, but if it happened prior to independence, he feared that it would prove particularly embarrassing for the British Government, and in order to avoid either eventuality he concluded,

"the partition of the Punjab to such degree and in such
form as will satisfy the rival nationalisms in the Province is really unavoidable from the political point of view of the transfer of authority in June 1948."\(^{232}\)

Thus at the outset of Mountbatten's viceroyalty the inevitability of partition was an accepted fact, and on 17 April 1947 the new Viceroy informed the Secretary of State that he agreed with his analysis, and in the event of the Cabinet Mission plan continuing to prove unacceptable to all parties, partition would be practically unavoidable.\(^{233}\) This plan, published on 16 May 1946, had envisaged the creation of a three-tiered Indian Union, consisting of three groups of Provinces - Section A to include Madras, Bombay, the Central Provinces, the United Provinces and Bihar; Section B comprising N.W.F.P., Punjab and Sind; and Section C, incorporating Bengal and Assam. Each group would be free to decide upon the constitution for each of its constituent provinces, as for the section as a whole, and to define which subjects would fall under the control of the section governments. This constitutional formula also proposed the creation of an Interim Government at the Centre, representing the major political parties. Jinnah on 6 June 1946 accepted the proposal, subject to the subsequent proviso, which Wavell accepted, that if the Congress rejected it, the League would still be able to join the Interim administration. Ispahani in explaining Jinnah's acceptance, has argued that in effect it guaranteed 'Pakistan' in fact, if not in name, as there were sufficient safeguards to protect the Muslim Provinces from interference from the Union Government, whose powers were limited to foreign affairs, defence and communications. Also any constitution agreed upon under the Plan would be revised at the end of a ten-year period, which implied that Provinces or Sections would be free to secede from the Union if they so desired. The Indian National Congress initially agreed to the compromise, but it refused to join an Interim Government, and on 10 July 1946 Nehru repudiated the notion of the compulsory grouping of the Provinces into sections. Prior to that development the Cabinet Mission had informed Jinnah that should the Congress refuse to co-operate in the Interim Government, then the League would not be permitted to participate. As a result Jinnah withdrew his acceptance of the scheme.\(^{234}\)

Any desire which Mountbatten entertained concerning the resuscitation of the Cabinet Mission formula, however, was quickly dispelled by Jinnah. The Muslim leader was no longer prepared to place his trust in the proposed formula. The revocation of Wavell's undertaking concerning League participation at the Centre, coupled with Nehru's objections to the compulsory grouping of Provinces, convinced him that he had been
betrayed by the British, and that he would suffer a similar fate at the hands of the Congress, in that the latter would use their permanent majority at the Centre to destroy 'Pakistan'. In view of Jinnah's fear, Mountbatten realised that any attempt to enforce the Cabinet Mission solution would invite an armed Muslim rebellion, and as such the only apparent alternative was an independent and sovereign 'Pakistan', which because of the extreme opposition of Punjabi Sikhs and Hindus, would of necessity have to be limited in the Punjab to the Muslim majority districts. In reacting to this situation, the Viceroy, during the course of six meetings, held with Jinnah in mid-April 1947, defined the 'Pakistan' which would emerge if Jinnah persisted in insisting on separation:

"I pointed out that the most he could hope for from me was to allow Provinces, and where applicable halves of Provinces, to decide whether they wished to join Pakistan. I pointed out that at this rate it looked as though he would get Sind and Western Punjab for certain; the N.W.F.P. would be a doubtful starter (and if he got it would cost him 3½ crores a year to keep the tribes quiet). In the east I pointed out that he would get the most useless part of Bengal, without Calcutta, and if he wished it he could have Sylhet back from Assam."

In view of the antipathy Mountbatten felt for Jinnah, and his distaste for the League, there can be little hope that the stark prospects with which he confronted Jinnah, caused him little regret. Nevertheless he was not the Muslim nation's architect, so far as the Punjab was concerned. He had known at the time of his arrival in India that the Secretary of State had decided that division was the only plausible alternative (see p.343), and it had been made abundantly apparent to him by the Sikhs in particular that Muslim national aspirations could only be satisfied at the expense of the unity of the territory. Tara Singh and Baldev Singh, in the last week of April 1947 had bluntly told the Viceroy that their co-religionists would fight to the 'last man' if placed under Muslim domination: "Any hopes that I still entertained of being able to avoid the partition of the Punjab if Pakistan is forced upon us were shattered at this meeting..." Faced with irreconcilable communal elements, and in the knowledge that Britain had no desire to resort to arms to impose a settlement, Mountbatten accepted, and in no sense engineered, the Province's break-up:

"I realise that all this partition business is sheer madness... No-one would ever induce me to agree to it were it not for this fantastic communal madness that has seized everybody and leaves no other course open."
On 2 June 1947 the fate of the Punjab and India was formally disclosed to the Indian national leaders by the Viceroy, Jinnah bowing to the inevitable with a nod of his head. Although he had publicly maintained his opposition to partition of the Punjab until the end, he had known from mid-April that it would occur. He was powerless to prevent it, the refusal of the Viceroy to consider the division of the Indian army, deprived him of the opportunity to use the presence of pro-Pakistani troops as a bargaining factor. His only alternative could have been the incitement of a Muslim rising; such a course, however, was contrary to his constitutional character, and could not have guaranteed success. Jinnah at heart was not a political gambler, but a cautious strategist, and as such even a 'moth-eaten Pakistan' was preferable to the risks involved in attempting to forge a nation through war or revolution.

On 3 June 1947 Mountbatten announced that the Assemblies in those Provinces which were to be partitioned would be required to vote to signify their acceptance of the scheme, and that the actual details of the divisions would be formulated by a Boundary Commission, to be advised by a Committee appointed by the leaders of the respective communities. Significantly, the Viceroy also revealed that the Fourth Infantry Division, at the unanimous request of his Cabinet, would be stationed in those areas of the Punjab subject to division to prevent further bloodshed:

"that is the reason and the only reason why the Defence Member, Sardar Baldev Singh, announced last night the transfer of additional troops.... I do not need to tell you that this is not a British move." The process of withdrawal had reached a critical stage for the British, the deployment of troops was bound to heighten tension if interpreted as a move to coerce any particular section of Punjabi society, and the eventual award of the Boundary Commission could not fail but to leave all the communities disappointed and more embittered, particularly as the Muslims had been denied a united Punjab, the Sikhs were entertaining hopes for a Sovereign State bordered by the Chenab and the Jamna, and the Hindus hoped to gain Lahore. Mountbatten considered that the clash of interests could precipitate civil war, and in order to reduce the risks of a British involvement, he advanced the date for independence to 15 August 1947.

Irrespective of the Viceroy's 'divide and quit' announcement Jenkins faced the onerous task of attempting to contain the communal violence which continued to plague the Province. The national leaders, sobered by
the prospect of inheriting political responsibility at the end of a six-week period, were all anxious to secure the tranquillity of the Punjab, and thereby avoid the escalation of a full-scale communal war between the two successor States. Jinnah complained to the Viceroy that the Governor had adopted a weak attitude, declaring that "I don't care whether you shoot Moslems or not, it has got to be stopped." Similarly Nehru also believed that strong action was necessary, and he favoured a declaration of martial law in all the troubled areas, including Lahore and Amritsar, although this suggestion did not meet with the approval of Liaqat Ali Khan. The Governor, however, despite the fact that Mountbatten favoured strong action, refused to yield to extreme methods. From the time of the collapse of the Coalition Government, Jenkins had been determined to avoid any move which would lead to an escalation of the disturbances and the subsequent involvement of British soldiers. It was his considered opinion, which he shared with Bruce (Inspector General of Police, Punjab) and Brigadier Cazenore (the Lahore area Commander), that the deployment of troops could not succeed in combating the agitation, as they would not be faced with widespread rioting but numerous bouts of terrorism of a 'cloak and dagger' nature. As such, Jenkins feared that having failed to crush the violence, the army, to the acute embarrassment of Britain, would become bogged down in attempting to combat a continually deteriorating situation. Furthermore he was opposed to the use of Indian troops, because he did not wish them to be exposed to the type of communal attacks to which the provincial police had been subjected. Also Jenkins was highly suspicious of the true motives behind the Congress call for martial law, being convinced that "When a Hindu leader talks about 'utter ruthlessness' or 'martial law', he means that he wants as many Muslims as possible shot out of hand." In view of these objections, particularly concerning the involvement of the army, and the almost total disintegration of the services, the morale of which had been seriously undermined by communalism, and the near exhaustion of the police, the Governor reasoned that the only way to stop the destruction and killings, was by persuading the provincial political leaders to use their influence to secure that objective, "not by press statements but by contacts which they unquestionably possess with violent elements". The Viceroy appreciated the logic of Jenkins' arguments, and in spite of Nehru's continued insistence, he refused to allow the imposition of martial law. It was agreed instead that the Governor should be permitted to seek the co-operation of the local leaders to join a Standing Security Committee to work with the
Governor for the restoration of peace and that at Patel's suggestion the provincial officials in Lahore should be replaced by men who enjoyed the confidence of all the communities.\textsuperscript{254}

Jenkins readily agreed to Patel's innovation - "If by permitting the poachers to select their own game-keepers we can stop them poaching, so much the better" - and on 26 June he secured the participation of all three communal leaders - Mamdot, Bhim Sen Sachar and Swaran Singh - on the Security Committee.\textsuperscript{255} In spite of the apparent desire of these men to restore order,\textsuperscript{256} the Committee disintegrated on 3 July as a result of Mamdot's resignation. The Muslim leader attempted to portray his withdrawal as a protest against the anti-Muslim activities which were being condoned in the Province, having complained to the Governor on 2 July of the "vindictive" and "outrageous" manner in which the administration had used all its powers to oppress and victimise the Muslim public of Lahore, by organising searches solely in Muslim areas, and by using the Special Staff, which had been brought into existence under the supervision of the D.I.G. of Police to extort false statements from Muslims. He also claimed that the communal partiality of that organisation was reflected by its overwhelmingly non-Muslim composition.\textsuperscript{257} In fact Mamdot's claims were largely spurious. The personnel employed on the Special Staff amounted to 20 officers, 9 of whom were Muslims, the remainder including 3 Britons, 6 Sikhs and 2 Hindus, and up to the 2 July 1947 37 people had been interrogated, of whom 20 were Muslims, 12 were Hindus and 5 were Sikhs. The Governor denied that any improper methods had been used in questioning suspects at any time, emphasising that the presence of a multi-communal staff provided adequate safeguards against excesses being directed against the members of any particular community, but he did admit that of the 419 arrests and searches which had occurred in Greater Lahore from 23 June to 2 July, 285 (68\%) had involved Muslims. Even so it would appear that although the figures seem to suggest a degree of anti-Muslim bias, in all probability they reflected the fact that so far as the Lahore area was concerned the activities of Muslim terrorist groups justified such a high degree of surveillance. For in reality the Muslims of Lahore in order to strengthen their claims on the Provincial capital had perpetrated a deliberate campaign to drive as many non-Muslims as possible from it. The success of their endeavours can be measured by the fact that by the beginning of July 1947 there was a large and continuous exodus of Hindus and Sikhs from the city.\textsuperscript{259} Mamdot knew of their endeavours, and he was not prepared to be publicly associated with any genuine, concentrated effort to curtail them. For
this reason, prior to his resignation, he had offered his continued co-operation on the condition that all 'repressive' and 'oppressive' measures would immediately cease, and would only be employed following full consultation with the Council.\textsuperscript{260} It seems evident that if the concession had been granted, Mamdot would have used it to attempt to prevent the further investigation of potentially dangerous Muslim areas.\textsuperscript{261}

Mamdot's retirement from the Security Committee effectively destroyed the last hope of diffusing the highly tense situation in the cities and rural areas of the Punjab. The murders, maimings and outbreaks of arson continued unabated, and as a result the Province's last weeks of geographical unity were marked by mounting fear and chaos. The Assembly had voted on the partition issue on 23 June 1947, formally sanctioning the Punjab's division, the eight former Muslim Unionists, including Khizar having supported the transfer of the territory to Pakistan. An attempt by Mamdot to retain provincial unity was defeated by M.L.As. from the Eastern Punjab, by 50 votes to 22.\textsuperscript{262} The drama was almost over, only one act remained, and that was to culminate in tragedy. Whilst Mountbatten was not responsible for the decision to break the Punjab into two, his failure to ensure that the division was made as humanely as possible, contributed greatly to the mass slaughter which occurred. In April 1947 Jinnah had told the Viceroy "You must carry out a surgical operation; cut India and its army firmly in half and give me the half that belong to the Muslim League."\textsuperscript{263} Under Mountbatten's direction, however, the 'surgical operation' degenerated into sheer butchery. At the Viceroy's insistence the period to achieve the transfer of power had been dramatically reduced, a decision which whilst it relieved Britain of any long-term commitment, sealed the fate of the Punjab and condemned it to certain mayhem, for as Jenkins observed:

"It would be difficult enough to partition within six weeks a country of 30 million people which has been governed as a unit for 98 years even if all concerned were friendly and anxious to make progress."\textsuperscript{264}

The Punjab, however, had tottered on the precipice of civil war for six months, its communities were actively engaged in committing atrocities, and exhorting reprisals against each other, and the mutual fears which the acts of violence had bred, had precipitated mass migrations from the east of Muslims, and from the west of non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{265} The situation was considerably aggravated at the district level, particularly those which fell in the border areas, by the transfer of many senior Indian officials either to the Indian or Pakistan territories. This development, in the opinion of Belcher (I.C.S. Officer, served in the Punjab 1939-1947),
increased the flood of refugees and the resultant chaos:

"A consequence of the requirement that senior Indian officials on each side of the border should be of the 'right' community on Independence Day; it followed from this that at the very moment when minorities were feeling most vulnerable and in need of reassurance they found that senior District officials of their own community who might have given them that reassurance had themselves disappeared over the border."266

Also no adequate measures were taken for the protection of the evacuees; a totally inadequate 'Border Patrol Force' was appointed to police the frontier areas but it represented nothing more than a token gesture. The force, comprised of only two divisions, was overwhelmed by the continuous tide of human despair and misery which confronted it.267

It was a serious error of judgement on the part of Mountbatten which ensured that the withdrawal of British power in the Punjab would take place amongst widespread suffering and carnage. Even so the Viceroy was not the only villain of the piece. The Home Government acquiesced in the Viceroy's action. But the key members of Attlee's Ministry had little knowledge of India. For example until December 1946, of the Prime Minister's senior colleagues, Addison, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, was ignorant of the fact that the Sikhs originated from and inhabited the Punjab, whilst Ellen Wilkinson, the Education Minister, was surprised to learn that only approximately five hundred British officials were stationed in the Province.268 Mountbatten, however, knew of the situation and dangers which prevailed in the Punjab, and as the man who sanctioned the largely ill-prepared and unsupervised partition he must bear the brunt of the blame for what occurred. The disgust which his actions engendered was not confined solely to the victims, but has been expressed by at least one British I.C.S. officer who served under him. Cowley (served in the Punjab 1939-47) has written:

"It was murder. This precipitate decision by the Labour Government which Wavell had refused to carry out, cost over a million lives.269 There are some members of the Punjab I.C.S. who think it was correct ... The majority share my view that it was a disastrous error. Wavell himself had a plan for a two-tier withdrawal, retaining control of the disputed areas until some reasonable solution could be reached. This would have been sensible ... Nothing could have been worse than the plan adopted and the timing and method of its adoption. I have the greatest admiration for Mountbatten as a Supreme Commander. No doubt as Governor General of the new independent India he was a success. But for the Punjab ... he was a disaster."270

Though the actual act of partition was brutal, the causes for the division emanated from a provincial society comprised of irreconcilable
elements. The growth of nationalism had divided the communities even further, especially as neither Muslims nor non-Muslims were willing to accept the rule of any community other than their own. Whilst the Unionist party had flourished until 1943, its multi-communal nature and philosophy could only survive so long as the British held the actual power in the Punjab and in India. The decision of the British to relinquish control in August 1947 created a power vacuum which multi-communal political philosophies could not fill, as fears and hatreds on both sides, having been aroused, particularly by the elections of 1946, totally prejudiced the prospects for co-operation between the communities following the transfer of power. In agreeing that the Punjab should be divided to satisfy the nationalist ambitions of the Muslim and non-Muslim communities, the Viceroy accepted the inevitable, though he did little to prevent the catastrophe which followed.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

3. Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 5 May 1946.
4. Ibid., 3 March 1946.
5. Ibid., 1 March 1946; GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
6. Civil and Military Gazette, 6 March 1946.
7. Ibid., 6 March 1946; 7 March 1946.
8. Ibid., 7 March 1946; 21 March 1946; GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
9. Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of Jan. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.
10. Ibid., second half of Feb. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.
17. Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 27 Nov. 1946, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.
19. GR, Jenkins to Colville, 30 Nov. 1946, L/P&J/5/249; GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 14 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
21. The British Government in January 1946 decided to send a Cabinet Delegation to India in an effort to solve the problems inherent in British withdrawal and the transfer of power. It consisted of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and A.V. Alexander.
23. Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of March 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.
24. Civil and Military Gazette, 6 March 1946.
25. Ibid.
27. GR, Glancy to Wavell, 15 March 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.
28. Note by Glancy, 7 March 1946, enclosure Abell to Clauson, 11 March 1946, L/P&J/8/462, IOR.
29. Civil and Military Gazette, 9 March 1946; Times of India, 7 March 1946.


31. Glancy confronted Mamdot with a letter signed by the two Hindu M.L.As. expressing their decision to continue as students - Note by Glancy, 7 March 1946, enclosure Abell to Clauson, 11 March 1946, L/P&J/8/472, IOR.

32. Ibid.

33. Note by Clauson, 21 Jan. 1946, L/P&J/8/470, IOR; Times of India, 7 March 1946.

34. Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana (Premier Khushab), Nawab Malik Sir Allah Bakhsh Tiwana (Sargodha), Mian Bagh Ali (Fazilka), Maulana Daud Ghaznavi (East Punjab - Labour), Fazal Illahi (Gujrat North), Khan Sahib Mir Muhammad Abdullah (Mianwali South), the Hon. Mian Muhammad Ibrahim (Alipur), Lt.Col. Sardar Sir Muhammad Nawaz Khan (Attock Central), Mian Muhammad Rafiq (Outer Lahore - urban), the Hon. Nawab Sir Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash (Lahore), Mian Sultan Ali Nangiana (Shahpur) - Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 21 March 1946, vol. XXV, pp. 7-5, 7-9, V/9/3830, IOR.

35. Khizar to Mamdot, 8 March 1946, Khizar Tiwana Papers, Copy with author; Civil and Military Gazette, 9 March 1946.

36. Times of India, 8 March 1946; Civil and Military Gazette, 9 March 1946.

37. Khizar to Mamdot, 8 March 1946, Khizar Tiwana Papers, Copy with author.

38. Note by Khizar, enclosure, Khizar to Mamdot, 8 March 1946, Khizar Tiwana Papers, Copy with author.


40. Ibid., 15 May 1945.

41. Ibid., 3 Aug. 1946.

42. Dawn (Karachi), 6 March 1946.

43. Note by Turnbull of interview with J.B.Morton (Indian Police, retired), 20 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

44. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 30 Sept. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

45. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 April 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

46. Note by Turnbull of interview with J.B. Morton, 20 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

47. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 April 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

48. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 Aug. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

49. The Congress had failed to capture any Muslim seats in the election. Also out of a Provincial Congress Committee of 147 in May 1946, there were only 16 Muslims - Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of May 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

50. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 Aug. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.
The money was devoted to Muslim charities.

Note by East, 6 Feb. 1947, enclosure GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 30 Jan. 1947, I/P&J/5/250, IOR.

Civil and Military Gazette, 21 July 1946.

GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 Aug. 1946; GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 14 Sept. 1946, I/P&J/5/249, IOR.

Memorandum by Jenkins, p. 5, 4 Aug. 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of Sept. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., first half of Aug. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

Civil and Military Gazette, 15 Aug. 1946.

Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of Aug. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.

The Indian Annual Register, Vol. I (January–June 1946), pp. 192, 197–198, IOR.

Times of India, 30 July 1946.

The 'Great Calcutta Killing' lasted from 16 to 20 August leaving approximately 6,000 killed and 15,000 wounded; in its wake massacres occurred in Bihar and the Noakhali district of Bengal, resulting in the deaths of 7,000 Muslims and a similar number of Hindus. For details of the Calcutta massacre, and the aftermath, see L. Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj, London, 1961, pp. 34-40 and L. Collins and D. Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight, London, 1975, pp. 20, 28-29.
84. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 13/14 Nov. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.
85. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 Aug. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.
86. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 14 Sept. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.
87. GR, Jenkins to Colville, 30 Nov. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Civil and Military Gazette, 22 Nov. 1946.
91. GR, Jenkins to Colville, 30 Nov. 1946, L/P&J/5/249, IOR.
93. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 14 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
94. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
97. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
98. R.M.K. Slater, op.cit., pp.28-30, MSS.EUR.F.180/69, IOR.
99. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
100. Ibid.
101. Jenkins to Sec. of State, telegram, 26 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.
103. Ibid., second half of Jan. 1946, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
104. Jenkins to Sec. of State, telegram, 26 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.
110. Jenkins to Sec. of State, 29 Jan. 1947, L/P&J/8/663; Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of Jan. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
111. The All-India Muslim League had demanded the removal of the ban imposed on meetings and processions in the Punjab, the withdrawal of all restrictive measures on political activities, and no misuse of the special powers conferred by the Punjab Public Safety Ordinance, and the release of all detainees - Jinnah to Mamdot, 25 Feb. 1947, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, Islamabad, File No. 372, pp. 24-27.
112. Press Information Bureau, New Delhi to India Office, Telegram No. B 100, 3 Feb. 1946, L/P&J/5/250; Mamdot to Jenkins, 14 May 1947, R/3/177, IOR.
114. I and B Departmental Note, 14 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.
By mid-February one Muslim demonstrator had died in Lahore as the result of a brick falling or being thrown on him in a Hindu majority locality. 10 February was marked by a complete hartal in the city. Outside of the capital there was comparatively little disturbance in the majority of districts, though events in Amritsar, Gujranwala, Gujrat and Sargodha gave rise to anxiety. The number of persons gaolled in connection with the agitation stood at 1,500, but there had been remarkably little violence, and only two deaths had occurred (one in Simla, one in Jhang) as a result of clashes with the police. Towards the end of the month the movement became more militant; on 24 February a clash between police and a large Muslim crowd in Amritsar resulted in 50 police casualties, 110 demonstrators were injured, and one killed. Trouble in Jullundur on the same day also resulted in a number of injuries. On 25 February the only serious upheaval occurred in Ambala, two rioters died when police fired on the mob - GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 15 Feb. 1947; GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.


140. Note by P.J. Patrick, 15 March 1947, enclosure, GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.


143. Jenkins to Wavell, 3 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

144. Undated Note on the Tiwanas by Khizar Hayat Khan, Khizar Tiwana Papers, Copy with author.

145. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.


147. Dewan Chaman Lal to Nehru, Note, 10 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

148. Memorandum by Jenkins, 4 Aug. 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

149. Minute by G.E.B. Abell, 11 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

150. Abell to Nehru, 11 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

151. Ibid.

152. *Hindustan Times* (Delhi), 13 March 1947.


154. Nehru to Wavell, 9 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.


156. Jenkins to Wavell, 3 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

157. Turnbull to Under Sec. of State, Note, 5 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

158. Sec. of State to Viceroy, telegram, 5 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

159. The British Government was extremely anxious to avoid any action which would appear to support the accusation that it was anti-Muslim League, especially as during the disturbances in the Punjab which had occurred in February 1947 it had been reported in the national press that British troops had fired on Muslim demonstrators in Amritsar - an action executed solely in order to disperse the crowd. See *Times of India*, 25 February 1947.

160. Memo on Punjab Situation by G.E.B. Abell, 6 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

161. Ibid.; Turnbull to Under Sec. of State, Note, 5 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

162. Jenkins to Viceroy, telegram, 5 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

163. Memorandum by Jenkins, 4 Aug. 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

164. Jenkins to Wavell, telegram, 5 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

165. Mamdot failed to produce a list of the names of his supporters as requested by the Governor - Ibid.

166. Sec. of State to Viceroy, telegram, 6 March 1947, R/3/1/89; Wavell to Jenkins, 6 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.
167. Memo by G.E.B. Abell, 6 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.


169. Sec. of State to Viceroy, telegram, 7 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

170. Memorandum by Jenkins, p.8, 4 Aug. 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

171. Ibid., p.8; Mamdot to Jenkins, 14 May 1947, R/3/1/177, IOR.

172. Mountbatten to Jenkins, 5 May 1947, R/3/1/178; 'The Punjab Problem', Memorandum by Jenkins, enclosure Jenkins to Wavell, 7 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

173. Jenkins to Wavell, telegram, 10 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.


175. The absence of violence was due to a number of contributory factors - the restrictions imposed in the Punjab on the press forbidding inflammatory statements, the exemplary conduct of the police, and the established tendency of communities not directly concerned with an attack on the Government refraining from participating. The situation had also been contained by Jinnah's instructions that the movement should be peaceful - GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250; Press Information Bureau, New Delhi to India Office, Telegram No. B.100, 23 Feb. 1943, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

176. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

177. Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of March 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR. Also see Civil and Military Gazette, 5, 6 and 8 March 1947.

178. GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947; Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of March, 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.


181. Ralph Izzard, the Daily Mail's correspondent in Lahore, emphasised the importance of a national understanding in precipitating a provincial settlement - Civil and Military Gazette, 13 March 1947.

182. Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din, during discussions with Jenkins on 18 and 19 February 1947, had "admitted candidly that he did not know what Pakistan meant, and that nobody in the Muslim League knew, so that it was very difficult for the League to carry on long-term negotiations with the minorities" - GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 28 Feb. 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

183. Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of March 1946, L/P&J/5/250; Memorandum by Jenkins, 4 Aug. 1947, p.13, R/3/1/89, IOR.

184. Memorandum by Jenkins, 4 Aug. 1947, p.13, R/3/1/89, IOR.

185. Ibid., p.2.

186. Ibid., p.2.

187. Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of March 1947, first and second halves of April 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

188. In recalling Shaukat's extreme behaviour Belcher has revealed that A.A. Hamid, the Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur, attempted unsuccessfully to prevent Shaukat's endeavours, eventually resigning in frustration and disgust. Later the Prime Minister of Pakistan, (continued)

Jenkins to Mountbatten, 25 June 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.

Memorandum by Jenkins, 4 Aug. 1947, p. 3, R/3/1/91, IOR.

GR, Jenkins to Mountbatten, 15 May 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

Ibid., 25 June 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.

Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of April 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

Jenkins to Mountbatten, 25 June 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.

Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of April 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

Memorandum by Jenkins, 4 Aug. 1947, pp. 2, 8, R/3/1/89, IOR.

Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, second half of April 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.


The term 'house' was misleading as it referred to any building ranging from a large hotel or office to a thatched hut - Memorandum by Jenkins, p. 11, 4 Aug. 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

Ibid., pp. 10-11.

Note by Wavell of interview with Nehru, 10 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

Note by Abell, 10 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

Other objections were also cited, in that presumably there would still be only one Legislature, that there could only be one budget and finance department and that such a decision to appoint two Ministries could only be decided by the British Government - Ibid.

Jenkins to Wavell, 20 March 1947, R/3/1/89; GR, Jenkins to Wavell, 31 March 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

Abbott considered that the League would capture all the 86 Muslim constituencies, plus the Tumandars, N. Punjab Landholders, West Punjab Landholders and the Non-Union Labour seat, all of which had mixed communal electorates in which Muslims predominated - Abbott to Abell, 4 April 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

Jenkins to Wavell, 20 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

Note of interview between the Viceroy and Ghazanfar Ali Khan, 31 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

Jenkins to Mountbatten, 15 May 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

Jenkins to Mountbatten, telegram, 24 April 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

Mountbatten to Jenkins, telegram, 25 April 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

Extract from note of interview between Viceroy and Jinnah, 26 April 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.

Ibid.

Viceroy's Personal Report No. 3, p. 4, 17 April 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.


216. GR, Jenkins to Mountbatten, 31 March 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

217. Viceroy to Sec. of State, 15 Jan. 1946, R/3/1/105, IOR.

218. Viceroy to Sec. of State, telegram, 15 March 1946, R/3/1/105, IOR.

219. Note by Abell, 5 Feb. 1946, R/3/1/105, IOR.

220. Note by Wavell on conversation with the Aga Khan, 21 Feb. 1946, R/3/1/105, IOR.

221. Note by Abell, 5 Feb. 1946, R/3/1/105, IOR.


223. Campbell-Johnson has drawn pointed attention to the fact that Jinnah, whilst in the company of the Viceroy and the Vicereine, referred to Lady Mountbatten as "a rose between two thorns", when in fact it was Jinnah himself who was in the centre of the group. Also, a photograph of Jinnah's phallic 'doodlings' is reproduced to indicate the Muslim leader's megalomania. See A.Campbell-Johnson, Mission With Mountbatten, London, 1951, pp.50-63, 101-102.

224. 'The Punjab Problem', Memorandum by Jenkins, enclosure, Jenkins to Wavell, 7 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

225. Baldev Singh to Wavell, 11 March 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.


228. Note by F.F. Turnbull, 26 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

229. Note by Patrick, 27 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

230. Note by Monteath, 1 April 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

231. Note by Croft, 27 March 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

232. Pethick-Lawrence to Mountbatten, 3 April 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.

233. Mountbatten to Pethick-Lawrence, 17 April 1947, L/P&J/8/663, IOR.


235. Viceroy's Personal Report, No.5, p.9, 1 May 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.

236. Ibid., No.3, p.5, 17 April 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.

237. Ibid., No.3, p.4, 17 April 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.

238. On 5 May 1947 Mountbatten wrote to Jenkins, "I know I do not need to assure you that I am not pro-Muslim League..." - Mountbatten to Jenkins, 5 May 1947, R/3/1/178, IOR.

239. Viceroy's Personal Report, No.4, p.4, 24 April 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.

240. Ibid., No.5, p.8, 1 May 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.

241. P. Hardy, op.cit., p.251.


245. Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of June 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
247. Extract of interview between Viceroy and Jinnah, 23 June 1947; Mountbatten to Jenkins, telegram, 24 June 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.
248. Mountbatten to Jenkins, 24 June 1947; Private Sec. to Viceroy to Sec., Governor, Punjab, 25 June 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.
249. Extract of interview between Viceroy and Jinnah, 23 June 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.
251. Memorandum by Jenkins, pp. 2-3, 4 August 1947, R/3/1/89, IOR.
252. GR, Jenkins to Mountbatten, 25 June 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
255. Jenkins to Mountbatten, 26 June 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.
256. GR, Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30 June 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
257. Mamdot to Jenkins, 2 July 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.
258. Jenkins to Mountbatten, 3 July 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.
259. Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of July 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
260. Mamdot also demanded that Muslims should be granted parity with the other communities on the Council, and on the 'Special Staff' - Mamdot to Jenkins, 2 July 1947, R/3/1/91, IOR.
263. Viceroy's Personal Report, No.3, p.3, 17 April 1947, L/P&O/433, IOR.
264. GR, Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30 July 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
265. Ibid.; Chief Sec.'s Report, Punjab, first half of July 1947, L/P&J/5/250, IOR.
266. R.Hunt and J.Harrison (Joint Eds.), op.cit., p.239.
269. Estimates relating to the number of deaths which occurred as a result of the partition of the Province vary. Whilst Cowley's estimate appears to have been exaggerated, it is clear that no consensus of opinion exists as to the exact amount. As Hodson has recorded: "It is impossible to be sure, even within a wide margin, how many people were killed in the communal war of August to November 1947. In the earlier stages there was no effective civil authority to report the widespread deaths; with the vast refugee
(contd.) movement, local records were destroyed or rendered useless. The figure of a million was popularly bandied about. The truth was probably around 200,000 men, women and children, a terrible enough total, even seen against India's 400 millions." - H.V.Hodson, op. cit, p.418. Other estimates which have been recorded are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of deaths</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>180,000 to 200,000</td>
<td>P.Moon, Divide and Quit, London,1961, p.293.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400,000 to 500,000</td>
<td>G.D.Khoja, Stern Reckoning, New Delhi, 1950, pp.298-299. (This figure included non-Muslim casualties in Sind and N.W.D.P.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>M.Edwardes, The Last Years of British India, London, 1963, p.223.</td>
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<td>(W. Punjab only)</td>
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270. Bill Cowley, 'Peacocks Calling: One Man's Experience in India, 1939-47', pp. 174-175, MSS. EUR. F. 180/66, IOR.
CONCLUSION

The course which Muslim politics pursued in the Punjab in the decade before Independence, heralding as it did the suppression of provincialism and the destruction of Unionism as political philosophies and the triumph of a separatist Muslim nationalism, made the partition of the Province unavoidable. This process was particularly bloody and horrific, and it has spawned a legacy of bitterness which in turn has clouded the interpretations of the pre-Partition history of the region. Broadly speaking the protagonists who have debated the issue fall into two main camps, 'Pakistani historians' arguing that the creation of an independent Muslim state necessitating the break-up of the Punjab and India was occasioned by the fact that the intrusion of Islam into Hindustan had generated the development of a Muslim 'nation', which ultimately responded to nationalist pressures by demanding and winning a geographical expression of its nation-hood in the form of Pakistan. ¹ 'Indian commentators' generally deny this assertion, opining that on the whole India's Muslims and Hindus were indistinguishable at the masses level, and that separatist tendencies resulted from the fact that Muslim leaders were willing to exploit religious fanaticism to establish a power-base for political power in the country independent of the Indian National Congress, and that the British actively encouraged that process in pursuit of their 'Divide and Rule' policies. ²

Both the Pakistani and Indian hypotheses appear to contain elements of truth, but neither in isolation can adequately explain the course which Indian history followed in the years 1936 to 1947, or the effect which it had on Muslim politics in the Punjab. There can be little doubt that the Muslims of the Punjab, whether as members of the educated or economic élite, or of the peasantry, regarded themselves as different from other non-Muslim Punjabis. This was not the outcome of a divisive British-inspired plot, but the consequence of rigid religio-social practices which prevented inter-marriage and other intimate social intercourse (e.g. communal eating and drinking) between Muslims and caste Hindus. Even so the British were not slow to realise the advantages which this gave them in attempting to prolong their rôle in India by manipulating the incompatibility between Muslim and non-Muslim leaders, as was witnessed by the use Limithgow
made of Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League (see pp. 185-188). But Muslim leaders had not been forced by the British to adopt a separatist communal philosophy, though the latter clearly welcomed it.  

Muslim leaders in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, notably Sir Sayid Ahmed Khan and Moshin-ul-Mulk, anxious to avoid the prospect of Congress and Hindu domination had actively sought British help to frustrate such a development. What of the Muslims of the Punjab, however, did they feel similarly threatened in the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century? The answer would seem to be that Punjabi Muslims did not believe their culture to be under threat, not until that is League propagandists made 'Islam in Danger' an issue of the 1946 election, but in the case of economics and politics they considered their position to be vulnerable. As has been pointed out in Chapter I, the average Muslim was more economically depressed than his non-Muslim counterpart, and as such endured a greater degree of poverty. He lived in a Province in which Muslims were in the majority, yet everywhere were the signs of the greater affluence and influence of the Hindus and Sikhs. Consequently the prevailing atmosphere, particularly regarding the non-Muslim control of the credit machine, provided a constant reminder to Muslims of their subordinate social status, and often of their economic dependency upon and exploitation by the non-Muslims. The response of the Muslim élites took a different form. Educated Muslims resented their inability to break the Hindu monopoly of the professions and in particular the bureaucracy, whilst the economic élite, personified by the wealthy zamindar class, were not prepared to countenance any measure of Hindu control over their political future. The large zamindars, who represented the Muslim political leadership of the Punjab, were the least vulnerable of all the Muslim groups. So long as the British maintained their rule in India they were prepared to accept the status quo because it afforded them protection from the possibility of a Hindu-dominated central government. Once it became apparent, however, that the British were sincerely considering handing over power, and that the Indian National Congress in all probability would emerge as a major beneficiary, complacency on their part was replaced by apprehension. Even a staunch Punjabi provincialist like Sikander Hyat Khan, vehemently opposed to Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League, and to whom the concept of 'Pakistan' was an anathema, never the less bitterly resented any political initiative which would place the destiny of
Muslim India and thereby the Punjab in the hands of the Hindu-controlled Congress (see p. 189). Such politically orientated alarm was conveyed down through the various strata of Muslim society, and in each it found a responsive audience as the activities of the Arya Samaj in the Punjab, an organisation which had supplied some of the most active members of the Punjab Congress, had been interpreted by many Muslims as heralding the "virtual establishment of a Hindu raj". Muslim trepidation in the Punjab was further increased by the refusal of the Congress following the 1937 elections to brook any cooperation with the Muslim League other than on their own terms (see p. 178).

Disquiet over the possibility of a Congress-ruled India, combined with the socio-economic ascendancy of the Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab provided the seeds for the growth of Muslim separatism and nationalism in the Province. To begin with, however, the Muslim zamindar leaders of the Punjab were equally concerned with preventing intrusions into the provincial sphere by any nationalist organisation, Congress or Muslim League. Yet the Punjab could not be isolated from national events, without the Province there could be no 'Pakistan' and failing the agreement of the Muslim leadership to accept absorption by an independent India there could be no sovereign Indian Union encompassing all of the Province, including the Muslim majority districts. In the final analysis the interests of the Muslim religious, economic and political élites could be more closely identified with the creation of a Muslim state, which would guarantee their continued political ascendancy in provincial affairs, and the curtailment of Hindu and Sikh competition in the economic, educational, professional and civic spheres, than union with India. Hence the fact that from the mid-1940's onwards many of the most influential zamindari personalities, together with large sections of the educated middle classes began to embrace the Muslim League. By the time that the 1946 elections were conducted in the Punjab, therefore, the League had largely replaced the Unionist Party as the repository of landed interest and power. It only needed the election results to proclaim that reality. Thus it is no exaggeration to claim that the zamindars' switch of allegiance from Unionism to the Muslim League greatly benefitted the latter, as it not only gave League candidates and propagandists access to the rural Punjab - the power house of Muslim provincial politics - but it guaranteed them the victories which it enjoyed in the great majority of those constituencies. In support of its impressive 'landed armoury' the League also enjoyed
the confidence and active support of the Punjab's religious leaders. Their involvement as canvassers for the League and 'Pakistan' contributed greatly into turning the League success into a massive landslide victory, for no other political organisation in the Province enjoyed the resources to resist a combination as powerful as the landlords and the Pirs.

All the available evidence, therefore, suggests that the eventual triumph of the Muslim League in the Punjab was achieved largely through its association with these two sections of Muslim society. That, however, does not necessarily militate against the popular appeal 'Pakistan' had for ordinary Muslims, whether enfranchised or not. As early as 1940-1941 Sikander Hyat Khan had realised correctly that the Muslim masses would fall victim to the allure of 'Pakistan'.\(^2\) Thus whilst it is the contention of this thesis that the conversion of the Muslim Punjab from a Unionist to a Pakistanist philosophy was due in large measure to the fact that the Province's Muslim landed and religious elites spearheaded that change, there can be no doubt that they espoused a cause which had considerable attraction for their tenants, murids, and constituents. The failure of the Indian National Congress to reassure Muslim leaders and the Muslim masses in general that their interests would be inviolate in a united India, and of the British or any other interested party to devise an acceptable realistic alternative to an independent Muslim state made the division of India and the Punjab unavoidable given the conditions prevailing in 1947. Thus Partition and thereby Pakistan had not one 'architect' but many; Muslim self-interest and fears, League intransigence, Congress obduracy and British deviousness to name but a few. The Muslim desire for separatism at whatever level, however, was not an illusion, it was a fact which found expression in the establishment of a sovereign state and the destruction of the 'unity' which the British had imposed on India.
FOOTNOTES TO CONCLUSION


2. J. Nehru, An Autobiography, Bombay, 1962, pp. 382, 467-471. Uma Kaura has attempted to chronicle the destructive role the British played in Hindu-Muslim relations, having claimed that British Viceroy's from Minto (1905-1910) to Linlithgow (1936-1943) seized every possible opportunity to encourage separatist tendencies on the part of Muslim leaders in order to drive a wedge between them and the Congress - Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, New Delhi, 1977. See also B.R. Nanda, 'Nehru, the Indian National Congress and the Partition of India, 1935-47', and M. Mujeeb, 'The Partition of India in Retrospect', in C.H. Philips and M.D. Wainwright (Eds.), The Partition of India, London, 1970.


4. Ibid., pp. 1-16; K.B. Sayeed, op.cit., pp. 14-20; Francis Robinson has claimed that in part the motivating force behind Sir Sayid's and Moshin-ul-Mulk's efforts was the desire to protect the Urdu-speaking elite of the U.P., to which they both belonged, from the erosive effect of Hindu revivalism. See F. Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims, Cambridge, 1974, pp. 33-84.


APPENDICES

A. Occupations in the Punjab and the Degree of Participation by the Members of the Major Communities as Recorded by the Census of India (Punjab), 1931

Bi. Communal Categorisation in Respect of the Number of Landowners, the Acreage Held, and the Land Revenue Paid in the Districts of the Punjab Listed Below

Bii. Communal Categories in Respect of the Number of Landowners and Shareholders, the Acreage Held, and the Land Revenue Paid in the Districts of the Punjab Listed Below

Biii. The Number of Owners and Shareholders, and the Amount of Land Held by Members of the Various Communities in the Districts of Jhelum, Jhang and Shahpur, and the Gujjar Khan and Rawalpindi Tahsils

Biv. Agricultural Land Held by the Various Communities in the Districts of Hissar, Kangra, Multan, Muzaffargarh, the Khushab Tahsil of Shahpur District, and the Lower Chenab Colony (Jhang)

C. Total Acreage Privately Owned and Subject to Usufructuary Mortgage in Muslim Majority (Land) Districts

D. Communal Categorisation of Land-Owners in the Punjab Paying Land Revenue Charges of and in Excess of Rs. 5 Per Annum in 1932

E. Taxes Paid in the Districts of Lyallpur, Gujranwala and Sialkot in the Year 1945-46

F. Percentages of Hindu and Muslim Students at Various Levels of University Education

G. Showing the Total Representation of the Communities Serving in the Transferred Departments of the Punjab Government on 1 Jan. 1933

H. Showing the Total Representation of the Communities Serving in the Reserved Departments of the Punjab Government on 1 Jan. 1933

I. Showing Representation of the Various Communities Serving at Different Levels in Some of the Reserved and Transferred Departments of the Punjab Government on 1 Jan. 1933

J. The Number of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh Officers in the Punjab Public Services in the Departments and Offices Listed Below

K. Showing the Communal Composition of the All-India Services on 31 December of each of the Years 1925 and 1932

L. I.C.S. Examinations Held in India, 1924-40

M. I.C.S. Examinations Held in London, 1924-40

N. Candidates who Sat I.C.S. Delhi Examinations 1930-1940, Grouped in Relation to Fathers' Occupations

O. Successful Candidates from the Punjab who Appeared at the London Examinations, 1924 to 1940
Appendices (continued)

P. Successful Candidates from the Punjab who Appeared at the Indian Examinations, 1924 to 1940
Q. Nominated Punjabi Candidates from Indian Examinations, 1924-1940
R. The Muslim Leadership of the Punjab in the 1919-1947 Period
S. The Punjab Electorate (1946)
T. The Pattern of Voting in the Muslim Constituencies
U. The Incidence of Official Interference in Muslim Constituencies in the Punjab During the 1946 Election
V. The Incidence of Bribery in Muslim Constituencies in the Punjab During the 1946 Elections
W. Incidence of Coercion and Intimidation which Occurred in Constituencies in the Punjab During the 1946 Election
X. Pirs and Religious Leaders who Supported the Muslim League - Listed According to the Constituencies they Visited, or in which Fatwas were issued in their names
Y. Example of Election Poster Distributed by the Muslim League
APPENDIX A.

Occupations in the Punjab and the Degree of Participation by the Members of the Major Communities as Recorded by the Census of India (Punjab), 1931.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1931</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Sikh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earners</td>
<td>6,957,062</td>
<td>3,895,947 (56%)</td>
<td>2,128,245 (31%)</td>
<td>932,870 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Dependents</td>
<td>1,772,247</td>
<td>624,040 (35%)</td>
<td>915,090 (52%)</td>
<td>233,117 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-working Dependents</td>
<td>15,125,173</td>
<td>9,117,806 (60%)</td>
<td>3,952,753 (26%)</td>
<td>2,054,614 (14%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AGRICULTURE

| Income from Rent of Land | 112,104 | 54,733 (49%) | 39,204 (35%) | 18,167 (16%) |
| Cultivation of All Kinds | 3,273,175 | 1,781,174 (54.4%) | 849,284 (26%) | 642,717 (19.6%) |
| Agents and Managers of Landed Estates; Planters; Forest Officers and their Clerks; Rent Collectors, &c. | 16,465 | 10,010 (60.8%) | 5,223 (31.7%) | 1,232 (7.5%) |
| Field Labourers and Woodcutters, &c. | 444,161 | 242,772 (54.7%) | 148,527 (33.4%) | 52,862 (11.9%) |
| Raisers of Livestock, Milkmen and Herdsmen | 316,237 | 235,037 (74.3%) | 72,385 (22.9%) | 8,815 (2.8%) |
| Fishing and Hunting | 4,752 | 3,134 (66%) | 928 (19.5%) | 690 (14.5%) |

EXPLOITATION OF MINERALS

| Owners, Managers, Clerks, &c. | 1,336 | 923 (69%) | 333 (25%) | 80 (6%) |
| Labourers | 10,483 | 5,487 (52.3%) | 3,656 (34.9%) | 1,340 (12.8%) |

INDUSTRIES

| Owners, Managers, Clerks, &c. | 5,247 | 2,723 (52%) | 2,148 (41%) | 376 (7%) |
| Labourers and Artisans | 511,680 | 318,189 (62.2%) | 136,553 (26.7%) | 56,938 (11.1%) |

TRANSPORT

| Owners, Managers, Clerks, &c. | 22,367 | 10,361 (46.3%) | 10,764 (48.1%) | 1,242 (5.6%) |
| Labourers, Boatmen, Carters, Palik Bearers | 152,616 | 87,771 (57.5%) | 42,417 (27.8%) | 22,428 (14.7%) |
| TRADE | 504,877 | 128,551 (25.5%) | 339,618 (67.3%) | 36,708 (7.2%) |

(continued)
### APPENDIX A (contd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Sikh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious</strong></td>
<td>97,056</td>
<td>42,532</td>
<td>50,308</td>
<td>4,216</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(43.8%)</td>
<td>(51.8%)</td>
<td>(4.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lawyers, Doctors, Teachers</strong></td>
<td>48,644</td>
<td>23,187</td>
<td>21,399</td>
<td>4,058</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(47.7%)</td>
<td>(44%)</td>
<td>(8.3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Persons living on their income</strong></td>
<td>26,934</td>
<td>11,987</td>
<td>9,780</td>
<td>5,167</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(44.5%)</td>
<td>(36.3%)</td>
<td>(19.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic service</strong></td>
<td>372,488</td>
<td>178,758</td>
<td>161,607</td>
<td>32,123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(48%)</td>
<td>(43.4%)</td>
<td>(8.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contractors, Clerks, Cashiers, &amp;c.</strong></td>
<td>15,053</td>
<td>6,996</td>
<td>6,814</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(45.5%)</td>
<td>(45.3%)</td>
<td>(8.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labourers unspecified</strong></td>
<td>188,182</td>
<td>127,511</td>
<td>50,260</td>
<td>10,418</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(67.8%)</td>
<td>(26.7%)</td>
<td>(5.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beggars, Prostitutes, Criminals and Inmates of Jails and Asylums</strong></td>
<td>280,169</td>
<td>211,866</td>
<td>56,566</td>
<td>11,735</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(75.6%)</td>
<td>(20.2%)</td>
<td>(4.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census of India, 1931, Punjab, Vol.XVII, Part II, Lahore, 1933, pp. 219-227, IOR.
APPENDIX B. Communal Categorisation in Respect of the Number of Landowners, the Acreage Held, and the Land Revenue Paid in the Districts of the Punjab Listed Below

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Land Owners</th>
<th>Total Area Held in Acres</th>
<th>Land Revenue Assessment (rupees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>Sikhs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>93,660</td>
<td>511,797</td>
<td>214,623</td>
<td>936,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Given</td>
<td>(31%)</td>
<td>(13%)</td>
<td>(56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amritsar</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>62,397</td>
<td>207,988</td>
<td>37,816</td>
<td>713,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Given</td>
<td>(22%)</td>
<td>(4%)</td>
<td>(74%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gurdaspur</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>101,435</td>
<td>405,022</td>
<td>374,748</td>
<td>363,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Given</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
<td>(33%)</td>
<td>(32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sialkot</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>135,661</td>
<td>507,175</td>
<td>171,957</td>
<td>276,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Given</td>
<td>(53%)</td>
<td>(18%)</td>
<td>(29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujranwala</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
<td>62,774</td>
<td>874,551</td>
<td>171,408</td>
<td>382,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Given</td>
<td>(61%)</td>
<td>(12%)</td>
<td>(27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheikhupura</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>63,569</td>
<td>734,384</td>
<td>108,380</td>
<td>511,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Given</td>
<td>(54%)</td>
<td>(8%)</td>
<td>(38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyallpur</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>62.84%</td>
<td>103,544</td>
<td>1,074,019</td>
<td>104,490</td>
<td>562,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Given</td>
<td>(62%)</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
<td>(32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
<td>100,340</td>
<td>1,332,928</td>
<td>388,315</td>
<td>436,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Given</td>
<td>(62%)</td>
<td>(18%)</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th></th>
<th>723,380</th>
<th>410,255</th>
<th>5,647,864</th>
<th>1,571,737</th>
<th>4,182,442</th>
<th>13,050,357</th>
<th>2,199,227</th>
<th>10,180,166</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A - Years of Assessment; B - Muslim Percentage of Total Population.
APPENDIX Bii - Communal Categories in Respect of the Number of Landowners and Shareholders, the Acreage Held, and the Land Revenue Paid in the Districts of the Punjab Listed Below

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Land Owners and Shareholders</th>
<th>Total Area Held in Acres</th>
<th>Land Revenue Assessment (rupees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>Sikhs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gurgaon</td>
<td>1941-1943</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>59258</td>
<td>88925</td>
<td>3655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujrat</td>
<td>1913-1927</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>167763</td>
<td>22462</td>
<td>(8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attock</td>
<td>1925-1926</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>58381</td>
<td>10355</td>
<td>(85%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dera Ghazi Khan</td>
<td>1918-1919</td>
<td>87.7%</td>
<td>152102</td>
<td>32880</td>
<td>(76%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambala</td>
<td>1917-1919</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>44079</td>
<td>32768</td>
<td>(29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jullundur</td>
<td>1915-1916</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>68659</td>
<td>53564</td>
<td>(29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoshiarpur</td>
<td>1912-1914</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>35615</td>
<td>10349</td>
<td>(33.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferozepore</td>
<td>1912-1914</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>37454</td>
<td>36922</td>
<td>(29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ludhiana</td>
<td>1910-1911</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>33606</td>
<td>28749</td>
<td>(25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rohtak</td>
<td>1907-1909</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16514</td>
<td>14532</td>
<td>(19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karnal</td>
<td>1907-1909</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>15615</td>
<td>31871</td>
<td>(28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mianwali</td>
<td>1902-1906</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>5467</td>
<td>10578</td>
<td>(84%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A - Years of Assessment; B - Muslim Percentage of Population at Time of Assessment
1 - Revenue figures for Ballabgarh and Firozepur-Jhirka Tehsils not given; 2 - Does not include Morari Hill Tract, Narinaing Tehsil (23,757 acres)
APPENDIX Bii (continued)

SOURCE: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in the following:

ASSESSMENT REPORTS


DISTRICT GAZETTRES

APPENDIX Bii(continued)


SETTLEMENT REPORTS

Gurgaon, 1938-43, p. 9; Attock, 1923-27, pp. 5-6; Jullundur, 1913-17, pp. 6, 25; Hoshiarpur, 1914, p. 5; Ludhiana, 1908-1911, pp. 2-3; Rohtak, 1905-1910, pp.10-11; Karnal, 1909, p.19. IOR & PBRL.
APPENDIX Biii. The Number of Owners and Shareholders, and the Amount of Land Held by Members of the Various Communities in the Districts of Jhelum, Jhang and Shahpur, and the Gujjhar Khan and Rawalpindi Tahsils.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Land Owners and Shareholders</th>
<th>Total Area Held in Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>Hindus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhelum</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>147,646</td>
<td>14,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhang</td>
<td>1923-1925</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>50,285</td>
<td>17,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahpur (Khushab Tahsil not included here)</td>
<td>1923-1924</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>24,872</td>
<td>2,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi* (Gujjar Khan &amp; Rawalpindi Tahsils only)</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>67,058</td>
<td>6,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>289,861</td>
<td>40,880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Cultivated land only. In the case of the Murree and Kahuta tahsils no information was given in respect of the actual acreage cultivated by the various tribes or communities, consequently these tahsils were not included in the above Appendix. Though land revenue assessment figures demonstrate that as in the case of the Gujjhar Khan and Rawalpindi tahsils, the bulk of the land was in Muslim hands, in that Muslims accounted for approximately 88% (38,348) of the proprietary body and they paid 90.4% (Rs.100,202) of the revenue charged.

A - Years of Assessment: B - Muslim Percentage of Population.
APPENDIX Biii(continued)

SOURCE: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in the following:

ASSESSMENT REPORTS


DISTRICT GAZETTEERS


SETTLEMENT REPORTS

Jhelum, 1937-41, p.7; Jhang, 1928, pp.19-21. IOR.
APPENDIX

Agricultural Land Held by the Various Communities in the Districts of Hissar, Kangra, Multan, Muzaffargarh, the Khushab Tahsil of Shahpur District, and the Lower Chenab Colony (Jhang).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Sikhs</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hissar</td>
<td>1908-1910</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>574,145 (17.5%)</td>
<td>2,011,122 (62%)</td>
<td>244,193 (7.5%)</td>
<td>197,092 (6%)</td>
<td>233,574 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangra</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1,066,136 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahpur (Khushab Tahsil only)</td>
<td>1915-1916</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>1,115,971 (91%)</td>
<td>41,556 (3%)</td>
<td>24,626 (2%)</td>
<td>43,549 (4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang (Lower Chenab Colony only)</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>218,452 (95.3%)</td>
<td>9,359 (4.1%)</td>
<td>274 (0.1%)</td>
<td>1,086 (0.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>1919-1920</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>1,955,200 (73%)</td>
<td>630,950 (24%)</td>
<td>84,827 (3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muzaffargarh*</td>
<td>1923-1924</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>539,540 (75%)</td>
<td>179,847 (25%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Cultivated land only.

A - Years of Assessment: B - Muslim Percentage of Population at Assessment.

SOURCE: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in the following:

ASSESSMENT REPORTS

APPENDIX Biv (continued)

DISTRICT GAZETTEERS


SETTLEMENT REPORTS

Kangra, 1913-19, pp. 3-5, Appendix I, p.i; Jhang, 1928, pp.19-21; Chenab Colony, 1915, pp.36-47; Multan, 1917-21, pp. 6-7; Muzaffargarh, 1920-25, p. 7. IOR.
APPENDIX C.

TOTAL ACREAGE PRIVATELY OWNED AND SUBJECT TO USUFRUCTUARY MORTGAGE IN MUSLIM MAJORITY (LAND) DISTRICTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total Area</th>
<th>Area Mortgaged With Possession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>acres</td>
<td>(A) acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sialkot</td>
<td>879,535</td>
<td>205,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujranwala</td>
<td>1,340,317</td>
<td>(A) 101,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheikhupura</td>
<td>1,273,512</td>
<td>(A) 91,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujrat</td>
<td>1,215,226</td>
<td>(A) 98,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahpur</td>
<td>1,593,703</td>
<td>(A) 69,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhelum</td>
<td>1,199,854</td>
<td>(A) 39,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi</td>
<td>875,503</td>
<td>(A) 24,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attock</td>
<td>2,023,887</td>
<td>(A) 95,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mianwali</td>
<td>1,848,766</td>
<td>(A) 184,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>1,380,314</td>
<td>(A) 39,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyallpur</td>
<td>1,510,052</td>
<td>(A) 97,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhang</td>
<td>1,577,743</td>
<td>(A) 46,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>2,528,389</td>
<td>(A) 36,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muzaffargarh</td>
<td>2,248,361</td>
<td>(A) 99,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dera Ghazi Khan</td>
<td>2,983,631</td>
<td>(A) 142,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jullundur</td>
<td>781,740</td>
<td>(A) 82,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,260,533</strong></td>
<td><strong>(A) 1,454,956 (6%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(A) By members of notified agricultural tribes.
(B) By non-agriculturists.

Source: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in Punjab Land Revenue Administration Report, 1936, Statement No.III, pp. iii, v-vii. IOR.
APPENDIX D. Communal Categorisation of Land-Owners in the Punjab Paying Land Revenue Charges of and in Excess of Rs. 5 Per Annum in 1932

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
<th>Sikhs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land-Owners Paying Rs. 25 and upwards</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>169,000 (48%)</td>
<td>76,000 (21%)</td>
<td>105,000 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-Owners Paying Rs. 10 to Rs. 25</td>
<td>530,000</td>
<td>245,000 (46%)</td>
<td>144,000 (27%)</td>
<td>141,000 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-Owners Paying Rs. 5 to Rs. 10</td>
<td>518,000</td>
<td>258,000 (50%)</td>
<td>152,000 (29%)</td>
<td>108,000 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Land-Owners</td>
<td>1,398,000</td>
<td>672,000 (48%)</td>
<td>372,000 (27%)</td>
<td>354,000 (25%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX E.

TAXES PAID IN THE DISTRICTS OF LYALPUR, GUJRANWALA AND SIALKOT IN THE YEAR 1945-46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Non-Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rs. 22,900</td>
<td>Rs.140,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14%)</td>
<td>(86%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Tax</td>
<td>Rs. 17,000</td>
<td>Rs.308,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Tax</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
<td>(95%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Tax</td>
<td>Rs.500,000</td>
<td>Rs.5,950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8%)</td>
<td>(92%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LYALPUR

Urban Immovable

GUJRANWALA

Urban Immovable

Sales Tax

Income Tax

Rs. 13,000 (17%)  Rs. 65,000 (83%)

Income Tax

Rs. 50,000 (7%)  Rs.700,000 (93%)

SIALKOT

Sales Tax

Rs. 25,311 (16%)  Rs.132,870 (84%)

Income Tax

Rs.310,000 (21%)  Rs.1,155,142 (79%)

Source:
### APPENDIX F. PERCENTAGES OF HINDU AND MUSLIM STUDENTS AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Hindu</th>
<th>Total Muslim</th>
<th>Intermediate Hindu</th>
<th>Intermediate Muslim</th>
<th>Degree Hindu</th>
<th>Degree Muslim</th>
<th>Post-Graduate Hindu</th>
<th>Post-Graduate Muslim</th>
<th>Research Hindu</th>
<th>Research Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919-20</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NOT GIVEN</td>
<td></td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-25</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-31</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-36</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937-38</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-40</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-42</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943-44</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-45</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from information given in *Punjab Education Reports*:

1919-20, Table III, pp. x-xl; 1924-25, Tables IVA and IVB, pp. xx-xxxii;
1930-31, Tables IVA and IVB, pp. xii-xv; 1935-36, Tables IVA and IVB, pp. xii-xv;
1937-38, Tables IVA and IVB, pp. xii-xv; 1939-40, Tables IVA and IVB, pp. xii-xv;
1941-42, Tables IVA and IVB, pp.xvi-xix; 1943-44, Tables IVA and IVB, pp.xiv-xvii; 1944-45, Tables IVA and IVB, pp.xiv-xvii. IOR.
### APPENDIX G.

Showing the Total Representation of the Communities Serving in the Transferred Departments of the Punjab Government on 1 Jan. 1933.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department or Office</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Sikhs</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Agriculture.</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary Department.</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operative Society Department</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.W.D.(Buildings and Road Branch)</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excise Department.</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Department.</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Department.</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health Department.</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Joint Secretary to the Punjab Govt., Transferred Departments</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Museum.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Industries.</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.W.D.(Hydro-Electric Branch).</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Secretary to the Govt., Registration Department</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTALS.</td>
<td>3,048</td>
<td>2,959</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENTAGES.</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures and percentages calculated from information contained in Consolidated Statement Showing the Proportionate Representation of the Various Communities Serving in the Different Departments of the Punjab Government as it stood on 1st Jan., 1933, pp.12-23, enclosed with letter, C.C. Garbett to Under Sec. of State, 31 Aug. 1933, S&G.4093/1933, L/S&G/7/30. IOR.
APPENDIX H.

Showing the Total Representation of the Communities Serving in the
Reserved Departments of the Punjab Government on 1 Jan. 1933.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department or Office</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Sikhs</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P.C.S.(Executive Branch).</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.C.S.(Judicial Branch).</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Dept..</td>
<td>2,906</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.W.D.(Irrigation Branch).</td>
<td>2,270</td>
<td>3,035</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Dept..</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Revenue Dept..</td>
<td>5,082</td>
<td>4,403</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jails Dept..</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reclamation Dept..</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Tribes Dept..</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Court.</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab Civil Secretariat.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Director of Information.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab Government Printing Office.</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Jail and Borstal Presses.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Financial Commissioners.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Director of Land Records.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industries Department (Factory and Boiler Inspection).</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambala Division (Commissioner's Office and District Offices in the Division).</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jullundur Division (Commissioner's Office and District Offices in the Division).</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore Division (Commissioner's Office and District Offices in the Division).</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi Division (Commissioner's Office and District Offices in the Division).</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan Division (Commissioner's Office and District Offices in the Division).</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nili Bar Colony Establishment.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commissioner's Office,</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyallpur Colony Branch.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Department.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTALS</td>
<td>14,689</td>
<td>12,010</td>
<td>2,849</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENTAGES</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in
Consolidated Statement Showing the Proportionate Representation of the
Various Communities.... as in Appendix G.
APPENDIX I.

Showing Representation of the Various Communities Serving at Different Levels in Some of the Reserved and Transferred Departments of the Punjab Government on 1 Jan. 1933.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>A</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>C</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H.</td>
<td>S.</td>
<td>O.</td>
<td></td>
<td>M.</td>
<td>H.</td>
<td>S.</td>
<td>O.</td>
<td></td>
<td>M.</td>
<td>H.</td>
<td>S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.W.D. Irrigation Branch</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Department</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>1,054</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Department</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jails Department</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>132</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>P.W.D. Building and Roads Branch</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>96</td>
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<td>102</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>138</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>P.W.D. Hydro Electric Branch</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>377</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7,030</td>
<td>4,350</td>
<td>1,611</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>2,376</td>
<td>2,330</td>
<td>436</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Included Specialist Posts and Temporary Gazetted Officers.

M - Muslim, H - Hindu, S - Sikh, O - Others. A - Provincial Services, B - Subordinate Services, C - Clerical Establishments.

Source: Figures and Percentages calculated from information contained in Consolidated Statement Showing the Proportionate Representation of the Various Communities... As in Appendix G.
APPENDIX J.  The Number of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh Officers in the Punjab Public Services in the
Departments and Offices Listed Below.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1947</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secs., Under Secs. and Asst.Secs. to Govt.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3(43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents, H.Q.Offices</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14(47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.C.S. Officers in Punjab Commission</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18(40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab Commission, Superior Appointments</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13(41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Dept.</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>17(25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District and Sessions Judges</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7(41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Civil Service (Executive Branch)</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>174(41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Officers (Inspectors and senior ranks)</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>105(54%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate Education Service (Headmasters)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>45(57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Officers</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>65(31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Public Health</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>17(29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers, Public Works Dept. (Roods, Rail, Electricity and Irrigation)</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>66(23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canal Supervision and Maintenance Branch (P.W.D.)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>49(27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Agriculture</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>28(41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Industries</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5(21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehsildars</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>78(54%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excise Dept.</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16(42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Tax Dept.</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>17(32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posts and Telegraph Dept.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8(27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W. Railway Dept.</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>33(30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2089</td>
<td>778(37%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source: Punjab Civil List, Jan. 1936, Parts II, pp. 6-8; II-A, pp. 9-10; III, pp. 11-20; IV, pp. 21-23; VIII, pp. 27-32; IX, pp. 35-51(a); XI, pp. 53-68; XII, pp. 88-90; XIII, pp. 91-109; XIV, pp. 110-113; XV, pp. 114-144; XVII, pp. 148-151; XI, pp. 110-161; XXV, pp. 165-171; XXVI, pp. 172-173; XXVIII, pp. 174-177; XXX, pp. 179-182; XXXV, pp. 193-207; XXXVII, p. 213; XLII, p. 236; XLVI, pp. 240-252; Punjab Civil List, Nov. 1946, Parts II, pp. 9-11(b); II-A, pp. 13-14(a); III, pp. 15-26(a); IV, pp. 27-30; VIII, pp. 35-41; IX, pp. 42-70; XI, pp. 72-90(a); XII, pp. 116-119; XIII, pp. 120-142(c); XIV, pp. 143-146; XV, pp. 147-186; XVII, pp. 191-194; XI, pp. 204-205(a); XXV, pp. 210-218(b); XXVI, pp. 219-220; XXVIII, pp. 222-225(g); XXX, pp. 227-231; XXXV, pp. 246-261; XXXVII, p. 267; XLII, pp. 290-291; XLVI, pp. 295-309(g), PGSA.

(The religion of each officer was determined on the basis of the individual's name.) PGSL.

* In order to fit the table into the space available, the following abbreviations have been used as column headings:

A - Indians (includes Parsis and Indian Christians)
B - Muslims
C - Hindus
D - Sikhs
E - Differential in Muslim Employment
APPENDIX K.
Showing the Communal Composition of the All-India Services
on 31st December of each of the Years 1925 and 1932

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Sikhs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Police</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Forest Service</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Service of Engineers</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Medical Service (Civil)</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior Engineering, Telegraph and Wireless</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Audit and Accounts Service</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1925</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
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<td>10.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Accounts Dept.</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Railway Service of Engineers</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
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<td>5.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Revenue Establishments</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Statement Showing Communal Composition of the All-India Services on 31 Dec. of each of the years 1925-32, enclosed with letter, C.M. Trivedi to F.W.H. Smith, Sec., S&G Dept., Oct., 1933, S&G/5415/1933, L/S&G/7/18. IOR.
### APPENDIX L.

**I.C.S. Examinations Held in India, 1924-40**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Sikh</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>H</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>M</td>
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</table>

| %   | 29.9  | 61.7  | 3.9  | 4.5  | 20.4  | 74.5 | 2  | 31 | 50 | 34 | 14 | 2 | 47 | 42 | 5 | 5 | 83 | 10 | 7 | 78 | 18 | 4 |


Source: Compiled from information contained in India Office Records, I/S & G/7/234 - I/S & G/7/250. *See Column A above for full headings.
### APPENDIX M.

**I.C.S. Examinations Held in London, 1924-40**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Successful Candidates - All-India</th>
<th>Successful Candidates - Punjab</th>
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<td>Hindu</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1932</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

|        | 16      | 191    | 4     | 32     | 4     | 10    | 4     | 3      |

| Percentages | 6.6% | 78.6% | 1.6% | 13.2% | 19% | 48% | 19% | 14% |

**Source:** Compiled from information contained in India Office Records, L/S&G/7/131 - L/S&G/7/145, L/S&G/7/160, L/S&G/7/172, L/S&G/7/173, L/S&G/7/192.
### Appendix N. Candidates who Sat I.C.S. Delhi Examinations 1930-1940, Grouped in Relation to Fathers' Occupations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% K</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% L</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% M</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% N</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations:

A - Agriculture, Zamindars, Landlords, Jagirdars
B - Mixed Incomes: (a) Land and Trade and/or Businesses
    (b) Land and Professional and/or Government Service
C - Government or State's Service
D - Military Service
E - Government Contracting
F - The Professions: (a) Medicine, (b) Law, (c) Teaching, (d) Accounting.
G - Commerce, Banking, Industry, Business
H - Private Service
I - Honorific Positions
K - Muslims
L - Hindus
M - Sikhs
N - Others
% - Percentage

Source: Compiled from information contained in India Office Record Files L/S&G/7/240 - L/S&G/7/250.
**APPENDIX O.**

Successful Candidates from the Punjab who appeared at the London Examinations, 1924 to 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exam Year</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Father's Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Gopal Das Kholsa</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>District &amp; Sessions Judge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Prem Nath Thaper</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Landowner &amp; Banker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Nawab Singh</td>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>Government Servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Ghulam Mueenuddin</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Zamindar, Departmental Supt. Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dharma Vira</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Chief Engineer, Irrigation Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>S.F. Hassan</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Punjab Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Arthur Samuels Lall</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>Professor of Mathematics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>N. Sen</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Government Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.O. Ali</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Supt. Post Offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>M. Ayub</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Merchant, Dairyowner, Contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B.S. Grewal</td>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>States' Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>T. Singh</td>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>Asst.Commissioner, Income Tax, Bombay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K.C. Chowdhry</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Government Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Lal</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>P.G. Nair</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Barrister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J.S. Lall</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>Professor of Mathematics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Raghu Pati Kapur</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Tahsildar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>K. Chand</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Landlord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R.F. Isar</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>Provincial Civil Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Narottam Sahgal</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Chief Engineer, B &amp; R Branch, Sec., Govt. of Punjab.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from information contained in India Office Records, L/S&G/7/132 - L/S&G/7/145, L/S&G/7/160, L/S&G/7/172, L/S&G/7/173, L/S&G/7/192.
### APPENDIX P.

**Successful Candidates from the Punjab who appeared at the Indian Examinations, 1924 to 1940**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exam Year</th>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Place and date of Birth</th>
<th>Father's Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Balwant Rai Tandon</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Jullundur, 8/10/1903</td>
<td>C.I.E. &amp; I.S.O.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sisir Kumar Sen</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Jessore, Bengal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Sheikh Abdur Rahman</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Wazirabad, Gujranwala, 4/6/1903</td>
<td>Contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Hafiz Abdul Majid</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Kasur, 17/10/1907</td>
<td>Silk Merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Dharm Pal Bhandari</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Lahore, 28/9/1908</td>
<td>Punjab Civil Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Pir Ahsanud-Din</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Ludhiana, 7/9/1909</td>
<td>Acting Comm., Lyallpur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammad Ikram</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Ledharianwala, 10/9/1908</td>
<td>Employed in Office of Dir.of Agriculture Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parvez Mohammad Ismail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I.C. Jagraon, 27/5/1908</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>N.N. Wancoo</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Satna (Baghelkhand C.I.Agency)*1/5/1910</td>
<td>Supt.to A.G.G. Punjab States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Agha Abdul Hamid</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Sialkot, 2/8/1912</td>
<td>E.A.C., Dir.of Agri., Multan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Ali Ashgar</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Ferozepur, 15/7/1914</td>
<td>Advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Nizir Ahmed</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Murree, 10/2/1914</td>
<td>Cloth Merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Basir Ahmad Khan</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Quetta, Baluchistan,* 1/12/1914</td>
<td>E.A. Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kewal Singh Chaudhary</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Lyallpur, 1/6/1915</td>
<td>Landlord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Saroop Krishen</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Ludhiana, 18/1/1915</td>
<td>Barrister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ranjit Rai Bahl</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Hoshiarpur, 16/8/1915</td>
<td>Landlord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Sahdve Vohra</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Lahore, 5/7/1917</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maqbul Mohammad Niaiz</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Hoshiarpur, 5/11/1917</td>
<td>Advocate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Though these candidates were born outside of the Punjab they were of Punjabi parentage and were classed as Punjabis in the application forms and result lists.

** M - Muslim, H - Hindu, S - Sikh, I.C. - Indian Christian.

Source: Compiled from information contained in files L/S&G/7/235-250, ICR.
## APPENDIX Q.
### Nominated Punjabi Candidates from Indian Examinations, 1924-1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Place and Date of Birth</th>
<th>Father's Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Shamsher Singh Dulat</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No information given</td>
<td>No information given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Nasir Ahmad</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Karnal, 14/6/05</td>
<td>Surgeon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aziz Ahmad</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Lahore, 24/6/06</td>
<td>Sub-Divl. Officer, Railway Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tarlochan Das Bedi</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Kaparthala State, 25/12/05</td>
<td>Tahsildar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Muhammad Hadi Hussain</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Gujranwala, 15/1/06</td>
<td>Not given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nazir Ahmed Faruqi</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Gujar Khan, 15/12/06</td>
<td>Asst. Surgeon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.M. Burke</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>I.C. Sheikhpura, 3/7/06</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Niaz Md. Khan Barakzai</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Gurdaspur, 12/6/07</td>
<td>Sub-Inspt. Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khwaja Abdur Rahim</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Amritsar, 1/9/08</td>
<td>Sub-Judge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammad Khurshid</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Rawalpindi, 8/12/07</td>
<td>Not given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Kapar Singh</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Lyallpur, 2/3/09</td>
<td>Agriculturist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Abdulla Khalid Malik</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Govali, 7/7/10</td>
<td>Not given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohindar Singh Randhawa</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Zira, 2/2/09</td>
<td>Tahsildar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Sheikh Nazrul-Bakar</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Gujranwala, 21/12/13</td>
<td>General Merchant and Contractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Muhammad Azim Husain</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Gurdaspur, 5/10/13</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sardar Ata Muhammad Khan</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Lyallpur, 8/1/14</td>
<td>Hon. Army Lieut., (Agriculturist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gyan Singh Kahlon</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Gurdaspur, 13/3/13</td>
<td>Headmaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Sheikh Muhammad Yusuf</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Lahore, 13/11/13</td>
<td>Supt. High Court, Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mirza Muzaffar Ahmad</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Qadian, 23/2/13</td>
<td>Agriculturist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. Ata Muhammad Khan Leghari</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Dera Ghazi Khan, 1913</td>
<td>Agriculturist M.L.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A.S. Wazir</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Jammu Kashmir, 23/2/14</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Syed Ghias-ud-Din Ahmed</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Abbaspur, 1/6/15</td>
<td>Agriculturist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohd. Hussain Sufi</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Gujranwala, 13/2/14</td>
<td>Agriculturist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Sheikh Anwaral Haq</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>N.W.F.P.*, 11/5/17</td>
<td>Stationmaster NWFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muhammad Masud</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Lahore, 25/6/16</td>
<td>Doctor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Qudrat Ullah Shahab</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Gilgit, Kashmir*, 26/2/17</td>
<td>Agriculture and Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from information contained in files L/S&G/7/236-250.IOR.
* As in Appendix P. ** M-Muslim, H-Hindu, S-Sikh, I.C.-Indian Christian
APPENDIX R.

THE MUSLIM LEADERSHIP OF THE PUNJAB IN THE 1919-1947 PERIOD

The families who dominated Muslim politics included the Arain Mians of Baghbanpura (Sir Muhammad Shafi, Mian Muhammad Shah Nawaz, Begum Jahanara Shah Nawaz, Mian Iftikharuddin, Mian Bashir Ahmad), the Mokul family (Sardar Habibullah), and the Qizilbash clan (Nawab Sir Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash) of Lahore District; the Chatras (Riasat Ali) of Gujranwala; the Janjuas of Darapur (Talib Mehdi Khan, Khair Mehdi Khan, Lahrasab Khan), the Pirs of Jalalpur (Nawab Sir Mehr Shah) and Khokars (Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan) of Jhelum; the Pirs of Makhad, the Kot Ghebas (Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan), the Hyats of Wah (Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, Nawab Muzaffar Khan, Sardar Shaukat Hyat Khan), and the Shamasabad Awans (Nawab Muhammad Amin Khan) of Attock; the Noon-Tiwana family group (Sir Muhammad Hayat Khan Noon, Sir Muhammad Firoz Khan Noon, Malik Sardar Khan Noon, Sir Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Sir Allah Bakhsh Khan, Nawabzada Malik Muhammad Habibullah Khan), the Qureshis (Nawab Muhammad Hayat, Mian Saeed, Mian Zakir), Pirachas (Sheikh Fazle Haq, Sheikh Fazal Ilahi) and the Pirs of Jahanian Shah (Syed Ghulam Muhammad) of Shahpur; the Wanbachran (Malik Muzaffar Khan) and the Kalabagh (Malik Amir Muhammad Khan) families of Mianwali; the Pirs of Rajoa (Syed Ghulam Abbas) and of Shah Jiwana (Syed Mubarak Ali, Syed Abid Husain) and Siats of Jhang (S.Muhammad Amin); the Daultanas (Nawab Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, Mian Allah Yar Khan, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana), the Gilanis (Mustafa Shah and Muhammad Hussain), Dehas (Khan Haibat Khan), Qureshis (Murid Hussain, Ashiq Hussain), Gardezis (Syed Ali Husain Shah) and Khaggas (Pir Budhan Shah) of Multan; the Gurmanis (Mushtaq Ahmad, Muhammad Ghulam Jilani Gurmani) and Dastis (Abdul Hamid Khan) of Muzaffargarh; the Legharis (Sir Jamal Khan), Drishaks (Allah Khan, Bahadur Khan), Mazaris (Balakh Sher, Sher Baz) and the Pirs of Taunsa Sharif of Dera Ghazi Khan and the Mamdots (Nawab Shawaz Khan, Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Khan) of Ferozepore.

The names underlined signify membership of the Punjab Legislative Assembly in the 1937-47 period.

## APPENDIX S.

THE PUNJAB ELECTORATE (1946)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Category</th>
<th>Number (1946)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>27,955,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Male Population (+ 20)</td>
<td>7,642,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Voters</td>
<td>3,514,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total Population</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate Percentage of Total Adult Male Population (+ 20) Enfranchised</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Category</th>
<th>Number (1946)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Muslim Population</td>
<td>15,913,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Adult Male Muslim Population (+ 20)</td>
<td>4,260,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Muslims Enfranchised</td>
<td>1,619,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Muslim Population</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate Percentage of Adult Muslim Male Population (+ 20) Enfranchised</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Category</th>
<th>Number (1946)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Hindu Population</td>
<td>7,414,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Adult Male Hindu Population (+ 20)</td>
<td>2,114,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Hindus Enfranchised</td>
<td>848,744</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage of Hindu Population</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate Percentage of Adult Hindu Male Population (+ 20) Enfranchised</td>
<td>40%</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Category</th>
<th>Number (1946)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Sikh Population</td>
<td>3,770,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Adult Male Sikh Population (+ 20)</td>
<td>1,040,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Sikhs Enfranchised</td>
<td>659,396</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage of Sikh Population</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate Percentage of Adult Sikh Male Population (+ 20) Enfranchised</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**SOURCE:** Census of India, 1941, Punjab, Table XI, p.68; Times of India, 13 March, 1946.

The above population figures provide an approximation rather than an absolute truth. The 1941 Census of India was conducted in difficult wartime conditions, as a result of which the standard of accuracy declined.
APPENDIX T.

THE PATTERN OF VOTING IN THE MUSLIM CONSTITUENCIES

Details of abbreviations used given at end of Appendix, p. 403.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.of Voters</th>
<th>Votes Polled</th>
<th>Parties' share of votes cast</th>
<th>Percentage of total electorate who voted for successful Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
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RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>No. of Voters</th>
<th>Votes Polled</th>
<th>ML.</th>
<th>U.</th>
<th>I.</th>
<th>Inv.</th>
<th>Percentage of total electorate who voted for successful Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hissar</td>
<td>19,870</td>
<td>10,218</td>
<td>7,840</td>
<td>2,375</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rohtak</td>
<td>10,983</td>
<td>6,157</td>
<td>5,150</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W. Gurgaon</td>
<td>15,018</td>
<td>9,794</td>
<td>4,193</td>
<td>3,022</td>
<td>2,579</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.E. Gurgaon</td>
<td>12,775</td>
<td>8,347</td>
<td>3,821</td>
<td>1,763</td>
<td>2,763</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karnal</td>
<td>19,068</td>
<td>11,461</td>
<td>10,072</td>
<td>1,189</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambala and Simla</td>
<td>19,324</td>
<td>11,952</td>
<td>10,141</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangra and E. Hoshiarpur</td>
<td>16,549</td>
<td>11,729</td>
<td>7,803</td>
<td>3,895</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hoshiarpur West</td>
<td>19,669</td>
<td>12,503</td>
<td>5,815</td>
<td>4,077</td>
<td>2,611</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jullundur North</td>
<td>23,986</td>
<td>15,718</td>
<td>11,390</td>
<td>4,296</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jullundur South</td>
<td>24,414</td>
<td>14,583</td>
<td>8,428</td>
<td>3,417</td>
<td>2,738</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
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</table>
### APPENDIX T (continued)

**RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:**

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<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ludhiana</td>
<td>20,360</td>
<td>13,087</td>
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<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(64%)</td>
<td>(56%)</td>
<td>U. 2,707</td>
<td>21%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(74.5%)</td>
<td>O. 1,453</td>
<td>11%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferozepore</td>
<td>17,291</td>
<td>12,880</td>
<td>ML. 7,205</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td></td>
<td>(74.5%)</td>
<td>U. 3,549</td>
<td>28%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O.&amp; Inv.2,126</td>
<td>16%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ferozepore</td>
<td>12,503</td>
<td>7,275</td>
<td>ML. 5,067</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td></td>
<td>(58%)</td>
<td>U. 2,167</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O.&amp; Inv. 41</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fazilka</td>
<td>13,138</td>
<td>8,994</td>
<td>U. 5,549</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(68.5%)</td>
<td>ML. 3,441</td>
<td>38%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Inv. 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>13,594</td>
<td>10,104</td>
<td>U. 5,405</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(74%)</td>
<td>ML. 4,656</td>
<td>46%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O.&amp; Inv. 43</td>
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<td>Chunian</td>
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<td>15,148</td>
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<td>50%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>O.&amp; Inv. 688</td>
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<td>Kasur</td>
<td>14,493</td>
<td>9,389</td>
<td>ML. 6,969</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(68%)</td>
<td>U. 2,118</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O.&amp; Inv. 302</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amritsar</td>
<td>10,407</td>
<td>7,372</td>
<td>ML. 5,151</td>
<td>70%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(71%)</td>
<td>U. 2,209</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I. 12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tarn Taran</td>
<td>8,210</td>
<td>5,779</td>
<td>ML. 3,399</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(70%)</td>
<td>U. 2,217</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O. 163</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajnala</td>
<td>11,300</td>
<td>7,222</td>
<td>ML. 5,326</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(64%)</td>
<td>U. 1,476</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O. 420</td>
<td>6%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gurdaspur</td>
<td>16,590</td>
<td>9,207</td>
<td>ML. 8,609</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td></td>
<td>(55.5%)</td>
<td>U. 5,573</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O.&amp; Inv. 25</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batala</td>
<td>22,730</td>
<td>16,161</td>
<td>I. 6,266</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(71%)</td>
<td>U. 5,651</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O.&amp; Inv.4,244</td>
<td>26%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shakargarh</td>
<td>12,889</td>
<td>9,015</td>
<td>ML. 4,516</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(70%)</td>
<td>U. 3,779</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O.&amp; Inv. 720</td>
<td>8%</td>
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## RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sialkot North</td>
<td>19,793</td>
<td>12,366</td>
<td>ML. 9,080</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(62.5%)</td>
<td>U. 2,874</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O. &amp; Inv. 412</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sialkot Central</td>
<td>17,496</td>
<td>10,958</td>
<td>ML. 6,353</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(63%)</td>
<td>A. 4,514</td>
<td>41%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O. &amp; Inv. 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sialkot South</td>
<td>20,349</td>
<td>13,225</td>
<td>ML. 8,351</td>
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<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(65%)</td>
<td>U. 3,983</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O. &amp; Inv. 891</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gujranwala North</td>
<td>21,906</td>
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<td>ML. 7,872</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>36%</td>
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<td>U. 6,332</td>
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<td>O. &amp; Inv. 216</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gujranwala East</td>
<td>21,562</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(75%)</td>
<td>U. 7,905</td>
<td>49%</td>
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<td>Inv. 82</td>
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<td>U. 3,168</td>
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<td>O. &amp; Inv. 18</td>
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<td>30,875</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(48%)</td>
<td>U. 3,394</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>O. &amp; Inv. 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nankana Sahib</td>
<td>15,125</td>
<td>10,566</td>
<td>ML. 5,576</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(70%)</td>
<td>U. 4,862</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Inv. 128</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shahdara</td>
<td>14,714</td>
<td>10,119</td>
<td>ML. 7,573</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(69%)</td>
<td>U. 2,402</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Inv. 144</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujrat North</td>
<td>19,161</td>
<td>12,512</td>
<td>ML. 8,742</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>(65%)</td>
<td>U. 3,743</td>
<td>30%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Inv. 27</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujrat East</td>
<td>15,665</td>
<td>10,432</td>
<td>ML. 6,876</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(67%)</td>
<td>U. 3,556</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ML. 3,556</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>S.E. Gujrat</td>
<td>22,409</td>
<td>13,154</td>
<td>ML.10,838</td>
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<td>48%</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>(59%)</td>
<td>U. 2,316</td>
<td>18%</td>
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<td>ML. 2,942</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W. Gujrat</td>
<td>18,141</td>
<td>11,191</td>
<td>ML. 8,253</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(62%)</td>
<td>U. 2,942</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O. &amp; Inv. 2,942</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.W. Gujrat</td>
<td>15,235</td>
<td>9,717</td>
<td>ML. 6,794</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(64%)</td>
<td>U. &amp; Inv. 2,923</td>
<td>30%</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX T (continued)

RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:

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<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
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<td>Shahpur</td>
<td>32,282</td>
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<td>14,553</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>45%</td>
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</tr>
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<td>ML.</td>
<td>10,411</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>O.&amp; Inv.</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>57%</td>
<td>40%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>18,870</td>
<td>ML.</td>
<td>8,182</td>
<td>43%</td>
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<td>O.&amp; Inv.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Pind Dadan Khan</td>
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<td>41%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>O.&amp; Inv.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chakawal</td>
<td>18,656</td>
<td>U.</td>
<td>8,444</td>
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<td>45%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,133</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi Sadr</td>
<td>17,822</td>
<td>ML.</td>
<td>5,624</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,480</td>
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<td>3,271</td>
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<tr>
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<td>44%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,387</td>
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<td>883</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>I.&amp; Inv.</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<td>Rawalpindi East</td>
<td>20,931</td>
<td>ML.</td>
<td>10,380</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,397</td>
<td>U.</td>
<td>2,008</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O.&amp; Inv.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attock North</td>
<td>21,820</td>
<td>ML.</td>
<td>7,639</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>35%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14,999</td>
<td>U.</td>
<td>7,238</td>
<td>48%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>O.&amp; Inv.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attock Central</td>
<td>21,094</td>
<td>U.unopposed</td>
<td>75%</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attock South</td>
<td>19,926</td>
<td>U.</td>
<td>8,342</td>
<td>66.5%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,545</td>
<td>ML.</td>
<td>4,203</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mianwali North</td>
<td>19,657</td>
<td>ML.</td>
<td>8,310</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,409</td>
<td>U.</td>
<td>4,099</td>
<td>33%</td>
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</table>
### APPENDIX T (continued)

**RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mianwali South</td>
<td>29,710</td>
<td>19,864</td>
<td>U. 10,049</td>
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<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(67%)</td>
<td>(67%)</td>
<td>ML &amp; Inv. 9,815</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>28,851</td>
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<td>51%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(61.5%)</td>
<td>U. 2,888</td>
<td>16%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I. &amp; Inv. 104</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<td>Okara</td>
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<td>15,164</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>U. 1,840</td>
<td>12%</td>
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<td>10,180</td>
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<td>43%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(63%)</td>
<td>U. 3,190</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>O. &amp; Inv. 108</td>
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<tr>
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<td>40%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(63.5%)</td>
<td>U. 4,867</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<td>Inv. 2</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Lyallpur</td>
<td>23,812</td>
<td>14,701</td>
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<td>(62%)</td>
<td>U. 4,256</td>
<td>29%</td>
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<td>O. &amp; Inv. 33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samundri</td>
<td>24,387</td>
<td>16,203</td>
<td>ML. 10,233</td>
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<td>42%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(66%)</td>
<td>U. 5,906</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<td>O. &amp; Inv. 64</td>
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<td>Toba Tek Singh</td>
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<td>23,570</td>
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<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(62%)</td>
<td>U. 10,294</td>
<td>44%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O. &amp; Inv. 1,784</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jaranwala</td>
<td>17,139</td>
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<td>47%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(72%)</td>
<td>U. 4,203</td>
<td>34%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O. &amp; Inv. 41</td>
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<td>ML. Unopposed</td>
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<tr>
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<td>50%</td>
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<td>(66%)</td>
<td>U. 3,490</td>
<td>24%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>I. &amp; Inv. 35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jhang West</td>
<td>18,502</td>
<td>6,176</td>
<td>ML. 5,571</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(33%)</td>
<td>U. 600</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I. 5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>20,291</td>
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<td>36.5%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(71%)</td>
<td>U. 6,759</td>
<td>47%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O. &amp; Inv. 210</td>
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<td>8,788</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(69%)</td>
<td>U. 3,358</td>
<td>38%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>O. &amp; Inv. 25</td>
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APPENDIX T (continued):

RURAL CONSTITUENCIES:

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<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Population (1)</th>
<th>Votes (2)</th>
<th>ML. (3)</th>
<th>U. (4)</th>
<th>Inv. (5)</th>
</tr>
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<td>Lodhran</td>
<td>18,200</td>
<td>10,606</td>
<td>8,204</td>
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<td>Mailsi</td>
<td>27,826</td>
<td>17,694</td>
<td>13,304</td>
<td>4,315</td>
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<td>Khanewal</td>
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<td>9,827</td>
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<td>Kabirwala</td>
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<td>9,193</td>
<td>4,060</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>Muzaffargarh Sadr</td>
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<td>11,736</td>
<td>6,093</td>
<td>2,983</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>8,729</td>
<td>3,961</td>
<td>3,597</td>
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<td>Muzaffargarh North</td>
<td>18,725</td>
<td>11,644</td>
<td>7,524</td>
<td>3,741</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dera Ghazi Khan North</td>
<td>9,105</td>
<td></td>
<td>ML. Unopposed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dera Ghazi Khan Central</td>
<td>10,236</td>
<td>6,650</td>
<td>3,655</td>
<td>2,986</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dera Ghazi Khan South</td>
<td>14,414</td>
<td>9,431</td>
<td>3,237</td>
<td>3,133</td>
<td>75</td>
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URBAN CONSTITUENCIES:

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<th>Population (1)</th>
<th>Votes (2)</th>
<th>ML. (3)</th>
<th>U. (4)</th>
<th>Inv. (5)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Towns</td>
<td>17,102</td>
<td>8,870</td>
<td>8,627</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>South Eastern Towns</td>
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<td>15,405</td>
<td>12,072</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<td>Inner Lahore</td>
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<td>11,349</td>
<td>9,802</td>
<td>1,422</td>
<td>125</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX T (continued)

URAL CONSTITUENCIES:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Muslim League</th>
<th>Socialist League</th>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Others</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Outer Lahore</td>
<td>39,650</td>
<td>13,414</td>
<td>13,053</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>33%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(34%)</td>
<td>I.&amp; Inv. 361</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amritsar City</td>
<td>28,130</td>
<td>17,241</td>
<td>11,172</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(61%)</td>
<td>A.&amp; Inv. 6,069</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.E. Towns</td>
<td>29,948</td>
<td>24,116</td>
<td>14,813</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(80.5%)</td>
<td>A. 9,077</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O.&amp; Inv. 226</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi Div.</td>
<td>30,424</td>
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<td>14,728</td>
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<td>48%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Towns</td>
<td>(56%)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
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<td>O.&amp; Inv. 60</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Multan Div. Towns</td>
<td>30,402</td>
<td>17,024</td>
<td>12,905</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(56%)</td>
<td>A. 4,112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O. 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations:
- ML. - Muslim League
- U. - Unionist
- C. - Congress
- A. - Ahrar
- I. - Independent
- O. - Others
- Inv. - Invalid

SOURCE: Times of India, 13 March, 1946
APPENDIX U.

The Incidence of Official Interference in Muslim Constituencies in the Punjab During the 1946 Election

Out of a total of 56 Muslim constituencies which were examined, official interference was reported in 39 of them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituencies Surveyed</th>
<th>Party Illegally Employing Government Officials</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Dera Ghazi Khan North</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chakwal</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipalpur</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mianwali North</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muzaffargarh North</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhang West</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attock South</td>
<td>Unionist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kabirwala</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheikhupura</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shakargarh</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gurgaon</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W. Gurgaon</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.E. Towns</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rohtak</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarn Taran</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dera Ghazi Khan South</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujranwala North</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jullundur North</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sialkot Central</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alipur</td>
<td>Unionist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ludhiana</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi East</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sargodha</td>
<td>Unionist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fazilka</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hissar</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Towns</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batala</td>
<td>Independent Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahpur</td>
<td>Unionist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyallpur</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Appendix U continued

Constituencies Surveyed

Gujrat North
Hafizabad
Gujranwala East
Rawalpindi Division Towns
Mianwali South
Khushab
Toba Tek Singh

Party Illegally Employing Government Officials

Muslim League
" "
" "
" "
Unionist Party
" 
Muslim League

No cases of official interference were reported in East Jhang, S.E. Gujrat, N.W. Gujrat, Pakpattan, Ferozepore Central, Muzaffargarh Sadr, Outer Lahore, S.W. Gujrat, Hoshiarpur West, Khanewal, Pind Dadan Khan, Nankana Sahib, Attock North, Bhalwal, Samundri, Jhang Central and Sialkot South.

APPENDIX V.

The Incidence of Bribery in Muslim Constituencies in the Punjab During the 1946 Elections

Out of a total of 56 Muslim constituencies which were examined (see Appendix U) bribery was alleged to have occurred in 24 of them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituencies</th>
<th>Name of Candidate on whose behalf Bribes were offered</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Jhan</td>
<td>M. Ghulam Muhammad</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chakwal</td>
<td>Raja Mohd. Sarfraz Ali Khan</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipalpur</td>
<td>Syed Ahsaq Hussain</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>Major Ashiq Hussain</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabirwala</td>
<td>Nau Bahar Shah</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheikhupura</td>
<td>Mohammad Hussain</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muzaffargah Sadr</td>
<td>K.S. Abdul Hamid Khan</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.E. Gurgaon</td>
<td>Mihtab Khan</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W. Gurgaon</td>
<td>M. Ahmad Jan</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>M. Khan of Kot</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanewal</td>
<td>Pir Buddan Shah Khagga</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firozabad Khan</td>
<td>Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujranwala North</td>
<td>Chaudhr Sahib Bad Khan</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jullundur North</td>
<td>Mohammad Abus Salam</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sialkot Central</td>
<td>Safras Khan</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ludhiana</td>
<td>Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed Khan</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hisar</td>
<td>K.S. Chaudhry Sahib Bad Khan</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhalwal</td>
<td>Sheikh Fazal Huq</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samundri</td>
<td>Mohammad Khan</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahpur</td>
<td>Sultan Ali Mian</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujranwala East</td>
<td>Zafrulla Khan</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mianwali South</td>
<td>Mohd. Abdullah Khan</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khushab</td>
<td>Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX W.

Incidence of Coercion and Intimidation Which Occurred in Muslim Constituencies in the Punjab During the 1946 Election

Out of 56 Muslim constituencies surveyed (for full list of constituencies see Appendix U), the irregularities referred to above occurred in the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mianwali North</td>
<td>Khan Abdul Sattar Khan</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attock South</td>
<td>M.Mohi-ud-Din Lal Badshah Mukhad</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>Major Ashiq Hussain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farozepore Central</td>
<td>Nawab of Mamdot</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.W. Gujrat</td>
<td>Ghulam Rasul</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.E. Towns</td>
<td>K.B.Karamat Ali</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferozepore Central</td>
<td>Raja Ghazanfar Ali</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dera Ghazi Khan South</td>
<td>Sardar Bahadar Khan</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nankana Sahib</td>
<td>Shahadat Khan</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sargodha</td>
<td>Sir Malik Allah Bux Khan Tiwana</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fazilka</td>
<td>M. Bagh Ali</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hisaar</td>
<td>K.S.Chaudhry Sahib Dad Khan</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahpur</td>
<td>Sultan Ali Mian</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujrat North</td>
<td>Fazal Ilahi</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujranwala East</td>
<td>Zafrulla Khan</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mianwali South</td>
<td>Mohd. Abdullah Khan.</td>
<td>Unionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khushab</td>
<td>Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toba Tek Singh</td>
<td>Mian Nur Ullah</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX X.

Pirs and Religious Leaders Who Supported the Muslim League -
Listed According to the Constituencies they Visited, or in
which Fatwas were issued in their names

S.E. Gujrat
Maulvi Mohd. Abdullah Sulemani of Kurjab, Qazi of the Ilaqa. Haji Syed
Pir Yaqub Shah of Majra (Gujrat Tahsil). Pir Nawazish Hussain (Gujrat
Tahsil). Hiaz Hussain of Jehran Wali (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Said Karim
Shah (son of Murtza Shah of Hugho Wal, Gujrat Tahsil). Hafiz Fazal
Hussain of Rajeki. Maulvi Mohd. Alam (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Mahmud Shah
(son of Wilayat Shah, President of the Sunni Conference, Gujrat). Syed
Malang Shah of Suq Kalan (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Fazal Shah of Khepra
Wala (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Gul Hussain Shah of Majoki (Gujrat Tahsil).
Syed Nur Shah of Majoki (Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Akhar Shah of Bhidana
(Gujrat Tahsil). Syed Shekoor Shah of Bukan (Gujrat Tahsil). The Pirs
The Khalifa of Qadian (Ahmadia Spiritual Head). Pir Jamat Ali Shah of
Alipur (Sialkot District).

Mianwali North
Pir Jamat Ali Shah of Alipur. Also local Pirs who were not named
confronted electors at the polling stations.

Muzaffargarh North

Jhang West
Sultan. Mian Ghulam Jilani. Faqir Ghulam Yasin. The Sajjada Nashins
of Hauu Bale, Sultan Bahu of Shorkot. Maulana Fazal Shah, Qureshi
Ram. Maulana Azan Husain.

Sheikhupura
Ali Husain Shah, Sassad Nashin of Khangah Dogran.

N.W. Gujrat
Din (President of the Jama Masjid Committee). Pir Sayet Arif Hussain of
Ali Shah. Syed Fazl Shah. Malik Sufi Mohd. Din (Municipal Commissioner,
Allam Shah (Phalia Tahsil). Maulvi Ghulam Mohd. (Imam of Jama Masjid,

Shakargarh

(continued)
Appendix X continued:

**Ferozepore Central**


**Muzaffargarh Sadr.**


**S.W. Gujrat**


**S.E. Gurgaon**


**N.W. Gurgaon**


**Khanewal**


**N.E. Towns**


**Rohtak**


**Pind Dadan Khan**


**Gujranwala North**

Appendix X continued

Gujranwala North (continued)


Nankana Sahib


Jullundur North


Sialkot Central


Attock North


Ludhiana

Pir Jamat Ali Shah.

Hisar


Southern Towns


Bhalwal

Maulvi Muhammad Harif (Kot Momin). Maulvi Habibur Rehman of Bhalwal.

Batala


Samundri

Syed Iqbal Hussain.

Jhang Central


Lyallpur


(continued)
Appendix X continued

**Lyallpur (continued)**


**Gujrat North**


**Sialkot South**


**Hafizabad**


**Gujranwala East**


(continued)
Appendix X continued.

Rawalpindi Division Towns


Toba Tek Singh


Dera Ghazi Khan South

Appendix X continued.

Dera Ghazi Khan South (continued)


The style of names, titles, and localities have been reproduced as they appeared in the Punjab Government Gazette, which on occasions has given rise to discrepancies.
## RELIGION

1. On one side Pakistan.

## WORLDLINESS

2. On the other side Kufirstan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Worldliness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad (may the blessings of Allah be on his posterity) and Ali (may God be pleased with him).</td>
<td>Baldev Singh and Khizar Hayat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On one side the question is of organising the people of the Kalima.</td>
<td>On the other side there is idol worship, brotherhood and caste system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On one side the Honour of the green flag.</td>
<td>On the other side there is the Government of the Khiziri Ministry.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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